Electric Power Generation, Transmission, and Distribution; Electrical Protective Equipment, 20315-20743 [2013-29579]

Agencies

• DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
• Occupational Safety and Health Administration

[Federal Register Volume 79, Number 70 (Friday, April 11, 2014)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 20315-20743]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2013-29579]



[[Page 20315]]

Vol. 79

Friday,

No. 70

April 11, 2014

Part II





Department of Labor





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Occupational Safety and Health Administration





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29 CFR Parts 1910 and 1926





 Electric Power Generation, Transmission, and Distribution; Electrical 
Protective Equipment; Final Rule

Federal Register / Vol. 79 , No. 70 / Friday, April 11, 2014 / Rules 
and Regulations

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DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

Occupational Safety and Health Administration

29 CFR Parts 1910 and 1926

[Docket No. OSHA-S215-2006-0063]
RIN 1218-AB67


Electric Power Generation, Transmission, and Distribution; 
Electrical Protective Equipment

AGENCY: Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), Labor.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: OSHA last issued rules for the construction of transmission 
and distribution installations in 1972. Those provisions are now out of 
date and inconsistent with the more recently promulgated general 
industry standard covering the operation and maintenance of electric 
power generation, transmission, and distribution lines and equipment. 
OSHA is revising the construction standard to make it more consistent 
with the general industry standard and is making some revisions to both 
the construction and general industry requirements. The final rules for 
general industry and construction include new or revised provisions on 
host employers and contractors, training, job briefings, fall 
protection, insulation and working position of employees working on or 
near live parts, minimum approach distances, protection from electric 
arcs, deenergizing transmission and distribution lines and equipment, 
protective grounding, operating mechanical equipment near overhead 
power lines, and working in manholes and vaults. The revised standards 
will ensure that employers, when appropriate, must meet consistent 
requirements for work performed under the construction and general 
industry standards.
    The final rule also revises the general industry and construction 
standards for electrical protective equipment. The existing 
construction standard for the design of electrical protective 
equipment, which applies only to electric power transmission and 
distribution work, adopts several national consensus standards by 
reference. The new standard for electrical protective equipment, which 
matches the corresponding general industry standard, applies to all 
construction work and replaces the incorporation of out-of-date 
consensus standards with a set of performance-oriented requirements 
that is consistent with the latest revisions of the relevant consensus 
standards. The final construction rule also includes new requirements 
for the safe use and care of electrical protective equipment to 
complement the equipment design provisions. Both the general industry 
and construction standards for electrical protective equipment will 
include new requirements for equipment made of materials other than 
rubber.
    OSHA is also revising the general industry standard for foot 
protection. This standard applies to employers performing work on 
electric power generation, transmission, and distribution 
installations, as well as employers in other industries. The final rule 
removes the requirement for employees to wear protective footwear as 
protection against electric shock.

DATES: The final rule becomes effective on July 10, 2014. (Certain 
provisions have compliance deadlines after this date as explained later 
in this preamble.)

ADDRESSES: In accordance with 28 U.S.C. 2112(a), the Agency designates 
the Associate Solicitor of Labor for Occupational Safety and Health, 
Office of the Solicitor of Labor, Room S4004, U.S. Department of Labor, 
200 Constitution Avenue NW., Washington, DC 20210, to receive petitions 
for review of the final rule.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
    General information and press inquiries: Mr. Frank Meilinger, 
Office of Communications, Room N3647, OSHA, U.S. Department of Labor, 
200 Constitution Avenue NW., Washington, DC 20210; telephone (202) 693-
1999.
    Technical information: Mr. David Wallis, Directorate of Standards 
and Guidance, Room N3718, OSHA, U.S. Department of Labor, 200 
Constitution Avenue NW., Washington, DC 20210; telephone (202) 693-1950 
or fax (202) 693-1678.
    For additional copies of this Federal Register document, contact 
OSHA, Office of Publications, U.S. Department of Labor, Room N3101, 200 
Constitution Avenue NW., Washington, DC 20210; telephone (202) 693-
1888. Electronic copies of this Federal Register document are available 
at https://www.regulations.gov. Electronic copies of this Federal 
Register document, as well as news releases and other relevant 
documents, are available at OSHA's Web page at https://www.osha.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Table of Contents

    I. Executive Summary
    A. Introduction
    B. Need for Regulation
    C. Affected Establishments
    D. Benefits, Net Benefits, and Cost Effectiveness
    E. Cost Effectiveness
    F. Compliance Costs
    G. Economic Impacts
    H. Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
II. Background
    A. Acronyms and Abbreviations
    B. Need for the Rule
    C. Accident Data
    D. Significant Risk and Reduction in Risk
III. Development of the Final Rule
    A. History of the OSHA Standards
    B. Relevant Consensus Standards
    C. Advisory Committee on Construction Safety and Health
IV. Legal Authority
V. Summary and Explanation of the Final Rule
    A. Section 1926.97, Electrical Protective Equipment
    B. Subpart V, Electric Power Transmission and Distribution
    C. Part 1910, Revisions
    D. Part 1926, Removal of Incorporations by Reference
    E. Part 1926, Subpart CC Revisions
VI. Final Economic Analysis and Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
    A. Introduction
    B. Need for the Rule
    C. Examination of Alternative Regulatory Approaches
    D. Profile of Affected Industries
    E. Benefits, Net Benefits, and Cost Effectiveness
    F. Technological Feasibility
    G. Costs of Compliance
    H. Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
    I. References
VII. Federalism
VIII. Unfunded Mandates
IX. Consultation and Coordination With Indian Tribal Governments
X. Office of Management and Budget Review Under the Paperwork 
Reduction Act of 1995
    A. Information Collection Request for the Proposed Rule
    B. Information Collection Requirements in the Final Rule
XI. State-Plan Requirements
XII. Dates
    A. The New Requirements for Transferring Information Between 
Host Employers and Contract Employers (Sec. Sec.  1926.950(c) and 
1910.269(a)(3))
    B. Revised Provisions on the Use of Fall Protection Systems 
(Sec. Sec.  1926.954(b)(3)(iii) and (b)(3)(iv) and 
1910.269(g)(2)(iv)(C), and (g)(2)(iv)(D))
    C. Revised Requirements for Minimum Approach Distances 
(Sec. Sec.  1926.960(c)(1) and 1910.269(l)(3))
    D. New Requirements for Protecting Employees From the Hazards 
Associated with Electric Arcs (Sec. Sec.  1926.960(g) and 
1910.269(l)(8))
XIII. Authority and Signature

Executive Summary

A. Introduction

    OSHA last issued rules for the construction of transmission and

[[Page 20317]]

distribution installations in 1972. Those provisions are now out of 
date and inconsistent with the more recently promulgated general 
industry standard covering the operation and maintenance of electric 
power generation, transmission, and distribution lines and equipment. 
OSHA is revising the construction standard to make it more consistent 
with the general industry standard and is making some revisions to both 
the construction and general industry requirements. The final rules for 
general industry and construction include new or revised provisions on 
host employers and contractors, training, job briefings, fall 
protection, insulation and working position of employees working on or 
near live parts, minimum approach distances, protection from electric 
arcs, deenergizing transmission and distribution lines and equipment, 
protective grounding, operating mechanical equipment near overhead 
power lines, and working in manholes and vaults. The revised standards 
will ensure that employers, when appropriate, must meet consistent 
requirements for work performed under the construction and general 
industry standards.
    The new provisions on host employers and contractors include 
requirements for host employers and contract employers to exchange 
information on hazards and on the conditions, characteristics, design, 
and operation of the host employer's installation. These new provisions 
also include a requirement for host employers and contract employers to 
coordinate their work rules and procedures to protect all employees. 
The revised provisions on training add requirements for the degree of 
training to be determined by the risk to the employee for the hazard 
involved and for training line-clearance tree trimmers and remove the 
existing requirement for the employer to certify training. The revised 
requirements for job briefings include a new requirement for the 
employer to provide information about existing characteristics and 
conditions to the employee in charge. The revised fall protection 
provisions include new requirements for the use of fall restraint 
systems or personal fall arrest systems in aerial lifts and for the use 
of fall protection equipment by qualified employees climbing or 
changing location on poles, towers, or similar structures. The revised 
provisions on insulation and working position of employees working on 
or near live parts include new requirements relating to where an 
employee who is not using electrical protective equipment may work. The 
revised provisions on minimum approach distances include a new 
requirement for the employer to determine maximum anticipated per-unit 
transient overvoltages through an engineering analysis or, as an 
alternative, assume certain maximum anticipated per-unit transient 
overvoltages. These provisions also replace requirements for specified 
minimum approach distances with requirements for the employer to 
establish minimum approach distances using specified formulas. The new 
provisions for protection from electric arcs include new requirements 
for the employer to: Assess the workplace to identify employees exposed 
to hazards from flames or from electric arcs, make reasonable estimates 
of the incident heat energy to which the employee would be exposed, 
ensure that the outer layer of clothing worn by employees is flame 
resistant under certain conditions, and generally ensure that employees 
exposed to hazards from electric arcs wear protective clothing and 
other protective equipment with an arc rating greater than or equal to 
the estimated heat energy. The revised provisions on deenergizing 
transmission and distribution lines and equipment clarify the 
application of those provisions to multiple crews and to deenergizing 
network protectors. The revised requirements for protective grounding 
now permit employers to install and remove protective grounds on lines 
and equipment operating at 600 volts or less without using a live-line 
tool under certain conditions. The revised provisions for operating 
mechanical equipment near overhead power lines clarify that the 
exemption from the requirement to maintain minimum approach distances 
applies only to the insulated portions of aerial lifts. The revised 
provisions on working in manholes and vaults clarify that all of the 
provisions for working in manholes also apply to working in vaults and 
include a new requirement for protecting employees from electrical 
faults when work could cause a fault in a cable.
    The final rule also revises the general industry and construction 
standards for electrical protective equipment. The existing 
construction standard for the design of electrical protective 
equipment, which applies only to electric power transmission and 
distribution work, adopts several national consensus standards by 
reference. The new standard for electrical protective equipment applies 
to all construction work and replaces the incorporation of out-of-date 
consensus standards with a set of performance-oriented requirements 
that is consistent with the latest revisions of the relevant consensus 
standards. The final construction rule also includes new requirements 
for the safe use and care of electrical protective equipment to 
complement the equipment design provisions. Both the general industry 
and construction standards for electrical protective equipment will 
include new requirements for equipment made of materials other than 
rubber.
    OSHA is also revising the general industry standard for foot 
protection. This standard applies to employers performing work on 
electric power generation, transmission, and distribution 
installations, as well as employers in other industries. The final rule 
removes the requirement for employees to wear protective footwear as 
protection against electric shock.

B. Need for Regulation

    Employees doing work covered by the final rule are exposed to a 
variety of significant hazards that can and do cause serious injury and 
death. As explained fully in Section II.B, Need for the Rule, later in 
this preamble, after carefully weighing the various potential 
advantages and disadvantages of using a regulatory approach to reduce 
risk, OSHA concludes that in this case mandatory standards represent 
the best choice for reducing the risks to employees. In addition, 
rulemaking is necessary in this case to replace older existing 
standards with updated, clear, and consistent safety standards. 
Inconsistencies between the construction and general industry standards 
can create difficulties for employers attempting to develop appropriate 
work practices for their employees. For example, an employer replacing 
a switch on a transmission and distribution system is performing 
construction work if it is upgrading the cutout, but general industry 
work if it is simply replacing the cutout with the same model. Under 
the existing standards, different requirements apply depending upon 
whether the work is construction or general industry work. Under the 
final rule, the requirements are the same.

C. Affected Establishments

    The final rule affects establishments in a variety of different 
industries involving electric power generation, transmission, and 
distribution. The rule primarily affects firms that construct, operate, 
maintain, or repair electric power generation, transmission, or 
distribution installations. These firms

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include electric utilities, as well as contractors hired by utilities 
and primarily classified in the construction industry. In addition, 
potentially affected firms are found in a variety of manufacturing and 
other industries that own or operate their own electric power 
generation, transmission, or distribution installations as a secondary 
part of their business operations. The rule also affects establishments 
performing line-clearance tree-trimming operations.

D. Benefits, Net Benefits, and Cost Effectiveness

    OSHA expects the final rule to result in an increased degree of 
safety for the affected employees, thereby reducing the numbers of 
accidents, fatalities, and injuries associated with the relevant tasks 
and reducing the severity of certain injuries, such as burns or 
injuries that employees could sustain as a result of an arrested fall, 
that may still occur during the performance of some of the affected 
work procedures.
    An estimated 74 fatalities and 444 serious injuries occur annually 
among employees involved in the electric power generation, 
transmission, and distribution work addressed by the provisions of this 
rulemaking. Based on a review and analysis of the incident reports 
associated with the reported injuries and fatalities, OSHA expects full 
compliance with the final rule to prevent 79.6 percent of the relevant 
injuries and fatalities, compared with 52.9 percent prevented with full 
compliance with the existing standards. Thus, OSHA estimates that the 
final rule will prevent approximately 19.75 additional fatalities and 
118.5 additional serious injuries annually. Applying an average 
monetary value of $62,000 per prevented injury and a value of $8.7 
million per prevented fatality results in estimated monetized benefits 
of $179.2 million annually.
    OSHA estimated the net monetized benefits of the final rule to be 
about $129.7 million annually when costs are annualized at 7 percent 
($179.2 million in benefits minus $49.5 million in costs), and $132.0 
million when costs are annualized at 3 percent ($179.2 million in 
benefits minus $47.1 million in costs). Note that these net benefits 
exclude any unquantified benefits associated with revising existing 
standards to provide updated, clear, and consistent regulatory 
requirements for electric power generation, transmission, and 
distribution work. OSHA believes that the updated standards are easier 
to understand and to apply. Accordingly, the Agency expects the final 
rule to improve safety by facilitating compliance.
    Table 1 summarizes the costs, benefits, net benefits, and cost 
effectiveness of the final rule.

             Table 1--Net Benefits and Cost Effectiveness *
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                                       7 percent           3 percent
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Annualized Costs:
    Calculating Incident Energy   $2.2 million......  $1.8 million.
     and Arc-Hazard Assessment
     (Arc-Hazard Assessment).
    Provision of Arc-Flash        $17.3 million.....  $15.7 million.
     Protective Equipment.
    Fall Protection.............  $0.6 million......  $0.4 million.
    Host-Contractor               $17.8 million.....  $17.8 million.
     Communications.
    Expanded Job Briefings......  $6.7 million......  $6.7 million.
    Additional Training.........  $3.0 million......  $2.7 million.
    Other costs for employees     $0.2 million......  $0.2 million.
     not already covered by Sec.
       1910.269.
    MAD Costs...................  $1.8 million......  $1.8 million.
        Total Annual Costs......  $49.5 million.....  $47.1 million.
Annual Benefits:
    Number of Injuries Prevented  118.5.............  118.5.
    Number of Fatalities          19.75.............  19.75.
     Prevented.
    Monetized Benefits (Assuming  $179.2 million....  $179.2 million.
     $62,000 per injury and $8.7
     million per fatality
     prevented.
    OSHA standards that are       Unquantified......  Unquantified.
     updated and consistent.
        Total Annual Benefits...  118.5 injuries and  118.5 injuries and
                                   19.75 fatalities    19.75 fatalities
                                   prevented.          prevented.
Net Benefits (Benefits minus      $129.7 million....  $132.0 million.
 Costs):.
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* Totals may not equal the sum of the components due to rounding.
Source: Office of Regulatory Analysis, OSHA. Details provided in text.

E. Cost Effectiveness

    OSHA estimates that compliance with the final rule will result in 
the prevention of an one fatality and six injuries per $2.4 million in 
costs (using a 7-percent annualization rate) and one fatality and six 
injuries per $2.2 million in costs (using a 3-percent annualization 
rate).

F. Compliance Costs

    The estimated costs of compliance with this rule represent the 
additional costs necessary for employers to achieve full compliance. 
They do not include costs for employers that are already in compliance 
with the new requirements imposed by the final rule; nor do they 
include costs employers must incur to achieve full compliance with 
existing applicable requirements.
    OSHA based the Preliminary Regulatory Impact Analysis and Initial 
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (PRIA) for the proposed rule, in part, 
on a report prepared by CONSAD Corp. (Exhibit 0080) under contract to 
OSHA. Eastern Research Group, Inc., (ERG) under contract to OSHA, 
assisted in preparing the analysis of the final rule presented here. 
With ERG's assistance, OSHA updated data on establishments, employment, 
wages, and revenues, and updated the analyses in the final rule with 
these new cost inputs. OSHA also calculated costs for provisions of the 
final rule not accounted for in the PRIA. These costs are for the use 
of upgraded fall protection equipment resulting from revised fall 
protection requirements, the provision of arc-rated head and face 
protection for some employees, the training of employees in the use of 
new fall protection equipment, the calculation of minimum approach 
distances, and, in some cases, the use of portable protective gaps 
(PPGs) to comply with the new minimum approach-distance requirements. 
The FEA also modifies the PRIA's approach

[[Page 20319]]

to estimating costs for arc-hazard assessments.
    OSHA estimated the total annualized cost of compliance with the 
present rulemaking to be between about $47.1 million (when costs are 
annualized at 3 percent) and $49.5 million (when costs are annualized 
at 7 percent). The final rule's requirements for employers to provide 
arc-flash protective equipment account for the largest component of the 
total compliance costs, at approximately $15.7 million to $17.2 million 
(when costs are annualized at 3 and 7 percent, respectively). Other 
nonnegligible compliance costs associated with the final rule include 
costs related to host-contractor communications ($17.8 million), job 
briefings ($6.7 million), training ($2.7 million to $3.0 million), 
minimum approach distances ($1.8 million to $1.8 million), fall 
protection ($0.4 million to $0.6 million), compliance with existing 
Sec.  1910.269 for employees not already covered by that standard ($0.2 
million), and arc-hazard assessments ($1.8 million to $2.2 million).

G. Economic Impacts

    To assess the economic impacts associated with compliance with the 
final rule, OSHA developed quantitative estimates of the potential 
economic impact of the requirements in this rule on entities in each 
affected industry. OSHA compared the estimated costs of compliance with 
industry revenues and profits to provide an assessment of potential 
economic impacts.
    The costs of compliance for the final rule are not large in 
relation to the corresponding annual financial flows associated with 
the regulated activities. The estimated costs of compliance (when 
annualized at 7 percent) represent about 0.007 percent of revenues and 
0.06 percent of profits, on average, across all entities; compliance 
costs do not represent more than 0.1 percent of revenues or more than 
about 2 percent of profits in any affected industry.
    The economic impact of the present rulemaking is most likely to 
consist of a small increase in prices for electricity, of about 0.007 
percent on average. It is unlikely that a price increase on the 
magnitude of 0.007 percent will significantly alter the services 
demanded by the public or any other affected customers or 
intermediaries. If employers can substantially recoup the compliance 
costs of the present rulemaking with such a minimal increase in prices, 
there may be little effect on profits.
    In general, for most establishments, it is likely that employers 
can pass some or all of the compliance costs along in the form of 
increased prices. In the event that unusual circumstances may inhibit 
even a price increase of 0.1 percent (the highest estimated cost as a 
percent of revenue in any of the affected industries), profits in any 
of the affected industries would be reduced by a maximum of about 2 
percent.
    OSHA concludes that compliance with the requirements of the final 
rule is economically feasible in every affected industry sector.
    In addition, based on an analysis of the costs and economic impacts 
associated with this rulemaking, OSHA concludes that the effects of the 
final rule on international trade, employment, wages, and economic 
growth for the United States are negligible.

H. Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act, as amended in 1996 by the Small 
Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act, requires the preparation 
of a Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis for certain rules 
promulgated by agencies (5 U.S.C. 601-612). Under the provisions of the 
law, each such analysis must contain: (1) A succinct statement of the 
need for, and objectives of, the rule; (2) A summary of the significant 
issues raised by the public comments in response to the initial 
regulatory flexibility analysis, a summary of the assessment of the 
agency of such issues, and a statement of any changes made in the final 
rule as a result of such comments; (3) a description and an estimate of 
the number of small entities to which the rule will apply or an 
explanation of why no such estimate is available; (4) a description of 
the projected reporting, recordkeeping, and other compliance 
requirements of the rule, including an estimate of the classes of small 
entities that will be subject to the requirement, and the type of 
professional skills necessary for preparation of the report or record; 
and (5) a description of the steps the agency took to minimize the 
significant economic impact on small entities consistent with the 
stated objectives of applicable statutes, including a statement of the 
factual, policy, and legal reasons for selecting the alternative 
adopted in the final rule, and why the agency rejected each one of the 
other significant alternatives to the rule considered by the agency 
which affect the impact on small entities.
    OSHA analyzed the potential impact of the final rule on small and 
very small entities, as described further under the heading ``Final 
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis,'' in Section VI, Final Economic 
Analysis and Regulatory Flexibility Analysis, later in this preamble. 
OSHA concludes that the compliance costs are equivalent to 
approximately 0.086 percent of profits for affected small entities 
generally, and less than approximately 2.9 percent of profits for small 
entities in any particular industry, and approximately 0.39 percent of 
profits for affected very small entities generally, and less than 
approximately 5.61 percent of profits for very small entities in any 
particular industry.

II. Background

A. Acronyms and Abbreviations

    The following acronyms have been used throughout this document:

ACCSH Advisory Committee on Construction Safety and Health
AED automated external defibrillator
AGC Associated General Contractors of America
ALJ administrative law judge
ANSI American National Standards Institute
APPA American Public Power Association
ASTM American Society for Testing and Materials
BLS Bureau of Labor Statistics
BPA Bonneville Power Administration
CFOI Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries
CPL 02-01-038 the compliance directive for existing Sec.  1910.269, 
CPL 02-01-038, ``Enforcement of the Electric Power Generation, 
Transmission, and Distribution Standard'' (June 18, 2003, originally 
CPL 2-1.38D)
CPR cardiopulmonary resuscitation
CRIEPI Central Research Institute of Electric Power Industry
EEI Edison Electric Institute
EIA Energy Information Administration
E.O. Executive Order
EPRI Electric Power Research Institute
ERG Eastern Research Group, Inc.
ESCI Electrical Safety Consultants International
Ex. Exhibit \1\
FCC Federal Communications Commission
FEA Final Economic Analysis and Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
FR flame-resistant \2\

[[Page 20320]]

FRA flame-resistant apparel
FRECC Farmers Rural Electric Cooperative Corporation
FRFA Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
FTE full-time equivalent [employee]
IBEW International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers
IEC International Electrotechnical Commission
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers
IMIS OSHA's Integrated Management Information System
IRFA Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
IRS Internal Revenue Service
ISEA International Safety Equipment Association
MAD minimum approach distance
MAID minimum air-insulation distance
MCC motor control center
MTID minimum tool-insulation distance
NA not applicable
NAHB National Association of Home Builders
NAICS North American Industry Classification System
NAM National Association of Manufacturers
NECA National Electrical Contractors Association
NEPA National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
NESC National Electrical Safety Code
NFPA National Fire Protection Association
NIOSH National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
NRECA National Rural Electric Cooperative Association
OIRA Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
OMB Office of Management and Budget
OSH Act (or the Act) Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970
OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration
OSHRC Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
PPE personal protective equipment
PPG portable protective gap
PRIA Preliminary Regulatory Impact Analysis and Initial Regulatory 
Flexibility Analysis
PSM process safety management
p.u. per unit
RIN regulatory information number
SBA Small Business Administration
SBAR Panel (or Panel) Small Business Advocacy Review Panel
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    \1\ Exhibits are posted on https://www.regulations.gov and are 
accessible at OSHA's Docket Office, Docket No. OSHA-S215-2006-0063, 
U.S. Department of Labor, 200 Constitution Avenue NW., Room N2625, 
Washington, DC 20210; telephone (202) 693-2350. (OSHA's TTY number 
is (877) 889-5627.) OSHA Docket Office hours of operation are 8:15 
a.m. to 4:45 p.m., E.T.
    Throughout this notice exhibit numbers are referred to in the 
form Ex. XXXX, where XXXX is the last four digits of the full 
document number on https://www.regulations.gov. For example, document 
number OSHA-S215-2006-0063-0001 is referred to as Ex. 0001. Exhibit 
numbers referred to as ``269-Ex.'' are from the record for the 1994 
final rule on Sec. Sec.  1910.137 and 1910.269 and are contained in 
Docket Number OSHA-S015-2006-0645.
    \2\ In citations, such as 70 FR 34822, ``FR'' means ``Federal 
Register.''
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SBREFA Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act
SER small entity representative
SIC Standard Industrial Classification
T maximum transient overvoltage, which is defined as the ratio of 
the 2-percent statistical switching overvoltage expected at the 
worksite to the nominal peak line-to-ground voltage of the system
TCIA Tree Care Industry Association
the 1994 Sec.  1910.269 rulemaking the rulemaking in which existing 
Sec. Sec.  1910.137 and Sec.  1910.269 were developed and published 
on January 31, 1994
Tr. Transcript page number or numbers from the March 6-14, 2006, 
public hearing on the proposed rule \3\
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    \3\ Exhibit numbers 0509 through 0515.
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Tr2. Transcript page number or numbers from the October 28, 2009, 
public hearing on the limited reopening of the proposed rule \4\
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    \4\ Exhibit number 0571.
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TVA Tennessee Valley Authority
ULCC Utility Line Clearance Coalition
USDA United States Department of Agriculture
UWUA Utility Workers Union of America
WCRI Worker Compensation Research Institute

    Record citations. References in parentheses are to exhibits or 
transcripts in the rulemaking record. Documents from the Subpart V 
rulemaking record are accessible at the Docket Office under Docket 
OSHA-S215-2006-0063 (originally Docket S-215). (The 2006 transcripts, 
abbreviated as ``Tr.,'' are listed in this docket as ``exhibits'' 0509 
through 0515. The 2009 transcript, abbreviated as ``Tr2.,'' is listed 
as ``exhibit'' 0571.) Because the subpart V proposal was based in large 
part on existing Sec.  1910.269, OSHA has also relied on the record 
developed during the earlier rulemaking for that general industry 
standard (the 1994 Sec.  1910.269 rulemaking). EEI ``incorporate[d] 
into [the subpart V] record the entire record in . . . the record 
underlying existing Section 1910.269'' (Ex. 0227). References in this 
preamble that are prefixed by ``269'' are to exhibits and transcripts 
in the rulemaking record from OSHA's 1994 rulemaking on Sec.  1910.137 
and Sec.  1910.269 (59 FR 4320-4476, Jan. 31, 1994). These documents 
are accessible at the Docket Office under Docket OSHA-S015-2006-0645 
(originally Docket S-015).\5\
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    \5\ Documents in the records, with the exception of copyrighted 
material such as ASTM standards, are also generally available 
electronically at www.regulations.gov. The subpart V and 1994 Sec.  
1910.269 dockets are available at: https://www.regulations.gov/#!docketDetail;dct=FR+PR+N+O+SR+PS;rpp=250;po=0;D=OSHA-S215-2006-
0063 and https://www.regulations.gov/#!docketDetail;dct=FR+PR+N+O+SR+PS;rpp=250;po=0;D=OSHA-S015-2006-
0645, respectively.
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    Some exhibits (see, for example, Exs. 0002, 0003, 0004, and 0400) 
contain records of accidents that are relevant to work covered by the 
final rule. In several instances in this preamble, OSHA has included 
hyperlinks to accident descriptions from those exhibits. Those 
hyperlinks link to one or more accident records in OSHA's IMIS system. 
The hyperlinked pages contain the most recent version of those records, 
which might have been edited since being placed in the record for this 
rulemaking. Consequently, the accident descriptions could differ 
slightly from the description included in the rulemaking record. 
However, the accident record numbers in the hyperlinked page match the 
accident record numbers in the relevant exhibit.

B. Need for the Rule

    Employees performing work involving electric power generation, 
transmission, and distribution are exposed to a variety of hazards, 
including fall, electric shock, and burn hazards, that can and do cause 
serious injury and death. These workers are often exposed to energized 
parts of the power system, and the voltages involved are generally much 
higher than voltages encountered in other types of work. OSHA estimates 
that, on average, 74 fatalities and 444 serious injuries occur annually 
among these workers. (See Section VI, Final Economic Analysis and 
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis, later in the preamble, for a detailed 
discussion of the methodology used to develop these estimates.)
    Although some of these incidents may have been prevented with 
better compliance with existing safety standards, OSHA concludes that 
many, in fact almost half of, fatal and nonfatal injuries among 
employees covered by the final rule would continue to occur even if 
employers were in full compliance with existing standards. Discounting 
incidents that would potentially have been prevented with compliance 
with existing standards, an estimated additional 19.75 fatalities and 
118.5 serious injuries will be prevented each year through full 
compliance with the final rule. (See Section VI, Final Economic 
Analysis and Regulatory Flexibility Analysis, later in the preamble, 
for a detailed discussion of the methodology used to develop these 
estimates.)
    This rulemaking will have the additional benefit of providing 
updated, clear, and consistent safety standards for electric power 
generation, transmission, and distribution work. OSHA currently has 
different standards covering construction and general industry work on 
electric power transmission and distribution systems. In most 
instances, the work practices used by employees are the same whether 
they are performing construction or general industry work. Which 
standard applies to a particular job depends upon whether the employer 
is altering the system (construction work) or maintaining the system 
(general industry work). For example, an employer replacing a cutout 
(disconnect switch) on a transmission and distribution system is 
performing construction work if it is upgrading the cutout, but general 
industry work if it is simply replacing the cutout with the same model. 
Since the work practices used by the employees would most

[[Page 20321]]

likely be identical, the applicable OSHA standards should be as similar 
as possible. Inconsistencies between the construction and general 
industry standards can create difficulties for employers attempting to 
develop appropriate work practices for their employees. Currently, it 
is conceivable that, for work involving two or more cutouts, different 
and conflicting OSHA standards (that is, one for construction work, the 
other for general industry work) might apply. For this reason, 
employers and employees have told OSHA that it should make the two 
standards more consistent with each other. This final rule does so. 
(This issue is addressed in greater detail in the summary and 
explanation for Sec.  1926.950, in Section V, Summary and Explanation 
of the Final Rule, later in this preamble.)
    Moreover, the final rule adds important updates to, and clarifies, 
existing standards. The existing standards for the construction of 
electric power transmission and distribution lines and equipment and 
for electrical protective equipment are contained in subpart V of 
OSHA's construction standards (29 CFR 1926.950 through 1926.960). 
Subpart V was promulgated on November 23, 1972, around 40 years ago (37 
FR 24880, Nov. 23, 1972). Some of the technology involved in electric 
power transmission and distribution work has changed since then, and 
the current standards do not reflect those changes. For example, 
methods for determining minimum approach distances have become more 
exact since 1972, and the minimum approach distances in existing Sec.  
1926.950(c)(1) are not based on the latest methodology. The minimum 
approach distances in the final rule are more protective and more 
technologically sound than the distances specified in the existing 
standard. Even the newer general industry standards on the operation 
and maintenance of electric power generation, transmission, and 
distribution installations (29 CFR 1910.269) and electrical protective 
equipment (29 CFR 1910.137) are not entirely consistent with the latest 
advances in technology.
    Finally, the final rule clarifies certain confusing parts of the 
regulations. See, for example, Wisconsin Elec. Power Co. v. OSHRC, 567 
F.2d 735, 738 (7th Cir. 1977) (``[r]evision of the regulations by any 
competent draftsman would greatly improve their clarity'').

C. Accident Data

    OSHA has looked to several sources for information on accidents in 
the electric utility industry in preparing this final rule. Besides 
OSHA's own accident investigation files (recorded in the Agency's 
Integrated Management Information System (IMIS)), statistics on 
injuries are compiled by the Edison Electric Institute (EEI) and by the 
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW). Additionally, 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) publishes accident data, including 
incidence rates for total cases, lost-workday cases, and lost workdays, 
and the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) 
publishes accident data as part of its Fatality Assessment and Control 
Evaluation Program.
    To develop estimates of the potential benefits associated with the 
standards during the proposal stage, CONSAD Corp., under contract to 
OSHA, researched and reviewed potential sources of useful data. CONSAD, 
in consultation with the Agency, determined that the most reliable data 
sources for this purpose were OSHA's IMIS data and the Census of Fatal 
Occupational Injuries developed by BLS. A majority of the accidents 
reviewed by CONSAD involved electrocutions or shocks. In addition, a 
significant percentage of victims (5.5 percent) suffered from burns to 
their arms, abdomen, or legs from electric arc blasts and flashes, and 
another sizeable group of victims (3.2 percent) died or sustained 
injuries after falling out of vehicle-mounted aerial lifts.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \6\ `` Analytical Support and Data Gathering for a Preliminary 
Economic Analysis for Proposed Standards for Work on Electric Power 
Generation, Transmission, and Distribution Lines and Equipment (29 
CFR 1910.269 and 29 CFR 1926--Subpart V),'' 2005, CONSAD Research 
Corp. (Ex. 0080).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

D. Significant Risk and Reduction in Risk

    Section 3(8) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSH 
Act or the Act) defines an ``occupational safety and health standard'' 
as ``a standard which requires conditions, or the adoption or use of 
one or more practices, means, methods, operations, or processes, 
reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful 
employment and places of employment.'' 29 U.S.C. 652(8). This 
definition has been interpreted to require OSHA to make a threshold 
showing of ``significant risk'' before it can promulgate a safety or 
health standard. See, for example, Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. 
American Petroleum Institute (Benzene), 448 U.S. 607 (1980) (plurality 
opinion); see also, for example, UAW v.  OSHA (Lockout/Tagout II), 37 
F.3d 665 (D.C. Cir. 1994). The Agency's obligation to show significant 
risk is not, however, a ``mathematical straitjacket.'' Benzene, 448 
U.S. at 655. In fact, the Agency has discretion to ``determine, in the 
first instance, what it considers to be a `significant' risk[,]'' and 
it ``is not required to support its finding that a significant risk 
exists with anything approaching scientific certainty.'' Id. at 655-56; 
see also, for example, Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Tyson 
(Ethylene Oxide), 796 F.2d 1479, 1486 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
    Although OSHA makes significant risk findings for both health and 
safety standards, see Lockout/Tagout II, 37 F.3d 665, the methodology 
used to evaluate risk in safety rulemakings is more straightforward. 
Unlike the risks related to health hazards, which ``may not be evident 
until a worker has been exposed for long periods of time to particular 
substances,'' the risks associated with safety hazards such as burns 
and falls, ``are generally immediate and obvious.'' Benzene, 448 U.S. 
at 649, n.54. See also 59 FR 28594, 28599 (June 2, 1994) (proposed rule 
for longshoring and marine terminals, explaining that health hazards 
``are frequently undetectable because they are subtle or develop slowly 
or after long latency periods,'' whereas safety hazards ``cause 
immediately noticeable physical harm''). As OSHA explained in its 
lockout-tagout rulemaking:

    For health standards, such as benzene, risk estimates are 
commonly based upon mathematical models (e.g., dose response curves) 
and the benefits are quantified by estimating the number of future 
fatalities that would be prevented under various exposure 
reductions. [In contrast, f]or safety standards risk is based upon 
the assumption that past accident patterns are representative of 
future ones. OSHA estimates benefits [for safety standards] by 
determining the percentage of accidents that will be prevented by 
compliance with the standard. . . . [58 FR 16612, 16623, Mar. 30, 
1993]

    OSHA's Final Economic and Regulatory Flexibility Analysis presents 
the Agency's assessment of the risks and benefits of this final rule. 
(See Section VI, Final Economic Analysis and Regulatory Flexibility 
Analysis, later in the preamble.) In these analyses, as previously 
mentioned, OSHA estimates that there are 74 fatalities and 444 serious 
injuries among employees covered by this final rule each year. The 
Agency has determined that almost half of those injuries and fatalities 
would have occurred even if employers were in full compliance with 
existing standards. (See Section VI, Final Economic Analysis and 
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis, later in the preamble, in

[[Page 20322]]

which OSHA estimates that 53 percent of injuries and fatalities could 
have been prevented through full compliance with existing standards.) 
The accident data reviewed during this rulemaking, as explained in 
detail in the economic and regulatory analyses, reveals that the 
injuries and fatalities suffered by workers in power generation, 
transmission, and distribution result from electric shocks, burns from 
electric arcs, and falls, as well as other types of harmful incidents, 
including ones in which employees are struck by, struck against, or 
caught between, objects. Based on the large number of injuries and 
fatalities occurring in this industry each year, and the fact that 
existing standards are inadequate to prevent almost half of those 
incidents, OSHA has determined that employees working on electric power 
generation, transmission, and distribution installations are currently 
exposed to a significant risk of injury or death.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \7\ In industries in which worker exposure is less frequent than 
in other industries, the number of injuries or fatalities associated 
with the hazards covered by the final rule will most likely be less 
than that of industries that have a higher rate of exposure. But 
even for industries with low, negligible, or even no reported 
injuries or fatalities, the workers exposed to the hazards covered 
by the final rule face a ``significant risk of material harm.'' As 
such, there is a significant risk to any worker of any industry 
exposed to the hazards covered by the final rule. See, for example, 
Lockout/Tagout II, 37 F.3d at 670 (``even in industries with low or 
negligible overall accident rates, the workers who engage in the 
operations covered by the standard face a `significant risk of 
material harm'''); Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc. v. 
Brock, 862 F.2d 63, 67-68 (3d Cir. 1988) (where the Court ordered 
OSHA to expand its rule to cover additional industries, there was no 
need to make separate significant risk findings for those industries 
because ``the significant risk requirement must of necessity be 
satisfied by a general finding concerning all potentially covered 
industries'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Agency estimates that the changes implemented in this final 
rule will prevent 19.75 fatalities and 118.5 serious injuries each 
year. (See Section VI, Final Economic Analysis and Regulatory 
Flexibility Analysis, later in the preamble.) OSHA, therefore, 
concludes that this final standard substantially reduces the 
significant risk that currently exists at power generation, 
transmission, and distribution worksites. As noted in Section VI, Final 
Economic Analysis and Regulatory Flexibility Analysis, later in the 
preamble, the various new provisions and amendments being adopted 
target the hazards the Agency has identified as contributors to the 
significant risk associated with electric power generation, 
transmission, and distribution work. Therefore, each element of this 
final rule is reasonably necessary and appropriate to achieve the 
anticipated reduction in overall risk.
    No rulemaking participants meaningfully disputed OSHA's conclusion 
that the aforementioned estimates establish a significant risk for 
power generation, transmission, and distribution work. EEI, however, 
argued that OSHA has an obligation to make an independent significant 
risk showing for each of the hazards addressed by this rulemaking (See, 
for example, Exs. 0227, 0501; see also Ex. 0237 (comments of the 
American Forest & Paper Association).) OSHA does not agree that it is 
required to make multiple, hazard-specific significant risk findings.
    As OSHA has explained in prior rulemakings, ``[v]ertical standards 
[such as Sec.  1910.269 and subpart V of part 1926] apply specifically 
to a given industry'' or type of work (59 FR 28596 (proposed rule for 
longshoring and marine terminals)). They generally address multiple 
hazards faced by employees performing the covered work. See, for 
example, 66 FR 5196 (Jan. 18, 2001) (steel erection standards address, 
among other hazards, risks from working under loads, dangers associated 
with landing and placing decking, and falls to lower levels); 62 FR 
40142 (July 25, 1997) (standards covering longshoring and marine 
terminals address multiple hazards, including hazards associated with 
manual cargo handling and exposure to hazardous atmospheres); 52 FR 
49592 (Dec. 31, 1987) (standard covering grain-handling facilities 
includes provisions related to fire and explosion hazards, as well as 
other safety hazards, such as the danger associated with entering bins, 
silos, and tanks). OSHA believes that vertical ``standards can 
encourage voluntary compliance because they are directed to the 
particular problems of [an] industry'' (59 FR 28596). The adoption of 
vertical standards is recognized as a legitimate exercise of OSHA's 
standard-setting authority under the OSH Act. See Forging Indus. Ass'n 
v. Secretary of Labor (Noise), 773 F.2d 1436, 1455 (4th Cir. 1985) 
(``[T]he Agency has determined that a particular industry should be 
made the subject of a vertical standard. . . . That decision was not 
arbitrary or capricious . . . . Nor does the use of a comprehensive 
vertical standard amount to a prohibited special treatment'').
    Although the Agency can identify the general types of hazards 
addressed by its vertical standards, and has done so in this 
rulemaking, there is no legal requirement for hazard-by-hazard 
significant risk findings in vertical standards. First, the DC Circuit 
Court of Appeals has already rejected the argument ``that Benzene 
requires that the agency find that each and every aspect of its 
standard eliminates a significant risk faced by employees.'' Ethylene 
Oxide, 796 F.2d at 1502, n. 16. Once OSHA makes a general finding of 
significant risk, the question becomes whether the requirements of the 
standard are reasonably related to the standard's purpose. See, for 
example, Noise, 773 F.2d at 1447. Second, when the Supreme Court first 
construed the OSH Act as imposing a significant risk requirement, it 
spoke in terms of the Agency making findings about unsafe workplaces, 
not individual hazards. Benzene, 448 U.S. at 642 (``before promulgating 
any standard, the Secretary must make a finding that the workplaces in 
question are not safe [and] a workplace can hardly be considered 
`unsafe' unless it threatens the workers with a significant risk of 
harm''). See also, for example, id. (framing the ``significant risk'' 
requirement as obligating OSHA ``to make a threshold finding that a 
place of employment is unsafe--in the sense that significant risks are 
present and can be eliminated or lessened by a change in practices''); 
Texas Indep. Ginners Ass'n v. Marshall, 630 F.2d 398, 400 (5th Cir. 
1980) (``[t]he Supreme Court recently ruled that the Act requires OSHA 
to provide substantial evidence that a significant risk of harm arises 
from a workplace or employment''). Third, courts have held that the OSH 
Act does not require the disaggregation of significant risk analyses 
along other lines. See, for example, Lockout/Tagout II, 37 F.3d at 670 
(upholding OSHA's decision not to conduct individual significant risk 
analyses for various affected industries); American Dental Ass'n v. 
Martin, 984 F.2d 823, 827 (7th Cir. 1993) (OSHA is not required to 
evaluate risk ``workplace by workplace''); Associated Builders and 
Contractors, 862 F.2d at 68 (``the significant risk requirement must of 
necessity be satisfied by a general finding concerning all potentially 
covered industries'').
    Requiring OSHA to make multiple, hazard-specific significant risk 
findings would place an unwarranted burden on OSHA rulemaking because 
of difficulties in specifically defining each of the hazards addressed 
by a vertical standard.\8\ Hazards can be defined

[[Page 20323]]

broadly, for example, falling from an elevation, or more narrowly, for 
example, falling from an elevated aerial lift while performing tree-
trimming work. The outcome of the significant risk analysis called for 
by EEI would be largely (and somewhat arbitrarily) dependent on where 
along this vast spectrum OSHA defined the relevant dangers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \8\ Indeed, disputes over how to define hazards are commonplace 
in enforcement cases under the general duty clause of the OSH Act. 
See, for example, Secretary of Labor v. Arcadian Corp., 20 BNA OSHC 
2001 (OSHRC, Sept. 30, 2004); Secretary of Labor v. Inland Steel 
Co., 12 BNA OSHC 1968 (OSHRC, July 30, 1986); Secretary of Labor v. 
Pelron Corp., 12 BNA OSHC 1833 (OSHRC, June 2, 1986).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    OSHA reviewed the authority EEI relied on in support of the 
purported requirement for hazard-specific risk findings, but does not 
find it persuasive. First, EEI argued that the Supreme Court, in its 
Benzene decision, held that the Agency had to make separate significant 
risk findings for the air-contaminant and dermal-contact provisions of 
that standard (Ex. 0227). A close reading of the decision in that case 
reveals no such holding. Instead, the dermal-contact provisions in that 
case were remanded on the same basis that the air-contaminant 
provisions were rejected--namely that the provisions were not supported 
by any significant risk findings. See Benzene, 448 U.S. at 661-62. 
While the Court did suggest that OSHA needed to find that a prohibition 
on dermal contact was reasonably necessary and appropriate to address a 
significant risk, that is, that preventing dermal contact would reduce 
the overall risk associated with workplace exposure to benzene, it did 
not address whether a single significant risk finding could ultimately 
support both the dermal-contact and air-contaminant provisions in the 
standard. Id.
    Second, EEI relied on the Eleventh Circuit's decision in AFL-CIO v. 
OSHA (PELs), 965 F.2d 962 (11th Cir. 1992), which vacated and remanded 
OSHA's Air Contaminants Standard (Ex. 0227). That rule set permissible 
exposure limits for more than 400 toxic substances. Although in that 
case the court said that OSHA needed to explain its assessment of risk 
for each regulated substance, that rulemaking is readily distinguished 
from this final rule. In PELs, the various regulated substances were 
``unrelated'' and had ``little [in] common.'' 965 F.2d at 972. Here, in 
contrast, the various hazards addressed by this final rule are closely 
related. They all arise at power generation, transmission, and 
distribution worksites and jointly contribute to the large number of 
injuries and fatalities suffered by covered workers. OSHA does not 
believe that the PELs decision limits its discretion to adopt 
provisions it deems reasonably necessary and appropriate to abate the 
existing electrocution, burn, fall, and other hazards that, together, 
result in covered employees being exposed to an overall workplace risk 
that is significant.
    Finally, EEI's reliance on the Agency's ergonomics rulemaking is 
misplaced. EEI pointed out that OSHA's risk assessment in its 
ergonomics rulemaking considered only accidents that resulted from 
hazards covered by that standard (Ex. 0227). But this interpretation 
offers no support for EEI's position, as the risk assessment in this 
rulemaking similarly considered only injuries and fatalities that 
occurred during the performance of work covered by this final rule (Ex. 
0080). (See also Section VI, Final Economic Analysis and Regulatory 
Flexibility Analysis, later in the preamble.)
    Although OSHA does not agree that hazard-specific significant risk 
findings are necessary, the Agency believes that the record supports 
such findings for the critical hazards addressed in this rulemaking--
namely electrocutions and electric shocks, burns from arc flashes, and 
falls. The Agency has found that a significant number of injuries and 
fatalities occur every year as a result of employee exposure to each of 
these hazards. (See Section VI, Final Economic Analysis and Regulatory 
Flexibility Analysis, later in the preamble.) Moreover, as EEI points 
out, ``most of the hazards'' addressed in this rulemaking ``are already 
covered by the existing standards that OSHA [is] now . . . modify[ing] 
and supplement[ing]'' (Ex. 0227). Furthermore, some of the hazards 
addressed by this rulemaking are already the subject of generally 
applicable hazard-specific horizontal standards. See, for example, 29 
CFR part 1926, subpart K (electrical hazards) and subpart M (fall 
hazards). All of these existing standards were supported by findings of 
significant risk, and OSHA simply concludes that the additional 
provisions of this final rule are reasonably necessary and appropriate 
to reduce a substantial portion of the remaining significant risk at 
power generation, transmission, and distribution worksites.

III. Development of the Final Rule

A. History of the OSHA Standards

    OSHA first adopted standards for the construction of power 
transmission and distribution lines and equipment in 1972 (subpart V of 
29 CFR part 1926). OSHA defines the term ``construction work'' in 29 
CFR 1910.12(b) as ``work for construction, alteration, and/or repair, 
including painting and decorating.'' The term ``construction'' is 
broadly defined in Sec.  1910.12(d) and existing Sec.  1926.950(a)(1) 
to include the original installation of, as well as the alteration, 
conversion, and improvement of electric power transmission and 
distribution lines and equipment.
    The general industry standard at 29 CFR 1910.269 applies to the 
operation and maintenance of electric power generation, transmission, 
and distribution installations. OSHA adopted Sec.  1910.269 on January 
31, 1994. That standard is a companion standard to subpart V of the 
construction standards and addresses work to which subpart V did not 
apply. When promulgated, Sec.  1910.269 was also based on the latest 
technology and national consensus standards.
    OSHA revised its Electrical Protective Equipment Standard in Sec.  
1910.137 at the same time Sec.  1910.269 was promulgated. The revision 
of Sec.  1910.137 eliminated the incorporation by reference of national 
consensus standards for rubber insulating equipment and replaced it 
with performance-oriented rules for the design, manufacture, and safe 
care and use of electrical protective equipment.
    OSHA published a proposed rule (the subpart V proposal) on June 15, 
2005 (70 FR 34822). That document proposed revising the construction 
standard for electric power transmission and distribution work (29 CFR 
part 1926, subpart V) and the general industry standards for electric 
power generation, transmission, and distribution work (29 CFR 
1910.269). That document also proposed a new construction standard for 
electrical protective equipment (29 CFR 1926.97) and revisions to the 
general industry standards for foot protection (29 CFR 1910.136) and 
electrical protective equipment (29 CFR 1910.137). Public comments were 
originally due by October 13, 2005, but in response to requests from 
interested parties, including EEI, OSHA extended the comment period 90 
days to January 11, 2006 (70 FR 59290, Oct. 12, 2005). OSHA held an 
informal public hearing beginning on March 6, 2006, and ending on March 
14, 2006. After the hearing, interested parties had until May 15, 2006, 
to submit additional information and until July 14, 2006, to file 
posthearing briefs (Tr. 1415).
    On October 22, 2008, OSHA reopened the record for 30 days to gather 
information from the public on specific questions related to minimum 
approach distances (73 FR 62942). EEI requested a public hearing and an 
additional 60 days to submit comments on the issues raised in the 
reopening notice (Ex. 0530). On September 14, 2009, OSHA

[[Page 20324]]

opened the record for an additional 30 days to receive more comments on 
minimum approach distances and announced a public hearing to be held on 
October 28, 2009, addressing the limited issues raised in the two 
reopening notices (74 FR 46958). After the hearing, interested parties 
had until December 14, 2009, to submit additional information and until 
February 10, 2010, to file posthearing briefs (Tr2. 199).
    The record for this rulemaking consists of all prehearing comments, 
the transcripts of the two public hearings, all exhibits submitted 
prior to and during the two hearings, and posthearing submissions and 
briefs. Administrative Law Judge Stephen Purcell issued an order 
closing the record and certified the record to the Assistant Secretary 
of Labor for Occupational Safety and Health. The Agency carefully 
considered the entire record in preparing this final standard.

B. Relevant Consensus Standards

    The National Electrical Safety Code (American National Standards 
Institute (ANSI) Standard ANSI/IEEE C2, also known as the NESC) 
contains provisions specifically addressing electric power generation, 
transmission, and distribution work. ANSI/IEEE C2 does not, however, 
address the full range of hazards covered by this final rule. It is 
primarily directed to the prevention of electric shock, although it 
does contain a few requirements for the prevention of falls and burns 
from electric arcs.
    The American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) has adopted 
standards related to electric power generation, transmission, and 
distribution work. ASTM Committee F18 on Electrical Protective 
Equipment for Workers has developed standards on rubber insulating 
equipment, climbing equipment, protective grounding equipment, 
fiberglass rod and tube used in live-line tools, and clothing for 
workers exposed to electric arcs.
    The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) has adopted a 
standard on electrical safety for employees, NFPA 70E, Standard for 
Electrical Safety in the Workplace. Although it does not apply to 
electric power generation, transmission, or distribution installations, 
the NFPA standard contains provisions addressing work near such 
installations performed by unqualified employees, that is, employees 
who have not been trained to work on or with electric power generation, 
transmission, or distribution installations. It also contains methods 
for estimating heat energy levels from electric arcs and describes ways 
to protect employees from arc-flash hazards.
    The Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) writes 
standards for electric power generation, transmission, and distribution 
installations and for work on those installations. Many of these 
standards have been adopted by ANSI. Among these IEEE standards are: 
IEEE Std 516, IEEE Guide for Maintenance Methods on Energized Power-
Lines, and IEEE Std 1048, IEEE Guide for Protective Grounding of Power 
Lines.
    OSHA recognizes the important role consensus standards can play in 
ensuring worker safety. A comprehensive list of consensus standards 
relating to electric power generation, transmission, and distribution 
work can be found in existing Appendix E to Sec.  1910.269. OSHA 
proposed to add the same list as Appendix E to subpart V. OSHA 
considered the latest editions of all the standards listed in Appendix 
E in the development of this final rule. Any substantial deviations 
from these consensus standards are explained in Section V, Summary and 
Explanation of the Final Rule, later in this preamble.

C. Advisory Committee on Construction Safety and Health

    Under 29 CFR parts 1911 and 1912, OSHA must consult with the 
Advisory Committee on Construction Safety and Health (ACCSH or the 
Committee), established pursuant to Section 107 of the Contract Work 
Hours and Safety Standards Act (40 U.S.C. 3701 et seq.), in setting 
standards for construction work. Specifically, Sec.  1911.10(a) 
requires the Assistant Secretary to provide ACCSH with a draft proposed 
rule (along with pertinent factual information) and give the Committee 
an opportunity to submit recommendations. See also Sec.  1912.3(a) 
(``[W]henever occupational safety or health standards for construction 
activities are proposed, the Assistant Secretary [for Occupational 
Safety and Health] shall consult the Advisory Committee.'').
    OSHA has a long history of consulting with ACCSH on this 
rulemaking. On May 25, 1995, OSHA took a draft of the proposed 
construction standards to ACCSH, providing the Committee with a draft 
of the proposal and with a statement on the need to update the 
standards. The Committee formed a workgroup to review the materials, 
and the workgroup provided comments to OSHA. The Agency gave a status 
report on the proposal to the Committee on August 8, 1995, and an 
updated draft of the proposal to ACCSH on December 10, 1999. On 
February 13, 2003, OSHA gave ACCSH another status report and summarized 
the major revisions it had made to the proposal. On May 22, 2003, OSHA 
provided the Committee with the same copy of the draft proposal that 
had been provided to the small entity representatives who were 
participating in the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement and Fairness 
Act (SBREFA) proceedings, which were being conducted at that time. OSHA 
also explained the major issues being raised by the small entity 
representatives on the draft proposal.
    On May 18, 2004, ACCSH gave the Agency formal recommendations on 
the proposal. OSHA sought ACCSH's recommendations on the proposal 
generally, as well as on issues specifically related to host employer-
contractor communications and flame-resistant clothing. ACCSH voted 
unanimously that: (1) The construction standards for electric power 
transmission and distribution work should be the same as the general 
industry standards for the same type of work; (2) it was necessary to 
require some safety-related communications between host employers and 
contractors; and (3) employees need to be protected from hazards posed 
by electric arcs through the use of flame-retardant clothing. ACCSH 
recommended, by unanimous vote, that OSHA issue its proposal, 
consistent with these specific recommendations.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \9\ ACCSH transcript for May 18, 2004, pages 224-239. This 
document can be viewed in the OSHA Docket Office or online at https://www.osha.gov.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    EEI suggested that OSHA had to seek additional input from ACCSH if 
it decided to rely on the recent work of the IEEE technical committee 
responsible for revising IEEE Std 516, which has not been presented to 
ACCSH, in developing the final rule's minimum approach-distance 
provisions (Tr2. 18-19). EEI is not correct. In making its assertion, 
EEI relies on Nat'l Constructors Ass'n. v. Marshall (Nat'l 
Constructors), 581 F.2d 960 (D.C. Cir. 1978). EEI's reliance on this 
case is misplaced. Although the court stated that the OSH Act and 
OSHA's procedural regulations (29 U.S.C. 655(b)(1); 29 CFR 1911.10(a)) 
place ``a `stricter' requirement on when, and how often, the agency 
must utilize the advisory committee procedure than does the 
[Administrative Procedure Act (APA)] with respect to public comment 
during informal rulemaking,'' id. at 970, that statement in the 
decision is nonprecedential dicta. The court did not ``decide how much 
stricter the requirement is'' because, the court

[[Page 20325]]

concluded, the rule at issue did not meet ``even the APA's . . . 
standard.'' Id. at 971 n.27. As such, the case stands, at most, for the 
proposition that OSHA must return to ACCSH where the final rule at 
issue does not meet the APA's ``logical outgrowth'' test.
    OSHA's consultation with ACCSH in this rulemaking was consistent 
with the Nat'l Constructors decision. The Nat'l Constructors court 
stated that OSHA had to engage in further consultation with ACCSH 
regarding its ground-fault circuit protection standard where the final 
rule recognized ``assured equipment grounding conductor programs'' as a 
method of compliance, but ACCSH had never had the opportunity to 
comment on that particular form of employee protection. The DC Circuit 
concluded that the compliance program in question was neither presented 
to ACCSH, nor ``gr[e]w logically out of anything that was presented to, 
or heard from, the Committee.'' Id. at 970--971. In this Subpart V 
rulemaking, in contrast, the basic requirement to adhere to minimum 
approach distances was presented to ACCSH. (See, for example, ACCSH 
Docket ACCSH 1995-2.) The Agency is simply refining the method used to 
establish the minimum approach distances \10\ in light of technical 
progress that has been made since the proposal was reviewed by ACCSH. 
(For a complete discussion of the minimum approach-distance 
requirements and OSHA's rationale for adopting them, see the summary 
and explanation for final Sec.  1926.960(c)(1), in Section V, Summary 
and Explanation of the Final Rule, later in this preamble.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \10\ The basic equation for computing minimum approach distances 
in the final rule is the same as the one used in existing Sec.  
1910.269 and in the draft proposal submitted to ACCSH.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In any event, ACCSH had an opportunity to comment on whether OSHA 
should rely on the work of the IEEE committee generally. ACCSH knew 
that OSHA might base the minimum approach distances for subpart V on 
existing Sec.  1910.269. (See, for example, Exhibit 12 in Docket ACCSH 
1995-2 and Exhibit 101-X in Docket ACCSH 1995-3.) In fact, ACCSH 
ultimately concluded in its recommendation that the construction 
standards for electric power transmission and distribution work should 
be the same as the general industry standards for the same type of 
work. As existing Sec.  1910.269's minimum approach-distance 
requirements were derived from IEEE Std 516 (59 FR 4320, 4382-4384 
(Jan. 31, 1994)), ACCSH was on notice that the work of the IEEE 516 
committee might be used by the Agency in formulating the minimum 
approach-distance requirements for this final rule.
    That ACCSH did not specifically pass on the question of whether 
OSHA should derive its minimum approach-distance requirements from work 
done in the formulation of an IEEE standard that was not yet issued at 
the time of the ACCSH consultation is of no consequence. The OSH Act 
and OSHA's procedural regulation (29 U.S.C. 655(b)(1); 29 CFR 
1911.10(a)) ``make clear that the Assistant Secretary need only supply 
whatever information he has available to him at the time he submits his 
proposal to the Committee.'' Nat'l Constructors, 581 F.2d at 968. As 
the Nat'l Constructors Court recognized, ``by designing the Advisory 
Committee option as a procedural step that must precede public notice, 
comment, and the informal hearing, [Congress] assumed that the 
Committee would not be provided with all information that the Labor 
Department eventually developed on the subject.'' Id. at 968 n.16. 
Thus, OSHA's action in the final rule is consistent with Nat'l 
Constructors.

IV. Legal Authority

    The purpose of the OSH Act, 29 U.S.C. 651 et seq., is ``to assure 
so far as possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe and 
healthful working conditions and to preserve our human resources.'' 29 
U.S.C. 651(b). To achieve this goal, Congress authorized the Secretary 
of Labor to promulgate and enforce occupational safety and health 
standards. 29 U.S.C. 654, 655(b), 658.
    A safety or health standard ``requires conditions, or the adoption 
or use of one or more practices, means, methods, operations, or 
processes, reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or 
healthful employment and places of employment.'' 29 U.S.C. 652(8). A 
safety standard is reasonably necessary or appropriate within the 
meaning of 29 U.S.C. 652(8) if:
     It substantially reduces a significant risk of material 
harm in the workplace;
     It is technologically and economically feasible;
     It uses the most cost-effective protective measures;
     It is consistent with, or is a justified departure from, 
prior Agency action;
     It is supported by substantial evidence; and
     It is better able to effectuate the purposes of the OSH 
Act than any relevant national consensus standard.

Lockout/Tagout II, 37 F.3d at 668. In addition, safety standards must 
be highly protective. See, for example, id. at 669.
    A standard is technologically feasible if the protective measures 
it requires already exist, can be brought into existence with available 
technology, or can be created with technology that can reasonably be 
expected to be developed. See, for example, American Iron and Steel 
Inst. v. OSHA (Lead II), 939 F.2d 975, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (per 
curiam). A standard is economically feasible when industry can absorb 
or pass on the costs of compliance without threatening industry's long-
term profitability or competitive structure. See, for example, American 
Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 530 n. 55 (1981); Lead 
II, 939 F.2d at 980. A standard is cost effective if the protective 
measures it requires are the least costly of the available alternatives 
that achieve the same level of protection. See, for example, Lockout/
Tagout II, 37 F.3d at 668.
    Section 6(b)(7) of the OSH Act authorizes OSHA to include among a 
standard's requirements labeling, monitoring, medical testing, and 
other information-gathering and information-transmittal provisions. 29 
U.S.C. 655(b)(7). Finally, the OSH Act requires that when promulgating 
a rule that differs substantially from a national consensus standard, 
OSHA must explain why the promulgated rule is a better method for 
effectuating the purposes of the Act. 29 U.S.C. 655(b)(8). Deviations 
from relevant consensus standards are explained elsewhere in this 
preamble.

V. Summary and Explanation of the Final Rule

    OSHA is adopting a new construction standard on electrical 
protective equipment, 29 CFR 1926.97, and is revising the standard on 
the construction of electric power transmission and distribution lines 
and equipment, 29 CFR part 1926, subpart V. The Agency is also revising 
the general industry counterparts to these two construction standards, 
29 CFR 1910.137 and 1910.269, respectively. Finally, OSHA is revising 
its general industry standard on foot protection, 29 CFR 1910.136, to 
require employers to ensure that each affected employee uses protective 
footwear when the use of protective footwear will protect the affected 
employee from an electrical hazard, such as a static-discharge or 
electric-shock hazard, that remains after the employer takes other 
necessary protective measures.
    This section discusses the important elements of the final rule, 
explains the individual requirements, and explains

[[Page 20326]]

any differences between the final rule and existing standards. This 
section also discusses issues that were raised at the two public 
hearings, significant comments received as part of the rulemaking 
record, and substantive changes from the language of the proposed rule. 
Unless otherwise noted, paragraph references in the summary and 
explanation of the final rule fall under the section given in the 
heading for the discussion. For example, except as otherwise noted, 
paragraph references in V.A, Section 1926.97, Electrical Protective 
Equipment, are to paragraphs in final Sec.  1926.97. Except as noted, 
the Agency has carried proposed provisions into the final rule without 
substantive change.
    The final rule contains several differences from the proposal and 
existing Sec. Sec.  1910.137 and 1910.269 that are purely editorial and 
nonsubstantive. For example, the Agency amended the language of some 
provisions to shift from passive to active voice, thereby making the 
standard easier to read. OSHA does not discuss explicitly in the 
preamble all of these differences. The purpose of these differences, 
unless otherwise noted, is to clarify the final standard.

A. Section 1926.97, Electrical Protective Equipment

    Workers exposed to electrical hazards face a risk of death or 
serious injury from electric shock. According to BLS, there were 192 
and 170 fatalities involving contact with electric current in 2008 and 
2009, respectively (https://www.bls.gov/iif/oshwc/cfoi/cftb0240.pdf and 
https://www.bls.gov/iif/oshwc/cfoi/cftb0249.pdf). About half of these 
fatalities (89 in both years) occurred in construction (id.).\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \11\ Similar data are available at https://www.bls.gov/iif/oshcfoi1.htm#2009 for each year back to 2003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The use of properly designed, manufactured, and cared-for 
electrical protective equipment helps protect employees from this risk. 
Therefore, OSHA is issuing final Sec.  1926.97, Electrical protective 
equipment, which addresses the design, manufacture, and proper care of 
electrical protective equipment. In addition, OSHA is revising existing 
Sec.  1910.137, which also contains provisions addressing the design, 
manufacture, and proper care of electrical protective equipment. For 
reasons described at length in this section of the preamble, OSHA 
concludes that the final rule will be a more effective means of 
protecting employees from the risk of electric shock than existing OSHA 
standards.
    The existing requirements for electrical protective equipment in 
construction work are in Sec.  1926.951(a)(1), which only applies to 
the construction of electric power transmission and distribution lines 
and equipment. However, employers throughout the construction industry 
use electrical protective equipment, and OSHA believes that provisions 
for electrical protective equipment, as specified by final Sec.  
1926.97, should apply, not only to electric power transmission and 
distribution work, but to all construction work. Therefore, OSHA is 
issuing new Sec.  1926.97, Electrical protective equipment, which 
applies to all construction work.
    Existing Sec.  1926.951(a)(1) incorporates by reference the 
following six American National Standards Institute (ANSI) standards:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Item                             ANSI Standard
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rubber insulating gloves..............  J6.6-1971
Rubber matting for use around electric  J6.7-1935 (R1971)
 apparatus.
Rubber insulating blankets............  J6.4-1971
Rubber insulating hoods...............  J6.2-1950 (R1971)
Rubber insulating line hose...........  J6.1-1950 (R1971)
Rubber insulating sleeves.............  J6.5-1971
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    These standards contain detailed specifications for manufacturing, 
testing, and designing electrical protective equipment. However, these 
standards have undergone several revisions since the 1971 publication 
date of existing subpart V and are now seriously out of date. Following 
is a complete list of the corresponding current national consensus 
standards:
    ASTM D120-09, Standard Specification for Rubber Insulating Gloves.
    ASTM D178-01 (Reapproved 2010), Standard Specification for Rubber 
Insulating Matting.
    ASTM D1048-12, Standard Specification for Rubber Insulating 
Blankets.
    ASTM D1049-98 (Reapproved 2010), Standard Specification for Rubber 
Insulating Covers.
    ASTM D1050-05 (Reapproved 2011), Standard Specification for Rubber 
Insulating Line Hose.
    ASTM D1051-08, Standard Specification for Rubber Insulating 
Sleeves.
    Additionally, there are now standards on the in-service care of 
insulating line hose and covers (ASTM F478-09), insulating blankets 
(ASTM F479-06 (2011)), and insulating gloves and sleeves (ASTM F496-
08), which OSHA did not incorporate or reference in existing Sec.  
1926.951(a)(1).\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \12\ The relevant ASTM standards are in the record as Exs. 0048, 
0049, 0050, 0051, 0066, 0067, 0068, 0069, 0070. In several cases, 
the version of the consensus standard in the record is older than 
the version listed in the preamble. However, OSHA based final 
Sec. Sec.  1926.97 and 1910.137 only on the ASTM documents and other 
data in the record. The preamble lists editions of the consensus 
standards not in the record because OSHA evaluated them for 
consistency with the final rule. OSHA determined that these later 
ASTM standards conform to the requirements of final Sec. Sec.  
1926.97 and 1910.137. See the discussion of the notes following 
paragraphs (a)(3)(ii)(B) and (c)(2)(ix) for the significance of this 
determination.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    OSHA derived proposed new Sec.  1926.97 from these national 
consensus standards, but drafted it in performance terms. OSHA is 
carrying this approach forward into the final rule. The final rule 
relies on provisions from the consensus standards that are performance 
based and necessary for employee safety, but the final rule does not 
contain many of the detailed specifications from those standards. Thus, 
the final rule will provide greater flexibility for compliance.
    BGE commented that OSHA's performance-based approach leaves the 
standards ``vague'' and creates ``opportunities for unsafe practices'' 
(Ex. 0126).
    OSHA disagrees with this comment for the following reasons.
    The Agency recognizes the importance of the consensus standards in 
defining basic requirements for the safe design and manufacture of 
electrical protective equipment for employees. To this end, OSHA will 
allow employers to comply with the final rule by following specific 
provisions in the consensus standards. OSHA believes that the option of 
following these specific provisions addresses the commenter's concern 
about vagueness.
    However, OSHA determined that it would be inappropriate to adopt 
the consensus standards in toto in this rulemaking. First, each of the 
currently referenced standards has undergone several revisions since 
OSHA adopted the standards in existing Sec.  1926.951(a)(1). Because of 
the continual process by which the consensus standards development 
organizations periodically revise their consensus standards, any 
specific editions that OSHA might adopt likely would be outdated within 
a few years. Additionally, since OSHA's rulemaking process is lengthy, 
it would not be practical for OSHA to revise its standards as often as 
necessary to keep pace with the changes in the consensus

[[Page 20327]]

standards. Final Sec.  1926.97 is flexible enough to accommodate 
changes in technology, obviating the need for constant revision. 
Wherever possible, OSHA wrote the final rule in performance terms to 
allow alternative methods of compliance that provide comparable safety 
to employees.
    Another difficulty with incorporating the consensus standards by 
reference is that they contain details that go beyond the scope of the 
OSHA standard and are not directly related to employee safety. In final 
Sec.  1926.97, OSHA relied only on consensus standard provisions that 
are relevant to employee safety in the workplace. Furthermore, to make 
the requirements easier for employers and employees to use and 
understand, OSHA adopted language in the final rule that is simpler 
than that in the consensus standards. Because all relevant requirements 
are in the text of the regulations, employers will not need to refer to 
the consensus standards to determine their obligations under final 
Sec.  1926.97. Although OSHA is no longer incorporating the consensus 
standards by reference, notes throughout the rule clarify that OSHA 
will deem compliance with the consensus standards listed in the notes 
to be compliance with the performance requirements of final Sec.  
1926.97.
    OSHA notes that it recently decided not to adopt a proposed 
performance-based approach when it revised the design requirements 
contained in several personal protective equipment standards (74 FR 
46350, Sept. 9, 2009). In issuing that final rule, OSHA reasoned that 
``widespread opposition'' to, and misunderstanding of, the proposal 
indicated ``possible misapplication . . . if adopted'' (74 FR 46352).
    This rationale does not apply to this rulemaking. First, there was 
no widespread opposition to the proposed performance-based approach in 
this rulemaking. A number of commenters did request that OSHA deem 
employers that are in compliance with all future revisions of the 
listed consensus standards as being in compliance with the final rule 
(see, for example, Exs. 0156, 0180, 0183, 0202, 0206, 0229, 0231, 
0239). The Agency believes that the performance-based approach it 
adopts in final Sec.  1926.97 will provide these commenters with the 
flexibility they requested by permitting employers to follow future 
versions of consensus standards so long as those future versions meet 
the final rule's performance-based criteria. Second, OSHA adopted a 
performance-based approach when it previously revised existing Sec.  
1910.137 in 1994 (59 FR 4323-4325). Several participants in the 1994 
rulemaking supported a performance-based approach (59 FR 4324). Third, 
OSHA believes that harmonizing Sec.  1926.97 and Sec.  1910.137 will 
reduce misapplication by the regulated community and, thereby, reduce 
the risk of electric shock. Promulgating inconsistent standards would 
increase misapplication by the regulated community and, consequently, 
increase the risk of electric shock. Finally, OSHA has had no 
difficulty enforcing Sec.  1910.137 since issuing it in 1994.
    Regarding the commenters' requests that OSHA deem employers that 
are in compliance with all future revisions of the listed consensus 
standards as being in compliance with the final rule, OSHA has no basis 
on which to find that future revisions of the consensus standards will 
provide suitable guidance for compliance with the performance criteria 
of the final rule. Revised consensus standards may or may not meet the 
final rule's performance criteria. If a revised consensus standard does 
not satisfy this final rule's performance criteria, however, the Agency 
may consider compliance with that consensus standard to be a de minimis 
condition if the consensus standard clearly provides protection equal 
to, or greater than, the protection provided by Sec.  1926.97.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \13\ De minimis conditions are conditions in which an employer 
implemented a measure different from one specified in a standard, 
but that has no direct or immediate relationship to safety or 
health. The Agency does not issue citations or penalties for de 
minimis conditions, nor is the employer required to bring the 
workplace into compliance, that is, there are no abatement 
requirements. Pursuant to OSHA's de minimis policy, which is set 
forth in OSHA Instruction CPL 02-00-148 (``Field Operations 
Manual''), a de minimis condition exists when an employer complies 
with a consensus standard rather than with the standard in effect at 
the time of the inspection and the employer's action clearly 
provides equivalent or more effective employee protection.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    An employer seeking to rely on an updated consensus standard may 
evaluate for itself whether the consensus standard meets the 
performance criteria contained in final Sec.  1926.97. An employer that 
is unsure about whether a revised consensus standard meets the OSHA 
standard's performance criteria may seek guidance from OSHA. If a 
revised consensus standard does not appear to meet the OSHA standard's 
performance criteria, but the employer nonetheless wants to follow the 
revised consensus standard, the employer should seek guidance from OSHA 
as to whether the Agency would consider an employer's following the 
revised consensus standard to be a de minimis condition.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \14\ Note that this approach applies to the use of any consensus 
standard referenced in the final rule. Moreover, the same principles 
described with respect to subsequent versions of the consensus 
standards also apply to earlier versions of the consensus standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some rulemaking participants asked OSHA to provide the applicable 
consensus standards to employers at no cost. (See, for example, Exs. 
0156, 0161, 0183, 0202, 0206, 0229, 0231, 0233; Tr. 1287-1288.) For 
instance, Mr. Terry Williams with the Electric Cooperatives of South 
Carolina stated: ``If OSHA is to rely on procedures that it does not 
describe in full, . . . the agency should provide a cost-free way for 
employers to review these procedures to make sure they are following 
them'' (Ex. 0202). Mr. Don Adkins with Davis H. Elliot Construction Co. 
stated that the ``cost of securing and reviewing these voluntary 
standards place[s] a financial burden on small employers'' (Ex. 0156).
    OSHA is rejecting these requests. The Agency stated the rule in 
performance-based terms, which allows employers flexibility in 
complying with the rules. The Agency understands that employers may 
want additional guidance in terms of precise procedures or detailed 
specifications to follow. Final Sec.  1926.97 references relevant 
consensus standards to provide such additional guidance, but those 
standards are not mandatory.
    In any event, even when OSHA incorporates consensus standards by 
reference, the Agency does not provide those consensus standards to 
employers at no cost. Many consensus standards are copyrighted 
documents; and, in those cases, the copyright holder has certain legal 
rights regarding the public distribution of those documents. Note that 
some consensus standards development organizations, for example, NFPA, 
do provide free, view-only access to their standards (https://www.nfpa.org/itemDetail.asp?categoryID=279&itemID=18123&URL=Codes%20&%20Standards/Code%20development%20process/Online%20access).\15\ OSHA also will 
continue to explore other ways of informing the regulated community

[[Page 20328]]

about applicable compliance obligations specified by the final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \15\ For instance, NFPA 70E, Standard for Electrical Safety in 
the Workplace, one of the documents listed in Appendix G to Subpart 
V, described later in this section of the preamble, is available at 
https://www.nfpa.org/aboutthecodes/AboutTheCodes.asp?DocNum=70E&cookie_test=1. Select either the 2009 
or 2012 edition from the drop-down box labeled ``Edition to 
display'' and click the link labeled ``View [selected] edition 
online.'' Note that registration with NFPA is required to view the 
standard.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Moreover, employers can often rely on the assurances of third 
parties that equipment or test methods meet the listed consensus 
standards. First, OSHA expects that employers will typically get the 
assurance of manufacturers that electrical protective equipment is 
capable of withstanding the appropriate electrical proof tests required 
by final paragraphs (a) and (b). In this regard, an employer can simply 
look for equipment labeled as meeting the listed consensus standards. 
Manufacturers attest, through such a label, typically required by the 
relevant consensus standard, that their equipment passed the requisite 
tests.
    Second, it is OSHA's understanding that many employers, 
particularly small employers, do not test their own equipment to 
determine whether employees can use the equipment, as required by final 
paragraph (c). Instead, these employers send the equipment to an 
electrical laboratory for testing (see, for example, the testimony of 
Mr. Frank Brockman of Farmers Rural Electric Cooperative Corporation 
about the use of testing laboratories, Tr. 1301-1302). It is OSHA's 
understanding that, as a matter of practice, such laboratories follow 
the test methods in the applicable consensus standards for testing a 
wide range of products (see, for example, Ex. 0211).\16\ To determine 
whether employees can use the equipment in accordance with final 
paragraph (c), employers can rely on the assurance of these testing 
laboratories that they followed the listed consensus standards, as well 
as the requirements of OSHA's standard.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \16\ When a question arises as to the validity of a test method 
a laboratory is using, OSHA will investigate the validity of the 
method.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    OSHA expects that, when consensus standards development 
organizations revise their consensus standards, manufacturers' labels 
will certify that the equipment meets the latest consensus standards, 
and that testing laboratories will use the test methods in the latest 
consensus standards, rather than the consensus standards listed in the 
notes. OSHA is sympathetic to concerns that employers, especially small 
businesses, do not have the resources to purchase and check whether 
revised consensus standards meet the final rule's performance criteria. 
As discussed previously, an employer that does not have the resources 
to purchase and review an updated consensus standard (indeed, any 
employer) may request guidance from OSHA on whether compliance with an 
updated consensus standard would conform to this final rule or bring 
the employer within OSHA's de minimis policy.
    In the final rule, OSHA reworded the headings for paragraphs (a), 
(b), and (c) to more accurately reflect the content of the respective 
paragraphs. Paragraph (a). Paragraph (a) of Sec.  1926.97 addresses the 
design and manufacture of the following types of rubber insulating 
equipment: Blankets, matting, covers, line hose, gloves, and 
sleeves.\17\ (Paragraph (b) of Sec.  1926.97 contains general 
requirements for other types of insulating equipment (see the 
discussion of this paragraph later in this section of the preamble).) 
Paragraphs (a) and (c) of proposed Sec.  1926.97 were based on existing 
Sec.  1910.137(a) and (b); however, the proposal added Class 00 
equipment to the classes addressed by the existing provisions to 
reflect the coverage of this new class of equipment in the consensus 
standards (Exs. 0048, 0051). This class of electrical protective 
equipment is used with voltages of 500 volts or less. OSHA received no 
comments on the proposed addition of Class 00 electrical protective 
equipment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \17\ The language in proposed paragraph (a) has been editorially 
revised in the final rule to make it clearer that the paragraph 
applies to rubber insulating equipment only.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Paragraph (a)(1)(i), which is being adopted without change from the 
proposal, requires blankets, gloves, and sleeves to be manufactured 
without seams. This method of making the protective equipment minimizes 
the chance that the material will split. Because they are used when 
workers handle energized lines, gloves and sleeves are the only defense 
an employee has against electric shock. Additionally, the stresses 
placed on blankets, gloves, and sleeves by the flexing of the rubber 
during normal use could cause a seam to separate from tensile or shear 
stress.
    The prohibition on seams does not apply to the other three types of 
electrical protective equipment covered by paragraph (a) (covers, line 
hose, and matting). These types of equipment generally provide a more 
indirect form of protection because they insulate the live parts from 
accidental, rather than intended, contact. Moreover, they are not 
usually subject to similar amounts or types of flexing and, thus, are 
not subject to the same stress.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \18\ Flexing can cause different types of stress on rubber, 
including tensile, compression, and shear stress. Rubber insulating 
line hose and covers are subject to the greatest amount of flexing 
while employees are installing them on an energized part. However, 
employees install this equipment either with live-line tools or 
while wearing rubber insulating gloves and sleeves. Thus, when seam 
separation is likely, the employee is protected by other means.
    Rubber insulating matting is generally laid on the floor and is 
not subject to the type of flexing that is likely to cause 
separation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Paragraph (a)(1)(ii), which is being adopted with one modification 
from the proposal, requires electrical protective equipment to be 
marked to indicate its class and type. The class marking indicates the 
voltage with which the equipment can be used; \19\ the type marking 
indicates whether the equipment is ozone resistant. These markings 
enable employees to know the uses and voltages for which the equipment 
is suited. This provision also permits equipment to contain other 
relevant markings, for example, the manufacturer's name, the size of 
the equipment, or a notation that the equipment is manufactured in 
accordance with the relevant consensus standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \19\ The maximum use voltages for individual classes of 
equipment are provided in Table E-4, discussed under the summary and 
explanation for paragraph (c)(2)(i), infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Proposed paragraphs (a)(1)(ii)(G) and (a)(1)(ii)(H) would have 
required rubber insulating equipment ``other than matting'' to be 
marked as Type I or Type II to indicate whether or not it was ozone-
resistant. Mr. James Thomas, President of ASTM International, submitted 
comments recommending that the quoted language be deleted from these 
paragraphs because the ``type classification denotes the manufacturing 
material being either Nonresistant to Ozone (Type I) or Resistant to 
Ozone (Type II) and applies to all [rubber insulating equipment], 
including [m]atting'' (Ex. 0148).
    OSHA agrees that the ASTM standards require matting to be marked 
with the type to indicate whether or not it is ozone-resistant, and the 
Agency has adopted the commenter's recommendation in the final rule.
    Mr. Leo Muckerheide of Safety Consulting Services recommended that 
OSHA require marking the maximum use voltage on electrical protective 
equipment, stating:

    Many electrical workers work with multiple voltages and are 
infrequent users of electrical protective equipment. Therefore, 
expecting them to remember which class to use with which voltage is 
a potentially hazardous problem. This problem can be easily 
eliminated by having the maximum use voltage marked on the 
electrical protective equipment. [Ex. 0180]

    OSHA rejects this recommendation. First, workers using electrical 
protective equipment receive training that ensures that they know which 
class of equipment to use on which voltage. The

[[Page 20329]]

record demonstrates that most of the workers covered by Sec.  1910.269 
and subpart V are highly trained (see, for example, Tr. 1228) and use 
electrical protective equipment to work on energized lines on a 
regular, often daily, basis (see, for example, Tr. 394, 889, 1218-
1219). Furthermore, several OSHA standards require training for 
employees working on or near exposed energized parts, when electrical 
protective equipment would also be required. For instance, final 
Sec. Sec.  1910.269(a)(2)(ii)(D) and 1926.950(b)(2)(iv) require 
training in the use of electrical protective equipment for qualified 
employees performing electric power generation, transmission, and 
distribution work. Paragraph (c)(2) of Sec.  1910.333 contains a 
similar requirement for workers performing other types of general 
industry electrical work. Paragraph (b)(2) of Sec.  1926.21 contains 
training requirements for workers performing construction work. 
Although this requirement is more general than the training requirement 
in this final standard, Sec.  1926.21 requires training in OSHA 
standards applicable to the employee's work environment.
    Second, electrical protective equipment meeting the applicable 
consensus standards is manufactured with the Class ratings included, 
but generally without labels for maximum use voltages. (See, for 
example, Exs. 0048, 0049, 0050, 0066, 0067, 0068.) Requiring electrical 
protective equipment to be marked with its maximum use voltage would 
likely force employers to mark the equipment themselves. OSHA believes 
that the permanent class-rating marking placed on electrical protective 
equipment by the manufacturer provides adequate information and is less 
likely to wear off over the useful life of the equipment than any 
marking put in place by an employer. Thus, the Agency concludes that a 
requirement for marking the maximum use voltage on electrical 
protective equipment is unnecessary.
    Mr. Frank Owen Brockman, representing Farmers Rural Electric 
Cooperative Corporation, recommended that OSHA also require that the 
markings include the company testing the equipment, the test date, and 
owners of the equipment (Ex. 0173). He did not explain how including 
this additional information in the markings would better protect 
employees. Moreover, although requiring the employer to note the date 
equipment is tested does enhance worker protection, final paragraph 
(c)(2)(xii) of Sec.  1926.97 addresses this matter by requiring the 
employer to certify that equipment has successfully passed the periodic 
testing required by the final rule and by requiring this certification 
to identify the equipment that passed the test and the date it was 
tested. OSHA agrees with Mr. Brockman that keeping workers aware of the 
date of last testing would enhance worker protection. Therefore, OSHA 
revised the language in final paragraph (c)(2)(xii) to also require 
that the certification required by the rule be made available to 
employees or their authorized representatives.
    It should be noted that, although not required, the markings 
suggested by Mr. Muckerheide and Mr. Brockman are permitted under 
paragraph (a)(1)(ii)(I).
    Paragraph (a)(1)(iii) requires all markings to be nonconductive and 
to be applied so as not to impair the insulating properties of the 
equipment. OSHA did not receive any comments on this provision in the 
proposal and has carried it forward without change into the final rule. 
This requirement ensures that no marking interferes with the protection 
to be provided by the equipment.
    Paragraph (a)(1)(iv), which is being adopted without change from 
the proposal, requires markings on gloves to be confined to the cuff 
area.\20\ As OSHA explained in the preamble to the proposed rule, 
markings in other areas could possibly wear off (70 FR 34828). 
Moreover, having the markings in one place will allow the employee to 
determine the class and type of glove quickly. Finally, as discussed 
later in this section of the preamble, final paragraph (c)(2)(vii) 
requires that rubber gloves normally be worn under protector gloves. 
Because a protector glove is almost always shorter than the 
corresponding rubber glove with which it is worn, and because the cuff 
of the protector glove can easily be pulled back without removal, it is 
easy to see markings on the cuff portion of the rubber glove beneath. 
Any marking provided on the rubber glove in an area outside of the cuff 
could not be seen with the protector glove in place.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \20\ The cuff area is the area near the reinforced edge of the 
glove.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Paragraph (a)(2) of final Sec.  1926.97 contains electrical 
requirements for rubber insulating blankets, matting, line hose, 
gloves, and sleeves. As previously discussed, this provision uses 
performance language, and does not contain a lengthy discussion of 
specific test procedures.
    Paragraph (a)(2)(i), which is being carried forward from the 
proposed rule, requires electrical protective equipment to be capable 
of withstanding the ac proof-test voltages in Table E-1 or the dc 
proof-test voltages in Table E-2 of the standard.\21\ The proof-test 
voltages listed in these tables have been derived from the current ASTM 
standards, which also contain detailed test procedures that can be used 
to determine whether electrical protective equipment is capable of 
withstanding these voltages. As previously discussed, these details 
were not included in the proposed rule, and this approach is being 
carried forward in the final rule. Paragraph (a)(2)(i)(A) replaces 
those details with a performance-oriented requirement that any proof 
test can be used as long as it reliably indicates that the equipment 
can withstand the proof-test voltage involved.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \21\ Existing Sec.  1910.137 contains Table I-2 through Table I-
6, and the proposal did not redesignate those tables. The final rule 
revises all of Sec.  1910.137 so as to redesignate the tables, 
starting with Table I-1. Consequently, existing Table I-2 
corresponds to Table I-1 in the final rule, existing Table I-3 
corresponds to Table I-2 in the final rule, existing Table I-4 
corresponds to Table I-3 in the final rule, existing Table I-5 
corresponds to Table I-4 in the final rule, and existing Table I-6 
corresponds to Table I-5 in the final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Mr. Muckerheide with Safety Consulting Services stated that the 
standard for rubber insulating gloves, ASTM D120, lists a 280-
millimeter glove instead of the 267-millimeter glove listed in Table E-
1 in the proposed rule (Ex. 0180). He recommended making OSHA's 
standard consistent with the ASTM standard or explaining the difference 
in the standard.
    OSHA is revising Table E-1 from the proposal in response to this 
comment.
    OSHA based proposed Table E-1 on Table I-2 in existing Sec.  
1910.137, which, in turn, was based on the 1987 edition of ASTM D120. 
Section 10.3.1 of ASTM D120-1987 lists four standard lengths for Class 
0 rubber insulating gloves: 279, 356, 406, and 457 millimeters. Table 2 
in that edition, however, listed 267 millimeters as the shortest length 
glove even though the shortest standard length was 279 millimeters.
    Unlike the 1987 edition of the consensus standard, the latest 
edition, ASTM D120-2009, rounds up the standard metric sizes. Thus, the 
relevant consensus standards for rubber insulating gloves list four 
standard sizes of 280, 360, 410, and 460 millimeters for Classes 00, 0, 
1, 2, 3, and 4 gloves. The table in the 2009 edition of the consensus 
standard corresponding to Table 2 in the 1987 edition lists a 280-
millimeter glove as the shortest one.
    Based on this information, OSHA concludes that the appropriate 
length for the shortest glove is 280 millimeters. In addition, the 
Agency does not consider the difference between the 280-millimeter 
length recommended by Mr.

[[Page 20330]]

Muckerheide and the 267-millimeter proposed length to be substantial. 
The 1987 and 2009 editions of the consensus standard each permit a 
glove to vary from the standard length by as much as 13 millimeters. 
Thus, a 280-millimeter glove can be as short as 267 millimeters. 
However, to ensure consistency with the latest consensus standard, OSHA 
is adopting, in Table E-1, both the 280-millimeter glove length in 
place of the proposed 267-millimeter length and the rounded-up metric 
sizes, as listed in the latest edition of the consensus standard.
    Paragraph (a)(2)(i)(B), which is being adopted as proposed, 
requires the proof-test voltage to be applied continuously for 1 minute 
for insulating matting and 3 minutes for other insulating equipment. 
These times are derived from on the proof-test times given in the ASTM 
design standards and are appropriate for testing the design 
capabilities of electrical protective equipment.
    Paragraph (a)(2)(i)(C), which is being adopted as proposed, 
requires rubber insulating gloves to be capable of withstanding the ac 
proof-test voltage indicated in Table E-1 of the standard after a 16-
hour water soak. If rubber insulating gloves absorb water, a reduction 
in insulating properties will result. Electrical work is sometimes 
performed in the rain, and an employee's perspiration is often present 
while the gloves are in use, so water absorption is a critical 
property. The soak test is needed to ensure that rubber insulating 
gloves can withstand the voltage involved under these conditions.
    It should be noted that the soak test is a separate test from the 
initial proof test. Gloves must be capable of passing both tests.
    Paragraph (a)(2)(ii), which is being adopted as proposed, prohibits 
the 60-hertz ac proof-test current from exceeding the values specified 
in Table E-1 at any time during the test period. The currents listed in 
the table have been taken from ASTM D120-09. This provision in the 
final rule is important because, when an ac proof test is used on 
gloves, the resulting proof-test current gives an indication of the 
validity of the gloves' make-up, the dielectric constant of the type of 
material used, its thickness, and the total area under test.
    Under paragraph (a)(2)(ii)(A), which is being adopted without 
change from the proposal, the maximum current for ac voltages at 
frequencies other than 60 hertz is computed from the direct ratio of 
the frequencies. This provision ensures that maximum current is 
equivalent for varying frequencies.
    Paragraph (a)(2)(ii)(B), which is being adopted as proposed, 
specifies that gloves to be tested be filled with and immersed in water 
to the depth given in Table E-3 and that water be added to or removed 
from the glove as necessary to ensure that the water level is the same 
inside and outside the glove. Table E-3 is derived from ASTM D120 and 
is valid for the proof-test currents listed in Table E-1. During the ac 
proof test, a gloves is filled with, and immersed in, water, and the 
water inside and outside the glove forms the electrodes. The ac proof-
test current is dependent on the length of the portion of the glove 
that is out of the water. Because the proof-test current is a function 
of immersion depth, it is important to specify the depth in the 
rule.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \22\ Atmospheric conditions might invalidate the test results at 
the clearances specified in Table E-3. For instance, under certain 
atmospheric conditions, the air between the water inside and outside 
the glove, which forms the two electrodes, might flash over, and 
thereby invalidate the test results and damage the glove. As another 
example, some atmospheric conditions can lead to excessive corona 
and the formation of ozone that ventilation cannot sufficiently 
dissipate. To account for these atmospheric conditions, final Table 
E-3 contains a note that provides that, if atmospheric conditions 
make these clearances impractical, the clearances may be increased 
by a maximum of 25 mm. (1 in.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Paragraph (a)(2)(ii)(C) requires that, after the 16-hour water soak 
specified in paragraph (a)(2)(i)(C), the 60-hertz proof-test current 
not exceed the values given in Table E-1 by more than 2 milliamperes. 
The allowable proof-test current must be increased for proof tests on 
gloves after a 16-hour water soak because the gloves absorb a small 
amount of water, which results in slightly increased current during the 
test. The final rule was derived from ASTM D120, which allows an 
increase in the proof-test current of 2 milliamperes. If the proof-test 
current increases more than 2 milliamperes, it indicates that the 
gloves absorbed too much water. OSHA has revised this provision in the 
final rule to indicate more clearly that it is a requirement rather 
than an exception.
    Paragraph (a)(2)(iii), which is being adopted without change from 
the proposed rule, prohibits electrical protective equipment that has 
been subjected to a minimum breakdown voltage test from being used to 
protect employees from electrical hazards. The relatively high voltages 
used in testing electrical protective equipment for minimum breakdown 
voltage can damage the insulating material under test (even if the 
equipment passes). The intent of this rule is to prohibit the use of 
equipment that has been tested for minimum breakdown voltage under 
conditions equivalent to those in the ASTM standards, because minimum 
breakdown tests are destructive. Such tests are performed only on 
equipment samples that are to be discarded.
    Paragraph (a)(2)(iv), which is being adopted as proposed, requires 
ozone-resistant material (Type II) to be capable of withstanding an 
ozone test that can reliably indicate that the material will resist 
ozone exposure in actual use. Standardized ozone tests are given in the 
ASTM specifications listed in the note following paragraph 
(a)(3)(ii)(B), and compliance with these specifications will be deemed 
compliance with this OSHA requirement. Around high-voltage lines and 
equipment, a luminous discharge, called electric corona, can occur due 
to ionization of the surrounding air caused by a voltage gradient that 
exceeds a certain critical value. The blue corona discharge is 
accompanied by a hissing noise and by ozone, which can cause damage to 
certain types of rubber insulating materials. Therefore, when there is 
a chance that ozone may be produced at a work location, electrical 
protective equipment made of ozone-resistant material is frequently 
used. The final rule ensures that ozone-resistant material will, in 
fact, be resistant to the deteriorating effects of the gas. The final 
rule also provides that visible signs of ozone deterioration, such as 
checking, cracking, breaks, and pitting, are evidence of failure to 
meet the requirements for ozone-resistant material.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \23\ ASTM F819-10, Standard Terminology Relating to Electrical 
Protective Equipment for Workers, which is listed in the note 
following paragraph (a)(3)(ii)(B), defines ``ozone cutting and 
checking'' as: ``Cracks produced by ozone in a material under 
mechanical stress.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Paragraph (a)(3) addresses the workmanship and finish of electrical 
protective equipment. Because physical irregularities can interfere 
with the insulating properties of the equipment and thus reduce the 
protection it affords, paragraph (a)(3)(i) prohibits the presence of 
physical irregularities that can adversely affect the insulating 
properties of the equipment and that can be detected by the tests or 
inspections required under other provisions in Sec.  1926.97. In the 
final rule, OSHA has revised the language for this provision to clarify 
that ``harmful physical irregularities'' (the term used in the 
proposal) means ``physical irregularities that can adversely affect the 
insulating properties of the equipment.''
    OSHA recognizes that some minor irregularities are nearly 
unavoidable in the manufacture of rubber goods, and

[[Page 20331]]

these imperfections may be present in the insulating materials without 
significantly affecting the insulation. Paragraph (a)(3)(ii), which is 
being adopted without change from the proposal, describes the types of 
imperfections that are permitted. Even with these imperfections, 
electrical protective equipment must be capable of passing the 
electrical tests specified in paragraph (a)(2).
    Since paragraph (a) of final Sec.  1926.97 is written in 
performance-oriented language, OSHA has included a note at the end of 
the paragraph stating that rubber insulating equipment meeting the 
requirements of the listed ASTM standards will be deemed in compliance 
with the performance requirements of final Sec.  1926.97(a). This list 
of ASTM standards references the latest revisions of those documents. 
The Agency has reviewed the referenced ASTM standards and has found 
them to provide suitable guidance for compliance with the performance 
criteria of Sec.  1926.97(a).\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \24\ See the extended discussion, earlier in this section of the 
preamble, on how to address future revisions of the listed consensus 
standards, as well as earlier versions of the listed consensus 
standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Paragraph (b). Paragraph (b) of final Sec.  1926.97 addresses 
electrical protective equipment other than the rubber insulating 
equipment addressed in paragraph (a). Equipment falling under this 
paragraph includes plastic guard equipment, insulating barriers, and 
other protective equipment intended to provide electrical protection to 
employees.
    Mr. Steven Theis, representing MYR Group, requested that OSHA 
clarify that equipment complying with the ASTM and IEEE consensus 
standards mentioned in the proposal would constitute compliance with 
the final rule (Ex. 0162). In the proposal, OSHA pointed to ASTM F712. 
OSHA has reviewed ASTM F712-06 (2011) and has found that it provides 
suitable guidance for plastic guard equipment that employers can use to 
comply with final Sec.  1926.97(b). To clarify the standard, OSHA has 
added a new note to paragraph (b) to indicate that OSHA will consider 
plastic guard equipment to conform to the performance requirements of 
paragraph (b) if it meets, and is used in accordance with, ASTM F712-06 
(2011).
    In the proposal, the Agency also pointed to IEEE Std 516, Guide for 
Maintenance Methods on Energized Power Lines, as support for the 
electrical criteria in proposed paragraph (b). The Agency has not 
referenced this consensus standard in the final rule. The IEEE standard 
does not contain specifications or test methods for electrical 
protective equipment. Instead, that consensus standard contains work 
methods for live-line work, including criteria for evaluating 
insulating tools and equipment. The Agency notes that the criteria for 
evaluating insulating tools and equipment specified in the IEEE 
standard are equivalent to the design criteria for electrical 
protective equipment contained in paragraph (b) in the final rule.
    Paragraph (b)(1), which is being adopted without substantive change 
from the proposed rule, requires electrical protective equipment to be 
capable of withstanding any voltage that might be imposed on it. The 
voltage that the equipment must withstand includes transient 
overvoltages, as well as the nominal voltage that is present on an 
energized part of an electric circuit. Equipment withstands a voltage 
if it maintains its integrity without flashover or arc through.
    Equipment conforming to a national consensus standard for that type 
of equipment will generally be considered as complying with this rule 
if that standard contains proof testing requirements for the voltage 
involved. In the proposal, OSHA considered accepting electrical 
protective equipment that was capable of passing a test equivalent to 
that described in ASTM F712 or IEEE Std 516 for types of equipment not 
addressed by any consensus standard. OSHA invited comments on whether 
these standards contain suitable test methods and whether equipment 
passing those tests should be acceptable under the OSHA standard.
    Rulemaking participants generally agreed that the consensus 
standards provide suitable guidance for the equipment they addressed. 
(See, for example, Exs. 0162, 0230.) For instance, IBEW stated:

    The test methods referenced in these standards are suitable for 
the types of equipment they are designed for . . . [This] equipment 
[has] proven to be acceptable for use in this industry. [Ex. 0230]

Mr. Steven Theis of MYR Group agreed that the ``specified standards 
contain suitable test methods'' (Ex. 0162).
    As noted previously, OSHA has reviewed ASTM F712-06 (2011) and 
found that it provides suitable guidance for compliance with final 
paragraph (b). The Agency has included a note in the final rule to 
indicate that plastic guard equipment is deemed to conform to the 
performance requirements of paragraph (b) if the equipment conforms to 
that consensus standard.
    ASTM maintained that none of the ASTM standards listed in the 
proposed standard contain an impulse test method for transient 
overvoltages (Ex. 0148). The organization recommended that the final 
rule reflect the current referenced consensus standards.
    ASTM misconstrues paragraph (b)(1) of the final rule. Paragraph 
(b)(1) of the final rule does not require impulse testing as ASTM 
alleges. Rather, it is a performance requirement that equipment be 
capable of withstanding both the steady-state voltages and transient 
(or impulse) overvoltages, to which it will be subjected. Both types of 
voltages can appear across the equipment during use. (See the summary 
and explanation for final Sec.  1926.960(c)(1), later in this section 
of the preamble, for a discussion of maximum transient overvoltages 
that can appear on electric power lines and equipment.)
    The typical test method contained in the ASTM standards for 
determining minimum breakdown voltage (or withstand voltage) requires 
testing at substantially higher voltages than those on which the 
equipment will be used. (See, for example, Exs. 0048, 0053, 0071.) In 
addition, minimum breakdown voltage testing is performed using a 
steadily rising ac voltage, in contrast to impulse testing, in which 
the overvoltage is applied for a very short period (id.). As noted in 
IEEE Std 516-2009, the existing standards for insulating tools and 
equipment do not address whether equipment passing the ac withstand 
voltage tests in those standards will also withstand transient voltage 
stresses (Ex. 0532). However, the IEEE standard suggests the use of a 
1.3 ratio to convert ac withstand voltages to impulse, or transient, 
voltages (id.). While the IEEE standard notes that research in this 
area is ongoing, OSHA concludes that, in the absence of better 
information, employers may rely on this ratio and multiply the ac 
minimum breakdown voltage for protective equipment by this value to 
determine if that equipment can withstand the expected transient 
overvoltages on energized circuits. For example, insulating equipment 
with a minimum breakdown, or withstand, voltage of 20,000 volts is 
capable of withstanding a maximum transient overvoltage of 26,000 
volts. This equipment would be acceptable for use to protect employees 
from phase-to-ground exposures on a circuit operating at 15-kilovolt, 
phase-

[[Page 20332]]

to-phase, with a 3.0 per unit maximum transient overvoltage.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \25\ The maximum impulse voltage for this equipment is 20 
kilovolts times 1.3, or 26 kilovolts. The maximum phase-to-ground 
use voltage for the equipment is 26 kilovolts divided by the maximum 
transient overvoltage in kilovolts, or 8.7 kilovolts. The phase-to-
phase circuit voltage for this exposure is 8.7 kilovolts times 
[radic]3, or 15 kilovolts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Alabama Rural Electric Association of Cooperatives, requested 
that OSHA provide a definition of ``transient overvoltage'' and a 
suggested method of calculation (Ex. 0224).
    IEEE Std 516-2009 contains the following suitable guidance 
(although, as stated earlier, the standard does not contain 
specifications or test methods for electrical protective equipment). 
First, the IEEE standard contains the industry-recognized definition of 
``transient overvoltage,'' which reads as follows:

    Voltage that exceeds the maximum operating line-to-ground 
voltage. This voltage may be the result of a transient or switching 
surge. [Ex. 0532 \26\]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \26\ This is the definition of ``overvoltage,'' for which 
``transient overvoltage'' is a synonym.

    Second, the IEEE consensus standard contains methods of determining 
the maximum transient overvoltage on an electric power generation, 
transmission, or distribution system and, as noted earlier, discusses 
comparing the ability of insulation equipment to withstand a transient 
overvoltage based on its ability to withstand voltages under more 
typical testing conditions (Ex. 0532). OSHA has not duplicated this 
information in Sec.  1926.97. It is copyrighted information that is 
publicly available. However, OSHA concludes that the IEEE standard 
provides suitable guidance that can assist employers in complying with 
paragraph (b)(1) and has added a reference to that consensus standard 
in the note following that paragraph in the final rule.
    The proposed rule invited comments on the need to set specific 
electrical performance values in the standard and on whether the 
electrical test criteria in ASTM F968 \27\ (which were summarized in 
Table IV-1 and Table IV-2 of the preamble to the proposal (70 FR 
34830)) could be applied to all types of electrical protective 
equipment covered by proposed paragraph (b). IBEW commented that the 
test values and use values in ASTM F968 are appropriate for 
electrically insulating plastic guard equipment, but suggested that the 
values are not suitable for other types of equipment because plastic 
guard equipment is designed to perform differently than other types of 
electrical protective equipment (Ex. 0230). Based on the IBEW comment, 
OSHA has not included in the final rule the values from Table IV-1 and 
Table IV-2. Moreover, since the final rule is written in performance 
terms, inclusion of values like those included in these tables is 
unnecessary.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \27\ The proposal noted that there were two ASTM standards 
addressing plastic guard equipment, F712, which contained test 
methods, and F968, which contained specifications (70 FR 34829-
34830, June 15, 2005). ASTM has since combined those two standards 
into a single one, F712-06 (2011), which contains both test methods 
and specifications for plastic guard equipment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Final paragraph (b)(2) addresses the properties of insulating 
equipment that limit the amount of current to which an employee is 
exposed. Paragraph (b)(2)(i), which is being adopted without change 
from the proposal, requires electrical protective equipment used as the 
primary insulation of employees from energized parts to be capable of 
passing a test for current (that is, a proof test) when subjected to 
the highest nominal voltage on which the equipment is to be used. 
Paragraph (b)(2)(ii), which is also being adopted as proposed, provides 
that during the test, the equipment current may not exceed 1 
microampere per kilovolt of phase-to-phase applied voltage. This 
requirement will prevent dangerous electric shock to employees by 
prohibiting use of both poor insulating materials and good insulating 
materials that are contaminated with conductive substances (for 
example, fiberglass-reinforced plastic coated with a conductive 
finish). The limit for current has been derived from IEEE Std 516, and 
OSHA believes such a limit is reasonable and appropriate.
    In the preamble to the proposed rule, the Agency invited comments 
on whether another value would better protect employees. IBEW commented 
on this issue as follows:

    The IEEE Standard 516 limit of 1 microampere per kilovolt of 
phase-to-phase applied voltage is appropriate for testing equipment 
used for primary insulation of employees from energized parts. This 
limit has apparently worked to keep inferior protective equipment 
of[f] the market. [Ex. 0230]

    One commenter was concerned that the proposed current limit might 
not protect employees in the event that a fault occurred (Ex. 0126). 
OSHA believes that this concern is unfounded. During a fault, the 
voltage on a circuit typically falls, and the equipment current would 
fall with it. Although it is possible that transient overvoltages may 
occur, either during a fault on an adjacent phase or during switching 
operations, such overvoltages are extremely short in duration, and the 
possible resulting increase in equipment current should not prove life-
threatening to employees.
    ASTM stated that the only one of its standards that includes a 1-
microampere per kilovolt requirement is ASTM F712 on plastic guard 
equipment (Ex. 0148). The organization recommended that OSHA limit this 
provision to this type of equipment.
    OSHA is not adopting ASTM's recommendation. The Agency notes that 
ASTM F712 is not the only ASTM standard that limits equipment current 
to values less than 1 microampere per kilovolt of test voltage. ASTM 
F711, Standard Specification for Fiberglass-Reinforced Plastic (FRP) 
Rod and Tube Used in Live Line Tools, limits maximum current during the 
dielectric testing prescribed in that standard to values substantially 
less than 1 microampere per kilovolt of test voltage (Ex. 0053).\28\ 
Further, as noted previously, this limit has been derived from IEEE Std 
516. Thus, OSHA concludes that the 1-microampere limit is reasonable 
and appropriate.\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \28\ Table 2 in ASTM F711-02 sets maximum leakage current for 
different types of rod and tube used in live-line tools (Ex. 0053). 
The highest value in this table is 14 microamperes. A note to the 
table provides that, for special applications, the maximum 
acceptable leakage current is twice the value listed in the table, 
so that 28 microamperes is the highest acceptable leakage current. 
The voltage applied during this test is 50 kilovolts. Thus, the 
maximum current is less than 1 microampere per kilovolt.
    \29\ It should be noted that the equipment current requirement 
contained in paragraph (b)(2) does not apply to rubber insulating 
equipment, which is covered by paragraph (a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Note 1 to paragraph (b)(2), which is being adopted without 
substantive change from the proposal, emphasizes that this paragraph 
applies to equipment that provides primary insulation from energized 
parts, which is consistent with the plain language of paragraph 
(b)(2)(i). The note also clarifies that paragraph (b)(2) does not apply 
to equipment used for secondary insulation or equipment used for brush 
contact only. OSHA considers primary insulation to be the insulation 
that is placed directly between an employee and an energized part or, 
for live-line barehand work, between an employee and ground. Insulation 
that supplements the primary insulation, for example, a second form of 
insulation placed between the employee and ground (in addition to the 
primary insulation), is secondary insulation.
    Note 2 to paragraph (b)(2), which is being adopted without change 
from the proposal, provides that when equipment is tested with ac 
voltage, the current measured during the test consists of three 
components: (1) Capacitive

[[Page 20333]]

current caused by the dielectric properties of the equipment being 
tested, (2) conduction current through the equipment, and (3) leakage 
current passing along the surface of the equipment. The conduction 
current is negligible for materials typically used in insulating 
equipment, and the leakage current should be small for clean, dry 
insulating equipment. The capacitive component usually predominates 
when insulating equipment is tested in good condition.
    OSHA expects that the tests required under final paragraphs (b)(1) 
and (b)(2) will normally be performed by the manufacturer during the 
design process and periodically during the manufacturing process. The 
Agency recognizes, however, that some employers might want to use 
equipment that is made of insulating materials but that was not 
intended by the manufacturer to be used as insulation. For example, a 
barrier made of rigid plastic may be intended for use as a general 
purpose barrier. An employer could test the barrier under paragraphs 
(b)(1) and (b)(2), and, if the equipment passes the tests, it would be 
acceptable for use as insulating electrical protective equipment.
    Paragraph (c). Although existing construction standards do not 
contain provisions for the care and use of insulating equipment, OSHA 
believes provisions of this type can contribute greatly to employee 
safety. Electrical protective equipment is, in large part, manufactured 
in accordance with the latest ASTM standards. This would probably be 
the case even in the absence of OSHA regulation. However, improper use 
and care of this equipment can easily reduce, or even eliminate, the 
protection afforded by this equipment. Therefore, OSHA proposed to add 
new requirements for the in-service care and use of electrical 
protective equipment to the design standards already contained in 
existing Sec.  1926.951(a)(1). These new provisions are being adopted 
in the final rule and will help ensure that these safety products 
retain their insulating properties.
    Paragraph (c)(1), which is being adopted without change from the 
proposal, requires electrical protective equipment to be maintained in 
a safe and reliable condition. This general, performance-oriented 
requirement, which applies to all equipment addressed by final Sec.  
1926.97, helps ensure that employees are fully protected from electric 
shock.
    Detailed criteria for the use and care of specific types of 
electrical protective equipment are contained in the following ASTM 
standards:

ASTM F478-09, Standard Specification for In-Service Care of 
Insulating Line Hose and Covers.
ASTM F479-06 (2011), Standard Specification for In-Service Care of 
Insulating Blankets.
ASTM F496-08, Standard Specification for In-Service Care of 
Insulating Gloves and Sleeves.

    The requirements in final paragraph (c)(2) are derived from these 
standards.
    Paragraph (c)(2) applies only to rubber insulating blankets, 
covers, line hose, gloves, and sleeves. No consensus standards address 
the care and use of other types of electrical protective equipment. 
Whereas the material design specifications for rubber insulating 
matting is addressed in Sec.  1926.97(a), the in-service care of this 
matting is not covered by any ASTM standard or by existing Sec.  
1910.137(b)(2). This type of equipment is generally permanently 
installed to provide supplementary protection against electric shock. 
Employees stand on the matting, and they are insulated from the floor, 
which is one of the grounds present in the work area. This provides a 
degree of protection from phase-to-ground electric shock. Because this 
type of equipment is normally left in place after it is installed, and 
because it is not relied on for primary protection from electric shock 
(the primary protection is provided by other insulating equipment or by 
insulating tools), it does not need to be tested on a periodic basis 
and need not be subject to the same careful inspection before use that 
other insulating equipment must receive. It should be noted, however, 
that rubber insulating matting is still required to be maintained in a 
safe, reliable condition under paragraph (c)(1).
    In final paragraph (c)(2)(i) and Table E-4, which are being adopted 
without substantive change from the proposal, OSHA is incorporating the 
margins of safety recognized in the ASTM standards by restricting the 
use of insulating equipment to voltages lower than the proof-test 
voltages given in Table E-1 and Table E-2. The rubber insulating 
equipment addressed in Sec.  1926.97(a) is to be used at lower voltages 
than the voltages the equipment is designed to withstand. For instance, 
although Class 4 equipment is currently designed to be capable of 
withstanding voltages of up to 40 kilovolts, the maximum use voltage 
for such equipment is 36 kilovolts (see also, for example, ASTM F496 on 
the care and use of rubber insulating gloves and sleeves). The use of 
insulating equipment at voltages less than the actual breakdown voltage 
provides a margin of safety for the employee.
    The maximum use voltage for class 3 equipment in Table E-4 in the 
final rule is being corrected to 26,500. OSHA proposed that the maximum 
use voltage for this class of equipment be 26,000. OSHA intended this 
cell in the proposed table to read 26,500, as it is in Table I-5 in 
existing Sec.  1910.137 and in the applicable consensus standards, but 
an inadvertent error in printing resulted in the wrong number being 
entered in the table.
    In the proposed rule, Note 1 to Table E-4 explained how the maximum 
use voltage of electrical protective equipment varies depending on 
whether multiphase exposure exists. In the general case, electrical 
protective equipment must be rated for the full phase-to-phase voltage 
of the lines or equipment on which work is being performed. This 
requirement ensures that employees are protected against the most 
severe possible exposure, that is, contact between one phase conductor 
and another. However, if the employee is only exposed to phase-to-
ground voltage, then the electrical protective equipment selected can 
be based on this lower voltage level (nominally, the phase-to-phase 
voltage divided by [radic]3). For example, a three-phase, solidly 
grounded, Y-connected overhead distribution system could be run as 
three phase conductors with a neutral or as three single-phase circuits 
with one phase conductor and a neutral each. If only one phase 
conductor is present on a pole, there is no multiphase exposure. If all 
three phase conductors are present, the multiphase exposure can be 
removed by insulating two of the phases or by isolating two of the 
phases.\30\ After the insulation is in place or while the employee is 
isolated from the other two phase conductors, there is no multiphase 
exposure, and electrical protective equipment rated for the phase-to-
ground voltage could be used.\31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \30\ Depending on the configuration of the system, an employee 
could be isolated from two of the phases on the pole by approaching 
one of the outside phase conductors and working on it from a 
position where there is no possibility of coming too close to the 
other two phase conductors. Isolation of the employee may be 
impossible for some line configurations.
    \31\ It should be noted that, until the multiphase exposure has 
actually been removed, the phase-to-phase voltage remains the 
maximum use voltage. Thus, the maximum use voltage of any insulation 
used to ``remove phase-to-phase exposure'' must be greater than or 
equal to the phase-to-phase voltage on the system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the proposal, the Agency requested information about whether 
employees can be insulated or isolated from multiphase exposure to 
ensure safe use of electrical protective equipment. The

[[Page 20334]]

comments generally supported the note to proposed Table E-4 and 
previously codified in Table I-5 in existing Sec.  1910.137. (See, for 
example, Exs. 0155, 0175, 0177, 0227.) Mr. Charles Kelly of EEI 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
explained:

    [T]he typical practice in the industry is for employees to cover 
the first phase from a position where the other phases cannot be 
reached. This practice isolates employees from multiphase exposure. 
Thus, the use of phase-to-ground voltage-rated equipment is safe.
    Many utilities use a class of equipment which is rated for the 
phase to ground voltage and rely on isolation and, to a lesser 
extent, cover-up equipment, to remove the potential for a multiphase 
exposure. Multiphase exposure is always avoided regardless of 
whether protective equipment (gloves or gloves and sleeves) is rated 
for the phase to phase voltage. Outside of rubber blankets, cover-up 
equipment is considered secondary protection against brush contact. 
Isolation from phases different than the one being worked on has 
always and will continue to be the primary form of defense against a 
phase to phase contact. The administrative control of cover on the 
way in and uncover on the way out ensures the cover-up equipment is 
placed from a position which isolates the worker. A worker will 
always cover the first phase from a position where he cannot reach 
the other phases. . . .
    The terminology for maximum use voltage in ASTM F-819 has always 
recognized this work practice: Thus, the ability to use phase to 
ground voltage rated equipment is considered by the industry to be 
both prudent and safe. [Ex. 0227; emphasis included in original]

    Mr. Thomas Taylor of Consumers Energy agreed that these practices 
isolate employees from multiphase exposure so that using equipment 
based on the phase-to-ground voltage is safe (Ex. 0177). Ms. Salud 
Layton of the Virginia, Maryland & Delaware Association of Electric 
Cooperatives similarly believed that using isolating work practices can 
minimize employee exposure. She stated that, while ``isolation or 
insulation of the employee from differing potentials in the work zone 
is limited to the ability of the insulating equipment to cover exposed 
parts,'' work practices can greatly minimize employee exposure (Ex. 
0175).
    IBEW did not specifically object to the language in the note to 
proposed Table E-4, but cautioned:

    To ensure a worker is isolated from contact to an energized 
circuit, the isolating device has to physically prohibit the worker 
from making contact, and the device has to maintain the electrical 
integrity of the energized circuit. Although the isolating device 
does not need to be permanent, the device should have the physical 
strength to ensure isolation in the case of a slip or fall, and 
other types of unintentional movements. [Ex. 0230]

The union also maintained that ``the insulating value of the equipment 
would have to be . . . rated at the phase-to-phase voltage of the 
circuit being worked'' (id.).
    Another commenter, however, objected to the preamble statements 
that permitted using phase-to-ground rated insulation, stating: 
``Industry practice has always been to use protective equipment rated 
for the phase-to-phase rms voltage'' (Ex. 0184).
    After considering the rulemaking record on this issue, OSHA 
concludes that the note to proposed Table E-4 is necessary and 
appropriate and has carried it forward into the final rule without 
substantive change. The comments broadly supported the proposed note. 
In addition, the note is identical to Note 1 to Table I-5 of existing 
Sec.  1910.137. As observed by the commenters, when multiphase exposure 
has been removed, by either isolating or insulating the employee, the 
worker is adequately protected against electric shock from the 
remaining phase-to-ground exposure by using phase-to-ground rated 
electrical protective equipment. The extent to which the note was 
supported contradicts the comment that industry practice is to use 
phase-to-phase rated electrical protective equipment. To address IBEW's 
concerns, OSHA emphasizes that any insulation used to remove multiphase 
exposure must adequately protect workers carrying out their tasks from 
factors that could negate the insulation's purpose. These factors 
include, among other things, worker movements such as reaching for 
tools, adjusting clothing or personal protective equipment, and slips 
and falls. Finally, OSHA agrees with IBEW that insulation used to 
protect employees from phase-to-phase exposure must be rated for the 
phase-to-phase exposure. After all, until this protective equipment is 
installed, there is phase-to-phase exposure.
    Paragraph (c)(2)(ii), which is being adopted substantially as 
proposed, requires insulating equipment to be visually inspected before 
use each day and immediately after any incident that can reasonably be 
suspected of causing damage. In this way, obvious defects can be 
detected before an accident occurs. Possible damage-causing incidents 
include exposure to corona and direct physical damage. Additionally, 
rubber gloves must be subjected to an air test, along with the visual 
inspection. In the field, this test usually consists of rolling the 
cuff towards the palm so that air is entrapped within the glove. In a 
testing facility, a mechanical inflater is typically used. In either 
case, punctures and cuts can easily be detected. The note following 
paragraph (c)(2)(ii) indicates that ASTM F1236-96 (2012), Standard 
Guide for Visual Inspection of Electrical Protective Rubber Products, 
contains information on how to inspect rubber insulating equipment and 
descriptions and photographs of potential irregularities in the 
equipment.
    Electrical protective equipment could become damaged during use and 
lose some of its insulating value. Final paragraph (c)(2)(iii), which 
is being adopted without substantive change from the proposal, lists 
types of damage that cause the insulating value of rubber insulating 
equipment to drop, for example, a hole, tear, puncture, or cut, or an 
embedded foreign object. The equipment may not be used if any of the 
defects listed here or in paragraph (c)(2)(iii), or any other defect 
that damages its insulating properties, is present.
    Defects other than those listed in paragraph (c)(2)(iii) might 
develop during use of the equipment and could also affect the 
insulating or mechanical properties of the equipment. If such defects 
are found, paragraph (c)(2)(iv), which is being adopted without change 
from the proposal, requires the equipment to be removed from service 
and tested in accordance with other requirements in paragraph (c)(2). 
The results of the tests will determine if it is safe to return the 
items to service.
    Foreign substances on the surface of rubber insulating equipment 
can degrade the material and lead to damage to the insulation. 
Paragraph (c)(2)(v), which is being adopted as proposed, requires the 
equipment to be cleaned as needed to remove any foreign substances.
    Over time, certain environmental conditions can also cause 
deterioration of rubber insulating equipment. Final paragraph 
(c)(2)(vi), which is being adopted without substantive change from the 
proposal, requires insulating equipment to be stored so that it is 
protected from damaging conditions and substances, such as light, 
temperature extremes, excessive humidity, and ozone. This requirement 
helps the equipment retain its insulating properties as it ages. OSHA 
has replaced the proposed term ``injurious substances and conditions'' 
with ``damaging substances and conditions'' to make it clear that the 
equipment must be protected from substances and conditions that might 
damage it rather

[[Page 20335]]

than substances and conditions that could injure workers.
    In connection with this requirement, the Agency does not believe 
that it is safe to store equipment on trucks for extended periods 
between use if such storage would expose the equipment to extremes of 
temperature or humidity. It may be necessary, under some circumstances, 
to store equipment indoors during prolonged periods when employees are 
not using the equipment. Workers are dependent upon electrical 
protective equipment for their safety, and all reasonable means of 
protecting it from unnecessary damage must be employed.
    Rubber insulating gloves are particularly sensitive to physical 
damage during use. Through handling conductors and other electrical 
equipment, an employee can damage the gloves and lose the protection 
they provide. For example, a sharp point on the end of a conductor 
could puncture the rubber. To protect against damage, protector gloves 
(made of leather) are worn over the rubber gloves. Paragraph 
(c)(2)(vii) recognizes the extra protection afforded by leather gloves 
and requires their use over rubber gloves, except under limited 
conditions.
    Proposed paragraph (c)(2)(vii)(A) provided that protector gloves 
are not required with Class 0 or Class 00 gloves under limited-use 
conditions, that is, when unusually high finger dexterity is needed for 
small equipment and parts manipulation. This exception is necessary to 
allow work to be performed on small energized parts. The Agency is 
adopting the proposed provision with one revision. Under paragraph 
(c)(2)(i) and Table E-4, which are being adopted without substantive 
change from the proposal, the maximum voltage on which Class 0 and 
Class 00 gloves can be used is 1,000 volts and 500 volts, respectively. 
Mr. James A Thomas, President of ASTM International, pointed out that 
Section 8.7.4 of ASTM F496 restricts the use of Class 00 rubber 
insulating gloves to voltages of 250 volts, ac, or less when they are 
used without protectors (Ex. 0148). Moreover, the consensus standard 
also includes a maximum dc voltage for Class 00 gloves used without 
protectors. Section 8.7.4 of ASTM F496-02a, Standard Specification for 
In-Service Care of Insulating Gloves and Sleeves, states:

    Protector gloves may be omitted for Class 0 gloves, under 
limited use conditions, where small equipment and parts manipulation 
require unusually good finger dexterity. Under the same conditions, 
Class 00 gloves may be used without protectors, but only at voltages 
up to and including 250 V a-c or 375 V d-c. Other classes of gloves 
may be used without protector gloves for similar conditions only 
where the possibility of physical damage to the gloves is unlikely 
and provided the voltage class of the glove used is one class above 
the voltage exposure. Rubber insulating gloves that have been used 
without protectors shall not be used with protectors until given an 
inspection and electrical retest. [Ex. 0051]

    Based on Section 8.7.4 of ASTM F496-02a, the Agency concludes that 
using Class 00 gloves without protectors on voltages above 250 volts, 
ac, or 375 volts, dc, is considered to be unsafe by the experts on the 
consensus standards committee.\32\ In the final rule, OSHA has 
therefore included a new paragraph (c)(2)(vii)(B) addressing the use of 
Class 00 gloves and incorporating these two voltage restrictions on the 
use of Class 00 gloves without protectors. Consequently, OSHA 
renumbered proposed paragraphs (c)(2)(vii)(B) and (c)(2)(vii)(C) as 
paragraphs (c)(2)(vii)(C) and (c)(2)(vii)(D), respectively, and is 
adopting them without substantive change.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \32\ ASTM F496-08 contains an identical requirement in Section 
8.7.4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As noted earlier, if protector gloves are not worn, there is a 
danger a sharp object could puncture the rubber. The resulting hole 
could endanger employees handling live parts because of the possibility 
that current could arc through the hole to the employee's hand or that 
leakage could develop and expose the employee to electric shock. At 250 
volts, ac, or less, or 375 volts, dc, or less, for Class 00 gloves, and 
at 1,000 volts or less for Class 0 gloves, the danger of current 
passing through a hole is low, and an employee is protected against 
electric shock as long as the live part itself does not puncture the 
rubber and contact the employee's hand (59 FR 4328). Although the type 
of small parts, such as small nuts and washers, encountered in work 
covered by the exception are not likely to do this, the danger still 
exists (id.). OSHA, therefore, is adopting, without substantive change 
from the proposal, a note to final paragraph (c)(2)(vii)(A) that 
provides that persons inspecting rubber insulating gloves used under 
these conditions need to take extra care in visually examining them and 
that employees using the gloves under these conditions need to take 
extra care to avoid handling sharp objects.
    Under paragraph (c)(2)(vii)(C), classes of rubber insulating gloves 
other than Class 0 and Class 00 may be used without protector gloves 
only if: (1) The employer can demonstrate that the possibility for 
physical damage to the glove is small, and (2) gloves at least one 
class higher than required for the voltage are used. For example, if a 
Class 2 glove is used at 7,500 volts or less (the maximum use voltage 
for Class 1 equipment pursuant to Table E-4) and the employer can 
demonstrate that the possibility of damage is low, then protector 
gloves need not be used. The final rule ensures that, under the 
conditions imposed by the exception, damage is unlikely, and the rule 
further reduces the risk to the employee by requiring thicker 
insulation as a measure of extra physical protection that will better 
resist puncture during use.\33\ In addition, the consensus standard 
permits these classes of rubber insulating gloves to be used without 
protectors under the same conditions (Ex. 0051). This exception does 
not apply when the possibility of damage is significant, such as when 
an employee is using a knife to trim insulation from a conductor or 
when an employee has to handle moving parts, such as conductors being 
pulled into place.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \33\ The thickness of the rubber increases with increasing class 
of rubber insulating glove (for example, from Class 0 to Class 1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Mr. Brockman with Farmers Rural Electric Cooperative Corporation 
recommended, without explanation, that there should be no exception 
permitting the use of rubber insulating gloves above Class 0 without 
protectors (Ex. 0173).
    The Agency rejects this recommendation. OSHA has explained that it 
is safe to use Class 1 and higher rubber insulating gloves without 
protectors under the conditions imposed by final paragraph 
(c)(2)(vii)(C). OSHA notes, however, that electric power generation, 
transmission, and distribution work covered by Sec.  1910.269 and 
subpart V will nearly always pose a substantial probability of physical 
damage to rubber insulating gloves worn without protectors. Thus, the 
exception contained in paragraph (c)(2)(vii)(C) will rarely apply when 
rubber insulating gloves are used for that type of work. However, 
electrical protective equipment covered by Sec.  1926.97 is used 
outside of electric power generation, transmission, and distribution 
work, and there may be rare cases in these other types of work, for 
example, in product manufacturing or testing laboratories, in which the 
possibility of damage is slight.
    To ensure that no loss of insulation has occurred, paragraph 
(c)(2)(vii)(D) prohibits any rubber insulating gloves used without 
protector gloves from being reused until the rubber gloves have been 
tested in accordance with paragraphs (c)(2)(viii) and (c)(2)(ix),

[[Page 20336]]

which address required test voltages and the adequacy of the test 
method, respectively. It should be noted that this testing is required 
regardless of whether the glove is Class 0 or 00, as permitted in 
paragraphs (c)(2)(vii)(A) and (c)(2)(vii)(B), or is Class 1 or higher, 
as permitted in paragraph (c)(2)(vii)(C).
    The National Electrical Contractors Association (NECA) and several 
NECA chapters objected to the requirement to test rubber insulating 
gloves after use without protectors. (See, for example, Exs. 0127, 
0171, 0172, 0188.) They argued that there was no safety benefit and 
that the increased frequency of testing would be a burden on employers. 
For example, NECA stated:

    The preamble doesn't include any information on electrical 
injuries resulting from the failure of insulated gloves used without 
leather protectors. Thus, requiring insulating gloves to be retested 
after each use without a protector is a burden upon the employer 
without offering any additional safety to employees. When using 
gloves in Classes 1-4, protectors often must be removed for reasons 
of manual dexterity, but the parts being worked on are fairly large 
which minimizes the likelihood for damage. Current techniques of 
inspecting and air-testing insulating gloves are sufficient to 
identify damaged gloves. [Ex. 0171]

    Another commenter, Mr. Tom Chappell of the Southern Company, argued 
that an accelerated testing schedule (every 90 days instead of every 6 
months) should be an acceptable alternative to testing each time a 
rubber insulating glove is used without a protector (Ex. 0212).
    OSHA disagrees with these objections. First, the consensus standard 
also contains this requirement, which indicates that the consensus of 
expert opinion considers that the requirement provides necessary 
additional safety to employees (Ex. 0051). Second, a visual inspection 
and air test may not detect minor damage that a voltage test will. Even 
Mr. Chappell believes that additional testing is required to supplement 
the visual inspection. Third, testing on an accelerated schedule would 
allow such damage to go undetected until the next test, which could be 
as long as 89 days under Mr. Chappell's recommended testing regimen. 
Fourth, OSHA believes that the requirement to test rubber insulating 
gloves used without protectors will strongly discourage any unnecessary 
use of the gloves without protectors because of the expense of the test 
and because testing gloves shortens their useful life. Finally, any 
additional burden on employers is insubstantial, as employers are 
already required to do much of the testing specified by the final rule. 
In addition, existing Sec.  1910.137(b)(2)(vii)(B) already requires 
gloves used without protectors to be tested before being used at a 
higher voltage.\34\ Therefore, OSHA has carried forward proposed 
paragraph (c)(2)(vii)(C) into the final rule without change.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \34\ Existing Sec.  1910.137(b)(2)(vii)(B) only requires gloves 
to be tested before being used on a higher voltage. The final rule 
adopts the proposed revision to this requirement so that rubber 
insulating gloves used without protectors must be tested before 
reuse after any use without protector gloves. For the purposes of 
Sec. Sec.  1926.97(c)(2)(vii)(D) and 1910.137(c)(2)(vii)(D), 
``reuse'' means any use after the limited use permitted without 
protector gloves.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Paragraph (c)(2)(viii), which is being adopted as proposed, 
requires insulating equipment to be tested periodically at the test 
voltages and testing intervals specified in Table E-4 and Table E-5, 
respectively. These tests will verify that electrical protective 
equipment retains its insulating properties over time. Table E-4 lists 
the retest voltages that are required for the various classes of 
protective equipment, and Table E-5 presents the testing intervals for 
the different types of equipment. These test voltages and intervals 
were derived from the relevant ASTM standards.
    Mr. Thomas Frank of Ameren Company objected to the inclusion of 
rubber insulating line hose in proposed Table E-4 and Table E-5 (Ex. 
0209). He argued that the applicable consensus standard does not 
designate a test method for this equipment.
    OSHA disagrees with this objection. Contrary to Mr. Frank's 
assertion, ASTM D1050, Standard Specification for Rubber Insulating 
Line Hose, does contain test methods for rubber insulating line hose 
(Ex. 0068).\35\ Table E-5, which specifies test intervals for rubber 
insulating equipment, only requires testing of line hose either when 
the insulating value is suspect \36\ or after repair. In these cases, 
testing is the only way of ensuring that the insulating properties of 
the equipment are at an acceptable level (id.). After all, paragraph 
(a)(2)(i) requires rubber insulating equipment to be capable of passing 
electrical tests. When the insulating value of the equipment is 
suspect, or when the equipment has been altered, as it will have been 
during any repair, there is simply no way other than testing to 
determine whether the equipment retains the required insulating value. 
Therefore, OSHA has carried proposed Table E-4 and Table E-5 into the 
final rule without substantive change.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \35\ Both the 1990 edition of ASTM D1050 referenced in the note 
to existing Sec.  1910.137(b)(2)(ix) and the 2005 edition referenced 
in the note to final Sec.  1926.97(c)(2)(ix) contain test methods 
for rubber insulating line hose.
    \36\ The insulating value of rubber insulating equipment is 
suspect when the inspection required by final paragraph (c)(2)(ii) 
leads to questions about the quality of the insulation or uncovers 
any damage to the insulating equipment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Paragraph (c)(2)(ix), which is being adopted without change from 
the proposal, establishes a performance-oriented requirement that the 
method used for the tests required by paragraphs (c)(2)(viii) and 
(c)(2)(xi) (the periodic and postrepair tests, respectively) give a 
reliable indication of whether the electrical protective equipment can 
withstand the voltages involved. As this is a performance-oriented 
standard, OSHA does not spell out detailed procedures for the required 
tests, which will obviously vary depending on the type of equipment 
being tested.
    Following paragraph (c)(2)(ix) is a note stating that the 
electrical test methods in various listed ASTM standards on rubber 
insulating equipment will be deemed to meet the performance 
requirement. As mentioned earlier, this note does not mean that OSHA is 
adopting the listed ASTM standards by reference. In enforcing Sec.  
1926.97(c)(2)(ix), the Agency will accept any test method that meets 
the performance criteria of the OSHA standard.
    Once equipment has undergone in-service inspections and tests, it 
is important to ensure that any failed equipment is not returned to 
service. Final paragraph (c)(2)(x), which is being adopted without 
change from the proposal, prohibits the use of electrical protective 
equipment that failed the required inspections and tests. Paragraph 
(c)(2)(x) does, however, list the following acceptable means of 
eliminating defects and rendering the equipment fit for use again.
    The final standard permits defective portions of rubber line hose 
and blankets to be removed in some cases. The result would be a smaller 
blanket or a shorter length of line hose. Under the standard, Class 1, 
2, 3, and 4 rubber insulating blankets may only be salvaged by severing 
the defective portions of the blanket if the resulting undamaged area 
is at least 560 millimeters by 560 millimeters (22 inches by 22 
inches). For these classes, smaller sizes cannot be reliably tested 
using standard test methods. Although the standard does not restrict 
the size of Class 0 blankets, OSHA believes that practical 
considerations in testing and using Class 0 blankets will force 
employers to similarly limit the size of these blankets when they have 
been repaired by cutting out a damaged portion.

[[Page 20337]]

    Obviously, gloves and sleeves cannot be repaired by removing a 
defective portion; however, the final standard permits patching rubber 
insulating gloves and sleeves if the defects are minor. Blankets may 
also be patched under certain circumstances. Moreover, rubber 
insulating gloves and sleeves with minor surface blemishes may be 
repaired with a compatible liquid compound. In all cases (that is, 
whether a patch is applied or a liquid compound is employed), the 
repaired area must have electrical and physical properties equal to 
those of the material being repaired.
    Repairs performed in accordance with the standard are unlikely to 
fail because the rule requires the use of compatible patches or 
compatible liquid compounds and requires the repaired area to have 
electrical and physical properties equal to those of the surrounding 
material. However, to minimize the possibility that glove repairs will 
fail, repairs to rubber insulating gloves outside the gauntlet area 
(that is, the area between the wrist and the reinforced edge of the 
opening) are not allowed. OSHA stresses that the final rule does not 
permit repairs in the working area of the glove, where the constant 
flexing of the rubber during the course of work could loosen an ill-
formed patch. A failure of a patch or liquid compound in this area of 
the glove would likely lead to injury very quickly. On the other hand, 
the gauntlet area of rubber insulating gloves is not usually in direct 
contact with energized parts. If a patch fails in this area, a worker 
is much less likely to be injured.
    Farmers Rural Electric Cooperative Corporation recommended, without 
explanation, that OSHA not permit patching of rubber insulating gloves 
and sleeves (Ex. 0173). OSHA rejects this recommendation. OSHA has 
explained that it is safe only to patch insulating gloves and sleeves 
under the conditions imposed by final paragraph (c)(2)(x)(D).
    Once the insulating equipment has been repaired, it must be 
retested to ensure that any patches are effective and that there are no 
other defects present. Such retests are required under paragraph 
(c)(2)(xi), which is being adopted without change from the proposal.
    Employers, employees, and OSHA compliance staff must have a method 
of determining whether the tests required under this section have been 
performed. Paragraph (c)(2)(xii) requires this determination to be 
accomplished by means of certification by the employer that equipment 
has been tested in accordance with the standard. The certification is 
required to identify the equipment that passed the test and the date it 
was tested. Typical means of meeting this requirement include logs and 
stamping test dates on the equipment. A note following paragraph 
(c)(2)(xii) explains that these means of certification are acceptable. 
As explained under the summary and explanation for paragraph (a)(1)(ii) 
earlier in this section of the preamble, the final rule, unlike the 
proposal, includes an explicit requirement that employers make this 
certification available upon request to employees and their authorized 
representatives. OSHA has also clarified the requirement to indicate 
that the certification records must be made available upon request to 
the Assistant Secretary for Occupational Safety and Health.

B. Subpart V, Electric Power Transmission and Distribution

    OSHA is revising subpart V of its construction standards. This 
subpart contains requirements designed to prevent deaths and other 
injuries to employees performing construction work on electric power 
transmission and distribution installations. OSHA based the revision of 
subpart V primarily on the general industry standard at Sec.  1910.269, 
Electric power generation, transmission, and distribution, which the 
Agency promulgated in January 1994. The final standard revises the 
title of subpart V from ``Power Transmission and Distribution'' to 
``Electric Power Transmission and Distribution'' to make it clear that 
the subpart addresses ``electric'' power transmission and distribution 
(and not mechanical power transmission) and to match the title of Sec.  
1910.269 more closely.
1. Section 1926.950, General
    Section 1926.950 defines the scope of final subpart V and includes, 
among other provisions, general requirements for training and the 
determination of existing workplace conditions. Paragraph (a)(1)(i) of 
final Sec.  1926.950 is adopted without change from proposed Sec.  
1926.950(a)(1) and sets the scope of revised subpart V. This paragraph 
has been taken largely from existing Sec.  1926.950(a) and (a)(1). 
Subpart V applies to the construction of electric power transmission 
and distribution installations. In accordance with existing Sec.  
1926.950(a)(1) and Sec.  1910.12(d), paragraph (a)(1)(i) of final Sec.  
1926.950 provides that ``construction'' includes the erection of new 
electric transmission and distribution lines and equipment, and the 
alteration, conversion, and improvement of existing electric 
transmission and distribution lines and equipment.
    As noted in Section II, Background, earlier in this preamble, 
rulemaking participants generally supported OSHA's goal of providing 
consistency between Sec.  1910.269 and subpart V. However, many 
commenters urged the Agency to combine Sec.  1910.269 and subpart V 
into a single standard applicable to all electric power generation, 
transmission, and distribution work. (See, for example, Exs. 0099, 
0125, 0127, 0146, 0149, 0151, 0152, 0153, 0156, 0159, 0161, 0164, 0172, 
0175, 0179, 0180, 0183, 0186, 0188, 0202, 0206, 0225, 0226, 0229, 0231, 
0233, 0239, 0241, 0401; Tr. 291-294, 542-543, 1235-1236, 1282-1283, 
1322, 1332.) These rulemaking participants argued that several benefits 
would result from combining Sec.  1910.269 and subpart V into a single 
standard, including:
     Lessening confusion--a single standard would eliminate 
questions about whether work is construction or maintenance and ensure 
uniform interpretations for all generation, transmission, and 
distribution work (see, for example, Exs. 0146, 0151, 0152, 0156, 0175, 
0183, 0202, 0233);
     Facilitating compliance and reducing costs--under a single 
standard, employers would be able to train workers in a single set of 
rules rather than one set for construction and another set for 
maintenance (Tr. 293-294); and
     Eliminating the need to maintain and update two standards 
over time (see, for example, Exs. 0127, 0149, 0152, 0179).
    OSHA is rejecting these recommendations to combine Sec.  1910.269 
and subpart V into a single standard. First, OSHA does not believe that 
employers will have to maintain separate sets of rules for construction 
and maintenance. Because the final rule largely adopts identical 
requirements for construction and maintenance, OSHA expects that 
employers will be able to fashion a single set of rules, consistent 
with both Sec.  1910.269 and subpart V, that apply regardless of the 
type of work being performed. In the final standard, OSHA is adopting 
different rules in a few cases, based on fundamental differences 
between the other construction standards in part 1926 and the general 
industry standards in part 1910. For example, Sec.  1910.269 and 
subpart V reference the general industry and construction standards on 
medical services and first aid in Sec. Sec.  1910.151 and 1926.50, 
respectively. These general industry and construction standards set 
slightly different requirements for

[[Page 20338]]

medical services and first aid. Similarly, Sec.  1910.269 and subpart V 
separately reference the general industry and construction standards on 
ladders. The differences between the construction and general industry 
standards that may apply to electric power generation, transmission, 
and distribution work go well beyond the few examples described here. 
It is beyond the reach of this rulemaking to unify all of the different 
general industry and construction standards that apply to electric 
power generation, transmission, and distribution work. Consequently, 
any employer that performs both general industry and construction work 
will need to ensure compliance with applicable provisions in both part 
1910 and part 1926. Even if OSHA were to adopt one electric power 
generation, transmission, and distribution standard, employers would 
still be faced with differences between other requirements in the 
general industry and construction standards.
    Second, commenters' concerns over differences in language and 
interpretation are largely unfounded. As noted in the preamble to the 
proposal, one of the primary goals of this rulemaking is to make the 
requirements for construction and maintenance consistent with one 
another. The Agency will take steps to ensure that interpretations of 
identical requirements in the two standards are the same. Toward this 
end, the Agency is including a note to final Sec.  1926.950(a)(1)(i) to 
indicate that an employer that complies with Sec.  1910.269 generally 
will be considered in compliance with the requirements in subpart V. 
There is a minor exception for provisions in subpart V that incorporate 
by reference requirements from other subparts of part 1926. For those 
provisions of subpart V, the employer must comply with the referenced 
construction standards; compliance with general industry standards 
referenced in comparable provisions of Sec.  1910.269 will not be 
sufficient. The new note to Sec.  1926.950(a)(1) should allay the 
concerns of commenters about potentially inconsistent interpretations 
of identical requirements in Sec.  1910.269 and subpart V. The note 
should also assure employers that they can adopt uniform work practices 
for the construction, operation, and maintenance of electric power 
generation, transmission, and distribution installations with regard to 
these requirements.
    Ameren Corporation was concerned that OSHA would ``make significant 
and costly changes to the current 1910.269 standard without adequately 
providing the opportunity for utilities to study and comment on the 
impact to these changes'' (Ex. 0209). The company requested that the 
Agency provide the utility industry with an opportunity to comment on 
any changes to existing Sec.  1910.269 that were not identified in the 
proposal.
    OSHA does not believe additional notice and opportunity for comment 
is necessary for any of the revisions to Sec.  1910.269 being made in 
this final rule. In the preamble to the proposed rule, the Agency 
stated:

    OSHA expects that final Subpart V will differ from proposed 
Subpart V because of changes adopted based on the rulemaking record. 
When the final rule is published, the Agency intends to make 
corresponding changes to Sec.  1910.269 to keep the two rules the 
same, except to the extent that substantial differences between 
construction work and general industry work warrant different 
standards. [70 FR 34892]

The Agency met this objective in this final rule. OSHA concludes that 
any revisions to existing Sec.  1910.269 adopted in the final rule are 
based on the record considered as a whole and are a logical outgrowth 
of the rulemaking record.
    Mr. Anthony Ahern with Ohio Rural Electric Cooperatives recommended 
that OSHA combine Sec. Sec.  1910.137 and 1926.97, or simply reference 
Sec.  1910.137, instead of creating a new section on electrical 
protective equipment in the construction standards (Ex. 0186).
    OSHA rejects this request. New Sec.  1926.97 applies to all of 
construction, not just electric power generation, transmission, and 
distribution work. Final Sec.  1926.97 imposes no additional burden on 
employers beyond what would apply under Sec.  1910.137. Duplicating the 
Sec.  1910.137 requirements in part 1926 meets the needs of 
construction employers and employees for ready access to the protective 
equipment standards that are applicable to their work.
    Ms. Salud Layton of the Virginia, Maryland & Delaware Association 
of Electric Cooperatives objected to the word ``improvement'' in 
proposed Sec.  1926.950(a)(1) (Ex. 0175). Ms. Layton also expressed 
concern about a part of the preamble to the proposed rule in which OSHA 
used the term ``repair'' to describe construction activities (id.). She 
commented:

    As defined in the regulation, ``construction'' includes 
``erection of new transmission and distribution lines and equipment, 
and the alteration, conversion, and improvement of existing electric 
transmission and distribution lines and equipment.[''] While 
``alteration'' and ``conversion'' can be construed as construction 
activities, the term ``improvement'' is too broad. Many maintenance 
activities are considered improvements. Additionally, the preamble 
uses the term ``repair'' in describing construction activities. 
Repairs are typically considered maintenance activities in our 
industry, further complicating this issue. [id.]

    OSHA considered Ms. Layton's comments, but decided to adhere to its 
longstanding practice of treating ``improvements'' and ``repairs'' as 
construction. The term ``improvement'' has been a part of the 
definition of construction work under Subpart V for decades. 
Furthermore, as noted earlier, this definition is codified in 29 CFR 
1910.12(d). In addition, removing the term would have no practical 
effect on the definition, as all improvements are ``alterations,'' a 
term to which she did not object. OSHA has consistently treated 
``repairs'' as construction work as well. See Sec.  1910.12(b) 
(``Construction work means work for construction, alteration, and/or 
repair. . . .''). OSHA recognizes that there may not always be a clear 
distinction between construction repair and general industry 
maintenance and has provided clarification in numerous letters of 
interpretation, including the Agency's Memorandum for Regional 
Administrators dated August 11, 1994.\37\ That memorandum explains 
construction work as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \37\ This document is available at https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=INTERPRETATIONS&p_id=21569.

    [C]onstruction work is not limited to new construction. It 
includes the repair of existing facilities. The replacement of 
structures and their components is also considered construction 
work.
* * * * *
    There is no specified definition for ``maintenance'', nor a 
clear distinction between terms such as ``maintenance'', ``repair'', 
or ``refurbishment.'' ``Maintenance activities'' can be defined as 
making or keeping a structure, fixture or foundation (substrates) in 
proper condition in a routine, scheduled, or anticipated fashion. 
This definition implies ``keeping equipment working in its existing 
state, i.e., preventing its failure or decline.'' However, this 
definition, (taken from the directive on confined spaces) is not 
dispositive; and, consequently, determinations of whether a 
contractor is engaged in maintenance operations rather than 
construction activities must be made on a case-by-case basis, taking 
into account all information available at a particular site. 
[Emphasis included in original.]

(See also, for example, letter to Raymond Knobbs (Nov. 18, 2003) and 
letter to Randall Tindell (Feb. 1, 1999).\38\) In addition, the 
Occupational

[[Page 20339]]

Safety and Health Review Commission (OSHRC) has addressed this issue. 
(See, for example, Gulf States Utilities Co., 12 BNA OSHC 1544 (No. 82-
867, Nov. 20, 1985).) In any event, one of OSHA's primary objectives in 
this rulemaking is to make Sec.  1910.269 and subpart V more consistent 
with each other. Therefore, going forward, the distinction between 
construction and maintenance will be of much less significance to 
employers covered by these standards. Even Ms. Layton recognized that 
her concern about the definition of construction was only relevant 
``[i]f the regulations are not the same'' (Ex. 0175). The proposed 
definition of ``construction'' in Sec.  1926.950(a)(1) is, therefore, 
being carried forward into the final rule without change.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \38\ The Knobbs and Tindell letters are available at: https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=INTERPRETATIONS&p_id=24789 and https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=INTERPRETATIONS&p_id=22687, 
respectively.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Mr. Kenneth Stoller of the American Insurance Association inquired 
about the applicability of the revised standards to insurance industry 
employees, stating:

    AIA is concerned that the new contractor obligations 
contemplated by the proposal with respect to training, reporting, 
record-keeping and personal protective equipment may unintentionally 
apply to insurance industry employees, whose only obligation is to 
inspect--but not work on--some of the electrical equipment in 
question. While our members are neither electrical utilities nor 
electrical construction companies, some of their commissioned 
inspectors are required to visit and inspect equipment that is both 
energized and open. In addition, some state laws identify certain 
equipment (such as pressure vessels) located within close proximity 
to energized and open electrical apparatus that must be inspected 
periodically.
    Subjecting insurers to these new requirements would require 
individual companies to spend tens of thousands of dollars per year 
for additional training and equipment, notwithstanding the fact that 
the proposal's preamble indicates that these obligations should only 
apply to entities performing maintenance and repairs, not simply 
inspections. Accordingly, we recommend that the proposal be amended 
to explicitly exempt insurance industry employees from any 
obligations it places on contractors. [Ex. 0198]

    OSHA considered this comment, but will not be exempting insurance 
industry employees from the final rule. Existing Sec.  1910.269 already 
covers inspections of electric power generation, transmission, and 
distribution installations performed by insurance company workers as 
work ``directly associated with'' these installations. In this regard, 
existing Sec.  1910.269(a)(1)(i)(D) states that ``[Sec.  1910.269 
applies to:] (D) Work on or directly associated with [electric power 
generation, transmission, and distribution and other covered] 
installations. . . .'' OSHA, therefore, interprets existing Sec.  
1910.269(a)(1)(i)(D) as applying to inspections conducted by insurance 
company employees because the purpose of these inspections is to assure 
the safety of these installations and employees working on or near 
them. Insurance inspections are similar to inspections conducted by 
electric utilities and their contractors. The preamble to the 1994 
final rule adopting Sec.  1910.269 specifically listed ``inspection'' 
as an activity covered by that standard (59 FR 4333). Section 1910.269 
applies to this type of work without regard to the industry of the 
employer that has employees performing the inspections.\39\ Thus, 
existing Sec.  1910.269 covers this work as it pertains to general 
industry and will continue to cover this work after the final rule 
becomes effective. However, insurance inspections may fall under 
subpart V, instead of Sec.  1910.269, to the extent the inspections are 
construction work. Whether an insurance inspection constitutes 
construction depends on the characteristics of the work performed. 
(See, for example, CH2M Hill, Inc. v. Herman, 192 F.3d 711 (7th Cir. 
1999).)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \39\ See the letter of interpretation dated June 9, 1999, to Mr. 
G. William Doody, which is available at https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=INTERPRETATIONS&p_id=22749.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    OSHA does not believe that the final rule will impose substantial 
additional costs on the insurance industry. Existing Sec.  1910.269 
currently covers the vast majority of insurance inspections on electric 
power installations. Of the new provisions this final rule is adding to 
Sec.  1910.269, the ones that impose the greatest costs on all 
employers are unlikely to impose significant economic burdens on 
inspections conducted by insurance industry workers. First, the minimum 
approach distance and arc-flash-protection requirements usually will 
not apply to the insurance industry because insurance industry 
inspectors will almost never be qualified employees (see final 
Sec. Sec.  1910.269(l) and 1926.960).\40\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \40\ According to final Sec.  1910.269(a)(1)(ii)(B), Sec.  
1910.269 does not apply to electrical safety-related work practices 
covered by Subpart S. Subpart S applies to work performed by 
unqualified persons on, near, or with electric power generation, 
transmission, and distribution installations (see Sec.  
1910.331(b)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Second, the host-contractor provisions in Sec. Sec.  1910.269(a)(3) 
and 1926.950(c) should not impose significant costs on the insurance 
industry. As explained in Section VI, Final Economic Analysis and 
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis, later in this preamble, OSHA estimated 
the costs of the host-contractor provisions on a per-project basis; 
that is, employers will incur costs once for each project. OSHA 
believes that its estimate of the number of projects fully accounts for 
projects that involve inspections, including insurance inspections, of 
electric power generation, transmission, and distribution 
installations, though OSHA allocated the costs to contract employers 
generally. OSHA anticipates that the number of insurance inspections 
will be a small fraction of the number of overall projects. If 1 in 
every 1,000 projects involves an insurance inspection, then the total 
costs related to employers' complying with the host-contractor 
provisions for insurance inspections would be less than $20,000 per 
year, half of which host employers would bear. The Agency deems such 
costs an inconsequential portion of the overall costs of the final rule 
and not significant for the insurance industry.
    Third, OSHA does not believe that insurance inspections will 
typically involve employees working from aerial lifts or on poles, 
towers, or similar structures covered by the personal protective 
equipment requirements in final Sec. Sec.  1910.269(g)(2)(iv)(C) and 
1926.954(b)(3)(iii). Mr. Stoller's lone example of work potentially 
affected by the final rule, the inspection of pressure vessels, is not 
generally covered by those provisions, which primarily affect work 
involving overhead transmission and distribution lines. OSHA is unaware 
of any other insurance inspection work that would involve employees 
working from aerial lifts or on poles, towers, or similar structures. 
Even if such inspections are taking place, they should be rare, and the 
Agency deems costs associated with such inspections an inconsequential 
portion of the overall costs of the final rule, and inconsequential as 
well for the insurance industry.
    Paragraph (a)(1)(ii) of final Sec.  1926.950 provides that subpart 
V does not apply to electrical safety-related work practices for 
unqualified employees. Electrical safety-related work-practice 
requirements for these employees are contained in other subparts of 
part 1926, including subparts K, N, and CC. For example, Sec.  
1926.416(a)(1) in subpart K prohibits employers from permitting an 
employee to work in such proximity to any part of an electric power 
circuit that the employee could contact the electric power circuit in 
the course of work, unless the employee is protected against

[[Page 20340]]

electric shock by deenergizing the circuit and grounding it or by 
guarding it effectively by insulation or other means. Deenergizing 
circuits and insulating them from employees protects unqualified 
employees from electric shock. By contrast, subpart V, in final Sec.  
1926.960(b)(1)(i), permits only qualified employees to work on or with 
exposed energized lines or parts of equipment. Final Sec.  
1926.960(c)(1)(iii) requires the employer to ensure that no employee 
approaches or takes any conductive object closer to exposed energized 
parts than the minimum approach distances, established by the employer 
under final Sec.  1926.960(c)(1)(i), unless the employee is insulated 
from the energized part (for example, with rubber insulating gloves and 
sleeves), or the energized part is insulated from the employee and from 
any other conductive object at a different potential, or the employee 
is performing live-line barehand work in accordance with Sec.  
1926.964(c).
    Subpart CC generally requires employers to ensure that employees 
maintain minimum clearances when operating cranes or derricks near 
overhead power lines. Paragraph (a)(6) of Sec.  1926.600 also generally 
requires minimum clearances when mechanical equipment is operated near 
overhead power lines. In part because subpart V establishes 
requirements for qualified employees operating mechanical equipment, 
Sec.  1926.959(d)(1) of this final rule generally requires mechanical 
equipment, including cranes and derricks, to maintain minimum approach 
distances that are significantly less than the minimum clearance 
distances in either Sec.  1926.600(a)(6) or subpart CC.
    OSHA did not expressly propose to exempt electrical safety-related 
work practices used by unqualified employees from subpart V; however, 
the preamble to the proposal made it clear that subpart V's 
requirements did not apply to electrical safety-related work practices 
used by unqualified employees. (See, for example, 70 FR 34857.) 
Specifically, the Agency stated: ``The general approach taken in the 
proposed revision of Subpart V is to provide safety-related work 
practices for qualified employees to follow when they are performing 
electric power transmission and distribution work. Safe work practices 
for unqualified employees are not addressed in proposed Subpart V . . 
.'' (70 FR 34857). Information in the record shows that the 
requirements in subpart V are not sufficiently protective for 
unqualified employees. (See, for example, Exs. 0077, 0134.) For 
example, NFPA 70E contains electrical safety-related work practice 
requirements to protect unqualified employees from electrical hazards 
posed by electric power transmission and distribution installations 
(Ex. 0134).\41\ The consensus standard requires unqualified employees 
to maintain minimum approach distances that are substantially greater 
than the minimum approach distances in Subpart V.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \41\ See NFPA 70E-2004, Section 110.1, which sets the scope for 
Article 110, General Requirements for Electrical Safety-Related Work 
Practices (Ex. 0134).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    OSHA designed subpart V to mirror the requirements in Sec.  
1910.269. Existing Sec.  1910.269(a)(1)(i)(A), which is being adopted 
in the final rule without substantive change, provides that Sec.  
1910.269 applies to ``[p]ower generation, transmission, and 
distribution installations, including related equipment for the purpose 
of communication or metering, which are accessible only to qualified 
employees.'' Existing (and final) Sec.  1910.269(a)(1)(ii)(B) 
explicitly excludes ``electrical safety-related work practices . . . 
covered by subpart S of this part'' from coverage. According to Sec.  
1910.331(b), subpart S covers electrical safety-related work practices 
for unqualified employees working on, near, or with installations for 
the generation, transmission, or distribution of electric energy. Thus, 
Sec.  1910.269 does not apply to electrical safety-related work 
practices for unqualified employees.
    In conclusion, OSHA notes that the electrical safety-related work 
practices required by Subpart V do not provide sufficient protection 
for unqualified employees. Therefore, Subpart V does not and should not 
cover such work practices. The final rule, in Sec.  1926.950(a)(1)(ii), 
expressly clarifies that Subpart V does not cover electrical safety-
related work practices for unqualified employees.
    Paragraph (a)(2) of final Sec.  1926.950, which is being adopted 
without change from the proposal, explains that subpart V applies in 
addition to all other applicable standards contained in part 1926. This 
paragraph also provides that employers doing work covered by subpart V 
are not exempt from complying with other applicable provisions in part 
1926 by the operation of Sec.  1910.5(c). Paragraph (a)(2) also 
clarifies that specific references in subpart V to other sections of 
part 1926 are provided for emphasis only. In accordance with this 
provision, all construction industry standards continue to apply to 
work covered by subpart V unless there is an applicable exception in 
subpart V or elsewhere in part 1926. For example, Sec.  1926.959(a)(2) 
requires the critical safety components of mechanical elevating and 
rotating equipment to be visually inspected before each shift. This 
provision does not supersede Sec.  1926.1412(d), which details specific 
requirements for the visual inspection of cranes each shift by a 
competent person. In a change that OSHA considers nonsubstantive, Sec.  
1910.269(a)(1)(iii) is being amended to include language equivalent to 
that in Sec.  1926.950(a)(2).
    Subpart V has never applied to work on electric power generation 
installations. Proposed Sec.  1926.950(a)(3) provided that Sec.  
1910.269 would cover all work, including construction, involving 
electric power generation installations. In the preamble to the 
proposal, the Agency explained that the construction of an electric 
power generation station normally poses only general construction 
hazards, that is, hazards not addressed by subpart V (70 FR 34833). 
OSHA recognized, however, the following two exceptions to this 
conclusion: (1) during the final phase of construction of a generating 
station, when electrical and other acceptance testing of the 
installation is being performed, and (2) during ``reconstruction,'' 
when portions of the generating station not undergoing construction are 
still in operation (id.). In both of these scenarios, construction work 
at a generation station exposes workers to hazards akin to those posed 
by the operation and maintenance of a generation plant. Because the 
Agency believed that these two operations were more like general 
industry work than construction, it deemed it appropriate for employers 
to follow Sec.  1910.269 in those situations (id.). Rather than repeat 
the relevant portions of Sec.  1910.269 in subpart V, OSHA proposed 
that Sec.  1910.269 apply to all work involving electric power 
generation installations.
    The Agency requested comments on whether Sec.  1910.269 should 
apply to all work involving electric power generation installations, as 
proposed, or whether instead the relevant requirements from Sec.  
1910.269 should be contained in final subpart V for purposes of 
construction work involving electric power generation installations. 
OSHA received numerous responses to this request. (See, for example, 
Exs. 0125, 0127, 0130, 0149, 0151, 0155, 0159, 0162, 0163, 0172, 0177, 
0179, 0186, 0188, 0201, 0208, 0209, 0212, 0213, 0227, 0230.) Commenters 
largely supported OSHA's proposed approach and the language making 
Sec.  1910.269 applicable to all work involving electric power 
generation installations. For

[[Page 20341]]

example, Mason County Public Utility District 3 commented: ``We believe 
the proposed language referencing 1910.269 for all work involving 
electric power generation installations should be adopted'' (Ex. 0125). 
Siemens Power Generation responded similarly, explaining, ``Subpart V 
should not apply to the electric power generation installations 
[because m]aintenance in these installations is covered adequately by 
1910.269 and construction is covered adequately by general construction 
requirements'' (Ex. 0163). In addition, Mr. Tom Chappell of Southern 
Company agreed with OSHA that ``[a]pplying 1910.269 during the `final 
phase of construction' or `reconstruction work' would be preferable to 
recreating the same requirements in Subpart V'' (Ex. 0212).
    On the other hand, NIOSH suggested that it ``would be less 
burdensome'' for employers if the relevant requirements for 
construction at generation installations were incorporated in subpart V 
(Ex. 0130). In addition, MYR Group was concerned that OSHA's proposed 
approach could lead to confusion, explaining:

    [A]pplying part 1910 electrical standards [to construction work 
involving generation installations] would cause confusion as to 
whether other applicable general industry or construction standards 
would govern the remaining aspects of such work. Thus, OSHA's 
proposal--based on an alleged simplification--does itself create 
confusion. [Ex. 0162]

    OSHA considered these comments, but does not believe that applying 
Sec.  1910.269 to construction involving generation installations is 
likely to result in any heavy burdens or confusion. OSHA's construction 
standards (29 CFR part 1926) apply to general construction activities 
performed at generation installation sites. As previously explained, 
Sec.  1910.269 generally will not apply to the original construction of 
a generating station until the final phase of construction, when many 
of the provisions in Sec.  1910.269 become applicable. For example, in 
the early construction phases, the generation installation would 
contain no energized circuits, so the provisions for working near 
energized parts in Sec.  1910.269(l) would not apply. Similarly, in the 
construction of a coal-fired generating station, the requirements in 
Sec.  1910.269(v)(11) on coal handing would have no application until 
coal is present. To the extent an employer is performing late-stage 
construction or reconstruction of a generation installation and Sec.  
1910.269 applies, the provisions of Sec.  1910.269 supplement, but do 
not replace, any relevant general construction requirements. (See 
Sec. Sec.  1910.269(a)(1)(iii) and 1926.950(a)(2).) For example, the 
training requirements in Sec.  1910.269(a)(2) apply in addition to any 
applicable training requirements in part 1926.\42\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \42\ Paragraph (e) of Sec.  1910.269 contains requirements for 
work in enclosed spaces. OSHA recently proposed a standard covering 
confined spaces in construction, which will cover many of the same 
hazards. OSHA will consider how to apply these new confined space 
provisions to the construction of power generation installations in 
the development and promulgation of that final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    With this additional clarification and the support of most of the 
commenters who provided feedback on this issue, the Agency is adopting 
proposed Sec.  1926.950(a)(3) as it relates to the construction of 
electric power generation installations.\43\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \43\ Current Sec.  1910.269(a)(1)(ii)(A) provides that Sec.  
1910.269 does not apply to construction work. In the final rule, 
OSHA is revising this paragraph to indicate that Sec.  1910.269 does 
not apply to construction work, as defined in Sec.  1910.12, except 
for line-clearance tree-trimming operations and work involving 
electric power generation installations as specified in Sec.  
1926.950(a)(3). This change makes the application of Sec.  1910.269 
consistent with the coverage of work involving electric power 
generation installations in subpart V.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Another coverage issue raised in the proposal relates to line-
clearance tree trimming, which is currently addressed in Sec.  
1910.269.\44\ (See existing Sec.  1910.269(a)(1)(i)(E).) As OSHA 
explained in the preamble to the proposal, line-clearance tree trimming 
is not normally performed as part of the construction of electric power 
transmission or distribution installations (70 FR 34833). One exception 
occurs when trees are trimmed along an existing overhead power line to 
provide clearance for a new transmission or distribution line that is 
under construction (id.). While this type of work by line-clearance 
tree trimmers is properly classified as construction work, it shares 
many similarities with the work done by line-clearance tree trimmers 
that is properly classified as general industry work.\45\ For this 
reason, as well as for ease of compliance and enforcement, proposed 
Sec.  1926.950(a)(3) provided that Sec.  1910.269 would apply to all 
line-clearance tree-trimming operations, even those that might be 
considered construction. OSHA requested comments on whether Sec.  
1910.269 should apply to all work involving line-clearance tree 
trimming, as proposed, or whether the relevant requirements from Sec.  
1910.269 should be contained in subpart V.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \44\ Line-clearance tree trimming is also addressed in Sec.  
1910.268 when the lines involved are telecommunications lines. (See 
29 CFR 1910.268(q).)
    \45\ Throughout the preamble discussion of this final rule, OSHA 
generally refers to line-clearance tree trimmers who are not 
qualified employees under Sec.  1910.269 or subpart V as ``line-
clearance tree trimmers,'' and to qualified employees who also meet 
the definition of ``line-clearance tree trimmers'' as ``qualified 
employees.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Agency received a handful of comments on this issue. (See, for 
example, Exs. 0175, 0186, 0201, 0213, 0230.) These comments generally 
supported OSHA's proposed approach. For example, Mr. Anthony Ahern of 
Ohio Rural Electric Cooperatives agreed that OSHA need not duplicate 
the line-clearance tree-trimming requirements from Sec.  1910.269 in 
subpart V (Ex. 0186). Also, Mr. James Gartland of Duke Energy commented 
that the requirements for line-clearance tree-trimming operations 
should be covered exclusively under Sec.  1910.269, explaining that 
line-clearance tree-trimming operations are the same whether one 
considers the work to be general industry or construction (Ex. 0201).
    IBEW asked OSHA to clarify whether Sec.  1910.269 would apply even 
to tree-trimming operations that could be considered ``construction,'' 
for example clearing around existing energized facilities for a new 
right of way (Ex. 0230). OSHA is applying Sec.  1910.269 in those 
circumstances. Given that clarification, IBEW agreed that the Sec.  
1910.269 requirements for line-clearance tree-trimming operations do 
not need to be repeated in subpart V (Ex. 0230). In light of the 
commenters' support, OSHA is adopting Sec.  1926.950(a)(3) as proposed 
with respect to line-clearance tree trimming.\46\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \46\ Current Sec.  1910.269(a)(1)(ii)(A) provides that Sec.  
1910.269 does not apply to construction work. In the final rule, 
OSHA is revising this paragraph to indicate that Sec.  1910.269 does 
not apply to construction work, as defined in Sec.  1910.12, except 
for line-clearance tree-trimming operations and work involving 
electric power generation installations as specified in Sec.  
1926.950(a)(3). This change makes the application of Sec.  1910.269 
consistent with the coverage of line-clearance tree-trimming 
operations in subpart V.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Although the tree trimming industry did not object to covering all 
line-clearance tree trimming in Sec.  1910.269, representatives of the 
industry urged the Agency to expand the scope of covered line-clearance 
tree-trimming activities by broadening the definition of that term. 
(See, for example, Exs. 0174, 0200, 0502, 0503; Tr. 620-628, 765-769.) 
The proposed definition of ``line-clearance tree trimming'' in Sec.  
1926.968, which was based on existing Sec.  1910.269(x), read as 
follows:


[[Page 20342]]


    The pruning, trimming, repairing, maintaining, removing, or 
clearing of trees or the cutting of brush that is within 3.05 m (10 
feet) of electric supply lines and equipment.

    The Utility Line Clearance Coalition (ULCC) commented that the 
definition of line-clearance tree trimming should not be limited to 
trees within 3.05 meters (10 feet) of an electric supply line. ULCC 
requested that OSHA expand the definition of ``line-clearance tree 
trimming'' to include all vegetation management work done by line-
clearance tree trimmers and trainees for the construction or 
maintenance of electric supply lines or for electric utilities (Ex. 
0502). The Tree Care Industry Association (TCIA) proposed the same 
change to the definition of ``line-clearance tree trimming'' (Ex. 
0503). Both tree trimming trade associations recommended that the 
definition of ``line-clearance tree trimming'' be revised to read as 
follows:

    The pruning, trimming, repairing, maintaining, removing, 
treating or clearing of trees or the cutting of brush (vegetation 
management) that is within 10 feet (305 cm) of electric supply lines 
and equipment, or vegetation management work performed by line 
clearance tree trimmer/trainees for the construction or maintenance 
of electric supply lines and/or for electric utilities. [Exs. 0502, 
0503]

    The industry provided three main arguments in support of its 
recommendation to expand the scope of tree-trimming work covered by 
Sec.  1910.269. For the reasons described later, OSHA is not persuaded 
by the industry's arguments and will not be expanding the definition of 
``line-clearance tree trimming'' to include all vegetation management 
work for the construction or maintenance of electric supply lines or 
for electric utilities. However, OSHA is making some changes to the 
definition of ``line-clearance tree trimming'' that will broaden, in a 
limited manner, the scope of tree-trimming operations covered by Sec.  
1910.269. These changes are discussed later in this section of the 
preamble.
    The tree trimming industry's first argument in support of its 
recommended definition is that the ``10-foot rule'' (as they described 
it) contradicts other portions of Sec.  1910.269. Joe Tommasi of the 
Davey Tree Expert Company, testifying on behalf of ULCC, noted:

    [T]he minimum separation distances tables in the standard 
requires [sic] a line clearance arborist to maintain more than ten 
feet from some lines depending on the voltage exposures, but at the 
same time, the definition says that such work is not subject to 
[the] line clearance tree trimming standard because the standard 
[applies] only to trees that are within the ten feet of overhead 
conductors. [Tr. 622]

Mr. Tommasi also suggested that some requirements, such as those for 
spraying herbicides and stump cutting, may apply to work that takes 
place more than 3.05 meters away from power lines (Tr. 622-623).
    OSHA does not find this argument persuasive. This first of the tree 
trimmers' arguments reflects a basic misunderstanding of the way the 
proposed standard worked. Under the proposed rule, tree-trimming work 
was covered by Sec.  1910.269 only to the extent it was done on trees 
or brush within 3.05 meters of electric supply lines and equipment. If 
it was done on trees or brush more than 3.05 meters away from lines and 
equipment, none of the provisions in proposed Sec.  1910.269 applied. 
The proposed ``10-foot rule'' did not create any internal conflicts in 
Sec.  1910.269. For work done outside of the 3.05-meter boundary, the 
proposed provisions the industry was concerned about, that is, minimum 
approach distances and requirements for spraying herbicides and stump 
cutting, did not apply.
    The tree trimmers' second justification for expanding the 
definition of line-clearance tree trimming in Sec.  1910.269 is that 
the ``10-foot rule'' undermines safety by causing different safety 
requirements to apply to line-clearance tree trimmers depending on 
their distance from the line. Mr. Tommasi testified that ``experience 
teaches that a single set of safety rules applicable to the line tree 
arborist achieves the highest rate of compliance and thus the highest 
safety'' (Tr. 625). Mr. Tommasi maintained that Federal and State OSHA 
compliance officials have enforced other standards, such as OSHA's 
logging standard (29 CFR 1910.266), during arborist operations more 
than 3.05 meters from power lines (id.). Further, ULCC commented that 
``the foundation of worker safety in line clearance tree trimming is 
adherence to a single predictable set of safety standards in which 
employees can be trained and repeatedly drilled'' (Ex. 0174).
    OSHA appreciates the industry's desire for a single set of safety-
related work practices, but changing the definition of ``line-clearance 
tree trimming'' in Sec.  1910.269 would not necessarily achieve the 
industry's goal. As stated previously, even work covered by Sec.  
1910.269 and subpart V must comply with all other applicable general 
industry and construction standards. In any event, the Agency does not 
believe that it is necessary to employee safety to address in Sec.  
1910.269 every hazard faced by line-clearance tree trimmers. Employers 
in every industry, including line-clearance tree trimming firms, must 
identify all OSHA standards applicable to their work, along with their 
general duty clause obligations, and then set, communicate, and enforce 
a set of work rules that meets all of the applicable requirements. For 
example, if a line-clearance tree trimming contractor performs work 
that falls under the logging or site-clearing standards (Sec. Sec.  
1910.266 and 1926.604, respectively), the contractor will have to 
ensure that its work rules meet those standards, in addition to Sec.  
1910.269.\47\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \47\ ULCC suggested that the references in Sec.  1910.269(r)(5) 
to specific requirements in the logging standard ``shows OSHA's 
intent to not apply [the] logging standard to line clearance unless 
so-designated'' (Ex. 0174). This is an erroneous interpretation that 
overlooks existing Sec.  1910.269(a)(1)(iii), which explains that 
``[s]pecific references in this section to other sections of part 
1910 are provided for emphasis only.'' Other relevant provisions in 
part 1910 continue to apply, including other provisions in the 
logging standard, if the work being performed falls within the scope 
of those standards and within the scope of Sec.  1910.269 at the 
same time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The provisions on brush chippers, sprayers and related equipment, 
stump cutters, gasoline-engine power saws, backpack units for use in 
pruning and clearing, rope, and fall protection (Sec.  1910.269(r)(2), 
(r)(3), (r)(4), (r)(5), (r)(6), (r)(7), and (r)(8), respectively) in 
existing Sec.  1910.269 were taken, in part, from the EEI-IBEW draft on 
which Sec.  1910.269 was based. Those provisions were ``checked against 
the equivalent ANSI standard, ANSI Z133.1-1982[, American National 
Standard for Tree Care Operations--Pruning, Trimming, Repairing, 
Maintaining, and Removing Trees, and Cutting Brush--Safety 
Requirements] ([269-]Ex. 2-29), to be sure that OSHA's regulations 
would better effectuate safety than the national consensus standard'' 
(59 FR 4322). However, OSHA did not incorporate a comprehensive tree-
trimming standard in Sec.  1910.269. Thus, many important safety 
provisions included in applicable consensus standards and in other OSHA 
standards were not included in Sec.  1910.269, and that section does 
not address some important safety hazards faced by workers performing 
tree care operations. For example, Sec.  1910.269 does not contain any 
specific requirements to protect workers felling trees. Those 
requirements are in OSHA's logging standard. Furthermore, even with 
respect to the nonelectrical hazards that are regulated in the Sec.  
1910.269 tree-trimming provisions, the OSHA standards do not cover 
those hazards as comprehensively as the current version,

[[Page 20343]]

or even the 1982 version, of ANSI Z133.1.\48\ For example, the new and 
old consensus standards include additional requirements for brush 
chippers and provisions on hand tools such as axes, pruners, and saws 
that are not contained in Sec.  1910.269. For these reasons, adopting 
the industry's recommendation to have Sec.  1910.269 be the exclusive 
source of requirements for tree-trimming work would not improve 
employee safety. Instead, it would jeopardize the workers performing 
those operations. For example, an employer may perform a logging 
operation near an overhead power line under contract with an electric 
utility to remove trees along the right of way for the power line. 
Applying the tree care industry's recommendation and logic to this work 
would place that work exclusively under Sec.  1910.269, eliminating the 
protection provided by the logging standard's tree-felling provisions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \48\ As stated earlier, in its review of the EEI-IBEW draft, 
OSHA checked provisions of that draft against equivalent provisions 
in ANSI Z133.1-1982. However, because Sec.  1910.269 is a standard 
for electric power generation, transmission, and distribution work 
and not a comprehensive standard on tree trimming, the Agency did 
not examine provisions in the ANSI standard that had no counterpart 
in the EEI-IBEW draft.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Agency has published an advance notice of proposed rulemaking 
to gather information to use in developing a comprehensive standard on 
tree care operations (73 FR 54118-54123, Sept. 18, 2008). In that 
rulemaking, OSHA will consider whether, and to what extent, any new 
standard on tree care operations should cover line-clearance tree 
trimming.
    The tree trimmers' third justification for expanding the definition 
of line-clearance tree trimming in Sec.  1910.269 is that the 
electrical hazards regulated by Sec.  1910.269 exist at distances 
greater than 3.05 meters from the line. ULCC argued that there are many 
circumstances that expose line-clearance tree trimmers to electrical 
hazards at distances beyond 3.05 meters from the line, such as when a 
tree or section of a tree can fall into the line even though the tree 
itself is farther than 3.05 meters away (Ex. 0174). To illustrate this 
point, Mr. Tommasi provided an example of a 15.2-meter tall oak tree 
located 4.6 meters from an overhead power line (Tr. 623).
    OSHA has considered this argument, but has concluded that the 3.05-
meter rule is generally reasonable and consistent with provisions in 29 
CFR part 1910, subpart S, OSHA's general industry electrical standards. 
An examination of the different requirements that apply to the 
electrical hazards posed by tree-trimming operations will illuminate 
the need to set a locus within which Sec.  1910.269 should apply.
    The line-clearance tree-trimming provisions in existing Sec.  
1910.269 contain several requirements to protect line-clearance tree 
trimmers from electrical hazards. First, to be considered line-
clearance tree trimmers under Sec.  1910.269, employees must, through 
training or experience, be familiar with the special techniques and 
hazards involved in line-clearance tree trimming.\49\ (See existing 
Sec.  1910.269(a)(1)(i)(E)(2) and the definition of ``line-clearance 
tree trimmer'' in existing Sec.  1910.269(x).) Second, there must be at 
least two line-clearance tree trimmers present under any of the 
following conditions: (1) If a line-clearance tree trimmer is to 
approach any conductor or electric apparatus energized at more than 750 
volts more closely than 3.05 meters, (2) if branches or limbs being 
removed are closer than the applicable minimum approach distances to 
lines energized at more than 750 volts, or (3) if roping is necessary 
to remove branches or limbs from such conductors or apparatus. (See 
existing Sec.  1910.269(r)(1)(ii).) Third, when the voltage on the 
lines is 50 volts or more and two or more employees are present, 
generally at least two employees must be trained in first aid, 
including cardiopulmonary resuscitation.\50\ (See existing Sec.  
1910.269(b)(1).) Fourth, employees must maintain minimum approach 
distances appropriate for qualified employees. (See existing Sec.  
1910.269(r)(1)(iii) and (r)(1)(v).) Fifth, employees must use 
insulating equipment to remove branches that are contacting exposed, 
energized conductors or equipment or that are within the applicable 
minimum approach distances of energized conductors or equipment. (See 
existing Sec.  1910.269(r)(1)(iv).) Sixth, line-clearance tree-trimming 
work may not be performed when adverse weather conditions make the work 
hazardous in spite of the work practices required by Sec.  1910.269. 
(See existing Sec.  1910.269(r)(1)(vi).) Seventh, mechanical equipment 
must maintain appropriate minimum approach distances, and certain 
measures must be taken to protect employees on the ground from hazards 
that might arise from equipment contact with energized lines. (See 
existing Sec.  1910.269(p)(4).)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \49\ Throughout this preamble, OSHA differentiates between line-
clearance tree trimmers (as defined in Sec.  1910.269) and other 
workers involved in tree-trimming operations. OSHA refers to 
employees doing tree-related work who are not line-clearance tree 
trimmers under Sec.  1910.269 as ``regular tree trimmers'' (that is, 
all other tree trimmers) or ``tree workers who are not line-
clearance tree trimmers'' (that is, all other tree trimmers and 
ground workers). See also the summary and explanation for Sec.  
1926.950(b)(2), later in this section of the preamble.
    \50\ See the summary and explanation for final Sec.  
1926.951(b)(1), later in this section of the preamble, for a 
discussion of the requirements for first-aid training for field 
work, such as line-clearance tree-trimming operations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Requirements for tree trimmers who are not performing line-
clearance tree trimming (as defined in final Sec.  1910.269(x)), that 
is, ``regular tree trimmers,'' are contained in Subpart S of the 
general industry standards in part 1910. It is important to note that, 
for the purposes of Subpart S, tree trimmers fall into two categories: 
(1) Regular tree trimmers, whom OSHA treats as unqualified persons, and 
(2) line-clearance tree trimmers (as defined in Sec.  1910.269), whom 
OSHA considers qualified persons under subpart S. Line-clearance tree 
trimmers under Sec.  1910.269 are exempt from the electrical safety-
related work practice requirements in subpart S and must comply with 
the Sec.  1910.269 requirements described previously.\51\ (See Sec.  
1910.331(c)(1).) In contrast, regular tree trimmers are subject to the 
subpart S requirements, but are not covered by Sec.  1910.269.\52\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \51\ Note 2 to the definition of ``line-clearance tree trimmer'' 
in existing Sec.  1910.269(x) explains that line-clearance tree 
trimmers are considered qualified employees for purposes of the 
electrical safety-related work practices in Subpart S (Sec. Sec.  
1910.331 through 1910.335). Paragraph (c)(1) of Sec.  1910.331 
provides that Sec. Sec.  1910.331 through 1910.335 do not apply to 
work performed by qualified persons, including line-clearance tree 
trimmers under Sec.  1910.269, on or directly associated with 
generation, transmission, and distribution installations. In 
addition, Note 3 to Sec.  1910.331(c)(1) clarifies that the agency 
considers line-clearance tree trimming to be work directly 
associated with such installations.
    \52\ Currently, an employee must meet the definition of ``line-
clearance tree trimmer'' in existing Sec.  1910.269(x) and have 
training meeting Sec.  1910.332(b)(3) to be considered a line-
clearance tree trimmer who is a qualified employee for the purposes 
of subpart S. (See Note 1 to Sec.  1910.332(b)(3), which states that 
a person must have the training required by that paragraph to be 
considered a qualified person.) As explained in the summary and 
explanation for Sec. Sec.  1926.950(b)(2) and 1910.269(a)(2)(iii), 
later in this section of the preamble, OSHA added to Sec.  1910.269 
appropriate training requirements for line-clearance tree trimmers. 
Consequently, under this final rule, an employee must meet the 
definition of ``line-clearance tree trimmer'' and have training 
meeting Sec.  1910.269(a)(2)(iii) to be considered a line-clearance 
tree trimmer who is a qualified employee for the purposes of subpart 
S. Under both the existing standards and the final rule, any given 
tree trimmer is either a line-clearance tree trimmer, who is 
considered a qualified employee under subpart S, or a regular tree 
trimmer, who is considered an unqualified employee under subpart S.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Subpart S sets some basic requirements for regular tree trimmers.

[[Page 20344]]

(Other requirements also apply, but are not germane to this 
discussion.) First, regular tree trimmers must be appropriately trained 
(see Sec.  1910.332(b)(1) and (b)(2)), although the training required 
for regular tree trimmers is not as extensive as that required for 
line-clearance tree trimmers. Second, regular tree trimmers must 
generally maintain a minimum separation of 3.05 meters from overhead 
power lines (see Sec.  1910.333(c)(3)(i) and (c)(3)(iii)). Finally, 
regular tree trimmers working on the ground may not contact vehicles or 
mechanical equipment capable of having parts of its structure elevated 
near energized overhead lines, except under certain conditions (see 
Sec.  1910.333(c)(3)(iii)(B)).
    As a general matter, OSHA believes that workers performing line-
clearance tree-trimming operations under existing Sec.  1910.269 are 
afforded more protection than workers performing regular tree-trimming 
operations under Subpart S. Under existing Sec.  1910.269, line-
clearance tree-trimming operations generally require the presence of at 
least two line-clearance tree trimmers trained in first aid, including 
cardiopulmonary resuscitation. Subpart S does not have a comparable 
requirement. Existing Sec.  1910.269 forbids line-clearance tree-
trimming operations from being performed when adverse weather 
conditions make work unsafe. Subpart S does not address weather 
conditions. Furthermore, in comparison with subpart S, existing Sec.  
1910.269 contains additional requirements to protect workers in case 
mechanical equipment contacts a power line. OSHA believes that these 
important protections in existing Sec.  1910.269 must be required only 
when tree-trimming operations expose employees to the most serious 
electrical hazards, not any time electrical hazards are present, as 
posited by ULCC.
    OSHA believes that the seriousness of electrical hazards posed by 
tree trimming depends on how close the tree is to the power line. The 
closer the tree is to the power line, the more difficulty the worker 
has in maintaining minimum approach distances. For example, roping may 
be necessary to maintain the required minimum approach distances. (This 
practice is addressed in existing Sec.  1910.269(r)(1)(ii)(C).) 
Furthermore, when the tree is close to the power line, a worker 
trimming trees from an aerial lift has to be more concerned with the 
distances between the power line and the tree, the aerial lift, and 
himself or herself. The farther the tree is from the power line, the 
more room an employee has in which to maneuver the aerial lift.
    Therefore, the Agency has only to decide how close the tree needs 
to be to a power line before the protections required by Sec.  1910.269 
are necessary. The Agency concludes that those protections should start 
when the tree is 3.05 meters from a power line. Under Subpart S, 
unqualified employees are not permitted within that distance, but they 
are permitted to work in compliance with subpart S outside of that 
distance (plus 100 millimeters (4 inches) of additional distance for 
every 10 kilovolts over 50 kilovolts). (See Sec.  1910.333(c)(3)(i).) 
OSHA believes that it would be inconsistent to expand the definition of 
``line-clearance tree trimming'' to the point that line-clearance tree 
trimmers working on trees or brush more than 3.05 meters from the lines 
would be entitled to the enhanced protections of Sec.  1910.269, while 
employees doing other types of work closer to the lines (between 3.05 
meters from the line and where the line-clearance tree trimmers are 
working) would be governed by the more limited protections afforded by 
subpart S. The Agency generally believes that any electrical hazards 
that are present when a tree is more than 3.05 meters from power lines 
are addressed adequately by subpart S.
    Nevertheless, changes to the existing definition of ``line-
clearance tree trimming'' in Sec.  1910.269 (which is identical to the 
definition proposed for subpart V) are necessary to ensure consistency 
with the 3.05-meter rule that applies to unqualified employees under 
Sec.  1910.331(c)(3)(i). As noted previously, under Sec.  
1910.333(c)(3)(i)(A)(1), 3.05 meters is the minimum distance an 
unqualified employee must maintain from overhead power lines. If the 
voltage is higher than 50 kilovolts, the required distance under Sec.  
1910.333(c)(3)(i)(A)(2) increases by 100 millimeters for every 10 
kilovolts of voltage above 50 kilovolts. OSHA believes that this 
increase in distance reasonably captures the relationship between the 
severity of the electrical hazard and voltage. Therefore, OSHA decided 
that, although it is not expanding the definition of ``line-clearance 
tree trimming'' to the extent recommended by the tree trimming 
industry, it will add this extra distance to the definition of ``line-
clearance tree trimming'' to accord with Sec.  1910.333(c)(3)(i)(A). 
The revised definition appears in Sec. Sec.  1910.269(x) and 1926.968.
    Paragraph (b) of final Sec.  1926.950 addresses training for 
employees. Subpart V currently contains no general provisions related 
to training employees in the safety practices necessary to perform 
electric power transmission and distribution work. It is widely 
recognized that the types of work covered by this standard require 
special knowledge and skills. Additionally, final subpart V contains 
many safety-related work practice requirements that are necessary for 
the protection of employees. To gain the requisite knowledge and skills 
to use these work practices, employees must be adequately trained. 
Therefore, in the proposed revision of subpart V, OSHA included 
training requirements mirroring those already in Sec.  1910.269, with a 
few changes and additions (discussed later). OSHA notes that editorial 
changes are being made throughout paragraph (b) to clarify that 
employers must ensure that ``each'' employee covered by a specific 
training provision receives the training required by that 
provision.\53\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \53\ Several provisions in the proposed rule and existing Sec.  
1910.269 require employers to provide personal protective equipment 
(PPE) and training for ``employees'' or for ``all employees.'' The 
final rule amends these provisions to require PPE and training for 
``each employee.'' These editorial, nonsubstantive changes emphasize 
that the standards' training and PPE requirements impose a 
compliance duty to each and every employee covered by the standards 
and that noncompliance may expose the employer to liability on a 
per-employee basis. This action is in accord both with OSHA's 
longstanding position and OSHA standards addressing employers' 
duties. (See Sec. Sec.  1910.9 and 1926.20(f); see also 73 FR 75568 
(Dec. 12, 2008)). It should be noted that, if any provision in the 
final rule continues to require training or PPE for ``employees'' or 
for ``all employees,'' rather than for ``each employee,'' as 
described above, this was an unintentional omission on OSHA's part 
and should not be interpreted as amending OSHA's longstanding 
position, or the general standards, addressing employers' duties to 
provide training and PPE to each employee.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Paragraph (b)(1) contains training requirements applying to all 
employees performing work covered by subpart V. Siemens Power 
Generation and ORC Worldwide suggested deleting the heading ``All 
employees'' from proposed paragraph (b)(1). They expressed concern that 
the provision could be construed to require training for clerical 
employees or other workers doing tasks not covered by subpart V (Exs. 
0163, 0208, 0235). Siemens commented:

    By adding the word ``ALL'' the Agency is implying that training 
must be conducted for any and all employees regardless of their 
scope of task. It implies for example, that even for clerical 
employees that have no risk, there must be some documented training 
conducted to comply with this requirement. [Ex. 0163]

    OSHA appreciates these concerns, but has elected to retain the 
title in paragraph (b)(1) as proposed. The Agency thinks that it is 
important to distinguish the training requirements in

[[Page 20345]]

paragraph (b)(1), which is broadly applicable to workers doing work 
covered by subpart V, from the requirements in paragraph (b)(2), which 
is applicable only to ``qualified employees.'' OSHA clarified in the 
proposal, and is reiterating here, that paragraph (b)(1) does not 
impose training requirements on employees who are not performing work 
covered by subpart V. The text of paragraph (b)(1) is self-limiting--
employers need only ensure that each employee receives safety training 
that ``pertain[s] to his or her job assignments'' and that is ``related 
to his or her work.''
    As clerical workers do not perform the types of hazardous work 
covered by subpart V, this provision does not require employers to 
train such employees in live-line barehand or other work techniques 
addressed by this final rule. Employees performing clerical work or 
other work not covered by subpart V would not need to receive the same 
electrical safety training required for workers involved in the 
construction of transmission and distribution lines and equipment. 
However, employers must train clerical workers performing work covered 
by subpart V in the hazards to which they might be exposed.
    Proposed paragraphs (b)(1)(i) and (b)(1)(ii) were borrowed in large 
part from provisions in existing Sec.  1910.269. Paragraph (b)(1)(i) 
requires each employee to be trained in, and be familiar with, the 
safety-related work practices, safety procedures, and other safety 
requirements in subpart V that pertain to his or her job assignments. 
OSHA considers this training necessary to ensure that employees use the 
safety-related work practices outlined in subpart V. It should be noted 
that this provision requires employers to train employees not only in 
the content of the applicable requirements of the final rule but in how 
to comply with those requirements. OSHA received no comments on 
proposed paragraph (b)(1)(i) and is carrying it forward into the final 
rule without substantive change.
    Proposed paragraph (b)(1)(ii) additionally provided that employees 
had to be trained in, and be familiar with, any other safety practices 
related to their work and necessary for their safety, including 
applicable emergency procedures, such as pole-top and manhole rescue. 
Proposed paragraph (b)(1)(ii) required that safety training be provided 
in areas that are not directly addressed by subpart V, but that are 
related to the employee's job. This training fills in the gaps left 
when the final rule does not specify requirements for every hazard the 
employee may encounter in performing electric power generation, 
transmission, or distribution work. OSHA explained in the preamble to 
the proposal that if more than one set of work practices could be used 
to accomplish a task safely, the employee would only need to be trained 
in the work methods to be used (70 FR 34833). For example, an insulator 
on a power line could be replaced by an employee using live-line tools 
or rubber insulating equipment or by an employee working without 
electrical protective equipment after deenergizing and grounding the 
line. The employee would only need to be trained in the method actually 
used to replace that insulator.
    The Agency received numerous comments suggesting that the training 
requirement proposed in paragraph (b)(1)(ii) was too broad (Exs. 0156, 
0160, 0168, 0170, 0202, 0206, 0207, 0229, 0233, 0237). Mr. Don Adkins 
of Davis H. Elliot Company, an electrical contractor, commented, for 
example, that this proposed provision was ``impermissibly broad'' and 
offered ``no guidance as to what safety practices are `related' to the 
work of those covered by the standard'' (Ex. 0156). Mr. Robert Matuga 
of the National Association of Home Builders (NAHB) believed that 
paragraph (b)(1)(ii) was ``overly broad,'' potentially ``creating an 
obligation for employers to provide training to workers . . . on almost 
every hazard that could conceivably be encountered on a construction 
jobsite'' (Ex. 0168). He also argued that proposed paragraph (b)(1)(ii) 
is duplicative of Sec.  1926.21(b)(2), which requires ``[t]he employer 
[to] instruct each employee in the recognition and avoidance of unsafe 
conditions and the regulations applicable to his work environment to 
control or eliminate any hazards or other exposure to illness or 
injury'' (id.). Also, the U.S. Small Business Administration's (SBA) 
Office of Advocacy commented:

    The scope of this mandatory employee training is not limited to 
work practices required by the proposed electrical standards, but 
extends to any other safety practices that are related to their work 
and necessary for their safety. The SBREFA panel was concerned that 
this language was overly broad and could be viewed as covering 
other, non-specified hazards on the worksite, such as ergonomic 
injuries from overhead work.
* * * * *
    The proposed training language remains vague and OSHA should 
clarify what training is necessary to comply with the standard (as 
well as what alternative training is acceptable for compliance) [Ex. 
0207]

    Despite these comments, OSHA continues to believe that the 
requirement in proposed paragraph (b)(1)(ii) is essential to the safety 
and welfare of employees and is adopting it without significant change 
in this final rule. Mr. Brian Erga of Electrical Safety Consultants 
International (ESCI) supported the proposed training requirements and 
attributed an increase in employee proficiency, and safer work 
environments, to the adoption of these provisions in existing Sec.  
1910.269. He explained:

    It has been shown time and time again that high quality training 
and retraining not only provides a safer work site, but returns 
dividends in financial contributions and long term productivity to 
the employer. The proposed [1926.]950(b) and associated verbiage in 
the preamble, if followed, will, in our opinion, move the industry 
to a safer work site. The current training requirements in 1910.269 
and [the] proposed training requirements are not unduly burdensome, 
and will provide a more educated and experienced work force. [Ex. 
0155]

    Further, Mr. Donald Hartley with IBEW testified at the 2006 public 
hearing that ``ensur[ing] that . . . employees are trained in the 
safety-related work practices, procedures, and requirements that 
pertain to their . . . assignments . . . is necessary to ensure that 
employees are equipped to deal with potential hazards associated with 
this dangerous work'' (Tr. 876). He did not suggest that this training 
be limited only to the safety practices and other safety requirements 
in subpart V. Several rulemaking participants recognized that subpart V 
does not specifically address all hazards faced by employees performing 
covered work and suggested that training is an important factor in 
employee safety. For example, Mr. Lee Marchessault testified about the 
importance of training in substation rescue procedures, stating, ``You 
should do rescue training from substation structures'' (Tr. 572). Also, 
Energy United EMC commented that ``proper training is necessary'' to 
prevent employees in insulated aerial lifts from touching conductors 
(Ex. 0219). The record also indicates that employers train employees to 
protect them from heat-stress hazards (see, for example, Tr. 1129-
1130), to ensure proper maintenance of protective clothing (see, for 
example, Tr. 471), and to supplement the line-clearance tree-trimming 
requirements in existing Sec.  1910.269 (see, for example, Tr. 683).
    Existing Sec.  1910.269(a)(2)(i) already contains a requirement 
identical to the one proposed in Sec.  1926.950(b)(1)(ii), and OSHA has 
successful enforcement experience with this provision. First, except 
for two questions addressing who needs to be trained in emergency and 
rescue procedures, the Agency has

[[Page 20346]]

not received any letters requesting interpretation or clarification of 
this provision, leading the Agency to believe that the requirement is 
not as ambiguous as the commenters claim. Second, OSHA has issued only 
a few citations under existing Sec.  1910.269(a)(2)(i) (for example, in 
2008, OSHA issued only 2 citations of Sec.  1910.269(a)(2)(i) in 362 
inspections of electric utilities), which supports OSHA's conclusion 
that employees performing work under existing Sec.  1910.269 are 
generally being trained as required. Third, even EEI admits that ``EEI 
members have generally found the training requirements of paragraph 
1910.269(a)(2) to be workable for their employees'' (Ex. 0227). Thus, 
it appears that electric utilities have not had difficulty complying 
with the identical requirement in existing Sec.  1910.269(a)(2)(i).
    On the other hand, the Agency agrees with these commenters that 
Sec.  1926.950(b)(1)(ii) of the final rule sets a broad, general 
requirement to train employees. This is not an uncommon approach for an 
OSHA standard to take. OSHA's personal protective equipment (PPE) 
standards in Sec. Sec.  1910.132(a) and 1926.95(a) require the employer 
to provide and ensure the use of protective equipment wherever it is 
necessary by reason of hazards of processes or environment, chemical 
hazards, radiological hazards, or mechanical irritants encountered in a 
manner capable of causing injury or impairment in the function of any 
part of the body through absorption, inhalation or physical contact. An 
employer is deemed to be in violation of the PPE standards when it 
fails to provide PPE despite having actual or constructive knowledge of 
a hazard in its facility for which protective equipment is necessary. 
(See, for example, Cape & Vineyard Div. of the New Bedford Gas & Edison 
Light Co. v. OSHRC, 512 F.2d 1148, 1152 (1st Cir.1975).) The general 
construction training requirement contained in Sec.  1926.21(b)(2) is 
similarly broad, requiring employers to instruct each employee in the 
recognition and avoidance of unsafe conditions and the regulations 
applicable to his or her work environment to control or eliminate any 
hazards or other exposure to illness or injury. That standard has been 
interpreted to require employers to provide employees with ``the 
instructions that a reasonably prudent employer would have given in the 
same circumstances.'' (El Paso Crane & Rigging Co., Inc., 16 BNA OSHC 
1419 (No. 90-1106, Sept. 30, 1993); see also Pressure Concrete Constr. 
Co., 15 BNA OSHC 2011 (No. 90-2668, Dec. 7, 1992) (``Because section 
1926.21(b)(2) does not specify exactly what instruction the employees 
must be given, the Commission and the courts have held that an employer 
must instruct its employees in the recognition and avoidance of those 
hazards of which a reasonably prudent employer would have been 
aware.'').) The applicability of Sec.  1926.21(b)(2) turns on an 
employer's actual or constructive knowledge of hazards, just as under 
the general PPE requirements. (See, for example, W.G. Fairfield Co. v. 
OSHRC, 285 F. 3d 499 (6th Cir. 2002).)
    OSHA is applying final paragraph (b)(1)(ii) in the same manner. 
Therefore, if an employer has actual knowledge of a hazard (for 
example, through safety warnings from equipment manufacturers or 
through injury experience), or if the employer has constructive 
knowledge of a hazard (for example, when industry practice recognizes 
particular hazards), then each employee exposed to the hazard must be 
trained. For the training to comply with this provision, it must be 
sufficient to enable the employee to recognize the hazard and take 
reasonable measures to avoid or adequately control it.
    In addition, OSHA agrees with Mr. Matuga that, except to the extent 
that it only covers Subpart V work, paragraph (b)(1)(ii) requires the 
same training as Sec.  1926.21(b)(2). Consequently, employers who meet 
Sec.  1926.21(b)(2) also meet final Sec.  1926.950(b)(1)(ii). Even 
though the final rule duplicates the general construction training 
provision, the Agency is adopting paragraph (b)(1)(ii) to maintain 
consistency with existing Sec.  1910.269.
    Mr. Lee Marchessault with Workplace Safety Solutions recommended 
that paragraph (b)(1)(ii) refer to rescues at heights generally, rather 
than just pole-top rescue, in the parenthetical listing examples of 
potentially applicable emergency procedures (Tr. 572). He noted that 
rescue procedures are performed from wind turbines, towers, and 
substation structures, as well as utility poles (id.).
    OSHA has decided not to adopt this recommendation because no change 
is necessary. The types of emergency procedures listed in paragraph 
(b)(1)(ii) in the final rule are examples only. Pole-top rescue is 
listed because it is a widely recognized and used emergency procedure. 
The Agency notes, however, that training in these other types of 
emergency procedures is required if it is necessary for employee safety 
during the work in question.
    OSHA proposed to add a new provision to both subpart V and Sec.  
1910.269 clarifying that the degree of training required is based on 
the risk to the employee for the task involved. OSHA explained that, 
under this proposed paragraph, the training provided to an employee 
would need to be commensurate with the risk he or she faces (70 FR 
34834). The two provisions, proposed Sec. Sec.  1910.269(a)(2)(i)(C) 
and 1926.950(b)(1)(iii), were based on Sec.  1910.332(c), although 
Sec.  1910.332(c) does not contain the ``for the task involved'' 
language. The purpose of these new training paragraphs was to ensure 
that an appropriate level of training is provided to employees. 
Employees who face little risk in their job tasks need less training 
than those whose jobs expose them to more danger. OSHA believed that 
this provision would ensure that employers direct their training 
resources where they will provide the greatest benefit, while still 
making sure that all employees receive adequate training to protect 
them against the hazards they face in their jobs (id.). OSHA noted in 
the preamble to the proposal that training already provided in 
compliance with existing Sec.  1910.269 would be considered sufficient 
for compliance with these paragraphs (id.). The provisions would not 
require employers to make changes to existing training programs that 
comply with Sec.  1910.269; rather, they would provide employers with 
options to tailor their training programs and resources to employees 
with particularly high-risk jobs (id.).
    OSHA received several comments regarding paragraph (b)(1)(iii) of 
proposed Sec.  1926.950. (See, for example, Exs. 0128, 0162, 0163, 
0169, 0177, 0201, 0209, 0210, 0212, 0221, 0225, 0227, 0235; Tr. 873-
874, 1316-1319, 1332-1333.)\54\ Some commenters maintained that this 
provision was unnecessary or too vague. For example, Mr. Pat McAlister 
of Henry County REMC requested additional guidance to ``clarify 
generally when and how risks link with training and [how to assign] the 
appropriate level of training to offset those risks'' (Ex. 0210). EEI 
commented that this proposed training provision was unnecessary, 
explaining:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \54\ The remaining discussion of these provisions refers to the 
proposed construction requirement. However, the comments and OSHA's 
resolution of those comments applies equally to the corresponding 
general industry provision as is generally the case throughout this 
preamble.

    We question the soundness of changing the [current] requirements 
[in Sec.  1910.269] because if compliance with existing Section 
1910.269 training requirements is sufficient, there is no reason to 
add another regulatory

[[Page 20347]]

requirement, and the proposed provisions demonstrably have no 
purpose. The stated explanation is that the standard is intended to 
``provide employers with options,'' but employers have those options 
without the added regulation. No additional provisions are necessary 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
to preserve existing options. [Ex. 0227]

    EEI went on to suggest that the added requirement would create 
confusion, commenting:

    EEI's concern is that the new language will likely create 
confusion among many employers who do not have access to or 
regularly consult the preambles to OSHA standards. All but the most 
sophisticated readers likely will assume that the revised standard 
imposes a requirement to modify existing training programs. 
Moreover, the proposal is unclear: The meaning of the term ``degree 
of training'' is difficult to discern in that it is not evident how 
OSHA would classify and evaluate a ``degree'' of training. [Id.]

    Many of the comments received on proposed paragraph (b)(1)(iii) 
expressed concern only about the language tying training to ``the task 
involved.'' For example, Mr. Mark Spence with Dow Industries generally 
supported the proposed provision, but stated that the similar 
requirement in Sec.  1910.332(c), which does not contain the ``for the 
task involved'' language, ``has been in effect since 1990 without 
causing significant problems for employers'' (Ex. 0128). Mr. Spence had 
concerns about the additional language in proposed paragraph 
(b)(1)(iii), explaining:

    [T]he proposal refers to training ``for the task involved''. 
Training programs typically are broad, rather than task-specific. 
[T]he present wording could be interpreted to indicate an 
unmanageable requirement to train affected employees on the details 
of each individual task. OSHA should consider re-wording this 
provision or clarifying that it means that, where necessary, 
additional training may be required for a particular task . . . 
[Id.]

    Mr. Tom Chappell of Southern Company similarly noted that ``[d]ue 
to the large number of different tasks that an employee may need to 
perform, it would be difficult to evaluate each task and identify the 
level of training that would be required'' (Ex. 0212). Consumers Energy 
commented that, in its experience, ``employees can safely complete 
hundreds of specific tasks'' without the need for training in each task 
individually (Ex. 0177). Mr. Donald Hartley of IBEW testified that the 
requirement ``to tie the degree of training to the risk to the employee 
for the task involved . . . is both an unworkable and inappropriate 
standard'' (Tr. 873-874). Mr. William Mattiford with Henkels & McCoy 
testified:

    [I]t's not very clear as to what by definition, the degree of 
training shall be determined by the risk to the employee for the 
task involved. And that's where we see it's very confusing.
    And if it's literally taken that way, then it's each individual 
task. So it's not just setting a pole, but it's digging a hole, to 
set the pole, to prefab the pole. Each one of those things could be, 
I guess, understood as being training for each one of those tasks.
    And I feel as though, many of us feel as though that by the 
design of the training programs today that have redundancy and 
overlapping in them, you do cover all of those.
    But to actually spell out perhaps a lesson plan for each one of 
those tasks I think would be just too difficult to do, if not 
impossible. [Tr. 1339]

Mr. Wilson Yancey with Quanta Services agreed with these comments:

    I agree with Bill's comments, too. I think most of that is being 
covered today. If we have to go down and copy it and put lesson 
plans for everything, we will never get it accomplished and it will 
be too costly to the contractor. [Tr. 1340]

    OSHA continues to believe that it is important that the level of 
training provided to employees be commensurate with the risk they 
encounter. Focusing training where the risk is greatest maximizes the 
benefits to be achieved. In addition, providing no more training than 
is necessary for hazards that pose less risk can conserve valuable, and 
often limited, safety and health resources. OSHA successfully used this 
general approach in Sec.  1910.332(c), allowing employers flexibility 
in providing training to employees, yet ensuring that employees most at 
risk receive the most training. This approach is recognized by the 
Agency's publication ``Training Requirements in OSHA Standards and 
Training Guidelines.'' \55\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \55\ This document can be obtained by contacting OSHA's Office 
of Publications as directed in the ADDRESSES section of this 
preamble or from OSHA's Web page: https://www.osha.gov/pls/publications/publication.html. See, in particular, Section III of 
the voluntary guidelines, ``Matching Training to Employees,'' on pp. 
6-8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On the other hand, the Agency understands the rulemaking 
participants' concerns. Most commenters objected to providing a level 
of training determined by ``the task involved.'' Although employees are 
trained to perform the various tasks involved in their jobs, as noted 
by Mr. Mattiford (Tr. 1339), examining each task to determine the 
relative risk may seem daunting and unworkable as claimed by Mr. 
Hartley (Tr. 873-874). Employers should, however, be capable of 
determining the relative risk of the various hazards encountered by 
their employees. To clarify this requirement, OSHA replaced the phrase 
``for the task involved'' from the proposal with the phrase ``for the 
hazard involved'' in paragraph (b)(1)(iii) of the final rule.
    To determine the relative risk encountered by employees, employers 
are encouraged to follow the guidelines in OSHA's publication 
``Training Requirements in OSHA Standards and Training Guidelines,'' 
Voluntary Training Guidelines, Section III. In any event, employers may 
allocate training resources in accordance with their own determination 
of relative risk, provided that each affected employee receives the 
minimum training required under subpart V.
    Paragraph (b)(2) contains additional requirements for training 
qualified employees. Because qualified employees may work extremely 
close to electric power lines and equipment and, therefore, encounter a 
high risk of electrocution, it is important that they be specially 
trained. Towards this end, the standard requires that these employees 
be trained in: distinguishing exposed live parts from other parts of 
electric equipment; determining nominal voltages of exposed live parts; 
applicable minimum approach distances and how to maintain them; the 
techniques, protective equipment, insulating and shielding materials, 
and tools for working on or near exposed live parts; and the knowledge 
necessary to recognize electrical hazards and the techniques to control 
or avoid these hazards. The language in paragraph (b)(2) generally 
mirrors language in existing Sec.  1910.269(a)(2)(ii). However, 
paragraph (b)(2)(v), which requires training in how to recognize and 
control or avoid electrical hazards, has no counterpart in existing 
Sec.  1910.269. In addition, OSHA has added language to paragraph 
(b)(2)(iii) of the final rule explicitly requiring employers to train 
qualified employees in the skills and techniques necessary to maintain 
minimum approach distances. See the summary and explanation of final 
Sec.  1926.960(c)(1), later in this section of the preamble, for an 
explanation of this change.
    NIOSH commented that qualified and unqualified employees are 
exposed to the same electrical hazards and should receive the same 
training (Ex. 0130). NIOSH suggested that ``[a]ll workers potentially 
exposed to electrocution hazards should be trained in hazard awareness 
and the identification and control of these hazards, as qualified 
employees are trained'' (id.). NIOSH specifically noted that line-
clearance tree trimmers and ground workers face

[[Page 20348]]

electrical hazards comparable to those of qualified employees (id.).
    OSHA does not believe that is appropriate to adopt requirements in 
this final rule for the training of ground workers on tree crews or 
other tree workers who are neither qualified employees under Sec.  
1910.269 nor line-clearance tree trimmers. Subpart S, not Sec.  
1910.269 or subpart V, applies to electrical safety-related work 
practices of ground workers on tree crews and other tree workers who 
are not line-clearance tree trimmers. (See Sec.  1910.331(b).) The 
preamble to the 1994 Sec.  1910.269 final rule makes this clear as 
follows:

    Other tree workers do not have the training necessary for them 
to be either ``qualified employees'' or ``line-clearance tree 
trimmers'', as defined under Sec.  1910.269(x). These employees are 
not covered under Sec.  1910.269 at all. The work practices these 
employees must use are contained in Subpart S of Part 1910. Under 
Subpart S, tree workers must maintain a 10-foot minimum approach 
distance from overhead lines. (In fact, trimming any branch that is 
within 10 feet of an overhead power line is prohibited by Subpart 
S.) [59 FR 4410; footnotes omitted.]

Existing Sec.  1910.269(a)(1)(ii)(B) states that Sec.  1910.269 does 
not cover ``electrical safety-related work practices . . . covered by 
subpart S.'' Consequently, addressing the training of ground workers on 
tree crews or other tree workers who are neither qualified employees 
nor line-clearance tree trimmers in Sec.  1910.269 or subpart V would 
be inappropriate.
    On the other hand, OSHA believes that the final rule should address 
the training of line-clearance tree trimmers. However, not all of the 
training requirements in final Sec.  1910.269(a)(2)(ii), which are 
applicable to qualified employees, are appropriate for line-clearance 
tree trimmers. Qualified employees are trained to work on energized 
parts. Specifically, the final rule requires qualified employees to be 
trained in, among other topics, the proper use of the special 
precautionary techniques, personal protective equipment, insulating and 
shielding materials, and insulated tools for working on or near exposed 
energized parts of electric equipment (Sec.  1926.950(b)(2)(iv)). This 
training enables qualified employees to work directly on energized 
parts of electric circuits, which line-clearance tree trimmers do not 
do.
    Line-clearance tree trimmers work close to, but not on, energized, 
overhead power lines. (See, for example, Ex. 0502; Tr. 611.) 
Consequently, the Agency believes that these employees have different 
training needs than qualified employees covered by Sec.  1910.269. 
Under existing Sec.  1910.269, OSHA has addressed the training for 
line-clearance tree trimmers in the definition of ``line-clearance tree 
trimmer'' and in the notes to that definition. The definition and notes 
appear in existing Sec.  1910.269(x). Note 2 to that definition 
explains that while line clearance tree trimmers are not considered 
qualified employees for purposes of Sec.  1910.269, they are considered 
to be qualified employees exempt from the electrical safety-related 
work practice requirements in subpart S (Sec. Sec.  1910.331 through 
1910.335). The note following Sec.  1910.332(b)(3) indicates that, for 
the purposes of Sec. Sec.  1910.331 through 1910.335, a person must 
have the training required by Sec.  1910.332(b)(3) for OSHA to consider 
that person a qualified person. Therefore, to be considered a line-
clearance tree trimmer under Sec.  1910.269 and, thus, a qualified 
person under subpart S, a tree trimmer needs the training specified by 
Sec.  1910.332(b)(3). Any tree trimmer who has not had such training is 
considered an unqualified person under subpart S, and the electrical 
safety-related work practices in that standard apply instead of those 
in Sec.  1910.269 as explained previously.
    The training required by Sec.  1910.332(b)(3) is virtually 
identical to the training required by final Sec.  1910.269(a)(2)(ii)(A) 
through (a)(2)(ii)(C) for qualified employees, except that Sec.  
1910.332(b)(3)(iii) requires training in the clearance (that is, 
minimum approach) distances specified in Sec.  1910.333(c), whereas 
Sec.  1910.269(a)(2)(ii)(C) requires training in the minimum approach 
distances in Sec.  1910.269 and in the skills and techniques necessary 
to maintain those distances. Considering NIOSH's recommendation, OSHA 
believes that putting appropriate training requirements for line-
clearance tree trimmers directly in Sec.  1910.269 rather than applying 
them indirectly through definitions and scope statements will make the 
standards more transparent and make the obligation to train these 
workers clearer. Consequently, the Agency is adopting a new Sec.  
1910.269(a)(2)(iii) requiring line-clearance tree trimmers to be 
trained in: (1) The skills and techniques necessary to distinguish 
exposed live parts from other parts of electric equipment (final Sec.  
1910.269(a)(2)(iii)(A)), (2) the skills and techniques necessary to 
determine the nominal voltage of exposed live parts (final Sec.  
1910.269(a)(2)(iii)(B)), and (3) the minimum approach distances in the 
final rule corresponding to the voltages to which the line-clearance 
tree trimmer will be exposed and the skills and techniques necessary to 
maintain those distances (final Sec.  1910.269(a)(2)(iii)(C)).\56\ The 
first two training requirements, final Sec.  1910.269(a)(2)(iii)(A) and 
(a)(2)(iii)(B), are identical to Sec.  1910.332(b)(3)(i) and 
(b)(3)(ii). The remaining requirement, final Sec.  
1910.269(a)(2)(iii)(C), is comparable to Sec.  1910.332(b)(3)(iii), 
except that line-clearance tree trimmers need to be trained in the 
minimum approach distances required under Sec.  1910.269 rather than 
those in subpart S and need to be trained in the skills and techniques 
necessary to maintain those distances. OSHA concludes that the minimum 
approach distances required under Sec.  1910.269 are the more 
appropriate reference for final Sec.  1910.269(a)(2)(iii)(C) because 
line-clearance tree trimmers are required to comply with the minimum 
approach distances in Sec.  1910.269.\57\ The Agency also concludes 
that line-clearance tree trimmers need to be trained in the skills and 
techniques necessary to maintain the required minimum approach 
distances for the same reasons that qualified employees must be trained 
in these subjects. (See the discussion of minimum approach distances 
under the summary and explanation for final Sec.  1926.960(c)(1), later 
in this section of the preamble.) OSHA believes that training in these 
skills and techniques are even more important for line-clearance tree 
trimmers, who, unlike qualified employees, generally work without 
electrical protective equipment (see, for example, Ex. 0503).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \56\ Line-clearance tree trimming firms may need to train their 
employees in the more protective of the minimum approach distances 
in subpart S and Sec.  1910.269 to ensure compliance both during 
work that is covered by subpart S and work that is covered by Sec.  
1910.269.
    \57\ Even though line-clearance tree trimmers are not generally 
qualified employees under Sec.  1910.269, paragraph (r)(1)(iii) of 
final Sec.  1910.269 requires them to maintain the minimum approach 
distances specified in Table R-5, Table R-6, Table R-7, and Table R-
8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Paragraph (b)(2)(v), which is being adopted without change from the 
proposal, requires qualified employees to be trained in the recognition 
of electrical hazards to which the employee may be exposed and the 
skills and techniques necessary to control or avoid those hazards. 
Commenting on proposed Sec.  1910.269(a)(2)(ii)(E), which is the 
general industry counterpart to proposed Sec.  1926.950(b)(2)(v), Mr. 
Kevin Taylor of Lyondell Chemical Company requested clarification of 
the training required for workers who operate, but do not maintain, 
480-volt circuit breakers (Ex. 0218). Workers operating these circuit 
breakers need not be

[[Page 20349]]

qualified employees unless the devices are in areas restricted to 
qualified employees (final Sec. Sec.  1910.269(u)(4) and (v)(4) and 
1926.966(e)) or otherwise expose the employees to contact with live 
parts (final Sec.  1910.269(l)(1) and 1926.960(b)(1)). Thus, assuming 
that these workers are not qualified employees, they would need to be 
trained only as required by final Sec. Sec.  1910.269(a)(2)(i) and 
1926.950(b)(1). The scope of this training is described earlier in this 
section of the preamble under the discussion of final Sec.  
1926.950(b)(1).
    OSHA proposed to supplement the training requirements in paragraphs 
(b)(1) and (b)(2) with requirements for supervision and additional 
training in paragraphs (b)(3) and (b)(4). These requirements were taken 
directly from existing Sec.  1910.269(a)(2)(iii) and (a)(2)(iv). The 
Agency explained in the proposal that initial instruction in safe 
techniques is not sufficient to ensure that employees will use safe 
work practices all of the time (70 FR 34834). Continual reinforcement 
of this initial training must be provided to ensure that the worker 
uses the procedures he or she has been taught. This reinforcement can 
take the form of supervision, safety meetings, prejob briefings or 
conferences, and retraining.
    Paragraph (b)(3), which is being adopted without change from the 
proposal, requires the employer to determine, through regular 
supervision (that is, supervision that takes place on a periodic basis 
throughout the year) and inspections conducted at least annually, that 
each employees is complying with the safety-related work practices 
required by subpart V. Paragraph (b)(4), also being adopted without 
change from the proposal, requires additional training (or retraining) 
whenever:
     Regular supervision or an annual inspection required by 
paragraph (b)(3) indicates that the employee is not following the 
safety-related work practices required by subpart V,
     New technology, new types of equipment, or changes in 
procedures necessitate the use of safety-related work practices that 
are different from practices that the employee would normally use, or
     The employee must use safety-related work practices that 
are not normally used during his or her regular job duties.
    A note to paragraph (b)(4)(iii) explains that retraining must be 
provided before an employee performs a task that is done less 
frequently than once a year. Instruction provided in prejob briefings 
is acceptable if it is detailed enough to fully inform the employee of 
the procedures involved in the job and to ensure that he or she can 
accomplish them in a safe manner.
    Mr. Leo Muckerheide of Safety Consulting Services commented that 
the requirements for retraining in proposed paragraph (b)(4) were 
reactive rather than proactive (Ex. 0180). He recommended that the 
standard require 4 to 8 hours of retraining every 2 to 3 years, arguing 
that workers follow proper safety practices immediately after training, 
but drift away from those practices as time goes on.
    OSHA does not agree that the retraining requirements in paragraph 
(b) are exclusively reactive. Employees performing work covered by the 
final rule typically employ the safety-related work practices required 
by the standard on a daily or other regular basis. The Agency believes 
that workers generally will continue to follow these practices over 
time and has no evidence that a lack of regularly scheduled retraining 
contributes to a failure to follow safe work practices that are used 
frequently. OSHA does recognize, however, that retraining is important 
for work practices that are employed infrequently. Thus, paragraphs 
(b)(4)(ii) and (b)(4)(iii) require employees to receive additional 
training if they need to use new or different safety-related work 
practices or safety-related work practices that are not part of their 
regular job duties. For example, under paragraph (b)(4)(iii), an 
employee who is expected to administer CPR in the event of an emergency 
needs retraining if he or she has not used those emergency practices 
over the course of the previous year. Retraining would also be required 
for an employee who needs to climb a pole if it has been more than a 
year since he or she has used pole-climbing practices.\58\ OSHA does 
not believe that any changes to paragraph (b)(4) are necessary and is 
adopting that paragraph without change from the proposal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \58\ OSHA interprets the phrase ``must employ'' in paragraph 
(b)(4)(iii) to include both practices the employer specifically 
assigns to the employee and practices the employer expects the 
employee to be prepared to use, such as emergency response 
procedures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under paragraph (b)(5), training required by paragraph (b) can be 
provided in a classroom or on-the-job, or in both places. This 
paragraph is taken directly from existing Sec.  1910.269(a)(2)(v). The 
Agency has found these types of instruction, which provide workers an 
opportunity to ask questions and have the employer respond to them, to 
be most effective. (See, for example, OSHA's publication ``Training 
Requirements in OSHA Standards and Training Guidelines.'') OSHA 
received no comments on this provision, and it is being adopted as 
proposed.
    Paragraph (b)(6) provides that training given in accordance with 
Sec.  1926.950(b) has to result in employee proficiency in required 
work practices and introduce procedures necessary for subpart V 
compliance. OSHA did not receive any comments on this paragraph, which 
is borrowed from existing Sec.  1910.269(a)(2)(vi), and is adopting it 
without change from the proposal. Unless a training program establishes 
an employee's proficiency in safe work practices and that employee then 
demonstrates his or her ability to perform the necessary work 
practices, there will be no assurance that the employee will work 
safely. An employee who has attended a single training class on a 
complex procedure, for example lockout and tagging procedures used in 
an electric generating plant, will not generally be deemed proficient 
in that procedure. Paragraph (b)(6), and the demonstration of 
proficiency requirement contained in paragraph (b)(7) (discussed 
later), will ensure that employers do not try to comply with Sec.  
1926.950(b) by simply distributing training manuals to employees. These 
provisions require employers to take steps to assure that employees 
comprehend what they have been taught and that they are capable of 
performing the work practices mandated by the standard. OSHA believes 
that this maximizes the benefits of the training required under the 
final rule.
    Existing Sec.  1910.269(a)(2)(vii) requires employers to certify 
that each employee has received required training. The certification 
has to be made when the employee demonstrates proficiency in the 
relevant work practices and maintained for the duration of the 
employee's employment. OSHA proposed to eliminate this certification 
requirement and to replace it with paragraphs in both Sec.  1910.269 
(paragraph (a)(2)(vii)) and subpart V (Sec.  1926.950(b)(7)) that 
simply require the employer to determine that each employee has 
demonstrated proficiency in the necessary work practices. In proposing 
this change, the Agency aimed to reduce unnecessary paperwork burdens 
on employers (70 FR 34835). In the preamble to the proposal, OSHA 
explained that, in the absence of training certifications, compliance 
with training requirements could be determined through employee 
interviews (id.). A note following this proposed paragraph explained 
that, although not required, employee

[[Page 20350]]

training records could continue to be used by employers to track when 
employees demonstrate proficiency. OSHA specifically requested comments 
on whether the existing certification requirement is necessary and 
whether the proposed standard, without a certification requirement, was 
adequately protective.
    OSHA received a lot of feedback on this issue. Many rulemaking 
participants supported OSHA's proposal. (See, for example, Exs. 0125, 
0127, 0159, 0169, 0171, 0175, 0177, 0179, 0186, 0212, 0222, 0227.) For 
instance, Mr. Brian Skeahan of Public Utility District No. 1 of Cowlitz 
County commented that the change from the certification requirement to 
the requirement to demonstrate proficiency was an ``acceptable 
modification,'' pointing out that recording on-the-job training can be 
burdensome (Ex. 0159). Mr. Wilson Yancey of Quanta Services provided 
similar comments, expressing ``support [for] OSHA's proposal to require 
only that the employer ensure that the employee is able to demonstrate 
proficiency'' (Ex. 0169). He commented that the ``certification 
requirement is an unnecessary recordkeeping burden that would be 
difficult to administer in practice because of the way that crews are 
spread out and would not advance employee safety and health in any 
material way'' (id.). Mr. Brooke Stauffer of the National Electrical 
Contractors Association also supported the proposal: ``NECA supports 
the proposed changes from certification of training to demonstration of 
proficiency. We do not support a requirement to keep records of 
employee training, due to high turnover in the line construction 
industry. Such record-keeping also isn't feasible to document on-the-
job training . . . .'' (Ex. 0171). EEI commented that ``in the 
experience of EEI members, the existing training certification 
requirement in paragraph 1910.269(a)(2)(vii) has proven to be of no 
value, and is unnecessary and should be eliminated'' (Ex. 0227). Also, 
Southern Company told OSHA:

    Since on-the-job training is recognized as a method for training 
employees, it would be difficult or impossible to maintain records 
for this type of training. We agree that records of training that 
are normally maintained (classroom instruction or hands-on training 
exercises) should be recognized as a method for determining if an 
employee has been trained. However, it is the employee's ability to 
demonstrate their proficiency which should be the measure of the 
employee's ability to work safely. [Ex. 0212]

    Other commenters objected to the proposed move away from the 
certification requirement, stressing the importance of recordkeeping. 
(See, for example, Exs. 0200, 0213, 0230, 0505.) For instance, Mr. 
Tommy Lucas of TVA commented:

    To ensure that employees have been trained and demonstrated 
proficiency, the training should be documented. Documented training 
is necessary for managers and supervisors to know whether or not the 
employee is proficient in the skills required for tasks being 
assigned. Having training records available to managers and 
supervisors will better protect employees. [Ex. 0213]

    IBEW similarly supported a recordkeeping requirement for training, 
commenting as follows:

    The standard should require employers to record employee 
training. The question that needs [to be] asked is how, if training 
records are not kept, can an employer comply with requirements for 
initial and ongoing training? Most training that is offered in this 
industry is structured using somewhat universal subjects and 
methods. Those employers that are engaged in this type of training 
are most likely recording initial training and any other additional 
training that they may offer. Recording of employee training will 
not impose any unnecessary or costly requirement on employers that 
they are not currently doing. [Ex. 0230]

    Mr. Donald Hartley with IBEW further explained the union's position 
in his testimony during the 2006 public hearing:

    OSHA should require employers to certify that employees are 
proficient in the tasks that they are assigned to perform and to 
maintain records documenting their demonstrated proficiency. There 
is simply no way to ensure that employers are actually certifying 
employees if documentation is not required. Moreover, the records 
can be used over time to determine whether employees have satisfied 
the training requirements in the past and whether retraining or 
recertification is necessary. [Tr. 874]

    Mr. Steven Semler, counsel for ULCC, asked that OSHA retain the 
existing training certification requirement because it ``works well . . 
. and has enhanced safety . . . by requiring the checkoff of 
certification of employees in writing'' (Tr. 743). Mr. Scott Packard of 
Wright Tree Service testified on behalf of TCIA that the certification 
requirement ``has clearly raised the level of safety in the line 
clearance tree trimming industry overall'' (Tr. 751). The TCIA further 
commented:

    The current and existing ``shall certify'' language has raised 
the level of safety in the line clearance tree trimming industry as 
well as in non-line clearance firms with exposure to the electrical 
hazard and hence the need to train and to certify. This requirement 
is particularly important among smaller employers with less 
sophisticated safety programs.
    Requiring ``certification'' of employees having received the 
required safety training has imposed internally within line 
clearance contractors' and others' training procedures creation of 
failsafe mechanisms to unambiguously assure the employee has 
received the required safety training. The newly-proposed method is 
a more subjective--hence looser--requirement. [Ex. 0200; footnote 
omitted; emphasis included in original.]

Mr. Peter Gerstenberger, also testifying on behalf of TCIA, suggested 
that ``it's the connotation of the word `certify' that just accords the 
whole process more importance'' (Tr. 811-812).

    OSHA has carefully considered the feedback it received on this 
issue and has decided to adopt the requirement as proposed, without a 
certification requirement. OSHA believes this gives employers maximum 
flexibility, while still ensuring that employees have demonstrated 
required proficiencies. The Agency concludes that it is particularly 
important to provide flexibility for employers using less formal (that 
is, on-the-job) methods to train workers because, as noted by Messrs. 
Stauffer and Yancey, it could be challenging for these employers to 
record training that occurs sporadically and in circumstances that are 
not conducive to the preparation of written certifications. In 
addition, as noted in the preamble to the proposal, the Agency does not 
need training certifications for enforcement purposes under final Sec.  
1910.269 and subpart V because compliance with the training 
requirements can be determined through interviews with management and 
workers (70 FR 34835). Therefore, the Agency believes that the plain 
language of the final rule will be at least as effective in protecting 
workers as a requirement to certify these records; in this regard, the 
plain language of the final rule still requires employers to determine 
that each employee demonstrates necessary proficiencies.
    OSHA also points out that Note 1 to paragraph (b)(7) specifically 
clarifies that the rule does not prohibit the keeping of training 
records. In light of the comments received, OSHA expects that some 
employers will voluntarily elect to prepare and maintain training 
records for their own purposes in tracking who has received training 
and demonstrated the requisite level of proficiency.
    OSHA proposed a second note to paragraph (b)(7) of Sec.  1926.950 
that described how an employer may treat training that an employee has 
received previously (for example, through previous employment). OSHA 
explained in the preamble to the proposal that employers relying on 
training provided by others would need

[[Page 20351]]

to take steps to verify that the employee had been trained and to 
ensure that the previous training was adequate for the work practices 
the employee would be performing (70 FR 34835). The proposed note read:

    Employers may rely on an employee's previous training as long as 
the employer: (1) Confirms that the employee has the job experience 
appropriate to the work to be performed, (2) through an examination 
or interview, makes an initial determination that the employee is 
proficient in the relevant safety-related work practices before he 
or she performs any work covered by this subpart, and (3) supervises 
the employee closely until that employee has demonstrated 
proficiency in all the work practices he or she will employ.

    Several rulemaking participants noted that some employees receive 
training from third parties, such as unions, and supported OSHA's 
effort to recognize the potential portability of training. (See, for 
example, Exs. 0162, 0169, 0234.) For example, MYR Group stated: ``MYR 
Group . . . supports allowing reliance on prior training through 
demonstration of proficiency--in the circumstance of prior training not 
conducted by the employer a proficiency demonstration is a reasonable 
means of avoiding duplicative training'' (Ex. 0162).
    The line-clearance tree trimming industry, however, claimed that 
the new note would make it too difficult for an employer to rely on 
training that its employees received elsewhere. The tree trimmers 
argued that closely supervising all newly hired employees would be 
unworkable. (See, for example, Exs. 0174, 0200; Tr. 753-754.) For 
instance, Mr. Steven Semler representing ULCC argued that the note 
would unnecessarily require the close scrutiny of experienced and 
already-trained employees and suggested that the high rate of turnover 
in the line-clearance tree trimming industry made close supervision of 
all new hires administratively impractical (Ex. 0174). ULCC preferred 
existing Sec.  1910.269(a)(2)(vii), which contained the training 
certification requirement, because, in its view, the existing standard 
permitted an employer to ``verify the [previous employer's] 
certification records and observe the demonstrated proficiency of the 
newly hired employee staff'' (id.). According to ULCC, ``the current 
standard desirably enable[d] continuity of operations with trained 
personnel whose proficiency is determined by verification of training 
and observance of work'' (id.). TCIA echoed these arguments and stated 
that the proposed new note ``adds a new hardship to the employer 
without any offset whatsoever in safety'' (Ex. 0200).
    OSHA did not impose any new burdens on employers through proposed 
Note 2 to paragraph (b)(7). The proposed note simply explained one way 
for an employer to comply with the proficiency-demonstration 
requirement in final paragraph (b)(7). Tree care industry witnesses 
described the process they use to determine the proficiency of newly 
hired experienced employees, and OSHA believes that process is similar 
to the steps for determining proficiency that were described in 
proposed Note 2 (Tr. 715-717, 805-806). For example, one tree-care 
industry witness described his company's process for hiring an 
experienced employee as follows:

    [T]here would be face-to-face interviews. There will be 
verification of prior certifications and/or training. There will be 
observations done and there will be field evaluations [to verify] 
that . . . the certification that they claim to possess they do. 
[Tr. 805-806]

    Although the tree care industry appears to use the process that 
OSHA envisioned in drafting the proposed note, OSHA reworded the note 
in the final rule to more closely match the process described by the 
tree care industry. The note in the final rule explains that for an 
employee with previous training, an employer may determine that that 
employee has demonstrated the required proficiency using the following 
process: (1) Confirm that the employee has the training required by 
final Sec.  1926.950(b), (2) use an examination or interview to make an 
initial determination that the employee understands the relevant 
safety-related work practices before he or she performs any work 
covered by subpart V, and (3) supervise the employee closely until that 
employee has demonstrated the required proficiency.
    The revised note makes it clearer than the proposed note that the 
process described in the note is not mandatory. Any process that 
ensures that the employee is not treated as having completed training 
until the employer confirms that he or she has had the training 
required by paragraph (b), and has demonstrated proficiency as required 
by paragraph (b)(7), is acceptable. The revised language also replaces 
the phrase ``in all the work practices he or she will employ'' with 
``as required by this paragraph'' at the end of the note to make it 
clear that the process is designed to ensure that the employee 
demonstrates proficiency to the employer as required by the final rule.
    Since subpart V covers some transient workers, and training is 
often provided by previous employers or third parties (for example, 
unions), some commenters suggested that employers could benefit from 
the development of a system for storing and accessing training 
information for all covered workers (Exs. 0196, 0227). EEI noted the 
potential value of such a system, but did not think it should be an 
OSHA requirement (Ex. 0227). Also, Mr. Lee Marchessault with Workplace 
Safety Solutions recommended that OSHA consider recognizing a universal 
training booklet, called a training passport in some countries, that 
workers would carry to prove to employers that they have been trained 
and have demonstrated their abilities (Ex. 0196; Tr. 573-574).
    OSHA understands the third-party process by which many line workers 
are trained. The Agency has adopted Note 2 to paragraph (b)(7) in the 
final rule partly in recognition that this type of training takes 
place. The final rule is designed to allow employers to rely on 
previous training conducted by unions, previous employers, or other 
third parties. In fact, it would be permissible for employer groups, 
unions, or other third parties to design and implement a system such as 
the training passport recommended by Mr. Marchessault, provided that 
employers using the system complied with relevant OSHA training 
requirements. OSHA stresses that it is the employer's, not the 
employee's, obligation to determine that the employee demonstrates 
proficiency before he or she is deemed to have completed the required 
training.
    OSHA proposed to add provisions to both subpart V and Sec.  
1910.269 concerning communication between host employers (utilities) 
and the contractors they hire to work on their systems.\59\ As OSHA 
explained in the preamble to the proposal, the work covered by Subpart 
V is frequently done by an employer working under contract to an 
electric utility (70 FR 34835). Traditionally, employers with electric 
power generation, transmission, and distribution systems have had a 
workforce sufficient for the day-to-day maintenance of their systems. 
These employers usually hire contractors when the work to be performed 
goes beyond routine maintenance. Thus, contractors typically construct 
new transmission and distribution lines,

[[Page 20352]]

perform extensive renovations of transmission and distribution lines 
(such as replacing a large number of utility poles or upgrading a line 
to a higher voltage), do line-clearance tree trimming, overhaul 
generation plants, and repair extensive storm damage. Mr. Donald 
Hartley of IBEW testified at the 2006 public hearing in this rulemaking 
that ``utilities are increasingly contracting out work, both because 
contractors bring expertise that the utilities do not themselves 
possess and as a cost-saving measure to reduce their overall payroll 
and overhead'' (Tr. 875).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \59\ In this discussion, OSHA uses the term ``electric utility'' 
and ``host employer'' synonymously. In some cases, however, the host 
employer may not be an electric utility. See the discussion of the 
definition of ``host employer'' later in this section of the 
preamble.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In proposing the host-contractor provisions, OSHA explained that, 
in many (if not all) instances, sharing of information between the 
electric utility employer and the contractor is necessary to adequately 
protect the contractor's employees from hazards associated with work on 
the utility's facilities (70 FR 34838-34839). For example, if the host 
employers and contract employers do not coordinate their procedures for 
deenergizing lines and equipment, then contractor employees could 
mistakenly believe that a line is deenergized when it is not. This 
mistake could have potentially fatal results for contractor employees. 
In a similar fashion, as OSHA also explained in the preamble to the 
proposal, the safety of electric utility employees is affected by the 
contract employer's work (id.). For example, a contractor's work could 
cause an overhead energized line to fall on a deenergized line on which 
an electric utility employee is working, creating hazards for the 
electric utility employee. Although electric utility employees do not 
typically work with contract employees, sometimes they do work 
together. For example, it is common practice for contract employees and 
electric utility employees to work side by side during emergency-
restoration operations, such as after a big storm (Ex. 0505; Tr. 392, 
1379-1380). Additionally, contractors in electric power generation 
plants will be working near utility employees who work in the plant 
(Tr. 985). The record also indicates that utility and contract 
employees work side by side in other situations, including during 
outages on transmission lines (Ex. 0505; Tr. 1380) and while working in 
the same substation (Ex. 0505; Tr. 313-314, 559).
    Because in this host-contractor relationship the work of (or 
information possessed by) one affects the safety of the other's 
employees, OSHA believed that it was necessary for host employers and 
contractors to cooperate and communicate with each other to provide 
adequate protection for all employees maintaining or constructing 
electric power generation, transmission, or distribution facilities. 
Thus, OSHA proposed requirements in Sec.  1926.950 (as well as in Sec.  
1910.269) to ensure the necessary exchange of information between host 
employers and contract employers. The requirements in the proposal were 
loosely based on similar provisions in the Agency's standard for 
process safety management (PSM), Sec.  1910.119(h).
    IBEW agreed that there was a need for host-contractor requirements 
in these standards, explaining that it ``fully supports the basic 
principles underlying OSHA's proposals regarding the reciprocal 
obligations of the host employers and contract employers to provide one 
another with information necessary to safeguard their workforces'' (Tr. 
878).
    Mr. Donald Hartley of IBEW testified about the importance of host 
employers and contract employers exchanging ``critically important'' 
information (Tr. 877-878). He elaborated that for contractor employees 
to be ``equipped to deal with potential hazards associated with this 
dangerous work, [they require] access to information that may be in the 
sole possession of the host employer'' (Tr. 876). He continued:

    [W]hile some contract employers report that utilities routinely 
provide this information with every job they contract out, as we 
have heard, others have found that utilities refuse to disclose that 
information about operating conditions even when the contract 
employers specifically request it.
    Just as the host employer possesses information critically 
important to the safety of contract employees, the contract 
employees may in the course of their work discover conditions about 
which the host is unaware, also recently testified to. This is 
particularly true when contract employees are working out in the 
field on equipment that the host employer may not regularly inspect. 
[Tr. 877-878]

    OSHA received a number of comments suggesting that it should not 
include host-contractor provisions in the final rule. The Agency has 
considered these comments and concluded that, although some changes to 
the proposed regulatory text are necessary (as described later in this 
section of the preamble), the information-sharing requirements in Sec.  
1926.950(c) of this final rule are reasonably necessary and 
appropriate.
    Some commenters took the position that the extent to which host 
employers and contract employers exchange information with each other 
is an issue best left to private contracts between the parties. (See, 
for example, Exs. 0149, 0151, 0159, 0172, 0179, 0188.) For example, the 
Lewis County Public Utility District commented:

    We feel that any arrangement between a contractor and host 
employer is best handled by contractual language between the two 
parties without OSHA involvement. This includes how the host 
employer and contractor communicate and exchange information. [Ex. 
0149].

    Evidence in the record makes clear, however, that relying on 
private contracts has proven to be an ineffective method of ensuring 
the adequate exchange of information between hosts and contractors. A 
number of participants at the 2006 public hearing explained that there 
are times when contractors are unable to get the information they need 
from utilities to permit the contractors' employees to work safely. For 
example, Mr. Donald Hartley of IBEW testified that ``complying with 
[OSHA standards] requires access to information that may be in the sole 
possession of the host employer'' (Tr. 876). As noted earlier, he also 
stated that some ``utilities refuse to disclose . . . information about 
operating conditions even when the contract employers specifically 
request it'' (Tr. 877). An ESCI representative agreed, testifying: ``I 
work with a number of utility contractors that tell me that [t]here are 
a number of things that they are not provided that they need'' (Tr. 
1240). Also, MYR noted that ``although . . . the transfer of 
information between utilities and contractors has improved tremendously 
over the last several years, issues still exist in the industry today'' 
(Tr. 1333). In light of this evidence, OSHA concludes that relying on 
the parties' private contracts to serve this function is unlikely to 
ensure that host employers and contract employers receive all of the 
information they need to protect their workers.
    Some commenters suggested that OSHA does not have statutory 
authority to adopt host-contractor provisions. (See, for example, Exs. 
0168, 0177, 0209, 0227, 0501.) For instance, EEI commented:

    The fundamental point is that the OSH Act simply does not confer 
authority upon OSHA to require one employer to be responsible for 
the safety or health of another employer's employees. Any final rule 
that seeks to impose duties on host employers and contractors vis-
[agrave]-vis each other will be legally vulnerable. [Ex. 0227]

    OSHA has clear authority to include the host-contractor provisions 
in the final rule. First, the plain language of the OSH Act and its 
underlying purpose support OSHA's authority to place requirements on 
employers that are necessary to protect the employees of

[[Page 20353]]

others.\60\ Second, congressional action subsequent to passage of the 
OSH Act recognizes this authority. Third, OSHA has consistently 
interpreted its statutory authority as permitting it to impose 
obligations on employers that extend beyond their own employees, as 
evidenced by the numerous standards, including several construction 
standards, that OSHA has promulgated with multiemployer provisions. 
Finally, OSHA's authority to place obligations on employers that reach 
beyond their own employees has been upheld by numerous courts of 
appeals and the OSHRC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \60\ As explained later in this section of the preamble, the 
overall sharing of information that will occur in accordance with 
the final host-contractor provisions will help protect the employees 
of both host employers and contract employers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The purpose of the OSH Act is to assure so far as possible safe and 
healthful working conditions for every working man and woman in the 
nation (29 U.S.C. 651(b)). To achieve this goal, Congress authorized 
the Secretary of Labor to establish mandatory occupational safety and 
health standards. The Act broadly defines an OSHA standard as a rule 
that ``requires conditions, or the adoption or use of one or more 
practices, means, methods, operations, or processes, reasonably 
necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment and 
places of employment'' (29 U.S.C. 652(8)). (See Building & Constr. 
Trades Dep't., AFL-CIO v. Brock, 838 F.2d 1258, 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1988).) 
OSHA standards must prescribe measures that are appropriate to protect 
``places of employment;'' nothing in the statutory language suggests 
that OSHA may do so only by regulating an employer's interactions with 
its own employees. On the contrary, the OSH Act's broad language gives 
OSHA almost ``unlimited discretion'' to devise means to reach the 
statutory goal. (See United Steelworkers v. Marshall (Steelworkers), 
647 F.2d 1189, 1230 (D.C. Cir. 1980).)
    Similarly, Section 5(a)(2) of the OSH Act provides that each 
employer ``shall comply with occupational safety and health standards 
promulgated under'' the OSH Act (29 U.S.C. 654(a)(2)).\61\ Nothing in 
this language suggests that compliance is required only when necessary 
to protect the employer's own employees or that the employer is 
entitled to endanger other employer's employees at the worksite.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \61\ This language is in marked contrast to the language of 
Section 5(a)(1) of the OSH Act (known as the ``general duty 
clause''), which requires each employer to ``furnish to each of his 
employees employment and a place of employment which are free from 
recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or 
serious physical harm to his employees'' (29 U.S.C. 654(a)(1)). (See 
Brennan v. OSHRC, 513 F.2d 1032, 1037-38 (2d Cir. 1975).)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Section 6(b)(7) of the OSH Act specifically permits the Secretary 
to ``prescribe the use of labels or other appropriate forms of warning 
as are necessary to insure that employees are apprised of all hazards 
to which they are exposed . . . and proper conditions and precautions 
of safe use or exposure'' (29 U.S.C. 655(b)(7)). (Notably, the Agency's 
authority to require warnings is not limited to information that would 
warn the employer's own employees of hazards.) Finally, Section 8(g)(2) 
of the OSH Act generally affords the Secretary authority to ``prescribe 
such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary to carry out . . . 
responsibilities under'' the OSH Act (29 U.S.C. 657(g)(2)).
    In short, the statute focuses on workplace conditions to effectuate 
the OSH Act's congressional mandate and not on a particular employment 
relationship. The OSH Act's underlying purpose is broad--to assure safe 
and healthful working conditions for working men and women--and 
Congress made clear that it expected the Act to protect all employees. 
(See H. Rep. No. 91-1291, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., pp.14-16 (July 9, 
1970).) Numerous references in the legislative history of the OSH Act 
discuss requiring employers to provide a safe and healthful ``place of 
employment.'' (See for example, S. Rep. No. 91-1282, 91st Cong., 2d 
Sess., p. 10 (Oct. 6, 1970).) The OSH Act tasks OSHA with promulgating 
rules that will create safe places of employment, notwithstanding the 
many varied employment relationships that might exist at a worksite.
    Subsequent congressional action has also recognized OSHA's 
authority to impose responsibilities on employers to protect employees 
who are not their own. For example, Congress directed OSHA to develop a 
chemical process safety standard (the PSM Standard) requiring employers 
to ``ensure contractors and contract employees are provided appropriate 
information and training'' and to ``train and educate employees and 
contractors in emergency response'' (Pub. L. 101-549, Title III, Sec. 
304, Nov. 15, 1990, 104 Stat. 2576 (reprinted at 29 U.S.C. 655 Note)). 
This is a clear ratification of the Agency's authority to require 
employers to protect the employees of others. Congress also approved of 
the Agency's authority when it relied on the provisions of OSHA's 
Hazard Communication Standard in promulgating the Emergency Planning 
and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA), 42 U.S.C. 11001-11050. The 
Hazard Communication Standard requires, in part, that manufacturers and 
importers of hazardous chemicals provide information for the benefit of 
downstream employees.\62\ (See 29 CFR 1910.1200; see also Martin v. 
American Cyanamid Co., 5 F.3d 140, 141 (6th Cir. 1993) (noting that the 
Hazard Communication Standard requires ``that a manufacturer of 
hazardous chemicals inform not only its own employees of the dangers 
posed by the chemicals, but downstream employers and employees as 
well'').) Congress incorporated provisions of the Hazard Communication 
Standard in EPCRA as a basis for triggering obligations on owners or 
operators of facilities producing hazardous chemicals to provide local 
governments with information needed for emergency response. Had 
Congress not approved of the multiemployer provisions in the Hazard 
Communication Standard, it would not have approved of it as a basis for 
obligations in EPCRA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \62\ As a rationale for those provisions, OSHA explained that 
chemical manufacturers and importers are in the best position to 
develop, disseminate, and obtain information about their products. 
(See 48 FR 53280, 53322, Nov. 25, 1983.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Furthermore, OSHA has consistently interpreted the OSH Act as 
authorizing it to impose multiemployer obligations in its standards. In 
addition to the Hazard Communication Standard and the PSM Standard 
already noted, OSHA included multiemployer provisions in its standard 
for powered platforms, which requires that a building owner inform 
employers that the building installation has been inspected and is safe 
to use. (See 29 CFR 1910.66(c)(3).) OSHA also has imposed multiemployer 
obligations in construction standards. For example, OSHA exercised its 
OSH Act authority to promulgate provisions in the Asbestos Standard for 
the construction industry that require building owners to communicate 
the presence of asbestos or presumed asbestos-containing materials to 
certain employers with employees who may be exposed to such materials. 
(See 29 CFR 1926.1101(k).) In OSHA's Steel-Erection Standard, the 
Agency imposed duties on controlling contractors to ensure that site 
conditions are safe for steel erection. (See 29 CFR 1926.752(c).) More 
recently, OSHA promulgated rules requiring controlling entities and 
utilities to take steps to protect other employers' employees during 
crane operations. (See 29 CFR 1926.1402(c), 1926.1402(e), 1926.1407(e), 
1926.1408(c), and 1926.1424(b).)
    Finally, OSHA's authority to impose these provisions is confirmed 
by the

[[Page 20354]]

decisions of numerous courts of appeals and the Review Commission. For 
example, the Third Circuit upheld the information-sharing requirements 
in the Asbestos Standard for the construction industry, noting: ``We 
are not convinced that the Secretary is powerless to regulate in this 
[way], especially given the findings she has made regarding the 
importance of building owners in the discovery and communication of 
asbestos hazards.'' Secretary of Labor v. Trinity Indus., Inc. 
(Trinity), 504 F.3d 397, 402 (3d Cir. 2007). (See also Universal 
Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 182 F.3d 726, 728 (10th Cir. 1999) (following 
decisions from Second, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits 
holding that an employer's duties and OSHA standards may extend beyond 
an employer's own employees).)
    EEI asserted that Sec.  1910.12(a) precludes host-contractor 
requirements in subpart V, commenting:

    Section 1910.12(a), standing alone, precludes OSHA from 
requiring an employer covered by the final Part 1926 rule to take 
any responsibility for the safety of another employer's employees, 
certainly insofar as the final standard purports to regulate 
``construction.'' [Ex. 0227].

    OSHA disagrees with EEI. Paragraph (a) of Sec.  1910.12 provides:

    The standards prescribed in part 1926 of this chapter are 
adopted as occupational safety and health standards under section 6 
of the Act and shall apply, according to the provisions thereof, to 
every employment and place of employment of every employee engaged 
in construction work. Each employer shall protect the employment and 
places of employment of each of his employees engaged in 
construction work by complying with the appropriate standards 
prescribed in this paragraph.

    Paragraph (a) of Sec.  1910.12 has no bearing on the host-
contractor requirements in the final rule because the Agency clearly 
intends to assign specific responsibilities to host employers and 
contract employers, and the final regulatory text plainly reflects that 
intent. (See Trinity, 504 F.3d at 402 (rejecting argument premised on 
Sec.  1910.12(a) where ``the regulation at issue . . . specifically 
applie[d] to building owners'').) Moreover, the Eighth Circuit and the 
Review Commission have squarely rejected EEI's argument. In Solis v. 
Summit Contractors, Inc. (Summit Contractors), the Eighth Circuit 
concluded that Sec.  1910.12(a) is ``unambiguous'' in that it does not 
preclude OSHA from citing an employer when only employees of other 
employers are exposed to the hazard in question (558 F.3d 815, 825 (8th 
Cir. 2009)). The Review Commission similarly held that Sec.  1910.12(a) 
does not prevent OSHA from citing a controlling employer that does not 
have exposed employees (Summit Contractors, Inc., 23 BNA OSHC 1196 (No. 
05-0839, Aug. 19, 2010)). Both the Eighth Circuit and the Review 
Commission emphasized the language in Sec.  1910.12(a) establishing a 
duty on the part of employers to protect ``places of employment'' as 
well as employees. (See, for example, Summit Contractors, 558 F.3d at 
824.) The first sentence in Sec.  1910.12(a) makes the construction 
standards applicable to every employment and to every ``place of 
employment'' of every construction employee, and the second sentence, 
by providing that each employer must protect ``places of employment,'' 
does not negate the broad reach of the first sentence.
    Moreover, the history of Sec.  1910.12(a) reveals that the purpose 
of this provision is to extend, not limit, the Agency's authority. 
Indeed, Sec.  1910.12(a) is located in a subpart entitled ``Adoption 
and Extension of Established Federal Standards,'' which was established 
to extend OSHA's authority through adoption of the Construction Safety 
Act's standards. (See 29 CFR 1910.11(a) (``The provisions of this 
subpart . . . adopt[,] and extend the applicability of, established 
Federal standards . . . with respect to every employer, employee, and 
employment covered by the Act.'').) Thus, neither the language nor the 
context of Sec.  1910.12(a) suggest a conflict with the information-
sharing requirements in this final rule.
    Some commenters asserted that the proposed host-contractor 
provisions inappropriately expanded or conflicted with OSHA's existing 
Multi-Employer Citation Policy (CPL 02-00-124 (Dec. 10, 1999)). (See, 
for example, Exs. 0162, 0167, 0170, 0207, 0237.)
    These comments reflect a misunderstanding of both the proposal and 
the multiemployer citation policy. The host-contractor provisions do 
not rely on, or modify, the Agency's multiemployer enforcement policy. 
(See Trinity, 504 F.3d at 402 (distinguishing an enforcement action 
under the multiemployer provisions of the Asbestos Standard for 
construction from cases in which the Agency invoked the multiemployer 
citation policy).) Rather, the multiemployer citation policy and the 
host-contractor provisions represent separate exercises of OSHA's 
statutory authority to protect places of employment. The host-
contractor provisions and the multiemployer enforcement policy operate 
in different, yet entirely consistent, ways to permit the Agency to 
fulfill its statutory mission.
    OSHA's multiemployer citation policy simply recognizes the existing 
responsibilities of different employers at multiemployer worksites 
under the Act and OSHA standards. For example, employers have a duty 
not to create hazardous conditions that violate OSHA standards, 
regardless whether it is their own employees or another employer's that 
they endanger. (Employers who do so are referred to as ``creating 
employers.'') And employers have a duty to protect their own employees 
from violative conditions, even if created by another employer. Such 
``exposing employers'' must take reasonable steps to correct the 
hazards or otherwise protect their workers. Similarly, ``controlling 
employers,'' that is, employers with general supervisory authority over 
safety and health at a worksite, by virtue of that authority, have 
certain responsibilities to prevent and detect violations affecting 
employees at the workplace.
    When OSHA promulgates new safety and health standards, it does so 
against this background principle that employers share responsibility 
for working conditions, and thus for OSHA compliance, at multiemployer 
worksites. Therefore, when the Agency issues a new safety or health 
standard, it is with the intention that creating, exposing, and 
controlling employers at multiemployer worksites will exercise their 
respective responsibilities to ensure that affected employees are 
protected as required by the standard.
    In some situations, however, the general background principles 
reflected in the multiemployer policy will not be sufficient to ensure 
the safety of workplaces; in those instances, OSHA may find it 
necessary to impose additional or more specific obligations on 
particular employers to protect workers. The host-contractor provisions 
in this final rule, as well as similar information-sharing provisions 
in the Hazard Communication Standard, the PSM Standard, and the 
Asbestos Standard for construction, are examples of the Agency 
regulating in this manner. In this rulemaking, OSHA determined that the 
final host-contractor provisions are necessary, in addition to the 
general background responsibilities employers have, to ensure the 
safety of affected employees. Not all utilities (or host employers) 
will have sufficient authority over, or relationships with, contractor 
worksites to qualify as controlling employers under the multiemployer 
citation policy. In addition, the final rule prescribes with 
specificity the information-sharing responsibilities of hosts and 
contractors. The specific information-sharing

[[Page 20355]]

requirements in the host-contractor provisions are necessary to ensure 
that critical information sharing and coordination take place at all 
workplaces where employees perform work covered by the final rule.
    Some commenters argued that the host-contractor provisions could 
create employer-employee relationships between host employers and 
contractor employees. (See, for example, Exs. 0173, 0178.) For 
instance, the Farmers Rural Electric Cooperative Corporation commented:

    It is up to the contractor and the employees of that firm to 
perform this work, under their supervision and direction, using 
their work practices and safety rules. Should we as hosts begin to 
direct their work, provide supervision of that work, oversee their 
safety practices, the IRS would then say they are our employees and 
are entitled to benefits. [Ex. 0173]

Also, some commenters suggested, more generally, that the host-
contractor provisions could expand the potential legal liability of the 
respective employers. (See, for example, Exs. 0168, 0187, 0220, 0226.) 
A few commenters argued that in these ways the proposed host-contractor 
provisions went so far as to violate the OSH Act. For example, the 
National Association of Home Builders commented:

    [W]e also believe that OSHA's multi-employer language in the 
proposed rule in Subpart V impermissibly expands the common law 
liability of host/general contractors in violation [of Section 
4(b)(4)] of the OSH Act. [Ex. 0168].

    OSHA concludes that, under any of the potentially applicable legal 
tests for an employment relationship, the final host-contractor 
provisions are unlikely to result in one employer exercising the type 
or degree of control over the employees of another employer that would 
create an employer-employee relationship when one otherwise would not 
have existed. (See, for example, Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co v. Darden, 
503 U.S. 318 (1992) (common-law test for determining who is an 
``employee''); Antenor v. D&S Farms, 88 F.3d 925 (11th Cir. 1996) 
(factors relevant to determining whether two employers are ``joint 
employers'' of an individual employee for purposes of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act); Weber v.  C.I.R., 60 F.3d 1104 (4th Cir. 1995) (test 
for determining whether there is an employment relationship for income 
tax purposes).)
    OSHA also disagrees with the commenters' claim about Section 
4(b)(4) of the OSH Act. That provision states:

    Nothing in [the OSH] Act shall be construed to . . . in any 
manner affect any workmen's compensation law or to enlarge or 
diminish or affect in any other manner the common law or statutory 
rights, duties, or liabilities of employers and employees under any 
law with respect to injuries, diseases, or death of employees 
arising out of, or in the course of, employment. [29 U.S.C. 
653(b)(4)]

This provision serves two purposes: First, it establishes that the OSH 
Act does not create a private right of action. (See, for example, Crane 
v. Conoco, Inc., 41 F.3d 547 (9th Cir. 1994).) Second, it makes clear 
that the duties and liabilities imposed under the OSH Act do not 
displace the duties and liabilities that exist under State tort and 
workers' compensation schemes. (See, for example, Frohlick Crane Serv., 
Inc. v. OSHRC, 521 F.2d 628 (10th Cir. 1975).)
    OSHA acknowledges that State courts are free to permit the use of 
OSHA regulations, including these final host-contractor provisions, as 
evidence of a standard of care in a negligence action. (See, for 
example, Knight v. Burns, Kirkley & Williams Constr. Co., 331 So.2d 651 
(Ala. 1976).) However, it does not follow that regulations used in that 
fashion are invalid under Section 4(b)(4) on the ground that they 
expand employers' common-law liabilities, a result that would limit the 
Secretary's rulemaking authority to issuing regulations that codify 
duties already owed by employers at common law. Such a result would be 
inconsistent with Congressional intent in promulgating the OSH Act, and 
no court has ever invalidated an OSHA regulation on the ground that it 
violates Section 4(b)(4). Indeed, courts have squarely rejected the 
argument that Section 4(b)(4) precludes multiemployer enforcement 
practices. For example, in Summit, the Eighth Circuit concluded that 
OSHA's multiemployer citation policy did not violate Section 4(b)(4), 
explaining that even though it could ``increas[e] an employer's 
liability at common law[,]'' the policy ``neither creates a private 
cause of action nor preempts state law'' (558 F.3d at 829). (See also 
Steelworkers, 647 F.2d at 1234-36.)
    OSHA decided to adopt the proposed host-contractor provisions, with 
some substantial modifications (described later in this section of the 
preamble), in the final rule. Before addressing each specific 
provision, however, OSHA must first address the scope of these 
requirements.
    The proposal defined a ``host employer'' as ``[a]n employer who 
operates and maintains an electric power transmission or distribution 
installation covered by subpart V of this Part and who hires a contract 
employer to perform work on that installation.'' This definition 
included electric utilities and other employers that operate and 
maintain electric power transmission or distribution installations. 
However, it did not include employers that own, but do not operate and 
maintain, such installations. The Agency believed that entities that do 
not operate or maintain these installations would generally not have 
the expertise necessary to work safely on transmission or distribution 
lines and equipment and would have little hazard-related knowledge to 
pass on to contractors. In addition, the employees of such entities 
would have little if any exposure to hazards created by a contract 
employer. The Agency invited comments on whether excluding such 
employers from the host-contractor provisions would unduly jeopardize 
employee safety and whether any of the host-contractor provisions could 
reasonably be applied to such employers.
    Some commenters, such as Energy United EMC (Ex. 0219), supported 
the proposed exclusion of owners that do not operate or maintain 
installations. Ohio Rural Electric Cooperatives commented: ``If an 
employer only owns but does not actually operate its own lines or 
equipment then that employer would certainly not be able to pass on any 
useful information to a contractor'' (Ex. 0186).
    IBEW took the position that ``[e]xcluding such employers from any 
host-contract employer provisions, in general, should not jeopardize 
employee safety,'' but questioned whether those entities may make 
``decisions on how the system will be operated, such as switching 
procedures and load transfer, that . . . could have a direct impact on 
worker safety'' (Ex. 0230). The union went on to suggest that 
``[w]hatever entity has the responsibility and/or decision making power 
as to how the system is operated should be included in the proposed 
provisions'' (id.).
    Others commented that the host-contractor provisions should apply 
to all system owners. Ms. Susan O'Connor of Siemens Power Generation 
commented, for example, that excluding owners that do not perform 
operations or maintenance could jeopardize employee safety ``in 
situations where host employers might use this provision as a loophole 
to avoid regulation'' (Ex. 0163). Ms. O'Connor suggested that a utility 
could ``eliminate [its] qualified maintenance department and outsource 
. . . maintenance to avoid dealing with this regulation'' (id.). MYR 
Group also ``believe[d] that the protections afforded to contractors 
through the host employer obligations should apply

[[Page 20356]]

regardless of whether the host actually operates the installation'' 
(Ex. 0162). MYR thought that ``[s]erious and inequitable problems could 
arise from failure to apply the proposed rule requirements on host 
employers that own but do not operate their electric utility 
installations'' (id.).
    OSHA considered the record and concludes that the host employer 
should be the employer that is in the best position to have information 
on the design, operation, and condition of an electric power 
generation, transmission, or distribution system. Based on this 
principle, OSHA decided that an employer that controls how the system 
is operated, such as switching procedures and load transfer, should not 
be excluded from the host-contractor provisions. Depending on the type 
of work practices used, such operational control could have a direct 
impact on worker safety. For example, an employer that controls the 
operation of an electric power generation, transmission, or 
distribution system could institute new switching procedures without 
informing contractors or coordinating the new procedures with 
contractors (Ex. 0230). In addition, because an employer, to fall 
within the proposed definition of ``host employer,'' needed to operate 
and maintain the installation and hire the contractor, it would have 
been possible under the proposal to have scenarios in which there was 
no host employer, such as if one employer owned the installation (and 
hired the contractor) and a different employer operated or maintained 
the installation. This result could have undermined the information-
sharing requirements altogether.
    The Agency is revising the definition of ``host employer'' to 
include employers that operate installations or control procedures for 
operation of installations without regard to whether the employer owns 
the installation. In addition, OSHA is deleting the reference to 
``maintenance'' in the final definition of ``host employer'' because 
the Agency believes that an employer that only maintains an electric 
power generation, transmission, or distribution system is unlikely to 
have knowledge of the design, operation, and condition of the 
installation; employers that perform such maintenance may be 
contractors hired by an electric utility. (See, for example, Tr. 403, 
1200-1201.) Maintenance contractors will need information from the 
employer that operates or controls the operation of the installation, 
as would any other contractor. The final rule states that an employer 
that operates, or that controls the operating procedures for, an 
electric power generation, transmission, or distribution installation 
on which a contract employer is performing work covered by subpart V is 
a host employer. A note to the definition of ``host employer'' provides 
that OSHA will treat the electric utility or the owner of the 
installation as the host employer if it operates or controls operating 
procedures for the installation. If the electric utility or 
installation owner neither operates nor controls operating procedures 
for the installation, OSHA will treat the employer that the utility or 
owner has contracted with to operate or control the operating 
procedures for the installation as the host employer. In no case will 
there be more than one host employer. (See the definition of ``host 
employer'' in final Sec.  1926.968.)
    The revised definition incorporates IBEW's recommendation that the 
Agency focus on the entity that has control over the system. OSHA 
believes any such entity is likely to have critical safety-related 
information about the system. In addition, the revised language renders 
Ms. O'Connor's comment moot; the revised language ensures that an 
entity that is in a position to have information that affects the 
safety of contractor employees will be identified as a host employer 
under the final rule.\63\ Note that OSHA has added electric power 
generation installations to the installations covered by the definition 
of ``host employer'' in subpart V for consistency with the definition 
of this term in Sec.  1910.269.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \63\ The definition of host employer in the final rule also 
removes any confusion over whether a holding company that owns a 
utility company's outstanding stock, which is a common practice, or 
the electric utility itself ``owns'' the installation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, the definition in the final rule removes the criterion 
that the host employer be the entity that hires the contractor. The 
record indicates that various entities hire contractors to work on 
electric power generation, transmission, and distribution 
installations. For example, utility owners hire contractors to perform 
maintenance (Ex. 0186; Tr. 403). In addition, some contractors 
subcontract some of their work (Tr. 315-316, 1380-1381). Subcontractors 
will be treated as ``contract employers'' under the final rule even 
though the host does not hire them directly.\64\ The standard's 
information-exchange requirements hinge on the need to exchange 
information between the entity that operates or controls operating 
procedures for the system and entities that are performing maintenance 
or construction work on the system. The type of contractual 
relationship that exists between the host employer and contract 
employers does not change the need for this information exchange. OSHA 
realizes that the final rule will require some employers to exchange 
information with entities with which they have no direct contractual 
relationship. These employers can either exchange information directly 
with each other or can arrange to handle their information exchange 
through contacts with entities that do have contractual relationships 
with the other employer. For example, an electric utility transmitting 
information to an employer under contract to perform work on the 
installation could instruct (or contract for) that contractor to share 
the same information with any subcontractors hired to perform work 
under the contract. Ultimately, however, it is the host employer's 
responsibility to ensure that whatever procedures it uses are adequate 
to get the required information to all ``contract employers'' working 
on the installation. Paragraph (c)(3) of final Sec.  1926.950 
(discussed later in this section of the preamble) requires host 
employers and contract employers to coordinate their work rules and 
procedures; part of this coordination involves establishing appropriate 
procedures for exchanging information in accordance with the host-
contractor provisions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \64\ As explained later in this section of the preamble, 
``contract employer'' is defined as: ``An employer, other than a 
host employer, that performs work covered by subpart V of this part 
under contract.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The other issue involving coverage under the host-contractor 
provisions pertains to line-clearance tree trimming. OSHA proposed to 
exclude from the host-contractor requirements work done by line-
clearance tree trimmers who are not qualified employees. As discussed 
earlier in this section of the preamble, line-clearance tree-trimming 
work is covered by Sec.  1910.269. Paragraph (a)(1)(i)(E)(2) of 
existing Sec.  1910.269 lists the paragraphs of that section that apply 
to work performed by line-clearance tree trimmers who are not qualified 
employees, and OSHA did not propose to add the host-contractor 
provisions to that list.
    By not proposing to modify existing Sec.  1910.269(a)(1)(i)(E)(2), 
OSHA would not have applied the host-contractor provisions to line-
clearance tree-trimming operations performed by unqualified employees. 
However, as long as qualified employees are using electrical protective 
equipment, these employees would be permitted to come much closer to 
energized parts than unqualified employees. The Agency believed that 
qualified employees

[[Page 20357]]

performing line-clearance tree-trimming work in proximity to energized 
lines and equipment face hazards similar to contract power line workers 
and should receive similar protection.\65\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \65\ For a full discussion of why Sec.  1910.269 applies 
different requirements to line-clearance tree-trimming operations 
depending on whether they are performed by qualified or unqualified 
employees, see the preamble to the 1994 Sec.  1910.269 final rule 
(59 FR 4336).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    OSHA requested comments on whether its proposed approach for 
dealing with line-clearance tree-trimming work under the host-
contractor provisions unduly jeopardized employee safety and whether 
any of the host-contactor provisions could reasonably be applied to 
tree-trimming work performed by line-clearance tree trimmers who are 
unqualified employees. Many commenters supported OSHA's proposal. (See, 
for example, Exs. 0126, 0174, 0177, 0200, 0201, 0213, 0219, 0227.) For 
instance, EEI agreed ``that line clearance tree-trimming contractors 
should be excluded from the requirement,'' explaining: ``Host utilities 
are usually not familiar with the hazards associated with trimming 
trees and routinely rely on the expertise of the line clearance tree-
trimming contractors to perform that work in a manner which ensures the 
safety of their employees'' (Ex. 0227). These comments were echoed by 
ULCC, which ``commended'' OSHA's proposal to exclude work done by line-
clearance tree trimmers who ``do not work on or touch electric supply 
lines'' from the host-contractor provisions (Ex. 0174). ULCC urged the 
Agency to maintain this exclusion in the final rule, commenting:

    [T]he wisdom of the exclusion is manifest: for, the rationale of 
the proposed ``host-contractor'' provisions . . . is to apply the 
utilities' expertise to utility contractors performing utilities' 
typical work--in effect, to force down utilities' safety expertise 
onto their electric-work contractors in order to raise the safety 
experience rate of those contractors to the better safety rate of 
the utilities who employ them. Such policy-driver for applying 
``host-contractor'' to utility contractors performing electric 
utility (i.e. lineman) ``qualified'' work, simply is inapplicable to 
line clearance work: for, the utilities hire line clearance 
contractors because line clearance contractors are arborists who are 
specialists in vegetation management--precisely skills which the 
utilities contract out because they typically do not have that 
expertise in tree growth, tree trimming techniques, tree rigging, 
tree removal, vegetation management, etc. In short, utilities simply 
do not have the institutional expertise of line clearance tree 
knowledge to develop and direct line clearance safety practices of 
line clearance contractors via ``host-contractor'' provisions. . . . 
So, the ``force-down'' premise of ``host-contractor'' simply does 
not apply to line clearance. [Id.; emphasis included in original.]

    Duke Energy commented that ``[t]here should be no expectation that 
host employers provide information on tree-trimming hazards to line-
clearance tree trimming contractors,'' suggesting that ``[a]pplying the 
host-contract employer provisions [in the context of line-clearance 
tree trimming] will be very difficult'' (Ex. 0201).
    Some commenters, however, advised against the proposed exclusion 
and argued that all line-clearance tree trimmers should be covered by 
the host-contractor provisions. (See, for example, Exs. 0162, 0186, 
0230, 0234.) IBEW, for instance, commented:

    Line-clearance tree-trimming work could, in some instances, be 
affected by the host employer[']s operation of the system. Lockout/
Tagout procedures during service restoration are one example where 
contractor employee safety could be jeopardized if line-clearance 
tree-trimming contractors are excluded from all provisions of the 
proposed host-contract employer provisions. At a minimum, 
information regarding circuit conditions, changes in conditions, and 
lockout/tagout applications should be communicated by the host 
employer to the contractor employer. [Ex. 0230]

    The Ohio Rural Electrical Cooperatives agreed, also suggesting that 
all line-clearance tree trimmers be covered by the host-contractor 
requirements. That organization explained that tree trimmers ``might 
not need as much information as a line contractor but they still need 
to know for sure which lines are energized, which are on single-shot 
protection, etc.'' (Ex. 0186). Mr. Wilson Yancey of Quanta Services 
noted that ``[w]hether an employee is qualified or not, hazards will 
exist that are unique to the host employer'' (Ex. 0234). He believed 
that the proposal to leave some line-clearance tree trimmers out of the 
host-contractor requirements was ``not well-founded and might unduly 
jeopardize employee safety'' (id.).
    The Agency recognizes that line-clearance tree trimmers do not face 
exactly the same hazards as line workers. However, the record indicates 
that host employers have information that line-clearance tree trimmers 
need so that they can perform their work safely (Ex. 0505; Tr. 642-643, 
686-688, 775). For example, Mr. Mark Foster of Lucas Tree Experts 
testified that line workers will generally inform tree crews that a 
line is about to be reenergized (Tr. 642-643). In addition, ULCC's 
posthearing brief indicated that ``line clearance tree trimmers 
necessarily must rely upon information from utility representatives 
that the line has been deenergized, isolated and grounded when those 
procedures are appropriate'' and that the ``safety of line clearance 
tree trimmers would be enhanced by . . . utilities being required, by 
OSHA standard, to give [certain] information to line clearance tree 
trimmers'' (Ex. 0502).
    Not only do line-clearance tree trimmers need information from 
utilities, but line-clearance tree trimming contractors often have 
important safety information for utilities, for example, information 
they discover in the course of work about hazardous conditions that 
could affect utility employees. Such conditions can include downed 
power lines, transformer problems, and insulator and pole issues (Tr. 
665, 689-690, 787-788).
    Upon considering the record, it has become apparent to OSHA that: 
(1) There is a need for information exchange between host employers and 
tree-trimming contractors and (2) the host-contractor provisions should 
apply to all line-clearance tree trimming. Therefore, the Agency added 
Sec.  1910.269(a)(3) to the list of paragraphs denoted in final Sec.  
1910.269(a)(1)(i)(E)(2) to cover line-clearance tree-trimming 
operations performed by line-clearance tree trimmers who are not 
qualified employees.
    As noted earlier, some commenters maintained that utilities hire 
contractors for their expertise and knowledge about particular hazards 
and rely on those contractors to use that expertise to protect their 
(that is, the contractors') own employees. (See, for example, Exs. 
0127, 0172, 0173, 0177, 0200, 0207, 0227.) For instance, Mr. Frank 
Brockman with Farmers Rural Electric Cooperatives Corporation stated, 
``We, as host employers, hire contractors to do specific jobs, often 
that we do not have the knowledge, expertise, equipment or manpower to 
accomplish.'' He maintained that ``[c]ontractors are responsible for 
their employees' safety'' (Ex. 0173). SBA commented that ``the host is 
usually not present at these worksites and often does not possess 
expertise in the type of work being performed'' and noted that ``many 
of the SERs questioned whether the host-contractor provisions are 
appropriate for the electric power industry at all'' (Ex. 0207).
    Some comments specifically addressed the issue of whether line-
clearance tree trimming firms should be covered by the host-contractor 
provisions. For example, Consumers Energy stated, ``Host utilities are 
usually not familiar with the hazards associated with trimming trees 
and routinely rely

[[Page 20358]]

on the expertise of the line clearance tree-trimming contractors to 
perform that work in a manner which ensures the safety of their 
employees'' (Ex. 0177). In addition, TCIA stated:

    OSHA makes the correct assertion that the utility must have a 
shared expertise with the contractor in order to specify its safety 
standards for the contractor to follow. In stark contrast, utilities 
typically contract line clearance tree trimming because of their 
lack of expertise in that subject. [Ex. 0200; emphasis included in 
original]

    OSHA recognizes that contractors may have specific expertise that 
host employers do not have. However, the Agency does not believe that 
this is a valid reason not to require the type of information exchange 
required by the final rule. As noted earlier, electric utilities have 
information about their systems that the contractors do not have. The 
Agency also believes that contractors, especially those hired for 
expertise in a particular area, have information about hazardous 
conditions related to their work that host employers do not have (for 
example, the dangers posed to the host employer's employees from 
chippers and falling tree limbs). In addition, when one employer's 
activities may endanger another employer's employees, the Agency 
believes that it is essential for the two employers to coordinate their 
activities to ensure that all employees are adequately protected. For 
example, as noted later in this section of the preamble, it is 
important for an electrical contractor to coordinate procedures for 
deenergizing and grounding lines and equipment with the host employer. 
Similarly, it is important for line-clearance tree trimming firms to 
coordinate their work with host employers and to inform host employers 
of hazardous conditions posed by the tree-trimming work to ensure that 
the host employers' employees are not exposed to tree-trimming hazards 
about which those employees have received no training.
    OSHA proposed to define ``contract employer'' as ``[a]n employer 
who performs work covered by subpart V of this part for a host 
employer.'' OSHA did not receive any significant comment on this 
definition. However, OSHA is revising the definition to include any 
``work covered by subpart V of this part under contract'' rather than 
just work ``for a host contractor.'' This revision correlates the 
definition of ``contract employer'' with the revised definition of 
``host employer,'' which no longer provides that an employer must 
``hire'' another employer to be a host employer. This revision makes it 
clear that an employer performing subpart V work under contract is 
covered as a ``contract employer'' by the host-contractor provisions in 
final paragraph (c) regardless of whether the entity for which the work 
is being performed is the ``host employer'' or another ``contract 
employer.'' Contract employers under the final rule may include 
painting contractors, line-construction contractors, electrical 
contractors, and any other contractors working on the construction of 
electric power transmission and distribution lines. (For final Sec.  
1910.269, contract employers will also include contractors working on 
covered electric power generation installations, such as boiler-
maintenance contractors, conveyor-servicing contractors, and electrical 
contractors.) The definition of ``contract employer'' does not include 
contractors that might be present at a jobsite where some work 
performed is covered by subpart V, but that are not performing covered 
work.
    Paragraph (c) of final Sec.  1926.950 contains requirements for the 
transfer of information between host employers and contract employers. 
In the proposal, OSHA entitled this paragraph ``Contractors.'' After 
considering the comments received, the Agency concludes that the 
proposed title does not reflect the true scope of the paragraph's 
provisions. The title at final Sec.  1926.950(c) is being changed to 
``Information transfer'' to more appropriately describe the 
requirements contained in the paragraph.\66\ In addition, the final 
rule does not include proposed Sec.  1926.950(c)(1)(ii), which would 
have required host employers to report observed contract-employer-
related violations of this section to the contract employer. 
Consequently, OSHA renumbered proposed paragraph (c)(1)(i) (and 
subordinate paragraphs (c)(1)(i)(A) and (c)(1)(i)(B)) as final 
paragraph (c)(1) (and subordinate paragraphs (c)(1)(i) through 
(c)(1)(iv)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \66\ The title of this provision is ``Information transfer.'' 
However, throughout the rulemaking, the Agency and the regulated 
community referred to the provision as the ``host-contractor 
provision,'' as the provision contains information-transfer 
requirements for host employers and contract employers. OSHA, 
therefore, uses the terms ``information-transfer provision'' and 
``host-contractor provision'' interchangeably when referring to this 
provision.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Proposed paragraph (c)(1)(i) required host employers to provide 
certain information to contract employers. Paragraph (c)(1)(i)(A), as 
proposed, required host employers to provide contractors with 
information about ``[k]nown hazards that are covered by this section, 
that are related to the contract employer's work, and that might not be 
recognized by the contract employer or its employees.'' The purpose of 
this provision was to ensure that contractors could take measures to 
protect their employees from hazards posed by hosts' workplaces. 
Although this proposed provision would not require hosts to inform 
contract employers of hazards that contract employees are expected to 
recognize, such as hazards posed by an overhead power line, the 
proposal provided that hosts inform contract employers of hazards known 
to the hosts that might not be recognized by the contractors. For 
example, if a host employer knew that a particular manhole on its 
system was subject to periodic contamination from a nearby fuel tank, 
the host was to share this information with the contractor.
    OSHA received considerable feedback on this proposed requirement. 
(See, for example, Exs. 0146, 0159, 0160, 0167, 0175, 0178, 0186, 0201, 
0227, 0234, 0480, 0505; Tr. 1333-1334.) Some commenters agreed with the 
proposal to require host employers to inform contractors of known 
hazards. (See, for example, Exs. 0167, 0169, 0234; Tr. 1333-1334.) For 
example, the Iowa Association of Electric Cooperatives commented that 
its members supported proposed paragraph (c)(1)(i)(A), explaining that 
``[i]t is . . . common practice for Iowa's cooperatives to inform their 
contract employers of hazards that are related to the contract 
employer's work that might not be recognized by the contract employer 
or its employees'' (Ex. 0167).
    However, most of the comments on this provision objected to the 
proposed language. The most common complaint was that the proposed 
language was too broad or vague. (See, for example, Exs. 0146, 0175, 
0178, 0201, 0227.) For instance, EEI commented:

    This proposal is impermissibly vague because it fails to provide 
adequate notice of what would constitute compliance. See, e.g., Ga. 
Pac. Corp., v. OSHRC, 25 F.3d 999 (11th Cir. 1994). For example, 
what are hazards ``that are covered by this section?'' Considering 
that the proposed standards incorporate the requirements of many 
standards other than those addressed in the proposal, would host 
employers be required to inform contractors of known hazards 
addressed by all potentially applicable standards? Even if the term 
is confined to the standards under consideration here, this is a 
vastly overbroad requirement.
    Next, what is the test for determining the hazards that are 
``related'' to the contractor's work? Further, on what objective 
basis is a host employer to determine which hazards might not be 
recognized by the contract employer or its employees? Does this mean 
that the host must be sufficiently familiar with the training of a 
specialty contractors' employees to allow an intelligent assessment

[[Page 20359]]

of what hazards those employees ``might'' or ``might not'' 
recognize? What will be the penalty for mis-evaluating these 
possibilities, if made in good faith?
    Indeed, what are ``hazards'' for purposes of this rule? Are they 
limited to conditions and practices that pose a significant risk of 
injury to employees, and would the likelihood of occurrence and 
degree of gravity make a difference? Similarly, what are ``known'' 
hazards? Are they hazards that the host employer actually knows of, 
or are they hazards that a host employer should have known through 
the exercise of reasonable diligence? Does actual knowledge for this 
purpose mean knowledge of any hazard that can be discerned by 
searching a company's records--a daunting test for an electric 
utility that may have decades of records related to work on 
transmission and distribution facilities that cover literally 
thousands of square miles--or is a more realistic test to be 
applied? If so, what is it? [Ex. 0227]

    Mr. James Shill with ElectriCities similarly commented that the 
proposed provision would `require ElectriCities' members to take into 
account every section of the OSHA standards, as well as others 
incorporated by reference, and make a `guess' as to all of the 
potential hazards a contractor may be unable or unwilling to 
`recognize' (Ex. 0178). Ms. Salud Layton with the Virginia, Maryland & 
Delaware Association of Electric Cooperatives argued that ``[t]he 
phrase `might not be recognized by the contract employer or its 
employees' is too broad'' and suggested that the proposed paragraph be 
revised to ``specifically state the items that must be provided by the 
host employer to the contract employer'' (Ex. 0175).
    Some commenters proposed new language for this provision. (See, for 
example, Exs. 0201, 0227, 0505.) For instance, EEI suggested:

    [T]he final rules should be limited to requiring that a host 
employer notify a contractor of a hazard where: (1) The host 
employer has actual knowledge: (a) That the hazard is present, and 
(b) that the contractors' employees are likely to encounter the 
hazard in performing the work for which the contractor is engaged; 
(2) given its known expertise, the contractor cannot reasonably be 
expected to recognize the hazard; and (3) for this purpose, the 
``hazard'' is a condition or practice that poses a significant risk 
of death or serious physical harm to the contractor's employees. The 
standard should also make clear that the host employer is not 
obligated to evaluate each job assigned to a contractor to determine 
whether such hazards are presented. [Ex. 0227]

    IBEW, although generally supporting this and the other proposed 
host-contractor requirements, also suggested changes to paragraph 
(c)(1)(i)(A). The union proposed:

    The host employer shall inform the contract employer of . . . 
existing or reasonably anticipated hazards covered by this 
subsection (i) of which the host employer is aware, (ii) that are 
related to the contract employer's work, and (iii) that are 
sufficiently unique to the host employer's operations or premises 
that the contract employer or its employees would not, through the 
exercise of reasonable care, be expected to recognize. [Ex. 0505]

Mr. Donald Hartley with IBEW explained:

    It is important . . . to require the host employer to disclose 
hazardous conditions that it knows actually exist and that it 
reasonably anticipates may exist. The point here is to include 
hazards that may exist intermittently: for example, switching surges 
or environmental conditions or only under certain circumstances 
that, when they occur, affect the workplace safety.
    Second, the focus of the information disclosure should be on 
information that is sufficiently unique to the host's workplace or 
operations that the contract employer cannot be expected to know 
without the input from the host employer. A contractor may be unable 
to identify hazards not only because it lacks the technical 
expertise, but for the very basic reason that it is unfamiliar with 
the unique features of the host's operation or workplace 
environment. Again, environmental conditions or specific operating 
procedures are examples of this.
    Finally, we believe that host employers should be required to 
disclose any hazards that threaten contractor employees with any 
illness or injury, not just death or the most serious of physical 
harm. [Tr. 879-880]

    OSHA considered the comments on proposed paragraph (c)(1)(i)(A) and 
continues to believe that the final rule should include a requirement 
for host employers to convey certain information to contractors that 
will bear on the contractor's ability to ensure the safety of its 
employees. Much of the opposition to this provision was to the specific 
language in the proposal, not to the general principle that utilities 
have safety-related information that should be shared with contractors.
    OSHA is sensitive to the concerns of commenters who noted that the 
proposed language was overbroad or unclear. Therefore, OSHA revised the 
final rule to more clearly define the information host employers must 
provide to contractors. The Agency is linking the information-transfer 
requirements, in part, to the requirement in final Sec.  1926.950(d) 
for determining existing conditions. (Paragraph (d), discussed later in 
this section of the preamble, is essentially the same as existing Sec.  
1910.269(a)(3).) In the final rule, Sec.  1926.950(d) requires a 
determination of the existing characteristics and conditions of 
electric lines and equipment related to the safety of the work. The 
examples of ``existing conditions'' that were listed in proposed 
paragraph (d) have been separately numbered in final paragraph (d). The 
first five items of information listed in final paragraph (d) are 
``characteristics'' of the electric power installation. The remaining 
three items of information listed in final paragraph (d) are 
``conditions'' at those installations. Therefore, paragraphs (c)(1)(i) 
and (c)(1)(ii) of the host-contractor provisions in the final rule 
refer to (and require the sharing of) information about the 
characteristics and conditions specifically listed in final paragraph 
(d) that are related to the safety of the work to be performed.
    Contract employers may request from the host employer information 
they need to protect their employees, in addition to the information 
that host employers must provide under final paragraphs (c)(1)(i) 
through (c)(1)(iii).\67\ Thus, final paragraph (c)(1)(iv) requires host 
employers to provide contractors with information about the design or 
operation of the host employer's installation that is known by the host 
employer, that the contract employer requests, and that is related to 
the protection of the contract employer's employees.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \67\ Final paragraph (c)(1)(iii), discussed later in this 
section of the preamble, requires host employers to provide 
contractors with information about the design and operation of the 
host employer's installation that the contract employer needs to 
make the assessments required by subpart V.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As already noted, OSHA decided to adopt language in paragraphs 
(c)(1)(i) and (c)(1)(ii) in the final rule that more clearly specifies 
the information that host employers must provide to contractors and 
does so by using language that is familiar to employers complying with 
existing Sec.  1910.269.\68\ Paragraph (d), discussed later in this 
section of the preamble, lists specific characteristics and conditions 
of electric lines and equipment that must be determined before work on 
or near electric lines or equipment is started when these 
characteristics and conditions are related to the safety of the work to 
be performed. These characteristics and conditions include the nominal 
voltages of lines and

[[Page 20360]]

equipment, maximum switching transient voltages, the presence and 
condition of protective grounds and equipment grounding conductors, and 
the condition of poles. Host employers are the parties that possess 
much of this information, and it would be difficult in many cases (and 
impossible in others) for contract employers to determine these 
conditions and comply with paragraph (d) without getting the necessary 
information from the host employer.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \68\ It should be noted that, in revising the language of this 
provision in the final rule, OSHA did not conclude that the proposed 
language was overbroad or too vague. Similar language is used in 
other OSHA standards, including the standard for process safety 
management of highly hazardous chemicals (see Sec.  
1910.119(h)(2)(ii)). The Agency believes that employers subject to 
that rule are successfully complying with it. However, OSHA is 
revising the language of this provision in Subpart V because it 
resolves rulemaking participants' concerns about the proposed 
provision in a manner that adequately protects employees and is more 
consistent with existing requirements for electric power generation, 
transmission, and distribution work in Sec.  1910.269.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For example, an electrical contractor might be able to make a 
reasonable estimate of the nominal voltage on a line through 
examination of the equipment. However, having the host employer provide 
that information to the contractor eliminates guesswork and the hazards 
associated with inaccurate estimates.
    Similarly, contractors will usually be unable to determine the 
maximum switching transient overvoltages on a power line without 
information from the host employer. The maximum per-unit transient 
overvoltage determines the minimum approach distance for workers to 
maintain from exposed, energized parts (see the discussion of this 
issue under the summary and explanation of final Sec.  1926.960(c)(1) 
later in this section of the preamble). Without this information from 
the host, a contractor might not adhere to the proper minimum approach 
distance and, as a result, a power line worker might come too close to 
the power line and be at risk of serious injury from electric shock and 
burns.
    Paragraph (c)(1)(i) of the final rule provides that, before work 
begins, the host employer must inform the contractor of the 
characteristics of the host employer's installation that are related to 
the safety of the work to be performed and are listed in paragraphs 
(d)(1) through (d)(5). These characteristics are: the nominal voltages 
of lines and equipment, the maximum switching-transient voltages, the 
presence of hazardous induced voltages, the presence of protective 
grounds and equipment grounding conductors, and the locations of 
circuits and equipment, including electric supply and communication 
lines and fire-protective signaling circuits.\69\ OSHA presumes that 
host employers have this information because they typically need it for 
the design and operation of an electric power generation, transmission, 
or distribution system. A note to final paragraph (c)(1)(i) explains 
that in an unusual case in which the host employer does not have this 
information in existing records, it must obtain the information for 
purposes of complying with paragraph (c)(1)(i).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \69\ In final Sec.  1926.950(d)(5), OSHA changed the proposed 
term ``power . . . lines'' to ``electric supply . . . lines.'' The 
two terms are synonymous, and the final rule defines ``electric 
supply lines'' in Sec.  1926.968. Note that lines that employees 
encounter are either electric supply lines, communication lines, or 
control lines, such as those on fire-protective signaling circuits.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of the final rule requires that, before work 
begins, the host employer inform the contract employer of the 
conditions of the host employer's installation that are related to the 
safety of the work to be performed, that are listed in final paragraphs 
(d)(6) through (d)(8), and that are known to the host employer. These 
conditions are: the condition of protective grounds and equipment 
grounding conductors, the condition of poles, and environmental 
conditions relating to safety. Final paragraph (c)(1)(ii) only requires 
host employers to provide known information to contractors. Host 
employers gain information on the condition of their electric power 
generation, transmission, and distribution systems through normal 
preventive-maintenance inspections; and, if host employers find 
conditions listed in final paragraphs (d)(6) through (d)(8) and related 
to the safety of work to be performed by a contractor during such 
inspections, the host employer must pass that information to the 
contract employer under final paragraph (c)(1)(ii). For example, if a 
utility conducts a wood-pole inspection program and finds several poles 
that are structurally unsound and that need replacement, this 
information must be imparted to a contractor whose work involves the 
affected poles. However, this paragraph only requires the host employer 
to provide information that the host can obtain from existing records 
through the exercise of reasonable diligence; this provision does not 
require host employers to conduct inspections to identify these 
conditions. To make this clear in the final rule, OSHA included a note 
following paragraph (c)(1)(ii) clarifying that, for the purposes of 
that paragraph, the host employer does not have to inspect of worksite 
conditions or otherwise get information that it cannot obtain through a 
reasonably diligent search of its existing records.
    OSHA believes that the revised language in paragraphs (c)(1)(i) and 
(c)(1)(ii) of the final rule addresses the concerns expressed by 
commenters, such as ElectriCities and EEI, about the clarity and scope 
of proposed paragraph (c)(1)(i)(A). The provision no longer requires 
host employers to determine whether a hazard exists or whether 
contractors might be expected to recognize particular hazards.
    Under final paragraph (c)(1)(iv), before work begins, a host 
employer must provide additional information about the design or 
operation of the installation, but only if that information (1) is 
known by the host employer, (2) is requested by the contract employer, 
and (3) is related to the protection of the contract employer's 
employees. A note to final paragraph (c)(1)(iv) clarifies that, for 
purposes of complying with that paragraph, the host employer is not 
required to make inspections or otherwise get information that it 
cannot obtain through a reasonably diligent search of its existing 
records.
    IBEW commented that, ``[i]n addition to the information about 
`existing conditions' needed to perform the hazard analysis, there may 
be other information unique to the host's operations or premises that 
the contractor employer needs to ensure the safety of its employees'' 
(Ex. 0505). The union identified ``schedules of other crews that may be 
working on the same circuits or equipment, anticipated operational 
changes, and the potential impact of unique localized climatic, 
environmental or geological conditions'' as examples of such 
information (id.). Details about the scheduling of outages is another 
example of information a contractor might need to obtain from the host 
employer before employees start work.
    OSHA is not explicitly requiring host employers to provide this 
other type of information to contractors. The Agency believes that, 
although information such as the scheduling of crews may prove useful 
in some situations, it is not always essential to ensure the safety of 
employees. When a contractor needs this information to protect its 
employees, the contractor may request this type of information under 
final paragraph (c)(1)(iv). In addition, OSHA believes that host 
employers and contract employers will exchange this type of information 
in their efforts to comply with other provisions in final paragraph 
(c). For example, when host and contractor crews will be working 
together or on the same circuit, OSHA intends for both employers to 
exchange crew-scheduling information when necessary to comply with 
final paragraph (c)(3) (discussed later in this section of the 
preamble), which requires the contract employer and the host employer 
to coordinate their work rules and procedures to ensure that employees 
are protected as required by subpart V.
    As a general matter, OSHA does not believe that the information 
host

[[Page 20361]]

employers must share with contract employers under final paragraph 
(c)(1)(iv) is likely to contain proprietary information or trade 
secrets. OSHA recognizes, however, that an unusual case could arise 
presenting issues related to trade secrets. In any such case, OSHA 
expects that the host employer will find a way to provide the necessary 
information to the contract employer without divulging trade secrets or 
will share the information with the contract employer pursuant to an 
appropriate confidentiality agreement.
    Southern Company expressed concern that contractors and their 
employees might rely on the information provided by the utility in lieu 
of doing a thorough job briefing as required by final Sec.  1926.952 
(Ex. 0212). Final Sec.  1926.950(c)(1)(i), which requires host 
employers to provide information to contractors, does not replace the 
contract employer's basic responsibility to conduct the job briefing 
required by final Sec.  1926.952. The briefing will impart information, 
including relevant information a contractor obtains from a host 
employer, to the employees doing the work. The requirements in final 
Sec. Sec.  1926.950(c)(1) and (d) and 1926.952 work in combination to 
ensure that the employees performing the work are provided with 
sufficient information to perform that work safely.
    Proposed paragraph (c)(1)(i)(B) required host employers to provide 
contract employers with information about the installation that the 
contract employer would need to make the assessments required elsewhere 
in Subpart V. EEI inquired as to who (the host or contract employer) 
would be responsible for deciding what assessments the contractor must 
make and whether the host would have to survey contractor work areas to 
identify hazards that need assessment (Ex. 0227).
    The language in final paragraph (c)(1)(iii) states explicitly that, 
before work begins, the host employer must provide information that the 
contract employer needs to perform the assessments. In addition, the 
language from the proposal has been modified in the final rule to limit 
the information the host employer must provide to ``[i]nformation about 
the design and operation of the host employer's installation.'' Table 2 
shows the assessments that are implicitly or explicitly required by 
final subpart V and lists information that the Agency anticipates 
contractors will need to perform the required assessments.

               Table 2--Assessments Required by Subpart V
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                     Type of information
                                                    to be provided under
          Provision            Assessment required          Sec.
                                                     1926.950(c)(1)(iii)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sec.   1926.953(a)..........  Whether an enclosed   Whether an enclosed
                               space must be         space contains
                               entered as a permit-  hazards, other than
                               required confined     electrical and
                               space.                atmospheric
                                                     hazards, that could
                                                     endanger the life
                                                     of an entrant or
                                                     could interfere
                                                     with escape from
                                                     the space.
Sec.   1926.953(m)..........  Whether forced air    The size of the
                               ventilation has       enclosed space.
                               been maintained
                               long enough that a
                               safe atmosphere
                               exists.
Sec.   1926.960(c)(1)(i)....  What is the           What the operating
                               appropriate minimum   conditions are for
                               approach distance     the value of the
                               for the work to be    maximum transient
                               performed.            overvoltage
                                                     provided to the
                                                     contract
                                                     employer.\1\
Sec.   1926.960(g)(1).......  Whether employees     Information on
                               are exposed to        electric equipment,
                               hazards from flames   such as safety
                               or electric arcs.     information
                                                     provided by
                                                     manufacturers, that
                                                     relates to the
                                                     required hazard
                                                     assessment.
Sec.   1926.960(g)(2).......  What is the           The electrical
                               estimated incident    parameters needed
                               energy from an        to calculate
                               electric arc.         incident energy,
                                                     such as maximum
                                                     fault current, bus
                                                     spacings, and
                                                     clearing times.
Sec.   1926.960(k)..........  Whether devices are   Load current for,
                               designed to open or   and the opening and
                               close circuits        closing ratings of,
                               under load            devices used to
                               conditions.           open and close
                                                     circuits under
                                                     load.
Sec.  Sec.   1926.961 and     What are the known    All known sources of
 1926.967(h).                  sources of electric   electric energy,
                               energy (including     including known
                               known sources of      sources of
                               backfeed) supplying   backfeed.
                               electric circuits.
Sec.   1926.962(d)(1)(i)....  Whether protective    The maximum fault
                               grounds have          current and
                               adequate current-     clearing time for
                               carrying capacity.    the circuit.
Sec.   1926.962(g)..........  Whether there is a    Potential rise on
                               possibility of        remote grounds
                               hazardous transfer    under fault
                               of potential should   conditions.
                               a fault occur.
Sec.   1926.964(a)(2).......  Whether overhead      The design strength
                               structures such as    of the pole or
                               poles and towers      structure.
                               are capable of
                               sustaining stresses
                               imposed by the work.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Includes information on conditions that must be in place for the
  maximum transient overvoltage to be valid, such as whether circuit
  reclosing devices are disabled.

    In specific cases, contractors may need information that is 
somewhat different from that described in Table 2. OSHA expects that 
contractors will inform host employers if they need additional 
information, and that information must be provided to the extent the 
host employer is required to provide it by final paragraph (c)(1)(iii). 
In addition, the Agency does not expect host employers to provide 
contractors with information in the table if the contractor informs the 
host that the information is not needed.
    EEI questioned whether the proposed provision was limited to 
information actually known by the host employer (Ex. 0227). OSHA 
expects that the host employer will usually have, in existing records, 
information about the design and operation of its installation that the 
contract employer will need to make required assessments. OSHA presumes 
that host employers know their electric power generation, transmission, 
or distribution installations and know their systems' nominal system 
and operating voltages, available fault currents, relay protection 
schemes, anticipated relay clearing times, and switching schedules. As 
IBEW noted, this is information ``that the host employer should have 
for basic operational purposes and that is

[[Page 20362]]

generally solely in the host's possession'' (Ex. 0505). In addition, 
electric utilities will also need to have this information to perform 
their own required assessments when their employees are performing work 
on the utilities' installations. However, the record also indicates 
that, in some unusual circumstances, electric utilities do not have 
basic information about their system readily available. (See Mr. Brian 
Erga's testimony regarding a nuclear power plant that did not know its 
available fault current, Tr. 1241-1242.) In such cases, the final rule 
requires the host employer to ascertain the information and provide it 
to its contractor so that the contractor can conduct the required 
assessments. A note to final paragraph (c)(1)(iii) clarifies that, in 
any situation in which the host does not have such information in 
existing records, it must obtain the information and provide it to the 
contract employer to comply with paragraph (c)(1)(iii).\70\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \70\ The preamble to the proposal indicated that proposed 
paragraph (c)(1)(i) would not require host employers to provide 
``unknown information'' to contractors (70 FR 34840). It should be 
noted, however, that OSHA presumes that host employers ``know'' the 
information that must be shared under final paragraphs (c)(1)(i) and 
(c)(1)(iii) because it relates to the design and operation of the 
installation, which are aspects of an electric power generation, 
transmission, or distribution system that are under the exclusive 
purview of the host employer.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Mr. Steven Theis of MYR Group recommended that the final rule 
require hosts and contractors to perform joint hazard analyses (Tr. 
1334).
    The final rule neither requires nor prohibits such joint 
assessments. Even if employers do not conduct a joint hazard analysis, 
the information exchange required by final paragraph (c)(1) of the 
final rule will be part of a two-way conversation between host 
employers and contract employers. As discussed later in this section of 
the preamble, final paragraph (c)(3) requires hosts and contractors to 
coordinate their work rules and procedures to ensure that employees are 
protected as required by subpart V. To comply with the final rule, the 
contractor, as part of this effort, must communicate with the host 
about the information the contractor needs about the host's 
installation.
    OSHA notes that final paragraph (c)(1) does not require the host 
employer to report any information to the contract employer in writing; 
the Agency will deem it sufficient for the host employer to provide the 
necessary information, through any appropriate mechanism (for example, 
a phone call or an email), to an authorized agent of the contractor.
    Proposed paragraph (c)(1)(ii) would have required the host employer 
to report observed contract-employer-related violations of subpart V to 
contract employers. OSHA included this provision in the proposal 
because the Agency believed that host employers occasionally observe 
contractor employees performing work under the contract and that it was 
important for the host employer to inform the contract employer of 
observed violations so that the contractor could correct them and 
prevent them from occurring in the future.
    OSHA received many comments on this proposed requirement. (See, for 
example, Exs. 0128, 0152, 0160, 0167, 0169, 0170, 0171, 0178, 0183, 
0186, 0201, 0222, 0227, 0235, 0505; Tr. 880-882.) IBEW supported the 
need for a reporting requirement, explaining:

    [T]he point is that if in performing its usual functions the 
host observes contract employees exposed to hazards, it must report 
those observations to their contract employer. This requirement is 
particularly important in the electrical industry where contract 
employees are potentially exposed to extremely serious hazards.
    If the host employer who knows the worksite's hazards and the 
potential for harm sees a contract employee exposed to those 
conditions the host knows to be hazardous, it is unconscionable for 
the host to walk away. The host must report that information to the 
contract employer so the contract employer can take the steps 
necessary to eliminate the unsafe condition, and the contract 
employer must report back what action it actually took . . . [Tr. 
881].

    Many commenters objected to the proposed reporting requirement, 
however. (See, for example, Exs. 0128, 0152, 0167, 0170, 0178, 0183, 
0186, 0222, 0227.) Some expressed concerns about putting host employers 
in an enforcement role and requiring them to make determinations about 
whether an OSHA violation exists. (See, for example, Exs. 0128, 0152, 
0170, 0178, 0183, 0222, 0227.) For instance, EEI commented:

    The proposal would require a host employer to report observed 
contract-employer-related violations of the standard to the contract 
employer.
* * * * *
    Typically, utility employees and managers are not trained ``in 
the requirements of'' OSHA standards.'' [sic] Rather . . . they are 
trained in the requirements of their own employer's safety rules. . 
. . There simply are no requirements that any employee know what 
OSHA standards require--only that behavior and work practices be in 
compliance with standards. Employees are entitled, however, to 
assume that if they comply with their employer's safety rules, they 
will comply with OSHA standards. . . . Indeed, among EEI members, 
the requirements of safety rules often exceed the minimum 
requirements of OSHA standards.
    Clearly, the proposed requirement would create confusion. 
Utility representatives may believe they are seeing OSHA violations, 
but in fact may observe that contractors are not performing as the 
utility's internal safety rules require. [T]he proposal would 
effectively place utility personnel in the role of surrogate 
Compliance Officers. They are not trained or qualified to perform 
such a function. [Ex. 0227; emphasis included in original]

    Mr. Alan Blackmon with the Blue Ridge Electric Cooperative 
suggested that, ``[b]y requiring the [host] employer to report on the 
violation of a federal rule, the proposal in a sense deputizes the 
employer as an OSHA inspector, a role for which employers have no 
training and no experience'' (Ex. 0183). Mr. Chris Tampio of the 
National Association of Manufacturers argued that, by requiring hosts 
to report observed violations, OSHA ``would inappropriately force a 
host employer to make a legal determination as to whether the 
contractor has committed a violation of the OSH Act'' (Ex. 0222).
    EEI was also concerned that host employers would be cited for 
failing to report violations that were present, but not recognized by, 
the host's employees, commenting:

    The proposal provides no guidance as to the kinds of observation 
that would trigger a notification requirement. For example, 
[utilities commonly] engage inspectors . . . to observe contractors' 
performance. In other situations, this is performed by a utility's 
own foremen or supervisors. Such inspections often are aimed at 
assuring that the work is performed accurately and in timely 
fashion, and observation of safety performance, while important, may 
not be the main or only focus. If a utility inspector is found to 
have had the opportunity to observe a contractor's violative 
behavior but did not understand or appreciate what he saw and failed 
to report it, would the host be cited? [Ex. 0227]

Similarly, Duke Energy commented: ``Host employers may have a variety 
of employees observing contract operations for reasons unrelated to 
safety. They may be observing contract operations for quality, 
schedule, productivity, or cost purposes. A host employee may `observe' 
a condition, but not recognize it as a violation of this OSHA 
regulation'' (Ex. 0201).

