Financial Responsibility Rules for Broker-Dealers, 51823-51907 [2013-18734]

Download as PDF Vol. 78 Wednesday, No. 162 August 21, 2013 Part II Securities and Exchange Commission emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with RULES2 17 CFR Part 240 Financial Responsibility Rules for Broker-Dealers; Final Rule VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:54 Aug 20, 2013 Jkt 229001 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 4717 Sfmt 4717 E:\FR\FM\21AUR2.SGM 21AUR2 51824 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 162 / Wednesday, August 21, 2013 / Rules and Regulations SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 17 CFR Part 240 [Release No. 34–70072; File No. S7–08–07] RIN 3235–AJ85 Financial Responsibility Rules for Broker-Dealers Securities and Exchange Commission. ACTION: Final rule. AGENCY: The Securities and Exchange Commission (‘‘Commission’’) is adopting amendments to the net capital, customer protection, books and records, and notification rules for broker-dealers promulgated under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (‘‘Exchange Act’’). These amendments are designed to address several areas of concern regarding the financial responsibility requirements for broker-dealers. The amendments also update certain financial responsibility requirements and make certain technical amendments. SUMMARY: DATES: Effective Date: October 21, 2013. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Michael A. Macchiaroli, Associate Director, at (202) 551–5525; Thomas K. McGowan, Deputy Associate Director, at (202) 551–5521; Randall Roy, Assistant Director, at (202) 551–5522; Raymond Lombardo, Branch Chief, at (202) 551– 5755; Sheila Dombal Swartz, Special Counsel, (202) 551–5545; Carrie A. O’Brien, Special Counsel, (202) 551– 5640; or Kimberly N. Chehardy, Attorney Advisor, (202) 551–5791; Division of Trading and Markets, Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE., Washington, DC 20549–7010. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with RULES2 Table of Contents I. Background II. Amendments A. Amendments to the Customer Protection Rule 1. Background 2. Proprietary Accounts of Broker-Dealers i. Definition of ‘‘PAB Account’’ under Rule 15c3–3(a)(16) ii. Written Permission To Use PAB Account Securities iii. PAB Reserve Bank Accounts iv. Other PAB Issues Raised by Commenters v. Amendment to Rule 15c3–1(c)(2)(iv)(E) Related to PAB Accounts 3. Banks Where Special Reserve Deposits May Be Held 4. Allocation of Customers’ Fully Paid and Excess Margin Securities to Short Positions VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:54 Aug 20, 2013 Jkt 229001 5. Importation of Rule 15c3–2 Requirements Into Rule 15c3–3 and Treatment of Free Credit Balances i. Importation of Rule 15c3–2 ii. Treatment of Free Credit Balances a. Treatment of Free Credit Balances Outside of a Sweep Program b. Treatment of Free Credit Balances in a Sweep Program 6. ‘‘Proprietary Accounts’’ Under the Commodity Exchange Act 7. Expansion of the Definition of ‘‘Qualified Securities’’ To Include Certain Money Market Funds B. Holding Futures Positions in a Securities Portfolio Margin Account C. Amendments With Respect to Securities Lending and Borrowing and Repurchase/ Reverse Repurchase Transactions D. Documentation of Risk Management Procedures E. Amendments to the Net Capital Rule 1. Requirement To Deduct From Net Worth Certain Liabilities or Expenses Assumed by Third Parties 2. Requirement To Subtract From Net Worth Certain Non-Permanent Capital Contributions 3. Requirement To Deduct the Amount by Which a Fidelity Bond Deductible Exceeds SRO Limits 4. Broker-Dealer Solvency Requirement 5. Amendment to Rule Governing Orders Restricting Withdrawal of Capital From a Broker-Dealer 6. Adjusted Net Capital Requirements i. Amendment to Appendix A of Rule 15c3–1 ii. Money Market Funds a. Clarification b. Proposed Haircut Reduction From 2% to 1% c. Aggregate Debit Items Charge F. Technical Amendments III. Responses to Specific Requests for Comment IV. Paperwork Reduction Act A. Summary of the Collection of Information Requirements B. Use of Information C. Respondents D. Total Annual Reporting and Recordkeeping Burden 1. Securities Lending Agreements and Disclosures 2. DEA Permission To Withdraw Capital Within One Year of Contribution 3. Written Subordination Agreements Under Rule 15c3–3 4. PAB Reserve Bank Account Recordkeeping Requirements 5. Adequate Procedures Required Under Paragraph (j)(1) of Rule 15c3–3 6. Treatment of Free Credit Balances 7. Documentation of Risk Management Procedures 8. Notice Requirements E. Collection of Information Is Mandatory F. Confidentiality G. Record Retention Period V. Economic Analysis A. Introduction B. Economic Baseline C. Discussion of General Comments Received D. Economic Analysis of the Amendments and Alternatives PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 1. Amendments to the Customer Protection Rule i. Economic Analysis a. Proprietary Accounts of Broker-Dealers (I). Summary of Amendments (II). Baseline and Incremental Economic Effects (III). Alternatives (IV). Compliance Cost Estimates b. Banks Where Special Reserve Deposits May Be Held (I). Summary of Amendments (II). Baseline and Incremental Economic Effects (III). Alternatives (IV). Compliance Cost Estimates c. Allocation of Customers’ Fully Paid and Excess Margin Securities to Short Positions d. Importation of Rule 15c3–2 Requirements Into Rule 15c3–3 e. Treatment of Free Credit Balances (I). Summary of Amendments (II). Baseline and Incremental Economic Effects (III). Alternatives (IV). Compliance Cost Estimates f. ‘‘Proprietary Accounts’’ Under the Commodity Exchange Act ii. Consideration of Burden on Competition, and Promotion of Efficiency, Competition, and Capital Formation 2. Holding Futures Positions in a Securities Portfolio Margining Account i. Economic Analysis ii. Consideration of Burden on Competition, and Promotion of Efficiency, Competition, and Capital Formation 3. Amendments With Respect to Securities Lending and Borrowing and Repurchase/ Reverse Repurchase Transactions i. Economic Analysis ii. Consideration of Burden on Competition, and Promotion of Efficiency, Competition, and Capital Formation 4. Documentation of Risk Management Procedures i. Economic Analysis ii. Consideration of Burden on Competition, and Promotion of Efficiency, Competition, and Capital Formation 5. Amendments to the Net Capital Rule i. Economic Analysis a. Requirement To Deduct From Net Worth Certain Liabilities or Expenses Assumed By Third Parties (I). Summary of Amendments (II). Baseline and Incremental Economic Effects (III). Alternatives b. Requirement To Subtract From Net Worth Certain Non-Permanent Capital Contributions (I). Summary of Amendments (II). Baseline and Incremental Economic Effects (III). Alternatives c. Requirement To Deduct the Amount by Which a Fidelity Bond Exceeds SRO Limits d. Broker-Dealer Solvency Requirement e. Amendment to Rule Governing Restrictions of Withdrawals of Capital E:\FR\FM\21AUR2.SGM 21AUR2 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 162 / Wednesday, August 21, 2013 / Rules and Regulations f. Amendment to Rule 15c3–1 Appendix A ii. Consideration of Burden on Competition, and Promotion of Efficiency, Competition, and Capital Formation VI. Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis A. General Issues Raised by Public Comments B. Amendments to the Customer Protection Rule 1. Need for and Objectives of the Rule Amendments 2. Significant Issues Raised by Public Comment 3. Small Entities Subject to the Rules 4. Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other Compliance Requirements 5. Agency Action To Minimize Effect on Small Entities D. Securities Lending and Borrowing and Repurchase/Reverse Repurchase Transactions 1. Need for and Objectives of the Amendments 2. Significant Issues Raised by the Public Comments 3. Small Entities Subject to the Rule 4. Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other Compliance Requirements 5. Agency Action To Minimize Effect on Small Entities E. Documentation of Risk Management Procedures 1. Need for and Objectives of the Amendments 2. Significant Issues Raised by Public Comments 3. Small Entities Subject to the Rule 4. Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other Compliance Requirements 5. Agency Action To Minimize Effect on Small Entities F. Amendments to the Net Capital Rule 1. Need for and Objectives of the Amendments 2. Significant Issues Raised by Public Comments 3. Small Entities Subject to the Rule 4. Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other Compliance Requirements 5. Agency Action to Minimize Effect on Small Entities VII. Statutory Authority I. Background The Commission is adopting amendments to the broker-dealer net capital rule (Rule 15c3–1),1 customer protection rule (Rule 15c3–3),2 books and records rules (Rules 17a–3 and 17a– 4), and notification rule (Rule 17a–11).3 The Commission proposed these rule changes on March 9, 2007.4 The 1 17 CFR 240.15c3–1. CFR 240.15c3–3. 3 17 CFR 240.17a–3; 17 CFR 240.17a–4; and 17 CFR 240.17a–11. 4 See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules for Broker-Dealers, Exchange Act Release No. 55431 (Mar. 9, 2007), 72 FR 12862 (Mar. 19, 2007) (‘‘Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules’’). As part of this release, the Commission also requested comment on three additional matters: reducing the Rule 17a–11 (17 CFR 240.17a–11) early warning level for broker-dealers that carry emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with RULES2 2 17 Commission re-opened the public comment period on May 3, 2012.5 The Commission received a total of 97 comment letters on the proposed amendments.6 Sixty comment letters over $10 billion in debits; harmonization of the net capital deductions required by paragraph (c)(2)(iv)(B) of Rule 15c3–1 for securities lending and borrowing transactions with the deductions required under paragraph (c)(2)(iv)(F) for securities repurchase and reverse repurchase agreement transactions (17 CFR 240 240.15c3–1(c)(2)(iv)(B) and (c)(2)(iv)(F), respectively); and accounting for third-party liens on customer securities held at a broker-dealer. As discussed below in section III. of this release, the Commission received comments in response to these requests but has determined to defer consideration of actions with respect to these specific matters at this time. 5 Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules for Broker-Dealers, Exchange Act Release No. 66910 (May 3, 2012), 77 FR 27150 (May 9, 2012). 6 Comments on the amendments are available at https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-08-07/ s70807.shtml. See also letter dated April 22, 2007 from Peter G. Crane, President, Crane Data LLC (‘‘Crane Data Letter’’); letter dated April 22, 2007 from David Michael Bishop (‘‘Bishop Letter’’); letter dated April 27, 2007 from Ted Beer, Broker/Dealer Principal (‘‘Beer Letter’’); letter dated April 28, 2007 from Ted Beer, Broker/Dealer Principal (‘‘Beer 2 Letter’’); letter dated April 29, 2007 from R.A. Lowenstein, FinOps Compliance Consultant (‘‘Lowenstein Letter’’); letter dated April 29, 2007 from G. Kirk Ellis (‘‘Ellis Letter’’); letter dated May 1, 2007 from Stuart J. Kaswell and David J. Harris, Dechert LLP on behalf of Federated Investors (‘‘Federated Letter’’); letter dated May 2, 2007 from Daniel R. Levene, President, small NASD brokerdealer (‘‘Levene Letter’’); letter dated May 4, 2007 from Gerard J. Quinn, Vice President and Associate General Counsel, SIFMA (‘‘SIFMA Letter’’); letter dated May 7, 2007 from Michael Bell, President and CEO, Curian Clearing, LLC (‘‘Curian Clearing Letter’’); letter dated May 10, 2007 from Richard B. Franz II, Senior Vice-President, Treasurer and Chief Financial Officer, Raymond James & Associates (‘‘Raymond James Letter’’); letter dated May 16, 2007 from Steven R. Gerbel, Chicago Capital Management LP (‘‘Chicago Capital Letter’’); letter dated May 17, 2007 from Jeffrey L. Kiss, Principal, PackerKiss Securities, Inc. (‘‘PackerKiss Letter’’); letter dated May 17, 2007 from Josephine Wang, General Counsel, SIPC (‘‘SIPC Letter’’); letter dated May 18, 2007 from Kimberly Taylor, Managing Director and Clearing House President, Chicago Mercantile Exchange Inc. (‘‘CME Letter’’); letter dated May 18, 2007 from Diane V. Esheleman, Executive Vice President, JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (‘‘JP Morgan Letter’’); letter dated May 21, 2007 from Faith Colish, Carter Ledyard Milburn LLP (‘‘Colish Letter’’); letter dated May 23, 2007 from Charles R. Manzoni, Jr., General Counsel, FAF Advisors, Inc. (‘‘FAF Advisors Letter’’); letter dated May 27, 2007 from Joyce Glenn (‘‘Glenn Letter’’); letter dated May 28, 2007 from William Bare (‘‘Bare Letter’’); letter dated May 29, 2007 from Robert Keenan, CEO, St. Bernard Financial Services, Inc. (‘‘St. Bernard Financial Services Letter’’); letter dated May 31, 2007 from John C. Melton, Sr., Executive Vice President, Coastal Securities (‘‘Coastal Letter’’); letter dated June 3, 2007 from Anonymous (‘‘Anonymous Letter’’); letter dated June 5, 2007 from Kelly S. McEntire, Executor, Retired State Administrator/Executor of Janus Capital Investments (‘‘McEntire Letter’’); letter dated June 13, 2007 from Bruce Bent, Chairman, The Reserve (‘‘Reserve Letter’’); letter dated June 14, 2007 from Amal El Said, Accounting and Regulatory, Abbey National (‘‘Abbey National Letter’’); letter dated June 14, 2007 from Frank A. Perrone, Senior Vice President, Brown Brothers Harriman & Co. (‘‘Brown Brothers Harriman 51825 Letter’’); letter dated June 15, 2007 from James J. Angel, Ph.D., CFA, Associate Professor of Finance, McDonough School of Business, Georgetown University (‘‘Angel Letter’’); letter dated June 15, 2007 from Matthew M. Hughey, Chief Financial Officer, First Clearing, LLC (‘‘First Clearing Letter’’); letter dated June 15, 2007 from Marshall J. Levinson, Senior Managing Director, Bear, Stearns & Co. Inc., Chair, SIFMA Capital Committee (‘‘SIFMA 2 Letter’’); letter dated June 15, 2007 from Christopher Williams, Director and Senior Counsel, and Barbara Brooks, Principal Financial Officer, Dresdner Kleinwort (‘‘Dresdner Kleinwort Letter’’); letter dated June 18, 2007 from Michael Dworkin (‘‘Dworkin Letter’’); letter dated June 18, 2007 from Keith Weller, Executive Director and Senior Associate General Counsel, UBS Global Asset Management (Americas) Inc. (‘‘UBS Letter’’); letter dated June 18, 2007 from Marcelo Riffaud, Managing Director, Legal Department, Deutsche Bank Securities Inc. (‘‘Deutsche Bank Securities Letter’’); letter dated June 18, 2007 from Jill Gross and Rahat Sarmast, Pace Investor Rights Project (‘‘Pace Letter’’); letter dated June 18, 2007 from Robert E. Putney, III, Director and Senior Counsel, BlackRock, Inc. (‘‘BlackRock Letter’’); letter dated June 18, 2007 from James S. Keller, Chief Regulatory, the PNC Financial Services Group, Inc. (‘‘PNC Letter’’); letter dated June 18, 2007 from Sarah A. Miller, General Counsel, American ABA Securities Association (‘‘ABASA Letter’’); letter dated June 18, 2007 from David Hirschmann, Executive Vice President, National Chamber Foundation of U.S. Chamber of Commerce (‘‘National Chamber Foundation Letter’’); letter dated June 18, 2007 from Michael W. Fields, Chief Fixed Income Officers, American Beacon Advisors (‘‘American Beacon Letter’’); letter dated June 18, 2007 from David Lonergan, Head of U.S. Cash Management, Barclays Global Investors (‘‘Barclays Letter’’); letter dated June 18, 2007 from Howard Spindel, Senior Managing Directors, Integrated Management Solutions (‘‘Integrated Management Letter’’); letter dated June 18, 2007 from Jane G. Heinrichs, Associate Counsel, Investment Company Institute (‘‘ICI Letter’’); letter dated June 18, 2007 from Jeffrey P. Neubert, CEO, Clearinghouse Association L.L.C. (‘‘Clearing House Letter’’); letter dated June 19, 2007 from James T. McHale, Associate General Counsel, E*Trade Brokerage Holdings, Inc. (‘‘E*Trade Letter’’); letter dated June 25, 2007 from Cliff Verron, Managing Director, Deputy Chief Financial Officers and John Ramsay, Managing Director, Deputy General Counsel, Citigroup Global Markets Inc. (‘‘Citigroup Letter’’); letter dated June 25, 2007 from AMEX, CBOE, ISE, OCC, and NYSE/ARCA (‘‘AMEX Letter’’); letter dated July 3, 2007 from Keith F. Higgins, Chair, Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities, American Bar Association (‘‘American Bar Association Letter’’); letter dated July 23, 2007 from Charles S. Morrison, Senior Vice President and Money Market Group Leader, Fidelity Management & Research Company, and John Valenti, Vice President, National Financial Securities LLC (‘‘Fidelity/NFS Letter’’); letter dated August 6, 2007 from Stuart Kaswell, Dechert LLP, on behalf of Federated Investors, Inc. (‘‘Federated 2 Letter’’); letter dated October 9, 2007 from Stuart Kaswell, Dechert LLP on behalf of Federated Investors, Inc. (‘‘Federated 3 Letter’’); letter dated November 16, 2007 from Marshall J. Levinson, Chair, Capital Committee, SIFMA (‘‘SIFMA 3 Letter’’); letter dated January 7, 2008 from Stuart J. Kaswell, Dechert LLP, on behalf of Federated Investors, Inc. (‘‘Federated 4 Letter’’); letter dated August 7, 2008 from Stuart J. Kaswell, Bryan Cave LLP, on behalf of Federated Investors, Inc. (‘‘Federated 5 Letter’’); letter dated November 10, 2008 from Lee A. Pickard, Pickard & Djinis LLP on behalf of Federated Investors (‘‘Federated 6 Letter’’); letter dated November 25, 2008 from Lee A. Pickard, Pickard & Djinis LLP on behalf of Federated Investors (‘‘Federated 7 Letter’’); Continued VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:54 Aug 20, 2013 Jkt 229001 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 E:\FR\FM\21AUR2.SGM 21AUR2 51826 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 162 / Wednesday, August 21, 2013 / Rules and Regulations emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with RULES2 were received prior to the re-opening of the comment period, and 37 were received after it. The Commission carefully considered all of the comment letter dated December 18, 2008 from Lee A. Pickard, Pickard & Djinis LLP on behalf of Federated Investors (‘‘Federated 8 Letter’’); letter dated July 28, 2009 from Richard J. McDonald, Chief Regulatory Counsel, Susquehanna International Group LLP (‘‘SIG Letter’’); letter dated June 8, 2010 from The Honorable Gregory W. Meeks (‘‘Meeks Letter’’); letter dated October 14, 2011 from The Honorable Gregory W. Meeks (‘‘Meeks 2 Letter’’); letter dated May 5, 2012 from Edward P. Cernocky (‘‘Cernocky Letter’’); letter dated May 11, 2012 from Chris Barnard (‘‘Barnard Letter’’); letter dated May 15, 2012 from Helen M. Saarinen (‘‘Saarinen Letter’’); letter dated May 18, 2012 from Laura H. Hearne (‘‘Hearne Letter’’); letter dated May 24, 2012 from Dick Fuld (‘‘Fuld Letter’’); letter dated May 30, 2012 from Bruce J. Womack (‘‘Womack Letter’’); letter dated June 1, 2012 from Lee A. Pickard, Pickard & Djinis LLP, on behalf of Federated Investors (‘‘Federated 9 Letter’’); letter dated June 4, 2012 from Michael Scillia, Director, National Investment Banking Association (‘‘NIBA Letter’’); letter dated June 7, 2012 from Anthony Fitzgerald (‘‘Fitzgerald Letter’’); letter dated June 7, 2012 from Tom Vincent, Senior V.P., Corporate Governance and Wealth Management Compliance, BOK Financial Corporation (‘‘BOK Letter’’); letter dated June 8, 2012 from Denise Dolphin (‘‘Dolphin Letter’’); letter dated June 8, 2012 from Colin W. McKechnie, Managing Director, JP Morgan Chase Bank, N. A (‘‘JP Morgan 2 Letter’’); letter dated June 8, 2012 from William A. Jacobson, Associate Clinical Professor, Cornell Law School, and Director, Cornell Securities Law Clinic, Ithaca, New York (‘‘Cornell Letter’’); letter dated June 8, 2012 from Ryan K. Bakhtiari, Aidikoff, Uhl & Bakhtiari, on behalf of the Public Investors Arbitration Bar Association (‘‘PIABA Letter’’); letter dated June 8, 2012 from Kenneth E. Bentsen, Jr., Executive Vice President, Public Policy and Advocacy, SIFMA (‘‘SIFMA 4 Letter’’); letter dated June 8, 2012 from Sarah A. Miller, Chief Executive Officer, Institute of International Bankers (‘‘IIB Letter’’); letter dated June 8, 2012 from James T. McHale, Global Head of Compliance, E*TRADE Financial Corporation (‘‘E*Trade 2 Letter’’); letter dated June 11, 2012 from Steve M. Brewer, Sr., ASG Securities, LLC, Houston, Texas (‘‘ASG Securities Letter’’); letter dated June 25, 2012 from Gene L. Finn (‘‘Finn Letter’’); letter dated June 26, 2012 from Cindy Walsh (‘‘Walsh Letter’’); letter dated July 12, 2012 from Michael Scillia, Director, National Investment Banking Association (‘‘NIBA 2 Letter’’); letter dated July 18, 2012 from Gene L. Finn (‘‘Finn 2 Letter’’); letter dated July 30, 2012 from David Waddell (‘‘Waddell Letter’’); letter dated August 6, 2012 from Gene Finn (‘‘Finn 3 Letter’’); letter dated August 15, 2012 from Echeal R. Sigan (‘‘Sigan Letter’’); letter dated August 26, 2012 from Mark Irwin (‘‘Irwin Letter’’); letter dated September 17, 2012 from Gene L. Finn (‘‘Finn 4 Letter’’); letter dated September 27, 2012 from Jeff S. Clark (‘‘Clark Letter’’); letter dated September 28, 2012 from Robert LaPlante, M.P.A. (‘‘LaPlante Letter’’); letter dated October 19, 2012 from Rick Louderbough (‘‘Louderbough Letter’’); letter dated October 24, 2012 from Paul L. Matecki, Senior Vice President, General Counsel, Raymond James Financial, Inc. (‘‘Raymond James 2 Letter’’); letter dated October 25, 2012 from Eric Gamble, Ph.D. (‘‘Gamble Letter’’); letter dated November 1, 2012 from Percy R. Moorman, Esq. (‘‘Moorman Letter’’); letter dated January 4, 2013 from Marquis Wilkins (‘‘Wilkins Letter’’); letter dated January 5, 2013 from Anonymous SEC Fan (‘‘Anonymous SEC Letter’’); letter dated January 24, 2013 from Robert Fournier (‘‘Fournier Letter’’); and letter dated January 28, 2013 from Scott E. Shjefte (‘‘Shjefte Letter’’). Comment letters and specific comments outside the scope of this rulemaking are not addressed in this release. VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:54 Aug 20, 2013 Jkt 229001 letters, and as discussed in detail below, modified the amendments in certain respects in light of the comments received. In addition, the Commission has determined to defer consideration of action at this time with respect to certain of the proposed amendments. II. Amendments A. Amendments to the Customer Protection Rule 1. Background The Commission adopted Rule 15c3– 3 in 1972 in response to a congressional directive to strengthen the financial responsibility requirements for brokerdealers that hold securities and cash for customers.7 In particular, Rule 15c3–3 is designed ‘‘to give more specific protection to customer funds and securities, in effect forbidding brokers and dealers from using customer assets to finance any part of their businesses unrelated to servicing securities customers; e.g., a firm is virtually precluded from using customer funds to buy securities for its own account.’’ 8 To meet this objective, Rule 15c3–3 requires a broker-dealer that maintains custody of customer securities and cash (a ‘‘carrying broker-dealer’’) to take two primary steps to safeguard these assets. The steps are designed to protect customers 9 by segregating their securities and cash from the brokerdealer’s proprietary business activities. If the broker-dealer fails financially, the securities and cash should be readily available to be returned to the customers. In addition, if the failed broker-dealer is liquidated in a formal proceeding under the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (‘‘SIPA’’), the securities and cash would be isolated and readily identifiable as ‘‘customer property’’ and, consequently, available 7 See Broker-dealers; Maintenance of Certain Basic Reserves, Exchange Act Release No. 9856 (Nov. 10, 1972), 37 FR 25224 (Nov. 29, 1972). 8 See Net Capital Requirements for Brokers and Dealers, Exchange Act Release No. 21651 (Jan. 11, 1985), 50 FR 2690, 2690 (Jan. 18, 1985). See also Broker-Dealers; Maintenance of Certain Basic Reserves, Exchange Act Release No. 9856 (Nov. 10, 1972), 37 FR 25224, 25224 (Nov. 29, 1972). 9 Rule 15c3–3 defines customer as ‘‘any person from whom or on whose behalf a broker or dealer has received or acquired or holds funds or securities for the account of that person.’’ The rule excludes certain categories of persons from the definition, including broker-dealers, municipal securities dealers, and government securities broker-dealers. It also excludes general partners, directors, and principal officers of the broker-dealer and any other person to the extent that the person has a claim for property or funds which by contract, agreement or understanding, or by operation of law, is part of the capital of the broker-dealer or is subordinated to the claims of creditors of the broker-dealer. 17 CFR 240.15c3–3(a)(1). PO 00000 Frm 00004 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 to be distributed to customers ahead of other creditors.10 The first step required by Rule 15c3– 3 is that a carrying broker-dealer must maintain physical possession or control over customers’ fully paid and excess margin securities.11 Physical possession or control means the broker-dealer must hold these securities in one of several locations specified in Rule 15c3–3 and free of liens or any other interest that could be exercised by a third party to secure an obligation of the brokerdealer.12 Permissible locations include a bank, as defined in section 3(a)(6) of the Exchange Act, and a clearing agency.13 The second step is that a carrying broker-dealer must maintain a reserve of cash or qualified securities in an account at a bank that is at least equal in value to the net cash owed to customers, including cash obtained from the use of customer securities.14 The account must be titled ‘‘Special Reserve Bank Account for the Exclusive 10 See 15 U.S.C. 78aaa et seq. 17 CFR 240.15c3–3(b) and (d). The term fully paid securities includes all securities carried for the account of a customer in a special cash account as defined in Regulation T promulgated by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, as well as margin equity securities within the meaning of Regulation T which are carried for the account of a customer in a general account or any special account under Regulation T during any period when section 8 of Regulation T (12 CFR 220.8) specifies that margin equity securities shall have no loan value in a general account or special convertible debt security account, and all such margin equity securities in such account if they are fully paid: provided, however, that the term fully paid securities shall not apply to any securities which are purchased in transactions for which the customer has not made full payment. 17 CFR 240.15c3–3(a)(3). The term margin securities means those securities carried for the account of a customer in a general account as defined in Regulation T, as well as securities carried in any special account other than the securities referred to in paragraph (a)(3) of Rule 15c3–3. 17 CFR 240.15c3–3(a)(4). The term excess margin securities means those securities referred to in paragraph (a)(4) of Rule 15c3–3 carried for the account of a customer having a market value in excess of 140 percent of the total of the debit balances in the customer’s account or accounts encompassed by paragraph (a)(4) of Rule 15c3–3 which the brokerdealer identifies as not constituting margin securities. 17 CFR 240.15c3–3(a)(5). As discussed in section II.F. of this release, the Commission is adopting technical amendments to the definitions of the terms fully paid securities and margin securities under Rule 15c3–3. See paragraphs (a)(3) and (4) of Rule 15c3–3, as adopted. 12 See 17 CFR 240.15c3–3(c). Customer securities held by the carrying broker-dealer are not assets of the firm. Rather, the carrying broker-dealer holds them in a custodial capacity and the possession and control requirement is designed to ensure that the carrying broker-dealer treats them in a manner that allows for their prompt return. 13 Id. 14 17 CFR 240.15c3–3(e). The term qualified security is defined in Rule 15c3–3 to mean a security issued by the United States or a security in respect of which the principal and interest are guaranteed by the United States. See 17 CFR 240.15c3–3(a)(6). 11 See E:\FR\FM\21AUR2.SGM 21AUR2 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 162 / Wednesday, August 21, 2013 / Rules and Regulations emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with RULES2 Benefit of Customers.’’ 15 The amount of net cash owed to customers is computed pursuant to a formula set forth in Exhibit A to Rule 15c3–3.16 Under the customer reserve formula, the brokerdealer adds up customer credit items (e.g., cash in customer securities accounts and cash obtained through the use of customer margin securities) and then subtracts from that amount customer debit items (e.g., margin loans).17 If credit items exceed debit items, the net amount must be on deposit in the customer reserve account in the form of cash and/or qualified securities.18 A broker-dealer cannot make a withdrawal from the customer reserve account until the next computation and even then only if the computation shows that the reserve requirement has decreased.19 The broker-dealer must make a deposit into the customer reserve account if the computation shows an increase in the reserve requirement. In addition, the customer reserve formula permits the broker-dealer to offset customer credit items only with customer debit items.20 This means the broker-dealer can use customer cash to facilitate customer transactions such as financing customer margin loans and borrowing securities to make deliveries of securities that customers have sold 15 See 17 CFR 240.15c3–3(e)(1). The purpose of giving the account this title is to alert the bank and creditors of the broker-dealer that this account is to be used to meet the broker-dealer’s obligations to customers (and not the claims of general creditors) in the event the broker-dealer must be liquidated in a formal proceeding. 16 17 CFR 240.15c3–3a. 17 Id. 18 17 CFR 240.15c3–3(e). Customer cash is a balance sheet item of the carrying broker-dealer (i.e., the amount of cash received from a customer increases the amount of the carrying broker-dealer’s assets and creates a corresponding liability to the customer). The customer reserve formula is designed to isolate these broker-dealer assets so that an amount equal to the net liabilities to customers is held as a reserve in the form of cash or qualified securities. The requirement to establish this reserve is designed to effectively prevent the carrying broker-dealer from using customer funds for proprietary business activities such as investing in securities. The goal is to put the carrying brokerdealer in a position to be able to readily meet its cash obligations to customers by requiring the firm to make deposits of cash and/or qualified securities into the customer reserve account in the amount of the net cash owed to customers. Capital, Margin, and Segregation Requirements for Security-Based Swap Dealers and Major Security-Based Swap Participants and Capital Requirements for BrokerDealers, Exchange Act Release No. 68071 (Oct. 18, 2012), 77 FR 70213, 70277 n.671 (Nov. 23, 2012). 19 See 17 CFR 240.15c3–3(e). Under paragraph (e), broker-dealers are generally required to perform the customer reserve computation as of the close of business on the last business day of the week. Broker-dealers from time to time may perform a mid-week computation if it would permit them to make a withdrawal. 17 CFR 240.15c3–3(g). 20 See 17 CFR 240.15c3–3a. VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:54 Aug 20, 2013 Jkt 229001 short.21 Broker-dealer margin rules require securities customers to maintain a minimum level of equity in their securities accounts.22 In addition to protecting the broker-dealer from the consequences of a customer default, this equity serves to over-collateralize the customers’ obligations to the brokerdealer and thereby protect customers whose cash was used to facilitate the broker-dealer’s financing of securities purchases and short sales by other customers. For example, if the brokerdealer fails, the customer debits, because they generally are overcollateralized, should be attractive assets for another broker-dealer to purchase or, if not purchased by another broker-dealer, they should be able to be liquidated to a net positive equity.23 The proceeds of the debits sale or liquidation can be used to repay the customer cash used to finance the customer obligations. This cash plus the funds and/or qualified securities held in the customer reserve account should equal or exceed the total amount of customer credit items (i.e., the total amount owed by the broker-dealer to its customers).24 2. Proprietary Accounts of BrokerDealers A carrying broker-dealer may carry accounts that hold proprietary securities and cash of other broker-dealers (‘‘PAB 21 For example, if a broker-dealer holds $100 for customer A, the broker-dealer can use that $100 to finance a security purchase of customer B. The $100 the broker-dealer owes customer A is a credit in the formula and the $100 customer B owes the brokerdealer is a debit in the formula. Therefore, under the customer reserve formula there would be no requirement to maintain cash and/or U.S. government securities in the customer reserve account. However, if the broker-dealer did not use the $100 held in customer A’s account for this purpose, there would be no offsetting debit and, consequently, the broker-dealer would need to have on deposit in the customer reserve account cash and/or qualified securities in an amount at least equal to $100. 22 Broker-dealers are subject to margin requirements in Regulation T promulgated by the Federal Reserve (see 12 CFR 220.1, et seq.), in rules promulgated by the self-regulatory organizations (‘‘SROs’’) (see, e.g., FINRA Rules 4210–4240), and with respect to security futures, in rules jointly promulgated by the Commission and the CFTC (see 17 CFR 242.400–406). 23 The attractiveness of the over-collateralized debits facilitates the bulk transfer of customer accounts from a failing or failed broker-dealer to another broker-dealer. 24 See Net Capital Requirements for BrokerDealers; Amended Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 18417 (Jan. 13, 1982), 47 FR 3512, 3513 (Jan. 25, 1982) (‘‘The alternative method is founded on the concept that if the debit items in the Reserve Formula can be liquidated at or near their contract values, these assets, along with any cash required to be on deposit under the [customer protection] rule, will be sufficient to satisfy all customer-related liabilities (which are represented as credit items in the Reserve Formula’’). PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 51827 accounts’’). As noted above, brokerdealers are not within the definition of customer for purposes of Rule 15c3–3.25 Accordingly, a carrying broker-dealer that carries PAB accounts is not required to treat these accounts as customer accounts for the purposes of Rule 15c3–3. This means the carrying broker-dealer is not required to maintain possession or control of the securities of PAB account holders that are not securing margin loans to the account holders (‘‘non-margin securities’’) or include credit and debit items associated with those accounts in its customer reserve computation. The definition of customer in SIPA, however, is broader than the definition in Rule 15c3–3 in that the SIPA definition does not exclude brokerdealers.26 Customers under SIPA (‘‘SIPA customers’’) generally are entitled to a number of protections, including the right to share pro rata with other SIPA customers in the customer property held by the broker-dealer and, if the customer property is insufficient to make each SIPA customer whole, the entitlement to receive an advance from the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (‘‘SIPC’’) of up to $500,000 (of which $250,000 currently can be used to cover cash claims).27 Broker-dealers as SIPA customers have the right to a pro rata share of the customer property, but are not entitled to receive an advance from the SIPC fund.28 Consequently, when a carrying broker-dealer is liquidated in a SIPA proceeding, each customer (including a SIPA customer that is a broker-dealer) has a claim on the customer property. Because the possession and control and customer reserve account provisions of Rule 15c3–3 do not apply to PAB account holders by virtue of the definition of customer in the rule, the carrying broker-dealer is not restricted by Rule 15c3–3 from using the securities and cash in these accounts for its own business purposes. The treatment of PAB account holders as SIPA customers but not as customers for the purposes of Rule 15c3–3 25 17 CFR 240.15c3–3(a)(1). 15 U.S.C. 78lll(2). 27 See 15 U.S.C. 78fff–2(c) and 15 U.S.C. 78fff– 3(a), respectively. Under SIPA, customer property includes ‘‘cash and securities (except customer name securities delivered to the customer) at any time received, acquired, or held by or for the account of the debtor from or for the securities accounts of a customer, and the proceeds of any such property transferred by the debtor, including property unlawfully converted.’’ 15 U.S.C. 78lll(4). Therefore, customer property includes those securities positions that are held for customers and the cash that is owed to customers. 28 See 15 U.S.C. 78fff–2(c); see also 15 U.S.C. 78fff–3(a). 26 See E:\FR\FM\21AUR2.SGM 21AUR2 51828 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 162 / Wednesday, August 21, 2013 / Rules and Regulations emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with RULES2 increases the risk that, in the event a carrying broker-dealer is liquidated under SIPA, the claims of SIPA customers (i.e., customers and PAB account holders) will exceed the amount of customer property available and, thereby, expose the SIPC fund and potentially SIPA customers to losses. In addition, if the customer property is insufficient to fully satisfy all SIPA customer claims and losses are incurred, the PAB account holders could be placed in financial distress causing adverse impacts to the securities markets beyond those resulting from the failure of the carrying broker-dealer.29 To address the disparity in treatment between customers and PAB account holders, the Commission proposed amendments to Rules 15c3–3 and 15c3– 3a that would have required a brokerdealer that carries PAB accounts to perform a PAB reserve computation with respect to those accounts, generally as of the close of business on the last business day of the week.30 The amendments, as proposed, would have required the carrying broker-dealer to add up the debits and credits relating to PAB accounts—including credits arising from the use of securities held in PAB accounts—and maintain cash or qualified securities in a PAB reserve account in an amount equal to or greater than the amount that the credits exceed the debits. Seven commenters responded to the Commission’s request for comment on the proposed amendments.31 As discussed below, the Commission has modified the final rule in certain respects to address, among other things, issues raised by commenters. As adopted, the Commission’s amendments to Rules 15c3–3 and 15c3–3a require carrying broker-dealers to: (1) Perform a separate reserve computation for PAB accounts (in addition to the customer reserve computation currently required for Rule 15c3–3 customer accounts); (2) establish and fund a separate reserve account for the benefit of PAB account holders; and (3) obtain and maintain physical possession or control of nonmargin securities carried for PAB 29 As noted above, while broker-dealers are customers for the purposes of SIPA, they are not entitled to the advances from the SIPC fund to make up for shortfalls after the pro rata distribution of customer property. 15 U.S.C. 78fff–3(a)(5). 30 See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12863. A broker-dealer that does not carry an account of a customer as defined under Rule 15c3–3 or conduct a proprietary trading business would be permitted to make the computation monthly rather than weekly. See paragraph (e)(3)(iii) of Rule 15c3–3, as adopted. 31 See SIFMA 2 Letter; SIFMA 4 Letter; Dresdner Kleinwort Letter; Deutsche Bank Securities Letter; SIPC Letter; Abbey National Letter; First Clearing Letter; Cornell Letter. VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:54 Aug 20, 2013 Jkt 229001 accounts unless the carrying broker has provided written notice to the PAB account holders that it will use those securities in the ordinary course of its securities business, and has provided opportunity for the PAB account holder to object to such use.32 These amendments, in part, incorporate many of the provisions of a no-action letter regarding PAB accounts issued by Commission staff in 1998.33 The PAIB Letter stated that the staff would not recommend enforcement action to the Commission if a brokerdealer did not take a net capital deduction under Rule 15c3–1 for cash held in a securities account at another broker-dealer,34 provided the other broker-dealer agrees to: (1) Perform a reserve computation for PAB accounts; 35 (2) establish a separate special reserve bank account; and (3) maintain cash or qualified securities in the reserve account equal to the computed reserve requirement (‘‘PAIB agreement’’). Broker-dealers that carry PAB accounts have the incentive to enter into PAIB agreements to prevent their PAB account holders from choosing to open an account or enter into a clearing agreement with another broker-dealer. Because many of the provisions in the PAIB Letter are being incorporated in this rulemaking, the Commission is directing the Commission staff to withdraw the PAIB Letter as of the effective date of these rule amendments. i. Definition of ‘‘PAB Account’’ Under Rule 15c3–3(a)(16) The Commission proposed, among other things, to add paragraph (a)(16) to Rule 15c3–3 that would have defined the term PAB account as ‘‘a proprietary 32 See infra section II.A.2.ii. of this release for a discussion of the Commission’s rationale for the change in the final rule to require a carrying brokerdealer provide notice to, rather than obtain written permission from, a PAB account holder in order for its securities to be used in the ordinary course of the carrying firm’s securities business. 33 See Letter from Michael A. Macchiaroli, Associate Director, Division of Market Regulation, Commission, to Raymond J. Hennessy, Vice President, NYSE, and Thomas Cassella, Vice President, NASD Regulation, Inc. (Nov. 3, 1998) (‘‘PAIB Letter’’). 34 Under Rule 15c3–1, broker-dealers are generally required to deduct unsecured receivables from their net worth when computing their net capital. 35 Under new paragraph (e)(3), broker-dealers will be required to perform the PAB reserve account computation (and its customer reserve account computation, if applicable) on a weekly basis, as of the close of business on the last business day of the week. With regard to PAB accounts, a broker-dealer that does not carry an account of a customer as defined under Rule 15c3–3 or conduct a proprietary trading business may make the PAB reserve account computation monthly rather than weekly. See new paragraph (e)(3)(iii) of Rule 15c3–3. PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 securities account of a broker or dealer (which includes a foreign broker or dealer, or a foreign bank acting as a broker or dealer), but shall not include an account where the account owner is a guaranteed subsidiary of the carrying broker or dealer, the account owner guarantees all liabilities and obligations of the carrying broker or dealer, or the account is a delivery-versus-payment account or receipt-versus-payment account.’’ 36 Two commenters raised concerns about the proposed definition because—by including proprietary accounts of foreign broker-dealers and foreign banks acting as broker-dealers within the term PAB account—it differed from provisions in the PAIB Letter, which excluded such accounts from a PAIB computation.37 One of these commenters stated that brokerdealers (including foreign banks acting as broker-dealers) should be allowed to opt-out of PAB account treatment because they do not require the same protections as customers as defined in Rule 15c3–3.38 The commenter stated that broker-dealers are able to understand the insolvency risk of the broker-dealers at which they maintain proprietary accounts.39 This commenter noted that broker-dealer customers often self-insure or otherwise account for such exposure regardless of their status under SIPA.40 The second commenter stated that foreign broker-dealers and foreign banks acting as broker-dealers should be allowed to subordinate their claims to customers and creditors of the broker-dealer in order to remove their accounts from PAB account treatment because under SIPA foreign brokerdealers and foreign banks acting as broker-dealers, under certain circumstances, will not be deemed customers and, therefore, would not be entitled to a pro rata share of the estate of customer property in a SIPA liquidation.41 More specifically, the commenter suggested that the Commission modify the definition of PAB account, to exclude ‘‘any foreign broker-dealer and foreign bank to the extent that such entity has a claim for cash or securities that is subordinated to the claims of creditors of the carrying broker-dealer’’ in order to parallel the 36 See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12895. 37 See Dresdner Kleinwort Letter; Deutsche Bank Securities Letter. Though SIFMA initially raised concerns about the proposed definition, it later withdrew its recommendation that proprietary accounts of affiliated non-U.S. broker-dealers and non-U.S. banks be excluded from the PAB account definition. See SIFMA 2 Letter; SIFMA 4 Letter. 38 See Dresdner Kleinwort Letter. 39 Id. 40 See Dresdner Kleinwort Letter. 41 See Deutsche Bank Securities Letter. E:\FR\FM\21AUR2.SGM 21AUR2 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 162 / Wednesday, August 21, 2013 / Rules and Regulations emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with RULES2 language in SIPA.42 This commenter also recommended requiring the ‘‘subordinating’’ broker-dealer to follow the requirements for non-conforming subordinated loans to remove an account from PAB account treatment.43 Another commenter stated that the Commission’s desire to close the gap between Rule 15c3–3 and SIPA must be balanced against the potentially significant practical issues the Commission’s proposal would raise in the case of accounts carried for affiliated entities operating in non-U.S. jurisdictions.44 In a subsequent letter, this commenter stated that while it would prefer a more flexible solution that would allow broker-dealers and non-U.S. banks acting as broker-dealers (especially non-U.S. affiliates) to opt to have their accounts treated as neither customer accounts under SIPA nor PAB accounts, the commenter recognized that there is a clear need for an immediate solution that cannot be delayed until appropriate amendments to SIPA are adopted.45 Consequently, the commenter withdrew its recommendation that the proprietary accounts of affiliated non-U.S. brokerdealers and affiliated non-U.S. banks be excluded from the ‘‘PAB account’’ definition, but continued to endorse its previous comments to achieve the goal of correcting the gap between Rule 15c3–3 and SIPA without creating undue or unintended burdens.46 42 The definition of customer in SIPA excludes any person, to the extent that ‘‘such person has a claim for cash or securities which by contract, agreement, or understanding, or by operation of law, is part of the capital of the debtor, or is subordinated to the claims of any and all creditors of the debtor, notwithstanding that some grounds exist for declaring such contract, agreement, or understanding void or voidable in a suit between the claimant and the debtor.’’ See 15 U.S.C. 78lll(2)(C)(iii). 43 See Deutsche Bank Securities Letter. See also SIFMA 4 Letter. Under Rule 15c3–1, a broker-dealer can exclude liabilities that are subordinated to the claims of creditors pursuant to a satisfactory subordination agreement, as defined in Appendix D to Rule 15c3–1, for purposes determining its net capital. See 17 CFR 240.15c3–1(c)(2)(ii) and 17 CFR 240.15c3–1d. See also 17 CFR 240.15c3–1(c)(i)(x). A non-conforming subordination agreement generally would not meet all the requirements of Appendix D to Rule 15c3–1, and, therefore, a broker-dealer could not exclude the liability resulting from the loan agreement in computing its net capital. See 17 CFR 240.15c3–1(c)(2)(ii). 44 See SIFMA 2 Letter. This commenter specifically raised concerns that it would be cumbersome to subject transactions between a carrying broker-dealer and its foreign affiliates to the proposed PAB requirements because of the integrated securities processing and settlement activities of these entities, which would limit the ability of the group as a whole to provide competitive services to U.S. investors. 45 See SIFMA 4 Letter. 46 See SIFMA 4 Letter. Among other things, the commenter suggested that the Commission modify the proposed definition of PAB account to exclude VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:54 Aug 20, 2013 Jkt 229001 The goal of the proposed amendments is to create a process that protects Rule 15c3–3 customers and PAB account holders of a failed carrying brokerdealer. The amendments are designed to provide such protection by mitigating the risk that there will be insufficient customer property to fully satisfy all customer claims in a SIPA liquidation. The entitlement of PAB account holders to a pro rata share of the fund of customer property places all SIPA customers at risk if the carrying firm does not establish a PAB reserve account for excess credits owed to PAB account holders. At the same time, the Commission appreciates the need to consider both the practical issues raised by commenters and its objective to eliminate the inconsistency between Rule 15c3–3 and SIPA.47 Accordingly, in response to commenters, the final rule adopted by the Commission excludes from the definition of PAB account in paragraph (a)(16) of Rule 15c3–3 ‘‘an account that has been subordinated to the claims of creditors of the carrying broker or dealer.’’ 