    Some commenters presumed that the proposal required host employers 
to either actively monitor contractors or take measures to ensure that 
reported hazards were abated. (See, for example, Exs. 0187, 0225, 0235, 
0238, 0504.) For instance, Mr. James Strange with American Public Power 
Association (APPA) commented that municipal

[[Page 20363]]

utilities ``do not have the personnel to shadow contractors on each 
utility job site to assure that they are working according to OSHA 
rules'' (Ex. 0238). In addition, several commenters argued that the 
proposal would create an adversarial relationship between hosts and 
contractors. (See, for example, Exs. 0169, 0171, 0183.) Mr. Wilson 
Yancey expressed this argument as follows:

    [T]he proposed requirements might create an unduly adversarial 
relationship between the parties. For instance, the host employer 
seeking to fulfill its perceived duties under the regulations would 
thrust the host employer into the role of an investigator and rule-
enforcer, rather than a business partner seeking to achieve a common 
goal of employee safety. [Ex. 0169]

    After considering the comments received on this issue, OSHA decided 
not to include proposed paragraph (c)(1)(ii) in the final rule. First, 
the host employer, as defined in the final rule, may not be in position 
to recognize, or even observe, hazardous conditions created by contract 
employers. OSHA based the proposed rule on the premise that the host 
employer would hire the contract employer and would perform some 
maintenance on the system. As noted earlier, in the final rule, the 
Agency adopted a definition of ``host employer'' that is designed to 
capture the employer in the best position to provide information about 
the electric power generation, transmission, or distribution 
installation on which the contract employer is working. The definition 
of ``host employer'' in the final rule does not require the host 
employer to maintain the installation or to be the entity that hired 
the contractor. A host employer that does not perform maintenance work 
on the system would be unlikely to recognize hazardous conditions 
created by contractors. In addition, a host employer that does not hire 
the contract employer usually would not find itself in a position to 
observe the contractor's employees working.\71\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \71\ For example, a generation plant owner could contract with a 
company to operate, but not maintain, the plant. If the plant owner 
neither operates nor controls operating procedures for the 
installation, the company it contracts with to operate the plant is 
the host employer under the final rule. The plant owner could hire a 
different company to perform maintenance in the substation in the 
generation plant. Because the host employer in this scenario does 
not perform maintenance, it is likely that the host employer will 
not have any employees qualified to enter the substation, and, thus, 
will not observe the maintenance contractor's employees.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Second, in some circumstances, the host employer will also be a 
controlling employer under OSHA's multiemployer citation policy. A 
controlling employer has an underlying duty to exercise reasonable care 
to prevent and detect violations endangering contractor employees at 
the worksite. (See CPL 02-00-124; see also OSHA's discussion of the 
multiemployer citation policy earlier in this section of the preamble.) 
This is a broader obligation than the one OSHA proposed for host 
employers in proposed paragraph (c)(1)(ii); therefore, the proposed 
requirement is not necessary with respect to hosts that are controlling 
employers. (Whether a host employer is a controlling employer depends 
on whether it has general supervisory authority over the worksite, 
including the power to correct, or require others to correct, safety 
and health violations.\72\) Indeed, the Agency is concerned that 
including the proposed reporting requirement in the final rule would 
lead host employers to believe they could fulfill their obligations as 
controlling employers just by complying with the more limited 
requirement in the standard.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \72\ Such control can be established by contract or by the 
exercise of control in practice.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Although OSHA is not including proposed paragraph (c)(1)(ii) in the 
final rule, the Agency expects that, in many situations, liability and 
practical considerations will drive host employers that are not 
controlling employers to notify the contractor if they observe 
hazardous conditions involving the contractor's employees. Unsafe 
conditions created by contractors can pose hazards to employees of the 
host employer and to the public and can create additional obligations 
for host employers to protect their employees (for example, through 
OSHA standards and the general duty clause) and the public (for 
example, through liability concerns) from those hazards. For instance, 
a host employer that observes a contractor bypassing safety rules when 
installing a new line will likely have concerns about the quality of 
the contractor's work and about the effect of the contractor's unsafe 
practices on the installation and on public safety. These concerns will 
form a strong incentive for the host employer to report the hazardous 
conditions to the contractor.
    Although the Agency concluded, based on the current rulemaking 
record, that the reporting requirement in proposed paragraph (c)(1)(ii) 
is neither necessary nor appropriate for this final rule, the Agency 
will continue to monitor this issue and evaluate whether regulatory 
requirements like the one in proposed paragraph (c)(1)(ii) are 
necessary to ensure the safety of employees under subpart V or other 
OSHA standards.
    Proposed paragraph (c)(2)(iii)(C) would have required the contract 
employer to advise the host employer of measures taken to correct, and 
prevent from recurring, violations reported by the host employer under 
proposed paragraph (c)(1)(ii). In light of the Agency's decision not to 
adopt proposed paragraph (c)(1)(ii), proposed paragraph (c)(2)(iii)(C) 
is no longer meaningful and is not incorporated in the final rule.
    In addition to proposing the requirement for hosts to report 
observed contract-employer-related violations, OSHA requested comments 
on the related, but distinct, issue of whether it should require host 
employers to take appropriate measures to enforce contractual safety 
requirements or review the contracts of contractors who fail to correct 
violations.\73\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \73\ Contracts between electric utilities and their contractors 
often contain provisions requiring contractors to meet OSHA 
standards and other provisions addressing noncompliance with the 
terms of the contract. (See, for example, Ex. 0175.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    IBEW was the only commenter that supported such requirements, 
explaining:

    The host employer should regularly review the safety performance 
of a contractor while operating on its site. The host employer 
should take necessary action to ensure contractual obligations are 
being met. The rule should require the host employer to initiate 
further action if the review finds non compliance. [Ex. 0230]

    Rulemaking participants agreed that host employers regularly adopt 
contracts that specify safety standards to which contractors must 
adhere and that include provisions for enforcing those requirements. 
(See, for example, Exs. 0163, 0175, 0213, 0405; Tr. 1386-1387.) Also, 
some commenters recognized a general need for hosts to evaluate the 
safety performance of contractors. (See, for example, Exs. 0167, 0175, 
0184, 0213, 0219.) However, none of these rulemaking participants 
supported the adoption of OSHA requirements related to the enforcement, 
review, or awarding of contracts.
    For example, Ms. Susan O'Connor with Siemens Power Generation 
explained:

    While host employers often [require and enforce compliance with 
OSHA standards], in practice it would be burdensome [on] the host 
employer to require them, at the risk of OSHA sanctions, to enforce 
contract provisions as a regulatory matter. Indeed, establishing 
this as a regulatory standard could operate as a disincentive for 
host employers to establish sound health and safety contractual 
terms with contractors,

[[Page 20364]]

particularly terms which go beyond regulatory requirements. . . . In 
addition, OSHA regulations are promulgated and undergo public 
review; Host Employer requirements do not go through such a 
regulatory review process and therefore must not be held on par with 
OSHA regulations. Host employers have a right to establish site 
safety requirements that are more stringent than the law requires; 
however, they should have the right to deal with contractors who do 
not comply individually and in their own manner. But they must 
currently do this against the backdrop of specific OSHA standards, 
and the OSHA Multi-employer Workplace policy. Siemens sees no reason 
to change this.
* * * * *
    OSHA should not prescribe how contractors are selected or 
prescribe how contractors must be evaluated for purposes of 
contracting work or terminating work. It is up to the discretion of 
the party contracting for the services to make those determinations. 
Host employers should have the discretion to choose, to dismiss, or 
continue utilizing contractors. Given the already comprehensive and 
pervasive nature of health and safety regulation through OSHA and 
the states, as well as considerations of tort law, the effects of 
the marketplace will weed out contractors that are repeatedly 
substandard from a safety standpoint, as well as those that are 
chronically poor perform[ers] from a quality, delivery, or other 
standpoint. Contractors should be answerable to the host employe[r] 
for business matters, and the agency for regulatory matters. These 
lines should not be blurred by attempting to make the host employer 
responsible for both. As a practical matter, it would be impossible 
for OSHA . . . to come up with minimum requirements for every 
contract activity, to establish an ``acceptable'' versus 
``unacceptable'' contractor. [Ex. 0163]

    Duke Energy commented:

    The only safety performance that OSHA has authority to regulate 
is compliance with OSHA rules. Worker Compensation Insurance 
Carriers and others review safety performance. There is no need for 
OSHA to impose additional requirements. Each host employer is faced 
with a unique set of available contractors, each with its own safety 
record. Some may excel in one area and perform poorly in another. 
Some host employers may have such a limited pool of available 
contractors that requiring some pre-determined level of contractor 
safety performance would eliminate all contractors. Other goals, 
such as employing minority firms may cause hosts to work with poor 
performers to improve their performance, rather than eliminating the 
minority contractor with the poor record. OSHA should not interfere 
in decisions such as these. [Ex. 0201]

    In light of the comments received, OSHA decided not to adopt 
provisions requiring host employers to enforce contractual safety 
requirements, to review the contracts of contractors who fail to 
correct violations or hazards, or to evaluate the safety performance of 
contractors. As discussed previously, the host employer might not be 
the entity that hired the contract employer, in which case the host 
employer would not be in position to enforce contract requirements or 
be involved in awarding contracts to the contract employer. In 
addition, as Ms. O'Connor pointed out, and as noted earlier in this 
section of the preamble, host employers that have supervisory authority 
over a contractor's worksite are subject to a background statutory 
obligation, as set forth in OSHA's multiemployer citation policy, to 
exercise reasonable care to detect and prevent violations affecting 
contractor employees. Moreover, for the reasons stated previously, OSHA 
believes that, even in the absence of a specific requirement in subpart 
V, host employers that are not controlling employers have strong 
incentives to take measures to ensure safe contractor performance. In 
addition, the Agency believes that contractors with poor safety 
performance are likely to have similarly poor records with respect to 
the quality of their work, making it less likely that host employers 
will hire them. Therefore, the final rule does not contain provisions 
related to the enforcement, review, or awarding of contracts.
    Paragraph (c)(2) of final Sec.  1926.950 addresses the 
responsibilities of the contract employer. Final paragraph (c)(2)(i) 
requires the contract employer to ensure that each of its employees is 
instructed in any hazardous conditions relevant to the employee's work 
of which the contractor is aware as a result of information 
communicated to the contractor by the host employer as required by 
final paragraph (c)(1). This paragraph ensures that information on 
hazards the employees might face is conveyed to those employees. The 
information provided by the host employer under paragraph (c)(1) is 
essential to the safety of employees performing the work, especially 
because it may include information related to hazardous conditions that 
the contract employees might not identify or recognize.
    Proposed paragraph (c)(2)(i) was worded differently from the final 
rule; the proposed paragraph required contractors to instruct their 
employees in hazards communicated by the host employer. OSHA received 
no comments on this proposed provision. However, changes were made to 
this paragraph in the final rule to mirror the changes made to 
paragraph (c)(1) (described earlier). In the final rule, the Agency did 
not include the note to proposed paragraph (c)(2)(i) because OSHA 
believes that the note was confusing. The proposed note suggested that 
the instruction required under paragraph (c)(2)(i) was not part of the 
training required under Sec.  1926.950(b). The contractors' employees 
will already be trained in many of the hazards that are related to the 
information the contractor receives from the host, and the final rule 
does not require employers to duplicate this training. Contractors will 
need to supplement an employee's training only when that employee will 
be exposed to a hazard or will follow safety-related work practices 
with respect to which he or she has not already been trained.
    Paragraph (c)(2)(ii), as proposed, required the contract employer 
to ensure that its employees followed the work practices required by 
subpart V, as well as safety-related work rules imposed by the host 
employer. In proposing this provision, OSHA explained that a host 
employer's safety-related work rules are almost certain to impact the 
safety and health of the contractor's employees (70 FR 34840). For 
example, electric utilities typically require contractors to follow the 
utilities' procedures for deenergizing electric circuits. If the 
contract employer's employees do not follow these procedures, a circuit 
the contractor's employees are working on might not be properly 
deenergized, endangering the contractor's employees, or a circuit the 
contractor was not working on might become reenergized, endangering any 
host employer's employees that might be working on that circuit.
    OSHA invited comments on whether requiring a contractor to follow a 
host employer's safety-related work rules could make work more 
hazardous. A few commenters supported proposed paragraph (c)(2)(ii). 
(See, for example, Exs. 0164, 0213.) For instance, Mr. Tommy Lucas of 
TVA commented:

    The proposed requirement is supported. Regardless whether this 
requirement is carried forward, we will require contractors to 
follow certain host-employer safety rules contractually, such as the 
lockout/tagout (LOTO) procedure. Failure to follow the LOTO 
procedure could result in host or contractor employees being 
seriously injured. [Ex. 0213]

    In contrast, the vast majority of rulemaking participants opposed 
the proposed provision. (See, for example, Exs. 0156, 0161, 0162, 0168, 
0183, 0201, 0202, 0212, 0220, 0222, 0227, 0233, 0237, 0501; Tr. 1323, 
1333.) These commenters gave several reasons for objecting to this 
proposed requirement:
     It could result in the implementation of inadequately safe 
work rules, such as when the contractor has more protective work rules 
than the

[[Page 20365]]

host (see, for example, Ex. 0161) or when the host's work rules may be 
based on its own employees' working conditions that are less hazardous 
than the working conditions to which contractor employees will be 
exposed (see, for example, Ex. 0233).
     It could cause contract employees to be confused about 
proper work methods if rules change from contract to contract (see, for 
example, Ex. 0227).
     It would result in contractual requirements becoming 
enforceable OSHA standards in a way that constitutes an illegal 
delegation of OSHA's rulemaking authority, thereby circumventing proper 
rulemaking procedures (see, for example, Ex. 0237).
     It would place OSHA in the position of having to interpret 
and enforce third-party contracts (see, for example, Ex. 0233).
     It could increase disaster-response time (Ex. 0233).
     It would increase costs and administrative burdens on 
contract employers (see, for example, Ex. 0162).
     It could result in contractors having to follow host 
employer work rules that are not directly linked to employee safety, 
for example, in a situation in which the host's rules approve only one 
vendor for safety equipment when equivalent, equally protective, 
equipment is available from other vendors (Ex. 0162).
    For instance, Mr. Steven Theis with MYR Group commented:

    MYR Group believes that requiring a contractor to follow a 
host's safety rules would create hazards. Contractors are required 
by the standard to have appropriate work rules and policies for 
compliance. Requiring them to follow another employer's policies--
which they are unfamiliar with and untrained on--would either result 
in accidents or add undue and unnecessary time for retraining and 
familiarization with the policies when the contractor has its own 
policy . . . Indeed, MYR Group has experienced situations where host 
employers impose work rules that do not significantly affect 
employee safety and may even create an unsafe situation. [H]ost work 
rules can specify chain of command requirements that do not align 
with contractor management structure or responsibility and thus 
following host requirements could result in loss or miscommunication 
of safety information or safe work directives. Accordingly, MYR 
Group respectfully submits that the requirement to follow host 
employer work rules should be deleted. [Ex. 0162]

    Mr. Terry Williams with the Electric Cooperatives of South Carolina 
agreed and provided an example of how following a host employer's 
safety rules could jeopardize worker safety:

    The proposal ignores the fact that contractors have developed 
their own rules that are appropriate for the work they do. They 
train on these rules and operate according to them all the time. 
Requiring contractors . . . to work to the rules of others could 
easily result in the contractor working less safely.
    Consider the following actual situation: an electric utility 
that is primarily a 12kV system, with some 34.5kV. The utility uses 
its own crews for the 12kV work, and uses a qualified contractor for 
the 34.5kV work, as the need arises. The utility's safety rules 
specify use of Class 2 gloves, sleeves and cover up for all work, as 
that is all their line crews need. For the 34.5 kV work, the 
contractor should use Class 4 equipment, yet OSHA's proposal could 
justify use of Class 2, with unsafe results.
    OSHA should retract this proposal and allow host employers to 
require contractors to work to appropriate safety rules. [Ex. 0202]

    EEI made similar comments in its posthearing brief:

    [T]he standard would require contractors to utilize different 
safe procedures depending upon the owner involved. For example, an 
electric line contractor could be required to observe a ``ground-to-
ground'' rubber glove requirement while working for one electric 
utility, but not while working for another utility nearby (Tr. 110-
11). The confusion and consequent increased risk to employees from 
such requirements is obvious, not to mention the cost of training 
for employees and supervisors alike. [Ex. 0501]

    As to the legal arguments, Susan Howe with the Society of the 
Plastics Industry suggested that ``OSHA's incorporation'' of the host 
employer's rules ``into the OSHA standards which are the subject of 
this rulemaking would violate the rulemaking provisions of the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act, the Administrative Procedures Act, 
and the Federal Register Act'' (Ex. 0170). The National Association of 
Manufacturers similarly stated, with reference to this provision: 
``OSHA has never had the authority to incorporate the provisions of 
millions of private contracts into OSHA standards, nor to delegate its 
rulemaking authority to private entities'' (Ex. 0222). EEI also 
commented that the proposed requirement ``effectively would place each 
host employer in the position of promulgating safety and health 
standards for contractors' employees, and therefore would constitute an 
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power'' (Ex. 0227).
    OSHA does not believe that the proposed provision would cause the 
practical problems identified by rulemaking participants. There is 
evidence in the record that, as IBEW stated, ``contractors . . . 
routinely adapt their work rules and safety practices to accommodate 
the demands of particular jobs and the requirements of specific hosts'' 
(Ex. 0505). The union explained this statement as follows:

    There are circumstances related to contractors performing work 
on utility properties that would require the contractors to work 
under the host employer's safety related work rules to ensure both 
the contractor employees and the host employer employees are 
provided a safe work environment. In fact, many collective 
bargaining agreements require this. [Ex. 0230]

    Mr. Brian Erga with ESCI noted that some utilities have such unique 
systems that contractors have no choice but to follow the host's rules 
(Tr. 1271-1272). Several witnesses stated that contractors routinely 
follow a host employer's lockout-tagout requirements (Tr. 314, 984, 
1299-1301). There is evidence that some host employers require 
contractors to follow NFPA 70E (Ex. 0460), to follow the host's fall 
protection requirement for working from aerial lifts (Tr. 391), and to 
use particular types of flame-resistant clothing (Tr. 1346). In 
addition, the proposal did not require contractors to follow all of the 
host employer's safety rules, only rules the host imposes on 
contractors, which the contractors are required to follow anyway. The 
Agency also does not believe that proposed paragraph (c)(2)(ii) would 
result in undue confusion from work rules that vary from one employer 
to another. The record indicates that contractors are already required 
to institute different work rules because of contractual or other 
requirements imposed by host employers, such as following the host 
employers' lockout-tagout procedures (Tr. 314), using particular live-
line work methods (Tr. 320), and using particular forms of fall 
protection (Tr. 643-644).
    On the other hand, the record establishes that hosts sometimes 
impose rules that do not meet OSHA requirements (Tr. 1366 \74\) or that 
may be less safe than the contractor's rules (Tr. 1365-1366 \75\). 
These are outcomes that OSHA did not envision in proposing paragraph 
(c)(2)(ii). Considering these potential risks, and the commenters' 
overwhelming opposition to this proposed provision, the Agency decided 
not to include proposed paragraph (c)(2)(ii) in the final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \74\ Some host employers ``don't believe in equipotential work 
zone,'' which is required by existing Sec.  1910.269(n)(3), or want 
trucks barricaded, instead of having them grounded, as required by 
existing Sec.  1910.269(p)(4)(iii)(C).
    \75\ One host employer requires contractor employees to wear 
rubber insulating gloves while working with live-line tools on 
transmission lines, which may cause the gloves to fail.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    OSHA concludes, however, that some coordination of work rules 
between

[[Page 20366]]

hosts and contractors is necessary, particularly with respect to 
deenergizing lines and equipment (Ex. 0505) and grounding procedures 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(Tr. 1271-1272). According to IBEW:

    [What is important] is not that one party's rules take 
precedence over the others. Instead, what is important is that the 
parties operating on an electrical system coordinate procedures to 
ensure that all of the employees can perform safely. There are two 
sets of circumstances in which this kind of coordination is an 
issue: Where employees actually work together and when the manner in 
which one group of employees performs has an impact on the safety of 
another group of employees. [Ex. 0505]

    Other rulemaking participants similarly supported a requirement for 
coordination between host employers and contract employers to assure 
the protection of host employees and contract employees. (See, for 
example, Exs. 0128, 0235, 0237.) Therefore, the Agency is adopting a 
new paragraph in the final rule, Sec.  1926.950(c)(3), entitled ``Joint 
host- and contract-employer responsibilities,'' which reads as follows:

    The contract employer and the host employer shall coordinate 
their work rules and procedures so that each employee of the 
contract employer and the host employer is protected as required by 
this subpart.

This new provision provides host employers and contract employers more 
flexibility than the proposal to select appropriate work rules and 
procedures for each task or project, while ensuring that workers are 
not at risk of harm due to a lack of coordination between employers.
    Under the new provision, each employer has independent 
responsibility for complying with the final rule. In addition, the 
Agency stresses that a contract employer must comply with the final 
rule even though a host employer may try to impose work rules that 
would cause the contract employer to violate OSHA's rules. Accordingly, 
a contract employer is not relieved of its duty to comply with the 
final rule by following a work rule imposed by the host employer. For 
example, a contract employer must comply with final Sec.  1926.962(c), 
which prescribes rules for equipotential grounding, even if the host 
employer has its own noncompliant grounding procedures. Paragraph 
(c)(3) of final Sec.  1926.950 requires host employers and contract 
employers to confer in an effort to select work rules and procedures 
that comply with final Sec.  1926.962(c).
    Final paragraphs (c)(2)(ii) and (c)(2)(iii) (proposed as part of 
paragraph (c)(2)(iii)) require the contract employer to advise the host 
employer of unique hazardous conditions posed by the contract 
employer's work \76\ and any unanticipated hazardous conditions found, 
while the contractor's employees were working, that the host employer 
did not mention. Final paragraphs (c)(2)(ii) and (c)(2)(iii) enable the 
host employer to take necessary measures to protect its employees from 
hazards of which the host employer would not be aware. These 
requirements will protect the host employer's employees: when they are 
working near the contractor's employees (for example, during storm 
situations (Tr. 315, 392, 1379-1380); during outages on transmission 
lines (Tr. 1380) and in plants (Tr. 985); while working in the same 
substation (Tr. 313-314, 559); and when the host employer's employees 
work on the same equipment after the contract employer departs (such 
as, when contractors are working on equipment in the field that the 
host employer does not regularly inspect) (Tr. 877-878)). The Utility 
Workers Union supported these proposed requirements, commenting: 
``Requiring the sharing of information of hazards found or created by 
the contractor is . . . insurance that all employees, host and 
contractor, are in a safer working environment'' (Ex. 0197). OSHA notes 
that proposed paragraph (c)(2)(iii)(B) (now paragraph (c)(2)(iii)) 
required contractors to report any unanticipated ``hazards'' not 
mentioned by the host; however, in the final rule, the phrase 
``hazardous conditions'' replaces the word ``hazards'' throughout 
paragraph (c). In addition, the Agency anticipates that contract 
employers will inform host employers of any information provided by the 
host that is at odds with actual conditions at the worksite, consistent 
with paragraph (c)(3), which specifies that host employers and contract 
employers coordinate their work rules and procedures so that each 
employee is protected as required by subpart V.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \76\ For the purposes of final paragraph (c)(2)(ii), ``unique 
hazardous conditions presented by the contract employer's work'' 
means hazardous conditions that the work poses to which employees at 
the worksite are not already exposed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some commenters believed that proposed paragraph (c)(2)(iii) (now 
paragraphs (c)(2)(ii) and (c)(2)(iii)) needed clarification. For 
example, the Associated General Contractors of America (AGC) commented 
that proposed paragraph (c)(2)(iii) was vague and did not provide 
guidance on the timeframes or format of required information transfers 
(Ex. 0160).
    OSHA does not agree that final paragraphs (c)(2)(ii) or (c)(2)(iii) 
are vague or unclear. These provisions simply require that contractors 
provide information to host employers, which reciprocates the 
requirements under final paragraph (c)(1) that host employers provide 
contractors with information. The Agency deliberately omitted, in the 
proposed and final rules, any requirement for a formal or written 
report; the final rule simply requires contractors to advise the host 
employer, which allows contract employers maximum flexibility in 
complying with the final requirements. The Agency will deem it 
sufficient for the contract employer to provide the necessary 
information, through any appropriate mechanism (for example, a phone 
call or an email), to an authorized agent of the host employer.
    The purpose of final paragraph (c)(2)(ii) is to enable host 
employers to protect their own employees from hazardous conditions 
presented by the contractor's work. Thus, the information addressed by 
paragraph (c)(2)(ii) needs to be provided to the host employer soon 
enough so that the host employer can take any necessary action before 
its employees are exposed to a hazardous condition. To address AGC's 
concern that the proposed paragraph did not provide guidance on the 
timeframe of the required information transfer, OSHA added language to 
paragraph (c)(2)(ii) in the final rule to indicate that this 
information must be provided ``[b]efore work begins.''
    The final rule also includes, in paragraph (c)(2)(iii), a 2-working 
day timeframe in which the contractor must advise the host employer of 
information described in that paragraph. OSHA believes that this 
timeframe will give the contract employer sufficient time to provide 
the required information. The final rule does not specifically require 
hosts to take any direct action in response to information provided by 
contractors, although the Agency anticipates that host employers will 
use this information to protect their employees and comply with the OSH 
Act.
    Frequently, the conditions present at a jobsite can expose workers 
to unexpected hazards. For example, the grounding system available at 
an outdoor site may be damaged by weather or vehicular traffic, or 
communications cables in the vicinity could reduce the approach 
distance to an unacceptable level. To protect employees from such 
adverse situations, conditions affecting safety that are present in the 
work area should be known so that appropriate action can be taken. 
Paragraph (d) of Sec.  1926.950 addresses this problem by requiring 
safety-related characteristics and conditions existing in the work area 
to

[[Page 20367]]

be determined before employees start working in the area. The language 
for proposed paragraph (d) was based on language in current Sec.  
1926.950(b)(1) and was the same as existing Sec.  1910.269(a)(3). A 
similar requirement can be found in ANSI/IEEE C2-2002, Rule 420D.\77\ 
As noted earlier, OSHA revised the language in the final rule to 
clarify that the paragraph addresses installation characteristics, as 
well as work-area conditions, and to separately number the examples 
listed in the provision.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \77\ The 2012 NESC contains an equivalent requirement in Rule 
420D.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    OSHA received only a few of comments on proposed paragraph (d). EEI 
objected to this provision, commenting:

    EEI recognizes that the regulatory text of proposed paragraph 
1926.950(d) is the same as in existing 1910.269(a)(3). Also, the 
preamble accompanying the current proposal is essentially the same 
as in the final 1910.269. There are certain aspects of the current 
proposal, however, that are troublesome. . . .
* * * * *
    It is susceptible of being applied in a manner that effectively 
requires an employer to examine every imaginable condition on a 
jobsite, lest it be held accountable if some obscure, unexpected 
condition later is involved in causing an accident.
* * * * *
    [I]f the standard is not applied reasonably, the result could be 
a significant burden for line crews, as time is taken not to miss a 
single detail, however obscure, lest the crew be second-guessed for 
having missed observing some condition if something later goes 
wrong. In the final rule, OSHA needs to address this issue. Rather 
than state that there is an unqualified obligation to ``determine'' 
existing conditions relating to the safety of the work, the 
obligation should be modified to require a ``reasonable effort to 
determine'' the reasonably anticipated hazards. [Ex. 0227]

EEI noted, as an example of ``some obscure, unexpected condition . . . 
involved in causing an accident,'' an energized static line that caused 
the electrocution of an apprentice line worker (id.):

    In that case, the contractor was performing maintenance work on 
a high-voltage transmission tower. The host utility was shown to 
have been aware that what appeared to be a grounded static line atop 
one side of the tower was in fact energized at 4,000 volts. The 
utility did not inform the contractor of this information, however, 
and the contractor's foremen on the ground and on the tower did not 
notice that there was an insulator separating the line and tower, 
thus indicating that the line could be energized. [Id.]

EEI stated that the contractor was cited, under existing Sec.  
1910.269(a)(3), ``for failing to ascertain existing conditions, i.e., 
the energized condition of the static line, before beginning work'' 
(id.).
    OSHA considered this comment and decided not to adopt EEI's 
recommended change to proposed Sec.  1926.950(d). First, OSHA does not 
believe that obscure and unexpected conditions often lead to accidents, 
as EEI seems to argue. EEI's example, in which an apprentice power line 
worker was electrocuted by an energized static line, is a case in point 
(id.). An employer exercising reasonable diligence can be expected to 
determine that a static line is energized. In the case described by 
EEI, the electric utility that owned the line was aware that the line 
was energized, and the line itself was installed on insulators (id.). 
Thus, the energized condition of the static wire was neither obscure 
nor unexpected.
    Second, EEI appears confused about the purpose of this provision. 
Paragraph (d) of final Sec.  1926.950 requires employers to determine, 
before work is started on or near electric lines or equipment, existing 
installation characteristics and work-area conditions related to the 
safety of the work to be performed. The requirement also includes 
examples of such characteristics and conditions.
    Characteristics of the installation, such as the nominal voltage on 
lines, maximum switching transient overvoltages, and the presence of 
grounds and equipment grounding conductors, are parameters of the 
system. This is information the employer already has, either through 
direct knowledge or by the transfer of information from the host 
employer to the contract employer.\78\ Thus, this aspect of final 
paragraph (d) does not place any burden, much less an unreasonable one, 
on line crews.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \78\ The employer may not have knowledge of the exact locations 
of customer-owned backup generators; however, the location of 
possible sources of backfeed from such customer-owned equipment can 
readily be determined by looking for connections to customers' 
wiring in circuit diagrams or during an inspection at the worksite.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Conditions of the installation, including the condition of 
protective grounds and equipment grounding conductors, the condition of 
poles, and environmental conditions relating to safety, are worksite 
conditions. In some cases, the employer already will have information 
on the condition of the installation, such as information on the 
condition of poles from pole-inspection programs or on the condition of 
electric equipment from equipment manufacturers. In the usual case, 
however, the conditions addressed by paragraph (d) of the final rule 
will be determined by employees through an inspection at the worksite. 
This inspection need not be overly detailed, but it does need to be 
thorough rather than cursory. The standard does not require crews to 
determine ``every imaginable condition,'' as EEI suggests. Rather, the 
inspection must be designed to uncover the conditions specifically 
noted in this paragraph as well as any other conditions of electric 
lines and equipment that are related to the safety of the work to be 
performed and that can be discovered through the exercise of reasonable 
diligence by employees with the training required by Sec.  1926.950(b) 
of the final rule.
    Employers are required by Sec.  1926.952(a)(1) of the final rule to 
provide information on such worksite-specific conditions and the 
characteristics of the installation to the employee-in-charge. With 
this information, the employer then will determine the current 
conditions of the installation through an examination by employees at 
the worksite. Employer-supplied information, as well as information 
gathered at the worksite, must be used in the job briefing required by 
Sec.  1926.952 of the final rule. (See the discussion of Sec.  1926.952 
later in this section of the preamble.) The characteristics and 
conditions found as a result of compliance with final Sec.  1926.950(d) 
could affect the application of various Subpart V requirements. For 
example, the voltage on equipment will determine the minimum approach 
distances required under final Sec.  1926.960(c)(1). Similarly, the 
presence or absence of an equipment grounding conductor will affect the 
work practices required under final Sec.  1926.960(j). If conditions 
are found to which no specific subpart V provision applies, then the 
employee would need to be trained, as required by final Sec.  
1926.950(b)(1)(ii), to use appropriate safe work practices.
    Employers need not take measurements on a routine basis to make the 
determinations required by final Sec.  1926.950(d). For example, 
knowledge of the maximum transient voltage level is necessary to 
perform many routine transmission and distribution line jobs safely. 
However, no measurement of this maximum level is necessary to make the 
requisite determination. Employers can make the determination by 
conducting an analysis of the electric circuit, or they can assume the 
default maximum transient overvoltages discussed under the summary and 
explanation of final Sec.  1926.960(c)(1), later in this section of

[[Page 20368]]

the preamble. Similarly, employers can make determinations about the 
presence of hazardous induced voltages, as well as the presence and 
condition of grounds, without taking measurements.
    It may be necessary for employers to make measurements when there 
is doubt about the condition of a ground or the level of induced or 
transient voltage if the employer is relying on one of these conditions 
to meet other requirements in the standard. For example, an engineering 
analysis of a particular installation might demonstrate that the 
voltage induced on a deenergized line is considerable, but should not 
be dangerous. However, a measurement of the voltage may be required if 
the employer is using this analysis as a basis for claiming that the 
provisions of final Sec.  1926.964(b)(4) on hazardous induced voltage 
do not apply. In another example, further investigation is required 
when an equipment ground is found to be of questionable reliability, 
unless the equipment is treated as energized under final Sec.  
1926.960(j).
    EEI was concerned about this discussion of engineering analysis in 
the preamble to the proposed rule (70 FR 34841), commenting:

    This [discussion] is unrealistic: engineering analyses are not 
made in the field in transmission and distribution work. [Ex. 0227]

    OSHA agrees with EEI that engineering analyses are not made in the 
field. Under this provision of the final rule, employers would conduct 
any engineering analyses required by this provision off site and supply 
the requisite information to the employees performing the work.
Section 1926.951, Medical services and first aid
    Section 1926.951 sets requirements for medical services and first 
aid. Paragraph (a) of Sec.  1926.951 emphasizes that the requirements 
of Sec.  1926.50 apply. (See Sec.  1926.950(a)(2).) Existing Sec.  
1926.50 includes provisions for available medical personnel, first-aid 
training and supplies, and facilities for drenching or flushing of the 
eyes and body in the event of exposure to corrosive materials.
    Mr. Daniel Shipp with the International Safety Equipment 
Association (ISEA) recommended that the reference in Sec.  1926.50, 
Appendix A, to ANSI Z308.1-1978, Minimum Requirements for Industrial 
Unit-Type First-aid Kits, be updated to the 2003 edition (Ex. 0211). 
OSHA did not propose any changes to Sec.  1926.50, nor was that section 
a subject of this rulemaking. Thus, the Agency is not adopting Mr. 
Shipp's suggestion. It should be noted, however, that Appendix A to 
Sec.  1926.50 is not mandatory. The Agency encourages employers to 
examine the recommendations in the latest edition of the consensus 
standard, which is ANSI/ISEA Z308.1-2009, when reviewing the guidance 
in Appendix A to Sec.  1926.50.
    Mr. Stephen Sandherr with AGC was concerned that the requirements 
proposed in Sec.  1926.951 conflicted with the requirements in Sec.  
1926.50 and maintained that such a conflict would hinder a contractor's 
ability to implement safety (Ex. 0160).
    OSHA reexamined the requirements in proposed Sec.  1926.951 and 
found that the requirements for first-aid supplies in proposed 
paragraphs (b)(2) and (b)(3) in that section conflicted with similar 
requirements in Sec.  1926.50. Proposed paragraph (b)(2) would have 
required weatherproof containers if the supplies could be exposed to 
the weather, whereas existing Sec.  1926.50(d)(2) requires that the 
contents of first-aid kits be placed in weatherproof containers, with 
individual sealed packages for each type of item. Further, proposed 
paragraph (b)(3) would have required that first-aid kits be inspected 
frequently enough to ensure that expended items are replaced, but not 
less than once per year. By contrast, existing Sec.  1926.50(d)(2) 
requires that first-aid kits ``be checked by the employer before being 
sent out on each job and at least weekly on each job to ensure that the 
expended items are replaced.''
    As noted earlier, final Sec.  1926.951(a), which requires that 
employers comply with existing Sec.  1926.50, was adopted without 
change from the proposal. The Agency is not including proposed 
paragraphs (b)(2) and (b)(3) in the final rule because these provisions 
were less restrictive than the requirements of Sec.  1926.50. Including 
them in the final rule would compromise OSHA's efforts to enforce Sec.  
1926.50 on jobsites covered by Subpart V. OSHA notes that the remaining 
provisions in Sec.  1926.951 apply in addition to those in Sec.  
1926.50.
    Final Sec.  1926.951(b) supplements Sec.  1926.50 by requiring 
cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) to help resuscitate electric shock 
victims.\79\ OSHA concludes that the requirements for CPR training in 
the final rule are supported by the record. This training is required 
by existing Sec.  1910.269(b)(1), and work under subpart V poses the 
same electric-shock hazards and requires the same protection against 
those hazards. As discussed in the summary and explanation for Sec.  
1926.953(h), the final rule defines ``first-aid training'' to include 
CPR training. Therefore, in final Sec.  1926.951(b), OSHA replaced the 
proposed phrase ``persons trained in first aid including 
cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR)'' with ``persons with first-aid 
training.'' The Agency stresses that CPR training is required by this 
and other provisions in the final rule for first-aid training.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \79\ In discussing these remaining provisions in this preamble, 
OSHA generally uses the term ``CPR training'' to describe the first-
aid training required by the provisions. OSHA does not mean to imply 
by this language that the final provisions do not require first-aid 
training other than CPR. In fact, as explained later in the 
preamble, the final rule defines ``first-aid training'' as training 
in the initial care, including CPR, performed by a person who is not 
a medical practitioner, of a sick or injured person until definitive 
medical treatment can be administered. OSHA is emphasizing ``CPR 
training'' in its preamble discussion because that type of first aid 
is particularly beneficial to workers who are injured by an electric 
shock.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Electric shock is a serious and ever-present hazard to electric 
power transmission and distribution workers because of the work they 
perform on or with energized lines and equipment. CPR is necessary to 
revive an employee rendered unconscious by an electric shock. As OSHA 
concluded in the 1994 Sec.  1910.269 rulemaking, CPR must be started 
within 4 minutes to be effective in reviving an employee whose heart 
has gone into fibrillation (59 FR 4344-4347; see also 269-Ex. 3-21).
    To protect employees performing work on, or associated with, 
exposed lines or equipment energized at 50 volts or more, OSHA proposed 
to require that employees with training in first aid including CPR be 
available to render assistance in an emergency.
    OSHA chose 50 volts as a widely recognized threshold for hazardous 
electric shock.\80\ In this regard, several OSHA and national consensus 
standards recognize this 50-volt threshold. For example, OSHA's general 
industry and construction electrical standards require guarding live 
parts energized at 50 volts or more (Sec. Sec.  1910.303(g)(2)(i) and 
1926.403(i)(2)(i)); the general industry electrical standard also 
requires that electric circuits be deenergized generally starting at 50 
volts (Sec.  1910.333(a)(1)). Similarly, NFPA's Standard for Electrical 
Safety in the Workplace (NFPA 70E-2004) and the National Electrical 
Safety Code (ANSI/IEEE C2-2002) impose electrical safety requirements 
starting at 50 volts (Exs. 0134, 0077, respectively). (See, for 
example, Section 400.16 of NFPA 70E-

[[Page 20369]]

2004, which requires guarding of live parts of electric equipment 
operating at more than 50 volts, and Rule 441A2 of ANSI/IEEE C2-
2002,\81\ which prohibits employees from contacting live parts 
energized at 51 to 300 volts unless certain precautions are taken.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \80\ Although it is theoretically possible to sustain a life-
threatening shock below this voltage, it is considered extremely 
unlikely. (See, for example, Ex. 0428.)
    \81\ The 2012 NESC contains a similar requirement in Rule 441A2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Many electric shock victims suffer ventricular fibrillation (59 FR 
4344-4347; 269-Ex. 3-21). Ventricular fibrillation is an abnormal, 
chaotic heart rhythm that prevents the heart from pumping blood and, if 
unchecked, leads to death (id.). Someone must defibrillate a victim of 
ventricular fibrillation quickly to allow a normal heart rhythm to 
resume (id.). The sooner defibrillation is started, the better the 
victim's chances of survival (id.). If defibrillation is provided 
within the first 5 minutes of the onset of ventricular fibrillation, 
the odds are about 50 percent that the victim will recover (id.). 
However, with each passing minute, the chance of successful 
resuscitation is reduced by 7 to 10 percent (id.). After 10 minutes, 
there is very little chance of successful rescue (id.). Paragraph (b) 
of the final rule requires CPR training to ensure that electric shock 
victims survive long enough for defibrillation to be efficacious. The 
employer may rely on emergency responders to provide defibrillation.
    In the preamble to the proposal, OSHA requested public comment on 
whether the standard should require the employer to provide automated 
external defibrillators (AEDs) and, if so, where they should be 
required. AEDs are widely available devices that enable CPR-trained 
individuals to perform defibrillation.
    Many rulemaking participants recommended that OSHA not adopt a 
requirement for AEDs. (See, for example, Exs. 0125, 0162, 0167, 0169, 
0171, 0173, 0174, 0177, 0200, 0225, 0227; Tr. 635-636, 762-763.) Some 
commenters argued that there were no injuries for which AEDs would 
prove beneficial. (See, for example, Exs. 0174, 0200; Tr. 635-636, 762-
763.) In this regard, Mr. Steven Semler, commenting on behalf of ULCC, 
stated:

    [W]hen tragic electric contact accidents do, albeit rarely, 
occur with respect to line clearance tree trimmers, they tend to 
involve catastrophic accidental direct contract with high voltage 
electric supply lines which inherently pass massive amounts of 
electricity through the victim which irreversibly damages cardiac 
conductivity altogether--as to which AED's cannot, nor even purport 
to, rectify . . . . It is, of course, a misnomer that AED's can 
restart a heart which is stopped from electrical contact or any 
other reason. The stoppage is known as ``asystole'' for which an AED 
is programmed to not shock the patient because AED's cannot start a 
stopped heart--for instance, one whose stoppage is due to 
destruction of the heart's electrical path, or due to irreversible 
brain damage, respiratory muscle paralysis, tissue burn, or due to 
electrical contact which serves to destroy the ability to breathe.
    Rather, AED's use is limited solely to cases of cardiac 
fibrillation--cases of the heart beating in quivering fashion so as 
to cease effective pumping capacity (and also to rarer situations of 
ventricular tachycardia where the heart beats very fast). But, as a 
trauma specialist physician has observed, ventricular fibrillation 
is a rare occurrence in high voltage electrical contacts, as to 
which rescue breathing and CPR (currently required) are remedial 
pending arrival of medical help. [Footnote: Richard F. Edlict, MD, 
``Burns, Electrical, www.emedicine.com/plastic/topic491.htm (7/12/
05) . . .]
    Given that the unfortunate nature of line clearance tree 
trimmers cardiac events due to electric contact tend to be 
catastrophic because of accidental non compliance with the OSHA 
minimum distance separation from electric supply lines separation 
requirement, the cardiac events which unfortunately have happened to 
line clearance tree trimmers have tended to catastrophic, tending to 
involve cardiac and brain damage of such severity that AED's are not 
designed to, and cannot, perform a useful purpose. [Ex. 0174; 
emphasis included in original]

Furthermore, TCIA presented polling data to show that their members 
have not experienced any occupational incidents for which AED use would 
have been appropriate to treat the victim (Exs. 0200, 0419).

    On the other hand, several rulemaking participants pointed out that 
AEDs have saved lives (Exs. 0213, 0230). TVA, which has deployed AEDs 
in both fixed work locations, such as generation plants, and in field 
service-centers, reported two successful uses of AEDs in a 17-month 
period (Ex. 0213). IBEW commented that ``AED units have proven to be 
effective in the utility industry. More than one `save' has occurred'' 
(Ex. 0230). Testifying on behalf of IBEW, Mr. James Tomaseski stated, 
``[B]ased on what the experts tell you about the need to have AEDs in 
certain environments, [electric utility work] is [at the] top of the 
list. We have an aging workforce. The possibilities of sudden cardiac 
arrest to occur to people in this industry is very high'' (Tr. 964).
    The Agency concludes that employees performing work covered by 
subpart V and Sec.  1910.269 are exposed to electric shocks for which 
defibrillation is needed as part of the emergency medical response to 
such injuries. The Agency bases this conclusion on the evidence in both 
this record, as well as the record supporting its decision in the 1994 
Sec.  1910.269 rulemaking to require first-aid training, including CPR 
training, for work covered by that standard. OSHA found in its 1994 
Sec.  1910.269 rulemaking that line-clearance tree trimmers were 
exposed to electric-shock hazards for which CPR would be efficacious 
(59 FR 4344-4347), and the National Arborist Association (TCIA's 
predecessor) pointed out that low-voltage electric shock can result 
from indirect contact with higher voltage sources (269-Ex. 58, 59 FR 
4345). OSHA's inspection data amply demonstrate that indirect contacts, 
such as contacting a power line through a tree branch, do occur in work 
covered by Sec.  1910.269 and Subpart V (Ex. 0400). Half of the ten 
line-clearance tree-trimmer electrocutions described in these data 
resulted from indirect contacts. The experience of TVA and IBEW 
reinforces the Agency's conclusion that employees performing work 
covered by Subpart V and Sec.  1910.269 are exposed to electric shocks 
for which defibrillation is needed as part of the emergency medical 
response.
    Many rulemaking participants argued that work covered by Subpart V 
would subject AEDs to environmental and other conditions for which the 
devices are not, or may not be, designed, including:
     Extreme heat (see, for example, Exs. 0169, 0171, 0173, 
0177, 0227),
     Extreme cold (see, for example, Exs. 0169, 0171, 0173, 
0177, 0227),
     Vibration or jarring (see, for example, Exs. 0169, 0173, 
0175),
     Dust (see, for example, Exs. 0169, 0171, 0173, 0175), and
     Humidity and moisture (see, for example, Exs. 0169, 0171, 
0173).

For instance, Mr. Wilson Yancey with Quanta Services commented that the 
conditions to which AEDs would be exposed could ``quickly degrade the 
performance of the equipment and require frequent inspection and 
maintenance'' (Ex. 0169). Ms. Salud Layton with the Virginia, Maryland 
& Delaware Association of Electric Cooperatives commented, ``Most field 
experience with AED's has been at either fixed sites or carried by 
ambulances in padded bins/cases inside of heated and cooled ambulance 
bodies. This is not what the AED's would be exposed to on a utility 
vehicle'' (Ex. 0175). Mr. Thomas Taylor with Consumers Energy noted 
that manufacturers' instructions tightly control AEDs' storage 
requirements, explaining:


[[Page 20370]]


    [L]ine truck storage conditions would prohibit the AED from 
functioning properly and therefore provide no tangible safety 
benefit to employees. In this regard, the manufacturer instructions 
for preventing electrode damage states: ``Store electrodes in a 
cool, dry location (15 to 35 degree Celsius or 59 to 95 degrees 
Fahrenheit''. The instruction also states: [``]It is important that 
when the AED is stored with the battery installed, temperature 
exposure should not fall below 0 degrees Celsius (32 degrees 
Fahrenheit) or exceed 50 degrees Celsius (122 degrees Fahrenheit). 
If the AED is stored outside this temperature range, the auto tests 
may erroneously detect a problem and the AED may not operate 
properly.[''] [Ex. 0177]

    OSHA decided not to include a requirement for AEDs in the final 
rule because the Agency believes that there is insufficient evidence in 
the record that AEDs exposed to the environmental extremes typical of 
work covered by Subpart V and Sec.  1910.269 would function properly 
when an incident occurs. There is no evidence in the record that AEDs 
are adversely affected by dust, vibration, or humidity; however, it is 
clear that line work in many areas of the country would subject AEDs to 
temperatures above and below their designed operating range of 0 to 50 
degrees Celsius. For example, Mr. Frank Owen Brockman with the Farmers 
Rural Electric Cooperatives testified that temperatures in Kentucky can 
get as cold as -34 degrees Celsius and as high as 44 degrees Celsius 
(Tr. 1283). Although the record indicates that the highest of these 
temperatures is within the operating range of AEDs, OSHA believes that 
it is likely that the interior of trucks would be significantly hotter 
than the 50-degree Celsius recommended maximum. Accordingly, there is 
insufficient evidence in the record for the Agency to determine whether 
AEDs will work properly in these temperature extremes during use, even 
if they are stored in temperature-controlled environments as mentioned 
by some rulemaking participants (see, for example, Ex. 0186; Tr. 965-
966).\82\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \82\ Some rulemaking participants gave other reasons why OSHA 
should not require AEDs, including: Costs of acquiring the devices 
(see, for example, Exs. 0162, 0169, 0173, 0174, 0200, 0227), varying 
State requirements related to AEDs, such as requirements that they 
be prescribed by a physician (see, for example, Exs. 0125, 0149, 
0227), conflicts with requirements of other Federal agencies, such 
as the Food and Drug Administration (see, for example, Exs. 0177, 
0227), and OSHA's failure to meet all its regulatory burdens, such 
as burdens imposed by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement 
Fairness Act (Ex. 0170). Because OSHA decided not to require AEDs 
for the reason given in this section of the preamble, it need not 
consider these other issues.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As explained previously, the Agency stresses that defibrillation is 
a necessary part of the response to electric shock incidents that occur 
during work covered by the final rule. OSHA is not adopting a rule 
requiring AEDs because the record is insufficient for the Agency to 
conclude that these devices will be effective in the conditions under 
which they would be used. OSHA encourages employers to purchase and 
deploy AEDs in areas where they could be useful and efficacious. This 
action likely will save lives and provide the Agency with useful 
information on the use of AEDs under a wide range of conditions.
    Proposed paragraph (b)(1) would have required CPR training for 
field crews of two or more employees, in which case a minimum of two 
trained persons would generally have been required (proposed paragraph 
(b)(1)(i)), and for fixed worksites, in which case enough trained 
persons to provide assistance within 4 minutes would generally have 
been required (proposed paragraph (b)(1)(ii)). Proposed paragraph 
(b)(1)(i) provided that employers could train all employees in first 
aid including CPR within 3 months of being hired as an alternative to 
having two trained persons on every field crew. If the employer chose 
this alternative for field work, then only one trained person would 
have been required for each crew. In practice, crews with more than one 
employee would normally have two or more CPR-trained employees on the 
crew, since all employees who worked for an employer more than 3 months 
would receive CPR training. However, employers who rely on seasonal 
labor (for example, employees hired only in the summer months), or 
those with heavy turnover, might have some two-person crews with only 
one CPR-trained employee. Because the Agency was concerned that those 
new employees might be most at risk of injury, OSHA requested comment 
on whether allowing employers the option of training all their 
employees in CPR if they are trained within 3 months of being hired is 
sufficiently protective. The Agency also requested comment on how this 
provision could be revised to minimize the burden on employers, while 
providing adequate protection for employees.
    Several commenters shared OSHA's concern with the 3-month delay in 
CPR training. (See, for example, Exs. 0126, 0187, 0213, 0230) Mr. Rob 
Land with the Association of Missouri Electric Cooperatives commented 
that this option was too hazardous because of ``the hazards that 
linemen face and the distinct possibility that [emergency medical 
services] may be delayed due to remoteness and distances involved'' 
(Ex. 0187). TVA opposed the option because the ``3[ ]months when a two-
person crew would have only one CPR trained member . . . reduce[s] the 
level of safety provided'' (Ex. 0213). IBEW presented its reasons for 
opposing the 3-month option, and its recommendation for revising the 
rule, as follows:

    Allowing employers the option of training all their employees in 
CPR if they are trained within 3 months of being hired may not work 
in all situations. Many utilities engaged in field work have 
implemented the use of 2-person crews. It is not uncommon for the 2-
person crew to perform rubber gloving work on all distribution 
voltage ranges. It is also not uncommon for a utility to assign a 
new-hire (less than 3 months of service) as the second person on the 
2-person crew. In these work scenarios, the second person would have 
to be trained in CPR. Waiting 3 months to complete this training 
would not [be] proper.
* * * * *
    The only revision that is necessary is to make it clear that 
under certain circumstances, new-hires may need to be trained in CPR 
well before the 3 month window. Manning of crews, especially in the 
construction industry, cannot always be accomplished using CPR 
certification as a factor. All employees need to receive the 
training and the 3 months gives enough flexibility when 
appropriate[.] [Ex. 0230; emphasis included in original]

    Other rulemaking participants supported the provision as proposed. 
(See, for example, Exs. 0155, 0162, 0174, 0200; Tr. 633-635, 764-765.) 
Some of them argued that the provision, which was taken from existing 
Sec.  1910.269(b)(1)(i), has worked well. (See, for example, Exs. 0155, 
0200; Tr. 764.) The tree care industry stated that the line-clearance 
tree trimming industry did not use seasonal labor and argued that the 
3-month delay in training new employees in CPR was justified on the 
basis of high turnover in that industry (Exs. 0174, 0200; Tr. 633-635, 
764-765). For example, testifying on behalf of ULCC, Mr. Mark Foster 
stated:

    [T]he current standard reflects a clearly considered balance 
made by OSHA at the time of adoption of the current standard to 
allow a three-month phase-in period for CPR compliance for new 
hires. That policy judgment rests on the fact that there was then an 
81 percent turnover rate among line clearance tree trimming 
employees such that many would not last in employment beyond the 
initial training period and that that would be very difficult to 
field crews if new hires had first had to be sent for CPR training.
    While the turnover ratio has improved somewhat, it is still 
staggering[ly] high, [presenting] the same considerations that led 
to the adoption of the phase-in period in the initial standard. [Tr. 
633-634]

In its comment, ULCC indicated that the annual turnover rate in the 
line-

[[Page 20371]]

clearance tree trimming industry is 53 to 75 percent (Ex. 0174).

    OSHA decided to restrict the exception permitting a 3-month delay 
in training employees in first aid, including CPR, to line-clearance 
tree trimming. The Agency agrees that turnover in the line-clearance 
tree trimming industry remains high, which was the underlying reason 
for OSHA's original adoption of the 3-month delay in training for newly 
hired employees in the 1994 Sec.  1910.269 rulemaking (59 FR 4346-
4347). However, as noted by Mr. Land, the provision as proposed leaves 
employees exposed to hazards when a new employee who has not yet been 
trained in CPR is the second person in a two-worker crew (Ex. 0187). 
IBEW also recognized the need to have both employees trained in CPR in 
many circumstances (Ex. 0230). Finally, turnover rates for the electric 
utility and power line contractor industries are not nearly as high as 
that for the tree trimming industry. OSHA estimates that the turnover 
rates among employees performing electric power generation, 
transmission, and distribution work ranges from 11 to 16 percent in the 
construction industries and 3 percent in the generation and utility 
industries (see Section VI, Final Economic Analysis and Regulatory 
Flexibility Analysis, later in the preamble). These turnover rates are 
significantly lower than the turnover rate indicated by ULCC for the 
line-clearance tree trimming industry.
    Because this exception in the final rule applies only to line-
clearance tree trimming, which is addressed only in Sec.  1910.269, the 
Agency is not adopting it in final Sec.  1926.951(b)(1).\83\ The 
corresponding provision in Sec.  1910.269(b)(1)(i) retains the 
exception providing for a 3-month delay in first-aid training, 
including CPR, but only for line-clearance tree-trimming work.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \83\ Final Sec.  1926.951(b) uses the term ``trained persons,'' 
rather than ``trained employees,'' because the individuals with the 
training do not necessarily need to be employees. For instance, the 
``trained persons'' required by the rule could be self-employed 
individuals working with a crew of employees.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    These changes will continue to permit employers in the line-
clearance tree trimming industry to delay training in first aid, 
including CPR, to new employees for a reasonable time.
    Finally, OSHA notes that it remains concerned that some employees 
in the line-clearance tree trimming industry might encounter an 
unnecessary delay in being treated in an emergency. The Agency does not 
believe that it is reasonable to unnecessarily staff crews so that some 
crews had only one CPR-trained worker, while other crews had three or 
four. Although the Agency is not addressing this concern in the final 
rule, OSHA expects employers to staff each tree trimming crew with as 
many employees trained in first aid as possible, including CPR, to 
assist in emergencies.
    Mr. Steven Theis of MYR Group requested that OSHA provide a similar 
3-month grace period for refresher training (Ex. 0162).\84\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \84\ Although paragraph (b)(1) in the final rule does not 
address refresher first-aid training, final Sec.  
1926.950(b)(4)(iii) contains a general requirement that employees 
receive additional training when they must employ safety-related 
work practices (such as administering first aid) that are not 
normally used during their regular work duties. A note following 
Sec.  1926.950(b)(4)(iii) indicates that the Agency would consider 
tasks performed less often than once per year to require retraining. 
See the discussion of that requirement earlier in this section of 
the preamble.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    OSHA rejects this request. As stated, OSHA is adopting the 3-month 
delay in CPR training because of the high turnover in the tree trimming 
industry. There is no evidence in the record that this rationale also 
applies to refresher training. The Agency expects employers to plan for 
their employees' training needs and to schedule training in accordance 
with the standard.
    Mr. Paul Hamer, a member of the NFPA 70E Technical Committee on 
Electrical Safety in the Workplace, recommended that OSHA require 
first-aid training, including CPR training, for all qualified employees 
who work on electric circuits of 50 volts or more. He also recommended 
deleting the 4-minute maximum response time for fixed work locations 
(Ex. 0228). He argued that the sooner a victim receives CPR, the less 
cell damage will occur. On the other hand, the American Forest & Paper 
Association recommended that the 4-minute requirement should be deleted 
because ``no one could ensure ([that is], guarantee) survival of the 
victim for any particular length of time or that defibrillation would 
be successful'' (Ex. 0237).
    OSHA rejects these recommendations. OSHA considered requiring all 
employees to receive first-aid training, including CPR training, when 
the Agency developed existing Sec.  1910.269. In lieu of such a 
requirement, OSHA decided that the best approach was to require a 4-
minute maximum response time for fixed work locations and to require at 
least two trained persons for field work involving crews of two or more 
employees (existing Sec.  1910.269(b)). OSHA supplemented these 
provisions with a requirement that two employees be present for work 
exposing an employee to contact with exposed live parts energized at 
more than 600 volts (existing Sec.  1910.269(l)(1)).\85\ This approach 
continues to be the best one, as it ensures that persons trained in 
first aid, including CPR, will be available to employees most at risk 
of electrocution. The Agency further notes that Mr. Hamer's approach 
does not address employees working alone in fixed work locations. In 
these cases, it would still take time for someone to discover the 
injury, which also would delay first-aid treatment, including CPR.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \85\ The issue of whether the requirement for two employees 
should apply to voltages of 600 volts or less is discussed under the 
summary and explanation of final Sec.  1926.960(b)(3), later in this 
section of the preamble.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Two rulemaking participants commented that proposed paragraphs 
(b)(1)(i) and (b)(1)(ii) were vague (Exs. 0175, 0180). They did not 
understand the difference between ``field work'' and ``fixed work 
locations'' (id.). For example, Ms. Salud Layton with the Virginia, 
Maryland & Delaware Association of Electric Cooperatives questioned 
whether the requirements for fixed work locations applied to work at 
unmanned substations (Ex. 0175). OSHA does not consider an unmanned 
location to be a fixed work location, as there are normally no 
employees present. In determining whether to apply paragraph (b)(1) or 
(b)(2), the Agency would treat an unmanned substation no differently 
than a manhole or utility pole in the field.
    As explained previously in this section of the preamble, OSHA 
decided not to include proposed paragraphs (b)(2) or (b)(3) in the 
final rule. The corresponding provisions in existing Sec.  
1910.269(b)(2) and (b)(3) are being retained, however. The Agency did 
not propose to revise these existing requirements and received no 
comments alleging inconsistencies between existing Sec.  1910.269(b) 
and Sec.  1910.151, OSHA's general industry standard addressing medical 
services and first aid.
Section 1926.952, Job Briefing
    In Sec.  1926.952, OSHA is requiring that employers ensure that 
employees conduct a job briefing before each job. This section, which 
has no counterpart in existing subpart V, is based largely on existing 
Sec.  1910.269(c).
    Most of the work covered by this final rule requires planning to 
ensure employee safety (as well as to protect equipment and the general 
public). Typically, electric power transmission and distribution work 
exposes employees to the hazards of exposed conductors energized at 
thousands of volts. If the work is not thoroughly

[[Page 20372]]

planned ahead of time, the possibility of human error that could harm 
employees increases greatly. To avoid problems, the task sequence is 
prescribed before work is started. For example, before climbing a pole, 
the employee must determine if the pole is capable of remaining in 
place and if minimum approach distances are sufficient, and he or she 
must determine what tools will be needed and what procedure should be 
used for performing the job. Without job planning, the worker may not 
know or recognize the minimum approach-distance requirements or may 
have to reclimb the pole to retrieve a forgotten tool or perform an 
overlooked task, thereby increasing employee exposure to the hazards of 
falling and contact with energized lines.
    Employers performing electric power generation, transmission, and 
distribution work use job briefings to plan the work and communicate 
the job plan to employees. If the job is planned, but the plan is not 
discussed with the workers, an employee may perform his or her duties 
out of order or may not coordinate activities with the rest of the 
crew, thereby endangering the entire crew. Therefore, OSHA is requiring 
a job briefing before work is started.
    Commenters agreed that job briefings are an important part of 
electric power work. (See, for example, Exs. 0162, 0173, 0184, 0213, 
0241; Tr. 1335.) For instance, Mr. John Masarick of the Independent 
Electrical Contractors considered job briefings to be ``one of the most 
critical steps for safety on any task'' (Ex. 0241). Also, Mr. Stephen 
Frost of the Mid-Columbia Utilities Safety Alliance voiced his 
organization's support for job briefings:

    We strongly agree that the job briefing requirement should be 
written into Sec.  1926.952. Good communications on the job is 
paramount to safety, and too often workers either choose not to 
communicate or don't have the skills to communicate their ideas. The 
job briefing requirement makes it the personal responsibility of 
every crew member to understand all aspects of the job. The time it 
takes to do a thorough job briefing is usually 5 to 15 minutes. This 
is time well-spent to eliminate the possibility of an accident due 
to workers not knowing or controlling hazards in the work area. [Ex. 
0184]

    OSHA's experience in enforcing Sec.  1910.269(c), however, shows 
that some employers are placing the entire burden of compliance with 
the job briefing requirement on the employee in charge of the work. 
Therefore, OSHA proposed to include a provision in Subpart V requiring 
the employer to provide the employee in charge of a job with available 
information necessary to perform the job safely. This requirement, 
which is not in existing Sec.  1910.269(c), was in proposed Sec.  
1926.952(a)(1). OSHA proposed to add the same requirement to Sec.  
1910.269(c). A note following the proposed paragraph indicated that the 
information provided by the employer was intended to supplement the 
training requirements proposed in Sec.  1926.950(b) and was likely to 
be more general than the job briefing provided by the employee in 
charge. This note also clarified that information covering all jobs for 
a day could be disseminated at the beginning of the day.
    Many commenters recognized the need for the employer to provide 
certain information to the employee in charge about conditions to which 
an employee would be exposed. (See, for example, Exs. 0125, 0127, 0186, 
0197, 0200, 0219, 0230.) For instance, Mr. Anthony Ahern with Ohio 
Rural Electric Cooperatives commented:

    The person in charge does need to be given more information than 
is usually given him/her. They need to know things like the status 
of the system where they will be working. What are the breaker 
configurations/settings. Is reclosing enabled or disabled. What is 
the available fault current at their work site. Are there any other 
crews working in the area whose work could impact them. For the most 
part most of this information is of a general type and a company 
could probably develop a simple form that would be fairly easy to 
fill out and attach to the usual work orders. This could also be 
used to document that this information was given and could be used 
to document the job briefing (tailgate) that the person in charge is 
required to give the rest of the crew. [Ex. 0186]

Mr. James Junga, the Safety Director of Local 223 of the Utility 
Workers Union of America (UWUA), also commented on the need for the 
employer to supply information about the work:

    Requiring the employer to provide adequate information to the 
employee in charge of a crew is the best way of ensuring that all 
available information is given to the crew leader. Then and only 
then the crew leader will be able to brief the crew. Without this 
requirement a crew leader will be left on his/her own to figure out 
what the crew is to do. [Ex. 0197]

    Some rulemaking participants described the types of information 
that should be provided to employees. (See, for example, Exs. 0186, 
0219; Tr. 402-403, 1373.) Commenters stated that employees in charge 
need to be provided with the available fault current (Ex. 0186; Tr. 
1373), circuit breaker settings, including whether reclosing is enabled 
(Ex. 0186), whether there are other crews that could affect their work 
(Ex. 0186), detailed maps and staking sheets (Ex. 0219), and relevant 
information from outage reports by customers (Tr. 402-403).
    Other rulemaking participants addressed when there was a need for 
the employer to provide information about a job. Mr. Allan Oracion with 
EnergyUnited EMC maintained: ``When a job is not routine, special or 
large-scale, the employer needs to share any special information with 
the employee in charge. When the employee in charge is working at a 
distant location, radio or telephone can be used to communicate 
information'' (Ex. 0219). Mr. Donald Hartley with IBEW stated that the 
employer needs to provide information ``when a contractor's crew 
performs its first tasks on a host employer's worksite or when the job 
assignment involves hazards or conditions the crew has not yet 
encountered'' (Tr. 887).
    However, many commenters argued that the provision as proposed was 
inappropriate. (See, for example, Exs. 0125, 0127, 0128, 0163, 0177, 
0178, 0200, 0201 0226.) Many argued that the proposed provision was too 
broad. (See, for example, Exs. 0125, 0127, 0200, 0226.) For instance, 
Ms. Cynthia Mills of TCIA stated, ``We are uncomfortable with the open-
ended and subjective nature of the [proposed language], even though we 
believe it is intended to convey anything `known to the employer, but 
unusual,' associated with the work assignment'' (Ex. 0200).
    Some commenters argued that it was the responsibility of the 
employee in charge to survey the site and determine all hazards 
associated with the work. (See, for example, Exs. 0163, 0177, 0178, 
0201.) Consumers Energy's submission typified these comments:

    The computer-generated job assignment will contain information 
related to the location, circuit, and task to be accomplished but no 
information related to unique hazards of the assignment. It is 
critical that the employees on the job site survey the site and 
identify all hazards upon arrival at the site. Removing that 
responsibility from them would create a false sense of security and 
a less than desirable knowledge of the hazards present. Safety 
manuals and written procedures provide general information on 
hazards that are typically expected in transmission and distribution 
work. It is the responsibility of the employee in charge to survey 
the site and identify all hazards upon arrival at the site. [Ex. 
0177]

    After carefully considering the evidence in the record, OSHA 
concludes that job briefings are important for ensuring the safety of 
employees performing work covered by the final rule and that the 
employer needs to provide adequate information to employees in charge 
so that a complete job briefing can be conducted. However, OSHA also 
decided to address

[[Page 20373]]

the concerns of commenters that the proposed rule was overly broad or 
open ended. To this end, OSHA decided to require the employer to 
provide the employee in charge of the job with all available 
information that relates to the determination of existing 
characteristics and conditions required by Sec.  1926.950(d). Thus, 
final Sec.  1926.952(a)(1) requires the employer, in assigning an 
employee or a group of employees to perform a job, to provide the 
employee in charge of the job with all available information that 
relates to the determination of existing characteristics and conditions 
required by Sec.  1926.950(d).
    The Agency notes that final paragraph (a)(1) requires the employer 
to provide the employee in charge with two types of available 
information, as noted in Sec.  1926.950(d): (1) Available information 
on the characteristics of electric lines and equipment, and (2) 
available information on the conditions of the installation. The Agency 
also notes that, because Sec.  1926.950(d) limits the determination of 
characteristics and conditions only to characteristics and conditions 
that relate to the safety of the work to be performed, this same 
limitation extends to information that must be provided under final 
Sec.  1926.952(a)(1). As such, information on the characteristics of 
electric lines and equipment that must be provided under the final rule 
(including, for instance, the nominal voltage of lines and equipment, 
the maximum switching transient voltages, and the presence of hazardous 
induced voltage) is critical to the selection of proper safety-related 
work practices and protective equipment.\86\ For example, for an 
employee to select the minimum approach distance required by final 
Sec.  1926.960(c)(1), he or she needs to know, at a minimum, the 
nominal voltage on the energized parts. Depending on the employer's 
established minimum approach distances, the employee also may need to 
know the maximum transient overvoltage at the worksite. Similarly, an 
employee needs to know the employer's estimate of incident energy for 
electric equipment so that he or she can select protective equipment 
with an appropriate arc rating as required by final Sec.  
1926.960(g)(5).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \86\ In fact, these are the types of information that commenters 
argued employers should provide. (See, for example, Exs. 0186, 0219; 
Tr. 402-403, 1373.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Information on the conditions of the installation that must be 
provided under the final rule (including, for instance, the condition 
of protective grounds and equipment grounding conductors, the condition 
of poles, and environmental conditions relative to safety) also is 
critical because that information can facilitate the employees' 
assessment of conditions at the worksite and enable the employees to 
take appropriate protective measures. For example, an employer may know 
of defects in a wood pole on which employees are to work because it has 
a pole-inspection program or has received reports that the pole had 
defects. Information on such defects can help employees ascertain 
whether the pole is safe to climb as required by Sec.  1926.964(a)(2). 
Likewise, information from an employee or a customer that electric 
equipment is making arcing noises periodically can affect the 
assessment of whether the employee is exposed to hazards from flames or 
electric arcs as required by Sec.  1926.960(g)(1).
    Thus, the type of information that the employer must provide under 
the final rule ensures that employees in charge are provided with 
information relevant to selecting appropriate work practices and 
protective equipment as required by the final rule. Moreover, because 
final Sec.  1926.952(a)(1) links the information that the employer must 
provide the employee in charge to the determination required by Sec.  
1926.950(d), final Sec.  1926.952(a)(1) is neither overly broad nor 
open ended.
    The final rule also is narrowly tailored because it limits the 
information the employer must provide to information that is available 
to the employer. Under the rule, the question of whether information is 
available to the employer varies depending on the type of information 
at issue. First, OSHA presumes that information related to the 
characteristics of electric lines and equipment is available to the 
employer. Second, OSHA will deem information on the condition of the 
installation to be available to the employer only when the information 
is known by the employer or can be obtained by the employer from 
existing records through the exercise of reasonable diligence. OSHA 
does not expect employers to make inspections of worksite conditions to 
determine the conditions of the installation. The Agency believes that, 
in most instances, employees will gather additional information about 
worksite conditions after they reach the worksite. It is nevertheless 
important that employers provide employees with available information 
to aid the employees' assessment of worksite conditions and as a 
secondary precaution in case employees at the site fail to observe a 
particular condition related to their safety.
    Paragraph (a)(1) of 1926.952 applies fully to contractors. 
Contractors will obtain much or all of the information that they need 
to comply with Sec.  1926.952(a)(1)--especially information about the 
characteristics of electric lines and equipment--through the operation 
of the host-contractor provision in Sec.  1926.950(c).
    Several commenters maintained that, in proposing this provision, 
OSHA did not account for the way work is currently assigned to 
employees. (See, for example, Exs. 0128, 0163, 0177, 0178, 0201.) For 
instance, Mr. James Shill of ElectriCities noted that small towns often 
assign work through a town manager who has insufficient knowledge of 
the electrical system to provide the required information (Ex. 0178). 
Further, Mr. James Gartland of Duke Energy described how the process 
commonly used to assign work to employees at many utilities was at odds 
with the proposal:

    Requiring a representative of the employer (a manager or 
supervisor) to provide employees with information necessary to 
perform a job safely for every job is inconsistent with the use of 
technology in work management and scheduling. Today's utility 
workers drive vehicles equipped with computers with wireless 
communications. They receive job assignments throughout the day from 
the computer. There frequently is no direct supervisor-employee 
interface to discuss specific work assignments. The computer-
generated job assignment will contain information related to the 
location, circuit, and task to be accomplished but no information 
related to unique hazards of this assignment. . . .
    It is also inconsistent with industry practices to expect a 
supervisor/manager to conduct a pre-job briefing at the beginning of 
the day as mentioned in the Note [to proposed Sec.  1926.952(a)(1)]. 
Many utilities have employees who report directly to work locations 
where their supervisor/manager is not present. They are expected to 
do a pre-job briefing and to assess hazards on their own. There is 
no company manager/supervisor at the work location to do that 
assessment. [Ex. 0201]

Some of these commenters also recommended that the Agency make it clear 
(1) that the rule does not require a face-to-face exchange of 
information and (2) that the exchange can be provided through work 
orders or in conjunction with training, safety manuals, and written 
procedures. (See, for example, Exs. 0177, 0201.)

    OSHA appreciates these commenters' concerns and therefore changed 
the heading for paragraph (a)(1) to read ``Information provided by the 
employer'' to help clarify that a separate briefing or face-to-face 
discussion

[[Page 20374]]

between the employer and the employee in charge is not required. The 
Agency recognizes that assignments are made through a wide range of 
mechanisms that do not always provide for face-to-face contact between 
the employer and the employees performing the work. The rule does not 
require such contact. The employer is free to use any mechanism that 
provides the required information before the employees begin their 
assignment. For example, information could be provided through radio 
communication with the employee in charge, through a written work 
order, or through a computer-generated assignment conveyed 
electronically. Some of this information may be provided through 
training, in a safety manual, or through written work procedures. 
However, the Agency will deem such information as meeting paragraph 
(a)(1) only if it effectively communicates the information about the 
particular job in question to the employee in charge and if employers 
respond to these employees' questions about this information as it 
relates to the particular job in question.
    Some commenters suggested that OSHA add certain explicit language 
to the requirement. (See, for example, Exs. 0125, 0127, 0149, 0169, 
0171.) For instance, several commenters recommended revising the rule 
to read: ``In assigning an employee or group of employees to perform a 
job, the employer shall provide the employee in charge of the job with 
any additional information known by the employee's supervisor that 
could affect the safety of the job before the start of the work'' (Exs. 
0125, 0127, 0149). Other commenters recommended that OSHA clarify that 
the employer need only provide the information once for work lasting 
long periods of time (Exs. 0169, 0171).
    OSHA rejects these recommended approaches. First, the key issue is 
whether the information is available to the employer, not whether the 
supervisor has knowledge of the required information. Second, the final 
rule requires the employer to provide required information in 
connection with each job. As stated, the information must be 
communicated to the employee in charge in an effective manner. Whether 
a prior communication constitutes an effective communication depends on 
several factors, such as, but not limited to: The time between the 
prior communication and the job at hand; the manner in which the prior 
communication was made; the extent to which the prior job and the 
present job are similar; and whether any additional or different 
information needs to be provided with respect to the present job.
    OSHA is not including in the final rule the note following proposed 
paragraph (a)(1). This note was to clarify the meaning of the phrase 
``available information necessary to perform the job safely.'' The 
final rule does not contain that phrase, and OSHA concludes that the 
note is no longer necessary.
    Paragraph (a)(2), which is being adopted without substantive change 
from the proposal, requires the employee in charge of the job to 
conduct a job briefing. This provision comes from existing Sec.  
1910.269(c).
    In the 2005 notice extending the comment period on the proposal, 
OSHA requested comments on whether the standard should include a 
requirement to document the job briefing. Comments addressing this 
issue recommended that the Agency not include such a requirement in the 
final rule because it would add to employers' paperwork burden without 
a significant increase in safety. (See, for example, Exs. 0201, 0212.) 
Considering the lack of record support for such a provision, OSHA is 
not adopting a requirement to document job briefings in the final rule.
    Paragraph (b), which is being adopted without substantive change 
from the proposal, requires the briefing by the employee in charge to 
cover: Hazards and work procedures involved, special precautions, 
energy-source controls, and requirements for personal protective 
equipment. This requirement also comes from existing Sec.  1910.269(c).
    Under final paragraph (c)(1), the employee in charge must conduct 
at least one briefing before the start of each shift. Only one briefing 
in a shift is needed if all the jobs to be performed are repetitive or 
similar. Additional briefings must be conducted pursuant to final 
paragraph (c)(2) for work involving significant changes in routine that 
might affect the safety of the employees. For example, if the first two 
jobs of the day involve working on a deenergized line and the third job 
involves working on energized lines with live-line tools, separate 
briefings must be conducted for each type of job. It should be noted 
that additional job briefings provided under paragraph (c)(2) are 
separate from the job briefing provided at the start of the shift; 
these briefings may not be combined. Paragraphs (c)(1) and (c)(2), 
which duplicate existing Sec.  1910.269(c)(1), have been adopted 
without substantive change from the proposal.
    For routine work, under final paragraph (d)(1), the required 
briefing need only consist of a concise discussion outlining the tasks 
to be performed and how to perform them safely. However, if the work is 
complicated or particularly hazardous or if the employees may not be 
able to recognize and avoid the hazards involved, then a more thorough 
discussion is required by paragraph (d)(2). OSHA included a note 
following this paragraph to clarify that, regardless of how short the 
discussion is, the briefing must still address all the topics listed in 
paragraph (b).
    OSHA received several comments on proposed paragraphs (d)(1) and 
(d)(2). These commenters expressed concern that the proposed provisions 
were vague and provided insufficient guidance on the conditions 
requiring more detailed job briefings. (See, for example, Exs. 0162, 
0175, 0213.) For instance, MYR Group maintained that the proposal did 
not sufficiently distinguish between work that is ``routine'' and work 
that is ``complicated'' (Ex. 0162; Tr. 1335), and TVA asked the Agency 
to define ``complicated or particularly hazardous'' (Ex. 0213).
    With final paragraphs (d)(1) and (d)(2), which were taken from 
existing Sec.  1910.269(c)(2), OSHA recognizes that employees are 
familiar with the tasks and hazards involved in routine work. However, 
it is important to take the time to carefully discuss unusual work 
situations that may pose additional or different hazards to workers. 
(See also the discussion of Sec.  1926.950(b)(4) earlier in this 
section of the preamble.) The Agency believes that it is important for 
the briefing to be as detailed as necessary for the hazards and work 
practices involved. MYR Group noted that ``the general requirement for 
short discussions could . . . be applied differently depending on the 
skill and qualification of the employees involved in the work rather 
than the work itself'' (Ex. 0162). This comment interprets the 
requirement correctly, and the Agency believes that the language in 
final Sec.  1926.952(d)(1) and (d)(2), which duplicates existing Sec.  
1910.269(c)(2), appropriately conveys this meaning. Accordingly, a more 
detailed discussion is required ``[i]f the employee cannot be expected 
to recognize and avoid the hazards involved in the job.'' In addition, 
the Agency has received no formal interpretation requests related to 
existing Sec.  1910.269(c)(2). Thus, OSHA concludes that the vast 
majority of employers understand this provision, and the Agency is 
adopting Sec.  1926.952(d) without change from the proposal.
    OSHA recognizes the importance of job planning for all employees. 
Although employees working alone cannot participate in formal job

[[Page 20375]]

briefings, the Agency believes that an employee who works alone needs 
to plan his or her tasks as carefully and extensively as an employee 
who works as part of a team. OSHA is aware of several fatalities 
involving lone employees who could have benefited from better job 
planning, or perhaps a briefing with the supervisor, before the job 
started (Ex. 0400). In one such incident, a power line worker working 
alone was repairing a broken guy. Standing on the ground, the employee 
had the anchor in place and grabbed the dangling guy to attach it to 
the anchor. The guy contacted a 7200-volt overhead power line that had 
not been guarded or insulated. Had the employee properly planned the 
job, he would have seen that the guy was close to the power line and 
could have avoided the contact (id.).\87\ Therefore, paragraph (e), 
which OSHA took from existing Sec.  1910.269(c)(3), provides that 
employees working alone do not need to conduct job briefings, but the 
employer must ensure that that the tasks are planned as if a briefing 
were required. This provision is being adopted in the final rule 
without change from the proposal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \87\ This accident can be viewed at: https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=909119.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

4. Section 1926.953, Enclosed Spaces
    Section 1926.953 contains requirements for entry into, and work in, 
enclosed spaces. An ``enclosed space'' is defined in final Sec.  
1926.968 as a working space, such as a manhole, vault, tunnel, or 
shaft, that has a limited means of egress or entry, that is designed 
for periodic employee entry under normal operating conditions, and 
that, under normal conditions, does not contain a hazardous atmosphere, 
but may contain a hazardous atmosphere under abnormal conditions. The 
hazards posed by enclosed spaces consist of (1) limited access and 
egress, (2) possible lack of oxygen, (3) possible presence of flammable 
gases, and (4) possible presence of limited amounts of toxic chemicals. 
The potential atmospheric hazards are caused by an enclosed space's 
lack of adequate ventilation and can normally be controlled through the 
use of continuous forced-air ventilation alone. Practices to control 
these hazards are widely recognized and are currently in use in 
electric, telecommunications, and other underground utility industries. 
Such practices include testing for the presence of flammable gases and 
vapors, testing for oxygen deficiency, ventilation of the enclosed 
space, controls on the use of open flames, and the use of an attendant 
outside the space. These practices already are required by existing 
Sec.  1910.269(e) for the maintenance of electric power generation, 
transmission, and distribution installations, and OSHA took the 
requirements adopted in final Sec.  1926.953 from existing Sec.  
1910.269(e).
    Paragraph (a) of final Sec.  1926.953, which is being adopted 
without substantive change from the proposal, sets the scope of the 
section's provisions. Accordingly, this section applies only to the 
types of enclosed spaces that are routinely entered by employees 
engaged in electric power transmission and distribution work and that 
are unique to underground utility work. Work in these spaces is part of 
the day-to-day activities performed by some of the employees protected 
by this final rule. Enclosed spaces covered by this section include, 
but are not limited to, manholes and vaults that provide employees 
access to electric power transmission and distribution equipment.
    There are several types of spaces that are not covered by final 
Sec.  1926.953 (or the corresponding general industry provisions in 
final Sec.  1910.269(e)). If maintenance work is being performed in 
confined spaces, it may be covered by OSHA's general industry permit-
required confined space (permit-space) standard at Sec.  1910.146; this 
standard applies to all of general industry, including industries 
engaged in electric power generation, transmission, and distribution 
work.
    In Sec.  1910.146(b), the permit-space standard defines ``confined 
space'' and ``permit-required confined space.'' A confined space is a 
space that: (1) Is large enough and so configured that an employee can 
bodily enter and perform assigned work; and (2) Has limited or 
restricted means for entry or exit (for example, tanks, vessels, silos, 
storage bins, hoppers, vaults, and pits are spaces that may have 
limited means of entry); and (3) Is not designed for continuous 
employee occupancy. A permit-required confined space (permit space) is 
a confined space that has one or more of the following characteristics: 
(1) Contains or has a potential to contain a hazardous atmosphere; (2) 
Contains a material that has the potential for engulfing an entrant; 
(3) Has an internal configuration such that an entrant could be trapped 
or asphyxiated by inwardly converging walls or by a floor which slopes 
downward and tapers to a smaller cross-section; or (4) Contains any 
other recognized serious safety or health hazard.
    Section 1926.953 of the final rule applies to ``enclosed spaces.'' 
By definition, an enclosed space is a permit-required confined space 
under Sec.  1926.146. An enclosed space meets the definition of a 
confined space--it is large enough for an employee to enter; it has a 
limited means of access or egress; and it is designed for periodic, 
rather than continuous, employee occupancy under normal operating 
conditions. An enclosed space also meets the definition of a permit 
space--while it is not expected to contain a hazardous atmosphere, it 
has the potential to contain one. OSHA also notes that the definition 
of permit space in the general industry permit-space standard is 
broader than the definition of enclosed space in Sec.  1926.968. For 
instance, if a space contains a hazardous atmosphere under normal 
conditions, that space is a permit space under Sec.  1910.146, but it 
is not an enclosed space under final Sec.  1910.269 or Subpart V.
    Paragraph (b)(6) of Sec.  1926.21 specifies training requirements 
for employees who enter ``confined or enclosed spaces'' as defined in 
Sec.  1926.21(b)(6)(ii).
    When Sec.  1926.21(b)(6) applies, it requires employers to: (1) 
Instruct their employees about confined-space hazards, the necessary 
precautions to be taken, and protective and emergency equipment 
required; and (2) comply with any specific regulations that apply to 
work in dangerous or potentially dangerous areas. An enclosed space 
under Sec.  1926.953 also is a confined or enclosed space under Sec.  
1926.21(b)(6). However, the definition of confined or enclosed space in 
Sec.  1926.21(b)(6) (like the definition of permit space in the general 
industry permit-space standard) is broader than the definition of 
enclosed space in Sec.  1926.968.\88\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \88\ Under Sec.  1926.21(b)(6)(ii), a confined or enclosed space 
is any space having a limited means of egress, which is subject to 
the accumulation of toxic or flammable contaminants or has an oxygen 
deficient atmosphere.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Paragraph (b)(6) of Sec.  1926.21 applies to enclosed spaces 
covered by final Sec.  1926.953 because employers covered under subpart 
V are not exempt from complying with other applicable provisions in 
Part 1926 (see Sec.  1926.950(a)(2)). Section 1926.953 is, therefore, 
different from final Sec.  1910.269(e), which ``applies to routine 
entry into enclosed spaces in lieu of the permit-space entry 
requirements contained in paragraphs (d) through (k) of Sec.  
1910.146.'' OSHA concludes, however, that an employer that is compliant 
with Sec.  1926.953 is considered as being in compliance with existing 
Sec.  1926.21(b)(6) for entry into enclosed

[[Page 20376]]

spaces covered by final Sec.  1926.953. Therefore, for all practical 
purposes, Sec.  1926.953 applies to routine entry into enclosed spaces 
in lieu of the requirements contained in Sec.  1926.21(b)(6). OSHA is 
not including the ``in lieu of'' language in final Sec.  1926.953 
because OSHA recently proposed a new standard for confined-space entry 
during construction work (72 FR 67352, Nov. 28, 2007). OSHA intends to 
revise Sec.  1926.953 to include appropriate ``in lieu of'' language 
when it promulgates the new standard.
    Under final Sec.  1926.953(a), entry into an enclosed space to 
perform construction work covered by Subpart V must meet the permit-
space entry requirements of paragraphs (d) through (k) of the general 
industry permit-space standard at Sec.  1910.146 when the precautions 
taken under Sec. Sec.  1926.953 and 1926.965 are insufficient to 
eliminate hazards in the enclosed space that endanger the life of an 
entrant or could interfere with escape from the space. This requirement 
ensures that employees working in enclosed spaces will be afforded 
protection in circumstances in which the Subpart V provisions are 
insufficiently protective.\89\
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    \89\ Section 1926.953 thus functions similarly to corresponding 
provisions in Sec.  1910.146. An employer need not follow the 
permit-entry requirements of Sec.  1910.146 for spaces where the 
hazards have been completely eliminated, or for limited situations 
in which OSHA permits the use of alternative procedures (Sec.  
1910.146(c)(5) and (c)(7)). The spaces for which alternative 
procedures may be used are similar to ``enclosed spaces,'' as 
defined in this final rule, and the alternative procedures 
themselves are similar to the procedures contained in final Sec.  
1926.953 (Sec.  1910.146(c)(5); 58 FR 4462, 4486-4489, Jan. 14, 
1993).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some employers may prefer to comply with Sec.  1910.146 instead of 
Sec.  1926.953 for entry into enclosed spaces covered by Subpart V. 
Because the provisions of Sec.  1910.146 protect employees entering 
enclosed spaces at least as effectively as Sec.  1926.953, OSHA will 
accept compliance with Sec.  1910.146 as meeting the enclosed-space 
entry requirements of Sec.  1926.953. OSHA included a note to this 
effect immediately following final Sec.  1926.953(o). The Agency is 
adopting the note as proposed.
    MYR Group opposed applying the general industry standard for permit 
spaces to construction work. The company argued that subpart V should 
not incorporate ``standard requirements that have already been rejected 
for construction work'' and recommended that the Agency develop 
requirements specific ``to electrical construction work or through the 
proposed and pending separate confined space standard for 
construction'' (Ex. 0162).
    OSHA disagrees with this comment. The Agency developed the 
enclosed-space provisions in existing Sec.  1910.269 to protect 
employees during routine entry into enclosed spaces. As discussed in 
detail previously, OSHA concluded that the requirements for work on 
electric power generation, transmission, and distribution installations 
should generally be the same regardless of whether the work is covered 
by final Sec.  1910.269 or subpart V. (See the summary and explanation 
for final Sec.  1926.950(a)(1), earlier in this section of the 
preamble.) For the purpose of routine entry into these spaces, OSHA 
concludes that it is appropriate for employers to follow the same rules 
with respect to both construction and general industry work.
    OSHA also is applying the general industry permit-space standard to 
work in enclosed spaces when the hazards remaining in the enclosed 
space endanger the life of an entrant or could interfere with escape 
from the space after an employer takes the precautions required by 
Sec. Sec.  1926.953 and 1926.965. This action is necessary because, as 
OSHA noted in the proposed construction standard for confined spaces, 
``the existing construction standard for confined and enclosed spaces 
at 29 CFR 1926.21(b)(6) does not adequately protect construction 
employees in confined spaces from atmospheric, mechanical, and other 
hazards'' (72 FR 67354). OSHA notes, however, that the references to 
the general industry standard in final Sec.  1926.953 are included as a 
placeholder pending the promulgation of the confined spaces in 
construction standard. OSHA intends to change these references to refer 
to the construction standard when it promulgates that standard.
    Paragraph (a) in final Sec.  1926.953 provides that Sec.  1926.953 
does not apply to vented vaults under certain conditions. Permanent 
ventilation in vented vaults prevents a hazardous atmosphere from 
accumulating. However, the intake or exhaust of a vented vault could be 
clogged, limiting the flow of air through the vaults. The employee in 
such cases would be exposed to the same hazards presented by unvented 
vaults. Additionally, mechanical ventilation for a vault so equipped 
may fail to operate. To ensure that the employee is protected from the 
hazards posed by lack of proper ventilation, the final rule exempts 
vented vaults only if the employer determines that the ventilation is 
operating to protect employees. This determination must ensure that 
ventilation openings are clear and that any permanently installed 
mechanical ventilating equipment is in proper working order.
    Section 1926.953 also does not apply to spaces not designed for 
periodic entry by employees during normal operating conditions, such as 
spaces that require energy sources to be isolated or fluids to be 
drained before an employee can safely enter. These types of spaces 
include, but are not limited to, boilers, fuel tanks, coal bunkers, and 
transformer and circuit breaker cases. As explained in the preamble to 
the 1994 Sec.  1910.269 final rule, the measures required in existing 
Sec.  1910.269(e) (and, by implication, final Sec.  1926.953) are not 
adequate to protect employees from the various hazards posed by these 
types of permit-entry confined spaces (59 FR 4364-4367).
    MYR Group commented that subpart V's definition of ``enclosed 
space'' was ``overly narrow and unclear'' because ``there is no 
specific basis for creation of such a broad definition solely for 
electrical work'' (Ex. 0162).
    OSHA disagrees with this comment. The Agency derived the definition 
from the definition of ``enclosed space'' in existing Sec.  
1910.269(x). As explained in the preamble to the 1994 Sec.  1910.269 
final rule, OSHA narrowly tailored the definition of ``enclosed space'' 
to the protective measures required by existing Sec.  1910.269(e) (59 
FR 4364-4367). A broader definition would involve permit spaces 
presenting hazards against which final Sec.  1926.953 would not offer 
protection. Therefore, OSHA is adopting the definition of ``enclosed 
space'' as proposed. However, OSHA is not adopting the proposed note in 
final Sec.  1926.968.\90\ The proposed note, which appears in existing 
Sec.  1910.269(x), describes types of spaces that are enclosed, but 
that do not meet the definition of ``enclosed space,'' and explains 
that such spaces meet the definition of permit spaces in Sec.  1910.146 
and that entries into those spaces must conform to that standard. 
Although the types of spaces described in the proposed note do not meet 
the definition of ``enclosed space'' in either the general industry or 
construction standard, Sec.  1910.146 does not apply to confined-space 
entry during construction work. Consequently, the final rule does not 
include the note to the definition of ``enclosed space'' in final Sec.  
1926.968. OSHA intends to revise Sec.  1926.968 to include an 
appropriate note to the definition of ``enclosed

[[Page 20377]]

space'' when it promulgates the new standard for confined-space entry 
during construction work.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \90\ OSHA is not removing the existing note to that definition 
from final Sec.  1910.269(x).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Paragraph (b), which is being adopted without substantive change 
from the proposal, contains the general requirement that employers 
ensure the use of safe work practices for entry into, and work in, 
enclosed spaces and for rescue of employees from such spaces. These 
safe work practices ensure that employees are protected against hazards 
in the enclosed space and include, among others, the practices 
specified in paragraphs (e) through (o).
    Paragraph (c), which is being adopted without substantive change 
from the proposal, requires each employee who enters enclosed spaces, 
or who serves as an attendant, to be trained in the hazards associated 
with enclosed-space entry and in enclosed-space entry and rescue 
procedures. This training must ensure that employees are trained to 
work safely in enclosed spaces and that they will be knowledgeable of 
the rescue procedures in the event that an emergency arises within the 
space.
    Paragraph (d), which is being adopted without change from the 
proposal, requires that the employer provide equipment that will assure 
the prompt and safe rescue of employees from the enclosed space. This 
requirement is necessary to ensure that employees who are injured in 
enclosed spaces will be retrieved from the spaces. The equipment must 
enable a rescuer to remove an injured employee from the enclosed space 
quickly and without injury to the rescuer or further harm to the 
injured employee. A harness, lifeline, and self-supporting winch can 
normally be used for this purpose.
    Mr. Leo Muckerheide with Safety Consulting Services recommended 
that, because of the risk of arc hazards, OSHA should explicitly 
require nonconductive and flame-resistance-rated rescue equipment that 
meets ASTM F887, Standard Specifications for Personal Climbing 
Equipment (Ex. 0180). He argued that the general industry confined 
space standard does not protect against arc-flash and electric-shock 
hazards and contrasted proposed paragraph (d) with provisions in 
proposed Sec.  1926.960 that do require protection from these hazards 
(id.).
    OSHA rejects this recommendation. First, work in enclosed spaces 
does not always pose arc-flash or electric-shock hazards. Sometimes, 
employees enter spaces to take readings or perform inspections; during 
these activities these hazards are unlikely to be present,\91\ or there 
may be no energized electric equipment present.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \91\ It is possible under certain circumstances that employees 
taking readings or performing inspection activities could be exposed 
to arc-flash hazards. See the discussion of arc-flash hazard 
assessment under the summary and explanation for final Sec.  
1926.960(g)(1), later in this section of the preamble.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Second, addressing arc-flash and electric-shock hazards in Sec.  
1926.953 would be unnecessarily duplicative, as these hazards are more 
appropriately addressed in Sec.  1926.960, which applies to work on or 
near exposed live parts. When work is performed within reaching 
distance of exposed energized parts of equipment, final Sec.  
1926.960(f) requires the employer to ensure that each employee removes, 
or renders nonconductive, all exposed conductive articles, unless such 
articles do not increase the hazards associated with contact with the 
energized parts. This provision covers conductive articles on 
harnesses. Paragraph (c)(1)(iii) of final Sec.  1926.960 requires the 
employer to ensure that employees do not take conductive objects, such 
as conductive lifelines, closer to energized parts than the employer's 
established minimum approach distances, unless the live parts or 
conductive objects are insulated.\92\ Because, in a rescue situation, 
the attendant would not have control over how close the lifeline got to 
exposed energized parts, any lifeline would have to be insulated, or 
the live parts would have to be insulated, to protect the attendant and 
the entrant against electric shock. Paragraph (g)(1) of final Sec.  
1926.960 requires the employer to assess the workplace to determine if 
each employee is exposed to hazards from flames or electric arcs. This 
assessment can guide the selection of rescue equipment that can effect 
safe rescue when employees are exposed to these hazards. If there is a 
risk that an electric arc could occur in an enclosed space, then the 
rescue equipment must be capable of withstanding that hazardous 
condition.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \92\ There is a third exception associated with live-line 
barehand work, which is generally inapplicable in enclosed spaces.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some conditions within an enclosed space, such as high temperature 
and high pressure, make it hazardous to remove a cover from the space. 
For example, if high pressure is present within the space, the cover 
could be blown off in the process of removing it. Paragraph (e), which 
is being adopted without substantive change from the proposal, protects 
against these hazards by requiring a determination of whether it is 
safe to remove the cover. This determination must include checking for 
the presence of any atmospheric pressure or temperature differences 
(generally between the inside and outside of the enclosed space) and 
evaluating whether there might be a hazardous atmosphere in the space. 
Furthermore, any condition making it unsafe for employees to remove the 
cover must be eliminated (that is, reduced to the extent that it is no 
longer unsafe) before the cover is removed. A note following paragraph 
(e) clarifies that this determination may consist of checking the 
conditions that might foreseeably be inside the enclosed space. For 
example, the cover could be checked to see if it is hot and, if it is 
fastened in place, it could be loosened gradually to release any 
residual pressure. The note also clarifies that, to evaluate whether 
there might be a hazardous atmosphere in the space, an evaluation needs 
to be made of whether conditions at the site could cause a hazardous 
atmosphere to accumulate in the space.
    Paragraph (f), which is being adopted without substantive change 
from the proposal, requires that, when covers are removed, openings to 
enclosed spaces be promptly guarded to protect employees from falling 
into the space and to protect employees in the enclosed space from 
being injured by objects entering the space. The guard could be a 
railing, a temporary cover, or any other barrier that provides the 
required protection.
    Paragraph (g), which is being adopted without substantive change 
from the proposal, prohibits employees from entering enclosed spaces 
that contain a hazardous atmosphere unless the entry conforms to the 
general industry permit-space standard at Sec.  1910.146. Accordingly, 
if an entry is to be made while a hazardous atmosphere is present in 
the enclosed space, the entry must conform to the general industry 
permit-required confined spaces standard at Sec.  1910.146.\93\ Once 
the hazardous atmosphere is removed (for example, by ventilating the 
enclosed space), employees may enter the enclosed space following the 
provisions in Sec.  1926.953.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \93\ As stated previously, the references to the general 
industry standard in final Sec.  1926.953 are included as a 
placeholder pending the promulgation of the confined spaces in 
construction standard. OSHA intends to change these references to 
refer to the construction standard when it promulgates that 
standard.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The use of the term ``entry'' in this paragraph of Sec.  1926.953 
is consistent with the use of that term in Sec.  1910.146, and OSHA 
proposed to include the Sec.  1910.146 definition of ``entry'' in 
Subpart V. Two commenters objected to the proposed definition of 
``entry'' on the basis that the definition would

[[Page 20378]]

prevent them from hanging a tag in the chimney of a manhole with a 
fault (Exs. 0157, 0227). Consolidated Edison Company of New York 
(ConEd) described their opposition to the proposed definition of 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
``entry'' as follows:

    In order to comply with Sec.  1910.269(t)(7)(i), Con Edison 
utilizes an identification system for structures that have cable and 
joint abnormalities. This system requires the identifying crew to 
hang a tag (in our nomenclature, a D-Fault tag) in the chimney of 
the manhole. This red tag is a clear indication to any other 
personnel who may attempt to enter the structure that the entry 
should not be made. This tagging system is an integral part of our 
compliance method and of protecting our employees. If OSHA adds the 
definition as proposed, it will prevent us from breaking the plane 
of the opening and hence prevent us from hanging the tag. This 
process will reduce, not increase the safety of our employees and as 
such will have the opposite effect from what OSHA is trying to 
accomplish. [Ex. 0157]

EEI recommended instead that ``that the Agency grant electric utilities 
an [exemption from] the definition for [Sec.  1910.269](t)(7) 
Protection against faults, to allow utilities to properly comply'' (Ex. 
0227).

    OSHA rejects ConEd's recommendation. Paragraph (g) of final Sec.  
1926.953 does not preclude employers from hanging tags in the chimney 
of a manhole with a fault. To the contrary, the rule permits entry into 
an enclosed space that contains a hazardous atmosphere if entry 
conforms to the general industry permit-space standard. Moreover, if 
there is no hazardous atmosphere in the space, employees may enter when 
the entry conforms to Sec.  1926.953. OSHA concludes that the proposed 
definition is, therefore, appropriate as it applies to final Sec.  
1926.953 and the corresponding requirements in final Sec.  1910.269(e).
    OSHA also rejects EEI's recommendation, because it is unnecessary. 
The definition of ``entry,'' as proposed and adopted, applies only to 
the use of that term in final Sec. Sec.  1910.269(e) and 1926.953. The 
definition does not apply to final Sec.  1910.269(t)(7)(i) or Sec.  
1926.965(h)(1). (See the summary and explanation for final Sec.  
1926.965(h)(1) for the response to ConEd's and EEI's concerns that this 
provision, and its counterpart in Sec.  1910.269(t)(7)(i), would 
preclude an employer from hanging a tag in the chimney of a manhole or 
vault to indicate the presence of a faulted cable.)
    Paragraph (h), which has been adopted with clarifying revisions 
from the proposal, requires an attendant with first-aid training, 
including CPR, to be immediately available outside the enclosed space 
to provide assistance when a hazard exists because of traffic patterns 
in the area of the opening used for entry.\94\ This paragraph does not 
prohibit the attendant from performing other duties outside the 
enclosed space, as long as those duties do not distract the attendant 
from monitoring employees who are in the enclosed space (entrants) and 
ensuring that it is safe to enter and exit the space. This paragraph 
has two purposes: To protect the entrant from hazards involving traffic 
patterns while the entrant is entering or exiting the space and to 
provide assistance in an emergency.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \94\ Typically, workers direct traffic away from the work area 
using traffic control devices, as required by Sec.  1926.967(g). 
When the resultant traffic patterns (that is, the flow of traffic) 
could bring vehicles close to the enclosed space entrance (for 
example, when the work reduces the number of traffic lanes), the 
employer must provide an attendant.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Mr. Frank Brockman with Farmers Rural Electric Cooperative 
Corporation noted that attendants should never be allowed to enter 
manholes or confined spaces (Ex. 0173).
    The final rule, like the proposal, requires the attendant to remain 
immediately available outside the enclosed space during the entire 
entry. If the attendant were permitted to enter the enclosed space 
during entry, he or she might not be able to assist the entrant. For 
example, if traffic-pattern hazards are present in the area of the 
opening to the enclosed space and if the attendant enters the space, 
then both the attendant and the workers he or she is protecting would 
be vulnerable upon leaving the enclosed space because no one would be 
present to minimize or control the traffic-pattern hazards. Therefore, 
the final rule specifies that the attendant must remain outside the 
enclosed space during the entire entry process. It should be noted that 
the rescue equipment required by paragraph (d) will enable the entrant 
to rescue the entrant from the space before administering any necessary 
first aid.
    Mr. Lee Marchessault of Workplace Safety Solutions recommended that 
paragraph (h) require the attendant to be trained in CPR, in addition 
to first-aid training (Ex. 0196; Tr. 575). He noted that the electrical 
hazards in the space, as well as other hazards, might present a need 
for CPR (Tr. 598).
    OSHA is clarifying paragraph (h) in the final rule. The proposed 
rule required training in first aid, including CPR, so that the 
attendant could provide emergency assistance in case of injury. This is 
the type of training required by Sec.  1926.951(b). However, the 
reference to Sec.  1926.951(b)(1) in the proposal likely caused Mr. 
Marchessault to misinterpret the requirement. Therefore, the Agency 
included a definition of ``first-aid training'' in Sec.  1926.968 in 
the final rule. That definition states that first-aid training is 
training in the initial care, including cardiopulmonary resuscitation 
(which includes chest compressions, rescue breathing, and, as 
appropriate, other heart and lung resuscitation techniques), performed 
by a person who is not a medical practitioner, of a sick or injured 
person until definitive medical treatment can be administered. The 
definition clarifies that, wherever first-aid training is required by 
the final rule, CPR training must be included.\95\ OSHA also dropped 
the proposed cross-reference to Sec.  1926.951(b)(1), as it is no 
longer necessary.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \95\ The definition also clarifies that CPR training includes 
resuscitation techniques both for the heart and for the lungs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Mr. Anthony Ahern with the Ohio Rural Electric Cooperatives 
recommended that an attendant always be available for enclosed-space 
operations, not just when traffic-pattern hazards exist (Ex. 0186).
    OSHA is not adopting this recommendation. By definition, an 
enclosed space contains a hazardous atmosphere only under abnormal 
conditions. The Agency previously concluded that these spaces do not 
present the type of atmospheric hazards that warrant the presence of an 
attendant after the employer takes precautions such as those required 
by Sec.  1926.953. (See, for example, 58 FR 4485-4488.) In addition, as 
provided in final Sec.  1926.953(a), when a hazardous atmosphere is 
present after the employer takes the precautions required by this 
section, paragraphs (d) through (k) of OSHA's general industry permit-
space standard, Sec.  1910.146, which do require attendants, apply. 
Therefore, the Agency concluded that, when paragraph (h) applies, the 
only hazards (other than electrical) that necessitate the presence of 
an attendant while work is being performed in an enclosed space are 
traffic-pattern hazards in the area of the opening used for entering 
and exiting the enclosed space. OSHA notes that even if no traffic-
pattern hazards are present, an attendant is required under Sec.  
1926.965(d) of the final rule while work is being performed in a 
manhole or vault containing energized electric equipment. A note to 
this effect follows final Sec.  1926.953(h).
    Mr. Leo Muckerheide with Safety Consulting Services commented that 
the purpose of proposed paragraph (h) was confusing because the purpose 
of the requirement as stated in the first

[[Page 20379]]

sentence--that is, protecting entrants from traffic-pattern hazards--
differs from the attendant's duties as noted in the second sentence--
monitoring employees within the space. He recommended that OSHA revise 
the second sentence of that paragraph as follows:

    That person is not precluded from performing other duties 
outside the enclosed space if these duties do not distract the 
attendant from monitoring the traffic patterns outside the enclosed 
space. [Ex. 0180]

    OSHA rejects Mr. Muckerheide's recommended language. Part of the 
attendant's duty to monitor employees in the space is to warn entrants 
preparing to exit an enclosed space about hazards involving traffic 
patterns. If the attendant is watching traffic patterns instead of 
monitoring the entrant, the entrant might not receive warnings about 
that traffic before exiting the space. When the entrant is ready to 
exit the space, the attendant can then monitor or direct traffic and 
let the entrant know when it is safe to exit the space. On the other 
hand, OSHA agrees with Mr. Muckerheide that the duties of the attendant 
may not be clear from the language of the provision as proposed. 
Therefore, OSHA revised the language in final paragraph (h) to make it 
clear that ensuring that it is safe to enter and exit an enclosed space 
is part of the attendant's duties.
    Paragraph (i), which is being adopted without change from the 
proposal, requires that test instruments used to monitor atmospheres in 
enclosed spaces have a minimum accuracy of 10 percent and 
be kept in calibration. This provision will ensure that test 
measurements are accurate so that hazardous conditions will be detected 
when they arise. The accuracy of instruments used for testing the 
atmosphere of these spaces is important for employee safety, and 
calibration is critical to test-instrument accuracy. As noted in the 
preamble to the proposal and to the 1994 Sec.  1910.269 final rule, 
OSHA considers 10 percent to be the minimum accuracy needed 
to detect hazardous conditions reliably (70 FR 34849, 59 FR 4369).
    Two commenters objected to the proposed requirements (Exs. 0128, 
0227). EEI recommended that the standard only require ``that test 
instruments be kept in calibration using the recommendations set forth 
by the specific manufacturer'' and not address accuracy (Ex. 0227). Mr. 
Mark Spence of Dow Chemical Company argued that OSHA did not 
demonstrate that the provision was necessary or that calibration has 
been a problem (Ex. 0128). He stated that the general industry permit-
space standard did not contain such a requirement, but only requires 
that the atmospheres in spaces be monitored (id.).
    OSHA rejects the recommendations from these two commenters. Mr. 
Spence is incorrect. The permit-space standard requires test equipment 
to be calibrated. As mentioned previously, Sec.  1910.146(c)(5) 
contains requirements for alternative procedures for permit spaces that 
are analogous to the enclosed-space requirements contained in Sec.  
1926.953 of the final rule. Paragraph (c)(5)(ii)(C) of Sec.  1910.146 
requires atmospheric testing using a calibrated test instrument. 
Paragraph (d) of Sec.  1910.146, which contains requirements for 
permit-required confined-space programs, specifies, at paragraph 
(d)(4)(i), that employers maintain ``[t]esting and monitoring equipment 
needed to comply with paragraph (d)(5).'' As OSHA concluded in the 
preamble to the general industry permit-space final rule, if test 
equipment ``is properly selected, calibrated, and maintained . . ., the 
testing and monitoring needs for entry and work in permit-required 
confined spaces can be effectively met'' (58 FR 4498). Thus, the use of 
inaccurate or uncalibrated test instruments does not meet the permit-
space standard.
    OSHA rejects EEI's recommendation that the standard not address 
accuracy. The Agency concluded in the 1994 Sec.  1910.269 rulemaking 
that the requirement for test instruments to be accurate within 10 percent was reasonably necessary for the protection of 
employees (59 FR 4369). OSHA continues to believe that the accuracy of 
instruments used for testing the atmosphere of these spaces is 
important, and EEI offered no evidence to the contrary.
    OSHA also rejects EEI's assertion that equipment calibrated to 
manufacturers' specification is an adequate substitute for test 
equipment accuracy. Calibration and accuracy are not synonymous. A 
calibrated test instrument is one that has been compared to a standard 
reference source for the substance (oxygen, or a toxic or flammable 
gas) to be measured. Accuracy is a measure of the precision with which 
the substance can be measured. An oxygen meter, for example, with an 
accuracy of 20 percent could give a reading as much as 20 
percent above or below the actual oxygen content even when it is 
properly calibrated. It is evident that this calibrated instrument 
would not meet the final rule's minimum accuracy requirement of 10 percent.
    Several commenters recommended that OSHA include in the final rule 
specific requirements on how to keep instruments calibrated. (See, for 
example, Exs. 0196, 0211, 0227.) For instance, ISEA recommended that 
OSHA refer employers and employees to the Agency's Safety and Health 
Information Bulletin ``Verification of Calibration for Direct-Reading 
Portable Gas Monitors'' (SHIB 05-04-2004) for information on this topic 
(Ex. 0211).\96\ As noted earlier, EEI recommended that test instruments 
be calibrated in accordance with manufacturers' instructions (Ex. 
0227). Another commenter, Mr. Lee Marchessault with Workplace Safety 
Solutions agreed that the standard should require calibration in 
accordance with manufacturers' instructions because test instruments 
``may go out of calibration 2 hours after being calibrated'' (Ex. 
0196).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \96\ This document is available on the OSHA Web site at: https://www.osha.gov/dts/shib/shib050404.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    OSHA is not adopting these recommendations. The Agency decided to 
adopt a performance-based approach for this requirement to provide 
compliance flexibility. OSHA considers a test instrument to be ``kept 
in calibration,'' as required by paragraph (i), when the employer 
follows the manufacturers' calibration instructions or other reasonable 
guidelines for the calibration of the instrument involved. The Agency 
anticipates that most employers will follow manufacturers' 
instructions. However, these instructions might not be available if the 
manufacturer has gone out of business. In addition, there are other 
sources of information on proper calibration methods. As mentioned 
earlier, ISEA noted one appropriate source of information that can be 
used instead, although the Agency decided against including a reference 
to that publication in the final rule.
    Mr. Kevin Taylor with the Lyondell Chemical Company asked for 
clarification of the requirement that test instruments have a minimum 
accuracy of 10 percent (Ex. 0218). He inquired whether that 
level of accuracy was needed for each measured gas or whether the 
accuracy measurement was based on total detection of gases.
    OSHA clarifies that the accuracy required by the final rule 
pertains to each gas being measured. Moreover, the accuracy of the 
instrument must be determined based on the threshold quantities that 
would make the atmosphere within the space hazardous (as per the 
definition of ``hazardous atmosphere'' in Sec.  1926.968). For

[[Page 20380]]

example, a particular enclosed space could potentially contain 
hazardous levels of methane, carbon dioxide, and carbon monoxide, as 
well as insufficient levels of oxygen. The instrument or instruments 
used to test the space in this example must be accurate to within 
10 percent of: (1) A 0.5-percent concentration of methane 
(which is 10 percent of its lower flammable limit),\97\ (2) the 
permissible exposure limits (PELs) contained in Subpart D for both 
carbon dioxide and carbon monoxide (9,000 and 55 mg/m\3\, 
respectively), and (3) atmospheric concentrations of oxygen at 19.5 
percent. It is important for the test instrument to be accurate near 
the threshold because those are the critical values for determining 
whether or not a space is hazardous.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \97\ The lower flammable limit for methane is 5 percent, and 10 
percent of that value is 0.5 percent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As noted earlier, because of the lack of adequate ventilation, 
enclosed spaces can accumulate hazardous concentrations of flammable 
gases and vapors, or an oxygen deficient atmosphere could develop. It 
is important to keep concentrations of oxygen and flammable gases and 
vapors at safe levels; otherwise, an explosion could occur while 
employees are in the space, or an oxygen deficiency could lead to 
suffocation of an employee. Toward these ends, paragraphs (j) through 
(o) of the final rule address the testing of the atmosphere in the 
space and ventilation of the space. OSHA notes that the specific 
testing requirements in paragraphs (j), (k), and (o) must be met 
irrespective of the results of the employer's evaluation performed 
under paragraph (e). The evaluation performed under paragraph (e) 
serves only to ensure that it is safe to remove the cover and will not 
determine whether an enclosed space contains a hazardous atmosphere. 
The testing required by paragraphs (j), (k), and (o) will ensure, as 
required by paragraph (g), that employees not enter an enclosed space 
while it contains a hazardous atmosphere unless they follow the 
requirements of the general industry permit-space standard.
    Paragraph (j), which is being adopted without substantive change 
from the proposal, requires that, before an employee enters an enclosed 
space, the atmosphere in the space be tested for oxygen deficiency and 
that the testing be done with a direct-reading meter or similar 
instrument capable of collecting and immediately analyzing data samples 
without the need for off-site evaluation. Continuous forced air-
ventilation is permitted as an alternative to testing. However, 
procedures for such ventilation must ensure that employees are not 
exposed to the hazards posed by oxygen deficiency.\98\ (See also 
paragraph (m) for additional requirements relating to ventilation of 
the space.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \98\ The definition of ``hazardous atmosphere'' determines what 
concentrations of oxygen are considered hazardous. (See Sec.  
1926.968.) Paragraph (g) of final Sec.  1926.953 prohibits entry 
into an enclosed space while a hazardous atmosphere is present.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Paragraph (k), which is being adopted without change from the 
proposal, requires that, before employees enter an enclosed space, the 
internal atmosphere of the space be tested for flammable gases and 
vapors. If the results of the test indicate the presence of a hazardous 
atmosphere, employees may not enter under the procedures specified by 
Sec.  1926.953. (See Sec.  1926.953(g).) So that the results are 
accurate and relevant to the atmosphere in the space at the time of 
employee entry, testing must be performed with a direct-reading meter, 
or similar instrument, capable of collecting and immediately analyzing 
data samples without the need for off-site evaluation. The flammability 
test required by this paragraph must be performed after oxygen testing 
and ventilation required by paragraph (j) demonstrate that the enclosed 
space has sufficient oxygen for an accurate flammability test.
    If flammable gases or vapors are detected or if an oxygen 
deficiency is found, paragraph (l), which is being adopted without 
substantive change from the proposal, requires the employer to provide 
forced-air ventilation to maintain safe levels of oxygen and to prevent 
a hazardous concentration of flammable gases or vapors from 
accumulating. As an alternative to ventilation, an employer may use a 
continuous monitoring system that ensures that no hazardous atmosphere 
develops and no increase in flammable gas or vapor concentrations above 
safe levels occur if flammable gases or vapors are detected at safe 
levels. The language in the final rule clarifies that the monitoring 
must ensure that concentrations of flammable gases and vapors do not 
increase above safe levels (as opposed to not increasing at all). The 
definition of hazardous atmosphere contains guidelines for determining 
whether the concentration of a substance is at a hazardous level. OSHA 
is including a note to this effect after paragraph (l). An identical 
note appears after paragraph (o). OSHA changed the title of this 
paragraph in the final rule to ``Ventilation, and monitoring for 
flammable gases or vapors'' to accurately reflect the contents of the 
paragraph.
    Paragraph (m), which is being adopted without substantive change 
from the proposal, contains specific requirements for the ventilation 
of enclosed spaces. When forced-air ventilation is used, it must begin 
before entry is made and must be maintained long enough for the 
employer to be able to demonstrate that a safe atmosphere exists before 
employees are allowed to enter the space. To accomplish this, the 
ventilation must be maintained long enough to purge the atmosphere 
within the space of hazardous levels of flammable gases and vapors and 
to supply an adequate concentration of oxygen.
    OSHA decided not to specify a minimum number of air changes before 
employee entry into the enclosed space is permitted. Instead, the 
Agency places the burden on the employer to ensure that the atmosphere 
is safe before such entry. The employer can discharge this duty either 
by testing to determine the safety of the atmosphere in the space or by 
a thorough evaluation of the air flow required to make the atmosphere 
safe. In this way, the safety of employees working in enclosed spaces 
will not be dependent on speculation by a supervisor or an 
employee.\99\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \99\ This discussion, which also appeared in the preamble to the 
proposal, responds to one commenter's request for clarification of 
how the employer could demonstrate that the atmosphere in the 
enclosed space is safe (Ex. 0186).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Paragraph (m) also requires the air provided by the ventilating 
equipment to be directed at the immediate area within the enclosed 
space where employees are at work. The forced-air ventilation must be 
maintained the entire time the employees are present within the space. 
These provisions ensure that a hazardous atmosphere does not reoccur 
where employees are working.
    NIOSH recommended that ``the atmosphere in a confined space be 
tested before entry and monitored continuously while workers are in the 
confined space to determine if the atmosphere has changed due to the 
work being performed'' (Ex. 0130). NIOSH identified its publication 
``Worker Deaths in Confined Spaces: A Summary of NIOSH Surveillance and 
Investigative Findings,'' Publication No. 94-103, as evidence of the 
need for continuous monitoring (id.).
    As explained earlier in this section of the preamble, the final 
rule requires the atmosphere in enclosed spaces to be tested before 
entry. OSHA concludes, however, that continuous monitoring of enclosed 
spaces is unnecessary. By

[[Page 20381]]

definition, enclosed spaces contain a hazardous atmosphere only under 
abnormal conditions. Thus, enclosed spaces almost never contain the 
types of conditions that will cause a hazardous atmosphere to reoccur 
after employers implement the precautions required by Sec.  1926.953 
(such as forced-air ventilation). If these precautions are not 
sufficient to keep the atmosphere in the space safe, then the space 
would not qualify for entry under Sec.  1926.953, and entry could only 
proceed under the general industry permit-required confined space 
standard, as specified by paragraph (a) of that section. Therefore, 
OSHA has not adopted NIOSH's recommendation in the final rule.
    Two commenters noted that proposed paragraph (m) might be 
impossible to implement under certain conditions and recommended that 
the final rule recognize these conditions (Exs. 0128, 0224). One of 
these commenters, Dow Chemical Company, noted that it is not always 
possible to test atmospheric conditions before entry into an enclosed 
space (Ex. 0128). The other commenter, the Alabama Rural Electric 
Association of Cooperatives, maintained that it was not always feasible 
to use forced-air ventilation because of space constraints (Ex. 0224).
    OSHA concludes that no changes to paragraph (m) are necessary. The 
final rule, as with the proposal, recognizes that the enclosed-space 
procedures might not adequately protect employees in some 
circumstances. Paragraph (a) of the final rule requires that employers 
follow the general industry permit-space standard at Sec.  1910.146 
whenever the precautions required by final Sec. Sec.  1926.953 and 
1926.965 are insufficient to adequately control the hazards posed by 
the space. These conditions include any conditions that make complying 
with those two sections in this final rule infeasible. Therefore, OSHA 
is including paragraph (m) in the final rule as proposed.
    To ensure that the air supplied by the ventilating equipment 
provides a safe atmosphere, paragraph (n), which is being adopted 
without substantive change from the proposal, requires the air supply 
to be from a clean source and prohibits it from increasing the hazards 
in the enclosed space. For example, the final rule prohibits 
positioning the air intake for ventilating equipment near the exhaust 
from a gasoline or diesel engine because doing so would contaminate the 
atmosphere in the enclosed space.
    The use of open flames in enclosed spaces is safe only when 
flammable gases or vapors are not present in hazardous quantities. For 
this reason, final paragraph (o), which is being adopted without change 
from the proposal, requires additional testing for flammable gases and 
vapors if open flames are to be used in enclosed spaces. The tests must 
be performed immediately before the open-flame device is used and at 
least once per hour while the device is in use. More frequent testing 
is required if conditions indicate the need for it. Examples of such 
conditions include the presence of volatile flammable liquids in the 
enclosed space and a history of hazardous quantities of flammable 
vapors or gases in such a space.
5. Section 1926.954, Personal protective equipment
    Final Sec.  1926.954 contains requirements for personal protective 
equipment (PPE). Paragraph (a), which is being adopted without change 
from the proposal, clarifies that PPE used by employees during work 
covered by Subpart V must meet Subpart E of Part 1926.
    Mr. Daniel Shipp with ISEA recommended that OSHA update the 
national consensus standards incorporated by reference in Subpart E 
(Ex. 0211). He pointed out, for example, that Sec.  1926.100, which 
covers head protection, incorporates two outdated ANSI standards, 
namely ANSI Z89.1-1969, Safety Requirements for Industrial Head 
Protection, and ANSI Z89.2-1971, Industrial Protective Helmets for 
Electrical Workers (id.).
    Updating the national consensus standards incorporated by reference 
in Subpart E is beyond the scope of this rulemaking, so OSHA is not 
adopting Mr. Shipp's recommendation in this final rule. However, on 
June 22, 2012, OSHA published a direct final rule updating its head 
protection standard in Subpart E (77 FR 37587-37600).\100\ On November 
16, 2012, OSHA published a notice confirming the effective date of the 
direct final rule (77 FR 68684; effective date--September 20, 2012). 
That rulemaking action updates the national consensus standard for head 
protection incorporated in Subpart E of the construction standards as 
recommended by Mr. Shipp.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \100\ OSHA also updated its consensus standards for general 
industry and maritime on September 9, 2009 (74 FR 46350). The Agency 
again updated the general industry and maritime standards with the 
June 22, 2012, direct final rule because OSHA published the proposal 
for the 2009 final rule before ANSI updated its head-protection 
standard that year.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The preamble to the proposal noted that OSHA had separately 
proposed regulatory language for the general PPE standards to clarify 
that employers are generally responsible for the cost of PPE (70 FR 
34868-34869; 64 FR 15402, Mar. 31, 1999). OSHA published the final rule 
on employer payment for PPE on November 15, 2007 (72 FR 64342). The 
final rule on employer payment for PPE requires employers to pay for 
the PPE used to comply with OSHA standards, with a few exceptions. The 
exceptions include: (1) Everyday clothing, such as longsleeve shirts, 
long pants, street shoes, and normal work boots; and (2) ordinary 
clothing, skin creams, or other items, used solely for protection from 
weather, such as winter coats, jackets, gloves, parkas, rubber boots, 
hats, raincoats, ordinary sunglasses, and sunscreen. (See Sec. Sec.  
1910.132(h) and 1926.95(d).)
    Employers must pay for fall protection equipment and other PPE used 
by employees in compliance with this final rule to the extent required 
by Sec.  1926.95(d), the general construction rule regarding payment 
for PPE, or Sec.  1910.132(h), the general rule regarding payment for 
PPE in general industry. (See 72 FR 64369 (explaining that the general 
PPE-payment provisions ``apply to all OSHA standards requiring PPE''); 
see also the March 16, 2009, letter of interpretation to Mr. William 
Mattiford \101\ (employers must pay for body belts, positioning straps, 
and pole- and tree-climbing equipment in accordance with Sec.  
1910.132(h)) and the May 1, 2008, letter to Mr. Gil Niedenthal \102\ 
(employers must pay for body belts and pole climbers in accordance with 
Sec.  1910.132(h)).)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \101\ The letter of interpretation to Mr. Mattiford is available 
at https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=INTERPRETATIONS&p_id=27014.
    \102\ The letter of interpretation to Mr. Niedenthal is 
available at https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=INTERPRETATIONS&p_id=27091.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    OSHA included a note to final Sec.  1926.954(a) to indicate that 
Sec.  1926.95(d) sets employer payment obligations for the PPE required 
by subpart V, including, but not limited to, the fall protection 
equipment required by final Sec.  1926.954(b), the electrical 
protective equipment required by final Sec.  1926.960(c), and the 
flame-resistant and arc-rated clothing and other protective equipment 
required by final Sec.  1926.960(g). (See the summary and explanation 
for Sec.  1926.960(g), later in this section of the preamble, for a 
discussion of the issue of employer payment for flame-resistant and 
arc-rated clothing.)
    Paragraph (b) of the final rule sets requirements for personal fall 
protection systems. Subpart M of part 1926, which sets requirements for 
fall protection for

[[Page 20382]]

construction, contains provisions covering two types of personal fall 
protection systems: Personal fall arrest systems, addressed in Sec.  
1926.502(d), and positioning device systems, addressed in Sec.  
1926.502(e). Subpart M defines a ``personal fall arrest system'' as a 
system used to arrest an employee in a fall from a working level. It 
consists of an anchorage, connectors, and body harness and may include 
a lanyard, deceleration device, lifeline, or suitable combinations of 
these. (See Sec.  1926.500(b).) Personal fall arrest systems are 
designed to safely arrest the fall of an employee working on a 
horizontal or vertical surface.
    Subpart M defines a ``positioning device system'' as a body belt or 
body harness system rigged to allow an employee to be supported on an 
elevated vertical surface, such as a wall, and work with both hands 
free while leaning. (See Sec.  1926.500(b).)
    Positioning device systems are designed to support an employee 
working on a vertical surface so that the employee can work with both 
hands without falling. Proposed Subpart V contained requirements for 
``work positioning equipment,'' which is equivalent to ``positioning 
device system'' as that term is defined in subpart M. (See the summary 
and explanation for final Sec.  1926.954(b)(2), later in this section 
of the preamble.)
    A third form of personal fall protection system, which is not 
specifically addressed in Subpart M, is a tethering, restraint, or 
travel-restricting system. OSHA's steel erection standard in Subpart R 
of Part 1926 contains requirements for ``fall restraint systems,'' 
which it defines as a fall protection system that prevents the user 
from falling any distance. The system consists of either a body belt or 
body harness, along with an anchorage, connectors and other necessary 
equipment. The other components typically include a lanyard, and may 
also include a lifeline and other devices. (See Sec.  1926.751.\103\)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \103\ The term ``fall restraint system'' as defined in Sec.  
1926.751 is a broad term that includes travel-restricting equipment, 
tethering systems, and other systems that prevent an employee from 
falling any distance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Fall restraint, tethering, and travel-restricting equipment are all 
designed to prevent employees from falling, in some cases by 
restraining an employee's access to unprotected edges (restraint, 
tethering, and travel-restricting equipment) and in other cases by 
holding the employee in place to prevent falling (restraint equipment).
    IBEW recommended that the fall protection provisions in proposed 
paragraph (b), and in its general industry counterpart, proposed Sec.  
1910.269(g)(2), contain a reference to IEEE Std 1307, Standard for Fall 
Protection for Utility Work (Ex. 0230; Tr. 904-905, 983-984). The union 
noted that this is the only consensus standard addressing specific fall 
protection issues for the utility industry (Ex. 0230).
    OSHA agrees that this consensus standard provides useful 
information to help employers comply with some provisions of the final 
rule and added the IEEE standard to the list of reference documents in 
Appendix G to subpart V and Appendix G to Sec.  1910.269.\104\ The 
Agency is not, however, referencing IEEE Std 1307 in Sec.  1926.954 of 
the final rule. OSHA made substantial changes to the fall protection 
requirements in the final rule, and the IEEE standard does not reflect 
all of the final rule's requirements. For example, on and after April 
1, 2015, final Sec.  1926.954(b)(3)(iii)(C) generally does not permit 
qualified employees to climb poles, towers, or similar structures 
without fall protection. (See the summary and explanation for final 
Sec.  1926.954(b)(3)(iii), later in this section of the preamble.) In 
contrast, section 6.2.1 of IEEE Std 1307-2004 permits qualified 
climbers to climb poles, towers, and similar structures without fall 
protection (Ex. 0427).\105\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \104\ See the discussion of the appendices to the final rule, 
later in this section of the preamble. As explained in the 
appendices, the referenced national consensus standards, including 
IEEE Std 1307, contain detailed specifications that employers may 
follow in complying with the more performance-oriented requirements 
of OSHA's final rule. However, compliance with IEEE Std 1307 is not 
a substitute for compliance with Sec.  1926.954(b).
    \105\ IEEE Std 1307-2004 is the most recent edition of that 
consensus standard.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Proposed paragraph (b)(1) provided that personal fall arrest 
systems had to meet the requirements of Subpart M of Part 1926. 
Existing Sec.  1910.269(g)(2)(i) already contains a similar 
requirement. A note following proposed paragraph (b)(1) indicated that 
this provision would apply to all personal fall arrest systems used in 
work covered by subpart V. OSHA is not including this note in the final 
rule as it is unnecessary.
    OSHA received a number of comments about proposed paragraph (b)(1). 
(See, for example, Exs. 0128, 0180, 0211, 0219, 0227, 0230.) Some of 
these comments generally supported the proposal, noting that there are 
no situations in which work covered by Subpart V would necessitate 
different requirements for fall arrest equipment than those already 
found in Subpart M. (See, for example, Exs. 0219, 0227, 0230.) Mr. Mark 
Spence with Dow Chemical Company supported the incorporation of subpart 
M in both subpart V and Sec.  1910.269, but noted OSHA's plan to revise 
the general industry fall protection standard. He recommended that 
Sec.  1910.269 and subpart V eventually be revised to refer to the 
updated general industry fall protection provisions:

    The existing general industry standard [Sec.  1910.269] requires 
personal fall arrest equipment to meet the requirements of the 
construction industry fall protection standards, 29 CFR Part 1926, 
Subpart M. Both Sec.  1910.269 and Subpart M were promulgated in 
1994, whereas the general industry fall protection standards date 
back to 1971 (and are based on earlier requirements). To take 
advantage of the updated fall protection requirements in the 
construction standards, OSHA chose to make them applicable to work 
under this general industry standard. [Footnote omitted.]
* * * * *
    Dow sees no current option for OSHA other than continuing to 
refer to Subpart M, supplementing it as appropriate with new 
provisions, as OSHA has done here. However, Dow urges OSHA to 
proceed expeditiously with the issuance of . . . new general 
industry fall protection . . . standards. Once . . . new [general 
industry fall protection standards are] published as a final rule, 
OSHA should revise both [Subpart V and Sec.  1910.269] to refer to 
the new [provisions]. [Ex. 0126]

    On May 24, 2010, OSHA proposed to revise the general industry 
walking-working surfaces standards and the personal protective 
equipment standards (75 FR 28862). The proposal included a new standard 
for personal fall protection systems, Sec.  1910.140, which would 
increase consistency between construction, maritime, and general 
industry standards. When that rulemaking is finalized, OSHA will 
consider whether the cross-references in subpart V and Sec.  1910.269 
should be changed as recommended by Mr. Spence.
    Two commenters noted that subpart M does not address arc-flash 
resistance for fall arrest equipment and recommended that OSHA require 
this equipment to pass arc-flash tests (Exs. 0180, 0211). Mr. Daniel 
Shipp of ISEA supported arc-flash testing as follows:

    We believe that workers in electric power transmission and 
distribution have special requirements different from those in 
general construction activities. These special requirements are 
recognized as hazards associated with exposure to high-voltage 
electric current. The hazard of exposure to energized electrical 
sources often occurs at height[s] where personal fall arrest systems 
are required. The hazard of electric arc flash has been addressed in 
the ASTM F887-04 [Standard Specifications for Personal Climbing 
Equipment] for full body harnesses used in fall arrest.

[[Page 20383]]

    We support the inclusion of electric arc-flash resistance 
requirements, referenced in ASTM F887-04, to be extended to 
[include] fall arrest PPE, especially full body harnesses and shock 
absorbing lanyards that are worn together as part of a complete fall 
arrest system. These components would be exposed to potentially 
damaging thermal shock in the event of an arc flash. The damage to 
lanyards not designed to withstand a high-voltage arc flash can be 
quite severe, reducing strength to levels below the factor of safety 
necessary to assure arrest of a fall. Tests have been performed by 
the Kinetrics high energy laboratory on high-tensile webbing, such 
as that used in fall protection PPE products. Testing at exposure 
levels of 40 cal/cm\2\, in accordance with the procedures in ASTM 
F1958/F1958M-99 [Standard Test Method for Determining the 
Ignitability of Non-flame-Resistance Materials for Clothing by 
Electric Arc Exposure Method Using Mannequins], demonstrated 
ignition and melting of the webbing sufficient to reduce webbing 
strength by greater than 30 percent.
    One common example of this hazard involves employees tied off in 
bucket trucks working in close proximity to high-voltage power 
lines. The fall arrest harness and lanyard are typically exposed 
above the edge of the bucket where contact with electric arc flash 
is possible. In the event of an incident, including a fall by 
ejection out of the bucket, the strength of fall arrest components 
could be severely compromised if they were exposed to a high-voltage 
electric arc flash. [Ex. 0211]

Mr. Leo Muckerheide of Safety Consulting Services similarly recommended 
that harnesses and lanyards used by employees working on or near 
energized circuits meet ASTM F887-04, because that consensus standard 
provides performance criteria for arc resistance (Ex. 0180).

    OSHA recognizes that employees performing work covered by subpart V 
and Sec.  1910.269 are sometimes exposed to hazards posed by electric 
arcs. In fact, final Sec. Sec.  1910.269(l)(8) and 1926.960(g) are 
designed to protect employees from electric arcs. In addition, the 
Agency already recognized the need for work-positioning equipment to be 
capable of passing a flammability test to ensure that the equipment 
does not fail if an electric arc occurs. (See final Sec. Sec.  
1910.269(g)(2)(iii)(G)(5) and 1926.954(b)(2)(vii)(E).) On the other 
hand, in work covered by subpart V or Sec.  1910.269, personal fall 
arrest equipment has broader application than work-positioning 
equipment, with work-positioning equipment being used primarily on 
support structures for overhead power lines. Several applications for 
personal fall arrest equipment involve work that does not pose 
electric-arc hazards, especially in electric power generation work 
covered by Sec.  1910.269. For example, an employee working on a 
cooling tower or atop a dam at an electric power generation plant would 
not normally be exposed to these hazards. Consequently, OSHA decided 
not to include a general requirement for all fall arrest equipment used 
under the final rule to be capable of passing an electric-arc test.
    However, OSHA agrees that electric arcs can damage personal fall 
arrest equipment as readily as work-positioning equipment. The testing 
to which the commenters referred, and which is the basis of the test 
data found in the record, demonstrates that harnesses subjected to an 
electric arc can fail a drop test (Ex. 0432). The Agency concludes from 
these test data that personal fall arrest equipment worn by an employee 
who is exposed to an electric arc could fail if it is not designed to 
withstand the heat energy involved. OSHA also agrees with the 
commenters that employees working on or near energized circuits are 
exposed to electric arcs when the circuit parts are exposed (Ex. 0180). 
Accordingly, OSHA adopted a requirement in the final rule that fall 
arrest equipment used by employees exposed to hazards from flames or 
electric arcs be capable of passing a drop test after exposure to an 
electric arc \106\ with a heat energy of 405 cal/cm\2\. 
This requirement matches the electric arc performance required of fall 
arrest equipment by ASTM F887-04 (Ex. 0055). The provision appears in 
final paragraph (b)(1)(ii).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \106\ The electric arc test required by this paragraph is a test 
exposing the equipment to an electric arc with a specified incident 
heat energy. ASTM F887-12\e1\ includes an electric-arc test method 
that involves positioning the fall arrest equipment in front of two 
vertically mounted electrodes. The electric arc forms between the 
electrodes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Paragraph (g)(1) of Sec.  1926.960 in the final rule requires 
employers to identify employees exposed to the hazards of flames or 
electric arcs. When these employees are using personal fall arrest 
equipment, that equipment also would be exposed to flame or electric-
arc hazards, and the final rule requires this fall arrest equipment to 
be capable of passing a drop test equivalent to the test specified in 
paragraph (b)(2)(xii) (discussed later in this section of the preamble) 
after exposure to an electric arc with a heat energy of 405 
cal/cm\2\. Harnesses and shock-absorbing lanyards meeting ASTM F887-
12\e1\ \107\ will be deemed to comply with this provision.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \107\ The final rule is based on the edition of the consensus 
standard that is in the record, ASTM F887-04, Standard 
Specifications for Personal Climbing Equipment (Ex. 0055). OSHA 
reviewed the most recent edition of this standard, ASTM F887-12\e1\, 
and found that equipment meeting that standard will also comply with 
final Sec.  1926.954(b)(1)(ii).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    OSHA received a substantial number of comments addressing fall 
protection requirements for employees working in aerial lifts. Existing 
fall protection requirements to protect employees in aerial lifts 
performing work, including line-clearance tree-trimming work, covered 
by Subpart V or Sec.  1910.269 are found in several standards. In 
construction, the construction aerial lift standard (Sec.  1926.453) 
and subpart M apply. For maintenance and operation work, the general 
industry aerial lift standard (Sec.  1910.67) and existing Sec.  
1910.269(g)(2) (incorporating subpart M of the construction standards) 
apply. Currently, line-clearance tree-trimming work is typically 
governed by the fall protection requirements in Sec.  1910.269 and, 
depending on the type of work performed, falls under either the general 
industry or construction aerial lift standard.
    Paragraph (b)(2)(v) of Sec.  1926.453 in the construction standard 
for aerial lifts requires an employee working from an aerial lift to 
wear a body belt with a lanyard attached to the boom or basket. 
However, the introductory text to Sec.  1926.502(d) in subpart M 
provides that ``body belts are not acceptable as part of a personal 
fall arrest system.'' The hazards of using a body belt as part of a 
fall arrest system are described in the preamble to the Subpart M final 
rule (59 FR 40672, 40702-40703, Aug. 9, 1994) and later in this section 
of the preamble. In short, since the fall-arrest forces are more 
concentrated for a body belt compared to a body harness, the risk of 
injury in a fall is much greater with a body belt. In addition, an 
employee can fall out of a body belt in a fall. Lastly, an employee 
faces an unacceptable risk of further injury while suspended in a body 
belt awaiting rescue.
    Given the potential discrepancy between the aerial lift standard's 
requirement for body belts and the subpart M limitation on the use of 
body belts in fall arrest systems, a note following Sec.  
1926.453(b)(2)(v) explains that Sec.  1926.502(d) provides that body 
belts are not acceptable as part of a personal fall arrest system. The 
use of a body belt in a tethering system or in a restraint system is 
acceptable and is regulated under Sec.  1926.502(e).
    Like the aerial lift standard in construction, the general industry 
aerial lift standard at Sec.  1910.67(c)(2)(v) requires an employee 
working from an aerial lift to wear a body belt with a lanyard attached 
to the boom or basket. Even though existing Sec.  1910.269(g)(2)(i) 
requires fall arrest equipment to meet subpart M of part 1926, which 
prohibits the use of body belts in personal fall arrest systems, the 
Agency previously decided that employers could use body belts and 
lanyards configured as fall

[[Page 20384]]

arrest systems to protect employees doing work covered by Sec.  
1910.269 in aerial lifts.
    OSHA explained in the preamble to the proposal that this rulemaking 
would prohibit the use of body belts in personal fall arrest systems 
for all work covered by Sec.  1910.269 and subpart V, including work 
done from aerial lifts (70 FR 34850). The tree trimming industry 
criticized OSHA's proposed application of the Subpart M prohibition on 
body belts in personal fall arrest systems on the basis that it left 
line-clearance tree trimming employers with two (in the industry's 
view, undesirable) options--providing either (1) a personal fall arrest 
system with a body harness, or (2) a positioning system that, under 
proposed Sec.  1926.954(b)(3)(iv) (or proposed Sec.  
1910.269(g)(2)(iii)(D)), is rigged to prevent free falls of more than 
0.6 meters (2 feet). (See, for example, Exs. 0174, 0200, 0502, 0503; 
Tr. 611-619, 756-760.)
    The tree trimming industry is mistaken about the compliance options 
available to its employers. The 0.6-meter free-fall limit applies only 
to work-positioning equipment, which may not be used in aerial lifts. 
As noted previously, under Sec.  1926.500(b) of subpart M, 
``positioning device system'' is defined as ``a body belt or body 
harness system rigged to allow an employee to be supported on an 
elevated vertical surface, such as a wall, and work with both hands 
free while leaning.'' Positioning device systems are not permitted to 
be used from a horizontal surface, such as the platform or bucket of an 
aerial lift.\108\
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    \108\ See, for example, the following OSHA letters of 
interpretation:
    May 11, 2001, to Mr. Jessie L. Simmons (https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=INTERPRETATIONS&p_id=24360);
    August 14, 2000, to Mr. Charles E. Hill (https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=INTERPRETATIONS&p_id=24110); and
    April 20, 1998, to Mr. Jonathan Hemenway Glazier (https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=INTERPRETATIONS&p_id=22569).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Although employees in aerial lifts cannot use work-positioning 
equipment, they can use restraint systems. As noted previously, a 
restraint system is a method of fall protection that prevents the 
worker from falling, for example, by preventing the employee from 
reaching an unprotected edge. Body belts are permissible in restraint 
systems. If an employer has an employee use a fall restraint system, it 
must ensure that the lanyard and anchor are arranged so that the 
employee is not exposed to falling any distance.\109\ In addition, for 
a restraint system to work, the anchorage must be strong enough to 
prevent the worker from moving past the point where the system is fully 
extended, including an appropriate safety factor. In a November 2, 
1995, letter of interpretation to Mr. Dennis Gilmore, OSHA suggested 
that, at a minimum, a fall restraint system have the capacity to 
withstand at least 13.3 kilonewtons (3,000 pounds) or twice the maximum 
expected force that is needed to restrain the employee from exposure to 
the fall hazard.\110\ The Agency recommended that, in determining this 
force, employers should consider site-specific factors such as the 
force generated by an employee (including his or her tools, equipment 
and materials) walking, slipping, tripping, leaning, or sliding along 
the work surface.\111\ With respect to work in aerial lifts, to the 
extent that the bucket or platform can become separated from the boom 
as noted by several commenters (see, for example, Tr. 614-615, 700), 
the restraint system would need to be anchored to the boom.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \109\ See, for example, the August 14, 2000, letter of 
interpretation to Mr. Charles E. Hill (https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=INTERPRETATIONS&p_id=24110).
    \110\ This letter of interpretation is available at (https://osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=INTERPRETATIONS&p_id=22006.
    \111\ See also the following letters of interpretation:
    November 8, 2002, to Mr. Jeff Baum (https://osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=INTERPRETATIONS&p_id=24576); and
    November 2, 1995, to Mr. Mike Amen (https://osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=INTERPRETATIONS&p_id=21999).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed rule gave line-clearance tree trimming employers two 
options for employees in aerial lifts: (1) Use a personal fall arrest 
system with a harness; or (2) use a fall restraint system with a body 
belt or a harness. With respect to the first option, the tree trimming 
industry argued that personal fall arrest systems with body harnesses 
pose two hazards unique to line-clearance tree trimmers: (1) An 
electrocution hazard in the event of a fall into a power line and (2) a 
hazard associated with a harness' being pulled into a chipper. (See, 
for example, Exs. 0174, 0200, 0502, 0503; Tr. 616-617, 757-758.) 
Testifying on behalf of ULCC, Mr. Andrew Salvadore explained these 
arguments as follows:

    It is to be noted that this full body harness as one of the 
options is potentially problematic though for line clearance tree 
trimmers. [D]ue to the unique way that line clearance tree trimmers 
work, this is for two reasons.
    Reason 1: Linemen work next to energized conductors at arm's 
height. So if they fall from the aerial lift, they fall below the 
wire suspended in the air. But because . . . line clearance tree 
trimmers uniquely work from aerial lifts routinely positioned . . . 
or traveling above the wires if they were to fall from the bucket, 
they would likely fall onto the wire below when using the six-foot 
lanyard and full body harness, facing certain death by 
electrocution.
    Reason 2: Some line clearance tree trimming companies have their 
tree trimmers help feed brush into the truck's wood chippers. This 
is a concern among many line clearance tree trimming safety 
professionals in that the harness's appendage straps . . . can get 
caught on the brush being fed into the chipper and drag the operator 
into the chipper. Additionally the donning and doffing of a full 
body harness may predispose the aerial lif[t] operator to take [an] 
unacceptable risk of aiding a coworker chipping brush on the ground 
or conversely removing the harness and not putting it back on when 
returning [aloft] in the lift. [Tr. 616-617]

    In their posthearing comments, ULCC and TCIA expanded on this 
testimony. These organizations acknowledged that power line workers 
also work above power lines, but maintained that there are still 
significant differences that make it more dangerous to use personal 
fall arrest equipment with harnesses for line-clearance tree trimming 
work (Exs. 0502, 0503). First, ULCC and TCIA argued that, unlike line-
clearance tree trimmers, line workers take measures to protect 
themselves from contact with power lines below the aerial lift bucket. 
For example, TCIA commented:

    Through questioning of IBEW Panelists Jim Tomaseski and Don 
Hartley (Hearing Transcript, pages 1016-1019), we discovered that it 
is the lineman's typical practice to insulate wires underneath the 
person in an elevated work position in an aerial lift when there is 
the possibility of the worker coming within (including falling 
within) the minimum approach distance. Obviously, it effectively 
frees the lineman from concern of their fall protection allowing 
them to drop into the conductor(s). [I]nsulating the line is 
infeasible or impractical for our crews since they do not possess 
the tools or expertise to implement it. [Ex. 0503]

Second, ULCC asserted that line workers perform significantly less work 
above power lines than line-clearance tree trimmers, explaining:

    Linemen usually work at the height of the electric line; their 
work from above the line is atypical--we estimate that less than 20% 
of linemen work is from above the line. Thus, the amount of linemen 
work [conducted] from above an electric line is di minimis [sic]. 
[Ex. 0502; emphasis included in original]

    First, with respect to fall arrest equipment, OSHA does not 
consider body harnesses to pose greater hazards to line-clearance tree 
trimmers than

[[Page 20385]]

body belts. The hazard to a worker from being pulled into a chipper is 
easily dismissed. OSHA acknowledges that there are serious hazards 
associated with operating chippers, including the hazard that workers 
could be caught by the chipper feed mechanism. NIOSH published an 
article warning of hazards associated with the operation of chippers 
(see NIOSH Publication No. 99-145, ``Hazard ID 8--Injury Associated 
with Working Near or Operating Wood Chippers;'' Ex. 0481), and that 
publication provides recommendations to protect workers against being 
caught in the feed mechanism.\112\ These recommendations include: (1) 
Having workers wear close-fitting clothing and gloves, (2) having 
workers wear trousers without cuffs, and (3) ensuring that employees 
tuck in their clothing. Consistent with these recommendations, OSHA 
expects that any hazards associated with using a chipper while wearing 
a harness can be avoided by requiring employees to remove their 
harnesses before working with the chipper. The tree trimming industry 
commented that employees might not want to take off their harnesses 
before feeding brush into chippers. (See, for example, Ex. 0502; Tr. 
616-617.) OSHA does not find that argument persuasive. Employers can 
avoid this concern altogether by having these workers perform other 
ground-based work, such as moving the cut tree branches near the 
chipper, while ground workers, who are not wearing harnesses, feed the 
branches into the chippers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \112\ This document is available at https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/docs/99-145.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Second, OSHA does not consider the risk of falling into a power 
line to be as serious as the tree care industry portrays. If an 
employee falls from an aerial lift while using a personal fall arrest 
system with a harness, contact with a power line, though possible, is 
not certain. Sometimes the employee will not be working over the line. 
In other situations, the line will be on one side of the aerial lift 
bucket, but the employee will fall out on the other side where no 
conductors are present. In addition, the line may be far enough away 
that the employee does not reach it during the fall. In any event, the 
hazards associated with an employee falling into a power line can be 
reduced--or even removed altogether--by using a shorter lanyard as 
suggested by some rulemaking participants. (See, for example, Ex. 0505; 
Tr. 694-695.) In this regard, IBEW noted: ``If . . . the normal lanyard 
length [for a fall arrest system] of 5 to 6 feet is too long, the 
lanyard can be shortened to 3 or 4 feet, thereby eliminating the 
anticipated problems'' (Ex. 0505). Noting that the attachment point on 
a harness will be farther from the anchorage on the boom than is the 
attachment point on a body belt, ULCC claimed that a 0.9-meter (3-foot) 
lanyard was unworkable with a body harness (Ex. 0502). OSHA is not 
suggesting that a 0.9-meter lanyard with a body harness is feasible, 
only that a lanyard shorter than 1.8 meters (6 feet) could be used to 
reduce the risk of contact with a power line. A retractable lanyard 
could be used to keep the length of the lanyard as short as possible, 
thereby reducing the risk even further.
    Finally, the tree trimming associations' attempt to portray the 
hazards of falling into power lines as unique to their industry is 
flawed. The evidence is clear from the comments of employees who 
perform line work that power line workers also work above power lines 
and can fall into them. (See, for example, Ex. 0505; Tr. 971.) In 
addition, ULCC's attempt to distinguish line-clearance tree trimming 
work from power line work on the grounds that power line workers 
insulate the conductors above which they are working is unpersuasive. 
Like line-clearance tree trimmers, power line workers often work above 
energized power lines that have not been insulated. The final rule does 
not require insulation on conductors for a power line worker 
maintaining the minimum approach distance. In addition, insulating the 
lines is not always possible. According to Sec.  1926.97(c)(2)(i) and 
Table E-4 of the final rule, the highest maximum use voltage for rubber 
insulating equipment, such as rubber insulating line hose or blankets, 
is 36 kilovolts. The maximum use voltage for plastic guard equipment is 
72.5 kilovolts (Ex. 0073). Insulation is not available above those 
voltages.
    TCIA argued that insulating power lines is not feasible or 
practical for line-clearance tree trimming crews (Ex. 0503). OSHA is 
not persuaded by this argument. To the extent that it is the practice 
of line workers to insulate conductors beneath them, OSHA concludes 
that this practice also represents a feasible means of protecting line-
clearance tree trimmers from the hazard of falling into the line. The 
comment that line-clearance tree trimmers are not currently being 
trained in this practice is not relevant to whether it is feasible. If 
necessary, a line-clearance tree trimming employer could have the 
electric utility install the insulation or train line-clearance tree 
trimmers so that they are qualified to install insulation. In any 
event, the final rule does not require insulation for line-clearance 
tree trimmers; the final rule at Sec.  1910.269(r)(1)(iii) simply 
requires them to maintain the minimum approach distance from power 
lines. The use of insulation would simply be one way for line-clearance 
tree trimming employers to address their concern about employees 
falling into power lines while using personal fall arrest systems.
    The tree trimming industry did not submit any comments directly 
addressing the use of restraint systems, which is the second compliance 
option available to line-clearance tree trimming employers. Instead, as 
a result of the industry's misunderstanding regarding the applicability 
of the 0.6-meter (2-foot) free-fall distance for work-positioning 
systems (described earlier), it simply argued that it would be 
impossible or unsafe for employees working from an aerial lift to use a 
0.6-meter lanyard with a body belt for their work. (See, for example, 
Exs. 0174, 0200, 0419, 0502, 0503; Tr. 613-615, 756.)
    Mr. Andrew Salvadore, representing ULCC, testified as follows:

    [W]e can't do line clearance tree trimming with a lanyard of two 
foot [sic] or less. There are three reasons for this.
    Reason No. 1: Line clearance tree trimmers need to be able to 
reach from the four corners of an aerial lift bucket to do their 
work because [of the need] to maintain a minimum approach distance 
from energized wires different from linemen who can work right next 
to the wires. We can't get to the four corners of the bucket with a 
two-foot or shorter lanyard, typically anchored . . . outside of the 
bucket on the boom. This prevents us from reaching outside of the 
bucket with our tools or extending from the bucket. . . .
    Reason 2: The two-foot limitation is also unworkable because we 
usually work from [an] aerial lift positioned above energized 
conductors, reaching down to the tree branches below adjacent to 
conductors using insulated pole tools. This is different from 
linemen who typically position their lift buckets right next to the 
wire at arm's length. We lack the range of movement within the 
bucket necessary to reach over the bucket and down to the worksite 
because we would be restrained to the side of the bucket closest to 
the anchor. Relocation of an anchor is not [an] easy fix because the 
anchor is required to withstand a 5,000 pounds of force and 
typically can't be installed on the bucket . . . because [of] the 
lack of [a] strong enough anchoring point and because if the bucket 
breaks off in a catastrophic incident the worker goes down with the 
anchor attached to the bucket [rather than] being suspended by the 
lanyard attached to the boom.
    The Third Reason: Our people may be potentially yanked out of 
the bucket into precisely the fall that is sought to be avoided by 
the proposal because line clearance tree trimmers routinely rotate 
and articulate their lift buckets in ways that would exceed the 
distance of a short lanyard. . . . [This

[[Page 20386]]

exposes] the worker to being yanked out of the bucket by the short 
lanyard when the range of articulation of the bucket exceeds the 
short length of the lanyard. [Tr. 613-615]

To address these problems, the tree care industry recommended that OSHA 
permit the use of a 0.9-meter (3-foot) shock-absorbing lanyard with a 
body belt. (See, for example, Exs. 0174, 0200, 0502, 0503; Tr. 615--
616, 759--760.) The industry proposed a 408-kilogram (900-pound) 
limitation on fall arrest forces, presumably to remove hazards 
associated with concentrated fall arrest forces in falls into body 
belts (id.).
    As noted earlier, the tree care industry misinterpreted its 
compliance options under the proposed rule. For work from an aerial 
lift, there are only two options: (1) Fall arrest equipment and (2) a 
fall restraint system. Restraint systems do not permit any free fall. 
An acceptable restraint system for an aerial lift would prevent an 
employee from falling out of the lift and from being catapulted from 
the lift (for example, if the vehicle supporting the aerial lift was 
struck by a vehicle or if a large tree section struck the boom). Body 
belts are permitted as part of a restraint system; however, a system 
rigged to allow an employee to free fall even 0.6 meters (2 feet) would 
not be acceptable as a restraint system. The system proposed by the 
tree care industry, namely a body belt connected to a 0.9-meter (3-
foot) lanyard attached to an anchorage on the boom of an aerial lift, 
would not prevent the employee from falling out of or being catapulted 
from an aerial lift. Therefore, it would not be acceptable as a 
restraint system.
    Moreover, with a body belt instead of a harness, the system 
proposed by the tree care industry would not be an acceptable fall 
arrest system. Even if it provides sufficient protection to employees 
against concentrated fall arrest forces, it does not address the other 
two significant hazards associated with falling into body belts, that 
is, falling out of the body belt and sustaining further injury during 
suspension.\113\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \113\ Paragraph (d)(16) of Sec.  1926.502 requires a personal 
fall arrest system to be rigged so that the employee cannot free 
fall more than 6 feet (1.8 meters) nor contact any lower level. The 
Agency notes that the lanyard may need to be shorter than the 
maximum free-fall distance. This is the case for aerial lift work. 
The anchorage point on the boom of an aerial lift may be below the 
attachment point on the body belt or harness. As a result, the 
employee could free fall a distance equal to twice the length of the 
lanyard if he or she is ejected or catapulted from the aerial lift, 
as can happen when a vehicle strikes the aerial lift truck or a 
falling object, such as a tree branch, strikes the boom. This is not 
an unlikely event as several accidents in the record demonstrate 
(Ex. 0003; these three accidents can be viewed at https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=14507743&id=953869&id=14333157). Thus, the tree industry's 
recommended lanyard length could result in a free fall of 1.8 meters 
(6 feet).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The tree care industry asserted that OSHA has not demonstrated that 
using body belts in personal fall arrest systems in aerial lifts poses 
hazards to line-clearance tree trimmers. (See, for example, Exs. 0174, 
0200, 0502, 0503; Tr. 613, 758-759.) TCIA made this point as follows:

    The only fall protection issue arising in aerial lifts is 
failure to use any form of fall protection--an unsafe and non-
compliant behavior that the industry must strive to eliminate. 
Similarly, if operators in the past have worn body belts 
incorrectly, causing the equipment to not deliver the level of 
protection it should have, then there is a behavioral issue to 
address in training.
    It is our industry's experience that workers are not being 
injured by virtue of using body belts . . . and that non-compliance 
with PPE use requirements is directly proportional to how hard or 
uncomfortable the PPE is to use. [Ex. 0200; emphasis included in 
original]

    ULCC had similar comments:

    Preliminarily, there is NO showing in the subject notice of rule 
making that . . . allowing a body belt and lanyard for fall 
protection from aerial devices . . . creates a risk which merits 
modification of existing practice. It is our industry's experience 
that line clearance tree trimmers are not being injured by virtue of 
using body belts (OSHA cites no evidence, nor contrary evidence of 
any such bucket fall hazard or hazard from body belt lanyards over 
two feet long in line clearance tree trimming), and that lack of 
compliance with PPE use requirements is directly proportional to how 
hard or uncomfortable the PPE is to use. Between 1984 and 2002, 
there were 34 OSHA-recorded fatalities in Tree Trimming (SIC 0783) 
involving aerial device operators and falls. The details of these 
accidents illustrate where the greatest problems lie:
     23 of 34 fatalities were caused by catastrophic 
mechanical failures of some part of the aerial device that slammed 
the victim to the ground from considerable height. Fall protection, 
or lack of it, was not a factor in these fatalities.
     5 of 34 fatalities were caused by a tree or limb 
striking the aerial lift boom, again causing failure of the aerial 
device. Again, fall protection was not a factor.
     6 of 34 fatalities were caused by unsecured falls from 
the aerial device, and probably would have been prevented by the use 
of any means of fall protection.
    At a recent meeting of the Tree Care Industry Association Safety 
Committee (a tree care industry trade association), with the safety 
directors of 20 of the largest tree care companies representing well 
over 60,000 tree care employees present, a survey was taken as to 
whether these companies had any experience with aerial lift 
operators being injured from secured falls out of buckets. None did. 
For them, the more profound problem was the operator who disobeyed 
company policy and failed to wear any fall protection. [Ex. 0174; 
emphasis included in original]

In its posthearing comments, ULCC further argued that the one accident 
OSHA described, in which an employee slipped out of a body belt, 
occurred to a line worker, not a line-clearance tree trimmer, and that 
this single accident ``is statistically insignificant, insufficiently 
documented on the record, and in no way probative of any problem of 
line clearance tree trimmers falling from aerial lifts'' (Ex. 0502). 
ULCC further suggested that OSHA's proposal ignored the suspension-
trauma risk associated with full body harnesses (Exs. 0481, 0502). 
(OSHA describes the hazards related to prolonged suspension in fall 
protection equipment later in this section of the preamble.)
    OSHA rejects these assertions. OSHA closely examined issues related 
to the use of body belts in arresting falls in its Subpart M rulemaking 
(59 FR 40702-40703). In that rulemaking, the Agency concluded that 
``evidence in the record clearly demonstrates that employees who fall 
while wearing a body belt are not afforded the level of protection they 
would be if the fall occurred while the employee was wearing a full 
body harness'' (59 FR 40703). In addition, the Agency pointed to 
``evidence of injuries resulting from the use of body belts'' in fall 
arrest systems (id.). Also, as mentioned by ULCC, there is evidence in 
this rulemaking of an incident in which an employee, working from an 
aerial lift while wearing a body belt in a fall arrest system, slipped 
from the belt in a fall (Ex. 0003 \114\). Contrary to the tree care 
industry's suggestion, OSHA need not show that injuries are presently 
occurring to line-clearance tree trimmers because of falls into body 
belts; it is sufficient that the Agency found that tree trimming 
employees are exposed to a significant risk of injury under the 
existing standard and that the final rule will substantially reduce 
that risk. (See Section II.D, Significant Risk and Reduction in Risk, 
earlier in this preamble, for OSHA's response to the argument that the 
Agency is required to demonstrate a significant risk for each of the 
hazards addressed by this rulemaking.) ULCC's own analysis confirms 
that line-clearance tree trimmers are exposed to fall hazards (Ex. 
0174). Nearly 18 percent of falls from aerial lifts were of the type 
that, if the employee had been wearing a body belt in a personal fall 
arrest system, he or she would have been exposed to the serious 
hazards, described earlier, that

[[Page 20387]]

are associated with using body belts in fall arrest systems (id.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \114\ The description of this accident is available at: https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=170155857.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Agency acknowledges the suspension risk from body harnesses 
identified by ULCC. When an employee is suspended in a body belt or 
harness, a number of adverse medical effects can occur, including upper 
or lower extremity numbness; abdominal, shoulder, or groin pain; 
respiratory distress; nausea; dizziness; and arrhythmias (Ex. 0088). At 
least one of the adverse effects, orthostatic incompetence, can lead to 
death (Ex. 0481). It is because of these hazards that Sec.  
1926.502(d)(20) in Subpart M requires the employer to provide for 
prompt rescue of employees in the event of a fall or to assure that 
employees are able to rescue themselves. In any event, the hazards 
associated with prolonged suspension in a body belt are substantially 
more severe than the hazards associated with suspension in a harness. 
In 1985, the U.S. Technical Advisory Group on Personal Equipment for 
Protection Against Falling stated, in comments on another OSHA 
rulemaking: ``The length of time which a fallen person can tolerate 
suspension in a body belt is measured in a very few minutes under the 
most favorable conditions'' (Ex. 0084). In addition, a 1984 U.S. Air 
Force literature review recounted one study that found that ``two 
subjects evaluated in . . . waist belt[s] with shoulder straps 
tolerated suspension for 1 min 21 sec and 3 min'' (Ex. 0088).\115\ That 
same study showed that subjects suspended in full body harnesses could 
tolerate suspension for approximately 20 to 30 minutes (id.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \115\ Hearon, B.F., Brinkley, J.W., ``Fall Arrest and Post-Fall 
Suspension: Literature Review and Directions for Further Research,'' 
AFAMRL-TR-84-021, April 1984.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The tree care industry commented that, to the extent injuries are 
occurring, they are caused by the failure of employees to use any fall 
protection, rather than by the use of body belts. (See, for example, 
Exs. 0174, 0200.) This argument supports, rather than undermines, a 
requirement for harnesses in personal fall arrest systems. To the 
extent better enforcement of fall protection requirements by employers 
is a critical component of protecting employees in aerial lifts, 
harnesses are preferable to body belts. It is not always possible to 
detect from the ground whether an employee is wearing a body belt, but 
it is relatively easy to determine if an employee is wearing a body 
harness (Tr. 972-973). If employees initially resist the use of body 
harnesses, as suggested by some commenters (see, for example, Exs. 
0174, 0200, 0219), employers must be proactive in communicating the 
need for, and ensuring the use of, the required equipment.
    The Agency concludes that the use of a 0.9-meter shock-absorbing 
lanyard with a body belt, as proposed by the tree trimming industry, is 
not an adequate substitute for the use of a harness in a fall arrest 
system. OSHA has not been persuaded to abandon its finding in the 
Subpart M rulemaking that body belts present unacceptable risks in fall 
arrest situations and should be prohibited as components of fall arrest 
equipment. OSHA is adopting in the final rule the requirement proposed 
in paragraph (b)(1) that personal fall arrest equipment meet Subpart M 
of Part 1926. This provision appears in final Sec.  1926.954(b)(1)(i).
    ULCC noted what it perceived as an implied, but unstated, revision 
in the proposal to the provisions contained in the general industry 
aerial lift standard (Sec.  1910.67(c)(2)(v)) requiring employees 
working in aerial lifts to use body belts and lanyards. (See, for 
example, Ex. 0174.)
    In the preamble to the proposal, OSHA explained that it was relying 
on the provisions in the aerial lift standards to establish the 
employer's duty to provide fall protection for employees, but that 
Subpart M would govern the criteria fall arrest equipment must meet (70 
FR 34850). In other words, for work covered by this rule, body belts 
would not be permitted in personal fall arrest systems. The ULCC 
commented: ``OSHA's suggestion that [the aerial lift standard] 
describes only the `duty' to use fall protection rather than the kind 
of fall protection, respectfully, is a makeweight'' (Ex. 0502).
    In light of ULCC's comments, the Agency is concerned that some 
employers reading the final rule may mistakenly assume that the body 
belts required by Sec. Sec.  1910.67(c)(2)(v) and 1926.453(b)(2)(v) 
remain acceptable for use in personal fall arrest systems. In addition, 
the Agency wants to make it clear in the final rule that work-
positioning equipment is unacceptable from the horizontal working 
surface of an aerial lift. Employees working from aerial lifts covered 
by the final rule must be protected using either a fall restraint 
system or a personal fall arrest system. Therefore, OSHA is adding a 
provision in final Sec. Sec.  1910.269(g)(2)(iv)(C)(1) and 
1926.954(b)(3)(iii)(A) providing that employees working from aerial 
lifts be protected with a fall restraint system or a personal fall 
arrest system and that the provisions of the aerial lift standards 
requiring the use of body belts and lanyards do not apply. This 
provision clearly states the requirement contained in the proposal. As 
a consequence of this change, the final rule does not include the text 
in Note 1 to proposed Sec.  1910.269(g)(2)(iii)(C) and Note 1 to 
proposed Sec.  1926.954(b)(3)(iii) referring to fall protection for 
aerial lifts or referencing the general industry and construction 
standards on aerial lifts. (The corresponding notes in the final rule 
are Note 1 to Sec.  1910.269(g)(2)(iv)(C)(2) and (g)(2)(iv)(C)(3) and 
Note 1 to Sec.  1926.954(b)(3)(iii)(B) and (b)(3)(iii)(C).)
    OSHA is adopting revised requirements for work-positioning 
equipment in Sec.  1926.954(b)(2).\116\ Section 1926.959 of existing 
Subpart V contains requirements for body belts, safety straps,\117\ and 
lanyards.\118\ This equipment was traditionally used as both work-
positioning equipment and fall arrest equipment in the maintenance and 
construction of electric power transmission and distribution 
installations. However, fall arrest equipment and work-positioning 
equipment present significant differences in the way they are used and 
in the forces they place on an employee's body. With fall arrest 
equipment, an employee has freedom of movement within an area 
restricted by the length of the lanyard or other device connecting the 
employee to the anchorage. In contrast, and as explained earlier, work-
positioning equipment is used on a vertical surface to support an 
employee in position while he or she works. The employee ``leans'' into 
this equipment so that he or she can work with both hands free. If a 
fall occurs while an employee is wearing fall arrest equipment, the 
employee will free fall up to 1.8 meters (6 feet) before the slack is 
removed and the equipment begins to arrest the fall. In this case, the 
fall arrest forces can be high, and they need to be spread over a 
relatively large area of the

[[Page 20388]]

body to avoid injury to the employee. Additionally, the velocity at 
which an employee falls can reach up to 6.1 meters per second (20 feet 
per second). Work-positioning equipment is normally used to prevent a 
fall from occurring in the first place. If the employee slips and if 
the work-positioning equipment is anchored, the employee will only fall 
a short distance (no more than 0.6 meters (2 feet) under paragraph 
(b)(3)(iv) of final Sec.  1926.954). This distance limits the forces on 
the employee and the maximum velocity of a fall. Additionally, because 
of the way the equipment is used, the employee should not be free 
falling. Instead, the work-positioning equipment will be exerting some 
force on the employee to stop the fall, thereby further limiting the 
maximum force and velocity. As long as the employee is working on a 
vertical surface, the chance of an employee using work-positioning 
equipment falling out of, or being suspended at the waist in, a body 
belt is extremely low.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \116\ In Sec.  1910.269(g)(2)(ii), OSHA proposed to require body 
belts and positioning straps for work positioning to meet Sec.  
1926.954(b)(2). The final rule duplicates the requirements of Sec.  
1926.954(b)(2) in Sec.  1910.269(g)(2)(iii) rather than referencing 
them.
    \117\ ``Safety straps'' is an older, deprecated term for 
``positioning straps.''
    \118\ Existing Sec.  1926.500(a)(3)(iii) states that additional 
performance requirements for personal climbing equipment, lineman's 
body belts, safety straps, and lanyards are provided in subpart V. 
OSHA is revising the language in this provision to make it 
consistent with the terms used in final Subpart V. Furthermore, 
because the Agency is adopting, in subpart V, an additional 
requirement for fall arrest equipment used by employees exposed to 
electric arcs (as described earlier in this section of the 
preamble), OSHA is adding fall arrest equipment to the list of 
equipment in Sec.  1926.500(a)(3)(iii). As revised, Sec.  
1926.500(a)(3)(iii) states that additional performance requirements 
for fall arrest and work-positioning equipment are provided in 
Subpart V.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the final rule, OSHA is applying requirements to personal fall 
arrest systems that differ from the requirements that apply to work-
positioning equipment. As discussed previously, personal fall arrest 
systems must meet subpart M of part 1926, as required by paragraph 
(b)(1)(i), supplemented by the requirement in final paragraph 
(b)(1)(ii) that the equipment withstand exposure to electric arcs. 
Work-positioning equipment must meet the requirements contained in 
paragraph (b)(2) of the final rule. Employers engaged in electric power 
transmission and distribution work may use the same equipment for fall 
arrest and for work positioning provided the equipment meets both sets 
of requirements. In fact, as noted in the preamble to the proposal, 
several manufacturers market combination body harness-body belt 
equipment, which can be used as fall arrest systems by employees 
working on horizontal surfaces or as work-positioning systems 
supporting employees working on vertical surfaces (70 FR 34850).
    Paragraph (b)(2) of the final rule is based on existing Sec.  
1926.959 and ASTM F887-04, Standard Specifications for Personal 
Climbing Equipment, which was the latest edition of the national 
consensus standard applicable to work-positioning equipment when OSHA 
developed the proposed rule (Ex. 0055). Although OSHA is adopting 
requirements derived from the ASTM standard, the final rule is written 
in performance-oriented terms. Detailed specifications contained in the 
ASTM standard, which do not directly impact the safety of employees, 
were not included in the final rule. The Agency believes that this 
approach will retain the protection for employees afforded by the ASTM 
standard, while giving employers flexibility in meeting the OSHA 
standard and accommodating future changes in the ASTM standard without 
needing to change the OSHA standard. This is similar to the approach 
OSHA took in final Sec.  1926.97, discussed previously.
    While the ASTM standard does not cover lanyards, paragraph (b)(2), 
as proposed, would have applied many of the requirements based on the 
ASTM standard to lanyards. Existing Sec.  1926.959 imposes the same 
basic requirements on lanyards.
    OSHA requested comment on whether any of the proposed requirements 
for work-positioning equipment should not be applicable to lanyards. 
Some commenters supported the Agency's proposal. (See, for example, 
Exs. 0211, 0230.) For instance, IBEW stated:

    [L]anyards used for fall protection for electric power 
transmission and distribution work [already] meet the requirements 
of ASTM F887-04. Therefore these requirements, as proposed, should 
be applicable to lanyards used for work positioning equipment. [Ex. 
0230]

    However, Buckingham Manufacturing Company, a manufacturer of work-
positioning equipment used by line workers, opposed the application of 
some of the proposed requirements for work-positioning equipment to 
lanyards:

    Buckingham Mfg. recommends including a section on lanyards to 
remove requirements outlined in the referenced sections that are not 
applicable to lanyards such as: (b)(2)(vii) and including at least 
criteria such as strength requirements for the rope or webbing used 
to manufacture . . . a lanyard, the minimum number of rope tucks for 
rope lanyards, the length of stitching for turnover at ends of web 
lanyards, stitching used be of a contrasting color to facilitate 
visual inspection, etc. [Ex. 0199]

    ASTM F887-04 refers to the straps used with work-positioning 
equipment as ``positioning straps,'' not lanyards.\119\ That consensus 
standard uses the term ``lanyard'' only with respect to personal fall 
arrest equipment. In addition, subpart M uses the term ``lanyard'' only 
in the requirements applicable to personal fall arrest systems in Sec.  
1926.502(d). However, existing Sec.  1926.959 applies to ``body belts, 
safety straps, and lanyards'' used for either work positioning or fall 
arrest. Because the term ``lanyard'' is most typically used with 
reference to fall arrest equipment, OSHA is concerned that using that 
term in requirements for work-positioning equipment could lead 
employers or employees to believe that work-positioning equipment is 
acceptable for use in fall arrest situations, for example, when an 
employee is working from a horizontal surface. For these reasons, OSHA 
decided to use the term ``positioning strap'' instead of lanyard in 
final paragraph (b)(2) to describe the strap used to connect a body 
belt to an anchorage in work-positioning equipment. Thus, any strap 
used with work-positioning equipment is a ``positioning strap'' for the 
purposes of paragraph (b)(2). This language also should address 
Buckingham Manufacturing's concerns that some of the proposed 
requirements were inapplicable to lanyards. The Agency believes that 
Buckingham Manufacturing's comment was referring to lanyards used with 
personal fall arrest systems, which OSHA recognizes may not meet all of 
the requirements for positioning straps in final Sec.  1926.954(b)(2). 
Paragraph (b)(2)(vii) contains specifications for positioning straps 
that are essential to electric power generation, transmission, and 
distribution work, including requirements for electrical performance, 
strength, and flame resistance (Ex. 0055). Lanyards, which are used 
with personal fall arrest systems, have to meet appropriate strength 
and, if necessary, arc-resistance requirements under subpart M and 
final Sec.  1926.954(b)(1)(ii).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \119\ ASTM F887-12\e1\ uses the term ``adjustable positioning 
lanyards'' for equipment used as part of certain positioning 
devices. OSHA treats these lanyards as ``positioning straps'' under 
the final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Paragraph (b)(2)(i), which is being adopted without substantive 
change from the proposal, requires hardware for body belts and 
positioning straps to be made from drop-forged steel, pressed steel, 
formed steel, or equivalent material. This hardware also must have a 
corrosion-resistant finish. Surfaces must be smooth and free of sharp 
edges. These requirements ensure that the hardware is durable, strong 
enough to withstand the forces likely to be imposed, and free of sharp 
edges that could damage other parts of the work-positioning equipment. 
These requirements are equivalent to existing Sec.  1926.959(a)(1), 
except that the existing standard does not permit hardware to be made 
of any material other than drop-forged or pressed steel. Although ASTM 
F887-04 requires hardware to be made

[[Page 20389]]

of drop-forged steel,\120\ OSHA explained in the preamble to the 
proposal that, while the drop-forged steel process produces hardware 
that more uniformly meets the required strength criteria and will 
retain its strength over a longer period than pressed or formed steel, 
it is possible for other processes to produce hardware that is 
equivalent in terms of strength and durability (70 FR 34851). 
Paragraphs (d)(1) and (e)(3) of Sec.  1926.502 already permit 
``connectors'' (that is, ``hardware'' as that term is used in this 
final rule) to be made of materials other than drop-forged or pressed 
steel.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \120\ The current edition of this standard, ASTM F887-12\e1\, 
also requires hardware to be made from drop-forged steel in Section 
15.4.1.1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    OSHA invited comments on whether alternative materials would 
provide adequate safety to employees. Most commenters responding to 
this issue supported the proposed language accepting the use of 
equivalent materials. (See, for example, Exs. 0126, 0162, 0173, 0175, 
0186, 0230.) For instance, Ms. Salud Layton of the Virginia, Maryland & 
Delaware Association of Electric Cooperatives commented:

    We support the flexibility OSHA [is] offering in this area. 
Allowing hardware to be made of material other than drop-forged or 
pressed steel allows for potential alternatives to be evaluated for 
use. Other material, however, must meet the strength and durability 
criteria of drop-forged or pressed steel materials. [Ex. 0175]

Other commenters supported the proposal because it would permit the use 
of alternative materials that might be developed in the future (Exs. 
0162, 0186, 0230). Mr. Daniel Shipp with ISEA commented that the ``use 
of non-ferrous materials, including high-tensile aluminum with [a] 
protective anodize coating, is common'' and noted that there are 
``criteria [available] for evaluating the equivalence between forged 
alloy steel and other materials'' (Ex. 0211).
    Although OSHA received no outright opposition to the proposal, ASTM 
Committee F18 on Electrical Protective Equipment for Workers, the 
committee responsible for developing ASTM F887, submitted the following 
statement from Mr. Hans Nichols, P.E., Metallurgical Consulting:

    My opinion is that forgings are superior to stampings. The 
principal advantage of forgings is control of grain direction to 
match the part geometry. The grain direction of a stamping will be 
oriented transverse to the part in some areas. Since the mechanical 
properties, i.e.--yield strength and impact strength, are lower in 
the transverse direction, this area of the part would be a weak 
point. [Ex. 0148]

    OSHA agrees that some materials have advantages over others and 
expects that manufacturers typically base their design decisions on 
factors such as these. However, the fact that forgings may result in 
more uniform strength throughout a material than stampings is not 
relevant to the overall strength of hardware. It is the area of least 
strength that determines whether hardware has sufficient overall 
strength, and the design-test requirements in the final rule (discussed 
later in this section of the preamble) ensure that hardware, and the 
entire work-positioning system, are sufficiently strong. In other 
words, the testing requirements in the rule ensure that the weakest 
part of the weakest piece of the system will not fail under conditions 
likely to be encountered during use. In addition, the final rule 
requires that the hardware be made of material that has strength and 
durability equivalent to that of drop-forged, pressed, or formed steel, 
materials used successfully for work-positioning equipment for decades. 
Therefore, OSHA is including paragraph (b)(2)(i) in the final rule 
substantially as proposed.
    Paragraph (b)(2)(ii), which is being adopted without substantive 
change from the proposal, requires buckles to be capable of 
withstanding an 8.9-kilonewton (2,000-pound-force) tension test with a 
maximum permanent deformation no greater than 0.4 millimeters (0.0156 
inches). This requirement, which also can be found in existing Sec.  
1926.959(a)(2), will ensure that buckles do not fail if a fall occurs.
    Paragraph (b)(2)(iii), which is being adopted without substantive 
change from the proposal, requires that D rings be capable of 
withstanding a 22-kilonewton (5,000-pound-force) tensile test without 
cracking or breaking. (A D ring is a metal ring in the shape of a 
``D.'' See Figure 2, which shows a snaphook and a D ring.) This 
provision, which is equivalent to existing Sec.  1926.959(a)(3), will 
ensure that D rings do not fail if a fall occurs.
    Paragraph (b)(2)(iv), which is being adopted without substantive 
change from the proposal, is equivalent to existing Sec.  
1926.959(a)(4) and requires snaphooks to be capable of withstanding a 
22-kilonewton (5,000-pound-force) tension test without failure. A note 
following this provision indicates that distortion of the snaphook 
sufficient to release the keeper is considered to be tensile failure. 
The language of the note in the final rule was revised from the 
proposal to make it clear that such distortion is only one form of 
failure. The snaphook breaking completely is a more obvious failure not 
mentioned in the note.
    Paragraph (b)(2)(v), which is being adopted without change from the 
proposal, prohibits leather or leather substitutes from being used 
alone as a load-bearing component of a body-belt and positioning-strap 
assembly. This is a new requirement for Subpart V and was derived from 
ASTM F887-04, Sections 14.2.1 and 15.2.1.\121\ The requirement is 
necessary because leather and leather substitutes do not retain their 
strength as they age. Because this loss in strength is not always easy 
to detect by visual inspection, it can lead to failure under fall 
conditions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \121\ These requirements are also contained in the latest 
edition, ASTM F887-12\e1\, in Sections 14.2.1 and 15.2.1.1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Paragraph (b)(2)(vi), which is being adopted without substantive 
change from the proposal, requires that plied fabric used in 
positioning straps and in load-bearing portions of body belts be 
constructed so that no raw edges are exposed and the plies do not 
separate. This new requirement, which also is based on ASTM F887-04, in 
this instance, Sections 14.2.2 and 15.2.2, will prevent plied fabric 
from separating, which could cause it to fail under fall 
conditions.\122\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \122\ These requirements are also contained in the latest 
edition, ASTM F887-12\e1\, in Sections 14.2.2 and 15.2.1.2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Although work-positioning equipment used in electric power 
transmission and distribution work is not to be used as insulation from 
live parts, positioning straps could come into accidental contact with 
live parts while an employee is working. Thus, OSHA deems it important 
for this equipment to provide a specified level of insulation. 
Accordingly, the Agency proposed, in paragraphs (b)(2)(vii)(A) and 
(b)(2)(vii)(B), to require positioning straps to be capable of passing 
dielectric and leakage current tests.\123\ Similar requirements are 
found in existing Sec.  1926.959(b)(1). The voltages listed in the 
proposed paragraphs were alternating current. A note following proposed 
paragraph (b)(2)(vii)(B) indicated that equivalent direct current tests 
also would be acceptable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \123\ The dielectric and leakage-current tests required by these 
paragraphs involve attaching electrodes to the fall protection 
equipment, applying a test voltage across the electrodes, and 
checking for deterioration (in the case of the dielectric test) or 
measuring leakage current (in the case of the leakage-current test). 
ASTM F887-12\e1\ includes test methods for these two tests.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the preamble to the proposed rule, OSHA explained that ASTM 
F887-04 did not require positioning straps to pass a withstand-voltage 
test (70 FR

[[Page 20390]]

34851). Instead, the consensus standard stated in a note that the 
fabric used in the positioning straps must pass a withstand-voltage 
test. The Agency invited comment on whether performing electrical tests 
on positioning straps is necessary for employee safety in electric 
transmission and distribution work (that is, whether the requirements 
proposed in paragraphs (b)(2)(vii)(A) and (b)(2)(vii)(B) were 
necessary).\124\ A number of commenters responded to this question. 
Some commenters supported OSHA's proposal. (See, for example, Exs. 
0148, 0230.) For instance, IBEW explained:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \124\ The preamble to the proposal asked specifically about the 
withstand test requirement proposed in paragraph (b)(2)(vii)(A); 
however, most commenters responded to the question of whether there 
is a need to perform electrical tests on positioning straps (the 
withstand test and the leakage test proposed in paragraph 
(b)(2)(vii)(B)).

    Positioning straps should offer a minimum level of insulation in 
the event [the] strap comes in contact with energized parts. The 
manufacturing specifications from ASTM F887-04 do not ensure the 
positioning strap actually offers any level of insulation. As stated 
in the proposal, the ASTM requirements only require the fabric used 
to make the strap be tested for leakage current. Other products used 
[in] the manufacture of the strap could . . . jeopardize the 
electrical [insulation] integrity of the fabric. Therefore, the 
leakage current of the finished product will not be known without a 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
separate test. [Ex. 0230]

    ASTM commented that ``requirements in ASTM F887 04 for leakage 
current and withstand testing of the positioning strap material in 
Sections 15.3.1 and 15.3.1--Note 2 are adequate for the performance of 
the positioning strap'' (Ex. 0148). The organization recommended that 
the ASTM language ``be repeated in the Final 1926.954, or incorporated 
by reference'' (id.).
    Other commenters did not see a need to perform electrical tests on 
positioning straps. (See, for example, Exs. 0162, 0173, 0186, 0219.) 
For instance, Mr. Anthony Ahern with Ohio Rural Electric Cooperatives 
argued: ``Given the environment these devices will be used in, within 5 
minutes of being used the first time they will probably have enough 
dirt and wood preservative ground into them that they couldn't pass 
such a test again'' (Ex. 0186). He also noted that this equipment has 
been in service for years and he is not aware of any accidents that 
have occurred due to the breakdown of a positioning strap (id.). Mr. 
Allen Oracion with Energy United EMC maintained that positioning straps 
will be separated from energized parts by at least the minimum approach 
distance, making withstand tests unnecessary (Ex. 0219).
    OSHA believes that requiring positioning straps to be capable of 
passing the electrical tests in proposed Sec.  1926.954(b)(2)(vii)(A) 
and (b)(2)(vii)(B) will provide an additional measure of protection to 
employees if a conductor or other energized part slips and lands on the 
strap or if the strap slips from the employee's hand and lands on an 
energized part. In response to Mr. Oracion's comment, the Agency notes 
that the minimum approach distance will not always protect employees 
exposed to electric-shock hazards. For example, minimum approach 
distances do not apply to conductors on which work is being performed 
by employees using rubber insulating gloves (as explained under the 
discussion of Sec.  1926.960(c)(1) of the final rule). The proposed 
withstand- and leakage-testing requirements will confirm that the 
fabric used in the manufacture of the strap will provide insulation 
from electrical contact and that the manufacturing process that created 
the strap did not compromise the fabric's insulating properties. 
Although the equipment may become contaminated during use, as noted by 
Mr. Ahern, the inspection requirements in Sec.  1926.954(b)(3)(i) of 
the final rule (discussed later in this section of the preamble) will 
ensure that any contamination that can affect the insulating properties 
of the equipment will be identified and removed. In addition, any 
contamination will normally be on the portion of the positioning strap 
in contact with a pole; the remaining portion of the strap will still 
provide a measure of protection.
    The testing requirements in final paragraphs (b)(2)(vii)(A) and 
(b)(2)(vii)(B) are also equivalent to the tests required by ASTM F887-
12\e1\ (Section 15.3.1 and Note 2). It is not clear why ASTM included 
the requirement that positioning straps pass a withstand test in a note 
rather than in the rule itself. OSHA is including the requirement that 
positioning straps be capable of passing a withstand test in the text 
of final Sec.  1926.954(b)(2)(vii)(A) to make it clear that this 
provision is mandatory. The Agency believes that straps currently being 
manufactured and used usually meet the final provisions. There is no 
evidence in the rulemaking record that current positioning straps do 
not meet these requirements. Therefore, OSHA is including paragraphs 
(b)(2)(vii)(A) and (b)(2)(vii)(B) in the final rule as proposed.
    Paragraphs (b)(2)(vii)(C) and (b)(2)(vii)(D), which are being 
adopted without substantive change from the proposal, contain new 
requirements for positioning straps to be capable of passing tension 
tests and buckle-tear tests. These tests are based on ASTM F887-04, 
sections 15.3.2 and 15.3.3, and will ensure that individual parts of 
positioning straps have adequate strength and will not fail during a 
fall.\125\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \125\ These requirements are also contained in the latest 
edition, ASTM F887-12\e1\, in Section 15.3.2 and 15.3.3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Paragraph (b)(2)(vii)(E) requires positioning straps to be capable 
of passing a flammability test (described in Table V-1). This 
requirement, and the test in Table V-1, are based on ASTM F887-04, 
Section 15.3.4.\126\ If an electric arc occurs while an employee is 
working, the work-positioning equipment must be capable of supporting 
the employee in case he or she loses consciousness. It is particularly 
important for the positioning strap to be resistant to igniting, 
because, once ignited, it would quickly lose its strength and fail.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \126\ This requirement is also contained in the latest edition, 
ASTM F887-12\e1\, in Section 15.3.4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Mr. Pat McAlister with Henry County REMC questioned the ``value in 
the proposed arc testing requirement'' because his company was ``not 
aware of any situation where exposure to thermal energy has contributed 
to failure of'' positioning straps (Ex. 0210).
    OSHA responds that, although paragraph (b)(2)(vii)(E) will help 
ensure that positioning straps do not fail if an electric arc occurs, 
the standard just requires positioning straps to be capable of passing 
a flammability test; the standard does not require electric-arc 
testing. As noted later in the discussion of Sec.  1926.960(g) of the 
final rule, electric power generation, transmission, and distribution 
work exposes employees to hazards from electric arcs. Paragraph 
(b)(2)(vii)(E) of Sec.  1926.954 protects against some of those 
hazards, including ignition of the positioning strap, which could lead 
to failure of the strap and burns to the employee. ASTM F887 has 
required positioning straps to be capable of passing a flammability 
test since 1988, so the Agency is not surprised that Mr. McAlister is 
not aware of failures of positioning straps in electric-arc exposures. 
Having ASTM adopt a requirement for positioning straps to pass a 
flammability test is evidence that the consensus of industry opinion is 
that such testing is necessary. Therefore, OSHA is including paragraph 
(b)(2)(vii)(E) in the final rule as proposed. (OSHA, however, has made 
nonsubstantive, clarifying changes to final Table V-1.)

[[Page 20391]]

    Paragraph (b)(2)(viii), which is being adopted without substantive 
change from the proposal, requires the cushion part of a body belt to 
be at least 76 millimeters (3 inches) wide, with no exposed rivets on 
the inside. This requirement is equivalent to existing Sec.  
1926.959(b)(2)(i) and (ii).
    Existing Sec.  1926.959(b)(2)(iii), which requires the cushion part 
of the body belt to be at least 0.15625 inches thick if made of 
leather, was omitted from the final rule. The strength of the body belt 
assembly, which this existing provision addresses, is now adequately 
addressed by the performance-based strength criteria specified in final 
Sec.  1926.954(b)(2)(xii) (discussed later in this section of the 
preamble). Additionally, as noted previously, load-bearing portions of 
the body belt may no longer be constructed of leather alone under 
paragraph (b)(2)(v) of the final rule.
    Paragraph (b)(2)(ix), which is being adopted without substantive 
change from the proposal, requires that tool loops on a body belt be 
situated so that the 100 millimeters (4 inches) at the center of the 
back of the body belt (measured from D ring to D ring) are free of tool 
loops and other attachments. OSHA based this requirement on ASTM F887-
04, Section 14.4.3, which is similar to existing Sec.  1926.959(b)(3). 
This requirement will prevent spine injuries to employees who fall onto 
their backs while wearing a body belt, which could happen to an 
employee walking on the ground before or after climbing a pole.
    Existing Sec.  1926.959(b)(2)(iv) requires body belts to contain 
pocket tabs for attaching tool pockets. ASTM F887-04 also contained a 
requirement that body belts have pocket tabs. In the proposal, OSHA 
stated that it did not consider provisions regarding pocket tabs to be 
necessary for the protection of employees; the Agency believed that 
these requirements ensured that body belts were suitable as tool belts, 
but did not contribute significantly to the safety of employees (70 FR 
34851).
    ASTM Committee F18 on Electrical Protective Equipment for Workers 
clarified the purpose of the requirements for pocket tabs in the 
consensus standard as follows:

    [Pocket tabs are] addressed in ASTM F887-04, Section 
14.4.1\[127]\ as follows: ``The belt shall have pocket tabs 
extending at least 1\1/2\ (3.8 cm) down, and with the 
point of attachment at least 3 in. (7.6 cm) back of the inside of 
the circle dee rings on each side for the attachment of pliers or 
tool pockets. On shifting dee belts, the measurement for pocket tabs 
shall be taken when the dee ring section is centered.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \127\ Section 14.3.1 in ASTM F887-12\e1\ contains an identical 
requirement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

* * * * *
    The primary reason for the specific placement of these pocket 
tabs is to assist in eliminating the interference of tools being 
carried on the belt with the proper engagement of a positioning 
strap snaphook into the body belt dee ring.
    Therefore, this detail is important for the safety of employees 
using these body belts. [Ex. 0148]

The committee recommended that OSHA either adopt the ASTM language or 
incorporate it by reference.
    OSHA does not believe that pocket tabs are a hazard. The tabs are 
flush with the body belt and extend down from it. They do not interfere 
with the attachment of snaphooks to the D rings. OSHA agrees that tool 
pockets fastened to the tabs, or the tools in those pockets, could 
interfere under certain conditions. For example, a large tool or pocket 
could interfere with the attachment of snaphooks and D rings even with 
the tabs positioned as required by the consensus standard. The Agency 
believes that this hazard is better addressed by the general 
requirement in final paragraph (b)(3)(i) (discussed later in this 
section of the preamble) that work-positioning equipment be inspected 
to ensure that it is in safe working condition before use. In addition, 
the ASTM committee did not explain why tabs are necessary in the first 
place. Therefore, OSHA is not adopting the committee's recommendation 
to add the ASTM requirement on pocket tabs in the final rule.
    Existing Sec.  1926.959(b)(3) permits a maximum of four tool loops 
on body belts. As explained in the preamble to the proposal, OSHA does 
not believe that this provision is necessary for the protection of 
employees (70 FR 34851). Like existing Sec.  1926.959(b)(2)(iv), this 
requirement ensures only that body belts are suitable as tool belts. 
OSHA received no comments on the proposed removal of this requirement, 
and the final rule removes this requirement from subpart V.\128\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \128\ Existing Sec.  1926.959(b)(3) also requires the 100-
millimeter (4-inch) section of the body belt in the middle of the 
back to be free of tool loops and other attachments. This portion of 
the existing paragraph is retained as Sec.  1926.954(b)(2)(ix) in 
the final rule, as described previously.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Paragraph (b)(2)(x), which is being adopted without change from the 
proposal, requires copper, steel, or equivalent liners to be used 
around the bars of D rings. This provision, which duplicates existing 
Sec.  1926.959(b)(4), will prevent wear between the D ring and the body 
belt fabric. Such wear could contribute to failure of the body belt 
during use.
    In paragraph (b)(2)(xi), OSHA proposed that snaphooks used as part 
of work-positioning equipment be of the locking type. A snaphook has a 
keeper designed to prevent the D ring to which it is attached from 
coming out of the opening of the snaphook. (See Figure 1.) However, if 
the design of the snaphook is not compatible with the design of the D 
ring, the D ring can roll around, press open the keeper, and free 
itself from the snaphook. (See Figure 2.)

[[Page 20392]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR11AP14.000

    For many years, ASTM F887 had a requirement that snaphooks be 
compatible with the D rings with which they were used. Even with this 
requirement, however, accidents resulting from snaphook roll-outs still 
occurred. As OSHA explained in the preamble to the proposal, several 
factors account for this condition (70 FR 34852). First, while one 
manufacturer can (and most do) thoroughly test its snaphooks and its D 
rings to ensure ``compatibility,'' no manufacturer can test its 
hardware in every conceivable combination with other manufacturers' 
hardware, especially since some models of snaphooks and D rings are no 
longer manufactured. While an employer might be able to test all of the 
different hardware combinations with its existing equipment, the 
employer normally does not have the expertise necessary to conduct such 
tests in a comprehensive manner. Second, snaphook keepers can be 
depressed by objects other than the D rings to which they are attached. 
For example, a loose guy (a support line) could fall onto the keeper 
while an employee is repositioning himself or herself. This situation 
could allow the D ring to escape from the snaphook, and the employee 
would fall as soon as he or she leaned back into the work-positioning 
equipment. The locking-type snaphooks OSHA proposed to require will not 
open unless employees release the locking mechanisms.
    A few commenters objected to the requirement for locking snaphooks, 
maintaining that existing pole straps with nonlocking snaphooks have 
been used safely and effectively for many years. (See, for example, 
Exs. 0210, 0225.) Mr. Jonathan Glazier with the National Rural Electric 
Cooperative Association (NRECA) questioned the safety benefits of 
locking snaphooks, commenting:

    Is the cost of replacing the thousands of non-locking snaphooks 
in use today outweighed by the benefit? Certainly workers are 
familiar with the rudimentary technology presented by non-locking 
snaphooks, so the danger they present is low. [Ex. 0233]

    A majority of the rulemaking participants who commented on this 
issue agreed that the proposed requirement for locking snaphooks was 
justified. (See, for example, Exs. 0167, 0169, 0213; Tr. 579.) For 
instance, Quanta Services commented that ``the current requirement [to 
use] snaphooks compatible with the particular D rings with which they 
are used is not sufficient because accidents from snaphook rollover 
still occur'' and agreed with OSHA that the proposal to require locking 
snaphooks ``will provide greater protection'' (Ex. 0169).
    Snaphook rollout is a recognized hazard, as indicated by updated 
requirements in the consensus standard. The ASTM committee believed 
that the former requirement for compatibility between snaphooks and D 
rings was inadequate to protect employees; thus, the committee included 
a requirement for locking snaphooks in ASTM F887-04 (Ex. 0055). 
Evidence in the record indicates that the committee was correct; one 
exhibit showed that two workers were killed when the snaphooks they 
were using apparently rolled out (Ex. 0003).\129\ OSHA considered the 
record on this issue and concluded that the proposed requirement for 
locking snaphooks is justified; therefore, the Agency is including the 
proposed provision in the final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \129\ Descriptions of these two accidents can be viewed at: 
https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=922336&id=14340061.
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    Mr. Lee Marchessault with Workplace Safety Solutions recommended 
that the term ``double locking type'' be used rather than ``locking 
type'' (Ex. 0196; Tr. 579). His comment addressed the reference to 
locking snaphooks in proposed paragraph (b)(3)(vi) (discussed later in 
this section of the preamble), but, because paragraph (b)(2)(xi) 
contains the requirement that snaphooks on positioning straps be of the 
locking type, his comment applies equally here.
    The devices specified in the standard are ``locking snaphooks.'' 
They are also known as ``double-locking snaphooks.'' However, this 
latter term is a misnomer. There is only a single locking mechanism. 
The keeper, which ``keeps'' the snaphook on the D ring, is not self-
locking. Consequently, these devices are correctly known as ``locking

[[Page 20393]]

snaphooks,'' and OSHA is using this term in the final rule.
    In issuing the proposal, OSHA recognized that there might be 
thousands of existing nonlocking snaphooks currently in use and 
requested comment on whether it should phase in the requirement for 
locking snaphooks for older equipment or allow employers to continue 
using existing equipment that otherwise complies with the standard 
until it wears out and must be replaced.
    Several commenters recommended grandfathering existing equipment 
and requiring that only newly purchased positioning straps be equipped 
with locking snaphooks. (See, for example, Exs. 0162, 0175, 0210, 0224, 
0225, 0227, 0233.) For instance, the Virginia, Maryland & Delaware 
Association of Electric Cooperatives commented:

    [G]randfathering existing equipment for those companies that 
have not started utilizing locking snap-hooks is prudent. For 
companies currently using older equipment, the requirement should be 
that as the older equipment is phased out or worn out, new equipment 
must be the locking snap-hook type. [Ex. 0175]

In addition, Mr. Glazier with NRECA was concerned that requiring an 
immediate switch to locking snaphooks could lead to a shortage of 
compliant equipment (Ex. 0233).
    Other commenters argued that there should be little or no phase-in 
period because nonlocking snaphooks have not been available for over 10 
years and because employees would be left at risk. (See, for example, 
Exs. 0148, 0199, 0212.) TVA commented that it had ``prohibited 
nonlocking snaphooks for a number of years'' before OSHA's proposal 
(Ex. 0213). The Southern Company and ASTM Committee F18 recommended a 
phase-in period of no more than 12 months (Exs. 0148, 0212). Buckingham 
Manufacturing Company recommended a phase-in period of no more than 3 
months (Ex. 0199).
    According to the ASTM committee, manufacturers stopped producing 
nonlocking snaphooks before 1998 (Ex. 0148). In addition, evidence in 
the record indicates that the average useful life of a body belt or 
body harness is 5 years (Ex. 0080). The Agency believes that the useful 
life of positioning straps (to which snaphooks are affixed) also is 
approximately 5 years because they are made from the same materials and 
are subject to the same conditions of use. Thus, any nonlocking 
snaphooks still remaining in use are substantially beyond their 
expected useful life and are probably in need of replacement. In 
addition, there is evidence in the record that the vast majority of 
positioning straps in use already have locking snaphooks. Mr. James 
Tomaseski of IBEW testified that, based on a survey of the union's 
members, 80 percent of electric utilities and contractors performing 
work covered by the final rule require the use of locking snaphooks 
(Tr. 976). He also testified that locking snaphooks are used even by 
companies that do not require them and that there will not be a problem 
with availability (Tr. 975-976). Therefore, OSHA concludes that a 
phase-in period of 90 days should be adequate to comply with the 
requirement. Compliance with paragraph (b)(2)(xi) is required on the 
effective date of the final rule: July 10, 2014.
    OSHA proposed three requirements for locking snaphooks to ensure 
that keepers do not open without employees intentionally releasing 
them. First, for the keeper to open, a locking mechanism would have to 
be released, or a destructive force would have to be impressed on the 
keeper (paragraph (b)(2)(xi)(A)). Second, a force in the range of 6.7 N 
(1.5 lbf) to 17.8 N (4 lbf) would be required to release the locking 
mechanism (paragraph (b)(2)(xi)(B)). Third, with a force on the keeper 
and the locking mechanism released, the keeper must be designed not to 
open with a force of 11.2 N (2.5 lbf) or less, and the keeper must 
begin to open before the force exceeds 17.8 N (4 lbf) (paragraph 
(b)(2)(xi)(C)).\130\ These requirements are based on ASTM F887-04, 
section 15.4.1.\131\ Proposed paragraph (b)(2)(xi)(C), relating to the 
spring tension on the keeper, was equivalent to existing Sec.  
1926.959(b)(6).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \130\ In proposed paragraphs (b)(2)(xi)(B) and (b)(2)(xi)(C), 
the metric units were not equal to the English units. The metric 
units were corrected in the final rule.
    \131\ These requirement are also contained in the latest 
edition, ASTM F887-12\e1\, in Section 15.4.2.1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Mr. Daniel Shipp with ISEA objected to these proposed requirements 
and maintained that the provisions on work-positioning equipment should 
be consistent with Sec.  1910.66 (Powered platforms for building 
maintenance), Appendix C, and Sec.  1926.502 (Fall protection systems 
criteria and practices), commenting:

    Neither of these [existing] standards set forth detailed 
specifications for the forces required to actuate the locking and 
gate mechanisms of snaphooks. The determining factors that relate 
most closely to incidents of accidental disengagement of a snaphook 
from its connector are (a) the compatibility in size and shape of 
the connecting element, and (b) the tensile strength of the gate in 
the closed and locked position, which are fully discussed in 1910.66 
and 1926.502. It is difficult to envision one range of force 
requirements that would apply equally to all locking snaphooks 
because of the wide variety of existing and possible snaphook 
designs.
    OSHA should limit its regulation of self-closing and self-
locking snaphooks to use in work positioning applications that 
follow existing fall protection regulations. The addition of further 
restrictive requirements will have the effect of possibly 
eliminating otherwise safe and efficient equipment from the 
marketplace without any demonstrable improvement in worker safety. 
[Ex. 0211]

    It is not clear from Mr. Shipp's comment whether he opposes the 
requirement that snaphooks be of the locking type. If he does, there is 
ample evidence in the record, as discussed previously, to support the 
adoption of a requirement for locking snaphooks. Therefore, the Agency 
will focus on his comments relating to the forces used to unlock and 
open keepers. The proposed paragraphs ensure the adequacy of the 
locking mechanism by requiring a destructive force to open the keeper 
if it is not first unlocked and by specifying the minimum force 
required to open the locking mechanism. The proposed paragraphs also 
ensure that the keeper does not open unintentionally if the locking 
mechanism is opened accidentally (for example, by a loose conductor 
striking it), or if it breaks.
    In addition to specifying minimum forces, the proposed paragraphs 
specified the maximum forces necessary to open the locking mechanism 
and the keeper when the locking mechanism is open. Because this 
equipment is frequently used with rubber insulating gloves and leather 
protectors, employees have limited dexterity when they are opening and 
closing keepers (Ex. 0173). Snaphook keepers that are too difficult to 
unlock or open by employees wearing rubber insulating gloves could 
interfere with connecting a snaphook to a D ring and lead to falls. In 
addition, employees develop a rhythm, buckling and unbuckling the 
positioning straps into the D rings of their body belts (see, for 
example, 269-Ex. 3-11). Snaphook keepers that are too difficult to 
unlock or open will interfere with this rhythm, potentially leading to 
falls. These conditions are not present for employees working from 
power platforms covered by Sec.  1910.66 or in general construction 
work covered by Sec.  1926.502.
    As noted previously, existing subpart V already requires the 
opening force on the keeper to be within the range specified in the 
proposal. Also, the inclusion of similar provisions in ASTM F887 is 
evidence that the ASTM committee concluded that there is a need for the 
requirements proposed in paragraph (b)(2)(xi). For these reasons,

[[Page 20394]]

OSHA is including paragraphs (b)(2)(xi)(A), (b)(2)(xi)(B), and 
(b)(2)(xi)(C) in the final rule as proposed. (As previously noted, OSHA 
has corrected the metric units in these provisions in the final rule.)
    Mr. Frank Owen Brockman of Farmers Rural Electric Cooperative 
Corporation recommended that OSHA prohibit the use of any snaphook that 
requires employees to remove gloves before opening the snaphook (Ex. 
0173). As noted earlier, the objective performance requirements in 
paragraph (b)(2)(xi) will ensure that snaphooks meeting the standard 
are usable by employees wearing rubber insulating gloves and leather 
protectors. The Agency does not believe that adding a requirement that 
snaphooks be capable of being opened by an employee wearing gloves will 
improve the safety of these devices. OSHA believes, however, that 
employers will consider this facet of snaphook design when selecting 
positioning straps, if only to minimize employee complaints.
    Existing Sec.  1926.959(b)(7) requires body belts, safety straps, 
and lanyards to be capable of passing a drop test in which a test load 
is dropped from a specific height and the equipment arrests the fall. 
The test consists of dropping a 113.4-kg (250-lbm) bag of sand a 
distance of either 1.2 meters (4 feet) or 1.8 meters (6 feet), for 
safety straps and lanyards, respectively.\132\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \132\ As noted earlier, existing Sec.  1926.959 covers body 
belts, safety straps, and lanyards as both fall arrest and work-
positioning equipment. Paragraph (b)(2) of final Sec.  1926.954 
covers only work-positioning equipment. Lanyards, which are used in 
fall arrest and are not covered in final Sec.  1926.954(b)(2), have 
to be capable of withstanding higher forces as required by Sec.  
1926.502(d)(9).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    OSHA explained in the preamble to the proposal that ASTM adopted a 
different test in ASTM F887-04 (70 FR 34853). Under the existing OSHA 
test, the bag of sand can be fitted with the body belt in different 
ways, resulting in tests that are not necessarily consistent among 
different testing laboratories. To overcome this problem, ASTM 887-04 
adopted a drop test that uses a rigid steel mass of a specified design. 
To compensate for differences between a rigid mass and the more 
deformable human body, the ASTM standard uses a lower test mass, 100 kg 
(220 lbm), and a shorter drop height, 1 meter (39.4 inches). OSHA 
proposed to replace the drop test in existing Sec.  1926.959(b)(7) with 
a test modeled on the test specified in the 2004 ASTM standard.\133\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \133\ ASTM F887-12\e1\ specifies equivalent test procedures and 
criteria for this equipment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Proposed paragraph (b)(2)(xii)(A) would have required the test mass 
to be rigidly constructed of steel or equivalent material having a mass 
of 100 kg (220.5 lbm). OSHA explained in the proposal that this mass 
was comparable to the 113.4-kg (250-lbm) bag of sand that must be used 
under the existing OSHA standard (70 FR 34853). Even though the 
proposed test mass was lighter than a heavy power line worker, OSHA 
explained that the proposed test method would place significantly more 
stress on the equipment than an employee of the same mass because the 
test drop was greater than the maximum permitted free-fall distance and 
because the test mass was rigid (id.).
    Proposed paragraphs (b)(2)(xii)(B) and (b)(2)(xii)(C) specified the 
means used to attach body belts and positioning straps during testing. 
These provisions would ensure that the work-positioning equipment being 
tested was properly attached to the test apparatus.
    Proposed paragraph (b)(2)(xii)(D) provided for the test mass to be 
dropped an unobstructed distance of 1 meter (39.4 inches). OSHA 
explained in the preamble that, for positioning straps, this distance 
was equivalent (given the rigid test mass) to the existing standard's 
test distance of 1.2 meters (4 feet) (70 FR 34853).
    Proposed paragraphs (b)(2)(xii)(E) and (b)(2)(xii)(F) specified the 
following acceptance criteria for tested equipment: (1) Body belts 
would have had to arrest the fall successfully and be capable of 
supporting the test mass after the test, and (2) positioning straps 
would have had to successfully arrest the fall without breaking or 
allowing an arresting force exceeding 17.8 kilonewtons (4,000 pounds-
force). Additionally, the proposal provided that snaphooks on 
positioning straps not distort sufficiently to allow release of the 
keeper.
    OSHA requested comment on whether the proposed test was reasonable 
and appropriate and, more specifically, whether the requirement for a 
rigid test mass of 100 kg (220.5 lbm) dropped a distance of 1 meter 
(39.4 inches) was sufficiently protective.
    Most rulemaking participants who commented on this issue supported 
the proposed requirements. (See, for example, Exs. 0126, 0199, 0230.) 
For instance, IBEW commented:

    This change has been accepted in the ASTM standard. The ASTM 
Technical Subcommittee realized more consistent results were 
necessary, and therefore, through experimentation with different 
test methods, developed the test method using a specific design of a 
rigid steel mass. OSHA should recognize this test method as the best 
industry practice. [Ex. 0230]

    Two commenters noted that the test mass specified in the proposed 
rule was adequate for workers weighing up to 140 kg (310 lbm) (Exs. 
0199, 0211). Mr. James Rullo of Buckingham Manufacturing explained:

    The standard conversion factor used in the industry for the sand 
bag to steel mass is 1.4 which when applied to the 220.5 lbm equates 
to 310 lbm. That would seem to cover the general range of line 
workers. In addition, the straight drop with the wire cable imposes 
forces on the equipment which we believe to be more severe than most 
falls that might be experienced by line workers. [Ex. 0199]

Mr. Daniel Shipp with ISEA supported the proposal's requirement for 
testing with a 100-kg rigid test mass, but recommended a modification 
for workers weighing more than 140 kg:

    ISEA supports the change to a test mass of rigid steel 
construction, weighing 100 kg (220 lb). Our members' experience in 
testing fall protection products leads us to conclude that the rigid 
mass will produce more repeatable results than testing with a sand-
filled bag. However, we believe the 100 kg test mass should only be 
sufficient to qualify products for use by employees with a maximum 
body weight up to 140 kg (310 lb). For employees with weights 
greater [than] 140 kg (310 lb), including body weight, clothing, 
tools and other user-borne objects, the test should be modified to 
increase the test mass proportionately greater than 100 kg (220 lb). 
For example, for a worker with an all-up weight of 160 kg (354 lb), 
the test mass should be increased to 114 kg (251 lb). [Ex. 0211]

    The ASTM committee and the fall-protection equipment-manufacturing 
industry recognize the proposed tests as being reasonable and adequate. 
As some of the commenters noted, the proposed test mass will impose 
sufficient stress on work-positioning equipment for a worker weighing 
140 kg (310 lbm), including tools and equipment. However, OSHA 
concludes that the proposed test is insufficiently protective for 
workers weighing more than 140 kg when fully equipped. Therefore, the 
Agency is adopting paragraph (b)(2)(xii)(A) as proposed, except that 
the final rule requires work-positioning equipment used by employees 
with an equipped weight of more than 140 kg to be capable of passing 
the same test, but with a test mass of proportionally greater mass 
(that is, the test mass must equal the mass of the equipped worker 
divided by 1.4). With this change, the final rule will ensure that 
work-positioning equipment will adequately protect even the heaviest 
workers. OSHA believes that, if any equipped worker has a mass greater 
than 140 kg, the employer will order work-positioning equipment that is 
adequate for the increased mass and that

[[Page 20395]]

manufacturers will supply work-positioning equipment that has been 
tested with a mass that conforms to the standard.
    In the final rule, OSHA is adopting the remaining provisions in 
Sec.  1926.954(b)(2)(xii), namely paragraphs (b)(2)(xii)(B) through 
(b)(2)(xii)(F), without substantive change from the proposal.
    OSHA proposed three notes to paragraph (b)(2). The first note 
indicated that paragraph (b)(2) applies to all work-positioning 
equipment used in work covered by subpart V. The Agency is not 
including this note in the final rule as it is unnecessary.
    The Ohio Rural Electric Cooperatives suggested that, instead of the 
specific provisions proposed in paragraph (b)(2), the standard require 
only that belts be certified to ASTM F887-04 (Ex. 0186). A note to 
final paragraph (b)(2) (Note 2 in the proposal), which appears after 
final paragraph (b)(2)(xii)(F), provides that, when used by employees 
weighing no more than 140 kg (310 lbm) fully equipped, body belts and 
positioning straps that conform to ASTM F887-12 \e1\, the most recent 
edition of that standard, are deemed to be in compliance with paragraph 
(b)(2). This note clearly informs employers that body belts and 
positioning straps meeting that consensus standard also meet the 
testing requirements in OSHA's final rule. To avoid confusion, the 
Agency removed the phrase ``the manufacturing and construction 
requirements of,'' which modified ``paragraph (b)(2) of this section'' 
and which appeared in the proposal, from the language of this note in 
the final rule. The purpose of this phrase was to describe the contents 
of paragraph (b)(2) rather than restrict the application of the note. 
The Agency restricted the application of the note in the final rule to 
body belts and safety straps used by employees weighing no more than 
140 kg (310 lbm), as the ASTM standard does not address this aspect of 
the final rule.\134\
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    \134\ Body belts and safety straps that meet ASTM F887-12\e1\, 
but with the test weight adjusted as required by Sec.  
1926.954(b)(2)(xii)(A), will be deemed to be in compliance with 
final Sec.  1926.954(b)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Note 2 in the proposal provided that work-positioning equipment 
meeting the consensus standard also needed to meet proposed paragraphs 
(b)(2)(iv), which specified tensile testing for snaphooks, and 
(b)(2)(xi), which required snaphooks to be of the locking type. ASTM 
Committee F18 stated that ASTM F887-04 contained nearly identical 
requirements and suggested that the note omit references to those two 
proposed paragraphs (Ex. 0148). OSHA agrees that ASTM F887-04 
adequately covered all the requirements in final paragraph (b)(2), and 
OSHA removed the two referenced paragraphs (paragraphs (b)(2)(iv) and 
(b)(2)(xi)) from the note in the final rule. In addition, the Agency 
reviewed the latest edition of the ASTM standard, ASTM F887-12\e1\, and 
found that it also adequately addresses all of the design requirements 
in the final rule. Consequently, the note in the final rule states 
that, when used by employees weighing no more than 140 kg (310 lbm) 
fully equipped, body belts and positioning straps meeting this later 
edition of the consensus standard will be deemed as complying with 
paragraph (b)(2).
    OSHA also proposed a third note to paragraph (b)(2) indicating that 
body belts and positioning straps meeting Sec.  1926.502(e) on 
positioning device systems would be deemed to be in compliance with the 
manufacturing and construction requirements of paragraph (b)(2) of 
proposed Sec.  1926.954, provided that the equipment also conformed to 
proposed paragraph (b)(2)(vii), which contained provisions addressing 
electrical and flame-resistance tests for positioning straps, as well 
as requirements for positioning straps to be capable of withstanding a 
tension test and a buckle-tear test. The preamble to the proposal 
explained that body belts and positioning straps that are parts of 
positioning device systems addressed by Sec.  1926.502(e) serve the 
same function as work-positioning equipment used for work covered by 
subpart V (70 FR 34853). OSHA originally believed that body belts and 
positioning straps that met the design criteria specified by Sec.  
1926.502(e), as well as the provisions in proposed Sec.  
1926.954(b)(2)(vii), would generally be sufficiently strong for power 
line work.
    OSHA reexamined the need for, and appropriateness of, proposed Note 
3 to Sec.  1926.954(b)(2) in light of the rulemaking record for subpart 
V. As indicated by Mr. Daniel Shipp with ISEA, Sec.  1926.502(e) does 
not contain requirements comparable to those in final Sec.  
1926.954(b)(2)(xi)(B) and (b)(2)(xi)(C) for the minimum and maximum 
opening and closing forces for snaphook keepers and locking mechanisms. 
As explained in the discussion of final Sec.  1926.954(b)(2)(xi) 
earlier in this section of the preamble, OSHA believes that snaphooks 
must meet these performance requirements to be adequately protective in 
the conditions encountered by employees performing work covered by 
Subpart V. In addition, Sec.  1926.502(e) does not contain requirements 
comparable to several other provisions of final Sec.  1926.954(b)(2), 
including those prohibiting leather in load-bearing components of body-
belt and positioning-strap assemblies (paragraph (b)(2)(v)), 
prohibiting tool loops in the center 100 millimeters (4 inches) of the 
back of a body belt (paragraph (b)(2)(ix)), and requiring a maximum 
arresting force during the drop test (paragraph (b)(2)(xii)(F)). OSHA 
believes that these also are important requirements necessary for the 
safety of employees performing work covered by Subpart V. Consequently, 
OSHA is not including Note 3 to proposed Sec.  1926.954(b)(2) in the 
final rule.
    Some commenters were concerned that the proposal required the tests 
in paragraph (b)(2) to be conducted by the employer. (See, for example, 
Exs. 0169, 0175, 0186.) OSHA notes that the final rule states that 
work-positioning equipment must be ``capable'' of passing these tests. 
The tests in the final rule could be performed by the manufacturer on 
samples that are representative of the finished product. However, it 
will be the employer's responsibility to ensure that it selects, and 
has its employees use, a type of equipment that has been subject to 
adequate testing by the manufacturer. The final rule does not require 
employers to conduct the tests specified by paragraph (b)(2) when the 
manufacturer conducts such testing. Employers will be able to 
determine, in most instances, whether work-positioning equipment meets 
the OSHA standard simply by ensuring that the manufacturer has tested 
the equipment in accordance with the OSHA standard or ASTM F887-12 
\e1\. The tests required by paragraph (b)(2) are potentially 
destructive and should never be performed on work-positioning equipment 
that will be used by employees (Exs. 0055, 0072).
    Paragraph (b)(3) addresses the care and use of fall protection 
equipment. As OSHA explained in the preamble to the proposal, fall 
protection equipment provides maximum protection only when it is 
properly used and maintained (70 FR 34853). Existing Sec.  
1926.951(b)(3) requires this equipment to be inspected each day before 
use. OSHA believed that this requirement had to be supplemented by 
additional requirements to protect employees fully from fall hazards 
posed by electric power transmission and distribution work and, 
therefore, proposed to add requirements to subpart V, borrowed from 
existing Sec.  1910.269(g)(2) and Sec.  1926.502(d) and (e), regulating 
the care and use of fall protection equipment.

[[Page 20396]]

    Paragraph (b)(3)(i) requires the employer to ensure that work-
positioning equipment is inspected before use each day to determine if 
it is in safe working condition. (Paragraph (d)(21) of Sec.  1926.502 
already contains a similar requirement for fall arrest equipment that 
applies, and will continue to apply, to work covered by Subpart V.) 
Paragraph (b)(3)(i) also prohibits the use of work-positioning 
equipment that is not in safe working condition. The proposal was 
worded to prohibit the use of ``defective equipment.'' OSHA replaced 
this term in the final rule with ``equipment that is not in safe 
working condition'' and added ``work-positioning'' before ``equipment'' 
to clarify that this provision applies to any condition that would make 
work-positioning equipment unsafe. This language also makes it 
consistent with the requirement in this paragraph to inspect the 
equipment to determine if it is in ``safe working condition.'' This 
paragraph ensures that protective equipment will be capable of 
protecting employees when needed. This requirement is similar to 
existing Sec.  1926.951(b)(3), except that the prohibition on the use 
of unsafe equipment is now stated explicitly. A thorough inspection of 
fall protection equipment can detect defects such as cracked snaphooks 
and D rings, frayed lanyards, loose snaphook keepers, and bent buckles. 
A note to this paragraph states that a guide to the inspection of this 
equipment is included in Appendix F.
    Paragraph (b)(3)(ii) requires personal fall arrest systems to be 
used in accordance with Sec.  1926.502(d). Paragraph (d)(21) of Sec.  
1926.502 provides: ``Personal fall arrest systems shall be inspected 
prior to each use for wear, damage and other deterioration, and 
defective components shall be removed from service.'' Removing 
``defective'' equipment from service in accordance with Sec.  
1926.502(d)(21) will ensure that employees are not using fall arrest 
equipment that is not in safe working condition.\135\
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    \135\ Subpart M, Appendix C, section II, paragraph (g) provides 
examples of defects that require removing equipment from service. 
Such defects include cuts, tears, abrasions, mold, or undue 
stretching; alterations or additions which might affect the 
efficiency of the equipment; damage due to deterioration; contact 
with fire, acids, or other corrosives; distorted hooks or faulty 
hook springs; tongues unfitted to the shoulder of buckles; loose or 
damaged mountings; nonfunctioning parts; or wearing or internal 
deterioration in the ropes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    OSHA explained in the proposal that personal fall arrest equipment 
is sometimes used as work-positioning equipment such that the employee 
can lean into the body harness and perform work (70 FR 34854). In this 
scenario, the normal attachment point would be at waist level. 
Paragraph (d)(17) of Sec.  1926.502 requires the attachment point for 
body harnesses to be located in the center of the employee's back near 
shoulder level or above his or her head. As the Agency explained in the 
preamble to the proposal, such an attachment could prevent the employee 
from performing his or her job while the employee is using work-
positioning equipment (id.), so OSHA proposed to exempt fall arrest 
equipment used as work-positioning equipment from this requirement if 
the equipment was rigged so that the maximum free-fall distance was no 
greater than 0.6 meters (2 feet).
    Mr. Daniel Shipp with ISEA agreed with the proposal, commenting:

    ISEA agrees with the proposed change to allow frontal-attachment 
for personal fall arrest on equipment that is used for work 
positioning, with a maximum permissible free fall distance of 0.6 m 
(2 ft). [Ex. 0211]

    OSHA reconsidered including this exception in the regulatory text 
of paragraph (b)(3)(ii) and concluded that it is unnecessary. Fall 
arrest equipment that is rigged for work positioning is considered to 
be work-positioning equipment for the purposes of final Sec.  
1926.954(b). When fall protection equipment is rigged for work 
positioning, the equipment must meet the requirements in paragraph (b) 
that apply to work-positioning equipment, and the provisions that apply 
to fall arrest systems, including the anchorage requirement in Sec.  
1926.502(d)(17), are not applicable. When fall protection equipment is 
rigged to arrest falls, the equipment is considered to be a fall arrest 
system, and the provisions for those systems apply. OSHA included a 
note to paragraph (b)(3)(ii) to clarify this point.
    In paragraph (b)(3)(iii), OSHA proposed to require the use of a 
personal fall arrest system or work-positioning equipment by employees 
working at elevated locations more than 1.2 meters (4 feet) above the 
ground on poles, towers, and similar structures if other fall 
protection has not been provided. As OSHA clarified in the proposal, 
the term ``similar structures'' includes any structure that supports 
electric power transmission or distribution lines or equipment, such as 
lattice substation structures and H-frame wood transmission structures 
(70 FR 34854). A similar requirement is in existing Sec.  
1910.269(g)(2)(v). (In existing Sec.  1926.951(b)(1), OSHA requires 
fall protection for ``employees working at elevated locations,'' but 
does not specify a height at which such protection becomes necessary.) 
Note 1 to proposed paragraph (b)(3)(iii) indicated that these fall 
protection requirements did not apply to portions of buildings, 
electric equipment, or aerial lifts, and referred to the relevant 
portions of the construction standards that do apply in those instances 
(that is, subpart M for walking and working surfaces generally and 
Sec.  1926.453 for aerial lifts).\136\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \136\ As noted earlier, the corresponding note in the final rule 
does not pertain to fall protection for employees in aerial lifts or 
reference Sec.  1926.453.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Many rulemaking participants commented on the proposed requirement 
to use fall protection starting at 1.2 meters (4 feet) above the 
ground. (See, for example, Exs. 0173, 0183, 0186, 0196, 0202, 0210, 
0219, 0229, 0233, 0239; Tr. 575-576.) Two commenters recommended that 
Subpart V mirror the Subpart M ``6-foot rule,'' in other words, that 
fall protection not be required until an employee is 1.8 meters (6 
feet) or more above the ground (Exs. 0196, 0219; Tr. 575-576). Lee 
Marchessault with Workplace Safety Solutions commented:

    [The proposal] requires fall protection when working at heights 
greater than 4 feet, however the referrence [sic] to 1926 subpart M 
requires 6 feet and therefore the fall protection system is designed 
to engage at distances not more than 6 feet. This renders the system 
useless for a 5 foot fall in some cases. An example may be working 
on a trash platform of a hydro generation facility cleaning racks 
that are 4.5 feet off the lower walking surface. A fall restraint 
system works best, but workers are allowed to use a harness and 6 
foot lanyard. [Ex. 0196]

Mr. Marchessault suggested in testimony at the 2006 public hearing that 
using different length lanyards for different jobs would not be 
feasible (Tr. 576). The Virginia Maryland & Delaware Association of 
Electric Cooperatives commented that it did not see a need for OSHA to 
set any height threshold for fall protection in the standard, 
explaining: ``Line work is inherently different than other occupations 
with climbing a necessary skill required in the trade. Therefore, 
specification of a distance does not add additional safety to the 
employee'' (Ex. 0175).

    Other commenters supported the proposed 1.2-meter height or stated 
that it generally has not presented problems since it was adopted in 
existing Sec.  1910.269. (See, for example, Exs. 0186, 0211, 0213, 
0230.) IBEW commented that ``[t]he 1910.269 requirement [for fall 
protection starting at] 1.2 meters (4 feet) has proven not [to] be 
problematic. The addition of 2 feet will not offer anything to the 
requirement'' (Ex. 0230).

[[Page 20397]]

    Most of the comments relating to the starting height for fall 
protection were from electric cooperatives or their representatives who 
recommended that OSHA not require fall protection until 3 meters (10 
feet) above the ground for employees who are undergoing training. (See, 
for example, Exs. 0183, 0186, 0202, 0210, 0229, 0233, 0239.) For 
instance, Mr. Anthony Ahern of Ohio Rural Electric Cooperatives 
commented:

    [F]or training purposes it would be nice to have the option of 
going to 10 feet without fall protection . . . under close 
supervision. At a height of only 4 [feet] a climber really does not 
get a sense of height. Using fall arrest equipment at higher levels 
gives the new climber a false sense of security, can hinder mobility 
and make it more difficult to move around the pole. Being able to 
work new climbers up to 10 [feet] after demonstrating basic 
abilities at lower levels would give the new climber a better sense 
of working at heights and make it easier for trainers to determine 
which [climbers] need additional training or who simply can not 
handle working on a pole. [Ex. 0186]

NRECA maintained that ``in the highly-supervised and specially-equipped 
environment of linemen training, the extra height adds very little, if 
any extra danger'' (Ex. 0233).

    As previously noted, the current requirement in Sec.  
1910.269(g)(2)(v) for fall protection starts at 1.2 meters (4 feet), 
and multiple commenters indicated that this provision is not causing 
problems. (See, for example, Exs. 0186, 0230.) Adjustable-length 
lanyards, retractable lanyards, and work-positioning equipment can 
serve to accommodate the varying heights at which an employee will be 
working (Ex. 0211). In addition, the relevant paragraph in the final 
rule (Sec.  1926.954(b)(3)(iii)(B)) does not apply to the example 
provided by Mr. Marchessault (the ``trash platform of a hydro 
generation facility''), as such work locations are not ``poles, towers, 
or similar structures.'' OSHA is not persuaded by the speculation that 
employees undergoing training experience a ``false sense of security'' 
or that employees using fall protection cannot be successfully trained 
in the use of free-climbing techniques. Employees undergoing training 
can use combination body belt-body harness systems that attach both to 
a retractable lanyard anchored to the top of a pole (for fall arrest) 
and to a positioning strap (for work positioning). This arrangement 
will ensure protection for the trainees until they master climbing 
techniques. Any sense of security the employee experiences using such 
equipment would not be ``false,'' but rather would be based on real 
protection. There is evidence in the record that unprotected employees 
in training to climb wood poles have been injured (Ex. 0003 \137\). 
Several of these employees were climbing wood poles with wood chips at 
the base of the pole. The chips did not protect the employees, and they 
received serious injuries, for which all but one were hospitalized. 
OSHA has previously taken the position that wood chips do not provide 
adequate fall protection for employees, and the evidence in this 
rulemaking does not support a different conclusion. Under final Sec.  
1926.954(b)(3)(iii)(B), employers must provide employees with 
appropriate fall protection when they are in training to climb wood 
poles.\138\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \137\ See, for example, the descriptions of five accidents at: 
https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=170157069&id=170181432&id=170175269&id=170176630&id=170204267.
    \138\ As stated in Note 2 to paragraphs (b)(3)(iii)(B) and 
(b)(3)(iii)(C), employees who have not completed training in 
climbing and the use of fall protection are not considered 
``qualified employees'' for the purposes of paragraph 
(b)(3)(iii)(C), which permits qualified employees to climb without 
fall protection in limited situations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The 1.2-meter threshold provides additional safety when compared to 
higher thresholds. The speed with which an employee will strike the 
ground increases with increasing height. An extra 0.6 meters (2 feet) 
in height increases fall velocity by over 20 percent, substantially 
increasing the potential severity of any injuries the employee 
receives. An extra 1.8 meters (6 feet) in height increases fall 
velocity by nearly 50 percent. After considering the comments in the 
record, OSHA concluded that the rationales offered by these commenters 
do not justify increasing the severity of the fall hazard by increasing 
the height threshold. Therefore, OSHA is adopting the proposed 
requirement for fall protection to start at 1.2 meters (4 feet) and, 
for the reasons described previously, is not adopting a less protective 
threshold for employees undergoing training.
    Southern Company suggested that OSHA reference IEEE Std 1307-2004, 
Standard for Fall Protection for Utility Work, for work on 
transformers, circuit breakers, and other large equipment. That 
standard requires fall protection at heights of 3.05 meters (10 feet) 
and higher (Ex. 0212).
    The duty to provide fall protection for work on electric equipment, 
such as transformers and capacitors, is not in Subpart V or Sec.  
1910.269, but rather in Part 1926, Subpart M, and Part 1910, Subpart D, 
for construction and general industry, respectively. The application of 
Subpart D rather than Sec.  1910.269 to walking-working surfaces other 
than poles, towers, and similar structures was explained in the 
preamble to the 1994 Sec.  1910.269 final rule (59 FR 4374) and in 
letters of interpretation.\139\ The consensus standard's requirement 
for fall protection at heights over 3.05 meters conflicts with the more 
protective requirements in Subparts M and D. Also, for reasons noted 
earlier, the Agency concluded that an increase in the 1.2-meter (4-
foot) and 1.8-meter (6-foot) threshold heights for initiating fall 
protection in Subparts D and M, respectively, is not warranted. It 
should be noted that IEEE Std 1307 is included in Appendix G, and 
employers may find that it contains useful information on how to 
provide fall protection for work covered by subpart V. However, OSHA 
concludes that a nonmandatory reference to the consensus standard for a 
situation to which Sec.  1926.954(b)(3)(iii) does not apply, as 
recommended by Southern Company, would be inappropriate and misleading. 
Note 1 to proposed Sec.  1926.954(b)(3)(iii) stated that ``[t]he duty 
to provide fall protection associated with walking and working surfaces 
is contained in subpart M of this part.'' However, the relevant portion 
of existing Sec.  1926.500(a) seems to indicate otherwise, stating that 
requirements relating to fall protection for employees engaged in the 
construction of electric transmission and distribution lines and 
equipment are provided in subpart V (see Sec.  1926.500(a)(2)(vi)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \139\ See, for example, the October 18, 1995, letter to Mr. 
Lonnie Bell (https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=INTERPRETATIONS&p_id=21981) and the December 18, 
1997, letter to Mr. Dimitrios Mihou (https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=INTERPRETATIONS&p_id=22508).

    As was clear from Note 1 to proposed Sec.  1926.954(b)(3)(iii), 
OSHA was proposing that the duty to provide fall protection for 
general walking working surfaces, that is, everything other than 
aerial lifts and poles, towers, and similar structures, would be 
covered by subpart M. To clarify this point, in the final rule, OSHA 
is revising Sec.  1926.500(a)(2)(vi) so that the subpart V exemption 
applies only to the duty to provide fall protection for aerial lifts 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
and poles, towers, and similar structures.

    Existing Sec.  1910.269(g)(2)(v) permits travel-restricting 
equipment as an alternative to fall arrest or work-positioning systems. 
OSHA proposed to omit the use of travel-restricting equipment as a 
recognized fall protection system for electric power transmission and 
distribution work on poles, towers, and similar structures. In the 
preamble to the proposal, the Agency explained that travel-restricting 
equipment is only appropriate for work

[[Page 20398]]

on open-sided platforms, where employees can walk around the working 
surface with the travel-restricting equipment keeping them from 
approaching too close to an unguarded edge (70 FR 34854). When it 
published the proposal, the Agency did not believe that this type of 
working surface could be found on poles, towers, or similar structures 
(id.). Therefore, OSHA did not include travel-restricting equipment as 
an acceptable fall protection system in proposed Sec.  
1926.954(b)(3)(iii) and proposed to remove the reference to travel-
restricting equipment in existing Sec.  1910.269(g)(2)(v), but invited 
comments on this omission.
    Many commenters argued that there are surfaces used in work covered 
by Subpart V for which travel-restricting equipment is appropriate and 
recommended that OSHA restore travel-restricting equipment as an 
alternative form of fall protection. (See, for example, Exs. 0126, 
0173, 0183, 0201, 0202, 0210, 0225, 0229, 0230, 0233, 0239.) However, 
few of these commenters provided specific, relevant examples. IBEW 
commented that travel-restricting equipment is sometimes used when an 
employee is transferring from a crossarm to a hook ladder or working or 
climbing above an energized circuit (Ex. 0230). In addition, Duke 
Energy asserted that the top of large transformers and rooftop 
installations were places where travel-restricting equipment could be 
used (Ex. 0201).
    OSHA concludes that the examples provided by IBEW and Duke Energy 
are not relevant because the paragraph at issue does not apply to the 
tops of transformers or rooftops. Also, travel-restricting equipment, 
which is used to protect employees from fall hazards at unprotected 
edges, is not an appropriate form of fall protection for employees 
transferring from one location to another or for employees working or 
climbing above energized equipment.
    Several commenters maintained that open-sided platforms are found 
on electric utility structures. (See, for example, Exs. 0126, 0183, 
0202, 0229, 0233, 0239.) One of them, BGE, commented that it still has 
some open-sided platforms on switch structures (Ex. 0126).
    OSHA previously concluded that equipment that can prevent an 
employee from falling, such as fall restraint equipment, is an 
acceptable form of fall protection. This conclusion is consistent with 
Agency policy as indicated in several letters of interpretation. (See, 
for example, letter dated November 2, 1995, to Mr. Mike Amen, https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=INTERPRETATIONS&p_id=21999, and letter dated August 14, 2000, to 
Mr. Charles E. Hill, https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=INTERPRETATIONS&p_id=24110.) The term ``travel 
restricting equipment'' appears only in existing Sec.  1910.269; the 
equivalent terms ``restraint system'' and ``tethering system'' are used 
consistently throughout other OSHA standards, such as Sec.  
1926.760(a)(1), and official letters of interpretation (id.). The term 
``fall restraint system,'' as defined in Sec.  1926.751 (in the steel 
erection standard), is a broad term that OSHA generally uses to refer 
to any equipment that prevents employees from falling. Thus, ``fall 
restraint'' includes travel-restricting equipment, tethering systems, 
and other systems that prevent falls from occurring. On the basis of 
comments received on travel-restricting equipment, OSHA believes that 
there are situations in which fall restraint systems can be used to 
protect employees performing work on poles, towers, and similar 
structures; therefore, the final rule includes these systems as an 
acceptable form of fall protection.
    In reviewing the rulemaking record for Sec.  1926.954, the Agency 
noted situations in which commenters appeared confused about the proper 
use of the various forms of fall protection. For example, the tree care 
industry believed that it was acceptable for employees working from 
aerial lifts to use work-positioning equipment (Exs. 0174, 0200, 0502, 
0503), and IBEW condoned the use of travel-restricting equipment in 
what appear to be fall-arrest situations (Ex. 0230). OSHA adopted two 
changes in the final rule to clarify these terms. First, in Sec. Sec.  
1910.269(x) and 1926.968, OSHA is defining the three forms of fall 
protection listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iii) of the final rule.
    The final rule defines ``personal fall arrest system'' as a system 
used to arrest an employee in a fall from a working level. This 
definition is borrowed from Sec.  1926.500(b) in subpart M. The Agency 
is not, however, including the descriptive text following the 
definition in Sec.  1926.500(b), which describes the various parts of 
personal fall arrest systems. Although this description is not a 
necessary part of the definition, OSHA notes that it describes personal 
fall arrest systems as consisting of an anchorage, connectors, and a 
body harness and indicates that such equipment may include a lanyard, 
deceleration device, lifeline, or suitable combinations of these.
    The final rule defines ``work-positioning equipment'' as a body 
belt or body harness system rigged to allow an employee to be supported 
on an elevated vertical surface, such as a utility pole or tower leg, 
and work with both hands free while leaning. This definition is based 
on the definition of ``positioning device system'' in Sec.  1926.500(b) 
in subpart M. However, OSHA is replacing the example of vertical 
surface work in the subpart M definition with examples of vertical 
surfaces that are commonly found in electric power generation, 
transmission, and distribution work and that are covered by the final 
rule.
    Finally, the final rule defines ``fall restraint system'' as a fall 
protection system that prevents the user from falling any distance. 
This definition is borrowed from Sec.  1926.751, which specifies 
definitions for the steel erection standard in subpart R of part 1926. 
The Agency is not including the descriptive text following the 
definition, which describes the various parts of fall restraint 
systems. Although this description is not a necessary part of the 
definition, OSHA notes that it describes such systems as consisting of 
either a body belt or body harness, along with an anchorage, connectors 
and other necessary equipment. The final rule does not specify strength 
requirements for fall restraint systems; however, the system must be 
strong enough to restrain the worker from exposure to the fall 
hazard.\140\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \140\ OSHA recommended more specific strength criteria in a 
letter of interpretation dated November 2, 1995, to Mr. Mike Amen 
(https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=INTERPRETATIONS&p_id=21999). This letter stated: ``OSHA has 
no specific standards for restraint systems, however, we suggest 
that as a minimum, fall restraint systems should have the capacity 
to withstand at least twice the maximum expected force that is 
needed to restrain the person from exposure to the fall hazard. In 
determining this force, consideration should be given to site-
specific factors such as the force generated by a person walking, 
leaning, or sliding down the working surface.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Second, OSHA is adding the phrase ``as appropriate'' to the 
requirement in paragraph (b)(3)(iii)(B) to provide a personal fall 
arrest system, work-positioning equipment, or fall restraint system on 
poles, towers, or similar structures. This addition will make it clear 
that the system the employer chooses to implement must be appropriate 
for the situation, as indicated by the respective definitions. For 
example, because work-positioning equipment, by definition, is to be 
used on a vertical working surface, it would be inappropriate to use 
this equipment on horizontal working surfaces, such as a crossarm or 
horizontal tower arm.

[[Page 20399]]

    With these modifications, the relevant provision in the final rule, 
which is in paragraph (b)(3)(iii)(B), states that, except as provided 
in paragraph (b)(3)(iii)(C), each employee in elevated locations more 
than 1.2 meters (4 feet) above the ground on poles, towers, or similar 
structures must use a personal fall arrest system, work-positioning 
equipment, or fall restraint system, as appropriate, if the employer 
has not provided other fall protection meeting Subpart M.
    In the final rule, OSHA also added the phrase ``meeting subpart M 
of this part'' to clarify that the requirements of Subpart M apply to 
other forms of fall protection. The Agency is making a corresponding 
clarification in final Sec.  1910.269(g)(2)(iv)(C)(2) that ``other fall 
protection'' must meet the general industry fall protection 
requirements in subpart D.
    The Southern Company recommended that OSHA not specify the type of 
fall protection equipment to be used for open-sided platforms (Ex. 
0212).
    The language OSHA is adopting in paragraph (b)(3)(iii)(B) of the 
final rule provides the employer some latitude in deciding which form 
of fall protection is appropriate for employees working at elevated 
locations on poles, towers, and similar structures. However, the rule 
requires that the selected fall protection equipment be appropriate for 
the fall hazard. Using equipment for an application for which it is not 
designed exposes employees to hazards that were not considered in the 
design of the equipment. For example, an employee using work-
positioning equipment in a fall-arrest situation could fall out of the 
equipment or be injured by fall-arrest forces. Thus, the Agency 
concludes that employers must select fall protection equipment that is 
appropriate for the hazard to which the employee is exposed. 
Consequently, an employee exposed to a fall hazard on an open-sided 
platform more than 1.2 meters (4 feet) above the ground must use either 
a fall arrest system or a fall restraint system, with the fall 
restraint system eliminating exposure to the fall hazard altogether.
    Proposed paragraph (b)(3)(iii) included an exemption from fall 
protection requirements for qualified employees climbing or changing 
locations on poles, towers, or similar structures unless conditions, 
such as ice or high winds, could cause the employee to lose his or her 
grip or footing. Two rulemaking participants objected to the proposed 
provision allowing qualified employees to climb or change location 
without using fall protection (Exs. 0130, 0196; Tr. 576-579). NIOSH 
recommended ``that fall protection equipment be used by all employees, 
including qualified employees, climbing or changing location on poles, 
towers, and other walking/working surfaces that present a potential 
fall hazard in both general industry and construction'' (Ex. 0130). 
NIOSH supported its recommendation with a report that summarized 
surveillance data and investigative reports of fatal work-related falls 
from elevations (Ex. 0144). The first report noted that, according to 
National Traumatic Occupational Fatalities surveillance-system data, 23 
percent of fatal falls in the transportation/communications/public 
utilities sector were from structures, predominantly poles and towers. 
This report provided detailed information about two fatalities 
involving employees performing work on poles or towers covered by this 
final rule:
     A power line worker died in a fall from a utility pole. As 
he was securing his positioning strap around the pole, he contacted a 
120-volt conductor and fell as he tried to free himself from the 
conductor. He landed on his head and died of a broken neck.
     A painter died in a fall from an electric power 
transmission tower. As the employee unhooked his lanyard to reposition 
himself on the tower, he lost his balance and fell to the ground. He 
died of massive internal trauma sustained in the fall.
    In both of these cases, NIOSH recommended evaluating the 
possibility of using 100-percent fall protection, including using fall 
protection while employees climb and relocate.
    Lee Marchessault of Workplace Safety Solutions also recommended 
requiring fall protection for employees climbing or changing location 
on poles, towers, or similar structures, commenting:

    I have asked line workers in many companies if they have 
``cutout'' (gaffs released and fallen to some extent from a pole). 
\[141]\ The answer is almost universal, most (more than 90%) have 
cutout at lease once. The resulting injury is usually a nasty sliver 
from a treated wood pole or minor bruises or broken bones. This is a 
known hazard and yet it is allowed to continue even though there are 
devices that prevent this injury. This section should be eliminated 
from this regulation and replaced with ``fall restraint devices are 
required from the ground for climbing poles or similar structures 
more than 6 feet and these devices shall be of a type that cannot be 
defeated where practicable''. In other words, systems modifying 
existing pole straps, or pole mounted devices that need to be 
installed once you arrive would not be allowed because free-climbing 
is still or may still be done. Pole top mounted retractable devices 
protect from free fall but will not prevent slowly slipping down the 
pole picking up slivers from every gaff cut along the way. A system 
such as or similar to Buckingham's Bucksqueeze fall protection belt 
would meet this requirement. Regarding towers and structures, there 
is equipment or options available for most circumstances. [Ex. 0196]

    \141\ A line worker using positioning equipment on a wood pole 
uses pole climbers, leg irons that are strapped to the worker's 
legs. A gaff, or spike, protrudes from the leg iron. The gaffs 
penetrate the wood of the pole and support the weight of the worker. 
A cutout occurs when the gaff slips out of the wood, allowing the 
worker to fall.

Mr. Marchessault recognized, however, that there may be times when it 
is not feasible to provide protection and suggested that the standard 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
account for those situations (Tr. 595).

    Other rulemaking participants supported the proposed provision in 
paragraph (b)(3)(iii) that permitted qualified employees to free climb 
without fall protection. (See, for example, Exs. 0167, 0185, 0212.) For 
instance, Mr. John Vocke with Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) 
recommended that OSHA retain the exception allowing employees to free 
climb poles and towers, commenting:

    PG&E submits that the ``free climbing'' of utility poles and/or 
towers should continue to be permitted by the OSHA regulations. As 
more cable television, telephone and communication equipment is 
situated on utility poles, safe climbing space on these structures 
becomes a consideration. In order for line workers to access 
overhead electric facilities, in some instances, free climbing is a 
safer alternative. [Ex. 0185]

    Whether to provide fall protection for employees climbing poles, 
towers, and similar structures was an issue in the 1994 Sec.  1910.269 
rulemaking. Participants in that rulemaking submitted substantial 
evidence on the need for, and feasibility of, providing such 
protection. Based on accident data submitted to that record in several 
exhibits, the Agency found that employees are at risk of injury when 
free climbing:

    [T]hese exhibits demonstrate that electric power generation, 
transmission, and distribution workers face a significant risk of 
serious injury due to falls under current industry practices. To 
determine the extent to which they face hazards addressed by 
proposed Sec.  1910.269(g)(2)(v), OSHA analyzed fall accidents 
included in various exhibits contained in the rulemaking record. . . 
. [E]mployees do fall while climbing poles, towers, or similar 
structures--26 percent of the falling accidents related to Sec.  
1910.269 occurred in this manner. The evidence in the record 
indicates that climbing a pole, tower, or similar structure is not 
as safe, under current industry practices, as some of the hearing 
witnesses testified. Therefore, the

[[Page 20400]]

Agency has decided that the final standard must provide additional 
protection beyond that provided by the existing industry practices. 
. . . [59 FR 4373]

    Although OSHA concluded that it was not always safe to free climb, 
the Agency ``accepted the position that it is not always necessary for 
a qualified employee to use a pole strap when climbing an unstepped 
wooden pole'' (id.) Therefore, in existing Sec.  1910.269(g)(2)(v), 
OSHA adopted a rule, identical to that proposed in paragraph 
(b)(3)(iii), that allowed free climbing ``unless conditions . . . could 
cause the employee to lose his or her grip or footing.'' OSHA believed 
that the rule adopted in Sec.  1910.269 would ensure that employees 
were protected when conditions were most likely to lead to falls.
    The Agency examined the accident information in the current record 
to determine if the rule in existing Sec.  1910.269(g)(2)(v) has 
reduced climbing-related accidents. Table 3 presents relevant accident 
information from the 1994 record, and from the record in this 
rulemaking, to show the number of fall accidents occurring over time.

                                             Table 3--Falls by Year
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                              Number of accidents \2\
        Type of fall \1\         -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   1981-1989    1991-1993     1994     1995     1996     1997     1998     1999
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Climbing \3\....................          11           15        3        5        2        3        1        3
At work location................           7            5        0        0        0        0        0        1
Other (not stated)..............           3            0        0        0        0        0        0        0
Failure of Structure............          12            6        0        0        1        2        0        2
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes: 1. The table only includes falls from poles, towers, and similar structures.
2. Each accident involves the death or serious injury of one or more employees.
3. Climbing includes descending and changing location.
Sources: 1981-1989--Table 1 in the preamble to the 1994 Sec.   1910.269 final rule (59 FR 4373).
1991-1999--Exs. 0003 and 0400.

    The number of accidents in the years 1991 through 1999 are based on 
OSHA IMIS data. Because IMIS reports are based on investigations 
resulting from employer reports of accidents, and because employers are 
not required to report accidents that do not involve a fatality or the 
hospitalization of three or more employees, it is likely that IMIS data 
substantially undercount the number of nonfatal injuries. Even without 
adjusting for potential undercounting, however, the table shows that 
employees still face a significant risk of being severely injured in a 
fall while climbing poles, towers, or similar structures. In the 3 
years before Sec.  1910.269 was promulgated, employees climbing poles, 
towers, or similar structures experienced five accidents per year, on 
average. In the first 6 years after that standard was promulgated, 
there were approximately three accidents per year, on average, for a 
reduction of two accidents per year, on average.\142\ This is in sharp 
contrast to the reduction in the number of falls experienced by 
employees at the work location on poles, towers, and similar 
structures. This type of accident has largely disappeared since OSHA 
issued Sec.  1910.269.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \142\ OSHA examined accident data for electric utilities for the 
years 2009 and 2010. In that industry alone, four employees were 
injured (three fatally) when they fell from structures supporting 
overhead power lines. (See the descriptions of these four accidents 
at: https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=202469680&id=202489316&id=201491990&id=201859964.) In half 
the cases, the employees were climbing or changing location.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, more than a third of the falls experienced by 
employees climbing wood structures occurred when the employee's gaff 
cut out of the wood and caused the employee to fall to the ground (Exs. 
0003, 0004). This is also the experience reported by Mr. Marchessault 
of Workplace Safety Solutions (Tr. 578). Federal and State compliance 
records reported that the poles involved in two of the gaff cutout 
accidents reflected in Table 3 had no observable defects (Ex. 
0003\143\). Even though both of those accidents occurred before Sec.  
1910.269 was promulgated, it is likely that nothing in that standard 
would have prevented those accidents. Based on the comments, Mr. 
Marchessault's testimony, and the accident descriptions in the record, 
OSHA concludes that gaff cutout is pervasive, cannot be reliably 
predicted, and can lead to death or serious physical harm. (Mr. 
Marchessault described the injuries as ``slivers'' in his testimony, 
but injuries from gaff cutout accidents have included such serious 
injuries as severe fractures, a concussion, and a collapsed lung for 
which the injured employees were hospitalized (Exs. 0003, 0400).\144\)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \143\ See the descriptions of the two accidents at: https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=170374144&id=170611693.
    \144\ OSHA also has documentation, not included in this 
analysis, of three instances in which employees were killed when 
they fell from utility poles as a result of gaff cutout (https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=170252852&id=14422471&id=14412209).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The current rule in Sec.  1910.269 requires employers to protect 
employees from falling while climbing or changing location under 
specified circumstances, and evidence in this record indicates that in 
many, if not all, circumstances it is feasible for employees to climb 
and change locations while protected. For example, Mr. Marchessault of 
Workplace Safety Solutions testified that there are ``equipment options 
available for most circumstances [involving employees climbing or 
changing location]'' (Tr. 576); Mr. Steven Theis of MYR testified that 
he was aware that one utility required 100-percent fall protection (Tr. 
1357); and IBEW noted that some employers require ``fulltime attachment 
while climbing and working on a wood pole'' \145\ (Ex. 0230). According 
to an IBEW survey of 102 IBEW construction locals, more than a quarter 
of 93 locals responding to one question in the survey reported that 
``the employer require[s] continuous attachment to the pole when 
climbing,'' and nearly a third of 91 locals responding to another 
question reported that ``the employer require[s] continuous attachment 
to the

[[Page 20401]]

structure when climbing'' (Ex. 0230). The preamble to the 1994 final 
rule for Sec.  1910.269 noted that the Electrical Division of the 
Panama Canal Commission and Ontario Hydro in Canada required fall 
protection for their employees while they work on elevated structures 
(59 FR 4372-4373).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \145\ OSHA concludes that, in describing the ``climbing'' of 
poles or structures, rulemaking participants used the term 
``climbing'' broadly to indicate any employee movement, including 
``changing location,'' on poles or structures, as climbing a pole or 
structure to get to the working position involves the same 
horizontal and vertical movements as changing location vertically or 
horizontally on a pole or structure. OSHA also concludes that, in 
this context, rulemaking participants used the term ``working'' 
narrowly to indicate the activity of working in stationary positions 
on poles or structures and not broadly to also indicate the activity 
of climbing or changing location on poles or structures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    There are several new forms of work-positioning equipment that can 
provide continuous attachment for employees climbing or changing 
location on poles, towers, and similar structures. The preamble to the 
proposal noted the Pole Shark and Pole Choker (70 FR 34855).\146\ Two 
commenters pointed to the BuckSqueeze as another work-positioning 
system that can provide continuous attachment while employees are 
climbing or changing location on wood structures (Ex. 0199; Tr. 
578).\147\ A video of this equipment being used demonstrates that an 
employee proficient in its use can ascend and descend poles with 
relative ease while being protected from falling (Ex. 0492). Rulemaking 
participants indicated that fall protection equipment is available to 
protect employees climbing or changing location on towers and similar 
structures (Exs. 0144, 0196). This equipment includes rail and rope-
grab systems to which an employee can attach a harness and a lanyard, 
retractable lanyards attached above the employee, and double-lanyard 
systems (Ex. 0199; Tr. 578, 587 \148\). OSHA believes that these, and 
similar new, devices make it easier to provide fall protection for 
employees climbing or changing location on poles, towers, and similar 
structures, as evidenced by the growing prevalence of employers 
requiring 100-percent attachment. Therefore, OSHA concludes that 
employees climbing or changing location on poles, towers, and similar 
structures can use fall protection under more conditions than required 
by existing Sec.  1910.269(g)(2)(v).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \146\ A Pole Shark is a device that uses jaws and a spur wheel 
to grip the pole and provide an anchorage for climbing wood poles. A 
Pole Choker is a pole strap with an integrated choker strap. The 
employee tightens the choker strap against the pole to prevent the 
pole strap from sliding down the pole. Note that, throughout this 
notice, references to these and other products are examples only and 
do not constitute an endorsement by OSHA.
    \147\ A BuckSqueeze is a pole strap with an integrated choker 
strap. The employee tightens the choker strap against the pole to 
prevent the pole strap from sliding down the pole.
    \148\ Mr. Marchessault described a double-strap system for use 
on a pole (Tr. 587). OSHA believes that employers can adapt this 
system, using lanyards in place of positioning straps, for use on a 
tower or similar structure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    However, OSHA also concludes that there may be circumstances that 
preclude the use of fall protection while employees are climbing or 
changing location. For example, Mr. James Tomaseski of IBEW testified, 
``[O]n congested poles, to be able to ascend the pole to your working 
area could be a major task in itself. On the congested poles it is 
enough of a task already, but adding to the point that you have to stay 
connected the entire time, it would be at best difficult'' (Tr. 977). 
Mr. Theis of MYR Group echoed these concerns:

    [Employees] are using [pole chokers] now. And some of the guys 
are telling us they can't be used in all situations. In a lot of 
situations, they can be. When they start getting into a very 
congested pole, very congested area, they become more cumbersome 
than they are of any benefit. [Tr. 1357]

    Consequently, OSHA decided to modify the provision proposed in 
paragraph (b)(3)(iii) (paragraph (b)(3)(iii)(C) in the final rule) to 
require fall protection even for qualified employees climbing or 
changing location on poles, towers, or similar structures, unless the 
employer can demonstrate that the conditions at the worksite would make 
using fall protection infeasible or would create a greater hazard for 
employees climbing or changing location on these structures while using 
fall protection. This rule will ensure that 100-percent fall protection 
is the default procedure when employees are working on these structures 
and, therefore, will better protect employees than the current 
requirement. Based on the rulemaking record, OSHA would consider it 
feasible to use fall protection while climbing or changing location on 
a structure with few or no obstructions. Employers may, however, make 
reasonable determinations of what conditions, for example, the degree 
of congestion on a pole, would result in a greater hazard for employees 
climbing with fall protection than without fall protection. Employers 
making these determinations must consider the use of devices that 
provide for continuous attachment and should account for other 
conditions that would make climbing or changing location without fall 
protection unsafe, including such conditions as ice, high winds, and 
the other conditions noted in existing Sec.  1910.269(g)(2)(v). In 
addition, OSHA notes that this provision does not affect fall 
protection requirements in final Sec.  1926.954(b)(3)(iii)(B) for 
employees once they reach the work location.
    Because the final rule permits qualified employees to climb or 
change location without fall protection under limited circumstances, 
the Agency anticipates that it will be necessary for employees to 
occasionally defeat the continuous attachment feature on the fall 
protection equipment. Therefore, OSHA decided not to require the 
equipment used to meet paragraph (b)(3)(iii)(C) of the final rule to be 
incapable of being defeated by employees, as recommended by Mr. 
Marchessault (Ex. 0196).
    Even though under existing Sec.  1910.269(g)(2)(v) there already 
are some circumstances in which employers must provide equipment that 
will protect employees who are climbing or changing location on 
structures, OSHA believes that many employers covered by the final rule 
will need additional time to explore options to select equipment that 
best protects their employees while climbing or changing location. In 
some cases, the equipment employers currently are providing may not be 
ideal for everyday use. In addition, employers will need time to train 
employees to become proficient in the use of any new equipment. Before 
employees gain proficiency, it is possible that not only will they have 
difficulties climbing or changing location on structures, but the 
equipment may distract them from climbing or changing location safely. 
As noted by Mr. Gene Trombley, representing EEI in the 1994 rulemaking, 
``To suddenly try to require them to change years and years of training 
and experience would, I feel, cause a serious reduction in that high 
level of confidence and ability'' (DC Tr. 853, as quoted in the 
preamble to the 1994 rulemaking, 59 FR 4372).\149\ Therefore, OSHA is 
giving employers until April 1, 2015, to comply with the new 
requirements in Sec.  1926.954(b)(3)(iii)(C) of the final rule. This 
delay should provide sufficient time for employers to: Evaluate the 
various types of fall protection equipment that employees climbing or 
changing location can use; select and purchase the type of equipment 
that best satisfies their needs; train employees in the use of this 
equipment; and certify that the employees demonstrated proficiency in 
using the equipment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \149\ This transcript is available for inspection and copying in 
OSHA's Docket Office, Docket No. S-015, U.S. Department of Labor, 
200 Constitution Avenue NW., Room N2625, Washington, DC 20210; 
telephone (202) 693-2350. (OSHA's TTY number is (877) 889-5627.) 
OSHA Docket Office hours of operation are 8:15 a.m. to 4:45 p.m., 
ET.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the intervening period, paragraph (b)(3)(iii)(C) of the final 
rule will apply the existing rule from Sec.  1910.269, which permits 
qualified employees to climb and change location without fall 
protection as long as there are no conditions, such as ice, high winds, 
the

[[Page 20402]]

design of the structure (for example, no provision for holding on with 
hands), or the presence of contaminants on the structure, that could 
cause the employee to lose his or her grip or footing. The conditions 
specifically listed in the standard are not the only ones warranting 
the use of fall protection for climbing and changing position. Other 
factors affecting the risk of an employee's falling include the level 
of competence of the employee, the condition of a structure, the 
configuration of attachments on a structure, and the need to have both 
hands free for climbing. Moreover, if the employee is not holding onto 
the structure (for example, because the employee is carrying tools or 
equipment in his or her hands), the final rule requires fall 
protection. Video tapes entered into the 1994 Sec.  1910.269 rulemaking 
record by EEI (269-Ex. 12-6), which EEI claimed represented typical, 
safe climbing practices in the utility industry, show employees using 
their hands to provide extra support and balance.\150\ Climbing and 
changing location in this manner will enable an employee to continue to 
hold onto the structure in case his or her foot slips. When employees 
are not using their hands for additional support, they are much more 
likely to fall as a result of a slip.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \150\ Exhibits in the 1994 Sec.  1910.269 rulemaking record 
(denoted as ``269-Ex'') also are available in Docket Number S-015.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    All of these revisions, including the revisions related to fall 
protection for employees working from aerial lifts described earlier in 
this section of the preamble, appear in final Sec.  
1926.954(b)(3)(iii).
    Paragraph (e)(1) of Sec.  1926.502 limits the maximum free-fall 
distance for work-positioning systems to 0.6 meters (2 feet). OSHA 
proposed to adopt this same limit in Sec.  1926.954. However, in 
electric power transmission and distribution work, permanent anchorages 
are not always available. Many utility poles provide no attachment 
points lower than the lowest crossarm. If an employee is working below 
the crossarm, there would be no place on the pole where he or she can 
attach the work-positioning equipment. The preamble to the proposed 
rule explained that, in such cases, work-positioning equipment still 
provides some degree of fall protection in that the equipment holds the 
employee in a fixed work position and keeps him or her from falling (70 
FR 34855). Therefore, OSHA proposed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv) to require 
work-positioning equipment to be rigged so that the employee could free 
fall no more than 0.6 meters (2 feet), unless no anchorage was 
available. In the preamble to the proposed rule, OSHA requested comment 
on whether proposed paragraph (b)(3)(iv) would provide sufficient 
protection for employees and on whether portable devices (such as a 
Pole Shark, Pole Choker, or similar device) could be used as suitable 
anchorages.
    Some commenters objected to the proposed requirement that work-
positioning equipment be rigged with a maximum free fall of 0.6 meters 
(2 feet) insofar as it would apply when employees are working above 
equipment that could serve as an anchorage. (See, for example, Exs. 
0201, 0230.) For instance, IBEW noted that an employee using work-
positioning equipment might be much more than 0.6 meters above a 
potential attachment point, such as a neutral bolt (Ex. 0230). The 
union claimed that, if the employee used this attachment point, the 
free-fall distance would have to be more than 0.6 meters for the 
employee to reach the work.
    OSHA acknowledges these concerns, but believes they can be 
eliminated by the use of portable devices. With portable devices, 
employees will not have to rely on anchorages on poles or structures 
because the employees would have anchorages that are part of the work-
positioning equipment. Thus, it would always be possible to rig the 
equipment to accommodate a free fall of no more than 0.6 meters.
    Many commenters opposed requiring portable devices to provide 
anchorages for employees on poles, towers, and similar structures. 
(See, for example, Exs. 0125, 0127, 0149, 0151, 0162, 0171, 0173, 0175, 
0177, 0186, 0200, 0209, 0227.) Some of these commenters maintained that 
these devices do not meet the strength requirements for anchorages. 
(See, for example, Exs. 0177, 0227.) For instance, Mr. Thomas Taylor 
with Consumers Energy commented that ``the specified portable devices 
do not meet the specifications for anchorages in Subpart M and were 
never designed to be used for that purpose'' (Ex. 0177). Several 
commenters argued that these devices are not always effective, are 
difficult or impossible to use in some circumstances, are unnecessary, 
and could even increase the risk to employees. (See, for example, Exs. 
0125, 0127, 0149, 0151, 0171, 0175, 0186, 0200.) For instance, Ms. Jill 
Lowe of the Employers Electrical and Communication Safety Committee of 
Washington and Oregon commented:

    The use of an anchorage device [such as] the pole shark, would 
not be an effective anchor when working on a structural member or 
sitting on a cross arm. The device would only be effective when 
climbing a pole without obstructions or working in a position on a 
pole below a cross arm or structural member. It must also be 
acknowledged that some of these devices could not physically be used 
due to limited space available on the pole at the work position 
(i.e.: Secondaries, crossarm braces, etc.) . . . .
    More information and data would be required before mandating the 
use of this type of equipment. For example, how many actual injuries 
have been recorded in a fall where a worker is belted in on the 
pole? Would this add weight or further encumber the worker when 
climbing the pole? These types of devices could be effective in 
severe ice conditions, but for day to day use, would not provide the 
desired efficacies and would impede climbing, add to maneuvering 
difficulties and could increase risk factor(s). [Ex. 0151]

Ms. Salud Layton of the Virginia, Maryland & Delaware Association of 
Electric Cooperatives argued that these devices pose a greater hazard 
because they increase ``the amount of time spent on the pole, the 
complexity of the work performed on the pole, and the number of 
opportunities to make mistakes while doing unnecessary jobs not related 
to the original reason the pole was actually climbed'' (Ex. 0175).

    Mr. Anthony Ahern with the Ohio Rural Electric Cooperatives 
provided the following explanation for his argument that these devices 
can be difficult to use and could potentially increase the risk to 
employees:

    Some of these devices, especially the pole-shark, are large and 
very awkward to use. They are very difficult to maneuver into a 
narrow space and greatly limit movement on the pole. It is next to 
impossible for a lineman to turn around far enough with one of these 
devices to be able to reach the end of a ten foot cross arm or a 
davit arm or even work on a transformer bank mounted on a cluster 
rack. If two or more workers are working in the same area on a pole, 
these devices can really create a lot of interference. Also, quite 
often a second safety is required to be used with these devices so 
that the climber can transition past cables, cross arms or other 
equipment on a pole. This means an extra snap hook in the D-rings 
and increases the possibility of an accident because the lineman 
grabs the wrong one. These devices are also much more difficult to 
operate with rubber gloves on than a conventional safety strap. [Ex. 
0186]

    However, some commenters suggested that these types of devices 
could be used as anchorages. (See, for example, Ex. 0199; Tr. 1338, 
1357.) A video submitted to the record shows one of these devices 
successfully supporting an employee who had fallen from a pole (Ex. 
0492).

[[Page 20403]]

    OSHA concludes that the concerns of commenters who argued that 
portable anchorage equipment is difficult to use or poses increased 
hazards are unwarranted. As noted earlier, some employers already 
require 100-percent attachment. The testimony of Messrs. Marchessault 
(of Workplace Safety Solutions) and Theis (of MYR Group) offer evidence 
that Pole Sharks, Pole Chokers, and similar devices can be, and have 
been, used successfully as anchorages (Tr. 576-579, 1338, 1357). The 
videotape of one of these devices in use clearly demonstrates that the 
particular device is reasonably light and not significantly more 
difficult to use than the traditional positioning straps currently used 
by power line workers (Ex. 0492). Some of these devices occupy about 
the same space on a pole or structure as a positioning strap and, 
therefore, should fit wherever those straps fit (id.). Evidence also 
indicates that, with training, employees can use these devices 
proficiently (Ex. 0199; Tr. 576-579).
    Mr. Ahern's example of an employee using positioning equipment to 
reach the end of a 3-meter (10-foot) crossarm supports the need for 
employees to use an anchorage at the work location. The end of the 
crossarm would be about 1.4 meters (4.6 feet) from the edge of the 
pole. To perform such work, a 2-meter-tall (6.5-foot-tall) employee 
would have to be in a nearly horizontal position to reach the end of 
the arm. This position increases the likelihood of gaff cutout, because 
the gaffs would be at an angle to the force applied by the employee's 
weight, which would be applied in a vertical direction. A gaff is 
designed to penetrate the wood when force is applied along its length. 
When force is applied perpendicular to the length of the gaff, it can 
twist the gaff out of the wood. In addition, to the extent it is 
impossible to reach the end of the crossarm with some of these devices, 
other methods of working from the pole can be used. For example, the 
employee could work from a pole-mounted platform, which would both 
enable the employee to reach further from the pole and provide an 
anchorage for the fall protection equipment (269-Ex. 8-5). Thus, the 
Agency concludes that there is greater need for an anchorage when work 
is performed in such positions.
    The examples of working on a crossarm or a structural member 
provided by Ms. Lowe with the Employers Electrical and Communication 
Safety Committee of Washington and Oregon are inapposite. As noted 
earlier, work-positioning equipment is inappropriate for use in these 
situations; such equipment may be used only on vertical structural 
members. It is not clear why Pole Sharks, Pole Chokers, or similar 
devices, which are designed to supplement or replace traditional 
positioning straps, could not be used on vertical members in the same 
way a traditional positioning strap can be used.
    OSHA concludes that the accident information in the record 
indicates that there is a need for employees to use an anchorage to 
keep them from falling while they are at the work location (Exs. 0002, 
0400). Two of the gaff cutout accidents included in Table 3 occurred 
while an employee was at the work location. One commenter stated that 
one of his company's eight fall accidents occurred while an employee 
was at the work position (Ex. 0209). Although the total number of 
accidents is not great, these accidents are easily preventable.
    The final rule, in paragraph (b)(3)(iii)(C), already requires 
employees to be protected while climbing. The same equipment that 
protects an employee climbing a pole can serve as an anchorage and can 
prevent him or her from falling while at the work location as well (Ex. 
0492; Tr. 576-579). As a result, OSHA does not believe there will often 
be problems finding or providing anchorage points for work-positioning 
equipment that can satisfy the 0.6-meter maximum free-fall requirement.
    The Agency notes that Consumers Energy incorrectly identified the 
relevant strength requirements for anchorages used with work-
positioning equipment. Paragraph (b)(1)(i) of final Sec.  1926.954 
applies Subpart M only to fall arrest equipment. Paragraph (b)(3)(v) of 
final Sec.  1926.954, described later in this section of the preamble, 
requires anchorages used with work-positioning equipment to be capable 
of supporting at least twice the potential impact load of an employee's 
fall, or 13.3 kilonewtons (3,000 pounds), whichever is greater. OSHA 
concludes that it is feasible with available technology for portable 
anchorage devices to meet the tensile-strength requirement in paragraph 
(b)(3)(v) of the final rule. The materials, including straps, buckles, 
rivets, snaphooks, and other hardware, that are, or could be, used in 
anchorages also are used in positioning straps for work-positioning 
equipment (Exs. 0055, 0492), which paragraph (b)(2)(vii)(C) of the 
final rule requires to have greater tensile strength than required by 
paragraph (b)(3)(v) of the final rule. In addition, Mr. Lee 
Marchessault with Workplace Safety Solutions testified about the 
experience of a line worker he had been training (Tr. 577-578). The 
line worker, who had been using a portable anchorage device (the 
BuckSqueeze) during the training exercise, experienced a gaff cutout, 
but was not injured because the device successfully arrested the fall 
(id.). The videotape Mr. Marchessault submitted for the record depicted 
this equipment as successfully arresting the fall of the worker who had 
been using it (Ex. 0492). Portable anchorage devices are designed to 
arrest an employee's fall into work-positioning equipment; thus, the 
devices almost certainly meet the strength requirements in ASTM F887-
04, which, as noted earlier, are equivalent to OSHA's strength 
requirements for work-positioning equipment. In fact, the latest 
edition of the consensus standard, ASTM F887-12\e1\, contains 
equivalent strength requirements for what it calls ``wood pole fall 
restriction devices.'' \151\ OSHA has included a note following 
paragraph (b)(3)(v) of the final rule to indicate that wood-pole fall-
restriction devices meeting ASTM F887-12\e1\ are deemed to meet the 
anchorage-strength requirement when they are used in accordance with 
manufacturers' instructions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \151\ Section 15.3.2 of ASTM F887-12\e1\ requires these devices, 
when new, to have a breaking strength of 13.3 kilonewtons (3,000 
pounds). Section 24 of that standard describes test procedures for 
these devices to ensure that they will successfully arrest a fall.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For these reasons, paragraph (b)(3)(iv) in the final rule requires 
work-positioning systems to be rigged so that an employee can free fall 
no more than 0.6 meters (2 feet). OSHA is not including the proposed 
exemption for situations in which no anchorage is available. In view of 
the availability of wood-pole fall-restriction devices, OSHA expects 
that in most, if not all, circumstances, anchorages will not only be 
available, but will be built into work-positioning equipment to permit 
compliance with this provision, as well as paragraph (b)(3)(iii)(C) of 
the final rule. However, because the Agency believes that employers 
will purchase equipment that complies with both paragraphs 
(b)(3)(iii)(C) and (b)(3)(iv), OSHA is requiring compliance with both 
of these paragraphs starting on April 1, 2015. This delay should 
provide employers with sufficient time to evaluate, and then purchase, 
compliant equipment.
    Final paragraph (b)(3)(v), which is being adopted without 
substantive change from the proposal, requires anchorages used with 
work-positioning equipment to be capable of sustaining at least twice 
the potential impact load of an employee's fall, or 13.3 kilonewtons 
(3,000 pounds), whichever is greater.

[[Page 20404]]

This provision, which duplicates Sec.  1926.502(e)(2), will ensure that 
an anchorage will not fail when needed to stop an employee's fall. 
Comments on the technological feasibility of this provision are 
addressed in the summary and explanation for paragraph (b)(3)(iv), 
earlier in this section of the preamble.
    Final paragraph (b)(3)(vi), which is being adopted without 
substantive change from the proposal, provides that, unless a snaphook 
is a locking type and designed specifically for the following 
conditions, snaphooks on work-positioning equipment not be engaged to 
any of the following:
    (1) Webbing, rope, or wire rope;
    (2) Other snaphooks;
    (3) A D ring to which another snaphook or other connector is 
attached;
    (4) A horizontal lifeline; or
    (5) Any object that is incompatibly shaped or dimensioned in 
relation to the snaphook such that accidental disengagement could occur 
should the connected object sufficiently depress the snaphook keeper to 
allow release of the object.
    This paragraph, which duplicates Sec.  1926.502(e)(8), prohibits 
methods of attachment that are unsafe because of the potential for 
accidental disengagement of the snaphooks during use.
6. Section 1926.955, Portable Ladders and Platforms
    Final Sec.  1926.955 addresses portable ladders and platforms. 
Paragraph (a) provides that requirements for portable ladders used in 
work covered by Part 1926, Subpart V are contained in Part 1926, 
Subpart X, except as noted in Sec.  1926.955(b). Proposed paragraph (a) 
also provided that the requirements for fixed ladders in subpart D of 
part 1910 (Sec.  1910.27) applied to fixed ladders used in electric 
power transmission and distribution construction work. OSHA is 
including proposed paragraph (a) in the final rule with one change--
deleting the second provision.
    Fixed ladders used in electric power generation, transmission, and 
distribution work are permanent ladders. They are the same ladders 
irrespective of whether the work being performed on them is 
construction work covered by subpart V or maintenance work covered by 
Sec.  1910.269. In the preamble to the proposal, OSHA explained that 
the Agency believed that the Part 1910, Subpart D standards should 
apply to these ladders during construction, as well as during 
maintenance work (70 FR 34855), but requested comments on whether the 
proposed incorporation of the general industry standard for fixed 
ladders was warranted, especially in light of the 1990 proposed 
revision to Part 1910, Subpart D (55 FR 13360, Apr. 10, 1990). OSHA 
recently reproposed the revision of that subpart (75 FR 28862, May 24, 
2010).
    A few commenters responded to this issue. (See, for example, Exs. 
0162, 0212, 0227, 0230.) Southern Company was concerned about the 
proposed incorporation of Subpart D, commenting:

    We question the use of 1910.27 for fixed ladders since OSHA 
proposed the revision of this standard over 15 years ago and there 
has been no action to date. Due to the time that has elapsed since 
OSHA published the proposed revisions to 1910 Subpart D and the 
revisions that have been made to the national consensus standards 
for all types of ladders, OSHA may wish to consider reopening the 
rulemaking prior to proceeding with the revisions to Subpart D. We 
recommend that OSHA not reference Subpart D as a part of the 
revisions to Subpart V and 1910.269 until work on the revision to 
Subpart D is completed. [Ex. 0212]

Southern Company also asked OSHA to explain ``why the provisions of 
1910 Subpart D should be applied to fixed ladders instead of the fixed 
ladder requirements of 1926.1053'' (id.). Southern Company asserted 
that the construction standard contained requirements that are not 
found in the general industry standard, but that contribute to employee 
safety (id.).

    EEI recommended that neither Sec.  1926.955(a) nor the 
corresponding provision in the general industry standard, Sec.  
1910.269(h)(1), incorporate part 1910, subpart D by reference until 
OSHA finalizes revisions to part 1910, subpart D (Ex. 0227). EEI 
asserted that there were discrepancies between the requirements for 
fixed ladders in existing part 1910, subpart D, the 1990 proposed part 
1910, subpart D, and the then-current ANSI standard for fixed ladders, 
ANSI A14.3-2002, American National Standard for Ladders--Fixed--Safety 
Requirements (id.). EEI also asserted that the existing general 
industry standard contained outdated design requirements (id.).
    OSHA accepts EEI's and Southern Company's recommendation not to 
apply the requirements for fixed ladders in Sec.  1910.27 to fixed 
ladders used in the construction of electric power transmission and 
distribution installations, though not for the reasons these commenters 
stated. OSHA believes that the use of fixed ladders in the construction 
of transmission and distribution installations is not unique. As such, 
the requirements that apply to fixed ladders in the construction of 
electric power transmission and distribution installations should be 
the same as the requirements that apply generally to construction work 
(including, as Southern Company noted, the requirements contained in 
Sec.  1926.1053).
    Because OSHA is not including the cross-reference to subpart D for 
fixed ladders in the final rule and because the remaining provisions in 
Sec.  1926.955(a) apply only to portable ladders and platforms, OSHA is 
revising the title of Sec.  1926.955 to ``Portable ladders and 
platforms'' to more accurately reflect the contents of this section.
    OSHA also accepts EEI's and Southern Company's recommendation not 
to reference in final Sec.  1910.269(h) the part 1910, subpart D 
provisions for fixed ladders because, as with final Sec.  1926.955, 
Sec.  1910.269(h) in the final rule covers only portable ladders and 
platforms. Therefore, OSHA is revising the title of Sec.  1910.269(h) 
to ``Portable ladders and platforms'' and is revising the regulatory 
text of final Sec.  1910.269(h)(1) to clarify that the paragraph 
applies to portable ladders and platforms, not fixed ladders. These 
changes make final Sec.  1910.269(h) consistent with final Sec.  
1926.955.
    MYR Group also had concerns about applying the general industry 
standards to construction work. MYR Group maintained that contractors 
would have little control over fixed ladders provided by host employers 
(Ex. 0162).
    The Agency notes that an employer whose employees are performing 
the work must adhere to OSHA standards. If, for example, an electric 
utility's fixed ladder does not comply with Part 1926, Subpart X, then 
a contractor whose employees would be using that ladder must take 
whatever measures are necessary to protect its employees and comply 
with Part 1926, Subpart X. Such measures include enforcing any 
contractual language requiring the utility to address any noncompliant 
ladders, using other means of accessing the work area, such as portable 
ladders or aerial lifts, and repairing or replacing the ladder.
    IBEW recommended that OSHA consider the specifications for fixed 
ladders in IEEE Std 1307, Standard for Fall Protection for Utility 
Work, when finalizing the language for subpart V and Sec.  1910.269 
(Ex. 0230).The union wrote:

    [T]he committee responsible for developing the standard went 
through great pains to research ladders, step bolts, and other 
climbing devices commonly installed on electrical structures. 
Lineman climbing boots and other equipment was looked at for the 
purpose of establishing ladder and step

[[Page 20405]]

bolt criteria that would be compatible with the worker safety 
equipment. [Ex. 0230]

    OSHA rejects IBEW's recommendation to adopt requirements based on 
IEEE Std 1307. Although that consensus standard contains requirements 
for structures found in electric power generation, transmission, and 
distribution work (for example, utility poles and towers), those 
structures are not unique to the electric power industry; and the 
Agency believes, therefore, that this rulemaking is not the proper 
vehicle to regulate them. The same types of structures are found in 
other industries, in particular, the telephone and cable-television 
industries. Utility poles and towers are used to support telephone 
lines, cable television lines, communications antennas, and other 
equipment used by these industries. OSHA notes that its recently 
proposed revision of part 1910, subpart D includes requirements for 
fixed ladders on towers and for step bolts on towers and poles (see 
proposed Sec.  1910.24, Step bolts and manhole steps; 75 FR 29136).
    Paragraph (b) of the final rule establishes requirements for 
special ladders and platforms used for electrical work. Because the 
lattice structure of an electric power transmission tower and overhead 
line conductors generally do not provide solid footing or upper support 
for ladders, OSHA is exempting portable ladders used on structures or 
conductors in conjunction with overhead line work from the general 
provisions of Sec.  1926.1053(b)(5)(i) and (b)(12), which address 
ladder support and the use of ladders near exposed electric equipment. 
As noted in the preamble to the proposal, an example of a type of 
ladder exempted from these provisions is a portable hook ladder used by 
power line workers to work on overhead power lines (70 FR 34855).\152\ 
These ladders are hooked over the line or other support member and then 
are lashed in place at both ends to keep them steady while employees 
are working from them.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \152\ Existing Sec.  1926.1053(b)(12) provides that ``[l]adders 
shall have nonconductive siderails if they are used where the 
employee or the ladder could contact exposed energized electrical 
equipment, except as provided in Sec.  1926.951(c)(1) of this 
part.'' In this final rule, OSHA is replacing the reference to Sec.  
1926.951(c)(1) with a reference to the corresponding provision in 
the final rule, Sec.  1926.955(c), and to final Sec.  1926.955(b), 
which exempts special ladders used for electrical work from the 
requirement for nonconductive siderails.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Final paragraphs (b)(1) through (b)(4) and (c) provide employees 
with protection that is similar to the protection afforded to employees 
by Sec.  1926.1053(b)(5)(i) and (b)(12). These provisions require that 
these special ladders and platforms be secured, specify the acceptable 
loads and proper strength of this equipment, and provide that the 
ladders be used only for the particular types of application for which 
they are designed. These provisions thereby ensure that employees are 
adequately protected when using the ladders covered by the final rule. 
In the Sec.  1910.269 rulemaking, OSHA concluded that these alternative 
criteria provide for the safe use of this special equipment, and the 
Agency is extending the application of these alternative criteria to 
work covered by Subpart V (59 FR 4375). It should be noted that the 
requirements for portable ladders in final paragraphs (b)(1) through 
(b)(4) apply in addition to requirements in Sec.  1926.1053 for 
portable ladders. OSHA revised the language in the final rule to 
clarify that the requirements in Sec.  1926.1053, except for paragraph 
(b)(5)(i) and (b)(12), apply to portable ladders used on structures or 
conductors in conjunction with overhead line work and that the 
requirements in paragraphs (b)(1) through (b)(4) apply only to portable 
ladders and platforms used in this manner.
    Paragraph (b)(1) of final Sec.  1926.955 requires portable 
platforms to be capable of supporting without failure at least 2.5 
times the maximum intended load in the configurations in which they are 
used. Paragraph (b)(1) in the proposed rule also applied this 
requirement to portable ladders. However, Sec.  1926.1053(a)(1), which 
also applies, already specifies the strength of portable ladders. 
Having two standards with different strength requirements for portable 
ladders would be confusing. Consequently, OSHA revised Sec.  
1926.955(b)(1) in the final rule so that it covers only portable 
platforms.
    Paragraph (b)(2) of final Sec.  1926.955 prohibits portable ladders 
and platforms from being loaded in excess of the working loads for 
which they are designed. It should be noted that, with respect to 
portable ladders, compliance with this provision constitutes compliance 
with Sec.  1926.1053(b)(3).
    Paragraph (b)(3) of final Sec.  1926.955 requires portable ladders 
and platforms to be secured to prevent them from becoming accidentally 
dislodged.\153\ Accordingly, with respect to portable ladders, OSHA 
concludes that compliance with Sec.  1926.955(b)(3) constitutes 
compliance with Sec.  1926.1053(b)(6), (b)(7), and (b)(8).\154\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \153\ It should be noted that, to meet paragraph (b)(3), 
employers must ensure that portable ladders and platforms are always 
secured when in use, regardless of the conditions of the surface on 
which the ladder is placed. For example, when a conductor platform, 
such as a cable cart, is suspended from a line conductor by a 
trolley or hooks, the platform must be secured to the conductor so 
that it cannot fall if the trolley or hooks become dislodged.
    \154\ It should also be noted that Sec.  1926.1053(b)(1), which 
requires that portable ladders be secured in certain situations, 
applies additional requirements when portable ladders are used to 
access an upper landing surface. Therefore, compliance with final 
Sec.  1926.955(b)(3) does not constitute compliance with these 
requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Paragraph (b)(4) of final Sec.  1926.955 requires portable ladders 
and platforms to be used only in applications for which they are 
designed. It should be noted that, with respect to portable ladders, 
compliance with this provision constitutes compliance with Sec.  
1926.1053(b)(4).
    Paragraph (c) prohibits the use of portable metal, and other 
portable conductive, ladders near exposed energized lines or equipment. 
This paragraph addresses the hazard to employees of contacting 
energized lines and equipment with conductive ladders. However, as 
noted in the preamble to the proposal, in specialized high-voltage 
work, the use of nonconductive ladders could present a greater hazard 
to employees than the use of conductive ladders (70 FR 34855-34856). In 
some high-voltage work, voltage can be induced on conductive objects in 
the work area. When the clearances between live parts operating at 
differing voltages, and between the live parts and grounded surfaces, 
are large enough that it is relatively easy to maintain the minimum 
approach distances required by Sec.  1926.960(c)(1), electric shock 
from induced voltage on objects in the vicinity of these high-voltage 
lines can pose a greater hazard. Although these voltages do not 
normally pose an electrocution hazard, the involuntary muscular 
reactions caused by contacting objects at different voltages can lead 
to falls. Using a conductive ladder in these situations can minimize 
the voltage differences between objects within an employee's reach, 
thereby reducing the hazard to the employee. Therefore, the final rule 
permits a conductive ladder to be used if an employer can demonstrate 
that the use of a nonconductive ladder would present a greater hazard 
to employees.
7. Section 1926.956, Hand and Portable Power Equipment
    Final Sec.  1926.956 addresses hand and portable power equipment. 
The title of this section in the proposal was ``Hand and portable power 
tools.'' OSHA revised the title to comport with the scope of the 
requirements in this section, which address equipment generally and not 
just tools. Paragraph

[[Page 20406]]

(a) of this section of the final rule provides that electric equipment 
connected by cord and plug is covered by paragraph (b), portable and 
vehicle-mounted generators used to supply cord- and plug-connected 
equipment are governed by paragraph (c), and hydraulic and pneumatic 
tools are covered by paragraph (d). OSHA took all of the requirements 
in this section from existing Sec.  1910.269(i).
    Electric equipment connected by cord and plug must satisfy the 
requirements in paragraph (b). Proposed paragraph (b)(1) stated that 
cord- and plug-connected equipment supplied by premises wiring is 
covered by Subpart K of Part 1926. OSHA is not including this proposed 
requirement in the final rule because, first, OSHA determined that the 
language in proposed paragraph (b) improperly emphasized ``premises 
wiring.'' The purpose of the proposed provision was to clarify that 
equipment covered by Subpart K would continue to be covered by that 
Subpart (70 FR 34856). However, OSHA derived the proposed provision 
from the corresponding provision in existing Sec.  1910.269(i). That 
provision was, in turn, derived from Sec.  1910.302(a)(1), which 
specifies the scope of part 1910, subpart S, and provides that the 
subpart's ``design safety standards for electric utilization of 
systems'' apply to ``electrical installations and utilization equipment 
installed or used within or on buildings, structures, and other 
premises'' (that is, premises wiring). Section 1926.402, which 
specifies the scope of Subpart K, does not use the term ``premises 
wiring.'' Second, proposed Sec.  1926.956(b)(1), and its counterpart in 
existing Sec.  1910.269(i)(2)(i), are unnecessary because these 
provisions simply refer to requirements that already apply. Therefore, 
to remove any ambiguity, the Agency is not including proposed Sec.  
1926.956(b)(1) in the final rule and is removing existing Sec.  
1910.269(i)(2)(i) and is replacing the reference in existing Sec.  
1910.269(i)(2)(ii) (final Sec.  1910.269(i)(2)) to any cord- and plug-
connected equipment supplied by other than premises wiring with a 
reference to cord- and plug-connected equipment not covered by Subpart 
S.
    Pursuant to proposed paragraph (b)(2), equipment not covered by 
subpart K had to have the tool frame grounded, be double insulated, or 
be supplied by an isolating transformer with an ungrounded secondary. 
The proposed rule (and existing Sec.  1926.951(f)(2)(iii)) did not 
specify any limit on the secondary voltage of the isolating 
transformer. OSHA is promulgating this paragraph in the final rule 
(final paragraph (b)(3)) with one substantive change--if an isolating 
transformer with an ungrounded secondary is used to comply with this 
provision, its secondary voltage is limited to 50 volts.
    In the preamble to the proposed rule, OSHA noted the widespread 
availability of double-insulated tools and requested comment on whether 
the option permitting tools to be supplied through an isolating 
transformer was still necessary (75 FR 34856). Several commenters 
responded to this request. (See, for example, Exs. 0126, 0186, 0201, 
0209, 0212, 0213, 0227, 0230.)
    Most of these comments supported retaining the proposed option that 
permits cord- and plug-connected equipment to be supplied by an 
isolating transformer. (See, for example, Exs. 0201, 0209, 0212, 0213, 
0227.) For instance, Duke Energy stated: ``OSHA should continue to 
allow the third option of isolating transformers. While most 
applications are covered by grounding or double insulating, there are 
unique situations where neither of these is possible and an isolating 
transformer may be necessary to protect employees'' (Ex. 0201). TVA 
commented, without elaboration, that ``[d]uring plant outages there are 
situations where the use of isolating transformers provides the best 
employee safety'' (Ex. 0213). Southern Company relied on OSHA's 
statement in the preamble to the proposal \155\ that using isolating 
transformers is ``an effective means of protecting employees from 
shock'' (Ex. 0212).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \155\ See 70 FR 34856.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Other commenters asserted that using isolating transformers was an 
outdated form of protection. (See, for example, Exs. 0126, 0186, 0230.) 
For instance, Mr. Anthony Ahern of Ohio Rural Electric Cooperatives 
wrote:

    Isolating transformers are not needed today. Almost all tools 
today are either double insulated or equipped with a grounding (3 
wire) cord and plug. OSHA already has rules which cover the use and 
maintenance of these types of tools. Further, battery operated and 
gas powered tools are becoming more and more common and hydraulic 
tools are commonly used with bucket trucks. [Ex. 0186]

IBEW commented, ``Double insulated hand tools are the industry 
standard. It would be difficult to find tools that are not double 
insulated or the tool frame is not grounded'' (Ex. 0230). IBEW stated, 
however, that isolating transformers continue to be an option ``[i]f 
other types of tools continue to be used'' (id.).

    OSHA determined that the proposed option permitting cord- and plug-
connected equipment to be supplied by an isolating transformer was 
insufficiently protective and that this option will only provide 
sufficient protection against ground faults when the isolation 
transformer has an ungrounded secondary of no more than 50 volts. OSHA 
is imposing the 50-volt limit on isolation transformers because, 
although OSHA stated in the preamble to the proposal that each of the 
three options (grounding, double insulation, and isolation) provided 
protection from electric shock (70 FR 34856), OSHA recognized in other 
standards the limited protection provided by isolating 
transformers.\156\ If unlimited voltages are permitted with respect to 
the isolating transformer option, employees working with cord- and 
plug-connected equipment operating at higher voltages would be exposed 
to a serious electric-shock hazard when a second ground fault occurs. 
Even if equipment is supplied by an isolating transformer with an 
ungrounded secondary, there will always be a path to ground for the 
circuit conductors. This path will be caused by leakage or by 
capacitive or inductive coupling. Depending on the location of this 
path, one of the circuit conductors could have a voltage to ground as 
high as the full circuit voltage. Thus, while the corresponding 
electrical standards for general industry and construction at 
Sec. Sec.  1910.304(g)(6)(vi) and (g)(6)(vii) and 1926.404(f)(7)(iv), 
respectively, permit all three options, the standards (in Sec. Sec.  
1910.304(g)(6)(vii)(A) and 1926.404(f)(7)(iv)(C)(6)) also limit the 
secondary voltage on the isolating transformer to 50 volts or less. 
Fifty volts or less is widely recognized as a generally safe voltage. 
(See, for example, Exs. 0076, 0077, 0532.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \156\ OSHA notes that TVA did not address the safety of using an 
isolating transformer with a secondary voltage of more than 50 volts 
during a plant outage. However, pursuant to the final rule, if TVA 
uses such a transformer during a plant outage or otherwise, that 
transformer must have a secondary voltage of not more than 50 volts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Paragraph (c) of final Sec.  1926.956 requires portable and 
vehicle-mounted generators used to supply cord- and plug-connected 
equipment covered by paragraph (b) to meet several requirements. Under 
paragraph (c)(1), the generator may only supply equipment on the 
generator or the vehicle (for example, lights mounted on the generator 
or vehicle) and cord- and plug-connected equipment through receptacles 
mounted on the generator or the vehicle. Paragraph (c)(2) provides that 
non-current-carrying metal parts of

[[Page 20407]]

equipment, and the equipment grounding conductor terminals of the 
receptacles, must be bonded to the generator frame. Paragraph (c)(3) 
requires that the frame of vehicle-mounted generators be bonded to the 
vehicle frame. Finally, paragraph (c)(4) requires the neutral conductor 
to be bonded to the generator frame. The final rule clarifies that 
these requirements apply only when Subpart K does not apply, as 
explained in the discussion of Sec.  1926.956(b), earlier in this 
section of the preamble. The requirements in this paragraph are similar 
to the corresponding Subpart K requirements, which are contained in 
Sec.  1926.404(f)(3).
    Final paragraph (d), which is being adopted without substantive 
change from the proposal, applies to pneumatic and hydraulic tools. 
Paragraph (d)(1) of Sec.  1926.302 requires the fluids used in 
hydraulic-powered tools to be fire resistant. As explained in the 
preamble to the proposed rule, insulating hydraulic fluids are not 
inherently fire resistant, and additives that could make them fire 
resistant generally make the hydraulic fluid unsuitable for use as 
insulation (70 FR 34856). Because of these characteristics and because 
hydraulic fluids must be insulating to protect employees performing 
power transmission and distribution work, existing Sec.  1926.950(i) 
exempts insulating hydraulic fluids from Sec.  1926.302(d)(1).
    OSHA proposed to continue this exemption in Sec.  1926.956(d)(1), 
but was concerned by several accidents described in the record that 
occurred when insulating hydraulic fluid ignited and burned employees 
(Ex. 0002). The Agency requested information on whether fire-resistant 
insulating hydraulic fluids were available or were being developed.
    OSHA did not receive any information about the availability or 
progress with the development of fire-resistant insulating hydraulic 
fluid; consequently, OSHA is including the existing exemption for 
insulating hydraulic fluids in the final rule. The Agency believes that 
the most serious hazard faced by an employee performing work covered by 
subpart V is electric shock. The Agency also reviewed the accidents in 
the record (such as Exs. 0002, 0003, 0004, and 0400) and concluded 
that, although insulating hydraulic fluid poses a substantial risk of 
igniting and burning workers, the risk of electric shock with 
uninsulated hydraulic equipment poses a greater risk of harm. OSHA 
encourages employers and manufacturers to develop insulating fluid that 
also is fire-resistant and will reexamine this issue if such fluids 
become available.
    Final paragraph (d)(2) provides that safe operating pressures may 
not be exceeded. This requirement protects employees from the harmful 
effects of tool failure. If hazardous defects are present, no operating 
pressure would be safe, and the tools could not be used. In the absence 
of defects, the maximum rated operating pressure (which may be 
specified by the manufacturer or by hydraulics handbooks) is the 
maximum safe pressure. OSHA included a note to this effect in the final 
rule.
    If a pneumatic or hydraulic tool is used where it may contact 
exposed energized parts, the tool must be designed and maintained for 
such use under final paragraph (d)(3). In addition, under paragraph 
(d)(4), hydraulic systems for tools that may contact exposed live parts 
during use must provide protection against loss of insulating value, 
for the voltage involved, due to the formation of a partial vacuum in 
the hydraulic line. Under paragraph (d)(5), a pneumatic tool used on 
energized electric lines or equipment or used where it may contact 
exposed live parts must provide protection against the accumulation of 
moisture in the air supply. These three requirements protect employees 
from electric shock by restricting current flow through hoses.
    OSHA included a note following paragraph (d)(4) of the final rule 
addressing the use of hydraulic lines that do not have check 
valves.\157\ If such lines are located in such a manner that the 
highest point on the hydraulic system is more than 10.7 meters (35 
feet) above the oil reservoir, a partial vacuum can form inside the 
line. A partial vacuum can cause a loss of insulating value, possibly 
resulting in an electrical fault and consequent hydraulic system 
failure while an employee is working on a power line. During the 
rulemaking on the 1994 Sec.  1910.269 final rule, IBEW reported two 
accidents that resulted from such an occurrence (269-DC Tr. 613). 
Therefore, OSHA inserted the note when the Agency adopted existing 
Sec.  1910.269(i)(4)(iii), which is mirrored in final Sec.  
1926.956(d)(4).\158\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \157\ A check valve blocks reverse flow of the hydraulic fluid 
and prevents the formation of a partial vacuum.
    \158\ OSHA notes that whether a partial vacuum will result in 
the loss of insulating value that triggers actions to prevent the 
formation of a partial vacuum depends on the voltage involved.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Final paragraphs (d)(6) and (d)(7) provide work-practice 
requirements to protect employees from the accidental release of 
pressure and from the injection of hydraulic oil (which is under high 
pressure) through the skin and into the body. The first of these two 
provisions requires the release of pressure before connections in the 
lines are broken, unless quick-acting, self-closing connectors are 
used. In the case of hydraulic tools, the spraying hydraulic fluid 
itself, which is flammable, poses additional hazards. Final paragraph 
(d)(7) requires employers to ensure that employees do not use any part 
of their bodies, such as a finger, to try to locate or stop a hydraulic 
leak. This provision in the final rule has been reworded to clarify 
that the employer has responsibility for compliance.
    Final paragraph (d)(8) provides that hoses not be kinked. Kinks in 
hydraulic and pneumatic hoses can lead to premature failure of the hose 
and to sudden loss of pressure. If this loss of pressure occurs while 
the employee is using the tool, an accident could result in harm to 
employees. For example, a hydraulic or pneumatic tool supporting a load 
could drop the load onto an employee on a sudden loss of pressure.
    NIOSH suggested that OSHA ``consider an additional safeguard 
against the unintentional release of hydraulic oil--the use of hoses 
that are color coded by the [operating pressure] they can withstand, 
thus reducing the hazard of skin absorption or fire'' (Ex. 0130). NIOSH 
did not submit any evidence that employers are using hoses of improper 
rating on hydraulic equipment. Consequently, the Agency is not adopting 
a requirement to color code hydraulic hoses according to safe operating 
pressure. However, NIOSH submitted evidence that an employer performing 
maintenance on an insulating hydraulic tool improperly replaced a 
nonconductive hose with a hose that was conductive because of its metal 
reinforcement (Ex. 0139). Although OSHA is not adopting a color-coding 
requirement in the final rule, the Agency advises manufacturers to 
clearly distinguish between conductive and nonconductive hoses.
Section 1926.957, Live-Line Tools
    Final Sec.  1926.957 is equivalent to existing Sec.  1910.269(j) 
and contains requirements for live-line tools (some of which are 
commonly called ``hot sticks''). This type of tool is used by qualified 
employees to handle energized conductors. The tool insulates the 
employee from the energized line. For example, a wire tong, which is a 
slender insulated pole with a clamp on one end, is used to hold a 
conductor at a distance while work is being performed. Common types of 
live-line tools include

[[Page 20408]]

wire tongs, wire-tong supports, tension links, and switch, fuse, and 
tie sticks.
    Mr. Leo Muckerheide of Safety Consulting Services was concerned 
that proposed Sec.  1926.957 did not address all types of live-line 
tools, stating:

    There is no definition given for a live-line tool except in the 
preamble. It states that such a tool is used to handle energized 
conductors and then gives some examples. There are other work 
practices, such as installing personal protective grounds, checking 
for voltage, pulling fuses or cutouts, removing or installing pins 
on suspension insulators, removing or installing jumpers, etc., 
where an insulated tool (switch/fuse/hot stick) is utilized. The 
insulating characteristics of these insulated tools (switch/fuse/hot 
stick) is critical to the accomplishment of such activities without 
injury to the worker. Any insulated tool (switch/fuse/hot stick) 
that is used on an energized circuit or a normally energized circuit 
in a manner that places a part of the tool inside the minimum 
approach distance . . . should be considered a live-line tool. The 
worker is depending on the insulating characteristics of the tool 
for protection. [Ex. 0180]

He recommended that OSHA expand this section to include these other 
insulated tools (id.).

    OSHA notes that the lists of live-line tools provided here and in 
the preamble to the proposal (70 FR 34853) are not exhaustive. Also, 
OSHA added some of Mr. Muckerheide's examples to the list in the first 
paragraph of the summary and explanation for final Sec.  1926.957. 
Final Sec.  1926.957, and its general industry counterpart, final Sec.  
1910.269(j), cover any tool that is designed to contact an energized 
part and insulate the worker from that part. IEEE Std 516-2003, IEEE 
Guide for Maintenance Methods on Energized Power Lines, defines 
``insulating tool or device'' as a tool or device ``designed primarily 
to provide insulation from an energized part or conductor'' (Ex. 
0041).\159\ This definition is consistent with OSHA's use of the term 
``live-line tool.'' The Agency believes that the term is well 
understood by the regulated community and that the guidance provided in 
this preamble makes the Agency's meaning of the term clear. Therefore, 
OSHA concludes that it is not necessary to define ``live-line tool'' in 
the final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \159\ IEEE Std 516-2009 contains the same definition (Ex. 0532).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Paragraph (a), which is being adopted without change from the 
proposal, requires live-line tool rods, tubes, and poles to be designed 
and constructed to withstand 328,100 volts per meter (100,000 volts per 
foot) for 5 minutes if made of fiberglass-reinforced plastic (FRP), 
246,100 volts per meter (75,000 volts per foot) for 3 minutes if made 
of wood, or other tests that the employer can demonstrate are 
equivalent. The voltage per unit length varies with the type of 
material because different insulating materials are capable of 
withstanding different voltages over equal lengths. For example, a 
higher design standard for wood would cause most wood to fail to meet 
the specification, while a lower design specification would allow 
substandard products into service. Since the withstand voltages in 
final paragraph (a) are consistent with the withstand voltages in 
existing Sec.  1910.269(j)(1) and ASTM F711-02 (2007), Standard 
Specification for Fiberglass-Reinforced Plastic (FRP) Rod and Tube Used 
in Live-Line Tools, OSHA expects that tools currently in use in the 
industry will continue to be acceptable. A note in the final regulatory 
text provides that tools that meet ASTM F711-02 (2007) will be deemed 
to comply with paragraph (a)(1) of final Sec.  1926.957. Together with 
the minimum approach distances in Sec.  1926.960(c)(1), final paragraph 
(a) of Sec.  1926.957 protects employees from electric shock when they 
are using these tools.
    Mr. Frank Owen Brockman with Farmers Rural Electric Cooperative 
Corporation recommended that the standard not contain provisions for 
live-line tools made of wood (Ex. 0173). He maintained that these tools 
are outdated and should no longer be in service (id.).
    OSHA believes that wood live-line tools likely are no longer in 
service and are no longer being manufactured. However, the Agency has 
no evidence in the record that there are no wood live-line tools 
currently in service. As long as they meet the requirements in final 
Sec.  1926.957, they can effectively protect employees from electric 
shock. Therefore, OSHA is including in the final rule without change 
the proposed requirements for live-line tools made of wood.
    Paragraph (b) addresses the condition of tools. The requirements in 
this paragraph duplicate the requirements in existing Sec.  
1910.269(j)(2) and will ensure that live-line tools remain in a safe 
condition after they are put into service. Paragraph (b)(1), which is 
being adopted without change from the proposal, requires live-line 
tools to be wiped clean and visually inspected for defects before each 
day's use. Wiping the tool removes surface contamination that could 
lower the insulating value of the tool. Inspecting the tool will 
identify any obvious defects that could also adversely affect the 
insulating value of the tool.
    Paragraph (b)(2), which is being adopted without change from the 
proposal, provides that a tool be removed from service if any 
contamination or defect that could adversely affect its insulating 
qualities or mechanical integrity is present after the tool is wiped 
clean. This paragraph protects employees from the failure of live-line 
tools during use. Tools removed from service must be examined and 
tested under final paragraph (b)(3) before being returned to service.
    During the rulemaking on existing Sec.  1910.269, OSHA found that, 
while there was no evidence in the record of any injuries related to 
the failure of a hot stick, evidence did indicate that these tools have 
failed in use (without injury to employees) and that employees depend 
on their insulating value while using them to handle energized 
conductors (59 FR 4378). The Agency believes that live-line tools are 
not typically used to provide protection for employees in the rain 
(when work is normally suspended), which probably accounts for the lack 
of injuries in the record.\160\ However, live-line tools might be used 
under wet conditions, in which case it is necessary to ensure that 
these tools will retain their insulating qualities when they are wet. 
In addition, employee safety is dependent on the insulating integrity 
of the tool--failure of a live-line tool would almost certainly lead to 
serious injury or death whenever the tool is the only insulating 
barrier between the employee and a live part. Therefore, OSHA is 
adopting rules on the periodic examination and testing of live-line 
tools to ensure that the live-line tools employees use are safe.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \160\ A contaminated tool will fail more easily when wet than 
when dry (Ex. 0532). Tools are supposed to be wiped before use, in 
part to remove moisture.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Although visual inspection can detect the presence of hazardous 
defects and contamination, the Agency concluded, on the basis of the 
1994 rulemaking record for existing Sec.  1910.269, that the daily 
inspections required by final paragraph (b)(1) might not detect all 
defects and contamination (59 FR 4378). Referring to live-line tools 
that had failed in use, a Georgia Power Company study submitted to that 
1994 rulemaking record stated: ``Under visual inspection all the sticks 
appeared to be relatively clean with no apparent surface 
irregularities'' (269-Ex. 60). These tools passed a dry voltage test, 
but failed a wet voltage test.\161\ While the study

[[Page 20409]]

further noted that the surface luster on the sticks was reduced, 
apparently the normal visual inspection alone did not detect the 
defects that caused those tools to fail.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \161\ A so-called ``dry test'' of a live-line tool is an 
electrical test performed on the tool after it is stored under 
ambient, low-humidity, test conditions for 24 hours. A so-called 
``wet test'' is an electrical test performed on the tool after the 
tool is placed in a high-humidity (at least 93-percent humidity) 
chamber for 168 hours. After conditioning and before testing, the 
tool is wiped with a dry cloth. Thus, the outside of the tool is dry 
during both tests.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To address these concerns, OSHA is adopting requirements in 
paragraph (b)(3) for the thorough examination, cleaning, repair, and 
testing of live-line tools on a periodic basis. These provisions are 
adopted in the final rule without substantive change from the proposal. 
The tools must undergo this process on a 2-year cycle and whenever the 
tools are removed from service on the basis of the daily 
inspection.\162\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \162\ When an employer removes a tool from service under final 
paragraph (b)(2) and inspects and tests it under final paragraph 
(b)(3), the 2-year cycle begins again on the date of the test.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The final rule first requires a thorough examination of the live-
line tool for defects (paragraph (b)(3)(i)). After the examination, the 
tool must be cleaned and waxed if no defects or contamination are 
found; if a defect or contamination that could adversely affect the 
insulating qualities or mechanical integrity of the live-line tool is 
found during the examination, the tool must be repaired and refinished 
or permanently removed from service as specified by final paragraph 
(b)(3)(ii). In addition, under final paragraph (b)(3)(iii), a tool must 
be tested: (1) After it has been repaired or refinished, regardless of 
its composition; or (2) after an examination is conducted in accordance 
with final paragraph (b)(3)(i) that results in no repair or refinishing 
being performed (although no testing is required if the tool is made of 
FRP rod or foam-filled FRP tube and the employer can demonstrate that 
the tool has no defects that could cause it to fail in use).
    In accordance with final paragraph (b)(3)(iv), the test method used 
must be designed to verify the tool's integrity along its full working 
length and, if the tool is made of FRP, its integrity under wet 
conditions. The performance criteria specified by final paragraph (a) 
are ``design standards'' that must be met by the manufacturer. The test 
voltages and test duration used during the manufacturing process are 
not appropriate for periodic retesting of the hot sticks because live-
line tools may sustain damage during such tests. Accordingly, the in-
service tests required by final paragraph (b)(3)(v) are designed to 
assure as much employee protection as possible without damaging the 
tools. For tools with both hollow and foam-filled sections, the filled 
section is typically considered to constitute the insulating portion of 
the tool, which, for the purposes of final paragraph (b)(3)(iv), is the 
working length of the tool.
    Under final paragraph (b)(3)(v), the test voltages must be 246,100 
volts per meter (75,000 volts per foot) for fiberglass tools or 164,000 
volts per meter (50,000 volts per foot) for wood tools, and, in both 
cases, the voltage must be applied for 1 minute. Other tests are 
permitted if the employer can demonstrate that they provide equivalent 
employee protection.
    A note to paragraph (b) of the final rule states that guidelines 
for the inspection, care, and testing of live-line tools are specified 
in IEEE Std 516-2009.
    Mr. Stephen Frost with Mid-Columbia Utilities Safety Alliance 
commented that the IEEE standard does not contain test criteria for FRP 
tools with hollow sections, but supported OSHA's proposal to adopt the 
same language as existing Sec.  1910.269 (Ex. 0184).
    OSHA reviewed the test procedures in IEEE Std 516-2009 and found 
that they do address hollow, as well as foam-filled, live-line tools. 
The Agency believes that these tests can be used by the employer as 
appropriate for the different sections of multiple-section tools.
    Mr. Leo Muckerheide of Safety Consulting Services commented that 
existing Sec.  1910.269(j)(2)(iii) references a 1994 edition of the 
2003 IEEE standard that OSHA referenced in the note to proposed 
paragraph (b). He also noted that the ``wet'' test procedure in an ASTM 
standard differs from the one in the IEEE standard. Mr. Muckerheide 
explained:

    [Paragraph (j)(2)(iii)(D) of existing Sec.  1910.269 and 
proposed Sec.  1926.957(b)(3)(iv)] require the integrity testing of 
fiberglass-reinforced plastic tools under ``wet conditions'' but it 
does not define ``wet conditions''. The note for paragraph 
1926.957(b)(3)(iv) refers to IEEE Std 516-2003 while the note for 
1910.269(j)(2)(iii)(D) refers to IEEE Std 978-1984. IEEE Std 978-
1984 is no longer supported by IEEE. There is also an ASTM standard, 
F711-02, that establishes specifications for live-line tools. Both 
have a test protocol for ``wet conditions''. However, they are not 
identical. One specifies a 7 day 93% humidity test and the other a 
fine mist of distilled water. [Ex. 0180]

He recommended that both Sec.  1910.269 and subpart V require testing 
under wet conditions to conform to the ``current version of IEEE Std 
516.''

    OSHA notes that the test procedure and criteria in ASTM F711 are 
design or acceptance tests for new live-line tools, while the tests in 
the IEEE standard are in-service tests. As noted earlier, design and 
acceptance tests generally are more severe than in-service tests and 
can damage tools if repeated on a regular basis. A tool in new 
condition should perform at an optimal level. Once a tool has been in 
service for a while, it will typically exhibit reduced performance 
because the tool deteriorates as it is handled--it develops microscopic 
scratches and becomes contaminated with creosote and other substances. 
To account for this deterioration, in-service testing frequently uses 
different test procedures or test criteria, or both. In the final 
standard, the Agency provides employers flexibility in adopting test 
procedures and criteria. Thus, test procedures and criteria are 
acceptable as long as they meet the performance requirements of the 
standard, that is, they ``verify the tool's integrity along its entire 
working length and, if the tool is made of fiberglass-reinforced 
plastic, its integrity under wet conditions.'' As explained in detail 
under the summary and explanation for final Sec.  1926.97, earlier in 
this section of the preamble, OSHA is adopting performance requirements 
rather than incorporating consensus standards by reference for a number 
of reasons, including allowing greater compliance flexibility and 
reducing the need to update the OSHA standards as frequently.
    As explained in the summary and explanation for Appendix G, later 
in this section of the preamble, OSHA is updating the consensus 
standards specified in nonmandatory references throughout final Sec.  
1910.269 and final subpart V. In this case, the note to final Sec.  
1910.269(j)(2) includes an updated reference to IEEE Std 516-2009 to 
match the corresponding note to final Sec.  1926.957(b). (See the 
summary and explanation of Sec.  1926.97, earlier in this preamble, for 
a discussion of OSHA's approach regarding future updates of the 
consensus standards referenced in this final rule.)
Section 1926.958, Materials Handling and Storage
    Final Sec.  1926.958 is equivalent to existing Sec.  1910.269(k) 
and contains requirements for materials handling and storage. Final 
paragraph (a) clarifies that material-handling and material-storage 
requirements in Part 1926, including those in Subparts N and CC, apply. 
Proposed paragraph (a) referenced only Subpart N.\163\ However, OSHA 
recently

[[Page 20410]]

revised its cranes and derricks standard, former Sec.  1926.550, which 
was in subpart N when OSHA published the proposed rule for subpart V. 
The recently published cranes and derricks final rule moved the 
requirements for cranes and derricks into a new subpart, subpart CC of 
part 1926 (75 FR 47906, Aug. 9, 2010).\164\ Consequently, the Agency is 
including a reference to this new subpart in final Sec.  1926.958(a). 
Work performed under subpart V is exempt from certain requirements in 
subpart CC. For example, Sec.  1926.1408(b)(5) exempts cranes and 
derricks used in subpart V work from Sec.  1926.1408(b)(4), which 
requires employers to adopt one of several encroachment-prevention 
measures for certain work near overhead power lines. Any exemptions in 
subpart CC for subpart V work continue to apply; those exemptions are 
not affected by this final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \163\ When subpart V was originally promulgated in 1972, that 
final rule also added a standard for aerial lifts to subpart N. That 
aerial lift standard, which originally appeared at Sec.  1926.556, 
eventually was redesignated as Sec.  1926.453, in subpart L. It 
should be noted that, except for Sec.  1926.453(b)(2)(v), the aerial 
lift standard still applies to work covered by subpart V even though 
it is not referenced in final Sec.  1926.958 or final Sec.  
1926.959. (See Sec.  1926.950(a)(2).) See, also, the summary and 
explanation for final Sec.  1926.954(b)(3)(iii) for a discussion of 
why the fall protection requirement in Sec.  1926.453(b)(2)(v) does 
not apply to work covered by Subpart V.
    \164\ Subpart CC applies to power-operated equipment, when used 
in construction, that can hoist, lower, and horizontally move a 
suspended load. The discussion of Subpart CC in the preamble to the 
Subpart V final rule refers to this equipment as ``cranes and 
derricks.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    It should be noted that Subparts H and O of OSHA's construction 
standards also contain requirements pertaining to material handling and 
storage. For example, Sec.  1926.602 covers material-handling 
equipment. These provisions continue to apply even though they are not 
specifically mentioned in final Sec.  1926.958(a). (See final Sec.  
1926.950(a)(2).) To make this clear in the final rule, OSHA reworded 
Sec.  1926.958(a) in the final rule to require material handling and 
storage to ``comply with applicable material-handling and material-
storage requirements in this part, including those in subparts N and CC 
of this part.''
    Paragraph (b) addresses the storage of materials in the vicinity of 
energized lines and equipment. Paragraph (b)(1), which is being adopted 
without substantive change from the proposal, contains requirements for 
areas to which access is not restricted to qualified employees only. As 
a general rule, the standard does not permit materials or equipment to 
be stored in such areas within 3.05 meters (10 feet) of energized lines 
or exposed parts of equipment. This clearance distance must be 
increased by 0.10 meters (4 inches) for every 10 kilovolts over 50 
kilovolts. The distance also must be increased to account for the 
maximum sag and side swing of any conductor and to account for the 
height and movement of material-handling equipment. Maintaining these 
clearances protects unqualified employees from contacting energized 
lines or equipment with materials being handled. Storing materials at 
the required distances also will facilitate compliance with provisions 
elsewhere in the construction standards that require material-handling 
equipment to maintain specific distances from energized lines and 
equipment, such as Sec.  1926.600(a)(6).\165\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \165\ OSHA's revised standard for cranes and derricks at subpart 
CC requires minimum clearance distances for cranes and derricks, 
which, under certain conditions, are greater than the distances 
specified by final Sec.  1926.958(b)(1). Therefore, employers 
covered by subpart V must be knowledgeable about these requirements 
when they store materials that are lifted by equipment covered under 
subpart CC and may need to adjust the clearance distances for 
storing materials away from energized lines and equipment 
accordingly. (For work covered by subpart V, compliance with final 
Sec.  1926.959 is deemed compliance with the relevant requirements 
in subpart CC (per Sec.  1926.1400(g)). However, employers must 
comply with subpart CC clearance distances for work performed by 
unqualified employees because subpart V does not contain electrical 
safety-related work practices for those workers. See final Sec.  
1926.950(a)(1)(ii).)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The work practices unqualified workers must use in handling 
material stored near energized lines, including in areas addressed by 
final Sec.  1926.958(b)(1), are addressed elsewhere in Part 1926, 
including subparts K and CC of part 1926. The general approach taken in 
this revision of subpart V is to provide safety-related work practices 
for qualified employees to follow when they are performing electric 
power transmission and distribution work, including work in areas 
addressed by final Sec.  1926.958(b)(1). (See the summary and 
explanation for final Sec.  1926.950(a)(1)(ii).)
    Mr. Kenneth Brubaker was concerned that unqualified employees 
storing materials near energized lines or equipment could not determine 
the relevant voltage and recommended specifying clearance distances 
that did not require calculations based on voltage (Exs. 0099, 0100).
    OSHA is not adopting Mr. Brubaker's recommendation. As noted under 
the summary and explanation for final Sec.  1926.950(a)(1)(ii), subpart 
V does not apply to electrical safety-related work practices for 
unqualified employees. Paragraph (b)(1) of final Sec.  1926.958 
specifies minimum clearance distances between energized lines or 
exposed energized parts and stored material or equipment. The 
electrical safety-related work practices used by unqualified employees 
handling the stored material or equipment are addressed in subparts of 
part 1926 other than subpart V. In any event, the employer is 
responsible for determining where to store material and equipment so as 
to comply with final Sec.  1926.958(b)(1), which addresses Mr. 
Brubaker's concern that unqualified employees will be determining these 
distances.
    Paragraph (b)(2), which is being adopted without substantive change 
from the proposal, governs the storage of materials in areas restricted 
to qualified employees. If the materials are stored where only 
qualified workers have access to them, the materials may be safely 
stored closer to the energized parts than 3.05 meters (10 feet), 
provided that the employees have sufficient room to perform their work. 
Therefore, to ensure that enough room is available, paragraph (b)(2) 
prohibits material from being stored in the working space around 
energized lines or equipment. A note to this paragraph clarifies that 
requirements for the size of the working space are contained in Sec.  
1926.966(b). (See the discussion of final Sec.  1926.966(b) later in 
this preamble for an explanation of requirements for access and working 
space.)
    Working space under this provision is the clear space that must be 
provided around the equipment to enable qualified employees to work on 
the equipment. The minimum working space specifies the minimum distance 
an obstruction can be from the equipment. For example, if a switchboard 
is installed in a cabinet that an employee will enter, the inside walls 
of the cabinet must provide sufficient minimum working space to enable 
the employee to work safely within the cabinet.
    The minimum approach distance that must be maintained from a live 
part is the minimum dimension of the space around the equipment that a 
qualified employee is not permitted to enter, except under specified 
conditions. Note that the minimum approach distance a qualified 
employee must maintain from an energized part (covered in final Sec.  
1926.960(c)(1)) is smaller than the working space that is required to 
be provided around the part. Accordingly, the employee must enter the 
working space and still maintain the minimum approach distance unless 
one of the exceptions specified in Sec.  1926.960(c)(1) applies. 
Employers must ensure that materials are stored outside the working 
space so that employees can quickly

[[Page 20411]]

escape from the space if necessary. In addition, sufficient room must 
be available in the working space to allow employees to move without 
violating the minimum approach distance.
Section 1926.959, Mechanical Equipment
    Requirements for mechanical equipment are contained in Sec.  
1926.959. Paragraph (a) sets general requirements for mechanical 
equipment used in the construction of electric power transmission or 
distribution lines and equipment. Paragraph (a)(1) provides that 
mechanical equipment must be operated in accordance with applicable 
requirements in part 1926, including subparts N, O, and CC, except for 
one requirement pertaining to the operation of mechanical equipment 
near energized power lines at Sec.  1926.600(a)(6), which does not 
apply to operations performed by qualified employees. Accordingly, 
Sec.  1926.600(a)(6) continues to apply to operations performed by 
unqualified employees. Final subpart V contains requirements for the 
operation of mechanical equipment by qualified employees near energized 
power lines and equipment. While the final rule allows qualified 
employees to operate equipment closer to energized lines and equipment 
than permitted for unqualified employees by Sec.  1926.600(a)(6), the 
final rule also contains the relevant safeguards for protecting these 
employees. These safeguards include special training for qualified 
employees (see Sec.  1926.950(b)(2)) and the use of special safety 
procedures for operations involving mechanical equipment (see Sec.  
1926.959(d)). Therefore, OSHA believes that the final rule will provide 
more appropriate protection for qualified electric power transmission 
and distribution workers than Sec.  1926.600(a)(6). OSHA revised the 
language of final Sec.  1926.959(a)(1) from the proposal to clarify 
this point and to be more consistent with final Sec.  1926.958(a).
    OSHA proposed to exempt subpart V operations performed by qualified 
employees from Sec.  1926.550(a)(15) in subpart N, which specified 
minimum approach distances for cranes and derricks. As noted earlier, 
however, after OSHA published proposed subpart V, the Agency revised 
its standard for cranes and derricks. The revised requirements for 
cranes and derricks were relocated to subpart CC. In the cranes and 
derricks rulemaking, OSHA concluded that the provisions for operating 
cranes and derricks near overhead power lines in subpart CC were 
reasonable and appropriate and were more protective of employees than 
comparable provisions in existing subpart V. However, the Agency also 
concluded that existing Sec.  1910.269(p) was just as protective of 
employees as the requirements for operating cranes and derricks near 
power lines adopted in subpart CC. (See 75 FR 47921, 47930, 47965-
47966.) Accordingly, OSHA deemed compliance with existing Sec.  
1910.269(p) as compliance with Sec. Sec.  1926.1407 through 1926.1411. 
(See Sec.  1926.1400(g).) The exemptions for subpart V work specified 
in subpart CC (or elsewhere in part 1926) continue to apply; however, 
as explained later in this section of the preamble, the Agency revised 
several provisions in subpart CC to incorporate changes to subpart V in 
this final rule.
    Paragraph (a)(2) of final Sec.  1926.959 requires that the critical 
safety components of mechanical elevating and rotating equipment 
receive a thorough visual inspection before use on each shift. Although 
the inspection must be thorough, it is not necessary to disassemble the 
equipment. The note following this paragraph describes what equipment 
parts OSHA considers to be critical safety components, that is, any 
part for which failure would result in a free fall or free rotation of 
the boom. These parts are critical to safety because failure would 
immediately pose serious hazards to employees, as can be seen in 
several aerial-lift accidents in the record (Ex. 0004 \166\). This 
provision is adopted as proposed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \166\ See, for example, the seven accidents described at https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=951145&id=200200137&id=928168&id=908343&id=837740&id=14244818&id=564765.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Paragraph (a)(3), which is being adopted without substantive change 
from the proposal, prohibits the operator of an electric line truck 
from leaving his or her position at the controls while a load is 
suspended, unless the employer can demonstrate that no employee, 
including the operator, would be endangered if the operator left his or 
her position. This provision ensures that the operator will be at the 
controls if an emergency arises that necessitates moving the suspended 
load. For example, due to wind or unstable soil, the equipment might 
start to tip over. Having the operator at the controls ensures that 
corrective action can be taken quickly enough to prevent an accident.
    Paragraph (b) sets requirements for outriggers. As proposed, 
paragraph (b)(1) would have required that mobile equipment \167\ 
provided with outriggers be operated with the outriggers extended and 
firmly set ``as necessary for the stability of the specific 
configuration of the equipment.'' The manufacturer normally provides 
limits for various configurations to ensure the stability of the 
equipment, but these limits can also be derived through engineering 
analysis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \167\ Paragraphs (p)(1)(ii) and (p)(2) of existing Sec.  
1910.269 use the term ``vehicular equipment,'' which is not defined 
in existing Sec.  1910.269(x). Existing paragraph (p)(1)(ii) 
requires reverse-signal alarms under certain conditions. This 
paragraph ``is based on existing Sec. Sec.  1926.601(b)(4) and 
1926.602(a)(9)(ii)'' (59 FR 4399). Existing Sec.  1926.601(b)(4) 
contains a reverse-signal-alarm requirement applicable to motor 
vehicles, and existing Sec.  1926.602(a)(9)(ii) contains a similar 
requirement applicable to earthmoving and compacting equipment. 
Because those construction standards apply to motor vehicles and 
earthmoving and compacting equipment, the term ``vehicular 
equipment'' in existing Sec.  1910.269(p)(1)(ii), which OSHA drew 
from those construction standards, means motor vehicles and 
earthmoving and compacting equipment.
    Existing Sec.  1910.269(p)(2) generally requires vehicular 
equipment, if provided with outriggers, to be operated with the 
outriggers extended and firmly set. Thus, ``vehicular equipment'' in 
existing Sec.  1910.269(p)(2) applies more broadly to mobile 
equipment fitted with outriggers.
    In the final rule, OSHA is clarifying these two provisions in 
Sec.  1910.269 and the provision in Sec.  1926.959(b), which 
corresponds to existing Sec.  1910.269(p)(2). First, OSHA is 
replacing the term ``vehicular equipment'' in the introductory text 
to paragraph (p)(1)(ii) with ``motor vehicle or earthmoving or 
compacting equipment'' to make it clear that Sec.  
1910.269(p)(1)(ii) applies to the same equipment as Sec. Sec.  
1926.601(b)(4) and 1926.602(a)(9)(ii). Second, the Agency is using 
the term ``mobile equipment'' in final Sec. Sec.  1910.269(p)(2)(i) 
and 1926.959(b)(1) in place of the term ``vehicular equipment.'' 
``Mobile equipment,'' as used in these paragraphs, means mechanical 
equipment that is mounted on a body, such as a truck, that is used 
to transport the equipment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Mr. Frank Owen Brockman with Farmers Rural Electric Cooperative 
Corporation commented that outriggers ``should be used any time the 
boom is out of the cradle'' (Ex. 0173).
    In considering this comment, OSHA examined accidents in the record 
involving overturned mobile equipment. There were several such 
accidents in the record involving equipment that overturned, and at 
least two of them occurred because the outriggers were not set (Exs. 
0002, 0400 \168\). Based on these accidents, OSHA believes that, even 
if employees setting up mobile mechanical equipment expect to operate 
the equipment within its stability limits, they may inadvertently go 
beyond those limits while operating the equipment. Consequently, the 
Agency agrees with Mr. Brockman that outriggers should always be set, 
at least when it is possible to do so. Therefore, in paragraph (b)(1) 
of the final rule, OSHA is requiring the outriggers of mobile

[[Page 20412]]

equipment to be extended and firmly set, except as permitted in 
paragraph (b)(3), which provides for the safe operation of the 
equipment when the work area or terrain precludes the use of 
outriggers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \168\ See the two accidents described at https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=170872162&id=201403771.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The second sentence of proposed paragraph (b)(1) would have 
prohibited outriggers from being extended or retracted outside the 
clear view of the operator unless all employees were outside the range 
of possible equipment motion. There were no comments on this provision, 
and OSHA is including this requirement as paragraph (b)(2) in the final 
rule. This requirement will prevent injuries caused by extending 
outriggers into employees.
    If the work area or terrain precludes the use of outriggers, 
proposed paragraph (b)(2) would have permitted the operation of the 
equipment only within the maximum load ratings specified by the 
manufacturer for the particular equipment configuration without 
outriggers. There were no comments on this provision, and OSHA is 
including this requirement in paragraph (b)(3) in the final rule. The 
requirements contained in paragraphs (b)(1) and (b)(3) will ensure the 
stability of the equipment while loads are being handled, thereby 
preventing equipment tipovers, which could harm employees.
    Paragraph (c), which is being adopted without substantive change 
from the proposal, requires mechanical equipment used to lift or move 
lines or other material to be operated within its maximum load rating 
and other design limitations for the conditions under which it is being 
used. As OSHA explained in the preamble to the proposal, it is 
important for mechanical equipment to be used within its design 
limitations so that the lifting equipment does not fail during use and 
harm employees (70 FR 34858).
    In electric-utility operations, contact between live parts and 
mechanical equipment causes many fatalities each year. A sample of 
typical accidents involving the operation of mechanical equipment near 
overhead lines is given in Table 4. Industry practice (Exs. 0041, 0076, 
0077), and existing rules in Subpart V (Sec. Sec.  1926.952(c) and 
1926.955(a)(5)(ii)), require that mechanical equipment be kept from 
exposed energized lines and equipment at distances generally greater 
than or equal to those proposed in Table V-2 (AC Live-Line Work Minimum 
Approach Distance). However, incidents involving contact between 
mechanical equipment and energized parts still occur during the 
hundreds of thousands of operations performed near overhead power lines 
each year (Ex. 0017). If the equipment operator is distracted briefly 
or if the distances involved or the speed of the equipment towards the 
line is misjudged, contact with the lines is likely to occur, 
especially when the minimum approach distances are small. Because these 
types of contacts cannot be totally avoided, OSHA believes that 
additional requirements, beyond provisions for maintaining minimum 
approach distances, are necessary for operating mechanical equipment 
near exposed energized lines. Paragraph (d) of final Sec.  1926.959 
addresses this issue.