48 A PAB account holder that has subordinated its claims with respect to that account to claims of creditors of the carrying broker-dealer will not be entitled to SIPA protection for that account.49 Consequently, this provision will provide flexibility to carrying broker-dealers and their broker-dealer affiliates to structure their PAB account relationships in a manner that permits operational efficiencies (i.e., the ability to exclude these accounts from the PAB reserve computation) while still promoting the goal of the amendments to have a consistent treatment of these accounts under Rule 15c3–3 and SIPA, and thereby protect accounts holders that are ‘‘customers’’ under SIPA.50 If a U.S. broker-dealer, however, chooses to subordinate its claims to assets in that account to the claims of other creditors any customer as defined in Rule 15c3–3 and also to exclude the other types of persons who are specifically excluded from the definition of customer. This suggestion included excluding accounts whose claims are subordinated to the claims of other creditors of the carrying brokerdealer. Id. 47 See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12863. 48 The agreement would not need to be conforming for purposes of Exchange Act Rule 15c3–1d (Satisfactory Subordination Agreements). 49 See 15 U.S.C. 78lll(2). 50 See 17 CFR 240.15c3–3(a)(1) and 15 U.S.C. 78lll(2)(C)(ii). These accounts will be excluded from both the definition of PAB account, as well from the definition of customer under SIPA. See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12863. Consequently, these account holders will not be entitled to the protections in SIPA applicable to customers. PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 51829 of the carrying broker-dealer, it will not be able to include those assets as allowable for its own net capital computation.51 Further, as was proposed, the definition of PAB account in the final rule excludes accounts that operate on a delivery-versus-payment or a receiptversus-payment basis, or ‘‘DVP/RVP’’ basis, because these accounts generally hold securities and cash for short durations.52 The provision relating to DVP/RVP accounts is being adopted substantially as proposed, though paragraph (a)(16), as adopted, has been modified by splitting the text into two sentences. As adopted, the reference to the DVP/RVP accounts provision was moved to the first sentence. The Commission is not adopting the proposed exclusions from the PAB reserve computation requirement related to accounts established by a PAB account holder that fully guarantee the obligations of, or whose accounts are fully guaranteed by, the carrying brokerdealer. Rather than create a specific exemption for such account holders, the Commission believes the better approach is to allow these accounts to enter into subordination agreements with the carrying broker-dealer, in order for these accounts to be excluded from the definition of PAB account. This approach simplifies the final rule, while continuing to provide a means for these account holders to be excluded from its scope. Consequently, as adopted, paragraph (a)(16) to Rule 15c3–3 defines the term PAB account to mean ‘‘a proprietary securities account of a broker or dealer (which includes a foreign broker or dealer, or a foreign bank acting as a broker or dealer) other than a delivery-versus-payment account or a receipt-versus-payment account.’’ 53 The definition of PAB Account does not include accounts that have been subordinated to the claims of a carrying broker-dealer’s creditors.54 ii. Written Permission To Use PAB Account Securities Because PAB account holders are not customers for purposes of Rule 15c3–3, a carrying broker-dealer is not required to maintain possession or control of their non-margin securities. Consequently, it has been a long51 See 17 CFR 240.15c3–1(c)(2)(iv)(E). Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12863, n.17 (‘‘[T]he amendment would exclude delivery-versus-payment and receipt-versus-payment accounts. These types of accounts pose little risk of reducing the estate of customer property in a SIPA liquidation since they only hold assets for short periods of time.’’). 53 See paragraph (a)(16) to Rule 15c3–3, as adopted. 54 Id. 52 See E:\FR\FM\21AUR2.SGM 21AUR2 emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with RULES2 51830 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 162 / Wednesday, August 21, 2013 / Rules and Regulations standing industry practice for carrying broker-dealers to use these PAB securities in their business activities. Under the final rule, a carrying brokerdealer that uses these PAB securities will need to include the market value of the securities as a credit in the formula when performing the PAB reserve computation. Thus, the amount that the carrying broker-dealer must maintain in its PAB reserve account will increase by the amount of these credits because there would be no corresponding debit item.55 Using non-margin securities of PAB account holders presents the risk that securities may increase in market value between PAB reserve computations and, therefore, the amount of the credit items in the formula may be less than the value of the securities for a short period of time. To accommodate industry practice, however, the Commission did not propose amending Rule 15c3–3 to apply the possession or control requirements to PAB accounts. The Commission proposed adding paragraph (b)(5) to Rule 15c3–3 that would have required the carrying broker-dealer to obtain written permission from a PAB account holder before it could use the PAB account holder’s securities in the ordinary course of its securities business. In this way, the Commission proposed increasing the protections for PAB account holders without interfering with long-standing industry practice of carrying broker-dealers using the securities of their broker-dealer account holders. However, securities not being used by the broker-dealer must be maintained in accordance with the possession or control requirements of Rule 15c3–3. One commenter stated that this provision should be eliminated from the proposed amendments, arguing that ‘‘[t]he proposal interferes unnecessarily in the contractual arrangements between broker-dealers, which are capable of understanding the terms of standard industry custodial relationships.’’ 56 The commenter also noted that the PAIB Letter did not contain any such requirement.57 The Commission agrees with the commenter that broker-dealers should be able to understand the implications of granting another brokerdealer the ability to use their nonmargin securities and, therefore, the final rule requires written notice rather than written permission. An appropriate level of protection for the PAB account holder may be achieved without requiring the carrying broker-dealer to 55 17 CFR 240.15c–3–3a. SIFMA 2 Letter. 56 See 57 Id. VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:54 Aug 20, 2013 Jkt 229001 maintain possession or control of securities carried for a PAB account, provided that the carrying broker-dealer gives written notice to its PAB account holders that it may use their non-margin securities.58 The Commission acknowledges that this change, as compared to the proposed rule, will shift the burden to the PAB account holder to proactively object to the carrying broker-dealer using the account holder’s securities. However, the new written notice requirement increases the protections for PAB account holders from the status quo without imposing substantial burdens on existing account relationships. The revised rule is intended to provide to the PAB account holders the opportunity to negotiate different terms if they do not want their securities used, while eliminating the need for, and the costs that would result from, carrying broker-dealers reworking existing contracts. As adopted, the Commission is modifying the final rule to add the phrase ‘‘and has provided an opportunity for the account holder to object’’ following the phrase ‘‘ordinary course of its securities business.’’ 59 This language was added to the final rule to impose a requirement that the carrying broker-dealer provide the PAB account holders an opportunity to object to the use of their non-margin securities after they receive the written notice from the carrying broker-dealer. The rule does not prescribe the form in which a PAB account holder must provide notice to the carrying broker-dealer of its objection. This will provide the PAB account holder with flexibility to communicate the objection in a manner the account holder determines is most effective in terms of conveying such objection to the carrying broker-dealer. If the PAB account holder objects, the carrying broker-dealer could not use the securities. Further, the PAB account holder could seek to move the account to another carrying broker-dealer or negotiate different terms with the carrying broker-dealer with regard to the use of its securities. Finally, the Commission has modified proposed paragraph (b)(5) to clarify in the final rule that a broker-dealer is affirmatively required to maintain 58 The Commission has deleted the phrase ‘‘obtained the written permission of the account owner to use the securities in the ordinary course of its securities business’’ from paragraph (b)(5) of the final rule and replaced it with ‘‘provided written notice to the account holder that the securities may be used in the ordinary course of its securities business, and has provided an opportunity for the account holder to object.’’ 59 See paragraph (b)(5) of Rule 15c3–3, as adopted. PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 possession and control of non-margin securities unless the broker-dealer has provided written notice to the PAB account holder.60 As modified, paragraph (b)(5) reads: ‘‘A broker or dealer is required to obtain and thereafter maintain the physical possession or control of securities carried for a PAB account, unless the broker or dealer has provided written notice to the account holder that the securities may be used in the ordinary course of its securities business, and has provided an opportunity for the account holder to object.’’ 61 iii. PAB Reserve Bank Accounts The Commission proposed amendments to paragraph (e) of Rule 15c3–3 to require a carrying broker with PAB accounts to establish and maintain a PAB reserve account for PAB accounts, perform a separate PAB reserve computation for PAB accounts, and maintain cash or qualified securities in the PAB reserve account in an amount equal to the PAB reserve requirement.62 The Commission also proposed amendments to paragraph (f) of Rule 15c3–3 to require carrying broker-dealers with PAB accounts to notify the bank about the status of the PAB reserve account and obtain an agreement and notification from the bank that the PAB reserve account will be maintained for the benefit of the PAB account holders.63 The Commission is adopting these amendments to paragraphs (e) and (f) of Rule 15c3–3 substantially as proposed, with some technical modifications suggested by one commenter, including making terminology consistent throughout the paragraphs.64 In addition, the Commission is adopting substantially as proposed the amendments to paragraph (g) of Rule 15c3–3 which specifies when the carrying broker-dealer can make withdrawals from a PAB reserve account.65 Finally, the Commission is 60 The modifications replaced the phrase ‘‘shall not be required’’ with the phrase ‘‘is required’’ and replaced the phrase ‘‘provided that’’ with the word ‘‘unless.’’ 61 See paragraph (b)(5) of Rule 15c3–3, as adopted. 62 See section II.A.3. of this release for a discussion of changes to paragraph (e)(5) of Rule 15c3–3 with respect to banks where customer or PAB reserve accounts may be held. 63 17 CFR 240.15c3–3(f). 64 See SIFMA 2 Letter. 65 17 CFR 240.15c3–3(g). In this paragraph, the Commission deleted the phrase ‘‘his Reserve Bank Accounts’’ and replaced it with the phrase ‘‘a Customer Reserve Bank Account and PAB Reserve Bank Account.’’ The Commission also deleted the phrase ‘‘each Reserve Bank Account’’ and replaced it with the phrase ‘‘the Customer Reserve Bank Account and PAB Reserve Bank Account.’’ These were the only changes made to the final rule in paragraph (g) of Rule 15c3–3. E:\FR\FM\21AUR2.SGM 21AUR2 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 162 / Wednesday, August 21, 2013 / Rules and Regulations adopting, as proposed, new paragraph (e)(4) to Rule 15c3–3, which allows a carrying broker-dealer to use credits related to PAB accounts to finance Rule 15c3–3 customer debits, but does not allow a carrying broker-dealer to use Rule 15c3–3 customer credits to finance PAB debits. emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with RULES2 iv. Other PAB Issues Raised by Commenters In addition to specific comments on the proposed rule language, one commenter had other interpretive questions and comments about the proposed PAB requirements.66 The commenter requested that the Commission clarify whether PAB account holders must obtain from their carrying broker-dealers a written agreement to perform the calculation as required by the PAIB Letter.67 Under the amendments, there is no requirement that PAB account holders obtain a written agreement from the carrying firm that it will perform the PAB reserve computation. Rule 15c3–3, as amended, requires the carrying firm to perform the PAB reserve computation. As stated above, Rule 15c3–3 prescribes the requirements for carrying firms with respect to PAB accounts, and the PAIB Letter is being withdrawn.68 In addition, the commenter requested the Commission to clarify that existing PAIB reserve accounts need not be retitled to comply with the proposed amendments.69 Item 4 of the PAIB Letter required that a carrying broker-dealer, ‘‘establish and maintain a separate ‘Special Reserve Account for the Exclusive Benefit of Customers’ with a bank in conformity with the standards of paragraph (f) of Rule 15c3–3.’’ Paragraph (e)(1) of Rule 15c3–3, however, requires that a carrying brokerdealer establish and maintain a ‘‘Special Reserve Bank Account for Brokers and Dealers.’’ Given the small differences in nomenclature and the time and expense associated with broker-dealers re-titling these accounts, a carrying broker-dealer that has properly established PAB reserve account in the manner described in Item 4 of the PAIB Letter need not retitle the account and obtain a new notification from the bank.70 However, all PAB reserve accounts established on or after the effective date of these amendments must title the account in 66 See SIMFA 2 Letter. 67 Id. 68 As discussed above in this section II.A.2., the Commission is directing the staff to withdraw the PAIB Letter as of the effective date of these rules. 69 See SIFMA 2 Letter. 70 See PAIB Letter. VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:54 Aug 20, 2013 Jkt 229001 accordance with paragraph (e)(1) of Rule 15c3–3. Finally, the commenter urged the Commission to clarify whether, for purposes of Rule 15c3–1, the term aggregate debit items means total aggregate debit items computed in accordance with the customer reserve formula or the total aggregate debit items computed in accordance with both the customer reserve formula and the PAB reserve formula.71 Aggregate debit items are used in the net capital rule to determine the minimum net capital requirement for broker-dealers that elect to use the alternative standard in computing their minimum net capital requirement. Specifically, the net capital rule requires broker-dealers using the alternative standard to maintain net capital of at least the greater of $250,000 or 2% of aggregate debit items.72 Including PAB aggregate debit items in this computation would significantly increase net capital requirements for broker-dealers that use the alternative method. The intended purpose of this rule change is to address the inconsistencies between Rule 15c3– 3 and SIPA—not to increase net capital requirements. Consequently, the requirements in Rules 15c3–1, 15c3–1d, and 17a–11 that refer to aggregate debit items continue to be based only on aggregate debit items computed in accordance with the customer reserve computation, and do not include aggregate debit items computed in accordance with the PAB reserve computation.73 v. Amendment to Rule 15c3– 1(c)(2)(iv)(E) Related to PAB Accounts Finally, the Commission proposed an amendment to Rule 15c3–1 74 that would have required a broker-dealer, when calculating net capital, to deduct from net worth cash and securities held in a securities account at another broker-dealer if the other broker-dealer does not treat the account, and the 71 See SIFMA 2 Letter; SIFMA 4 Letter. CFR 240.15c3–1(a)(1)(ii). In addition, certain other financial responsibility rules require that a broker-dealer that computes net capital pursuant to the alternative method either report to the Commission, limit its ability to obtain, pre-pay, or repay subordinated debt, or limit its business if its net capital falls below a certain level based on a percentage of aggregate debit items (see, e.g., Rules 15c3–1(e)(2)(vi), 15c3–1d(b)(6)(iii), 15c3–1d(b)(7), 15c3–1d(b)(8)(i)(A), 15c3–1d(b)(10)(ii)(B), 15c3– 1d(c)(2), 15c3–1d(c)(5)(ii)(A), and 17a–11(c)(2)). 73 Under paragraph (e)(4) to Rule 15c3–3, a carrying broker-dealer will be permitted to use credits related to PAB accounts to finance Rule 15c3–3 customer debits. This rule, however, does not affect the use of aggregate debit items in computing a broker-dealer’s net capital under the alternative standard pursuant to paragraph (a)(1)(ii) of Rule 15c3–1. 74 17 CFR 240.15c3–1(c)(2)(iv)(E). 72 17 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 51831 assets therein, in compliance with the applicable PAB reserve account requirements of Rules 15c3–3 and 15c3– 3a.75 A commenter suggested modifying this proposed amendment,76 arguing that ‘‘[a]lthough the Proposing Release states that the Commission ‘would not expect broker-dealers to audit or examine their carrying broker-dealers to determine whether the carrying brokerdealer is in compliance with [the proposed rules],’ the text of the proposed amendment suggests that they in fact would have such an obligation.’’ 77 The commenter also stated that a broker-dealer should not be deemed to have violated Rule 15c3–1 merely because its carrying firm fails to properly perform requirements solely applicable to the carrying firm and that paragraph (c)(2)(iv)(E) under Rule 15c3– 1 should be explicitly modified to clarify that cash and securities held in a securities account at another brokerdealer are not subject to the deduction specified in that paragraph.78 While the Commission did not intend to impose any monitoring requirement on the PAB account holder, the Commission recognizes that the language, as proposed, could have implied such a requirement and agrees with the commenter that a broker-dealer should not be deemed to have violated Rule 15c3–1 with respect to requirements that are solely applicable to the carrying broker-dealer. To address this concern, the Commission has modified the language in paragraph (c)(2)(iv)(E) under Rule 15c3–1 to eliminate the proposed capital charge of Rule 15c3–1 that would have resulted from a failure of a carrying broker-dealer to comply with the PAB requirements in Rule 15c3–3.79 Instead, the Commission has adopted amendments to Rule 15c3–1 providing that a broker-dealer need not deduct cash and securities held in a securities account at a carrying broker-dealer except where the account has been subordinated to the claims of creditors of the carrying broker-dealer.80 This provision is intended to prevent brokerdealers from including assets in their net capital that may not be readily available to be returned because they 75 See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12864. 76 See SIFMA 2 Letter. 77 Id. 78 Id. 79 More specifically, the Commission has deleted the proposed language referring to ‘‘cash and securities held in a securities account at another broker-dealer if the other broker-dealer does not treat the account, and the assets therein in compliance with paragraphs (b)(5) and (e) of § 240.15c3–3. . . .’’ 80 17 CFR 240.15c3–1(c)(2)(iv)(E). E:\FR\FM\21AUR2.SGM 21AUR2 51832 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 162 / Wednesday, August 21, 2013 / Rules and Regulations would not be subject to the PAB account provisions discussed above. Accordingly, the amendments to paragraph (c)(2)(iv)(E) of Rule 15c3–1 are consistent with the exclusions from the definition of PAB account in paragraph (a)(16) of Rule 15c3–3.81 3. Banks Where Special Reserve Deposits May Be Held As amended, paragraph (e) of Rule 15c3–3 requires a broker-dealer to deposit cash or qualified securities into the customer or PAB reserve account,82 which must be maintained at a bank.83 While cash deposits at a bank are fungible and may be used by the bank in its lending and investment activities, paragraph (f) of Rule 15c3–3 requires that a broker-dealer obtain a written contract from the bank wherein the bank agrees not to re-lend or hypothecate securities deposited into the reserve account.84 This means the bank cannot use the securities in its business, which provides a measure of protection by requiring that the securities will be available to the broker-dealer if the bank falls into financial difficulty. Cash deposits, however, may be freely used in the course of the bank’s commercial activities.85 Therefore, to the extent a broker-dealer deposits cash in a reserve account, there is a risk the cash could become inaccessible if the bank experiences financial difficulties.86 This could adversely impact the brokerdealer and its customers.87 To limit these risks, the Commission proposed amendments to Rule 15c3–3 that would have: (1) Prohibited a broker-dealer from maintaining cash deposits in the reserve accounts for customers and PAB account holders if the bank was affiliated; and (2) limited the amount of cash that could be deposited in both types of reserve accounts at nonaffiliated banks.88 These restrictions would not have applied to securities held in the reserve accounts because, as noted above, the bank must agree not to use the securities in its business. The goal of the proposals was to limit cash 81 17 CFR 15c3–3(a)(16). PAB reserve account and the customer reserve account are collectively referred to as the ‘‘reserve accounts’’ or a ‘‘reserve account.’’ 83 The term bank is defined in paragraph (a)(7) of Rule 15c3–3 as a ‘‘bank as defined in section 3(a)(6) of the Exchange Act and will also mean any building and loan, savings and loan or similar banking institution subject to the supervision by a Federal banking authority.’’ See paragraph (a)(7) to Rule 15c3–3, as adopted. 84 See 17 CFR 240.15c3–3(f). 85 See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12864. 86 Id. 87 Id. 88 Id. emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with RULES2 82 The VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:54 Aug 20, 2013 Jkt 229001 reserve account deposits to reasonably safe amounts as measured against the capitalization of the broker-dealer and the bank.89 Specifically, as proposed, paragraph (e)(5) of 15c3–3 provided that a carrying broker-dealer would have been required to exclude the amount of cash deposited into reserve accounts at affiliated banks when determining whether it maintained the minimum amount required to be on deposit in the reserve accounts for its customers and PAB account holders. In addition, the proposed amendment would have required a carrying broker-dealer to exclude cash deposited in a reserve account at an unaffiliated bank to the extent the amount of the cash deposited exceeded: (1) 50% of the broker-dealer’s excess net capital (based on the brokerdealer’s most recently filed FOCUS Report); 90 or (2) 10% of the bank’s equity capital (based on the bank’s most recently filed Call Report or Thrift Financial Report).91 The Commission is adopting the amendments with modifications designed to address issues identified by commenters. Twenty-three commenters addressed the proposed amendments.92 Fifteen commenters urged the 89 Id. 90 Under Rule 17a–5, broker-dealers must file periodic reports on Form X–17a–5 (Financial and Operational Combined Uniform Single Reports) (‘‘FOCUS Reports’’). See 17 CFR 240.17a–5(a). The FOCUS Report requires, among other financial information, a balance sheet, income statement, and net capital and customer reserve computations. Excess net capital is the amount that a brokerdealer’s net capital exceeds its minimum requirement. 91 See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12864. On July 21, 2011, supervisory responsibility for federal savings associations was transferred from the Office of Thrift Supervision (‘‘OTS’’) to the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (‘‘OCC’’). As of the quarter ending March 31, 2012, savings associations were required to file a Call Report in lieu of a Thrift Financial Report. See Proposed Agency Information Collection Activities; Comment Request, 76 FR 7082 (Feb. 8, 2011). The Call Report includes a line item for total bank equity capital. A report for a specific institution is available at https://cdr.ffiec.gov/ public/. See also, FINRA, Interpretations of Financial and Operational Rules, Interpretations 15c3–3(e)(1)/01 and/011 (establishing similar threshold restrictions on using money market deposit accounts or time deposits, respectively, to meet customer reserve account requirements), and Interpretation 15c3–3(e)(3)/051 (establishing similar threshold restrictions with respect to meeting the customer reserve requirement by depositing cash at an affiliated bank). 92 See Federated Letter; Curian Clearing Letter; Raymond James Letter; JP Morgan Letter; Reserve Letter; Dresdner Kleinwort Letter; SIFMA 2 Letter; SIFMA 4 Letter; First Clearing Letter; Clearing House Letter; ICI Letter; Barclays Letter; ABASA Letter; PNC Letter; BlackRock Letter; Deutsche Bank Securities Letter; E*Trade Letter; Citigroup Letter; American Bar Association Letter; Fidelity/NFS Letter; BOK Letter; JP Morgan 3 Letter; IIB Letter; Raymond James 2 Letter. PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 Commission not to adopt the proposed prohibition on broker-dealers maintaining cash in reserve accounts at affiliated banks.93 These commenters generally stated that, with regard to cash in reserve accounts, affiliated banks should be treated the same as unaffiliated banks because both groups are subject to the same financial regulation.94 These commenters noted that banks are subject to safety and soundness requirements of their respective banking regulators and, therefore, the commenters argued that the proposed restriction with respect to affiliated banks is unwarranted. One commenter also stated that the Commission’s distinction between affiliated and unaffiliated banks was not sufficiently supported in the proposing release.95 More specifically, this commenter stated that the Commission’s ‘‘bare statement that a broker-dealer ‘may not exercise due diligence with the same degree of impartiality when assessing the soundness of an affiliate bank as it would with a non-affiliate . . .’ does not suffice to justify the disparate treatment’’ with regard to the treatment of affiliated banks under the proposed rule.96 This commenter also stated that it is just as easy to argue that broker-dealers are in a much better position to know about the soundness of an affiliated bank then to learn about the soundness of a unaffiliated bank, which may not be willing to provide complete and accurate information.97 In addition, another commenter stated that the Commission cited no empirical or anecdotal evidence to support its reasons for prohibiting cash reserve deposits at an affiliated bank.98 This commenter also stated that the Commission’s concerns discount the operational efficiencies to be gained between an affiliated broker-dealer and its bank, including: Commonality between certain policies and procedures; greater ease in communication internally; and greater operational efficiencies leading to reduced operational risk in the transfer of funds to and from the bank.99 One commenter stated that it took no issue with the proposed restriction on 93 See Federated Letter; JP Morgan Letter; Dresdner Kleinwort Letter; SIFMA 4 Letter; First Clearing Letter; ICI Letter; ABASA Letter; E*Trade Letter; Citigroup Letter; American Bar Association Letter; Fidelity/NFS Letter; Curian Letter; BOK Letter; JP Morgan 2 Letter; IIB Letter. 94 Id. 95 See Dresdner Kleinwort Letter. 96 Id. 97 Id. 98 See Citigroup Letter. 99 Id. E:\FR\FM\21AUR2.SGM 21AUR2 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 162 / Wednesday, August 21, 2013 / Rules and Regulations emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with RULES2 affiliated banks.100 Another commenter noted that the financial industry has seen a remarkable consolidation of the banking and securities industries, and, as a result, the number of broker dealers affiliated with banks has increased, along with the number of those brokerdealers maintaining deposits at affiliated banks.101 This commenter stated that broker-dealers would be required to move deposits from one institution and divide that amount among several banks, resulting in credit risk to the broker-dealer, as well as an increase in operational risk.102 Finally, the commenter observed that the Commission did not provide any specific examples of bank failures impacting affiliated broker-dealers, which led the commenter to question whether there is any realistic benefit to offset the increased risk that brokerdealers would be required to take on as a result of the proposal to place restrictions on cash deposits in reserve accounts at affiliated and unaffiliated banks.103 The Commission recognizes that all banks, whether or not affiliated with a broker-dealer, are subject to regulation by their respective banking regulators. The Commission’s continuing concern, however, is that a carrying broker-dealer may not exercise due diligence with the same degree of impartiality and care when assessing the financial soundness of an affiliated bank as it would with an unaffiliated bank.104 Moreover, the goal of protecting the carrying brokerdealer’s customers through the Rule 15c3–3 reserve requirement may be undermined in the event a holding company becomes insolvent, with corresponding adverse consequences to both the bank and broker-dealer subsidiaries. In some cases, a broker-dealer may have access to more information about an affiliated bank in comparison to an unaffiliated bank for purposes of conducting due diligence. However, having more information would not be of benefit if the individuals making the decision on where to maintain the reserve account are not objective in their decision making. The Commission is concerned that a broker-dealer’s decision to hold cash in a reserve 100 See Raymond James Letter. In a subsequent comment letter, this commenter stated that if this proposal is adopted, registered broker-dealers holding customer funds may be required to move their reserve accounts if those accounts are currently held at affiliated banks, which would increase costs. See Raymond James 2 Letter. 101 See BOK Letter. 102 Id. 103 Id. 104 See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12864. VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:54 Aug 20, 2013 Jkt 229001 account at an affiliated bank may be driven in part by profit or reasons based on the affiliation, regardless of any due diligence it may conduct or the overall safety and soundness of the bank. In addition, in response to the comments regarding affiliated banks, the Commission notes that substantial numbers of banks have failed or required government assistance in recent years.105 While a particular bank failure may not have materially impacted an affiliated broker-dealer to date,106 the risk remains that the financial difficulty of an entity that is part of a holding company structure may adversely impact other affiliated entities, including affiliated brokerdealers and banks.107 Therefore, the final rule retains the prohibition on maintaining customer reserve cash deposits at an affiliated bank.108 This prohibition does not apply to securities on deposit at an affiliated bank, but only cash deposits because, as noted above, the latter are fungible with other deposits carried by the bank and may be freely used in the course of the bank’s commercial activities.109 Consequently, to the extent that operational or other efficiencies can be achieved through the use of an affiliated bank, the carrying broker-dealer can use qualified securities held at an affiliated bank to meet its reserve deposit requirements.110 The ability to use qualified securities alleviates concerns that a broker-dealer would be required to take deposits from one institution and divide that amount among several banks, resulting in credit risk to the 105 According to the FDIC, the number of FDICinsured institutions that failed in the U.S. over the last four years are: (1) 140 in 2009; (2) 157 in 2010; (3) 92 in 2011; and (4) 51 in 2012. A complete list of failed banks since October 1, 2000, is available at www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/ banklist.html. 106 See BOK Letter; Dresdner Kleinwort Letter. 107 See, e.g., Lehman Brothers Inc.—Trustee’s Preliminary Investigation Report and Recommendations (Case No. 08–01420 (JMP) SIPA), available at https://bankrupt.com/misc/ sipareport0904.pdf. 108 Id. 109 See Federal Reserve, Division of Banking Supervision and Regulation, Commercial Bank Examination Manual, Section 3000.1, Deposit Accounts (stating that deposits are the primary funding source for most banks and that banks use deposits in a variety of ways, primarily to fund loans and investments), available at https:// www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/supmanual/ cbem/3000.pdf. See also OCC Banking Circular (BC–196), Securities Lending (May 7, 1985) (stating securities should be lent only pursuant to a written agreement between the lender institution and the owner of the securities specifically authorizing the institution to offer the securities for loan), available at https://www.occ.gov/static/news-issuances/ bulletins/pre-1994/banking-circulars/bc-1985196.pdf. 110 See Citigroup Letter. PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 51833 broker-dealer, as well as an increase in operational risk.111 In summary, while the Commission acknowledges concerns raised by commenters, the Commission continues to believe that it is appropriate to exclude cash deposited in affiliated banks from the calculation to determine whether a broker-dealer has met its reserve account requirements. Therefore, the final rule excludes the amount of any cash on deposit in an affiliated bank of the broker-dealer from being used to meet the reserve requirements.112 Broker-dealers that use affiliated banks for holding cash customer reserve accounts will need to either deposit qualified securities into the accounts or move their accounts to non-affiliated banks. As for the limits on the amounts of cash that could be deposited in one unaffiliated bank, some commenters argued that the proposed thresholds were too restrictive. One commenter urged the Commission to reconsider the proposed limits, noting that the proposed amendment will impose significant costs on broker-dealers and potentially adversely impact the brokerdealers’ customers.113 Several commenters suggested that the Commission allow cash reserve deposits without the percentage restrictions at unaffiliated banks that are wellcapitalized or for which the brokerdealer has performed due diligence.114 One commenter suggested that the Commission consider higher percentages for cash deposits at large money-center banks.115 This commenter stated that this would strike a better balance between the Commission’s concerns regarding the safety of cash deposits and the costs imposed on broker-dealers arising from having to use qualified securities (as opposed to cash) to meet deposit requirements or having to maintain reserve accounts at multiple banks.116 This commenter also stated that the percentage thresholds would negatively impact smaller brokerdealers because they would exceed the 50% of excess net capital threshold at lower deposit levels.117 Two 111 See BOK Letter. Based on FOCUS Report data, as of December 31, 2011, 79% of the total customer reserve requirement across all carrying brokerdealers was met using qualified securities. 112 See paragraph (e)(5) of Rule 15c3–3, as adopted. 113 See Raymond James 2 Letter. 114 See Raymond James Letter; JP Morgan Letter; Clearing House Letter; ABASA Letter; PNC Letter; Deutsche Bank Securities Letter; E*Trade Letter; JP Morgan 2 Letter. 115 See SIFMA 2 Letter; SIFMA 4 Letter. 116 See SIFMA 2 Letter. 117 Id. E:\FR\FM\21AUR2.SGM 21AUR2 emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with RULES2 51834 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 162 / Wednesday, August 21, 2013 / Rules and Regulations commenters noted that the proposed 10% bank equity capital limitation appears to be derived from a 1988 NYSE staff interpretation, which stated that customer reserve accounts may be maintained in money market deposit accounts if the total of such deposits in any one bank does not exceed 50% of the broker-dealer’s excess net capital or 10% of the bank’s equity capital.118 These commenters pointed out that significant changes have taken place with respect to federal bank regulatory agency oversight of the safety and soundness of banks since 1988, including the imposition of prompt corrective action provisions.119 These commenters stated that the concerns that gave rise to the 1988 interpretation have been mitigated by current statutes and regulations requiring prompt corrective action in the event that a bank’s capital position deteriorates.120 As stated above, substantial numbers of banks have failed or required government assistance in recent years.121 Consequently, the rule, as adopted, establishes requirements designed to avoid the situation where a carrying broker-dealer’s cash deposits constitute a substantial portion of the bank’s deposits. At the same time, the proposal has been modified to mitigate concerns raised by commenters that broker-dealers would have to maintain reserve accounts at multiple banks. First, the Commission has eliminated the provision that would have excluded the amount of a cash deposit that exceeds 50% of the broker-dealer’s excess net capital. As noted by comments, this provision likely would have disproportionately impacted small and mid-size broker-dealers when they deposited cash into large commercial banks since they would exceed the excess net capital threshold well before exceeding the bank equity capital threshold.122 Also, based on staff experience monitoring larger brokerdealers, firms that maintain large amounts of cash in their customer reserve accounts generally use more than one non-affiliated bank to maintain these accounts. The bank equity capital threshold is the more important metric since it relates directly to the financial strength of the bank, which is the entity holding the account. Thus, this metric more directly addresses the risk at issue: The potential impairment of the bank’s 118 See 119 See PNC Letter; ABASA Letter. PNC Letter; ABASA Letter. 120 Id. 121 See www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/ banklist.html. 122 See SIFMA 2 Letter; JP Morgan 2 Letter. VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:54 Aug 20, 2013 Jkt 229001 ability to quickly return the customer reserve deposit to the broker-dealer. Second, with respect to the bank equity capital threshold, in response to comments, the Commission has increased the threshold from 10% to 15% of the bank’s equity capital. The increase of the threshold to 15% is designed to address concerns raised by commenters that the proposed percentage tests were unduly restrictive in certain respects and should be modified, particularly with respect to large broker-dealers with large deposit requirements. Consequently, the increase from 10% to 15% is designed to mitigate commenters’ concerns that the 10% threshold would require broker-dealers to spread out cash deposits over a number of banks, while still providing adequate protection against the risk that arises when a bank’s deposit base is overly reliant on a single depositor. The elimination of the 50% of excess net capital threshold and increase in the bank capital threshold from 10% to 15% is intended to address concerns raised by commenters that they would have to substantially alter their current cash deposit practices in light of the goal of the rule to promote the broker-dealer’s ability to have quick access to the deposit. As proposed, the equity capital threshold would have been based on equity capital ‘‘as reported by the bank in its most recent Call Report or Thrift Financial Report.’’ Under the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (‘‘Dodd-Frank Act’’),123 the supervision of savings associations was transferred from the OTS to the OCC (for federal savings associations) and the FDIC (for state savings associations).124 Also, beginning in the period ending March 31, 2012, savings associations began to file a Call Report in lieu of a Thrift Financial Report, thereby ending the use of the Thrift Financial Report.125 Therefore, due to the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act and the elimination of the Thrift Financial Report, as well as to provide more flexibility with regard to any successor reports that may be required to be filed by a bank, the Commission is modifying the phrase ‘‘Call Report or Thrift 123 Public Law 111–203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). at §§ 300–378. See also List of OTS Regulations to be Enforced by the OCC and the FDIC Pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act, OCC, FDIC, (June 14, 2011), 76 FR 39246 (July 6, 2011). Supervision of savings and loan holding companies and their subsidiaries (other than depository institutions) was transferred from the OTS to the Federal Reserve. 125 See Proposed Agency Information Collection Activities; Comment Request, 76 FR 7082 (Feb. 8, 2011). 124 Id. PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 Financial Report’’ to read ‘‘Call Report or any successor form the bank is required to file by its appropriate Federal banking agency (as defined by section 3 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1813))’’. Two commenters expressed concern about the use of a Call Report to determine a bank’s ‘‘equity capital’’ under the rule.126 These commenters noted that there is no equity capital line item in the Call Reports of U.S. branches of foreign banks due to these branches not being separately incorporated legal entities.127 Therefore, the proposed Call Report provision potentially excluded U.S. branches of foreign banks from holding reserve accounts. The commenters stated that for foreign banks, the equity capital can be found in other forms, such as Form FR Y–7, Form FR Y–70, Form 6–K, and Form F– 20, among other financial statements filed with U.S. regulators.128 One commenter suggested the Commission revise the proposed provision to read: ‘‘The amount of the deposit exceeds 10% of the bank’s equity capital (as reported by the bank in its most recent Call Report or Thrift Financial Report if such report includes a line item for ‘equity capital’).’’ 129 Alternatively, these commenters suggested that in lieu of a Call Report a U.S. branch of a foreign bank could periodically obtain a certificate from the bank stating its equity capital (or stating that its equity capital exceeds a specified level).130 The Commission recognizes that the U.S. branches of some foreign banks may meet the definition of bank under section (3)(a)(6) of the Exchange Act and, therefore, also under paragraph (a)(7) of Rule 15c3–3.131 However, the 126 See IIB Letter; SIFMA 4 Letter. 127 Id. 128 Id. 129 See IIB Letter. IIB Letter; SIFMA 4 Letter. 131 The term bank as defined in section 3(a)(6) of the Exchange Act is limited to banks directly regulated by U.S. state or federal bank regulators. The determination whether any particular financial institution meets the requirements of section 3(a)(6) is the responsibility of the financial institution and its counsel. See 15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(6); cf. Securities Issued Or Guaranteed By United States Branches Or Agencies of Foreign Banks; Interpretive Release, Securities Act Release No. 6661 (Sept. 23, 1986), 51 FR 34460 (Sept. 29, 1986) (determination as to whether branch or agency of foreign bank falls within the definition of bank under section 3(a)(2) of Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. 77c(a)(2), is responsibility of issuers and their counsel). However, section 4(d) of the International Banking Act, 12 U.S.C. 3102(d), expressly prohibits agencies of foreign banks established under federal law from receiving deposits or exercising fiduciary powers, criteria necessary for qualification as a bank under section 3(a)(6)(C) of the Exchange Act. See 12 U.S.C. 3102(d); see also Conference of State Bank Supervisors v. Conover, 715 F.2d 604 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 927 (1984) (stating that 130 See E:\FR\FM\21AUR2.SGM 21AUR2 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 162 / Wednesday, August 21, 2013 / Rules and Regulations emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with RULES2 Commission is retaining the requirement that the bank’s equity be determined using its most recent Call Report because U.S. branches of foreign banks generally are not FDIC-insured.132 Consequently, deposits at these institutions would not receive the protections of FDIC insurance in the event of a bank failure. FDIC insurance provides additional protections to cash deposited in a reserve account at a bank in the event of a bank failure that would not be available at an uninsured bank.133 The Commission, however, will consider requests for exemptive relief from broker-dealers that wish to hold a reserve account at a U.S. branch of a foreign bank. For these reasons, the Commission is adopting the final rule to exclude, when determining whether a broker-dealer maintains the minimum deposits required under paragraph (e) of Rule 15c3–3, cash deposited with an affiliated bank as well as cash deposited with an unaffiliated bank ‘‘to the extent that the amount of the deposit exceeds 15% of the bank’s equity capital as reported by the bank in its most recent Call Report or any successor form the bank is required to file by its appropriate Federal banking agency (as defined by section 3 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1813)).’’ 134 As discussed above, the Commission is deleting from the final rule the provision that would have excluded the amount of cash on deposit that exceeds 50% of the broker-dealer’s excess net capital. federally-chartered agencies of foreign banks are prohibited from receiving deposits from foreign, as well as domestic, sources). 132 The FDIC protects depositors’ funds in the event of the financial failure of their bank or savings institution. FDIC deposit insurance covers the balance of each depositor’s account, dollar-fordollar, up to the insurance limit, including principal and any accrued interest through the date of the insured bank’s closing. No depositor has suffered a loss of insured deposits since the FDIC was created in 1933. See FDIC, When a Bank Fails—Facts for Depositors, Creditors, and Borrowers, available at https://fdic.gov/consumers/ banking/facts/. See also Federal Reserve, Structure and Share Data for U.S. Offices of Foreign Banks, available at https://www.federalreserve.gov/ releases/iba/. 133 Id. Therefore, the availability of FDIC insurance could also be a contributing factor to mitigating the risk that an impairment of the reserve deposit at an unaffiliated bank will have a material negative impact on the broker-dealer’s ability to meet its obligations to customers and PAB account holders. See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12864. 134 See paragraph (e)(5) of Rule 15c3–3, as adopted. VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:54 Aug 20, 2013 Jkt 229001 4. Allocation of Customers’ Fully Paid and Excess Margin Securities to Short Positions Paragraph (d) of Rule 15c3–3 currently sets forth steps a broker-dealer must take to retrieve securities from non-control locations if there is a shortfall in the fully paid or excess margin securities it is required to hold for its customers. The actions prescribed in the rule do not include a requirement that the broker-dealer obtain possession or control of a fully paid or excess margin security that is reflected on the broker-dealer’s stock record as a long position of a customer that allocates to a broker-dealer or non-customer short position. In the simplest case, this occurs when the carrying broker-dealer as principal sells short a security to its own customer. Currently, in such a case, the broker-dealer is not required to have possession or control of the security even though its customer has paid for the security in full. Rather, the brokerdealer must include the mark-to-market value of the security as a credit item in the reserve formula. The broker-dealer can use the cash paid by the customer to purchase the security to make any increased deposit requirement caused by the credit item.135 As the Commission stated in the proposing release, this permits the broker-dealer, in effect, to partially monetize the customer’s security.136 This result is contrary to the customer protection goals of Rule 15c3–3, which seek to ensure that broker-dealers do not use customer assets for proprietary purposes.137 To address these concerns, the Commission proposed an amendment to Rule 15c3–3 that would have required a broker-dealer to obtain physical possession or control of customer fully paid and excess margin securities that allocate to a broker-dealer short position.138 Specifically, the proposed amendment would have added a fifth step to take when a deficit arose in the amount of securities the broker-dealer was required to maintain in possession or control; namely that for ‘‘[s]ecurities included on [the broker-dealer’s] books or records as a proprietary short position or as a short position for another person, excluding positions 135 In effect, the broker-dealer has monetized the customer’s security and has to purchase or borrow it, at a future date, to return the customer’s fully paid securities. 136 See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12865. 137 See, e.g., Customer Protection Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 22499 (Oct. 3, 1985), 50 FR 41337 (Oct. 10, 1985). 138 See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12865. PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 51835 covered by paragraph (m) of this section, for more than 10 business days (or more than 30 calendar days if the broker or dealer is a market maker in the securities), [. . .] the broker or dealer shall, not later than the business day following the day on which the determination is made, take prompt steps to obtain physical possession or control of such securities.’’ 139 Eleven commenters addressed this proposed amendment.140 Three commenters urged the Commission to disallow naked short selling of securities and one argued that the Commission should force short sellers to pre-borrow.141 Three commenters generally opposed the proposed rule. They argued that the credit item added to the reserve formula computation when a customer’s fully paid or excess margin security allocates to a short position provides the customer with adequate protection.142 Two of these commenters requested that the 30 calendar days allowed for a brokerdealer acting as a market maker to obtain possession or control over securities allocating to a short position be expanded to include all situations where a broker-dealer must act pursuant to the rule (i.e., not be limited to market maker positions).143 These commenters argued that it would be difficult to distinguish between market maker and non-market maker positions in complying with the proposed rule. Another commenter requested that the Commission reevaluate the proposed amendment because of its potential effects on investment and hedging strategies in addition to the heavy 139 Id. at 12895. Glenn Letter; Bare Letter; Anonymous Letter; SIFMA 2 Letter; First Clearing Letter; Hearne Letter; Deutsche Bank Securities Letter; Citigroup Letter; AMEX Letter; SIFMA 4 Letter; Federated 6 Letter; Raymond James 2 Letter. 141 See Glenn Letter; Bare Letter; Anonymous Letter; Hearne Letter. The Commission has taken a number of measures to strengthen investor protections against potentially abusive ‘‘naked’’ short selling, including adopting rules requiring that fails to deliver resulting from short sales immediately be closed-out and expressly targeting fraud in short selling transactions. See Amendments to Regulation SHO, Exchange Act Release No. 60388 (July 27, 2009), 74 FR 38266 (July 31, 2009); ‘‘Naked’’ Short Selling Antifraud Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 58774 (Oct. 14, 2008), 73 FR 61666 (Oct. 17, 2008). In addition, the Commission adopted a short sale-related price test that, if triggered, imposes a restriction on the prices at which securities may be sold short. See Amendments to Regulation SHO, Exchange Act Release No. 61595 (Feb. 26, 2010), 75 FR 11232 (Mar. 10, 2010). 142 See First Clearing Letter; Deutsche Bank Securities Letter; Citigroup Letter. 143 See Citigroup Letter; Deutsche Bank Securities Letter. 140 See E:\FR\FM\21AUR2.SGM 21AUR2 emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with RULES2 51836 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 162 / Wednesday, August 21, 2013 / Rules and Regulations burden it will impose on short sales.144 One commenter supported the amendments noting that it had ‘‘come to believe . . . that the Commission’s proposal is consistent with the direction of the Commission’s other short sale regulations. . . .’’ 145 As discussed above in section II.A.2.ii. of this release, the Commission has determined that a credit item is sufficient to protect PAB account holders if the carrying broker-dealer provides them with notice that it may be using their non-margin securities, as well as the opportunity to object to such use. The use of the non-margin securities of PAB account holders is a long-standing industry practice. In contrast, customers under Rule 15c3–3, which include the carrying brokerdealer’s retail customers, have an expectation that the fully paid and excess margin securities reflected on their account statements are, in fact, in the possession or control of the carrying broker-dealer. However, as described above, this expectation may be frustrated where the securities are allocated to a short position carried by the broker-dealer, as the securities are not in the possession or control of the broker-dealer. This gap in the existing rule, in effect, permits the broker-dealer to partially monetize the customer’s security. Also, under some circumstances (e.g., a change in the market value of the securities), the amount the broker-dealer may have on deposit in the customer reserve account as a consequence of the credit item may be less than the value of the securities. Consequently, if the broker-dealer fails, sufficient funds may not be readily available to purchase the securities to return them to customers. The use of customer securities in this manner is contrary to the customer protection goals of Rule 15c3–3 and the expectations of a broker-dealer’s customers.146 For these reasons, the Commission is adopting the amendment.147 The Commission agrees, however, that the proposed distinction based upon a broker-dealer’s market maker status could present operational challenges and, consequently, the final rule has been modified to allow a uniform period of 30 calendar days before the possession and control requirement is triggered. Specifically, as adopted, paragraph (d)(4) of Rule 15c3–3 requires a broker144 See Raymond James 2 Letter. SIFMA 4 Letter. SIFMA originally opposed the proposed amendments. See SIFMA 2 Letter. 146 See supra notes 12 and 18, and accompanying text. 147 Current paragraph (d)(4) of Rule 15c3–3 is being re-designated paragraph (d)(5), as proposed. 145 See VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:54 Aug 20, 2013 Jkt 229001 dealer to take prompt steps to obtain physical possession or control over securities of the same issue and class as those included ‘‘on the broker’s or dealer’s books or records that allocate to a short position of the broker or dealer or a short position for another person, excluding positions covered by paragraph (m) of this section, for more than 30 calendar days. . . .’’ 148 The Commission does not believe that lengthening the time from 10 business days to 30 calendar days for non-market maker positions will significantly diminish the protections provided by the new rule.149 Therefore, the Commission is adopting a uniform 30 calendar day time period in the final rule. Three commenters requested that the Commission clarify that the aging process begins when the Rule 15c3–3 possession and control deficit arises and not when the short transaction is executed.150 The proposed amendment was designed to require that the aging process commence at the time a deficit in securities allocating to a short position arises. One commenter 151 also requested that the Commission modify the proposed amendment to specifically exclude an underwriter’s short position created in connection with a distribution of securities until after the later of the completion of such underwriter’s participation in the distribution (as defined in Rule 100 of Regulation M) 152 or the delivery date 148 See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12865–12866. The amendment will not apply to securities that are sold long for a customer but not obtained from the customer within ten days after the settlement date. This circumstance is addressed by paragraph (m) of Rule 15c3–3, which requires the broker-dealer to close the transaction by purchasing securities of like kind and quantity. 17 CFR 240.15c3–3(m). 149 For example, the rule currently has a thirty calendar day time period for securities failed to receive and a forty-five calendar day time period for securities receivable as a result of corporate actions (e.g., stock splits) before the broker-dealer must take prompt steps to obtain possession or control of such securities. See 17 CFR 240.15c3–3(d)(2)–(3). 150 See Deutsche Bank Securities Letter; Citigroup Letter; SIFMA 2 Letter. 151 See SIFMA 2 Letter. The commenter stated: ‘‘Regulation M embodies a carefully crafted scheme for the regulation of secondary market transactions by underwriters and other distribution participants, including the regulation of ‘syndicate covering transactions,’ which should not be disrupted by proposed paragraph (d)(4).’’ Id. In addition, SIFMA commented that where an underwriter sells short to a customer in anticipation of obtaining the securities through the exercise of an overallotment option, paragraph (d)(4) should not require the premature exercise of the overallotment option or the use of secondary market purchases instead of the overallotment option. Id. 152 17 CFR 242.100 through 242.105. More specifically, Rule 100 of Regulation M provides: ‘‘For purposes of regulation M . . . the following definitions shall apply: . . . Completion of PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 for securities acquired in the exercise of any overallotment option (or ‘‘Green Shoe’’).153 The Commission agrees with the commenter that there should be consistency between the final rule and Regulation M.154 Consequently, the Commission has added a sentence to the final rule to clarify that the 30 calendar day period with respect to a syndicate short position established in connection with an offering does not begin to run until the underwriter’s participation in the distribution is complete as determined pursuant to Rule 100(b) of Regulation M.155 Finally, the Commission is adopting the revision to paragraph (n) as proposed to permit broker-dealers to apply to their designated examining authority (‘‘DEA’’) for extensions of time related to paragraph (d)(4).156 5. Importation of Rule 15c3–2 Requirements Into Rule 15c3–3 and Treatment of Free Credit Balances i. Importation of Rule 15c3–2 Rule 15c3–2 requires a broker-dealer holding free credit balances to provide its customers (defined as any person other than a broker-dealer) at least once every three months with a statement of the amount due the customer and a notice that: (1) the funds are not being segregated, but rather are being used in the broker-dealer’s business; and (2) the funds are payable on demand. The rule was adopted in 1964, before the participation in a distribution. . . . A person shall be deemed to have completed its participation in a distribution as follows: . . . (2) [a]n underwriter, when such person’s participation has been distributed, including all other securities of the same class that are acquired in connection with the distribution, and any stabilization arrangements and trading restrictions in connection with the distribution have been terminated; Provided, however, that an underwriter’s participation will not be deemed to have been completed if a syndicate overallotment option is exercised in an amount that exceeds the net syndicate short position at the time of such exercise. . . .’’ 17 CFR 242.100(b). 153 A green shoe or overallotment option is a provision contained in an underwriting agreement that gives the underwriting syndicate the right to purchase additional shares from the issuer or selling security holders (in addition to those initially underwritten by the syndicate) for the purpose of covering any overallotments that are made on behalf of the syndicate in connection with an offering of securities. 154 Rule 100 of Regulation M also provides that an underwriter’s participation will not be deemed to have been completed if a syndicate overallotment option is exercised in an amount that exceeds the net syndicate short position at the time of exercise. 17 CFR 242.100(b). 155 17 CFR 242.100(b). 156 SROs generally have procedures in place for broker-dealers to apply for extensions of time under paragraph (n) of Rule 15c3–3. See, e.g., FINRA Rule 4230. E:\FR\FM\21AUR2.SGM 21AUR2 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 162 / Wednesday, August 21, 2013 / Rules and Regulations emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with RULES2 adoption of Rule 15c3–3 in 1972.157 Since the adoption of Rule 15c3–3, broker-dealers have been limited in their use of customer free credit balances. The Commission proposed importing requirements in Rule 15c3– 2 158 into Rule 15c3–3 and eliminating Rule 15c3–2 as a separate rule in the Code of Federal Regulations.159 The Commission received two comments supporting the proposal.160 The Commission is adopting the amendments substantially as proposed—deleting Rule 15c3–2 and adding paragraph (j)(1) to Rule 15c3–3. The Commission believes it is appropriate to eliminate Rule 15c3–2 as a separate rule because it is largely irrelevant in light of the requirements in Rule 15c3–3. Further, the provisions in Rule 15c3–2 that the Commission wishes to retain are being re-codified in Rule 15c3–3. These provisions include the requirement that broker-dealers inform customers of the amounts due to them and that such amounts are payable on demand.161 Consequently, the Commission is amending Rule 15c3–3 to add new paragraph (j)(1), which provides that ‘‘[a] broker or dealer must not accept or use any free credit balance carried for the account of any customer of the broker or dealer unless such broker or dealer has established adequate procedures pursuant to which each customer for whom a free credit balance is carried will be given or sent, together with or as part of the customer’s statement of account, whenever sent but not less frequently than once every three months, a written statement informing the customer of the amount due to the customer by the broker or dealer on the date of the statement, and that the funds are payable on demand of the customer.’’ 162 157 See Customers’ Free Credit Balances, Exchange Act Release No. 7266 (Mar. 12, 1964), 29 FR 7239 (June 3, 1964). 158 17 CFR 240.15c3–2. 159 See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12867. 160 See SIFMA 2 Letter; SIFMA 4 Letter. 161 Rule 15c3–2 contains an exemption for brokerdealers that also are banking institutions supervised by a Federal authority. This exemption will not be imported into Rule 15c3–3 because there are no broker-dealers left that fit within the exemption. Further, the definition of customer for purposes of the imported 15c3–2 requirements will be the definition of customer in Rule 15c3–3, which is somewhat narrower than the definition in Rule 15c3–2. 162 See paragraph (j)(1) of Rule 15c3–3, as adopted. The Commission also modified the phrase ‘‘[i]t shall be unlawful for a broker or dealer to’’ to the phrase ‘‘[a] broker or dealer must not’’ in order to avoid using the term ‘‘unlawful.’’ Any violation of the rules and regulations promulgated under the Exchange Act is unlawful and therefore it is unnecessary to use this phrase in the final rule. VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:54 Aug 20, 2013 Jkt 229001 ii. Treatment of Free Credit Balances Free credit balances are funds payable by a broker-dealer to its customers on demand.163 They may result from cash deposited by the customer to purchase securities, proceeds from the sale of securities or other assets held in the customer’s account, or earnings from dividends and interest on securities and other assets held in the customer’s account. Broker-dealers may, among other things, pay interest to customers on their free credit balances or offer to routinely transfer (‘‘sweep’’) them to a money market fund or bank account. On occasion, broker-dealers have changed the product to which a customer’s free credit balances are swept—in recent years, most frequently from a money market fund to an interest bearing bank account. Because of differences in these two types of products, including the type of protection afforded the customer in the event of insolvency, there may be investment consequences to the customer when changing from one product to the other. The money market shares—as securities—would receive up to $500,000 in SIPA protection in the event the broker-dealer failed. The bank deposits—as cash—would receive up to $250,000 in protection from the FDIC in the event the bank failed. On the other hand, the money market fund shares may incur market losses; whereas, the full amount of the bank deposit would be guaranteed up to the FDIC’s $250,000 limit. There also may be differences in the amount of interest earned from the two products. In short, there may be consequences to moving a customer’s free credit balances from one product to another, and, accordingly, customers should have a sufficient opportunity to make an informed decision.164 The Commission proposed amendments to Rule 15c3–3 that would have established conditions required to be met in order for a broker-dealer to use or transfer free credit balances in a customer’s securities account.165 More specifically, as initially proposed, the amendments would have structured the new rule to make it unlawful for a broker-dealer to convert, invest, or otherwise transfer to another account or institution free credit balances held in a customer’s account except as provided in the proposed rule.166 The proposed rule then prescribed three conditions to address three different scenarios involving the use or transfer of customer free credit balances. The first scenario 163 See 17 CFR 240.15c3–3(a)(8). Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12866. 165 Id. at 12866–12867. 166 Id. at 12866. 164 See PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 51837 involved the use or transfer of free credit balances outside the context of a routine sweep to a money market fund or bank. As discussed below, proposed paragraph (j)(2)(i) would have prohibited the use or transfer of free credit balances in this scenario unless the customer had specifically ordered or authorized the transaction. The second and third scenarios involved the use or transfer of free credit balances in the context of a program to routinely sweep them to a money market fund or bank account (a ‘‘sweep program’’). As discussed below, proposed paragraph (j)(2)(ii) would have addressed sweep program requirements for accounts opened after the effective date of the rule (‘‘new accounts’’) and proposed paragraph (j)(2)(iii) would have addressed sweep program requirements for accounts existing as of the effective date of the rule (existing accounts). The Commission is adopting new paragraph (j)(2) to Rule 15c3–3 with substantial modifications from the proposed rule in response to comments and to clarify certain portions of the rule.167 As proposed, the first sentence of paragraph (j)(2) of the rule would have established the prohibition with respect to the treatment of free credit balances by providing that ‘‘[i]t shall be unlawful for a broker or dealer to convert, invest, or otherwise transfer to another account or institution, free credit balances held in a customer’s account except as provided in paragraphs (j)(2)(i), (ii) and (iii).’’ 168 The Commission received one comment in response to the proposed text of this first sentence.169 The commenter expressed concern that the proposed text in the first sentence of paragraph (j)(2) could be construed broadly, in effect, to prohibit a brokerdealer from using, investing, or transferring cash deposits that are not swept to other investments or products (and are included as credits in the reserve formula) in the normal course of the broker-dealer’s business, as is currently permitted by Rule 15c3–3. The commenter suggested that the text be 167 In 2005, the NYSE addressed the issue of disclosure in a sweep program context by issuing an information memo to its members discussing, among other things, the disclosure responsibilities of a broker-dealer offering a sweep program to its customers. See Information Memo 05–11 (Feb. 15, 2005). The memo stated that broker-dealers should disclose material differences in interest rates between the different sweep products and, with respect to the bank sweep program, further disclose the terms and conditions, risks and features, conflicts of interest, current interest rates, manner by which future interest rates will be determined, and the nature and extent of FDIC and SIPC protection. 168 See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12896. 169 See SIFMA 2 Letter. E:\FR\FM\21AUR2.SGM 21AUR2 51838 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 162 / Wednesday, August 21, 2013 / Rules and Regulations revised to clarify the scope of the proposed rule by prohibiting a brokerdealer from deducting a free credit balance from the customer’s account at the broker-dealer and transferring it to another institution and investing it in another instrument on behalf of the customer, except as permitted under paragraph (j)(2).170 In response to the comment, as a preliminary matter, cash balances in customer securities accounts must be included as credits in the customer reserve formula. Further, the net amount of the credits over debits must be deposited in a customer reserve account in the form of cash or qualified securities. However, cash credit items that are net of debit items can be used by the broker-dealer for the limited purpose of facilitating transactions of its customers.171 The commenter suggested that proposed paragraph (j)(2) of Rule 15c3–3 could be interpreted to impose new limits on a broker-dealer’s ability to use cash that is an asset on the firm’s balance sheet. In response to this concern, the Commission notes that the prohibition in the first sentence of proposed paragraph (j)(2) of Rule 15c3– 3 is intended to place conditions only on the broker-dealer’s ability to convert the cash asset of the customer (i.e., a receivable from the broker-dealer) into a different type of asset (e.g., a security or an obligation of another institution outside the context of a sweep program) or to transfer the customer’s cash asset to another account. The Commission is adopting paragraph (j)(2) of Rule 15c3–3 with certain technical modifications.172 As adopted paragraph (j)(2) reads: ‘‘A broker or dealer must not convert, emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with RULES2 170 Id. 171 See 17 CFR 240.15c3–3(e)(2) (‘‘It shall be unlawful for any broker or dealer to accept or use any of the amounts under items comprising Total Credits under the formula referred to in paragraph (e)(1) of this section except for the specified purposes indicated under items comprising Total Debits under the formula, and, to the extent Total Credits exceed Total Debits, at least the net amount thereof shall be maintained in the Reserve Bank Account pursuant to paragraph (e)(1) of this section.’’). 172 Specifically, the Commission is replacing the phrase ‘‘[i]t shall be unlawful for a broker or dealer to’’ with the phrase ‘‘[a] broker or dealer must not’’ because—as noted above—any violation of the rules and regulations promulgated under the Exchange Act is unlawful and therefore it is unnecessary to use this phrase in the final rule. The Commission also is replacing the phrase ‘‘free credit balance’’ with the phrase ‘‘credit balances’’ to clarify that this provision covers both free credit balances and other credit balances. See 17 CFR 240.15c3–3(a)(8)–(9) (defining free credit balances and other credit balances). The Commission is deleting the word ‘‘otherwise’’ because it would be redundant. Finally, the rule text does not include a reference to paragraph (j)(2)(iii), as proposed, because this paragraph was deleted from the final rule text. VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:54 Aug 20, 2013 Jkt 229001 invest, or transfer to another account or institution, credit balances held in a customer’s account except as provided in paragraphs (j)(2)(i) and (ii) of this section.’’ 173 a. Treatment of Free Credit Balances Outside of a Sweep Program As proposed, paragraph (j)(2)(i) of Rule 15c3–3 would have permitted a broker-dealer to convert, invest or otherwise transfer to another account or institution free credit balances held in a customer’s account only upon a specific order, authorization, or draft from the customer, and only in the manner, and under the terms and conditions, specified in the order, authorization, or draft.174 This catchall provision would have applied to any use or transfer of customer free credit balances outside the context of a sweep program. The Commission proposed paragraph (j)(2)(i) in order to comprehensively cover the range of possibilities with respect to the disposition of free credit balances in a customer account other than pursuant to a sweep program. The Commission received two comments recommending that proposed paragraph (j)(2)(i) be clarified to permit a brokerdealer to obtain a one-time consent to ongoing transfers of any free credit balances to a customer to another account, entity or product (outside of a sweep program).175 The commenters noted that customers, for example, may prefer that free credit balances be regularly transferred to a linked account in their name at another broker-dealer or bank that is not part of a sweep program, and that this clarification would enable a broker-dealer to efficiently handle such customer requests by eliminating the need to obtain individual ‘‘specific orders’’ for repeated transfers that are substantially identical.176 The Commission agrees with the commenters that a customer may consent to ongoing routine transfers from the customer’s account outside of a sweep program without obtaining the customer’s specific consent for each individual transfer, provided the customer has consented to the ongoing transfers under paragraph (j)(2)(i) of Rule 15c3–3. This scenario would already be covered by the proposed rule, and, therefore, the Commission is adopting paragraph (j)(2)(i) substantially as proposed, with 173 See paragraph (j)(2) of Rule 15c3–3, as adopted. 174 See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12866. 175 See SIFMA 2 Letter; E*Trade 2 Letter. 176 Id. PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 certain technical modifications.177 As adopted, paragraph (j)(2)(i) of Rule 15c3–3 reads: ‘‘A broker or dealer is permitted to invest or transfer to another account or institution, free credit balances in a customer’s account only upon a specific order, authorization, or draft from the customer, and only in the manner, and under the terms and conditions, specified in the order, authorization, or draft.’’ 178 Finally, one commenter stated that both regulators and firms need the flexibility to remove funds from a reserve account to cover extraordinary requests for payment of customer free credit balances.179 However, the commenter noted that ‘‘in light of recent market events, we withdraw our earlier proposal to allow such withdrawals under specified conditions and instead recommend that such withdrawals be permitted only by approval of Commission staff or a broker-dealer’s [DEA].’’ 180 Broker-dealers currently may make withdrawals under paragraph (g) of Rule 15c3–3.181 In light of the risks that could arise to customer funds, the Commission does not believe it would be appropriate at this time to expand a firm’s ability to make additional withdrawals from its reserve account. b. Treatment of Free Credit Balances in a Sweep Program The second and third set of conditions in the proposed rules addressed using or transferring free credit balances in the context of a sweep program.182 In particular, the Commission proposed four conditions with respect to using or transferring free credit balances in a sweep program. A broker-dealer would have been required to meet: (1) all four conditions with respect to free credit balances in new accounts; 183 and (2) the second, third, and fourth conditions with respect to 177 See paragraph (j)(2)(i) of Rule 15c3–3, as adopted. The technical changes delete the words ‘‘convert’’ and ‘‘otherwise’’ from the final rule because a broker-dealer would be prohibited from ‘‘converting’’ a customer’s free credit balances and, therefore, it is not necessary to include the word in the final rule. The word ‘‘otherwise’’ is redundant. 178 Id. 179 See SIFMA 4 Letter. 180 Id. In its June 15, 2007 comment letter, SIFMA urged ‘‘the Commission to consider allowing a broker-dealer to remove funds from a reserve account to cover a large same-day request for payment of a free credit balance, as long as the free credit balance was included in the latest Rule 15c3– 3 reserve computation and the broker-dealer begins a new reserve computation as of that date.’’ See SIFMA 2 Letter. 181 17 CFR 240.15c3–3(g). 182 See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12866. 183 See paragraph (j)(2)(ii)(A)–(D) of Rule 15c3–3, as adopted. E:\FR\FM\21AUR2.SGM 21AUR2 emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with RULES2 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 162 / Wednesday, August 21, 2013 / Rules and Regulations free credit balances in existing accounts.184 The four conditions were: 1. The customer has previously affirmatively consented to such treatment of the free credit balances after being notified of the different general types of money market mutual fund and bank account products in which the broker or dealer may transfer the free credit balances and the applicable terms and conditions that would apply if the broker or dealer changes the product or type of product in which free credit balances are transferred; 2. The broker or dealer provides the customer on an ongoing basis with all disclosures and notices regarding the investment and deposit of free credit balances as required by the selfregulatory organizations for which the broker or dealer is a member; 3. The broker or dealer provides notice to the customer as part of the customer’s quarterly statement of account that the money market mutual funds or bank deposits to which the free credit balances have been transferred can be liquidated on the customer’s demand and held as free credit balances; and 4. The broker or dealer provides the customer with at least 30 calendar days notice before the free credit balances would begin being transferred to a different product, different product type, or into the same product but under materially different terms and conditions. The notice must describe the new money market fund, bank deposit type, or terms and conditions, and how the customer can notify the broker or dealer if the customer chooses not to have the free credit balances transferred to the new product or product type, or under the new terms and conditions. Commenters generally agreed with the fundamental principle embodied in the proposal—that customer free credit balances should not be transferred from an obligation of the broker-dealer to an obligation of another entity without the customer’s authorization.185 Other commenters supported the proposed disclosures but suggested additional disclosures be made to customers, including clarification with respect to other protections available to the customer.186 Two commenters stated that the practice of sweep programs should be banned entirely or that the Commission should adopt a ‘‘harder 184 See paragraph (j)(2)(iii)(A)–(C) of Rule 15c3– 3, as adopted. 185 See SIFMA 2 Letter; First Clearing Letter; Pace Letter. 186 See SIPC Letter. VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:54 Aug 20, 2013 Jkt 229001 stance’’ and require more than just disclosure.187 One commenter responded to the Commission’s request for comment as to the cost burdens that would result if the first condition (set forth in proposed paragraph (j)(2)(ii)(A)) to obtain a new customer’s prior agreement were to be applied to existing customers. The commenter stated that such costs would be substantial because broker-dealers would be required to amend their agreements with all existing customers.188 One commenter stated that the amendments in the proposing release did not adequately address situations in which brokerdealers change customer account elections without first obtaining customer authorization.189 In adopting the final rule, the Commission has made some modifications to the language in the proposed rule in response to commenters and to clarify its application. For clarification and in response to comments, the Commission has defined the term Sweep Program in paragraph (a)(17) of Rule 15c3–3 to identify the types of transactions and products to which the new provisions apply. Commenters raised concerns about limitations on the types of products broker-dealers could use for sweep arrangements under the proposed amendments. Three commenters suggested that the Commission should not limit the types of products brokerdealers can use for sweep arrangements to money market funds and bank deposit products.190 Sweep programs provide a mechanism for excess cash in a customer’s securities account to be held in a manner that allows the customer to earn interest on the funds but retain the flexibility to quickly access that cash to purchase securities or withdraw it.191 In effect, transferring this excess cash to a bank account or money market fund is an alternative to retaining a credit balance in the customer’s securities 187 See Ellis Letter; Dworkin Letter. One commenter stated that broker-dealers profit from ‘‘excessive’’ fees charged to clients who opt out of the sweep programs. See Ellis Letter. The second commenter suggested that the broker-dealer’s ‘‘customer has been effectively denied the opportunity to opt out of bank account sweeps by [the broker-dealer] preventing him or her from utilizing any other vehicle to park his or her free credit balances. . . .’’ See Dworkin Letter. The commenter noted that by opting out of the sweep, the customer is ‘‘confined to a situation where the free credit balance cannot earn any kind of return at all[.]’’ Id. 188 See SIFMA 2 Letter. 189 See Waddell Letter. 190 See SIFMA 2 Letter; First Clearing Letter; Raymond James 2 Letter. 191 See Ellis Letter; Dworkin Letter. PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 51839 account. The final rule is designed to accommodate this alternative by providing broker-dealers with flexibility in the operation of sweep programs. The Commission believes it is appropriate to confine this flexibility to products that approximate the holding of a customer’s excess cash in a securities account. The Commission does not view sweep accounts as a mechanism for investing customers’ excess cash without their specific consent in longer term or more volatile assets. For these reasons, the Commission does not believe it would be appropriate to expand the products covered by the final rule beyond money market funds as described in Rule 2a– 7 under the Investment Company Act of 1940 or an account at an insured bank as described in paragraph (a)(17) of Rule 15c3–3. Consequently, paragraph (a)(17) of Rule 15c3–3, as adopted, states ‘‘[t]he term Sweep Program means a service provided by a broker or dealer where it offers to its customers the option to automatically transfer free credit balances in the securities account of the customer to either a money market mutual fund product as described in [Rule 2a–7] or an account at a bank whose deposits are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.’’ 192 The Commission intended that the definition of Sweep Program provide that the bank to which free credits are swept be insured by the FDIC.193 The revised text of the rule makes this explicit. Finally, under this definition, a one-time or other special transfer of a customer’s free credit balances would not qualify as a Sweep Program. Three commenters raised the issue of bulk transfers.194 They argued that the rule should allow broker-dealers to process bulk transfers of customer assets between, for instance, one money market fund and another money market fund or a bank deposit product and a money market fund. These commenters identify a potential ambiguity in the rule as proposed; namely, how transfers from one Sweep Program product to another Sweep Program product are to be handled under the rule if they do not involve passing funds through the 192 See paragraph (a)(17) of Rule 15c3–3, as adopted. 193 See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12866 (‘‘[T]he bank deposit would be guaranteed up to the FDIC’s $100,000 limit.’’). FDIC insurance covers all deposit accounts, including checking and savings accounts, money market deposit accounts and certificates of deposit. The standard insurance amount is currently $250,000 per depositor, per insured bank, for each account ownership category. 12 CFR 330.1(o). 194 See SIFMA 2 Letter; First Clearing Letter; E*Trade 2 Letter. E:\FR\FM\21AUR2.SGM 21AUR2 51840 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 162 / Wednesday, August 21, 2013 / Rules and Regulations customer’s securities account. To address this issue, paragraph (j)(2)(ii) of Rule 15c3–3 is being modified from the proposal to clarify that the conditions for operating a Sweep Program (which are set forth in paragraphs (j)(2)(ii)(A) and (B)) will apply to: (1) The transfer of free credit balances from a customer’s securities account to a product in a Sweep Program; and (2) the transfer of a customer’s interest in one Sweep Program product to another Sweep Program product. This will address both bulk transfers 195 of customer positions from one product (e.g., a money market fund) to another (e.g., a bank deposit product) and transfers of individual customer positions from one product to another. The Commission is modifying paragraph (j)(2)(ii) of Rule 15c3–3 from the proposal to delete the phrase ‘‘to either a money market mutual fund as described in § 270.2a–7 of this chapter or an interest bearing account at a bank without a specific order, authorization or draft for each such transfer, provided’’ and instead to use the term Sweep Program as defined in paragraph (a)(17) of the final rule. The Commission also replaced the phrase ‘‘the account of a customer’’ with the phrase ‘‘a customer’s securities account’’ to clarify that paragraph (j)(2)(ii) and its required conditions apply to the transfer of free credit balances in connection with a customer’s securities account, in addition to the bulk transfers described above.196 As adopted, paragraph (j)(2)(ii) to Rule 15c3–3 reads, in pertinent part: ‘‘[a] broker or dealer is permitted to transfer free credit balances held in a customer’s securities account to a product in its Sweep Program or to transfer a customer’s interest in one product in a Sweep Program to another product in a Sweep Program, provided’’ the conditions set forth in paragraphs (j)(2)(ii)(A) and (B) are met.197 195 See emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with RULES2 also NASD Rule 2510 (Discretionary Accounts) (providing an exception from the NASD rule for ‘‘bulk exchanges at net asset value of money market mutual funds . . . utilizing negative response letters provided: (A) The bulk exchange is limited to situations involving mergers and acquisitions of funds, changes of clearing members and exchanges of funds used in sweep accounts; (B) The negative response letter contains a tabular comparison of the nature and amount of the fees charged by each fund; (C) The negative response letter contains a comparative description of the investment objectives of each fund and a prospectus of the fund to be purchased; and (D) The negative response feature will not be activated until at least 30 days after the date on which the letter was mailed.’’). 196 The final rule also deletes the phrase ‘‘opened on or after the effective date of this paragraph’’ from paragraph (j)(2)(ii) and moves it to paragraph (j)(2)(ii)(A), as described below. 197 See paragraph (j)(2)(ii) of Rule 15c3–3, as adopted. As adopted, paragraphs (j)(2)(ii)(A) and (B) establish four conditions that must be met to lawfully transfer a customer’s free credit balances to a product in a Sweep Program or to transfer a customer’s interest directly from one product in a Sweep Program to another product in a Sweep Program. The first condition—set forth in paragraph (j)(2)(ii)(A)—applies only with respect to accounts opened on or after the effective date of the rule. This addresses the burden that would have been associated with having brokerdealers re-document existing accounts. The remaining three conditions—set forth in paragraph (j)(2)(ii)(B)(1) through (3)—apply to both existing and new accounts. Paragraph (j)(2)(ii)(A), as adopted, provides that for an account opened on or after the effective date of the rule, the customer must give prior written affirmative consent to having free credit balances in the customer’s securities account included in the Sweep Program after being notified: (1) Of the general terms and conditions of the products available through the Sweep Program; and (2) that the broker or dealer may change the products available under the Sweep Program.198 As stated above, the Commission has modified paragraph (j)(2)(ii)(A) in the final rule to read ‘‘the customer gives prior written affirmative consent to having free credit balances in the customer’s securities account included in the Sweep Program after being notified. . . .’’ 199 The Commission modified this paragraph to incorporate the term Sweep Program as defined in paragraph (a)(17) of the rule and the reference to the ‘‘customer’s securities account’’ to make this paragraph consistent with other modifications to paragraph (j)(2) of the final rule. Additionally, the Commission modified this paragraph to clarify that the customer’s consent must be written, VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:54 Aug 20, 2013 Jkt 229001 198 See paragraph (j)(2)(ii)(A) of Rule 15c3–3, as adopted. 199 Id. The proposed rule stated the ‘‘customer has previously affirmatively consented to such treatment of the free credit balances after being notified of . . . .’’ In addition, as noted above, the phrase ‘‘accounts opened on or after the effective date of this paragraph’’ was deleted from proposed paragraph (j)(2)(ii) and moved to paragraph (j)(2)(ii)(A), with the reference to specific paragraph (j)(2)(ii) inserted after the word ‘‘paragraph.’’ Moving this phrase to paragraph (j)(2)(ii)(A) simplifies the final rule by eliminating the necessity of codifying two largely overlapping sets of conditions, with three of the conditions being repeated in both paragraphs. The effect of this change is to make the first condition only applicable to new accounts and the remaining conditions (paragraph (j)(2)(ii)(B)(1) through (3)) applicable to both new and existing accounts. The word ‘‘accounts’’ also has been replaced with the phrase ‘‘an account.’’ PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 consistent with the discussion in the proposing release, which noted customer consent could be given in an account opening agreement.200 The Commission received one comment stating that the text of proposed paragraph (j)(2)(ii)(A) that would have required the disclosure of ‘‘applicable terms and conditions that will apply if the broker or dealer changes the product or type of product’’ could be read to require highly specific disclosure about product terms and conditions that may only be established or modified in the future and, therefore, are unknown at the time the customer opens an account with the brokerdealer.201 In addition, the commenter stated that under proposed paragraph (j)(2)(ii)(D), a broker-dealer would already be required to describe any changes to the terms and conditions it makes contemporaneously with such changes. Given this type of notice, the commenter stated that there is no need for the type of generalized (and therefore less effective) disclosure that would have been required by paragraph (j)(2)(ii)(A). The Commission agrees with the commenter and, therefore, has deleted the phrase ‘‘transfer the free credit balances and the applicable terms and conditions that will apply if the broker or dealer changes the product or type of product in which the free credit balances are transferred. . . .’’ In its place, the Commission is adopting language in paragraph (j)(2)(ii)(A)(2) of Rule 15c3–3 under which the brokerdealer must notify the customer that the broker or dealer may change the products available under the Sweep Program.202 Paragraph (j)(2)(ii)(B), as adopted, prescribes the following three conditions to sweeping the customer’s free credit balances in a new or existing account: • The broker-dealer provides the customer with the disclosures and notices regarding the Sweep Program required by each SRO of which the broker-dealer is a member; 203 • The broker-dealer provides notice to the customer, as part of the customer’s quarterly statement of account, that the balance in the bank deposit account or shares of the money market mutual fund in which the customer has a beneficial interest can be liquidated on the customer’s order and the proceeds 200 See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12866 (‘‘[T]he customer would need to agree prior to the change (e.g., in the account opening agreement) that the broker-dealer could switch the sweep option between those two types of products.’’). 201 See SIFMA 2 Letter. 202 See paragraph (j)(2)(ii)(A)(2) of Rule 15c3–3, as adopted. 203 See paragraph (j)(2)(ii)(B) of Rule 15c3–3, as adopted. E:\FR\FM\21AUR2.SGM 21AUR2 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 162 / Wednesday, August 21, 2013 / Rules and Regulations returned to the securities account or remitted to the customer; 204 and • The broker-dealer provides the customer with written notice at least 30 calendar days before: (1) Making changes to the terms and conditions of the Sweep Program; (2) making changes to the terms and conditions of a product currently available through the Sweep Program; (3) changing, adding or deleting products available through the Sweep Program; or (4) changing the customer’s investment through the Sweep Program from one product to another; and the notice describes the new terms and conditions of the Sweep Program or product or the new product, and the options available to the customer if the customer does not accept the new terms and conditions or product.205 As proposed, paragraph (j)(2)(ii)(B) of Rule 15c3–3 would have required that the broker-dealer provide these disclosures and notices ‘‘on an ongoing basis.’’ Three commenters stated that there are no current SRO requirements that broker-dealers make disclosures concerning sweep arrangements on an ‘‘ongoing basis’’ and that the Commission should clarify the source and meaning of this requirement.206 The Commission has deleted the phrase ‘‘ongoing basis’’ from the final rule. As adopted, the Commission has also modified the text in paragraph (j)(2)(ii)(B), now paragraph (j)(2)(ii)(B)(1), to delete the phrase ‘‘investment and deposit of free credit balances as’’ and inserted the phrase ‘‘Sweep Program’’ to incorporate the definition in paragraph (a)(17). Finally, the Commission has modified the phrase ‘‘the self-regulatory organizations’’ to read ‘‘each selfregulatory organization of’’ to clarify that the broker-dealer must provide the notices and disclosures required by each SRO of which it is a member (including an SRO that is not its DEA).207 As adopted, paragraph (j)(2)(ii)(B)(2) states that the broker-dealer must provide information on a quarterly basis with respect to the customer’s balance in an account or fund ‘‘in which the customer has a beneficial interest.’’ 208 The rule text has been modified to account for the fact that customers can have a beneficial interest in accounts in their name and in omnibus accounts in 204 Id. emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with RULES2 205 Id. 206 See SIFMA 2 Letter; First Clearing Letter; Raymond James 2 Letter. 207 See 17 CFR 240.17d–1. 208 See paragraph (j)(2)(ii)(B)(2) of Rule 15c3–3, as adopted. More specifically, the Commission modified the phrase ‘‘that the money market mutual funds or bank deposits to which the free credit balances have been transferred’’ to read ‘‘that the balance in the bank deposit account or shares of the money market mutual fund in which the customer has a beneficial interest. . . .’’ VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:54 Aug 20, 2013 Jkt 229001 the name of a custodian in which the assets of multiple customers are commingled. The Commission also modified language in paragraph (j)(2)(ii)(B)(2) of Rule 15c3–3 to replace the phrase ‘‘on the customer’s demand’’ with the phrase ‘‘on the customer’s order’’ to address concerns by two commenters that the former phrase could lead customers to believe that they will receive immediate re-payment of those funds, or they could revert to holding those funds as free credit balances at the broker-dealer.209 These commenters pointed out that the disclosed terms of most sweep programs allow the money market fund or bank up to seven days to meet requests for withdrawals. Further, there are some broker-dealers that do not allow customers to maintain free credit balances in securities accounts. In response to these comments, the Commission has deleted the phrase ‘‘demand and held as free credit balances’’ and replaced it with the phrase ‘‘and the proceeds returned to the securities account or remitted to the customer.’’ This language is designed to account for broker-dealers that do not offer customers the option of having their funds held as free credit balances. In such cases, the broker-dealer would remit the funds withdrawn from the bank or derived from redeeming money market shares directly to the customer (e.g., by transferring them to the customer’s bank account). Proposed paragraphs (j)(2)(ii)(D) and (iii)(C)—now paragraph (j)(2)(ii)(B)(3)— would have required the broker-dealer to provide the customer with notice at least thirty days before the broker-dealer begins transferring the customer’s free credit balances to a different product or product type, or into the same product but under materially different terms and conditions.210 As adopted, paragraph (j)(2)(ii)(B)(3) will require broker-dealers to provide customers written notice at least 30 calendar days before the brokerdealer: (1) Makes changes to the terms and conditions of the Sweep Program; (2) makes changes to the terms and conditions of a product currently available through the Sweep Program; (3) changes, adds, or deletes products available through the Sweep Program; or (4) changes the customer’s investment through the Sweep Program from one product to another.211 This modification 209 See SIFMA 2 Letter. Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12896. 