             Table 4--Accidents Involving the Operation of Mechanical Equipment Near Overhead Lines
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                  Number of fatalities
                                          ------------------------------------
            Type of equipment                                Grounded                  Types of accident
                                            Total  ---------------------------
                                                      Yes       No       ?
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Boom Truck/Derrick Truck.................        9        2  .......        7  Boom contact with energized line.
                                                                               Pole contact with energized line.
Aerial Lift..............................        8  .......        1        7  Boom contact with energized line.
                                           .......  .......  .......  .......  Lower boom contact with energized
                                                                                line.
                                           .......  .......  .......  .......  Employee working on deenergized
                                                                                line when upper boom contacted
                                                                                energized line.
                                           .......  .......  .......  .......  Electric current arced from a
                                                                                winch on a lift used on an
                                                                                energized line to nearby ground.
Vehicle..................................        2  .......        1        1  Line fell on vehicle.
                                           .......  .......  .......  .......  Unknown type of vehicle and type
                                                                                of accident.
                                          ----------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total................................       19        2        2       15  .................................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: OSHA accident investigation data (269-Exs. 9-2 and 9-2A).

    Mr. Brian Erga with ESCI proposed a complete revision of proposed 
paragraph (d) (Exs. 0155, 0471; Tr. 1249-1253). OSHA decided not to 
adopt this proposal. The Agency addresses his specific concerns and 
recommendations in the following discussion of the individual 
provisions of proposed paragraph (d).
    Proposed paragraph (d)(1) would have required that the minimum 
approach distances in Table V-2 through Table V-6 be maintained between 
the mechanical equipment and live parts while the equipment was being 
operated near exposed energized lines or equipment. This provision 
would ensure that sufficient clearance is provided between the 
mechanical equipment and the energized part to prevent an electric arc 
from occurring and energizing the equipment. The requirement to 
maintain a minimum approach distance also lessens the chance that the 
mechanical equipment will strike the lines and knock them to the 
ground. (See 70 FR 34858-34859; 59 FR 4400-4401.)
    Mr. Brian Erga with ESCI objected to the prohibition against taking 
mechanical equipment inside the minimum approach distance (MAD), 
commenting:

    [The proposal] requires that mechanical equipment can not be 
allowed within the minimum approach distance. However, the electric 
utility industry routinely works near MAD, at MAD, and takes 
mechanical equipment into MAD during many industry accepted work 
practices many times per day. [Ex. 0155]

    Mr. Erga argued that proper work methods and grounding would 
prevent accidents involving mechanical equipment contacting overhead 
power lines. He expanded on his comments in his posthearing submission:

    During cross examination at the public hearing on March 2006, 
speakers from EEI, NECA, IBEW and others, testified that qualified 
workers routinely take mechanical equipment into the Minimum 
Approach Distance (MAD). In cross examination of Mr. Tomaseski, IBEW 
Director of Safety, was asked, ``is mechanical equipment taken 
inside the minimum approach distance at times?'' Mr. Tomaseski 
replied ``regularly,''

[[Page 20413]]

and he further stated ``it could be (the standard) rewritten to 
offer a better level of safety.''
    This standard industry practice of taking mechanical equipment 
into MAD occurs when qualified workers are setting new poles, 
installing transformers, installing equipment and moving conductors 
with mechanical equipment. This practice is safe and effective if 
[proper work methods are used].
    Table IV-5 ``Accidents Involving the Operation of Mechanical 
Equipment Near Overhead Lines,'' page 34859 of the Federal Register, 
dated June 15, 2005, details fatalities around mechanical equipment 
that were grounded, ungrounded, or not known. However, the table 
does not detail how the equipment was grounded, if proper cover-up 
was used or if any safety precaution was taken. To date there has 
never been a documented case of a worker being injured or killed 
around properly grounded mechanical equipment, or when the proper 
work methods . . . have been used.
    And, as clearly seen in the IEEE paper 91 SM 312-9 PWRD ``Tests 
Results of Grounding Uninsulated Aerial Lift Vehicles Near Energized 
Lines'' (Attachment 1), whether the vehicle was left ungrounded or 
grounded to a temporarily driven ground rod, neither of these two 
practices provided any worker protection. However, when the vehicle 
was grounded to a proper ground source, electrical hazards to 
workers were greatly reduced to survival levels. Use of insulated 
cover-up on the exposed energized lines and equipment, or the use of 
insulated and tested mechanical equipment are industry accepted and 
safe work procedures which should be supported by OSHA. [Ex. 0471]

    OSHA does not dispute Mr. Erga's evidence regarding the 
effectiveness of grounding and addresses that issue in the discussion 
of paragraph (d)(3)(iii), later in this section of the preamble. 
Although Mr. Erga maintains that ``qualified workers routinely take 
mechanical equipment into the Minimum Approach Distance'' (Ex. 0471), 
OSHA does not consider this a valid reason for eliminating proposed 
paragraph (d)(1) from Sec.  1926.959. Mr. Erga did not demonstrate that 
it is infeasible to comply with proposed paragraph (d)(1). In fact, 
when performing tasks such as installing poles or equipment, employers 
can use temporary arms or other live-line tools to move the lines far 
enough away from mechanical equipment so that the equipment maintains 
the required minimum approach distance (269-Ex. 8-5). Moreover, 
insulated aerial lifts (discussed later in this section of the 
preamble) can be used to install equipment and move conductors (id.)
    Mr. Erga also maintains that grounding mechanical equipment and 
other safety precautions, such as insulating the lines with coverup, 
provide better protection than the proposed rule. However, he did not 
explain how grounding, insulated coverup, or any of the other practices 
he recommended protect employees from conductors being knocked down as 
a result of contact by mechanical equipment. The practices he 
recommended can help protect employees who contact energized equipment; 
however, those practices do not protect employees from being injured or 
killed by energized lines contacting them directly or energizing the 
earth around them.
    Proposed Sec.  1926.959(d)(1) was equivalent to existing Sec.  
1910.269(p)(4)(i). Mr. Erga was the only rulemaking participant in 
either this rulemaking or the 1994 rulemaking to object to the 
prohibition against taking mechanical equipment into the minimum 
approach distance. OSHA concludes that this provision of proposed 
paragraph (d)(1) is reasonably necessary and appropriate and is 
including it in the final rule.
    The proposal specified minimum approach distances in proposed Table 
V-2 through Table V-6. However, in the final rule, Sec.  
1926.960(c)(1)(i) requires the employer to establish minimum approach 
distances. (See the summary and explanation of Sec.  1926.960(c)(1)(i), 
later in this section of the preamble.) Accordingly, final Sec.  
1926.959(d)(1) requires mechanical equipment to maintain ``the minimum 
approach distances, established by the employer under Sec.  
1926.960(c)(1)(i)'' rather than ``the minimum approach distances of 
Table V-2 through Table V-6,'' as proposed.
    Mr. Erga questioned whether proposed paragraph (d)(1) allowed a 
qualified employee to ``use insulating protective material to cover the 
line and then go into [the minimum approach distance] with a conductive 
boom'' (Ex. 0155). The word ``exposed'' is defined in final Sec.  
1926.968 as ``[n]ot isolated or guarded.'' The word ``isolated'' is 
defined in final Sec.  1926.968 as ``Not readily accessible to persons 
unless special means for access are used.'' (See the summary and 
explanation for final Sec.  1926.960(b)(3) for a discussion of this 
definition.) The word ``guarded'' is defined in final Sec.  1926.968 as 
covered, fenced, enclosed, or otherwise protected, by means of suitable 
covers or casings, barrier rails or screens, mats, or platforms, 
designed to minimize the possibility, under normal conditions, of 
dangerous approach or inadvertent contact by persons or objects. A note 
following the definition of ``guarded'' explains that conductors that 
are insulated, but not otherwise protected, are not guarded. Thus, 
energized lines and equipment that are protected only by rubber 
insulating equipment are neither guarded nor isolated from the 
mechanical equipment and would, consequently, still be ``exposed'' for 
purposes of final paragraph (d)(1). Therefore, under these conditions, 
employers must ensure that mechanical equipment complies with the 
minimum approach distance.
    Proposed paragraph (d)(1) provided an exception permitting the 
insulated portion of an aerial lift operated by a qualified employee 
located in the lift to breach the minimum approach distance. The Agency 
is adopting this exception in final paragraph (d)(1) with only minor 
editorial changes. As OSHA noted in the preamble to the proposal, 
aerial lifts are designed to enable an employee to position himself or 
herself at elevated locations with a high degree of accuracy (70 FR 
34859). The aerial-lift operator is in the bucket next to the energized 
lines and, therefore, can easily judge the approach distance. This 
requirement minimizes the chance that the equipment will contact an 
energized line and that the energized line will be struck down should 
such contact occur. Furthermore, the employee operating the lift in the 
bucket would be protected under the provisions of final Sec.  1926.960 
from the hazards of contacting the live parts. As the aerial lift is 
insulated, employees on the ground are protected from electric shock in 
case the aerial lift contacts the lines, provided that the contact is 
made above the insulated section of the boom. OSHA further noted in the 
preamble to the proposal that Sec.  1926.959(c) \169\ and other 
provisions would protect employees against the possibility that the 
aerial lift would strike down the power line (id.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \169\ Paragraph (c) of final Sec.  1926.959 requires mechanical 
equipment used to lift or move lines to be used within its maximum 
load rating and other design limitations. This provision will ensure 
that an aerial lift used to move an overhead line conductor is 
designed for that purpose and operated in a manner that will not 
cause the conductor to fail.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Two commenters requested clarification of the exception specified 
in proposed paragraph (d)(1) for parts of insulated aerial lifts (Exs. 
0186, 0192). Mr. Anthony Ahern of Ohio Rural Electric Cooperatives 
requested clarification regarding the portion of the boom of an aerial-
lift truck that would be considered uninsulated (Ex. 0186). He noted 
that some aerial devices have second insulated inserts in the lower 
portion of their booms and that some companies treat these inserts as 
secondary protection and do not regularly dielectrically test them 
(id.). In

[[Page 20414]]

addition, an aerial-lift manufacturer, Altec Industries, offered these 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
comments:

    It is important to clarify that insulated aerial lifts have 
conductive components located above their insulated sections. The 
insulated aerial lift allows a qualified employee using appropriate 
PPE to approach within the minimum approach distance to a single 
unguarded energized conductor. However the minimum approach distance 
to other unguarded conductors at different potentials remain in 
effect. The qualified employee may not approach, or take any 
conductive object, including conductive portions of an insulated 
aerial lift (e.g., material handling system) that are located above 
its insulated section, into the minimum approach distance of two 
unguarded conductors at different electrical potential. [Ex. 0192]

    Altec recommended that the exception be worded, in part: ``the 
insulated portion of an aerial lift operated by a qualified employee in 
the lift is exempt from this requirement if the applicable minimum 
approach distance ARE maintained between the CONDUCTIVE PORTIONS OF THE 
AERIAL LIFT LOCATED ABOVE INSULATION, THE uninsulated portions of the 
aerial lift and exposed objects at a different potential'' (id.; 
emphasis in original).
    Final paragraph (d)(1) will protect employees on the ground by 
ensuring that the equipment does not become energized and that the 
overhead power lines are not knocked to the ground. Both of these 
conditions pose hazards for ground workers. For the purposes of final 
paragraph (d)(1), OSHA considers ``the insulated portion of an aerial 
lift'' to be that portion of an insulated aerial lift that is on the 
end of the insulated boom section farthest from the vehicle supporting 
the aerial lift. This is the portion of the aerial device that is 
insulated from the vehicle. If contact with an energized line is made 
on this portion of the boom, employees on the ground are 
protected.\170\ The Agency does not believe that Altec's recommended 
language would further clarify this requirement. In addition, OSHA does 
not consider insulated inserts that the employer does not deem to be 
insulation, or does not maintain, to be part of the insulated portion 
of the aerial lift as specified by final paragraph (d)(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \170\ Requiring the equipment to be operated by an employee in 
the aerial lift, who has better control over the distance between 
the equipment and the power line than an operator on the ground, 
also ensures that the line is not knocked down.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    It should be noted that, even if the exception in final paragraph 
(d)(1) for the insulated portions of aerial lifts applies, the employee 
must still maintain the minimum approach distances to the extent 
required in final Sec.  1926.960(c)(1). In addition, final Sec.  
1926.959(d)(1) requires the conductive portions of the boom to 
continuously maintain the minimum approach distances from conductive 
objects at potentials different from that on which the employee is 
working. It should also be noted that the insulating portion of the 
boom can be bridged by improper positioning of the boom or by 
conductive objects suspended from the aerial lift platform. For 
example, the insulating portion of the boom will be bridged when it is 
resting against a grounded object, such as a utility pole, or when the 
employee in an aerial bucket is holding onto a grounding jumper. For 
purposes of final Sec.  1926.959(d)(1), OSHA does not consider any part 
of the aerial lift to be insulated when the insulation is bridged.
    Paragraph (d)(2), which is being adopted without substantive change 
from the proposal, requires a designated employee to observe the 
operation and give timely warnings to the equipment operator before the 
minimum approach distance is reached. There is an exception to this 
requirement for situations in which the employer can demonstrate that 
the operator can accurately determine that the minimum approach 
distance is being maintained. As OSHA explained in the preamble to the 
proposal, determining the distance between objects that are relatively 
far away from an equipment operator who is standing on the ground can 
sometimes be difficult (70 FR 34859). For example, different visual 
perspectives can lead to different estimates of the distance, and lack 
of a suitable reference point can result in errors (269-Ex. 8-19). In 
addition, an operator may not be in the best position to observe the 
clearance between an energized part and the mechanical equipment 
because, for example, an obstruction may block his or her view.
    An aerial-lift operator would not normally need to judge the 
distance between far away objects. In most cases, an aerial-lift 
operator is maintaining the minimum approach distance from energized 
parts relatively close to himself or herself, and it should be easy for 
him or her to stay far enough away from these parts. In such cases, the 
employer would normally be able to demonstrate that the employee can 
maintain the minimum approach distance without an observer. However, 
even an aerial-lift operator may have difficulty maintaining the 
minimum approach distances in certain circumstances. For example, the 
congested configuration of some overhead power lines may necessitate 
maintaining clearance from more than one conductor at a time, or an 
aerial-lift operator may need to judge the distance between the lower, 
uninsulated portion of the boom and a conductor that is located well 
below the operator. In these situations, in which it is unlikely that 
an employer could demonstrate that the operator could accurately 
determine that the required distance is being maintained, an observer 
is required.
    Final paragraph (d)(3) will protect employees, primarily employees 
on the ground, from electric shock in case contact is made between the 
mechanical equipment and the energized lines or equipment. This 
paragraph requires employers to take one of three alternative 
protective measures if the equipment can become energized. The first 
option (paragraph (d)(3)(i)) requires that energized lines or equipment 
exposed to contact with the mechanical equipment be covered with 
insulating protective material that will withstand the type of contact 
that could be made during the operation. The second option (paragraph 
(d)(3)(ii)) requires the mechanical equipment to be insulated for the 
voltage involved. Under this option, the mechanical equipment must be 
positioned so that uninsulated portions of the equipment cannot come 
within the applicable minimum approach distance of the energized line 
or equipment.\171\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \171\ This provision contrasts with final paragraph (d)(1), 
which prohibits mechanical equipment (except, in some situations, 
the insulated portion of an aerial lift) from being taken closer 
than the minimum approach distance to exposed energized lines and 
equipment, but allows the equipment to be positioned so that it is 
possible to breach that distance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Mr. Brian Erga with ESCI was concerned about the requirement in 
proposed paragraph (d)(3)(ii) that insulated equipment be positioned so 
that its uninsulated portions cannot approach energized lines or 
equipment closer than the minimum approach distance, commenting:

    OSHA 1910.269(p)(4) is currently being read word for word that 
when using the insulated portion of mechanical equipment, the un-
insulated portion cannot possibly ever reach into [the minimum 
approach distance]. This requires the truck to be positioned so far 
away that it cannot lift anything, and is often impractical since 
the truck may need to be 30 feet from the pole or line to keep the 
possibility of the un-insulated portion entering [the minimum 
approach distance]. [Ex. 0155]

    Paragraph (d)(3)(ii) in the final rule, which applies to insulated 
equipment, requires the mechanical equipment to be positioned so that 
the uninsulated

[[Page 20415]]

portion cannot approach any closer than the minimum approach distance. 
OSHA understands that this may not always be practical, depending on 
the work to be performed, the location of the energized lines and 
equipment, and available operating positions for the mechanical 
equipment. However, the Agency notes that this paragraph presents one 
of three options that employers may take to comply with final paragraph 
(d)(3). The first and third options, in final paragraphs (d)(3)(i) and 
(d)(3)(iii), permit mechanical equipment, including insulated 
equipment, to be positioned more closely to energized lines and 
equipment provided that employers take the precautions specified in 
those paragraphs. (Note that final paragraph (d)(1) still generally 
requires mechanical equipment to be operated so that the minimum 
approach distances, established by the employer under final Sec.  
1926.960(c)(1)(i), are maintained from exposed energized lines and 
equipment, regardless of where the equipment is positioned.)
    The third compliance option, specified in final paragraph 
(d)(3)(iii), is for each employee to be protected from the hazards that 
could arise from contact of mechanical equipment with the energized 
lines or equipment. The measures used must ensure that employees will 
not be exposed to hazardous differences in electric potential. Based on 
the Sec.  1910.269 rulemaking record, OSHA concluded that vehicle 
grounding alone could not always provide sufficient protection against 
the hazards of mechanical equipment contact with energized power lines 
(59 FR 4403). However, the Agency recognized the usefulness of 
grounding as a protective measure against electric shock when it is 
used with other techniques. Therefore, proposed paragraph (d)(3)(iii), 
which was equivalent to existing Sec.  1910.269(p)(4)(iii)(C), 
required:
    (1) Using the best available ground to minimize the time the lines 
or equipment remain energized,
    (2) Bonding equipment together to minimize potential differences,
    (3) Providing ground mats to extend areas of equipotential, and
    (4) Using insulating protective equipment or barricades to guard 
against any remaining hazardous electrical potential differences.
    To comply with the third compliance option in final paragraph 
(d)(3)(iii), the employer must use all of these techniques, unless it 
can show that it is using other methods that protect each employee from 
the hazards that could arise if the mechanical equipment contacts the 
energized lines or equipment. The techniques listed in paragraph 
(d)(3)(iii): (1) minimize differences in electrical potential, (2) 
minimize the time employees would be exposed to hazardous electrical 
potentials, and (3) protect against any remaining hazardous electrical 
potentials. The performance-oriented requirements in final paragraph 
(d)(3)(iii) assure that employees are protected from the hazards that 
could arise if the mechanical equipment contacts energized parts. 
Information in Appendix C to final subpart V provides guidelines for 
employers and employees that explain various measures for protecting 
employees from hazardous differences in electrical potential and how to 
use those measures. A note referencing this appendix is included after 
final paragraph (d)(3)(iii).
    Mr. Erga objected to proposed paragraph (d)(3)(iii). He recommended 
that mechanical equipment always be grounded ``cradle to cradle,'' that 
is, from the time the boom lifts out of the cradle until it returns 
(Tr. 1237) and that it always be grounded when it comes within 3 meters 
(10 feet) of energized lines or equipment (Tr. 1252). He recommended 
further that the standard provide three options to supplement this 
grounding requirement: (1) that the lines or equipment be covered, (2) 
that the mechanical equipment be insulated, or (3) that barricades, 
ground mats, and rubber insulating gloves be used (Tr. 1252).
    OSHA concludes that it is not always necessary to ground mechanical 
equipment operated near energized lines or equipment. Under the first 
option in final paragraph (d)(3), the energized lines or equipment are 
covered with insulating protective material that will withstand the 
type of contact that could be made during the operation. This option 
should prevent the mechanical equipment from becoming energized, and 
the Agency, therefore, concludes that grounding is unnecessary for this 
option. Under the second option in final paragraph (d)(3), the 
uninsulated portion of insulated mechanical equipment must be 
positioned so that it cannot approach any closer than the minimum 
approach distance. This option also should prevent the mechanical 
equipment from becoming energized, and the Agency concludes that 
grounding is unnecessary under this option as well.
    The third option in final paragraph (d)(3) requires that mechanical 
equipment be grounded unless the employer can demonstrate that other 
methods in use will protect each employee from the hazards that could 
arise if the mechanical equipment contacts the energized lines or 
equipment. In his comments, Mr. Erga referred to an IEEE paper on 
grounding, explaining:

    IEEE paper 91 SM 312-9 PWRD ``Test results of grounding un-
insulated aerial lift vehicles near energized distribution lines'' . 
. . clearly shows mechanical equipment grounded to the best 
available ground reduces the voltage and current exposed to the 
worker by more than 96%. The ESCI staff knows of no electrical 
worker ever killed or injured around properly grounded mechanical 
equipment that has become accidentally energized. [Ex. 0155; 
emphasis included in original]

The IEEE paper to which Mr. Erga referred clearly shows that using the 
best available ground provides the most protection for employees and, 
therefore, supports the requirement in final paragraph (d)(3)(iii)(A) 
to ground the mechanical equipment to the best available ground (Ex. 
0472). However, the paper also demonstrates that this ground is 
insufficient by itself to protect employees fully. With grounding 
alone, the current through a resistor of more than 900 ohms is high 
enough to injure and possibly kill an employee. OSHA has considered the 
minimum resistance of an employee to be 500 ohms, not 1,000 ohms, as 
specified in the paper (59 FR 4406). As NIOSH states in its Publication 
No. 98-131, Worker Deaths by Electrocution: A Summary of NIOSH 
Surveillance and Investigative Findings, ``High-voltage electrical 
energy quickly breaks down human skin, reducing the human body's 
resistance to 500 Ohms'' (Ex. 0141). Using Ohm's Law, current is 
inversely proportional to resistance, and the current through a 500-ohm 
resistor would be nearly twice the current shown in the IEEE paper. In 
addition, the testing for the IEEE paper was performed with a 7,200-
volt power line. Distribution and transmission lines of higher 
voltages, which are not uncommon, would result in even higher currents 
through a resistor. Thus, the evidence provided by Mr. Erga 
demonstrates the need for additional measures beyond grounding, such as 
the measures required by the final rule.
    As noted earlier, final paragraph (d)(3)(iii) requires the employer 
to take specified measures unless it can demonstrate that the methods 
in use protect each employee from the hazards that could arise if the 
equipment contacts the energized line or equipment. Mr. Erga's proposal 
would require only two of those measures: Grounding and one of three 
additional measures, two of which are comparable to measures required 
by final paragraph (d)(3)(iii). OSHA continues to believe that all of 
the measures listed in final

[[Page 20416]]

paragraph (d)(3)(iii) will protect employees from hazardous differences 
in electrical potential as explained in the preamble to the 1994 Sec.  
1910.269 final rule (59 FR 4402-4403). Employers are free to use other 
protective measures, including those proposed by Mr. Erga, but these 
employers must demonstrate that the methods in use protect each 
employee from the hazards that could arise if the equipment contacts an 
energized line or equipment. OSHA concludes that it is important for 
employers that do not implement all of the measures required by final 
paragraph (d)(3)(iii) to evaluate their systems, and the alternative 
measures they select, to ensure that employees are protected. 
Therefore, OSHA is not adopting Mr. Erga's recommended changes to 
paragraph (d)(3)(iii).
    OSHA is including paragraph (d)(3) in the final rule substantially 
as proposed. The Agency has, however, made technical changes to the 
proposed language to clearly distinguish between references to 
mechanical equipment and references to energized equipment. Several 
provisions in proposed paragraph (d)(3) used the word ``equipment'' 
without specifying whether it meant the mechanical equipment itself or 
the energized equipment that the mechanical equipment could contact. 
Although the language was clear from the context, the final rule 
consistently states which term applies. Also, in two places, proposed 
paragraph (d)(3) used the term ``energized lines'' when OSHA meant 
``energized lines or equipment.'' The final rule corrects these 
oversights. In addition, final paragraph (d)(3)(ii) requires mechanical 
equipment to maintain ``the minimum approach distances, established by 
the employer under Sec.  1926.960(c)(1)(i),'' rather than ``the minimum 
approach distances specified in Table V-2 through Table V-6,'' as 
proposed.
11. Section 1926.960, Working on or Near Exposed Energized Parts
    Paragraph (a) specifies the scope of Sec.  1926.960 of the final 
rule. This section applies to work on exposed live parts and work near 
enough to such parts to expose the employee to any hazard they present. 
Many of the provisions in this section have been taken directly from 
existing Sec.  1910.269(l).
    Paragraph (b) contains general requirements for working on or near 
live parts. OSHA is adopting paragraph (b)(1) in this final rule 
without change from the proposal. This paragraph requires employees 
working on, or with, exposed energized lines or parts of equipment (at 
any voltage), and employees working in areas containing unguarded, 
uninsulated energized lines or parts of equipment operating at 50 volts 
or more, to be qualified employees. Without proper training in the 
construction and operation of the lines and equipment and in the 
electrical hazards involved, workers performing this type of work are 
at risk of being electrocuted and also may expose others to injury. In 
areas containing unguarded live parts energized at 50 volts or more, 
untrained employees would not be familiar with the practices that are 
necessary to recognize and avoid contact with these parts.
    Commenting on the language in proposed paragraph (b)(1), Mr. Tommy 
Lucas with TVA questioned what OSHA means by ``areas containing 
unguarded, uninsulated energized lines or parts of equipment'' (Ex. 
0213). He noted that the ``area'' at issue could be the room, yard, or 
building in which the equipment is located.
    Paragraph (e) of Sec.  1926.966 of the final rule contains 
requirements for guarding rooms containing electric supply equipment in 
substations. Paragraphs (u)(4) and (v)(4) of existing Sec.  1910.269 
contain corresponding requirements for maintenance work in substations 
and generating plants. These provisions generally require live parts 
operating at 50 volts or more to be in rooms or spaces enclosed within 
fences, screens, partitions, or walls so as to minimize the possibility 
that unqualified persons will enter. (See existing Sec.  
1910.269(u)(4)(ii) and (v)(4)(ii) and final Sec.  1926.966(e)(2).) 
These are the areas to which final Sec.  1926.960(b)(1)(ii) (and the 
corresponding requirement in final Sec.  1910.269(l)(1)(ii)) refer.
    The definition of ``qualified employee'' contains a note to 
indicate that employees who are undergoing on-the-job training are 
considered to be qualified if they have demonstrated an ability to 
perform duties safely and if they are under the immediate supervision 
of a qualified employee. (See the discussion of this definition under 
the summary and explanation of final Sec.  1926.968.) Therefore, 
employees in training, who have demonstrated an ability to perform 
duties safely and are under the direct supervision of a qualified 
employee, are permitted to perform the types of work described in 
paragraph (b)(1). OSHA believes that close supervision of trainees will 
permit employers to correct errors before they cause accidents. 
Allowing these workers to perform tasks under workplace conditions also 
may better prepare the employees to work safely.
    Paragraph (b)(2), which is similar to the last sentence of the 
introductory text of existing Sec.  1910.269(l)(1), is being adopted in 
the final rule without change from the proposal. This paragraph 
requires lines and equipment to be considered and treated as energized 
unless they have been deenergized under the provisions of final Sec.  
1926.961. Existing Sec.  1926.950(b)(2) requires electric lines and 
equipment to be considered energized until determined to be deenergized 
by tests or other appropriate means. The existing standard does not 
specify what those appropriate means are. However, even if the line or 
equipment is tested and found to be deenergized, it may become 
reenergized through contact with another source of electric energy or 
by someone reenergizing it at its points of control. So Sec.  1926.961 
of the final rule contains requirements for deenergizing electric power 
transmission and distribution lines and equipment. Unless the 
procedures contained in that section have been followed, lines and 
equipment cannot reliably be considered as deenergized.
Two-Person Rule
    If an employee working on or near energized electric power 
transmission or distribution lines or equipment is injured by an 
electric shock, a second employee will be needed to provide emergency 
care to the injured employee. As noted under the summary and 
explanation of final Sec.  1926.951(b), discussed earlier in this 
section of the preamble, CPR must begin within 4 minutes after an 
employee loses consciousness as a result of an electric shock. OSHA is 
requiring the presence of a second employee during certain types of 
work on or near electric power transmission or distribution lines or 
equipment to ensure that CPR begins as soon as possible and to help 
ensure that it starts within the 4-minute timeframe. (Note that final 
Sec.  1926.951(b) requires at least two people trained in first-aid 
procedures, including CPR, for field work involving two or more 
employees at a work location.)
    OSHA proposed, in paragraph (b)(3)(i) of Sec.  1926.960, to require 
the presence of at least two employees during the following types of 
work:
    (1) Installation, removal, or repair of lines energized at more 
than 600 volts,
    (2) Installation, removal, or repair of deenergized lines if an 
employee is exposed to contact with other parts energized at more than 
600 volts,
    (3) Installation, removal, or repair of equipment, such as 
transformers, capacitors, and regulators, if an employee is exposed to 
contact with parts energized at more than 600 volts,

[[Page 20417]]

    (4) Work involving the use of mechanical equipment, other than 
insulated aerial lifts, near parts energized at more than 600 volts, 
and
    (5) Other work that exposes an employee to electrical hazards 
greater than, or equal to, the electrical hazard posed by these 
operations.
    However, OSHA also proposed exemptions to the two-person 
requirement to account for work that the Agency believed could be 
performed safely by a single employee or that must be performed as 
quickly as possible for public-safety purposes. These exemptions were 
proposed in paragraph (b)(3)(ii) for the following operations:
    (1) Routine circuit switching, if the employer can demonstrate that 
conditions at the site allow safe performance of this work,
    (2) Work performed with live-line tools if the employee is in a 
position from which he or she is neither within reach of nor exposed to 
contact with energized parts, and
    (3) Emergency repairs to the extent necessary to safeguard the 
general public.
    OSHA based the proposed two-person rule on existing Sec.  
1910.269(l)(1)(i) and (l)(1)(ii). OSHA explained in the preamble to the 
proposal that the first four work operations listed in proposed 
paragraph (b)(3)(i) were the operations that expose employees to the 
greatest risk of electric shock, as demonstrated by the 1994 Sec.  
1910.269 rulemaking record (70 FR 34861). OSHA proposed the fifth and 
last category in paragraph (b)(3)(i) to cover additional types of work 
that pose equal or greater electrical hazards. The preamble to the 
proposal noted that operations covered under existing Sec.  
1910.269(l)(1)(i) are performed during construction, as well as during 
maintenance (id.). The preamble further noted that construction 
operations are similar to the operations performed during maintenance 
work and that the Agency believed that these operations involved the 
same hazards (id.). For example, using mechanical equipment near a 
7200-volt overhead power line during construction of a new line poses 
hazards that are equivalent to the hazards posed during the use of 
mechanical equipment to replace a damaged pole on an existing line of 
the same voltage. Thus, OSHA proposed to extend the existing general 
industry requirement to construction.
    The proposed requirement for at least two employees to be present 
during certain operations generally would not have applied if the 
voltage of the energized parts involved was 600 volts or less. In the 
proposal, OSHA requested comments on whether the final rule should 
extend the application of the two-person rule to any operations 
involving work on installations operating at 600 volts or less.
    Most commenters opposed changing the proposed rule to require two 
persons for work on energized lines or parts operating at 600 volts or 
less. (See, for example, Exs. 0175, 0177, 0209, 0210, 0212, 0219, 0224, 
0227.) Some of these rulemaking participants likened this work to the 
work performed by electricians, for which consensus standards do not 
require the presence of two people. (See, for example, Exs. 0175, 0209, 
0212.) For instance, Ms. Salud Layton with the Virginia, Maryland & 
Delaware Association of Electric Cooperatives commented:

    We do not see the need for a second person on the job site for 
voltages below 600 Volts. . . . This work is generally easier and 
less hazardous. Work below 600 volts is generally similar to 
electricians work. Neither the NEC nor NESC require two employees to 
be present when working these voltages. Most electricians isolate 
themselves only thru the use of insulated tools. Utilities commonly 
exceed that level of protection by requiring the use of Class 0 
gloves, in addition to the use of insulated tools. This combination 
effectively negates the need for a second person. The use of 
insulated tools with Class 0 gloves helps with protection and also 
eliminates the need for a second person. [Ex. 0175]

Mr. Allan Oracion with Energy United EMC similarly commented that work 
at voltages of 600 volts and less is less hazardous than work at higher 
voltages and that there is little potential for injury during ``low-
voltage'' work as long as other applicable OSHA standards are followed 
(Ex. 0219). Others argued that a requirement for a second person would 
be costly and impractical without substantial benefits. (See, for 
example, Exs. 0177, 0224, 0227.) EEI commented:

    EEI submits that there is no need for further precautions to be 
required for such work, provided that the required insulated cover-
up materials are used and personal protective equipment is being 
worn by employees while working on lines and equipment energized at 
less than 600 volts. One moderately sized utility forecasts that if 
it is required to replace existing one-person crews with two-person 
operations due [to] a revision in this requirement, the cost to the 
company would be approximately $ 3.8 million annually. OSHA has 
shown no data supporting a change in the requirements for work at 
less than 600 volts, including none showing that the benefit, if 
any, to be derived from unspecified additional precautions would be 
reasonably related to the cost. [Ex. 0227]

In responding to OSHA's request for comments on whether to require two 
persons for work at voltages of 600 volts or less, Consumers Energy 
noted that its accident experience indicated that employees who work 
alone have a significantly lower injury incidence rate than employees 
working together (Ex. 0177). Also on this issue, Siemens Power 
Generation commented that ``OSHA should allow the employer to evaluate 
the hazard and determine which situations meet the need for a two 
person rule'' (Ex. 0163).
    Some commenters maintained that a second person should be present 
when work is performed on equipment energized at 600 volts or less. 
(See, for example, Exs. 0126, 0161, 0197, 0230.) Mr. Brad Davis of BGE 
suggested that ``the same care should be taken at all voltage levels'' 
(Ex. 0126). Mr. James Junga with Local 223 of the UWUA maintained that 
two persons should be required for all work on voltages of 480 volts or 
more, commenting:

    Working on secondary voltage at or above 480 volts should also 
require two qualified persons. I believe this voltage is extremely 
dangerous and should not be performed by one person [because of] the 
quick response that is necessary for a person who gets in contact 
with energized equipment operating at 480 volts. [Ex. 0197]

IBEW recommended that two-person crews always be required for 
construction work covered by Subpart V and that Sec.  1910.269 be 
amended to include limitations on the work that can be performed by 
employees working alone on voltages of 600 volts or less, explaining:

    First and foremost, contractor crews, unless assigned only to 
perform minor maintenance, should never employ a one person crew. 
Contractor crews are generally performing new construction type work 
that usually requires several employees on each job. For the 
purposes of 1926 Subpart V, reference to a one person crew should 
not be included.
    For the purpose of 1910.269 and maintenance work, this section 
should be clarified. Just because the work involves voltages under 
600 volts, there should be limitations as to how much a one person 
crew can perform. For example, the job requires open wire 1/0 
aluminum secondary conductors that were burned down by a tree limb 
to be reinstalled up a pole. This will include clearing the downed 
tree parts, splicing the conductors, and sagging and dead-ending the 
conductors. Some of this work will even be performed de-energized, 
but exposure to other energized conductors is a possibility. There 
is no reason to put one person in this situation. [Ex. 0230]

    OSHA does not agree with the comments suggesting that work on 
circuit parts energized at 600 volts and less is safe. When Sec.  
1910.269 was promulgated in 1994, the Agency concluded that there was 
``insufficient

[[Page 20418]]

evidence in the record as to whether or not it is safe for qualified 
employees to work alone on live parts energized at'' 600 volts or less 
(59 FR 4381). In developing the subpart V proposal, OSHA examined more 
recent accident data. Table 5 shows the number of electrocutions for 
various voltage ranges for the years 1991 through 1998. In the years 
1991 to 1994, an average of 3 fatalities occurred per year involving 
voltages of 600 volts or less. For the years 1995 to 1998, when Sec.  
1910.269 was fully in effect, the average dropped slightly to 2.5 
fatalities per year.

                                     Table 5--Fatalities by Voltage and Year
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                    100 kV and
                      Year                         600 V or less  601 V to 20 kV    20 to 80 kV       higher
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1991............................................               3              24               2               1
1992............................................               5              24               2               0
1993............................................               3              23               3               1
1994............................................               1              21               2               2
1995............................................               2              22               4               5
1996............................................               4              16               0               2
1997............................................               1               6               3               1
1998............................................               3              13               0               1
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: OSHA database of electric power generation, transmission, and distribution accidents (Ex. 0004). These
  data include only cases involving electrocution in which the voltage was indicated in the accident abstract.

    These data indicate that, in general, there is a substantial risk 
of death for employees working on voltages of 600 volts or less. 
Although it appears as though exposures to live parts energized at 600 
volts or less result in relatively few accidents, OSHA concludes that 
these voltages are capable of killing workers. Consumers Energy's 
injury rates are not relevant here. The primary purpose of the two-
person rule is the prevention of electrocution. Electrocutions are the 
result of electric shocks, which are a very low probability event, and 
have no significant effect on injury rates even when they occur in 
substantial numbers among all employees performing work addressed by 
the final rule.\172\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \172\ Electric shocks are responsible for a tiny proportion of 
the total number of injuries suffered by workers in the electric 
utility industry, as shown in ``Assessment of the Benefits of the 
Proposed Standard on Electric Power Generation, Transmission, and 
Distribution; Coding Results and Analysis,'' which is an analysis of 
reports of injuries in the electric utility industry for calendar 
year 1989 (Ex. 0081). As this report shows, the leading categories 
for nature of injury are sprains and strains, lacerations, 
contusions, and scratches and abrasions, which together accounted 
for over 70 percent of the injuries. Electric shock accounted for 
only 0.7 percent of the injuries.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, the types of work commonly assigned to crews of more 
than one employee include line installation and removal and the use of 
mechanical apparatus to lift or position material (59 FR 4380). This 
heavy type of work seems more likely to cause sprains and strains, 
lacerations, contusions, and scratches and abrasions, which form the 
majority of line worker injuries, than the lighter type of work 
commonly assigned to employees working alone, such as switching (Ex. 
0081). OSHA, therefore, concludes that it is unlikely that the 
increased incidence rates experienced by Consumers Energy for employees 
working together are due to an increased incidence of electric shock. 
OSHA does not believe, and it is illogical to suggest, that an employee 
working alone is less likely to die as the result of an electric shock 
than an employee working in an environment in which another employee is 
available to provide emergency assistance in the event of a shock 
incident.
    OSHA also disagrees with comments arguing that requirements for 
proper use of electrical protective equipment and other safety-related 
work practices make safe any work performed on circuit parts energized 
at 600 volts or less. The use of personal protective equipment and 
compliance with other OSHA-required work practices may well protect 
against hazards posed by these voltages; however, in the 1994 Sec.  
1910.269 final rule, the Agency adopted the two-person rule to 
supplement work practice and PPE requirements for certain types of 
electrical work.
    In the rulemaking on the 1994 Sec.  1910.269 final rule, OSHA 
examined the record to determine what operations posed sufficient 
residual risk to warrant the presence of a second person. The Agency 
found that some work involving installations operating at more than 600 
volts posed hazards requiring the presence of a second person, but 
other work was safe enough for an employee to perform alone. In this 
rulemaking, OSHA is using the same approach to examine the need for a 
second person at voltages of 600 volts and less. Because there are 
relatively few accidents involving circuit parts energized at 600 volts 
or less, the Agency believes it is reasonable to assume, at these 
voltages, that there are few types of work that cannot be safely 
performed without the presence of a second person. However, OSHA agrees 
with IBEW that some low-voltage operations require at least two 
persons. There are many types of low-voltage work in which employees 
suffer electric shock, including installation, repair, and testing. 
Employees have sustained low-voltage electric shocks working on 
transformers, circuit breakers, and conductors.
    Although the Agency is in general agreement with IBEW about the 
need for two persons for some work involving parts energized at 600 
volts or less, OSHA decided not to require the presence of a second 
person during any specific types of work at such voltages because the 
record does not specifically indicate which low-voltage operations are 
hazardous enough to warrant a second-person requirement (except when a 
worker could contact lines or circuit parts energized at more than 600 
volts while working on parts energized at less than 600 volts).
    IBEW listed the following factors that limit when a one-person crew 
performs work: complexity of the tasks, hot-stick versus the rubber-
glove work method, voltage-range limitations, limited time spent on a 
specific task, maintenance work only, and other factors (Ex. 0230). As 
already noted, with respect to low-voltage work, the union further 
commented:

    Just because the work involves voltages under 600 volts, there 
should be limitations as to how much a one person crew can perform. 
For example, the job requires open wire 1/0 aluminum secondary 
conductors that were burned down by a tree limb to be reinstalled up 
a pole. This will include clearing the downed tree parts, splicing 
the conductors, and sagging and dead-ending the conductors. Some of 
this work will even be performed de-energized, but exposure to other 
energized conductors is a possibility. There is no reason to put one 
person in this situation. [Id.].


[[Page 20419]]


    IBEW's comments do not provide the specificity about hazardous low-
voltage tasks that the Agency determined is missing from the record. 
The purpose of the second-person requirement is to prevent fatalities 
from electric shock. Thus, the complexity of the job and time spent 
during the deenergized portion of the work have no bearing on the 
likelihood of an electric shock occurring and, accordingly, no bearing 
on whether OSHA should require a second person. Finally, in IBEW's 
specific example of low-voltage work, a second person is already 
required under the final rule if the employee is exposed to parts 
energized at more than 600 volts.\173\ The remaining factors listed by 
IBEW do not appear to be related to the causes of low-voltage 
electrical accidents in the record. Although OSHA is not adopting any 
two-person requirements for work exposing employees to contact with 
lines or circuit parts energized at 600 volts or less, the Agency 
anticipates that, in certain situations, an employer will need to 
ensure that at least two trained persons are present for such work to 
satisfy the employer's obligations under the general duty clause of the 
OSH Act (Section 5(a)(1)). (See Chapter 4, Section III of OSHA's Field 
Operations Manual (FOM), CPL 02-00-150 (https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=DIRECTIVES&p_id=4935), for a 
discussion of general duty clause violations.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \173\ Final paragraph (b)(3)(i)(B) requires the presence of a 
second employee when an employee installing deenergized lines is 
exposed to contact with parts energized at more than 600 volts. The 
operating voltage of the deenergized line has no bearing on whether 
a second person is required.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    IBEW pointed to new construction as an example of work 
necessitating the presence of more than one worker. New construction 
involves the installation of lines and equipment. Final paragraph 
(b)(3)(i) requires a second person for installation of lines or 
equipment if an employee is exposed to contact with other parts 
energized at more than 600 volts. IBEW's recommendation would also 
require a second person when an employee is exposed to electric-shock 
hazards of 600 volts or less and when electric-shock hazards are not 
present at all. OSHA decided against requiring a second person for 
lower voltage work for the reasons explained previously.
    Mr. Junga recommended that the standard require a second person 
when ``work is to be performed on electrical lines operating at primary 
voltages'' (Ex. 0197). He stated:

    If a person working alone gets in contact with energized primary 
voltages and they are working alone they will die. No one will be 
there to assist, provide CPR, use an AED, provide first aid or even 
call for help. [Id.]

    OSHA decided not to adopt Mr. Junga's recommendation. The Agency 
believes that the language adopted in final Sec.  1926.960(b)(3)(i) 
adequately captures work in which employees are exposed to contact with 
parts energized at more than 600 volts (primary voltage). The 
exceptions to the two-person rule, adopted in final Sec.  
1926.960(b)(3)(ii), generally are limited to work that does not expose 
the employee to contact with parts energized at more than 600 
volts.\174\ OSHA believes that final Sec.  1926.960(b)(3) ensures that 
employees at a substantial risk of electric shock are protected by the 
presence of a second person.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \174\ Under final Sec.  1926.960(b)(3)(ii)(C), one employee 
working alone may perform emergency repair work involving parts 
energized at more than 600 volts, but only to the extent necessary 
to safeguard the general public.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Mr. Daniel Shipp with ISEA recommended that OSHA require the 
presence of a second person whenever fall hazards are present in 
combination with electric-shock hazards (Ex. 0211). He pointed to risks 
associated with prolonged suspension in personal fall protection 
equipment, commenting:

    In a recent Safety and Health Information Bulletin, OSHA 
describes the hazard of prolonged suspension in a full body harness 
following a fall event. OSHA SHIB 03-24-2004 cites the hazard of 
orthostatic intolerance, recommending prompt rescue of suspended 
personnel, especially when other complicating factors may be 
present. A fall precipitated by exposure to an energized electrical 
source will require immediate rescue of the incapacitated employee 
and removal to a safe working level where medical aid can be 
administered. [Id.]

    OSHA recognizes the hazards associated with prolonged suspension in 
full body harnesses. Therefore, Sec.  1926.502(d)(20), which applies to 
personal fall arrest equipment, requires employers to provide for 
prompt rescue of employees in the event of a fall or assure that 
employees are able to rescue themselves. The Agency believes that final 
Sec.  1926.960(b)(3) will assure the rescue of employees exposed to 
electric-shock hazards of more than 600 volts. Also, as explained 
previously, under Section 5(a)(1) of the OSH Act, employers may need to 
adopt additional measures beyond the measures required in final subpart 
V to assure prompt rescue of employees exposed to lower voltage 
electric-shock hazards. Because hazards associated with suspension in 
full body harnesses already are covered in Sec.  1926.502(d)(20), OSHA 
sees no need to address them further in subpart V.
    For all of these reasons, OSHA concludes that the evidence in this 
rulemaking record does not support adding a two-person requirement for 
any operation that existing Sec.  1910.269(l)(1) permits an employee to 
perform alone.
    Some commenters requested clarification of the relationship between 
the two-person rule in paragraph (b)(3) and the requirements on minimum 
approach distances, which are discussed later in this section of the 
preamble (Exs. 0209, 0230; Tr. 903). Mr. Thomas Frank of Ameren 
Corporation requested that OSHA revise the language so that the two-
person rule applies only when an employee performs work within the 
applicable minimum approach distance (Ex. 0209). In addition, Mr. Edwin 
Hill with IBEW suggested that there is confusion in the industry about 
the applicability of minimum approach distances to employees working 
alone, commenting:

    The current language in 1910.269 is many times misunderstood. 
[S]ome people believe that a worker can get closer than the minimum 
approach distance to an energized primary conductor when working 
alone. This should not be true. . . .
    If the standard is going [to] allow a one person crew to work 
around energized primary conductors of voltages greater than 600 
volts, then it should be clear that minimum approach distances must 
be maintained. In the case of underground distribution equipment, 
the same detailed restrictions should be explained. Many times 
during an underground circuit outage, a worker opens the equipment 
doors and is within the minimum approach distances of the energized 
cables, both ``live front terminations'' and ``dead front elbows''. 
The established minimum approach distances should be maintained at 
all times, in any work situation, to ensure worker safety. If these 
distances cannot be maintained, rubber insulating cover-up equipment 
should be installed. [Ex. 0230]

    In this regard, paragraph (b)(3) does not excuse compliance with 
otherwise applicable minimum approach-distance requirements. OSHA 
previously clarified existing Sec.  1910.269(l)(1), from which it 
adopted final paragraph (b)(3), explaining that an employee is 
``exposed to contact'' for purposes of Sec.  1910.269(l)(1) when he or 
she is in a working position from which he or she can reach or take a 
conductive object within the electrical component of the minimum 
approach distance.\175\ (See the summary and explanation for final 
Sec.  1926.960(c)(1) later in this section of the preamble for a 
discussion of the

[[Page 20420]]

electrical component of the minimum approach distance.) OSHA notes that 
an employee who is ``exposed to contact'' with an energized part under 
this interpretation is still ``exposed to contact'' with the energized 
part even when insulation covers the part, the employee, or both. (See 
final Sec. Sec.  1910.269(x) and 1926.968 (defining ``exposed'' as not 
isolated \176\ or guarded;\177\ merely covering a conductor or an 
employee with insulation does not provide guarding or isolation).) 
\178\ The Agency also notes that a second employee may be required when 
employees can reach or take a conductive object into the electrical 
component of the minimum approach distance as they are approaching or 
leaving their final work positions or moving from one work position to 
another.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \175\ See the letter of interpretation dated October 18, 1995, 
to Mr. Lonnie Bell, https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=INTERPRETATIONS&p_id=21981.)
    \176\ The proposed rule and existing Sec.  1910.269 did not 
define ``isolated.'' However, existing Subpart V did define that 
term in Sec.  1926.960 as ``not readily accessible to persons unless 
special means of access are used.'' This definition is identical to 
the definition of this term in OSHA's electrical standards for 
general industry (Sec.  1910.399) and construction (Sec.  1926.449) 
and in the 2002 NESC (Ex. 0077). This definition also is consistent 
with the use of the term ``exposed to contact'' in final paragraph 
(b)(3). OSHA believes that defining ``isolated'' will help clarify 
the final rule. Consequently, OSHA included the definition of 
``isolated'' in final Sec. Sec.  1910.269(x) and 1926.968. The 
Agency also included ``exposed to contact'' as a synonym in the 
definition of ``exposed'' to clarify that the definition of 
``exposed'' also applies to the term used in final paragraph (b)(3).
    \177\ Section 1926.968 defines ``guarded'' as ``[c]overed, 
fenced, enclosed, or otherwise protected, by means of suitable 
covers or casings, barrier rails or screens, mats, or platforms, 
designed to minimize the possibility, under normal conditions, of 
dangerous approach or inadvertent contact by persons or objects.'' 
Subpart V recognizes two methods of guarding: barriers (or 
enclosures), which serve to ``minimize the possibility . . . of . . 
. inadvertent contact,'' and guarding by location, which serves to 
``minimize the possibility . . . of dangerous approach.'' As 
explained in the note to final Sec.  1926.966(f)(1), the 2002 NESC 
contains guidelines for the dimensions of clearance distances about 
electric equipment in substations. OSHA considers these clearance 
distances as minimizing the possibility of dangerous approach for 
employees and considers energized parts conforming to the clearance 
distances in the 2002 NESC to be guarded, unless employees bypass 
those distances (for example, by accessing a ``guarded'' area). (See 
also the summary and explanation for final Sec.  1926.966(f)(1) 
later in this section of the preamble.)
    \178\ IEEE Std 516 further clarifies the treatment of insulated 
cables (Exs. 0041, 0532). For example, Section 4.9.1 of IEEE Std 
516-2009 states:
    The following are considered to be live parts at their normal 
operating voltage unless they are properly grounded:
    * * * * *
    --Conductors--insulated unless they have solidly grounded and 
tested shields (The condition of the conductor insulation exposed to 
weather is unknown and may be damaged or defective.) [Ex. 0532]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Mr. Junga with UWUA Local 223 was concerned that ``[e]mployers are 
pushing for more one-person crews and asking [them] to do more [of] the 
work that historically has been performed by two or more qualified 
persons'' (Ex. 0197).
    In response, OSHA reiterates that the exceptions from the two-
person rule, which are specified in final paragraph (b)(3)(ii) and are 
based on existing Sec.  1910.269(l)(1)(ii), will be interpreted and 
applied narrowly. Paragraph (b)(3)(ii)(A) permits an employee to work 
alone to perform routine circuit switching, as long as the employer can 
demonstrate that conditions at the site allow safe performance of this 
work. Employees have been injured during switching operations when 
unusual conditions, such as poor lighting, bad weather, or hazardous 
configuration or state of repair of the switching equipment, were 
present (269-Ex. 9-2). If there is poor lighting, for example, the 
employer may be unable to demonstrate that the operation can be 
performed safely by one employee; the employer could, however, elect to 
provide supplemental lighting adequate to make it safe for an employee 
to work alone.
    Paragraph (b)(3)(ii)(B) permits one employee to work alone with 
live-line tools if the employee is positioned so that he or she is 
neither within reach of, nor otherwise exposed to contact with, 
energized parts. Accidents involving hot-stick work have typically 
occurred only when the employee was close enough to energized parts to 
be injured--either through direct contact or by contact through 
conductors being handled (269-Ex. 9-2).
    Finally, paragraph (b)(3)(ii)(C) permits one employee to work alone 
on emergency repairs necessary to safeguard the general public. OSHA 
will generally consider situations in which there is a downed energized 
power line, an energized power line on an occupied vehicle, or a 
service outage to life-support equipment to be emergency situations for 
which an employee can work alone to safeguard the public. Whether 
outages to street lights, traffic lights, or homes are emergency 
situations for purposes of final paragraph (b)(3)(ii)(C) depends on 
many factors, including the extent and expected duration of the outage 
and the availability of alternative means of protecting the public, 
such as the availability of police or other officials to manage or stop 
traffic at intersections in the absence of working stoplights. Because 
hospitals and similar patient-care facilities usually have backup 
generators, outages of circuits supplying these facilities will not 
generally be deemed to fall under final paragraph (b)(3)(ii)(C).
Minimum Approach Distances
    Paragraph (c)(1) in the final rule sets requirements for minimum 
approach distances. Paragraph (c)(1)(i) requires employers to establish 
minimum approach distances no less than the distances computed by the 
equations set in Table V-2 for ac systems or Table V-7 for dc systems. 
(The equations in Table V-2 in the final rule are described and 
explained later in this section of the preamble.) Paragraph (c)(1)(iii) 
of the final rule requires the employer to ensure that no employee 
approaches, or takes any conductive object, closer to exposed energized 
parts than the employer's established minimum approach distance, except 
as permitted in paragraphs (c)(1)(iii)(A), (c)(1)(iii)(B), and 
(c)(1)(iii)(C) (as explained later in this section of the preamble).
    Table V-2 provides equations for the employer to use to compute 
minimum approach distances under paragraph (c)(1)(i). The equations 
vary depending on voltage and, for phase-to-phase voltages of more than 
72.5 kilovolts, on whether the exposure is phase-to-phase or phase-to-
ground.
    Paragraph (c)(1)(ii) in the final rule provides that, no later than 
April 1, 2015, for voltages over 72.5 kilovolts, the employer determine 
the maximum anticipated per-unit transient overvoltage, phase-to-
ground, through an engineering analysis or assume a maximum anticipated 
per-unit transient overvoltage, phase-to-ground, in accordance with 
Table V-8. The employer must make any engineering analysis conducted to 
determine maximum anticipated per-unit transient overvoltage available 
upon request to affected employees and to the Assistant Secretary or 
designee for examination and copying. When the employer uses portable 
protective gaps to control the maximum transient overvoltage, final 
paragraph (c)(1)(ii) also requires that the value of the maximum 
anticipated per-unit transient overvoltage, phase-to-ground, must 
provide for five standard deviations between the statistical sparkover 
voltage of the gap and the statistical withstand voltage corresponding 
to the electrical component of the minimum approach distance.
    Under Appendix B to existing Sec.  1910.269, employers use 
engineering analyses to determine any reductions in maximum transient 
overvoltages below the maximum values listed in Table R-7 and Table R-
8. Also under Appendix B to existing Sec.  1910.269, when an employer 
is using portable protective gaps, it determines minimum approach 
distances using a specific methodology

[[Page 20421]]

that provides for five standard deviations between the statistical 
sparkover voltage of the gap and the statistical withstand voltage 
corresponding to the electrical component of the minimum approach 
distance at the worksite. OSHA incorporated both of these performance 
requirements in final paragraph (c)(1)(ii). To explain terms used in 
final paragraph (c)(1)(ii), OSHA also added definitions of 
``statistical sparkover voltage'' and ``statistical withstand voltage'' 
to final Sec.  1926.968. Statistical sparkover voltage is a transient 
overvoltage level that produces a 97.72-percent probability of 
sparkover (in other words, two standard deviations above the voltage at 
which there is a 50-percent probability of sparkover). Statistical 
withstand voltage is a transient overvoltage level that produces a 
0.14-percent probability of sparkover (in other words, three standard 
deviations below the voltage at which there is a 50-percent probability 
of sparkover). OSHA based both definitions on definitions in IEEE Std 
516-2009 (Ex. 0532).
    Table V-7 contains minimum approach distances for dc systems. In 
Table V-7, the applicable minimum approach distance depends on the 
maximum anticipated per-unit transient overvoltage and the maximum 
line-to-ground voltage. In accordance with final paragraph (c)(1)(ii) 
and Table V-8, an employer using Table V-7 must determine the maximum 
anticipated per-unit transient overvoltage through an engineering 
analysis that is made available upon request to affected employees and 
to the Assistant Secretary or designee for examination and copying or 
must assume a maximum per-unit transient overvoltage of 1.8.
    Paragraph (c)(1)(i) makes it clear that the required minimum 
approach distances are based on engineering principles that OSHA 
adopted in the final rule. The Agency is adopting the equations and the 
engineering principles behind the minimum approach distances rather 
than just setting distances as it did when it promulgated Sec.  
1910.269 in 1994. This paragraph also ensures that the minimum approach 
distance maintained by each employee is appropriate for the workplace 
rather than for the industry in general. OSHA believes that this 
approach will better protect each employee than existing Sec.  1910.269 
and the proposed rule.
    The minimum approach distances set by Table V-2 for phase-to-phase 
system voltages of 72.5 kilovolts and less do not vary based on 
worksite conditions provided the altitude is 900 meters (3,000 feet) or 
less above sea level. Therefore, OSHA calculated the minimum approach 
distances for these voltages and listed them in Table V-5 in the final 
rule. Note 1 in Table V-2 provides that, for voltages up to 72.5 
kilovolts, employers may use the precalculated minimum approach 
distances in Table V-5 provided the worksite is at an elevation of 900 
meters or less.
    Minimum approach distances for phase-to-phase system voltages of 
more than 72.5 kilovolts will vary depending on conditions present at 
the worksite and possibly the work practices used by employees. 
Parameter C in the equation for these voltages varies depending on 
whether an insulated tool or conductive object is in the approach 
distance (gap) between the employee and the energized part (if the 
employee is at ground potential or at the potential of a different 
energized part) or between the employee and ground (if the employee is 
at the potential of the energized part). For phase-to-ground exposures, 
if the employer can demonstrate that there is only air in this gap, 
then C equals 0.01. For phase-to-phase exposures, if the employer can 
demonstrate that no insulated tool spans the gap and that no large 
conductive object is in the gap, then C equals 0.01. In all other 
cases, C equals 0.011. When an employee is climbing on a structure or 
performing live-line barehand work, OSHA expects that there normally 
will only be air present in the gap, and the equation will produce a 
smaller minimum approach distance than if the employee is using an 
insulated tool to work on energized parts.\179\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \179\ Live-line barehand work is work performed with the 
employee at the same potential as one of the phase conductors. The 
employee is insulated, by air or another insulating medium, from the 
other phase conductors and from ground.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The saturation factor, a, in the equation for system voltages of 
more than 72.5 kilovolts varies depending on whether the exposure is 
phase-to-ground or phase-to-phase. For phase-to-ground exposures, the 
saturation factor will be reduced slightly, resulting in smaller 
minimum approach distances. As explained in Note 3 in Table V-2, unless 
the employer can demonstrate that no insulated tool spans the gap and 
that no large conductive object is in the gap, the employer must 
calculate the saturation factor using the phase-to-ground equations 
(with the peak voltage for phase-to-phase exposures), even for phase-
to-phase exposures.
    Finally, T \180\ in the equation for phase-to-phase system voltages 
of more than 72.5 kilovolts represents the maximum phase-to-ground 
anticipated per-unit transient overvoltage, which can vary from 
worksite to worksite.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \180\ T is the ratio of the 2-percent statistical switching 
overvoltage expected at the worksite to the nominal peak line-to-
ground voltage of the system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For voltages over 72.5 kilovolts, employers may use the minimum 
approach distances in the tables in Appendix B provided the worksite is 
at an elevation of 900 meters or less. The tables in Appendix B contain 
minimum approach distances for various values of T. In accordance with 
final paragraph (c)(1)(ii), the employer must determine T through 
engineering analysis or use the maximum T from Table V-8.
    For phase-to-phase system voltages of more than 5,000 volts, the 
altitude-correction factor applies when the worksite is at an elevation 
of more than 900 meters above sea level. When the worksite is at these 
higher elevations, the employer must use the appropriate altitude 
correction factor from Table V-4 when calculating minimum approach 
distances. Table V-2 explains how to apply the altitude correction 
factors in computing minimum approach distances.
    As noted earlier, paragraph (c)(1)(i) requires employers to 
establish minimum approach distances. Because the elevation and maximum 
transient overvoltage may vary from worksite to worksite, each minimum 
approach distance established by the employer must be appropriate for 
the worksite involved. Employers can avoid establishing separate 
distances for every worksite by using worst-case values for elevation 
and T or by grouping worksites by ranges for elevation and T.
    Paragraph (c)(1) of proposed Sec.  1926.960 would have required 
employers to ensure that employees maintain minimum approach distances 
from exposed energized parts. Proposed Table V-2 through Table V-6 
specified the minimum approach distances. This proposed provision was 
borrowed from existing Sec.  1910.269(l)(2), although, as described 
later, OSHA proposed to make minor changes to the minimum approach 
distances listed in the existing Sec.  1910.269 tables.
    Electric power systems operate at a given nominal voltage. However, 
the actual voltage on a power line varies above and below that nominal 
voltage. For brief periods, the instantaneous voltage on a line can be 
3 or more times its nominal value (Ex. 0532).
    The safe minimum approach distance assures that an electric arc 
will not

[[Page 20422]]

form, even under the most severe transient overvoltages that can occur 
on a system and even when the employee makes errors in maintaining the 
minimum approach distance. To determine what this distance is for a 
specific voltage, OSHA must first determine the size of the air gap 
that must be present to prevent arc-over during the most severe 
overvoltage that can reasonably be expected to occur on the system. 
This gap is the electrical component of the minimum approach distance. 
To determine the minimum safe approach distance, OSHA must add extra 
distance to account for ergonomic considerations (that is, human 
error).
    The electrical component depends on five factors:
    (1) The maximum voltage,
    (2) The wave shape of this voltage,
    (3) The configuration of the ``electrodes'' forming the end points 
of the gap,
    (4) The insulating medium in the gap, and
    (5) The atmospheric conditions.
    In existing Sec.  1910.269, and in the proposal for this 
rulemaking, OSHA borrowed its approach for setting minimum approach 
distances from a consensus standard, namely the NESC. OSHA based the 
minimum approach distances in existing Sec.  1910.269 on the 1993 
edition of the NESC. In this rulemaking, OSHA proposed to adopt 
slightly revised minimum approach distances for both Sec.  1910.269 and 
subpart V; the revised minimum approach distances in the proposal were 
drawn from the updated, 2002 edition of the NESC.
    To develop the minimum approach distance tables for the 1993 
standard, NESC Subcommittee 8 adopted the following principles:
     ANSI/IEEE Std 516 was to be the electrical basis of the 
NESC Rules for approach distances for alternating- and direct-current 
voltages above 72.5 kilovolts.\181\ Distances for lower voltages were 
to be based on ANSI/IEEE Std 4. The application of ANSI/IEEE Std 516 
included the formula used by that standard to derive electrical 
clearance distances.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \181\ ANSI/IEEE Std 516-1987 (the edition in effect when NESC 
Subcommittee 8 revised the minimum approach distances for the 1993 
NESC) listed values for the electrical component of the minimum 
approach distance, both for air alone as an insulating medium and 
for live-line tool sticks in air, that were accepted as being 
accurate when the standard was adopted (by IEEE) in 1987.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Altitude correction factors were to be in accordance with 
ANSI/IEEE Std 516.
     The maximum design transient-overvoltage data to be used 
in the development of the basic approach distance tables were:
     3.0 per unit for voltages of 362 kilovolts and less
     2.4 per unit for 500 to 550 kilovolts
     2.0 per unit for 765 to 800 kilovolts
     All phase-to-phase values were to be calculated from the 
EPRI Transmission Line Reference Book for 115 to 138 kilovolts.
     An ergonomic-movement factor (inadvertent component) that 
accounted for errors in judging the approach distance was to be added 
to all basic electrical approach distances (electrical component) for 
all voltage ranges. A distance of 0.31 meters (1 foot) was to be added 
to all voltage ranges for the ergonomic component. An additional 0.3 
meters (1 foot) was to be added to voltage ranges below 72.6 kilovolts.
     The voltage reduction allowance for controlled maximum 
transient overvoltage was to be such that the minimum allowable 
approach distance was not less than the approach distance specified for 
the highest voltage listed for the given range.
     The transient overvoltage tables were to be applied only 
at voltage ranges inclusive of 72.6 to 800 kilovolts. All tables were 
to be established using the higher voltage of each separate voltage 
range.
    After publication of OSHA's proposed rule in 2005, the IEEE 
technical committee responsible for revising Standard 516 identified 
what in its view was an error in calculating the minimum approach 
distances in the IEEE standard that potentially affected the validity 
of the minimum approach distances in the 2002 NESC and OSHA's proposed 
rule. IEEE Std 516 was revised in 2009 to address the issue identified 
by the technical committee. (The error identified by the IEEE committee 
is discussed, at length, later in this section of the preamble.) In 
light of the IEEE revision process, OSHA twice reopened the record on 
subpart V, first in October 2008 and again in September 2009, to 
solicit additional comments on minimum approach distances. (See 73 FR 
62942, Oct. 22, 2008; 74 FR 46958, Sept. 14, 2009.) The Agency 
requested information on whether there was an error in the method OSHA 
used to calculate the proposed minimum approach distances and on what 
basis OSHA should set minimum approach distances. A public hearing was 
held on these issues in October 2009.
    In response to the issues OSHA raised about the minimum approach 
distances, EEI, IBEW, and the NESC urged the Agency to delay issuing 
revised minimum approach distances until after IEEE approved the next 
update of the NESC in 2012.\182\ (See, for example, Exs. 0545.1, 
0551.1, 0552.1; Tr2. 40-41, 72-75, 151-154.) The commenters maintained 
that, in writing the respective standards, the NESC subcommittees give 
greater weight to the practical effects of its rules than does the IEEE 
subcommittee responsible for IEEE Std 516. The commenters also 
maintained that an OSHA standard setting minimum approach distances 
that turn out to be different from the distances in the 2012 NESC could 
cause confusion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \182\ IEEE approved the 2012 NESC on April 14, 2011, and ANSI 
approved the 2012 NESC as an American National Standard on June 3, 
2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The chair of Subcommittee 8 of the NESC, Mr. James Tomaseski, 
testified that the NESC serves as the authority on safety requirements 
for electric power systems, that (at the time of his testimony) the 
NESC had yet to act on the revised methodologies in IEEE Std 516-2009 
for calculating minimum approach distances, and that NESC Subcommittee 
8 would transcribe the engineering information contained in the 2009 
IEEE 516 standard into a user-friendly format (Tr2. 34-41).\183\ He 
stated:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \183\ The 2012 NESC adopts the 2009 IEEE Std 516 distances for 
certain voltage ranges and values of T and permits an engineering 
determination of minimum approach distances as an alternative.

    NESC's Subcommittee 8 has the task of trying to make sense of 
and keep up with this evolving problem [of adopting adequate minimum 
approach distances]. Simply put, the IEEE 516 MAD Tables as they are 
published today in that [2009] guide are confusing.
    This takes us to the point what Subcommittee 8 recommends to 
OSHA for this Rule making. The agency should realize this is a 
difficult issue, not only for the Technical Subcommittee responsible 
for the different Codes, but most importantly for the users of the 
Rules. The MAD concept has been around for a long time. Even though 
new engineering principles continue to be developed, industry 
performance associated with these rules [has] to be considered.
* * * * *
    When OSHA revise[s] this Rule, these changes are somewhat 
permanent. This rule will probably not be revised again for a long 
time. Subcommittee 8 wants to do their part to make sure the MAD 
[c]oncepts get fixed correctly this time. The NESC Subcommittee 8 
recommends that OSHA leave the record open until the time the 
Subcommittee has the opportunity to review public comments as to 
what MAD values should be in the NESC. [Tr2. 39-41]

    IBEW also maintained that the OSHA standard should be consistent 
with the 2012 NESC (Tr2. 151-152). Testifying on behalf of IBEW, Mr. 
Donald Hartley stated:


[[Page 20423]]


    The IBEW believes the responsibility for developing [minimum 
approach distances resides with] the NESC. Technical Subcommittee 8 
on Work Rules, the body responsible for writing Part IV of the NESC 
where MAD Rules and Tables are located, should [set the rules] for 
OSHA to follow.
    The NESC is adopted by many states in the U.S. The U.S. [Rural] 
Electric Service requires member cooperatives to follow the NESC if 
they receive government loans. Many public power utilities, 
municipalities are not covered by OSHA. The NESC in these instances 
becomes the rule to follow.
* * * * *
    The IBEW strongly recommends that OSHA keep this record open 
until Subcommittee 8 has the opportunity to review public comment on 
this issue and develop final Code Language on the MAD principles and 
Rules. [Id.]

    EEI argued that, if OSHA failed to follow NESC action on minimum 
approach distances, the final rule could differ from the 2012 NESC and 
create confusion for the electric utility industry (Ex. 0545.1). Mr. 
Stephen Yohay, counsel for EEI, described the potential for confusion 
over differing standards as follows:

    The other question you asked is whether [there is] confusion in 
the industry [resulting from the fact that there are currently 
differences between the minimum approach distances in the existing 
OSHA standards and the distances in the consensus standards], and I 
am going to answer this anecdotally based on my experience in 
representing employers in this industry.
    I have often, not often, but more than occasionally heard 
confusion expressed as to which standards are the applicable 
standards, whether they are the OSHA standards, whether they are the 
NESC standards. And as you heard Mr. Tomaseski say various companies 
adopt different [distances] for their own work practices.
    Now when you throw in the element of State plans, you further 
confuse the mix. So I think there is some confusion and I think you 
all heard him say here earlier, and I think we all agree it is time 
for there to be consistency. [Tr2. 102-103]

    EEI also pointed out that Section 6(b)(8) of the OSH Act requires 
OSHA to explain deviations from national consensus standards (Ex. 
0545.1). Mr. Charles Kelly testified to this point on behalf of EEI, as 
follows:

    Section 6(b)(8) of the Act expresses that OSHA standards should 
not deviate from National Consensus Standards without an adequate 
statement of reason.
    The NESC Committee may or may not adopt the precise distances 
stated in the IEEE documents. Therefore, if OSHA incorporates the 
IEEE distances in a final standard that is promulgated in the next 
year or so, OSHA [may] soon find its final standard at odds with 
even the newest version of the NESC.
    The NESC, however, is well recognized as the preeminent National 
Consensus Standard on clearance distances for electric utility work 
on high voltage lines and equipment. Such a result could only create 
confusion in the industry. [Tr2. 73]

Mr. Kelly also maintained that the NESC gives greater weight to the 
practical application of its rules than does IEEE and that OSHA should 
adhere to its past practice of basing its rules for minimum approach 
distances on the NESC, testifying:

    [B]y virtue of the nature of its membership and the mission of 
its Subcommittee 8, we daresay with due respect to IEEE Committee 
516, that the NESC's final standards on Work Rules tend to give more 
attention to the practical impact that its Rules will have in the 
workplace than do IEEE Technical Standards.
    [T]he 516 Standard is basically an engineering standard and 
built that way on the technical issues whereby the NESC Subcommittee 
8 Standard; it deals with the Work Rules and Worker Protection more 
specifically.
* * * * *
    The usual cycle, and as I mean the historical cycle that OSHA 
has followed, is that the IEEE 516 Standard develops its standard, 
ballots it and publishes the standard over a period of time.
    The NESC Subcommittee 8 reviews 516, develops their standard, 
tables, ballots, and publishes it in that order. Then OSHA usually 
comes in and reviews the documented proof by both groups, and 
incorporates the NESC document into its particular Rule.
    The above scenario reflects the past practices used by OSHA in 
its development of standards affecting electric power generation, 
transmission, and distribution work. [Tr2. 73-74]

    Although the Agency considered the commenters' suggestion to hold 
the record for this rulemaking open until IEEE approved the 2012 NESC, 
OSHA concludes that it is unnecessary to reopen the record to consider 
the 2012 NESC in this rulemaking. First, OSHA does not agree that 
adopting minimum approach distances that differ from the distances in 
the 2012 NESC will produce widespread confusion or lead to additional 
risk for employees in the electric power industry. As acknowledged by 
some of the rulemaking participants, the distances in existing Sec.  
1910.269 and Subpart V differed from the 2009 edition of the NESC. 
(See, for example, Tr2. 53, 102-103.) In fact, Mr. Tomaseski presented 
slides showing that there were many differences between the NESC, IEEE 
Std 516, and the OSHA standards (Ex. 0568). Rulemaking participants 
testified that they were not aware of any specific safety problems 
arising in the industry by virtue of these discrepancies. (See, for 
example, Tr2. 58, 102, 104). Also, counsel for EEI admitted that 
``[e]mployers are at least following OSHA standards. . . . Some are 
exceeding the values that are in the OSHA standards and adopting more 
conservative standards'' (Tr2. 104). In any event, evidence in the 
record indicates that consensus standards are constantly evolving (see 
for example, Tr2. 39-40, 142-143); therefore, if the Agency were to 
adopt the minimum approach distances from the 2012 NESC, it is likely 
that there would be differences between the OSHA standard and 
subsequent editions of the NESC.
    OSHA does not believe there is merit to the commenters' suggestion 
that the existence of State plan programs will be an additional source 
of confusion for employers. As noted in Section XI, State-Plan 
Requirements, later in this preamble, States with OSHA-approved 
occupational safety and health plans must adopt standards that are 
equivalent to, and at least as protective as, this final rule within 6 
months of its promulgation. Thus, States with State plans will adopt 
provisions on minimum approach distances that are at least as 
protective as the provisions in this final standard. On a technical 
issue such as minimum approach distances, OSHA expects that most States 
with State plans will choose to incorporate the federal provision as 
promulgated in this final rule, although it is possible that one or 
more of these States will adopt more protective provisions. Even if 
some States do adopt more protective standards, OSHA does not believe 
that the resultant differences will result in any significant confusion 
for employers.
    Public electric utilities in States with State occupational safety 
and health plans, including plans that cover only State and local 
government employees, will be required to comply with the applicable 
State plan standards. Public electric utilities in other States are not 
covered by a State plan or by the Federal OSHA standard and may choose 
to adhere to the NESC. Private-sector electric utilities must comply 
with the Federal or State plan OSHA standards that cover their 
worksites. This scheme is well established, and OSHA does not believe 
that employers will have difficulty determining the applicable 
requirements.
    As noted earlier, IBEW suggested that a conflict between the OSHA 
and the 2012 NESC minimum approach distances could be problematic for 
loan recipients in the United States Department of Agriculture's (USDA) 
Rural Development Electric Programs because, according to the union, 
utilities receiving USDA loans must comply with the NESC as a condition 
of their loans (Tr2. 151). These USDA programs

[[Page 20424]]

provide loans for electric services that meet certain standards, and 
IBEW is correct that the NESC is among the standards that these 
services must meet (7 CFR 1724.50). However, even if the loan programs 
require compliance with the minimum approach distances in the NESC, 
employers can meet both the OSHA and USDA loan-program requirements 
simply by adopting the more conservative (that is, larger) minimum 
approach distances. Therefore, differences between the minimum 
approach-distance provisions in this final rule and the minimum 
approach distances in the 2012 NESC should not be a problem for 
participants in the USDA programs.
    Second, the Agency does not believe that considering public input 
on the 2012 NESC will result in a standard that is more protective than 
the final rule. The NESC minimum approach distances are based on the 
minimum approach distances in IEEE Std 516-2009, on which OSHA already 
solicited public comment and provided opportunity for additional input 
at a public hearing (74 FR 46958). The 2012 NESC does not include any 
additional support for the IEEE minimum approach distances, which, as 
explained later in this section of the preamble, OSHA rejected. In 
addition, reopening the record for this rulemaking would further delay 
the final rule. Therefore, OSHA concludes that reopening the record to 
gather additional public comment on the 2012 NESC minimum approach 
distances is unwarranted.
    Finally, in response to the commenters' references to Section 
6(b)(8) of the OSH Act the Agency concludes that, with respect to 
minimum approach distances, this final rule ``will better effectuate 
the purposes of [the] Act'' than the 2012 edition of the NESC. (See the 
discussion under the heading OSHA's requirements on minimum approach 
distances better effectuate the purpose of the OSH Act than the 
national consensus standard, later in this section of the preamble.)
    Some commenters maintained that the minimum approach distances in 
the 2005 proposed rule, which were based on the 2002 NESC, were safe 
despite any technical errors potentially made in calculating those 
distances. (See, for example, Ex. 0545.1; Tr2. 79-82.) The commenters 
argued that industry experience establishes the safety of the existing 
minimum approach distances in Sec.  1910.269. (See, for example, Exs. 
0545.1, 0551.1.)
    American Electric Power argued against adopting minimum approach 
distances different from the minimum approach differences in OSHA's 
proposal, relying on calculations they made that were taken from a 
paper by Vaisman et al.\184\ (Ex. 0550.1). American Electric Power 
described this method as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \184\ Vaisman, R., Fonseca, J. R., Andrade, V. H. G., Almeida, 
M. A., Hattori, H. K., Melo, M. O. B. C., Teivelis, F., Fernandes, 
J. H. M., Silva, J. T. S., Dias, L. E. N., Esmeraldo, P. C. V., and 
Samico, R. A. M., ``Switching Impulse Strength of Compact 
Transmission Lines,'' IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery, Vol. 8, 
No. 3, July 1993 (Ex. 0555).

    The method is based on calculating V50[percnt] 
(critical flashover[\185\] voltage--CFO) and determining distances 
from the V50[percnt] value of conductor-to-
conductor gap test data. The V50[percnt] is 
derived from the required VW (withstand voltage), using 
the line-to-line overvoltage factor, TL-L. The required 
distance for [minimum air insulation distance] and MAD is then taken 
from . . . Figure 13 in an IEEE paper by Vaisman [footnote omitted] 
et al., 1993, which represents conductor-to-conductor gap test data 
from five different laboratories. The test data is based on [alpha] 
= 0.50 (ratio between the negative impulse crest and the phase to 
phase voltage) which provides more conservative results for 
V50[percnt] than [alpha] = 0.33 (Figure 12 of 
the aforementioned Vaisman paper). [Id.]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \185\ IEEE Std 516-2009 defines ``flashover'' as ``[a] 
disruptive discharge through air around and over a surface of solid 
or liquid insulation, between parts at different potential or 
polarity, produced by application of voltage wherein the breakdown 
path becomes sufficiently ionized to maintain an electric arc'' (Ex. 
0532). That standard defines ``sparkover'' as ``[a] disruptive 
discharge between preset electrodes in either a gaseous or a liquid 
dielectric'' (id.). Thus, the more technically correct term for an 
electrical discharge across an air gap is ``sparkover.'' However, 
the term ``flashover'' has been used historically for either event, 
and this preamble uses these terms interchangeably. The critical 
flashover distance, V50 or 
V50[percnt], is the distance that will 
flashover 50 percent of the time at a given voltage.

American Electric Power calculated V50[percnt] to 
be 2421 kilovolts for an 800-kilovolt power line (id.). From Figure 13 
of the Vaisman paper, American Electric Power determined that the 
corresponding minimum air-insulation distance (the electrical component 
of the minimum approach distance) was 6.52 meters (21.4 feet) and that 
the minimum approach distance (with the ergonomic component included as 
explained later in this section of the preamble) was 6.82 meters (22.4 
feet). American Electric Power contrasted this with the corresponding 
7.91-meter (26-foot) minimum approach distance proposed by OSHA and 
concluded that the proposed value was adequately protective (id.). 
(See, also, Ex. 0545.1, in which EEI makes a similar argument based on 
the Vaisman paper.)
    As explained in greater detail later in this section of the 
preamble, OSHA concludes that the proposed minimum approach distances 
do not provide adequate safety for employees. In addition, OSHA finds 
that there are two basic problems with American Electric Power's 
comparison of the proposed 800-kilovolt minimum approach distance and 
what it considers to be a safe approach distance. First, as is clear 
from the Vaisman paper (Ex. 0555), the distances in Figure 13 of that 
paper (which correspond to [alpha] = 0.50) are less conservative than 
the distances in Figure 12 of that paper (corresponding to [alpha] = 
0.33).\186\ The air-insulation distance from Figure 12 appears to be 
about 7.8 meters (25.6 feet). Adding the 0.31-meter (1-foot) ergonomic 
component yields a comparable minimum approach distance of 8.11 meters 
(26.6 feet), which is clearly more protective than the 7.91-meter (26-
foot) minimum approach distance proposed by OSHA in 2005.\187\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \186\ American Electric Power commented that an [alpha] of 0.50 
``provides more conservative results for V50[percnt] 
than [alpha] = 0.33'' (Ex. 0550.1). This comment may be true, but it 
is irrelevant. For a given V50[percnt], an 
[alpha] of 0.33 produces a more conservative (that is, greater) 
minimum approach distance, as is the case here.
    \187\ The quality of Figures 12 and 13 in the original Vaisman 
paper is poor, and it is difficult to accurately determine the 
distance (Ex. 0555). The figures included in American Electric 
Power's and EEI's exhibits, which apparently recreated Figure 13 
from the Vaisman paper, were of much better quality (Exs. 0550.1 and 
0545.1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Second, the testing that serves as the basis for Figures 12 and 13 
of the Vaisman paper determined the switching impulse strength of two 
conductors in parallel (Ex. 0555). From the paper's description of the 
test procedure, OSHA concludes that the testing did not account for 
different configurations that could be present during live-line work or 
for the presence of workers and the tools and equipment they would be 
using to perform this work. As explained later in this section of the 
preamble, different electrode configurations and the presence of 
workers and other conductive objects in the gap between them can reduce 
the electrical strength of the air gap substantially. Thus, although 
American Electric Power's and EEI's approach may validly estimate the 
strength of a power line while no work is being performed, OSHA 
concludes that this approach fails to represent employee exposure 
adequately.
    For reasons described later in this section of the preamble, the 
Agency concludes that there is a significant risk to employees from the 
minimum approach distances contained in existing Sec.  1910.269 and 
Subpart V. In addition, OSHA concludes that it has enough information 
in the rulemaking record to set appropriate minimum approach-distance 
requirements.

[[Page 20425]]

Consequently, the Agency decided that it is necessary and appropriate 
to include revised minimum approach-distance provisions in this final 
rule.
    The ergonomic component of MAD. The ergonomic-movement component of 
the minimum approach distance is a safety factor designed to ensure 
that the employee does not breach the electrical component of the 
minimum approach distance in case he or she errs in judging and 
maintaining the minimum approach distance. In developing the minimum 
approach distance tables for its 1993 standard, the NESC subcommittee 
based the ergonomic-movement factor (the ergonomic component of MAD) on 
relevant data, including a typical arm's reach of about 610 millimeters 
(2 feet) and a reaction time to a stimulus ranging from 0.2 to more 
than 1.0 second (269-Ex. 8-19). As OSHA explained in the preamble to 
the proposal, the ergonomic-movement factor must be sufficient for the 
employee to be able to recognize a hazardous approach to an energized 
line and withdraw to a safe position so that he or she does not breach 
the air gap required for the electrical component of the minimum 
approach distance (70 FR 34862). Thus, the ergonomic-movement distance 
should equal the response time multiplied by the average speed of an 
employee's movement plus the stopping distance.\188\ The maximum reach 
(or range of movement) may place an upper bound on the ergonomic 
component. The NESC subcommittee developing the 1993 standard used this 
information as a basis for selecting appropriate distances for two 
major voltage ranges: 1.1 to 72.5 kilovolts and 72.6 kilovolts and 
more.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \188\ This calculation is comparable to the calculation of total 
braking distance for a motor vehicle. This distance equals the 
initial speed of the vehicle times the driver's reaction time plus 
the stopping distance of the vehicle after the driver applies the 
brakes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For system voltages up to 72.5 kilovolts, phase-to-phase, much of 
the work is performed using rubber gloves, and the employee is working 
within arm's reach of energized parts. The ergonomic component of the 
minimum approach distance must account for this condition since the 
employee may not have time to react and position himself or herself out 
of danger. A distance of 0.61 meters (2 feet) for the ergonomic 
component appears to meet this criterion and was, therefore, adopted by 
the NESC subcommittee developing the 1993 standard. This ergonomic 
component remained the same in the 2007 NESC, except that the standard 
applied it to voltages as low as 751 volts instead of 1100 volts (Ex. 
0533).\189\ OSHA used this value in existing Sec.  1910.269 for 
voltages of 1.1 to 72.5 kilovolts and proposed to use it in Subpart V 
for voltages of 751 volts to 72.5 kilovolts. There were no objections 
to this distance on the record.\190\ Therefore, for voltages of 751 
volts to 72.5 kilovolts, the final rule adopts a 0.61-meter (2-foot) 
ergonomic-movement component of the minimum approach distance, as 
proposed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \189\ At all voltages, the values for the ergonomic component of 
the minimum approach distance are the same in the 2012 NESC as they 
are in the 2007 NESC.
    \190\ EEI did, however, object to what it mistakenly believed 
was a proposed increase in the ergonomic component over what was 
adopted in existing Sec.  1910.269 (Exs. 0227, 0501; Tr. 1056-1082). 
OSHA discusses these comments later in this section of the preamble.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As OSHA explained in the preamble to the proposed rule, the 
applicable work practices change for operations involving lines 
energized at voltages over 72.5 kilovolts (70 FR 34862; 269-Exs. 64, 
65). Generally, live-line tools are employed to perform the work while 
equipment is energized. These tools hold the energized part at a fixed 
distance from the employee, ensuring that the minimum approach distance 
is maintained during the work operation. Even when live-line tools are 
not used, as during live-line barehand work, employees use work methods 
that more tightly control their movements than when they perform rubber 
glove work, and it is usually easier to plan how to keep employees from 
violating the minimum approach distance. For example, employees 
planning a job to replace spacers on a 500-kilovolt overhead power line 
can circumscribe an envelope (or bounds) of anticipated movement for 
the job and ensure that the working position they select keeps this 
envelope entirely outside the minimum approach distance. Thus, all the 
employees' movements during the job can easily be kept within the 
envelope. Additionally, there is limited or no exposure to conductors 
at a potential different from the one on which work is being performed 
because the distance between conductors is much greater than the 
distance between conductors at lower voltages and higher voltage 
systems do not present the types of congestion that are found commonly 
on lower voltage systems. Consequently, a smaller ergonomic component 
is appropriate for higher voltages. The NESC subcommittee developing 
the 1993 standard accepted a value of 0.31 meters (1 foot) for this 
component. This ergonomic component also remained the same in the 2007 
NESC (Ex. 0533). OSHA used this value in existing Sec.  1910.269 and 
proposed it in this rulemaking. There were no comments on this issue in 
this rulemaking, therefore, OSHA is adopting the proposed ergonomic-
movement component of 0.31 meters (1 foot) for voltages over 72.5 
kilovolts.\191\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \191\ In the 1994 Sec.  1910.269 rulemaking, OSHA adopted an 
ergonomic-movement factor based on English units of 1 foot or 2 
feet, depending on voltage. It should be noted that, to three 
significant digits, 0.305 meters is 1.00 foot and 0.610 meters is 
2.00 feet. In this final rule, OSHA used metric units and rounded 
0.305 meters up to 0.31 meters.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    EEI misconstrued OSHA's proposal as increasing the ergonomic-
movement component in existing Sec.  1910.269 by 0.61 meters (2 feet), 
for a total ergonomic component of 1.22 meters (4 feet) for voltages up 
to 72.5 kilovolts (Exs. 0227, 0392; Tr. 1056-1082). Testifying on 
behalf of EEI, Mr. Clayton Abernathy of OG&E Energy Corporation 
described how increasing the minimum approach distance by 0.61 meters 
would restrict some of the work performed by his company's employees 
(Tr. 1056-1082).
    The ergonomic components of the minimum approach distances in 
OSHA's proposal were the same as the ergonomic components used for the 
minimum approach distances in existing Sec.  1910.269 for voltages over 
1,000 volts. The ergonomic component for voltages between 751 volts and 
72.5 kilovolts (the voltages addressed by EEI's comments) is 0.61 
meters. The ergonomic component of the proposed minimum approach 
distances for those voltages was not, contrary to EEI's suggestion, 
greater than that value. It appears that EEI's objections were aimed at 
two other proposed requirements: (1) Proposed Sec.  1926.960(c)(2)(ii), 
which provided that, when using rubber insulating gloves or rubber 
insulating gloves with sleeves for insulation against energized parts, 
employees put on and take off their rubber insulating gloves and 
sleeves when they are in positions from which they cannot reach into 
the minimum approach distance, and (2) proposed Sec.  1926.960(d)(2), 
which provided that employees performing work near exposed parts 
energized at 601 volts to 72.5 kilovolts either work from positions 
from which they cannot reach into the minimum approach distance or use 
specified protective measures or work methods. OSHA addresses EEI's 
concerns with these proposed provisions later in this section of the 
preamble.
    Finally, OSHA addresses some confusion expressed by commenters 
during the rulemaking about whether

[[Page 20426]]

the ergonomic component of the minimum approach distance should be used 
in determining whether a line worker is exposed to phase-to-phase or 
phase-to-ground voltage (Tr. 1060-1061, 1076-1077).
    As noted earlier in this section of the preamble, under the summary 
and explanation for final Sec.  1926.97(c)(2)(i) and Table E-4, the 
final rule permits insulating protective equipment to be rated for 
phase-to-ground voltage if ``[t]he electric equipment and devices are 
insulated . . . so that the multiphase exposure on a grounded wye 
circuit is removed'' (Table E-4, Note 1).\192\ Existing Sec.  1910.137 
and Table I-5 contain the same provisions. OSHA policy with regard to 
whether there is multiphase exposure under existing Sec.  1910.137 is 
discussed in a September 27, 2005, letter of interpretation to Mr. 
Edwin Hill, IBEW President.\193\ This letter explains how to determine 
whether multiphase exposure exists:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \192\ Note that the word ``exposure'' in the note relates to the 
maximum voltage that can appear across the insulation, and not to 
whether an energized part is ``exposed.'' The definition of 
``exposed'' in final Sec.  1926.968 applies only to the use of that 
term in Subpart V. It does not apply to final Sec.  1926.97.
    \193\ This letter is available on OSHA's Web site at: https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=INTERPRETATIONS&p_id=25133.

    Phase-to-phase exposure exists whenever it is foreseeable that 
an employee or the longest conductive object he or she may handle 
can simultaneously breach the electrical components of the MADs of 
live parts energized at different phase potentials, taking into 
account such factors as: The nature of the work being performed, the 
physical configuration and spacing of the conductors, the proximity 
of grounded objects or other circuit conductors, the method of 
approach to the conductors, the size of the employee, the tools and 
equipment being used, and the length of the conductive object. In 
addition, the employer must always consider mechanical loads and 
other conditions, such as wind and ice, that could cause a conductor 
to move or a support to fail. Notably, the determination of whether 
or not multiphase exposure exists is made without regard to 
insulation that may be covering the live part or the employee. This 
is because the exposure determination must be made prior to the 
selection of insulation in order to ensure that the insulation 
selected is adequate to protect employees from the electrical 
hazard. Moreover, it must be noted that phase-to-phase exposure 
involves not only the hazard of electric shock to the employee, but 
also arc flash and arc blast hazards from phase-to-phase contact of 
conductive objects, such as could occur if an employee dropped a 
conductive object onto or within the electrical components of the 
MADs of live parts energized at different phase potentials. 
[Figures] illustrating when phase-to-phase exposure exists can be 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
found at the conclusion of this letter. . . .

Figure 3 and Figure 4 are the figures from that letter:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR11AP14.001


[[Page 20427]]


[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR11AP14.002

    The 0.61-meter ergonomic component of the minimum approach distance 
is labeled ``2 feet'' in these figures. As can be seen from the 
explanation and figures in the letter of interpretation, the ergonomic 
component of the minimum approach distance has no bearing on whether 
there is multiphase exposure. The rating required for the insulating 
protective equipment installed on the phase conductors depends on the 
electrical component of the minimum approach distance (which, in turn, 
depends on the voltage on the power line, as discussed later in this 
section of the preamble), the distance between the phase conductors, 
and the reach of the employee and any conductive object he or she may 
handle while working. As noted in the letter to Mr. Hill, when 
multiphase exposure exists, the insulating protective equipment used to 
remove multiphase exposure must be rated for the phase-to-phase voltage 
at a minimum.\194\ In addition, the preamble to the 1994 Sec.  1910.269 
rulemaking noted that ``until the multiphase exposure has actually been 
removed, the phase-to-phase voltage remains the maximum use voltage'' 
(59 FR 4328). After the insulating protective equipment covering the 
conductors not being worked on is in place, the rubber insulating 
gloves and sleeves need only be rated for the phase-to-ground voltage. 
This is current OSHA policy under existing Sec. Sec.  1910.137 and 
1910.269 and will continue to be the policy of the Agency under this 
final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \194\ It should be noted that the insulating values of two 
insulating materials in series are not additive (Exs. 0041, 0532; 
269-Ex. 60). At least one layer of insulation must be rated for the 
maximum voltage for the exposure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The electrical component of MAD--general. The differences between 
the minimum approach distances under existing Sec.  1910.269 and the 
minimum approach distances under this final rule are the result of 
changes in the way the Agency is calculating the electrical components 
of the minimum approach distances. As described previously, this final 
rule adopts the ergonomic components of the minimum approach distances 
used in existing Sec.  1910.269. In addition, as explained later in 
this section of the preamble, the number of variables (such as 
elevation, maximum transient overvoltage, type of exposure, and type of 
insulating medium) involved in determining the appropriate minimum 
approach distance in any particular set of circumstances makes setting 
minimum approach distances exclusively by means of tables unmanageable. 
This approach would require one set of tables for each potential set of 
variables. Consequently, the final rule requires the employer to 
establish an appropriate minimum approach distance based on equations 
that OSHA is adopting in Table V-2. The final rule also contains a 
table, Table V-5, that specifies alternative minimum approach distances 
for work done at elevations not exceeding 900 meters (3,000 feet) for 
system voltages of 72.5 kilovolts and less. Finally, Appendix B to 
final subpart V contains tables of minimum approach distances, for 
varying maximum transient overvoltages for system voltages above 72.5 
kilovolts, that employers may use for work done at elevations not 
exceeding 900 meters.
    Some rulemaking participants questioned the need for any changes to 
the minimum approach distances in existing Sec.  1910.269. (See, for 
example, Exs. 0227, 0545.1, 0551.1, 0552.1; Tr2. 71.) For instance, Mr. 
Charles Kelly with EEI testified:

    [U]nder Sections 3(8) and 6(b) of the Occupational Safety and 
Health Act, as long interpreted by the Supreme Court, OSHA [is] 
required to show that the change[s] in the clearance distances are, 
as a matter of substantial evidence, reasonably necessary to protect 
employees, and that they would reduce or eliminate a significant 
risk for employees.
    As several people have stated previous to our testimony, we are 
not aware that the existing MAD distances, even though they may have 
been mathematically incorrect for decades, have shown to be unsafe 
in that they have contributed to accidents or placed employees at 
substantial risk of harm. We doubt seriously that a desire to make a 
technical mathematical correction is enough to satisfy this 
requirement. [Tr2. 71-72]

IBEW also maintained that the minimum approach distances in existing 
Sec.  1910.269 are adequate:

    It is important to look at how the use [of] MAD values, 
regardless of the origin and year of publication, have protected 
workers performing tasks in the vicinity of energized power lines. 
The IBEW regularly reviews accidents occurring in the electric 
utility industry. We cannot remember a single accident caused by 
inadequate MAD values. OSHA 1910.269 MAD values have proven to 
protect workers as they were intended to do. The obvious question 
then is why change successful MAD values? Based on industry 
performance, we do not see why changes are necessary. [Ex. 0551.1]


[[Page 20428]]


    As OSHA explained in Section II.D, Significant Risk and Reduction 
in Risk, earlier in this preamble, the Agency need not make hazard-
specific or provision-specific risk findings. In any event, the Agency 
concludes that the electric-shock hazards faced by employees performing 
electric power generation, transmission, and distribution work are 
serious and significant and that the changes to the minimum approach-
distance provisions in this final rule are reasonably necessary and 
appropriate to reduce a significant risk to employees.
    OSHA finds that employees are being injured by the dielectric 
failure of air (that is, sparkover) between them (or a conductive 
object they are handling) and conductive objects at a different 
potential. It is widely recognized that electric current can arc over 
distances and that it is necessary only to come too close to, rather 
than contact, an energized object to sustain an electric shock. In 
fact, some of the accidents in the record occurred when an employee 
brought a conductive object or himself or herself too close to an 
energized part and electric current arced to the object or employee 
(Exs. 0002,\195\ 0003 \196\).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \195\ See, for example, the five accidents described at https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=908012&id=170220602&id=564740&id=14496384&id=14418321.
    \196\ See, for example, the three accidents described at https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=200000453&id=201350485&id=596304.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Agency does not believe that it is necessary to show that the 
specific minimum approach distances in the existing standards have led 
to accidents. Instead, it is only necessary to show that the 
probability of sparkover at the worksite, given the existing minimum 
approach distances, is significant. The sparkover voltage between two 
objects at different potentials is recognized as following a normal 
distribution (Ex. 0532). The withstand voltage for an air gap between 
two objects at different potentials is three standard deviations below 
the statistical mean sparkover voltage. This represents approximately a 
1 in 1,000 probability that the air gap will fail dielectrically and 
spark over.\197\ The withstand distance is the distance between two 
objects corresponding to a given withstand voltage. (In other words, 
the withstand distance is the shortest distance between two objects 
that will spark over at a given voltage approximately one time in 
1,000.) Consensus standards have based the electrical component of the 
minimum approach distance on the withstand distance corresponding to 
the maximum voltage that can occur at the worksite. (See, for example, 
Exs. 0076, 0077, 0532, 0533.) When the electrical component of the 
minimum approach distance is less than the withstand distance for the 
maximum voltage at the worksite, the probability of sparkover is 
greater than 1 in 1,000. OSHA, therefore, concludes that employees are 
at significant risk of injury whenever the electrical component of the 
minimum approach distance is less than the withstand distance for the 
maximum voltage that can occur at the worksite. As explained in detail 
later in this section of the preamble, several of the minimum approach 
distances contained in the existing OSHA standards and in the proposed 
rule represent a significant risk of injury under this criterion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \197\ The probability of sparkover at the withstand voltage is 
0.14 percent or 1.4 in 1,000.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The electrical component of MAD--tools and conductive objects in 
the air gap. The methodology used to develop the proposed minimum 
approach distances, which were based on the 2002 NESC, did not account 
for tools in the air gap. As noted in the 2009 reopening notice, the 
presence of an insulated tool in the air gap reduces the air gap's 
dielectric strength (74 FR 46961). IEEE Std 516-2009 (Ex. 0532) 
generally provides two values for the electrical component of the 
minimum approach distance: One in air (called MAID \198\) and one with 
a tool in the air gap (called MTID \199\). However, that consensus 
standard does not provide minimum tool-insulation distances for either: 
(1) Any exposures (phase-to-ground or phase-to-phase) at voltages of 
72.5 kilovolts or less or (2) phase-to-phase exposures at voltages of 
more than 72.5 kilovolts. In the 2009 reopening notice, the Agency 
requested comments on whether any of the minimum approach distances in 
the final rule should be based on minimum tool-insulation distances 
rather than minimum air-insulation distances. A similar question was 
raised in the 2008 reopening notice.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \198\ MAID is the minimum air-insulation distance.
    \199\ MTID is the minimum tool-insulation distance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Scenario 1--exposures at 72.5 kilovolts and less. Rulemaking 
participants generally opposed basing minimum approach distances for 
voltages of 72.5 kilovolts and less on minimum tool distances. (See, 
for example, Exs. 0543.1, 0545.1, 0548.1, 0550.1; Tr2. 88.) For 
instance, Pike Electric commented, ``Pike utilizes proper rubber 
protective cover-up at . . . voltages [of 72.5 kilovolts and lower]. 
This technique would eliminate the hazard of employee exposure to 
energized lines and equipment, so there is no need to utilize a MAD 
approach using tool insulation distances'' (Ex. 0543.1). EEI and 
Southern Company argued that only one set of minimum approach distances 
is necessary for work on systems operating at voltages of 72.5 
kilovolts and less because, based on IEEE Std 516-2009, minimum tool 
distances and minimum air distances are the same at those voltages 
(Exs. 0545.1, 0548.1). American Electric Power maintained that, for 
voltages at or less than 72.5 kilovolts, MAD has not been based on 
minimum tool distances in the past, so doing so now could potentially 
confuse workers (Ex. 0550.1).
    IEEE Std 516-2009 defines MTID as ``the required undisturbed air 
insulation distance that is needed to prevent a tool flashover at the 
worksite during a system event that results in the maximum anticipated 
TOV'' (Ex. 0532). Although the specified minimum tool distances in IEEE 
Std 516-2009 are the same as the corresponding minimum air-insulation 
distances for voltages of 72.5 kilovolts and less, the consensus 
standard includes the following disclaimer in Section 4.5.2.1: ``The 
MTID for ac and dc line-to-line voltages at and below 72.5 kV has not 
been determined. Industry practices normally use an MTID that is the 
same as or greater than the MAID'' (id.; emphasis added). Thus, IEEE 
Std 516-2009 does not indicate that the minimum air- and tool-
insulation distances are the same, nor does it contain tables with 
minimum tool-insulation distances for voltages of 72.5 kilovolts and 
less. According to IEEE Std 516-2009, electrical testing at higher 
voltages indicates that the dielectric strength of an air gap is lower 
when an insulating tool is present across the gap or when a conductive 
object is present within the gap (id.). OSHA concludes that minimum 
approach distances for voltages of 72.5 kilovolts and less should be 
conservative enough so that the gap will withstand the electric 
potential across it even if a tool bridges the gap or a conductive 
object is present within it. As explained later in this section of the 
preamble, the final rule specifies minimum approach distances that meet 
this criterion. Because the final rule does not adopt separate minimum 
approach distances for exposures with and without tools at 72.5 
kilovolts and less, the concerns about confusion at these voltages are 
unfounded.
    Scenario 2--phase-to-ground exposures at more than 72.5 kilovolts. 
Some commenters maintained that the final rule should follow the 
practice of

[[Page 20429]]

the 2007 NESC and base minimum approach distances for phase-to-ground 
exposures at voltages of 72.6 kilovolts and higher on the minimum tool 
distance. (See, for example, Exs. 0519, 0521, 0528, 0543.1.) For 
instance, Mr. Brian Erga with ESCI commented:

    The MAD for voltages above 72.6 kV should be based on the 
minimum tool distance as published in the 2007 NESC. Live line work 
is conducted with tools, workers and equipment within the electrical 
field of energized lines and equipment[,] and the minimum tool 
distance is correct information to be provided to the industry. [Ex. 
0521]

    Others suggested that the final rule include two sets of minimum 
approach distances for phase-to-ground exposures at voltages exceeding 
72.5 kilovolts: One each for work performed with and without tools in 
the air gap. (See, for example, Exs. 0545.1, 0548.1, 0575.1; Tr2. 88.) 
For instance, Mr. Charles Shaw with Southern Company commented:

    In the proposed rule, OSHA is using minimum air insulation 
distances when a line worker is using a tool in the air gap. 
Allowing the minimum air insulation distance plus an inadvertent 
movement factor to be used as the live-line tool distance is an 
incorrect interpretation of the science behind the IEEE method. At a 
minimum, the note in the [Subpart] V and [Sec.  1910.269] tables 
that states that the referenced distances are for ``live-line tool 
distances'' should be removed since they are not.
    However, we recommend that OSHA include two sets of minimum 
approach distances for phase to ground work on voltages above 72.5 
kV, one for work performed without tools in the air-gap and one for 
work performed with tools in the air gap. These distances should be 
based on MAID and MTID respectively using the method shown in IEEE 
516-2009. [Ex. 0548.1]

    Some commenters suggested that separate sets of air and tool 
minimum approach distances might be necessary for phase-to-ground 
exposures above 72.5 kilovolts because basing minimum approach 
distances solely on minimum tool distances could prevent employees from 
performing activities such as climbing and inspection with lines or 
equipment energized. (See, for example, Ex. 0549.1, 0573.1; Tr2. 54-
55.)
    EEI submitted evidence that approximately 23 percent of the 
insulators installed on transmission systems, and 25 percent of 
insulators installed on systems operating at 345 kilovolts and more, 
would be too short to accommodate the IEEE standard's minimum approach 
distances for tools (Ex. 0575.1). EEI noted that ``there have been no 
reported safety events or flashovers with the current insulator 
lengths'' \200\ and maintained that using MAD for tools would force 
employers to perform routine inspections under deenergized conditions 
(id.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \200\ OSHA is unsure what EEI meant by ``safety event,'' but 
assumes that it means accident or near miss.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Minimum approach distances in the 2007 NESC and IEEE Std 516-2009 
are generally based on a substantial body of electrical tests run on 
air gaps with and without objects in them (Ex. 0532; Tr2. 38).\201\ A 
1968 IEEE Committee Report entitled ``Recommendations for Safety in 
Live Line Maintenance,'' and a 1973 IEEE Committee Report entitled 
``Live-Line Maintenance Methods,'' presented a formula, based on that 
testing, for calculating minimum safe distances for energized power 
line work (Exs. 0556, 0558). This formula, which is given later in this 
section of the preamble, generally provides for a 10-percent increase 
in distance to account for the presence of tools across the air gap. 
\202\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \201\ As noted later in this section of the preamble, the 2012 
NESC distances are identical to corresponding minimum approach 
distances in IEEE Std 516-2009.
    \202\ The equation included a factor, C2, equal to 
``1.1, composed of 1.06 for live-line tool-to-air withstand distance 
ratio plus intangibles'' (Ex. 0556).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    IEEE Std 516-2009, in Section 4.7.9.2, recognizes the effect that a 
large floating object has on minimum approach distances:

    When a large floating object, not at ground or the conductor 
potential, is in the air gap, additional compensation may be needed 
to provide for the size and location of the floating object in the 
air gap. [Ex. 0532]

IEEE Std 516-2009 accounts for this effect by reducing the withstand 
voltage by 10 percent for phase-to-phase exposures on systems operating 
at more than 72.5 kilovolts (id.). This approach effectively increases 
the minimum approach distance by at least 10 percent. Although IEEE Std 
516-2009 applies a floating-object correction factor only to phase-to-
phase exposures, the effect (as noted in the quoted passage) also 
applies to phase-to-ground exposures.
    In light of the comments received and the other information in the 
record, OSHA concludes that, for phase-to-ground exposures at voltages 
of more than 72.5 kilovolts, basing minimum approach distances on 
minimum air-insulation distances will not provide sufficient protection 
for employees when insulated tools or large conductive objects are in 
the air gap. Minimum air-insulation distances are based on testing air 
gaps with only air between the electrodes, which does not account 
adequately for the presence of tools (Ex. 0532). Therefore, the 
provisions adopted in the final rule ensure that minimum air-insulation 
distances are applied only when air alone serves as the insulating 
medium protecting the worker. For phase-to-ground exposures at voltages 
of more than 72.5 kilovolts, Table V-2 requires employers to establish 
minimum approach distances that are based on the minimum air-insulation 
distance ``for phase-to-ground exposures that the employer can 
demonstrate consist only of air across the approach distance.'' 
Otherwise, the minimum approach distances for these exposures must be 
based on the minimum tool-insulation distance.
    Scenario 3--phase-to-phase exposures at more than 72.5 kilovolts. 
The third and final scenario the Agency has to address is the presence 
of tools or other insulation across a phase-to-phase air gap at 
voltages of more than 72.5 kilovolts. Rulemaking participants 
maintained that, for voltages of more than 72.5 kilovolts, minimum 
approach distances based on minimum tool-insulation distances are 
unnecessary because the phase-to-phase air gap is rarely, if ever, 
bridged by an insulated tool. (See, for example, Exs. 0545.1, 0548.1, 
0550.1, 0551.1; Tr2. 89, 157). For instance, Dr. Randy Horton, 
testifying on behalf of EEI, stated:

    [EEI is] unaware of any live-line working scenario situations 
above 72.5 kV where the phase-to-phase air gap is bridged by live-
line tool. Most work practices are developed to work on only one 
phase at a time per structure, phase to ground. [Tr2. 89]

    Thus, the rulemaking record indicates that, for voltages over 72.5 
kilovolts, tools or other objects infrequently, if ever, bridge the gap 
between two phases. Considering how rare the practice of spanning the 
air gap is, OSHA decided against adopting generally applicable minimum 
approach distances that account for tools in the gap for phase-to-phase 
exposures at these voltages. However, there is still a need to account 
for conductive bodies in the air gap in the limited circumstances in 
which they are present, for example, when an employee is moving between 
phases in an aerial lift. Therefore, OSHA is including provisions in 
the final rule ensuring that the phase-to-phase minimum approach 
distance for voltages over 72.5 kilovolts takes account of any objects 
that will be present in the air gap. Table V-2 requires the employer to 
establish minimum approach distances that are based on the minimum air-
insulation distance as long as ``the employer can demonstrate that no 
insulated tool spans

[[Page 20430]]

the gap and that no large conductive object is in the gap.''\203\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \203\ Two variables in the equation for minimum approach 
distances account for tools or large conductive bodies in the air 
gap. The variable C is 0.01 for exposures that the employer can 
demonstrate are with air only between the employee and the energized 
part if the employee is at ground potential or between the employee 
and ground if the employee is at the potential of the energized 
part, or 0.011 otherwise. Because it is rare that tools or large 
conductive bodies are in the air gap between phases, employers 
should not have difficulty making this demonstration for phase-to-
phase exposures. The second variable, the saturation factor, a, is 
calculated differently when an insulated tool spans the gap or a 
large conductive object is in the gap. For phase-to-phase exposures, 
the final rule requires this factor generally to be based on air 
only in the gap.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The electrical component of MAD--maximum transient overvoltages. 
Existing Sec.  1910.269 and OSHA's 2005 proposal specified maximum 
transient overvoltages of 3.0 per unit for voltages up to 362 
kilovolts, 2.4 per unit for voltages in the 550-kilovolt range (500 to 
550 kilovolts, nominal\204\), and 2.0 per unit for voltages in the 800-
kilovolt range (765 to 800 kilovolts, nominal). These are known as 
``industry-accepted values'' of maximum per-unit overvoltage (Ex. 
0532). The IEEE committee and the electric utility industry, as 
evidenced by the 1993 through 2002 NESC and pre-2003 editions of IEEE 
Std 516, believed that these were the highest transient overvoltages 
possible. However, the 2007 NESC and IEEE Std 516-2009 recognize that 
even higher maximum per-unit transient overvoltages can exist (Exs. 
0532, 0533).\205\ Therefore, OSHA requested comments on how, if at all, 
the final rule should address the possibility of higher maximum 
transient overvoltages.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \204\ Table R-7 and Table R-8 in existing Sec.  1910.269 and 
Table V-1 and Table V-2 in existing subpart V list the upper bound 
of this voltage range as 552 kilovolts. Table R-6 in existing Sec.  
1910.269 lists the upper bound of this voltage range as 550 
kilovolts, which is the correct value (Ex. 0532). The final rule 
uses 550 kilovolts as the upper bound of this voltage range.
    \205\ Table 441-2 of the 2007 NESC contains minimum approach 
distances with maximum transient overvoltages higher than the 
industry-accepted values, though the higher values do not apply when 
certain conditions are met (Ex. 0533). Section 4.7.4.3 of IEEE Std 
516-2009 lists the industry-accepted values for maximum transient 
overvoltages. However, it also states that, if certain assumptions 
about the operation of the system are not met, ``the values listed 
in the table may not be valid, and an engineering evaluation should 
be performed to determine [the maximum per-unit transient 
overvoltage]'' (Ex. 0532).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    No rulemaking participants disputed that overvoltages beyond those 
accounted for in the proposed standard were possible. Pike Electric 
recommended that minimum approach distances be calculated for the 
highest possible transient overvoltage (Ex. 0543.1). IBEW suggested 
that, if the higher per-unit overvoltage factors are included, specific 
instructions for using those higher factors also should be included in 
the final rule (Ex. 0551.1; Tr2. 158).
    Electric utility representatives argued that, even though higher 
overvoltages are possible, their industry does not widely recognize 
that higher overvoltages exist. (See, for example, Exs. 0545.1, 0548.1, 
0549.1, 0550.1; Tr2. 90-93.) These rulemaking participants urged OSHA 
to base the final standard on the existing industry-accepted values 
upon which the proposal was based (id.). For example, Southern Company 
stated, ``Although IEEE 516-2003 and IEEE 516-2009 recognize the 
possibility of higher surge values, the concept that such surges exist 
is not widely accepted in the Industry'' (Ex. 0548.1).
    Dr. Randy Horton, testifying on behalf of EEI, explained this 
position as follows:

    Over the years, none of the field-measured over-voltages on 
actual operating systems has produced results which exceed the 
industry accepted T values (transient overvoltage values). The 
documentation of these measurements and of numerous simulations, 
encompassing all current transmission operating voltages, and the 
results have consistently supported the accepted T values. [Tr2. 90]

    However, Dr. Horton acknowledged that one utility (Bonneville Power 
Administration, or BPA) measured overvoltages above 3.0 per unit on one 
of its 230-kilovolt circuits (id.). As he noted, BPA tested that 
circuit in response to sparkovers on rod gaps placed on the circuit to 
protect it from lightning strikes (Tr2. 90-91). Dr. Horton argued that 
the measured overvoltages on that circuit were unrealistic because: (1) 
The gaps on the circuit flashed over at overvoltages less than 3.0 per 
unit during testing; (2) the circuit breaker characteristics and 
performance, including pole-closing spans and breaker current, were 
unrealistic; and (3) monitoring inaccuracies could have occurred, 
leading to measurements that were too high. (See, for example, Exs. 
0546.1, 0575.1; Tr2. 90-92.) EEI recommended adhering to the industry-
accepted overvoltage values. However, it noted that, if OSHA elected to 
account for the values of maximum per-unit overvoltage from the BPA 
measurements, the final rule should just include a footnote similar to 
that contained in IEEE Std 516-2009, noting: ``At 242 kV, it is assumed 
that automatic instantaneous reclosing is disabled. If not, the values 
shown in the table may not be valid, and an engineering evaluation 
should be performed to determine `T' '' (Ex. 0545.1; Tr2. 93).
    In its posthearing submission, EEI offered evidence suggesting that 
the industry-accepted values of maximum per-unit transient overvoltage 
are reasonable (Ex. 0575.1). In this submission, EEI reported results 
of testing on several other systems of varying voltages, none of which 
exceeded the industry-accepted values. EEI explained:

    The field tests were conducted for energization, reclosings and 
with or without shunt reactors. Attempts were made to obtain the 
worst possible overvoltages during the field tests. For all cases, 
listed above, the expected overvoltages, now, would be lower since 
the system has matured and at each bus, the source strength has 
increased considerably. . . .
    The IEEE Transactions Papers on the aforementioned information 
are provided below. Additional IEEE Transactions Papers references 
are attached for switching overvoltage field tests on system voltage 
levels of 220 kV, 345 kV and 500 kV by various power companies, 
including American Electric Power. All papers show that:
     Without breaker closing resistors, the maximum 
switching overvoltages do not exceed 3.0 pu.
     With closing resistor, the maximum switching 
overvoltages are near 2.0 pu. And, with control closings the maximum 
switching overvoltages do not exceed 1.6 pu.
     Calculated overvoltages are generally much higher than 
those by the field measured values . . . [Id.]

    EEI also pointed to an excerpt from International Electrotechnical 
Commission (IEC) Standard 61472 as evidence that higher maximum 
transient overvoltages are possible, but unlikely (id.). This IEC 
excerpt reads as follows:

    B.2.2 Overvoltages under abnormal conditions.
    Among the possible abnormal conditions which can lead to very 
high overvoltages, restrikes between the contacts of circuit 
breakers during opening is considered, and in particular the 
following conditions may be of concern:
    -single or three-phase opening of no load lines;
    -three-phase clearing of line-to-earth fault.
    Such abnormal behaviour may lead to overvoltage amplitudes of 
the same order or even higher than those under three-phase 
reclosing.
    However, the restrike probability of circuit breakers is 
normally low, and is very low for the modern circuit breaker. So the 
low probability of these events is not such as to influence the 
probability distribution of the family considered (opening or fault 
clearing) and thus the relevant Ue2 value. [Id.]

    OSHA understands that the information in the record pertaining to 
maximum transient overvoltages applies basically to voltages over 72.5 
kilovolts.

[[Page 20431]]

IEEE Std 516-2009 does not include separate overvoltage factors for 
voltages of 72.5 kilovolts and less (Ex. 0532). For voltages of 72.5 
kilovolts and less, IEEE Std 516-2009 relies on a maximum transient 
overvoltage of 3.0 per unit and does not recognize the possibility of 
higher values. Section 4.8.1d of IEEE Std 516-2009 states, ``Shunt-
connected devices, such as transformers, and reactors will tend to 
reduce the trapped charge on the line and, therefore, limit the 
overvoltages due to reenergization'' (id.). Such shunt-connected 
devices are not only pervasive on systems of 72.5 kilovolts and less, 
but are a necessary part of the distribution systems that form the 
overwhelmingly predominant portion of these systems (see, for example, 
269-Ex. 8-13). Even for the 45- and 69-kilovolt systems that are 
sometimes used in transmission circuits, there is no evidence in the 
record that maximum transient overvoltages exceed 3.0 per unit. 
Consequently, the final rule adheres to a maximum transient overvoltage 
of 3.0 per unit for systems with a nominal phase-to-phase voltage of 
72.5 kilovolts or less. OSHA calculated the values in Table V-3, which 
are the electrical components of the minimum approach distances, using 
a maximum transient overvoltage of 3.0 per unit.
    For voltages of more than 72.5 kilovolts, no rulemaking participant 
disputed the fact that maximum transient overvoltages based on 
engineering calculations can exceed those on which the proposed rule 
was based. (See, for example, Exs. 0532, 0575.1.) It also is clear that 
maximum transient overvoltages exceeding industry-accepted values are 
possible as IEEE Std 516-2009, IEC Standard 61472, and the BPA report 
show. (id.) The evidence in the record indicates that most systems do 
not, however, exceed the industry-accepted values on which the proposal 
was based. (See, for example, Exs. 0545.1, 0549.1, 0575.1; Tr2. 90-93.) 
This is the major argument relied on by the commenters that urged OSHA 
to base the final rule on industry-accepted values of maximum transient 
overvoltage (id.).
    The Agency considered all of the comments and record evidence on 
this issue and concluded that the arguments against relying on BPA's 
report are not strong enough to justify ignoring it for purposes of 
this final rule. First, EEI argued that, in the BPA scenario, during 
testing the gaps on the circuit flashed over at overvoltages less than 
3.0 per unit (see, for example, Tr2. 91). The magnitude of the 
overvoltage during these gap sparkovers is irrelevant. In one series of 
tests, the measured overvoltages for two of the tests in which three 
gaps arced over were lass than 3.0 per unit. However, measured 
overvoltages on at least one phase exceeded 3.0 per unit during 10 of 
the tests, including both tests involving sparkovers.\206\ For this 
circuit, the testing found overvoltages as high as 3.3 per unit. The 
BPA report explained:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \206\ The measured overvoltages on the phases with gap 
sparkovers were under 3.0 per unit, but the measured overvoltages on 
the phases without gap sparkovers during the same tests exceeded 3.0 
per unit. For example, during test 5-25, the overvoltage on the 
phase with the gap sparkover was 2.83 per unit, and the overvoltage 
on one of the other two phases was 3.30 per unit.

    Rod gap flashovers occurred . . . during the last two tests of 
[one test series]. . . . [S]ignificantly higher overvoltages were 
measured on [the] phases [with flashovers] during other tests in the 
series, but the gaps did not flash over. This demonstrates the 
highly statistical nature of . . . gap flashover . . . . [Ex. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
0575.1]

Thus, that the measured overvoltages for the sparkovers were less than 
3.0 per unit has no bearing on whether overvoltages exceeding 3.0 per 
unit are possible.

    Second, EEI's argument that the circuit breaker characteristics 
were unrealistic are unpersuasive. EEI argued that, because ``[t]he 
field tests were conducted with individual phase breaker pole 
control,'' the pole-closing span \207\ was exceedingly large and 
unrealistic (id.). Although BPA controlled the opening and closing of 
the circuit breakers during testing to ``measure overvoltage levels 
that can occur on a long transmission line during high speed 
reclosing,'' there is no indication in the BPA report that it varied 
the closing spans for the individual poles on the circuit breakers 
(id.). The report states:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \207\ The circuit-breaker pole-closing span is the maximum 
closing time difference between the phases.

    [The relevant test series] involved three-phase reclosing into 
trapped charge on the Big Eddy-Chemewa 230-kV line. Breaker opening 
was controlled and synchronized to generate the same polarity and 
magnitude trapped charge on each phase for each test shot. Testing 
began by switching from the Big Eddy end, varying the closing time 
of the breaker uniformly over a complete 60 Hz cycle by increments 
of 18 electrical degrees (\1/20\ cycle). After these 20 tests, 4 
additional tests were performed in an attempt to generate a maximum 
possible overvoltage. This same procedure was then repeated from the 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chemewa end of the line. [Id.]

Thus, it appears that BPA took measures to synchronize the switching of 
the poles in each circuit breaker. The report mentioned that the 
circuit breaker at the Big Eddy end was ``constructed with each phase 
in its own tank'' (id.). The pole-closing span for this circuit breaker 
was 3.7 milliseconds. The circuit breaker at Chemewa was ``constructed 
with all three contacts in a single tank'' (id.). The pole-closing span 
for this circuit breaker was 0.24 milliseconds, significantly shorter 
than the pole-closing span for the Big Eddy circuit breaker. Measured 
overvoltages exceeded 3.0 per unit during tests with switching 
performed at both locations. Thus, OSHA concludes that pole-closing 
spans did not contribute to measured overvoltages exceeding 3.0 per 
unit during BPA testing. BPA did not indicate that the pole-closing 
span for either circuit breaker was unusual, and EEI did not submit any 
evidence that would demonstrate that circuit breakers of any type of 
construction generally have shorter pole-closing spans. Consequently, 
the Agency concludes that, even if the pole-closing span did contribute 
to the measured overvoltages in BPA's testing, circuit breakers in 
other installations could have similarly long pole-closing spans with 
correspondingly high maximum transient overvoltages.

    Furthermore, although the difference in time taken for each pole to 
close might affect the phase-to-phase overvoltage, that value was not 
measured during the BPA tests. Because pole-closing spans only affect 
the offset between phases and should have no substantial effect on the 
behavior of the transient voltage on a single phase, long pole-closing 
spans should have little effect on phase-to-ground overvoltages (that 
is, the overvoltage on a single phase). As explained later, the report 
clearly states that the main cause of the unexpectedly high maximum 
transient overvoltages was ``prestrike.'' OSHA, therefore, concludes 
that prestrike, not pole-closing spans, were the primary cause of the 
high maximum transient overvoltages.
    EEI, through Dr. Horton, also expressed concern about the 
performance of the circuit breakers in the BPA report, because the 
circuit breaker current showed evidence of prestrikes (Tr2. 91). 
Restrike and prestrike may occur during the opening of circuit 
breakers. The current and voltage across the contacts of a circuit 
breaker vary with time. When the contacts are closed, the voltage 
across them is very close to zero, and the current oscillates at 60 
cycles per second. When the contacts are open, the voltage oscillates, 
and the current is zero. As the contacts of a circuit breaker open or 
close, current can arc across them. When the current drops to zero,

[[Page 20432]]

the arcing stops. However, if the voltage across the contacts from 
reflected traveling waves exceeds the dielectric strength of the gap 
between the contacts, arcing can recur. Arcing that occurs after the 
initial arc is extinguished as the circuit breaker is opening is called 
``restrike.'' Arcing that occurs as the contacts close, but before they 
are touching, is called ``prestrike.''
    Whether a circuit breaker is subject to restrikes or prestrikes is 
dependent on the design of the circuit breaker, maintenance of the 
circuit breaker, and the characteristics of the circuit to which the 
breaker is connected. Prestrikes and restrikes can lead to high 
transient overvoltages that can damage equipment. Therefore, 
manufacturers design circuit breakers to resist restrikes and 
prestrikes. However, the probability that these events will occur can 
be affected by maintenance and circuit design. Poor circuit breaker 
maintenance can lead to longer pole-opening times and can increase the 
probability that prestrike or restrike will occur. Similarly, circuit 
designs can shorten the time in which traveling waves reach the breaker 
contacts, which also can increase the probability of prestrikes or 
restrikes.
    The circuit breakers that were the subject of BPA's testing 
exhibited prestrikes during testing (Ex. 0575.1). Commenting on this, 
Dr. Horton stated:

    The line breaker performance appears suspicious. The breaker 
current shows pre-strikes with abrupt interruptions and subsequent 
re-ignitions [Tr2. 91]

However, the BPA report explained why the prestrikes occurred:

    During Test Series V, it was found that the sending end can 
experience significant overvoltages that were previously assumed to 
occur only out on the line or at the receiving end. During breaker 
prestrike, a current wave (initiated by arcing across the contacts) 
travels down the line to the receiving (open) end where it is 
reflected. As the reflected wave travels back toward the sending end 
of the line, it reduces the current to near zero along the line. 
When the reflected current wave reaches the sending end of the line, 
it creates a current zero and allows the prestrike arc between the 
breaker contacts to extinguish, isolating the line voltage from the 
bus voltage. After the arc extinguishes, the line voltage often 
increases due to traveling voltage waves that continue to be 
reflected from the receiving end. The voltage across the breaker 
then builds up until another prestrike occurs. The next prestrike 
occurs at a lower breaker cross voltage because the breaker contacts 
are closer together. In Test Series V, the majority of breaker 
closings resulted in only a single prestrike. However, in a few 
tests, up to four prestrikes occurred on one phase during a single 
closing operation. [Ex. 0575.1]

BPA found this information useful, explaining:

    This field test has also provided a considerable amount of data 
on 230-kV SF6 breaker prestrikes. Typical characteristics 
of the dielectric strength across the breaker contacts have now been 
developed and can be used for statistical switching surge studies. 
Additional information has also been obtained about another property 
of 230-kV SF6 breakers--where the prestrike arc is 
extinguished by the traveling current wave during line switching. 
The test results show that when the prestrike arc extinguishes, the 
voltage at the sending end of a line reaches values that are much 
higher than were previously expected. [Id.]

    In light of this explanation in the BPA report itself, OSHA 
concludes that the existence of prestrikes does not invalidate the BPA 
report's findings. In fact, the prestrikes were the cause of the 
unexpectedly high maximum transient overvoltages. The Agency 
anticipates that any workplace where prestrikes occur during switching 
operations, particularly during reclosing, can experience similarly 
high maximum transient overvoltages.
    EEI's third and final concern about the BPA report was that 
``inaccuracies in the monitoring system and in the waveform calibration 
[could have resulted] in unrealistic over-voltage readings'' (Tr2. 91). 
However, there is no evidence in either BPA's report or in OSHA's 
rulemaking record that such inaccuracies existed during the BPA tests.
    For the foregoing reasons, OSHA does not accept EEI's criticism of 
the BPA report and finds that it provides substantial evidence of the 
existence of maximum transient overvoltages higher than industry-
accepted values.
    IEEE Std 516-2009 does not account for the possibility of circuit-
breaker restrikes. In Section 4.7.4.3, IEEE Std 516-2009 explains its 
approach for addressing maximum transient overvoltages, as follows:

    (a) At all voltage levels, it is assumed that circuit breakers 
are being used to switch the subject line while live work is being 
performed. This further assumes that the restrike probability of a 
circuit breaker is low and consequently extremely low while a worker 
is near the MAD and that it can, therefore, be ignored in the 
calculation of T. If devices other than circuit breakers are being 
utilized to switch the subject line while live work is being 
performed, then the values listed in the table may not be valid, and 
an engineering evaluation should be performed to determine T.
    (b) At 242 kV, it is assumed that automatic instantaneous 
reclosing is disabled. If not, the values shown in the table may not 
be valid, and an engineering evaluation should be performed to 
determine T. [Ex. 0532]

    OSHA has serious concerns about the validity of the assumptions on 
which this IEEE standard relies to support its general application of 
the industry-accepted values for maximum transient overvoltages. 
Indeed, with all the caveats in these paragraphs of the IEEE standard, 
it is clear that even the drafters of that standard did not believe in 
the universal applicability of its key assumptions. IEEE Std 516-2009 
recognizes that switching can be performed using devices other than 
circuit breakers and recommends an engineering analysis if such devices 
are used. The Agency concludes that the prestrike experience reported 
by BPA demonstrates that the occurrence of prestrikes is likely to be a 
consequence of the design of the circuit breaker and the circuit 
involved, rather than a low probability event for each circuit breaker 
on every circuit. The BPA report explained that the occurrence of 
prestrikes was influenced heavily by the magnitude of the trapped 
charge on the line and the speed of the initial and repeated reflected 
traveling wavefronts (Ex. 0575.1). Because the cause of prestrikes and 
restrikes are the same, the Agency believes that restrikes are 
similarly influenced. In this regard, prestrikes and restrikes are the 
same type of event, with prestrikes occurring during circuit breaker 
opening and restrikes occurring during circuit breaker closing. Thus, 
although the overall probability that circuit breakers in general will 
restrike or prestrike may be low, OSHA concludes that the probability 
that a particular circuit breaker will restrike or prestrike may be 
high enough that it cannot be ignored.
    Additionally, neither the IEEE standard nor Dr. Horton explained 
why the IEEE committee chose to base maximum transient overvoltage on 
the 2-percent statistical switching overvoltage expected at the 
worksite, which is a probability-based assessment, while ignoring the 
probability of restrikes (Ex. 0532).\208\ After all, if the probability 
is low enough, then the potential for restrikes will not have a 
significant effect on the 2-percent statistical switching overvoltage. 
On the other hand, if it is high enough, then the 2-percent statistical 
switching overvoltage will increase.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \208\ Section 4.7.4.2 of IEEE Std 516-2009 reads, in part, ``The 
line-to-ground maximum anticipated per-unit TOV (T) for live work is 
defined as the ratio of the 2% statistical switching overvoltage 
expected at the worksite to the nominal peak line-to-ground voltage 
of the system.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In response to EEI's recommendation to permit employers to use 
industry-accepted values in accordance with IEEE Std 516-2009, OSHA 
concludes

[[Page 20433]]

that this alternative does not adequately account for higher maximum 
transient overvoltages. Section 4.7.4.3b of IEEE Std 516-2009 indicates 
that the industry-accepted values are valid only when reclosing is 
blocked at 242 kilovolts (Ex 0532). Although the BPA testing was 
performed on a 242-kilovolt circuit, there is no evidence in the record 
indicating that maximum transient overvoltages higher than the 
industry-accepted values are limited only to this voltage. In addition, 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
the IEEE standard, in Section E.2 of Appendix E, notes:

    If restriking of the switching device is included [in the 
determination of maximum transient overvoltage], then the resulting 
overvoltages are essentially the same as those of reclosing into a 
trapped charge. The only difference is the probability of 
occurrence. [Id.]

Consequently, even if reclosing is blocked, the maximum transient 
overvoltage may still exceed industry-accepted values.

    OSHA concludes that it is not in the interest of worker safety to 
adopt minimum approach-distance provisions based on the conditions 
expected to be present in the workplaces of most, but not all, 
employers covered by this final rule. Basing the rule on industry-
accepted values of maximum transient overvoltage, as EEI and other 
commenters recommended, would result in some employees not receiving 
adequate protection. In the extreme case, in which the maximum 
transient overvoltage is 3.5 instead of the industry-accepted value of 
3.0, the electrical component of the minimum approach distance would 
sparkover nearly 50 percent of the time, rather than 0.1 percent of the 
time, at the maximum overvoltage. OSHA designed the minimum approach-
distance provisions in this final rule to protect employees from the 
conditions that are present in their specific workplaces. Under the 
final rule, employers must select and adhere to minimum approach 
distances based on the maximum transient overvoltages present at their 
workplaces or base minimum approach distances on the highest maximum 
transient overvoltage.
    EEI and other commenters noted that IEEE recently established a 
working group to examine maximum transient overvoltages and recommended 
that OSHA rely on industry-accepted values for these overvoltages until 
the committee reports its findings. (See, for example, Exs. 0545.1, 
0548.1; Tr2. 92-93.) For instance, Dr. Horton, testifying on behalf of 
EEI, stated:

    In order to address the possibility of higher surge values, the 
General Systems Subcommittee of the IEEE Transmission and 
Distribution Committee has recently created a working group entitled 
``Field Measured Over-Voltages and Their Analysis'' to determine if 
higher surge values actually exist, and if so, what is their upper 
limits. This working group is chaired by myself (Dr. Randy Horton of 
Southern Company) and is co-chaired by Dr. Albert Keri of American 
Electric Power. Numerous experts and utilities from around the world 
are involved in this work, and initial findings of the working group 
will likely be available in the next 3 to 4 years. Until such time, 
it is recommended that the industry accepted values (in other words 
T equal to 3 per unit, 2.4 per unit, and 2.0 per unit, corresponding 
to 362 kV and below, 363 kV to 550 kV, and 551 kV to 800 kV 
respectively) be used as the maximum per unit transient over-voltage 
values. [Tr2. 92-93]

    The Agency concludes that it is not necessary to wait for the 
findings of the new IEEE working group before proceeding with new 
minimum approach-distance provisions. The Agency does not believe that 
it is necessary to delay action on minimum approach distances until the 
IEEE or any other standard-setting organization produces additional 
information on this subject. OSHA believes that there is sufficient 
information in the record, described earlier in this discussion of 
maximum transient overvoltages, to form the basis of a final rule on 
minimum approach distances that accurately accounts for the presence, 
magnitude, and effect of maximum transient overvoltages. The Agency 
concludes that BPA's experience proves the existence of maximum 
transient overvoltages higher than the industry-accepted values; and, 
although the consensus standards do not fully account for potentially 
higher values in their minimum approach distances, the 2007 NESC and 
the 2003 and 2009 editions of IEEE Std 516 recognize the existence of 
such overvoltages (Exs. 0041, 0532, 0533, 0575.1). Consequently, for 
purposes of Table V-6, and Table 7 through Table 14 in Appendix B to 
subpart V, the Agency is adopting maximum per-unit transient 
overvoltages of 3.5 for systems operating at 72.6 to 420 kilovolts, 3.0 
for systems operating at 420.1 to 550.0 kilovolts, and 2.5 for systems 
operating at 550.1 to 800 kilovolts. These values are the same values 
as the highest maximum transient overvoltages recognized in the 2007 
NESC and IEEE Std 516-2009 (Exs. 0532, 0533).
    The electrical component of MAD--calculation methods for voltages 
up to 72.5 kilovolts. OSHA based the minimum approach distances in 
existing Sec.  1910.269 for voltages up to 72.5 kilovolts on ANSI/IEEE 
Std 4 (59 FR 4383). Existing Sec.  1910.269 specifies ``avoid contact'' 
as the minimum approach distance for voltages between 51 and 1,000 
volts. To make the revised standards consistent with the 2002 NESC, 
OSHA proposed in the 2005 proposal to adopt minimum approach distances 
of 0.31 meters (1 foot) for voltages between 301 volts and 750 volts 
and 0.65 meters (2 feet, 2 inches) for voltages between 751 volts and 
15 kilovolts. The proposal specified ``avoid contact'' as the minimum 
approach distance for 51 to 300 volts.
    Two commenters objected to the requirement for employees to ``avoid 
contact'' with lines energized at 50 to 300 volts (Exs. 0169, 0171). 
Mr. Brooke Stauffer with NECA commented, ``The `avoid contact' 
requirement on lines energized at 50 to 300 volts is infeasible for 
line construction and maintenance, because linemen must contact these 
energized lines on a routine basis while doing their work'' (Ex. 0171). 
Quanta Services similarly asserted, ``The `avoid contact' requirement 
on lines energized at 50 to 300 volts presents a problem because 
linemen will contact those lines on a routine basis while doing their 
work'' (Ex. 0169).

[[Page 20434]]

    These comments do not indicate how employees are contacting 
electric conductors and other circuit parts energized up to 300 
volts.\209\ It is well recognized that these voltages are potentially 
lethal. Exhibit 0002 alone describes at least 25 accidents in which 
employees were killed because of contact with circuit parts energized 
at 120 volts to ground.\210\ OSHA believes that, in the past, the 
practice was for power line workers to use leather gloves rather than 
rubber insulating gloves to handle these voltages, and it is possible 
that these commenters are recommending that the standard permit that 
practice. However, leather gloves do not insulate workers from 
energized parts (Ex. 0002).\211\ Perspiration can saturate these gloves 
during use, making them conductive. One of the accidents in the record 
involved an employee handling a 120-volt conductor with leather gloves 
(id.). Therefore, the final rule requires employees to avoid contact 
with circuit parts energized at 50 to 300 volts.\212\ If it is 
necessary for employees to handle exposed parts energized at these 
voltages, they must do so in accordance with final Sec.  
1926.960(c)(1)(iii)(A), (c)(1)(iii)(B), or (c)(1)(iii)(C); and any 
insulating equipment used must meet the electrical protective equipment 
requirements in final Sec.  1926.97.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \209\ In the proposed rule, the lowest voltage in the avoid-
contact range was 51 volts, not 50 volts as indicated by the two 
commenters.
    \210\ See the 25 accidents described at https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=660118&id=817114&id=14307003&id=14311666&id=982645&id=14327944&id=894584&id=14351076&id=14525430&id=201360062&id=601468&id=14251771&id=14251987&id=14257034&id=14371751&id=14523591&id=14383376&id=695437&id=514547&id=170080238&id=14400782&id=14219851&id=764365&id=14505366&id=778332.
    \211\ See, for example, the two accidents described at https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=14371751&id=660118.
    \212\ OSHA proposed 51 volts as the low end of the avoid-contact 
range. The final rule adopts 50 volts as the low end for consistency 
with Table R-6 in existing Sec.  1910.269 and IEEE Std 516-2009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    There were few comments on the minimum approach distances proposed 
in 2005 for voltages of 301 volts to 72.5 kilovolts. Some commenters 
objected to the small changes in minimum approach distances from 
existing Sec.  1910.269 that were specified in the 2005 proposal. (See, 
for example, Exs. 0227, 0543.1.) EEI maintained that the safety benefit 
of slight changes was outweighed by the practical implications of 
implementing revised minimum approach distances:

    For the sake of an inch or two, OSHA ought not to change the 
existing MAD tables. Such changes could require revising every 
safety rule book and training curriculum in the industry, including 
among line contractors, as well as related retraining of line 
workers. The established clearance distances are well-known to 
employees in the transmission and distribution industry, and 
changing them for the sake of an additional inch or two can only 
lead to confusion, with no significant safety benefit. As a 
practical matter, it is not clear that such a small change will make 
a significant difference in the safety of line workers. [Ex. 0227]

    OSHA understands that changing minimum approach distances, even 
slightly, may require employers to adjust their safety rules and 
training. The Agency accounted for the cost of changing these safety 
rules and training because of differences between existing Sec.  
1910.269 and the final rule, including the revised minimum approach 
distances (see Section VI, Final Economic Analysis and Regulatory 
Flexibility Analysis, later in this preamble).
    Ignoring evidence that small increases in the electrical component 
of the minimum approach distances are necessary would result in 
shrinking the ergonomic component of the minimum approach distance, 
thereby making work less safe for employees than if the ergonomic 
component remained constant. As explained previously, OSHA designed 
this final rule to ensure that the ergonomic component of the minimum 
approach distance remains at least 0.31 meters (1 foot) or 0.61 meters 
(2 feet), depending on the voltage.
    OSHA proposed a minimum approach distance of 0.31 meters (1 foot) 
for voltages of 301 through 750 volts. Although there were no comments 
on this minimum approach distance, the Agency is adopting a slightly 
larger distance. In Section 4.7.1.1, IEEE Std 516-2009 explained its 
approach to setting the electrical component of the minimum approach 
distance, as follows:

    For ac and dc line-to-line and line-to-ground work between 300 V 
and 5.0 kV, sufficient test data are not available to calculate the 
MAID,\[213]\ which is less than 2 cm or 0.07 ft. For this voltage 
range, it is assumed that MAID is 0.02 m or 0.07 ft . . . . [Ex. 
0532]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \213\ IEEE Std 516-2009 assumes that MAID and MTID have the same 
value in this voltage range. Using this approach, the electrical 
component of the minimum approach distance would be the same in air 
or along the length of an insulated tool.

Using this approach for voltages of 301 to 750 volts, OSHA added the 
0.31-meter (1-foot) ergonomic component of the minimum approach 
distance to the 0.02-meter (0.07-foot) electrical component, for a 
total minimum approach distance of 0.33 meters (1.07 feet) in the final 
rule.
    As noted earlier, OSHA based the methodology for calculating the 
electrical component of the minimum approach distance for voltages from 
751 volts to 72.5 kilovolts in the 2005 proposal on IEEE Std 4. Table 6 
lists the critical sparkover distances from that standard as listed in 
IEEE Std 516-2009.

             Table 6--Sparkover Distance for Rod-to-Rod Gap
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                       Gap spacing from
        60 Hz Rod-to-rod sparkover (kV peak)            IEEE Std 4-1995
                                                             (cm)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
25..................................................                   2
36..................................................                   3
46..................................................                   4
53..................................................                   5
60..................................................                   6
70..................................................                   8
79..................................................                  10
86..................................................                  12
95..................................................                  14
104.................................................                  16
112.................................................                  18
120.................................................                  20
143.................................................                  25
167.................................................                  30
192.................................................                  35
218.................................................                  40
243.................................................                  45
270.................................................                  50
322.................................................                  60
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: IEEE Std 516-2009 (Ex. 0532).

    To use the table to determine the electrical component of the 
minimum approach distance, the employer would determine the peak phase-
to-ground transient overvoltage and select a gap from the table that 
corresponds to that voltage as a withstand voltage rather than a 
critical sparkover voltage. For voltages between 5 and 72.5 kilovolts, 
the process for using Table 6 to calculate the electrical component of 
the minimum approach distance, starting with the phase-to-phase system 
voltage, was described generally as follows in Draft 9 of the 2009 
revision to IEEE Std 516 (Ex. 0524):
    1. Divide the phase-to-phase voltage by the square root of 3 to 
convert it to a phase-to-ground voltage.
    2. Multiply the phase-to-ground voltage by the square root of 2 to 
convert the rms value of the voltage to the peak phase-to-ground 
voltage.
    3. Multiply the peak phase-to-ground voltage by the maximum per-
unit transient overvoltage, which, for this voltage range, is 3.0, as 
discussed earlier in this section of the preamble. This is the maximum 
phase-to-ground transient overvoltage, which corresponds to the 
withstand voltage for the relevant exposure.\214\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \214\ The withstand voltage is the voltage at which sparkover is 
not likely to occur across a specified distance. It is the voltage 
taken at the 3[sigma] point below the sparkover voltage, assuming 
that the sparkover curve follows a normal distribution.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 20435]]

    4. Divide the maximum phase-to-ground transient overvoltage by 0.85 
to determine the corresponding critical sparkover voltage. (The 
critical sparkover voltage is 3 standard deviations (or 15 percent) 
greater than the withstand voltage.)
    5. Determine the electrical component of the minimum approach 
distance from the table through interpolation.\215\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \215\ Draft 9 of IEEE Std 516 used curve-fitted equations rather 
than interpolation to determine the distance. The two methods result 
in nearly equivalent distances.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    These steps are illustrated in Table 7.

                      Table 7--Calculating the Electrical Component of MAD 751 V to 72.5 kV
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                   Maximum system phase-to-phase voltage (kV)
             Step             ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                        15                   36                   46                 72.5
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Divide by [radic]3........  8.7................  20.8...............  26.6...............  41.9
2. Multiply by [radic]2......  12.2...............  29.4...............  37.6...............  59.2
3. Multiply by 3.0...........  36.7...............  88.2...............  112.7..............  177.6
4. Divide by 0.85............  43.2...............  103.7..............  132.6..............  208.9
5. Interpolate from Table 6..  3+(7.2/10)*1.......  14+(8.7/9)*2.......  20+(12.6/23)*5.....  35+(16.9/26)*5
Electrical component of MAD    3.72...............  15.93..............  22.74..............  38.25
 (cm).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    This method is consistent with the method OSHA used to develop the 
minimum approach distances for voltages of 751 volts to 72.5 kilovolts 
in the 2005 proposal. Although OSHA received no comments on this 
approach, the methodology contained in final IEEE Std 516-2009 added 
one additional step (Ex. 0532). The distances in IEEE Std 4-1995 result 
from 60-Hz impulse rod-to-rod tests. The extra step in IEEE Std 516-
2009 divides the phase-to-ground maximum transient overvoltage by 1.3 
to account for the difference between the strength of an air gap under 
60-hertz voltages and the strength under transient voltages.\216\ The 
IEEE committee relied on two papers that are not in the current OSHA 
record to develop the 1.3 factor.\217\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \216\ A 60-hertz voltage cycles through its maximum, or peak, 
voltage 60 times each second, and the value of the voltage forms a 
sine wave. A transient overvoltage does not cycle, but generally 
increases quickly as a single pulse.
    \217\ These documents are (1) CIGR[Eacute]/SC 33, ``Phase-to-
Phase Insulation Coordination,'' ELECTRA, no. 64, 1979; and (2) 
Esmeraldo, P. C. V., and Fonseca, C. S., ``Evaluation of the Phase-
to-Phase Overvoltage Characteristics due to Switching Surges for 
Application on Risk of Failure Statistical Methods in Non- 
Conventional Power Design,'' Paper 34.01, 6th ISH, New Orleans, 
1989.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    OSHA is not adopting this part of the method that IEEE Std 516-2009 
uses to calculate the electrical components of the minimum approach 
distances for voltages from 751 volts to 72.5 kilovolts. First, the 
Agency does not believe that there is sufficient information in this 
record to support the 1.3 conversion factor, which was not used in 
earlier editions of IEEE Std 516 and was not used in any version of the 
NESC through the 2007 edition.\218\ Second, although OSHA raised this 
issue in its September 2009 reopening notice, no commenters voiced 
support for such a change in the OSHA rule. Finally, as previously 
noted, for voltages of 72.5 kilovolts and lower, IEEE Std 516-2009 
assumes that the electrical component of the minimum approach distance 
is the same with tools in the air gap as it is for air alone. The 
dielectric strength of an air gap is less with a tool in the gap than 
it is when the gap is air, however (see, for example, Exs. 0556, 0558). 
Thus, an increase in the electrical component of the minimum approach 
distance is necessary to account for tools. OSHA does not believe that 
a 60-hertz-to-transient conversion factor (which reduces MAD values) is 
appropriate when no counterbalancing distance is added to account for 
tools in the air gap. For these reasons, the Agency is adopting the 
proposed methodology for determining the electrical component of the 
minimum approach distance for voltages of 751 volts to 72.5 kilovolts. 
As noted earlier, OSHA also is adopting the proposed ergonomic 
component for this voltage range. Thus, the final rule incorporates 
minimum approach distances for these voltages generally as proposed. 
However, Table V-5 in the final rule breaks the proposed voltage range 
of 751 volts to 15 kilovolts into two ranges--751 to 5,000 volts and 
5.1 kilovolts to 15 kilovolts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \218\ The 2012 NESC adopts minimum approach distances from IEEE 
Std 516-2009, which, as noted, uses the 1.3 conversion factor.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For the reasons described earlier under the discussion of the 301- 
to 750-volt range, IEEE Std 516-2009 sets the electrical component of 
the minimum approach distance at 0.02 meters for voltages of 301 to 
5,000 volts.\219\ As can be seen from Table 6, this is the sparkover 
distance for the smallest transient overvoltage listed in the table. 
There is no evidence in the record that lower voltages will produce 
larger sparkover distances. Consequently, there is no reason to believe 
that the electrical component of the minimum approach distance will be 
greater for voltages of 5,000 volts or less. In addition, rounding the 
electrical component of the minimum approach distance to the nearest 25 
millimeters (1.0 inch) results in a minimum distance of 25 millimeters. 
As explained earlier, OSHA concludes that this value is reasonable and, 
therefore, adopts 0.02 meter (1 inch) as the electrical component of 
the minimum approach distance for this voltage range.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \219\ The electrical component of MAD is 0.02 meters (1 inch) 
for all voltages from 301 volts to 5.0 kilovolts. However, the 
ergonomic component of MAD is 0.305 meters (1 foot) for voltages up 
to 750 volts and 0.61 meters for higher voltages as explained 
earlier.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The electrical component of MAD--calculation methods for voltages 
over 72.5 kilovolts. As noted earlier, OSHA based its proposed minimum 
approach distances on criteria adopted by NESC Subcommittee 8 in 1993. 
The NESC based its criteria, at least in part, on IEEE Std 516-1987. As 
noted in Appendix B to proposed Subpart V, OSHA used the following 
equation, which was based on IEEE Std 516-1987, to calculate the 
electrical component of the minimum approach distance for voltages of 
72.6 to 800 kilovolts in the proposed rule:

[[Page 20436]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR11AP14.003

Where:

D = Electrical component of the minimum approach distance in air in 
feet
C = 0.01 to account for correction factors associated with the 
variation of gap sparkover with voltage
a = A factor relating to the saturation of air at voltages \220\ of 
345 kilovolts or higher
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \220\ This voltage is the maximum transient overvoltage.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

pu = Maximum anticipated transient overvoltage, in per unit (p.u.)
Vmax = Maximum rms system line-to-ground voltage in kilovolts--this 
value is the true maximum, that is, the normal highest voltage for 
the range (for example, 10 percent above the nominal voltage).

    Phase-to-ground exposures. For phase-to-ground exposures, 
rulemaking participants agreed that the proposal's methodology for 
calculating minimum approach distances was generally appropriate unless 
insulated tools were present across the air gap. (See, for example, 
Exs. 0521, 0527.1, 0529, 0575.1.) For instance, EEI commented, ``The 
existing MAID formula, based on rod-to-rod gap data, is acceptable for 
all line-to-ground applications [through 800 kilovolts with a maximum 
per-unit overvoltage of 2.44 per unit]'' (Ex. 0527.1).
    Therefore, the final rule requires employers to set minimum 
approach distances based on Equation 1 for phase-to-ground exposures at 
voltages of more than 72.5 kilovolts. Here is the full equation 
contained in Table V-2, with the part that is equivalent to Equation 1 
highlighted:

MAD = 0.3048(C + a)VL-GTA + M

The equation in Table V-2 is identical to Equation 1 except that it: 
(1) Incorporates an altitude correction factor, A, as described later 
in this section of the preamble, (2) converts the result to meters 
through multiplication by 0.3048, and (3) adds the ergonomic component 
of MAD, M to the electrical component of MAD given in Equation 1. In 
addition, the table uses slightly different variable designations: VL-G 
for Vmax and T for pu.
    As explained earlier in this section of the preamble, OSHA decided 
to specify minimum approach distances that account for the presence of 
tools in the air gap unless the employer can demonstrate that there is 
only air between the employee and the energized part or between the 
employee and ground, as appropriate. (The air gap would be between the 
employee and the energized part if the employee is at ground potential, 
or at the potential of another energized part, or between the employee 
and ground if the employee is at the potential of the energized part 
during live-line barehand work.) Consequently, in the equation for 
phase-to-phase system voltages of more than 72.5 kilovolts in Table V-
2, the term C must be adjusted depending on whether the minimum tool-
insulation distance or the minimum air-insulation distance will be used 
as the electrical component of the minimum approach distance. According 
to IEEE Std 516-2009, C is 0.01 for the minimum air-insulation distance 
and 0.011 for the minimum tool-insulation distance. OSHA concludes that 
these values of C are reasonable because they are supported by 
scientific evidence (Exs. 0556, 0558) and because there were no other 
values recommended in the rulemaking record for the proposal. 
Therefore, these values are incorporated in Table V-2 in the final 
rule.
    There is one other minor issue that requires resolution before the 
electrical components of the minimum approach distances for phase-to-
ground exposures can be calculated--that is, the determination of the 
saturation factor, a. The proposed rule and IEEE Std 516-1987, which 
formed the original basis for the calculation of phase-to-ground 
minimum approach distances in existing Sec.  1910.269, relied on Figure 
2 in ``Recommendations for Safety in Live Line Maintenance'' to 
determine the saturation factor (269-Ex. 60; Ex. 0558). That figure 
plotted the saturation factor against crest voltage. In preparing IEEE 
Std 516-2009, the IEEE committee decided to use equations to represent 
the saturation factor rather than reading it from the figure (Ex. 
0532). The committee used a curve-fitting program to develop the 
following equations for the saturation factor for calculating the 
electrical components of the minimum approach distances for phase-to-
ground exposures: \221\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \221\ These equations calculate the saturation factor, a, for 
any exposure for which Equation 1 is used to calculate the 
electrical components of the minimum approach distances. However, as 
explained later in this section of the preamble, the committee chose 
to apply Equation 1 only to phase-to-ground exposures.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 20437]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR11AP14.004

    OSHA concludes that adopting IEEE's method of calculating the 
saturation factor is reasonable because that method will lead to more 
accurate and consistent determinations of minimum approach distances 
for phase-to-ground exposures on system voltages of more than 72.5 
kilovolts than approximating the saturation factor by reading it 
directly from the graph, as was done to calculate the minimum approach 
distances in existing Sec.  1910.269.\223\ Consequently, the Agency is 
adopting these equations for calculating the saturation factor in Table 
V-2 in the final rule for phase-to-ground exposures, except for the 
1,600-kilovolt limitation for the last voltage range. As explained 
later in this section of the preamble, the Agency concluded that 
extrapolating the saturation factor beyond the 1,600-kilovolt maximum 
switching impulse used during the experimental testing used to support 
the IEEE method is reasonable and will better protect employees than 
alternative approaches. For phase-to-ground exposures, this limit would 
have no practical effect as the Agency anticipates that few, if any, 
systems will have maximum phase-to-ground transient overvoltages 
(VPeak) as high as 1,600 kilovolts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \222\ Through an apparent oversight, the IEEE equations for a 
fail to cover 635.0 kilovolts.
    \223\ The quality of the graph is poor, and the underlying data 
is no longer available (Ex. 0532).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Phase-to-phase exposures. For phase-to-phase exposures, OSHA based 
the proposal on the 2002 NESC approach, which used the maximum phase-
to-phase transient overvoltage in Equation 1 for calculating the 
electrical components of minimum approach distances for phase-to-phase 
exposures. As noted in Appendix B to proposed Subpart V, OSHA used the 
following equation to determine the phase-to-phase maximum transient 
overvoltage based on a system's per-unit nominal voltage phase-to-
ground crest:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR11AP14.005

Where:

pup = p.u. phase-to-phase maximum transient overvoltage, and
pug = p.u. phase-to-ground maximum transient overvoltage.

    The value for pup was to be used for pu in Equation (1) for 
calculating the phase-to-phase MADs.
    Until approximately 2007, the technical committees responsible for 
IEEE Std 516 and the NESC calculated minimum approach distances based 
on these equations. Because OSHA was using the same methodology, the 
Agency relied on the technical committees' calculations as they 
appeared in IEEE Std 516-2003 and the 2002 NESC and proposed to include 
those distances in Sec.  1910.269 and subpart V.
    During the revision cycle for IEEE Std 516-2009, the IEEE technical 
committee responsible for revising that standard identified what, in 
the committee's view, was an error in the calculations of phase-to-
phase minimum approach distances for nominal voltages 230 kilovolts and 
higher. At these voltages, the saturation factor, a, which appears in 
Equation (1), varies depending on the voltage; that is, the value of a 
increases with increasing voltage. The NESC subcommittee calculated the 
phase-to-phase minimum approach distances for the 1993 NESC using a 
value for the saturation factor, a, corresponding to the maximum phase-
to-ground transient overvoltage, rather than the maximum phase-to-phase 
transient overvoltage.\224\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \224\ ANSI/IEEE Std 516-1987 did not contain distances for 
phase-to-phase exposures. The NESC subcommittee derived them by 
applying the IEEE equation, Equation (1), to the phase-to-phase 
temporary overvoltages calculated using Equation (2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Because, in its proposal, OSHA borrowed the minimum approach 
distances from IEEE Std 516-2003 and the 2002 NESC, the Agency twice 
solicited comments on whether changes to its rule were necessary in 
light of the

[[Page 20438]]

errors identified by the IEEE committee (73 FR 62942, 74 FR 46958).
    The consensus among rulemaking participants was that the proposed 
rule's minimum approach distances for phase-to-phase exposures at 
maximum transient overvoltages exceeding approximately 630 kilovolts 
involved a mathematical error. (See, for example, Exs. 0521, 0524, 
0526.1, 0528, 548.1; Tr2. 122-123, 139.) Draft 9 of the 2009 revision 
of IEEE Std 516 derived formulas for the saturation factor, a, using a 
curve-fitting program (Ex. 0524). When maximum phase-to-phase transient 
overvoltages are less than 630 kilovolts, a is 0.0, and the 
mathematical error is not present (id.). For higher maximum transient 
overvoltages, a is a function of the peak voltage, which is higher for 
phase-to-phase exposures than it is for phase-to-ground exposures (id.)
    Because the proposed rule used an approach for calculating phase-
to-phase minimum approach distances that commenters generally agreed 
was in error, OSHA decided to make changes in this final rule to 
account for that mistake.
    To determine the increased risk to employees, OSHA compared the 
probability of sparkover for the electrical component of the largest 
proposed minimum approach distance with the probability of sparkover 
for the electrical component of the corrected minimum approach 
distance.\225\ For systems operating at 800 kilovolts, the probability 
of sparkover with the maximum phase-to-phase transient overvoltage at 
the corrected electrical component of the minimum approach distance is 
approximately 1 in 1,000. The probability of sparkover at the proposed 
electrical component of the minimum approach distance is 64 in 100. 
Clearly, the proposed minimum approach distance poses significant risk 
to employees when the phase-to-phase transient overvoltage is at its 
maximum. Because, for systems operating at 800 kilovolts, the minimum 
approach distance in the existing standard is the same as the distance 
in the proposed rule, the existing standard also poses a substantial 
risk to employees.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \225\ The corrected minimum approach distance is the minimum 
approach distance calculated with an extrapolated saturation factor 
for the maximum phase-to-phase transient overvoltage in place of the 
maximum phase-to-ground transient overvoltage. This is the method 
used in IEEE Std 516 Draft 9 (Ex. 0524).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    OSHA calculated the probabilities of sparkover at the proposed 
electrical component of the minimum approach distance and the corrected 
minimum approach distance in the following manner. The minimum approach 
distance proposed in Table V-2 for this exposure was 7.91 meters, and 
the electrical component of this distance was 7.60 meters (7.91 meters 
- 0.31 meters). The phase-to-phase maximum transient overvoltage at 800 
kilovolts is 2,352 kilovolts.\226\ Draft 9 of the 2009 revision of IEEE 
Std 516 derived formulas for the saturation factor, a, using a curve-
fitting program. Equation 59 in that draft standard provided the 
following equation for a for maximum transient overvoltages of more 
than 1,485 kilovolts:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \226\ Using Equation 2, the phase-to-phase maximum per-unit 
transient overvoltage is 2.0 + 1.6, or 3.6, times the peak phase-to-
ground voltage. The peak phase-to-ground voltage is the maximum 
system phase-to-phase voltage times [radic]2 divided by [radic]3. 
Thus, the maximum transient overvoltage for a phase-to-phase 
exposure for a maximum system voltage of 800 kilovolts (the highest 
system voltage) is 3.6 x 800 x [radic]2 / [radic]3, or 2,352, 
kilovolts.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
a = (TOV - 1,485) x 0.00000491 + 0.0055704,

where TOV is the maximum transient overvoltage (Ex. 0524).

    This equation extrapolates a beyond the 1,600-kilovolt upper limit 
on available rod-gap test data. Using this equation to determine a and 
using that value in Equation 1, the withstand voltage corresponding to 
7.60 meters is 1,966 kilovolts. The critical sparkover voltage for a 
7.60-meter gap is 1,966 / 0.85, or 2,312, kilovolts. (See Step 4 in the 
explanation of how to use Table 6 to determine the electrical component 
of clearance earlier in this section of the preamble.) The probability 
of sparkover for this distance at the maximum transient overvoltage of 
2,352 kilovolts is 64 percent.\227\ This percentage means that the 
electrical component of the proposed minimum approach distance at 800 
kilovolts has a probability of 64 percent of sparking over at the 
industry-accepted maximum per-unit transient overvoltage of 2.0.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \227\ The probability of sparkover is determined by normalizing 
the mean (average) sparkover voltage and the standard deviation and 
looking up those two normalized parameters in standard distribution 
tables. The critical sparkover voltage (that is, the mean voltage 
that will spark over) is 2,312 kilovolts. The standard deviation is 
5 percent of this value, or 115.6 kilovolts. The maximum transient 
overvoltage corresponding to the industry-accepted value of 2.0 per 
unit at 800 kilovolts is 2,352 kilovolts, or 0.346 standard 
deviations above the mean voltage at sparkover. The probability of 
sparkover can be determined from normal distribution tables for a Z 
of 0.346.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    There were three basic methods submitted to the record for 
calculating minimum approach distances for phase-to-phase exposures. 
The first method was the one OSHA used in developing the proposed rule. 
As described earlier in this section of the preamble, that method used 
Equation (1) and Equation (2) to determine the minimum approach 
distance, but without adjusting the saturation factor, a, in Equation 
(1) to account for the increase between the phase-to-ground and phase-
to-phase maximum transient overvoltage. For the reasons already 
explained, OSHA concludes that this method is invalid and would expose 
employees to an unreasonable increase in risk for phase-to-phase 
exposures at maximum transient overvoltages higher than 630 kilovolts. 
Consequently, the Agency decided against adopting this method in the 
final rule.
    The second method, adopted by IEEE Std 516-2009, uses equations 
based on the paper by Vaisman,\228\ and two papers by Gallet,\229\ to 
determine minimum approach distances (Ex. 0532). OSHA refers to this 
method as the ``IEEE method'' in the following discussion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \228\ Vaisman, op cit.
    \229\ Gallet, G., Leroy, G., Lacey, R., and Kromer, I., 
``General expression for positive switching impulse strength valid 
up to extra line air gaps,'' IEEE Transaction on Power Apparatus and 
Systems, vol. PAS-94, pp. 1989-1993, Nov./Dec. 1975 (Ex. 0560); and 
Gallet, G., Hutzler, B., and Riu, J-P., ``Analysis of the switching 
impulse strength of phase-to-phase air gaps,'' IEEE Transactions on 
Power Delivery, vol. PAS-97, no. 2, Mar./Apr. 1978 (Ex. 0553).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The formula used in IEEE Std 516-2009 for calculating phase-to-
phase minimum approach distances for voltages of 72.6 kilovolts and 
higher is derived from testing that replicates line configurations 
rather than live-line work. Accordingly, the underlying formula in IEEE 
Std 516-2009 originally was intended for determining appropriate 
conductor spacing rather than for determining minimum approach 
distances appropriate for employees performing live-line work. To 
account for the presence of an employee working in an aerial lift 
bucket within the air gap between the two phase conductors, the IEEE 
committee incorporated the concept of a floating electrode in the air 
gap. The committee's approach to determining the electrical component 
of the minimum approach distance can be summarized as follows:
    1. Start with a formula to calculate the critical sparkover voltage 
for the distance between two conductors.
    2. Modify the formula to account for a 3.3-meter floating electrode 
representing an employee working within an aerial lift bucket between 
the phase conductors.
    3. Modify the formula to convert the critical sparkover voltage to 
a withstand voltage.

[[Page 20439]]

    4. Determine the maximum transient overvoltage on the line, and 
substitute that value for the withstand voltage.
    5. Rearrange the equation to solve for distance.
    In more technical detail, this approach is described as follows:
    1. The equation for calculating the critical sparkover voltage for 
a given distance between two conductors includes a gap factor, k. This 
factor depends on several variables:

alpha = the proportion of the negative switching impulse voltage to the 
total phase-to-phase impulse voltage,
Ddesign L-L = the design phase-to-phase clearance, and
H = the average height of the phase above the ground.
    Table 8 shows the values recommended by IEEE Std 516-2009 for these 
variables and the resultant gap factors.

                                   Table 8--IEEE Std 516-2009 Gap Factors (k)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
               Phase-to-phase voltage                        alpha           Ddesign L-L/H             k
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
<= 242 kV...........................................                0.33                 0.8               1.451
> 242 kV............................................                0.41                 0.8               1.530
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    IEEE Std 516-2009 uses the following equation to calculate the 
critical sparkover voltage for the designed gap between two phase 
conductors:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR11AP14.006

Where:

V50 = the critical sparkover voltage in kilovolts,
k = the gap factor from Table 8, and
Dl-l = the sparkover distance in meters.

    2. When an employee performs live-line barehand work, the employee 
typically is positioned between two or more phase conductors. The 
employee could be working, for example, from an aerial lift platform or 
a conductor cart. These devices and the worker are both conductive. The 
presence of a conductive object in the air gap between the two 
electrodes (which, in this case, are the two conductors) reduces its 
dielectric strength. IEEE Std 516-2009 introduces a constant, 
KF, to account for the presence of the employee and other 
conductive objects in the air gap. In that consensus standard, 
KF equals 0.9 to accommodate a 3.3-meter conductive object 
in the air gap. This value is equivalent to a 10-percent reduction in 
the dielectric strength of the gap.
    With this factor included, the equation for the critical sparkover 
voltage is:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR11AP14.007

    3. IEEE sets the withstand voltage at a level that is 3[sigma] 
lower than the critical sparkover voltage, as indicated in the 
following equation:
VW = (1-3[sigma])V50

Where:

VW = the withstand voltage,
V50 = the critical sparkover voltage, and
[sigma] = 5 percent for a normal distribution.

    4. To solve for the electrical component of the clearance, the 
maximum transient overvoltage is substituted for the withstand voltage. 
The IEEE committee used the following equation to calculate the maximum 
transient overvoltage on the line:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR11AP14.047

Where:

TL-L = the phase-to-phase maximum transient overvoltage in per unit, 
and
TL-G = the phase-to-ground maximum transient overvoltage in per 
unit.

    5. Substituting the values of the various constants and solving 
these equations for distance, IEEE Std 516-2009 uses the following 
equations to calculate the minimum air-insulation distance:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR11AP14.008


[[Page 20440]]


Where:

DL-L = the minimum air-insulation distance (the minimum distance 
needed to prevent sparkover with air alone as the insulating 
medium),
TL-G = the phase-to-ground maximum transient overvoltage in per 
unit, and
VL-L = the rms phase-to-phase system voltage.

    Testifying on behalf of EEI, Dr. Horton explained the IEEE method 
as follows:It is well recognized that the dielectric strength of a 
given electrode geometry is different for line-to-ground surges than 
for line-to-line surges. A phase-to-phase surge between two phases is 
the voltage difference between the phase-to-ground surges which may be 
of opposite polarity and displaced in time, (and many times are) 
whereas a maximum phase-to-ground surge is considered uni-polar.
* * * * *
[The surges from the two phases] are displaced by some amount of 
time. . . .

    The resulting line-to-line surge . . . will stress a given air 
gap geometry differently than either of the line-to-ground surges 
that the resulting waveform is comprised of. Unlike line-to-ground 
insulation characteristics of a given electrode geometry, which 
depend primarily on the gap spacing, line-to-line insulation 
characteristics . . . are more complex because one of the surges has 
a positive polarity with respect to ground while the other has a 
negative polarity with respect to ground.
    The resulting insulation strength is a function of alpha, which 
again, is the ratio of the negative surge to the sum of the negative 
and positive surge.
    The IEEE recently tried to address this limitation [in IEEE Std 
516-2009] by developing a method based on a modified version of the 
Gallet equation. The upper voltage limit of the resulting equation 
is 3500 kV peak or air gap distances of up to 15 meters. This 
limitation is well within the typical range of live-line working 
scenarios in the United States.
    Historically, IEEE Standard 516 has used rod-to-rod electrode 
geometry data for determining line-to-ground MAID. One reason for 
this is that the test data that the method is based on represents a 
rod-to-rod electrode configuration.
    In addition, the line-to ground [testing] that was performed 
showed that the rod-to-rod results were in the middle range for a 
wide range of conductor configurations. The rod-to-rod data 
presented neither the worst case nor the best. Thus, it was chosen 
as a reasonable representation of all the possible gap 
configurations to which a line worker might be exposed while 
performing tasks, which are characterized as line-to-ground.
    When considering line-to-line minimum air insulation distances, 
a rod-to-rod gap may not be the most appropriate. Typically, the 
worker will bond onto one phase and will not need to bridge the gap 
to the other phase. Since the shape of the adjacent electrode 
remains unchanged during the task, (in other words it remains a 
conductor) the resulting air gap geometry more closely resembles 
that of a conductor-to-conductor. The effect of the change in 
geometry of the phase to which the worker is bonded is dealt with in 
the new IEEE method by introducing an additional factor that 
accounts for the effect of large conductive objects floating in the 
air gap. [Tr2. 83-86]

    No rulemaking participant recommended that OSHA adopt the IEEE 
method for calculating minimum air-insulation distances for phase-to-
phase exposures at more than 72.5 kilovolts. In addition, the Agency 
has several concerns with the approach taken in that consensus 
standard. First, the IEEE method relies on test data for an electrode 
configuration that is not comparable to the rod-to-rod gap used for 
phase-to-ground exposures on which OSHA based the minimum approach 
distances in existing Sec.  1910.269. Second, the choices for some of 
the parameters used in the equations for the electrical component of 
the minimum approach distance appear to be arbitrary. Third, the IEEE 
method is based on papers that explore the dielectric strength of 
electric power lines rather than the dielectric strength of circuit 
parts configured as they would be when employees are performing live-
line barehand work.
    (1) Conductor-to-conductor-based method does not accurately model 
employee exposure. OSHA considered the evidence in the record and 
concludes that the IEEE method, which is based on testing on conductor-
to-conductor electrodes, does not accurately model employee exposure. 
As noted by Dr. Horton, the approach taken by existing Sec.  1910.269 
and earlier editions of IEEE Std 516 based the calculation of minimum 
air-insulation distances for both phase-to-ground and phase-to-phase 
exposures on phase-to-ground testing of rod-to-rod electrodes (Tr2. 
85).\230\ By adopting the approach taken in IEEE Std 516-1987 in 
promulgating existing Sec.  1910.269, OSHA deemed it reasonable to rely 
on rod-to-rod gap data (59 FR 4383-4384). The record in this rulemaking 
contains reports of tests on a variety of electrode configurations, 
showing clearly that the dielectric strength of air varies with the 
configuration (269-Ex. 60; Exs. 0553, 0554). In reviewing the record, 
OSHA has again concluded that phase-to-ground rod-to-rod gap test data 
forms a reasonable basis for the determination of minimum approach 
distances because it falls in the middle range of various electrode 
configurations (that is, it is neither the best case nor the worst). In 
addition, OSHA believes that employees performing work on energized 
lines are rarely exposed to the worst-case configuration, rod-to-plane 
electrodes, or to the best-case configuration, sphere-to-sphere 
electrodes. Thus, an exposure representing the middle range of various 
electrode configurations is reasonable for a model based on phase-to-
ground testing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \230\ Typical configurations include rod-rod, rod-plane, and 
conductor-plane. The terminology refers to the configuration of the 
two electrodes. For example, in a rod-plane configuration, one of 
the electrodes is a rod perpendicular to an electrode in the shape 
of a plane.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A paper by Gallet \231\ reports on a variety of phase-to-phase gap 
factors, including supported busbars and asymmetrical geometries, as 
shown in the following table (Ex. 0553):
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \231\ Gallet, G, Hutzler, B., and Riu, J-P., op cit.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
       Electrode geometry             alpha = 0.5        alpha = 0.33
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rings or large, smooth                          1.80                1.70
 electrodes.....................
Crossed conductors..............                1.65                1.53
Rod-rod or conductor-conductor..                1.62                1.52
Supported busbars...............                1.50                1.40
Asymmetrical geometries.........                1.45                1.36
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table reprinted with permission from the Institute for Electrical and
  Electronics Engineers (IEEE). OSHA revised the table from IEEE's
  original.

    Although the performance during phase-to-phase tests are the same 
for rod-to-rod and conductor-to-conductor electrodes, OSHA concludes 
that phase-to-phase exposures are more likely to correspond to 
asymmetrical geometries, which, as can be seen from the table in the 
Gallet paper, have a lower dielectric strength than rod-to-rod or 
conductor-

[[Page 20441]]

to-conductor electrodes.\232\ Employees performing live-line barehand 
work face a wide variety of exposure conditions reflecting a number of 
different electrode configurations. Several of these electrode 
configurations are not equivalent to conductor-to-conductor electrodes. 
Employees working on energized supported busbars could experience 
phase-to-phase exposures. Additionally, during live-line barehand work 
on energized conductors, employees are working on the conductors, and 
the installation may be configured differently when maintained or 
installed. For example, a damaged portion of a bundled conductor may 
protrude from the bundle, or an employee may be holding an armor rod 
perpendicular to the conductor. The equipment used to position the 
employee also can affect the shape of one of the electrodes. The Agency 
believes that these examples may more closely resemble asymmetrical 
geometries. Consequently, the gap factor for those electrode 
configurations, as shown in the table, would be lower than the gap 
factor used in IEEE Std 516-2009. The IEEE standard reduced the gap 
factor by accounting for a conductive object in the gap. However, the 
Agency believes that such a reduction also would be necessary when 
another conductive object is in the air gap while an employee is 
working on an energized conductor, which could occur as equipment is 
transferred to the employee or if a second worker is in the air gap. 
Thus, OSHA concludes that a model based on phase-to-phase testing 
should be based on asymmetrical electrode geometries and that the IEEE 
committee's choice of a conductor-to-conductor gap is not appropriate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \232\ Dielectric strength is proportional to the gap factor. 
Thus, a smaller gap factor yields a lower dielectric strength.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (2) The values of some of the parameters used in the IEEE method 
appear to be arbitrary. The ratio of the negative switching impulse 
voltage to the total phase-to-phase impulse voltage is designated as 
alpha. Dr. Horton described this parameter, and its importance, as 
follows:

    A phase-to-phase surge between two phases is the voltage 
difference between the phase-to-ground surges which may be of 
opposite polarity and displaced in time, (and many times are) 
whereas a maximum phase-to-ground surge is considered uni-polar.
    [Figure 5] shows how two separate phase-to-ground surges combine 
to form a line-to-line surge. . . .
    [W]e have one [transient] for phase 1 and we have . . . one for 
phase 2, and . . . they are displaced by some amount of time. The 
resulting transient overvoltage or surge that would be across the 
air gap, which would be the line-to-line air gap, would be . . . a 
combination of the [two] curve[s]. [Tr2. 83-84]


[[Page 20442]]


[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR11AP14.009

    The IEEE committee used an alpha of 0.33 for system voltages up to 
242 kilovolts. However, the committee used a value of 0.41 for higher 
system voltages. It described the rationale for this latter decision 
with a quote from the Vaisman paper:

    \233\ Figure 5, which is a copy of Figure 4 from Ex. 0545.1, was 
included in the presentation by Dr. Horton at the October 28, 2009, 
public hearing. (See, also, Ex. 0567.) EEI identified the source of 
this figure as EPRI Transmission Line Reference Book: 115-345-kV 
Compact Line Design, 2007 (Blue Book).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In [extra-high voltage] systems, where there is efficient 
overvoltage control and hence the overvoltage factor a tends to lie 
in the range of 0.41 to 0.50, the ratio between the line-to-line 
(D1) and the line-to-ground (D) clearance equal to 2.0 is the one 
which provides a more balanced distribution of flashovers between 
the two gaps. [Ex. 0532]

    OSHA has two concerns about this choice. First, the paper does not 
indicate that an alpha of 0.41 is the smallest expected for these 
systems. A smaller value of alpha will produce a smaller value for the 
gap factor, k, and, consequently, a larger electrical component of the 
minimum approach distance.\234\ Second, it is not clear why efficient 
overvoltage control has any effect on alpha. Overvoltage control limits 
the maximum transient overvoltage on each individual phase, but it does 
not necessarily limit the delay between the peak transient overvoltage 
on each phase, which appears as [Delta]Tcr in Figure 5. The 
Vaisman paper also explored the effect of [Delta]Tcr, which 
is not accounted for in the IEEE method:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \234\ In the IEEE method, the critical sparkover voltage, 
V50, is directly proportional to k, and the minimum air-
insulation distance (the electrical component of the minimum 
approach distance) is inversely proportional to V50. 
Thus, the electrical component of the minimum approach distance is 
inversely proportional to k.

    In other tests, where only the negative wave was displaced, the 
observed reductions were:

[[Page 20443]]



                          Table 2--Reduction in [V50] When Displacing the Negative Wave
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                  [alpha]  Desired                     [alpha]  Obtained   [Delta]Tcr  (ms)     Reduction  (%)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
0.33................................................                0.28                   1                 1.5
0.50................................................                0.43                   1                 3.1
0.33................................................                0.22                   2                 4.0
0.50................................................                0.36                   2                 8.7
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Nevertheless, under these conditions, besides the shift between 
impulses, there was also a decrease of [alpha].
    From all the results a maximum reduction of 8.7% in the value of 
U50 can be observed when the positive and negative components of 
phase-to-phase overvoltage are not synchronized [Ex. 0555].

    From Figure 5, it is clear that the maximum overvoltage occurs when 
the positive and negative transient waves are synchronized, that is, 
when [Delta]Tcr = 0. In addition, it is clear from the BPA 
report that the poles of a circuit breaker do not trip simultaneously 
(Ex. 0575.1). In addition, circuit characteristics also may contribute 
to the size of [Delta]Tcr. The [Delta]Tcr range 
shown in the Vaisman paper does not seem unreasonable. Thus, from this 
paper, on which the IEEE committee relied, it appears that the maximum 
phase-to-phase transient overvoltage should be calculated, as shown by 
Table 2 in the Vaisman paper, by using an alpha of 0.50 and reducing 
the critical sparkover voltage by 8.7 percent. In this case, the peak 
overvoltage on each phase has the same value, which seems reasonable if 
the phases are identical in most respects, but displaced by 2 
milliseconds, which, based on the BPA report, also seems reasonable.
    (3) The IEEE method is based on papers on the design of lines 
rather than employee safety during maintenance. Finally, OSHA has a 
concern that the IEEE method is based almost exclusively on papers that 
explore the dielectric strength of lines. Employees perform work on 
energized lines and equipment. In addition, the lines on which 
employees work during maintenance and repair may not be in the same 
condition as the lines were when they were first installed. The Agency 
believes that it is appropriate to base minimum approach distances for 
workers on papers and scientific data derived from actual working 
conditions.
    The Agency agrees with Dr. Horton and EEI that phase-to-phase 
overvoltages are more complicated than phase-to-ground overvoltages. 
However, the Gallet formula on which the IEEE method is based models 
phase-to-ground, as well as phase-to-phase, critical sparkover 
voltages. In addition, the IEEE committee chose not to use it for 
phase-to-ground exposures, presumably because the papers supporting the 
method for phase-to-ground exposures examined the safety of employees 
performing live-line maintenance.\235\ OSHA believes that these papers 
support the method used in the final rule to calculate minimum approach 
distances for phase-to-phase exposures, as well as phase-to-ground 
exposures. Therefore, for all the foregoing reasons, OSHA concludes 
that the IEEE approach does not reasonably represent the range of 
overvoltages or the dielectric strength of air gaps that a worker will 
encounter during phase-to-phase exposures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \235\ IEEE Std 516-2009 listed three papers that supported the 
method used for phase-to-ground exposures:
    Elek, A., and Simpson, J. W., ``Safe clearance and protection 
against shocks during live-line work,'' AIEE Transaction on Power 
Apparatus and Systems, vol. 80, pt. III, pp. 897-902, Feb. 1962.
    IEEE Committee Report, ``Live-line maintenance methods,'' IEEE 
Transactions on Power Apparatus and Systems, vol. PAS-92, pp. 1642-
1648, Sept./Oct. 1973.
    IEEE Committee Report, ``Recommendations for safety in live-line 
maintenance,'' IEEE Transactions on Power Apparatus and Systems, 
vol. PAS-87, no. 2, pp. 346-352, Feb. 1968.
    All three of these papers examined minimum approach distances 
for live-line work (Ex. 0532).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The third method, described in Drafts 9 and 10 of IEEE Std 516 and 
incorporated in this final rule, uses Equation (3) \236\ to determine 
the maximum per-unit transient overvoltage, calculates the saturation 
factor, a, based on the maximum phase-to-phase transient overvoltage, 
and uses Equation (1) \237\ to determine the minimum approach distance 
(Exs. 0524, 0525). The calculation of the saturation factor uses a 
curve-fitted equation, which extrapolated the value for that factor 
beyond the 1,600-kilovolt limitation on the test data noted earlier. 
OSHA refers to this method as the ``extrapolation method'' in the 
following discussion. In comments responding to the 2008 reopening 
notice, Mr. Brian Erga with ESCI supported the adoption of this method 
because it corrects the calculation error present in the 2003 edition 
of IEEE Std 516 (Ex. 0521).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \236\ TL-L = 1.35TL-G + 0.45. OSHA is 
adopting this equation in Table V-2. Drafts 9 and 10 of IEEE Std 516 
and final IEEE Std 516 adopt this equation for calculating the 
phase-to-phase maximum per-unit transient overvoltage (Exs. 0524, 
0525, and 0532), and there is no evidence in the record to indicate 
that it does not accurately represent the phase-to-phase maximum 
per-unit transient overvoltage.
    \237\ D = (C + a) x pu x Vmax.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Other rulemaking participants objected to the extrapolation of the 
saturation factor. (See, for example, Exs. 0545.1, 0548.1; Tr2. 77-79.) 
These rulemaking participants maintained that there was no test data to 
support extrapolating this factor and argued that other methods of 
estimating the dielectric strength of air demonstrated that 
extrapolating the saturation factor would result in minimum approach 
distances that are ``dangerously inaccurate'' (Ex. 0548.1). The 
Southern Company explained its objections as follows:

    [T]here are at least two methods of estimating the dielectric 
strength of air gaps that show that extrapolating the saturation 
factor, ``a'', beyond the test data [reference omitted] for which it 
was based is not valid. A comparison of the MAID values computed 
using the [extrapolation] formula and those of Gallet and CRIEPI 
[238]  [references omitted] show that extrapolating test 
points beyond the 1650 kV range is dangerously inaccurate. [Id.]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \238\ Central Research Institute of Electric Power Industry.

The Southern Company described how it ``manipulated'' the formulas and 
plotted the results, comparing the extrapolation method with the other 
two methods (the Gallet and CRIEPI formulas), as shown in Figure 6.

[[Page 20444]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR11AP14.010

Southern Company included a second figure (not shown here) consisting 
of the area beyond 1,600 kilovolts, where test data is unavailable to 
support either Equation (1) or the determination of the saturation 
factor, a. The commenter concluded:

    [These figures] show that three methods agree rather closely for 
transient overvoltages less than 1600 kV (the limitation of the 
[Drafts 9 and 10] IEEE method). However, at approximately 1800 kV, 
the results found using the Gallet and CRIEPI formulas diverge 
significantly from the [extrapolation] method. The reason for this 
is primarily due to the fact that the Gallet and CRIEPI formulae are 
based on test data in this voltage range, whereas, the 
[extrapolation] formula is not. [Id.]

    OSHA notes that there is a similar divergence between these 
formulas at voltages from 600 to 750 kilovolts. The following table 
shows minimum air-insulation distances for two voltages \239\ using the 
Equation (1) extrapolation method and Southern Company's modified 
Gallet formula:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \239\ OSHA chose 592.8 and 2,149 kilovolts (which correspond to 
systems of 161 kilovolts at 3.0 per-unit maximum transient 
overvoltage and 800 kilovolts at 2.1 per-unit maximum transient 
overvoltage) because these values generally represent the low and 
high end of the voltage range covered by Figure 6. In addition, 
there is rod-gap test data supporting the current method at 592.8 
kilovolts, but not at 2,149 kilovolts.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                       Equation (1) based on
              Voltage                 extrapolation method \1\     Modified gallet formula    Percent difference
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
592.8 kV..........................  1.28 meters................  1.50 meters................                  17
2149.0 kV.........................  9.23 meters................  10.68 meters...............                  16
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Based on IEEE Standard 516 Draft 9 (Ex. 0524).

    This table shows a substantial difference between the Southern 
Company's modified Gallet formula and the extrapolation method at 
voltages where test data exist. Southern Company's modified Gallet 
formula produces minimum approach distances that are much higher at 
voltage levels where test data exist than they are where test data do 
not exist. Because the modified Gallet formula does not accurately 
produce minimum approach distances where test data exists, there is no 
reason to believe that it will accurately calculate minimum approach 
distances where there is no test data. Therefore, OSHA concludes that 
it cannot rely on the Southern Company's analysis to show that the 
extrapolation method does not provide adequate employee 
protection.\240\ The results of this comparison are not surprising. The 
curves representing these formulas have slightly different shapes. In 
comparison to Equation (1), in which the saturation factor increases 
nearly linearly before and after extrapolation, the Gallet formula 
results in a small increase in the saturation factor at lower voltages, 
but a large increase at higher voltages. Thus, despite the similarity 
in appearance between the two equations, OSHA concludes that, compared 
to the extrapolation method, the modified Gallet formula does not 
equally represent the strength of the air gap.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \240\ The Agency did not compare the modified CRIEPI formula as 
there is no evidence in the record to suggest that OSHA base the 
final rule on that formula.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Further exploration of the modified Gallet and CRIEPI formulas 
sheds additional light on this issue. The Gallet formula uses a gap 
factor as one parameter. Southern Company used a gap factor of 1.3 in 
its comparison. Although the comment stated that Southern Company based 
the gap factor on rod-to-rod electrode configurations,

[[Page 20445]]

there is no record support for this value. The lowest value for the gap 
factor provided in the Gallet paper was 1.36 (Ex. 0553). Had Southern 
Company used a gap factor of 1.33 instead,\241\ the differences between 
the equations would be generally smaller, and the high-voltage 
``difference'' noted by Southern Company would not be apparent until 
approximately 2,100 kilovolts. At system voltages higher than 242 
kilovolts, IEEE Std 516-2009 uses a gap factor equivalent to 1.377, 
which results in smaller rather than larger minimum air-insulation 
distances at voltages between approximately 800 and 2,200 kilovolts 
(Ex. 0532). Therefore, the Agency is rejecting Southern Company's 
argument that the modified Gallet and CREIPI formulas show that the 
extrapolation method is not sufficiently protective.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \241\ With no record support for a gap factor of 1.3, it appears 
that Southern Company chose the gap factor arbitrarily. In this 
example, OSHA has chosen an equally arbitrary gap factor simply to 
show how the curves can be manipulated.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The concern about the lack of test data appears to be unfounded, at 
least for the range of overvoltages addressed by the final rule. The 
largest overvoltage addressed by the final rule is approximately 2,500 
kilovolts, which corresponds to an 800-kilovolt system with a phase-to-
ground maximum per-unit transient overvoltage of 2.5 pu. The test data 
for rod-to-rod gaps extends to 1,600 kilovolts. Thus, the data cover 
about two thirds of the voltage range covered by the final rule, and 
the test data provide substantial support for maximum transient 
overvoltages of 1,600 kilovolts (which corresponds to an 800-kilovolt 
system with a 1.5 per-unit maximum transient overvoltage) regardless of 
whether the exposure is phase-to-phase or phase-to-ground. In addition, 
the saturation factor varies almost linearly with voltage, as can be 
seen from the table and graphs of voltage vs. saturation factor in the 
IEEE reports on which Equation (1) is based (Exs. 0556, 0558). Figure 7 
reproduces the relevant graphs in those papers.\242\ Thus, an 
extrapolation of the saturation factor likely will produce reasonable 
results.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \242\ This graph is Figure 1 in Ex. 0556 and Figure 2 in Ex. 
0558.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

BILLING CODE 4510-26-P

[[Page 20446]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR11AP14.011

BILLING CODE 4510-26-C
    In addition, as noted earlier, the Gallet and CRIEPI formulas, the 
other two formulas described by Southern Company for determining 
sparkover voltages, have a similar shape. (See Figure 6.) The 
extrapolation method might not be as conservative at the highest 
voltages as the Gallet and CRIEPI formulas. However, because the 
modified Gallet and CREIPI formulas rely on a gap factor that is 
unsupported on the record, and because the gap factor adopted in IEEE 
Std 516-2009 yields minimum approach distances that are less 
conservative than the extrapolation method, the Agency believes that 
the extrapolation method will provide adequate protection for workers. 
For these reasons, OSHA concludes that it is reasonable to extrapolate 
the test data to determine minimum approach distances. Consequently, 
the final rule adopts the extrapolation method of determining minimum 
approach distances by providing equations for calculating the 
saturation factor, a, as described in the following paragraphs.
    Drafts 9 and 10 of the 2009 revision of IEEE Std 516, as well as 
the approved edition of that standard, provided linear equations for 
the saturation factor. These equations varied depending on the voltage 
range (Exs. 0524, 0525, 0532). IEEE Std 516-2009 limits the

[[Page 20447]]

equation for the highest range to transient overvoltages of 1,600 
kilovolts (Ex. 0532).\243\ Drafts 9 and 10 of the 2009 revision of that 
IEEE standard extrapolated the saturation factor by applying the 
equation for the highest voltage range without limit (Exs. 0524, 0525). 
OSHA notes that Drafts 9 and 10 of IEEE Std 516 used slightly different 
equations for the calculation of the saturation factor than does IEEE 
Std 516-2009 (Exs. 0524, 0525, 0532). The Agency compared the results 
of the two sets of equations with the data from the original IEEE 
reports on which Equation (1) is based and determined that the 
equations from IEEE Std 516-2009 fit the data precisely. However, IEEE 
Std 516-2009 notes:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \243\ It should be noted that, despite the 1,600-kilovolt 
limitation, IEEE Std 516-2009 apparently applies this equation to 
1,633 kilovolts (the maximum transient overvoltage on an 800-
kilovolt system with a 2.5 per-unit maximum transient overvoltage) 
in the minimum approach distance tables in Appendix D of that 
standard.

    [T]here is a different value of the ``a'' [saturation] factor 
for same voltage used to calculate MAID and MTID. To avoid having 
values of the ``a'' factors for MAID and MTID, the working group 
decided to use only the MTID ``a'' factor since it matches the 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
values of the ``a'' factor shown on the figure. [Ex. 0532]

Thus, the IEEE standard bases the saturation factor on the withstand 
voltages with tools in the gap. OSHA believes that this approach is 
appropriate for phase-to-ground exposures. However, for phase-to-phase 
exposures, which almost never involve tools across the gap, the Agency 
believes that this approach is unnecessarily conservative. Draft 9 of 
the IEEE standard uses equations for the saturation factor based on 
test data for air gaps without tools. Therefore, the final rule bases 
the saturation factor on: (1) The equations from IEEE Std 516-2009 for 
phase-to-ground exposures and (2) the equations in Draft 9 of that 
standard for phase-to-phase exposures. Therefore, Table V-2 applies the 
equations for the saturation factor, a, from IEEE Std 516-2009 to 
phase-to-ground exposures, while using the equations for this factor 
from Draft 9 of that standard for phase-to-phase exposures. To 
extrapolate the saturation factor to the highest voltage addressed by 
the final rule, OSHA is extending the application limit of Equation 59 
from IEEE Std 516-2009. The Agency based these equations on the 
assumption that no insulated tool or large conductive object are in the 
gap. Note 3 to Table V-2 indicates that, if an insulated tool spans the 
gap or if a large conductive object is in the gap, employers are to use 
the equations for phase-to-ground exposures (with VPeak for phase-to-
phase exposures).
    Circuits operating at 362.1 to 420 kilovolts. In the 2009 reopening 
notice, OSHA noted that IEEE Std 516-2009 included an additional 
voltage range, 362.1 to 420 kilovolts, in its minimum approach distance 
tables; this range did not appear in OSHA's proposed rule (74 FR 
46962). The Agency requested comments on whether it should add this 
voltage range to the minimum approach tables in the final rule. 
Rulemaking participants recommended adding this voltage range to the 
OSHA standard, though no electric utilities responding to the issue 
operated any system in this voltage range. (See, for example, Exs. 
0545.1, 0548.1, 0551.1; Tr2. 93, 159.) Dr. Randy Horton, testifying on 
behalf of EEI, stated:

    OSHA should include these voltage ranges in the final [r]ule in 
order to provide complete guidance to the industry. However, there 
are not many lines that operate at these voltages within the 
American electric utility industry. [Tr2. 93]

    Although it appears that there are few, if any, electric power 
transmission systems in the United States operating at 362.1 to 420 
kilovolts, OSHA is including this voltage range in the final standard. 
Otherwise, an employer with a system operating in this voltage range 
would have to set minimum approach distances based on a maximum system 
voltage of 550 kilovolts, the highest voltage in the next higher 
voltage range listed in Table V-6. Even if systems operating in the 
362.1- to 420-kilovolt range are extremely rare, OSHA is not requiring 
employers to adhere to minimum approach distances that are 
substantially higher than necessary to protect employees doing work at 
those voltages. Therefore, OSHA decided to include the 362.1- to 420-
kilovolt range in Table V-6 in the final rule, which specifies 
alternative minimum approach distances for worksites at an elevation of 
900 meters or less. Employers not using that table can establish 
minimum approach distances for any particular voltage, including 
voltages in the 362.1- to 420-kilovolt range, using the equations in 
Table V-2 for the maximum voltage on the particular circuit involved.
    The electrical component of MAD--DC exposures. OSHA proposed 
minimum approach distances for dc circuits in Table V-5. OSHA received 
no comments on these minimum approach distances and, therefore, is 
adopting them in Table V-7 of the final rule as proposed.
    OSHA's requirements on minimum approach distances better effectuate 
the purpose of the OSH Act than the national consensus standard. 
Whenever a final rule differs substantially from an existing national 
consensus standard, Section 6(b)(8) of the OSH Act requires OSHA to 
publish a statement of reasons in the Federal Register explaining why 
the final rule will better effectuate the purposes of the Act than the 
national consensus standard. This final rule contains requirements for 
minimum approach distances that differ substantially from those in the 
2012 NESC, which the Agency determined is the current, relevant 
national consensus standard.
    Paragraph (g) of Sec.  1910.2 defines ``national consensus 
standard''. There are currently two existing consensus standards 
addressing minimum approach distances for electric power generation, 
transmission, and distribution work: ANSI/IEEE C2-2012 and IEEE Std 
516-2009. The 2012 NESC, which also is an IEEE standard, was approved 
as an ANSI standard on June 3, 2011.\244\ IEEE Std 516-2009 is not 
currently an ANSI standard, although the 2003 edition was an ANSI 
standard.\245\ Many States adopt the NESC (Tr2. 151).\246\ Mr. Charles 
Kelly of EEI called the NESC ``the preeminent National Consensus 
Standard on clearance distances for electric utility work on high 
voltage lines and equipment'' (Tr2. 73). Mr. James Tomaseski, 
testifying on behalf of the NESC, called that document ``the authority 
on safety requirements for power . . . systems'' (Tr2. 35). In 
contrast, rulemaking participants characterized IEEE Std 516 as ``an 
engineering document'' containing engineering principles and guidelines

[[Page 20448]]

(Tr2. 56; see also, for example, Tr2. 59, 74, 129-130, 174). However, 
the NESC takes those engineering principles and produces work rules, 
taking into account the practical effects of the requirements. (See, 
for example, Tr2. 57, 73, 175-176.) OSHA, therefore, concludes that the 
2012 NESC is the existing national consensus standard for the purposes 
of Section 6(b)(8).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \244\ IEEE is the secretariat of the National Electrical Safety 
Code, which IEEE adopted and which ANSI approved subsequently as a 
standard. The official designation of the current version of the 
National Electrical Safety Code is ANSI/IEEE C2-2012. Standards 
approved as ANSI standards are American National Standards. In 
addition, the ANSI approval process ensures that procedures used to 
adopt standards conform to the procedures described in the 
definition of ``national consensus standard'' in 29 CFR 1910.2(g). 
See, for example, OSHA's adoption of national consensus standards 
and established Federal standards under Section 6(a) of the OSH Act 
(36 FR 10466, May 29, 1971).
    \245\ IEEE standards frequently undergo the ANSI approval 
process. After becoming an approved American National Standard, an 
IEEE standard shares a joint ANSI/IEEE designation.
    \246\ According to a survey conducted by IEEE, over 20 States 
adopted the 2007 edition of the NESC, and several other States 
adopted other editions of the NESC (https://standards.ieee.org/about/nesc/pucsurvey2007.pdf). The States generally enforce public safety 
provisions of the NESC through public utility commissions. OSHA is 
not aware of any States that adopted the updated consensus standard 
since its most recent publication. OSHA anticipates that States will 
adopt this edition of the NESC when they update their regulations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The 2012 NESC sets its basic ac minimum approach distances in Table 
441-1. This table divides minimum approach distances into two sets of 
distances: one for voltages up to 72.5 kilovolts and the other for 
voltages of 72.6 to 800 kilovolts. The minimum approach distances 
applying to voltages of 72.5 kilovolts and less are the same for work 
with and without tools between the employee and the energized part. The 
minimum approach distances applying to voltages of 72.6 to 800 
kilovolts vary depending on whether a tool spans the distance between 
the employee and the energized part. The distances in Table 441-1 are 
identical to the minimum approach distances in IEEE Std 516-2009 for 
industry-accepted values of maximum transient overvoltage, and the NESC 
limits the application of Table 441-1 to situations in which IEEE Std 
516-2009 declares that industry-accepted values of maximum transient 
overvoltage are valid, as described earlier in this section of the 
preamble.
    Table 441-1 in the 2012 NESC does not specify distances for phase-
to-phase exposures with tools or large conductive objects between the 
employee and the energized part. In addition, the table applies only to 
worksites at an elevation below 900 meters (3,000 feet). For higher 
elevations, the 2012 NESC requires the employer to calculate minimum 
approach distances using a formula equivalent to that in IEEE Std 516-
2009.
    The 2012 NESC requires the employer to make an engineering analysis 
to determine the minimum approach distance in two situations: (1) If 
the employer uses phase-to-phase live line tools between the employee 
and the energized part (Table 441-1, Note 8), and (2) if the employer 
chooses to use an engineering analysis in lieu of using Table 441-1 
(Rule 441A1). A note in the 2012 NESC reads: ``IEEE Std 516-2009 
contains information that may be used to perform an engineering 
analysis to determine minimum approach distances.''
    The 2012 NESC bases its minimum approach distances on IEEE Std 516-
2009; and, as explained previously, the Agency concluded that the 
minimum approach distances in IEEE Std 516-2009 expose employees to 
additional risk of injury for various exposures. The IEEE standard sets 
minimum approach distances for exposures at voltages of 72.5 kilovolts 
and less that do not take account of tools or conductive objects in the 
air gap. Consequently, OSHA determined that, for these voltages, the 
IEEE method for calculating minimum approach distances, on which the 
2012 NESC bases its minimum approach distances, does not protect 
employees as well as the method for calculating minimum approach 
distances specified in the final rule. The final rule ensures adequate 
employee protection, even when tools or conductive objects are present 
in the air gap. In addition, for phase-to-phase exposures at voltages 
of more than 72.5 kilovolts, the Agency found that the method for 
calculating minimum approach distances in IEEE Std 516-2009, on which 
the 2012 NESC bases its minimum approach distances, does not use gap 
factors that adequately represent the full range of employee exposures. 
Furthermore, the 2012 NESC permits employers to use the industry-
accepted values for the maximum per-unit transient overvoltage without 
ensuring that the maximum transient overvoltages at the worksite cannot 
exceed those values. Although the 2012 NESC limits the use of the 
industry-accepted values in some situations, the limitation does not 
appear to apply to circuits such as the BPA circuit that exhibited 
higher maximum per-unit transient overvoltages. Thus, OSHA concludes 
that the 2012 NESC is not as effective as the final rule in protecting 
employees against high maximum transient overvoltages. Because the 
minimum approach distances contained in the final rule will better 
protect employees than the distances specified in the NESC, the Agency 
also concludes that the final rule will better effectuate the purposes 
of the OSH Act than the NESC. Therefore, the Agency concludes that the 
minimum approach distances required by the final rule, which account 
for actual workplace conditions, will better protect employees than the 
IEEE distances for these exposures.

    Impacts of changes in minimum approach distances. The final rule 
at Sec.  1926.950(d)(2), as well as Sec.  1926.960(c)(1)(ii) and 
Table V-2, requires employers to determine the maximum per-unit 
transient overvoltage for the systems on which employees will be 
working. Existing Sec.  1910.269(a)(3) already contains a comparable 
provision, requiring employers to determine existing conditions 
related to the safety of the work to be performed, including maximum 
switching transient voltages.

    The maximum per-unit transient overvoltages addressed by the 
existing standard are the industry-accepted values of 3.0 for voltages 
up to 362 kilovolts, 2.4 for 552 kilovolts, and 2.0 for 800 kilovolts. 
OSHA believes that, under the existing rule, most employers simply 
assume these maximum per-unit transient overvoltages and set minimum 
approach distances accordingly. As explained earlier, this final rule 
raises the highest maximum transient overvoltages to 3.5 for up to 420 
kilovolts, 3.0 for 550 kilovolts, and 2.5 for 800 kilovolts. OSHA 
believes that some systems will accommodate the larger minimum approach 
distances that will result from using these new, default values. Not 
all systems will accommodate such changes, however. (See, for example, 
Exs. 0573.1, 0575.1, 0577.1.) For phase-to-ground exposures, the 
minimum approach distance could be as much as 2.35 meters (7.67 feet) 
greater under the final rule than under Table R-6 in existing Sec.  
1910.269. The existing minimum approach distance is 4.53 meters (14.9 
feet) for phase-to-ground exposures on an 800-kilovolt system. The 
final rule sets 6.88 meters (22.57 feet) as the largest minimum 
approach distance for this voltage. (This increase is due to the use of 
minimum tool distances, as well as the higher default maximum per-unit 
transient overvoltage.) Consequently, OSHA believes that employers with 
installations that will not accommodate these larger minimum approach 
distances will either determine through engineering analysis or 
establish through the use of portable protective gaps \247\ precise 
maximum per-unit transient overvoltages on these installations so that 
the installations will accommodate the required minimum approach 
distances.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \247\ A portable protective gap is a device installed on a phase 
conductor to provide a known withstand voltage. The gap is designed 
to spark over at a low enough transient overvoltage to prevent 
sparkover at the (reduced) electrical component of the minimum 
approach distance at the work location (Ex. 0532).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For the systems that exhibit transient overvoltages that will not 
accommodate the resultant minimum approach distances, OSHA concludes 
that it is feasible for employers to either control the maximum 
transient overvoltages, through the implementation of such measures as 
portable protective gaps, circuit alterations, or operational controls 
(including blocking reclosing and restricting circuit switching), or 
deenergize the circuit to perform the work. (See, for example, Exs. 
0532, 0548.1; Tr2. 114-115.)

[[Page 20449]]

    The final economic analysis, in Section VI, Final Economic Analysis 
and Regulatory Flexibility Analysis, later in this preamble, assumes 
that electric utilities with circuits operating at 230 kilovolts or 
more (including all circuits in the 169.1- to 242.0-kilovolt voltage 
range \248\) will be affected by increases in minimum approach 
distances at those voltages. Therefore, the Agency estimates that 10 
percent of the circuits operating at 230 kilovolts or more will require 
additional measures, such as installing portable protective gaps, that 
permit employers to adopt minimum approach distances that their 
circuits can accommodate.\249\ However, OSHA is not including any costs 
for retrofitting or redesigning circuits or equipment for this purpose. 
The Agency believes that such measures will be rare and undertaken only 
when they are less costly than the alternatives or when necessitated 
for reasons unrelated to requirements in the final rule. OSHA did not 
include cost estimates for taking outages because the Agency concludes 
that only rarely will other, less costly, measures be impractical.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \248\ As seen from Table R-6 in existing Sec.  1910.269 and 
Table V-1 in existing Sec.  1926.950, existing electric power 
circuits operate at 161 to 169 kilovolts and at 230 to 242 
kilovolts. OSHA broadened the ranges in the corresponding tables in 
the final rule in the unlikely event that electric utilities design 
and install circuits operating at voltage between the listed voltage 
ranges.
    \249\ The final economic analysis estimates that 10 percent of 
the ``projects'' (as that term is used in Section VI, Final Economic 
Analysis and Regulatory Flexibility Analysis, later in this 
preamble) performed by employers with circuits operating at 230 
kilovolts or more will involve installing portable protective gaps 
based on the assumption that projects are distributed 
proportionately across affected and unaffected circuits. 
Consequently, if 10 percent of the circuits operating at voltages of 
230 kilovolts or more require ``additional measures, such as 
installing portable protective gaps,'' then 10 percent of the 
projects on those circuits will require such measures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Several rulemaking participants maintained that adopting minimum 
approach distances greater than the distances in existing Sec.  
1910.269 would have a substantial effect on how employees perform 
energized line work and possibly on whether they could perform it at 
all. (See, for example, Exs. 0545.1, 0549.1, 0550.1, 0573.1, 0575.1; 
Tr2. 53-55, 96-98.) Some of these comments related to climbing 
structures, with the commenters claiming that employees would be 
precluded from climbing some structures if the final rule substantially 
increased minimum approach distances. (See, for example, Exs. 0549.1, 
0573.1; Tr2. 54-55, 166.) For instance, Consolidated Edison reported 
that larger minimum approach distances could prevent workers from 
climbing towers on several of its lines and noted that clearances vary 
from tower to tower (Ex. 0549.1). Consolidated Edison also maintained 
that larger minimum approach distances might prohibit it from 
positioning an employee on the tower with a live-line tool to perform 
tasks such as installing cotter keys or removing debris (id.). EEI 
argued that, if minimum approach distances exceeded the length of line 
insulators, employees would not be permitted to use existing live-line 
maintenance equipment without changing their work methods (Ex. 0545.1; 
Tr2. 114-115). EEI and Consolidated Edison, among others, maintained 
that larger minimum approach distances could increase the number of 
outages. (See, for example, Exs. 0545.1, 0549.1.)
    For each of the examples the commenters provided of situations in 
which higher minimum approach distances might be problematic, the 
worker would be at ground potential while located on a tower or other 
structure. Thus, these comments relate solely to phase-to-ground 
exposures. For these exposures, the final rule increases minimum 
approach distances substantially under two conditions: (1) When the 
maximum per-unit transient overvoltage exceeds the default maximums 
under the existing standards,\250\ or (2) when insulating tools or 
conductive objects are present in the air gap. In each case, the 
employer can implement measures, such as using a portable protective 
gap, to reduce the maximum per-unit transient overvoltage and, 
consequently, the minimum approach distance. (See Appendix B to final 
Subpart V for a discussion of the use of a portable protective gap to 
reduce the required minimum approach distance. Appendix B to existing 
Sec.  1910.269 recognizes this method of reducing the required minimum 
approach distance.) In addition, when the employer can demonstrate that 
there will be only air between the employee and the energized part, 
which should normally be the case during climbing or inspection 
procedures, Table V-2 permits the employer to determine minimum 
approach distances using the equation based on minimum air-insulation 
distances, which will produce smaller minimum approach distances than 
the equation based on minimum tool-insulation distance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \250\ The maximum per-unit transient overvoltages under existing 
Sec.  1910.269 are 3.0 for voltages up to 362 kilovolts, 2.4 for 552 
kilovolts, and 2.0 for 800 kilovolts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some rulemaking participants maintained that revised minimum 
approach distances would result in costs related to the purchase of new 
tools, revision of training programs, and retraining of employees. 
(See, for example, Exs. 0545.1, 0548.1, 0550.1, 0551.1; Tr2. 94-95.) 
For instance, American Electric Power commented:

    The potential [cost impact] could be significant, especially 
when considering the proposed changes and resulting implications on 
the design standards. It is sufficient to state that changes in 
minimum approach distances, that exceed the length of standard line 
insulation, could require the re-tooling of live line maintenance 
equipment (placing some live line maintenance currently done on hold 
until new tooling is available); the development of new work methods 
and the training/re-education that could be required; and could 
impact current design standards (that are relatively common across 
the industry). In some cases, on [extra-high-voltage] lines, it is 
not possible to state that new tooling and procedures can be 
established until maintenance experts have had adequate time to 
fully evaluate the situation. [Ex. 0550.1]

    OSHA included the costs of training employees in the requirements 
of the standard, including the minimum approach-distance requirements, 
in the economic analysis conducted for the proposed rule. (See 70 FR 
34905-34910.) The proposal included revised minimum approach distances 
that were in some cases greater than the distances specified in 
existing Sec.  1910.269. OSHA's estimates for the proposed rule already 
accounted for the costs associated with training employees in the 
revised minimum approach distances, including any necessary changes in 
procedures. Therefore, the Agency concludes that it is not necessary to 
increase those cost estimates as a result of the changes made to the 
minimum approach-distance provisions between the proposed and final 
rules.\251\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \251\ OSHA addressed the cost of retrofitting or redesigning 
circuits or equipment earlier in this discussion. OSHA's conclusion 
regarding these costs apply equally to American Electric Power's 
comment regarding the need to purchase new live-line maintenance 
equipment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Table 9 shows the differences between the default minimum approach 
distances in existing Sec.  1910.269 and the final rule for phase-to-
ground and phase-to-phase exposures on circuits operating between 72.6 
kilovolts and 169.0 kilovolts. This table compares the minimum approach 
distances in Table R-6 in existing Sec.  1910.269 with the largest 
minimum approach distances in Table 7 through Table 9 in Appendix B to 
final Subpart V. The distances in the tables in the appendix assume 
that an insulated tool spans the gap (or that a

[[Page 20450]]

large conductive object is in the gap) for phase-to-ground exposures.


  Table 9--Increases in Minimum Approach Distances for Phase-to-Ground
       Exposures From Existing Sec.   1910.269 to Final Subpart V
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                    Phase-to-ground     Phase-to-phase
           Voltage kV               increase m (ft)     increase m (ft)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
72.6 to 121.0...................         0.18 (0.59)         0.13 (0.43)
121.1 to 145.0..................         0.21 (0.69)         0.14 (0.46)
145.1 to 169.0..................         0.24 (0.79)         0.23 (0.75)
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For these voltage ranges, the maximum difference is no more than 
0.24 meters (9 inches). As photographs of live-line tool work in the 
record show, at these voltages, employers can comply with the minimum 
approach distances specified in the final rule by having employees make 
small adjustments in their working positions (269-Ex. 8-5). For 
example, employees using live-line tools can take a position slightly 
lower on the pole or structure and maintain the revised minimum 
approach distances. (As noted previously, when employees work where the 
employer can demonstrate that no insulated tool spans the gap and that 
no large conductive object is in the gap, such as during climbing or 
inspection activities, the final rule sets minimum approach distances 
for phase-to-ground exposures that are substantially smaller than the 
minimum approach distances for working with tools; and the maximum 
difference between the existing and the new minimum approach distance 
is no more than 0.14 meters (5.5 inches). Information in the record 
indicates that, as long as OSHA does not apply minimum approach 
distances to climbing and similar activities based on tools in the gap, 
employers should be able to comply with the minimum approach distances 
required by the final rule for those activities without adopting 
additional measures (Ex. 0575.1\252\).) Because employers generally 
should be able to demonstrate that no insulated tool spans the gap and 
that no large conductive object is in the gap during climbing and 
inspection activities and because the increases in minimum approach 
distances for voltages of 72.6 to 169.0 kilovolts are small, OSHA 
believes that, with regard to circuits operating at those voltages, 
employers will not incur significant costs beyond costs associated with 
retraining employees, which OSHA included in its economic analysis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \252\ In this exhibit, EEI described how applying ``MAD for 
tools'' to climbing and inspection activities would make some of 
this work infeasible. According to EEI, up to 23 percent of line 
insulators at transmission voltages are shorter than minimum 
approach distances based on tools in the gap. As explained 
previously in this section of the preamble, when the employer can 
demonstrate that there will be only air between the employee and the 
energized part, which normally should be the case during climbing or 
inspection procedures, Table V-2 permits the employer to determine 
minimum approach distances using the equation based on minimum air-
insulation distances, which will produce smaller minimum approach 
distances than the equation based on minimum tool-insulation 
distance. Therefore, OSHA concludes, the percentage of structures 
that workers could not climb or inspect without violating the 
default minimum approach distances in the final rule is 
significantly smaller than 23 percent for voltages up to 169.0 
kilovolts and that, up to this voltage level, any costs related to 
complying with the final rule's minimum approach distances 
applicable to climbing or inspecting a structure (such as performing 
an engineering analysis) are negligible.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Explanation of the final minimum approach-distance requirements. As 
noted earlier in this section of the preamble, final Sec.  
1926.960(c)(1) specifies minimum approach distances. The proposed rule 
would have required the employer to ensure that no employee approached 
or took any conductive object closer to exposed energized parts than 
the minimum approach distances in proposed Tables V-2 through V-6. The 
final rule splits this requirement into two provisions. First, as noted 
previously, paragraph (c)(1)(i) requires employers to establish minimum 
approach distances no less than the distances computed by Table V-2 for 
ac systems or Table V-7 for dc systems; OSHA described and explained 
earlier in this section of the preamble the equations in Table V-2 of 
the final rule. Second, paragraph (c)(1)(iii) of the final rule 
requires the employer to ensure that no employee approaches, or takes 
any conductive object, closer to exposed energized parts than the 
employer's established minimum approach distances, unless the employee 
works in accordance with paragraphs (c)(1)(iii)(A), (c)(1)(iii)(B), or 
(c)(1)(iii)(C). (See the discussion of these alternative methods later 
in this section of the preamble.)
    Paragraph (c)(1)(iii) in the final rule is equivalent to proposed 
paragraph (c)(1), except that it is the employer that is establishing 
the specific minimum approach distances for the workplace, based on 
equations in the standard, rather than the standard setting those 
distances explicitly.
    The proposed rule would have allowed employees to approach 
energized parts closer than the minimum approach distance under certain 
conditions (see proposed Sec.  1926.960(c)(1)(i) through (c)(1)(iii)). 
Existing Sec.  1926.950(c)(1)(i), which is similar to proposed Sec.  
1926.960(c)(1)(i), permits the employee to be insulated or guarded from 
the live parts. OSHA omitted from the proposal language in the existing 
standard specifically recognizing guarding. However, the language 
proposed in paragraph (c)(1) required employees to maintain minimum 
approach distances from ``exposed'' energized parts. OSHA defines 
``exposed'' in final Sec.  1926.968 as ``[n]ot isolated or guarded''; 
therefore, the minimum approach-distance requirement does not cover 
guarded live parts, whether guarded by enclosures or barriers or 
guarded by position (isolated), because they are not ``exposed.'' OSHA 
removed similar redundancies throughout proposed paragraphs (c)(1)(i) 
through (c)(1)(iii).
    Farmers Rural Electric Cooperative Corporation (FRECC) urged OSHA 
to retain the language that explicitly recognizes that employees do not 
have to maintain minimum approach distances from guarded or isolated 
energized parts (Ex. 0173).
    Including language exempting guarded or isolated live parts would 
be redundant and could lead to misinterpretation of the rule by 
implying that ``exposed energized parts'' has a meaning other than not 
guarded or isolated. Consequently, OSHA did not change the relevant 
language in this final rule in response to FRECC's comment, and the 
final rule removes the redundancies as proposed.
    OSHA proposed a note to paragraph (c)(1) reading as follows:


[[Page 20451]]


    Paragraph (f)(1) of Sec.  1926.966 contains requirements for the 
guarding and isolation of live parts. Parts of electric circuits 
that meet these two provisions are not considered as ``exposed'' 
unless a guard is removed or an employee enters the space intended 
to provide isolation from the live parts.

Final Sec.  1926.966(f)(1) requires the employer to provide guards 
around all live parts operating at more than 150 volts to ground 
without an insulating covering unless the location of the live parts 
gives sufficient clearance (horizontal, vertical, or both) to minimize 
the possibility of accidental employee contact. This provision, which 
applies to substations, requires guards or isolation for all live parts 
operating at more than 150 volts to ground unless the live parts have 
an insulating covering. As explained previously, ``exposed'' means 
``[n]ot isolated or guarded,'' and live parts that are insulated, but 
not guarded or isolated, are exposed. Thus, live parts operating at 
more than 150 volts with an insulating covering meet final Sec.  
1926.966(f)(1), but are still exposed. Therefore, the proposed note to 
Sec.  1926.960(c)(1) inaccurately portrays insulated parts as not 
exposed, and OSHA did not include the note in the final rule.
    Proposed paragraph (c)(1)(i) contained the first exception to 
maintaining the minimum approach distances--insulating the employee 
from the energized part. This insulation, for example, can take the 
form of rubber insulating gloves and rubber insulating sleeves. This 
equipment protects employees from electric shock while they work on 
energized lines or equipment. Even though uninsulated parts of an 
employee's body may come closer to the live part being worked on than 
the minimum approach distance, the requisite rubber insulating gloves 
and sleeves would insulate the employee's hand and arm from the live 
part, and the working distances involved would be sufficient protection 
against arc-over. As noted earlier, the minimum approach distances 
include a component for inadvertent movement, which is unnecessary for 
employees using rubber insulating equipment. Such inadvertent movement 
most often involved the employee's hands and arms, and the insulating 
equipment will protect them. In addition, the employee has control over 
the energized part. The accident data in the record show that the 
overriding hazard to employees involves other energized conductors in 
the work area, to which the minimum approach distances still apply. 
Final paragraph (c)(1)(iii)(A) provides that employees may use 
insulating gloves and sleeves to insulate themselves from the energized 
parts upon which they are working; rubber insulating gloves and sleeves 
provide protection only for the line on which the employee is 
performing work. Employers must ensure that employees maintain the 
required minimum approach distances from other exposed energized parts. 
In addition, the insulation used must be designed for the voltage. 
(Final Sec.  1926.97 gives use voltages for electrical protective 
equipment.)
    IBEW recommended that OSHA clarify the final rule to indicate that 
rubber insulating gloves or rubber insulating gloves with sleeves 
provide adequate protection ``only from the energized part upon which 
the employee is working, not to other energized parts in the work 
area'' (Ex. 0230; emphasis included in original). OSHA is not adopting 
IBEW's suggestion. Although this language correctly represents the 
meaning of the provision, the Agency believes that this meaning is 
clear without the suggested changes.
    It is important to ensure that conductors on which the employee is 
working cannot move unexpectedly while only rubber insulating gloves 
and sleeves are protecting the employee against contact with the 
conductors. It is a violation of the minimum approach-distance 
requirement contained in existing Sec.  1910.269(l)(2)(i) for an 
employee to be insulated from an energized part only by rubber 
insulating gloves and sleeves if the part is not under the full control 
of the employee at all times. For example, if an employee is cutting a 
conductor, the employee must restrain the conductor from moving toward 
the employee after being cut, or the employee must use additional 
insulation to prevent the conductor from striking uninsulated parts of 
his or her body. OSHA proposed to make this requirement explicit in 
parenthetical text in the proposed rule, including in the proposed 
revision of Sec.  1910.269.
    Two commenters objected to the proposed language requiring the 
employee to have control of the energized part sufficient to prevent 
exposure to uninsulated parts of the employee's body (Exs. 0201, 0209). 
They claimed that it is not always possible for the employer to ensure 
that an employee has adequate control over a part. For example, Mr. 
James Gartland with Duke Energy commented:

    OSHA should require employees to maintain control of energized 
parts only when it is reasonably achievable. It is not always 
possible. . . . The revised text . . . should be: ``. . .provided 
that the employee has control of the part insofar as possible to 
prevent exposure to uninsulated parts of the body.'' [Ex. 0201; 
emphasis in original.]

    The Agency is not adopting this recommendation. The language does 
not require employees to maintain control of energized parts under all 
conditions. The provision requires additional insulation on the 
energized part when the employee does not have sufficient control to 
prevent contact with uninsulated parts of his or her body. When it is 
not possible for the employee to maintain sufficient control, the final 
rule provides several options: (1) Maintain the minimum approach 
distance (per the introductory text to final paragraph (c)(1)(iii)); 
(2) insulate the employee by installing an insulating barrier, such as 
a rubber insulating blanket, between the employee and the energized 
part (per final paragraph (c)(1)(iii)(A)); or (3) install a rubber 
insulating line hose or a rubber insulating blanket on the energized 
part (per final paragraph (c)(1)(iii)(B)). Allowing the employee to 
work on an energized part that is not under the employee's full 
control, with rubber insulating gloves and sleeves as the only 
insulating barrier from the energized part, would not protect employees 
sufficiently.
    The Ohio Rural Electric Cooperatives requested clarification of 
what the Agency would consider to be adequate control, suggesting that 
several types of measures might be adequate, including tying a 
conductor to an insulator, clipping a conductor into the holder on the 
jib arm of an aerial lift, and holding the conductor by hand at the 
edge of the bucket of an aerial lift (Ex. 0186).
    OSHA would generally consider any of these measures to constitute 
adequate control. Using a mechanical device, such as a tie wire or 
live-line tool clamps, would adequately control the end of an energized 
conductor as long as it is of adequate strength for the application. 
However, the employer also must consider portions of the conductor not 
under the control of a mechanical device. For example, when the 
employee takes the slack from a conductor under tension and must cut 
the conductor to remove any excess, the employer must consider whether 
the conductor, now held in place by the tensioning equipment, will 
break from the employee's control after it is cut. OSHA would consider 
a conductor held by an employee to generally be under adequate control. 
However, if the conductor is hanging down and is not under the 
employee's full control, the employer must ensure that the employee is 
protected from exposure to

[[Page 20452]]

the lower portion of the conductor that could come too close to his or 
her leg.
    Mr. Leo Muckerheide with Safety Consulting Services objected to the 
description of the application of minimum approach distances to 
employees wearing rubber insulating gloves provided in the preamble to 
the proposal (Ex. 0180). He assumed that existing Subpart V and the 
proposal, which use similar language, did not permit uninsulated 
portions of the employee's body to come closer to energized parts than 
the minimum approach distance, even when the employee was wearing 
rubber insulating gloves. In one particular example, he commented:

    [T]he minimum distance listed in existing table V-1 for 2100 
volts is 24 inches and the maximum length of an insulated glove is 
18 inches. Therefore, it would be impossible to work on energized 
circuits with only insulating gloves and be in compliance with the 
existing table V-1. [id.]

    Mr. Muckerheide misinterpreted this provision. The final standard 
clearly considers the whole employee insulated as long as rated rubber 
insulating gloves or gloves with sleeves insulate his or her hands and 
arms.
    The Agency determined that the language explaining when rubber 
insulating gloves or rubber insulating gloves with sleeves are adequate 
protection is necessary and appropriate and has adopted it without 
substantial change in the final rule. (The final rule adds the word 
``rubber'' to the term ``insulating gloves or insulating gloves and 
sleeves.'' ``Rubber insulating gloves'' and ``rubber insulating 
sleeves'' are the precise terms used to describe this equipment, and 
this revision clarifies that final Sec. Sec.  1910.137 and 1926.97 
cover this equipment.)
    As a second exception to maintaining the minimum approach 
distances, paragraph (c)(1)(iii)(B), which OSHA adopted without change 
from proposed paragraph (c)(1)(ii), allows the energized part to be 
insulated from the employee and any other conductive object at a 
different potential. Such insulation can be in the form of rubber 
insulating blankets or line hose or other suitable insulating 
equipment. Again, the insulation must be adequate for the voltage.
    Paragraphs (c)(1)(iii)(A) and (c)(1)(iii)(B) in the final rule 
recognize the protection afforded to the employee by an insulating 
barrier between the employee and the energized part. As long as the 
insulation is appropriate and is in good condition, current will not 
flow through the worker, thereby protecting the worker.
    The third exception to the requirement to maintain minimum approach 
distances (final paragraph (c)(1)(iii)(C)) is for live-line barehand 
work. (For specific practices for this type of work, see the discussion 
of final Sec.  1926.964(c) later in this preamble.) In this type of 
work, the employee is in contact with the energized line, but is not 
contacting another conductive object at a different potential. This is 
the ``bird-on-a-wire'' scenario. Because there is no complete circuit, 
current cannot flow through the worker, thereby protecting the worker.
    In the proposed rule, the exception for live-line barehand work was 
broad enough to cover any work in which the employee is insulated from 
any other exposed conductive objects. However, OSHA knows of several 
accidents that occurred when employees working from aerial lifts, 
either insulated or uninsulated, grabbed energized conductors (Ex. 0004 
\253\). OSHA believes that some employers assume that this practice is 
safe and, therefore, do not follow the live-line barehand procedures 
specified in final Sec.  1926.964(c) for live-line barehand work. In 
the preamble to the proposed rule, OSHA requested comments on whether 
the proposal would adequately protect employees from this type of 
accident and on what additional requirements, if any, would prevent 
this type of accident.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \253\ See, for example, the four accidents described at https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=200550457&id=171055783&id=200780294&id=301171807.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Two commenters responded to this issue; they both believed that the 
proposed rule would adequately protect employees (Exs. 0126, 0213). 
Another commenter stated that proper training is necessary to prevent 
these types of actions (Ex. 0219).
    OSHA determined that the requirements for live-line barehand work 
are necessary whenever employees are working closer than the minimum 
approach distance in accordance with final paragraph (c)(1)(iii)(C). 
The accidents in the record make it clear that simply using an 
insulated aerial lift to isolate employees from energized parts is not 
sufficient protection (Exs. 0002, 0003, 0004). In Ex. 0004 alone, 69 
accidents involved employees in aerial lifts who were working inside 
the minimum approach distance without sufficient electrical protective 
equipment. The accident summaries for these accidents indicated that 11 
of the accidents involved insulated aerial lifts and that 2 of the 
accidents involved uninsulated aerial lifts. Because power line work 
predominantly makes use of insulated aerial devices, the Agency 
believes that most of the other 56 accidents also involved insulated 
aerial lifts. Employers may argue that the language in proposed 
paragraph (c)(1)(iii) permits employees working from insulated aerial 
lifts to position themselves inside the minimum approach distance 
without following Sec.  1926.964(c). The sheer number of accidents 
involving this practice clearly demonstrates that this practice is 
unsafe. In addition, the 2002 NESC, in Rule 441A1d,\254\ contains a 
similar restriction on its equivalent exception to its minimum 
approach-distance requirement. Therefore, OSHA concludes that it is 
necessary to restrict the exception proposed in paragraph (c)(1)(iii) 
to live-line barehand work performed in accordance with final Sec.  
1926.964(c) and modified the language of this exception, which is 
contained in Sec.  1926.960(c)(1)(iii)(C), accordingly.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \254\ The 2012 NESC contains a similar provision in Rule 441A1d.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    According to testimony in the Sec.  1910.269 rulemaking, between 
five and six percent of accidents experienced by power line workers 
resulted when the upper arm of an employee wearing rubber insulating 
gloves without sleeves contacted an energized part (269-DC Tr. 558-
561). This is a significant portion of the total number of serious 
accidents occurring among electric line workers. The Agency believes 
that most of these injuries and fatalities were preventable had the 
employees used rubber insulating sleeves. However, as demonstrated by 
the safety record of some electric utility companies, the extensive use 
of insulating equipment to cover energized parts in the employee's work 
area also would appear to prevent employees' upper arms and shoulders 
from contacting live parts (269-Ex. 46). OSHA believes that insulating 
every energized part within reach of an employee also would avert 
electrical contacts involving other parts of the body, such as an 
employee's head or back.
    Existing Subpart V does not require any protection for employees 
working on or near exposed live parts beyond the use of rubber 
insulating gloves. To prevent the types of accidents described 
previously from occurring in the future, the Agency decided to require 
protection in addition to that required by existing Subpart V.
    OSHA adopted paragraph (c)(2)(i) in the final rule substantially as 
proposed; this provision generally requires employees to use rubber 
insulating

[[Page 20453]]

sleeves whenever they are using rubber insulating gloves under final 
paragraph (c)(1)(iii)(A). However, insulating exposed live parts on 
which the employee is not working makes the sleeves unnecessary as long 
as the insulation is placed from a position that would not expose the 
employee's upper arm to contact with those parts (see final paragraph 
(c)(2)). Therefore, employees can work without sleeves by installing 
rubber line hose, rubber blankets, or plastic guard equipment on 
exposed, energized parts on which the employees are not performing 
work. OSHA reworded this provision in the final rule for purposes of 
clarity.
    NIOSH recommended that the standard require rubber insulating 
sleeves whenever employees use rubber insulating gloves (Ex. 0130). 
NIOSH explained: ``[G]loves can be easily caught and pulled down by any 
object protruding from the pole or powerline, exposing the body to 
electrical current. . . [S]leeves add extra protection'' (id.). NIOSH 
pointed to one accident in support of its position (Ex. 0137).
    OSHA reviewed the accident and found that it involved a situation 
in which a splice on a conductor pulled down the cuff of the employee's 
rubber insulating glove, with the conductor then contacting his forearm 
near the wrist (id.). OSHA acknowledges that such accidents occur. For 
example, there is a description of an additional similar accident in 
the rulemaking record (Ex. 0002 \255\). Rubber insulating sleeves 
protect an employee's arm from a point above the cuff of the rubber 
insulating glove to the shoulder. In the accident cited by NIOSH, as 
well as the other accident in the record, the conductor contacted the 
employee at or near the wrist, where rubber insulating sleeves probably 
would not have protected the employee. OSHA believes that the work 
practices in which an employer trains qualified employees must include 
practices designed to protect workers from the possibility that an 
energized conductor will either pull a cuff down or penetrate the 
opening at the end of the glove. (Paragraph (b)(1)(ii) of final Sec.  
1926.950 requires employers to train each employee in ``safety 
practices . . . that are not specifically addressed by this subpart but 
that are related to his or her work and are necessary for his or her 
safety.'') The Agency concludes that such work practices, rather than 
the use of sleeves, will protect employees from being injured or killed 
in the circumstances described by NIOSH. Therefore, OSHA is not 
adopting NIOSH's recommendation in the final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \255\ A report of this accident is available at: https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=573717.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    OSHA knows of several accidents that occurred while employees were 
performing work (generally on deenergized lines) near energized parts 
without using rubber insulating equipment (Ex. 0004 \256\). In these 
accidents, the employees were working near energized parts and 
inadvertently entered the minimum approach distance. Employers 
successfully challenged citations issued in a similar context by 
arguing that the standard permits employees to work near energized 
parts without the use of electrical protective equipment, as long as 
they maintain the minimum approach distance involved and that, because 
they trained their employees to maintain those distances, the accidents 
were the result of unpreventable employee misconduct. (See, for 
example, Central Kansas Power Co., 6 BNA OSHC 2118 (No. 77-3127, 
1978).)
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    \256\ See, for example, the six accidents described at https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=170074801&id=200010163&id=201750080&id=14242036&id=982082&id=170189849.
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    OSHA does not believe that working close to energized parts (that 
is, near the minimum approach distance boundary) without the use of 
electrical protective equipment is a safe practice. The Agency further 
believes that existing Sec.  1910.269, which appears to allow this 
practice, is not effective in preventing these accidents. Therefore, 
OSHA concludes that further regulation is necessary. Toward this end, 
OSHA proposed two new requirements:
    (1) If an employee is performing work near exposed parts energized 
at more than 600 volts but not more than 72.5 kilovolts and is not 
insulated from the energized parts or performing live-line bare-hand 
work, the employee would have to work from a position where he or she 
could not reach into the minimum approach distance (proposed Sec.  
1926.960(d)(2)), and
    (2) If an employee uses insulating gloves or insulating gloves with 
sleeves to insulate himself or herself from energized parts, the 
insulating gloves and sleeves would have to be put on and removed in a 
position where the employee could not reach into the minimum approach 
distance (proposed Sec.  1926.960(c)(2)(ii)).
    The Agency proposed Sec.  1926.960(c)(2)(ii) to ensure that 
employees don rubber insulating gloves and sleeves from a safe 
position. OSHA is aware that some employers have a ground-to-ground 
rule requiring their employees to wear rubber insulating gloves before 
leaving the ground to perform work and to leave the gloves on until the 
employees return to the ground. This practice ensures that employees 
wear the rubber gloves and sleeves before they reach the energized area 
and eliminates the chance that an employee will forget to don the 
protective equipment once he or she reaches the work position. Other 
employers simply require their employees to put on their gloves and 
sleeves before they enter the energized area. This practice normally 
requires the employee to use his or her judgment in determining where 
to begin wearing the protective equipment. The proposal recognized both 
methods of protecting employees, but still ensured that employees wear 
rubber insulating gloves and sleeves once they reach positions from 
which they can reach into the minimum approach distance. In the 
preamble to the proposal, the Agency requested comments on the need for 
this requirement and on whether the provision as proposed would protect 
employees from the relevant hazards.
    Many commenters expressed support for this proposed requirement or 
urged the Agency to make the rule even more protective. (See, for 
example, Exs. 0099, 0126, 0130, 0155, 0175, 0186, 0219, 0230, 0505; Tr. 
891-894.) In supporting the proposed requirement, Mr. Anthony Ahern 
with Ohio Rural Electric Cooperatives explained:

    Judging actual distance when in close proximity to a conductor 
can be tricky. Great care needs to be used when putting on or taking 
off sleeves when in close proximity to lines. This usually requires 
the arms to be extended more than the employee might normally do 
during regular work practices. Quite often too you will see a worker 
waving his arms about as they try to settle the sleeve harness into 
position behind their head. These inadvertent movements could bring 
the workers arms inside of MAD. Also, while sleeves are being put on 
or taken off the employee is not wearing rubber gloves. So if he 
should reach inside of MAD his hands will have no protection. [Ex. 
0186]

    EEI and Ameren Corporation objected to proposed paragraph 
(c)(2)(ii) because, they argued, it would effectively increase the 
minimum approach distance (Exs. 0209, 0227, 0501). Ameren argued that 
``[e]nsuring compliance with this proposal would be extremely 
difficult, if not impossible,'' and that there was additional risk for 
employees climbing with rubber insulating gloves (Ex. 0209). EEI echoed 
Ameren's objections and maintained that this provision was effectively 
increasing the ergonomic movement

[[Page 20454]]

factor of the minimum approach distance (Ex. 0227). EEI maintained that 
this provision would have a significant adverse impact on industry 
practices (id.). In its posthearing submission after the 2006 hearing, 
EEI presented additional arguments against the proposed requirement:

    There are several important difficulties with the proposed rules 
that are self-evident. First, they do not establish an objective 
standard, and therefore would be unenforceable. The rules would be 
different for each employee, depending for example on personal 
height, reach, working position, and the particular configuration of 
the energized equipment in the vicinity. This will make it difficult 
to train employees in compliance, and could make supervisory 
enforcement of the rule a nightmare. Indeed, whether an employee is 
[in] compliance could change literally from second to second, for 
example, as the employee shift[s] weight on a pole, or turns around 
to speak with a co-worker. As a litigation matter, proving the 
violation element of employer knowledge will be problematic at best.
    Second, the rules will effectively limit or inhibit the nature 
of work that can be performed outside, but within reaching distance, 
of the MAD. In planning a job, it would be necessary to consider 
what work is to be performed outside the MAD distance, and to 
consider the individual physical characteristics of the employee(s) 
who would perform it. Conceivably, short employees, with short arms, 
would be favored over tall, lanky employees, with long arms. This 
makes no sense, and it does not appear that OSHA has considered or 
analyzed the potential practical implications of these requirements. 
. . .
    Finally, there is no evidence in the record to show why OSHA is 
proposing to implement these requirements. There is no evidence that 
in the absence of these particular requirements, employees have been 
injured or suffered near misses with energized electrical equipment. 
In sum, these proposals are without any basis, and cannot be 
sustained. [Ex. 0501]

    OSHA does not agree that proposed paragraph (c)(2)(ii) increased 
the minimum approach distance. Proposed paragraphs (c)(2)(ii) and 
(d)(2) did not address the question of the employee's location once he 
or she is wearing rubber insulating gloves and sleeves. Final paragraph 
(c)(2)(ii) simply ensures that the employee is already wearing the 
gloves and sleeves before he or she gets into position to perform work. 
This paragraph has no effect on the minimum approach distances, which 
provide protection against both energized parts on which the employee 
will be working and other energized parts in the area. Under final 
paragraph (c)(1)(iii)(A), once the gloves and sleeves are on, workers 
may get within the minimum approach distance for the part on which they 
are performing work. In addition, employees need to maintain the 
minimum approach distances (not distances greater than the minimum 
approach distances) for parts on which they are not working.
    EEI and Ameren's argument that the provision would be difficult to 
enforce is specious. The record contains several examples of methods of 
compliance that would be reasonably easy to enforce, as well as easy 
for employees to understand and follow. For example, employers can 
institute ground-to-ground, cradle-to-cradle, or lock-to-lock rules. 
(See, for example, Exs. 0099, 0130, 0201.) Mr. Kenneth Brubaker 
described these rules as ``the wearing of rubber [insulating] gloves 
and sleeves from ground to ground while climbing energized structures, 
from cradle to cradle while working from aerial baskets, and lock to 
lock when working on underground cabinets and vaults for qualified line 
personnel'' (Exs. 0099, 0100). Commenters also suggested a ``10-foot 
rule'' in which employees must wear electrical protective equipment 
whenever they are within 3.05 meters (10 feet) of an exposed energized 
part (Exs. 0099, 0186). OSHA expects that employers generally will 
elect to use bright-line rules (for example, cradle-to-cradle or 3.05-
meter rules) such that an individual employee's height and reach will 
not be an issue. Instituting such rules will ensure that all employees 
put on and take off rubber insulating gloves and sleeves as specified 
by the final rule. If an employer elects to use an alternative in which 
an employee will be putting on and taking off rubber gloves and sleeves 
in an unspecified location (for example if the employer simply 
instructs the employee to put on and take off gloves and sleeves at any 
location outside the reach of the minimum approach distance), the 
employer will need to account for the employee's individual 
characteristics.
    EEI's argument that planning jobs would be difficult under proposed 
paragraph (c)(2)(ii) is not relevant. This paragraph only applies when 
workers use rubber insulating gloves or rubber insulating gloves with 
sleeves, which the employees have to don and remove. This rule simply 
addresses donning and removal of this equipment in relation to the 
energized parts. OSHA addresses EEI's comments further in its 
discussion of proposed paragraph (d)(2), which addresses selecting work 
positions.
    OSHA concludes that there is clear evidence in the record of 
fatalities and injuries caused when employees approach too close to 
energized parts without adequate protection (Exs. 0002, 0003, 
0004).\257\ Evidence in the record indicates that industry and employee 
representatives recognize that failure to wear electrical protective 
equipment when necessary is a leading cause of accidents and that 
additional measures to ensure the use of this equipment in appropriate 
circumstances addresses this problem. For example, Mr. James Tomaseski 
with IBEW testified:
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    \257\ See, for example, the 15 accidents described at https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=526236&id=564971&id=566257&id=565051&id=512269&id=525675&id=609404&id=573832&id=743310&id=755231&id=738989&id=755199&id=800508&id=784397&id=812479.

    In a study on recent fatalities and serious accidents in the 
industry by the OSHA Strategic Partnership of Major Electric Line 
Contractor Employees, NECA, the IBEW, and EEI, by far the majority 
of the accidents were from contact with energized parts. A solution 
was easy in some folks' minds, and that was to come up with a 
practice to get employees in rubber gloves and/or, again, rubber 
sleeves, where required.
    The Partnership, as part of their agreed-upon path, will develop 
best practices. Their first target for these best practices was in 
general to address electrical contacts. It was no surprise to many 
of the partners that ground-to-ground and cradle-to-cradle practices 
were first on the list. [Tr. 892]

IBEW also pointed to action taken by NESC Subcommittee 8 as evidence of 
the need to don and remove rubber insulating gloves and sleeves outside 
locations in which employees can reach into minimum approach distances 
(Ex. 0505). According to IBEW's comments, the NESC subcommittee adopted 
a requirement for the 2007 NESC specifying that rubber insulating 
gloves be ``worn whenever employees are within the reach or extended 
reach of the minimum approach distances'' (id.).\258\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \258\ The NESC adopted this requirement, which, in the 2012 
edition, appears in Rule 441A3b.

    In addition, Mr. Ahern's description of the types of movements 
employees make when donning rubber insulating sleeves makes it clear 
that the final rule needs measures to ensure that workers do not 
encroach on the minimum approach distance during such activities. 
Encroaching on the minimum approach distance to energized parts 
presents hazards to employees, particularly when involved in tasks not 
related directly to work on those live parts.\259\ Thus, the Agency 
believes that paragraph (c)(2)(ii), which OSHA is

[[Page 20455]]

adopting in the final rule with only editorial changes from the 
proposal, is reasonably necessary and appropriate.\260\
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    \259\ The ergonomic component of the minimum approach distance 
only protects against errors in judging and maintaining the minimum 
approach distance. It does not account for errors that might result 
when employees become inattentive to the approach distance because 
of work-related distractions or other factors.
    \260\ One commenter noted that OSHA proposed the same 
requirement in Sec.  1910.269(l)(3)(ii) using slightly different 
language (Ex. 0186). The final rule uses the same language in both 
Sec. Sec.  1910.269(l)(3)(ii) and 1926.960(c)(2)(ii).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some rulemaking participants recommended that the final rule 
include a requirement that employers availing themselves of the 
exception to the minimum approach-distance requirements for work 
performed with rubber insulating gloves (or rubber insulating gloves 
and sleeves) adopt ground-to-ground, cradle-to-cradle, or lock-to-lock 
rules, or set a specific distance from energized parts at which 
employees must wear electrical protective equipment.\261\ (See, for 
example, Exs. 0099, 0130, 0186, 0230; Tr. 893-894.) IBEW recommended a 
cradle-to-cradle requirement (Ex. 0230; Tr. 893-894). Two comments 
suggested that the rule specify the distance from energized parts at 
which employees must wear rubber insulating gloves or rubber insulating 
gloves and sleeves (Exs. 0099, 0186). One of these commenters suggested 
requiring that employees wear rubber insulating gloves and sleeves 
within 3.05 meters (10 feet) of circuits energized at 500 volts to 500 
kilovolts and within 6.1 meters (20 feet) of circuits energized at 500 
to 800 kilovolts (Ex. 0099).
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    \261\ A ground-to-ground rule requires employees climbing a pole 
to put on rubber insulating gloves or rubber insulating gloves with 
sleeves while still on the ground and to remove them only after 
returning to the ground. A cradle-to-cradle rule requires employees 
working from an aerial lift to wear gloves or gloves with sleeves 
whenever the aerial lift platform leaves its cradle. A lock-to-lock 
rule requires employees working on transformers to wear gloves or 
gloves with sleeves from the time they unlock the lock on the 
transformer until they close the transformer case and reinstall the 
lock.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    NIOSH recommended adopting a ground-to-ground rule, stating:

    Ground to ground use of personal protective equipment (PPE) 
eliminates the hazard of reaching the energized area before donning 
PPE. It also eliminates the reliance on employee judgment in 
determining a safe distance to don PPE, and requires the worker to 
don PPE before entering an aerial bucket . . . [Ex. 0130]

    Other rulemaking participants opposed ground-to-ground and 
similarly specific rules (Exs. 0163, 0212, 0225). For example, Ms. 
Susan O'Connor with Siemens argued that ``[f]orcing the use of one type 
of enforcement strategy, especially one that questions the employee's 
competency, can undermine a strong safety culture'' (Ex. 0163). Mr. 
James Gartland with Duke Energy did not oppose ground-to-ground and 
similar rules, but recommended that any such rule include an exception 
to permit employees, during short breaks, to move 3.05 meters (10 feet) 
away and to remove their electrical protective equipment (Ex. 0201). He 
commented that his company ``has found the occurrence of heat-related 
illnesses has been reduced by allowing employees to move the bucket 
away from the conductors and remove rubber gloves and sleeves for a 
brief rest period'' (id.). Although IBEW did not oppose a ground-to-
ground rule, the union recognized that there may be valid arguments 
against such a requirement. Mr. Tomaseski testified:

    There are a few factors that mitigate against requiring [rubber 
insulating gloves] ground-to-ground in all circumstances. First, 
some linemen are concerned that they would have difficulty feeling 
the pole while they are climbing if they had to wear rubber gloves 
and they, therefore, would be at a greater risk of falling.
    Second, if a splinter on the pole [punctures] the glove . . . 
while [the employee is] climbing, it may compromise the protective 
value of the glove and, therefore, create a hazard for the lineman 
who subsequently touches an energized object. [Tr. 893]

    In recommending a cradle-to-cradle rule, the union argued that 
these factors were not present when an employee is working from an 
aerial lift (Tr. 893-894).
    OSHA concludes that there is likely to be little risk associated 
with wearing rubber insulating gloves while climbing. The practices 
required by final Sec.  1926.954(b)(3)(iii) should mitigate any fall 
hazards posed by climbing with rubber insulating gloves; this provision 
specifies fall protection for employees climbing poles and other 
structures. The Agency also believes it is unlikely that splinters will 
puncture rubber insulating gloves during climbing. In this regard, 
final Sec.  1926.97(c)(2)(vii) requires employees to wear protector 
gloves over rubber insulating gloves; protector gloves should eliminate 
any risk from small splinters. The Agency believes that employees would 
feel any splinter large enough to penetrate the protector gloves and 
also would notice any resulting damage to a rubber insulating glove. In 
any event, there is little, if any, evidence that accidents occurred as 
a result of fall or splinter hazards posed by climbing with rubber 
insulating gloves.\262\ On the other hand, evidence of accidents caused 
by employees not wearing rubber insulating gloves is pervasive (Exs. 
0002, 0003, 0004). As Mr. Tomaseski noted, the electric power 
partnership found that ``by far the majority of the accidents were from 
contact with energized parts'' (Tr. 892).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \262\ The record contains descriptions of several accidents 
involving falls by employees during climbing, but none of the 
descriptions indicates that the use of rubber insulating gloves 
caused the fall.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    There is, however, significant evidence, as noted in the summary 
and explanation for Sec.  1926.960(g) of the final rule later in this 
section of the preamble, that electric power workers encounter heat-
stress hazards and that providing cooling breaks is a recognized method 
of reducing such hazards. Adopting a ground-to-ground or cradle-to-
cradle rule would force employees wearing rubber insulating gloves to 
either descend and reclimb poles or lower and reraise their aerial lift 
platforms to take breaks from wearing the protective equipment. The 
Agency suspects that such a requirement could discourage employees from 
taking these breaks. Consequently, OSHA is not adopting a ground-to-
ground or cradle-to-cradle rule. Although the Agency is not adopting 
ground-to-ground or cradle-to-cradle provisions in the final rule, OSHA 
encourages employers to adopt such provisions when appropriate and to 
remind employees of the importance of taking cooling breaks when 
necessary.
    The Agency also decided not to include in the final rule a specific 
distance beyond which employees must put on and take off their rubber 
insulating gloves. Any such distance would be arbitrary, and OSHA 
believes that allowing employers to design work rules appropriate for 
their workforces and workplaces is a more reasonable approach. 
Consequently, OSHA is adopting paragraph (c)(2)(ii) in the final rule 
substantially as proposed. As explained previously under the summary 
and explanation for paragraph (c)(1)(iii)(A), the final rule uses the 
term ``rubber insulating gloves'' in place of the term ``insulating 
gloves'' included in the proposed rule.
    Paragraph (d) of the final rule addresses the employee's working 
position. The requirements in this paragraph protect employees against 
slipping, falling, or accidentally reaching into energized parts. Mr. 
Stephen Frost with the Mid-Columbia Utilities Safety Alliance supported 
proposed paragraph (d), commenting:

    Industry practice and OSHA guidance has always stated that the 
worker shall not be within reaching or falling distance when working 
near energized lines or equipment. We appreciate OSHA revising the 
language to more clearly state what is reaching or falling distance. 
[Ex. 0184]

    Paragraph (d)(1), which is being adopted without substantive change

[[Page 20456]]

from the proposal, requires the employer to ensure that each employee, 
to the extent permitted by other safety-related conditions at the 
worksite, works in a position from which a shock or slip would not 
cause the employee to contact exposed, uninsulated parts energized at a 
potential different from the employee's. Since slips, and even electric 
shocks, are not entirely preventable, it is important for the employee 
to take a working position so that such an event will not increase the 
severity of any incurred injury. OSHA adopted this requirement from 
existing Sec.  1910.269(l)(4). There is no counterpart to this 
requirement in existing subpart V.
    The Agency believes that it is important for employees to work from 
positions where a slip or a shock will not bring them into contact with 
exposed, uninsulated energized parts unless other conditions, such as 
the configuration of the lines involved, would make another working 
position safer. The position taken must be the most protective 
available to accomplish the task. In certain situations, this work 
position may not be the most efficient one. OSHA notes that the 
language in paragraph (d)(1) allows for guarding or insulating the live 
part as an alternative means of compliance.
    Proposed paragraph (d)(2) generally would have required an employee 
working near exposed parts energized at 601 volts to 72.5 kilovolts to 
be in a position such that he or she could not reach into the 
applicable minimum approach distance. In the preamble to the proposed 
rule, OSHA requested comments on the need for proposed paragraph (d)(2) 
and on whether there are other effective means of protecting employees 
from the relevant hazard.
    The Southern Company argued that ``[t]he minimum approach distance 
contains an ergonomic component that should provide adequate protection 
from inadvertent movement'' (Ex. 0212).
    OSHA does not agree with Southern Company that the ergonomic 
component of the minimum approach distance provides adequate protection 
for employees who are working close to, but not on, exposed, 
uninsulated energized parts. As explained earlier in the preamble, OSHA 
concluded that working extremely close to (that is, near the minimum 
approach distance boundary to) energized parts without the use of 
electrical protective equipment is not a safe practice and that 
existing Sec.  1910.269, which may allow this practice, is not 
effective in preventing accidents involving contact with energized 
parts by employees who are not using electrical protective equipment. 
(See the summary and explanation for final Sec.  1926.960(c)(2)(ii) for 
a description of the purpose behind paragraphs (c)(2)(ii) and (d)(2) 
and a discussion of the relevant accidents.)
    When employees are not working directly on live parts, then nearby 
exposed, uninsulated live parts are typically not in their view. Those 
parts can be above them,\263\ below them,\264\ behind them,\265\ or to 
the side \266\ (Exs 0002, 0003, 0004). As noted previously, OSHA 
designed the ergonomic component of the minimum approach distance on 
the premise that the employee will detect an error in judging and 
maintaining the minimum approach distance and then have time to correct 
that error before encroaching on the electrical component of the 
minimum approach distance. When exposed, uninsulated live parts are not 
in an employee's line of sight, such errors are difficult to detect. In 
addition, the Agency believes that, when employees are not performing 
work on energized parts, the employees are not paying as much attention 
to those parts as to the equipment the employees are servicing and may, 
inadvertently, become complacent about the hazards posed by those 
parts. In any event, the accident record makes it clear that employees 
working without electrical protective equipment near exposed, 
uninsulated parts energized at 601 volts to 72.5 kilovolts face an 
unacceptable risk of electric shock.
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    \263\ See, for example, the three accidents described at https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=201520301&id=573832&id=14333439.
    \264\ See, for example, the three accidents described at https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=927830&id=839480&id=14373955.
    \265\ See, for example, the three accidents described at https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=14403315&id=200350395&id=14346514.
    \266\ See, for example, the three accidents described at https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=170672547&id=512269&id=569988.
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    An alternative approach would be for OSHA to adopt a more limited 
requirement prohibiting employees without electrical protective 
equipment from working where they could reach into the electrical 
component of the minimum approach distance. The basis of such a 
requirement would be that the probability that current could arc to the 
employee is not significant at a distance that is farther than the 
electrical component of the minimum approach distance from exposed, 
uninsulated live parts. However, as the accident data show, employees 
often are moving up, back, down, or in other directions away from their 
working positions when they contact live parts (id.).\267\ The Agency, 
therefore, concludes that requiring employees to work in positions from 
which they cannot reach into the electrical component (rather than the 
full minimum approach distance) would not protect employees adequately. 
Existing Sec.  1910.269(a)(2)(ii)(C) already requires employers to 
train their employees in minimum approach distances. In addition, final 
Sec.  1926.960(c)(2)(ii) requires employers to ensure that employees 
using rubber insulating gloves or rubber insulating gloves and sleeves 
don the gloves and sleeves before they get into a position from which 
they can reach into the minimum approach distance. OSHA believes that 
using the same distance for paragraph (d)(2) will simplify training and 
make it easier for employers to establish work rules governing the use 
of electrical protective equipment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \267\ See, for example, the four accidents described at https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=573832&id=14373955&id=200350395&id=569988.
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    In the preamble to the proposed rule, the Agency discussed how to 
comply with OSHA's minimum approach-distance requirements in the 
summary and explanation for the proposal's minimum approach distances 
specified in Sec.  1926.960(c)(1) (70 FR 34862). Although this 
discussion applies equally to Sec.  1926.960(c)(1) in the final rule, 
the Agency is moving the discussion to the summary and explanation for 
final Sec.  1926.960(d)(2) because it relates to both provisions and to 
comments received on both provisions, which OSHA discusses here. The 
ergonomic component of the minimum approach distance accounts for 
errors in maintaining the minimum approach distance (which might occur 
if an employee misjudges the length of a conductive object he or she is 
holding), and for errors in judging the minimum approach distance. The 
ergonomic component also accounts for inadvertent movements by the 
employee, such as slipping. In contrast, the working position selected 
to comply with final paragraph (c)(1)(iii) (and paragraphs (c)(2)(ii) 
and (d)(2)) must account for all of an employee's reasonably likely 
movements and still permit the employee to adhere to the applicable 
minimum approach distance. As noted in the preamble to the proposal 
(id.), and in final Appendix B, to ensure compliance with minimum 
approach distances (the electrical and ergonomic components combined), 
the work position selected must account for such reasonably likely 
movements as:

[[Page 20457]]

     adjusting an employee's hardhat,
     maneuvering a tool onto an energized part with a 
reasonable amount of over- or under-reaching,
     reaching for, and handling, tools, material, and equipment 
passed to him or her, and
     adjusting tools and replacing components on them, when 
necessary during the work procedure.
    Figure 1 in final Appendix B depicts an example of the range of 
reasonably likely movements by an employee.
    OSHA believes that it is important for employers to train employees 
not only in the applicable minimum approach distances, but also in how 
to maintain those distances. Proposed Appendix B explained this 
approach, stating: ``The training of qualified employees required under 
Sec.  1926.950 and the job planning and briefing required under Sec.  
1926.952 must address selection of the proper working position.'' To 
clarify this point, final Sec.  1926.950(b)(2)(iii) requires employers 
to train qualified employees in the ``minimum approach distances 
specified in this subpart corresponding to the voltages to which the 
qualified employee will be exposed and the skills and techniques 
necessary to maintain those distances'' (emphasis added to show the new 
language). (See the discussion of this provision earlier in this 
section of the preamble.) Final Sec.  1926.952(b) requires the job 
briefing to cover personal protective equipment requirements and the 
procedures employees are to use in performing the work. OSHA interprets 
this provision as requiring the job briefing to address the selection 
of the proper working position under final Sec.  1926.960(c)(1)(iii) 
and (d)(2).
    EEI counsel Mr. Stephen Yohay and Mr. Clayton Abernathy with OG&E 
Energy Corporation indicated that information in Appendix B to proposed 
Subpart V, and the requirements in proposed paragraphs (c)(2)(ii)(a) 
and (d), led EEI to believe that OSHA was increasing the ergonomic 
component of the minimum approach distance by 0.61 meters, for a total 
ergonomic component of 1.22 meters (Tr. 1079-1082). EEI commented:

    In the proposed preamble, OSHA states it is necessary to add the 
reach component since many injuries resulted from violation of MAD. 
EEI requests that OSHA place in the record the evidence on which it 
relies to substantiate this change. EEI also suggests that if, in 
fact, OSHA's reasoning is correct and employees did cross the 
imaginary 24 inch line in the past, why and how does OSHA believe 
that employees will not cross a 50 inch line in the future? [Ex. 
0227]

    Testifying on behalf of EEI, Mr. Abernathy described how increasing 
the minimum approach distance by 0.61 meters would restrict some of the 
work his company's employees do (Tr. 1055-1078). He described two 
scenarios that he claimed would be affected by this increase--an 
apprentice line worker working on the secondary conductors on a 
distribution transformer and a line worker installing insulating 
protective equipment on overhead conductors. The apprentice in Mr. 
Abernathy's first example was wearing rubber insulating gloves rated 
for the secondary voltage, but not for the 15-kilovolt primary voltage 
(Tr. 1058-1059).
    As explained previously in this preamble, the ergonomic component 
for voltages addressed by EEI's comments is 0.61 meters; it is not 1.22 
meters as Messrs. Abernathy and Yohay claimed. The Agency believes that 
EEI's confusion stemmed from a common misperception of how minimum 
approach distances work in practice. Some employers mistakenly believe 
that the ergonomic component of the minimum approach distance accounts 
for all movement on the part of the employee. As described previously, 
this is not the case. The minimum approach distance sets a boundary 
that the employee may not penetrate as he or she is working. To ensure 
that employees do not penetrate this boundary as they are working, the 
employer must instruct workers how to position themselves so that 
reasonably likely movements do not bring the employees inside that 
boundary. Paragraph (d)(2) of the final rule ensures that employees who 
are not protected against exposure to energized parts are working at a 
safe distance from the parts. The final standard generally provides 
that an employee performing work near exposed parts energized between 
601 volts and 72.5 kilovolts must work from a position where he or she 
cannot reach into the minimum approach distance. This positioning 
requirement does not apply if the employee is wearing rubber insulating 
gloves, being protected by insulating equipment covering the energized 
parts, performing work using live-line tools, or performing live-line 
barehand work.\268\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \268\ The proposal provided that paragraph (d)(2) did not apply 
to employees ``insulated from the energized parts.'' The language in 
the final rule clarifies that the provision does not apply to 
employees wearing rubber insulating gloves or protected by 
insulating equipment covering the energized parts. Note that 
employers must still ensure that employees wearing rubber insulating 
gloves maintain the minimum approach distance from energized parts 
on which they are not working unless those parts are insulated from 
the employee. (See final paragraph (c)(1)(iii).)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As noted previously, OSHA concluded that there is clear evidence in 
the record that approaching too close to energized parts kills and 
injures employees (Exs. 0002, 0003, 0004). In Ex. 0004 alone, there 
were at least 27 accidents involving employees coming too close to 
energized parts without using electrical protective equipment.\269\ 
There are at least six accidents in the record involving apprentices 
coming too close to energized parts without using electrical protective 
equipment (Exs. 0002, 0003).\270\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \269\ There were 27 accidents in which the investigation summary 
indicated that an employee who was not using electrical protective 
equipment contacted energized parts. There were many other accidents 
involving employee contact with energized parts in which the summary 
did not indicate whether the employee was using electrical 
protective equipment. The 27 accidents can be found at: https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=512269&id=525675&id=573832&id=755199&id=768101&id=819805&id=894196&id=927830&id=982082&id=14238117&id=14242036&id=14333439&id=14367023&id=14392393&id=14402788 and https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=14403315&id=14482723&id=170074801&id=170118475&id=170189849&id=170672547&id=170891014&id=171054430&id=200010163&id=200010338&id=201520301&id=201750080.
    \270\ See the six accidents described at https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=200010163&id=201440013&id=14345318&id=170170179&id=789354&id=711960.
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    As noted by an OSHA witness at the hearing, employers can protect 
the apprentice in Mr. Abernathy's example by ensuring that the 
apprentice is working from a position where he or she cannot reach into 
the minimum approach distance or, if that is not possible, by 
installing electrical protective equipment on the primary conductors to 
enable the employee to work within the minimum approach distance of 
those conductors (Tr. 1087-1088). According to Mr. Abernathy, the 
primary conductor is 1.0 meter (40 inches) from the secondary conductor 
on which the apprentice would be working (Tr. 1069, 1071). The minimum 
approach distance for a 15-kilovolt primary generally is 0.65 meters 
(26 inches).\271\ Thus, the worker could position himself or herself so 
that he or she could reach 0.34 meters (14 inches) beyond the secondary 
conductor and still be in compliance with final paragraph (d)(2). In 
addition, as long as the secondary conductor is below the primary by a 
distance that is greater than the minimum approach distance, it should 
be possible under the final rule for the apprentice to work on the 
secondary without rubber insulating gloves rated for the primary 
voltage. If the secondary conductor is closer to the

[[Page 20458]]

primary conductor than the minimum approach distance, the existing 
standards (Sec. Sec.  1926.950(c)(1) and 1910.269(l)(2)) already 
prohibit employees from working on the secondary conductor without 
using electrical protective equipment rated for the primary voltage on 
either the primary conductor or the employee.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \271\ The minimum approach distance for 15 kilovolts is 0.65 
meters at elevations of 900 meters or less, but increases at higher 
elevations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Final paragraph (d)(2) does not apply to voltages of 600 volts and 
less. Much of the work performed at these lower voltages involves the 
use of insulating hand tools in a panelboard or cabinet. The chance of 
contacting a live part during this work is low because of the layout of 
live parts within the enclosure and the use of the insulated tool to 
maintain a safe distance from the live parts. The electrical clearances 
between energized parts for voltages in this range are small enough 
that all energized circuit parts normally will be in front of the 
employee, enabling the employee to maintain the required minimum 
approach distance easily. This paragraph also does not apply when the 
voltage exceeds 72.5 kilovolts, because the minimum approach distances 
generally become greater beyond this voltage and because employees 
cannot use rubber insulating equipment for protection at these higher 
voltages.
    Mr. Lee Marchessault of Workplace Safety Solutions recommended that 
paragraph (d)(2) apply to exposed parts energized at more than 300 
volts rather than 600 volts, noting that this application would expand 
the scope of the requirement to ``underground, power plant and meter 
work on exposed 480 volt secondary systems'' (Ex. 0196).
    As explained previously, and in the preamble to the proposed rule 
(70 FR 34865), employees typically use insulated tools to work on this 
equipment. In addition, a working position requirement is inappropriate 
for this equipment because much of this equipment is at ground level, 
where employees easily and frequently adjust their working positions 
while they work. (In contrast, when employees are working at elevated 
locations, where employees perform most of the energized work on higher 
voltages, employees work from a fixed position determined by the 
location of an aerial lift platform or their positioning straps. 
Therefore, the Agency did not adopt Mr. Marchessault's recommendation 
to expand the scope of final paragraph (d)(2).
    Proposed paragraph (d)(2) did not apply to situations involving 
employees insulated from the energized parts or performing live-line 
barehand work. However, many rulemaking participants expressed concern 
that proposed paragraph (d)(2) did not fully account for work practices 
involving the use of live-line tools. (See, for example, Exs. 0125, 
0127, 0149, 0151, 0155, 0159, 0164, 0172, 0179, 0188, 0226, 0471; Tr. 
1237, 1245-1246.) The comments of Ms. Tracy Harness with the Northwest 
Line Constructors Chapter of NECA typified these concerns:

    This requirement proposes to add a greater working distance for 
an employee working near energized exposed parts at more than 600 
volts, but not more than 72.5 kilovolts if the employee is not 
insulated from the energized exposed part or performing live-line 
bare-hand work. This additional distance is proposed to prevent an 
employee from accidentally reaching into the minimum approach 
distance from their working position without protection . . . In 
many states employees use insulated sticks to perform work on 
energized parts above 600 volts. On page 34862 of the Federal 
Register it appears that OSHA recognizes the difference when using 
an insulated stick by not requiring this additional distance for 
work above 72.5 kilovolts. A number of states do not allow the use 
of protective gloves to work on energized parts above 5,000 volts. 
There are no requirements for employees to wear insulated gloves 
when using an insulated stick.
    Will OSHA consider an employee using an insulated stick exempt 
from having to maintain the added positioning distance for all 
voltages above 600 volts?
    If not, we request that OSHA reconsider this issue due to the 
increased ergonomic risk it will place on employees. Requiring 
employees to hold the stick at a greater distance from the object 
they are handling or working on can put more stress on wrists, 
elbows and shoulders by changing the leverage point. We do not 
believe that the industry fatalities that support the proposed 
change occurred while employees were using insulated sticks. [Ex. 
0188]

    A live-line tool used by an employee to work on an energized part 
insulates the employee from that part. As noted earlier and in the 
preamble to the proposed rule (70 FR 34862), a live-line tool holds the 
energized part at a distance. Using a live-line tool, an employee can 
easily maintain minimum approach distances, at least once the tool is 
engaged with the energized part. The working position requirement in 
proposed paragraph (d)(2) did not apply to employees insulated from the 
energized parts, including employees working on live parts with live-
line tools. However, there may be energized parts in the work area 
other than the one the worker is handling with the tool, and he or she 
would not be insulated from those parts by the live-line tool. Thus, it 
was less clear from the language in the proposed rule whether a worker 
using a live-line tool on one part would be required to position 
himself or herself out of reach of the minimum approach distances from 
other energized parts.
    OSHA examined the accident reports in Ex. 0004 and found that only 
five of the 800 accidents in that database involved employees using the 
live-line tool work method approaching too close to an energized part 
operating between 600 volts and 72.5 kilovolts (Ex. 0004).\272\ This 
compares to the 27 other accidents involving uninsulated employees 
coming too close to energized parts noted previously. In addition, 
employees using live-line tools generally are looking in the direction 
of the live parts, are constantly aware of the presence of energized 
parts, and position themselves by means of the live-line tool at a 
fixed distance from the energized part on which they are working. Thus, 
it is much less likely that these employees (compared to employees not 
working on energized parts) will inadvertently encroach on the minimum 
approach distances for parts not being worked on. The Agency concludes 
that, although there is still some risk for employees using live-line 
tools, that risk is much lower than for employees not insulated at all 
from energized parts. Consequently, OSHA is adopting the commenters' 
suggestion and is exempting work performed with live-line tools from 
final paragraph (d)(2). This exemption only applies to work performed 
using live-line tools. Thus, an employee who is hanging hardware on a 
pole without the use of a tool or electrical protective equipment must 
be in a position where he or she cannot reach into the minimum approach 
distance of any part energized at 601 volts to 72.5 kilovolts, even if 
the employee performs other work on that pole using live-line tools. 
OSHA revised the language in Appendix B addressing the issue of proper 
work positioning to explain clearly how to comply with the minimum 
approach-distance requirements adopted in the final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \272\ See the five accidents described at https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=170378616&id=170577688&id=170336325&id=170089197&id=792739.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Paragraph (e) of Sec.  1926.960 in the final rule, which is being 
adopted without substantive change from the proposal, addresses the 
practices of connecting and disconnecting lines and equipment. Common 
industry practice, as specified in the 2002 NESC, Rule 443F,\273\ is 
for employees to make connections by connecting the source as the last 
item in the sequence and to break connections by removing the source as 
the first item in the sequence (Ex. 0077). These practices, specified 
by

[[Page 20459]]

paragraphs (e)(1) and (e)(2) in the final rule, will ensure that the 
wire or device handled by an employee remains deenergized as long as 
possible, thereby minimizing the chance that an electrical accident 
will occur. Also, to prevent energizing any disconnected conductors, 
employers must ensure that employees keep loose ends of conductors away 
from exposed, energized parts, as required by final paragraph (e)(3). 
These three provisions, which have no counterparts in existing Subpart 
V, duplicate the requirements of existing Sec.  1910.269(l)(5).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \273\ The 2012 NESC contains the same requirement in Rule 443F.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Paragraph (f) of final Sec.  1926.960, which OSHA adopted from 
existing Sec.  1910.269(l)(6)(i), provides that, when employees perform 
work within reach of exposed, energized parts, the employer must ensure 
that each employee removes, or renders nonconductive, all exposed 
conductive articles, such as keys or watches, if those articles would 
increase the hazards associated with contact with the energized parts. 
If an employee wears metal jewelry, he or she could cover the jewelry 
so as to eliminate the contact hazard. This requirement does not 
preclude workers from wearing metal rings or watch bands if the work 
already exposes them to electric-shock hazards and if the metal would 
not increase those hazards. (For example, for work performed on an 
overhead line, the wearing of a ring would not increase the likelihood 
that an employee would contact the line, nor would it increase the 
severity of the injury should contact occur.) This requirement protects 
employees working on energized circuits with small clearances and high 
current capacities (such as some battery-supplied circuits) from severe 
burn hazards. The rule also protects workers minimally exposed to shock 
hazards from injuries resulting from a dangling chain's making contact 
with an energized part. This provision has no counterpart in existing 
subpart V.
    The North Carolina Department of Labor recommended expanding the 
list of prohibited articles or discussing other conductive articles in 
the preamble to the final rule (Ex. 0098). The State agency pointed to 
an OSHA interpretation related to a comparable provision in existing 
Sec.  1910.333(c)(8).
    The interpretation to which the North Carolina Department of Labor 
referred was an intraagency memorandum dated December 30, 1993, and it 
related to whether Sec.  1910.333(c)(8), which is similar to proposed 
Sec.  1926.960(f), prohibits metal eyeglasses.\274\ This interpretation 
reads as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \274\ This memorandum is available at https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=INTERPRETATIONS&p_id=21350.

    Eyeglasses with exposed metal parts are considered ``Conductive 
apparel''. As noted in the middle of column 2 of page 32007 of the 
preamble published in Volume 55, Number 151 of the Federal Register 
on Monday, August 6, 1990, the Electrical Safety Related Work 
Practice standard at 1910.333(c)(8) prohibits employees from wearing 
conductive objects in a manner presenting an electrical contact 
hazard. Normally, the wearing of eyeglasses containing exposed metal 
frames (or metal parts of frames) is not considered to present an 
electrical contact hazard. However, when the glasses have a metal 
type frame and the employee is working with his or her face 
extremely close to energized parts or when a metallic chain strap is 
attached to the frame for wearing around the neck, an electrical 
contact hazard can be present. In such cases, the standard permits 
the hazard to be removed by eliminating the chain and wearing either 
a protective face shield or appropriate safety glasses over the 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
metal frame optical glasses.

    OSHA confirms that this interpretation also applies to paragraph 
(f) of the final rule. However, because eyeglasses would rarely pose 
the hazards addressed by this provision, the Agency concludes that it 
is not necessary to mention eyeglasses as an example of the type of 
conductive article prohibited by paragraph (f). Therefore, OSHA is 
adopting paragraph (f) in the final rule without substantive change 
from the proposal.
Protection From Flames and Electric Arcs
    Paragraph (g) of the final rule addresses protective clothing and 
other personal protective equipment worn by employees exposed to 
hazards posed by flames and electric arcs. OSHA revised the title of 
paragraph (g) in the final rule to ``Protection from flames and 
electric arcs'' to reflect more accurately that this paragraph 
addresses forms of protection other than protective clothing. (For the 
same reason, OSHA included language in final paragraph (g)(5) to be 
clear that that provision requires both protective clothing and other 
protective equipment.) In the 1994 rulemaking on Sec.  1910.269, OSHA 
determined that electric power generation, transmission, and 
distribution workers face a significant risk of injury from burns due 
to electric arcs (59 FR 4388). In that rulemaking, OSHA also concluded 
that certain fabrics increase the extent of injuries to employees 
caught in an electric arc or otherwise exposed to flames (59 FR 4389). 
Therefore, the Agency adopted two rules: (1) Existing Sec.  
1910.269(l)(6)(ii), which requires that employers train employees 
exposed to flames and electric arcs in the hazards related to the 
clothing that they wear, and (2) existing Sec.  1910.269(l)(6)(iii), 
which requires employers to ensure that employees exposed to flames or 
electric arcs do not wear clothing that, when exposed to flames or 
arcs, could increase the extent of injuries sustained by the workers. A 
note following existing Sec.  1910.269(l)(6)(iii) indicates the types 
of clothing fabrics that the Sec.  1910.269 rulemaking record 
demonstrated were hazardous when worn by employees exposed to electric 
arcs, namely, acetate, nylon, polyester, and rayon. The note explains 
that the standard prohibits the use of clothing made from these types 
of fabric unless the employer can demonstrate that the fabric was 
treated to withstand any relevant conditions or the employee wears it 
in a manner that eliminates the hazard.
    Need for protection from electric arcs and hazard assessment. Even 
after existing Sec.  1910.269(l)(6) became effective,\275\ employees 
continue to sustain burn injuries when working on energized lines and 
equipment. In the preamble to the 2005 Subpart V proposal, OSHA noted 
that, from January 1, 1990, to October 30, 1994, there were 46 
accidents investigated by Federal OSHA or State-plan occupational 
safety and health agencies involving burns addressed later by Sec.  
1910.269(l)(6)(iii) (70 FR 34866). These 46 accidents resulted in 71 
total injuries (id.). Averaged over this period, there were 9.5 
accidents and 14.7 injuries per year. Also in the preamble to the 2005 
proposal, OSHA noted that, from November 1, 1994 (when Sec.  
1910.269(l)(6)(iii) became effective), to December 31, 1998, there were 
17 relevant accidents resulting in 26 injuries (id.). Averaged over 
this period, there were 4.0 accidents and 6.2 injuries per year. Thus, 
while the clothing rule in Sec.  1910.269 appeared to reduce the number 
of relevant accidents and injuries by more than 50 percent, OSHA 
believed that the remaining risk of burn injury was still serious and 
significant when it published the proposal in 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \275\ The original Federal Register notice promulgating Sec.  
1910.269 set an effective date for Sec.  1910.269(l)(6) of May 31, 
1994 (59 FR 4320). However, OSHA subsequently stayed the enforcement 
of Sec.  1910.269(l)(6)(iii) until November 1, 1994 (59 FR 33658; 
June 30, 1994).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    OSHA based its belief that the risk of burn injury was serious and 
significant on two assumptions. First, the accidents identified in the 
2005 preamble

[[Page 20460]]

represented only a small fraction of the accidents that occurred during 
this period because employers must report to the Agency only accidents 
involving a fatality or three or more hospitalized injuries (29 CFR 
1904.39(a)). In this regard, OSHA generally does not investigate 
accidents that are not reported by employers (see OSHA directives CPL 
02-00-150 and CPL 02-00-094). Therefore, OSHA does not investigate, or 
have documentation of, most injury-producing accidents, even serious 
ones, so data on these accidents are not included in the information 
that OSHA reviewed. Second, the reported burn injuries identified in 
the 2005 preamble were extremely serious and costly. Eighty-four 
percent of the burn injuries were fatalities or required 
hospitalization (70 FR 34866). Eighty-seven percent of the accidents 
for which the report lists the severity of the injury involved third-
degree burns (id.). Such burns are extremely painful and costly, 
typically requiring skin grafts and leaving permanent scars.
    Dr. Mary Capelli-Schellpfeffer testified as OSHA's expert witness 
on the subject of protecting workers from the hazards posed by electric 
arcs. Dr. Capelli-Schellpfeffer received her medical degree from the 
University of Florida in 1982. She also holds a master's degree in 
public administration. Following her postgraduate medical training and 
several years in private practice, Dr. Capelli-Schellpfeffer served as 
the medical director of Wisconsin Energy Company, which included an 
electric utility and a nuclear power generating plant. She joined the 
University of Chicago, Department of Surgery Faculty, in 1993, where 
she served as the director of the hyperbaric unit of the University of 
Chicago Burn Center. Since 1999, she has worked as a consultant, 
researcher, and teacher, and has treated employees in outpatient 
clinical settings. She is licensed as a physician in Wisconsin, 
Illinois, and Maryland, and she is board certified by the American 
College of Preventive Medicine. Dr. Capelli-Schellpfeffer is also a 
member of the American College of Occupational and Environmental 
Medicine and a fellow of IEEE (Tr. 175-177).
    In her prepared testimony for the 2006 public hearing, Dr. Capelli-
Schellpfeffer described the physical properties of an electric arc and 
possible injury following exposure to an arc as follows:

    [A]n electric arc exposure in a 480 V installation with 22.6 kA 
available current is . . . captured on video from a high voltage 
test laboratory. . . . In the . . . test, data results showed peak 
monitored temperature exceeded 225 degrees C in 10 ms at the 
mannequin's hand, and at the mannequin's neck at 120 ms. Cooling of 
the hand to 70 degrees C required more than 2500 ms.
    The injuries that accompany high temperature exposures at the 
body surface are commonly referred to as skin burns. High 
temperature exposures that occur volumetrically, or that distribute 
within the body's tissues, are also called burns. The term burn 
generally refers to a physico-chemical change in the human tissue.
    For example, most people are familiar with the appearance of a 
superficial sunburn, and how painful this can be. As the skin's 
appearance changes more severely, the burn trauma is more profound, 
and can affect other organ systems. When skin changes are 
irreversible and irreparable, the trauma is severe.
    Other organs beside the skin can be burned. The mechanism or way 
organ injury unfolds in response to temperature is again sensitive 
to the temperature peak, duration, and biophysical processes.
    Additionally, the form of energy which creates the temperature 
rise can influence the injury, once more because of biophysical 
processes. For example, temperature change in the eye and 
recognition of the resulting injury from conductive heat exposure 
(like a piece of molten metal on the cornea) will be different than 
the injury from a radiation exposure (like UV light).
    The latent heat of melting subsequent to an electric arc can 
also serve as an ignition hazard for clothing. This means that along 
with the hazard from an arc's heat burning the skin, there is 
additional possibility of severe harm from the arc burning up 
clothing which lies against the skin. Burning clothing against the 
skin creates damage to the skin through conductive heating for the 
extended time which might be necessary to extinguish the clothing 
and start cooling.
* * * * *
    [T]est results illustrated the high degree of variability in 
electric arc faults and led to excerpts of video images into time-
lapsed photographs. The test results also provided exposure data. 
Finally, the stop action frames of video recordings permitted 
visualization of the dynamic changes in the tests involving the 
mannequin worker.
    Of particular note in the stop action frames of video recordings 
is the explosive speed and ``blast'' character of electric arcs. 
These images allow for the viewing of a destructive plasma ball, 
flames, and waves of air, smoke, and other gases.
    The heating from the sub-second thermal expansion of air and 
vaporization by sublimation of metallic conductors leads to pressure 
waves, referred to as the ``thermo acoustic effect'' of an electric 
arc.
* * * * *
    [A picture] illustrates the extent of injury that can follow an 
electric arc exposure. Eyes, ears, face, skin, limbs, and organs are 
affected. Basic bodily function, including the ability to breath[e], 
eat, urinate, and sleep are completely changed. For this patient, 
initial medical treatment cost more than $650,000, including five 
surgeries; $250,000 for reconstructive surgeries for five subsequent 
admissions; and $250,000 for [5] years of rehabilitation including 
over 100 physician visits and numerous therapy sessions. These costs 
represent only direct medical expenditures, without inclusion of 
indirect employer and family costs . . . . [Ex. 0373; emphasis 
included in original]

Dr. Capelli-Schellpfeffer's testimony reveals the power and injury-
producing effects of electric arcs. She also highlights the potential 
extent and costs of these injuries.
    OSHA's existing clothing requirement in Sec.  1910.269 does not 
require employers to protect employees from electric arcs through the 
use of flame-resistant (FR) clothing. It simply requires that an 
employee's clothing do no greater harm. Because the remaining risk to 
power workers from electric arcs is serious, the Agency proposed to 
revise the standard to require the use of flame-resistant clothing, 
under certain circumstances, to protect employees from severe burns. As 
OSHA noted in the preamble to the proposal (70 FR 34866), the electric 
power industry is beginning to recognize this need, as evidenced by the 
many employers that provide flame-resistant clothing to employees (see, 
for example, Ex. 0080), in ASTM standards that provide for arc ratings 
of protective clothing \276\ (see, for example, Exs. 0061, 0065, 0131, 
0326), and by the adoption of protective-clothing requirements in the 
2007 NESC \277\ (Ex. 0533). The National Fire Protection Association 
also recognizes the need to protect employees working on energized 
equipment from the hazards posed by electric arcs (see, for example, 
Ex. 0134).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \276\ ASTM also has standards for other arc-protective 
equipment, including ASTM F2178-08, Standard Test Method for 
Determining the Arc Rating and Standard Specification for Face 
Protective Products.
    \277\ The 2012 NESC also contains protective-clothing 
requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    When OSHA promulgated Sec.  1910.269, there were no standards for 
clothing to protect employees from the thermal hazards resulting from 
electric arcs. Since then, ASTM adopted such standards (see, for 
example, Exs. 0061, 0065, 0131, 0326). These standards ensure that 
clothing does not ignite and that it is rated to provide protection 
against a specific level of heat energy. Manufacturers label apparel 
meeting the ASTM standards with the amount of heat energy that the 
clothing can absorb under laboratory test conditions without letting 
through sufficient heat to cause a second-degree burn.\278\ Such 
clothing

[[Page 20461]]

currently is widely available in ratings from about 4 cal/cm \2\ to 
over 50 cal/cm \2\ (Tr. 412). In general, the higher the rating, the 
heavier the clothing; however, lighter fabrics now provide a level of 
protection equivalent to heavier fabrics used in the past (Tr. 440).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \278\ OSHA explains the arc rating for clothing in the summary 
and explanation for final paragraph (g)(5), under the heading 
Selecting arc-rated protective clothing and other protective 
equipment, later in this section of the preamble.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some rulemaking participants generally supported OSHA's proposal to 
require the use of FR clothing \279\ in certain circumstances. (See, 
for example, Exs. 0155, 0230, 0235, 0241, 0505; Tr. 895-897.) IBEW, 
ESCI, and the Independent Electrical Contractors, among others, 
supported FR clothing requirements (Exs. 0155, 0230, 0241, 0505; Tr. 
895-897). ORC voiced general support for the proposal's approach to 
arc-flash protection, commenting:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \279\ The final rule requires arc-rated clothing (which also is 
flame-resistant) in some circumstances and FR clothing in others. 
When the distinction is unimportant, as when discussing general 
comments on the need for protective clothing, OSHA uses the term 
``FR clothing,'' even though the final rule may require that 
clothing also be arc rated. For a detailed explanation of the 
difference between FR clothing and arc-rated clothing, see the 
summary and explanation for final paragraph (g)(5), under the 
heading Selecting arc-rated protective clothing and other protective 
equipment, later in this section of the preamble.

    ORC generally supports the proposed requirements to protect 
employees from the thermal hazards of electric arcs. Assessing the 
potential for employee exposure to hazards from flames or electric 
arcs is appropriate for employees working with or near energized 
equipment and where their work clothing could be ignited directly by 
molten metals or electric arcs or by flammable materials ignited by 
an electric arc. Prohibiting the wearing of clothing that could melt 
or ignite and requiring the wearing of flame-resistant and 
appropriate arc-rated clothing based on the extent of the hazards 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
present are also appropriate. [Ex. 0235]

    Many electric utility representatives generally opposed the 
proposed requirements for protection from electric arcs. (See, for 
example, Exs. 0177, 0183, 0202, 0220, 0227, 0233, 0238, 0401; Tr. 371-
374, 1093-1104, 1184-1185.) Some of these rulemaking participants 
suggested that the requirements in existing Sec.  1910.269 were 
sufficiently protective and that there was insufficient evidence of a 
need to adopt more protective requirements. (See, for example, Exs. 
0177, 0181, 0227.) For instance, Consumers Energy stated that, in its 
experience, existing Sec.  1910.269(1)(6)(iii) ``has been largely 
effective'' (Ex. 0177). Some commenters argued that the accidents that 
occurred were the result of employees violating safety-related work 
rules. (See, for example, Exs. 0152, 0238.) For instance, Mr. Frank 
Owen Brockman with Farmers Rural Electric Cooperative Corporation 
commented: ``Most people are . . . injured not by arcs and their heat, 
but by not following the simple, most basic rules'' (Ex. 0401).
    OSHA acknowledges that the adoption of existing Sec.  1910.269 in 
1994 led to a reduction in the number (and potentially the severity) of 
burn and other injuries incurred by power line workers exposed to 
electric arcs. However, the Agency concludes that existing Sec.  
1910.269 has not been sufficiently protective in preventing these 
injuries.
    As noted earlier, the 6.2 injuries per year that OSHA identified as 
being caused by electric arcs represent only a small fraction of such 
injuries experienced by electric power generation, transmission, and 
distribution workers. Moreover, the vast majority of the injuries OSHA 
identified are extremely serious, such as the accident described in Dr. 
Capelli-Schellpfeffer's testimony.
    OSHA's final regulatory analysis estimates that there are 444 
serious injuries occurring each year during work addressed by the final 
rule. This estimate was derived by multiplying the 25 serious injuries 
actually reported annually over the period examined by a specified 
correction factor to account for undercounting. (See Section VI, Final 
Economic Analysis and Regulatory Flexibility Analysis, later in the 
preamble to the final rule.) Multiplying the 6.2 reported serious arc-
related injuries by the ratio of 444 estimated injuries to 25 reported 
injuries yields an estimate of 110 serious arc-related injuries still 
occurring each year. As noted earlier, the vast majority of these 
injuries involve third-degree burns.
    Existing Sec.  1910.269 requires extensive training in electrical 
safety-related work practices, and evidence in the record indicates 
that workers covered by this final rule receive extensive training in 
these practices and are highly qualified to perform electric power 
generation, transmission, and distribution work. Mr. Albert Smoak with 
Southwestern Electric Power Company stated, ``We have a very extensive 
apprentice program. And so we spend lots of money doing that. Our 
apprentices are very well trained'' (Tr. 1229). Mr. William Mattiford 
of Henkels & McCoy testified, ``Employees are trained either by Henkels 
and McCoy or other construction companies or have undergone extensive 
training in a certified apprenticeship program'' (Tr. 1318-1319). 
Similar statements appear elsewhere in the rulemaking record. (See, for 
example, Tr. 1238-1239.) As the data show, however, serious arc-related 
incidents continue to occur during work covered by this final rule. 
Even Mr. Brockman recognized that ``in the majority of [accidents], the 
fatality involved [a] worker who had been appropriately trained for the 
exposure'' (Tr. 1278).
    It would be contrary to the purposes of the OSH Act for the Agency 
to set standards based on an expectation that there will be perfect 
compliance with work-rule requirements. To be effective, such work-rule 
provisions rely, in part, on employee compliance with employer work 
practices. Because there will always be occasional instances of 
noncompliance with work rules, OSHA standards incorporate secondary 
protective measures. Moreover, arcs can occur as a result of 
circumstances that work rules cannot control. For example, electric 
arcs can result from accidents, such as an employee's dropping a tool 
onto energized parts (Ex. 0004 \280\). According to Dr. Capelli-
Schellpfeffer, other causes of electric arcs on electric utility 
systems include transient overvoltage disturbances (such as lightning, 
switching surges, arcing ground fault in ungrounded systems), 
mechanical breaking, cracking, loosening, abrading or deforming of 
static or structural parts, and shorting by animals (Ex. 0373). These 
types of electric arcs generally do not result from poor work 
practices. Exhibit 0004 describes 100 accidents involving electric 
arcs. More than 10 percent of those accidents involved equipment 
failure or internal faults.\281\ Dr. Capelli-Schellpfeffer testified 
about one of the reasons for this type of event:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \280\ See, for example, the accident described at https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=201841061.
    \281\ See the 12 accidents described at https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=201340395&id=170749873&id=170632699&id=170762769&id=14343594&id=170238109&id=170891899&id=170358428&id=170888259&id=170727697&id=14241863&id=170193353.

    There is more available power in the electric system, and the 
higher availables put more stress, electromechanical stress, on the 
infrastructure, at the same time that the infrastructure that we 
have installed is mature. It is aging. And so there is a transition 
in the experience of the power systems from fairly low levels of 
available power and a relatively young infrastructure from the time 
of the 1950s and `60s, to where we are today at the beginning of the 
21st century where the availables are orders of magnitude higher, 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
and the infrastructure is far more mature. [Tr. 205-206]

IBEW explained:

    Arcs can occur for reasons totally independent of the conduct of 
employees or the utilities or contractors. Thus, arcs can result 
from the presence of rodents, changes in mechanical properties, 
environmental

[[Page 20462]]

conditions or the amount of stress that increasing amounts of 
available power are putting on the aging infrastructure. [Tr.] 205, 
207. Arc events are complicated and variable, and no one strategy 
for preventing or protecting against them will be ``maximally 
protective.'' Moreover, whatever the reason for an arc flash, the 
fact is that they occur in the electrical transmission and 
distribution industry, and there are measures that can be taken to 
minimize the hazard they pose to employees. As Dr. Capelli-
Schellpfeffer noted, employee protection requires a ``multifactorial 
approach,'' [Tr.] 210, which includes the use of FR clothing so that 
if all else fails, employees will remain protected. [Ex. 0505]

    The Agency, thus, continues to believe that further reductions in 
the number and severity of arc-flash-related injuries will result from 
adopting requirements that provide protection from electric arcs in a 
way that supplements the existing requirements in Sec.  1910.269 
designed to prevent electric arcs and the ignition of clothing when 
arcs do occur. OSHA concludes that, under existing Sec.  1910.269 and 
subpart V, the risks associated with electric arcs warrant additional 
protection for employees.
    The Agency does agree with APPA, however, that protective clothing 
``is not a comprehensive solution to eliminating fire related injuries 
in [the electric utility] industry'' (Ex. 0504). Paragraph (g) of the 
final rule protects employees in case an electric arc occurs in spite 
of other provisions in the final rule designed to prevent them from 
happening in the first place.
    The National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) recommended that, 
even if the Agency found that there is a significant risk of arc-flash 
burns for activities covered by this final rule, it should state 
clearly that no findings indicate whether there is significant risk for 
activities outside the scope of the final rule (Ex. 0222). The 
association maintained that Sec. Sec.  1910.132 and 1926.95 do not 
presently require arc-flash hazard assessments or arc-rated clothing 
and that there is no justification for citations under those standards 
or the general duty clause. NAM also recommended that the Agency 
instruct its enforcement personnel not to issue such citations.
    The risk findings OSHA makes in this preamble regarding hazards 
posed by electric arcs address only the types of work covered by this 
final rule. However, some existing general industry and construction 
standards already address these hazards. For example, Sec.  
1910.335(a)(2)(ii) requires the use of protective shields, barriers, or 
insulating materials ``to protect each employee from shock, burns, or 
other electrically related injuries while that employee is working . . 
. where dangerous electric heating or arcing might occur'' (emphasis 
added). Furthermore, Sec.  1926.95(a) requires personal protective 
equipment ``wherever it is necessary by reason of hazards of processes 
or environment, chemical hazards, radiological hazards, or mechanical 
irritants encountered in a manner capable of causing injury or 
impairment in the function of any part of the body through absorption, 
inhalation, or physical contact.'' Also, the generally applicable PPE 
provisions for both general industry and construction--Sec. Sec.  
1910.132(a) and 1926.95(a)--specifically mention ``protective 
clothing'' as one form of required protection. The Agency described its 
enforcement policy relating to the protection of employees from 
electric-arc hazards in certain situations not covered by this final 
rule in several letters of interpretation. (See, for example, the 
November 14, 2006, letter to Ms. Joanne Linhard and the February 29, 
2008, letter to Mr. Brian Dolin.\282\)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \282\ The Dolin letter is available at https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=INTERPRETATIONS&p_id=25973.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Several commenters argued against the proposed requirements for 
arc-protective clothing on the grounds that it is expensive and 
uncomfortable. (See, for example, Exs. 0158, 0183, 0202, 0229, 0233, 
0239.) For instance, NRECA commented:

    Data so far suggest that arc protective clothing is expensive 
and is uncomfortable to wear, especially in hot and humid climates. 
Of course, the discomfort in wearing arc protective clothing is 
largely because it must act as a heat shield and, therefore, it is 
inherently bulky. [Ex. 0233]

    OSHA finds that the costs associated with the requirements of 
paragraph (g) of the final rule are commensurate with the benefits 
resulting from those requirements. (For a detailed response to this 
issue, see the discussion of comments on balance of risk and costs in 
employing protective equipment to prevent arc-related burns in Section 
VI, Final Economic Analysis and Regulatory Flexibility Analysis, later 
in the preamble to the final rule.)
    As explained later in this section of the preamble, OSHA determined 
that the PPE required by paragraph (g) of the final rule is not likely 
to be unduly uncomfortable for employees to wear. In any event, the 
Agency does not believe that discomfort alone would justify deleting 
Sec.  1926.960(g) from the final rule. Complaints that PPE is 
uncomfortable have been common throughout the Agency's history. For 
example, employees have complained that hard hats and eye protection 
are too uncomfortable to wear. (See, for example, I.T.O. Corp. of New 
England v. OSHRC, 540 F.2d 543, 546 (1st Cir. 1976), noting ``employee 
complaints that the [hard] hats created minor inconveniences e.g., 
because they were too heavy, too light, too hot, or too cold''; and 
Lewis County Dairy Corp., 2006 WL 3247249, at *10 (03-1533, 2006) 
(ALJ), noting that ``[the plant manager] knew that employees did not 
always wear eye protection and that it was difficult to get them to do 
so as they found it uncomfortable.'') In this rulemaking, the tree 
trimming industry complained that employees find body harnesses 
uncomfortable. (See, for example, Exs. 0174, 0200, 0219.) Although OSHA 
generally advises employers to take the comfort of protective equipment 
into consideration when selecting appropriate protective items for 
their employees, the Agency concludes that the potential for complaints 
about comfort does not outweigh the strong evidence that there is a 
safety need for employees covered by this final rule to use PPE when 
exposed to electric-arc hazards.
    Paragraph (g)(1) of the final rule, which is being adopted without 
substantive change from the proposal, requires the employer to assess 
the workplace to identify employees exposed to hazards from flames or 
electric arcs.\283\ This provision ensures that the employer evaluates 
employee exposure to flames and electric arcs so that employees who 
face such exposures receive the required protection. Because final 
Sec.  1926.960 applies to work performed on or near exposed, energized 
parts of electric circuits, employers do not need to conduct 
assessments under paragraph (g)(1) for employees who do not perform 
such work. However, until the employer ensures the complete 
deenergization of a line or part of an electric circuit following the 
procedures required by final Sec.  1926.961, including any required 
testing and grounding, the line or part must be considered and treated 
as energized as required by final Sec.  1926.960(b)(2). Also, final 
paragraphs (g)(2) through (g)(5) protect employees only from the 
thermal hazards posed by flames and electric arcs. Therefore, if

[[Page 20463]]

the hazard assessment required by paragraph (g)(1) shows employee 
exposure to other hazards, then other standards, such as Sec. Sec.  
1910.132(a) and 1926.95(a), may require the employer to provide PPE for 
those hazards. (See the discussion under the heading Protecting 
employees from flying debris from electric arcs, later in this section 
of the preamble.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \283\ Under paragraph (g)(1), employers need not identify 
employees by name. The required identification can also be 
occupation based, task based, or location based provided that each 
employee exposed to hazards from flames or from electric arcs 
receives the protection that paragraph (g) requires.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Final paragraph (g)(1) requires the employer to assess the 
workplace to identify employees ``exposed to hazards from flames or 
from electric arcs.'' A few commenters requested that OSHA define this 
phrase in the final rule (Exs. 0170, 0222, 0237). These commenters 
argued that simply operating electric equipment, such as a disconnect 
switch in an electrical box, does not pose a significant risk of injury 
from an electric arc. For example, the American Forest & Paper 
Association stated these concerns as follows:

    [W]e are concerned that the language of proposed Sections 
1910.269(l)(11) and 1926.960(g) could have unintended consequences 
if interpreted to apply to employees not exposed to a significant 
risk * * *
* * * * *
    [W]e do not believe the individual who opens or closes the 
electrical disconnect on an enclosed electrical box or panel with 
the cover on/closed would be exposed to a significant risk of harm 
from arc flash hazards, but that is not clear from the proposed 
regulatory text or the preamble. A contrary interpretation would 
involve a huge increase in the cost of both the proposed standards 
and their potential extension outside the Electric Power Sector. 
[Ex. 0237; emphasis in original; footnote omitted.]

    If the employer properly installs and maintains enclosed equipment 
and if there is no evidence of impending failure, the risk that an 
electric arc will occur is low enough that the Agency would not deem 
there to be exposure to electric-arc hazards.\284\ For the purposes of 
final paragraph (g), OSHA will consider an employee ``exposed'' to 
electric-arc hazards whenever there is a reasonable likelihood that an 
electric arc will occur in the employee's work area. The Agency 
considers there to be a reasonable likelihood that an electric arc will 
occur whenever the probability of such an event is higher than it is 
for the normal operation of enclosed equipment.\285\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \284\ There is still a low risk that the equipment will fail 
(with or without an employee operating it); however, that risk is 
low enough that no arc-flash protection is necessary. This risk is 
equivalent to the risk encountered by employees every day when they 
turn on the lights.
    \285\ Basically, OSHA considers there to be a reasonable 
likelihood that an electric arc will occur when an employee operates 
enclosed electric equipment in a manner that is not in accordance 
with the manufacturer's recommendations (that is, normal operation) 
or when an employee operates enclosed electric equipment that the 
employer has not maintained properly.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In contrast, whenever the risk that an arc will occur is higher 
than the risk of such an occurrence posed by the normal operation of 
enclosed equipment, the Agency considers electric-arc hazards to be 
present. For example, operating equipment that is not enclosed (for 
example, racking in a circuit breaker) poses such a risk (Ex. 0004 
\286\). Conductive objects can fall onto exposed live parts and cause 
an arc. Evidence that the equipment may be defective, for example, 
arcing noises or unusual behavior or heating, indicates that there is 
employee exposure to the hazards of electric arcs (id. \287\). Also, 
working near energized parts exposes employees to electric-arc hazards 
whenever the employee or another conductive object can contact those 
energized parts and other parts at a different potential (id. \288\). 
(See the definition of ``exposed'' and the summary and explanation for 
final Sec.  1926.960(b)(3), earlier in this section of the preamble.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \286\ See, for example, the three accidents described at https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=14328736&id=200962322&id=170197156.
    \287\ See, for example, the two accidents described at https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=170762769&id=170204622.
    \288\ See, for example, the three accidents described at https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=170054258&id=170614002&id=170611057.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    With respect to the American Forest & Paper Association's comment 
about opening and closing disconnects in an enclosed electrical box, 
evidence in the record indicates that equipment enclosures do not 
always provide adequate protection against electrical faults (Ex. 
0373). A paper by Jones et al. \289\ described the results of one 
arcing-fault test as follows: ``the fault blew the door open and 
progressed up the vertical bus, completely destroying the vertical 
section of the [motor control center]'' (id.). A paper by Land \290\ 
described problems the Navy had in 1979 with arcing faults in 
switchboards: ``These arcs could completely destroy a switchboard 
within a matter of seconds'' (id.). Although these events may be 
uncommon, OSHA believes that it is appropriate for the standard to 
require the employer to assess the hazards posed by different 
operations and distinguish conditions that expose employees to 
electric-arc hazards from conditions that do not. For example, 
employers may consider a properly maintained switch as posing no 
electric-arc hazards when an employee is opening it under normal 
conditions. On the other hand, if there is evidence that the switch may 
be faulty or if the employee is opening the switch to troubleshoot the 
circuit, OSHA would expect the employer to assume that the switch does 
pose electric-arc hazards. Evidence that a switch may be faulty can 
include the presence of arcing or unusual noise from the switch, 
abnormally high temperatures around the switch, and safety bulletins 
from the switch manufacturer indicating that the device might fail 
under certain operating conditions. Thus, OSHA concludes that it is not 
always safe to operate an enclosed switch and, therefore, is not 
generally exempting such activities from the hazard-assessment 
requirement in final paragraph (g)(1) or any of the other provisions in 
final paragraph (g).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \289\ Jones, R. A., Liggett, D. P., Capelli-Schellpfeffer, M., 
Macalady, T., Saunders, L. F., Downey, R. E., McClung, L. B., Smith, 
A., Jamil, S., Saporita, V. J., ``Staged Tests Increase Awareness of 
Arc-Flash Hazards in Electrical Equipment,'' IEEE Transactions on 
Industry Applications Society, 36(2): 659-667, March-April 2000.
    \290\ Land III, H. B., ``The Behavior of Arcing Faults in Low 
Voltage Switchboards,'' 2005 IEEE ESTS, Philadelphia, pp. 133-140, 
2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    OSHA does not believe that applying paragraph (g)(1) of the final 
rule in this manner will impose substantial extra costs on employers. 
The Agency anticipates that, in the vast majority of cases, the 
employer will determine that employees operating enclosed switches will 
have no exposure to hazards from electric arcs. On the basis of the 
foregoing discussion, it should be clear that the only occasions that 
an employee performing a switching operation would have exposure to 
electric-arc hazards under paragraph (g)(1), and, thus, be required to 
use arc-rated protection, would be if: a switch or other disconnect may 
be faulty (which should be rare); an employee operates a switch outside 
its rating \291\ (which also should be rare), or an employee is 
performing troubleshooting or repair on the switch or a circuit 
controlled by the switch. In the latter case, the employee will be 
exposed to those same hazards during the troubleshooting or repair 
activities, when appropriate arc-flash protection would be required 
anyway. For the rare cases in which the employer has reason to believe 
that the switch might fail and expose an employee to an electric-arc 
hazard, the protection afforded by arc-flash protection would be 
necessary.