211 A broker-dealer could request exemptive relief from the rule in unusual or emergency cases where it may be impractical or contrary to investor protection for a broker-dealer to first provide customers 30 days’ written notice under the rule 210 See PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 51841 to the final rule is in response to commenters’ requests that the Commission provide clarity with respect to when the thirty day notice requirement would be triggered.212 In response to comments, the final rule is designed to make clear that the triggering event for the thirty day notice is not exclusively related to the transfer of the customer’s free credit balances, but rather changes relating to the terms and conditions of the Sweep Program, as well as, the products available through the Sweep Program. This greater specificity should enhance the protections under the final rule by providing greater certainty that the customer will have time to evaluate available options before a change to the Sweep Program is put into effect. In addition, paragraphs (j)(2)(ii)(B)(3)(i)(A)–(D) of Rule 15c3–3 require the broker-dealer to provide the customer with written notice at least 30 calendar days before: (1) Making changes to the terms and conditions of the Sweep Program; (2) making changes to the terms and conditions of a product currently available through the Sweep Program; (3) changing, adding or deleting products available through the Sweep Program; or (4) changing the customer’s investment through the Sweep Program from one product to another.213 Collectively, these provisions provide more specificity about the types of disclosures and notices required under the final rule than under the proposal. Further, the final rule includes the word ‘‘written’’ before the word ‘‘notice’’ to make explicit that a written notice is required. As adopted, paragraph (j)(2)(ii)(B)(3)(ii) requires that ‘‘[t]he notice must describe the new terms and conditions of the Sweep Program or product or the new product, and the options available to the customer if the customer does not accept the new terms and conditions or product.’’ 214 The Commission modified the final rule in response to a comment regarding the text of proposed paragraphs (j)(2)(ii)(D) and (iii)(C).215 The commenter stated that, as drafted, proposed paragraphs (j)(2)(ii)(D) and (iii)(C) would have required a broker-dealer to disclose before taking one of these actions. See, e.g., paragraph (k)(3) to Rule 15c3–3. 212 See SIFMA 2 Letter; First Clearing Letter; Cornell Letter; E*Trade Letter. 213 See paragraph (j)(2)(ii)(B)(3)(i) of Rule 15c3–3, as adopted. The requirements set forth in final paragraph (j)(2)(ii)(B)(3)(i) were proposed as paragraphs (j)(2)(ii)(D) and (iii)(C). 214 See paragraph (j)(2)(ii)(B)(ii) of Rule 15c3–3, as adopted. The final rule codifies this text in a separate paragraph in order to emphasize the specific items the notice must contain. 215 See SIFMA 2 Letter. E:\FR\FM\21AUR2.SGM 21AUR2 51842 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 162 / Wednesday, August 21, 2013 / Rules and Regulations ‘‘how the customer can notify the [broker-dealer] if the customer chooses not to have the free credit balances transferred to the new product or product type, or under new terms and conditions.’’ 216 The commenter stated that these paragraphs appear to assume that the customer will have the option of continuing to have free credit balances treated as they were prior to the change to the sweep arrangement.217 The commenter pointed out that, in fact, the broker-dealer may elect not to continue offering the prior sweep options and not to offer another sweep product.218 To account for this possibility, the Commission has revised the text in paragraph (j)(2)(ii)(B)(3)(ii) 219 to require the broker-dealer to provide the customer with a notice that contains a description of the options available to the customer if the customer does not wish to accept the new terms and conditions or product.220 This is intended to give customers sufficient opportunity to make an informed decision in connection with a Sweep Program. 6. ‘‘Proprietary Accounts’’ Under the Commodity Exchange Act Some broker-dealers also are registered as futures commission merchants under the Commodity Exchange Act (‘‘CEA’’). These firms carry both securities and commodities accounts for customers. The definition of free credit balances in paragraph (a)(8) of Rule 15c3–3 does not include funds carried in commodities accounts that are segregated in accordance with the requirements of the CEA.221 However, regulations promulgated under the CEA exclude certain types of accounts (‘‘proprietary accounts’’) from the CEA’s segregation requirements.222 216 Id. 217 Id. emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with RULES2 218 Id. 219 More specifically, paragraph (j)(2)(ii)(B)(3)(ii) provides that ‘‘the notice must describe the new terms and conditions of the Sweep Program or product or the new product, and the options available to the customer if the customer does not accept the new terms and conditions or product.’’ A customer that does not accept the new terms and conditions or product would need to change how free credit balances are treated by, for example, selecting investments outside the Sweep Program or having the balances transferred to an account at another financial institution. 220 See Dworkin Letter. 221 17 CFR 240.15c3–3(a)(8). 222 Rule 1.20 requires a futures commission merchant to segregate customer funds. See 17 CFR 1.20. Rule 1.3(k) defines the term customer for this purpose. See 17 CFR 1.3(k). The definition of customer excludes persons who own or hold a proprietary account as that term is defined in Rule 1.3(y). See 17 CFR 1.3(y). Generally, the definition of proprietary account refers to persons who have an ownership interest in the futures commission merchant. Id. VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:54 Aug 20, 2013 Jkt 229001 This exclusion from the segregation requirements under the CEA has raised a question as to whether a broker-dealer must treat payables to customers in proprietary commodities accounts as ‘‘free credit balances’’ when performing a customer reserve computation.223 In response to this question, the Commission notes that the objective of the customer reserve requirement in Rule 15c3–3 is to require broker-dealers to hold sufficient funds or qualified securities to facilitate the prompt return of customer property to customers either before or during a liquidation proceeding if the firm fails.224 Under SIPA, customer property generally does not include funds held in a commodities account.225 Therefore, funds held in a proprietary commodities account generally would not constitute customer property and persons having 223 See Part 241-Interpretive Releases Relating to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and General Rules and Regulations Thereunder, Exchange Act Release No. 9922 (Jan. 2, 1973), 38 FR 1737 (Jan. 18, 1973) (interpreting the credit balance used in Item 1 of the Rule 15c3–3a formula ‘‘to include the net balance due to customers in non-regulated commodities accounts reduced by any deposits of cash or securities with any clearing organization or clearing broker in connection with the open contracts in such accounts’’). 224 See Capital, Margin, and Segregation Requirements for Security-Based Swap Dealers and Major Security-Based Swap Participants and Capital Requirements for Broker-Dealers, Exchange Act Release No. 68071 (Oct. 18, 2012), 77 FR 70214, 70274 (Nov. 23, 2012) (describing rationale and requirements of Rule 15c3–3 segregation requirements). See also Broker-Dealers; Maintenance of Certain Basic Reserves, Exchange Act Release No. 9856 (Nov. 10, 1972), 37 FR 25224, 25225 (Nov. 29, 1972) (stating that the intent of Rule 15c3–3 is, among other things, to ‘‘facilitate the liquidations of insolvent broker-dealers and to protect customer assets in the event of a SIPC liquidation through a clear delineation in Exchange Act Rule 15c3–3 of specifically identifiable property of customers.’’); Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12862, 12868. 225 As noted above, customer property under SIPA includes ‘‘cash and securities (except customer name securities delivered to the customer) at any time received, acquired, or held by or for the account of the debtor from or for the securities accounts of a customer, and the proceeds of any such property transferred by the debtor, including property unlawfully converted.’’ 15 U.S.C. 78lll(4). To receive protection under SIPA, a claimant must first qualify as a customer as that term is defined in the statute. Generally, a customer is any person who has: (1) ‘‘a claim on account of securities received, acquired, or held by the [broker-dealer];’’ (2) ‘‘deposited cash with the debtor for the purposes of purchasing securities;’’ (3) ‘‘a claim against the debtor for. . .[positions]. . .received, acquired, or held in a portfolio margin account carried as a securities account pursuant to a portfolio margining program approved by the Commission;’’ or (4) ‘‘a claim against the [broker-dealer] arising out of sales or conversions of such securities.’’ See 15 U.S.C. 78lll(2)(A)–(B). The definition of security in SIPA specifically excludes commodities and nonsecurities futures contracts and, thus, a person with a claim for such assets (not held in a portfolio margin account carried as a securities account) would not meet the definition of customer. See 15 U.S.C. 78lll(14). PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 claims to those funds would not be customers under SIPA.226 Moreover, the regulations under the CEA similarly provide the persons having claims to funds in proprietary commodities accounts are not customers for purposes of those regulations.227 For these reasons, the Commission proposed a specific amendment to the definition of the term free credit balances in paragraph (a)(8) of Rule 15c3–3 that would have clarified that funds held in a commodities account meeting the definition of a proprietary account under CEA regulations are not to be included as free credit balances in the customer reserve formula.228 As discussed below, the Commission is adopting the amendment substantially as proposed. The Commission received three comments in support of the proposed rule change.229 One commenter requested that the Commission clarify that the relevant definition of proprietary account for these purposes is the definition contained in Rule 1.3(y) under the CEA. While Rule 1.3(y) under the CEA currently contains the relevant definition of proprietary account for the purpose of the amendment, the definition could be codified in a different rule in the future. Consequently, the Commission is adopting the final rule amendment to paragraph (a)(8) of Rule 15c3–3, as proposed. Thus, the final rule does not include specific references to a specific rule. Rather, the amendment to paragraph (a)(8) to Rule 15c3–3, as adopted, more generally refers to a ‘‘proprietary account as that term is defined in regulations under the Commodity Exchange Act.’’ As stated above, this amendment to paragraph (a)(8) of Rule 15c3–3 is designed to clarify that funds held in a commodities account meeting the definition of a proprietary account under CEA regulations are not to be included as ‘‘free credit balances’’ in the customer reserve formula. Under Item 1 of Rule 15c3–3a, however, cash balances that do not meet the definition of free credit balances (e.g., because they are not subject to immediate payment) are included in the customer reserve formula if they meet the definition of other credit balances under paragraph 226 Id. 227 See 17 CFR 1.3(k). Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12868. The Commission proposed additional amendments to paragraph (a)(8) of Rule 15c3–3 related to portfolio margining. See also discussion below in section II.B. of this release. 229 See SIPC Letter; SIFMA 2 Letter; SIFMA 4 Letter. 228 See E:\FR\FM\21AUR2.SGM 21AUR2 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 162 / Wednesday, August 21, 2013 / Rules and Regulations emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with RULES2 (a)(9) of Rule 15c3–3.230 Therefore, in order to remove any ambiguity as to the proper exclusion of proprietary accounts under the CEA from Rule 15c3–3, the Commission also is amending the definition of the term other credit balances in the final rule to delete the words ‘‘as aforesaid’’ and insert the phrase ‘‘in accordance with the Commodity Exchange Act or in a similar manner, or funds carried in a proprietary account as that term is defined in regulations under the Commodity Exchange Act.’’ 231 Consequently, the amendments clarify that both free credit balances and other credit balances as defined in Rule 15c3– 3 do not include funds carried in proprietary accounts under the CEA. One commenter also suggested that due to the changes to the swap markets mandated by Title VII of the DoddFrank Act, swap accounts (in addition to commodities accounts) are now subject to customer protection rules under the CEA.232 This commenter suggested that the Commission make it clear that funds in swap accounts also do not constitute free credit balances, whether those funds are required to be segregated by rules under the CEA (e.g., cleared swap accounts or uncleared swap accounts that have opted for segregation) or excepted from segregation under the CEA (e.g., cleared swaps proprietary accounts or uncleared swap accounts that have not opted for segregation). The commenter noted this treatment ‘‘would be consistent with the treatment of funds in commodities accounts and with the regulation of swap accounts under the CEA.’’ 233 The Commission agrees there may be additional accounts under the CEA, as amended by the Dodd-Frank Act, that should explicitly be excluded from the definition of free credit balances under Rule 15c3–3. However, the amendments today are designed to clarify the specific question raised with respect to the treatment of funds in proprietary commodities accounts under the CEA and, consequently, the suggestions by 230 Item 1 of Rule 15c3–3a requires a brokerdealer to include in the customer reserve formula ‘‘free credit balances and other credit balances in customers’ security accounts.’’ Paragraph (a)(9) of Rule 15c3–3 defines other credit balances as ‘‘cash liabilities of a broker or dealer to customers other than free credit balances and funds in commodities accounts segregated as aforesaid.’’ 17 CFR 240.15c3–3(a)(9). 231 See paragraph (a)(9) to Rule 15c3–3. See also comments and additional amendments to paragraph (a)(9) of Rule 15c3–3 discussed in section II.B. of this release. 232 See SIFMA 4 Letter. 233 Id. VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:54 Aug 20, 2013 Jkt 229001 the commenter are beyond the scope of this rulemaking. 7. Expansion of the Definition of ‘‘Qualified Securities’’ To Include Certain Money Market Funds A broker-dealer is limited to depositing cash or qualified securities into the bank account it maintains to meet its customer (and now PAB account) reserve deposit requirements under Rule 15c3–3. Paragraph (a)(6) of Rule 15c3–3 defines qualified securities to mean securities issued by the United States or guaranteed by the United States with respect to principal and interest.234 This strictly limits the types of assets that can be used to fund a broker-dealer’s customer or PAB reserve account. The strict limitation is designed to further the purpose of Rule 15c3–3; namely, that customer assets be segregated and held in a manner that makes them readily available to be returned to the customer. As the Commission noted when first proposing Rule 15c3–3: The operative procedures of the Special [Reserve] Account are designed to protect the integrity of customer-generated funds by insulating them against inroads from the broker-dealer’s firm activities, whether they be underwriting, market making, other trading, investing, or mere speculation in securities, meeting overhead or any other nature whatever. The Special [Reserve] Account should achieve a virtual 100% protection to customers with respect to the carrying and use of customers’ deposits or credit balances which is mandated by Section 7(d) of the SIPC Act.235 In response to a petition for rulemaking,236 the Commission 234 17 CFR 240.15c3–3(a)(6). and Related Measures Respecting the Financial Responsibility of Brokers and Dealers, Exchange Act Release No. 9388 (Nov. 8, 1971), 36 FR 22312 (Nov. 24, 1971). 236 As discussed in the proposing release, Federated submitted a petition for rulemaking on April 3, 2003, which it later amended on April 4, 2005. See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12865, 12874. More specifically, Federated’s petition requested that the Commission amend: (i) Rule 15c3–1 to lower the haircut for certain money market funds to 0%; and (ii) Rule 15c3–3 to: (a) permit a broker-dealer to pledge such money market funds when borrowing fully paid or excess margin securities from a customer under paragraph (b)(3); and (b) treat such money market funds as ‘‘qualified securities’’ that may be deposited into a broker-dealer’s customer reserve account. On February 9, 2009, Federated submitted another request for rulemaking (Petition 4–577), reiterating its first petition with respect to amending Rule 15c3–3 to allow a broker-dealer to treat certain money market funds as ‘‘qualified securities’’ that may be deposited into a reserve account. However, this new petition changed the definition of the types of funds that could be treated as qualified securities. More specifically, the new petition proposed amending Rule 15c3–3(a)(6) to define the term qualified securities to include, ‘‘a redeemable security of an investment company registered under the Investment Company Act of 235 Reserves PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 51843 proposed a limited expansion of the definition of qualified security to include shares of an unaffiliated money market fund that: (1) Is described in Rule 2a–7 under the Investment Company Act of 1940; (2) invests solely in securities issued by the United States or guaranteed by the United States as to interest and principal; (3) agrees to redeem fund shares in cash no later than the business day following a redemption request by a shareholder; and (4) has net assets equal to at least 10 times the value of the shares deposited by the broker-dealer in its customer reserve account.237 Twenty commenters addressed the proposed amendment.238 A majority of commenters supported the proposal and generally argued that the definition of qualified security should be expanded further to include more types of instruments. One commenter noted that permitting the use of certain money market funds to make up the required reserve account deposit would introduce ‘‘an intermediary (namely, the holding company or money market fund) at which problems might arise.’’ 239 The commenter also noted that a number of SIPA liquidations have involved the mishandling of money market or mutual fund shares or the confirmations of purchases of nonexistent ‘‘money market funds.’’ 240 The Commission recently has proposed substantial amendments to its rules on money market funds.241 In light 1940 and described in 17 CFR 270.2a–7, unaffiliated with the broker-dealer and which limits its investments to securities issued or guaranteed by the United States Government or its agencies or instrumentalities (including repurchase transactions).’’ See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12874 and n.112; see also Public Petitions for Rulemaking No. 4–478 (Apr. 3, 2003) (available at https://www.sec.gov/ rules/petitions/petn4-478.htm), as amended (Apr. 4, 2005) (amendment available at https://www.sec.gov/ rules/petitions/petn4-478a.pdf), and No. 4–577 (Feb. 3, 2009) (available at https://www.sec.gov/ rules/petitions/2009/petn4-577.pdf). 237 See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12865. 238 See Federated Letter; Federated 2 Letter; Federated 3 Letter; Federated 4 Letter; Federated 5 Letter; Federated 6 Letter; Federated 7 Letter; Federated 8 Letter; Meeks Letter; Meeks 2 Letter; Crane Data Letter; SIPC Letter; Curian Letter; FAF Letter; Reserve Letter; Brown Brothers Letter; SIFMA Letter; First Clearing Letter; ICI Letter; Barclays Letter; American Beacon Letter; Chamber of Commerce Letter; ABASA Letter; UBS Letter; Fidelity/NFS Letter; Barnard Letter; Federated 9 Letter; BOK Letter; Cornell Letter. 239 See SIPC Letter. 240 Id. 241 Money Market Fund Reform; Amendments to Form PF, Release No. IC–30551 (June 5, 2013), 78 FR 36834 (June 19, 2013) (The rule proposal includes two principal alternative reforms that could be adopted alone or in combination. One alternative would require a floating net asset value or ‘‘NAV’’ for prime institutional money market E:\FR\FM\21AUR2.SGM Continued 21AUR2 51844 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 162 / Wednesday, August 21, 2013 / Rules and Regulations of these proposed amendments,242 the Commission is deferring consideration of any further expansion of the definition of qualified security in Rule 15c3–3 at this time. This will allow the Commission to assess the potential impact of any money market fund reforms it may adopt and whether any such impact would have consequences for the customer protection objective of the reserve account requirement in Rule 15c3–3. emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with RULES2 B. Holding Futures Positions in a Securities Portfolio Margin Account Under SRO portfolio margin rules (‘‘portfolio margin rules’’),243 a brokerdealer can combine securities and futures positions in a portfolio margin securities account to compute margin requirements based on the net market risk of all positions in the account.244 Until the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, however, SIPA only protected customer claims for securities and cash, and specifically excluded from protection futures contracts that are not also securities. This fact created a potential ambiguity as to how futures positions in a portfolio margin securities account would be treated in a SIPA liquidation. Consequently, the Commission proposed amendments to funds. The other alternative would allow the use of liquidity fees and redemption gates in times of stress. The proposal also includes additional diversification and disclosure measures that would apply under either alternative.). See also Division of Risk, Strategy, and Financial Innovation, Commission, Responses to Questions Posed by Commissioners Aguilar, Paredes, and Gallagher (Nov. 30, 2012) (responding to questions posed by Commissioners Aguilar, Paredes, and Gallagher regarding effectiveness of the 2010 money market fund reforms, as well as how future reforms might affect demand for investments in money market fund substitutes and the implications for investors, financial institutions, corporate borrowers, municipalities, and states that sell their debt to money market funds), available at https:// www.sec.gov/news/studies/2012/money-marketfunds-memo-2012.pdf. 242 Money Market Fund Reform; Amendments to Form PF, Release No. IC–30551 (June 5, 2013), 78 FR 36834 (June 19, 2013). 243 See Exchange Act Release No. 55471 (Mar. 14, 2007), 72 FR 13149 (Mar. 20, 2007) (SR–NASD– 2007–013); Exchange Act Release No. 54918 (Dec. 12, 2006), 72 FR 1044 (Jan. 9, 2007) (SR–NYSE– 2006–13); Exchange Act Release No. 54919 (Dec. 12, 2006), (SR–CBOE–2006–14); Exchange Act Release No. 54125 (July 11, 2006), 71 FR 40766 (July 18, 2006) (SR–NYSE–2005–93); Exchange Act Release No. 52031 (July 14, 2005), 70 FR 42130 (July 21, 2005) (SR–NYSE–2002–19); Exchange Act Release No. 52032 (July 14, 2005), 70 FR 42118 (July 21, 2005) (SR–CBOE–2002–03); see also Exchange Act Release No. 58251 (July 30, 2008), 73 FR 46111 (Aug. 7, 2008) (SR–FINRA–2008–041); Exchange Act Release No. 58243 (July 28, 2008), 73 FR 45505 (Aug. 5, 2008) (SR–CBOE–2008–73); and Exchange Act Release No. 58261 (July 30, 2008), 73 FR 46116 (Aug. 7, 2008) (SR–NYSE–2008–66) (making portfolio margin rules permanent). 244 See, e.g., FINRA Rule 4210(g) and CBOE Rule 12.4. VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:54 Aug 20, 2013 Jkt 229001 Rule 15c3–3 to accommodate the holding of futures positions in a securities account that is margined on a portfolio basis.245 Subsequent to the Commission’s proposals, the Dodd-Frank Act amended the definitions of customer, customer property, and net equity in section 16 of SIPA to take into account futures and options on futures held in a portfolio margin account carried as a securities account pursuant to a Commissionapproved portfolio margining program.246 As a result, persons who hold futures positions in a portfolio margining account carried as a securities account are now entitled to SIPA protection. While the Dodd-Frank Act addressed the protection under SIPA of futures and futures options held in a securities portfolio margin account, the Commission’s proposed amendments to Rule 15c3–3 and 15c3–3a will still serve an important purpose. In particular, they complement the Dodd-Frank SIPA amendments, and will provide additional protections to customers by requiring broker-dealers to treat these futures positions in accordance with the segregation requirements in Rules 15c3– 3 and 15c3–3a. Consequently, the Commission is adopting the amendments with modifications to address, in part, comments. To accommodate securities and futures portfolio margining, the Commission’s proposals included several amendments. First, the Commission proposed amending the definition of free credit balance in paragraph (a)(8) of Rule 15c3–3 to provide that the term shall also include such liabilities carried in a securities account pursuant to an SRO portfolio margining rule approved by the Commission under section 19(b) of the Act (‘‘SRO portfolio margining rule’’), including daily marks to market, and proceeds resulting from closing out futures contracts and options thereon, and, in the event the broker-dealer is the subject of a proceeding under SIPA, the market value as of the filing date as that term is defined in SIPA (15 U.S.C. 78lll(7)) of any long options on futures contracts. In addition, the Commission proposed amendments to treat the unrealized value of a futures option in a portfolio margin account on the SIPA filing date 247 as a free credit balance for purposes of Rule 15c3–3. This 245 See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12868–12870. 246 See Public Law 111–203 § 983. 247 The term filing date is defined in SIPA as, generally, being the date a SIPA proceeding is commenced. See 15 U.S.C. 78lll(7). PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 amendment was designed to clarify that the market value of such assets should be included in determining a customer’s net equity claim in a SIPA proceeding. Unlike futures contracts, futures options do not generate cash balances on a daily basis in the account (i.e., they have unrealized market value at the end of a trading day). Since the broker-dealer is not holding cash for the customer, there is no need to treat the futures options as a free credit balance for purposes of the reserve formula. However, if the brokerdealer was liquidated under SIPA, the unrealized gains or losses of the futures options should be included in calculating the customer’s net equity in the account (along with the securities positions and all futures-related and securities-related cash balances).248 The proposed amendments were designed to provide for this outcome by defining the market value of the futures options as a free credit balance as of the filing date of a SIPA liquidation of the brokerdealer. As free credit balances, funds originating from futures transactions (e.g., margin deposits and daily marks to market) and the market value of futures options as of the SIPA filing date would constitute claims for cash in a SIPA proceeding and, therefore, become a part of a customer’s net equity claim entitling the customer to up to $250,000 in advances to make up for shortfalls. The Commission received six comments on the proposed amendments.249 Three commenters generally supported the amendments.250 One commenter stated that the amendments represent a positive step forward in resolving certain regulatory obstacles in connection with the inclusion of futures contracts in a portfolio margin account.251 Another commenter stated that it supported the Commission’s efforts to facilitate the cross-margining of futures and securities in the portfolio margin account by clarifying the treatment of futures and options positions under SIPA.252 A commenter expressed support for the development of rules for portfolio margining, and supported the 248 See 15 U.S.C 78lll(11); see also Public Law 111–203 § 983 (revising definition of net equity). 249 See SIFMA 2 Letter; CME Letter; SIPC Letter; Citigroup Letter; American Bar Association Letter; SIFMA 4 Letter. The comment letters received as a result of the original solicitation of comment predate the Dodd-Frank Act. As such, these comment letters address the proposed amendments prior to the enactment of the Dodd-Frank SIPA amendments related to portfolio margining. The comment letters received subsequent to the passage of the DoddFrank Act address the SIPA amendments. 250 See SIFMA 2 Letter; Citigroup Letter; American Bar Association Letter. 251 See Citigroup Letter. 252 See American Bar Association Letter. E:\FR\FM\21AUR2.SGM 21AUR2 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 162 / Wednesday, August 21, 2013 / Rules and Regulations Commission’s effort to provide greater legal certainty regarding the SIPA treatment of futures positions in a portfolio margin account.253 In a subsequent comment letter, however, this commenter stated that this amendment is no longer necessary in light of the Dodd-Frank Act amendments, and recommended the Commission withdraw it.254 Another commenter stated that the Commission’s proposal is premature in that including futures in a portfolio margin account, which is a securities account, would conflict with the segregation provisions under the CEA 255 and that SIPC has not determined that protection should be extended to futures.256 The Commission agrees, in part, with the commenter who stated that the Dodd-Frank Act SIPA amendments make the Commission’s proposed amendments to Rules 15c3–3 and 15c3– 3a unnecessary.257 As noted above, the definitions of customer, customer property, and net equity in section 16 of SIPA were amended by the Dodd-Frank Act to take into account futures and options on futures held in a portfolio margin account carried as a securities account pursuant to a Commissionapproved portfolio margining program.258 Consequently, in a proceeding under SIPA, futures and options on futures positions held in a portfolio margin account carried as a securities account would be included in determining a customer’s net equity claim.259 Therefore, the proposed amendment relating to the unrealized value of a futures option is not necessary to achieve the objective of providing SIPA protection for such positions. As a result, the Commission is modifying the final rule to delete the proposed language in paragraph (a)(8) of 253 See SIFMA 2 Letter. SIFMA 4 Letter. 255 See, e.g., 17 CFR 1.20–1.29. 256 See CME Letter. See also SIPC Letter (expressing ‘‘grave concerns’’ about potential conflict between the proposed amendments and SIPA). 257 See SIFMA 4 Letter. 258 See Public Law 111–203 § 983. 259 Under the Dodd-Frank Act SIPA amendments, a customer’s net equity now includes all positions in futures contracts and options on futures contracts held in a portfolio margining account carried as a securities account pursuant to a portfolio margining program approved by the Commission, including all property collateralizing such positions, to the extent that such property is not otherwise included herein. See 15 U.S.C. 78lll(11)(A)(ii). Further, the amendment provided that a claim for a commodity futures contract received, acquired, or held in a portfolio margining account pursuant to a portfolio margining program approved by the Commission or a claim for a security futures contract, shall be deemed to be a claim with respect to such contract as of the filing date, and such claim shall be treated as a claim for cash. See 15 U.S.C. 78lll(11). emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with RULES2 254 See VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:54 Aug 20, 2013 Jkt 229001 Rule 15c3–3 that would have treated the unrealized value of a futures option in a portfolio margin account on the filing date of a SIPA proceeding as a free credit balance for purposes of Rule 15c3–3.260 As stated above, however, the remaining rule amendments to Rules 15c3–3 and 15c3–3a complement the amendments to SIPA and provide additional protections to customers. Consequently, the Commission is adopting them with some technical modifications in response to suggestions offered by commenters. One commenter suggested a change to paragraph (a)(8) of Rule 15c3–3 that would expand the definition of free credit balances to include cash balances related to futures positions and the value of futures options positions on the SIPA filing date.261 First, the commenter noted that paragraph (a)(8) of Rule 15c3–3 concerns free credit balances, which are funds subject to immediate payment (among other limitations).262 The commenter expressed concern that the Commission’s proposal could have been construed as excluding cash balances in a portfolio margin account that are not subject to immediate payment. The Commission agrees that the proposal could have been interpreted as requiring that futuresrelated cash balances be treated differently depending on whether or not they are subject to immediate payment. The amendments to Rule 15c3–3 are designed to provide the same treatment to futures-related cash balances in a portfolio margin account as applies to securities-related cash balances. As discussed above, under Item 1 of Rule 15c3–3a, cash balances that do not meet the definition of free credit balances (e.g., because they are not subject to immediate payment) are included in the customer reserve formula if they meet the definition of other credit balances under paragraph (a)(9) of Rule 15c3–3.263 Consequently, to remove any ambiguity as to the effect of the rule changes in response to the comments 260 Specifically, the final rule does not include the proposed language: ‘‘, and, in the event the broker-dealer is the subject of a proceeding under SIPA, the market value as of the ‘‘filing date’’ as that term is defined in SIPA (15 U.S.C. 78lll(7)) of any long options on futures contracts.’’ 261 See SIFMA 2 Letter. 262 Id. 263 Item 1 of Rule 15c3–3a requires a brokerdealer to include in the customer reserve formula free credit balances and other credit balances in customers’ securities accounts. Paragraph (a)(9) of Rule 15c3–3 defines other credit balances as ‘‘cash liabilities of a broker or dealer to customers other than free credit balances and funds in commodities accounts segregated as aforesaid.’’ 17 CFR 240.15c3–3(a)(9). PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 51845 noted above, the Commission is amending paragraph (a)(9) of Rule 15c3– 3—which defines other credit balances—to include futures-related cash balances other than free credit balances. In addition, the Commission has deleted the phrase ‘‘shall include such liabilities,’’ in the amendment to proposed paragraph (a)(8) and replaced it with ‘‘includes, if subject to immediate cash payment to customers on demand, funds . . .’’ to clarify that this paragraph relates to cash balances in a portfolio margin account that are subject to immediate payment and, hence, that paragraph (a)(9) relates to other cash balances in a portfolio margin account. One commenter suggested changes with respect to the marks to market language in the rule, stating that the phrase relating to daily marks to market be modified to read ‘‘variation margin or initial margin marks to market’’ and the phrase in the proposal that read ‘‘proceeds resulting from closing out futures contracts and options thereon’’ be modified to read ‘‘proceeds resulting from margin paid or released in connection with closing out, settling or exercising futures contracts and options thereon.’’ 264 The Commission agrees with these technical suggestions because they clarify the rule by incorporating appropriate futures terminology. Consequently, as adopted, the text in paragraphs (a)(8) and (a)(9) of Rule 15c3–3 expands the terms free credit balance and other credit balances to include ‘‘funds carried in a securities account pursuant to a self-regulatory organization portfolio margin rule approved by the Commission . . . including variation margin or initial margin, marks to market, and proceeds resulting from margin paid or released in connection with closing out, settling or exercising futures contracts and options thereon.’’ 265 The amendments, as adopted, more precisely capture the Commission’s intent in terms of identifying the types of futures-related cash balances that may be held in a portfolio margin account than the language in the proposed rule. On the debit side of the customer reserve formula, the Commission is adopting, substantially as proposed, an amendment to Rule 15c3–3a Item 14 that permits a broker-dealer to include as a debit item the amount of customer margin required and on deposit at a derivatives clearing organization related to futures positions carried in a portfolio 264 See 265 See E:\FR\FM\21AUR2.SGM SIFMA 2 Letter. also section II.A.6. of this release. 21AUR2 51846 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 162 / Wednesday, August 21, 2013 / Rules and Regulations emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with RULES2 margin account.266 Under SIPA, the term customer property includes, ‘‘resources provided through the use or realization of customers’ debit cash balances and other customer-related debit items as defined by the Commission by rule,’’ as well as, ‘‘in the case of a portfolio margining account of a customer that is carried as a securities account pursuant to a portfolio margining program approved by the Commission, a futures contract or an option on a futures contract received, acquired, or held by or for the account of a debtor from or for such portfolio margining account, and the proceeds thereof.’’ 267 Under this provision of SIPA, this amendment to Rule 15c3–3 makes the margin required and on deposit at a derivatives clearing organization part of the ‘‘customer property’’ in the event the broker-dealer is placed in a SIPA liquidation. Thus, it would be available for distribution to the failed firm’s customers. Finally, one commenter suggested changes to Commission rules beyond those in the proposing release. This commenter urged the Commission to consider amending Rules 8c–1, 15c2–1, and 15c3–3 to provide that their provisions could be waived by customers that are entitled to engage in derivative transactions in a portfolio margin account, provided the customer agrees in writing to waive SIPA protection.268 According to the commenter, a customer executing such a waiver would not be entitled to the protections under SIPA for customers and would be deemed a general creditor of the broker-dealer with respect to claims arising from their portfolio margin accounts. At this time, the Commission does not believe it would be appropriate to amend the rules as C. Amendments With Respect to Securities Lending and Borrowing and Repurchase/Reverse Repurchase Transactions In the proposing release, the Commission noted two concerns about stock lending that arose from the failure of the registered broker-dealer MJK Clearing, Inc. (‘‘MJK’’); 269 namely: (1) That broker-dealers with principal liability in a stock loan transaction may purport to be acting in an agency capacity and, consequently, not taking appropriate capital charges; and (2) that broker-dealers that historically have not been active in stock loan activities may rapidly expand their balance sheets with such transactions and, thereby, increase leverage to a level that poses significant financial risk to the firm and its counterparties. In response, the Commission proposed, and is now adopting, amendments to Rules 15c3–1 and 17a–11. With respect to the Rule 15c3–1 proposal, the Commission is adopting the amendment, as proposed. This amendment to subparagraph (c)(2)(iv)(B) of Rule 15c3–1 clarifies that brokerdealers providing securities lending and borrowing settlement services are deemed, for purposes of the rule, to be acting as principal and are subject to applicable capital deductions.270 Under the amendment, these deductions can be avoided if a broker-dealer takes certain steps to disclaim principal liability. In particular, the final rule provides that ‘‘a broker or dealer that participates in a loan of securities by one party to another party will be deemed a principal for the purpose of 266 The Commission also is amending Item 14 of Rule 15c3–3a to replace the phrase ‘‘Security futures products’’ with the phrase ‘‘security futures products.’’ In addition, the Commission adopting some non-substantive amendments to Note G to Item 14, including: (1) In paragraph (a) replacing the word ‘‘shall’’ with the word ‘‘must’’; (2) in paragraph (b) replacing the word ‘‘shall’’ with the word ‘‘will’’; in the second line in paragraph (b)(2) inserting the phrase ‘‘futures in a’’ before the phrase ‘‘portfolio margin account’’ and deleting the word ‘‘margin’’; (3) in paragraph (b)(2) replacing the word ‘‘shall’’ with the word ‘‘will’’ in three places; (4) in the sixth and seventh lines of paragraph (b)(2), inserting the phrase ‘‘futures in a’’ before the phrase ‘‘portfolio margin account’’ and deleting the phrase ‘‘futures margin’’; in paragraph (b)(3)(iv) replacing the word ‘‘securities’’ with the word ‘‘security’’, inserting the phrase ‘‘futures in a’’ before the phrase ‘‘portfolio margin account’’ and deleting the word ‘‘futures’’; and (4) in paragraph (c), replacing the word ‘‘shall’’ with the word ‘‘will’’, inserting the phrase ‘‘futures in a’’ before the phrase ‘‘portfolio margin account’’ and deleting the word ‘‘futures.’’ 267 15 U.S.C. 78lll(4)(B) and (D); see also DoddFrank Act Section 983. 268 See American Bar Association Letter. 269 See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12869. The failure of MJK raised several concerns regarding securities lending transactions. As explained in more detail in the proposing release, at the time of its failure, MJK owed cash collateral to several borrowing brokerdealers. Id. at 12862, 12869–12870. These brokerdealers suffered losses caused by MJK’s failures and, in later proceedings related to these losses, questions arose as to whether these broker-dealers were acting as principal or agent. 270 A broker-dealer is required to deduct from net worth most unsecured receivables, including the amount that the market value of a securities loan exceeds the value of collateral obtained for the loan. See 17 CFR 240.15c3–1(c)(2)(iv)(B). Similarly, with respect to repo transactions, a broker-dealer obligated to resell securities must, in computing net capital, deduct the amount that the market value of the securities is less than the resale price. See 17 CFR 240.15c3–1(c)(2)(iv)(F). A broker-dealer obligated to repurchase securities must, in computing net capital, deduct the amount that the market value of the securities is greater than the repurchase price to the extent the excess is greater than certain percentages. See 17 CFR 240.15c3– 1(c)(2)(iv)(F). VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:54 Aug 20, 2013 Jkt 229001 recommended by the commenter because such changes are beyond the scope of this rulemaking. PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 the deductions required under this section, [i.e., deductions from net worth] unless the broker or dealer has fully disclosed the identity of each party to the other and each party has expressly agreed in writing that the obligations of the broker or dealer do not include a guarantee of performance by the other party and that such party’s remedies in the event of a default by the other party do not include a right of setoff against obligations, if any, of the broker or dealer.’’ 271 The Commission received five comments on the proposed amendment.272 Two commenters objected to this amendment, stating that they believed the standard legal documents used in securities lending transactions provide sufficient legal certainty on the status of the parties.273 The Commission, in recognition of standard stock loan agreement templates, designed the amendment to accommodate the continued use of these industry model agreements by incorporating their use into the rule’s requirements. For the purposes of establishing a broker-dealer’s status as agent or lender, these agreements may be sufficiently detailed to satisfy the new requirements. However, it would be the broker-dealer’s responsibility to ensure that any ‘‘standard’’ agreement contains the necessary provisions to comply with this amendment, and that such provisions are not weakened by any other language in the agreement or any subsequent amendment. The goal is to avoid ambiguity about a brokerdealer’s status as agent or principal regarding the applicability of the stock loan charges in the net capital rule. As the failure of MJK illustrated, disputes can arise over whether a broker-dealer is acting as a principal or agent in a stock loan transaction.274 Under the formulation of the rule, a broker-dealer is presumed to be acting in a principal capacity unless it can demonstrate through its agreements with the other participants in the transaction that it is acting as agent. In this regard, a broker271 See paragraph (c)(2)(iv)(B) of Rule 15c3–1, as adopted. Standard master securities loan agreements (including the annexes thereto) commonly used by the parties to a securities lending transaction contain provisions for establishing agent (as opposed to principal) status in a securities lending and borrowing transaction that are consistent with the requirements in paragraph (c)(2)(iv)(B) of Rule 15c3–1, as amended. See, e.g., 2000 Master Securities Loan Agreement, Annex I, published by SIFMA, available at www.sifma.org. 272 See Abbey National Letter; Dresdner Kleinwort Letter; SIFMA 2 Letter; Citigroup Letter; Cornell Letter. 273 See SIFMA 2 Letter; Citigroup Letter. 274 See, e.g., Nomura v. E*Trade, 280 F.Supp.2d 184 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). E:\FR\FM\21AUR2.SGM 21AUR2 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 162 / Wednesday, August 21, 2013 / Rules and Regulations emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with RULES2 dealer will be responsible for determining that its agreements are fully consistent with the standards of the rule. One commenter asked for clarification on the timing of when the agent lender must disclose the principal parties to one another in order to disclaim principal liability under the rule.275 This commenter stated that the amendment should be modified so as not to require pre-trade disclosure of the identity of the principal, since under the agency annex to standardized master lending agreements such disclosure can be made on the next business day.276 The amendment is intended to accommodate the continued use of these industry model agreements by incorporating their use into the rule’s requirements. Consequently, disclosure of principals in conformance with the requirements of the ‘‘standard’’ stock loan agreement templates would be consistent with the requirements of the rule (as long as the identity of the borrower and the lender is disclosed within one business day after the trade date), which is designed to ensure that firms are taking the required net capital charges related to the securities lending activity to the extent they have principal liability. The Commission also is adding new paragraph (c)(5) to Rule 17a–11 to help identify broker-dealers with highly leveraged non-government securities lending and borrowing and repurchase operations.277 This new provision requires a broker-dealer to notify the Commission whenever the total amount of money payable against all securities loaned or subject to a repurchase agreement, or the total contract value of all securities borrowed or subject to a reverse repurchase agreement, exceeds 2,500 percent of tentative net capital; provided that, for purposes of this leverage threshold, transactions involving government securities as defined in section 3(a)(42) of the Exchange Act, are excluded from the calculation.278 The amendment is designed to alert regulators to a sudden increase in a broker-dealer’s stock loan and repo positions, which could indicate that the broker-dealer is taking 275 See SIFMA 2 Letter. e.g., www.sifma.org for sample Master Securities Loan Agreements (and annex). 277 See paragraph (c)(5) of Rule 17a–11, as adopted. 278 15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(42). ‘‘Government securities’’ generally present less market risk than other types of securities used in securities lending and repo transactions. Consequently, they are excluded from the scope of the rule. 276 See, VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:54 Aug 20, 2013 Jkt 229001 on new risk that it may have limited experience in managing. One commenter supported the proposed amendment and believes the notification could serve as ‘‘an early warning’’ that a firm is approaching insolvency and generally supports the Commission’s efforts to protect customers from broker-dealers who recklessly rely on excessively leveraged transactions.279 In the proposing release, the Commission estimated that a leverage threshold of 25 times tentative net capital would be triggered by 21 brokerdealers on a regular basis.280 The Commission stated that this establishes a threshold high enough to only capture on a regular basis those few firms highly active in securities lending and repo transactions. The Commission did not receive any comments regarding the 2,500% tentative net capital threshold in the proposing release. Based on FOCUS Report data, as of December 31, 2011, there were six broker-dealers whose securities loaned and securities borrowed transactions exceeded 25 times their tentative net capital. The Commission continues to believe that the 2,500% threshold is an appropriate notice trigger for a firm that historically has not been as active in these transactions but rapidly leverages up its securities lending and repo positions. Given the updated estimates of how many broker-dealers would trigger this threshold, the Commission believes the proposed threshold is high enough to capture on a regular basis only those few firms highly active in securities lending and repo transactions. Therefore, the Commission is retaining this 2,500% threshold in the final rule without revision. As proposed, the amendment to Rule 17a–11 also would have provided that a broker-dealer that submitted a monthly report of its stock loan and repo activity to its DEA need not file the notices. This provision was designed to accommodate large broker-dealers that are active in this business and regularly maintain stock loan and repo balances that exceed the threshold. The Commission expects that these broker-dealers have experience in managing the risks specific to these types of transactions and have established controls to address those risks. Consequently, a notice under paragraph (c)(5) from these broker-dealers might not be as useful in providing risk assessment information to regulators. Instead, the monthly 279 See Cornell Letter. Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12870 (providing rationale for 2,500% threshold). 280 See PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 51847 reports will provide the Commission and other financial regulators with information with which to develop trend analysis, when deemed appropriate. They could use this analysis to identify leverage levels that are outside the normal trend range, and which may be indicative of a material change in the firm’s business model that could indicate it was taking on higher levels of leverage, branching into new products, or experiencing operational or financial difficulties (e.g., the firm could be reducing leverage rapidly because creditors were not willing to enter into new transactions). Three commenters addressed the proposed monthly notification requirement.281 They stated that the monthly report in lieu of the notification should be provided as part of the monthly FOCUS report many broker-dealers file with their DEA.282 The Commission agrees that the FOCUS report may be an appropriate mechanism for reporting stock loan and repo positions in lieu of the proposed monthly notification requirement.283 Consequently, the Commission has modified the final rule to delete the phrase ‘‘submits a monthly report of’’ and replace it with ‘‘reports monthly.’’ 284 In addition, as adopted, in order to provide that the monthly report be sent to a broker-dealer’s DEA, the Commission added the phrase ‘‘to its designated examining authority in a form acceptable’’ before ‘‘to its designated examining authority.’’ 285 This language, as adopted, will provide each DEA with the flexibility to prescribe how the monthly reports are to be made and will accommodate a DEA that opts to use the FOCUS report as the reporting mechanism.286 In summary, as adopted, the notice exemption in paragraph (c)(5) will state ‘‘provided further, however, that a broker or dealer will not be required to send the notice required by this paragraph (c)(5) if it reports monthly its securities lending and borrowing and repurchase and reverse repurchase activity (including the total amount of money payable against securities loaned or subject to a repurchase agreement and the total contract value of securities borrowed or subject to a reverse repurchase agreement) to its designated 281 See Abbey National Letter; Citigroup Letter; SIFMA 2 Letter; SIFMA 4 Letter. 282 See Abbey National Letter; Citigroup Letter; SIFMA 2 Letter. 283 Carrying broker-dealers generally are required to submit FOCUS reports on a monthly basis. 284 See paragraph (c)(5) of Rule 17a–11, as adopted. 285 Id. 286 See also SIFMA 4 Letter. E:\FR\FM\21AUR2.SGM 21AUR2 51848 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 162 / Wednesday, August 21, 2013 / Rules and Regulations examining authority in a form acceptable to its designated examining authority.’’ 287 A commenter asked the Commission to clarify that the new reporting provision of paragraph (c)(5) of Rule 17a–11 is triggered only by principal activity meeting or exceeding stated thresholds.288 The notification provision applies when a broker-dealer is acting as principal and exceeds the stated thresholds, and a broker-dealer will not need to include transactions for which it does not have principal liability in determining whether the notification threshold has been triggered. D. Documentation of Risk Management Procedures emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with RULES2 It is important for broker-dealers to document the controls they establish for managing the material risk exposures that arise from their business activities. For example, a broker-dealer active in securities lending is exposed to a variety of risks, including market risk,289 credit risk,290 and liquidity risk.291 Other broker-dealer activities give rise to these risks as well, including managing a repo book, dealing in OTC derivatives, trading proprietary positions, and lending on margin. A well-documented system of internal controls designed to manage material risk exposures reflects the determination of a firm’s management as to how its business activities should be conducted in light of such exposures. It also enables management to better identify, analyze, and manage the risks inherent in the firm’s business activities with a view to preventing material losses and to review whether the firm’s activities are being conducted in a manner that is consistent with such procedures and controls as well as in accordance with the Federal securities laws. Risk management controls are particularly important for the largest broker-dealers, which generally engage in a wide range of highly complex activities across many 287 See paragraph (c)(5) of Rule 17a–11, as adopted. The Commission also inserted the text ‘‘(c)(5)’’ in the final rule before the phrase ‘‘if it reports monthly’’ to make the paragraph reference more explicit. 288 See Dresdner Kleinwort Letter. 289 Generally, market risk is the risk that prices, values, or rates will adversely change. 290 Generally, credit risk is the risk of loss resulting from a counterparty or other type of obligor failing to meet an obligation, including an obligation with respect to a loan, security, swap, option, or settlement. 291 Generally, funding liquidity risk is the risk that a firm will not be able to meet cash demands as they become due and asset liquidity risk is the risk that an asset will not be able to be sold quickly at its market value. VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:54 Aug 20, 2013 Jkt 229001 different markets and geographical locations. While most broker-dealers already have well-documented procedures and controls for managing risks as a matter of business practice, it is important to reinforce the practice and make it easier for regulators to understand a brokerdealer’s procedures and controls so that they can review whether the brokerdealer is adhering to them. Consequently, the Commission proposed an amendment to Rule 17a-3 that would have required a brokerdealer to create a record documenting its ‘‘internal risk management controls.’’ 292 Commenters raised concerns that the proposed amendment would be ‘‘overly broad and ambiguous’’ 293 and ‘‘so broad as to create uncertainty.’’ 294 Three commenters argued that the requirement, if adopted, should be limited to market, credit, and liquidity risk management.295 Another commenter recommended that the Commission propose the minimum elements required to be documented, such as market risk, credit risk, liquidity risk, and operational risk.296 While market, credit, and liquidity risk were among the specific examples of risk identified in the proposed rule,297 the Commission agrees that the phrase ‘‘risk controls’’ could be interpreted very broadly. To address this concern, the Commission has modified the final rule to clarify its application. The final rule requires the documentation of controls established specifically to manage market, credit, and liquidity risk, ‘‘which have more commonly understood meanings within the industry.’’ 298 This also focuses the rule on the key risks inherent in conducting a securities business. Commenters also requested that the Commission clarify that, when a brokerdealer is part of a corporate family, risk management controls could be applicable to multiple entities within the corporate family, including the broker-dealer.299 In response, the final rule does not specify the type of controls a broker-dealer must establish to manage these risks. It simply requires 292 See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12899. 293 See E*Trade Letter. 294 See Citigroup Letter. 295 See E*Trade Letter; SIFMA 2 Letter; Citigroup Letter. 296 See Barnard Letter. 297 See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12870. 298 E*Trade Letter. The final rule also deletes the term ‘‘internal’’ because it would be redundant. 299 See E*Trade Letter; SIFMA 2 Letter; Citigroup Letter. PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 the documentation of the procedures the broker-dealer has established. Brokerdealers that are part of holding companies may be subject to procedures that are used globally throughout the organization. As long as the brokerdealer maintains documented procedures of controls pertaining to the designated entity, the requirements of the rule would be met. Other commenters requested that the Commission clarify that the risk management controls do not have to include any minimum elements 300 and that the rule does not impose any qualitative requirements.301 Two commenters suggested that because there were no stated content requirements for the risk management controls, it would be difficult for a firm to prove that their risk management procedures were adequate, which could lead to a ‘‘subjective process’’ 302 or to examiners applying a ‘‘one size fits all’’ best practices standard.303 One commenter suggested that to address this issue, the Commission should articulate the process that examiners will follow when examining risk management controls.304 Finally, one commenter encouraged the Commission to consider strengthening this requirement in terms of both its scope and applicability.305 The Commission is not mandating any specific controls, procedures, or policies that must be established by a broker-dealer to manage market, credit, or liquidity risk, nor is it requiring any minimum elements or specifying any procedures that would be required to be included in a firm’s market, credit, and liquidity risk management policies. Rather, the Commission is requiring that a control, procedure, or policy be documented if it is in place. Based on staff experience monitoring large brokerdealers, the Commission anticipates that most brokers-dealers that will be subject to this rule already have documented controls, procedures, and policies as part of their overall risk management processes. The purpose of this amendment is not to change the controls, procedures, and policies that are in place, but to require that they be adequately documented. For the foregoing reasons, paragraph (a)(23) to Rule 17a–3, as adopted, requires certain broker-dealers to make and keep current a record documenting the credit, market, and liquidity risk 300 See SIFMA 2 Letter. Citigroup Letter. 302 See Coastal Securities Letter. 303 See American Bar Association Letter. 304 Id. 305 See Cornell Letter. 301 See E:\FR\FM\21AUR2.SGM 21AUR2 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 162 / Wednesday, August 21, 2013 / Rules and Regulations emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with RULES2 management controls established and maintained by the broker-dealer to assist it in analyzing and managing the risks associated with its business activities.306 This documentation requirement applies only to brokerdealers that have more than (1) $1,000,000 in aggregate credit items as computed under the customer reserve formula of Rule 15c3–3, or (2) $20,000,000 in capital, including debt subordinated in accordance with Appendix D to Rule 15c3–1.307 The Commission also proposed adding paragraph (e)(9) to Rule 17a–4 to require a broker-dealer to retain the documented risk management controls or procedures until three years after the broker-dealer terminates the use of the system of controls or procedures documented therein. One commenter stated that given the minimal cost of electronic storage, the commenter believes that the retention period could be extended beyond three years.308 Conversely, two commenters suggested that Rule 17a–4 be revised so that a broker-dealer would not be required to maintain outdated versions of its risk management controls.309 The Commission is adding paragraph (e)(9) to Rule 17a–4, with a minor modification from the proposed amendment. Specifically, the final rule is modified to require retention of the records until three years after termination of the use of the risk management controls documented therein by replacing the phrase ‘‘systems of controls or procedures’’ with the phrase ‘‘risk management controls.’’ 310 This modification maintains consistency with the terminology in paragraph (a)(23) of Rule 17a–3, as adopted, which requires broker-dealers to make and keep current a ‘‘record documenting the credit, market, and liquidity risk management controls established and maintained by the broker or dealer.’’ 311 Finally, the three year retention period is designed to establish an audit trail between the risk management controls that have 306 See paragraph (a)(23) of Rule 17a–3, as adopted. 307 The Commission also has modified paragraph (a)(23) of Rule 17a–3 from the proposed rule to delete the reference to the term ‘‘member’’ in two places in the final rule because the reference to ‘‘member’’ is unnecessary. Id. 308 Id. 309 See E*Trade Letter; SIFMA 2 Letter. 310 See paragraph (e)(9) of Rule 17a–4, as adopted. The Commission also modified the final rule to delete the phrase ‘‘paragraph (a)(23) of’’ and insert ‘‘(a)(23)’’ immediately following ‘‘17a–3’’ to make the referenced citation consistent with other parts of the rule. 311 See paragraph (a)(23) of Rule 17a–3, as adopted. VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:54 Aug 20, 2013 Jkt 229001 most recently been made inoperative and the risk management controls currently in effect to provide sufficient opportunity to review the former during the broker-dealer’s exam cycle. Three years also is consistent with the retention period for many of the records required to be preserved under Rule 17a–4.312 Finally, one commenter noted that the proposed amendment does not impose any requirements beyond those applicable under Rule 15c3–4.313 Accordingly, the commenter urged the Commission to create an exception from the proposed amendment to Rule 17a– 3 for a broker-dealer that is effectively subject to Rule 15c3–4. With the modifications to the final rule to include only market, credit, and liquidity risk, a broker-dealer subject to the conditions of Rule 15c3–4 would already comply with this amendment given that these risks are included in the risks a brokerdealer would be required to address under Rule 15c3–4. Therefore, an exception from the rule is unnecessary. E. Amendments to the Net Capital Rule Under Rule 15c3–1, broker-dealers are required to maintain, at all times, a minimum amount of net capital.314 The capital standard in Rule 15c3–1 is a net liquid assets test. This standard is designed to allow a broker-dealer the flexibility to engage in activities that are part of conducting a securities business (e.g., taking securities into inventory) but in a manner that places the firm in the position of holding at all times more than one dollar of highly liquid assets for each dollar of unsubordinated liabilities (e.g., money owed to customers, counterparties, and creditors).315 For example, Rule 15c3–1 312 See 17 CFR 240.17a–4(b). SIFMA 2 Letter. See also 17 CFR 240.15c3–4. 314 See 17 CFR 240.15c3–1. 315 See, e.g., Interpretation Guide to Net Capital Computation for Brokers and Dealers, Exchange Act Release No. 8024 (Jan. 18, 1967), 32 FR 856 (Jan. 25, 1967) (‘‘Rule 15c3–1 (17 CFR 240.15c3–1) was adopted to provide safeguards for public investors by setting standards of financial responsibility to be met by brokers and dealers. The basic concept of the rule is liquidity; its object being to require a broker-dealer to have at all times sufficient liquid assets to cover his current indebtedness.’’) (Footnotes omitted); Net Capital Treatment of Securities Positions, Obligations and Transactions in Suspended Securities, Exchange Act Release No. 10209 (June 8, 1973), 38 FR 16774 (June 26, 1973) (Commission release of a letter from the Division of Market Regulation) (‘‘The purpose of the net capital rule is to require a broker or dealer to have at all times sufficient liquid assets to cover its current indebtedness. The need for liquidity has long been recognized as vital to the public interest and for the protection of investors and is predicated on the belief that accounts are not opened and maintained with broker-dealers in anticipation of relying upon suit, judgment and execution to collect claims but 313 See PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 51849 allows securities positions to count as allowable net capital, subject to standardized or model-based deductions (‘‘haircuts’’).316 The rule, however, does not permit most unsecured receivables to count as allowable net capital.317 This aspect of the rule severely limits the ability of broker-dealers to engage in activities that generate unsecured receivables (e.g., lending money without obtaining collateral). The rule also does not permit fixed assets or other illiquid assets to count as allowable net capital, which creates disincentives for brokerdealers to own real estate and other fixed assets that cannot be readily converted into cash.318 For these reasons, Rule 15c3–1 incentivizes broker-dealers to confine their business activities and devote capital to activities such as underwriting, market making, and advising on and facilitating customer securities transactions.319 Rule 15c3–1 requires broker-dealers to maintain a minimum level of net capital (meaning highly liquid capital) at all times.320 The rule requires that a brokerdealer perform two calculations: (1) A computation of the minimum amount of net capital the broker-dealer must maintain; 321 and (2) a computation of the amount of net capital the brokerdealer is maintaining.322 The minimum net capital requirement is the greater of a fixed-dollar amount specified in the rule and an amount determined by applying one of two financial ratios: The 15-to-1 aggregate indebtedness to net rather on a reasonable demand one can liquidate his cash or securities positions.’’); Net Capital Requirements for Brokers and Dealers, Exchange Act Release No. 15426 (Dec. 21, 1978), 44 FR 1754 (Jan. 8, 1979) (‘‘The rule requires brokers or dealers to have sufficient cash or liquid assets to protect the cash or securities positions carried in their customers’ accounts. The thrust of the rule is to insure that a broker or dealer has sufficient liquid assets to cover current indebtedness.’’); Net Capital Requirements for Brokers and Dealers, Exchange Act Release No. 26402 (Dec. 28, 1989), 54 FR 315 (Jan. 5, 1989) (‘‘The rule’s design is that brokerdealers maintain liquid assets in sufficient amounts to enable them to satisfy promptly their liabilities. The rule accomplishes this by requiring brokerdealers to maintain liquid assets in excess of their liabilities to protect against potential market and credit risks.’’) (Footnote omitted). 316 See 17 CFR 240.15c3–1(c)(2)(vi); 17 CFR 240.15c3–1e; 17 CFR 240.15c3–1f . 317 See 17 CFR 240.15c3–1(c)(2)(iv). 318 See, e.g., 17 CFR 240.15c3–1(c)(2)(iv)(A). 319 See Capital, Margin, and Segregation Requirements for Security-Based Swap Dealers and Major Security-Based Swap Participants and Capital Requirements for Broker-Dealers, Exchange Act Release No. 68071 (Oct. 18, 2012), 77 FR 70214, 70219 (Nov. 23, 2012). 320 See 17 CFR 240.15c3–1. 321 See 17 CFR 240.15c3–1(a). 322 See 17 CFR 240.15c3–1(c)(2). The computation of net capital is based on the definition of net capital in paragraph (c)(2) of Rule 15c3–1. Id. E:\FR\FM\21AUR2.SGM 21AUR2 51850 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 162 / Wednesday, August 21, 2013 / Rules and Regulations capital ratio or the 2% of aggregate debit items ratio.323 In computing net capital, the brokerdealer must, among other things, make certain adjustments to net worth such as deducting illiquid assets, taking other capital charges, and adding qualifying subordinated loans.324 The amount remaining after these adjustments is defined as tentative net capital.325 The final step in computing net capital is to take prescribed percentage deductions (‘‘standardized haircuts’’) from the mark-to-market value of the proprietary positions (e.g., securities, money market instruments, and commodities) that are included in its tentative net capital.326 The standardized haircuts are designed to account for the market risk inherent in these positions and to create a buffer of liquidity to protect against other risks associated with the securities business.327 Alternative Net Capital or ‘‘ANC’’ broker-dealers and a type of limited purpose broker-dealer that deals solely in OTC derivatives (‘‘OTC derivative dealers’’) are permitted, with Commission approval, to, among other things, use internal models as the basis for taking market risk charges as an alternative approach in lieu of the standardized haircuts for classes of positions for which they have been approved to use models.328 Rule 15c3– 1 imposes substantially higher minimum capital requirements for ANC broker-dealers and OTC derivatives dealers, as compared to other types of broker-dealers, because, among other reasons, the use of internal models to compute net capital can substantially reduce the deductions for securities and money market positions as compared with the standardized haircuts.329 323 See 17 CFR 240.15c3–1(a). 17 CFR 240.15c3–1(c)(2)(i)–(xiii). 325 See 17 CFR 240.15c3–1(c)(15). 326 See 17 CFR 240.15c3–1(c)(2)(vi). 327 See, e.g., Uniform Net Capital Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 13635 (June 16, 1977), 42 FR 31778 (June 23, 1977) (‘‘[Haircuts] are intended to enable net capital computations to reflect the market risk inherent in the positioning of the particular types of securities enumerated in [the rule]’’); Net Capital Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 22532 (Oct. 15, 1985), 50 FR 42961 (Oct. 23, 1985) (‘‘These percentage deductions, or ‘haircuts’, take into account elements of market and credit risk that the broker-dealer is exposed to when holding a particular position.’’); Net Capital Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 39455 (Dec. 17, 1997), 62 FR 67996 (Dec. 30, 1997) (‘‘Reducing the value of securities owned by broker-dealers for net capital purposes provides a capital cushion against adverse market movements and other risks faced by the firms, including liquidity and operational risks.’’) (Footnote omitted). 328 See 17 CFR 240.15c3–1(a)(5) and (a)(7); 17 CFR 240.15c3–1e; 17 CFR 240.15c3–1f. 329 See 17 CFR 240.15c3–1(a)(5) and (a)(7). See also Capital, Margin, and Segregation Requirements for Security-Based Swap Dealers and Major Security-Based Swap Participants and Capital emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with RULES2 324 See VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:54 Aug 20, 2013 Jkt 229001 1. Requirement To Deduct From Net Worth Certain Liabilities or Expenses Assumed by Third Parties In the proposing release, the Commission expressed concern that some broker-dealers may be excluding from their calculations of net worth certain liabilities that relate directly to expenses or debts incurred by the broker-dealer.330 The accounting justification for the exclusion is that a third party (usually a parent or affiliate) has assumed responsibility for these expenses and debts through an expense sharing agreement.331 In some cases, however, the third party does not have the resources —independent of the broker-dealer’s revenues and assets—to assume these liabilities. Thus, the third party is dependent on the resources of the broker-dealer to pay the expenses and debts. Excluding liabilities from the broker-dealer’s net worth calculation in these situations may misrepresent the firm’s actual financial condition, deceive the firm’s customers, and hamper the ability of regulators to monitor the firm’s financial condition.332 To address this issue, the Commission proposed—and is now adopting substantially as proposed—an amendment to Rule 15c3–1 to add a new paragraph (c)(2)(i)(F) that will require a broker-dealer, in calculating net capital, to take into account any liabilities that are assumed by a third party if the broker-dealer cannot demonstrate that the third party has the resources—independent of the brokerdealer’s income and assets—to pay the liabilities.333 Requirements for Broker-Dealers, Exchange Act Release No. 68071, 77 FR at 70219 (‘‘[T]he use of internal models to compute net capital can substantially reduce the deductions for securities and money market positions as compared with the standardized haircuts.’’); Alternative Net Capital Requirements for Broker-Dealers that are Part of Consolidated Supervised Entities, Exchange Act Release No. 49830 (June 8, 2004), 69 FR 34428, 34431 (June 21, 2004) (‘‘We expect that use of the alternative net capital computation will reduce deductions for market and credit risk substantially for broker-dealers that use that method.’’). 330 See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12871. 331 See, e.g., Letter from Michael A. Macchiaroli, Associate Director, Division of Market Regulation, Commission, to Elaine Michitsch, Member Firm Operations, NYSE, and Susan DeMando, Director, Financial Operations, NASD Regulation, Inc. (July 11, 2003) (‘‘Third Party Expense Letter’’); see also FINRA Notice to Members 03–63, Expense-Sharing Agreements (Oct. 2003) (discussing the issuance of the Third Party Expense Letter). 332 See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12871. 333 As adopted, the final rule does not include the ‘‘-’’ in the phrase ‘‘third-party.’’ In addition, the final rule uses the phrase ‘‘broker or dealer’’ in the place of the phrase ‘‘broker-dealer’’ (which appeared in two places) to maintain consistency PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 The Commission received five comments regarding this proposal.334 Two commenters stated that the amendment was overly burdensome and that it would not result in a more accurate picture of a broker-dealer’s financial condition than obtained through current requirements.335 One of these commenters added that any implementation and enforcement of the amendments ‘‘should not be made retroactive.’’336 This commenter stated that it is unclear how, and unlikely that, this amendment would achieve any of the desired results and argued that it could conversely impair a firm’s ability to continue as a going concern.337 Finally, this commenter also argued that this amendment would affect capital transactions that originate at the holding company level.338 Two commenters agreed in principle with the amendments but urged the Commission to carefully consider the potential consequences of implementation and to provide clarification on the standard for demonstrating that the third party has adequate financial resources, including factors beyond those referred to in the proposing release that they believed would be potentially relevant.339 One commenter supported the Commission’s goal of clarifying disclosures relating to expense sharing or obligations.340 As with the proposal, the amendment, as adopted, is designed to prohibit a practice that could misrepresent a broker-dealer’s actual financial condition, deceive the firm’s customers, and hamper the ability of regulators to monitor the firm’s financial condition. Moreover, the amendment, as adopted, should not impose undue burdens or present serious implementation difficulties because the requirement is consistent with prior staff guidance regarding the treatment of broker-dealer expenses assumed by a third party.341 Finally, as compared to staff guidance, a federal regulation offers broker-dealers greater certainty as to how to treat expense sharing agreements under Rule 15c3–1. In response to the comments discussed above, and as the Commission explained in the proposing release, a broker-dealer can demonstrate the adequacy of the third party’s financial throughout Rule 15c3–1, which uses the phrase ‘‘broker or dealer.’’ 334 See Beer Letter; Levene Letter; Lowenstein Letter; SIFMA 2 Letter; NIBA 2 Letter. 335 See Beer Letter; Levene Letter. 336 See Levene Letter. 337 Id. 338 Id. 339 See Lowenstein Letter; SIFMA 2 Letter. 340 See NIBA 2 Letter. 341 See, e.g., Third Party Expense Letter. E:\FR\FM\21AUR2.SGM 21AUR2 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 162 / Wednesday, August 21, 2013 / Rules and Regulations emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with RULES2 resources by maintaining records such as the third party’s most recent (i.e., as of a date within the previous twelve months) audited financial statements, tax returns, or regulatory filings containing financial reports.342 Given that the entity to which the brokerdealer is seeking to shift one or more liabilities typically is an affiliate, the staff’s experience is that such records should be available to the broker-dealer. Further, because the proposed rule change is consistent with prior staff guidance regarding the need to be able to demonstrate the third party’s financial adequacy,343 a broker-dealer seeking to shift a liability to a third party already would be expected to provide such evidence of the third party’s financial resources. For these reasons, the change from staff guidance to Commission rule should not result in implementation and burden concerns of the magnitude raised by the two commenters.344 Finally, one commenter noted it would be helpful if the Commission would clarify whether this amendment supersedes the Commission staff guidance in the Third Party Expense Letter.345 Unlike the PAIB Letter discussed above, the Commission is not directing the staff to withdraw the Third Party Expense Letter on the effective date of these amendments. The Third Party Expense Letter will still be relevant as staff guidance, notwithstanding that it contains a condition that has been codified into Rule 15c3–1 (i.e., that an expense of the broker-dealer assumed by a third party will be considered a liability for net capital purposes unless the brokerdealer can demonstrate that the third party has adequate resources independent of the broker-dealer to pay the liability or expense).346 In particular, the letter contains additional staff guidance not incorporated into the rule that will be relevant as staff guidance with respect to complying with the amendment to Rule 15c3–1 being adopted today. For example, the letter contains staff guidance with respect to the records a broker-dealer would be expected to make, keep current, and preserve under Rules 17a– 3 and 17a–4 with respect to brokerdealer liabilities and expenses assumed 342 See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12872. The Commission specifically requested comment regarding the records by which a broker-dealer could demonstrate financial resources. It received no comments in response to this request. 343 See, e.g., Third Party Expense Letter. 344 See Lowenstein Letter; SIFMA 2 Letter. 345 See SIFMA 2 Letter. 346 See Third Party Expense Letter, at 2–3. VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:54 Aug 20, 2013 Jkt 229001 by a third party, as well as requirements regarding written expense sharing agreements.347 Broker-dealers can continue to rely on the guidance in the Third Party Expense Letter with respect to these matters in complying with today’s amendment. 2. Requirement To Subtract From Net Worth Certain Non-Permanent Capital Contributions In the proposing release, the Commission noted its concern that broker-dealers may be receiving capital contributions from investors that are subsequently withdrawn after a short period of time (often less than a year).348 In some cases, the capital may be contributed under an agreement giving the investor the option to withdraw it at the investor’s discretion. In the past, the Commission has emphasized that capital contributions to broker-dealers should not be temporary,349 and the Commission staff has explained that a capital contribution should be treated as a liability if it is made with the understanding that the contribution can be withdrawn at the option of the investor.350 Consistent with these Commission and staff positions that capital is not temporary,351 and given the importance of this issue and the Commission’s concern that broker-dealers may not be properly treating short-term capital contributions as liabilities, the 347 Id. 348 See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12873. 349 See Net Capital Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 28927 (Feb. 28, 1991), 56 FR 9124 (Mar. 5, 1991). See also Study of Unsafe and Unsound Practices of Broker-Dealers, Report and Recommendations of the Securities and Exchange Commission, H.R. Doc. No. 92–231 (1971), at 17, 42 (recommending improvement of adequacy and permanency of capital) (‘‘During the 1967–1970 period under review, many broker-dealers, some of them large retail houses, were found to have inadequate and impermanent capital in relation to their business.’’). 350 Letter from Michael A. Macchiaroli, Associate Director, Division of Market Regulation, Commission, to Raymond J. Hennessy, Vice President, NYSE, and Susan DeMando, Vice President, NASD Regulation, Inc. (Feb. 23, 2000) (‘‘Temporary Capital Letter’’) (‘‘It is the view of the Division that, for net capital purposes, if an individual investor contributes capital to a brokerdealer with an understanding that the contribution can be withdrawn at the option of the individual investor, the contribution may not be included in the firm’s net capital computation and must be recharacterized as a liability. Any withdrawal of capital as to that investor within a period of one year, other than a withdrawal described in paragraph (e)(4)(iii) of Rule 15c3–1, shall be presumed to have been contemplated at the time of the contribution.’’) (footnote omitted); see also Net Capital Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 28927 (Feb. 28, 1991), 56 FR 9124 (Mar. 5, 1991). 351 See Net Capital Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 28927 (Feb. 28, 1991), 56 FR 9124 (Mar. 5, 1991). PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 51851 Commission proposed amending Rule 15c3–1 to add paragraph (c)(2)(i)(G) to further incorporate these positions into the rule.352 The proposed change would require a broker-dealer to treat as a liability any capital that is contributed under an agreement giving the investor the option to withdraw it or that is contributed with the intent to withdraw the capital within one year. The Commission further proposed that capital withdrawn within one year would be presumptively subject to treatment as a liability (i.e., it would be presumed to have been contributed with the intent to withdraw within one year).353 The Commission is adopting the final rule amendment with certain modifications. As adopted, the rule requires that a broker-dealer treat as a liability any capital that is contributed under an agreement giving the investor the option to withdraw it. The rule, as adopted, also requires that a brokerdealer treat as a liability any capital contribution that is intended to be withdrawn within one year of its contribution. In addition, the final rule provides that capital withdrawn within one year of contribution is deemed to have been intended to be withdrawn within one year unless the broker-dealer receives permission in writing for the withdrawal from its DEA.354 The ability of a broker-dealer to seek permission in writing from its DEA to withdraw capital contributed within one year will provide a means for firms to seek to withdraw capital in limited circumstances after review by its DEA without having to reclassify the withdrawn capital as a liability for net capital purposes.355 In the final rule, the Commission has modified the proposed language by moving the qualifier that the DEA can approve a withdrawal so that it modifies this presumption. Specifically, as proposed, the rule provided that a contribution of capital had to be subtracted from net worth if it ‘‘is 352 See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 74 FR at 12871–12872. 353 Id. 354 These requirements will not apply to withdrawals covered by paragraph (e)(4)(iii) of Rule 15c3–1, namely, withdrawals used to make tax payments or to pay reasonable compensation to partners. See 17 CFR 240.15c3–1(e)(4)(iii). These types of payments are ordinary business expenditures and do not raise the types of concerns the proposed rule is designed to address. One commenter suggested that the rule be amended to explicitly exclude any withdrawals that would fall under paragraph (e)(4)(iii) of Rule 15c3–1. 355 See FINRA Rule 4110(c)(1) (providing, in part, that no equity capital of a member may be withdrawn for a period of one year from the date such equity capital is contributed, unless otherwise permitted by FINRA in writing). E:\FR\FM\21AUR2.SGM 21AUR2 51852 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 162 / Wednesday, August 21, 2013 / Rules and Regulations emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with RULES2 intended to be withdrawn within a period of one year unless the withdrawal has been approved in writing by the Examining Authority for the broker or dealer.’’ As adopted, the rule provides that ‘‘[a]ny withdrawal of capital made within one year of its contribution is deemed to have been intended to be withdrawn within a period of one year, unless the withdrawal has been approved in writing by the Examining Authority for the broker or dealer.’’ 356 The change is intended to eliminate a potential ambiguity in the proposal as to whether a withdrawal of capital within one year could ever be approved by the firm’s DEA and, therefore, afford the intended relief from the deduction.357 The Commission received five comments regarding the amendment to paragraph (c)(2)(i)(G)(2) of Rule 15c3– 1.358 In addition to the general request for comment included in the proposing release, the Commission also requested specific comment on whether the time period within which withdrawn and intended-to-be-withdrawn contributions must be treated as liabilities should be longer than one year.359 While the commenters agreed in principle that contributions of capital to brokerdealers should not be subject to withdrawal at will, they expressed concerns regarding the negative effect that overly restrictive limitations on withdrawals of capital could have on obtaining capital contributions and, therefore, on the financial health of broker-dealers. One commenter, a registered broker-dealer, stated that it believed that the amendment would raise its cost of capital to the point where it would be impossible to obtain capital from unrelated third parties at all.360 Two commenters also expressed concerns about the potential burden posed by the amendment to brokerdealers in need of capital.361 One suggested the addition of exceptions to the rule for de minimis withdrawals and dividends or distributions.362 Another commenter suggested that the proposal should be amended to exclude a 356 See paragraph (c)(2)(i)(G)(2) of Rule 15c3–1, as adopted. 357 The phrase ‘‘to the broker or dealer’’ following ‘‘one year of its contribution’’ is not included in the final rule because it would be redundant, as the contributions covered in the amendment all involve contributions to the broker-dealer. 358 See Chicago Capital Management Letter; SIFMA 2 Letter; American Bar Association Letter; SIG Letter; NIBA 2 Letter. 359 See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12871–12872. 360 See Chicago Capital Management Letter. 361 See American Bar Association Letter; SIFMA 2 Letter. 362 See SIFMA 2 Letter. VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:54 Aug 20, 2013 Jkt 229001 redemption right—a form of option— provided to the investor in connection with the investor’s capital contribution to the broker-dealer, where (i) the redemption right may only be exercised by the investor commencing more than one year following the date of the capital contribution to the broker-dealer and (ii) the redemption right would not be mandatorily redeemable.363 Another commenter opposed the rule, stating that it contravenes pertinent legal and accounting standards and is unnecessary in view of existing capital withdrawal limitations and notification requirements.364 This commenter stated that neither GAAP nor Rule 15c3–1 contain a requirement that capital must be permanent, and the word ‘‘capital’’ has no intrinsic meaning that requires it to be permanent.365 This commenter stated that if any further limitations on capital withdrawals are adopted beyond the current provisions of the net capital rule, they should be designed to allow for the ability of broker-dealer holding companies to withdraw excess net capital at their option for legitimate purposes.366 The fifth commenter agreed that there should be no circumstance in which a broker-dealer accepted a capital contribution for net capital purposes that could be withdrawn at the option of the investor.367 This commenter, however, also stated that the standard for withdrawals should be shortened from one year to nine or six months to increase the availability of funds from investors and owners, allowing more broker-dealers to raise capital and strengthen their financial stability.368 The commenter requested that the Commission consider the needs of small firms that it said likely will require additional net capital over the next decade.369 In response to the commenters’ concerns about firms’ ability to obtain capital and that the amendment contravenes pertinent legal and accounting standards, the amended rule merely clarifies what constitutes a broker-dealer’s permanent capital under Rule 15c3–1 and further emphasizes the requirement that capital contributions 363 See 364 See American Bar Association Letter. SIG Letter. 365 Id. 366 Id. 367 See NIBA 2 Letter. 368 Id. 369 Id. The commenter also stated that rules that ‘‘restrict small broker-dealers from raising capital as a result of uncertainty of investors or owneroperators related to the return of their capital in a reasonable time frame will create a disproportionate and impossible hurdle for small broker-dealers to overcome.’’ Id. PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 cannot be temporary.370 Rule 15c3–1 imposes a capital standard that is distinct from the use of the term ‘‘capital’’ in other legal and accounting contexts, and the rule amendments under paragraph (c)(2)(i)(G) of Rule 15c3–1 are consistent with the Commission’s and staff’s views that capital under Rule 15c3–1 should not be temporary.371 370 See Net Capital Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 28927 (Feb. 28, 1991) (‘‘The Commission wishes to emphasize that the net capital maintained in a broker-dealer should be permanent capital and not merely a temporary infusion of funds from an affiliate or other sources. For example, there are instances where a broker-dealer receives funds from an affiliate in an amount that would enable the broker-dealer to engage in a transaction that it would otherwise be prohibited from doing because of minimum net capital requirements. If the funds are transferred back to the affiliate within a relatively short period of time after the transaction, the Commission questions whether the funds transferred into the broker-dealer entity could properly be characterized as capital of the firm. Instead, the transaction could be viewed as a loan by the affiliate to the broker-dealer, with the result that the broker-dealer would have to treat the transaction as a liability.’’). See also Net Capital Requirements for Brokers and Dealers, Exchange Act Release No. 18417 (Jan. 13, 1982), 47 FR 3512 (Jan. 25, 1982) (describing subordination agreement requirements under Appendix D to Rule 15c3–1, including that, among other things, no prepayment may be made (except under the strictly defined limitations of paragraph (c)(5) of Appendix D) before the expiration of one year from the effective date of the subordination agreement, and noting this provision was designed to insure the adequacy as well as the permanence of capital in the industry.); Temporary Capital Letter; Study of Unsafe and Unsound Practices of Broker-Dealers, Report and Recommendations of the Securities and Exchange Commission, H.R. Doc. No. 92–231 (1971) (recommending improvement of adequacy and permanency of capital); and Letter from Nelson Kibler, Assistant Director, Division of Market Regulation to John Pinto, National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (Sept. 8, 1980). 371 See Study of Unsafe and Unsound Practices of Broker-Dealers, Report and Recommendations of the Securities and Exchange Commission, H.R. Doc. No. 92–231 (1971), at p. 15 (‘‘The unfortunate use of the term ‘‘net capital’’ in the financial responsibility rules of the Commission and the various exchanges resulted in a semantic confusion which too frequently has led to the mistaken belief that a broker-dealer’s net capital is the equivalent of or has some relationship to the concept of ‘‘capital’’, as that term is commonly understood. ‘‘Net Capital’’ applies only to a hard core residue of net liquid assets designed to enable a brokerdealer to meet all rightful current demands of customers for their funds and securities.’’). See also Capital, Margin, and Segregation Requirements for Security-Based Swap Dealers and Major SecurityBased Swap Participants and Capital Requirements for Broker-Dealers, 77 FR at 70230 (‘‘The net liquid assets test is imposed through the mechanics of how a broker-dealer is required to compute net capital pursuant to Rule 15c3–1. These requirements are set forth in paragraph (c)(2) of Rule 15c3–1, which defines the term net capital. The first step is to compute the broker-dealer’s net worth under GAAP. Next, the broker-dealer must make certain adjustments to its net worth to calculate net capital. These adjustments are designed to leave the firm in a position where each dollar of unsubordinated liabilities is matched by more than a dollar of highly liquid assets. There are thirteen categories of net worth adjustments required by the rule.’’) (footnotes omitted). E:\FR\FM\21AUR2.SGM 21AUR2 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 162 / Wednesday, August 21, 2013 / Rules and Regulations emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with RULES2 The Commission also considered the commenter’s suggestion that there be exceptions for de minimis withdrawals, dividends, or distributions. As previously stated, however, the Commission has emphasized that capital contributions should not be temporary.372 Moreover, paragraph (e) of Rule 15c3–1 already contains mechanisms to permit a broker-dealer to make capital withdrawals for specified purposes.373 Finally, if a broker-dealer believes it has a basis to appropriately withdraw capital within one year of contribution because, for example, the withdrawal would be de minimis, the final rule provides a mechanism for the broker-dealer to seek permission in writing from its DEA to make such a withdrawal.374 With respect to a commenter’s view that the standard for withdrawal should be less than one year (e.g., six or nine months), the Commission continues to believe that one year is an appropriate amount of time that a broker-dealer must retain a contribution in order to classify it as capital and not a liability. This is the standard that the Commission staff and FINRA have applied for a number of years and there is no compelling reason to change it.375 Because the final rule change is an incorporation of, among other things, existing Commission staff guidance into Rule 15c3–1, the requirement should not significantly alter current practice. Moreover, with respect to commenters’ concerns about the ability to obtain capital, the rule does not prohibit an investor from withdrawing capital at any time. It prohibits a broker372 See Study of Unsafe and Unsound Practices of Broker-Dealers, Report and Recommendations of the Securities and Exchange Commission, H.R. Doc. No. 92–231 (1971), at p. 15; Capital, Margin, and Segregation Requirements for Security-Based Swap Dealers and Major Security-Based Swap Participants and Capital Requirements for BrokerDealers, 77 FR at 70230. 373 See 17 CFR 240.15c3–1(e)(1)(iii)(B) and (e)(4)(iii). See also Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12872, n.79 (‘‘These requirements would not apply to withdrawals covered by paragraph (e)(4)(iii) of Rule 15c3–1, namely, withdrawals used to make tax payments or pay reasonable compensation to partners. These types of payments are ordinary business expenditures and do not raise the types of concerns the proposed rule is designed to address.’’). 374 See paragraph (c)(2)(i)(G)(2) of Rule 15c3–1, as adopted. 375 See Temporary Capital Letter; FINRA Rule 4110(c)(1) (‘‘No equity capital of a member may be withdrawn for a period of one year from the date such equity capital is contributed, unless otherwise permitted by FINRA in writing.’’). See also Exchange Act Release No. 60933 (Nov. 4, 2009), 74 FR 58334 (Nov. 12, 2009) (SR–FINRA–2008–067); Net Capital Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 28927 (Feb. 28, 1991) (emphasizing ‘‘that the net capital maintained in a broker-dealer should be permanent capital and not merely a temporary infusion of funds from an affiliate or other sources’’). VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:54 Aug 20, 2013 Jkt 229001 dealer from treating temporary cash infusions as capital for purposes of Rule 15c3–1. Finally, as stated above, the final rule provides a mechanism for a broker-dealer to apply to its DEA to make a withdrawal without triggering the deduction.376 This provides a process for firms to affect withdrawals within one year where appropriate. In summary, the Commission is adding paragraph (c)(2)(i)(G) to Rule 15c3–1 to require a broker-dealer to subtract from net worth any contribution of capital to the broker or dealer: ‘‘(1) [u]nder an agreement that provides the investor with the option to withdraw the capital; or (2) [t]hat is intended to be withdrawn within a period of one year of contribution.’’ 377 The final rule further provides that ‘‘[a]ny withdrawal of capital made within one year of its contribution is deemed to have been intended to be withdrawn within a period of one year, unless the withdrawal has been approved in writing by the Examining Authority for the broker or dealer.’’ 