[[Page 20464]]

However, the need to outfit the employee in arc-flash protection in 
such cases will serve as an incentive to effect repair of the switch 
and remove the hazard.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \291\ Operating a switch or other disconnect outside its rating 
is prohibited by Sec.  1926.960(k) of the final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some commenters argued that some utilities perform work with live-
line tools, which limits employee exposure to hazards posed by electric 
arcs and makes FR clothing unnecessary. (See, for example, Exs. 0125, 
0171, 0179, 0188, 0226.) NECA also argued that 40-cal/cm\2\ arc-flash 
suits with hoods would reduce manual dexterity to the point that they 
would interfere with the employee's ability to use live-line tools (Ex. 
0171).
    OSHA agrees that work with live-line tools exposes employees to a 
lower incident-energy level than work directly on energized parts with 
rubber insulating gloves because employees working with live-line tools 
are normally farther from an electric arc than employees using gloves. 
(The tables in Appendix E use a method of estimating heat energy that 
assumes that employees using live-line tools will be substantially 
further away from the arc than employees using rubber insulating 
gloves.) All of the incident-energy calculation methods (described 
later in this section of the preamble) result in energy estimates that 
are approximately inversely proportional to the square of the distance. 
This proportion means that, when the employee is twice as far from the 
electric arc, he or she has exposure to no more than a quarter of the 
energy. OSHA does not believe that there are many, if any, working 
conditions that would expose an employee using a live-line tool to an 
incident energy of 40-cal/cm\2\. NECA's example using clothing 
appropriate for such high exposure contradicts its claim that employees 
using live-line tools face reduced exposures.
    As discussed later in this section of the preamble, final paragraph 
(g)(4)(iv) requires FR clothing when the estimated incident-energy 
levels are more than 2.0 cal/cm\2\. If live-line tool work practices 
limit incident-energy levels to that value or less, then paragraph 
(g)(4) may not require flame-resistant clothing. However, clothing can 
ignite even at low incident-energy levels. For example, an arc can 
ignite insulating fluid in transformers and other equipment, which 
could ultimately ignite clothing (Ex. 0004 \292\). Current passing 
through grounding conductors can melt those conductors and ignite 
clothing (id. \293\). Hot debris from faulted equipment can spew out 
and ignite clothing (Exs. 0342, 0373). Final paragraph (g)(4), as 
described more fully later in this section of the preamble, requires 
flame-resistant clothing in those scenarios. OSHA is not exempting 
live-line tool work from the hazard assessment or other requirements in 
paragraph (g) of the final rule. Employers must account for the 
possibility of clothing ignition from sources other than incident heat 
energy in the hazard assessment required by paragraph (g)(1) of the 
final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \292\ See the seven accidents described at https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=200671253&id=201340395&id=170762769&id=170632699&id=1450477
3&id=14343594&id=837815.
    \293\ See the accident described at https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=596304.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The American Forest & Paper Association commented that the proposed 
definition of ``exposed'' in Sec.  1926.968 does not seem applicable to 
the use of the word ``exposed'' in proposed Sec.  1926.960(g) because 
the definition refers to a conductor or part rather than a person (Ex. 
0237).
    OSHA agrees that the definition in final Sec.  1926.968 relates 
only to parts of electric circuits; it does not address employee 
exposure to hazards other than exposure to live parts.\294\ To clarify 
the application of the definition of ``exposed'' in Sec.  1926.968 of 
the final rule, OSHA is adding the parenthetical phrase ``(as applied 
to energized parts)'' to the defined term ``exposed.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \294\ Several provisions in subpart V in addition to final Sec.  
1926.960(g) refer to employee exposure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Estimating incident heat energy.\295\ Once an employer determines 
the employees exposed to hazards from flames or electric arcs, the next 
step in protecting these employees is to determine the extent of the 
hazard. Paragraph (g)(2) of the final rule, which OSHA revised from the 
proposal as described later in this section of the preamble, requires 
the employer to make a reasonable estimate of the incident heat energy 
to which each employee exposed to electric-arc hazards would be 
exposed. Under final paragraph (g)(5), employers must use this estimate 
to select appropriate PPE.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \295\ This preamble uses the term ``incident energy'' as a 
synonym for ``incident heat energy.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As noted in the preamble to the proposal, OSHA is aware of various 
methods of calculating values of available heat energy from an electric 
circuit (70 FR 34866-34867). Table 10, later in this section of the 
preamble, lists methods that were available when OSHA proposed 
paragraph (g)(2). Each method requires the input of various parameters, 
such as fault current, the expected length of the electric arc, the 
distance from the arc to the employee, and the clearing time for the 
fault (that is, the time the circuit protective devices take to open 
the circuit and clear the fault). Some of these parameters, such as the 
fault current and the clearing time, are known quantities for a given 
system. Other parameters, such as the length of the arc and the 
distance between the arc and the employee, vary depending on what 
happens to initiate the electric arc and are estimated parameters. It 
should be noted that NFPA 70E-2004 Annex D contains three different 
methods of estimating incident heat energy: (1) a method based on a 
paper by Lee entitled ``The Other Electrical Hazard: Electric Arc Blast 
Burns,'' \296\ also known as the ``Lee equation''; (2) a method based 
on the Doughty, Neal, and Floyd paper, which Table 10 lists separately; 
and (3) the IEEE 1584 method, which Table 10 also lists 
separately.\297\ The following discussion refers to the method based on 
the Lee equation as the NFPA 70E Annex D method.\298\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \296\ Lee, R. H., ``The Other Electrical Hazard: Electric Arc 
Blast Burns, '' IEEE Transactions on Industry Applications, 1A-
18(3):246--251, May/June 1982 (Ex. 0433).
    \297\ NFPA 70E-2012, Annex D, contains the same three methods 
plus an additional method for calculating incident heat energy for 
dc systems. Although OSHA has not evaluated this new method, 
employers may use it to calculate incident heat energy if it 
reasonably predicts the incident energy for the system involved.
    \298\ NFPA 70E-2012, Annex D, also contains the Lee equation. 
Consequently, OSHA's conclusions regarding the NFPA 70E-2004 Annex D 
method also apply to NFPA 70E-2012, and Appendix E to final Subpart 
V references NFPA 70E-2012. Unless otherwise noted, the preamble 
references to the content of NFPA 70E-2004, Annex D, apply equally 
to NFPA 70E-2012.

[[Page 20465]]



 Table 10--Methods of Calculating Incident Heat Energy From an Electric
                                   Arc
------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Standard for Electrical Safety Requirements for Employee Workplaces,
 NFPA 70E-2004, Annex D, ``Sample Calculation of Flash Protection
 Boundary.''
2. Doughty, T. E., Neal, T. E., and Floyd II, H. L., ``Predicting
 Incident Energy to Better Manage the Electric Arc Hazard on 600 V Power
 Distribution Systems,'' Record of Conference Papers IEEE IAS 45th
 Annual Petroleum and Chemical Industry Conference, September 28-30,
 1998.
3. Guide for Performing Arc Flash Hazard Calculations, IEEE Std 1584-
 2002.
4. Heat Flux Calculator, a free software program created by Alan
 Privette (widely available on the Internet).
5. ARCPRO, a commercially available software program developed by
 Kinectrics, Toronto, ON, CA.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Employee arc exposures. One of the following three separate types 
of electric arcs typically serves as the basis for the methods used to 
estimate incident energy: single-phase arc in open air, three-phase arc 
in open air, and three-phase arc in an enclosure (arc in a box) (Exs. 
0425, 0430, 0433, 0463, 0468, 0469). A single-phase arc occurs when 
electric current arcs from a circuit part for one phase to ground or to 
a circuit part for another phase. A three-phase arc involves arcing 
between all three phases of a three-phase circuit. A single-phase arc 
can escalate into a three-phase arc as the air around the arc ionizes 
and becomes more conductive (Ex. 0425). Both kinds of arcs can occur in 
open air or inside an enclosure. The incident-energy levels vary 
between the types of arcs, with energy levels progressively increasing 
from single-phase arcs in open air, to three-phase arcs in open air, to 
three-phase arcs in a box (Exs. 0425, 0430, 0468). OSHA finds that, for 
an estimate of heat energy to be reasonable, it must account for the 
type of exposure the employee likely will encounter.
    Varying results using different calculation methods. Many 
rulemaking participants objected to the proposed requirement that 
employers make a reasonable estimate of the incident heat energy 
associated with an employee's exposure to an electric-arc hazard. (See, 
for example, Exs. 0152, 0173, 0178, 0201, 0209, 0227, 0233, 0501; Tr. 
374-376, 547-548, 1094-1098, 1100-1102.) Some of these rulemaking 
participants focused on purported problems with methods of calculating 
incident heat energy. (See, for example, Exs. 0152, 0173, 0201, 0209, 
0227, 0233, 0501; Tr. 547, 1094-1098, 1100-1102.) These commenters 
maintained that the results of calculations from the different methods 
varied widely or are subject to manipulation that would make the 
calculation methods unreliable or unscientific (id.). For example, Ms. 
Kathy Wilmer, testifying on behalf of EEI, spoke to the wide variations 
she found in calculating incident heat energy using the methods listed 
in the proposed rule:

    OSHA does not endorse any of the methods listed in the table. 
OSHA further acknowledges that the method of calculation can affect 
the results inasmuch as each method yields somewhat different values 
using the same input parameters.
* * * * *
    [F]our methods, including two tables and two formulas, were 
compared for the conditions of 15,000 volts, 5,000 amps, and 34.5 
cycles. The heat energies determined were, No. 1, from Appendix F, 
Table 8,\[\\299\\]\ of the proposal, 5 calories per square 
centimeter; No. 2, from the HeatFlux Calculator, 2.9 calories per 
square centimeter; No. 3, from NFPA 70E, Table 
130.7(c)(9)(a),\[\\300\\]\ 40 calories per square centimeter, as it 
is listed as risk category 4 \[\\301\\]\ for work on energized parts 
in the other equipment over 1,000-fold category; No. 4, from NFPA 
70E, Annex D, D7, formula, 153 calories per square centimeter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \299\ Table 8 in proposed Appendix F listed estimates of 
incident energy for different parts of an electrical system 
operating at 4 to 46 kilovolts. OSHA based these estimates on the 
ARCPRO method.
    \300\ NFPA 70E-2004 Table 130.7(C)(9)(a) is a method for 
selecting PPE based on hazard/risk categories. Proposed Appendix F 
did not list NFPA 70E-2004, Table 130.7(C)(9)(a), as an acceptable 
method of estimating incident-energy level.
    \301\ NFPA 70E-2004, Table 130.7(C)(11) lists the following 
hazard-risk categories (HRC) with the corresponding minimum required 
arc ratings: 0-none, 1-4 cal/cm\2\, 2-8 cal/cm\2\, 3-25 cal/cm\2\, 
4-40 cal/cm\2\.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In summary, the results were 2.9, 5, 40, and 153 calories per 
square centimeter for the same conditions: 15,000 volts, 5,000 amps, 
34.5 cycles. Again, this example illustrates serious concerns about 
the reliability of methods offered to determine heat energy on 
transmission and distribution systems. [Tr. 1096, 1101-1102]

    OSHA applied the same methods Ms. Wilmer described in this comment 
and arrived at values similar to the values provided in her testimony, 
as shown in Table 11.

                      Table 11--Sample Incident-Energy Calculations Using Different Methods
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                  Method                                         Incident energy (cal/cm\2\)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Heat flux calculator......................  3.0 (results must be rounded up to ensure that the protective
                                             equipment rating equals or exceeds this value).
Table 8 from proposed Appendix F..........  5.0.
NFPA 70E-2004, Annex D, section D.7.......  152.
NFPA 70E-2004, Table 130.7(C)(9)(a).......  Not applicable. Table 130.7(C)(9)(a) lists a Hazard-Risk Category of
                                             2 (8 cal/cm\2\) for insulated cable examination in open areas,
                                             which is an exposure comparable to that of a single-phase arc in
                                             open air represented by the Heat Flux calculator and Table 8 from
                                             proposed Appendix F. Table 130.7(C)(9)(a) lists a Hazard-Risk
                                             Category of 4 (40 cal/cm\2\) for work on energized parts, which is
                                             an exposure comparable to the three-phase arc in an enclosure
                                             represented by the method in NFPA 70E-2004, Annex D, section D.7.
                                             However, as explained later in this section of the preamble, Table
                                             130.7(C)(9)(a) combines a risk assessment with incident-energy
                                             calculation and does not represent incident energy alone.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A closer look at these results shows that the two software 
programs, heat flux calculator and ARCPRO (upon which OSHA based Table 
8 of proposed Appendix F), produce similar results: 3.0 cal/cm\2\ for 
the heat flux calculator and 5.0 cal/cm\2\ for ARCPRO. Because the arc 
rating for the lightest weight arc-rated clothing ranges from 4.0 to 
5.0 cal/

[[Page 20466]]

cm\2\, both programs would lead generally to the use of the same 
minimum level of protection for the system parameters at issue.\302\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \302\ As explained later in this section of the preamble, Table 
6 and Table 7 in Appendix E in the final rule set a minimum level of 
4.0 cal/cm\2\, which is the minimum level of arc-rated clothing 
currently available.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The heat flux calculator and ARCPRO both calculate incident energy 
produced by single-phase arcs in air, which is clear in the ARCPRO 
documentation (Ex. 0468). Also, the preamble to the proposal clearly 
stated that the results from the heat flux calculator require 
adjustment for application to exposures involving three-phase arcs or 
arcs in enclosures (70 FR 34867), and other evidence in the record 
indicates that the calculator is designed for application to single-
phase arc exposures (Exs. 0430, 0463).
    The incident-energy estimate resulting from application of the 
formula in NFPA 70E-2004, Annex D, is significantly higher than the 
results obtained using either of the software programs. There are two 
reasons for this difference. First, the formula that appears in section 
D.7 of NFPA 70E, Annex D, is designed to calculate the incident energy 
produced by a three-phase arc in open air. The corresponding single-
phase exposure, based on an ARCPRO conversion factor (multiplying 
single-phase values by 2.2 to convert them to three-phase values or, 
conversely, dividing three-phase values by 2.2 to convert them to 
single-phase values), would be 70 cal/cm\2\ (Ex. 0468). Second, 
although NFPA 70E states that the formula in section D.7 of Annex D can 
be used to predict the incident energy produced by arcs on systems 
operating at more than 600 volts, it also explicitly warns about doing 
so, noting:

    The following example is conservative at voltage levels above 
600 volts. Experience suggests that the example is conservative at 
voltage levels above 600 volts and becomes more conservative as the 
voltage increases. [Ex. 0134; annex section D.1\303\]

    \303\ NFPA 70E-2012, Annex D, contains the same equation in 
Section D.6. Similar language warning about conservative results 
from using the Lee paper for voltages over 600 volts appears in 
Table D.1, Limitation of Calculation Methods.

    Consequently, it is not surprising that the incident-energy 
estimate calculated using Annex D of NFPA 70E-2004 for a scenario 
involving a single-phase arc on a 15-kilovolt system \304\ is 
substantially higher than the values derived using the two software 
programs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \304\ Although Ms. Wilmer did not state that her scenario 
involved a single-phase exposure, her use of Table 8 in proposed 
Appendix F, the use of which is limited to such exposures, implies 
that the scenario is for a single-phase arc.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Ms. Wilmer also mentioned Table 130.7(C)(9)(a) of NFPA 70E-2004. 
The closest hazard-risk category from Table 130.7(C)(9)(a) is 2 
(requiring clothing rated at 8 cal/cm\2\), which is for the task of 
``[i]nsulated cable examination in open air'' (Ex. 0134). The other 
tasks in the category entitled ``Other Equipment 1 kV and Above'' 
appear to represent exposures from arcs in enclosures, and all of those 
tasks, including the one for cable examination, represent three-phase 
exposures. Moreover, OSHA examined this table more closely and found 
that it does not represent incident-energy calculations alone. The 
hazard-risk categories listed in NFPA 70E-2004, Table 
130.7(C)(9)(a),\305\ include a risk component, as well as an incident-
energy component, as can be seen from the entries for the various tasks 
on 600-volt class motor control centers. The hazard-risk categories for 
this equipment vary from 1 to 3 (which require clothing rated from 4 to 
25 cal/cm\2\) depending on the task, even though, according to the 
notes to the table, the system parameters are the same for all the 
tasks; thus, the calculated incident energy for all the tasks for this 
equipment should be the same. While not clear from NFPA 70E-2004, it 
appears that the NFPA 70E Committee chose to reduce the amount of 
protection for a task based on the likelihood that an electric arc 
would occur.\306\ The level of protection needed for a particular 
incident heat energy is the same regardless of the probability that an 
electric arc will occur. In other words, whether there is a 5-percent 
risk or a 10-percent risk is not relevant to whether the employee's PPE 
is adequate. As will be explained later in this section of the 
preamble, OSHA based the determination of the level of PPE required 
under the final rule solely on incident heat energy. OSHA's final rule 
separates the determination of risk (that is, whether an employee is 
exposed to hazards posed by electric arcs), as required by final 
paragraph (g)(1), from the calculation of incident energy, as required 
by final paragraph (g)(2). Therefore, the Agency concludes that NFPA 
70E-2004, Table 130.7(C)(9)(a), is not a reasonable method of 
estimating incident energy under final paragraph (g)(2) and, therefore, 
is not referencing that table in Appendix E in the final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \305\ NFPA 70E-2012 contains an equivalent table in Table 
130.7(C)(15)(a). As noted earlier, NFPA 70E-2004, Table 130.7(C)(11) 
lists the minimum arc rating for each hazard-risk category. NFPA 
70E-2012 lists minimum arc ratings for each hazard-risk category in 
Table 130.7(C)(16). OSHA's conclusions regarding NFPA 70E-2004 Table 
130.7(C)(9)(a) apply equally to NFPA 70E-2012 Table 130.7(C)(15)(a).
    \306\ Earlier editions of NFPA 70E, such as the 2000 edition, 
and NFPA documentation on the adoption of the task table show that 
the hazard/risk category is reduced by 1 if the probability of an 
arc is low and reduced by 2 if the probability is very low.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the following discussion, the Agency evaluates the various 
methods listed in Table 10 across three distinct voltage categories 
(600 volts and less, 601 to 1,000 volts, and more than 1,000 volts), 
and for each type of electric arc (single-phase arc in open air, three-
phase arc in open air, and three-phase arc in an enclosure).
    Voltages of 600 volts and less. As can be seen from the tasks 
listed in Table 130.7(C)(9)(a), much of the work addressed by NFPA 70E-
2004 involves voltages of 600 volts or less (Ex. 0134). This category 
represents the dominant voltage class for utilization equipment 
installed in buildings, including electric power generation stations. 
It also includes service-class equipment, such as meters, installed on 
distribution circuits. There is wide experience using the incident-
energy calculation methods included in Annex D of NFPA 70E-2004 and in 
IEEE Std 1584a-2004,\307\ and there is evidence that some electric 
utilities use these methods successfully (Exs. 0216 (showing TVA's use 
of IEEE Std 1584 to calculate incident-energy levels), 0444 (``INPO 
(Institute for Nuclear Power Operations) was and is a huge factor in 
driving the use of NFPA 70E as a recognized `best practice' for 
electrical safety programs in the nuclear power industry'')). A 
national consensus standard recognizes these methods

[[Page 20467]]

(NFPA 70E),\308\ and there is considerable test data validating them 
(Exs. 0425 (``[the IEEE 1584 committee] has overseen a significant 
amount of testing and has developed new models of incident energy'' and 
``[IEEE Std 1584a-2004 provides calculations based on] new, empirically 
derived models based on statistical analysis and curve fitting of the 
overall test data available''), 0430 (this paper, which the IEEE 1584 
committee referenced, reported on the results of 25 tests that 
supplemented ``previously completed extensive arc testing'').)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \307\ IEEE adopted two amendments after it published IEEE Std 
1584-2002: IEEE Std 1584a-2004 (Amendment 1 to IEEE Std 1584-2002), 
and IEEE Std 1584b-2011 (Amendment 2: Changes to Clause 4 of IEEE 
Std 1584-2002). (Ex. 0425 contains both the IEEE Std 1584-2002 
standard and the 1584a-2004 amendment.) This preamble refers to 
specific versions of IEEE Std 1584 as follows:
    IEEE Std 1584-2002: the base IEEE Std 1584 standard
    IEEE Std 1584a-2004: IEEE Std 1584-2002 as amended by IEEE Std 
1584a-2004
    IEEE Std 1584b-2011: IEEE Std 1584-2002 as amended by IEEE Std 
1584a-2004 and IEEE Std 1584b-2011.
    IEEE Std 1584a-2004 and IEEE Std 1584b-2011 use the same basic 
methodology to calculate incident-energy levels as IEEE Std 1584-
2002. In this section of the preamble, OSHA analyzed IEEE Std 1584a-
2004 (Ex. 0425) to determine whether employers can use that standard 
to make reasonable estimates of incident energy. The Agency also 
examined the latest version of IEEE Std 1584 and found that, because 
the calculation method did not change from IEEE Std 1584a-2004 to 
IEEE Std 1584b-2011, OSHA's conclusions regarding IEEE Std 1584a-
2004 also apply to IEEE Std 1584b-2011, and Appendix E to final 
Subpart V references IEEE Std 1584b-2011. Unless otherwise noted, 
the preamble references to the content of IEEE Std 1584a-2004 apply 
equally to IEEE Std 1584b-2011.
    \308\ As previously mentioned, NFPA 70E-2004, Annex D, 
recognizes IEEE Std 1584-2002 as a valid method of calculating 
incident heat energy (Ex. 0134).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    OSHA concludes that the methods of calculating incident heat energy 
in NFPA 70E-2004, Annex D, and IEEE Std 1584a-2004 are reasonable at 
voltages of 600 volts and less for the exposures these methods address, 
as explained more fully later in this section of the preamble. No 
evidence in the record persuades OSHA otherwise. A paper by Stokes and 
Sweeting entitled ``Electric Arcing Burn Hazards'' criticized both the 
NFPA 70E Annex D and IEEE 1584 methods (Ex. 0452).\309\ That paper 
notes that the NFPA and IEEE methods use a predominantly radiant model 
of incident heat energy from an electric arc, in which 90 percent of 
the heat is radiant heat and in which the entire exposure will be 
outside the electric arc plasma. The Stokes and Sweeting paper 
disagrees that radiant heat is the predominant hazard and shows that 
orienting the test electrodes in a horizontal configuration can result 
in the transference of a greater degree of convective heat and that the 
amount of heat within the electric arc plasma \310\ is more than three 
times higher than predicted by the NFPA and IEEE models. The Stokes and 
Sweeting paper also noted that the Lee paper, which is the basis of the 
NFPA method, predicts a smaller plasma diameter than the plasma 
diameter found during testing. The Stokes and Sweeting paper explained:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \309\ Stokes, A. D., Sweeting, D. K., ``Electric Arcing Burn 
Hazards,'' IEEE Transactions on Industry Applications. Vol. 42. No. 
1, January/February 2006, pp. 134-141.
    \310\ Plasma is the high-temperature ionized gas cloud that 
results from the electric arc.

    As an example, for a three-phase arcing exposure of 5000 V and 
20000 A, the Lee prediction forecasts a plasma diameter of 170 mm [7 
inches]. . . . The authors' test results for this condition, for an 
arc duration of 0.5 s, show a brilliant plasma cloud some 3000 mm 
[118 inches] long and around 1500 mm [59 inches] tall in the plane 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
of the camera. [Id.]

    OSHA recognizes that exposures within the plasma field of an 
electric arc will produce heat that is several times the incident 
energy predicted by any of the methods used to calculate heat energy 
recognized by the final rule. However, the Agency believes that the 
predominant exposure for employees covered by this final rule will be 
outside the plasma field. Although, in the Stokes and Sweeting paper, 
the plasma field extended beyond the distance provided for in the NFPA 
and IEEE methods, the paper did not indicate how to estimate the 
field's reach. Furthermore, all of the calculation methods require an 
estimate of the distance from the electric arc to the employee. The 
IEEE 1584 method uses 455 to 610 millimeters (18 to 24 inches) for low-
voltage (600 volts and less) equipment such as switchboards, 
panelboards, and motor control centers. As explained later in this 
section of the preamble, those distances are reasonable estimates of 
the distance from the employee to the arc. In addition, the testing 
supporting the IEEE 1584 method, which is representative of typical 
exposures, confirms the incident-energy results derived using that 
method (Ex. 0425). There is no evidence in the record that indicates 
that employees will typically be closer than these distances for this 
type of work or will be in the plasma field at these working distances. 
Therefore, OSHA concludes that, in general, the incident-energy 
calculation methods in NFPA 70E-2004, Annex D, and IEEE Std 1584a-2004 
reasonably represent employee exposure for voltages of 600 volts and 
less.
    The IEEE 1584 method accounts for differences between single-phase 
and three-phase arcs and between arcs in open air and arcs in an 
enclosure (id. (``The arc-flash hazard calculations included in this 
guide will enable quick and comprehensive solutions for arcs in single- 
or three-phase electrical systems either of which may be in open air or 
in a box, regardless of the low or medium voltage available'')). In 
addition, as noted earlier, this method is based on extensive testing, 
and a consensus standard recognizes this method. Therefore, OSHA 
concludes that this method reasonably represents employee exposures for 
single-phase and multiphase arcs in enclosures and open air.
    Proposed Appendix F also listed a paper by Doughty, Neal, and Floyd 
as a method of estimating incident energy from an electric arc. (See 
Table 10 earlier in this section of the preamble.) This paper describes 
the results of tests performed on a 600-volt power system with a 36.25-
kiloampere prospective fault current and contains algorithms to 
estimate incident energy at a specified distance from an arc as a 
function of the available bolted-fault current on a 600-volt system 
(Ex. 0430). The tests included three-phase arcs in enclosures and in 
open air (id.). Because this paper was peer reviewed and the methods it 
uses are based on testing electric arcs, OSHA finds that the method in 
this paper reliably estimates incident energy for the 600-volt systems 
it represents.\311\ The Agency also finds that it reasonably represents 
incident energy for systems of lower voltages and for single-phase 
systems because the power produced by these systems should be 
comparable to, and not exceed, the power from a three-phase 600-volt 
system with an equivalent supply. The Doughty, Neal, and Floyd method 
will produce conservative results for lower-voltage and single-phase 
systems. On the other hand, this method does not estimate incident 
energy for systems of higher voltages. Therefore, OSHA finds that it is 
not reasonable to use this method to estimate incident energy for 
systems of voltages of more than 600 volts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \311\ The equations given in this paper are for an arc lasting 6 
cycles. An employer using the Doughty, Neal, and Floyd method will 
need to adjust the results to account for any clearing times 
different from 6 cycles by multiplying the incident energy 
calculated using these equations by the ratio of the actual clearing 
time to 6 cycles.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Doughty, Neal, Floyd paper compared the results of its authors' 
testing with other methods of estimating incident-energy levels, 
including the NFPA Annex D method, the heat flux calculator, and a 
commercial software program (apparently ARCPRO), which OSHA listed in 
the proposal (id.). The paper compared the incident energy it found for 
three-phase electric arcs with the incident energy calculated by the 
Lee equation used in NFPA 70E, Annex D, by examining the distance 
required to achieve an incident-energy level of 1.2 cal/cm\2\. This 
distance is the ``curable burn distance,'' which is the distance at 
which an employee will begin to sustain a second-degree, or curable, 
burn. The paper explained the results of this comparison as follows:

    The Lee ``curable burn'' distances coincide almost exactly with 
the second-degree burn distances for the open three-phase arc. The 
second-degree burn distances for the arc in the cubic box, however, 
are significantly higher. The difference is more pronounced at 
higher bolted fault levels. [id.]

Figure 8 depicts these functions.

[[Page 20468]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR11AP14.012

    Based on this analysis, the Agency finds that the Lee equation from 
NFPA 70E-2004, Annex D, is a reasonable method of estimating the 
incident energy of a three-phase electric arc in open air for systems 
of 600 volts or less. However, because the Lee equation significantly 
underestimates incident energy from three-phase arcs in an enclosure, 
OSHA finds that this is not a reasonable method to estimate incident 
energy from such exposures. The Agency also finds that the NFPA 70E-
2004, Annex D, method reasonably represents incident energy for single-
phase systems because the power produced by these systems should be 
comparable to, and not exceed, the power from a three-phase system with 
an equivalent supply. Thus, this method will produce conservative 
results for single-phase systems.
    The Doughty, Neal, and Floyd paper also compared the results of its 
authors' testing with the heat flux calculator and ``a commercially 
available computer program'' (id.).\312\ The paper found that:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \312\ Although the paper did not identify the ``commercially 
available computer program'' by name, OSHA closely examined the 
results from ARCPRO and compared them with the commercial software 
program incident-energy estimates reported by the paper and found 
them to be equivalent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     The three-phase test values of maximum incident energy for 
open arcs were 2.5 to 3.0 times the amounts calculated for single-phase 
arcs in air by the two programs; and
     The three-phase test values of maximum incident energy for 
arcs in a box were 5.2 to 12.2 times the amounts calculated for single-
phase arcs in air by the two programs (id.).
    This comparison clearly shows that neither program reasonably 
estimates incident heat energy from three-phase electric arcs or 
electric arcs in an enclosure. Although there are conversion factors 
recommended for these programs, these conversion factors do not account 
for the wide variation between the incident energies the programs 
calculate and the actual incident energy found during testing. Thus, 
OSHA finds that the heat flux calculator and ARCPRO do not reasonably 
estimate incident heat energy for three-phase arcs or arcs in a box for 
systems of 600 volts or less.
    On systems of 600 volts or less, the phase conductors are typically 
relatively close together, approximately 30 millimeters (1.25 inches), 
as noted in the Doughty, Neal, and Floyd paper (id.). When an arc 
occurs between one phase and ground, or between two phases, the 
surrounding air becomes ionized (and, thus, conductive), and it can 
relatively easily escalate to a three-phase arc (Ex. 0425). In 
addition, as seen from NFPA 70E-2004, Table 130.7(C)(9)(a), most of the 
exposures at this voltage level, with the exception of work on service 
drops, involve equipment in enclosures (Ex. 0134).\313\ Consequently, 
OSHA concludes that it normally would be unreasonable to estimate 
incident-energy levels for systems of 600 volts using methods based on 
single-phase open air arcs. However, the employer may use such methods 
when it can demonstrate that there is only one phase present or that 
the spacing of the phases is sufficient to prevent the formation of a 
three-phase arc. The incident energy results from the electric-arc 
model used by ARCPRO ``have shown good agreement with measured values 
from a series of tests covering the following ranges of parameters: 
Currents from 3.5 kA to 21.5 kA, arc durations from 4 cycles to 30 
cycles, arc lengths from 1 inches to 12 inches, and distances of 8 
inches to 24 inches from the arc'' (Ex. 0469). The ARCPRO documentation 
does not indicate the voltage range verified by the test results; 
however, the model used by this program uses voltage only to ensure 
that an arc can be sustained over the distance between electrodes. 
Consequently, OSHA finds that this program can reasonably estimate 
incident energy from a single-phase arc in open air for systems of 600 
volts or less, and the employer may use the program as long as the 
employer can demonstrate that there is only one phase present or that 
the spacing of the phases is sufficient to prevent the formation of a 
three-phase arc.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \313\ OSHA acknowledges that NFPA 70E exempts work on electric 
power generation, transmission, and distribution installations. 
However, the electric equipment installed in generating plants is of 
the same type as that covered by NFPA 70E (Ex. 0077), and OSHA 
concludes that the tasks performed on this equipment would be of a 
similar nature.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For reasons explained later in this section of the preamble, OSHA 
finds that the heat flux calculator is not a reasonable method for 
estimating incident energy for any type of exposures, irrespective of 
voltage.

[[Page 20469]]

    Table 12 summarizes OSHA's findings regarding the reasonableness of 
using the various methods of estimating incident heat energy for 
exposures involving single-phase and three-phase arcs in open air and 
in an enclosure for voltages of 600 volts and less.
    Voltages of 601 volts to 15 kilovolts. Work at voltages from 601 
volts to 15 kilovolts is common to both electric power distribution 
work and to work in industrial and electric utility substations and 
plants. Industrial installations use equipment similar to that used by 
electric utilities (see, for example, 59 FR 4333-4334). Therefore, any 
method that is appropriate for use with industrial systems operating at 
these voltages should be appropriate for use with electric power 
generation and distribution installations.
    Again, there is wide experience using the incident-energy methods 
included in Annex D of NFPA 70E-2004 and in IEEE Std 1584, and there is 
evidence that some electric utilities use these methods successfully 
(Exs. 0216, 0444). A national consensus standard (NFPA 70E) recognizes 
these methods, and there is considerable test data validating them 
(Exs. 0425, 0430). OSHA, therefore, finds that the IEEE 1584 method 
reasonably estimates incident-energy levels for systems operating at 
voltages of 601 volts to 15 kilovolts for exposures involving single-
phase and three-phase arcs in open air or in enclosures. As explained 
previously in the discussion of Ms. Wilmer's comments, the method in 
NFPA 70E, Annex D (the Lee method), is conservative at more than 600 
volts. In addition, this method estimates incident-energy levels for 
three-phase arcs and, thus, is even more conservative for exposures 
involving single-phase arcs. Because the NFPA 70E Annex D method is 
conservative, OSHA finds that it reasonably estimates incident-energy 
levels for systems operating at voltages of 601 volts to 15 kilovolts, 
that is, it will provide employees with adequate protection.\314\ 
However, clothing appropriate for the levels of incident energy 
calculated by the NFPA 70E Annex D method will be heavier and bulkier, 
as well as more expensive, than clothing appropriate for incident 
energy calculated using other acceptable methods. (See, for example, 
Ex. 0213, ``[The NFPA 70E Annex D method] could be used to calculate 
incident energies for transmission system voltages, but [it] will 
produce very conservative (high heat energy) results. This will result 
in employees wearing unnecessarily heavy arc flash protection when 
working on lines.'') Consequently, the Agency anticipates that 
employers will only use this method to estimate incident-energy levels 
at voltages of 601 volts to 15 kilovolts when it would result in the 
use of clothing with a relatively low arc rating.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \314\ For reasons already explained, the NFPA 70E Annex D method 
is not reasonable for estimating incident energy exposures from 
three-phase arcs in an enclosure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The method in the Doughty, Neal, and Floyd paper described earlier 
in this section of the preamble is based on testing performed 
exclusively with an electrode spacing of 32 millimeters (1.25 inches) 
at 600 volts (Ex. 0430). There is no evidence in the record that 
suggests that this method is suitable at higher voltages, at which 
electrode gaps likely are significantly longer. Therefore, OSHA finds 
that this method does not reasonably estimate incident-energy levels 
for systems operating at voltages above 600 volts.
    The Agency closely examined the two software calculation methods, 
ARCPRO and the heat flux calculator, over the voltage range 601 volts 
to 15 kilovolts. OSHA performed this examination in part by looking at 
the estimates of heat flux for different system parameters. Heat flux 
is a measure of the flow of heat energy per unit area per second. The 
incident energy from an electric arc can be computed by multiplying the 
heat flux, which has the units cal/cm\2\-sec, by the number of seconds 
the arc lasts (that is, the clearing time or the amount of time the 
devices protecting a circuit take to open the circuit). The clearing 
time for circuit protective devices typically is given in cycles, which 
then is converted to seconds by dividing the number of cycles by the 
number of cycles per second, usually 60. The two software programs, 
ARCPRO and the heat flux calculator, can be used to calculate the heat 
flux at a given distance from an electric arc with varying parameters 
(for example, arc length, system voltage, and current). Figure 9 
compares the heat flux calculated by these two programs at 380 
millimeters (15 inches) from an arc with an electrode spacing of 51 
millimeters (2 inches).\315\ Note that, although 15 kilovolts is the 
voltage input to these programs, the incident energy calculated by both 
programs would be the same at 601 volts. The two programs only use the 
voltage to verify that an arc can be sustained across the given 
electrode gap. Figure 9 shows that the heat flux calculator produces 
results that can be more than 50 percent less than the results produced 
by ARCPRO.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \315\ In preparing Figure 9, OSHA used the values from Table 6 
in Appendix E for the distance to the arc and the electrode spacing 
corresponding to 15 kilovolts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    After calculating the incident heat energy using ARCPRO or the heat 
flux calculator, an employer can select arc-rated protective equipment. 
NFPA 70E-2004 contains a widely used, five-level system for selecting 
protective clothing based on different incident-energy levels (Ex. 
0134). Figure 10 shows the protective-clothing arc rating, based on the 
NFPA 70E levels, that employers would select based on the heat-flux 
results shown in Figure 9 for each software program using clearing 
times of 6, 12, and 36 cycles. The figures clearly show that incident-
energy calculations from the heat flux calculator can be more than 50 
percent lower than the calculations from ARCPRO. This difference 
generally increases with increasing fault current.
    The documentation for ARCPRO describes the formulas for calculating 
energy and heat estimates and the basis for that program's formulas, as 
follows:

    The ARCPRO computer program is based on a state-of-the-art 
electrical arc model . . . Temperature-dependent gas properties, the 
electrode materials and configuration are taken into account in the 
model . . .
    Energy and heat values computed by ARCPRO have been verified by 
comparison with measured results from high current laboratory tests 
involving controlled vertical arcs in air. ARCPRO results have shown 
good agreement with measured values from a series of tests covering 
the following ranges of parameters: Currents from 3.5 kA to 21.5 kA, 
arc durations from 4 cycles to 30 cycles, arc lengths from 1 inches 
to 12 inches, and distances of 8 inches to 24 inches from the arc. 
[Ex. 0469]

    Ontario Hydro Technologies (now known as Kinectrics), the same 
company that performs high-voltage and high-current electrical testing, 
including arc testing, developed this program for numerous purposes. 
(See, for example, Exs. 0469, 0501; Tr. 283.\316\) Consequently, OSHA 
concludes that the incident-energy values calculated by this program 
relate reasonably to the heat energy faced by employees facing 
exposures involving single-phase electric arcs in open air. (As 
explained previously, ARCPRO's conversion factors for exposures 
involving three-phase arcs and arcs in enclosures do not reasonably 
estimate employee exposures and would result in significant 
underprotection for workers.) The Agency believes that this program is 
highly accurate over the range of input parameters for which testing 
validated the results, that is, single-phase arcs in

[[Page 20470]]

open air only. Therefore, OSHA finds that ARCPRO reasonably estimates 
incident-energy levels for single-phase arcs in open air for systems 
operating at 601 volts to 15 kilovolts.
BILLING CODE 4510-26-P
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \316\ See also https://www.kinectrics.com/en/serviceline/ElectricalTesting.html.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR11AP14.013


[[Page 20471]]


[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR11AP14.014

BILLING CODE 4510-26-C

[[Page 20472]]

    On the other hand, there is little documentation supporting use of 
the heat flux calculator beyond the documentation provided by the NASCO 
Electric Arc Hazard Support Page, which describes the program (Ex. 
0467).\317\ OSHA is aware that some employers, electric utilities and 
others, use this program to estimate incident-energy levels and select 
appropriate PPE (Ex. 0430). However, there is little information in the 
record on which to judge the heat flux calculator on its own merits or 
the results it produces. In fact, TVA commented that it is ``not aware 
of any test verification of the results derived from the Heat Flux 
Calculator'' (Ex. 0213). Because the heat flux calculator provides 
incident-energy levels that are substantially below the levels 
resulting from the testing that supports ARCPRO and because there is no 
other means of validating the incident energy results from this 
program, OSHA cannot find that the heat flux calculator reasonably 
estimates incident heat energy levels for any exposures covered by this 
final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \317\ The updated online version of this page contains a link to 
download the free program (https://www.nascoinc.com/quick_links/heatflux.htm). The program is also available on other Internet Web 
sites.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Table 12 summarizes OSHA's findings regarding the reasonableness of 
using the various methods of estimating incident heat energy for 
exposures involving single-phase and three-phase arcs in open air and 
in an enclosure for voltages of 601 volts to 15 kilovolts.
    OSHA expects employers to determine the type of exposure employees 
will face. If the energized parts are not in an enclosure, the employer 
may use a method appropriate for single-phase arcs in open air as long 
as the employer can demonstrate that there is only one phase present or 
if the spacings of the phases is sufficient to prevent the formation of 
a three-phase arc. Otherwise, employers must use a method suitable for 
three-phase arcs in open air or in an enclosure, as appropriate.
    Voltages of more than 15 kilovolts. Systems that operate at more 
than 15 kilovolts generally are electric power distribution or 
transmission systems covered by existing Sec.  1910.269 and subpart V. 
Although some industrial plants operate systems at these voltages, 
these existing OSHA standards typically cover systems operating at more 
than 15 kilovolts regardless of whether an electric utility or an 
industrial operation operates the system. (See, for example, the 
preamble to the 1994 final rule adopting existing Sec.  1910.269 (59 FR 
4333-4335).)
    IEEE Std 1584a-2004 describes the limits of its application as 
follows:
    This model is designed for systems having:

--Voltages in the range of 208 V-15 000 V, three-phase.
* * * * *
    Use of this model is recommended for applications within the 
parameters stated in this subclause. [Ex. 0425]

    Systems operating at voltages above 15 kilovolts are, thus, 
outside the recommended range of applications for the IEEE standard. 
Consequently, OSHA finds that the IEEE 1584 method does not 
reasonably estimate incident-energy levels for systems operating at 
voltages of more than 15 kilovolts.
    As noted earlier, the NFPA 70E Annex D method gives conservative 
results for voltages over 600 volts. For example, as explained in 
the discussion of Ms. Wilmer's comment earlier in this section of 
the preamble, that method produces an incident heat energy level of 
152 cal/cm\2\ for an exposure involving a three-phase arc in open 
air for a system of 15 kilovolts with a fault current of 5,000 
amperes, a clearing time of 34.5 cycles, and a distance from the 
employee to the arc of 381 millimeters (15 inches). In addition, the 
NFPA 70E Annex D method produces an incident-energy level of 1254 
cal/cm\2\ for an exposure involving a three-phase arc in open air 
for a system of 800 kilovolts with a fault current of 20,000 
amperes, a clearing time of 54.5 cycles, and a distance from the 
employee to the arc of 2,200 meters (86.6 inches).\318\ These values 
are too high to be meaningful, particularly at the higher end of the 
voltage range. Employers using the NFPA 70E Annex D method to select 
arc-rated clothing would outfit employees in clothing that exposes 
employees to severe heat-stress hazards even though the incident 
energy is not high enough to warrant such protection. Thus, OSHA 
finds that it is not reasonable to use this method to estimate 
incident energy for systems of voltages of more than 15 kilovolts. 
However, in some cases, employees may be far enough away from any 
potential arc that even the NFPA 70E Annex D method does not result 
in an estimated incident energy that is sufficient to ignite 
flammable clothing (2.0 cal/cm\2\ or less, as explained later in 
this section of the preamble). Because that method is conservative, 
employers may use it to determine that employee exposure to 
estimated incident-heat energy is not more than 2.0 cal/cm\2\ and, 
thus, that employees need not wear FR clothing under final paragraph 
(g)(4)(iv).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \318\ Table 9 in proposed Appendix F listed incident heat 
energies for various voltage ranges of more than 46 kilovolts and 
fault currents. These are the values for the distance to the arc and 
the electrode spacing used in that table for 765 to 800 kilovolts. 
The corresponding table in the final rule (Table 7 of Appendix E) 
has been revised, as explained later in this section of the 
preamble, but those parameters are the same for that voltage range.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For reasons explained previously, OSHA finds the Doughty, Neal, 
and Floyd method does not reasonably estimate incident energy for 
systems at voltages of more than 600 volts.
    OSHA compared incident-energy values evaluated by the heat flux 
calculator to the values computed by ARCPRO at voltages higher than 
15 kilovolts using parameters from Table 8 and Table 9 of proposed 
Appendix F. The results of this comparison were similar to the 
results of the comparison using voltages of 601 volts to 15 
kilovolts described earlier. The incident energies computed by the 
heat flux calculator were substantially lower than the results 
computed by ARCPRO using the same parameters for systems of more 
than 15 kilovolts. In addition, as noted earlier, there is no 
information in the record validating the incident-energy results 
obtained using the heat flux calculator. Therefore, OSHA concludes 
that the heat flux calculator does not reasonably estimate incident 
energy from systems of more than 15 kilovolts.
    As noted earlier, verification of the ARCPRO incident-energy 
calculation model occurred by testing a wide range of input 
parameters (Ex. 0469). This model is mostly independent of voltage 
(in other words, the results do not vary with voltage); the program 
only checks that the voltage will sustain an arc across the 
electrode gap (id.). The program accepts parameters outside the 
range verified by testing,\319\ and there is no evidence in the 
record to indicate that results using parameters outside that range 
would be invalid (id.). As noted earlier, this program calculates 
incident energy from a single-phase arc in open air. OSHA concludes 
that this program accurately calculates incident heat energy from 
such arcs. Therefore, the Agency finds that ARCPRO reasonably 
estimates incident energy from single-phase arcs in open air on 
systems of more than 15 kilovolts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \319\ ``ARCPRO results have shown good agreement with measured 
values from a series of tests covering the following ranges of 
parameters: currents from 3.5 kA to 21.5 kA, arc durations from 4 
cycles to 30 cycles, arc lengths from 1 [inch] to 12 inches, and 
distances of 8 inches to 24 inches from the arc'' (Ex. 0469).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As mentioned previously, the incident energy calculated by 
ARCPRO was significantly less than the actual heat energy found when 
testing 600-volt, three-phase arcs in open air and in an enclosure 
(Ex. 0430). Regardless of voltage, three-phase arcs consume more 
power and, therefore, produce more energy, and three-phase arcs in 
an enclosure produce even more heat energy because the heat energy 
radiating away from the worker reflects back towards the worker and 
because all of the convective heat energy is directed toward the 
worker (Exs. 0430, 0433).\320\ Therefore, OSHA concludes that using 
unmodified ARCPRO results would significantly underestimate the 
amount of incident heat energy from these exposures. ARCPRO provides 
multiplication factors for adjusting the results to estimate 
incident energy from three-phase arcs in open air and

[[Page 20473]]

in enclosures.\321\ However, the Agency found that those adjustments 
were not reasonable for systems up to 15 kilovolts. In those cases, 
there are alternative calculation methods, identified in Table 12, 
that more accurately estimate incident energy for those exposures. 
In contrast, there is no reasonable alternative for voltages of more 
than 15 kilovolts. Therefore, because ARCPRO is the best available 
technology for estimating incident energy for three-phase arcs in 
open air and in an enclosure for systems operating at more than 15 
kilovolts, OSHA will treat this program as reasonably estimating 
incident energy for these exposures provided the employer adjusts 
the results using the conversion factors in the instructions 
included with the program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \320\ Convection occurs in fluids (liquids and gases) through 
the mixing of hot and cold fluid regions driven by pressure, 
gravity, or mechanical agitation. This is the type of heating that 
occurs as a pot of water is heated to boiling on a stove. Thermal 
radiation occurs when radiation (such as infrared radiation) is 
emitted from an object and is absorbed by another object. This is 
the type of heating provided by the sun.
    \321\ Here are the conversion factors listed in ARCPRO's help 
system:
    Energy for: Multiply by:
     1-phase in a box.... 1.5
     3-phase.................. 1.2 to 2.2
     3-phase in a box.... 3.7 to 6.5
    (Ex. 0468).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Mr. Tommy Lucas with TVA maintained that there are no nationally 
recognized methods of reasonably estimating incident energy over 60 
kilovolts (Ex. 0213).
    As noted previously, however, OSHA evaluated the ARCPRO computer-
software method and found that it provides a reasonable estimate of 
incident energy for voltages above 15 kilovolts, including voltages of 
more than 60 kilovolts.
    Table 12 summarizes OSHA's findings regarding the reasonableness of 
using the various methods of estimating incident heat energy for 
exposures involving single-phase and three-phase arcs in open air and 
in an enclosure for voltages higher than 15 kilovolts.
    Underground exposures, internal transformer faults, and other 
potentially high exposures. Consolidated Edison Company of New York 
(Con Edison), commented that the methodologies included in the proposal 
would not be useful for exposures faced by its employees, explaining:

    Con Edison has spent millions of dollars to recreate real life 
fault situations on our system at a high power testing laboratory. 
In these recreation scenarios we deliberately caused cable faults 
both in open air and in manholes and had mannequins wired with heat 
sensors to measure the incident energies our employees could 
potentially be exposed to. Based on the experience gained through 
thousands of these faults, both open air and in manholes, we 
realized that none of the methodologies OSHA now proposes would be 
useful in conducting an analysis to arrive at a protective scheme 
for our employees. [Ex. 0157]

    Although Con Edison did not provide the results of its tests, Dr. 
Mary Capelli-Schellpfeffer submitted a presentation that Con Edison 
prepared describing the company's tests (Ex. 0371). This presentation 
did not include any quantitative comparisons with OSHA's proposed 
methods of estimating incident energy. However, it did indicate that 
Con Edison was able to select appropriate protective garments that 
``have proven to be effective in the protection of [its employees]'' 
(id.).
    The company's tests included tests of faulted transformers and 
cable faults in manholes, and OSHA acknowledges that it is possible for 
the incident energy for these exposures to exceed results obtained 
using the IEEE 1584 method, which addresses exposures involving three-
phase arcs in both open air and enclosures.\322\ If a transformer 
experiences an internal fault, the transformer oil can ignite, and the 
burning oil will contribute additional heat energy not accounted for by 
that method (Ex. 0004).\323\ For underground exposures in manholes and 
vaults, it is possible not only for the wall of the enclosure close to 
the arc to reflect the heat energy, but for the far walls to do so as 
well. The IEEE 1584 method accounts for the former but not the latter 
reflections (Ex. 0425). Because the IEEE 1584 method, if the voltage is 
15 kilovolts or less, and ARCPRO, if the voltage exceeds 15 kilovolts, 
are the best available methods for estimating incident energy for 
three-phase arcs in open air or in enclosures, OSHA will treat those 
two methods as reasonably estimating incident energy for the exposures 
cited by Con Edison. However, these estimates may not fully protect 
employees from electric-arc exposures resulting from internal faults in 
transformers or similar equipment or from arcs in underground manholes 
or vaults. Despite this shortcoming, the Agency believes that using 
these methods to estimate incident energy and to select appropriate 
protective equipment in accordance with the other provisions of final 
paragraph (g) will better protect employees than if employers permitted 
employees to work without arc-rated protective equipment. (See, also, 
the summary and explanation of paragraph (g)(5), later in this section 
of the preamble.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \322\ Because Con Edison did not provide the parameters involved 
in its tests, OSHA cannot determine for certain what the exposure 
was. However, the Agency assumes that the manhole and cable testing 
was performed with three-phase voltages between 601 volts and 15 
kilovolts. From Table 12, the IEEE 1584 method is the only method 
that provides a reasonable estimate for three-phase arcs in an 
enclosure, which is the exposure most common in manholes; and the 
IEEE 1584 and NFPA 70E Annex D methods are the only methods that 
provide a reasonable estimate for three-phase arcs in open air, 
which is the exposure associated with three-phase cables.
    \323\ See, for example, the two accidents described at https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=170632699&id=14343594.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Manipulation of results. Some rulemaking participants maintained 
that employers could manipulate the estimate of incident energy by 
selecting an inappropriate calculation method or by varying the 
parameters, such as arc length or distance from the arc, to achieve 
desired results. (See, for example, Exs. 0156, 0161, 0183.) Others 
commented more generally that the results of incident-energy 
calculations will vary depending on the parameters selected. (See, for 
example, Exs. 0163, 0173, 0181.) For instance, Mr. Alan Blackmon with 
Blue Ridge Electric Cooperative commented:

    Estimates of maximum amounts of heat energy to which an employee 
would be exposed require making so many subjective assumptions as to 
render the calculations useless. OSHA therefore should drop this 
requirement. There is no value in an estimation that so easily can 
be manipulated through choosing of, for example, duration of arc and 
distance from arc to employee. [Ex. 0183]

    The parameters used by the calculation methods discussed earlier 
include: the fault current (usually the maximum available fault 
current), the system voltage, the arc length, the arc duration, and the 
distance from the arc to the employee.\324\ The system fixes most of 
these parameters. Each system has a fixed system voltage, fault 
current, and fault clearing time.\325\ The system voltage is a known 
``quantity.'' IEEE Std 1584a-2004, Section 4.4, explains the 
calculation of the maximum fault current based on known characteristics 
about the circuit involved (Ex. 0425). IEEE Std 1584a-2004 describes 
how to determine the corresponding fault-clearing time by checking the 
maximum fault current against the time characteristics provided by the 
protective device manufacturer as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \324\ IEEE Std 1584a-2004 also expects the user to select the 
overcurrent device protecting the circuit (Ex. 0425). However, that 
method makes certain assumptions about some of the other parameters, 
in particular, arc duration, that avoid the need to enter those 
parameters. The consensus standard also provides a generic case in 
which all of the typical parameters are input. IEEE Std 1584b-2011 
provides additional guidance on selecting arc-duration times for 
different types of overcurrent protective devices (that is, fuses, 
integral-trip circuit breakers, and relay-operated circuit breakers) 
for the generic case.
    \325\ The arc will last until the protective device opens the 
circuit. Thus, the fault clearing time equals the duration of the 
arc.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    An arc-flash hazard analysis should be performed in association 
with or as a continuation of the short-circuit study and protective-
device coordination study. The process and methodology of 
calculating

[[Page 20474]]

short-circuit currents and performing protective-device coordination 
is covered in IEEE Std 141-1993 (IEEE Red Book TM) and 
IEEE Std 242-2001 (IEEE Buff Book TM), respectively. 
Results of the short-circuit study are used to determine the fault 
current momentary duty, interrupting rating, and short-circuit 
(withstand) rating of electrical equipment. Results of the 
protective-device coordination study are used to determine the time 
required for electrical circuit protective devices to isolate 
overload or short-circuit conditions. Results of both short-circuit 
and protective-device coordination studies provide information 
needed to perform an arc-flash hazard analysis. [id. \326\]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \326\ IEEE Std 1584b-2011 revises this paragraph and separates 
it into five paragraphs. The revisions are editorial, except for 
updated references to relevant IEEE standards, including the 
substitution of IEEE Std 551 TM-2006 (IEEE Violet Book 
TM) for IEEE Std 141-1993 (IEEE Red Book TM), 
and additional language explaining that ``electrical system analysis 
software may be used to simplify the calculations for complex 
distribution systems . . .'' and explaining the limitations and 
advantages of such software.

    Engineers typically perform system coordination studies during the 
design of the system and again periodically and after any significant 
change to the system (Tr. 1030-1031). If no initial or periodic studies 
take place, the system owner risks having a fault on one part of the 
system cause an outage over an extended portion of the system instead 
of having the fault confined to the affected circuit. (See, for 
example, 269-Exs. 8-15, 8-16, 8-17, 8-20, 8-21, 8-22.) As required by 
existing Sec.  1910.269(n)(4)(i), employers must ensure that a similar 
engineering analysis is performed to determine the appropriate ampacity 
for protective grounding equipment; this provision specifies that 
protective grounding equipment must be ``capable of conducting the 
maximum fault current that could flow at the point of grounding for the 
time necessary to clear the fault.'' As noted by Mr. James Tomaseski of 
IBEW: ``For . . . employees to install personal protective grounds on a 
circuit, they need to establish what level of . . . fault currents are 
available, and that will decide what size grounds they will install'' 
(Tr. 960). Consequently, OSHA concludes that employers are likely to 
have information that the Agency can verify about the system voltage, 
fault current, and clearing times. OSHA will deem any manipulation of 
these parameters for purposes of estimating heat energy under final 
paragraph (g)(2) to result in an unreasonable estimate of incident 
energy in violation of the standard.
    Table 8 in proposed Appendix F presented estimates of available 
energy for different parts of an electrical system operating at 4 to 46 
kilovolts. Table 9 of proposed Appendix F presented similar estimates 
for systems operating at voltages of 46.1 to 800 kilovolts. These 
tables were for open-air, phase-to-ground (that is, single-phase) 
electric-arc exposures typical for overhead systems operating at these 
voltages. Table 8 and Table 9 of proposed Appendix F provided 
information on what OSHA would consider as reasonable estimates of arc 
length and the distance from the arc to the employee, as described 
later in this section of the preamble. OSHA revised these tables as 
described later in this section of the preamble and included them in 
the final rule as Table 6 and Table 7 of Appendix E. OSHA will consider 
it reasonable for an employer to use the Table 6 and Table 7 estimates 
of arc length and the distance from the arc to the employee--for 
single-phase arcs in open air--for purposes of the calculations 
required by final paragraph (g)(2). IEEE Std 1584a-2004 also provides 
guidance on these parameters (Ex. 0425).
    Reasonable estimates of the arc gap (arc length). As noted earlier, 
the exposures covered by Table 6 and Table 7 of Appendix E of final 
subpart V, that is single-phase arcs in open air, typically occur 
during overhead line work. In this case, the arc will almost always 
occur when an energized conductor approaches too close to ground. Thus, 
employers can determine the arc gap, or arc length, for these exposures 
by the dielectric strength of air and the voltage on the line (Exs. 
0041, 0533).\327\ The dielectric strength of air is approximately 10 
kilovolts for every 25 millimeters (1 inch) (Ex. 0041), with a minimum 
arc gap of 51 millimeters (1 inch). For example, at 50 kilovolts, the 
arc gap would be 50 / 10 x 25, or 125 millimeters (5 inches). Although 
OSHA is providing this guidance in the final rule, as discussed later 
in this section of the preamble, employers may use other estimates of 
the arc gap for single-phase arcs in open air if the estimates 
reasonably resemble the actual exposures faced by employees.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \327\ Table 6 of Appendix E of final subpart V uses a more 
conservative arc gap that equals the electrical component of the 
minimum approach distance rather than a value corresponding to the 
dielectric strength of air for the system voltage. (See the summary 
and explanation for final Sec.  1926.960(c)(1), earlier in this 
section of the preamble, and Appendix B to final Subpart V for 
additional information on determining the electrical component of 
the minimum approach distance based on the maximum transient 
overvoltage for a system and determining the dielectric strength of 
air for the maximum phase-to-ground system voltage.) OSHA used the 
electrical component of the MAD to create Table 6 in final Appendix 
E for consistency with the approach used in similar tables in the 
2007 NESC (Ex. 0533) and the 2012 NESC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For three-phase arcs in open air and in enclosures, the IEEE 1584 
method provides guidance (Ex. 0425). That method does not require the 
user to input an arc gap (id.). Instead, it incorporates the arc gap 
into its calculations based on the class of equipment involved. The 
user selects the type of equipment involved (for example, 600-volt 
switchgear). It then uses the appropriate bus or conductor spacings in 
that equipment as the arc gap in the calculation of incident energy. 
For a three-phase arc to occur, current must arc between all of the 
phases. Such arcs typically occur when a conductive object drops across 
the phases or when there is an internal fault in the equipment; 
therefore, OSHA concludes that it is reasonable to use the bus or 
conductor spacing as the arc gap. Notably, neither the NFPA 70E Annex D 
nor the Doughty, Neal, and Floyd method require users to input an arc 
gap.
    Reasonable estimates of the distance from the employee to the arc. 
All of the acceptable methods of estimating incident energy require the 
user to input the distance from the arc to the employee. This approach 
requires some judgment by the employer. However, the hazard assessment 
required by final paragraph (g)(1) will provide information that the 
employer can use to assess where arcs are reasonably likely to occur in 
relation to the employee. To determine employee exposure to hazards 
from electric arcs as required by final paragraph (g)(1), the employer 
must determine where an employee is reasonably likely to be when an arc 
occurs (in addition to whether there is a reasonable likelihood that an 
arc could occur in the first place).
    In Appendix E to final subpart V, OSHA provides guidance on 
distance assumptions it will consider reasonable for estimating 
incident energy for exposures involving single-phase arcs in open air. 
As noted earlier, work on overhead power lines typically exposes 
employees to single-phase arcs in open air. Employees performing this 
type of work handle conductors; and these conductors can contact a 
grounded object, or a grounded conductor (such as a guy or grounding 
jumper) can contact a phase conductor (Ex. 0004 \328\).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \328\ See, for example, the six accidents described at https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=170805238&id=200021004&id=170070981&id=201791803&id=14291868&id=170178370.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 20475]]

    As noted under the summary and explanation for final paragraph 
(c)(1), earlier in this section of the preamble, much of the work 
performed on energized parts operating at 46 kilovolts and less is done 
by employees using rubber insulating gloves.\329\ Working in a 
comfortable position with elbows bent, an employee would be 
approximately 380 millimeters (15 inches) from the energized conductor 
on which he or she is working, measured from the employee's chest.\330\ 
Thus, OSHA used a distance of 380 millimeters (15 inches) to calculate 
the incident-energy values in Table 8 in proposed Appendix F (Table 6 
in final Appendix E) and will deem that a reasonable estimate for 
employers to use when performing incident-energy calculations for 
single-phase open-air exposures on voltages of 46 kilovolts and less. 
Employers may use other distances if those distances reasonably 
resemble the actual exposures faced by employees.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \329\ Work is not performed on energized parts in the 46.1- to 
72.5-kilovolt range using rubber insulating gloves. The maximum 
voltage rating for rubber insulating gloves is 36 kilovolts. (See 
Table E-4 to final Sec.  1926.97.) The phase-to-ground voltage on a 
72.5-kilovolt circuit is 41.8 kilovolts, which is above the maximum 
use voltage for rubber gloves. Minimum approach distances are set 
for the 46.1- to 72.5-kilovolt range based on the rubber insulating 
glove work technique because rubber insulating glove work is 
performed close to energized parts in this voltage range. For the 
purposes of estimating incident-energy levels, the Agency believes 
that the most likely electric arc will generally involve live parts 
the employee will be handling, which will be energized at 46 
kilovolts or less.
    \330\ Rubber insulating gloves with leather protectors and 
rubber insulating sleeves normally cover the employee's arms. This 
equipment provides protection against incident heat energy (Exs. 
0373, 0466; Tr. 434).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    TVA maintained that the 380-millimeter (15-inch) distance 
assumption for these exposures was too small, commenting:

    OSHA states that an employee's chest will be about 380 
millimeters (15 in.) from an energized conductor during rubber glove 
work on that conductor. A review of anthropometric estimates 
(``Anthropometry, Ergonomics, and the Design of Work'' by S. 
Pheasant) for British adults (19 to 65 years old) shows that the 
elbow to finger tip length for the 5th percentile is 440 mm (17.3 
inches) for men and 400 mm (15.75 inches) for women. After adding a 
distance of 51 mm (2 inches) for the arms to move toward the front 
of the body and into a working position, the distance from the chest 
to the potential arc point will be 451 mm (17.76 inches) for women 
and 491 mm (19.33 inches) for men. Based [on] this data, the default 
distance from the worker to the arc point should be 451 mm (17.76 
inches) or about 18 inches. The 15-inch distance proposed by [OSHA] 
will increase the calculated arc flash incident energy, which means 
that employees will have to wear heavier protection within the area 
of the arc flash boundary. This heavier protection is not warranted 
based on anthropometric data. IEEE 1584 states that a typical 
distance is 455 mm (17.91 inches) to the arc for cable work and low 
voltage panelboards and motor control centers. It is recommended 
that the final rule adopt 457 mm (18 inches) as the default distance 
to the arcing point. [Ex. 0213]

    OSHA does not dispute the anthropometric data described by TVA. 
However, the Agency does not agree with TVA's application of this data 
to rubber glove work. An employee working in a comfortable position on 
a conductor will have his or her upper and lower arms at an angle of 
about 60 degrees (269-Ex. 8-5). This position forms an equilateral 
triangle with the sides produced by the upper arm, the lower arm, and 
the distance between the employee's chest and the conductor. Therefore, 
the distance from the energized part to the worker's chest is the same 
as the distance between the energized part and the worker's elbow. 
Although the 95th percentile distance between the elbow and the 
fingertip may be 440 millimeters (17.3 inches), the conductor will be 
closer than that distance because it will originate at the crotch 
between the thumb and the palm rather than at the fingertip (id.). 
Subtracting 60 millimeters (2.4 inches) from the length of the lower 
arm, which is a conservative approximation of the distance between the 
middle fingertip and the crotch between the thumb and the palm, yields 
a distance of 380 millimeters (15 inches). This is the approximate 
distance between an employee using rubber gloves on an energized 
conductor and the live part, which also is the same distance as the 
estimated distance TVA was challenging.\331\ OSHA does not dispute the 
IEEE Std 1584 distance mentioned by TVA; however, the IEEE distances 
are for cables and enclosed equipment, not for open conductors in air 
(which involve the use of rubber insulating gloves). The Agency 
concludes that the distance from the arc to the employee should be 
different for these exposures, as explained later. Consequently, OSHA 
concludes that 380 millimeters (15 inches) is a reasonable distance to 
assume between the employee and the arc for work by employees using 
rubber gloves involving exposures to single-phase arcs of up to 46 
kilovolts in open air.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \331\ OSHA's approach is identical to the approach taken by the 
2007 NESC in Table 410-1 (Ex. 0533). (The 2012 NESC retains this 
approach in Table 410-2.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    At voltages higher than 46 kilovolts, employees must use live-line 
tools or the live-line barehand technique to handle energized 
parts.\332\ For this work, OSHA considers it reasonable to calculate 
incident-energy exposures for single-phase open-air arcs using a 
distance from the employee to the arc that is equal to the applicable 
minimum approach distance minus twice the arc length. In this case, the 
employee would be at the minimum approach distance from the energized 
part,\333\ where OSHA assumes the arc occurs, and subtracting twice the 
arc length from that distance accounts for movement of the arc \334\ 
and for small errors in judging and maintaining the minimum approach 
distance. There is no evidence on the record that this distance is 
unreasonable, and the Agency received no adverse comments on that 
assumption. Therefore, OSHA concludes that, for exposures involving 
single-phase arcs in open air when employees perform work using live-
line tools, a reasonable estimate of the distance from the arc to the 
employee is the minimum approach distance minus twice the arc length.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \332\ Although the rest of this discussion relates to work 
performed using live-line tools, an employer can use the same 
technique to reasonably estimate the distance from the employee to 
the electric arc when the employee is performing live-line barehand 
work. An employee performing live-line barehand work is at the 
potential of the conductor and is maintaining the applicable minimum 
approach distance from ground. From the worker's perspective, the 
dangerous potential is ground, not the conductor to which he or she 
is bonded. In that case, the employer can reasonably assume that the 
arc, if one occurs, will be close to objects at ground potential as, 
for example, if an energized conductor drops onto a grounded tower 
leg, or at the potential of other phase conductors as, for example, 
if a phase conductor drops on another phase conductor below.
    \333\ The design of the live-line tool keeps the employee at a 
distance from the energized part equal to, or greater than, the 
applicable minimum approach distance.
    \334\ When the arc initiates, the worker is likely to react by 
pulling the live-line tool away from the energized part and toward 
himself or herself. This action would pull the arc toward the 
worker. If the worker reacts in the opposite direction, then he or 
she would get closer to the arc.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Table 9 in proposed Appendix F only covered work on systems 
operating at more than 46 kilovolts. The Agency recognizes that some 
employers require their employees to use live-line tools on voltages of 
46.0 kilovolts and less. (See, for example, Exs. 0125, 0127, 0159.) 
Therefore, the Agency is extending Table 7 in final Appendix E to cover 
these lower voltages as well. Table 7 applies whenever employees use 
live-line tools, irrespective of voltage, because OSHA based the table 
on the work method, not on the voltage. OSHA also revised the titles of 
Table 6 and Table 7 in final Appendix E to indicate that they are 
applicable to work using

[[Page 20476]]

rubber insulating gloves and live-line tools, respectively, rather than 
work on systems based on voltage as proposed.
    One mechanism for reducing estimated incident energy is to move the 
employee farther away from the electric arc. One way to accomplish this 
objective is to use live-line tool work methods with a larger minimum 
approach distance than the minimum distance required by paragraph 
(c)(1) of final Sec.  1926.960. OSHA encourages employers to use such 
methods to reduce incident-energy levels. If an employer requires an 
employee to maintain a minimum approach distance greater than the 
minimum distance required by paragraph (c)(1), OSHA would deem it 
reasonable for the employer to use an estimate of the distance from the 
employee to the arc that reflects the employer-imposed minimum approach 
distance rather than the minimum approach distance required by the 
standard.
    Work that exposes employees to three-phase arcs in open air, or 
single-phase or three-phase arcs in enclosures, typically involves the 
employee working at a greater distance from energized parts than is the 
case when an employee is working on a single phase conductor of an 
overhead line. For example, employees typically perform work on 
energized equipment using insulating tools or test equipment on the 
energized parts or by operating the equipment or removing covers. In 
the first two cases, that is, using insulated tools or test equipment 
on energized parts, the employee will be working with arms extended. In 
the latter two cases, that is, operating the equipment or removing 
covers, employees would be working with their hands near the outside of 
equipment. OSHA believes that, in all four cases, it is reasonable to 
assume that the employee is working at a greater distance from the 
energized parts than an employee working with rubber insulating gloves 
on energized overhead line conductors. IEEE Std 1584a-2004 uses 
distances based, at least in part, on the dimensions of the equipment 
enclosure (Ex. 0425). Because IEEE designed that standard to address a 
wide range of equipment, OSHA believes that the IEEE approach is 
broadly applicable to work on energized equipment. The IEEE approach is 
explained in Section 4.8 of that standard as follows:

    Arc-flash protection is always based on the incident energy 
level on the person's face and body at the working distance, not the 
incident energy on the hands or arms. The degree of injury in a burn 
depends on the percentage of a person's skin that is burned. The 
head and body are a large percentage of total skin surface area and 
injury to these areas is much more life threatening than burns on 
the extremities. Typical working distances are shown in [the 
following table:]


------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                        Typical working
                Classes of equipment                   distance \a\ (mm)
                                                           [inches]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
15 kV switchgear....................................            910 [36]
5 kV switchgear.....................................            910 [36]
Low-voltage switchgear..............................            610 [24]
Low-voltage MCCs \[\\335\\]\ and panelboards........            455 [18]
Cable...............................................            455 [18]
 
                              * * * * * * *
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a\ Typical working distance is the sum of the distance between the
  worker standing in front of the equipment, and from the front of the
  equipment to the potential arc source inside the equipment. [id.\336\]
IEEE Std 1584a-2004--IEEE Guide for Performing Arc-Flash Hazard
  Calculations--Amendment 1--Reprinted with permission from IEEE--
  Copyright 2004, by IEEE. (Table revised from original).

    There is no evidence on the record that the distances in IEEE Std 
1584-2004 for three-phase arcs in open air or single-phase or three-
phase arcs in enclosures are unreasonable. Therefore, OSHA concludes 
that the distances in IEEE Std 1584-2004 described earlier are 
reasonable estimates for the distance from the employee to the electric 
arc for three-phase arcs in open air, and single-phase and three-phase 
arcs in enclosures, for voltages up to 15 kilovolts. Above that 
voltage, employers must consider equipment enclosure size and the 
working distance to the employee in selecting a distance from the 
employee to the arc. The Agency will consider a distance reasonable 
when the employer bases it on equipment size and working distance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \335\ Motor control center.
    \336\ IEEE Std 1584b-2011 makes editorial changes to the quoted 
paragraph and adds a column with English units to the table. The 
metric distances in the table remain unchanged.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Summary and discussion of general issues related to incident-energy 
calculation methods. Table 12, Table 13, and Table 14 in this preamble 
summarize OSHA's findings related to methods employers can use to 
estimate incident heat energy as required by final paragraph (g)(2). 
OSHA included these tables in Appendix E to Subpart V in the final rule 
to enable employers to readily select incident-energy calculation 
methods and input parameters that OSHA will consider reasonable and 
acceptable for compliance with paragraph (g)(2) of final Sec.  
1926.960.

                                         Table 12--Selecting a Reasonable Incident-Energy Calculation Method\1\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                     600 V and less \2\            601 V to 15 kV \2\              More than 15 kV
              Incident-energy calculation method               -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                 1[Phi]    3[Phi]a   3[Phi]b   1[Phi]    3[Phi]a   3[Phi]b   1[Phi]    3[Phi]a   3[Phi]b
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NFPA 70E-2004 Annex D (Lee equation) \3\......................       Y-C        Y         N        Y-C       Y-C        N      N\4\      N\4\      N\4\
Doughty, Neal, and Floyd......................................       Y-C        Y         Y         N         N         N         N         N         N
IEEE Std 1584-2004 \5\........................................        Y         Y         Y         Y         Y         Y         N         N         N
ARCPRO........................................................        Y         N         N         Y         N         N         Y      Y\6\      Y\6\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Key:
1[Phi]: Single-phase arc in open air

[[Page 20477]]

 
3[Phi]a: Three-phase arc in open air
3[Phi]b: Three-phase arc in an enclosure (box)
Y: Acceptable; produces a reasonable estimate of incident heat energy from this type of electric arc
N: Not acceptable; does not produce a reasonable estimate of incident heat energy from this type of electric arc
Y-C: Acceptable; produces a reasonable, but conservative, estimate of incident heat energy from this type of electric arc.
Notes:
\1\ Although OSHA will consider these methods reasonable for enforcement purposes when employers use the methods in accordance with this table,
  employers should be aware that the listed methods do not necessarily result in estimates that will provide full protection from internal faults in
  transformers and similar equipment or from arcs in underground manholes or vaults.
\2\ At these voltages, the arc is presumed to be three-phase unless the employer can demonstrate that only one phase is present or that the spacing of
  the phases is sufficient to prevent a multiphase arc from occurring.
\3\ The entries for NFPA 70E-2004 Annex D (Lee equation) apply equally to NFPA 70E-2012, and the comparable table in Appendix E refers to NFPA 70E-2012
  Annex D (Lee equation).
\4\ Although OSHA will consider this method acceptable for purposes of assessing whether incident energy exceeds 2.0 cal/cm\2\, the results at voltages
  of more than 15 kilovolts are extremely conservative and unrealistic.
\5\ The entries for IEEE Std 1584-2004 apply equally to IEEE 1584-2011, and the comparable table in Appendix E refers to IEEE Std 1584 with this latest
  amendment.
\6\ OSHA will deem the results of this method reasonable when the employer adjusts them using the conversion factors for three-phase arcs in open air or
  in an enclosure, as indicated in the program's instructions.


                                    Table 13--Selecting a Reasonable Arc Gap
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                           Single-phase arc mm
         Class of equipment                     (inches)                  Three-phase arc mm \1\  (inches)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cable...............................  NA \2\......................  13 (0.5)
Low voltage MCCs and panelboards....  NA..........................  25 (1.0)
Low-voltage switchgear..............  NA..........................  32 (1.25)
5-kV switchgear.....................  NA..........................  104 (4.0)
15-kV switchgear....................  NA..........................  152 (6.0)
Single conductors in air, 15 kV and   51 (2.0) \3\................  Phase conductor spacing.
 less.
Single conductor in air, more than    Voltage in kV times 2.54      Phase conductor spacing.
 15 kV.                                (0.1), but no less than 51
                                       mm (2 inches) \3\.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Source: IEEE Std 1584a-2004.
\2\ ``NA'' = not applicable.
\3\ Table 6 of Appendix E of final Subpart V uses a more conservative arc gap that equals the electrical
  component of the minimum approach distance rather than a value corresponding to the dielectric strength of air
  for the system voltage, which forms the basis for the values in this table.


 Table 14--Selecting a Reasonable Distance From the Employee to the Arc
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                Single-phase arc mm   Three-phase arc mm
      Class of equipment              (inches)             (inches)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cable........................  NA\*\................            455 (18)
Low voltage MCCs and           NA...................            455 (18)
 panelboards.
Low-voltage switchgear.......  NA...................            610 (24)
5-kV switchgear..............  NA...................            910 (36)
15-kV switchgear.............  NA...................            910 (36)
Single conductors in air (up   380 (15).............                  NA
 to 46 kilovolts), work with
 rubber insulating gloves.
Single conductors in air,      MAD - (2 x kV x 2.54)                  NA
 work with live-line tools     (MAD - (2 x kV /
 and live-line barehand work.   10))[dagger].
------------------------------------------------------------------------
* ``NA'' = not applicable.
[dagger] The terms in this equation are:
MAD = The applicable minimum approach distance, and
kV = The system voltage in kilovolts.

    With the guidance provided here and in Appendix E to final subpart 
V, OSHA believes that employers will be able to reasonably estimate 
incident-energy levels as required by final paragraph (g)(2). The 
Agency expects that, upon inspection, it will be able to detect any 
manipulation of input parameters designed to undermine the purpose and 
requirements of this final rule.
    In enforcing paragraph (g)(2) of the final rule, the Agency will 
accept as reasonable any estimates made following the guidance in the 
preamble and in Appendix E. Employers may depart from this guidance as 
long as the methods and variables used to calculate incident heat 
energy relate reasonably to the electric-arc exposures actually faced 
by employees. Duke Energy pointed out that ``standard writing 
committees . . . are continuing to address the electric-arc hazards, 
specifically NFPA 70E, IEEE Std 1584-2002, and technical papers written 
by the IEEE/ESMOL[337] committee'' (Ex. 0201). These efforts 
may result in additional sources of information for employers to use in 
estimating incident heat energy for purposes of final paragraph (g)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \337\ Electrical Safety and Maintenance of Lines.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Several rulemaking participants noted that IEEE and NFPA are 
undertaking a joint research effort to address issues related to 
methods of calculating incident heat energy from electric arcs. (See, 
for example, Exs. 0177, 0201, 0227; Tr. 1095, 1128-1129.) These 
rulemaking participants recommended that OSHA delay the rulemaking 
pending the results of this research. For example, Ms. Kathy Wilmer, 
testifying on behalf of EEI, stated:


[[Page 20478]]


    In 2005, IEEE and NFPA sponsored a joint task force whose charge 
was to develop a research and test plan intended to address 
technical issues, including those raised by the calculation methods. 
It will be several years, however, before the results of the IEEE/
NFPA Research and Test Plan Committee are available to employers. 
[Tr. 1095]

    EEI recommended that ``OSHA wait for NFPA and IEEE to answer some 
of [the] questions'' related to the calculation methods (Tr. 1129).

    As noted by Ms. Wilmer, the results of any research conducted as a 
result of the IEEE-NFPA joint effort may be years away. Today, the 
final results of this research are not available. OSHA concludes that 
there is sufficient information in the rulemaking record to determine 
that existing calculation methods can reasonably estimate incident heat 
energy from electric arcs. Therefore, the Agency does not believe that 
it is necessary to wait for IEEE and NFPA to complete the research. In 
the future, this research may result in additional sources of 
information for employers estimating incident heat energy for the 
purposes of final paragraph (g)(2).
    Note 2 to paragraph (g)(2), which is being adopted without 
substantive change from the proposal, explains that paragraph (g)(2) 
does not require the employer to estimate the heat-energy exposure for 
every job task performed by each employee. The note indicates that the 
employer may make broad estimates that cover multiple system areas 
provided that: (1) The employer uses reasonable assumptions about the 
energy-exposure distribution throughout the system, and (2) the 
estimates represent the maximum exposure for those areas.
    Proposed Appendix F explained that the employer could use the 
maximum fault current and clearing time to cover several system areas 
at once.
    NIOSH expressed concern that, following this guidance, an employer 
could estimate incident energy based on the maximum available fault 
current, even though a higher incident-energy level is possible with a 
lower fault current (Ex. 0130). NIOSH explained:

    [Proposed Note 2 to paragraph (g)(2) and proposed Appendix F] 
suggest that the point in a power system that has the highest 
available fault current will also have the maximum heat energy 
hazard in the event of an arcing-fault. [T]he heat energy released 
during an arcing-fault is a function of both current and duration 
(clearing time). The maximum heat energy hazard may be at a point in 
the system where available fault current is less than the system 
maximum and may consequently have a longer clearing time. This 
longer clearing time is due to the inverse-time characteristic of 
many circuit protection components such as fuses and relays (the 
higher the fault current, the more quickly the circuit protection 
components will clear the fault). [Id.]

NIOSH recommended ``providing a more detailed explanation of the 
interdependence of current and clearing time with respect to arcing-
fault hazards,'' and indicated that ``NFPA 70E-2004 provides an example 
of such an explanation'' (id.).

    OSHA recognizes that fault current lower than the maximum available 
fault current can produce a higher incident energy. The maximum fault 
current, also known as the bolted-fault current, occurs when the fault 
has no impedance,\338\ as if the two conductors were bolted together. 
The current in an electric arc is never as high as the maximum 
available fault current because the arc itself has some impedance, and 
this lowers the fault current. All of the incident-energy calculation 
methods, except ARCPRO, account for this reduction (Exs. 0134, 0425, 
0430, 0469).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \338\ Impedance is the effective resistance of an electric 
circuit to alternating current. It includes the combined effects of 
ohmic resistance and reactance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As NIOSH notes, when the current is less than the maximum available 
fault current, the protective devices for the circuit may take longer 
to clear the fault, resulting in longer clearing times. IEEE Std 1584a-
2004 accounts for this difference in clearing times and for variations 
in arc current with arc voltage in the formulas it uses to calculate 
incident energy (Ex. 0425). The other methods use the clearing time 
corresponding to the fault current used to calculate the incident 
energy.
    However, the fault current and the clearing times used to calculate 
incident energy in these calculations are only approximations of the 
values that might occur in an actual fault. Like the distance from the 
employee to the arc and, in some cases, the arc length, the fault 
current and clearing time in an actual fault likely will be different 
from the fault current and clearing time used to calculate incident 
energy. The final rule requires that the employer's estimate of 
incident energy be reasonable, not that it be a precise estimate of the 
maximum possible incident energy. Lower fault current may produce a 
higher incident energy, but so would exposures with the employee closer 
to the arc. Other variations, such as short clearing times (which can 
occur if the arc self-extinguishes) or longer distances between the 
employee and the arc, could lead to lower incident energy. Considering 
the evidence in the record as a whole, the Agency believes that using 
maximum fault current in estimating incident energy will produce 
reasonable estimates of the exposures faced by employees.
    Mr. John Vocke with Pacific Gas and Electric Company stated that 
his company conducted testing to verify the values in Table 8 and Table 
9 in proposed Appendix F (Ex. 0185). He maintained that the incident-
energy values provided in those tables may be inaccurate.
    As noted earlier, the Agency concluded that the ARCPRO method, on 
which OSHA based the incident-energy values in proposed Table 8 and 
Table 9, reasonably estimates incident energy from single-phase arcs in 
open air on systems of more than 600 volts. Mr. Vocke did not provide 
the parameters used in, or the results of, Pacific Gas and Electric 
Company's testing. For example, it is not clear from Mr. Vocke's 
comment whether the testing was with single-phase arcs in open air. If 
not, then the Agency would expect their results to differ from the 
values in proposed Table 8 and Table 9.
    As described earlier, OSHA based Table 8 and Table 9 in proposed 
Appendix F on calculations using ARCPRO and designed those tables to 
cover a wide range of exposures faced by employees performing overhead 
line work. TVA noted that these tables had little application and 
expressed concern that employers would misuse the tables, commenting:

    We believe the use of tables, e.g., * * * proposed Tables 8 & 9, 
have limited application for estimating heat energy for electrical 
circuits common to the electric utility industry. The footnotes to 
these tables instruct users to use other methods if the circuit 
assumptions in the tables are not applicable to the circuit being 
analyzed. Our concern is that many companies will not understand the 
limitations of these tables or choose to ignore the instruction to 
use other methods. Either of these actions could result in under 
estimating the arc flash hazard.
* * * * *
    [W]e do not agree with the ``table'' method approach. We believe 
that for many exposures in generating and transmission facilities 
OSHA's proposed Tables 8 and 9 will not be useful to employers for 
selecting arc flash protection. The tables are misleading because in 
reality there are too many circuits with parameters that do not meet 
the table use criteria. OSHA states in [proposed Appendix F] that 
employers will need to use other methods in situations not addressed 
by Table 8 or Table 9. We believe that an accepted method should be 
used to calculate arc flash incident energies and recommend that the 
final rule not include tables like proposed Table 8 and Table 9 for 
selecting arc flash protection. [Ex. 0213]


[[Page 20479]]


    OSHA believes that Table 8 and Table 9 from proposed Appendix F 
(Table 6 and Table 7 in final Appendix E, which OSHA revised as 
described elsewhere in this section of the preamble) serve as 
relatively simple ways for employers to estimate incident energy. The 
SBREFA Panel Report specifically recommended that OSHA consider 
including such tables in the standard (Ex. 0019). The National 
Electrical Safety Code committee adopted provisions on protection from 
electric arcs that included tables similar to the ones in the proposal 
(Ex. 0480). Mr. James Tomaseski of IBEW supported the proposed tables 
and stated that the values in those tables represent ``common exposures 
out on distribution lines'' (Tr. 939--940). Mr. Brian Erga with ESCI 
also supported proposed Table 8 and Table 9, testifying:

    ESCI fully supports the table 8 and table 9 in the appendix of 
this proposal as a way of providing a method of choosing some FR 
clothing for workers or small companies.
    It will allow a company to figure out, take their fault current, 
their clearing time, go into a table, and find . . . some clothing 
that might be appropriate, buy that for them, and feel . . . assured 
that they were doing what they could do and . . . what OSHA would 
require. [Tr. 1246-1247]

The Agency concludes that Table 8 and Table 9 in proposed Appendix F 
will assist employers in complying with the requirement in final 
paragraph (g)(2) to estimate incident heat energy and that the tables 
reasonably represent exposures in electric distribution systems, as 
noted by Mr. Tomaseski, if not transmission systems.\339\ (See, also, 
Mr. Erga's testimony at Tr. 1247: ``I passed table 8 and table 9 around 
to my customers. All of them feel it looks very good and looks very 
straightforward for them to follow. And they feel pretty comfortable 
that they would be willing to get into an FR program using [those] 
table[s] . . . .'') Consequently, OSHA is including the tables in final 
Appendix E, with revisions as described elsewhere in this section of 
the preamble. OSHA agrees with TVA that it is important for employers 
to heed the notes to these tables, which limit their application to 
rubber insulating glove work (Table 6) and live-line tool work (Table 
7) involving exposure to single-phase arcs in open air. OSHA further 
agrees that these tables are of little, if any, use in electric power 
generating plants, where most of the exposures come from three-phase 
arcs. Nevertheless, the Agency believes that many employers, especially 
small ones, will find these tables useful.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \339\ Although there is nothing in the record that states 
explicitly that Table 9 represents actual exposures for employees 
working on transmission systems, the existence of similar tables in 
the 2007 NESC (Ex. 0533) and the 2012 NESC strongly suggests that 
Table 9 does reasonably represent transmission exposures. (Table 8 
of proposed Appendix F covers only distribution voltages.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Mr. Tom Chappell of Southern Company suggested that the final rule 
not require incident-energy estimates for voltages of 600 volts and 
less, arguing that these systems do not pose the same risk as higher 
voltage systems:

    This proposed language would require that the employer make 
estimates of the maximum available heat energy to which employees 
are exposed to at 600 volts and below as well as those above 600 
volts. We do not believe this to be reasonable. Even OSHA recognizes 
that the risks of exposures at 600 volts and below do not carry the 
same risk as those above 600 volts since the proposed regulations do 
not require flame resistant clothing at voltages 600 volts and 
below. Additionally, Note 2 suggests making broad estimates that 
cover multiple system areas, and further gives an example of how 
that may be done for distribution circuits. Both of these suggest 
that the OSHA's intent was not to cover systems operating at 600 
volts or less where such broad estimates are meaningless and not 
possible. We recommend that estimates of heat energy not be required 
for systems operating at 600 volts and below and that engineering 
controls and work practices be used for these systems so that 
contact is avoided. This recommendation would be consistent with 
NESC proposed language. [Ex. 0212]

    Mr. Chappell misunderstood the rationale behind OSHA's final rule. 
First, Note 2 to proposed paragraph (g)(2), which OSHA is adopting 
without substantive change, contained an example, clearly identified as 
such, of how to estimate incident heat energy over a wide area. There 
are other possible circuits that might be suitable for wide estimates. 
In addition, the note only addresses circuits that are far-ranging, 
such as transmission and distribution circuits. Circuits that operate 
at 600 volts and less are found normally as services or as feeder or 
branch circuits inside electric power generation plants. (See, for 
example, 269-Exs. 8-5, 8-17, 8-20, 8-21, 8-22.) These circuits do not 
normally extend for miles; each of them usually serves a single 
facility. Second, OSHA does not agree that 600-volt systems produce 
lower amounts of incident energy or pose a lower risk of burn injury to 
employees than higher voltage systems. The rationale behind the 
requirement in final Sec.  1926.960(g)(4)(i) that employees exposed to 
contact with circuit parts operating at more than 600 volts wear flame-
resistant clothing relates to the reduced likelihood that contact with 
a circuit part energized at lower voltages would produce an electric 
arc through, and ignite, the clothing. As noted under the summary and 
explanation for final paragraph (g)(4)(i), many commenters noted that 
systems operating at 600 volts and less are capable of producing 
extremely high levels of incident energy, sometimes even higher than 
systems operating at higher voltages. For example, Mr. Paul Hamer 
stated, ``Many systems and equipment operating at 600 volts and below 
have severe arc-flash hazards . . .'' (Ex. 0166). In addition, TVA 
noted:

    The magnitude of the heat energy in 480 V arc flash accidents is 
greater [than at voltages higher than 600 volts] because of the 
following: 1. The single phase fault typically propagates to three 
phase fault. 2. The clearing times in generating plants are 
typically longer. 3. The arc flash energy is typically forced into 
one direction (arc in a box). [Ex. 0213]

Therefore, while there may not be an ignition hazard from contact at 
the lower voltages, burn hazards at these voltages may still be serious 
and require arc-rated protective equipment.

    For these reasons, OSHA is not adopting Mr. Chappell's 
recommendation. The Agency believes that it is just as important to 
estimate incident-energy levels for systems operating at 600 volts and 
less as it is for systems of higher voltages. Without an estimate of 
incident energy, an employer would not be able to select appropriate 
arc-rated protective equipment for employees exposed to these voltages 
in accordance with final Sec.  1926.960(g)(5).
    Some rulemaking participants maintained that incident-heat-energy 
exposures change over time. (See, for example, Exs. 0126, 0163; Tr. 
404-405.) For instance, Ms. Susan O'Connor with Siemens Power 
Generation commented that ``if new equipment is added or the available 
fault current to the plant from the utility changes, the entire 
calculations change. The arc faults become a moving target'' (Ex. 
0163). Noting that fault current can change hourly, Mr. James Shill 
with ElectriCities of North Carolina testified:

    [I]n one of my first assignments in the power company I was in 
charge of coordinating the equipment, and fault currents change 
hourly. [I]t depends on where your source of energy comes from. [Tr. 
404]

    The final rule does not require employers to estimate incident-
energy levels on a moment-by-moment basis. As indicated by Note 2 to 
paragraph (g)(2), the final rule permits employers to make broad 
estimates of incident-energy exposure, provided those

[[Page 20480]]

estimates represent the reasonably expected maximum exposures. There 
would be no need to perform additional calculations when changes to the 
system would lower incident energy. In addition, as long as the 
protective clothing and other protective equipment selected by the 
employer will protect against the incident energy, including any 
increase caused by changes to the system, the final rule does not 
require the employer to reconduct the incident-energy estimates 
required by paragraph (g)(2).
    The Agency believes that employers will select arc-rated protective 
equipment, not on the basis of estimates for individual circuits, but 
on the basis of what levels will provide protection for broad areas of 
the employers' systems. For instance, an employer could select a base 
clothing outfit rated at 8 cal/cm.\2\ This clothing would be acceptable 
as long as the estimated energy levels are less than that value. 
Accordingly, OSHA believes that an employer can take measures to 
minimize the number of times it must perform additional calculations. 
For example, an employer using Table 6 or Table 7 in final Appendix E, 
can select an incident-energy estimate for a maximum number of cycles 
at a given level of fault current on a particular circuit. As long as 
any change to the circuit does not increase the fault current or 
clearing time beyond the fault current and clearing time used in 
selecting a value from the table, the employer would not have to make 
additional estimates. The employer then would know that as long as 
relay settings (which affect clearing time) and transformer kilovolt-
ampere ratings (which affect maximum fault current) stay below the 
values on which the employer bases the selection of incident-energy 
level, then employees would remain safe, and the employer would remain 
in compliance. Thus, the employer could avoid having to reestimate 
incident-energy levels simply by limiting the types of changes that 
could be made to a circuit or by selecting protective clothing and 
other protective equipment that accommodates any changes that will be 
made. As Mr. Donald Hartley of IBEW testified: ``[If] you don't find 
that [the fault current and clearing times] are substantially different 
[then] you may not have to change what it is you were doing'' (Tr. 
1031-1032). On the other hand, it is possible that employers that do 
not adequately plan changes to their systems will need to reestimate 
incident heat energy for some of their circuits.
    OSHA does not expect employers to account for unanticipated changes 
to their systems in estimating incident-energy levels. As Mr. Shill 
noted, it is possible that an unanticipated system change could 
increase incident energy. For example, an unidentified faulty relay 
could substantially increase the clearing time and, thus, an employee's 
potential incident-energy exposure. However, final paragraph (g)(2) 
does not require employers to anticipate such events. The estimates 
required by this paragraph are for normal operating conditions.
    For these reasons, OSHA concludes that concerns that employers 
would need to constantly update their incident-energy estimates are 
largely baseless. To the extent that employers must update these 
estimates, the Agency's regulatory analysis fully accounts for periodic 
updates. (See Section VI, Final Economic Analysis and Regulatory 
Flexibility Analysis, later in the preamble.)
    Some commenters maintained that employers would need to hire 
consultants to perform the incident-energy calculations required by 
final paragraph (g)(2). (See, for example, Exs. 0163, 0178; Tr. 375-
376, 563.) Mr. James Shill of ElectriCities of North Carolina 
testified: ``Even if professional engineers know the method to use in 
calculating maximum available heat energy, small electric utilities 
often do not have such qualified personnel on staff. Instead, small 
utility businesses will be faced with hiring outside consultants to 
perform this work for each job at each workplace, and for each 
employee'' (Tr. 375-376).
    OSHA agrees with these commenters that small employers may need to 
hire consultants to perform or assist in the preparation of incident-
energy calculations. Even some larger utilities hire consultants to 
help perform incident-energy calculations (Tr. 1197). The Agency 
understands that estimating incident heat energy demands some 
electrical engineering expertise. OSHA believes that most employers 
that work on electric power generation, transmission, and distribution 
systems have such engineering expertise available. As noted by some 
witnesses, these estimates require much of the same knowledge and skill 
as other assessments needed to operate, maintain, and work on electric 
power generation, transmission, and distribution systems (Tr. 1030-
1032). In any event, OSHA's estimate of the costs associated with 
complying with paragraph (g)(2) in the final rule accounts for the 
possibility that, in some instances, consultants will perform the 
required estimates. (See Section VI, Final Economic Analysis and 
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis, later in this preamble.)
    Some rulemaking participants suggested that contractors would have 
difficulty estimating incident energy or would not be able to perform 
the estimates at all. (See, for example, Exs. 0162, 0169, 0234, 0501; 
Tr. 1326-1327, 1335-1336.) For instance, Quanta Services noted that 
utility operators frequently do not know the maximum fault current on 
their systems, making it ``difficult [for contractors] to determine the 
maximum fault current'' (Ex. 0234). The Davis H. Elliot Construction 
Company suggested that utilities might provide worst-case estimates to 
their contractors because of potential liability concerns (Exs. 0156, 
0206, 0231).
    OSHA understands that contractors may face challenges in estimating 
incident heat energy as required by paragraph (g)(2) in the final rule. 
The requirements in final Sec.  1926.950(c)(1), which specifies that 
host employers provide information about their systems to contract 
employers, should ensure that contractors have the information they 
need to estimate incident energy. Paragraph (c)(1)(iii) of final Sec.  
1926.950 specifically requires host employers to provide information to 
enable contract employers to perform the assessments required by the 
final rule. This would include information contractors need to estimate 
incident heat energy as required in final Sec.  1926.960(g)(2).\340\ In 
any case in which the host employer does not provide the contractor 
with necessary information and, therefore, violates this final rule, 
contractors can use other (albeit less certain) means of estimating the 
system parameters needed to perform incident-energy calculations. 
Contractors can estimate fault currents through the ratings of the 
transformers supplying the circuit \341\ and clearing times from the 
type of overcurrent devices protecting the circuit \342\ (Ex. 0425; 
269-Ex. 8-15). The Agency assumes that, when utilities are

[[Page 20481]]

not providing this information, contractors already are using these 
methods when determining the size of grounds necessary under existing 
Sec.  1910.269(n)(4)(i) (``Protective grounding equipment shall be 
capable of conducting the maximum fault current that could flow at the 
point of grounding for the time necessary to clear the fault.'') There 
is no evidence in the record that utilities are currently providing 
unduly conservative estimates of fault current or clearing times to 
contractors for the purposes of existing Sec.  1910.269(n)(4)(i), and 
it seems unlikely that they would provide different estimates after 
this final rule becomes effective. Consequently, the Agency concludes 
that the concerns specific to contractors are baseless.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \340\ In the economic analysis, OSHA assumes that costs related 
to estimating incident energy will be borne only by host employers. 
The Agency anticipates that, for economic reasons, host employers 
will provide the results of their estimates to contract employers 
even though the final rule does not require them to do so. See 
Section VI, Final Economic Analysis and Regulatory Flexibility 
Analysis, later in the preamble.
    \341\ For example, a contractor can estimate the fault current 
on the secondary side of a transformer on a radial system by 
calculating the fault current at the transformer, which is equal to 
the transformer rating divided by the product of the per-unit 
impedance and the voltage (Ex. 0134).
    \342\ IEEE Std 1584a-2004 gives the clearing times for a wide 
range of circuit protective devices (Ex. 0425). Contractors also can 
try to obtain clearing times from a number of other sources, 
including the manufacturer.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Several commenters suggested that proposed paragraph (g)(2) was too 
vague. (See, for example, Exs. 0126, 0152, 0227; Tr. 1095-1097.) For 
instance, Ms. Jean Thrasher with Community Electric Cooperative 
commented: ``With undefined terms in the equation and no firm 
guidelines from OSHA the employer has the potential to be cited even 
though they performed a good faith appraisal but the inspector 
disagreed with the values chosen'' (Ex. 0152).
    OSHA made it clear in this preamble and in Appendix E to final 
Subpart V that the employer is free to choose any method for estimating 
incident energy that results in a reasonable estimate of incident heat 
energy to which the employee would be exposed. Appendix E provides 
guidance on how to estimate incident heat energy and information on 
approaches that OSHA will recognize as reasonable for performing these 
estimates. In the final rule, OSHA revised Note 1 to paragraph (g)(2) 
to further clarify what constitutes compliance with that paragraph. The 
revised note provides that: (1) OSHA will deem employers that follow 
the guidance in Appendix E to be in compliance with paragraph (g)(2), 
and (2) employers can choose another method of estimating incident heat 
energy if the chosen method reasonably predicts the incident energy to 
which the employee would be exposed. (Note 1 in the proposal simply 
referred to the appendix for guidance.) Employers can rely on the 
guidance in this preamble and final Appendix E to select methods and 
input parameters accepted by OSHA for compliance with final paragraph 
(g)(2). Accordingly, the Agency concludes that paragraph (g)(2) in the 
final rule is not unenforceably vague.
    Proposed paragraph (g)(2) would have required employers to make ``a 
reasonable estimate of the maximum available heat energy to which the 
employee would be exposed.'' OSHA concludes that this language might 
not accurately convey the purpose of the proposed rule and, therefore, 
could confuse the regulated community. For example, as should be clear 
from the foregoing explanation of what OSHA will consider a 
``reasonable estimate,'' the Agency believes that it is reasonable to 
estimate incident-energy exposures based on the location where an 
employee is reasonably expected to be working when an arc occurs. 
However, as explained earlier, the maximum heat energy will occur 
within the arc plasma, and the Agency concludes that it is not 
necessary to estimate heat energy assuming that the employee is close 
enough to the arc to be within the plasma field. In addition, as 
explained previously, the choice of methods and other input parameters 
also can affect the calculated incident energy. To clarify that the 
Agency is expecting a reasonable estimate, and not an estimate of the 
maximum heat energy, OSHA replaced the phrase ``a reasonable estimate 
of the maximum available heat energy'' in paragraph (g)(2) in the 
proposed rule with ``a reasonable estimate of the incident heat 
energy'' in the corresponding provision in the final rule. The Agency 
believes that the final rule more accurately reflects the purpose of 
this provision and will clarify some of the confusion related to the 
requirement to estimate incident-energy levels.
    NIOSH stated that arc warning labels would be valuable for new or 
upgraded installations (Ex. 0130). NIOSH explained its position as 
follows:

    Arc warning labels that explain the voltage, available fault 
current, Arc Hazard Category, the ATPV of the required protective 
clothing, and the approach distances would be a valuable addition to 
all new or upgraded installations. Such information, as calculated 
by the systems' designers, would then be readily available to the 
workers who need to maintain such systems. Many commercial power 
systems analysis packages can automatically generate these labels as 
part of the systems design and analysis procedure. Having labels on 
new equipment would eliminate the need for the employer to estimate 
arc hazards by providing calculated engineering data. [id.]

    OSHA decided against requiring arc-hazard warning labels such as 
those recommended by NIOSH. OSHA believes that the employer can 
effectively provide information on arc hazards and the required 
protective measures in other ways. Employers must train their employees 
in the recognition of electrical hazards, including hazards from 
electric arcs, and the proper use of PPE, including FR and arc-rated 
clothing, as required by final Sec.  1926.950(b)(2)(v) and (b)(2)(iv), 
respectively. The employer can use several methods other than labels to 
ensure that employees wear appropriately rated protective equipment, 
including requiring a minimum level of protection that will cover most 
exposures and including the arc rating on work orders. OSHA believes 
that these other measures are likely to be more effective than warning 
labels since they inform the employee of the appropriate rating before 
the employee arrives at the jobsite. If the employer relies on labels, 
employees may arrive at the jobsite without properly rated protective 
equipment. In addition, OSHA does not believe that providing labels on 
transmission and distribution installations is feasible or effective. 
It is not possible to label the entire length of a transmission or 
distribution line, and installing labels at switching points would not 
prove effective or useful to employees whose work is remote from those 
switching points. Therefore, OSHA is not adopting the requirement for 
arc-hazard warning labels recommended by NIOSH.
    Prohibited clothing. Paragraph (g)(3), which is being adopted with 
only minor changes from the proposal, requires the employer to ensure 
that employees exposed to hazards from flames or electric arcs do not 
wear clothing that could either melt onto their skin or ignite and 
continue to burn when exposed to flames or the heat energy estimated 
under final paragraph (g)(2). This rule is equivalent to existing Sec.  
1910.269(l)(6)(iii), although OSHA revised the language to explicitly 
prohibit clothing that could melt onto an employee's skin or ignite and 
continue to burn.\343\ Final paragraph (g)(3) ensures that employees 
exposed to electric arcs do not wear clothing presenting the most 
severe burn hazards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \343\ The existing rule prohibits clothing that could increase 
the extent of injuries to an employee. The Agency interprets this 
rule as prohibiting clothing that could melt or that could ignite 
and continue to burn in the presence of an electric arc faced by an 
employee. (See, for example, Memorandum to the Field dated August 
10, 1995, from James W. Stanley, ``Guidelines for the Enforcement of 
the Apparel Standard, 29 CFR 1910.269(l)(6), of the Electric Power 
Generation, Transmission, and Distribution Standard.'' This 
memorandum is available at https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=INTERPRETATIONS&p_id=21878.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A note following this provision lists fabrics, including acetate, 
nylon, polyester, and rayon, that the final rule specifically prohibits 
unless the

[[Page 20482]]

employer demonstrates that the clothing is treated or worn in such a 
manner as to eliminate the hazard. In the proposed rule, this note was 
the same as the note following existing Sec.  1910.269(l)(6)(iii). In 
the preamble to the proposal, OSHA requested comments on whether it 
should add any other fabrics posing similar hazards to the note.
    Many commenters recommended adding polypropylene to the list of 
prohibited fabrics. (See, for example, Exs. 0148, 0183, 0233, 0239; Tr. 
563-564.) Mr. Mark Zavislan, representing NRECA, testified:

    Polypropylene is a synthetic fabric under heat conditions. It 
melts. It's terrible. I have not witnessed it in an arc type of 
exposure, but I was an EMT for several years, and one of the worst 
injuries I have ever seen, vehicle accident involving a fire, an 
individual wearing long underwear made out of this material, and it 
was pretty ugly.
    So I think, if you are looking at the heat exposures from an 
arc, you've got the potential for the same type of damage. [Tr. 564]

    OSHA finds that this evidence indicates that polypropylene can 
melt. Although Mr. Zavislan's testimony did not indicate that this 
fabric is likely to melt in an arc exposure, it does indicate that, if 
polypropylene is exposed to sufficient heat, it will melt. In this 
regard, OSHA believes that the heat generated by a arc flash is at 
least as severe as the heat generated by a vehicle fire. Consequently, 
OSHA is adding polypropylene to the list of prohibited fabrics 
contained in the note following paragraph (g)(3) in the final rule.
    Two commenters suggested adding acrylic fibers to the list in the 
note, although they did not provide any evidence that this fabric melts 
or ignites and continues to burn when exposed to electric arcs (Exs. 
0148, 0213). While OSHA decided against adding acrylic fibers to the 
list of prohibited fabrics contained in the note, the Agency observes 
that the note's list of the types of fabric prohibited by final Sec.  
1926.960(g)(3) is not exhaustive. Employers must ensure that employees 
do not wear clothing made from an acrylic fiber if such clothing could 
melt onto the skin or ignite and continue to burn when exposed to the 
heat energy estimated under final paragraph (g)(2), regardless of 
whether the note lists the fabric. One of the two commenters that 
advocated adding acrylic fibers to the note was ASTM. ASTM has 
extensive experience with testing materials. The Agency suspects that 
acrylic fibers will melt onto the skin or easily ignite and continue to 
burn in the presence of an electric arc, although it did not arrive at 
this conclusion in this rulemaking.
    Two commenters recommended removing rayon from the list of 
prohibited fabrics contained in the proposed note (Exs. 0166, 0228, 
0235). These commenters pointed out that rayon is a cellulose-based 
synthetic fiber that burns but does not melt.
    OSHA included rayon as one of the prohibited fabrics on the basis 
of evidence in the record for the 1994 Sec.  1910.269 rulemaking (59 FR 
4389; 59 FR 33658-33659, 33661). In that rulemaking, the Agency 
described the evidence and rationale for prohibiting certain fabrics as 
follows:

    The IBEW introduced a videotape, produced by the Duke Power 
Company, demonstrating the effects of different types of clothing 
upon exposure to electric arcs (Ex. 12-12). This tape provides clear 
evidence of the hazards of wearing clothing made from certain 
untreated synthetic fabrics, such as polyester, acetate, nylon, and 
rayon.
* * * * *
    Therefore, for exposed employees, . . . final Sec.  1910.269 
adopts a requirement that these employees be trained in the hazards 
related to the clothing that they wear [and prohibits] apparel that 
could increase the extent of injuries received by a worker who is 
exposed to an electric arc. OSHA has also included a note . . . to 
indicate the types of clothing fabrics that the record demonstrates 
are hazardous to wear by employees exposed to electric arcs.
    The requirement is intended to prohibit the types of fabrics 
shown in the Duke Power Company videotape to be expected to cause 
more severe injuries than would otherwise be anticipated. These 
include such untreated materials as polyester and rayon, unless the 
employee is otherwise protected from the effects of their burning. 
[59 FR 4389, as corrected at 59 FR 33658]

    The Duke video indicated that rayon ignites easily in the presence 
of electric arcs (269-Ex. 12-12). Existing Sec.  1910.269(l)(6)(iii) 
and final paragraph (g)(3) prohibit clothing that can ignite and 
continue to burn, in addition to fabrics that can melt onto the skin in 
the presence of electric arcs. The evidence in the record indicates 
that rayon meets this criterion. Therefore, OSHA is not removing rayon 
from the list of prohibited fabrics.
    When flame-resistant clothing is required. Proposed paragraph 
(g)(4) would have required employees to wear flame-resistant clothing 
whenever: (1) The employee was subject to contact with energized 
circuit parts operating at more than 600 volts (proposed paragraph 
(g)(4)(i)); (2) an electric arc could ignite flammable material in the 
work area that, in turn, could ignite the clothing of an employee 
nearby (proposed paragraph (g)(4)(ii)); or (3) molten metal or electric 
arcs from faulted conductors in the work area could ignite the 
employee's clothing (proposed paragraph (g)(4)(iii)). A note to 
proposed paragraph (g)(4)(iii) indicated that this provision would not 
apply to conductors capable of carrying, without failure, the maximum 
available fault current for the time the circuit protective devices 
take to intercept the fault. In such instances, conductors would not 
melt from the fault current and, therefore, could not ignite the 
employee's clothing. The conditions listed in proposed paragraph (g)(4) 
address several burn accidents examined by OSHA involving ignition of 
an employee's clothing (Exs. 0002, 0003, 0004).\344\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \344\ See, for example, the four accidents described at https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=596304&id=14418776&id=170238109&id=202043758.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    OSHA reworded the introductory text to paragraph (g)(4) in the 
final rule to clarify what clothing must be flame-resistant and to make 
it consistent with provisions in final paragraphs (g)(5)(i) through 
(g)(5)(v) that permit some types of non-flame-resistant clothing in 
lieu of arc-rated clothing in certain conditions. (See the discussion 
of the difference between flame-resistant and arc-rated clothing under 
the summary and explanation for final paragraph (g)(5), later in this 
section of the preamble.) The language in final paragraph (g)(4) makes 
it clear that only the outer layer of clothing must be flame-resistant. 
This requirement recognizes that some companies successfully use 100-
percent cotton T-shirts under FR shirts. (See, for example, Tr. 1345-
1346.) NFPA 70E-2004 also recognizes the use of non-flame-resistant 
clothing under flame-resistant clothing as providing adequate 
protection against electric-arc hazards in certain situations (Ex. 
0134). In any event, final paragraph (g)(3) prohibits the use of 
flammable layers of clothing beneath flame-resistant outer clothing 
whenever doing so poses a burn hazard.
    For reasons explained later, OSHA is adopting in the final rule 
paragraphs (g)(4)(i) through (g)(4)(iii) (including the note) largely 
as proposed. The Agency is adding a new paragraph (g)(4)(iv) that 
requires employees to wear flame-resistant clothing whenever the 
incident heat energy estimated under paragraph (g)(2) exceeds 2.0 cal/
cm\2\. See the explanation of this new paragraph later in this section 
of the preamble.
    Several rulemaking participants argued that some employers are 
providing adequate protection for their employees by requiring them to 
wear 100-percent cotton (that is, that flame-resistant clothing is 
unnecessary). (See, for example, Exs. 0187, 0238, 0506; Tr.

[[Page 20483]]

543-544.) For instance, Mr. Jonathan Glazier with NRECA stated:

    Many utilities now allow their employees to wear 100 percent 
natural fiber clothing. This means cotton and, in colder climates, 
wool or cotton/wool blends. One hundred percent natural fiber 
clothing complies with OSHA's current 1910.269, if it is thick 
enough not to ignite and to continue burning, but this will change 
if the new proposal becomes final.
    Proposed Sections 1910.269(l)(11)(4)(a) and 1926.960(g)(4)(i) 
would require wearing FR clothing--that's FR clothing, not merely 
clothing that will not melt or ignite and continue to burn, but FR 
clothing--when an employee is ``subject to contact with energized 
circuit parts operating at more than 600 volts.''
    Arguably, this means that 100 percent natural fiber clothing 
cannot be worn by employees doing rubber glove work on parts 
energized above 600 volts. This will require many utilities that 
have been successfully allowing 100 percent natural fiber clothing 
to move to the more expensive and, let's face it, more [problematic] 
FR clothing. [Tr. 543-544]

    The evidence in the rulemaking record clearly shows that flame-
resistant clothing is necessary for the protection of employees when 
the conditions addressed by final paragraph (g)(4) are present. (See, 
for example, Exs. 0002, 0003, 0004.\345\) Sixteen of the 100 arc-
related burn accidents in Ex. 0004, covering the period from 1991 to 
1998, involved the ignition of an employee's clothing. Two additional 
burn accidents involved hydraulic fluid that ignited when an aerial 
lift approached too close to an energized line (Ex. 0004 \346\). The 
burning fluid can ignite flammable clothing. Five of these 18 accidents 
occurred when an employee contacted or came too close to an energized 
part; 3 accidents involved conductors or equipment that could not carry 
fault current; and 3 accidents involved flammable materials ignited by 
an electric arc. OSHA acknowledges that some, or potentially all, of 
these injuries could occur even if the employees had been wearing 
flame-resistant clothing. However, flame-resistant clothing can 
minimize the extent of the injury.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \345\ See the 16 accidents described at https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=14418776&id=170611057&id=170191050&id=170203871&id=14241863&id=14277487&id=170193353&id=170061972&id=880658&id=170238109&id=170053128&id=170720957&id=880112&id=202043758&id=14373245&id=596304.
    \346\ See the two accidents described at https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=200671253&id=201340395.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As noted by Dr. Thomas Neal, much of the energy in a typical 
electric arc is concentrated over one part of the body, and other parts 
of the body receive less energy (Tr. 496-497).\347\ When an employee's 
clothing ignites, the employee receives burns from the burning 
clothing, as well as from any other heat sources in the area, such as 
an electric arc or fire. In such cases, the ignition of clothing 
exacerbates the extent of any burn injury that may occur. (See, for 
example, Tr. 188-189, 215, 228.) For this reason, OSHA concludes that 
preventing clothing ignition in the scenarios in which it is most 
likely to occur will significantly enhance employee protection. In only 
one of the 18 incidents mentioned previously was there an indication 
that the clothing melted, indicating that the clothing probably 
consisted of one of the fabrics explicitly prohibited by the note to 
final paragraph (g)(3). Although it is not clear whether the remaining 
injured employees were wearing 100-percent cotton clothing, it is 
likely that they were. The record indicates that use of 100-precent 
cotton clothing is standard practice for electric utilities that do not 
require their employees to use flame-resistant clothing. (See, for 
example, Exs. 0173 (``Much of the workforce across the nation uses 100% 
cotton for their uniforms''), 0187 (``A large number of electric 
utilities already are providing or requiring their employees to wear 
flame-resistant clothing or 100 percent cotton clothing'').) Because 
some 100-percent cotton clothing poses an ignition hazard, which final 
paragraph (g)(4) would likely prevent, OSHA concludes that use of 100-
percent cotton in lieu of FR clothing would not adequately protect 
employees in the situations addressed by paragraph (g)(4).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \347\ Thomas Neal has a Ph.D. in analytical chemistry. He worked 
for E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Company for 30 years, primarily in 
the field of protective clothing. He has worked with ASTM to develop 
standards for arc testing and has substantial experience with 
protective garments used for arc-flash protection (Tr. 491-492).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Pacific Gas and Electric Company requested an exemption from the FR 
clothing requirements for live-line barehand work (Ex. 0185). The 
company argued that the conductive suits used for this work provide 
primary protection for employees and that the electrocution hazard (not 
the burn hazard) is the primary concern in this type of work (id.).
    Employers use the conductive clothing described by Pacific Gas as a 
form of shielding to minimize potential differences and body current 
for employees performing live-line barehand work (Ex. 0041). The 
clothing assists in bonding the worker to the energized part and keeps 
the worker from experiencing minor electric shocks as he or she moves 
along a conductor. Where the conductive fibers that make the suit 
conductive break, hot spots can develop (id.). It is important for this 
clothing to be flame-resistant material, or these hot spots could 
ignite the clothing. Consensus standards require that conductive 
clothing used in live-line barehand work be flame-resistant; therefore, 
conductive clothing manufactured with FR fabric with interwoven 
conductive fibers is readily available (269-Ex. 60 \348\; Ex. 0041). 
Accordingly, OSHA has decided against exempting live-line barehand work 
from final paragraph (g)(4).\349\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \348\ IEC 60895-2002, Live working--Conductive clothing for use 
at nominal voltage up to 800 kV a.c. and  600 
kV d.c., is the international standard for conductive clothing. IEEE 
Std 516-2009 references this standard (Ex. 0532). Since 1987 when 
IEC first adopted its standard, IEC 895-1987, Conductive clothing 
for live working at a nominal voltage up to 800 kV a.c., the 
consensus standard required conductive clothing to be flame-
resistant (269-Ex. 60).
    \349\ Note that estimates of incident energy for live-line 
barehand work may assume that the arc is most likely to form at 
objects at potentials different from the worker, such as grounded 
objects.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    EEI argued that proposed paragraph (g)(4) was too vague, 
commenting:

    [The requirements in this paragraph] call for determinations for 
which objective criteria are absent. . . . For example, on what 
basis is an employer to determine that an electric arc could ignite 
a flammable material that could in turn ignite the clothing of an 
employee? What kind of calculations does this require, especially 
considering that it is virtually impossible to predict the movement 
of an electric arc? Likewise, how is an employer to determine that 
an employee's clothing could be ignited by molten metal? In sum, the 
standard calls for speculation, not an objective determination, and 
therefore does not satisfy due process requirements. [Ex. 0227]

    OSHA disagrees with EEI's comment that the requirement for flame-
resistant clothing is vague. The Agency believes that employers can 
determine the presence of each of the conditions listed in final 
paragraph (g)(4) through a reasonable assessment of what conditions 
they can expect when an electric arc occurs. This assessment should be 
part of the hazard assessment required by final paragraph (g)(1). For 
purposes of final paragraph (g)(4)(i), if the employee is using the 
rubber glove work method within reaching distance of circuit parts 
energized at more than 600 volts or if the employee is using the live-
line tool work method underneath parts energized at more than 600 
volts, OSHA will consider the employee to be ``exposed to contact'' 
with those parts. The proposed rule used the phrase ``subject to 
contact,'' which the Agency has changed in the final rule to the

[[Page 20484]]

phrase ``exposed to contact.'' (See the discussion of that phrase under 
the summary and explanation of final Sec.  1926.960(b)(3) earlier in 
this section of the preamble.) That change should clarify the meaning 
of this paragraph.
    For purposes of final paragraph (g)(4)(ii), OSHA will be looking 
for flammable material, such as insulating hydraulic fluid, in the work 
area close to where an arc may occur. In such situations, the arc can 
be expected to ignite the fluid, with the burning fluid then igniting 
an employee's flammable clothing.
    For purposes of final paragraph (g)(4)(iii), if there are 
conductors, such as pole grounds, that energized parts may contact 
during the course of work and if these conductors cannot carry the 
fault current, then OSHA expects the employer to assume that molten 
metal or arcing from the faulted conductor could ignite the flammable 
clothing of a nearby employee. As explained in the note to final 
paragraph (g)(4)(iii), the employer can presume that conductors do not 
pose ignition hazards related to molten metal or arcing if they are 
capable of carrying, without failure, the maximum available fault 
current for the time the circuit protective devices take to interrupt 
the fault.
    Paragraph (g)(4)(iii) of the final rule, which is being adopted 
without substantive change from the proposal, requires flame-resistant 
clothing where ``[m]olten metal or electric arcs from faulted 
conductors in the work area could ignite the employee's clothing.'' The 
Southern Company objected to the requirement in proposed paragraph 
(g)(4)(iii) that employees wear flame-resistant clothing if molten 
metal could ignite their clothing (Ex. 0212). The company maintained 
that ``it is difficult to determine where molten metal may pose a 
risk'' (id.).
    OSHA notes that the prepositional phrase ``from faulted conductors 
in the work area'' modifies ``molten metal'' as well as ``electric 
arcs.'' Thus, employers must provide flame-resistant clothing where 
employees are working close to equipment, such as pole grounds, that 
cannot carry fault current. The test is not whether employees are 
working in areas where an electric arc could eject molten metal onto 
them; it is whether the employee is working near a conductor that 
cannot carry fault current. Consequently, OSHA is not adopting the 
recommendation of Southern Company to eliminate this requirement from 
paragraph (g)(4)(iii).
    Final paragraph (g)(4)(iv) provides that, if the incident heat 
energy estimated under paragraph (g)(2) exceeds 2.0 cal/cm\2\, then the 
employer must ensure that employees wear flame-resistant clothing.
    The foregoing explanation is not an exhaustive discussion of all of 
the scenarios that would require flame-resistant clothing under final 
paragraph (g)(4). The Agency expects employers to use the hazard 
assessment required by final paragraph (g)(1) to determine if any of 
the conditions listed in final paragraphs (g)(4)(i) through (g)(4)(iv) 
are present.
    Many commenters opposed the 600-volt threshold in the requirement 
for flame-resistant clothing in proposed paragraph (g)(4)(i). (See, for 
example, Exs. 0128, 0166, 0186; Tr. 537-538.) These commenters argued 
that severe arc-flash hazards occur at voltages lower than 600 volts. 
For example, Mr. Paul Hamer commented:

    Many systems and equipment operating at 600 volts and below have 
severe arc-flash hazards and [require] the use of flame-resistant 
clothing for personnel protection. Low-voltage motor control 
centers, panelboards, switchboards, and switchgear are commonly used 
in electrical power generation, transmission, and distribution 
systems. See the requirements of NFPA 70E-2004, which include 
systems operating at 600 volts and below. [Ex. 0228]

    TVA recommended lowering the threshold to 480 volts, explaining:

    Our conclusion is that FR clothing must be worn to protect 
employees from arc flash hazards on circuits operating at 480 V or 
more. We have experienced serious injuries in accidents involving 
480 V circuits. In 23 arc flash accidents recorded between 1981 and 
2003 in our company, 52 percent (23 cases) [were] on 480 V circuits. 
The 1584 IEEE Guide for Performing Arc-Flash Hazard Calculations 
lists in its Annex C, 49 arc flash cases. Of these cases, 46 percent 
of the accidents involved either 480 V or 600 V systems. These 
statistics show that employees working on circuits operating at 480 
V or 600 V are at a significant risk of arc flash injury.
    We believe the 480 V arc flash hazard is as great as or greater 
than the higher voltage arc flash hazard. At transmission voltages, 
the arcs generally present a lower risk of injury because of the 
distance the employee is to the arc (MAD), the arc being phase-to-
ground, the arc being in open air, and the other reasons stated in 
our comments to other sections of this rule. The magnitude of the 
heat energy in 480 V arc flash accidents is greater because of the 
following:
    1. The single phase fault typically propagates to three phase 
fault.
    2. The clearing times in generating plants are typically longer.
    3. The arc flash energy is typically forced into one direction 
(arc in a box).
    It is recommended that the final rule require the employee to 
wear flame resistant clothing any time he or she is subject to 
contact with live parts energized at 480 V or more. [Ex. 0213]

    These commenters misunderstood the proposed rule. Paragraph (g)(3) 
of the final rule contains a prohibition against wearing clothing that 
could melt onto an employee's skin or that could ignite and continue to 
burn when exposed to flames or the incident heat energy estimated under 
final paragraph (g)(2). Thus, final paragraph (g)(3) indirectly 
requires flame-resistant clothing when the incident heat energy could 
melt clothing onto an employee's skin or ignite an employee's clothing. 
Paragraph (g)(4) of the final rule supplements paragraph (g)(3) and 
requires flame-resistant clothing under other conditions likely to 
ignite flammable clothing. Thus, final paragraph (g)(4)(i) requires 
flame-resistant clothing when an employee is exposed to contact with 
energized parts operating at more than 600 volts, regardless of the 
estimated incident heat energy.
    NFPA 70E-2004 Section 130.3 requires employers to conduct an arc-
flash hazard analysis and determine the arc-flash protection boundary 
to protect employees from being injured by electric arcs (Ex. 
0134).\350\ That section defines the arc-flash protection boundary as 
the distance at which the incident energy equals 1.2 cal/cm\2\ or, if 
the clearing time is 0.1 seconds (6 cycles) or less, 1.5 cal/cm\2\ 
(id.). A few commenters urged the Agency to consider an arc-flash 
boundary requirement similar to the one in NFPA 70E. (See, for example, 
Exs. 0128, 0130, 0235.) For instance, the Dow Chemical Company 
commented:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \350\ Section 130.5 of NFPA 70E-2012 contains an equivalent 
requirement.

    Dow recommends that OSHA change the trigger for wearing FRC from 
``contact with energized circuit parts operating at more than 600 
volts'' to ``work within the electric arc flash hazard distance when 
there is a substantial potential for an arc flash'' . . . . NFPA 70E 
uses the electric arc flash hazard distance as the trigger for 
wearing FRC, and it provides guidance in how to determine the 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
electric arc flash hazard distance. [Ex. 0128]

    In response to these comments, OSHA is adding a requirement, in 
final paragraph (g)(4)(iv), that employees wear clothing that is flame-
resistant where the incident heat energy estimated under final 
paragraph (g)(2) exceeds 2.0 cal/cm\2\. Although NFPA 70E-2004 sets the 
arc-flash protection boundary at lower levels, Section 130.7(C)(14)(b) 
of that standard \351\

[[Page 20485]]

permits employees to wear ``nonmelting flammable natural materials'' 
(in lieu of flame-resistant clothing) where the incident-energy level 
is 2.0 cal/cm\2\ or less.\352\ New paragraph (g)(4)(iv) should make it 
clear that employees must wear flame-resistant clothing whenever the 
incident heat energy would be sufficient to ignite flammable clothing, 
regardless of voltage. For consistency, OSHA is making a corresponding 
change in final paragraph (g)(5), which requires employers to ensure 
that each employee exposed to hazards from electric arcs wears 
protective clothing and other protective equipment with an arc rating 
greater than or equal to the heat energy estimated under final 
paragraph (g)(2) whenever that estimate exceeds 2.0 cal/cm\2\. The 
Agency believes that final paragraphs (g)(4)(iv) and (g)(5) must have 
the same incident-energy threshold; otherwise, the final rule would 
require clothing to be arc rated, but not flame resistant, when the 
estimated incident energy was 2.0 cal/cm\2\ or less. (As noted under 
the summary and explanation for final paragraph (g)(5), later in this 
section of the preamble, all arc-rated clothing is flame resistant. 
Thus, if the final rule required arc-rated clothing when the estimated 
incident energy was 2.0 cal/cm\2\ or less, it also would effectively 
require flame-resistant clothing at these exposures.) Therefore, under 
the final rule, whenever paragraph (g)(4)(iv) requires clothing to be 
flame resistant, that clothing must also have an arc rating under 
paragraph (g)(5).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \351\ NFPA 70E-2012 no longer explicitly permits ``nonmelting 
flammable materials'' for exposures from 1.2 to 2.0 cal/cm\2\; 
however, NFPA 70E-2012 Table 130.7(C)(15)(b) apparently permits such 
fabrics for certain exposures above 1.2 cal/cm\2\. Consequently, the 
latest edition of NFPA 70E does not conflict with OSHA's decision to 
require flame-resistant clothing for estimated incident heat energy 
exposures exceeding 2.0 cal/cm\2\.
    \352\ Although OSHA has not stated the requirement in final 
paragraph (g)(4)(iv) in terms of a boundary, the area inside which 
flame-resistant clothing is required extends to the boundary where 
the estimated incident energy equals 2.0 cal/cm\2\.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Selecting arc-rated protective clothing and other protective 
equipment. Paragraphs (g)(3) and (g)(4) of final Sec.  1926.960 will 
protect workers against burns from the ignition or melting of clothing. 
These provisions do not address the protection of workers from the 
incident heat energy in an electric arc, which is the purpose of 
paragraph (g)(5).
    Much of the flame-resistant clothing available today comes with an 
arc rating.\353\ In basic terms, an arc rating indicates that a fabric 
should not transfer sufficient thermal energy to cause a second-degree 
burn when tested under standard laboratory conditions that expose the 
fabric to an electric arc that radiates an energy at or below the 
rating.\354\ Proposed paragraph (g)(5) would have required that 
employees exposed to hazards from electric arcs wear clothing with an 
arc rating greater than or equal to the heat energy estimated under 
paragraph (g)(2). This clothing will protect employees exposed to heat 
energy from sustaining severe burn injuries in areas covered by the 
clothing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \353\ The ASTM standards governing arc rating require the tested 
fabric to be flame resistant. Thus, no non-flame-resistant clothing 
has an arc rating.
    \354\ ASTM F1506-02a\e1\, Standard Performance Specification for 
Flame Resistant Textile Materials for Wearing Apparel for Use by 
Electrical Workers Exposed to Momentary Electric Arc and Related 
Thermal Hazards: defines ``arc rating'' as ``the maximum incident 
energy (E 1) resistance demonstrated by a material prior to 
breakopen or at the onset of a second-degree burn'' (Ex. 0061). The 
latest version of that consensus standard, ASTM F1506-10a, contains 
a differently worded, but equivalent definition.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Several rulemaking participants argued that OSHA should not require 
protection based on unreliable estimates of incident energy. (See, for 
example, Exs. 0183, 0229, 0233.) For instance, Mr. Jonathan Glazier 
with NRECA commented:

    [E]stimates of maximum amounts of heat energy are inherently 
unreliable. Accordingly, such estimates do not provide an adequate 
foundation for a protective clothing requirement. In other words, it 
makes no sense to require clothing to protect against second degree 
burns from an amount of energy that cannot be calculated reliably. 
For that reason, OSHA should drop the protective clothing 
requirement of 1910.269(l)(11)(v) and 1926.960(g)(5). [Ex. 0233]

    As explained under the discussion of final paragraph (g)(2) earlier 
in this section of the preamble, OSHA concludes that there are incident 
heat energy calculation methods that can provide reasonable estimates 
of incident energy for all types of arc exposures employees experience. 
Therefore, the Agency concludes that it is reasonable to select arc-
rated clothing and other protective equipment on the basis of those 
estimates.
    EEI argued that ``OSHA has not shown that the risk of harm would be 
materially reduced by using the methods specified in the proposal'' and 
that ``there simply is not substantial evidence that wearing clothing 
with an appropriate arc rating . . . would eliminate or substantially 
reduce employee exposure to a burn injury from a flame or electric 
arc'' (Ex. 0227).
    OSHA disagrees with EEI. There is substantial evidence in the 
record that selecting protective clothing and other protective 
equipment with an arc rating based on a reasonable estimate of incident 
energy will substantially reduce injury from electric arcs. To 
understand how arc-rated clothing and other protective equipment 
substantially reduces injury, one must first examine how burn injuries 
occur. The skin absorbs heat energy; and, after absorbing a certain 
amount of energy, the skin sustains burn injury. According to Dr. 
Thomas Neal, the human body begins to get a burn at 1 to 2 cal/cm\2\ 
(Tr. 433). At low levels of heat, the body sustains a first-degree 
burn, like a sunburn, with redness and minor pain, but no blistering. 
An incident heat energy level of 1.2 cal/cm\2\ is the threshold at 
which the burn injury becomes a second-degree burn (Exs. 0134, 0425). 
Second-degree burns involve swelling and blisters, along with greater 
pain and redness. As the skin absorbs more energy, the burn gets worse, 
involving more layers of skin, until it reaches a full-thickness, or 
third-degree, burn. The most serious burns require prolonged 
hospitalization and skin grafts and result in permanent scarring (Ex. 
0373; Tr. 219).
    Figure 11 shows a simplified diagram of a worker exposed to an 
electric arc.\355\ This diagram shows the boundary (depicted by a 
broken circle) where the estimated incident energy equals a clothing 
rating that meets, but does not exceed, the rating required by final 
paragraph (g)(5). Inside the broken circle, the incident energy is 
greater than the estimate; outside the circle, the incident energy is 
less than the estimate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \355\ In all likelihood, an electric arc would be larger than 
the small-diameter sphere depicted in Figure 11. However, the 
estimated energy is the same at all points that are the same 
distance from the arc, and the diagram is valid for any spherical 
arc.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 20486]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR11AP14.015

    The arc rating of protective clothing and other protective 
equipment is an indication of the relative protection it provides from 
incident energy. Dr. Thomas Neal explained that ``the arc rating . . . 
is defined as the level of . . . exposure at which you would expect 50 
percent probability of a burn injury'' (Tr. 444). The ASTM standard 
clarifies that the rating is at ``the onset of a second-degree bum'' 
(Ex. 0061). Thus, in Figure 11, the employee has a 50-percent chance of 
barely receiving a second-degree burn at the point where the broken 
circle touches the employee. (That is, the probability that the 
incident energy will be equal to or greater than 1.2 cal/cm\2\ is 50 
percent.) As Dr. Neal explained, the chance of barely sustaining a 
second-degree burn drops quickly with a reduction in incident energy 
(Tr. 443-445). The probability of receiving a second-degree burn while 
wearing a particular arc-rated garment typically drops to 1 percent 
with a reduction in incident energy of a few calories below the arc 
rating of the clothing (id.). For example, with the NFPA 70E Annex D 
method, the incident energy is inversely proportional to the square of 
the distance from the arc to the employee. If the distance from the arc 
to the employee is 455 millimeters (18 inches), the incident energy 
drops nearly 10 percent at a distance of 150 millimeters (6 inches) 
from the point where the circle touches the employee.
    From this, OSHA concludes that an employee wearing arc-rated 
protection in accordance with the final rule should receive, at worst, 
a second-degree burn over a relatively small portion of his or her body 
at the estimated incident-energy level. In addition, because arc-rated 
clothing and other protective equipment that complies with final 
paragraph (g)(5) will block a substantial portion of the heat energy, 
any injury that occurs will be substantially less severe than would 
occur without arc-rated protection at all or with arc-rated protection 
with a rating lower than the estimated heat energy. Consequently, the 
Agency concludes that the severity of injury will be reduced when an 
employee is wearing protective clothing and other protective equipment 
with an arc rating greater than or equal to the actual incident-energy 
level experienced by the employee. Although an employee will receive a 
more severe burn injury if the incident energy exceeds the arc rating 
of the protection than if it does not, OSHA concludes that estimates of 
incident heat energy prepared in compliance with final paragraph (g)(2) 
will relate reasonably well to the incident energy actually experienced 
by employees in the event of an arc. Also, even if the incident energy 
actually exceeds those estimates, arc-rated protection will still 
reduce the extent and degree of injury (see Tr. 535: ``MR. WALLIS 
[asking question]: `Would arc [rated] clothing reduce the extent and 
degree of injury, even if the arc energy is higher than the employer's 
estimate?' DR. NEAL [responding]: `Yes, it would.'''). The reduction in 
these effects occurs because arc-rated protective clothing and other 
protective equipment blocks the amount of heat that gets through to the 
employee's skin (Tr. 471-472).
    Protecting the entire body. OSHA did not propose to require a 
specific level of protection for skin not covered by clothing. However, 
in the preamble to the proposal, the Agency requested comments on 
whether the standard should require protection for an employee's entire 
body.
    TVA recommended that the rule address unprotected skin as follows:

    Due to our experience with arc flash accidents, we believe that 
the employee's hands and arms require some level [of] protection. 
Our procedure requires the employee to wear the long sleeved FR 
shirt with the sleeve down and buttoned. [W]e do not consider a 
short sleeve FR shirt to provide adequate arc flash protection to 
the employee's arms. We also require employees to wear leather 
gloves or voltage rated gloves with leather protectors when in arc 
flash

[[Page 20487]]

exposure situations. The electric utility industry has arc flash 
exposures that could result in 3rd degree burns to unprotected parts 
of the body that could cause serious injury. It is recommend[ed] 
that the final rule require employees to wear a long-sleeved FR 
shirt with its sleeve[s] down and buttoned in potential arc flash 
situations. The rule should also require leather gloves, if voltage 
rated gloves are not being worn. [Ex. 0213]

    Forty-six of the 100 arc-related burn accidents in Exhibit 0004 
involved burn injuries to an employee's arms.\356\ Five of those 100 
accidents involved burns to an employee's leg.\357\ Forty of those 100 
accidents involved burns to an employee's head.\358\ The accidents in 
the rulemaking record and TVA's experience clearly indicate a need to 
protect all parts of the employee's body. Employees with uncovered skin 
are at risk of severe injury or death. Requiring protection only for 
areas covered by clothing would lead to the absurd possibility that an 
employer would be in compliance if an employee worked without clothing. 
Therefore, OSHA concludes that the standard should address not only the 
rating of the clothing, but the extent of protection needed for the 
employee's body. Accordingly, paragraph (g)(5) in the final rule 
requires that, when employers must provide arc-rated protection to 
employees, the protection must cover the employee's entire body, with a 
few exceptions described later.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \356\ See, for example, the nine accidents described at https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=170097497&id=170054258&id=170614002&id=14225569&id=201140522&id=170152540&id=170071138&id=170738165&id=170250062.
    \357\ See the five accidents described at https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=170361026&id=170389811&id=201791803&id=14490114&id=596304.
    \358\ See, for example, the nine accidents described at https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=170097497&id=170054258&id=14225569&id=170631469&id=170071138&id=170738165&id=170611057&id=200962322&id=170764021.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    There is evidence in the record that some types of nonarc-rated 
clothing and protective equipment provide suitable protection from arc-
related burn injuries on areas not typically covered by clothing, for 
instance, the hands and feet. (See, for example, Exs. 0186, 0212, 0213; 
Tr. 433-435.) As noted in the preamble to the proposal, although 
neither rubber insulating gloves nor leather protectors have arc 
ratings, their weight and thickness typically provide greater 
protection from electric arcs than light-weight flame-resistant 
clothing (70 FR 34868). The accident data support this conclusion--none 
of the burn injuries to employees' hands described in the record 
involved an employee wearing rubber insulating gloves. In addition, 
NFPA 70E-2004 recognizes the protection afforded by rubber insulating 
gloves (Ex. 0134). Heavy-duty leather work gloves with a weight of 407 
gm/m\2\ (12 oz/yd\2\) provide protection up to about 14 cal/cm\2\ (Ex. 
0134; Tr. 434).\359\ Therefore, the final rule recognizes the 
protection afforded by rubber insulating gloves with protectors, as 
well as heavy-duty leather work gloves. Under final paragraph 
(g)(5)(i), the employer need not ensure the use of arc-rated protective 
gear over the employee's hands when the employee wears rubber 
insulating gloves with protectors or, if the estimated incident-energy 
exposure is 14 cal/cm\2\ or lower, if the employee wears heavy-duty 
leather work gloves with a weight of at least 407 gm/m\2\ (12 oz/
yd\2\).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \359\ In a note to Section 130.7(C)(13)(c), NFPA 70E-2004 states 
that ``[i]nsulating rubber gloves . . . provide hand protection 
against the arc flash hazard'' (Ex. 0134). OSHA anticipates that 
there is a limit to the amount of protection afforded by rubber 
insulating gloves, but there is no information in the record to 
indicate what that limit might be. However, that section in the NFPA 
standard requires leather protectors to be worn over rubber 
insulating gloves for purposes of arc-flash protection. (NFPA 70E-
2012 contains an equivalent requirement and note.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    NFPA 70E recognizes ``[h]eavy-duty work shoes'' as providing ``some 
arc flash protection to the feet'' and generally requires this type of 
shoe when the exposure is above 4 cal/cm\2\ (Ex. 0134).\360\ As OSHA 
found no evidence in the record of an employee sustaining burn injuries 
to the feet in an arc-related accident, the final rule recognizes the 
protection afforded by heavy-duty work shoes. Final paragraph 
(g)(5)(ii) provides that employees wearing heavy-duty work shoes or 
boots do not need to use arc-rated protection on their feet.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \360\ NFPA 70E-2004 requires heavy-duty work shoes for tasks in 
hazard-risk category 2 and higher (Ex. 0134). Table 130.7(C)(9)(a) 
generally requires hazard-risk category 2 protection when the 
incident energy is more than 4 cal./cm\2\, but less than 8 cal./
cm\2\ (id.). NFPA 70E-2012 additionally requires heavy-duty work 
shoes for ``all exposures greater than 4 cal/cm\2\.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Many rulemaking participants opposed requiring arc-rated protection 
for the head,\361\ arguing that faceshields could interfere with vision 
and make the work more dangerous. (See, for example, Exs. 0167, 0175, 
0186, 0233.) For instance, Ms. Salud Layton with the Virginia, Maryland 
& Delaware Association of Electric Cooperatives commented, ``Employing 
the use of a faceshield may cause more of [a] hazard than benefit by 
reducing peripheral vision and nuisance distraction to the employee 
while work is being performed on energized facilities'' (Ex. 0175).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \361\ In the preamble and regulatory text, the term ``protection 
for the head'' means protection for the entire head, from the neck 
up. It includes protection for the neck, face, and ears. In 
contrast, the term ``head protection'' as used in Sec. Sec.  
1910.135 and 1926.100 and in final Sec.  1910.269 and subpart V, 
means protection provided for the head by a hardhat, which generally 
does not protect the face or neck.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Other rulemaking participants supported a requirement for 
faceshields or other forms of arc-rated head and face protection. (See, 
for example, Exs. 0130, 0241; Tr. 461-463.) NIOSH explained their 
position as follows:

    NIOSH recommends that the use of arc-rated face protection be 
included in sections 1910.269(l)(11) and 1926.960(g)(5). An arcing-
fault can injure an employee's face and eyes, and typical non-arc-
rated safety eyewear is inadequate. Arc-rated face shields and hoods 
are available that offer protection levels that can be matched to 
the rating of any arc-rated fire resistant clothing. NFPA 70E-2004 
requires a wraparound face shield of appropriate arc-rating that 
protects forehead, ears, and neck . . . for heat energy exposure 
levels above 4 calories/cm\2\, and a flash suit hood of appropriate 
arc-rating . . . for levels above 8 calories/cm\2\ (see NFPA 70E-
2004, page 33, table 130.7(C)(10)). [Ex. 0130]

    IBEW supported a requirement for arc-rated head and face 
protection, but only in certain circumstances (Exs. 0230, 0505). The 
union explained its position and rationale as follows:

    IBEW submits that while face shields may provide effective 
protection in some work environments, they are not appropriate means 
of protection for all aspects of transmission and distribution work.
    [F]ace shields are designed to be attached to the employee's 
hard hat. . . . They provide a complete shield from above the 
employee's forehead to below his or her chin. Because they only 
protect the front of the employee's head, however, Dr. [Thomas] Neal 
recommends that they be worn in combination either with a ``bee 
keeper's hood,'' of the type used by firefighters, or with a 
lighter-weight and cooler advancement, a balaclava, or ski-type 
mask. . . .
    Dr. Neal testified that although he knows utilities have 
purchased face shields, he does not know how they have been used. In 
particular, he could not say whether they are being used by anyone 
doing line work. Nor did he have any familiarity with what it would 
be like to perform line work while wearing the face shield, either 
alone or in combination with a balaclava. . . .
    A face shield is appropriate PPE for an electrician in a power 
plant racking a breaker in or out of its enclosure. In that 
situation, it usually takes only minutes to accomplish the task. 
Further, the electrician would generally be on solid footing--either 
on the plant floor or a platform--when wearing the shield to perform 
the energized work. The shield is also practical PPE when setting or 
removing a meter, where, again, the

[[Page 20488]]

employee would be donning the face shield for a short period of 
time.
    These two work situations sharply contrast with that of climbing 
a pole, working up a pole surrounded by wires, braces, brackets, and 
transformers, and descending the pole. In these types of work 
situations, wearing the face shield for lengthy periods would create 
additional safety problems, including issues with mobility, heat, 
and vision, that could more than offset the shield's arc protection 
factor.
    To summarize, although face shields are designed to provide 
important protection against arc flash hazards, the record fails to 
demonstrate the feasibility of requiring them in every instance of 
energized work. Indeed, simply examining the conditions under which 
employees work on electrical lines shows that it would be 
impractical to require their use as PPE in all situations. [Ex. 
0505]

    OSHA agrees with IBEW that wearing arc-rated head and face 
protection is likely to cause more problems for overhead power line 
work than for in-plant work. For instance, faceshields and other forms 
of arc-rated head and face protection potentially can interfere with 
climbing and descending a pole (Ex. 0505). However, the Agency does not 
believe that this interference necessarily creates a greater hazard. 
Power line workers generally must wear hardhats under existing 
Sec. Sec.  1910.135 and 1926.100. Because it is suspended below the 
employee's hardhat, a faceshield does not extend significantly beyond 
the edge of the hardhat. Consequently, a faceshield worn alone with a 
hardhat should not be substantially more of an impediment to climbing 
than the hardhat alone. Perhaps a beekeeper-type hood, which extends on 
all sides beyond a hardhat, would interfere more substantially with 
climbing and descending poles; however, Dr. Neal noted that newer forms 
of arc-rated protection, such as a balaclava (a garment that looks like 
a ski mask and that an employee wears beneath a hardhat), can provide 
nearly the same protection as a hood without the hood's bulk (Tr. 438-
440). In addition, as discussed in the summary and explanation for 
final Sec.  1926.954(b)(3)(iii), the final rule generally requires 
employers to protect employees against falling while climbing or 
descending poles. Therefore, OSHA concludes that suitable head 
protection should not interfere with climbing or descending poles 
enough to pose a significant hazard.
    If an employee is working so close to ``wires, braces, brackets, 
and transformers'' that a faceshield would interfere with his or her 
performance, as IBEW argues, the objects would also be close enough to 
endanger the employee's face as the employee is working. In any event, 
it is unclear how a faceshield, or even a faceshield with a balaclava, 
would interfere significantly with the mobility of an employee 
performing overhead line work. Thus, OSHA concludes that employers can 
find suitable head and face protection that will interfere minimally 
with a worker's mobility and allow the worker to perform his or her job 
safely and efficiently, without posing a significant hazard to the 
worker.
    As discussed later in this section of the preamble, OSHA examined 
the heat stress issue raised by some commenters and concludes that, 
although heat stress can be a significant hazard, there are feasible 
means of abating the hazard for employees wearing arc-rated protective 
garments and head and face protection. In fact, Dr. Neal testified that 
faceshields would not contribute significantly to heat-stress hazards 
because ``air is going to be moving inside the shield'' (Tr. 478). As 
explained later, employers need not use arc-rated head protection or a 
faceshield until the estimated incident-energy level is greater than or 
equal to 9 cal/cm\2\ for most forms of overhead line work. At higher 
levels, employers must take heat-stress abatement measures when 
warranted by environmental conditions.
    A beekeeper-type hood likely would interfere with peripheral 
vision. However, as noted earlier, employers can achieve similar 
protection with a faceshield and balaclava combination, which should 
not interfere with an employee's peripheral vision.
    Dr. Neal noted that clear faceshields do not provide much 
protection from arc-related burn injuries, however (Tr. 433-434). In 
response to questions about whether arc-rated faceshields could reduce 
visibility, especially at night, Dr. Neal testified:

    MR. BYRD: Does that shield--Is that designed primarily for 
daylight work?
    DR. NEAL: Well, it's designed for work where you have light, 
yes. Could be daylight; it could be artificial light.
    MR. BYRD: I guess what I'm asking: If I had a car break a pole 
off at two o'clock in the morning and I'm having to wear some kind 
of shield, do I have to have a tinted shield and also a clear 
shield? Do you make the clear shields as well?
    DR. NEAL: Yes, I think there are companies that make both types 
of shields. But, no, the clear shield is--The tinted shield takes 
care of the function of the clear shield, which is actually to 
protect you from projectiles.
    MR. BYRD: Well, I guess what I'm looking at is visibility in 
repairing that pole and the lines that are energized. If I have a 
shield on that is designed for daylight and I put that in, it's kind 
of like sunglasses or your safety glasses that are tinted. If I put 
those on at night, I'm totally blind now. So I would have to have a 
shield for nighttime use as well.
    DR. NEAL: Well, those sunglasses actually are much darker than 
the shield that I had here. It's not really designed for day work, 
but you may find that--You know, I think when you are doing work at 
night, you have to add light in most cases.
    MR. BYRD: We do.
    DR. NEAL: Yes. So I think whatever you add for doing the work 
normally would suffice for most of the shields. It's something you 
would have to try, and you would say, well, no, I'm not getting 
enough light. So you may have to do something different there. [Tr. 
511-513]

Based on this evidence, OSHA concludes that employers can find suitable 
arc-rated head and face protection that does not significantly 
interfere with an employee's vision and that normally does not require 
supplemental lighting beyond what they would otherwise supply.
    For the foregoing reasons, OSHA concludes that suitable arc-rated 
head and face protection does not necessarily pose greater hazards than 
working without it and that a requirement for employees to wear such 
protection when warranted by arc hazards generally will be 
technologically feasible and reasonable for overhead line work. Because 
the evidence, including IBEW's comments, suggests that overhead line 
work is the most problematic type of work for purposes of wearing arc-
rated head and face protection, the Agency comes to the same conclusion 
for the other types of work addressed by Sec.  1910.269 and Subpart V.
    Dr. Neal testified that he believed that employees should wear head 
and face protection ``[a]nytime there is a risk of a heat exposure over 
[1.5 to] 2 calories, . . . where you are just on the edge of getting a 
second degree burn'' (Tr. 462). He also noted, however, that his 
opinion is at odds with ``some of the standards that exist today, [in 
which] this is not required until you get to about 8 calories'' (id.). 
For instance, Table 130.7(C)(10), Protective Clothing and Personal 
Protective Equipment (PPE) Matrix, in NFPA 70E-2004, requires 
faceshields for hazard-risk category 2, which generally corresponds to 
an incident-energy level of 5 to 8 cal/cm\2\, and flash-suit hoods for 
hazard-risk category 3 and higher, which generally corresponds to an 
incident-energy level of 9 cal/cm\2\ and higher (Ex. 0134).\362\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \362\ NFPA 70E-2012, in Table 130.7(C)(16), requires an arc-
rated faceshield for hazard-risk category 1, which generally 
corresponds to an incident-energy level of 1.2 to 4 cal/cm\2\, and 
an arc-rated flash suit hood or arc-rated faceshield and arc-rated 
balaclava for hazard-risk category 2 and higher, which generally 
corresponds to an incident-energy level of 5 to 8 cal/cm\2\. 
However, as explained later in this section of the preamble, this 
edition of NFPA 70E does not account for any reduction in incident 
heat energy at the employee's face in comparison to the level of 
incident heat energy at the working distance (generally the 
employee's chest). OSHA concludes that not accounting for this 
reduction would require more protection against incident heat energy 
than necessary. As explained under the heading Heat stress, later in 
this section of the preamble, heat stress is a genuine concern of 
many rulemaking participants. Requiring a level of head and face 
protection higher than the likely incident energy at employees' 
heads would unnecessarily increase heat stress for employees. As 
further explained in that section of the preamble, OSHA also 
concluded that: Heat stress is a widely recognized hazard; employers 
covered by the final rule already have an obligation under the 
general duty clause of the OSH Act to abate these hazards; and 
employers covered by the final rule already are addressing heat-
stress issues in their workplaces. Despite these conclusions, the 
Agency believes that, for work covered by the final rule, paragraphs 
(g)(5)(iii) through (g)(5)(v) strike a more reasonable balance 
between the need for protection against incident energy from 
electric arcs and the need to protect employees against heat stress. 
The final rule achieves this balance by requiring a level of 
protection commensurate with the incident energy likely at the 
employee's head.
    Note that OSHA's finding regarding the need for faceshields 
applies only with respect to their use as protection from incident 
energy. As noted under the heading Protecting employees from flying 
debris from electric arcs, OSHA's existing general PPE requirements 
in Sec. Sec.  1910.132 and 1926.95 require employers to address 
nonthermal hazards, including physical trauma hazards posed by 
flying debris, associated with employee exposure to electric arcs.
    Note also that OSHA's findings regarding head and face 
protection apply only to electric power generation, transmission, 
and distribution work covered by the final rule. NPPA 70E-2012, like 
subpart S of OSHA's general industry standards, requires employers 
to deenergize electric circuits before employees work on them except 
under limited circumstances. Thus, heat stress hazards for work 
performed under NFPA 70E-2012 and Subpart S should not be as 
pervasive as under this final rule, which generally permits 
employees to work on energized circuits without restriction.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 20489]]

    For the three-phase exposures addressed by the incident-energy 
calculation methods given in NFPA 70E-2004, Annex D, the Agency 
concludes that these are reasonable thresholds for requiring head and 
face protection (id.).\363\ It is apparent that NFPA 70E-2004 Table 
130.7(C)(10) sets protective equipment requirements for the worst-case 
exposures for the methods in Annex D of that standard, that is, 
exposures involving three-phase arcs in enclosures. The Agency believes 
that such exposures are more likely to involve convective heat energy, 
which can transfer to the area behind a faceshield, and to involve the 
back of the head due to reflected heat energy. In addition, Annex D 
presumes a distance from the employee to the arc of 455 millimeters (18 
inches).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \363\ NFPA 70E-2004, Annex D describes the Doughty, Neal, and 
Floyd and IEEE 1584 methods in addition to the Lee method. See the 
summary and explanation for final paragraph (g)(2), earlier in this 
section of the preamble, for a discussion of these methods (Ex. 
0134). Annex D in NFPA 70E-2012 adds a method, from the NESC, for 
single-phase arcs in open air.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As explained previously in this section of the preamble, much 
overhead line work poses hazards involving exposure to single-phase 
arcs in open air. In such exposures, there is little or no reflected or 
convective heat energy. In addition, as also noted earlier, OSHA 
concluded that a reasonable distance from the employee to the arc for 
these exposures is 380 millimeters (15 inches), measured from the 
crotch of the employee's hand to the chest.\364\ (See Table 14, earlier 
in this section of the preamble.) OSHA estimates that the employee's 
face will likely be at least 455 millimeters (18 inches) from the 
arc.\365\ Because the heat energy from a single-phase arc in air drops 
in inverse proportion to the square of the distance, the roughly 20-
percent increase in distance (from 380 to 455 millimeters) results in a 
drop in incident energy of nearly 30 percent (Ex. 0430). Therefore, 
because the incident energy at the employee's head will be more than 30 
percent lower than the estimated incident energy, which OSHA based on 
the exposure at the employee's chest, OSHA concludes that the 
thresholds for requiring head and face protection for exposures 
involving a single-phase arc in air can be higher than the threshold 
for requiring head and face protection for three-phase exposures. The 
final rule adopts the following ranges for head and face protection:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \364\ OSHA concluded that 380 millimeters (15 inches) is a 
reasonable distance for rubber insulating glove work. For work with 
live-line tools, OSHA concluded that the distance is greater than 
380 millimeters. (See the summary and explanation for final Sec.  
1926.960(g)(2) earlier in this section of the preamble.)
    \365\ With the employee's hands out directly opposite the chest, 
the distance from the chest to the arc is 380 millimeters (15 
inches), and the distance vertically from that point on the chest to 
the employee's chin is about 255 millimeters (10 inches). The 
distance from the chin to the arc is the hypotenuse of the right 
triangle with those two sides, or about 455 millimeters (18 inches).

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                         Minimum head and face protection
                                 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                            Arc-rated
            Exposure                                    faceshield with a     Arc-rated hood or faceshield with
                                         None *        minimum rating of 8                balaclava
                                                           cal/cm\2\ *
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Single-phase, open air..........  2-8 cal/cm\2\......  9-12 cal/cm\2\.....  13 cal/cm\2\ or higher [dagger].
Three-phase.....................  2-4 cal/cm\2\......  5-8 cal/cm\2\......  9 cal/cm\2\ or higher [Dagger].
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* These ranges assume that employees are wearing hardhats meeting the specifications in Sec.   1910.135 or Sec.
   1926.100(b)(2), as applicable.
[dagger] The arc rating must be a minimum of 4 cal/cm\2\ less than the estimated incident energy. Note that Sec.
    1926.960(g)(5)(v) permits this type of head and face protection, with a minimum arc rating of 4 cal/cm\2\
  less than the estimated incident energy, at any incident energy level.
[Dagger] Note that Sec.   1926.960(g)(5) permits this type of head and face protection at any incident energy
  level.

    OSHA chose the 5- and 9-cal/cm\2\ thresholds for three-phase arcs 
to match the thresholds in NFPA 70E-2004, as recommended by NIOSH (Ex. 
0134). The 9- and 13-cal/cm\2\ thresholds for exposures involving 
single-phase arcs in open air account for the lack of reflected and 
convective heat on the employee's head, as well as the 30-percent 
reduction in incident energy expected at the employee's head.
    Final paragraph (g)(5)(iii) does not require arc-rated protection 
for the employee's head when the employee is wearing head protection 
meeting Sec.  1926.100(b)(2) and the estimated incident energy is less 
than 9 cal/cm\2\ for exposures involving single-phase arcs in open air 
or 5 cal/cm\2\ for other exposures. Final paragraph (g)(5)(iv) permits 
the employer to protect the employee's head using a faceshield with a 
minimum arc rating of 8 cal/cm\2\ if the employee is wearing head 
protection meeting Sec.  1926.100(b)(2) and the estimated incident-
energy exposure is less than 13 cal/cm\2\ for exposures involving 
single-phase arcs in open air or 9 cal/cm\2\ for other exposures. 
Paragraph (g)(5)(v) permits a reduction of 4 cal/cm\2\ in the arc 
rating of head and face protection for single-phase arcs in open air 
(the difference between the two sets of thresholds). For example, if 
the estimated incident energy for an exposure involving a single-phase 
arc in open air is 13 cal/cm\2\, the head protection provided to the 
employee must have an arc rating of at least 9 cal/cm\2\.
    Other issues relating to the selection of protective clothing and 
other

[[Page 20490]]

protective equipment. Ms. Susan O'Connor with Siemens Power Generation 
contended that there were factors to consider other than incident heat 
energy in the selection of arc-rated protection, commenting:

    We do not believe that protective clothing decisions should be 
made solely based on a numerical calculation--especially when such 
calculation methods are suspect as to their range of error. There 
are certainly hazards that would be created by utilizing this 
equipment. This clothing is heavy, hot, and bulky. It is not 
unreasonable to foresee that heat stress, and injuries related to 
lack of mobility or visibility would increase when using this 
equipment. Likewise, the heat calculations make no allowances for 
the inherent risk of a task. Opening a bolted panel on a piece of 
equipment is riskier than opening a hinged panel. (A bolted panel 
could be fumbled into live bus causing a fault, while this is nearly 
impossible with a hinged panel). Racking a breaker out with the 
enclosure door open is riskier than with the door closed. (The 
closed door will contain much of the fault energy should it occur 
thereby protecting the employee) However, if we rely solely on the 
heat calculation these two sets of scenarios would require identical 
PPE. [Ex. 0163]

    As explained earlier, OSHA already considered issues related to the 
mobility and vision of workers using arc-rated head and face protection 
and concluded that such items generally will not create more hazardous 
conditions for employees. For similar reasons, the Agency also 
concludes that mobility is not generally a concern for arc-rated 
protection. Even the highest-rated clothing is not significantly 
heavier than winter weather clothing (see, for example, Tr. 440 \366\), 
and line workers are currently performing tasks in winter clothing in 
cold weather. In addition, evidence in the record indicates that at 
least one utility requires its employees to use some of the heaviest 
weights of arc-rated clothing, and this utility did not report any 
problems with worker mobility (Exs. 0213, 0215). As explained later in 
this section of the preamble, the Agency also concludes that heat 
stress should not affect the selection of arc-rated protection under 
final paragraph (g)(5) as there are other ways of mitigating that 
hazard when necessary.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \366\ According to Dr. Thomas Neal, manufacturers make suits 
rated at 100-cal/cm\2\ from material weighing 610 gm/m\2\ (18 
ounces/yd\2\) (Tr. 440). That weight is less than twice the weight 
of denim material, which is about 375 gm/m\2\ (11 ounces/yd\2\) 
(269-Ex. 12-12. See, also, 59 FR 33659).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As discussed under the summary and explanation for final paragraph 
(g)(2), earlier in this section of the preamble, OSHA concluded that it 
is unreasonable to reduce estimated incident-energy levels simply 
because an employee is working in a situation in which there is a low 
risk that an electric arc will occur. The Agency similarly concludes 
that it unreasonable to select arc-rated protection based on how likely 
an arc is to occur. OSHA does not dispute that there is a higher risk 
of an arc occurring when an employee is racking a circuit breaker than 
when an employee is opening a hinged panel.\367\ Three of the arc-
related burn accidents in Ex. 0004 occurred as employees were racking 
breakers.\368\ None of the burn accidents involved an employee opening 
or closing a hinged cover on enclosed equipment. As explained in the 
summary and explanation for final paragraph (g)(2), if there is no 
reasonable likelihood that an electric arc will occur, OSHA will 
consider the employee to have no electric-arc exposure, and the 
employer need not provide the protection required under final paragraph 
(g)(4)(ii), (g)(4)(iv), or (g)(5).\369\ OSHA believes that opening a 
hinged cover on a dead-front panelboard generally would not result in 
employee exposure to electric-arc hazards under final paragraph (g)(2). 
However, if there is a reasonable likelihood that an electric arc will 
occur in the employee's work area, then protection against the full 
incident heat energy of the arc is necessary. Otherwise, when an arc 
does occur, the employee could receive severe burn injuries.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \367\ Racking a circuit breaker is the process by which a 
circuit breaker is inserted and removed from the circuit breaker 
cubicle.
    \368\ See the three accidents described at https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=14328736&id=200962322&id=170197156.
    \369\ Paragraphs (g)(4)(i) and (g)(4)(iii) involve exposures 
that OSHA has determined expose employees to electric arcs or 
flames, namely, contact with energized circuit parts operating at 
more than 600 volts and molten metal or electric arcs from faulted 
conductors in the work area that could ignite the employee's 
clothing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Three commenters wanted OSHA to clarify that paragraph (g)(5) only 
requires protection to the extent that compliant clothing is reasonably 
available (Exs. 0170, 0222, 0237). These commenters expressed concern 
that the standard would require employers to implement potentially 
costly abatement measures to reduce incident energy to levels for which 
clothing is available (id.). For example, Mr. Chris Tampio with the 
National Association of Manufacturers commented:

    The proposal does not explain how the rule would be interpreted 
in situations where compliance with the proposed arc-rated clothing 
requirements is infeasible because there is no clothing available to 
protect against that level of heat energy (and still permit the 
employee to perform the required work). We believe it is critical 
that OSHA clarify that compliance with the proposed rule would be 
considered infeasible under those circumstances, and that the agency 
would not require the employer to exhaust other feasible measures. 
Otherwise, we are concerned that employers could be required to 
engage in very expensive retrofitting of electrical installations so 
as to reduce the maximum heat energy that might be released by an 
arc flash to a level where suitable [flame-resistant or arc-rated] 
clothing would be reasonably available.
    The extremely costly measure of retrofitting equipment is not 
accounted for in the agency's economic analysis for this rulemaking, 
would substantially raise the costs of compliance with the proposed 
standard, and might invalidate the agency's entire economic analysis 
for this proposal. OSHA has a duty to promulgate rules that are both 
technically and economically feasible, and a duty to base its 
decisions on the best available information relating to the economic 
consequences of the intended regulation. Executive Order . . . No. 
12866, titled ``Regulatory Planning and Review'', . . . include[s] a 
requirement that each agency assess both the costs and the benefits 
of the intended regulation and, recognizing that some costs and 
benefits are difficult to quantify, propose or adopt a regulation 
only upon a reasoned determination that the benefits of the intended 
regulation justify its costs. Additionally, the U.S. Supreme Court 
and various Courts of Appeals have held that OSHA regulations must 
be technically and economically feasible. . . .
    In order to meet these legal requirements, OSHA must either 
clarify that no retrofitting is required or adequately address the 
economic impact of retrofitting electrical equipment due to the 
infeasibility of providing protective equipment and clothing that 
can withstand arc-flash hazards. [Ex. 0222; footnotes omitted; 
emphasis included in original.]

    The final rule generally requires that employers provide protection 
with an arc rating at least as high as the incident energy estimated 
under final paragraph (g)(2). When the initial estimated incident 
energy is extremely high, employers can either provide protection with 
an arc rating that is at least as high as the estimate or take measures 
to reduce the estimated incident energy. Those measures include changes 
to the installation and changes to work procedures. For example, 
installing current-limiting fuses is one way that will reduce incident 
energy by changing the installation (Tr. 498), and performing the work 
from a remote position (Tr. 499) and installing heat-shielding barriers 
(Tr. 210, 266) are ways that will reduce incident energy by changing 
work procedures.
    The Agency examined the rulemaking record and concluded that 
retrofitting would rarely be necessary to permit compliance with this 
final rule. Employees perform much of the work covered by the final 
rule on overhead

[[Page 20491]]

transmission and distribution lines. Several rulemaking participants 
noted that work on the vast majority of overhead line installations 
will not require the highest-rated protection available. Mr. James 
Tomaseski, representing IBEW testified:

    From the tables that are proposed in Appendix F, . . . we looked 
at those as common exposures out on distribution lines. [I]n 
discussions that I have had with utility employers and engineers, 
and so forth, about these values, I have not heard anybody yet say 
that they would have to be in hoods working on their distribution 
circuits'' (Tr. 939-940).

There is no evidence in the record that estimated incident-energy 
values for overhead power line installations are likely to exceed the 
values in Table 6 and Table 7 in final Appendix E. The highest 
estimated incident-energy level listed in those tables is 12 cal/cm\2\, 
and protection with this rating is readily available (see, for example, 
Tr. 412-414).
    Underground distribution systems potentially expose employees to 
higher incident-energy levels. IBEW noted, for example, that 
``replacing fuses in underground distribution systems'' is one type 
``of short duration [job] with a possible high hazard arc energy 
level'' (Ex. 0230). However, although the three-phase arc-in-a-box 
exposures faced by employees working on underground installations may 
be high, much of the work performed in these locations is on 
deenergized circuits (269-Ex. 8-5).\370\ For the remaining work, which 
potentially exposes employees to relatively high incident-energy 
levels, employers will have to choose between providing arc-rated 
protection appropriate for those levels and reducing the incident-
energy level through the installation or work methods changes noted 
previously. The Agency estimates that, for underground exposures, 
employers will be able to institute measures, such as increasing 
working distances, that do not involve substantial expense.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \370\ Existing Sec.  1910.269(t)(7) already requires protection 
from hazards posed by energized cables in a manhole. This 
requirement provides that, where a cable in a manhole has one or 
more abnormalities that could lead to or be an indication of an 
impending fault, the defective cable must be deenergized before any 
employee may work in the manhole, except when service load 
conditions and a lack of feasible alternatives require that the 
cable remain energized. In that case, employees may enter the 
manhole provided they are protected from the possible effects of a 
failure by shields or other devices that are capable of containing 
the adverse effects of a fault in the joint.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Potential incident-energy exposures for electric power generation 
installations also can be quite high, but the record shows that 
employers can implement relatively simple controls to reduce those 
exposures to levels for which adequately rated protection is readily 
available. Table 15 summarizes incident-energy estimates for a TVA 
nuclear generation plant (Ex. 0215).

    Table 15--Distribution of Incident Energy at TVA Generation Plant
------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Incident Energy (E) at 455 mm (18 inches),  cal/   Number of   Percent
                       cm\2\                          buses     of buses
------------------------------------------------------------------------
0.0 < E <= 4.0....................................         26         15
4.0 < E <= 8.0....................................         48         29
8.0 < E <= 30.0...................................         22         13
30.0 < E <= 50.0..................................         32         19
50.0 < E <= 75.0..................................          7          4
75.0 < E <= 100.0.................................         15          9
100.0 < E <= 162.4................................         18         11
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    TVA instituted engineering or administrative controls to reduce all 
incident-energy levels to 100 cal/cm\2\ or less.\371\ These controls 
included:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \371\ The highest arc rating for clothing is 100 cal/cm\2\ (Tr. 
440).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Using remote-control voltage test equipment,
     Resetting circuit breaker trip devices,
     Installing current limiting devices,
     Using robotics,
     Employing remote control devices to operate equipment, and
     Developing procedures that increase the working distance 
between the worker and the arc (id.).
    Two of these methods, resetting circuit-breaker trip devices and 
increasing the working distance, do not involve heavy capital outlays. 
The record identifies other simple methods for reducing incident-energy 
levels, such as setting up a circuit for work by temporarily adjusting 
relays (Tr. 940), changing operating procedures to eliminate or 
minimize the time two sources of power remain tied together (Ex. 
0425),\372\ and using shields or barriers to block incident energy 
before it reaches the employee (Ex. 0445). Because they do not make 
permanent changes to the installation, these methods also do not 
involve capital expenditures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \372\ In a network setting, more than one source can supply a 
circuit. Diverting one or more of those sources, by switching them 
so that they do not supply power to that circuit, can reduce the 
incident-energy level.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Agency decided to adjust its regulatory analysis to accommodate 
the extra measures that employers likely will take to reduce incident-
energy levels below 100 cal/cm\2\. To account for the costs of adopting 
incident-energy-control measures for electric power generation 
installations, OSHA included costs for reducing incident-energy 
exposures that, when combined with OSHA's estimated costs for 
calculating incident energy, correspond to TVA's estimate of $300 per 
employee for firms in industries with generation installations. Because 
TVA included incident-energy reduction costs in its estimate, OSHA's 
cost estimates also account for additional engineering controls that 
employers with power generation installations might need to implement 
to reduce the incident energy of particular circuits to no more than 
100 cal/cm\2\ (the maximum level for which protective clothing and 
equipment are generally available). In addition, in some cases, 
employers will be able to institute measures, such as resetting 
breakers or increasing working distances, that do not involve 
substantial expense. (See Section VI, Final Economic Analysis and 
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis, later in this preamble.)
    A note following final paragraph (g) explains that Appendix E to 
final Subpart V contains information on the selection of appropriate 
protection. This appendix contains information on the ignition 
threshold of various fabrics, techniques for estimating available heat 
energy, and means of selecting protective clothing and other protective 
equipment to protect employees from burn injuries resulting from 
electric arcs. OSHA adopted this note substantially as proposed, except 
as necessary to reference the appropriate appendix (Appendix E).
    Heat stress. Many commenters argued that arc-rated protection would 
subject employees to heat-stress hazards. (See, for example, Exs. 0099, 
0152, 0169, 0238; Tr. 406, 1105.) Mr. Jean Thrasher with Community 
Electric Cooperative, for instance, commented:

    An already existing hazard in the utility industry is heat 
stroke and heat exhaustion. If the calculated arc thermal value 
results in a requirement for multiple layers of FR clothing, there 
WILL BE hospitalizations from heat stroke and heat exhaustion. Many 
manufacturers gloss over or try to hide this concern by claiming 
they have engineered ``cool and comfortable'' FR clothing. The 
simple fact is that in summer, in 90[deg]+ heat with 80% or higher 
humidity multiple layers of any type clothing are too much, 
especially considering the linemen already are wearing solid rubber 
from shoulder to fingers on both arms. [Ex. 0152; emphasis included 
in original]

EEI expressed concern that, in proposing the arc-protection 
requirements in Subpart V, OSHA did not consider ``the impact that 
excessive clothing could have on employees

[[Page 20492]]

working in high temperatures'' (Ex. 0227).
    There is considerable evidence in the record related to heat-stress 
hazards. (See, for example, Exs. 0227, 0268, 0363, 0364; Tr. 431-461, 
1106-1110.) Record evidence suggests that heat stress can result in:
     Heat cramps (Ex. 0268; Tr. 1106),
     Heat exhaustion (id.),
     Heat rash (id.),
     Heat stroke (id.),
     Fainting (Ex. 0268),
     Loss of concentration (id.), and
     Unsafe behaviors (Tr. 1109-1110).

EEI submitted a State of California Finding of Emergency that reported 
on occupational heat-related illnesses in that State (Ex. 0268). That 
document reported that ``[s]tatistical information from the California 
Division of Workers Compensation's report on occupational injuries in 
heat-related illness from 2000-2004 [found] that at least 300 . . . 
cases of heat-related illness annually [were] recorded by employers or 
are the subject of claims for Workers Compensation Insurance'' (id.). 
EEI noted that heat stress would cause unsafe behaviors, which could 
lead to accidents involving contact with energized parts, an outcome 
these commenters contended presents a serious hazard that OSHA should 
address in the final rule in the context of arc-rated protection (Ex. 
0227; Tr. 1109-1110).
    OSHA acknowledges that heat stress can pose serious hazards to 
employees. As EEI noted, OSHA has several documents available that 
discuss heat-stress hazards and mitigation measures (Ex. 0478). In 
fact, the Agency has a Web page devoted to this topic (https://www.osha.gov/SLTC/heatstress/).
    Dr. Thomas Neal explained that ``heat stress is an occurrence when 
the human body core temperature goes over its normal temperature, which 
we normally state [is] 98.6 degrees F'' (Tr. 446). He further described 
the hazard of heat stress as follows:

    When the work you are doing generates more heat than can escape 
through your clothing, that heat can only go to your body. So what 
happens is your body, a fairly sizeable mass that it is, begins to 
heat up, and if you continue that process for a period of time, your 
body will basically heat up to a point where you are into a heat 
stress condition that can be dangerous.
    Heat builds up, and the core temperature of your organs and your 
brain heat up, and just a few degrees above 98.6, and it's been 
shown that your judgment can be impaired, and the core temperature, 
if it reaches up to . . . 105, it can actually become a life 
threatening situation. [Tr. 447]

    Dr. James Lancour, testifying for EEI, addressed the factors that 
can contribute to heat stress:

    Information gleaned from the literature clearly demonstrates the 
following:

    One, heat stress job-risk factors include: hot work 
environments, the metabolic rate required by the worker to perform 
the task, the type of protective clothing that is worn by a worker, 
exposure time, and the age and physical condition of the worker.
    Two, as metabolic requirements necessary to perform a given task 
increase, the exposure time at a given temperature necessary to 
minimize heat stress decreases.
    Three, the amount of clothing worn by a worker tends to increase 
the risk of heat stress.
    Four, as the temperature of the work environment increases above 
about 30 degrees Centigrade, or 88 degrees Fahrenheit, there is a 
sharp increase in heat-related illnesses. [Tr. 1108-1109]

The record also clearly shows that electric power generation, 
transmission, and distribution workers perform tasks outdoors in hot 
and humid environments. (See, for example, Exs. 0169, 0183, 0220, 0233; 
Tr. 406, 1003.)
    In view of this evidence, OSHA agrees that heat stress poses a 
significant hazard to employees covered by this final rule. The Agency 
does not dispute that electric power generation, transmission, and 
distribution work can be physically demanding and that employees 
perform this work in hot and humid weather. OSHA also agrees with the 
testimony of its expert witness, Dr. Mary Capelli-Schellpfeffer, that 
heat stress ``is not a new topic'' for employers with employees who 
perform this type of work and that ``strategies to manage thermal 
hazards, and . . . heat thermal stress, are well appreciated across 
geographic domains,'' north and south (Tr. 234-235). Drs. Neal, 
Lancour, and Capelli-Schellpfeffer noted that employers in this 
industry must deal with heat-stress hazards even if employees are not 
wearing arc-rated protection (Tr. 198, 478-479, 1129).
    Evidence in the record also indicates that there is a range of 
measures that employers can take to mitigate heat-stress hazards, 
including:
     Rest breaks (Ex. 0268; Tr. 198-199),
     Supplying sufficient amounts of water (Ex. 0268; Tr. 199),
     Using cooling vests (Tr. 199),
     Supplying ambient cooling (Tr. 198),
     Providing shade (Ex. 0268), and
     Acclimatizing employees to the heat (Ex. 0268).

Evidence in the record indicates that employers already are using some 
of these measures (Tr. 1129-1130).
    Dr. Neal described the body's metabolic process, which controls how 
the body responds to heat, as follows:

    If the heat generation from metabolic activity is greater than 
the heat loss through clothing or through parts of the body, 
obviously, also that are not clothed, then you have heat stress. 
Conversely, if the opposite happens, if your heat generation by 
metabolic activity is less than the heat loss through your clothing 
and uncovered parts of your body, then you have hypothermia.
    So your body operates in a narrow zone, and needs to do that to 
function effectively. Obviously, both heat stress and hypothermia 
are dangerous when you move away from that normal zone. . . .
    [There are] two main ways the body loses heat, and this comes 
from a North Carolina State University study of several years ago. 
One is what we call dry heat transfer, just air moving through my 
clothing, my body basically giving up heat as that happens. If I am 
cold, that is what is happening or, if I am in a comfort zone, 
that's pretty much what is happening.
    If I get hotter, then I begin to perspire and go into the 
evaporative heat transfer process, which is a very effective way of 
losing heat. . . . So then I am in a discomfort zone . . . . 
Finally, if I get to the point where I can't los[e] enough heat by 
sweating and by dry heat transfer to maintain my body temperature, I 
go into a heat stress situation where my core temperature begins to 
rise. [Tr. 448--449]

Dr. Neal then described how arc-rated clothing affects this process:

    Flame resistant shirts, pants, coveralls that you wear are 
basically like any other clothing article. They are breathable. We 
actually measure that in terms of air permeability, and they are 
typically lighter weight or similar weight than conventional cotton 
work apparel like jeans or cotton shirts that would be worn as 
nonmeltable work clothing.
    So they don't really function any different when you are wearing 
them. You may feel different. Again, somebody tells me it's not as 
comfortable as his cotton shirt, I'm not going to argue that, 
because he has to be the judge of what is comfortable. But it is not 
anymore prone to heat stress is my point on that.
    . . . The heat stress potential for the wearer [of] FR clothing 
would be typically less than or equivalent [to] typical conventional 
work clothing. . . . I'm talking about regular shirts, pants, and 
coveralls that you would wear for protection, and it would give you 
something up to maybe 8 calories or so of protection, single layer-
wise.
* * * * *
    When arc flash suits basically have higher ratings like 25 or 40 
calories, 100 calories, 60 calories--there are many different levels 
that are fairly high--well, there are multiple layers that are used 
to create those levels of protection. So heat, obviously--and there 
are hoods involved in those. So in those cases, obviously, the heat 
stress potential does go up. [Tr. 449-451]

    Dr. Neal presented two tables, one showing metabolic rates for 
different

[[Page 20493]]

tasks and the other showing heat-loss values for various types of 
protection (Ex. 0363). OSHA is reproducing these tables here as Table 
16 and Table 17, respectively.

               Table 16--Metabolic Rates for Various Tasks
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                               Metabolic
                             Task                              rate  (W/
                                                                 m\2\)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Standing.....................................................         70
Walking at 1.3 m/s (4.4 ft/s)................................        180
Tennis.......................................................        260
Heavy labor..................................................    320-440
Wrestling....................................................        500
------------------------------------------------------------------------


           Table 17--Typical Heat Loss Values Through Clothing
------------------------------------------------------------------------
              Clothing material                Total heat loss  (W/m\2\)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
205-gm/m\2\ (6-oz/yd) Meta-aramid FR Woven     747.
 Fabric (for example, NOMEX).
205-gm/m\2\ (6-oz/yd) Cotton T-shirt Knit....  688.
Lightest 8-cal/cm\2\ FR Shirt-Pants Fabric...  500 to 600.
40-cal/cm\2\ systems.........................  300 to 400.
Firefighter turnout, breathable..............  150 to 250.
100-cal/cm\2\ arc-flash suits................  150 to 250.
Firefighter turnout, nonbreathable...........  80 to 120.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    OSHA presumes that electric power work is equivalent to heavy 
labor, with a metabolic rate of 320 to 440 watts/meter \2\. As 
demonstrated in Table 17, even 8-cal/cm\2\ clothing does not interfere 
with heat loss significantly more than normal (non-flame-resistant) 
work clothing. Thus, the Agency concludes that employers can treat 
clothing with an arc rating of 8 cal/cm\2\ or less the same as normal 
work clothing with respect to its contribution to heat stress and that 
clothing with an arc rating of 8 cal/cm\2\ or less should not require 
any significant changes to measures employers already are taking to 
protect electric power workers from heat stress generally (Tr. 503--
504).
    Employers with employees who are in protection with arc ratings 
between 8 and 25 cal/cm\2\ will need to start planning for, and 
implement, heat-stress mitigation strategies beyond the strategies used 
for employees wearing normal work clothing (id.). These employers may 
need to choose among such mitigation strategies as: Providing the 
lightest-weight arc-rated clothing for the estimated incident-energy 
level, ensuring that employees take extra rest breaks, and reducing the 
incident energy using the methods described previously. However, 
employers will need to take these measures only when the ambient 
temperature warrants such actions.
    As shown in Table 16 and Table 17, when the estimated energy level 
rises above 25 cal/cm\2\, employers likely will need to implement a 
variety of heat-stress reduction measures, except for short-duration 
tasks. An employee who is performing heavy labor has a metabolic rate 
of 320 to 440 watts/m \2\ (Table 16). Protection rated at 40 cal/cm\2\ 
provides for a heat loss of 300 to 400 watts/m \2\ (Table 17). However, 
tasks requiring this level of protection \373\ are normally of short 
duration (Tr. 202). Such tasks include racking circuit breakers (Tr. 
381), replacing fuses in an underground installation (Ex. 0230), and 
removing or installing socket-type meters (id.). Dr. Capelli-
Schellpfeffer also testified that, even when employees are wearing this 
level of protection, ``at one to two minutes, three minutes, four 
minutes, in that ballpark, [it] is very, very uncommon to appreciate 
that there would be any thermal challenge significant enough to take . 
. . an employee to a heat stress condition'' (Tr. 202--203). Dow 
Chemical Company similarly commented that arc-rated clothing ``is only 
needed when an employee is working where there is a substantial 
potential for an arc flash, which typically should be for very short 
periods of time'' (Ex. 0128).\374\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \373\ Dr. Capelli-Schellpfeffer described this level of 
protection as ``fully enclosing FR protective clothing,'' which 
includes a protective hood (Tr. 202). Dr. Neal testified that a 
faceshield attached to a hard hat and a balaclava could be used in 
lieu of a hood for exposures up to about 40 cal/cm\2\ (Tr. 439).
    \374\ OSHA interprets this comment as applying to tasks 
performed in a generation plant or substation, as the Agency does 
not believe that Dow Chemical performs maintenance on utility-type 
transmission or distribution installations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Mr. Wilson Yancey with Quanta Services maintained that ``[o]n 
transmission work, employees often experience potential fault currents 
that would require multiple layers of FR clothing, plus a 40 calorie 
space suit with hood and shield, to provide the necessary protection'' 
(Ex. 0169). In addition, EEI presented information contending that 
clothing rated for more than 100 cal/cm\2\ might be necessary when 
employees work on 15-kilovolt distribution circuits with varying fault 
current levels (Ex. 0227). However, OSHA concludes that neither of 
these cases represents typical exposures for distribution or 
transmission systems. As explained earlier, under the summary and 
explanation for paragraph (g)(2) of the final rule, the NFPA 70E Annex 
D calculation method EEI used to arrive at its 97- to 153-cal/cm\2\ 
estimates is extremely conservative and likely would produce extremely 
elevated estimates at voltages of more than 15 kilovolts. EEI's 
corresponding estimate, based on Table 8 in proposed Appendix F, was 
only 5 cal/cm\2\ (id.), which, as explained earlier, would not require 
employers to put employees in protection that would cause concerns 
about heat stress. There is no evidence in the record that fault 
currents on transmission circuits typically are higher than the fault 
currents listed in Table 7 of final Appendix E or that incident-energy 
estimates likely would be higher than the values in that table.
    As explained under the heading Other issues relating to the 
selection of protective clothing and other protective equipment, 
earlier in this section of the preamble, the Agency concluded that most 
exposures on overhead transmission and distribution systems, where 
employees perform much of the work covered by the final rule, are no 
higher than 12 cal/cm\2\. Furthermore, as noted by Dr. Capelli-
Schellpfeffer, the types of tasks that require protection rated at more 
than 25 cal/cm\2\ are typically of short duration and will not require 
measures to reduce heat stress (Tr. 202-203). Thus, the final rule will 
not result in employers having to take

[[Page 20494]]

additional measures to protect workers from heat stress in most cases. 
When incident energy requires protection rated at more than 8 cal/
cm\2\, but no more than 12 cal/cm\2\ (the highest level in Table 6 and 
Table 7 in final Appendix E), employers might have to take some 
additional measures to protect employees in elevated ambient 
temperatures from heat stress. (See, for example, Tr. 503-504.) Even 
under these conditions, the Agency concludes that these measures should 
not be extreme because the clothing weight should be only slightly 
higher than 8-cal/cm\2\ clothing,\375\ and because affected employers 
already institute measures under these conditions to mitigate heat-
stress hazards (Tr. 197-198, 1129-1130).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \375\ Clothing rated 15 to 20 cal/cm\2\ is available in weights 
of 300 gm/m\2\ (8.8 oz/yd\2\), less than typical jeans-weight 
material (370 gm/m\2\, or 11 oz/yd\2\) (Ex. 0363).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Heat stress is a widely recognized hazard, and employers covered by 
the final rule already have an obligation under the general duty clause 
of the OSH Act to abate these hazards.\376\ As noted earlier, the 
record indicates that employers covered by the final rule already are 
addressing heat-stress issues in their workplaces. Depending on the 
level of protection afforded to comply with final paragraph (g)(5), 
employers may have to adjust their heat-stress programs, but the Agency 
believes that employers will be able to provide compliant protection 
under paragraph (g)(5) without necessarily exposing employees to 
dangerous heat-stress conditions. Moreover, OSHA believes that EEI's 
concerns about heat stress from arc-rated protection causing unsafe 
acts are groundless even if the protection could increase heat stress 
experienced by employees, because employers can take measures to abate 
the heat-stress hazard.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \376\ See, for example, https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=INTERPRETATIONS&p_id=24008.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In summary, the Agency agrees with IBEW's posthearing brief on the 
subject of heat stress:

    Another issue raised during the hearing was the specter that 
wearing FR clothing increases the risk of heat stress for employees 
working in hot climates. While the record is replete with reference 
to heat stress, material about its attendant hazards, and advice 
about how to avoid it, see, e.g., Ex. [0478] (EEI Post-Hearing 
Comments; references to materials on OSHA's Web site), there is 
absolutely no evidence in the record that employees wearing FR 
clothing are necessarily at greater risk of suffering heat stress 
than employees working in similar conditions but wearing regular 
work clothes.
    Heat stress is a function of a number of different factors, 
including not only the kind of clothing the employee is wearing, but 
the heat load of the particular operation in which the employee is 
involved, the level of exertion associated with the employee's 
tasks, his or her physical condition and diet, and such 
environmental conditions as temperature and humidity. [Tr.] 198, 
234[,] 1349-51; Ex. [0363]. Dr. Capelli-Schellpfeffer explained that 
the extent to which clothing poses a heat stress problem is less a 
function of the FR rating than the degree to which it encloses the 
body and prevents it from cooling. Thus, for most FR clothing worn 
during routine operations, if the clothing is not ``enclosing'' and 
the body has the ability to cool naturally, its FR nature will not 
pose any more of a heat stress threat than any other clothing. [Tr.] 
200-01, 249. Thomas Neal, of Neal Associates, added that although 
heavier clothing may contribute to heat stress, the availability of 
lighter weight FR clothing is minimizing that issue. Ex. [0363]. And 
representatives of both the utility industry ([Tr.] 388 
(ElectriCities)) and electrical contractors ([Tr.] 1349, 1350, 1351) 
concurred that although they certainly have had experience with heat 
stress, they were unaware of any situation that would not have 
occurred if the employee had not been wearing FR clothing. In fact, 
Quanta's Wilson Yancey noted that of the 6000 company employees who 
worked during last summer's extreme hurricane season, there was not 
one case of heat stress that he would attribute to FR clothing. 
[Tr.] 1350.
    This is not to disregard the fact that heat stress is an issue 
for electrical transmission and distribution workers--whether or not 
they are wearing FR clothing. The record shows, however, that there 
are industrial hygiene strategies for minimizing the possibility 
that employees working in hot, humid conditions experience heat 
stress, which utility and contractor employers either do or should 
utilize. These strategies include controlling the amount of time a 
particular employee performs a particular task, rotating employees, 
permitting cooling rests, ensuring adequate fluid intake, and 
utilizing light-weight, layered systems of arc-rated clothing. [Tr.] 
198-99[,] 460; Ex. [0363].
    Where the arc hazard analysis dictates putting employees in such 
highly rated FR clothing that heat stress or other performance 
impediments become a real problem, the answer may be to employ other 
strategies for protecting the employee from the threat. For example, 
an arc hazard analysis showed Gallatin Steel that it needed to 
develop alternative switching procedures to minimize employee 
exposure to arc flashes. Ex. [0460]. NIOSH recommends establishing 
``flash protection boundaries'' from which employees can maintain a 
sufficient distance from the exposure that they will not require 
protective clothing. Ex. [0130]. See also [Tr.] 498-99 (examples 
from other industries that have employed methods to lower heat 
energy estimates). [Ex. 0505]

    Are FR and arc-rated clothing personal protective equipment? As 
described earlier, OSHA is requiring employers, in certain situations, 
to ensure that their employees (1) wear flame-resistant clothing and 
(2) wear protective clothing and other protective equipment with an arc 
rating greater than or equal to the heat energy estimated under 
paragraph (g)(2) of the final rule. In the preamble to the proposal, 
OSHA stated that it considered the protective clothing required by 
proposed paragraph (g) to be PPE (70 FR 34868). As the preamble noted, 
the protective clothing would reduce the degree of injury sustained by 
an employee when an electric arc occurs and, in some cases, would 
prevent injury altogether (id.).
    Many rulemaking participants objected to OSHA's classification of 
arc-rated clothing as PPE. (See, for example, Exs. 0125, 0157, 0170, 
0172, 0185, 0207, 0209, 0504, 0506; Tr. 544-547, 1123-1124.) For 
instance, Mr. Jonathan Glazier with NRECA commented:

    To avoid any confusion, NRECA requests that OSHA reiterate its 
longstanding position that FR clothing is not PPE. That is, FR 
clothing, when it is not used as protective clothing, is not PPE 
even though it also has a protective value. For an example of OSHA's 
longstanding position on FR clothing as not being PPE, see the 
statement in the July 31, 1995 letter from John B. Miles, Jr., 
Director, Directorate of Compliance Programs, to Mr. Jack Callaway, 
Director of Environment Affairs, Sho-Me Power Electric Cooperative, 
that the Power Generation, Transmission, and Distribution standard 
section ``1910.269 (l)(6)(iii) is not a personal protective 
(clothing) equipment requirement.'' [Ex. 0233]

    The letter of interpretation referred to by Mr. Glazier simply 
states that existing Sec.  1910.269(l)(6)(iii), which prohibits the use 
of clothing that could increase the extent of an injury in the event of 
an arc exposure, is not a requirement for PPE. The letter does not 
state that FR clothing itself is not PPE. An OSHA memorandum to the 
field describes this Agency policy more explicitly:

    The Apparel Standard is intended to provide worker protection 
from exposure to the secondary hazard of the employee's clothing 
burning or melting and making even worse any injuries caused by 
primary exposure to the electric arc or flame. While OSHA requires, 
with exceptions, that employers provide and pay for PPE, paragraph 
1910.269(l)(6)(iii) is silent on these points. Note that this 
Apparel Standard is not considered a personal protective equipment 
(PPE) standard; however, it may apply to personal protective 
equipment. [Emphasis added.] For example, paragraph 
1910.269(l)(6)(iii) applies to an employer who provides personal 
protective clothing worn by an employee, who is exposed to the 
hazards of electric arcs or flames, for protection against cold or 
rain.
    Because it is not a PPE requirement, the Apparel Standard does 
not address whether

[[Page 20495]]

or not an employee's clothing must cover all exposed parts of the 
employee's body. The Apparel Standard, by itself, does not prohibit 
employers from purchasing flame-retardant-treated short sleeve 
shirts or from altering flame-retardant-treated long sleeve shirts 
to shorten the sleeves. However, such practices are discouraged. 
Flame-retardant-treated clothing provides a measure of protection to 
an employee exposed to an electric arc.
    From this standpoint, flame-retardant-treated clothing which 
covers not only the body and legs, but also the arms provides better 
protection to the employee.

    Note: An employer would be in a citable posture for violation of 
[Sec.  1910.132] of the Subpart I Personal protective equipment 
standard when it is a generally accepted safe work practice of the 
industry to wear clothing which covers the arms, legs or other 
exposed surfaces of the body to protect an employee in a particular 
workplace application and the employee does not do so. [Memorandum 
for: Regional Administrators, From: James W. Stanley, dated August 
10, 1995, Subject: Guidelines for the Enforcement of the Apparel 
Standard, 29 CFR 1910.269(l)(6), of the Electric Power Generation, 
Transmission, and Distribution Standard; \377\ emphasis included in 
original]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \377\ The full text of this memorandum is available at https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=INTERPRETATIONS&p_id=21878.

This memorandum makes it clear that, while OSHA does not treat existing 
Sec.  1910.269(l)(6)(iii) as a PPE requirement, some FR clothing may be 
PPE for purposes of other OSHA standards.
    Some rulemaking participants maintained that OSHA did not define 
PPE or argued that the Agency was defining PPE to include FR clothing 
for the first time in this rulemaking. (See, for example, Exs. 0207, 
0222, 0233; Tr. 568.) For instance, the Small Business Administration's 
Office of Advocacy commented: ``OSHA declares in a single sentence in 
the preamble that it now views protective clothing as PPE, a position 
that OSHA has previously not asserted'' (Ex. 0207; footnote omitted). 
Mr. Chris Tampio with NAM argued:

    The basic Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) standards for 
general industry and construction are found in Sections 1910.132 and 
1926.95, respectively, and have been in existence for over 30 years. 
To the best of our knowledge, these provisions have not been 
interpreted to require fire-resistant or arc-rated clothing to 
address arc flash hazards. If OSHA already interpreted Section 
1910.132 or 1926.95 to require fire-resistant or arc-rated clothing 
to address arc flash hazards, there would have been no reason to 
propose the clothing requirements in the current rulemaking. 
Accordingly, should the final rule contain provisions requiring arc 
flash hazard assessments and FR/AR clothing, it is essential for 
OSHA to insert language into the final rule and the preamble to the 
final rule clarifying that the agency's interpretations of Sections 
1910.132 and 1926.95 remains unchanged--that they do not require 
flame-resistant and arc-rated clothing in connection with any arc 
flash hazards that may exist outside the activities covered by 
Section 1910.269 and Subpart V.
* * * * *
    OSHA's discussion of the clothing requirements in the preamble 
to this rulemaking demonstrate that fire-resistant clothing is . . . 
not considered PPE under Section 1910.132:
    OSHA's existing clothing requirement in Sec.  1910.269 [which 
incorporates the personal protective equipment requirements of 
Subpart I of Part 1910 by reference into Section 1910.269(g)(1)] 
does not require employers to protect employees from electric arcs 
through the use of flame-resistant clothing. It simply requires that 
an employee's clothing do no greater harm. Because of the serious 
nature of the still remaining risk to power workers from electric 
arcs, the Agency believes that the standard should be revised to 
require the use of flame-resistant clothing, under certain 
circumstances, to protect employees from the most severe burns.
    Section 1910.132, ``General Requirements [for PPE]'', is OSHA's 
general PPE standard which requires that PPE shall be used wherever 
necessary by reason of workplace hazards. Because 1910.269 already 
incorporates Sec.  1910.132, there would be no reason to revise 
Sec.  1910.269 (or Subpart V) to require the use of FR/AR clothing, 
or to perform an economic impact analysis of the additional burden 
of that requirement, if FR/AR clothing was already required by Sec.  
1910.132 (or Sec.  [1926].95) to address the arc flash hazard.
    . . . In [a] 1999 rulemaking, OSHA issued [a notice of proposed 
rulemaking] to address the issue of whether an employer would be 
required to pay for the PPE required by Sec.  1910.132. The scope of 
that preamble and the technical and economic feasibility analysis 
for that proposal were limited to head, eye, hand, face and foot 
protection, and some forms of protective clothing (other than arc-
rated or fire-resistant clothing). There was no mention of its 
application to fire-resistant or arc-rated clothing for electrical 
workers. The NAM respectfully submits that, to this day, as the 
subject rulemaking acknowledges, OSHA has never interpreted Sec.  
1910.132 or 1926.95 to require fire-resistant clothing or arc-rated 
clothing to address arc flash hazards.
    In light of this well-established interpretation of Sec. Sec.  
1910.132 and 1926.95, we respectfully submit it may not be 
materially changed except through notice and comment rulemaking that 
clearly announces to all interested parties that such an enormous 
change is under consideration. It is well-established that agency 
interpretations, even when reasonable constructions of its rules, 
trigger notice and comment requirements under the APA when the 
interpretation represents a significant change from a previous, 
definitive interpretation. See Alaska Professional Hunters 
Association, Inc. v. FAA, 177 F.3d 1030, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1999). [Ex. 
0222; footnotes omitted; emphasis included in original.]

    First, the Agency considers irrelevant the argument that, if 
Sec. Sec.  1910.132 and 1926.95 already cover arc-rated clothing, OSHA 
does not need separate requirements for such clothing in Subpart V and 
Sec.  1910.269. The regulated community could construe existing Sec.  
1910.269(l)(6)(iii), because it explicitly covers electric-arc hazards 
for work performed under Sec.  1910.269, to preempt application of 
Sec.  1910.132(a) to electric-arc hazards in electric power generation, 
transmission, and distribution work. Consequently, OSHA needed to 
revise Sec.  1910.269, as it proposed to do, to clarify that employees 
must use arc-rated clothing for work covered by that standard.
    Second, the commenters' statements about current OSHA policy are 
wrong. The Agency currently considers FR clothing to be PPE; OSHA is 
not establishing new policy on that issue in this final rule. The 
Agency has issued, and the Occupational Safety and Health Review 
Commission has upheld, citations against employers for violating Sec.  
1910.132(a) by not providing flame-resistant clothing to employees. 
(See, for example, Lukens Steel Co., 10 BNA OSHC 1115 (No. 76-1053, 
1981) (Section 1910.132 required the use of ``protective equipment, 
including . . . flame retardant clothing'' for employees exposed to 
burn hazards at a steel-producing facility).) In addition, the Agency 
has issued several letters of interpretation stating that, under 
certain circumstances, Sec.  1910.132(a) or Sec.  1926.95(a) require FR 
clothing. (See, for example, letters of interpretation dated March 7, 
2006, to Mr. Joseph P. Zemen \378\ (FR clothing in plants processing 
flammable materials) and February 29, 2008, to Mr. Brian Dolin \379\ 
(protection against arc-flash hazards for work covered by 29 CFR Part 
1926, Subpart K).)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \378\ This letter is available at https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=INTERPRETATIONS&p_id=25366.
    \379\ This letter is available at https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=INTERPRETATIONS&p_id=25973.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the recently completed rulemaking on employer payment for 
personal protective equipment (72 FR 64342), some commenters suggested 
``that FR clothing is not PPE.'' (72 FR 64353). OSHA rejected that 
argument, noting:

    If OSHA determines in [the Subpart V] rulemaking that FR 
clothing is required, it will then become subject to the PPE payment 
provisions of this rule . . . [Id.]

Thus, it is clear that the Agency considers flame-resistant clothing to 
be PPE. In this regard, this rulemaking does not establish new policy 
or revise

[[Page 20496]]

longstanding policy, as the commenters suggested.\380\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \380\ Mr. Tampio also argued that FR clothing is not considered 
electrical protective equipment under Sec.  1910.335 (Ex. 0222). 
This argument is not relevant to this discussion. However, note that 
OSHA agrees with Mr. Tampio that FR clothing is not electrical 
protective equipment. This equipment, covered by Sec. Sec.  1910.137 
and 1926.97 in this final rule, protects employees from electric 
shock. FR clothing, whether arc-rated or not, does not provide 
protection against electric shock.
    In addition, Mr. Tampio argued that the hazard assessment and 
training requirements in Sec.  1910.132 apply only to head, eye, 
hand, face, and foot protection. OSHA also agrees with this 
statement, but again finds it irrelevant. The limitation of the PPE 
hazard assessment and training provisions, contained in Sec.  
1910.132(g), has no bearing or effect on the types of PPE covered by 
the general requirement to provide PPE in Sec.  1910.132(a). The 
preamble to the Subpart V proposal requested comment on whether to 
extend the hazard assessment and training requirements of Sec.  
1910.132 to electrical protective equipment, which is another form 
of PPE covered by Sec.  1910.132(a) (70 FR 34893).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Consistent with past policy, OSHA believes that it is reasonable 
and appropriate to treat FR and arc-rated clothing required under final 
paragraph (g) as PPE. FR clothing required by paragraph (g)(4) of the 
final rule will protect against the ignition of clothing, and arc-rated 
clothing, as required by paragraph (g)(5) of the final rule, will 
protect against heat-related hazards caused by electric arcs. Dr. Mary 
Capelli-Schellpfeffer explained that electric arcs can ``occur 
unintentionally in man-made systems'' and represent ``a common 
electrical fault condition which may lead to a failure in the power 
system'' (Ex. 0373). She explained that, when an employee is repairing 
an electrical installation, ``[i]f the installation remains energized, 
or is not in an electrically safe working condition, the risk of 
electric arc persists, and may be increased as a result of the post-
fault status'' (id.). As Dr. Capelli-Schellpfeffer noted, the causes of 
electric arcs include: transient overvoltage disturbances, such as 
lightning and switching surges; mechanical damage from foreign sources, 
such as digging or vehicles; shorting by tools or metal objects; 
mechanical failure of static or structural parts; and insulation 
breakdown (id.). Thus, electric arcs commonly result from the breakdown 
of equipment in the process of generating, transporting, or using 
electricity or from the process of repairing an electrical 
installation.
    Dr. Capelli-Schellpfeffer also described the thermal hazards posed 
by electric arcs, explaining:

    With temperatures rising in and around an arc, burn hazard is 
present from ohmic heating due to electrical power flow; ignition 
and combustion of nearby materials, notably including worn clothing 
and adjacent equipment; and sprayed or blown hot or melting 
installation elements moved by the mechanical forces in the electric 
arc event. Additionally, radiation is another major source of heat. 
[Ex. 0373; see, also, Tr. 178-188.]

Thus, thermal hazards posed by electric arcs arise not only from the 
processes but are a direct result of the rapidly changing environment 
that results from a fault in an electrical system.
    Dr. Capelli-Schellpfeffer also described the injuries that can 
result from electric arcs:

    The injuries that accompany high temperature exposures at the 
body surfaces are commonly referred to as skin burns. When these 
injuries are distributed within the body we still call them skin 
burns, and the burn generally refers to a physical chemical change.
    As many appreciate from the experience of sunburn, this kind of 
condition is painful, and when the trauma is more severe, the pain 
is extraordinary, and of course the medical treatment is extensive. 
[Tr. 188]

As noted earlier, she graphically depicted these injuries with a 
photograph of the victim of an electric arc, which she explained as 
follows:

    [T]he extent of the injury that can follow an arc exposure is 
readily appreciated. Eyes, ears, faces, skin, limbs, and organs are 
affected. Basic bodily function, including the ability to breathe, 
eat, urinate, and sleep are completely changed. [Tr. 186]

Thus, thermal injuries from an electric arc occur when an employee's 
body absorbs the heat from the arc.
    In light of the foregoing discussion, OSHA concludes that FR 
clothing and arc-rated clothing will protect against ``hazards of 
processes or environment'' and are designed to protect against hazards 
``encountered in a manner capable of causing injury or impairment in 
the function of any part of the body through absorption, inhalation or 
physical contact.'' Thus, OSHA is reiterating that FR clothing and arc-
rated clothing are PPE as Sec. Sec.  1910.132(a) and 1926.95(a) 
generally describe that term.
    Mr. Jonathan Glazier with NRECA argued that FR clothing is not 
protective (Ex. 0506; Tr. 544-545). At the hearing, Mr. Glazier 
testified:

    The FR nature of clothing offers no protective value. It refers 
merely to the clothing's inability to melt or ignite and remain 
ignited. We should be aware of the difference between the attribute 
of FR and the attribute of protection.
    It gets confusing, because arc protective clothing, which sounds 
like it may be personal protective equipment, and OSHA says it is 
personal protective equipment in the preamble . . .
    It gets confusing, because arc protective clothing is first FR. 
That is, all arc protective clothing is also FR, and I am told that 
all FR clothing sold nowadays has an arc protective rating.\[381]\ 
But still, there is a difference between the FR attribute and the 
arc protective attribute. [Tr. 544-545]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \381\ OSHA is aware that some FR clothing, such as children's FR 
sleepwear and certain types of FR clothing made specifically for 
protection from contact with molten metal, are not arc rated.

    OSHA disagrees with Mr. Glazier. FR clothing, even without an arc 
rating, protects employees against burns caused by radiant and 
convective heat as well as burns caused by potential ignition of 
clothing that is not flame resistant. Dr. Thomas Neal testified that FR 
clothing ``not only [does not] ignite and, basically, eliminate[s] the 
burning clothing on the body syndrome, but [it] also provide[s] a level 
of protection by blocking heat from reaching the body'' (Tr. 472). Dr. 
Capelli-Schellpfeffer similarly testified that ``FR clothing . . . is 
protective and designed to resist ignition and block heat transfer'' 
(Tr. 189). An arc-rating on FR clothing is a measure of how much 
incident energy can be present before the wearer will just barely 
sustain a second-degree burn (Ex. 0061). Clearly, arc-rated clothing 
and FR clothing (even without an arc rating) protect employees from 
being burned by electric arcs and are, therefore, protective.
    Mr. Frank White with ORC Worldwide expressed concern that OSHA 
would consider untreated cotton clothing to be PPE (Ex. 0235). He noted 
that Table 10 in proposed Appendix F listed untreated cotton clothing 
as ``protective'' for incident energy up to 2 cal/cm\2\ and that ``at 
higher incident energy exposures a [T]-shirt is listed as the first 
layer of protective clothing, followed by other layers of FR clothing'' 
(id.). Mr. White also interpreted Table 11 from proposed Appendix F, 
which listed ignition thresholds for various weights of cotton fabrics, 
as indicating that these fabrics provide ``protection from heat energy 
below the ignition threshold'' (id.).
    Untreated cotton can ignite and continue to burn when subjected to 
incident heat energy above its ignition threshold (Tr. 467-469, 472). 
OSHA does not consider cotton clothing, which can ignite and pose a 
hazard itself, as constituting protective clothing with respect to 
electric arcs common to work covered by the final rule. Therefore, OSHA 
did not include Table 10 or Table 11 from proposed Appendix F in final 
Appendix E. (See also the summary and explanation for the appendices to 
Subpart V, later in this section of the preamble.) Finally, even though 
wearing cotton clothing as one

[[Page 20497]]

layer in a clothing system can effectively increase the arc-rating of 
the system, OSHA does not consider cotton clothing to be 
protective.\382\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \382\ Note that, even if cotton clothing in these circumstances 
were PPE, Sec. Sec.  1910.132(h)(4)(ii) and 1926.95(d)(4)(i) exempt 
``everyday clothing'' from the employer-payment requirements in 
Sec. Sec.  1910.132(h) and 1926.95(d).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some commenters maintained that OSHA needed to conduct a separate 
rulemaking to determine whether FR clothing is PPE. (See, for example, 
Exs. 0170, 0183, 0202, 0207, 0222, 0229, 0233, 0239, 0240.) For 
instance, Mr. Alan Blackmon with Blue Ridge Electric Cooperative 
commented that, if ``OSHA institutes an arc protective clothing 
requirement, its nature as PPE or non-PPE should be the subject of 
public notice and comment. It is not enough for OSHA merely to issue a 
pronouncement in the Preamble of this rulemaking'' (Ex. 0183).
    The U.S. SBA's Office of Advocacy suggested that ``the issue of 
protective clothing as PPE [was] not . . . fully vetted in the 
rulemaking process'' and recommended that ``OSHA address the issues of 
protective clothing, PPE, and employer payment for PPE in the PPE 
rulemaking process and not finalize these provisions prior to that 
rulemaking's conclusion'' (Ex. 0207).
    As noted earlier, existing OSHA policy treats FR clothing (whether 
or not it is arc rated) as PPE. OSHA's statement in the preamble to the 
proposed rule simply reaffirmed that position. Although the Agency does 
not believe notice and comment is necessary on this issue (see, for 
example, 5 U.S.C. 553(b) (APA notice and comment requirements do not 
apply ``to interpretative rules'')), affected parties had clear notice 
in the preamble to this rulemaking that the Agency was considering 
whether employers would have to pay for the arc-rated clothing required 
by the final rule (an issue discussed later in this section of the 
preamble). OSHA believes that the public also had clear notice that the 
Agency considered FR clothing to be PPE and had ample opportunity to 
challenge the Agency on that point as it relates to this rulemaking. 
Consequently, OSHA concludes that there is no need to conduct further 
rulemaking related to the issue of whether FR clothing is PPE.
    Who should pay for the PPE required by paragraph (g) of the final 
rule? As explained earlier, OSHA considers FR clothing and arc-rated 
clothing required by the final rule to be PPE. The proposed rule did 
not specify whether employers would have to provide protective clothing 
at no cost to employees. However, OSHA noted in the preamble to the 
proposal that it was considering including an employer-payment 
requirement in the final rule and sought comments on the issue.
    The preamble to the proposal also noted that OSHA had proposed 
regulatory language for the general PPE standards to clarify that 
employers generally are responsible for the cost of PPE (70 FR 34869, 
citing 64 FR 15402, Mar. 31, 1999). OSHA published the final rule on 
employer payment for PPE on November 15, 2007 (72 FR 64342). The final 
rule on employer payment for PPE requires employers to pay for the PPE 
used to comply with OSHA standards, with a few exceptions, including 
(1) everyday clothing, such as longsleeve shirts, long pants, street 
shoes, and normal work boots; and (2) ordinary clothing, skin creams, 
or other items, used solely for protection from weather, such as winter 
coats, jackets, gloves, parkas, rubber boots, hats, raincoats, ordinary 
sunglasses, and sunscreen. (See 29 CFR 1910.132(h); 29 CFR 1926.95(d).)
    In the PPE-payment rulemaking, OSHA explained the rationale behind 
its decision to require employers generally to pay for PPE, as follows:

1. The OSH Act Requires Employer Payment for PPE

    OSHA is requiring employers to pay for PPE used to comply with 
OSHA standards in order to effectuate the underlying cost allocation 
scheme in the OSH Act. The OSH Act requires employers to pay for the 
means necessary to create a safe and healthful work environment. 
Congress placed this obligation squarely on employers, believing 
such costs to be appropriate in order to protect the health and 
safety of employees. This final rule does no more than clarify that 
under the OSH Act employers are responsible for providing at no cost 
to their employees the PPE required by OSHA standards to protect 
employees from workplace injury and death.
* * * * *

2. The Rule Will Result in Safety Benefits

    Separate from effectuating the statutory cost allocation scheme, 
this rule will also help prevent injuries and illnesses. OSHA has 
carefully reviewed the rulemaking record and finds that requiring 
employers to pay for PPE will result in significant safety benefits. 
As such, it is a legitimate exercise of OSHA's statutory authority 
to promulgate these ancillary provisions in its standards to reduce 
the risk of injury and death.
    There are three main reasons why the final rule will result in 
safety benefits:
     When employees are required to pay for their own PPE, 
many are likely to avoid PPE costs and thus fail to provide 
themselves with adequate protection. OSHA also believes that 
employees will be more inclined to use PPE if it is provided to them 
at no cost.
     Employer payment for PPE will clearly shift overall 
responsibility for PPE to employers. When employers take full 
responsibility for providing PPE to their employees and paying for 
it, they are more likely to make sure that the PPE is correct for 
the job, that it is in good condition, and that the employee is 
protected.
     An employer payment rule will encourage employees to 
participate wholeheartedly in an employer's safety and health 
program and employer payment for PPE will improve the safety culture 
at the worksite.
* * * * *

3. Clarity in PPE Payment Policy

    Another benefit of the final PPE payment rule is clarity in 
OSHA's policy. While it is true that most employers pay for most PPE 
most of the time, the practices for providing PPE are quite diverse. 
Many employers pay for some items and not for others, either as a 
matter of collective bargaining or long standing tradition. In some 
cases, costs are shared between employees and employers. In other 
workplaces, the employer pays for more expensive or technologically 
advanced PPE while requiring employees to pay for more common items. 
However, in some workplaces exactly the opposite is true. [72 FR 
64344]

    OSHA concludes that there is no evidence in the Subpart V 
rulemaking record to persuade the Agency that any of these reasons 
are invalid with respect to FR and arc-rated clothing. As explained 
later, OSHA considered and rejected nearly all of the arguments 
against an employer-payment requirement for FR and arc-rated 
clothing in the PPE-payment rulemaking. As noted previously, OSHA 
specifically considered FR clothing in the PPE-payment rulemaking 
and concluded in the preamble to the final PPE-payment rule that, 
``[i]f OSHA determines in [the Subpart V] rulemaking that FR 
clothing is required, it will then become subject to the PPE payment 
provisions of this rule, unless the final Sec.  1910.269 and Part 
1926 Subpart V standards specifically exempt FR clothing from 
employer payment'' (72 FR 64353). Therefore, the default position 
for the Subpart V rulemaking is that employers must pay for the FR 
and arc-rated clothing required by this final rule unless the Agency 
adopts provisions specifically exempting this clothing from the 
general PPE-payment rule. Also, for reasons described later, OSHA 
concludes that such an exemption is neither necessary nor 
appropriate for the FR or arc-rated clothing required under 
paragraph (g) of this final rule. The general PPE-payment rule, 
including all exceptions, applies to the FR and arc-rated clothing 
used to comply with this final rule. (See 72 FR 64369.)
    Several rulemaking participants supported requiring employers to 
pay for the FR clothing and arc-rated clothing required by the final 
rule. (See, for example, Exs. 0130, 0164, 0197, 0211, 0230, 0505; 
Tr. 819-820, 834, 897-898.) These rulemaking participants gave 
several reasons for supporting an employer-payment requirement:
     Many employers already are providing this protective 
clothing (Exs. 0230, 0505; Tr. 897-898),
     Employers are more likely to properly train employees 
in using PPE (Ex. 0211),

[[Page 20498]]

     Employers are more likely to select, and ensure that 
employees wear, proper protective clothing (Exs. 0197, 0211, 0230),
     Employers are more likely to properly maintain the 
protective clothing (Exs. 0130, 0211, 0230), and
     The OSH Act requires employers to pay for this type of 
protection (Tr. 848--849).
    Other commenters opposed an employer-payment requirement. (See, 
for example, Exs. 0099, 0125, 0146, 0169, 0173, 0186, 0201, 0209, 
0222; Tr. 546--547.) These rulemaking participants presented the 
following reasons for not imposing such a requirement:
     The difficulty and expense contractors would have 
buying protective clothing for employees who move from employer to 
employer (Exs. 0169, 0186),
     Employees take better care of clothing when they pay at 
least a portion of the cost (Exs. 0099, 0186),
     Employers consider protective clothing a ``tool of the 
trade'' that employees must bring with them to the job (Ex. 0222; 
Tr. 295-297),
     FR and arc-rated clothing only provides secondary 
protection (Exs. 0209, 0210), and
     Protective clothing is personal because employees can 
wear it off the job (Exs. 0125, 0146, 0173, 0209, 0222).
    OSHA examined several of these arguments in the PPE-payment 
rulemaking. For example, the Agency explained how employers could 
handle the problems associated with transient workforces:

    If the employer retains ownership of the PPE, then the employer 
may require the employee to return the PPE upon termination of 
employment. If the employee does not return the employer's 
equipment, nothing in the final rule prevents the employer from 
requiring the employee to pay for it or take reasonable steps to 
retrieve the PPE, in a manner that does not conflict with federal, 
state or local laws concerning such actions. In these situations, 
OSHA notes that the employer is not allowed to charge the employee 
for wear and tear to the equipment that is related to the work 
performed or workplace conditions. As suggested by National Tank 
Truck Carriers, Inc., a written agreement, for example, between the 
employer and employee on the matter may be an effective method of 
ensuring that the employer's expectations of the employee are clear 
and unambiguous . . . . Another acceptable alternative is a deposit 
system that provides an incentive for employees to return the 
equipment. However, the Agency cautions that the deposit system must 
not be administered in a fashion that circumvents the rule and 
results in an employee involuntarily paying for his or her PPE.
    In some situations, an employer may prohibit an employee from 
using PPE that the employer has paid for while working for another 
employer. . . . Conversely, an employer may allow an employee to use 
employer-owned PPE while working for another employer. . . . Since 
the employer has retained ownership of the PPE, he or she can 
stipulate where it is used. OSHA does not object to either of the 
aforementioned practices. [72 FR 64359]

    The same solutions apply here. OSHA notes that the record in this 
rulemaking describes another possible solution for contractors 
employing unionized labor. Mr. Jules Weaver with Western Line 
Constructors Chapter testified that ``[t]here are certain parts of the 
country in our industry, IBEW and [NECA], have a . . . safety fund, and 
the contractors pay into it, and they provide FR clothing for 
individuals'' (Tr. 307). Thus, although providing employees with PPE, 
including FR clothing and arc-rated clothing, might be challenging for 
employers with transient workforces, the Agency believes that there are 
reasonable compliance options available.
    In the PPE-payment rulemaking, the Agency rejected an argument that 
employees take better care of PPE than employers, explaining: ``OSHA is 
also not swayed by [the] arguments that employees are in a better 
position to maintain, use, and store PPE. In fact, the existing PPE 
standards place on employers the responsibility for ensuring proper 
fit, use, and maintenance of PPE'' (72 FR 64380). The same rationale 
applies to the argument in this rulemaking that employees take better 
care of protective clothing when they pay for all, or a portion, of it. 
The OSH Act and the PPE standards at Sec. Sec.  1910.132 and 1926.95 
make the employer, not the employee, responsible for the care and 
maintenance of PPE.
    In the PPE-payment rulemaking, the Agency decided not to exempt 
``tools of the trade,'' stating:

    As discussed previously and noted by many commenters, in some 
trades, industries, and/or geographic locations, PPE for employees 
who frequently change jobs can take on some of the qualities of a 
``tool of the trade.'' In other words, the PPE is an item that the 
employee traditionally keeps with his or her tool box. This may be 
because the PPE is used while performing some type of specialized 
work, such as welding or electrical work, or because it is a 
tradition in the industry, such as in home building. OSHA has not 
included an exception to the payment requirement for tools of the 
trade because, among other things, of the difficulty of defining, 
with adequate precision, when an item of PPE is or is not a tool of 
the trade. However, because the rule does not require employers to 
reimburse employees for PPE they already own, it recognizes that 
some employees may wish to own their tools of the trade and bring 
that equipment to the worksite.
    OSHA has further emphasized in the regulatory text that 
employees are under no obligation to provide their own PPE by 
stating that the employer shall not require an employee to provide 
or pay for his or her own PPE, unless the PPE is specifically 
excepted in the final rule. These provisions address the concern 
that employers not circumvent their obligations to pay for PPE by 
making employee ownership of the equipment a condition of employment 
or continuing employment or a condition for placement in a job. OSHA 
recognizes that in certain emergency situations, such as response to 
a natural disaster, where immediate action is required, it may be 
necessary for employers to hire or select employees already in 
possession of the appropriate PPE. As a general matter, however, 
employers must not engage in this practice. Taking PPE-ownership 
into consideration during hiring or selection circumvents the intent 
of the PPE standard and constitutes a violation of the standard. [72 
FR 64358-64359]

    The same rationale applies here.
    OSHA also rejects the argument that, because FR and arc-rated 
clothing is secondary protection, the Agency should not require 
employers to pay for it. As noted earlier, PPE is part of a hierarchy 
of controls. OSHA standards typically require other forms of controls, 
such as engineering and work-practice controls, in preference to PPE. 
In many cases, PPE supplements engineering controls and forms a second 
line of defense to protect employees in the event that other types of 
controls do not provide complete abatement of the relevant hazard. For 
example, existing Sec. Sec.  1910.67(c)(2)(v) and 1926.453(b)(2)(v) 
require employees working from aerial lifts to wear personal fall 
protection equipment because that PPE would protect the workers in case 
the engineering controls (that is, the guardrails or bucket walls on 
the aerial lift platforms or buckets) do not provide sufficient 
protection. (See, also, the preamble to the final rule on respiratory 
protection, 29 CFR 1910.134 and 29 CFR 1926.103, which notes: 
``Respiratory protection is a backup method which is used to protect 
employees from toxic materials in the workplace in those situations 
where feasible engineering controls and work practices are . . . not in 
themselves sufficient to protect employee health . . .'' (63 FR 1156-
1157, Jan. 8, 1998).) Consequently, OSHA standards often consider PPE 
``secondary'' protection. FR and arc-rated clothing is not unique in 
this regard. In any event, where this final rule requires FR or arc-
rated clothing, OSHA determined that it is necessary for employee 
protection (as described previously) and, thus, the rationale for 
requiring employers to pay for this type of PPE still applies.
    In the PPE-payment rulemaking, OSHA also considered exempting types 
of PPE that were ``personal in nature.'' \383\ However, instead of

[[Page 20499]]

exempting all such personal PPE, the Agency chose to evaluate various 
types of personal PPE individually. First, OSHA chose not to require 
employer payment for everyday clothing or ordinary clothing used solely 
for protection from weather. The Agency explained the reasoning for 
this decision as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \383\ For the purposes of this discussion, OSHA considers PPE 
that is ``personal in nature'' to be PPE fitted to an individual 
employee and not shared by other employees and that the employee can 
use off the job.

    OSHA does not believe that Congress intended for employers to 
have to pay for everyday clothing and ordinary clothing used solely 
for protection from the weather. While serving a protective function 
in certain circumstances, employees must wear such clothing to work 
regardless of the hazards found. OSHA is exercising its discretion 
through this rulemaking to exempt jeans, long sleeve shirts, winter 
coats, etc., from the employer payment requirement. As stated, this 
is consistent with OSHA's intent in the proposal and is also 
supported by the rulemaking record. A number of commenters stated 
that OSHA should exempt these items from the employer payment 
requirement . . .
    Thus, OSHA is not requiring employers to pay for everyday 
clothing even though they may require their employees to use such 
everyday clothing items such as long pants or long-sleeve shirts, 
and even though they may have some protective value. Similarly, 
employees who work outdoors (e.g., construction work) will normally 
have weather-related gear to protect themselves from the elements. 
This gear is also exempt from the employer payment requirement. [72 
FR 64349]

    The PPE-payment rule also exempts nonspecialty safety-toe 
protective footwear, provided the employer permits employees to wear it 
off the jobsite.\384\ OSHA explained this exemption as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \384\ The PPE-payment rule provides additional exemptions for 
such items as nonspecialty prescription safety eyewear. However, the 
rationale behind those exemptions sheds no additional light on 
whether FR and arc-rated clothing should or should not be subject to 
the general employer-payment requirement.

    OSHA has historically taken the position that safety-toe 
protective footwear has certain attributes that make it unreasonable 
to require employers to pay for it in all circumstances . . . . 
Safety footwear selection is governed by a proper and comfortable 
fit. It cannot be easily transferred from one employee to the next. 
Unlike other types of safety equipment, the range of sizes of 
footwear needed to fit most employees would not normally be kept in 
stock by an employer and it would not be reasonable to expect 
employers to stock the array and variety of safety-toe footwear 
necessary to properly and comfortably fit most individuals.
    Furthermore, most employees wearing safety-toe protective 
footwear spend the majority of their time working on their feet, and 
thus such footwear is particularly difficult to sanitize and reissue 
to another employee. Other factors indicate as well that employers 
should not be required to pay for safety-toe protective footwear in 
all circumstances. Employees who work in non-specialty safety-toe 
protective footwear often wear it to and from work, just as 
employees who wear dress shoes or other non-safety-toe shoes do. In 
contrast, employees who wear specialized footwear such as boots 
incorporating metatarsal protection are likely to store this type of 
safety footwear at work, or carry it back and forth between work and 
home instead of wearing it. . . . OSHA does not believe that 
Congress intended for employers to have to pay for shoes of this 
type.
    For all of these reasons, OSHA has decided to continue to exempt 
nonspecialty safety shoes from the employer payment requirement. 
OSHA, however, also wants to make clear that this exemption applies 
only to non-specialty safety-toe shoes and boots, and not other 
types of specialty protective footwear. Any safety footwear that has 
additional protection or is more specialized, such as shoes with 
non-slip soles used when stripping floors, or steel-toe rubber 
boots, is subject to the employer payment requirements of this 
standard. Put simply, the exempted footwear provides the protection 
of an ordinary safety-toe shoe or boot, while footwear with 
additional safety attributes beyond this (e.g., shoes and boots with 
special soles) fall under the employer payment requirement. [72 FR 
64348]

    FR and arc-rated clothing is not ``everyday clothing'' or 
``ordinary clothing . . . used solely for protection from weather'' as 
OSHA used those terms in the exemptions from the PPE-payment rule. This 
is not clothing that employees would purchase on their own to wear 
every day or to wear for protection against the weather. Although 
employees could wear it off the job, FR and arc-rated clothing command 
a premium above the price of normal clothing. OSHA estimates that a 
single set of flame-resistant apparel costs $191.75, on average. (See 
Section VI, Final Economic Analysis and Regulatory Flexibility 
Analysis, later in the preamble.) OSHA estimates that normal work 
clothing would cost half that amount. Winter-weather gear that is 
flame-resistant or arc-rated commands a greater premium. Evidence in 
the record indicates that non-FR winter wear may cost about $60 to 
$120, whereas similar FR winter wear could cost as much as $300 (Tr. 
1024-1026).
    In addition, FR and arc-rated clothing provides more than 
incidental protection. As explained earlier, manufacturers design these 
garments specifically to protect against clothing ignition and incident 
heat energy. Consequently, OSHA determined that the rationale for 
exempting ``everyday clothing'' and ``ordinary clothing . . . used 
solely for protection from weather'' from the final PPE-payment rule 
does not apply to FR or arc-rated clothing, and OSHA is not 
interpreting these exemptions specified in the PPE-payment rule as 
covering the FR and arc-rated clothing required by final Sec.  
1926.960(g).
    FR and arc-rated clothing shares some attributes with nonspecialty 
safety-toe protective footwear. Employers normally may not keep in 
stock the range of sizes of pants, shirts, and other clothing needed to 
fit most employees,\385\ and it would not be reasonable to expect 
employers to stock the array and variety of clothing necessary to 
properly and comfortably fit most individuals. In addition, employees 
who work in FR or arc-rated clothing may sometimes wear it to and from 
work, just like employees who wear ordinary clothing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \385\ There are ways to provide FR and arc-rated clothing to 
employees that do not require the employer to maintain stocks of 
clothing, including using a clothing rental or uniform service and 
providing a clothing allowance so that employees can purchase their 
own clothing (Tr. 1134).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On the other hand, FR and arc-rated clothing does not have some of 
the other characteristics that formed the basis of OSHA's decision to 
exempt nonspecialty safety-toe protective footwear from PPE-payment 
requirements. FR clothing is not exempt from requirements for employer 
payment in other workplaces, such as steel plants, where an OSHA 
standard, such as Sec.  1910.132(a), requires it. Furthermore, 
employers can sanitize this clothing easily for use by other employees. 
In fact, evidence in the record indicates that some employers currently 
use uniform-supply companies to provide and launder FR and arc-rated 
clothing (Ex. 0230). In addition, employers can purchase arc-rated 
clothing in a wide variety of ratings and are in a better position to 
make purchasing decisions with respect to arc rating than employees, 
which is not true of nonspecialty safety-toe protective footwear. OSHA 
concludes that FR and arc-rated clothing do not have all the attributes 
on which the Agency based its rationale for exempting nonspecialty 
safety-toe protective footwear; and, therefore, OSHA is not granting a 
similar exemption from the employer payment requirements for this 
clothing.
    Moreover, OSHA believes that the record in this rulemaking 
demonstrates that, similar to most OSHA requirements for PPE, employee 
safety will significantly benefit from a requirement that employers 
provide FR and arc-rated clothing at no cost to employees. Employers 
generally need to ensure that the clothing worn by

[[Page 20500]]

employees has an arc rating at least as high as the employer's 
incident-energy estimates. Selecting the proper clothing sometimes will 
involve determining the rating of an entire clothing system; such a 
determination is likely beyond the capability of individual employees, 
but is within an employer's capability. For example, Dr. Thomas Neal 
testified:

    [T]he only sure way [to obtain a rating for a layered clothing 
system] is to measure the arc rating for the system. [I]t's not [a] 
situation where you could have an arc rating for three different 
layers that you put those on top of each other, just add them 
together. That doesn't work. [Tr. 500]

In addition, as discussed later in this section of the preamble, 
clothing maintenance can substantially impact the ability of FR and 
arc-rated clothing to protect employees. Employers are in a better 
position to make purchasing decisions based on clothing maintenance 
needs than employees.
    While considerations regarding clothing selection and maintenance 
address principally arc-rated clothing, the Agency believes that 
requiring employers to purchase arc-rated but not FR clothing would cut 
too fine a line through OSHA's rationale. It is OSHA's understanding 
that most FR clothing, especially work clothing, has an arc rating (Tr. 
545), and the Agency believes that employers will use arc-rated 
clothing (which is always flame-resistant) to meet the requirement in 
final paragraph (g)(4) for FR clothing. In this regard, it seems 
unlikely that employers will purchase one set of clothing to meet final 
paragraph (g)(4) and a different set of clothing to meet final 
paragraph (g)(5).
    Some employers recommended that OSHA exempt clothing of various 
types, or having a specified minimum arc rating, from any requirement 
that employers pay for FR or arc-rated clothing. (See, for example, 
Exs. 0125, 0149, 0167; Tr. 295-297.) For instance, Mr. Ward Andrews 
with Wilson Construction recommended that employees come to the job in 
a minimum level of protective clothing and that employers pay for any 
higher level of protection needed for a particular exposure (Tr. 295-
297). He justified his recommendation as follows:

    [I]t is our belief that journeyman linemen should come to work 
with basic tools. And we believe a Level one FR garment would be a 
basic tool to do his everyday task.
    [O]ur position is that they should come to work with those basic 
tools. And that is the minimum level one protection for the average 
distributional circuit here in America.
* * * * *
    So we agree that at level one, basic [attire] should be 
clothing, as part of their job requirement, to step on. And then as 
they associate a job with hazards, and a higher level of protection 
needs to be provided, then surely that contractor should provide 
those additional levels.
    [W]e look [at] a journeyman lineman today, and we realize that 
he brings in his climbing belt, his positioning belt, his skid, his 
line boots. I believe that his positioning belt falls under--his 
line belt is a positioning belt, which is considered personal 
protective equipment. They provide that as tool that they bring to 
the job. So once again, I think that's evidence to--the same thing 
as a shirt, a very basic component that they should wear as 
journeyman lineman.
    They provide their own raingear. They provide their own clothing 
right now. Your rule as proposed would say the most outer garment 
should be FR resistant. I believe that these basic tools that they 
now require, they should still provide, and you should give them 
time to buy FR raingear and clothes. [Tr. 295-297]

    This argument is identical to the argument made for tools of the 
trade. In the PPE-payment rulemaking, OSHA rejected that argument for 
tools of the trade, as described earlier, and the Agency rejects this 
argument as it applies to FR and arc-rated clothing for the same 
reasons.
    For the foregoing reasons, OSHA determined that employers must 
provide FR and arc-rated clothing at no cost to employees, and OSHA is 
not exempting this protective clothing from the PPE-payment rule. The 
requirements in Sec. Sec.  1910.132(h) and 1926.95(d) apply to FR and 
arc-rated clothing; and, therefore, OSHA is not adding PPE-payment 
provisions to Sec.  1910.269 or Subpart V.\386\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \386\ OSHA does not consider the FR and arc-rated clothing 
required by this final rule to be the type of everyday or ordinary 
clothing exempted from the PPE-payment rules in Sec. Sec.  1910.132 
and 1926.95.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some employees performing work covered by this final rule may 
already own FR or arc-rated clothing. The PPE-payment requirements in 
Sec. Sec.  1910.132(h)(6) and 1926.95(d)(6) provide that, when an 
employee provides adequate protective equipment that he or she owns, 
the employer may allow the employee to use it and need not reimburse 
the employee for the equipment. However, those provisions also prohibit 
the employer from requiring an employee to provide or pay for his or 
her own PPE, unless the PPE-payment requirement exempts the PPE. 
Accordingly, paragraph (h)(6) of Sec.  1910.132 and paragraph (d)(6) of 
Sec.  1926.95 apply to the FR and arc-rated clothing required by this 
final rule.
    Maintenance of FR and arc-rated clothing. Some rulemaking 
participants stressed the importance of proper maintenance of the FR 
and arc-rated clothing required by the standard (Exs. 0130, 0186, 0325; 
Tr. 830-831, 834-839). For example, NIOSH stated that ``[c]lothing 
maintenance is required for arc-rated FR clothing to provide continued 
protection at its rated arc thermal performance value'' (Ex. 0130). Mr. 
Eric Frumin with UNITE HERE testified:

    Regarding the FR uniform programs in which the employees wash 
the garments themselves, there are number of factors that make it 
difficult or impossible for employees themselves to preserve the FR 
characteristics of the garments, contamination of the garment, 
inadequate training about the proper care of the garment, how do you 
maintain the physical integrity of it, the proper materials to use 
for repairing defects, proper laundering techniques, what kinds of 
cleaning agents or bleaching agents to avoid and so forth.
    And of course maintaining a proper number of garments to be 
available so that workers always have them. . . .
    A number of these problems are mentioned in the standard, [ASTM] 
1449 and recommends the use of professional laundering services. 
Likewise NIOSH in its comments for this hearing said, ``The emphasis 
that manufacturers place on proper laundering to maintain the FR 
characteristics of their garment suggests the need for professional 
laundering.'' So these are important things for OSHA to be mindful 
of as far as possibly assur[ing] that quality of the FR garments is 
maintained even when employees are washing the garments themselves.
    Now I would like to address that question of maintenance of 
consistent high quality laundering of FR clothing. Employers have a 
critical role to play here and that's envisioned in the ASTM 
standard. Likewise, NFPA 70E talks about the need specifically for 
careful inspection of clothing and kinds of interferences, 
contamination, damage and takes the position that defective clothing 
shall not be used. Very important. [Tr. 835-836]

Mr. Frumin cited two examples of a contract uniform service that failed 
to properly maintain the FR clothing they serviced (Tr. 836-838). Mr. 
John Devlin with the Utility Workers Union of America also described 
examples of inadequate maintenance of FR clothing:

This shirt was sent in several times and it continually came back 
with a hole that was never repaired even though it was requested 
twice. These pants were sent out twice with the repair tag for the 
frayed bottoms of the trousers to be either shortened or repaired in 
some manner. The answer that Cintas did was they sent back a pair of 
new trousers. The only problem there was no belt loops. [Tr. 821]

Mr. Frumin urged OSHA to ``require . . . employers to obtain with each 
delivery a certification from their suppliers that the correct number 
of garments has been provided, that they

[[Page 20501]]

are free of defects and contamination that could compromise the FR 
protection'' (Tr. 838).
    The record indicates that there are a variety of methods currently 
in use to maintain FR and arc-rated clothing. Some employers have their 
employees launder and maintain this clothing. (See, for example, Tr. 
305-306, 1192--1193.) Other employers hire laundering or uniform 
services to perform those functions. (See, for example, Tr. 388, 821.) 
OSHA stresses that Sec. Sec.  1910.132(a) and (b) and 1926.95(a) and 
(b) require employers to properly maintain FR and arc-rated clothing 
required by this final rule. These provisions make PPE maintenance the 
responsibility of employers, not employees. The Agency is declining to 
adopt Mr. Frumin's suggestion to require employers to have suppliers 
certify that each delivery of FR clothing is free of defects and 
contamination because OSHA believes that it is the employer's 
responsibility to ensure proper maintenance of PPE. There are ways of 
ensuring proper maintenance of FR and arc-rated clothing that do not 
rely on the certification of a supplier. For example, employers can 
inspect this clothing before accepting it, and they can return it to 
the supplier if they find defects or contaminants on the clothing. In 
any event, the responsibility for maintaining PPE rests squarely with 
the employer under existing OSHA standards.
    The Agency is not prohibiting home laundering of FR and arc-rated 
clothing. However, to comply with Sec.  1910.132 or Sec.  1926.95, 
employers cannot simply instruct employees to follow manufacturers' 
instructions.\387\ If employers rely on home laundering of the 
clothing, they must train their employees in proper laundering 
procedures and techniques, and employers must inspect the clothing on a 
regular basis to ensure that it is not in need of repair or 
replacement. Evidence in the record indicates that some employers 
already are performing these functions. (See, for example, Tr. 1193.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \387\ See also a memorandum from Richard E. Fairfax, Director, 
Directorate of Enforcement Programs, and Steven Witt, Director, 
Directorate of Cooperative and State Programs, dated March 19, 2010, 
detailing OSHA's enforcement policy for flame-resistant clothing in 
oil and gas drilling, well servicing, and production-related 
operations https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=INTERPRETATIONS&p_id=27296.
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    Protecting employees from flying debris from electric arcs. Two 
rulemaking participants recommended that OSHA require protection from 
flying debris that results from electric arcs (Exs. 0340, 0342, 0378; 
Tr. 253-268, 274-283). Mr. Nestor Kolcio with 2K Consultants argued 
that a substantial number of injuries result from the flying debris, 
which he called ``fragmentation'' or ``shrapnel,'' released in an 
electric arc-flash incident (Ex. 0342). Using OSHA's preliminary 
regulatory analysis as a baseline, he estimated that 17 injuries from 
flying debris occur annually in work covered by the final rule (id.). 
He stated that these injuries result from work activities such as 
pulling fuses and end caps, working on dead-front transformers, 
installing lightning arresters, and operating load-break switches 
(id.). Mr. Jim Stillwagon with Gary Guard described injuries that 
occurred from flying debris caused by electric arcs, including an eye 
injury and a chest injury in which debris ``settled in the [worker's] 
aort[ic] valve'' (Tr. 276-280). Mr. Kolcio and Mr. Stillwagon 
recommended that OSHA require protection, in the form of shields on 
live-line tools, from injuries caused by flying debris resulting from 
electric arcs that occur when employees are using live-line tools (Tr. 
268, 274-275). Mr. Kolcio also noted that the existence of IEEE and 
ASTM standards covering these shields, as well as various scientific 
papers, indicated the need for such protection (Tr. 265-267).
    OSHA agrees with Messrs. Kolcio and Stillwagon that electric arcs 
pose hazards in addition to the thermal hazards addressed by the final 
rule. Dr. Mary Capelli-Schellpfeffer testified that electric arcs can 
result in ``sprayed or blown hot or melting installation elements, 
moved by the mechanical forces in the electric arc event'' (Tr. 187). 
Also, NFPA 70E-2004 warned that ``[d]ue to the explosive effect of some 
arc events, physical trauma injuries could occur'' (Ex. 0134; emphasis 
added).\388\ OSHA expects that the hazard analysis required by 
paragraph (g)(1) in the final rule will identify nonthermal hazards, 
including physical trauma hazards posed by flying debris, associated 
with employee exposure to electric arcs. Although the final rule does 
not address these hazards, OSHA's existing general PPE requirements, 
for example, Sec. Sec.  1910.132 and 1926.95, require employers to 
address them. Those standards require employers to provide shields and 
barriers necessary to protect employees from physical trauma hazards. 
However, as noted by NFPA 70E, not all arc events pose physical trauma 
hazards from flying debris; therefore, this protection will not always 
be necessary, and the Agency concludes that this final rule does not 
have to address these hazards further.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \388\ NFPA 70E-2012 contains the same warning in Informational 
Note No. 1 to Section 130.7(A).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Compliance deadlines for certain provisions in paragraph (g). The 
final rule includes a new paragraph (g)(6) setting a compliance 
deadline of January 1, 2015, for the requirement in paragraph (g)(2) 
that the employer make reasonable estimates of incident energy and a 
compliance deadline of April 1, 2015, for: (1) the requirement in 
paragraph (g)(4)(iv) that the employer ensure that the outer layer of 
clothing worn by an employee is flame-resistant when the estimated 
incident heat energy exceeds 2.0 cal/cm\2\ and (2) the requirement in 
paragraph (g)(5) that the employer ensure that each employee exposed to 
hazards from electric arcs wears the necessary arc-rated protection. 
These deadlines are described more fully in Section XII, Dates, later 
in this preamble.
    Fuse handling, covered conductors, non-current-carrying metal 
parts, and opening circuits under load. The remaining provisions in 
final Sec.  1926.960 deal with handling fuses, covered (noninsulated) 
conductors, non-current-carrying metal parts, and opening and closing 
circuits under load. To protect employees from contacting energized 
parts, paragraph (h) of final Sec.  1926.960 requires employers to 
ensure that employees installing and removing fuses use tools or gloves 
rated for the appropriate voltage if one or both terminals are 
energized at over 300 volts or if exposed parts are energized at more 
than 50 volts. When an expulsion fuse operates on a fault or overload, 
the arc from the fault current reacts with an agent in the tube. This 
reaction produces hot gas that blasts the arc through the fuse tube 
vent or vents, and with it any loose material in its path. The arc 
blast or particles blown by the blast could injure employees' eyes. 
Employers must ensure that employees do not install or remove such 
fuses using rubber insulating gloves alone. Therefore, final paragraph 
(h) also requires employees installing or removing expulsion-type fuses 
with one or both terminals energized at more than 300 volts to wear eye 
protection, use a tool rated for the voltage, and be clear of the fuse 
barrel's exhaust path. (See, also, the discussion of protection from 
flying debris under the summary and explanation for paragraph (g) of 
the final rule earlier in this section of the preamble.) OSHA adopted 
this paragraph, which has no counterpart in existing Subpart V, from 
existing Sec.  1910.269(l)(7).
    Proposed paragraph (h) provided that employees use eye protection 
only during expulsion fuse installation. Mr.

[[Page 20502]]

Nestor Kolcio presented data indicating that employees sustained 
injuries associated with electric arcs when the employees were 
removing, as well as installing, fuses or end caps (Ex. 0342). As noted 
earlier, Mr. Kolcio recommended that the standard require employees to 
be protected from flying debris associated with electric arcs.
    Based on Mr. Kolcio's data, OSHA concludes that protection from the 
material expelled from expulsion-type fuses is necessary for employees 
removing, as well as installing, them. Therefore, final paragraph (h) 
requires the same protection for employees removing expulsion-type 
fuses as for employees installing such fuses.
    The Virginia, Maryland and Delaware Association of Electric 
Cooperatives recommended that this paragraph include the term ``live-
line tool'' to make it clear that the provision was not requiring a 
special tool designed specifically for handling fuses (Ex. 0175).
    A live-line tool is one type of insulated tool. Paragraph (h) of 
the final rule permits fuse handling with any type of insulated tool, 
including a live-line tool. This provision was clear in the proposed 
rule. Therefore, OSHA is not adopting the recommendation from the 
Virginia, Maryland and Delaware Association of Electric Cooperatives.
    Final paragraph (i) explains that the requirements of Sec.  
1926.960 that pertain to the hazards of exposed live parts also apply 
when employees perform work in proximity to covered (noninsulated) 
conductors. That is, the final standard treats covered conductors as 
uninsulated. (See the definition of ``covered conductor'' in final 
Sec.  1926.968.) The covering on this type of wire protects the 
conductor from the weather, but does not provide adequate insulating 
value. OSHA took this provision, which has no counterpart in existing 
Subpart V, from existing Sec.  1910.269(l)(8). The Agency received no 
comments on this provision and is adopting it with only editorial 
changes from the proposal.
    Final paragraph (j) requires that non-current-carrying metal parts 
of equipment or devices be treated as energized at the highest voltage 
to which those parts are exposed unless the employer inspects the 
installation and determines that the parts are grounded. Grounding 
these parts, whether by permanent grounds or by the installation of 
temporary grounds, provides protection against ground faults and 
minimizes the possibility that non-current-carrying metal parts of 
equipment and devices will become energized. OSHA based this 
requirement, which has no counterpart in existing Subpart V, on 
existing Sec.  1910.269(l)(9). OSHA received no comments on this 
provision and is adopting it in the final rule without substantive 
change from the proposal.
    Paragraph (k) in the proposed rule provided that employers ensure 
the use of devices designed to interrupt the current involved to open 
circuits under load conditions. This proposed requirement had no 
counterpart in existing Subpart V; OSHA adopted it from existing Sec.  
1910.269(l)(10).
    The Ameren Corporation requested that OSHA clarify that this 
provision only applies to switches and breakers (Ex. 0209). Ameren 
believed that this interpretation was consistent with the 1994 
rulemaking record for existing Sec.  1910.269(l)(10) (id.). In that 
rulemaking, OSHA explained the rationale for this provision as follows:

    The National Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEMA) urged 
OSHA to add a requirement for opening circuits under load only with 
devices intended to interrupt current (Ex. 3-81). Edison Electric 
Institute recommended adoption of a similar requirement (Ex. 28). 
The Agency agrees with EEI and NEMA that it is hazardous to open a 
circuit with a device that is not designed to interrupt current if 
that circuit is carrying current. Non-load-break switches used to 
open a circuit while it is carrying load current could fail 
catastrophically, severely injuring or killing any nearby employee. 
Therefore, OSHA has adopted a requirement that devices used to open 
circuits under load conditions be designed to interrupt the current 
involved . . . . [59 FR 4390]

    The Agency disagrees with Ameren that this provision applies only 
to switches and circuit breakers. The preamble to the 1994 rulemaking 
mentioned non-load-break switches as an example of a type of device 
that could fail catastrophically. However, the rationale and the rule 
apply similarly to any device that is not capable of interrupting load 
current. In addition, a similar provision in the 2002 NESC, quoted in 
the next paragraph, applies to ``switches, circuit breakers, or other 
devices.'' The OSHA provision applies to other devices in addition to 
switches and circuit breakers. Therefore, OSHA is not adopting the 
change requested by Ameren.
    IBEW recommended that OSHA expand proposed paragraph (k) to cover 
devices used to pick up load or close circuits (Ex. 0230). Rule 443E of 
the 2002 NESC \389\ supports IBEW's position; the NESC provision 
addresses the opening and closing of circuits under load as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \389\ The 2012 NESC contains the same requirement in Rule 443E.

    When equipment or lines are to be disconnected from any source 
of electric energy for the protection of employees, the switches, 
circuit breakers, or other devices designated and designed for 
operation under the load involved at sectionalizing points shall be 
opened or disconnected first. When re-energizing, the procedure 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
shall be reversed. [Ex. 0077]

    OSHA recognizes that closing a circuit onto a load poses the same 
hazards as opening a circuit under load. In either case, heavy current 
can cause a device to fail if the design of that device is not such 
that it can safely interrupt or pick up load current. Therefore, OSHA 
is adopting IBEW's recommendation by adding a new paragraph (k)(2), 
that reads as follows: ``The employer shall ensure that devices used by 
employees to close circuits under load conditions are designed to 
safely carry the current involved.'' OSHA is adopting proposed 
paragraph (k) without substantive change as paragraph (k)(1) in the 
final rule.
12. Section 1926.961, Deenergizing Lines and Equipment for Employee 
Protection
    Section 1926.961 of the final rule addresses the deenergizing of 
electric transmission and distribution lines and equipment for the 
protection of employees. Transmission and distribution systems are 
different from other energy systems found in general industry or in the 
electric utility industry. The hazardous energy control methods for 
these systems are necessarily different from the methods covered under 
the general industry standard on the control of hazardous energy 
sources (Sec.  1910.147). As explained in the preamble to the 1994 
final rule on existing Sec.  1910.269, electric utilities install 
transmission and distribution lines and equipment outdoors; 
consequently, these lines and equipment are subject to reenergization 
by means other than normal energy sources (59 FR 4390). For example, 
lightning can strike a line and energize a deenergized conductor, or 
unknown cogeneration sources not under the control of the employer can 
energize a line. Additionally, some deenergized transmission and 
distribution lines are subject to reenergization by induced voltage 
from nearby energized conductors or by contact with other energized 
sources of electrical energy. Another difference is that energy control 
devices often are remote from the worksite and are frequently under the 
centralized control of a system operator.

[[Page 20503]]

    For these reasons, OSHA is adopting requirements for the control of 
hazardous energy sources related to transmission and distribution 
systems. This is the same approach used in existing Sec.  1910.269. In 
this regard, OSHA developed the requirements proposed in Sec.  1926.961 
from existing Sec.  1910.269(m). Existing Subpart V also contains 
procedures for deenergizing transmission and distribution 
installations. OSHA discusses the differences between existing Sec.  
1926.950(b)(2) and (d) and final Sec.  1926.961 later in this preamble.
    OSHA is promulgating paragraph (a) of the final rule without change 
from the proposal. Final paragraph (a) describes the application of 
Sec.  1926.961 and explains that conductors and equipment that have not 
been deenergized under the procedures specified by Sec.  1926.961 have 
to be treated as energized.
    Ms. Susan O'Connor with Siemens Power Generation recommended that 
OSHA require that live parts be deenergized ``unless the employer can 
demonstrate that deenergizing introduces additional or increased 
hazards or is infeasible due to equipment design or operational 
limitations'' (Ex. 0163).
    It is true that other OSHA standards that protect employees from 
hazardous energy (such as the general industry lockout-tagout standard 
at Sec.  1910.147 and the electrical lockout and tagging requirements 
at Sec.  1910.333(a)(1) and (b)(2)) generally require employers to 
deenergize energy sources. OSHA nevertheless rejects Ms. O'Connor's 
recommendation because there is insufficient information in the record 
to determine whether the recommendation is economically or 
technologically feasible. First, Ms. O'Conner did not include 
information in her comment on whether deenergizing transmission and 
distribution lines and equipment would be economically and 
technologically feasible. Second, Federal and local government agencies 
regulate the reliability of electric power systems, thereby limiting 
electric utilities' ability to deenergize transmission and distribution 
circuits.\390\ Finally, the record in this rulemaking demonstrates 
that: (1) Electric utilities and their contractors routinely work on 
energized lines and equipment and (2) deenergizing transmission and 
distribution circuits can involve significant cost and practicability 
issues. (See, for example, Exs. 0573.1, 0575.1.) For instance, EEI 
stated that ``[p]lanning and scheduling for an outage [on a 
transmission circuit] can require as little as 1 month and 3 day 
notification to as long as 6 months and 3 days depending on the outage 
length'' (Ex. 0575.1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \390\ For example, section 215 of the Federal Power Act, 16 
U.S.C. 824o, requires a Federal Energy Regulatory Commission-
certified Electric Reliability Organization to develop mandatory and 
enforceable reliability standards, which are subject to review and 
approval by the Commission. Electric utilities ultimately must meet 
those reliability standards. (See also 18 CFR Part 40; Ex. 0545.1.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some systems are under the direction of a central system operator 
who controls all switching operations. Other systems (mostly 
distribution installations) are not under any centralized control. 
Electric utilities energize and deenergize these systems in the field 
without the direct intervention of a system operator. Paragraph (b)(1) 
of the final rule states that employers must designate one employee in 
the crew as being in charge of the clearance and must comply with all 
of the requirements of paragraph (c) if a system operator is in charge 
of the lines and equipment and of their means of disconnection. 
(Paragraph (c), which OSHA discusses in detail later, sets procedures 
that employers must follow when deenergizing lines and equipment.) OSHA 
is adopting final paragraph (b)(1) as proposed with one clarification. 
This provision in the final rule makes clear that the employer must 
designate the employee in charge of the clearance. Final paragraph 
(c)(1) requires the ``designated'' employee in charge to request the 
clearance, and final paragraph (b)(2) (described in the next paragraph 
in this preamble) requires the employer to designate the employee in 
charge when there is no system operator. OSHA included an explicit 
requirement in final paragraph (b)(1) that the employer designate the 
employee in charge when there is a system operator to clarify that 
designating the employee in charge is the employer's responsibility 
whether or not there is a system operator.
    Final paragraph (b)(2), which is also being adopted without 
substantive change from the proposal, sets requirements for crews 
working on lines or equipment that are not under the control of a 
system operator.\391\ When final paragraph (b)(2) applies, the employer 
must designate one employee on the crew to be in charge of the 
clearance. In this case, final paragraph (b)(2) provides that, except 
as provided in final paragraph (b)(3), all of the requirements in final 
paragraph (c) apply and provides that the employee in charge of the 
clearance perform the functions that the system operator would 
otherwise perform.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \391\ If there are multiple circuits involved with some lines or 
equipment under the control of a system operator and the others not 
under system-operator control, the lines or equipment that are under 
the control of a system operator fall under paragraph (b)(1), and 
the ones that are not under such control fall under paragraph 
(b)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Final paragraph (b)(3) exempts a portion of the requirements of 
final paragraph (c) from applying to work performed by a single crew of 
employees if the means of disconnection of the lines and equipment are 
accessible and visible to, and under the sole control of, the employee 
in charge of the clearance. The provisions of final paragraph (c) that 
do not apply are those relating to: (1) Requesting the system operator 
to deenergize the lines and equipment (final paragraph (c)(1)), (2) 
automatic and remote control of the lines (final paragraph (c)(3)), and 
(3) the wording on tags (final paragraph (c)(5)). Final paragraph 
(b)(3) also provides that employers need not use the tags required by 
the remaining provisions of final paragraph (c).\392\ It is not 
necessary to request the system operator to deenergize the lines or 
equipment because he or she would not be in control of the 
disconnecting means for the lines or equipment. When paragraph (b)(3) 
applies, employers do not need tags for the protection of the crew 
because only one person would be in charge of the clearance for the 
crew, and the means of disconnection for the lines or equipment would 
be accessible and visible to, and under the control of, that person. 
Finally, OSHA exempted the provision addressing remote and automatic 
switching of lines and equipment because, again, the means of 
disconnection must be accessible and visible to, and under the sole 
control of, the employee in charge of the clearance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \392\ The proposed rule was similar, except that it exempted an 
additional provision, proposed paragraph (c)(11), which addressed 
the removal of tags. In the final rule, the corresponding provision, 
in paragraph (c)(12), clarifies that ``[n]o one may remove tags 
without the release of the associated clearance as specified under 
paragraphs (c)(10) and (c)(11) of this section.'' Even though final 
paragraph (b)(3) does not require tags, when that paragraph applies, 
final paragraph (c)(12) should not be exempted. It is important that 
members of a crew not remove tags that are placed for the protection 
of other crews.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Final paragraph (b)(4) addresses work situations in which a group 
of employees consists of several ``crews'' of employees working on the 
same lines or equipment. Final paragraph (b)(4)(i) provides that 
employers may treat these crews as a single crew when they are under 
the direction of a single employee in charge of the clearance for all 
of the crews and they are working in a coordinated manner to accomplish 
a task on the same lines or equipment. In such cases, the employer must 
ensure

[[Page 20504]]

that employees coordinate all operations that could energize or 
deenergize a circuit through a single employee in charge, as required 
in final paragraphs (b) and (c). OSHA notes that, if paragraph 
(b)(4)(i) does not apply, employers must treat the crews as independent 
crews (see the discussion of final paragraph (b)(4)(ii) in the 
following paragraph), and each independent crew must have an employee 
in charge, as required by final paragraphs (b) and (c).\393\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \393\ OSHA notes that this interpretation of the word ``crew'' 
applies only to Sec.  1926.961(b)(3). The interpretation does not 
apply to other provisions in the final rule addressing the work of 
two or more crews.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Final paragraph (b)(4)(ii) provides for the situation in which more 
than one independent crew is working on the same line or equipment. 
Under the final rule, in such circumstances: (1) Each crew must follow 
separately the steps outlined in final paragraph (c); and, (2) if there 
is no system operator in charge of the lines or equipment, each crew 
must have separate tags and coordinate deenergizing and reenergizing 
the lines and equipment with the other crews. The purpose of the 
provision is to ensure that a group of workers does not make faulty 
assumptions about what steps another group took or will take to 
deenergize and reenergize lines or equipment.
    OSHA adopted the provisions in final paragraph (b)(4)(ii), which 
require each independent crew to comply independently with paragraph 
(c) and each crew to coordinate deenergizing and reenergizing the lines 
or equipment with the other crews if there is no system operator in 
charge of the lines or equipment, from proposed paragraph (b)(3)(ii). 
Final paragraph (b)(4)(i), and the provision in final paragraph 
(b)(4)(ii) requiring a separate tag for each crew if there is no system 
operator in charge of the lines or equipment, are new provisions that 
were not in the proposal. OSHA is adopting the new provisions after 
examining comments on whether the standard should require each crew to 
have a separate tag.
    Several commenters argued that separate tags for each crew are 
unnecessary (Exs. 0126, 0175, 0177, 0201, 0209, 0220, 0227). These 
commenters maintained that crews working on the same circuits typically 
coordinate their activities and work under a single person with 
authority over the clearance. For example, Duke Energy stated:

    Multiple crew tagging could create confusion and will result in 
insufficient coordination between the crews. If one person is in 
charge of multiple crews in a work group, one tag is sufficient for 
that group of crews. If each crew has a person placing tags, the 
probability of error increases. If a single tag is applied, then the 
employee in charge will be responsible to verify that it is placed 
correctly. Considering multiple crews working in a coordinated 
manner as one crew for the purpose of tagging ensures that the 
employee in charge will maintain control over the entire situation. 
Multiple tagging complicates coordination of the work effort. [Ex. 
0201]

    Other commenters stated that when multiple crews work 
independently, without a single employee responsible for the clearance, 
they should use separate tags for each crew (Exs. 0186, 0210, 0212, 
0219, 0225, 0230). For example, Mr. Anthony Ahern with the Ohio Rural 
Electric Cooperatives commented:

    Every independent crew working on a line that is protected by 
the same disconnect device should have their own tag in place. This 
is particularly important in storm or emergency restoration work. It 
is simply too easy to lose track of crews, even with a system 
[operator]. If each crew tags the disconnect, then it simply is not 
allowed to be operated until all crews remove their tags. This is 
the only real way to ensure that everyone is accounted for and in 
the clear. There could be a procedure where a crew could grant 
someone else permission to remove their tag if they were a long 
distance away and it would require an extended amount of time for 
them to go back to the disconnect location. But because they did 
have a tag at the disconnect they were still contacted and accounted 
for. This should also be a requirement for line-clearance tree-
crews. Quite often they are working on clearing a section of line 
and other line crews don't know they are there. [Ex. 0186]

Southern Company commented:

    We agree that when two independent crews are working under a 
system operator that each crew should have their own clearance but a 
single tag issued by the system operator is sufficient. . . . There 
may be situations where the ``independent'' crews do not want to 
coordinate their activities. The standard should require in those 
situations that each independent crew have their own tag on the 
lines or equipment. [Ex. 0212]

    After considering these comments, OSHA concludes that employers may 
treat crews working in a coordinated manner under a single employee 
holding the clearance as a single crew. Such crews act as a single 
crew, and the Agency believes that requiring separate tags would not 
increase worker safety. OSHA drafted final paragraph (b)(4)(i) 
accordingly.
    In the 1994 Sec.  1910.269 rulemaking, the Agency explained its 
decision regarding the issue of whether employers must use separate 
tags for independent crews as follows:
    Three commenters stated that some utilities use one tag for all 
crews involved, maintaining a log to identify each crew separately . 
. . . They recommended that the standard allow this practice to 
continue.
    Paragraph (m)(3) of final 1910.269 does not require a separate 
tag for each crew (nor did paragraph (m)(3) in the proposal); it 
does require, however, separate clearances for each crew. There must 
be one employee in charge of the clearance for each crew, and the 
clearance for a crew is held by this employee. In complying with 
paragraph (m)(3)(viii), the employer must ensure that no tag is 
removed unless its associated clearances are released (paragraph 
(m)(3)(xii)) and that no action is taken at a given point of 
disconnection until all protective grounds have been removed, until 
all crews have released their clearances, until all employees are 
clear of the lines or equipment, and until all tags have been 
removed at that point of disconnection (paragraph (m)(3)(xiii)). [59 
FR 4393]

    If a system operator controls clearances, employers may use a log 
or other system to identify each crew working under a single tag (269-
Exs. 3-20, 3-27, 3-112). When each crew releases its clearance to the 
system operator, that signals to the system operator that each employee 
in the crew received notification that release of the clearance is 
pending, that all employees in the crew are in the clear, and that all 
protective grounds for the crew have been removed. (See final paragraph 
(c)(10).) The system operator cannot take action to restore power 
without the release of all clearances on a line or equipment. (See 
final paragraphs (c)(12) and (c)(13).)
    However, without a system operator, each independent crew would 
have no way of knowing the exposure status of other crews without 
separate tags. When the crews are truly independent and there is no 
system operator, there would be no way to determine that all crew 
members are clear of energized parts or that all the crew's protective 
grounds have been removed unless each crew uses a separate tag. 
Consequently, OSHA decided to adopt a requirement in final paragraph 
(b)(4)(ii) that, whenever there is no system operator, each crew must 
(1) have separate tags (this is a new provision not in the proposal) 
and (2) coordinate deenergizing and reenergizing the lines or equipment 
with other crews (OSHA adopted this provision from proposed paragraph 
(b)(3)(ii)). Final paragraph (b)(4)(ii) also carries forward the 
requirement from proposed paragraph (b)(3)(ii) that independent crews 
independently comply with Sec.  1926.961 whether or not there is a 
system operator.
    It is apparent that commenters did not completely understand the 
discussion of how the proposal treated separate

[[Page 20505]]

crews. Even though the preamble to the proposal indicated that OSHA 
would treat separate crews coordinating their activities and operating 
under a single employee in charge of the clearance as a single crew (70 
FR 34871), several commenters appeared to believe that the Agency was 
considering separate tags for each crew in such circumstances. (See, 
for example, Exs. 0175, 0201.) Therefore, the final rule provides 
separate requirements for (1) single crews working with the means of 
disconnection under the sole control of the employee in charge of the 
clearance (final paragraph (b)(3)), (2) multiple crews coordinating 
their activities with a single employee in charge of the clearance for 
all of the crews (final paragraph (b)(4)(i)), and (3) multiple crews 
operating independently (final paragraph (b)(4)(ii)). This approach 
should clarify the application of the final rule to multiple crews.
    OSHA is adding new titles to final paragraphs (b)(3) and (b)(4) to 
clarify their content. The title of final paragraph (b)(3) is ``Single 
crews working with the means of disconnection under the control of the 
employee in charge of the clearance.'' Although this provision applies 
to a single crew, OSHA limited its application to circumstances in 
which the means of disconnection is accessible and visible to, and 
under the sole control of, the employee in charge of the clearance. The 
revised title makes this limitation clear. Thus, this paragraph applies 
to a special subset of instances in which employees are working as a 
single crew; it is not generally applicable.\394\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \394\ Existing Sec.  1926.950(d) also recognizes deenergizing 
procedures that are not generally applicable. These alternative 
procedures, which apply when ``[w]hen a crew working on a line or 
equipment can clearly see that the means of disconnecting from 
electric energy are visibly open or visibly locked-out,'' require: 
(1) Guards or barriers to be installed to protect against contact 
with adjacent lines (existing paragraph (d)(2)(i)), and (2) the 
designated employee in charge, upon completion of work, to determine 
that all employees in the crew are clear and that protective grounds 
installed by the crew have been removed, and to report to the 
designated authority that all tags protecting the crew may be 
removed (existing paragraph (d)(2)(ii)). Unlike final Sec.  
1926.961, existing Sec.  1926.950(d)(2) specifies no procedures for 
deenergizing, testing, or grounding lines and equipment. OSHA 
concluded in the 1994 Sec.  1910.269 rulemaking that requirements 
for deenergizing, testing, and grounding are necessary for employee 
protection (59 FR 4390-4391). Therefore, OSHA concludes that the 
existing alternative procedures are inadequate to ensure worker 
safety.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    However, final paragraph (b)(4), pertaining to multiple crews, 
applies unconditionally, whenever more than one crew is working on the 
same lines or equipment. OSHA believes that the purpose of this 
paragraph will be clearer under its own title, ``Multiple crews.'' With 
these new titles, the final rule clearly states the purposes of the 
paragraphs and closely follows the procedures described in the 
rulemaking record.
    Paragraph (b)(5) of the final rule requires the employer to render 
inoperable any disconnecting means that are accessible to individuals 
not under the employer's control.\395\ For example, the employer must 
render inoperable a switch handle mounted at the bottom of a utility 
pole that is not on the employer's premises to ensure that the overhead 
line remains deenergized. This requirement prevents a member of the 
general public or an employee who is not under the employer's control 
(such as an employee of a contractor) from closing the switch and 
energizing the line. OSHA adopted this requirement, which has no 
counterpart in existing Subpart V, from existing Sec.  
1910.269(m)(2)(iv). OSHA received no comments on this provision, which 
was proposed as paragraph (b)(4), and is adopting it substantially as 
proposed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \395\ Note that this provision, unlike paragraph (c)(2), 
requires employers to render disconnecting means inoperable 
regardless of whether the design of the disconnecting means permits 
this capability. When the design of the disconnecting means does not 
permit this capability, employers then must install some additional 
means, such as a lockable cover, to render the disconnecting means 
inoperable when required under paragraph (b)(5).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Paragraph (c) of the final rule sets forth the exact procedure for 
deenergizing transmission and distribution lines and equipment. 
Employers must follow the procedure in the order specified in paragraph 
(c), as provided in paragraphs (b)(1) and (b)(2). Except as noted, the 
rules are consistent with existing Sec.  1926.950(d)(1), although OSHA 
took the language from existing Sec.  1910.269(m)(3).
    Paragraph (c)(1) of the final rule requires an employee to request 
the system operator to deenergize a particular section of line or 
equipment.\396\ So that control is vested in one authority, a single 
designated employee is assigned this task. The employer must assign 
this task to a single designated employee to ensure that only one 
employee is in charge of, and responsible for, the clearance for work. 
OSHA adopted this provision, which has no counterpart in existing 
Subpart V, from existing Sec.  1910.269(m)(3)(i). The designated 
employee who requests the clearance need not be in charge of other 
parts of the work; in the final rule, this designated employee is in 
charge of the clearance. He or she is responsible for requesting the 
clearance, for informing the system operator of changes in the 
clearance (such as transfer of responsibility), and for ensuring that, 
before the clearance is released, it is safe to reenergize the circuit. 
OSHA received no comments on this provision and is adopting it 
substantially as proposed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \396\ If there is no system operator in charge of the lines or 
equipment or their means of disconnection, the employer must ensure, 
pursuant to final paragraph (b)(2), that the designated employee 
performs the functions that the system operator would otherwise 
perform. This means, with respect to final paragraph (c)(1), that 
the employer must ensure that the designated employee takes 
appropriate action to deenergize the particular section of line or 
equipment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    When an employee requests a clearance in advance, the employees who 
will be performing the actual work would not necessarily have notice of 
this request and would not be in position to answer questions about the 
clearance. Therefore, if someone other than an employee at the worksite 
requests a clearance and if that clearance is in place before the 
employee arrives at the site, then that employee will need to transfer 
the clearance, pursuant to final paragraph (c)(9), to an on-site 
employee responsible for the work (such as an employee on the crew or a 
supervisor for the crew).\397\ This transfer must occur before the work 
begins so that the system operator can inform the on-site employees of 
any alterations in the clearance. The Agency believes that the employee 
holding the clearance must, after the system operator deenergizes the 
lines and equipment, serve as the point of contact in case alterations 
in the clearance, such as restrictions in the length or extent of the 
outage, are necessary.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \397\ Although the language in paragraph (c) does not state 
explicitly that the employee in charge must be at the worksite, the 
employee in charge is responsible, under paragraph (c)(10), for (1) 
notifying each employee under his or her direction of the pending 
release of the clearance, (2) ensuring that all employees on the 
crew are clear of the lines and equipment, (3) ensuring the removal 
of all protective grounds installed by the crew, (4) reporting this 
information to the system operator, and (5) releasing the clearance. 
Only an employee at the worksite can perform these functions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Paragraph (c)(2) of the final rule requires the employer to open 
all disconnecting means, such as switches, disconnectors, jumpers, and 
taps, through which electrical energy could flow to the section of line 
or equipment. This provision also requires the employer to render the 
disconnecting means inoperable if the design of the device permits. For 
example, the employer could detach the removable handle of a switch. 
The final rule also requires that the disconnecting means

[[Page 20506]]

be tagged to indicate that employees are at work.
    This paragraph ensures the disconnection of lines and equipment 
from their sources of supply and protects employees against the 
accidental reclosing of the switches. This rule requires the 
disconnection of known sources of electric energy only. Employers 
control hazards related to the presence of unexpected energy sources by 
testing for voltage and grounding the circuit, as required by 
paragraphs (c)(6) and (c)(7), respectively (see the discussion of these 
provisions later in this section of the preamble).
    OSHA adopted paragraph (c)(2) of the final rule from existing Sec.  
1910.269(m)(3)(ii). Existing Subpart V has comparable requirements in 
Sec.  1926.950(d)(1)(i), (d)(1)(ii)(a), and (d)(1)(ii)(b). The existing 
provisions require: (1) The employer to identify and isolate the line 
or equipment from sources of energy (paragraph (d)(1)(i)), and (2) each 
designated employee in charge to notify and assure the employees on the 
crew that all disconnecting means have been opened and tagged 
(paragraphs (d)(1)(ii)(a) and (d)(1)(ii)(b)). OSHA believes that the 
language in the final rule accurately reflects the steps taken by 
employers to deenergize lines and equipment. OSHA received no comments 
on this provision and is adopting it substantially as proposed.
    Paragraph (c)(3) of the final rule requires the tagging of 
automatically and remotely controlled switches. Employers also must 
render inoperable an automatically or remotely controlled switch if the 
design of the switch allows for it to be made inoperable. This 
provision, which OSHA adopted from existing Sec.  1910.269(m)(3)(iii), 
protects employees from injuries resulting from the automatic operation 
of such switches. Existing Subpart V contains an equivalent requirement 
in Sec. Sec.  1926.950(d)(1)(ii)(b) and (d)(1)(ii)(c). OSHA received no 
comments on this provision and is adopting it substantially as 
proposed.
    The final rule contains a new exemption from the tagging 
requirements of final paragraphs (c)(2) and (c)(3) that was not in the 
proposal. OSHA included this exemption in the final rule as paragraph 
(c)(4).
    Consolidated Edison Company of New York and EEI noted that the 
compliance directive for existing Sec.  1910.269, CPL 02-01-038, 
``Enforcement of the Electric Power Generation, Transmission, and 
Distribution Standard'' (June 18, 2003, originally CPL 2-1.38D; 
hereafter, ``CPL 02-01-038'') addressed specific conditions under which 
OSHA considered it a de minimis condition to leave network protectors 
used to isolate network distribution lines from voltage untagged (Exs. 
0157, 0227; Tr. 1111-1118). The two organizations requested that the 
Agency incorporate the directive's language on network protectors into 
the final rule. Consolidated Edison expressed this view as follows:

    Under normal conditions, switches at the substation are used to 
deenergize the primary conductors to the distribution transformers. 
When the primary conductors become deenergized, . . . network 
protectors operate to disconnect the secondary side of the 
transformers and to prevent back feed from energizing the primary 
conductors. The network protectors are automatic devices and are not 
normally opened or closed manually.
    OSHA inserted language into the Compliance Directive and made 
not tagging a network protector to its associated network 
transformer for work on the primary feeder . . . a ``de minimis'' 
violation if certain conditions were met. . . We are requesting that 
[an exception for network protectors be included in the standard] 
and that the ``de minimis'' violation be eliminated. We recommend 
the following language be included in the 269 standard:
    ``Network feeders utilizing low voltage network protectors, or 
similarly designed devices, are considered isolated from all network 
sources of supply when the associated feeder is removed from service 
at the source station and verified as being de-energized, and 
provided that the design of the protectors prevent operation of the 
device when the supply feeder is de-energized.'' [Ex. 0157]

    OSHA did not incorporate the recommended exemption into the 
proposal because the Agency believed that the conditions permitted by 
the directive were applicable to a single company, Consolidated Edison. 
OSHA continues to believe that the preferred approach to protect 
employees is to tag network protectors. However, the Agency's rationale 
for considering it a de minimis condition not to tag network protectors 
in certain circumstances remains viable. The directive describes the 
operation of network protectors, the circumstances necessary for a de 
minimis condition, and the Agency's rationale as follows:

    Paragraph (m)(3)(ii) of [existing] Sec.  1910.269 requires all 
switches, disconnectors, jumpers, taps, and other means through 
which known sources of electric energy may be supplied to the 
particular lines and equipment to be deenergized to be opened and 
tagged. Paragraph (m)(3)(iii) requires automatically and remotely 
controlled switches to be tagged at the point of control.
    An AC network system consists of feeders, step-down 
transformers, automatic reverse-current trip breakers called network 
protectors, and the network grid of street mains. The network grid 
is made up of a number of single conductor cables tied together at 
street intersections to form a solid grid over the area they serve. 
This grid is typically energized at 120/208 volts from the secondary 
windings of the distribution transformers serving a particular area.
    A network protector, placed between the secondary side of the 
transformer and the secondary mains, is provided for each 
transformer. The primary windings of the transformer are connected 
to a feeder cable that is energized from a substation at voltages 
ranging from 13 to 33 kilovolts. Each feeder cable is connected to 
the substation through an automatic circuit breaker. . .
    Network protectors are placed between the network transformer 
and the secondary network to protect against reverse power flow 
through the network transformer into the supply feeders. Reverse 
power protection is necessary because fault current would continue 
to flow into a short circuit in a network transformer or primary 
feeder. Backfeed from the network grid would continue to flow into 
the fault even after the primary feeder circuit breaker trips. The 
other primary feeders would continue to supply power to their 
network transformers, which are interconnected with the faulted 
circuit through the network grid.
    Under normal conditions, switches at the substation are used to 
deenergize the primary conductors to the distribution transformers. 
When the primary conductors become deenergized, the network 
protectors operate to disconnect the secondary side of the 
transformers and to prevent backfeed from energizing the primary 
conductors. The network protectors are automatic devices and are not 
normally opened or closed manually.
    Not tagging a network protector to its associated network 
transformer for work on the primary feeder is considered a de 
minimis violation of Sec.  1910.269(m)(3)(ii) under the following 
conditions:
    a. The line is deenergized as otherwise required by paragraph 
(m)(3)(ii);
    b. Any switches or disconnecting means (other than network 
protectors) used to deenergize the line are tagged as required by 
paragraph (m)(3)(ii);
    c. The line is tested to ensure that it is deenergized as 
required by paragraph (m)(3)(v);
    d. Grounds are installed as required by paragraph (m)(3)(vi);
    e. The network protectors are maintained so that they will 
immediately trip open if closed when a primary conductor is 
deenergized;
    f. The network protector cannot be manually placed in a closed 
position without the use of tools, and any manual override position 
must be blocked, locked, or otherwise disabled; and
    g. The employer has procedures for manually overriding the 
network protector that incorporates provisions for ensuring that the 
primary conductors are energized before the protector is placed in a 
closed position and for determining if the line is deenergized for 
the protection of employees working on the line. [CPL 02-01-038; 
emphasis included in original]


[[Page 20507]]


Figure 12 is a one-line diagram from the directive showing network 
protectors, the primary conductors (primary voltage feeder), and the 
extent of the deenergized area for lines connected to the network 
protectors.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR11AP14.016

    OSHA decided to include in the final rule a provision that 
duplicates the exempted conditions specified in the directive. In 
issuing the directive, OSHA determined that leaving network protectors 
untagged under these conditions was a de minimis condition, or a 
condition having ``no direct or immediate relationship to safety or 
health'' (29 U.S.C. 658(a)). Moreover, even if Consolidated Edison is 
the only affected company, it does have a considerable number of 
circuits and network protectors covered by the conditions listed in the 
directive: ``At Con Edison in any given one-year period over 5,000 
feeders involving approximately 123,000 network protectors are worked 
on using the procedures described [in the directive]'' (Ex. 0157). 
Therefore, the Agency decided to exempt network protectors from the 
requirements for tags in paragraphs (c)(2) and (c)(3) when the employer 
can demonstrate that the following conditions are present:
    1. Every network protector is maintained so that it will 
immediately trip open if closed when a primary conductor is 
deenergized;
    2. Employees cannot manually place any network protector in a 
closed position without the use of tools, and any manual override 
position is blocked, locked, or otherwise disabled; and
    3. The employer has procedures for manually overriding any network 
protector that incorporate provisions for determining, before anyone 
places a network protector in a closed position, that: (a) The line 
connected to the network protector is not deenergized for the 
protection of any employee working on the line and (b) (if the line 
connected to the network protector is not deenergized for the 
protection of any employee working on the line) the primary conductors 
for the network protector are energized. (See Figure 12 for a depiction 
of network protectors, the primary conductors (primary voltage feeder), 
and the extent of the deenergized area for lines connected to the 
network protectors.)
    These three conditions are identical to the last three conditions 
listed in the Sec.  1910.269 directive. OSHA is not including the first 
four conditions listed in the directive as provisions in the exemption 
because other provisions in the final rule already require these 
conditions. Note that the exemption applies only to the network 
protectors themselves. As required by paragraphs (c)(2) and (c)(3) in 
the final rule, employers must still tag any switches or disconnecting 
means, other than the network protectors, used to deenergize lines or 
equipment and any other automatically and remotely controlled switches 
that could cause the opened disconnecting means to close.
    OSHA stresses that it is including the network protector exemption 
in the final rule only for the reasons stated here, that is, because 
OSHA already concluded that leaving network protectors untagged under 
the conditions now required by the

[[Page 20508]]

exemption is a de minimis condition. OSHA does not agree with the other 
reasons provided by Consolidated Edison and EEI for incorporating the 
exemption. For example, the Agency does not agree that tagging network 
protectors would be extremely difficult or complex, as claimed by EEI 
and Consolidated Edison (Exs. 0157, 0227). The Agency also does not 
agree with EEI and Consolidated Edison that backfeed from the network 
grid prevented by network protectors is an unexpected source of 
electric energy. By design, such backfeed is an expected source of 
electric energy. If such backfeed were not an expected source, the 
network protector would not be necessary. Contrary to the claims made 
by EEI and Consolidated Edison, OSHA made no contradictory statement in 
the preamble to the 1994 rulemaking on existing Sec.  1910.269 
regarding the disconnection of distribution transformers supplying 
customer loads. In that preamble, OSHA stated only that employers did 
not have to disconnect transformers if doing so would remove unknown 
sources of electric energy only (59 FR 4392). OSHA expressly required 
in the 1994 rulemaking (as in this rulemaking) that employers had to 
disconnect expected sources of electric energy (id.).
    In addition, in adopting the network-protector exemption, OSHA 
decided not to use the language recommended by Consolidated Edison and 
EEI because their recommended language addresses only the design of 
network protectors and not the additional procedures required to ensure 
worker safety when employees perform work on network protectors. OSHA 
previously concluded, in issuing the directive, that these additional 
procedures were necessary steps in ensuring employee safety when 
employers leave network protectors untagged; the Agency reaffirms that 
conclusion here.
    In the notice extending the comment period on the proposal and 
setting dates for a public hearing, OSHA requested comment on the issue 
of whether the standard should include tagging requirements for systems 
using supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) equipment (70 FR 
59291).\398\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \398\ SCADA is a computer system for monitoring and controlling 
equipment (in this case, electric power transmission and 
distribution lines and equipment).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Agency received only three comments on this issue. One 
commenter stated, ``If OSHA adopts SCADA tagging requirements, it 
should be as written in the . . . NESC'' (Ex. 0201). Two other 
commenters recommended that OSHA adopt the SCADA requirements in the 
NESC (Exs. 0212, 0230). One of the commenters, IBEW, voiced its support 
as follows:

    [The NESC discusses] specific tagging activities utilizing 
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) equipment . . . 
SCADA switching is common place in the electric utility industry for 
both deenergizing circuits and defeating automatic recloser 
operation. Both of these actions have a direct impact on employee 
safety and OSHA should at a minimum reference this section of the 
NESC [Ex. 0230]

    Rule 442E of the 2002 NESC includes the following provision: ``When 
the automatic reclosing feature of a reclosing device is disabled 
during the course of work on energized equipment or circuits, a tag 
shall be placed at the reclosing device location'' (Ex. 0077; emphasis 
added).\399\ The SCADA provisions in that consensus standard are in the 
form of an exception to this tagging requirement (id.). Final Sec.  
1926.961 does not contain a similar requirement for tagging reclosing 
devices, as Sec.  1926.961 applies to deenergizing lines and equipment, 
and not to work on energized lines and equipment. However, final 
Subpart V provides requirements for disabling reclosing in paragraphs 
(b)(3) and (c)(4) of Sec.  1926.964. In addition, employers may need to 
disable automatic circuit reclosing as one measure in ensuring that the 
maximum transient overvoltage does not exceed a specific value, as 
required by the minimum approach-distance provisions of Sec.  
1926.960(c)(1) and Table V-2. To disable automatic reclosing devices, 
the employer will need to adopt measures that prevent reenabling the 
automatic feature of these devices in addition to turning the feature 
off. When the employer uses SCADA on a reclosing device, the employer 
may follow the SCADA provisions in the NESC to ensure that the 
reclosing feature remains disabled. However, the Agency believes that 
there are other methods, such as tagging those controls, that employers 
can use for the same purpose. Therefore, OSHA is not adopting the SCADA 
rules from the 2002 NESC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \399\ The relevant provisions in the 2012 edition of the NESC 
are identical.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Paragraph (c)(5) of the final rule, which OSHA is adopting without 
change from proposed paragraph (c)(4), requires that tags attached to 
disconnecting means prohibit operation of the disconnecting means and 
state that employees are at work. OSHA adopted this requirement from 
existing Sec.  1910.269(m)(3)(iv). Existing Sec.  1926.950(d)(1)(ii)(b) 
specifies that tags indicate that employees are working; however, it 
does not require that the tags prohibit operation of the disconnecting 
means. The Agency believes that it is essential for the tags to contain 
this prohibition so that the meaning of the tag is clear.
    Proposed paragraph (c)(5) would have required employers to test the 
lines or equipment. This test would ensure that the lines or equipment 
are deenergized and prevent accidents resulting from someone's opening 
the wrong disconnect. It also would protect employees from hazards 
associated with unknown sources of electric energy.
    OSHA based proposed paragraph (c)(5) on existing Sec.  
1910.269(m)(3)(v). Existing Sec.  1926.950(d)(1)(iii) requires the 
employer to perform a test or a visual inspection to ensure that the 
lines or equipment are deenergized. Employers cannot determine that a 
line or equipment is deenergized by visual inspections alone because 
voltage backfeed, induced current, and leakage current can energize 
electric lines and equipment without the employee ``seeing'' it (Ex. 
0041). Additionally, OSHA determined in the 1994 Sec.  1910.269 
rulemaking that visual inspection instead of testing was not sufficient 
for this purpose because of evidence about lack of testing causing 
accidents (59 FR 4393; 269-Exs. 3-107, 9-2, 12-12). Therefore, OSHA 
proposed to require a test, rather than a visual inspection, to 
determine whether the lines or equipment are energized. OSHA adopts 
that requirement in the final rule as final paragraph (c)(6).
    In the proposed rule, OSHA did not specify the type of test; 
however, the preamble to the proposal stated that the Agency expects 
employers to use testing procedures that will indicate reliably whether 
the part in question is energized (70 FR 34872). OSHA stated in the 
preamble to the proposal that using a voltage detector on the part 
would be acceptable for this purpose (id.). OSHA requested comments on 
when and if methods such as ``fuzzing'' a line are acceptable. The 
preamble to the proposal explained that ``fuzzing,'' or ``buzzing,'' a 
line involves using a live-line tool to hold a wrench or similar tool 
near a line and listening for the buzzing sound emitted as the tool 
approaches a circuit part energized at a high voltage (id.). OSHA 
requested comments on this issue because two OSHA letters of 
interpretation, which addressed a similar requirement in existing Sec.  
1910.269(n)(5), recognized the fuzzing or buzzing method of checking 
lines for voltage. (See the August 23, 1995, letter to Mr. Enoch F. 
Nicewarner

[[Page 20509]]

and the October 18, 1995, letter to Mr. Lonnie Bell.\400\)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \400\ The Nicewarner letter is available at https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=INTERPRETATIONS&p_id=21897. The Bell letter is available at https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=INTERPRETATIONS&p_id=21981. 
(After the effective date of the final rule, the Nicewarner letter 
will not be available on the Internet, and OSHA will edit the Bell 
letter to remove the response to the question on fuzzing.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    OSHA decided that fuzzing, or buzzing, will not be an acceptable 
testing method under the final rule. The preamble to the proposal noted 
that this method has obvious disadvantages when ambient noise levels 
are excessive and is only reliable above certain voltage levels (70 FR 
34872; see also 269-Ex. 8-5). Moreover, rulemaking participants 
universally opposed recognizing the fuzzing method of checking lines 
for voltage. (See, for example, Exs. 0155, 0162, 0175, 0213, 0220, 
0227, 0230; Tr. 882-884, 1238.) Several rulemaking participants 
reported incidents involving failure to detect voltage using this 
method (Exs. 0213, 0220; Tr. 947-948). Some commenters recommended 
requiring devices specifically designed as voltage detectors (Exs. 
0186, 0213, 0230; Tr. 1238).
    To implement its decision, OSHA modified the language of the 
requirement proposed in paragraph (c)(5) so that employers must perform 
the test ``with a device designed to detect voltage.'' Such devices 
include voltage detectors meeting ASTM F1796-09 Standard Specification 
for High Voltage Detectors--Part 1 Capacitive Type to be Used for 
Voltages Exceeding 600 Volts AC (Ex. 0480).\401\ OSHA is adopting this 
requirement in paragraph (c)(6) in the final rule. The final rule also 
replaces the proposed term ``employee in charge of the work'' with 
``employee in charge'' for consistency with the rest of final paragraph 
(c). The designated employee in charge of the clearance need not be a 
supervisor or be responsible for the work. The employee in charge need 
only be responsible for the clearance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \401\ ASTM F1796-09 is an updated version of ASTM F1796-97 
(2002), which IBEW cited in Ex. 0480. OSHA reviewed both documents 
and determined that devices meeting either ASTM standard are 
acceptable for use in meeting paragraph (c)(6) of the final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Final paragraph (c)(7), which OSHA is adopting without substantive 
change from proposed paragraph (c)(6), requires the installation of any 
protective grounds required by Sec.  1926.962. Installation of 
protective grounds must occur after employees deenergize and test the 
lines or equipment in accordance with the previous provisions; at this 
point, it is safe to install a protective ground. OSHA based this 
requirement on existing Sec.  1910.269(m)(3)(vi). Paragraph (d)(1)(iv) 
of existing Sec.  1926.950 contains an equivalent requirement.
    Mr. Brian Erga with ESCI recommended that OSHA reword this 
provision to refer to ``temporary protective grounding equipment'' 
rather than ``protective grounds'' (Ex. 0155). He noted that his 
recommendation is consistent with the terminology used in ASTM F855, 
Standard Specifications for Temporary Protective Grounds to Be Used on 
De-energized Electric Power Lines and Equipment. He made the same 
recommendation with respect to other provisions of the proposal, such 
as proposed Sec.  1926.962(c).
    OSHA decided not to use the term recommended by Mr. Erga. ASTM 
F855-04 covers ``the equipment making up the temporary grounding system 
used on de-energized electric power lines, electric supply stations, 
and equipment'' (Ex. 0054).\402\ The term ``protective grounds,'' as 
used in final Subpart V and Sec.  1910.269, encompasses more than just 
the equipment covered by the ASTM standard. For instance, employers can 
use permanent (that is, fixed) grounding equipment as part of a 
protective grounding system. Moreover, the protective grounding system 
also includes the ``ground'' itself, that is, the device to which 
employees attach the grounding equipment to bring deenergized parts to 
ground potential. Therefore, OSHA is adopting the language in the 
proposal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \402\ The most recent edition of that consensus standard, ASTM 
F855-09, uses identical language to describe its scope.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    After an employer follows the seven previous provisions of final 
paragraph (c), final paragraph (c)(8) permits the lines or equipment to 
be treated as deenergized. OSHA based this provision, which OSHA is 
adopting without substantive change from proposed paragraph (c)(7) and 
which has no counterpart in existing Subpart V, on existing Sec.  
1910.269(m)(3)(vii).\403\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \403\ As noted earlier in this preamble, under the summary and 
explanation for final Sec.  1926.960(b)(2), existing Sec.  
1926.950(b)(2) requires electric equipment and lines to be 
considered as energized until determined to be deenergized by tests 
or other appropriate means. The existing rule is insufficient to 
protect employees because employers cannot rely on a simple test for 
a deenergized condition to ensure that lines and equipment remain 
deenergized. OSHA concludes that final Sec.  1926.961 contains the 
appropriate procedures for treating lines and equipment as 
deenergized.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Mr. Erga also commented on this provision in the proposed rule, 
recommending that the standard use the term ``deenergized and 
grounded'' rather than just ``deenergized'' (Ex. 0155). He maintained 
that ``line[s] and equipment [are] not safe to work unless [they have] 
been de-energized and grounded'' (id.).
    OSHA decided not to adopt Mr. Erga's recommendation. The final 
rule, as with existing Sec.  1910.269, does not always require 
grounding of deenergized equipment. Final paragraph (b) of Sec.  
1926.962 permits deenergized lines and equipment to remain ungrounded 
under limited circumstances. OSHA believes that it is safe to work on 
deenergized lines and equipment under these limited circumstances, and 
there is no evidence in this rulemaking record that indicates that it 
would not be reasonably safe to do so. Therefore, OSHA is adopting the 
language of this provision as proposed.
    In some cases, as when an employee in charge has to leave the job 
because of illness, it may be necessary to transfer a clearance. Under 
such conditions, final paragraph (c)(9), which OSHA is adopting from 
proposed paragraph (c)(8), requires the employee in charge to inform 
the system operator and the employees in the crew of the transfer. If 
the employee holding the clearance must leave the worksite due to 
illness or other emergency, the employee's supervisor could inform the 
system operator and crew members of the transfer in clearance. This 
requirement, which OSHA based on existing Sec.  1910.269(m)(3)(ix), has 
no counterpart in existing Subpart V.
    The Agency received no comments on this provision in the proposal. 
However, neither the existing standard at Sec.  1910.269(m)(3)(ix) nor 
the proposal addresses who notifies crew members of the transfer in 
clearance. Because the employee in charge of the clearance is 
responsible for the clearance and communications regarding it, the 
notification must come from that individual. Therefore, OSHA has 
revised the language of paragraph (c)(9) in the final rule to clarify 
that ``the employee in charge (or the employee's supervisor if the 
employee in charge must leave the worksite due to illness or other 
emergency) shall inform . . . employees in the crew '' of the transfer.
    After transfer of the clearance, the new employee in charge is 
responsible for the clearance. To avoid confusion that could endanger 
the entire crew, employers must ensure that only one employee at a time 
be responsible for any clearance.
    Once the crew completes its work, the employee in charge must 
release the clearance before the system operator can reenergize the 
lines or equipment. Paragraph (c)(10) covers this procedure.

[[Page 20510]]

To ensure that it is safe to release the clearance, the employee in 
charge must: (1) Notify workers in the crew \404\ of the release, (2) 
ensure that they are clear of the lines and equipment, (3) ensure the 
removal of all protective grounds, and (4) notify the system operator 
of the release of the clearance. OSHA based this provision on existing 
Sec.  1910.269(m)(3)(x). Paragraph (d)(1)(vii) of existing Sec.  
1926.950 contains an equivalent requirement. OSHA received no comments 
on this provision, proposed as paragraph (c)(9), and is adopting it 
substantially as proposed. Paragraph (c)(7) requires the employer to 
ensure the installation of protective grounds for the crew, but does 
not require the crew to install them. To account for the possibility 
that the crew does not install the grounds protecting them, paragraph 
(c)(10)(iii) requires the employee in charge to ensure the removal of 
``protective grounds protecting employees under [the] clearance'' 
rather than ``protective grounds installed by the crew.''
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    \404\ The employees in the crew are working under the clearance 
assigned to the employee in charge of the clearance. The proposed 
rule required notification of ``each employee under his or her 
direction.'' The final rule, in paragraph (c)(10)(i), uses the 
phrase ``under that clearance'' instead of ``under his or her 
direction'' to make it clear that the employee in charge is 
responsible for the clearance and, as noted earlier in this section 
of the preamble, need not be a foreman or supervisor. In addition, 
the final rule uses the term ``employees under that clearance'' in 
place of the proposed terms ``employees in the crew'' and ``the 
crew'' in paragraphs (c)(10)(ii) and (c)(10)(iii), respectively. 
This revision makes it clear that, in cases in which a single 
employee is in charge of the clearance for multiple crews under 
paragraph (b)(4)(i), the employee in charge must ensure that 
employees in all crews under his or her clearance are clear of lines 
and equipment and that grounds protecting employees in all crews 
under his or her clearance are removed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Final paragraph (c)(11), which OSHA is adopting without substantive 
change from proposed paragraph (c)(10), requires the individual who is 
releasing the clearance to be the one who requested it, unless the 
employer transfers responsibility under final paragraph (c)(9). Final 
paragraph (c)(11) ensures that the employee in charge of the clearance 
authorizes release of the clearance. OSHA based this paragraph, which 
has no counterpart in existing Subpart V, on existing Sec.  
1910.269(m)(3)(xi). The Agency received no comments on this provision.
    Paragraph (c)(12), proposed as paragraph (c)(11), prohibits the 
removal of a tag without release of its associated clearance. Because 
the persons who place and remove the tags may not be the same person, 
the standard prohibits removing a tag unless the employee in charge of 
the associated clearance first releases it. OSHA based this provision, 
which has no counterpart in existing Subpart V, on existing Sec.  
1910.269(m)(3)(xii). OSHA is adopting paragraph (c)(12) with one 
clarification from proposed paragraph (c)(11). Final paragraph (c)(12) 
clarifies that the release of the clearance must comply with final 
paragraph (c)(11), in addition to final paragraph (c)(10) (which 
corresponds to proposed paragraph (c)(9), the only provision referenced 
in proposed paragraph (c)(11)). As noted in the preceding paragraph of 
this preamble, paragraph (c)(11) of the final rule requires the 
individual who is releasing the clearance to be the one who requested 
it, unless the employer transfers responsibility. This provision 
applies regardless of whether final paragraph (c)(12) references it, 
and the final rule makes its application clear.
    NIOSH recommended that the person removing the tag ``be the person 
who placed the tag on the line or the supervisor, unless they have been 
replaced due to shift change'' (Ex. 0130). NIOSH recommended that, if a 
shift change occurred, the employer brief the replacement workers on 
their responsibilities (id.).
    OSHA agrees with NIOSH that employees placing and removing tags 
need appropriate training. In this regard, Sec.  1926.950(b)(1) 
requires that each employee receive training in, and be familiar with, 
the safety-related work practices, safety procedures, and other safety 
requirements in Subpart V that pertain to his or her job assignments. 
However, OSHA does not believe that the employee who removes a tag 
under paragraph (c)(12) needs to be the same one who placed it. Because 
tags are often remote from the work location, the employee in charge of 
the clearance does not typically place or remove them. The key to 
employee safety in such cases is that no one may remove a tag until the 
employee in charge of the associated clearance releases that clearance. 
Accordingly, the key employee in this situation is the employee in 
charge of the clearance (that is, the employee who requested the 
clearance or the employee to whom the employer has transferred 
responsibility under final paragraph (c)(9)). Therefore, OSHA is not 
adopting NIOSH's recommendation.
    According to final paragraph (c)(13), the employer shall ensure 
that no one initiates action to reenergize the lines or equipment at a 
point of disconnection until all protective grounds have been removed, 
all crews working on the lines or equipment release their clearances, 
all employees are clear of the lines and equipment, and all protective 
tags are removed from that point of disconnection. This provision 
protects employees from possible reenergization of the line or 
equipment while employees are still at work. This provision does not 
require the removal of all tags from all disconnecting means before any 
of them may be reclosed. Instead, it requires that all tags for any 
particular switch be removed before that switch is closed. It is 
important in a tagging system not to return any energy isolating device 
to a position that could allow energy flow if there are any tags on the 
energy isolating device that are protecting employees. For example, 
after the employee in charge releases the clearance for a 5-mile 
section of line that the employer deenergized by opening switches at 
both ends of the line, the employer can close any one switch only after 
all the tags are removed from that switch. OSHA received no comments on 
this provision (proposed as paragraph (c)(12)) and is adopting it 
substantially as proposed. Final paragraph (c)(13), which has no 
counterpart in Subpart V, has been taken from existing Sec.  
1910.269(m)(3)(xiii).
13. Section 1926.962, Grounding for the Protection of Employees
    Sometimes, deenergized lines and equipment become energized. Such 
energization can happen in several ways, for example, by contact with 
another energized circuit, voltage backfeed from a customer's 
cogeneration installation, lightning contact, or failure of the 
clearance system outlined in final Sec.  1926.961.
    Electric utilities normally install transmission and distribution 
lines and equipment outdoors, where the weather and actions taken by 
members of the general public can damage the lines and equipment. 
Electric utilities install many utility poles alongside roadways where 
motor vehicles can strike the poles. Falling trees damage distribution 
lines, and the public may use transmission-line insulators for target 
practice. Additionally, customers fed by a utility company's 
distribution line may have cogeneration or backup generation 
capability, sometimes without the utility company's knowledge. All of 
these factors can reenergize a deenergized transmission or distribution 
line or equipment. When energized lines are knocked down, they can fall 
onto deenergized lines. A backup generator or a cogenerator can cause 
voltage backfeed on a deenergized power line. Lastly, lightning, even 
miles from the worksite, can reenergize a line. All of these situations 
pose hazards to

[[Page 20511]]

employees working on deenergized transmission and distribution lines 
and equipment. These circumstances factored into 14 of the accidents 
described in 269-Exhibit 9-2, as noted in the preamble to the 1994 
final rule adopting Sec.  1910.269 (59 FR 4394).
    Grounding the lines and equipment protects employees from injury 
should such energizing occur. Grounding also protects against induced 
current and static charges on a line.\405\ (These induced and static 
voltages can be high enough to endanger employees, either directly from 
electric shock or indirectly from involuntary reaction (Exs. 0041, 
0046.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \405\ Induced current can flow in a deenergized conductor when a 
nearby conductor is carrying alternating current. The varying 
electromagnetic field that surrounds the current-carrying conductor 
causes electrons to flow in any nearby electrical path, or loop, 
formed by a nearby deenergized conductor. The amount of current in 
the loop increases with an increase in the length of the loop that 
intersects the electromagnetic field; that is, the current increases 
as the length of the deenergized conductor running in parallel with 
a current-carrying conductor increases.
    Induced static electric charge can develop on a conductive 
object in several ways. The capacitive coupling that occurs between 
an energized conductor and a nearby deenergized conductive object 
can induce a voltage on the conductive object. Similarly, the same 
environmental conditions that can cause an electric charge to build 
in clouds can cause a buildup of charge on a deenergized conductor. 
A static discharge in the form of lightning can deposit an electric 
charge directly on the conductive object.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Grounding, as a temporary protective measure, involves connecting 
the deenergized lines and equipment to earth through conductors. As 
long as the conductors remain deenergized, this action maintains the 
lines and equipment at the same potential as the earth. However, if a 
source impresses voltage on a line, the voltage on the grounded line 
rises to a value dependent upon the impressed voltage, the impedance 
between its source and the grounding point, and the impedance of the 
grounding conductor.
    Employers use various techniques to limit the voltage across an 
employee working on a grounded line should the line become energized. 
Bonding is one of these techniques; it involves bonding conductive 
objects within the reach of the employee to establish an equipotential 
work area for the employee. Bonding limits voltage differences within 
this area of equal potential to a safe value.
    OSHA took the requirements proposed in Sec.  1926.962 from existing 
Sec.  1910.269(n). Existing Sec.  1926.954 contains provisions related 
to grounding for the protection of employees. In developing the 
proposal for this rulemaking, OSHA reviewed existing Sec.  1926.954 and 
found that it is not as protective as existing Sec.  1910.269(n) and 
also contains redundant and unnecessary requirements. For example, as 
noted under the summary and explanation of Sec.  1926.960(b)(2) of this 
final rule, existing Sec.  1926.950(b)(2) requires ``[e]lectric 
equipment and lines [to] be considered energized until determined to be 
deenergized by tests or other appropriate methods or means.'' Existing 
Sec.  1926.954(a) similarly requires ``[a]ll conductors and equipment 
[to] be treated as energized until tested or otherwise determined to be 
deenergized or until grounded.'' These provisions do not adequately 
protect employees from inadvertently reenergized lines and equipment, 
however. As noted in the earlier discussion, electric power 
transmission and distribution lines and equipment can become 
reenergized even after an employer deenergizes them. Therefore, OSHA 
concluded in the Sec.  1910.269 rulemaking that grounding deenergized 
lines and equipment is essential, except under limited circumstances 
(59 FR 4394-4395). The Agency is adopting that approach here. In 
developing Sec.  1926.962 of the final rule, OSHA eliminated redundant 
requirements from existing Sec.  1926.954, consolidated related 
requirements from that section, and strengthened the current Subpart V 
requirements to protect employees better.
    Section 1926.962 of the final rule addresses protective grounding 
and bonding.\406\ Paragraph (a) provides that all of Sec.  1926.962 
applies to the grounding of transmission and distribution lines and 
equipment for the purpose of protecting employees. Paragraph (a) also 
provides that paragraph (d) in final Sec.  1926.962 additionally 
applies to the protective grounding of other equipment, such as aerial 
lift trucks, as required elsewhere in Subpart V. Under normal 
conditions, such mechanical equipment would not be connected to a 
source of electric energy. However, to protect employees in case of 
accidental contact of the equipment with live parts, OSHA requires 
protective grounding elsewhere in the standard (in Sec.  
1926.964(c)(11), for example); to ensure the adequacy of this 
grounding, paragraph (d) of final Sec.  1926.962 addresses the ampacity 
and impedance of protective grounding equipment. A note following 
paragraph (a) indicates that Sec.  1926.962 covers grounding of 
transmission and distribution lines and equipment when this subpart 
requires protective grounding and whenever the employer chooses to 
ground such lines and equipment for the protection of employees. 
Although the Agency did not propose the note, OSHA included the note in 
the final rule to clarify that Sec.  1926.962 applies both when Subpart 
V requires grounding of transmission and distribution lines and 
equipment \407\ and when the employer grounds such lines and equipment 
for the protection of employees even though not required to do so.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \406\ As used throughout the rest of this discussion and within 
final Sec.  1926.962, the term ``grounding'' includes bonding. 
Technically, grounding refers to the connection of a conductive part 
to ground, whereas bonding refers to connecting conductive parts to 
each other. However, for convenience, OSHA is using the term 
``grounding'' to refer to both techniques of minimizing voltages to 
which an employee will be exposed.
    \407\ For example, final Subpart V requires the employer to 
ground transmission and distribution lines and equipment in 
Sec. Sec.  1926.962(b) and 1926.964(b)(4).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Mr. James Junga with Local 223 of the Utility Workers Union of 
America suggested that any requirement in the rule ``that an aerial 
lift truck should be grounded should be worded exactly that way, not 
implied'' (Ex. 0197). He stated that this language would eliminate any 
confusion between a worker and his or her supervisor regarding this 
issue (id.).
    The Agency notes that Sec.  1926.962 in the final rule does not 
contain requirements for grounding aerial lifts or other types of 
mechanical equipment. Final Sec. Sec.  1926.959(d)(3)(iii) and 
1926.964(c)(11) contain requirements to ground this equipment. These 
provisions, which do permit alternatives to grounding mechanical 
equipment, specify precisely when employers must ensure proper 
grounding of this equipment.
    TVA recommended that Sec.  1926.962 also apply to medium-voltage 
installations in generating plants, explaining:

    The ``application'' sections of 1910.269(n) and 1926.961 are 
limited to the grounding of transmission and distribution lines and 
equipment for the purpose of protecting employees. Both 1910.269 and 
Subpart V have no requirements on grounding of generating plant 
conductors and equipment for the protection of employees. We believe 
this exposes employees to shock and electrocution hazards in the 
workplace. These conductors may become energized by dangerous 
induced voltage and failure of the clearance system. For circuits 
operating at 480 V and below, we recommend grounding for the 
protection of employees from the hazard of induced voltage because 
the ampacity of the grounding jumper necessary to conduct the 
current for the time to clear the fault would make the jumper [too] 
large to install in many cases. It is recommended that the final 
rule incorporate requirements for grounding medium voltage (1 kV to 
23 kV) conductors and equipment in generating plants. [Ex. 0213]


[[Page 20512]]


    Subpart V does not apply to work on generation installations. 
Therefore, it would be inappropriate to include grounding requirements 
for generating plants in Subpart V. Although final Sec.  1910.269 
applies to work in generation plants, the grounding requirements in 
Sec.  1910.269(n) do not apply to electric power generation circuits. 
Existing Sec.  1910.269(n)(1) provides that Sec.  1910.269(n) applies 
to ``the grounding of transmission and distribution lines and equipment 
for the purpose of protecting employees.'' Existing Sec.  
1910.269(n)(2) requires such lines and equipment to be grounded under 
certain conditions. The remaining requirements in existing Sec.  
1910.269(n) apply to grounding of transmission and distribution lines 
and equipment without regard to whether Sec.  1910.269 requires them to 
be grounded if the grounding is ``for the purpose of protecting 
employees.''
    To respond to TVA's comment, OSHA examined two issues: (1) Whether 
final Sec.  1910.269(n)(2) should require grounding of electric power 
generation circuits, and (2) whether the other requirements in final 
Sec.  1910.269(n) should apply to the grounding of generation circuits 
whenever an employer grounds them to protect employees (that is, even 
when the standard does not require such grounding). With respect to the 
first issue, OSHA does not believe that it is always necessary to 
ground electric power generation circuits. These circuits are similar 
in most respects to electric utilization circuits (circuits used to 
supply equipment that uses electric energy for lighting, heating, or 
other purposes) covered by Subpart S; Subpart S, which generally 
applies to utilization circuits in generation plants, does not require 
grounding of deenergized circuits. Subpart S rather than Sec.  1910.269 
covers many of the circuits in generation plants.\408\ The voltages on 
generation circuits are typically lower than distribution and 
transmission voltages. In addition, the hazards of induced voltage, and 
voltages impressed on the circuits from lightning or contact with other 
energized lines, noted earlier as being common to transmission and 
distribution lines, are rarely, if ever, present on generation 
circuits. Therefore, OSHA concludes that it is unnecessary to require 
grounding of electric power generation lines and equipment in final 
Sec.  1910.269(n)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \408\ The safety-related work practices required by Sec. Sec.  
1910.331 through 1910.335 in Subpart S apply to utilization circuits 
in electric power generation plants that ``are not an integral part 
of a generating installation.'' (See Note 1 to Sec.  
1910.331(c)(1).)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Note, however, that electric power generation plants typically have 
the electrical output of the generators feeding a substation. The 
generating plant substation, in turn, steps up the voltage and supplies 
a transmission line. Consequently, any lines and equipment in a 
substation at a generation plant connected to a transmission line are 
subject to the same induced and impressed voltage hazards as the 
transmission line. OSHA expects employers to treat lines and equipment 
connected to a transmission line as transmission lines and equipment 
for purposes of final Sec. Sec.  1926.962 and 1910.269(n).\409\ This 
requirement will protect employees from the hazards of induced and 
impressed voltage that may be present at electric generation plants.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \409\ The existing directive for Sec.  1910.269, CPL 02-01-038, 
generally permits employers to designate where in a generation plant 
substation the generation installation ends and the transmission 
installation begins for the purpose of choosing to follow Sec.  
1910.269(d) or (m) in deenergizing that portion of the substation. 
Employers must deenergize circuits on the generation side of the 
demarcation point in accordance with Sec.  1910.269(d) and the 
remaining circuits in the substation in accordance with Sec.  
1910.269(m). However, irrespective of any such demarcation, Sec.  
1910.269(n) always applies to any lines or equipment still connected 
to the transmission circuit after the employer deenergizes the 
circuit.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    With respect to the second issue, OSHA agrees with TVA that 
grounding of electric power generation circuits should comply with the 
grounding requirements in final Sec.  1910.269(n) other than paragraph 
(n)(2). These requirements serve two functions. First they protect 
employees working on grounded circuits from electric shock should the 
circuits become energized. Second, they protect employees from hazards 
related to the installation and removal of protective grounds and to 
the ability of the ground to carry current. For example, final 
paragraphs (n)(6)(i) and (n)(6)(ii) ensure that employees are not 
injured if the protective grounding equipment is installed on or 
removed from an energized circuit. Also, paragraph (n)(4) ensures that 
the protective grounding equipment can safely carry the current that 
would flow if the circuit becomes energized. Applying these provisions 
to electric power generation circuits will protect employees from these 
hazards. Therefore, OSHA decided to apply the requirements of final 
Sec.  1910.269(n), other than paragraph (n)(2), to electric generation 
lines and equipment.
    Paragraph (b) of final Sec.  1926.962 sets the conditions under 
which employers must ensure that lines and equipment are grounded as a 
prerequisite to employees' working the lines or equipment as 
deenergized.\410\ Generally, for lines or equipment to be treated as 
deenergized, employers must deenergize the lines and equipment as 
specified under Sec.  1926.961 and then ground them as well. An 
employer may omit grounds on lines and equipment by demonstrating that 
either installation of a ground is impracticable (such as during the 
initial stages of work on underground cables, when the conductor is not 
bare for grounding) or the conditions resulting from the installation 
of a ground would present greater hazards than work without grounds. 
OSHA expects that conditions warranting the absence of protective 
grounds will be rare.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \410\ As previously noted, existing Sec.  1926.954(a) requires 
conductors and equipment to be considered as energized until 
determined to be deenergized or until grounded. Paragraph (c) of 
existing Sec.  1926.954 requires bare communication conductors on 
poles or structures to be treated as energized unless protected by 
insulating materials. Paragraph (b)(2) of final Sec.  1926.960 
covers the hazard addressed by these existing requirements, as 
discussed earlier in this preamble.
    Existing Sec.  1926.954(b) addresses when to ground new lines 
and equipment. When an employee installs equipment, it poses the 
same hazard to the employee as any other conductive object 
manipulated near exposed energized parts. Requirements contained in 
final Sec.  1926.960(c) and (d) adequately address this hazard. The 
installation of lines, however, poses additional hazards. First, the 
lines may be subject to hazardous induced voltage. Second, because 
of their length, new overhead lines are much more likely than other 
new equipment to contact existing energized lines. This contact can 
happen, for example, through failure of the stringing and tensioning 
equipment used to install the new lines or through failure of the 
existing lines or support structures. Final Sec.  1926.964(b) 
addresses these hazards by specifically covering the installation 
and removal of overhead lines. Lastly, new underground lines, which 
are run as insulated cable, do not pose these electrical hazards.
    For these reasons, OSHA indicated in the preamble to the 
proposal that the Agency would not include the provisions of 
existing Sec.  1926.954(b) in the final rule (70 FR 34873). However, 
OSHA requested comment on whether the proposal adequately protected 
employees from hazards associated with the installation of new lines 
and equipment. Only one commenter supported including the existing 
requirements in the final rule, but that commenter did not provide 
any rationale for its position (Ex. 0175). Therefore, OSHA is not 
including the provisions of existing Sec.  1926.954(b) in the final 
rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    When paragraph (b) does not require grounds, but the lines and 
equipment are to be treated as deenergized, the employer must meet 
certain conditions and ensure that employees use additional 
precautions. The employer must still deenergize the lines and equipment 
according to the procedures required by final Sec.  1926.961 (per final 
paragraph (b)(1)). Also, there must be no possibility of contact with 
another energized source (per final paragraph (b)(2)) and no hazard of 
induced voltage

[[Page 20513]]

present (per final paragraph (b)(3)). Since these precautions and 
conditions do not protect against the possible reenergizing of the 
lines or equipment under all conditions, the standard requires 
employers to ground lines and equipment in all but extremely limited 
circumstances.
    Paragraph (f) of existing Sec.  1926.954 allows employers to omit 
grounds without the additional restrictions specified in final Sec.  
1926.962(b)(1) through (b)(3). However, the existing standard requires 
the lines or equipment to be treated as energized in such cases. While 
the final rule does not specifically permit omitting grounds for 
conductors that are treated as energized, it does not require grounding 
unless the equipment is to be considered as deenergized. (See also the 
discussion of final Sec.  1926.960(b)(2), earlier in this section of 
the preamble.)
    Ms. Salud Layton with the Virginia, Maryland & Delaware Association 
of Electric Cooperatives opposed requiring the grounding of lines 
operating at 600 volts and less:

    We do not agree with [the requirement to ground lines operating 
at 600 volts or less] and do not see how this is physically possible 
in most cases. We typically open, isolate, [tagout], and test 600 
volt lines deenergized prior to performing work. We do not see the 
need for protective grounding in order to provide safety to 
employees on these circuits. Further, operational methods do not 
exist to ground 600 volt URD (underground residential distribution) 
or insulated overhead circuits.
    Commercial electricians commonly work on 600 volt or less lines 
and there is no industry standard from electricians or utilities to 
ever ground such lines. The industry standard is to isolate, test, 
and tag. This should be sufficient for personnel safety. It should 
be noted that most 600 volt or less equipment has no provisions or 
space for attaching protective grounds. [Ex. 0175]

    OSHA believes that the operating voltage on a distribution line is 
immaterial. As explained earlier, these lines can not only become 
energized by a failure of the clearance system, but also by a number of 
external factors that the deenergizing procedures required by final 
Sec.  1926.961 do not control. These factors include lightning, voltage 
backfeed, and contact with other energized lines. Commercial 
electricians working on systems operating at 600 volts or less do not 
face these same hazards unless they are working on a distribution line; 
in such cases, Sec.  1910.269 or Subpart V, which require grounding the 
lines and equipment, would cover the electricians. Thus, OSHA concludes 
that, regardless of voltage, it is necessary to ground transmission and 
distribution lines and equipment that are to be treated as deenergized, 
except when those external hazards are not present.
    Ms. Layton did not convince the Agency that it is impossible to 
ground lines operating at 600 volts or less. Ms. Layton did not state 
why it is not possible to ground these lines. Protective grounding 
equipment is available in sizes down to No. 2 AWG, and this size should 
be suitable for typical line conductor sizes at the 600-volt class (269 
Ex. 8-5; Ex. 0054). Moreover, even if grounding were not possible, it 
would be possible, and acceptable under the final rule, to work the 
lines as though energized.
    Mr. Wilson Yancey with Quanta Services recommended that OSHA remove 
the exceptions for installing grounds (Exs. 0169, 0234). He commented 
that the exceptions are subject to possible abuse by workers, 
explaining, ``Since it is easier not to ground, crews might attempt to 
claim that the specified criteria for not grounding applies in their 
situation'' (Ex. 0234). He suggested that employees should always work 
lines and equipment as though energized if grounds cannot be provided 
(id.).
    As noted earlier, OSHA believes that the conditions in which the 
final rule will not require grounding are extremely rare. OSHA also 
believes that the restrictions imposed by final Sec.  1926.962(b) 
reduce the risk of electric shock to employees to an acceptable level. 
The alternative suggested by Mr. Yancey seems compelling; however, it 
relies on the assumption that working lines and equipment energized is 
as safe as, or safer than, working them deenergized without grounds in 
the limited conditions permitted under this final rule. OSHA concludes 
that when the risk of electric shock is low, as it is under conditions 
that satisfy final Sec.  1926.962(b)(1) through (b)(3), working the 
lines and equipment energized poses more risk than working them 
deenergized without grounds. The choice suggested by Mr. Yancey would 
provide an incentive to work with the lines and equipment energized 
(rather than deenergized, but treated as energized), which the Agency 
believes is less safe. Therefore, OSHA is adopting paragraph (b) 
without substantive change from the proposal.
    Paragraph (f) of existing Sec.  1926.954 addresses where employers 
must place grounds. The existing standard requires employers to place 
grounds between the work location and all sources of energy and as 
close as practicable to the work location. Alternatively, employers can 
place grounds at the work location. If employees are to perform work at 
more than one location in a line section, the existing standard 
requires them to ground and short circuit the line section at one 
location and to ground the conductor they are working on at each work 
location. Although these requirements are designed to protect employees 
in case the line on which they are working becomes reenergized, OSHA 
indicated in the preamble to the proposal that it did not believe that 
these existing provisions ensure the use of grounding practices and 
equipment that are adequate to provide this protection (70 FR 34874).
    OSHA proposed requirements similar to the requirements in existing 
Sec.  1926.954(f) when it initially proposed Sec.  1910.269(n). In 
developing final Sec.  1910.269(n), OSHA reviewed the accidents in 269-
Ex. 9-2 and 269-Ex. 9-2A for situations involving improper protective 
grounding. There were nine accidents in these two exhibits related to 
protective grounding. In three cases, inadequately protective grounds, 
which did not protect the employee against hazardous differences in 
potential, were present. Because grounding is a backup measure that 
provides protection only when all other safety-related work practices 
fail, OSHA concluded that this incidence of faulty grounding was 
significant.
    In promulgating Sec.  1910.269 in 1994, OSHA concluded that 
grounding practices that do not provide an equipotential zone (which 
safeguards an employee from voltage differences) do not provide 
complete protection (59 FR 4395-4396). In case the line becomes 
energized inadvertently, the voltages could be lethal, as demonstrated 
by some of the exhibits in the Sec.  1910.269 rulemaking record (269-
Exs. 6-27, 57). Absent equipotential grounding, the only protection an 
employee will receive is if he or she does not contact the line until a 
circuit protective device clears the energy source, thereby removing 
the potentially lethal voltage on the line.
    For these reasons, OSHA proposed in this rulemaking to require 
grounds that would protect employees in the event that the line or 
equipment on which they are working becomes reenergized. OSHA took 
proposed Sec.  1926.962(c) directly from existing Sec.  1910.269(n)(3), 
which provides that protective grounds must be so located and arranged 
that employees are not exposed to hazardous differences in electric 
potential. The Agency designed the proposal to allow employers and 
employees to use any grounding method that protects employees in this 
way. OSHA explained in the preamble to the proposal that, for employees 
working at elevated positions

[[Page 20514]]

on poles and towers, single-point grounding may be necessary, together 
with grounding straps, to provide an equipotential zone for the worker 
(70 FR 34874). OSHA also noted in the proposal that grounding at 
convenient points on both sides of the work area might protect 
employees in insulated aerial lifts working midspan between two 
conductor-supporting structures (id.). Bonding the aerial lift to the 
grounded conductor would ensure that the employee remains at the 
potential of the conductor in case of a fault. The Agency also 
explained that other methods may be necessary to protect workers on the 
ground, including grounding mats and insulating platforms (id.). In the 
preamble to the proposal, the Agency stated that it believed that the 
proposed performance-oriented approach to grounding would provide 
flexibility for employers, while still affording adequate protection to 
employees (id.).
    Ms. Salud Layton with the Virginia, Maryland & Delaware Association 
of Electric Cooperatives argued that the requirement to provide an 
equipotential zone is unnecessary:

    [W]e agree with the need to employ safe grounding practices. 
However, we have concerns with the requirement for equipotential 
grounding as the ``safe'' method for grounding when an employee is 
working on the pole. Three incidents/injuries are referenced that 
were a result of inadequate grounding. More information is needed to 
determine the inadequacies with these grounds. That is, were there 
high resistant ground connections, were the grounds placed as 
described in 1926.954 (b), and were the grounds properly constructed 
to provide maximum protection to the employee[.] [Ex. 0175]

    Ms. Layton recognized the importance of ``grounds properly 
constructed to provide maximum protection to the employee'' (id.). The 
accidents described in the 1994 rulemaking clearly indicate that the 
grounds involved did not provide a working zone free of hazardous 
differences in electric potential. As noted earlier, evidence in that 
record also indicated that lethal voltages can develop when employees 
use such inadequate grounds.
    In its posthearing brief, EEI maintained that existing Sec.  
1910.269(n), and the identically worded proposed Sec.  1926.962(c), are 
unenforceably vague (Ex. 0501). EEI argued as follows:

    [T]he proposed standards would require employers to place 
grounds in such a manner ``as to prevent each employee from being 
exposed to hazardous differences in electrical potential.'' See 
proposed 1926.962(c). OSHA doubtless would characterize this as a 
``performance'' standard that allows the employer to cho[o]se a 
means of compliance. But there is a point at which the total absence 
of objective criteria for achieving compliance takes a standard 
beyond the legally safe harbor of a ``performance standard'' to the 
constitutionally infirm area of ambiguity and vagueness. That is 
where a requirement for ``equipotential grounding'' stands as of 
now.
    First, the record allows no other conclusion. Mr. Tomaseski and 
Mr. Brian Erga, who together are as knowledgeable as any in the 
electric utility industry about transmission and distribution 
grounding, agree that there are no guidelines, standards or other 
sources to guide employers as to how to achieve equipotential 
grounding (Tr. 1262-1266). Mr. Erga commented in particular that 
IEEE 1048 is ``quite outdated.'' (Tr. 1262).
    Second, OSHA's enforcement experience under Section 
1910.269(n)(3) confirms this conclusion. Several years ago, the 
Department of Justice, on OSHA's recommendation, indicted an 
electrical contractor for an alleged criminal violation of this 
section. At trial, however, neither DOJ [nor] OSHA could produce 
even a single expert witness to testify in support of the indictment 
as to what constitutes equipotential grounding, and the contractor 
was acquitted of this charge. There is no basis, therefore, now to 
extend the ``equipotential zone'' requirement to Part 1926, and it 
should be stricken from the final standards. Also, OSHA should issue 
compliance advice to its field personnel that Section 1910.269(n)(3) 
is unenforceable. [Ex. 0501]

    With respect to the hearing testimony referenced by EEI, OSHA notes 
that the cited exchange involved Mr. Tomaseski, representing IBEW, 
questioning Mr. Brian Erga with ESCI (Tr. 1262-1263). Mr. Tomaseski did 
not testify during that exchange; he only asked questions.\411\ 
Although OSHA does not dispute Mr. Erga's expertise in equipotential 
grounding, the Agency disagrees with his description of IEEE Std 1048 
as ``outdated.'' IEEE Std 1048-2003, IEEE Guide for Protective 
Grounding of Power Lines, was available at the time of the 2006 hearing 
(Ex. 0046). At that point, it had been available for only 3 years, and 
there is no evidence in the record that IEEE withdrew the consensus 
standard or otherwise disavowed it. There also is no evidence that IEEE 
Std 1048-2003 is inaccurate. On the basis of the rulemaking record 
considered as a whole, that consensus standard represents the best 
available guidance on what constitutes equipotential grounding. 
Paragraph (c) of final Sec.  1926.962 requires employers to determine 
the proper grounding method based on the system involved. An 
engineering determination of the currents in the employee's body that 
will occur if the lines or equipment become reenergized during work 
generally is necessary for this purpose. IEEE Std 1048-2003 (previously 
IEEE Std 1048-1990) provides detailed guidelines on how to determine 
maximum body currents and how to calculate what those currents would be 
for a particular protective grounding system on a particular circuit 
(Ex. 0046). Consequently, OSHA concludes that there are guidelines 
available that can assist employers in developing grounding methods 
that will comply with final Sec. Sec.  1910.269(n)(3) and 1926.962(c). 
However, as explained later, OSHA agrees that additional guidance from 
the Agency on this issue will facilitate compliance, and Appendix C to 
this final rule provides such guidance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \411\ Although Mr. Tomaseski did not testify about proposed 
Sec.  1926.962(c), IBEW generally supported the proposed provision 
in its posthearing comments (Ex. 0505).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    EEI did not provide a citation for the case on which it relies to 
support its assertion that existing Sec.  1910.269(n)(3) is 
unenforceable. However, OSHA assumes that EEI is referring to United 
States v. L.E. Myers Co., 2005 WL 3875213 (N.D.Ill. Nov. 2, 2005), 
rev'd on other grounds, 562 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2009), as that case was 
a criminal prosecution involving, among other issues, the equipotential 
grounding provision in existing Sec.  1910.269. EEI's reliance on this 
case is misplaced. First, EEI incorrectly asserts that the Government 
elected not to call an expert witness on equipotential grounding in 
that case because the Government could not produce such an expert. In 
fact, before the trial in that case, the Government designated an 
expert witness who was prepared to describe the proper way to establish 
an equipotential zone consistent with the facts of the case. Second, 
the unfavorable decision in the case may mean simply that the jury 
decided that the defendant did not violate Sec.  1910.269(n)(3), not 
that the standard is unenforceable.
    The Agency concludes that the standard should explicitly state that 
the employer has a duty to determine (and be able to demonstrate) that 
the grounding practices in use provide an equipotential zone for the 
worker. IBEW commented that ``[p]ersonal protective grounding is either 
entirely misunderstood or just not thought of as much as other issues 
involved [in electric power transmission and distribution] work'' (Ex. 
0230). OSHA infers from this statement that employers are not fully 
implementing the existing requirement for equipotential zones in Sec.  
1910.269(n)(3). Mr. Wilson Yancey with Quanta

[[Page 20515]]

Services testified: ``We believe that the [equipotential grounding] 
standard should be entirely performance-based and put both the burden 
and responsibility on the employer, putting in place procedures and 
practices that protect employees from electrical hazards'' (Tr. 1324-
1325). The Agency agrees with Mr. Yancey. Therefore, OSHA is revising 
the proposed language to expressly require employers to demonstrate 
that temporary protective grounds have been placed at such locations 
and arranged in such a manner so as to prevent each employee from being 
exposed to hazardous differences in electric potential.
    Two commenters objected to use of the phrase ``equipotential zone'' 
in the heading for proposed paragraph (c) and opposed a specific 
requirement for the creation of an ``equipotential zone'' (Exs. 0201, 
0212). Duke Energy commented:

    The OSHA standard should not include specific requirements for 
the creation of an equipotential zone. There is not adequate 
information available to employers about how to effectively 
establish equipotential zones on distribution structures. Without 
this information, OSHA should not specify the technique of 
``equipotential'' on those structures. In addition, OSHA should 
change the term ``equipotential grounding'' to ``temporary 
protective grounding'' which will allow employers to determine 
effective grounding techniques. [Ex. 0201]

Southern Company commented that the term ``equipotential zone'' is a 
misnomer because it ``implies that the voltage difference between two 
points within the zone will be zero, therefore allowing no voltage to 
develop across the worker. This misconception eliminates consideration 
of the other critical parameters such as impedance of the temporary 
ground, fault levels, etc.'' (Ex. 0212). Like Duke Energy, Southern 
Company advocated use of the phrase ``temporary protective grounding'' 
in lieu of ``equipotential zone'' (id.).
    In contrast, several commenters supported the requirement for an 
equipotential zone. (See, for example, Exs. 0155, 0162, 0186, 0230, 
0505; Tr. 899-900, 1253-1254.) For example, Mr. Anthony Ahern of Ohio 
Rural Electric Cooperatives commented, ``These grounding requirement[s] 
will be a major improvement. Equal-potential grounding/bonding should 
be required where ever it is possible to do so'' (Ex. 0186). However, 
many of those who supported the proposed requirement recommended that 
OSHA provide more guidance on acceptable methods that employers can use 
to achieve the equipotential zone called for in the proposal. (See, for 
example, Exs. 0162, 0230, 0505; Tr. 899-900, 1253-1254.) For example, 
Mr. James Tomaseski with IBEW spoke to the need for guidance:

    [Protective grounding] is an essential procedure to ensure 
employee safety when performing work associated with transmission 
and distribution voltages. As important as it is, it is also a 
procedure that is commonly misunderstood and many times misapplied.
    In particular, many people, for some reason, do not understand 
the term ``equipotential'' and do not understand proper application 
of grounds to create an equipotential zone. This needs to be 
changed. Either in the rule itself or in existing Appendix C or a 
new appendix devoted to equipotential zones, OSHA should better 
describe what an equipotential zone actually is and how an 
equipotential zone is created and offer examples for overhead 
distribution, overhead transmission, and underground distribution of 
how to accomplish that task of creating an equipotential zone. [Tr. 
899-900]

Mr. Steven Theis with MYR Group ``strongly recommended that OSHA 
attempt to clarify acceptable grounding methods and/or configurations 
that would be considered adequate or acceptable'' (Ex. 0162). Mr. Erga 
recommended that the Agency address grounding for underground systems 
and provided information for that purpose (Exs. 0474, 0475; Tr. 1256-
1257).
    OSHA disagrees with the commenters who objected to the term 
``equipotential zone.'' As used in paragraph (c) of the final rule, the 
word ``equipotential'' means that conductive objects within the 
worker's reach do not differ in electric potential to the point that it 
could endanger employees.\412\ This definition differs slightly from 
the dictionary definition of ``equipotential'' (that is, having the 
same electric potential at every point), but the difference is clear 
from the regulatory text in paragraph (c). OSHA uses the term 
``equipotential zone'' only in the heading. The text of paragraph (c) 
states the requirement precisely without using the term. In other 
words, the standard does not require what Southern Company alleges, 
that is, a zone of precisely equal electric potential.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \412\ See the summary and explanation for final Sec.  
1926.964(b)(4)(i) for an explanation of what OSHA considers to be a 
hazardous difference in electric potential.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    OSHA agrees, however, that some employers can use assistance 
determining what an equipotential zone is. Appendix C to final Subpart 
V contains information designed to help employers develop grounding 
practices that will provide the equipotential zone required by the 
final rule. OSHA culled this information from the record, primarily 
IEEE Std 1048-2003 (Ex. 0046) and from determinations that the Agency 
made in this rulemaking (see, for example, the summary and explanation 
for final Sec.  1926.964(b)(4)) and other rulemakings on safe levels of 
current in the body, including the 1994 preamble to final Sec.  
1910.269 (59 FR 4406) and the preamble to the rule on ground-fault 
protection (41 FR 55696-55704, Dec. 21, 1976). In addition, the Agency 
decided to provide a safe harbor of the type requested by Mr. Theis, so 
a new note in the final rule provides that grounding practices meeting 
the guidelines in Appendix C will comply with Sec.  1926.962(c). This 
note will enable employers to adopt safe grounding practices that 
provide an equipotential zone without having to conduct a separate 
engineering determination, which should be particularly useful to 
contractors who perform work on many different systems. Following the 
guidelines in Appendix C, employers will be able to adopt a uniform set 
of grounding practices that will be acceptable for a wide range of 
above-ground and underground transmission and distribution systems. 
Employers may set their own grounding practices without following the 
guidelines in Appendix C, but the Agency reminds employers that the 
final rule requires them to be able to demonstrate that any practices 
selected will prevent each employee from being exposed to hazardous 
differences in electric potential.
    Paragraph (d) of the final rule contains requirements that 
protective grounding equipment must meet. For the grounding equipment 
to protect employees completely, it must not fail while the line or 
electric equipment is energized. Thus, paragraph (d)(1)(i) requires 
protective grounding to have an ampacity high enough so that the 
equipment is capable of conducting the maximum fault current that could 
flow at the point of grounding during the period necessary to clear the 
fault. In other words, the grounding equipment must be able to carry 
the fault current for the amount of time necessary to allow protective 
devices to interrupt the circuit. OSHA adopted this provision from the 
first sentence of existing Sec.  1910.269(n)(4)(i). There was broad 
support in the record for this requirement (see, for example, Exs. 
0125, 0127, 0149, 0159, 0172, 0179). Consequently, OSHA is including it 
in the final rule as proposed.
    As noted in the preamble to the proposed rule, the design of 
electric power distribution lines operating at 600 volts or less can 
present a maximum fault current and fault interrupting time

[[Page 20516]]

that exceeds the current carrying capability of the circuit conductors 
(70 FR 34874). In other words, the maximum fault current on 
distribution secondaries of 600 volts or less can be high enough to 
melt the phase conductors carrying the fault current. If OSHA required 
protective grounding equipment to carry the maximum amount of fault 
current without regard to whether the phase conductors would fail, the 
size of the grounding equipment would be impractical. OSHA does not 
interpret existing Sec.  1910.269(n)(4)(i) to require protective 
grounding equipment to be capable of carrying more current than 
necessary to allow the phase conductors to fail. (See OSHA Instruction 
CPL 02-01-038.) A protective grounding jumper sized slightly larger 
than a phase conductor would be sufficient to meet the existing 
standard.
    To clarify this requirement, OSHA proposed, in paragraph 
(d)(1)(ii), to recognize certain conditions in which it would be 
permissible to use protective grounding equipment that would not be 
large enough to carry the maximum fault current indefinitely, but that 
would be large enough to carry this current until the phase conductor 
fails. First, the proposal would have required the grounding equipment 
to be capable of carrying the maximum fault current until the conductor 
protected by the grounding equipment failed. Second, the conductor 
would have been considered grounded only where the grounding equipment 
was protecting the employee after the conductor failed. In other words, 
the portion of the phase conductor between the grounding equipment and 
the employee protected by the grounding equipment would have had to 
remain intact under fault conditions. Third, since the phase conductor 
will likely fall once it fails, the proposal provided that ``[n]o 
employees . . . be endangered by the failed conductor.'' OSHA requested 
comments on proposed paragraph (d)(1)(ii), including specifically 
whether the Agency should restrict the provision to lines and equipment 
operating at 600 volts or less.
    Some commenters supported proposed paragraph (d)(1)(ii) (Exs. 0126, 
0167, 0201, 0219, 0220). For example, Duke Energy supported this 
change, contending that ``it relaxes overly restrictive rules'' (Ex. 
0201). Mr. Allan Oracion with Energy United EMC commented that proposed 
paragraph (d)(1)(ii) ``is needed for fault current of lines at 600 
volts or less because, if not, the ground wire would be too big to 
handle and use'' (Ex. 0219).
    However, most of the comments received on the proposed provision 
opposed it. (See, for example, Exs. 0125, 0127, 0149, 0159, 0172, 0179, 
0227, 0230.) For instance, Ms. Wyla Wood with Mason County Public 
Utility District Number 3 commented:

    [T]he requirement to size a grounding jumper to be able to 
withstand the maximum fault current for the time necessary to have 
the grounded conductor fail to the point of separation and fall to 
the ground is impracticable in most situations due (1) to the 
required size of the grounding jumper and (2) the lack of adequate 
connection points at which to attach the grounding jumper. In a 
transmission system there usually is no neutral conductor so the 
grounding jumper must be attached to the tower or structure ground 
which at the most is only a 4/0 conductor or less. In the National 
Electric Safety Code and the National Electric[al] Code (NFPA 70), 
the connection to ground is only required to be sized to withstand 
the available fault current for the time required to have the 
electrical protective equipment operate. This would include relays 
seeing the fault current and opening breakers, tripping generating 
units off line, and/or allowing proper fusing to fail thereby 
creating an electrical opening in the system stopping the flow of 
current. The design requirements for electrical circuits as found in 
the NESC Section 9, 093.C1-9 and the NEC Chapter 2 Article 250 would 
need to be changed so that all new construction would have the 
ability to do what we believe you are asking in this section.
    Another consideration would be the physical size and weight of a 
temporary grounding jumper. As loads are becoming greater, the size 
of transmission and distribution conductors are becoming larger in 
size. If, for instance, the conductor was 756 MCM,\[\\413\\]\ the 
grounding jumper would be required to be equal in size or capable of 
carrying the full fault current for the time necessary to have this 
conductor fail to the point of separation. A temporary grounding 
jumper of this size would be too heavy for a worker to lift and too 
stiff to form into the proper configuration required by some 
situations. OSHA should adhere to the requirements already in place 
in the above referenced regulations. [Ex. 0125]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \413\ MCM is million circular mils.

EEI opposed the proposed requirement for similar reasons and argued 
that crews ``would have to carry ten different sets of ground chains'' 
(Ex. 0227).\414\ IBEW also opposed the proposed provision, stating that 
the ``requirement for properly sized grounds should not be [dependent] 
on [the] size [of the] conductor [to which] the ground is attached'' 
(Ex. 0230). Noting that the size of grounds should not be a concern 
with transmission circuits, the union recommended that, if the grounds 
would be too large because of available fault current, employees should 
work the circuit as energized (id.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \414\ OSHA believes that EEI intended to use the term 
``grounding equipment'' rather than ``grounding chains.'' Grounding 
chains are an outdated form of protective grounding equipment that 
are unlikely to meet current design standards for protective 
grounding equipment such as those in ASTM F855-09, Standard 
Specifications for Temporary Protective Grounds to Be Used on De-
energized Electric Power Lines and Equipment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    It appears to the Agency that commenters that opposed proposed 
paragraph (d)(1)(ii) did not understand that this provision was 
intended as an exception to the requirement in proposed paragraph 
(d)(1)(i) that protective grounding equipment ``be capable of 
conducting the maximum fault current that could flow at the point of 
grounding for the time necessary to clear the fault.'' However, based 
on the comments received, OSHA reconsidered the need for the proposed 
exception. Based on IBEW's comment, there appears to be no need for it 
on transmission circuits, and possibly even for any circuit of more 
than 600 volts (Ex. 0230). In addition, the hazards posed by faulted 
conductors that cannot carry fault current appear to be greater than 
those from working those conductors as energized because, when a 
faulted overhead conductor fails, it will drop. The ungrounded side may 
be energized (depending on where the failure occurred) and may contact 
the worker, who will not be protected against such contact as he or she 
would be if the work were performed energized. Therefore, OSHA is not 
adopting proposed paragraph (d)(1)(ii) in the final rule. However, note 
that, even though OSHA is not adopting proposed paragraph (d)(1)(ii), 
the final standard does not require protective grounding equipment to 
be capable of carrying more current than necessary to allow the phase 
conductors to fail.
    Paragraph (d)(1)(ii) of the final rule, which OSHA proposed as 
paragraph (d)(1)(iii), requires protective grounding equipment to have 
an ampacity of at least No. 2 AWG copper. This provision is equivalent 
to language in existing Sec.  1910.269(n)(4) and ensures that 
protective grounding equipment has a suitable minimum ampacity and 
mechanical strength. This proposed requirement received broad support. 
(See, for example, Exs. 0125, 0127, 0149, 0159, 0172, 0179.) 
Consequently, OSHA is adopting the requirement in the final rule 
without substantive change from the proposal.
    Paragraph (d)(2) requires the impedance of the grounding equipment 
to be low enough so as not to delay the operation of protective devices 
in case of accidental energization. Existing Sec.  1910.269(n)(4)(ii) 
requires protective grounding equipment to have ``an

[[Page 20517]]

impedance low enough to cause immediate operation of protective devices 
in case of accidental energizing of the lines or equipment.'' As noted 
in OSHA Instruction CPL 02-01-038, this requirement ensures that the 
protective grounding equipment does not contribute to any delay in the 
operation of the devices protecting the circuit. For certain lines and 
equipment, the design of the system allows some ground faults to occur 
without the operation of the circuit protection devices, regardless of 
the impedance of the grounding equipment. According to the OSHA 
Instruction, if the impedance of the grounding equipment does not 
contribute to delay in the operation of the circuit protection devices 
and if the impedance of this equipment is low enough to provide a safe 
work zone for employees (as required by existing Sec.  1910.269(n)(3)), 
the employer is in compliance with existing Sec.  1910.269(n)(4)(ii).
    The Agency proposed to include this interpretation in the 
regulatory text of Sec. Sec.  1910.269(n)(4) and 1926.962(d) by 
requiring the impedance of the grounding equipment to be low enough so 
that it ``do[es] not delay the operation of protective devices,'' 
rather than low enough ``to cause immediate operation of protective 
devices'' in case of accidental energizing of the lines or equipment. 
OSHA did not receive any objection to the change in language and is 
adopting it without change in the final rule.
    Paragraphs (d)(1) and (d)(2) help ensure the prompt clearing of the 
circuit supplying voltage to the point where the employee is working. 
Thus, the grounding equipment limits the duration and reduces the 
severity of any electric shock, though it does not prevent shock from 
occurring. (As discussed earlier, Sec.  1926.962(c) of the final rule 
requires employers to protect employees from hazardous differences in 
electric potential.) OSHA included a note to paragraph (d) of the final 
rule referencing the ASTM and IEEE standards on protective grounding 
equipment (ASTM F855-09 and IEEE Std 1048-2003, respectively) so that 
employers can find additional information that may be helpful in their 
efforts to comply with the standard. Mr. Tom Chappell with Southern 
Company maintained that, because the ASTM standard does not require 
asymmetrical test current,\415\ grounding equipment that satisfies that 
standard still might not be able to withstand the peak current and 
forces of a fully offset asymmetrical current (Ex. 0212.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \415\ In an alternating current system, current varies over time 
in a symmetrical pattern--the current forms a sine wave as a 
function of time, in which current above the zero axis is equal in 
magnitude and duration to current below the zero axis. In a fault 
condition, a direct current offset is added to the normal 
symmetrical current (still in the form of a sine wave), which 
results in current that is not symmetrical about the zero axis. The 
instantaneous current is higher due to this asymmetry than it would 
be when the current is symmetrical. The higher current also leads to 
higher mechanical forces on the protective grounding equipment. The 
degree of asymmetry depends on the ratio of the reactance of the 
circuit to its resistance, which is called the X/R ratio.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    OSHA agrees that ASTM F855-09 does not require testing using 
asymmetrical current. However, that consensus standard provides for 
reduced maximum current-carrying ratings for temporary protective 
grounding equipment used with systems that present asymmetrical fault 
current (Ex. 0054).\416\ In addition, there are other factors to 
consider in the selection and installation of appropriate protective 
grounding equipment, such as maximum forces imposed on protective 
grounding cables during a fault, circuit reclosing, inductive and 
capacitive coupling with adjacent energized lines, and clamp connection 
considerations (Ex. 0046). These factors are not adequately addressed 
in ASTM F855 because it is a specification standard for the design of 
protective grounding equipment, not a guide for selecting and using 
that equipment. However, IEEE Std 1048-2003 includes substantial useful 
information on these factors, including information on derating 
protective grounding equipment for systems with worst-case asymmetry 
(id.). The Agency added a reference to the IEEE standard in the note to 
address Mr. Chappell's concerns.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \416\ ASTM F855-09 contains the same reduction in ratings as the 
2004 edition that is in the rulemaking record as Ex. 0054.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Mr. Chappell also asked whether ``opening and locking a switch'' 
removes the possibility that the circuit would contribute to the fault 
current and, thus, eliminates the need to account for that circuit in 
calculating fault current (Ex. 0212). The procedures required by final 
Sec.  1926.961 ensure that circuits are deenergized and that they 
remain deenergized while employees are working on those circuits. 
However, OSHA determined that these procedures do not eliminate the 
risk that these circuits can become reenergized; in other words, 
grounding is still necessary (Exs. 0002, 0004).\417\ The Agency does 
not believe that installing a lock will substantially reduce the risk 
of reenergization further. Tags required by final Sec.  1926.961(c)(2) 
already would protect those switches, and a failure in the tagging 
procedures would be nearly as likely to render a lock ineffective for a 
person authorized to close the circuit.\418\ Therefore, lines and 
equipment deenergized under the procedures required by final Sec.  
1910.269(m) or final Sec.  1926.961 can still become reenergized 
through a failure in those procedures, and protective grounding 
equipment must be capable of withstanding the maximum current if the 
circuits become reenergized. However, the employer generally may assume 
that multiple (deenergized) sources of energy will not reenergize a 
deenergized line simultaneously. This assumption would limit the 
maximum current to the current from the highest capacity source. 
Nevertheless, the employer must assume that additional sources can 
contribute to the current through the protective grounding equipment 
for any sources that automatic switches could reenergize 
simultaneously.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \417\ See, for example, the eight accidents described at https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=566034&id=170000459&id=14198543&id=783118&id=170228035&id=14342513&id=14445399&id=768002.
    \418\ For example, the system operator could remove a tag or a 
lock from the wrong switch when energizing or deenergizing a 
circuit.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Existing Sec.  1926.954(h), (i), and (j) contain requirements 
relating to the impedance and ampacity of personal protective grounds. 
Paragraph (i) requires tower clamps to have adequate ampacity, and 
paragraph (j) establishes the same requirement for ground leads, with 
an additional restriction that they be no smaller than No. 2 AWG 
copper. Paragraph (h) requires the impedance of a grounding electrode 
(if used) to be low enough to remove the danger of harm to employees or 
to permit prompt operation of protective devices.
    OSHA believes that the entire grounding system should be capable of 
carrying the maximum fault current and should have an impedance low 
enough to protect employees. The existing standard does not specify the 
impedance of grounding conductors or clamps, nor does it specify the 
ampacity of grounding clamps other than tower clamps. By addressing 
specific portions of the grounding systems but not addressing others, 
the existing standard does not provide complete protection for 
employees. Because the final rule's grounding requirements apply to the 
entire grounding system, OSHA believes that the revised standard will 
provide better protection for employees than the existing rule.
    Paragraph (e), which is being adopted without substantive change 
from the proposal, requires employers to ensure that employees test 
lines and equipment

[[Page 20518]]

and verify that nominal voltage is absent before employees install any 
ground on those lines or equipment. If a previously installed ground is 
present, employees need not conduct a test. This provision prevents the 
grounding of energized equipment, which could injure the employee 
installing the ground. OSHA adopted this paragraph, which is equivalent 
to existing Sec.  1926.954(d), from existing Sec.  1910.269(n)(5).
    Paragraphs (f)(1) and (f)(2) of the final rule set procedures for 
installing and removing grounds. To protect employees in the event that 
the ``deenergized'' equipment employees will ground is, or becomes, 
energized, these paragraphs require employees to attach the ``equipment 
end'' of grounding devices last and remove them first. These paragraphs 
also generally require employees to use a live-line tool for both 
procedures.
    These provisions are similar to existing Sec.  1926.954(e)(1) and 
(e)(2), except that the existing standard recognizes the use of a 
``suitable device'' in addition to a live-line tool. As noted in the 
preamble to the proposal, OSHA expressed concern that this language 
implied that employees could use rubber insulating gloves to install 
and remove grounds under any circumstance (70 FR 34875). The Agency 
also noted that it is unsafe for an employee to be too close when 
connecting or disconnecting a ground (id.). Under the final rule, OSHA 
will consider any device insulated for the voltage, and that allows an 
employee to apply or remove the ground from a safe position, to be a 
live-line tool for the purposes of paragraphs (f)(1) and (f)(2).
    OSHA based the corresponding paragraphs in the proposed rule on 
existing Sec.  1910.269(n)(6) and (n)(7). Subsequent to the publication 
of existing Sec.  1910.269 in 1994, some electric utilities complained 
that lines and equipment operating at 600 volts or less cannot always 
accommodate the placement and removal of a protective ground by a line-
line tool. OSHA, therefore, proposed alternatives to enable employees 
to place protective grounds on this equipment in a manner that would 
still provide adequate protection. The proposal would have permitted 
the use of insulated equipment other than live-line tools for attaching 
protective grounds to, and removing them from, lines and equipment 
operating at 600 volts or less: (1) If the employer ensured that the 
line or equipment was not energized at the time or (2) if the employer 
could demonstrate that the employee would be protected from any hazard 
that could develop if the line or equipment was energized. For example, 
an employee could connect test equipment to a line to be grounded, and 
than an employee wearing rubber insulating gloves could apply the 
protective ground while the test equipment indicated that the line was 
deenergized. After the ground was in place, an employee could remove 
the test equipment.
    Two commenters supported the proposal's approach to grounding lines 
and equipment operating at 600 volts or less (Exs. 0201, 0227). One 
additional commenter, who apparently supported the proposal, 
recommended that OSHA recognize the use of devices other than live-line 
tools for removing grounds at voltages less than 600 volts (Ex. 0212). 
This commenter cited the difficulty in ``situations such as a pad mount 
transformer, [in which] the use of a live line tool is impractical due 
[to] space constraints and equipment design'' (id.). There was no 
opposition to this part of proposed paragraphs (f)(1) and (f)(2), so 
OSHA is adopting the proposed exception for lines or equipment operated 
at 600 volts or less in this final rule.
    Some rulemaking participants recommended that OSHA revise the 
language in proposed paragraph (f)(2) to provide additional protection 
for employees who are removing grounds from deenergized lines (Exs. 
0162, 0230; Tr. 900-901). Mr. James Tomaseski with IBEW described the 
problem and recommended a solution as follows:

    The removal of protective grounds has caused many fatal 
accidents over the years. As far back as the IBEW has maintained 
accident records, removal of grounds in the wrong sequence has been 
the principal factor in these grounding accidents.
    One might assume that the same hazard exists during installation 
of the grounds, but the situation is actually different. The 
accident always occurs when an employee is in the process of 
removing a ground potential clamp from one of the number of grounds 
that are connected in the same location on the pole or structure.
    Mistake is made when a ground end is removed and the other end 
is connected to the phase conductor, and usually because of induced 
voltage from a parallel or crossing energized circuit, the employee 
ends up holding an energized ground clamp in his or her hand while 
wearing only leather gloves.
    This can be rectified by prescribing a work rule that, when more 
than one ground end connection is assembled in the same general area 
on the pole or the structure, all phase conductor ends must be 
removed first before any ground ends are removed. This is consistent 
with the new code language that Subcommittee 8 of the National 
Electric Safety Code has adopted to address this problem. [Tr. 900-
901]

    OSHA agrees that the process of removing grounds can be even more 
dangerous than installing them. As noted earlier, if a worker removes 
the grounded end of a grounding cable before the line end, the worker, 
who typically will not be using a live-line tool or other form of 
protective equipment, will be in contact with any residual voltage on 
the ``deenergized'' line or equipment, which may be from induced 
voltage or voltage backfeed. As Mr. Tomaseski notes, this situation has 
resulted in fatal accidents (Ex. 0004 \419\). However, the final rule 
prohibits the practice of removing the ground end after the line or 
equipment end, including when the grounding cables are crossed or 
parallel. Although the rule does not prescribe a particular method of 
installing and removing parallel or crossed conductors, OSHA expects an 
employer's work rules and training to adequately ensure the correct 
order of removal of grounds however employees install them. Depending 
on the circumstances, the employer may have to instruct employees to 
remove all phase conductor ends first so as to avoid confusion between 
multiple grounds. For the reasons explained by IBEW, the Agency does 
not consider a work rule that simply repeats the OSHA standard to be 
adequate to prevent employees from removing the grounded end of the 
wrong cable in circumstances in which it is reasonably likely that 
employees will mistake one ground for another during the removal 
process. If the employer's work methods could cause confusion for 
employees regarding the identity of a cable or cable end, then the 
employer must design the work rules and training to prevent employees 
from removing the ground ends of cables still attached at their line or 
equipment ends.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \419\ See, for example, the two accidents described at https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=200780245&id=922914.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, note that, during the periods before employees install 
all of the grounds and after employees remove the first end of a 
ground, the line or equipment involved must be considered as energized 
(under final Sec.  1926.960(b)(2)). As a result, the live work 
provisions in final Sec.  1926.960(c) apply during these periods. The 
employer's work rules and training must also account for this 
requirement. For example, when an employee cuts a deenergized and 
grounded conductor, unless both sides of the cut are grounded or 
connected by a bonding jumper, the employee must treat as energized the 
end that is not connected to ground when he or she is making the cut. 
In this case, the employer's work rules must either provide for 
grounding

[[Page 20519]]

both sides of the cut or ensure that the employee complies with the 
minimum approach-distance requirements with respect to the ungrounded 
end of the conductor.
    As the preamble to the proposal noted, with certain underground 
cable installations, the current from a fault at one location along the 
cable can create a substantial potential difference between the earth 
at that location and the earth at other locations (70 FR 34875). Under 
normal conditions, this is not a hazard. However, if an employee is in 
contact with a remote ground (by being in contact with a conductor 
grounded at a remote station), he or she can be exposed to the 
difference in potential (because he or she also is in contact with the 
local ground). To protect employees in such situations, final paragraph 
(g) prohibits grounding cables at remote locations if a hazardous 
potential transfer could occur under fault conditions. OSHA adopted 
this provision from existing Sec.  1910.269(n)(8), which has no 
counterpart in existing Subpart V. Mr. James Junga with Local 223 of 
the Utility Workers Union of America expressed support for this 
provision (Ex. 0197). OSHA is adopting paragraph (g) without 
substantive change from the proposal.
    Paragraph (h) addresses the removal of grounds for test purposes. 
Employers may permit employees to remove grounds for test purposes 
following the procedure specified by paragraph (h). Existing Subpart V 
contains a comparable requirement in Sec.  1926.954(g). However, the 
existing standard simply requires employees to take extreme caution 
when removing grounds for testing. In the preamble to the proposed 
rule, OSHA indicated that it did not believe that the existing language 
contains sufficient safeguards for employees (70 FR 34875). Therefore, 
the Agency is adopting performance criteria for testing procedures. 
OSHA took the language in final paragraph (h) from existing Sec.  
1910.269(n)(9). During the test procedure, the employer must: (1) 
Ensure that each employee uses insulating equipment, (2) isolate each 
employee from any hazards involved, and (3) implement any additional 
measures necessary to protect each exposed employee in case the 
previously grounded lines and equipment become energized. OSHA believes 
that the final rule protects employees better than the existing rule. 
The Agency received no comments on this provision in the proposal and 
is adopting it without substantive change from the proposal.
14. Section 1926.963, Testing and Test Facilities
    Section 1926.963 of the final rule contains safety work practices 
covering electrical hazards arising from the special testing of lines 
and equipment (namely, in-service and out-of-service, as well as new, 
lines and equipment) to determine maintenance needs and fitness for 
service. Generally, the NESC specifies the need to conduct tests on new 
and idle lines and equipment as part of normal checkout procedures, in 
addition to maintenance evaluations. As stated in paragraph (a), final 
Sec.  1926.963 applies only to testing involving interim measurements 
using high voltage, high power, or combinations of both high voltage 
and high power, as opposed to testing involving continuous measurements 
as in routine metering, relaying, and normal line work.
    OSHA adopted this section from existing Sec.  1910.269(o). Existing 
Subpart V has no counterpart to the requirements in this section. In 
the preamble to the proposal, the Agency stated its belief that 
employees perform these high-voltage and high-current tests during 
construction work and that employees and employers would benefit from 
the inclusion of these provisions in the construction standard instead 
of a reference to Sec.  1910.269 (70 FR 34876). However, in the 
proposal, OSHA requested comments on the need to include proposed Sec.  
1926.963 in Subpart V.
    The Agency received little response to this request for comments, 
but commenters who did respond supported the inclusion of proposed 
Sec.  1926.963 in the final rule. (See, for example, Exs. 0126, 0175, 
0186, 0213.) TVA expressed its support as follows:

    Our experience shows that the tests performed before new 
equipment and conductors are energized for electrical service on the 
system may be performed by either the construction contractor or the 
owner's maintenance and operations employees. It is recommended that 
the requirements in 1910.269(o) be repeated in proposed Sec. 
1926.963. [Ex. 0213]

    With the endorsement of these commenters, OSHA included Sec.  
1926.963 on testing and test facilities in the final rule.
    For the purposes of this section, OSHA assumes that high-voltage 
testing involves voltage sources having sufficient energy to cause 
injury and having magnitudes generally in excess of 1,000 volts, 
nominal. High-power testing involves sources of fault current, load 
current, magnetizing current, or line dropping current for testing, 
either at the rated voltage of the equipment under test or at lower 
voltages. Final Sec.  1926.963 covers such testing in laboratories, in 
shops and substations, and in the field. However, the Agency believes 
that testing in laboratories and shops will almost always fall under 
final Sec.  1910.269(o), rather than final Sec.  1926.963.
    Examples of typical special tests in which employees use either 
high-voltage sources or high-power sources as part of operation, 
maintenance, and construction of electric power transmission and 
distribution systems include cable-fault locating, large capacitive 
load tests, high current fault-closure tests, insulation-resistance and 
leakage tests, direct-current proof tests, and other tests requiring 
direct connection to power lines.
    Excluded from the scope of final Sec.  1926.963 are routine 
inspection- and maintenance-type measurements made by qualified 
employees for which the hazards associated with the use of intrinsic 
high-voltage or high-power sources require only the normal precautions 
specified by Subpart V. The work practices for these routine tests 
would have to comply with the rest of final Subpart V. Because this 
type of testing poses hazards that are identical to other types of 
routine electric power transmission and distribution work, OSHA 
believes that the requirements of final Subpart V, other than Sec.  
1926.963, adequately protect employees performing these tests. Two 
typical examples of such excluded test work procedures would be 
``phasing-out'' testing and testing for a ``no voltage'' condition. To 
clarify the scope of this section, OSHA included a note to this effect 
after paragraph (a).
    Paragraph (b)(1), which is being adopted without substantive change 
from the proposal, requires employers to establish and enforce work 
practices governing employees engaged in certain testing activities. 
These work practices delineate precautions that employees must observe 
for protection from the hazards of high-voltage or high-power testing. 
For example, if an employer uses high-voltage sources in the testing, 
the employer must institute safety practices under paragraph (b)(1) to 
protect employees against such typical hazards as inadvertent arcing or 
voltage overstress destruction, as well as accidental contact with 
objects that have induced voltage from electric field exposure. If an 
employer uses high-power sources in the testing, the employer must 
establish safety practices to protect employees against such typical 
hazards as ground voltage rise, as well as exposure to excessive

[[Page 20520]]

electromagnetic forces associated with the passage of heavy current.
    These practices apply to work performed at both permanent and 
temporary test areas (that is, areas permanently located in 
laboratories or shops or in temporary areas located in the field). At a 
minimum, the safety work practices include:
    (1) Safeguards for the test area to prevent inadvertent contact 
with energized parts,
    (2) Safe grounding practices,
    (3) Precautions for the use of control and measuring circuits, and
    (4) Periodic checks of field test areas.
    Final paragraph (b)(2) complements the general rule on the use of 
safe work practices in test areas with a requirement that employers 
ensure that each employee involved in these safety test practices 
receives training in safe work practices upon his or her initial 
assignment to the test area. This paragraph simply makes explicit one 
type of training required in any event by the general training 
provisions in final Sec.  1926.950(b). Paragraph (b)(2) of final Sec.  
1926.963 also requires the employer to provide retraining as required 
by final Sec.  1926.950(b). OSHA is adopting paragraph (b)(2) of final 
Sec.  1926.963 without substantive change from the proposal.
    Although specific work practices used in test areas generally are 
unique to a particular test, three basic elements affecting safety are 
commonly present to some degree at all test sites: Safeguarding, 
grounding, and the safe use of control and measuring circuits. By 
considering safe work practices in these three categories, OSHA 
provided a performance-oriented standard applicable to high-voltage and 
high-power testing and test facilities.
    OSHA believes that employers can best achieve safeguarding when 
they provide it both around and within test areas. By controlling 
access to all parts that are likely to become energized by either 
direct or inductive coupling, the standard will prevent accidental 
contact by employees. Within test areas, whether temporary or 
permanent, employers can achieve a degree of safety by ensuring that 
employees observe safeguarding practices that control access to test 
areas. Therefore, paragraph (c)(1), which is being adopted without 
substantive change from the proposal, requires that employers provide 
such safeguarding if the test equipment or apparatus under test could 
become energized as part of the testing by either direct or inductive 
coupling. A combination of guards \420\ and barriers \421\ or 
barricades \422\ can provide protection to all employees in the 
vicinity of the testing. In final paragraph (c)(1) and elsewhere in 
paragraphs (b) and (c) of final Sec.  1926.963, OSHA changed the words 
``guarding'' and ``guarded'' to ``safeguarding'' and ``safeguarded,'' 
respectively, to clarify when employers may use protective measures 
other than guards, such as barricades.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \420\ A guard is a physical barrier to an area or hazard. It is 
usually an enclosure.
    \421\ According to final Sec.  1926.968, a ``barrier'' is ``[a] 
physical obstruction that prevents contact with energized lines or 
equipment or prevents unauthorized access to a work area.'' Fences 
and walls are examples of barriers.
    \422\ According to final Sec.  1926.968, ``barricade'' is ``[a] 
physical obstruction such as tapes, cones, or A-frame type wood or 
metal structures that provides a warning about, and limits access 
to, a hazardous area.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Paragraph (c)(2), which is being adopted without substantive change 
from the proposal, requires employers to guard permanent test areas, 
such as laboratories, by having them completely enclosed by walls or 
some other type of physical barrier. In the case of field testing, 
paragraph (c)(3) provides a level of safety for temporary test sites 
comparable to that achieved in permanent test areas. For these areas, 
if employers do not provide permanent fences or gates, employers must 
either (1) use distinctively colored safety tape--approximately waist 
high--with safety signs attached or (2) station one or more observers 
to monitor the test area. Paragraph (c)(3), which is being adopted 
without substantive change from the proposal, also accepts safeguarding 
of test areas by any barriers or barricades that limit access to the 
test area in a manner that is physically and visually equivalent to the 
safety tape with signs that employers can use under paragraph 
(c)(3)(i).
    Since failing to remove a temporary safeguarding means when it is 
not required can severely compromise its effectiveness, employers must 
make frequent safety checks of the safeguarding means to monitor its 
use. For example, leaving barriers in place for a week when the 
employer performs testing only an hour or two per day is likely to 
result in disregard for the barriers. Accordingly, final paragraph 
(c)(4) requires employers to ensure the removal of temporary safeguards 
when they are no longer needed for the protection of employees.\423\ 
OSHA changed the word ``barrier'' in this paragraph to ``safeguards'' 
because ``safeguards'' more accurately describes the protective 
measures required by paragraph (c)(3) than barriers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \423\ Employees who serve as test observers under final 
paragraph (c)(3)(iii) need not leave the area. However, they no 
longer function as test observers when the protection they provide 
is no longer needed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Suitable grounding is another important work practice that 
employers can use to protect employees from the hazards of high-voltage 
or high-power testing. If employers use high currents in the testing, 
they can use an isolated ground-return conductor, adequate for the 
service, so that heavy current, with its attendant voltage rise, will 
not pass in the ground grid or the earth. Another safety consideration 
involving grounding is that employers should maintain at ground 
potential all conductive parts accessible to the test operator while 
the equipment is operating at high voltage. Final paragraph (d) 
contains requirements for proper grounding at test sites.
    Final paragraph (d)(1) requires that employers establish and 
implement safe grounding practices for test facilities that will ensure 
proper grounding of conductive parts accessible to the test operator 
and that will ensure that all ungrounded terminals of test equipment or 
apparatus under test are treated as energized until determined to be 
deenergized by tests. The final rule drops the exception for ``portions 
of the equipment that are isolated from the test operator by guarding'' 
specified in proposed paragraph (d)(1) because guarded parts of 
equipment are not accessible to the operator.
    Paragraph (d)(2), which is being adopted without substantive change 
from the proposal, requires employers to ensure either that visible 
grounds are applied automatically, or that employees using properly 
insulated tools manually apply visible grounds, to the high-voltage 
circuits. The grounds must be applied after the circuits are 
deenergized but before employees perform work on the circuit or on the 
item or apparatus under test. This paragraph also requires common 
ground connections to be solidly connected to the test equipment and 
apparatus under test.
    Paragraph (d)(3), which is being adopted without substantive change 
from the proposal, addresses hazards resulting from the use of 
inadequate ground returns. Inadequate ground returns can result in a 
voltage rise in the ground grid or in the earth whenever high currents 
occur during the testing.\424\ This paragraph requires the use of an 
isolated ground return so that no intentional passage of current, with

[[Page 20521]]

its attendant voltage rise, can occur in the ground grid or in the 
earth. However, under some conditions, it may be impractical to provide 
an isolated ground return. In such cases, it would not be reasonable to 
require an isolated ground-return conductor system. Therefore, final 
paragraph (d)(3) provides an exception to the requirement for an 
isolated ground return if the employer cannot use isolated ground 
returns because of the distance between the test site and the electric 
energy source and if the employer protects employees from hazardous 
step and touch potentials that may develop.\425\ Employers must always 
consider the possibility of voltage gradients developing in the earth 
during impulse, short-circuit, inrush, or oscillatory conditions. 
Examples of acceptable protection from step and touch potentials 
include suitable electrical protective equipment and the removal of 
employees from areas that may expose them to hazardous potentials.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \424\ High current can occur during high-voltage testing, in 
which case the testing would also be high-power testing.
    \425\ The term ``step and touch potentials'' refers to voltages 
that can appear between the feet of an observer or between his or 
her body and a grounded object.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A note following final paragraph (d)(3)(ii) indicates that Appendix 
C contains information on measures employers can take to protect 
employees from hazardous step and touch potentials. Mr. Brad Davis with 
BGE noted that IEEE Std 80, Guide for Safety in AC Substation 
Grounding, is a good reference for guidance on protecting against 
hazardous step and touch potentials (Ex. 0126). OSHA reviewed IEEE Std 
80-2000 and agrees that it does provide useful guidance on measures to 
protect employees from hazardous differences in electric potential, 
even though it applies to substation grounding rather than to high-
voltage and high-power testing. Therefore, OSHA included references to 
this standard in both Appendix C, Protection from Step and Touch 
Potentials, and Appendix G, Reference Documents.
    Final paragraph (d)(4) addresses situations in which grounding 
through the power cord of test equipment would prevent employers from 
taking satisfactory measurements or would result in greater hazards for 
test operators. Normally, an equipment grounding conductor in the power 
cord of test equipment connects it to a grounding connection in the 
power receptacle. However, in some circumstances, this practice can 
prevent satisfactory measurements, or current induced in the grounding 
conductor can cause a hazard to employees. If these conditions exist, 
the use of the equipment grounding conductor within the cord would not 
be mandatory. In such situations, final paragraph (d)(4) requires the 
employer to use a ground clearly indicated in the test set up (for 
example, a ground with a distinctive appearance), and the employer must 
demonstrate that the ground used affords safety equivalent to the 
protection afforded by an equipment grounding conductor in the power 
supply cord. OSHA reworded this paragraph in the final rule for 
clarity.
    Final paragraph (d)(5) addresses grounding after tests and requires 
the employer to ensure that a ground is placed on the high-voltage 
terminal and any other exposed terminals when any employee enters the 
test area after equipment is deenergized. In the case of high 
capacitance equipment or apparatus, before any employee applies the 
direct ground, the employer must discharge the equipment or apparatus 
through a resistor having an adequate rating for the available energy. 
A direct ground must be applied to exposed terminals after the stored 
energy drops to a level at which it is safe to do so. OSHA adopted this 
paragraph substantially as proposed. The Agency reworded paragraph 
(d)(5)(i) to explicitly require the employer to discharge equipment or 
apparatus before a direct ground is applied. The proposed rule implied 
this requirement by ordering paragraph (d)(5)(i), which required 
employers to discharge the equipment or apparatus, before paragraph 
(d)(5)(ii), which required the application of a direct ground.
    Paragraph (d)(6), which is being adopted without substantive change 
from the proposal, addresses the hazards associated with field testing 
in which employers use test trailers or test vehicles. This paragraph 
requires that the chassis of such vehicles be grounded and further 
requires employers to protect employees, by bonding, insulation, or 
isolation, against hazardous touch potentials with respect to the 
vehicle, instrument panels, and other conductive parts accessible to 
the employees. The following examples describe the protection provided 
by each of these methods:
    (1) Protection by bonding: Provide, around the vehicle, an area 
covered by a metallic mat or mesh of substantial cross-section and low 
impedance, with the mat or mesh bonded to the vehicle at several points 
and to an adequate number of driven ground rods or, where available, to 
an adequate number of accessible points on the station ground grid. All 
bonding conductors must be of sufficient electrical size to keep the 
voltage developed during maximum anticipated current tests at a safe 
value. The mat must be of a size that precludes simultaneous contact 
with the vehicle and with the earth or with metallic structures not 
adequately bonded to the mat.
    (2) Protection by insulation: Provide, around the vehicle, an area 
of dry wooden planks covered with rubber insulating blankets. The 
physical extent of the insulated area must be sufficient to prevent 
simultaneous contact between the vehicle, or the ground lead of the 
vehicle, and the earth or metallic structures in the vicinity.
    (3) Protection by isolation: Provide an effective means to exclude 
employees from any area where they could make simultaneous contact 
between the vehicle (or conductive parts electrically connected to the 
vehicle) and other conductive materials. Employers may use a 
combination of barriers, together with effective, interlocked gates, to 
ensure that the system is deenergized when an employee enters the test 
area.
    Finally, a third category of safe work practices applicable to 
employers performing testing work, which complements the first two 
safety work practices of safeguarding and grounding, involves work 
practices associated with the installation of control and measurement 
circuits used at test facilities. Employers must adopt the practices 
necessary for the protection of personnel and equipment from the 
hazards of high-voltage or high-power testing for every test using 
special signal-gathering equipment (that is, meters, oscilloscopes, and 
other special instruments). In addition, special settings on protective 
relays and reexamination of backup schemes may be necessary to ensure 
an adequate level of safety during the tests or to minimize the effects 
of the testing on other parts of the system under test. Accordingly, 
final paragraphs (e)(1) through (e)(4) address the principal safe work 
practices associated with control and measuring circuits used in the 
test area.
    Generally, control wiring, meter connections, test leads, and 
cables should remain within the test area. Paragraph (e)(1), which is 
being adopted without substantive change from the proposal, contains 
requirements to minimize hazards involving test wiring routed outside 
the test area. The employer may not run control wiring, meter 
connections, test leads, or cables from a test area unless contained in 
a grounded metallic sheath and terminated in a grounded metallic 
enclosure or unless the employer takes other precautions that it can 
demonstrate will provide employees

[[Page 20522]]

with equivalent safety, such as guarding the area so that employees do 
not have access to parts that could be hazardous.
    Paragraph (e)(2), which is being adopted without substantive change 
from the proposal, prevents possible hazards that arise from 
inadvertent contact with energized accessible terminals or parts of 
meters and other test instruments. Employers must isolate meters and 
instruments with such terminals or parts from employees performing 
tests. If an employer provides isolation by locating test equipment in 
metal compartments with viewing windows, the employer must also provide 
interlocks that interrupt the power supply when someone opens the 
compartment cover.
    Paragraph (e)(3) of the final rule addresses protecting temporary 
wiring and its connections from damage. This paragraph requires the 
employer to protect temporary wiring and its connections against 
damage, accidental interruptions, and other hazards. This paragraph 
also requires employers to keep the functional wiring used for the test 
set-up (that is, signal, control, ground, and power cables) separate 
from each other to the maximum extent possible, thereby minimizing the 
coupling of hazardous voltages into the control and measuring circuits. 
Paragraph (e)(3) in the proposal would have required employers to 
secure ``[t]he routing and connections of temporary wiring'' against 
hazards. Paragraph (e)(3) of the final rule clarifies that the employer 
has to protect the temporary wiring and its connections against 
hazards.
    Paragraph (e)(4) of the final rule identifies a final safety work 
practice requirement related to control circuits. This paragraph, which 
is being adopted without substantive change from the proposal, requires 
the presence of a test observer in the test area during the entire test 
period if employees will be in the area. The test observer must be 
capable of immediately deenergizing all test circuits for safety 
purposes.
    Since the conditions for conducting field tests differ in important 
respects from those for laboratory tests, employers must take extra 
care to ensure appropriate levels of safety. Under field test 
conditions, employers usually do not provide permanent fences and gates 
for isolating the field test area, nor is there a permanent conduit for 
the instrumentation and control wiring. Additional hazards include 
sources of high-voltage electric energy in the vicinity, other than the 
source of test voltage.
    It is not always possible in the field for the employer to erect 
fences and interlocked gates to prevent employee ingress into a test 
area, as is possible during laboratory testing. Consequently, as 
described earlier under the summary and explanation for final paragraph 
(c)(3), employers must use readily recognizable means to discourage 
such ingress during field testing. Accordingly, final paragraph (f)(1) 
requires employers to adopt safety practices that provide for a safety 
check of temporary and field test areas before employees begin each 
group of continuous tests (that is, a series of tests conducted one 
immediately after another). Final paragraph (f)(2) provides that the 
test operator responsible for the testing verify, before the initiation 
of a continuous period of testing, the status of several safety 
conditions. These conditions include the state and placement of 
barriers and safeguards, the condition of status signals, the marking 
and availability of disconnects, the provision of clearly identifiable 
ground connections, the provision and use of necessary personal 
protective equipment, and the separation of signal, ground, and power 
cables. OSHA adopted paragraphs (f)(1) and (f)(2) without substantive 
change from the proposal.
Section 1926.964, Overhead Lines and Live-Line Barehand Work
    As noted in paragraph (a)(1), Sec.  1926.964 of the final rule 
applies to work performed on or near overhead lines and equipment. The 
types of work performed on overhead lines and addressed by this section 
include the installation and removal of overhead lines, live-line 
barehand work, and work on towers and structures, which typically 
expose employees to the hazards of falls and electric shock.
    Section 1926.955 of existing Subpart V covers overhead lines. As 
OSHA noted in the preamble to the proposal, several requirements in the 
existing standard are redundant, and the Agency believes the existing 
section needs better organization (70 FR 34878). For example, existing 
paragraphs (c) and (d) both apply to the installation of lines parallel 
to existing lines. Existing paragraph (c)(3) requires the employer to 
ground lines being installed where there is a danger of hazardous 
induced voltage, unless the employer makes provisions to isolate or 
insulate employees. Paragraph (d)(1) of existing Sec.  1926.955 
contains a similar requirement, and the rest of paragraph (d) specifies 
exactly how employers are to install the grounding.
    Paragraph (q) of existing Sec.  1910.269 also addresses work on 
overhead lines. When OSHA proposed to revise Subpart V, the Agency 
stated that it believed that ``the newer standard is much better 
organized, contains no redundancies, and better protects employees than 
the older construction standard'' (70 FR 34878). Therefore, the Agency 
used existing Sec.  1910.269(q), rather than existing Sec.  1926.955, 
as the base document in developing proposed Sec.  1926.964. However, 
OSHA also proposed requirements for Sec.  1926.964 that the Agency took 
from existing Sec.  1926.955 pertaining specifically to construction 
work. (Paragraph (q) of existing Sec.  1910.269 does not contain these 
requirements, because it does not apply to construction.) For example, 
OSHA included the requirements of existing Sec.  1926.955(b), which 
applies to metal-tower construction, in the proposed revision of 
Subpart V.
    Paragraph (a)(2), which is being adopted without substantive change 
from the proposal, requires the employer to determine that elevated 
structures such as poles and towers are strong enough to withstand the 
stresses imposed by the work employees will perform on them. For 
example, if the work involves removing and reinstalling an existing 
line on a utility pole, the pole must withstand the weight of the 
employee (a vertical force) and the forces resulting from the release 
and replacement of the overhead line (a vertical and possibly a 
horizontal force). The additional stress involved may cause the pole to 
break, particularly if the pole is rotted at its base. If the pole or 
structure cannot withstand the imposed loads, the employer must 
reinforce the pole or structure so that failure does not occur. This 
rule protects employees from hazards posed by the failure of a pole or 
other elevated structure. OSHA took this requirement, which is 
equivalent to existing Sec.  1926.955(a)(2), (a)(3), and (a)(4), from 
existing Sec.  1910.269(q)(1)(i).
    In ascertaining whether a wood pole is safe to climb, as required 
under paragraph (a)(2), it is important to check the actual condition 
of the pole for the presence of decay or other conditions adversely 
affecting the strength of the pole.\426\ Appendix D to Subpart V 
contains methods of inspecting and testing the condition of wood 
structures before employees climb those structures. OSHA took these 
methods,

[[Page 20523]]

which employers can use in ascertaining whether a wood structure is 
capable of sustaining the forces imposed by an employee climbing it, 
from Appendix D to existing Sec.  1910.269. Note that the employer also 
must ascertain whether the pole is capable of sustaining any additional 
forces imposed on it during the work, such as the weight of employees 
working on it, the weight of any new or replaced equipment installed on 
it, and forces resulting from putting tension on conductors and guys. A 
note to this effect follows paragraph (a)(2). The note also references 
Appendix D.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \426\ In some cases, the host employer will know about the 
condition of a pole, such as when the host employer has results from 
a pole-inspection program. Host employers must pass any such 
information to employees (as required by final Sec.  1926.952(a)(1)) 
and contractors (as required by final Sec.  1926.950(c)(1)(ii)). 
However, in most cases, the employee at the worksite will still need 
to inspect the structure for deterioration to determine whether it 
is safe to climb.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The employer can comply with final paragraph (a)(2) by ensuring 
that the design of support structures can withstand the stresses 
involved, training employees in proper inspection and evaluation 
techniques, and enforcing company rules that adhere to the standard. 
OSHA notes that employees in the field do not necessarily have 
structural engineering skills, so in many situations--such as those 
involving the installation of new, heavier, equipment in place of 
older, lighter, equipment--the employer might need to have its 
engineering staff conduct engineering analyses to ensure that the pole 
can withstand the stresses involved. (Typically, utilities perform this 
task in the initial design of the system or when they plan changes to 
it.) In such situations, the Agency still expects the employer to have 
the determination of the condition of the pole or structure made at the 
worksite by an employee who is capable of making this determination.
    When employees handle a pole near overhead lines, it is necessary 
to prevent the pole from contacting exposed, energized lines. Paragraph 
(a)(3)(i) of final Sec.  1926.964 prohibits letting the pole come into 
direct contact with exposed, energized overhead conductors. One measure 
commonly used to prevent such contact involves pulling conductors away 
from the area where the pole will go. OSHA took final paragraph 
(a)(3)(i), which is equivalent to existing Sec.  1926.955(a)(5)(i), 
from existing Sec.  1910.269(q)(1)(ii).
    Mr. Brian Erga with ESCI recommended that OSHA revise this section 
to specify the measures that employers must take if employees bring 
poles within the minimum approach distance, explaining:

    Poles whether wood, steel or concrete are conductive, often very 
conductive, and should never enter MAD without insulated cover-up. 
However, the task of taking poles into MAD is conducted thousands of 
times each day across the US. OSHA needs to insure that safe work 
practices are used when working with poles. [Ex. 0155]

    Paragraph (a)(3)(i) of the final rule protects employees against 
injury from contact with conductors knocked down by poles being set, 
moved, or removed. OSHA did not design this paragraph primarily to 
protect against electric shock caused by approaching too closely to 
energized parts. OSHA agrees with Mr. Erga that poles are conductive 
and that employees must not take them within the minimum approach 
distance of energized parts. However, final Sec.  1926.960(c)(1)(iii) 
already prohibits employees from taking any conductive object closer to 
exposed energized parts than the employer's established minimum 
approach distance, unless employers take certain protective measures. 
The Agency believes that it is unnecessary to repeat those requirements 
or alter them here. However, it is possible that the preamble to the 
proposal prompted Mr. Erga's comment; the preamble indicated that 
``[m]easures commonly used to prevent . . . contact [between poles and 
lines] include installation of insulating guards on the pole'' (70 FR 
34879). In light of Mr. Erga's apparent confusion, OSHA did not include 
this example in the final explanation for paragraph (a)(3)(i). In any 
event, Mr. Erga's recommendation does not protect employees from injury 
by conductors knocked down by poles. Therefore, OSHA is adopting 
paragraph (a)(3)(i) substantively as proposed.
    Paragraph (a)(3)(ii) requires the employer to ensure that employees 
who handle a pole while setting, moving, or removing it near an exposed 
energized overhead conductor use electrical protective equipment or 
insulated devices and do not contact the pole with uninsulated parts of 
their bodies. OSHA took this provision from existing Sec.  
1910.269(q)(1)(iii). NIOSH supported proposed paragraph (a)(3)(ii), 
noting that ``[e]lectrocutions have occurred when ground workers not 
wearing PPE were guiding poles into holes and a powerline was 
contacted'' (Ex. 0130). OSHA is adopting paragraph (a)(3)(ii) without 
change from the proposal.
    Existing Sec.  1926.955(a)(6)(i), which OSHA did not adopt in final 
Sec.  1926.964, requires employers to ensure that employees standing on 
the ground do not contact equipment or machinery that is working 
adjacent to energized lines or equipment, unless the employees are 
using suitable electrical protective equipment. The final rule covers 
the hazards of using mechanical equipment near energized parts in Sec.  
1926.959, discussed earlier in this section of the preamble, and the 
Agency does not believe that there is a need for redundancy in Sec.  
1926.964. In fact, OSHA designed the final rule to eliminate the 
redundant and conflicting requirements contained in existing Subpart V. 
OSHA notes that it also left existing Sec.  1926.955(a)(5)(ii), 
(a)(6)(ii), and (a)(8) out of final Sec.  1926.964 because final Sec.  
1926.959 already adequately covers the hazards addressed by these 
provisions (that is, hazards related to operation of mechanical 
equipment near energized parts).
    Paragraphs (a)(3)(i) and (a)(3)(ii) protect employees from hazards 
caused by falling power lines and by the pole's contacting the line. 
They apply in addition to other applicable provisions, including 
requirements in final Sec.  1926.959(d) for operations involving 
mechanical equipment and in final Sec.  1926.960(c)(1)(iii) for minimum 
approach distances.
    To protect employees from falling into holes dug for poles, 
paragraph (a)(3)(iii), which is being adopted without substantive 
change from the proposal, requires employers to physically guard the 
holes, or ensure that employees attend the holes, whenever anyone is 
working nearby.\427\ OSHA took this provision, which is equivalent to 
existing Sec.  1926.955(a)(7), from existing Sec.  1910.269(q)(1)(iv).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \427\ For the purpose of Sec.  1926.964(a)(3)(iii), ``nearby'' 
means that an employee on the ground is near enough to the hole that 
he or she could fall into it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Paragraph (b) addresses the installation and removal of overhead 
lines. OSHA took the provisions contained in this paragraph from 
existing Sec.  1910.269(q)(2), which OSHA based in large part on 
existing Sec.  1926.955(c) (stringing and removing deenergized 
conductors) and Sec.  1926.955(d) (stringing adjacent to energized 
lines). However, the final rule, as with existing Sec.  1910.269(q)(2), 
combines these provisions into a single paragraph (b). OSHA believes 
that these provisions, which combine and simplify the construction 
requirements for stringing overhead lines, will be easier for employers 
and employees to understand. OSHA added ``(overhead lines)'' after 
``overhead conductors or cable'' in the introductory text to paragraph 
(b) in the final rule to clarify that paragraph (b) uses these terms 
synonymously.
    Paragraph (b)(1) requires employers to take precautions to minimize 
the possibility that conductors and cables, during installation and 
removal, will contact energized power lines or equipment. This 
paragraph requires

[[Page 20524]]

employers to do so by stringing conductors using the tension-stringing 
method (which keeps the conductors off the ground and clear of 
energized circuits) or by using barriers, such as rope nets and guards 
(which physically prevent one line from contacting another). Employers 
also may use equivalent measures. This paragraph protects employees 
against electric shock and against the effects of equipment damage 
resulting from accidental contact between the line and energized parts 
during line installation and removal.
    Ms. Salud Layton with the Virginia, Maryland and Delaware 
Association of Electric Cooperatives asked the Agency to ``clarify that 
this requirement is necessary to avoid hazards only when crossing or 
paralleling existing energized cables and conductors'' (Ex. 0175).
    OSHA generally agrees with this comment, but notes that the 
required precautions are necessary whenever the lines can contact any 
energized parts, not just existing energized cables and conductors. 
Therefore, to clarify the rule, the Agency added the clause ``[w]hen 
lines that employees are installing or removing can contact energized 
parts'' at the beginning of final paragraph (b)(1).
    Even though the precautions taken under paragraph (b)(1) minimize 
the possibility of accidental contact, there is still a significant 
residual risk that the line could contact energized parts during 
installation or removal of the line. In the 1994 rulemaking on Sec.  
1910.269, OSHA concluded that the hazards posed during line 
installation or removal were equivalent to the hazards posed during the 
operations of mechanical equipment near energized parts (59 FR 4406). 
Employee exposure to hazardous differences in potential occurs if, 
during installation or removal of the line, the conductor or the 
equipment installing or removing the conductor contacts an energized 
part. The methods of protection employers can apply also are the same 
in both cases. Therefore, the Agency concluded that the approach 
applied to the hazard associated with contact between mechanical 
equipment and overhead lines also should apply to the hazard associated 
with contact between an existing energized conductor and a line during 
installation and removal of the line. Accordingly, paragraph (b)(2) of 
proposed Sec.  1926.964 adopted the requirements of proposed Sec.  
1926.959(d)(3) by reference for conductors, cables, and pulling and 
tensioning equipment in situations in which employees install or remove 
conductors or cables close enough to energized conductors that certain 
failures (in the pulling or tensioning equipment, the conductor or 
cable being pulled, or the previously installed lines or equipment) 
could energize the pulling or tensioning equipment, conductor, or 
cable. Therefore, the proposal essentially provided that the employer 
would have to institute measures to protect employees from hazardous 
differences in potential at the work location. (See the discussion of 
final Sec.  1926.959(d)(3) and Appendix C to Subpart V for acceptable 
methods of compliance.)
    Mr. Brian Erga with ESCI recommended that the heading to paragraph 
(b)(2) be shortened from ``Conductors, cables, and puling and 
tensioning equipment'' to ``Pulling and Tensioning Equipment'' (Ex. 
0155). Mr. Erga also proposed extensive new language for this 
provision, explaining:

    [ESCI's] proposed changes to 1926.694(b)(2) [use] current 
industry safe work practices accepted in the electrical industry and 
supported by IEEE 516 Section 7.5 and IEEE 1048 Section 10. These 
changes are the current thinking of the industry and should be 
followed to protect workers near mechanical equipment. [Id.]

    As discussed earlier in this section of the preamble, Mr. Erga made 
a similar proposal with respect to proposed Sec.  1926.959(d)(3) (id.). 
OSHA rejected that proposal. (See the summary and explanation for final 
Sec.  1926.959(d)(3), earlier in this section of the preamble.) The 
Agency is declining to adopt Mr. Erga's proposal here for the same 
reasons. In addition, OSHA believes that it is important for the final 
rule to allow employers to set the same procedures for protecting 
pulling and tensioning equipment as they set for other types of 
mechanical equipment; the hazards, and the methods of protecting 
employees, are the same. The Agency declines to change the heading for 
this paragraph, as suggested by Mr. Erga, because this paragraph 
applies not only to pulling and tensioning equipment, but to conductors 
and cables as well. Therefore, OSHA adopted paragraph (b)(2) 
substantially as proposed. In the final rule, OSHA replaced the word 
``wire'' with ``conductor'' for consistency, as proposed Sec.  
1926.964(b)(2) used these words interchangeably.
    Mr. James Junga with Local 223 of the Utility Workers Union of 
America requested clarification of proposed paragraph (b)(2) as it 
applies to pulling underground cables up a pole (Ex. 0197). First, he 
asked if this provision addressed the stress that the pulling operation 
puts on the pole (id.). OSHA notes that it addressed these hazards in 
final paragraph (a)(2), which requires the employer to determine that 
elevated structures such as poles and towers are strong enough to 
withstand the stresses imposed by the work employees will perform. In 
making that determination, the employer must consider the stresses 
imposed by pulling underground cables up a pole.
    Second, Mr. Junga asked whether paragraph (b)(2) applies to pulling 
operations when employees pull an underground cable up a pole between 
energized conductors. OSHA considers an underground cable-pulling 
operation to fall under the overhead line provisions whenever employees 
pull the ``underground'' cable up a pole or other overhead structure 
because the cable is an overhead line where the cable rises overhead. 
Thus, the precautions in final paragraph (b)(2) apply when employees 
pull an underground cable up a pole close enough to energized 
conductors that the specified failures could energize the pulling or 
tensioning equipment or the cable.
    Paragraph (b)(3), which is being adopted without substantive change 
from the proposal, requires the disabling of the automatic-reclosing 
feature of the devices protecting any circuit for conductors energized 
at more than 600 volts and that pass under conductors employees are 
installing or removing. If the employer did not make the automatic-
reclosing feature inoperable, it would cause the circuit protective 
devices to reenergize the circuit after they had tripped, exposing the 
employees to additional or more severe injury.
    Final paragraph (b)(1) requires the use of techniques that minimize 
the possibility of contact between existing and new conductors. Final 
paragraph (b)(2) requires the use of measures that protect employees 
from hazardous differences in potential. These two paragraphs provide 
the primary protection to employees installing conductors. Final 
paragraph (b)(3) is a redundant form of protection; it provides an 
additional measure of safety in case the employer violates the first 
two provisions.\428\ Therefore, this paragraph applies only to circuit 
reclosing devices designed to permit the disabling of the automatic-
reclosing feature. The Agency believes that the

[[Page 20525]]

combination of final paragraphs (b)(1), (b)(2), and (b)(3) will provide 
effective protection to employees against the electrical hazards 
associated with installing or removing lines near energized parts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \428\ Disabling the reclosing feature of circuit protective 
devices does not provide any protection against initial contact with 
the energized circuit involved. It only prevents the devices from 
reenergizing the circuit after they open it on a fault condition as 
would occur, for example, when a line an employee is stringing drops 
onto an energized conductor.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    OSHA proposed paragraph (b)(4) to protect workers from the hazard 
of induced voltage on lines they are installing near (and usually 
parallel to) other energized lines. Proposed paragraph (b)(4) contained 
supplemental provisions on grounding that would have applied, in 
addition to grounding requirements elsewhere in Subpart V. The proposed 
paragraph generally would have required employers to ground these lines 
to minimize the voltage and protect employees handling the lines from 
electric shock when there was a hazard from induced voltage.
    Proposed paragraph (b)(4) provided that, before employees install 
lines parallel to existing energized lines, the employer would have to 
determine the approximate voltage to be induced in the new lines or 
assume that the induced voltage would be hazardous. Additionally, the 
proposal would have permitted employers to treat the line as energized 
rather than comply with the grounding requirements contained in 
proposed paragraph (b)(4). As proposed, paragraph (b)(4) contained five 
requirements that would have applied unless: (a) The employer could 
demonstrate that the lines being installed were not subject to the 
induction of hazardous voltage or (b) the lines were treated as 
energized. These provisions would have required employers to:
    (1) Install grounds on each bare conductor in increments of no more 
than 2 miles (proposed paragraph (b)(4)(i));
    (2) Ensure that grounds remain in place until completion of the 
installation between dead ends (proposed paragraph (b)(4)(ii));
    (3) Remove grounds as the last phase of aerial cleanup (proposed 
paragraph (b)(4)(iii));
    (4) Install grounds at each work location and at all open dead-end 
or catch-off points or the next adjacent structure when employees are 
working on bare conductors (proposed paragraph (b)(4)(iv)); and
    (5) Bond and ground bare conductors before splicing them (proposed 
paragraph (b)(4)(v)).
    Mr. Brian Erga with ESCI objected to the requirements in proposed 
paragraph (b)(4), maintaining that the proposed provisions had serious 
flaws that posed hazards to employees (Exs. 0155, 0471; Tr. 1254-1256). 
He proposed alternative provisions to protect workers installing lines 
from hazards associated with the lines becoming energized either 
through contact with energized parts or by electromagnetic or 
electrostatic induction (id.). He explained:

    [S]everal paragraphs in the current section of OSHA 1910.269(q) 
and the proposed section of OSHA 1926.964 are simply wrong and ``old 
school.'' Much of the current and proposed regulations rely on 
theories and beliefs that have been found to be totally incorrect 
and in some cases deadly wrong.
    OSHA 1910.269(q)(2)(iv) and 1926.964(b)(4)(i) requires:
    (i) Each bare conductor shall be grounded in increments so that 
no point along the conductor is more than 3.22 km (2 miles) from a 
ground.
    (ii) If employees are working on bare conductors, grounds shall 
also be installed at each work location where these employees are 
working and grounds shall be installed at all open dead-ends or 
catch-off points or the next adjacent structure.
    OSHA 1926.964(b)(4)(i) through (b)(4)(iv) provides no protection 
and cannot be justified with today's knowledge of equipotential 
grounding procedures. These procedures are not supported in any 
industry published documents and contradicts IEEE 1048.
    . . . ESCI has yet to find an industry expert who can explain 
the reason for OSHA 1910.269(q)(2)(iv) and 1926.964(b)(4)(i). In 
fact these procedures create lethal hazards on de-energized lines 
and equipment for workers. Again, these rules are from the days when 
we believed in safety of ``felt hats'' and the ``horse and buggy.''
    Documented fatal accidents prove multiple sets of grounds on the 
same de-energized line can create electrostatic induction at lethal 
levels. On December 18, 2000, Connecticut Light and Power sustained 
a fatal accident when a qualified worker was electrocuted on a 
grounded static wire, of a de-energized and grounded line that was 
grounded in multiple locations along the lines route . . . .
    IEEE 1048-2003, Section 4.4.2 ``Magnetic coupling under normal 
conditions'' discusses the hazard developed by closing the station 
ground switches and installing grounds at the worksite (use of 
multiple grounds at multiple locations along the line). This hazard 
can be easily eliminated by grounding at one location; the worksite 
with [an equipotential zone].
    Other industry studies have shown that more than one personal 
protective ground, installed at the work location, does nothing but 
create additional hazards. [Ex. 0471]

    Mr. Erga's comment convinced the Agency that multiple unnecessary 
grounds can lead to injury and that proposed paragraph (b)(4), which 
provided for multiple redundant grounds, is therefore insufficiently 
protective. Furthermore, OSHA notes that other provisions in the 
standard that require protective grounding impose performance 
requirements that protect employees from hazardous differences in 
potential. For example, final Sec.  1926.962(c) requires temporary 
protective grounds to be placed on deenergized conductors to prevent 
employee exposure to hazardous differences in electric potential. 
Paragraph (d)(3)(iii) of final Sec.  1926.959 requires employers to 
protect each employee from hazards that might arise from mechanical 
equipment's contacting energized lines, including protection from 
hazardous differences in electric potential. OSHA decided to adopt a 
similar provision here. First, the Agency divided paragraph (b)(4) of 
proposed Sec.  1926.964 into two paragraphs. Final paragraph (b)(4)(i), 
which is described further later in this section of the preamble, 
contains the first sentence from the introductory text to proposed 
paragraph (b)(4) without substantive change. Paragraph (b)(4)(ii), 
which replaces the last sentence of the introductory text to proposed 
paragraph (b)(4) and proposed paragraphs (b)(4)(i) through (b)(4)(v), 
sets the employer's obligation to protect employees from hazardous 
differences in potential unless the lines employees are installing are 
not subject to the induction of a hazardous voltage or unless the lines 
are treated as energized. Paragraph (b)(4)(ii) of the final rule reads 
as follows:

    Unless the employer can demonstrate that the lines that 
employees are installing are not subject to the induction of a 
hazardous voltage or unless the lines are treated as energized, 
temporary protective grounds shall be placed at such locations and 
arranged in such a manner that the employer can demonstrate will 
prevent exposure of each employee to hazardous differences in 
electric potential.

OSHA also added a note following this paragraph, similar to the notes 
to final Sec. Sec.  1926.959(d)(3)(iii) and 1926.962(c), indicating 
that Appendix C contains guidelines for protecting employees from 
hazardous differences in electric potential.
    OSHA decided against adopting Mr. Erga's suggested regulatory 
language. The Agency believes that his proposed language is too 
detailed and that the requirement adopted in the final rule 
appropriately states the objective in performance terms. OSHA, however, 
considered Mr. Erga's suggested requirements and adopted several of 
them as guidelines in Appendix C to final Subpart V for installing 
protective grounding equipment to protect employees from hazardous 
differences in potential.
    As noted earlier, paragraphs (b)(4)(i) and (b)(4)(ii) of the final 
rule require the employer to determine whether existing energized lines 
will induce hazardous voltage when lines are installed parallel

[[Page 20526]]

to the existing lines. OSHA notes that the final rule does not provide 
specific guidance for determining whether a hazard exists due to 
induced voltage. The hazard depends not only on the voltage of the 
existing line, but also on the length of the line employees are 
installing and the distance between the existing line and the new one. 
Electric shock, whether caused by induced or other voltage, poses two 
different hazards. First, the electric shock could cause an involuntary 
reaction, which could cause a fall or other injury. Second, the 
electric shock itself could cause respiratory or cardiac arrest. If the 
employer takes no precautions to protect employees from hazards 
associated with involuntary reactions from electric shock, a hazard 
exists if the induced voltage is sufficient to pass a current of 1 
milliampere through a 500-ohm resistor. (The 500-ohm resistor 
represents the resistance of an employee. The 1 milliampere current is 
the threshold of perception.) If the employer protects employees from 
injury due to involuntary reactions from electric shock, a hazard 
exists if the resultant current would be more than 6 milliamperes (the 
let-go threshold for women \429\). OSHA included a note to this effect 
following final paragraph (b)(4).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \429\ Electric current passing through the body has varying 
effects depending on the amount of the current. At the let-go 
threshold, the current overrides a person's control over his or her 
muscles. At that level, an employee grasping an object will not be 
able to let go of the object. The let-go threshold varies from 
person to person; however, there are accepted values for women, men, 
and children. At 6 milliamperes, 5 percent of women will not be able 
to let go. Thus, this is the accepted let-go threshold for women. 
(See 41 FR 55698.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Paragraph (b)(5) of the final rule requires reel-handling 
equipment, including pulling and tensioning equipment, to be in safe 
operating condition, as well as leveled and aligned. Proper alignment 
of the stringing machines will help prevent failure of the equipment, 
conductors, and supporting structures, which could result in injury to 
workers. OSHA is adopting this provision without change from the 
proposal.
    The purpose of final paragraphs (b)(6), (b)(7), and (b)(8) is to 
prevent failure of the line-pulling equipment and accessories. These 
provisions, respectively, require the employer to ensure that employees 
do not exceed load ratings (limits) of the equipment, require the 
repair or replacement of defective pulling lines and accessories, and 
prohibit the use of conductor grips on wire rope unless the 
manufacturer designed such grips specifically for use in pulling wire 
rope. OSHA considers equipment damaged beyond manufacturing 
specifications or damaged to an extent that would reduce its load 
ratings to be ``defective'' for the purposes of final paragraph (b)(7). 
Manufacturers normally provide load limits and design specifications, 
but employers also can find load limits and specifications in 
engineering and materials handbooks (see, for example, The Lineman's 
and Cableman's Handbook, 269-Ex. 8-5). OSHA adopted paragraphs (b)(6), 
(b)(7), and (b)(8) without substantive revision from the proposal.
    When employers use the tension stringing method, the pulling rig 
(which takes up the pulling rope and thereby pulls the conductors into 
place) is separated from the reel stands and tensioner (which pay out 
the conductors and apply tension to them) by one or more spans (the 
distance between the structures supporting the conductors). In an 
emergency, the pulling equipment operator may have to shut down the 
operation. Paragraph (b)(9), which is being adopted without substantive 
change from the proposal, requires the employer to ensure that 
employees maintain reliable communication between the reel tender and 
the pulling-rig operator through two-way radios or other equivalent 
means. OSHA designed this provision to ensure that, in case of 
emergency at the conductor supply end, the pulling rig operator can 
shut the equipment down before injury-causing damage occurs.
    Paragraph (b)(10), which is being adopted without substantive 
change from the proposal, prohibits the operation of the pulling rig 
under unsafe conditions. OSHA included an explanatory note following 
final paragraph (b)(10) providing examples of unsafe conditions.
    Paragraph (b)(11), which is being adopted without substantive 
change from the proposal, generally prohibits employees from working 
directly beneath overhead operations or on the crossarm while a power-
driven device is pulling the conductor or pulling line and the 
conductor or pulling line is in motion. Employees may perform work in 
such positions only as necessary to guide the stringing sock or board 
over or through the stringing sheave. This provision minimizes employee 
exposure to injury resulting from the failure of equipment, conductors, 
or supporting structures during pulling operations.
    Under certain conditions, employees must perform work on 
transmission and distribution lines while they remain energized. 
Sometimes, employees use rubber insulating equipment or live-line tools 
to accomplish this work. However, this equipment has voltage and other 
limitations which make it impossible to insulate the employee 
performing work on energized lines under all conditions. In such cases, 
usually on medium- and high-voltage transmission lines, employees use 
the live-line barehand technique to perform the work. When they perform 
work ``bare handed,'' the employees work from an insulated aerial 
platform and are electrically bonded to the energized line. In this 
configuration, there is essentially no potential difference across the 
worker's body, thereby protecting the employee from electric shock. 
Final paragraph (c) addresses the live-line barehand technique.
    OSHA took paragraph (c) from existing Sec.  1910.269(q)(3). 
Existing Sec.  1926.955(e) contains similar requirements for live-line 
bare hand work. The following summary and explanation of final Sec.  
1926.964(c) outlines the substantive differences between this final 
rule and the existing rules.
    Because employees perform live-line barehand work on overhead 
lines, OSHA proposed to place requirements for this type of work in the 
section relating to work on overhead lines. This placement is 
consistent with the placement of live-line barehand requirements in 
existing Subpart V. However, it is technically possible to perform 
live-line barehand work on other types of installations as well (in 
substations, for example). In the preamble to the proposal, OSHA 
requested comments on whether it should consolidate the live-line 
barehand requirements with the other requirements relating to work on 
energized lines contained in Sec.  1926.960.
    OSHA received few comments on this issue. Most of the commenters 
recommended leaving the live-line barehand requirements in the section 
on overhead line work. (See, for example, Exs. 0162, 0186, 0227.) TVA 
recommended moving the live-line bare hand requirements to Sec.  
1926.960 to place all requirements related to work on energized lines 
in one location (Ex. 0213). BGE recommended that the live-line barehand 
requirements stand alone (Ex. 0126).
    OSHA decided to keep the live-line barehand provisions with the 
requirements for overhead line work. The Agency believes that nearly 
all live-line barehand work is performed on overhead lines. In 
addition, the inherent characteristics of the work and the required 
minimum approach distances to grounded objects generally make it 
difficult to use the live-line barehand technique on energized parts 
not

[[Page 20527]]

installed overhead. However, OSHA is making changes to Sec.  1926.964 
to clarify that paragraph (c) applies to all barehand work on energized 
parts. The Agency is modifying the title of final Sec.  1926.964 and 
the scope of this section, as set forth in paragraph (a)(1), to 
indicate that this section applies to live-line barehand work, in 
addition to overhead line work. Thus, final paragraph (c) applies to 
live-line barehand work irrespective of whether employees perform this 
work on overhead lines.
    Final paragraph (c)(1) requires employers to train each employee 
using, or supervising the use of, the live-line barehand method on 
energized circuits in the technique and safety requirements of final 
Sec.  1926.964(c). The training must conform to Sec.  1926.950(b). 
Without this training, employees would not be able to perform this 
highly specialized work safely. Proposed paragraph (c)(1) incorrectly 
implied that only refresher training needed to meet proposed Sec.  
1926.950(b). OSHA revised the language in this provision in the final 
rule to make it clear that the employee must complete training 
conforming to final Sec.  1926.950(b) and that all of the training 
requirements in Sec.  1926.950(b) apply.
    Before employees can start live-line barehand work, employers must 
ascertain the voltage of the lines on which employees will be 
performing work. This voltage determines the minimum approach distances 
and the types of equipment that employees can use. If the voltage is 
higher than expected, the minimum approach distance will be too small, 
and the equipment may not be safe for use. Therefore, final paragraph 
(c)(2) requires employers to make a determination, before any employee 
uses the live-line barehand technique on energized high-voltage 
conductors or parts, of the nominal voltage rating of the circuit, of 
the clearances to ground of lines and other energized parts on which 
employees will perform work, and of the voltage limitations of 
equipment they will be using. OSHA is adopting this provision largely 
as proposed. The Agency describes two key revisions in the following 
paragraph.
    First, the final rule clarifies that this information is in 
addition to the information about existing conditions that is required 
by final Sec.  1926.950(d). Second, final Sec.  1926.964(c)(2)(ii) uses 
the term ``clearances to ground'' in place of the proposed term 
``minimum approach distances to ground.'' OSHA took this provision from 
existing Sec.  1910.269(q)(3)(ii)(B). OSHA took existing Sec.  
1910.269(q)(3)(ii)(B), in turn, from existing Sec.  1926.955(e)(2)(ii), 
which uses the term ``clearances to ground.'' \430\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \430\ In fact, in 1989, OSHA used ``clearances to ground'' in 
proposed Sec.  1910.269(q)(3)(ii)(B). The Agency mistakenly changed 
the language from ``clearances to ground'' to ``minimum approach 
distances to ground'' in the 1994 final rule promulgating Sec.  
1910.269 because OSHA decided to replace the term ``clearance'' with 
``minimum approach distance'' throughout Sec.  1910.269 where it 
used the word ``clearances'' to refer to ``[t]he closest distance an 
employee is permitted to approach an energized or a grounded 
object'' (59 FR 4381).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The term ``clearances to ground'' in existing Sec.  
1926.955(e)(2)(ii) refers to the clear distance between energized parts 
and ground. That term, not ``minimum approach distances to ground,'' is 
appropriate here. Therefore, in final Sec.  1926.964(c)(2)(ii), OSHA is 
adopting the term from existing Sec.  1926.955(e)(2)(ii) in place of 
the proposed term.
    Because an employee performing live-line barehand work is at the 
same potential as the line on which he or she is working, the employee 
has exposure to two different voltages. First, the employee is exposed 
to the phase-to-ground voltage with respect to any grounded object, 
such as a pole or tower. Second, the employee is exposed to the full 
phase-to-phase voltage with respect to the other phases on the circuit. 
Thus, there are two sets of minimum approach distances applicable to 
live-line barehand work--one for the phase-to-ground exposure (the 
distance from the employee to a grounded object) and one for the phase-
to-phase exposure (the distance from the employee to another phase). 
The phase-to-phase voltage is higher than the phase-to-ground voltage. 
Consequently, the phase-to-phase-based minimum approach distance is 
greater than the phase-to-ground-based minimum approach distance. (See 
the explanation of the basis for minimum approach distances in the 
summary and explanation for final Sec.  1926.960(c)(1), earlier in this 
section of the preamble.)
    Paragraph (c)(3)(i), which is being adopted without substantive 
change from the proposal, requires that the employer ensure that the 
insulated tools (such as live-line tools), insulated equipment (such as 
insulated ladders), and aerial devices and platforms used by employees 
in live-line barehand work are designed, tested, and made for live-line 
barehand work. The Agency considers insulated equipment (such as live-
line tools) designed for long-duration contact with parts energized at 
the voltage on which employees will use the equipment to meet this 
requirement. Insulating equipment designed for brush contact only is 
not suitable for live-line barehand work. Paragraph (c)(3)(ii), which 
is being adopted without substantive change from the proposal, requires 
that employers ensure that employees keep tools and equipment clean and 
dry while they are in use. These provisions are important to ensure 
that equipment does not fail under constant contact with high-voltage 
sources.
    Paragraph (c)(4), which is being adopted without substantive change 
from the proposal, requires employers to render inoperable the 
automatic-reclosing feature of circuit-interrupting devices protecting 
the lines if the design of those devices so permits. In case of a fault 
at the worksite, it is important for the circuit to be deenergized as 
quickly as possible and for it to remain deenergized once the 
protective devices open the circuit.\431\ Preventing the reclosing of a 
circuit will reduce the severity of any possible injuries. 
Additionally, this measure helps limit possible switching-surge 
voltage, thereby providing an extra measure of safety for employees. 
This provision is comparable to existing Sec.  1926.955(e)(5), which 
requires the employer to render the automatic-reclosing feature 
inoperable ``where practical.'' The proposal eliminates this phrase 
because OSHA believes that it is essential that a line that becomes 
deenergized on a fault not be reenergized if possible. During live-line 
barehand work, employees have no other back-up system providing for 
their safety as they would for work on deenergized lines.\432\ Thus, if 
the employee causes a fault on the line, the line must not become 
reenergized automatically.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \431\ If the circuit protective devices do not provide an 
autoreclosing feature, the circuit will remain deenergized by 
design. In addition, voltage surges caused by circuit reclosing 
would not occur.
    \432\ Protective grounding provides supplementary protection in 
case the deenergized line is reenergized.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Sometimes the weather makes live-line barehand work unsafe. For 
example, lightning strikes on lines can create severe transient 
voltages against which the minimum approach distances required by final 
paragraph (c)(13) (described later in this section of the preamble) may 
not provide complete protection to employees working on the line. 
Additionally, forces imposed by the wind can move line conductors and 
reduce the clearance below the minimum approach distance. To provide 
protection against environmental conditions that can increase the 
hazards by an unacceptable degree, final paragraph (c)(5) prohibits 
live-line barehand work under adverse weather conditions that make the 
work

[[Page 20528]]

hazardous even after the employer implements the work practices 
required by Subpart V. Also, employees may not work under any 
conditions in which winds reduce phase-to-phase or phase-to-ground 
clearances at the work location below the minimum approach distances 
specified in final paragraph (c)(13), unless insulating guards cover 
the grounded objects and other lines and equipment.
    Existing Sec.  1926.955(e)(6) prohibits live-line barehand work 
only during electrical storms. OSHA believes that expanding the 
prohibition to include any weather condition making it unsafe to 
perform this type of work will increase employee protection. OSHA took 
the language for paragraph (c)(5) in the final rule from existing Sec.  
1910.269(q)(3)(v), which prohibits live-line barehand work ``when 
adverse weather conditions would make the work hazardous even after the 
work practices required by this section are employed.'' (Emphasis 
added.) OSHA included this language in proposed Sec.  1926.964(c)(5). 
The Agency corrected paragraph (c)(5) in the final rule by replacing 
the word ``section'' with ``subpart.'' In addition, the Agency revised 
this provision in the final rule to clarify that employees may not 
perform work when winds reduce the phase-to-ground or phase-to-phase 
clearances (rather than ``minimum approach distances'') below the 
required minimum approach distances.
    A note to final paragraph (c)(5) provides that thunderstorms in the 
vicinity, high winds, snow storms, and ice storms are examples of 
adverse weather conditions that make live-line barehand work too 
hazardous to perform safely, even after the employer implements the 
work practices required by Subpart V. In the final rule, OSHA revised 
the note from the proposal to more closely match the regulatory text in 
paragraph (c)(5). In addition, the Agency changed ``immediate 
vicinity'' to ``vicinity'' to clearly indicate that thunderstorms do 
not need to be in the work area to pose hazards.\433\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \433\ Section 7.3.1.1 of IEEE Std 516-2009 states: ``Energized-
line maintenance should not be started when lightning is visible or 
thunder is audible at the worksite'' (Ex. 0532).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Paragraph (c)(6), which is being adopted without substantive change 
from the proposal, requires the use of a conductive device, usually a 
conductive bucket liner, for bonding the insulated aerial device to the 
energized line or equipment. This bond creates an area of equipotential 
in which the employee can work safely. The employee must be bonded to 
this device by means of conductive shoes or leg clips or by another 
effective method. Additionally, if necessary to protect employees 
further (that is, if differences in electric potential at the worksite 
pose a hazard to employees), the employer must provide electrostatic 
shielding designed for the voltage. This paragraph, which OSHA took 
from existing Sec.  1910.269(q)(3)(vi), is essentially identical to 
existing Sec.  1926.955(e)(7).
    To avoid receiving a shock caused by charging current, the employee 
must bond the conductive bucket liner or other conductive device to the 
energized conductor before he or she touches the conductor. Typically, 
employees use a live-line tool to bring a bonding jumper (already 
connected to the conductive bucket liner) into contact with the 
energized line. This connection brings the equipotential area 
surrounding the employee to the same voltage as that of the line. Thus, 
paragraph (c)(7), which is being adopted without substantive change 
from the proposal, requires the employer to ensure that, before the 
employee contacts the energized part, the employee bonds the conductive 
bucket liner or other conductive device to the energized conductor by 
means of a positive connection. Final paragraph (c)(7) also requires 
this connection to remain attached to the energized conductor until 
employees complete the work on the energized circuit. This paragraph, 
which OSHA took from existing Sec.  1910.269(q)(3)(vii), is essentially 
identical to existing Sec.  1926.955(e)(14).
    Paragraph (c)(8), which is being adopted without substantive change 
from the proposal, requires aerial lifts used for live-line barehand 
work to have upper controls that are within easy reach of the employee 
in the bucket and lower controls near the base of the boom that can 
override operation of the equipment. On two-bucket-type lifts, the 
upper controls must be within easy reach of both buckets. Upper 
controls are necessary so that employees in the bucket can precisely 
control the lift's direction and speed of approach to the live line. 
Control by workers on the ground responding to directions from a worker 
in the bucket could lead to contact by an employee in the lift with the 
energized conductor before the bonding jumper is in place. Controls are 
necessary at ground level, however, so that employees on the ground can 
promptly lower and assist employees in the lift who become disabled as 
a result of an accident or illness. Therefore, paragraph (c)(9), which 
is being adopted without substantive change from the proposal, 
prohibits, except in an emergency, operation of the ground-level 
controls when an employee is in the lift. Final paragraphs (c)(8) and 
(c)(9), which OSHA took from existing Sec.  1910.269(q)(3)(viii) and 
(q)(3)(ix), respectively, are essentially identical to existing Sec.  
1926.955(e)(12) and (e)(13).
    Paragraph (c)(10), which is being adopted without substantive 
change from the proposal, requires the employer to ensure that 
employees check all aerial-lift controls to ensure that they are in 
proper working order before employees elevate an aerial lift into the 
work position. This paragraph, which OSHA took from existing Sec.  
1910.269(q)(3)(x), is essentially identical to existing Sec.  
1926.955(e)(10).
    To protect employees on the ground from the electric shock they 
would receive upon touching the truck supporting the aerial lift, 
paragraph (c)(11), which is being adopted without substantive change 
from the proposal, requires the body of the truck to be grounded, or 
the body of the truck to be barricaded and treated as energized, before 
employees elevate the boom. If the truck is grounded, the insulation of 
the lift limits the voltage on the body of the truck to a safe level. 
This paragraph, which OSHA took from existing Sec.  1910.269(q)(3)(xi), 
is similar to existing Sec.  1926.955(e)(9). The existing requirement 
in Subpart V, however, also includes a provision for using the 
outriggers on the aerial lift to stabilize the equipment. Final Sec.  
1926.959(b), discussed earlier in this section of the preamble, 
addresses the need to stabilize aerial lifts.
    Aerial lifts that are used in live-line barehand work are exposed 
to the full line-to-ground voltage of the circuit for the duration of 
the job. To ensure that the insulating value of the lift being used is 
high enough to protect employees, final paragraph (c)(12) requires the 
employer to ensure that employees perform a boom-current test before 
starting work each day. Employers also must ensure that employees 
perform the test each time during the day when they encounter a higher 
voltage and whenever changed conditions indicate a need for retesting.
    According to final paragraph (c)(12)(i), the test consists of 
placing the bucket in contact with a source of voltage equal to that 
encountered during the job and keeping it there for at least 3 minutes. 
Employees normally accomplish the test at the worksite by placing the 
bucket in contact with the energized line on which they will be working 
(without anybody in the bucket, of course).
    To provide employees with a level of protection equivalent to that 
provided by existing Sec.  1910.269(q)(3)(xii) and

[[Page 20529]]

American National Standard for Vehicle-Mounted Elevating and Rotating 
Aerial Devices (ANSI/SIA A92.2-2001 \434\), OSHA proposed, in the third 
sentence of paragraph (c)(12), to permit a leakage current of up to 1 
microampere per kilovolt of nominal phase-to-ground voltage. In 
contrast, the corresponding provision in existing Sec.  1926.955(e)(11) 
is less protective; it allows up to 1 microampere of current for every 
kilovolt of phase-to-phase voltage.\435\ OSHA received no comments on 
this issue and, therefore, adopted the proposed limit of 1 microampere 
per kilovolt of nominal phase-to-ground voltage in paragraph 
(c)(12)(ii) of the final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \434\ The 2009 edition of ANSI/SIA A92.2 contains an identical 
requirement.
    \435\ For a three-phase, Y-connected system, the phase-to-phase 
voltage equals times the phase-to-ground voltage.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Final paragraph (c)(12)(iii) requires the immediate suspension of 
work from the aerial lift whenever there is an indication of a 
malfunction of the equipment, not only during tests. This requirement 
will prevent the failure of insulated aerial devices during use and 
will only affect work from an aerial lift. Employers may continue work 
not involving an aerial lift. Halting work from the lift will protect 
employees in the lift, as well as employees on the ground, from the 
electrical hazards involved.
    OSHA took paragraph (c)(12) from existing Sec.  1910.269(q)(3)(xii) 
and adopted paragraph (c)(12) without substantive change from the 
proposal; this provision in the final rule is similar to existing Sec.  
1926.955(e)(11), except as previously noted.
    Paragraphs (c)(13), (c)(14), and (c)(15) in the proposed rule would 
have generally required employees to maintain the minimum approach 
distances specified in Table V-2 through Table V-6 from grounded 
objects and from objects at an electric potential different from the 
potential of the bucket. Those proposed provisions, which OSHA based on 
existing Sec.  1910.269(q)(3)(xiii), (q)(3)(xiv), and (q)(3)(xv), were 
essentially identical to existing Sec.  1926.955(e)(15), (e)(16), and 
(e)(17). Proposed paragraph (c)(13) applied to minimum approach 
distances in general; proposed paragraph (c)(14) covered minimum 
approach distances for employees approaching or leaving the energized 
conductor or bonding to an energized circuit; and proposed paragraph 
(c)(15) applied to the distance between the bucket and the grounded end 
of a bushing or insulator string and other grounded surfaces. The 
latter two paragraphs in the proposal clarified that the employee and 
the bucket are, in effect, at phase potential as the employee is 
approaching the energized part and that employees would have to 
maintain the phase-to-ground minimum approach distance from grounded 
objects. The preamble to the proposal noted that the employee also 
would have to maintain the phase-to-phase minimum approach distance 
from the other phases on the system (70 FR 34882) and requested 
comments on whether proposed paragraphs (c)(14) and (c)(15) should 
address objects at different phase potentials, in addition to objects 
at ground potential.
    Only two commenters addressed this issue. BGE commented that it is 
reasonable to address only phase-to-ground potential because the 
proposed provisions implied phase-to-phase potential (Ex. 0126). IBEW 
argued, in contrast, that OSHA also should address phase-to-phase 
exposures in paragraphs (c)(14) and (c)(15), commenting:

    Since this requirement is contained in the live-line bare-hand 
work section of the proposal, the language should address objects at 
different phase potential, not just ground potentials. When 
performing live-line bare-hand work mid span, the phase-to-phase MAD 
could be critical. The same would hold true anytime an aerial device 
would be positioned between dead-ends on structures, or any other 
configuration when multiphases are present on the structure. [Ex. 
0230]

    OSHA decided to take a middle course on this issue. When an 
employee is working at phase potential, which final paragraph (c)(13) 
covers, or moving into or away from the working position, which final 
paragraph (c)(14) covers, both phase-to-phase and phase-to-ground 
exposures may come into play. Proposed paragraph (c)(13) addressed both 
exposures, but, as noted in the preamble to the proposal, proposed 
paragraph (c)(14) did not (70 FR 34882). OSHA is correcting this 
oversight in the final rule, so that final paragraph (c)(14) also 
requires the employer to ensure that employees maintain the minimum 
approach distances ``between the employee and conductive objects 
energized at different potentials.''
    Proposed paragraph (c)(15) supplemented proposed paragraphs (c)(13) 
and (c)(14) and served as a reminder that the phase-to-ground minimum 
approach distance applied to the grounded end of the insulator string. 
Thus, there is no need to add phase-to-phase exposures to this 
paragraph.
    OSHA is making an additional change to paragraphs (c)(13) through 
(c)(15) to account for changes in the minimum approach-distance 
requirements adopted in final Sec.  1926.960(c)(1). The final rule does 
not list specific minimum approach distances in tables as the proposal 
did. Instead, final Sec.  1926.960(c)(1)(i) requires the employer to 
establish minimum approach distances. (See the summary and explanation 
for final Sec.  1926.960(c)(1), earlier in this section of the 
preamble.) Consequently, paragraphs (c)(13) through (c)(15) of final 
Sec.  1926.964 refer to ``minimum approach distances, established by 
the employer under Sec.  1926.960(c)(1)(i),'' in place of the 
references to proposed Table V-2 through Table V-6.
    Mr. Anthony Ahern with Ohio Rural Electric Cooperatives noted that 
clearances between phases in substations typically are closer than on 
power lines (Ex. 0186). He asserted that if paragraph (c) ``is also 
going to cover bare hand work in substations then phase to phase 
clearances also need to be addressed'' (id.).
    OSHA does not dispute Mr. Ahern's assertion that phase-to-phase 
clearances in substations may be smaller than on overhead lines. 
However, if the clearances are too small to permit employees to 
maintain minimum approach distances for phase-to-phase exposures while 
performing live-line barehand work, then the employer will have to 
choose a different work method. The Agency notes that employers already 
face this issue under existing Sec.  1910.269 and Subpart V, which both 
set minimum approach distances for phase-to-phase exposures.
    Paragraph (c)(16), which is being adopted without substantive 
change from the proposal, prohibits the use of handlines between the 
bucket and boom or between the bucket and ground. Such use of lines 
could result in a potential difference between the employee in the 
bucket and the power line when the employee contacts the handline. If 
the handline is a nonconductive type not supported from the bucket, 
employees may use it from the conductor to ground. (Unless the rope is 
insulated for the voltage, employees on the ground must treat it as 
energized.\436\) Lastly, the employer must ensure that no one uses

[[Page 20530]]

ropes used for live-line barehand work for other purposes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \436\ The definition of ``insulated'' in final Sec.  1926.968 
reads: ``Separated from other conducting surfaces by a dielectric 
(including air space) offering a high resistance to the passage of 
current.'' The note following this definition states: ``When any 
object is said to be insulated, it is understood to be insulated for 
the conditions to which it normally is subjected. Otherwise, it is, 
for the purpose of this subpart, uninsulated.'' Thus, employees must 
treat any rope not insulated for the voltage as a conductive object 
and, thus, as energized when it is in contact with an energized 
part.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    OSHA took final paragraph (c)(16) from existing Sec.  
1910.269(q)(3)(xvi); this provision is similar to existing Sec.  
1926.955(e)(18). However, the existing standard, at Sec.  
1926.955(e)(18)(ii), prohibits employees from placing conductive 
materials over 36 inches long in the aerial lift bucket. Existing Sec.  
1926.955(e)(18)(ii) makes exceptions for ``appropriate length jumpers, 
armor rods, and tools.'' OSHA is removing this requirement. Under the 
final rule, employers must ensure that employees maintain minimum 
approach distances regardless of the length of any conductive object. 
Thus, existing Sec.  1926.955(e)(18)(ii) is unnecessary.
    Paragraph (c)(17), which is being adopted without substantive 
change from the proposal, prohibits passing uninsulated equipment or 
materials between a pole or structure and an aerial lift while an 
employee working from the bucket is bonded to an energized part. 
Passing uninsulated objects in this way would bridge the insulation to 
ground and endanger the employee. This provision, which OSHA based on 
existing Sec.  1910.269(q)(3)(xvii), has no counterpart in existing 
Sec.  1926.955(e).
    Proposed paragraph (c)(18) would have required the employer to 
print, on a plate of durable nonconductive material, a table reflecting 
the minimum approach distances listed in proposed Table V-2 through 
Table V-6. That paragraph would also have required the employer to 
mount the plate so as to be visible to the operator of the boom on 
aerial devices used for live-line barehand work. This provision, which 
OSHA took from existing Sec.  1910.269(q)(3)(xviii), was equivalent to 
existing Sec.  1926.955(e)(20)(i).
    Although the Agency received no comments on this proposed 
provision, OSHA is not including it in the final rule. First, the final 
rule replaces the tables specifying minimum approach distances with a 
requirement that the employer establish minimum approach distances 
based on formulas. For voltages over 72.5 kilovolts, where employers 
use the live-line barehand technique, those established minimum 
approach distances could vary from site to site as the maximum 
transient overvoltage varies.\437\ Employers would comply with proposed 
paragraph (c)(18) with a table listing either a single minimum approach 
distance for each voltage or listing a variety of minimum approach 
distances for each voltage. A table listing a single value for each 
voltage would list minimum approach distances that employees would not 
be using at some sites, possibly leading to confusion. A table listing 
a variety of minimum approach distances for each voltage would be more 
difficult for employees to follow and might lead them to use 
noncompliant minimum approach distances, thus exposing the employees to 
sparkover hazards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \437\ The final rule does not require the employer to make site-
by-site engineering analyses. The employer could make an analysis 
that applies to a single site, a range of sites, or all sites for a 
given voltage, depending on the approach the employer takes in 
performing the engineering analysis. See the summary and explanation 
for final Sec.  1926.960(c)(1)(ii), earlier in this section of the 
preamble.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Second, with information provided by the employer under final 
Sec. Sec.  1926.950(d) and 1926.952(a)(1), employees will know the 
applicable minimum approach distance and will discuss it during the job 
briefing required under final Sec.  1926.952(a)(2). Through the job 
briefing, the aerial device operator, and, if needed, the observer 
required under Sec.  1926.959(d)(2), will know the applicable minimum 
approach distance without needing to reference a table mounted on the 
boom of the aerial device.
    For these reasons, OSHA is not adopting proposed Sec.  
1926.964(c)(18) in the final rule.
    Final paragraph (c)(18) requires a nonconductive measuring device 
to be available and readily accessible to employees performing live-
line barehand work. OSHA took this provision from existing Sec.  
1910.269(q)(3)(xix). Existing Sec.  1926.955(e)(20)(ii) recommends, but 
does not require, an insulating measuring device. OSHA believes that 
this should be a requirement, rather than a recommendation, so that 
employees can accurately determine whether they are maintaining the 
required minimum approach distances. Compliance with final paragraph 
(c)(18) will help the employee accurately determine and maintain the 
minimum approach distances required by the standard. OSHA revised 
paragraph (c)(18) in the final rule to clarify that the measuring 
device must be accessible to employees performing live-line barehand 
work.
    Existing Sec.  1926.955(e)(19) prohibits employees from 
overstressing an aerial lift used in live-line barehand work while 
lifting or supporting weights. OSHA did not include this requirement in 
proposed or final Sec.  1926.964. The hazard addressed by the existing 
requirement is a general hazard, which is present whenever an employee 
uses an aerial lift, not just during live-line barehand work. Final 
Sec.  1926.959(c), which requires employers to operate mechanical 
equipment within its maximum load ratings and other design limitations, 
is the appropriate provision addressing the relevant hazards.
    Final paragraph (d) addresses hazards associated with towers and 
other structures supporting overhead lines. OSHA took this paragraph 
from existing Sec.  1910.269(q)(4).
    Paragraph (b) of existing Sec.  1926.955 addresses metal tower 
construction. Many of the requirements in the existing rules cover the 
same hazards as other provisions in the construction standards. For 
example, existing Sec.  1926.955(b)(1), (b)(2), and (b)(3) address 
hazards associated with footing excavations. Subpart P of Part 1926 
fully protects power transmission and distribution workers from these 
hazards.\438\ Therefore, revised Subpart V contains no counterparts to 
these existing requirements. Existing Sec.  1926.955(b)(5)(i) and 
(b)(7) contain simple references to other Part 1926 requirements. 
Existing Sec.  1926.955(b)(5)(iii), (b)(6)(i), (b)(6)(v), and (b)(8), 
which address a few of the hazards associated with mechanical 
equipment, contain requirements that are equivalent to provisions in 
existing Subpart CC of Part 1926 or final Sec.  1926.959. Revised 
Subpart V does not contain counterparts for these six paragraphs. OSHA 
believes that eliminating these provisions will reduce redundancy and 
will eliminate the potential for conflicts between different standards. 
No rulemaking participants opposed the removal of these existing 
requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \438\ Provisions outside Subpart P cover two of the requirements 
in the existing paragraphs. Under the last sentence of existing 
Sec.  1926.955(b)(1), employees must use ladders to access pad- or 
pile-type footing excavations more than 4 feet deep. Paragraph (a) 
of Sec.  1926.1051 already addresses this hazard; this provision 
requires employers to provide a stairway or a ladder for access to 
breaks in elevation of more than 48 cm, unless a ramp, runway, 
sloped embankment, or personnel hoist is available. Existing Sec.  
1926.955(b)(3)(iii) addresses the stability of equipment used near 
excavations. Final Sec.  1926.959(b) and (c) cover hazards 
associated with instability of mechanical equipment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To protect employees on the ground from hazards presented by 
falling objects, paragraph (d)(1), which is being adopted without 
substantive change from the proposal, prohibits workers from standing 
under a tower or other structure while work is in progress, unless the 
employer can demonstrate that their presence is necessary to assist 
employees working above. This provision, which OSHA took from existing 
Sec.  1910.269(q)(4)(i), is equivalent

[[Page 20531]]

to existing Sec.  1926.955(b)(4)(i) and (b)(5)(ii). However, final 
paragraph (d)(1) eliminates the redundancy presented by the two 
existing requirements in Sec.  1926.955.
    Paragraph (d)(2), which is being adopted without substantive change 
from the proposal, requires the employer to ensure that employees use 
tag lines or other similar devices to maintain control of tower 
sections being raised or positioned, unless the employer can 
demonstrate that the use of such devices would result in a greater 
hazard to employees. The use of tag lines prevents moving tower 
sections from striking employees. This provision, which OSHA took from 
existing Sec.  1910.269(q)(4)(ii), is similar to existing Sec.  
1926.955(b)(4)(ii) and (b)(6)(ii). However, final paragraph (d)(2) 
eliminates the redundancy presented by the two existing requirements in 
Sec.  1926.955.
    Paragraph (d)(3), which is being adopted without substantive change 
from the proposal, requires loadlines to remain in place until 
employees safely secure the load so that it cannot topple and injure an 
employee. This provision, which OSHA took from existing Sec.  
1910.269(q)(4)(iii), is essentially identical to existing Sec.  
1926.955(b)(4)(iii) and (b)(6)(iii). However, final paragraph (d)(3) 
eliminates the redundancy presented by the two existing requirements in 
Sec.  1926.955.
    Some weather conditions can increase the hazard for employees 
working from towers and other overhead structures. For example, icy 
conditions may increase the likelihood of slips and falls, perhaps 
making them unavoidable. Final paragraph (d)(4) generally provides that 
work must stop when adverse weather conditions make the work hazardous 
in spite of compliance with other applicable provision of Subpart V. 
However, when the work involves emergency restoration of electric 
power,\439\ the additional risk may be necessary for public safety, and 
the standard permits employees to perform such work even in adverse 
weather conditions. This provision, which OSHA took from existing Sec.  
1910.269(q)(4)(iv), is essentially identical to existing Sec.  
1926.955(b)(6)(iv). OSHA changed ``this section'' in proposed paragraph 
(d)(4) to ``this subpart'' in final paragraph (d)(4) to accurately 
identify the CFR unit involved.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \439\ For purposes of final paragraph (d)(4), OSHA considers 
emergency-restoration work to be work needed to restore an electric 
power transmission or distribution installation to an operating 
condition to the extent necessary to safeguard the general public.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A note to paragraph (d)(4) provides that thunderstorms in the 
vicinity, high winds, snow storms, and ice storms are examples of 
adverse weather conditions that make work on towers or other structures 
that support overhead lines too hazardous to perform, even after the 
employee implements the work practices required by final Subpart V. In 
the final rule, OSHA revised the note to closely match the regulatory 
text in paragraph (d)(4). In addition, the Agency changed ``immediate 
vicinity'' to ``vicinity'' to more clearly indicate that thunderstorms 
do not need to be in the work area to pose a hazard.\440\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \440\ Section 7.3.1.1 of IEEE Std 516-2009 states: ``Energized-
line maintenance should not be started when lightning is visible or 
thunder is audible at the worksite'' (Ex. 0532).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

16. Section 1926.965, Underground Electrical Installations
    In many electric distribution systems, utilities install electric 
equipment in enclosures, such as manholes and vaults, set beneath the 
earth. Section 1926.965 addresses safety for these underground 
electrical installations. As noted in final paragraph (a), the 
requirements in this section are in addition to requirements contained 
elsewhere in Subpart V (and elsewhere in Part 1926) because Sec.  
1926.965 only addresses conditions unique to underground facilities. 
For example, final Sec.  1926.953, relating to enclosed spaces, also 
applies to underground operations involving entry into an enclosed 
space.
    OSHA took Sec.  1926.965 from existing Sec.  1910.269(t). Existing 
Subpart V contains requirements for work on underground lines in Sec.  
1926.956. OSHA explains the differences between the existing rules and 
the final rule in the following summary and explanation of final Sec.  
1926.965.
    Paragraph (b), which is being adopted without substantive change 
from the proposal, requires the use of ladders or other climbing 
devices for entrance into, and exit from, manholes and subsurface 
vaults that are more than 1.22 meters (4 feet) deep. Because employees' 
jumping into subsurface enclosures or climbing on the cables and 
hangers installed in these enclosures can easily injure employees, the 
standard requires the use of appropriate devices for employees entering 
and exiting manholes and vaults. Paragraph (b) specifically prohibits 
employees from climbing on cables and cable hangers to get into or out 
of a manhole or vault. OSHA took this provision from existing Sec.  
1910.269(t)(1). Existing Subpart V contains no counterpart to this 
requirement.
    Paragraph (c), which is being adopted without substantive change 
from the proposal, requires equipment used to lower materials and tools 
into manholes or vaults to be capable of supporting the weight of the 
materials and tools and specifies that employers check this equipment 
for defects before employees use it. Paragraph (c) also requires 
employees to be clear of the area directly under the opening for the 
manhole or vault before tools or materials are lowered into the 
enclosure. These provisions, found in separate paragraphs in the final 
rule, protect employees against injuries from falling tools and 
material. Note that, because work addressed by this paragraph exposes 
employees to the danger of head injury, Sec.  1926.100(a) requires 
employees to wear head protection when they are working in underground 
electrical installations. OSHA took paragraph (c) of the final rule 
from existing Sec.  1910.269(t)(2). Existing Subpart V contains no 
counterpart to this requirement.
    Final paragraph (d) requires attendants for manholes and vaults. 
Under final paragraph (d)(1), during the time employees are performing 
work in a manhole or vault that contains energized electric equipment, 
an employee with first-aid training must be available on the surface in 
the immediate vicinity \441\ of the manhole or vault entrance (but not 
normally in the manhole or vault) to render emergency assistance. 
However, under paragraph (d)(2), the attendant may enter the manhole, 
for brief periods, to provide nonemergency assistance to the employees 
inside.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \441\ For the purposes of final Sec.  1926.965(d)(1), 
``immediate vicinity'' means near enough to the manhole or vault 
opening that the attendant can monitor employees in the space and 
render any necessary assistance in an emergency.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The provisions in final paragraph (d) ensure that employers can 
provide emergency assistance to employees working in manholes and 
vaults, where the employees work unobserved and where undetected injury 
could occur. Taken from existing Sec.  1910.269(t)(3) and existing 
Sec.  1926.956(b)(1), these requirements protect employees within the 
manholes and vaults without exposing the attendants outside to a risk 
of injury faced by employees inside these structures.
    Because the hazards addressed by final paragraph (d) involve 
primarily electric shock, allowing the attendant to

[[Page 20532]]

enter the manhole briefly \442\ would have no significant effect on the 
safety of the employee he or she is protecting. In case of electric 
shock, the attendant would still be able to provide assistance. OSHA is 
adopting paragraph (d) without substantive change from the proposed 
rule. As noted in the summary and explanation for final Sec. Sec.  
1926.951(b) and 1926.953(h) earlier in this section of the preamble, 
OSHA adopted a definition of ``first-aid training'' that provides that 
first-aid training includes training in CPR. Therefore, OSHA replaced 
the term ``first aid and CPR training meeting Sec.  1926.951(b)(1)'' in 
proposed Sec.  1926.965(d)(1) with ``first-aid training'' in final 
Sec.  1926.965(d)(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \442\ The attendant may remain within the manhole only for the 
short period necessary to assist the employee inside the manhole 
with a task that one employee cannot perform alone. For example, if 
a second employee is necessary to help lift a piece of equipment 
into place, the attendant may enter only for the period needed to 
accomplish this task. However, if significant portions of the job 
require the assistance of a second worker in the manhole, the 
attendant may not remain in the manhole for the necessary period, 
and a third employee would have to provide the requisite assistance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Mr. Kevin Taylor with Lyondell Chemical Company requested that the 
Agency clarify what this provision means by ``immediate vicinity,'' 
asking: ``Would this definition include someone in a nearby control 
room that is readily available (via radio) to come and administer CPR 
or first aid?'' (Ex. 0218).
    Final Sec.  1926.968 defines ``attendant'' as ``[a]n employee 
assigned to remain immediately outside the entrance to an enclosed or 
other space to render assistance as needed to employees inside the 
space.'' An employee in a control room is not close enough to the 
manhole or vault to qualify as an attendant for the purposes of the 
final rule.
    As previously noted, final paragraph (d)(2) permits the attendant 
to occasionally enter the manhole or vault for brief periods to provide 
assistance for nonemergency purposes. Note that, if hazards other than 
electric shock could endanger the employee in the manhole or vault, 
final Sec.  1926.953(h) also may apply. Paragraph (h) in final Sec.  
1926.953 requires attendants when employees are working in an enclosed 
space (which includes, manholes and vaults) and traffic patterns 
present a hazard in the area of the opening to the enclosed space. In 
such situations, having an attendant enter the manhole or vault would 
expose the attendant and the entrant to the traffic-pattern hazards. 
Therefore, the final rule does not permit attendants required under 
Sec.  1926.953(h) to enter a manhole or vault. To clarify the 
application of the two different attendant requirements, OSHA included 
a note following final Sec.  1926.965(d)(2). The note states that Sec.  
1926.953(h) may also require an attendant and does not permit this 
attendant to enter the manhole or vault.
    OSHA included a second note following final paragraph (d)(2). The 
second note serves as a reminder that Sec.  1926.960(b)(1)(ii) 
prohibits unqualified employees from working in areas containing 
unguarded, uninsulated energized lines or parts of equipment operating 
at 50 volts or more.
    Mr. Lee Marchessault with Workplace Safety Solutions maintained 
that there was a conflict between proposed Sec.  1926.953 and Sec.  
1926.965 with respect to the requirements for attendants (Ex. 0196; Tr. 
580-581). He also recommended that OSHA revise Sec.  1926.965(d)(2) to 
permit the attendant to enter a manhole or vault only when it is less 
than 1.5 meters (5 feet) in depth (Ex. 0196).
    OSHA does not believe that the depth of a manhole or vault is 
generally relevant to determining whether an employer should permit an 
attendant to enter one of these spaces. If the depth of the manhole or 
vault presents a hazard, as it might if it were deep enough to pose 
pressure or access and egress hazards, then those hazards would still 
endanger the life of an entrant or interfere with escape from the space 
even after the employer takes the precautions required by final 
Sec. Sec.  1926.953 and 1926.965. In such cases, final Sec.  
1926.953(a) would require entries to conform to paragraphs (d) through 
(k) of Sec.  1910.146. Otherwise, the hazards for the entrant and 
attendant should be independent of the depth of the manhole or vault.
    Moreover, the Agency does not believe that there is a conflict 
between the requirements for attendants in final Sec. Sec.  1926.953 
and 1926.965. As noted earlier, final Sec.  1926.953(h) requires 
attendants for work in an enclosed space (which includes, manholes and 
vaults) if a hazard exists because of traffic patterns in the area of 
the opening to the enclosed space. Thus, this attendant requirement 
addresses hazards outside the space. On the other hand, the hazards 
addressed by final Sec.  1926.965(d) primarily involve electric shock. 
As noted earlier, allowing the attendant required by this paragraph to 
enter the manhole or vault briefly has no significant effect on the 
safety of the employee he or she is protecting.
    Paragraph (d)(3), which is being adopted without change from the 
proposal, permits an employee working alone to enter a manhole or 
vault, where energized cables or equipment are in service, for brief 
periods of time for the purpose of inspection, housekeeping, taking 
readings, or similar work. In such situations, the employer must 
demonstrate that the employee will be protected from all electrical 
hazards.
    Mr. Lee Marchessault of Workplace Safety Solutions recommended that 
OSHA remove this paragraph from the standard (Ex. 0196; Tr. 581). He 
testified that ``[t]here is no way to ensure the safety of a worker in 
a vault containing energized cables, and an attendant should always be 
prepared for rescue in case of emergency'' (Tr. 581).
    As noted earlier, the purpose of requiring an attendant under final 
paragraph (d) is to provide assistance in case the employee in the 
manhole or vault receives an electric shock. In proposing paragraph 
(d)(3), OSHA believed that, when an employee is performing the types of 
work listed in this provision, there is very little chance that he or 
she would suffer an electric shock. Mr. Marchessault did not provide 
any evidence that the permitted types of work are unsafe or that they 
expose employees to a risk of electric shock. In fact, final paragraph 
(d)(3) requires the employer to demonstrate that the employee will be 
protected from all electrical hazards. Thus, the Agency continues to 
believe it is safe for an employee to perform duties such as 
housekeeping and inspection without the presence of an attendant in the 
circumstances described by final paragraph (d)(3).
    NIOSH recommended that this provision require the employer to 
demonstrate that employees will also be protected from ``hazardous 
atmospheres (as required in 1910.146)'' (Ex. 0130).
    OSHA agrees that employees entering manholes and vaults may be 
exposed to hazardous atmospheres. However, these hazards are adequately 
addressed by the requirements on enclosed spaces contained in final 
Sec.  1926.953, which also apply to manholes and vaults. Consequently, 
the Agency is not adopting the recommendation from NIOSH.
    Paragraph (d)(4), which is being adopted without substantive change 
from the proposal, requires reliable communications through two-way 
radios or other equivalent means to be maintained among all employees 
involved in the job, including any attendants, the employees in the 
manhole or vault, and employees in separate manholes or vaults working 
on the same job. This requirement, which OSHA took from existing Sec.  
1910.269(t)(3)(iv), has no counterpart in Sec.  1926.956(b)(1).

[[Page 20533]]

    To install cables into the underground ducts, or conduits, that 
will contain them, employees use a series of short jointed rods, or a 
long flexible rod, inserted into the ducts. The insertion of these rods 
into the ducts is known as ``rodding.'' Employees use the rods to 
thread the cable-pulling rope through the conduit. After withdrawing 
the rods and inserting the cable-pulling ropes, employees then can pull 
the cables through the conduit by mechanical means.
    Paragraph (e), which is being adopted without substantive change 
from the proposal, requires the employer to ensure that employees 
install the duct rods in the direction presenting the least hazard to 
employees. To make sure that a rod does not contact live parts at the 
far end of the duct line being rodded, which would be in a different 
manhole or vault, this paragraph also requires the employer to station 
an employee at the remote, or far, end of the rodding operation to 
ensure that employees maintain the required minimum approach distances. 
This provision, which OSHA took from existing Sec.  1910.269(t)(4), has 
no counterpart in existing Subpart V.
    To prevent accidents resulting from working on the wrong, and 
possibly energized, cable, paragraph (f), which is being adopted 
without substantive change from the proposal, requires the employer to 
identify the proper cable when multiple cables are present in a work 
area. The employer must make this identification by electrical means 
(for example, a meter), unless the proper cable is obvious because of 
distinctive appearance, location, or other readily apparent means of 
identification. The employer must protect cables other than the one 
being worked from damage. This paragraph, which OSHA took from existing 
Sec.  1910.269(t)(5), is similar to existing Sec.  1926.956(c)(4), 
(c)(5), and (c)(6); however, existing Sec.  1926.956(c)(4) and (c)(5) 
apply only to excavations. Final paragraph (f) applies the requirements 
to all underground installations.
    If employees will be moving any energized cables during underground 
operations, paragraph (g) requires the employer to ensure that 
employees inspect these cables for abnormalities that could lead to a 
fault, except as provided in paragraph (h)(2). If the employees find an 
abnormality, final paragraph (h)(1) applies. These provisions protect 
employees against possibly defective cables, which could fault when 
moved, leading to serious injury. OSHA replaced ``defects'' in proposed 
paragraph (g) with ``abnormalities'' in the final rule for consistency 
with the language used in final paragraph (h). In addition, OSHA added 
language exempting employers from the inspection requirement when final 
paragraph (h)(2) permits employees to perform work that could cause a 
fault in an energized cable in a manhole or vault. Under paragraph 
(h)(2), employers may perform work that could cause a fault in a cable 
when service-load conditions and a lack of feasible alternatives 
require that the cable remain energized. In that case, employees may 
enter the manhole or vault, and perform that work without the 
inspection required by paragraph (g), provided the employer protects 
them from the possible effects of a failure using shields or other 
devices that are capable of containing the adverse effects of a fault. 
Paragraph (g) in the final rule, which OSHA took from existing Sec.  
1910.269(t)(6), has no counterpart in existing Subpart V.
    Since an energized cable with an abnormality may fail with an 
enormous release of energy, employers must take precautions to minimize 
the possibility of such an occurrence while an employee is working in a 
manhole or vault. Therefore, final paragraph (h) addresses conditions 
that could lead to a failure of a cable and injure an employee working 
in a manhole or vault.
    Final paragraph (h)(1) provides that, if a cable in a manhole or 
vault has one or more abnormalities that could lead to a fault or be an 
indication of an impending fault, the employer must deenergize the 
cable before an employee may work in the manhole or vault, except when 
service-load conditions and a lack of feasible alternatives \443\ 
require that the cable remain energized. For example, under some 
service-load conditions, it may not be feasible for the electric 
utility to deenergize the cable with the abnormality because the 
utility deenergized another line for maintenance work. In such cases, 
employees may enter the manhole or vault only if protected from the 
possible effects of a failure by shields or other devices capable of 
containing the adverse effects of a fault. Final paragraph (h)(1) 
provides that the employer must treat the following abnormalities as 
indications of impending faults: oil or compound leaking from cable or 
joints, broken cable sheaths or joint sleeves, hot localized surface 
temperatures of cables or joints, or joints swollen beyond normal 
tolerance. However, if the employer can demonstrate that the listed 
conditions could not lead to a fault, final paragraph (h)(1) does not 
require the employer to take protective measures. This provision, which 
OSHA took from existing Sec.  1910.269(t)(7), has no counterpart in 
existing Subpart V. OSHA revised the language in the final rule to 
clarify that it applies to abnormalities that ``could lead to a fault 
or be an indication of an impending fault'' (emphasis added). The 
Agency also included the information in the note to proposed paragraph 
(h)(1) in the regulatory text of this final paragraph to clarify that, 
when any of the abnormalities specifically listed in paragraph (h)(1) 
are present, the burden is on the employer to demonstrate that the 
abnormality could not lead to a fault.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \443\ Feasible alternatives could include the use of shunts or 
other means of supplying areas with power.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As noted earlier in the discussion of the definition for ``entry'' 
under the summary and explanation for final Sec.  1926.953(g), ConEd 
and EEI expressed concern that proposed Sec.  1910.269(t)(7)(i) (and by 
implication its counterpart in proposed Sec.  1926.965(h)(1)) would 
preclude the ability of an employer to enter a manhole or vault and 
hang a tag to indicate the presence of a defective cable.
    Final Sec.  1910.269(t)(7)(i) and its counterpart in final Sec.  
1926.965(h)(1) are substantially the same as existing Sec.  
1910.269(t)(7). These provisions generally prohibit employees from 
entering a manhole or vault containing a cable that has one or more 
abnormalities that could lead to a fault, or be an indication of an 
impending fault. Employers are unlikely to know about the abnormalities 
addressed by these provisions before employees enter the manholes or 
vaults in which they are present. The rule does not prohibit an initial 
entry into a manhole or vault, so long as the employer does not have 
actual or constructive knowledge of the abnormalities before the 
initial entry. If an employer uses the described tagging system to 
identify cables with these abnormalities, OSHA expects that the tags 
will be hung during the initial entry into the manhole or vault when 
employees first identify the abnormalities. Once the employer acquires 
knowledge of cables with abnormalities that could lead to a fault, or 
be an indication of an impending fault, the final rule prohibits 
additional entries unless the employer takes the precautions required 
by final paragraph (h)(1).
    Paragraph (h)(2), which is being adopted without substantive change 
from the proposal, addresses work that could cause a fault in a cable, 
such as removing asbestos covering on a cable

[[Page 20534]]

or using a power tool to break concrete encasing a cable. This type of 
work can damage the cable and create an internal fault. The energy 
released by the fault could injure not only the employee performing the 
work, but any other employees nearby. Final paragraph (h)(2) requires 
the same protective measures in those situations as paragraph (h)(1), 
that is, deenergizing the cable or, under certain conditions, using 
shields or other protective devices capable of containing the effects 
of a fault.
    Two commenters requested that OSHA clarify the meaning of the 
phrase ``shields or other devices that are capable of containing the 
adverse effects of a fault'' in proposed paragraph (h) (Exs. 0209, 
0227). Both paragraphs (h)(1) and (h)(2) use this phrase. OSHA notes 
that the preamble to the proposal described the types of devices that 
employers could use to satisfy these requirements:

    For example, a ballistic blanket wrapped around a defective 
splice can protect against injury from the effects of a fault in the 
splice. The energy that could be released in case of a fault is 
known, and the energy absorbing capability of a shield or other 
device can be obtained from the manufacturer or can be calculated. 
As long as the energy absorbing capability of the shield or other 
device exceeds the available fault energy, employees will be 
protected. The proposal would require employees to be protected, 
regardless of the type of device used and of how it is applied. [70 
FR 34884-34885]

This clarification applies equally to the final rule.
    Mr. Lee Marchessault with Workplace Safety Solutions suggested that 
paragraph (h) also require consideration of FR clothing as outlined in 
proposed Appendix F (Ex. 0196).
    Employers may use arc-rated clothing, which employers must use 
under final Sec.  1926.960(g)(5), in combination with the shields or 
other devices specified by final paragraph (h), to achieve the 
protection from heat energy required by both of these provisions. 
However, paragraph (h) of the final rule requires a broader form of 
protection, including protection from flying objects and other hazards 
from the fault. Therefore, OSHA does not recognize FR or arc-rated 
clothing as a device that is capable, by itself, of containing the 
adverse effects of a fault as required by that paragraph.
    Consolidated Edison objected to the wording of proposed paragraph 
(h)(2) and the explanation of proposed paragraph (h)(2) in the preamble 
to the proposal (70 FR 34885), commenting:

    While Consolidated Edison does not object to the concept that 
OSHA is trying to convey in this new provision, we find the wording 
to be unnecessarily vague. In the preamble to the proposed rule, 
OSHA uses the example of removing asbestos covering from a cable as 
a type of work that could cause a fault. In a given year, Con Edison 
conducts almost one hundred (100) projects in which we remove 
twenty-five (25) linear feet of asbestos covering from energized 
cable. This is the regulatory limit at which we must file for the 
project; it does not include projects where we remove less than the 
regulatory filing limit. Con Edison has a set procedure by which 
this work is conducted. This does not represent work that could be 
expected to cause a fault in a cable since we routinely conduct this 
work without cable faulting. In addition, we routinely remove arc-
proof tape of non-asbestos type from cables that are energized 
without incident.
    In another example, you indicate that using a power tool to 
break concrete encasing a cable could cause a fault. Con Edison uses 
power tools to break concrete duct encasing energized cable as part 
of our normal operations. We took the time to analyze the operation 
and develop a procedure by which this can be done safely. By 
following this procedure, we successfully remove concrete (and other 
material) duct from energized cable.
    There are recognized work practices that could be expected to 
cause a fault in a cable but the two examples OSHA provides in the 
preamble to the proposed rule are not these type of operation. As 
currently written, the rule could preclude a great deal of work in a 
subsurface structure with energized cable even though there is no 
danger to employee safety. Therefore, we are suggesting that OSHA 
change the proposed language to the following:
    If the work being performed in a manhole or vault could be 
expected to cause a fault in a cable, that cable shall be 
deenergized before any employee may work in the manhole or vault, 
except when service load conditions and a lack of feasible 
alternatives require that the cable remain energized. In that case, 
employees may enter the manhole or vault provided they are protected 
from the possible effects of a failure by shields or other devices 
that are capable of containing the adverse effects of a fault. [Ex. 
0157; emphasis included in original]

    EEI similarly objected to the language in proposed paragraph (h), 
arguing that ``the wording as . . . proposed would eliminate any work 
in a structure with live equipment'' (Ex. 0227). EEI recommended the 
following language to address its concerns: \444\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \444\ Paraphrasing language from proposed paragraph (h)(1), EEI 
indicated that it was commenting on that provision of the proposal 
(Ex. 0227). However, EEI recommended revised language that would 
replace proposed paragraph (h)(2). In this discussion, OSHA responds 
to EEI's comment as it applies to proposed paragraph (h) generally 
and to the recommended language as a suggested replacement for 
proposed paragraph (h)(2).

    If the work being performed in a manhole or vault could be 
expected to lead to a fault in a cable, that cable shall be 
deenergized before an employee may work on that cable. [Id.; 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
emphasis included in original]

    First, OSHA disagrees with Consolidated Edison with regard to the 
two examples of work that could cause a fault in a cable. In both 
cases, the cable is hidden from view--in one case, by an asbestos 
covering, and in the other case, by concrete. Employees cannot inspect 
the condition of the cable jacket and insulation, which may be decades 
old, until after removing the covering.\445\ It is reasonable to expect 
that vibrations from the removal of an asbestos or concrete covering 
would move the encased cables, and any movement of a cable with an 
abnormality, even movement from vibrations, can lead to the failure of 
the cable (that is, a fault). In addition, there is at least one 
accident in the record involving the use of tools to remove concrete 
from underground cables, and others involving tools penetrating 
concrete-encased underground cables (Ex. 0004 \446\). Consequently, 
OSHA continues to believe that these are two good examples of work that 
could cause a fault in a cable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \445\ As noted earlier, final paragraph (g) requires employees 
to inspect energized cables before moving them, except as provided 
in paragraph (h)(2). OSHA added the exception, which the proposal 
did not make explicit, to clarify that paragraph (g) does not 
require an inspection when paragraph (h)(2) permits employees to 
perform work that could cause a fault in an energized cable in a 
manhole or vault.
    \446\ See, for example, the three accidents described at https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=170063499&id=14485585&id=170191100.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Second, the Agency does not agree with EEI that the final rule will 
``eliminate any work in a structure with live equipment'' (Ex. 0227). 
Final paragraph (h) requires employers to deenergize cables only under 
limited conditions. Paragraph (h)(1) requires the employer to 
deenergize a cable only when the cable has one or more abnormalities 
that could lead to a fault or be an indication of an impending fault. 
Paragraph (h)(2) requires the employer to deenergize a cable only when 
employees will perform work that could cause a fault in that cable. The 
final rule permits employees to work in manholes and vaults containing 
live equipment whenever the conditions specified in paragraphs (h)(1) 
and (h)(2) are not present, as well as when service-load conditions and 
a lack of feasible alternatives require that the cable remain 
energized.
    Finally, OSHA is not adopting Consolidated Edison's (or EEI's) 
suggested language. The Agency does not believe that the recommended 
change would clarify the rule and

[[Page 20535]]

believes that adopting the change would make the provision more 
difficult to enforce. Final paragraph (h)(2) does not require 
deenergizing cables when there is only a remote possibility that a 
fault would occur. There must be a reasonable possibility that 
performing the work could cause a fault. Such work would include: work 
in which employees are using tools or equipment in a manner in which 
they could foreseeably penetrate the cable jacket; work that would 
disturb a cable that employees cannot visually inspect; and any other 
work that could damage a cable. These are the types of activities that 
caused accidents in the record (Exs. 0002, 0003 \447\). In addition, 
EEI's recommendation would only protect employees working on a cable. 
EEI's proposed language would not ensure the safety of employees 
performing work in the vicinity of, but not on, the energized cable in 
which a fault could occur. Such work would include work in which 
employees are using tools or equipment in a manner in which they could 
foreseeably penetrate the cable jacket, as noted previously. Therefore, 
OSHA concludes that EEI's language would not provide adequate 
protection to employees.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \447\ See, for example, the five accidents at https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=170065650&id=014485585&id=170191100&id=170153977&id=170247944.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Paragraph (i), which is being adopted without substantive change 
from the proposal, requires employers to maintain metallic-sheath 
continuity while employees are working on buried cables or cables in 
manholes and vaults. Bonding across an opening in a cable's sheath 
protects employees against electric shock from a difference in electric 
potential between the two sides of the opening. As an alternative to 
bonding, the cable sheath can be treated as energized. (In this case, 
the voltage at which the sheath is to be considered energized is equal 
to the maximum voltage that could be seen across the sheath under fault 
conditions.) This requirement, which OSHA took from existing Sec.  
1910.269(t)(8), is essentially identical to existing Sec.  
1926.956(c)(7), except that the final rule allows the cable sheath to 
be treated as energized in lieu of bonding. This requirement is 
consistent with other parts of the final rule, such as Sec.  
1926.960(j), which recognize treating objects as energized as an 
alternative to grounding.
    Mr. John Vocke with Pacific Gas and Electric Company objected to 
proposed paragraph (i) as follows:

    Paragraph (i) of proposed Sec.  1926.965 would require metallic 
sheath continuity to be maintained while work is performed on 
underground cables. In its underground transmission system, PG&E has 
deliberately engineered certain circuits with discontinuous shield 
wires for system reliability. PG&E submits that as long as specific 
safety procedures are in place, underground transmission cables need 
not be equipped with metallic sheath continuity. [Ex. 0185]

    Paragraph (i) of the final rule requires employers to maintain 
metallic-sheath continuity. It does not require these sheaths to be 
continuous across the system, nor does it require the employer to bond 
across breaks already installed in the system. As noted in the earlier 
explanation of this provision, it requires employers to place bonds 
when employees interrupt the continuity of the sheath as part of the 
work procedure (for example, when the employee strips the jacket, 
sheath, and insulation from a cable to splice it). Thus, Mr. Vocke's 
concern is unfounded. OSHA notes, however, that final Sec.  1926.962(c) 
requires temporary protective grounds to be installed to prevent each 
employee from being exposed to hazardous differences in electric 
potential. Installing grounds in accordance with this provision will 
protect employees from hazardous differences in potential where 
designed breaks in metallic sheath continuity exist.
    Mr. Brian Erga with ESCI recommended that OSHA add specific 
procedures for grounding underground cables (Exs. 0155, 0471; Tr. 1256-
1257). He explained:

    IEEE has recognized the problem after a number of accidents 
involving de-energized cables. The industry has also recognized the 
hazard and has conducted research justifying the need for new safe 
work methods.
    Again, there ha[ve] been a number of serious accidents and 
fatalities when de-energized cable, thought to be . . . safely 
grounded, has been energized due to voltage rise on the system 
neutral. After an accident at San Diego Gas and Electric (SDG&E) 
involving a grounded cable [that] became energized, SDG&E conducted 
research in system neutral voltage rise. A paper was written and 
published on the research . . . . Also, the IEEE/ESMOL Task Force 
15.07.09.01 published a paper titled ``Worker Protection While 
Working De-energized Underground Distribution Systems''. . . . [Ex. 
0471]

    Mr. Erga suggested provisions that included requiring the employer 
to (1) insulate employees from system neutral voltage rise, (2) isolate 
the cable and its associated neutral from system neutral voltage rise, 
or (3) create an equipotential zone at the work location (id.).
    The final rule already addresses the provisions recommended by Mr. 
Erga. Final Sec.  1926.962 requires employers to install grounds and 
provide an equipotential zone on lines treated as deenergized. 
Alternatively, the employer can treat the lines as energized. Paragraph 
(b) of final Sec.  1926.962 also permits lines and equipment to be 
treated as deenergized without grounds under certain conditions; 
however, Mr. Erga did not include all of these conditions in his 
recommendations. Finally, final Sec.  1926.962(g) prohibits grounding 
at a remote terminal if there is a possibility of hazardous transfer of 
potential should a fault occur. Thus, OSHA believes that the final rule 
adequately addresses the hazards covered by Mr. Erga's suggested 
regulatory text and decided not to adopt it. The Agency is, however, 
incorporating appropriate information from Mr. Erga's submission in 
Appendix C to final Subpart V, Protection from Hazardous Differences in 
Electric Potentials, to assist employers in complying with the 
requirements on grounding as they apply to underground installations.
17. Section 1926.966, Substations
    As explained in paragraph (a), final Sec.  1926.966 addresses work 
performed in substations. The provisions of this paragraph supplement 
(rather than modify) the general requirements contained in other 
portions of Subpart V, such as final Sec.  1926.960, which regulates 
working on or near live parts.
    Final paragraph (b) requires the employer to provide and maintain 
sufficient access and working space around electric equipment to permit 
ready and safe operation and maintenance of the equipment by employees. 
This rule prevents employees from contacting exposed live parts as a 
result of insufficient maneuvering room. A note following this 
paragraph recognizes, for compliance purposes, the provisions of ANSI/
IEEE C2-2012, which address the design of workspace for electric 
equipment. Final Sec.  1926.966(b), which OSHA took from existing Sec.  
1910.269(u)(1), has no counterpart in existing Subpart V.
    OSHA realizes that older installations may not meet the dimensions 
set forth in the latest version of the national consensus standard. The 
Agency believes that the language of final paragraph (b) is 
sufficiently performance-oriented that older installations, likely 
built to specifications in the national consensus standards that were 
in effect during construction of the installation, will meet the 
requirement for sufficient workspace provided that the installation

[[Page 20536]]

and work practices used enable employees to perform work safely within 
the space and to maintain the minimum approach distances established by 
the employer under Sec.  1926.960(c)(1)(i). The note to final Sec.  
1926.966(b) states that the NESC specifications are guidelines. That 
note indicates that OSHA will determine whether an installation that 
does not conform to that consensus standard complies with final 
paragraph (b) based on the following criteria:
    (1) Whether the installation conforms to the edition of ANSI/IEEE 
C2 that was in effect when the installation was made,
    (2) Whether the configuration of the installation enables employees 
to maintain the minimum approach distances, established by the employer 
under Sec.  1926.960(c)(1)(i), while the employees are working on 
exposed, energized parts, and
    (3) Whether the precautions taken when employees perform work on 
the installation provide protection equivalent to the protection 
provided by access and working space meeting ANSI/IEEE C2-2012.
    The language in this note is equivalent to a note in existing Sec.  
1910.269(u)(1) and accomplishes three goals. First, it explains that an 
installation need not be in conformance with ANSI/IEEE C2-2012 to be in 
compliance with final paragraph (b). Second, it informs employers with 
installations that do not conform to the latest ANSI standard of how 
they can comply with final paragraph (b). Third, it ensures that, 
however old an installation is, it provides sufficient space to enable 
employees to work within the space without significant risk of injury. 
OSHA received no comments on either proposed paragraph (b) or the note 
and is adopting them without substantive change from the proposal. OSHA 
updated the version of ANSI/IEEE C2 listed in the note to the most 
recent edition (2012). OSHA reviewed ANSI/IEEE C2-2012 and finds that 
it provides protection equivalent to the 2002 edition referenced in the 
note in the proposal.
    Paragraph (c), which is being adopted without substantive change 
from the proposal, requires the employer to ensure that, when employees 
remove or insert draw-out-type circuit breakers,\448\ the breaker is in 
the open position. Additionally, if the design of the control devices 
permits, the employer must render the control circuit for the circuit 
breaker inoperable. These provisions prevent arcing that could injure 
employees. Final paragraph (c), which OSHA took from existing Sec.  
1910.269(u)(2), has no counterpart in existing Subpart V.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \448\ A draw-out-type circuit breaker is one in which the 
removable portion may be withdrawn from the stationary portion 
without unbolting connections or mounting supports.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Because voltages can be impressed or induced on large metal objects 
near substation equipment, proposed paragraph (d) would have required 
conductive fences around substations to be grounded. In addition, the 
proposal specified that employers maintain grounding continuity and 
provide bonding to prevent electrical discontinuity when the employer 
expanded substation fences or removed sections of such fences.
    OSHA took the proposed provision from existing Sec.  
1910.269(u)(3). Existing Sec.  1926.957(g)(1) requires employers to 
maintain ``[a]dequate interconnection with ground'' between temporary 
and permanent fences, but does not require permanent substation fences 
to be grounded. In the preamble to the proposal, OSHA indicated that it 
believes that grounding metal fences, whether they are temporary or 
permanent, is essential to the safety of employees working near the 
fences (70 FR 34885).
    OSHA received many comments on proposed paragraph (d). (See, for 
example, Exs. 0125, 0126, 0151, 0159, 0172, 0188, 0212.) Most of these 
commenters pointed out that the proposal was at odds with the methods 
of protecting employees and the general public from hazardous 
differences in electric potential described in IEEE Std 80-2000, IEEE 
Guide for Safety in AC Substation Grounding. (See, for example, Exs. 
0125, 0126, 0151, 0159, 0172, 0188.) For instance, Mr. Jules Weaver 
with the Northwest Line Constructors Chapter of NECA commented:

    As currently written, [paragraph (d)] creates a situation in 
which death or serious injury to both employees and the public 
exists. When a substation fence is expanded or a section removed for 
working in an existing substation, the temporary fence installed to 
keep the work area secured shall not be bonded or the fence 
continuity maintained between the existing grounded fence enclosure 
and the temporary fence, as explained in IEEE Standard 80-2000 
``IEEE Guide for Safety in AC Substation Grounding'' section 17.3. 
When expanding a substation the practice is to remove the existing 
section of fence between the energized portion of the substation and 
the new section. The new section is fenced to protect the worksite 
and the public from unauthorized access into the energized sub. 
Temporary isolation fences are installed between the existing 
substation fence and the temporary fence to prevent touch and step 
potential hazards. As stated in the current regulations by 
maintaining a bond and electrical continuity employees are exposed 
to these differences of potential. As the new substation addition is 
built the following basic sequence of events occur, excavation of 
the existing soil is completed, foundations and footings are poured 
for equipment placement, control wiring and ground grid installed, 
and then final installation of rock placed creating the required 
insulation for employee protection. It is not until the new ground 
grid in the substation addition is installed and equipment in place 
does the connection between the new addition and the existing 
substation [begin]. As the new addition nears completion the fence 
isolation fences are removed, permanent fencing is installed, and 
the grid connected. It is at this critical time that the employees 
can be exposed to critical potential differences and proper work 
rules on bonding and grounding would be required. [Ex. 0188; 
emphasis included in original]

He recommended that OSHA modify paragraph (d) to read:

    Conductive fences around substations shall be grounded. When a 
substation fence is expanded or a section is removed, they shall be 
designed to limit touch, step, and transferred voltages in 
accordance with industry practices.

    Note to paragraph . . . (d) . . . of this section: Guidelines 
for substation grounding as defined in IEEE Guide for Safety in AC 
substation Grounding (Standard 80-2000) would he one source that may 
be utilized to provide guidance in meeting these requirements. [Id.; 
emphasis included in original]


    OSHA agrees that this approach, which other commenters also 
recommended, would better protect employees than the proposed 
requirement. As demonstrated by the description quoted from Mr. 
Weaver's comment, employers isolate temporary fences from existing 
fences, in addition to bonding and grounding substation fence sections, 
to protect employees from hazardous differences in potential. The 
Agency also agrees that IEEE Std 80 provides useful guidance to protect 
employees from hazardous differences in electric potential. Therefore, 
OSHA adopted the following language in final paragraph (d):

    Conductive fences around substations shall be grounded. When a 
substation fence is expanded or a section is removed, fence sections 
shall be isolated, grounded, or bonded as necessary to protect 
employees from hazardous differences in electric potential.

    Note to paragraph (d) of this section: IEEE Std 80-2000, IEEE 
Guide for Safety in AC Substation Grounding, contains guidelines for 
protection against hazardous differences in electric potential.



[[Page 20537]]


    The Agency believes that the language in the final rule addresses 
the commenters' concerns, as well as the concern of another commenter, 
who questioned whether isolation joints would be acceptable under the 
standard as proposed (Ex. 0212).
    Final paragraph (e) addresses the guarding of rooms and other 
spaces that contain electric supply equipment. OSHA took this paragraph 
from existing Sec.  1910.269(u)(4). Paragraphs (c) and (g) of Sec.  
1926.957 are the only provisions in existing Subpart V that address the 
guarding of live parts in substations. These two provisions require 
employers to install barricades or barriers (paragraph (c)) and to 
install temporary fences if sections of permanent fencing are expanded 
or removed (paragraph (g)). Existing Sec.  1926.957(g)(2) also 
generally requires employers to lock gates to unattended substations.
    The existing requirements only address temporary guarding measures. 
Existing Sec.  1926.957 does not mention permanent guarding of live 
parts, which generally is more substantial than the tape and cone 
barricades permitted under the existing rule. OSHA's revision of the 
substation rules addresses guarding of live parts in substations in a 
more comprehensive manner and will provide better protection for 
employees than existing Sec.  1926.957.
    OSHA believes that it is important to prohibit unqualified persons 
from entering areas containing energized electric supply equipment, 
regardless of the work they are performing. Employees working in these 
areas must be trained in the hazards involved and in the appropriate 
work practices, as required by final Sec.  1926.950(b)(2). This 
training will enable employees to distinguish hazardous circuit parts 
from nonhazardous equipment and will ensure that they are familiar with 
the appropriate work practices, regardless of the jobs they are 
performing. Many accidents occur because unqualified persons contact 
energized parts in such areas (Ex. 0004 \449\).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \449\ See, for example, the eight accidents at https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=800995&id=170571012&id=902650&id=170571632&id=14529085&id=170681456&id=170681456&id=170108310.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Subpart V applies to electrical installations for which OSHA has 
few design requirements. The Subpart K electrical installation 
standards typically do not apply to electric power transmission and 
distribution installations, and such installations may pose hazards in 
addition to the hazards associated with exposed live parts. For 
example, ungrounded equipment enclosures pose such hazards. If 
employers do not meet the requirements of Subpart K, then it is 
important to prevent unqualified persons from gaining access to areas 
containing electric power transmission and distribution equipment.
    Paragraph (e) of final Sec.  1926.966 sets forth criteria for 
access by unqualified persons to rooms and other spaces containing 
electric supply lines or equipment. Final paragraph (e)(1) specifies 
which areas containing electric supply lines or equipment must meet the 
guarding requirements contained in final paragraphs (e)(2) through 
(e)(5). These areas fall into three categories as follows:
    (1) Rooms and other spaces where exposed live parts operating at 50 
to 150 volts to ground are within 2.4 meters (8 feet) of the ground or 
other working surface,
    (2) Rooms and other spaces where live parts operating at 151 to 600 
volts to ground are within 2.4 meters (8 feet) of the ground or other 
working surface and are guarded only by location, as permitted under 
final Sec.  1926.966(f)(1), and
    (3) Rooms and other spaces where live parts operating at more than 
600 volts to ground are located, unless:
    (a) The live parts are enclosed within grounded, metal-enclosed 
equipment whose only openings are designed so that foreign objects 
inserted in these openings will be deflected from energized parts, or
    (b) The live parts are installed at a height, above ground and any 
other working surface, that provides protection at the voltage on the 
live parts corresponding to the protection provided by a 2.4-meter (8-
foot) height at 50 volts.
    Final paragraphs (e)(2) through (e)(5) contain requirements that 
apply to these areas. Fences, screens, partitions, or walls must 
enclose these rooms and other spaces so as to minimize the possibility 
that unqualified persons will enter; the employer must display signs at 
the entrances warning unqualified persons to keep out; and the employer 
must keep the entrances locked unless the entrances are under the 
observation of a person attending the room or other space for the 
purpose of preventing unqualified employees from entering. 
Additionally, unqualified persons may not enter these rooms or other 
spaces while the electric supply lines or equipment are energized.
    OSHA received no comments on proposed paragraph (e) and is adopting 
it substantially as proposed. In the final rule, OSHA added metric 
equivalents that were missing from proposed paragraphs (e)(1)(i) and 
(e)(1)(ii). In addition, the Agency reworded paragraph (e)(5) in the 
final rule as follows: ``The employer shall keep each entrance to a 
room or other space locked, unless the entrance is under the 
observation of a person who is attending the room or other space for 
the purpose of preventing unqualified employees from entering.'' 
Proposed paragraph (e)(5) would have required the employer to lock 
entrances to rooms and other spaces not under the observation of an 
``attendant.'' OSHA defined the word ``attendant'' in final Sec.  
1926.968 as ``[a]n employee assigned to remain immediately outside the 
entrance to an enclosed or other space to render assistance as needed 
to employees inside the space.'' This term applies to provisions that 
require an attendant whose purpose is to protect employees within an 
enclosed or other space. In contrast, the purpose of the person 
attending the room or other space under final paragraph (e)(5) is to 
keep unqualified employees from entering the room or other space. 
Therefore, the use of the term ``attendant'' in proposed paragraph 
(e)(5) was inappropriate, and the revised language is more accurate.
    Paragraph (f) also addresses guarding of live parts. This 
paragraph, which OSHA took from existing Sec.  1910.269(u)(5), has no 
counterpart in existing Subpart V.
    Paragraph (f)(1), which is being adopted without substantive change 
from the proposal, requires the employer to provide guards around all 
live parts operating at more than 150 volts to ground without an 
insulating covering unless the location of the live parts gives 
sufficient clearance to minimize the possibility of accidental employee 
contact. This provision protects qualified employees from accidentally 
contacting energized parts. Guidance for clearance distances 
appropriate for guarding by location is available in ANSI/IEEE C2. A 
note following final paragraph (f)(1) provides that OSHA considers 
installations meeting ANSI/IEEE C2-2002 to meet paragraph (f)(1), which 
OSHA based on Rule 124A1 of that standard.\450\ The note further 
provides that OSHA will determine whether an installation that does not 
conform to this ANSI standard complies with paragraph (f)(1) based on 
the following criteria:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \450\ The 2012 NESC contains a similar requirement in Rule 
124A1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (1) Whether the installation conforms to the edition of ANSI C2 
that was in effect when the installation was made,
    (2) Whether each employee is isolated from energized parts at the 
point of closest approach, and

[[Page 20538]]

    (3) Whether the precautions taken when employees perform work on 
the installation provide protection equivalent to the protection 
provided by horizontal and vertical clearances meeting ANSI/IEEE C2-
2002.
    This approach affords employers flexibility in complying with the 
standard and affords employees protection from injury due to sparkover 
from live circuit parts.
    In developing the final rule, OSHA examined the 2012 version of 
ANSI/IEEE C2 to determine if the guarding requirements of the newer 
consensus standard protect employees to the extent required by final 
paragraph (f)(1) and ANSI/IEEE C2-2002. Rule 124A1 of ANSI/IEEE C2-2012 
requires guarding of ``live parts operating above 300 V phase-to-
phase'' rather than ``live parts operating at more than 150 volts to 
ground'' as required by final paragraph (f)(1). Therefore, some live 
parts that require guarding under the OSHA standard and ANSI/IEEE C2-
2002 do not require guarding under ANSI/IEEE C2-2012. For example, an 
ungrounded, single-phase circuit operating at 240 volts between 
conductors has a phase-to-ground voltage of 240 volts.\451\ The phase-
to-phase voltage of this circuit also is 240 volts. Consequently, final 
paragraph (f)(1) and ANSI/IEEE C2-2002 require guarding of live parts 
on this circuit, while ANSI/IEEE C2-2012 does not. Accordingly, the 
Agency finds that ANSI/IEEE C2-2012 requires guarding of fewer live 
parts and, therefore, provides less employee protection than the OSHA 
standard and ANSI/IEEE C2-2002. The note to final paragraph (f)(1) 
retains the reference to ANSI/IEEE C2-2002, as proposed, rather than 
updating the reference to ANSI/IEEE C2-2012. However, with regard to 
the dimensions of clearance distances about electric equipment, 
employers can rely on ANSI/IEEE C2-2012 for providing sufficient 
clearance to minimize the possibility of accidental employee contact.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \451\ The 2002 and 2007 editions of ANSI/IEEE C2 define the 
phase-to-ground voltage on an ungrounded circuit as ``[t]he highest 
nominal voltage available between any two conductors of the circuit 
concerned'' (Ex. 0077).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Paragraph (f)(2), which is being adopted without substantive change 
from the proposal, requires that the employer maintain guarding of 
energized parts within a compartment during operation and maintenance 
functions. This guarding will prevent accidental contact with energized 
parts and prevent tools or other equipment from contacting energized 
parts if an employee drops the tools or equipment. However, since 
qualified employees need access to energized equipment, an exception to 
this requirement allows qualified employees to remove guards to replace 
fuses and to perform other necessary work. In such cases, paragraph 
(f)(3), which also is being adopted without substantive change from the 
proposal, applies. When anyone removes guards from energized equipment, 
final paragraph (f)(3) requires the employer to install barriers around 
the work area to prevent employees who are not working on the 
equipment, but who are in the area, from contacting the exposed live 
parts.
    Paragraph (g)(1), which is being adopted without substantive change 
from the proposal, requires employees who do not work regularly at the 
station to report their presence to the employee in charge of 
substation activities so that they can receive information on special 
system conditions affecting employee safety. Final paragraph (g)(2) 
requires the job briefing under final Sec.  1926.952 to cover 
information on special system conditions affecting employee safety, 
including the location of energized equipment in, or adjacent to, the 
work area and the limits of any deenergized work area. OSHA took 
paragraphs (g)(1) and (g)(2) from existing Sec.  1910.269(u)(6). The 
Agency revised the language in paragraph (g)(2) in the final rule to 
make it clear that the information covered in the job briefing must 
include all information on special system conditions affecting employee 
safety in the substation. Note that, unlike paragraph (g)(1), paragraph 
(g)(2) applies equally to unattended and attended substations, and to 
employees already working in a substation and employees who enter a 
substation.
    Existing Sec.  1926.957(a)(1) requires the employer to ensure that 
employees obtain authorization from the person in charge of the 
substation before performing work. Proposed paragraph (g) would not 
have required authorization. In the preamble to the proposal, OSHA 
stated that the Agency did not believe that such a requirement was 
necessary (70 FR 34886). Proposed paragraph (g)(1) would have required 
employees who do not work regularly in the substation to report their 
presence to the employee in charge. OSHA explained in the preamble to 
the proposal that the main purpose of this rule is to ensure a flow of 
important safety-related information from the employee in charge to 
employees about to work in the substation (70 FR 34887). The Agency 
believed that, as long as the employee in charge imparted this 
information to the employees performing the work and as long as 
employers followed the requirements proposed in the revision of Subpart 
V, employees could perform the work safely. Although OSHA did not 
believe that it was necessary to require that the employee in charge 
authorize the work, the Agency requested comments on whether the lack 
of authorization to perform work could lead to accidents.
    Four commenters argued that the final rule should require 
authorization (Exs. 0167, 0209, 0219, 0227). Three of these commenters 
stated that lack of authorization can lead to accidents, but did not 
describe how or why such accidents could occur (Exs. 0209, 0219, 0227). 
The other commenter maintained that the only way to assure that 
employees receive the proper information is by requiring authorization 
by the employee in charge (Ex. 0167).
    Other commenters supported the proposal and agreed with OSHA's 
preliminary conclusion that authorization is unnecessary. (See, for 
example, Exs. 0186, 0201, 0212, 0213.) Mr. Anthony Ahern with the Ohio 
Rural Electric Cooperatives succinctly described this reasoning as 
follows:

    [A]n employee is required to report to the person in charge. The 
person in charge knows who is present and what they are doing. Newly 
arrived employee[s] cannot start work until they receive their 
safety briefing. If the person in charge doesn't want the employee 
to start work on their particular task they will stop them at that 
time. Otherwise the employee will start working on their task after 
the safety briefing. [Ex. 0186]

    The Agency agrees with Mr. Ahern that the act of reporting will 
give the employee in charge an opportunity to deny access if necessary. 
Therefore, the Agency is not including Subpart V's existing requirement 
for authorization in the final rule.
    One commenter questioned: ``Should there be a provision that states 
an unqualified person may enter a substation with a qualified employee, 
and must not touch anything, even if they are just doing a visual 
inspection?'' (Ex. 0126).
    OSHA notes that final Sec.  1926.966(e) generally prohibits 
unqualified employees from entering rooms and other spaces containing 
unguarded energized supply lines or equipment. If it is necessary for 
such employees to enter these rooms and other spaces, employers must 
train them as qualified employees. Note that OSHA considers employees 
in training to be qualified employees under certain conditions, one of 
which is when they are under the direct supervision of a qualified 
employee. (For more detail, see CPL 02-01-038.)

[[Page 20539]]

    Another commenter asked OSHA to clarify how proposed paragraph 
(g)(1) would apply to vendors and engineers who may be present, but do 
not directly work in substations (Ex. 0162).
    Final paragraph (g)(1) does not require employees who are not 
performing work covered by Subpart V to report their presence to the 
employee in charge. In such cases, Subpart V would not be applicable.
    Existing Sec.  1926.957(a)(2) is essentially identical to final 
Sec.  1926.966(g)(2), except that the existing rule, in paragraph 
(a)(2)(ii), also requires the determination of what protective 
equipment and precautions are necessary. Since final Sec.  1926.952(b) 
already requires the job briefing to cover these areas, existing Sec.  
1926.957(a)(2)(ii), which applies only to work in energized 
substations, is no longer necessary. The Agency received no objection 
to this proposed change.
18. Section 1926.967, Special Conditions
    Final Sec.  1926.967 sets requirements for special conditions 
encountered during electric power transmission and distribution work. 
Except as noted otherwise, OSHA received no comments on this section.
    Since capacitors store electric charge and can release electrical 
energy even when disconnected from their sources of supply, some 
precautions may be necessary--in addition to the precautions contained 
in final Sec.  1926.961 (deenergizing lines and equipment) and final 
Sec.  1926.962 (grounding)--when employees perform work on capacitors 
or on lines connected to capacitors. Paragraph (a), which is being 
adopted without substantive change from the proposal, contains 
precautions that will enable this equipment to be treated as 
deenergized. This paragraph, which OSHA took from existing Sec.  
1910.269(w)(1), has no counterpart in existing Subpart V. A note to 
paragraph (a) serves as a reminder that final Sec. Sec.  1926.961 and 
1926.962 apply to deenergizing and grounding capacitor installations.
    Under final paragraph (a)(1), before employees work on capacitors, 
the employer must disconnect the capacitors from energized sources and 
short circuit the capacitors. In addition, the employer must ensure 
that the employee short circuiting the capacitors waits at least 5 
minutes from the time of disconnection before applying the short 
circuit. This provision not only removes the sources of electric 
current, but also relieves the capacitors of their charge. Note that 
ANSI/IEEE Std 18-2012, IEEE Standard for Shunt Power Capacitors, 
requires all capacitors to have an internal discharge device to reduce 
the voltage to 50 volts or less within 5 minutes after the capacitor is 
disconnected from an energized source.\452\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \452\ The time limit is 5 minutes for capacitors rated over 600 
volts and 1 minute for capacitors rated 600 volts or less.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Before employees handle the units, the employer must short circuit 
each unit in series-parallel capacitor banks between all terminals and 
the capacitor case or its rack; and, if the cases of capacitors are on 
ungrounded substation racks, the employer must bond the racks to 
ground. Final paragraph (a)(2) requires these measures to ensure that 
individual capacitors do not retain a charge. Final paragraph (a)(3) 
requires the employer to short circuit any line connected to capacitors 
before the line is treated as deenergized.
    Although the magnetic flux density in the core of a current 
transformer usually is low, resulting in a low secondary voltage, it 
will rise to saturation if the secondary circuit opens while the 
transformer primary is energized. When the secondary opens, the 
magnetic flux will induce a voltage in the secondary winding high 
enough to be hazardous to the insulation in the secondary circuit and 
to workers. Because of this hazard to workers, paragraph (b), which is 
being adopted without substantive change from the proposal, prohibits 
the opening of the secondary circuit of a current transformer while the 
transformer is energized. If the employer cannot deenergize the primary 
of the current transformer before employees perform work on an 
instrument, a relay, or other section of a current transformer 
secondary circuit, the employer must bridge the circuit so that the 
current transformer secondary does not experience an open-circuit 
condition. This provision, which OSHA took from existing Sec.  
1910.269(w)(2), has no counterpart in existing Subpart V.
    In a series streetlighting circuit, the lamps are connected in 
series, and the same current flows in each lamp. A constant-current 
transformer, which provides a constant current at a variable voltage 
from a source of constant voltage and variable current, supplies the 
current in a series streetlighting circuit. As with the current 
transformer, the constant current source attempts to supply current 
even to an open secondary circuit. The resultant open-circuit voltage 
can be extremely high and hazardous to employees. For this reason, 
final paragraph (c)(2) contains a requirement similar to that in 
paragraph (b). Under final paragraph (c)(2), before any employee opens 
a series loop, the employer must deenergize the streetlighting 
transformer and isolate it from the source of supply or must bridge the 
loop to avoid an open-circuit condition. In addition, final paragraph 
(c)(1) requires the employer to ensure that employees work on series 
streetlighting circuits with an open-circuit voltage of more than 600 
volts in accordance with the requirements for overhead lines in final 
Sec.  1926.964 or for underground electrical installations in final 
Sec.  1926.965, as appropriate. Final paragraph (c), which OSHA took 
from existing Sec.  1910.269(w)(3), has no counterpart in existing 
Subpart V, and the Agency is adopting it without substantive change 
from the proposal.
    Frequently, electric power transmission and distribution employees 
must work at night, or in enclosed places, such as manholes, without 
natural illumination. Since inadvertent contact with live parts can be 
fatal, proper lighting is important to the safety of these workers. 
Therefore, paragraph (d), which is being adopted without substantive 
change from the proposal, requires the employer to provide sufficient 
illumination to enable the employee to perform the work safely. This 
provision, which OSHA took from existing Sec.  1910.269(w)(4), is 
comparable to existing Sec.  1926.950(f). The existing requirement in 
Sec.  1926.950(f), however, applies only at night. OSHA believes that 
it is important for employees to have sufficient lighting to perform 
the work safely regardless of the time of day. The note following 
paragraph (d) refers to Sec.  1926.56 for specific levels of 
illumination required under various conditions.
    Paragraph (e) of the final rule sets requirements to protect 
employees working in areas that expose them to drowning hazards. 
Paragraph (e)(1), which is being adopted without substantive change 
from the proposal, requires the provision and use of personal flotation 
devices meeting Sec.  1926.106 whenever an employee may be pulled or 
pushed, or might fall, into water where there is a danger of 
drowning.\453\ Paragraph (e)(2), which is being adopted without 
substantive change from the proposal, requires that the employer 
maintain each personal flotation device in safe condition and

[[Page 20540]]

inspect each personal flotation device frequently enough to ensure that 
it does not have rot, mildew, water saturation, or any other condition 
that could render the device unsuitable for use. Lastly, paragraph 
(e)(3) requires a safe means of passage, such as a bridge, for 
employees crossing streams or other bodies of water. This provision, 
which OSHA took from existing Sec.  1910.269(w)(5), replaces existing 
Sec.  1926.950(g). The existing rule at Sec.  1926.950(g) simply 
references other construction standards on body belts, safety straps, 
and lanyards, on safety nets, and on protection for working over or 
near water, namely Sec. Sec.  1926.104, 1926.105, and 1926.106. In 
final Sec.  1926.967(e)(3), OSHA is adopting language nearly identical 
to that contained in existing Sec.  1910.269 to ensure a safe means of 
passage, which the existing Subpart V rule does not address. In 
addition, existing Sec.  1926.950(g) is unnecessary because the 
referenced construction standards apply.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \453\ Paragraph (w)(5)(i) of Sec.  1910.269 explicitly requires 
that the employer provide flotation devices approved by the U.S. 
Coast Guard, rather than referring to Sec.  1926.106, which is a 
construction standard. Section 1926.106 also requires that the 
employer provide flotation devices approved by the U.S. Coast Guard.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Ms. Salud Layton with the Virginia, Maryland & Delaware Association 
of Electric Cooperatives objected to proposed paragraph (e)(3) because 
she believed it to be too broad (Ex. 0175). She stated that the U.S. 
Geological Survey designates ``many intermitted streams on their 
topographic map that may not have running waters many times during the 
year'' (id.). She also argued that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
prohibits building bridges in certain wetlands. Ms. Layton maintained 
that workers wearing waders can cross safely some small streams.
    OSHA notes that final paragraph (e)(3) does not require a bridge, 
but only a safe means of passage. A bridge is only one form of safe 
passage that employers can use to meet this requirement. A safe means 
of passage would exist when the water is shallow enough that workers 
wearing waders can cross it safely. Therefore, OSHA is adopting 
paragraph (e)(3) without substantive change from the proposal.
    Paragraph (f) references Subpart P of Part 1926 for requirements on 
excavations. This provision is equivalent to existing Sec.  
1926.956(c)(2), which references Sec. Sec.  1926.651 and 1926.652 of 
that subpart. The final rule clearly indicates that all of the 
requirements of Subpart P apply. OSHA is adopting paragraph (f) without 
change from the proposal.
    Working in areas with pedestrian or vehicular traffic exposes 
employees to additional hazards compared to employees working on an 
employer's premises, where the employer generally restricts public 
access. One serious additional hazard faced by employees working in 
public areas is traffic mishaps (for example, impact with a vehicle or 
a pedestrian). Final paragraph (g) sets requirements to protect 
employees against injuries resulting from traffic mishaps. If employees 
work in the vicinity of vehicular or pedestrian traffic that may 
endanger them, paragraph (g)(2), which is being adopted without 
substantive change from the proposal, requires the employer to place 
warning signs or flags and other traffic-control devices in conspicuous 
locations to alert and channel approaching traffic. If the measures 
required by paragraph (g)(2) do not provide sufficient employee 
protection or if employees are working in an area in which there are 
excavations, paragraphs (g)(3) and (g)(4), which are being adopted 
without substantive change from the proposal, require the employer to 
erect barricades. Paragraph (g)(5), which is being adopted without 
substantive change from the proposal, requires the employer to display 
warning lights prominently for night work. Paragraph (g)(1) requires 
traffic-control signs and devices to meet Sec.  1926.200(g)(2), which 
covers traffic-control devices. This provision in OSHA's construction 
standards requires compliance with Part VI of the Manual of Uniform 
Traffic Control Devices, 1988 Edition, Revision 3, September 3, 1993, 
FHWA-SA-94-027, or Part VI of the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control 
Devices, Millennium Edition, December 2000, Federal Highway 
Administration. OSHA is adopting paragraph (g)(1) without substantive 
change from the proposal. Paragraph (g), which OSHA took from existing 
Sec.  1910.269(w)(6), has no counterpart in existing Subpart V.
    Paragraph (h), which is being adopted without substantive change 
from the proposal, addresses the hazards of voltage backfeed due to 
sources of cogeneration or from the secondary system. Under conditions 
of voltage backfeed, the lines on which employees will perform work 
remain energized after the employer disconnects the main source of 
power. According to this provision, if there is a possibility of 
voltage backfeed from sources of cogeneration or from the secondary 
system, employers must have employees work the lines as energized under 
final Sec.  1926.960 or work the lines deenergized following final 
Sec. Sec.  1926.961 and 1926.962. The referenced requirements contain 
the appropriate controls and work practices employers must implement in 
case of voltage backfeed. Final paragraph (h), which OSHA took from 
existing Sec.  1910.269(w)(7), has no counterpart in existing Subpart 
V.
    Sometimes, electric power transmission and distribution work 
involves the use of lasers. Existing Sec.  1926.54 of the construction 
standards contains appropriate requirements for the installation, 
operation, and adjustment of lasers. Paragraph (i), which is being 
adopted without substantive change from the proposal, requires the 
employer to install, adjust, and operate laser equipment in accordance 
with Sec.  1926.54. Paragraph (i), which OSHA took from existing Sec.  
1910.269(w)(8), has no counterpart in existing Subpart V.
    To ensure that hydraulic equipment retains its insulating value, 
paragraph (j) requires the hydraulic fluid used in insulated sections 
of hydraulic equipment to provide insulation for the voltage involved. 
Proposed paragraph (j) also contained an exemption from the requirement 
in Sec.  1926.302(d)(1) that hydraulic fluid used in hydraulic-powered 
tools be fire-resistant. OSHA did not adopt the proposed exemption in 
final Sec.  1926.967(j) because final Sec.  1926.956(d)(1) already 
contains the relevant exemption.
    Final paragraph (k) addresses communication facilities associated 
with electric power transmission and distribution systems. Typical 
communications installations include installations for microwave 
signaling and power line carriers. This paragraph, which OSHA took from 
existing Sec.  1910.269(s), has no counterpart in existing Subpart V.
    Paragraph (k)(1) addresses microwave signaling systems. To protect 
employees' eyes from injury caused by microwave radiation, paragraph 
(k)(1)(i), which is being adopted without substantive change from the 
proposal, requires employers to ensure that employees do not look into 
an open waveguide or antenna connected to an energized source of 
microwave radiation.
    Existing Sec.  1910.97, which covers nonionizing radiation, 
prescribes a warning sign with a special symbol to indicate nonionizing 
radiation hazards. Paragraph (k)(1)(ii), which is being adopted without 
substantive change from the proposal, provides that, if the 
electromagnetic-radiation level in an accessible area exceeds the 
radiation-protection guide set forth in Sec.  1910.97(a)(2), the 
employer post the area with warning signs containing the warning symbol 
described in Sec.  1910.97(a)(3). This paragraph also requires the 
lower half of that symbol to include the following statements or

[[Page 20541]]

statements that the employer can demonstrate are equivalent:

    Radiation in this area may exceed hazard limitations and special 
precautions are required. Obtain specific instruction before 
entering.

    The sign will warn employees about the hazards present in the area 
and inform them that special instructions are necessary to enter the 
area.
    In Sec.  1910.97, the radiation-protection guide is advisory only. 
In final paragraph (k)(1)(iii), OSHA makes the guide mandatory for 
electric power transmission and distribution work by requiring the 
employer to institute measures that prevent any employee's exposure 
from being greater than the exposure set forth in the guide. These 
measures may be administrative measures (such as limitations on the 
duration of exposure) or engineering measures (such as a design of the 
system that limits the emitted radiation to that permitted by the 
guide), or the measures may involve the use of personal protective 
equipment. This provision does not require employers to follow the 
hierarchy of controls normally required for the protection of employees 
from occupational hazards. Employees exposed to radiation levels beyond 
that permitted by the radiation-protection guide are typically 
performing maintenance tasks, and OSHA typically permits the use of 
personal protective equipment in lieu of engineering or administrative 
controls during work operations, such as some maintenance and repair 
activities, for which engineering and work-practice controls are not 
feasible. (See, for example, Sec. Sec.  1910.1001(g)(1)(ii) (asbestos), 
1910.1018(h)(1)(ii) (inorganic arsenic), and 1910.1028(g)(1)(ii) 
(benzene).) The Agency indicated in the preamble to the proposal that 
it did not believe any employees had radiation exposures exceeding the 
radiation-protection guide on a routine basis (70 FR 34888). The Agency 
requested comments on whether the proposal adequately protected 
employees and whether the standard should require employers to follow 
the hierarchy of controls.
    No commenters suggested that OSHA apply the hierarchy of controls 
to electromagnetic-radiation exposure. However, Mr. Anthony Ahern with 
Ohio Rural Electric Cooperatives commented that ``[e]xposure to really 
high power microwave radiation is diminishing as more and more of the 
big telcos are dismantling their microwave facilities in favor of fiber 
optic networks'' (Ex. 0186). The record, therefore, does not contradict 
OSHA's determination that it is unnecessary in final paragraph 
(k)(1)(iii) to require that employers comply with the hierarchy of 
controls.
    Two commenters maintained that Sec.  1910.97 is out of date and 
recommended other, more protective guidelines (Exs. 0163, 0212). Ms. 
Susan O'Connor with Siemens Power Generation commented that ANSI, the 
American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists, and the 
International Commission on Non-Ionizing Radiation Protection have 
guidelines that are more current and more protective than the 
requirements in Sec.  1910.97 (Ex. 0163). She recommended that OSHA 
update Sec.  1910.97 if the Agency references Sec.  1910.97 in the 
final rule. Mr. Tom Chappell with Southern Company stated that the 
Federal Communications Commission's (FCC) OET Bulletin 65, Edition 97-
01, Evaluating Compliance with FCC Guidelines for Human Exposure to 
Radiofrequency Electromagnetic Fields, has a two-tiered approach for 
setting permissible exposure limits for nonionizing radiation that 
``appears to provide a greater level of protection for employees'' (Ex. 
0212). He recommended that OSHA defer to the FCC in establishing 
employee exposure limits.
    The purpose of this rulemaking is to set safety standards for 
employees working on electric power generation, transmission, and 
distribution installations and to set safety standards for electrical 
protective equipment. It is not the purpose of this rulemaking to set 
permissible exposure limits for nonionizing radiation. Therefore, the 
radiation-protection guide contained in Sec.  1910.97 is outside the 
scope of this rulemaking, and OSHA is not revising Sec.  1910.97 in 
this final rule.
    The FCC authorizes and licenses devices, transmitters, and 
facilities that generate radio-frequency radiation. It has jurisdiction 
over all transmitting services in the United States, except services 
operated by the Federal government. (See https://www.fcc.gov/oet/rfsafety/rf-faqs.html#Q10.) However, the FCC's primary jurisdiction 
does not include the health and safety of employees, and the FCC relies 
on other agencies and organizations for guidance in such matters (id.). 
Therefore, OSHA decided that it would be inappropriate to defer 
establishing employee exposure limits to the FCC as recommended by Mr. 
Chappell. For these reasons, OSHA is adopting paragraph (k)(1)(iii) as 
proposed.
    Power-line carrier systems use power lines to carry signals between 
equipment at different points on lines. Therefore, paragraph (k)(2), 
which is being adopted without substantive change from the proposal, 
requires the employer to ensure that employees perform work associated 
with power-line carrier installations, including work on equipment used 
for coupling carrier current to power line conductors, according to the 
requirements for work on energized lines. As a correction, the final 
rule replaces the term ``this section,'' which was in the proposal, 
with ``this subpart.''
Comments Regarding Heightened Sensitivity to Electromagnetic Radiation
    Some rulemaking participants recommended that OSHA adopt protection 
for workers who are sensitive to electromagnetic radiation. (See, for 
example, Exs. 0106, 0482; Tr. 326-352.) These commenters maintained 
that some individuals are especially sensitive to electromagnetic 
radiation from sources such as computers, power lines, and other 
electric equipment (id.) For example, Ms. M. Matich Hughes commented 
that sensitive individuals react to this type of radiation with a wide 
range of symptoms, including itching, redness, swelling, and stinging 
(Ex. 0106). Some of these commenters also pointed to papers supporting 
their claims (Exs. 0106, 0482). For instance, Drs. Diane and Bert 
Schou, and Mr. Paul Schou, submitted several papers, and referenced 
others, on the effects of electromagnetic radiation in humans and 
animals (Ex. 0482).
    OSHA declines to regulate exposure to electromagnetic radiation in 
this rulemaking for several reasons. First, the relevant portion of 
this rulemaking focuses on the safety hazards associated with the 
maintenance and construction of electric power generation, 
transmission, and distribution installations.\454\ The hazards that 
these commenters address appear to be health hazards posed by 
electromagnetic radiation. The commenters maintain that only certain 
individuals are sensitive to electromagnetic radiation (see, for 
example, Ex. 0106 (``a California Department of Health Services survey 
has found that 3 percent of the people interviewed reported that they 
are unusually sensitive to electric appliances or power lines''), Ex. 
0124 (``It is most easily understood as a radiation type injury that 
affects . . . a population estimated at 3 to 5 percent in the world''), 
and Tr. 330 (``we're talking about three percent worldwide of the 
people who are very, very

[[Page 20542]]

sensitive'')) and that symptoms may develop or worsen after long-term 
exposure (see, for example, Ex. 0482 (``High [electromagnetic 
radiation] exposure for a short time is preferred to long time low 
power [electromagnetic radiation]''). Second, these commenters are 
requesting that OSHA address hazardous conditions that go far beyond 
the work covered by the final rule. The commenters maintain that there 
are many sources of electromagnetic radiation that can cause symptoms. 
(See, for example, Ex. 0106 (``[Electromagnetic radiation] sensitivity 
is . . . associated with exposure to electromagnetic fields created by 
computers, power lines and other electronic equipment'') and Tr. 334 
(``Sources that [can trigger electromagnetic radiation sensitivity] 
include the fluorescent lights[,] remote meters[,] broadband on power 
lines, [and] wireless Internet'').) Thus, to the extent that 
electromagnetic radiation poses ``sensitivity hazards,'' those hazards 
are not unique to work on electric power generation, transmission, and 
distribution installations, but are present in nearly all workplaces. 
OSHA, therefore, concludes that this rulemaking is not a proper vehicle 
for regulating the hazards identified by these commenters.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \454\ This rulemaking also addresses electrical protective 
equipment, a subject unrelated to electromagnetic radiation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

19. Section 1926.968, Definitions
    Final Sec.  1926.968 contains definitions of terms used in Subpart 
V. Since OSHA based these definitions, in large part, on consensus 
standards and existing OSHA rules, and since the definitions included 
are generally self-explanatory, OSHA believes the regulated community 
understands these terms well; therefore, with a few exceptions, this 
discussion of final Sec.  1926.968 provides no explanation of the 
terms' definitions. For terms having meanings that may not be readily 
apparent, the Agency is providing an explanation of the definition of 
each of these terms in the discussion of the provision in which the 
term first appears. The following table shows where in this preamble 
OSHA discusses some of the key definitions.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                         See the summary and explanation
                  Term                                 for:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Contract employer......................  Sec.   1926.950(c), Information
                                          transfer.
Enclosed space.........................  Sec.   1926.953(a), Enclosed
                                          spaces, General.
Entry..................................  Sec.   1926.953(g), Hazardous
                                          atmosphere.
Exposed................................  Sec.   1926.960(b)(3), At least
                                          two employees.
                                         Sec.   1926.960(g)(1), Hazard
                                          assessment.
Fall restraint system..................  Sec.   1926.954(b)(3)(iii),
                                          Care and use of personal fall
                                          protection equipment.
Host employer..........................  Sec.   1926.950(c), Information
                                          transfer.
Isolated...............................  Sec.   1926.960(b)(3), At least
                                          two employees.
Line-clearance tree trimming...........  Sec.   1926.950(a)(3),
                                          Applicable Part 1910
                                          requirements.
Personal fall arrest system............  Sec.   1926.954(b)(3)(iii),
                                          Care and use of personal fall
                                          protection equipment.
Work-positioning equipment.............  Sec.   1926.954(b)(3)(iii),
                                          Care and use of personal fall
                                          protection equipment.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    OSHA based the definition of ``qualified employee'' on the 
definition of that term as set forth in existing Sec.  1910.269(x). 
This definition states that a qualified employee is an employee 
knowledgeable in the construction and operation of the electric power 
generation, transmission, and distribution equipment involved, along 
with the associated hazards.
    As OSHA indicated in the preamble to the proposal, the Agency is 
not requiring that a ``qualified employee'' be knowledgeable in all 
aspects of electric power generation, transmission, and distribution 
equipment (70 FR 34888--34889). OSHA believes that this definition will 
convey the true meaning of this term. Note that the final rule uses the 
term ``qualified employee'' to refer only to employees who have the 
training to work on energized electric power transmission and 
distribution installations. Paragraph (b)(2) of final Sec.  1926.950 
sets out the training an employee must have to be a qualified employee. 
OSHA included a note to this effect following the definition of the 
term. OSHA received no comments on the definition of ``qualified 
employee'' and is adopting it without substantive change from the 
proposal.
    One commenter requested that the standard define ``fire-resistant 
clothing'' (Ex. 0237). This commenter noted that untreated cotton, 
regardless of weight, is not considered ``fire-resistant'' and asked 
that the final rule clarify this point.
    As the commenter pointed out in its submission, a footnote in 
proposed Appendix F described flame-resistant clothing as follows:

    Flame-resistant clothing includes clothing that is inherently 
flame resistant and clothing that has been chemically treated with a 
flame retardant. (See ASTM F1506-02a, Standard Performance 
Specification for Textile Materials for Wearing Apparel for Use by 
Electrical Workers Exposed to Momentary Electric Arc and Related 
Thermal Hazards.) [70 FR 34977]

OSHA decided not to include a definition of ``flame-resistant 
clothing'' in the final rule. From the comments received on the record, 
the Agency believes that affected employers and employees understand 
that untreated cotton is not flame-resistant for the purposes of final 
Sec.  1926.960(g)(4). Because final Sec.  1926.960(g)(5) requires arc-
rated protection, and because most FR clothing has an arc rating, OSHA 
also believes that employers generally will use arc-rated clothing to 
meet both requirements. (See, for example, Tr. 545.) In any event, the 
Agency included a separate topic in Appendix E explaining what OSHA 
means by FR and arc-rated clothing, so that employers will know what 
clothing to purchase.
    IBEW objected to the definition of ``system operator'' as it 
applied to the control room operator in a generating station (Exs. 
0230, 0480; Tr. 905). The union maintained that generating plants do 
not have system operators, stating:

    Most generating stations have a control room operator that is 
responsible for all operations related to a specific generating 
unit. System operators are usually located in some type of system 
operations center and are responsible for operations of the 
transmission system. There is available technology for computer 
systems operated by system operators to have some form of automated 
generation control . . . in a specific transmission system, but the 
operations of the generating unit, specifically the installation of 
lockout/tagout devices are the responsibility of station personnel, 
probably the control room operator. OSHA should make the appropriate 
changes. [Ex. 0230]

IBEW recommended that OSHA adopt a different term, ``control room 
operator,''

[[Page 20543]]

applicable to the lockout-tagout requirements in Sec.  1910.269(d) and 
defined as follows:

    Control room operator. A qualified employee who operates an 
electric generating system or its parts from within a centralized 
control room. [Ex. 0480]

    In final Sec.  1926.968, ``system operator'' means a ``qualified 
person designated to operate the system or its parts.'' This is a 
generic definition that OSHA believes applies equally to the employees 
in the dispatch center operating a transmission or distribution system 
and to the employees in the control room of a power generating plant 
who control the generation system and apply lockout-tagout devices. 
OSHA recognizes that the utility industry views these two groups of 
employees as being distinct and may even frequently use the term 
``system operator'' exclusively for the transmission and distribution 
operators (though some utilities call these employees ``dispatchers'' 
(Exs. 0167, 0508)). However, from the description of the energy control 
procedures in the 1994 Sec.  1910.269 rulemaking record, and even from 
IBEW's own recommended definition, it is clear that the control room 
operator in a generation plant serves the same function as a system 
operator for a transmission or distribution system (269-Ex. 12-6; Ex. 
0480). Therefore, the Agency concludes that a control room operator in 
a generation plant is ``designated'' by the employer to ``operate'' or 
control ``the [generation] system or its parts'' and, thus, meets the 
definition for ``system operator'' contained in the final rule. For 
these reasons, OSHA is adopting the definition of ``system operator'' 
as proposed.
20. Appendices
    OSHA is including six appendices to final Subpart V. The first of 
these appendices is Appendix A. Proposed Appendix A to Subpart V 
referred to Appendix A to Sec.  1910.269. The general industry appendix 
contains flow charts depicting the interface between Sec.  1910.269 and 
the following standards: Sec.  1910.146, Permit-required confined 
spaces; Sec.  1910.147, The control of hazardous energy (lockout/
tagout); and Part 1910, Subpart S, Electrical. Appendix A to Sec.  
1910.269 has little relevance, if any, to work covered by Subpart V, as 
that appendix only contains information relevant to the application of 
general industry standards. Therefore, the Agency is not adopting 
proposed Appendix A to Subpart V.
    Lee Marchessault with Workplace Safety Solutions expressed concern 
that Appendix A to Sec.  1910.269 granted electric power generation, 
transmission, and distribution work an exemption from Subpart S of the 
general industry standards (Ex. 0196; Tr. 582-583). Based on his 
experience as an electrician, he believed that there were some hazards 
covered by Subpart S that Sec.  1910.269 does not address.
    OSHA did not propose any changes to existing Appendix A to Sec.  
1910.269 and is adopting it in Sec.  1910.269 of this final rule 
without substantive change. This appendix does not grant an exemption 
from Subpart S for electric power generation, transmission, and 
distribution work. It simply provides guidance, in the form of a 
flowchart, on how Sec.  1910.269 and Subpart S apply to various 
installations. OSHA is not altering the scope of Subpart S in any way. 
In fact, final Sec.  1910.269(a)(1)(ii)(B) explicitly states that Sec.  
1910.269 does not apply to ``electrical installations, electrical 
safety-related work practices, or electrical maintenance considerations 
covered by Subpart S of this part.'' Therefore, Mr. Marchessault's 
concerns are groundless.
    Appendix B provides information relating to the determination of 
appropriate minimum approach distances under final Sec.  
1926.960(c)(1)(i). In the proposed rule, OSHA based this appendix on 
existing Appendix B to Sec.  1910.269, with revisions necessary to 
reflect the changes to the minimum approach distances proposed for 
Sec.  1910.269 and Subpart V. In this final rule, OSHA revised this 
appendix as necessary to account for the calculation methods required 
by final Sec.  1926.960(c)(1)(i) and Table V-2. OSHA based these 
revisions on: (1) the findings made with regard to minimum approach 
distances (see the summary and explanation for Sec.  1926.960(c)(1), 
under the heading Minimum approach distances, earlier in this section 
of the preamble); (2) IEEE Std 516-2009 (Ex. 0532); and (3) draft 9 of 
IEEE Std 516 (Ex. 0524). The appendix includes a discussion, based on 
IEEE Std 516-2009 (Ex. 0532), regarding how to determine the maximum 
transient overvoltage for a system.
    Proposed Appendix C provided information relating to the protection 
of employees from hazardous step and touch potentials as addressed in 
proposed Sec. Sec.  1926.959(d)(3)(iii)(D), 1926.963(d)(3)(ii), and 
1926.964(b)(2). As discussed under the summary and explanation for 
final Sec.  1926.962(c), earlier in this section of the preamble, the 
Agency expanded this appendix to incorporate guidance on protecting 
employees from hazardous differences in potential as required by that 
provision in the final rule. OSHA renamed this appendix accordingly. 
OSHA based the additional material in this appendix on IEEE Std 1048-
2003 (Ex. 0046). Appendix C in the final rule also includes examples of 
how to achieve equipotential grounding as required by final Sec.  
1926.962(c). The Agency based these examples on information in the IEEE 
standard and on the principle from the consensus standard that 
installing grounds of adequate ampacity (as required by Sec.  
1926.962(d)(1)) and sufficiently low impedance (as required by Sec.  
1926.962(d)(2)) and adequately bonding all conductive objects within 
the work zone will minimize potential differences (Ex. 0046). As 
discussed in the summary and explanation for Sec.  1926.962(c), earlier 
in this preamble, OSHA will deem employers using the examples in 
Appendix C to be in compliance with that final paragraph. Employers are 
free to use other methods of grounding as long as they can demonstrate 
that those other methods will prevent exposure of each employee to 
hazardous differences in electric potential.
    Appendix D contains information on the inspection and testing of 
wood poles addressed in final Sec.  1926.964(a)(2). This appendix 
describes ways to test wood poles to ensure that they are sound. 
Proposed Appendix D described how to test a wood pole using a ``hammer 
weighing about 1.4 kg (3 pounds).'' Ms. Salud Layton with the Virginia, 
Maryland & Delaware Association of Electric Cooperatives recommended 
deleting the weight of the hammer from the appendix (Ex. 0175). She 
maintained that lighter hammers are as effective in sounding a pole as 
a 1.4-kilogram hammer.
    OSHA notes that Appendix D is not mandatory. It contains guidelines 
that employers may choose to follow in inspecting and testing wood 
poles. Thus, employers may use lighter or heavier hammers if they find 
them to be effective. However, Appendix D provides some guidance on 
what weight hammer OSHA knows to be effective in testing wood poles. 
The Agency took the weight given in Appendix D directly from Sec.  
1910.268(n)(3)(i). Therefore, the Agency is not adopting Ms. Layton's 
recommendation and is adopting Appendix D substantially as proposed.
    Appendix E, which OSHA proposed as Appendix F, provides guidance on 
the selection of protective clothing and other protective equipment for 
employees exposed to flames or electric arcs as addressed in final 
Sec.  1926.960(g). The Agency modified this appendix to reflect the 
final rule as discussed in the

[[Page 20544]]

summary and explanation for Sec.  1926.960(g), earlier in this section 
of the preamble. That preamble discussion also responds to some of the 
comments OSHA received on proposed Appendix F. Several other comments 
addressed the appendix; OSHA discusses these comments here.
    Proposed Appendix F included tables for estimating incident-energy 
levels based on voltage, fault current, and clearing times (proposed 
Table 8 and Table 9, which OSHA adopted as Table 6 and Table 7 in 
Appendix E of the final rule). Employers could use these tables to 
estimate incident energy for exposures involving phase-to-ground arcs 
in open air. The proposed appendix also included a table giving 
protective clothing guidelines for electric-arc hazards (Table 10, 
which OSHA did not adopt in the final rule). This table described 
protective clothing that employers could use for different ranges of 
estimated incident energy.
    Noting that the energy is inversely proportional to the distance, 
NIOSH pointed out that proposed Appendix F incorrectly stated that the 
amount of heat energy is directly proportional to the distance between 
the employee and the arc (Ex. 0130). OSHA corrected the appendix 
accordingly.
    Three commenters made recommendations for clarifying the 
information presented in proposed Appendix F. First, NIOSH recommended:
     Revising the headings in Table 8 and Table 9 (Table 6 and 
Table 7 in Appendix E of the final rule) to reflect more clearly that 
the values in the table represent maximum clearing times at specified 
maximum incident-energy levels,
     Making it clear that unqualified references to ``cotton'' 
in the appendix meant ``untreated cotton,''
     Describing how to use the arc rating on the clothing label 
to select clothing appropriate for a given estimate of incident energy,
     Clarifying that the standard prohibits the use of meltable 
undergarments, and
     Clarifying that employer-added logos on arc-rated clothing 
can adversely affect the arc rating and FR characteristics of the 
clothing (id.).

Second, TVA recommended that OSHA clarify that workers can sustain 
burns even when wearing appropriately selected protection because there 
is a 50-percent chance that a worker will sustain a second-degree burn 
at the arc rating of the protective equipment (Ex. 0213). Third, Mr. 
Paul Hamer recommended that the Agency note the method used to 
calculate the incident-energy values in proposed Table 8 and Table 9 
(Table 6 and Table 7 in Appendix E of the final rule) (Ex. 0228).
    OSHA believes that these recommendations will serve to provide 
additional useful guidance to workers and employers. Therefore, OSHA is 
adopting all of these suggestions in Appendix E of the final rule.
    Mr. James Thomas, president of ASTM International, recommended 
adding ASTM F1891-02b, Standard Specification for Arc and Flame 
Resistant Rainwear, as a reference within proposed Appendix F (Ex. 
0148).
    OSHA agrees that ASTM F1891 contains recognized standards for 
particular types of arc-rated protective equipment. Therefore, OSHA 
added a reference to ASTM F1891-12, the latest edition of the consensus 
standard, in Appendix E in the final rule.
    Leo Muckerheide with Safety Consulting Services requested that OSHA 
stress the limitations of the various methods of estimating incident 
heat energy, in particular the limitations included in the notes to 
proposed Table 8 and Table 9 (Table 6 and Table 7 in Appendix E of the 
final rule) (Ex. 0180). He expressed concern that employers would use 
the methods inappropriately and ignore notes and other information 
limiting their use.
    As noted in the summary and explanation for final Sec.  
1926.960(g)(2), OSHA is including information on the acceptable use of 
the various calculation methods in Appendix E of the final rule. The 
Agency also made it clear in the captions to Table 6 and Table 7 in the 
final appendix that those tables only apply to exposures involving 
phase-to-ground arcs in open air.
    Proposed Appendix F included the following statement, ``Outer 
flame-resistant layers may not have openings that expose flammable 
inner layers that could be ignited.'' Mr. Anthony Ahern with Ohio Rural 
Electric Cooperatives objected to this statement because it would 
require buttoning the top button on a shirt worn over an untreated 
cotton T-shirt, which could increase discomfort and heat stress (Ex. 
0186).
    The Agency dismissed objections to FR and arc-rated clothing based 
on comfort and heat stress as noted under the summary and explanation 
for final Sec.  1926.950(g)(5). In addition, the exposed portion of a 
T-shirt poses an ignition hazard. Existing Sec.  1910.269(l)(6)(iii), 
which proscribes the wearing of clothing that could increase the extent 
of injury in the event of exposure to flames or electric arcs, already 
prohibits exposing flammable garments, including T-shirts, to possible 
ignition from an electric arc.\455\ Therefore, OSHA did not adopt Mr. 
Ahern's recommendation to remove the quoted statement from the 
appendix.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \455\ See, for example, the August 10, 1995, memorandum to 
regional administrators from James W. Stanley, ``Guidelines for the 
Enforcement of the Apparel Standard, 29 CFR 1910.269(l)(6), of the 
Electric Power Generation, Transmission, and Distribution Standard'' 
(https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=INTERPRETATIONS&p_id=21878).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Lee Marchessault with Workplace Safety Solutions recommended that 
OSHA replace references to ARCPRO in proposed Appendix F with 
references to ``commercially available software'' (Ex. 0196; Tr. 582). 
He noted that software other than that mentioned in the appendix was 
available, such as EasyPower (Tr. 582, 598).
    Today, there is a much wider array of software available for 
calculating incident heat energy from an electric arc. However, the 
basis of most of this software, including EasyPower, is the NFPA 70E 
Annex D or IEEE 1584 methods. The Agency is not aware of any software 
that uses a calculation method, other than the heat flux calculator, 
that is not already listed in Table 2 of Appendix E in the final rule. 
As discussed earlier under the summary and explanation for final Sec.  
1926.960(g)(2), ARCPRO uses its own calculation method validated 
through testing of electric arcs. As explained in that same portion of 
the preamble, OSHA found the heat flux calculator to be an unacceptable 
method of estimating incident heat energy. The Agency believes that it 
is essential to inform employers of what methods OSHA will deem 
acceptable, and not all available software for calculating incident 
energy from an arc will provide reasonable estimates of incident heat 
energy. Consequently, Table 2 of Appendix E in the final rule lists 
ARCPRO as an acceptable method. However, the appendix notes that other 
software that yields results based on any of the listed methods is also 
acceptable. In addition, as noted earlier under the summary and 
explanation for final Sec.  1926.960(g)(2), an employer is free to 
choose a method that is not listed in the appendix if the chosen method 
reasonably predicts the potential incident-heat-energy exposure of the 
employee.
    Some rulemaking participants recommended that OSHA revise Table 8 
and Table 9 in proposed Appendix F (Table 6 and Table 7 in Appendix E 
of the final rule) to reflect an incident-energy level of 4 cal/cm\2\ 
rather 5 cal/cm\2\ (Exs. 0228, 0230, 0383; Tr. 410-412, 490-491). Mr. 
Norfleet Smith with

[[Page 20545]]

E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Company described the reasons for this 
change as follows:

    [T]he 5 cal column in Tables 8 and 9 of Appendix F [should] be 
changed to be 4 cals, and the respective clearing times in those 
charts [should] be updated accordingly. That's what we propose. . . 
.
    [T]here are numerous U.S. based electric utility companies that 
have adopted flame resistant protective clothing systems under 
1910.269, and . . . many of those clothing systems today meet 4 
calories per square centimeter arc thermal performance ratings but 
may not meet 5 cal per centimeter square arc thermal performance 
ratings.
    These employers would be forced to modify their existing 
clothing programs, should the new rule go into effect as it is 
written today.
    Further, NFPA 70E has already defined hazard risk categories of 
4, 8, 25, and 40 cals per square centimeter, and flame resistant 
protective clothing systems have already been developed to match 
those levels. Having both a 4 calorie per square centimeter category 
in NFPA 70E and a 5 calorie per square centimeter category in OSHA 
29 CFR 1910.269 and 1926.960 may create confusion and inefficiency 
in the garment supply system.
    Since Tables 8 and 9 of Appendix F have maximum clearing times 
listed which are generated using commercially available software 
programs, the appropriate clearing times for 4 calories per square 
centimeter can be modified to support that rating, and no loss of 
protection would occur, as the new maximum clearing times would 
match the new protection levels of 4 calories per square centimeter. 
. . .
    Lastly, as referenced on one of the pages in the proposed rule, 
. . . ``clothing is currently widely available in ratings from about 
4 calories per square centimeter to over 50 calories per square 
centimeter.'' [Tr. 410-412]

In addition, IBEW pointed out that the NESC subcommittee with 
responsibility for work rules adopted a proposal with charts equivalent 
to Table 8 and Table 9 in proposed Appendix F (Table 6 and Table 7 in 
Appendix E of the final rule), except that the minimum incident heat 
energy listed in the NESC proposal was 4 cal/cm\2\ rather than 5 cal/
cm\2\ (Ex. 0230). The union submitted the NESC proposal to the Subpart 
V rulemaking record; the NESC proposal also contained corrections to 
some of the values reflected in the proposed OSHA tables (id.).\456\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \456\ IEEE subsequently adopted the NESC proposal, which is 
contained in Table 410-1 and 410-2 of the 2007 NESC. The 2012 NESC 
contains equivalent tables in Table 410-2 and 410-3, though the 
values in Table 410-3 are different from the values in 2007 NESC 
Table 410-2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    OSHA agrees with these rulemaking participants that some employers 
already have programs using protective equipment with an arc rating of 
4 cal/cm\2\. Although the Agency does not agree that keeping a 5-cal/
cm\2\ minimum incident-energy level in final Table 6 and Table 7, which 
are not mandatory, would force employers to upgrade their existing 
protection to match the higher level, OSHA does believe that a 4-cal/
cm\2\ minimum energy level would facilitate compliance for many of 
these employers. Therefore, Table 6 and Table 7 in the final rule adopt 
the lower minimum incident-energy level. In addition, OSHA is 
correcting the clearing times in those tables.
    Mr. Paul Hamer recommended that Table 8 and Table 9 in proposed 
Appendix F (Table 6 and Table 7 in Appendix E of the final rule) list 
clearing times for incident-energy levels corresponding to the NFPA 70E 
hazard-risk categories (4, 8, 25, and 40 cal/cm\2\) because, in his 
view, these are the levels that industry already is using (Ex. 0228).
    Although industries other than the electric utility industry use 
the hazard-risk categories in NFPA 70E, evidence in the record 
indicates that electric utilities and their contractors for electric 
power transmission and distribution work do not widely use this 
consensus standard. (See, for example, Ex. 0212 (``[NFPA 70E] was 
developed primarily for premise[s] wiring, not utility type electric 
systems. The systems covered by the [hazard-risk category task table] 
are not utility type distribution or transmission systems. The tables 
are therefore not applicable for utility [transmission and 
distribution] systems.'') OSHA believes that the NESC proposal better 
reflects incident-energy levels appropriate for the types of systems 
addressed by final Table 6 and Table 7, that is, overhead transmission 
and distribution lines.\457\ Table 6 and Table 7 apply only to 
exposures involving phase-to-ground arcs in open air, which are the 
types of exposures found predominantly in work on overhead transmission 
and distribution lines. Consequently, OSHA is not adopting Mr. Hamer's 
recommendation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \457\ The corresponding tables in the 2007 and 2012 NESC provide 
clearing times for incident-energy levels of 4-, 8-, and 12 cal/
cm\2\.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some commenters urged OSHA to replace Table 10 in proposed Appendix 
F with a similar table from NFPA 70E, Table 130.7(C)(11), protective 
clothing characteristics (Exs. 0190, 0228, 0235). Mr. Frank White with 
ORC Worldwide noted that OSHA appeared to have based Table 10 in the 
proposal on a 1996 IEEE paper that was significantly older than NFPA 
70E-2004 (Ex. 0235). He asked OSHA to explain why it is not basing the 
table on the more recent consensus standard. Mr. Thomas Stephenson with 
International Paper commented, ``Based on my research, of the readily 
available single layer shirts, the highest ATPV rating is 8.2 cal/sq 
cm. Based on Table 10, this shirt would not be acceptable for a 5.1 
cal/sq cm exposure'' (Ex. 0190). He noted that many companies base 
their electrical safety programs, including PPE, on NFPA 70E and 
recommended that the rule match that consensus standard.
    OSHA did not include proposed Table 10 in the final rule. The 
Agency agrees with these commenters that Table 10 in proposed Appendix 
F is out of date. There also is evidence in the record indicating that 
arc-rated clothing is getting lighter and that even Table 130.7(C)(11) 
in NFPA 70E-2004 might be out of date (Tr. 493). Appendix E in the 
final rule explains that any protective clothing and other protective 
equipment that meets the employer's reasonable estimate of incident 
heat energy is acceptable. For example, employers may use protective 
shirts and pants rated at 12 cal/cm\2\ for an estimated exposure of 12 
cal/cm\2\.
    Some rulemaking participants pointed out an error in the way the 
proposed appendix described the energy level expected to produce a 
second-degree burn injury (Exs. 0213, 0228; Tr. 540). These commenters 
noted that the threshold of second-degree burn injury, as reflected in 
NFPA 70E and IEEE Std 1584, is 1.2 cal/cm\2\, unless the fault-clearing 
time is under about 0.1 second. For the faster clearing times, the 
threshold is 1.5 cal/cm\2\ (id.).
    OSHA agrees with these comments and revised the language in 
Appendix E in the final rule to indicate that the threshold for second-
degree burn injury is 1.2 to 1.5 cal/cm\2\.
    Appendix F in the final rule, which OSHA proposed as Appendix G, 
contains guidelines for the inspection of work-positioning equipment to 
assist employers in complying with final Sec.  1926.954(b)(3)(i). OSHA 
received no comments on this appendix and is adopting the appendix 
substantially as proposed.
    Appendix G in the final rule, which OSHA proposed as Appendix E, 
contains references to additional sources of information that 
supplement the requirements of Subpart V. The national consensus 
standards referenced in this appendix contain detailed specifications 
to which employers may refer in complying with the performance-oriented 
requirements of OSHA's final rule. Except as specifically noted in 
Subpart V, however, compliance with the national consensus standards is 
not a substitute for

[[Page 20546]]

compliance with the provisions of the OSHA standards.
    OSHA listed the most recent versions of the consensus standards in 
final Appendix G. In some cases, the version of the consensus standard 
in the record is older than the version listed in the appendix. In 
other cases, the consensus standard is not contained in the record at 
all. However, OSHA based the requirements in the final rule only on the 
consensus documents and other data contained in the record. The Agency 
evaluated any editions of the consensus standards listed in the 
appendix that are not in the record for consistency with OSHA's final 
rule. The Agency determined that these later consensus standards 
conform to the requirements of final Subpart V, as specifically noted 
in the final rule, and that these later consensus standards provide 
information useful for employers and workers in complying with the 
final rule.

C. Part 1910 Revisions

1. Sections 1910.137 and 1910.269
    The construction of electric power transmission and distribution 
lines and equipment nearly always exposes employees to the same hazards 
as the maintenance of electric power lines and equipment. Power line 
workers use the same protective equipment and safety techniques in both 
types of work. During the course of a workday, these employees can 
perform both types of work.
    For example, an employer might assign a power line crew to replace 
one failed transformer with an equivalent one and a second failed 
transformer with a transformer with a different kilovolt-ampere rating. 
When the employees perform the first job, they are performing 
maintenance work covered by Part 1910. However, the second job would be 
construction and covered by Part 1926. The employees would almost 
certainly use identical work practices and protective equipment for 
both jobs.
    Because of this, OSHA believes that, in most cases, it is important 
to have the same requirements apply regardless of the type of work 
performed. If the corresponding Part 1910 and Part 1926 standards are 
the same, employers can adopt one set of work rules covering both types 
of work. Employers and employees will generally not have to decide 
whether a particular job is construction or maintenance--a factor that, 
in virtually every instance, has no bearing on the safety of employees. 
(For a discussion of comments suggesting that OSHA combine Subpart V 
and Sec.  1910.269 into one rule, refer to the introductory paragraphs 
in the summary and explanation of final Sec.  1926.950.)
    Therefore, OSHA is adopting revisions to Sec. Sec.  1910.137 and 
1910.269 so that the construction and maintenance standards will be 
substantially the same.\458\ The following cross-reference table shows 
the major paragraphs in final Sec.  1910.269 and the corresponding 
section in final Subpart V:\459\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \458\ Subpart V does not contain requirements for work involving 
electric power generation installations or line-clearance tree-
trimming operations. See the summary and explanation for final Sec.  
1926.950(a)(3), earlier in this section of the preamble.
    \459\ Existing Sec.  1910.269 contains an introductory note 
explaining that OSHA is staying the enforcement of certain 
provisions of existing Sec.  1910.269 until November 1, 1994, and of 
existing Sec.  1910.269(v)(11)(xii) until February 1, 1996. OSHA is 
not including this note in final Sec.  1910.269 because it is no 
longer applicable. OSHA is not including this note in final Sec.  
1910.269 because it is no longer applicable.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                             Corresponding section in
   Major paragraph in Sec.   1910.269               subpart V
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(a) General............................  Sec.   1926.950 General.
(b) Medical services and first aid.....  Sec.   1926.951 Medical
                                          services and first aid.
(c) Job briefing.......................  Sec.   1926.952 Job briefing.
(d) Hazardous energy control (lockout/   Sec.   1926.950(a)(3)--Subpart
 tagout) procedures [applies only to      V applies Sec.   1910.269 to
 work involving electric power            work involving electric power
 generation installations].               generation installations.
(e) Enclosed spaces....................  Sec.   1926.953 Enclosed
                                          spaces.
(f) Excavations........................  Sec.   1926.967(f) Excavations.
(g) Personal protective equipment......  Sec.   1926.954 Personal
                                          protective equipment.
(h) Portable ladders and platforms.....  Sec.   1926.955 Portable
                                          ladders and platforms.
(i) Hand and portable power equipment..  Sec.   1926.956 Hand and
                                          portable power equipment.
(j) Live-line tools....................  Sec.   1926.957 Live-line
                                          tools.
(k) Materials handling and storage.....  Sec.   1926.958 Materials
                                          handling and storage.
(l) Working on or near exposed           Sec.   1926.960 Working on or
 energized parts.                         near exposed energized parts.
(m) Deenergizing lines and equipment     Sec.   1926.961 Deenergizing
 for employee protection.                 lines and equipment for
                                          employee protection.
(n) Grounding for the protection of      Sec.   1926.962 Grounding for
 employees.                               the protection of employees.
(o) Testing and test facilities........  Sec.   1926.963 Testing and
                                          test facilities.
(p) Mechanical equipment...............  Sec.   1926.959 Mechanical
                                          equipment.
(q) Overhead lines and live-line         Sec.   1926.964 Overhead lines
 barehand work.                           and live-line barehand work.
(r) Line-clearance tree-trimming         Sec.   1926.950(a)(3)--Subpart
 operations.                              V applies Sec.   1910.269 to
                                          line-clearance tree-trimming
                                          operations.
(s) Communication facilities...........  Sec.   1926.967(k)
                                          Communication facilities.
(t) Underground electrical               Sec.   1926.965 Underground
 installations.                           electrical installations.
(u) Substations........................  Sec.   1926.966 Substations.
(v) Power generation...................  Sec.   1926.950(a)(3)--Subpart
                                          V applies Sec.   1910.269 to
                                          work involving electric power
                                          generation installations.
(w) Special conditions.................  Sec.   1926.967 Special
                                          conditions.
(x) Definitions........................  Sec.   1926.968 Definitions.
Appendices A through G.................  Appendices A through G,
                                          respectively.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The following distribution table presents the major revisions and a 
brief summary of OSHA's rationale for adopting them. The full 
explanation of the changes and the rationale for adopting them is in 
the summary and explanation for the corresponding provision in final 
Sec.  1926.97 or Subpart V.

[[Page 20547]]



----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                          New part 1910
    Existing part 1910 paragraph            paragraph          Part 1926 revision       Rationale and comments
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                      Sec.   1910.137                        Sec.   1926.97
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(b)................................  (c)...................  (c)...................  Existing Sec.   1910.137(b)
                                                                                      redesignated as Sec.
                                                                                      1910.137(c) for
                                                                                      consistency with Sec.
                                                                                      1926.97.
(a)(1)(ii), (b)(2)(vii), and Table   (a)(1)(ii),             (a)(1)(ii),             Section 1910.137 revised to
 I-2, Table I-3, Table I-4, and       (c)(2)(vii), and        (c)(2)(vii), and        include Class 00 rubber
 Table I-5.                           Table I-1, Table I-2,   Table E-1, Table E-2,   insulating gloves.
                                      Table I-3, and Table    Table E-3, and Table
                                      I-4.                    E-4.
The note following (a)(3)(ii)(B)...  The note following      The note following      Note revised to include the
                                      (a)(3)(ii)(B).          (a)(3)(ii)(B).          latest ASTM standards.
                                                                                      References to ASTM
                                                                                      definitions and to an ASTM
                                                                                      guide for visual
                                                                                      inspection of rubber
                                                                                      insulating equipment
                                                                                      included to provide
                                                                                      additional useful
                                                                                      information for complying
                                                                                      with the OSHA standard.
A new note following (b)(2)(ii)....  A new note following    The note following      A reference to an ASTM
                                      (c)(2)(ii).             (c)(2)(ii).             guide for visual
                                                                                      inspection of rubber
                                                                                      insulating equipment
                                                                                      included to provide
                                                                                      additional useful
                                                                                      information for complying
                                                                                      with the OSHA standard.
                                     (b) [New].............  (b)...................  A new paragraph added to
                                                                                      cover electrical
                                                                                      protective equipment not
                                                                                      made of rubber.
(b)(2)(vii)(B).....................  (c)(2)(vii)(C) and      (c)(2)(vii)(C) and      Existing Sec.
                                      (c)(2)(vii)(D).         (c)(2)(vii)(D).         1910.137(b)(2)(vii)(B)
                                                                                      divided into two separate
                                                                                      CFR units.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                      Sec.   1910.269                        Subpart V
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(a)(2)(i)..........................  (a)(2)(i)(A),           Sec.                    Existing Sec.
                                      (a)(2)(i)(B), and       1926.950(b)(1)(i),      1910.269(a)(2)(i) divided
                                      (a)(2)(i)(C).           (b)(1)(ii), and         into three separate CFR
                                                              (b)(1)(iii).            units. The last of those
                                                                                      units, paragraph
                                                                                      (a)(2)(i)(c), adopts a new
                                                                                      requirement that employers
                                                                                      determine the degree of
                                                                                      training by the risk to
                                                                                      the employee.
                                     (a)(2)(ii)(E) [New]...  Sec.                    A new paragraph added to
                                                              1926.950(b)(2)(v).      require employers to train
                                                                                      qualified employees to
                                                                                      recognize electrical
                                                                                      hazards and to control or
                                                                                      avoid them.
(a)(2)(vii)........................  (a)(2)(viii)..........  Sec.   1926.950(b)(7).  The existing requirement
                                                                                      for employers to certify
                                                                                      that they trained
                                                                                      employees has been
                                                                                      replaced with a
                                                                                      requirement for employers
                                                                                      to determine that
                                                                                      employees demonstrated
                                                                                      proficiency in the work
                                                                                      practices involved. In
                                                                                      addition, a new note added
                                                                                      to clarify how training
                                                                                      received in a previous job
                                                                                      would satisfy the training
                                                                                      requirements.
                                     (a)(2)(iii) [New].....  None..................  A new paragraph added to
                                                                                      require training for line-
                                                                                      clearance tree trimmers.
                                                                                      (See the summary and
                                                                                      explanation for Sec.
                                                                                      1926.950(b)(2).)
                                     (a)(3) [New]..........  Sec.   1926.950(c)....  A new paragraph added to
                                                                                      require host employers and
                                                                                      contract employers to
                                                                                      share information on
                                                                                      safety-related matters.
(a)(3).............................  (a)(4)................  Sec.   1926.950(d)....  Existing Sec.
                                                                                      1910.269(a)(3)
                                                                                      redesignated as Sec.
                                                                                      1910.269(a)(4) for
                                                                                      consistency with Subpart
                                                                                      V.
(c)................................  (c)...................  Sec.   1926.952.......  The existing provisions on
                                                                                      job briefing reorganized
                                                                                      and renumbered. A new
                                                                                      requirement added to
                                                                                      ensure that employers
                                                                                      provide the employee in
                                                                                      charge with information
                                                                                      that relates to the
                                                                                      determination of existing
                                                                                      characteristics and
                                                                                      conditions.
The note following existing (e)(6).  None..................  None..................  This note removed. It
                                                                                      currently references Sec.
                                                                                       1910.146 for the
                                                                                      definition of ``entry.''
                                                                                      OSHA added a definition of
                                                                                      this term to Sec.
                                                                                      1910.269(x), so this note
                                                                                      is unnecessary.
(e)(7).............................  (e)(7)................  Sec.   1926.953(h)....  OSHA removed the
                                                                                      requirement to provide an
                                                                                      attendant if there is
                                                                                      reason to believe a hazard
                                                                                      exists in the enclosed
                                                                                      space. The introductory
                                                                                      text to Sec.   1910.269(e)
                                                                                      requires the entry to
                                                                                      conform to Sec.   1910.146
                                                                                      if there are hazards for
                                                                                      which the requirements of
                                                                                      Sec.   1910.269(e) and (t)
                                                                                      do not provide adequate
                                                                                      protection. Thus, if an
                                                                                      employer has reason to
                                                                                      believe that a hazard
                                                                                      exists despite the
                                                                                      precautions taken under
                                                                                      Sec.   1910.269(e) and
                                                                                      (t), then Sec.   1910.146
                                                                                      applies and requires an
                                                                                      attendant.
(e)(8).............................  (e)(8)................  Sec.   1926.953(i)....  The existing requirement
                                                                                      revised to clarify that
                                                                                      the test instrument must
                                                                                      have an accuracy of 10 percent.

[[Page 20548]]

 
(e)(12)............................  (e)(12)...............  Sec.   1926.953(m)....  The existing requirement
                                                                                      revised to require the
                                                                                      employer to be able to
                                                                                      demonstrate that it
                                                                                      maintained ventilation
                                                                                      long enough to ensure that
                                                                                      a safe atmosphere exists
                                                                                      before employees enter an
                                                                                      enclosed space.
(g)(2).............................  (g)(2)................  Sec.   1926.954(b)....  The existing requirements
                                                                                      revised to maintain
                                                                                      consistency with the
                                                                                      construction provisions.
(i)(2)(i)..........................  None..................  None..................  The existing requirement
                                                                                      was removed because it is
                                                                                      unnecessary. See the
                                                                                      summary and explanation
                                                                                      for final Sec.
                                                                                      1926.956(b).
(i)(2)(ii)(C)......................  (i)(2)(iii)...........  Sec.   1926.956(b)(3).  The final rule limits the
                                                                                      voltage on isolating
                                                                                      transformers used with
                                                                                      cord- and plug-connected
                                                                                      equipment to 50 volts.
(l)(1), introductory text..........  (l)(1)(i), (l)(1)(ii),  Sec.                    The introductory text to
                                      and (l)(1)(iii).        1926.960(b)(1)(i),      existing Sec.
                                                              (b)(1)(ii), and         1910.269(l)(1) divided
                                                              (b)(2).                 into three separate CFR
                                                                                      units.
(l)(1)(i) and (l)(1)(ii)...........  (l)(2)(i) and           Sec.                    Existing Sec.
                                      (l)(2)(ii).             1926.960(b)(3)(i) and   1910.269(l)(1)(i) and
                                                              (b)(3)(ii).             (l)(1)(ii) redesignated as
                                                                                      Sec.   1910.269(l)(2)(i)
                                                                                      and (l)(2)(ii) for
                                                                                      consistency with Subpart
                                                                                      V.
(l)(2) and existing Table R-6        (l)(3) and Table R-3    Sec.   1926.960(c)(1)   The final rule revises, and
 through Table R-10.                  through Table R-9.      and Table V-2 through   requires the employer to
                                                              Table V-8.              establish, minimum
                                                                                      approach distances that
                                                                                      employees must maintain
                                                                                      from exposed energized
                                                                                      parts. Note that, in other
                                                                                      provisions, the final rule
                                                                                      replaces references to
                                                                                      minimum approach-distance
                                                                                      tables with references to
                                                                                      the minimum approach-
                                                                                      distance requirements in
                                                                                      Sec.   1910.269(l)(3)(i)
                                                                                      or Sec.
                                                                                      1926.960(c)(1)(i), as
                                                                                      appropriate.
(l)(2)(i)..........................  (l)(3)(iii)(A)........  Sec.   1926.960         The existing requirement
                                                              (c)(1)(iii)(A).         clarified to indicate that
                                                                                      an energized part must be
                                                                                      under the full control of
                                                                                      the employee for rubber
                                                                                      insulating gloves or
                                                                                      rubber insulating gloves
                                                                                      and sleeves to be
                                                                                      sufficient insulation from
                                                                                      that part.
(l)(3) and (l)(4)..................  (l)(4) and (l)(5).....  Sec.   1926.960(c)(2)   OSHA revised the existing
                                                              and (d).                requirements to ensure
                                                                                      that employees use
                                                                                      electrical protective
                                                                                      equipment whenever they
                                                                                      can reach within the
                                                                                      minimum approach distance
                                                                                      of an energized part.
(l)(5).............................  (l)(6)................  Sec.   1926.960(e)....  Existing Sec.
                                                                                      1910.269(l)(5)
                                                                                      redesignated as Sec.
                                                                                      1910.269(l)(6) for
                                                                                      consistency with Subpart
                                                                                      V.
(l)(6).............................  (l)(7) [Revised] and    Sec.   1926.960(f) and  OSHA revised the
                                      (l)(8) [New].           (g).                    requirements on clothing
                                                                                      in existing Sec.
                                                                                      1910.269(l)(6)(ii) and
                                                                                      (iii) to require the
                                                                                      employer to protect
                                                                                      employees from electric
                                                                                      arcs. Existing paragraph
                                                                                      (l)(6)(i) redesignated as
                                                                                      new paragraph (l)(7), and
                                                                                      the new protective
                                                                                      clothing and other
                                                                                      protective equipment
                                                                                      requirements added as
                                                                                      paragraph (l)(8).
(l)(7) through (l)(10).............  (l)(9) through (l)(12)  Sec.   1926.960(h)      Existing Sec.
                                                              through (k).            1910.269(l)(7), (l)(8),
                                                                                      (l)(9), and (l)(10)
                                                                                      redesignated as new Sec.
                                                                                      1910.269(l)(9), (l)(10),
                                                                                      (l)(11), and (l)(12),
                                                                                      respectively.
(m)(3)(viii).......................  (m)(2)(iv)(A) [New]     Sec.   1926.961(b)(4).  The existing provision
                                      and (m)(2)(iv)(B).                              revised to require
                                                                                      independent crews to
                                                                                      coordinate energizing and
                                                                                      deenergizing lines and
                                                                                      equipment. A new paragraph
                                                                                      has been added requiring
                                                                                      multiple crews to
                                                                                      coordinate their
                                                                                      activities under a single
                                                                                      employee in charge and to
                                                                                      act as a single crew.
(n)(6) and (n)(7)..................  (n)(6)(i) and           Sec.   1926.962(f)(1)   The existing requirement
                                      (n)(6)(ii).             and (f)(2).             revised to allow, under
                                                                                      certain conditions,
                                                                                      insulating equipment,
                                                                                      other than a live-line
                                                                                      tool, to place grounds on,
                                                                                      or remove them from,
                                                                                      circuits of 600 volts or
                                                                                      less.
(p)(4)(i)..........................  (p)(4)(i).............  Sec.   1926.959(d)(1).  OSHA revised this provision
                                                                                      to clarify that, if an
                                                                                      insulated aerial lift
                                                                                      comes closer to an
                                                                                      energized part than the
                                                                                      minimum approach distance,
                                                                                      the aerial lift must
                                                                                      maintain the minimum
                                                                                      approach distance from
                                                                                      objects at a different
                                                                                      potential.
(t)(3), (t)(7), and (t)(8).........  (t)(3), (t)(7), and     Sec.   1926.965(d),     OSHA revised these
                                      (t)(8).                 (h), and (i).           requirements to apply to
                                                                                      vaults as well as
                                                                                      manholes. Additionally,
                                                                                      OSHA added a requirement
                                                                                      (paragraph (t)(7)(ii)) to
                                                                                      address work that could
                                                                                      cause a cable to fail.

[[Page 20549]]

 
The notes following (u)(1) and       The notes following     The note following      OSHA updated the references
 (v)(3).                              (u)(1) and (v)(3).      Sec.   1926.966(b).     in these notes from ANSI
                                                                                      C2-1987 to ANSI/IEEE C2-
                                                                                      2012.
The notes following (u)(5)(i) and    The notes following     The note following      OSHA updated the references
 (v)(5)(i).                           (u)(5)(i) and           Sec.   1926.966(f)(1).  in these notes from ANSI
                                      (v)(5)(i).                                      C2-1987 to ANSI/IEEE C2-
                                                                                      2002.
(x)................................  (x)...................  Sec.   1926.968.......  OSHA added definitions of
                                                                                      ``contract employer,''
                                                                                      ``first-aid training,''
                                                                                      ``host employer,'' and
                                                                                      ``entry.'' (See the
                                                                                      discussion of final Sec.
                                                                                      Sec.   1926.950(c),
                                                                                      1926.953(g), and
                                                                                      1926.953(h) in the
                                                                                      preamble discussion of
                                                                                      final Subpart V.)
Appendix E to Sec.   1910.269......  Appendix G to Sec.      Appendix G to Subpart   OSHA redesignated this
                                      1910.269.               V.                      appendix as Appendix G to
                                                                                      Sec.   1910.269. In
                                                                                      addition, the final rule
                                                                                      updates the references
                                                                                      contained in this
                                                                                      appendix.
                                     Appendix E to Sec.      Appendix E to Subpart   OSHA added a new appendix
                                      1910.269 [New].         V.                      containing information on
                                                                                      protecting employees from
                                                                                      electric arcs.
                                     Appendix F to Sec.      Appendix F to Subpart   OSHA added a new appendix
                                      1910.269 [New].         V.                      containing guidelines for
                                                                                      the inspection of work-
                                                                                      positioning equipment.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    OSHA received several comments on provisions in existing Sec.  
1910.269 that the Agency did not propose for revision.\460\ Mr. Mark 
Spence with Dow Chemical Company maintained that, in the years since 
OSHA promulgated Sec.  1910.269, ``industrial establishments have had 
some difficulties in adapting to this utility-oriented rule'' (Ex. 
0128). He recommended that, in promulgating this final rule, OSHA 
``take the differences between industrial establishments and electric 
utilities into account and establish different provisions for each as 
appropriate'' (id.). He provided two examples. For the first, he noted 
that electric utilities generally follow the NESC whereas industrial 
establishments generally follow the NEC and NFPA 70E. For the second 
example, he noted that electric utilities frequently use contractors to 
perform work ``off-site,'' but that industrial establishments typically 
have contractors' employees working on-site, side-by-side with their 
own employees.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \460\ OSHA stated in the proposal that it was seeking comment on 
entire Sec. Sec.  1910.137 and 1910.269 (70 FR 34892). However, OSHA 
also stated:
    Comments received on the general industry standards will be 
considered in adopting the final construction standards and vice 
versa. In particular, the Agency has requested comments on several 
issues in the proposed revision of Subpart V and in proposed new 
Sec.  1926.97. Some of these issues are directed towards 
requirements in those construction standard that are taken from 
general industry provisions that OSHA is not proposing to revise. 
For example, earlier in this section of the preamble, the Agency 
requests comments on whether AEDs should be required as part of the 
medical and first-aid requirements in proposed Sec.  1926.951. (See 
the summary and explanation of proposed Sec.  1926.951(b)(1).) 
Although OSHA has not proposed to revise the corresponding general 
industry provision, existing Sec.  1910.269(b)(1), the Agency 
intends to revise that general industry provision if the rulemaking 
record supports a requirement for AEDs. Therefore, OSHA encourages 
all rulemaking participants to respond to these issues regardless of 
whether the participants are covered by the construction standards. 
[Id.]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    OSHA is not setting separate requirements for industrial 
establishments in final Sec.  1910.269. First, OSHA rejected a similar 
comment during the 1994 rulemaking. One of the commenters in that 
rulemaking opposed the application of Sec.  1910.269 to industrial 
establishments because ``[t]raditionally, industrial electrical systems 
have been based upon the [NEC] in their design and operation'' and 
``[u]tility electrical systems, on the other hand, have always been 
based upon the [NESC] in their design and operation'' (269-Ex. 3-45). 
In rejecting this comment, OSHA reasoned in part that ``there are 
hazards related to electrical power generation, transmission, and 
distribution work that are not adequately addressed elsewhere in the 
General Industry Standards'' (59 FR 4334). Mr. Spence provides no basis 
to support a conclusion that OSHA's determination on this issue in the 
1994 rulemaking was erroneous, and OSHA continues to find its earlier 
determination to be valid.
    Second, OSHA believes that whether contractors work off-site or on-
site is not relevant to the issue of whether Sec.  1910.269 should 
apply to industrial establishments. The work practices required by the 
final rule are necessary for employee safety without regard to whether 
an industrial establishment's employees are working alone or alongside 
contractor employees.\461\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \461\ Comments, including comments from Mr. Spence, regarding 
the requirement proposed in Sec. Sec.  1910.269(a)(4)(ii)(B) and 
1926.950(c)(2)(ii) for contract employers to follow the host 
employer's safety-related work rules are discussed in the summary 
and explanation for final Sec.  1926.950(c)(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Third, the Agency believes that, at least for electric power 
generation facilities and plant distribution substations, there are 
more similarities between electric utilities and industrial 
establishments than portrayed by Mr. Spence. There is evidence that 
some electric utilities with electric power generation plants refer to 
NFPA 70E for electrical safety guidelines. (See, for example, Exs. 0214 
and 0217, which both list NFPA 70E, but not the NESC, as references for 
TVA's electrical safety practices in electric power generation plants.) 
OSHA, therefore, finds that it is not necessary or appropriate to adopt 
Mr. Spence's recommendation for promulgating separate requirements for 
electric utilities and industrial establishments.
    EEI petitioned OSHA to revise the group lockout-tagout and system-
operator provisions in existing Sec.  1910.269(d)(8)(ii) and (d)(8)(v) 
(Exs. 0227, 0501).
    OSHA hereby denies EEI's petition. In doing so, OSHA reexamined the 
evidence supporting the promulgation of the existing group lockout-
tagout provisions in 1994 and continues to find that evidence 
persuasive. OSHA also finds that the evidence on which EEI relies in 
support of its petition does not justify revising the standard, as 
explained in the following paragraphs.
    OSHA designed the requirements for hazardous energy control 
(lockout-tagout) procedures in existing Sec.  1910.269(d) to protect 
employees working on electric power generation installations from 
injury while maintaining or servicing machinery or equipment that is 
part of that installation. Paragraph (d) of existing Sec.  1910.269, 
which is almost identical to OSHA's general industry standard for the 
control of hazardous energy at Sec.  1910.147, requires the employer to 
``establish a program consisting of

[[Page 20550]]

energy control procedures, employee training, and periodic inspections 
to ensure that, before any employee performs any servicing or 
maintenance on a machine or equipment where the unexpected energizing, 
start up, or release of stored energy could occur and cause injury, the 
machine or equipment is isolated from the energy source and rendered 
inoperative'' \462\ (existing Sec.  1910.269(d)(2)(i)). In part, 
existing Sec.  1910.269(d) requires: the employer to isolate the 
machine or equipment from hazardous energy sources before servicing 
begins; authorized employees to affix lockout or tagout devices to the 
switches, disconnects, and other means used to isolate the machine or 
equipment after the employer isolates the machine or equipment but 
before servicing or maintenance begins; and authorized employees to 
remove their lockout or tagout devices before the machine or equipment 
is reenergized (existing Sec.  1910.269(d)(6)(ii) and (d)(6)(iii), 
(d)(6)(iv), and (d)(7)). The standard generally prohibits anyone from 
removing a lockout or tagout device other than the employee who placed 
it (existing Sec.  1910.269(d)(7)(iv)). This prohibition protects the 
employee who is performing work on the machine or equipment from injury 
resulting from the reenergization of hazardous energy by someone else.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \462\ Throughout the final rule, OSHA changed ``inoperative'' 
wherever it appeared in the existing standard to ``inoperable.'' 
``Inoperable,'' which means ``incapable of being operated,'' is the 
more precise of the two terms. (``Inoperative'' means ``not 
working.'') Paragraph (c)(1) of Sec.  1910.147, which is identical 
to existing Sec.  1910.269(d)(2)(i), continues to use 
``inoperative.'' OSHA intends to publish a technical amendment 
making a similar change to Sec.  1910.147(c)(1) in the near future.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The existing Sec.  1910.269 group lockout-tagout provision, which 
is identical to the analogous general industry provision (Sec.  
1910.147(f)(3)), makes it clear that each individual authorized 
employee must take an affirmative step to accept and release his or her 
own protection under the lockout-tagout standard and that this 
affirmative step must be traceable to the employee and under that 
employee's control. The group lockout-tagout provision applies ``[w]hen 
servicing or maintenance is performed by a . . . group'' of workers 
(existing Sec.  1910.269(d)(8)(ii)). Although this provision allows 
certain variations from the individual servicing model, it requires a 
lockout-tagout ``procedure which affords the employees a level of 
protection equivalent to that provided by the implementation of a 
personal lockout or tagout device.'' In particular, ``[e]ach authorized 
employee shall affix a personal lockout or tagout device to the group 
lockout device, group lockbox, or comparable mechanism when he or she 
begins work and shall remove those devices when he or she stops working 
on the machine or equipment being serviced or maintained'' (existing 
Sec.  1910.269(d)(8)(ii)(D)).
    The existing Sec.  1910.269 system-operator provision in paragraph 
(d)(8)(v) is the only provision that has no analog in the general 
industry standard. In the 1994 Sec.  1910.269 rulemaking, OSHA found 
that ``the only concept employed by electric utilities that is unique 
to their industry is the use of central control facilities'' (59 FR 
4364). To account for this unique aspect of power generation plants, 
the standard provides that when ``energy isolating devices are 
installed in a central location and are under the exclusive control of 
a system operator,'' so that the servicing employees cannot 
individually affix and remove their personal lockout or tagout devices, 
the system operator may ``place and remove lockout and tagout devices 
in place of the'' servicing employees (existing Sec.  
1910.269(d)(8)(v)). However, as with the existing group lockout-tagout 
provision, the existing system-operator provision requires the employer 
to ``use a procedure that affords employees a level of protection 
equivalent to that provided by the implementation of a personal lockout 
or tagout device.'' In the preamble discussion, OSHA elaborated on this 
language, stating that, under the system operator provision, procedures 
must ``ensure that no lock or tag protecting an employee is removed 
without the knowledge and participation of the employee it is 
protecting'' (59 FR 4364). The preamble also stated that the procedures 
must ensure that no one operates locked-out or tagged-out energy-
isolating devices without the employee's personal authorization (id.). 
As such, the requirement for personal control and accountability in the 
existing standard's group lockout-tagout and system-operator provisions 
is clear.
    EEI's petition for rulemaking marks the latest stage in a long-
running dispute between OSHA and EEI over appropriate lockout-tagout 
procedures in the electric power generation industry. Even before OSHA 
proposed the existing Power Generation Standard, and throughout that 
rulemaking, EEI urged OSHA to adopt a standard that would allow 
supervisors to maintain exclusive control of energy isolating devices 
in group-servicing operations (59 FR 4322, 4350-4351, 4360, 4363-4364). 
OSHA definitively rejected EEI's suggestions when it promulgated the 
standard in 1994. Since OSHA promulgated the existing standard, EEI 
sought repeatedly to have the standard's personal control and 
accountability provisions nullified.\463\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \463\ In its latest effort, EEI challenged the validity of the 
Sec.  1910.269 compliance directive on the basis that the standard 
did not contain a requirement for personal control and 
accountability (EEI v. OSHA, 411 F.3d 272 (D.C. Cir. 2005)). The 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
rejected that challenge, and in doing so, noted that EEI ``should 
have made [its] points in a challenge to the 1994 Standard-a 
challenge that it began but later withdrew--not in a petition to 
review a compliance directive issued nearly a decade later'' (id. at 
282).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In its petition for rulemaking, EEI once again challenges the 
validity of the existing Sec.  1910.269(d)(8)(ii) requirements for 
group lockout-tagout to provide ``a level of protection equivalent to 
that provided by the implementation of a personal lockout or tagout 
device'' and for each authorized employee to ``affix a personal lockout 
or tagout device to the group lockout device, group lockbox, or 
comparable mechanism when he or she begins work and [to] remove those 
devices when he or she stops working on the machine or equipment being 
serviced or maintained'' (the ``personal control and accountability 
requirements''). OSHA addresses EEI's assertions, and the Agency's 
rationale for rejecting those assertions, in the following paragraphs.
    1. EEI asserted that OSHA should revise the existing standard to 
permit electric utilities to use procedures that were in place before 
the promulgation of the 1994 standard; that is, OSHA should permit the 
person who is responsible for servicing the equipment (referred to by 
the electric utility industry as ``the person who holds the 
clearance'') to communicate orally with the employees working on the 
equipment instead of requiring measures equivalent to applying a 
personal lockout-tagout device.
    OSHA decided not to adopt EEI's suggestion to remove the existing 
personal control and accountability requirements from the final 
standard. The Agency found in the 1994 rulemaking on Sec.  1910.269 
that application of personal lockout-tagout devices by each authorized 
employee in a group was necessary and reasonable, stating, ``OSHA is 
convinced that the use of individual lockout or tagout devices as part 
of the group lockout provides the greatest assurance of protection for 
servicing employees'' (59 FR 4361). There was clear evidence in the 
1994 rulemaking that individual protection was necessary, including 
evidence that ``work authorizations under [electric utility generation 
plant]

[[Page 20551]]

tagging systems had been released under pressure from supervisory 
personnel or without the knowledge of the employee who held the 
authorization'' (59 FR 4351).
    EEI's suggested change would have the principle authorized 
employee, or, as the trade association put it, the ``holder of the 
clearance,'' be responsible for the safety of all authorized employees 
working under the lockout-tagout for the group. Such a change would be 
inconsistent with the fundamental principle adopted in the general 
industry lockout-tagout rulemaking, and again in the 1994 Sec.  
1910.269 rulemaking, that each individual authorized employee controls 
his or her own lockout-tagout. As the Occupational Safety and Health 
Review Commission held in rejecting a challenge to the personal control 
and accountability requirements in existing Sec.  1910.269, ``the core 
concept of lockout/tagout is personal protection'' (Exelon Generating 
Corp., 21 BNA OSHC 1087, 1090 (No. 00-1198, 2005); emphasis included in 
original). Vesting power over and responsibility for an employee's 
protection from the release of hazardous energy in another employee 
allows for the types of abuse reported in the 1994 rulemaking record.
    As the primary rationale for its suggested revisions, EEI attacked 
the validity of the existing rule resulting from the 1994 rulemaking 
record. EEI maintained that ``[t]here was no evidence when Section 
1910.269 was adopted . . . that electric utility workers were at 
significant risk of harm under the unique procedures that had been used 
successfully in the industry for decades'' (Ex. 0227). Second, EEI 
contended that OSHA did not show that ``sign-on, sign-off requirements 
in utility power plants were reasonably necessary to eliminate or 
reduce a significant [risk] of harm to affected employees'' (id.). 
Third, EEI asserted that OSHA did not show that the cost of compliance 
bears any relationship to expected benefits or that OSHA considered 
``the cost of compliance with the sign-on, sign-off principle'' (id.).
    EEI bases these arguments on the false premise that OSHA must make 
hazard-by-hazard significant risk findings in vertical standards. As 
explained in detail in Section II.D, Significant Risk and Reduction in 
Risk, earlier in this preamble, there is no such legal requirement. 
During the 1994 rulemaking, OSHA examined the injuries and fatalities 
in the electric power generation, transmission, and distribution 
industry, and concluded that ``hazards of work on electric power 
generation, transmission, and distribution installations pose a 
significant risk to employees and that the standard is reasonably 
necessary and appropriate to deal with that risk'' (59 FR 4321). OSHA 
also found that the existing standard's lockout-tagout and other 
provisions would ``significantly'' reduce the number of injuries 
associated with ``uncontrolled exposure to occupational hazards'' and 
that the economic impacts on affected industry groups would be small 
(59 FR 4431-4434). Finally, OSHA examined nonregulatory alternatives 
and concluded that ``the need for government regulation arises from the 
significant risk of job-related injury or death caused by inadequate 
safety practices for electric power generation, transmission, and 
distribution work'' (59 FR 4432).
    In any event, although OSHA does not agree that hazard-specific 
significant risk findings are necessary, the record in the 1994 
rulemaking supports such a finding with respect to the standard's 
personal control and accountability requirements. EEI's first argument 
on this issue was that ``[t]here was no evidence when Section 1910.269 
was adopted . . . that electric utility workers were at significant 
risk of harm under the unique procedures that had been used 
successfully in the industry for decades'' (Ex. 0227). According to 
EEI, OSHA applied the principles and assumptions about risk in general 
industry in adopting lockout-tagout requirements taken from the general 
industry lockout-tagout standard without accounting for the unique 
methods proven to be safe in the electric power generation plants of 
electric utilities (id.).
    In the preamble to the 1994 final rule on Sec.  1910.269, OSHA 
explicitly rejected EEI's argument that electric utility employees were 
not at significant risk of injury under then-existing lockout-tagout 
procedures:

    In both the Subpart S work practices rulemaking and the [general 
industry] hazardous energy control rulemaking, OSHA found existing 
electric utility lockout and tagging procedures to expose employees 
to a significant risk of injury (55 FR 32003, 54 FR 36651-36654, 
36684). In a review of IBEW fatality reports, Eastern Research 
Group, Ind., found 4 of 159 fatalities (2.5%) could have been 
prevented by compliance with proposed Sec.  1910.269(d) (Ex. 6-24). 
These fatalities occurred among approximately 50,000 electric 
utility employees at high risk (Ex. 4: Table 3-22 with the 
population limited to generating plant workers at high risk) at the 
rate of nearly 2 per year (2.5% of the estimated 70 deaths per year; 
Ex. 5). The Agency believes that these employees are exposed to a 
significant risk of injury under existing industry practices. 
Otherwise, no lockout and tagging standard would have been proposed. 
OSHA evaluates significant risk based on the hazards that exist 
under the current state of regulation. [59 FR 4363]

    Second, during the rulemaking for the 1994 rule, OSHA also rejected 
EEI's claim about the successful use of then-existing procedures by the 
electric utility industry. For instance, the Agency found that 
``although some electric utility companies have had excellent success 
with their tagging systems, other companies have had problems'' (59 FR 
4351). The Agency also reported that ``the electric utility industry 
had [at least] 14 fatalities and 17 injuries recorded in OSHA files 
that were directly caused by a failure of the lockout/tagout procedure 
in use, during the period of July 1, 1972, to June 30, 1988'' (id.; 
internal citation omitted). OSHA found that ``the evidence presented by 
UWUA members demonstrated that not all electric utility tagging systems 
work as well as those presented by the EEI witnesses'' (59 FR 4354). 
Finally, the Agency found that ``the emergence of new types of 
companies [footnote omitted] into the electric utility industry and 
extending the scope of the standard to other industries will expand 
coverage of Sec.  1910.269 to employers that might not have the tagging 
systems that provide the level of safety EEI has testified is common 
among their member companies'' (id.).
    Third, the current rulemaking record also provides evidence of risk 
related to inadequate hazardous energy control procedures (Exs. 0002, 
0004). Ex. 0002, which is a printout of accidents coded with the 
keyword ``elec utility work'' or ``e ptd'' occurring in the years 1984 
through 1997, includes 17 accidents at electric power generation plants 
or substations coded as a failure of the lockout/tagout procedure in 
use. The keywords ``elec utility work'' and ``e ptd'' capture work on 
electric power generation, transmission, and distribution installations 
covered by Sec.  1910.269 or Subpart V. OSHA included substations in 
this analysis because Sec.  1910.269(d) covers substations at power 
generation plants and because the procedures used at substations 
typically follow the same lockout-tagout procedures, using a system 
operator, used in generation plants. Ex. 0004, an accident database 
that includes electric power generation, transmission, and distribution 
accidents for the years 1991 through 1999, includes 53 accidents in 
electric power generation plants or substations coded with the keyword 
``lockout,'' which signifies either a failure to deenergize and lockout 
or tagout a hazardous

[[Page 20552]]

energy source or a failure in lockout-tagout procedures.
    Fourth, in the preamble to the 1994 rule, OSHA explicitly rejected 
EEI's claim ``that the elements of hazardous energy control in electric 
utility operations are so unique that they warrant a completely 
different set of lockout and tagging requirements'' than the general 
industry lockout-tagout requirements (59 FR 4350). In the rulemaking 
for the 1994 rule, the Agency examined the six elements of electric 
utility lockout-tagout procedures that EEI claimed made them unique. 
The Agency found that those elements also were present in lockout-
tagout procedures used in other industries (59 FR 4350-4351), and it is 
for this reason that the existing standards' lockout-tagout provisions 
are nearly identical. As such, contrary to EEI's argument, evidence of 
significant risk in the general industry rulemaking bolsters the 
finding of significant risk in the 1994 rulemaking.
    In making its significant risk argument, EEI relied on a statement 
in the preamble to the 1994 rulemaking in which OSHA was discussing 
existing Sec.  1910.269(d)'s system-operator provision. OSHA stated in 
the preamble that the system-operator provision ``recognize[s] lockout 
and tagout practices that are common in the electric utility industry 
and that have been successful in protecting employees'' (59 FR 4364). 
EEI asserted that this statement demonstrated that the Agency 
recognized that electric utility lockout-tagout practices were safe. 
This assertion is not correct. OSHA did not intend this statement to 
negate the numerous statements in the preamble that existing industry 
practices posed a significant risk to workers (59 FR 4349-4364). The 
industry practice referred to in the preamble statement on which EEI 
relies was the industry practice in which ``the system operator has 
complete control over hazardous energy sources,'' not the industry 
practice of not requiring individual employee control and 
accountability (59 FR 4364).
    EEI also contended that OSHA did not show that ``sign-on, sign-off 
requirements in utility power plants were reasonably necessary to 
eliminate or reduce a significant [risk] of harm to affected 
employees'' (Ex. 0227). In support of this contention, the association 
pointed to a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request it made asking 
for documents that show that employees in electric power generation 
plants are at risk from failure to use personal lockout or tagout 
devices, or their equivalent. EEI stated that ``OSHA admitted that it 
had no documents that responded to [EEI's] requests'' (id.). EEI also 
pointed to the testimony of Mr. James Tomaseski before an 
administrative law judge in the Exelon enforcement case. Mr. Tomaseski 
testified that ``signing on and off a piece of paper would not add to 
employee safety, and could induce crew members to have a false sense of 
security'' (Ex. 0227; Tr. 906).
    OSHA rejects EEI's contention. As explained earlier, OSHA described 
in the preamble to the 1994 rule the basis for determining that the 
personal control and accountability requirements were necessary (59 FR 
4349-4364). OSHA concluded in that rulemaking, and in the earlier 
rulemaking on the general industry lockout-tagout standard at Sec.  
1910.147 (54 FR 36644, Sept. 1, 1989), that personal protection was 
fundamental to ensuring employee safety in the control of hazardous 
energy. Moreover, there was clear evidence in the 1994 rulemaking that 
personal protection was necessary, including evidence that ``work 
authorizations under [electric utility generation plant] tagging 
systems had been released under pressure from supervisory personnel or 
without the knowledge of the employee who held the authorization'' (59 
FR 4351).
    This evidence stands in stark contrast to Mr. Tomaseski's opinion 
that signing on and off a piece of paper does not increase safety.\464\ 
Similarly, OSHA's response to EEI's FOIA request has no bearing on the 
Agency's finding in the 1994 Sec.  1910.269 rulemaking, or in this one. 
The Agency responded as it did because, among other reasons: the FOIA 
request did not seek documents associated with the Sec.  1910.147 and 
existing Sec.  1910.269 rulemaking proceedings; during the rulemaking 
process that preceded the adoption of both Sec.  1910.147 and existing 
Sec.  1910.269, OSHA examined evidence and determined that individual 
employee control of energy isolating devices, through the use of 
personal lockout/tagout devices, was an essential element of an 
effective energy control procedure; and OSHA limited its FOIA response 
to certain, specified documents maintained in OSHA's National Office 
because EEI's counsel declined to pay the statutorily defined costs 
associated with locating and reproducing records from OSHA area 
offices, as well as some records identified in the National 
Office.\465\ OSHA, therefore, reaffirms its earlier conclusion that 
personal protection, in the form of a personal lockout-tagout device or 
comparable mechanism as required by existing Sec.  
1910.269(d)(8)(ii)(D), is reasonably necessary for, and indeed is 
fundamental to, the protection of employees from the release of 
hazardous energy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \464\ EEI also fails to explain the basis of Mr. Tomaseski's 
belief. At the 2005 public hearing on the Subpart V proposal, Mr. 
Tomaseski testified that ``[r]equiring a personal action such as 
signing on and off a work permit does nothing to ensure the 
equipment to be worked on is actually safe to work on. A walkdown of 
the equipment and the principal isolation points will verify that 
switching has been performed, the lockout/tagout devices are 
installed, and the equipment is safe to work on. OSHA should 
incorporate these changes into Paragraph (d)'' (Tr. 906-907). OSHA 
addresses Mr. Tomaseski's concern about verification later in this 
section of the preamble.
    \465\ The Agency's Docket Office contains the information on 
which OSHA relied in adopting the lockout-tagout requirements in the 
Sec.  1910.147 and 1994 Sec.  1910.269 rulemakings; the Docket 
Office provides the public with access to the rulemaking record 
during normal business hours. This docket is also available, on a 
limited basis, at https://www.regulations.gov in Docket ID OSHA-S015-
2006-0645.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, EEI asserts that OSHA did not show that the cost of 
compliance bears any relationship to expected benefits and that OSHA 
did not consider ``the cost of compliance with the sign-on, sign-off 
principle'' (Ex. 0227). OSHA rejects this assertion. As OSHA already 
explained, the existing standard's lockout-tagout provisions were 
reasonably necessary to eliminate or reduce a risk of significant harm 
to affected employees. Moreover, the evidence is clear that there were 
no substantial increased costs associated with the existing personal 
control and accountability provisions. According to EEI, it was the 
industry's practice prior to the promulgation of existing Sec.  
1910.269 to ``communicat[e] orally with each member of the maintenance 
crew to advise when it is safe to begin work, and to assure that the 
crewmembers have been notified and are clear of all equipment when the 
job is complete'' (id.). The time it currently takes the principle 
authorized employee to communicate with each authorized employee should 
be approximately equal to the time it would take the individual 
authorized employee to sign in or sign out, or attach or remove a 
tagout device, at the work location. Thus, the Agency did not account 
for substantial increased costs for this provision because there was no 
evidence in the 1994 Sec.  1910.269 rulemaking record to indicate 
otherwise.
    EEI's contrary belief that requiring each authorized employee to 
take an affirmative, physical action, such as attaching a tagout device 
or signing on and off a work order, would result in a substantial 
increase in cost is

[[Page 20553]]

unreasonable. Relying on a 2003 letter from Exelon to OSHA, EEI 
asserted that ``compliance with the tagging requirements specified in 
[CPL 02-01-038] would cost more than $6 million annually in Exelon's 
ten nuclear powered generation plants alone'' and that, extrapolated to 
the entire industry, the cost would be more than $100 million (Ex. 
0227). Relying on the Exelon letter is problematic. As OSHA explained 
in its response to this letter:

    OSHA does not agree that compliance with the provisions in Sec.  
1910.269(d) that require individual authorized employees to take an 
affirmative and physical step prior to authorizing the re-
energization of machines or equipment is necessarily as costly as 
you describe. While the computer terminal method that you describe 
may permit the requisite degree of employee control, so too would 
significantly simpler approaches, which would cost little, if 
anything, to implement.
    Indeed, in the Exelon litigation to which you refer, the 
Secretary of Labor claimed that Exelon's energy control procedure, 
as described, was deficient in only one respect. The deficiency was 
that Exelon allowed a supervisor to authorize the re-energization of 
equipment or machinery on behalf of individual authorized employees 
after orally accounting for the employees and checking off the 
employees' names on a Worker Tagout Tracking List (WTTL). During the 
litigation, the Secretary clearly and repeatedly stated that the 
same procedure would permit the requisite degree of employee 
control, if amended slightly to require that each individual 
employee sign the WTTL before beginning work and sign off the WTTL 
to authorize re-energization of the machinery after completing work. 
This minor modification would produce the individual employee 
accountability and control mandated by the standard. [June 13, 2003, 
letter of interpretation to Mr. Robert J. Fisher \466\]

    \466\ This letter of interpretation is available at https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=INTERPRETATIONS&p_id=24548.

As such, Exelon apparently overestimated the cost of compliance because 
there are less expensive means of compliance available.\467\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \467\ EEI also did not adequately explain the basis for Exelon's 
estimated costs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Thus, EEI's attacks on the 1994 rulemaking record are without 
basis. EEI provided no new evidence to invalidate OSHA's conclusion 
that the standard's personal control and accountability requirements 
are necessary and appropriate. For these reasons, OSHA is denying EEI's 
request to remove the personal control and accountability requirements 
from Sec.  1910.269.
    2. EEI asserted that the Agency should eliminate from the final 
standard the concept that a system operator may place tags for 
servicing and maintenance employees where energy controls are in a 
central location under the exclusive control of the system operator 
because those conditions are not present in electric generation plants. 
Existing Sec.  1910.269(d)(8)(v) applies where ``energy isolating 
devices are installed in a central location and are under the exclusive 
control of a system operator.'' OSHA promulgated the existing system-
operator provision because OSHA found in the 1994 Sec.  1910.269 
rulemaking that ``the only concept employed by electric utilities that 
is unique to their industry is the use of central control facilities'' 
(59 FR 4364). According to EEI, OSHA intended ``to craft a provision 
that endorsed longstanding utility power plant practices, [but] made a 
fundamental error, apparently due to a lack of understanding of the 
power plant environment'' (Ex. 0227). EEI also describes OSHA's use of 
the term ``central control facilities'' in the 1994 preamble as 
``baffling.'' (id.).
    OSHA denies EEI's petition to revise the existing system-operator 
provision. First, the Agency's use of the term ``central control 
facilities'' in the 1994 preamble was not ``baffling.'' From the 
language adopted in the introductory text to existing Sec.  
1910.269(d)(8)(v), it is apparent that the Agency intended the term 
``central control facilities'' to mean facilities ``where energy 
isolating devices are installed in a central location and are under the 
exclusive control of a system operator.'' As OSHA stated in the 
preamble:

    Under paragraph (d)(8)(v), the system operator has complete 
control over hazardous energy sources that endanger employees 
maintaining or servicing machinery or equipment associated with an 
electric power generation installation. Other employees do not even 
have access to the energy control devices and cannot operate them to 
reenergize machinery or equipment being serviced. [59 FR 4364]

    Second, OSHA based its decision to incorporate a system-operator 
provision into the existing standard on the 1994 rulemaking record. An 
EEI videotape showed a ``control room operator'' working in what 
appears to be an isolated control room, with the ability to turn off 
equipment at a master switch, although the employer also used 
additional tags for local deenergization procedures (269-Ex. 12-6). 
Furthermore, the 1987 NESC, in Rule 170, required that circuit 
breakers, reclosers, switches, and fuses be accessible only to persons 
qualified for operation and maintenance (269-Ex. 2-8).
    If it was not widespread practice in the electric utility industry 
to have energy controls in a central location under the exclusive 
control of a system operator, then the existing provision would apply 
to a narrower class of installations than the class of installations 
OSHA believed existed during the 1994 rulemaking. There is evidence in 
the record in this rulemaking that indicates that there are at least 
some locations in electric power generation plants to which existing 
Sec.  1910.269(d)(8)(v) could apply. (See, for example, Ex. 0480, 
``Switchboard operators (or individuals with similar job 
classifications) control the flow of electricity from a central point 
[emphasis omitted],'' and the ``control room operator may have 
exclusive control of some energy isolating devices within the control 
room.'')
    Note that, in adopting existing Sec.  1910.269(d)(8)(v), OSHA 
retained the fundamental precept that requires ``a procedure that 
affords employees a level of protection equivalent to that provided by 
the implementation of a personal lockout or tagout device'' (paragraph 
(d)(8)(v)(A).) Consequently, even if OSHA were to accede to EEI's 
request to broaden the scope of the system-operator provisions, 
existing paragraph (d)(8)(v)(A) still requires the same measures to 
which the association objects in existing paragraph (d)(8)(ii)(D).
    For these reasons, OSHA is not adopting EEI's recommendation to 
expand the scope of the existing system-operator provisions in final 
Sec.  1910.269(d)(8)(v).
    3. EEI asserted that OSHA should remove the existing requirement 
that group lockout-tagout procedures must afford a level of protection 
equivalent to that provided by the implementation of a personal 
lockout-tagout device because the Agency did not provide the basis for 
this comparison.
    The existing rule provides an interpretation of ``protection 
equivalent to a personal lockout or tagout device.'' Accordingly, to 
provide equivalent protection, a group lockout-tagout program must 
contain either the elements required by existing Sec.  1910.269(d) for 
protection associated with the use of personal lockout or tagout 
devices or elements that are equivalent to the elements required by 
existing Sec.  1910.269(d) for protection associated with the use of 
personal lockout or tagout devices. Thus, for instance, a group 
lockout-tagout program must provide protection equivalent to the 
personal control and accountability requirements of existing Sec.  
1910.269(d)(6) and (d)(7). OSHA framed this requirement in performance 
terms because the existing group lockout-tagout provisions offer a

[[Page 20554]]

compromise that balances the need for protection of each authorized 
employee with the complexity and redundancy involved in many group 
lockout-tagout situations. (In its response to IBEW's comment later in 
this section of the preamble, OSHA further explains this compromise in 
the context of the existing standard's verification requirement.)
    Paragraphs (d)(8)(ii)(A) through (d)(8)(ii)(D) of existing Sec.  
1910.269 further clarify the meaning of ``protection equivalent to a 
personal lockout or tagout device.'' Existing paragraph (d)(8)(ii)(A) 
requires the employer to vest primary responsibility in an authorized 
employee for a set number of employees (the group or crew) working 
under the protection of a group lockout or tagout device. Existing 
paragraph (d)(8)(ii)(B) requires that the group lockout-tagout 
procedures provide for the authorized employee to ascertain the 
exposure status of all individual group members with regard to the 
lockout or tagout of the machine or equipment. Existing paragraph 
(d)(8)(ii)(C) requires the employer to assign overall job-associated 
lockout or tagout control responsibility to an authorized employee 
designated to coordinate affected work forces and ensure continuity of 
protection when the servicing or maintenance involves more than one 
crew, craft, department, or other group. Existing paragraph 
(d)(8)(ii)(D) requires each authorized employee to affix a personal 
lockout or tagout device to the group lockout device, group lockbox, or 
comparable mechanism when he or she begins work and to remove those 
devices when he or she stops performing service or maintenance on the 
machine or equipment.
    Moreover, the preamble to the 1994 Sec.  1910.269 rule elaborated 
on personal control and accountability requirements in the existing 
standard by including the following guidelines:

    (1) Group lockout/tagout procedures must be tailored to the 
specific operation involved. Irrespective of the situation, the 
requirements of the final rule specify that each employee performing 
maintenance or servicing activities be in control of hazardous 
energy during his or her period of exposure.
    (2) The procedures must ensure that each authorized employee is 
protected from the unexpected release of hazardous energy by 
personal lockout or tagout devices. No employee may affix the 
personal lockout or tagout device of another employee.
    (3) The use of such devices as master locks and tags are 
permitted and can serve to simplify group lockout/tagout procedures. 
For example, a single lock may [be] used on each energy isolating 
device, together with the use of a lockbox for retention of the keys 
and to which each authorized employee affixes his or her lock or 
tag. In a tagging system, a master tag may be used, as long as each 
employee personally signs on and signs off on it and as long as the 
tag clearly identifies each authorized employee who is being 
protected by it.
    (4) All other provisions of paragraph continue to apply. [59 FR 
4362]

These guidelines make it clear that ``each employee performing 
maintenance or servicing activities be in control of hazardous energy 
during his or her period of exposure.'' These guidelines, therefore, 
provided the basis for determining whether group lockout-tagout 
procedures afford a level of protection equivalent to that provided by 
the implementation of a personal lockout-tagout device.
    The pre-1994 procedures described by EEI in its comment to this 
rulemaking, and in the videotape discussed earlier in this section of 
the preamble, address many of the aspects of group lockout-tagout 
required by existing Sec.  1910.269(d) (Ex. 0227; 269-Ex. 12-6). For 
instance, the procedures described include a maintenance crew 
supervisor or lead maintenance worker holding the ``clearance'' for the 
group, which EEI calls a ``crew'' (Ex. 0227). This employee, who can 
serve as the primary authorized employee called for in existing 
paragraph (d)(8)(ii)(A), ``assure[s] that the crewmembers have been 
notified and are clear of all equipment when the job is complete and 
the equipment is to be re-energized,'' as required by existing 
paragraph (d)(8)(ii)(B) (id.). The system operator described by EEI and 
seen in the videotape prepares ``a list of energy control devices . . . 
that must be operated to de-energize the equipment to be worked on'' 
and then gives the list to an operations employee, who, functioning as 
a system operator, ``performs the actions necessary to assure de-
energization, and applies the warning tags in the specified locations'' 
(id.). The system operator also coordinates with the principle 
authorized employee, through mechanisms such as a master tag with the 
principle authorized employee's signature or similar device, to help 
prevent reenergization of hazardous energy while employees are working, 
even under conditions involving multiple crews (Ex. 0227; 269-Ex. 12-
6). An employer can use these system-operator functions to comply with 
existing paragraph (d)(8)(ii)(C). Apparently, the only facet of 
``protection equivalent to a personal lockout or tagout device'' that 
EEI finds troubling is the personal control and accountability 
requirements in the introductory text to existing paragraph (d)(8)(ii) 
and in existing paragraph (d)(8)(ii)(D). Consequently, the Agency is 
denying EEI's petition to the extent that EEI seeks removal of the 
existing requirement that group lockout-tagout procedures afford a 
level of protection equivalent to that provided by the implementation 
of a personal lockout-tagout device.
    4. EEI asserted that OSHA abused its discretion in elaborating on 
the meaning of existing Sec.  1910.269 in its compliance directive (CPL 
02-01-038). In this regard, EEI stated that ``the requirements of the 
standard should be clearly evident from its text'' and that there 
should be ``no justification for continuing to rely on Appendix B to 
[CPL 02-01-038] after this rulemaking is completed'' (Ex. 0227). EEI 
stated further that ``any `clarifications' that are needed should be 
accomplished in the text of the rule itself'' (id.).
    The Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission in Exelon 
Generating Corp., 21 BNA OSHC 1087 and the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in EEI v. OSHA, 411 F.3d 
272 rejected EEI's assertions regarding the meaning of both existing 
Sec.  1910.269 and the Sec.  1910.269 directive. In Exelon, the 
Commission stated that ``[t]he plain wording of . . . Sec.  
1910.269(d)(8)(ii)(D) . . . clearly and explicitly mandates use of a 
personal tagout device in a group tagging situation.. . . Accordingly, 
we reject Exelon's contention that the group tagging requirements of 
the standard are confusing or unclear'' (21 BNA OSHC at 1090). 
Moreover, in rejecting EEI's challenge to the Sec.  1910.269 directive, 
the D.C. Circuit stated:

    EEI's first contention is that the 2003 Directive constitutes a 
change from the Power Generation Standard because neither the text 
of the 1994 Standard, nor that of the preamble accompanying it, 
requires that maintenance employees working in a group ``exercise 
personal accountability by affixing personal locks or tags or their 
equivalent to energy control devices.'' Pet'r Br. at 33. But this 
contention is simply incorrect. The 1994 Standard expressly states 
that, ``[w]hen servicing or maintenance is performed by'' a group, 
``[e]ach authorized employee shall affix a personal lockout or 
tagout device . . ., or comparable mechanism, when he or she begins 
work and shall remove those devices when he or she stops working.'' 
29 C.F.R. Sec.  1910.269(d)(8)(ii)(D) (emphasis added). That 
provision reflects OSHA's view, as stated in the 1994 preamble, that 
``the only way to ensure that the employee is aware of whether or 
not the lockout or tagout device is in place is to permit only that 
employee to remove the device himself or herself.'' 59 Fed.Reg. at 
4360; see id. at 4361 (``[E]ach employee in the group needs to be 
able to affix his/her personal lockout or tagout

[[Page 20555]]

system device as part of the group lockout.'' (quoting 54 Fed.Reg. 
36,644, 36,681-82 (Sept. 1, 1989))). Indeed, in announcing the 1994 
Standard, OSHA expressly rejected ``EEI['s] argu[ment] that the 
person removing a lockout or tagout device need not be the same as 
the person who placed it,'' and instead adopted the position that 
``each employee must have the assurance that the device is in his or 
her control, and that it will not be removed by anyone else except 
in an emergency situation.'' Id. at 4360; see also id. at 4361 
(``The authorized employee in charge of the group lockout or tagout 
cannot reenergize the equipment until each employee in the group has 
removed his/her personal device.'' (quoting 54 Fed.Reg. at 36,681-
82)). [footnote omitted]
    EEI's second argument is that the 2003 Directive changes the 
Power Generation Standard by adding, for the first time, a 
definition of the term ``central location under the exclusive 
control of a system operator'' that assertedly alters the term's 
original meaning. The term plays a key role in the system operator 
exception to the general requirements of the Power Generation 
Standard. Under the 1994 Standard, the exception applies only when 
``energy isolating devices are installed in a central location and 
are under the exclusive control of a system operator.'' 29 C.F.R. 
Sec.  1910.269(d)(8)(v). In such circumstances, the ``system 
operator'' may ``place and remove lockout and tagout devices in 
place of'' the individual maintenance employee. Id. Sec.  
1910.269(d)(8)(v)(B).
    The 2003 Directive defines this key term as an ``area to which 
access by employees, other than the system operator, to energy 
isolating devices is physically limited.'' 2003 Directive at A-2. It 
further explains that the system operator exception applies only 
when the ``system operator has complete control over the hazardous 
energy sources because no other employees have access to the area 
and its energy control devices.'' Id. According to EEI, this 
definition marks a dramatic change from the Power Generation 
Standard, because it limits the system operator exception to cases 
in which the operator is the only employee with physical access to 
the equipment. By contrast, in EEI's view the 1994 Standard permits 
a supervisor to place and remove locks and tags for other employees 
whenever the supervisor has exclusive administrative control over 
the machinery under repair--i.e., whenever the system operator is 
the only person authorized to operate the equipment.
    But what EEI calls a ``new definition,'' Pet'r Br. at 21, is in 
fact a near-verbatim recitation of the text of the 1994 preamble. 
Compare 2003 Directive at A-2 (``The system operator has complete 
control over the hazardous energy sources because no other employees 
have access to the area and its energy control devices.'' (emphasis 
added)), with 59 Fed.Reg. at 4364 (``Under [the system operator 
exception], the system operator has complete control over hazardous 
energy sources. . . . Other employees do not even have access to the 
energy control devices and cannot operate them.'' (emphasis added)). 
And the preamble's insistence that the system operator have 
``complete control'' because ``[o]ther employees do not even have 
access to the energy control devices,'' id. at 4364, strongly 
supports the directive's focus on physical control. [411 F.3d 278-
80; emphasis included in original]

    As such, the Sec.  1910.269 directive was not a ``mandatory 
regulatory'' requirement, as EEI alleges (Ex. 0227). For all of the 
foregoing reasons, OSHA is denying EEI's petition to revise the group 
lockout-tagout and system-operator provisions in existing Sec.  
1910.269(d).
    IBEW also recommended changes to the lockout-tagout provisions in 
Sec.  1910.269(d). First, as noted earlier, IBEW recommended that OSHA 
replace the term ``system operator'' with ``control room operator'' 
(Ex. 0230).
    The Agency rejects IBEW's first recommendation for the reasons 
given in the summary and explanation for final Sec.  1926.968, earlier 
in this section of the preamble.
    Second, IBEW recommended that OSHA require the ``walk down of 
principal isolating devices prior to any employee taking any action 
other than application of a personal lockout/tagout device, including 
beginning work under a group lockout/tagout application'' (id.). IBEW 
questioned why OSHA allows each authorized employee in a group lockout-
tagout situation the opportunity to verify the effective isolation of 
hazardous energy sources, but does not make that action mandatory.\468\ 
The union asked, ``If the agency allows another employee to verify this 
action, how does this provide the same level of protection as the 
application of a personal lockout/tagout device?'' (id.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \468\ Paragraph (d)(6)(vii) of existing Sec.  1910.269 states: 
``Before starting work on machines or equipment that have been 
locked out or tagged out, the authorized employee shall verify that 
isolation and deenergizing of the machine or equipment have been 
accomplished.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    OSHA rejects IBEW's recommendation. As stated earlier, the 
standard's group lockout-tagout provisions offer a compromise that 
balances the need for protection of each authorized employee with the 
complexity and redundancy involved in many group lockout-tagout 
situations. Thus, for instance, the group lockout-tagout provisions 
permit group lockout or tagout devices on energy isolating devices 
instead of requiring each authorized employee to place individual 
lockout-tagout devices on each isolating device. (final Sec.  
1910.269(d)(8)(ii)(D)).
    With respect to the verification issue, OSHA believes that IBEW was 
addressing a letter of interpretation dated January 29, 2002, to Mr. 
Jack Prestwood of Tampa Electric Company.\469\ This letter, in a 
footnote, states, ``While hazardous energy isolation may be 
accomplished by a single authorized employee (a ``primary authorized 
employee'') in a group lockout/tagout scenario, each authorized 
employee has the right, and must be given the opportunity, to 
participate in the verification process, regardless of whether the 
verification ultimately is performed by each authorized employee or by 
a primary authorized employee.'' OSHA based its response to Mr. 
Prestwood on an earlier statement covering the general industry 
lockout-tagout standard, Sec.  1910.147. OSHA restated the earlier 
statement in the directive on that standard, CPL 02-00-147, ``The 
Control of Hazardous Energy--Enforcement Policy and Inspection 
Procedures.'' That directive states, in part:

    \469\ This letter is available at https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=INTERPRETATIONS&p_id=24005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    OSHA has recognized the need for an alternative to the 
verification requirement where complex LOTO operations involve many 
employees and numerous energy isolating devices. In such situations, 
the employer may designate a primary authorized employee (PAE), with 
the responsibility for a set number of employees working under the 
group LOTO device(s). The primary authorized employee must implement 
and coordinate the LOTO of hazardous energy sources and verify that 
the steps taken, in accordance with the specific energy control 
procedure, have in fact isolated the machine or equipment 
effectively from the hazardous energy sources.
    In addition to the primary authorized employee, each authorized 
employee participating in the group LOTO must be informed of his 
right to verify the effectiveness of the lockout measures, and each 
authorized employee must be allowed to personally verify, if he so 
chooses, that hazardous energy sources have been effectively 
isolated. An authorized employee who opts to verify the 
effectiveness of the isolation measures must perform this 
verification simultaneously with or after the PAE verifies the 
accomplishment of energy isolation and after the authorized employee 
affixes her personal lockout or tagout device to the group LOTO 
mechanism. These steps must be taken before authorized employees 
perform servicing/maintenance activities. [CPL 02-00-147]

    This alternative to the verification requirement, if properly 
implemented, is consistent with the standard, but the procedure used 
must afford employees ``a level of protection equivalent to that 
provided by the implementation of a personal lockout or tagout device'' 
as required by the introductory text to final Sec.  1910.269(d)(8)(ii). 
To that end, for an employer to properly implement this

[[Page 20556]]

alternative, that employer's group lockout-tagout procedures must 
ensure that any energy verification performed by a primary authorized 
employee affords a level of protection equivalent to the protection 
provided had each authorized employee installed a personal lockout or 
tagout device on each energy-isolating device. For example, the 
procedures could provide that the primary authorized employee conducts 
the appropriate verification for the machine or equipment they will be 
servicing and effectively communicates the results of the verification 
to each employee in the group. Thus, OSHA would not consider as 
adequate, procedures under which the primary authorized employee merely 
communicates with a group of authorized employees via radio, without 
verifying that the machinery or equipment employees will be servicing 
has, in fact, been deenergized and locked or tagged out.
    Existing Sec.  1910.269(r)(1)(ii)(B), (r)(1)(iii), (r)(1)(iv), and 
(r)(1)(v), which apply to line-clearance tree-trimming operations, 
impose requirements that refer to existing Table R-6, Table R-9, and 
Table R-10. Those tables in the existing standard set specific minimum 
approach distances based on voltage. Existing Table R-6 sets minimum 
approach distances for ac systems; existing Table R-9 sets minimum 
approach distances for dc systems; and existing Table R-10 applies 
altitude correction factors to the minimum approach distances in 
existing Table R-6 and Table R-9.
    Table R-6 and Table R-7 in the final rule correspond to existing 
Table R-6. The two tables in the final rule set minimum approach 
distances for ac systems based on the highest maximum per-unit 
transient overvoltage, just as Table R-6 in existing Sec.  1910.269 
does.\470\ Table R-8 in the final rule, which sets minimum approach 
distances for dc systems, corresponds to Table R-9 in existing Sec.  
1910.269.\471\ Table R-5 in the final rule, which sets altitude 
correction factors, corresponds to Table R-10 in existing Sec.  
1910.269.\472\ The final rule revises the relevant provisions in Sec.  
1910.269(r)(1) by replacing the references to ``Table R-6, Table R-9, 
and Table R-10'' with references to ``Table R-5, Table R-6, Table R-7, 
and Table R-8'' wherever the former references appear in the existing 
standard.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \470\ Existing Sec.  1910.269(r)(1)(ii)(B), (r)(1)(iii), 
(r)(1)(iv), and (r)(1)(v) require line-clearance tree trimmers to 
maintain minimum approach distances based on the highest maximum 
transient overvoltage. Paragraph (l)(3)(i) of final Sec.  1910.269 
requires employers to establish minimum approach distances based on 
Table R-3 for ac systems. This table contains equations that 
employers must use to calculate minimum approach distances. Table R-
6 and Table R-7 set minimum approach distances based on the highest 
maximum transient overvoltage. Thus, Table R-6 and Table R-7 in the 
final rule correspond to Table R-6 in existing Sec.  1910.269.
    \471\ Table R-8 in the final rule is the same as existing Table 
R-9 in existing Sec.  1910.269, except that the table in the final 
rule lists distances in metric units.
    \472\ Table R-5 in the final rule is the same as Table R-10 in 
existing Sec.  1910.269, except that the table in the final rule 
lists altitudes in metric units.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Tree trimming industry practice, as reflected in the consensus 
standard applicable to tree trimming work,\473\ is that ``[a]ll 
overhead and underground electrical conductors and all communication 
wires and cables . . . be considered energized with potentially fatal 
voltages'' (Ex. 0037). However, testimony from tree trimming industry 
witnesses described situations in which line-clearance tree trimmers 
would treat power line conductors as deenergized. (See, for example, 
Tr. 657-658, 665-667, 690-692.) In its posthearing comment, TCIA 
indicated that a majority of its members would treat all conductors as 
energized even if they were deenergized (Ex. 0503).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \473\ ANSI Z133.1-2000, ``American National Standard for 
Arboricultural Operations--Pruning, Repairing, Maintaining, and 
Removing Trees, and Cutting Brush Safety Requirements.'' ANSI Z133-
2012 contains the same requirement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    OSHA has a concern that some tree trimming firms might consider 
conductors deenergized simply because an electric utility told the 
firms that the lines are deenergized. Paragraph (l)(1)(iii) of Sec.  
1910.269 in the final rule provides that ``[e]lectric lines and 
equipment shall be considered and treated as energized unless they have 
been deenergized in accordance with paragraph (d) or (m) of this 
section.'' Tree-trimming firms typically perform line-clearance tree-
trimming operations around overhead power distribution or transmission 
lines; final Sec.  1910.269(m) covers deenergizing these lines. 
Paragraph (m)(3)(vii) of final Sec.  1910.269 requires that ``[t]he 
employer shall ensure the installation of protective grounds as 
required by paragraph (n) of this section.'' However, paragraphs (d), 
(l), (m), and (n) are not among the paragraphs listed in final Sec.  
1910.269(a)(1)(i)(E)(2) as applying to line-clearance tree-trimming 
operations performed by line-clearance tree trimmers who are not 
qualified employees. On the other hand, according to final Sec.  
1910.269(a)(1)(i)(D), these provisions do apply to work on, or directly 
associated with, electric power generation, transmission, and 
distribution installations (that is, installations covered by Sec.  
1910.269(a)(1)(i)(A) through (a)(1)(i)(C)). OSHA considers Sec.  
1910.269(a)(1)(i)(D) to regulate any work performed to deenergize lines 
for the protection of employees. Thus, an electric utility or other 
employer operating an electric power generation, transmission, or 
distribution installation around which tree-trimming firms are 
performing line-clearance tree-trimming operations must comply with 
Sec.  1910.269(d) or (m),\474\ as applicable, before the line-clearance 
tree-trimming firms may consider and treat the lines or equipment 
involved as deenergized, in accordance with Sec.  1910.269(l)(1)(iii). 
Note that each line-clearance tree trimming firm must coordinate its 
work rules and procedures with the work rules and procedures of the 
host employer as required by Sec.  1910.269(a)(3)(iii).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \474\ Paragraph (m) contains provisions that the ``employee in 
charge of the clearance'' take certain actions. (See, for example, 
paragraph (m)(2)(iv)(A), which requires, as one of two alternatives 
for multiple crews working on the same lines, the crews to 
coordinate their activities with a single employee in charge of the 
clearance.) OSHA believes that this employee will be an employee of 
the electric utility or other employer operating the electric power 
transmission or distribution installation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    OSHA revised Sec.  1910.269(r)(5)(iv) to clarify that drop starting 
of chain saws is prohibited by Sec.  1910.266(e)(2)(vi). Existing Sec.  
1910.269(r)(5)(iv) requires employees to start gasoline-engine power 
saws on the ground or where they are otherwise firmly supported. The 
existing provision also permits drop starting of power saws weighing 
more than 6.8 kilograms (15 pounds) outside of the bucket of an aerial 
lift when the area below the lift is clear of personnel. While 
paragraph (r)(5) of existing Sec.  1910.269 applies broadly to 
gasoline-engine power saws, the introductory text to the paragraph 
requires that power saws meet the requirements of Sec.  1910.266(e), 
which applies to chain saws only. Paragraph (e)(2)(vi) of Sec.  
1910.266, which OSHA promulgated after it promulgated existing Sec.  
1910.269(r)(5)(iv), prohibits drop starting of chain saws. (See 59 FR 
51672, 51712, Oct. 12, 1994.) Thus, existing Sec. Sec.  
1910.266(e)(2)(vi) and 1910.269(r)(5)(iv) together operate to prohibit 
drop starting of chain saws, but permit drop starting of other types of 
gasoline-engine power saws weighing over 6.8 kilograms outside of the 
bucket of an aerial lift when the area below the lift is clear of 
personnel. OSHA clarified the language of Sec.  1910.269(r)(5)(iv) in 
the final rule to this effect. In addition, the Agency added a note to 
that paragraph stating that

[[Page 20557]]

Sec.  1910.266(e)(2)(vi) prohibits drop starting of chain saws.
    EEI recommended that, except with respect to lockout-tagout 
procedures in electric power generation installations, OSHA 
``incorporate in the final standard the `[c]larifications' that are 
contained in Appendix B of [CPL 02-01-038]'' (Ex. 0227). (See also, Tr. 
1171-1175.) Mr. Stephen Yohay, counsel for EEI, testified that doing so 
would ``provide notice of what the law requires, both to employers and 
employees'' and would prevent OSHA from ``changing unilaterally'' its 
directive (Tr. 1174).
    OSHA decided not to adopt EEI's recommendation (except with respect 
to the issue of network protectors described in the summary and 
explanation for final Sec.  1926.961(c)(4), earlier in this section of 
the preamble). First, some of the statements in CPL 02-01-038 are moot 
because of the changes made to Sec.  1910.269. For example, revisions 
to the requirements on fall protection in the final rule, described in 
the summary and explanation of Sec.  1926.954(b)(3)(iii) earlier in 
this section of the preamble, make some of the statements in the 
directive inconsistent with the requirements in the final rule. When 
OSHA issues a directive on the final rule, it will address the 
requirements in the final rule.
    Many of the remaining statements in Appendix B to CPL 02-01-038 are 
in accord with final Sec.  1910.269. For example, a statement regarding 
temporary protective grounds notes that the term ``temporary protective 
grounds'' in existing Sec.  1910.269(n)(3) refers to grounds placed 
temporarily and explains that employers can use fixed, as well as 
portable, grounds to meet this provision. In any event, EEI's concern 
that OSHA will make changes to such statements through future 
directives is speculative, and EEI has no grounds to challenge the 
directive, as it is not a standard.
2. Section 1910.132
    Paragraph (d) of Sec.  1910.132 addresses hazard assessment and 
selection of personal protective equipment. Paragraph (f) of Sec.  
1910.132 addresses training in the use of personal protective 
equipment. As noted in Sec.  1910.132(g), paragraphs (d) and (f) of 
existing Sec.  1910.132 do not apply to electrical protective equipment 
covered by Sec.  1910.137. While other electrical standards cover 
training (for example, in Sec.  1910.268, Telecommunications, in Sec.  
1910.269, Electric power generation, transmission, and distribution, 
and in Sec.  1910.332, Training in electrical safety-related work 
practices), other OSHA electrical standards do not address many of the 
hazard-assessment requirements in Sec.  1910.132(d). In the preamble to 
the proposed rule, OSHA requested comments on whether it should add 
electrical protective equipment to the scope of Sec.  1910.132(d) or 
Sec.  1910.132(f), or both.
    One commenter supported adding electrical protective equipment to 
the scope of the requirements for hazard assessment and selection of 
PPE in Sec.  1910.132(d), and for training in Sec.  1910.132(f), if no 
other standard addressed those issues (Ex. 0126).
    Other commenters opposed expanding the scope of Sec.  1910.132(d) 
and (f) to cover electrical protective equipment (Exs. 0177, 0186, 
0201, 0209, 0212, 0227). Several of those comments argued that there is 
no other ``special industry equipment in Sec.  1910.132'' (Exs. 0177, 
0209, 0227).
    Section 1910.132 covers all types of PPE regardless of their use 
only in particular industries. The language of Sec.  1910.132(a) is 
broad and inclusive of all types of PPE. That section clearly covers 
electrical protective equipment under Sec.  1910.137 in Subpart I, 
Personal Protective Equipment. Even assuming that these commenters 
meant only that paragraphs (d) and (f) of Sec.  1910.132 do not cover 
``special industry equipment,'' the commenters' rationale is not valid. 
OSHA does not consider electrical protective equipment to be under the 
exclusive domain of the electric power industry. OSHA standards having 
general applicability to all of general industry require this type of 
PPE (see Subpart S of Part 1910). Paragraph (a)(1)(i) of Sec.  1910.335 
requires that ``[e]mployees working in areas where there are potential 
electrical hazards . . . be provided with, and shall use, electrical 
protective equipment that is appropriate for the specific parts of the 
body to be protected and for the work to be performed.''
    Southern Company argued that adding electrical protective equipment 
to the scope of Sec.  1910.132(d) and (f) would appear to offer few 
benefits (Ex. 0212). The company maintained that electrical protective 
equipment has little in common with other types of PPE because the 
selection of the type of rubber insulating equipment depends on many 
factors, such as the work methods involved and the worksite 
configuration.
    OSHA disagrees that electrical protective equipment is unique with 
respect to the number of factors involved with its selection. Whether 
other types of PPE are necessary also depends on the work methods and 
worksite configuration involved. For example, whether foot protection 
is necessary depends on both the work methods in use and the worksite 
configuration. Foot protection typically is necessary when employees 
carry or handle materials such as packages, objects, parts, or heavy 
tools that the employees could drop or when objects in the work area 
could potentially roll over an employee's feet. (See Appendix B to 
Subpart I of Part 1910.) Additionally, OSHA believes that the many 
factors that go into the decision of whether to use electrical 
protective equipment and what types of equipment to use argue for 
adding this type of equipment to the scope of Sec.  1910.132(d) and 
(f). The more difficult the decision-making process, the more important 
it is for employers to train workers adequately and for employers to 
adopt a more formal process for selecting PPE.
    Two of the commenters opposing the addition of electrical 
protective equipment to the scope of Sec.  1910.132(d) and (f) disputed 
the need to do so (Exs. 0186, 0201). These two commenters maintained 
that training and hazard assessment are addressed adequately in 
existing standards. Duke Energy stated that Sec.  1910.269 addresses 
training and assessment (Ex. 0201). Mr. Anthony Ahern with Ohio Rural 
Electric Cooperatives commented that changing the scope of Sec.  
1910.132 would be unnecessarily duplicative (Ex. 0186).
    The Agency agrees with these commenters. The electrical standards 
in Sec. Sec.  1910.268(c), 1910.269(a)(2) (which OSHA is revising in 
this rulemaking), and 1910.332 require training that will ensure that 
employees know how to properly use and care for electrical protective 
equipment. These standards also contain several explicit requirements 
mandating the use of electrical protective equipment. These training 
and specific electrical protective equipment requirements clearly 
reduce, if not eliminate, the need to cover hazard assessment and 
training in Sec.  1910.132. Thus, the Agency agrees with Mr. Ahern that 
adding electrical protective equipment to the scope of Sec.  
1910.132(d) and (f) would be unnecessarily duplicative. Consequently, 
OSHA decided against doing so.
    NAM objected to adding arc-flash hazard assessment or protective 
clothing to the scope of Sec.  1910.132(d) and (f) (Ex. 0222).
    OSHA neither proposed adding, nor requested comments on whether it 
should add, arc-flash hazard assessment or protective equipment needed 
to protect against arc-flash hazards to the scope of Sec.  1910.132(d) 
or (f). The preamble request for comments

[[Page 20558]]

addressed specifically electrical protective equipment covered by Sec.  
1910.137. In this final rule, the Agency is explicitly requiring 
employers to assess the hazards of flames and electric arcs only for 
work covered by Sec.  1910.269(l) or Sec.  1926.960. Therefore, OSHA 
finds no basis in NAM's concerns that the Agency is expanding the 
hazard-assessment and training requirements related to electric-arc 
hazards beyond the requirements contained in Sec.  1910.269 and Subpart 
V. (See also the summary and explanation of final Sec.  1926.960(g), 
earlier in this section of the preamble, for further discussion of 
issues related to protection of workers from electric arcs.)
3. Section 1910.136
    OSHA proposed to revise Sec.  1910.136(a), in addition to the 
proposed new Sec.  1926.97 and the proposed revisions to Sec.  
1910.137, Sec.  1910.269, and Subpart V. Existing Sec.  1910.136(a) 
states that the employer must ensure that each affected employee uses 
protective footwear when working in areas where there is a danger of 
foot injuries due to falling or rolling objects, or objects piercing 
the sole, and where such employee's feet are exposed to electrical 
hazards.
    In the preamble to the proposal, the Agency expressed concern that 
the regulated community was interpreting this language to recognize the 
use of electrical-hazard footwear as a primary form of electrical 
protection (70 FR 34893).\475\ Manufacturers construct electrical-
hazard footwear to provide insulation of the wearer's feet from ground. 
While this footwear can provide the wearer a small degree of protection 
from electric shock at 600 volts or less under dry conditions, the 
footwear is only a secondary form of electrical insulation. Conductive 
footwear, which is not electrical-hazard footwear, prevents static 
electricity buildup.\476\ This is one method of protecting against 
static electrical discharges that can damage equipment or, in hazardous 
locations, could possibly lead to fires or explosions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \475\ Primary insulation normally insulates an employee directly 
from an energized part. Rubber insulating gloves and rubber 
insulating blankets are examples of primary electrical protection. 
Secondary insulation normally insulates an employee's feet from a 
grounded surface. Electrical-hazard footwear and rubber insulating 
matting are examples of secondary electrical protection.
    \476\ ANSI Z41-1999, American National Standard for Personal 
Protection--Protective Footwear, which is incorporated by reference 
in existing Sec. Sec.  1910.6 and 1910.136, covers electrical-hazard 
and conductive footwear.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the preamble to the proposal, OSHA explained that the use of 
electrical-hazard footwear as a primary form of electrical protection 
could expose workers to electric-shock hazards if they believe that the 
primary forms of electrical protection (for example, rubber insulating 
gloves or blankets) are no longer necessary (id.). First, electrical-
hazard footwear only insulates an employee's feet from ground. The 
employee still might be grounded through other parts of his or her 
body. Second, the insulation provided by electrical-hazard footwear is 
effective only under dry conditions; this footwear provides little, if 
any, protection once it becomes wet or damp. Lastly, the voltage rating 
on electrical-hazard footwear is only 600 volts. Therefore, OSHA 
proposed to delete language relating to electrical hazards from Sec.  
1910.136(a). In the proposal, this paragraph read as follows:

    (a) General requirements. The employer shall ensure that each 
affected employee uses protective footwear when working in areas 
where there is a danger of foot injuries due to falling or rolling 
objects or due to objects piercing the sole.

    OSHA decided not to incorporate the proposed language into the 
final standard. Many commenters supported the proposed removal of the 
language in Sec.  1910.136(a) relating to electrical hazards. (See, for 
example, Exs. 0183, 0202, 0206, 0229, 0233.) These commenters agreed 
with the rationale OSHA provided in the preamble to the proposed rule, 
and some noted that this type of footwear is not designed for outdoor 
environments or rated for the voltages encountered in electric power 
distribution work.
    Three commenters opposed the complete removal from existing Sec.  
1910.136(a) of language addressing electrical hazards (Exs. 0105, 0123, 
0148). These commenters mentioned ASTM F1116, Standard Test Method for 
Determining Dielectric Strength of Dielectric Footwear, and F1117, 
Standard Specification for Dielectric Footwear, as examples of 
consensus standards for footwear that provides primary protection 
against electric shock. Comments from Norcross Safety Products, LLC, 
and LaCrosse Footwear noted that OSHA recognizes the need for electric 
power workers to use dielectric footwear,\477\ but stated that the 
proposed removal of protection against electrical hazards \478\ would 
reduce protection for workers outside the electric power industry (Exs. 
0105, 0123). These commenters indicated that an employer should base 
the need for footwear to protect against electrical hazards on the 
employer's job-safety assessment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \477\ ASTM F1117 describes dielectric footwear as ``footwear 
designed to provide additional isolation or insulation of workers if 
in accidental contact with energized electrical conductors, 
apparatus, or circuits.'' This ASTM standard covers three types of 
footwear: rubbers, boots, and galoshes. Dielectric footwear, which 
is proof tested at 15 or 20 kilovolts, ac, provides better electric 
shock protection than electrical-hazard footwear, which is rated at 
600 volts, maximum.
    \478\ ``Electrical hazards'' as used in the discussion of 
protective footwear in this preamble and in existing Sec.  
1910.136(a) means electric shock hazards and hazards from the 
discharge of static build up. There are three types of footwear that 
protect against electrical hazards, that is, conductive, electrical-
hazard, and dielectric footwear.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Paragraph (d) of Sec.  1910.132 requires employers to assess their 
workplaces ``to determine if hazards are present, or are likely to be 
present, which necessitate the use of personal protective equipment,'' 
and to provide PPE in accordance with that assessment. As noted 
previously, Sec.  1910.132(g) restricts the application of Sec.  
1910.132(d) to PPE covered by Sec. Sec.  1910.133 (eye and face 
protection), 1910.135 (head protection), 1910.136 (foot protection), 
and 1910.138 (hand protection). Thus, OSHA's existing standards require 
the hazard assessment recommended by Norcross and Lacrosse. However, if 
the Agency adopted the proposed removal of electrical-safety footwear 
(that is, electrical-hazard, dielectric, and conductive footwear) from 
Sec.  1910.136(a), the requirement in Sec.  1910.132(d) for employers 
to perform a hazard assessment would no longer apply to electrical-
safety footwear.
    On the other hand, OSHA believes that, because of its limitations, 
electrical-hazard and dielectric footwear should only be required by 
Sec.  1910.136 as a supplementary form of electrical protection. The 
Agency also believes that conductive footwear, whether or not it 
provides protection for the foot, is supplementary protection to be 
used when flammable gases or vapors or combustible dusts cannot be 
adequately controlled. Consequently, OSHA is revising the language in 
Sec.  1910.136(a) to require the employer to ensure that each affected 
employee uses protective footwear (1) when working in areas where there 
is a danger of foot injuries due to falling or rolling objects, or 
objects piercing the sole, or (2) when the use of protective footwear 
will protect the affected employee from an electrical hazard, such as a 
static-discharge or electric-shock hazard, that remains after the 
employer takes other necessary protective measures.
    In addition, OSHA is revising nonmandatory Appendix B to Subpart I 
to include a passage in section 10 of that appendix indicating that 
electrically

[[Page 20559]]

conductive shoes would be required as a supplementary form of 
protection for work activities in which there is a danger of fire or 
explosion from the discharge of static electricity. The passage also 
states that electrical-hazard or dielectric footwear would be required 
as a supplementary form of protection when an employee standing on the 
ground is exposed to hazardous step or touch potential (the difference 
in electrical potential between the feet or between the hands and feet) 
or when primary forms of electrical protective equipment, such as 
rubber insulating gloves and blankets, do not provide complete 
protection for an employee standing on the ground.
    The same three commenters who opposed the complete removal from 
existing Sec.  1910.136(a) of language addressing electrical hazards 
also noted that existing Sec.  1910.137 did not specifically mention 
dielectric footwear covered by ASTM F1116 and F1117 (Exs. 0105, 0123, 
0148). These commenters maintained that this equipment does provide 
primary protection from electric shock and recommended that OSHA 
require such protection either in Sec.  1910.136, Sec.  1910.137, Sec.  
1926.97, or Subpart V. Norcross submitted specific suggestions for 
revising Sec.  1910.137 to address dielectric footwear (Ex. 0105).
    OSHA considers dielectric footwear to be electrical protective 
equipment, which is covered by Sec. Sec.  1910.137 and 1926.97 of the 
final rule, in addition to being protective footwear covered by Sec.  
1910.136.\479\ It is true that final Sec. Sec.  1910.137(a) and 
1926.97(a) explicitly limit their coverage to rubber insulating 
blankets, matting, covers, line hose, gloves, and sleeves and thus do 
not cover dielectric footwear. However, final Sec. Sec.  1910.137(b) 
and 1926.97(b) cover ``the design and manufacture of electrical 
protective equipment that is not covered by paragraph (a),'' including 
dielectric footwear. OSHA has examined the revisions to Sec.  1910.137 
suggested by Norcross and concludes that the requirements adopted in 
Sec.  1910.137(a) are not and should not be applicable to dielectric 
footwear. The Agency has also concluded that it is more appropriate to 
cover this equipment in Sec.  1910.137(b). In addition, OSHA does not 
agree that dielectric footwear is primary electrical protection. ASTM 
F1117-03 covers dielectric footwear ``designed to provide additional 
isolation or insulation of workers'' from electric shock (Ex. 0105; 
emphasis added). Thus, ASTM recognizes that dielectric footwear is 
supplementary, not primary, protection. Consequently, OSHA is not 
adopting the recommendation of these commenters to add specific 
requirements for dielectric footwear in Sec.  1910.137.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \479\ OSHA notes that Sec.  1926.96, which incorporates 
requirements for occupational foot protection used in construction 
work, applies to safety-toe footwear only. That section does not 
apply to electrical-safety footwear except to the extent that it is 
also safety-toe footwear.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

4. Part 1910, Subpart S Revisions
    As noted earlier, OSHA revised the definition of ``line-clearance 
tree trimming'' in Sec.  1910.269(x). Changing the definition broadens 
the scope of Sec.  1910.269 with respect to tree-trimming operations 
performed near electric supply lines and equipment energized at more 
than 50 kilovolts. This change also impacts the scope of the 
requirements for electrical safety-related work practices in Subpart S 
of the general industry standards. Note 3 to Sec.  1910.331(c)(1) 
indicates that Sec. Sec.  1910.332 through 1910.335 do not apply to 
qualified employees performing line-clearance tree trimming operations. 
Section 1910.399 defines ``line-clearance tree trimming,'' using 
language that is identical to the language in existing Sec.  
1910.269(x), even though that term is used in Subpart S only in Note 3 
to Sec.  1910.331(c)(1). OSHA determined that the meaning of ``line-
clearance tree trimming'' must be the same in Sec.  1910.269 and 
Subpart S to ensure that there are no gaps or overlaps in coverage 
between the two standards with respect to tree-trimming operations 
performed by line-clearance tree trimmers (who are qualified employees 
under Subpart S) near electric supply lines and equipment operating at 
more than 50 kilovolts. Therefore, the Agency is removing the 
definition of ``line-clearance tree trimming'' from Sec.  1910.399 and 
is adding, to Note 3 of Sec.  1910.331(c)(1), a reference to the 
definition of that term in Sec.  1910.269(x).

D. Part 1926, Removal of Incorporations by Reference

    As explained earlier in this section of the preamble, the final 
rule removes the incorporation by reference of several consensus 
standards. OSHA is revising existing Sec.  1926.6, which provides 
notification of approval of incorporations by reference by the Director 
of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR 
Part 51. In this regard, OSHA is removing and reserving paragraphs 
(h)(17), (h)(18), (h)(19), (h)(20), (h)(21), (h)(22), and (j)(2), which 
list the approval of the incorporation of ANSI standards that are no 
longer incorporated in final Subpart V.

E. Part 1926, Subpart CC Revisions

    OSHA's revised standard for cranes and derricks at Subpart CC of 
Part 1926 contains provisions that reference existing Sec.  1910.269. 
Paragraph (g) of existing Sec.  1926.1400 provides that, for work 
covered by Subpart V of Part 1926, OSHA will deem employers complying 
with existing Sec.  1910.269(p) as in compliance with Sec. Sec.  
1926.1407 through 1926.1411 of Subpart CC. Because requirements for the 
operation of mechanical equipment are the same in both final Sec.  
1910.269 and final Subpart V, OSHA is revising these references in 
Subpart CC of Part 1926 to refer to the corresponding provisions in 
Subpart V of Part 1926.
    In addition, Subpart CC contains provisions that apply when 
employers perform Subpart V work with cranes or derricks closer to 
overhead power lines than the minimum clearance distances in Table V-1 
of existing Subpart V. First, existing Sec.  1926.1410(c)(2) permits an 
employer engaged in Subpart V work to work closer than the distances in 
existing Sec.  1926.950 Table V-1 where the employer meets both the 
requirements of Sec.  1926.1410 and existing Sec.  1926.952(c)(3)(i) or 
(c)(3)(ii). Second, existing Sec.  1926.1410(d)(4)(ii) provides that, 
for work covered by Subpart V, existing Sec.  1926.1410(d)(4)(i), which 
requires the use of an insulating link or device, applies only when 
working inside the existing Subpart V, Table V-1 clearance distances. 
Finally, existing Sec.  1926.1410(d)(4)(iii) provides that, for work 
covered by Subpart V of Part 1926 involving operations for which use of 
an insulating link/device is infeasible, employers may substitute the 
requirements of existing Sec.  1910.269(p)(4)(iii)(B) or (p)(4)(iii)(C) 
for the requirement in existing Sec.  1926.1410(d)(4)(i).
    As noted in the summary and explanation for final Sec.  
1926.959(d)(1) earlier in this section of the preamble, Subpart V 
requires that employers ensure that employees do not take mechanical 
equipment, except for the insulated portion of an aerial lift operated 
by a qualified employee, inside the minimum approach distance, 
established by the employer under Sec.  1926.960(c)(1)(i). 
Consequently, the requirements in existing Sec.  1926.1410(c)(2), 
(d)(4)(ii), and (d)(4)(iii) that pertain to the operation of cranes and 
derricks inside the minimum approach distance, are no longer 
applicable. Therefore, OSHA is removing those requirements from Subpart 
CC. However, OSHA is retaining the paragraph (d)(4)(ii) exemption from 
Sec.  1926.1410(d)(4)(i) for

[[Page 20560]]

Subpart V work. Also, OSHA is replacing the phrase ``the minimum 
clearance distances specified in Sec.  1926.950 Table V-1'' with ``the 
minimum approach distances established by the employer under Sec.  
1926.960(c)(1)(i)'' to reflect the changes made to the minimum approach 
distances required by Sec.  1926.960(c)(1) in this final rule.

VI. Final Economic Analysis and Regulatory Flexibility Analysis

A. Introduction

    The OSH Act requires OSHA to demonstrate that standards promulgated 
under the Act are technologically and economically feasible. Executive 
Order 12866 and 13563 and the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 601 
et seq., require Federal agencies to estimate the costs, assess the 
benefits, and analyze the impacts, including small business impacts, of 
their rules. Executive Orders 12866 and 13563 direct agencies to assess 
all costs and benefits of available regulatory alternatives and, if 
regulation is necessary, to select regulatory approaches that maximize 
net benefits (including potential economic, environmental, public 
health and safety effects, distributive impacts, and equity). Executive 
Order 13563 states that the Federal regulatory system ``must take into 
account benefits and costs'' and ``reduce burdens and maintain 
flexibility and freedom of choice.'' OSHA determined that this action 
is economically significant within the meaning of Section 3(f)(1) of 
Executive Order 12866 because it is likely to have an effect on the 
economy of $100 million or more in any 1 year. This final rule is also 
a major rule under the Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. 801 et seq. 
The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in the Office of 
Management and Budget reviewed this final rule. As required by the 
Regulatory Flexibility Act, OSHA assessed the impacts of this final 
rule on small entities and prepared a Final Regulatory Flexibility 
Analysis.
    This is the Final Economic Analysis and Regulatory Flexibility 
Analysis (FEA) for OSHA's update of the standards addressing electric 
power generation, transmission, and distribution work, and the use of 
electrical protective equipment. This analysis covers all elements of 
this present rulemaking, including changes to 29 CFR Part 1910 and 
changes to 29 CFR Part 1926. OSHA analyzed the consolidated set of 
actions in its entirety; only portions of the standards identified as 
involving nonnegligible costs are explicitly reflected in the analysis 
of compliance costs and impacts. This FEA includes a discussion of all 
the specific comments OSHA received on the PRIA in support of the 
proposed rule, including comments received on OSHA's assumptions and 
estimates. Where OSHA does not note comments or suggestions with 
respect to an estimate, there were no comments or suggestions. OSHA is 
including the complete FEA in this Federal Register notice.