378 3. Requirement To Deduct the Amount by Which a Fidelity Bond Deductible Exceeds SRO Limits Under SRO rules, certain brokerdealers that do business with the public or that are required to become members of SIPC must comply with mandatory fidelity bonding requirements.379 SRO rules typically permit a broker-dealer to have a deductible provision included in the bond; however, such rules provide that the deductible may not exceed certain amounts. With regard to firms that maintain deductible amounts over the maximum amount specified, several SRO rules provide that the broker-dealer must deduct this excess amount from its net worth when calculating net capital 376 The final rule does not distinguish between complete and partial withdrawals of capital and, consequently, the deduction could be triggered in either event. Moreover, a partial withdrawal would require a deduction of the full amount of the original contribution as it would indicate that the contribution was merely temporary in nature. 377 See paragraph (c)(2)(i)(G) of Rule 15c3–1, as adopted. 378 Id. 379 See, e.g., FINRA Rule 4360, CBOE Rule 9.22, and NASDAQ OMX PHLX Rule 705. SRO fidelity bonding requirements typically contain agreements covering areas such as: a ‘‘Fidelity’’ insuring clause to indemnify against loss of property through dishonest or fraudulent acts of employees; an ‘‘On Premises’’ agreement insuring against losses resulting from crimes such as burglary and theft and from misplacement of property of the insured; an ‘‘In Transit’’ clause indemnifying against losses occurring while property is in transit; a ‘‘Forgery and Alteration’’ agreement insuring against loss due to forgery or alteration of various kinds of negotiable instruments; and a ‘‘Securities Loss’’ clause protecting against losses incurred through forgery and alteration of securities. Id. PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 51853 under Rule 15c3–1.380 Other SROs require that any deductible amount elected by a broker-dealer that is greater than 10% of the coverage purchased by the broker-dealer must be deducted from the broker-dealer’s net worth when calculating net capital under Rule 15c3– 1.381 Rule 15c3–1, however, does not specifically reference the SRO deductible requirements as a charge to net worth. Therefore, a broker-dealer would not be required to account for the deduction required by an SRO rule in computing net capital under Rule 15c3– 1 or in the net capital computation reflected on the broker-dealer’s FOCUS report. To address this inconsistency, the Commission proposed to amend Rule 15c3–1 to add paragraph (c)(2)(xiv) to require a broker-dealer to deduct, with regard to fidelity bonding requirements, the amount required by the rules of the broker-dealer’s DEA, i.e., the amount in excess of the deductible prescribed in the applicable DEA’s fidelity bond rule.382 The Commission received one comment supporting the proposal and one opposing it.383 The commenter opposing the amendment noted that amending Rule 15c3–1 to conform to FINRA Rule 4360 would create an increase in minimum net capital requirements for some brokerdealers.384 SRO rules prescribing fidelity bond deductibles, and capital charges for deductibles in excess of a certain amount, are designed to incentivize broker-dealers to carry fidelity bonds with a deductible low enough to help ensure customer protection. Moreover, in response to the comment that this amendment would increase minimum net capital requirements, the Commission notes that broker-dealers that are members of an SRO with such a fidelity bonding rule already must account for the deduction in complying with the net capital requirements of the SROs and nothing in the Commission’s amendment to paragraph (c)(2)(xiv) of Rule 15c3–1 would alter this status quo. Rather, the proposed rule change would conform the capital calculation under paragraph (c)(2)(xiv) of Rule 15c3–1 to that required by the broker-dealer’s SRO. For these reasons, the Commission is adopting paragraph (c)(2)(xiv) to Rule 15c3–1 with technical revisions to the proposed rule text to make the text of 380 See, e.g., CBOE Rule 9.22. e.g., FINRA Rule 4360. 17 CFR 240.15c3–1(c)(12) (defining examining authority for purposes of Exchange Act Rule 15c3–1). 383 See SIFMA 2 Letter; NIBA 2 Letter. 384 See NIBA 2 Letter. 381 See, 382 See E:\FR\FM\21AUR2.SGM 21AUR2 51854 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 162 / Wednesday, August 21, 2013 / Rules and Regulations the final rule, as adopted, a more generic cross reference to SRO fidelity bond requirements. The technical changes are designed to increase the flexibility of the final rule so that revisions to SRO fidelity bond requirements pursuant to section 19(b) of the Exchange Act 385 will not require conforming amendments to paragraph (c)(2)(xiv) of Rule 15c3–1.386 More specifically, the proposed rule text, as set forth in the proposing release, would have required the broker-dealer to deduct ‘‘with respect to fidelity bond coverage, the excess of any deductible amount over the maximum deductible amount permitted by the Examining Authority for the broker or dealer.’’ 387 The final rule, as adopted, provides that the broker-dealer must deduct ‘‘the amount specified by rule of the Examining Authority for the broker or dealer with respect to a requirement to maintain fidelity bond coverage.’’ 388 Thus, the final rule does not include the phrase ‘‘maximum permissible deductible amounts.’’ This phrase was borrowed from SRO fidelity bond rules. Because the construction of the SRO rules may change over time, the Commission is making the crossreference to the SRO rules more general.389 4. Broker-Dealer Solvency Requirement The Commission is adopting an amendment to paragraph (a) of Rule 15c3–1 to require a broker-dealer to cease conducting a securities business if certain insolvency events were to occur. Specifically, as adopted, amended paragraph (a) of Rule 15c3–1 provides that a broker-dealer must not be insolvent as that term is defined in new paragraph (c)(16) of the rule.390 By making solvency a requirement of Rule 15c3–1, this amendment will require an insolvent 391 broker-dealer to cease conducting a securities business pursuant to section 15(c)(3) of the Exchange Act, which generally prohibits a broker-dealer from effecting any transaction in, or inducing or attempting 385 15 U.S.C. 78s(b). e.g., FINRA Rule 4360. 387 See, e.g., Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12872. 388 See paragraph (c)(2)(xiv) of Rule 15c3–1, as adopted. 389 See, e.g., FINRA Rule 4360. See also Exchange Act Release No. 63961 (Feb. 24, 2011), 76 FR 11542 (Mar. 2, 2011). 390 The final rule also has been modified by replacing the word ‘‘shall’’ with the word ‘‘must.’’ 391 The definition of insolvent is intended to be broad enough to encompass any type of insolvency proceeding or condition of insolvency; for example, the proposed definition incorporates concepts of insolvency in the U.S. Bankruptcy Code and SIPA. See 11 U.S.C. 101; 15 U.S.C. 78eee(b)(1). to induce the purchase or sale of, any security in contravention of the Commission’s financial responsibility rules (which include Rule 15c3–1).392 As proposed, paragraph (c)(16) of Rule 15c3–1 would have defined the term insolvent as, among other things, a broker-dealer’s placement in a voluntary or involuntary bankruptcy or similar proceeding; the appointment of a trustee, receiver, or similar official; a general assignment by the broker-dealer for the benefit of its creditors; an admission of insolvency; or the inability to make computations necessary to establish compliance with Rule 15c3– 1.393 As discussed more specifically below, the Commission modified paragraph (c)(16) of Rule 15c3–1 in the final rule in response to concerns raised by commenters. In the proposing release, the Commission solicited comment on whether there are other insolvency events that should be captured in the proposed definition.394 One commenter noted that involuntary insolvency proceedings do not necessarily indicate that the broker-dealer is insolvent, as such proceedings can be frivolous, malicious, or otherwise lacking in merit.395 The commenter also noted that industry standard contract forms generally provide a grace period for a party to such a proceeding to obtain a stay or dismissal before an event of default is deemed to occur.396 In response to this comment, the Commission notes that the number of broker-dealer bankruptcy filings (voluntary or involuntary) is small, and therefore, the institution of a frivolous involuntary proceeding involving a broker-dealer likely is a very rare event. Thus, the Commission must consider the potential need for an automatic grace period to address the potential for a frivolous involuntary bankruptcy as well as the harm that could result from allowing a broker-dealer to continue to effect securities transactions for a period of time even though it is properly the subject of a bankruptcy proceeding. The Commission believes the more appropriate approach is to address emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with RULES2 386 See, VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:54 Aug 20, 2013 Jkt 229001 392 15 U.S.C. 78o. Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12872–12873. A broker-dealer’s inability to make computations necessary to establish compliance with Rule 15c3–1 may also impact the broker-dealer’s ability to make the computations necessary to establish compliance with Rule 15c3–3 and vice versa. See, e.g., Rule 15c3–1(a)(1)(ii) (incorporating computations under Rule 15c3–3 into the minimum net capital requirement). 394 See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12873. 395 See SIFMA 2 Letter. 396 Id. 393 See PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 potentially frivolous proceedings on a case-by-case basis. In the event that a case arises where there would be a need to fashion relief for a broker-dealer that was the subject of a frivolous or meritless involuntary petition, the Commission’s existing authority permits it sufficient flexibility to fashion exemptions under appropriate circumstances.397 In addition to the comment discussed above, the Commission received four other comment letters that addressed these amendments.398 One commenter objected to the amendments as unnecessary, citing the Rule 15c3–1 prohibition on broker-dealers effecting securities transactions if their net capital is below certain minimums and noting that a broker-dealer that was insolvent would ‘‘by definition’’ be below those minimums.399 In response to this comment, the Commission notes that the purpose of the amendment is to address cases where a broker-dealer is subject to an insolvency event but takes the position that it is in compliance with the net capital rule. While such instances may be rare, an insolvent broker-dealer could seek the protection of the bankruptcy laws but continue to effect transactions with the public, potentially jeopardizing customers and other creditors of the broker-dealer, including counterparties. Another commenter requested that the Commission modify the definition of insolvent to carve out market-wide disruptions that prevent the computation of net capital but are unrelated to the solvency of the brokerdealer.400 In response to this suggestion, the Commission notes that if appropriate and necessary, such an event can be addressed through the Commission’s exemptive authority, rather than by a specific exception in the rule. One commenter, while supporting the amendment, objected to the incorporation of the definition of insolvent from section 101 of the Bankruptcy Code.401 This commenter argued a bankruptcy-based standard for insolvency was appropriate for a notice requirement but that the proper standard for determining whether a broker-dealer should be prohibited from continuing to conduct a securities business is its amount of net capital. As noted above, allowing an insolvent 397 See 15 U.S.C. 78mm(a). See also 17 CFR 240.15c3–1(b)(3). 398 See SIPC Letter; St. Bernard Financial Services Letter; American Bar Association Letter; Cornell Letter. 399 See St. Bernard Financial Services Letter. 400 See American Bar Association Letter. 401 See SIFMA 2 Letter. E:\FR\FM\21AUR2.SGM 21AUR2 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 162 / Wednesday, August 21, 2013 / Rules and Regulations emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with RULES2 broker-dealer to continue conducting a securities business during the period of its insolvency, notwithstanding its net capital position, could jeopardize customers and other market participants because a broker-dealer that has made an admission of insolvency, or is otherwise deemed insolvent or entitled to protection from creditors, does not possess the financial resources necessary to operate a securities business.402 Continuing to operate in such circumstances poses a significant credit risk to counterparties and to the clearance and settlement system, and, in the event the firm subsequently is placed in a liquidation proceeding under SIPA, may impair the ability of the SIPA trustee to make customers of the broker-dealer whole and satisfy claims of other creditors out of the assets of the general estate.403 In addition, this commenter also was concerned that under the proposed amendment a firm would be prevented from effecting hedging or liquidating transactions intended to reduce the risk the firm poses to the financial markets and its customers. The commenter noted that such limitations also would be at odds with section 5(a)(2) of SIPA, which contemplates that a broker-dealer that is in, or approaching, financial difficulty may undertake to liquidate or reduce its business either voluntarily or pursuant to the direction of an SRO.404 The final rule amendment is not intended to affect in any a brokerdealer’s ability to act under section 5(a)(2) of SIPA.405 In addition, the Commission is amending the final rule to incorporate within the term insolvency the circumstance in which a broker-dealer is unable to make such computations as may be necessary to establish compliance with Rule 15c3–3.406 In the proposing release, the Commission 402 See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12872. 403 Id. 404 See SIFMA 2 Letter; SIPC Letter. See also 15 U.S.C. 78eee(a)(5). 405 See15 U.S.C. 78eee(a)(5). Further, the amendment is not intended to affect in any way a SIPA trustee’s ability to liquidate a broker-dealer. Effectively, a SIPA trustee steps into the shoes of the debtor broker-dealer in order to liquidate the broker-dealer and protect its customers’ interests. 406 The final rule adds the phrase ‘‘or with § 240.15c3–3’’ to follow the phrase ‘‘[i]s unable to make such computations as may be necessary to establish compliance with this section.’’ See paragraph (c)(16)(iv) of Rule 15c3–1. See also generally, SIPC Letter (favoring an amendment requiring broker-dealers to cease doing business if insolvent as defined under proposed Rule 15c3l(c)(16) and noting that the circumstances under which the broker would be required to cease doing business are consistent with the circumstances under which SIPC may seek to place a firm in liquidation). VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:54 Aug 20, 2013 Jkt 229001 stated that the ‘‘proposed definition of ‘insolvent’ is intended to be broad enough to encompass any type of insolvency proceeding or condition of insolvency,’’ 407 and noted that the proposed definition incorporates concepts of insolvency from the U.S. Bankruptcy Code and SIPA.408 Consequently, consistent with the discussion in the proposing release, the modification in the final rule will more closely align the definition of insolvent under paragraph (c)(16) of Rule 15c3–1 with the grounds for the commencement of a proceeding under SIPA,409 which includes the circumstance that a brokerdealer is unable to make computations necessary to establish compliance with the financial responsibility or hypothecation rules.410 Rule 3a40–1 defines the term financial responsibility rules to include, among others, any rule adopted by the Commission pursuant to section 15(c)(3) of the Exchange Act— Rules 15c3–1 and 15c3–3 were adopted under section 15(c)(3). As a financial responsibility rule, the inability of a broker-dealer to make a computation necessary to establish compliance with Rule 15c3–3 constitutes a basis for commencing a SIPA proceeding. Consequently, this modification to the proposed definition of insolvency under paragraph (c)(16) of Rule 15c3–1 will more closely align the definition with SIPA.411 The Commission also is adopting an amendment to the first sentence of paragraph (b)(1) of Rule 17a–11 to require that a broker-dealer meeting the definition of insolvent must provide immediate notice to the Commission, the firm’s DEA and, if applicable, the CFTC. One commenter specifically favored this amendment.412 This notice will assist regulators in taking steps to protect the insolvent firm’s customers, including, if appropriate, notifying SIPC of the need to commence a SIPA 407 See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12872. 408 Id. at n.85. 409 See 15 U.S.C. 78eee(b). 410 See 15 U.S.C. 78eee(b)(l)(D). See also 17 CFR 240.3a40–1 (defining the term financial responsibility rules for purposes of SIPA to include Rule 15c3–3). 411 The Commission also has made three technical modifications to the text of the insolvency definition. In response to a comment, the phrase ‘‘broker-dealer’’ was replaced with the phrase ‘‘broker or dealer’’ to be consistent with the use of the phrase in Rule 15c3–1. In addition, the phrase ‘‘for purposes of this section’’ was moved to the beginning of paragraph (c)(16) in order to clarify that the term insolvency is defined for purposes of Rule 15c3–1 in its entirety. Finally, the final rule does not include the phrase ‘‘whether commenced voluntarily or involuntarily’’ because the phrase would be redundant. 412 See SIPC Letter. PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 51855 proceeding. The Commission is adopting the amendment to paragraph (b)(1) of Rule 17a–11, with one technical modification.413 5. Amendment To Rule Governing Orders Restricting Withdrawal of Capital From a Broker-Dealer Paragraph (e) of Rule 15c3–1, which places certain conditions on a brokerdealer when withdrawing capital,414 also allows the Commission to issue an order temporarily restricting a brokerdealer from withdrawing capital or making loans or advances to stockholders, insiders, and affiliates under certain circumstances.415 The rule, however, limits such orders to withdrawals, advances, or loans that, when aggregated with all other withdrawals, advances, or loans on a net basis during a 30 calendar day period, exceed 30 percent of the firm’s excess net capital.416 When the Commission adopted this paragraph of Rule 15c3–1 more than 20 years ago, the Commission stated that it intended this section to be applied only where the continued viability of a broker-dealer appeared to be at stake.417 In the ensuing years, the Commission has utilized this provision only one time.418 The Commission has determined that the requirement is difficult to enforce, as it generally would not be clear when the 30% threshold had been reached, due to the inherent unreliability of a troubled broker-dealer’s books and records. Consequently, the Commission proposed, and is adopting, a change to delete this provision and instead to allow the Commission to restrict all withdrawals, advances, and loans so long as the other conditions under the rule (all of which remain unchanged) are met.419 The Commission received three comment letters addressing this proposal.420 One commenter supported the deletion of the 30% threshold, but believed its removal reflected the 413 The Commission is deleting the phrase ‘‘paragraph (c)(16) of’’ and inserting ‘‘(c)(16)’’ immediately following the second ‘‘15c3–1’’. 414 See 17 CFR 240.15c3–1(e). 415 See 17 CFR 240.15c3–1(e)(3). 416 Id. 417 Net Capital Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 28927 (Feb. 28, 1991), 56 FR 9124, 9128 (Mar. 5, 1991). 418 Order Regarding Withdrawals, Unsecured Loans or Advances from Refco Securities, LLC and Refco Clearing, LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 52606 (Oct. 13, 2005). 419 The Commission also proposed revising the second sentence in paragraph (e)(3)(ii) to remove the text ‘‘The hearing’’ and in its place adding the text ‘‘A hearing on an order temporarily prohibiting the withdrawal of capital.’’ 420 See NIBA 2 Letter; SIFMA 2 Letter; Raymond James 2 Letter. E:\FR\FM\21AUR2.SGM 21AUR2 51856 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 162 / Wednesday, August 21, 2013 / Rules and Regulations emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with RULES2 Commission’s desire to regulate large firms with complex capitalization without considering the needs of smaller firms.421 This commenter recommended the Commission set forth all conditions required for a firm to withdraw, repay, or redeem any amount that affects its overall capitalization.422 Specifically, the commenter suggested the following non-exclusive list of conditions for consideration: (1) ‘‘[r]egulatory minimum capital requirement related to all lines of business’’; (2) ‘‘[e]xcess mandated by that firms’ accruals for that period’’; (3) ‘‘[e]xcess mandated by the firms’ upcoming one-time non-recurring costs within that quarter’’; (4) ‘‘[e]xcess mandated by operating costs expected[,] but not related to accruals for that period’’; (5) [c]osts related to increased personnel coverage or recruitment within that quarter’’; and (6) ‘‘[d]etermination of the Board of the firm that there is no reasonable expectation at the time of its approval of the capital withdrawal, repayment or redemption, that the firm would be required to, or advisable to, increase its net capital excess.’’ The second commenter recommended several modifications to the amendment, including: (1) Clarifying that in addition to ordering complete restrictions on withdrawals, advances, and loans, the Commission may also issue orders imposing partial or conditional restrictions; (2) explicitly permitting certain types of withdrawals, advances, or loans, such as those in paragraphs (e)(4)(ii) and (iii) of Rule 15c3–1 (e.g., required tax payments or payments to partners for reasonable compensation) even after the issuance of a temporary restrictive order; and (3) clarifying that the provision in paragraph (e)(3)(ii) of the rule allowing a broker-dealer to request and receive a hearing on an order temporarily restricting withdrawals also applies to orders temporarily restricting advances and loans (in addition to withdrawals).423 Finally, the third commenter noted that the proposed amendment would eliminate the 30% requirement limit and allow the Commission to restrict all withdrawals, advances, and loans under specific circumstances.424 The commenter believes this action will impose an additional compliance 421 See NIBA 2 Letter. As noted above, the 30% threshold provision only applied in emergency situations and has only been used once before. As such, its deletion should only affect a limited number of broker-dealers. 422 Id. 423 See SIFMA 2 Letter. 424 See Raymond James 2 Letter. VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:54 Aug 20, 2013 Jkt 229001 burden on broker-dealers and will significantly limit the flexibility of broker-dealers in the event of a liquidity crisis.425 In response to these comments, the Commission notes that the 30% threshold pertains only to paragraph (e)(3)(i) of Rule 15c3–1, which relates to the Commission’s authority to temporarily restrict withdrawals of net capital. The Commission cannot impose these restrictions without concluding under subparagraph (e)(3)(i) that ‘‘such withdrawal, advance or loan may be detrimental to the financial integrity of the broker or dealer, or may unduly jeopardize the broker or dealer’s ability to repay its customer claims or other liabilities which may cause a significant impact on the markets or expose the customers or creditors of the broker or dealer to loss without taking into account the application of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970.’’ 426 While paragraph (e)(3)(i) of Rule 15c3– 1 would apply to all broker-dealers, the conditions under which the Commission may exercise its authority under the rule apply only to circumstances where the continued viability of the broker-dealer appears to be at stake.427 As noted above, the Commission has only utilized this provision once.428 The Commission, however, agrees with the importance of maintaining flexibility in the context of ordering restrictions on withdrawals, advances, and loans. Therefore, the Commission is modifying the amendment, as adopted, to add language to paragraph (e)(3)(i) to state (following the phrase ‘‘employee or affiliate’’) that such orders will be issued, ‘‘under such terms and conditions as the Commission deems necessary or appropriate in the public interest or consistent with the protection of investors. . . .’’ 429 With respect to the suggestion that the Commission explicitly permit certain types of withdrawals, advances, or loans even after the issuance of a temporary order, the Commission does not believe that it would be appropriate to permit— by codifying in the rule—a broker-dealer to take the actions described if the Commission has issued an order placing 425 Id. 426 See paragraph (e)(3)(i) of Rule 15c3–1, as adopted. 427 Net Capital Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 28927 (Feb. 28, 1991), 56 FR 9124, 9128 (Mar. 5, 1991). 428 Order Regarding Withdrawals, Unsecured Loans or Advances from Refco Securities, LLC and Refco Clearing, LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 52606 (Oct. 13, 2005). 429 See paragraph (e)(3)(i) of Rule 15c3–1, as adopted. See also 17 CFR 15c3–1(e). See generally, 15 U.S.C. 78mm(a)(1). PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 temporary restrictions on a brokerdealer’s ability to withdraw net capital under paragraph (e)(3) of the rule. The order would be intended to protect the customers and creditors of the brokerdealer, and permitting the actions by rule could undermine those protections. Moreover, there is no need to explicitly permit certain types of withdrawals, advances or loans because if there were circumstances that merited the brokerdealer making such payments, the Commission order could be fashioned as appropriate to permit those payments. With respect to the suggestion that the Commission clarify in paragraph (e)(3)(ii) of Rule 15c3–1 that a brokerdealer may request and receive a hearing on orders temporarily restricting advances and loans (in addition to withdrawals), under the existing rule, a broker-dealer may request a hearing if the Commission has issued an order temporarily restricting advances and loans by a broker-dealer, in addition to withdrawals, and the Commission is therefore adopting the amendment to paragraph (e)(3)(ii), as proposed.430 6. Adjusted Net Capital Requirements i. Amendment to Appendix A of Rule 15c3–1 The Commission is adopting an amendment to Appendix A of Rule 15c3–1, which permits broker-dealers to employ theoretical option pricing models to calculate haircuts for listed options and related positions that hedge those options.431 The amendment makes permanent a temporary amendment the Commission originally adopted in 1997.432 The temporary amendment expired on September 1, 1997, unless it was otherwise extended by the Commission.433 The Commission staff subsequently issued a no-action letter on January 13, 2000, which stated that the staff would not recommend enforcement action if broker-dealers continued to rely on the temporary amendment.434 430 17 CFR 240.15c3–1(e)(3)(ii). The Commission also is adopting revisions to the second sentence of paragraph (e)(3)(ii), replacing the phrase ‘‘The hearing’’ with the phrase ‘‘A hearing on an order temporarily prohibiting the withdrawal of capital.’’ 431 17 CFR 240.15c3–1a. 432 See Net Capital Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 38248 (Feb. 6, 1997), 62 FR 6474 (Feb. 12, 1997). 433 See 17 CFR 15c3–1a(b)(1)(iv)(B). 434 Letter from Michael Macchiaroli, Associate Director, Division of Market Regulation, Commission, to Richard Lewandowski, Vice President, Regulatory Division, The Chicago Board Options Exchange, Inc. (Jan. 13, 2000) (stating that the Division of Market Regulation ‘‘will not recommend . . . enforcement action if non-clearing option specialists and market-makers continue to rely on subparagraph (b)(1)(iv) of Appendix A to Rule 15c3–1 under the Exchange Act until such E:\FR\FM\21AUR2.SGM 21AUR2 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 162 / Wednesday, August 21, 2013 / Rules and Regulations The temporary amendment decreased the range of pricing inputs to the approved option pricing models, which effectively reduced the haircuts applied by the carrying firm with respect to nonclearing option specialist and market maker accounts.435 The temporary amendment, which applied only to these types of accounts, was limited to major market foreign currencies and diversified indexes. Even during periods of substantial volatility, there have been no significant increases in the number of deficits in non-clearing option specialist and market-maker accounts, nor did the lower capital charges under paragraph (b)(1)(iv) result in excessive leverage. Consequently, this amendment appropriately aligns the net capital requirements of affected firms with the risks Rule 15c3–1 seeks to mitigate. The Commission received one comment letter regarding this aspect of the proposing release. The commenter concurred with the Commission’s conclusions as to the effect of the temporary amendment and supported the proposal to make it permanent.436 Accordingly, the Commission is amending paragraph (b)(1)(iv) of Appendix A to Rule 15c3–1, as proposed, to make the temporary amendment permanent.437 ii. Money Market Funds a. Clarification emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with RULES2 The Commission is adopting an amendment to paragraph (c)(2)(vi)(D)(1) of Rule 15c3–1 to clarify that a money market fund, for the purposes of paragraph (c)(2)(vi)(D)(1), is a fund described in Rule 2a–7 under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (‘‘Rule 2a–7’’).438 The Commission did not time as the Commission has determined whether it should be extended’’). The letter did not grant any other relief. 435 See Net Capital Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 38248 (Feb. 6, 1997), 62 FR 6474 (Feb. 12, 1997). Under Appendix A to Rule 15c3–1, a brokerdealer calculating net capital charges for its options portfolios shocks the products in each portfolio (grouped by underlying instrument) at ten equidistant points along a potential market move range. The market move ranges for major market foreign currencies, high-capitalization diversified indexes, and non-high-capitalization diversified indexes are, respectively: +(¥) 6%, +(¥) 10% and +(¥) 15%. The temporary rule lowered these market move ranges to respectively: +(¥) 4c%, + 6% (¥) 8% and +(¥) 10% in terms of calculating haircuts for positions of non-clearing options specialists and market makers. Id. 436 See SIFMA 2 Letter. 437 As a result, the Commission also is redesignating paragraphs (b)(1)(iv)(A), (b)(1)(iv)(A)(1), (b)(1)(iv)(A)(2), and (b)(1)(iv)(A)(3) as paragraphs (b)(1)(iv), (b)(1)(iv)(A), (b)(1)(iv)(B), and (b)(1)(iv)(C), respectively. 438 See 17 CFR 270.2a–7. VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:54 Aug 20, 2013 Jkt 229001 receive any comments on this proposal and is adopting it, as proposed. b. Proposed Haircut Reduction From 2% to 1% The Commission proposed an amendment to reduce the ‘‘haircut’’ that broker-dealers apply under Rule 15c3– 1 for money market funds.439 In 1982, the Commission adopted a 2% haircut requirement for redeemable securities of money market funds.440 In 1991, the Commission adopted certain amendments to Rule 2a–7 that strengthened the risk-limiting investment restrictions for money market funds.441 Based on the enhancements to Rule 2a–7, the Commission proposed to amend paragraph (c)(2)(vi)(D)(1) of Rule 15c3– 1 to reduce the haircut on such funds from 2% to 1% in order to better align the net capital charge with the risk associated with holding shares of a money market fund.442 In addition to the general request for comments in the proposing release, the Commission also specifically requested comments regarding whether the haircut for certain types of money market funds should be reduced to 0% as suggested in a petition for rulemaking submitted to the Commission.443 The Commission received a total of 14 responses from 12 different commenters regarding this proposed amendment. All of the commenters supported a reduction in the haircut for money market funds and urged that the haircut be reduced below the proposed 1%, with the majority proposing a haircut of 0% for ‘‘top-rated’’ money market funds (i.e., those with the highest ratings).444 Commenters cited the safety record of money market funds, in particular AAArated money market funds, in support of 439 See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12874. 440 Net Capital Requirements for Brokers and Dealers, Exchange Act Release No. 18737 (May 13, 1982), 47 FR 21759 (May 20, 1982). See 17 CFR 240.15c3–1(c)(2)(vi)(D)(1). 441 Revisions to Rules Regulating Money Market Funds, Investment Company Act Release No. 18005 (Feb. 20, 1991), 56 FR 8113 (Feb. 27, 1991). 442 See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12874. 443 See Public Petitions for Rulemaking No. 4–478 (Apr. 3, 2003) (available at https://www.sec.gov/ rules/petitions/petn4–478.htm), as amended (Apr. 4, 2005) (available at https://www.sec.gov/rules/ petitions/petn4–478a.pdf), and No. 4–577 (Feb. 3, 2009) (available at https://www.sec.gov/rules/ petitions/2009/petn4–577.pdf). 444 See Federated Letter; Federated 3 Letter; Curion Clearing Letter; FAF Advisors Letter; Brown Brothers Harriman Letter; SIFMA 2 Letter; ICI Letter; Barclays Letter; National Chamber Foundation Letter; Blackrock Letter; Deutsche Bank Securities Letter; UBS Letter; SIFMA 4 Letter; NIBA 2 Letter. PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 51857 imposing lower haircuts.445 Several commenters argued that top-rated money market funds were more liquid and posed less credit and interest rate risk than other instruments and suggested haircuts of 1/8 of 1% or even 0%.446 One commenter argued that since broker-dealers (like investors) view money market funds as cash equivalents, they would view a 1% haircut as a significant cost and would therefore avoid using money market funds.447 Two commenters suggested that if the Commission determined it necessary to impose a haircut on some Rule 2a–7 money market funds, it should implement a bifurcated scheme under which money market funds that qualify for deposit into a broker-dealer’s reserve account under Rule 15c3–3 would be subject to a 0% haircut,448 with one arguing that such qualifying money market funds should in any case receive a haircut no greater than 1/8 of 1%.449 Another commenter suggested that the proposed amendments to reduce the haircut for money market funds should be deferred until the results of the Commission’s money market reforms are known.450 Another commenter suggested a haircut of 5/8 of 1%, based on a combination of the 1/8 of 1% haircut applied to highly rated shorter-term (at least 30 but less than 91 days to maturity) commercial paper and municipal securities and an additional charge of 1/2 of 1% to account for any minimal risk associated with the nature or operation of mutual funds.451 Finally, one commenter supported a 0% haircut for applied to money market funds that: (1) Do not hold investments in their affiliates or holding companies; and (2) are not affiliated with the bank in which the broker-dealer holds its cash reserves and operating funds.452 As discussed above in section II.E.6.ii. of this release, the Commission recently proposed substantial amendments to its money market fund rules.453 In light of these proposed amendments,454 the Commission is deferring consideration of a reduction of the haircut for money market funds in Rule 15c3–1 at this time. Therefore, the haircut that brokerdealers apply for money market funds will remain at 2% under paragraph 445 See, e.g., Barclays Letter. e.g., FAF Advisors Letter. 447 See Federated Letter. 448 See Blackrock Letter; ICI Letter. 449 See Blackrock Letter. 450 See SIFMA 4 Letter. 451 See SIFMA 2 Letter. 452 See NIBA 2 Letter. 453 See Money Market Fund Reform; Amendments to Form PF, Release No. IC–30551 (June 5, 2013), 78 FR 36834 (June 19, 2013). 454 Id. 446 See, E:\FR\FM\21AUR2.SGM 21AUR2 51858 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 162 / Wednesday, August 21, 2013 / Rules and Regulations (c)(2)(vi)(D)(1) of Rule 15c3–1. Deferring action will allow the Commission to assess the potential impact of any money market fund reforms it may adopt and whether any such impact would have consequences for the net liquid asset standard of Rule 15c3–1. c. Aggregate Debit Items Charge emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with RULES2 The Commission proposed amendments to Rule 15c3–1 that would have eliminated a reduction to aggregate debit items that certain broker-dealers must take when computing their reserve requirements under Rule 15c3–3.455 Under paragraph (a)(1)(ii)(A) of Rule 15c3–1, a broker-dealer using the ‘‘alternative standard’’ 456 to compute its minimum net capital requirement must reduce aggregate debit items by 3% when computing its customer reserve requirement under Rule 15c3–3. Conversely, Note E(3) to the customer reserve formula (Rule 15c3–3a) requires a broker-dealer using the ‘‘basic method’’ of computing net capital under Rule 15c3–1 to reduce by 1% the total debits in Item 10 of the formula (i.e., debit balances in customer cash and margin accounts).457 Both of these provisions serve to increase the amount of funds a broker-dealer must deposit into its customer reserve account; however, the deduction applicable to alternative standard firms can result in an even larger reserve deposit requirement. The Commission received four comment letters regarding these amendments and all were supportive.458 However, recent market turmoil has highlighted the importance of maintaining adequate amounts of funds and qualified securities in the customer reserve account under Rule 15c3–3 to protect customers. Consequently, it would be imprudent to lower the debit reduction requirement for brokerdealers using the alternative standard at this time (especially given the fact that this standard is primarily used by firms with a substantial customer business). Therefore, the Commission has determined to defer consideration of action on this amendment at this time. 455 See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12867. 456 Under the ‘‘alternative standard,’’ a brokerdealer’s minimum net capital requirement is equal to 2% of the firm’s aggregate debit items. 17 CFR 240.15c3–1(a)(1)(ii). 457 Under the ‘‘basic method,’’ a broker-dealer cannot permit its aggregate indebtedness (generally total money liabilities) to exceed 1500% of its net capital. 17 CFR 15c3–1(a)(1)(i). 458 See Curian Clearing Letter; SIFMA 2 Letter; Deutsche Bank Securities Letter; Citigroup Letter. VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:54 Aug 20, 2013 Jkt 229001 F. Technical Amendments The Commission proposed a number of technical amendments to these rules, including changes to the definitions of fully paid securities, margin securities, and bank in Rule 15c3–3.459 These proposed technical amendments were not designed to substantively change the meanings of these defined terms but, rather, to amend out-of-date citations and remove text that the Commission believed to be superfluous or redundant. Two commenters 460 opposed the proposed technical amendments to the Rule 15c3–3 definition of fully paid securities. As proposed, the definition of fully paid securities would have included ‘‘all securities carried for the account of a customer unless such securities are purchased in a transaction for which the customer has not made full payment.’’ 461 The commenters contend that the amendments to the definition of fully paid securities would significantly expand the universe of fully paid securities because these securities generally are carried in a cash account, and under the proposed definition any security, in any account, including a margin account, could be considered a fully paid security (and subject to possession and control requirements) if it has been paid for in full. As such, the commenter noted that the term fully paid securities, as proposed, would require broker-dealers to determine whether securities in a margin account are fully paid (in which case they could not be hypothecated even if they are not excess margin securities). As a result, the commenter suggested that this definition should be limited to include only securities in a cash account that have been paid for in full. After careful consideration, and in response to the comment, the Commission has modified the text of paragraph (a)(3) to Rule 15c3–3 to more closely follow the original definition, while still adopting the updated references and terminology to reflect changes made to Regulation T since 1972. As adopted, the term fully paid securities includes ‘‘all securities carried for the account of a customer in a cash account as defined in Regulation T (12 CFR 220.1 et seq.), as well as securities carried for the account of a customer in a margin account or any special account under Regulation T that have no loan value for margin purposes, and all margin equity securities in such 459 17 CFR 240.15c3–3(a)(3), (4), and (7), respectively. 460 See SIFMA 2 Letter; Angel Letter. 461 See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12894. PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 account if they are fully paid. . . .’’ 462 The definition also states that, ‘‘the term ‘‘fully paid securities’’ does not apply to any securities purchased in transactions for which the customer has not made full payment.’’ The Commission did not receive any comments on the proposed amendments to the definition of margin securities under paragraph (a)(4) of Rule 15c3–3. The Commission is adopting this definition as proposed. In addition, the Commission did not receive any comments to the proposed amendments to the definition of bank under paragraph (a)(7) of Rule 15c3–3. The Commission, however, has modified the language in this paragraph to make the paragraph gender neutral by replacing the phrase ‘‘who maintains his principal place of business’’ with the phrase ‘‘that maintains its principal place of business.’’ The Commission also has amended other provisions of Rule 15c3–3 to make the rule gender neutral. Finally, the Commission has replaced the word ‘‘shall’’ throughout the rule, as amended, with clearer words, such as ‘‘will’’ or ‘‘must.’’ This change will not change either the nature or substance of the affected rule provisions. III. Responses to Specific Requests for Comment In the proposing release, the Commission requested comment on certain specific matters, in addition to the proposed rule amendments.463 These matters included: (1) A proposal to reduce the Rule 17a–11 notice requirement for broker-dealers that carry over $10 billion in debits; (2) whether to harmonize the net capital deductions required under paragraph (c)(2)(iv)(B) of Rule 15c3–1 for securities lending and borrowing transactions with the deductions required under paragraph (c)(2)(iv)(F) for securities repo transactions; and (3) solicitation of comment on how third-party liens against customer fully paid securities carried by a broker-dealer should be treated under the financial responsibility rules, including Rule 15c3–3, Rule 17a–3 and Rule 17a–4. The Commission received seven comment letters that addressed the solicitation of comments for these matters.464 With respect to the early warning level proposal, one commenter proposed modifying the Commission’s 462 See paragraph (a)(3) of Rule 15c3–3, as adopted. 463 Id. at 12874. 464 See SIFMA 2 Letter; SIFMA 4 Letter; First Clearing Letter; Citigroup Letter; American Bar Association Letter; Cornell Letter; Raymond James 2 Letter. E:\FR\FM\21AUR2.SGM 21AUR2 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 162 / Wednesday, August 21, 2013 / Rules and Regulations early warning levels for very large ‘‘alternative standard’’ firms with more than $10 billion in debits.465 The commenter recommended this approach because of the increase in debit items at large broker-dealers and the increased focus on effective risk management practices.466 Another comment supported the amendment, suggesting that the notification could serve as an early warning if a firm is approaching insolvency.467 In addition, the Commission received three comments with respect to harmonizing the net capital deductions required under paragraph (c)(2)(iv)(B) of Rule 15c3–1 for securities lending and borrowing transactions with the deductions required under paragraph (c)(2)(iv)(F) for securities repo transactions.468 These commenters stated that the Commission should consider the potential disruption to the marketplace that may arise in connection with any effort to harmonize capital charges.469 The Commission also received seven comments in response to the solicitation of comment on how third-party liens against customer fully paid securities carried by a broker-dealer should be treated under the financial responsibility rules, including Rule 15c3–3, Rule 17a–3 and Rule 17a–4.470 Two commenters stated that the Commission should not require that a broker-dealer include third party liens as a credit in the reserve formula and stated that this is an area in which it would be productive to have a detailed discussion between Commission staff and the industry before any amendments are proposed.471 Another commenter stated that each of the suggested approaches in the proposing release imposes burdens and requirements on broker-dealers that do not serve to address the concerns noted by the Commission.472 Two commenters stated that the most effective way to avoid confusion regarding third party liens in a SIPC liquidation would be to segregate securities subject to a lien to a separate pledge account in the name of the pledgee.473 Finally, one 465 See 466 Id. 467 See Cornell Letter. SIFMA 2 Letter; Citigroup Letter; Raymond James 2 Letter. 469 Id. 470 See SIFMA 2 Letter; SIFMA 4 Letter; First Clearing Letter; Citigroup Letter; American Bar Association Letter; NIBA 2 Letter; Raymond James 2 Letter. 471 See SIFMA 2 Letter; SIFMA 4 Letter; Citigroup Letter. 472 See First Clearing Letter. 473 See American Bar Association Letter; NIBA 2 Letter. emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with RULES2 468 See 17:54 Aug 20, 2013 IV. Paperwork Reduction Act Certain provisions of the amendments contain ‘‘collection of information’’ requirements within the meaning of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (‘‘PRA’’).475 The Commission published a notice requesting comment on the collection of information requirements in the proposing release 476 and submitted the amendments to the Office of Management and Budget (‘‘OMB’’) for review in accordance with the PRA.477 An agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a collection of information unless it displays a currently valid control number. The amended rules—Rule 15c3–1, Rule 15c3–3, Rule 17a–3, Rule 17a–4 and Rule 17a–11—contain currently approved collections of information under, respectively, OMB control numbers 3235–0200, 3235–0078, 3235–0033, 3235–0279 and 3235–0085. In response to comments received regarding the proposed amendments in the proposing release, the Commission has modified the language in the final rules being adopted, as discussed above. These comments and their impact on PRA estimates are discussed below. In addition, the initial burden estimates in the proposing release have been adjusted,478 as discussed below, to reflect updated information used to make the current estimates, including updated FOCUS Report data.479 Finally, one commenter specifically stated that the estimates the Commission provided utilized only that number of broker-dealers in its estimates that the Commission 474 See Raymond James 2 Letter. U.S.C. 3501, et seq. 476 See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12875. 477 44 U.S.C. 3507(d); 5 CFR 1320.11. 478 See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12875. 479 The PRA estimates derived from FOCUS Reports filed by broker-dealers pursuant to Section 17 of the Exchange Act and Rule 17a–5 have been updated in this final release to reflect more recently available information, including FOCUS Report data as of December 31, 2011. The PRA estimates in the proposing release derived from FOCUS reports were from 2004 year end data. See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12875. 475 44 SIFMA 2 Letter. VerDate Mar<15>2010 commenter argued that requiring brokerdealers to include the amount of liens as a credit item in the reserve formula was not necessary to achieve customer protection and would impose significant costs and burdens on the brokerdealers.474 The Commission will consider the comments received in developing any proposals should the Commission decide to take further action in any of these areas. Jkt 229001 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 51859 ‘‘justifiably considers to be affected by the proposals.’’ 