B. Need for the Rule

    Employees performing work involving electric power generation, 
transmission, and distribution are exposed to a variety of significant 
hazards, such as fall, electric-shock, and burn hazards, that can and 
do cause serious injury and death. As detailed later in this section of 
the preamble, OSHA estimates that, on average, 444 serious injuries and 
74 fatalities occur annually among these workers. Although better 
compliance with existing safety standards may prevent some of these 
accidents, research and analyses conducted by OSHA found that many 
preventable injuries and fatalities could continue to occur even if 
employers fully complied with the existing standards. As the benefits 
analysis shows, if the final rule can prevent even 10 percent of these 
fatal and nonfatal accidents, then the benefits of the final rule will 
exceed its costs. As the same analysis concludes, the final rule will 
likely prevent far more than 10 percent of these fatal and nonfatal 
accidents (assuming full compliance with the final rule). Accounting 
for the probability that some accidents will be prevented by the 
existing rule, OSHA estimates that the final rule will prevent 118.5 
injuries and 19.75 fatalities per year (26.7 percent of all fatal and 
nonfatal accidents).
    Executive Order 12866 provides that ``[e]ach agency shall identify 
the problem that it intends to address [via regulation] including, 
where applicable, the failures of private markets.'' OSHA believes it 
can make a reasonable case that, in the absence of regulations, market 
failures prevent free markets from providing the levels of occupational 
safety, and particularly the levels of safety for electrical workers 
affected by this standard, that would maximize net benefits to society.
    Employees and supervisors affected by this rule are frequently 
trained in, and knowledgeable about, the relevant hazards. Many are 
also knowledgeable about existing OSHA standards. The primary problem 
is that contractors, employees, and supervisors frequently lack the 
information about the specific electrical system and worksite 
conditions needed to determine what protective measures to take. The 
most costly provisions of this standard address this problem. As 
explained in the summary and explanation of the final rule's 
requirements on information transfer and job briefing (Sec. Sec.  
1926.950(c) and 1926.952(a)(1)), testimony and other information in the 
record show that key information necessary for taking the appropriate 
safety measures is sometimes lacking, often with fatal consequences. In 
addition, as explained in the summary and explanation of the final 
rule's requirements on minimum approach distances (Sec.  
1926.960(c)(1)), employers frequently adopt minimum approach distances 
that rely on industry-accepted values of maximum per-unit transient 
overvoltage rather than the maximum value present at the worksite. The 
benefits analysis presented under the heading ``Benefits, Net Benefits, 
and Cost Effectiveness,'' later in this section of the preamble, shows 
that many accidents are potentially preventable with better information 
on the electrical system and worksite conditions.
    To determine possible market failures that could lead to employers 
either not providing information to other employers or their own 
employees, or to not providing other safety measures when the benefits 
exceed the costs, it is necessary to examine the way employers make 
decisions with respect to health and safety. When an employee accepts a 
job with an employer, the employee will typically accept the risks 
associated with the job in return for two forms of compensation--(1) a 
wage premium for assuming the risk and (2) compensation for damages in 
the event the risk actually leads to damages. The rational profit-
maximizing employer will make investments in workplace safety to reduce 
the level of risk to employees to the extent that such expenditures 
result at least in an offsetting reduction in the employer's payouts of 
wage premiums for risk and compensation for damages. To the extent that 
the sum of the costs of wage premiums and compensation for damages 
accurately represent the total damages associated with workplace 
accidents, the rational employer will conduct the appropriate economic 
analysis and arrive at the level of accident prevention that is optimal 
from a benefit-cost viewpoint. As a result, the possible origins of 
market failure would be either: (1) There are costs of accidents that 
are borne neither by the employee or the employer, or (2) the costs of 
wage premiums or compensation for damages are not fully

[[Page 20561]]

responsive to changes in risk. Both cases apply here.
    In the first case, there are some accident costs incurred by 
neither the employer nor the employee. For instance, neither the 
employer nor the employee will have a vested interest in Federal and 
State taxes that go unpaid as a result of an employee injury. Such 
taxes will typically be 15 (for Social Security alone) to 26 percent of 
the total value of the income loss to the employee [17, 52].\480\ Tax 
losses are likely to be significant because (1) workers' compensation 
payments are not subject to Federal income or Social Security taxes 
[16], and (2) many studies found that income losses not compensated by 
workers' compensation are significant [23].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \480\ The average federal tax rate for 2009 for the middle 
quintile of household income was 11.1 percent [52].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the second case, the costs employers pay in compensation for 
damages, or for wage premiums, are not completely responsive to changes 
in risk, as discussed in the following paragraphs.
Workers' Compensation
    Most employers cover, and are required to cover, compensation for 
injured employees through workers' compensation insurance. (Some very 
large employers may self-insure in some States.) States highly regulate 
premiums for workers' compensation insurance and generally employ a 
combination of a class rating and an experience rating in deriving 
premiums [24, 3]. The class rating is the average risk for employees 
with the same occupations as those employed by the employer. The basis 
of the experience rating is the employer's actual workers' compensation 
claims over the past several years. Very small firms are almost 
entirely class rated; even medium-sized firms are partly class rated; 
and firms that are fully experience rated will need several years 
before their insurance premiums fully reflect any change in their 
performance. As a result, many employers will find that changes in 
their expenditures to avoid risk are only minimally reflected in 
changes in their workers' compensation premiums, and all insured 
employers will find that there is a considerable delay before changes 
in risk are fully reflected in their workers' compensation insurance 
premiums. As a result, many employers will not see improvements they 
make in preventing injuries and illnesses reflected in the costs they 
bear for compensating employee injuries and illnesses.\481\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \481\ This outcome, of course, involves an accounting point. 
Premiums due to class rating, by definition, do not change with an 
individual employer's injury experience. There is some empirical 
evidence, using a difference in differences methodology, that 
(small) firms that move from class to experience rating decrease 
their total claims by 8 to 12 percent [27].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Wage Premiums
    Wage premiums for risk are the remaining factor that could affect 
employers' decisions about risk levels. The effects of wage premiums 
are particularly important for risks that lead to fatalities because 
workers' compensation covers only a small fraction of most estimates of 
willingness to pay to prevent a fatality.\482\ Additionally, workers' 
compensation payments do not fully compensate injuries in that workers' 
compensation provides no payments for pain and suffering or losses 
other than lost wages or medical expenses associated with injuries; 
there is extensive evidence that workers' compensation does not fully 
restore wages lost as result of long-term disability [3]. As a result, 
wage premiums that accurately reflect the risks of a specific employer 
are necessary, in addition to workers' compensation, for employers to 
make valid risk-reduction decisions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \482\ While workers' compensation varies by State, Leigh and 
Marcin estimate that the average indemnity benefits for a fatality 
are $225,919, far less than willingness-to-pay estimates [21]. For 
example, as explained in the benefits section of this analysis, OSHA 
uses a willingness-to-pay measure of $8.9 million per life saved. 
Other agencies use different estimates, but all of the values are in 
the millions of dollars.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For an employer to have an adequate incentive to implement measures 
that will prevent workplace accidents, it is not sufficient that 
employees simply know that their work is dangerous, or even know 
quantitatively that their occupation has a given risk. Employees must: 
know the exact quantitative effect of a specific employer's safety 
measures and systems; have a reasonable expectation that the employer 
will continue to provide existing safety measures in the future; and be 
able to act on their knowledge of risk by readily changing workplaces 
or changing wage demands in response to differences in levels of risk. 
OSHA believes that even skilled electrical workers (and not all persons 
injured in accidents preventable by the final rule are skilled 
electrical workers) lack this detailed employer-specific quantitative 
knowledge or the ability to act on it. Further, construction employees, 
who typically work at a variety of different sites, including sites 
controlled by multiple employers, will find it particularly challenging 
to determine future risk levels, as these levels will vary from site to 
site.
    In summary, OSHA believes that: (1) The most costly portions of the 
rule are necessary to assure that supervisors and employees have the 
information they need to protect themselves; (2) the benefits of this 
standard exceed the costs; (3) neither employers nor employees incur 
some key costs of injuries and fatalities; and (4) neither wage 
premiums nor workers' compensation insurance are sufficiently 
responsive to changes in risk to assure that employers will reduce risk 
to the optimal extent. The rule is, therefore, necessary to address 
market failures that result in the provision of insufficient safety 
measures in the workplace.
    The OSH Act provides a Congressional finding as to the compelling 
social need for assuring occupational safety. Congress declared that 
the purpose of the OSH Act is ``to assure so far as possible every 
working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working 
conditions'' (29 U.S.C. 651(b)). Thus, it is reasonable to argue that 
there is a social purpose for this final rule independent of whether or 
not it addresses a market failure.\483\ Further, by emphasizing ``every 
working man and woman,'' Congress expressed an interest in preventing 
unsafe workplaces, not simply in assuring that, on average, workplaces 
are safe. Thus, while some employers are excessively cautious about 
risk while others are insufficiently cautious, OSHA's concern needs to 
be with the insufficiently cautious.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \483\ See Section IV, Legal Authority, earlier in this preamble, 
for a detailed discussion of the legal authority for this standard 
and how the final standard meets the various requirements of the OSH 
Act as interpreted by the courts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

C. Examination of Alternative Regulatory Approaches

    Under Section 3(8) of the OSH Act, the requirements of an OSHA 
standard must be ``reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe 
or healthful employment and places of employment.'' To be reasonably 
necessary or appropriate, a safety standard must be technologically and 
economically feasible, better able to effectuate the purposes of the 
OSH Act than any relevant national consensus standards, and use the 
most cost-effective protective measures.
    To determine the appropriate regulatory requirements to address 
occupational risks for employees working on electric power generation, 
transmission, and distribution systems, OSHA considered many different 
factors and potential alternatives. The Agency examined the incidence 
of injuries and fatalities and their direct and underlying

[[Page 20562]]

causes to ascertain where existing standards needed strengthening. OSHA 
reviewed these standards, assessed current practices in affected 
industries, collected information and comments from experts, and 
scrutinized the available data and research. A full discussion of the 
Agency's rationale for adopting each of the regulatory requirements in 
the final rule is available in Section V, Summary and Explanation of 
the Final Rule, earlier in this preamble.
    The most costly provisions in the final rule are those requiring 
employers to conduct arc-flash hazard assessments and provide arc-flash 
protective equipment appropriate for the identified arc hazards (as 
required by Sec.  1926.960(g)). OSHA calculated the costs of two 
alternative regulatory approaches to arc-flash protective equipment. As 
a less stringent alternative to the final rule, OSHA considered a 
general requirement for arc-flash protective clothing with an arc 
rating of 4 cal/cm\2\. This alternative would eliminate the costs 
associated with performing arc-hazard assessments, as well as the costs 
of providing some types of protective gear, such as switching coats or 
flash suits, faceshields, and head protection. Under this less 
stringent alternative, the total annual costs for arc-flash protective 
clothing would be approximately $15.6 million (instead of $19.4 million 
for the arc-hazard assessment and arc-flash protective equipment 
combined), and the total annual cost of the rule would be approximately 
$45.7 million (instead of $49.5 million).
    OSHA also considered the more stringent alternative of requiring 
affected industries to follow Table 130.7(C)(9) in NFPA 70E-2009, 
Standard for Electrical Safety in the Workplace. This approach would 
obviate the need for employers to do arc-hazard assessments, but would 
result in affected workers needing protective clothing with a higher 
arc rating, and a higher percentage of power workers \484\ needing to 
use arc-rated faceshields and head protection (80 percent of power 
workers at small establishments and 90 percent of power workers at 
large establishments, as opposed to 13 percent under the rule as 
adopted). The cost for switching coats or flash suits would remain 
unchanged under the more stringent alternative.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \484\ The term ``power worker'' describes workers affected by 
the rule by virtue of their performing electric power generation, 
transmission or distribution work.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To analyze the costs of requiring clothing with a higher arc rating 
under the NFPA approach, OSHA estimated that a coverall with an arc 
rating of 8 cal/cm\2\ costs $191.75 [13],\485\ while the equivalent 
piece of clothing with an arc rating of 12 cal/cm\2\ costs $290.50 
[14], for an incremental cost of $98.75 per item.\486\ With eight sets 
of flame-resistant clothing \487\ per affected worker, this results in 
incremental annualized costs of approximately $8.0 million. Adding 
these costs to the $15.6 million in annualized costs for flame-
resistant clothing under the provisions of the final rule results in 
total annualized costs for flame-resistant clothing of approximately 
$23.7 million.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \485\ References are available at the end of this section of the 
preamble.
    \486\ Clothing rated at 8 cal/cm\2\ would, in turn, offer more 
than adequate protection for incident heat energy of 8 cal/cm\2\ or 
less.
    \487\ This FEA uses the term ``flame-resistant clothing'' to 
refer generally to the flame-resistant and arc-rated clothing, and 
the term ``arc-flash protective equipment'' to refer to the flame-
resistant and arc-rated clothing and equipment, required by Sec.  
1926.960(g).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    OSHA calculated the costs for arc-rated faceshields and head 
protection as described under the heading ``Costs of Compliance,'' 
later in this section of the preamble, using estimated costs of $86.50 
per arc-rated faceshield [11] and $29.75 per arc-rated balaclava [12]. 
OSHA assumes that 80 percent of affected workers at small 
establishments and 90 percent of power workers at large establishments 
would need to wear this equipment under the NFPA approach, for total 
annualized costs of $8.3 million, or an additional annualized cost of 
approximately $7.1 million.
    Under this more stringent alternative, the estimated total 
annualized cost of arc-hazard assessment and arc-flash protective 
equipment would be approximately $32.4 million, and the estimated total 
annualized cost of the rule would be approximately $62.5 million. Under 
the final rule, OSHA estimated the total annualized costs of arc-hazard 
assessment and arc-flash protective equipment to be approximately $19.4 
million and estimated the total annualized cost of the rule to be 
approximately $49.5 million. As outlined in Table 18, the NFPA 
alternative would result in approximately $12.9 million in additional 
costs relative to the final rule.

                                   Table 18--Alternative Regulatory Approaches
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                    Annualized
                                                                     costs for    Less stringent  More stringent
                            Provision                              provisions in    alternative     alternative
                                                                    final rule
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Calculating Incident Energy and Arc-Hazard Assessment (Arc-           $2,186,883              $0              $0
 Hazard Assessment).............................................
Flame-Resistant Apparel.........................................      15,620,365      15,620,365      23,664,751
Switching Coats or Flash Suits..................................         366,245               0         366,245
Faceshields.....................................................         946,964               0       6,212,770
Head Protection.................................................         325,690               0       2,136,762
                                                                 -----------------------------------------------
Total Arc-Hazard Assessment and Arc-Flash Protective Equipment        19,446,147      15,620,365      32,380,528
 Costs..........................................................
Total Cost of Rule..............................................      49,516,264      45,690,483      62,450,646
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Incremental Annualized Cost of Alternative......................  ..............      -3,825,782      12,934,381
Incremental Lives Saved Annually of Alternative.................  ..............           -0.52               0
Incremental Injuries Prevented Annually of Alternative..........  ..............              -3               0
Incremental Monetized Benefits..................................  ..............      -4,710,000               0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Incremental Net Benefits ($)....................................  ..............        -884,218     -12,934,381
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Totals may not equal the sum of the components due to rounding.
Source: Office of Regulatory Analysis, OSHA.


[[Page 20563]]

    To assess the benefits associated with the alternative versions of 
the arc-flash protective equipment requirements, OSHA considered the 
fatalities prevented under the various approaches. A review of the same 
set of IMIS reports used in the benefits analysis described later (see 
the discussion under the heading ``Benefits, Net Benefits, and Cost 
Effectiveness'') indicates that the more stringent requirement would 
prevent an estimated 1.92 fatalities, while the less stringent option 
would prevent an estimated 1.40 fatalities per year. These options 
compare to an estimated 1.92 preventable fatalities under the provision 
in the final rule. Consistent with the benefits methodology described 
elsewhere in this section, the Agency estimates the final rule will 
prevent approximately an additional 0.52 fatalities and 3 injuries 
annually beyond the less stringent alternative, but would be as 
effective as the more stringent alternative, as the arc-hazard 
assessment allows employers to better target their need for protective 
clothing and equipment. Monetizing these prevented fatalities using the 
methodology described in the benefits analysis, and values of $8.7 
million per prevented fatality and $62,000 per prevented injury, 
results in an estimated incremental monetized benefit of about $0.9 
million per year for the final rule over the less stringent option and 
about $12.9 million a year over the more stringent option.

Profile of Affected Industries

    The final rule affects establishments in a variety of different 
industries involving electric power generation, transmission, and 
distribution. The rule primarily affects firms that construct, operate, 
maintain, or repair electric power generation, transmission, or 
distribution systems. These firms include electric utilities, as well 
as contractors hired by utilities and primarily classified in the 
construction industry. In addition, affected firms appear in a variety 
of manufacturing and other industries that own or operate their own 
electric power generation, transmission, or distribution systems as a 
secondary part of their business operations. The rule also affects 
establishments performing line-clearance tree-trimming operations.
    Some other industries will occasionally enter electric power 
facilities (for example, insurance inspectors (Ex. 0198)). OSHA expects 
that this rule will have no significant economic impact on industries 
such as the insurance industry that occasionally have employees enter 
electric power facilities for purposes other than construction or 
maintenance. Further, to the extent such visitors to electric power 
facilities are within the scope of the rule, the more costly provisions 
of the rule are unlikely to have a substantial effect on those 
visitors. (For a discussion of the application of the final rule to 
insurance inspections and the implications for costs for the insurance 
industry, see the summary and explanation for final Sec.  
1926.950(a)(1), in Section V, Summary and Explanation of the Final 
Rule, earlier in this preamble.) Finally, while final Sec. Sec.  
1910.137 and 1926.97 apply to all general industry work and all 
construction work, respectively, OSHA anticipates that these final 
rules will primarily impact industries involved in electric power 
generation, transmission, and distribution, and industries in the 
nonutility sector involved with the cogeneration of electric power. 
OSHA, therefore, concludes that these final rules will have a de 
minimis effect on other industries.
    OSHA based the PRIA in part on a report prepared by CONSAD [5], 
which used 1997 NAICS and SIC code classifications of industries. OSHA 
updated the information in the FEA with the assistance of ERG, using 
the data sources described in the following paragraphs. CONSAD based 
the estimates it developed for small, large, and total establishments 
on the 1997 U.S. Economic Census, which used some NAICS classifications 
that are now obsolete. To be analytically consistent, however, OSHA is 
maintaining the older NAICS categories.
    To update industry profile information for the construction 
industry (NAICS 23), OSHA used the U.S. Census' County Business 
Patterns data [47] on the growth of the construction contracting 
industry between 1997 and 2007. These data suggest that the number of 
establishments and firms grew 20.6 percent, and employment grew 32.7 
percent, from 1997 to 2007. OSHA, thus, multiplied CONSAD's estimate of 
the number of establishments and affected establishments by 1.206, and 
CONSAD's estimate of total employment and affected power workers by 
1.327, to obtain updated industry profile information. In the case of 
firms, CONSAD listed total affected firms for each NAICS, but did not 
delineate between small and large firms. To update the number of 
affected firms in the construction industry, OSHA multiplied CONSAD's 
estimate of total affected firms by 1.206, and assumed that, because 
very small firms (that is, those with fewer than 20 employees) are 
unlikely to have more than one establishment, the number of small firms 
is equal to the number of small establishments and that the remainder 
of affected firms are large. OSHA assumed that very small 
establishments and firms grew in proportion to the rest of the 
construction industry.
    In the case of the privately owned utilities in the 1997 NAICS 
Electric Power Generation (NAICS 221110) and Electric Power 
Transmission, Control, and Distribution (NAICS 221120) categories, OSHA 
updated industry profile information using the U.S. Census Bureau's 
1997 NAICS and 1987 SIC Correspondence Tables [44], 1997 NAICS to 2002 
NAICS Correspondence Tables [45], and 2002 NAICS to 2007 NAICS 
Correspondence Tables [46] to match CONSAD's NAICS and SIC categories 
to the 2007 NAICS categories. The 1997 category Electric Power 
Generation (NAICS 221110) is the sum of the 2007 NAICS categories: 
Hydroelectric Power Generation; Fossil Fuel Electric Power Generation; 
Nuclear Electric Power Generation; and Other Electric Power Generation. 
Similarly, the 1997 NAICS category Electric Power Transmission, 
Control, and Distribution (NAICS 221120) is the sum of the 2007 NAICS 
categories: Electric Bulk Power Transmission and Control; and Electric 
Power Distribution.
    To calculate the number of establishments among Industrial Power 
Generators, OSHA used data from the Energy Information Administration 
(EIA)'s Form EIA-860 Database Annual Electric Generator Report [49], 
removed plants primarily engaged in the utility, mining, or agriculture 
industries, and counted the remaining plants as establishments among 
industrial power generators.
    To estimate the number of major publicly owned utilities for the 
analysis prepared for the proposed rule, CONSAD used EIA's Form-412 
Annual Electricity Financial Report, which contained data on ``each 
municipality, political subdivision, State, and Federal entity engaged 
in the generation, transmission, or distribution of electricity, which 
had at least 150,000 megawatt hours of sales to ultimate consumers and/
or at least 150,000 megawatt hours of sales for resale for each of the 
2 previous years'' [48]. EIA terminated this survey, and there are no 
data more recent than 2003.
    To update CONSAD's estimate of publicly owned utility 
establishments and firms, OSHA used data from EIA's Form-861 Annual 
Electric Power Industry Report [50] for utilities with municipal, 
state, or political subdivision ownership located in State-plan States

[[Page 20564]]

with sales of at least 150,000 megawatt-hours. These data indicate that 
there are now 277 firms that are major publicly owned utilities. 
Establishment data are not available for these utilities. In the 
analysis prepared for the proposed rule, OSHA estimated that there were 
923 establishments and 276 firms, and OSHA used the same ratio of 
establishments to firms to estimate that there are now 927 
establishments among firms that are Major Publicly Owned Utilities.
    Similarly, there are no Census or EIA data on employees in Major 
Publicly Owned Utilities.\488\ Applying the ratio of power workers to 
utilities in CONSAD's report [5], OSHA estimated employment in Major 
Publicly Owned Utilities (NAICS 2211) by taking the EIA Form-861 [50] 
establishment data and extrapolating from those data an estimate of 
8,582 employees at Major Publicly Owned Utilities affected by the final 
rule.\489\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \488\ The category ``Major Publicly Owned Utilities'' does not 
have its own NAICS code. In this analysis, OSHA used the NAICS code 
2211, which encompasses both privately and publicly owned utilities, 
to refer to ``Major Publicly Owned Utilities'' only, as OSHA found 
it necessary to account for the costs to Major Publicly Owned 
Utilities separately from the costs to private utilities. Similarly, 
OSHA used NAICS 221110 and NAICS 221120 to refer to privately owned 
utilities only, even though those NAICS codes include privately and 
publicly owned utilities.
    \489\ The rule will affect Major Publicly Owned Utilities that 
operate in OSHA State-plan States. (State-plan States cover about 
half of total U.S. employment. They operate their own OSHA-approved 
occupational safety and health programs and must, under formal 
agreements with OSHA, impose OSHA-equivalent State regulatory 
requirements on public employers operating major publicly owned 
utilities within their jurisdictions.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    OSHA used several data sources to estimate the number of line-
clearance tree trimmers (SOC 37-3013) affected by the rule within 
Ornamental Shrub and Tree Services (SIC 0783) (now included in NAICS 
561730, Landscaping Services). To estimate the number of establishments 
performing line-clearance tree-trimming operations in NAICS 561730, 
Landscaping Services, OSHA used 2007 BLS Occupational Employment 
Statistics data [34] combined with establishment data from the 2007 BLS 
Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages [35]. These data suggest that 
there are 4,803 establishments in NAICS 561730 Landscaping Services 
that employ tree trimmers and pruners (SOC 37-3013). Based on 
statistics on the distribution of establishments by employment size for 
NAICS 561730 reported in the 2007 U.S. Census' Statistics of U.S. 
Businesses, OSHA estimated that 4,479 of these establishments have 
fewer than 20 employees or fewer and that 324 of these establishments 
have 20 employees or more [43].\490\ In the analysis prepared for the 
proposed rule, CONSAD used data from the National Arborist Association 
\491\ to estimate the number of establishments in SIC 0783 involved in 
line-clearance tree-trimming operations, with approximately 90 percent 
of large establishments (291 establishments) and 2 percent of small 
establishments (90 establishments) performing line-clearance tree-
trimming operations. OSHA applies these same percentages of affected 
large and small establishments to the BLS data, which suggests that 
there are 381 affected establishments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \490\ BLS Occupational Employment Statistics data [34] indicated 
that 5 percent of establishments in NAICS 561730 employ Tree 
Trimmers, and BLS Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages [35] data 
indicated that there were 96,605 establishments in NAICS 561730, 
suggesting that 4,803 establishments in NAICS 561730 employ tree 
trimmers. The portion of establishments with fewer than 20 employees 
was estimated based on the distribution of establishment sizes in 
NAICS 561730 as a whole, as reported in the 2007 U.S. Census's 
Statistics of U.S. Businesses [43].
    \491\ The National Arborist Association subsequently changed its 
name to the National Tree Care Industry Association.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    U.S. Census data [43] suggest that total employment in Landscaping 
Services (NAICS 561730) is 572,520, with 260,815 of these employees (46 
percent) \492\ working at establishments that employ fewer than 20 
employees and 311,705 (54 percent) working at establishments that 
employ 20 employees or more. To estimate the proportion of employees in 
NAICS 561730 potentially affected by the proposed rule, OSHA used BLS 
data [38] suggesting that there are a total of 32,600 tree trimmers and 
pruners (SOC 37-3013) working in Landscaping Services (NAICS 561730). 
OSHA extrapolated the percentage of employees working at small and 
large establishments in all establishments in NAICS 561730 to 
establishments that employ tree trimmers and pruners, suggesting that 
there are 14,851 (46 percent of 32,600) employees at small 
establishments and 17,749 (54 percent of 32,600) at large 
establishments potentially affected by the final rule. OSHA then used 
CONSAD's determination of the proportion of these workers who are doing 
line-clearance tree-trimming work, suggesting that 5 percent of workers 
at small establishments (768 workers) and 81 percent of workers at 
large establishments (14,318 workers) perform line-clearance tree-
trimming operations, for a total of 15,086 employees doing line-
clearance tree-trimming work covered by the final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \492\ In this paragraph, as elsewhere in this section of the 
preamble, OSHA is presenting ratios in a concise, but rounded, 
format. For instance, the 46 percent cited is more precise in 
CONSAD's analysis, in this case 45.5556138 percent. This latter 
ratio is the precise ratio of numbers in the CONSAD analysis. OSHA 
used the more precise numbers in the calculations presented in this 
FEA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Table 19 presents data on the numbers of affected establishments 
and employees for each affected industry. Across all industries, an 
estimated 24,407 establishments and 211,452 employees will be affected 
by the final rule.

                           Table 19--Profile of Affected Establishments and Employees
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                          Affected      Affected       Affected
          Industry code                       Industry name                firms     establishments   employees
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NAICS 234910.....................  Water, Sewer, and Pipeline                   106           1,021        1,262
                                    Construction.
NAICS 234920.....................  Power and Communication                    2,870           3,412       34,740
                                    Transmission Line Construction.
NAICS 234930.....................  Industrial Nonbuilding Structure             158             321        1,846
                                    Construction.
NAICS 234990.....................  All Other Heavy Construction.......           28             791        7,395
NAICS 235310.....................  Electrical Contractors.............           51           1,945       21,686
NAICS 235910.....................  Structural Steel Erection                    120             786          398
                                    Contractors.
NAICS 235950.....................  Building Equipment and Other                 202           1,148          373
                                    Machine Installation Contractors.
NAICS 235990.....................  All Other Special Trade Contractors          313           3,150          974
NAICS 221110.....................  Electric Power Generation..........          626           2,171       37,560
NAICS 221120.....................  Electric Power Transmission,               1,232           7,440       64,179
                                    Control, and Distribution.
NAICS 2211.......................  Major Publicly Owned Utilities.....          277             927        8,582
Various..........................  Industrial Power Generators........          197             913       17,372

[[Page 20565]]

 
SIC 0783.........................  Ornamental Shrub and Tree Services.          309             381       15,086
                                                                       -----------------------------------------
    Total........................  ...................................        6,488          24,407      211,452
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Totals may not equal the sum of the components due to rounding.
Sources: CONSAD [5], EIA [49, 50], U.S. Census [43].

    As shown in Table 19, the construction industries with the largest 
numbers of affected employees are the Power and Communication 
Transmission Line Construction and Electrical Contractors industries, 
which together account for 56,426 employees of the affected workforce. 
Other affected construction industries include All Other Heavy 
Construction, Building Equipment and Other Machine Installation 
Contractors, Industrial Nonbuilding Structure Construction, Structural 
Steel Erection Contractors, Water, Sewer, and Pipeline Construction, 
and All Other Special Trade Contractors.
    Table 19 also shows that establishments classified as utilities 
(namely establishments in the Electric Power Generation industry (NAICS 
221110) and the Electric Power Transmission, Control, and Distribution 
industry (NAICS 221120)) account for 9,611 of the potentially affected 
establishments and for 101,739 of the potentially affected employees. 
One commenter questioned whether OSHA distinguished between electric 
power generation and electric power transmission and distribution (Ex. 
0227). OSHA included establishments classified in the Electric Power 
Generation industry (NAICS 221110) and in the Electric Power 
Transmission, Control, and Distribution industry (NAICS 221120), and 
the Agency distinguished between them in the industrial profile and in 
the costs and economic analysis.
    Table 19 also shows OSHA's estimates of two special categories of 
electric generators not covered in the data sources used for Census on 
electric utilities: Major Publicly Owned Utilities and Industrial Power 
Generators. Table 19 shows that that there are 927 establishments with 
8,582 employees for Major Publicly Owned Utilities. Firms in the 
Industrial Power Generator category include manufacturing and other 
industries that own or operate their own electric power generation, 
transmission, or distribution systems as a secondary part of their 
business operations. These firms account for 913 establishments and 
17,372 employees. Based on their primary business activity, OSHA 
classified these establishments in the following industry sectors: Oil 
and Gas Extraction; Mining; Water, Sewer, and Other Systems; Food 
Manufacturing; Wood Product Manufacturing; Paper Manufacturing; 
Petroleum and Coal Products Manufacturing; Chemical Manufacturing; 
Primary Metal Manufacturing; Wholesale Trade, Durable Goods; 
Educational Services; and Hospitals.
    Finally, Table 19 presents figures for the numbers of affected 
establishments and employees in the Ornamental Shrub and Tree Services 
industry. As noted previously, OSHA estimates that the final rule 
potentially affects 381 establishments and 15,086 employees in this 
industry. (Note that Table 19 does not present Census data for all 
employees and establishments in the Ornamental Shrub and Tree Services 
industry, but rather only employees and establishments estimated to 
perform line-clearance tree-trimming operations. For more detail, see 
the explanation of OSHA's estimates of employees and establishments in 
that industry earlier in this section of the preamble.)

E. Benefits, Net Benefits, and Cost Effectiveness

    OSHA expects the final rule addressing electric power generation, 
transmission, and distribution work to result in an increased degree of 
safety for affected employees and to reduce the numbers of accidents, 
fatalities, and injuries associated with the relevant tasks. The 
accidents, fatalities, and injuries that the final rule will prevent 
include falls, some burns, and many electric-shock incidents. OSHA also 
expects the final rule to reduce the severity of certain injuries that 
the final rule will not prevent, but that could still occur during the 
performance of some of the affected work procedures. These injuries 
include, among others, injuries that could occur as a result of an 
arrested fall and some burns (for example, burns that result from 
employee exposure to incident energy from an electric arc greater than 
the employer's estimate).
    To develop estimates of the benefits associated with the proposed 
rule, CONSAD researched and reviewed potential sources of useful data. 
CONSAD, in consultation with the Agency, determined that the most 
reliable data sources for this purpose were reports from OSHA fatality-
catastrophe accident inspections contained in OSHA's IMIS, and the 
Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries (CFOI) developed by the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics.
    From the IMIS and CFOI data, CONSAD identified and analyzed 
injuries and fatalities for the proposed rule. CONSAD based this 
analysis on over 9 years of data contained in these databases. CONSAD 
identified relevant cases in the databases by determining the criteria 
provided in the databases that would apply to such cases, such as the 
type of the injury, the occupation of the employee, the source of the 
injury, and the industry classification of the employer. CONSAD then 
reviewed individual accident abstracts to make a final determination 
whether to include the accident as one addressed by the proposed rule. 
The final report CONSAD submitted to OSHA includes a complete 
description of the methodological approach CONSAD used for analyzing 
the data [5].
    CONSAD's analysis found that, on average, the IMIS and CFOI 
databases recorded 74 fatalities and 25 injuries annually involving 
circumstances directly addressed by the existing or proposed standards 
[5]. These figures likely represent underestimates of the injuries 
addressed by this rulemaking since the figures are cases documented by 
IMIS and CFOI only. As explained later under this heading of the FEA, 
OSHA adjusted the approach used in CONSAD's analysis to reflect a more 
accurate estimate of the number of total injuries affected by this 
rulemaking.\493\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \493\ The number of fatalities addressed by this rulemaking also 
may be somewhat higher, but OSHA does not currently have a basis for 
estimating possible fatalities not included in the relevant data 
sources.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The number of injuries addressed by this rulemaking is almost 
certainly much greater than the number included

[[Page 20566]]

in CONSAD's analysis. Generally, the IMIS database includes injuries 
only when the incident in question involves at least one fatality or 
three or more hospitalizations. However, some individual States having 
OSHA-approved safety and health plans (for example, California) have 
more stringent reporting requirements than Federal OSHA, thereby 
assuring that the IMIS database included at least some single-injury 
cases (76 FR 36419). For this reason, CONSAD performed an analysis of 
the IMIS fatality and injury data from California, which requires 
employers to report all injuries involving hospitalization [6]. This 
analysis, which includes only injuries that involve hospitalization, 
found that the ratio of injuries to fatalities was over six to 
one.\494\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \494\ OSHA relied on the IMIS data for California, and not the 
IMIS data for any other State, because, for the period covered by 
the IMIS data on which OSHA based its benefits determination, those 
data included reasonably complete hospitalization information only 
from California.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Applying this ratio to the number of known fatalities addressed by 
this rulemaking, OSHA estimated that 444 relevant serious injuries 
occur annually. Note that even this figure is probably low given that 
the applied ratio, which OSHA based on California data, did not account 
for injuries that did not involve hospitalization of a worker. Thus, 
OSHA estimates that 74 fatalities and 444 serious injuries occur 
annually among employees involved in electric power generation, 
transmission, and distribution work addressed by the provisions of this 
rulemaking.
    To determine whether there were any significant declines in 
fatalities since the time period of the CONSAD analysis, OSHA examined 
available BLS CFOI data for the years 1992 to 2011 involving the 
electric power, transmission, and distribution industry, which includes 
all private-sector electric utilities. OSHA found that the number of 
fatalities per year on average was 10 percent lower than for the time 
period covered by the original CONSAD analysis. Most of the difference 
between the two time periods was due to a single anomalous year (2009) 
that had 55 percent fewer fatalities than any other year on record [8]. 
Based on these data, OSHA believes its earlier estimate of the numbers 
of fatalities and injuries associated with work addressed by this 
rulemaking continues to be accurate for purposes of estimating the 
magnitude of benefits expected as a result of the final rule.\495\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \495\ The Agency also emphasizes that, except for firms coming 
into compliance with provisions of the final standard in advance of 
its promulgation, the passage of time should not affect 
significantly the relevant pattern of fatalities and injuries 
underlying the data. To the extent that higher rates of 
prepromulgation compliance than estimated in the FEA occurred, the 
expected benefits of the standard may be lower, but so would the 
costs of compliance and economic impact.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To determine how many of the 74 fatalities and 444 serious injuries 
the final rule would prevent, OSHA relied on CONSAD's probability 
estimates, based on expert judgment, that the existing rule or the 
proposed rule would prevent a given accident and the new rule would 
prevent that same accident. CONSAD estimated the probability of 
prevention on a case-by-case basis, and, therefore, did not find that 
the final rule would prevent all 74 fatalities and 444 serious 
injuries. To the contrary, CONSAD's estimate of the probability of 
prevention for individual accidents ranged from 5 percent to 95 percent 
[5]. Based on its review of CONSAD's analysis, OSHA estimates that full 
compliance with the existing standards would prevent 52.9 percent of 
the relevant injuries and fatalities. In comparison, full compliance 
with the final rule is estimated to prevent 79 percent of the relevant 
injuries and fatalities. Thus, the increase in safety provided by the 
final rule would prevent an additional 19.75 fatalities and 118.5 
serious injuries annually. Applying an average monetary value of 
$62,000 per prevented injury and a value of $8.7 million per prevented 
fatality (as explained later under the ``Benefits'' heading of the 
FEA), OSHA estimates a monetized benefit of $179.2 million per year.
    A number of commenters addressed these estimates. For example, EEI 
submitted a posthearing brief suggesting that the IMIS descriptions on 
which OSHA relied were not sufficiently reliable or detailed (Ex. 
0501). EEI suggested as an alternative using the citations and 
investigative files generated by compliance officers in OSHA's field 
offices.
    As EEI notes, reports generated by compliance officers serve as the 
basis of the IMIS data. Other advantages of the IMIS data are that OSHA 
reviews the data to ensure employee privacy, and the data are readily 
available to the public. As stated earlier, OSHA also accounted for 
uncertainties in the IMIS data by estimating the probability of 
prevention for each accident and did not assume that the existing or 
final rule was certain to prevent any accident. While the IMIS reports 
may be incomplete in that OSHA compliance officers investigate only 
accidents resulting in fatalities or multiple hospitalizations, OSHA 
believes IMIS reports are one of the best available sources for 
assessing the types and causes of serious accidents. OSHA used IMIS 
data for benefit assessments in a number of previous economic analyses, 
including the original benefits analysis for the existing general 
industry standard for Electric Power Generation, Transmission, and 
Distribution (Sec.  1910.269), which OSHA promulgated in 1994.\496\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \496\ To further support its argument that reliance on the IMIS 
data was improper, EEI questioned whether CONSAD ``appreciate[d] and 
consider[ed] the distinction between the power generation, and power 
transmission and distribution, industries'' (Ex. 0227). Thus, EEI 
criticized CONSAD's ``review [of] the IMIS accident database for the 
time period January 1994 through April 2000, to ascertain the extent 
to which these power generation, transmission, and distribution 
accidents would have been preventable under the existing power 
generation, transmission, and distribution standards, and if the 
proposed revisions to these standards were implemented'' (id., 
internal citation omitted). EEI's assertion is baseless. In the 
final rule, OSHA properly relied on the IMIS data, which reveals 
that the injuries and fatalities suffered by workers performing 
power generation, transmission, and distribution work result from 
electric shocks, burns from electric arcs, and falls, as well as 
other types of harmful accidents, including accidents involving 
employees struck by, struck against, and caught between objects. 
OSHA also properly relied on the IMIS data to form its conclusion 
regarding the net benefits of complying with the final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    EEI also suggested that OSHA should separately determine benefits 
for each individual hazard affected by this rulemaking (Ex. 0227).
    In response, OSHA added for this FEA some analysis of the benefits 
associated with reducing burn injuries under the final rule (see the 
discussion under this heading of the FEA). However, OSHA did not rely 
on a further hazard-by-hazard analysis in computing benefits for its 
main analysis. Fundamentally, most of the fatalities and injuries 
prevented by the final rule relate to the single hazard of electric 
shock, and the final rule uses a variety of provisions, some redundant, 
to prevent those fatalities and injuries. Redundancy is a fundamental 
principle of safety systems--safety professionals do not rely on a 
single mechanism to prevent fatalities, but instead use more than one 
method to assure that the failure of a single mechanism does not lead 
to harm. As a result, OSHA cannot separately estimate the number of 
injuries or fatalities prevented by each of the specific provisions 
that, taken together, address the same basic hazard. A hypothetical 
example may clarify this point. Suppose we know with certainty that the 
addition of a training provision alone will reduce fatalities by 20 
percent. Suppose that we also know that the addition of a host-
contractor provision alone will reduce fatalities by

[[Page 20567]]

20 percent. It is perfectly possible that the addition of both 
provisions will reduce fatalities by 30 percent (rather than 40 
percent) because host-contractor communications, in part, reduce the 
need for training and, likewise, training somewhat reduces the need for 
host-contractor communications. However, in this situation, there is no 
correct answer as to the extent to which each provision independently 
reduces fatalities because the two provisions are partially redundant 
and overlapping. In any event, this kind of hypothetical knowledge 
about the separate effects of each provision in a rule is rarely, if 
ever, available. In light of these limitations, OSHA typically 
estimates the joint effects of all of the provisions (that is, the 
benefits of the final rule in its entirety). See Section II.D, 
Significant Risk and Reduction in Risk, earlier in this preamble, for 
additional discussion.
    Despite these impediments to a provision-by-provision benefits 
analysis, in an effort to ensure the transparency of its analysis, OSHA 
reviewed and reanalyzed each IMIS accident from 1995 and later from the 
CONSAD report [5] and, based on those results, provided a supplemental 
``Break-Even Sensitivity Analysis, Including Provision-by-Provision 
Analysis of Benefits,'' in an appendix under this heading of the FEA. 
OSHA undertook this additional analysis for two reasons: (1) It adds a 
provision-by-provision analysis to the calculation of the rule's 
aggregate probability of accident prevention, enabling OSHA to tie 
analysis of the accidents more closely to individual provisions or 
groups of provisions; and (2) it enables OSHA to calculate the 
percentages of accidents that need to be prevented to assure that a 
given provision, or combination of provisions, will pay for itself, or 
themselves, and to then discuss the likelihood of achieving that level 
of prevention.
    OSHA presents the results of the supplemental analysis in detail in 
the appendix. In short, the break-even level of accident prevention 
needed for the benefits to exceed costs for various provisions ranged 
between 0.8 percent for minimum approach distances and 18.5 percent for 
arc-flash protection. With an accounting for joint prevention by 
multiple provisions, the break-even analysis results ranged between 2.3 
percent for aerial lift fall protection and 23.8 percent for arc-flash 
protection. OSHA concludes in the appendix that the benefits of this 
rule's provisions will exceed these break-even levels. For instance, if 
there is full compliance with the combination of provisions intended to 
protect against arc-flash related accidents, then there should be no 
fatalities and very few or no serious injuries involving arc flash.
    However, OSHA did not rely on the supplemental analysis to meet any 
OSH Act legal test for the final rule or to determine costs and 
benefits of the final rule. As discussed in Section IV, Legal 
Authority, earlier in this preamble, OSHA must demonstrate that a 
safety or health standard substantially reduces a significant risk of 
material harm in the workplace (see Lockout/Tagout II, 37 F.3d 665, 
668-69 (D.C. Cir. 1994)), and the supplemental analysis cannot serve 
this purpose. As explained earlier in this preamble (Section II.D, 
Significant Risk and Reduction in Risk), OSHA concluded that the final 
rule will substantially reduce significant risk based on the 19.75 
fatalities and 118.5 serious injuries that this FEA demonstrates the 
final rule will prevent each year, a conclusion OSHA cannot draw from 
the supplemental analysis. Accordingly, the supplemental analysis 
focuses on the percentage of potential benefits individual provisions 
must achieve for the benefits of those provisions to break even with 
the costs of those provisions.
    EEI also asserted that an individual accident case CONSAD reviewed 
did not clearly establish the benefits of the final standard (Exs. 
0227, 0501). EEI maintained that CONSAD's judgment in the review of 
this case was unreliable (id.).
    Reviewing cases will inevitably involve professional judgment based 
on limited information, with the results described reasonably only in 
probabilistic terms. The Agency stands by that professional judgment 
with respect to this accident. Moreover, EEI's narrow focus on an 
individual accident is misplaced. OSHA's professional judgment, as a 
whole, provides a substantial body of evidence to support the standard. 
The Agency's analysis recognizes that full compliance with the existing 
standard would prevent a number of fatalities and injuries. 
Nonetheless, the Agency believes that a close reading of the accident 
abstracts, as embodied in its final analysis, indicates that the final 
standard will prevent about half of the remaining cases. Therefore, the 
Agency believes its approach represents the use of the best available 
techniques applied to the best available data. (See Tr. 83-84.)
    OSHA also believes, based on its supplemental analysis of benefits 
(see the appendix under this heading of the FEA), that its main 
analysis represents a low estimate of benefits. In this regard, the 
supplemental analysis found that fatalities and serious injuries from 
climbing-fall-protection, minimum approach-distance, and arc-flash-
related accidents are virtually impossible if there is full compliance 
with the final rule, and that, if there is full compliance, the final 
rule will prevent 40.8 of the 74 annual fatalities, and 245.1 of the 
444 annual serious injuries, addressed by the final rule (see Table 7 
in supplemental analysis). As such, OSHA interprets the supplemental 
analysis as indicating that OSHA's estimate is conservative, based on 
the CONSAD analysis, that this final rule will prevent 19.75 of the 74 
annual fatalities, and 118.5 of the 444 annual serious injuries, 
addressed by the final rule.
    One commenter stated that, in the proposal, OSHA relied on data 
from 1991 to 1998, and that this data was inadequate to show the 
benefits associated with the promulgation of Sec.  1910.269 in 1994 
(Ex. 0180).
    The premise of the comment is incorrect. The underlying CONSAD 
analysis of data covers the period from 1984 to 2001, and, therefore, 
provides nearly 7 years of post-1994 experience (not 3 years, as 
asserted by the commenter).
    One commenter, Frank Brockman of the Farmers Rural Electric 
Cooperative Corporation, asserted that, from experience, only a small 
number of fatalities arose from situations that did not represent 
violations of existing rules (Ex. 0173).
    In response to Mr. Brockman's comments, OSHA first notes that its 
analysis draws from a nationwide pool of data that will likely exceed 
any individual's personal experience. Second, although most of the 
existing cases are preventable by full compliance with existing 
standards, as explained more fully in the supplemental analysis, there 
remain a number of accidents unaffected by existing standards that the 
final rule will affect; and, even though full compliance with existing 
standards might prevent an accident, new requirements in the final 
rule, like the information-transfer and job-briefing provisions, will 
make it easier to assure full compliance with existing standards.
    Another commenter suggested that OSHA's estimate in the PRIA was 
likely an overestimate of the benefits because the Agency assumes full 
compliance:

    The estimated prevention of 19 fatalities and 116 injuries is a 
likely overstatement of benefits of this rulemaking because it based 
on an estimate of full compliance with the new regulation. 70 Fed. 
Reg. 34894. Clearly from the description provided of the actual 
record of fatalities and injuries, failure of compliance with the 
current rule is the primary reason lives were endangered. A

[[Page 20568]]

more candid analysis would estimate the compliance rate as a part of 
the calculation, which is likely 50 percent to 95 percent if OSHA's 
analysis of training compliance was used. [Ex. 0240]

    In response to this comment OSHA concludes, based on its analysis, 
that compliance with the final standard, as a whole, will reduce 
fatalities and injuries to a greater extent than compliance with the 
existing standard, as a whole. Moreover, when performing an analysis of 
the economic feasibility of a standard, it is necessary to assume full 
compliance with the standard. Otherwise, the Agency could always find a 
standard economically feasible by assuming that employers for whom it 
was not feasible would not comply with the standard.
    To estimate the monetary value of preventing a fatality, OSHA 
followed the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) recommendation 
(OMB Circular A-4, [30]) to rely on estimates developed using a 
methodology based on the willingness of affected individuals to pay to 
avoid a marginal increase in the risk of a fatality.
    To develop an estimate using the willingness-to-pay approach, OSHA 
relied on existing studies of the imputed value of fatalities avoided 
based on the theory of compensating wage differentials in the labor 
market. These studies rely on certain critical assumptions for their 
accuracy, particularly that workers understand the risks to which they 
are exposed, and that workers have legitimate choices between high-risk 
and low-risk jobs. These assumptions are rarely accurate in actual 
labor markets. A number of academic studies, summarized in Viscusi and 
Aldy [53], show a correlation between job risk and wages, suggesting 
that employees demand monetary compensation in return for a greater 
risk of injury or fatality. The estimated tradeoff between lower wages 
and marginal reductions in fatal occupational risk--that is, workers' 
willingness to pay for marginal reductions in such risk--yields an 
imputed value of an avoided fatality: the willingness-to-pay amount for 
a reduction in risk divided by the reduction in risk. OSHA used this 
approach in many recent proposed and final rules. (See, for example, 69 
FR 59306 (Oct. 4, 2004) and 71 FR 10100 (Feb. 28, 2006), the preambles 
for the proposed and final Hexavalent Chromium rules.) \497\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \497\ The Agency used the willingness-to-pay approach in the 
PRIA for this rule as well. In estimating the value of preventing a 
fatality in the PRIA, OSHA relied on an estimate by EPA, which made 
an earlier attempt to summarize the willingness-to-pay literature 
(70 FR 34901). For the FEA, the Agency went directly to the 
underlying literature, a recent summary by Viscusi and Aldy [53], to 
update its valuation. The estimate in the PRIA equaled $6.8 million 
per fatality prevented in 2003 dollars; this amount would, in turn, 
equal $7.9 million in 2009 dollars. The difference between the 
underlying valuation used in the PRIA and the underlying valuation 
used in this FEA is not significant for the purposes of OSHA's 
analysis of the final rule. In the PRIA, OSHA used Viscusi and Aldy 
[53] for valuing injuries, but not for valuing fatalities. For this 
FEA, OSHA used recent Viscusi and Aldy [53] for valuing both 
injuries and fatalities because Viscusi and Aldy is more recent than 
the EPA estimated used in the PRIA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    OSHA reviewed the available research literature on willingness to 
pay. Viscusi and Aldy conducted a metaanalysis of studies in the 
economics literature that used a willingness-to-pay methodology to 
estimate the imputed value of life-saving programs, and concluded that 
each fatality avoided should have a value of approximately $7 million 
in 2000 dollars [53]. Using the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis' Gross 
Domestic Product Deflator [31], this $7 million base number in 2000 
dollars yields an estimate of $8.7 million in 2009 dollars for each 
fatality avoided. This Value of a Statistical Life estimate also is 
within the range of the substantial majority of such estimates in the 
literature ($1 million to $10 million per statistical life, as 
discussed in OMB Circular A-4 [30]).
    Workers also place an implicit value on nonfatal occupational 
injuries or illnesses avoided. This value reflects a worker's 
willingness to pay to avoid monetary costs (for medical expenses and 
lost wages) and quality-of-life losses. Viscusi and Aldy found that 
most studies had estimates in the range of $20,000 to $70,000 per 
injury, and several studies had even higher values [53]. The measure of 
nonfatal job risks used partly explains the range of values: some 
studies use an overall injury rate, and other studies use only injuries 
resulting in lost workdays. The injuries prevented by this final rule 
generally will be hospitalized injuries, which are likely to be more 
severe, on average, than other lost-workday injuries. In addition, this 
final rule will reduce the incidence of burn injuries, which tend to be 
severe injuries, involving more pain and suffering, more expensive 
treatments, and generally longer recovery periods than other lost-
workday injuries. Thus, for this rulemaking, OSHA believes it is 
reasonable to select an estimated value of a statistical injury in the 
upper part of the reported range of estimates. OSHA, accordingly, uses 
a base number of $50,000 in 2000 dollars. Updating this estimate using 
the Gross Domestic Product deflator [31], OSHA estimates a value of 
$62,000 per prevented injury.
    Frank Brockman of the Farmers Rural Electric Cooperative 
Corporation commented that OSHA has ``vastly overestimated'' the 
valuation of fatalities, citing the National Safety Council's (NSC) 
valuation of $1 million per fatality [26], which he claimed was a more 
``realistic'' estimate of the ``cost'' of a fatality (Ex. 0173). The 
commenter did, however, suggest a substantially larger estimate of the 
cost of injury, $250,000, as perhaps being more typical of the electric 
power industry.
    The Agency notes that the concept of valuation of benefits in 
question is fundamentally different than a simple loss of wages and 
medical costs, or what is sometimes referred to as the ``direct cost'' 
approach. As stated on the NSC Web site after introducing their $1 
million (updated to $1.29 million for 2009 dollars) figure:

    [This estimate] should not be used, however, in computing the 
dollar value of future benefits due to traffic safety measures 
because they do not include the value of a person's natural desire 
to live longer or to protect the quality of one's life. That is, the 
economic loss estimates do not include what people are willing to 
pay for improved safety. Work has been done to create the necessary 
theoretical groundwork and empirical valuation of injury costs under 
the ``willingness to pay'' or comprehensive cost concept. [26]

    The NSC's statement validates the Agency's decision to use the 
willingness-to-pay approach in valuing benefits.
    Finally, OSHA notes that although the Agency lacks a complete body 
of data specific to the electric power industry that reflects the 
economic loss involved in the types of injuries these workers will 
frequently encounter, its estimate of the value of preventing an injury 
may well be understated. As Dr. Mary Capelli-Schellpfeffer testified at 
the hearings:

    Then this figure, Figure 4, takes us to an illustration of a 
real patient case, where the worker was in a 600 volt scenario, in a 
power generation facility, and this is the human consequence--not 
the staged consequence, but the human consequence--of being in an 
electric shock and electric arc event, where the injuries are 
severe.
* * * * *
    So in Figure 4 the extent of the injury that can follow an arc 
exposure is readily appreciated. Eyes, ears, faces, skin, limbs, and 
organs are affected. Basic bodily function, including the ability to 
breathe, eat, urinate, and sleep are completely changed.
    For this patient initial medical treatment costs more than 
$650,000 including five surgeries; $250,000 for reconstructive 
surgeries as an outpatient; and subsequent

[[Page 20569]]

admissions and $250,000 for five years of rehabilitation, including 
over 100 physician visits and numerous therapy sessions.
    These costs represent only direct medical expenditures, without 
inclusion of indirect employer and family costs. [Tr. 185-186 \498\]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \498\ OSHA concludes that it conservatively underestimated 
benefits using its willingness-to-pay valuation of $62,000 per 
injury. First, a study of burn injuries (Ex. 0424) indicated that, 
between 1991 and 1993, the average medical cost for burns was 
$39,533. Adjusting for inflation (to 2009 dollars) using the Medical 
Services Consumer Price Index raises this cost to $76,694. Second, 
OSHA calculated an alternative willingness-to-pay valuation using a 
sensitivity analysis that assumed that 25 percent of burn injuries 
were sufficiently severe as to equal 58.3 percent of a statistical 
value of a life for a severe nonfatal medical event [22]. If OSHA 
used this alternative formulation, the total benefits of the rule 
would increase from $179 million to $328 million.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    OSHA estimates the net monetized benefits of the final rule at 
$129.7 million annually ($179.2 million in benefits minus $49.5 million 
in costs). These net benefits exclude any unquantified benefits 
associated with revising existing standards to provide updated, clear, 
and consistent regulatory requirements. Given that monetized benefits 
are nearly four times larger than the estimated costs of the standard, 
the total estimated benefits of the standard could be approximately 
four times smaller than OSHA's estimate, and the rule would still 
retain positive net monetized benefits. Thus, benefits would exceed 
costs even if the new rule prevented no more than 5.5 fatalities and 
29.6 serious injuries per year. This number is significantly less than 
the 19.75 fatalities and 118.5 serious injuries that OSHA estimates the 
final rule will prevent. Further, as explained earlier, the 
supplemental analysis suggests that there are far more than 19.75 
fatalities and 118.5 serious injuries that this final rule will 
prevent. Finally, for reasons discussed in the supplemental analysis, 
full compliance with the existing rule will not prevent certain 
accidents the final rule will prevent, and although compliance with the 
existing rule might prevent some accidents, full compliance with the 
final rule will make it more likely that employers will comply with the 
existing rule. As a result, OSHA is confident that benefits of the 
final rule exceed the costs.
    Table 20 and Table 21 provide an overview of the estimated benefits 
associated with this final rule. Table 22 shows costs and benefits of 
the final rule, in 2009 dollars, for the first 10 years after the rule 
becomes effective.

              Table 20--Net Benefits and Cost Effectiveness
------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Annualized costs:              7 Percent           3 Percent
------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Calculating Incident Energy   $2.2 million......  $1.8 million.
     and Arc-Hazard Assessment
     (Arc-Hazard Assessment).
    Provision of Arc-Flash        17.3 million......  15.7 million.
     Protective Equipment.
    Fall Protection.............  0.6 million.......  0.4 million.
    Host-Contractor               17.8 million......  17.8 million.
     Communications.
    Expanded Job Briefings......  6.7 million.......  6.7 million.
    Additional Training.........  3.0 million.......  2.7 million.
    Other Costs for Employees     0.2 million.......  0.2 million.
     not Already Covered by Sec.
       1910.269.
    MAD Costs...................  1.8 million.......  1.8 million.
                                 ---------------------------------------
        Total Annual Costs......  49.5 million......  47.1 million.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Annual Benefits:
    Number of Injuries Prevented  118.5.............  118.5.
    Number of Fatalities          19.75.............  19.75.
     Prevented.
    Monetized Benefits (Assuming  179.2 million.....  179.2 million.
     $62,000 per Injury and $8.7
     Million per Fatality
     Prevented.
    OSHA Standards that Are       Unquantified......  Unquantified.
     Updated and Consistent.
        Total Annual Benefits...  118.5 injuries and  118.5 injuries and
                                   19.75 fatalities    19.75 fatalities
                                   prevented.          prevented.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Net Benefits (Benefits    129.7 million.....  132.0 million.
         minus Costs):.
                                  Compliance with
                                   the final rule
                                   will result in
                                   the prevention of
                                   one fatality and
                                   6 injuries per
                                   $2.5 million in
                                   costs, or,
                                   alternatively,
                                   $3.62 of benefits
                                   per dollar of
                                   costs.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Totals may not equal the sum of the components due to rounding.
Sources: Provided in text.


                  Table 21--Overview of Annual Benefits
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                      Injuries            Fatalities
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Addressed by the Final    444................  74.
 Rule.
Preventable through Full        235................  39.
 Compliance with Existing
 Standards (52.9 percent).
Additional Preventable with     118.5..............  19.75.
 Full Compliance with Final
 Rule (26.1 percent).
Monetized Benefits (Assuming    $7.3 million.......  $171.8 million.
 $62,000 per Injury and $8.7
 million per Fatality
 Prevented).
                               -----------------------------------------
    Total Monetized Benefits..               $179.2 million.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes: (1) Totals may not equal the sum of the components due to
  rounding.
(2) Additional benefits associated with this rulemaking involve
  providing OSHA standards that are updated, clear, and consistent.
Source: CONSAD [5].


[[Page 20570]]


                                                         Table 22--Costs and Benefits Over Time
                                                                   [Millions of 2009$]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                       Year 1    Year 2    Year 3    Year 4    Year 5    Year 6    Year 7    Year 8    Year 9    Year 10
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Costs*........................................    $107.9     $20.3     $22.6     $20.3     $75.5     $22.6     $22.6     $20.3     $75.5     $20.3
Monetized Benefits[dagger]..........................     179.2     179.2     179.2     179.2     179.2     179.2     179.2     179.2     179.2     179.2
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Costs after the first year will vary as a result of the estimated cycle of protective equipment replacement: 2 years for faceshields and balaclavas, 4
  years for flame resistant apparel, and 5 years for body harnesses and positioning straps.
[dagger] Assuming $62,000 per injury and $8.7 million per fatality prevented.

    Additional benefits associated with this rule involve providing 
updated, clear, and consistent safety standards regarding electric 
power generation, transmission, and distribution work to relevant 
employers, employees, and interested members of the public. The 
existing OSHA standards for the construction of electric power 
transmission and distribution systems (Subpart V) are over 30 years old 
and inconsistent with the more recently promulgated standard addressing 
repair and maintenance work in Sec.  1910.269. OSHA believes that the 
updated standards are easier to understand and to apply than the 
existing standards and will improve employee safety by facilitating 
compliance.
    As explained earlier, inconsistencies between Subpart V and Sec.  
1910.269 can create numerous difficulties for employers and employees. 
The benefits associated with providing updated, clear, and consistent 
safety standards are likely substantial, but OSHA did not monetize or 
quantify them.
    The Small Business Advocacy Review Panel (which OSHA convened for 
this rulemaking in accordance with the provisions of the Small Business 
Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 (Pub. L. 104-121), as 
codified at 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.) (Ex. 0019 [29]) and others (see, for 
example, Ex. 0227) expressed concern about the balance of risk and 
costs in employing protective equipment to prevent arc-related burns.
    In response to this concern, the Agency performed an analysis of 
burn injuries in the electric power and distribution industry to 
specifically estimate the effect of the final rule on preventing burns 
from electric arcs or on reducing the severity of any arc-related 
injuries sustained by workers. To assess the effectiveness of the final 
rule in preventing fatalities associated with burns from exposure to 
electric arc-related accidents, OSHA reviewed IMIS accident reports 
already in the record for the period January 1991 through December 1998 
(Ex. 0004).\499\ OSHA identified 99 accidents that involved burns from 
arcs from energized equipment faults or failures, resulting in 21 
fatalities and 94 hospitalized injuries [8]. Based on this data, OSHA 
estimates that an average of at least 8 burn accidents occur each year 
involving employees doing work covered by this final rule, leading to 
12 nonfatal injuries and 2 fatalities per year (id.). Of the reports 
indicating the extent of the burn injury, 75 percent reported third-
degree burns (id.). Proper protective equipment and clothing would 
reduce the number of fatalities and the severity of these injuries.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \499\ As previously indicated, the Agency reviewed more recent 
BLS CFOI data to verify the continued relevance of the IMIS data on 
which OSHA relied in the proposed and final rules.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Based on the description of the accidents contained in the IMIS 
reports, OSHA determined that the IMIS reports indicate that compliance 
with the final rule would prevent 11 of the 21 fatalities either by 
averting the injury altogether (2 cases) or by reducing the severity of 
nonfatal injuries (9 cases). The IMIS accident reports, therefore, 
indicate that the final rule will prevent 1.14 burn-related fatalities 
a year.\500\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \500\ OSHA made an error in calculating the number of prevented 
fatalities per year. The actual number of fatalities prevented each 
year is 1.38, or the number of prevented fatalities (11) divided by 
the number of years covered by the data (8). A similar error affects 
the estimated number of injuries prevented annually described later 
in this section of the FEA. Because the annual estimate of 1.14 
prevented fatalities, and the corresponding estimate of prevented 
burn injuries, are conservative, OSHA elected to base its benefits, 
in part, on those values rather than the actual values.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A comparison of the total number of IMIS fatal accidents covered by 
the final rule and the number of comparable fatalities reported in the 
BLS CFOI data suggests that IMIS undercounts fatality numbers related 
to electric power generation by about 41 percent [5, 8]. Increasing the 
number of preventable fatalities by this factor (1.00/(1.00-0.41) = 
1.69) results in an estimate of 1.92 burn fatalities per year averted 
under the final rule (1.14 IMIS burn fatalities x 1.69) [8]. This 
estimate is somewhat higher than the estimate of 1.57 burn fatalities 
estimated for the proposal.\501\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \501\ Based on the increase in the estimated number of burn 
fatalities prevented, the Agency determined that, on an average 
annual basis, the final rule will prevent an additional 0.35 fatal 
cases beyond the fatal cases OSHA estimated in the proposal. The 
CONSAD analysis previously estimated 19.4 cases prevented annually 
[5]. Hence, the Agency's estimate for the final rule is 19.75 
fatalities prevented annually. By extension, the Agency estimates 
that the final rule will prevent 118.5 injuries annually, or 2.5 
more injuries annually than OSHA estimated in the proposal. OSHA 
notes, however, that its revised estimate for the final rule does 
not account for other types of fatalities and injuries (that is, 
electric shock or falls) prevented by the new requirements of the 
final rule not contained in the proposal (that is, new minimum 
approach-distance and fall protection requirements). For this reason 
(as well as for other reasons contained in this FEA), OSHA's 
estimate is likely to be conservative.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    OSHA determined that the final rule would prevent 36.2 percent of 
nonfatal burn injuries such as the nonfatal burn injuries identified in 
the IMIS data, compared to 17.0 percent prevented under the proposed 
rule. OSHA's review of the IMIS data also found that 75 percent of burn 
accidents resulted in third-degree burns to one or more of the victims 
[8]. The Agency believes that the societal costs, including substantial 
treatment costs and significantly reduced quality of life, for severe 
burns is closer to the value of a prevented fatality than to the value 
generally assigned to prevented injuries (Tr. 185-186).
    Requiring the use of body harnesses instead of body belts as fall 
arrest equipment for employees working from aerial lifts, in 
conjunction with other provisions of the final rule, such as the 
information-transfer, job-briefing, and training provisions, would 
likely reduce fatalities and injuries among affected workers. There are 
several problems with body belts. First, they are more likely than 
harnesses to result in serious injury during a fall because body belts 
place greater stress on the workers' body. Second, body belts virtually 
eliminate the possibility of self rescue after the fall, and increase 
the probability of serious internal injuries as the worker hangs 
suspended after the arrested fall. Studies performed in Europe and by 
the U.S. Air Force indicate high risks associated with the body belt as 
used both in fall-arrest and suspension modes. Third, it is difficult 
for supervisors to determine visually if workers are using body belts 
as fall arrest equipment. By contrast,

[[Page 20571]]

supervisors can easily see from a distance whether a worker is wearing 
a harness. Finally, there is a greater risk that a worker could slip 
out of a body belt than a harness. As a result of these considerations, 
many employers already switched to requiring harnesses rather than body 
belts. Studies documenting the inappropriateness of, and the safety 
risks associated with the use of, body belts as part of a fall arrest 
system include Document IDs OSHA-S206-2006-0699-0039, OSHA-S206-2006-
0699-0171, OSHA-S206-2006-0699-0173, OSHA-S206-2006-0699-0174, and 
OSHA-S206-2006-0699-0177 in Docket OSHA-S206-2006-0699 \502\ and 
Document IDs OSHA-S700A-2006-0723-0044, OSHA-S700A-2006-0723-0065, 
OSHA-S700A-2006-0723-0066, OSHA-S700A-2006-0723-0067, and OSHA-S700A-
2006-0723-0068 in Docket OSHA-S700A-2006-0723.\503\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \502\ These documents are legacy exhibits 2-36, 3-7, 3-9, 3-10, 
and 3-13 in OSHA Docket S-206 (Fall Protection).
    \503\ These documents are legacy exhibits 9-33, 11-3, 11-4, 11-
5, and 11-6 in OSHA Docket S-700A (Powered Platforms).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    An average of about 15 fatalities annually involve falls from 
aerial lifts; in these cases, the employees typically were not wearing 
a belt or a harness. Since most employees wear a belt or a harness 
(according to the CONSAD report, the current compliance rate is over 80 
percent), there are likely to be at least 60 falls annually in which an 
employee uses a belt or harness to arrest a potentially fatal 
fall.\504\ Therefore, employees who rely only on a belt to arrest a 
potentially fatal fall are still at significant risk of serious injury 
or death. The use of a body belt as part of a fall arrest system is 
generally inappropriate as OSHA already established with an extensive 
record on the subject in the final rule for fall arrest equipment in 
construction. (For a complete discussion of this issue, see the Summary 
and Explanation section of the preamble to the final OSHA rule on fall 
arrest equipment in construction (59 FR 40672, Aug. 9, 1994).)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \504\ OSHA calculated the annual number of nonfatal falls as 
follows: X (total number of falls) multiplied by 1/5 (that is, a 20-
percent noncompliance rate) = 15 fatal falls; solving for X (that 
is, 5 x 15), the total number of falls is 75, of which 60 (80 
percent) are nonfatal and 15 (20 percent) are fatal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Appendix to Section VI.E, Benefits, Net Benefits, and Cost 
Effectiveness-- Break-Even Sensitivity Analysis, Including Provision-
by-Provision Analysis

1. Introduction

    This supplemental analysis provides additional insight into the 
effect of possible uncertainties on the benefits and costs of the 
final rule and contains a break-even sensitivity analysis of the 
possible benefits and costs of the final rule on a provision-by-
provision basis. As noted earlier in this section of the preamble, 
the OSH Act does not require that OSHA standards meet an overall 
benefit-cost test or that individual provisions have incremental 
benefits that exceed costs. Thus, OSHA is providing this 
supplemental analysis purely for the purpose of aiding public 
understanding of the benefits and costs of the final rule, and this 
analysis is not necessary, or used, to meet the requirements of the 
OSH Act with respect to the final rule.
    Section V, Summary and Explanation of the Final Rule, earlier in 
this preamble, provides a justification for each provision of the 
final rule. However, OSHA provides this supplemental analysis to 
assess provisions with substantial costs, including two types of 
training; information transfer; job briefing; aerial-lift fall 
protection; climbing fall protection; minimum approach distance and 
working position; and arc-flash protection.\505\ Accordingly, we 
will not be analyzing provisions in the final rule contained in 
existing Sec.  1910.269.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \505\ The chief costs that we are not analyzing are training and 
other costs for employers not covered by existing Sec.  1910.269. 
OSHA covered the justification for those costs in a previous 
rulemaking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Because the final rule contains jointly interacting and 
overlapping provisions, there are two logistical issues with 
performing a provision-by-provision sensitivity analysis of whether 
benefits exceed costs in this case: (1) The available data do not 
permit OSHA to determine the numbers of accidents that every 
combination of provisions could prevent; and (2) a simple marginal 
analysis will not fully address the question of whether benefits 
exceed costs for the rule as a whole. It might, for example, take 
two or more provisions to prevent a class of accident: A requirement 
to do x if y would need, not only a requirement to do x if y, but 
also a requirement to train workers to do x, as well as a 
requirement to inform workers of when y is the case. In such 
circumstances, while each provision alone might pass a marginal 
benefit-cost test, all of the provisions together might not pass a 
benefit-cost test because the provisions would prevent the same 
accidents. The three provisions, each costing $5 million (for a 
total cost of $15 million), might prevent only $12 million worth of 
accidents because the three provisions would prevent the exact same 
accidents. Thus, even if a provision-by-provision sensitivity 
analysis were possible for this rule, that analysis would still not 
justify the overall combination of provisions. Moreover, for the 
purpose of determining whether benefits of a rule exceed the costs, 
one cannot simply test each provision individually, but must find 
ways to examine situations involving likely joint effects of the 
provisions of the rule.
    This two-part supplemental analysis addresses both of these 
problems and takes the form of a break-even sensitivity analysis 
that compares the potential benefits of a given individual provision 
against the costs of both that provision and, separately, all 
provisions that, when combined, achieve those particular benefits. 
Thus, a break-even sensitivity analysis in this case represents an 
estimate of the percentage of potentially preventable accidents that 
an individual provision, or a combination of provisions, must 
prevent for the benefits to equal the costs. Any percentage greater 
than this percentage would result in benefits exceeding costs.
    OSHA began this analysis by conducting a new analysis of the 
existing accident record, rather than trying to build off of the 
existing analysis. This supplemental analysis reviewed each accident 
and indicated each provision that could have had an effect in 
preventing the accident. Unlike the analysis performed by CONSAD for 
the proposal, the new approach simply determined that a provision 
might have prevented an accident, but did not attempt to assign an 
accident-by-accident probability of prevention. OSHA took this new 
approach for two reasons: (1) The new approach enabled OSHA to 
conduct a more reproducible analysis of the accidents than did the 
analysis CONSAD conducted for the proposal because there were no 
expert judgments on probability of prevention; and (2) the new 
approach enabled OSHA to calculate the percentage of accidents that 
a given provision or combination of provisions needs to prevent to 
assure that the provision or combination of provisions passes the 
aforementioned test for cost-effectiveness, and then discuss the 
reasonableness of that percentage.
    OSHA used the results of the new analysis of the accident record 
in three ways. First, OSHA determined the frequency with which each 
single provision would have to prevent potentially preventable 
accidents for benefits to exceed costs for that provision. Second, 
to further address the issue of joint prevention effects, OSHA 
conducted an analysis that: Noted the combinations of provisions 
that were necessary to prevent different kinds of accidents; 
allocated the costs of each provision according to the percentage of 
each type of accident that provision likely would prevent; and 
analyzed the break-even conditions needed for the combined costs of 
the relevant provisions to be less than, or equal to, the benefits 
of the accidents those provisions likely would prevent. Finally, 
OSHA used the two sensitivity analyses it conducted (that is, the 
analysis showing the break-even point for each single provision and 
the alternative analysis showing the break-even point for combined 
provisions) to further bolster the conclusion OSHA drew, in its main 
analysis, that the benefits of the final rule as a whole exceed the 
costs of the final rule as a whole.

2. Accident Analysis

    The first step in each of these analyses was to examine accident 
records to determine how many fatalities and nonfatal injuries the 
relevant provisions of the final rule could potentially prevent. In 
its accident analysis for the proposed rule, CONSAD examined 
relevant accident data from OSHA's Integrated Management Information 
System (IMIS) for the period of January 1, 1994, to March 31, 2000 
(Ex. 0031). OSHA reviewed accidents in CONSAD's analysis that

[[Page 20572]]

occurred on or after January 1, 1995--a total of 268 accidents.\506\ 
For each accident, OSHA identified the provisions with costs in the 
final rule that could help prevent the accident. Table 23 lists the 
general criteria OSHA used to evaluate each accident, and the 
discussion that follows explains in greater detail how the Agency 
applied these criteria and how complying with the respective 
provisions in the final rule would contribute to the prevention of 
accidents in each category. The full details of this accident 
analysis are in a printout [1] and a spreadsheet [2] showing the 
analysis of each accident, including both the original accident 
description and any comments on why OSHA classified the accident the 
way it did.\507\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \506\ OSHA began its analysis with the 1995 accidents because 
some major provisions of the 1994 Sec.  1910.269 final rule, 
including the training requirements, did not go into effect until 
1995. The 268 accidents included all accidents of a type that the 
proposed rule was trying to prevent. However, as shown in this 
analysis, OSHA ultimately determined that not all of those accidents 
were potentially preventable by provisions in the final rule.
    \507\ For each accident, the printout displays: Information 
about the accident, including the accident abstract and information 
on the injuries resulting from the accident; inspection information, 
including the industry classification for the employer and citations 
issued to the employer; and the results of the analysis, including 
comments. In some cases, the printout truncated the accident 
abstract, citation data, or injury lines because of limitations on 
the length of the related field. However, the complete record is 
available on OSHA's Web site through the hyperlink for the 
inspection record.
    The spreadsheet contains the following information about each 
accident: The accident form number; a hyperlink to the accident on 
OSHA's Web page; the date of the accident; a one-line description of 
the accident; the applicable categories of regulatory provisions (a 
value of 1 indicates that the category is applicable to the 
accident); and the comments from the analysis of the accident. On a 
separate worksheet, the spreadsheet calculates the percentage of the 
total number of accidents that are potentially preventable by each 
category of provisions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Note that the individual accident abstracts do not typically 
indicate whether: A host employer provided a contract employer with 
available information about the installation involved in the 
accident; the employer provided the employee in charge with such 
information; or employees received training on the work practices 
required by the final rule and involved in the accident. Thus, OSHA 
can only state that the accidents were of a kind that information-
transfer, job-briefing, or training would prevent, but not whether 
there actually was adequate information transfer, job briefings, or 
training. OSHA considers the information-transfer, job-briefing, and 
training requirements to be prerequisites for compliance with the 
work practices in the final rule. Without sufficient information 
about the characteristics and conditions of the work and the 
training on work-practices that the final rule requires, employees 
are not likely to be capable of safely completing the work or 
following those work practices. For example, if employees do not 
know the voltage of exposed live parts, they will not be able to 
determine the appropriate minimum approach distance or select a safe 
work position with respect to those live parts. As noted under the 
summary and explanation for final Sec. Sec.  1926.950(c) and 
1926.952(a)(1), host employers do not always provide adequate 
information to contract employers (see, for example, Tr. 877-878, 
1240, 1333), and employers do not always provide adequate 
information to employees in charge (see, for example, Ex. 0002 
\508\). In addition, as explained in the summary and explanation for 
final Sec.  1926.950(b), rulemaking participants broadly recognized 
the importance of training to ensure that employees use the safety-
related work practices required by the final rule (see, for example, 
Ex. 0219; Tr. 876). OSHA, therefore, considers the information-
transfer, job-briefing, and training requirements to be necessary 
complements to the work-practice requirements in the final rule, 
including the fall-protection, approach-distance, and arc-flash-
protection provisions. Consequently, the Agency attributed some 
accidents, in part, to the employer's failure to provide contract 
employers with the needed information to comply with the final rule 
or employees with the needed information or training to comply with 
the work practices the final rule requires, even if the accident 
abstracts did not clearly indicate that contract employers or 
employees lacked such information or training.\509\ However, in 
cases in which the accident description indicated that appropriate 
information transfers (between host employers and contract employers 
or from the employer to the employee in charge) or training took 
place, OSHA did not deem the accident potentially preventable by the 
information-transfer, job-briefing, or training provisions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \508\ See, for example, the three accidents at https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/accidentsearch.accident_detail?id=14418941&id=200960060&id=642975, in which employers did 
not provide sufficient information to employees about the extent of 
a deenergized area, the location of circuits, and the location of 
disconnects, respectively.
    \509\ OSHA performs its accident investigations as part of the 
Agency's inspection activities and focuses those investigations on 
determinations of compliance with existing standards. Because 
existing Sec.  1910.269 and Subpart V do not require the exchange of 
information between host and contract employers, or between 
employers and employees in charge, required by this new final rule, 
OSHA compliance staff generally do not determine whether such an 
information exchange takes place or, if they do make such a 
determination, they do not include the results of the determination 
in the accident abstracts.

     Table 23--General Criteria for Determining Whether Cost-Related
                Provisions Might Have Prevented Accidents
------------------------------------------------------------------------
       Categories of requirements                    Criteria
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Information-transfer requirements        The accident occurred to an
 (final Sec.  Sec.   1910.269(a)(3) and   employee working for an
 1926.950(c)).                            employer classified under a
                                          construction SIC (primarily,
                                          1623 and 1731), or the
                                          abstract otherwise indicated
                                          that the employer was
                                          performing work under contract
                                          to a utility, and information
                                          required by the final rule was
                                          necessary for compliance with
                                          provisions related to the
                                          accident.
Job-briefing requirements (final Sec.    Information required by the
 Sec.   1910.269(c)(1)(i) and             final rule was necessary for
 1926.952(a)(1)).                         compliance with provisions
                                          related to the accident.
Fall protection for employees in aerial  The accident involved a fall
 lifts (final Sec.                        from an aerial lift by an
 1910.269(g)(2)(iv)(C)(1)).               employee working for a line-
                                          clearance tree-trimming firm
                                          (SIC 0783) or for an employer
                                          that was not a utility or a
                                          contractor.
Fall protection for employees on poles,  The accident involved a fall by
 towers, or similar structures (final     an employee climbing or
 Sec.  Sec.   1910.269(g)(2)(iv)(C)(3)    changing location on a pole,
 and 1926.954(b)(3)(iii)(C)).             tower, or similar structure.
Minimum approach distances and working   The accident involved an
 position (final Sec.   1910.269(l)(3),   employee who approached too
 (l)(4)(ii), and (l)(5)(ii), and final    close to an energized part,
 Sec.   1926.960(c)(1), (c)(2)(ii), and   including employees who were
 (d)(2)).                                 not using electrical
                                          protective equipment for
                                          voltages of 301 V to 72.5 kV.
                                          Note that this category does
                                          not include accidents
                                          involving contact through
                                          mechanical equipment.
Arc-flash protection (final Sec.  Sec.   The accident involved an
  1910.269(l)(8) and 1926.960(g)).        employee burned by an electric
                                          arc, injured by flying debris
                                          from an electric arc, or
                                          burned by clothing ignited by
                                          an electric arc (including
                                          electric arcs from direct
                                          contact) or by burning
                                          material ignited by an
                                          electric arc.

[[Page 20573]]

 
Training (final Sec.  Sec.               Any accident included under any
 1910.269(a)(2)(i) and 1926.950(b)(1)).   category other than
                                          information transfer and job
                                          briefing, and any other
                                          accident involving work
                                          practices that would change as
                                          a result of revisions to
                                          existing Sec.   1910.269 made
                                          in the final rule. (Note that
                                          employees must be trained in
                                          the work practice changes
                                          included in the final rule to
                                          achieve the benefits from the
                                          changes in those work
                                          practices.)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: This table summarizes the general criteria for a category of
  requirements, but does not include all refinements on these criteria.
  The full text provides additional qualifying criteria not included in
  the table.

Information-Transfer Requirements

    The information-transfer requirements in final Sec. Sec.  
1910.269(a)(3) and 1926.950(c) require host employers (generally 
electric utilities) to exchange specified information with contract 
employers (generally construction firms) so that each employer can 
comply with the final rule to protect its employees. OSHA identified 
accidents in which an employer that appeared to be a contract 
employer (that is, employers in construction SICs, except as 
otherwise noted in the comments to individual accidents) needed 
specific information to comply with the final rule. The comments 
note the type of information, such as voltage or incident energy, 
that the contract employer would need to comply with requirements in 
the final rule.
    For example, in many instances, a contractor employee approached 
too closely to an energized part.\510\ In these cases, the contract 
employer needed, but might not have had, information on the voltage 
of energized parts involved in the accident. With that information, 
employees would be more likely to use the appropriate minimum 
approach distance and less likely to experience the accident. 
However, OSHA did not include in this category accidents in which 
there was an explicit notation or clear implication in the abstract 
that the employer knew the voltage.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \510\ See, for example, the five accidents at: https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/establishment.inspection_detail?id=121317119&id=106549090&id=108964321&id=126680362&id=301305058.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In other instances, a contractor employee was exposed to an 
electric arc.\511\ In these cases, the contract employer needed, and 
might not have had,\512\ information on incident heat energy to 
provide employees with appropriate protection against electric arcs 
and to prevent or reduce the severity of injuries resulting from the 
accident. OSHA did not include in this category accidents in which 
employees received burns from hydraulic fluid ignited by electric 
arcs because the required information has no bearing on these 
accidents.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \511\ See, for example, the five accidents at: https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/establishment.inspection_detail?id=122248933&id=123255036&id=119572378&id=125310748&id=113324040.
    \512\ Because existing Sec.  1910.269 and Subpart V do not 
require employers to protect employees from arc-flash hazards, OSHA 
assumes that contract employers generally do not already have 
information on incident heat energy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Job-Briefing Requirements

    The job-briefing requirements in final Sec. Sec.  
1910.269(c)(1)(i) and 1926.952(a)(1) specify that employers provide 
employees in charge with certain information. OSHA identified 
accidents in which employees needed the required information to 
adhere to the work practices required by the final rule.\513\ For 
example, in many instances, an employee approached too closely to an 
energized part.\514\ In such cases, employees needed, but might not 
have had, information on the voltage on energized parts so that they 
could maintain the appropriate minimum approach distances from those 
energized parts and, based on that information, select appropriate 
electrical protective equipment rated for the voltage. However, OSHA 
did not include in this category accidents in which there was 
explicit notation or clear implication in the abstract that the 
employees knew the voltage.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \513\ Such cases include all cases captured by the information-
transfer category. These cases also include similar cases involving 
employees of host employers.
    \514\ See, for example, the five accidents involving employees 
of a host employer at: https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/establishment.inspection_detail?id=125850560&id=107095234&id=126603075&id=126480821&id=114145840.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In other instances, employees needed, and might not have had, 
information on incident heat energy so that they could wear 
appropriate protection against electric arcs to prevent or reduce 
the severity of injuries resulting from the accident.\515\ However, 
OSHA did not include in this category accidents involving employees 
burned by direct contact with energized parts unless the employees' 
clothing ignited.\516\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \515\ See, for example, the five accidents involving employees 
of a host employer at: https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/establishment.inspection_detail?id=119617454&id=125958280&id=112130158&id=106447691&id=119541977.
    \516\ The arc-flash protection requirements in the final rule 
protect employees against burns resulting from incident heat energy 
from an electric arc or resulting from clothing or other material 
ignited by the incident heat energy from the electric arc. When the 
employee's clothing ignited in a direct-contact incident, OSHA 
assumed that the ignition resulted from the electric arc that 
occurred during contact. Otherwise, OSHA assumed that the burns 
resulted from current passing through the employee's body. The arc-
flash protection requirements will not prevent the latter type of 
burn.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In a few instances, employees needed other required information, 
such as information on the condition of poles, to select appropriate 
work practices, such as installing bracing to those poles to prevent 
them from failing or falling over.\517\ The Agency did not include 
in this category one instance in which an on-site supervisor was 
aware of the conditions causing a pole to collapse.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \517\ See, for example, the two accidents at: https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/establishment.inspection_detail?id=125773978&id=302868344.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    OSHA recognizes that, in some of the accidents counted in this 
category, the relevant information might not have been available to 
the employer at the time of the accident; and, therefore, the 
employer could not provide that information to the employee in 
charge. However, if the information was available, the employer, 
under the final rule, would have to provide it to the employee in 
charge, making it more likely that employees would select compliant 
work practices and, consequently, lessen the likelihood of the 
accident.

Fall Protection for Employees in Aerial Lifts

    The requirement for fall protection for employees in aerial 
lifts in final Sec.  1910.269(g)(2)(iv)(C)(1) ensures that employees 
working from aerial lifts use body harnesses to protect against 
injuries resulting from falls. OSHA identified accidents involving 
employees falling from aerial lifts.\518\ The Agency did not include 
accidents involving aerial lifts overturning or aerial-lift failure 
unless the accident abstract indicated that such an event ejected 
the employee from the aerial lift platform and that the employee 
might have suffered less severe injuries in the fall had the 
employee been wearing a body harness. The comments included in the 
analysis of these accidents explain OSHA's reasoning in such cases.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \518\ See the three accidents at: https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/establishment.inspection_detail?id=127350080&id=301827531&id=301994091.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Note that, unless the abstract indicated that body harnesses 
were the employer's required form of fall protection, the Agency 
included in this category accidents involving employees not wearing 
any fall protection because the final rule makes it more likely that 
employees will use fall protection.\519\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \519\ See the summary and explanation of final Sec.  
1926.954(b)(1)(i), which explains that requirements associated with 
using body harnesses are easier for employers to enforce than 
requirements associated with using body belts.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 20574]]

Fall Protection for Employees on Poles, Towers, or Similar 
Structures

    The final rule, at Sec. Sec.  1910.269(g)(2)(iv)(C)(3) and 
1926.954(b)(3)(iii)(C), requires qualified employees climbing and 
changing location on poles, towers, or similar structures to use 
fall protection. OSHA identified accidents involving employees 
falling while climbing or changing location on poles, towers, and 
similar structures.\520\ The Agency did not include in this category 
accidents involving employees falling while at the work location (as 
opposed to during climbing or while changing location) because the 
existing standards require the use of fall protection in such 
circumstances. Nor did the Agency include accidents involving 
employees falling from ladders or structures that do not support 
overhead power lines because the relevant fall protection 
requirements in the final rule do not apply to ladders or structures 
that do not support overhead power lines. Finally, OSHA did not 
include in this category accidents involving falls resulting from 
the failure of a pole, tower, or structure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \520\ See, for example, the five accidents at: https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/establishment.inspection_detail?id=123997892&id=120080296&id=125864686&id=126603075&id=126053644.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    OSHA recognizes that the final rule does not require an employee 
to use fall protection while the employee is climbing or changing 
location on poles, towers, or similar structures when the employer 
can demonstrate that climbing or changing location with fall 
protection is infeasible or creates a greater hazard than climbing 
or changing location without fall protection. Although OSHA was 
unable to determine whether any of the accidents involved situations 
in which this exception would apply, the Agency anticipates that the 
exceptions would apply only in unusual, and relatively rare, 
instances. Consequently, the Agency did not exclude any of the 
accidents on this basis and determined that the final rule could 
prevent nearly all accidents of this type.

Minimum Approach Distances and Working Position

    The approach-distance requirements in final Sec.  
1910.269(l)(3), (l)(4)(ii), and (l)(5)(ii), and final Sec.  
1926.960(c)(1), (c)(2)(ii), and (d)(2), require that employees 
maintain the employer's established minimum approach distances and 
ensure that employees within reach of those minimum approach 
distances are using electrical protective equipment or are otherwise 
protected against electric shock.\521\ OSHA identified accidents in 
which the final rule would make it more likely that employees would 
use electrical protective equipment or in which substantially larger 
minimum approach distances would make it less likely that an 
unprotected employee would come too close to an energized part. 
Although other provisions in the standard require that employers 
ensure that employees maintain the employers' established minimum 
approach distances in specific circumstances, for example, during 
the operation of mechanical equipment, this analysis does not 
account for benefits resulting from increases in minimum approach 
distances in those other circumstances.\522\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \521\ The benefits of these provisions relate to the final 
rule's costs, either directly (see discussion of costs of minimum 
approach distance provisions in the FEA) or indirectly (because 
employees will need training in the revised work practices contained 
in the provisions).
    \522\ These additional approach-distance requirements are in 
final Sec. Sec.  1910.269(p)(4) and 1926.959(d) (for the operation 
of mechanical equipment), final Sec. Sec.  1910.269(q)(3)(vi), 
(q)(3)(xiv), (q)(3)(xv), and (q)(3)(xvi) and 1926.964(c)(5), 
(c)(13), (c)(14), and (c)(15) (for live-line barehand work), and 
final Sec.  1910.269(r)(1)(iii), (r)(1)(iv), and (r)(1)(v) (for 
line-clearance tree-trimming work).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The final rule generally prohibits employees who are not using 
some form of electrical protective equipment or live-line tools from 
being within reach of the minimum approach distance of exposed parts 
energized at more than 600 volts, but not more than 72.5 kilovolts 
(final Sec.  1910.269(l)(4)(ii) and (l)(5)(ii), and final Sec.  
1926.960(c)(2)(ii) and (d)(2)). Existing Sec.  1910.269 contains no 
such provisions; therefore, the final rule provides increased 
protection in these circumstances and makes accidents less likely. 
In addition, the final rule adopts minimum approach distances that 
are substantially greater than the corresponding minimum approach 
distances in existing Sec.  1910.269 for voltages between 301 and 
1,000 volts and over 72.5 kilovolts.\523\ If employers follow the 
final rule and ensure that employees use substantially greater 
minimum approach distances at these voltages, then it is less likely 
that an unprotected employee will approach too close to an exposed 
energized part.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \523\ Under existing Sec.  1910.269, the minimum approach 
distance for voltages of 50 to 1,000 volts is the statement, ``avoid 
contact.'' The final rule requires the employer to establish a 
minimum approach distance of not less than 0.33 meters (1.09 feet) 
for voltages of 301 to 750 volts and not less than 0.63 meters (2.07 
feet) for voltages of 751 to 5,000 volts.
    The default minimum approach distances in Table R-7 and Table V-
6 in the final rule provide substantially larger minimum approach 
distances than the minimum approach distances in Table R-6 in 
existing Sec.  1910.269 for voltages above 72.5 kilovolts. Under the 
final rule, employers may establish their own minimum approach 
distances, which may be the same as the minimum approach distances 
in existing Table R-6, in lieu of using the default distances; but, 
for the purposes of this analysis, OSHA assumed that employers would 
use the default minimum approach distances. Even if employers 
establish smaller minimum approach distances than the default 
distances, the final rule requires that such distances ensure that 
the probability of sparkover at the electrical component of the 
minimum approach distance is no greater than 1 in 1,000, which makes 
the probability of an accident less likely than under the existing 
standard.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    OSHA identified accidents in which employees who were not using 
electrical protective equipment or live-line tools contacted, or 
approached too close to, exposed circuit parts energized at 301 
volts or more.\524\ Although the accident abstracts typically state 
that the employee ``contacted'' an energized part, at the voltages 
commonly encountered in transmission and distribution work, the air 
between the worker and the energized part will break down 
dielectrically before the employee can contact the part. Whether the 
employee pulls away or subsequently touches the energized part will 
not affect the outcome--that is, electric shock, and potentially 
electrocution, and burns from current passing through the skin and 
from exposure to the electric arc carrying current to the energized 
part. Consequently, OSHA concludes that all ``contact'' accidents 
involve a sparkover across an air gap and not actual contact with 
the energized part.\525\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \524\ See, for example, the five accidents at: https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/establishment.inspection_detail?id=122193329&id=109573204&id=122194707&id=109298216&id=125652016.
    \525\ As detailed in the summary and explanation of final Sec.  
1926.960(c), in Section V, Summary and Explanation of the Final 
Rule, earlier in this preamble, the sparkover distance at the 
worksite depends on several factors, including, in particular, the 
nominal voltage on the system and any transient overvoltage that 
occurs while the employee is working.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Furthermore, for several reasons, increasing the minimum 
approach distance will decrease the likelihood that an employee will 
approach closely enough for sparkover. First, the increases in 
minimum approach distance, though slight in most cases, reduce the 
probability of sparkover to 3[sigma] (approximately 1 in 1,000) from 
sometimes substantially higher probabilities. (For example, the 
probability of sparkover at the electrical component of the existing 
phase-to-phase minimum approach distance for an 800-kilovolt system 
with a 2.5-per unit maximum transient overvoltage is approximately 6 
in 10.) Second, the increased distance will provide the employee 
with additional distance, and thus time, to detect and withdraw from 
an approach that is too close to energized parts. (See the summary 
and explanation of final Sec.  1926.960(c)(1) under the heading 
``The ergonomic component of MAD'' in Section V, Summary and 
Explanation of the Final Rule, earlier in this preamble, for further 
information.) Third, the increased distance provides a greater 
margin of error for the employee in the absence of a known maximum 
transient overvoltage.
    The Agency did not, however, include certain types of accidents 
under this category. First, the Agency did not include accidents 
involving mechanical equipment, loose conductors, or guys \526\ that 
contacted overhead power lines energized at less than 72.6 
kilovolts. The revised requirements in the final rule do not 
increase the likelihood of preventing such accidents because the 
minimum approach distances at those voltages are substantially the 
same as the distances in existing Sec.  1910.269, and the revised 
work-positioning requirements in the final rule generally do not 
address hazards associated with these accidents.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \526\ A guy is a tensioned cable, or wire rope, that adds 
stability and support to structures carrying overhead power lines.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Second, OSHA did not include accidents in which the abstract 
indicated that an employee contacted an energized part that the 
employee incorrectly believed to be deenergized, except when 
information on the location of circuits and their voltages would

[[Page 20575]]

have informed the employees that lines or equipment were 
energized.\527\ Provisions for deenergizing and grounding lines and 
equipment in the existing standard address these hazards, and the 
final rule does not revise those provisions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \527\ An example of the exception is an accident in which an 
employer assigns a crew to work on one line the crew correctly 
believes is deenergized, but a crew member accidentally works on a 
wrong line, which is energized. Information on the correct location 
of lines and which lines are energized would help prevent such 
accidents.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Third, OSHA did not include accidents in which the abstract 
indicated that the employee was using, or likely was using, 
appropriate electrical protective equipment or live-line tools. The 
revised work-positioning requirements would not apply in such cases.

Arc-Flash Protection

    Final Sec. Sec.  1910.269(l)(8) and 1926.960(g) require the 
employer to provide, and ensure the use of, appropriate protective 
clothing and equipment to either prevent or reduce the severity of 
injuries to employees exposed to electric arcs. OSHA identified 
accidents in which employees sustained burns and other injuries from 
electric arcs.\528\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \528\ See, for example, the five accidents at: https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/establishment.inspection_detail?id=119617454&id=125958280&id=112130158&id=106447691&id=119541977.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Agency did not include accidents in which employees directly 
contacted energized parts unless: (1) The employee survived the 
electric shock and (2) the employee sustained burns or other arc-
flash injuries to parts of the body other than the hands and feet. 
In the analysis, OSHA assumes that rubber insulating gloves with 
leather protectors worn in compliance with the approach-distance 
requirements will protect against burns to the hands. OSHA also 
assumes that the injured employee was wearing heavy-duty work shoes 
or boots that comply with the arc-flash protection requirements in 
the final rule. Based on the analysis of the accident data, such 
footwear will protect against exposure to electric arcs, but will 
not protect against burns resulting from dielectric failure of the 
footwear, which can occur in cases of direct contact with high-
voltage energized parts.
    In addition, OSHA did not include accidents in which employees 
received burns from hydraulic fluid ignited by an electric arc, 
unless the burning hydraulic fluid ignited the employee's clothing. 
The Agency assumes that the arc-flash provisions in the final rule 
will not prevent, or substantially reduce, injuries caused by the 
heat from burning hydraulic fluid.

Training

    OSHA did not substantially revise the training requirements in 
existing Sec.  1910.269. However, employers will incur costs for 
training employees. Even though employees already are trained in the 
work practices required by existing Sec.  1910.269, additional 
training costs will result because employers must train workers in 
the revised work practices required by the final rule. The 
additional training requirements provide benefits because trained 
employees are more likely to follow the work practices specified by 
the standard than untrained employees.
    The Agency identified accidents involving incorrect work 
practices that the final rule will prevent.\529\ Specifically, OSHA 
included in this category any accident included in the fall-
protection, approach-distance, or arc-flash categories described 
earlier. The work-practice changes required in those areas in the 
final rule will result in new training, which, in turn, will make 
accidents included in the training category less likely.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \529\ See, for example, the five accidents at: https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/establishment.inspection_detail?id=123997892&id=119617454&id=125958280&id=123383382&id=124822347.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Results of Accident Analysis

    Table 24 presents the results of OSHA's analysis of the CONSAD 
accident data. The first column in that table lists the categories 
of provisions in the final rule included in this analysis, while the 
second column presents the number of accidents that the requirements 
in each of these categories likely will prevent. For example, the 
information-transfer requirements in the final rule make 77 of the 
accidents less likely to occur in comparison with the existing 
standards. The third column of Table 24 shows the corresponding 
percentage of accidents that the requirements in each of these 
categories likely will prevent. For example, the approach-distance 
requirements in the final rule make 35.8 percent of the accidents 
less likely to occur in comparison with the existing standards.

                    Table 24--Percentage of Accidents Addressed by Each Category of Provision
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                            Percentage of 268
                                                                  Number of accidents        total accidents
                     Category of provision                          addressed by the         addressed by the
                                                                       provision                provision
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Information Transfer..........................................                       77                     28.7
Job Briefing..................................................                      153                     57.1
Training......................................................                      144                     53.7
Aerial Lift Fall Protection...................................                        3                      1.1
Climbing Fall Protection......................................                       10                      3.7
Approach Distance.............................................                       96                     35.8
Arc Flash.....................................................                       42                     15.7
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

4. Provision-by-Provision Sensitivity Analysis

    To conduct its provision-by-provision sensitivity analysis, OSHA 
first compared the percentage of accidents in each category (from 
Table 24) against the estimated total number of fatalities involving 
circumstances directly addressed by the final rule, 74 annually, and 
the corresponding number of serious injuries, 444 annually. OSHA 
next estimated the economic value of those prevented fatalities and 
injuries.\530\ Finally, OSHA estimated the percentage of provision-
relevant benefits that would be necessary to establish that a 
particular provision produces zero net benefit (that is, the 
estimated value of the prevented accidents equals the estimated cost 
of the related provision). Any percentage greater than this will 
produce positive net benefits. Table 25 shows the results of this 
analysis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \530\ Note that, due to data limitations discussed in the body 
of the FEA, OSHA could not identify or evaluate injuries with the 
same degree of accuracy as fatalities. For that reason, throughout 
this analysis, estimated injuries are in fixed proportion to 
estimated fatalities. Note, also, that prevented injuries comprise 
only a minor percentage of the total benefits of the rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As noted earlier in the accident analysis, the Agency sometimes 
attributed an accident to a provision even though it was unclear 
from the accident abstract whether the employer followed that 
provision on a voluntary basis. Therefore, although Table 25 
accounts for baseline compliance in terms of costs, Table 25 does 
not account for baseline compliance in terms of potential monetized 
benefits. Table 26, on the other hand, accounts for baseline 
compliance in terms of both costs and benefits.
    OSHA notes that accounting for baseline compliance is difficult 
because effectiveness and baseline compliance interact for purposes 
of estimating the number of accidents where there is no baseline 
compliance. For example, if a provision is so effective that there 
would be no accidents so long as employers follow the regulation, 
then all accidents attributed to that provision would necessarily 
occur when employers did not follow the provision; and OSHA, 
therefore, could state with 100 percent certainty that employers did 
not follow the provision voluntarily. Conversely, if the provision 
is completely ineffective, the associated injury and fatality rate 
for employers in voluntary compliance will be

[[Page 20576]]

the same as for employers not in voluntary compliance. As a result, 
the expected percentage of associated injuries and fatalities for 
firms in voluntary compliance will equal the percentage of employees 
in firms in voluntary compliance (as a percentage of all employees 
with associated injuries and fatalities). Thus, if 20 percent of 
employees work in firms in voluntary compliance with a completely 
ineffective provision, then 20 percent of all associated injuries 
and fatalities will occur among these employees, assuming an equal 
distribution of affected work. OSHA examines intermediate cases, 
which are more complex to calculate, in a spreadsheet showing the 
calculation of breakeven rates taking account of baseline compliance 
[9].
    Table 26 shows estimated rates of baseline compliance for each 
provision and the resulting percentage of potential benefits needed 
for benefits to equal costs, adjusted for the compliance rate using 
the methodology. The compliance rates show that, for all provisions, 
with the exception of new requirements for calculating minimum 
approach distances, industry already bears most of the costs 
voluntarily. As expected, the break-even rates in Table 26 usually 
are higher than the rates shown in Table 25. In some cases, as 
discussed later, OSHA believes that accidents addressed by 
individual provisions could not occur in the event of full 
compliance with the final rule. In these cases, the last column of 
Table 26 shows a range of potential benefits needed to break even 
with costs, with the percentage in that column, adjusted for 
baseline compliance, representing the top end of the range, and the 
percentage from the last column of Table 25 representing the bottom 
end of the range. OSHA believes the percentage at the top end of the 
range is premised on an incorrect assumption--that relevant 
accidents can occur even with full compliance with the final rule.

[[Page 20577]]



                    Table 25--Sensitivity Analysis of Potential Benefits From Different Provisions of the Electric Power Generation, Transmission, and Distribution Standard
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                 Percentage of                     Monetized                                                      Percentage of
                                                                                   accidents                      benefits of      Injuries        Monetized         Total          potential
                                                                  Annualized     addressed by     Fatalities      fatalities      potentially     benefits of      potential     benefits needed
                     Category of provision                          cost of      the provision     prevented      potentially   prevented Sec.     injuries        monetized      to break even
                                                                  compliance      (from Table      [dagger]        prevented                      potentially      benefits        with costs
                                                                                     24) *                         [Dagger]                      prevented **                   [dagger][dagger]
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Information Transfer..........................................     $17,820,841            28.7            21.5    $184,770,600           127.4      $7,900,536    $192,671,136              9.2
Job Briefing..................................................       6,697,557            57.1            42.3     367,609,800           253.5      15,718,488     383,328,288              1.7
Training......................................................       2,950,935            53.7            39.7     345,720,600           238.4      14,782,536     360,503,136              0.8
Aerial Lift Fall Protection...................................         113,222             1.1             0.8       7,081,800             4.9         302,808       7,384,608              1.5
Climbing Fall Protection......................................         451,768             3.7             2.7      23,820,600            16.4       1,018,536      24,839,136              1.8
Approach Distances............................................       1,807,505            35.8            26.5     230,480,400           159.0       9,855,024     240,335,424              0.8
Arc Flash.....................................................      19,446,147            15.7            11.6     101,076,600            69.7       4,321,896     105,398,496             18.5
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Total exceeds 100 percent because more than one provision may prevent a given accident.
[dagger] Percentage of accidents addressed multiplied by 74 (the number of fatalities of the type addressed by the final rule).
[Dagger]thnsp;Valued at $8.7 million per fatality.
Sec.   Percentage of accidents addressed multiplied by 444 (the number of injuries of the type addressed by the final rule).
** Valued at $62,000 per injury.
[dagger][dagger] The Percentage of Potential Benefits Needed to Break Even with Costs derived by dividing the monetized benefits in column 8 by the costs in column 2.
Note: Totals may not equal the sum or product of the components due to rounding.


 Table 26--Baseline Compliance Rates and Percentage of Potential Benefits Needed To Break Even With Costs, Given
                                               Baseline Compliance
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                         Percentage of potential
                                                                                          benefits that need to
                                                                 Baseline compliance *     be realized to break
                     Category of provision                             (percent)             even with costs,
                                                                                          adjusted for baseline
                                                                                           compliance [dagger]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Information Transfer..........................................                       77                     31.6
Job Briefing..................................................                       96                     31.7
Training......................................................                       95                     14.7
Aerial Lift Fall Protection [Dagger]..........................                       65                  1.5-4.4
Climbing Fall Protection [Dagger].............................                       50                  1.8-3.7
Approach Distances [Dagger]...................................                        0                      0.8
Arc Flash [Dagger]............................................                       81                18.5-55.6
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Calculated as the percentage of costs for projects already in compliance as a percentage of costs if no firms
  were in compliance.
[dagger] See reference [9] for method of calculation.
[Dagger] It is possible that baseline compliance may be irrelevant because no accidents could occur (or, in the
  case of the arc-flash provisions, no fatalities could occur, and the final rule would significantly reduce the
  incidence of serious burns) in the event of 100-percent compliance, in which case the break-even percentage is
  the same as in Table 25.

    Before discussing the results of Table 25 and Table 26, OSHA 
will address the potential preventability of the types of accidents 
the final rule likely will prevent. Generally, no set of controls 
can prevent all accidents associated with a particular activity and 
still allow workers to engage in the activity at reasonable cost. 
For example, controls cannot prevent fully many kinds of accidents, 
such as transportation accidents or slips and trips. However, this 
is not the case for many of the hazards addressed by this final 
rule. The fall, burn, and electric-shock accidents that this 
standard addresses are almost completely preventable with 
appropriate, affordable precautions. The final rule addresses the 
problem that, in many cases, employers do not apply known, effective 
controls, either because no rule requires such controls or because 
individual employers may lack the information to apply required 
controls properly.
    Because the benefits of information transfer, job briefings, and 
training depend in part on the effectiveness of other provisions, 
OSHA will first consider the effectiveness of provisions involving 
aerial lift and climbing fall protection, approach distances, and 
arc-flash protection. In evaluating the likelihood of meeting any of 
the calculated break-even effectiveness rates, there are several key 
factors to consider: The potential that a provision could prevent an 
accident; the extent to which full compliance with existing rules 
could prevent the accident; and, even if full compliance with 
existing rules could prevent an accident, the extent to which the 
provision makes it easier or more likely that there will be greater 
compliance with existing rules.

Aerial Lift Fall Protection

    Under the final rule, employees in aerial lifts performing 
covered work will not be able to use body belts as part of fall-
arrest systems and, instead, must use body harnesses. While perfect 
compliance with the existing fall-protection provision could prevent 
most fatalities and some nonfatal injuries, as OSHA stated in 
Section V, Summary and Explanation of the Final Rule, earlier in 
this preamble, using body harnesses instead of body belts will not 
only reduce the number of fatalities and the severity of some 
injuries, but also increase the probability that employees use fall 
protection because it is not always possible for an employer to 
detect from the ground whether an employee is wearing a body belt, 
but it is relatively easy to determine whether an employee is 
wearing a body harness.
    Table 25 shows that the aerial-lift fall-protection provision 
addresses 1.1 percent of all accidents OSHA reviewed for this 
supplemental analysis. Moreover, Table 25 shows that, if compliance 
with the final rule's aerial-lift fall-protection provision prevents 
only 1.5 percent of these accidents, then the benefits will meet or 
exceed the costs. Table 26 shows that, after adjusting for baseline 
compliance, benefits will meet or exceed the costs if the provision, 
including the correct use of body harnesses, prevents 4.4 percent or 
more of these accidents.\531\

[[Page 20578]]

Ignoring the benefits resulting from the decrease in the number and 
severity of injuries from falls into body harnesses in comparison to 
falls into body belts, OSHA concludes that the increased probability 
that workers subject to the final rule will use fall protection is 
sufficient reason alone to assure a 4.4 percent decrease in 
accidents involving falls from aerial lifts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \531\ OSHA uses the term ``these accidents'' in this and similar 
portions of the text to refer to the percentage of the percentage of 
total accidents that a particular provision needs to prevent for the 
benefits of that provision to meet or exceed the costs of that 
provision. For example, OSHA says in the text that ``Table 25 shows 
that the aerial-lift fall-protection provision addresses 1.1 percent 
of all accidents OSHA reviewed for this analysis,'' and that ``if 
compliance with the final rule's aerial-lift fall-protection 
provision prevents only 1.5 percent of these accidents, then the 
benefits will meet or exceed the costs.'' This statement means that 
Table 25 shows that benefits will meet or exceed costs if compliance 
with the final rule's aerial-lift fall-protection provision prevents 
1.5 percent of the 1.1 percent of total accidents that compliance 
with the final rule's aerial-lift fall-protection provision would 
potentially prevent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Climbing Fall Protection

    The final rule requires that qualified employees use fall 
protection when climbing or changing location on poles, towers, or 
similar structures. Existing fall protection standards do not 
require the use of fall protection in these circumstances. 
Therefore, full compliance with existing rules would not prevent any 
of the falls OSHA attributed to this provision.
    Moreover, proper use of fall protection will prevent almost all 
fatalities or serious injuries resulting from falls by employees 
when climbing or changing location on such structures. Table 25 
shows that the final rule's climbing fall protection provision 
addresses 3.7 percent of all accidents and that benefits will meet 
or exceed the costs if use of fall protection prevents 1.8 percent 
or more of these accidents. Since it is nearly impossible for an 
accident to occur if employers comply fully with these provisions, 
it is reasonable to conclude that baseline compliance is irrelevant 
and that 1.8 percent remains the relevant break-even percentage even 
when considering existing compliance. OSHA believes that, given that 
full compliance with this requirement will prevent almost all 
fatalities and serious injuries from falls under these 
circumstances, it is reasonable to conclude that this provision will 
have benefits that exceed costs.

Approach Distances

    The approach-distance provisions require employers to ensure 
that employees who do not use electrical protective equipment or 
have other protection against electric shock not reach into the 
employer's established minimum approach distances. The existing rule 
does not contain similar requirements. Even though full compliance 
with existing rules may have prevented some of the accidents OSHA 
attributed to the final rule's provisions, the final rule's 
provisions will make the maintenance of the minimum approach 
distance easier or more likely than under the existing rule. Under 
the final rule's approach, the type of contact accidents OSHA 
attributed to the final rule's provisions are less likely because an 
employee following the revised approach-distance requirements would 
not need to divide his or her attention between performing a job 
task and maintaining the minimum approach distance. Simply put, the 
final rule's provisions will minimize the risk that errors in 
judgment about the minimum approach distance will lead to 
electrocution.
    These provisions also require minimum approach distances that 
are substantially greater than the corresponding minimum approach 
distances in existing Sec.  1910.269 for voltages between 301 and 
1,000 volts and over 72.5 kilovolts. For reasons stated earlier in 
this analysis, increasing the minimum approach distance will 
decrease the likelihood that an employee will approach closely 
enough to an exposed energized part for sparkover. Therefore, if 
employers follow the final rule and use substantially greater 
minimum approach distances at these voltages, then it is 
substantially less likely that an unprotected employee (that is, an 
employee not using electrical protective equipment) will approach 
too close to an exposed energized part.
    It is almost certain that full compliance with the final rule 
would prevent all accidents attributed to these provisions. Table 25 
shows that the final rule's minimum approach distance provisions 
address 35.8 percent of all accidents and that benefits will meet or 
exceed the costs if the new provisions prevent 0.8 percent or more 
of these accidents. Moreover, baseline compliance is zero percent in 
this case; therefore, even if baseline compliance was above zero, 
since it is nearly impossible for an accident to occur if employers 
comply with these provisions, it is reasonable to conclude that 
baseline compliance would be irrelevant, and that 0.8 percent would 
remain the relevant break-even percentage even when considering 
existing compliance. Given that full compliance with this 
requirement will prevent almost all applicable fatalities and 
serious injuries, OSHA believes that it is reasonable to conclude 
that this provision will have benefits that exceed costs.

Arc Flash

    The final rule contains new provisions addressing arc-flash 
protection. These new provisions, if followed, will prevent 
virtually all fatalities, and significantly reduce the incidence of 
serious burns from arc-flash accidents. The existing rule does not 
contain such protections. OSHA's existing rule simply requires that 
an employee's clothing do no greater harm than the harm that the 
employee would experience without the clothing. As such, it is 
highly likely that full compliance with existing rules would prevent 
none of the burn accidents OSHA analyzed.
    Moreover, it is almost certain that full compliance with the 
final rule would prevent the fatalities and reduce the serious 
injuries resulting from electric arcs. Table 25 shows that the final 
rule's arc-flash provisions address 15.7 percent of all accidents 
and that benefits will meet or exceed the costs if the new 
provisions prevent 18.5 percent or more of these accidents. 
Compliance with these provisions will almost certainly reduce the 
severity of burns and will make it is nearly impossible for a 
fatality to occur.\532\ Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that 
baseline compliance is irrelevant and that 18.5 percent remains the 
relevant break-even percentage even when considering existing 
compliance. OSHA believes that, given that full compliance with 
these provisions will prevent almost all applicable fatalities and 
significantly reduce the severity of burn injuries, it is reasonable 
to conclude that this provision will have benefits that exceed 
costs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \532\ See the summary and explanation of final Sec.  
1926.960(g), in Section V, Summary and Explanation of the Final 
Rule, earlier in this preamble, for an explanation of how the final 
rule protects employees from fatal and nonfatal burn injuries.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Information Transfer

    The information-transfer provisions require host employers to 
exchange specified information with contract employers so that each 
employer can comply with the final rule to protect its employees. 
The existing rule does not contain such provisions. However, 
accidents among employers are far more likely to occur when those 
employers do not have adequate information to comply with 
requirements that depend on the employer having that information. 
For example, an employer cannot not select protective grounding 
equipment meeting existing Sec.  1910.269(n)(4)(i), which requires 
that protective grounding equipment be capable of conducting the 
maximum fault current that could flow at the point of grounding for 
the time necessary to clear the fault, if the employer does not know 
the fault current or clearing time for a circuit. As such, it is 
highly likely that the existing rule could not prevent at least some 
of the accidents OSHA attributed to these provisions because many 
employers did not have adequate information to achieve full 
compliance with the existing rule's work practice requirements and, 
but for the new information-transfer provisions, would not have 
adequate information to achieve full compliance with the final 
rule's work-practice requirements.
    OSHA also believes that it is likely that the benefits of this 
provision will exceed the costs. In its analysis, OSHA identified 
accidents in which an employer that appeared to be a contract 
employer needed specific information to comply with the final rule. 
It is necessary that the host employer transfer certain key 
information about the electric power generation, transmission, or 
distribution installation to the contract employer, as such 
information is almost never readily available to the contract 
employer from any source other than the host employer. Table 25 
shows that the final rule's information-transfer provisions address 
28.7 percent of all accidents and that benefits will meet or exceed 
the costs if the new provisions prevent 9.2 percent or more of these 
accidents. Table 26 shows that, after adjusting for baseline 
compliance, benefits will meet or exceed the costs if the provisions 
prevent 31.6 percent or more of these accidents. The transfer of 
required information is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition 
for preventing accidents; therefore, OSHA considers it likely that 
the final rule will achieve this level of preventability given that 
the record for this rulemaking clearly shows that contract employers 
have difficulty meeting the provisions of the existing standard due 
to a lack of information. In particular, the record shows that 
contract employers experience a recurring inability to get needed 
information from utilities. (See, for example, Tr. 877, 1240, 1333.)

[[Page 20579]]

Job Briefing

    The job-briefing provision requires employers to provide certain 
necessary safety information to the employee in charge. It is 
important that the employer provide the employee in charge with this 
information to aid employees' assessment of worksite conditions and, 
as a secondary precaution, in case employees at the site fail to 
observe a particular condition related to their safety. The existing 
standards do not contain such a provision. Moreover, the record 
makes clear that, under the existing rule, employees do not always 
have, nor can they always obtain, the necessary information they 
need to perform their jobs safely because employers are placing the 
entire burden of compliance with the job-briefing requirement on the 
employee in charge (see discussion of Sec.  1926.952 in Section V, 
Summary and Explanation of the Final Rule, earlier in this 
preamble). As such, it is highly likely that the existing rule could 
not prevent at least some of the accidents OSHA attributed to this 
provision because many employees did not have adequate information 
for employers to achieve full compliance with the existing rule's 
work practice requirements and, but for the new job-briefing 
provision, would not have adequate information for employers to 
achieve full compliance with the final rule's work-practice 
requirements.
    However, under existing Sec.  1910.269(c), employees become 
aware of at least some of this necessary safety information because, 
although the existing rule does not require employers to provide 
this information to the employee in charge, the existing rule 
requires job briefings that cover hazards associated with the job, 
work procedures involved, special precautions, energy-source 
controls, and personal protective equipment requirements. Consistent 
with this conclusion, Table 25 shows that benefits will meet or 
exceed the costs if the new provision prevents 1.7 percent or more 
of the accidents addressed by this provision; Table 26 shows that, 
after adjusting for baseline compliance, benefits will meet or 
exceed the costs if the new provision prevents 31.7 percent or more 
of these accidents.
    Table 25 shows that compliance with the final rule's job-
briefing provision potentially would prevent a large portion (57.1 
percent) of all accidents. As such, it is likely that the benefits 
of this provision will exceed the costs because of the large 
percentage of total accidents potentially prevented by this 
provision (57.1 percent) and the percentage of prevention (31.7 
percent) needed for the benefits of these accidents to equal costs. 
Again, the record evidence supports the conclusion that at least 
some employees do not have adequate information to perform their 
jobs safely and, further, that the overwhelming majority of 
employers do find such job briefings desirable.

Training

    The training requirements in the final rule are substantially 
the same as those in existing Sec.  1910.269. Training costs arise, 
not from new training requirements, but from the need to provide 
employees with new training in work practices conforming to new and 
revised work-practice requirements in the final rule. Consequently, 
the training required under the existing rule will prevent accidents 
that only the existing rule's work-practice requirements might 
prevent, and not accidents that only the final rule's work-practice 
requirements might prevent.
    For example, full compliance with the existing rule's training 
requirements would not prevent the falls that OSHA attributed to the 
final rule's climbing fall-protection provision because the existing 
rule does not require qualified employees to use fall protection 
when climbing or changing location on poles, towers, or similar 
structures. However, full compliance with the existing rule's 
training requirements might prevent some of the falls that OSHA 
attributed to the final rule's aerial-lift fall-protection provision 
because full compliance with the existing rule's aerial-lift fall-
protection provision would likely prevent some of those accidents. 
As such, the training required under the existing rule would prevent 
some, but not all, of the accidents attributed to the training 
required under the final rule.
    In its analysis, OSHA attributed to the training required under 
the final rule any accident that the Agency attributed to provisions 
requiring compliance with the final rule's new and revised work-
practice requirements (that is, provisions on aerial-lift fall 
protection, climbing fall protection, information transfer, approach 
distances, and arc flash). Consequently, the revised training 
employers will provide under the final rule will prevent some, but 
not all, of the accidents attributed to training required under the 
final rule to the same extent as the new and revised work-practice 
requirements. As such, full compliance with the new training 
required under the final rule would help prevent the accidents OSHA 
attributed to the new training precisely because OSHA also 
attributed those accidents to the new and revised work-practice 
provisions.
    As noted earlier, the training provisions act jointly with the 
new and revised work-practice requirements in the final rule to 
prevent accidents. The new and revised work-practice provisions 
necessitate new training, which, in turn, will make accidents 
included in the training category less likely. Trained employees are 
much more likely to follow the work practices required under the 
final rule than untrained employees. As discussed earlier, it is 
almost certain that full compliance with the final rule's climbing 
fall-protection, approach-distance, and arc-flash provisions would 
prevent all accidents attributed to these provisions. As also 
discussed earlier, using body harnesses instead of body belts in 
aerial lifts also will reduce the number of fatalities and the 
severity of some nonfatal injuries. The training requirements will 
contribute to this reduction in accidents because those requirements 
will help ensure full compliance with the final rule's work-practice 
provisions.
    Table 25 shows that compliance with the final rule's training 
provisions potentially would prevent 53.7 percent of all accidents 
and that benefits will meet or exceed the costs if the provisions 
prevent 0.8 percent or more of these accidents. Table 26 shows that, 
after adjusting for baseline compliance, benefits will meet or 
exceed the costs if the training provisions prevent 14.7 percent or 
more of these accidents. OSHA believes that it is reasonably likely 
the benefits will exceed the costs because training is essential to 
assure that employees can follow the other provisions of the 
standard and because of the relatively large portion of total 
accidents related to this provision (53.7 percent) and the 
relatively low percentage of these accidents (14.7 percent) that the 
new provisions would need to prevent for benefits to equal costs.

5. Methodology for Comparing the Costs of Preventing Accidents, by 
Accident Category, to the Associated Benefits

    In the first sensitivity analysis, discussed previously, OSHA 
determined the frequency with which each single provision would have 
to prevent accidents addressed by that provision for benefits to 
exceed costs for that provision; however, the analysis ignored the 
possibility that it may take multiple provisions to prevent a given 
accident and that not all provisions may be necessary to prevent 
every accident. The second sensitivity analysis, described in this 
section, addresses the joint effects arising from various 
provisions.
    The requirements in the final rule work in combination to 
prevent accidents. For example, as noted previously, the minimum 
approach-distance requirements work in combination with the training 
requirements to prevent employees from coming too close to live 
parts and receiving an electric shock. OSHA took steps to assure 
that its provision-by-provision analysis accurately accounts for the 
issue of joint costs, as described later.
    As noted earlier, Table 24 shows, for different categories of 
provisions, the number of accidents that the requirements in that 
category are likely to prevent. Table 27 breaks down the data in 
Table 24 further, and presents, for five different categories of 
accidents (falls from aerial lifts; falls from structures; electric 
shock, too close to live parts; burns from arc flash; and accidents 
other than those listed above), the number and percentage of 
accidents in each accident category that the different combinations 
of provisions (that is, ``provision categories'') in Table 24 are 
likely to prevent. An example illustrates how OSHA calculated the 
percentages in Table 27. From Table 24, the Agency determined that 
the information-transfer provisions in the final rule would address 
77 accidents. Table 27 shows the number of those 77 accidents in 
each accident category, and the corresponding percentage of those 77 
accidents, that the information-transfer provisions will address: 
Electric shock, too close to live parts--53 (69 percent); burns from 
arc flash--13 (17 percent); and accidents other than those listed 
above--11 (14 percent).
    Table 28 presents the data in Table 24 differently. 
Specifically, Table 28 presents, for each of the five provision 
categories, the number and percentage of accidents (out of the total 
accidents reviewed by OSHA for this supplemental analysis) that each 
provision category of the final rule would address. Four of the 
categories of accidents

[[Page 20580]]

in Table 28 (falls from aerial lifts; falls from structures; 
electric shock, too close to live parts; burns from arc flash) 
contain numbers of accidents that are identical to the numbers 
contained in Table 24, as OSHA based both tables on its analysis of 
the CONSAD accident data. For reasons explained later, OSHA derived 
the number of accidents associated with the fifth category by 
determining the number of accidents in Table 24 that the 
information-transfer, job-briefing, and training provisions of the 
final rule could prevent, not including accidents that the 
provisions of the final rule that address the first four accident 
categories in Table 27 also could prevent. Based on the analysis in 
Table 27, OSHA determined that the final rule could potentially 
prevent 165 (or 61.6 percent) of the 268 total accidents the Agency 
analyzed.
    Table 29 takes the analyses from Table 24, Table 27, and Table 
28 and performs a sensitivity analysis that accounts for the 
combinations of provisions that are necessary to prevent different 
kinds of accidents. OSHA discusses this analysis in more detail 
later. However, OSHA first describes the costs associated with each 
accident category in detail.
    For the purposes of Table 29, OSHA allocated to each hazard the 
costs of a provision based on the percentage of accidents addressed 
by the provision as a percentage of all accidents addressed by that 
provision. That is, if a provision has costs of $10 million dollars 
and 10 percent of all accidents addressed by the provision address 
electric-shock hazards, then OSHA allocated $1 million dollars of 
the costs of the provision to electric-shock hazards. OSHA believes 
that allocating costs of provisions in proportion to the percentage 
of accidents those provisions address allows for a reasonable 
determination of the costs of provisions associated with individual 
accidents. Indeed, this approach is entirely consistent with the 
approach OSHA takes in the final rule: For example, final Sec. Sec.  
1910.269(a)(2)(i)(C) and 1926.950(b)(1)(iii) specifically require 
that employers determine the degree of employee training based on 
the risk to the employees for the hazards they are likely to 
encounter. Accordingly, allocating costs in proportion to the 
percentage of accidents caused by each hazard is a reasonable 
approach.
    There are two possibilities with respect to the costs of the 
provisions that address multiple kinds of hazards (like the job-
briefing and information-transfer provisions). First, there may be a 
certain minimum time necessary for such activities as job briefings 
or information transfer whenever the final rule requires those 
activities. If so, the allocation of the minimum time for each 
activity is a classic joint-cost allocation problem and allocating 
cost as a percentage of expected benefits is one common solution. 
Alternatively, the total time allotted may be a function of whether 
or not hazards are present. If this is the case, then the percentage 
of accidents associated with a given hazard is a reasonable proxy 
for the percentage of time employees encounter the hazard and the 
time required to transfer the associated information. OSHA believes 
the data supports the conclusion that the time allotted is a 
function of whether or not hazards are present. For example, OSHA 
expects, and the data supports the conclusion, that the hazards from 
falls from aerial lifts and from structures will seldom be part of 
the information employers provide for job briefings and information 
transfer because employees encounter the hazards from falls from 
aerial lifts and from structures far less often than they do other 
hazards addressed by the final rule, such as electric-shock and arc-
flash hazards.

Falls From Aerial Lifts

    As explained later in the FEA, OSHA estimated the costs of 
purchasing new fall protection equipment for employees working from 
aerial lifts. However, this is not the only cost associated with 
preventing these employees from falling. To ensure that employees 
use this fall protection equipment properly, employers must train 
workers in its use. Thus, training, and, consequently, a portion of 
the training costs, contributes to the prevention of falls from 
aerial lifts. OSHA assigned a percentage (2 percent) of the 
annualized general training costs equal to the percentage of 
accidents involving such falls taken from Table 27 and added that 
cost to the annualized costs associated with providing fall 
protection for employees working from aerial lifts. The Agency 
estimates that the information-transfer and job-briefing 
requirements do not contribute substantially to the prevention of 
these accidents because there is little or no additional related 
information provided to employees as a result of those new 
provisions.

Falls From Structures

    As explained later in the FEA, OSHA estimated the costs directly 
associated with the new fall-protection requirements for employees 
climbing or changing location on poles, towers, or similar 
structures. The costs include the purchase of upgraded fall 
protection equipment, training workers in its use, and, to a small 
extent (1 percent, from Table 27), job briefing. As opposed to other 
categories of training, the FEA includes a separate cost item for 
training when the employer requires workers to use the upgraded fall 
protection equipment. OSHA included this cost in its cost estimate 
for this analysis. OSHA estimated that 1 percent of the annualized 
job-briefing-related accidents \533\ involve the ``Falls from 
Structure'' category.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \533\ The percentages listed in this portion of the analysis 
come from Table 27.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Electric Shock, Too Close to Live Parts

    As explained later in the FEA, OSHA estimated the costs of the 
revised minimum approach distances. However, the final rule further 
prevents electric-shock accidents involving employees approaching 
too close to energized parts through the revised work-positioning 
requirements. Employers incur costs for these requirements through 
training, including training in the revised minimum approach 
distances. Consequently, the Agency assigned a percentage of the 
annualized general-training costs (71 percent) to the prevention of 
these electric-shock accidents and added these costs to its cost 
estimate for the approach-distance requirements. In addition, 
without knowledge of the voltages of exposed live parts in the work 
area, employees would not be able to comply with the revised 
approach-distance provisions. As a result, the information-transfer 
(for contract employers) and job-briefing provisions also act to 
prevent these electric-shock accidents, and OSHA added a percentage 
of the annualized information-transfer and job-briefing costs (69 
percent and 63 percent, respectively) to its estimated costs for the 
approach-distance provisions.

Burns From Arc Flash

    As explained later in the FEA, OSHA estimated costs associated 
with the arc-flash requirements in the final rule. To follow the new 
work practices involving arc-flash protection, employees must 
receive training, and employers incur training costs associated with 
these requirements, in addition to the direct costs associated with 
these requirements. Finally, without knowledge of the estimated 
incident energy (or, for contract employers, the system parameters 
necessary to estimate incident energy), contract employers and 
employees would not be able to select the appropriate protective 
equipment. For these reasons, OSHA added a percentage of the 
annualized costs associated with general training (27 percent), 
information transfer (17 percent), and job briefing (27 percent) to 
its estimate of costs for the arc-flash requirements.

Accidents Other Than Those Listed Above

    As shown in Table 27, the new information-transfer requirements 
and the new job-briefing requirements potentially could prevent 11 
and 14 accidents, respectively (not including accidents in the other 
four accident categories).\534\ The information provided to 
employees through these requirements would facilitate employee 
compliance with the work practices required by the existing 
standard. Therefore, the only costs of the final rule directed 
toward the prevention of these accidents are costs associated with 
the information-transfer and job-briefing provisions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \534\ Because the final rule effectively requires a contract 
employer to pass information from the host employer to the employee 
in charge, the job-briefing requirements in the final rule also 
could prevent all 11 accidents potentially prevented by the 
information-transfer requirements. For example, in several cases, 
the accidents involved employees who fell when a utility pole broke. 
If the host employer had information about the condition of the 
poles, the final rule requires the host employer to provide that 
information to a contract employer and, through the employees' 
employer, to the employee in charge. The employees then would use 
that information in the evaluation of the need for bracing or 
support as required by final Sec. Sec.  1910.269(q)(1)(i) and 
1926.964(a)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

6. Sensitivity of Net Benefits to Potential Preventability

    Table 29 shows the break-even percentages by type of accident 
and for the final rule as whole. In this analysis, OSHA first 
addresses the reasonableness of concluding that the

[[Page 20581]]

benefits of the final rule's provisions addressing each individual 
type of accident outweigh the costs of those provisions. OSHA then 
explains how the two sensitivity analyses it conducted (that is, the 
first analysis showing the break-even point for each provision 
separately and the second analysis, discussed herein, showing the 
break-even point for the combined provisions) further supports the 
conclusion OSHA drew, in its main benefits analysis, that the total 
benefits of the final rule exceed the total costs of the final rule.
    Table 29 indicates that, for four categories of hazards, less 
than 10 percent of potential benefits are necessary for benefits to 
break even with the costs of the provisions addressing those 
hazards. One category of hazard in Table 29, arc-flash-related 
accidents, has a breakeven effectiveness of 23.8 percent. OSHA 
concludes that the benefits of the final rule's provisions 
addressing these five categories of hazards will outweigh the costs 
of these provisions. First, as explained earlier, in discussing the 
first sensitivity analysis, if there is full compliance with all 
provisions necessary to protect against arc-flash, electric-shock, 
and climbing fall protection-related accidents (including the 
relevant work-practice and training, information-transfer, and job-
briefing provisions), then there will be no fatalities and few or no 
serious injuries involving arc flash, electric shock, and climbing 
fall protection. Second, the break-even percentage associated with 
the aerial-lift fall-protection hazard is only 2.3 percent of 
relevant benefits (or 2.3 percent of 0.8 fatalities and 4.9 serious 
injuries). The new aerial-lift fall-protection provision should 
prevent at least this small percentage of fatalities and serious 
injuries. As discussed in the first sensitivity analysis, using body 
harnesses instead of body belts will not only reduce the number of 
fatalities and the severity of some injuries, but also increase the 
probability that employees use fall protection because it is not 
always possible for an employer to detect from the ground whether an 
employee is wearing a body belt, but it is relatively easy to 
determine whether an employee is wearing a body harness. Finally, 
the relevant benefits of the job-briefing and information-transfer 
provisions outweigh the costs assigned to the ``other'' category 
(which has a break-even percentage of 8.9 percent of 3.8 fatalities 
and 23.1 serious injuries). The relevant benefits should prevent at 
least this small percentage of fatalities and serious injuries. The 
accidents associated with the ``other'' category all involved 
employer failure to comply with the work practices required by the 
existing standard. As explained earlier, the information provided to 
employees through the new job-briefing and information-transfer 
requirements will facilitate employee compliance with these existing 
work-practice requirements. OSHA concludes that the relevant 
benefits will outweigh the relevant costs because of greater 
compliance with existing rules that the costs will engender.
    Finally, the two sensitivity analyses OSHA conducted support the 
conclusion that, given full compliance with the final rule, the 
total benefits of the final rule exceed the total costs of the rule. 
The single-provision analysis, in Table 25 and Table 26, established 
the break-even percentages that are necessary for the benefits of 
single provisions to meet or exceed costs. In discussing that 
analysis, OSHA explained that it was reasonable to conclude, for 
each of the provisions, that benefits meet or exceed costs. Since it 
is reasonable to conclude, with respect to individual provisions, 
that benefits meet or exceed costs, it also is reasonable to 
conclude, based on this analysis, that the total benefits of the 
final rule meet or exceed total costs.
    It is also reasonable to conclude, based on the second 
sensitivity analysis, that the total benefits of the final rule meet 
or exceed total costs. Table 29 provides that the final rule will 
have total benefits at least equal to total costs if the rule 
prevents 12.0 percent or more of potentially preventable accidents. 
Thus, according to Table 29, the final rule will have benefits that 
are equal to or exceed costs if the rule prevents at least 5.5 
fatalities and 33 injuries per year (that is, 12.0 percent of the 
45.5 total fatalities and 273.1 total injuries potentially prevented 
annually by the final rule).\535\ Full compliance with the final 
rule will almost certainly prevent 12.0 percent or more of 
potentially preventable accidents because, as explained in the 
discussion of the first sensitivity analysis, fatalities and serious 
injuries from climbing fall protection, minimum approach-distance, 
and arc-flash-related accidents are virtually impossible if there is 
full compliance with the final rule. According to Table 29, these 
hazards together account for 55.2 percent of all accidents OSHA 
reviewed for this supplemental analysis, as well as 40.8 fatalities 
and 245.1 injuries.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \535\ The 45.5 total potentially prevented annual fatalities and 
273.1 total potentially prevented annual injuries are the sums of 
the fatalities and injuries potentially prevented annually for each 
accident type, from columns 3 and 4 in Table 29.

 
                                                                                                    Provision category
                                                                 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                  Information transfer      Job briefing       Training other than    Training in fall
                        Accident category                        --------------------------------------------  fall protection for     protection for
                                                                                                                   structures*           structures*
                                                                    Number    Percent     Number    Percent  -------------------------------------------
                                                                                                                Number    Percent     Number    Percent
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Falls from Aerial Lifts.........................................          0          0          0          0          3          2        N/A        N/A
Falls from Structures...........................................          0          0          1          1        N/A        N/A         10        100
Electric Shock, Too Close to Live Parts.........................         53         69         96         63         95         71        N/A        N/A
Burns from Arc Flash............................................         13         17         42         27         36         27        N/A        N/A
Accidents Other than Those Listed Above.........................         11         14         14          9          0          0        N/A        N/A
                                                                 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total.......................................................         77        100        153        100        134        100         10        100
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


 
                                                                                                    Provision category
                                                                 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                    Aerial lift fall        Climbing fall       Approach distance         Arc flash
                        Accident category                              protection            protection      -------------------------------------------
                                                                 --------------------------------------------
                                                                    Number    Percent     Number    Percent     Number    Percent     Number    Percent
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Falls from Aerial Lifts.........................................          3        100  .........  .........  .........  .........  .........  .........
Falls from Structures...........................................  .........  .........         10        100  .........  .........  .........  .........
Electric Shock, Too Close to Live Parts.........................  .........  .........  .........  .........         96        100  .........  .........
Burns from Arc Flash............................................  .........  .........  .........  .........  .........  .........         42        100
Accidents Other than Those Listed Above.........................  .........  .........  .........  .........  .........  .........  .........  .........
                                                                 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total.......................................................  .........  .........  .........  .........  .........  .........  .........  .........
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* The FEA separately estimates costs for training employees in upgraded fall protection for poles, towers, or similar structures.


[[Page 20582]]


 Table 28--Accident Categories and Total Number and Percent of Accidents Potentially Prevented by All Provisions
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                       Accident category                                Number *             Percent [dagger]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Falls from Aerial Lifts.......................................                        3                      1.1
Falls from Structures.........................................                       10                      3.7
Electric Shock, Too Close to Live Parts.......................                       96                     35.8
Burns from Arc Flash..........................................                       42                     15.7
Accidents Other than Those Listed Above.......................                       14                      5.2
                                                               -------------------------------------------------
  Total.......................................................                      165                     61.6
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Number of accidents addressed by the final rule.
[dagger] Percent of 268 total accidents.


                                     Table 29--The Benefits and Costs of Provisions of the Electric Power Generation Standard Compared, by Type of Accident
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                Percent of
                                                                 relevant                                                            Aggregate      Portion of      Annualized     Percentage of
                                                                 accidents      Fatalities        Injuries       Total potential    annualized       relevant         cost of        potential
            Type of accident/relevant provisions               addressed by     potentially      potentially    annual monetized      cost of        accidents      preventing       benefits
                                                                provisions       prevented        prevented     benefits[Dagger]    provisions      related to      particular       needed to
                                                                (from Table      annually*    annually[dagger]                      (from FEA)      particular        hazard        break even
                                                                    28)                                                                             provision                     with costs**
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Aerial Lift Fall Protection:
    Equipment...............................................  ..............  ..............  ................  ................        $113,222               1        $113,222  ..............
    Training................................................  ..............  ..............  ................  ................       2,950,935            0.02          59,019  ..............
                                                             -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        SUBTOTAL............................................             1.1             0.8              4.9        $7,384,608   ..............  ..............         172,241             2.3
Climbing Fall Protection:
    Equipment...............................................  ..............  ..............  ................  ................         451,768               1         451,768  ..............
    Training[dagger][dagger]................................  ..............  ..............  ................  ................          68,719               1          68,719  ..............
    Job Briefing............................................  ..............  ..............  ................  ................       6,697,557            0.01          66,976  ..............
                                                             -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        SUBTOTAL............................................             3.7             2.7             16.4        24,839,136   ..............  ..............         587,463             2.4
MAD:
    Evaluation/Equipment....................................  ..............  ..............  ................  ................       1,807,505               1       1,807,505  ..............
    Training................................................  ..............  ..............  ................  ................       2,950,935            0.71       2,095,164  ..............
    Information Transfer....................................  ..............  ..............  ................  ................      17,820,841            0.69      12,296,380  ..............
    Job Briefing............................................  ..............  ..............  ................  ................       6,697,557            0.63       4,219,461  ..............
                                                             -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        SUBTOTAL............................................            35.8            26.5            159.0       240,335,424   ..............  ..............      20,418,510             8.5
Arc-Flash Protection:
    Evaluation/Equipment....................................  ..............  ..............  ................  ................      19,446,147               1      19,446,147  ..............
    Training................................................  ..............  ..............  ................  ................       2,950,935            0.27         796,753  ..............
    Information Transfer....................................  ..............  ..............  ................  ................      17,820,841            0.17       3,029,543  ..............
    Job Briefing............................................  ..............  ..............  ................  ................       6,697,557            0.27       1,808,341  ..............
                                                             -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        SUBTOTAL............................................            15.7            11.6             69.7       105,398,496   ..............  ..............      25,080,783            23.8
Other:
    Information Transfer....................................  ..............  ..............  ................  ................      17,820,841            0.14       2,494,918  ..............
    Job Briefing............................................  ..............  ..............  ................  ................       6,697,557            0.09         602,780  ..............
                                                             -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        SUBTOTAL............................................             5.2             3.8             23.1        34,909,056   ..............  ..............       3,097,698             8.9
                                                             -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
            TOTAL...........................................            61.5            45.5            273.1       412,866,720   ..............  ..............      49,356,694            12.0
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Percentage of accidents potentially prevented (from Table 28) multiplied by 74 (the number of fatalities of the type addressed by the final rule).
[dagger] Percentage of accidents potentially prevented (from Table 28) multiplied by 444 (the number of injuries of the type addressed by the final rule).
[Dagger] Cases valued at $8.7 million per fatality, $62,000 per injury.
  From Table 27.
** Percentage of Potential Benefits Needed to Break Even with Costs derived by dividing the costs in column 8 by the benefits in column 5.
[dagger] In the FEA, OSHA separately estimated costs associated with training employees on the revised fall-protection requirements for climbing and changing location on poles, towers, and
  similar structures.
Note: Totals may not equal the sum or product of the components due to rounding.

F. Technological Feasibility

    In accordance with the OSH Act, OSHA must demonstrate that 
occupational safety and health standards promulgated by the Agency are 
technologically feasible. OSHA demonstrates that a standard is 
technologically feasible ``by pointing to technology that is either 
already in use or has been conceived and is reasonably capable of 
experimental refinement and distribution within the standard's 
deadlines'' (American Iron and Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 939 F.2d 975, 980 
(D.C. Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (internal citation omitted)). OSHA 
reviewed each of the requirements imposed by the final rule and 
determined that compliance with the requirements of the rule is 
technologically feasible for all affected industries, that employers 
can achieve compliance with all of the final requirements using readily 
and widely available technologies, and that there are no technological 
constraints associated with compliance with any of the final 
requirements.
    The final rule in Subpart V and Sec.  1910.269 includes several new 
provisions or requirements that differ from the proposed rule. These 
modifications primarily involve personnel time to develop programs and

[[Page 20583]]

procedures and to train employees. Any equipment required to comply is 
either currently in use or readily available. OSHA determined, based on 
its review, that all of the work practices and specifications required 
by the final standard are consistent with equipment procurement, 
installation, and work practices widely accepted in these industries.
    Several factors support OSHA's determination regarding the 
technological feasibility of the final rule. First, OSHA concluded that 
compliance with existing Sec.  1910.137 and Sec.  1910.269 was 
technologically feasible when it promulgated those standards in 1994 
(59 FR 4431). OSHA carefully reviewed the application of these 
provisions to construction operations and determined that the 
provisions in the final rule that OSHA based on the existing standards 
are technologically feasible in these operations. In fact, OSHA 
estimated as part of its cost analysis that 95 percent of firms that 
perform work for the construction of electric power transmission and 
distribution lines and equipment are currently following these 
standards because the firms also perform repair and maintenance work 
subject to Sec.  1910.269.
    Second, the provisions in the standard not based on existing 
standards are also technologically feasible. As is evident from the 
discussion of Sec.  1926.960(g)(2) in Section V, Summary and 
Explanation of the Final Rule, earlier in this preamble, any software 
that employers might have to use to comply with the final arc-hazard 
assessment provision is readily and widely available. Moreover, as is 
evident from the compliance-rate data discussed in this section of the 
preamble, the arc-flash protective equipment required by the final rule 
is readily and widely available, and the harnesses and work-positioning 
equipment required by the final rule are also readily and widely 
available.\536\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \536\ For voltages of 50 to 300 volts, Table R-3 specifies a 
minimum approach distance of ``avoid contact.'' The minimum approach 
distance for this voltage range contains neither an electrical 
component nor an ergonomic component.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Third, OSHA based many of the provisions in the final rule on 
national consensus standards, or indicated in the regulatory text of 
the final rule that it would deem employers that comply with specific 
provisions of certain national consensus standards to be in compliance 
with specified provisions of the final rule. Reliance on a national 
consensus standard provides assurance that a broad consensus of 
industry representatives recognize that a means of compliance is an 
appropriate way to comply and is, therefore, technologically feasible.
    Fourth, in Section V, Summary and Explanation of the Final Rule, 
earlier in this preamble, OSHA adequately responded to issues 
associated with the technological feasibility of specific provisions. 
In that section of the preamble, OSHA discussed technological 
feasibility concerns raised by rulemaking participants and also 
discussed the technological feasibility of provisions that differ from 
the proposed rule (such as the changes to the fall protection and 
minimum approach-distance requirements). The legal test for proving 
technological feasibility requires OSHA to establish a ``reasonable 
possibility that the typical firm will be able to . . . meet the 
[standard's requirement] in most of its operations'' (American Iron and 
Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 939 F.2d 975, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (per curiam) 
(internal citation omitted)). The following examples demonstrate how 
OSHA satisfied this test with respect to the key minimum approach 
distance and fall protection provisions.
    In the section addressing OSHA's revision of the minimum approach-
distance requirements, OSHA addressed concerns that not all systems 
have the space necessary to accommodate the larger minimum approach 
distances that may result when an employer uses the final rule's new 
default values for maximum per-unit transient overvoltages. (See the 
discussion of Sec.  1926.960(c)(1).) Instead of using these default 
values, employers may use an engineering analysis to determine the 
actual values for maximum per-unit transient overvoltages and then 
apply these values when calculating the required minimum approach 
distances. However, even then it is possible for the transient 
overvoltages to result in a minimum approach distance that exceeds the 
available space. In such cases, employers have the option of reducing 
the maximum transient overvoltages by implementing such measures as 
portable protective gaps, portable lightning arresters, circuit 
alterations, or operational controls (including disabling the automatic 
reclosing feature on the circuit and restricting circuit switching). 
Finally, if employers cannot use any of these measures to reduce the 
maximum transient overvoltages and, thereby, lessen the minimum 
approach distances, they have the option of deenergizing the circuit to 
perform the work. Therefore, the final rule's minimum approach-distance 
requirements will not prevent employers from completing their work.
    With respect to the final rule's requirement that qualified 
employees use fall protection when climbing and changing location on 
poles, towers, or similar structures, OSHA concluded, based on the 
record, that under these conditions it is generally feasible for 
employees to climb and change location while using fall protection. 
(See the discussion of Sec.  1926.954(b)(3)(iii).) Substantial evidence 
in the record supports OSHA's determination that the final rule is 
technologically feasible, notwithstanding the Agency's acknowledgment 
in Section V, Summary and Explanation of the Final Rule, earlier in 
this preamble, that there may be limited circumstances that preclude 
the use of fall protection while qualified employees are climbing, or 
changing location on, a structure. OSHA addressed this issue by 
incorporating into the final standard an exception to the requirement 
for fall protection under these circumstances. Accordingly, the final 
rule provides that qualified employees need not use fall protection 
when climbing or changing location on poles, towers, or similar 
structures if the employer can demonstrate that climbing or changing 
location with fall protection is infeasible or creates a greater hazard 
than climbing or changing location without it. (See Sec.  
1926.954(b)(3)(iii)(C).)

G. Costs of Compliance

1. Introduction
    This portion of the analysis presents the estimated costs of 
compliance for the final rule. The estimated costs of compliance 
represent the additional costs necessary for employers to achieve full 
compliance. They do not include costs for employers that are already 
complying with the new requirements, nor do they include costs 
associated with achieving full compliance with existing applicable 
requirements.
    This analysis includes all elements of the final rulemaking, 
including changes to 29 CFR Part 1910 and 29 CFR Part 1926. OSHA 
analyzed this consolidated set of actions in its entirety and included 
only parts of the final rule identified as imposing more than 
negligible costs in the analysis of compliance costs and impacts. The 
provisions of the rule with costs accounted for in this section 
include:
     Paragraph (b)(1) of Sec.  1926.950 and Sec.  
1910.269(a)(2)(i) require each employee to receive training in, and to 
be familiar with, the safety-related work practices, safety procedures, 
and other safety requirements that pertain to his or her respective job 
assignments, as well as applicable emergency procedures.

[[Page 20584]]

Table 30 refers to the nonnegligible costs of these provisions as 
``Training.''
     Paragraph (c) of Sec.  1926.950 and Sec.  1910.269(a)(3) 
require host employers to provide certain information to contract 
employers, contract employers to provide certain information to host 
employers, and some coordination between host employers and contract 
employers. Table 30 refers to the nonnegligible costs of these 
provisions as ``Host-contractor communication.''
     Paragraph (a)(1) of Sec.  1926.952 and Sec.  
1910.269(c)(1)(i) require the employer to provide the employee in 
charge of the job with all available information that relates to the 
determination of existing characteristics and conditions that the crew 
must complete. Table 30 refers to the nonnegligible costs of these 
provisions as ``Job briefing.''
     Paragraph (b)(3)(iii)(A) of Sec.  1926.954 and Sec.  
1910.269(g)(2)(iv)(C)(1) require that employees working in aerial lifts 
use appropriate fall protection. Table 30 refers to the nonnegligible 
costs of these provisions as ``Use of harnesses in aerial lifts.''
     Paragraphs (b)(3)(iii)(B) and (b)(3)(iii)(C) of Sec.  
1926.954 and Sec.  1910.269(g)(2)(iv)(C)(2) and (g)(2)(iv)(C)(3) 
require employees climbing or changing work locations at elevated 
locations more than 1.2 meters (4 feet) above the ground on poles, 
towers, or similar structures to use appropriate fall protection. Table 
30 refers to the nonnegligible costs of these provisions as ``Upgrading 
fall protection equipment.''
     Paragraph (c)(1) of Sec.  1926.960 and Sec.  
1910.269(l)(3) require the employer to establish minimum approach 
distances and to ensure that no employee approaches or takes any 
conductive object closer to exposed energized parts than the 
established MAD, unless they use certain, specified safe work 
practices. Table 30 refers to the nonnegligible costs of these 
provisions as ``MAD.''
     Paragraph (g)(1) of Sec.  1926.960 and Sec.  
1910.269(l)(8)(i) require employers to perform a hazard assessment to 
determine if each employee would be exposed to hazards from flames or 
from electric arcs. For employees exposed to such hazards, Sec. Sec.  
1926.960(g)(2) and 1910.269(l)(8)(ii) require the employer to make a 
reasonable estimate of the incident heat energy of each such exposure. 
Table 30 refers to the nonnegligible costs of these provisions as 
``Arc-hazard assessment.''
     Paragraphs (g)(4) and (g)(5) of Sec.  1926.960 and Sec.  
1910.269(l)(8)(iv) and (l)(8)(v) require the employer to select, and 
ensure that employees use, appropriate flame-resistant and arc-rated 
clothing and equipment (collectively referred to as arc-flash 
protective equipment). Table 30 refers to the nonnegligible costs of 
these provisions as ``Provision of appropriate arc-flash protective 
equipment.''
    Table 30 presents the total annualized estimated costs by provision 
and by industry sector.

                                             Table 30--Summary of Compliance Cost by Industry and Provision
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                                                            Calculating
                                                                                                                            Other costs      incident
                                                                                               Host-                       for employees  energy and arc-
             Industry code                        Industry name              Training       contractor     Job briefing     not already       hazard
                                                                                           communication                    covered by      assessment
                                                                                                                               Sec.         (arc-hazard
                                                                                                                             1910.269       assessment)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NAICS 234910...........................  Water, Sewer, and Pipeline              $59,908        $150,214         $70,743          $4,427              NA
                                          Construction.
NAICS 234920...........................  Power and Communication               1,579,831       1,891,463       1,777,657         121,855              NA
                                          Transmission Line Construction.
NAICS 234930...........................  Industrial Nonbuilding                    3,216         204,286          70,999              NA              NA
                                          Structure Construction.
NAICS 234990...........................  All Other Heavy Construction...         317,634         894,356         424,921          25,941              NA
NAICS 235310...........................  Electrical Contractors.........         840,667       2,702,235       1,545,162          76,067              NA
NAICS 235910...........................  Structural Steel Erection                 5,642          47,763          24,717              NA              NA
                                          Contractors.
NAICS 235950...........................  Building Equipment and Other              8,134          44,957          23,197              NA              NA
                                          Machine Installation
                                          Contractors.
NAICS 235990...........................  All Other Special Trade                  23,289         124,535          71,957              NA              NA
                                          Contractors.
NAICS 221110...........................  Electric Power Generation......          29,583       2,397,541         675,284              NA        $628,793
NAICS 221120...........................  Electric Power Transmission,             54,588       6,393,786       1,144,815              NA       1,012,130
                                          Control, and Distribution.
NAICS 2211.............................  Major Publicly Owned Utilities.           7,345         571,626         153,887              NA         261,913
Various................................  Industrial Power Generators....           4,778         648,391         306,992              NA         284,046
SIC 0783...............................  Ornamental Shrub and Tree                16,321       1,749,688         407,227              NA              NA
                                          Services.
                                                                         -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total..............................  ...............................       2,950,935      17,820,841       6,697,557         228,289       2,186,883
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


 
                                                                           Provision of
                                                                            appropriate       Use of      Upgrading fall                       Total
             Industry code                        Industry name              arc-flash     harnesses in     protection          MAD         annualized
                                                                            protective     aerial lifts      equipment                      compliance
                                                                             equipment                                                         costs
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NAICS 234910...........................  Water, Sewer, and Pipeline             $180,982              NA              NA              NA        $466,274
                                          Construction.
NAICS 234920...........................  Power and Communication               5,051,365              NA        $108,190              NA      10,530,361
                                          Transmission Line Construction.
NAICS 234930...........................  Industrial Nonbuilding                  216,963              NA              NA              NA         495,465
                                          Structure Construction.
NAICS 234990...........................  All Other Heavy Construction...       1,141,710              NA              NA              NA       2,804,561
NAICS 235310...........................  Electrical Contractors.........       3,468,183              NA              NA              NA       8,632,314
NAICS 235910...........................  Structural Steel Erection                58,585              NA              NA              NA         136,706
                                          Contractors.

[[Page 20585]]

 
NAICS 235950...........................  Building Equipment and Other             54,894              NA              NA              NA         131,182
                                          Machine Installation
                                          Contractors.
NAICS 235990...........................  All Other Special Trade                 174,370              NA              NA              NA         394,151
                                          Contractors.
NAICS 221110...........................  Electric Power Generation......       2,084,506              NA         116,972              NA       5,932,679
NAICS 221120...........................  Electric Power Transmission,          3,546,921              NA         199,879      $1,593,692      13,945,811
                                          Control, and Distribution.
NAICS 2211.............................  Major Publicly Owned Utilities.         475,610              NA          26,727         213,812       1,710,921
Various................................  Industrial Power Generators....         805,175         $48,612              NA              NA       2,097,993
SIC 0783...............................  Ornamental Shrub and Tree                     0          64,610              NA              NA       2,237,846
                                          Services.
                                                                         -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total..............................  ...............................      17,259,264         113,222         451,768       1,807,505      49,516,264
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: (1) Totals may not equal the sum of the components due to rounding.
(2) ``NA'' = Not Applicable.
Sources: Office of Regulatory Analysis, OSHA. See text.

    As shown in Table 30, OSHA estimated the total annualized cost of 
compliance with the final rule to be about $49.5 million. The largest 
component of the compliance costs, at approximately $17.3 million 
annually, is the cost of providing arc-flash protective equipment. The 
other provisions of the final rule resulting in nonnegligible 
compliance costs include training ($3.0 million), host-contractor 
communication ($17.8 million), job briefing ($6.7 million), calculating 
incident energy and arc-hazard assessment (arc-hazard assessment) ($2.2 
million), use of harnesses in aerial lifts ($0.1 million), upgrading 
fall protection equipment ($0.5 million), and MAD ($1.8 million). In 
addition, the Agency estimated other minor costs for employees 
potentially not covered by existing Sec.  1910.269 ($0.2 million).
    The remainder of this portion of the analysis explains the details 
underlying the calculations of the compliance costs associated with the 
final rule. OSHA estimated compliance costs for each provision of the 
rule that involves nonnegligible costs and for each affected industry 
sector. OSHA calculated total annualized costs by annualizing 
nonrecurring one-time costs (at 7 percent over 10 years) and then 
adding these costs to recurring annual costs.\536\ The calculations of 
the estimated costs associated with compliance are representative of 
the average resources necessary to achieve compliance with the final 
rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \536\ OSHA annualized one-time costs using the formula Ct = C 
i(1 + i) t/(1 + i) t -1, where C is the total one-time cost (also 
referred to as the ``Present Value''), i is the interest rate, and t 
is the number of years over which the cost is annualized (for 
example, the life of equipment). Loan-payment formulas, which can be 
used to calculate annualized payments for one-time costs, are 
standard items in spreadsheet software. To use these formulas to 
calculate annualized costs, substitute the annualization interest 
rate for the interest rate on the loan, the number of years of 
annualization for the loan period, and the one-time cost for the 
present value of the loan (the amount borrowed).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    OSHA based labor costs on industry-specific wage rates published by 
BLS [37], then, using data from its National Compensation Survey, OSHA 
adjusted those rates upwards by 43.5 percent to account for benefits 
and other employee-related costs [36], as presented in Table 31.\537\ 
OSHA estimated supervisory wage rates, including benefits, to be $29.20 
per hour in the Ornamental Shrub and Tree Services industry, with an 
estimated range of $41.55 to $50.60 in all other affected industries. 
The Agency estimated electric power worker wage rates, including 
benefits, to be $21.26 per hour in the Ornamental Shrub and Tree 
Services industry, with an estimated range of $29.99 to $40.77 in all 
other affected industries. OSHA estimated wage rates for engineers in 
the electric utility industry, including benefits, to be $51.94 per 
hour. The Agency estimated clerical wage rates, including benefits, to 
be $20.27 per hour in the Ornamental Shrub and Tree Services industry, 
with an estimated range of $22.44 to $28.75 in all other affected 
industries.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \537\ The survey indicated the benefits component to be 30.3 
percent of total compensation, the remainder being wages. The 
adjustment represents wages x (30.3/69.7). As elsewhere in the 
analysis, OSHA has performed its calculation on the precise 
fraction.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The appropriate sections of this analysis address the comments on 
the costs of specific provisions of the final rule. For other 
provisions, OSHA adhered to the general approach it adopted in the 
PRIA. In most cases, commenters did not question the cost methodology 
used in the PRIA; therefore, OSHA carried this methodology over to this 
FEA. OSHA notes that, unless otherwise indicated, any increase in cost 
in the FEA above the costs in the PRIA is due to market factors, such 
as inflation and an increase in employment or number of projects in the 
relevant industries.

                                      Table 31--Summary of Wage Rates for Calculating Compliance Costs, by Industry
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                 Electric                         Health and
            Industry code                       Industry name           Supervisor   Clerical     power      Utility    Utility      safety   Consultant
                                                                                                 worker *  supervisor   engineer  specialist
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NAICS 234910.........................  Water, Sewer, and Pipeline           $42.35      $23.76     $34.55          NA         NA          NA          NA
                                        Construction.
NAICS 234920.........................  Power and Communication               42.35       23.76      34.55          NA         NA          NA          NA
                                        Transmission Line Construction.

[[Page 20586]]

 
NAICS 234930.........................  Industrial Nonbuilding                42.30       24.46      34.55          NA         NA          NA          NA
                                        Structure Construction.
NAICS 234990.........................  All Other Heavy Construction...       41.81       23.60      29.99          NA         NA          NA          NA
NAICS 235310.........................  Electrical Contractors.........       42.47       23.10      37.49          NA         NA          NA          NA
NAICS 235910.........................  Structural Steel Erection             42.27       22.44      37.49          NA         NA          NA          NA
                                        Contractors.
NAICS 235950.........................  Building Equipment and Other          42.47       23.10      37.49          NA         NA          NA          NA
                                        Machine Installation
                                        Contractors.
NAICS 235990.........................  All Other Special Trade               41.55       23.13      30.72          NA         NA          NA          NA
                                        Contractors.
NAICS 221110.........................  Electric Power Generation......       50.60       28.75      40.77      $50.60     $51.94      $50.79     $250.00
NAICS 221120.........................  Electric Power Transmission,          50.60       28.75      40.77       50.60      51.94          NA      250.00
                                        Control, and Distribution.
NAICS 2211...........................  Major Publicly Owned Utilities.       50.60       28.75      40.77       50.60      51.94          NA      250.00
Various..............................  Industrial Power Generators....       50.60       28.75      40.77       50.60      51.94          NA      250.00
SIC 0783.............................  Ornamental Shrub and Tree             29.20       20.27      21.26          NA         NA          NA          NA
                                        Services.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Depending upon the industry and the type of work performed (that is, power generation, power line, or both), these workers include line workers, tree-
  trimming crew members, power plant workers, and substation workers.
Notes: (1) Wage rates include an additional 30.3 percent of base salary for fringe-benefit costs.
(2) ``NA'' = Not Applicable.
Sources: BLS [36, 37].

    For most provisions of the final rule, OSHA based the cost estimate 
in part on the estimated percentage of workers or firms already in 
compliance with the rule's requirements. OSHA originally drew the 
compliance rates used to calculate costs from CONSAD's report in 
support of the PRIA [5], which commenters on the proposal did not 
question, except as noted. In most cases, CONSAD estimated different 
compliance rates for small unionized establishments, small nonunionized 
establishments, large unionized establishments, and large nonunionized 
establishments.\538\ There are a few exceptions: Major Publicly Owned 
Utilities (NAICS 2211) and Ornamental Shrub and Tree Services (SIC 
0783) only have compliance-rate estimates for small and large 
establishments, and Industrial Power Generators only have a compliance-
rate estimate for large establishments. Generally, following the 
findings of CONSAD's report [5], OSHA estimated that larger 
establishments and unionized workforces have higher compliance rates 
than smaller establishments and nonunionized establishments. The 
compliance cost tables presented later in this section of the preamble 
list these compliance rates as appropriate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \538\ As with other assertions in this analysis not supported 
directly by a citation, OSHA based its estimates on CONSAD's 
analysis. CONSAD based its initial estimates on information gathered 
from Agency stakeholder meetings held in 2000 and from site visits 
conducted in 2001 and 2002. These initial estimates were reviewed by 
small entity representatives during the SBREFA process, in 
accordance with the SBREFA Panel findings, as summarized in the 2003 
report of the Small Business Advocacy Review Panel [29]. CONSAD 
subsequently modified its estimates to reflect the findings of the 
Panel. CONSAD also incorporated information from the regulatory 
analysis, and supporting research, for the 1994 Sec.  1910.269 
rulemaking and from regulatory analyses for related rulemakings. The 
CONSAD report was finalized in 2005 [5]. Unless otherwise specified, 
OSHA received no objections to, or new evidence about, CONSAD's 
estimates, and the estimates were not altered.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

One-Time Costs for Revising Training Programs
    Establishments covered by this final rule may need to revise their 
existing training programs to accommodate the amendments to existing 
standards made in this final rule. For example, employers may need to 
revise their training programs to address revisions in the employers' 
minimum approach distances or arc-flash protection practices. However, 
these costs are one-time costs only because employers will have to 
revise these training programs once. These costs, therefore, merely 
reflect the transitional costs of the new standard.
    For all industries except for Ornamental Shrub and Tree Services, 
OSHA estimated the costs associated with revising training programs 
based on 8 hours of supervisory time plus an hour of clerical 
time.\539\ Due to the limited and less complex training required for 
employees in the Ornamental Shrub and Tree Services industry, OSHA 
estimated the costs associated with revising a training program in this 
industry based on 4 hours of supervisory time plus half an hour of 
clerical time [5].\540\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \539\ One commenter suggested that it would take more than 8 
hours to revise its training program (Ex. 0240). While it is 
possible that some larger employers with complex operations may find 
this to be the case, the Agency believes its estimate is a 
reasonable average, in part because employers already are training 
employees in need of training on existing Sec.  1910.269 and, in 
many cases, already are operating under elements of the final 
standard.
    \540\ OSHA is retaining from the PRIA its estimate of 4 hours of 
supervisory time, plus a half an hour of clerical time, for the 
Ornamental Shrub and Tree Services industry (70 FR 34905). Although 
no commenter objected to the estimate in the PRIA, OSHA now believes 
the estimate is conservative given the limited obligations on this 
industry specified by the final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Thus, OSHA estimates that the average cost of compliance per 
affected establishment for revising existing training programs will be 
$127 for establishments in the Ornamental Shrub and Tree Services 
industry and $356 to $434 per establishment in all other affected 
industries.
    Most establishments in the affected industries either already have 
training programs that meet the requirements of the final rule or 
regularly revise their training programs to account for new information 
or work practices. These establishments will not incur any additional 
costs to achieve compliance with the final rule.
    OSHA estimated rates of current compliance for each affected 
industry. Within each industry, the Agency estimated rates of current 
compliance separately for establishments based on

[[Page 20587]]

their size and on whether they had a unionized workforce. In the 
Ornamental Shrub and Tree Services industry, estimated rates of current 
compliance range from 50 to 75 percent. In all other affected 
industries, OSHA estimated rates of current compliance to range from 75 
to 98 percent [5].
    The total estimated cost of compliance for revising training 
programs is $0.7 million. Annualizing this nonrecurring one-time cost 
at a rate of 7 percent over 10 years \541\ results in a total estimated 
annualized cost of approximately $0.1 million for all affected 
industries, as shown in Table 32. Table 32 also shows the costs of 
compliance for each affected industry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \541\ Unless otherwise discussed in this FEA, and as with most 
other one-time costs under the final standard, OSHA annualized costs 
assuming that initial costs will occur in the first year after 
promulgation of the standard. OSHA notes that the PRIA referred to 
one-time costs as first-year costs. The Agency did not annualize 
these costs when initially presented in the PRIA, but did annualize 
them in the FEA.

                       Table 32--Annualized One-Time Costs for Revising Training Programs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                            Average cost per                     Annualized one-
     Industry code        Industry name    Establishments       affected      Compliance rates   time compliance
                                            affected  (%)     establishment          (%)              costs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NAICS 234910...........  Water, Sewer,                  95              $363       90/75/95/85            $6,426
                          and Pipeline
                          Construction.
NAICS 234920...........  Power and                      95               363       90/75/95/85            21,836
                          Communication
                          Transmission
                          Line
                          Construction.
NAICS 234930...........  Industrial                    100               363       90/75/95/85             1,804
                          Nonbuilding
                          Structure
                          Construction.
NAICS 234990...........  All Other Heavy                95               358       90/75/95/85             5,233
                          Construction.
NAICS 235310...........  Electrical                     95               363       90/75/95/85            13,158
                          Contractors.
NAICS 235910...........  Structural                    100               361       90/75/95/85             5,258
                          Steel Erection
                          Contractors.
NAICS 235950...........  Building                      100               363       90/75/95/85             7,774
                          Equipment and
                          Other Machine
                          Installation
                          Contractors.
NAICS 235990...........  All Other                     100               356       90/75/95/85            22,351
                          Special Trade
                          Contractors.
NAICS 221110...........  Electric Power                100               434       95/95/98/98             3,325
                          Generation.
NAICS 221120...........  Electric Power                100               434       95/95/98/98             9,821
                          Transmission,
                          Control, and
                          Distribution.
NAICS 2211.............  Major Publicly                100               434             95/98             1,350
                          Owned
                          Utilities.
Various................  Industrial                    100               434                98             1,127
                          Power
                          Generators.
SIC 0783...............  Ornamental                    100               127             50/75             2,130
                          Shrub and Tree
                          Services.
 
    Total..............  ...............  ................  ................  ................           101,592
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes: (1) Totals may not equal the sum of the components due to rounding.
(2) For most NAICSs, compliance rates are for small unionized establishments, small nonunionized establishments,
  large unionized establishments, and large nonunionized establishments, respectively. Major Publicly Owned
  Utilities (NAICS 2211) and Ornamental Shrub and Tree Services (SIC 0783) only have compliance rates for small
  and large establishments, and Industrial Power Generators only have a compliance rate for large
  establishments.
Sources: CONSAD [5], U.S. Census [43, 44, 45, 46].

One-Time Costs for Providing Additional Training for Employees Already 
Receiving Training in Accordance With Existing Sec.  1910.269
    The final rule will impose costs related to the additional training 
required for employees currently receiving training that complies with 
existing Sec.  1910.269. The costs in this section describe the cost of 
performing the training once the employer redesigns the program. As 
discussed in greater depth elsewhere, affected firms that perform 
construction work typically will need to comply with requirements of 
Sec.  1910.269 as their operations span both construction and general 
industry operations. In this regard, Sec.  1910.269 already effectively 
covers these firms. The discussion under the next heading provides 
costs for the limited number of firms that perform only construction 
operations.\542\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \542\ In the proposal, OSHA also accounted for on-going, annual 
training costs. OSHA determined that this approach was an error. 
Employers providing additional training for employees already 
receiving training in accordance with existing Sec.  1910.269 will 
not accrue new on-going training costs in conjunction with the 
training requirements in revised Sec.  1910.269 because these 
employers already must provide training under existing Sec.  
1910.269; OSHA does not consider the modified requirements of the 
revised standard to be more time-intensive than the existing 
requirements. Any new training (including the training in the use of 
fall protection for qualified climbers, discussed infra) replaces 
training already required. In contrast, OSHA notes that any 
employers providing additional training for employees not already 
receiving training in accordance with existing Sec.  1910.269 will 
accrue new on-going, annual training costs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    OSHA estimates the costs associated with the additional training 
required for these employees as involving resources (including labor 
costs or other expenditures) equivalent to 1.5 hours of employee time 
plus 12 minutes of supervisory time plus 3 minutes of clerical time per 
employee for all affected industries, except Ornamental Shrub and Tree 
Services [5].\543\ For establishments in the Ornamental Shrub and Tree 
Services industry, OSHA estimates that providing additional training 
involves resources (including labor costs or other expenditures) 
equivalent to 0.75 hours of employee time plus 6 minutes of supervisory 
time plus 3 minutes of clerical time per employee [id.].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \543\ Consistent with this estimate, one commenter, Siemens 
Power Generation, Inc., noted that its employees already receive 4--
8 hours of electrical safety training per year (Ex. 0163). The 
commenter indicated that the additional time OSHA allotted for 
training was not sufficient for its workers. In response, the Agency 
states that the assigned 1.5 hours additional training is an average 
for most workers, including workers in the commenter's industry, and 
that the allotted time should be sufficient to address the hazards 
for workers in that industry. The Agency also emphasizes that this 
estimate covers training on the new elements of the standard, not an 
entire safety training course.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    OSHA estimates that the average cost of compliance for providing 
the additional training will be 20 per employee for establishments in 
the Ornamental Shrub and Tree Services industry and will range from 55 
to 73 per employee in all other affected industries.
    OSHA accounted for new hires using a 3- to 53-percent turnover 
rate, depending on the industry, and accounted for additional costs 
associated with the transition to the final rule in the first-year by 
halving the

[[Page 20588]]

applicable turnover rate for each industry. OSHA notes that it 
increased the estimated turnover rate for Ornamental Shrub and Tree 
Services from 31 percent to 53 percent based on comments received from 
the Tree Care Industry Association (Exs. 0419, 0503). Table 33 shows 
the estimated turnover rates for the various affected industry 
segments.\544\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \544\ The FEA carries over the assumption, presented in the 
original CONSAD analysis and carried through the PRIA, of additional 
one-time training costs related to turnover. OSHA received no 
comments on this approach. The consideration of turnover here is to 
account for potential transitional costs related to the incremental 
increase in the time it takes to train new employees. In any event, 
inclusion of these costs results, at most, in a more conservative 
(and perhaps overestimated) estimate of costs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Based on research conducted by CONSAD, OSHA estimates that most 
establishments in affected industries already are providing training 
that fully complies with the requirements of the final rule [5]. These 
establishments will not incur any costs for training under the final 
rule.
    OSHA estimated the rates of current compliance with the final 
requirements for each affected industry. Within each industry, the 
Agency estimated rates of current compliance separately for 
establishments based on their size and whether they have a unionized 
workforce. In the Ornamental Shrub and Tree Services industry, 
estimated rates of current compliance range from 50 to 75 percent. In 
all other affected industries, the estimated rates of current 
compliance range from 75 to 98 percent [5].
    The total estimated one-time cost of compliance for providing 
training that meets the requirements of the final rule is 0.6 million. 
When OSHA annualized this nonrecurring one-time cost at a rate of 7 
percent over 10 years, it results in total estimated annualized costs 
of approximately 0.1 million, as shown in Table 33. Table 33 also shows 
the costs of compliance for each affected industry.

     Table 33--Annualized One-Time Costs for Providing Additional Training to Employees Already Receiving Training in Accordance With Existing Sec.
                                                                        1910.269
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                     % workers     Average                   Annualized
                                                                           Employees     Turnover    in first-     cost per    Compliance     one-time
             Industry code                        Industry name             affected    rate  (%)       year       affected     rate  (%)    compliance
                                                                              (%)                    transition    employee                     costs
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NAICS 234910...........................  Water, Sewer, and Pipeline                95           16            8          $61   90/75/95/85        $1,082
                                          Construction.
NAICS 234920...........................  Power and Communication                   95           16            8           61   90/75/95/85        28,521
                                          Transmission Line Construction.
NAICS 234930...........................  Industrial Nonbuilding                   100           16            8           62   90/75/95/85         1,413
                                          Structure Construction.
NAICS 234990...........................  All Other Heavy Construction...           95           16            8           55   90/75/95/85         5,984
NAICS 235310...........................  Electrical Contractors.........           95           11            6           66   90/75/95/85        21,348
NAICS 235910...........................  Structural Steel Erection                100           11            6           66   90/75/95/85           384
                                          Contractors.
NAICS 235950...........................  Building Equipment and Other             100           11            6           66   90/75/95/85           360
                                          Machine Installation
                                          Contractors.
NAICS 235990...........................  All Other Special Trade                  100           11            6           56   90/75/95/85           938
                                          Contractors.
NAICS 221110...........................  Electric Power Generation......          100            3            2           73   95/95/98/98         8,023
NAICS 221120...........................  Electric Power Transmission,             100            3            2           73   95/95/98/98        13,608
                                          Control, and Distribution.
NAICS 2211.............................  Major Publicly Owned Utilities.          100            3            2           73         95/98         1,829
Various................................  Industrial Power Generators....          100            3            2           73            98         3,651
SIC 0783...............................  Ornamental Shrub and Tree                100           53           27           20         50/75        14,191
                                          Services.
                                                                         -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total..............................  ...............................  ...........  ...........  ...........  ...........  ............       101,332
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes: (1) Totals may not equal the sum of the components due to rounding.
(2) For most NAICSs, compliance rates are for small unionized establishments, small nonunionized establishments, large unionized establishments, and
  large nonunionized establishments, respectively. Major Publicly Owned Utilities (NAICS 2211) and Ornamental Shrub and Tree Services (SIC 0783) only
  have compliance rates for small and large establishments, and Industrial Power Generators only have a compliance rate for large establishments.
Sources: CONSAD [5], U.S. Census [43, 44, 45, 46].

One-Time Costs for Additional Training for Employees Not Already 
Receiving Training in Accordance with Existing Sec.  1910.269
    Companies that perform construction work associated with electric 
power generation, transmission, and distribution systems generally are 
also able and willing to perform (and do perform) similar work 
involving the repair and maintenance of such systems. The distinction 
between construction work and repair or maintenance work can be 
difficult to make in some situations. For example, the distinction may 
hinge on whether a particular piece of equipment is regarded as an 
upgrade or a ``replacement-in-kind.''
    Since the work is often almost identical, companies are not likely 
to restrict themselves to only repair or maintenance work, or to only 
construction work, with regard to potential jobs involving electric 
power generation, transmission, and distribution. Thus, it is 
reasonable to assume that any company involved in such work will have 
their employees trained as required by the existing OSHA standard 
addressing this type of work in general industry (Sec.  1910.269).
    Small business representatives from the affected industries 
providing

[[Page 20589]]

comments to OSHA on a draft of the proposed rule generally indicated 
that construction contractors follow and comply with Sec.  1910.269 for 
all of their work, including construction work. But some small business 
representatives indicated that there are some companies that follow the 
existing standards for construction work in Subpart V, rather than the 
standards for general industry work in Sec.  1910.269 [29].
    When performing construction jobs covered by existing Subpart V, 
employers may be able to avoid costs associated with complying with 
Sec.  1910.269 requirements unrelated to training. However, those 
employers would still incur training costs if they perform maintenance 
jobs, which are covered by existing Sec.  1910.269. Thus, before the 
compliance deadlines for the final rule, compliance with the training 
requirements of Sec.  1910.269 in particular is likely, even if a 
specific job involves only construction work and the employer follows 
the relevant provisions of Subpart V.
    The number of firms, if any, that do only construction work as 
defined by OSHA, and, therefore, avoid providing a basic training 
regimen for employees under existing Sec.  1910.269, is difficult to 
estimate. One Small Entity Representative (SER) estimated that about 10 
to 30 percent of contractors involved in electric power transmission 
and distribution work may exclusively do construction; another 
representative stated that it did not know of any contractor firms that 
do exclusively construction work [29].
    It is unlikely that contractors performing electric power 
generation, transmission, or distribution work meet both of the 
following criteria: (1) know and expect that, for all projects 
performed, only construction work will be done such that they do not 
need to train employees as required by existing Sec.  1910.269 and (2) 
have employees work without providing them with what many consider to 
be minimum basic safety training applicable to this type of work, as 
specified in the training requirements in existing Sec.  1910.269. Only 
contractors meeting both of these criteria will incur costs under the 
final rule for training employees who are not already receiving 
training in accordance with existing Sec.  1910.269.
    In the development of the final rule, OSHA was not able to identify 
any employers that performed work covered by Subpart V and did not 
perform work covered by Sec.  1910.269. However, carrying over 
assumptions presented in the PRIA, OSHA calculated costs based on an 
estimate that 5 percent of the affected construction employees performs 
no work covered by existing Sec.  1910.269, primarily in response to 
the recommendations of the SBREFA Panel, as discussed in the Initial 
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis. Therefore, for purposes of estimating 
the costs of compliance associated with this final rule, OSHA estimates 
that 5 percent of the affected employees in several construction 
industries will need to receive the training required by existing Sec.  
1910.269 for their employers to achieve full compliance.
    Specifically, OSHA estimates that 5 percent of the affected 
employees in the following industries will require this training: 
Water, Sewer, and Pipeline Construction; Power and Communication 
Transmission Line Construction; All Other Heavy Construction; and 
Electrical Contractors. OSHA also accounted for new hires using an 11- 
to 16-percent turnover rate, depending on the industry, and accounted 
for additional costs associated with the transition to the final rule 
in the first-year by halving the applicable turnover rate for each 
industry.\545\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \545\ For a discussion of why the FEA carried over the 
assumption, presented in the original CONSAD analysis and through 
the PRIA, of additional one-time training costs related to turnover, 
see supra, footnote 545.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    One commenter stated:

    While many contractors may be doing work covered by Sec.  
1910.269 a good many of them don't think they do or are not aware of 
it. Many if not all of their employees have never received training 
required by Sec.  1910.269. We believe that OSHA's estimate of 5% of 
contractor employees will need this training is way off. [Ex. 0186]

    The contractors to which the commenter is referring are already 
legally obligated to comply with training under Sec.  1910.269. These 
are costs the employers in question should already be bearing. The 
costs in this section only capture employers not currently required to 
comply with Sec.  1910.269.
    OSHA estimates the costs associated with the additional training 
necessary to achieve full compliance with the final rule for employees 
not already trained in accordance with Sec.  1910.269 as involving 
resources (including labor costs or other expenditures) equivalent to 
24.75 hours of employee time plus 3 minutes of clerical time per 
employee in the affected industries.\546\ The Agency also includes a 
cost for supervisor training not accounted for in the PRIA, with one 
supervisor trained for every five workers. The Agency updated the 
assumptions contained in the PRIA to reflect current costs and assumes 
that these employees will receive their training in a training course 
at $1,149 per person [28]. OSHA also updated the travel allowance of 
$90 included in the PRIA to $99 using the Bureau of Economic Analysis' 
Implicit Price Deflator for Gross Domestic Product [32]. The Agency 
estimates that the average cost of compliance per affected employee for 
the required training will range from $2,198 to $2,387 in the affected 
industries. OSHA estimates current compliance of zero for this part of 
the analysis [5]. Commenters did not question this assumption.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \546\ CONSAD estimated the additional training would be 
equivalent to 24 hours, rather than 24.75 hours, of employee time 
[5]. OSHA's estimate (which it developed in the PRIA) reflects 
additional transitional elements associated with these one-time 
costs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Thus, the Agency estimates the total one-time cost of compliance 
for providing additional training for employees not already trained in 
accordance with Sec.  1910.269 to be $9.2 million. When OSHA annualized 
this nonrecurring one-time cost at a rate of 7 percent over 10 years, 
it resulted in estimated total annualized costs of approximately $2.7 
million, as shown in Table 34. Table 34 also shows the costs of 
compliance for each affected industry.
Annual Costs for Additional Training for Employees Not Already Covered 
by Sec.  1910.269
    As noted earlier, OSHA included training costs based on an estimate 
that 5 percent of the affected construction workforce performs no work 
covered by Sec.  1910.269. Specifically, OSHA estimates that these 
training costs would affect 5 percent of the relevant workforce in the 
following industries: Water, Sewer, and Pipeline Construction; Power 
and Communication Transmission Line Construction; All Other Heavy 
Construction; and Electrical Contractors.
    OSHA estimated the annual costs associated with this additional 
training for new affected employees as involving resources (including 
labor costs or other expenditures) equivalent to 24 hours of supervisor 
and worker time plus 3 minutes of clerical time per employee. OSHA 
estimates that the average cost of compliance per affected employee for 
the required training would range from $2,198 to $741,783 in the 
affected industries.
    The Agency estimated the number of affected employees in each 
establishment needing training each year by determining the 
corresponding workforce turnover rate. OSHA estimated the workforce 
turnover rate associated with the relevant occupational category for 
each

[[Page 20590]]

potentially affected industry. The estimated turnover rates among 
employees performing electric power generation, transmission, and 
distribution work ranged from 11 to 16 percent in the affected 
construction industries [5].
    For the establishments and employees affected by the expansion of 
the scope of this training requirement, OSHA estimated current 
compliance to be zero [5].
    The total estimated annual cost of compliance for providing 
additional training for employees not already covered by Sec.  1910.269 
(and not already provided with such training) was about $0.0 million. 
Summing the annualized one-time costs and annual costs results in total 
costs of approximately $0.0 million, as shown in Table 34.

  Table 34--Annualized One-Time Costs and Annual Costs for Additional Training for Employees Not Already Receiving Training in Accordance With Existing
                                                                     Sec.   1910.269
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                             % workers                                 Annualized               Total,
                                                      Employees   Turnover   in first-   Average cost per  Compliance   one-time     Annual   annualized
        Industry code              Industry name       affected  rate  (%)     year          affected       rate  (%)  compliance    costs    and annual
                                                         (%)                transition     employee\*\                    costs                  costs
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NAICS 234910................  Water, Sewer, and               5         16           8     $2,314/$26,730       25671     $52,400         $0          $0
                               Pipeline Construction.
NAICS 234920................  Power and                       5         16           8      2,314/741,783      772533   1,514,316          0           0
                               Communication
                               Transmission Line
                               Construction.
NAICS 234930................  Industrial Nonbuilding          0         NA          NA                 NA           0           0          0           0
                               Structure
                               Construction.
NAICS 234990................  All Other Heavy                 5         16           8      2,198/150,006      156411     306,417          0           0
                               Construction.
NAICS 235310................  Electrical Contractors          5         11           6      2,387/466,573      339587     806,160          0           0
NAICS 235910................  Structural Steel                0         NA          NA                 NA           0           0          0           0
                               Erection Contractors.
NAICS 235950................  Building Equipment and          0         NA          NA                 NA           0           0          0           0
                               Other Machine
                               Installation
                               Contractors.
NAICS 235990................  All Other Special               0         NA          NA                 NA           0           0          0           0
                               Trade Contractors.
NAICS 221110................  Electric Power                  0         NA          NA                 NA           0           0          0           0
                               Generation.
NAICS 221120................  Electric Power                  0         NA          NA                 NA           0           0          0           0
                               Transmission,
                               Control, and
                               Distribution.
NAICS 2211..................  Major Publicly Owned            0         NA          NA                 NA           0           0          0           0
                               Utilities.
Various.....................  Industrial Power                0         NA          NA                 NA           0           0          0           0
                               Generators.
SIC 0783....................  Ornamental Shrub and            0         NA          NA                 NA           0           0          0           0
                               Tree Services.
                                                     ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total...................  ......................  .........  .........  ..........  .................     1294201   2,679,293          0           0
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
*The first value is the one-time cost; the second value is the annual cost.
Notes: (1) Totals may not equal the sum of the components due to rounding.
(2) ``NA'' = Not Applicable.
(3) For most NAICSs, compliance rates are for small unionized establishments, small nonunionized establishments, large unionized establishments, and
  large nonunionized establishments, respectively. Major Publicly Owned Utilities (NAICS 2211) and Ornamental Shrub and Tree Services (SIC 0783) only
  have compliance rates for small and large establishments, and Industrial Power Generators only have a compliance rate for large establishments.
Sources: CONSAD [5], U.S. Census [43, 44, 45, 46].

6. One-Time Costs for Training Qualified Employees in the Use of Fall 
Protection
    The final rule requires qualified employees climbing or changing 
location on poles, towers, or similar structures to use fall protection 
equipment unless the employer can demonstrate that climbing or changing 
location with fall protection is infeasible or creates a greater hazard 
than climbing or changing location without it. This provision requires 
the use of new types of fall protection equipment, such as positioning 
straps with built-in anchorage straps by qualified workers who climb 
poles to work on electric equipment. Qualified employees will need to 
receive brief training--OSHA estimates an hour--in the use of the new 
fall protection equipment. To estimate the ratio of workers who climb 
or change location on poles, towers, or similar structures to all 
workers in that industry, OSHA divided the number of line installers 
and repairers (51,440) in NAICS 221100 (Electric Power Generation, 
Transmission and Distribution) by the total employment in that NAICS 
(395,570) [39, 40]. OSHA assumed that the resulting value of 0.13 was 
similar across all affected NAICSs.\547\ In addition to the 13 percent 
of existing workers affected by this requirement, OSHA accounted for 
turnover and the first-year transition to the final rule, as previously 
noted.\548\ The compliance rate for this training is necessarily the 
same as the compliance rate estimated for upgrading fall protection 
equipment, that is, 50 percent across all affected NAICS. This approach 
results in estimated total one-time costs of $0.4 million and 
annualized one-time compliance costs of $0.07 million, as shown in 
Table 35. Table 35 also shows the costs of compliance for each affected 
industry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \547\ OSHA's estimates of the one-time costs for training 
qualified employees in the use of fall protection and the costs for 
upgrading positioning straps as part of work-positioning equipment 
are conservative, as OSHA based these estimates on the total number 
of line installers and repairers, including underground power-line 
installers and repairers, who generally do not need to climb or 
change location on poles, towers, or similar structures. Employers 
will generally neither need to provide and ensure the use of, nor 
provide training on, the newly required type of work-positioning 
equipment for this subset of workers.
    \548\ For a discussion of why the FEA carried over the 
assumption, presented in the original CONSAD analysis and through 
the PRIA, of additional one-time training costs related to turnover, 
see supra, footnote 545.

[[Page 20591]]



                           Table 35--Annualized One-Time Costs for Training in Use of Fall Protection for Qualified Employees
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                    % workers     Average                     Annualized
                                                                          Employees     Turnover    in first-     cost per     Compliance      one-time
             Industry code                        Industry name            affected    rate  (%)       year       affected      rate (%)      compliance
                                                                             (%)                    transition    employee                      costs
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NAICS 234910...........................  Water, Sewer, and Pipeline                0           NA           NA           NA              NA           $0
                                          Construction.
NAICS 234920...........................  Power and Communication                  13           16            8          $44     50/50/50/50       15,159
                                          Transmission Line
                                          Construction.
NAICS 234930...........................  Industrial Nonbuilding                    0           NA           NA           NA              NA            0
                                          Structure Construction.
NAICS 234990...........................  All Other Heavy Construction..            0           NA           NA           NA              NA            0
NAICS 235310...........................  Electrical Contractors........            0           NA           NA           NA              NA            0
NAICS 235910...........................  Structural Steel Erection                 0           NA           NA           NA              NA            0
                                          Contractors.
NAICS 235950...........................  Building Equipment and Other              0           NA           NA           NA              NA            0
                                          Machine Installation
                                          Contractors.
NAICS 235990...........................  All Other Special Trade                   0           NA           NA           NA              NA            0
                                          Contractors.
NAICS 221110...........................  Electric Power Generation.....           13            3            2           52     50/50/50/50       18,235
NAICS 221120...........................  Electric Power Transmission,             13            3            2           52     50/50/50/50       31,159
                                          Control, and Distribution.
NAICS 2211.............................  Major Publicly Owned Utilities           13            3            2           52           50/50        4,166
Various................................  Industrial Power Generators...            0            0            0           NA              NA            0
SIC 0783...............................  Ornamental Shrub and Tree                 0           NA           NA           NA              NA            0
                                          Services.
 
    Total..............................  ..............................  ...........  ...........  ...........  ...........  ..............       68,719
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes: (1) Totals may not equal the sum of the components due to rounding.
(2) ``NA'' = Not Applicable.
(3) For most NAICSs, compliance rates are for small unionized establishments, small nonunionized establishments, large unionized establishments, and
  large nonunionized establishments, respectively. Major Publicly Owned Utilities (NAICS 2211) and Ornamental Shrub and Tree Services (SIC 0783) only
  have compliance rates for small and large establishments, and Industrial Power Generators only have a compliance rate for large establishments.
Sources: BLS [39, 40], CONSAD [5], U.S. Census [43, 44, 45, 46].

7. Costs To Comply With Existing Sec.  1910.269 (Other Than Training) 
for Employers Not Already Covered by Sec.  1910.269
    As described earlier, OSHA believes that construction contractors 
that perform work involving electric power generation, transmission, or 
distribution generally comply with the requirements of Sec.  1910.269. 
Nevertheless, for purposes of estimating the costs of compliance 
associated with this final rule, OSHA estimated costs associated with 
complying with existing requirements in Sec.  1910.269 for some 
construction establishments. Specifically, OSHA estimates that the 
compliance costs associated with achieving full compliance with the 
requirements of existing Sec.  1910.269 for the construction industry 
will be equivalent to that represented by 5 percent of the relevant 
workforce not being in compliance with the requirements of existing 
Sec.  1910.269, which OSHA introduced in the general industry standards 
in 1994. In the PRIA, OSHA identified the affected employees as being 
in the following industries: Water, Sewer, and Pipeline Construction; 
Power and Communication Transmission Line Construction; All Other Heavy 
Construction; and Electrical Contractors. No commenters objected to 
this approach.
    In the analysis of the proposed rule published in 2005, OSHA 
estimated the resources necessary to achieve compliance with the 
relevant requirements to average about $64 per employee.\549\ This cost 
is equivalent to that associated with compliance with existing Sec.  
1910.269, as supported by the public record developed during 
promulgation of that standard (59 FR 4320). There were no comments on 
the PRIA questioning this estimate but OSHA has updated it from $64 in 
2005 dollars to $70 in 2009 dollars to account for inflation, using the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis' Implicit Price Deflator for Gross Domestic 
Product [32].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \549\ OSHA derived this cost, which represents a composite of 
the various annualized nontraining costs divided by the number of 
affected employees, from the regulatory impact analysis supporting 
the 1994 Sec.  1910.269 rulemaking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Thus, the total estimated annual costs associated with achieving 
compliance with the nontraining requirements of existing Sec.  1910.269 
for the construction industry is $0.2 million, as shown in Table 36. 
Table 36 also shows the costs of compliance for each affected 
industry.\550\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \550\ This estimated cost increased over that estimated cost in 
the PRIA because OSHA updated the unit cost and the estimates of 
power workers in the affected industries (see the approach outlined 
under the heading ``Profile of Affected Industries'').

[[Page 20592]]



 Table 36--Annual Costs To Comply With Existing Sec.   1910.269 (Other Than Training) for Employees Not Already
                                           Covered by Sec.   1910.269
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                             Average
                                                               Employees     cost per    Compliance     Annual
          Industry code                  Industry name          affected     affected    rates  (%)   compliance
                                                                  (%)        employee                   costs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NAICS 234910.....................  Water, Sewer, and                    5          $70      0/0/0/0       $4,427
                                    Pipeline Construction.
NAICS 234920.....................  Power and Communication              5           70      0/0/0/0      121,855
                                    Transmission Line
                                    Construction.
NAICS 234930.....................  Industrial Nonbuilding               0           NA           NA           NA
                                    Structure Construction.
NAICS 234990.....................  All Other Heavy                      5           70      0/0/0/0       25,941
                                    Construction.
NAICS 235310.....................  Electrical Contractors...            5           70      0/0/0/0       76,067
NAICS 235910.....................  Structural Steel Erection            0           NA           NA           NA
                                    Contractors.
NAICS 235950.....................  Building Equipment and               0           NA           NA           NA
                                    Other Machine
                                    Installation Contractors.
NAICS 235990.....................  All Other Special Trade              0           NA           NA           NA
                                    Contractors.
NAICS 221110.....................  Electric Power Generation            0           NA           NA           NA
NAICS 221120.....................  Electric Power                       0           NA           NA           NA
                                    Transmission, Control,
                                    and Distribution.
NAICS 2211.......................  Major Publicly Owned                 0           NA           NA           NA
                                    Utilities.
Various..........................  Industrial Power                     0           NA           NA           NA
                                    Generators.
SIC 0783.........................  Ornamental Shrub and Tree            0           NA           NA           NA
                                    Services.
                                                             ---------------------------------------------------
    Total........................  .........................  ...........  ...........  ...........      228,289
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes: (1) Totals may not equal the sum of the components due to rounding.
(2) ``NA'' = Not Applicable.
(3) For most NAICSs, compliance rates are for small unionized establishments, small nonunionized establishments,
  large unionized establishments, and large nonunionized establishments, respectively. Major Publicly Owned
  Utilities (NAICS 2211) and Ornamental Shrub and Tree Services (SIC 0783) only have compliance rates for small
  and large establishments, and Industrial Power Generators only have a compliance rate for large
  establishments.
Sources: CONSAD [5], U.S. Census [43, 44, 45, 46].

8. Annual Costs for Required Communications Between Host Employers and 
Contract Employers
    The final rule requires specific communications between host 
employers and contract employers. These requirements would apply for 
each project performed by a contractor.\551\ For a complete discussion 
of the host-contractor provisions of the final rule, see relevant 
discussion for Sec.  1926.950(c) in Section V, Summary and Explanation 
of the Final Rule, earlier in this preamble.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \551\ Final Sec.  1926.968 defines ``contract employer'' as 
``[a]n employer, other than a host employer, that performs work 
covered by Subpart V of this part under contract.'' That section 
also defines ``host employer'' as ``[a]n employer that operates, or 
that controls the operating procedures for, an electric power 
generation, transmission, or distribution installation on which a 
contract employer is performing work covered by Subpart V of this 
part.'' Thus, under the final rule the contract employer (also 
called ``contractor'' in the FEA) is not always under contract to a 
host employer. However, to simplify the analysis of costs under the 
final rule, the FEA assumes that every contract employer is working 
under contract to a host employer. This simplifying assumption 
should have a negligible effect on costs since contract employers 
will almost always be working for host employers and, in the 
remaining cases, the host employer and the contract employer (which 
is working for a different entity) must still exchange information.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Contractors perform an estimated 4,596,731 projects for host 
employers annually. Contractors in establishments classified in the 
Power and Communication Transmission Line Construction industry perform 
about 1,701,656 of those projects, and contractors in establishments 
classified in the Electrical Contractors industry perform another 
1,247,104 of those projects [5, updated by OSHA].\552\ OSHA estimates 
that the requirements for communications between host employers and 
contract employers will affect 50 percent of projects performed by 
contractors from small establishments and 100 percent of projects 
performed by contractors from large establishments. Furthermore, OSHA 
estimates that between 50 and 90 percent of these projects are already 
in compliance.\553\ This compliance rate results in a total of 932,061 
projects that will incur costs under the rule. The final requirements 
will not affect projects performed by host employers without the use of 
contract employers, so only projects performed by contract employers 
result in costs for host employers. To calculate the projects for which 
hosts will incur costs, OSHA relied on CONSAD's [5] estimate of the 
percentage of projects performed using contractors, as shown in Table 
37.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \552\ OSHA used CONSAD's approach to estimating the number of 
projects. That is, the estimated number of projects per year for a 
given industry is equal to the number of crews (that is, the number 
of power workers divided by the crew size) multiplied by the number 
of projects per crew per day (that is, one project), multiplied by 
the number of workdays per year (250). For most industries, OSHA 
estimates that a crew consists of three power workers at small 
establishments and six power workers at large establishments. For 
Ornamental Shrub and Tree Services (SIC 0783), however, OSHA 
estimates that a crew consists of two workers at a small 
establishment and four workers at a large establishment [5].
    \553\ OSHA notes that there are no costs associated with the 
provision in the final rule requiring the contract employer and the 
host employer to coordinate their work rules and procedures so that 
each employee of the contract employer and the host employer is 
protected. Because such coordination is essential for the reliable 
operation of electric power generation, transmission, and 
distribution systems, OSHA anticipates that host employers and 
contract employers are virtually in 100-percent compliance already.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some projects will be sufficiently simple, straightforward, and 
routine as to avoid the need for additional communication beyond what 
was already occurring between host employers and their contractors 
before the promulgation of the final rule. The new communication 
requirements will not affect an estimated 50 percent of the projects 
performed by establishments with fewer than 20 employees [5]. OSHA 
determined that these requirements will affect all projects performed 
by establishments with 20 or more employees [id.]
    OSHA estimated the costs associated with these provisions as 
involving resources (including labor costs or other expenditures) 
equivalent to 10 minutes of supervisory time each for the host employer 
and the contractor on affected projects involving establishments with 
fewer than 20 employees and involving resources equivalent to 15 
minutes of supervisory time each for the host employer and the 
contractor on affected projects involving establishments with 20 or 
more employees [5].\554\ OSHA also

[[Page 20593]]

estimates that the average cost of compliance for contractors 
associated with the host-contractor provisions will range from $4.87 to 
$10.62 per affected project. The corresponding cost of compliance for 
utilities (host employers) associated with these requirements range 
from $8.43 to $12.65 per affected project.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \554\ OSHA's estimates include the time for gathering, as well 
as disseminating, the required information. The Agency believes that 
host employers will most likely gather the required information for 
each contract as a whole, instead of gathering the information for 
each project, as this approach to gathering information would be the 
most cost-effective approach. Thus, the costs of gathering 
information would be distributed over all projects covered by each 
contract. Information on the safety aspects of the project should 
flow from the purely technical aspects of the project, for which 
consultation should be a logical outcome, thereby resulting in 
limited and incidental additional burden.
    The final rule's time estimates are likely conservative. OSHA 
retained its estimates from the proposal. However, OSHA also revised 
the host-contractor requirements in the final rule in response to 
numerous comments, including comments from the Small Business 
Administration's Office of Advocacy (Ex. 0207). The revisions should 
lower compliance burdens and reduce costs for host employers and 
contract employers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    OSHA estimates that the communications required by the final rule 
already occur for most affected projects. Employers involved in an 
estimated 50 percent of the affected projects performed by smaller 
establishments are already in compliance with the final requirements, 
and an estimated 75 to 90 percent of the affected projects performed by 
larger contractors are also already in compliance. These projects will 
incur no additional costs to achieve compliance with the final host-
contractor provisions. No commenter questioned these estimates of 
current compliance, originally developed by CONSAD for the PRIA [5].
    Thus, OSHA estimates the total annual cost of compliance associated 
with the final host-contractor provisions to be approximately $17.8 
million, as shown in Table 37. This total represents an increase from 
the PRIA due to a general increase in the number of contractor projects 
performed annually; furthermore, for reasons discussed in the summary 
and explanation for final Sec.  1926.950(c), in Section V, Summary and 
Explanation of the Final Rule, earlier in this preamble, the increase 
also results from accounting for the percentage of projects affected in 
the Ornamental Shrub and Tree Services industry. Table 37 also shows 
the costs of compliance for each affected industry.
    EEI questioned OSHA's cost estimate for the host-contractor 
requirements in the proposed rule (Ex. 0501). EEI's first objection was 
that ``CONSAD gave no attention to the host-contractor provisions when 
assessing the risk to be addressed by the standard.''
    OSHA does not find that the extent to which the host-contractor 
provisions obviate risk has any bearing on the reasonableness of the 
estimated cost of complying with these provisions.
    EEI's second objection was that ``the nature of such communications 
varies widely [depending on] the nature of the particular work being 
performed, and the relative size of the owners and contractors 
involved.''
    As explained previously under the summary and explanation for final 
Sec.  1926.950(c), in Section V, Summary and Explanation of the Final 
Rule, earlier in this preamble, OSHA revised the host-contractor 
provisions to more clearly define the information that hosts and 
contractors must exchange. With the host-contractor requirements now 
more clearly defined, OSHA believes that the 10 to 15 minutes of 
supervisory time used to estimate the costs of these provisions are 
reasonable. The Agency notes that neither EEI nor any other commenter 
provided specific information that would enable the Agency to revise 
its estimate.

                                Table 37--Annual Costs for Required Communications Between Host Employers and Contractors
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                             Projects
                                                Contractor   affected               Contractor   Host % of     Host     Cost per   Cost per     Annual
      Industry code           Industry name      projects      (%)      Compliance   projects   contractor   projects   project    project    compliance
                                                 performed    small/    rate  (%)    affected      work      affected    (small     (large      costs
                                                 annually*    large                                                      est.)      est.)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                       Contractors
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NAICS 234910.............  Water, Sewer, and        65,078     50/100  50/50/75/75      16,270          NA         NA      $7.06     $10.59     $150,214
                            Pipeline
                            Construction.
NAICS 234920.............  Power and             1,701,656     50/100  65/65/90/90     208,292          NA         NA       7.06      10.59    1,891,463
                            Communication
                            Transmission Line
                            Construction.
NAICS 234930.............  Industrial               78,017     50/100  50/50/75/75      19,504          NA         NA       7.05      10.57      204,286
                            Nonbuilding
                            Structure
                            Construction.
NAICS 234990.............  All Other Heavy         410,541     50/100  50/50/75/75     102,635          NA         NA       6.97      10.45      894,356
                            Construction.
NAICS 235310.............  Electrical            1,247,104     50/100  50/50/75/75     311,776          NA         NA       7.08      10.62    2,702,235
                            Contractors.
NAICS 235910.............  Structural Steel         21,066     50/100  50/50/75/75       5,267          NA         NA       7.04      10.57       47,763
                            Erection
                            Contractors.
NAICS 235950.............  Building Equipment       19,739     50/100  50/50/75/75       4,935          NA         NA       7.08      10.62       44,957
                            and Other Machine
                            Installation
                            Contractors.
NAICS 235990.............  All Other Special        62,701     50/100  50/50/75/75      15,675          NA         NA       6.92      10.39      124,535
                            Trade Contractors.
SIC 0783.................  Ornamental Shrub        990,830     50/100        50/75     247,707          NA         NA       4.87       7.30    1,749,688
                            and Tree Services.
                                               ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Contractor Subtotal..  ...................   4,596,731  .........  ...........     932,061  ..........  .........  .........  .........    7,809,497
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                     Host Employers
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NAICS 221110.............  Electric Power       ..........  .........  ...........  ..........          23    217,357       8.43      12.65    2,397,541
                            Generation.
NAICS 221120.............  Electric Power       ..........  .........  ...........  ..........          62    579,649       8.43      12.65    6,393,786
                            Transmission,
                            Control, and
                            Distribution.

[[Page 20594]]

 
NAICS 2211...............  Major Publicly       ..........  .........  ...........  ..........           6     51,823       8.43      12.65      571,626
                            Owned Utilities.
Various..................  Industrial Power     ..........  .........  ...........  ..........           9     83,233         NA      12.65      648,391
                            Generators.
                                               ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Various Host Employer  ...................  ..........  .........  ...........  ..........  ..........    932,061  .........  .........   10,011,344
     Subtotal.
                                               ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total................  ...................  ..........  .........  ...........  ..........  ..........    932,061  .........  .........   17,820,841
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* The table excludes projects performed directly by host employer utilities as they do not involve communications between host employers and
  contractors. The costs to utilities consist of costs to communicate with contractors on the projects contractors perform for utilities.
Notes: (1) Totals may not equal the sum of the components due to rounding.
(2) ``NA'' = Not Applicable.
(3) For most NAICSs, compliance rates are for small unionized establishments, small nonunionized establishments, large unionized establishments, and
  large nonunionized establishments, respectively. Major Publicly Owned Utilities (NAICS 2211) and Ornamental Shrub and Tree Services (SIC 0783) only
  have compliance rates for small and large establishments, and Industrial Power Generators only have a compliance rate for large establishments.
Sources: CONSAD [5], U.S. Census [43, 44, 45, 46].

9. Annual Costs Associated With Expanded Requirements for Job Briefings
    The final rule expands existing requirements for employers to 
conduct job briefings before employees begin work on affected projects. 
Specifically, the final rule requires affected employers to provide the 
employee in charge of the job with all available information that 
relates to the determination of existing characteristics and conditions 
that the crew must complete.
    OSHA estimates that employers perform 9,953,249 projects in the 
construction, utility, power generation, and line-clearance tree-
trimming industries annually [5, updated by OSHA]. Of these employers, 
the industries with the highest annual compliance costs, the Power and 
Communication Transmission Line Construction industry and the 
Electrical Contractors industry, perform an estimated 1,701,656 
projects and 1,247,104 projects, respectively (id.). While the final 
rule potentially affects 100 percent of all 9,953,249 projects, between 
85 and 98 percent of the projects are already in compliance [5].
    Employers can achieve compliance with the final rule through the 
following small addition to routine communications that already take 
place regularly between employers and employees involved in the 
affected projects. Specifically, OSHA estimates the costs of compliance 
associated with the final job-briefing requirement to involve resources 
(including labor costs or other expenditures) equivalent to 5 minutes 
of supervisory time and 5 minutes of employee time for each employee on 
each affected project [5].\555\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \555\ Consistent with the assumption on the number of total 
employees per project, the costs also reflect one supervisor per 
project, plus two regular employees per project at small 
establishments, and five regular employees at large establishments, 
except in Ornamental Shrub and Tree Services (SIC 0783), where it is 
one regular employee at small establishments and three at large 
establishments. OSHA's cost estimate is probably overly 
conservative. OSHA believes that it should not, on average, take any 
additional time (over the time already required to conduct a job 
briefing under existing Sec.  1910.269) for the employee in charge 
to brief the rest of the employees about the information the 
employer must supply the employee in charge pursuant to the final 
rule. In fact, in some cases, the final rule could reduce the time 
needed to conduct a job briefing. For example, if the employer tells 
the employee in charge that a utility pole on the job is cracked and 
that the pole's ability to support additional weight is suspect, the 
employee in charge would no longer need to go over the pole 
inspection in as much detail, although the employee in charge would 
have to discuss pole-bracing procedures, during the job briefing. If 
the employer had not reported this information, the employee in 
charge would cover the pole inspection, but not bracing procedures, 
during the job briefing. However, after the employees discovered the 
crack, the employee in charge would need to hold a second job 
briefing (and expend additional time) to go over the bracing 
procedures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Thus, OSHA estimates that the average cost of compliance associated 
with the final requirements for job briefings will be $8.48 to $21.21 
per affected project performed by utilities, other power generators, 
and construction contractors. The estimated average cost of compliance 
for projects performed by establishments in the Ornamental Shrub and 
Tree Services industry is about $4.20 to $7.75 per project.
    For the PRIA, based on research by CONSAD, OSHA estimated that 
employers already provide the required information to the employee in 
charge for most affected projects. Commenters on the proposal did not 
question these assumptions. OSHA estimates that employers (other than 
utilities and other power generators) involved in an estimated 85 
percent of the affected projects performed by establishments with fewer 
than 20 employees are already in compliance with the final 
requirements, while employers (other than utilities and other power 
generators) involved in an estimated 95 percent of the affected 
projects performed by establishments with 20 or more employees also are 
already in compliance with the final requirements [5]. Among utilities 
and other power generators, an estimated 95 percent to 98 percent of 
the potentially affected projects involve employers already fully in 
compliance with the final provisions [id.]. For projects already in 
compliance, employers will incur no additional costs to achieve 
compliance with the final rule [id.].
    The total estimated annual cost of compliance associated with the 
final requirement to provide information to the employee in charge is, 
thus, approximately $6.7 million, as shown in Table 38. Table 38 also 
shows the costs of compliance for each affected industry.

[[Page 20595]]



                                                  Table 38--Annual Costs Associated With Job Briefings
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                        Projects     Cost per     Cost per
                                                                           Projects     affected     project      project      Compliance       Annual
             Industry code                        Industry name           performed    (%) small/     (small       (large       rate  (%)     compliance
                                                                           annually      large        est.)        est.)                        costs
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NAICS 234910...........................  Water, Sewer, and Pipeline           65,078      100/100        $9.29       $17.92     85/85/95/95      $70,743
                                          Construction.
NAICS 234920...........................  Power and Communication           1,701,656      100/100         9.29        17.92     85/85/95/95    1,777,657
                                          Transmission Line
                                          Construction.
NAICS 234930...........................  Industrial Nonbuilding               78,017      100/100         9.28        17.92     85/85/95/95       70,999
                                          Structure Construction.
NAICS 234990...........................  All Other Heavy Construction..      410,541      100/100         8.48        15.98     85/85/95/95      424,921
NAICS 235310...........................  Electrical Contractors........    1,247,104      100/100         9.79        19.16     85/85/95/95    1,545,162
NAICS 235910...........................  Structural Steel Erection            21,066      100/100         9.77        19.14     85/85/95/95       24,717
                                          Contractors.
NAICS 235950...........................  Building Equipment and Other         19,739      100/100         9.79        19.16     85/85/95/95       23,197
                                          Machine Installation
                                          Contractors.
NAICS 235990...........................  All Other Special Trade              62,701      100/100         8.58        16.26     85/85/95/95       71,957
                                          Contractors.
NAICS 221110...........................  Electric Power Generation.....    1,582,025      100/100        11.01        21.21     95/95/98/98      675,284
NAICS 221120...........................  Electric Power Transmission,      2,689,805      100/100        11.01        21.21     95/95/98/98    1,144,815
                                          Control, and Distribution.
NAICS 2211.............................  Major Publicly Owned Utilities      360,869      100/100        11.01        21.21           95/98      153,887
Various................................  Industrial Power Generators...      723,820      100/100        21.21        21.21              98      306,992
SIC 0783...............................  Ornamental Shrub and Tree           990,830      100/100         4.20         7.75           85/95      407,227
                                          Services.
                                                                        --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total..............................  ..............................    9,953,249  ...........  ...........  ...........  ..............    6,697,557
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes: (1) Totals may not equal the sum of the components due to rounding.
(2) For most NAICSs, compliance rates are for small unionized establishments, small nonunionized establishments, large unionized establishments, and
  large nonunionized establishments, respectively. Major Publicly Owned Utilities (NAICS 2211) and Ornamental Shrub and Tree Services (SIC 0783) only
  have compliance rates for small and large establishments, and Industrial Power Generators only have a compliance rate for large establishments.
Sources: CONSAD [5], U.S. Census [43, 44, 45, 46].

10. Costs Associated With Arc-Hazard Assessment
    Paragraph (g)(1) of final Sec.  1926.960 requires the employer to 
assess employee workplace exposures to hazards from flames or from 
electric arcs. Paragraph (g)(2) of final Sec.  1926.960 requires the 
employer to make a reasonable estimate, for each exposed employee, of 
the incident heat energy associated with hazards from electric arcs. 
The FEA estimates the cost for both provisions simultaneously in this 
section because, as part of the effort to calculate incident energy, 
the employer necessarily must assess the hazards to employees. The FEA 
also uses the term ``arc-hazard assessment'' to refer to both 
requirements.
    For the proposed rule, the PRIA used an approach based on the 
CONSAD report [5], calculating annual costs on a per-project and per-
employee basis. Some commenters questioned this approach, which 
projected a cost of $2 per project. (See, for example, Exs. 0208, 
0505.) OSHA modified the PRIA methodology for arc-hazard assessment and 
instead is calculating primarily one-time costs on a per-firm basis. 
OSHA modified the methodology because it is not necessary to 
recalculate the costs for each project; the Agency believes that, 
except with respect to power generation installations as discussed 
later, a system-wide calculation is a more logical outcome of the 
rule.\556\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \556\ Since employers do not need to perform extensive 
recalculations of their systems annually, as assumed in the PRIA, 
the estimated annualized cost of this provision is substantially 
less than the estimated cost in the PRIA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    OSHA also is not accounting for costs to contractors in the final 
rule (a second modification from the PRIA). The Agency believes that, 
as utilities will need to perform the calculations on their own systems 
either in-house or using engineering consultants, utilities will 
provide information on potential heat energy to contractors, even 
though the final rule does not explicitly require utilities to do so. 
Otherwise, host employers would incur costs associated with those 
estimates twice, once when the host employer generates the estimate and 
a second time when the contractor passes the costs of generating the 
estimate back to the host employer.
    As in the PRIA, OSHA estimates that 75 percent of small utilities 
and 85 percent of large utilities already performed the necessary 
calculations and will not incur costs under the rule. For the remaining 
utilities, which will have to estimate the available heat energy that 
would result from electric arcs, the approach will likely vary 
depending on the size of the utility. OSHA believes that small 
utilities would likely hire a consultant to perform the calculations 
for them, while large utilities would likely use commercially available 
software and perform the calculations in-house.
    OSHA estimates that the 25 percent of small utilities that do not 
already perform the calculations will hire a consultant to provide 
estimates of incident-heat-energy exposures. OSHA estimates that it 
will take a consultant 28 hours to perform the calculations at a rate 
of $250 per hour, for an average cost of $7000 per affected utility and 
a total of approximately $1.2 million for all affected small 
utilities.\557\ When OSHA annualized this cost at 7 percent over 10 
years, it results in annualized costs for affected small utilities of 
approximately $0.03 million.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \557\ While small utilities have the option of using the tables 
OSHA provides, this FEA conservatively assumed they will use the 
more expensive option of hiring consultants.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Large utilities are more likely than small utilities to face 
situations not

[[Page 20596]]

covered by the tables in Appendix E. These utilities can perform the 
calculations using several different methods. The proposed rule allowed 
employers to use Allen Privette's Heat Flux Calculator, a free software 
program widely available on the Internet, to perform the calculations. 
After considering comments from rulemaking participants, OSHA 
determined that the Heat Flux Calculator is not a reasonable method for 
estimating incident energy regardless of exposure or voltage. (See the 
discussion of final Sec.  1926.960(g)(2) in Section V, Summary and 
Explanation of the Final Rule, earlier in this preamble.) Many 
utilities already use a more reliable means of calculating incident 
heat energy, but some utilities will have to buy software to estimate 
incident heat energy. OSHA estimates that 15 percent of large utilities 
will need to purchase software, at a cost of approximately $2,500 per 
firm [7].
    For the large utilities buying software, an engineer will have to 
input parameters into the software to determine the incident-heat 
energy that would result from electric arcs. These parameters include 
fault current, the expected length of the electric arc, the distance 
from the arc to the employee, and the clearing time for the fault. OSHA 
estimates that performing this task for all affected large-utility 
employees will require 500 engineering hours per affected firm, at the 
estimated hourly rate for an engineer of $47.17. This determination 
results in engineering costs of $25,970 per affected firm, and total 
engineering costs for all affected firms of $6.5 million. Consistent 
with the ratio of engineering time to clerical time used in the PRIA, 
these same firms will also incur clerical costs, equivalent to 25 hours 
of clerical time at a wage of $28.75 per hour, or $719 per utility. 
This determination results in total clerical costs for all affected 
firms of approximately $0.2 million. Summing software, engineering 
labor, and clerical labor costs for all affected large firms results in 
total costs of $6.7 million and annualized costs of $2.1 million.
    TVA estimated that costs should be about $300 per employee (Ex. 
0213). The PRIA estimated 2 hours of engineering time per employee and 
$2 per project.\558\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \558\ OSHA believes that (with the exception of power generation 
facilities, as discussed later) it likely overestimated the cost of 
performing the calculations, particularly with respect to 
distribution installations. This belief is based in part on expert 
opinion provided to ERG, which suggested that the calculations would 
require substantially fewer hours than indicated by TVA [8].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Agency concluded that, because electric utilities will likely 
perform calculations on a per-circuit, rather than per-project or per-
employee, basis and because the number of circuits operated by a 
utility is generally proportional to the size of that utility, the 
costs should be based on the number of hours the utility will take to 
perform the calculations as determined by the size of the utility. 
Consequently, the per-employee basis used by TVA and the per-employee 
and per-project basis used by the PRIA are generally unsuitable for 
estimating costs related to calculating incident energy.
    However, TVA's description of the methodology it used in 
calculating incident energy suggests that TVA included costs associated 
with lowering incident energy at a nuclear power generation plant. As 
explained in the summary and explanation for final Sec.  
1926.960(g)(5), in Section V, Summary and Explanation of the Final 
Rule, earlier in this preamble, OSHA believes that any such measures 
requiring substantial expenditures are likely to be necessary only for 
electric power generation installations. To account for the costs of 
adopting incident-energy-control measures for electric power generation 
installations, OSHA included costs for reducing incident-energy 
exposures that, when combined with OSHA's estimated costs for 
calculating incident energy, correspond to TVA's estimate of $300 per 
employee for firms in industries with generation installations.
    Thus, OSHA included costs in this FEA to account for additional 
engineering controls that employers with power generation installations 
might need to implement to reduce the incident energy of particular 
circuits to no more than 100 cal/cm\2\ (the maximum level for which 
protective clothing and equipment are generally available). Such 
engineering controls might include installing current-limiting devices, 
resetting circuit breaker trip devices, and using remote control 
operating and test equipment.
    To estimate the cost of these potential engineering controls, OSHA 
relied on the TVA estimate that the arc-hazard assessment will cost 
about $300 per employee. For each relevant industry affected by the 
need to implement these potential controls (the utilities in the 
Electric Power Generation industry (NAICS 221100), all Industrial Power 
Generators (Various NAICS), and Major Publicly-Owned Utilities (NAICS 
2211) judged to operate power generation installations), TVA's total 
estimated costs for the arc-hazard assessment were higher than the 
costs estimated by OSHA for this assessment. OSHA attributed the 
difference in cost between the two estimates to the additional 
engineering controls that OSHA identified for the final rule. TVA 
stated in its comments to the proposed rule that TVA based its 
estimates ``on all circuits'' (including, presumably, circuits that 
require a reduction in incident energy using engineering controls) and 
that its estimates did not include the cost of purchasing arc-flash 
protective equipment (Ex. 0213).
    To account for the additional engineering control costs, OSHA 
increased the cost of the arc-hazard assessments (which include the 
cost for engineering controls) for utilities having power generation 
installations above what OSHA already estimated for the assessment so 
that the total averaged $300 per power worker employee, consistent with 
TVA's cost estimate. (For example, for a given industry, if the cost of 
the arc-hazard assessment, without the engineering controls adjustment, 
amounted to $150 per employee, OSHA increased the cost by $150 per 
employee to account for the adjustment.) OSHA also assumed that 
existing compliance rates associated with these engineering controls 
are identical to the compliance rates estimated for the unadjusted arc-
hazard assessment (that is, the compliance rate estimated for the arc-
hazard assessment without the addition of engineering controls).
    To calculate the percentage of firms in the Major Publicly-Owned 
Utilities industry that operate generating plants (and thus power 
generation installations), OSHA first cross-referenced OSHA's estimate 
of 277 firms that are in the Major Publicly-Owned Utilities industry 
against the 2008 EIA Form 860 database, which provides a nationwide 
census of generating plants by owner [49]. This comparison showed that 
106 of the firms that are in the Major Publicly-Owned Utilities 
industry and that are under the scope of the final rule own generating 
plants. OSHA then assumed that the distribution by size of this subset 
would mirror that of the entire Major Publicly-Owned Utilities 
population, resulting in an estimated 13 small firms and 93 large firms 
that are Major Publicly-Owned Utilities with generating facilities.
    As indicated in Table 39, the Agency estimates that the annualized 
one-time cost for these engineering controls is approximately $26,737 
for small firms and $2,123,110 for large firms, for a total of 
$2,149,847 for all affected firms.
    Summing software costs, engineering labor, clerical labor, 
consulting, and incident-energy reduction costs for both

[[Page 20597]]

small and large firms results in total estimated costs for all affected 
firms of $10.6 million. When this one-time cost is annualized at a 7-
percent interest rate over 10 years, the resulting annualized costs are 
approximately $1.5 million as shown in Table 39. Table 39 also shows 
the costs of compliance for each affected industry.
    TVA asserted that the costs associated with arc-hazard assessments 
recur annually (Ex. 0213). TVA indicated that performing such a 
calculation, while time consuming initially, is not nearly as time 
consuming when performed on an ongoing basis. TVA suggested the ongoing 
cost would be only 3 percent of the initial cost (id.).
    As explained later, the Agency took a more conservative approach by 
assuming annual ongoing costs of 10 percent of the initial cost. This 
approach includes an annual assessment to examine any changes in 
conditions and the costs of a potential recalculation of the system. 
(See Table 40.)
    One commenter suggested that liability costs would rise due to 
consultants underestimating incident heat energy (Ex. 0178).
    OSHA believes that this comment is speculative and without merit. 
Moreover, as a practical matter, the typical consultant would likely 
carry personal liability insurance and, therefore, factors this cost 
into his or her consulting fees (which the Agency is assuming will be 
$250 an hour, on average). Also, the commenter did not establish why 
these determinations present a new source of liability, as firms 
(whether consultants or utilities) that perform such calculations now 
are liable for any flawed estimates given to others.
    Another commenter suggested that electrical contractors may find it 
especially demanding to comply with the arc-hazard assessment provision 
because of the difficulties involved in training a highly mobile 
workforce to understand a constantly changing variety of electrical 
systems and because of the difficulties resulting from contractors' 
working for a variety of utilities (Ex. 0501).
    OSHA believes that the commenter's concerns are groundless. First, 
as stated earlier, the Agency accounted for any costs related to 
training and included in its calculations the costs specific to each 
affected industry. Second, as also stated earlier, the Agency expects 
that host employers will pass information related to potential heat-
energy hazards to the contractors during the exchange of information 
between host employers and contract employers, as doing so is in their 
economic self-interest. As such, varying work situations and a mobile 
workforce should not pose major issues for contractors.\559\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \559\ The commenter also stated that electrical contractors 
would incur a special burden in conjunction with the final rule's 
arc-flash protective equipment requirements. As discussed later, the 
Agency is costing eight pairs of flame-resistant clothing, which 
should be sufficient to cover the different situations contractors 
might face.

                                        Table 39--Annualized One-Time Costs Associated With Arc-Hazard Assessment
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                        Firms using                             Incident-       Total
                                                                            Compliance   consultant   Consulting     Total        energy     annualized
              Industry code                        Industry name            rate  (%)      (% of      hours per    consulting   reduction   costs--small
                                                                                           small)        firm        costs        costs         firms
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                       Small Firms
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NAICS 234910............................  Water, Sewer, and Pipeline                NA           NA           NA           NA           NA            NA
                                           Construction.
NAICS 234920............................  Power and Communication                   NA           NA           NA           NA           NA            NA
                                           Transmission Line Construction.
NAICS 234930............................  Industrial Nonbuilding                    NA           NA           NA           NA           NA            NA
                                           Structure Construction.
NAICS 234990............................  All Other Heavy Construction...           NA           NA           NA           NA           NA            NA
NAICS 235310............................  Electrical Contractors.........           NA           NA           NA           NA           NA            NA
NAICS 235910............................  Structural Steel Erection                 NA           NA           NA           NA           NA            NA
                                           Contractors.
NAICS 235950............................  Building Equipment and Other              NA           NA           NA           NA           NA            NA
                                           Machine Installation
                                           Contractors.
NAICS 235990............................  All Other Special Trade                   NA           NA           NA           NA           NA            NA
                                           Contractors.
NAICS 221110............................  Electric Power Generation......           75           25           28     $553,000      $25,461       $82,360
NAICS 221120............................  Electric Power Transmission,              75           25           28      563,500           NA        80,230
                                           Control, and Distribution.
NAICS 2211..............................  Major Publicly Owned Utilities.           75           25           28       57,750        1,276         8,404
Various.................................  Industrial Power Generators....           NA           NA           NA           NA           NA             0
SIC 0783................................  Ornamental Shrub and Tree                 NA           NA           NA           NA           NA            NA
                                           Services.
                                                                          ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total...............................  ...............................  ...........  ...........  ...........    1,174,250       26,737       170,994
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


[[Page 20598]]


                                                            Table 39--Annualized One-Time Costs Associated With Arc-Hazard Assessment
                                                                                           [Continued]
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                        Firms
                                                                     purchasing   Software      Total     Firms with  Engineering     Total      Clerical      Total     Incident-      Total
        Industry code               Industry name        Compliance    software   cost per    software   engineering   hours per   engineering   hours per   clerical     energy     annualized
                                                          rate  (%)     (% of       firm        cost      hours  (%       firm         costs       firm        costs     reduction  costs--large
                                                                       large)                             of large)                                                        costs        firms
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                           Large Firms
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NAICS 234910................  Water, Sewer, and                  NA          NA          NA          NA           NA           NA           NA          NA          NA          NA           NA
                               Pipeline Construction.
NAICS 234920................  Power and Communication            NA          NA          NA          NA           NA           NA           NA          NA          NA          NA           NA
                               Transmission Line
                               Construction.
NAICS 234930................  Industrial Nonbuilding             NA          NA          NA          NA           NA           NA           NA          NA          NA          NA           NA
                               Structure Construction.
NAICS 234990................  All Other Heavy                    NA          NA          NA          NA           NA           NA           NA          NA          NA          NA           NA
                               Construction.
NAICS 235310................  Electrical Contractors...          NA          NA          NA          NA           NA           NA           NA          NA          NA          NA           NA
NAICS 235910................  Structural Steel Erection          NA          NA          NA          NA           NA           NA           NA          NA          NA          NA           NA
                               Contractors.
NAICS 235950................  Building Equipment and             NA          NA          NA          NA           NA           NA           NA          NA          NA          NA           NA
                               Other Machine
                               Installation Contractors.
NAICS 235990................  All Other Special Trade            NA          NA          NA          NA           NA           NA           NA          NA          NA          NA           NA
                               Contractors.
NAICS 221110................  Electric Power Generation          85          15      $2,500    $116,250           15          500   $1,207,532          25     $33,424  $1,388,374     $390,909
NAICS 221120................  Electric Power                     85          15       2,500     341,250           15          500    3,544,692          25      98,115          NA      567,240
                               Transmission, Control,
                               and Distribution.
NAICS 2211..................  Major Publicly Owned               85          15       2,500      91,500           15          500      950,445          25      26,308      82,382      163,825
                               Utilities.
Various.....................  Industrial Power                   85          15       2,500      73,875           15          500      767,367          25      21,240     652,353      215,679
                               Generators.
SIC 0783....................  Ornamental Shrub and Tree          NA          NA          NA          NA           NA           NA           NA          NA          NA          NA           NA
                               Services.
                                                        ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total...................  .........................  ..........  ..........  ..........     622,875  ...........  ...........    6,470,036  ..........     179,088   2,123,110    1,337,652
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


[[Page 20599]]


     Table 39--Annualized One-Time Costs Associated With Arc-Hazard
                               Assessment
                               [Continued]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                Total
                                                              annualized
         Industry code                 Industry name          costs--all
                                                                firms
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                All Firms
------------------------------------------------------------------------
NAICS 234910..................  Water, Sewer, and Pipeline            NA
                                 Construction.
NAICS 234920..................  Power and Communication               NA
                                 Transmission Line
                                 Construction.
NAICS 234930..................  Industrial Nonbuilding                NA
                                 Structure Construction.
NAICS 234990..................  All Other Heavy                       NA
                                 Construction.
NAICS 235310..................  Electrical Contractors.....           NA
NAICS 235910..................  Structural Steel Erection             NA
                                 Contractors.
NAICS 235950..................  Building Equipment and                NA
                                 Other Machine Installation
                                 Contractors.
NAICS 235990..................  All Other Special Trade               NA
                                 Contractors.
NAICS 221110..................  Electric Power Generation..      473,269
NAICS 221120..................  Electric Power                   647,470
                                 Transmission, Control, and
                                 Distribution.
NAICS 2211....................  Major Publicly Owned             172,228
                                 Utilities.
Various.......................  Industrial Power Generators      215,679
SIC 0783......................  Ornamental Shrub and Tree             NA
                                 Services.
                                                            ------------
    Total.....................  ...........................    1,508,646
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes: (1) Totals may not equal the sum of the components due to
  rounding.
(2) ``NA'' = Not Applicable.
(3) All Industrial Power Generators are large establishments.
Sources: ERG estimates, Cress [7], U.S. Census [43, 44, 45, 46].

    OSHA also accounted for the periodic costs associated with updating 
arc-hazard assessments, as necessary. As explained in discussion of 
final Sec.  1926.960(g)(2) in Section V, Summary and Explanation of the 
Final Rule, earlier in this preamble, while commenters' concerns that 
employers would need to constantly update their incident-energy 
estimates are baseless, periodic updates may be necessary under certain 
limited circumstances. As mentioned earlier, OSHA estimates that this 
periodic labor cost is equal to 10 percent of the total one-time 
consulting, engineering, and clerical costs indicated in Table 39. When 
OSHA annualized the present value of this recurring labor cost \560\ at 
7 percent over 10 years, total annualized costs for all affected 
industries are $0.7 million. When OSHA included these periodic costs 
with the one-time arc-hazard assessment costs calculated earlier, total 
annualized arc-hazard assessment costs are approximately $2.2 million, 
as shown in Table 40.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \560\ OSHA computed the present value for 9 years of costs, 
beginning with the year after the arc-hazard assessment provision 
goes into effect and lasting through year 10.

                     Table 40--Total Annualized Costs Associated With Arc-Hazard Assessment
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                       Total
                                                   Annual labor    Present value       Total      annualized arc-
       Industry code            Industry name     costs (years 2- of labor costs    annualized        hazard
                                                        10)        (years 2-10)    updating cost    assessment
                                                                                                       costs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NAICS 234910...............  Water, Sewer, and                NA              NA              NA              NA
                              Pipeline
                              Construction.
NAICS 234920...............  Power and                        NA              NA              NA              NA
                              Communication
                              Transmission Line
                              Construction.
NAICS 234930...............  Industrial                       NA              NA              NA              NA
                              Nonbuilding
                              Structure
                              Construction.
NAICS 234990...............  All Other Heavy                  NA              NA              NA              NA
                              Construction.
NAICS 235310...............  Electrical                       NA              NA              NA              NA
                              Contractors.
NAICS 235910...............  Structural Steel                 NA              NA              NA              NA
                              Erection
                              Contractors.
NAICS 235950...............  Building Equipment               NA              NA              NA              NA
                              and Other Machine
                              Installation
                              Contractors.
NAICS 235990...............  All Other Special                NA              NA              NA              NA
                              Trade Contractors.
NAICS 221110...............  Electric Power             $179,396      $1,092,340        $155,525        $628,793
                              Generation.
NAICS 221120...............  Electric Power              420,631       2,561,221         364,660       1,012,130
                              Transmission,
                              Control, and
                              Distribution.
NAICS 2211.................  Major Publicly              103,450         629,909          89,685         261,913
                              Owned Utilities.
Various....................  Industrial Power             78,861         480,183          68,367         284,046
                              Generators.
SIC 0783...................  Ornamental Shrub                 NA              NA              NA              NA
                              and Tree Services.
                                                 ---------------------------------------------------------------
    Total..................  ...................         782,337       4,763,654         678,237       2,186,883
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes: (1) Totals may not equal the sum of the components due to rounding.
(2) ``NA'' = Not Applicable.
Source: ERG estimate.


[[Page 20600]]

Costs for Providing Arc-Flash Protective Equipment
    The final rule requires affected employers to ensure that employees 
exposed to certain hazards wear flame-resistant clothing. The final 
rule also requires employers to ensure that each employee exposed to 
electric-arc hazards wears clothing with an arc rating greater than or 
equal to the applicable estimate of incident heat energy. Generally, 
the arc-rated clothing must cover the employee's entire body, although 
there are limited situations in which the final rule does not require 
arc-rated protection for the employee's hands, feet, or head. As 
previously mentioned in this analysis, OSHA uses the term ``flame-
resistant clothing'' to refer generally to the flame-resistant and arc-
rated clothing, and the term ``arc-flash protective equipment'' to 
refer to the flame-resistant and arc-rated clothing and equipment, 
required by Sec.  1926.960(g).
    OSHA estimated the average costs associated with providing the 
clothing that will be necessary to achieve full compliance with the 
final rule to involve resources equivalent to those associated with the 
following case example. An employer could generally achieve compliance 
with the final rule's clothing provisions by purchasing eight sets of 
flame-resistant clothing per employee and one switching coat or flash 
suit for every three employees.
    OSHA estimated a single set of flame-resistant clothing to cost 
$191.75 [13]; and, with eight sets provided for each employee (at a 
total cost of $1,534.00 per employee), the Agency assumed that the 
useful life of this apparel was 4 years [5]. OSHA estimated a switching 
coat or flash suit to cost about $226.00 [19] and to have an expected 
life of 10 years [5]. Because use of the switching coat or flash suit 
will be intermittent, OSHA estimated that employers will need to 
provide only one switching coat or flash suit for every three affected 
employees [5].
    Frank Brockman of the Farmers Rural Electric Cooperative 
Corporation commented on the costs of flame-resistant apparel (Ex. 
0173). Mr. Brockman estimated that the cost of flame-resistant clothing 
would be in excess of $1,000 per employee.
    OSHA notes that the cost estimate used in this FEA ($1,534.00 per 
employee for flame-resistant clothing exclusive of switching coats) is 
consistent with Mr. Brockman's estimate.
    Employers generally will substitute flame-resistant clothing for 
clothing that the employee or the employer would already be providing. 
OSHA did not include in this analysis the savings associated with 
employees' no longer needing to purchase and launder the clothing that 
employees would otherwise wear.
    The final rule does not require employers to launder protective 
clothing for employees. To the extent that employers choose to begin 
laundering clothing or provide laundering services for employees in 
conjunction with providing flame-resistant clothing, the cost is not 
attributable to this final rule; and OSHA regards any such costs as 
transfers from employers to employees rather than additional costs to 
society.
    Based on research conducted by CONSAD, OSHA estimates that most 
establishments in all affected industries already provide employees 
with flame-resistant clothing that fully complies with the requirements 
of the final rule [5]. These establishments, therefore, will incur no 
additional costs to achieve compliance with the final rule's 
requirements for flame-resistant clothing.
    For each affected industry, OSHA estimated rates of current 
compliance with the final requirements to provide arc-rated clothing. 
Within each industry, the Agency estimated rates of current compliance 
separately for establishments based on their size. Among construction 
contractors, the estimated average rate of current compliance for 
establishments with fewer than 20 employees is 50 percent. The average 
rate of current compliance among construction-contractor establishments 
with 20 or more employees is an estimated 75 percent. Among electric 
utilities and other electric power generators, current compliance is an 
estimated 80 percent for establishments with fewer than 20 employees 
and 90 percent for establishments with 20 or more employees [5].
    In his comments, Frank Brockman of the Farmers Rural Electric 
Cooperatives Corporation estimated that the flame-resistant clothing 
provision of the rule would affect 25 percent of the relevant 
workforce, for an implied compliance rate of 75 percent (Ex. 0173). 
This estimate is similar to the compliance estimates developed by 
CONSAD [5], which range from 50 percent to 90 percent depending on the 
industry and establishment size, for an industry-wide average of 78-
percent compliance.
    The total estimated annualized cost of compliance for providing 
flame-resistant clothing is approximately $15.6 million, as shown in 
Table 41. The total estimated annualized cost of compliance for 
providing switching coats or flash suits is approximately $0.4 million 
as shown in Table 42. Table 41 and Table 42 also show the costs of 
compliance for each affected industry. Together, the total estimated 
annualized cost of providing flame-resistant apparel and switching 
coats is approximately $16.0 million.
    In addition to clothing and switching coats or flash suits, the 
final rule requires the provision of face and head protection for 
workers in certain circumstances, typically when the workers perform 
energized work on equipment in enclosures and when work involves 
exposures to three-phase arcs. OSHA did not estimate costs in 
connection with face and head protection for the PRIA. To estimate the 
number of affected Electrical Power-Line Installers and Repairers (SOC 
49-9051) for the final rule, OSHA calculated the number of line 
installers and repairers (that is, 51,440) as a percentage of total 
employment in NAICS 221100--Electric Power Generation, Transmission and 
Distribution (that is, 395,570) [39, 40], and assumed that this 
percentage (that is, 13 percent) was similar across all affected NAICS. 
OSHA believes that none of these workers currently use arc-rated face 
and head protection. To estimate the number of affected Electrical and 
Electronics Repairers working in generating stations, substations, and 
in-service relays (SOC 49-2095), OSHA calculated the number of 
Electrical and Electronics Repairers (that is, 17,240) as a percentage 
of total employment in NAICS 221100--Electric Power Generation, 
Transmission and Distribution (that is, 395,570) [40, 41] and assumed 
that this percentage (that is, 4 percent) was similar across all 
affected NAICSs. OSHA believes that the use of arc-rated face and head 
protection is fairly common by these workers and estimates current 
compliance among the affected industry groups to range from 50 to 90 
percent (equivalent to the compliance rates for flame-resistant 
clothing (Table 41) and switching coats or flash suits (Table 42).
    Based on publicly available information from vendors of electrical 
protective equipment, OSHA estimates that a faceshield costs $86.50 
(with a useful life of 2 years), and that head protection such as a 
balaclava costs $29.75 (with a useful life of 2 years) [11, 12]. 
Testimony suggesting that faceshields might run $60 and that balaclava 
might run $30 corroborates these cost estimates (Tr. 479).
    When OSHA annualized the costs of arc-rated face and head 
protection at a 7-percent interest rate over the useful

[[Page 20601]]

life of the equipment, the resulting total estimated costs are 
approximately $0.9 million for faceshields and $0.3 million for head 
protection, as shown in Table 43 and Table 44, and Table 45 and Table 
46, respectively. These tables also show the costs of compliance for 
each affected industry.
    Summing the costs for flame-resistant clothing, switching coats or 
flash suits, faceshields, and head protection results in total 
estimated annualized costs of approximately $17.2 million.\561\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \561\ While the final rule added some minor cost elements to the 
costs estimated in the proposal, the higher estimated cost of 
protective clothing in the FEA, relative to the PRIA, is due 
primarily to the higher estimated unit cost for the eight pairs of 
flame-resistant clothing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Using Mr. Brockman's (Ex. 0173) approach to calculating costs for 
flame-resistant clothing, along with OSHA's estimate of the number of 
affected workers, results in a ``Brockman'' estimate of $48.9 
million.\562\ However, Mr. Brockman did not annualize his estimated 
costs. Doing so using an interest rate of 7 percent over the 4-year 
expected life of flame-resistant clothing \563\ results in an 
annualized cost estimate of $14.4 million. OSHA notes that this 
estimate is less than both OSHA's estimate of annualized costs for 
flame-resistant clothing alone $15.6 million) and OSHA's estimate of 
annualized costs for all arc-flash protective equipment ($17.3 
million). As such, OSHA's estimate is entirely reasonable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \562\ In his comments, Mr. Brockman calculated costs for workers 
in all affected establishments. This approach was erroneous, 
however, because the protective-clothing provisions of the final 
rule do not cover employees in the Ornamental Shrub and Tree 
Services industry. OSHA excluded the tree-care employees from Mr. 
Brockman's calculation to arrive at a corrected estimate, using Mr. 
Brockman's analysis, of $48.9 million.
    \563\ Mr. Brockman apparently estimated a cost for flame-
resistant clothing only, but not other equipment such as switching 
coats or flash suits, as Mr. Brockman's estimate referred only to 
OSHA's proposed 4-year useful-life estimate for flame-resistant 
clothing, not OSHA's proposed 10-year useful-life estimate for 
switching coats or flash suits (Ex. 0173; 70 FR 34915-34916).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    One commenter emphasized that workers typically wear multiple 
layers of clothing and complained that the proposal would require 
additional costs for the various layers of clothing (Ex. 0186).
    The final rule clarifies that only the outer layer of clothing must 
be flame-resistant.
    Another commenter suggested the cost analysis should account for 
``selecting and fitting'' of apparel (Ex. 0240).
    The commenter's use of the terms ``selecting and fitting'' here is 
somewhat ambiguous; in any event, the Agency already accounted for the 
key informational element in selecting and fitting apparel--the arc-
hazard assessment. OSHA believes that once employers perform this 
assessment, any other elements of selecting and fitting clothing (such 
as selecting brand or vendor or size) is a negligible part of the 
overall cost.
    Some commenters argued that flame-resistant clothing required 
special laundering and that this would be an additional cost. (See, for 
example, Ex. 0186.)
    OSHA concludes that there is no additional cost associated with 
laundering the flame-resistant clothing required by the final rule. 
First, as stated, the final rule does not require employers to launder 
protective clothing for employees; and, therefore, while employers may 
choose to launder protective clothing for their employees, the rule 
does not impose the cost of laundering on employers. Second, according 
to the record, employers or their employees can generally follow the 
manufacturers' care instructions that come with the clothing (Tr. 305--
306, 1373--1374), and there is generally no additional cost to 
employees over that of laundering normal (that is, non-flame-resistant) 
clothing. Even if employees needed some training on how to care for 
flame-resistant clothing to ensure that the clothing does not lose its 
flame-resistant properties (as some commenters argued (Ex. 0186)), the 
training provisions of the final rule (costed previously in this 
analysis) would cover this cost (that is, the Agency assumes all 
employers will give their employees the requisite training to come into 
compliance with the standard).
    One commenter argued that the life of flame-resistant clothing was 
less than the 4-year period used by OSHA in its calculations (Ex. 
0173). A witness at the 2006 public hearing testified that the life of 
flame-resistant clothing varied considerably and might well last more 
than 4 years; this witness spoke of the enhanced durability of newer 
flame-resistant materials that were emerging at the time of the hearing 
(Tr. 1374). (See, also, Tr. 1192.) One commenter believed that OSHA 
should assume that employees require a slightly larger number of sets 
of clothing (Ex. 0186). Other commenters stated that less clothing 
would be adequate (Ex. 0099; Tr. 387, 828, 1374). Another commenter 
mentioned a possible range of 5 to 14 sets (Tr. 309).\564\ Other 
commenters stated that the estimate does not take into account all 
types of clothing required, such as winter wear (see, for example, Ex. 
0173).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \564\ OSHA examined the effect of changing the costs for flame-
resistant clothing using either end of this range--the costs range 
from $9.8 million for 5 sets to $27.3 million for 14 sets (with 
OSHA's estimate of $15.6 million for 8 sets between the two ends). 
As discussed under the heading ``Economic Feasibility and Impacts,'' 
later in this section of the preamble, costs must increase 
substantially beyond this range to raise an issue regarding economic 
feasibility.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    OSHA notes that its estimate of eight sets is in the middle of the 
number of sets recommended by the commenters. Moreover, as indicated in 
the PRIA, OSHA significantly increased its initial estimate of clothing 
costs in response to comments from SERs during the SBREFA Panel 
process. For the FEA, the Agency is basing its estimates on a cost of 
$1,534.00 per employee for eight sets of flame-resistant clothing 
(using the estimated cost of $191.75 per set), or on an annualized cost 
of approximately $452.88 per employee. The Agency believes this final 
estimate is reasonable and captures the average cost of all flame-
resistant clothing required by the new provisions of the final 
standard. In this regard, the record indicates that annual employee 
stipends to cover all flame-resistant clothing typically run $125--250 
(Tr. 828). This evidence supports the conclusion that OSHA's estimate 
is reasonable, if not conservative.

[[Page 20602]]



                  Table 41--Annualized Costs Associated With Providing Flame-Resistant Clothing
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                            Useful
                                                                     Sets of               life of
                                           Employees   Compliance      FRC      Cost per   FRC with   Annualized
      Industry code        Industry name    affected   rates  (%)    provided    set of    8 sets/    compliance
                                              (%)                      per        FRC      employee     costs
                                                                     employee              (years)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NAICS 234910............  Water, Sewer,          100   50/50/75/75          8    $191.75          4     $176,836
                           and Pipeline
                           Construction.
NAICS 234920............  Power and              100   50/50/75/75          8     191.75          4    4,623,876
                           Communication
                           Transmission
                           Line
                           Construction.
NAICS 234930............  Industrial             100   50/50/75/75          8     191.75          4      211,993
                           Nonbuilding
                           Structure
                           Construction.
NAICS 234990............  All Other Heavy        100   50/50/75/75          8     191.75          4    1,115,554
                           Construction.
NAICS 235310............  Electrical             100   50/50/75/75          8     191.75          4    3,388,729
                           Contractors.
NAICS 235910............  Structural             100   50/50/75/75          8     191.75          4       57,243
                           Steel Erection
                           Contractors.
NAICS 235950............  Building               100   50/50/75/75          8     191.75          4       53,637
                           Equipment and
                           Other Machine
                           Installation
                           Contractors.
NAICS 235990............  All Other              100   50/50/75/75          8     191.75          4      170,375
                           Special Trade
                           Contractors.
NAICS 221110............  Electric Power         100   80/80/90/90          8     191.75          4    1,719,508
                           Generation.
NAICS 221120............  Electric Power         100   80/80/90/90          8     191.75          4    2,923,654
                           Transmission,
                           Control, and
                           Distribution.
NAICS 2211..............  Major Publicly         100         80/90          8     191.75          4      392,232
                           Owned
                           Utilities.
Various.................  Industrial             100            90          8     191.75          4      786,729
                           Power
                           Generators.
SIC 0783................  Ornamental              NA            NA         NA         NA         NA           NA
                           Shrub and Tree
                           Services.
                                          ----------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total...............  ...............  .........  ............  .........  .........  .........   15,620,365
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes: (1) Totals may not equal the sum of the components due to rounding.
(2) ``NA'' = Not Applicable.
(3) For most NAICSs, compliance rates are for small unionized establishments, small nonunionized establishments,
  large unionized establishments, and large nonunionized establishments, respectively. Major Publicly Owned
  Utilities (NAICS 2211) and Ornamental Shrub and Tree Services (SIC 0783) only have compliance rates for small
  and large establishments, and Industrial Power Generators only have a compliance rate for large
  establishments.
Sources: CONSAD [5], Grainger [13], U.S. Census [43, 44, 45, 46].


               Table 42--Annualized Costs Associated With Providing Switching Coats or Flash Suits
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                            Useful
                                                                    Switching   Cost per   life of
                                           Employees                 coat or   switching  switching   Annualized
      Industry code        Industry name    affected   Compliance     flash     coat or    coat or    compliance
                                              (%)      rates  (%)    suit per    flash      flash       costs
                                                                     employee     suit       suit
                                                                                           (years)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NAICS 234910............  Water, Sewer,          100   50/50/75/75       0.33    $226.00         10       $4,146
                           and Pipeline
                           Construction.
NAICS 234920............  Power and              100   50/50/75/75       0.33     226.00         10      108,414
                           Communication
                           Transmission
                           Line
                           Construction.
NAICS 234930............  Industrial             100   50/50/75/75       0.33     226.00         10        4,971
                           Nonbuilding
                           Structure
                           Construction.
NAICS 234990............  All Other Heavy        100   50/50/75/75       0.33     226.00         10       26,156
                           Construction.
NAICS 235310............  Electrical             100   50/50/75/75       0.33     226.00         10       79,454
                           Contractors.
NAICS 235910............  Structural             100   50/50/75/75       0.33     226.00         10        1,342
                           Steel Erection
                           Contractors.
NAICS 235950............  Building               100   50/50/75/75       0.33     226.00         10        1,258
                           Equipment and
                           Other Machine
                           Installation
                           Contractors.
NAICS 235990............  All Other              100   50/50/75/75       0.33     226.00         10        3,995
                           Special Trade
                           Contractors.
NAICS 221110............  Electric Power         100   80/80/90/90       0.33     226.00         10       40,317
                           Generation.
NAICS 221120............  Electric Power         100   80/80/90/90       0.33     226.00         10       68,550
                           Transmission,
                           Control, and
                           Distribution.
NAICS 2211..............  Major Publicly         100         80/90       0.33     226.00         10        9,197
                           Owned
                           Utilities.
Various.................  Industrial             100            90       0.33     226.00         10       18,446
                           Power
                           Generators.
SIC 0783................  Ornamental              NA            NA         NA         NA         NA           NA
                           Shrub and Tree
                           Services.
                                          ----------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total...............  ...............  .........  ............  .........  .........  .........      366,245
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes: (1) Totals may not equal the sum of the components due to rounding.
(2) ``NA'' = Not Applicable.
(3) For most NAICSs, compliance rates are for small unionized establishments, small nonunionized establishments,
  large unionized establishments, and large nonunionized establishments, respectively. Major Publicly Owned
  Utilities (NAICS 2211) and Ornamental Shrub and Tree Services (SIC 0783) only have compliance rates for small
  and large establishments, and Industrial Power Generators only have a compliance rate for large
  establishments.
Sources: CONSAD [5], Lab Safety Supply [18], U.S. Census [43, 44, 45, 46].


[[Page 20603]]


 Table 43--Annualized Costs Associated With Providing Arc-Rated Faceshield for Electrical Power-Line Installers
                                                  and Repairers
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                           Useful life
                                                  Employees     Cost per        of       Compliance   Annualized
       Industry code            Industry name      affected    faceshield   faceshield    rate (%)    compliance
                                                     (%)                     (years)                    costs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NAICS 234910...............  Water, Sewer, and             0           NA            2           NA           NA
                              Pipeline
                              Construction.
NAICS 234920...............  Power and                    13       $86.50            2      0/0/0/0     $216,130
                              Communication
                              Transmission Line
                              Construction.
NAICS 234930...............  Industrial                    0           NA           NA           NA           NA
                              Nonbuilding
                              Structure
                              Construction.
NAICS 234990...............  All Other Heavy               0           NA           NA           NA           NA
                              Construction.
NAICS 235310...............  Electrical                    0           NA           NA           NA           NA
                              Contractors.
NAICS 235910...............  Structural Steel              0           NA           NA           NA           NA
                              Erection
                              Contractors.
NAICS 235950...............  Building Equipment            0           NA           NA           NA           NA
                              and Other Machine
                              Installation
                              Contractors.
NAICS 235990...............  All Other Special             0           NA           NA           NA           NA
                              Trade Contractors.
NAICS 221110...............  Electric Power               13        86.50            2      0/0/0/0      233,674
                              Generation.
NAICS 221120...............  Electric Power               13        86.50            2      0/0/0/0      399,296
                              Transmission,
                              Control, and
                              Distribution.
NAICS 2211.................  Major Publicly               13        86.50            2          0/0       53,391
                              Owned Utilities.
Various....................  Industrial Power              0           NA           NA           NA           NA
                              Generators.
SIC 0783...................  Ornamental Shrub              0           NA           NA           NA           NA
                              and Tree Services.
                                                ----------------------------------------------------------------
    Total..................  ..................  ...........  ...........  ...........  ...........      902,492
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes: (1) Totals may not equal the sum of the components due to rounding.
(2) ``NA'' = Not Applicable.
(3) For most NAICSs, compliance rates are for small unionized establishments, small nonunionized establishments,
  large unionized establishments, and large nonunionized establishments, respectively. Major Publicly Owned
  Utilities (NAICS 2211) and Ornamental Shrub and Tree Services (SIC 0783) only have compliance rates for small
  and large establishments, and Industrial Power Generators only have a compliance rate for large
  establishments.
Sources: BLS [39, 40], Grainger [11], U.S. Census [43, 44, 45, 46].


    Table 44--Annualized Costs Associated With Providing Arc-Rated Faceshield for Electrical and Electronics
                  Repairers Working in Generating Stations, Substations, and in-Service Relays
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                           Useful life
                                                  Employees     Cost per        of       Compliance   Annualized
       Industry code            Industry name      affected    faceshield   faceshield    rate (%)    compliance
                                                     (%)                     (years)                    costs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NAICS 234910...............  Water, Sewer, and             0           NA           NA           NA           NA
                              Pipeline
                              Construction.
NAICS 234920...............  Power and                     4       $86.50            2  50/50/75/75      $21,289
                              Communication
                              Transmission Line
                              Construction.
NAICS 234930...............  Industrial                    0           NA           NA           NA           NA
                              Nonbuilding
                              Structure
                              Construction.
NAICS 234990...............  All Other Heavy               0           NA           NA           NA           NA
                              Construction.
NAICS 235310...............  Electrical                    0           NA           NA           NA           NA
                              Contractors.
NAICS 235910...............  Structural Steel              0           NA           NA           NA           NA
                              Erection
                              Contractors.
NAICS 235950...............  Building Equipment            0           NA           NA           NA           NA
                              and Other Machine
                              Installation
                              Contractors.
NAICS 235990...............  All Other Special             0           NA           NA           NA           NA
                              Trade Contractors.
NAICS 221110...............  Electric Power                4        86.50            2  80/80/90/90        7,917
                              Generation.
NAICS 221120...............  Electric Power                4        86.50            2  80/80/90/90       13,461
                              Transmission,
                              Control, and
                              Distribution.
NAICS 2211.................  Major Publicly                4        86.50            2        80/90        1,806
                              Owned Utilities.
Various....................  Industrial Power              0           NA           NA           NA           NA
                              Generators.
SIC 0783...................  Ornamental Shrub              0           NA           NA           NA           NA
                              and Tree Services.
                                                ----------------------------------------------------------------
    Total..................  ..................  ...........  ...........  ...........  ...........       44,472
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes: (1) Totals may not equal the sum of the components due to rounding.
(2) ``NA'' = Not Applicable.
(3) For most NAICSs, compliance rates are for small unionized establishments, small nonunionized establishments,
  large unionized establishments, and large nonunionized establishments, respectively. Major Publicly Owned
  Utilities (NAICS 2211) and Ornamental Shrub and Tree Services (SIC 0783) only have compliance rates for small
  and large establishments, and Industrial Power Generators only have a compliance rate for large
  establishments.
Sources: BLS [40, 41], Grainger [11], U.S. Census [43, 44, 45, 46].


    Table 45--Annualized Costs Associated With Providing Arc-Rated Head Protection for Electrical Power-Line
                                            Installers and Repairers
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                           Useful life
                                                  Employees     Cost per        of       Compliance   Annualized
       Industry code            Industry name      affected    balaclava    balaclava     rate (%)    compliance
                                                     (%)                     (years)                    costs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NAICS 234910...............  Water, Sewer, and             0           NA           NA           NA           NA
                              Pipeline
                              Construction.
NAICS 234920...............  Power and                    13       $29.75            2      0/0/0/0      $74,334
                              Communication
                              Transmission Line
                              Construction.

[[Page 20604]]

 
NAICS 234930...............  Industrial                    0           NA           NA           NA           NA
                              Nonbuilding
                              Structure
                              Construction.
NAICS 234990...............  All Other Heavy               0           NA           NA           NA           NA
                              Construction.
NAICS 235310...............  Electrical                    0           NA           NA           NA           NA
                              Contractors.
NAICS 235910...............  Structural Steel              0           NA           NA           NA           NA
                              Erection
                              Contractors.
NAICS 235950...............  Building Equipment            0           NA           NA           NA           NA
                              and Other Machine
                              Installation
                              Contractors.
NAICS 235990...............  All Other Special             0           NA           NA           NA           NA
                              Trade Contractors.
NAICS 221110...............  Electric Power               13        29.75            2      0/0/0/0       80,368
                              Generation.
NAICS 221120...............  Electric Power               13        29.75            2      0/0/0/0      137,330
                              Transmission,
                              Control, and
                              Distribution.
NAICS 2211.................  Major Publicly               13        29.75            2          0/0       18,363
                              Owned Utilities.
Various....................  Industrial Power              0           NA           NA           NA           NA
                              Generators.
SIC 0783...................  Ornamental Shrub              0           NA           NA           NA           NA
                              and Tree Services.
                                                ----------------------------------------------------------------
    Total..................  ..................  ...........  ...........  ...........  ...........      310,395
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes: (1) Totals may not equal the sum of the components due to rounding.
(2) ``NA'' = Not Applicable.
(3) For most NAICSs, compliance rates are for small unionized establishments, small nonunionized establishments,
  large unionized establishments, and large nonunionized establishments. respectively. Major Publicly Owned
  Utilities (NAICS 2211) and Ornamental Shrub and Tree Services (SIC 0783) only have compliance rates for small
  and large establishments, and Industrial Power Generators only have a compliance rate for large
  establishments.
Sources: BLS [39, 40], Grainger [12], U.S. Census [43, 44, 45, 46].


     Table 46--Annualized Associated With Providing Arc-Rated Head Protection for Electrical and Electronics
                  Repairers Working in Generating Stations, Substations, and In-Service Relays
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                          Useful life
                                                 Employees     Cost per        of       Compliance    Annualized
       Industry code           Industry name      affected    balaclava    balaclava     rate (%)     compliance
                                                    (%)                     (years)                     costs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NAICS 234910..............  Water, Sewer, and             0           NA           NA            NA           NA
                             Pipeline
                             Construction.
NAICS 234920..............  Power and                     4       $29.75            2   50/50/75/75       $7,322
                             Communication
                             Transmission Line
                             Construction.
NAICS 234930..............  Industrial                    0           NA           NA            NA           NA
                             Nonbuilding
                             Structure
                             Construction.
NAICS 234990..............  All Other Heavy               0           NA           NA            NA           NA
                             Construction.
NAICS 235310..............  Electrical                    0           NA           NA            NA           NA
                             Contractors.
NAICS 235910..............  Structural Steel              0           NA           NA            NA           NA
                             Erection
                             Contractors.
NAICS 235950..............  Building Equipment            0           NA           NA            NA           NA
                             and Other Machine
                             Installation
                             Contractors.
NAICS 235990..............  All Other Special             0           NA           NA            NA           NA
                             Trade Contractors.
NAICS 221110..............  Electric Power                4        29.75            2   80/80/90/90        2,723
                             Generation.
NAICS 221120..............  Electric Power                4        29.75            2   80/80/90/90        4,630
                             Transmission,
                             Control, and
                             Distribution.
NAICS 2211................  Major Publicly                4        29.75            2         80/90          621
                             Owned Utilities.
Various...................  Industrial Power              0           NA           NA            NA           NA
                             Generators.
SIC 0783..................  Ornamental Shrub              0           NA           NA            NA           NA
                             and Tree Services.
                                               -----------------------------------------------------------------
    Total.................  ..................  ...........  ...........  ...........  ............       15,295
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes: (1) Totals may not equal the sum of the components due to rounding.
(2) ``NA'' = Not Applicable.
(3) For most NAICSs, compliance rates are for small unionized establishments, small nonunionized establishments,
  large unionized establishments, and large nonunionized establishments, respectively. Major Publicly Owned
  Utilities (NAICS 2211) and Ornamental Shrub and Tree Services (SIC 0783) only have compliance rates for small
  and large establishments, and Industrial Power Generators only have a compliance rate for large
  establishments.
Sources: BLS [40, 41], Grainger [12], U.S. Census [43, 44, 45, 46].

12. Annual Costs for Providing Harnesses for Fall Arrest in Aerial 
Lifts
    Under the final rule, employees in aerial lifts performing work 
covered by Sec.  1910.269 will no longer be able to use body belts as 
part of fall arrest systems and instead must use harnesses. However, 
OSHA estimates that while the final rule affects employees of 
construction contractors or utilities, employers in these industries 
are in 100-percent compliance with the final rule. Employers already 
must use harnesses for equivalent work in construction (see Sec.  
1926.502(d) and the discussion of final Sec.  1926.954(b) in Section V, 
Summary and Explanation of the Final Rule, earlier in this preamble), 
and employers in these industries perform construction work. Moreover, 
research conducted by CONSAD reveals that establishments in these 
industries already provide employees with harnesses as required by the 
final rule [5]. (To simplify analysis, Table 47 treats the costs for 
all industries other than Industrial Power Generators and Ornamental 
Shrub and Tree Services as not applicable.)

[[Page 20605]]

    OSHA estimates that employers in the Industrial Power Generators 
and Ornamental Shrub and Tree Services industries will incur costs 
under the final rule. OSHA bases its cost estimates on CONSAD's finding 
that, unlike the other industries, a substantial portion of 
establishments in the Industrial Power Generators and Ornamental Shrub 
and Tree Services industries do not provide their workers with 
harnesses [5].\565\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \565\ This estimate may be an overestimate. First, the pattern 
of providing harnesses to employees may now differ from what CONSAD 
observed in 2005. Second, as explained earlier in this analysis, 
since repair or maintenance work and construction work are often 
identical, companies are not likely to restrict themselves to only 
repair or maintenance work, or to only construction work, with 
regard to potential jobs involving electric power generation, 
transmission, and distribution. Therefore, employers that are in the 
Industrial Power Generators industry, that perform construction 
work, and that are not providing harnesses to their employees may 
simply be out of compliance with the existing construction 
requirement. OSHA's analysis assumes that employers in the 
Ornamental Shrub and Tree Services industry do not perform 
construction work. To the extent that these employees do perform 
construction work, as during site-clearing operations, Sec.  
1926.502(d) currently requires harnesses when employees are 
performing this work from aerial lifts. Consequently, OSHA estimates 
of current compliance in this industry also should be conservative.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For employers in the Industrial Power Generators industry, the 
harness provisions would affect an estimated 67 percent of the 
employees who perform electric power generation, transmission, and 
distribution work [5]. Among employees in the Ornamental Shrub and Tree 
Services industry who perform line-clearance tree-trimming operations, 
these provisions affect an estimated 50 percent of the workforce (id.).
    OSHA estimated the rates of current compliance with the final 
requirements for each affected industry. The Agency estimated the 
average rate of compliance currently among employers in the Industrial 
Power Generators industry, which have employees potentially affected by 
the final rule, to be 75 percent. Similarly, among employees performing 
line-clearance tree-trimming operations, OSHA estimated current 
compliance to be 25 percent for establishments with fewer than 20 
employees and 50 percent for establishments with 20 or more employees 
[5]. OSHA concludes that this estimate is reasonable. While one 
commenter questioned this estimate for line-clearance tree trimmers 
(Ex. 0174), another commenter confirmed that it was generally accurate 
(Ex. 0419).
    The Agency estimated the average cost associated with providing a 
harness instead of a body belt to be about $69 per affected employee 
[19, 20].\566\ When OSHA annualized the costs of compliance for 
providing harnesses for fall arrest in aerial lifts at a 7-percent 
interest rate over the useful life of the equipment (5 years), the 
resulting total estimated annualized cost is approximately $0.1 
million, as shown in Table 47. Table 47 also shows the costs of 
compliance for each affected industry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \566\ In the PRIA, OSHA estimated that the average cost 
associated with providing a harness instead of a belt was about $100 
per affected employee (70 FR 34917). OSHA's new estimate reflects 
data showing that the cost differential between harnesses and belts 
fell between the time of the PRIA and the FEA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    While one commenter indicated that the cost would be several times 
larger than OSHA estimated, the commenter failed to annualize the costs 
associated with providing harnesses (Ex. 0174). The commenter also 
failed to account for the manner in which OSHA estimated the percentage 
of employees affected, that is, by excluding from the percentage of 
employees affected employees who do not work from aerial lifts and 
affected employees who must wear harnesses as the existing construction 
standard requires.

                                   Table 47--Annualized Costs for Providing Harnesses for Fall Arrest in Aerial Lifts
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                            Incremental
                                                                             Employees        cost of     Useful life of    Compliance      Annualized
             Industry code                        Industry name            affected (%)     harness in        harness        rates (%)      compliance
                                                                                           lieu of belt       (years)                          costs
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NAICS 234910..........................  Water, Sewer, and Pipeline                     0              NA              NA              NA              NA
                                         Construction.
NAICS 234920..........................  Power and Communication                        0              NA              NA              NA              NA
                                         Transmission Line Construction.
NAICS 234930..........................  Industrial Nonbuilding Structure               0              NA              NA              NA              NA
                                         Construction.
NAICS 234990..........................  All Other Heavy Construction....               0              NA              NA              NA              NA
NAICS 235310..........................  Electrical Contractors..........               0              NA              NA              NA              NA
NAICS 235910..........................  Structural Steel Erection                      0              NA              NA              NA              NA
                                         Contractors.
NAICS 235950..........................  Building Equipment and Other                   0              NA              NA              NA              NA
                                         Machine Installation
                                         Contractors.
NAICS 235990..........................  All Other Special Trade                        0              NA              NA              NA              NA
                                         Contractors.
NAICS 221110..........................  Electric Power Generation.......               0              NA              NA              NA              NA
NAICS 221120..........................  Electric Power Transmission,                   0              NA              NA              NA              NA
                                         Control, and Distribution.
NAICS 2211............................  Major Publicly Owned Utilities..               0              NA              NA              NA              NA
Various...............................  Industrial Power Generators.....              67             $69               5              75         $48,612
SIC 0783..............................  Ornamental Shrub and Tree                     50              69               5           25/50          64,610
                                         Services.
                                                                         -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total.............................  ................................  ..............  ..............  ..............  ..............         113,222
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes: (1) Totals may not equal the sum of the components due to rounding.
(2) ``NA'' = Not Applicable.
(3) Ornamental Shrub and Tree Services (SIC 0783) only have compliance rates for small and large establishments, and Industrial Power Generators only
  have a compliance rate for large establishments.
Sources: CONSAD [5], Lab Safety Supply [19, 20], U.S. Census [43, 44, 45, 46].


[[Page 20606]]

13. Costs for Upgrading Fall Protection Equipment
    An additional cost for fall protection equipment that OSHA did not 
include in the analysis of the proposed rule is the cost of upgrading 
fall protection equipment for line workers in the affected industries. 
Paragraph (b)(3)(iv) of final Sec.  1926.954 requires that employers 
ensure that employees rig work-positioning systems so that the employee 
can free fall not more than 0.6 meters (2 feet). Paragraph (b)(3)(v) of 
final Sec.  1926.954 requires that anchorages for work-positioning 
equipment be capable of supporting at least twice the potential impact 
load of an employee's fall, or 13.3 kilonewtons (3,000 pounds-force), 
whichever is greater. Paragraph (b)(3)(iii)(C) of final Sec.  1926.954 
provides that, on and after April 1, 2015, employers must ensure that 
qualified employees climbing or changing location on poles, towers, or 
similar structures use fall protection unless the employer can 
demonstrate that climbing or changing location with fall protection is 
infeasible or creates a greater hazard than climbing or changing 
location without fall protection. Therefore, these three provisions, as 
explained in the discussion of final Sec.  1926.954(b)(3) in Section V, 
Summary and Explanation of the Final Rule, earlier in this preamble, 
require replacement of most positioning straps and lanyards currently 
in use. To estimate the number of line workers affected by these 
provisions, OSHA calculated the percentage of line installers and 
repairers in NAICS 221100--Electric Power Generation, Transmission and 
Distribution from the number of line installers and repairers (that is, 
51,440) and the total employment (that is, 402,840) in that industry 
[37, 38] and assumed that this percentage (that is, 13 percent) was 
similar across all affected NAICSs. Based on publicly available 
information from vendors of electrical protective equipment, OSHA 
estimates that positioning straps cost approximately $200 [4].\567\ 
Estimating a compliance rate of 50 percent across all industries \568\ 
and annualizing the cost of the positioning straps over a 5-year useful 
life, results in estimated annualized compliance costs of approximately 
$0.5 million, as shown in Table 48. Table 48 also shows the costs of 
compliance for each affected industry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \567\ The final rule generally gives employers the option of 
using different types of fall protection equipment. OSHA estimated 
costs for replacing positioning straps only and did not estimate 
costs associated with using other types of fall protection required 
by the relevant provisions of the final rule. OSHA believes that the 
cost of replacing positioning straps (per employee) is 
representative of the per-employee cost for any type of fall 
protection. In any event, employees can and do use work-positioning 
equipment in the vast majority of applicable cases. OSHA also 
assumed that, on average, employers need purchase only one type of 
fall protection for each affected worker. OSHA believes this is a 
valid assumption. On the one hand, the fall protection requirements 
at issue will not require employers to provide fall protection to 
qualified employees, such as underground power line workers, who do 
not climb or change location on poles, towers, or similar 
structures. On the other hand, some employers will need to provide 
different types of fall protection to some line workers who work on 
multiple types of structures.
    \568\ Comments to the record suggested that, as of 2005, 
compliance with this provision was common, but less than universal 
(Ex. 0230; Tr. 1357). The Agency believes that compliance with the 
provision has become more widespread in the interim, in part because 
the Agency already requires attachment under certain circumstances. 
Therefore, the estimate of 50-percent current compliance likely is 
conservative.

                                           Table 48--Annualized Costs for Upgrading Fall Protection Equipment
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                              Cost of     Useful life of                    Annualized
             Industry code                        Industry name              Employees      positioning     positioning     Compliance      compliance
                                                                           affected (%)       straps       strap (years)     rate (%)          costs
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NAICS 234910..........................  Water, Sewer, and Pipeline                    NA              NA              NA              NA              NA
                                         Construction.
NAICS 234920..........................  Power and Communication                       13            $200               5     50/50/50/50        $108,190
                                         Transmission Line Construction.
NAICS 234930..........................  Industrial Nonbuilding Structure              NA              NA              NA              NA              NA
                                         Construction.
NAICS 234990..........................  All Other Heavy Construction....              NA              NA              NA              NA              NA
NAICS 235310..........................  Electrical Contractors..........              NA              NA              NA              NA              NA
NAICS 235910..........................  Structural Steel Erection                     NA              NA              NA              NA              NA
                                         Contractors.
NAICS 235950..........................  Building Equipment and Other                  NA              NA              NA              NA              NA
                                         Machine Installation
                                         Contractors.
NAICS 235990..........................  All Other Special Trade                       NA              NA              NA              NA              NA
                                         Contractors.
NAICS 221110..........................  Electric Power Generation.......              13             200               5     50/50/50/50         116,972
NAICS 221120..........................  Electric Power Transmission,                  13             200               5     50/50/50/50         199,879
                                         Control, and Distribution.
NAICS 2211............................  Major Publicly Owned Utilities..              13             200               5           50/50          26,727
Various...............................  Industrial Power Generators.....              NA              NA              NA              NA              NA
SIC 0783..............................  Ornamental Shrub and Tree                     NA              NA              NA              NA              NA
                                         Services.
                                                                         -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total.............................  ................................  ..............  ..............  ..............  ..............         451,768
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes: (1) Totals may not equal the sum of the components due to rounding.
(2) ``NA'' = Not Applicable.
(3) For most NAICSs, compliance rates are for small unionized establishments, small nonunionized establishments, large unionized establishments, and
  large nonunionized establishments, respectively. Major Publicly Owned Utilities (NAICS 2211) and Ornamental Shrub and Tree Services (SIC 0783) only
  have compliance rates for small and large establishments, and Industrial Power Generators only have a compliance rate for large establishments.
Sources: Buckingham Manufacturing [4], U.S. Census [43, 44, 45, 46].


[[Page 20607]]

14. Costs Related to Minimum Approach Distances
    The final rule contains provisions related to the calculation of 
minimum approach distances that are new to both Sec.  1910.269 and 
Subpart V. The final rule is more protective and more technologically 
sound than the existing standards; in some cases the final rule will 
require employers to either perform an engineering analysis or use 
portable protective gaps to ensure implementation of the required 
minimum approach distance.
    To calculate the cost of these provisions, OSHA first determined 
the number of potentially affected entities by estimating the number of 
utilities performing transmission work.\569\ The Census' NAICS 
categories used elsewhere in this analysis do not differentiate between 
utilities performing transmission work and utilities performing 
generation or distribution work, so OSHA used data from the Department 
of Energy to estimate the number of utilities performing transmission 
work. The Department of Energy's U.S. Energy Information Administration 
Form EIA-861 Final Data File for 2008 [50] suggests that there are 
approximately 623 utilities performing transmission work. Of these 
utilities, 6 utilities list 0 sales, and 105 are missing sales data. Of 
the remaining 512 utilities with sales data, 265 (52 percent) are small 
businesses by SBA standards [51], with sales of less than 4 million 
megawatt-hours annually. The remaining 247 (48 percent) are large 
businesses, with sales of over 4 million megawatt-hours annually.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \569\ For reasons explained in the summary and explanation of 
final Sec.  1926.960(c)(1), in Section V, Summary and Explanation of 
the Final Rule, earlier in this preamble, the Agency believes that 
the final rule will have a substantial effect only on transmission 
work involving voltages of 230 kilovolts or more. Utilities use 
portable protective gaps to reduce the maximum transient overvoltage 
on a line (and thereby reduce the required minimum approach 
distance). According to ERG, electric utilities perform most of the 
affected work themselves [8]. Accounting for this factor, OSHA's 
analysis assumes that contractors will not be using portable 
protective gaps to achieve reduced minimum approach distances. In 
any event, given the small amount of relevant work performed by 
contractors, any costs for portable protective gaps borne by 
contractors will be negligible.
    As with other provisions of the standard, the Agency made a 
reasonable estimate of whether the contractor or the utility would 
immediately bear the cost of this requirement. The Agency expects 
that, to the extent that contractors incur this cost, utilities 
ultimately will bear it, as contracts between contractors and 
utilities will most likely pass through the cost to utilities. 
Moreover, to the extent the Agency overallocated cost estimates 
directly to the utility sector, it should not affect questions of 
economic feasibility.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    OSHA next estimated the percentage of utilities performing 
transmission work that have lines operating at voltages of 230 
kilovolts or more. Recent data on publicly owned utilities are not 
available because EIA terminated its Form EIA-412 database of annual 
electric industry financial reports from publicly owned utilities in 
2005. However, a similar database of investor-owned utilities is 
available from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's Form No. 1: 
Annual Report of Major Electric Utilities [10]. ERG downloaded 
transmission-line statistics for a random selection of investor-owned 
utilities that perform transmission work and analyzed the operational 
voltage for all of their transmission lines. ERG found that 28 percent 
of these utilities had transmission lines with operational voltages of 
at least 230 kilovolts. ERG then applied this percentage to all 
publicly owned and investor-owned utilities performing transmission 
work. This approach found that 143 utilities performing transmission 
work have transmission lines operating at these voltages and, thus, 
will incur costs related to MAD [8].
    OSHA estimates that these 143 affected utilities will calculate the 
maximum anticipated transient overvoltage (that is, T) on their systems 
to determine appropriate minimum approach distances. OSHA estimated 
costs based on 4 engineering hours for small utilities and 8 
engineering hours for large utilities to perform this calculation [8]. 
This approach results in total estimated labor costs of $26,097. When 
annualized at a rate of 7 percent over 10 years, this approach results 
in total estimated costs of $6,286 (see Table 49).
    Some commenters, such as EEI (Ex. 0575.1), expressed concern that 
substantially increased minimum approach distances would require the 
purchase of additional hardware, such as aerial lifts with longer 
booms, or possibly result in more scheduled outages.
    As discussed in depth in the discussion of final Sec.  
1926.960(c)(1) in Section V, Summary and Explanation of the Final Rule, 
earlier in this preamble, the Agency believes that the regulated 
community can largely avoid these costs. In some cases, however, after 
performing the engineering analysis, utilities may find that they are 
not able to perform work in accordance with the minimum approach 
distances required by the final rule without using portable protective 
gaps to reduce the maximum per-unit transient overvoltage on a 
line.\570\ OSHA estimated that this impact will occur for 10 percent of 
the 143 affected utilities, or 14 utilities [8]. Each of these 14 
utilities will incur fixed costs of approximately $25,000 to design and 
test the portable protective gaps, regardless of how many portable 
protective gaps they use (id.). The portable protective gaps will cost 
approximately $5,000, and OSHA estimates that each affected utility 
will purchase 24 portable protective gaps, resulting in total costs for 
portable protective gaps of approximately $2.1 million (id.). When 
annualized at a rate of 7 percent over 10 years, the estimated costs 
are approximately $0.3 million (see Table 49).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \570\ See the summary and explanation for final Sec.  
1926.960(c)(1)(i), in Section V, Summary and Explanation of the 
Final Rule, earlier in this preamble, for a discussion of how 
employers will comply with increased minimum approach distances.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, utilities will incur costs to install the portable 
protective gaps on affected projects. OSHA estimated the number of 
projects performed per year by the 143 affected utilities performing 
transmission work by calculating the ratio of affected utilities to 
total firms in the Electric Power Transmission, Control, and 
Distribution (NAICS 221120) and Major Publicly Owned Utilities (NAICS 
2211) categories (see Table 19). Applying this ratio (approximately 
0.095) to the total number of projects for all firms in these two 
industries (see Table 38) results in a total of 289,824 projects for 
the affected firms. With an estimated 10 percent of these projects 
using portable protective gaps, the total number of affected projects 
is 28,982.\571\ The number of portable protective gaps used per 
project, and the time it will take to install each portable protective 
gap, will vary depending on the number of phase conductors and the 
voltage of the lines. OSHA estimates that, on average, it will take a 
crew of two individuals using an aerial lift half an hour per project 
to install the appropriate number of portable protective gaps, 
resulting in estimated total annual labor costs for the 14 affected 
utilities of approximately $1.5 million, as shown in Table 49. (Note 
that this analysis conservatively assumes that no firms currently 
employ portable protective gaps.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \571\ ERG estimated that utilities in dense urban areas use 
portable protective gaps about 10 percent of the time and that they 
normally use portable protective gaps on compact design lines found 
in major population areas [8]. Since utilities are less likely to 
use portable protective gags in nonurban areas, the 10-percent 
statistic is a conservative measure of the extent of portable-
protective-gap use among all utilities with high-voltage 
transmission lines (id.).

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 20608]]

    Summing the annualized costs for utilities to calculate the maximum 
anticipated transient overvoltage and to purchase and install portable 
protective gaps results in an estimated total cost of approximately 
$1.8 million for the new minimum approach-distance requirements in the 
final rule, as shown in Table 49.

                                 Table 49--Annualized Costs for Calculating New MADs and Using Portable Protective Gaps
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                          Annualized one-
                                                          Share of power     Affected          time       Annualized PPG    Annual PPG         Total
         Industry code                Industry name        projects (%)      utilities      engineering    capital costs   installation     annualized
                                                                                               cost                            costs           costs
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NAICS 221120..................  Electric Power                      88.2             126          $5,542        $260,953      $1,327,197      $1,593,692
                                 Transmission, Control,
                                 and Distribution.
NAICS 2211....................  Major Publicly Owned                11.8              17             744          35,010         178,059         213,812
                                 Utilities.
                                                         -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total.....................  ........................  ..............             143           6,286         295,963       1,505,256       1,807,505
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Totals may not equal the sum of the components due to rounding.
Sources: BLS [36, 37], CONSAD [5], EIA [49], ERG [8], FERC [10], SBA [51].

15. First-Year Costs
    The first-year nonnegligible costs for the final rule include 
unannualized capital costs, unannualized costs for other one-time 
expenses (such as the cost of revising training programs), and any 
annual costs borne in the first year. In the case of training, first-
year costs include one-time costs for revising training programs, one-
time costs for providing additional training to employees already 
receiving training in accordance with existing Sec.  1910.269, one-time 
costs for additional training for employees not already receiving 
training in accordance with existing Sec.  1910.269, and one-time costs 
for training in the use of fall protection for qualified employees. 
First-year costs also include one-time costs for the arc-hazard 
assessment (but not the annual cost of updating the assessment), the 
costs of providing appropriate arc-flash protective equipment 
(including flame-resistant clothing, switching coats and flash suits, 
head protection, and face protection), the cost of providing harnesses 
for fall arrest for employees working from aerial lifts, the cost of 
upgrading fall protection equipment, one-time engineering costs for 
calculating new minimum approach distances, and capital costs for 
portable-protective-gaps. Finally, first-year costs include the first 
year's annual costs for installing portable protective gaps, the first 
year's annual costs for host-contractor communication, the first year's 
annual costs for job briefings, and the first year's annual costs of 
complying with existing Sec.  1910.269 (other than training) for 
employees not already covered by Sec.  1910.269. These first year costs 
total $113.8 million and are summarized in Table 50.

                                                               Table 50--First Year Costs
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                                                            Calculating
                                                                                                                            Other costs      incident
                                                                                               Host-                       for employees  energy and arc-
             Industry code                        Industry name              Training       contractor     Job briefing     not already       hazard
                                                                                           communication                    covered by      assessment
                                                                                                                               Sec.         (arc-hazard
                                                                                                                             1910.269       assessment)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NAICS 234910..........................  Water, Sewer, and Pipeline              $240,468        $150,214         $70,743          $4,427              NA
                                         Construction.
NAICS 234920..........................  Power and Communication                5,670,126       1,891,463       1,777,657         121,855              NA
                                         Transmission Line Construction.
NAICS 234930..........................  Industrial Nonbuilding Structure          22,591         204,286          70,999              NA              NA
                                         Construction.
NAICS 234990..........................  All Other Heavy Construction....       1,132,361         894,356         424,921          25,941              NA
NAICS 235310..........................  Electrical Contractors..........       3,519,375       2,702,235       1,545,162          76,067              NA
NAICS 235910..........................  Structural Steel Erection                 39,624          47,763          24,717              NA              NA
                                         Contractors.
NAICS 235950..........................  Building Equipment and Other              57,131          44,957          23,197              NA              NA
                                         Machine Installation
                                         Contractors.
NAICS 235990..........................  All Other Special Trade                  163,570         124,535          71,957              NA              NA
                                         Contractors.
NAICS 221110..........................  Electric Power Generation.......         207,776       2,397,541         675,284              NA       1,910,206
NAICS 221120..........................  Electric Power Transmission,             383,402       6,393,786       1,144,815              NA       4,547,557
                                         Control, and Distribution.
NAICS 2211............................  Major Publicly Owned Utilities..          51,589         571,626         153,887              NA       1,126,003
Various...............................  Industrial Power Generators.....          33,561         648,391         306,992              NA         862,483
SIC 0783..............................  Ornamental Shrub and Tree                114,631       1,749,688         407,227              NA              NA
                                         Services.
                                                                         -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total.............................  ................................      11,636,205      17,820,841       6,697,557         228,289       8,446,249
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


[[Page 20609]]


                                                         Table 50--First Year Costs (Continued)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                           Provision of
                                                                            appropriate       Use of      Upgrading fall                    Total first
             Industry code                        Industry name              arc-flash     harnesses in     protection          MAD            year
                                                                            protective     aerial lifts      equipment                      compliance
                                                                             equipment                                                         costs
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NAICS 234910..........................  Water, Sewer, and Pipeline              $687,227              NA              NA              NA      $1,153,078
                                         Construction.
NAICS 234920..........................  Power and Communication               18,546,383              NA         443,601              NA      28,451,085
                                         Transmission Line Construction.
NAICS 234930..........................  Industrial Nonbuilding Structure         823,855              NA              NA              NA       1,121,731
                                         Construction.
NAICS 234990..........................  All Other Heavy Construction....       4,335,309              NA              NA              NA       6,812,888
NAICS 235310..........................  Electrical Contractors..........      13,169,413              NA              NA              NA      21,012,253
NAICS 235910..........................  Structural Steel Erection                222,458              NA              NA              NA         334,562
                                         Contractors.
NAICS 235950..........................  Building Equipment and Other             208,445              NA              NA              NA         333,729
                                         Machine Installation
                                         Contractors.
NAICS 235990..........................  All Other Special Trade                  662,120              NA              NA              NA       1,022,182
                                         Contractors.
NAICS 221110..........................  Electric Power Generation.......       7,269,449              NA         479,610              NA      12,939,866
NAICS 221120..........................  Electric Power Transmission,          12,364,959              NA         819,545       3,198,950      28,853,013
                                         Control, and Distribution.
NAICS 2211............................  Major Publicly Owned Utilities..       1,658,430              NA         109,585         429,176       4,100,296
Various...............................  Industrial Power Generators.....       3,057,416         199,318              NA              NA       5,108,161
SIC 0783..............................  Ornamental Shrub and Tree                      0         264,915              NA              NA       2,536,461
                                         Services.
                                                                         -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total.............................  ................................      63,005,465         464,233       1,852,340       3,628,126     113,779,305
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes: (1) Totals may not equal the sum of the components due to rounding.
(2) ``NA'' = Not Applicable.
Sources: Office of Regulatory Analysis, OSHA (see text).

16. Economic Feasibility and Impacts
    This portion of the analysis presents OSHA's analysis of the 
economic impacts of the final rule and an assessment of the economic 
feasibility of compliance with the requirements imposed by the 
rulemaking. To assess the types and magnitude of the economic impacts 
associated with compliance with the final rule, OSHA developed 
quantitative estimates of the economic impact of the requirements on 
entities in each of the affected industries. OSHA compared the 
estimated costs of compliance presented previously in this economic 
analysis with industry revenues and profits to provide an assessment of 
potential economic impacts. (Following the assessment of potential 
economic impacts, OSHA presents a separate analysis of the economic 
impacts of the final rule on small entities as part of the Final 
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis.)
    Table 51 presents data on the revenues for each affected industry, 
along with the corresponding industry profits and the estimated costs 
of compliance in each industry. For the FEA, OSHA updated revenue data 
for the 1997 NAICS and SIC categories used in the CONSAD analysis using 
the U.S. Census Bureau's 1997 NAICS and 1987 SIC Correspondence Tables 
[44], the 1997 NAICS to 2002 NAICS Correspondence Tables [45], and the 
2002 NAICS to 2007 NAICS Correspondence Tables [46]. As explained 
earlier in this FEA, in many cases, a single 1997 NAICS code maps to 
multiple 2007 NAICS codes (see the discussion under the heading 
``Profile of Affected Industries''). Revenue data is drawn from the 
U.S. Census' Statistics of U.S. Businesses [43]. In most cases, once 
OSHA matched a 1997 category with its corresponding 2007 categories, 
OSHA averaged revenue for the 2007 NAICS categories to produce a single 
updated estimate for the 1997 NAICS category. In the case of Electric 
Power Generation (1997 NAICS 221110) and Electric Power Transmission, 
Control, and Distribution (1997 NAICS 221120), however, the updated 
estimates for the respective 1997 NAICS categories are the sum of the 
corresponding 2007 NAICS categories. After updating the revenue data, 
OSHA calculated the average revenue per establishment for each 1997 
NAICS or SIC category by dividing the updated data for each category by 
the updated estimate of total establishments in each 1997 category. 
Then, to estimate the weighted average revenues and profits for 
affected establishments, OSHA multiplied the revenue per establishment 
by the updated estimate of affected establishments in each 1997 NAICS 
category \572\ (see Table 19).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \572\ In most affected industry sectors, the earlier NAICS code 
fragmented into several different NAICS codes that would be 
difficult to reassemble. In the case of the Electric Power 
Generation (1997 NAICS 221110) and Electric Power Transmission, 
Control, and Distribution (1997 NAICS 221120) industries, however, 
the NAICS codes still largely align with their earlier version. For 
this reason, OSHA estimated revenues for these two industries than 
for the other affected industries.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Generally, the Agency assumed that the revenue profiles of affected 
establishments mirrored the profiles of the other establishments in the 
designated NAICS codes. However, CONSAD's industry profile evidenced 
significantly larger than average affected establishments for 
Electrical Contractors (NAICS 235310) and Ornamental Shrub and Tree 
Services (SIC 0783), as the affected establishments in these two 
industries had more ``power workers'' than the average number of 
employees per establishment for all establishments in those industries. 
For these two industries, the Agency increased the average revenues by 
the respective ratios of power workers to total average employees.
    In addition, in the case of these two industries, the Agency needed 
to further adjust the estimated revenue profile to better match the 
establishments that the final standard would affect. First, the Agency 
determined that the establishments and firms in the Electrical 
Contractors industry (NAICS 235310), on average, do only a small 
portion of their work on electric power installations covered by the 
final standard. OSHA based this determination, in part, on the NAICS 
definitions--if the establishments did

[[Page 20610]]

most of their work on electric utility systems, the establishments 
would be in another NAICS code. Moreover, the Agency believes that 
Electrical Contractors (NAICS 235310) affected by the final rule are 
different in kind than Electrical Contractors (NAICS 235310) not 
affected by the final rule, as those affected by the final rule are 
part of a small minority of specialized firms and establishments in 
NAICS 235310 that do high-voltage work and are larger and invest in 
more specialized capital equipment than the typical small electrical 
contractor (which typically does only low-voltage work in settings such 
as residential construction). Based on these factors, the Agency 
assumed that power workers comprise only 25 percent of the typical 
workforce in establishments that are in the Electrical Contractors 
industry and that the final rule affects. The Agency also assumed that 
the relevant revenue figures for these establishments and for firms 
controlling these establishments would be four times those of the 
average electrical contractor.
    Second, as discussed under the heading ``Profile of Affected 
Industries,'' earlier in this section of the preamble, the affected 
establishments in the Ornamental Shrub and Tree Services industry (SIC 
0783) are primarily large establishments having 20 or more employees. 
The size of affected establishment is decidedly different from the 
average in the industry, which, the Profile of Affected Industries 
shows, consists mostly of small establishments having fewer than 20 
employees. Therefore, to analyze the economic impact for the Ornamental 
Shrub and Tree Services industry (SIC 0783), the Agency used the 
projected economic profile of the affected set of establishments, as 
opposed to that of all establishments, in the industry. (Consistent 
with this approach, for the analysis of firms with fewer than 20 
employees, the analysis incorporated only the information from this 
small subset of smaller establishments.)
    To calculate profit rates, OSHA used data from the Internal Revenue 
Service's (IRS) Corporation Sourcebook, which contains accounting 
information for the various industries established by the NAICS system. 
OSHA calculated profit rates using IRS data for each year from 2000 
through 2006 and averaged these rates to produce an average profit rate 
for each 2007 NAICS. OSHA then averaged the profit rates for each 2007 
NAICS to produce an estimate for the profit rate for each of the 1997 
NAICS, consistent with the original CONSAD analysis. OSHA then 
multiplied the updated revenue estimates by the profit rate to 
determine profits.

                                    Table 51--Costs as a Percent of Revenues and Profits for Affected Establishments
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                                            Costs as a      Costs as a
         Industry code                Industry name          Number of       Costs per     Revenues per     Profits per     percent of      percent of
                                                           affected est.   affected est.       est.            est.          revenues         profits
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NAICS 234910..................  Water, Sewer, and                  1,021            $456      $8,513,020        $444,380           0.005           0.103
                                 Pipeline Construction.
NAICS 234920..................  Power and Communication            3,412           3,086       5,973,947         311,840           0.052           0.990
                                 Transmission Line
                                 Construction.
NAICS 234930..................  Industrial Nonbuilding               321           1,544       8,616,909         434,005           0.018           0.356
                                 Structure Construction.
NAICS 234990..................  All Other Heavy                      791           3,545       3,426,792         166,062           0.103           2.135
                                 Construction.
NAICS 235310..................  Electrical Contractors..           1,945           4,438       6,231,556         269,203           0.071           1.648
NAICS 235910..................  Structural Steel                     786             174       2,346,498         103,715           0.007           0.168
                                 Erection Contractors.
NAICS 235950..................  Building Equipment and             1,148             114       3,463,515         153,087           0.003           0.075
                                 Other Machine
                                 Installation
                                 Contractors.
NAICS 235990..................  All Other Special Trade            3,150             125       2,948,895         135,944           0.004           0.092
                                 Contractors.
NAICS 221110..................  Electric Power                     2,171           2,733     101,021,115      19,113,195           0.003           0.014
                                 Generation.
NAICS 221120..................  Electric Power                     7,440           1,874      44,202,675       4,181,573           0.004           0.045
                                 Transmission, Control,
                                 and Distribution.
NAICS 2211....................  Major Publicly Owned                 927           1,846      48,441,576              NA           0.004              NA
                                 Utilities.
Various.......................  Industrial Power                     913           2,298       2,819,000              ND           0.082              ND
                                 Generators.
SIC 0783......................  Ornamental Shrub and                 381           5,867       5,259,031         274,424           0.112           2.138
                                 Tree Services.
                                                         -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total.....................  ........................          24,407           2,029      27,018,684       3,101,847           0.008           0.065
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes: (1) Totals may not equal the sum of the components due to rounding.
(2) ``NA'' = Not Applicable.
(3) ``ND'' = No Data is available.
Sources: CONSAD [5], IRS [15], U.S. Census [43, 44, 45, 46].

    As is evident from the data presented in Table 51, the costs of 
compliance with the present rulemaking are not large in relation to the 
corresponding annual financial flows associated with the regulated 
activities. The estimated

[[Page 20611]]

costs of compliance represent about 0.008 percent of revenues and 0.065 
percent of profits, on average, across all entities; compliance costs 
do not represent more than about 0.11 percent of revenues or more than 
about 2.14 percent of profits in any affected industry.
    The economic impact of the present rulemaking is most likely to 
consist of a small increase in prices for electricity of about 0.008 
percent, on average. It is unlikely that a price increase of the 
magnitude of 0.008 percent will significantly alter the services 
demanded by the public or any other affected customers or 
intermediaries. If the regulated community can substantially recoup the 
compliance costs of the present rulemaking with such a minimal increase 
in prices, there may be little effect on profits.\573\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \573\ One commenter questioned the ability of electric 
cooperatives to adjust their rates, as they are ``highly regulated'' 
(Ex. 0173). The commenter asserted that it could take more than a 
year to raise rates, if at all.
    The Agency does not assume cost pass-through in establishing 
economic feasibility; the estimate of costs as a percentage of 
profits represents the possibility that there is no cost pass-
through. Moreover, for this rulemaking, the profit impacts would be 
small. Finally, this economic-impact analysis captures ongoing 
issues for economic feasibility, not just the first year. If it 
takes a year or two to raise prices, this is well within the realm 
of possibilities. Industries may not be able to raise prices 
immediately for a variety of reasons--for market, as well as 
regulatory, reasons.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In general, it is unlikely that most establishments could pass none 
of the compliance costs along in the form of increased prices. In the 
event that unusual circumstances may inhibit even a price increase of 
0.11 percent, the maximum reduction in profits in any of the affected 
industries would be about 2.14 percent.
    OSHA established a minimum threshold of annualized costs equal to 1 
percent of annual revenues and 10 percent of annual profits. OSHA also 
determined that costs below this minimum threshold will not threaten 
the economic viability of an affected industry. Table 51 shows that the 
estimated annualized cost of the final rule is, on average, equal to 
only 0.008 percent of annual revenue and 0.065 percent of annual 
profit, far below the minimum threshold. Similarly, there is no 
individual affected industry in which the annualized costs of the final 
rule approaches 1 percent of annual revenues or 10 percent of annual 
profits. The industries with the highest cost impacts, NAICS 234990 
(All Other Heavy Construction) and SIC 0783 (Ornamental Shrub and Tree 
Services), have cost impacts as a percentage of revenues of only about 
0.1 percent each and cost impacts as a percentage of profits of only 
about 2 percent each. Based on these results, there would be no threat 
to the economic viability of any affected industry even if the costs of 
the final rule were nine times higher than OSHA estimated, as the 
highest cost impact as a percentage of revenues in any affected 
industry would still be less than 1 percent. Furthermore, the costs of 
the final rule would have to be five times higher than OSHA estimated 
for the cost impact as a percentage of revenues in any affected 
industry to approach 10 percent, the point at which further, more 
detailed, examination is needed to determine if the final rule might 
threaten the economic viability of any affected industry. For these 
reasons, the Agency believes that the finding of economic feasibility 
is robust for this rulemaking. A simple sensitivity analysis of the 
results finds that even if aggregate costs were several times larger 
than those estimated here, the rule would still be economically 
feasible.
    In profit-earning entities, establishments generally can absorb 
compliance costs through a combination of increases in prices and 
reduction in profits. The extent to which the impacts of cost increases 
affect prices or profits depends on the price elasticity of demand for 
the products or services produced and sold by the entity.
    Price elasticity of demand refers to the relationship between 
changes in the price charged for a product and the resulting changes in 
the demand for that product. A greater degree of elasticity of demand 
implies that an entity or industry is less able to pass increases in 
costs through to its customers in the form of a price increase and, 
therefore, must absorb more of the cost increase through a reduction in 
profits.
    Given the small incremental increases in prices potentially 
resulting from compliance with the final rule, and the lack of readily 
available substitutes for the products and services provided by the 
covered industries, demand is likely to be sufficiently inelastic in 
each affected industry to enable entities to substantially offset 
compliance costs through minor price increases without experiencing any 
significant reduction in total revenues or in net profits.
    For the economy as a whole, OSHA expects the economic impact of the 
present rulemaking to be both an increase in the efficiency of 
production of goods and services and an improvement in the welfare of 
society. First, as demonstrated by the analysis of costs and benefits 
associated with compliance with the requirements of the final rule, 
OSHA expects that societal welfare will increase as a result of these 
standards because the benefits achieved clearly and strongly justify 
the relatively small costs. The impacts of the final rule involve net 
benefits of over $100 million achieved in a relatively cost-effective 
manner.
    Second, until now, society externalized many of the costs 
associated with the injuries and fatalities resulting from the risks 
addressed by the final rule. That is, the costs incurred by society to 
supply certain products and services associated with electric power 
generation, transmission, and distribution work did not fully reflect 
in the prices of those products and services. Workers who suffer the 
consequences associated with the activities causing these risks partly 
bore the costs of production. To the extent society externalizes fewer 
of these costs, the price mechanism will enable the market to result in 
a more efficient allocation of resources. Note that reductions in 
externalities alone do not necessarily increase efficiency or social 
welfare unless the associated benefits outweigh the costs of achieving 
the reductions.
    OSHA concludes that compliance with the requirements of the final 
rule is economically feasible in every affected industry. The Agency 
based this conclusion on the criteria established by the OSH Act, as 
interpreted in relevant case law. In general, the courts hold that a 
standard is economically feasible if there is a reasonable likelihood 
that the estimated costs of compliance ``will not threaten the 
existence or competitive structure of an industry, even if it does 
portend disaster for some marginal firms'' (United Steelworkers of 
America v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1980)). As 
demonstrated by this Final Economic Analysis and the supporting 
evidence, the potential impacts associated with achieving compliance 
with the final rule fall well within the bounds of economic feasibility 
in each industry. OSHA does not expect compliance with the requirements 
of the final rule to threaten the viability of entities or the 
existence or competitive structure of any of the affected industries. 
No commenters suggested that the regulation would not be economically 
feasible.
    In addition, based on an analysis of the costs and economic impacts 
associated with this rulemaking, OSHA concludes that the effects of the 
final rule on international trade, employment, wages, and economic 
growth for the United States will be negligible.

[[Page 20612]]

17. Statement of Energy Effects
    As required by Executive Order 13211 and in accordance with the 
guidance for implementing Executive Order 13211 and with the 
definitions provided therein as prescribed by the Office of Management 
and Budget, OSHA analyzed the final rule with regard to its potential 
to have a significant adverse effect on the supply, distribution, or 
use of energy. As a result of this analysis, OSHA determined that this 
action is not a significant energy action as defined by the relevant 
OMB guidance.

H. Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act, as amended in 1996, requires the 
preparation of a Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (FRFA) for 
certain rules (5 U.S.C. 601-612). Under the provisions of the law, each 
such analysis must contain:
    1. A succinct statement of the need for, and objectives of, the 
rule;
    2. A summary of the significant issues raised by the public 
comments in response to the initial regulatory flexibility analysis, a 
summary of the assessment of the agency of such issues, and a statement 
of any changes made in the final rule as a result of such comments;
    3. A description and an estimate of the number of small entities to 
which the rule will apply or an explanation of why no such estimate is 
available;
    4. A description of the projected reporting, recordkeeping, and 
other compliance requirements of the rule, including an estimate of the 
classes of small entities that will be subject to the requirement and 
the type of professional skills necessary for preparation of the report 
or record; and
    5. A description of the steps the agency took to minimize the 
significant economic impact on small entities consistent with the 
stated objectives of applicable statutes, including a statement of the 
factual, policy, and legal reasons for selecting the alternative 
adopted in the final rule and why the agency rejected each one of the 
other significant alternatives to the rule considered by the agency 
that affect the impact on small entities.
    The Regulatory Flexibility Act further states that an agency may 
perform the required elements of the FRFA in conjunction with, or as 
part of, any other agenda or analysis required by any other law if such 
other analysis satisfies the relevant requirements.
1. A Succinct Statement of the Need for, and Objectives of, the Rule
    The primary objective of the final rule is to provide an increased 
degree of occupational safety for employees performing electric power 
generation, transmission, and distribution work. As stated earlier, the 
final rule will prevent an estimated 119 injuries and about 20 
fatalities annually through compliance with the final rule, in addition 
to injuries and fatalities prevented through compliance with existing 
standards.
    Another objective of the present rulemaking is to provide updated, 
clear, and consistent safety standards regarding electric power 
generation, transmission, and distribution work to relevant employers 
and employees and interested members of the public. The final rule is 
easier to understand and to apply than existing standards, which will 
improve safety by facilitating compliance.
2. A Summary of the Significant Issues Raised by the Public Comments in 
Response to the Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis, a Summary of 
the Assessment of the Agency of Such Issues, and a Statement of Any 
Changes Made in the Final Rule as a Result of Such Comments
    Few public commenters focused on the specific results of the 
Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis. OSHA responds to the few 
issues raised by the commenters elsewhere in this FEA.
3. A Description and an Estimate of the Number of Small Entities To 
Which the Rule Will Apply or an Explanation of Why No Such Estimate Is 
Available
    OSHA completed an analysis of the type and number of small and very 
small entities to which the final rule will apply. Relying on the Small 
Business Administration definitions [51], OSHA estimated the number of 
firms in the construction and Ornamental Shrub and Tree Services (SIC 
0783) industries that are small businesses based on revenue and 
estimated the number of firms in the utilities industries that are 
small businesses based on sales (in megawatt-hours). With the exception 
of Major Publically Owned Utilities, the Agency converted definitions 
based on megawatt-hours to revenue cutoffs using the EIA's Form EIA-860 
Database Annual Electric Generator Report, which estimates the average 
revenue per mega watt-hour to be $99.59 [49]. Multiplying $99.59 by the 
4-million megawatt-hour cutoff in the SBA definitions suggests a 
revenue cutoff for small utilities of $398,363,132. After determining 
revenue cutoffs implied by the SBA definitions for every affected 
NAICS, OSHA found the revenue of the largest employment-size class in 
the U.S. Census' Statistics of U.S. Businesses [43] equal to, or 
smaller than, the revenue implied in the SBA definition and then 
designated entities of that size or smaller as ``small.''
    In the case of Major Publicly Owned Utilities, as explained earlier 
in this FEA, OSHA estimates, based on EIA's Form-861 Annual Electric 
Power Industry Report, that there are now 277 firms that are major 
publicly owned utilities [50]. (See the discussion under the heading 
``Profile of Affected Industries,'' earlier in this section of the 
preamble). Of the 277 Major Publicly Owned Utilities in the EIA Form-
861 database, 261 have sales of less than 4-million megawatt-hours, and 
16 have sales of more than 4-million megawatt-hours. OSHA did not 
convert this sales data to a revenue or employment-size class 
equivalent because EIA's Form 861 database does not include employment 
data and because the U.S. Census' Statistics of U.S. Businesses does 
not include data for Major Publicly Owned Utilities distinct from 
nonmajor or privately owned utilities. Thus, OSHA used the 4-million 
megawatt-hour cutoff in the SBA definitions to designate as small the 
261 entities with sales of less than 4 million megawatt-hours.
    Table 52 summarizes the small business definitions discussed 
herein.
    For small entities, OSHA estimates the total cost of the final rule 
per small firm to be $3,159. (See Table 53.)
    To assess the potential economic impact of the rule on small 
entities, OSHA calculated the ratios of compliance costs to profits and 
to revenues. Table 53 presents these ratios for each affected industry. 
OSHA expects that, among small firms potentially affected by the rule, 
the average increase in prices necessary to completely offset the 
compliance costs will be less than 0.138 percent in any individual 
affected industry and an average of 0.010 percent for all affected 
industries.
    Only to the extent that such price increases are not possible would 
there be any effect on the average profits of small firms. Even in the 
unlikely event that these firms could not pass the costs through, the 
firms could absorb the compliance costs completely through an average 
reduction in profits of no more than 2.9 percent in any single affected 
industry and through an average reduction in profits of 0.086 percent 
in all affected industries.
    OSHA also separately examined the impact of the final rule on very 
small entities, defined as entities with fewer than 20 employees. In 
the proposed rule, the numbers presented in the CONSAD report for 
small, large, and total establishments were from the 1997

[[Page 20613]]

U.S. Economic Census. For this FEA, OSHA used the U.S. Census Bureau's 
2007 Statistics of U.S. Businesses [43] to update the numbers used in 
the PRIA. Based on these data, OSHA estimated that the final rule would 
affect a total of approximately 11,004 very small firms. Table 54 
presents the estimated number of affected very small firms in each 
industry.
    OSHA modified the analysis it made in the PRIA to accurately 
reflect the number of affected very small entities, as well as 
compliance costs, revenues, and profits per affected entity. In 
general, OSHA assumed that the profile of the affected firms mirrored 
the profile of rest of industry. However, in the case of Ornamental 
Tree and Shrub Services, SIC 0723, the Agency recognized that the 
limited number of very small entities actually involved in line-
clearance tree trimming was atypical for the industry, as very small 
entities involved in line-clearance tree trimming have significantly 
more employees than the average firm in this SIC category. 
Corresponding to their relatively larger employment, very small 
entities involved in line-clearance tree trimming likely have larger 
revenue than the average firm in the industry.
    OSHA calculated the ratios of compliance costs to profits and to 
revenues for very small firms. Table 54 presents these ratios for each 
affected industry. OSHA expects that, among very small firms affected 
by the final rule, the average increase in prices necessary to 
completely offset the compliance costs will be 0.040 percent.
    Only to the extent that such price increases are not possible would 
there be any effect on the average profits of small firms. Even in the 
unlikely event that these firms could not pass the costs through, the 
firms could absorb the compliance costs completely through an average 
reduction in profits of less than 0.040 percent.

                                                          Table 52--Small Business Definitions
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                                                            Equivalent
                                                                                                                            Equivalent      employment
    CONSAD/1997 NAICS      CONSAD industry name     2002/2007     2002/2007 industry   SBA size standard  ($ million or     revenue ($     size category
                                                      NAICS              name          mega watt-hours, as  applicable)      million)          (max.
                                                                                                                                            employees)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
234910...................  Water, Sewer, and             237110  Water and Sewer      $33.5.............................              NA             100
                            Pipeline                              Line and Related
                            Construction.                         Structures
                                                                  Construction.
                                                         237120  Oil and Gas          33.5..............................              NA             100
                                                                  Pipeline and
                                                                  Related Structures
                                                                  Construction.
234920...................  Power and                     237130  Power and            33.5..............................              NA             All
                            Communication                         Communication Line
                            Transmission Line                     and Related
                            Construction.                         Structures
                                                                  Construction.
237120...................  Industrial                    236210  Industrial Building  33.5..............................              NA             100
                            Nonbuilding                           Construction.
                            Structure
                            Construction.
                                                         237120  Oil and Gas          33.5..............................              NA             100
                                                                  Pipeline and
                                                                  Related Structures
                                                                  Construction.
                                                         237130  Power and            33.5..............................              NA             All
                                                                  Communication Line
                                                                  and Related
                                                                  Structures
                                                                  Construction.
234990...................  All Other Heavy               236210  Industrial Building  33.5..............................              NA             100
                            Construction.                         Construction.
                                                         237110  Water and Sewer      33.5..............................              NA             100
                                                                  Line and Related
                                                                  Structures
                                                                  Construction.
                                                         237990  Other Heavy and      33.5..............................              NA             500
                                                                  Civil Engineering
                                                                  Construction.
                                                         238910  Site Preparation     14.0..............................              NA             100
                                                                  Contractors.
                                                         238990  All Other Specialty  14.0..............................              NA             100
                                                                  Trade Contractors.
235310...................  Electrical                    238210  Electrical           14.0..............................              NA             100
                            Contractors.                          Contractors.
235910...................  Structural Steel              238120  Structural Steel     14.0..............................              NA             100
                            Erection                              and Precast
                            Contractors.                          Concrete
                                                                  Contractors.
                                                         238190  Other Foundation,    14.0..............................              NA             100
                                                                  Structure, and
                                                                  Building Exterior
                                                                  Contractors.

[[Page 20614]]

 
235950...................  Building Equipment            238290  Other Building       14.0..............................              NA             100
                            and Other Machine                     Equipment
                            Installation                          Contractors.
                            Contractors.
235990...................  All Other Special             236220  Commercial and       33.5..............................              NA             100
                            Trade Contractors.                    Institutional
                                                                  Building
                                                                  Construction.
                                                         237990  Other Heavy and      33.5..............................              NA             500
                                                                  Civil Engineering
                                                                  Construction.
                                                         238190  Other Foundation,    14.0..............................              NA             100
                                                                  Structure, and
                                                                  Building Exterior
                                                                  Contractors.
                                                         238290  Other Building       14.0..............................              NA             100
                                                                  Equipment
                                                                  Contractors.
                                                         238390  Other Building       14.0..............................              NA             100
                                                                  Finishing
                                                                  Contractors.
                                                         238910  Site Preparation     14.0..............................              NA             100
                                                                  Contractors.
                                                         238990  All Other Specialty  14.0..............................              NA             100
                                                                  Trade Contractors.
221110...................  Electric Power                221111  Hydroelectric Power  4 million mega watt-hours.........           398.4             All
                            Generation.                           Generation.
                                                         221112  Fossil Fuel          4 million mega watt-hours.........           398.4             500
                                                                  Electric Power
                                                                  Generation.
                                                         221113  Nuclear Electric     4 million mega watt-hours.........           398.4             500
                                                                  Power Generation.
                                                         221119  Other Electric       4 million mega watt-hours.........           398.4             All
                                                                  Power Generation.
221120...................  Electric Power                221121  Electric Bulk Power  4 million mega watt-hours.........           398.4             All
                            Transmission,                         Transmission and
                            Control, and                          Control.
                            Distribution.
                                                         221122  Electric Power       4 million mega watt-hours.........           398.4             500
                                                                  Distribution.
2211.....................  Major Publicly Owned            2211  Major Publicly       4 million mega watt-hours.........              NA              NA
                            Utilities.                            Owned Utilities.
SIC 0783.................  Ornamental Shrub and          561730  Landscaping          7.0...............................              NA             100
                            Tree Services.                        Services.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: ``NA'' = Not Applicable.
Sources: EIA [49, 50], SBA [51], U.S. Census [43, 44, 45, 46].


                          Table 53--Costs as a Percent of Revenues and Profits for Affected Small Entities (as Defined by SBA)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                            Compliance                                      Costs as a      Costs as a
         Industry code                Industry name          Affected       costs  per     Revenues  per   Profits  per     percent of      percent of
                                                           small  firms        firm            firm            firm          revenues         profits
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NAICS 234910..................  Water, Sewer, and                    968            $465      $8,846,770        $461,801           0.005           0.101
                                 Pipeline Construction.
NAICS 234920..................  Power and Communication            3,347           3,147       6,736,654         351,653           0.047           0.895
                                 Transmission Line
                                 Construction.
NAICS 234930..................  Industrial Nonbuilding               304           1,574       9,022,755         454,446           0.017           0.346
                                 Structure Construction.
NAICS 234990..................  All Other Heavy                      768           3,605       3,466,142         167,969           0.104           2.146
                                 Construction.
NAICS 235310..................  Electrical Contractors..           1,903           4,474       6,236,853         269,432           0.072           1.660
NAICS 235910..................  Structural Steel                     760             176       2,310,169         102,109           0.008           0.172
                                 Erection Contractors.
NAICS 235950..................  Building Equipment and               921             138       3,896,757         172,237           0.004           0.080
                                 Other Machine
                                 Installation
                                 Contractors.
NAICS 235990..................  All Other Special Trade            3,063             127       3,046,117         140,426           0.004           0.090
                                 Contractors.
NAICS 221110..................  Electric Power                       530           9,477     283,932,698      53,720,066           0.003           0.018
                                 Generation.
NAICS 221120..................  Electric Power                     1,134          11,320     162,314,688      15,354,970           0.007           0.074
                                 Transmission, Control,
                                 and Distribution.
NAICS 2211....................  Major Publicly Owned                 261           6,177     162,113,144              NA           0.004              NA
                                 Utilities.
Various.......................  Industrial Power                       0              NA              NA              NA              NA              NA
                                 Generators.
SIC 0783......................  Ornamental Shrub and                 303           7,231       5,259,210         225,620           0.138           3.205
                                 Tree Services.
    Total.....................  ........................          14,263           3,159      30,956,353       3,437,179           0.010           0.092
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes: (1) Totals may not equal the sum of the components due to rounding.
(2) ``NA'' = Not Applicable.

[[Page 20615]]

 
Sources: CONSAD [5], EIA [49, 50], IRS [15], SBA [51], U.S. Census [43, 44, 45, 46].