480 The commenter, however, believes that most, if not all, broker-dealers will spend over 90 hours each analyzing the effects of the rules as implemented, will spend many more than 90 hours each in implementing procedures and modifying their written supervisory procedures to comply with the new rules, will spend in excess of 240 hours each in the monitoring of such rules, and will spend in excess of $15,000 each for outside counsel and auditor opinions or work product.481 This commenter did not provide additional detail about the basis for its view that the Commission’s estimates were too low. The Commission agrees with the commenter that broker-dealers directly affected by the rule amendments may be required to implement procedures or modify their written supervisory procedures in order to comply with the rule amendments. In cases where the rule amendments are requiring a broker-dealer to implement or document certain policies and procedures, these hour burdens are already included in the final hour estimates discussed below.482 In addition, the Commission acknowledges that a broker-dealer may need to review its operations to determine whether or not it has any obligations under the rule amendments. Even if a broker-dealer is not directly affected by the rule amendments, such a review may result in an indirect effect on its operations. These indirect effects or costs, however, are more appropriately addressed in the Economic Analysis in section V. of this release because they relate to the overall impact of the amendments, rather than to the specific collections of information discussed below. Consequently, the Commission addresses the commenter’s concerns that directly relate to the collections of information below, and the indirect burdens and costs in the Economic Analysis in section V. of this release. A. Summary of the Collection of Information Requirements The rule amendments contain recordkeeping and disclosure requirements that are subject to the PRA. In summary, the amendments may require a broker-dealer, under certain circumstances, to: (1) Disclose the principals and obtain certain agreements from the principals in a securities lending transaction where it performs settlement services if it is to be 480 See NIBA 2 Letter. 481 Id. 482 See, e.g., paragraph (j)(1) of Rule 15c3–3 and paragraph (a)(23) of Rule 17a–3, as adopted. E:\FR\FM\21AUR2.SGM 21AUR2 51860 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 162 / Wednesday, August 21, 2013 / Rules and Regulations emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with RULES2 considered an agent (as opposed to a principal) for the purposes of the net capital rule 483; (2) obtain permission in writing from its DEA to withdraw capital within one year of contribution 484; (3) enter into a subordination agreement with an account holder in order to exclude such account holder from the definition of PAB account 485; (4) provide written notice to PAB account holders that their securities may be used in the ordinary course of its securities business 486; (5) perform a PAB reserve computation 487; (6) obtain written notification from each bank with which it maintains a PAB reserve account that the bank was informed that all cash and/or qualified securities being held by the bank are being held for the exclusive benefit of brokers and dealers 488; (7) enter into a written contract with a bank with which it maintains its PAB reserve accounts providing that the cash and/or qualified securities shall at no time be used directly or indirectly as security for a loan to the broker-dealer by the bank, and shall be subject to no right, charge, security interest, lien, or claim of any kind in favor of the bank or any person claiming through the bank 489; (8) develop adequate procedures to ensure a customer for whom a free credit balance is carried is sent a written statement regarding the customer’s free credit balances, including information regarding the amount due to the customer and that the funds are payable on demand, prior to using funds arising from free credit balances in the brokerdealer’s operations 490; (9) obtain the written affirmative consent of a new customer before including the customer’s free credit balances in a Sweep Program, as well as provide certain disclosures and notices to all customers with regard to the brokerdealer’s Sweep Program 491; (10) make and maintain records documenting its credit, market, and liquidity risk management controls to assist the broker-dealer in analyzing the risks associated with its business 483 See paragraph (c)(2)(iv)(B) of Rule 15c3–1, as adopted. 484 See paragraph (c)(2)(i)(G) to Rule 15c3–1, as adopted. 485 See paragraph (a)(16) to Rule 15c3–3, as adopted. 486 See paragraph (b)(5) to Rule 15c3–3, as adopted. 487 See paragraph (e)(1) and (e)(3) of Rule 15c3– 3, as adopted. 488 See paragraph (f) of Rule 15c3–3, as adopted. 489 Id. 490 See paragraph (j)(1) to Rule 15c3–3, as adopted. 491 See paragraph (j)(2) to Rule 15c3–3, as adopted. VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:54 Aug 20, 2013 Jkt 229001 activities 492; (11) provide notice to the Commission and other regulatory authorities if the broker-dealer becomes insolvent 493; and (12) provide notice to the Commission and other regulatory authorities if the broker-dealer’s securities borrowed and loaned or securities repurchase/reverse repurchase activity reaches a certain threshold or, alternatively, report monthly its securities borrowed and loan or securities repurchase/reverse repurchase activity to its DEA in a form acceptable to its DEA.494 B. Use of Information The Commission, its staff, and SROs will use the information collected under the amendments to Rule 15c3–1 and Rule 15c3–3 to determine whether the broker-dealer is in compliance with each rule and to help fulfill their oversight responsibilities. The collections of information would also help to ensure that broker-dealers are meeting their obligations under the rule amendments and have any required policies and procedures in place. In particular, the record with respect to acting as agent in a securities loan transaction will assist examiners in verifying that the broker-dealer is properly accounting for securities loan deficits under Rule 15c3–1. The records with respect to obtaining DEA approval prior to withdrawing capital within one year of contribution under Rule 15c3–1 will assist examiners in determining if a broker-dealer is computing its net capital accurately with regard to the proper classification of its capital contributions, and will help to ensure the DEA only approves capital withdrawals which are appropriate in light of the firm’s current financial condition at the time of the requested withdrawal. The amendments to Rule 15c3–1 also will facilitate the monitoring of the financial condition of broker-dealers by the Commission and its staff, as well as by SROs. The records with respect to the PAB accounts will assist examiners in verifying that: (1) A carrying brokerdealer has properly excluded certain accounts from being treated as PAB accounts by entering into subordination agreements with particular account holders; (2) a carrying broker-dealer sent written notices to PAB accountholders to use their PAB securities; (3) the broker-dealer performed the PAB reserve computation; and (4) the bank 492 See paragraph (a)(23) to Rule 17a–3 and paragraph (e)(9) of Rule 17a–4, as adopted. 493 See paragraph (b)(1) of Rule 17a–11, as adopted. 494 See paragraph (c)(5) to Rule 17a–11, as adopted. PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 holding the PAB reserve account agreed to do so free of lien by entering into a written contract with the broker-dealer. The records with respect to customer’s free credit balances will assist examiners in verifying that: (1) A carrying broker-dealer has obtained the written affirmative consent of a new customer before including a customer’s free credit balances in a Sweep Program; (2) a carrying broker-dealer has provided the required disclosures and notices to all customers with regard to the broker-dealer’s Sweep Program; and (3) the broker-dealer has maintained adequate procedures with regard to the use of a customer’s free credit balances prior to using such customer’s free credit balances in its operations. The amendments to Rule 15c3–3 will facilitate the process by which the Commission, its staff, and SROs monitor how broker-dealers are fulfilling the customer protection requirements of the rule. The written affirmative consent, disclosures and notices required to be provided to customers also will alert customers to the alternatives available to them with respect to their free credit balances. The Commission, its staff, and SROs will use the information collected under the amendments to Rules 17a–3 and 17a–4 to determine whether the brokerdealer is adhering to its documented credit, market, and liquidity risk management controls, as well as to evaluate the effectiveness of these controls. The Commission, its staff, and SROs will use the information collected under the amendments to Rule 17a–11 to identify a broker-dealer experiencing financial difficulty. This information will assist the Commission and other regulators in promptly taking appropriate steps to protect customers, creditors, and counterparties. In particular, a notice of insolvency will assist regulators in responding more quickly to protect customers of a failing institution. The notices and reports with respect to securities lending and repos will assist regulators in identifying broker-dealers that are active in these transactions or suddenly take on large positions and thereby assist in monitoring systemic risk. C. Respondents The final estimates of respondents below have been updated to reflect more recent information.495 The amendment 495 The final estimates of respondents derived from FOCUS Reports filed by broker-dealers pursuant to Section 17 of the Exchange Act and Rule 17a–5 have been updated in this final release to reflect more recently available information, including FOCUS Report data as of December 31, E:\FR\FM\21AUR2.SGM 21AUR2 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 162 / Wednesday, August 21, 2013 / Rules and Regulations emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with RULES2 to Rule 15c3–1 requiring a broker-dealer to make disclosures to, and obtain certain agreements from, securities lending principals will apply only to those firms that participate in the settlement of securities lending transactions as agents. The Commission estimates that approximately 122 broker-dealers will be affected by this requirement.496 This estimate has been updated from the estimate of 170 broker-dealers in the proposing release.497 No comments were received on this estimate. The amendment to Rule 15c3–1 with respect to a broker-dealer obtaining permission in writing from its DEA prior to withdrawing capital within one year of contribution under Rule 15c3–1 will apply to any broker-dealer who wishes to withdraw such capital. Because most broker-dealers already comply with existing interpretations regarding the treatment of temporary capital contributions and similar SRO requirements, or are familiar with such interpretations and requirements, this part of the amendment to Rule 15c3–1 regarding temporary capital contributions likely will impact only a small number of the approximately 4,709 broker-dealers registered with the Commission, as of December 31, 2011 (based on FOCUS Report data).498 Therefore, the Commission estimates that approximately 90 broker-dealers will seek permission from their DEA in writing to withdraw capital within one year of its contribution under the amendment.499 The amendments to Rule 15c3–3 requiring a broker-dealer to perform a PAB reserve computation and to obtain certain agreements and notices related to its PAB accounts will affect only those firms that carry such accounts. 2011. The estimates of respondents in the proposing release derived from FOCUS reports were from 2004 year end data. See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12876. 496 This estimate is derived from FOCUS Reports. 497 See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12876. 498 Temporary Capital Letter; see also Net Capital Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 28927 (Feb. 28, 1991), 56 FR 9124 (Mar. 5, 1991); and FINRA Rule 4110(c). 499 The Commission received 900 broker-dealer capital withdrawal notices under paragraph (e) of Rule 15c3–1 in 2012. Because this amendment is consistent with prior Commission and staff positions that capital is not temporary, as well as current SRO requirements, it is likely that only a small number of these notices are capital withdrawals made within one year of contribution, and therefore, based on staff experience with the application of Rule 15c3–1, the Commission estimates that approximately 90 broker-dealers (10% of 900) will seek permission from their DEA in writing to withdraw capital under the amendment. See Net Capital Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 28927 (Feb. 28, 1991); Temporary Capital Letter; and FINRA Rule 4110. VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:54 Aug 20, 2013 Jkt 229001 Based on FOCUS Report data, as of December 31, 2011, the Commission estimates that approximately 61 brokerdealers will carry such accounts.500 The amendment to Rule 15c3–3 requiring a broker-dealer to obtain the affirmative consent of a new customer before changing the terms under which the customer’s free credit balances are maintained will apply only to firms that carry free credit balances for customers. Based on FOCUS Report data, as of December 31, 2011, the Commission estimates that approximately 189 broker-dealers carry free credit balances.501 The Commission estimates that the amendment to Rule 15c3–3 permitting a broker-dealer to exclude certain accounts from being treated as PAB accounts under Rule 15c3–3 by entering into subordination agreements with certain account holders will apply to all 61 broker-dealers that will carry such accounts. The Commission estimates that these 61 broker-dealers each will enter into an average of 11 subordination agreements.502 The amendments to Rules 17a–3 and 17a–4 requiring a broker-dealer to make and maintain records documenting the credit, market and liquidity risk management control for analyzing and managing risks will apply only to firms that have more than $1,000,000 in aggregate credit items, or $20,000,000 in capital. Thus, its impact will be limited to larger broker-dealers. Accordingly, the number of respondents will equal the number of broker-dealers meeting the thresholds set forth in the amendment. The Commission estimates that approximately 490 broker-dealers will meet at least one of these thresholds.503 500 This estimate has been updated from our estimate of 75 broker-dealers in the proposing release. See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12876. No comments were received on this estimate. 501 In the proposing release, the Commission estimated approximately 256 broker-dealers carried free credit balances. See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12876. No comments were received on this estimate. 502 See Order Granting Conditional Exemption Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in Connection with Portfolio Margining of Swaps and Security-Based Swaps, Exchange Act Release No. 68433 (Dec. 14, 2012), 77 FR 75211, 75222 n.69 (Dec. 19, 2012). (‘‘FINRA CRD data indicate that the 17 largest broker-dealers (i.e., those with total assets of $50 billion or more) reported a total of 188 affiliates that are themselves registered with the SEC (i.e., they have their own CRD numbers), representing approximately 11 affiliates per brokerdealer.’’). Carrying firms likely will enter into subordination agreements with affiliates, including foreign banks or foreign broker-dealers affiliated with the carrying broker-dealer to exclude such accounts from the rule. See SIFMA 2 Letter. 503 This estimate has been updated from the proposing release estimate of 517 broker-dealers. PO 00000 Frm 00039 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 51861 One amendment to Rule 17a–11 will require a broker-dealer to provide the Commission with notice if it becomes subject to certain insolvency events. The Commission estimates that approximately two broker-dealers will become subject to one of these events in a given year.504 Another amendment to Rule 17a–11 will require a broker-dealer to provide notice to the Commission if its securities borrowed or loaned, or its securities repurchase or reverse repurchase activity reaches a certain threshold or, alternatively, provide monthly reports to its DEA about such activities. This amendment will only affect a limited number of firms per year. The Commission estimates that approximately one broker-dealer 505 will provide notice and six broker-dealers 506 will opt to send the monthly reports in a given year. D. Total Annual Reporting and Recordkeeping Burden 1. Securities Lending Agreements and Disclosures The amendments to paragraph (c)(2)(iv)(B) of Rule 15c3–1 will require a broker-dealer to make disclosures to, See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12876. No comments were received on this estimate. 504 This estimate is based on the 2012 SIPC Annual Report, which indicates that over the last ten-year-period, the annual average of new customer protection proceedings was two. A copy of the 2012 Annual Report is available at https:// www.sipc.org/. This estimate has been updated from our proposing release estimate of 6, which was based on the SIPC 2005 Annual Report. See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12876. No comments were received on this estimate. 505 This estimate is derived from information filed by broker-dealers in their FOCUS Reports. This estimate has been updated from the proposing release estimate of 11. See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12876. No comments were received on this estimate. Based on FOCUS Report data, as of December 31, 2011, there were seven broker-dealers whose securities borrowed or securities loaned exceeded 80% of 25 times their tentative net capital, and there were six broker-dealers whose securities borrowed or securities loaned exceeded 25 times their tentative net capital. Therefore, the Commission assumes for purposes of the PRA that six broker-dealers would chose to file monthly reports in lieu of the notice requirements, and that one would file a notice. 506 This estimate is derived from information filed by broker-dealers in their FOCUS Reports. Based on FOCUS Report data, as of December 31, 2011, there were six broker-dealers whose securities borrowed or securities loaned exceeded 25 times their tentative net capital. These firms likely will opt to file the monthly report under the proposed amendments to Rule 17a–11. This estimate has been updated from our proposing release estimate of 21 broker-dealers. See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12876. No comments were received on this estimate. The estimated number of firms filing notices and monthly reports has decreased largely due to an overall decrease in the number of broker-dealers. See also id. at 12870 (discussing rationale for 2,500% threshold). E:\FR\FM\21AUR2.SGM 21AUR2 51862 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 162 / Wednesday, August 21, 2013 / Rules and Regulations emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with RULES2 and obtain certain agreements from, securities lending principals in situations where the firm participates in the settlement of a securities lending transaction but wants to be deemed an agent for purposes of Rule 15c3–1.507 The Commission has adopted the final rule substantially as proposed, and consequently, there were no changes to the final rule amendments that would affect the Commission’s PRA estimates. In addition, the Commission did not receive any comments on the estimates in the proposing release,508 and is therefore is retaining the amendment’s PRA hour burden estimates without revision. The Commission, however, is updating the number of respondents to reflect more recently-available data from broker-dealer FOCUS Reports. As discussed above in section II.C. of this release, the Commission, in recognition of standard stock loan agreements, designed the amendment to accommodate the continued use of these industry model agreements by incorporating their use into the rule’s requirements. For the purpose of establishing a broker-dealer’s status as agent or lender, these agreements may be sufficiently detailed to satisfy the new requirements. Thus, the standard agreement used by the vast majority of broker-dealers may contain the representations and disclosures required by the amendment. Nevertheless, based on staff experience with securities lending agreements and disclosure and the application of Rule 15c3–1, the Commission continues to believe that a small percentage of broker-dealers may need to modify their standard agreements. In the proposing release, the Commission estimated that 5% 509 of broker-dealers may need to modify their standard agreements. No comments were received on this estimate and the Commission believes 5% continues to be an appropriate estimate for the final rule amendments. Thus, the Commission estimates that 5% of the approximately 122 firms engaged in this business, or approximately 6 firms, will not have used the standard agreements.510 The Commission estimates each of these firms will spend approximately 20 hours of employee resources updating their standard agreement template.511 Therefore, the 507 17 CFR 240.15c3–1(c)(2)(iv)(B). Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12876. 509 Id. 510 This estimate is updated from the estimate of 9 firms (5% of 170 firms) in the proposing release. Id. 511 Because these firms are already engaging in stock loan and repo activities, these functions likely 508 See VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:54 Aug 20, 2013 Jkt 229001 Commission estimates that the total onetime burden to broker-dealers as a result of this requirement will be approximately 120 hours.512 2. DEA Permission To Withdraw Capital within One Year of Contribution The amendment to paragraph (c)(2)(i)(G)(2) of Rule 15c3–1 will require that a broker-dealer treat as a liability any capital contribution that is intended to be withdrawn within one year of its contribution.513 The rule amendment also includes the presumption that capital withdrawn within one year of contribution is presumed to have been intended to be withdrawn within one year, unless the broker-dealer receives permission in writing for the withdrawal from its DEA. This amendment likely will impose annual recordkeeping burdens on broker-dealers making the request. The Commission estimates that 90 broker-dealers will seek to obtain permission from their DEA in writing to withdraw capital within one year of its contribution, and that it will take a broker-dealer approximately one hour to prepare and submit the request to its DEA to withdraw capital.514 Therefore, the Commission estimates that the total annual hour burden with respect to the rule amendment will be approximately 90 hours.515 3. Written Subordination Agreements under Rule 15c3–3 As discussed above in section II.A.2. of this release, in response to comments, the final rule amendment adopted by the Commission excludes from the definition of PAB account in paragraph (a)(16) of Rule 15c3–3, an account that ‘‘has been subordinated to the claims of creditors of the carrying broker or dealer.’’ 516 This modification to the final rule will result in one-time burdens under the collection of information for Rule 15c3–3.517 In light of comments received 518 and based on staff experience, the Commission understands most PAB account holders that enter into a subordinated loan agreement with a carrying broker-dealer in order to not be will be performed by in-house employees, rather than outside counsel. 512 6 broker-dealers × 20 hours per firm = 120 hours. This is an update from the proposing release estimate of 9 broker-dealers × 20 hours = 180 hours. Id. 513 17 CFR 240.15c3–1(c)(2)(i)(G)(2). 514 See section IV.C. of this release. 515 90 broker-dealers × 1 hour = 90 hours. 516 17 CFR 240.15c3–3(a)(16). 517 The proposing release did not contain any proposals with regard to subordination agreements. 518 See SIFMA 2 Letter; SIFMA 4 Letter; Deutsche Bank Securities Letter. PO 00000 Frm 00040 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 treated as PAB accounts under paragraph (a)(16) likely will be affiliates of the broker-dealer.519 The Commission estimates that the 61 broker-dealers that carry PAB accounts will enter into an average of 11 subordination agreements as a result of the rule amendment.520 The Commission estimates that it will take a carrying broker-dealer approximately 20 hours to develop a subordination agreement, based on the Commission’s prior experience with the development of subordination agreements.521 Therefore, the Commission estimates that the total onetime hour burden resulting from this requirement will be 13,420 hours.522 4. PAB Reserve Bank Account Recordkeeping Requirements The amendments to Rules 15c3–3 and 15c3–3a require carrying broker-dealers to: (1) Perform a separate reserve computation for PAB accounts (in addition to the reserve computation currently required for Rule 15c3–3 customer accounts); (2) establish and fund a separate PAB reserve account; and (3) obtain and maintain physical possession or control of non-margin securities carried in PAB accounts unless the carrying broker-dealer has provided written notice to the PAB account holders that it will use those securities in the ordinary course of its securities business, and has provided opportunity for the PAB account holder to object to such use. In the proposing release, the Commission proposed to require that the carrying broker-dealer obtain written permission from a PAB account holder before it could use the securities of the PAB account holder in the ordinary course of its securities business. The Commission estimated that, based on FOCUS Report data, there were approximately 2,533 existing PAB customers, and therefore, broker-dealers would have to amend approximately 2,533 existing PAB agreements.523 The Commission further estimated that, on average, a firm would spend approximately 10 hours of employee 519 See Deutsche Bank Letter; SIFMA 2 Letter. section IV.C. of this release. 521 See Capital, Margin, and Segregation Requirements for Security-Based Swap Dealers and Major Security-Based Swap Participants and Capital Requirements for Broker-Dealers, Exchange Act Release No. 68071, 77 FR at 70299. See also Order Granting Conditional Exemption Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in Connection with Portfolio Margining of Swaps and Security-Based Swaps, Exchange Act Release No. 68433 (Dec. 14, 2012), 77 FR 75211 (Dec. 19, 2012). 522 61 broker-dealers × 11 accounts × 20 hours = 13,420 hours. 523 See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12877. 520 See E:\FR\FM\21AUR2.SGM 21AUR2 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 162 / Wednesday, August 21, 2013 / Rules and Regulations resources amending each agreement and that 75 firms would spend 20 hours amending their standard PAB agreement template, for a total of 26,830 hours.524 The Commission did not receive any comments regarding these estimates in the proposing release. In response to comments, as discussed above, the Commission determined not to adopt the requirement, as proposed. Instead, paragraph (b)(5) of Rule 15c3–3 requires the carrying broker-dealer to provide PAB account holders with written notice that the account holder’s nonmargin securities may be used in the ordinary course of its business.525 Therefore, the Commission is revising the final one-time hour burden in light of the change in the rule to a notice requirement, which is expected to be less burdensome than the proposed customer consent provision while still providing customers with necessary information. The Commission estimates, based on FOCUS Report data, that approximately 61 broker-dealers carry PAB accounts.526 The Commission further estimates, based on similar collections of information and the fact that these firms already carry PAB accounts, and on average, a firm will spend approximately 10 hours of employee resources drafting a standard notice template, for a total one-time burden of 610 hours.527 In addition, based on FOCUS Report data, the Commission estimates that there are approximately 1,551 existing PAB customers and, therefore, broker-dealers will have to send approximately 1,551 written notices.528 The Commission estimates, based on staff experience, that a firm will spend approximately 10 minutes per account sending out the PAB customers × 10 hours per customer) + (75 firms × 20 hours per firm) = 26,830. Id. 525 17 CFR 240.15c3–3(b)(5). 526 This estimate is based on the number of broker-dealers carrying PAB accounts as of December 31, 2011. This is an update from the proposing release estimate of approximately 75 broker-dealers that carry PAB accounts. See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12877. 527 61 firms × 10 hours = 610 hours. See also Capital, Margin, and Segregation Requirements for Security-Based Swap Dealers and Major SecurityBased Swap Participants and Capital Requirements for Broker-Dealers, Exchange Act Release No. 68071, 77 FR at 70298 (estimating that the notice required to be sent by a security based swap dealer to a counterparty pursuant to section 3E(f) of the Exchange Act would take an outside counsel 10 hours to draft). 528 The number of customers also is updated from the proposing release estimate of 2,533 customers. See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12877. emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with RULES2 524 (2,533 VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:54 Aug 20, 2013 Jkt 229001 51863 required written notice, for a total onetime burden of 259 hours.529 The Commission estimates that a broker-dealer will incur postage costs sending out the required written notice to customers. These carrying brokerdealers likely will use the least cost method to comply with this requirement and may include this notification with other mailings sent to PAB account holders. The Commission, however, conservatively estimates that the postage cost of for each notification, using the current price of first class postage, will be approximately $.46 per document sent. Therefore, the staff estimates that the cost of sending the required written notification to PAB account holders will be approximately $713.530 Based on FOCUS Report data, the Commission also estimates that approximately 61 broker-dealers carry PAB accounts, and based upon differences between the PAIB Letter and the final rule, these 61 firms would have to amend their standard PAB agreement template. The Commission estimates a firm will spend, on average, approximately 20 hours of employee resources on this task, for a total of 1,220 hours.531 In light of the changes to the final rule amendments which require a brokerdealer to send a written notice, rather than obtain a customer’s consent regarding the use of a PAB account holder’s securities, the 61 broker-dealers carrying PAB accounts likely will engage outside counsel 532 to review the required notice,533 as well as the standard PAB template agreement under the final rule amendments to Rule 15c3– 3. As a result, the Commission estimates that these 61 broker-dealers will likely incur $2,000 in legal costs,534 or $122,000 535 in aggregate initial burden to review and comment on these materials. The requirements to perform a PAB reserve computation and obtain agreements and notices from banks holding PAB accounts will result in annual burdens based on the number of broker-dealers that hold PAB accounts and the number of times per year these broker-dealers open new PAB reserve accounts. Currently, to obtain the relief provided in the PAIB Letter, brokerdealers are required to obtain the agreements and notices from the banks.536 The Commission understands that broker-dealers generally already obtain these agreements and notices. Therefore, the Commission estimates there will be no additional burden imposed by this requirement.537 The Commission did not receive any comments on this estimate from the proposing release. The amendment requiring a PAB reserve computation will produce a onetime burden. Based on FOCUS Report data, as of December 31, 2011, the Commission estimates that approximately 61 broker-dealers will perform a PAB reserve computation.538 These firms already perform a reserve computation for domestic broker-dealer customers under the PAIB Letter. Nonetheless, the Commission estimates these firms will spend, on average, approximately 30 hours of employee resources per firm updating their systems to implement changes that will be necessitated by the amendment. Therefore, consistent with the hour estimates in the proposing release, the Commission estimates that the total onetime burden to broker-dealers arising from updating their systems to comply 529 1,551 PAB account holders × 10 minutes = 15,510 minutes/60 minutes = 258.5 hours (rounded to 259 hours). See generally, Exchange Act Release No. 68071, 77 FR at 70298 (estimating that the notice required to be sent by a security based swap dealer to a counterparty pursuant to section 3E(f) of the Exchange Act would take 10 minutes to send). 530 1,551 notices × $0.46 = $713.46. 531 61 firms × 20 hours = 1,220. 532 See NIBA 2 Letter. 533 17 CFR 240.15c3–3(b)(5). 534 5 hours × $400 per hour = $2,000. The Commission estimates the review of the notice and standard PAB template would require 5 hours of outside counsel time, which is the same estimate used for outside counsel review in another recent release. Based on staff experience with the PAIB Letter and the application of Rule 15c3–3, the Commission estimates the outside counsel review related to the PAB amendments will take a comparable amount of time. See Capital, Margin, and Segregation Requirements for Security-Based Swap Dealers and Major Security-Based Swap Participants and Capital Requirements for BrokerDealers, Exchange Act Release 68071, 77 FR at 70297, n.904. The Commission estimates that the outside counsel would cost $400 per hour, which is the same estimate used by the Commission in other recent releases. See Capital, Margin, and Segregation Requirements for Security-Based Swap Dealers and Major Security-Based Swap Participants and Capital Requirements for BrokerDealers, Exchange Act Release 68071, 77 FR at 70297; Further Definition of ‘‘Swap,’’ ‘‘SecurityBased Swap,’’ and ‘‘Security-Based Swap Agreement’’; Mixed Swaps; Security-Based Swap Agreement Recordkeeping, Exchange Act Release No. 67453 (July 18, 2012), 77 FR 48208 (Aug. 13, 2012). 535 61 firms × $2,000 legal cost = $122,000. 536 See PAIB Letter. 537 In addition, the hour burdens for brokerdealers to open new customer reserve bank account under Rule 15c3–3 are already included within the currently approved collection of information for Rule 15c3–3. 538 This estimate is based on the number of broker-dealers which currently perform a PAB computation as of December 31, 2011. This is an update from the estimate in the proposing release of 75 broker-dealers. PO 00000 Frm 00041 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 E:\FR\FM\21AUR2.SGM 21AUR2 51864 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 162 / Wednesday, August 21, 2013 / Rules and Regulations with this requirement will be approximately 1,830 hours.539 The amendment requiring a PAB reserve computation also will produce an annual burden. Based on FOCUS Report data, the Commission estimates that of the 61 broker-dealers estimated to perform a PAB reserve computation, approximately 56 of the current PAB filers will perform the PAB reserve computation on a weekly basis, two broker-dealers will perform it on a monthly basis, and three broker-dealers will perform the PAB reserve computation on a daily basis.540 The Commission further estimates that a broker-dealer will spend, on average, approximately 2.5 hours to complete the PAB reserve computation in order to make a record of such computation under Rule 15c3–3 as a result of the amendment.541 Therefore, consistent with the hour burden estimates in the proposing release, the Commission estimates that the total annual burden to broker-dealers from this requirement will be approximately 9,215 hours.542 emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with RULES2 5. Adequate Procedures Required Under Paragraph (j)(1) of Rule 15c3–3 The Commission proposed importing requirements in Rule 15c3–2 into Rule 15c3–3 and eliminating Rule 15c3–2 as a stand-alone rule in the Code of Federal Regulations, and adopting new paragraph (j)(1) to Rule 15c3–3, which includes a condition that a broker-dealer must establish adequate procedures that will impose a paperwork burden if a broker-dealer wishes to accept or use any free credit balance for the account of any customer of the broker-dealer. 539 61 broker-dealers × 30 hours per firm = 1,830 hours. This is an update from the proposing release estimate of 75 firms × 30 hours per firm = 2,250 hours. See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12877. 540 These estimates are based on the number of broker-dealers performing a PAB reserve computation monthly, weekly, and daily, as of December 31, 2011. This is an update from the estimate in the proposing release, which provided that of the 75 broker-dealers estimated to perform a PAB computation, 71 broker-dealers would prefer PAB computations on a weekly basis and four broker-dealers would perform it on a monthly basis. See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12877. No broker-dealers performed daily PAB computations as of the date of the proposing release. No comments were received on this estimate. 541 This estimate is based on staff experience with the current estimate of 2.5 hours under the current collection of information for Rule 15c3–3 to make a record of each reserve computation. See 17 CFR 240.15c3–3(e)(3). 542 (56 weekly filers × 52 weeks × 2.5 hours per computation) + (2 monthly filers × 12 months × 2.5 hours per computation) + (3 daily filers × 250 business days per year × 2.5 hours per computation) = 9,215 total hours. This is an update from the proposing release estimate of 9,350 hours. See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12877, n.137. VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:54 Aug 20, 2013 Jkt 229001 The Commission is adopting this amendment substantially as proposed, which provides, ‘‘[a] broker or dealer must not accept or use any free credit balance carried for the account of any customer of the broker or dealer unless such broker or dealer has established adequate procedures pursuant to which each customer for whom a free credit balance is carried will be given or sent, together with or as part of the customer’s statement of account, whenever sent but not less frequently than once every three months, a written statement informing the customer of the amount due to the customer by the broker or dealer on the date of the statement, and that the funds are payable on demand of the customer.’’ 543 The requirement that broker-dealers establish adequate procedures with regard to free credit balances will result in one-time and annual hours burdens for broker-dealers subject to the requirements of new paragraph (j)(1) to Rule 15c3–3. Based on FOCUS Report data, the Commission estimates that 189 broker-dealers carry free credit balances. Most firms may already have such procedures in place with regard to the requirements of the rule, because these provisions are being imported from current Rule 15c3–2, which is being eliminated as a result of these amendments. Therefore, the Commission estimates that a brokerdealer will spend approximately 25 additional hours reviewing and updating its procedures to ensure it is in compliance with new paragraph (j)(1) to Rule 15c3–3 and approximately 10 additional hours per year reviewing and updating its procedures, for a total onetime and annual hour burden of 4,725 hours 544 and 1,890 hours,545 respectively.546 6. Treatment of Free Credit Balances New paragraph (j)(2) to Rule 15c3–3 will require a broker-dealer to obtain the written affirmative consent of a new customer before including a customer’s free credit balances in a Sweep Program, as well as to provide certain disclosures 543 17 CFR 240.15c3–3(j)(1). broker-dealers × 25 hours = 4,725 hours. The 25 and 10 hour estimates are based on similar collections of information and the Commission’s belief that many of these broker-dealers already have procedures in place and, therefore, most broker-dealers will only be revising and updating their current policies and procedures to ensure compliance with the rule. See Removal of Certain References to Credit Ratings Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 64532 (Apr. 27, 2011), 76 FR 26550, 26568 (May 6, 2011). 545 189 broker-dealers × 10 hours = 1,890 hours. 546 See NIBA 2 Letter. 544 189 PO 00000 Frm 00042 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 and notices to all customers with regard to the broker-dealer’s Sweep Program. These requirements will result in onetime and annual burdens to brokerdealers subject to its provisions. However, these requirements will apply only to a firm that carries customer free credit balances and opts to have the ability to change how its customers’ free credit balances are treated. The Commission did not receive comments regarding the hour burden estimates relating to the treatment of free credit balances in the proposing release. In the proposing release, the Commission estimated that approximately 50 broker-dealers 547 would choose to provide new customers with the disclosures and notices required under the amendment in order to have the ability to change how their customers’ free credit balances were treated. The Commission did not receive any comments on this estimate. The Commission, however, is revising this estimate for the final rule to include all 189 broker-dealers that carry free credit balances to reflect the fact that these firms may have to update their systems to comply with these new requirements. The Commission further estimates these firms will spend, on average, approximately 200 hours of employee resources per firm updating their current systems (including processes for generating customer account statements) to incorporate changes that will be necessitated by the amendment. Therefore, the Commission estimates that the total one-time burden to brokerdealers arising from this requirement will be approximately 37,800 hours.548 The Commission also estimates that these firms will consult with outside counsel in making these systems changes, particularly with respect to the language in the disclosures and notices under new paragraph (j)(2) to Rule 15c3–3. The Commission estimates that an outside counsel will spend, on average, approximately 50 hours assisting a broker-dealer in updating its systems 549 for a one-time aggregate burden to broker-dealers of 9,450 hours.550 The Commission estimates that the average hourly cost for an outside counsel will be approximately 547 See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12877. 548 189 broker-dealers × 200 hours per firm = 37,800. 549 Because broker-dealers affected by these amendments are likely to already have existing sweep programs in place, a broker-dealer likely will need to update its existing systems, rather than be required to purchase additional hardware to comply with these rule amendments. 550 189 broker-dealers × 50 hours per firm = 9,450 hours. E:\FR\FM\21AUR2.SGM 21AUR2 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 162 / Wednesday, August 21, 2013 / Rules and Regulations $400 per hour.551 For these reasons, consistent with its estimate in the proposing release, the Commission estimates that the average one-time cost to a broker-dealer will be approximately $20,000 552 and the one-time cost to broker-dealers will be approximately $3,780,000.553 As for the annual hour burden, the Commission estimates, consistent with its estimate in the proposing release, these requirements will impact 5% 554 of the total broker-dealer customer accounts per year. Based on FOCUS Report data, the Commission estimates there are approximately 110,493,215 customer accounts and, consequently, 5% of the accounts (5,524,661 accounts per year) will be impacted.555 Based on staff experience with similar requirements under the existing PRA collection for Rule 17a–3, the Commission further estimates that a broker-dealer will spend, on average, four minutes 556 of employee resources to process a written affirmative consent for new customers, as well as disclosures required under paragraph (j) to Rule 15c3–3. Therefore, the Commission estimates that the annual burden to broker-dealers arising from the requirement will be approximately 368,311 hours.557 emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with RULES2 7. Documentation of Risk Management Procedures The amendments to Rules 17a–3 and 17a–4 will require certain large brokerdealers to make and keep current a record documenting credit, market, and liquidity risk management controls established and maintained by the broker-dealer to assist it in analyzing and managing the risks associated with its business activities. The amendment 551 Based on staff experience, the Commission used the estimate of $400 per hour for legal services provided by outside counsel, which is the same estimate used by the Commission in other recent releases. See Capital, Margin, and Segregation Requirements for Security-Based Swap Dealers and Major Security-Based Swap Participants and Capital Requirements for Broker-Dealers, Exchange Act Release 68071, 77 FR at 70297; Further Definition of ‘‘Swap,’’ ‘‘Security-Based Swap,’’ and ‘‘Security-Based Swap Agreement’’; Mixed Swaps; Security-Based Swap Agreement Recordkeeping; Final Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 67453 (July 18, 2012), 77 FR 48208 (Aug. 13, 2012). 552 $400 per hour × 50 hours = $20,000. 553 189 broker-dealers × $20,000 = $3,780,000. 554 See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12877. 555 These estimates have been updated from the proposing release estimates of 109,300,000 customer accounts and 5% of the customer account or 5,465,000 accounts. Id. 556 Id. 557 [5,524,661 accounts × 4 minutes/account]/60 minutes = 368,311 hours. This is an update from our proposing release estimate of 5,465,000 accounts × 4 minutes/account = 364,333 hours. Id. at 12878. VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:54 Aug 20, 2013 Jkt 229001 only will apply to broker-dealers that have more than (1) $1,000,000 in aggregate credit items as computed under the customer reserve formula of Rule 15c3–3, or (2) $20,000,000 in capital, including debt subordinated in accordance with Appendix D to Rule 15c3–1. As proposed, the amendment would have required a broker-dealer to create a record documenting its ‘‘internal risk management controls.’’ 558 To address commenters’ concerns that the proposed rule language was ambiguous and that the Commission should narrow the application of the rule, the Commission modified new paragraph (a)(23) to Rule 17a–3, as stated above, so that the final rule requires certain broker-dealers to document risk management controls established to manage market, credit, and liquidity risk, rather than all of its ‘‘internal risk management controls.’’ In the proposing release, the Commission estimated that based on FOCUS Report data, that there would be approximately 517 broker-dealers that would meet the applicability threshold of this amendment ($1,000,000 in credits or $20,000,000 in capital), and therefore would be subject to the proposed rule.559 The Commission also estimated that this requirement would result in a one-time burden to brokerdealers of approximately 62,040 hours, based on the estimate that a brokerdealer would spend approximately 120 hours of employee resources augmenting its procedures to comply with the proposed rule.560 The Commission did not receive any comments on this estimate in the proposing release. In light of the change in the final rule text to require the documentation of controls established to manage market, credit, and liquidity risk, rather than all of its ‘‘internal risk management controls,’’ the Commission is reducing the final PRA estimate for Rule 17a–3 because the final rule narrows the scope of internal risk management controls the broker-dealer is required to document. Consequently, the change to the final rule should result in a reduction in the one-time hour burden estimate. The rule does not specify the type of controls a broker-dealer must establish to manage these risks. It simply requires the documentation of the procedures the broker-dealer has established. Brokerdealers that are part of holding companies may be subject to procedures that are used globally throughout the organization. As long as the broker558 Id. at 12899. at 12878. 560 517 broker-dealers × 120 hours = 62,040 hours. 559 Id. PO 00000 Frm 00043 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 51865 dealer maintains documented procedures of controls pertaining to the designated entity, the requirements of the rule would be met. The one-time hour burden to comply with the rule will vary depending on the size and complexity of a firm. In addition, some larger broker-dealers required to comply with Rule 15c3–4 (Internal Risk Management Control Systems for OTC Derivatives Dealers) already would be required to document their internal risk management control systems related to market, credit, and liquidity risk.561 Taking this into account, as well as based on staff experience monitoring compliance of risk management controls of broker-dealers, the Commission estimates that a broker-dealer will spend, on average, approximately 100 hours of employee resources to comply with this amendment to ensure its market, credit, and liquidity risk controls are documented. For the reasons discussed above, including narrowing the scope of the final rule, the estimate of 100 hours reflects a 20% reduction from the estimate in the proposing release of 120 hours. Based on FOCUS Report data, as of December 31, 2011, the Commission estimates there are approximately 490 brokerdealers that would be subject to the final rule amendment (because the firm has $1,000,000 in credits or $20,000,000 in capital). Therefore, the Commission estimates the total one-time burden to broker-dealers will be approximately 49,000 hours.562 In addition to the one-time hour burden discussed in the proposing release,563 based on similar collections of information requiring the documentation of risk management controls,564 large broker-dealers required to comply with the amendment as adopted likely will incur annual hour burdens.565 Consequently, the Commission is incorporating annual hour burdens for this collection of information in the final rule amendments.566 Therefore, the Commission estimates that a broker561 See 17 CFR 240.15c3–4(a). broker-dealers × 100 hours = 49,000 hours. 563 See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12878. 564 See Risk Management Controls for Brokers or Dealers with Market Access; Final Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 63241 (Nov. 3, 2010), 75 FR 69792, 69815 (Nov. 15, 2013). See also Capital, Margin, and Segregation Requirements for Security-Based Swap Dealers and Major Security-Based Swap Participants and Capital Requirements for BrokerDealers, Exchange Act Release 68071, 77 FR at 70295 and 70297. 