               Table 54--Costs as a Percent of Revenues and Profits for Affected Very Small Entities (Those With Fewer Than 20 Employees)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                          Affected firms
                                                            with fewer      Compliance     Revenues per     Profits per     Costs as a      Costs as a
         Industry code                Industry name           than 20        costs per         Firm            Firm         percent of      percent of
                                                             employees         firm                                          `revenues        profits
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NAICS 234910..................  Water, Sewer, and                    759            $220      $1,088,731         $56,832           0.020           0.388
                                 Pipeline Construction.
NAICS 234920..................  Power and Communication            2,651           1,187         913,129          47,665           0.130           2.490
                                 Transmission Line
                                 Construction.
NAICS 234930..................  Industrial Nonbuilding               142             100       1,164,177          58,636           0.009           0.171
                                 Structure Construction.
NAICS 234990..................  All Other Heavy                      689           1,895         958,076          46,428           0.198           4.082
                                 Construction.
NAICS 235310..................  Electrical Contractors..           1,731           2,597       2,223,705          96,064           0.117           2.704
NAICS 235910..................  Structural Steel                     608              96         734,692          32,473           0.013           0.296
                                 Erection Contractors.
NAICS 235950..................  Building Equipment and               748              77         832,404          36,792           0.009           0.209
                                 Other Machine
                                 Installation
                                 Contractors.
NAICS 235990..................  All Other Special Trade            2,916              96         836,651          38,570           0.011           0.248
                                 Contractors.
NAICS 221110..................  Electric Power                       316           2,841      29,775,772       5,633,576           0.010           0.050
                                 Generation.
NAICS 221120..................  Electric Power                       322           6,415      33,598,972       3,178,463           0.019           0.202
                                 Transmission, Control,
                                 and Distribution.
NAICS 2211....................  Major Publicly Owned                  33           5,868       4,740,998              NA           0.124              NA
                                 Utilities.
Various.......................  Industrial Power                       0              NA              NA              NA              NA              NA
                                 Generators.
SIC 0783......................  Ornamental Shrub and                  90           2,047         849,923          36,462           0.241           5.614
                                 Tree Services.
                                                         -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total.....................  ........................          11,004           1,169       2,898,088         303,777           0.040           0.385
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes: (1) Totals may not equal the sum of the components due to rounding.
(2) ``NA'' = Not Applicable.
Sources: CONSAD [5], IRS [15], U.S. Census [43, 44, 45, 46].

4. A Description of the Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping and Other 
Compliance Requirements of the Rule, Including an Estimate of the 
Classes of Small Entities That Will Be Subject to the Requirement and 
the Type of Professional Skills Necessary for Preparation of the Report 
or Record
    OSHA is revising the standards addressing the work practices 
employers will use, and other requirements they will follow, for the 
operation and maintenance of, and for construction work involving, 
electric power generation, transmission, and distribution 
installations. OSHA issued the existing rules for this type of work in 
1972 for construction work and in 1994 for work covered by general 
industry standards. The construction standards, in particular, are out 
of date and are not consistent with the more recent, corresponding 
general industry rules for the operation and maintenance of electric 
power generation, transmission, and distribution systems. As described 
in detail earlier, this final rule will make the construction and 
general industry standards for this type of work more consistent than 
is currently the case.
    Existing Sec.  1910.269 contains requirements for the maintenance 
and operation of electric power generation, transmission, and 
distribution installations. Section 1910.269 is primarily a work-
practices standard. OSHA based the requirements in Sec.  1910.269 on 
recognized safe industry practices as reflected in current national 
consensus standards covering this type of work, such as the National 
Electrical Safety Code.
    Section 1910.269 contains provisions protecting employees from the 
most serious hazards they face in performing this type of work, 
primarily hazards causing falls, burns, and electric shocks. 
Requirements in Sec.  1910.269 include provisions on training, job 
briefings, working near energized parts, deenergizing lines and 
equipment and grounding them for employee protection, work on 
underground and overhead installations, work in power-generating 
stations and substations, work in enclosed spaces, and other special 
conditions and equipment unique to the generation, transmission, and 
distribution of electric energy.
    OSHA also is extending its general industry standard on electrical 
protective equipment (Sec.  1910.137) to the construction industry. The 
existing construction standards for the design of electrical protective 
equipment, which apply only to electric power transmission and 
distribution work, adopted several national consensus standards by 
reference. This final rule replaces the incorporation of these out-of-
date consensus standards with a set of performance-oriented 
requirements that are consistent with the latest revisions of these 
consensus standards and with the corresponding standard for general 
industry. Additionally, OSHA is issuing new requirements for the safe 
use and care of electrical protective equipment to complement the 
equipment-design provisions. The final rule, which will apply to all 
construction work, will update the existing OSHA industry-specific 
standards and will prevent accidents caused by inadequate electrical 
protective equipment.
    As discussed in detail earlier, OSHA does not expect this transfer 
to the construction standards of the existing general industry 
standards in Sec.  1910.137 and Sec.  1910.269 to impose a significant 
burden on employers. Generally, many employers doing construction work 
also do general industry work; thus, OSHA believes that they are 
already following the existing general industry standards in their 
construction work. The final provisions in Subpart V also are generally 
consistent with the latest national consensus standards.
    In addition, OSHA also is making miscellaneous changes to the 
existing requirements in Sec.  1910.137 and Sec.  1910.269. These 
changes include requirements for: Class 00 rubber insulating gloves; 
electrical protective equipment made from materials other than rubber; 
training for electric power generation, transmission, and distribution 
workers; host-contractor responsibilities; job briefings; fall 
protection equipment; insulation and working position of employees 
working on or near live parts; protective clothing; minimum approach 
distances; deenergizing transmission and

[[Page 20616]]

distribution lines and equipment; protective grounding; operating 
mechanical equipment near overhead power lines; and working in manholes 
and vaults.
    These changes to the general industry standards, because they also 
apply to construction, will ensure that consistent requirements, when 
appropriate, apply to employers engaged in work performed under the 
construction and general industry standards. As explained more fully in 
Section V, Summary and Explanation of the Final Rule, earlier in this 
preamble, OSHA believes that this consistency will further protect 
employees performing electrical work covered under the general industry 
standards. The rule also updates references to consensus standards in 
Sec. Sec.  1910.137 and 1910.269 and adds a new appendix to assist 
employers to comply with the new clothing provisions.
    Section V, Summary and Explanation of the Final Rule, earlier in 
this preamble, provides further detail regarding the requirements of 
the final rule.
    The preceding sections of this economic analysis present a 
description of the classes of small entities that are subject to the 
final rule, as well as the types of professional skills necessary to 
comply with the requirements.
5. A Description of the Steps the Agency Took To Minimize the 
Significant Economic Impact on Small Entities Consistent With the 
Stated Objectives of Applicable Statutes, Including a Statement of the 
Factual, Policy, and Legal Reasons for Selecting the Alternative 
Adopted in the Final Rule, and Why the Agency Rejected Each One of the 
Other Significant Alternatives to the Rule Considered by the Agency 
That Affect the Impact on Small Entities
    OSHA evaluated many alternatives to the final rule to ensure that 
the final requirements will best accomplish the stated objectives of 
applicable statutes and minimize any significant economic impact of the 
rule on small entities.
    In developing the rule, and especially in establishing compliance, 
reporting requirements, or timetables that affect small entities, OSHA 
took the resources available to small entities into account. To the 
extent practicable, OSHA clarified, consolidated, and simplified 
compliance and reporting requirements under the rule that are 
applicable to small entities. Wherever possible, OSHA stated the final 
rule's requirements in terms of performance rather than design 
specifications. OSHA did not consider an exemption from coverage of the 
rule for small entities to be a viable option because such an exemption 
would unduly jeopardize the safety and health of the affected 
employees.
    OSHA considered many other specific alternatives to the present 
requirements. Section V, Summary and Explanation of the Final Rule, 
earlier in this preamble, provides a discussion and explanation of the 
particular requirements of the rule and the alternatives OSHA 
considered.
    OSHA considered other regulatory alternatives raised by the Small 
Business Advocacy Review Panel, which OSHA convened for purposes of 
soliciting comments on the rule from affected small entities. The 
Agency discusses these alternatives later in this economic analysis.
    OSHA also considered nonregulatory alternatives in determining the 
appropriate approach to reducing occupational hazards associated with 
electric power generation, transmission, and distribution work. The 
Agency discusses these alternatives under the heading ``Examination of 
Alternative Regulatory Approaches,'' earlier in this section of the 
preamble.

Alternatives Considered and Changes Made in Response to Comments From 
SERs and Recommendations From the Small Business Advocacy Review Panel

    On May 1, 2003, OSHA convened a Small Business Advocacy Review 
Panel (SBAR Panel or Panel) for this rulemaking in accordance with the 
provisions of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 
1996 (Pub. L. 104-121), as codified at 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq. The SBAR 
Panel consisted of representatives from OSHA, the Office of Information 
and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) in the Office of Management and Budget, 
and the Office of Advocacy within the U.S. Small Business 
Administration. The Panel received, from small entities potentially 
affected by this rulemaking, oral and written comments on a draft rule 
and on a draft economic analysis. The Panel, in turn, prepared a 
written report, which it delivered to the Assistant Secretary for 
Occupational Safety and Health [29]. The report summarized the comments 
received from the small entities and included recommendations from the 
Panel to OSHA regarding the rule and the associated analysis of 
compliance costs.
    Table 55 lists each of the recommendations made by the Panel and 
describes the corresponding answers or changes made by OSHA in response 
to the issues raised.

           Table 55--Panel Recommendations and OSHA Responses
------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Panel recommendations *                   OSHA Responses
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. The SERs generally [believed] that    OSHA revised its economic and
 OSHA had underestimated the costs and    regulatory flexibility
 may have overestimated the benefits in   analysis as appropriate in
 [the draft] economic analysis            light of the additional
 [provided to the SERs]. The Panel        information received from the
 recommends that OSHA revise its          SERs and rulemaking
 economic and regulatory flexibility      participants. Many of the
 analysis as appropriate, and that OSHA   comments from the SERs
 specifically discuss the alternative     asserting deficiencies in the
 estimates and assumptions provided by    estimates of the compliance
 SERs and compare them to OSHA's          costs were the result of
 revised estimates.                       differing interpretations of
                                          what would have to be done to
                                          achieve compliance with
                                          particular requirements.
                                         Some SERs remarked that OSHA
                                          underestimated the time and
                                          resources that would be
                                          necessary to develop and
                                          maintain written records
                                          associated with requirements
                                          for making determinations
                                          regarding training and
                                          protective clothing, for
                                          documenting employee training,
                                          and for communicating with
                                          host employers or contractors
                                          about hazards and appropriate
                                          safety practices. OSHA
                                          clarified, in some cases in
                                          the preamble and other cases
                                          in the regulatory text, that
                                          the final rule does not
                                          require written records to
                                          achieve compliance with these
                                          provisions of the final rule.

[[Page 20617]]

 
                                         In some cases, the SERs also
                                          interpreted the draft
                                          requirements associated with
                                          job briefings, host-contractor
                                          responsibilities, and incident-
                                          energy calculations in ways
                                          that would involve higher
                                          compliance costs than those
                                          estimated by OSHA, but that
                                          were not consistent with the
                                          way in which OSHA intended
                                          employers to achieve
                                          compliance. In these cases,
                                          OSHA clarified, in the
                                          preamble and regulatory text,
                                          what would be necessary to
                                          comply with the standards to
                                          alleviate the corresponding
                                          potential cost and impact
                                          concerns raised by the SERs.
                                         With regard to the cost for
                                          training that will be
                                          necessary for employees
                                          currently not requiring
                                          training in accordance with
                                          the existing training
                                          requirements in Sec.
                                          1910.269, OSHA revised its
                                          compliance cost calculations
                                          to account for one-time and
                                          annual cost of the additional
                                          training these employees will
                                          receive, as described under
                                          the headings ``One-Time Costs
                                          for Additional Training for
                                          Employees Not Already
                                          Receiving Training in
                                          Accordance with Existing Sec.
                                           1910.269'' and ``Annual Costs
                                          for Additional Training for
                                          Employees Not Already Covered
                                          by Sec.   1910.269,'' earlier
                                          in this section of the
                                          preamble.
                                         For employees currently
                                          provided the training required
                                          by existing Sec.   1910.269,
                                          OSHA generally included costs
                                          equivalent to 1.5 hours of
                                          employee time, 12 minutes of
                                          supervisory time, and 3
                                          minutes of clerical time per
                                          employee. In the case of line-
                                          clearance tree trimmers, OSHA
                                          assumed 0.75 hours of employee
                                          time, 6 minutes of supervisory
                                          time, and 3 minutes of
                                          clerical time per employee.
                                         Most SERs indicated that the
                                          job briefing requirements were
                                          generally consistent with
                                          current practices and that 5
                                          minutes for the additional job
                                          briefing requirements per
                                          project would be a reasonable
                                          estimate for the amount of
                                          time involved. For purposes of
                                          estimating compliance costs in
                                          this analysis, OSHA used
                                          estimates of current
                                          compliance of 85 percent to 98
                                          percent, and estimated that
                                          each affected project would
                                          require resources equivalent
                                          to 5 minutes of supervisor
                                          time and 5 minutes of employee
                                          time.
                                         With regard to the cost
                                          associated with providing
                                          flame-resistant clothing to
                                          employees, the SERs generally
                                          suggested that OSHA's estimate
                                          of two sets per employee per
                                          year for small establishments
                                          and five sets per employee
                                          every 5 years for large
                                          establishments was an
                                          underestimate. The SERs also
                                          gave OSHA broad estimates of
                                          the costs of flame-resistant
                                          clothing, ranging from $50 per
                                          shirt to $150 for switching
                                          coats or flash suits. Several
                                          SERs agreed that many
                                          companies contract with
                                          uniform companies to supply
                                          and launder clothing. In the
                                          FEA, in the analysis of
                                          compliance costs associated
                                          with the requirements to
                                          provide flame-resistant
                                          clothing, OSHA estimates that,
                                          on average, employers will
                                          provide eight sets of clothing
                                          per employee, and that, with
                                          eight sets per employee, the
                                          useful life of the clothing
                                          will average 4 years. OSHA
                                          estimated the cost per set of
                                          clothing to be $110 in the
                                          analysis of the proposed rule,
                                          but increased that estimate to
                                          $192 in this analysis to
                                          reflect current costs [13].
                                          This analysis excluded
                                          laundering costs because the
                                          rule does not require
                                          employers to launder the
                                          clothing. OSHA estimated the
                                          cost per switching coat or
                                          flash suit to be $200 in the
                                          analysis of the proposed rule
                                          and increased that estimate to
                                          $226 in this analysis to
                                          reflect current costs [19].
2. In [the draft] economic and RFA       OSHA's final economic and
 analyses [provided to the SERs], OSHA    regulatory flexibility
 assumed that all affected firms apply    analyses reflect additional
 existing [Sec.   ]1910.269 to            costs for firms previously not
 construction related activities, even    required to comply with Sec.
 though not required to do so. The        1910.269. Specifically, OSHA
 reason OSHA made this assumption is      estimated that these firms
 [that] OSHA thought that all affected    would incur compliance costs
 firms are either covered solely by       equivalent to the costs
 [Part] 1910, or engage in both [Part]    incurred by firms affected by
 1910 and [Part] 1926 activities, and     the new requirements of Sec.
 find it easiest to adopt the general     1910.269 when OSHA promulgated
 industry standard for all activities.    it originally in 1994.
 SERs confirmed that most firms do in    In addition, OSHA considered
 fact follow [Sec.   ]1910.269.           the SER comments on training
 However, they also pointed out that      and revised its estimate of
 there are some firms that are engaged    training costs accordingly.
 solely in construction activities and    OSHA added a separate training
 thus may not be following the [Part]     cost for firms not currently
 1910 standards. The Panel recommends     covered by the existing
 that OSHA revise its economic and        training requirements in Sec.
 regulatory flexibility analyses to        1910.269, as described under
 reflect the costs associated with some   the heading ``Costs of
 firms coming into compliance with        Compliance,'' earlier in this
 [Sec.   ]1910.269. The SERs also         section of the preamble.
 reported that compliance training
 under [Sec.   ]1910.269 is extensive.
 One SER estimated that in excess of 30
 hours per employee is necessary in the
 first year. The Panel recommends that
 OSHA consider the SER comments on
 training and revise its estimate of
 training costs as necessary.

[[Page 20618]]

 
3. Most SERs were concerned that a       The final rule does not require
 ``performance standard'' such as [the    employers to maintain records
 draft proposal provided to SERs] means   of training. Employees
 that even in cases where OSHA does not   themselves can attest to the
 require recordkeeping, such as for       training they receive, and
 training, many small entities will       OSHA will determine compliance
 find recordkeeping (1) useful for        with the training requirements
 internal purposes and (2) virtually      primarily through employee
 the only way they will be able to        interviews
 demonstrate compliance with the rule.
 The Panel recommends that OSHA
 consider whether recordkeeping is
 necessary to demonstrate compliance
 with the standard, and, if not, that
 OSHA explicitly discuss ways in which
 employers can demonstrate compliance
 without using recordkeeping.
4. SERs pointed out that the [draft      The final rule does not require
 proposed host-contractor] requirements   host employers to supervise
 for observation and follow-up would      contractors' employees or
 result in paperwork and reporting        change their practices for
 requirements not presented in the cost   observing or inspecting the
 analysis. The Panel recommends that      work of contractors.
 OSHA include such costs and paperwork   OSHA has eliminated the draft
 burdens in its economic analysis as      proposed requirement for the
 appropriate.                             host employer ``to note any
                                          failures of the contract
                                          employer to correct such
                                          violations, take appropriate
                                          measures to correct the
                                          violations, and consider the
                                          contract employer's failure to
                                          correct violations in
                                          evaluating the contract
                                          employer.'' Thus, OSHA did not
                                          include costs for the host
                                          employer to follow up to
                                          ensure that the contract
                                          employer corrected any
                                          violations.
                                         OSHA included estimates of the
                                          costs of information
                                          collection requirements, and
                                          of the associated paperwork
                                          burdens, in the paperwork
                                          analysis for the final rule.
5. Several SERs argued that [the draft   The final rule does not contain
 proposal's requirement for]              a requirement for the host
 consideration of safety records would    employer to obtain and
 restrict the number of eligible          evaluate information on
 contractors, resulting in both           contractors' safety
 increased costs and potential impacts    performance and programs.
 on small firms. Several SERs also were   Consequently, the final
 concerned that the draft requirement     regulatory flexibility
 would result in the increased use of     analysis does not include
 methods such as pre-qualification in     costs associated with this
 the hiring of contractors or would       draft proposed provision.
 increase reliance on favored
 contractors; the SERs said that both
 of these effects could result in
 increased costs and restricted
 business opportunities, especially for
 small businesses. The Panel recommends
 that OSHA study the extent of such
 costs and impacts and solicit comment
 on them.
6. Several SERs questioned OSHA's        In the development of the FEA,
 estimates of the number of sets of       OSHA reexamined its
 flame-resistant clothing an employee     assumptions and cost estimates
 would need, and its assumptions and      with regard to the entire
 cost estimates. The Panel recommends     final rule, including the
 that OSHA reexamine its assumptions      requirements to provide flame-
 and cost estimates in light of these     resistant clothing. OSHA's
 comments.                                response to Panel
                                          recommendation 1, earlier in
                                          this table, describes the
                                          comments from the SERs and
                                          OSHA's revised estimates made
                                          in response to these comments.
7. Many SERs questioned whether the * *  OSHA collected and compiled
 * revisions to [Sec.   ]1910.269 would   information from a variety of
 in fact save any lives or prevent any    sources to document and
 accidents. Some commented that they      support the need for the
 had never seen an accident that would    provisions of the final rule.
 have been prevented by any of the new    OSHA analyzed the data on the
 provisions [in the draft proposal].      fatalities and injuries that
 Some SERs suggested that [the draft]     occurred among the affected
 analysis [provided to SERs] might have   workforce over the past decade
 included fatalities in municipal         specifically with regard to
 facilities that may not be covered by    the effectiveness of both the
 the standard. Others suggested OSHA      existing and final
 should discuss the extent to which the   requirements in preventing
 existing general industry standard had   such incidents. The discussion
 resulted in reduced fatalities and       under the heading ``Benefits,
 injuries, and how this compares with     Net Benefits, and Cost
 OSHA estimates of how many fatalities    Effectiveness,'' earlier in
 and injuries would be prevented by the   this section of the preamble,
 proposal. The Panel recommends that      summarizes this evaluation;
 OSHA provide more documentation          the corresponding research
 regarding the sources and nature of      report [5] provides a detailed
 the anticipated benefits attributed to   explanation of this
 the draft proposal. The [Panel also      evaluation.
 recommends that the] estimated          To quantitatively determine the
 benefits [in the draft analysis] * * *   effectiveness of the existing
 be reexamined in light of the SER        and final rules in preventing
 comments and experiences regarding the   injuries and fatalities, OSHA
 perceived effectiveness of the new       performed a detailed review of
 provisions. In particular, [the Panel    the descriptions of accidents.
 recommends that] OSHA * * * focus        For each accident reviewed,
 attention on the benefits associated     OSHA analyzed the detailed
 with the provisions on flame-            description of the accident,
 resistant] apparel, training, host/      along with the citations
 contractor responsibilities, and fall    issued, the type of injuries
 protection.                              incurred, and the causes
                                          associated with the accident
                                          to estimate the likelihood
                                          that the accident was
                                          preventable under, first, the
                                          existing applicable standards,
                                          and second, the final rule.
                                          Based on these analyses,
                                          CONSAD found that full
                                          compliance with the existing
                                          standards would prevent 52.9
                                          percent of the injuries and
                                          fatalities; compliance with
                                          the final rule, however, would
                                          prevent 79.8 percent of the
                                          relevant injuries and
                                          fatalities. Compared to the
                                          existing standards, the final
                                          standard increases safety by
                                          preventing an additional 20
                                          fatalities and 119 injuries
                                          annually.
                                         In addition, the final rule
                                          improves safety by clarifying
                                          and updating the existing
                                          standards to reflect modern
                                          technologies, work practices,
                                          and terminology and by making
                                          the standards consistent with
                                          current consensus standards
                                          and other related standards
                                          and documents. By facilitating
                                          the understanding of, and
                                          compliance with, these
                                          important safety standards,
                                          the final rule increases
                                          protection of employees while
                                          reducing uncertainty,
                                          confusion, and compliance
                                          burdens on employers.

[[Page 20619]]

 
                                         Section V, Summary and
                                          Explanation of the Final Rule,
                                          earlier in this preamble,
                                          includes explanations of the
                                          need for, and the expected
                                          benefits associated with,
                                          specific provisions of the
                                          final rule. In particular, see
                                          the summary and explanation of
                                          final Sec.  Sec.   1926.950(c)
                                          (host-contractor
                                          responsibilities), 1926.954(b)
                                          (fall protection), and
                                          1926.960(g) (flame-resistant
                                          clothing) for a discussion of
                                          the need for, and a
                                          qualitative explanation of,
                                          the benefits of these
                                          provisions.
8. There were no comments from the SERs  As discussed under the heading
 on OSHA's estimates [in the draft        ``Costs of Compliance,''
 analysis provided to the SERs] of the    earlier in this section of the
 number and type of small entities        preamble, OSHA's FEA,
 affected by the proposal. However,       including its estimates of
 some [SERs] pointed out that there may   baseline activities and its
 be some small entities that engage in    cost estimates, reflect the
 only construction related activities.    possible existence of some
 The Panel recommends that OSHA's         firms not currently covered by
 estimates of current baseline            existing Sec.   1910.269 and
 activities and OSHA's cost estimates     that do not comply with these
 reflect such firms.                      provisions when performing
                                          construction work on electric
                                          power generation,
                                          transmission, or distribution
                                          installations.
9. Most SERs were uncertain about how    OSHA included appendices
 to comply with performance oriented      containing guidelines on the
 provisions of the proposal, and          inspection of work-positioning
 further, that additional expenses        equipment to assist employers
 might be required to be confident that   in complying with the
 they were in compliance with such        requirement to conduct such
 provisions. The Panel recommends that    inspections described in Sec.
 OSHA study and address these issues      Sec.   1910.269(g)(2)(iv)(A)
 and consider the use of guidance         and 1926.954(b)(3)(i). The
 material (e.g. non-mandatory             final rule also includes
 appendices) to describe specific ways    appendices on clothing in Sec.
 of meeting the standard, which will        1910.269 and Subpart V of
 help small employers comply, without     Part 1926. These appendices
 making the standard more prescriptive.   should assist employers to
                                          comply with the clothing
                                          provisions in Sec.  Sec.
                                          1910.269(l)(8) and
                                          1926.960(g).
                                         The rule also includes many
                                          references to consensus
                                          standards that contain
                                          information that can assist
                                          employers to comply with
                                          various provisions of the
                                          final rule. For example, the
                                          note to Sec.   1926.957(b)
                                          directs employers to the
                                          Institute of Electrical and
                                          Electronics Engineers' IEEE
                                          Guide for Maintenance Methods
                                          on Energized Power Lines, IEEE
                                          Std 516-2009 for guidance on
                                          the examination, cleaning,
                                          repairing, and in-service
                                          testing of live-line tools to
                                          help employers comply with
                                          that provision in the OSHA
                                          standards. Lastly, Appendix G
                                          to Sec.   1910.269 and
                                          Appendix G to Subpart V of
                                          Part 1926 contain lists of
                                          reference documents that
                                          employers can access for help
                                          in complying with the final
                                          rule.
                                         The preamble and this analysis
                                          both contain additional
                                          descriptions of what OSHA
                                          considers necessary and
                                          sufficient for purposes of
                                          achieving compliance with the
                                          requirements of the final
                                          rule.
10. Most SERs were highly critical of    OSHA modified the provisions on
 the host contractor provisions [in the   host-contractor
 draft proposal provided to the SERs]     responsibilities substantially
 and had trouble understanding what       from the requirements in the
 OSHA required. If these provisions are   draft proposal reviewed by the
 to be retained, the Panel recommends     SERs. The Agency believes that
 that they be revised. The Panel          the changes address the
 recommends that OSHA clarify what        concerns expressed by the
 constitutes adequate consideration of    SERs.
 contractor safety performance, clarify  The final rule does not contain
 what is meant by ``observation,''        requirements for the host
 clarify how the multi-employer           employer to consider a
 citation policy is related to the        contract employer's safety
 proposal, and clarify whether the        performance or for the host
 requirement to communicate hazards       employer to observe or
 does or does not represent a             supervise contract employers'
 requirement for the host employer to     work. In addition, the final
 conduct their own risk assessment. The   rule does not include the
 Panel also recommends that OSHA          proposed requirement that host
 examine the extent to which state        employers report observed
 contractor licensing could make the      contract-employer-related
 host contractor provisions in the        violations to the contract
 proposal unnecessary.                    employer.
                                         The discussion of final Sec.
                                          1926.950(c), in Section V,
                                          Summary and Explanation of the
                                          Final Rule, earlier in this
                                          preamble, provides
                                          clarification of the purpose
                                          and application of the host-
                                          contractor requirements and
                                          their relationship to OSHA's
                                          multiemployer citation policy.
                                         The discussion of final Sec.
                                          1926.950(c)(1), in Section V,
                                          Summary and Explanation of the
                                          Final Rule, earlier in this
                                          preamble, makes it clear that
                                          the purpose of the
                                          requirements for host
                                          employers to provide
                                          information to contractors is
                                          to facilitate the contractors'
                                          efforts to perform their own
                                          assessments as required by the
                                          final rule.
                                         OSHA does not believe that
                                          State contractor-licensing
                                          requirements make the final
                                          host-contractor provisions
                                          unnecessary. Not all States
                                          require electric power
                                          generation, transmission, and
                                          distribution contractors to
                                          have a license. For example,
                                          Illinois and New York do not
                                          require licensing at the State
                                          level (see https://www.electric-find.com/license.htm).
                                          Additionally, States with such
                                          licensing requirements judge
                                          primarily the contractors'
                                          ability to install electric
                                          equipment in accordance with
                                          State or national installation
                                          codes, and not their ability
                                          to perform electric power
                                          generation, transmission, and
                                          distribution work safely.
11. Some SERs questioned the need for    OSHA considered these issues in
 flame-resistant clothing beyond the      the development of the final
 existing clothing provisions in [Sec.    clothing requirements, as
  ]1910.269. Some argued that there was   explained in the discussion of
 a trade-off between possible decreased   final Sec.   1926.960(g), in
 injuries from burns and heat stress      Section V, Summary and
 injuries as a result of using flame-     Explanation of the Final Rule,
 resistant clothing. The Panel            earlier in this preamble.
 recommends that OSHA consider and
 solicit comments on these issues.

[[Page 20620]]

 
12. Many SERs were uncertain whether     OSHA adopted requirements in
 [the draft proposal's] requirements      the final rule that provide
 for determining the need for flame-      guidance explaining ways an
 resistant clothing would allow the use   employer can comply with the
 of such methods as 1) ``worst case''     arc-flash protection
 analysis or 2) specifying minimum        requirements in Sec.  Sec.
 levels of protection for use when a      1910.269(l)(8) and
 system does not exceed certain limits.   1926.960(g). For example, the
 The Panel recommends that OSHA clarify   Agency included two notes and
 what methods are acceptable to meet      additional appendix material
 these requirements, and specify these    explaining how an employer can
 methods in such a way that small         calculate estimates of
 entities can be confident that they      available heat energy. For
 have met the requirements of the         additional information, see
 standards.                               the discussion of final Sec.
                                          1926.960(g) in Section V,
                                          Summary and Explanation of the
                                          Final Rule, earlier in this
                                          preamble.
13. OSHA[`s draft proposal included]     OSHA believes that the changes
 some changes to the training             this final rule makes to the
 provisions in [Sec.   ]1910.269,         training requirements in
 including dropping certification         existing Sec.   1910.269
 requirements and allowing training to    clarify the standard and
 vary with risk. OSHA stated that both    reduce burdens on employers.
 of these changes were designed to give   See the discussion of final
 the rules a greater performance          Sec.   1926.950(b), in Section
 orientation and to ease compliance.      V, Summary and Explanation of
 Some SERs felt that these changes        the Final Rule, earlier in
 might make compliance more complicated   this preamble, for additional
 by making it less clear what needs to    clarification on how to comply
 be done. The Panel recommends that       with the training requirements
 OSHA clarify the performance             in the final rule. OSHA did
 orientation of these [draft proposed]    not state that compliance with
 changes and consider explaining that     the training provisions in
 existing compliance methods would        existing Sec.   1910.269 will
 still be considered adequate under the   constitute compliance with the
 new rules. The Panel further             training provisions in the
 recommends that OSHA examine the         final rule because employers
 requirement [in existing Sec.            will need to develop and
 1910.269(a)(2)(vii)] that employees      provide additional training to
 demonstrate proficiency and provide      address the new and revised
 examples of how that can be              safety-related work-practice
 accomplished. The Panel also             requirements in the final
 recommends that OSHA consider the        rule. Thus, training that
 possibility that the proposed draft      complies with existing Sec.
 may introduce costs to small             1910.269 will not be
 businesses that are uncertain of how     sufficient under the final
 to comply with the new performance       rule.
 oriented training provisions.           Existing Sec.
                                          1910.269(a)(2)(vii) already
                                          requires employees to
                                          demonstrate proficiency in the
                                          work practices involved. OSHA
                                          believes that most employers
                                          are already complying with
                                          this requirement in various
                                          ways. For example, some
                                          employers have employees
                                          demonstrate proficiency in
                                          climbing after completing a
                                          pole-climbing class that
                                          includes climbing on practice
                                          poles as part of the
                                          curriculum. In addition, many
                                          employers use an
                                          apprenticeship program, in
                                          which journeyman line workers
                                          acting as crew leaders observe
                                          trainees over the course of
                                          the program. The trainees pass
                                          through the apprenticeship
                                          program by successfully
                                          completing each step,
                                          demonstrating proficiency in
                                          various tasks along the way,
                                          until the trainees reach the
                                          journeyman level.
                                         In addition to the guidance
                                          provided in the preamble and
                                          appendices on how to comply
                                          with the new training
                                          requirements, the Agency is
                                          planning to issue a Small
                                          Entity Compliance Guide
                                          covering these issues
                                          following publication of the
                                          standard.
14. Several SERS argued that the         OSHA clarified the purpose of
 [draft] proposal placed restrictions     the changes to the fall
 on the length of [a] lanyard and that    protection requirements in
 these restrictions were unworkable.      final Sec.   1926.954(b)(1)(i)
 The Panel recommends that OSHA clarify   and (b)(2) in the discussion
 the intent of the fall protection        of those provisions in Section
 provisions. Other SERs argued that       V, Summary and Explanation of
 fall fatalities from aerial lifts were   the Final Rule, earlier in
 either the result of catastrophic        this preamble. The Agency also
 failures in which case fall protection   clarified the requirements in
 would not have prevented the death, or   final Sec.
 the result of failure to use any form    1926.954(b)(3)(iii) to use
 of fall arrest or fall restraint. Some   fall protection equipment to
 SERs argued that some workers might      make it clear what each type
 find harnesses more awkward than belts   of fall protection system is
 and be less likely to wear them. The     and when it is acceptable. The
 Panel recommends that OSHA consider      discussion of final Sec.
 and solicit comment on these issues.     1926.954(b)(3)(iii), in
                                          Section V, Summary and
                                          Explanation of the Final Rule,
                                          earlier in this preamble,
                                          describes why the reasons
                                          provided by the SERs did not
                                          persuade the Agency to permit
                                          the use of body belts in a
                                          fall arrest system.
15. This rule was designed by OSHA to    OSHA does not believe that the
 eliminate confusing differences          provisions on host-contractor
 between the applicable construction      responsibilities duplicate or
 and general industry standards by        overlap the Agency's
 making the standards consistent.         multiemployer policy or create
 Several SERs felt this was a             employer-employee
 worthwhile goal. Some SERs felt that     relationships for FLSA or IRS
 the host contractor provisions of the    purposes. See the discussion
 rule could result in causing             of final Sec.   1926.950(c) in
 contractor employees to be considered    Section V, Summary and
 employees of the host employer under     Explanation of the Final Rule,
 the Fair Labor Standards Act and under   earlier in this preamble, for
 the Internal Revenue Service             a full discussion of these
 regulations. In addition, the SERs       issues.
 identified OSHA's multi-employer
 citation policy as duplicative and
 overlapping of the host contractor
 provisions in the proposal. The Panel
 recommends that, if this provision is
 retained, OSHA investigate this issue
 and clarify these provisions to assure
 that contractor employees do not
 become direct employees of the host
 employer as a result of complying with
 possible OSHA requirements.
16. Some SERs were unconvinced about     The Agency received no comments
 the need for revisions to the existing   on the regulatory alternative
 [Sec.   ]1910.269 standard in light of   of extending existing Sec.
 their potential to improve safety        1910.269, in its entirety, to
 beyond what compliance with the          construction without further
 requirements in existing [Sec.           modification. In any event,
 ]1910.269 would achieve. The Panel       the Agency finds that the
 recommends that OSHA consider and        additional changes to both
 solicit comment on the regulatory        Sec.   1910.269 and Subpart V
 alternative of extending the             will prevent a significant
 requirements of [Sec.   ]1910.269 to     number of fatalities and
 construction, without further            injuries each year.
 modification.

[[Page 20621]]

 
17. The Panel notes that [the draft      OSHA considered these options
 proposed host-contractor] provisions     and adopted several of them.
 were particularly troublesome for        See the discussion of final
 almost all SERs, and that as a result,   Sec.   1926.950(c) in Section
 OSHA should provide either some change   V, Summary and Explanation of
 or provide extensive clarification to    the Final Rule, earlier in
 these [draft proposed] provisions. The   this preamble, for additional
 Panel recommends that OSHA consider,     discussion of these
 analyze, and solicit comment on a        provisions.
 variety of alternatives to these
 [draft proposed] provisions,
 including:
    (1) Dropping all or some of these
     provisions.
    (2) Specifying in detail methods
     that would be considered adequate
     for purposes of compliance for
     those provisions retained..
    (3) Changing the provision for
     consideration of safety
     performance to indicate how
     employers can be sure they have
     complied with the provision..
    (4) Changing the provisions
     concerning observed violations by:
         Dropping the provision
         concerning observed violations
         entirely;
         Changing the provision
         concerning observed violations
         to clearly indicate that
         ``inspections'' are not
         required;
         Minimizing the amount
         of follow-up and
         responsibility placed on the
         host employer when a violation
         is observed;
         Requiring only that
         the contractor be notified of
         observed violations (no
         requirement for subsequent
         monitoring or evaluation);
         Changing the provision
         to require observation for the
         purpose of determining if the
         contractor is performing safe
         work practices, and requiring
         observed violations to be
         reported to the contractor (no
         requirement for subsequent
         monitoring or evaluation);
         Providing explicit
         language that line clearance
         tree trimmers are not covered
         by this provision;
         Specifying that only
         observations made by a
         ``safety professional'' or
         other individual qualified to
         identify hazards must be
         reported to the contractor.
    (5) Changing the provision for
     hazard communication to make clear
     that the host employer is not
     required to conduct his or her own
     hazard analysis, but only to
     communicate such hazards of which
     the host employer may be aware.
18. The Panel recommends that OSHA       OSHA considered the options
 consider and solicit comment on two      recommended by the Panel. The
 kinds of options with respect to flame-  Agency adopted the second
 resistant clothing. First, [the Panel    option suggested by the Panel.
 recommends that] OSHA consider the       Appendix E to Sec.   1910.269
 alternative of no further requirements   and Appendix E to Part 1926,
 beyond existing [Sec.   ]1910.269 for    Subpart V, contain tables that
 the use of flame-resistant clothing.     employers may use to estimate
Second, [the Panel recommends that,]      available heat energy.
 should the draft requirement be          Although these tables do not
 retained in some manner, OSHA * * *      cover every circumstance, they
 consider and solicit comment on one or   do address many exposure
 a combination of alternative means of    conditions found in overhead
 determining how much protection is       electric power transmission
 needed or required. These alternatives   and distribution work. Other
 should include:.                         assessment aids are available,
                                          and also listed in the two
                                          appendices, for other exposure
                                          conditions, including typical
                                          electric power generation
                                          exposures.
    (1) Allowing the employer to         OSHA did not incorporate any of
     estimate the exposure assuming       the other Panel-recommended
     that the distance from the           options into the final rule
     employee to the electric arc is      because the Agency either
     equal to the minimum approach        currently believes that they
     distance.                            are not sufficiently
    (2) Providing tables showing heat     protective or has insufficient
     energy for different exposure        information to incorporate
     conditions as an alternative         them. See the discussion of
     assessment method..                  final Sec.   1926.960(g), in
    (3) Specifying a minimum level of     Section V, Summary and
     protection for overhead line work    Explanation of the Final Rule,
     (for example, 10 cal/cm2) for use    earlier in this preamble, for
     when the system does not exceed      a discussion of the regulatory
     certain limits as an alternative     alternatives recommended by
     to hazard assessment..               rulemaking participants and
                                          considered by the Agency.
    (4) Allowing the employer to reduce
     protection when other factors
     interfere with the safe
     performance of the work (for
     example, severe heat stress) after
     the employer has considered
     alternative methods of performing
     the work, including the use of
     live-line tools and deenergizing
     the lines and equipment, and has
     found them to be unacceptable.
    (5) Allowing employers to base
     their assessments on a ``worst
     case analysis.''.
    (6) Requiring employers to use
     appropriate flame-retard[a]nt
     clothing without specifying any
     assessment method..

[[Page 20622]]

 
19. Some SERs were concerned that the    See OSHA's response to Panel
 revised training requirements            recommendation 13, earlier in
 [contained in the draft proposal]        this table, and the discussion
 complicated the question of              of final Sec.   1926.950(b),
 demonstrating that training had been     in Section V, Summary and
 provided, and that the [draft            Explanation of the Final Rule,
 proposed] requirement that training be   earlier in this preamble.
 related to the risk would require
 additional training, additional
 documentation, or both. The Panel
 recommends that OSHA consider making
 it clear that employers that follow
 the existing training provisions in
 [Sec.   ]1910.269 will be in
 compliance with the new rules, and
 that OSHA clarify alternative methods
 that would be considered acceptable
 for demonstrating adequacy of training
 and the relation of the training to
 risk.
20. In response to comment by some       OSHA is adopting only one new
 SERs, the Panel recommends that OSHA     requirement related to job
 consider and solicit comment on the      briefings. Final Sec.  Sec.
 issue of whether the additional job      1910.269(c)(1)(i) and
 briefing requirements [in the draft      1926.952(a)(1) require the
 proposal] are needed and how they can    employer to provide the
 be met in situations in which the        employee in charge of the job
 employee is working at a distant         with all available information
 location.                                that relates to the
                                          determination of existing
                                          characteristics and conditions
                                          that the crew must complete.
                                          For additional discussion of
                                          this provision and related
                                          comments, see the discussion
                                          of final Sec.   1926.952(a)(1)
                                          in Section V, Summary and
                                          Explanation of the Final Rule,
                                          earlier in this preamble.
                                         The Agency believes that many
                                          employers are already
                                          providing relevant information
                                          about a job when they assign
                                          that job to a crew of
                                          employees or to an employee
                                          working alone. OSHA
                                          anticipates that employers
                                          will pass along the required
                                          information when they assign
                                          jobs to employees. Where the
                                          employees are working has no
                                          effect on the employer's
                                          ability to communicate the
                                          information.
21. All of the affected SERs felt that   Over the course of the
 the provisions of the [draft proposal]   rulemaking, OSHA examined the
 with respect to fall restraint systems   issue of whether using fall
 would make it difficult for a person     restraint systems to protect
 using a fall restraint system to         employees working from aerial
 perform the necessary work. The SERs     lifts was practical and
 also raised the possibility of safety    explored with manufacturers
 problems associated with wearing a       the nonregulatory option of
 safety harness as opposed to a safety    improving fall protection
 belt, such as an increased likelihood    systems for use in aerial
 of the harness being snagged and as a    lifts. The final rule requires
 result the employee being either         that employers ensure that
 pulled into a wood chipper while on      employees use a fall restraint
 the ground or pulled out of the bucket   system or a personal fall
 when it is lowered. The Panel            arrest system when working
 recommends that OSHA consider and        from aerial lifts. The final
 solicit comment on the alternative of    rule also requires that
 making no changes to its existing fall   employers ensure that
 protection requirements. [The Panel      employees use a personal fall
 recommends that, i]f the provision is    arrest system, work-
 retained, OSHA should carefully          positioning equipment, or fall-
 examine the issue of whether the fall    restraint system, as
 restraint system requirements in the     appropriate, when working at
 draft make use of fall restraint         elevated locations more than
 systems unworkable in aerial lifts.      1.2 meters (4 feet) above the
 [The Panel recommends that] OSHA * * *   ground on poles, towers, or
 also consider the nonregulatory          similar structures if the
 alternative of working with aerial       employer does not provide
 device manufacturers and aerial device   other fall protection. See the
 users (for example, electric and         discussion of final Sec.
 telecommunications utilities, painting   1926.954(b)(3)(ii) and
 and electrical contractors, tree-        (b)(3)(iii) in Section V,
 trimming firms) in the development of    Summary and Explanation of the
 improved fall restraint systems that     Final Rule, earlier in this
 are more comfortable than existing       preamble, for a discussion of
 systems and maintain the appropriate     comments received on the
 degree of protection for employees.      regulatory alternatives.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
* OSHA took the Panel recommendations listed in the table directly from
  the Panel's report (Ex. 0019). OSHA made editorial modifications, as
  necessary, for the purpose of clarity. Any modifications to the
  original recommendations are nonsubstantive and clearly indicated.

I. References

1. ``Analysis of CONSAD IMIS Accident Records, Inspection Detail,'' 
prepared by OSHA Directorate of Standards and Guidance, April 30, 
2013.
2. Analysis of CONSAD Records.xls, Excel spreadsheet showing OSHA's 
analysis of CONSAD accident data with one record per accident and 
summary table, November 30, 2013.
3. Ashford, N.A., 2007. ``Workers' Compensation,'' in Environmental 
and Occupational Medicine, Fourth Edition, W.N. Rom & S. Markowitz 
(Eds.), Lippincott-Raven Publishers, Philadelphia, pp. 1712-1719.
4. Buckingham Manufacturing. 2010. Buckingham Linemen's Catalog. See 
https://www.buckinghammfg.com (December 15, 2010 \574\).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \574\ In these references, a date in parentheses indicates the 
date on which ERG visited the pertinent Web site to retrieve pricing 
information that OSHA used in this FEA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

5. CONSAD. June 8, 2005. ``Revised Final Report. Analytical Support 
and Data Gathering for a Preliminary Economic Analysis for Proposed 
Standards for Work on Electric Power Generation, Transmission, and 
Distribution Lines and Equipment (29 CFR 1910.269 and 29 CFR 1926--
Subpart V).'' Ex. 0080.
6. CONSAD. ``Summary of 1910.269 and Subpart V Accidents from the 
IMIS Database, by State, 1992-2000.'' January 13, 2004.
7. Cress, S. 2010. Email between Stephen Cress, Kinectrics, and 
Eastern Research Group. October 22, 2010.
8. Eastern Research Group, Inc. 2011. Memo to OSHA re Supporting 
Analysis on Final Electric Power Generation Rule. March 6, 2012.
9. Excel spreadsheet showing calculation of breakeven rates taking 
account of baseline compliance.
10. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. 2009. Form No. 1: Annual 
Report of Major Electric Utility. See https://www.ferc.gov/docs-filing/forms.asp#1.
11. Grainger. 2010a. SALISBURY Face Shield, Arc Flash. See https://www.grainger.com/Grainger/SALISBURY-Arc-Flash-Face-Shield-3YA90 
(September 9, 2010).
12. Grainger. 2010b. NATIONAL SAFETY APPAREL Arc Flash Balaclava, 
Navy Blue. See https://www.grainger.com/Grainger/NATIONAL-SAFETY-APPAREL-Arc-Flash-Balaclava-2NNJ8 (September 9, 2010).

[[Page 20623]]

13. Grainger. 2010c. SALISBURY Coverall, Arc Flash, L, 8 cal/cm\2\. 
See https://www.grainger.com/Grainger/SALISBURY-Coverall-5EU57 
(September 9, 2010).
14. Grainger. 2010d. SALISBURY Coverall, Arc Flash, L, 12 cal/cm\2\. 
See https://www.grainger.com/Grainger/SALISBURY-Coverall-5EU60 
(September 9, 2010).
15. Internal Revenue Service. 2010. Corporation Sourcebook. See 
https://www.irs.gov/taxstats/bustaxstats/article/0,,id=149687,00.html.
16. Internal Revenue Service. 2012. Publication 525, ``Taxable and 
Nontaxable Income.'' Available at https://www.irs.gov/uac/
Publication-525,-Taxable-and-Nontaxable-Income--1.
17. Internal Revenue Service. 2013. ``Topic 751--Social Security and 
Medicare Withholding Rates.'' Available at https://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc751.html.
18. Lab Safety Supply. 2010a. Safety and Industrial Supplies: Indura 
UltraSoft Arc Flash Protective Apparel. See https://www.labsafety.com/catalog/Safety-Industrial-BB0/F/429 (October 19, 
2010).
19. Lab Safety Supply. 2010b. Safety and Industrial Supplies: TITAN 
Double D-Ring Body Belts. See https://www.labsafety.com/TITAN-Double-D-Ring-Body-Belts_24529135/ (October 19, 2010).
20. Lab Safety Supply. 2010c. Safety and Industrial Supplies: MILLER 
DuraLite Full Body Harnesses. See https://www.labsafety.com/MILLER-DuraLite-Full-Body-Harnesses_24536125/ (October 19, 2010).
21. Leigh, J.P., and Marcin, J.P. 2012. ``Workers' compensation 
benefits and shifting costs for occupational injury and illness,'' 
Journal of Occupational and Environmental Medicine, April, 54(4): 
445-450.
22. Magat, W.A, Viscusi, W.K, and Huber, J, 1996. ``A Reference 
Lottery Metric for Valuing Health.'' Management Science 42: 1118-
1130.
23. National Academy of Social Insurance. 2012. ``Workers' 
Compensation: Benefits, Coverage, and Costs, 2010,'' August. 
Available at https://www.nasi.org/research/2012/report-workers-compensation-benefits-coverage-costs-2010.
24. National Council on Compensation Insurance. 2013. ``ABCs of 
Experience Rating.'' Available at https://www.ncci.com/NCCIMain/Education/ExperienceRating/Pages/default.aspx.
25. National Fire Protection Association. 2009. NFPA 70E: Standard 
for Electrical Safety in the Workplace. See https://www.nfpa.org.
26. National Safety Council. 2011. Estimating the Costs of 
Unintentional Injuries. See https://www.nsc.org/news_resources/injury_and_death_statistics/Pages/EstimatingtheCostsofUnintentionalInjuries.aspx (January 19, 2011).
27. Neuhauser, F.W., Seabury, S.S., and Mendeloff, J. 2013. ``The 
Impact of Experience Rating on Small Employers: Would Lowering the 
Threshold for Experience Rating Improve Safety?'' Rand Working 
Papers WR-955. Newsletter discussion available at https://www.rand.org/jie/centers/workplace-health-safety/projects/experience-rating.html.
28. NTT Workforce Development Institute. 2011. NFPA 70E/Arc Flash 
Elec Safety/Safety for Power Gen & Trans & Dist. See https://www.nttinc.com/content/nfpa-70earc-flash-electrical-safety-electric-power-generation-transmission-and-distribution.
29. Occupational Safety and Health Administration Small Business 
Advocacy Review Panel. 2003. ``Report of the Small Business Advocacy 
Review Panel on the Draft OSHA Standard for Electric Power 
Generation, Transmission, and Distribution,'' submitted to Mr. John 
Henshaw, Assistant Secretary for Occupational Safety and Health, 
U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration. June 17, 2003. Ex. 0019.
30. Office of Management and Budget. 2003. Circular A-4. See https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars_a004_a-4/.
31. U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. 2010. National Income and 
Product Accounts Gross Domestic Product, 3rd quarter 2010 (second 
estimate); Corporate Profits, 3rd quarter 2010 (preliminary). See 
https://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/gdpnewsrelease.htm.
32. U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. 2011. Implicit Price Deflators 
for Gross Domestic Product. See https://www.bea.gov/national/nipaweb/TableView.asp?SelectedTable=13&ViewSeries=NO&Java=no&Request3Place=N&3Place=N&FromView=YES&Freq=Year&FirstYear=2005&LastYear=2009&3Place=N&Update=Update&JavaBox=no (September 1, 2011).
33. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 2001. 2001 Occupational 
Employment and Wage Estimates, National 3-digit SIC Industry-
Specific estimates. See https://www.bls.gov/oes/oes_dl.htm#2007.
34. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). 2007a. National 5-digit 
NAICS Industry-Specific estimates. See https://bls.gov/oes/oes_dl.htm.
35. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). 2007b. Quarterly Census 
of Employment and Wages. See https://www.bls.gov/cew/data.htm.
36. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 2009a. Employer Costs for 
Employee Compensation Summary, September 10, 2009. See https://www.bls.gov/news.release/ecec.nr0.htm.
37. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 2009b. May 2009 Occupational 
Employment and Wage Estimates, National 4-digit NAICS Industry-
Specific Estimates. See https://www.bls.gov/oes/oes_dl.htm.
38. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 2009c. Occupational Employment 
and Wages, May 2009: SOC 37-3013 Tree Trimmers and Pruners. See 
https://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes373013.htm.
39. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 2010a. Occupational Employment 
and Wages, May 2010: 49-9051 Electrical Power-Line Installers and 
Repairers. See https://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes499051.htm.
40. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 2010b. May 2010 National 
Industry-Specific Occupational Employment and Wage Estimates: NAICS 
221100--Electric Power Generation, Transmission and Distribution. 
See https://www.bls.gov/oes/current/naics4_221100.htm.
41. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 2010c. Occupational Employment 
and Wages, May 2010 49-2095 Electrical and Electronics Repairers, 
Powerhouse, Substation, and Relay. See https://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes492095.htm.
42. U.S. Census Bureau. 2002. Statistics of U.S. Businesses.
43. U.S. Census Bureau. 2007. Statistics of U.S. Businesses.
44. U.S. Census Bureau. 2009a. 1997 NAICS and 1987 SIC 
Correspondence Tables. See https://www.census.gov/epcd/www/naicstab.htm.
45. U.S. Census Bureau. 2009b. 1997 NAICS to 2002 NAICS 
Correspondence Tables. See https://www.census.gov/eos/www/naics/concordances/1997_NAICS_to_2002_NAICS.xls.
46. U.S. Census Bureau. 2009c. 2002 NAICS to 2007 NAICS 
Correspondence Tables. See https://www.census.gov/eos/www/naics/concordances/2002_to_2007_NAICS.xls.
47. U.S. Census Bureau. 2011. County Business Patterns, 1997 and 
2007. Growth in establishments and employment in combined Heavy 
Construction (NAICS 234000) and Special Trades Contractors (NAICS 
235000). See https://www.census.gov/econ/cbp/.
48. U.S. Energy Information Administration. 2003. Form EIA-412 
General Information. See https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=eia+form+412&source=web&cd=2&ved=0CC4QFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.eia.gov%2Fsurvey%2Fform%2Feia_412%2Finstructions_form.doc&ei=bEo5T4b5EozLrQfNnJ3WBQ&usg=AFQjCNHtrUZPjFTB08VAwGyOomBrBAjFsA.
49. U.S. Energy Information Administration. 2008a. Form EIA-860 
Database Annual Electric Generator Report. See https://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/page/eia860.html.
50. U.S. Energy Information Administration. 2008b. Form EIA-861 
Database. See https://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/page/eia861.html.
51. U.S. Small Business Administration. 2008. Small Business Size 
Standards. See https://www.sba.gov/content/table-small-business-size-standards.
52. Urban Institute/Brookings, 2012. ``Historical Average Federal 
Tax Rates for All Households,'' Tax Policy Center, October. 
Available at https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxfacts/displayafact.cfm?Docid=456.
53. Viscusi, W.K., and Aldy, J.E. 2003. ``The Value of a Statistical 
Life: A Critical

[[Page 20624]]

Review of Market Estimates Throughout the World.'' Journal of Risk 
and Uncertainty, 27(1): 5-76. See https://camra.msu.edu/documents/ViscusiandAldy2003.pdf.

VII. Federalism

    OSHA reviewed this final rule in accordance with the most recent 
Executive Order (E.O.) on Federalism (E.O. 13132, 64 FR 43255 (Aug. 10, 
1999)). This E.O. requires that Federal agencies, to the extent 
possible, refrain from limiting State policy options, consult with 
States prior to taking any actions that would restrict State policy 
options, and take such actions only when clear constitutional authority 
exists and the problem is national in scope. E.O. 13132 provides for 
preemption of State law only with the expressed consent of Congress. 
Any such preemption must be limited to the extent possible.
    Under Section 18 of the OSH Act, Congress expressly provides that 
States may adopt, with Federal approval, a plan for the development and 
enforcement of occupational safety and health standards; States that 
obtain Federal approval for such a plan are referred to as ``State-plan 
States'' (29 U.S.C. 667). Occupational safety and health standards 
developed by State-plan States must be at least as effective in 
providing safe and healthful employment and places of employment as the 
Federal standards. Subject to these requirements, State-plan States are 
free to develop and enforce under State law their own requirements for 
safety and health standards.
    While OSHA drafted this final rule to protect employees in every 
State, Section 18(c)(2) of the Act permits State-plan States and 
Territories to develop and enforce their own standards for electric 
power generation, transmission, and distribution and electrical 
protective equipment provided that those requirements are at least as 
effective in providing safe and healthful employment and places of 
employment as the requirements in this final rule.
    In summary, this final rule complies with E.O. 13132. In States 
without OSHA-approved State plans, this final rule limits State policy 
options in the same manner as every standard promulgated by OSHA. In 
States with OSHA-approved State plans, this rulemaking does not 
significantly limit State policy options.

VIII. Unfunded Mandates

    OSHA reviewed this final rule according to the Unfunded Mandates 
Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA) (2 U.S.C. 1501 et seq.) and E.O. 13132 (64 FR 
43255 (Aug. 10, 1999)). As discussed in the Final Economic and 
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis, OSHA estimates that compliance with 
the rule will require expenditures of less than $100 million per year 
by all affected employers. Therefore, this rule is not a significant 
regulatory action within the meaning of Section 202 of UMRA (2 U.S.C. 
1532).
    OSHA standards do not apply to State or local governments except in 
States that have elected voluntarily to adopt a State plan approved by 
the Agency. Consequently, the rule does not meet the definition of a 
``Federal intergovernmental mandate'' (2 U.S.C. 658(5)).
    Therefore, for the purposes of UMRA, the Agency certifies that this 
final rule does not mandate that State, local, or Tribal governments 
adopt new, unfunded regulatory obligations or increase expenditures by 
the private sector of more than $100 million in any year.

IX. Consultation and Coordination With Indian Tribal Governments

    OSHA reviewed this final rule in accordance with Executive Order 
13175, (65 FR 67249 (Nov. 9, 2000)) and determined that it does not 
have ``tribal implications'' as defined in that order. The final rule 
does not have substantial direct effects on one or more Indian tribes, 
on the relationship between the Federal government and Indian tribes, 
or on the distribution of power and responsibilities between the 
Federal government and Indian tribes.

X. Office of Management and Budget Review Under the Paperwork Reduction 
Act of 1995

    The final rule revising the general industry and construction 
standards for electric power generation, transmission, and 
distribution, and for electrical protective equipment, contains 
collection of information requirements (paperwork) subject to review by 
OMB. In accordance with Sec.  3506(c)(2) of the Paperwork Reduction Act 
of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.), OSHA solicited comments on the 
information collections included in the proposal. For the proposal, the 
Department of Labor also submitted an information collection request to 
OMB for review in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 3507(d). OMB subsequently 
informed the Department of Labor that its ``action [was] not an 
approval to conduct or sponsor an information collection under the 
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995.''

A. Information Collection Request for the Proposed Rule

    In the information request for the proposal, OSHA submitted to OMB 
the following proposed new collections of information and proposed 
removing existing collections of information:
1. Proposed Electrical Protective Equipment in Construction Collections 
of Information
    Proposed Sec.  1926.97(c)(2)(xii) provided that the employer must 
certify that it tested equipment in accordance with the requirements of 
proposed paragraphs (c)(2)(iv), (c)(2)(vii)(C), (c)(2)(viii), 
(c)(2)(ix), and(c)(2)(xi) of that section and must ensure that the 
certification identified the equipment that passed the test and the 
date of the test; the provision also specified that marking the 
equipment and entering the results of the tests and the dates of 
testing in logs are two acceptable means of meeting these requirements.
2. Proposed Information-Transfer Collections of Information for General 
Industry and Construction
    Proposed Sec. Sec.  1926.950(c)(1)(i) and 1910.269(a)(4)(i)(A) 
provided that the host employer must inform the contractor of any known 
hazards that might be related to the contractor's work and that the 
contractor might not recognize; the host employer also must notify the 
contractor of any information needed to do assessments required by the 
standard.
    Proposed Sec. Sec.  1926.950(c)(1)(ii) and 1910.269(a)(4)(i)(B) 
provided that the host employer must report any observed contract-
employer-related violations of the standards to the contract employer.
    Proposed Sec. Sec.  1926.950(c)(2)(iii) and 1910.269(a)(4)(ii)(C) 
provided that the contract employer must advise the host employer of 
unique hazards presented by the contract employer's work, unanticipated 
hazards found during the contract employer's work that the host 
employer did not mention, and measures the contractor took to correct 
and prevent recurrences of violations reported by the host employer.
3. Proposed Enclosed Spaces Collections of Information for Construction
    Proposed Sec.  1926.953(a) provided that, if, after the employer 
takes the precautions specified by Sec. Sec.  1926.953 and 1926.965, 
the hazards remaining in the enclosed space endanger the life of an 
entrant or could interfere with escape from the space, then entry into 
the enclosed space must meet the permit-

[[Page 20625]]

space entry requirements of paragraphs (d) through (k) of Sec.  
1910.146.\575\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \575\ Some of the requirements in paragraphs (d) through (k) of 
Sec.  1910.146 involve collections of information aimed at 
protecting employees from the hazards of entry into permit-required 
confined spaces. The proposal noted that Sec.  1910.146 already has 
a control number.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

4. Proposed Removal of General Industry Training Certification
    Existing Sec.  1910.269(a)(2)(vii) requires the employer to certify 
that each employee received the training required by Sec.  
1910.269(a)(2). The employer must make this certification when the 
employee demonstrates proficiency in the work practices involved and 
maintain the certification for the duration of the employee's 
employment. OSHA proposed to remove the certification requirement 
contained in existing Sec.  1910.269(a)(2)(vii).

B. Information Collection Requirements in the Final Rule

    OSHA responded to public comments addressing the proposed rule's 
requirements in Section V, Summary and Explanation of the Final Rule, 
earlier in this preamble. Also, OSHA has submitted to OMB a new 
information collection request in connection with the final rule: a new 
information collection request in connection with the final rule titled 
``Supporting Statement for the Information Collection Requirements of 
the Electric Power Generation, Transmission, and Distribution Standards 
for Construction and General Industry (29 CFR 1926 Subpart V and 29 CFR 
1910.269) and the Electrical Protective Equipment Standards for 
Construction and General Industry (29 CFR 1926.97and 29 CFR 
1910.137).'' This information collection request includes both the 
existing information collection requirements from the general industry 
standards and the new information collection requirements from the 
construction standards, resulting in a single information collection 
request for both the general industry and construction standards. 
Therefore, upon publication of the new information collection request, 
the Agency will discontinue the existing information collection request 
for the general industry standards titled ``Supporting Statement for 
the Electrical Protective Equipment Standard (29 CFR 1910.137) and the 
Electric Power Generation, Transmission, and Distribution Standard (29 
CFR 1910.269),'' OMB Control Number 1218-0190.
    The new information collection request contains several newly 
identified collections of information requirements in both construction 
and general industry (that is, collections of information not included 
in the information collection requests for either the proposal or 
existing Sec. Sec.  1910.137 and 1910.269). As OSHA explains in detail 
in the new information collection request, the majority of the 
requirements covered by these newly identified collections of 
information consist of usual and customary practices with zero burden.
    In addition to adding newly identified collections of information 
to the new information collection request, OSHA modified the following 
collections of information. First, the final electrical protective 
equipment provision for construction (final Sec.  1926.97(c)(2)(xii)) 
requires, in addition to the collections of information noted in the 
information collection request for the proposal, that the employer make 
the required certification available upon request to the Assistant 
Secretary for Occupational Safety and Health and to employees and their 
authorized representatives. Second, as described in Section V, Summary 
and Explanation of the Final Rule, earlier in this preamble, the final 
information-transfer provisions for construction and general industry 
(final Sec. Sec.  1926.950(c)(1) and (c)(2) and final Sec. Sec.  
1910.269(a)(3)(i) and (a)(3)(ii)) differ substantially from the 
proposal, and the information collection requests for Sec. Sec.  
1910.137 and 1910.269 and for Sec.  1926.97 and Subpart V reflect these 
revisions.
    Table 56 lists the provisions of the final rule that OSHA 
identified as containing collections of information.

         Table 56--Collections of Information in the Final Rule
------------------------------------------------------------------------
    General Industry  Standards            Construction  Standards
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sec.   1910.137(c)(2)(xii)           Sec.   1926.97(c)(2)(xii)
Sec.   1910.269(a)(3)(i)             Sec.   1926.950(c)(1)
Sec.   1910.269(a)(3)(ii)            Sec.   1926.950(c)(2)
Sec.   1910.269(c)(1)(i)             Sec.   1926.952(a)(1)
Sec.   1910.269(d)(2)(iii)           NA
Sec.   1910.269(d)(2)(v)             NA
Sec.   1910.269(d)(2)(ix)            NA
Sec.   1910.269(d)(3)(ii)(F)         NA
Sec.   1910.269(d)(5)                NA
Sec.   1910.269(d)(8)(iv)            NA
NA                                   Sec.   1926.953(a)
NA                                   Sec.   1926.953(g)
Sec.   1910.269(f)                   NA
Sec.   1910.269(l)(3)(ii)            Sec.   1926.960(c)(1)(ii)
Sec.   1910.269(m)(3)(i)             Sec.   1926.961(c)(1)
Sec.   1910.269(m)(3)(v)             Sec.   1926.961(c)(5)
Sec.   1910.269(m)(3)(ix)            Sec.   1926.961(c)(9)
Sec.   1910.269(m)(3)(x)(A)          Sec.   1926.961(c)(10)(i)
Sec.   1910.269(m)(3)(x)(D)          Sec.   1926.961(c)(10)(iv)
Sec.   1910.269(o)(3)(iii)(A)        Sec.   1926.963(c)(3)(i)
Sec.   1910.269(p)(4)(ii)            Sec.   1926.959(d)(2)
Sec.   1910.269(s)(1)(ii)            Sec.   1926.967(k)(1)(ii)
Sec.   1910.269(u)(4)(iv)            Sec.   1926.966(e)(4)
Sec.   1910.269(u)(6)(i)             Sec.   1926.966(g)(1)
Sec.   1910.269(v)(4)(iv)            NA
Sec.   1910.269(v)(7)(i)(A)          NA
Sec.   1910.269(v)(8)(i)             NA
Sec.   1910.269(v)(10)(i)            NA
Sec.   1910.269(v)(11)(ii)           NA
Sec.   1910.269(v)(11)(ix)           NA
Sec.   1910.269(v)(11)(x)            NA
Sec.   1910.269(v)(12)               NA
Sec.   1910.269(w)(6)(ii)            Sec.   1926.967(g)(2)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: ``NA'' = Not Applicable.

    Before publishing this final rule, the Department of Labor 
submitted the new information collection request to OMB for its 
approval.\576\ The new information collection request contains a full 
analysis and description of the burden hours and costs associated with 
paperwork requirements of the final rule. The public may obtain copies 
of the new information collection request on April 14, 2014 at 
www.reginfo.gov or by contacting OSHA at 202-693-2222. OSHA will 
publish a separate notice in the Federal Register that will announce 
the results of OMB's review and include in that notice any applicable 
OMB control number. Upon publication of that notice, any revisions to 
the new information collection request made as a result of OMB's review 
will be available at www.reginfo.gov by searching for the OMB-approved 
control number for the new information request.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \576\ OSHA notes that 24,407 business or other for-profit 
establishments are affected by the final rule and estimates that 
there are no capital or start-up costs associated with the final 
rule's information collection requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Department of Labor notes that a Federal agency cannot conduct 
or sponsor a collection of information unless OMB approves the 
collection of information under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 and 
the information collection requirement displays a currently valid OMB 
control number. Also, notwithstanding any other provision of law, no 
employer may be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a 
collection of information if the collection of information does not 
display a currently valid OMB control number.

XI. State-Plan Requirements

    When Federal OSHA promulgates a new standard or more stringent 
amendment to an existing standard, the 27 States and U.S. Territories 
with their own OSHA-approved occupational safety and health plans must 
amend their standards to reflect the new standard or amendment, or show 
OSHA

[[Page 20626]]

why such action is unnecessary, for example, because an existing State 
standard covering this area is ``at least as effective'' as the new 
Federal standard or amendment (29 CFR 1953.5(a)). The State standard 
must be at least as effective as the final Federal rule, must be 
applicable to both the private and public (State and local government 
employees) sectors, and must be completed within 6 months of the 
promulgation date of the final Federal rule. When OSHA promulgates a 
new standard or amendment that does not impose additional or more 
stringent requirements than an existing standard, State-Plan States are 
not required to amend their standards, although the Agency may 
encourage them to do so.
    The 21 States and one U.S. Territory with OSHA-approved 
occupational safety and health plans covering private employers and 
State and local government employees are: Alaska, Arizona, California, 
Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, 
New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, Puerto Rico, South Carolina, 
Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming. In 
addition, four States and one U.S. Territory have OSHA-approved State 
Plans that apply to State and local government employees only: 
Connecticut, Illinois, New Jersey, New York, and the Virgin Islands.
    This final rule results in more stringent requirements for the work 
it covers. Therefore, States and Territories with OSHA-approved State 
Plans must adopt comparable amendments to their standards within 6 
months of the promulgation date of this rule unless they demonstrate 
that such amendments are not necessary because their existing standards 
are at least as effective in protecting workers as this final rule. 
Each State Plan's existing requirements will continue to be in effect 
until it adopts the required revisions.

XII. Dates

    When OSHA promulgates a final rule, the Agency typically provides a 
delay to allow employers to become familiar with the rule and to come 
into compliance. The Agency requested comments generally on what an 
appropriate delay would be for this rule, on how long employers would 
need to make purchases necessary for compliance with the proposed rule, 
and on the expected useful life of equipment that the proposal would 
have required employers to replace.
    OSHA received a wide range of recommendations. A few commenters 
noted that the proposed rule was largely the same as existing Sec.  
1910.269 and suggested that employers would need minimal time to comply 
with the final rule. (See, for example, Exs. 0126, 0480.) BGE commented 
that employers would need 2 months ``to evaluate the changes'' (Ex. 
0126). IBEW noted that the proposed changes would require only minimal 
new training and that employers could implement those changes within 6 
months (Ex. 0480).
    Many commenters stated that employers would need time to complete 
the budgetary process necessary to acquire funding for compliance and 
training. (See, for example, Exs. 0175, 0183, 0202, 0210, 0225, 0229, 
0233, 0238, 0239, 0504.) One of these commenters suggested that OSHA 
should allow for one complete budget cycle (Ex. 0175). Another 
recommended a 3-year delay (Ex. 0238). The rest of these commenters 
recommended a 2-year delay. APPA maintained that small employers ``will 
require additional time and budget allocations to execute any rules 
that may come from this process'' and recommended that OSHA take this 
factor into consideration in adopting the final rule (Ex. 0504).
    Siemens Power Generation commented that the proposed rules on 
protection from electric arcs were ``so costly and onerous that they 
would require sophisticated employers two to three years to implement'' 
(Ex. 0163). The company contended that small employers would need even 
more time so that they could ``take advantage of OSHA outreach programs 
and obtain information from industry associations'' (id.).
    Ohio Rural Electric Cooperatives recommended at least a 2-year 
period ``to replace and upgrade equipment,'' noting that ``FR clothing 
in use at the time these change[s] become final will still have useable 
life before they need replacement'' (Ex. 0186). The company noted that 
equipment currently in use provides a measure of protection even though 
it may not be compliant with the final rule (id.).
    TVA recommended a 3-year delay for the requirement to estimate 
employee exposure to incident heat energy, explaining, ``We recommend a 
three year delay . . . to complete estimation of heat energy exposures. 
This is based on our experience of performing calculations on plant and 
transmission circuits down to the 480 V board and panel level'' (Ex. 
0213).
    TVA also recommended a 6- to 9-month delay for the arc-flash 
protection requirements,\577\ commenting:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \577\ OSHA understands TVA's comment to indicate that it will 
take employers 6 to 9 months to purchase protective clothing and 
other protective equipment after they determine what protection to 
purchase.

    To provide daily-wear FR clothing with an ATPV of 4 to 8 cal/
cm\2\ to meet the minimum proposed requirements for arc flash 
protection, we recommend a 6 to 9-month delay . . .. This 
recommendation is based on our experience of providing 3,600 
employees five sets of daily-wear FR garments until we calculated 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
the heat energy exposures. [Id.]

    IBEW commented that the only purchases potentially requiring a 
delayed compliance deadline involve the acquisition of arc-rated 
clothing, although the union also stated that, ``[b]ased on reports 
from protective clothing manufacturers and vendors, there is plenty of 
it to go around'' (Ex. 0230). IBEW acknowledged that employers might 
need some time to implement new protective-clothing policies and 
recommended that the final rule provide no more than an 12-month delay 
in that regard (Tr. 899).
    A few commenters, such as EEI, stated that, without knowing what 
the content of the final rule would be, they could not predict how long 
it would take to acquire new equipment, put it into place, and train 
employees in its use (Exs. 0177, 0209, 0227). These commenters 
recommended that OSHA consider their input after the Agency publishes 
the final rule.
    OSHA believes that there will be little impact on the regulated 
community as a result of adopting requirements from existing Sec.  
1910.137 into new Sec.  1926.97 or existing Sec.  1910.269 into Subpart 
V. Almost all affected employers are already complying with these 
requirements. (See Section VI, Final Economic Analysis and Regulatory 
Flexibility Analysis, earlier in the preamble.) Additionally, many of 
the revisions in existing Sec. Sec.  1910.137 and 1910.269 are 
clarifications of existing requirements or impose requirements that 
employers can implement quickly. For example, OSHA is revising 
provisions in existing Sec.  1910.269(t) to cover vaults as well as 
manholes. The definitions of ``manhole'' and ``vault'' are so 
similar,\578\ that OSHA believes that most employers already apply the 
relevant provisions to both manholes and vaults.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \578\ Existing Sec.  1910.269(x) defines ``manhole'' as ``[a] 
subsurface enclosure which personnel may enter and which is used for 
the purpose of installing, operating, and maintaining submersible 
equipment or cable.'' Existing Sec.  1910.269(x) defines ``vault'' 
as ``[a]n enclosure, above or below ground, which personnel may 
enter and which is used for the purpose of installing, operating, or 
maintaining equipment or cable.'' The only vaults addressed in Sec.  
1910.269(t), which applies to underground installations, are 
underground vaults.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Agency is setting a 90-day effective date for the final rule, 
although

[[Page 20627]]

OSHA will be imposing compliance deadlines more than 90 days after 
publication of the final rule for specific new or revised requirements, 
as explained later.
    Four sets of requirements in the final rule set substantial new or 
revised duties on employers: The new requirements for transferring 
information between host employers and contract employers, revised 
provisions on the use of fall protection systems, revised requirements 
for minimum approach distances, and new requirements for protecting 
employees from the hazards associated with flames and electric arcs. As 
described in the following paragraphs, OSHA is adopting delayed 
compliance dates for some of these provisions:

A. The New Requirements for Transferring Information Between Host 
Employers and Contract Employers (Sec. Sec.  1926.950(c) and 
1910.269(a)(3))

    Despite the controversy surrounding these provisions, OSHA believes 
that many host employers and contract employers already are 
implementing the practices required by final Sec. Sec.  1926.950(c) and 
1910.269(a)(3).\579\ Additionally, the host-contractor provisions 
generally require the host employer and contract employer to provide 
information that they already have to each other, and the provisions do 
not require the outlay of any capital expenditures. Therefore, OSHA 
does not believe it is necessary to delay enforcement of these 
provisions beyond the effective date for the final rule. OSHA expects 
employers to be in compliance with the host-contractor requirements 
starting 90 days after publication of the final rule in the Federal 
Register.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \579\ As the Agency noted in the preamble to the proposed rule, 
``Based on research conducted by CONSAD, OSHA believes that the 
communications that would be required by the proposed standards 
already occur for most affected projects'' (70 FR 34911).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Revised Provisions on the Use of Fall Protection Systems (Sec. Sec.  
1926.954(b)(3)(iii) and (b)(3)(iv) and 1910.269(g)(2)(iv)(C), and 
(g)(2)(iv)(D))

    As discussed earlier under the summary and explanation for final 
Sec.  1926.954(b)(3)(iii), some provisions in that paragraph and in 
final Sec.  1910.269(g)(2)(iv)(C) have compliance deadlines. In 
Sec. Sec.  1926.954(b)(3)(iii)(B) and 1910.269(g)(2)(iv)(C)(2), the 
final rule requires employees to use a personal fall arrest system, 
work-positioning equipment, or fall restraint system, as appropriate, 
when working at elevated locations more than 1.2 meters (4 feet) above 
the ground on poles, towers, or similar structures if the employer does 
not provide other fall protection meeting Subpart M of Part 1926. 
Paragraph (b)(3)(iii)(C) of Sec.  1926.954 and paragraph 
(g)(2)(iv)(C)(3) of Sec.  1910.269 provide exceptions to these general 
rules requiring fall protection. Paragraph (b)(3)(iii)(C) of Sec.  
1926.954 and paragraph (g)(2)(iv)(C)(3) of Sec.  1910.269 provide that, 
until March 31, 2015, qualified employees need not use fall protection 
equipment for climbing or changing location on poles, towers, or 
similar structures, unless conditions could cause the employee to lose 
his or her grip or footing. After that date, qualified employees must 
use fall protection for climbing poles, towers, or similar structures, 
unless the employer can demonstrate that climbing with fall protection 
is infeasible or creates a greater hazard than climbing without it. 
Starting April 1, 2015, Sec. Sec.  1926.954(b)(3)(iv) and 
1910.269(g)(2)(iv)(D) require the employer to ensure that employees rig 
work-positioning systems so that the employee can free fall no more 
than 0.6 meters (2 feet).

C. Revised Requirements for Minimum Approach Distances (Sec. Sec.  
1926.960(c)(1) and 1910.269(l)(3))

    As discussed in the summary and explanation for Sec.  
1926.960(c)(1), that provision in the final rule, and the comparable 
one in final Sec.  1910.269(l)(3), set revised requirements for minimum 
approach distances. For voltages of 5.1 kilovolts and more, employers 
have until April 1, 2015, to comply with the revised provisions, 
including the requirement for employers to determine the maximum 
anticipated per-unit transient overvoltage, phase-to-ground, through an 
engineering analysis.

D. New Requirements for Protecting Employees From the Hazards 
Associated With Electric Arcs (Sec. Sec.  1926.960(g) and 
1910.269(l)(8))

    Paragraph (g)(1) of final Sec.  1926.960 and paragraph (l)(8)(i) of 
final Sec.  1910.269 require the employer to assess the workplace to 
identify employees exposed to hazards from flames or from electric 
arcs. Although existing Sec.  1910.269 does not explicitly require the 
employer to perform such an assessment, this requirement is implicit in 
existing Sec.  1910.269(l)(6)(iii). This existing rule requires the 
employer to ensure that each employee exposed to the hazards of flames 
or electric arcs does not wear clothing that, when exposed to flames or 
electric arcs, could increase the extent of injury that would be 
sustained by the employee. To comply with this existing provision, the 
employer needs to determine if employees are exposed to hazards from 
flames or electric arcs. Consequently, OSHA concludes that employers 
already should be in substantial compliance with paragraphs (g)(1) of 
final Sec.  1926.960 and (l)(8)(i) of final Sec.  1910.269 and that no 
compliance delay beyond the effective date for the final rule is 
necessary.
    Paragraph (g)(2) of final Sec.  1926.960 and paragraph (l)(8)(ii) 
of final Sec.  1910.269 provide that, for each employee exposed to 
hazards from electric arcs, the employer make a reasonable estimate of 
the incident heat energy to which the employee would be exposed. TVA's 
experience estimating incident energy for exposures at its electric 
power generation plants and transmission lines led them to recommend a 
3-year delay for this element of the standard (id.). However, OSHA does 
not believe that TVA's experience forms a reasonable basis for setting 
compliance deadlines. In this regard, TVA indicated that it instituted 
measures to reduce energy below 100 cal/cm\2\, including modifying some 
installations (Ex. 0213). OSHA believes that the initial incident-
energy estimates conducted by TVA took only a fraction of the 3-year 
period and that the vast majority of this period involved retrofitting 
the circuits to reduce energy exposure below 100 cal/cm\2\.
    Mr. James Tomaseski with IBEW stated that the NESC was adopting 
requirements for a similar estimate of incident heat energy that was to 
become effective in 2009 (Tr. 898-899).\580\ Mr. Brian Erga with ESCI 
stated that a delay of 12 to 18 months for OSHA's clothing-related 
provisions would be reasonable (Tr. 1275-1276). Based on Mr. 
Tomaseski's testimony, the Agency believes that most employers already 
have estimates of incident heat energy for many exposures. Moreover, 
the guidance provided in Appendix E should facilitate employers' 
efforts to complete these estimates. Consequently, the Agency concludes 
that a reasonable compliance date for the requirements to estimate 
incident heat energy under final Sec. Sec.  1926.960(g)(2) and 
1910.269(l)(8)(ii) is January 1, 2015.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \580\ Although the 2007 edition of the NESC to which Mr. 
Tomaseski referred was not final at the time of his testimony, the 
2007 NESC ultimately set the effective date for its protective 
clothing provisions as January 1, 2009 (Ex. 0533).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Paragraph (g)(3) of final Sec.  1926.960 and paragraph (l)(8)(iii) 
of final Sec.  1910.269 require the employer to ensure that each 
employee exposed to hazards from flames or electric arcs does not wear 
clothing that could melt onto

[[Page 20628]]

his or her skin or that could ignite and continue to burn when exposed 
to flames or the heat energy estimated under Sec. Sec.  1926.960(g)(2) 
and 1910.269(l)(8)(ii). Existing Sec.  1910.269(l)(6)(iii) contains a 
comparable requirement without the reference to incident heat-energy 
estimates. As previously indicated, the final rule delays the 
requirements for incident heat-energy estimates until January 1, 2015. 
However, the Agency believes that it is important to continue the 
protection against clothing ignition contained in existing Sec.  
1910.269(l)(6)(iii). Therefore, OSHA is not setting a delayed 
compliance date for final Sec. Sec.  1926.960(g)(3) and 
1910.269(l)(8)(iii) beyond the effective date for the final rule. Until 
the employer completes the estimates required by final Sec. Sec.  
1926.960(g)(2) and 1910.269(l)(8)(ii), OSHA will enforce Sec. Sec.  
1926.960(g)(3) and 1910.269(l)(8)(iii) as it does existing Sec.  
1910.269(l)(6)(iii); that is, the clothing must not ignite and continue 
to burn when exposed to electric arcs the employee may encounter.
    Paragraph (g)(4) of final Sec.  1926.960 and paragraph (l)(8)(iv) 
of final Sec.  1910.269 generally require the employer to ensure that 
the outer layer of clothing worn by an employees is flame resistant 
under specified conditions. The first three conditions are: (1) There 
is employee exposure to contact with energized circuit parts operating 
at more than 600 volts; (2) an electric arc could ignite flammable 
material in the work area that could, in turn, ignite the employee's 
clothing, and (3) molten metal or electric arcs from faulted conductors 
in the work area could ignite the employee's clothing. As a practical 
matter, the employer's assessment of employee exposure to hazards from 
flames or from electric arcs (as required by final Sec. Sec.  
1926.960(g)(1) and 1910.269(l)(8)(i)) will determine whether one or 
more of these conditions are present. As previously noted, the 
requirement for the employer to perform the assessment becomes 
effective with the rest of the rule, and OSHA determined that employers 
need no additional delay to comply with final Sec. Sec.  
1926.960(g)(4)(i) through (g)(4)(iii) and 1910.269(l)(8)(iv)(A) through 
(l)(8)(iv)(C).
    Final Sec. Sec.  1926.960(g)(4)(iv) and 1910.269(l)(8)(iv)(D) 
generally require flame-resistant clothing when the incident energy 
estimated under Sec. Sec.  1926.960(g)(2) and 1910.269(l)(8)(ii) 
exceeds 2.0 cal/cm\2\. This is a substantially new requirement, and 
compliance is dependent on completion of the incident heat-energy 
estimates required by Sec. Sec.  1926.960(g)(2) and 1910.269(l)(8)(ii). 
As noted earlier, OSHA does not require compliance with the provisions 
on incident heat-energy estimates until January 1, 2015. Moreover, as 
explained later, OSHA is delaying requirements for arc-rated protection 
under final Sec. Sec.  1926.960(g)(5) and 1910.269(l)(8)(v) until April 
1, 2015. For these reasons, the Agency is adopting a compliance date 
for final Sec. Sec.  1926.960(g)(4)(iv) and 1910.269(l)(8)(iv)(D) of 
April 1, 2015.
    Final Sec. Sec.  1926.960(g)(5) and 1910.269(l)(8)(v) provide that, 
with some exceptions, employers ensure that employees exposed to 
electric-arc hazards wear protective clothing and other protective 
equipment with an arc rating greater than or equal to the heat energy 
estimated under final Sec. Sec.  1926.960(g)(2) and 1910.269(l)(8)(ii). 
Clearly, the employer must complete those incident heat-energy 
estimates before purchasing protection with an appropriate arc rating. 
Therefore, employers may delay complying with Sec. Sec.  1926.960(g)(5) 
and 1910.269(l)(8)(v) until April 1, 2015. This delay provides 
employers additional time, when added to the period provided for 
estimating incident heat energy under Sec. Sec.  1926.960(g)(2) and 
1910.269(l)(8)(ii), to purchase compliant protective clothing and other 
protective equipment. The Agency could impose the same deadline for the 
requirements to estimate incident heat energy and to provide protective 
clothing and other protective equipment based those estimates; however, 
OSHA believes that having separate deadlines will ensure that employers 
have additional time after initially making estimates of heat energy to 
make necessary adjustments in work practices and circuit protection to 
reduce those estimates to a level where employers can use arc-rated 
protection with acceptably low arc ratings. If OSHA were to require 
compliance with both sets of requirements at the same time, employers 
initially might have to provide protection with high arc ratings. The 
dates adopted by this final rule provide employers with adequate time 
to ensure that incident heat-energy exposure levels for employees are 
as low as practical when the Agency begins enforcing Sec. Sec.  
1926.960(g)(5) and 1910.269(l)(8)(v).
    The following table shows important compliance dates for the final 
rule.
    The final rule becomes effective on July 10, 2014. Employer 
obligations under the specific provisions listed in this table commence 
on the dates indicated.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
            Requirement                     Subpart V            Sec.   1910.269           Compliance date
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fall protection must be used by a    Sec.                    (g)(2)(iv)(C)(3)......  April 1, 2015.
 qualified employee climbing or       1926.954(b)(3)(iii)(C
 changing location on poles,          ).
 towers, or similar structures
 unless the employer can
 demonstrate that climbing with
 fall protection is infeasible or
 creates a greater hazard than
 climbing or changing location
 without it.
Work-positioning systems must be     Sec.                    (g)(2)(iv)(D).........  April 1, 2015.
 rigged so that an employee can       1926.954(b)(3)(iv).
 free fall no more than 0.6 m (2
 ft).
Until the compliance deadline,       Sec.   1926.960(c)(1)   (l)(3) and Table        April 1, 2015.
 employers may continue to use the    and Table V[dash]2.     R[dash]3.
 minimum approach distances in
 existing Subpart V and Sec.
 1910.269 for voltages of 5.1
 kilovolts and more. (Table 6 in
 Appendix B to Subpart V and in
 Table 6 through Table 13 in
 Appendix B to Sec.   1910.269
 specify the existing minimum
 approach distances.\1\) After the
 compliance deadline, employers
 must determine the maximum
 anticipated per-unit transient
 overvoltage, phase-to-ground in
 accordance with Sec.  Sec.
 1926.960(c)(1)(ii) and
 1910.269(l)(3)(ii) and must
 establish minimum approach
 distances in accordance with Sec.
 Sec.   1926.960(c)(1)(i) and
 1910.269(l)(3)(i).

[[Page 20629]]

 
The employer must make a reasonable  Sec.   1926.960(g)(2).  (l)(8)(ii)............  January 1, 2015.
 estimate of the incident heat
 energy to which the employee would
 be exposed.
The employer must ensure that the    Sec.  Sec.              (l)(8)(iv)(D).........  April 1, 2015.
 outer layer of clothing, except      1926.960(g)(4)(iv).
 for clothing not required to be
 arc rated, is flame resistant when
 the estimated incident heat energy
 exceeds 2.0 cal/cm\2\.
The employer must ensure that        Sec.  Sec.              (l)(8)(v).............  April 1, 2015.
 employees with exposure to           1926.960(g)(5).
 electric-arc hazards wear
 protective clothing and other
 protective equipment with an arc
 rating greater than or equal to
 the estimated heat energy whenever
 that estimate exceeds 2.0 cal/
 cm\2\.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Table 6 in Appendix B to Subpart V and in Table 6 through Table 13 in Appendix B to Sec.   1910.269 contain
  minimum approach distances that duplicate the minimum approach distances in Table V-1 and Table V-2 in
  existing Subpart V and Table R-6 through R-8 in existing Sec.   1910.269. OSHA reformatted and deleted
  extraneous information from these tables in the final rule; however, the relevant distances are identical to
  the existing tables.

List of Subjects in 29 CFR Parts 1910 and 1926

    Electric power, Fire prevention, Hazardous substances, 
Incorporation by reference, Occupational safety and health, Safety.

Authority and Signature

    David Michaels, Ph.D., MPH, Assistant Secretary of Labor for 
Occupational Safety and Health, U.S. Department of Labor, 200 
Constitution Ave. NW., Washington, DC 20210, authorized the preparation 
of this notice.
    This action is taken pursuant to sections 3704 et seq., Pub. L. 
107-217, 116 STAT. 1062, (40 U.S.C. 3704 et seq.); sections 4, 6, and 
8, Pub. L. 91-596, 84 STAT. 1590 (29 U.S.C. 653, 655, 657), Secretary 
of Labor's Order No. 1-2012 (77 FR 3912 (Jan. 25, 2012)), and 29 CFR 
Part 1911.

    Signed at Washington, DC, on December 6, 2013.
David Michaels,
Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and Health.

    Accordingly, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
amends Parts 1910 and 1926 of Title 29 of the Code of Federal 
Regulation as follows:

PART 1910--[AMENDED]

Subpart I--Personal Protective Equipment

0
1. Revise the authority citation for Subpart I of part 1910 to read as 
follows:

    Authority: 29 U.S.C. 653, 655, 657; Secretary of Labor's Order 
No. 12-71 (36 FR 8754), 8-76 (41 FR 25059), 9-83 (48 FR 35736), 1-90 
(55 FR 9033), 6-96 (62 FR 111), 3-2000 (65 FR 50017), 5-2002 (67 FR 
65008), 5-2007 (72 FR 31160), 4-2010 (75 FR 55355), or 1-2012 (77 FR 
3912), as applicable, and 29 CFR Part 1911.

0
2. Revise Sec.  1910.136(a) to read as follows:

Sec.  1910.136  Foot protection.

    (a) General requirements. The employer shall ensure that each 
affected employee uses protective footwear when working in areas where 
there is a danger of foot injuries due to falling or rolling objects, 
or objects piercing the sole, or when the use of protective footwear 
will protect the affected employee from an electrical hazard, such as a 
static-discharge or electric-shock hazard, that remains after the 
employer takes other necessary protective measures.
* * * * *


0
3. Revise Sec.  1910.137 to read as follows:


Sec.  1910.137  Electrical protective equipment.

    (a) Design requirements for specific types of electrical protective 
equipment. Rubber insulating blankets, rubber insulating matting, 
rubber insulating covers, rubber insulating line hose, rubber 
insulating gloves, and rubber insulating sleeves shall meet the 
following requirements:
    (1) Manufacture and marking of rubber insulating equipment. (i) 
Blankets, gloves, and sleeves shall be produced by a seamless process.
    (ii) Each item shall be clearly marked as follows:
    (A) Class 00 equipment shall be marked Class 00.
    (B) Class 0 equipment shall be marked Class 0.
    (C) Class 1 equipment shall be marked Class 1.
    (D) Class 2 equipment shall be marked Class 2.
    (E) Class 3 equipment shall be marked Class 3.
    (F) Class 4 equipment shall be marked Class 4.
    (G) Nonozone-resistant equipment shall be marked Type I.
    (H) Ozone-resistant equipment shall be marked Type II.
    (I) Other relevant markings, such as the manufacturer's 
identification and the size of the equipment, may also be provided.
    (iii) Markings shall be nonconducting and shall be applied in such 
a manner as not to impair the insulating qualities of the equipment.
    (iv) Markings on gloves shall be confined to the cuff portion of 
the glove.
    (2) Electrical requirements. (i) Equipment shall be capable of 
withstanding the ac proof-test voltage specified in Table I-1 or the dc 
proof-test voltage specified in Table I-2.
    (A) The proof test shall reliably indicate that the equipment can 
withstand the voltage involved.
    (B) The test voltage shall be applied continuously for 3 minutes 
for equipment other than matting and shall be applied continuously for 
1 minute for matting.
    (C) Gloves shall also be capable of separately withstanding the ac 
proof-test voltage specified in Table I-1 after a 16-hour water soak. 
(See the note following paragraph (a)(3)(ii)(B) of this section.)
    (ii) When the ac proof test is used on gloves, the 60-hertz proof-
test current may not exceed the values specified in Table I-1 at any 
time during the test period.
    (A) If the ac proof test is made at a frequency other than 60 
hertz, the permissible proof-test current shall be computed from the 
direct ratio of the frequencies.
    (B) For the test, gloves (right side out) shall be filled with tap 
water and immersed in water to a depth that is in accordance with Table 
I-3. Water shall be added to or removed from the glove, as necessary, 
so that the water level is the same inside and outside the glove.
    (C) After the 16-hour water soak specified in paragraph 
(a)(2)(i)(C) of this section, the 60-hertz proof-test current may not 
exceed the values given in Table I-1 by more than 2 milliamperes.

[[Page 20630]]

    (iii) Equipment that has been subjected to a minimum breakdown 
voltage test may not be used for electrical protection. (See the note 
following paragraph (a)(3)(ii)(B) of this section.)
    (iv) Material used for Type II insulating equipment shall be 
capable of withstanding an ozone test, with no visible effects. The 
ozone test shall reliably indicate that the material will resist ozone 
exposure in actual use. Any visible signs of ozone deterioration of the 
material, such as checking, cracking, breaks, or pitting, is evidence 
of failure to meet the requirements for ozone-resistant material. (See 
the note following paragraph (a)(3)(ii)(B) of this section.)
    (3) Workmanship and finish. (i) Equipment shall be free of physical 
irregularities that can adversely affect the insulating properties of 
the equipment and that can be detected by the tests or inspections 
required under this section.
    (ii) Surface irregularities that may be present on all rubber goods 
(because of imperfections on forms or molds or because of inherent 
difficulties in the manufacturing process) and that may appear as 
indentations, protuberances, or imbedded foreign material are 
acceptable under the following conditions:
    (A) The indentation or protuberance blends into a smooth slope when 
the material is stretched.
    (B) Foreign material remains in place when the insulating material 
is folded and stretches with the insulating material surrounding it.

    Note to paragraph (a): Rubber insulating equipment meeting the 
following national consensus standards is deemed to be in compliance 
with the performance requirements of paragraph (a) of this section:
    American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) D120-09, 
Standard Specification for Rubber Insulating Gloves.
    ASTM D178-01 (2010), Standard Specification for Rubber 
Insulating Matting.
    ASTM D1048-12, Standard Specification for Rubber Insulating 
Blankets.
    ASTM D1049-98 (2010), Standard Specification for Rubber 
Insulating Covers.
    ASTM D1050-05 (2011), Standard Specification for Rubber 
Insulating Line Hose.
    ASTM D1051-08, Standard Specification for Rubber Insulating 
Sleeves.
    The preceding standards also contain specifications for 
conducting the various tests required in paragraph (a) of this 
section. For example, the ac and dc proof tests, the breakdown test, 
the water-soak procedure, and the ozone test mentioned in this 
paragraph are described in detail in these ASTM standards.
    ASTM F1236-96 (2012), Standard Guide for Visual Inspection of 
Electrical Protective Rubber Products, presents methods and 
techniques for the visual inspection of electrical protective 
equipment made of rubber. This guide also contains descriptions and 
photographs of irregularities that can be found in this equipment.
    ASTM F819-10, Standard Terminology Relating to Electrical 
Protective Equipment for Workers, includes definitions of terms 
relating to the electrical protective equipment covered under this 
section.

    (b) Design requirements for other types of electrical protective 
equipment. The following requirements apply to the design and 
manufacture of electrical protective equipment that is not covered by 
paragraph (a) of this section:
    (1)Voltage withstand. Insulating equipment used for the protection 
of employees shall be capable of withstanding, without failure, the 
voltages that may be imposed upon it.

    Note to paragraph (b)(1): These voltages include transient 
overvoltages, such as switching surges, as well as nominal line 
voltage. See Appendix B to Sec.  1910.269 for a discussion of 
transient overvoltages on electric power transmission and 
distribution systems. See IEEE Std 516-2009, IEEE Guide for 
Maintenance Methods on Energized Power Lines, for methods of 
determining the magnitude of transient overvoltages on an electrical 
system and for a discussion comparing the ability of insulation 
equipment to withstand a transient overvoltage based on its ability 
to withstand ac voltage testing.

    (2) Equipment current. (i) Protective equipment used for the 
primary insulation of employees from energized circuit parts shall be 
capable of passing a current test when subjected to the highest nominal 
voltage on which the equipment is to be used.
    (ii) When insulating equipment is tested in accordance with 
paragraph (b)(2)(i) of this section, the equipment current may not 
exceed 1 microampere per kilovolt of phase-to-phase applied voltage.

    Note 1 to paragraph (b)(2):  This paragraph applies to equipment 
that provides primary insulation of employees from energized parts. 
It does not apply to equipment used for secondary insulation or 
equipment used for brush contact only.


    Note 2 to paragraph (b)(2): For ac excitation, this current 
consists of three components: Capacitive current because of the 
dielectric properties of the insulating material itself; conduction 
current through the volume of the insulating equipment; and leakage 
current along the surface of the tool or equipment. The conduction 
current is normally negligible. For clean, dry insulating equipment, 
the leakage current is small, and the capacitive current 
predominates.


    Note to paragraph (b): Plastic guard equipment is deemed to 
conform to the performance requirements of paragraph (b) of this 
section if it meets, and is used in accordance with, ASTM F712-06 
(2011), Standard Test Methods and Specifications for Electrically 
Insulating Plastic Guard Equipment for Protection of Workers.

    (c) In-service care and use of electrical protective equipment. (1) 
General. Electrical protective equipment shall be maintained in a safe, 
reliable condition.
    (2) Specific requirements. The following specific requirements 
apply to rubber insulating blankets, rubber insulating covers, rubber 
insulating line hose, rubber insulating gloves, and rubber insulating 
sleeves:
    (i) Maximum use voltages shall conform to those listed in Table I-
4.
    (ii) Insulating equipment shall be inspected for damage before each 
day's use and immediately following any incident that can reasonably be 
suspected of causing damage. Insulating gloves shall be given an air 
test, along with the inspection.

    Note to paragraph (c)(2)(ii): ASTM F1236-96 (2012), Standard 
Guide for Visual Inspection of Electrical Protective Rubber 
Products, presents methods and techniques for the visual inspection 
of electrical protective equipment made of rubber. This guide also 
contains descriptions and photographs of irregularities that can be 
found in this equipment.

    (iii) Insulating equipment with any of the following defects may 
not be used:
    (A) A hole, tear, puncture, or cut;
    (B) Ozone cutting or ozone checking (that is, a series of 
interlacing cracks produced by ozone on rubber under mechanical 
stress);
    (C) An embedded foreign object;
    (D) Any of the following texture changes: swelling, softening, 
hardening, or becoming sticky or inelastic.
    (E) Any other defect that damages the insulating properties.
    (iv) Insulating equipment found to have other defects that might 
affect its insulating properties shall be removed from service and 
returned for testing under paragraphs (c)(2)(viii) and (c)(2)(ix) of 
this section.
    (v) Insulating equipment shall be cleaned as needed to remove 
foreign substances.
    (vi) Insulating equipment shall be stored in such a location and in 
such a manner as to protect it from light, temperature extremes, 
excessive humidity, ozone, and other damaging substances and 
conditions.
    (vii) Protector gloves shall be worn over insulating gloves, except 
as follows:
    (A) Protector gloves need not be used with Class 0 gloves, under 
limited-use conditions, when small equipment and parts manipulation 
necessitate unusually high finger dexterity.


[[Page 20631]]


    Note to paragraph (c)(2)(vii)(A): Persons inspecting rubber 
insulating gloves used under these conditions need to take extra 
care in visually examining them. Employees using rubber insulating 
gloves under these conditions need to take extra care to avoid 
handling sharp objects.

    (B) If the voltage does not exceed 250 volts, ac, or 375 volts, dc, 
protector gloves need not be used with Class 00 gloves, under limited-
use conditions, when small equipment and parts manipulation necessitate 
unusually high finger dexterity.

    Note to paragraph (c)(2)(vii)(B): Persons inspecting rubber 
insulating gloves used under these conditions need to take extra 
care in visually examining them. Employees using rubber insulating 
gloves under these conditions need to take extra care to avoid 
handling sharp objects.

    (C) Any other class of glove may be used without protector gloves, 
under limited-use conditions, when small equipment and parts 
manipulation necessitate unusually high finger dexterity but only if 
the employer can demonstrate that the possibility of physical damage to 
the gloves is small and if the class of glove is one class higher than 
that required for the voltage involved.
    (D) Insulating gloves that have been used without protector gloves 
may not be reused until they have been tested under the provisions of 
paragraphs (c)(2)(viii) and (c)(2)(ix) of this section.
    (viii) Electrical protective equipment shall be subjected to 
periodic electrical tests. Test voltages and the maximum intervals 
between tests shall be in accordance with Table I-4 and Table I-5.
    (ix) The test method used under paragraphs (c)(2)(viii) and 
(c)(2)(xi) of this section shall reliably indicate whether the 
insulating equipment can withstand the voltages involved.

    Note to paragraph (c)(2)(ix): Standard electrical test methods 
considered as meeting this paragraph are given in the following 
national consensus standards:
    ASTM D120-09, Standard Specification for Rubber Insulating 
Gloves.
    ASTM D178-01 (2010), Standard Specification for Rubber 
Insulating Matting.
    ASTM D1048-12, Standard Specification for Rubber Insulating 
Blankets.
    ASTM D1049-98 (2010), Standard Specification for Rubber 
Insulating Covers.
    ASTM D1050-05 (2011), Standard Specification for Rubber 
Insulating Line Hose.
    ASTM D1051-08, Standard Specification for Rubber Insulating 
Sleeves.
    ASTM F478-09, Standard Specification for In-Service Care of 
Insulating Line Hose and Covers.
    ASTM F479-06 (2011), Standard Specification for In-Service Care 
of Insulating Blankets.
    ASTM F496-08, Standard Specification for In-Service Care of 
Insulating Gloves and Sleeves.

    (x) Insulating equipment failing to pass inspections or electrical 
tests may not be used by employees, except as follows:
    (A) Rubber insulating line hose may be used in shorter lengths with 
the defective portion cut off.
    (B) Rubber insulating blankets may be salvaged by severing the 
defective area from the undamaged portion of the blanket. The resulting 
undamaged area may not be smaller than 560 millimeters by 560 
millimeters (22 inches by 22 inches) for Class 1, 2, 3, and 4 blankets.
    (C) Rubber insulating blankets may be repaired using a compatible 
patch that results in physical and electrical properties equal to those 
of the blanket.
    (D) Rubber insulating gloves and sleeves with minor physical 
defects, such as small cuts, tears, or punctures, may be repaired by 
the application of a compatible patch. Also, rubber insulating gloves 
and sleeves with minor surface blemishes may be repaired with a 
compatible liquid compound. The repaired area shall have electrical and 
physical properties equal to those of the surrounding material. Repairs 
to gloves are permitted only in the area between the wrist and the 
reinforced edge of the opening.
    (xi) Repaired insulating equipment shall be retested before it may 
be used by employees.
    (xii) The employer shall certify that equipment has been tested in 
accordance with the requirements of paragraphs (c)(2)(iv), 
(c)(2)(vii)(D), (c)(2)(viii), (c)(2)(ix), and (c)(2)(xi) of this 
section. The certification shall identify the equipment that passed the 
test and the date it was tested and shall be made available upon 
request to the Assistant Secretary for Occupational Safety and Health 
and to employees or their authorized representatives.

    Note to paragraph (c)(2)(xii): Marking equipment with, and 
entering onto logs, the results of the tests and the dates of 
testing are two acceptable means of meeting the certification 
requirement.


                                                          Table I-1--AC Proof-Test Requirements
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                               Maximum proof-test current, mA (gloves only)
                                                                   Proof-test    -----------------------------------------------------------------------
                      Class of Equipment                         Voltage  rms V    280-mm (11-in)    360-mm (14-in)    410-mm (16-in)    460-mm (18-in)
                                                                                        glove             glove             glove             glove
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
00............................................................             2,500                 8                12  ................  ................
0.............................................................             5,000                 8                12                14                16
1.............................................................            10,000  ................                14                16                18
2.............................................................            20,000  ................                16                18                20
3.............................................................            30,000  ................                18                20                22
4.............................................................            40,000  ................  ................                22                24
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


[[Page 20632]]


                  Table I-2--DC Proof-Test Requirements
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                            Proof-test
                   Class of equipment                         voltage
------------------------------------------------------------------------
00......................................................          10,000
0.......................................................          20,000
1.......................................................          40,000
2.......................................................          50,000
3.......................................................          60,000
4.......................................................          70,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: The dc voltages listed in this table are not appropriate for proof
  testing rubber insulating line hose or covers. For this equipment, dc
  proof tests shall use a voltage high enough to indicate that the
  equipment can be safely used at the voltages listed in Table I-4. See
  ASTM D1050-05 (2011) and ASTM D1049-98 (2010) for further information
  on proof tests for rubber insulating line hose and covers,
  respectively.


                                   Table I-3--Glove Tests--Water Level \1\ \2\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                    AC proof test                        DC proof test
             Class of glove             ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                mm                 in                mm                in
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
00.....................................                38               1.5                 38               1.5
0......................................                38               1.5                 38               1.5
1......................................                38               1.5                 51               2.0
2......................................                64               2.5                 76               3.0
3......................................                89               3.5                102               4.0
4......................................               127               5.0                153               6.0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The water level is given as the clearance from the reinforced edge of the glove to the water line, with a
  tolerance of 13 mm. (0.5 in.).
\2\ If atmospheric conditions make the specified clearances impractical, the clearances may be increased by a
  maximum of 25 mm. (1 in.).


                          Table I-4--Rubber Insulating Equipment, Voltage Requirements
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                               Maximum use
                    Class of equipment                       voltage \1\ AC    Retest voltage    Retest voltage
                                                                   rms           \2\ AC rms        \2\ DC avg
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
00........................................................               500             2,500            10,000
0.........................................................             1,000             5,000            20,000
1.........................................................             7,500            10,000            40,000
2.........................................................            17,000            20,000            50,000
3.........................................................            26,500            30,000            60,000
4.........................................................            36,000            40,000            70,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The maximum use voltage is the ac voltage (rms) classification of the protective equipment that designates
  the maximum nominal design voltage of the energized system that may be safely worked. The nominal design
  voltage is equal to the phase-to-phase voltage on multiphase circuits. However, the phase-to-ground potential
  is considered to be the nominal design voltage if:
(1) There is no multiphase exposure in a system area and the voltage exposure is limited to the phase-to-ground
  potential, or
(2) The electric equipment and devices are insulated or isolated or both so that the multiphase exposure on a
  grounded wye circuit is removed.
\2\ The proof-test voltage shall be applied continuously for at least 1 minute, but no more than 3 minutes.


         Table I-5--Rubber Insulating Equipment, Test Intervals
------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Type of  equipment                      When to test
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rubber insulating line hose..  Upon indication that insulating value is
                                suspect and after repair.
Rubber insulating covers.....  Upon indication that insulating value is
                                suspect and after repair.
Rubber insulating blankets...  Before first issue and every 12 months
                                thereafter; \1\ upon indication that
                                insulating value is suspect; and after
                                repair.
Rubber insulating gloves.....  Before first issue and every 6 months
                                thereafter; \1\ upon indication that
                                insulating value is suspect; after
                                repair; and after use without
                                protectors.
Rubber insulating sleeves....  Before first issue and every 12 months
                                thereafter; \1\ upon indication that
                                insulating value is suspect; and after
                                repair.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ If the insulating equipment has been electrically tested but not
  issued for service, the insulating equipment may not be placed into
  service unless it has been electrically tested within the previous 12
  months.


[[Page 20633]]


0
4. In Appendix B to Subpart I of Part 1910, revise the heading and 
paragraph 10 to read as follows:

Appendix B to Subpart I of Part 1910--Nonmandatory Compliance 
Guidelines for Hazard Assessment and Personal Protective Equipment 
Selection

* * * * *
    10. Selection guidelines for foot protection. Safety shoes and 
boots which meet the ANSI Z41-1991 Standard provide both impact and 
compression protection. Where necessary, safety shoes can be 
obtained which provide puncture protection. In some work situations, 
metatarsal protection should be provided, and in other special 
situations electrical conductive or insulating safety shoes would be 
appropriate.
    Safety shoes or boots with impact protection would be required 
for carrying or handling materials such as packages, objects, parts 
or heavy tools, which could be dropped; and, for other activities 
where objects might fall onto the feet. Safety shoes or boots with 
compression protection would be required for work activities 
involving skid trucks (manual material handling carts) around bulk 
rolls (such as paper rolls) and around heavy pipes, all of which 
could potentially roll over an employee's feet. Safety shoes or 
boots with puncture protection would be required where sharp objects 
such as nails, wire, tacks, screws, large staples, scrap metal etc., 
could be stepped on by employees causing a foot injury. Electrically 
conductive shoes would be required as a supplementary form of 
protection for work activities in which there is a danger of fire or 
explosion from the discharge of static electricity. Electrical-
hazard or dielectric footwear would be required as a supplementary 
form of protection when an employee standing on the ground is 
exposed to hazardous step or touch potential (the difference in 
electrical potential between the feet or between the hands and feet) 
or when primary forms of electrical protective equipment, such as 
rubber insulating gloves and blankets, do not provide complete 
protection for an employee standing on the ground.
    Some occupations (not a complete list) for which foot protection 
should be routinely considered are: Shipping and receiving clerks, 
stock clerks, carpenters, electricians, machinists, mechanics and 
repairers, plumbers and pipe fitters, structural metal workers, 
assemblers, drywall installers and lathers, packers, wrappers, 
craters, punch and stamping press operators, sawyers, welders, 
laborers, freight handlers, gardeners and grounds-keepers, timber 
cutting and logging workers, stock handlers and warehouse laborers.
* * * * *

Subpart R--Special Industries

0
5. Revise the authority citation for Subpart R of Part 1910 to read as 
follows:

    Authority: 29 U.S.C. 653, 655, 657; Secretary of Labor's Order 
No. 12-71 (36 FR 8754), 8-76 (41 FR 25059), 9-83 (48 FR 35736), 1-90 
(55 FR 9033), 6-96 (62 FR 111), 5-2007 (72 FR 31159), 4-2010 (75 FR 
55355), or 1-2012 (77 FR 3912), as applicable; and 29 CFR Part 1911.


0
6. Revise Sec.  1910.269 to read as follows:


Sec.  1910.269  Electric power generation, transmission, and 
distribution.

    (a) General--(1) Application. (i) This section covers the operation 
and maintenance of electric power generation, control, transformation, 
transmission, and distribution lines and equipment. These provisions 
apply to:
    (A) Power generation, transmission, and distribution installations, 
including related equipment for the purpose of communication or 
metering that are accessible only to qualified employees;

    Note to paragraph (a)(1)(i)(A):  The types of installations 
covered by this paragraph include the generation, transmission, and 
distribution installations of electric utilities, as well as 
equivalent installations of industrial establishments. Subpart S of 
this part covers supplementary electric generating equipment that is 
used to supply a workplace for emergency, standby, or similar 
purposes only. (See paragraph (a)(1)(i)(B) of this section.)

    (B) Other installations at an electric power generating station, as 
follows:
    (1) Fuel and ash handling and processing installations, such as 
coal conveyors,
    (2) Water and steam installations, such as penstocks, pipelines, 
and tanks, providing a source of energy for electric generators, and
    (3) Chlorine and hydrogen systems;
    (C) Test sites where employees perform electrical testing involving 
temporary measurements associated with electric power generation, 
transmission, and distribution in laboratories, in the field, in 
substations, and on lines, as opposed to metering, relaying, and 
routine line work;
    (D) Work on, or directly associated with, the installations covered 
in paragraphs (a)(1)(i)(A) through (a)(1)(i)(C) of this section; and
    (E) Line-clearance tree-trimming operations, as follows:
    (1) Entire Sec.  1910.269 of this part, except paragraph (r)(1) of 
this section, applies to line-clearance tree-trimming operations 
performed by qualified employees (those who are knowledgeable in the 
construction and operation of the electric power generation, 
transmission, or distribution equipment involved, along with the 
associated hazards).
    (2) Paragraphs (a)(2), (a)(3), (b), (c), (g), (k), (p), and (r) of 
this section apply to line-clearance tree-trimming operations performed 
by line-clearance tree trimmers who are not qualified employees.
    (ii) Notwithstanding paragraph (a)(1)(i) of this section, Sec.  
1910.269 of this part does not apply:
    (A) To construction work, as defined in Sec.  1910.12 of this part, 
except for line-clearance tree-trimming operations and work involving 
electric power generation installations as specified in Sec.  
1926.950(a)(3) of this chapter; or
    (B) To electrical installations, electrical safety-related work 
practices, or electrical maintenance considerations covered by Subpart 
S of this part.

    Note 1 to paragraph (a)(1)(ii)(B): The Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration considers work practices conforming to 
Sec. Sec.  1910.332 through 1910.335 as complying with the 
electrical safety-related work-practice requirements of Sec.  
1910.269 identified in Table 1 of Appendix A-2 to this section, 
provided that employers are performing the work on a generation or 
distribution installation meeting Sec. Sec.  1910.303 through 
1910.308. This table also identifies provisions in Sec.  1910.269 
that apply to work by qualified persons directly on, or associated 
with, installations of electric power generation, transmission, and 
distribution lines or equipment, regardless of compliance with 
Sec. Sec.  1910.332 through 1910.335.


    Note 2 to paragraph (a)(1)(ii)(B): The Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration considers work practices performed by 
qualified persons and conforming to Sec.  1910.269 as complying with 
Sec. Sec.  1910.333(c) and 1910.335.

    (iii) This section applies in addition to all other applicable 
standards contained in this Part 1910. Employers covered under this 
section are not exempt from complying with other applicable provisions 
in Part 1910 by the operation of Sec.  1910.5(c). Specific references 
in this section to other sections of Part 1910 are for emphasis only.
    (2) Training. (i) All employees performing work covered by this 
section shall be trained as follows:
    (A) Each employee shall be trained in, and familiar with, the 
safety-related work practices, safety procedures, and other safety 
requirements in this section that pertain to his or her job 
assignments.
    (B) Each employee shall also be trained in and familiar with any 
other safety practices, including applicable emergency procedures (such 
as pole-top and manhole rescue), that are not specifically addressed by 
this section but that are related to his or her work and are necessary 
for his or her safety.
    (C) The degree of training shall be determined by the risk to the 
employee for the hazard involved.

[[Page 20634]]

    (ii) Each qualified employee shall also be trained and competent 
in:
    (A) The skills and techniques necessary to distinguish exposed live 
parts from other parts of electric equipment,
    (B) The skills and techniques necessary to determine the nominal 
voltage of exposed live parts,
    (C) The minimum approach distances specified in this section 
corresponding to the voltages to which the qualified employee will be 
exposed and the skills and techniques necessary to maintain those 
distances,
    (D) The proper use of the special precautionary techniques, 
personal protective equipment, insulating and shielding materials, and 
insulated tools for working on or near exposed energized parts of 
electric equipment, and
    (E) The recognition of electrical hazards to which the employee may 
be exposed and the skills and techniques necessary to control or avoid 
these hazards.

    Note to paragraph (a)(2)(ii): For the purposes of this section, 
a person must have the training required by paragraph (a)(2)(ii) of 
this section to be considered a qualified person.

    (iii) Each line-clearance tree trimmer who is not a qualified 
employee shall also be trained and competent in:
    (A) The skills and techniques necessary to distinguish exposed live 
parts from other parts of electric equipment,
    (B) The skills and techniques necessary to determine the nominal 
voltage of exposed live parts, and
    (C) The minimum approach distances specified in this section 
corresponding to the voltages to which the employee will be exposed and 
the skills and techniques necessary to maintain those distances.
    (iv) The employer shall determine, through regular supervision and 
through inspections conducted on at least an annual basis, that each 
employee is complying with the safety-related work practices required 
by this section.
    (v) An employee shall receive additional training (or retraining) 
under any of the following conditions:
    (A) If the supervision or annual inspections required by paragraph 
(a)(2)(iv) of this section indicate that the employee is not complying 
with the safety-related work practices required by this section, or
    (B) If new technology, new types of equipment, or changes in 
procedures necessitate the use of safety-related work practices that 
are different from those which the employee would normally use, or
    (C) If he or she must employ safety-related work practices that are 
not normally used during his or her regular job duties.

    Note to paragraph (a)(2)(v)(C): The Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration considers tasks that are performed less often 
than once per year to necessitate retraining before the performance 
of the work practices involved.

    (vi) The training required by paragraph (a)(2) of this section 
shall be of the classroom or on-the-job type.
    (vii) The training shall establish employee proficiency in the work 
practices required by this section and shall introduce the procedures 
necessary for compliance with this section.
    (viii) The employer shall ensure that each employee has 
demonstrated proficiency in the work practices involved before that 
employee is considered as having completed the training required by 
paragraph (a)(2) of this section.

    Note 1 to paragraph (a)(2)(viii): Though they are not required 
by this paragraph, employment records that indicate that an employee 
has successfully completed the required training are one way of 
keeping track of when an employee has demonstrated proficiency.


    Note 2 to paragraph (a)(2)(viii): For an employee with previous 
training, an employer may determine that that employee has 
demonstrated the proficiency required by this paragraph using the 
following process:
    (1) Confirm that the employee has the training required by 
paragraph (a)(2) of this section,
    (2) Use an examination or interview to make an initial 
determination that the employee understands the relevant safety-
related work practices before he or she performs any work covered by 
this section, and
    (3) Supervise the employee closely until that employee has 
demonstrated proficiency as required by this paragraph.

    (3) Information transfer.
    (i) Before work begins, the host employer shall inform contract 
employers of:
    (A) The characteristics of the host employer's installation that 
are related to the safety of the work to be performed and are listed in 
paragraphs (a)(4)(i) through (a)(4)(v) of this section;

    Note to paragraph (a)(3)(i)(A): This paragraph requires the host 
employer to obtain information listed in paragraphs (a)(4)(i) 
through (a)(4)(v) of this section if it does not have this 
information in existing records.

    (B) Conditions that are related to the safety of the work to be 
performed, that are listed in paragraphs (a)(4)(vi) through 
(a)(4)(viii) of this section, and that are known to the host employer;

    Note to paragraph (a)(3)(i)(B):  For the purposes of this 
paragraph, the host employer need only provide information to 
contract employers that the host employer can obtain from its 
existing records through the exercise of reasonable diligence. This 
paragraph does not require the host employer to make inspections of 
worksite conditions to obtain this information.

    (C) Information about the design and operation of the host 
employer's installation that the contract employer needs to make the 
assessments required by this section; and

    Note to paragraph (a)(3)(i)(C): This paragraph requires the host 
employer to obtain information about the design and operation of its 
installation that contract employers need to make required 
assessments if it does not have this information in existing 
records.

    (D) Any other information about the design and operation of the 
host employer's installation that is known by the host employer, that 
the contract employer requests, and that is related to the protection 
of the contract employer's employees.

    Note to paragraph (a)(3)(i)(D): For the purposes of this 
paragraph, the host employer need only provide information to 
contract employers that the host employer can obtain from its 
existing records through the exercise of reasonable diligence. This 
paragraph does not require the host employer to make inspections of 
worksite conditions to obtain this information.

    (ii) Contract employers shall comply with the following 
requirements:
    (A) The contract employer shall ensure that each of its employees 
is instructed in the hazardous conditions relevant to the employee's 
work that the contract employer is aware of as a result of information 
communicated to the contract employer by the host employer under 
paragraph (a)(3)(i) of this section.
    (B) Before work begins, the contract employer shall advise the host 
employer of any unique hazardous conditions presented by the contract 
employer's work.
    (C) The contract employer shall advise the host employer of any 
unanticipated hazardous conditions found during the contract employer's 
work that the host employer did not mention under paragraph (a)(3)(i) 
of this section. The contract employer shall provide this information 
to the host employer within 2 working days after discovering the 
hazardous condition.
    (iii) The contract employer and the host employer shall coordinate 
their work rules and procedures so that each employee of the contract 
employer and the host employer is protected as required by this 
section.
    (4) Existing characteristics and conditions. Existing 
characteristics and

[[Page 20635]]

conditions of electric lines and equipment that are related to the 
safety of the work to be performed shall be determined before work on 
or near the lines or equipment is started. Such characteristics and 
conditions include, but are not limited to:
    (i) The nominal voltages of lines and equipment,
    (ii) The maximum switching-transient voltages,
    (iii) The presence of hazardous induced voltages,
    (iv) The presence of protective grounds and equipment grounding 
conductors,
    (v) The locations of circuits and equipment, including electric 
supply lines, communication lines, and fire-protective signaling 
circuits,
    (vi) The condition of protective grounds and equipment grounding 
conductors,
    (vii) The condition of poles, and
    (viii) Environmental conditions relating to safety.
    (b) Medical services and first aid. The employer shall provide 
medical services and first aid as required in Sec.  1910.151. In 
addition to the requirements of Sec.  1910.151, the following 
requirements also apply:
    (1) First-aid training. When employees are performing work on, or 
associated with, exposed lines or equipment energized at 50 volts or 
more, persons with first-aid training shall be available as follows:
    (i) For field work involving two or more employees at a work 
location, at least two trained persons shall be available. However, for 
line-clearance tree trimming operations performed by line-clearance 
tree trimmers who are not qualified employees, only one trained person 
need be available if all new employees are trained in first aid within 
3 months of their hiring dates.
    (ii) For fixed work locations such as substations, the number of 
trained persons available shall be sufficient to ensure that each 
employee exposed to electric shock can be reached within 4 minutes by a 
trained person. However, where the existing number of employees is 
insufficient to meet this requirement (at a remote substation, for 
example), each employee at the work location shall be a trained 
employee.
    (2) First-aid supplies. First-aid supplies required by Sec.  
1910.151(b) shall be placed in weatherproof containers if the supplies 
could be exposed to the weather.
    (3) First-aid kits. The employer shall maintain each first-aid kit, 
shall ensure that it is readily available for use, and shall inspect it 
frequently enough to ensure that expended items are replaced. The 
employer also shall inspect each first aid kit at least once per year.
    (c) Job briefing. (1) Before each job. (i) In assigning an employee 
or a group of employees to perform a job, the employer shall provide 
the employee in charge of the job with all available information that 
relates to the determination of existing characteristics and conditions 
required by paragraph (a)(4) of this section.
    (ii) The employer shall ensure that the employee in charge conducts 
a job briefing that meets paragraphs (c)(2), (c)(3), and (c)(4) of this 
section with the employees involved before they start each job.
    (2) Subjects to be covered. The briefing shall cover at least the 
following subjects: hazards associated with the job, work procedures 
involved, special precautions, energy-source controls, and personal 
protective equipment requirements.
    (3) Number of briefings. (i) If the work or operations to be 
performed during the work day or shift are repetitive and similar, at 
least one job briefing shall be conducted before the start of the first 
job of each day or shift.
    (ii) Additional job briefings shall be held if significant changes, 
which might affect the safety of the employees, occur during the course 
of the work.
    (4) Extent of briefing. (i) A brief discussion is satisfactory if 
the work involved is routine and if the employees, by virtue of 
training and experience, can reasonably be expected to recognize and 
avoid the hazards involved in the job.
    (ii) A more extensive discussion shall be conducted:
    (A) If the work is complicated or particularly hazardous, or
    (B) If the employee cannot be expected to recognize and avoid the 
hazards involved in the job.

    Note to paragraph (c)(4): The briefing must address all the 
subjects listed in paragraph (c)(2) of this section.

    (5) Working alone. An employee working alone need not conduct a job 
briefing. However, the employer shall ensure that the tasks to be 
performed are planned as if a briefing were required.
    (d) Hazardous energy control (lockout/tagout) procedures. (1) 
Application. The provisions of paragraph (d) of this section apply to 
the use of lockout/tagout procedures for the control of energy sources 
in installations for the purpose of electric power generation, 
including related equipment for communication or metering. Locking and 
tagging procedures for the deenergizing of electric energy sources 
which are used exclusively for purposes of transmission and 
distribution are addressed by paragraph (m) of this section.

    Note to paragraph (d)(1): Installations in electric power 
generation facilities that are not an integral part of, or 
inextricably commingled with, power generation processes or 
equipment are covered under Sec.  1910.147 and Subpart S of this 
part.

    (2) General. (i) The employer shall establish a program consisting 
of energy control procedures, employee training, and periodic 
inspections to ensure that, before any employee performs any servicing 
or maintenance on a machine or equipment where the unexpected 
energizing, start up, or release of stored energy could occur and cause 
injury, the machine or equipment is isolated from the energy source and 
rendered inoperative.
    (ii) The employer's energy control program under paragraph (d)(2) 
of this section shall meet the following requirements:
    (A) If an energy isolating device is not capable of being locked 
out, the employer's program shall use a tagout system.
    (B) If an energy isolating device is capable of being locked out, 
the employer's program shall use lockout, unless the employer can 
demonstrate that the use of a tagout system will provide full employee 
protection as follows:
    (1) When a tagout device is used on an energy isolating device 
which is capable of being locked out, the tagout device shall be 
attached at the same location that the lockout device would have been 
attached, and the employer shall demonstrate that the tagout program 
will provide a level of safety equivalent to that obtained by the use 
of a lockout program.
    (2) In demonstrating that a level of safety is achieved in the 
tagout program equivalent to the level of safety obtained by the use of 
a lockout program, the employer shall demonstrate full compliance with 
all tagout-related provisions of this standard together with such 
additional elements as are necessary to provide the equivalent safety 
available from the use of a lockout device. Additional means to be 
considered as part of the demonstration of full employee protection 
shall include the implementation of additional safety measures such as 
the removal of an isolating circuit element, blocking of a controlling 
switch, opening of an extra disconnecting device, or the removal of a 
valve handle to reduce the likelihood of inadvertent energizing.

[[Page 20636]]

    (C) After November 1, 1994, whenever replacement or major repair, 
renovation, or modification of a machine or equipment is performed, and 
whenever new machines or equipment are installed, energy isolating 
devices for such machines or equipment shall be designed to accept a 
lockout device.
    (iii) Procedures shall be developed, documented, and used for the 
control of potentially hazardous energy covered by paragraph (d) of 
this section.
    (iv) The procedure shall clearly and specifically outline the 
scope, purpose, responsibility, authorization, rules, and techniques to 
be applied to the control of hazardous energy, and the measures to 
enforce compliance including, but not limited to, the following:
    (A) A specific statement of the intended use of this procedure;
    (B) Specific procedural steps for shutting down, isolating, 
blocking and securing machines or equipment to control hazardous 
energy;
    (C) Specific procedural steps for the placement, removal, and 
transfer of lockout devices or tagout devices and the responsibility 
for them; and
    (D) Specific requirements for testing a machine or equipment to 
determine and verify the effectiveness of lockout devices, tagout 
devices, and other energy control measures.
    (v) The employer shall conduct a periodic inspection of the energy 
control procedure at least annually to ensure that the procedure and 
the provisions of paragraph (d) of this section are being followed.
    (A) The periodic inspection shall be performed by an authorized 
employee who is not using the energy control procedure being inspected.
    (B) The periodic inspection shall be designed to identify and 
correct any deviations or inadequacies.
    (C) If lockout is used for energy control, the periodic inspection 
shall include a review, between the inspector and each authorized 
employee, of that employee's responsibilities under the energy control 
procedure being inspected.
    (D) Where tagout is used for energy control, the periodic 
inspection shall include a review, between the inspector and each 
authorized and affected employee, of that employee's responsibilities 
under the energy control procedure being inspected, and the elements 
set forth in paragraph (d)(2)(vii) of this section.
    (E) The employer shall certify that the inspections required by 
paragraph (d)(2)(v) of this section have been accomplished. The 
certification shall identify the machine or equipment on which the 
energy control procedure was being used, the date of the inspection, 
the employees included in the inspection, and the person performing the 
inspection.

    Note to paragraph (d)(2)(v)(E): If normal work schedule and 
operation records demonstrate adequate inspection activity and 
contain the required information, no additional certification is 
required.

    (vi) The employer shall provide training to ensure that the purpose 
and function of the energy control program are understood by employees 
and that the knowledge and skills required for the safe application, 
usage, and removal of energy controls are acquired by employees. The 
training shall include the following:
    (A) Each authorized employee shall receive training in the 
recognition of applicable hazardous energy sources, the type and 
magnitude of energy available in the workplace, and in the methods and 
means necessary for energy isolation and control.
    (B) Each affected employee shall be instructed in the purpose and 
use of the energy control procedure.
    (C) All other employees whose work operations are or may be in an 
area where energy control procedures may be used shall be instructed 
about the procedures and about the prohibition relating to attempts to 
restart or reenergize machines or equipment that are locked out or 
tagged out.
    (vii) When tagout systems are used, employees shall also be trained 
in the following limitations of tags:
    (A) Tags are essentially warning devices affixed to energy 
isolating devices and do not provide the physical restraint on those 
devices that is provided by a lock.
    (B) When a tag is attached to an energy isolating means, it is not 
to be removed without authorization of the authorized person 
responsible for it, and it is never to be bypassed, ignored, or 
otherwise defeated.
    (C) Tags must be legible and understandable by all authorized 
employees, affected employees, and all other employees whose work 
operations are or may be in the area, in order to be effective.
    (D) Tags and their means of attachment must be made of materials 
which will withstand the environmental conditions encountered in the 
workplace.
    (E) Tags may evoke a false sense of security, and their meaning 
needs to be understood as part of the overall energy control program.
    (F) Tags must be securely attached to energy isolating devices so 
that they cannot be inadvertently or accidentally detached during use.
    (viii) Retraining shall be provided by the employer as follows:
    (A) Retraining shall be provided for all authorized and affected 
employees whenever there is a change in their job assignments, a change 
in machines, equipment, or processes that present a new hazard or 
whenever there is a change in the energy control procedures.
    (B) Retraining shall also be conducted whenever a periodic 
inspection under paragraph (d)(2)(v) of this section reveals, or 
whenever the employer has reason to believe, that there are deviations 
from or inadequacies in an employee's knowledge or use of the energy 
control procedures.
    (C) The retraining shall reestablish employee proficiency and shall 
introduce new or revised control methods and procedures, as necessary.
    (ix) The employer shall certify that employee training has been 
accomplished and is being kept up to date. The certification shall 
contain each employee's name and dates of training.
    (3) Protective materials and hardware. (i) Locks, tags, chains, 
wedges, key blocks, adapter pins, self-locking fasteners, or other 
hardware shall be provided by the employer for isolating, securing, or 
blocking of machines or equipment from energy sources.
    (ii) Lockout devices and tagout devices shall be singularly 
identified; shall be the only devices used for controlling energy; may 
not be used for other purposes; and shall meet the following 
requirements:
    (A) Lockout devices and tagout devices shall be capable of 
withstanding the environment to which they are exposed for the maximum 
period of time that exposure is expected.
    (1) Tagout devices shall be constructed and printed so that 
exposure to weather conditions or wet and damp locations will not cause 
the tag to deteriorate or the message on the tag to become illegible.
    (2) Tagout devices shall be so constructed as not to deteriorate 
when used in corrosive environments.
    (B) Lockout devices and tagout devices shall be standardized within 
the facility in at least one of the following criteria: color, shape, 
size. Additionally, in the case of tagout devices, print and format 
shall be standardized.
    (C) Lockout devices shall be substantial enough to prevent removal 
without the use of excessive force or unusual techniques, such as with 
the use of bolt cutters or metal cutting tools.
    (D) Tagout devices, including their means of attachment, shall be 
substantial enough to prevent

[[Page 20637]]

inadvertent or accidental removal. Tagout device attachment means shall 
be of a non-reusable type, attachable by hand, self-locking, and 
nonreleasable with a minimum unlocking strength of no less than 50 
pounds and shall have the general design and basic characteristics of 
being at least equivalent to a one-piece, all-environment-tolerant 
nylon cable tie.
    (E) Each lockout device or tagout device shall include provisions 
for the identification of the employee applying the device.
    (F) Tagout devices shall warn against hazardous conditions if the 
machine or equipment is energized and shall include a legend such as 
the following: Do Not Start, Do Not Open, Do Not Close, Do Not 
Energize, Do Not Operate.

    Note to paragraph (d)(3)(ii)(F):  For specific provisions 
covering accident prevention tags, see Sec.  1910.145.

    (4) Energy isolation. Lockout and tagout device application and 
removal may only be performed by the authorized employees who are 
performing the servicing or maintenance.
    (5) Notification. Affected employees shall be notified by the 
employer or authorized employee of the application and removal of 
lockout or tagout devices. Notification shall be given before the 
controls are applied and after they are removed from the machine or 
equipment.

    Note to paragraph (d)(5): See also paragraph (d)(7) of this 
section, which requires that the second notification take place 
before the machine or equipment is reenergized.

    (6) Lockout/tagout application. The established procedures for the 
application of energy control (the lockout or tagout procedures) shall 
include the following elements and actions, and these procedures shall 
be performed in the following sequence:
    (i) Before an authorized or affected employee turns off a machine 
or equipment, the authorized employee shall have knowledge of the type 
and magnitude of the energy, the hazards of the energy to be 
controlled, and the method or means to control the energy.
    (ii) The machine or equipment shall be turned off or shut down 
using the procedures established for the machine or equipment. An 
orderly shutdown shall be used to avoid any additional or increased 
hazards to employees as a result of the equipment stoppage.
    (iii) All energy isolating devices that are needed to control the 
energy to the machine or equipment shall be physically located and 
operated in such a manner as to isolate the machine or equipment from 
energy sources.
    (iv) Lockout or tagout devices shall be affixed to each energy 
isolating device by authorized employees.
    (A) Lockout devices shall be attached in a manner that will hold 
the energy isolating devices in a ``safe'' or ``off'' position.
    (B) Tagout devices shall be affixed in such a manner as will 
clearly indicate that the operation or movement of energy isolating 
devices from the ``safe'' or ``off'' position is prohibited.
    (1) Where tagout devices are used with energy isolating devices 
designed with the capability of being locked out, the tag attachment 
shall be fastened at the same point at which the lock would have been 
attached.
    (2) Where a tag cannot be affixed directly to the energy isolating 
device, the tag shall be located as close as safely possible to the 
device, in a position that will be immediately obvious to anyone 
attempting to operate the device.
    (v) Following the application of lockout or tagout devices to 
energy isolating devices, all potentially hazardous stored or residual 
energy shall be relieved, disconnected, restrained, or otherwise 
rendered safe.
    (vi) If there is a possibility of reaccumulation of stored energy 
to a hazardous level, verification of isolation shall be continued 
until the servicing or maintenance is completed or until the 
possibility of such accumulation no longer exists.
    (vii) Before starting work on machines or equipment that have been 
locked out or tagged out, the authorized employee shall verify that 
isolation and deenergizing of the machine or equipment have been 
accomplished. If normally energized parts will be exposed to contact by 
an employee while the machine or equipment is deenergized, a test shall 
be performed to ensure that these parts are deenergized.
    (7) Release from lockout/tagout. Before lockout or tagout devices 
are removed and energy is restored to the machine or equipment, 
procedures shall be followed and actions taken by the authorized 
employees to ensure the following:
    (i) The work area shall be inspected to ensure that nonessential 
items have been removed and that machine or equipment components are 
operationally intact.
    (ii) The work area shall be checked to ensure that all employees 
have been safely positioned or removed.
    (iii) After lockout or tagout devices have been removed and before 
a machine or equipment is started, affected employees shall be notified 
that the lockout or tagout devices have been removed.
    (iv) Each lockout or tagout device shall be removed from each 
energy isolating device by the authorized employee who applied the 
lockout or tagout device. However, if that employee is not available to 
remove it, the device may be removed under the direction of the 
employer, provided that specific procedures and training for such 
removal have been developed, documented, and incorporated into the 
employer's energy control program. The employer shall demonstrate that 
the specific procedure provides a degree of safety equivalent to that 
provided by the removal of the device by the authorized employee who 
applied it. The specific procedure shall include at least the following 
elements:
    (A) Verification by the employer that the authorized employee who 
applied the device is not at the facility;
    (B) Making all reasonable efforts to contact the authorized 
employee to inform him or her that his or her lockout or tagout device 
has been removed; and
    (C) Ensuring that the authorized employee has this knowledge before 
he or she resumes work at that facility.
    (8) Additional requirements. (i) If the lockout or tagout devices 
must be temporarily removed from energy isolating devices and the 
machine or equipment must be energized to test or position the machine, 
equipment, or component thereof, the following sequence of actions 
shall be followed:
    (A) Clear the machine or equipment of tools and materials in 
accordance with paragraph (d)(7)(i) of this section;
    (B) Remove employees from the machine or equipment area in 
accordance with paragraphs (d)(7)(ii) and (d)(7)(iii) of this section;
    (C) Remove the lockout or tagout devices as specified in paragraph 
(d)(7)(iv) of this section;
    (D) Energize and proceed with the testing or positioning; and
    (E) Deenergize all systems and reapply energy control measures in 
accordance with paragraph (d)(6) of this section to continue the 
servicing or maintenance.
    (ii) When servicing or maintenance is performed by a crew, craft, 
department, or other group, they shall use a procedure which affords 
the employees a level of protection equivalent to that provided by the 
implementation of a personal lockout or tagout device. Group lockout or 
tagout devices shall be used in accordance with the procedures required 
by paragraphs (d)(2)(iii) and (d)(2)(iv) of this section including, but 
not limited to, the following specific requirements:

[[Page 20638]]

    (A) Primary responsibility shall be vested in an authorized 
employee for a set number of employees working under the protection of 
a group lockout or tagout device (such as an operations lock);
    (B) Provision shall be made for the authorized employee to 
ascertain the exposure status of all individual group members with 
regard to the lockout or tagout of the machine or equipment;
    (C) When more than one crew, craft, department, or other group is 
involved, assignment of overall job-associated lockout or tagout 
control responsibility shall be given to an authorized employee 
designated to coordinate affected work forces and ensure continuity of 
protection; and
    (D) Each authorized employee shall affix a personal lockout or 
tagout device to the group lockout device, group lockbox, or comparable 
mechanism when he or she begins work and shall remove those devices 
when he or she stops working on the machine or equipment being serviced 
or maintained.
    (iii) Procedures shall be used during shift or personnel changes to 
ensure the continuity of lockout or tagout protection, including 
provision for the orderly transfer of lockout or tagout device 
protection between off-going and on-coming employees, to minimize their 
exposure to hazards from the unexpected energizing or start-up of the 
machine or equipment or from the release of stored energy.
    (iv) Whenever outside servicing personnel are to be engaged in 
activities covered by paragraph (d) of this section, the on-site 
employer and the outside employer shall inform each other of their 
respective lockout or tagout procedures, and each employer shall ensure 
that his or her personnel understand and comply with restrictions and 
prohibitions of the energy control procedures being used.
    (v) If energy isolating devices are installed in a central location 
and are under the exclusive control of a system operator, the following 
requirements apply:
    (A) The employer shall use a procedure that affords employees a 
level of protection equivalent to that provided by the implementation 
of a personal lockout or tagout device.
    (B) The system operator shall place and remove lockout and tagout 
devices in place of the authorized employee under paragraphs (d)(4), 
(d)(6)(iv), and (d)(7)(iv) of this section.
    (C) Provisions shall be made to identify the authorized employee 
who is responsible for (that is, being protected by) the lockout or 
tagout device, to transfer responsibility for lockout and tagout 
devices, and to ensure that an authorized employee requesting removal 
or transfer of a lockout or tagout device is the one responsible for it 
before the device is removed or transferred.

    Note to paragraph (d): Lockout and tagging procedures that 
comply with paragraphs (c) through (f) of Sec.  1910.147 will also 
be deemed to comply with paragraph (d) of this section if the 
procedures address the hazards covered by paragraph (d) of this 
section.

    (e) Enclosed spaces. This paragraph covers enclosed spaces that may 
be entered by employees. It does not apply to vented vaults if the 
employer makes a determination that the ventilation system is operating 
to protect employees before they enter the space. This paragraph 
applies to routine entry into enclosed spaces in lieu of the permit-
space entry requirements contained in paragraphs (d) through (k) of 
Sec.  1910.146. If, after the employer takes the precautions given in 
paragraphs (e) and (t) of this section, the hazards remaining in the 
enclosed space endanger the life of an entrant or could interfere with 
an entrant's escape from the space, then entry into the enclosed space 
shall meet the permit-space entry requirements of paragraphs (d) 
through (k) of Sec.  1910.146.
    (1) Safe work practices. The employer shall ensure the use of safe 
work practices for entry into, and work in, enclosed spaces and for 
rescue of employees from such spaces.
    (2) Training. Each employee who enters an enclosed space or who 
serves as an attendant shall be trained in the hazards of enclosed-
space entry, in enclosed-space entry procedures, and in enclosed-space 
rescue procedures.
    (3) Rescue equipment. Employers shall provide equipment to ensure 
the prompt and safe rescue of employees from the enclosed space.
    (4) Evaluating potential hazards. Before any entrance cover to an 
enclosed space is removed, the employer shall determine whether it is 
safe to do so by checking for the presence of any atmospheric pressure 
or temperature differences and by evaluating whether there might be a 
hazardous atmosphere in the space. Any conditions making it unsafe to 
remove the cover shall be eliminated before the cover is removed.

    Note to paragraph (e)(4): The determination called for in this 
paragraph may consist of a check of the conditions that might 
foreseeably be in the enclosed space. For example, the cover could 
be checked to see if it is hot and, if it is fastened in place, 
could be loosened gradually to release any residual pressure. An 
evaluation also needs to be made of whether conditions at the site 
could cause a hazardous atmosphere, such as an oxygen-deficient or 
flammable atmosphere, to develop within the space.

    (5) Removing covers. When covers are removed from enclosed spaces, 
the opening shall be promptly guarded by a railing, temporary cover, or 
other barrier designed to prevent an accidental fall through the 
opening and to protect employees working in the space from objects 
entering the space.
    (6) Hazardous atmosphere. Employees may not enter any enclosed 
space while it contains a hazardous atmosphere, unless the entry 
conforms to the permit-required confined spaces standard in Sec.  
1910.146.
    (7) Attendants. While work is being performed in the enclosed 
space, an attendant with first-aid training shall be immediately 
available outside the enclosed space to provide assistance if a hazard 
exists because of traffic patterns in the area of the opening used for 
entry. The attendant is not precluded from performing other duties 
outside the enclosed space if these duties do not distract the 
attendant from: monitoring employees within the space or ensuring that 
it is safe for employees to enter and exit the space.

    Note to paragraph (e)(7): See paragraph (t) of this section for 
additional requirements on attendants for work in manholes and 
vaults.

    (8) Calibration of test instruments. Test instruments used to 
monitor atmospheres in enclosed spaces shall be kept in calibration and 
shall have a minimum accuracy of 10 percent.
    (9) Testing for oxygen deficiency. Before an employee enters an 
enclosed space, the atmosphere in the enclosed space shall be tested 
for oxygen deficiency with a direct-reading meter or similar 
instrument, capable of collection and immediate analysis of data 
samples without the need for off-site evaluation. If continuous forced-
air ventilation is provided, testing is not required provided that the 
procedures used ensure that employees are not exposed to the hazards 
posed by oxygen deficiency.
    (10) Testing for flammable gases and vapors. Before an employee 
enters an enclosed space, the internal atmosphere shall be tested for 
flammable gases and vapors with a direct-reading meter or similar 
instrument capable of collection and immediate analysis of data samples 
without the need for off-site evaluation. This test shall be performed 
after the oxygen testing and ventilation required by paragraph (e)(9) 
of this section demonstrate that there is sufficient oxygen to ensure 
the accuracy of the test for flammability.

[[Page 20639]]

    (11) Ventilation, and monitoring for flammable gases or vapors. If 
flammable gases or vapors are detected or if an oxygen deficiency is 
found, forced-air ventilation shall be used to maintain oxygen at a 
safe level and to prevent a hazardous concentration of flammable gases 
and vapors from accumulating. A continuous monitoring program to ensure 
that no increase in flammable gas or vapor concentration above safe 
levels occurs may be followed in lieu of ventilation if flammable gases 
or vapors are initially detected at safe levels.

    Note to paragraph (e)(11): See the definition of ``hazardous 
atmosphere'' for guidance in determining whether a specific 
concentration of a substance is hazardous.

    (12) Specific ventilation requirements. If continuous forced-air 
ventilation is used, it shall begin before entry is made and shall be 
maintained long enough for the employer to be able to demonstrate that 
a safe atmosphere exists before employees are allowed to enter the work 
area. The forced-air ventilation shall be so directed as to ventilate 
the immediate area where employees are present within the enclosed 
space and shall continue until all employees leave the enclosed space.
    (13) Air supply. The air supply for the continuous forced-air 
ventilation shall be from a clean source and may not increase the 
hazards in the enclosed space.
    (14) Open flames. If open flames are used in enclosed spaces, a 
test for flammable gases and vapors shall be made immediately before 
the open flame device is used and at least once per hour while the 
device is used in the space. Testing shall be conducted more frequently 
if conditions present in the enclosed space indicate that once per hour 
is insufficient to detect hazardous accumulations of flammable gases or 
vapors.

    Note to paragraph (e)(14): See the definition of ``hazardous 
atmosphere'' for guidance in determining whether a specific 
concentration of a substance is hazardous.


    Note to paragraph (e): Entries into enclosed spaces conducted in 
accordance with the permit-space entry requirements of paragraphs 
(d) through (k) of Sec.  1910.146 are considered as complying with 
paragraph (e) of this section.

    (f) Excavations. Excavation operations shall comply with Subpart P 
of Part 1926 of this chapter.
    (g) Personal protective equipment. (1) General. Personal protective 
equipment shall meet the requirements of Subpart I of this part.

    Note to paragraph (g)(1) of this section: Paragraph (h) of Sec.  
1910.132 sets employer payment obligations for the personal 
protective equipment required by this section, including, but not 
limited to, the fall protection equipment required by paragraph 
(g)(2) of this section, the electrical protective equipment required 
by paragraph (l)(3) of this section, and the flame-resistant and 
arc-rated clothing and other protective equipment required by 
paragraph (l)(8) of this section.

    (2) Fall protection. (i) Personal fall arrest systems shall meet 
the requirements of Subpart M of Part 1926 of this chapter.
    (ii) Personal fall arrest equipment used by employees who are 
exposed to hazards from flames or electric arcs, as determined by the 
employer under paragraph (l)(8)(i) of this section, shall be capable of 
passing a drop test equivalent to that required by paragraph 
(g)(2)(iii)(L) of this section after exposure to an electric arc with a 
heat energy of 405 cal/cm\2\.
    (iii) Body belts and positioning straps for work-positioning 
equipment shall meet the following requirements:
    (A) Hardware for body belts and positioning straps shall meet the 
following requirements:
    (1) Hardware shall be made of drop-forged steel, pressed steel, 
formed steel, or equivalent material.
    (2) Hardware shall have a corrosion-resistant finish.
    (3) Hardware surfaces shall be smooth and free of sharp edges.
    (B) Buckles shall be capable of withstanding an 8.9-kilonewton 
(2,000-pound-force) tension test with a maximum permanent deformation 
no greater than 0.4 millimeters (0.0156 inches).
    (C) D rings shall be capable of withstanding a 22-kilonewton 
(5,000-pound-force) tensile test without cracking or breaking.
    (D) Snaphooks shall be capable of withstanding a 22-kilonewton 
(5,000-pound-force) tension test without failure.

    Note to paragraph (g)(2)(iii)(D): Distortion of the snaphook 
sufficient to release the keeper is considered to be tensile failure 
of a snaphook.

    (E) Top grain leather or leather substitute may be used in the 
manufacture of body belts and positioning straps; however, leather and 
leather substitutes may not be used alone as a load-bearing component 
of the assembly.
    (F) Plied fabric used in positioning straps and in load-bearing 
parts of body belts shall be constructed in such a way that no raw 
edges are exposed and the plies do not separate.
    (G) Positioning straps shall be capable of withstanding the 
following tests:
    (1) A dielectric test of 819.7 volts, AC, per centimeter (25,000 
volts per foot) for 3 minutes without visible deterioration;
    (2) A leakage test of 98.4 volts, AC, per centimeter (3,000 volts 
per foot) with a leakage current of no more than 1 mA;

    Note to paragraphs (g)(2)(iii)(G)(1) and (g)(2)(iii)(G)(2):
    Positioning straps that pass direct-current tests at equivalent 
voltages are considered as meeting this requirement.

    (3) Tension tests of 20 kilonewtons (4,500 pounds-force) for 
sections free of buckle holes and of 15 kilonewtons (3,500 pounds-
force) for sections with buckle holes;
    (4) A buckle-tear test with a load of 4.4 kilonewtons (1,000 
pounds-force); and
    (5) A flammability test in accordance with Table R-2.

                      Table R-2--Flammability Test
------------------------------------------------------------------------
              Test method                 Criteria for passing the test
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Vertically suspend a 500-mm (19.7-inch)  Any flames on the positioning
 length of strapping supporting a 100-    strap shall self extinguish.
 kg (220.5-lb) weight.                   The positioning strap shall
Use a butane or propane burner with a     continue to support the 100-kg
 76-mm (3-inch) flame..                   (220.5-lb) mass.
Direct the flame to an edge of the
 strapping at a distance of 25 mm (1
 inch).
Remove the flame after 5 seconds.......
Wait for any flames on the positioning
 strap to stop burning.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (H) The cushion part of the body belt shall contain no exposed 
rivets on the inside and shall be at least 76 millimeters (3 inches) in 
width.
    (I) Tool loops shall be situated on the body of a body belt so that 
the 100

[[Page 20640]]

millimeters (4 inches) of the body belt that is in the center of the 
back, measuring from D ring to D ring, is free of tool loops and any 
other attachments.
    (J) Copper, steel, or equivalent liners shall be used around the 
bars of D rings to prevent wear between these members and the leather 
or fabric enclosing them.
    (K) Snaphooks shall be of the locking type meeting the following 
requirements:
    (1) The locking mechanism shall first be released, or a destructive 
force shall be placed on the keeper, before the keeper will open.
    (2) A force in the range of 6.7 N (1.5 lbf) to 17.8 N (4 lbf) shall 
be required to release the locking mechanism.
    (3) With the locking mechanism released and with a force applied on 
the keeper against the face of the nose, the keeper may not begin to 
open with a force of 11.2 N (2.5 lbf) or less and shall begin to open 
with a maximum force of 17.8 N (4 lbf).
    (L) Body belts and positioning straps shall be capable of 
withstanding a drop test as follows:
    (1) The test mass shall be rigidly constructed of steel or 
equivalent material with a mass of 100 kg (220.5 lbm). For work-
positioning equipment used by employees weighing more than 140 kg (310 
lbm) fully equipped, the test mass shall be increased proportionately 
(that is, the test mass must equal the mass of the equipped worker 
divided by 1.4).
    (2) For body belts, the body belt shall be fitted snugly around the 
test mass and shall be attached to the test-structure anchorage point 
by means of a wire rope.
    (3) For positioning straps, the strap shall be adjusted to its 
shortest length possible to accommodate the test and connected to the 
test-structure anchorage point at one end and to the test mass on the 
other end.
    (4) The test mass shall be dropped an unobstructed distance of 1 
meter (39.4 inches) from a supporting structure that will sustain 
minimal deflection during the test.
    (5) Body belts shall successfully arrest the fall of the test mass 
and shall be capable of supporting the mass after the test.
    (6) Positioning straps shall successfully arrest the fall of the 
test mass without breaking, and the arrest force may not exceed 17.8 
kilonewtons (4,000 pounds-force). Additionally, snaphooks on 
positioning straps may not distort to such an extent that the keeper 
would release.

    Note to paragraph (g)(2)(iii) of this section: When used by 
employees weighing no more than 140 kg (310 lbm) fully equipped, 
body belts and positioning straps that conform to American Society 
of Testing and Materials Standard Specifications for Personal 
Climbing Equipment, ASTM F887-12\e1\, are deemed to be in compliance 
with paragraph (g)(2)(iii) of this section.

    (iv) The following requirements apply to the care and use of 
personal fall protection equipment.
    (A) Work-positioning equipment shall be inspected before use each 
day to determine that the equipment is in safe working condition. Work-
positioning equipment that is not in safe working condition may not be 
used.

    Note to paragraph (g)(2)(iv)(A): Appendix F to this section 
contains guidelines for inspecting work-positioning equipment.

    (B) Personal fall arrest systems shall be used in accordance with 
Sec.  1926.502(d).

    Note to paragraph (g)(2)(iv)(B): Fall protection equipment 
rigged to arrest falls is considered a fall arrest system and must 
meet the applicable requirements for the design and use of those 
systems. Fall protection equipment rigged for work positioning is 
considered work-positioning equipment and must meet the applicable 
requirements for the design and use of that equipment.

    (C) The employer shall ensure that employees use fall protection 
systems as follows:
    (1) Each employee working from an aerial lift shall use a fall 
restraint system or a personal fall arrest system. Paragraph (c)(2)(v) 
of Sec.  1910.67 does not apply.
    (2) Except as provided in paragraph (g)(2)(iv)(C)(3) of this 
section, each employee in elevated locations more than 1.2 meters (4 
feet) above the ground on poles, towers, or similar structures shall 
use a personal fall arrest system, work-positioning equipment, or fall 
restraint system, as appropriate, if the employer has not provided 
other fall protection meeting Subpart D of this part.
    (3) Until March 31, 2015, a qualified employee climbing or changing 
location on poles, towers, or similar structures need not use fall 
protection equipment, unless conditions, such as, but not limited to, 
ice, high winds, the design of the structure (for example, no provision 
for holding on with hands), or the presence of contaminants on the 
structure, could cause the employee to lose his or her grip or footing. 
On and after April 1, 2015, each qualified employee climbing or 
changing location on poles, towers, or similar structures must use fall 
protection equipment unless the employer can demonstrate that climbing 
or changing location with fall protection is infeasible or creates a 
greater hazard than climbing or changing location without it.

    Note 1 to paragraphs (g)(2)(iv)(C)(2) and (g)(2)(iv)(C)(3):
    These paragraphs apply to structures that support overhead 
electric power transmission and distribution lines and equipment. 
They do not apply to portions of buildings, such as loading docks, 
or to electric equipment, such as transformers and capacitors. 
Subpart D of this part contains the duty to provide fall protection 
associated with walking and working surfaces.


    Note 2 to paragraphs (g)(2)(iv)(C)(2) and (g)(2)(iv)(C)(3):
    Until the employer ensures that employees are proficient in 
climbing and the use of fall protection under paragraph (a)(2)(viii) 
of this section, the employees are not considered ``qualified 
employees'' for the purposes of paragraphs (g)(2)(iv)(C)(2) and 
(g)(2)(iv)(C)(3) of this section. These paragraphs require 
unqualified employees (including trainees) to use fall protection 
any time they are more than 1.2 meters (4 feet) above the ground.

    (D) On and after April 1, 2015, work-positioning systems shall be 
rigged so that an employee can free fall no more than 0.6 meters (2 
feet).
    (E) Anchorages for work-positioning equipment shall be capable of 
supporting at least twice the potential impact load of an employee's 
fall, or 13.3 kilonewtons (3,000 pounds-force), whichever is greater.

    Note to paragraph (g)(2)(iv)(E): Wood-pole fall-restriction 
devices meeting American Society of Testing and Materials Standard 
Specifications for Personal Climbing Equipment, ASTM F887-12\e1\, 
are deemed to meet the anchorage-strength requirement when they are 
used in accordance with manufacturers' instructions.

    (F) Unless the snaphook is a locking type and designed specifically 
for the following connections, snaphooks on work-positioning equipment 
may not be engaged:
    (1) Directly to webbing, rope, or wire rope;
    (2) To each other;
    (3) To a D ring to which another snaphook or other connector is 
attached;
    (4) To a horizontal lifeline; or
    (5) To any object that is incompatibly shaped or dimensioned in 
relation to the snaphook such that accidental disengagement could occur 
should the connected object sufficiently depress the snaphook keeper to 
allow release of the object.
    (h) Portable ladders and platforms. (1) General. Requirements for 
portable ladders contained in Subpart D of this part apply in addition 
to the requirements of paragraph (h) of this section, except as 
specifically noted in paragraph (h)(2) of this section.
    (2) Special ladders and platforms. Portable ladders used on 
structures or

[[Page 20641]]

conductors in conjunction with overhead line work need not meet Sec.  
1910.25(d)(2)(i) and (d)(2)(iii) or Sec.  1910.26(c)(3)(iii). Portable 
ladders and platforms used on structures or conductors in conjunction 
with overhead line work shall meet the following requirements:
    (i) In the configurations in which they are used, portable 
platforms shall be capable of supporting without failure at least 2.5 
times the maximum intended load.
    (ii) Portable ladders and platforms may not be loaded in excess of 
the working loads for which they are designed.
    (iii) Portable ladders and platforms shall be secured to prevent 
them from becoming dislodged.
    (iv) Portable ladders and platforms may be used only in 
applications for which they are designed.
    (3) Conductive ladders. Portable metal ladders and other portable 
conductive ladders may not be used near exposed energized lines or 
equipment. However, in specialized high-voltage work, conductive 
ladders shall be used when the employer demonstrates that nonconductive 
ladders would present a greater hazard to employees than conductive 
ladders.
    (i) Hand and portable power equipment. (1) General. Paragraph 
(i)(2) of this section applies to electric equipment connected by cord 
and plug. Paragraph (i)(3) of this section applies to portable and 
vehicle-mounted generators used to supply cord- and plug-connected 
equipment. Paragraph (i)(4) of this section applies to hydraulic and 
pneumatic tools.
    (2) Cord- and plug-connected equipment. Cord- and plug-connected 
equipment not covered by Subpart S of this part shall comply with one 
of the following instead of Sec.  1910.243(a)(5):
    (i) The equipment shall be equipped with a cord containing an 
equipment grounding conductor connected to the equipment frame and to a 
means for grounding the other end of the conductor (however, this 
option may not be used where the introduction of the ground into the 
work environment increases the hazard to an employee); or
    (ii) The equipment shall be of the double-insulated type conforming 
to Subpart S of this part; or
    (iii) The equipment shall be connected to the power supply through 
an isolating transformer with an ungrounded secondary of not more than 
50 volts.
    (3) Portable and vehicle-mounted generators. Portable and vehicle-
mounted generators used to supply cord- and plug-connected equipment 
covered by paragraph (i)(2) of this section shall meet the following 
requirements:
    (i) The generator may only supply equipment located on the 
generator or the vehicle and cord- and plug-connected equipment through 
receptacles mounted on the generator or the vehicle.
    (ii) The non-current-carrying metal parts of equipment and the 
equipment grounding conductor terminals of the receptacles shall be 
bonded to the generator frame.
    (iii) For vehicle-mounted generators, the frame of the generator 
shall be bonded to the vehicle frame.
    (iv) Any neutral conductor shall be bonded to the generator frame.
    (4) Hydraulic and pneumatic tools. (i) Safe operating pressures for 
hydraulic and pneumatic tools, hoses, valves, pipes, filters, and 
fittings may not be exceeded.

    Note to paragraph (i)(4)(i): If any hazardous defects are 
present, no operating pressure is safe, and the hydraulic or 
pneumatic equipment involved may not be used. In the absence of 
defects, the maximum rated operating pressure is the maximum safe 
pressure.

    (ii) A hydraulic or pneumatic tool used where it may contact 
exposed energized parts shall be designed and maintained for such use.
    (iii) The hydraulic system supplying a hydraulic tool used where it 
may contact exposed live parts shall provide protection against loss of 
insulating value, for the voltage involved, due to the formation of a 
partial vacuum in the hydraulic line.

    Note to paragraph (i)(4)(iii): Use of hydraulic lines that do 
not have check valves and that have a separation of more than 10.7 
meters (35 feet) between the oil reservoir and the upper end of the 
hydraulic system promotes the formation of a partial vacuum.

    (iv) A pneumatic tool used on energized electric lines or 
equipment, or used where it may contact exposed live parts, shall 
provide protection against the accumulation of moisture in the air 
supply.
    (v) Pressure shall be released before connections are broken, 
unless quick-acting, self-closing connectors are used.
    (vi) Employers must ensure that employees do not use any part of 
their bodies to locate, or attempt to stop, a hydraulic leak.
    (vii) Hoses may not be kinked.
    (j) Live-line tools. (1) Design of tools. Live-line tool rods, 
tubes, and poles shall be designed and constructed to withstand the 
following minimum tests:
    (i) If the tool is made of fiberglass-reinforced plastic (FRP), it 
shall withstand 328,100 volts per meter (100,000 volts per foot) of 
length for 5 minutes, or

    Note to paragraph (j)(1)(i): Live-line tools using rod and tube 
that meet ASTM F711-02 (2007), Standard Specification for 
Fiberglass-Reinforced Plastic (FRP) Rod and Tube Used in Live Line 
Tools, are deemed to comply with paragraph (j)(1) of this section.

    (ii) If the tool is made of wood, it shall withstand 246,100 volts 
per meter (75,000 volts per foot) of length for 3 minutes, or
    (iii) The tool shall withstand other tests that the employer can 
demonstrate are equivalent.
    (2) Condition of tools. (i) Each live-line tool shall be wiped 
clean and visually inspected for defects before use each day.
    (ii) If any defect or contamination that could adversely affect the 
insulating qualities or mechanical integrity of the live-line tool is 
present after wiping, the tool shall be removed from service and 
examined and tested according to paragraph (j)(2)(iii) of this section 
before being returned to service.
    (iii) Live-line tools used for primary employee protection shall be 
removed from service every 2 years, and whenever required under 
paragraph (j)(2)(ii) of this section, for examination, cleaning, 
repair, and testing as follows:
    (A) Each tool shall be thoroughly examined for defects.
    (B) If a defect or contamination that could adversely affect the 
insulating qualities or mechanical integrity of the live-line tool is 
found, the tool shall be repaired and refinished or shall be 
permanently removed from service. If no such defect or contamination is 
found, the tool shall be cleaned and waxed.
    (C) The tool shall be tested in accordance with paragraphs 
(j)(2)(iii)(D) and (j)(2)(iii)(E) of this section under the following 
conditions:
    (1) After the tool has been repaired or refinished; and
    (2) After the examination if repair or refinishing is not 
performed, unless the tool is made of FRP rod or foam-filled FRP tube 
and the employer can demonstrate that the tool has no defects that 
could cause it to fail during use.
    (D) The test method used shall be designed to verify the tool's 
integrity along its entire working length and, if the tool is made of 
fiberglass-reinforced plastic, its integrity under wet conditions.
    (E) The voltage applied during the tests shall be as follows:
    (1) 246,100 volts per meter (75,000 volts per foot) of length for 1 
minute if the tool is made of fiberglass, or

[[Page 20642]]

    (2) 164,000 volts per meter (50,000 volts per foot) of length for 1 
minute if the tool is made of wood, or
    (3) Other tests that the employer can demonstrate are equivalent.

    Note to paragraph (j)(2): Guidelines for the examination, 
cleaning, repairing, and in-service testing of live-line tools are 
specified in the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers' 
IEEE Guide for Maintenance Methods on Energized Power Lines, IEEE 
Std 516-2009.

    (k) Materials handling and storage. (1) General. Materials handling 
and storage shall comply with applicable material-handling and 
material-storage requirements in this part, including those in Subpart 
N of this part.
    (2) Materials storage near energized lines or equipment. (i) In 
areas to which access is not restricted to qualified persons only, 
materials or equipment may not be stored closer to energized lines or 
exposed energized parts of equipment than the following distances, plus 
a distance that provides for the maximum sag and side swing of all 
conductors and for the height and movement of material-handling 
equipment:
    (A) For lines and equipment energized at 50 kilovolts or less, the 
distance is 3.05 meters (10 feet).
    (B) For lines and equipment energized at more than 50 kilovolts, 
the distance is 3.05 meters (10 feet) plus 0.10 meter (4 inches) for 
every 10 kilovolts over 50 kilovolts.
    (ii) In areas restricted to qualified employees, materials may not 
be stored within the working space about energized lines or equipment.

    Note to paragraph (k)(2)(ii): Paragraphs (u)(1) and (v)(3) of 
this section specify the size of the working space.

    (l) Working on or near exposed energized parts. This paragraph 
applies to work on exposed live parts, or near enough to them to expose 
the employee to any hazard they present.
    (1) General. (i) Only qualified employees may work on or with 
exposed energized lines or parts of equipment.
    (ii) Only qualified employees may work in areas containing 
unguarded, uninsulated energized lines or parts of equipment operating 
at 50 volts or more.
    (iii) Electric lines and equipment shall be considered and treated 
as energized unless they have been deenergized in accordance with 
paragraph (d) or (m) of this section.
    (2) At least two employees. (i) Except as provided in paragraph 
(l)(2)(ii) of this section, at least two employees shall be present 
while any employees perform the following types of work:
    (A) Installation, removal, or repair of lines energized at more 
than 600 volts,
    (B) Installation, removal, or repair of deenergized lines if an 
employee is exposed to contact with other parts energized at more than 
600 volts,
    (C) Installation, removal, or repair of equipment, such as 
transformers, capacitors, and regulators, if an employee is exposed to 
contact with parts energized at more than 600 volts,
    (D) Work involving the use of mechanical equipment, other than 
insulated aerial lifts, near parts energized at more than 600 volts, 
and
    (E) Other work that exposes an employee to electrical hazards 
greater than, or equal to, the electrical hazards posed by operations 
listed specifically in paragraphs (l)(2)(i)(A) through (l)(2)(i)(D) of 
this section.
    (ii) Paragraph (l)(2)(i) of this section does not apply to the 
following operations:
    (A) Routine circuit switching, when the employer can demonstrate 
that conditions at the site allow safe performance of this work,
    (B) Work performed with live-line tools when the position of the 
employee is such that he or she is neither within reach of, nor 
otherwise exposed to contact with, energized parts, and
    (C) Emergency repairs to the extent necessary to safeguard the 
general public.
    (3) Minimum approach distances. (i) The employer shall establish 
minimum approach distances no less than the distances computed by Table 
R-3 for ac systems or Table R-8 for dc systems.
    (ii) No later than April 1, 2015, for voltages over 72.5 kilovolts, 
the employer shall determine the maximum anticipated per-unit transient 
overvoltage, phase-to-ground, through an engineering analysis or assume 
a maximum anticipated per-unit transient overvoltage, phase-to-ground, 
in accordance with Table R-9. When the employer uses portable 
protective gaps to control the maximum transient overvoltage, the value 
of the maximum anticipated per-unit transient overvoltage, phase-to-
ground, must provide for five standard deviations between the 
statistical sparkover voltage of the gap and the statistical withstand 
voltage corresponding to the electrical component of the minimum 
approach distance. The employer shall make any engineering analysis 
conducted to determine maximum anticipated per-unit transient 
overvoltage available upon request to employees and to the Assistant 
Secretary or designee for examination and copying.

    Note to paragraph (l)(3)(ii): See Appendix B to this section for 
information on how to calculate the maximum anticipated per-unit 
transient overvoltage, phase-to-ground, when the employer uses 
portable protective gaps to reduce maximum transient overvoltages.

    (iii) The employer shall ensure that no employee approaches or 
takes any conductive object closer to exposed energized parts than the 
employer's established minimum approach distance, unless:
    (A) The employee is insulated from the energized part (rubber 
insulating gloves or rubber insulating gloves and sleeves worn in 
accordance with paragraph (l)(4) of this section constitutes insulation 
of the employee from the energized part upon which the employee is 
working provided that the employee has control of the part in a manner 
sufficient to prevent exposure to uninsulated portions of the 
employee's body), or
    (B) The energized part is insulated from the employee and from any 
other conductive object at a different potential, or
    (C) The employee is insulated from any other exposed conductive 
object in accordance with the requirements for live-line barehand work 
in paragraph (q)(3) of this section.
    (4) Type of insulation. (i) When an employee uses rubber insulating 
gloves as insulation from energized parts (under paragraph 
(l)(3)(iii)(A) of this section), the employer shall ensure that the 
employee also uses rubber insulating sleeves. However, an employee need 
not use rubber insulating sleeves if:
    (A) Exposed energized parts on which the employee is not working 
are insulated from the employee; and
    (B) When installing insulation for purposes of paragraph 
(l)(4)(i)(A) of this section, the employee installs the insulation from 
a position that does not expose his or her upper arm to contact with 
other energized parts.
    (ii) When an employee uses rubber insulating gloves or rubber 
insulating gloves and sleeves as insulation from energized parts (under 
paragraph (l)(3)(iii)(A) of this section), the employer shall ensure 
that the employee:
    (A) Puts on the rubber insulating gloves and sleeves in a position 
where he or she cannot reach into the minimum approach distance, 
established by the employer under paragraph (l)(3)(i) of this section; 
and
    (B) Does not remove the rubber insulating gloves and sleeves until 
he or she is in a position where he or she cannot reach into the 
minimum approach distance, established by the employer under paragraph 
(l)(3)(i) of this section.

[[Page 20643]]

    (5) Working position. (i) The employer shall ensure that each 
employee, to the extent that other safety-related conditions at the 
worksite permit, works in a position from which a slip or shock will 
not bring the employee's body into contact with exposed, uninsulated 
parts energized at a potential different from the employee's.
    (ii) When an employee performs work near exposed parts energized at 
more than 600 volts, but not more than 72.5 kilovolts, and is not 
wearing rubber insulating gloves, being protected by insulating 
equipment covering the energized parts, performing work using live-line 
tools, or performing live-line barehand work under paragraph (q)(3) of 
this section, the employee shall work from a position where he or she 
cannot reach into the minimum approach distance, established by the 
employer under paragraph (l)(3)(i) of this section.
    (6) Making connections. The employer shall ensure that employees 
make connections as follows:
    (i) In connecting deenergized equipment or lines to an energized 
circuit by means of a conducting wire or device, an employee shall 
first attach the wire to the deenergized part;
    (ii) When disconnecting equipment or lines from an energized 
circuit by means of a conducting wire or device, an employee shall 
remove the source end first; and
    (iii) When lines or equipment are connected to or disconnected from 
energized circuits, an employee shall keep loose conductors away from 
exposed energized parts.
    (7) Conductive articles. When an employee performs work within 
reaching distance of exposed energized parts of equipment, the employer 
shall ensure that the employee removes or renders nonconductive all 
exposed conductive articles, such as keychains or watch chains, rings, 
or wrist watches or bands, unless such articles do not increase the 
hazards associated with contact with the energized parts.
    (8) Protection from flames and electric arcs. (i) The employer 
shall assess the workplace to identify employees exposed to hazards 
from flames or from electric arcs.
    (ii) For each employee exposed to hazards from electric arcs, the 
employer shall make a reasonable estimate of the incident heat energy 
to which the employee would be exposed.

    Note 1 to paragraph (l)(8)(ii): Appendix E to this section 
provides guidance on estimating available heat energy. The 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration will deem employers 
following the guidance in Appendix E to this section to be in 
compliance with paragraph (l)(8)(ii) of this section. An employer 
may choose a method of calculating incident heat energy not included 
in Appendix E to this section if the chosen method reasonably 
predicts the incident energy to which the employee would be exposed.


    Note 2 to paragraph (l)(8)(ii): This paragraph does not require 
the employer to estimate the incident heat energy exposure for every 
job task performed by each employee. The employer may make broad 
estimates that cover multiple system areas provided the employer 
uses reasonable assumptions about the energy-exposure distribution 
throughout the system and provided the estimates represent the 
maximum employee exposure for those areas. For example, the employer 
could estimate the heat energy just outside a substation feeding a 
radial distribution system and use that estimate for all jobs 
performed on that radial system.

    (iii) The employer shall ensure that each employee who is exposed 
to hazards from flames or electric arcs does not wear clothing that 
could melt onto his or her skin or that could ignite and continue to 
burn when exposed to flames or the heat energy estimated under 
paragraph (l)(8)(ii) of this section.

    Note to paragraph (l)(8)(iii) of this section: This paragraph 
prohibits clothing made from acetate, nylon, polyester, rayon and 
polypropylene, either alone or in blends, unless the employer 
demonstrates that the fabric has been treated to withstand the 
conditions that may be encountered by the employee or that the 
employee wears the clothing in such a manner as to eliminate the 
hazard involved.

    (iv) The employer shall ensure that the outer layer of clothing 
worn by an employee, except for clothing not required to be arc rated 
under paragraphs (l)(8)(v)(A) through (l)(8)(v)(E) of this section, is 
flame resistant under any of the following conditions:
    (A) The employee is exposed to contact with energized circuit parts 
operating at more than 600 volts,
    (B) An electric arc could ignite flammable material in the work 
area that, in turn, could ignite the employee's clothing,
    (C) Molten metal or electric arcs from faulted conductors in the 
work area could ignite the employee's clothing, or

    Note to paragraph (l)(8)(iv)(C): This paragraph does not apply 
to conductors that are capable of carrying, without failure, the 
maximum available fault current for the time the circuit protective 
devices take to interrupt the fault.

    (D) The incident heat energy estimated under paragraph (l)(8)(ii) 
of this section exceeds 2.0 cal/cm\2\.
    (v) The employer shall ensure that each employee exposed to hazards 
from electric arcs wears protective clothing and other protective 
equipment with an arc rating greater than or equal to the heat energy 
estimated under paragraph (l)(8)(ii) of this section whenever that 
estimate exceeds 2.0 cal/cm\2\. This protective equipment shall cover 
the employee's entire body, except as follows:
    (A) Arc-rated protection is not necessary for the employee's hands 
when the employee is wearing rubber insulating gloves with protectors 
or, if the estimated incident energy is no more than 14 cal/cm\2\, 
heavy-duty leather work gloves with a weight of at least 407 gm/m\2\ 
(12 oz/yd\2\),
    (B) Arc-rated protection is not necessary for the employee's feet 
when the employee is wearing heavy-duty work shoes or boots,
    (C) Arc-rated protection is not necessary for the employee's head 
when the employee is wearing head protection meeting Sec.  1910.135 if 
the estimated incident energy is less than 9 cal/cm\2\ for exposures 
involving single-phase arcs in open air or 5 cal/cm\2\ for other 
exposures,
    (D) The protection for the employee's head may consist of head 
protection meeting Sec.  1910.135 and a faceshield with a minimum arc 
rating of 8 cal/cm\2\ if the estimated incident-energy exposure is less 
than 13 cal/cm\2\ for exposures involving single-phase arcs in open air 
or 9 cal/cm\2\ for other exposures, and
    (E) For exposures involving single-phase arcs in open air, the arc 
rating for the employee's head and face protection may be 4 cal/cm\2\ 
less than the estimated incident energy.

    Note to paragraph (l)(8): See Appendix E to this section for 
further information on the selection of appropriate protection.

    (vi) Dates. (A) The obligation in paragraph (l)(8)(ii) of this 
section for the employer to make reasonable estimates of incident 
energy commences January 1, 2015.
    (B) The obligation in paragraph (l)(8)(iv)(D) of this section for 
the employer to ensure that the outer layer of clothing worn by an 
employee is flame-resistant when the estimated incident heat energy 
exceeds 2.0 cal/cm\2\ commences April 1, 2015.
    (C) The obligation in paragraph (l)(8)(v) of this section for the 
employer to ensure that each employee exposed to hazards from electric 
arcs wears the required arc-rated protective equipment commences April 
1, 2015.
    (9) Fuse handling. When an employee must install or remove fuses 
with one or both terminals energized at more than 300 volts, or with 
exposed parts energized at more than 50 volts, the

[[Page 20644]]

employer shall ensure that the employee uses tools or gloves rated for 
the voltage. When an employee installs or removes expulsion-type fuses 
with one or both terminals energized at more than 300 volts, the 
employer shall ensure that the employee wears eye protection meeting 
the requirements of Subpart I of this part, uses a tool rated for the 
voltage, and is clear of the exhaust path of the fuse barrel.
    (10) Covered (noninsulated) conductors. The requirements of this 
section that pertain to the hazards of exposed live parts also apply 
when an employee performs work in proximity to covered (noninsulated) 
wires.
    (11) Non-current-carrying metal parts. Non-current-carrying metal 
parts of equipment or devices, such as transformer cases and circuit-
breaker housings, shall be treated as energized at the highest voltage 
to which these parts are exposed, unless the employer inspects the 
installation and determines that these parts are grounded before 
employees begin performing the work.
    (12) Opening and closing circuits under load. (i) The employer 
shall ensure that devices used by employees to open circuits under load 
conditions are designed to interrupt the current involved.
    (ii) The employer shall ensure that devices used by employees to 
close circuits under load conditions are designed to safely carry the 
current involved.

                             Table R-3--AC Live-Line Work Minimum Approach Distance
           [The minimum approach distance (MAD; in meters) shall conform to the following equations.]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
For phase-to-phase system voltages of 50 V to 300 V:\ 1\
MAD = avoid contact
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
For phase-to-phase system voltages of 301 V to 5 kV: \ 1\
MAD = M + D, where
    D = 0.02 m..................  the electrical component of the minimum approach distance.
    M = 0.31 m for voltages up    the inadvertent movement factor.
     to 750 V and 0.61 m
     otherwise.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
For phase-to-phase system
 voltages of 5.1 kV to 72.5 kV:
 \1\ \4\
MAD = M + AD, where
    M = 0.61 m..................  the inadvertent movement factor.
    A = the applicable value      the altitude correction factor.
     from Table R-5.
    D = the value from Table R-4  the electrical component of the minimum approach distance.
     corresponding to the
     voltage and exposure or the
     value of the electrical
     component of the minimum
     approach distance
     calculated using the method
     provided in Appendix B to
     this section.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
For phase-to-phase system voltages of more than 72.5 kV, nominal: \2\ \4\
MAD = 0.3048(C + )VL-GTA + M, where
    C = 0.01 for phase-to-ground exposures that the employer can demonstrate consist only of air across the
     approach distance (gap),.
        0.01 for phase-to-phase exposures if the employer can demonstrate that no insulated tool spans the gap
         and that no large conductive object is in the gap, or.
        0.011 otherwise.........................................................................................
    VL-G = phase-to-ground rms voltage, in kV...................................................................
    T = maximum anticipated per-unit transient overvoltage; for phase-to-ground exposures, T equals TL-G, the
     maximum per-unit transient overvoltage, phase-to-ground, determined by the employer under paragraph
     (l)(3)(ii) of this section; for phase-to-phase exposures, T equals 1.35TL-G + 0.45.
    A = altitude correction factor from Table R-5...............................................................
    M = 0.31 m, the inadvertent movement factor.................................................................
    a = saturation factor, as follows:..........................................................................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                Phase-to-Ground Exposures
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
VPeak = TL-GVL-G[radic]2................     635 kV or less        635.1 to 915 kV      915.1 to 1,050 kV                More than 1,050 kV
a.......................................                  0    (VPeak-635)/140,000    (VPeak-645)/135,000                (VPeak-675)/125,000
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                              Phase-to-Phase Exposures \3\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
VPeak = (1.35TL-G + 0.45)VL-G[radic]2...     630 kV or less        630.1 to 848 kV      848.1 to 1,131 kV    1,131.1 to 1,485 kV     More than 1,485 kV
a.......................................                  0    (VPeak-630)/155,000   (VPeak-633.6)/152,207   (VPeak-628)/153,846   (VPeak-350.5)/203,666
\1\ Employers may use the minimum approach distances in Table R-6. If the worksite is at an elevation of more than 900 meters (3,000 feet), see footnote
  1 to Table R-6.
\2\ Employers may use the minimum approach distances in Table R-7, except that the employer may not use the minimum approach distances in Table R-7 for
  phase-to-phase exposures if an insulated tool spans the gap or if any large conductive object is in the gap. If the worksite is at an elevation of
  more than 900 meters (3,000 feet), see footnote 1 to Table R-7. Employers may use the minimum approach distances in Table 6 through Table 13 in
  Appendix B to this section, which calculated MAD for various values of T, provided the employer follows the notes to those tables.
\3\ Use the equations for phase-to-ground exposures (with VPeak for phase-to-phase exposures) unless the employer can demonstrate that no insulated tool
  spans the gap and that no large conductive object is in the gap.
\4\ Until March 31, 2015, employers may use the minimum approach distances in Table 6 through Table 13 in Appendix B to this section.


[[Page 20645]]


               Table R-4--Electrical Component of the Minimum Approach Distance at 5.1 to 72.5 kV
                                                 [D; In meters]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                         Phase-to-ground exposure      Phase-to-phase exposure
         Nominal voltage (kV) phase-to-phase          ----------------------------------------------------------
                                                                   D (m)                        D (m)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
5.1 to 15.0..........................................                         0.04                          0.07
15.1 to 36.0.........................................                         0.16                          0.28
36.1 to 46.0.........................................                         0.23                          0.37
46.1 to 72.5.........................................                         0.39                          0.59
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                  Table R-5--Altitude Correction Factor
------------------------------------------------------------------------
       Altitude above sea level  (m)                      A
------------------------------------------------------------------------
0 to 900...................................                         1.00
901 to 1,200...............................                         1.02
1,201 to 1,500.............................                         1.05
1,501 to 1,800.............................                         1.08
1,801 to 2,100.............................                         1.11
2,101 to 2,400.............................                         1.14
2,401 to 2,700.............................                         1.17
2,701 to 3,000.............................                         1.20
3,001 to 3,600.............................                         1.25
3,601 to 4,200.............................                         1.30
4,201 to 4,800.............................                         1.35
4,801 to 5,400.............................                         1.39
5,401 to 6,000.............................                         1.44
------------------------------------------------------------------------


             Table R-6--Alternative Minimum Approach Distances for Voltages of 72.5 kV and Less \1\
                                         [In meters or feet and inches]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                             Distance
                                                ----------------------------------------------------------------
      Nominal voltage (kV) phase-to-phase            Phase-to-ground exposure         Phase-to-phase exposure
                                                ----------------------------------------------------------------
                                                        m               ft               m              ft
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
0.50 to 0.300 \2\..............................           Avoid Contact
                                                          Avoid Contact
                                                ----------------------------------------------------------------
0.301 to 0.750 \2\.............................            0.33            1.09             0.33            1.09
0.751 to 5.0...................................            0.63            2.07             0.63            2.07
5.1 to 15.0....................................            0.65            2.14             0.68            2.24
15.1 to 36.0...................................            0.77            2.53             0.89            2.92
36.1 to 46.0...................................            0.84            2.76             0.98            3.22
46.1 to 72.5...................................            1.00            3.29             1.20            3.94
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Employers may use the minimum approach distances in this table provided the worksite is at an elevation of
  900 meters (3,000 feet) or less. If employees will be working at elevations greater than 900 meters (3,000
  feet) above mean sea level, the employer shall determine minimum approach distances by multiplying the
  distances in this table by the correction factor in Table R-5 corresponding to the altitude of the work.
\2\ For single-phase systems, use voltage-to-ground.


         Table R-7--Alternative Minimum Approach Distances for Voltages of More Than 72.5 kV \1\ \2\ \3\
                                         [In meters or feet and inches]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                     Phase-to-ground exposure         Phase-to-phase exposure
       Voltage range phase to phase (kV)        ----------------------------------------------------------------
                                                        m               ft               m              ft
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
72.6 to 121.0..................................            1.13            3.71             1.42            4.66
121.1 to 145.0.................................            1.30            4.27             1.64            5.38
145.1 to 169.0.................................            1.46            4.79             1.94            6.36
169.1 to 242.0.................................            2.01            6.59             3.08           10.10
242.1 to 362.0.................................            3.41           11.19             5.52           18.11
362.1 to 420.0.................................            4.25           13.94             6.81           22.34
420.1 to 550.0.................................            5.07           16.63             8.24           27.03
550.1 to 800.0.................................            6.88           22.57            11.38           37.34
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Employers may use the minimum approach distances in this table provided the worksite is at an elevation of
  900 meters (3,000 feet) or less. If employees will be working at elevations greater than 900 meters (3,000
  feet) above mean sea level, the employer shall determine minimum approach distances by multiplying the
  distances in this table by the correction factor in Table R-5 corresponding to the altitude of the work.
\2\ Employers may use the phase-to-phase minimum approach distances in this table provided that no insulated
  tool spans the gap and no large conductive object is in the gap.

[[Page 20646]]

 
\3\ The clear live-line tool distance shall equal or exceed the values for the indicated voltage ranges.


                  Table R-8--DC Live-Line Minimum Approach Distance with Overvoltage Factor \1\
                                                   [In meters]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                 Distance (m) maximum line-to-ground voltage (kV)
  Maximum anticipated per-unit   -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
      transient overvoltage             250             400             500             600             750
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1.5 or less.....................            1.12            1.60            2.06            2.62            3.61
1.6.............................            1.17            1.69            2.24            2.86            3.98
1.7.............................            1.23            1.82            2.42            3.12            4.37
1.8.............................            1.28            1.95            2.62            3.39            4.79
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The distances specified in this table are for air, bare-hand, and live-line tool conditions. If employees
  will be working at elevations greater than 900 meters (3,000 feet) above mean sea level, the employer shall
  determine minimum approach distances by multiplying the distances in this table by the correction factor in
  Table R-5 corresponding to the altitude of the work.


        Table R-9--Assumed Maximum Per-Unit Transient Overvoltage
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                        Assumed  maximum
                                     Type of current        per-unit
        Voltage range (kV)              (ac or dc)         transient
                                                          overvoltage
------------------------------------------------------------------------
72.6 to 420.0.....................                 ac                3.5
420.1 to 550.0....................                 ac                3.0
550.1 to 800.0....................                 ac                2.5
250 to 750........................                 dc                1.8
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (m) Deenergizing lines and equipment for employee protection. (1) 
Application. Paragraph (m) of this section applies to the deenergizing 
of transmission and distribution lines and equipment for the purpose of 
protecting employees. See paragraph (d) of this section for 
requirements on the control of hazardous energy sources used in the 
generation of electric energy. Conductors and parts of electric 
equipment that have been deenergized under procedures other than those 
required by paragraph (d) or (m) of this section, as applicable, shall 
be treated as energized.
    (2) General. (i) If a system operator is in charge of the lines or 
equipment and their means of disconnection, the employer shall 
designate one employee in the crew to be in charge of the clearance and 
shall comply with all of the requirements of paragraph (m)(3) of this 
section in the order specified.
    (ii) If no system operator is in charge of the lines or equipment 
and their means of disconnection, the employer shall designate one 
employee in the crew to be in charge of the clearance and to perform 
the functions that the system operator would otherwise perform under 
paragraph (m) of this section. All of the requirements of paragraph 
(m)(3) of this section apply, in the order specified, except as 
provided in paragraph (m)(2)(iii) of this section.
    (iii) If only one crew will be working on the lines or equipment 
and if the means of disconnection is accessible and visible to, and 
under the sole control of, the employee in charge of the clearance, 
paragraphs (m)(3)(i), (m)(3)(iii), and (m)(3)(v) of this section do not 
apply. Additionally, the employer does not need to use the tags 
required by the remaining provisions of paragraph (m)(3) of this 
section.
    (iv) If two or more crews will be working on the same lines or 
equipment, then:
    (A) The crews shall coordinate their activities under paragraph (m) 
of this section with a single employee in charge of the clearance for 
all of the crews and follow the requirements of paragraph (m) of this 
section as if all of the employees formed a single crew, or
    (B) Each crew shall independently comply with paragraph (m) of this 
section and, if there is no system operator in charge of the lines or 
equipment, shall have separate tags and coordinate deenergizing and 
reenergizing the lines and equipment with the other crews.
    (v) The employer shall render any disconnecting means that are 
accessible to individuals outside the employer's control (for example, 
the general public) inoperable while the disconnecting means are open 
for the purpose of protecting employees.
    (3) Deenergizing lines and equipment. (i) The employee that the 
employer designates pursuant to paragraph (m)(2) of this section as 
being in charge of the clearance shall make a request of the system 
operator to deenergize the particular section of line or equipment. The 
designated employee becomes the employee in charge (as this term is 
used in paragraph (m)(3) of this section) and is responsible for the 
clearance.
    (ii) The employer shall ensure that all switches, disconnectors, 
jumpers, taps, and other means through which known sources of electric 
energy may be supplied to the particular lines and equipment to be 
deenergized are open. The employer shall render such means inoperable, 
unless its design does not so permit, and then ensure that such means 
are tagged to indicate that employees are at work.
    (iii) The employer shall ensure that automatically and remotely 
controlled switches that could cause the opened disconnecting means to 
close are also tagged at the points of control. The employer shall 
render the automatic or remote control feature inoperable, unless its 
design does not so permit.
    (iv) The employer need not use the tags mentioned in paragraphs 
(m)(3)(ii) and (m)(3)(iii) of this section on a network protector for 
work on the primary feeder for the network protector's associated 
network transformer when the employer can demonstrate all of the 
following conditions:
    (A) Every network protector is maintained so that it will 
immediately trip open if closed when a primary conductor is 
deenergized;

[[Page 20647]]

    (B) Employees cannot manually place any network protector in a 
closed position without the use of tools, and any manual override 
position is blocked, locked, or otherwise disabled; and
    (C) The employer has procedures for manually overriding any network 
protector that incorporate provisions for determining, before anyone 
places a network protector in a closed position, that: The line 
connected to the network protector is not deenergized for the 
protection of any employee working on the line; and (if the line 
connected to the network protector is not deenergized for the 
protection of any employee working on the line) the primary conductors 
for the network protector are energized.
    (v) Tags shall prohibit operation of the disconnecting means and 
shall indicate that employees are at work.
    (vi) After the applicable requirements in paragraphs (m)(3)(i) 
through (m)(3)(v) of this section have been followed and the system 
operator gives a clearance to the employee in charge, the employer 
shall ensure that the lines and equipment are deenergized by testing 
the lines and equipment to be worked with a device designed to detect 
voltage.
    (vii) The employer shall ensure the installation of protective 
grounds as required by paragraph (n) of this section.
    (viii) After the applicable requirements of paragraphs (m)(3)(i) 
through (m)(3)(vii) of this section have been followed, the lines and 
equipment involved may be considered deenergized.
    (ix) To transfer the clearance, the employee in charge (or the 
employee's supervisor if the employee in charge must leave the worksite 
due to illness or other emergency) shall inform the system operator and 
employees in the crew; and the new employee in charge shall be 
responsible for the clearance.
    (x) To release a clearance, the employee in charge shall:
    (A) Notify each employee under that clearance of the pending 
release of the clearance;
    (B) Ensure that all employees under that clearance are clear of the 
lines and equipment;
    (C) Ensure that all protective grounds protecting employees under 
that clearance have been removed; and
    (D) Report this information to the system operator and then release 
the clearance.
    (xi) Only the employee in charge who requested the clearance may 
release the clearance, unless the employer transfers responsibility 
under paragraph (m)(3)(ix) of this section.
    (xii) No one may remove tags without the release of the associated 
clearance as specified under paragraphs (m)(3)(x) and (m)(3)(xi) of 
this section.
    (xiii) The employer shall ensure that no one initiates action to 
reenergize the lines or equipment at a point of disconnection until all 
protective grounds have been removed, all crews working on the lines or 
equipment release their clearances, all employees are clear of the 
lines and equipment, and all protective tags are removed from that 
point of disconnection.
    (n) Grounding for the protection of employees. (1) Application. 
Paragraph (n) of this section applies to grounding of generation, 
transmission, and distribution lines and equipment for the purpose of 
protecting employees. Paragraph (n)(4) of this section also applies to 
protective grounding of other equipment as required elsewhere in this 
section.

    Note to paragraph (n)(1): This paragraph covers grounding of 
generation, transmission, and distribution lines and equipment when 
this section requires protective grounding and whenever the employer 
chooses to ground such lines and equipment for the protection of 
employees.

    (2) General. For any employee to work transmission and distribution 
lines or equipment as deenergized, the employer shall ensure that the 
lines or equipment are deenergized under the provisions of paragraph 
(m) of this section and shall ensure proper grounding of the lines or 
equipment as specified in paragraphs (n)(3) through (n)(8) of this 
section. However, if the employer can demonstrate that installation of 
a ground is impracticable or that the conditions resulting from the 
installation of a ground would present greater hazards to employees 
than working without grounds, the lines and equipment may be treated as 
deenergized provided that the employer establishes that all of the 
following conditions apply:
    (i) The employer ensures that the lines and equipment are 
deenergized under the provisions of paragraph (m) of this section.
    (ii) There is no possibility of contact with another energized 
source.
    (iii) The hazard of induced voltage is not present.
    (3) Equipotential zone. Temporary protective grounds shall be 
placed at such locations and arranged in such a manner that the 
employer can demonstrate will prevent each employee from being exposed 
to hazardous differences in electric potential.

    Note to paragraph (n)(3): Appendix C to this section contains 
guidelines for establishing the equipotential zone required by this 
paragraph. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration will 
deem grounding practices meeting these guidelines as complying with 
paragraph (n)(3) of this section.

    (4) Protective grounding equipment. (i) Protective grounding 
equipment shall be capable of conducting the maximum fault current that 
could flow at the point of grounding for the time necessary to clear 
the fault.
    (ii) Protective grounding equipment shall have an ampacity greater 
than or equal to that of No. 2 AWG copper.
    (iii) Protective grounds shall have an impedance low enough so that 
they do not delay the operation of protective devices in case of 
accidental energizing of the lines or equipment.

    Note to paragraph (n)(4): American Society for Testing and 
Materials Standard Specifications for Temporary Protective Grounds 
to Be Used on De-Energized Electric Power Lines and Equipment, ASTM 
F855-09, contains guidelines for protective grounding equipment. The 
Institute of Electrical Engineers Guide for Protective Grounding of 
Power Lines, IEEE Std 1048-2003, contains guidelines for selecting 
and installing protective grounding equipment.

    (5) Testing. The employer shall ensure that, unless a previously 
installed ground is present, employees test lines and equipment and 
verify the absence of nominal voltage before employees install any 
ground on those lines or that equipment.
    (6) Connecting and removing grounds. (i) The employer shall ensure 
that, when an employee attaches a ground to a line or to equipment, the 
employee attaches the ground-end connection first and then attaches the 
other end by means of a live-line tool. For lines or equipment 
operating at 600 volts or less, the employer may permit the employee to 
use insulating equipment other than a live-line tool if the employer 
ensures that the line or equipment is not energized at the time the 
ground is connected or if the employer can demonstrate that each 
employee is protected from hazards that may develop if the line or 
equipment is energized.
    (ii) The employer shall ensure that, when an employee removes a 
ground, the employee removes the grounding device from the line or 
equipment using a live-line tool before he or she removes the ground-
end connection. For lines or equipment operating at 600 volts or less, 
the employer may permit the employee to use insulating equipment other 
than a live-line tool if the employer ensures that the line or 
equipment is not energized at the time the ground is disconnected or if 
the employer can

[[Page 20648]]

demonstrate that each employee is protected from hazards that may 
develop if the line or equipment is energized.
    (7) Additional precautions. The employer shall ensure that, when an 
employee performs work on a cable at a location remote from the cable 
terminal, the cable is not grounded at the cable terminal if there is a 
possibility of hazardous transfer of potential should a fault occur.
    (8) Removal of grounds for test. The employer may permit employees 
to remove grounds temporarily during tests. During the test procedure, 
the employer shall ensure that each employee uses insulating equipment, 
shall isolate each employee from any hazards involved, and shall 
implement any additional measures necessary to protect each exposed 
employee in case the previously grounded lines and equipment become 
energized.
    (o) Testing and test facilities. (1) Application. Paragraph (o) of 
this section provides for safe work practices for high-voltage and 
high-power testing performed in laboratories, shops, and substations, 
and in the field and on electric transmission and distribution lines 
and equipment. It applies only to testing involving interim 
measurements using high voltage, high power, or combinations of high 
voltage and high power, and not to testing involving continuous 
measurements as in routine metering, relaying, and normal line work.

    Note to paragraph (o)(1): OSHA considers routine inspection and 
maintenance measurements made by qualified employees to be routine 
line work not included in the scope of paragraph (o) of this 
section, provided that the hazards related to the use of intrinsic 
high-voltage or high-power sources require only the normal 
precautions associated with routine work specified in the other 
paragraphs of this section. Two typical examples of such excluded 
test work procedures are ``phasing-out'' testing and testing for a 
``no-voltage'' condition.

    (2) General requirements. (i) The employer shall establish and 
enforce work practices for the protection of each worker from the 
hazards of high-voltage or high-power testing at all test areas, 
temporary and permanent. Such work practices shall include, as a 
minimum, test area safeguarding, grounding, the safe use of measuring 
and control circuits, and a means providing for periodic safety checks 
of field test areas.
    (ii) The employer shall ensure that each employee, upon initial 
assignment to the test area, receives training in safe work practices, 
with retraining provided as required by paragraph (a)(2) of this 
section.
    (3) Safeguarding of test areas. (i) The employer shall provide 
safeguarding within test areas to control access to test equipment or 
to apparatus under test that could become energized as part of the 
testing by either direct or inductive coupling and to prevent 
accidental employee contact with energized parts.
    (ii) The employer shall guard permanent test areas with walls, 
fences, or other barriers designed to keep employees out of the test 
areas.
    (iii) In field testing, or at a temporary test site not guarded by 
permanent fences and gates, the employer shall ensure the use of one of 
the following means to prevent employees without authorization from 
entering:
    (A) Distinctively colored safety tape supported approximately waist 
high with safety signs attached to it,
    (B) A barrier or barricade that limits access to the test area to a 
degree equivalent, physically and visually, to the barricade specified 
in paragraph (o)(3)(iii)(A) of this section, or
    (C) One or more test observers stationed so that they can monitor 
the entire area.
    (iv) The employer shall ensure the removal of the safeguards 
required by paragraph (o)(3)(iii) of this section when employees no 
longer need the protection afforded by the safeguards.
    (4) Grounding practices. (i) The employer shall establish and 
implement safe grounding practices for the test facility.
    (A) The employer shall maintain at ground potential all conductive 
parts accessible to the test operator while the equipment is operating 
at high voltage.
    (B) Wherever ungrounded terminals of test equipment or apparatus 
under test may be present, they shall be treated as energized until 
tests demonstrate that they are deenergized.
    (ii) The employer shall ensure either that visible grounds are 
applied automatically, or that employees using properly insulated tools 
manually apply visible grounds, to the high-voltage circuits after they 
are deenergized and before any employee performs work on the circuit or 
on the item or apparatus under test. Common ground connections shall be 
solidly connected to the test equipment and the apparatus under test.
    (iii) In high-power testing, the employer shall provide an isolated 
ground-return conductor system designed to prevent the intentional 
passage of current, with its attendant voltage rise, from occurring in 
the ground grid or in the earth. However, the employer need not provide 
an isolated ground-return conductor if the employer can demonstrate 
that both of the following conditions exist:
    (A) The employer cannot provide an isolated ground-return conductor 
due to the distance of the test site from the electric energy source, 
and
    (B) The employer protects employees from any hazardous step and 
touch potentials that may develop during the test.

    Note to paragraph (o)(4)(iii)(B): See Appendix C to this section 
for information on measures that employers can take to protect 
employees from hazardous step and touch potentials.

    (iv) For tests in which using the equipment grounding conductor in 
the equipment power cord to ground the test equipment would result in 
greater hazards to test personnel or prevent the taking of satisfactory 
measurements, the employer may use a ground clearly indicated in the 
test set-up if the employer can demonstrate that this ground affords 
protection for employees equivalent to the protection afforded by an 
equipment grounding conductor in the power supply cord.
    (v) The employer shall ensure that, when any employee enters the 
test area after equipment is deenergized, a ground is placed on the 
high-voltage terminal and any other exposed terminals.
    (A) Before any employee applies a direct ground, the employer shall 
discharge high capacitance equipment through a resistor rated for the 
available energy.
    (B) A direct ground shall be applied to the exposed terminals after 
the stored energy drops to a level at which it is safe to do so.
    (vi) If the employer uses a test trailer or test vehicle in field 
testing, its chassis shall be grounded. The employer shall protect each 
employee against hazardous touch potentials with respect to the 
vehicle, instrument panels, and other conductive parts accessible to 
employees with bonding, insulation, or isolation.
    (5) Control and measuring circuits. (i) The employer may not run 
control wiring, meter connections, test leads, or cables from a test 
area unless contained in a grounded metallic sheath and terminated in a 
grounded metallic enclosure or unless the employer takes other 
precautions that it can demonstrate will provide employees with 
equivalent safety.
    (ii) The employer shall isolate meters and other instruments with 
accessible terminals or parts from test personnel to protect against 
hazards that could arise should such terminals and parts become 
energized during testing. If the employer

[[Page 20649]]

provides this isolation by locating test equipment in metal 
compartments with viewing windows, the employer shall provide 
interlocks to interrupt the power supply when someone opens the 
compartment cover.
    (iii) The employer shall protect temporary wiring and its 
connections against damage, accidental interruptions, and other 
hazards. To the maximum extent possible, the employer shall keep 
signal, control, ground, and power cables separate from each other.
    (iv) If any employee will be present in the test area during 
testing, a test observer shall be present. The test observer shall be 
capable of implementing the immediate deenergizing of test circuits for 
safety purposes.
    (6) Safety check. (i) Safety practices governing employee work at 
temporary or field test areas shall provide, at the beginning of each 
series of tests, for a routine safety check of such test areas.
    (ii) The test operator in charge shall conduct these routine safety 
checks before each series of tests and shall verify at least the 
following conditions:
    (A) Barriers and safeguards are in workable condition and placed 
properly to isolate hazardous areas;
    (B) System test status signals, if used, are in operable condition;
    (C) Clearly marked test-power disconnects are readily available in 
an emergency;
    (D) Ground connections are clearly identifiable;
    (E) Personal protective equipment is provided and used as required 
by Subpart I of this part and by this section; and
    (F) Proper separation between signal, ground, and power cables.
    (p) Mechanical equipment. (1) General requirements. (i) The 
critical safety components of mechanical elevating and rotating 
equipment shall receive a thorough visual inspection before use on each 
shift.

    Note to paragraph (p)(1)(i): Critical safety components of 
mechanical elevating and rotating equipment are components for which 
failure would result in free fall or free rotation of the boom.

    (ii) No motor vehicle or earthmoving or compacting equipment having 
an obstructed view to the rear may be operated on off-highway jobsites 
where any employee is exposed to the hazards created by the moving 
vehicle, unless:
    (A) The vehicle has a reverse signal alarm audible above the 
surrounding noise level, or
    (B) The vehicle is backed up only when a designated employee 
signals that it is safe to do so.
    (iii) Rubber-tired self-propelled scrapers, rubber-tired front-end 
loaders, rubber-tired dozers, wheel-type agricultural and industrial 
tractors, crawler-type tractors, crawler-type loaders, and motor 
graders, with or without attachments, shall have rollover protective 
structures that meet the requirements of Subpart W of Part 1926 of this 
chapter.
    (iv) The operator of an electric line truck may not leave his or 
her position at the controls while a load is suspended, unless the 
employer can demonstrate that no employee (including the operator) is 
endangered.
    (2) Outriggers. (i) Mobile equipment, if provided with outriggers, 
shall be operated with the outriggers extended and firmly set, except 
as provided in paragraph (p)(2)(iii) of this section.
    (ii) Outriggers may not be extended or retracted outside of the 
clear view of the operator unless all employees are outside the range 
of possible equipment motion.
    (iii) If the work area or the terrain precludes the use of 
outriggers, the equipment may be operated only within its maximum load 
ratings specified by the equipment manufacturer for the particular 
configuration of the equipment without outriggers.
    (3) Applied loads. Mechanical equipment used to lift or move lines 
or other material shall be used within its maximum load rating and 
other design limitations for the conditions under which the mechanical 
equipment is being used.
    (4) Operations near energized lines or equipment. (i) Mechanical 
equipment shall be operated so that the minimum approach distances, 
established by the employer under paragraph (l)(3)(i) of this section, 
are maintained from exposed energized lines and equipment. However, the 
insulated portion of an aerial lift operated by a qualified employee in 
the lift is exempt from this requirement if the applicable minimum 
approach distance is maintained between the uninsulated portions of the 
aerial lift and exposed objects having a different electrical 
potential.
    (ii) A designated employee other than the equipment operator shall 
observe the approach distance to exposed lines and equipment and 
provide timely warnings before the minimum approach distance required 
by paragraph (p)(4)(i) of this section is reached, unless the employer 
can demonstrate that the operator can accurately determine that the 
minimum approach distance is being maintained.
    (iii) If, during operation of the mechanical equipment, that 
equipment could become energized, the operation also shall comply with 
at least one of paragraphs (p)(4)(iii)(A) through (p)(4)(iii)(C) of 
this section.
    (A) The energized lines or equipment exposed to contact shall be 
covered with insulating protective material that will withstand the 
type of contact that could be made during the operation.
    (B) The mechanical equipment shall be insulated for the voltage 
involved. The mechanical equipment shall be positioned so that its 
uninsulated portions cannot approach the energized lines or equipment 
any closer than the minimum approach distances, established by the 
employer under paragraph (l)(3)(i) of this section.
    (C) Each employee shall be protected from hazards that could arise 
from mechanical equipment contact with energized lines or equipment. 
The measures used shall ensure that employees will not be exposed to 
hazardous differences in electric potential. Unless the employer can 
demonstrate that the methods in use protect each employee from the 
hazards that could arise if the mechanical equipment contacts the 
energized line or equipment, the measures used shall include all of the 
following techniques:
    (1) Using the best available ground to minimize the time the lines 
or electric equipment remain energized,
    (2) Bonding mechanical equipment together to minimize potential 
differences,
    (3) Providing ground mats to extend areas of equipotential, and
    (4) Employing insulating protective equipment or barricades to 
guard against any remaining hazardous electrical potential differences.

    Note to paragraph (p)(4)(iii)(C): Appendix C to this section 
contains information on hazardous step and touch potentials and on 
methods of protecting employees from hazards resulting from such 
potentials.

    (q) Overhead lines and live-line barehand work. This paragraph 
provides additional requirements for work performed on or near overhead 
lines and equipment and for live-line barehand work.
    (1) General. (i) Before allowing employees to subject elevated 
structures, such as poles or towers, to such stresses as climbing or 
the installation or removal of equipment may impose, the employer shall 
ascertain that the structures are capable of sustaining the additional 
or unbalanced stresses. If the pole or other structure cannot withstand 
the expected loads, the employer shall brace or otherwise support the 
pole or structure so as to prevent failure.

    Note to paragraph (q)(1)(i): Appendix D to this section contains 
test methods that

[[Page 20650]]

employers can use in ascertaining whether a wood pole is capable of 
sustaining the forces imposed by an employee climbing the pole. This 
paragraph also requires the employer to ascertain that the pole can 
sustain all other forces imposed by the work employees will perform.

    (ii) When a pole is set, moved, or removed near an exposed 
energized overhead conductor, the pole may not contact the conductor.
    (iii) When a pole is set, moved, or removed near an exposed 
energized overhead conductor, the employer shall ensure that each 
employee wears electrical protective equipment or uses insulated 
devices when handling the pole and that no employee contacts the pole 
with uninsulated parts of his or her body.
    (iv) To protect employees from falling into holes used for placing 
poles, the employer shall physically guard the holes, or ensure that 
employees attend the holes, whenever anyone is working nearby.
    (2) Installing and removing overhead lines. The following 
provisions apply to the installation and removal of overhead conductors 
or cable (overhead lines).
    (i) When lines that employees are installing or removing can 
contact energized parts, the employer shall use the tension-stringing 
method, barriers, or other equivalent measures to minimize the 
possibility that conductors and cables the employees are installing or 
removing will contact energized power lines or equipment.
    (ii) For conductors, cables, and pulling and tensioning equipment, 
the employer shall provide the protective measures required by 
paragraph (p)(4)(iii) of this section when employees are installing or 
removing a conductor or cable close enough to energized conductors that 
any of the following failures could energize the pulling or tensioning 
equipment or the conductor or cable being installed or removed:
    (A) Failure of the pulling or tensioning equipment,
    (B) Failure of the conductor or cable being pulled, or
    (C) Failure of the previously installed lines or equipment.
    (iii) If the conductors that employees are installing or removing 
cross over energized conductors in excess of 600 volts and if the 
design of the circuit-interrupting devices protecting the lines so 
permits, the employer shall render inoperable the automatic-reclosing 
feature of these devices.
    (iv) Before employees install lines parallel to existing energized 
lines, the employer shall make a determination of the approximate 
voltage to be induced in the new lines, or work shall proceed on the 
assumption that the induced voltage is hazardous. Unless the employer 
can demonstrate that the lines that employees are installing are not 
subject to the induction of a hazardous voltage or unless the lines are 
treated as energized, temporary protective grounds shall be placed at 
such locations and arranged in such a manner that the employer can 
demonstrate will prevent exposure of each employee to hazardous 
differences in electric potential.

    Note 1 to paragraph (q)(2)(iv): If the employer takes no 
precautions to protect employees from hazards associated with 
involuntary reactions from electric shock, a hazard exists if the 
induced voltage is sufficient to pass a current of 1 milliampere 
through a 500-ohm resistor. If the employer protects employees from 
injury due to involuntary reactions from electric shock, a hazard 
exists if the resultant current would be more than 6 milliamperes.


    Note 2 to paragraph (q)(2)(iv): Appendix C to this section 
contains guidelines for protecting employees from hazardous 
differences in electric potential as required by this paragraph.

    (v) Reel-handling equipment, including pulling and tensioning 
devices, shall be in safe operating condition and shall be leveled and 
aligned.
    (vi) The employer shall ensure that employees do not exceed load 
ratings of stringing lines, pulling lines, conductor grips, load-
bearing hardware and accessories, rigging, and hoists.
    (vii) The employer shall repair or replace defective pulling lines 
and accessories.
    (viii) The employer shall ensure that employees do not use 
conductor grips on wire rope unless the manufacturer specifically 
designed the grip for this application.
    (ix) The employer shall ensure that employees maintain reliable 
communications, through two-way radios or other equivalent means, 
between the reel tender and the pulling-rig operator.
    (x) Employees may operate the pulling rig only when it is safe to 
do so.

    Note to paragraph (q)(2)(x): Examples of unsafe conditions 
include: employees in locations prohibited by paragraph (q)(2)(xi) 
of this section, conductor and pulling line hang-ups, and slipping 
of the conductor grip.

    (xi) While a power-driven device is pulling the conductor or 
pulling line and the conductor or pulling line is in motion, the 
employer shall ensure that employees are not directly under overhead 
operations or on the crossarm, except as necessary for the employees to 
guide the stringing sock or board over or through the stringing sheave.
    (3) Live-line barehand work. In addition to other applicable 
provisions contained in this section, the following requirements apply 
to live-line barehand work:
    (i) Before an employee uses or supervises the use of the live-line 
barehand technique on energized circuits, the employer shall ensure 
that the employee completes training conforming to paragraph (a)(2) of 
this section in the technique and in the safety requirements of 
paragraph (q)(3) of this section.
    (ii) Before any employee uses the live-line barehand technique on 
energized high-voltage conductors or parts, the employer shall 
ascertain the following information in addition to information about 
other existing conditions required by paragraph (a)(4) of this section:
    (A) The nominal voltage rating of the circuit on which employees 
will perform the work,
    (B) The clearances to ground of lines and other energized parts on 
which employees will perform the work, and
    (C) The voltage limitations of equipment employees will use.
    (iii) The employer shall ensure that the insulated equipment, 
insulated tools, and aerial devices and platforms used by employees are 
designed, tested, and made for live-line barehand work.
    (iv) The employer shall ensure that employees keep tools and 
equipment clean and dry while they are in use.
    (v) The employer shall render inoperable the automatic-reclosing 
feature of circuit-interrupting devices protecting the lines if the 
design of the devices permits.
    (vi) The employer shall ensure that employees do not perform work 
when adverse weather conditions would make the work hazardous even 
after the employer implements the work practices required by this 
section. Additionally, employees may not perform work when winds reduce 
the phase-to-phase or phase-to-ground clearances at the work location 
below the minimum approach distances specified in paragraph (q)(3)(xiv) 
of this section, unless insulating guards cover the grounded objects 
and other lines and equipment.

    Note to paragraph (q)(3)(vi): Thunderstorms in the vicinity, 
high winds, snow storms, and ice storms are examples of adverse 
weather conditions that make live-line barehand work too hazardous 
to perform safely even after the employer implements the work 
practices required by this section.

    (vii) The employer shall provide and ensure that employees use a 
conductive bucket liner or other conductive device for bonding the 
insulated aerial device to the energized line or equipment.

[[Page 20651]]

    (A) The employee shall be connected to the bucket liner or other 
conductive device by the use of conductive shoes, leg clips, or other 
means.
    (B) Where differences in potentials at the worksite pose a hazard 
to employees, the employer shall provide electrostatic shielding 
designed for the voltage being worked.
    (viii) The employer shall ensure that, before the employee contacts 
the energized part, the employee bonds the conductive bucket liner or 
other conductive device to the energized conductor by means of a 
positive connection. This connection shall remain attached to the 
energized conductor until the employee completes the work on the 
energized circuit.
    (ix) Aerial lifts used for live-line barehand work shall have dual 
controls (lower and upper) as follows:
    (A) The upper controls shall be within easy reach of the employee 
in the bucket. On a two-bucket-type lift, access to the controls shall 
be within easy reach of both buckets.
    (B) The lower set of controls shall be near the base of the boom 
and shall be designed so that they can override operation of the 
equipment at any time.
    (x) Lower (ground-level) lift controls may not be operated with an 
employee in the lift except in case of emergency.
    (xi) The employer shall ensure that, before employees elevate an 
aerial lift into the work position, the employees check all controls 
(ground level and bucket) to determine that they are in proper working 
condition.
    (xii) The employer shall ensure that, before employees elevate the 
boom of an aerial lift, the employees ground the body of the truck or 
barricade the body of the truck and treat it as energized.
    (xiii) The employer shall ensure that employees perform a boom-
current test before starting work each day, each time during the day 
when they encounter a higher voltage, and when changed conditions 
indicate a need for an additional test.
    (A) This test shall consist of placing the bucket in contact with 
an energized source equal to the voltage to be encountered for a 
minimum of 3 minutes.
    (B) The leakage current may not exceed 1 microampere per kilovolt 
of nominal phase-to-ground voltage.
    (C) The employer shall immediately suspend work from the aerial 
lift when there is any indication of a malfunction in the equipment.
    (xiv) The employer shall ensure that employees maintain the minimum 
approach distances, established by the employer under paragraph 
(l)(3)(i) of this section, from all grounded objects and from lines and 
equipment at a potential different from that to which the live-line 
barehand equipment is bonded, unless insulating guards cover such 
grounded objects and other lines and equipment.
    (xv) The employer shall ensure that, while an employee is 
approaching, leaving, or bonding to an energized circuit, the employee 
maintains the minimum approach distances, established by the employer 
under paragraph (l)(3)(i) of this section, between the employee and any 
grounded parts, including the lower boom and portions of the truck and 
between the employee and conductive objects energized at different 
potentials.
    (xvi) While the bucket is alongside an energized bushing or 
insulator string, the employer shall ensure that employees maintain the 
phase-to-ground minimum approach distances, established by the employer 
under paragraph (l)(3)(i) of this section, between all parts of the 
bucket and the grounded end of the bushing or insulator string or any 
other grounded surface.
    (xvii) The employer shall ensure that employees do not use 
handlines between the bucket and the boom or between the bucket and the 
ground. However, employees may use nonconductive-type handlines from 
conductor to ground if not supported from the bucket. The employer 
shall ensure that no one uses ropes used for live-line barehand work 
for other purposes.
    (xviii) The employer shall ensure that employees do not pass 
uninsulated equipment or material between a pole or structure and an 
aerial lift while an employee working from the bucket is bonded to an 
energized part.
    (xix) A nonconductive measuring device shall be readily accessible 
to employees performing live-line barehand work to assist them in 
maintaining the required minimum approach distance.
    (4) Towers and structures. The following requirements apply to work 
performed on towers or other structures that support overhead lines.
    (i) The employer shall ensure that no employee is under a tower or 
structure while work is in progress, except when the employer can 
demonstrate that such a working position is necessary to assist 
employees working above.
    (ii) The employer shall ensure that employees use tag lines or 
other similar devices to maintain control of tower sections being 
raised or positioned, unless the employer can demonstrate that the use 
of such devices would create a greater hazard to employees.
    (iii) The employer shall ensure that employees do not detach the 
loadline from a member or section until they safely secure the load.
    (iv) The employer shall ensure that, except during emergency 
restoration procedures, employees discontinue work when adverse weather 
conditions would make the work hazardous in spite of the work practices 
required by this section.

    Note to paragraph (q)(4)(iv): Thunderstorms in the vicinity, 
high winds, snow storms, and ice storms are examples of adverse 
weather conditions that make this work too hazardous to perform even 
after the employer implements the work practices required by this 
section.

    (r) Line-clearance tree trimming operations. This paragraph 
provides additional requirements for line-clearance tree-trimming 
operations and for equipment used in these operations.
    (1) Electrical hazards. This paragraph does not apply to qualified 
employees.
    (i) Before an employee climbs, enters, or works around any tree, a 
determination shall be made of the nominal voltage of electric power 
lines posing a hazard to employees. However, a determination of the 
maximum nominal voltage to which an employee will be exposed may be 
made instead, if all lines are considered as energized at this maximum 
voltage.
    (ii) There shall be a second line-clearance tree trimmer within 
normal (that is, unassisted) voice communication under any of the 
following conditions:
    (A) If a line-clearance tree trimmer is to approach more closely 
than 3.05 meters (10 feet) to any conductor or electric apparatus 
energized at more than 750 volts or
    (B) If branches or limbs being removed are closer to lines 
energized at more than 750 volts than the distances listed in Table R-
5, Table R-6, Table R-7, and Table R-8 or
    (C) If roping is necessary to remove branches or limbs from such 
conductors or apparatus.
    (iii) Line-clearance tree trimmers shall maintain the minimum 
approach distances from energized conductors given in Table R-5, Table 
R-6, Table R-7, and Table R-8.
    (iv) Branches that are contacting exposed energized conductors or 
equipment or that are within the distances specified in Table R-5, 
Table R-6, Table R-7, and Table R-8 may be removed only through the use 
of insulating equipment.

    Note to paragraph (r)(1)(iv): A tool constructed of a material 
that the employer can demonstrate has insulating qualities

[[Page 20652]]

meeting paragraph (j)(1) of this section is considered as insulated 
under paragraph (r)(1)(iv) of this section if the tool is clean and 
dry.

    (v) Ladders, platforms, and aerial devices may not be brought 
closer to an energized part than the distances listed in Table R-5, 
Table R-6, Table R-7, and Table R-8.
    (vi) Line-clearance tree-trimming work may not be performed when 
adverse weather conditions make the work hazardous in spite of the work 
practices required by this section. Each employee performing line-
clearance tree trimming work in the aftermath of a storm or under 
similar emergency conditions shall be trained in the special hazards 
related to this type of work.

    Note to paragraph (r)(1)(vi): Thunderstorms in the immediate 
vicinity, high winds, snow storms, and ice storms are examples of 
adverse weather conditions that are presumed to make line-clearance 
tree trimming work too hazardous to perform safely.

    (2) Brush chippers. (i) Brush chippers shall be equipped with a 
locking device in the ignition system.
    (ii) Access panels for maintenance and adjustment of the chipper 
blades and associated drive train shall be in place and secure during 
operation of the equipment.
    (iii) Brush chippers not equipped with a mechanical infeed system 
shall be equipped with an infeed hopper of length sufficient to prevent 
employees from contacting the blades or knives of the machine during 
operation.
    (iv) Trailer chippers detached from trucks shall be chocked or 
otherwise secured.
    (v) Each employee in the immediate area of an operating chipper 
feed table shall wear personal protective equipment as required by 
Subpart I of this part.
    (3) Sprayers and related equipment. (i) Walking and working 
surfaces of sprayers and related equipment shall be covered with slip-
resistant material. If slipping hazards cannot be eliminated, slip-
resistant footwear or handrails and stair rails meeting the 
requirements of Subpart D of this part may be used instead of slip-
resistant material.
    (ii) Equipment on which employees stand to spray while the vehicle 
is in motion shall be equipped with guardrails around the working area. 
The guardrail shall be constructed in accordance with Subpart D of this 
part.
    (4) Stump cutters. (i) Stump cutters shall be equipped with 
enclosures or guards to protect employees.
    (ii) Each employee in the immediate area of stump grinding 
operations (including the stump cutter operator) shall wear personal 
protective equipment as required by Subpart I of this part.
    (5) Gasoline-engine power saws. Gasoline-engine power saw 
operations shall meet the requirements of Sec.  1910.266(e) and the 
following:
    (i) Each power saw weighing more than 6.8 kilograms (15 pounds, 
service weight) that is used in trees shall be supported by a separate 
line, except when work is performed from an aerial lift and except 
during topping or removing operations where no supporting limb will be 
available.
    (ii) Each power saw shall be equipped with a control that will 
return the saw to idling speed when released.
    (iii) Each power saw shall be equipped with a clutch and shall be 
so adjusted that the clutch will not engage the chain drive at idling 
speed.
    (iv) A power saw shall be started on the ground or where it is 
otherwise firmly supported. Drop starting of saws over 6.8 kilograms 
(15 pounds), other than chain saws, is permitted outside of the bucket 
of an aerial lift only if the area below the lift is clear of 
personnel.

    Note to paragraph (r)(5)(iv): Paragraph (e)(2)(vi) of Sec.  
1910.266 prohibits drop starting of chain saws.

    (v) A power saw engine may be started and operated only when all 
employees other than the operator are clear of the saw.
    (vi) A power saw may not be running when the saw is being carried 
up into a tree by an employee.
    (vii) Power saw engines shall be stopped for all cleaning, 
refueling, adjustments, and repairs to the saw or motor, except as the 
manufacturer's servicing procedures require otherwise.
    (6) Backpack power units for use in pruning and clearing. (i) While 
a backpack power unit is running, no one other than the operator may be 
within 3.05 meters (10 feet) of the cutting head of a brush saw.
    (ii) A backpack power unit shall be equipped with a quick shutoff 
switch readily accessible to the operator.
    (iii) Backpack power unit engines shall be stopped for all 
cleaning, refueling, adjustments, and repairs to the saw or motor, 
except as the manufacturer's servicing procedures require otherwise.
    (7) Rope. (i) Climbing ropes shall be used by employees working 
aloft in trees. These ropes shall have a minimum diameter of 12 
millimeters (0.5 inch) with a minimum breaking strength of 10.2 
kilonewtons (2,300 pounds). Synthetic rope shall have elasticity of not 
more than 7 percent.
    (ii) Rope shall be inspected before each use and, if unsafe (for 
example, because of damage or defect), may not be used.
    (iii) Rope shall be stored away from cutting edges and sharp tools. 
Rope contact with corrosive chemicals, gas, and oil shall be avoided.
    (iv) When stored, rope shall be coiled and piled, or shall be 
suspended, so that air can circulate through the coils.
    (v) Rope ends shall be secured to prevent their unraveling.
    (vi) Climbing rope may not be spliced to effect repair.
    (vii) A rope that is wet, that is contaminated to the extent that 
its insulating capacity is impaired, or that is otherwise not 
considered to be insulated for the voltage involved may not be used 
near exposed energized lines.
    (8) Fall protection. Each employee shall be tied in with a climbing 
rope and safety saddle when the employee is working above the ground in 
a tree, unless he or she is ascending into the tree.
    (s) Communication facilities. (1) Microwave transmission. (i) The 
employer shall ensure that no employee looks into an open waveguide or 
antenna connected to an energized microwave source.
    (ii) If the electromagnetic-radiation level within an accessible 
area associated with microwave communications systems exceeds the 
radiation-protection guide specified by Sec.  1910.97(a)(2), the 
employer shall post the area with warning signs containing the warning 
symbol described in Sec.  1910.97(a)(3). The lower half of the warning 
symbol shall include the following statements, or ones that the 
employer can demonstrate are equivalent: ``Radiation in this area may 
exceed hazard limitations and special precautions are required. Obtain 
specific instruction before entering.''
    (iii) When an employee works in an area where the electromagnetic 
radiation could exceed the radiation-protection guide, the employer 
shall institute measures that ensure that the employee's exposure is 
not greater than that permitted by that guide. Such measures may 
include administrative and engineering controls and personal protective 
equipment.
    (2) Power-line carrier. The employer shall ensure that employees 
perform power-line carrier work, including work on equipment used for 
coupling carrier current to power line conductors, in accordance with 
the requirements of this section pertaining to work on energized lines.

[[Page 20653]]

    (t) Underground electrical installations. This paragraph provides 
additional requirements for work on underground electrical 
installations.
    (1) Access. The employer shall ensure that employees use a ladder 
or other climbing device to enter and exit a manhole or subsurface 
vault exceeding 1.22 meters (4 feet) in depth. No employee may climb 
into or out of a manhole or vault by stepping on cables or hangers.
    (2) Lowering equipment into manholes. (i) Equipment used to lower 
materials and tools into manholes or vaults shall be capable of 
supporting the weight to be lowered and shall be checked for defects 
before use.
    (ii) Before anyone lowers tools or material into the opening for a 
manhole or vault, each employee working in the manhole or vault shall 
be clear of the area directly under the opening.
    (3) Attendants for manholes and vaults. (i) While work is being 
performed in a manhole or vault containing energized electric 
equipment, an employee with first-aid training shall be available on 
the surface in the immediate vicinity of the manhole or vault entrance 
to render emergency assistance.
    (ii) Occasionally, the employee on the surface may briefly enter a 
manhole or vault to provide nonemergency assistance.

    Note 1 to paragraph (t)(3)(ii): Paragraph (e)(7) of this section 
may also require an attendant and does not permit this attendant to 
enter the manhole or vault.


    Note 2 to paragraph (t)(3)(ii): Paragraph (l)(1)(ii) of this 
section requires employees entering manholes or vaults containing 
unguarded, uninsulated energized lines or parts of electric 
equipment operating at 50 volts or more to be qualified.

    (iii) For the purpose of inspection, housekeeping, taking readings, 
or similar work, an employee working alone may enter, for brief periods 
of time, a manhole or vault where energized cables or equipment are in 
service if the employer can demonstrate that the employee will be 
protected from all electrical hazards.
    (iv) The employer shall ensure that employees maintain reliable 
communications, through two-way radios or other equivalent means, among 
all employees involved in the job.
    (4) Duct rods. The employer shall ensure that, if employees use 
duct rods, the employees install the duct rods in the direction 
presenting the least hazard to employees. The employer shall station an 
employee at the far end of the duct line being rodded to ensure that 
the employees maintain the required minimum approach distances.
    (5) Multiple cables. When multiple cables are present in a work 
area, the employer shall identify the cable to be worked by electrical 
means, unless its identity is obvious by reason of distinctive 
appearance or location or by other readily apparent means of 
identification. The employer shall protect cables other than the one 
being worked from damage.
    (6) Moving cables. Except when paragraph (t)(7)(ii) of this section 
permits employees to perform work that could cause a fault in an 
energized cable in a manhole or vault, the employer shall ensure that 
employees inspect energized cables to be moved for abnormalities.
    (7) Protection against faults. (i) Where a cable in a manhole or 
vault has one or more abnormalities that could lead to a fault or be an 
indication of an impending fault, the employer shall deenergize the 
cable with the abnormality before any employee may work in the manhole 
or vault, except when service-load conditions and a lack of feasible 
alternatives require that the cable remain energized. In that case, 
employees may enter the manhole or vault provided the employer protects 
them from the possible effects of a failure using shields or other 
devices that are capable of containing the adverse effects of a fault. 
The employer shall treat the following abnormalities as indications of 
impending faults unless the employer can demonstrate that the 
conditions could not lead to a fault: Oil or compound leaking from 
cable or joints, broken cable sheaths or joint sleeves, hot localized 
surface temperatures of cables or joints, or joints swollen beyond 
normal tolerance.
    (ii) If the work employees will perform in a manhole or vault could 
cause a fault in a cable, the employer shall deenergize that cable 
before any employee works in the manhole or vault, except when service-
load conditions and a lack of feasible alternatives require that the 
cable remain energized. In that case, employees may enter the manhole 
or vault provided the employer protects them from the possible effects 
of a failure using shields or other devices that are capable of 
containing the adverse effects of a fault.
    (8) Sheath continuity. When employees perform work on buried cable 
or on cable in a manhole or vault, the employer shall maintain 
metallic-sheath continuity, or the cable sheath shall be treated as 
energized.
    (u) Substations. This paragraph provides additional requirements 
for substations and for work performed in them.
    (1) Access and working space. The employer shall provide and 
maintain sufficient access and working space about electric equipment 
to permit ready and safe operation and maintenance of such equipment by 
employees.

    Note to paragraph (u)(1): American National Standard National 
Electrical Safety Code, ANSI/IEEE C2-2012 contains guidelines for 
the dimensions of access and working space about electric equipment 
in substations. Installations meeting the ANSI provisions comply 
with paragraph (u)(1) of this section. The Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration will determine whether an installation that 
does not conform to this ANSI standard complies with paragraph 
(u)(1) of this section based on the following criteria:
    (1) Whether the installation conforms to the edition of ANSI C2 
that was in effect when the installation was made,
    (2) Whether the configuration of the installation enables 
employees to maintain the minimum approach distances, established by 
the employer under paragraph (l)(3)(i) of this section, while the 
employees are working on exposed, energized parts, and
    (3) Whether the precautions taken when employees perform work on 
the installation provide protection equivalent to the protection 
provided by access and working space meeting ANSI/IEEE C2-2012.

    (2) Draw-out-type circuit breakers. The employer shall ensure that, 
when employees remove or insert draw-out-type circuit breakers, the 
breaker is in the open position. The employer shall also render the 
control circuit inoperable if the design of the equipment permits.
    (3) Substation fences. Conductive fences around substations shall 
be grounded. When a substation fence is expanded or a section is 
removed, fence sections shall be isolated, grounded, or bonded as 
necessary to protect employees from hazardous differences in electric 
potential.

    Note to paragraph (u)(3): IEEE Std 80-2000, IEEE Guide for 
Safety in AC Substation Grounding, contains guidelines for 
protection against hazardous differences in electric potential.

    (4) Guarding of rooms and other spaces containing electric supply 
equipment. (i) Rooms and other spaces in which electric supply lines or 
equipment are installed shall meet the requirements of paragraphs 
(u)(4)(ii) through (u)(4)(v) of this section under the following 
conditions:
    (A) If exposed live parts operating at 50 to 150 volts to ground 
are within 2.4 meters (8 feet) of the ground or other working surface 
inside the room or other space,

[[Page 20654]]

    (B) If live parts operating at 151 to 600 volts to ground and 
located within 2.4 meters (8 feet) of the ground or other working 
surface inside the room or other space are guarded only by location, as 
permitted under paragraph (u)(5)(i) of this section, or
    (C) If live parts operating at more than 600 volts to ground are 
within the room or other space, unless:
    (1) The live parts are enclosed within grounded, metal-enclosed 
equipment whose only openings are designed so that foreign objects 
inserted in these openings will be deflected from energized parts, or
    (2) The live parts are installed at a height, above ground and any 
other working surface, that provides protection at the voltage on the 
live parts corresponding to the protection provided by a 2.4-meter (8-
foot) height at 50 volts.
    (ii) Fences, screens, partitions, or walls shall enclose the rooms 
and other spaces so as to minimize the possibility that unqualified 
persons will enter.
    (iii) Unqualified persons may not enter the rooms or other spaces 
while the electric supply lines or equipment are energized.
    (iv) The employer shall display signs at entrances to the rooms and 
other spaces warning unqualified persons to keep out.
    (v) The employer shall keep each entrance to a room or other space 
locked, unless the entrance is under the observation of a person who is 
attending the room or other space for the purpose of preventing 
unqualified employees from entering.
    (5) Guarding of energized parts. (i) The employer shall provide 
guards around all live parts operating at more than 150 volts to ground 
without an insulating covering unless the location of the live parts 
gives sufficient clearance (horizontal, vertical, or both) to minimize 
the possibility of accidental employee contact.

    Note to paragraph (u)(5)(i): American National Standard National 
Electrical Safety Code, ANSI/IEEE C2-2002 contains guidelines for 
the dimensions of clearance distances about electric equipment in 
substations. Installations meeting the ANSI provisions comply with 
paragraph (u)(5)(i) of this section. The Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration will determine whether an installation that 
does not conform to this ANSI standard complies with paragraph 
(u)(5)(i) of this section based on the following criteria:
    (1) Whether the installation conforms to the edition of ANSI C2 
that was in effect when the installation was made,
    (2) Whether each employee is isolated from energized parts at 
the point of closest approach; and
    (3) Whether the precautions taken when employees perform work on 
the installation provide protection equivalent to the protection 
provided by horizontal and vertical clearances meeting ANSI/IEEE C2-
2002.

    (ii) Except for fuse replacement and other necessary access by 
qualified persons, the employer shall maintain guarding of energized 
parts within a compartment during operation and maintenance functions 
to prevent accidental contact with energized parts and to prevent 
dropped tools or other equipment from contacting energized parts.
    (iii) Before guards are removed from energized equipment, the 
employer shall install barriers around the work area to prevent 
employees who are not working on the equipment, but who are in the 
area, from contacting the exposed live parts.
    (6) Substation entry. (i) Upon entering an attended substation, 
each employee, other than employees regularly working in the station, 
shall report his or her presence to the employee in charge of 
substation activities to receive information on special system 
conditions affecting employee safety.
    (ii) The job briefing required by paragraph (c) of this section 
shall cover information on special system conditions affecting employee 
safety, including the location of energized equipment in or adjacent to 
the work area and the limits of any deenergized work area.
    (v) Power generation. This paragraph provides additional 
requirements and related work practices for power generating plants.
    (1) Interlocks and other safety devices. (i) Interlocks and other 
safety devices shall be maintained in a safe, operable condition.
    (ii) No interlock or other safety device may be modified to defeat 
its function, except for test, repair, or adjustment of the device.
    (2) Changing brushes. Before exciter or generator brushes are 
changed while the generator is in service, the exciter or generator 
field shall be checked to determine whether a ground condition exists. 
The brushes may not be changed while the generator is energized if a 
ground condition exists.
    (3) Access and working space. The employer shall provide and 
maintain sufficient access and working space about electric equipment 
to permit ready and safe operation and maintenance of such equipment by 
employees.

    Note to paragraph (v)(3) of this section:  American National 
Standard National Electrical Safety Code, ANSI/IEEE C2-2012 contains 
guidelines for the dimensions of access and working space about 
electric equipment in substations. Installations meeting the ANSI 
provisions comply with paragraph (v)(3) of this section. The 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration will determine whether 
an installation that does not conform to this ANSI standard complies 
with paragraph (v)(3) of this section based on the following 
criteria:
    (1) Whether the installation conforms to the edition of ANSI C2 
that was in effect when the installation was made;
    (2) Whether the configuration of the installation enables 
employees to maintain the minimum approach distances, established by 
the employer under paragraph (l)(3)(i) of this section, while the 
employees are working on exposed, energized parts, and;
    (3) Whether the precautions taken when employees perform work on 
the installation provide protection equivalent to the protection 
provided by access and working space meeting ANSI/IEEE C2-2012.

    (4) Guarding of rooms and other spaces containing electric supply 
equipment. (i) Rooms and other spaces in which electric supply lines or 
equipment are installed shall meet the requirements of paragraphs 
(v)(4)(ii) through (v)(4)(v) of this section under the following 
conditions:
    (A) If exposed live parts operating at 50 to 150 volts to ground 
are within 2.4 meters (8 feet) of the ground or other working surface 
inside the room or other space,
    (B) If live parts operating at 151 to 600 volts to ground and 
located within 2.4 meters (8 feet) of the ground or other working 
surface inside the room or other space are guarded only by location, as 
permitted under paragraph (v)(5)(i) of this section, or
    (C) If live parts operating at more than 600 volts to ground are 
within the room or other space, unless:
    (1) The live parts are enclosed within grounded, metal-enclosed 
equipment whose only openings are designed so that foreign objects 
inserted in these openings will be deflected from energized parts, or
    (2) The live parts are installed at a height, above ground and any 
other working surface, that provides protection at the voltage on the 
live parts corresponding to the protection provided by a 2.4-meter (8-
foot) height at 50 volts.
    (ii) Fences, screens, partitions, or walls shall enclose the rooms 
and other spaces so as to minimize the possibility that unqualified 
persons will enter.
    (iii) Unqualified persons may not enter the rooms or other spaces 
while the electric supply lines or equipment are energized.

[[Page 20655]]

    (iv) The employer shall display signs at entrances to the rooms and 
other spaces warning unqualified persons to keep out.
    (v) The employer shall keep each entrance to a room or other space 
locked, unless the entrance is under the observation of a person who is 
attending the room or other space for the purpose of preventing 
unqualified employees from entering.
    (5) Guarding of energized parts. (i) The employer shall provide 
guards around all live parts operating at more than 150 volts to ground 
without an insulating covering unless the location of the live parts 
gives sufficient clearance (horizontal, vertical, or both) to minimize 
the possibility of accidental employee contact.

    Note to paragraph (v)(5)(i): American National Standard National 
Electrical Safety Code, ANSI/IEEE C2-2002 contains guidelines for 
the dimensions of clearance distances about electric equipment in 
substations. Installations meeting the ANSI provisions comply with 
paragraph (v)(5)(i) of this section. The Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration will determine whether an installation that 
does not conform to this ANSI standard complies with paragraph 
(v)(5)(i) of this section based on the following criteria:
    (1) Whether the installation conforms to the edition of ANSI C2 
that was in effect when the installation was made;
    (2) Whether each employee is isolated from energized parts at 
the point of closest approach; and
    (3) Whether the precautions taken when employees perform work on 
the installation provide protection equivalent to the protection 
provided by horizontal and vertical clearances meeting ANSI/IEEE C2-
2002.

    (ii) Except for fuse replacement and other necessary access by 
qualified persons, the employer shall maintain guarding of energized 
parts within a compartment during operation and maintenance functions 
to prevent accidental contact with energized parts and to prevent 
dropped tools or other equipment from contacting energized parts.
    (iii) Before guards are removed from energized equipment, the 
employer shall install barriers around the work area to prevent 
employees who are not working on the equipment, but who are in the 
area, from contacting the exposed live parts.
    (6) Water or steam spaces. The following requirements apply to work 
in water and steam spaces associated with boilers:
    (i) A designated employee shall inspect conditions before work is 
permitted and after its completion. Eye protection, or full face 
protection if necessary, shall be worn at all times when condenser, 
heater, or boiler tubes are being cleaned.
    (ii) Where it is necessary for employees to work near tube ends 
during cleaning, shielding shall be installed at the tube ends.
    (7) Chemical cleaning of boilers and pressure vessels. The 
following requirements apply to chemical cleaning of boilers and 
pressure vessels:
    (i) Areas where chemical cleaning is in progress shall be cordoned 
off to restrict access during cleaning. If flammable liquids, gases, or 
vapors or combustible materials will be used or might be produced 
during the cleaning process, the following requirements also apply:
    (A) The area shall be posted with signs restricting entry and 
warning of the hazards of fire and explosion; and
    (B) Smoking, welding, and other possible ignition sources are 
prohibited in these restricted areas.
    (ii) The number of personnel in the restricted area shall be 
limited to those necessary to accomplish the task safely.
    (iii) There shall be ready access to water or showers for emergency 
use.

    Note to paragraph (v)(7)(iii): See Sec.  1910.141 for 
requirements that apply to the water supply and to washing 
facilities.

    (iv) Employees in restricted areas shall wear protective equipment 
meeting the requirements of Subpart I of this part and including, but 
not limited to, protective clothing, boots, goggles, and gloves.
    (8) Chlorine systems. (i) Chlorine system enclosures shall be 
posted with signs restricting entry and warning of the hazard to health 
and the hazards of fire and explosion.

    Note to paragraph (v)(8)(i): See Subpart Z of this part for 
requirements necessary to protect the health of employees from the 
effects of chlorine.

    (ii) Only designated employees may enter the restricted area. 
Additionally, the number of personnel shall be limited to those 
necessary to accomplish the task safely.
    (iii) Emergency repair kits shall be available near the shelter or 
enclosure to allow for the prompt repair of leaks in chlorine lines, 
equipment, or containers.
    (iv) Before repair procedures are started, chlorine tanks, pipes, 
and equipment shall be purged with dry air and isolated from other 
sources of chlorine.
    (v) The employer shall ensure that chlorine is not mixed with 
materials that would react with the chlorine in a dangerously 
exothermic or other hazardous manner.
    (9) Boilers. (i) Before internal furnace or ash hopper repair work 
is started, overhead areas shall be inspected for possible falling 
objects. If the hazard of falling objects exists, overhead protection 
such as planking or nets shall be provided.
    (ii) When opening an operating boiler door, employees shall stand 
clear of the opening of the door to avoid the heat blast and gases 
which may escape from the boiler.
    (10) Turbine generators. (i) Smoking and other ignition sources are 
prohibited near hydrogen or hydrogen sealing systems, and signs warning 
of the danger of explosion and fire shall be posted.
    (ii) Excessive hydrogen makeup or abnormal loss of pressure shall 
be considered as an emergency and shall be corrected immediately.
    (iii) A sufficient quantity of inert gas shall be available to 
purge the hydrogen from the largest generator.
    (11) Coal and ash handling. (i) Only designated persons may operate 
railroad equipment.
    (ii) Before a locomotive or locomotive crane is moved, a warning 
shall be given to employees in the area.
    (iii) Employees engaged in switching or dumping cars may not use 
their feet to line up drawheads.
    (iv) Drawheads and knuckles may not be shifted while locomotives or 
cars are in motion.
    (v) When a railroad car is stopped for unloading, the car shall be 
secured from displacement that could endanger employees.
    (vi) An emergency means of stopping dump operations shall be 
provided at railcar dumps.
    (vii) The employer shall ensure that employees who work in coal- or 
ash-handling conveyor areas are trained and knowledgeable in conveyor 
operation and in the requirements of paragraphs (v)(11)(viii) through 
(v)(11)(xii) of this section.
    (viii) Employees may not ride a coal- or ash-handling conveyor belt 
at any time. Employees may not cross over the conveyor belt, except at 
walkways, unless the conveyor's energy source has been deenergized and 
has been locked out or tagged in accordance with paragraph (d) of this 
section.
    (ix) A conveyor that could cause injury when started may not be 
started until personnel in the area are alerted by a signal or by a 
designated person that the conveyor is about to start.
    (x) If a conveyor that could cause injury when started is 
automatically controlled or is controlled from a remote location, an 
audible device shall be provided that sounds an alarm that will be 
recognized by each employee as a warning that the conveyor will start 
and

[[Page 20656]]

that can be clearly heard at all points along the conveyor where 
personnel may be present. The warning device shall be actuated by the 
device starting the conveyor and shall continue for a period of time 
before the conveyor starts that is long enough to allow employees to 
move clear of the conveyor system. A visual warning may be used in 
place of the audible device if the employer can demonstrate that it 
will provide an equally effective warning in the particular 
circumstances involved. However if the employer can demonstrate that 
the system's function would be seriously hindered by the required time 
delay, warning signs may be provided in place of the audible warning 
device. If the system was installed before January 31, 1995, warning 
signs may be provided in place of the audible warning device until such 
time as the conveyor or its control system is rebuilt or rewired. These 
warning signs shall be clear, concise, and legible and shall indicate 
that conveyors and allied equipment may be started at any time, that 
danger exists, and that personnel must keep clear. These warning signs 
shall be provided along the conveyor at areas not guarded by position 
or location.
    (xi) Remotely and automatically controlled conveyors, and conveyors 
that have operating stations which are not manned or which are beyond 
voice and visual contact from drive areas, loading areas, transfer 
points, and other locations on the conveyor path not guarded by 
location, position, or guards shall be furnished with emergency stop 
buttons, pull cords, limit switches, or similar emergency stop devices. 
However, if the employer can demonstrate that the design, function, and 
operation of the conveyor do not expose an employee to hazards, an 
emergency stop device is not required.
    (A) Emergency stop devices shall be easily identifiable in the 
immediate vicinity of such locations.
    (B) An emergency stop device shall act directly on the control of 
the conveyor involved and may not depend on the stopping of any other 
equipment.
    (C) Emergency stop devices shall be installed so that they cannot 
be overridden from other locations.
    (xii) Where coal-handling operations may produce a combustible 
atmosphere from fuel sources or from flammable gases or dust, sources 
of ignition shall be eliminated or safely controlled to prevent 
ignition of the combustible atmosphere.

    Note to paragraph (v)(11)(xii): Locations that are hazardous 
because of the presence of combustible dust are classified as Class 
II hazardous locations. See Sec.  1910.307.

    (xiii) An employee may not work on or beneath overhanging coal in 
coal bunkers, coal silos, or coal storage areas, unless the employee is 
protected from all hazards posed by shifting coal.
    (xiv) An employee entering a bunker or silo to dislodge the 
contents shall wear a body harness with lifeline attached. The lifeline 
shall be secured to a fixed support outside the bunker and shall be 
attended at all times by an employee located outside the bunker or 
facility.
    (12) Hydroplants and equipment. Employees working on or close to 
water gates, valves, intakes, forebays, flumes, or other locations 
where increased or decreased water flow or levels may pose a 
significant hazard shall be warned and shall vacate such dangerous 
areas before water flow changes are made.
    (w) Special conditions. (1) Capacitors. The following additional 
requirements apply to work on capacitors and on lines connected to 
capacitors.

    Note to paragraph (w)(1): See paragraphs (m) and (n) of this 
section for requirements pertaining to the deenergizing and 
grounding of capacitor installations.

    (i) Before employees work on capacitors, the employer shall 
disconnect the capacitors from energized sources and short circuit the 
capacitors. The employer shall ensure that the employee short 
circuiting the capacitors waits at least 5 minutes from the time of 
disconnection before applying the short circuit,
    (ii) Before employees handle the units, the employer shall short 
circuit each unit in series-parallel capacitor banks between all 
terminals and the capacitor case or its rack. If the cases of 
capacitors are on ungrounded substation racks, the employer shall bond 
the racks to ground.
    (iii) The employer shall short circuit any line connected to 
capacitors before the line is treated as deenergized.
    (2) Current transformer secondaries. The employer shall ensure that 
employees do not open the secondary of a current transformer while the 
transformer is energized. If the employer cannot deenergize the primary 
of the current transformer before employees perform work on an 
instrument, a relay, or other section of a current transformer 
secondary circuit, the employer shall bridge the circuit so that the 
current transformer secondary does not experience an open-circuit 
condition.
    (3) Series streetlighting. (i) If the open-circuit voltage exceeds 
600 volts, the employer shall ensure that employees work on series 
streetlighting circuits in accordance with paragraph (q) or (t) of this 
section, as appropriate.
    (ii) Before any employee opens a series loop, the employer shall 
deenergize the streetlighting transformer and isolate it from the 
source of supply or shall bridge the loop to avoid an open-circuit 
condition.
    (4) Illumination. The employer shall provide sufficient 
illumination to enable the employee to perform the work safely.
    (5) Protection against drowning. (i) Whenever an employee may be 
pulled or pushed, or might fall, into water where the danger of 
drowning exists, the employer shall provide the employee with, and 
shall ensure that the employee uses, a U.S. Coast Guard-approved 
personal flotation device.
    (ii) The employer shall maintain each personal flotation device in 
safe condition and shall inspect each personal flotation device 
frequently enough to ensure that it does not have rot, mildew, water 
saturation, or any other condition that could render the device 
unsuitable for use.
    (iii) An employee may cross streams or other bodies of water only 
if a safe means of passage, such as a bridge, is available.
    (6) Employee protection in public work areas. (i) Traffic-control 
signs and traffic-control devices used for the protection of employees 
shall meet Sec.  1926.200(g)(2) of this chapter.
    (ii) Before employees begin work in the vicinity of vehicular or 
pedestrian traffic that may endanger them, the employer shall place 
warning signs or flags and other traffic-control devices in conspicuous 
locations to alert and channel approaching traffic.
    (iii) The employer shall use barricades where additional employee 
protection is necessary.
    (iv) The employer shall protect excavated areas with barricades.
    (v) The employer shall display warning lights prominently at night.
    (7) Backfeed. When there is a possibility of voltage backfeed from 
sources of cogeneration or from the secondary system (for example, 
backfeed from more than one energized phase feeding a common load), the 
requirements of paragraph (l) of this section apply if employees will 
work the lines or equipment as energized, and the requirements of 
paragraphs (m) and (n) of this section apply if employees will work the 
lines or equipment as deenergized.
    (8) Lasers. The employer shall install, adjust, and operate laser 
equipment in accordance with Sec.  1926.54 of this chapter.
    (9) Hydraulic fluids. Hydraulic fluids used for the insulated 
sections of

[[Page 20657]]

equipment shall provide insulation for the voltage involved.
    (x) Definitions.
    Affected employee. An employee whose job requires him or her to 
operate or use a machine or equipment on which servicing or maintenance 
is being performed under lockout or tagout, or whose job requires him 
or her to work in an area in which such servicing or maintenance is 
being performed.
    Attendant. An employee assigned to remain immediately outside the 
entrance to an enclosed or other space to render assistance as needed 
to employees inside the space.
    Authorized employee. An employee who locks out or tags out machines 
or equipment in order to perform servicing or maintenance on that 
machine or equipment. An affected employee becomes an authorized 
employee when that employee's duties include performing servicing or 
maintenance covered under this section.
    Automatic circuit recloser. A self-controlled device for 
automatically interrupting and reclosing an alternating-current 
circuit, with a predetermined sequence of opening and reclosing 
followed by resetting, hold closed, or lockout.
    Barricade. A physical obstruction such as tapes, cones, or A-frame 
type wood or metal structures that provides a warning about, and limits 
access to, a hazardous area.
    Barrier. A physical obstruction that prevents contact with 
energized lines or equipment or prevents unauthorized access to a work 
area.
    Bond. The electrical interconnection of conductive parts designed 
to maintain a common electric potential.
    Bus. A conductor or a group of conductors that serve as a common 
connection for two or more circuits.
    Bushing. An insulating structure that includes a through conductor 
or that provides a passageway for such a conductor, and that, when 
mounted on a barrier, insulates the conductor from the barrier for the 
purpose of conducting current from one side of the barrier to the 
other.
    Cable. A conductor with insulation, or a stranded conductor with or 
without insulation and other coverings (single-conductor cable), or a 
combination of conductors insulated from one another (multiple-
conductor cable).
    Cable sheath. A conductive protective covering applied to cables.

    Note to the definition of ``cable sheath'': A cable sheath may 
consist of multiple layers one or more of which is conductive.

    Circuit. A conductor or system of conductors through which an 
electric current is intended to flow.
    Clearance (between objects). The clear distance between two objects 
measured surface to surface.
    Clearance (for work). Authorization to perform specified work or 
permission to enter a restricted area.
    Communication lines. (See Lines; (1) Communication lines.)
    Conductor. A material, usually in the form of a wire, cable, or bus 
bar, used for carrying an electric current.
    Contract employer. An employer, other than a host employer, that 
performs work covered by this section under contract.
    Covered conductor. A conductor covered with a dielectric having no 
rated insulating strength or having a rated insulating strength less 
than the voltage of the circuit in which the conductor is used.
    Current-carrying part. A conducting part intended to be connected 
in an electric circuit to a source of voltage. Non-current-carrying 
parts are those not intended to be so connected.
    Deenergized. Free from any electrical connection to a source of 
potential difference and from electric charge; not having a potential 
that is different from the potential of the earth.

    Note to the definition of ``deenergized'': The term applies only 
to current-carrying parts, which are sometimes energized (alive).

    Designated employee (designated person). An employee (or person) 
who is assigned by the employer to perform specific duties under the 
terms of this section and who has sufficient knowledge of the 
construction and operation of the equipment, and the hazards involved, 
to perform his or her duties safely.
    Electric line truck. A truck used to transport personnel, tools, 
and material for electric supply line work.
    Electric supply equipment. Equipment that produces, modifies, 
regulates, controls, or safeguards a supply of electric energy.
    Electric supply lines. (See Lines; (2) Electric supply lines.)
    Electric utility. An organization responsible for the installation, 
operation, or maintenance of an electric supply system.
    Enclosed space. A working space, such as a manhole, vault, tunnel, 
or shaft, that has a limited means of egress or entry, that is designed 
for periodic employee entry under normal operating conditions, and 
that, under normal conditions, does not contain a hazardous atmosphere, 
but may contain a hazardous atmosphere under abnormal conditions.

    Note to the definition of ``enclosed space'': The Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration does not consider spaces that are 
enclosed but not designed for employee entry under normal operating 
conditions to be enclosed spaces for the purposes of this section. 
Similarly, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration does 
not consider spaces that are enclosed and that are expected to 
contain a hazardous atmosphere to be enclosed spaces for the 
purposes of this section. Such spaces meet the definition of permit 
spaces in Sec.  1910.146, and entry into them must conform to that 
standard.

    Energized (alive, live). Electrically connected to a source of 
potential difference, or electrically charged so as to have a potential 
significantly different from that of earth in the vicinity.
    Energy isolating device. A physical device that prevents the 
transmission or release of energy, including, but not limited to, the 
following: a manually operated electric circuit breaker, a disconnect 
switch, a manually operated switch, a slide gate, a slip blind, a line 
valve, blocks, and any similar device with a visible indication of the 
position of the device. (Push buttons, selector switches, and other 
control-circuit-type devices are not energy isolating devices.)
    Energy source. Any electrical, mechanical, hydraulic, pneumatic, 
chemical, nuclear, thermal, or other energy source that could cause 
injury to employees.
    Entry (as used in paragraph (e) of this section). The action by 
which a person passes through an opening into an enclosed space. Entry 
includes ensuing work activities in that space and is considered to 
have occurred as soon as any part of the entrant's body breaks the 
plane of an opening into the space.
    Equipment (electric). A general term including material, fittings, 
devices, appliances, fixtures, apparatus, and the like used as part of 
or in connection with an electrical installation.
    Exposed, Exposed to contact (as applied to energized parts). Not 
isolated or guarded.
    Fall restraint system. A fall protection system that prevents the 
user from falling any distance.
    First-aid training. Training in the initial care, including 
cardiopulmonary resuscitation (which includes chest compressions, 
rescue breathing, and, as appropriate, other heart and lung 
resuscitation techniques), performed by a person who is not a medical 
practitioner, of a sick or injured person until definitive medical 
treatment can be administered.
    Ground. A conducting connection, whether planned or unplanned, 
between an electric circuit or equipment and the earth, or to some 
conducting body that serves in place of the earth.

[[Page 20658]]

    Grounded. Connected to earth or to some conducting body that serves 
in place of the earth.
    Guarded. Covered, fenced, enclosed, or otherwise protected, by 
means of suitable covers or casings, barrier rails or screens, mats, or 
platforms, designed to minimize the possibility, under normal 
conditions, of dangerous approach or inadvertent contact by persons or 
objects.

    Note to the definition of ``guarded'': Wires that are insulated, 
but not otherwise protected, are not guarded.

    Hazardous atmosphere. An atmosphere that may expose employees to 
the risk of death, incapacitation, impairment of ability to self-rescue 
(that is, escape unaided from an enclosed space), injury, or acute 
illness from one or more of the following causes:
    (1) Flammable gas, vapor, or mist in excess of 10 percent of its 
lower flammable limit (LFL);
    (2) Airborne combustible dust at a concentration that meets or 
exceeds its LFL;

    Note to the definition of ``hazardous atmosphere'' (2): This 
concentration may be approximated as a condition in which the dust 
obscures vision at a distance of 1.52 meters (5 feet) or less.

    (3) Atmospheric oxygen concentration below 19.5 percent or above 
23.5 percent;
    (4) Atmospheric concentration of any substance for which a dose or 
a permissible exposure limit is published in Subpart G, Occupational 
Health and Environmental Control, or in Subpart Z, Toxic and Hazardous 
Substances, of this part and which could result in employee exposure in 
excess of its dose or permissible exposure limit;

    Note to the definition of ``hazardous atmosphere'' (4): An 
atmospheric concentration of any substance that is not capable of 
causing death, incapacitation, impairment of ability to self-rescue, 
injury, or acute illness due to its health effects is not covered by 
this provision.

    (5) Any other atmospheric condition that is immediately dangerous 
to life or health.

    Note to the definition of ``hazardous atmosphere'' (5): For air 
contaminants for which the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration has not determined a dose or permissible exposure 
limit, other sources of information, such as Material Safety Data 
Sheets that comply with the Hazard Communication Standard, Sec.  
1910.1200, published information, and internal documents can provide 
guidance in establishing acceptable atmospheric conditions.

    High-power tests. Tests in which the employer uses fault currents, 
load currents, magnetizing currents, and line-dropping currents to test 
equipment, either at the equipment's rated voltage or at lower 
voltages.
    High-voltage tests. Tests in which the employer uses voltages of 
approximately 1,000 volts as a practical minimum and in which the 
voltage source has sufficient energy to cause injury.
    High wind. A wind of such velocity that one or more of the 
following hazards would be present:
    (1) The wind could blow an employee from an elevated location,
    (2) The wind could cause an employee or equipment handling material 
to lose control of the material, or
    (3) The wind would expose an employee to other hazards not 
controlled by the standard involved.

    Note to the definition of ``high wind'': The Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration normally considers winds exceeding 64.4 
kilometers per hour (40 miles per hour), or 48.3 kilometers per hour 
(30 miles per hour) if the work involves material handling, as 
meeting this criteria, unless the employer takes precautions to 
protect employees from the hazardous effects of the wind.

    Host employer. An employer that operates, or that controls the 
operating procedures for, an electric power generation, transmission, 
or distribution installation on which a contract employer is performing 
work covered by this section.

    Note to the definition of ``host employer'': The Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration will treat the electric utility or 
the owner of the installation as the host employer if it operates or 
controls operating procedures for the installation. If the electric 
utility or installation owner neither operates nor controls 
operating procedures for the installation, the Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration will treat the employer that the utility 
or owner has contracted with to operate or control the operating 
procedures for the installation as the host employer. In no case 
will there be more than one host employer.

    Immediately dangerous to life or health (IDLH). Any condition that 
poses an immediate or delayed threat to life or that would cause 
irreversible adverse health effects or that would interfere with an 
individual's ability to escape unaided from a permit space.

    Note to the definition of ``immediately dangerous to life or 
health'': Some materials--hydrogen fluoride gas and cadmium vapor, 
for example--may produce immediate transient effects that, even if 
severe, may pass without medical attention, but are followed by 
sudden, possibly fatal collapse 12-72 hours after exposure. The 
victim ``feels normal'' from recovery from transient effects until 
collapse. Such materials in hazardous quantities are considered to 
be ``immediately'' dangerous to life or health.

    Insulated. Separated from other conducting surfaces by a dielectric 
(including air space) offering a high resistance to the passage of 
current.

    Note to the definition of ``insulated'': When any object is said 
to be insulated, it is understood to be insulated for the conditions 
to which it normally is subjected. Otherwise, it is, for the purpose 
of this section, uninsulated.

    Insulation (cable). Material relied upon to insulate the conductor 
from other conductors or conducting parts or from ground.
    Isolated. Not readily accessible to persons unless special means 
for access are used.
    Line-clearance tree trimmer. An employee who, through related 
training or on-the-job experience or both, is familiar with the special 
techniques and hazards involved in line-clearance tree trimming.

    Note 1 to the definition of ``line-clearance tree trimmer'': An 
employee who is regularly assigned to a line-clearance tree-trimming 
crew and who is undergoing on-the-job training and who, in the 
course of such training, has demonstrated an ability to perform 
duties safely at his or her level of training and who is under the 
direct supervision of a line-clearance tree trimmer is considered to 
be a line-clearance tree trimmer for the performance of those 
duties.


    Note 2 to the definition of ``line-clearance tree trimmer'': A 
line-clearance tree trimmer is not considered to be a ``qualified 
employee'' under this section unless he or she has the training 
required for a qualified employee under paragraph (a)(2)(ii) of this 
section. However, under the electrical safety-related work practices 
standard in Subpart S of this part, a line-clearance tree trimmer is 
considered to be a ``qualified employee''. Tree trimming performed 
by such ``qualified employees'' is not subject to the electrical 
safety-related work practice requirements contained in Sec. Sec.  
1910.331 through 1910.335 of this part. (See also the note following 
Sec.  1910.332(b)(3) of this part for information regarding the 
training an employee must have to be considered a qualified employee 
under Sec. Sec.  1910.331 through 1910.335 of this part.)

    Line-clearance tree trimming. The pruning, trimming, repairing, 
maintaining, removing, or clearing of trees, or the cutting of brush, 
that is within the following distance of electric supply lines and 
equipment:
    (1) For voltages to ground of 50 kilovolts or less--3.05 meters (10 
feet);
    (2) For voltages to ground of more than 50 kilovolts--3.05 meters 
(10 feet) plus 0.10 meters (4 inches) for every 10 kilovolts over 50 
kilovolts.

[[Page 20659]]

    Lines. (1) Communication lines. The conductors and their supporting 
or containing structures which are used for public or private signal or 
communication service, and which operate at potentials not exceeding 
400 volts to ground or 750 volts between any two points of the circuit, 
and the transmitted power of which does not exceed 150 watts. If the 
lines are operating at less than 150 volts, no limit is placed on the 
transmitted power of the system. Under certain conditions, 
communication cables may include communication circuits exceeding these 
limitations where such circuits are also used to supply power solely to 
communication equipment.

    Note to the definition of ``communication lines'': Telephone, 
telegraph, railroad signal, data, clock, fire, police alarm, cable 
television, and other systems conforming to this definition are 
included. Lines used for signaling purposes, but not included under 
this definition, are considered as electric supply lines of the same 
voltage.

    (2) Electric supply lines. Conductors used to transmit electric 
energy and their necessary supporting or containing structures. Signal 
lines of more than 400 volts are always supply lines within this 
section, and those of less than 400 volts are considered as supply 
lines, if so run and operated throughout.
    Manhole. A subsurface enclosure that personnel may enter and that 
is used for installing, operating, and maintaining submersible 
equipment or cable.
    Minimum approach distance. The closest distance an employee may 
approach an energized or a grounded object.

    Note to the definition of ``minimum approach distance'': 
Paragraph (l)(3)(i) of this section requires employers to establish 
minimum approach distances.

    Personal fall arrest system. A system used to arrest an employee in 
a fall from a working level.
    Qualified employee (qualified person). An employee (person) 
knowledgeable in the construction and operation of the electric power 
generation, transmission, and distribution equipment involved, along 
with the associated hazards.

    Note 1 to the definition of ``qualified employee (qualified 
person)'': An employee must have the training required by (a)(2)(ii) 
of this section to be a qualified employee.


    Note 2 to the definition of ``qualified employee (qualified 
person)'': Except under (g)(2)(iv)(C)(2) and (g)(2)(iv)(C)(3) of 
this section, an employee who is undergoing on-the-job training and 
who has demonstrated, in the course of such training, an ability to 
perform duties safely at his or her level of training and who is 
under the direct supervision of a qualified person is a qualified 
person for the performance of those duties.

    Statistical sparkover voltage. A transient overvoltage level that 
produces a 97.72-percent probability of sparkover (that is, two 
standard deviations above the voltage at which there is a 50-percent 
probability of sparkover).
    Statistical withstand voltage. A transient overvoltage level that 
produces a 0.14-percent probability of sparkover (that is, three 
standard deviations below the voltage at which there is a 50-percent 
probability of sparkover).
    Switch. A device for opening and closing or for changing the 
connection of a circuit. In this section, a switch is manually 
operable, unless otherwise stated.
    System operator. A qualified person designated to operate the 
system or its parts.
    Vault. An enclosure, above or below ground, that personnel may 
enter and that is used for installing, operating, or maintaining 
equipment or cable.
    Vented vault. A vault that has provision for air changes using 
exhaust-flue stacks and low-level air intakes operating on pressure and 
temperature differentials that provide for airflow that precludes a 
hazardous atmosphere from developing.
    Voltage. The effective (root mean square, or rms) potential 
difference between any two conductors or between a conductor and 
ground. This section expresses voltages in nominal values, unless 
otherwise indicated. The nominal voltage of a system or circuit is the 
value assigned to a system or circuit of a given voltage class for the 
purpose of convenient designation. The operating voltage of the system 
may vary above or below this value.
    Work-positioning equipment. A body belt or body harness system 
rigged to allow an employee to be supported on an elevated vertical 
surface, such as a utility pole or tower leg, and work with both hands 
free while leaning.

Appendix A to Sec.  1910.269--Flow Charts

    This appendix presents information, in the form of flow charts, 
that illustrates the scope and application of Sec.  1910.269. This 
appendix addresses the interface between Sec.  1910.269 and Subpart 
S of this Part (Electrical), between Sec.  1910.269 and Sec.  
1910.146 (Permit-required confined spaces), and between Sec.  
1910.269 and Sec.  1910.147 (The control of hazardous energy 
(lockout/tagout)). These flow charts provide guidance for employers 
trying to implement the requirements of Sec.  1910.269 in 
combination with other General Industry Standards contained in Part 
1910. Employers should always consult the relevant standards, in 
conjunction with this appendix, to ensure compliance with all 
applicable requirements.
BILLING CODE 4510-26-P

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[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR11AP14.023

Appendix B to Sec.  1910.269--Working on Exposed Energized Parts

I. Introduction

    Electric utilities design electric power generation, 
transmission, and distribution installations to meet National 
Electrical Safety Code (NESC), ANSI C2, requirements. Electric 
utilities also design transmission and distribution lines to limit 
line outages as required by system reliability criteria \1\ and to 
withstand the maximum overvoltages impressed on the system. 
Conditions such as switching surges, faults, and lightning can cause 
overvoltages. Electric utilities generally select insulator design 
and lengths and the clearances to structural parts so as to prevent 
outages from contaminated line insulation and during storms. Line 
insulator lengths and structural clearances have, over the years, 
come closer to the minimum approach distances used by workers. As 
minimum approach distances and structural clearances converge, it is 
increasingly important that system designers and system operating 
and maintenance personnel understand the concepts underlying minimum 
approach distances.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ Federal, State, and local regulatory bodies and electric 
utilities set reliability requirements that limit the number and 
duration of system outages.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The information in this appendix will assist employers in 
complying with the minimum approach-distance requirements contained 
in Sec.  1910.269(l)(3) and (q)(3). Employers must use the technical 
criteria and methodology presented in this appendix in establishing 
minimum approach distances in accordance with Sec.  
1910.269(l)(3)(i) and Table R-3 and Table R-8. This appendix 
provides essential background information and technical criteria for 
the calculation of the required minimum approach distances for live-
line work on electric power generation, transmission, and 
distribution installations.
    Unless an employer is using the maximum transient overvoltages 
specified in Table R-9 for voltages over 72.5 kilovolts, the 
employer must use persons knowledgeable in the techniques discussed 
in this appendix, and competent in the field of electric 
transmission and distribution system design, to determine the 
maximum transient overvoltage.

II. General

    A. Definitions. The following definitions from Sec.  1910.269(x) 
relate to work on or near electric power generation, transmission, 
and distribution lines and equipment and the electrical hazards they 
present.
    Exposed. . . . Not isolated or guarded.
    Guarded. Covered, fenced, enclosed, or otherwise protected, by 
means of suitable covers or casings, barrier rails or screens, mats, 
or platforms, designed to minimize the possibility, under normal 
conditions, of dangerous approach or inadvertent contact by persons 
or objects.

    Note to the definition of ``guarded'': Wires that are insulated, 
but not otherwise protected, are not guarded.

    Insulated. Separated from other conducting surfaces by a 
dielectric (including air space) offering a high resistance to the 
passage of current.

    Note to the definition of ``insulated'': When any object is said 
to be insulated, it is understood to be insulated for the conditions 
to which it normally is subjected. Otherwise, it is, for the purpose 
of this section, uninsulated.


[[Page 20666]]


    Isolated. Not readily accessible to persons unless special means 
for access are used.
    Statistical sparkover voltage. A transient overvoltage level 
that produces a 97.72-percent probability of sparkover (that is, two 
standard deviations above the voltage at which there is a 50-percent 
probability of sparkover).
    Statistical withstand voltage. A transient overvoltage level 
that produces a 0.14-percent probability of sparkover (that is, 
three standard deviations below the voltage at which there is a 50-
percent probability of sparkover).
    B. Installations energized at 50 to 300 volts. The hazards posed 
by installations energized at 50 to 300 volts are the same as those 
found in many other workplaces. That is not to say that there is no 
hazard, but the complexity of electrical protection required does 
not compare to that required for high-voltage systems. The employee 
must avoid contact with the exposed parts, and the protective 
equipment used (such as rubber insulating gloves) must provide 
insulation for the voltages involved.
    C. Exposed energized parts over 300 volts AC. Paragraph 
(l)(3)(i) of Sec.  1910.269 requires the employer to establish 
minimum approach distances no less than the distances computed by 
Table R-3 for ac systems so that employees can work safely without 
risk of sparkover.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \2\ Sparkover is a disruptive electric discharge in which an 
electric arc forms and electric current passes through air.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Unless the employee is using electrical protective equipment, 
air is the insulating medium between the employee and energized 
parts. The distance between the employee and an energized part must 
be sufficient for the air to withstand the maximum transient 
overvoltage that can reach the worksite under the working conditions 
and practices the employee is using. This distance is the minimum 
air insulation distance, and it is equal to the electrical component 
of the minimum approach distance.
    Normal system design may provide or include a means (such as 
lightning arrestors) to control maximum anticipated transient 
overvoltages, or the employer may use temporary devices (portable 
protective gaps) or measures (such as preventing automatic circuit 
breaker reclosing) to achieve the same result. Paragraph (l)(3)(ii) 
of Sec.  1910.269 requires the employer to determine the maximum 
anticipated per-unit transient overvoltage, phase-to-ground, through 
an engineering analysis or assume a maximum anticipated per-unit 
transient overvoltage, phase-to-ground, in accordance with Table R-
9, which specifies the following maximums for ac systems:

72.6 to 420.0 kilovolts--3.5 per unit
420.1 to 550.0 kilovolts--3.0 per unit
550.1 to 800.0 kilovolts--2.5 per unit

    See paragraph IV.A.2, later in this appendix, for additional 
discussion of maximum transient overvoltages.
    D. Types of exposures. Employees working on or near energized 
electric power generation, transmission, and distribution systems 
face two kinds of exposures: Phase-to-ground and phase-to-phase. The 
exposure is phase-to-ground: (1) With respect to an energized part, 
when the employee is at ground potential or (2) with respect to 
ground, when an employee is at the potential of the energized part 
during live-line barehand work. The exposure is phase-to-phase, with 
respect to an energized part, when an employee is at the potential 
of another energized part (at a different potential) during live-
line barehand work.

III. Determination of Minimum Approach Distances for AC Voltages 
Greater Than 300 Volts

    A. Voltages of 301 to 5,000 volts. Test data generally forms the 
basis of minimum air insulation distances. The lowest voltage for 
which sufficient test data exists is 5,000 volts, and these data 
indicate that the minimum air insulation distance at that voltage is 
20 millimeters (1 inch). Because the minimum air insulation distance 
increases with increasing voltage, and, conversely, decreases with 
decreasing voltage, an assumed minimum air insulation distance of 20 
millimeters will protect against sparkover at voltages of 301 to 
5,000 volts. Thus, 20 millimeters is the electrical component of the 
minimum approach distance for these voltages.
    B. Voltages of 5.1 to 72.5 kilovolts. For voltages from 5.1 to 
72.5 kilovolts, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
bases the methodology for calculating the electrical component of 
the minimum approach distance on Institute of Electrical and 
Electronic Engineers (IEEE) Standard 4-1995, Standard Techniques for 
High-Voltage Testing. Table 1 lists the critical sparkover distances 
from that standard as listed in IEEE Std 516-2009, IEEE Guide for 
Maintenance Methods on Energized Power Lines.

             Table 1--Sparkover Distance for Rod-to-Rod Gap
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                        Gap spacing from
         60 Hz Rod-to-Rod sparkover (kV peak)            IEEE Std 4-1995
                                                              (cm)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
25....................................................                 2
36....................................................                 3
46....................................................                 4
53....................................................                 5
60....................................................                 6
70....................................................                 8
79....................................................                10
86....................................................                12
95....................................................                14
104...................................................                16
112...................................................                18
120...................................................                20
143...................................................                25
167...................................................                30
192...................................................                35
218...................................................                40
243...................................................                45
270...................................................                50
322...................................................                60
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: IEEE Std 516-2009.

    To use this table to determine the electrical component of the 
minimum approach distance, the employer must determine the peak 
phase-to-ground transient overvoltage and select a gap from the 
table that corresponds to that voltage as a withstand voltage rather 
than a critical sparkover voltage. To calculate the electrical 
component of the minimum approach distance for voltages between 5 
and 72.5 kilovolts, use the following procedure:
    1. Divide the phase-to-phase voltage by the square root of 3 to 
convert it to a phase-to-ground voltage.
    2. Multiply the phase-to-ground voltage by the square root of 2 
to convert the rms value of the voltage to the peak phase-to-ground 
voltage.
    3. Multiply the peak phase-to-ground voltage by the maximum per-
unit transient overvoltage, which, for this voltage range, is 3.0, 
as discussed later in this appendix. This is the maximum phase-to-
ground transient overvoltage, which corresponds to the withstand 
voltage for the relevant exposure.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \3\ The withstand voltage is the voltage at which sparkover is 
not likely to occur across a specified distance. It is the voltage 
taken at the 3[sigma] point below the sparkover voltage, assuming 
that the sparkover curve follows a normal distribution.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    4. Divide the maximum phase-to-ground transient overvoltage by 
0.85 to determine the corresponding critical sparkover voltage. (The 
critical sparkover voltage is 3 standard deviations (or 15 percent) 
greater than the withstand voltage.)
    5. Determine the electrical component of the minimum approach 
distance from Table 1 through interpolation.
    Table 2 illustrates how to derive the electrical component of 
the minimum approach distance for voltages from 5.1 to 72.5 
kilovolts, before the application of any altitude correction factor, 
as explained later.

[[Page 20667]]



                      Table 2--Calculating the Electrical Component of MAD 751 V to 72.5 kV
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                        Maximum system phase-to-phase voltage (kV)
                  Step                   -----------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                 15                36                46               72.5
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Divide by [radic]3...................               8.7              20.8              26.6              41.9
2. Multiply by [radic]2.................              12.2              29.4              37.6              59.2
3. Multiply by 3.0......................              36.7              88.2             112.7             177.6
4. Divide by 0.85.......................              43.2             103.7             132.6             208.9
5. Interpolate from Table 1.............      3+(7.2/10)*1      14+(8.7/9)*2    20+(12.6/23)*5    35+(16.9/26)*5
Electrical component of MAD (cm)........              3.72             15.93             22.74             38.25
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    C. Voltages of 72.6 to 800 kilovolts. For voltages of 72.6 
kilovolts to 800 kilovolts, this section bases the electrical 
component of minimum approach distances, before the application of 
any altitude correction factor, on the following formula:

Equation 1--For Voltages of 72.6 kV to 800 kV

D = 0.3048(C + a) VL-GT

Where:

D = Electrical component of the minimum approach distance in air in 
meters;
C = a correction factor associated with the variation of gap 
sparkover with voltage;
a = A factor relating to the saturation of air at system voltages of 
345 kilovolts or higher; \4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \4\ Test data demonstrates that the saturation factor is greater 
than 0 at peak voltages of about 630 kilovolts. Systems operating at 
345 kilovolts (or maximum system voltages of 362 kilovolts) can have 
peak maximum transient overvoltages exceeding 630 kilovolts. Table 
R-3 sets equations for calculating a based on peak voltage.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

VL-G = Maximum system line-to-ground rms voltage in kilovolts--it 
should be the ``actual'' maximum, or the normal highest voltage for 
the range (for example, 10 percent above the nominal voltage); and
T = Maximum transient overvoltage factor in per unit.

    In Equation 1, C is 0.01: (1) For phase-to-ground exposures that 
the employer can demonstrate consist only of air across the approach 
distance (gap) and (2) for phase-to-phase exposures if the employer 
can demonstrate that no insulated tool spans the gap and that no 
large conductive object is in the gap. Otherwise, C is 0.011.
    In Equation 1, the term a varies depending on whether the 
employee's exposure is phase-to-ground or phase-to-phase and on 
whether objects are in the gap. The employer must use the equations 
in Table 3 to calculate a. Sparkover test data with insulation 
spanning the gap form the basis for the equations for phase-to-
ground exposures, and sparkover test data with only air in the gap 
form the basis for the equations for phase-to-phase exposures. The 
phase-to-ground equations result in slightly higher values of a, 
and, consequently, produce larger minimum approach distances, than 
the phase-to-phase equations for the same value of VPeak.

                             Table 3--Equations for Calculating the Surge Factor, a
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                            Phase-to-ground exposures
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
VPeak = TL-GVL-G [radic]2.........           635 kV or less           635.1 to 915 kV         915.1 to 1,050 kV
a.................................                        0      (VPeak- 635)/140,000       (VPeak-645)/135,000
                                   -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
VPeak = TL-GVL-G[radic]2..........                               More than 1,050 kV
                                   -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
a.................................                               (VPeak-675)/125,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                          Phase-to-phase exposures \1\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
VPeak = (1.35TL-G + 0.45)VL-                 630 kV or less           630.1 to 848 kV         848.1 to 1,131 kV
 G[radic]2........................
a.................................                        0       (VPeak-630)/155,000     (VPeak-633.6)/152,207
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
VPeak = (1.35TL-G + 0.45)VL-                          1,131.1 to 1,485 kV                    More than 1,485 kV
 G[radic]2..........................
a...................................                  (VPeak-628)/153,846                 (VPeak-350.5)/203,666
\1\ Use the equations for phase-to-ground exposures (with VPeak for phase-to-phase exposures) unless the
  employer can demonstrate that no insulated tool spans the gap and that no large conductive object is in the
  gap.

    In Equation 1, T is the maximum transient overvoltage factor in 
per unit. As noted earlier, Sec.  1910.269(l)(3)(ii) requires the 
employer to determine the maximum anticipated per-unit transient 
overvoltage, phase-to-ground, through an engineering analysis or 
assume a maximum anticipated per-unit transient overvoltage, phase-
to-ground, in accordance with Table R-9. For phase-to-ground 
exposures, the employer uses this value, called TL-G, as T in 
Equation 1. IEEE Std 516-2009 provides the following formula to 
calculate the phase-to-phase maximum transient overvoltage, TL-L, 
from TL-G:

TL-L = 1.35TL-G + 0.45

For phase-to-phase exposures, the employer uses this value as T in 
Equation 1.
    D. Provisions for inadvertent movement. The minimum approach 
distance must include an ``adder'' to compensate for the inadvertent 
movement of the worker relative to an energized part or the movement 
of the part relative to the worker. This ``adder'' must account for 
this possible inadvertent movement and provide the worker with a 
comfortable and safe zone in which to work. Employers must add the 
distance for inadvertent movement (called the ``ergonomic component 
of the minimum approach distance'') to the electrical component to 
determine the total safe minimum approach distances used in live-
line work.
    The Occupational Safety and Health Administration based the 
ergonomic component of the minimum approach distance on response 
time-distance analysis. This technique uses an estimate of the total 
response time to a hazardous incident and converts that time to the 
distance traveled. For example, the driver of a car takes a given 
amount of time to respond to a ``stimulus'' and stop the vehicle. 
The elapsed time involved results in the car's traveling some 
distance before coming to a complete stop. This distance depends on 
the speed of the car

[[Page 20668]]

at the time the stimulus appears and the reaction time of the 
driver.
    In the case of live-line work, the employee must first perceive 
that he or she is approaching the danger zone. Then, the worker 
responds to the danger and must decelerate and stop all motion 
toward the energized part. During the time it takes to stop, the 
employee will travel some distance. This is the distance the 
employer must add to the electrical component of the minimum 
approach distance to obtain the total safe minimum approach 
distance.
    At voltages from 751 volts to 72.5 kilovolts,\5\ the electrical 
component of the minimum approach distance is smaller than the 
ergonomic component. At 72.5 kilovolts, the electrical component is 
only a little more than 0.3 meters (1 foot). An ergonomic component 
of the minimum approach distance must provide for all the worker's 
unanticipated movements. At these voltages, workers generally use 
rubber insulating gloves; however, these gloves protect only a 
worker's hands and arms. Therefore, the energized object must be at 
a safe approach distance to protect the worker's face. In this case, 
0.61 meters (2 feet) is a sufficient and practical ergonomic 
component of the minimum approach distance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \5\ For voltages of 50 to 300 volts, Table R-3 specifies a 
minimum approach distance of ``avoid contact.'' The minimum approach 
distance for this voltage range contains neither an electrical 
component nor an ergonomic component.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For voltages between 72.6 and 800 kilovolts, employees must use 
different work practices during energized line work. Generally, 
employees use live-line tools (hot sticks) to perform work on 
energized equipment. These tools, by design, keep the energized part 
at a constant distance from the employee and, thus, maintain the 
appropriate minimum approach distance automatically.
    The location of the worker and the type of work methods the 
worker is using also influence the length of the ergonomic component 
of the minimum approach distance. In this higher voltage range, the 
employees use work methods that more tightly control their movements 
than when the workers perform work using rubber insulating gloves. 
The worker, therefore, is farther from the energized line or 
equipment and must be more precise in his or her movements just to 
perform the work. For these reasons, this section adopts an 
ergonomic component of the minimum approach distance of 0.31 m (1 
foot) for voltages between 72.6 and 800 kilovolts.
    Table 4 summarizes the ergonomic component of the minimum 
approach distance for various voltage ranges.

        Table 4--Ergonomic Component of Minimum Approach Distance
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                   Distance
         Voltage range (kV)          -----------------------------------
                                              m                ft
------------------------------------------------------------------------
0.301 to 0.750......................              0.31               1.0
0.751 to 72.5.......................              0.61               2.0
72.6 to 800.........................              0.31               1.0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: The employer must add this distance to the electrical component of
  the minimum approach distance to obtain the full minimum approach
  distance.

    The ergonomic component of the minimum approach distance 
accounts for errors in maintaining the minimum approach distance 
(which might occur, for example, if an employee misjudges the length 
of a conductive object he or she is holding), and for errors in 
judging the minimum approach distance. The ergonomic component also 
accounts for inadvertent movements by the employee, such as 
slipping. In contrast, the working position selected to properly 
maintain the minimum approach distance must account for all of an 
employee's reasonably likely movements and still permit the employee 
to adhere to the applicable minimum approach distance. (See Figure 
1.) Reasonably likely movements include an employee's adjustments to 
tools, equipment, and working positions and all movements needed to 
perform the work. For example, the employee should be able to 
perform all of the following actions without straying into the 
minimum approach distance:
     Adjust his or her hardhat,
     maneuver a tool onto an energized part with a 
reasonable amount of overreaching or underreaching,
     reach for and handle tools, material, and equipment 
passed to him or her, and
     adjust tools, and replace components on them, when 
necessary during the work procedure.
    The training of qualified employees required under Sec.  
1910.269(a)(2), and the job planning and briefing required under 
Sec.  1910.269(c), must address selection of a proper working 
position.
BILLING CODE 4510-26-P

[[Page 20669]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR11AP14.024

BILLING CODE 4510-26-C
    E. Miscellaneous correction factors. Changes in the air medium 
that forms the insulation influences the strength of an air gap. A 
brief discussion of each factor follows.
    1. Dielectric strength of air. The dielectric strength of air in 
a uniform electric field at standard atmospheric conditions is 
approximately 3 kilovolts per millimeter.\6\ The pressure, 
temperature, and humidity of the air, the shape, dimensions, and 
separation of the electrodes, and the

[[Page 20670]]

characteristics of the applied voltage (wave shape) affect the 
disruptive gradient.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \6\ For the purposes of estimating arc length, Sec.  1910.269 
generally assumes a more conservative dielectric strength of 10 
kilovolts per 25.4 millimeters, consistent with assumptions made in 
consensus standards such as the National Electrical Safety Code 
(IEEE C2-2012). The more conservative value accounts for variables 
such as electrode shape, wave shape, and a certain amount of 
overvoltage.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    2. Atmospheric effect. The empirically determined electrical 
strength of a given gap is normally applicable at standard 
atmospheric conditions (20 [deg]C, 101.3 kilopascals, 11 grams/cubic 
centimeter humidity). An increase in the density (humidity) of the 
air inhibits sparkover for a given air gap. The combination of 
temperature and air pressure that results in the lowest gap 
sparkover voltage is high temperature and low pressure. This 
combination of conditions is not likely to occur. Low air pressure, 
generally associated with high humidity, causes increased electrical 
strength. An average air pressure generally correlates with low 
humidity. Hot and dry working conditions normally result in reduced 
electrical strength. The equations for minimum approach distances in 
Table R-3 assume standard atmospheric conditions.
    3. Altitude. The reduced air pressure at high altitudes causes a 
reduction in the electrical strength of an air gap. An employer must 
increase the minimum approach distance by about 3 percent per 300 
meters (1,000 feet) of increased altitude for altitudes above 900 
meters (3,000 feet). Table R-5 specifies the altitude correction 
factor that the employer must use in calculating minimum approach 
distances.

IV. Determining Minimum Approach Distances

A. Factors Affecting Voltage Stress at the Worksite

    1. System voltage (nominal). The nominal system voltage range 
determines the voltage for purposes of calculating minimum approach 
distances. The employer selects the range in which the nominal 
system voltage falls, as given in the relevant table, and uses the 
highest value within that range in per-unit calculations.
    2. Transient overvoltages. Operation of switches or circuit 
breakers, a fault on a line or circuit or on an adjacent circuit, 
and similar activities may generate transient overvoltages on an 
electrical system. Each overvoltage has an associated transient 
voltage wave shape. The wave shape arriving at the site and its 
magnitude vary considerably.
    In developing requirements for minimum approach distances, the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration considered the most 
common wave shapes and the magnitude of transient overvoltages found 
on electric power generation, transmission, and distribution 
systems. The equations in Table R-3 for minimum approach distances 
use per-unit maximum transient overvoltages, which are relative to 
the nominal maximum voltage of the system. For example, a maximum 
transient overvoltage value of 3.0 per unit indicates that the 
highest transient overvoltage is 3.0 times the nominal maximum 
system voltage.
    3. Typical magnitude of overvoltages. Table 5 lists the 
magnitude of typical transient overvoltages.

          Table 5--Magnitude of Typical Transient Overvoltages
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                         Magnitude  (per
                         Cause                                unit)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Energized 200-mile line without closing resistors.....               3.5
Energized 200-mile line with one-step closing resistor               2.1
Energized 200-mile line with multistep resistor.......               2.5
Reclosing with trapped charge one-step resistor.......               2.2
Opening surge with single restrike....................               3.0
Fault initiation unfaulted phase......................               2.1
Fault initiation adjacent circuit.....................               2.5
Fault clearing........................................        1.7 to 1.9
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    4. Standard deviation--air-gap withstand. For each air gap 
length under the same atmospheric conditions, there is a statistical 
variation in the breakdown voltage. The probability of breakdown 
against voltage has a normal (Gaussian) distribution. The standard 
deviation of this distribution varies with the wave shape, gap 
geometry, and atmospheric conditions. The withstand voltage of the 
air gap is three standard deviations (3[sigma]) below the critical 
sparkover voltage. (The critical sparkover voltage is the crest 
value of the impulse wave that, under specified conditions, causes 
sparkover 50 percent of the time. An impulse wave of three standard 
deviations below this value, that is, the withstand voltage, has a 
probability of sparkover of approximately 1 in 1,000.)
    5. Broken Insulators. Tests show reductions in the insulation 
strength of insulator strings with broken skirts. Broken units may 
lose up to 70 percent of their withstand capacity. Because an 
employer cannot determine the insulating capability of a broken unit 
without testing it, the employer must consider damaged units in an 
insulator to have no insulating value. Additionally, the presence of 
a live-line tool alongside an insulator string with broken units may 
further reduce the overall insulating strength. The number of good 
units that must be present in a string for it to be ``insulated'' as 
defined by Sec.  1910.269(x) depends on the maximum overvoltage 
possible at the worksite.

B. Minimum Approach Distances Based on Known, Maximum-Anticipated 
Per-Unit Transient Overvoltages

    1. Determining the minimum approach distance for AC systems. 
Under Sec.  1910.269(l)(3)(ii), the employer must determine the 
maximum anticipated per-unit transient overvoltage, phase-to-ground, 
through an engineering analysis or must assume a maximum anticipated 
per-unit transient overvoltage, phase-to-ground, in accordance with 
Table R-9. When the employer conducts an engineering analysis of the 
system and determines that the maximum transient overvoltage is 
lower than specified by Table R-9, the employer must ensure that any 
conditions assumed in the analysis, for example, that employees 
block reclosing on a circuit or install portable protective gaps, 
are present during energized work. To ensure that these conditions 
are present, the employer may need to institute new live-work 
procedures reflecting the conditions and limitations set by the 
engineering analysis.
    2. Calculation of reduced approach distance values. An employer 
may take the following steps to reduce minimum approach distances 
when the maximum transient overvoltage on the system (that is, the 
maximum transient overvoltage without additional steps to control 
overvoltages) produces unacceptably large minimum approach 
distances:
    Step 1. Determine the maximum voltage (with respect to a given 
nominal voltage range) for the energized part.
    Step 2. Determine the technique to use to control the maximum 
transient overvoltage. (See paragraphs IV.C and IV.D of this 
appendix.) Determine the maximum transient overvoltage that can 
exist at the worksite with that form of control in place and with a 
confidence level of 3[sigma]. This voltage is the withstand voltage 
for the purpose of calculating the appropriate minimum approach 
distance.
    Step 3. Direct employees to implement procedures to ensure that 
the control technique is in effect during the course of the work.
    Step 4. Using the new value of transient overvoltage in per 
unit, calculate the required minimum approach distance from Table R-
3.

C. Methods of Controlling Possible Transient Overvoltage Stress 
Found on a System

    1. Introduction. There are several means of controlling 
overvoltages that occur on transmission systems. For example, the 
employer can modify the operation of circuit breakers or other 
switching devices to reduce switching transient overvoltages. 
Alternatively, the employer can hold the overvoltage to an 
acceptable level by installing surge arresters or portable

[[Page 20671]]

protective gaps on the system. In addition, the employer can change 
the transmission system to minimize the effect of switching 
operations. Section 4.8 of IEEE Std 516-2009 describes various ways 
of controlling, and thereby reducing, maximum transient 
overvoltages.
    2. Operation of circuit breakers. \7\ The maximum transient 
overvoltage that can reach the worksite is often the result of 
switching on the line on which employees are working. Disabling 
automatic reclosing during energized line work, so that the line 
will not be reenergized after being opened for any reason, limits 
the maximum switching surge overvoltage to the larger of the opening 
surge or the greatest possible fault-generated surge, provided that 
the devices (for example, insertion resistors) are operable and will 
function to limit the transient overvoltage and that circuit breaker 
restrikes do not occur. The employer must ensure the proper 
functioning of insertion resistors and other overvoltage-limiting 
devices when the employer's engineering analysis assumes their 
proper operation to limit the overvoltage level. If the employer 
cannot disable the reclosing feature (because of system operating 
conditions), other methods of controlling the switching surge level 
may be necessary.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \7\ The detailed design of a circuit interrupter, such as the 
design of the contacts, resistor insertion, and breaker timing 
control, are beyond the scope of this appendix. The design of the 
system generally accounts for these features. This appendix only 
discusses features that can limit the maximum switching transient 
overvoltage on a system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Transient surges on an adjacent line, particularly for double 
circuit construction, may cause a significant overvoltage on the 
line on which employees are working. The employer's engineering 
analysis must account for coupling to adjacent lines.
    3. Surge arresters. The use of modern surge arresters allows a 
reduction in the basic impulse-insulation levels of much 
transmission system equipment. The primary function of early 
arresters was to protect the system insulation from the effects of 
lightning. Modern arresters not only dissipate lightning-caused 
transients, but may also control many other system transients caused 
by switching or faults.
    The employer may use properly designed arresters to control 
transient overvoltages along a transmission line and thereby reduce 
the requisite length of the insulator string and possibly the 
maximum transient overvoltage on the line.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \8\ Surge arrester application is beyond the scope of this 
appendix. However, if the employer installs the arrester near the 
work site, the application would be similar to the protective gaps 
discussed in paragraph IV.D of this appendix.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    4. Switching Restrictions. Another form of overvoltage control 
involves establishing switching restrictions, whereby the employer 
prohibits the operation of circuit breakers until certain system 
conditions are present. The employer restricts switching by using a 
tagging system, similar to that used for a permit, except that the 
common term used for this activity is a ``hold-off'' or 
``restriction.'' These terms indicate that the restriction does not 
prevent operation, but only modifies the operation during the live-
work activity.

D. Minimum Approach Distance Based on Control of Maximum Transient 
Overvoltage at the Worksite

    When the employer institutes control of maximum transient 
overvoltage at the worksite by installing portable protective gaps, 
the employer may calculate the minimum approach distance as follows:
    Step 1. Select the appropriate withstand voltage for the 
protective gap based on system requirements and an acceptable 
probability of gap sparkover.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \9\ The employer should check the withstand voltage to ensure 
that it results in a probability of gap flashover that is acceptable 
from a system outage perspective. (In other words, a gap sparkover 
will produce a system outage. The employer should determine whether 
such an outage will impact overall system performance to an 
acceptable degree.) In general, the withstand voltage should be at 
least 1.25 times the maximum crest operating voltage.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Step 2. Determine a gap distance that provides a withstand 
voltage \10\ greater than or equal to the one selected in the first 
step.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \10\ The manufacturer of the gap provides, based on test data, 
the critical sparkover voltage for each gap spacing (for example, a 
critical sparkover voltage of 665 kilovolts for a gap spacing of 1.2 
meters). The withstand voltage for the gap is equal to 85 percent of 
its critical sparkover voltage.
    \11\ Switch steps 1 and 2 if the length of the protective gap is 
known.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Step 3. Use 110 percent of the gap's critical sparkover voltage 
to determine the phase-to-ground peak voltage at gap sparkover (VPPG 
Peak).
    Step 4. Determine the maximum transient overvoltage, phase-to-
ground, at the worksite from the following formula:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR11AP14.025

    Step 5. Use this value of T \12\ in the equation in Table R-3 to 
obtain the minimum approach distance. If the worksite is no more 
than 900 meters (3,000 feet) above sea level, the employer may use 
this value of T to determine the minimum approach distance from 
Table 7 through Table 14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \12\ IEEE Std 516-2009 states that most employers add 0.2 to the 
calculated value of T as an additional safety factor.

    Note: All rounding must be to the next higher value (that is, 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
always round up).

    Sample protective gap calculations.
    Problem: Employees are to perform work on a 500-kilovolt 
transmission line at sea level that is subject to transient 
overvoltages of 2.4 p.u. The maximum operating voltage of the line 
is 550 kilovolts. Determine the length of the protective gap that 
will provide the minimum practical safe approach distance. Also, 
determine what that minimum approach distance is.
    Step 1. Calculate the smallest practical maximum transient 
overvoltage (1.25 times the crest phase-to-ground voltage): \13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \13\ To eliminate sparkovers due to minor system disturbances, 
the employer should use a withstand voltage no lower than 1.25 p.u. 
Note that this is a practical, or operational, consideration only. 
It may be feasible for the employer to use lower values of withstand 
voltage.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR11AP14.026

    This value equals the withstand voltage of the protective gap.
    Step 2. Using test data for a particular protective gap, select 
a gap that has a critical sparkover voltage greater than or equal 
to:

561kV / 0.85 = 660kV

For example, if a protective gap with a 1.22-m (4.0-foot) spacing 
tested to a critical sparkover voltage of 665 kilovolts (crest), 
select this gap spacing.
    Step 3. The phase-to-ground peak voltage at gap sparkover (VPPG 
Peak) is 110 percent of the value from the previous step:

665kV x 1.10 = 732kV

This value corresponds to the withstand voltage of the electrical 
component of the minimum approach distance.
    Step 4. Use this voltage to determine the worksite value of T:
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR11AP14.027
    
    Step 5. Use this value of T in the equation in Table R-3 to 
obtain the minimum approach distance, or look up the minimum 
approach distance in Table 7 through Table 14:

MAD = 2.29m (7.6 ft).

E. Location of Protective Gaps

    1. Adjacent structures. The employer may install the protective 
gap on a structure adjacent to the worksite, as this practice does 
not significantly reduce the protection afforded by the gap.
    2. Terminal stations. Gaps installed at terminal stations of 
lines or circuits provide a level of protection; however, that level 
of protection may not extend throughout the length of the line to 
the worksite. The use of substation terminal gaps raises the 
possibility that separate surges could enter the line at opposite 
ends, each with low enough magnitude to pass the terminal gaps 
without sparkover. When voltage surges occur simultaneously at each 
end of a line and travel toward each other, the total voltage on the 
line at the point where they meet is the arithmetic sum of the two 
surges. A gap installed within 0.8 km (0.5 mile) of the worksite 
will protect against such intersecting waves. Engineering studies of 
a particular line or system may indicate that employers can 
adequately protect employees by installing gaps at even more distant 
locations. In any event, unless using the default values for T from 
Table R-9, the employer must determine T at the worksite.
    3. Worksite. If the employer installs protective gaps at the 
worksite, the gap setting establishes the worksite impulse 
insulation strength. Lightning strikes as far as 6 miles from the 
worksite can cause a voltage surge greater than the gap withstand 
voltage, and a gap sparkover can occur. In addition, the gap can 
sparkover from overvoltages on the line that exceed the withstand 
voltage of the gap. Consequently, the employer must protect 
employees from hazards resulting from any sparkover that could 
occur.

[[Page 20672]]

    F. Disabling automatic reclosing. There are two reasons to 
disable the automatic-reclosing feature of circuit-interrupting 
devices while employees are performing live-line work:
     To prevent reenergization of a circuit faulted during 
the work, which could create a hazard or result in more serious 
injuries or damage than the injuries or damage produced by the 
original fault;
     To prevent any transient overvoltage caused by the 
switching surge that would result if the circuit were reenergized.

However, due to system stability considerations, it may not always 
be feasible to disable the automatic-reclosing feature.

V. Minimum Approach-Distance Tables

    A. Legacy tables. Employers may use the minimum approach 
distances in Table 6 through Table 13 until March 31, 2015.

                            Table 6--Minimum Approach Distances Until March 31, 2015
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                     Phase-to-ground exposure         Phase-to-phase exposure
       Voltage range phase to phase  (kV)       ----------------------------------------------------------------
                                                        m               ft               m              ft
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
0.05 to 1.0....................................           Avoid Contact
                                                          Avoid Contact
                                                ----------------------------------------------------------------
1.1 to 15.0....................................            2.10            0.64             2.20            0.66
15.1 to 36.0...................................            2.30            0.72             2.60            0.77
36.1 to 46.0...................................            2.60            0.77             2.80            0.85
46.1 to 72.5...................................            3.00            0.90             3.50            1.05
72.6 to 121....................................            3.20            0.95             4.30            1.29
138 to 145.....................................            3.60            1.09             4.90            1.50
161 to 169.....................................            4.00            1.22             5.70            1.71
230 to 242.....................................            5.30            1.59             7.50            2.27
345 to 362.....................................            8.50            2.59            12.50            3.80
500 to 550.....................................           11.30            3.42            18.10            5.50
765 to 800.....................................           14.90            4.53            26.00            7.91
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: The clear live-line tool distance must equal or exceed the values for the indicated voltage ranges.


       Table 7--Minimum Approach Distances Until March 31, 2015--72.6 to 121.0 kV With Overvoltage Factor
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                     Phase-to-ground exposure         Phase-to-phase exposure
                    T (p.u.)                    ----------------------------------------------------------------
                                                        m               ft               m              ft
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2.0............................................            0.74            2.42             1.09            3.58
2.1............................................            0.76            2.50             1.09            3.58
2.2............................................            0.79            2.58             1.12            3.67
2.3............................................            0.81            2.67             1.14            3.75
2.4............................................            0.84            2.75             1.17            3.83
2.5............................................            0.84            2.75             1.19            3.92
2.6............................................            0.86            2.83             1.22            4.00
2.7............................................            0.89            2.92             1.24            4.08
2.8............................................            0.91            3.00             1.24            4.08
2.9............................................            0.94            3.08             1.27            4.17
3.0............................................            0.97            3.17             1.30            4.25
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note 1: The employer may apply the distance specified in this table only where the employer determines the
  maximum anticipated per-unit transient overvoltage by engineering analysis. (Table 6 applies otherwise.)
Note 2: The distances specified in this table are the air, bare-hand, and live-line tool distances.


       Table 8--Minimum Approach Distances Until March 31, 2015--121.1 to 145.0 kV With Overvoltage Factor
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                     Phase-to-ground exposure         Phase-to-phase exposure
                    T (p.u.)                    ----------------------------------------------------------------
                                                        m               ft               m              ft
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2.0............................................            0.84            2.75             1.24            4.08
2.1............................................            0.86            2.83             1.27            4.17
2.2............................................            0.89            2.92             1.30            4.25
2.3............................................            0.91            3.00             1.32            4.33
2.4............................................            0.94            3.08             1.35            4.42
2.5............................................            0.97            3.17             1.37            4.50
2.6............................................            0.99            3.25             1.40            4.58
2.7............................................            1.02            3.33             1.42            4.67
2.8............................................            1.04            3.42             1.45            4.75
2.9............................................            1.07            3.50             1.47            4.83
3.0............................................            1.09            3.58             1.50            4.92
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note 1: The employer may apply the distance specified in this table only where the employer determines the
  maximum anticipated per-unit transient overvoltage by engineering analysis. (Table 6 applies otherwise.)
Note 2: The distances specified in this table are the air, bare-hand, and live-line tool distances.


[[Page 20673]]


       Table 9--Minimum Approach Distances Until March 31, 2015--145.1 to 169.0 kV With Overvoltage Factor
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                     Phase-to-ground exposure         Phase-to-phase exposure
                    T (p.u.)                    ----------------------------------------------------------------
                                                        m               ft               m              ft
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2.0............................................            0.91            3.00             1.42            4.67
2.1............................................            0.97            3.17             1.45            4.75
2.2............................................            0.99            3.25             1.47            4.83
2.3............................................            1.02            3.33             1.50            4.92
2.4............................................            1.04            3.42             1.52            5.00
2.5............................................            1.07            3.50             1.57            5.17
2.6............................................            1.12            3.67             1.60            5.25
2.7............................................            1.14            3.75             1.63            5.33
2.8............................................            1.17            3.83             1.65            5.42
2.9............................................            1.19            3.92             1.68            5.50
3.0............................................            1.22            4.00             1.73            5.67
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note 1: The employer may apply the distance specified in this table only where the employer determines the
  maximum anticipated per-unit transient overvoltage by engineering analysis. (Table 6 applies otherwise.)
Note 2: The distances specified in this table are the air, bare-hand, and live-line tool distances.


      Table 10--Minimum Approach Distances Until March 31, 2015--169.1 to 242.0 kV With Overvoltage Factor
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                     Phase-to-ground exposure         Phase-to-phase exposure
                    T (p.u.)                    ----------------------------------------------------------------
                                                        m               ft               m              ft
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2.0............................................            1.17            3.83             1.85            6.08
2.1............................................            1.22            4.00             1.91            6.25
2.2............................................            1.24            4.08             1.93            6.33
2.3............................................            1.30            4.25             1.98            6.50
2.4............................................            1.35            4.42             2.01            6.58
2.5............................................            1.37            4.50             2.06            6.75
2.6............................................            1.42            4.67             2.11            6.92
2.7............................................            1.47            4.83             2.13            7.00
2.8............................................            1.50            4.92             2.18            7.17
2.9............................................            1.55            5.08             2.24            7.33
3.0............................................            1.60            5.25             2.29            7.50
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note 1: The employer may apply the distance specified in this table only where the employer determines the
  maximum anticipated per-unit transient overvoltage by engineering analysis. (Table 6 applies otherwise.)
Note 2: The distances specified in this table are the air, bare-hand, and live-line tool distances.


      Table 11--Minimum Approach Distances Until March 31, 2015--242.1 to 362.0 kV With Overvoltage Factor
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                     Phase-to-ground exposure         Phase-to-phase exposure
                    T (p.u.)                    ----------------------------------------------------------------
                                                        m               ft               m              ft
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2.0............................................            1.60            5.25             2.62            8.58
2.1............................................            1.65            5.42             2.69            8.83
2.2............................................            1.75            5.75             2.79            9.17
2.3............................................            1.85            6.08             2.90            9.50
2.4............................................            1.93            6.33             3.02            9.92
2.5............................................            2.03            6.67             3.15           10.33
2.6............................................            2.16            7.08             3.28           10.75
2.7............................................            2.26            7.42             3.40           11.17
2.8............................................            2.36            7.75             3.53           11.58
2.9............................................            2.49            8.17             3.68           12.08
3.0............................................            2.59            8.50             3.81           12.50
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note 1: The employer may apply the distance specified in this table only where the employer determines the
  maximum anticipated per-unit transient overvoltage by engineering analysis. (Table 6 applies otherwise.)
Note 2: The distances specified in this table are the air, bare-hand, and live-line tool distances.


      Table 12--Minimum Approach Distances Until March 31, 2015--362.1 to 552.0 kV With Overvoltage Factor
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                     Phase-to-ground exposure         Phase-to-phase exposure
                    T (p.u.)                    ----------------------------------------------------------------
                                                        m               ft               m              ft
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1.5............................................            1.83            6.00             2.24            7.33
1.6............................................            1.98            6.50             2.67            8.75
1.7............................................            2.13            7.00             3.10           10.17
1.8............................................            2.31            7.58             3.53           11.58
1.9............................................            2.46            8.08             4.01           13.17
2.0............................................            2.67            8.75             4.52           14.83

[[Page 20674]]

 
2.1............................................            2.84            9.33             4.75           15.58
2.2............................................            3.02            9.92             4.98           16.33
2.3............................................            3.20           10.50             5.23           17.17
2.4............................................            3.43           11.25             5.51           18.08
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note 1: The employer may apply the distance specified in this table only where the employer determines the
  maximum anticipated per-unit transient overvoltage by engineering analysis. (Table 6 applies otherwise.)
Note 2: The distances specified in this table are the air, bare-hand, and live-line tool distances.


      Table 13--Minimum Approach Distances Until March 31, 2015--552.1 to 800.0 kV With Overvoltage Factor
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                     Phase-to-ground exposure         Phase-to-phase exposure
                    T (p.u.)                    ----------------------------------------------------------------
                                                        m               ft               m              ft
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
1.5............................................            2.95            9.67             3.68           12.08
1.6............................................            3.25           10.67             4.42           14.50
1.7............................................            3.56           11.67             5.23           17.17
1.8............................................            3.86           12.67             6.07           19.92
1.9............................................            4.19           13.75             6.99           22.92
2.0............................................            4.55           14.92             7.92           26.00
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note 1: The employer may apply the distance specified in this table only where the employer determines the
  maximum anticipated per-unit transient overvoltage by engineering analysis. (Table 6 applies otherwise.)
Note 2: The distances specified in this table are the air, bare-hand, and live-line tool distances.

    B. Alternative minimum approach distances. Employers may use the 
minimum approach distances in Table 14 through Table 21 provided 
that the employer follows the notes to those tables.

                            Table 14--AC Minimum Approach Distances--72.6 to 121.0 kV
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                     Phase-to-ground exposure         Phase-to-phase exposure
                    T (p.u.)                    ----------------------------------------------------------------
                                                        m               ft               m              ft
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1.5............................................            0.67             2.2             0.84             2.8
1.6............................................            0.69             2.3             0.87             2.9
1.7............................................            0.71             2.3             0.90             3.0
1.8............................................            0.74             2.4             0.93             3.1
1.9............................................            0.76             2.5             0.96             3.1
2.0............................................            0.78             2.6             0.99             3.2
2.1............................................            0.81             2.7             1.01             3.3
2.2............................................            0.83             2.7             1.04             3.4
2.3............................................            0.85             2.8             1.07             3.5
2.4............................................            0.88             2.9             1.10             3.6
2.5............................................            0.90             3.0             1.13             3.7
2.6............................................            0.92             3.0             1.16             3.8
2.7............................................            0.95             3.1             1.19             3.9
2.8............................................            0.97             3.2             1.22             4.0
2.9............................................            0.99             3.2             1.24             4.1
3.0............................................            1.02             3.3             1.27             4.2
3.1............................................            1.04             3.4             1.30             4.3
3.2............................................            1.06             3.5             1.33             4.4
3.3............................................            1.09             3.6             1.36             4.5
3.4............................................            1.11             3.6             1.39             4.6
3.5............................................            1.13             3.7             1.42             4.7
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                           Table 15--AC Minimum Approach Distances--121.1 to 145.0 kV
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                     Phase-to-ground exposure         Phase-to-phase exposure
                    T (p.u.)                    ----------------------------------------------------------------
                                                        m               ft               m              ft
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1.5............................................            0.74             2.4             0.95             3.1
1.6............................................            0.76             2.5             0.98             3.2
1.7............................................            0.79             2.6             1.02             3.3

[[Page 20675]]

 
1.8............................................            0.82             2.7             1.05             3.4
1.9............................................            0.85             2.8             1.08             3.5
2.0............................................            0.88             2.9             1.12             3.7
2.1............................................            0.90             3.0             1.15             3.8
2.2............................................            0.93             3.1             1.19             3.9
2.3............................................            0.96             3.1             1.22             4.0
2.4............................................            0.99             3.2             1.26             4.1
2.5............................................            1.02             3.3             1.29             4.2
2.6............................................            1.04             3.4             1.33             4.4
2.7............................................            1.07             3.5             1.36             4.5
2.8............................................            1.10             3.6             1.39             4.6
2.9............................................            1.13             3.7             1.43             4.7
3.0............................................            1.16             3.8             1.46             4.8
3.1............................................            1.19             3.9             1.50             4.9
3.2............................................            1.21             4.0             1.53             5.0
3.3............................................            1.24             4.1             1.57             5.2
3.4............................................            1.27             4.2             1.60             5.2
3.5............................................            1.30             4.3             1.64             5.4
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                           Table 16--AC Minimum Approach Distances--145.1 to 169.0 kV
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                     Phase-to-ground exposure         Phase-to-phase exposure
                    T (p.u.)                    ----------------------------------------------------------------
                                                        m               ft               m              ft
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1.5............................................            0.81             2.7             1.05             3.4
1.6............................................            0.84             2.8             1.09             3.6
1.7............................................            0.87             2.9             1.13             3.7
1.8............................................            0.90             3.0             1.17             3.8
1.9............................................            0.94             3.1             1.21             4.0
2.0............................................            0.97             3.2             1.25             4.1
2.1............................................            1.00             3.3             1.29             4.2
2.2............................................            1.03             3.4             1.33             4.4
2.3............................................            1.07             3.5             1.37             4.5
2.4............................................            1.10             3.6             1.41             4.6
2.5............................................            1.13             3.7             1.45             4.8
2.6............................................            1.17             3.8             1.49             4.9
2.7............................................            1.20             3.9             1.53             5.0
2.8............................................            1.23             4.0             1.57             5.2
2.9............................................            1.26             4.1             1.61             5.3
3.0............................................            1.30             4.3             1.65             5.4
3.1............................................            1.33             4.4             1.70             5.6
3.2............................................            1.36             4.5             1.76             5.8
3.3............................................            1.39             4.6             1.82             6.0
3.4............................................            1.43             4.7             1.88             6.2
3.5............................................            1.46             4.8             1.94             6.4
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                           Table 17--AC Minimum Approach Distances--169.1 to 242.0 kV
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                     Phase-to-ground exposure         Phase-to-phase exposure
                    T (p.u.)                    ----------------------------------------------------------------
                                                        m               ft               m              ft
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1.5............................................            1.02             3.3             1.37             4.5
1.6............................................            1.06             3.5             1.43             4.7
1.7............................................            1.11             3.6             1.48             4.9
1.8............................................            1.16             3.8             1.54             5.1
1.9............................................            1.21             4.0             1.60             5.2
2.0............................................            1.25             4.1             1.66             5.4
2.1............................................            1.30             4.3             1.73             5.7
2.2............................................            1.35             4.4             1.81             5.9
2.3............................................            1.39             4.6             1.90             6.2
2.4............................................            1.44             4.7             1.99             6.5
2.5............................................            1.49             4.9             2.08             6.8
2.6............................................            1.53             5.0             2.17             7.1
2.7............................................            1.58             5.2             2.26             7.4
2.8............................................            1.63             5.3             2.36             7.7
2.9............................................            1.67             5.5             2.45             8.0
3.0............................................            1.72             5.6             2.55             8.4

[[Page 20676]]

 
3.1............................................            1.77             5.8             2.65             8.7
3.2............................................            1.81             5.9             2.76             9.1
3.3............................................            1.88             6.2             2.86             9.4
3.4............................................            1.95             6.4             2.97             9.7
3.5............................................            2.01             6.6             3.08            10.1
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                           Table 18--AC Minimum Approach Distances--242.1 to 362.0 kV
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                     Phase-to-ground exposure         Phase-to-phase exposure
                    T (p.u.)                    ----------------------------------------------------------------
                                                        m               ft               m              ft
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1.5............................................            1.37             4.5             1.99             6.5
1.6............................................            1.44             4.7             2.13             7.0
1.7............................................            1.51             5.0             2.27             7.4
1.8............................................            1.58             5.2             2.41             7.9
1.9............................................            1.65             5.4             2.56             8.4
2.0............................................            1.72             5.6             2.71             8.9
2.1............................................            1.79             5.9             2.87             9.4
2.2............................................            1.87             6.1             3.03             9.9
2.3............................................            1.97             6.5             3.20            10.5
2.4............................................            2.08             6.8             3.37            11.1
2.5............................................            2.19             7.2             3.55            11.6
2.6............................................            2.29             7.5             3.73            12.2
2.7............................................            2.41             7.9             3.91            12.8
2.8............................................            2.52             8.3             4.10            13.5
2.9............................................            2.64             8.7             4.29            14.1
3.0............................................            2.76             9.1             4.49            14.7
3.1............................................            2.88             9.4             4.69            15.4
3.2............................................            3.01             9.9             4.90            16.1
3.3............................................            3.14            10.3             5.11            16.8
3.4............................................            3.27            10.7             5.32            17.5
3.5............................................            3.41            11.2             5.52            18.1
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                           Table 19--AC Minimum Approach Distances--362.1 to 420.0 kV
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                     Phase-to-ground exposure         Phase-to-phase exposure
                    T (p.u.)                    ----------------------------------------------------------------
                                                        m               ft               m              ft
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1.5............................................            1.53             5.0             2.40             7.9
1.6............................................            1.62             5.3             2.58             8.5
1.7............................................            1.70             5.6             2.75             9.0
1.8............................................            1.78             5.8             2.94             9.6
1.9............................................            1.88             6.2             3.13            10.3
2.0............................................            1.99             6.5             3.33            10.9
2.1............................................            2.12             7.0             3.53            11.6
2.2............................................            2.24             7.3             3.74            12.3
2.3............................................            2.37             7.8             3.95            13.0
2.4............................................            2.50             8.2             4.17            13.7
2.5............................................            2.64             8.7             4.40            14.4
2.6............................................            2.78             9.1             4.63            15.2
2.7............................................            2.93             9.6             4.87            16.0
2.8............................................            3.07            10.1             5.11            16.8
2.9............................................            3.23            10.6             5.36            17.6
3.0............................................            3.38            11.1             5.59            18.3
3.1............................................            3.55            11.6             5.82            19.1
3.2............................................            3.72            12.2             6.07            19.9
3.3............................................            3.89            12.8             6.31            20.7
3.4............................................            4.07            13.4             6.56            21.5
3.5............................................            4.25            13.9             6.81            22.3
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


[[Page 20677]]


                           Table 20--AC Minimum Approach Distances--420.1 to 550.0 kV
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                     Phase-to-ground exposure         Phase-to-phase exposure
                    T (p.u.)                    ----------------------------------------------------------------
                                                        m               ft               m              ft
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1.5............................................            1.95             6.4             3.46            11.4
1.6............................................            2.11             6.9             3.73            12.2
1.7............................................            2.28             7.5             4.02            13.2
1.8............................................            2.45             8.0             4.31            14.1
1.9............................................            2.62             8.6             4.61            15.1
2.0............................................            2.81             9.2             4.92            16.1
2.1............................................            3.00             9.8             5.25            17.2
2.2............................................            3.20            10.5             5.55            18.2
2.3............................................            3.40            11.2             5.86            19.2
2.4............................................            3.62            11.9             6.18            20.3
2.5............................................            3.84            12.6             6.50            21.3
2.6............................................            4.07            13.4             6.83            22.4
2.7............................................            4.31            14.1             7.18            23.6
2.8............................................            4.56            15.0             7.52            24.7
2.9............................................            4.81            15.8             7.88            25.9
3.0............................................            5.07            16.6             8.24            27.0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                           Table 21--AC Minimum Approach Distances--550.1 to 800.0 kV
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                     Phase-to-ground exposure         Phase-to-phase exposure
                    T (p.u.)                    ----------------------------------------------------------------
                                                        m               ft               m              ft
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1.5............................................            3.16            10.4             5.97            19.6
1.6............................................            3.46            11.4             6.43            21.1
1.7............................................            3.78            12.4             6.92            22.7
1.8............................................            4.12            13.5             7.42            24.3
1.9............................................            4.47            14.7             7.93            26.0
2.0............................................            4.83            15.8             8.47            27.8
2.1............................................            5.21            17.1             9.02            29.6
2.2............................................            5.61            18.4             9.58            31.4
2.3............................................            6.02            19.8            10.16            33.3
2.4............................................            6.44            21.1            10.76            35.3
2.5............................................            6.88            22.6            11.38            37.3
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes to Table 14 through Table 21:
1. The employer must determine the maximum anticipated per-unit transient overvoltage, phase-to-ground, through
  an engineering analysis, as required by Sec.   1910.269(l)(3)(ii), or assume a maximum anticipated per-unit
  transient overvoltage, phase-to-ground, in accordance with Table R-9.
2. For phase-to-phase exposures, the employer must demonstrate that no insulated tool spans the gap and that no
  large conductive object is in the gap.
3. The worksite must be at an elevation of 900 meters (3,000 feet) or less above sea level.

Appendix C to Sec.  1910.269--Protection From Hazardous Differences in 
Electric Potential

I. Introduction

    Current passing through an impedance impresses voltage across 
that impedance. Even conductors have some, albeit low, value of 
impedance. Therefore, if a ``grounded'' \14\ object, such as a crane 
or deenergized and grounded power line, results in a ground fault on 
a power line, voltage is impressed on that grounded object. The 
voltage impressed on the grounded object depends largely on the 
voltage on the line, on the impedance of the faulted conductor, and 
on the impedance to ``true,'' or ``absolute,'' ground represented by 
the object. If the impedance of the object causing the fault is 
relatively large, the voltage impressed on the object is essentially 
the phase-to-ground system voltage. However, even faults to grounded 
power lines or to well grounded transmission towers or substation 
structures (which have relatively low values of impedance to ground) 
can result in hazardous voltages.\15\ In all cases, the degree of 
the hazard depends on the magnitude of the current through the 
employee and the time of exposure. This appendix discusses methods 
of protecting workers against the possibility that grounded objects, 
such as cranes and other mechanical equipment, will contact 
energized power lines and that deenergized and grounded power lines 
will become accidentally energized.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \14\ This appendix generally uses the term ``grounded'' only 
with respect to grounding that the employer intentionally installs, 
for example, the grounding an employer installs on a deenergized 
conductor. However, in this case, the term ``grounded'' means 
connected to earth, regardless of whether or not that connection is 
intentional.
    \15\ Thus, grounding systems for transmission towers and 
substation structures should be designed to minimize the step and 
touch potentials involved.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

II. Voltage-Gradient Distribution

    A. Voltage-gradient distribution curve. Absolute, or true, 
ground serves as a reference and always has a voltage of 0 volts 
above ground potential. Because there is an impedance between a 
grounding electrode and absolute ground, there will be a voltage 
difference between the grounding electrode and absolute ground under 
ground-fault conditions. Voltage dissipates from the grounding 
electrode (or from the grounding point) and creates a ground 
potential gradient. The voltage decreases rapidly with increasing 
distance from the grounding electrode. A voltage drop associated 
with this dissipation of voltage is a ground potential. Figure 1 is 
a typical voltage-gradient distribution curve (assuming a uniform 
soil texture).
BILLING CODE 4510-26-P

[[Page 20678]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR11AP14.028

    B. Step and touch potentials. Figure 1 also shows that workers 
are at risk from step and touch potentials. Step potential is the 
voltage between the feet of a person standing near an energized 
grounded object (the electrode). In Figure 1, the step potential is 
equal to the difference in voltage between two points at different 
distances from the electrode (where the points represent the 
location of each foot in relation to the electrode). A person could 
be at risk of injury during a fault simply by standing near the 
object.
    Touch potential is the voltage between the energized grounded 
object (again, the electrode) and the feet of a person in contact

[[Page 20679]]

with the object. In Figure 1, the touch potential is equal to the 
difference in voltage between the electrode (which is at a distance 
of 0 meters) and a point some distance away from the electrode 
(where the point represents the location of the feet of the person 
in contact with the object). The touch potential could be nearly the 
full voltage across the grounded object if that object is grounded 
at a point remote from the place where the person is in contact with 
it. For example, a crane grounded to the system neutral and that 
contacts an energized line would expose any person in contact with 
the crane or its uninsulated load line to a touch potential nearly 
equal to the full fault voltage.
    Figure 2 illustrates step and touch potentials.
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR11AP14.029
    
III. Protecting Workers From Hazardous Differences in Electrical 
Potential

    A. Definitions. The following definitions apply to section III 
of this appendix:
    Bond. The electrical interconnection of conductive parts 
designed to maintain a common electric potential.
    Bonding cable (bonding jumper). A cable connected to two 
conductive parts to bond the parts together.
    Cluster bar. A terminal temporarily attached to a structure that 
provides a means for the attachment and bonding of grounding and 
bonding cables to the structure.
    Ground. A conducting connection between an electric circuit or 
equipment and the earth, or to some conducting body that serves in 
place of the earth.
    Grounding cable (grounding jumper). A cable connected between a 
deenergized part and ground. Note that grounding cables carry fault 
current and bonding cables generally do

[[Page 20680]]

not. A cable that bonds two conductive parts but carries substantial 
fault current (for example, a jumper connected between one phase and 
a grounded phase) is a grounding cable.
    Ground mat (grounding grid). A temporarily or permanently 
installed metallic mat or grating that establishes an equipotential 
surface and provides connection points for attaching grounds.
    B. Analyzing the hazard. The employer can use an engineering 
analysis of the power system under fault conditions to determine 
whether hazardous step and touch voltages will develop. The analysis 
should determine the voltage on all conductive objects in the work 
area and the amount of time the voltage will be present. Based on 
the this analysis, the employer can select appropriate measures and 
protective equipment, including the measures and protective 
equipment outlined in Section III of this appendix, to protect each 
employee from hazardous differences in electric potential. For 
example, from the analysis, the employer will know the voltage 
remaining on conductive objects after employees install bonding and 
grounding equipment and will be able to select insulating equipment 
with an appropriate rating, as described in paragraph III.C.2 of 
this appendix.
    C. Protecting workers on the ground. The employer may use 
several methods, including equipotential zones, insulating 
equipment, and restricted work areas, to protect employees on the 
ground from hazardous differences in electrical potential.
    1. An equipotential zone will protect workers within it from 
hazardous step and touch potentials. (See Figure 3.) Equipotential 
zones will not, however, protect employees located either wholly or 
partially outside the protected area. The employer can establish an 
equipotential zone for workers on the ground, with respect to a 
grounded object, through the use of a metal mat connected to the 
grounded object. The employer can use a grounding grid to equalize 
the voltage within the grid or bond conductive objects in the 
immediate work area to minimize the potential between the objects 
and between each object and ground. (Bonding an object outside the 
work area can increase the touch potential to that object, however.) 
Section III.D of this appendix discusses equipotential zones for 
employees working on deenergized and grounded power lines.
    2. Insulating equipment, such as rubber gloves, can protect 
employees handling grounded equipment and conductors from hazardous 
touch potentials. The insulating equipment must be rated for the 
highest voltage that can be impressed on the grounded objects under 
fault conditions (rather than for the full system voltage).
    3. Restricting employees from areas where hazardous step or 
touch potentials could arise can protect employees not directly 
involved in performing the operation. The employer must ensure that 
employees on the ground in the vicinity of transmission structures 
are at a distance where step voltages would be insufficient to cause 
injury. Employees must not handle grounded conductors or equipment 
likely to become energized to hazardous voltages unless the 
employees are within an equipotential zone or protected by 
insulating equipment.

[[Page 20681]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR11AP14.030

BILLING CODE 4510-25-C
    D. Protecting employees working on deenergized and grounded 
power lines. This Section III.D of Appendix C establishes guidelines 
to help employers comply with requirements in Sec.  1910.269(n) for 
using protective grounding to protect employees working on 
deenergized power lines. Paragraph (n) of Sec.  1910.269 applies to 
grounding of transmission and distribution lines and equipment for 
the purpose of protecting workers. Paragraph (n)(3) of Sec.  
1910.269 requires temporary protective grounds to be placed at such 
locations and arranged in such a manner that the employer can 
demonstrate will prevent exposure of each employee to hazardous 
differences in electric potential.\16\ Sections III.D.1 and III.D.2 
of this appendix provide guidelines that employers can use in making 
the demonstration required by Sec.  1910.269(n)(3). Section III.D.1 
of this appendix provides guidelines on how the employer can 
determine whether particular grounding practices expose employees to 
hazardous differences in electric potential. Section III.D.2 of this 
appendix describes grounding methods that the employer can use in 
lieu of an engineering analysis to make the demonstration required 
by Sec.  1910.269(n)(3). The Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration will consider employers that comply with the criteria 
in this appendix as meeting Sec.  1910.269(n)(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \16\ The protective grounding required by Sec.  1910.269(n) 
limits to safe values the potential differences between accessible 
objects in each employee's work environment. Ideally, a protective 
grounding system would create a true equipotential zone in which 
every point is at the same electric potential. In practice, current 
passing through the grounding and bonding elements creates potential 
differences. If these potential differences are hazardous, the 
employer may not treat the zone as an equipotential zone.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, Section III.D.3 of this appendix discusses other safety 
considerations that will help the employer comply with other 
requirements in Sec.  1910.269(n). Following these guidelines will 
protect workers from hazards that can occur when a deenergized and 
grounded line becomes energized.
    1. Determining safe body current limits. This Section III.D.1 of 
Appendix C provides guidelines on how an employer can determine 
whether any differences in electric potential to which workers could 
be exposed are hazardous as part of the demonstration required by 
Sec.  1910.269(n)(3).

[[Page 20682]]

    Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) Standard 
1048-2003, IEEE Guide for Protective Grounding of Power Lines, 
provides the following equation for determining the threshold of 
ventricular fibrillation when the duration of the electric shock is 
limited:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR11AP14.031

where I is the current through the worker's body, and t is the 
duration of the current in seconds. This equation represents the 
ventricular fibrillation threshold for 95.5 percent of the adult 
population with a mass of 50 kilograms (110 pounds) or more. The 
equation is valid for current durations between 0.0083 to 3.0 
seconds.
    To use this equation to set safe voltage limits in an 
equipotential zone around the worker, the employer will need to 
assume a value for the resistance of the worker's body. IEEE Std 
1048-2003 states that ``total body resistance is usually taken as 
1000 [Omega] for determining . . . body current limits.'' However, 
employers should be aware that the impedance of a worker's body can 
be substantially less than that value. For instance, IEEE Std 1048-
2003 reports a minimum hand-to-hand resistance of 610 ohms and an 
internal body resistance of 500 ohms. The internal resistance of the 
body better represents the minimum resistance of a worker's body 
when the skin resistance drops near zero, which occurs, for example, 
when there are breaks in the worker's skin, for instance, from cuts 
or from blisters formed as a result of the current from an electric 
shock, or when the worker is wet at the points of contact.
    Employers may use the IEEE Std 1048-2003 equation to determine 
safe body current limits only if the employer protects workers from 
hazards associated with involuntary muscle reactions from electric 
shock (for example, the hazard to a worker from falling as a result 
of an electric shock). Moreover, the equation applies only when the 
duration of the electric shock is limited. If the precautions the 
employer takes, including those required by applicable standards, do 
not adequately protect employees from hazards associated with 
involuntary reactions from electric shock, a hazard exists if the 
induced voltage is sufficient to pass a current of 1 milliampere 
through a 500-ohm resistor. (The 500-ohm resistor represents the 
resistance of an employee. The 1-milliampere current is the 
threshold of perception.) Finally, if the employer protects 
employees from injury due to involuntary reactions from electric 
shock, but the duration of the electric shock is unlimited (that is, 
when the fault current at the work location will be insufficient to 
trip the devices protecting the circuit), a hazard exists if the 
resultant current would be more than 6 milliamperes (the recognized 
let-go threshold for workers \17\).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \17\ Electric current passing through the body has varying 
effects depending on the amount of the current. At the let-go 
threshold, the current overrides a person's control over his or her 
muscles. At that level, an employee grasping an object will not be 
able to let go of the object. The let-go threshold varies from 
person to person; however, the recognized value for workers is 6 
milliamperes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    2. Acceptable methods of grounding for employers that do not 
perform an engineering determination. The grounding methods 
presented in this section of this appendix ensure that differences 
in electric potential are as low as possible and, therefore, meet 
Sec.  1910.269(n)(3) without an engineering determination of the 
potential differences. These methods follow two principles: (i) The 
grounding method must ensure that the circuit opens in the fastest 
available clearing time, and (ii) the grounding method must ensure 
that the potential differences between conductive objects in the 
employee's work area are as low as possible.
    Paragraph (n)(3) of Sec.  1910.269 does not require grounding 
methods to meet the criteria embodied in these principles. Instead, 
the paragraph requires that protective grounds be ``placed at such 
locations and arranged in such a manner that the employer can 
demonstrate will prevent exposure of each employee to hazardous 
differences in electric potential.'' However, when the employer's 
grounding practices do not follow these two principles, the employer 
will need to perform an engineering analysis to make the 
demonstration required by Sec.  1910.269(n)(3).
    i. Ensuring that the circuit opens in the fastest available 
clearing time. Generally, the higher the fault current, the shorter 
the clearing times for the same type of fault. Therefore, to ensure 
the fastest available clearing time, the grounding method must 
maximize the fault current with a low impedance connection to 
ground. The employer accomplishes this objective by grounding the 
circuit conductors to the best ground available at the worksite. 
Thus, the employer must ground to a grounded system neutral 
conductor, if one is present. A grounded system neutral has a direct 
connection to the system ground at the source, resulting in an 
extremely low impedance to ground. In a substation, the employer may 
instead ground to the substation grid, which also has an extremely 
low impedance to the system ground and, typically, is connected to a 
grounded system neutral when one is present. Remote system grounds, 
such as pole and tower grounds, have a higher impedance to the 
system ground than grounded system neutrals and substation grounding 
grids; however, the employer may use a remote ground when lower 
impedance grounds are not available. In the absence of a grounded 
system neutral, substation grid, and remote ground, the employer may 
use a temporary driven ground at the worksite.
    In addition, if employees are working on a three-phase system, 
the grounding method must short circuit all three phases. Short 
circuiting all phases will ensure faster clearing and lower the 
current through the grounding cable connecting the deenergized line 
to ground, thereby lowering the voltage across that cable. The short 
circuit need not be at the worksite; however, the employer must 
treat any conductor that is not grounded at the worksite as 
energized because the ungrounded conductors will be energized at 
fault voltage during a fault.
    ii. Ensuring that the potential differences between conductive 
objects in the employee's work area are as low as possible. To 
achieve as low a voltage as possible across any two conductive 
objects in the work area, the employer must bond all conductive 
objects in the work area. This section of this appendix discusses 
how to create a zone that minimizes differences in electric 
potential between conductive objects in the work area.
    The employer must use bonding cables to bond conductive objects, 
except for metallic objects bonded through metal-to-metal contact. 
The employer must ensure that metal-to-metal contacts are tight and 
free of contamination, such as oxidation, that can increase the 
impedance across the connection. For example, a bolted connection 
between metal lattice tower members is acceptable if the connection 
is tight and free of corrosion and other contamination. Figure 4 
shows how to create an equipotential zone for metal lattice towers.
    Wood poles are conductive objects. The poles can absorb moisture 
and conduct electricity, particularly at distribution and 
transmission voltages. Consequently, the employer must either: (1) 
Provide a conductive platform, bonded to a grounding cable, on which 
the worker stands or (2) use cluster bars to bond wood poles to the 
grounding cable. The employer must ensure that employees install the 
cluster bar below, and close to, the worker's feet. The inner 
portion of the wood pole is more conductive than the outer shell, so 
it is important that the cluster bar be in conductive contact with a 
metal spike or nail that penetrates the wood to a depth greater than 
or equal to the depth the worker's climbing gaffs will penetrate the 
wood. For example, the employer could mount the cluster bar on a 
bare pole ground wire fastened to the pole with nails or staples 
that penetrate to the required depth. Alternatively, the employer 
may temporarily nail a conductive strap to the pole and connect the 
strap to the cluster bar. Figure 5 shows how to create an 
equipotential zone for wood poles.
BILLING CODE 4510-26-P

[[Page 20683]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR11AP14.032


[[Page 20684]]


[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR11AP14.033

BILLING CODE 4510-26-C
    For underground systems, employers commonly install grounds at 
the points of disconnection of the underground cables. These 
grounding points are typically remote from the manhole or 
underground vault where employees will be working on the cable. 
Workers in contact with a cable grounded at a remote location can 
experience hazardous potential differences if the cable becomes 
energized or if a fault occurs on a different, but nearby, energized 
cable. The fault current causes potential gradients in the earth, 
and a potential difference will exist between the earth where the 
worker is standing and the earth where the cable is grounded. 
Consequently, to create an equipotential zone for the worker, the 
employer must provide a means of connecting the deenergized cable to 
ground at the worksite by having the worker stand on a conductive 
mat bonded to the deenergized cable. If the cable is cut, the 
employer must install a bond across the opening in the cable or 
install one bond on each side of the opening to ensure that the 
separate cable ends are at the same potential. The employer must 
protect the worker from any hazardous differences in potential any 
time there is no bond between the mat and the cable (for example, 
before the worker installs the bonds).
    3. Other safety-related considerations. To ensure that the 
grounding system is safe and effective, the employer should also 
consider the following factors: \18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \18\ This appendix only discusses factors that relate to 
ensuring an equipotential zone for employees. The employer must 
consider other factors in selecting a grounding system that is 
capable of conducting the maximum fault current that could flow at 
the point of grounding for the time necessary to clear the fault, as 
required by Sec.  1910.269(n)(4)(i). IEEE Std 1048-2003 contains 
guidelines for selecting and installing grounding equipment that 
will meet Sec.  1910.269(n)(4)(i).

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 20685]]

    i. Maintenance of grounding equipment. It is essential that the 
employer properly maintain grounding equipment. Corrosion in the 
connections between grounding cables and clamps and on the clamp 
surface can increase the resistance of the cable, thereby increasing 
potential differences. In addition, the surface to which a clamp 
attaches, such as a conductor or tower member, must be clean and 
free of corrosion and oxidation to ensure a low-resistance 
connection. Cables must be free of damage that could reduce their 
current-carrying capacity so that they can carry the full fault 
current without failure. Each clamp must have a tight connection to 
the cable to ensure a low resistance and to ensure that the clamp 
does not separate from the cable during a fault.
    ii. Grounding cable length and movement. The electromagnetic 
forces on grounding cables during a fault increase with increasing 
cable length. These forces can cause the cable to move violently 
during a fault and can be high enough to damage the cable or clamps 
and cause the cable to fail. In addition, flying cables can injure 
workers. Consequently, cable lengths should be as short as possible, 
and grounding cables that might carry high fault current should be 
in positions where the cables will not injure workers during a 
fault.

Appendix D to Sec.  1910.269--Methods of Inspecting and Testing Wood 
Poles

I. Introduction

    When employees are to perform work on a wood pole, it is 
important to determine the condition of the pole before employees 
climb it. The weight of the employee, the weight of equipment to be 
installed, and other working stresses (such as the removal or 
retensioning of conductors) can lead to the failure of a defective 
pole or a pole that is not designed to handle the additional 
stresses.\19\ For these reasons, it is essential that, before an 
employee climbs a wood pole, the employer ascertain that the pole is 
capable of sustaining the stresses of the work. The determination 
that the pole is capable of sustaining these stresses includes an 
inspection of the condition of the pole.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \19\ A properly guyed pole in good condition should, at a 
minimum, be able to handle the weight of an employee climbing it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    If the employer finds the pole to be unsafe to climb or to work 
from, the employer must secure the pole so that it does not fail 
while an employee is on it. The employer can secure the pole by a 
line truck boom, by ropes or guys, or by lashing a new pole 
alongside it. If a new one is lashed alongside the defective pole, 
employees should work from the new one.

II. Inspecting Wood Poles

    A qualified employee should inspect wood poles for the following 
conditions: \20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \20\ The presence of any of these conditions is an indication 
that the pole may not be safe to climb or to work from. The employee 
performing the inspection must be qualified to make a determination 
as to whether it is safe to perform the work without taking 
additional precautions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A. General condition. Buckling at the ground line or an unusual 
angle with respect to the ground may indicate that the pole has 
rotted or is broken.
    B. Cracks. Horizontal cracks perpendicular to the grain of the 
wood may weaken the pole. Vertical cracks, although not normally 
considered to be a sign of a defective pole, can pose a hazard to 
the climber, and the employee should keep his or her gaffs away from 
them while climbing.
    C. Holes. Hollow spots and woodpecker holes can reduce the 
strength of a wood pole.
    D. Shell rot and decay. Rotting and decay are cutout hazards and 
possible indications of the age and internal condition of the pole.
    E. Knots. One large knot or several smaller ones at the same 
height on the pole may be evidence of a weak point on the pole.
    F. Depth of setting. Evidence of the existence of a former 
ground line substantially above the existing ground level may be an 
indication that the pole is no longer buried to a sufficient depth.
    G. Soil conditions. Soft, wet, or loose soil around the base of 
the pole may indicate that the pole will not support any change in 
stress.
    H. Burn marks. Burning from transformer failures or conductor 
faults could damage the pole so that it cannot withstand changes in 
mechanical stress.

III. Testing Wood Poles

    The following tests, which are from Sec.  1910.268(n)(3), are 
acceptable methods of testing wood poles:
    A. Hammer test. Rap the pole sharply with a hammer weighing 
about 1.4 kg (3 pounds), starting near the ground line and 
continuing upwards circumferentially around the pole to a height of 
approximately 1.8 meters (6 feet). The hammer will produce a clear 
sound and rebound sharply when striking sound wood. Decay pockets 
will be indicated by a dull sound or a less pronounced hammer 
rebound. Also, prod the pole as near the ground line as possible 
using a pole prod or a screwdriver with a blade at least 127 
millimeters (5 inches) long. If substantial decay is present, the 
pole is unsafe.
    B. Rocking test. Apply a horizontal force to the pole and 
attempt to rock it back and forth in a direction perpendicular to 
the line. Exercise caution to avoid causing power lines to swing 
together. Apply the force to the pole either by pushing it with a 
pike pole or pulling the pole with a rope. If the pole cracks during 
the test, it is unsafe.

Appendix E to Sec.  1910.269--Protection From Flames and Electric Arcs

I. Introduction

    Paragraph (l)(8) of Sec.  1910.269 addresses protecting 
employees from flames and electric arcs. This paragraph requires 
employers to: (1) Assess the workplace for flame and electric-arc 
hazards (paragraph (l)(8)(i)); (2) estimate the available heat 
energy from electric arcs to which employees would be exposed 
(paragraph (l)(8)(ii)); (3) ensure that employees wear clothing that 
will not melt, or ignite and continue to burn, when exposed to 
flames or the estimated heat energy (paragraph (l)(8)(iii)); and (4) 
ensure that employees wear flame-resistant clothing \21\ and 
protective clothing and other protective equipment that has an arc 
rating greater than or equal to the available heat energy under 
certain conditions (paragraphs (l)(8)(iv) and (l)(8)(v)). This 
appendix contains information to help employers estimate available 
heat energy as required by Sec.  1910.269(l)(8)(ii), select 
protective clothing and other protective equipment with an arc 
rating suitable for the available heat energy as required by Sec.  
1910.269(l)(8)(v), and ensure that employees do not wear flammable 
clothing that could lead to burn injury as addressed by Sec. Sec.  
1910.269(l)(8)(iii) and (l)(8)(iv).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \21\ Flame-resistant clothing includes clothing that is 
inherently flame resistant and clothing chemically treated with a 
flame retardant. (See ASTM F1506-10a, Standard Performance 
Specification for Flame Resistant Textile Materials for Wearing 
Apparel for Use by Electrical Workers Exposed to Momentary Electric 
Arc and Related Thermal Hazards, and ASTM F1891-12 Standard 
Specification for Arc and Flame Resistant Rainwear.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

II. Assessing the Workplace for Flame and Electric-Arc Hazards

    Paragraph (l)(8)(i) of Sec.  1910.269 requires the employer to 
assess the workplace to identify employees exposed to hazards from 
flames or from electric arcs. This provision ensures that the 
employer evaluates employee exposure to flames and electric arcs so 
that employees who face such exposures receive the required 
protection. The employer must conduct an assessment for each 
employee who performs work on or near exposed, energized parts of 
electric circuits.

A. Assessment Guidelines

    Sources electric arcs. Consider possible sources of electric 
arcs, including:
     Energized circuit parts not guarded or insulated,
     Switching devices that produce electric arcs in normal 
operation,
     Sliding parts that could fault during operation (for 
example, rack-mounted circuit breakers), and
     Energized electric equipment that could fail (for 
example, electric equipment with damaged insulation or with evidence 
of arcing or overheating).
    Exposure to flames. Identify employees exposed to hazards from 
flames. Factors to consider include:
     The proximity of employees to open flames, and
     For flammable material in the work area, whether there 
is a reasonable likelihood that an electric arc or an open flame can 
ignite the material.
    Probability that an electric arc will occur. Identify employees 
exposed to electric-arc hazards. The Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration will consider an employee exposed to electric-arc 
hazards if there is a reasonable likelihood that an electric arc 
will occur in the employee's work area, in other words, if the 
probability of such an event is higher than it is for the normal 
operation of enclosed equipment. Factors to consider include:
     For energized circuit parts not guarded or insulated, 
whether conductive objects can

[[Page 20686]]

come too close to or fall onto the energized parts,
     For exposed, energized circuit parts, whether the 
employee is closer to the part than the minimum approach distance 
established by the employer (as permitted by Sec.  
1910.269(l)(3)(iii)).
     Whether the operation of electric equipment with 
sliding parts that could fault during operation is part of the 
normal operation of the equipment or occurs during servicing or 
maintenance, and
     For energized electric equipment, whether there is 
evidence of impending failure, such as evidence of arcing or 
overheating.

B. Examples

    Table 1 provides task-based examples of exposure assessments.

                                 Table 1--Example Assessments for Various Tasks
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   Task                                    Is employee exposed to flame or
                                                                            electric-arc hazard?
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Normal operation of enclosed equipment,   The employer properly installs   No.
 such as closing or opening a switch.      and maintains enclosed
                                           equipment, and there is no
                                           evidence of impending failure.
                                          There is evidence of arcing or   Yes.
                                           overheating.
                                          Parts of the equipment are       Yes.
                                           loose or sticking, or the
                                           equipment otherwise exhibits
                                           signs of lack of maintenance.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Servicing electric equipment, such as racking in a circuit breaker or      Yes.
 replacing a switch.
-----------------------------------------
Inspection of electric equipment with     The employee is not holding      No.
 exposed energized parts.                  conductive objects and remains
                                           outside the minimum approach
                                           distance established by the
                                           employer.
                                          The employee is holding a        Yes.
                                           conductive object, such as a
                                           flashlight, that could fall or
                                           otherwise contact energized
                                           parts (irrespective of whether
                                           the employee maintains the
                                           minimum approach distance).
                                          The employee is closer than the  Yes.
                                           minimum approach distance
                                           established by the employer
                                           (for example, when wearing
                                           rubber insulating gloves or
                                           rubber insulating gloves and
                                           sleeves).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Using open flames, for example, in wiping cable splice sleeves...........  Yes.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

III. Protection Against Burn Injury

A. Estimating Available Heat Energy

    Calculation methods. Paragraph (l)(8)(ii) of Sec.  1910.269 
provides that, for each employee exposed to an electric-arc hazard, 
the employer must make a reasonable estimate of the heat energy to 
which the employee would be exposed if an arc occurs. Table 2 lists 
various methods of calculating values of available heat energy from 
an electric circuit. The Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration does not endorse any of these specific methods. Each 
method requires the input of various parameters, such as fault 
current, the expected length of the electric arc, the distance from 
the arc to the employee, and the clearing time for the fault (that 
is, the time the circuit protective devices take to open the circuit 
and clear the fault). The employer can precisely determine some of 
these parameters, such as the fault current and the clearing time, 
for a given system. The employer will need to estimate other 
parameters, such as the length of the arc and the distance between 
the arc and the employee, because such parameters vary widely.

  Table 2--Methods of Calculating Incident Heat Energy From an Electric
                                   Arc
------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Standard for Electrical Safety Requirements for Employee Workplaces,
 NFPA 70E-2012, Annex D, ``Sample Calculation of Flash Protection
 Boundary.''
2. Doughty, T.E., Neal, T.E., and Floyd II, H.L., ``Predicting Incident
 Energy to Better Manage the Electric Arc Hazard on 600 V Power
 Distribution Systems,'' Record of Conference Papers IEEE IAS 45th
 Annual Petroleum and Chemical Industry Conference, September 28-30,
 1998.
3. Guide for Performing Arc-Flash Hazard Calculations, IEEE Std 1584-
 2002, 1584a-2004 (Amendment 1 to IEEE Std 1584-2002), and 1584b-2011
 (Amendment 2: Changes to Clause 4 of IEEE Std 1584-2002).*
4. ARCPRO, a commercially available software program developed by
 Kinectrics, Toronto, ON, CA.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
* This appendix refers to IEEE Std 1584-2002 with both amendments as
  IEEE Std 1584b-2011.

    The amount of heat energy calculated by any of the methods is 
approximately inversely proportional to the square of the distance 
between the employee and the arc. In other words, if the employee is 
very close to the arc, the heat energy is very high; but if the 
employee is just a few more centimeters away, the heat energy drops 
substantially. Thus, estimating the distance from the arc to the 
employee is key to protecting employees.
    The employer must select a method of estimating incident heat 
energy that provides a reasonable estimate of incident heat energy 
for the exposure involved. Table 3 shows which methods provide 
reasonable estimates for various exposures.

[[Page 20687]]



                                         Table 3--Selecting a Reasonable Incident-Energy Calculation Method \1\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                             600 V and Less \2\                       601 V to 15 kV \2\                      More than 15 kV
   Incident-energy calculation   -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
             method                  1[Phi]        3[Phi]a       3[Phi]b       1[Phi]      3[Phi]a      3[Phi]b       1[Phi]      3[Phi]a      3[Phi]b
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NFPA 70E-2012 Annex D (Lee        Y-C           Y             N             Y-C          Y-C          N            N \3\        N \3\        N \3\
 equation).
Doughty, Neal, and Floyd........  Y-C           Y             Y             N            N            N            N            N            N
IEEE Std 1584b-2011.............  Y             Y             Y             Y            Y            Y            N            N            N
ARCPRO..........................  Y             N             N             Y            N            N            Y            Y \4\        Y \4\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Key:
1[Phi]: Single-phase arc in open air.
3[Phi]a: Three-phase arc in open air.
3[Phi]b: Three-phase arc in an enclosure (box).
Y: Acceptable; produces a reasonable estimate of incident heat energy from this type of electric arc.
N: Not acceptable; does not produce a reasonable estimate of incident heat energy from this type of electric arc.
Y-C: Acceptable; produces a reasonable, but conservative, estimate of incident heat energy from this type of electric arc.
Notes:
\1\ Although the Occupational Safety and Health Administration will consider these methods reasonable for enforcement purposes when employers use the
  methods in accordance with this table, employers should be aware that the listed methods do not necessarily result in estimates that will provide full
  protection from internal faults in transformers and similar equipment or from arcs in underground manholes or vaults.
\2\ At these voltages, the presumption is that the arc is three-phase unless the employer can demonstrate that only one phase is present or that the
  spacing of the phases is sufficient to prevent a multiphase arc from occurring.
\3\ Although the Occupational Safety and Health Administration will consider this method acceptable for purposes of assessing whether incident energy
  exceeds 2.0 cal/cm\2\, the results at voltages of more than 15 kilovolts are extremely conservative and unrealistic.
\4\ The Occupational Safety and Health Administration will deem the results of this method reasonable when the employer adjusts them using the
  conversion factors for three-phase arcs in open air or in an enclosure, as indicated in the program's instructions.

    Selecting a reasonable distance from the employee to the arc. In 
estimating available heat energy, the employer must make some 
reasonable assumptions about how far the employee will be from the 
electric arc. Table 4 lists reasonable distances from the employee 
to the electric arc. The distances in Table 4 are consistent with 
national consensus standards, such as the Institute of Electrical 
and Electronic Engineers' National Electrical Safety Code, ANSI/IEEE 
C2-2012, and IEEE Guide for Performing Arc-Flash Hazard 
Calculations, IEEE Std 1584b-2011. The employer is free to use other 
reasonable distances, but must consider equipment enclosure size and 
the working distance to the employee in selecting a distance from 
the employee to the arc. The Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration will consider a distance reasonable when the employer 
bases it on equipment size and working distance.

                 Table 4--Selecting a Reasonable Distance From the Employee to the Electric Arc
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                  Single-phase arc mm       Three-phase arc mm
                      Class of equipment                                (inches)                 (inches)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cable.........................................................                     * NA                 455 (18)
Low voltage MCCs and panelboards..............................                       NA                 455 (18)
Low-voltage switchgear........................................                       NA                 610 (24)
5-kV switchgear...............................................                       NA                 910 (36)
15-kV switchgear..............................................                       NA                 910 (36)
Single conductors in air (up to 46 kilovolts), work with                       380 (15)                       NA
 rubber insulating gloves.....................................
Single conductors in air, work with live-line tools and live-     MAD - (2 x kV x 2.54)                       NA
 line barehand work...........................................     (MAD - (2 x kV /10))
                                                                               [dagger]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* NA = not applicable.
[dagger] The terms in this equation are:
MAD = The applicable minimum approach distance, and
kV = The system voltage in kilovolts.

    Selecting a reasonable arc gap. For a single-phase arc in air, 
the electric arc will almost always occur when an energized 
conductor approaches too close to ground. Thus, an employer can 
determine the arc gap, or arc length, for these exposures by the 
dielectric strength of air and the voltage on the line. The 
dielectric strength of air is approximately 10 kilovolts for every 
25.4 millimeters (1 inch). For example, at 50 kilovolts, the arc gap 
would be 50 / 10 x 25.4 (or 50 x 2.54), which equals 127 millimeters 
(5 inches).
    For three-phase arcs in open air and in enclosures, the arc gap 
will generally be dependent on the spacing between parts energized 
at different electrical potentials. Documents such as IEEE Std 
1584b-2011 provide information on these distances. Employers may 
select a reasonable arc gap from Table 5, or they may select any 
other reasonable arc gap based on sparkover distance or on the 
spacing between (1) live parts at different potentials or (2) live 
parts and grounded parts (for example, bus or conductor spacings in 
equipment). In any event, the employer must use an estimate that 
reasonably resembles the actual exposures faced by the employee.

                                     Table 5--Selecting a Reasonable Arc Gap
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Class of equipment              Single-phase arc mm  (inches)         Three-phase arc mm \1\  (inches)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cable............................  NA \2\................................  13 (0.5).
Low voltage MCCs and panelboards.  NA....................................  25 (1.0).
Low-voltage switchgear...........  NA....................................  32 (1.25).
5-kV switchgear..................  NA....................................  104 (4.0).
15-kV switchgear.................  NA....................................  152 (6.0).

[[Page 20688]]

 
Single conductors in air, 15 kV    51 (2.0)..............................  Phase conductor spacing.
 and less..
Single conductor in air, more      Voltage in kV x 2.54..................  Phase conductor spacing.
 than 15 kV.                       (Voltage in kV x 0.1), but no less
                                    than 51 mm (2 inches).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Source: IEEE Std 1584b-2011.
\2\ NA = not applicable.

    Making estimates over multiple system areas. The employer need 
not estimate the heat-energy exposure for every job task performed 
by each employee. Paragraph (l)(8)(ii) of Sec.  1910.269 permits the 
employer to make broad estimates that cover multiple system areas 
provided that: (1) The employer uses reasonable assumptions about 
the energy-exposure distribution throughout the system, and (2) the 
estimates represent the maximum exposure for those areas. For 
example, the employer can use the maximum fault current and clearing 
time to cover several system areas at once.
    Incident heat energy for single-phase-to-ground exposures. Table 
6 and Table 7 provide incident heat energy levels for open-air, 
phase-to-ground electric-arc exposures typical for overhead 
systems.\22\ Table 6 presents estimates of available energy for 
employees using rubber insulating gloves to perform work on overhead 
systems operating at 4 to 46 kilovolts. The table assumes that the 
employee will be 380 millimeters (15 inches) from the electric arc, 
which is a reasonable estimate for rubber insulating glove work. 
Table 6 also assumes that the arc length equals the sparkover 
distance for the maximum transient overvoltage of each voltage 
range.\23\ To use the table, an employer would use the voltage, 
maximum fault current, and maximum clearing time for a system area 
and, using the appropriate voltage range and fault-current and 
clearing-time values corresponding to the next higher values listed 
in the table, select the appropriate heat energy (4, 5, 8, or 12 
cal/cm\2\) from the table. For example, an employer might have a 
12,470-volt power line supplying a system area. The power line can 
supply a maximum fault current of 8 kiloamperes with a maximum 
clearing time of 10 cycles. For rubber glove work, this system falls 
in the 4.0-to-15.0-kilovolt range; the next-higher fault current is 
10 kA (the second row in that voltage range); and the clearing time 
is under 18 cycles (the first column to the right of the fault 
current column). Thus, the available heat energy for this part of 
the system will be 4 cal/cm\2\ or less (from the column heading), 
and the employer could select protection with a 5-cal/cm\2\ rating 
to meet Sec.  1910.269(l)(8)(v). Alternatively, an employer could 
select a base incident-energy value and ensure that the clearing 
times for each voltage range and fault current listed in the table 
do not exceed the corresponding clearing time specified in the 
table. For example, an employer that provides employees with arc-
flash protective equipment rated at 8 cal/cm\2\ can use the table to 
determine if any system area exceeds 8 cal/cm\2\ by checking the 
clearing time for the highest fault current for each voltage range 
and ensuring that the clearing times do not exceed the values 
specified in the 8-cal/cm\2\ column in the table.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \22\ The Occupational Safety and Health Administration used 
metric values to calculate the clearing times in Table 6 and Table 
7. An employer may use English units to calculate clearing times 
instead even though the results will differ slightly.
    \23\ The Occupational Safety and Health Administration based 
this assumption, which is more conservative than the arc length 
specified in Table 5, on Table 410-2 of the 2012 NESC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Table 7 presents similar estimates for employees using live-line 
tools to perform work on overhead systems operating at voltages of 4 
to 800 kilovolts. The table assumes that the arc length will be 
equal to the sparkover distance \24\ and that the employee will be a 
distance from the arc equal to the minimum approach distance minus 
twice the sparkover distance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \24\ The dielectric strength of air is about 10 kilovolts for 
every 25.4 millimeters (1 inch). Thus, the employer can estimate the 
arc length in millimeters to be the phase-to-ground voltage in 
kilovolts multiplied by 2.54 (or voltage (in kilovolts) x 2.54).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The employer will need to use other methods for estimating 
available heat energy in situations not addressed by Table 6 or 
Table 7. The calculation methods listed in Table 2 and the guidance 
provided in Table 3 will help employers do this. For example, 
employers can use IEEE Std 1584b-2011 to estimate the available heat 
energy (and to select appropriate protective equipment) for many 
specific conditions, including lower-voltage, phase-to-phase arc, 
and enclosed arc exposures.

Table 6--Incident Heat Energy for Various Fault Currents, Clearing Times, and Voltages of 4.0 to 46.0 kV: Rubber
         Insulating Glove Exposures Involving Phase-to-Ground Arcs in Open Air Only * [dagger] [Dagger]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                  Maximum clearing time (cycles)
     Voltage range  (kV) **        Fault current ---------------------------------------------------------------
                                       (kA)         4 cal/cm\2\     5 cal/cm\2\     8 cal/cm\2\    12 cal/cm\2\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
4.0 to 15.0.....................               5              46              58              92             138
                                              10              18              22              36              54
                                              15              10              12              20              30
                                              20               6               8              13              19
15.1 to 25.0....................               5              28              34              55              83
                                              10              11              14              23              34
                                              15               7               8              13              20
                                              20               4               5               9              13
25.1 to 36.0....................               5              21              26              42              62
                                              10               9              11              18              26
                                              15               5               6              10              16
                                              20               4               4               7              11
36.1 to 46.0....................               5              16              20              32              48
                                              10               7               9              14              21
                                              15               4               5               8              13

[[Page 20689]]

 
                                              20               3               4               6               9
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes:* This table is for open-air, phase-to-ground electric-arc exposures. It is not for phase-to-phase arcs or
  enclosed arcs (arc in a box).
[dagger] The table assumes that the employee will be 380 mm (15 in.) from the electric arc. The table also
  assumes the arc length to be the sparkover distance for the maximum transient overvoltage of each voltage
  range (see Appendix B to Sec.   1910.269), as follows:
4.0 to 15.0 kV 51 mm (2 in.)
15.1 to 25.0 kV 102 mm (4 in.)
25.1 to 36.0 kV 152 mm (6 in.)
36.1 to 46.0 kV 229 mm (9 in.)
[Dagger]The Occupational Safety and Health Administration calculated the values in this table using the ARCPRO
  method listed in Table 2.
** The voltage range is the phase-to-phase system voltage.


Table 7--Incident Heat Energy for Various Fault Currents, Clearing Times, and Voltages: Live-Line Tool Exposures
                  Involving Phase-to-Ground Arcs in Open Air Only * [dagger] [Dagger] 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                  Maximum clearing time (cycles)
      Voltage range (kV) **        Fault current ---------------------------------------------------------------
                                       (kA)         4 cal/cm\2\     5 cal/cm\2\     8 cal/cm\2\    12 cal/cm\2\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
4.0 to 15.0.....................               5             197             246             394             591
                                              10              73              92             147             220
                                              15              39              49              78             117
                                              20              24              31              49              73
15.1 to 25.0....................               5             197             246             394             591
                                              10              75              94             150             225
                                              15              41              51              82             122
                                              20              26              33              52              78
25.1 to 36.0....................               5             138             172             275             413
                                              10              53              66             106             159
                                              15              30              37              59              89
                                              20              19              24              38              58
36.1 to 46.0....................               5             129             161             257             386
                                              10              51              64             102             154
                                              15              29              36              58              87
                                              20              19              24              38              57
46.1 to 72.5....................              20              18              23              36              55
                                              30              10              13              20              30
                                              40               6               8              13              19
                                              50               4               6               9              13
72.6 to 121.0...................              20              10              12              20              30
                                              30               6               7              11              17
                                              40               4               5               7              11
                                              50               3               3               5               8
121.1 to 145.0..................              20              12              15              24              35
                                              30               7               9              15              22
                                              40               5               6              10              15
                                              50               4               5               8              11
145.1 to 169.0..................              20              12              15              24              36
                                              30               7               9              15              22
                                              40               5               7              10              16
                                              50               4               5               8              12
169.1 to 242.0..................              20              13              17              27              40
                                              30               8              10              17              25
                                              40               6               7              12              17
                                              50               4               5               9              13
242.1 to 362.0..................              20              25              32              51              76
                                              30              16              19              31              47
                                              40              11              14              22              33
                                              50               8              10              16              25
362.1 to 420.0..................              20              12              15              25              37
                                              30               8              10              15              23
                                              40               5               7              11              16
                                              50               4               5               8              12
420.1 to 550.0..................              20              23              29              47              70
                                              30              14              18              29              43
                                              40              10              13              20              30
                                              50               8               9              15              23
550.1 to 800.0..................              20              25              31              50              75
                                              30              15              19              31              46
                                              40              11              13              21              32

[[Page 20690]]

 
                                              50               8              10              16              24
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes:
* This table is for open-air, phase-to-ground electric-arc exposures. It is not for phase-to-phase arcs or
  enclosed arcs (arc in a box).
[dagger] The table assumes the arc length to be the sparkover distance for the maximum phase-to-ground voltage
  of each voltage range (see Appendix B to this section). The table also assumes that the employee will be the
  minimum approach distance minus twice the arc length from the electric arc.
[Dagger] The Occupational Safety and Health Administration calculated the values in this table using the ARCPRO
  method listed in Table 2.
 For voltages of more than 72.6 kV, employers may use this table only when the minimum approach
  distance established under Sec.   1910.269(l)(3)(i) is greater than or equal to the following values:
72.6 to 121.0 kV 1.02 m.
121.1 to 145.0 kV 1.16 m.
145.1 to 169.0 kV 1.30 m.
169.1 to 242.0 kV 1.72 m.
242.1 to 362.0 kV 2.76 m.
362.1 to 420.0 kV 2.50 m.
420.1 to 550.0 kV 3.62 m.
550.1 to 800.0 kV 4.83 m.
** The voltage range is the phase-to-phase system voltage.

B. Selecting Protective Clothing and Other Protective Equipment

    Paragraph (l)(8)(v) of Sec.  1910.269 requires employers, in 
certain situations, to select protective clothing and other 
protective equipment with an arc rating that is greater than or 
equal to the incident heat energy estimated under Sec.  
1910.269(l)(8)(ii). Based on laboratory testing required by ASTM 
F1506-10a, the expectation is that protective clothing with an arc 
rating equal to the estimated incident heat energy will be capable 
of preventing second-degree burn injury to an employee exposed to 
that incident heat energy from an electric arc. Note that actual 
electric-arc exposures may be more or less severe than the estimated 
value because of factors such as arc movement, arc length, arcing 
from reclosing of the system, secondary fires or explosions, and 
weather conditions. Additionally, for arc rating based on the 
fabric's arc thermal performance value \25\ (ATPV), a worker exposed 
to incident energy at the arc rating has a 50-percent chance of just 
barely receiving a second-degree burn. Therefore, it is possible 
(although not likely) that an employee will sustain a second-degree 
(or worse) burn wearing clothing conforming to Sec.  
1910.269(l)(8)(v) under certain circumstances. However, reasonable 
employer estimates and maintaining appropriate minimum approach 
distances for employees should limit burns to relatively small burns 
that just barely extend beyond the epidermis (that is, just barely a 
second-degree burn). Consequently, protective clothing and other 
protective equipment meeting Sec.  1910.269(l)(8)(v) will provide an 
appropriate degree of protection for an employee exposed to 
electric-arc hazards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \25\ ASTM F1506-10a defines ``arc thermal performance value'' as 
``the incident energy on a material or a multilayer system of 
materials that results in a 50% probability that sufficient heat 
transfer through the tested specimen is predicted to cause the onset 
of a second-degree skin burn injury based on the Stoll [footnote] 
curve, cal/cm\2\.'' The footnote to this definition reads: ``Derived 
from: Stoll, A. M., and Chianta, M. A., `Method and Rating System 
for Evaluations of Thermal Protection,' Aerospace Medicine, Vol 40, 
1969, pp. 1232-1238 and Stoll, A. M., and Chianta, M. A., `Heat 
Transfer through Fabrics as Related to Thermal Injury,' 
Transactions--New York Academy of Sciences, Vol 33(7), Nov. 1971, 
pp. 649-670.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Paragraph (l)(8)(v) of Sec.  1910.269 does not require arc-rated 
protection for exposures of 2 cal/cm\2\ or less. Untreated cotton 
clothing will reduce a 2-cal/cm\2\ exposure below the 1.2- to 1.5-
cal/cm\2\ level necessary to cause burn injury, and this material 
should not ignite at such low heat energy levels. Although Sec.  
1910.269(l)(8)(v) does not require clothing to have an arc rating 
when exposures are 2 cal/cm\2\ or less, Sec.  1910.269(l)(8)(iv) 
requires the outer layer of clothing to be flame resistant under 
certain conditions, even when the estimated incident heat energy is 
less than 2 cal/cm\2\, as discussed later in this appendix. 
Additionally, it is especially important to ensure that employees do 
not wear undergarments made from fabrics listed in the note to Sec.  
1910.269(l)(8)(iii) even when the outer layer is flame resistant or 
arc rated. These fabrics can melt or ignite easily when an electric 
arc occurs. Logos and name tags made from non-flame-resistant 
material can adversely affect the arc rating or the flame-resistant 
characteristics of arc-rated or flame-resistant clothing. Such logos 
and name tags may violate Sec.  1910.269(l)(8)(iii), (l)(8)(iv), or 
(l)(8)(v).
    Paragraph (l)(8)(v) of Sec.  1910.269 requires that arc-rated 
protection cover the employee's entire body, with limited exceptions 
for the employee's hands, feet, face, and head. Paragraph 
(l)(8)(v)(A) of Sec.  1910.269 provides that arc-rated protection is 
not necessary for the employee's hands under the following 
conditions:

For any estimated incident heat energy.  When the employee is wearing
                                          rubber insulating gloves with
                                          protectors.
If the estimated incident heat energy    When the employee is wearing
 does not exceed 14 cal/cm\2\.            heavy-duty leather work gloves
                                          with a weight of at least 407
                                          gm/m\2\ (12 oz/yd\2\).
 

Paragraph (l)(8)(v)(B) of Sec.  1910.269 provides that arc-rated 
protection is not necessary for the employee's feet when the 
employee is wearing heavy-duty work shoes or boots. Finally, Sec.  
1910.269(l)(8)(v)(C), (l)(8)(v)(D), and (l)(8)(v)(E) require arc-
rated head and face protection as follows:

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                         Minimum head and face protection
                                 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                            Arc-rated
            Exposure                                    faceshield with a     Arc-rated hood or faceshield with
                                         None *         minimum  rating of                balaclava
                                                           8 cal/cm\2\*
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Single-phase, open air..........  2-8 cal/cm\2\......  9-12 cal/cm\2\.....  13 cal/cm\2\ or higher [dagger].

[[Page 20691]]

 
Three-phase.....................  2-4 cal/cm\2\......  5-8 cal/cm\2\......  9 cal/cm\2\ or higher [Dagger].
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* These ranges assume that employees are wearing hardhats meeting the specifications in Sec.   1910.135 or Sec.
   1926.100(b)(2), as applicable.
[dagger] The arc rating must be a minimum of 4 cal/cm\2\ less than the estimated incident energy. Note that Sec.
    1910.269(l)(8)(v)(E) permits this type of head and face protection, with a minimum arc rating of 4 cal/cm\2\
  less than the estimated incident energy, at any incident energy level.
[Dagger] Note that Sec.   1910.269(l)(8)(v) permits this type of head and face protection at any incident energy
  level.

IV. Protection Against Ignition

    Paragraph (l)(8)(iii) of Sec.  1910.269 prohibits clothing that 
could melt onto an employee's skin or that could ignite and continue 
to burn when exposed to flames or to the available heat energy 
estimated by the employer under Sec.  1910.269(l)(8)(ii). Meltable 
fabrics, such as acetate, nylon, polyester, and polypropylene, even 
in blends, must be avoided. When these fibers melt, they can adhere 
to the skin, thereby transferring heat rapidly, exacerbating burns, 
and complicating treatment. These outcomes can result even if the 
meltable fabric is not directly next to the skin. The remainder of 
this section focuses on the prevention of ignition.
    Paragraph (l)(8)(v) of Sec.  1910.269 generally requires 
protective clothing and other protective equipment with an arc 
rating greater than or equal to the employer's estimate of available 
heat energy. As explained earlier in this appendix, untreated cotton 
is usually acceptable for exposures of 2 cal/cm\2\ or less.\26\ If 
the exposure is greater than that, the employee generally must wear 
flame-resistant clothing with a suitable arc rating in accordance 
with Sec.  1910.269(l)(8)(iv) and (l)(8)(v). However, even if an 
employee is wearing a layer of flame-resistant clothing, there are 
circumstances under which flammable layers of clothing would be 
uncovered, and an electric arc could ignite them. For example, 
clothing ignition is possible if the employee is wearing flammable 
clothing under the flame-resistant clothing and the underlayer is 
uncovered because of an opening in the flame-resistant clothing. 
Thus, for purposes of Sec.  1910.269(l)(8)(iii), it is important for 
the employer to consider the possibility of clothing ignition even 
when an employee is wearing flame-resistant clothing with a suitable 
arc rating.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \26\ See Sec.  1910.269(l)(8)(iv)(A), (l)(8)(iv)(B), and 
(l)(8)(iv)(C) for conditions under which employees must wear flame-
resistant clothing as the outer layer of clothing even when the 
incident heat energy does not exceed 2 cal/cm\2\.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under Sec.  1910.269(l)(8)(iii), employees may not wear 
flammable clothing in conjunction with flame-resistant clothing if 
the flammable clothing poses an ignition hazard.\27\ Although outer 
flame-resistant layers may not have openings that expose flammable 
inner layers, when an outer flame-resistant layer would be unable to 
resist breakopen,\28\ the next (inner) layer must be flame-resistant 
if it could ignite.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \27\ Paragraph (l)(8)(iii) of Sec.  1910.269 prohibits clothing 
that could ignite and continue to burn when exposed to the heat 
energy estimated under paragraph (l)(8)(ii) of that section.
    \28\ Breakopen occurs when a hole, tear, or crack develops in 
the exposed fabric such that the fabric no longer effectively blocks 
incident heat energy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Non-flame-resistant clothing can ignite even when the heat 
energy from an electric arc is insufficient to ignite the clothing. 
For example, nearby flames can ignite an employee's clothing; and, 
even in the absence of flames, electric arcs pose ignition hazards 
beyond the hazard of ignition from incident energy under certain 
conditions. In addition to requiring flame-resistant clothing when 
the estimated incident energy exceeds 2.0 cal/cm\2\, Sec.  
1910.269(l)(8)(iv) requires flame-resistant clothing when: The 
employee is exposed to contact with energized circuit parts 
operating at more than 600 volts (Sec.  1910.269(l)(8)(iv)(A)), an 
electric arc could ignite flammable material in the work area that, 
in turn, could ignite the employee's clothing (Sec.  
1910.269(l)(8)(iv)(B)), and molten metal or electric arcs from 
faulted conductors in the work area could ignite the employee's 
clothing (Sec.  1910.269(l)(8)(iv)(C)). For example, grounding 
conductors can become a source of heat energy if they cannot carry 
fault current without failure. The employer must consider these 
possible sources of electric arcs \29\ in determining whether the 
employee's clothing could ignite under Sec.  1910.269(l)(8)(iv)(C).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \29\ Static wires and pole grounds are examples of grounding 
conductors that might not be capable of carrying fault current 
without failure. Grounds that can carry the maximum available fault 
current are not a concern, and employers need not consider such 
grounds a possible electric arc source.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Appendix F to Sec.  1910.269--Work-Positioning Equipment Inspection 
Guidelines

I. Body Belts

    Inspect body belts to ensure that:
    A. The hardware has no cracks, nicks, distortion, or corrosion;
    B. No loose or worn rivets are present;
    C. The waist strap has no loose grommets;
    D. The fastening straps are not 100-percent leather; and
    E. No worn materials that could affect the safety of the user 
are present.

II. Positioning Straps

    Inspect positioning straps to ensure that:
    A. The warning center of the strap material is not exposed;
    B. No cuts, burns, extra holes, or fraying of strap material is 
present;
    C. Rivets are properly secured;
    D. Straps are not 100-percent leather; and
    E. Snaphooks do not have cracks, burns, or corrosion.

III. Climbers

    Inspect pole and tree climbers to ensure that:
    A. Gaffs are at least as long as the manufacturer's recommended 
minimums (generally 32 and 51 millimeters (1.25 and 2.0 inches) for 
pole and tree climbers, respectively, measured on the underside of 
the gaff);

    Note: Gauges are available to assist in determining whether 
gaffs are long enough and shaped to easily penetrate poles or trees.

    B. Gaffs and leg irons are not fractured or cracked;
    C. Stirrups and leg irons are free of excessive wear;
    D. Gaffs are not loose;
    E. Gaffs are free of deformation that could adversely affect 
use;
    F. Gaffs are properly sharpened; and
    G. There are no broken straps or buckles.

Appendix G to Sec.  1910.269--Reference Documents

    The references contained in this appendix provide information 
that can be helpful in understanding and complying with the 
requirements contained in Sec.  1910.269. The national consensus 
standards referenced in this appendix contain detailed 
specifications that employers may follow in complying with the more 
performance-based requirements of Sec.  1910.269. Except as 
specifically noted in Sec.  1910.269, however, the Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration will not necessarily deem 
compliance with the national consensus standards to be compliance 
with the provisions of Sec.  1910.269.

ANSI/SIA A92.2-2009, American National Standard for Vehicle-Mounted 
Elevating and Rotating Aerial Devices.
ANSI Z133-2012, American National Standard Safety Requirements for 
Arboricultural Operations--Pruning, Trimming, Repairing, 
Maintaining, and Removing Trees, and Cutting Brush.
ANSI/IEEE Std 935-1989, IEEE Guide on Terminology for Tools and 
Equipment to Be Used in Live Line Working.
ASME B20.1-2012, Safety Standard for Conveyors and Related 
Equipment.
ASTM D120-09, Standard Specification for Rubber Insulating Gloves.
ASTM D149-09 (2013), Standard Test Method for Dielectric Breakdown 
Voltage and Dielectric Strength of Solid Electrical Insulating 
Materials at Commercial Power Frequencies.
ASTM D178-01 (2010), Standard Specification for Rubber Insulating 
Matting.
ASTM D1048-12, Standard Specification for Rubber Insulating 
Blankets.

[[Page 20692]]

ASTM D1049-98 (2010), Standard Specification for Rubber Insulating 
Covers.
ASTM D1050-05 (2011), Standard Specification for Rubber Insulating 
Line Hose.
ASTM D1051-08, Standard Specification for Rubber Insulating Sleeves.
ASTM F478-09, Standard Specification for In-Service Care of 
Insulating Line Hose and Covers.
ASTM F479-06 (2011), Standard Specification for In-Service Care of 
Insulating Blankets.
ASTM F496-08, Standard Specification for In-Service Care of 
Insulating Gloves and Sleeves.
ASTM F711-02 (2007), Standard Specification for Fiberglass-
Reinforced Plastic (FRP) Rod and Tube Used in Live Line Tools.
ASTM F712-06 (2011), Standard Test Methods and Specifications for 
Electrically Insulating Plastic Guard Equipment for Protection of 
Workers.
ASTM F819-10, Standard Terminology Relating to Electrical Protective 
Equipment for Workers.
ASTM F855-09, Standard Specifications for Temporary Protective 
Grounds to Be Used on De-energized Electric Power Lines and 
Equipment.
ASTM F887-12\e1\, Standard Specifications for Personal Climbing 
Equipment.
ASTM F914/F914M-10, Standard Test Method for Acoustic Emission for 
Aerial Personnel Devices Without Supplemental Load Handling 
Attachments.
ASTM F1116-03 (2008), Standard Test Method for Determining 
Dielectric Strength of Dielectric Footwear.
ASTM F1117-03 (2008), Standard Specification for Dielectric 
Footwear.
ASTM F1236-96 (2012), Standard Guide for Visual Inspection of 
Electrical Protective Rubber Products.
ASTM F1430/F1430M-10, Standard Test Method for Acoustic Emission 
Testing of Insulated and Non-Insulated Aerial Personnel Devices with 
Supplemental Load Handling Attachments.
ASTM F1505-10, Standard Specification for Insulated and Insulating 
Hand Tools.
ASTM F1506-10a, Standard Performance Specification for Flame 
Resistant and Arc Rated Textile Materials for Wearing Apparel for 
Use by Electrical Workers Exposed to Momentary Electric Arc and 
Related Thermal Hazards.
ASTM F1564-13, Standard Specification for Structure-Mounted 
Insulating Work Platforms for Electrical Workers.
ASTM F1701-12, Standard Specification for Unused Polypropylene Rope 
with Special Electrical Properties.
ASTM F1742-03 (2011), Standard Specification for PVC Insulating 
Sheeting.
ASTM F1796-09, Standard Specification for High Voltage Detectors--
Part 1 Capacitive Type to be Used for Voltages Exceeding 600 Volts 
AC.
ASTM F1797-09[egr]\1\, Standard Test Method for Acoustic Emission 
Testing of Insulated and Non-Insulated Digger Derricks.
ASTM F1825-03 (2007), Standard Specification for Clampstick Type 
Live Line Tools.
ASTM F1826-00 (2011), Standard Specification for Live Line and 
Measuring Telescoping Tools.
ASTM F1891-12, Standard Specification for Arc and Flame Resistant 
Rainwear.
ASTM F1958/F1958M-12, Standard Test Method for Determining the 
Ignitability of Non-flame-Resistant Materials for Clothing by 
Electric Arc Exposure Method Using Mannequins.
ASTM F1959/F1959M-12, Standard Test Method for Determining the Arc 
Rating of Materials for Clothing.
IEEE Stds 4-1995, 4a-2001 (Amendment to IEEE Standard Techniques for 
High-Voltage Testing), IEEE Standard Techniques for High-Voltage 
Testing.
IEEE Std 62-1995, IEEE Guide for Diagnostic Field Testing of 
Electric Power Apparatus--Part 1: Oil Filled Power Transformers, 
Regulators, and Reactors.
IEEE Std 80-2000, Guide for Safety in AC Substation Grounding.
IEEE Std 100-2000, The Authoritative Dictionary of IEEE Standards 
Terms Seventh Edition.
IEEE Std 516-2009, IEEE Guide for Maintenance Methods on Energized 
Power Lines.
IEEE Std 524-2003, IEEE Guide to the Installation of Overhead 
Transmission Line Conductors .
IEEE Std 957-2005, IEEE Guide for Cleaning Insulators.
IEEE Std 1048-2003, IEEE Guide for Protective Grounding of Power 
Lines.
IEEE Std 1067-2005, IEEE Guide for In-Service Use, Care, 
Maintenance, and Testing of Conductive Clothing for Use on Voltages 
up to 765 kV AC and 750 kV DC.
IEEE Std 1307-2004, IEEE Standard for Fall Protection for Utility 
Work.
IEEE Stds 1584-2002, 1584a-2004 (Amendment 1 to IEEE Std 1584-2002), 
and 1584b-2011 (Amendment 2: Changes to Clause 4 of IEEE Std 1584-
2002), IEEE Guide for Performing Arc-Flash Hazard Calculations.
IEEE C2-2012, National Electrical Safety Code.
NFPA 70E-2012, Standard for Electrical Safety in the Workplace.

Subpart S--Electrical

0
7. Revise the authority citation for Subpart S of part 1910 to read as 
follows:

    Authority: 29 U.S.C. 653, 655, 657; Secretary of Labor's Order 
No. 8-76 (41 FR 25059), 1-90 (55 FR 9033), 5-2002 (67 FR 65008), 5-
2007 (72 FR 31160), or 1-2012 (77 FR 3912), as applicable; and 29 
CFR Part 1911.

0
8. In Sec.  1910.331(c)(1), revise the headings to Notes 1 and 2 and 
revise Note 3 to read as follows:


Sec.  1910.331  Scope.

* * * * *
    (c) * * *
    (1) * * *

    Note 1 to paragraph (c)(1):  * * *


    Note 2 to paragraph (c)(1):  * * *


    Note 3 to paragraph (c)(1): Work on or directly associated with 
generation, transmission, or distribution installations includes:

    (1) Work performed directly on such installations, such as 
repairing overhead or underground distribution lines or repairing a 
feed-water pump for the boiler in a generating plant.
    (2) Work directly associated with such installations, such as line-
clearance tree trimming and replacing utility poles (see the definition 
of ``line-clearance tree trimming'' in Sec.  1910.269(x)).
    (3) Work on electric utilization circuits in a generating plant 
provided that:
    (A) Such circuits are commingled with installations of power 
generation equipment or circuits, and
    (B) The generation equipment or circuits present greater electrical 
hazards than those posed by the utilization equipment or circuits (such 
as exposure to higher voltages or lack of overcurrent protection).
    This work is covered by Sec.  1910.269 of this part.


Sec.  1910.399  [Amended]

0
9. Remove the definition of ``line-clearance tree trimming'' from Sec.  
1910.399.

PART 1926--[AMENDED]

Subpart A--General

0
10. The authority citation for Subpart A of part 1926 is revised to 
read as follows:

    Authority: 40 U.S.C. 3701 et seq.; 29 U.S.C. 653, 655, 657; 
Secretary of Labor's Order No. 12-71 (36 FR 8754), 8-76 (41 FR 
25059), 9-83 (48 FR 35736), 1-90 (55 FR 9033), 6-96 (62 FR 111), 3-
2000 (65 FR 50017), 5-2002 (67 FR 65008), or 5-2007 (72 FR 31160), 
5-2007 (72 FR 31160), 4-2010 (75 FR 55355), or 1-2012 (77 FR 3912), 
as applicable; and 29 CFR Part 1911.


0
11. In Sec.  1926.6, remove and reserve paragraphs (h)(17), (h)(18), 
(h)(19), (h)(20), (h)(21), (h)(22), and (j)(2).


Sec.  1926.6  Incorporation by reference.

* * * * *
    (h) * * *
    (17) [Reserved]
    (18) [Reserved]
    (19) [Reserved]
    (20) [Reserved]
    (21) [Reserved]
    (22) [Reserved]
* * * * *
    (j) * * *

[[Page 20693]]

    (2) [Reserved]
* * * * *

Subpart E--Personal Protective and Life Saving Equipment

0
12. Revise the authority citation for Subpart E of Part 1926 to read as 
follows:

    Authority: 40 U.S.C. 3701 et seq.; 29 U.S.C. 653, 655, 657; 
Secretary of Labor's Order No. 12-71 (36 FR 8754), 8-76 (41 FR 
25059), 9-83 (48 FR 35736), 1-90 (55 FR 9033), 6-96 (62 FR 111), 5-
2002 (67 FR 65008), 5-2007 (72 FR 31160), or 1-2012 (77 FR 3912), as 
applicable; and 29 CFR Part 1911.


0
13. Add Sec.  1926.97 to read as follows:


Sec.  1926.97  Electrical protective equipment.

    (a) Design requirements for specific types of electrical protective 
equipment. Rubber insulating blankets, rubber insulating matting, 
rubber insulating covers, rubber insulating line hose, rubber 
insulating gloves, and rubber insulating sleeves shall meet the 
following requirements:
    (1) Manufacture and marking of rubber insulating equipment. (i) 
Blankets, gloves, and sleeves shall be produced by a seamless process.
    (ii) Each item shall be clearly marked as follows:
    (A) Class 00 equipment shall be marked Class 00.
    (B) Class 0 equipment shall be marked Class 0.
    (C) Class 1 equipment shall be marked Class 1.
    (D) Class 2 equipment shall be marked Class 2.
    (E) Class 3 equipment shall be marked Class 3.
    (F) Class 4 equipment shall be marked Class 4.
    (G) Nonozone-resistant equipment shall be marked Type I.
    (H) Ozone-resistant equipment shall be marked Type II.
    (I) Other relevant markings, such as the manufacturer's 
identification and the size of the equipment, may also be provided.
    (iii) Markings shall be nonconducting and shall be applied in such 
a manner as not to impair the insulating qualities of the equipment.
    (iv) Markings on gloves shall be confined to the cuff portion of 
the glove.
    (2) Electrical requirements. (i) Equipment shall be capable of 
withstanding the ac proof-test voltage specified in Table E-1 or the dc 
proof-test voltage specified in Table E-2.
    (A) The proof test shall reliably indicate that the equipment can 
withstand the voltage involved.
    (B) The test voltage shall be applied continuously for 3 minutes 
for equipment other than matting and shall be applied continuously for 
1 minute for matting.
    (C) Gloves shall also be capable of separately withstanding the ac 
proof-test voltage specified in Table E-1 after a 16-hour water soak. 
(See the note following paragraph (a)(3)(ii)(B) of this section.)
    (ii) When the ac proof test is used on gloves, the 60-hertz proof-
test current may not exceed the values specified in Table E-1 at any 
time during the test period.
    (A) If the ac proof test is made at a frequency other than 60 
hertz, the permissible proof-test current shall be computed from the 
direct ratio of the frequencies.
    (B) For the test, gloves (right side out) shall be filled with tap 
water and immersed in water to a depth that is in accordance with Table 
E-3. Water shall be added to or removed from the glove, as necessary, 
so that the water level is the same inside and outside the glove.
    (C) After the 16-hour water soak specified in paragraph 
(a)(2)(i)(C) of this section, the 60-hertz proof-test current may not 
exceed the values given in Table E-1 by more than 2 milliamperes.
    (iii) Equipment that has been subjected to a minimum breakdown 
voltage test may not be used for electrical protection. (See the note 
following paragraph (a)(3)(ii)(B) of this section.)
    (iv) Material used for Type II insulating equipment shall be 
capable of withstanding an ozone test, with no visible effects. The 
ozone test shall reliably indicate that the material will resist ozone 
exposure in actual use. Any visible signs of ozone deterioration of the 
material, such as checking, cracking, breaks, or pitting, is evidence 
of failure to meet the requirements for ozone-resistant material. (See 
the note following paragraph (a)(3)(ii)(B) of this section.)
    (3) Workmanship and finish. (i) Equipment shall be free of physical 
irregularities that can adversely affect the insulating properties of 
the equipment and that can be detected by the tests or inspections 
required under this section.
    (ii) Surface irregularities that may be present on all rubber goods 
(because of imperfections on forms or molds or because of inherent 
difficulties in the manufacturing process) and that may appear as 
indentations, protuberances, or imbedded foreign material are 
acceptable under the following conditions:
    (A) The indentation or protuberance blends into a smooth slope when 
the material is stretched.
    (B) Foreign material remains in place when the insulating material 
is folded and stretches with the insulating material surrounding it.

    Note to paragraph (a): Rubber insulating equipment meeting the 
following national consensus standards is deemed to be in compliance 
with the performance requirements of paragraph (a) of this section:
    American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) D120-09, 
Standard Specification for Rubber Insulating Gloves.
    ASTM D178-01 (2010), Standard Specification for Rubber 
Insulating Matting.
    ASTM D1048-12, Standard Specification for Rubber Insulating 
Blankets.
    ASTM D1049-98 (2010), Standard Specification for Rubber 
Insulating Covers.
    ASTM D1050-05 (2011), Standard Specification for Rubber 
Insulating Line Hose.
    ASTM D1051-08, Standard Specification for Rubber Insulating 
Sleeves.
    The preceding standards also contain specifications for 
conducting the various tests required in paragraph (a) of this 
section. For example, the ac and dc proof tests, the breakdown test, 
the water-soak procedure, and the ozone test mentioned in this 
paragraph are described in detail in these ASTM standards.
    ASTM F1236-96 (2012), Standard Guide for Visual Inspection of 
Electrical Protective Rubber Products, presents methods and 
techniques for the visual inspection of electrical protective 
equipment made of rubber. This guide also contains descriptions and 
photographs of irregularities that can be found in this equipment.
    ASTM F819-10, Standard Terminology Relating to Electrical 
Protective Equipment for Workers, includes definitions of terms 
relating to the electrical protective equipment covered under this 
section.

    (b) Design requirements for other types of electrical protective 
equipment. The following requirements apply to the design and 
manufacture of electrical protective equipment that is not covered by 
paragraph (a) of this section:
    (1) Voltage withstand. Insulating equipment used for the protection 
of employees shall be capable of withstanding, without failure, the 
voltages that may be imposed upon it.

    Note to paragraph (b)(1): These voltages include transient 
overvoltages, such as switching surges, as well as nominal line 
voltage. See Appendix B to Subpart V of this part for a discussion 
of transient overvoltages on electric power transmission and 
distribution systems. See IEEE Std 516-2009, IEEE Guide for 
Maintenance Methods on Energized Power Lines, for methods of 
determining the magnitude of transient overvoltages on an electrical 
system and for a discussion comparing the ability of insulation 
equipment to withstand a transient overvoltage based on its ability 
to withstand ac voltage testing.

    (2) Equipment current. (i) Protective equipment used for the 
primary insulation of employees from energized

[[Page 20694]]

circuit parts shall be capable of passing a current test when subjected 
to the highest nominal voltage on which the equipment is to be used.
    (ii) When insulating equipment is tested in accordance with 
paragraph (b)(2)(i) of this section, the equipment current may not 
exceed 1 microampere per kilovolt of phase-to-phase applied voltage.

    Note 1 to paragraph (b)(2): This paragraph applies to equipment 
that provides primary insulation of employees from energized parts. 
It does not apply to equipment used for secondary insulation or 
equipment used for brush contact only.


    Note 2 to paragraph (b)(2):  For ac excitation, this current 
consists of three components: Capacitive current because of the 
dielectric properties of the insulating material itself, conduction 
current through the volume of the insulating equipment, and leakage 
current along the surface of the tool or equipment. The conduction 
current is normally negligible. For clean, dry insulating equipment, 
the leakage current is small, and the capacitive current 
predominates.


    Note to paragraph (b): Plastic guard equipment is deemed to 
conform to the performance requirements of paragraph (b) of this 
section if it meets, and is used in accordance with, ASTM F712-06 
(2011), Standard Test Methods and Specifications for Electrically 
Insulating Plastic Guard Equipment for Protection of Workers.

    (c) In-service care and use of electrical protective equipment. (1) 
General. Electrical protective equipment shall be maintained in a safe, 
reliable condition.
    (2) Specific requirements. The following specific requirements 
apply to rubber insulating blankets, rubber insulating covers, rubber 
insulating line hose, rubber insulating gloves, and rubber insulating 
sleeves:
    (i) Maximum use voltages shall conform to those listed in Table E-
4.
    (ii) Insulating equipment shall be inspected for damage before each 
day's use and immediately following any incident that can reasonably be 
suspected of causing damage. Insulating gloves shall be given an air 
test, along with the inspection.

    Note to paragraph (c)(2)(ii): ASTM F1236-96 (2012), Standard 
Guide for Visual Inspection of Electrical Protective Rubber 
Products, presents methods and techniques for the visual inspection 
of electrical protective equipment made of rubber. This guide also 
contains descriptions and photographs of irregularities that can be 
found in this equipment.

    (iii) Insulating equipment with any of the following defects may 
not be used:
    (A) A hole, tear, puncture, or cut;
    (B) Ozone cutting or ozone checking (that is, a series of 
interlacing cracks produced by ozone on rubber under mechanical 
stress);
    (C) An embedded foreign object;
    (D) Any of the following texture changes: Swelling, softening, 
hardening, or becoming sticky or inelastic.
    (E) Any other defect that damages the insulating properties.
    (iv) Insulating equipment found to have other defects that might 
affect its insulating properties shall be removed from service and 
returned for testing under paragraphs (c)(2)(viii) and (c)(2)(ix) of 
this section.
    (v) Insulating equipment shall be cleaned as needed to remove 
foreign substances.
    (vi) Insulating equipment shall be stored in such a location and in 
such a manner as to protect it from light, temperature extremes, 
excessive humidity, ozone, and other damaging substances and 
conditions.
    (vii) Protector gloves shall be worn over insulating gloves, except 
as follows:
    (A) Protector gloves need not be used with Class 0 gloves, under 
limited-use conditions, when small equipment and parts manipulation 
necessitate unusually high finger dexterity.

    Note to paragraph (c)(2)(vii)(A): Persons inspecting rubber 
insulating gloves used under these conditions need to take extra 
care in visually examining them. Employees using rubber insulating 
gloves under these conditions need to take extra care to avoid 
handling sharp objects.

    (B) If the voltage does not exceed 250 volts, ac, or 375 volts, dc, 
protector gloves need not be used with Class 00 gloves, under limited-
use conditions, when small equipment and parts manipulation necessitate 
unusually high finger dexterity.

    Note to paragraph (c)(2)(vii)(B): Persons inspecting rubber 
insulating gloves used under these conditions need to take extra 
care in visually examining them. Employees using rubber insulating 
gloves under these conditions need to take extra care to avoid 
handling sharp objects.

    (C) Any other class of glove may be used without protector gloves, 
under limited-use conditions, when small equipment and parts 
manipulation necessitate unusually high finger dexterity but only if 
the employer can demonstrate that the possibility of physical damage to 
the gloves is small and if the class of glove is one class higher than 
that required for the voltage involved.
    (D) Insulating gloves that have been used without protector gloves 
may not be reused until they have been tested under the provisions of 
paragraphs (c)(2)(viii) and (c)(2)(ix) of this section.
    (viii) Electrical protective equipment shall be subjected to 
periodic electrical tests. Test voltages and the maximum intervals 
between tests shall be in accordance with Table E-4 and Table E-5.
    (ix) The test method used under paragraphs (c)(2)(viii) and 
(c)(2)(xi) of this section shall reliably indicate whether the 
insulating equipment can withstand the voltages involved.

    Note to paragraph (c)(2)(ix): Standard electrical test methods 
considered as meeting this paragraph are given in the following 
national consensus standards:
    ASTM D120-09, Standard Specification for Rubber Insulating 
Gloves.
    ASTM D178-01 (2010), Standard Specification for Rubber 
Insulating Matting.
    ASTM D1048-12, Standard Specification for Rubber Insulating 
Blankets.
    ASTM D1049-98 (2010), Standard Specification for Rubber 
Insulating Covers.
    ASTM D1050-05 (2011), Standard Specification for Rubber 
Insulating Line Hose.
    ASTM D1051-08, Standard Specification for Rubber Insulating 
Sleeves.
    ASTM F478-09, Standard Specification for In-Service Care of 
Insulating Line Hose and Covers.
    ASTM F479-06 (2011), Standard Specification for In-Service Care 
of Insulating Blankets.
    ASTM F496-08, Standard Specification for In-Service Care of 
Insulating Gloves and Sleeves.

    (x) Insulating equipment failing to pass inspections or electrical 
tests may not be used by employees, except as follows:
    (A) Rubber insulating line hose may be used in shorter lengths with 
the defective portion cut off.
    (B) Rubber insulating blankets may be salvaged by severing the 
defective area from the undamaged portion of the blanket. The resulting 
undamaged area may not be smaller than 560 millimeters by 560 
millimeters (22 inches by 22 inches) for Class 1, 2, 3, and 4 blankets.
    (C) Rubber insulating blankets may be repaired using a compatible 
patch that results in physical and electrical properties equal to those 
of the blanket.
    (D) Rubber insulating gloves and sleeves with minor physical 
defects, such as small cuts, tears, or punctures, may be repaired by 
the application of a compatible patch. Also, rubber insulating gloves 
and sleeves with minor surface blemishes may be repaired with a 
compatible liquid compound. The repaired area shall have electrical and 
physical properties equal to those of the surrounding material. Repairs 
to gloves are permitted only in the area between the wrist and the 
reinforced edge of the opening.

[[Page 20695]]

    (xi) Repaired insulating equipment shall be retested before it may 
be used by employees.
    (xii) The employer shall certify that equipment has been tested in 
accordance with the requirements of paragraphs (c)(2)(iv), 
(c)(2)(vii)(D), (c)(2)(viii), (c)(2)(ix), and (c)(2)(xi) of this 
section. The certification shall identify the equipment that passed the 
test and the date it was tested and shall be made available upon 
request to the Assistant Secretary for Occupational Safety and Health 
and to employees or their authorized representatives.

    Note to paragraph (c)(2)(xii): Marking equipment with, and 
entering onto logs, the results of the tests and the dates of 
testing are two acceptable means of meeting the certification 
requirement.


                                      Table E-1--AC Proof-Test Requirements
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                           Maximum proof-test current, mA (gloves only)
                                    Proof-test   ---------------------------------------------------------------
       Class of equipment          voltage rms V  280-mm (11-in)  360-mm (14-in)  410-mm (16-in)  460-mm (18-in)
                                                       glove           glove           glove           glove
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
00..............................           2,500               8              12  ..............  ..............
0...............................           5,000               8              12              14              16
1...............................          10,000  ..............              14              16              18
2...............................          20,000  ..............              16              18              20
3...............................          30,000  ..............              18              20              22
4...............................          40,000  ..............  ..............              22              24
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                  Table E-2--DC Proof-Test Requirements
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                            Proof-test
                   Class of equipment                         voltage
------------------------------------------------------------------------
00......................................................          10,000
0.......................................................          20,000
1.......................................................          40,000
2.......................................................          50,000
3.......................................................          60,000
4.......................................................          70,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: The dc voltages listed in this table are not appropriate for proof
  testing rubber insulating line hose or covers. For this equipment, dc
  proof tests shall use a voltage high enough to indicate that the
  equipment can be safely used at the voltages listed in Table E-4. See
  ASTM D1050-05 (2011) and ASTM D1049-98 (2010) for further information
  on proof tests for rubber insulating line hose and covers,
  respectively.


                                   Table E-3--Glove Tests--Water Level \1\ \2\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                           AC proof test                   DC proof test
                 Class of glove                  ---------------------------------------------------------------
                                                        mm              in              mm              in
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
00..............................................              38             1.5              38             1.5
0...............................................              38             1.5              38             1.5
1...............................................              38             1.5              51             2.0
2...............................................              64             2.5              76             3.0
3...............................................              89             3.5             102             4.0
4...............................................             127             5.0             153             6.0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The water level is given as the clearance from the reinforced edge of the glove to the water line, with a
  tolerance of 13 mm. (0.5 in.).
\2\ If atmospheric conditions make the specified clearances impractical, the clearances may be increased by a
  maximum of 25 mm. (1 in.).


                          Table E-4--Rubber Insulating Equipment, Voltage Requirements
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                      Maximum use
                Class of equipment                  voltage \1\ AC  Retest voltage  Retest voltage
                                                          rms         \2\ AC rms      \2\ DC avg
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
00................................................             500           2,500          10,000
0.................................................           1,000           5,000          20,000
1.................................................           7,500          10,000          40,000
2.................................................          17,000          20,000          50,000
3.................................................          26,500          30,000          60,000
4.................................................          36,000          40,000          70,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The maximum use voltage is the ac voltage (rms) classification of the protective equipment that designates
  the maximum nominal design voltage of the energized system that may be safely worked. The nominal design
  voltage is equal to the phase-to-phase voltage on multiphase circuits. However, the phase-to-ground potential
  is considered to be the nominal design voltage if:
(1) There is no multiphase exposure in a system area and the voltage exposure is limited to the phase-to-ground
  potential, or
(2) The electric equipment and devices are insulated or isolated or both so that the multiphase exposure on a
  grounded wye circuit is removed.
\2\ The proof-test voltage shall be applied continuously for at least 1 minute, but no more than 3 minutes.


[[Page 20696]]


                             Table E-5--Rubber Insulating Equipment, Test Intervals
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                        Type of equipment                                           When to test
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rubber insulating line hose......................................  Upon indication that insulating value is
                                                                    suspect and after repair.
Rubber insulating covers.........................................  Upon indication that insulating value is
                                                                    suspect and after repair.
Rubber insulating blankets.......................................  Before first issue and every 12 months
                                                                    thereafter;\1\ upon indication that
                                                                    insulating value is suspect; and after
                                                                    repair.
Rubber insulating gloves.........................................  Before first issue and every 6 months
                                                                    thereafter;\1\ upon indication that
                                                                    insulating value is suspect; after repair;
                                                                    and after use without protectors.
Rubber insulating sleeves........................................  Before first issue and every 12 months
                                                                    thereafter;\1\ upon indication that
                                                                    insulating value is suspect; and after
                                                                    repair.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ If the insulating equipment has been electrically tested but not issued for service, the insulating
  equipment may not be placed into service unless it has been electrically tested within the previous 12 months.

Subpart M--Fall Protection

0
14. Revise the authority citation for Subpart M of part 1926 to read as 
follows:

    Authority: 40 U.S.C. 3701 et seq.; 29 U.S.C. 653, 655, 657; 
Secretary of Labor's Order No. 1-90 (55 FR 9033), 6-96 (62 FR 111), 
3-2000 (65 FR 50017), 5-2007 (72 FR 31159), or 1-2012 (77 FR 3912), 
as applicable; and 29 CFR Part 1911.


0
15. Revise paragraphs (a)(2)(vi) and (a)(3)(iii) of Sec.  1926.500 to 
read as follows:


Sec.  1926.500  Scope, application, and definitions applicable to this 
subpart.

    (a) * * *
    (2) * * *
    (vi) Subpart V of this part provides requirements relating to fall 
protection for employees working from aerial lifts or on poles, towers, 
or similar structures while engaged in the construction of electric 
transmission or distribution lines or equipment.
* * * * *
    (3) * * *
    (iii) Additional performance requirements for fall arrest and work-
positioning equipment are provided in Subpart V of this part.
* * * * *
0
16. Revise the authority citation for Subpart V of Part 1926 to read as 
follows:

    Authority: 40 U.S.C. 3701 et seq.; 29 U.S.C. 653, 655, 657; 
Secretary of Labor's Order No. 1-2012 (77 FR 3912); and 29 CFR Part 
1911.


0
17. Revise Subpart V of Part 1926 to read as follows:
Subpart V--Electric Power Transmission and Distribution
Sec.
1926.950 General.
1926.951 Medical services and first aid.
1926.952 Job briefing.
1926.953 Enclosed spaces.
1926.954 Personal protective equipment.
1926.955 Portable ladders and platforms.
1926.956 Hand and portable power equipment.
1926.957 Live-line tools.
1926.958 Materials handling and storage.
1926.959 Mechanical equipment.
1926.960 Working on or near exposed energized parts.
1926.961 Deenergizing lines and equipment for employee protection.
1926.962 Grounding for the protection of employees.
1926.963 Testing and test facilities.
1926.964 Overhead lines and live-line barehand work.
1926.965 Underground electrical installations.
1926.966 Substations.
1926.967 Special conditions.
1926.968 Definitions.
Appendix A to Subpart V of Part 1926--[Reserved]
 Appendix B to Subpart V of Part 1926--Working on Exposed Energized 
Parts
Appendix C to Subpart V of Part 1926--Protection from Hazardous 
Differences in Electric Potential
Appendix D to Subpart V of Part 1926--Methods of Inspecting and 
Testing Wood Poles
Appendix E to Subpart V of Part 1926--Protection from Flames and 
Electric Arcs
Appendix F to Subpart V of Part 1926--Work-Positioning Equipment 
Inspection Guidelines
Appendix G to Subpart V of Part 1926--Reference Documents

Subpart V--Electric Power Transmission and Distribution


Sec.  1926.950  General.

    (a) Application. (1) Scope. (i) This subpart, except for paragraph 
(a)(3) of this section, covers the construction of electric power 
transmission and distribution lines and equipment. As used in this 
subpart, the term ``construction'' includes the erection of new 
electric transmission and distribution lines and equipment, and the 
alteration, conversion, and improvement of existing electric 
transmission and distribution lines and equipment.

    Note to paragraph (a)(1)(i): An employer that complies with 
Sec.  1910.269 of this chapter will be considered in compliance with 
requirements in this subpart that do not reference other subparts of 
this part. Compliance with Sec.  1910.269 of this chapter will not 
excuse an employer from compliance obligations under other subparts 
of this part.

    (ii) Notwithstanding paragraph (a)(1)(i) of this section, this 
subpart does not apply to electrical safety-related work practices for 
unqualified employees.
    (2) Other Part 1926 standards. This subpart applies in addition to 
all other applicable standards contained in this Part 1926. Employers 
covered under this subpart are not exempt from complying with other 
applicable provisions in Part 1926 by the operation of Sec.  1910.5(c) 
of this chapter. Specific references in this subpart to other sections 
of Part 1926 are provided for emphasis only.
    (3) Applicable Part 1910 requirements. Line-clearance tree-trimming 
operations and work involving electric power generation installations 
shall comply with Sec.  1910.269 of this chapter.
    (b) Training. (1) All employees. (i) Each employee shall be trained 
in, and familiar with, the safety-related work practices, safety 
procedures, and other safety requirements in this subpart that pertain 
to his or her job assignments.
    (ii) Each employee shall also be trained in and familiar with any 
other safety practices, including applicable emergency procedures (such 
as pole-top and manhole rescue), that are not specifically addressed by 
this subpart but that are related to his or her work and are necessary 
for his or her safety.
    (iii) The degree of training shall be determined by the risk to the 
employee for the hazard involved.
    (2) Qualified employees. Each qualified employee shall also be 
trained and competent in:
    (i) The skills and techniques necessary to distinguish exposed live 
parts from other parts of electric equipment,
    (ii) The skills and techniques necessary to determine the nominal 
voltage of exposed live parts,
    (iii) The minimum approach distances specified in this subpart 
corresponding to the voltages to which the qualified

[[Page 20697]]

employee will be exposed and the skills and techniques necessary to 
maintain those distances,
    (iv) The proper use of the special precautionary techniques, 
personal protective equipment, insulating and shielding materials, and 
insulated tools for working on or near exposed energized parts of 
electric equipment, and
    (v) The recognition of electrical hazards to which the employee may 
be exposed and the skills and techniques necessary to control or avoid 
these hazards.

    Note to paragraph (b)(2): For the purposes of this subpart, a 
person must have the training required by paragraph (b)(2) of this 
section to be considered a qualified person.

    (3) Supervision and annual inspection. The employer shall 
determine, through regular supervision and through inspections 
conducted on at least an annual basis, that each employee is complying 
with the safety-related work practices required by this subpart.
    (4) Additional training. An employee shall receive additional 
training (or retraining) under any of the following conditions:
    (i) If the supervision or annual inspections required by paragraph 
(b)(3) of this section indicate that the employee is not complying with 
the safety-related work practices required by this subpart, or
    (ii) If new technology, new types of equipment, or changes in 
procedures necessitate the use of safety-related work practices that 
are different from those which the employee would normally use, or
    (iii) If he or she must employ safety-related work practices that 
are not normally used during his or her regular job duties.

    Note to paragraph (b)(4)(iii): The Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration considers tasks that are performed less often 
than once per year to necessitate retraining before the performance 
of the work practices involved.

    (5) Type of training. The training required by paragraph (b) of 
this section shall be of the classroom or on-the-job type.
    (6) Training goals. The training shall establish employee 
proficiency in the work practices required by this subpart and shall 
introduce the procedures necessary for compliance with this subpart.
    (7) Demonstration of proficiency. The employer shall ensure that 
each employee has demonstrated proficiency in the work practices 
involved before that employee is considered as having completed the 
training required by paragraph (b) of this section.

    Note 1 to paragraph (b)(7): Though they are not required by this 
paragraph, employment records that indicate that an employee has 
successfully completed the required training are one way of keeping 
track of when an employee has demonstrated proficiency.


    Note 2 to paragraph (b)(7): For an employee with previous 
training, an employer may determine that that employee has 
demonstrated the proficiency required by this paragraph using the 
following process: (1) Confirm that the employee has the training 
required by paragraph (b) of this section, (2) use an examination or 
interview to make an initial determination that the employee 
understands the relevant safety-related work practices before he or 
she performs any work covered by this subpart, and (3) supervise the 
employee closely until that employee has demonstrated proficiency as 
required by this paragraph.

    (c) Information transfer. (1) Host employer responsibilities. 
Before work begins, the host employer shall inform contract employers 
of:
    (i) The characteristics of the host employer's installation that 
are related to the safety of the work to be performed and are listed in 
paragraphs (d)(1) through (d)(5) of this section;

    Note to paragraph (c)(1)(i): This paragraph requires the host 
employer to obtain information listed in paragraphs (d)(1) through 
(d)(5) of this section if it does not have this information in 
existing records.

    (ii) Conditions that are related to the safety of the work to be 
performed, that are listed in paragraphs (d)(6) through (d)(8) of this 
section, and that are known to the host employer;

    Note to paragraph (c)(1)(ii): For the purposes of this 
paragraph, the host employer need only provide information to 
contract employers that the host employer can obtain from its 
existing records through the exercise of reasonable diligence. This 
paragraph does not require the host employer to make inspections of 
worksite conditions to obtain this information.

    (iii) Information about the design and operation of the host 
employer's installation that the contract employer needs to make the 
assessments required by this subpart; and

    Note to paragraph (c)(1)(iii): This paragraph requires the host 
employer to obtain information about the design and operation of its 
installation that contract employers need to make required 
assessments if it does not have this information in existing 
records.

    (iv) Any other information about the design and operation of the 
host employer's installation that is known by the host employer, that 
the contract employer requests, and that is related to the protection 
of the contract employer's employees.

    Note to paragraph (c)(1)(iv): For the purposes of this 
paragraph, the host employer need only provide information to 
contract employers that the host employer can obtain from its 
existing records through the exercise of reasonable diligence. This 
paragraph does not require the host employer to make inspections of 
worksite conditions to obtain this information.

    (2) Contract employer responsibilities. (i) The contract employer 
shall ensure that each of its employees is instructed in the hazardous 
conditions relevant to the employee's work that the contract employer 
is aware of as a result of information communicated to the contract 
employer by the host employer under paragraph (c)(1) of this section.
    (ii) Before work begins, the contract employer shall advise the 
host employer of any unique hazardous conditions presented by the 
contract employer's work.
    (iii) The contract employer shall advise the host employer of any 
unanticipated hazardous conditions found during the contract employer's 
work that the host employer did not mention under paragraph (c)(1) of 
this section. The contract employer shall provide this information to 
the host employer within 2 working days after discovering the hazardous 
condition.
    (3) Joint host- and contract-employer responsibilities. The 
contract employer and the host employer shall coordinate their work 
rules and procedures so that each employee of the contract employer and 
the host employer is protected as required by this subpart.
    (d) Existing characteristics and conditions. Existing 
characteristics and conditions of electric lines and equipment that are 
related to the safety of the work to be performed shall be determined 
before work on or near the lines or equipment is started. Such 
characteristics and conditions include, but are not limited to:
    (1) The nominal voltages of lines and equipment,
    (2) The maximum switching-transient voltages,
    (3) The presence of hazardous induced voltages,
    (4) The presence of protective grounds and equipment grounding 
conductors,
    (5) The locations of circuits and equipment, including electric 
supply lines, communication lines, and fire-protective signaling 
circuits,
    (6) The condition of protective grounds and equipment grounding 
conductors,
    (7) The condition of poles, and
    (8) Environmental conditions relating to safety.

[[Page 20698]]

Sec.  1926.951  Medical services and first aid.

    (a) General. The employer shall provide medical services and first 
aid as required in Sec.  1926.50.
    (b) First-aid training. In addition to the requirements of Sec.  
1926.50, when employees are performing work on, or associated with, 
exposed lines or equipment energized at 50 volts or more, persons with 
first-aid training shall be available as follows:
    (1) Field work. For field work involving two or more employees at a 
work location, at least two trained persons shall be available.
    (2) Fixed work locations. For fixed work locations such as 
substations, the number of trained persons available shall be 
sufficient to ensure that each employee exposed to electric shock can 
be reached within 4 minutes by a trained person. However, where the 
existing number of employees is insufficient to meet this requirement 
(at a remote substation, for example), each employee at the work 
location shall be a trained employee.


Sec.  1926.952  Job briefing.

    (a) Before each job. (1) Information provided by the employer. In 
assigning an employee or a group of employees to perform a job, the 
employer shall provide the employee in charge of the job with all 
available information that relates to the determination of existing 
characteristics and conditions required by Sec.  1926.950(d).
    (2) Briefing by the employee in charge. The employer shall ensure 
that the employee in charge conducts a job briefing that meets 
paragraphs (b), (c), and (d) of this section with the employees 
involved before they start each job.
    (b) Subjects to be covered. The briefing shall cover at least the 
following subjects: Hazards associated with the job, work procedures 
involved, special precautions, energy-source controls, and personal 
protective equipment requirements.
    (c) Number of briefings. (1) At least one before each day or shift. 
If the work or operations to be performed during the work day or shift 
are repetitive and similar, at least one job briefing shall be 
conducted before the start of the first job of each day or shift.
    (2) Additional briefings. Additional job briefings shall be held if 
significant changes, which might affect the safety of the employees, 
occur during the course of the work.
    (d) Extent of briefing. (1) Short discussion. A brief discussion is 
satisfactory if the work involved is routine and if the employees, by 
virtue of training and experience, can reasonably be expected to 
recognize and avoid the hazards involved in the job.
    (2) Detailed discussion. A more extensive discussion shall be 
conducted:
    (i) If the work is complicated or particularly hazardous, or
    (ii) If the employee cannot be expected to recognize and avoid the 
hazards involved in the job.

    Note to paragraph (d): The briefing must address all the 
subjects listed in paragraph (b) of this section.

    (e) Working alone. An employee working alone need not conduct a job 
briefing. However, the employer shall ensure that the tasks to be 
performed are planned as if a briefing were required.


Sec.  1926.953  Enclosed spaces.

    (a) General. This section covers enclosed spaces that may be 
entered by employees. It does not apply to vented vaults if the 
employer makes a determination that the ventilation system is operating 
to protect employees before they enter the space. This section applies 
to routine entry into enclosed spaces. If, after the employer takes the 
precautions given in this section and in Sec.  1926.965, the hazards 
remaining in the enclosed space endanger the life of an entrant or 
could interfere with an entrant's escape from the space, then entry 
into the enclosed space shall meet the permit-space entry requirements 
of paragraphs (d) through (k) of Sec.  1910.146 of this chapter.
    (b) Safe work practices. The employer shall ensure the use of safe 
work practices for entry into, and work in, enclosed spaces and for 
rescue of employees from such spaces.
    (c) Training. Each employee who enters an enclosed space or who 
serves as an attendant shall be trained in the hazards of enclosed-
space entry, in enclosed-space entry procedures, and in enclosed-space 
rescue procedures.
    (d) Rescue equipment. Employers shall provide equipment to ensure 
the prompt and safe rescue of employees from the enclosed space.
    (e) Evaluating potential hazards. Before any entrance cover to an 
enclosed space is removed, the employer shall determine whether it is 
safe to do so by checking for the presence of any atmospheric pressure 
or temperature differences and by evaluating whether there might be a 
hazardous atmosphere in the space. Any conditions making it unsafe to 
remove the cover shall be eliminated before the cover is removed.

    Note to paragraph (e): The determination called for in this 
paragraph may consist of a check of the conditions that might 
foreseeably be in the enclosed space. For example, the cover could 
be checked to see if it is hot and, if it is fastened in place, 
could be loosened gradually to release any residual pressure. An 
evaluation also needs to be made of whether conditions at the site 
could cause a hazardous atmosphere, such as an oxygen-deficient or 
flammable atmosphere, to develop within the space.

    (f) Removing covers. When covers are removed from enclosed spaces, 
the opening shall be promptly guarded by a railing, temporary cover, or 
other barrier designed to prevent an accidental fall through the 
opening and to protect employees working in the space from objects 
entering the space.
    (g) Hazardous atmosphere. Employees may not enter any enclosed 
space while it contains a hazardous atmosphere, unless the entry 
conforms to the permit-required confined spaces standard in Sec.  
1910.146 of this chapter.
    (h) Attendants. While work is being performed in the enclosed 
space, an attendant with first-aid training shall be immediately 
available outside the enclosed space to provide assistance if a hazard 
exists because of traffic patterns in the area of the opening used for 
entry. The attendant is not precluded from performing other duties 
outside the enclosed space if these duties do not distract the 
attendant from: Monitoring employees within the space or ensuring that 
it is safe for employees to enter and exit the space.

    Note to paragraph (h): See Sec.  1926.965 for additional 
requirements on attendants for work in manholes and vaults.

    (i) Calibration of test instruments. Test instruments used to 
monitor atmospheres in enclosed spaces shall be kept in calibration and 
shall have a minimum accuracy of 10 percent.
    (j) Testing for oxygen deficiency. Before an employee enters an 
enclosed space, the atmosphere in the enclosed space shall be tested 
for oxygen deficiency with a direct-reading meter or similar 
instrument, capable of collection and immediate analysis of data 
samples without the need for off-site evaluation. If continuous forced-
air ventilation is provided, testing is not required provided that the 
procedures used ensure that employees are not exposed to the hazards 
posed by oxygen deficiency.
    (k) Testing for flammable gases and vapors. Before an employee 
enters an enclosed space, the internal atmosphere shall be tested for 
flammable gases and vapors with a direct-reading meter or similar 
instrument capable of collection and immediate analysis of data samples 
without the need for off-site evaluation. This test shall be performed 
after the oxygen testing and ventilation required

[[Page 20699]]

by paragraph (j) of this section demonstrate that there is sufficient 
oxygen to ensure the accuracy of the test for flammability.
    (l) Ventilation, and monitoring for flammable gases or vapors. If 
flammable gases or vapors are detected or if an oxygen deficiency is 
found, forced-air ventilation shall be used to maintain oxygen at a 
safe level and to prevent a hazardous concentration of flammable gases 
and vapors from accumulating. A continuous monitoring program to ensure 
that no increase in flammable gas or vapor concentration above safe 
levels occurs may be followed in lieu of ventilation if flammable gases 
or vapors are initially detected at safe levels.

    Note to paragraph (l): See the definition of ``hazardous 
atmosphere'' for guidance in determining whether a specific 
concentration of a substance is hazardous.

    (m) Specific ventilation requirements. If continuous forced-air 
ventilation is used, it shall begin before entry is made and shall be 
maintained long enough for the employer to be able to demonstrate that 
a safe atmosphere exists before employees are allowed to enter the work 
area. The forced-air ventilation shall be so directed as to ventilate 
the immediate area where employees are present within the enclosed 
space and shall continue until all employees leave the enclosed space.
    (n) Air supply. The air supply for the continuous forced-air 
ventilation shall be from a clean source and may not increase the 
hazards in the enclosed space.
    (o) Open flames. If open flames are used in enclosed spaces, a test 
for flammable gases and vapors shall be made immediately before the 
open flame device is used and at least once per hour while the device 
is used in the space. Testing shall be conducted more frequently if 
conditions present in the enclosed space indicate that once per hour is 
insufficient to detect hazardous accumulations of flammable gases or 
vapors.

    Note to paragraph (o): See the definition of ``hazardous 
atmosphere'' for guidance in determining whether a specific 
concentration of a substance is hazardous.


    Note to Sec.  1926.953: Entries into enclosed spaces conducted 
in accordance with the permit-space entry requirements of paragraphs 
(d) through (k) of Sec.  1910.146 of this chapter are considered as 
complying with this section.

Sec.  1926.954  Personal protective equipment.

    (a) General. Personal protective equipment shall meet the 
requirements of Subpart E of this part.

    Note to paragraph (a): Paragraph (d) of Sec.  1926.95 sets 
employer payment obligations for the personal protective equipment 
required by this subpart, including, but not limited to, the fall 
protection equipment required by paragraph (b) of this section, the 
electrical protective equipment required by Sec.  1926.960(c), and 
the flame-resistant and arc-rated clothing and other protective 
equipment required by Sec.  1926.960(g).

    (b) Fall protection. (1) Personal fall arrest systems. (i) Personal 
fall arrest systems shall meet the requirements of Subpart M of this 
part.
    (ii) Personal fall arrest equipment used by employees who are 
exposed to hazards from flames or electric arcs, as determined by the 
employer under Sec.  1926.960(g)(1), shall be capable of passing a drop 
test equivalent to that required by paragraph (b)(2)(xii) of this 
section after exposure to an electric arc with a heat energy of 
405 cal/cm\2\.
    (2) Work-positioning equipment. Body belts and positioning straps 
for work-positioning equipment shall meet the following requirements:
    (i) Hardware for body belts and positioning straps shall meet the 
following requirements:
    (A) Hardware shall be made of drop-forged steel, pressed steel, 
formed steel, or equivalent material.
    (B) Hardware shall have a corrosion-resistant finish.
    (C) Hardware surfaces shall be smooth and free of sharp edges.
    (ii) Buckles shall be capable of withstanding an 8.9-kilonewton 
(2,000-pound-force) tension test with a maximum permanent deformation 
no greater than 0.4 millimeters (0.0156 inches).
    (iii) D rings shall be capable of withstanding a 22-kilonewton 
(5,000-pound-force) tensile test without cracking or breaking.
    (iv) Snaphooks shall be capable of withstanding a 22-kilonewton 
(5,000-pound-force) tension test without failure.

    Note to paragraph (b)(2)(iv): Distortion of the snaphook 
sufficient to release the keeper is considered to be tensile failure 
of a snaphook.

    (v) Top grain leather or leather substitute may be used in the 
manufacture of body belts and positioning straps; however, leather and 
leather substitutes may not be used alone as a load-bearing component 
of the assembly.
    (vi) Plied fabric used in positioning straps and in load-bearing 
parts of body belts shall be constructed in such a way that no raw 
edges are exposed and the plies do not separate.
    (vii) Positioning straps shall be capable of withstanding the 
following tests:
    (A) A dielectric test of 819.7 volts, AC, per centimeter (25,000 
volts per foot) for 3 minutes without visible deterioration;
    (B) A leakage test of 98.4 volts, AC, per centimeter (3,000 volts 
per foot) with a leakage current of no more than 1 mA;

    Note to paragraphs (b)(2)(vii)(A) and (b)(2)(vii)(B): 
Positioning straps that pass direct-current tests at equivalent 
voltages are considered as meeting this requirement.

    (C) Tension tests of 20 kilonewtons (4,500 pounds-force) for 
sections free of buckle holes and of 15 kilonewtons (3,500 pounds-
force) for sections with buckle holes;
    (D) A buckle-tear test with a load of 4.4 kilonewtons (1,000 
pounds-force); and
    (E) A flammability test in accordance with Table V-1.

                      Table V-1--Flammability Test
------------------------------------------------------------------------
              Test method                 Criteria for passing the test
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Vertically suspend a 500-mm (19.7-inch)  Any flames on the positioning
 length of strapping supporting a 100-    strap shall self extinguish.
 kg (220.5-lb) weight.
Use a butane or propane burner with a    The positioning strap shall
 76-mm (3-inch) flame.                    continue to support the 100-kg
                                          (220.5-lb) mass.
Direct the flame to an edge of the
 strapping at a distance of 25 mm (1
 inch).
Remove the flame after 5 seconds.
Wait for any flames on the positioning
 strap to stop burning.
------------------------------------------------------------------------


[[Page 20700]]

    (viii) The cushion part of the body belt shall contain no exposed 
rivets on the inside and shall be at least 76 millimeters (3 inches) in 
width.
    (ix) Tool loops shall be situated on the body of a body belt so 
that the 100 millimeters (4 inches) of the body belt that is in the 
center of the back, measuring from D ring to D ring, is free of tool 
loops and any other attachments.
    (x) Copper, steel, or equivalent liners shall be used around the 
bars of D rings to prevent wear between these members and the leather 
or fabric enclosing them.
    (xi) Snaphooks shall be of the locking type meeting the following 
requirements:
    (A) The locking mechanism shall first be released, or a destructive 
force shall be placed on the keeper, before the keeper will open.
    (B) A force in the range of 6.7 N (1.5 lbf) to 17.8 N (4 lbf) shall 
be required to release the locking mechanism.
    (C) With the locking mechanism released and with a force applied on 
the keeper against the face of the nose, the keeper may not begin to 
open with a force of 11.2 N (2.5 lbf) or less and shall begin to open 
with a maximum force of 17.8 N (4 lbf).
    (xii) Body belts and positioning straps shall be capable of 
withstanding a drop test as follows:
    (A) The test mass shall be rigidly constructed of steel or 
equivalent material with a mass of 100 kg (220.5 lbm). For work-
positioning equipment used by employees weighing more than 140 kg (310 
lbm) fully equipped, the test mass shall be increased proportionately 
(that is, the test mass must equal the mass of the equipped worker 
divided by 1.4).
    (B) For body belts, the body belt shall be fitted snugly around the 
test mass and shall be attached to the test-structure anchorage point 
by means of a wire rope.
    (C) For positioning straps, the strap shall be adjusted to its 
shortest length possible to accommodate the test and connected to the 
test-structure anchorage point at one end and to the test mass on the 
other end.
    (D) The test mass shall be dropped an unobstructed distance of 1 
meter (39.4 inches) from a supporting structure that will sustain 
minimal deflection during the test.
    (E) Body belts shall successfully arrest the fall of the test mass 
and shall be capable of supporting the mass after the test.
    (F) Positioning straps shall successfully arrest the fall of the 
test mass without breaking, and the arrest force may not exceed 17.8 
kilonewtons (4,000 pounds-force). Additionally, snaphooks on 
positioning straps may not distort to such an extent that the keeper 
would release.

    Note to paragraph (b)(2): When used by employees weighing no 
more than 140 kg (310 lbm) fully equipped, body belts and 
positioning straps that conform to American Society of Testing and 
Materials Standard Specifications for Personal Climbing Equipment, 
ASTM F887-12\e1\, are deemed to be in compliance with paragraph 
(b)(2) of this section.

    (3) Care and use of personal fall protection equipment. (i) Work-
positioning equipment shall be inspected before use each day to 
determine that the equipment is in safe working condition. Work-
positioning equipment that is not in safe working condition may not be 
used.

    Note to paragraph (b)(3)(i): Appendix F to this subpart contains 
guidelines for inspecting work-positioning equipment.

    (ii) Personal fall arrest systems shall be used in accordance with 
Sec.  1926.502(d).

    Note to paragraph (b)(3)(ii): Fall protection equipment rigged 
to arrest falls is considered a fall arrest system and must meet the 
applicable requirements for the design and use of those systems. 
Fall protection equipment rigged for work positioning is considered 
work-positioning equipment and must meet the applicable requirements 
for the design and use of that equipment.

    (iii) The employer shall ensure that employees use fall protection 
systems as follows:
    (A) Each employee working from an aerial lift shall use a fall 
restraint system or a personal fall arrest system. Paragraph (b)(2)(v) 
of Sec.  1926.453 does not apply.
    (B) Except as provided in paragraph (b)(3)(iii)(C) of this section, 
each employee in elevated locations more than 1.2 meters (4 feet) above 
the ground on poles, towers, or similar structures shall use a personal 
fall arrest system, work-positioning equipment, or fall restraint 
system, as appropriate, if the employer has not provided other fall 
protection meeting Subpart M of this part.
    (C) Until March 31, 2015, a qualified employee climbing or changing 
location on poles, towers, or similar structures need not use fall 
protection equipment, unless conditions, such as, but not limited to, 
ice, high winds, the design of the structure (for example, no provision 
for holding on with hands), or the presence of contaminants on the 
structure, could cause the employee to lose his or her grip or footing. 
On and after April 1, 2015, each qualified employee climbing or 
changing location on poles, towers, or similar structures must use fall 
protection equipment unless the employer can demonstrate that climbing 
or changing location with fall protection is infeasible or creates a 
greater hazard than climbing or changing location without it.

    Note 1 to paragraphs (b)(3)(iii)(B) and (b)(3)(iii)(C): These 
paragraphs apply to structures that support overhead electric power 
transmission and distribution lines and equipment. They do not apply 
to portions of buildings, such as loading docks, or to electric 
equipment, such as transformers and capacitors. Subpart M of this 
part contains the duty to provide fall protection associated with 
walking and working surfaces.


    Note 2 to paragraphs (b)(3)(iii)(B) and (b)(3)(iii)(C): Until 
the employer ensures that employees are proficient in climbing and 
the use of fall protection under Sec.  1926.950(b)(7), the employees 
are not considered ``qualified employees'' for the purposes of 
paragraphs (b)(3)(iii)(B) and (b)(3)(iii)(C) of this section. These 
paragraphs require unqualified employees (including trainees) to use 
fall protection any time they are more than 1.2 meters (4 feet) 
above the ground.

    (iv) On and after April 1, 2015, work-positioning systems shall be 
rigged so that an employee can free fall no more than 0.6 meters (2 
feet).
    (v) Anchorages for work-positioning equipment shall be capable of 
supporting at least twice the potential impact load of an employee's 
fall, or 13.3 kilonewtons (3,000 pounds-force), whichever is greater.

    Note to paragraph (b)(3)(v): Wood-pole fall-restriction devices 
meeting American Society of Testing and Materials Standard 
Specifications for Personal Climbing Equipment, ASTM F887-12\e1\, 
are deemed to meet the anchorage-strength requirement when they are 
used in accordance with manufacturers' instructions.

    (vi) Unless the snaphook is a locking type and designed 
specifically for the following connections, snaphooks on work-
positioning equipment may not be engaged:
    (A) Directly to webbing, rope, or wire rope;
    (B) To each other;
    (C) To a D ring to which another snaphook or other connector is 
attached;
    (D) To a horizontal lifeline; or
    (E) To any object that is incompatibly shaped or dimensioned in 
relation to the snaphook such that accidental disengagement could occur 
should the connected object sufficiently depress the snaphook keeper to 
allow release of the object.


Sec.  1926.955  Portable ladders and platforms.

    (a) General. Requirements for portable ladders contained in Subpart 
X of this part apply in addition to the

[[Page 20701]]

requirements of this section, except as specifically noted in paragraph 
(b) of this section.
    (b) Special ladders and platforms. Portable ladders used on 
structures or conductors in conjunction with overhead line work need 
not meet Sec.  1926.1053(b)(5)(i) and (b)(12). Portable ladders and 
platforms used on structures or conductors in conjunction with overhead 
line work shall meet the following requirements:
    (1) Design load. In the configurations in which they are used, 
portable platforms shall be capable of supporting without failure at 
least 2.5 times the maximum intended load.
    (2) Maximum load. Portable ladders and platforms may not be loaded 
in excess of the working loads for which they are designed.
    (3) Securing in place. Portable ladders and platforms shall be 
secured to prevent them from becoming dislodged.
    (4) Intended use. Portable ladders and platforms may be used only 
in applications for which they are designed.
    (c) Conductive ladders. Portable metal ladders and other portable 
conductive ladders may not be used near exposed energized lines or 
equipment. However, in specialized high-voltage work, conductive 
ladders shall be used when the employer demonstrates that nonconductive 
ladders would present a greater hazard to employees than conductive 
ladders.


Sec.  1926.956  Hand and portable power equipment.

    (a) General. Paragraph (b) of this section applies to electric 
equipment connected by cord and plug. Paragraph (c) of this section 
applies to portable and vehicle-mounted generators used to supply cord- 
and plug-connected equipment. Paragraph (d) of this section applies to 
hydraulic and pneumatic tools.
    (b) Cord- and plug-connected equipment. Cord- and plug-connected 
equipment not covered by Subpart K of this part shall comply with one 
of the following instead of Sec.  1926.302(a)(1):
    (1) The equipment shall be equipped with a cord containing an 
equipment grounding conductor connected to the equipment frame and to a 
means for grounding the other end of the conductor (however, this 
option may not be used where the introduction of the ground into the 
work environment increases the hazard to an employee); or
    (2) The equipment shall be of the double-insulated type conforming 
to Subpart K of this part; or
    (3) The equipment shall be connected to the power supply through an 
isolating transformer with an ungrounded secondary of not more than 50 
volts.
    (c) Portable and vehicle-mounted generators. Portable and vehicle-
mounted generators used to supply cord- and plug-connected equipment 
covered by paragraph (b) of this section shall meet the following 
requirements:
    (1) Equipment to be supplied. The generator may only supply 
equipment located on the generator or the vehicle and cord- and plug-
connected equipment through receptacles mounted on the generator or the 
vehicle.
    (2) Equipment grounding. The non-current-carrying metal parts of 
equipment and the equipment grounding conductor terminals of the 
receptacles shall be bonded to the generator frame.
    (3) Bonding the frame. For vehicle-mounted generators, the frame of 
the generator shall be bonded to the vehicle frame.
    (4) Bonding the neutral conductor. Any neutral conductor shall be 
bonded to the generator frame.
    (d) Hydraulic and pneumatic tools. (1) Hydraulic fluid in 
insulating tools. Paragraph (d)(1) of Sec.  1926.302 does not apply to 
hydraulic fluid used in insulating sections of hydraulic tools.
    (2) Operating pressure. Safe operating pressures for hydraulic and 
pneumatic tools, hoses, valves, pipes, filters, and fittings may not be 
exceeded.

    Note to paragraph (d)(2): If any hazardous defects are present, 
no operating pressure is safe, and the hydraulic or pneumatic 
equipment involved may not be used. In the absence of defects, the 
maximum rated operating pressure is the maximum safe pressure.

    (3) Work near energized parts. A hydraulic or pneumatic tool used 
where it may contact exposed energized parts shall be designed and 
maintained for such use.
    (4) Protection against vacuum formation. The hydraulic system 
supplying a hydraulic tool used where it may contact exposed live parts 
shall provide protection against loss of insulating value, for the 
voltage involved, due to the formation of a partial vacuum in the 
hydraulic line.

    Note to paragraph (d)(4): Use of hydraulic lines that do not 
have check valves and that have a separation of more than 10.7 
meters (35 feet) between the oil reservoir and the upper end of the 
hydraulic system promotes the formation of a partial vacuum.

    (5) Protection against the accumulation of moisture. A pneumatic 
tool used on energized electric lines or equipment, or used where it 
may contact exposed live parts, shall provide protection against the 
accumulation of moisture in the air supply.
    (6) Breaking connections. Pressure shall be released before 
connections are broken, unless quick-acting, self-closing connectors 
are used.
    (7) Leaks. Employers must ensure that employees do not use any part 
of their bodies to locate, or attempt to stop, a hydraulic leak.
    (8) Hoses. Hoses may not be kinked.


Sec.  1926.957  Live-line tools.

    (a) Design of tools. Live-line tool rods, tubes, and poles shall be 
designed and constructed to withstand the following minimum tests:
    (1) Fiberglass-reinforced plastic. If the tool is made of 
fiberglass-reinforced plastic (FRP), it shall withstand 328,100 volts 
per meter (100,000 volts per foot) of length for 5 minutes, or

    Note to paragraph (a)(1): Live-line tools using rod and tube 
that meet ASTM F711-02 (2007), Standard Specification for 
Fiberglass-Reinforced Plastic (FRP) Rod and Tube Used in Live Line 
Tools, are deemed to comply with paragraph (a)(1) of this section.

    (2) Wood. If the tool is made of wood, it shall withstand 246,100 
volts per meter (75,000 volts per foot) of length for 3 minutes, or
    (3) Equivalent tests. The tool shall withstand other tests that the 
employer can demonstrate are equivalent.
    (b) Condition of tools. (1) Daily inspection. Each live-line tool 
shall be wiped clean and visually inspected for defects before use each 
day.
    (2) Defects. If any defect or contamination that could adversely 
affect the insulating qualities or mechanical integrity of the live-
line tool is present after wiping, the tool shall be removed from 
service and examined and tested according to paragraph (b)(3) of this 
section before being returned to service.
    (3) Biennial inspection and testing. Live-line tools used for 
primary employee protection shall be removed from service every 2 
years, and whenever required under paragraph (b)(2) of this section, 
for examination, cleaning, repair, and testing as follows:
    (i) Each tool shall be thoroughly examined for defects.
    (ii) If a defect or contamination that could adversely affect the 
insulating qualities or mechanical integrity of the live-line tool is 
found, the tool shall be repaired and refinished or shall be 
permanently removed from service. If no such defect or contamination is 
found, the tool shall be cleaned and waxed.
    (iii) The tool shall be tested in accordance with paragraphs 
(b)(3)(iv)

[[Page 20702]]

and (b)(3)(v) of this section under the following conditions:
    (A) After the tool has been repaired or refinished; and
    (B) After the examination if repair or refinishing is not 
performed, unless the tool is made of FRP rod or foam-filled FRP tube 
and the employer can demonstrate that the tool has no defects that 
could cause it to fail during use.
    (iv) The test method used shall be designed to verify the tool's 
integrity along its entire working length and, if the tool is made of 
fiberglass-reinforced plastic, its integrity under wet conditions.
    (v) The voltage applied during the tests shall be as follows:
    (A) 246,100 volts per meter (75,000 volts per foot) of length for 1 
minute if the tool is made of fiberglass, or
    (B) 164,000 volts per meter (50,000 volts per foot) of length for 1 
minute if the tool is made of wood, or
    (C) Other tests that the employer can demonstrate are equivalent.

    Note to paragraph (b): Guidelines for the examination, cleaning, 
repairing, and in-service testing of live-line tools are specified 
in the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers' IEEE Guide 
for Maintenance Methods on Energized Power Lines, IEEE Std 516-2009.

Sec.  1926.958  Materials handling and storage.

    (a) General. Materials handling and storage shall comply with 
applicable material-handling and material-storage requirements in this 
part, including those in Subparts N and CC of this part.
    (b) Materials storage near energized lines or equipment. (1) 
Unrestricted areas. In areas to which access is not restricted to 
qualified persons only, materials or equipment may not be stored closer 
to energized lines or exposed energized parts of equipment than the 
following distances, plus a distance that provides for the maximum sag 
and side swing of all conductors and for the height and movement of 
material-handling equipment:
    (i) For lines and equipment energized at 50 kilovolts or less, the 
distance is 3.05 meters (10 feet).
    (ii) For lines and equipment energized at more than 50 kilovolts, 
the distance is 3.05 meters (10 feet) plus 0.10 meter (4 inches) for 
every 10 kilovolts over 50 kilovolts.
    (2) Restricted areas. In areas restricted to qualified employees, 
materials may not be stored within the working space about energized 
lines or equipment.

    Note to paragraph (b)(2): Paragraph (b) of Sec.  1926.966 
specifies the size of the working space.

Sec.  1926.959  Mechanical equipment.

    (a) General requirements. (1) Other applicable requirements. 
Mechanical equipment shall be operated in accordance with applicable 
requirements in this part, including Subparts N, O, and CC of this 
part, except that Sec.  1926.600(a)(6) does not apply to operations 
performed by qualified employees.
    (2) Inspection before use. The critical safety components of 
mechanical elevating and rotating equipment shall receive a thorough 
visual inspection before use on each shift.

    Note to paragraph (a)(2): Critical safety components of 
mechanical elevating and rotating equipment are components for which 
failure would result in free fall or free rotation of the boom.

    (3) Operator. The operator of an electric line truck may not leave 
his or her position at the controls while a load is suspended, unless 
the employer can demonstrate that no employee (including the operator) 
is endangered.
    (b) Outriggers. (1) Extend outriggers. Mobile equipment, if 
provided with outriggers, shall be operated with the outriggers 
extended and firmly set, except as provided in paragraph (b)(3) of this 
section.
    (2) Clear view. Outriggers may not be extended or retracted outside 
of the clear view of the operator unless all employees are outside the 
range of possible equipment motion.
    (3) Operation without outriggers. If the work area or the terrain 
precludes the use of outriggers, the equipment may be operated only 
within its maximum load ratings specified by the equipment manufacturer 
for the particular configuration of the equipment without outriggers.
    (c) Applied loads. Mechanical equipment used to lift or move lines 
or other material shall be used within its maximum load rating and 
other design limitations for the conditions under which the mechanical 
equipment is being used.
    (d) Operations near energized lines or equipment. (1) Minimum 
approach distance. Mechanical equipment shall be operated so that the 
minimum approach distances, established by the employer under Sec.  
1926.960(c)(1)(i), are maintained from exposed energized lines and 
equipment. However, the insulated portion of an aerial lift operated by 
a qualified employee in the lift is exempt from this requirement if the 
applicable minimum approach distance is maintained between the 
uninsulated portions of the aerial lift and exposed objects having a 
different electrical potential.
    (2) Observer. A designated employee other than the equipment 
operator shall observe the approach distance to exposed lines and 
equipment and provide timely warnings before the minimum approach 
distance required by paragraph (d)(1) of this section is reached, 
unless the employer can demonstrate that the operator can accurately 
determine that the minimum approach distance is being maintained.
    (3) Extra precautions. If, during operation of the mechanical 
equipment, that equipment could become energized, the operation also 
shall comply with at least one of paragraphs (d)(3)(i) through 
(d)(3)(iii) of this section.
    (i) The energized lines or equipment exposed to contact shall be 
covered with insulating protective material that will withstand the 
type of contact that could be made during the operation.
    (ii) The mechanical equipment shall be insulated for the voltage 
involved. The mechanical equipment shall be positioned so that its 
uninsulated portions cannot approach the energized lines or equipment 
any closer than the minimum approach distances, established by the 
employer under Sec.  1926.960(c)(1)(i).
    (iii) Each employee shall be protected from hazards that could 
arise from mechanical equipment contact with energized lines or 
equipment. The measures used shall ensure that employees will not be 
exposed to hazardous differences in electric potential. Unless the 
employer can demonstrate that the methods in use protect each employee 
from the hazards that could arise if the mechanical equipment contacts 
the energized line or equipment, the measures used shall include all of 
the following techniques:
    (A) Using the best available ground to minimize the time the lines 
or electric equipment remain energized,
    (B) Bonding mechanical equipment together to minimize potential 
differences,
    (C) Providing ground mats to extend areas of equipotential, and
    (D) Employing insulating protective equipment or barricades to 
guard against any remaining hazardous electrical potential differences.

    Note to paragraph (d)(3)(iii): Appendix C to this subpart 
contains information on hazardous step and touch potentials and on 
methods of protecting employees from hazards resulting from such 
potentials.

Sec.  1926.960  Working on or near exposed energized parts.

    (a) Application. This section applies to work on exposed live 
parts, or near enough to them to expose the employee to any hazard they 
present.

[[Page 20703]]

    (b) General. (1) Qualified employees only. (i) Only qualified 
employees may work on or with exposed energized lines or parts of 
equipment.
    (ii) Only qualified employees may work in areas containing 
unguarded, uninsulated energized lines or parts of equipment operating 
at 50 volts or more.
    (2) Treat as energized. Electric lines and equipment shall be 
considered and treated as energized unless they have been deenergized 
in accordance with Sec.  1926.961.
    (3) At least two employees. (i) Except as provided in paragraph 
(b)(3)(ii) of this section, at least two employees shall be present 
while any employees perform the following types of work:
    (A) Installation, removal, or repair of lines energized at more 
than 600 volts,
    (B) Installation, removal, or repair of deenergized lines if an 
employee is exposed to contact with other parts energized at more than 
600 volts,
    (C) Installation, removal, or repair of equipment, such as 
transformers, capacitors, and regulators, if an employee is exposed to 
contact with parts energized at more than 600 volts,
    (D) Work involving the use of mechanical equipment, other than 
insulated aerial lifts, near parts energized at more than 600 volts, 
and
    (E) Other work that exposes an employee to electrical hazards 
greater than, or equal to, the electrical hazards posed by operations 
listed specifically in paragraphs (b)(3)(i)(A) through (b)(3)(i)(D) of 
this section.
    (ii) Paragraph (b)(3)(i) of this section does not apply to the 
following operations:
    (A) Routine circuit switching, when the employer can demonstrate 
that conditions at the site allow safe performance of this work,
    (B) Work performed with live-line tools when the position of the 
employee is such that he or she is neither within reach of, nor 
otherwise exposed to contact with, energized parts, and
    (C) Emergency repairs to the extent necessary to safeguard the 
general public.
    (c) Live work. (1) Minimum approach distances. (i) The employer 
shall establish minimum approach distances no less than the distances 
computed by Table V-2 for ac systems or Table V-7 for dc systems.
    (ii) No later than April 1, 2015, for voltages over 72.5 kilovolts, 
the employer shall determine the maximum anticipated per-unit transient 
overvoltage, phase-to-ground, through an engineering analysis or assume 
a maximum anticipated per-unit transient overvoltage, phase-to-ground, 
in accordance with Table V-8. When the employer uses portable 
protective gaps to control the maximum transient overvoltage, the value 
of the maximum anticipated per-unit transient overvoltage, phase-to-
ground, must provide for five standard deviations between the 
statistical sparkover voltage of the gap and the statistical withstand 
voltage corresponding to the electrical component of the minimum 
approach distance. The employer shall make any engineering analysis 
conducted to determine maximum anticipated per-unit transient 
overvoltage available upon request to employees and to the Assistant 
Secretary or designee for examination and copying.

    Note to paragraph (c)(1)(ii): See Appendix B to this subpart for 
information on how to calculate the maximum anticipated per-unit 
transient overvoltage, phase-to-ground, when the employer uses 
portable protective gaps to reduce maximum transient overvoltages.

    (iii) The employer shall ensure that no employee approaches or 
takes any conductive object closer to exposed energized parts than the 
employer's established minimum approach distance, unless:
    (A) The employee is insulated from the energized part (rubber 
insulating gloves or rubber insulating gloves and sleeves worn in 
accordance with paragraph (c)(2) of this section constitutes insulation 
of the employee from the energized part upon which the employee is 
working provided that the employee has control of the part in a manner 
sufficient to prevent exposure to uninsulated portions of the 
employee's body), or
    (B) The energized part is insulated from the employee and from any 
other conductive object at a different potential, or
    (C) The employee is insulated from any other exposed conductive 
object in accordance with the requirements for live-line barehand work 
in Sec.  1926.964(c).
    (2) Type of insulation. (i) When an employee uses rubber insulating 
gloves as insulation from energized parts (under paragraph 
(c)(1)(iii)(A) of this section), the employer shall ensure that the 
employee also uses rubber insulating sleeves. However, an employee need 
not use rubber insulating sleeves if:
    (A) Exposed energized parts on which the employee is not working 
are insulated from the employee; and
    (B) When installing insulation for purposes of paragraph 
(c)(2)(i)(A) of this section, the employee installs the insulation from 
a position that does not expose his or her upper arm to contact with 
other energized parts.
    (ii) When an employee uses rubber insulating gloves or rubber 
insulating gloves and sleeves as insulation from energized parts (under 
paragraph (c)(1)(iii)(A) of this section), the employer shall ensure 
that the employee:
    (A) Puts on the rubber insulating gloves and sleeves in a position 
where he or she cannot reach into the minimum approach distance, 
established by the employer under paragraph (c)(1) of this section; and
    (B) Does not remove the rubber insulating gloves and sleeves until 
he or she is in a position where he or she cannot reach into the 
minimum approach distance, established by the employer under paragraph 
(c)(1) of this section.
    (d) Working position. (1) Working from below. The employer shall 
ensure that each employee, to the extent that other safety-related 
conditions at the worksite permit, works in a position from which a 
slip or shock will not bring the employee's body into contact with 
exposed, uninsulated parts energized at a potential different from the 
employee's.
    (2) Requirements for working without electrical protective 
equipment. When an employee performs work near exposed parts energized 
at more than 600 volts, but not more than 72.5 kilovolts, and is not 
wearing rubber insulating gloves, being protected by insulating 
equipment covering the energized parts, performing work using live-line 
tools, or performing live-line barehand work under Sec.  1926.964(c), 
the employee shall work from a position where he or she cannot reach 
into the minimum approach distance, established by the employer under 
paragraph (c)(1) of this section.
    (e) Making connections. The employer shall ensure that employees 
make connections as follows:
    (1) Connecting. In connecting deenergized equipment or lines to an 
energized circuit by means of a conducting wire or device, an employee 
shall first attach the wire to the deenergized part;
    (2) Disconnecting. When disconnecting equipment or lines from an 
energized circuit by means of a conducting wire or device, an employee 
shall remove the source end first; and
    (3) Loose conductors. When lines or equipment are connected to or 
disconnected from energized circuits, an employee shall keep loose 
conductors away from exposed energized parts.
    (f) Conductive articles. When an employee performs work within 
reaching distance of exposed energized parts of equipment, the employer 
shall

[[Page 20704]]

ensure that the employee removes or renders nonconductive all exposed 
conductive articles, such as keychains or watch chains, rings, or wrist 
watches or bands, unless such articles do not increase the hazards 
associated with contact with the energized parts.
    (g) Protection from flames and electric arcs. (1) Hazard 
assessment. The employer shall assess the workplace to identify 
employees exposed to hazards from flames or from electric arcs.
    (2) Estimate of available heat energy. For each employee exposed to 
hazards from electric arcs, the employer shall make a reasonable 
estimate of the incident heat energy to which the employee would be 
exposed.

    Note 1 to paragraph (g)(2): Appendix E to this subpart provides 
guidance on estimating available heat energy. The Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration will deem employers following the 
guidance in Appendix E to this subpart to be in compliance with 
paragraph (g)(2) of this section. An employer may choose a method of 
calculating incident heat energy not included in Appendix E to this 
subpart if the chosen method reasonably predicts the incident energy 
to which the employee would be exposed.


    Note 2 to paragraph (g)(2): This paragraph does not require the 
employer to estimate the incident heat energy exposure for every job 
task performed by each employee. The employer may make broad 
estimates that cover multiple system areas provided the employer 
uses reasonable assumptions about the energy-exposure distribution 
throughout the system and provided the estimates represent the 
maximum employee exposure for those areas. For example, the employer 
could estimate the heat energy just outside a substation feeding a 
radial distribution system and use that estimate for all jobs 
performed on that radial system.

    (3) Prohibited clothing. The employer shall ensure that each 
employee who is exposed to hazards from flames or electric arcs does 
not wear clothing that could melt onto his or her skin or that could 
ignite and continue to burn when exposed to flames or the heat energy 
estimated under paragraph (g)(2) of this section.

    Note to paragraph (g)(3): This paragraph prohibits clothing made 
from acetate, nylon, polyester, rayon and polypropylene, either 
alone or in blends, unless the employer demonstrates that the fabric 
has been treated to withstand the conditions that may be encountered 
by the employee or that the employee wears the clothing in such a 
manner as to eliminate the hazard involved.

    (4) Flame-resistant clothing. The employer shall ensure that the 
outer layer of clothing worn by an employee, except for clothing not 
required to be arc rated under paragraphs (g)(5)(i) through (g)(5)(v) 
of this section, is flame resistant under any of the following 
conditions:
    (i) The employee is exposed to contact with energized circuit parts 
operating at more than 600 volts,
    (ii) An electric arc could ignite flammable material in the work 
area that, in turn, could ignite the employee's clothing,
    (iii) Molten metal or electric arcs from faulted conductors in the 
work area could ignite the employee's clothing, or

    Note to paragraph (g)(4)(iii): This paragraph does not apply to 
conductors that are capable of carrying, without failure, the 
maximum available fault current for the time the circuit protective 
devices take to interrupt the fault.

    (iv) The incident heat energy estimated under paragraph (g)(2) of 
this section exceeds 2.0 cal/cm\2\.
    (5) Arc rating. The employer shall ensure that each employee 
exposed to hazards from electric arcs wears protective clothing and 
other protective equipment with an arc rating greater than or equal to 
the heat energy estimated under paragraph (g)(2) of this section 
whenever that estimate exceeds 2.0 cal/cm\2\. This protective equipment 
shall cover the employee's entire body, except as follows:
    (i) Arc-rated protection is not necessary for the employee's hands 
when the employee is wearing rubber insulating gloves with protectors 
or, if the estimated incident energy is no more than 14 cal/cm\2\, 
heavy-duty leather work gloves with a weight of at least 407 gm/m\2\ 
(12 oz/yd\2\),
    (ii) Arc-rated protection is not necessary for the employee's feet 
when the employee is wearing heavy-duty work shoes or boots,
    (iii) Arc-rated protection is not necessary for the employee's head 
when the employee is wearing head protection meeting Sec.  
1926.100(b)(2) if the estimated incident energy is less than 9 cal/
cm\2\ for exposures involving single-phase arcs in open air or 5 cal/
cm\2\ for other exposures,
    (iv) The protection for the employee's head may consist of head 
protection meeting Sec.  1926.100(b)(2) and a faceshield with a minimum 
arc rating of 8 cal/cm\2\ if the estimated incident-energy exposure is 
less than 13 cal/cm\2\ for exposures involving single-phase arcs in 
open air or 9 cal/cm\2\ for other exposures, and
    (v) For exposures involving single-phase arcs in open air, the arc 
rating for the employee's head and face protection may be 4 cal/cm\2\ 
less than the estimated incident energy.

    Note to paragraph (g): See Appendix E to this subpart for 
further information on the selection of appropriate protection.

    (6) Dates. (i) The obligation in paragraph (g)(2) of this section 
for the employer to make reasonable estimates of incident energy 
commences January 1, 2015.
    (ii) The obligation in paragraph (g)(4)(iv) of this section for the 
employer to ensure that the outer layer of clothing worn by an employee 
is flame-resistant when the estimated incident heat energy exceeds 2.0 
cal/cm\2\ commences April 1, 2015.
    (iii) The obligation in paragraph (g)(5) of this section for the 
employer to ensure that each employee exposed to hazards from electric 
arcs wears the required arc-rated protective equipment commences April 
1, 2015.
    (h) Fuse handling. When an employee must install or remove fuses 
with one or both terminals energized at more than 300 volts, or with 
exposed parts energized at more than 50 volts, the employer shall 
ensure that the employee uses tools or gloves rated for the voltage. 
When an employee installs or removes expulsion-type fuses with one or 
both terminals energized at more than 300 volts, the employer shall 
ensure that the employee wears eye protection meeting the requirements 
of Subpart E of this part, uses a tool rated for the voltage, and is 
clear of the exhaust path of the fuse barrel.
    (i) Covered (noninsulated) conductors. The requirements of this 
section that pertain to the hazards of exposed live parts also apply 
when an employee performs work in proximity to covered (noninsulated) 
wires.
    (j) Non-current-carrying metal parts. Non-current-carrying metal 
parts of equipment or devices, such as transformer cases and circuit-
breaker housings, shall be treated as energized at the highest voltage 
to which these parts are exposed, unless the employer inspects the 
installation and determines that these parts are grounded before 
employees begin performing the work.
    (k) Opening and closing circuits under load. (1) The employer shall 
ensure that devices used by employees to open circuits under load 
conditions are designed to interrupt the current involved.
    (2) The employer shall ensure that devices used by employees to 
close circuits under load conditions are designed to safely carry the 
current involved.
BILLING CODE 4510-26-P

[[Page 20705]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR11AP14.034


[[Page 20706]]


[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR11AP14.035

BILLING CODE 4510-26-C

[[Page 20707]]



        Table V-3--Electrical Component of the Minimum Approach Distance (D; in Meters) at 5.1 to 72.5 kV
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                               Phase-to-ground exposure  Phase-to-phase exposure
             Nominal voltage (kV) phase-to-phase              --------------------------------------------------
                                                                         D (m)                    D (m)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
5.1 to 15.0..................................................                     0.04                      0.07
15.1 to 36.0.................................................                     0.16                      0.28
36.1 to 46.0.................................................                     0.23                      0.37
46.1 to 72.5.................................................                     0.39                      0.59
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                  Table V-4--Altitude Correction Factor
------------------------------------------------------------------------
          Altitude above sea level (m)                      A
------------------------------------------------------------------------
0 to 900.......................................                     1.00
901 to 1,200...................................                     1.02
1,201 to 1,500.................................                     1.05
1,501 to 1,800.................................                     1.08
1,801 to 2,100.................................                     1.11
2,101 to 2,400.................................                     1.14
2,401 to 2,700.................................                     1.17
2,701 to 3,000.................................                     1.20
3,001 to 3,600.................................                     1.25
3,601 to 4,200.................................                     1.30
4,201 to 4,800.................................                     1.35
4,801 to 5,400.................................                     1.39
5,401 to 6,000.................................                     1.44
------------------------------------------------------------------------


  Table V-5--Alternative Minimum Approach Distances (in Meters or Feet and Inches) for Voltages of 72.5 kV and
                                                    Less \1\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                             Distance
                                                ----------------------------------------------------------------
      Nominal voltage (kV) phase-to-phase            Phase-to-ground exposure         Phase-to-phase exposure
                                                ----------------------------------------------------------------
                                                        m               ft               m              ft
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
0.50 0.300 \2\.................................           Avoid contact
                                                          Avoid contact
                                                ----------------------------------------------------------------
0.301 to 0.750 \2\.............................            0.33            1.09             0.33            1.09
0.751 to 5.0...................................            0.63            2.07             0.63            2.07
5.1 to 15.0....................................            0.65            2.14             0.68            2.24
15.1 to 36.0...................................            0.77            2.53             0.89            2.92
36.1 to 46.0...................................            0.84            2.76             0.98            3.22
46.1 to 72.5...................................            1.00            3.29             1.20            3.94
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Employers may use the minimum approach distances in this table provided the worksite is at an elevation of
  900 meters (3,000 feet) or less. If employees will be working at elevations greater than 900 meters (3,000
  feet) above mean sea level, the employer shall determine minimum approach distances by multiplying the
  distances in this table by the correction factor in Table V-4 corresponding to the altitude of the work.
\2\ For single-phase systems, use voltage-to-ground.


 Table V-6--Alternative Minimum Approach Distances (in Meters or Feet and Inches) for Voltages of More Than 72.5
                                                    kV 1 2 3
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                     Phase-to-ground exposure         Phase-to-phase exposure
       Voltage range phase to phase (kV)        ----------------------------------------------------------------
                                                        m               ft               m              ft
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
72.6 to 121.0..................................            1.13            3.71             1.42            4.66
121.1 to 145.0.................................            1.30            4.27             1.64            5.38
145.1 to 169.0.................................            1.46            4.79             1.94            6.36
169.1 to 242.0.................................            2.01            6.59             3.08           10.10
242.1 to 362.0.................................            3.41           11.19             5.52           18.11
362.1 to 420.0.................................            4.25           13.94             6.81           22.34
420.1 to 550.0.................................            5.07           16.63             8.24           27.03
550.1 to 800.0.................................            6.88           22.57            11.38           37.34
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Employers may use the minimum approach distances in this table provided the worksite is at an elevation of
  900 meters (3,000 feet) or less. If employees will be working at elevations greater than 900 meters (3,000
  feet) above mean sea level, the employer shall determine minimum approach distances by multiplying the
  distances in this table by the correction factor in Table V-4 corresponding to the altitude of the work.
\2\ Employers may use the phase-to-phase minimum approach distances in this table provided that no insulated
  tool spans the gap and no large conductive object is in the gap.
\3\ The clear live-line tool distance shall equal or exceed the values for the indicated voltage ranges.


[[Page 20708]]


            Table V-7--DC Live-Line Minimum Approach Distance (in Meters) With Overvoltage Factor \1\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                 distance (m) maximum line-to-ground voltage (kV)
  Maximum anticipated per-unit   -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
      transient overvoltage             250             400             500             600             750
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1.5 or less.....................            1.12            1.60            2.06            2.62            3.61
1.6.............................            1.17            1.69            2.24            2.86            3.98
1.7.............................            1.23            1.82            2.42            3.12            4.37
1.8.............................            1.28            1.95            2.62            3.39            4.79
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The distances specified in this table are for air, bare-hand, and live-line tool conditions. If employees
  will be working at elevations greater than 900 meters (3,000 feet) above mean sea level, the employer shall
  determine minimum approach distances by multiplying the distances in this table by the correction factor in
  Table V-4 corresponding to the altitude of the work.


                            Table V-8--Assumed Maximum Per-Unit Transient Overvoltage
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                          Assumed maximum  per-
                      Voltage range (kV)                         Type of current (ac or       unit transient
                                                                          dc)                  overvoltage
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
72.6 to 420.0.................................................                       ac                      3.5
420.1 to 550.0................................................                       ac                      3.0
550.1 to 800.0................................................                       ac                      2.5
250 to 750....................................................                       dc                      1.8
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sec.  1926.961  Deenergizing lines and equipment for employee 
protection.

    (a) Application. This section applies to the deenergizing of 
transmission and distribution lines and equipment for the purpose of 
protecting employees. Conductors and parts of electric equipment that 
have been deenergized under procedures other than those required by 
this section shall be treated as energized.
    (b) General. (1) System operator. If a system operator is in charge 
of the lines or equipment and their means of disconnection, the 
employer shall designate one employee in the crew to be in charge of 
the clearance and shall comply with all of the requirements of 
paragraph (c) of this section in the order specified.
    (2) No system operator. If no system operator is in charge of the 
lines or equipment and their means of disconnection, the employer shall 
designate one employee in the crew to be in charge of the clearance and 
to perform the functions that the system operator would otherwise 
perform under this section. All of the requirements of paragraph (c) of 
this section apply, in the order specified, except as provided in 
paragraph (b)(3) of this section.
    (3) Single crews working with the means of disconnection under the 
control of the employee in charge of the clearance. If only one crew 
will be working on the lines or equipment and if the means of 
disconnection is accessible and visible to, and under the sole control 
of, the employee in charge of the clearance, paragraphs (c)(1), (c)(3), 
and (c)(5) of this section do not apply. Additionally, the employer 
does not need to use the tags required by the remaining provisions of 
paragraph (c) of this section.
    (4) Multiple crews. If two or more crews will be working on the 
same lines or equipment, then:
    (i) The crews shall coordinate their activities under this section 
with a single employee in charge of the clearance for all of the crews 
and follow the requirements of this section as if all of the employees 
formed a single crew, or
    (ii) Each crew shall independently comply with this section and, if 
there is no system operator in charge of the lines or equipment, shall 
have separate tags and coordinate deenergizing and reenergizing the 
lines and equipment with the other crews.
    (5) Disconnecting means accessible to general public. The employer 
shall render any disconnecting means that are accessible to individuals 
outside the employer's control (for example, the general public) 
inoperable while the disconnecting means are open for the purpose of 
protecting employees.
    (c) Deenergizing lines and equipment. (1) Request to deenergize. 
The employee that the employer designates pursuant to paragraph (b) of 
this section as being in charge of the clearance shall make a request 
of the system operator to deenergize the particular section of line or 
equipment. The designated employee becomes the employee in charge (as 
this term is used in paragraph (c) of this section) and is responsible 
for the clearance.
    (2) Open disconnecting means. The employer shall ensure that all 
switches, disconnectors, jumpers, taps, and other means through which 
known sources of electric energy may be supplied to the particular 
lines and equipment to be deenergized are open. The employer shall 
render such means inoperable, unless its design does not so permit, and 
then ensure that such means are tagged to indicate that employees are 
at work.
    (3) Automatically and remotely controlled switches. The employer 
shall ensure that automatically and remotely controlled switches that 
could cause the opened disconnecting means to close are also tagged at 
the points of control. The employer shall render the automatic or 
remote control feature inoperable, unless its design does not so 
permit.
    (4) Network protectors. The employer need not use the tags 
mentioned in paragraphs (c)(2) and (c)(3) of this section on a network 
protector for work on the primary feeder for the network protector's 
associated network transformer when the employer can demonstrate all of 
the following conditions:
    (i) Every network protector is maintained so that it will 
immediately trip open if closed when a primary conductor is 
deenergized;
    (ii) Employees cannot manually place any network protector in a 
closed position without the use of tools, and any manual override 
position is blocked, locked, or otherwise disabled; and
    (iii) The employer has procedures for manually overriding any 
network protector that incorporate provisions for determining, before 
anyone places a network protector in a closed position,

[[Page 20709]]

that: The line connected to the network protector is not deenergized 
for the protection of any employee working on the line; and (if the 
line connected to the network protector is not deenergized for the 
protection of any employee working on the line) the primary conductors 
for the network protector are energized.
    (5) Tags. Tags shall prohibit operation of the disconnecting means 
and shall indicate that employees are at work.
    (6) Test for energized condition. After the applicable requirements 
in paragraphs (c)(1) through (c)(5) of this section have been followed 
and the system operator gives a clearance to the employee in charge, 
the employer shall ensure that the lines and equipment are deenergized 
by testing the lines and equipment to be worked with a device designed 
to detect voltage.
    (7) Install grounds. The employer shall ensure the installation of 
protective grounds as required by Sec.  1926.962.
    (8) Consider lines and equipment deenergized. After the applicable 
requirements of paragraphs (c)(1) through (c)(7) of this section have 
been followed, the lines and equipment involved may be considered 
deenergized.
    (9) Transferring clearances. To transfer the clearance, the 
employee in charge (or the employee's supervisor if the employee in 
charge must leave the worksite due to illness or other emergency) shall 
inform the system operator and employees in the crew; and the new 
employee in charge shall be responsible for the clearance.
    (10) Releasing clearances. To release a clearance, the employee in 
charge shall:
    (i) Notify each employee under that clearance of the pending 
release of the clearance;
    (ii) Ensure that all employees under that clearance are clear of 
the lines and equipment;
    (iii) Ensure that all protective grounds protecting employees under 
that clearance have been removed; and
    (iv) Report this information to the system operator and then 
release the clearance.
    (11) Person releasing clearance. Only the employee in charge who 
requested the clearance may release the clearance, unless the employer 
transfers responsibility under paragraph (c)(9) of this section.
    (12) Removal of tags. No one may remove tags without the release of 
the associated clearance as specified under paragraphs (c)(10) and 
(c)(11) of this section.
    (13) Reenergizing lines and equipment. The employer shall ensure 
that no one initiates action to reenergize the lines or equipment at a 
point of disconnection until all protective grounds have been removed, 
all crews working on the lines or equipment release their clearances, 
all employees are clear of the lines and equipment, and all protective 
tags are removed from that point of disconnection.


Sec.  1926.962  Grounding for the protection of employees.

    (a) Application. This section applies to grounding of transmission 
and distribution lines and equipment for the purpose of protecting 
employees. Paragraph (d) of this section also applies to protective 
grounding of other equipment as required elsewhere in this Subpart.

    Note to paragraph (a): This section covers grounding of 
transmission and distribution lines and equipment when this subpart 
requires protective grounding and whenever the employer chooses to 
ground such lines and equipment for the protection of employees.

    (b) General. For any employee to work transmission and distribution 
lines or equipment as deenergized, the employer shall ensure that the 
lines or equipment are deenergized under the provisions of Sec.  
1926.961 and shall ensure proper grounding of the lines or equipment as 
specified in paragraphs (c) through (h) of this section. However, if 
the employer can demonstrate that installation of a ground is 
impracticable or that the conditions resulting from the installation of 
a ground would present greater hazards to employees than working 
without grounds, the lines and equipment may be treated as deenergized 
provided that the employer establishes that all of the following 
conditions apply:
    (1) Deenergized. The employer ensures that the lines and equipment 
are deenergized under the provisions of Sec.  1926.961.
    (2) No possibility of contact. There is no possibility of contact 
with another energized source.
    (3) No induced voltage. The hazard of induced voltage is not 
present.
    (c) Equipotential zone. Temporary protective grounds shall be 
placed at such locations and arranged in such a manner that the 
employer can demonstrate will prevent each employee from being exposed 
to hazardous differences in electric potential.

    Note to paragraph (c): Appendix C to this subpart contains 
guidelines for establishing the equipotential zone required by this 
paragraph. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration will 
deem grounding practices meeting these guidelines as complying with 
paragraph (c) of this section.

    (d) Protective grounding equipment. (1) Ampacity. (i) Protective 
grounding equipment shall be capable of conducting the maximum fault 
current that could flow at the point of grounding for the time 
necessary to clear the fault.
    (ii) Protective grounding equipment shall have an ampacity greater 
than or equal to that of No. 2 AWG copper.
    (2) Impedance. Protective grounds shall have an impedance low 
enough so that they do not delay the operation of protective devices in 
case of accidental energizing of the lines or equipment.

    Note to paragraph (d): American Society for Testing and 
Materials Standard Specifications for Temporary Protective Grounds 
to Be Used on De-Energized Electric Power Lines and Equipment, ASTM 
F855-09, contains guidelines for protective grounding equipment. The 
Institute of Electrical Engineers Guide for Protective Grounding of 
Power Lines, IEEE Std 1048-2003, contains guidelines for selecting 
and installing protective grounding equipment.

    (e) Testing. The employer shall ensure that, unless a previously 
installed ground is present, employees test lines and equipment and 
verify the absence of nominal voltage before employees install any 
ground on those lines or that equipment.
    (f) Connecting and removing grounds. (1) Order of connection. The 
employer shall ensure that, when an employee attaches a ground to a 
line or to equipment, the employee attaches the ground-end connection 
first and then attaches the other end by means of a live-line tool. For 
lines or equipment operating at 600 volts or less, the employer may 
permit the employee to use insulating equipment other than a live-line 
tool if the employer ensures that the line or equipment is not 
energized at the time the ground is connected or if the employer can 
demonstrate that each employee is protected from hazards that may 
develop if the line or equipment is energized.
    (2) Order of removal. The employer shall ensure that, when an 
employee removes a ground, the employee removes the grounding device 
from the line or equipment using a live-line tool before he or she 
removes the ground-end connection. For lines or equipment operating at 
600 volts or less, the employer may permit the employee to use 
insulating equipment other than a live-line tool if the employer 
ensures that the line or equipment is not energized at the time the 
ground is disconnected or if the employer can demonstrate that each 
employee is

[[Page 20710]]

protected from hazards that may develop if the line or equipment is 
energized.
    (g) Additional precautions. The employer shall ensure that, when an 
employee performs work on a cable at a location remote from the cable 
terminal, the cable is not grounded at the cable terminal if there is a 
possibility of hazardous transfer of potential should a fault occur.
    (h) Removal of grounds for test. The employer may permit employees 
to remove grounds temporarily during tests. During the test procedure, 
the employer shall ensure that each employee uses insulating equipment, 
shall isolate each employee from any hazards involved, and shall 
implement any additional measures necessary to protect each exposed 
employee in case the previously grounded lines and equipment become 
energized.


Sec.  1926.963  Testing and test facilities.

    (a) Application. This section provides for safe work practices for 
high-voltage and high-power testing performed in laboratories, shops, 
and substations, and in the field and on electric transmission and 
distribution lines and equipment. It applies only to testing involving 
interim measurements using high voltage, high power, or combinations of 
high voltage and high power, and not to testing involving continuous 
measurements as in routine metering, relaying, and normal line work.

    Note to paragraph (a): OSHA considers routine inspection and 
maintenance measurements made by qualified employees to be routine 
line work not included in the scope of this section, provided that 
the hazards related to the use of intrinsic high-voltage or high-
power sources require only the normal precautions associated with 
routine work specified in the other paragraphs of this subpart. Two 
typical examples of such excluded test work procedures are 
``phasing-out'' testing and testing for a ``no-voltage'' condition.

    (b) General requirements. (1) Safe work practices. The employer 
shall establish and enforce work practices for the protection of each 
worker from the hazards of high-voltage or high-power testing at all 
test areas, temporary and permanent. Such work practices shall include, 
as a minimum, test area safeguarding, grounding, the safe use of 
measuring and control circuits, and a means providing for periodic 
safety checks of field test areas.
    (2) Training. The employer shall ensure that each employee, upon 
initial assignment to the test area, receives training in safe work 
practices, with retraining provided as required by Sec.  1926.950(b).
    (c) Safeguarding of test areas. (1) Safeguarding. The employer 
shall provide safeguarding within test areas to control access to test 
equipment or to apparatus under test that could become energized as 
part of the testing by either direct or inductive coupling and to 
prevent accidental employee contact with energized parts.
    (2) Permanent test areas. The employer shall guard permanent test 
areas with walls, fences, or other barriers designed to keep employees 
out of the test areas.
    (3) Temporary test areas. In field testing, or at a temporary test 
site not guarded by permanent fences and gates, the employer shall 
ensure the use of one of the following means to prevent employees 
without authorization from entering:
    (i) Distinctively colored safety tape supported approximately waist 
high with safety signs attached to it,
    (ii) A barrier or barricade that limits access to the test area to 
a degree equivalent, physically and visually, to the barricade 
specified in paragraph (c)(3)(i) of this section, or
    (iii) One or more test observers stationed so that they can monitor 
the entire area.
    (4) Removal of safeguards. The employer shall ensure the removal of 
the safeguards required by paragraph (c)(3) of this section when 
employees no longer need the protection afforded by the safeguards.
    (d) Grounding practices. (1) Establish and implement practices. The 
employer shall establish and implement safe grounding practices for the 
test facility.
    (i) The employer shall maintain at ground potential all conductive 
parts accessible to the test operator while the equipment is operating 
at high voltage.
    (ii) Wherever ungrounded terminals of test equipment or apparatus 
under test may be present, they shall be treated as energized until 
tests demonstrate that they are deenergized.
    (2) Installation of grounds. The employer shall ensure either that 
visible grounds are applied automatically, or that employees using 
properly insulated tools manually apply visible grounds, to the high-
voltage circuits after they are deenergized and before any employee 
performs work on the circuit or on the item or apparatus under test. 
Common ground connections shall be solidly connected to the test 
equipment and the apparatus under test.
    (3) Isolated ground return. In high-power testing, the employer 
shall provide an isolated ground-return conductor system designed to 
prevent the intentional passage of current, with its attendant voltage 
rise, from occurring in the ground grid or in the earth. However, the 
employer need not provide an isolated ground-return conductor if the 
employer can demonstrate that both of the following conditions exist:
    (i) The employer cannot provide an isolated ground-return conductor 
due to the distance of the test site from the electric energy source, 
and
    (ii) The employer protects employees from any hazardous step and 
touch potentials that may develop during the test.

    Note to paragraph (d)(3)(ii): See Appendix C to this subpart for 
information on measures that employers can take to protect employees 
from hazardous step and touch potentials.

    (4) Equipment grounding conductors. For tests in which using the 
equipment grounding conductor in the equipment power cord to ground the 
test equipment would result in greater hazards to test personnel or 
prevent the taking of satisfactory measurements, the employer may use a 
ground clearly indicated in the test set-up if the employer can 
demonstrate that this ground affords protection for employees 
equivalent to the protection afforded by an equipment grounding 
conductor in the power supply cord.
    (5) Grounding after tests. The employer shall ensure that, when any 
employee enters the test area after equipment is deenergized, a ground 
is placed on the high-voltage terminal and any other exposed terminals.
    (i) Before any employee applies a direct ground, the employer shall 
discharge high capacitance equipment or apparatus through a resistor 
rated for the available energy.
    (ii) A direct ground shall be applied to the exposed terminals 
after the stored energy drops to a level at which it is safe to do so.
    (6) Grounding test vehicles. If the employer uses a test trailer or 
test vehicle in field testing, its chassis shall be grounded. The 
employer shall protect each employee against hazardous touch potentials 
with respect to the vehicle, instrument panels, and other conductive 
parts accessible to employees with bonding, insulation, or isolation.
    (e) Control and measuring circuits. (1) Control wiring. The 
employer may not run control wiring, meter connections, test leads, or 
cables from a test area unless contained in a grounded metallic sheath 
and terminated in a grounded metallic enclosure or unless the employer 
takes other precautions that it can demonstrate will provide employees 
with equivalent safety.
    (2) Instruments. The employer shall isolate meters and other 
instruments

[[Page 20711]]

with accessible terminals or parts from test personnel to protect 
against hazards that could arise should such terminals and parts become 
energized during testing. If the employer provides this isolation by 
locating test equipment in metal compartments with viewing windows, the 
employer shall provide interlocks to interrupt the power supply when 
someone opens the compartment cover.
    (3) Routing temporary wiring. The employer shall protect temporary 
wiring and its connections against damage, accidental interruptions, 
and other hazards. To the maximum extent possible, the employer shall 
keep signal, control, ground, and power cables separate from each 
other.
    (4) Test observer. If any employee will be present in the test area 
during testing, a test observer shall be present. The test observer 
shall be capable of implementing the immediate deenergizing of test 
circuits for safety purposes.
    (f) Safety check. (1) Before each test. Safety practices governing 
employee work at temporary or field test areas shall provide, at the 
beginning of each series of tests, for a routine safety check of such 
test areas.
    (2) Conditions to be checked. The test operator in charge shall 
conduct these routine safety checks before each series of tests and 
shall verify at least the following conditions:
    (i) Barriers and safeguards are in workable condition and placed 
properly to isolate hazardous areas;
    (ii) System test status signals, if used, are in operable 
condition;
    (iii) Clearly marked test-power disconnects are readily available 
in an emergency;
    (iv) Ground connections are clearly identifiable;
    (v) Personal protective equipment is provided and used as required 
by Subpart E of this part and by this subpart; and
    (vi) Proper separation between signal, ground, and power cables.


Sec.  1926.964  Overhead lines and live-line barehand work.

    (a) General. (1) Application. This section provides additional 
requirements for work performed on or near overhead lines and equipment 
and for live-line barehand work.
    (2) Checking structure before climbing. Before allowing employees 
to subject elevated structures, such as poles or towers, to such 
stresses as climbing or the installation or removal of equipment may 
impose, the employer shall ascertain that the structures are capable of 
sustaining the additional or unbalanced stresses. If the pole or other 
structure cannot withstand the expected loads, the employer shall brace 
or otherwise support the pole or structure so as to prevent failure.

    Note to paragraph (a)(2): Appendix D to this subpart contains 
test methods that employers can use in ascertaining whether a wood 
pole is capable of sustaining the forces imposed by an employee 
climbing the pole. This paragraph also requires the employer to 
ascertain that the pole can sustain all other forces imposed by the 
work employees will perform.

    (3) Setting and moving poles. (i) When a pole is set, moved, or 
removed near an exposed energized overhead conductor, the pole may not 
contact the conductor.
    (ii) When a pole is set, moved, or removed near an exposed 
energized overhead conductor, the employer shall ensure that each 
employee wears electrical protective equipment or uses insulated 
devices when handling the pole and that no employee contacts the pole 
with uninsulated parts of his or her body.
    (iii) To protect employees from falling into holes used for placing 
poles, the employer shall physically guard the holes, or ensure that 
employees attend the holes, whenever anyone is working nearby.
    (b) Installing and removing overhead lines. The following 
provisions apply to the installation and removal of overhead conductors 
or cable (overhead lines).
    (1) Tension stringing method. When lines that employees are 
installing or removing can contact energized parts, the employer shall 
use the tension-stringing method, barriers, or other equivalent 
measures to minimize the possibility that conductors and cables the 
employees are installing or removing will contact energized power lines 
or equipment.
    (2) Conductors, cables, and pulling and tensioning equipment. For 
conductors, cables, and pulling and tensioning equipment, the employer 
shall provide the protective measures required by Sec.  1926.959(d)(3) 
when employees are installing or removing a conductor or cable close 
enough to energized conductors that any of the following failures could 
energize the pulling or tensioning equipment or the conductor or cable 
being installed or removed:
    (i) Failure of the pulling or tensioning equipment,
    (ii) Failure of the conductor or cable being pulled, or
    (iii) Failure of the previously installed lines or equipment.
    (3) Disable automatic-reclosing feature. If the conductors that 
employees are installing or removing cross over energized conductors in 
excess of 600 volts and if the design of the circuit-interrupting 
devices protecting the lines so permits, the employer shall render 
inoperable the automatic-reclosing feature of these devices.
    (4) Induced voltage. (i) Before employees install lines parallel to 
existing energized lines, the employer shall make a determination of 
the approximate voltage to be induced in the new lines, or work shall 
proceed on the assumption that the induced voltage is hazardous.
    (ii) Unless the employer can demonstrate that the lines that 
employees are installing are not subject to the induction of a 
hazardous voltage or unless the lines are treated as energized, 
temporary protective grounds shall be placed at such locations and 
arranged in such a manner that the employer can demonstrate will 
prevent exposure of each employee to hazardous differences in electric 
potential.

    Note to paragraph (b)(4)(ii): Appendix C to this subpart 
contains guidelines for protecting employees from hazardous 
differences in electric potential as required by this paragraph.


    Note to paragraph (b)(4):  If the employer takes no precautions 
to protect employees from hazards associated with involuntary 
reactions from electric shock, a hazard exists if the induced 
voltage is sufficient to pass a current of 1 milliampere through a 
500-ohm resistor. If the employer protects employees from injury due 
to involuntary reactions from electric shock, a hazard exists if the 
resultant current would be more than 6 milliamperes.

    (5) Safe operating condition. Reel-handling equipment, including 
pulling and tensioning devices, shall be in safe operating condition 
and shall be leveled and aligned.
    (6) Load ratings. The employer shall ensure that employees do not 
exceed load ratings of stringing lines, pulling lines, conductor grips, 
load-bearing hardware and accessories, rigging, and hoists.
    (7) Defective pulling lines. The employer shall repair or replace 
defective pulling lines and accessories.
    (8) Conductor grips. The employer shall ensure that employees do 
not use conductor grips on wire rope unless the manufacturer 
specifically designed the grip for this application.
    (9) Communications. The employer shall ensure that employees 
maintain reliable communications, through two-way radios or other 
equivalent means, between the reel tender and the pulling-rig operator.
    (10) Operation of pulling rig. Employees may operate the pulling 
rig only when it is safe to do so.


[[Page 20712]]


    Note to paragraph (b)(10): Examples of unsafe conditions 
include: employees in locations prohibited by paragraph (b)(11) of 
this section, conductor and pulling line hang-ups, and slipping of 
the conductor grip.

    (11) Working under overhead operations. While a power-driven device 
is pulling the conductor or pulling line and the conductor or pulling 
line is in motion, the employer shall ensure that employees are not 
directly under overhead operations or on the crossarm, except as 
necessary for the employees to guide the stringing sock or board over 
or through the stringing sheave.
    (c) Live-line barehand work. In addition to other applicable 
provisions contained in this subpart, the following requirements apply 
to live-line barehand work:
    (1) Training. Before an employee uses or supervises the use of the 
live-line barehand technique on energized circuits, the employer shall 
ensure that the employee completes training conforming to Sec.  
1926.950(b) in the technique and in the safety requirements of 
paragraph (c) of this section.
    (2) Existing conditions. Before any employee uses the live-line 
barehand technique on energized high-voltage conductors or parts, the 
employer shall ascertain the following information in addition to 
information about other existing conditions required by Sec.  
1926.950(d):
    (i) The nominal voltage rating of the circuit on which employees 
will perform the work,
    (ii) The clearances to ground of lines and other energized parts on 
which employees will perform the work, and
    (iii) The voltage limitations of equipment employees will use.
    (3) Insulated tools and equipment. (i) The employer shall ensure 
that the insulated equipment, insulated tools, and aerial devices and 
platforms used by employees are designed, tested, and made for live-
line barehand work.
    (ii) The employer shall ensure that employees keep tools and 
equipment clean and dry while they are in use.
    (4) Disable automatic-reclosing feature. The employer shall render 
inoperable the automatic-reclosing feature of circuit-interrupting 
devices protecting the lines if the design of the devices permits.
    (5) Adverse weather conditions. The employer shall ensure that 
employees do not perform work when adverse weather conditions would 
make the work hazardous even after the employer implements the work 
practices required by this subpart. Additionally, employees may not 
perform work when winds reduce the phase-to-phase or phase-to-ground 
clearances at the work location below the minimum approach distances 
specified in paragraph (c)(13) of this section, unless insulating 
guards cover the grounded objects and other lines and equipment.

    Note to paragraph (c)(5):  Thunderstorms in the vicinity, high 
winds, snow storms, and ice storms are examples of adverse weather 
conditions that make live-line barehand work too hazardous to 
perform safely even after the employer implements the work practices 
required by this subpart.

    (6) Bucket liners and electrostatic shielding. The employer shall 
provide and ensure that employees use a conductive bucket liner or 
other conductive device for bonding the insulated aerial device to the 
energized line or equipment.
    (i) The employee shall be connected to the bucket liner or other 
conductive device by the use of conductive shoes, leg clips, or other 
means.
    (ii) Where differences in potentials at the worksite pose a hazard 
to employees, the employer shall provide electrostatic shielding 
designed for the voltage being worked.
    (7) Bonding the employee to the energized part. The employer shall 
ensure that, before the employee contacts the energized part, the 
employee bonds the conductive bucket liner or other conductive device 
to the energized conductor by means of a positive connection. This 
connection shall remain attached to the energized conductor until the 
employee completes the work on the energized circuit.
    (8) Aerial-lift controls. Aerial lifts used for live-line barehand 
work shall have dual controls (lower and upper) as follows:
    (i) The upper controls shall be within easy reach of the employee 
in the bucket. On a two-bucket-type lift, access to the controls shall 
be within easy reach of both buckets.
    (ii) The lower set of controls shall be near the base of the boom 
and shall be designed so that they can override operation of the 
equipment at any time.
    (9) Operation of lower controls. Lower (ground-level) lift controls 
may not be operated with an employee in the lift except in case of 
emergency.
    (10) Check controls. The employer shall ensure that, before 
employees elevate an aerial lift into the work position, the employees 
check all controls (ground level and bucket) to determine that they are 
in proper working condition.
    (11) Body of aerial lift truck. The employer shall ensure that, 
before employees elevate the boom of an aerial lift, the employees 
ground the body of the truck or barricade the body of the truck and 
treat it as energized.
    (12) Boom-current test. The employer shall ensure that employees 
perform a boom-current test before starting work each day, each time 
during the day when they encounter a higher voltage, and when changed 
conditions indicate a need for an additional test.
    (i) This test shall consist of placing the bucket in contact with 
an energized source equal to the voltage to be encountered for a 
minimum of 3 minutes.
    (ii) The leakage current may not exceed 1 microampere per kilovolt 
of nominal phase-to-ground voltage.
    (iii) The employer shall immediately suspend work from the aerial 
lift when there is any indication of a malfunction in the equipment.
    (13) Minimum approach distance. The employer shall ensure that 
employees maintain the minimum approach distances, established by the 
employer under Sec.  1926.960(c)(1)(i), from all grounded objects and 
from lines and equipment at a potential different from that to which 
the live-line barehand equipment is bonded, unless insulating guards 
cover such grounded objects and other lines and equipment.
    (14) Approaching, leaving, and bonding to energized part. The 
employer shall ensure that, while an employee is approaching, leaving, 
or bonding to an energized circuit, the employee maintains the minimum 
approach distances, established by the employer under Sec.  
1926.960(c)(1)(i), between the employee and any grounded parts, 
including the lower boom and portions of the truck and between the 
employee and conductive objects energized at different potentials.
    (15) Positioning bucket near energized bushing or insulator string. 
While the bucket is alongside an energized bushing or insulator string, 
the employer shall ensure that employees maintain the phase-to-ground 
minimum approach distances, established by the employer under Sec.  
1926.960(c)(1)(i), between all parts of the bucket and the grounded end 
of the bushing or insulator string or any other grounded surface.
    (16) Handlines. The employer shall ensure that employees do not use 
handlines between the bucket and the boom or between the bucket and the 
ground. However, employees may use nonconductive-type handlines from 
conductor to ground if not supported from the bucket. The employer 
shall ensure that no one uses ropes used for live-line barehand work 
for other purposes.

[[Page 20713]]

    (17) Passing objects to employee. The employer shall ensure that 
employees do not pass uninsulated equipment or material between a pole 
or structure and an aerial lift while an employee working from the 
bucket is bonded to an energized part.
    (18) Nonconductive measuring device. A nonconductive measuring 
device shall be readily accessible to employees performing live-line 
barehand work to assist them in maintaining the required minimum 
approach distance.
    (d) Towers and structures. The following requirements apply to work 
performed on towers or other structures that support overhead lines.
    (1) Working beneath towers and structures. The employer shall 
ensure that no employee is under a tower or structure while work is in 
progress, except when the employer can demonstrate that such a working 
position is necessary to assist employees working above.
    (2) Tag lines. The employer shall ensure that employees use tag 
lines or other similar devices to maintain control of tower sections 
being raised or positioned, unless the employer can demonstrate that 
the use of such devices would create a greater hazard to employees.
    (3) Disconnecting load lines. The employer shall ensure that 
employees do not detach the loadline from a member or section until 
they safely secure the load.
    (4) Adverse weather conditions. The employer shall ensure that, 
except during emergency restoration procedures, employees discontinue 
work when adverse weather conditions would make the work hazardous in 
spite of the work practices required by this subpart.

    Note to paragraph (d)(4): Thunderstorms in the vicinity, high 
winds, snow storms, and ice storms are examples of adverse weather 
conditions that make this work too hazardous to perform even after 
the employer implements the work practices required by this subpart.

Sec.  1926.965  Underground electrical installations.

    (a) Application. This section provides additional requirements for 
work on underground electrical installations.
    (b) Access. The employer shall ensure that employees use a ladder 
or other climbing device to enter and exit a manhole or subsurface 
vault exceeding 1.22 meters (4 feet) in depth. No employee may climb 
into or out of a manhole or vault by stepping on cables or hangers.
    (c) Lowering equipment into manholes. (1) Hoisting equipment. 
Equipment used to lower materials and tools into manholes or vaults 
shall be capable of supporting the weight to be lowered and shall be 
checked for defects before use.
    (2) Clear the area of employees. Before anyone lowers tools or 
material into the opening for a manhole or vault, each employee working 
in the manhole or vault shall be clear of the area directly under the 
opening.
    (d) Attendants for manholes and vaults. (1) When required. While 
work is being performed in a manhole or vault containing energized 
electric equipment, an employee with first-aid training shall be 
available on the surface in the immediate vicinity of the manhole or 
vault entrance to render emergency assistance.
    (2) Brief entries allowed. Occasionally, the employee on the 
surface may briefly enter a manhole or vault to provide nonemergency 
assistance.

    Note 1 to paragraph (d)(2): Paragraph (h) of 1926.953 may also 
require an attendant and does not permit this attendant to enter the 
manhole or vault.


    Note 2 to paragraph (d)(2): Paragraph (b)(1)(ii) of Sec.  
1926.960 requires employees entering manholes or vaults containing 
unguarded, uninsulated energized lines or parts of electric 
equipment operating at 50 volts or more to be qualified.

    (3) Entry without attendant. For the purpose of inspection, 
housekeeping, taking readings, or similar work, an employee working 
alone may enter, for brief periods of time, a manhole or vault where 
energized cables or equipment are in service if the employer can 
demonstrate that the employee will be protected from all electrical 
hazards.
    (4) Communications. The employer shall ensure that employees 
maintain reliable communications, through two-way radios or other 
equivalent means, among all employees involved in the job.
    (e) Duct rods. The employer shall ensure that, if employees use 
duct rods, the employees install the duct rods in the direction 
presenting the least hazard to employees. The employer shall station an 
employee at the far end of the duct line being rodded to ensure that 
the employees maintain the required minimum approach distances.
    (f) Multiple cables. When multiple cables are present in a work 
area, the employer shall identify the cable to be worked by electrical 
means, unless its identity is obvious by reason of distinctive 
appearance or location or by other readily apparent means of 
identification. The employer shall protect cables other than the one 
being worked from damage.
    (g) Moving cables. Except when paragraph (h)(2) of this section 
permits employees to perform work that could cause a fault in an 
energized cable in a manhole or vault, the employer shall ensure that 
employees inspect energized cables to be moved for abnormalities.
    (h) Protection against faults. (1) Cables with abnormalities. Where 
a cable in a manhole or vault has one or more abnormalities that could 
lead to a fault or be an indication of an impending fault, the employer 
shall deenergize the cable with the abnormality before any employee may 
work in the manhole or vault, except when service-load conditions and a 
lack of feasible alternatives require that the cable remain energized. 
In that case, employees may enter the manhole or vault provided the 
employer protects them from the possible effects of a failure using 
shields or other devices that are capable of containing the adverse 
effects of a fault. The employer shall treat the following 
abnormalities as indications of impending faults unless the employer 
can demonstrate that the conditions could not lead to a fault: Oil or 
compound leaking from cable or joints, broken cable sheaths or joint 
sleeves, hot localized surface temperatures of cables or joints, or 
joints swollen beyond normal tolerance.
    (2) Work-related faults. If the work employees will perform in a 
manhole or vault could cause a fault in a cable, the employer shall 
deenergize that cable before any employee works in the manhole or 
vault, except when service-load conditions and a lack of feasible 
alternatives require that the cable remain energized. In that case, 
employees may enter the manhole or vault provided the employer protects 
them from the possible effects of a failure using shields or other 
devices that are capable of containing the adverse effects of a fault.
    (i) Sheath continuity. When employees perform work on buried cable 
or on cable in a manhole or vault, the employer shall maintain 
metallic-sheath continuity, or the cable sheath shall be treated as 
energized.


Sec.  1926.966  Substations.

    (a) Application. This section provides additional requirements for 
substations and for work performed in them.
    (b) Access and working space. The employer shall provide and 
maintain sufficient access and working space about electric equipment 
to permit ready and safe operation and maintenance of such equipment by 
employees.


[[Page 20714]]


    Note to paragraph (b): American National Standard National 
Electrical Safety Code, ANSI/IEEE C2-2012 contains guidelines for 
the dimensions of access and working space about electric equipment 
in substations. Installations meeting the ANSI provisions comply 
with paragraph (b) of this section. The Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration will determine whether an installation that 
does not conform to this ANSI standard complies with paragraph (b) 
of this section based on the following criteria:
    (1) Whether the installation conforms to the edition of ANSI C2 
that was in effect when the installation was made;
    (2) Whether the configuration of the installation enables 
employees to maintain the minimum approach distances, established by 
the employer under Sec.  1926.960(c)(1)(i), while the employees are 
working on exposed, energized parts; and
    (3) Whether the precautions taken when employees perform work on 
the installation provide protection equivalent to the protection 
provided by access and working space meeting ANSI/IEEE C2-2012.

    (c) Draw-out-type circuit breakers. The employer shall ensure that, 
when employees remove or insert draw-out-type circuit breakers, the 
breaker is in the open position. The employer shall also render the 
control circuit inoperable if the design of the equipment permits.
    (d) Substation fences. Conductive fences around substations shall 
be grounded. When a substation fence is expanded or a section is 
removed, fence sections shall be isolated, grounded, or bonded as 
necessary to protect employees from hazardous differences in electric 
potential.

    Note to paragraph (d): IEEE Std 80-2000, IEEE Guide for Safety 
in AC Substation Grounding, contains guidelines for protection 
against hazardous differences in electric potential.

    (e) Guarding of rooms and other spaces containing electric supply 
equipment. (1) When to guard rooms and other spaces. Rooms and other 
spaces in which electric supply lines or equipment are installed shall 
meet the requirements of paragraphs (e)(2) through (e)(5) of this 
section under the following conditions:
    (i) If exposed live parts operating at 50 to 150 volts to ground 
are within 2.4 meters (8 feet) of the ground or other working surface 
inside the room or other space,
    (ii) If live parts operating at 151 to 600 volts to ground and 
located within 2.4 meters (8 feet) of the ground or other working 
surface inside the room or other space are guarded only by location, as 
permitted under paragraph (f)(1) of this section, or
    (iii) If live parts operating at more than 600 volts to ground are 
within the room or other space, unless:
    (A) The live parts are enclosed within grounded, metal-enclosed 
equipment whose only openings are designed so that foreign objects 
inserted in these openings will be deflected from energized parts, or
    (B) The live parts are installed at a height, above ground and any 
other working surface, that provides protection at the voltage on the 
live parts corresponding to the protection provided by a 2.4-meter (8-
foot) height at 50 volts.
    (2) Prevent access by unqualified persons. Fences, screens, 
partitions, or walls shall enclose the rooms and other spaces so as to 
minimize the possibility that unqualified persons will enter.
    (3) Restricted entry. Unqualified persons may not enter the rooms 
or other spaces while the electric supply lines or equipment are 
energized.
    (4) Warning signs. The employer shall display signs at entrances to 
the rooms and other spaces warning unqualified persons to keep out.
    (5) Entrances to rooms and other. The employer shall keep each 
entrance to a room or other space locked, unless the entrance is under 
the observation of a person who is attending the room or other space 
for the purpose of preventing unqualified employees from entering.
    (f) Guarding of energized parts. (1) Type of guarding. The employer 
shall provide guards around all live parts operating at more than 150 
volts to ground without an insulating covering unless the location of 
the live parts gives sufficient clearance (horizontal, vertical, or 
both) to minimize the possibility of accidental employee contact.

    Note to paragraph (f)(1): American National Standard National 
Electrical Safety Code, ANSI/IEEE C2-2002 contains guidelines for 
the dimensions of clearance distances about electric equipment in 
substations. Installations meeting the ANSI provisions comply with 
paragraph (f)(1) of this section. The Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration will determine whether an installation that does not 
conform to this ANSI standard complies with paragraph (f)(1) of this 
section based on the following criteria:
    (1) Whether the installation conforms to the edition of ANSI C2 
that was in effect when the installation was made;
    (2) Whether each employee is isolated from energized parts at 
the point of closest approach; and
    (3) Whether the precautions taken when employees perform work on 
the installation provide protection equivalent to the protection 
provided by horizontal and vertical clearances meeting ANSI/IEEE C2-
2002.

    (2) Maintaining guards during operation. Except for fuse 
replacement and other necessary access by qualified persons, the 
employer shall maintain guarding of energized parts within a 
compartment during operation and maintenance functions to prevent 
accidental contact with energized parts and to prevent dropped tools or 
other equipment from contacting energized parts.
    (3) Temporary removal of guards. Before guards are removed from 
energized equipment, the employer shall install barriers around the 
work area to prevent employees who are not working on the equipment, 
but who are in the area, from contacting the exposed live parts.
    (g) Substation entry. (1) Report upon entering. Upon entering an 
attended substation, each employee, other than employees regularly 
working in the station, shall report his or her presence to the 
employee in charge of substation activities to receive information on 
special system conditions affecting employee safety.
    (2) Job briefing. The job briefing required by Sec.  1926.952 shall 
cover information on special system conditions affecting employee 
safety, including the location of energized equipment in or adjacent to 
the work area and the limits of any deenergized work area.


Sec.  1926.967  Special conditions.

    (a) Capacitors. The following additional requirements apply to work 
on capacitors and on lines connected to capacitors.

    Note to paragraph (a): See Sec. Sec.  1926.961 and 1926.962 for 
requirements pertaining to the deenergizing and grounding of 
capacitor installations.

    (1) Disconnect from energized source. Before employees work on 
capacitors, the employer shall disconnect the capacitors from energized 
sources and short circuit the capacitors. The employer shall ensure 
that the employee short circuiting the capacitors waits at least 5 
minutes from the time of disconnection before applying the short 
circuit,
    (2) Short circuiting units. Before employees handle the units, the 
employer shall short circuit each unit in series-parallel capacitor 
banks between all terminals and the capacitor case or its rack. If the 
cases of capacitors are on ungrounded substation racks, the employer 
shall bond the racks to ground.
    (3) Short circuiting connected lines. The employer shall short 
circuit any line connected to capacitors before the line is treated as 
deenergized.
    (b) Current transformer secondaries. The employer shall ensure that

[[Page 20715]]

employees do not open the secondary of a current transformer while the 
transformer is energized. If the employer cannot deenergize the primary 
of the current transformer before employees perform work on an 
instrument, a relay, or other section of a current transformer 
secondary circuit, the employer shall bridge the circuit so that the 
current transformer secondary does not experience an open-circuit 
condition.
    (c) Series streetlighting. (1) Applicable requirements. If the 
open-circuit voltage exceeds 600 volts, the employer shall ensure that 
employees work on series streetlighting circuits in accordance with 
Sec.  1926.964 or Sec.  1926.965, as appropriate.
    (2) Opening a series loop. Before any employee opens a series loop, 
the employer shall deenergize the streetlighting transformer and 
isolate it from the source of supply or shall bridge the loop to avoid 
an open-circuit condition.
    (d) Illumination. The employer shall provide sufficient 
illumination to enable the employee to perform the work safely.

    Note to paragraph (d): See Sec.  1926.56, which requires 
specific levels of illumination.

    (e) Protection against drowning. (1) Personal flotation devices. 
Whenever an employee may be pulled or pushed, or might fall, into water 
where the danger of drowning exists, the employer shall provide the 
employee with, and shall ensure that the employee uses, a personal 
flotation device meeting Sec.  1926.106.
    (2) Maintaining flotation devices in safe condition. The employer 
shall maintain each personal flotation device in safe condition and 
shall inspect each personal flotation device frequently enough to 
ensure that it does not have rot, mildew, water saturation, or any 
other condition that could render the device unsuitable for use.
    (3) Crossing bodies of water. An employee may cross streams or 
other bodies of water only if a safe means of passage, such as a 
bridge, is available.
    (f) Excavations. Excavation operations shall comply with Subpart P 
of this part.
    (g) Employee protection in public work areas. (1) Traffic control 
devices. Traffic-control signs and traffic-control devices used for the 
protection of employees shall meet Sec.  1926.200(g)(2).
    (2) Controlling traffic. Before employees begin work in the 
vicinity of vehicular or pedestrian traffic that may endanger them, the 
employer shall place warning signs or flags and other traffic-control 
devices in conspicuous locations to alert and channel approaching 
traffic.
    (3) Barricades. The employer shall use barricades where additional 
employee protection is necessary.
    (4) Excavated areas. The employer shall protect excavated areas 
with barricades.
    (5) Warning lights. The employer shall display warning lights 
prominently at night.
    (h) Backfeed. When there is a possibility of voltage backfeed from 
sources of cogeneration or from the secondary system (for example, 
backfeed from more than one energized phase feeding a common load), the 
requirements of Sec.  1926.960 apply if employees will work the lines 
or equipment as energized, and the requirements of Sec. Sec.  1926.961 
and 1926.962 apply if employees will work the lines or equipment as 
deenergized.
    (i) Lasers. The employer shall install, adjust, and operate laser 
equipment in accordance with Sec.  1926.54.
    (j) Hydraulic fluids. Hydraulic fluids used for the insulated 
sections of equipment shall provide insulation for the voltage 
involved.
    (k) Communication facilities. (1) Microwave transmission. (i) The 
employer shall ensure that no employee looks into an open waveguide or 
antenna connected to an energized microwave source.
    (ii) If the electromagnetic-radiation level within an accessible 
area associated with microwave communications systems exceeds the 
radiation-protection guide specified by Sec.  1910.97(a)(2) of this 
chapter, the employer shall post the area with warning signs containing 
the warning symbol described in Sec.  1910.97(a)(3) of this chapter. 
The lower half of the warning symbol shall include the following 
statements, or ones that the employer can demonstrate are equivalent: 
``Radiation in this area may exceed hazard limitations and special 
precautions are required. Obtain specific instruction before 
entering.''
    (iii) When an employee works in an area where the electromagnetic 
radiation could exceed the radiation-protection guide, the employer 
shall institute measures that ensure that the employee's exposure is 
not greater than that permitted by that guide. Such measures may 
include administrative and engineering controls and personal protective 
equipment.
    (2) Power-line carrier. The employer shall ensure that employees 
perform power-line carrier work, including work on equipment used for 
coupling carrier current to power line conductors, in accordance with 
the requirements of this subpart pertaining to work on energized lines.


Sec.  1926.968  Definitions.

    Attendant. An employee assigned to remain immediately outside the 
entrance to an enclosed or other space to render assistance as needed 
to employees inside the space.
    Automatic circuit recloser. A self-controlled device for 
automatically interrupting and reclosing an alternating-current 
circuit, with a predetermined sequence of opening and reclosing 
followed by resetting, hold closed, or lockout.
    Barricade. A physical obstruction such as tapes, cones, or A-frame 
type wood or metal structures that provides a warning about, and limits 
access to, a hazardous area.
    Barrier. A physical obstruction that prevents contact with 
energized lines or equipment or prevents unauthorized access to a work 
area.
    Bond. The electrical interconnection of conductive parts designed 
to maintain a common electric potential.
    Bus. A conductor or a group of conductors that serve as a common 
connection for two or more circuits.
    Bushing. An insulating structure that includes a through conductor 
or that provides a passageway for such a conductor, and that, when 
mounted on a barrier, insulates the conductor from the barrier for the 
purpose of conducting current from one side of the barrier to the 
other.
    Cable. A conductor with insulation, or a stranded conductor with or 
without insulation and other coverings (single-conductor cable), or a 
combination of conductors insulated from one another (multiple-
conductor cable).
    Cable sheath. A conductive protective covering applied to cables.

    Note to the definition of ``cable sheath'': A cable sheath may 
consist of multiple layers one or more of which is conductive.

    Circuit. A conductor or system of conductors through which an 
electric current is intended to flow.
    Clearance (between objects). The clear distance between two objects 
measured surface to surface.
    Clearance (for work). Authorization to perform specified work or 
permission to enter a restricted area.
    Communication lines. (See Lines; (1) Communication lines.)
    Conductor. A material, usually in the form of a wire, cable, or bus 
bar, used for carrying an electric current.
    Contract employer. An employer, other than a host employer, that 
performs work covered by Subpart V of this part under contract.
    Covered conductor. A conductor covered with a dielectric having no 
rated insulating strength or having a

[[Page 20716]]

rated insulating strength less than the voltage of the circuit in which 
the conductor is used.
    Current-carrying part. A conducting part intended to be connected 
in an electric circuit to a source of voltage. Non-current-carrying 
parts are those not intended to be so connected.
    Deenergized. Free from any electrical connection to a source of 
potential difference and from electric charge; not having a potential 
that is different from the potential of the earth.

    Note to the definition of ``deenergized'': The term applies only 
to current-carrying parts, which are sometimes energized (alive).

    Designated employee (designated person). An employee (or person) 
who is assigned by the employer to perform specific duties under the 
terms of this subpart and who has sufficient knowledge of the 
construction and operation of the equipment, and the hazards involved, 
to perform his or her duties safely.
    Electric line truck. A truck used to transport personnel, tools, 
and material for electric supply line work.
    Electric supply equipment. Equipment that produces, modifies, 
regulates, controls, or safeguards a supply of electric energy.
    Electric supply lines. (See ``Lines; (2) Electric supply lines.'')
    Electric utility. An organization responsible for the installation, 
operation, or maintenance of an electric supply system.
    Enclosed space. A working space, such as a manhole, vault, tunnel, 
or shaft, that has a limited means of egress or entry, that is designed 
for periodic employee entry under normal operating conditions, and 
that, under normal conditions, does not contain a hazardous atmosphere, 
but may contain a hazardous atmosphere under abnormal conditions.
    Energized (alive, live). Electrically connected to a source of 
potential difference, or electrically charged so as to have a potential 
significantly different from that of earth in the vicinity.
    Energy source. Any electrical, mechanical, hydraulic, pneumatic, 
chemical, nuclear, thermal, or other energy source that could cause 
injury to employees.
    Entry (as used in Sec.  1926.953). The action by which a person 
passes through an opening into an enclosed space. Entry includes 
ensuing work activities in that space and is considered to have 
occurred as soon as any part of the entrant's body breaks the plane of 
an opening into the space.
    Equipment (electric). A general term including material, fittings, 
devices, appliances, fixtures, apparatus, and the like used as part of 
or in connection with an electrical installation.
    Exposed, Exposed to contact (as applied to energized parts). Not 
isolated or guarded.
    Fall restraint system. A fall protection system that prevents the 
user from falling any distance.
    First-aid training. Training in the initial care, including 
cardiopulmonary resuscitation (which includes chest compressions, 
rescue breathing, and, as appropriate, other heart and lung 
resuscitation techniques), performed by a person who is not a medical 
practitioner, of a sick or injured person until definitive medical 
treatment can be administered.
    Ground. A conducting connection, whether planned or unplanned, 
between an electric circuit or equipment and the earth, or to some 
conducting body that serves in place of the earth.
    Grounded. Connected to earth or to some conducting body that serves 
in place of the earth.
    Guarded. Covered, fenced, enclosed, or otherwise protected, by 
means of suitable covers or casings, barrier rails or screens, mats, or 
platforms, designed to minimize the possibility, under normal 
conditions, of dangerous approach or inadvertent contact by persons or 
objects.

    Note to the definition of ``guarded'': Wires that are insulated, 
but not otherwise protected, are not guarded.

    Hazardous atmosphere. An atmosphere that may expose employees to 
the risk of death, incapacitation, impairment of ability to self-rescue 
(that is, escape unaided from an enclosed space), injury, or acute 
illness from one or more of the following causes:
    (1) Flammable gas, vapor, or mist in excess of 10 percent of its 
lower flammable limit (LFL);
    (2) Airborne combustible dust at a concentration that meets or 
exceeds its LFL;

    Note to the definition of ``hazardous atmosphere'' (2): This 
concentration may be approximated as a condition in which the dust 
obscures vision at a distance of 1.52 meters (5 feet) or less.

    (3) Atmospheric oxygen concentration below 19.5 percent or above 
23.5 percent;
    (4) Atmospheric concentration of any substance for which a dose or 
a permissible exposure limit is published in Subpart D, Occupational 
Health and Environmental Controls, or in Subpart Z, Toxic and Hazardous 
Substances, of this part and which could result in employee exposure in 
excess of its dose or permissible exposure limit;

    Note to the definition of ``hazardous atmosphere'' (4): An 
atmospheric concentration of any substance that is not capable of 
causing death, incapacitation, impairment of ability to self-rescue, 
injury, or acute illness due to its health effects is not covered by 
this provision.

    (5) Any other atmospheric condition that is immediately dangerous 
to life or health.

    Note to the definition of ``hazardous atmosphere'' (5): For air 
contaminants for which the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration has not determined a dose or permissible exposure 
limit, other sources of information, such as Material Safety Data 
Sheets that comply with the Hazard Communication Standard, Sec.  
1926.1200, published information, and internal documents can provide 
guidance in establishing acceptable atmospheric conditions.

    High-power tests. Tests in which the employer uses fault currents, 
load currents, magnetizing currents, and line-dropping currents to test 
equipment, either at the equipment's rated voltage or at lower 
voltages.
    High-voltage tests. Tests in which the employer uses voltages of 
approximately 1,000 volts as a practical minimum and in which the 
voltage source has sufficient energy to cause injury.
    High wind. A wind of such velocity that one or more of the 
following hazards would be present:
    (1) The wind could blow an employee from an elevated location,
    (2) The wind could cause an employee or equipment handling material 
to lose control of the material, or
    (3) The wind would expose an employee to other hazards not 
controlled by the standard involved.

    Note to the definition of ``high wind'': The Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration normally considers winds exceeding 64.4 
kilometers per hour (40 miles per hour), or 48.3 kilometers per hour 
(30 miles per hour) if the work involves material handling, as 
meeting this criteria, unless the employer takes precautions to 
protect employees from the hazardous effects of the wind.

    Host employer. An employer that operates, or that controls the 
operating procedures for, an electric power generation, transmission, 
or distribution installation on which a contract employer is performing 
work covered by Subpart V of this part.

    Note to the definition of ``host employer'': The Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration will treat the electric utility or 
the owner of the installation as the host employer if it operates or 
controls operating procedures for the installation. If the electric 
utility or installation owner neither operates

[[Page 20717]]

nor controls operating procedures for the installation, the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration will treat the 
employer that the utility or owner has contracted with to operate or 
control the operating procedures for the installation as the host 
employer. In no case will there be more than one host employer.

    Immediately dangerous to life or health (IDLH). Any condition that 
poses an immediate or delayed threat to life or that would cause 
irreversible adverse health effects or that would interfere with an 
individual's ability to escape unaided from a permit space.

    Note to the definition of ``immediately dangerous to life or 
health'': Some materials--hydrogen fluoride gas and cadmium vapor, 
for example--may produce immediate transient effects that, even if 
severe, may pass without medical attention, but are followed by 
sudden, possibly fatal collapse 12-72 hours after exposure. The 
victim ``feels normal'' from recovery from transient effects until 
collapse. Such materials in hazardous quantities are considered to 
be ``immediately'' dangerous to life or health.

    Insulated. Separated from other conducting surfaces by a dielectric 
(including air space) offering a high resistance to the passage of 
current.

    Note to the definition of ``insulated'': When any object is said 
to be insulated, it is understood to be insulated for the conditions 
to which it normally is subjected. Otherwise, it is, for the purpose 
of this subpart, uninsulated.

    Insulation (cable). Material relied upon to insulate the conductor 
from other conductors or conducting parts or from ground.
    Isolated. Not readily accessible to persons unless special means 
for access are used.
    Line-clearance tree trimming. The pruning, trimming, repairing, 
maintaining, removing, or clearing of trees, or the cutting of brush, 
that is within the following distance of electric supply lines and 
equipment:
    (1) For voltages to ground of 50 kilovolts or less--3.05 meters (10 
feet);
    (2) For voltages to ground of more than 50 kilovolts--3.05 meters 
(10 feet) plus 0.10 meters (4 inches) for every 10 kilovolts over 50 
kilovolts.
    Lines. (1) Communication lines. The conductors and their supporting 
or containing structures which are used for public or private signal or 
communication service, and which operate at potentials not exceeding 
400 volts to ground or 750 volts between any two points of the circuit, 
and the transmitted power of which does not exceed 150 watts. If the 
lines are operating at less than 150 volts, no limit is placed on the 
transmitted power of the system. Under certain conditions, 
communication cables may include communication circuits exceeding these 
limitations where such circuits are also used to supply power solely to 
communication equipment.

    Note to the definition of ``communication lines'': Telephone, 
telegraph, railroad signal, data, clock, fire, police alarm, cable 
television, and other systems conforming to this definition are 
included. Lines used for signaling purposes, but not included under 
this definition, are considered as electric supply lines of the same 
voltage.

    (2) Electric supply lines. Conductors used to transmit electric 
energy and their necessary supporting or containing structures. Signal 
lines of more than 400 volts are always supply lines within this 
section, and those of less than 400 volts are considered as supply 
lines, if so run and operated throughout.
    Manhole. A subsurface enclosure that personnel may enter and that 
is used for installing, operating, and maintaining submersible 
equipment or cable.
    Minimum approach distance. The closest distance an employee may 
approach an energized or a grounded object.

    Note to the definition of ``minimum approach distance'': 
Paragraph (c)(1)(i) of Sec.  1926.960 requires employers to 
establish minimum approach distances.

    Personal fall arrest system. A system used to arrest an employee in 
a fall from a working level.
    Qualified employee (qualified person). An employee (person) 
knowledgeable in the construction and operation of the electric power 
generation, transmission, and distribution equipment involved, along 
with the associated hazards.

    Note 1 to the definition of ``qualified employee (qualified 
person)'': An employee must have the training required by Sec.  
1926.950(b)(2) to be a qualified employee.


    Note 2 to the definition of ``qualified employee (qualified 
person)'': Except under Sec.  1926.954(b)(3)(iii), an employee who 
is undergoing on-the-job training and who has demonstrated, in the 
course of such training, an ability to perform duties safely at his 
or her level of training and who is under the direct supervision of 
a qualified person is a qualified person for the performance of 
those duties.

    Statistical sparkover voltage. A transient overvoltage level that 
produces a 97.72-percent probability of sparkover (that is, two 
standard deviations above the voltage at which there is a 50-percent 
probability of sparkover).
    Statistical withstand voltage. A transient overvoltage level that 
produces a 0.14-percent probability of sparkover (that is, three 
standard deviations below the voltage at which there is a 50-percent 
probability of sparkover).
    Switch. A device for opening and closing or for changing the 
connection of a circuit. In this subpart, a switch is manually 
operable, unless otherwise stated.
    System operator. A qualified person designated to operate the 
system or its parts.
    Vault. An enclosure, above or below ground, that personnel may 
enter and that is used for installing, operating, or maintaining 
equipment or cable.
    Vented vault. A vault that has provision for air changes using 
exhaust-flue stacks and low-level air intakes operating on pressure and 
temperature differentials that provide for airflow that precludes a 
hazardous atmosphere from developing.
    Voltage. The effective (root mean square, or rms) potential 
difference between any two conductors or between a conductor and 
ground. This subpart expresses voltages in nominal values, unless 
otherwise indicated. The nominal voltage of a system or circuit is the 
value assigned to a system or circuit of a given voltage class for the 
purpose of convenient designation. The operating voltage of the system 
may vary above or below this value.
    Work-positioning equipment. A body belt or body harness system 
rigged to allow an employee to be supported on an elevated vertical 
surface, such as a utility pole or tower leg, and work with both hands 
free while leaning.

Appendix A to Subpart V of Part 1926--[Reserved]

Appendix B to Subpart V of Part 1926--Working on Exposed Energized 
Parts

I. Introduction

    Electric utilities design electric power generation, 
transmission, and distribution installations to meet National 
Electrical Safety Code (NESC), ANSI C2, requirements. Electric 
utilities also design transmission and distribution lines to limit 
line outages as required by system reliability criteria \1\ and to 
withstand the maximum overvoltages impressed on the system. 
Conditions such as switching surges, faults, and lightning can cause 
overvoltages. Electric utilities generally select insulator design 
and lengths and the clearances to structural parts so as to prevent 
outages from contaminated line insulation and during storms. Line 
insulator lengths and structural clearances have, over the years, 
come closer to the minimum approach distances used by workers. As 
minimum approach distances and structural clearances converge, it is 
increasingly important that system designers and system operating 
and maintenance personnel understand the

[[Page 20718]]

concepts underlying minimum approach distances.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ Federal, State, and local regulatory bodies and electric 
utilities set reliability requirements that limit the number and 
duration of system outages.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The information in this appendix will assist employers in 
complying with the minimum approach-distance requirements contained 
in Sec. Sec.  1926.960(c)(1) and 1926.964(c). Employers must use the 
technical criteria and methodology presented in this appendix in 
establishing minimum approach distances in accordance with Sec.  
1926.960(c)(1)(i) and Table V-2 and Table V-7. This appendix 
provides essential background information and technical criteria for 
the calculation of the required minimum approach distances for live-
line work on electric power generation, transmission, and 
distribution installations.
    Unless an employer is using the maximum transient overvoltages 
specified in Table V-8 for voltages over 72.5 kilovolts, the 
employer must use persons knowledgeable in the techniques discussed 
in this appendix, and competent in the field of electric 
transmission and distribution system design, to determine the 
maximum transient overvoltage.

II. General

    A. Definitions. The following definitions from Sec.  1926.968 
relate to work on or near electric power generation, transmission, 
and distribution lines and equipment and the electrical hazards they 
present.
    Exposed. . . . Not isolated or guarded.
    Guarded. Covered, fenced, enclosed, or otherwise protected, by 
means of suitable covers or casings, barrier rails or screens, mats, 
or platforms, designed to minimize the possibility, under normal 
conditions, of dangerous approach or inadvertent contact by persons 
or objects.

    Note to the definition of ``guarded'': Wires that are insulated, 
but not otherwise protected, are not guarded.

    Insulated. Separated from other conducting surfaces by a 
dielectric (including air space) offering a high resistance to the 
passage of current.

    Note to the definition of ``insulated'': When any object is said 
to be insulated, it is understood to be insulated for the conditions 
to which it normally is subjected. Otherwise, it is, for the purpose 
of this subpart, uninsulated.

    Isolated. Not readily accessible to persons unless special means 
for access are used.
    Statistical sparkover voltage. A transient overvoltage level 
that produces a 97.72-percent probability of sparkover (that is, two 
standard deviations above the voltage at which there is a 50-percent 
probability of sparkover).
    Statistical withstand voltage. A transient overvoltage level 
that produces a 0.14-percent probability of sparkover (that is, 
three standard deviations below the voltage at which there is a 50-
percent probability of sparkover).
    B. Installations energized at 50 to 300 volts. The hazards posed 
by installations energized at 50 to 300 volts are the same as those 
found in many other workplaces. That is not to say that there is no 
hazard, but the complexity of electrical protection required does 
not compare to that required for high-voltage systems. The employee 
must avoid contact with the exposed parts, and the protective 
equipment used (such as rubber insulating gloves) must provide 
insulation for the voltages involved.
    C. Exposed energized parts over 300 volts AC. Paragraph 
(c)(1)(i) of Sec.  1926.960 requires the employer to establish 
minimum approach distances no less than the distances computed by 
Table V-2 for ac systems so that employees can work safely without 
risk of sparkover.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \2\ Sparkover is a disruptive electric discharge in which an 
electric arc forms and electric current passes through air.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Unless the employee is using electrical protective equipment, 
air is the insulating medium between the employee and energized 
parts. The distance between the employee and an energized part must 
be sufficient for the air to withstand the maximum transient 
overvoltage that can reach the worksite under the working conditions 
and practices the employee is using. This distance is the minimum 
air insulation distance, and it is equal to the electrical component 
of the minimum approach distance.
    Normal system design may provide or include a means (such as 
lightning arrestors) to control maximum anticipated transient 
overvoltages, or the employer may use temporary devices (portable 
protective gaps) or measures (such as preventing automatic circuit 
breaker reclosing) to achieve the same result. Paragraph (c)(1)(ii) 
of Sec.  1926.960 requires the employer to determine the maximum 
anticipated per-unit transient overvoltage, phase-to-ground, through 
an engineering analysis or assume a maximum anticipated per-unit 
transient overvoltage, phase-to-ground, in accordance with Table V-
8, which specifies the following maximums for ac systems:

 
 
 
72.6 to 420.0 kilovolts..................  3.5 per unit.
420.1 to 550.0 kilovolts.................  3.0 per unit.
550.1 to 800.0 kilovolts.................  2.5 per unit.
 

    See paragraph IV.A.2, later in this appendix, for additional 
discussion of maximum transient overvoltages.
    D. Types of exposures. Employees working on or near energized 
electric power generation, transmission, and distribution systems 
face two kinds of exposures: Phase-to-ground and phase-to-phase. The 
exposure is phase-to-ground: (1) With respect to an energized part, 
when the employee is at ground potential or (2) with respect to 
ground, when an employee is at the potential of the energized part 
during live-line barehand work. The exposure is phase-to-phase, with 
respect to an energized part, when an employee is at the potential 
of another energized part (at a different potential) during live-
line barehand work.

III. Determination of Minimum Approach Distances for AC Voltages 
Greater Than 300 Volts

    A. Voltages of 301 to 5,000 volts. Test data generally forms the 
basis of minimum air insulation distances. The lowest voltage for 
which sufficient test data exists is 5,000 volts, and these data 
indicate that the minimum air insulation distance at that voltage is 
20 millimeters (1 inch). Because the minimum air insulation distance 
increases with increasing voltage, and, conversely, decreases with 
decreasing voltage, an assumed minimum air insulation distance of 20 
millimeters will protect against sparkover at voltages of 301 to 
5,000 volts. Thus, 20 millimeters is the electrical component of the 
minimum approach distance for these voltages.
    B. Voltages of 5.1 to 72.5 kilovolts. For voltages from 5.1 to 
72.5 kilovolts, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
bases the methodology for calculating the electrical component of 
the minimum approach distance on Institute of Electrical and 
Electronic Engineers (IEEE) Standard 4-1995, Standard Techniques for 
High-Voltage Testing. Table 1 lists the critical sparkover distances 
from that standard as listed in IEEE Std 516-2009, IEEE Guide for 
Maintenance Methods on Energized Power Lines.

             Table 1--Sparkover Distance for Rod-to-Rod Gap
------------------------------------------------------------------------
   60 Hz rod-to-rod sparkover (kV      Gap spacing from IEEE Std 4-1995
               peak)                                 (cm)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                        25                                    2
                        36                                    3
                        46                                    4
                        53                                    5
                        60                                    6
                        70                                    8
                        79                                   10
                        86                                   12
                        95                                   14
                       104                                   16
                       112                                   18
                       120                                   20
                       143                                   25
                       167                                   30
                       192                                   35
                       218                                   40
                       243                                   45
                       270                                   50
                       322                                   60
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: IEEE Std 516-2009.

    To use this table to determine the electrical component of the 
minimum approach distance, the employer must determine the peak 
phase-to-ground transient overvoltage and select a gap from the 
table that corresponds to that voltage as a withstand voltage rather 
than a critical sparkover voltage. To calculate the electrical 
component of the minimum approach distance for voltages between 5 
and 72.5 kilovolts, use the following procedure:
    1. Divide the phase-to-phase voltage by the square root of 3 to 
convert it to a phase-to-ground voltage.
    2. Multiply the phase-to-ground voltage by the square root of 2 
to convert the rms value of the voltage to the peak phase-to-ground 
voltage.
    3. Multiply the peak phase-to-ground voltage by the maximum per-
unit transient overvoltage, which, for this voltage range, is 3.0, 
as discussed later in this appendix. This is the maximum phase-to-
ground transient

[[Page 20719]]

overvoltage, which corresponds to the withstand voltage for the 
relevant exposure.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \3\ The withstand voltage is the voltage at which sparkover is 
not likely to occur across a specified distance. It is the voltage 
taken at the 3[sigma] point below the sparkover voltage, assuming 
that the sparkover curve follows a normal distribution.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    4. Divide the maximum phase-to-ground transient overvoltage by 
0.85 to determine the corresponding critical sparkover voltage. (The 
critical sparkover voltage is 3 standard deviations (or 15 percent) 
greater than the withstand voltage.)
    5. Determine the electrical component of the minimum approach 
distance from Table 1 through interpolation.
    Table 2 illustrates how to derive the electrical component of 
the minimum approach distance for voltages from 5.1 to 72.5 
kilovolts, before the application of any altitude correction factor, 
as explained later.

                     Table 2--Calculating the Electrical Component of MAD--751 V to 72.5 kV
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                            Maximum system phase-to-phase voltage (kV)
                      Step                       ---------------------------------------------------------------
                                                        15              36              46             72.5
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Divide by [radic]3...........................             8.7            20.8            26.6            41.9
2. Multiply by [radic]3.........................            12.2            29.4            37.6            59.2
3. Multiply by 3.0..............................            36.7            88.2           112.7           177.6
4. Divide by 0.85...............................            43.2           103.7           132.6           208.9
5. Interpolate from Table 1.....................    3+(7.2/10)*1    14+(8.7/9)*2  20+(12.6/23)*5  35+(16.9/26)*5
Electrical component of MAD (cm)................            3.72           15.93           22.74           38.25
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    C. Voltages of 72.6 to 800 kilovolts. For voltages of 72.6 
kilovolts to 800 kilovolts, this subpart bases the electrical 
component of minimum approach distances, before the application of 
any altitude correction factor, on the following formula:

Equation 1--For voltages of 72.6 kV to 800 kV

D = 0.3048(C + a)VL-GT

Where:

D = Electrical component of the minimum approach distance in air in 
meters;
C = a correction factor associated with the variation of gap 
sparkover with voltage;
    a = A factor relating to the saturation of air at system 
voltages of 345 kilovolts or higher; \4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \4\ Test data demonstrates that the saturation factor is greater 
than 0 at peak voltages of about 630 kilovolts. Systems operating at 
345 kilovolts (or maximum system voltages of 362 kilovolts) can have 
peak maximum transient overvoltages exceeding 630 kilovolts. Table 
V-2 sets equations for calculating a based on peak voltage.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    VL-G = Maximum system line-to-ground rms voltage in kilovolts--
it should be the ``actual'' maximum, or the normal highest voltage 
for the range (for example, 10 percent above the nominal voltage); 
and
T = Maximum transient overvoltage factor in per unit.

    In Equation 1, C is 0.01: (1) For phase-to-ground exposures that 
the employer can demonstrate consist only of air across the approach 
distance (gap) and (2) for phase-to-phase exposures if the employer 
can demonstrate that no insulated tool spans the gap and that no 
large conductive object is in the gap. Otherwise, C is 0.011.
    In Equation 1, the term a varies depending on whether the 
employee's exposure is phase-to-ground or phase-to-phase and on 
whether objects are in the gap. The employer must use the equations 
in Table 3 to calculate a. Sparkover test data with insulation 
spanning the gap form the basis for the equations for phase-to-
ground exposures, and sparkover test data with only air in the gap 
form the basis for the equations for phase-to-phase exposures. The 
phase-to-ground equations result in slightly higher values of a, 
and, consequently, produce larger minimum approach distances, than 
the phase-to-phase equations for the same value of VPeak.

[[Page 20720]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR11AP14.036

    In Equation 1, T is the maximum transient overvoltage factor in 
per unit. As noted earlier, Sec.  1926.960(c)(1)(ii) requires the 
employer to determine the maximum anticipated per-unit transient 
overvoltage, phase-to-ground, through an engineering analysis or 
assume a maximum anticipated per-unit transient overvoltage, phase-
to-ground, in accordance with Table V-8. For phase-to-ground 
exposures, the employer uses this value, called TL-G, as T in 
Equation 1. IEEE Std 516-2009 provides the following formula to 
calculate the phase-to-phase maximum transient overvoltage, TL-L, 
from TL-G:

TL-L = 1.35TL-G + 0.45.

For phase-to-phase exposures, the employer uses this value as T in 
Equation 1.
    D. Provisions for inadvertent movement. The minimum approach 
distance must include an ``adder'' to compensate for the inadvertent 
movement of the worker relative to an energized part or the movement 
of the part relative to the worker. This ``adder'' must account for 
this possible inadvertent movement and provide the worker with a 
comfortable and safe zone in which to work. Employers must add the 
distance for inadvertent movement (called the ``ergonomic component 
of the minimum approach distance'') to the electrical component to 
determine the total safe minimum approach distances used in live-
line work.
    The Occupational Safety and Health Administration based the 
ergonomic component of the minimum approach distance on response 
time-distance analysis. This technique uses an estimate of the total 
response time to a hazardous incident and converts that time to the 
distance traveled. For example, the driver of a car takes a given 
amount of time to respond to a ``stimulus'' and stop the vehicle. 
The elapsed time involved results in the car's traveling some 
distance before coming to a complete stop. This distance depends on 
the speed of the car at the time the stimulus appears and the 
reaction time of the driver.
    In the case of live-line work, the employee must first perceive 
that he or she is approaching the danger zone. Then, the worker 
responds to the danger and must decelerate and stop all motion 
toward the energized part. During the time it takes to stop, the 
employee will travel some distance. This is the distance the 
employer must add to the electrical component of the minimum 
approach distance to obtain the total safe minimum approach 
distance.
    At voltages from 751 volts to 72.5 kilovolts,\5\ the electrical 
component of the minimum approach distance is smaller than the 
ergonomic component. At 72.5 kilovolts, the electrical component is 
only a little more than 0.3 meters (1 foot). An ergonomic component 
of the minimum approach distance must provide for all the worker's 
unanticipated movements. At these voltages, workers generally use 
rubber insulating gloves; however, these gloves protect only a 
worker's hands and arms. Therefore, the energized object must be at 
a safe approach distance to protect the worker's face. In this case, 
0.61 meters (2 feet) is a sufficient and practical ergonomic 
component of the minimum approach distance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \5\ For voltages of 50 to 300 volts, Table V-2 specifies a 
minimum approach distance of ``avoid contact.'' The minimum approach 
distance for this voltage range contains neither an electrical 
component nor an ergonomic component.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For voltages between 72.6 and 800 kilovolts, employees must use 
different work practices during energized line work. Generally, 
employees use live-line tools (hot sticks) to perform work on 
energized equipment. These tools, by design, keep the energized part 
at a constant distance from the employee and, thus, maintain the 
appropriate minimum approach distance automatically.
    The location of the worker and the type of work methods the 
worker is using also influence the length of the ergonomic component 
of the minimum approach distance. In this higher voltage range, the 
employees use work methods that more tightly control their movements 
than when the workers perform work using rubber insulating gloves. 
The worker, therefore, is farther from the energized line or 
equipment and must be more precise in his or her movements just to 
perform the work. For these reasons, this subpart adopts an 
ergonomic component of the minimum approach distance of 0.31 m (1 
foot) for voltages between 72.6 and 800 kilovolts.
    Table 4 summarizes the ergonomic component of the minimum 
approach distance for various voltage ranges.

[[Page 20721]]



        Table 4--Ergonomic Component of Minimum Approach Distance
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                   Distance
         Voltage range (kV)          -----------------------------------
                                              m                ft
------------------------------------------------------------------------
0.301 to 0.750......................              0.31               1.0
0.751 to 72.5.......................              0.61               2.0
72.6 to 800.........................              0.31               1.0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: The employer must add this distance to the electrical component of
  the minimum approach distance to obtain the full minimum approach
  distance.

    The ergonomic component of the minimum approach distance 
accounts for errors in maintaining the minimum approach distance 
(which might occur, for example, if an employee misjudges the length 
of a conductive object he or she is holding), and for errors in 
judging the minimum approach distance. The ergonomic component also 
accounts for inadvertent movements by the employee, such as 
slipping. In contrast, the working position selected to properly 
maintain the minimum approach distance must account for all of an 
employee's reasonably likely movements and still permit the employee 
to adhere to the applicable minimum approach distance. (See Figure 
1.) Reasonably likely movements include an employee's adjustments to 
tools, equipment, and working positions and all movements needed to 
perform the work. For example, the employee should be able to 
perform all of the following actions without straying into the 
minimum approach distance:
     Adjust his or her hardhat,
     maneuver a tool onto an energized part with a 
reasonable amount of overreaching or underreaching,
     reach for and handle tools, material, and equipment 
passed to him or her, and
     adjust tools, and replace components on them, when 
necessary during the work procedure.
    The training of qualified employees required under Sec.  
1926.950, and the job planning and briefing required under Sec.  
1926.952, must address selection of a proper working position.
BILLING CODE 4510-26-P

[[Page 20722]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR11AP14.037

BILLING CODE 4510-26-C
    E. Miscellaneous correction factors. Changes in the air medium 
that forms the insulation influences the strength of an air gap. A 
brief discussion of each factor follows.
    1. Dielectric strength of air. The dielectric strength of air in 
a uniform electric field at standard atmospheric conditions is 
approximately 3 kilovolts per millimeter.\6\ The pressure, 
temperature, and humidity of the air, the shape, dimensions, and 
separation of the electrodes, and the

[[Page 20723]]

characteristics of the applied voltage (wave shape) affect the 
disruptive gradient.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \6\ For the purposes of estimating arc length, Subpart V 
generally assumes a more conservative dielectric strength of 10 
kilovolts per 25.4 millimeters, consistent with assumptions made in 
consensus standards such as the National Electrical Safety Code 
(IEEE C2-2012). The more conservative value accounts for variables 
such as electrode shape, wave shape, and a certain amount of 
overvoltage.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    2. Atmospheric effect. The empirically determined electrical 
strength of a given gap is normally applicable at standard 
atmospheric conditions (20 [deg]C, 101.3 kilopascals, 11 grams/cubic 
centimeter humidity). An increase in the density (humidity) of the 
air inhibits sparkover for a given air gap. The combination of 
temperature and air pressure that results in the lowest gap 
sparkover voltage is high temperature and low pressure. This 
combination of conditions is not likely to occur. Low air pressure, 
generally associated with high humidity, causes increased electrical 
strength. An average air pressure generally correlates with low 
humidity. Hot and dry working conditions normally result in reduced 
electrical strength. The equations for minimum approach distances in 
Table V-2 assume standard atmospheric conditions.
    3. Altitude. The reduced air pressure at high altitudes causes a 
reduction in the electrical strength of an air gap. An employer must 
increase the minimum approach distance by about 3 percent per 300 
meters (1,000 feet) of increased altitude for altitudes above 900 
meters (3,000 feet). Table V-4 specifies the altitude correction 
factor that the employer must use in calculating minimum approach 
distances.

IV. Determining Minimum Approach Distances

A. Factors Affecting Voltage Stress at the Worksite

    1. System voltage (nominal). The nominal system voltage range 
determines the voltage for purposes of calculating minimum approach 
distances. The employer selects the range in which the nominal 
system voltage falls, as given in the relevant table, and uses the 
highest value within that range in per-unit calculations.
    2. Transient overvoltages. Operation of switches or circuit 
breakers, a fault on a line or circuit or on an adjacent circuit, 
and similar activities may generate transient overvoltages on an 
electrical system. Each overvoltage has an associated transient 
voltage wave shape. The wave shape arriving at the site and its 
magnitude vary considerably.
    In developing requirements for minimum approach distances, the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration considered the most 
common wave shapes and the magnitude of transient overvoltages found 
on electric power generation, transmission, and distribution 
systems. The equations in Table V-2 for minimum approach distances 
use per-unit maximum transient overvoltages, which are relative to 
the nominal maximum voltage of the system. For example, a maximum 
transient overvoltage value of 3.0 per unit indicates that the 
highest transient overvoltage is 3.0 times the nominal maximum 
system voltage.
    3. Typical magnitude of overvoltages. Table 5 lists the 
magnitude of typical transient overvoltages.

          Table 5--Magnitude of Typical Transient Overvoltages
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                         Magnitude  (per
                         Cause                                unit)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Energized 200-mile line without closing resistors.....               3.5
Energized 200-mile line with one-step closing resistor               2.1
Energized 200-mile line with multistep resistor.......               2.5
Reclosing with trapped charge one-step resistor.......               2.2
Opening surge with single restrike....................               3.0
Fault initiation unfaulted phase......................               2.1
Fault initiation adjacent circuit.....................               2.5
Fault clearing........................................        1.7 to 1.9
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    4. Standard deviation--air-gap withstand. For each air gap 
length under the same atmospheric conditions, there is a statistical 
variation in the breakdown voltage. The probability of breakdown 
against voltage has a normal (Gaussian) distribution. The standard 
deviation of this distribution varies with the wave shape, gap 
geometry, and atmospheric conditions. The withstand voltage of the 
air gap is three standard deviations (3[sigma]) below the critical 
sparkover voltage. (The critical sparkover voltage is the crest 
value of the impulse wave that, under specified conditions, causes 
sparkover 50 percent of the time. An impulse wave of three standard 
deviations below this value, that is, the withstand voltage, has a 
probability of sparkover of approximately 1 in 1,000.)
    5. Broken Insulators. Tests show reductions in the insulation 
strength of insulator strings with broken skirts. Broken units may 
lose up to 70 percent of their withstand capacity. Because an 
employer cannot determine the insulating capability of a broken unit 
without testing it, the employer must consider damaged units in an 
insulator to have no insulating value. Additionally, the presence of 
a live-line tool alongside an insulator string with broken units may 
further reduce the overall insulating strength. The number of good 
units that must be present in a string for it to be ``insulated'' as 
defined by Sec.  1926.968 depends on the maximum overvoltage 
possible at the worksite.

B. Minimum Approach Distances Based on Known, Maximum-Anticipated 
Per-Unit Transient Overvoltages

    1. Determining the minimum approach distance for AC systems. 
Under Sec.  1926.960(c)(1)(ii), the employer must determine the 
maximum anticipated per-unit transient overvoltage, phase-to-ground, 
through an engineering analysis or must assume a maximum anticipated 
per-unit transient overvoltage, phase-to-ground, in accordance with 
Table V-8. When the employer conducts an engineering analysis of the 
system and determines that the maximum transient overvoltage is 
lower than specified by Table V-8, the employer must ensure that any 
conditions assumed in the analysis, for example, that employees 
block reclosing on a circuit or install portable protective gaps, 
are present during energized work. To ensure that these conditions 
are present, the employer may need to institute new live-work 
procedures reflecting the conditions and limitations set by the 
engineering analysis.
    2. Calculation of reduced approach distance values. An employer 
may take the following steps to reduce minimum approach distances 
when the maximum transient overvoltage on the system (that is, the 
maximum transient overvoltage without additional steps to control 
overvoltages) produces unacceptably large minimum approach 
distances:
    Step 1. Determine the maximum voltage (with respect to a given 
nominal voltage range) for the energized part.
    Step 2. Determine the technique to use to control the maximum 
transient overvoltage. (See paragraphs IV.C and IV.D of this 
appendix.) Determine the maximum transient overvoltage that can 
exist at the worksite with that form of control in place and with a 
confidence level of 3[sigma] . This voltage is the withstand voltage 
for the purpose of calculating the appropriate minimum approach 
distance.
    Step 3. Direct employees to implement procedures to ensure that 
the control technique is in effect during the course of the work.
    Step 4. Using the new value of transient overvoltage in per 
unit, calculate the required minimum approach distance from Table V-
2.

C. Methods of Controlling Possible Transient Overvoltage Stress 
Found on a System

    1. Introduction. There are several means of controlling 
overvoltages that occur on transmission systems. For example, the 
employer can modify the operation of circuit breakers or other 
switching devices to reduce switching transient overvoltages. 
Alternatively, the employer can hold the overvoltage to an 
acceptable level by installing surge arresters or portable

[[Page 20724]]

protective gaps on the system. In addition, the employer can change 
the transmission system to minimize the effect of switching 
operations. Section 4.8 of IEEE Std 516-2009 describes various ways 
of controlling, and thereby reducing, maximum transient 
overvoltages.
    2. Operation of circuit breakers.\7\ The maximum transient 
overvoltage that can reach the worksite is often the result of 
switching on the line on which employees are working. Disabling 
automatic reclosing during energized line work, so that the line 
will not be reenergized after being opened for any reason, limits 
the maximum switching surge overvoltage to the larger of the opening 
surge or the greatest possible fault-generated surge, provided that 
the devices (for example, insertion resistors) are operable and will 
function to limit the transient overvoltage and that circuit breaker 
restrikes do not occur. The employer must ensure the proper 
functioning of insertion resistors and other overvoltage-limiting 
devices when the employer's engineering analysis assumes their 
proper operation to limit the overvoltage level. If the employer 
cannot disable the reclosing feature (because of system operating 
conditions), other methods of controlling the switching surge level 
may be necessary.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \7\ The detailed design of a circuit interrupter, such as the 
design of the contacts, resistor insertion, and breaker timing 
control, are beyond the scope of this appendix. The design of the 
system generally accounts for these features. This appendix only 
discusses features that can limit the maximum switching transient 
overvoltage on a system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Transient surges on an adjacent line, particularly for double 
circuit construction, may cause a significant overvoltage on the 
line on which employees are working. The employer's engineering 
analysis must account for coupling to adjacent lines.
    3. Surge arresters. The use of modern surge arresters allows a 
reduction in the basic impulse-insulation levels of much 
transmission system equipment. The primary function of early 
arresters was to protect the system insulation from the effects of 
lightning. Modern arresters not only dissipate lightning-caused 
transients, but may also control many other system transients caused 
by switching or faults.
    The employer may use properly designed arresters to control 
transient overvoltages along a transmission line and thereby reduce 
the requisite length of the insulator string and possibly the 
maximum transient overvoltage on the line.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \8\ Surge arrester application is beyond the scope of this 
appendix. However, if the employer installs the arrester near the 
work site, the application would be similar to the protective gaps 
discussed in paragraph IV.D of this appendix.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    4. Switching Restrictions. Another form of overvoltage control 
involves establishing switching restrictions, whereby the employer 
prohibits the operation of circuit breakers until certain system 
conditions are present. The employer restricts switching by using a 
tagging system, similar to that used for a permit, except that the 
common term used for this activity is a ``hold-off'' or 
``restriction.'' These terms indicate that the restriction does not 
prevent operation, but only modifies the operation during the live-
work activity.

D. Minimum Approach Distance Based on Control of Maximum Transient 
Overvoltage at the Worksite

    When the employer institutes control of maximum transient 
overvoltage at the worksite by installing portable protective gaps, 
the employer may calculate the minimum approach distance as follows:
    Step 1. Select the appropriate withstand voltage for the 
protective gap based on system requirements and an acceptable 
probability of gap sparkover.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \9\ The employer should check the withstand voltage to ensure 
that it results in a probability of gap flashover that is acceptable 
from a system outage perspective. (In other words, a gap sparkover 
will produce a system outage. The employer should determine whether 
such an outage will impact overall system performance to an 
acceptable degree.) In general, the withstand voltage should be at 
least 1.25 times the maximum crest operating voltage.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Step 2. Determine a gap distance that provides a withstand 
voltage \10\ greater than or equal to the one selected in the first 
step.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \10\ The manufacturer of the gap provides, based on test data, 
the critical sparkover voltage for each gap spacing (for example, a 
critical sparkover voltage of 665 kilovolts for a gap spacing of 1.2 
meters). The withstand voltage for the gap is equal to 85 percent of 
its critical sparkover voltage.
    \11\ Switch steps 1 and 2 if the length of the protective gap is 
known.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Step 3. Use 110 percent of the gap's critical sparkover voltage 
to determine the phase-to-ground peak voltage at gap sparkover (VPPG 
Peak).
    Step 4. Determine the maximum transient overvoltage, phase-to-
ground, at the worksite from the following formula:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR11AP14.038

    Step 5. Use this value of T \12\ in the equation in Table V-2 to 
obtain the minimum approach distance. If the worksite is no more 
than 900 meters (3,000 feet) above sea level, the employer may use 
this value of T to determine the minimum approach distance from 
Table 7 through Table 14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \12\ IEEE Std 516-2009 states that most employers add 0.2 to the 
calculated value of T as an additional safety factor.

    Note: All rounding must be to the next higher value (that is, 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
always round up).

    Sample protective gap calculations.
    Problem: Employees are to perform work on a 500-kilovolt 
transmission line at sea level that is subject to transient 
overvoltages of 2.4 p.u. The maximum operating voltage of the line 
is 550 kilovolts. Determine the length of the protective gap that 
will provide the minimum practical safe approach distance. Also, 
determine what that minimum approach distance is.
    Step 1. Calculate the smallest practical maximum transient 
overvoltage (1.25 times the crest phase-to-ground voltage): \13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \13\ To eliminate sparkovers due to minor system disturbances, 
the employer should use a withstand voltage no lower than 1.25 p.u. 
Note that this is a practical, or operational, consideration only. 
It may be feasible for the employer to use lower values of withstand 
voltage.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR11AP14.039

This value equals the withstand voltage of the protective gap.
    Step 2. Using test data for a particular protective gap, select 
a gap that has a critical sparkover voltage greater than or equal 
to:

561kV / 0.85 = 660kV

For example, if a protective gap with a 1.22-m (4.0-foot) spacing 
tested to a critical sparkover voltage of 665 kilovolts (crest), 
select this gap spacing.
    Step 3. The phase-to-ground peak voltage at gap sparkover (VPPG 
Peak) is 110 percent of the value from the previous step:

665kVx 1.10 = 732kV

This value corresponds to the withstand voltage of the electrical 
component of the minimum approach distance.
    Step 4. Use this voltage to determine the worksite value of T:
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR11AP14.040
    
    Step 5. Use this value of T in the equation in Table V-2 to 
obtain the minimum approach distance, or look up the minimum 
approach distance in Table 7 through Table 14:

MAD = 2.29m(7.6ft)

E. Location of Protective Gaps

    1. Adjacent structures. The employer may install the protective 
gap on a structure adjacent to the worksite, as this practice does 
not significantly reduce the protection afforded by the gap.
    2. Terminal stations. Gaps installed at terminal stations of 
lines or circuits provide a level of protection; however, that level 
of protection may not extend throughout the length of the line to 
the worksite. The use of substation terminal gaps raises the 
possibility that separate surges could enter the line at opposite 
ends, each with low enough magnitude to pass the terminal gaps 
without sparkover. When voltage surges occur simultaneously at each 
end of a line and travel toward each other, the total voltage on the 
line at the point where they meet is the arithmetic sum of the two 
surges. A gap installed within 0.8 km (0.5 mile) of the worksite 
will protect against such intersecting waves. Engineering studies of 
a particular line or system may indicate that employers can 
adequately protect employees by installing gaps at even more distant 
locations. In any event, unless using the default values for T from 
Table V-8, the employer must determine T at the worksite.
    3. Worksite. If the employer installs protective gaps at the 
worksite, the gap setting establishes the worksite impulse 
insulation strength. Lightning strikes as far as 6 miles from the 
worksite can cause a voltage surge greater than the gap withstand 
voltage, and a gap sparkover can occur. In addition, the gap can 
sparkover from overvoltages on the line that exceed the withstand 
voltage of the gap. Consequently, the employer must protect 
employees from hazards resulting from any sparkover that could 
occur.

[[Page 20725]]

    F. Disabling automatic reclosing. There are two reasons to 
disable the automatic-reclosing feature of circuit-interrupting 
devices while employees are performing live-line work:
     To prevent reenergization of a circuit faulted during 
the work, which could create a hazard or result in more serious 
injuries or damage than the injuries or damage produced by the 
original fault;
     To prevent any transient overvoltage caused by the 
switching surge that would result if the circuit were reenergized.
    However, due to system stability considerations, it may not 
always be feasible to disable the automatic-reclosing feature.

V. Minimum Approach-Distance Tables

    A. Legacy tables. Employers may use the minimum approach 
distances in Table 6 until March 31, 2015.

                            Table 6--Minimum Approach Distances Until March 31, 2015
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                     Phase-to-ground exposure         Phase-to-phase exposure
       Voltage range phase to phase (kV)        ----------------------------------------------------------------
                                                        m               ft               m              ft
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2.1 to 15.0....................................            0.64             2.1             0.61             2.0
15.1 to 35.0...................................            0.71             2.3             0.71             2.3
35.1 to 46.0...................................            0.76             2.5             0.76             2.5
46.1 to 72.5...................................            0.91             3.0             0.91             3.0
72.6 to 121....................................            1.02             3.3             1.37             4.5
138 to 145.....................................            1.07             3.5             1.52             5.0
161 to 169.....................................            1.12             3.7             1.68             5.5
230 to 242.....................................            1.52             5.0             2.54             8.3
345 to 362 *...................................            2.13             7.0             4.06            13.3
500 to 552 *...................................            3.35            11.0             6.10            20.0
700 to 765 *...................................            4.57            15.0             9.45            31.0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* The minimum approach distance may be the shortest distance between the energized part and the grounded
  surface.

    B. Alternative minimum approach distances. Employers may use the 
minimum approach distances in Table 7 through Table 14 provided that 
the employer follows the notes to those tables.

                            Table 7--AC Minimum Approach Distances--72.6 to 121.0 kV
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                     Phase-to-ground exposure         Phase-to-phase exposure
                    T (p.u.)                    ----------------------------------------------------------------
                                                        m               ft               m              ft
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1.5............................................            0.67             2.2             0.84             2.8
1.6............................................            0.69             2.3             0.87             2.9
1.7............................................            0.71             2.3             0.90             3.0
1.8............................................            0.74             2.4             0.93             3.1
1.9............................................            0.76             2.5             0.96             3.1
2.0............................................            0.78             2.6             0.99             3.2
2.1............................................            0.81             2.7             1.01             3.3
2.2............................................            0.83             2.7             1.04             3.4
2.3............................................            0.85             2.8             1.07             3.5
2.4............................................            0.88             2.9             1.10             3.6
2.5............................................            0.90             3.0             1.13             3.7
2.6............................................            0.92             3.0             1.16             3.8
2.7............................................            0.95             3.1             1.19             3.9
2.8............................................            0.97             3.2             1.22             4.0
2.9............................................            0.99             3.2             1.24             4.1
3.0............................................            1.02             3.3             1.27             4.2
3.1............................................            1.04             3.4             1.30             4.3
3.2............................................            1.06             3.5             1.33             4.4
3.3............................................            1.09             3.6             1.36             4.5
3.4............................................            1.11             3.6             1.39             4.6
3.5............................................            1.13             3.7             1.42             4.7
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                            Table 8--AC Minimum Approach Distances--121.1 to 145.0 kV
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                     Phase-to-ground rxposure         Phase-to-phase rxposure
                    T (p.u.)                    ----------------------------------------------------------------
                                                        m               ft               m              ft
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1.5............................................            0.74             2.4             0.95             3.1
1.6............................................            0.76             2.5             0.98             3.2
1.7............................................            0.79             2.6             1.02             3.3
1.8............................................            0.82             2.7             1.05             3.4
1.9............................................            0.85             2.8             1.08             3.5
2.0............................................            0.88             2.9             1.12             3.7
2.1............................................            0.90             3.0             1.15             3.8
2.2............................................            0.93             3.1             1.19             3.9

[[Page 20726]]

 
2.3............................................            0.96             3.1             1.22             4.0
2.4............................................            0.99             3.2             1.26             4.1
2.5............................................            1.02             3.3             1.29             4.2
2.6............................................            1.04             3.4             1.33             4.4
2.7............................................            1.07             3.5             1.36             4.5
2.8............................................            1.10             3.6             1.39             4.6
2.9............................................            1.13             3.7             1.43             4.7
3.0............................................            1.16             3.8             1.46             4.8
3.1............................................            1.19             3.9             1.50             4.9
3.2............................................            1.21             4.0             1.53             5.0
3.3............................................            1.24             4.1             1.57             5.2
3.4............................................            1.27             4.2             1.60             5.2
3.5............................................            1.30             4.3             1.64             5.4
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                            Table 9--AC Minimum Approach Distances--145.1 to 169.0 kV
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                     Phase-to-ground exposure         Phase-to-phase exposure
                    T (p.u.)                    ----------------------------------------------------------------
                                                        m               ft               m              ft
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1.5............................................            0.81             2.7             1.05             3.4
1.6............................................            0.84             2.8             1.09             3.6
1.7............................................            0.87             2.9             1.13             3.7
1.8............................................            0.90             3.0             1.17             3.8
1.9............................................            0.94             3.1             1.21             4.0
2.0............................................            0.97             3.2             1.25             4.1
2.1............................................            1.00             3.3             1.29             4.2
2.2............................................            1.03             3.4             1.33             4.4
2.3............................................            1.07             3.5             1.37             4.5
2.4............................................            1.10             3.6             1.41             4.6
2.5............................................            1.13             3.7             1.45             4.8
2.6............................................            1.17             3.8             1.49             4.9
2.7............................................            1.20             3.9             1.53             5.0
2.8............................................            1.23             4.0             1.57             5.2
2.9............................................            1.26             4.1             1.61             5.3
3.0............................................            1.30             4.3             1.65             5.4
3.1............................................            1.33             4.4             1.70             5.6
3.2............................................            1.36             4.5             1.76             5.8
3.3............................................            1.39             4.6             1.82             6.0
3.4............................................            1.43             4.7             1.88             6.2
3.5............................................            1.46             4.8             1.94             6.4
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                           Table 10--AC Minimum Approach Distances--169.1 to 242.0 kV
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                     Phase-to-ground exposure         Phase-to-phase exposure
                    T (p.u.)                    ----------------------------------------------------------------
                                                        m               ft               m              ft
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1.5............................................            1.02             3.3             1.37             4.5
1.6............................................            1.06             3.5             1.43             4.7
1.7............................................            1.11             3.6             1.48             4.9
1.8............................................            1.16             3.8             1.54             5.1
1.9............................................            1.21             4.0             1.60             5.2
2.0............................................            1.25             4.1             1.66             5.4
2.1............................................            1.30             4.3             1.73             5.7
2.2............................................            1.35             4.4             1.81             5.9
2.3............................................            1.39             4.6             1.90             6.2
2.4............................................            1.44             4.7             1.99             6.5
2.5............................................            1.49             4.9             2.08             6.8
2.6............................................            1.53             5.0             2.17             7.1
2.7............................................            1.58             5.2             2.26             7.4
2.8............................................            1.63             5.3             2.36             7.7
2.9............................................            1.67             5.5             2.45             8.0
3.0............................................            1.72             5.6             2.55             8.4
3.1............................................            1.77             5.8             2.65             8.7
3.2............................................            1.81             5.9             2.76             9.1
3.3............................................            1.88             6.2             2.86             9.4
3.4............................................            1.95             6.4             2.97             9.7
3.5............................................            2.01             6.6             3.08            10.1
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


[[Page 20727]]


                           Table 11--AC Minimum Approach Distances--242.1 to 362.0 kV
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                     Phase-to-ground exposure         Phase-to-phase exposure
                    T (p.u.)                    ----------------------------------------------------------------
                                                        m               ft               m              ft
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1.5............................................            1.37             4.5             1.99             6.5
1.6............................................            1.44             4.7             2.13             7.0
1.7............................................            1.51             5.0             2.27             7.4
1.8............................................            1.58             5.2             2.41             7.9
1.9............................................            1.65             5.4             2.56             8.4
2.0............................................            1.72             5.6             2.71             8.9
2.1............................................            1.79             5.9             2.87             9.4
2.2............................................            1.87             6.1             3.03             9.9
2.3............................................            1.97             6.5             3.20            10.5
2.4............................................            2.08             6.8             3.37            11.1
2.5............................................            2.19             7.2             3.55            11.6
2.6............................................            2.29             7.5             3.73            12.2
2.7............................................            2.41             7.9             3.91            12.8
2.8............................................            2.52             8.3             4.10            13.5
2.9............................................            2.64             8.7             4.29            14.1
3.0............................................            2.76             9.1             4.49            14.7
3.1............................................            2.88             9.4             4.69            15.4
3.2............................................            3.01             9.9             4.90            16.1
3.3............................................            3.14            10.3             5.11            16.8
3.4............................................            3.27            10.7             5.32            17.5
3.5............................................            3.41            11.2             5.52            18.1
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                           Table 12--AC Minimum Approach Distances--362.1 to 420.0 kV
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                     Phase-to-ground exposure         Phase-to-phase exposure
                    T (p.u.)                    ----------------------------------------------------------------
                                                        m               ft               m              ft
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1.5............................................            1.53             5.0             2.40             7.9
1.6............................................            1.62             5.3             2.58             8.5
1.7............................................            1.70             5.6             2.75             9.0
1.8............................................            1.78             5.8             2.94             9.6
1.9............................................            1.88             6.2             3.13            10.3
2.0............................................            1.99             6.5             3.33            10.9
2.1............................................            2.12             7.0             3.53            11.6
2.2............................................            2.24             7.3             3.74            12.3
2.3............................................            2.37             7.8             3.95            13.0
2.4............................................            2.50             8.2             4.17            13.7
2.5............................................            2.64             8.7             4.40            14.4
2.6............................................            2.78             9.1             4.63            15.2
2.7............................................            2.93             9.6             4.87            16.0
2.8............................................            3.07            10.1             5.11            16.8
2.9............................................            3.23            10.6             5.36            17.6
3.0............................................            3.38            11.1             5.59            18.3
3.1............................................            3.55            11.6             5.82            19.1
3.2............................................            3.72            12.2             6.07            19.9
3.3............................................            3.89            12.8             6.31            20.7
3.4............................................            4.07            13.4             6.56            21.5
3.5............................................            4.25            13.9             6.81            22.3
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                           Table 13--AC Minimum Approach Distances--420.1 to 550.0 kV
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                     Phase-to-ground exposure         Phase-to-phase exposure
                    T (p.u.)                    ----------------------------------------------------------------
                                                        m               ft               m              ft
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1.5............................................            1.95             6.4             3.46            11.4
1.6............................................            2.11             6.9             3.73            12.2
1.7............................................            2.28             7.5             4.02            13.2
1.8............................................            2.45             8.0             4.31            14.1
1.9............................................            2.62             8.6             4.61            15.1
2.0............................................            2.81             9.2             4.92            16.1
2.1............................................            3.00             9.8             5.25            17.2
2.2............................................            3.20            10.5             5.55            18.2
2.3............................................            3.40            11.2             5.86            19.2
2.4............................................            3.62            11.9             6.18            20.3
2.5............................................            3.84            12.6             6.50            21.3
2.6............................................            4.07            13.4             6.83            22.4
2.7............................................            4.31            14.1             7.18            23.6

[[Page 20728]]

 
2.8............................................            4.56            15.0             7.52            24.7
2.9............................................            4.81            15.8             7.88            25.9
3.0............................................            5.07            16.6             8.24            27.0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                           Table 14--AC Minimum Approach Distances--550.1 to 800.0 kV
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                     Phase-to-ground exposure         Phase-to-phase exposure
                    T (p.u.)                    ----------------------------------------------------------------
                                                        m               ft               m              ft
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1.5............................................            3.16            10.4             5.97            19.6
1.6............................................            3.46            11.4             6.43            21.1
1.7............................................            3.78            12.4             6.92            22.7
1.8............................................            4.12            13.5             7.42            24.3
1.9............................................            4.47            14.7             7.93            26.0
2.0............................................            4.83            15.8             8.47            27.8
2.1............................................            5.21            17.1             9.02            29.6
2.2............................................            5.61            18.4             9.58            31.4
2.3............................................            6.02            19.8            10.16            33.3
2.4............................................            6.44            21.1            10.76            35.3
2.5............................................            6.88            22.6            11.38            37.3
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes to Table 7 through Table 14:
1. The employer must determine the maximum anticipated per-unit transient overvoltage, phase-to-ground, through
  an engineering analysis, as required by Sec.   1926.960(c)(1)(ii), or assume a maximum anticipated per-unit
  transient overvoltage, phase-to-ground, in accordance with Table V-8.
2. For phase-to-phase exposures, the employer must demonstrate that no insulated tool spans the gap and that no
  large conductive object is in the gap.
3. The worksite must be at an elevation of 900 meters (3,000 feet) or less above sea level.

Appendix C to Subpart V of Part 1926--Protection From Hazardous 
Differences in Electric Potential

I. Introduction

    Current passing through an impedance impresses voltage across 
that impedance. Even conductors have some, albeit low, value of 
impedance. Therefore, if a ``grounded'' \1\ object, such as a crane 
or deenergized and grounded power line, results in a ground fault on 
a power line, voltage is impressed on that grounded object. The 
voltage impressed on the grounded object depends largely on the 
voltage on the line, on the impedance of the faulted conductor, and 
on the impedance to ``true,'' or ``absolute,'' ground represented by 
the object. If the impedance of the object causing the fault is 
relatively large, the voltage impressed on the object is essentially 
the phase-to-ground system voltage. However, even faults to grounded 
power lines or to well grounded transmission towers or substation 
structures (which have relatively low values of impedance to ground) 
can result in hazardous voltages.\2\ In all cases, the degree of the 
hazard depends on the magnitude of the current through the employee 
and the time of exposure. This appendix discusses methods of 
protecting workers against the possibility that grounded objects, 
such as cranes and other mechanical equipment, will contact 
energized power lines and that deenergized and grounded power lines 
will become accidentally energized.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ This appendix generally uses the term ``grounded'' only with 
respect to grounding that the employer intentionally installs, for 
example, the grounding an employer installs on a deenergized 
conductor. However, in this case, the term ``grounded'' means 
connected to earth, regardless of whether or not that connection is 
intentional.
    \2\ Thus, grounding systems for transmission towers and 
substation structures should be designed to minimize the step and 
touch potentials involved.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

II. Voltage-Gradient Distribution

    A. Voltage-gradient distribution curve. Absolute, or true, 
ground serves as a reference and always has a voltage of 0 volts 
above ground potential. Because there is an impedance between a 
grounding electrode and absolute ground, there will be a voltage 
difference between the grounding electrode and absolute ground under 
ground-fault conditions. Voltage dissipates from the grounding 
electrode (or from the grounding point) and creates a ground 
potential gradient. The voltage decreases rapidly with increasing 
distance from the grounding electrode. A voltage drop associated 
with this dissipation of voltage is a ground potential. Figure 1 is 
a typical voltage-gradient distribution curve (assuming a uniform 
soil texture).
BILLING CODE 4510-26-P

[[Page 20729]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR11AP14.041

BILLING CODE 4510-26-C
    B. Step and touch potentials. Figure 1 also shows that workers 
are at risk from step and touch potentials. Step potential is the 
voltage between the feet of a person standing near an energized 
grounded object (the electrode). In Figure 1, the step potential is 
equal to the difference in voltage between two points at different 
distances from the electrode (where the points represent the 
location of each foot in relation to the electrode). A person could 
be at risk of injury during a fault simply by standing near the 
object.
    Touch potential is the voltage between the energized grounded 
object (again, the

[[Page 20730]]

electrode) and the feet of a person in contact with the object. In 
Figure 1, the touch potential is equal to the difference in voltage 
between the electrode (which is at a distance of 0 meters) and a 
point some distance away from the electrode (where the point 
represents the location of the feet of the person in contact with 
the object). The touch potential could be nearly the full voltage 
across the grounded object if that object is grounded at a point 
remote from the place where the person is in contact with it. For 
example, a crane grounded to the system neutral and that contacts an 
energized line would expose any person in contact with the crane or 
its uninsulated load line to a touch potential nearly equal to the 
full fault voltage.
    Figure 2 illustrates step and touch potentials.
BILLING CODE 4510-26-P
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR11AP14.042

BILLING CODE 4510-26-C

III. Protecting Workers From Hazardous Differences in Electrical 
Potential

    A. Definitions. The following definitions apply to section III 
of this appendix:
    Bond. The electrical interconnection of conductive parts 
designed to maintain a common electric potential.
    Bonding cable (bonding jumper). A cable connected to two 
conductive parts to bond the parts together.
    Cluster bar. A terminal temporarily attached to a structure that 
provides a means for the attachment and bonding of grounding and 
bonding cables to the structure.
    Ground. A conducting connection between an electric circuit or 
equipment and the earth, or to some conducting body that serves in 
place of the earth.
    Grounding cable (grounding jumper). A cable connected between a 
deenergized part

[[Page 20731]]

and ground. Note that grounding cables carry fault current and 
bonding cables generally do not. A cable that bonds two conductive 
parts but carries substantial fault current (for example, a jumper 
connected between one phase and a grounded phase) is a grounding 
cable.
    Ground mat (grounding grid). A temporarily or permanently 
installed metallic mat or grating that establishes an equipotential 
surface and provides connection points for attaching grounds.
    B. Analyzing the hazard. The employer can use an engineering 
analysis of the power system under fault conditions to determine 
whether hazardous step and touch voltages will develop. The analysis 
should determine the voltage on all conductive objects in the work 
area and the amount of time the voltage will be present. Based on 
the this analysis, the employer can select appropriate measures and 
protective equipment, including the measures and protective 
equipment outlined in Section III of this appendix, to protect each 
employee from hazardous differences in electric potential. For 
example, from the analysis, the employer will know the voltage 
remaining on conductive objects after employees install bonding and 
grounding equipment and will be able to select insulating equipment 
with an appropriate rating, as described in paragraph III.C.2 of 
this appendix.
    C. Protecting workers on the ground. The employer may use 
several methods, including equipotential zones, insulating 
equipment, and restricted work areas, to protect employees on the 
ground from hazardous differences in electrical potential.
    1. An equipotential zone will protect workers within it from 
hazardous step and touch potentials. (See Figure 3.) Equipotential 
zones will not, however, protect employees located either wholly or 
partially outside the protected area. The employer can establish an 
equipotential zone for workers on the ground, with respect to a 
grounded object, through the use of a metal mat connected to the 
grounded object. The employer can use a grounding grid to equalize 
the voltage within the grid or bond conductive objects in the 
immediate work area to minimize the potential between the objects 
and between each object and ground. (Bonding an object outside the 
work area can increase the touch potential to that object, however.) 
Section III.D of this appendix discusses equipotential zones for 
employees working on deenergized and grounded power lines.
    2. Insulating equipment, such as rubber gloves, can protect 
employees handling grounded equipment and conductors from hazardous 
touch potentials. The insulating equipment must be rated for the 
highest voltage that can be impressed on the grounded objects under 
fault conditions (rather than for the full system voltage).
    3. Restricting employees from areas where hazardous step or 
touch potentials could arise can protect employees not directly 
involved in performing the operation. The employer must ensure that 
employees on the ground in the vicinity of transmission structures 
are at a distance where step voltages would be insufficient to cause 
injury. Employees must not handle grounded conductors or equipment 
likely to become energized to hazardous voltages unless the 
employees are within an equipotential zone or protected by 
insulating equipment.
BILLING CODE 4510-26-P

[[Page 20732]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR11AP14.043

BILLING CODE 4510-26-C
    D. Protecting employees working on deenergized and grounded 
power lines. This Section III.D of Appendix C establishes guidelines 
to help employers comply with requirements in Sec.  1926.962 for 
using protective grounding to protect employees working on 
deenergized power lines. Section 1926.962 applies to grounding of 
transmission and distribution lines and equipment for the purpose of 
protecting workers. Paragraph (c) of Sec.  1926.962 requires 
temporary protective grounds to be placed at such locations and 
arranged in such a manner that the employer can demonstrate will 
prevent exposure of each employee to hazardous differences in 
electric potential.\3\ Sections III.D.1 and III.D.2 of this appendix 
provide guidelines that employers can use in making the 
demonstration required by Sec.  1926.962(c). Section III.D.1 of this 
appendix provides guidelines on how the employer can determine 
whether particular grounding practices expose employees to hazardous 
differences in electric potential. Section III.D.2 of this appendix 
describes grounding methods that the employer can use in lieu of an 
engineering analysis to make the demonstration required by Sec.  
1926.962(c). The Occupational Safety and Health Administration will 
consider employers that comply with the criteria in this appendix as 
meeting Sec.  1926.962(c).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \3\ The protective grounding required by Sec.  1926.962 limits 
to safe values the potential differences between accessible objects 
in each employee's work environment. Ideally, a protective grounding 
system would create a true equipotential zone in which every point 
is at the same electric potential. In practice, current passing 
through the grounding and bonding elements creates potential 
differences. If these potential differences are hazardous, the 
employer may not treat the zone as an equipotential zone.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, Section III.D.3 of this appendix discusses other safety 
considerations that will help the employer comply with other 
requirements in Sec.  1926.962. Following these guidelines will 
protect workers from hazards that can occur when a deenergized and 
grounded line becomes energized.
    1. Determining safe body current limits. This Section III.D.1 of 
Appendix C provides guidelines on how an employer can determine 
whether any differences in electric potential to which workers could 
be exposed are hazardous as part of the demonstration required by 
Sec.  1926.962(c).
    Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) Standard 
1048-2003, IEEE

[[Page 20733]]

Guide for Protective Grounding of Power Lines, provides the 
following equation for determining the threshold of ventricular 
fibrillation when the duration of the electric shock is limited:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR11AP14.044

where I is the current through the worker's body, and t is the 
duration of the current in seconds. This equation represents the 
ventricular fibrillation threshold for 95.5 percent of the adult 
population with a mass of 50 kilograms (110 pounds) or more. The 
equation is valid for current durations between 0.0083 to 3.0 
seconds.
    To use this equation to set safe voltage limits in an 
equipotential zone around the worker, the employer will need to 
assume a value for the resistance of the worker's body. IEEE Std 
1048-2003 states that ``total body resistance is usually taken as 
1000 [Omega] for determining . . . body current limits.'' However, 
employers should be aware that the impedance of a worker's body can 
be substantially less than that value. For instance, IEEE Std 1048-
2003 reports a minimum hand-to-hand resistance of 610 ohms and an 
internal body resistance of 500 ohms. The internal resistance of the 
body better represents the minimum resistance of a worker's body 
when the skin resistance drops near zero, which occurs, for example, 
when there are breaks in the worker's skin, for instance, from cuts 
or from blisters formed as a result of the current from an electric 
shock, or when the worker is wet at the points of contact.
    Employers may use the IEEE Std 1048-2003 equation to determine 
safe body current limits only if the employer protects workers from 
hazards associated with involuntary muscle reactions from electric 
shock (for example, the hazard to a worker from falling as a result 
of an electric shock). Moreover, the equation applies only when the 
duration of the electric shock is limited. If the precautions the 
employer takes, including those required by applicable standards, do 
not adequately protect employees from hazards associated with 
involuntary reactions from electric shock, a hazard exists if the 
induced voltage is sufficient to pass a current of 1 milliampere 
through a 500-ohm resistor. (The 500-ohm resistor represents the 
resistance of an employee. The 1-milliampere current is the 
threshold of perception.) Finally, if the employer protects 
employees from injury due to involuntary reactions from electric 
shock, but the duration of the electric shock is unlimited (that is, 
when the fault current at the work location will be insufficient to 
trip the devices protecting the circuit), a hazard exists if the 
resultant current would be more than 6 milliamperes (the recognized 
let-go threshold for workers \4\).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \4\ Electric current passing through the body has varying 
effects depending on the amount of the current. At the let-go 
threshold, the current overrides a person's control over his or her 
muscles. At that level, an employee grasping an object will not be 
able to let go of the object. The let-go threshold varies from 
person to person; however, the recognized value for workers is 6 
milliamperes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    2. Acceptable methods of grounding for employers that do not 
perform an engineering determination. The grounding methods 
presented in this section of this appendix ensure that differences 
in electric potential are as low as possible and, therefore, meet 
Sec.  1926.962(c) without an engineering determination of the 
potential differences. These methods follow two principles: (i) The 
grounding method must ensure that the circuit opens in the fastest 
available clearing time, and (ii) the grounding method must ensure 
that the potential differences between conductive objects in the 
employee's work area are as low as possible.
    Paragraph (c) of Sec.  1926.962 does not require grounding 
methods to meet the criteria embodied in these principles. Instead, 
the paragraph requires that protective grounds be ``placed at such 
locations and arranged in such a manner that the employer can 
demonstrate will prevent exposure of each employee to hazardous 
differences in electric potential.'' However, when the employer's 
grounding practices do not follow these two principles, the employer 
will need to perform an engineering analysis to make the 
demonstration required by Sec.  1926.962(c).
    i. Ensuring that the circuit opens in the fastest available 
clearing time. Generally, the higher the fault current, the shorter 
the clearing times for the same type of fault. Therefore, to ensure 
the fastest available clearing time, the grounding method must 
maximize the fault current with a low impedance connection to 
ground. The employer accomplishes this objective by grounding the 
circuit conductors to the best ground available at the worksite. 
Thus, the employer must ground to a grounded system neutral 
conductor, if one is present. A grounded system neutral has a direct 
connection to the system ground at the source, resulting in an 
extremely low impedance to ground. In a substation, the employer may 
instead ground to the substation grid, which also has an extremely 
low impedance to the system ground and, typically, is connected to a 
grounded system neutral when one is present. Remote system grounds, 
such as pole and tower grounds, have a higher impedance to the 
system ground than grounded system neutrals and substation grounding 
grids; however, the employer may use a remote ground when lower 
impedance grounds are not available. In the absence of a grounded 
system neutral, substation grid, and remote ground, the employer may 
use a temporary driven ground at the worksite.
    In addition, if employees are working on a three-phase system, 
the grounding method must short circuit all three phases. Short 
circuiting all phases will ensure faster clearing and lower the 
current through the grounding cable connecting the deenergized line 
to ground, thereby lowering the voltage across that cable. The short 
circuit need not be at the worksite; however, the employer must 
treat any conductor that is not grounded at the worksite as 
energized because the ungrounded conductors will be energized at 
fault voltage during a fault.
    ii. Ensuring that the potential differences between conductive 
objects in the employee's work area are as low as possible. To 
achieve as low a voltage as possible across any two conductive 
objects in the work area, the employer must bond all conductive 
objects in the work area. This section of this appendix discusses 
how to create a zone that minimizes differences in electric 
potential between conductive objects in the work area.
    The employer must use bonding cables to bond conductive objects, 
except for metallic objects bonded through metal-to-metal contact. 
The employer must ensure that metal-to-metal contacts are tight and 
free of contamination, such as oxidation, that can increase the 
impedance across the connection. For example, a bolted connection 
between metal lattice tower members is acceptable if the connection 
is tight and free of corrosion and other contamination. Figure 4 
shows how to create an equipotential zone for metal lattice towers.
    Wood poles are conductive objects. The poles can absorb moisture 
and conduct electricity, particularly at distribution and 
transmission voltages. Consequently, the employer must either: (1) 
Provide a conductive platform, bonded to a grounding cable, on which 
the worker stands or (2) use cluster bars to bond wood poles to the 
grounding cable. The employer must ensure that employees install the 
cluster bar below, and close to, the worker's feet. The inner 
portion of the wood pole is more conductive than the outer shell, so 
it is important that the cluster bar be in conductive contact with a 
metal spike or nail that penetrates the wood to a depth greater than 
or equal to the depth the worker's climbing gaffs will penetrate the 
wood. For example, the employer could mount the cluster bar on a 
bare pole ground wire fastened to the pole with nails or staples 
that penetrate to the required depth. Alternatively, the employer 
may temporarily nail a conductive strap to the pole and connect the 
strap to the cluster bar. Figure 5 shows how to create an 
equipotential zone for wood poles.
BILLING CODE 4510-26-P

[[Page 20734]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR11AP14.045


[[Page 20735]]


[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR11AP14.046

BILLING CODE 4510-26-C
    For underground systems, employers commonly install grounds at 
the points of disconnection of the underground cables. These 
grounding points are typically remote from the manhole or 
underground vault where employees will be working on the cable. 
Workers in contact with a cable grounded at a remote location can 
experience hazardous potential differences if the cable becomes 
energized or if a fault occurs on a different, but nearby, energized 
cable. The fault current causes potential gradients in the earth, 
and a potential difference will exist between the earth where the 
worker is standing and the earth where the cable is grounded. 
Consequently, to create an equipotential zone for the worker, the 
employer must provide a means of connecting the deenergized cable to 
ground at the worksite by having the worker stand on a conductive 
mat bonded to the deenergized cable. If the cable is cut, the 
employer must install a bond across the opening in the cable or 
install one bond on each side of the opening to ensure that the 
separate cable ends are at the same potential. The employer must 
protect the worker from any hazardous differences in potential any 
time there is no bond between the mat and the cable (for example, 
before the worker installs the bonds).
    3. Other safety-related considerations. To ensure that the 
grounding system is safe and effective, the employer should also 
consider the following factors: \5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \5\ This appendix only discusses factors that relate to ensuring 
an equipotential zone for employees. The employer must consider 
other factors in selecting a grounding system that is capable of 
conducting the maximum fault current that could flow at the point of 
grounding for the time necessary to clear the fault, as required by 
Sec.  1926.962(d)(1)(i). IEEE Std 1048-2003 contains guidelines for 
selecting and installing grounding equipment that will meet Sec.  
1926.962(d)(1)(i).

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 20736]]

    i. Maintenance of grounding equipment. It is essential that the 
employer properly maintain grounding equipment. Corrosion in the 
connections between grounding cables and clamps and on the clamp 
surface can increase the resistance of the cable, thereby increasing 
potential differences. In addition, the surface to which a clamp 
attaches, such as a conductor or tower member, must be clean and 
free of corrosion and oxidation to ensure a low-resistance 
connection. Cables must be free of damage that could reduce their 
current-carrying capacity so that they can carry the full fault 
current without failure. Each clamp must have a tight connection to 
the cable to ensure a low resistance and to ensure that the clamp 
does not separate from the cable during a fault.
    ii. Grounding cable length and movement. The electromagnetic 
forces on grounding cables during a fault increase with increasing 
cable length. These forces can cause the cable to move violently 
during a fault and can be high enough to damage the cable or clamps 
and cause the cable to fail. In addition, flying cables can injure 
workers. Consequently, cable lengths should be as short as possible, 
and grounding cables that might carry high fault current should be 
in positions where the cables will not injure workers during a 
fault.

Appendix D to Subpart V of Part 1926--Methods of Inspecting and Testing 
Wood Poles

I. Introduction

    When employees are to perform work on a wood pole, it is 
important to determine the condition of the pole before employees 
climb it. The weight of the employee, the weight of equipment to be 
installed, and other working stresses (such as the removal or 
retensioning of conductors) can lead to the failure of a defective 
pole or a pole that is not designed to handle the additional 
stresses.\1\ For these reasons, it is essential that, before an 
employee climbs a wood pole, the employer ascertain that the pole is 
capable of sustaining the stresses of the work. The determination 
that the pole is capable of sustaining these stresses includes an 
inspection of the condition of the pole.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ A properly guyed pole in good condition should, at a 
minimum, be able to handle the weight of an employee climbing it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    If the employer finds the pole to be unsafe to climb or to work 
from, the employer must secure the pole so that it does not fail 
while an employee is on it. The employer can secure the pole by a 
line truck boom, by ropes or guys, or by lashing a new pole 
alongside it. If a new one is lashed alongside the defective pole, 
employees should work from the new one.

II. Inspecting Wood Poles

    A qualified employee should inspect wood poles for the following 
conditions:\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \2\ The presence of any of these conditions is an indication 
that the pole may not be safe to climb or to work from. The employee 
performing the inspection must be qualified to make a determination 
as to whether it is safe to perform the work without taking 
additional precautions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A. General condition. Buckling at the ground line or an unusual 
angle with respect to the ground may indicate that the pole has 
rotted or is broken.
    B. Cracks. Horizontal cracks perpendicular to the grain of the 
wood may weaken the pole. Vertical cracks, although not normally 
considered to be a sign of a defective pole, can pose a hazard to 
the climber, and the employee should keep his or her gaffs away from 
them while climbing.
    C. Holes. Hollow spots and woodpecker holes can reduce the 
strength of a wood pole.
    D. Shell rot and decay. Rotting and decay are cutout hazards and 
possible indications of the age and internal condition of the pole.
    E. Knots. One large knot or several smaller ones at the same 
height on the pole may be evidence of a weak point on the pole.
    F. Depth of setting. Evidence of the existence of a former 
ground line substantially above the existing ground level may be an 
indication that the pole is no longer buried to a sufficient depth.
    G. Soil conditions. Soft, wet, or loose soil around the base of 
the pole may indicate that the pole will not support any change in 
stress.
    H. Burn marks. Burning from transformer failures or conductor 
faults could damage the pole so that it cannot withstand changes in 
mechanical stress.

III. Testing Wood Poles

    The following tests, which are from Sec.  1910.268(n)(3) of this 
chapter, are acceptable methods of testing wood poles:
    A. Hammer test. Rap the pole sharply with a hammer weighing 
about 1.4 kg (3 pounds), starting near the ground line and 
continuing upwards circumferentially around the pole to a height of 
approximately 1.8 meters (6 feet). The hammer will produce a clear 
sound and rebound sharply when striking sound wood. Decay pockets 
will be indicated by a dull sound or a less pronounced hammer 
rebound. Also, prod the pole as near the ground line as possible 
using a pole prod or a screwdriver with a blade at least 127 
millimeters (5 inches) long. If substantial decay is present, the 
pole is unsafe.
    B. Rocking test. Apply a horizontal force to the pole and 
attempt to rock it back and forth in a direction perpendicular to 
the line. Exercise caution to avoid causing power lines to swing 
together. Apply the force to the pole either by pushing it with a 
pike pole or pulling the pole with a rope. If the pole cracks during 
the test, it is unsafe.

Appendix E to Subpart V of Part 1926--Protection From Flames and 
Electric Arcs

I. Introduction

    Paragraph (g) of Sec.  1926.960 addresses protecting employees 
from flames and electric arcs. This paragraph requires employers to: 
(1) Assess the workplace for flame and electric-arc hazards 
(paragraph (g)(1)); (2) estimate the available heat energy from 
electric arcs to which employees would be exposed (paragraph 
(g)(2)); (3) ensure that employees wear clothing that will not melt, 
or ignite and continue to burn, when exposed to flames or the 
estimated heat energy (paragraph (g)(3)); and (4) ensure that 
employees wear flame-resistant clothing \1\ and protective clothing 
and other protective equipment that has an arc rating greater than 
or equal to the available heat energy under certain conditions 
(paragraphs (g)(4) and (g)(5)). This appendix contains information 
to help employers estimate available heat energy as required by 
Sec.  1926.960(g)(2), select protective clothing and other 
protective equipment with an arc rating suitable for the available 
heat energy as required by Sec.  1926.960(g)(5), and ensure that 
employees do not wear flammable clothing that could lead to burn 
injury as addressed by Sec. Sec.  1926.960(g)(3) and (g)(4).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ Flame-resistant clothing includes clothing that is 
inherently flame resistant and clothing chemically treated with a 
flame retardant. (See ASTM F1506-10a, Standard Performance 
Specification for Flame Resistant Textile Materials for Wearing 
Apparel for Use by Electrical Workers Exposed to Momentary Electric 
Arc and Related Thermal Hazards, and ASTM F1891-12 Standard 
Specification for Arc and Flame Resistant Rainwear.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

II. Assessing the Workplace for Flame and Electric-Arc Hazards

    Paragraph (g)(1) of Sec.  1926.960 requires the employer to 
assess the workplace to identify employees exposed to hazards from 
flames or from electric arcs. This provision ensures that the 
employer evaluates employee exposure to flames and electric arcs so 
that employees who face such exposures receive the required 
protection. The employer must conduct an assessment for each 
employee who performs work on or near exposed, energized parts of 
electric circuits.

A. Assessment Guidelines

    Sources electric arcs. Consider possible sources of electric 
arcs, including:
     Energized circuit parts not guarded or insulated,
     Switching devices that produce electric arcs in normal 
operation,
     Sliding parts that could fault during operation (for 
example, rack-mounted circuit breakers), and
     Energized electric equipment that could fail (for 
example, electric equipment with damaged insulation or with evidence 
of arcing or overheating).
    Exposure to flames. Identify employees exposed to hazards from 
flames. Factors to consider include:
     The proximity of employees to open flames, and
     For flammable material in the work area, whether there 
is a reasonable likelihood that an electric arc or an open flame can 
ignite the material.
    Probability that an electric arc will occur. Identify employees 
exposed to electric-arc hazards. The Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration will consider an employee exposed to electric-arc 
hazards if there is a reasonable likelihood that an electric arc 
will occur in the employee's work area, in other words, if the 
probability of such an event is higher than it is for the normal 
operation of enclosed equipment. Factors to consider include:
     For energized circuit parts not guarded or insulated, 
whether conductive objects can

[[Page 20737]]

come too close to or fall onto the energized parts,
     For exposed, energized circuit parts, whether the 
employee is closer to the part than the minimum approach distance 
established by the employer (as permitted by Sec.  
1926.960(c)(1)(iii)).
     Whether the operation of electric equipment with 
sliding parts that could fault during operation is part of the 
normal operation of the equipment or occurs during servicing or 
maintenance, and
     For energized electric equipment, whether there is 
evidence of impending failure, such as evidence of arcing or 
overheating.

B. Examples

    Table 1 provides task-based examples of exposure assessments.

                                 Table 1--Example Assessments for Various Tasks
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   Task                                    Is employee exposed to flame or
                                                                            electric-arc hazard?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Normal operation of enclosed equipment,   The employer properly installs   No.
 such as closing or opening a switch.      and maintains enclosed
                                           equipment, and there is no
                                           evidence of impending failure.
                                          There is evidence of arcing or   Yes.
                                           overheating.
                                          Parts of the equipment are       Yes.
                                           loose or sticking, or the
                                           equipment otherwise exhibits
                                           signs of lack of maintenance.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Servicing electric equipment, such as racking in a circuit breaker or      Yes.
 replacing a switch.
-----------------------------------------
Inspection of electric equipment with     The employee is not holding      No.
 exposed energized parts.                  conductive objects and remains
                                           outside the minimum approach
                                           distance established by the
                                           employer.
                                          The employee is holding a        Yes.
                                           conductive object, such as a
                                           flashlight, that could fall or
                                           otherwise contact energized
                                           parts (irrespective of whether
                                           the employee maintains the
                                           minimum approach distance).
                                          The employee is closer than the  Yes.
                                           minimum approach distance
                                           established by the employer
                                           (for example, when wearing
                                           rubber insulating gloves or
                                           rubber insulating gloves and
                                           sleeves).
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Using open flames, for example, in wiping cable splice sleeves...........  Yes.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

III. Protection Against Burn Injury

A. Estimating Available Heat Energy

    Calculation methods. Paragraph (g)(2) of Sec.  1926.960 provides 
that, for each employee exposed to an electric-arc hazard, the 
employer must make a reasonable estimate of the heat energy to which 
the employee would be exposed if an arc occurs. Table 2 lists 
various methods of calculating values of available heat energy from 
an electric circuit. The Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration does not endorse any of these specific methods. Each 
method requires the input of various parameters, such as fault 
current, the expected length of the electric arc, the distance from 
the arc to the employee, and the clearing time for the fault (that 
is, the time the circuit protective devices take to open the circuit 
and clear the fault). The employer can precisely determine some of 
these parameters, such as the fault current and the clearing time, 
for a given system. The employer will need to estimate other 
parameters, such as the length of the arc and the distance between 
the arc and the employee, because such parameters vary widely.

  Table 2--Methods of Calculating Incident Heat Energy From an Electric
                                   Arc
------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Standard for Electrical Safety Requirements for Employee Workplaces,
 NFPA 70E-2012, Annex D, ``Sample Calculation of Flash Protection
 Boundary.''
2. Doughty, T.E., Neal, T.E., and Floyd II, H.L., ``Predicting Incident
 Energy to Better Manage the Electric Arc Hazard on 600 V Power
 Distribution Systems,'' Record of Conference Papers IEEE IAS 45th
 Annual Petroleum and Chemical Industry Conference, September 28--30,
 1998.
3. Guide for Performing Arc-Flash Hazard Calculations, IEEE Std 1584-
 2002, 1584a--2004 (Amendment 1 to IEEE Std 1584-2002), and 1584b-2011
 (Amendment 2: Changes to Clause 4 of IEEE Std 1584-2002).*
4. ARCPRO, a commercially available software program developed by
 Kinectrics, Toronto, ON, CA.
*This appendix refers to IEEE Std 1584-2002 with both amendments as IEEE
 Std 1584b-2011.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The amount of heat energy calculated by any of the methods is 
approximatelyinversely proportional to the square of the distance 
between the employee and the arc. In other words, if the employee is 
very close to the arc, the heat energy is very high; but if the 
employee is just a few more centimeters away, the heat energy drops 
substantially. Thus, estimating the distance from the arc to the 
employee is key to protecting employees.
    The employer must select a method of estimating incident heat 
energy that provides a reasonable estimate of incident heat energy 
for the exposure involved. Table 3 shows which methods provide 
reasonable estimates for various exposures.

                                         Table 3--Selecting a Reasonable Incident-Energy Calculation Method \1\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                     600 V and Less \2\            601 V to 15 kV \2\              More than 15 kV
              Incident-energy calculation method               -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                 1[Phi]    3[Phi]a   3[Phi]b   1[Phi]    3[Phi]a   3[Phi]b   1[Phi]    3[Phi]a   3[Phi]b
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NFPA 70E-2012 Annex D (Lee equation)..........................       Y-C        Y         N        Y-C       Y-C        N     N \3\     N \3\     N \3\

[[Page 20738]]

 
Doughty, Neal, and Floyd......................................       Y-C        Y         Y         N         N         N         N         N         N
IEEE Std 1584b-2011...........................................        Y         Y         Y         Y         Y         Y         N         N         N
ARCPRO........................................................        Y         N         N         Y         N         N         Y     Y \4\     Y \4\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Key:
1[Phi]: Single-phase arc in open air
3[Phi]a: Three-phase arc in open air
3[Phi]b: Three-phase arc in an enclosure (box)
Y: Acceptable; produces a reasonable estimate of incident heat energy from this type of electric arc
N: Not acceptable; does not produce a reasonable estimate of incident heat energy from this type of electric arc
Y-C: Acceptable; produces a reasonable, but conservative, estimate of incident heat energy from this type of electric arc.
Notes:\1\ Although the Occupational Safety and Health Administration will consider these methods reasonable for enforcement purposes when employers use
  the methods in accordance with this table, employers should be aware that the listed methods do not necessarily result in estimates that will provide
  full protection from internal faults in transformers and similar equipment or from arcs in underground manholes or vaults.
\2\ At these voltages, the presumption is that the arc is three-phase unless the employer can demonstrate that only one phase is present or that the
  spacing of the phases is sufficient to prevent a multiphase arc from occurring.
\3\ Although the Occupational Safety and Health Administration will consider this method acceptable for purposes of assessing whether incident energy
  exceeds 2.0 cal/cm\2\, the results at voltages of more than 15 kilovolts are extremely conservative and unrealistic.
\4\The Occupational Safety and Health Administration will deem the results of this method reasonable when the employer adjusts them using the conversion
  factors for three-phase arcs in open air or in an enclosure, as indicated in the program's instructions.

    Selecting a reasonable distance from the employee to the arc. In 
estimating available heat energy, the employer must make some 
reasonable assumptions about how far the employee will be from the 
electric arc. Table 4 lists reasonable distances from the employee 
to the electric arc. The distances in Table 4 are consistent with 
national consensus standards, such as the Institute of Electrical 
and Electronic Engineers' National Electrical Safety Code, ANSI/IEEE 
C2-2012, and IEEE Guide for Performing Arc-Flash Hazard 
Calculations, IEEE Std 1584b-2011. The employer is free to use other 
reasonable distances, but must consider equipment enclosure size and 
the working distance to the employee in selecting a distance from 
the employee to the arc. The Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration will consider a distance reasonable when the employer 
bases it on equipment size and working distance.

    Table 4--Selecting a Reasonable Distance from the Employee to the
                              Electric Arc
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   Single-phase arc   Three-phase arc mm
       Class of equipment            mm  (inches)           (inches)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cable...........................  NA*...............            455 (18)
Low voltage MCCs and panelboards  NA................            455 (18)
Low-voltage switchgear..........  NA................            610 (24)
5-kV switchgear.................  NA................            910 (36)
15-kV switchgear................  NA................            910 (36)
Single conductors in air (up to   380 (15)..........                  NA
 46 kilovolts), work with rubber
 insulating gloves.
Single conductors in air, work    MAD-(2xkVx2.54)...                  NA
 with live-line tools and live-   (MAD-(2xkV/10))
 line barehand work.               [dagger].
------------------------------------------------------------------------
* NA = not applicable.
[dagger] The terms in this equation are:
MAD = The applicable minimum approach distance, and
kV = The system voltage in kilovolts.

    Selecting a reasonable arc gap. For a single-phase arc in air, 
the electric arc will almost always occur when an energized 
conductor approaches too close to ground. Thus, an employer can 
determine the arc gap, or arc length, for these exposures by the 
dielectric strength of air and the voltage on the line. The 
dielectric strength of air is approximately 10 kilovolts for every 
25.4 millimeters (1 inch). For example, at 50 kilovolts, the arc gap 
would be 50 / 10 x 25.4 (or 50 x 2.54), which equals 127 millimeters 
(5 inches).
    For three-phase arcs in open air and in enclosures, the arc gap 
will generally be dependent on the spacing between parts energized 
at different electrical potentials. Documents such as IEEE Std 
1584b-2011 provide information on these distances. Employers may 
select a reasonable arc gap from Table 5, or they may select any 
other reasonable arc gap based on sparkover distance or on the 
spacing between (1) live parts at different potentials or (2) live 
parts and grounded parts (for example, bus or conductor spacings in 
equipment). In any event, the employer must use an estimate that 
reasonably resembles the actual exposures faced by the employee.

                                     Table 5--Selecting a Reasonable Arc Gap
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
         Class of equipment             Single-phase arc mm  (inches)        Three-phase arc mm \1\  (inches)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cable..............................  NA \2\.............................  13 (0.5)
Low voltage MCCs and panelboards...  NA.................................  25 (1.0)
Low-voltage switchgear.............  NA.................................  32 (1.25)
5-kV switchgear....................  NA.................................  104 (4.0)
15-kV switchgear...................  NA.................................  152 (6.0)
Single conductors in air, 15 kV and  51 (2.0)...........................  Phase conductor spacings.
 less.

[[Page 20739]]

 
Single conductor in air, more than   Voltage in kV x 2.54...............
 15 kV.
                                     (Voltage in kV x 0.1), but no less   Phase conductor spacings.
                                      than 51 mm (2 inches)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Source: IEEE Std 1584b-2011.
\2\ NA = not applicable.

    Making estimates over multiple system areas. The employer need 
not estimate the heat-energy exposure for every job task performed 
by each employee. Paragraph (g)(2) of Sec.  1926.960 permits the 
employer to make broad estimates that cover multiple system areas 
provided that: (1) The employer uses reasonable assumptions about 
the energy-exposure distribution throughout the system, and (2) the 
estimates represent the maximum exposure for those areas. For 
example, the employer can use the maximum fault current and clearing 
time to cover several system areas at once.
    Incident heat energy for single-phase-to-ground exposures. Table 
6 and Table 7 provide incident heat energy levels for open-air, 
phase-to-ground electric-arc exposures typical for overhead 
systems.\2\ Table 6 presents estimates of available energy for 
employees using rubber insulating gloves to perform work on overhead 
systems operating at 4 to 46 kilovolts. The table assumes that the 
employee will be 380 millimeters (15 inches) from the electric arc, 
which is a reasonable estimate for rubber insulating glove work. 
Table 6 also assumes that the arc length equals the sparkover 
distance for the maximum transient overvoltage of each voltage 
range.\3\ To use the table, an employer would use the voltage, 
maximum fault current, and maximum clearing time for a system area 
and, using the appropriate voltage range and fault-current and 
clearing-time values corresponding to the next higher values listed 
in the table, select the appropriate heat energy (4, 5, 8, or 12 
cal/cm\2\) from the table. For example, an employer might have a 
12,470-volt power line supplying a system area. The power line can 
supply a maximum fault current of 8 kiloamperes with a maximum 
clearing time of 10 cycles. For rubber glove work, this system falls 
in the 4.0-to-15.0-kilovolt range; the next-higher fault current is 
10 kA (the second row in that voltage range); and the clearing time 
is under 18 cycles (the first column to the right of the fault 
current column). Thus, the available heat energy for this part of 
the system will be 4 cal/cm\2\ or less (from the column heading), 
and the employer could select protection with a 5-cal/cm\2\ rating 
to meet Sec.  1926.960(g)(5). Alternatively, an employer could 
select a base incident-energy value and ensure that the clearing 
times for each voltage range and fault current listed in the table 
do not exceed the corresponding clearing time specified in the 
table. For example, an employer that provides employees with arc-
flash protective equipment rated at 8 cal/cm\2\ can use the table to 
determine if any system area exceeds 8 cal/cm\2\ by checking the 
clearing time for the highest fault current for each voltage range 
and ensuring that the clearing times do not exceed the values 
specified in the 8-cal/cm\2\ column in the table.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \2\ The Occupational Safety and Health Administration used 
metric values to calculate the clearing times in Table 6 and Table 
7. An employer may use English units to calculate clearing times 
instead even though the results will differ slightly.
    \3\ The Occupational Safety and Health Administration based this 
assumption, which is more conservative than the arc length specified 
in Table 5, on Table 410-2 of the 2012 NESC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Table 7 presents similar estimates for employees using live-line 
tools to perform work on overhead systems operating at voltages of 4 
to 800 kilovolts. The table assumes that the arc length will be 
equal to the sparkover distance \4\ and that the employee will be a 
distance from the arc equal to the minimum approach distance minus 
twice the sparkover distance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \4\ The dielectric strength of air is about 10 kilovolts for 
every 25.4 millimeters (1 inch). Thus, the employer can estimate the 
arc length in millimeters to be the phase-to-ground voltage in 
kilovolts multiplied by 2.54 (or voltage (in kilovolts) x 2.54).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The employer will need to use other methods for estimating 
available heat energy in situations not addressed by Table 6 or 
Table 7. The calculation methods listed in Table 2 and the guidance 
provided in Table 3 will help employers do this. For example, 
employers can use IEEE Std 1584b-2011 to estimate the available heat 
energy (and to select appropriate protective equipment) for many 
specific conditions, including lower-voltage, phase-to-phase arc, 
and enclosed arc exposures.

Table 6--Incident Heat Energy for Various Fault Currents, Clearing Times, and Voltages of 4.0 to 46.0 kV: Rubber
         Insulating Glove Exposures Involving Phase-to-Ground Arcs in Open Air Only * [dagger] [Dagger]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                  Maximum clearing time (cycles)
      Voltage range (kV) **        Fault current ---------------------------------------------------------------
                                       (kA)         4 cal/cm\2\     5 cal/cm\2\     8 cal/cm\2\    12 cal/cm\2\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
4.0 to 15.0.....................               5              46              58              92             138
                                              10              18              22              36              54
                                              15              10              12              20              30
                                              20               6               8              13              19
15.1 to 25.0....................               5              28              34              55              83
                                              10              11              14              23              34
                                              15               7               8              13              20
                                              20               4               5               9              13
25.1 to 36.0....................               5              21              26              42              62
                                              10               9              11              18              26
                                              15               5               6              10              16
                                              20               4               4               7              11
36.1 to 46.0....................               5              16              20              32              48
                                              10               7               9              14              21
                                              15               4               5               8              13
                                              20               3               4               6               9
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes:
* This table is for open-air, phase-to-ground electric-arc exposures. It is not for phase-to-phase arcs or
  enclosed arcs (arc in a box).

[[Page 20740]]

 
[dagger] The table assumes that the employee will be 380 mm (15 in.) from the electric arc. The table also
  assumes the arc length to be the sparkover distance for the maximum transient overvoltage of each voltage
  range (see Appendix B to this subpart), as follows:
 
4.0 to 15.0 kV 51 mm (2 in.)
15.1 to 25.0 kV 102 mm (4 in.)
25.1 to 36.0 kV 152 mm (6 in.)
36.1 to 46.0 kV 229 mm (9 in.)
 
[Dagger] The Occupational Safety and Health Administration calculated the values in this table using the ARCPRO
  method listed in Table 2.
** The voltage range is the phase-to-phase system voltage.


Table 7--Incident Heat Energy for Various Fault Currents, Clearing Times, and Voltages: Live-Line Tool Exposures
                      Involving Phase-to-Ground Arcs in Open Air Only * [dagger] [Dagger] #
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                  Maximum clearing time (cycles)
      Voltage range (kV) **        Fault current ---------------------------------------------------------------
                                       (kA)         4 cal/cm\2\     5 cal/cm\2\     8 cal/cm\2\    12 cal/cm\2\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
4.0 to 15.0.....................               5             197             246             394             591
                                              10              73              92             147             220
                                              15              39              49              78             117
                                              20              24              31              49              73
15.1 to 25.0....................               5             197             246             394             591
                                              10              75              94             150             225
                                              15              41              51              82             122
                                              20              26              33              52              78
25.1 to 36.0....................               5             138             172             275             413
                                              10              53              66             106             159
                                              15              30              37              59              89
                                              20              19              24              38              58
36.1 to 46.0....................               5             129             161             257             386
                                              10              51              64             102             154
                                              15              29              36              58              87
                                              20              19              24              38              57
46.1 to 72.5....................              20              18              23              36              55
                                              30              10              13              20              30
                                              40               6               8              13              19
                                              50               4               6               9              13
72.6 to 121.0...................              20              10              12              20              30
                                              30               6               7              11              17
                                              40               4               5               7              11
                                              50               3               3               5               8
121.1 to 145.0..................              20              12              15              24              35
                                              30               7               9              15              22
                                              40               5               6              10              15
                                              50               4               5               8              11
145.1 to 169.0..................              20              12              15              24              36
                                              30               7               9              15              22
                                              40               5               7              10              16
                                              50               4               5               8              12
169.1 to 242.0..................              20              13              17              27              40
                                              30               8              10              17              25
                                              40               6               7              12              17
                                              50               4               5               9              13
242.1 to 362.0..................              20              25              32              51              76
                                              30              16              19              31              47
                                              40              11              14              22              33
                                              50               8              10              16              25
362.1 to 420.0..................              20              12              15              25              37
                                              30               8              10              15              23
                                              40               5               7              11              16
                                              50               4               5               8              12
420.1 to 550.0..................              20              23              29              47              70
                                              30              14              18              29              43
                                              40              10              13              20              30
                                              50               8               9              15              23
550.1 to 800.0..................              20              25              31              50              75
                                              30              15              19              31              46
                                              40              11              13              21              32
                                              50               8              10              16              24
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes:
* This table is for open-air, phase-to-ground electric-arc exposures. It is not for phase-to-phase arcs or
  enclosed arcs (arc in a box).
[dagger] The table assumes the arc length to be the sparkover distance for the maximum phase-to-ground voltage
  of each voltage range (see Appendix B to this subpart). The table also assumes that the employee will be the
  minimum approach distance minus twice the arc length from the electric arc.
[Dagger] The Occupational Safety and Health Administration calculated the values in this table using the ARCPRO
  method listed in Table 2.
# For voltages of more than 72.6 kV, employers may use this table only when the minimum approach distance
  established under Sec.   1926.960(c)(1) is greater than or equal to the following values:

[[Page 20741]]

 
72.6 to 121.0 kV 1.02 m
121.1 to 145.0 kV 1.16 m
145.1 to 169.0 kV 1.30 m
169.1 to 242.0 kV 1.72 m
242.1 to 362.0 kV 2.76 m
362.1 to 420.0 kV 2.50 m
420.1 to 550.0 kV 3.62 m
550.1 to 800.0 kV 4.83 m
** The voltage range is the phase-to-phase system voltage.

B. Selecting Protective Clothing and Other Protective Equipment

    Paragraph (g)(5) of Sec.  1926.960 requires employers, in 
certain situations, to select protective clothing and other 
protective equipment with an arc rating that is greater than or 
equal to the incident heat energy estimated under Sec.  
1926.960(g)(2). Based on laboratory testing required by ASTM F1506-
10a, the expectation is that protective clothing with an arc rating 
equal to the estimated incident heat energy will be capable of 
preventing second-degree burn injury to an employee exposed to that 
incident heat energy from an electric arc. Note that actual 
electric-arc exposures may be more or less severe than the estimated 
value because of factors such as arc movement, arc length, arcing 
from reclosing of the system, secondary fires or explosions, and 
weather conditions. Additionally, for arc rating based on the 
fabric's arc thermal performance value \5\ (ATPV), a worker exposed 
to incident energy at the arc rating has a 50-percent chance of just 
barely receiving a second-degree burn. Therefore, it is possible 
(although not likely) that an employee will sustain a second-degree 
(or worse) burn wearing clothing conforming to Sec.  1926.960(g)(5) 
under certain circumstances. However, reasonable employer estimates 
and maintaining appropriate minimum approach distances for employees 
should limit burns to relatively small burns that just barely extend 
beyond the epidermis (that is, just barely a second-degree burn). 
Consequently, protective clothing and other protective equipment 
meeting Sec.  1926.960(g)(5) will provide an appropriate degree of 
protection for an employee exposed to electric-arc hazards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \5\ ASTM F1506-10a defines ``arc thermal performance value'' as 
``the incident energy on a material or a multilayer system of 
materials that results in a 50% probability that sufficient heat 
transfer through the tested specimen is predicted to cause the onset 
of a second-degree skin burn injury based on the Stoll [footnote] 
curve, cal/cm\2\.'' The footnote to this definition reads: ``Derived 
from: Stoll, A.M., and Chianta, M.A., `Method and Rating System for 
Evaluations of Thermal Protection,' Aerospace Medicine, Vol 40, 
1969, pp. 1232-1238 and Stoll A.M., and Chianta, M.A., `Heat 
Transfer through Fabrics as Related to Thermal Injury,' 
Transactions--New York Academy of Sciences, Vol 33(7), Nov. 1971, 
pp. 649-670.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Paragraph (g)(5) of Sec.  1926.960 does not require arc-rated 
protection for exposures of 2 cal/cm\2\ or less. Untreated cotton 
clothing will reduce a 2-cal/cm\2\ exposure below the 1.2- to 1.5-
cal/cm\2\ level necessary to cause burn injury, and this material 
should not ignite at such low heat energy levels. Although Sec.  
1926.960(g)(5) does not require clothing to have an arc rating when 
exposures are 2 cal/cm\2\ or less, Sec.  1926.960(g)(4) requires the 
outer layer of clothing to be flame resistant under certain 
conditions, even when the estimated incident heat energy is less 
than 2 cal/cm\2\, as discussed later in this appendix. Additionally, 
it is especially important to ensure that employees do not wear 
undergarments made from fabrics listed in the note to Sec.  
1926.960(g)(3) even when the outer layer is flame resistant or arc 
rated. These fabrics can melt or ignite easily when an electric arc 
occurs. Logos and name tags made from non-flame-resistant material 
can adversely affect the arc rating or the flame-resistant 
characteristics of arc-rated or flame-resistant clothing. Such logos 
and name tags may violate Sec.  1926.960(g)(3), (g)(4), or (g)(5).
    Paragraph (g)(5) of Sec.  1926.960 requires that arc-rated 
protection cover the employee's entire body, with limited exceptions 
for the employee's hands, feet, face, and head. Paragraph (g)(5)(i) 
of Sec.  1926.960 provides that arc-rated protection is not 
necessary for the employee's hands under the following conditions:

For any estimated incident      When the employee is wearing rubber
 heat energy.                    insulating gloves with protectors
If the estimated incident heat  When the employee is wearing heavy-duty
 energy does not exceed 14 cal/  leather work gloves with a weight of at
 cm\2\.                          least 407 gm/m\2\ (12 oz/yd\2\)
 

    Paragraph (g)(5)(ii) of Sec.  1926.960 provides that arc-rated 
protection is not necessary for the employee's feet when the 
employee is wearing heavy-duty work shoes or boots. Finally, Sec.  
1926.960(g)(5)(iii), (g)(5)(iv), and (g)(5)(v) require arc-rated 
head and face protection as follows:

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                          Minimum head and face protection
                                  ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                         Arc-rated faceshield
             Exposure                                       with a minimum     Arc-rated hood or faceshield with
                                          None *           rating of 8 cal/                 balaclava
                                                                cm\2\ *
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Single-phase, open air...........  2-8 cal/cm\2\.......  9-12 cal/cm\2\......  13 cal/\2\ or higher.[dagger]
Three-phase......................  2-4 cal/cm\2\.......  5-8 cal/cm\2\.......  9 cal/cm\2\ or higher.[Dagger]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* These ranges assume that employees are wearing hardhats meeting the specifications in Sec.   1910.135 or Sec.
   1926.100(b)(2), as applicable.
[dagger] The arc rating must be a minimum of 4 cal/cm\2\ less than the estimated incident energy. Note that Sec.
    1926.960(g)(5)(v) permits this type of head and face protection, with a minimum arc rating of 4 cal/cm\2\
  less than the estimated incident energy, at any incident energy level.
[Dagger] Note that Sec.   1926.960(g)(5) permits this type of head and face protection at any incident energy
  level.

IV. Protection Against Ignition

    Paragraph (g)(3) of Sec.  1926.960 prohibits clothing that could 
melt onto an employee's skin or that could ignite and continue to 
burn when exposed to flames or to the available heat energy 
estimated by the employer under Sec.  1926.960(g)(2). Meltable 
fabrics, such as acetate, nylon, polyester, and polypropylene, even 
in blends, must be avoided. When these fibers melt, they can adhere 
to the skin, thereby transferring heat rapidly, exacerbating burns, 
and complicating treatment. These outcomes can result even if the 
meltable fabric is not directly next to the skin. The remainder of 
this section focuses on the prevention of ignition.
    Paragraph (g)(5) of Sec.  1926.960 generally requires protective 
clothing and other protective equipment with an arc rating greater 
than or equal to the employer's estimate of available heat energy. 
As explained earlier in this appendix, untreated cotton is usually 
acceptable for exposures of 2 cal/cm\2\ or less.\6\ If the exposure 
is greater than that, the employee generally must wear

[[Page 20742]]

flame-resistant clothing with a suitable arc rating in accordance 
with Sec.  1926.960(g)(4) and (g)(5). However, even if an employee 
is wearing a layer of flame-resistant clothing, there are 
circumstances under which flammable layers of clothing would be 
uncovered, and an electric arc could ignite them. For example, 
clothing ignition is possible if the employee is wearing flammable 
clothing under the flame-resistant clothing and the underlayer is 
uncovered because of an opening in the flame-resistant clothing. 
Thus, for purposes of Sec.  1926.960(g)(3), it is important for the 
employer to consider the possibility of clothing ignition even when 
an employee is wearing flame-resistant clothing with a suitable arc 
rating.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \6\ See Sec.  1926.960(g)(4)(i), (g)(4)(ii), and (g)(4)(iii) for 
conditions under which employees must wear flame-resistant clothing 
as the outer layer of clothing even when the incident heat energy 
does not exceed 2 cal/cm\2\.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under Sec.  1926.960(g)(3), employees may not wear flammable 
clothing in conjunction with flame-resistant clothing if the 
flammable clothing poses an ignition hazard.\7\ Although outer 
flame-resistant layers may not have openings that expose flammable 
inner layers, when an outer flame-resistant layer would be unable to 
resist breakopen,\8\ the next (inner) layer must be flame-resistant 
if it could ignite.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \7\ Paragraph (g)(3) of Sec.  1926.960 prohibits clothing that 
could ignite and continue to burn when exposed to the heat energy 
estimated under paragraph (g)(2) of that section.
    \8\ Breakopen occurs when a hole, tear, or crack develops in the 
exposed fabric such that the fabric no longer effectively blocks 
incident heat energy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Non-flame-resistant clothing can ignite even when the heat 
energy from an electric arc is insufficient to ignite the clothing. 
For example, nearby flames can ignite an employee's clothing; and, 
even in the absence of flames, electric arcs pose ignition hazards 
beyond the hazard of ignition from incident energy under certain 
conditions. In addition to requiring flame-resistant clothing when 
the estimated incident energy exceeds 2.0 cal/cm\2\, Sec.  
1926.960(g)(4) requires flame-resistant clothing when: The employee 
is exposed to contact with energized circuit parts operating at more 
than 600 volts (Sec.  1926.960(g)(4)(i)), an electric arc could 
ignite flammable material in the work area that, in turn, could 
ignite the employee's clothing (Sec.  1926.960(g)(4)(ii)), and 
molten metal or electric arcs from faulted conductors in the work 
area could ignite the employee's clothing (Sec.  
1926.960(g)(4)(iii)). For example, grounding conductors can become a 
source of heat energy if they cannot carry fault current without 
failure. The employer must consider these possible sources of 
electric arcs \9\ in determining whether the employee's clothing 
could ignite under Sec.  1926.960(g)(4)(iii).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \9\ Static wires and pole grounds are examples of grounding 
conductors that might not be capable of carrying fault current 
without failure. Grounds that can carry the maximum available fault 
current are not a concern, and employers need not consider such 
grounds a possible electric arc source.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Appendix F to Subpart V of Part 1926--Work-Positioning Equipment 
Inspection Guidelines

I. Body Belts

    Inspect body belts to ensure that:
    A. The hardware has no cracks, nicks, distortion, or corrosion;
    B. No loose or worn rivets are present;
    C. The waist strap has no loose grommets;
    D. The fastening straps are not 100-percent leather; and
    E. No worn materials that could affect the safety of the user 
are present.

II. Positioning Straps

    Inspect positioning straps to ensure that:
    A. The warning center of the strap material is not exposed;
    B. No cuts, burns, extra holes, or fraying of strap material is 
present;
    C. Rivets are properly secured;
    D. Straps are not 100-percent leather; and
    E. Snaphooks do not have cracks, burns, or corrosion.

III. Climbers

    Inspect pole and tree climbers to ensure that:
    A. Gaffs are at least as long as the manufacturer's recommended 
minimums (generally 32 and 51 millimeters (1.25 and 2.0 inches) for 
pole and tree climbers, respectively, measured on the underside of 
the gaff);

    Note: Gauges are available to assist in determining whether 
gaffs are long enough and shaped to easily penetrate poles or trees.

    B. Gaffs and leg irons are not fractured or cracked;
    C. Stirrups and leg irons are free of excessive wear;
    D. Gaffs are not loose;
    E. Gaffs are free of deformation that could adversely affect 
use;
    F. Gaffs are properly sharpened; and
    G. There are no broken straps or buckles.

Appendix G to Subpart V of Part 1926--Reference Documents

    The references contained in this appendix provide information 
that can be helpful in understanding and complying with the 
requirements contained in Subpart V of this part. The national 
consensus standards referenced in this appendix contain detailed 
specifications that employers may follow in complying with the more 
performance-based requirements of Subpart V of this part. Except as 
specifically noted in Subpart V of this part, however, the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration will not necessarily 
deem compliance with the national consensus standards to be 
compliance with the provisions of Subpart V of this part.
ANSI/SIA A92.2-2009, American National Standard for Vehicle-Mounted 
Elevating and Rotating Aerial Devices.
ANSI Z133-2012, American National Standard Safety Requirements for 
Arboricultural Operations--Pruning, Trimming, Repairing, 
Maintaining, and Removing Trees, and Cutting Brush.
ANSI/IEEE Std 935-1989, IEEE Guide on Terminology for Tools and 
Equipment to Be Used in Live Line Working.
ASME B20.1-2012, Safety Standard for Conveyors and Related 
Equipment.
ASTM D120-09, Standard Specification for Rubber Insulating Gloves.
ASTM D149-09 (2013), Standard Test Method for Dielectric Breakdown 
Voltage and Dielectric Strength of Solid Electrical Insulating 
Materials at Commercial Power Frequencies.
ASTM D178-01 (2010), Standard Specification for Rubber Insulating 
Matting.
ASTM D1048-12, Standard Specification for Rubber Insulating 
Blankets.
ASTM D1049-98 (2010), Standard Specification for Rubber Insulating 
Covers.
ASTM D1050-05 (2011), Standard Specification for Rubber Insulating 
Line Hose.
ASTM D1051-08, Standard Specification for Rubber Insulating Sleeves.
ASTM F478-09, Standard Specification for In-Service Care of 
Insulating Line Hose and Covers.
ASTM F479-06 (2011), Standard Specification for In-Service Care of 
Insulating Blankets.
ASTM F496-08, Standard Specification for In-Service Care of 
Insulating Gloves and Sleeves.
ASTM F711-02 (2007), Standard Specification for Fiberglass-
Reinforced Plastic (FRP) Rod and Tube Used in Live Line Tools.
ASTM F712-06 (2011), Standard Test Methods and Specifications for 
Electrically Insulating Plastic Guard Equipment for Protection of 
Workers.
ASTM F819-10, Standard Terminology Relating to Electrical Protective 
Equipment for Workers.
ASTM F855-09, Standard Specifications for Temporary Protective 
Grounds to Be Used on De-energized Electric Power Lines and 
Equipment.
ASTM F887-12\e1\, Standard Specifications for Personal Climbing 
Equipment.
ASTM F914/F914M-10, Standard Test Method for Acoustic Emission for 
Aerial Personnel Devices Without Supplemental Load Handling 
Attachments.
ASTM F1116-03 (2008), Standard Test Method for Determining 
Dielectric Strength of Dielectric Footwear.
ASTM F1117-03 (2008), Standard Specification for Dielectric 
Footwear.
ASTM F1236-96 (2012), Standard Guide for Visual Inspection of 
Electrical Protective Rubber Products.
ASTM F1430/F1430M-10, Standard Test Method for Acoustic Emission 
Testing of Insulated and Non-Insulated Aerial Personnel Devices with 
Supplemental Load Handling Attachments.
ASTM F1505-10, Standard Specification for Insulated and Insulating 
Hand Tools.
ASTM F1506-10a, Standard Performance Specification for Flame 
Resistant and Arc Rated Textile Materials for Wearing Apparel for 
Use by Electrical Workers Exposed to Momentary Electric Arc and 
Related Thermal Hazards.
ASTM F1564-13, Standard Specification for Structure-Mounted 
Insulating Work Platforms for Electrical Workers.
ASTM F1701-12, Standard Specification for Unused Polypropylene Rope 
with Special Electrical Properties.
ASTM F1742-03 (2011), Standard Specification for PVC Insulating 
Sheeting.

[[Page 20743]]

ASTM F1796-09, Standard Specification for High Voltage Detectors--
Part 1 Capacitive Type to be Used for Voltages Exceeding 600 Volts 
AC.
ASTM F1797-09 [egr] \1\, Standard Test Method for Acoustic Emission 
Testing of Insulated and Non-Insulated Digger Derricks.
ASTM F1825-03 (2007), Standard Specification for Clampstick Type 
Live Line Tools.
ASTM F1826-00 (2011), Standard Specification for Live Line and 
Measuring Telescoping Tools.
ASTM F1891-12, Standard Specification for Arc and Flame Resistant 
Rainwear.
ASTM F1958/F1958M-12, Standard Test Method for Determining the 
Ignitability of Non-flame-Resistant Materials for Clothing by 
Electric Arc Exposure Method Using Mannequins.
ASTM F1959/F1959M-12, Standard Test Method for Determining the Arc 
Rating of Materials for Clothing.
IEEE Stds 4-1995, 4a-2001 (Amendment to IEEE Standard Techniques for 
High-Voltage Testing), IEEE Standard Techniques for High-Voltage 
Testing.
IEEE Std 62-1995, IEEE Guide for Diagnostic Field Testing of 
Electric Power Apparatus--Part 1: Oil Filled Power Transformers, 
Regulators, and Reactors.
IEEE Std 80-2000, Guide for Safety in AC Substation Grounding.
IEEE Std 100-2000, The Authoritative Dictionary of IEEE Standards 
Terms Seventh Edition.
IEEE Std 516-2009, IEEE Guide for Maintenance Methods on Energized 
Power Lines.
IEEE Std 524-2003, IEEE Guide to the Installation of Overhead 
Transmission Line Conductors.
IEEE Std 957-2005, IEEE Guide for Cleaning Insulators.
IEEE Std 1048-2003, IEEE Guide for Protective Grounding of Power 
Lines.
IEEE Std 1067-2005, IEEE Guide for In-Service Use, Care, 
Maintenance, and Testing of Conductive Clothing for Use on Voltages 
up to 765 kV AC and 750 kV DC.
IEEE Std 1307-2004, IEEE Standard for Fall Protection for Utility 
Work.
IEEE Stds 1584-2002, 1584a-2004 (Amendment 1 to IEEE Std 1584-2002), 
and 1584b-2011 (Amendment 2: Changes to Clause 4 of IEEE Std 1584-
2002), IEEE Guide for Performing Arc-Flash Hazard Calculations.
IEEE C2-2012, National Electrical Safety Code.
NFPA 70E-2012, Standard for Electrical Safety in the Workplace.

Subpart X--Stairways and Ladders

0
18. Revise the authority citation for Subpart X of part 1926 to read as 
follows:

    Authority: 40 U.S.C. 3701 et seq.; 29 U.S.C. 653, 655, 657; 
Secretary of Labor's Order No. 1-90 (55 FR 9033), 5-2007 (72 FR 
31159), or 1-2012 (77 FR 3912), as applicable; and 29 CFR Part 1911.


0
19. Revise Sec.  1926.1053(b)(12) to read as follows:


Sec.  1926.1053  Ladders.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (12) Ladders shall have nonconductive siderails if they are used 
where the employee or the ladder could contact exposed energized 
electrical equipment, except as provided in Sec.  1926.955(b) and (c) 
of this part.

Subpart CC--Cranes and Derricks in Construction

0
20. Revise the authority citation for Subpart CC of Part 1926 to read 
as follows:

    Authority: 40 U.S.C. 3701 et seq.; 29 U.S.C. 653, 655, 657; 
Secretary of Labor's Order No. 5-2007 (72 FR 31159) or 1-2012 (77 FR 
3912), as applicable; and 29 CFR Part 1911.


0
21. Revise paragraph (g) of Sec.  1926.1400 to read as follows:


Sec.  1926.1400  Scope.

* * * * *
    (g) For work covered by Subpart V of this part, compliance with 
Sec.  1926.959 is deemed compliance with Sec. Sec.  1926.1407 through 
1926.1411.
* * * * *
0
22. In Sec.  1926.1410, remove and reserve paragraph (d)(4)(iii) and 
revise paragraphs (c)(2) and (d)(4)(ii) to read as follows:


Sec.  1926.1410  Power line safety (all voltages)--equipment operations 
closer than the Table A zone.

* * * * *
    (c) * * *
    (2) Paragraph (c)(1) of this section does not apply to work covered 
by Subpart V of this part; instead, for such work, the minimum approach 
distances established by the employer under Sec.  1926.960(c)(1)(i) 
apply.
* * * * *
    (d) * * *
    (4) * * *
    (ii) Paragraph (d)(4)(i) of this section does not apply to work 
covered by Subpart V of this part.
    (iii) [Removed and Reserved]
* * * * *
[FR Doc. 2013-29579 Filed 4-1-14; 11:15 am]
BILLING CODE 4510-26-P