565 See NIBA 2 Letter. 566 The proposing release did not contain annual hour burden estimates for this collection of information. 562 490 E:\FR\FM\21AUR2.SGM 21AUR2 51866 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 162 / Wednesday, August 21, 2013 / Rules and Regulations emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with RULES2 dealer would spend approximately 45 hours per year to ensure its compliance with the amendment to Rule 17a–3, for a total annual hour burden to the industry of 22,050 hours.567 Additionally, the proposing release did not specifically allocate the estimated hour burdens with respect to the amendments to Rule 17a–3 and 17a– 4 between these two rules.568 As discussed above, and based on staff experience with the application of Rule 17a–4, the Commission estimates that broker-dealers meeting the threshold requirements of paragraph (a)(23) of Rule 17a–3 will already have documented their established procedures and controls to manage the risks arising from their business. Consequently, the amendment to Rule 17a–4 to require a broker-dealer to preserve the records required pursuant to paragraph (a)(23) of Rule 17a–3 until three years after the termination of the use of the risk management controls documented therein should have a minimal impact on the current annual hour burden for Rule 17a–4 because the paperwork burden associated with this amendment derives from the substance of the amendments to paragraph (a)(23) of Rule 17a–3. Therefore, the Commission is retaining the current annual hour burden for Rule 17a–4 without change. Because the final rule amendment requires a broker-dealer to document its liquidity, credit, and market risk management controls, if it has established such controls, these brokerdealers may incur one-time startup costs to hire outside counsel to review the documented controls to ensure the broker-dealer is meeting the requirements of the rule. Based on staff experience with similar reviews, the Commission estimates that these brokerdealers would incur $2,000 in legal costs,569 or $980,000,570 in the aggregate, initial one-time burden to review and comment on the 567 490 broker-dealers × 45 hours = 22,050 hours. The 45 per hour annual estimate is based on a similar collection of information. See Risk Management Controls for Brokers or Dealers with Market Access; Final Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 63241 (Nov. 3, 2010), 75 FR 69792, 69815 (Nov. 15, 2010). 568 See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12878. 569 The Commission staff estimates that the review of the documented controls would require 5 hours of outside counsel time at a cost of $400 per hour. See also Capital, Margin, and Segregation Requirements for Security-Based Swap Dealers and Major Security-Based Swap Participants and Capital Requirements for Broker-Dealers, Exchange Act Release 68071, 77 FR at 70297, n.904. 570 490 broker-dealers × $2,000 = $980,000. VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:54 Aug 20, 2013 Jkt 229001 documented risk management controls.571 8. Notice Requirements The amendment to Rule 17a–11 requiring notice when a broker-dealer becomes subject to certain insolvency events will result in irregular filings from a small number of broker-dealers. As noted above, SIPC’s 2012 annual report indicates that the average annual number of broker-dealers which have become subject to a liquidation proceeding under SIPA over the last ten years is two. Accordingly, the Commission estimates that approximately two insolvency notices will be sent per year and that a brokerdealer will spend, on average, approximately ten minutes of employee resources to prepare and send the notice.572 The Commission did not receive any comments on its estimates from the proposing release. Therefore, the Commission estimates that the total annual burden to broker-dealers arising from this amendment will be approximately 20 minutes.573 The amendment to Rule 17a–11 requires broker-dealers engaged in securities lending or repurchase activities to either: (1) File a notice with the Commission and their DEA whenever the total money payable against all securities loaned, subject to a reverse repurchase agreement or the contract value of all securities borrowed or subject to a repurchase agreement, exceeds 2,500% of tentative net capital; or, alternatively, (2) report monthly their securities lending and repurchase activities to their DEA in a form acceptable to their DEA. The Commission did not receive any comments on these specific estimates in the proposing release and continues to believe they are appropriate. As such, the Commission is adopting this amendment with a minor modification that does not impact the collection of information. In addition, based on FOCUS Report data, as of December 31, 2011, the Commission estimates that approximately one stock loan/borrow notice will be sent per year.574 The 571 See NIBA 2 Letter. is an update from the proposing release estimate of an average of six broker-dealers per year have become subject to a liquidation proceeding under SIPA, based on SIPC’s 2005 annual report. The proposing release also contained a 10 minute estimate per broker-dealer (6 notices × 10 minutes per notice = 1 hour). See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12878. 573 2 notices × 10 minutes per notice = 20 minutes. 574 This estimate is an update of the proposing release estimate that twelve notices will be sent per year based on FOCUS data. See Amendments to 572 This PO 00000 Frm 00044 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 Commission further estimates that a broker-dealer will spend, on average, approximately ten minutes of employee resources to prepare and send the notice. Therefore, the Commission estimates that the total annual burden to broker-dealers arising from this amendment will be approximately ten minutes.575 Based on FOCUS Report data, as of December 31, 2011, and staff experience, the Commission estimates that, annually, six broker-dealers will submit the monthly stock loan/borrow report.576 Based on staff experience, the Commission estimates each firm will spend, on average, approximately 100 hours of employee resources updating its systems to generate the information required in the monthly report. Therefore, the Commission estimates that the total one-time burden to brokerdealers arising from this requirement will be approximately 600 hours.577 With respect to the annual hour burden, the Commission estimates each firm will spend, on average, approximately one hour per month (or twelve hours per year) of employee resources to prepare and send the report or to prepare the information for the FOCUS report (as required by the firm’s DEA, if applicable). Therefore, the Commission estimates the total annual burden arising from this amendment will be approximately 72 hours.578 Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12878. As of December 31, 2011, there were seven brokerdealers whose securities borrowed or securities loaned exceeded 80% of 25 times their tentative net capital, and there were six broker-dealers whose securities borrowed or securities loaned exceeded 25 times their tentative net capital. The Commission assumes for purposes of the PRA that six broker-dealers would chose to file monthly reports in lieu of the notice requirements, and that one would file a notice. 575 1 notice × 10 minutes per notice = 10 minutes. This is an update of the proposing release estimate of 2 hours (12 notices × 10 minutes per notice). See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12878. The Commission does not expect broker-dealers to incur postage costs as a result of this amendment because most broker-dealers file these notices via facsimile or email. Therefore, any incremental postages costs will likely be minimal. 576 This is an update from the proposing release estimate that 21 broker-would submit a monthly report. See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12878. 577 6 broker-dealers × 100 hours per firm = 600 hours. This is an update from our proposing release estimate of 2,100 hours (21 broker-dealers × 100 hours per firm). See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12878. 578 6 broker-dealers × 12 hours per year = 72 hours. This is an update from the proposing release estimate of 252 hours (21 broker-dealers × 12 hours per year). See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12878. E:\FR\FM\21AUR2.SGM 21AUR2 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 162 / Wednesday, August 21, 2013 / Rules and Regulations E. Collection of Information Is Mandatory These recordkeeping and notice requirements are mandatory with the exception of: (1) The option for a brokerdealer to report monthly its securities lending activities to its DEA in lieu of filing the notice required under paragraph (c)(5) of Rule 17a–11; (2) the option for a broker-dealer to request written approval from its DEA in order to withdraw capital that has been contributed within one year under paragraph (c)(2)(i)(G)(2) of Rule 15c3–1; and (3) the option of a carrying brokerdealer to enter into a subordination agreement with an account holder in order to exclude such account holder’s account from being treated as a PAB account under paragraph (a)(16) of Rule 15c3–3. emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with RULES2 F. Confidentiality Some of the information the Commission expects to receive may be confidential information. The information collected under the amendments to Rules 15c3–1, 15c3–3, 17a–3, and 17a–4 would be stored by the broker-dealers and made available to the Commission, Commission staff, and SROs, as required in connection with examinations, investigations, and enforcement proceedings. The information collected under the amendments to Rule 17a–11 would be generated from the internal records of the broker-dealers. It would be provided to the Commission, its staff, and SROs but not on a regular basis (except for the optional monthly reports). To the extent that the Commission receives confidential information pursuant to these collections of information, the Commission is committed to protecting the confidentiality of such information to the extent permitted by law.579 Broker-dealers will send required written notices regarding use of a PAB account holder’s securities to its customers, as required by Rule 15c3– 3.580 In addition, broker-dealers will 579 See, e.g., Exchange Act Section 24, 15 U.S.C. 78x (governing the public availability of information obtained by the Commission) and 5 U.S.C. 552 et seq. (Freedom of Information Act— ‘‘FOIA’’). FOIA provides at least two pertinent exemptions under which the Commission has authority to withhold certain information. FOIA Exemption 4 provides an exemption for ‘‘trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential.’’ 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(4). FOIA Exemption 8 provides an exemption for matters that are ‘‘contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions.’’ 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(8). 580 See 17 CFR 15c3–3(b)(5). VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:54 Aug 20, 2013 Jkt 229001 send certain notices and disclosures to customers regarding the treatment of their free credit balances under new paragraph (j)(2) to Rule 15c3–3. To the extent these standard notices and disclosures are made available to the Commission, they may not be kept confidential. G. Record Retention Period One amendment to Rule 15c3–1 will require broker-dealers to make disclosures to principals and obtain agreements from principals with respect to securities lending transactions where the broker-dealer acts as agent. In addition, the amendment to Rule 15c3– 3 to define the term PAB account will require carrying broker-dealers to enter into subordination agreements with certain account holders if they wish their account to be excluded from the definition. These records will have to be maintained for not less than three years under paragraph (b)(7) of Rule 17a–4.581 The amendments to Rule 15c3–3 require broker-dealers to provide PAB account holders with written notice that the securities may be used in the ordinary course of its business, obtain the written affirmative consent of a new customer before including a customer’s free credit balances in a Sweep Program, and provide certain disclosures and notices to all customers with regard to the broker-dealer’s Sweep Program. These agreements relate to the terms and conditions of the maintenance of the customer’s account and, accordingly, fall within the record retention requirements of paragraph (c) of Rule 17a–4.582 Under this paragraph, the records must be retained until six years after the closing of the customer’s account. The amendments to Rule 15c3– 3 also require broker-dealers to obtain notices and contracts from the banks holding their PAB reserve accounts. In order to comply with Rule 15c3–3, broker-dealers must have these notices and contracts in place and documented. These records will have to be maintained for not less than three years under the requirements of Rule 17a– 4.583 The amendments to Rules 17a–3 and 17a–4 require broker-dealers to document credit, market, and liquidity risk management controls. The amendments to Rule 17a–4 include the establishment of a retention period for these records, which will be until three years after the termination of the use of the risk management controls documented therein under new 581 17 CFR 240.17a–4(b)(7). CFR 240.17a–4(c). 583 17 CFR 240.17a–4. 582 17 PO 00000 Frm 00045 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 51867 paragraph (e)(9) of Rule 17a–4. The three-year retention period is designed to document former and current procedures and to provide sufficient opportunity to review the records during the broker-dealer’s normal exam cycle. The amendments to Rule 17a–11 will require broker-dealers to provide notice or report monthly to the Commission and other regulatory authorities under certain circumstances. These notices and reports will constitute communications relating to a brokerdealer’s ‘‘business as such’’ and, therefore, will need to be retained for three years.584 V. Economic Analysis A. Introduction The Commission is sensitive to the costs and benefits of its rules. When engaging in rulemaking that requires the Commission to consider or determine whether an action is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, section 3(f) of the Exchange Act requires that the Commission consider, in addition to the protection of investors, whether the action will promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation.585 In addition, section 23(a)(2) of the Exchange Act requires the Commission to consider the effects on competition of any rules the Commission adopts under the Exchange Act, and prohibits the Commission from adopting any rule that would impose a burden on competition not necessary or appropriate in furtherance of the purposes of the Exchange Act.586 In the proposing release,587 the Commission solicited comment on the costs and benefits of the proposed amendments including whether these costs and benefits were accurate.588 The 584 17 CFR 240.17a–4(b)(4). U.S.C. 78c(f). 586 15 U.S.C. 78w(a)(2). 587 See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12879; see also Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules for Broker-Dealers, Exchange Act Release No. 66910 (May 3, 2012), 77 FR 27150 (May 9, 2012) (re-opening of comment period). 588 For the purposes of this final economic analysis, the Commission is using salary data from the SIFMA Management & Professional Earnings in the Securities Industry 2012, which provides base salary and bonus information for middlemanagement and professional positions within the securities industry. The salary costs derived from the report and referenced in this cost/benefit section, are modified to account for an 1800-hour work year and multiplied by 5.35 to account for bonuses, firm size, employee benefits and overhead. Hereinafter, references to data derived from the report as modified in the manner described above will be cited as ‘‘SIFMA 2012 Report as Modified.’’ The proposing release used salary information for New York based employees derived from the SIA 585 15 Continued E:\FR\FM\21AUR2.SGM 21AUR2 51868 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 162 / Wednesday, August 21, 2013 / Rules and Regulations emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with RULES2 Commission also requested that commenters identify and assess any costs and benefits not discussed in the proposing release. The Commission further encouraged commenters to provide specific data and analysis in support of their views.589 The Commission also requested comment on whether the proposed amendments would place a burden on competition, and promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation.590 In May 2012, the Commission re-opened the comment period to permit commenters additional opportunity to address these, and any other, issues raised by the proposed rule amendments.591 The general comments received, as well as comments received relating to specific rule amendments, are discussed below. In adopting the rule amendments, the Commission has been mindful of the associated costs and benefits. The discussion focuses on the Commission’s reasons for adopting these amendments, the affected parties, the costs and benefits of the amendments compared to a baseline, and alternative courses of action. The discussion of the costs of the rule amendments includes a discussion of certain implementation burdens and related costs,592 which may include assessment costs, personnel costs, and other costs (e.g., technology costs).593 The cost estimates and related data derived from FOCUS Reports discussed in the proposing release have also been updated in this final release to reflect more recently available data.594 Many of the benefits and costs discussed below are difficult to quantify, in particular when discussing enhancements in investor protection. For example, it is unknown how much the amendments to the financial responsibility rules will result in enhanced compliance with those rules. Therefore, much of the discussion is qualitative in nature but, where Report on Management and Professional Earnings in the Securities Industry 2005. See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12879, n.151. 589 Id. at 12879. 590 Id. 591 Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules for Broker-Dealers, Exchange Act Release No. 66910 (May 3, 2012), 77 FR 27150 (May 9, 2012). 592 In the proposing release, the Commission estimated that the one-time and annual costs to broker-dealers would be $32,814,454 and $39,651,716, respectively. See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12887. 593 As discussed in section IV. of this release, the Commission has estimated certain indirect burdens and related costs of these implementation requirements. 594 See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12887. The FOCUS Report data from the proposing release was derived from 2004 year end numbers. VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:54 Aug 20, 2013 Jkt 229001 possible, the Commission has attempted to quantify the costs. However, the inability to quantify these costs and benefits does not mean that the costs and benefits of these rule amendments are any less significant. As discussed throughout this release, in part in response to comments, the Commission has modified the proposed rules to reduce compliance burdens where consistent with investor protection. In addition, where commenters identified additional costs, the Commission has revised its economic analysis of the final rules to take these costs into account. Finally, the Commission has considered all comment letters received related to the impact of the proposed amendments on efficiency, competition, and capital formation, and responds to these comments in the sections below discussing individual rule amendments. B. Economic Baseline The regulatory changes adopted today amend requirements that apply to broker-dealers registered with the Commission. The discussion below includes the approximate numbers of broker-dealers that will be affected by today’s amendments and a description of the economic baseline against which the costs and benefits, as well as the impact on efficiency, competition, and capital formation, of today’s amendments are measured. The broker-dealers registered with the Commission vary significantly in terms of their size, business activities, and the complexities of their operations. For example, carrying broker-dealers hold customer securities and funds.595 Clearing broker-dealers clear transactions as members of security exchanges, the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation and the Options Clearing Corporation.596 Many clearing 595 Rule 15c3–1 specifies that a broker-dealer shall be deemed to carry customer accounts ‘‘if, in connection with its activities as a broker or dealer, it receives checks, drafts, or other evidences of indebtedness made payable to itself or persons other than the requisite registered broker or dealer carrying the account of a customer, escrow agent, issuer, underwriter, sponsor, or other distributor of securities’’ or ‘‘if it does not promptly forward or promptly deliver all of the securities of customers or of other brokers or dealers received by the firm in connection with its activities as a broker or dealer.’’ 17 CFR 240.15c3–1(a)(2)(i). Rule 15c3–3 defines the term securities carried for the account of a customer to mean ‘‘securities received by or on behalf of a broker or dealer for the account of any customer and securities carried long by a broker or dealer for the account of any customer,’’ as well as securities sold to, or bought for, a customer by a broker-dealer. 17 CFR 240.15c3–3(a)(2). 596 See Definitions of Terms and Exemptions Relating to the ‘‘Broker’’ Exceptions for Banks, Exchange Act Release No. 56501 (Sept. 24, 2007), 72 FR 56514 (Oct. 3, 2007), at n.269. PO 00000 Frm 00046 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 broker-dealers are carrying brokerdealers, but some clearing brokerdealers clear only their own transactions and do not hold customer securities and cash. In addition, a broker-dealer that does not hold customer securities and/or cash is generally referred to as a ‘‘noncarrying broker-dealer.’’ Non-carrying broker-dealers include ‘‘introducing brokers.’’ 597 These introducing brokerdealers accept customer orders and introduce their customers to carrying broker-dealers that hold the securities and cash of the customers of the introducing broker-dealers along with the securities and cash of their direct customers. A carrying broker-dealer generally receives and executes orders of the introducing broker-dealers’ customers.598 Carrying broker-dealers generally also prepare trade confirmations, settle trades, and organize book entries of the securities purchased and sold.599 Introducing broker-dealers also may use carrying broker-dealers to clear the introducing firm’s proprietary trades and carry the firm’s securities. Another group of noncarrying broker-dealers effects transactions in securities like mutual funds on a subscription-way basis, where customers generally purchase the securities by providing the funds directly to the issuer.600 Finally, some non-carrying broker-dealers act as finders by referring prospective purchasers of securities to issuers.601 597 Id. at ¶ 1.15; see also Net Capital Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 31511 (Nov. 24, 1992), 57 FR 56973 (Dec. 2, 1992) (describing role of introducing broker-dealers). 598 Net Capital Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 31511 (Nov. 24, 1992), 57 FR 56973 (Dec. 2, 1992). 599 See, e.g., FINRA Rule 4311 (Carrying Agreements). This FINRA rule governs the requirements applicable to FINRA members when entering into agreements for the carrying of any customer accounts in which securities transactions can be effected. Historically, the purpose of this rule has been to ensure that certain functions and responsibilities are clearly allocated to either the introducing or carrying firm, consistent with the requirements of the SRO’s and Commission’s financial responsibility and other rules and regulations, as applicable. See also Notice of Filing of Amendment No. 1 and Order Granting Accelerated Approval of a Proposed Rule Change Adopting, as Modified by Amendment No. 1, Rules Governing Guarantees, Carrying Agreements, Security Counts and Supervision of General Ledger Accounts in the Consolidated FINRA Rulebook, Exchange Act Release No. 63999 (Mar. 7, 2011), 76 FR 12380 (Mar. 7, 2011). 600 See Books and Records Requirement for Brokers and Dealers Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 44992 (Nov. 2, 2001) (‘‘[T]he Commission recognizes that for some types of transactions, such as purchases of mutual funds or variable annuities, the customer may simply fill out an application or a subscription agreement that the broker-dealer then forwards directly to the issuer.’’). 601 See American Bar Association, Report and Recommendations of the Task Force on Private E:\FR\FM\21AUR2.SGM 21AUR2 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 162 / Wednesday, August 21, 2013 / Rules and Regulations While these amendments will impact investors and markets more generally, the broker-dealer industry is the primary industry directly affected by the rule amendments. In some cases, the amendments impose requirements on certain types of broker-dealers that engage in specific activities. For example, only carrying broker-dealers that carry free credit balances would be subject to the requirements regarding the treatment of free credit balances under paragraph (j) of Rule 15c3–3. All broker-dealers would be subject to the requirements to deduct from net worth certain liabilities or expenses assumed by third parties under Rule 15c3–1. 51869 To establish a baseline for competition among broker-dealers, the Commission looked at the status of the broker-dealer industry detailed below. In terms of size, the following table provides the distribution of brokerdealers by total capital levels and the aggregate total capital within each capital bracket. BROKER-DEALER CAPITAL AT CALENDAR YEAR END 2011 602 [$ millions] Number of firms Capital Aggregate total capital Less than $500,000 ................................................................................................................................................. Greater than or equal to $500,000 and less than $5 million .................................................................................. Greater than or equal to $5 million and less than $50 million ................................................................................ Greater than or equal to $50 million and less than $100 million ............................................................................ Greater than or equal to $100 million and less than $500 million .......................................................................... Greater than or equal to $500 million and less than $1 billion ............................................................................... Greater than or equal to $1 billion and less than $5 billion .................................................................................... Greater than or equal to $5 billion and less than $10 billion .................................................................................. Greater than or equal to $10 billion ........................................................................................................................ 2,506 1,320 608 80 125 28 27 6 9 $347 2,212 10,520 5,672 26,655 19,248 61,284 41,175 175,585 Total .................................................................................................................................................................. 4,709 342,698 emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with RULES2 According to FOCUS Report data, as of December 31, 2011, there were approximately 4,709 broker-dealers registered with the Commission. Nine broker-dealers hold over half of brokerdealers’ total capital. Further, based on FOCUS Report data, as of December 31, 2011, the Commission also estimates that there are approximately 287 brokerdealers that are clearing or carrying firms that do not claim exemptions pursuant to paragraph (k) of Rule 15c3– 3. Based on FOCUS Report data, as of December 31, 2011, approximately 189 of these broker-dealers carry free credit balances, while 61 broker-dealers carry PAB accounts. For the purposes of this economic analysis, the baseline is the current customer protection, net capital, books and records, and notification requirements for broker-dealers promulgated under the Exchange Act and existing interpretations thereunder, and how they affect broker-dealers. As discussed above in section II.A.1. of this release, Rule 15c3–3—the customer protection rule—in effect mandates a separation of customer assets from broker-dealer assets through two fundamental requirements: (1) That a carrying broker-dealer must maintain Placement Broker-Dealers 23–24 (2005); see also Net Capital Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 31511 (Nov. 24, 1992), 57 FR 56973 (Dec. 2, 1992). 602 The information in this chart is based on FOCUS Report data filed by broker-dealers in 2011. The information in the ‘‘Aggregate Total Capital’’ column is based on data reported on line 3530 of VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:54 Aug 20, 2013 Jkt 229001 physical possession or control over customers’ fully paid and excess margin securities; and (2) that a carrying brokerdealer must maintain a reserve of cash or qualified securities 603 in an account at a bank that is at least equal in value to the net cash owed to customers, including cash obtained from the use of customer securities. These provisions are designed to require the broker-dealer to hold customer securities and cash in a manner that enables the prompt return of these assets in the event that the firm falls into financial difficulty or becomes insolvent. The goal of the rule is to place a broker-dealer in a position where it is able to wind down in an orderly self-liquidation without the need for financial assistance from SIPC through a formal proceeding under SIPA.604 As discussed above in section II.E. of this release, Rule 15c3–1—the net capital rule—requires broker-dealers to maintain a minimum level of net capital (meaning highly liquid capital) at all times.605 The rule requires that a brokerdealer perform two calculations: (1) A computation of the minimum amount of net capital the broker-dealer must maintain; 606 and (2) a computation of the amount of net capital the brokerthe FOCUS Report, which includes total capital and allowable subordinated liabilities. 603 Rule 15c3–3 defines qualified securities as securities issued by the United States or guaranteed by the United States with respect to principal and interest. 17 CFR 240.15c3–3(a)(6). 604 15 U.S.C. 78aaa et seq. 605 See 17 CFR 240.15c3–1. PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 dealer is maintaining.607 The minimum net capital requirement is the greater of a fixed-dollar amount specified in the rule and an amount determined by applying one of two financial ratios: the 15-to-1 aggregate indebtedness to net capital ratio or the 2% of aggregate debit items ratio.608 In computing net capital, the broker-dealer must, among other things, make certain adjustments to net worth, such as deducting illiquid assets, taking other capital charges, and adding qualifying subordinated loans.609 The amount remaining after these adjustments is defined as tentative net capital.610 The final step in computing net capital is to take prescribed percentage deductions (‘‘standardized haircuts’’) from the mark-to-market value of the proprietary positions (e.g., securities, money market instruments, and commodities) that are included in its tentative net capital.611 As discussed above in section II.D. of this release, Rule 17a–3 and 17a–4—the books and records rules—require broker-dealers to make and keep current certain records (e.g., trade blotters, asset and liability ledgers, income ledgers, customer account ledgers, etc.), which must be maintained in a specific manner for required retention 606 See 17 CFR 240.15c3–1(a). 17 CFR 240.15c3–1(c)(2). The computation of net capital is based on the definition of net capital in paragraph (c)(2) of Rule 15c3–1. Id. 608 See 17 CFR 240.15c3–1(a). 609 See 17 CFR 240.15c3–1(c)(2)(i)–(xiii). 610 See 17 CFR 240.15c3–1(c)(15). 611 See 17 CFR 240.15c3–1(c)(2)(vi). 607 See E:\FR\FM\21AUR2.SGM 21AUR2 51870 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 162 / Wednesday, August 21, 2013 / Rules and Regulations periods.612 Finally, Rule 17a–11—the notification rule—requires a brokerdealer to notify the Commission and its DEA when certain events occur, such as if it fails to maintain certain levels of net capital.613 The specific requirements as well as the benefits and costs of each amendment and how broker-dealers will be affected are discussed in more detail in the sections below. C. Discussion of General Comments Received As stated above, in the proposing release, the Commission requested comment on estimates and views regarding the costs and benefits for particular types of market participants, as well as any other costs and benefits that may result from the adoption of the proposed rules.614 In response to this specific request, the Commission received two comment letters.615 The first commenter who was explicitly addressing the Commission’s Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis stated that the Commission should pay ‘‘explicit attention to regulatory trends in the rest of the world’’ because doing so ‘‘benefits not only small entities [the focus of the Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis] (by reducing their regulatory burden) but all entities, as larger entities can experience more consistent regulatory procedures around the world.’’ 616 The commenter suggested that the Commission consider a ‘‘Basel II type approach to net capital requirements.’’ 617 The second commenter requested that the Commission publish an update to all statistics and costs referenced in the proposing release.618 The commenter further requested that, once published, the Commission reopen the comment period so that comments could be provided based on ‘‘current conditions and statistics.’’ 619 In response to the first commenter’s request that the Commission should explicitly examine the alternatives used by regulators in other jurisdictions,620 in adopting the final rule amendments today, as discussed throughout this section, the Commission considered reasonable alternatives, including alternatives in other jurisdictions, as well as the costs and benefits of the emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with RULES2 612 17 CFR 240.17a–3; 17 CFR 240.17a–4. CFR 240.17a–11. 614 See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12879. 615 See Angel Letter; NIBA 2 Letter. 616 See Angel Letter. 617 Id. 618 See NIBA 2 Letter. 619 Id. 620 See Angel Letter. 613 17 VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:54 Aug 20, 2013 Jkt 229001 amendments. Moreover, the amendments relate to discrete areas of the broker-dealer financial responsibility rules (i.e., they do not establish new financial responsibility standards such as would be the case if the Commission were to adopt a ‘‘Basel II type approach to net capital requirements.’’). Consequently, the commenter’s suggestion is beyond the scope of this rulemaking.621 In response to the second commenter, the Commission is publishing updated costs and statistics in this release. The Commission, however, believes that it is unnecessary to reopen the comment period to obtain comment on the updated statistics for several reasons. First, in proposing the rule changes, the Commission included then current estimates in the proposing release. Second, as noted above, the Commission reopened the comment period in 2012.622 The reopening of the comment period afforded commenters an additional opportunity to comment on the proposed rules (including estimated costs and benefits), given the economic events since the rule amendments were proposed, the regulatory developments, the comments received on the proposed amendments, the continuing public interest in the proposed amendments, and the passage of time.623 The Commission received a total of 97 comment letters on the proposed amendments.624 As discussed below, in many cases, the revised data included in this release reflects a decrease in overall costs because of the decline in the total number of brokerdealers (including the number of brokerdealers that will be affected by each of these rule amendments). As of the 2004 year end, the number of registered broker-dealers was 6,339. As of the 2011 year end, the number of registered broker-dealers was 4,709, reflecting a net decrease of 1,630 (or 26%) in the number of registered broker-dealers. Consequently, many of the aggregate costs included in the proposing release have declined due to the decrease in the number of registered broker-dealers. Further, the costs incurred by a broker-dealer to comply with the rule 621 The commenter cited the JP Morgan Letter in support of the suggestion to ‘‘consider regulatory trends in the rest of the world.’’ Id. The JP Morgan Letter recommends that the Commission adopt a due diligence standard—citing a U.K. regulation— with respect to the amendments regarding customer reserve account cash deposits. See JP Morgan Letter. The Commission addresses this comment below in section V.D.1.i.b.(III) of this release. 622 Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules for Broker-Dealers, Exchange Act Release No. 66910 (May 3, 2012), 77 FR 27150 (May 9, 2012). 623 Id. 624 See supra note 6. PO 00000 Frm 00048 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 amendments will generally depend, among other factors, on the size and complexity of its business activities. Because the size and complexity of broker-dealers varies significantly, their costs also could vary significantly. In some cases, the Commission provided in the proposing release, and is providing here, estimates of the average cost per broker-dealer, taking into consideration the variance in size and complexity of the business activities of broker-dealers. In other cases, the cost impact to broker-dealers will depend on whether the broker-dealer is conducting activities that are subject to the rule amendments. For example, the amendments to Rule 15c3–3 will apply, for the most part, only to broker-dealers that carry PAB accounts (e.g., PAB account amendment), have a reserve deposit requirement (e.g., reserve bank account amendments), or carry free credit balances (e.g., free credit balance amendments). These amendments would have no direct cost impact on non-carrying broker-dealers, many of which are small broker-dealers. Moreover, given that some amendments are largely codifications of existing Commission and staff guidance (e.g., amendments related to PAB accounts, third parties assuming broker-dealer liabilities, temporary capital contributions, and fidelity bond deductions), any economic effects, including costs and benefits, should be compared to the baseline of current practice. Broker-dealers that are already complying with these requirements would not be expected to incur substantial costs to comply with these amendments. The second commenter also stated that broker-dealers are dealing with relatively static commission and fee schedules in comparison to what they might charge customers, and, as such, broker-dealers will be unable to pass on any cost increases resulting from these rule amendments directly to customers.625 The commenter stated that these cost increases over a relatively short period of time threaten the viability of all small broker-dealers, irrespective of their business line types or classes.626 The commenter noted that the estimates provided by the Commission utilized only the number of broker-dealers in its estimate that the Commission justifiably considered to be affected by the proposals.627 In contrast, the commenter believes that most, if not all broker-dealers will spend over 90 hours each analyzing the effects of these 625 See NIBA 2 Letter. 626 Id. 627 Id. E:\FR\FM\21AUR2.SGM 21AUR2 emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with RULES2 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 162 / Wednesday, August 21, 2013 / Rules and Regulations proposals and, if the rules are implemented, will spend much more than 90 hours each in implementing procedures to comply with the new rules. The commenter also believes that implementation will require brokerdealers to modify their written supervisory procedures and supervisory controls, and broker-dealers will spend in excess of 240 hours each in the monitoring of such rules on an ongoing basis. Consequently, the commenter believes that each broker-dealer will spend in excess of $15,000 for outside counsel and auditor opinions or work product.628 This commenter did not provide additional detail about the basis for its view that the Commission’s estimates were too low. As stated above in section IV. of this release, the Commission agrees with the commenter that the broker-dealers directly affected by the rule amendments may be required to implement procedures or modify their written supervisory procedures to comply with the rule amendments. In cases where the rule amendments require a broker-dealer to directly implement or document certain policies and procedures, these hour burdens and costs already are incorporated into the PRA costs discussed above in section IV. of this release, and incorporated into the discussion below.629 In response to the commenter, the Commission also acknowledges that a broker-dealer may need to review its operations to determine whether it has any obligations under the rule amendments. Even if the broker-dealer is not affected by the rule amendments, such a review may result in an indirect effect on its operations. These indirect costs are discussed in more detail below. In adopting these final rules, as discussed throughout the release, including this economic analysis, the Commission has sought to take into account the costs and benefits associated with each particular rule amendment. The Commission has also considered the indirect costs that a broker-dealer would incur to assess the impact of these final rule amendments. The Commission estimates that a broker-dealer likely will hire outside counsel to assess the impact of the final rules on the broker-dealer’s operations because all broker-dealers may be affected by the final rules, including non-carrying broker-dealers that may be affected by certain amendments, such as the Rule 15c3–1 amendments regarding third party liabilities or temporary capital contributions. Whether a broker628 Id. 629 See, e.g., paragraph (j)(1) of Rule 15c3–3 and paragraph (a)(23) of Rule 17a–3, as adopted. VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:54 Aug 20, 2013 Jkt 229001 dealer determines to incur such assessment costs will depend on the nature and size of the broker-dealer’s business and the range of activities the broker-dealer conducts. Therefore, while the Commission cannot estimate an aggregate assessment cost for all broker-dealers, the Commission estimates that these assessment costs would range approximately from $2,000 to $30,000 630 per broker-dealer.631 D. Economic Analysis of the Amendments and Alternatives This section discusses costs and benefits of the rule amendments for the affected parties against the economic baseline identified above, both in terms of each of the specific changes from the baseline and in terms of the overall impact. In considering costs, benefits, and overall impact, this discussion addresses comments received, modifications made to the proposed amendments, and reasonable alternatives, where applicable. This section also discusses the Commission’s considerations on the burden on competition, and the promotion of efficiency, competition, and capital formation.632 In significant part, the effects of the final rules on 630 These costs estimates include hour estimates in the range of 5 hours to 75 hours for outside counsel assessment review. A small broker-dealer may hire outside counsel to review only 1 or 2 of the final rule amendments for approximately 5 hours × $400 per hour = $2,000. See Business Conduct Standards for Security-Based Swap Dealers and Major Security-Based Swap Participants, Exchange Act Release No. 64766, 76 FR 42396 (June 29, 2011), 76 FR 42396 (July 18, 2011) (applying the estimated cost of $400 for legal services by outside counsel). See also Further Definition of ‘‘Swap Dealer,’’ ‘‘Security-Based Swap Dealer,’’ ‘‘Major Swap Participant,’’ ‘‘Major Security-Based Swap Participant’’ and ‘‘Eligible Contract Participant’’, Exchange Act Release No. 66868 (Apr. 27, 2012), 77 FR 30596 (May 23, 2012) (noting that the review of the final rules by outside counsel for a large firm would generally cost more because the review would be more complex). 631 As discussed above, and in section IV. of this release, broker-dealers directly affected by a specific rule amendment may be required to implement procedures or modify their written supervisory procedures in order to comply with the rule amendments. The hours and related costs are discussed in section IV. of this release, and are incorporated into the specific sections below discussing each rule amendment. Therefore, while the range of hours is less than 90 hours (as suggested by the commenter), the Commission has adjusted other specific hour and cost estimates (in sections IV. and V. of this release) in response to the commenter’s concerns, and believes these adjusted estimates, in totality, for the reasons discussed above, adequately address the estimated costs as well as the commenter’s concerns. See NIBA 2 Letter. 632 In the proposing release, the Commission stated that its preliminary view was that the proposed amendments promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation and would not have any anti-competitive effects. See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12887. PO 00000 Frm 00049 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 51871 efficiency and capital formation are linked to the effects of these rules on competition. Competitive markets are generally expected to promote an efficient allocation of capital. Rules that promote, or do not unduly restrict, investor participation and competition in the broker-dealer industry can be accompanied by regulatory benefits that may reduce the risk of market failure and thus promote market efficiency and capital formation. 1. Amendments to the Customer Protection Rule i. Economic Analysis a. Proprietary Accounts of BrokerDealers (I). Summary of Amendments Today’s amendments to Rules 15c3–3 and 15c3–3a require carrying brokerdealers to: (1) Perform a separate reserve computation for PAB accounts (in addition to the customer reserve computation currently required under Rule 15c3–3); 633 (2) establish and fund a separate reserve account for the benefit of the PAB account holders; 634 and (3) obtain and maintain physical possession or control of securities carried for a PAB account, unless the carrying broker-dealer has provided written notice to the PAB account holder that the securities may be used in the ordinary course of its securities business, and has provided opportunity for the PAB account holder to object.635 In addition to the amendments to Rules 15c3–3 and 15c3–3a, the Commission is adopting amendments to Rule 15c3–1 that will require a broker-dealer to deduct from net capital cash and securities held in a securities account at a carrying broker-dealer except where the account has been subordinated to the claims of creditors of the carrying broker-dealer.636 As discussed above in section II.A.2. of this release, there is a disparity between the customer reserve requirements in Rule 15c3–3 and the treatment of customers in a liquidation proceeding under SIPA.637 Brokerdealers are not within the definition of customer for the purposes of Rule 15c3– 3.638 Accordingly, a carrying brokerdealer that carries PAB accounts is not required to treat these accounts as customer accounts for the purposes of Rule 15c3–3. However, the definition of customer in SIPA is broader than the 633 17 CFR 250.15c3–3(e)(3). CFR 240.15c3–3(e)(1). 635 17 CFR 240.15c3–3(b)(5). 636 17 CFR 240.15c3–1(c)(2)(iv)(E). 637 15 U.S.C. 78aaa et seq. 638 17 CFR 240.15c3–3(a)(1). 634 17 E:\FR\FM\21AUR2.SGM 21AUR2 51872 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 162 / Wednesday, August 21, 2013 / Rules and Regulations definition in Rule 15c3–3 in that the SIPA definition does not exclude broker-dealers.639 SIPA customers are entitled to a number of protections if their brokerdealer fails and is liquidated in a SIPA proceeding, including the right to share pro rata with other SIPA customers in the customer property held by the broker-dealer and, if the fund of customer property is insufficient to make each SIPA customer whole, the entitlement to receive an advance from the SIPC fund of up to $500,000 (of which only $250,000 can be used to cover cash claims).640 Broker-dealers that are SIPA customers have the right to share pro rata in customer property.641 Consequently, when a carrying broker-dealer is liquidated in a SIPA proceeding, each customer (including a SIPA customer that is a broker-dealer) has a claim on the customer property. However, because the possession and control and customer reserve account provisions of Rule 15c3–3 do not apply to PAB account holders by virtue of the definition of customer in the rule, the carrying broker-dealer is not restricted from using the securities and cash in these accounts for its business purposes. The treatment of PAB account holders as customers for the purposes of SIPA but not as customers for the purposes of Rule 15c3–3 increases the risk that, in the event that a carrying broker-dealer is liquidated under SIPA, the claims of all SIPA customers will exceed the amount of customer property available and, thereby, expose the SIPC fund and potentially SIPA customers to losses. In addition, if the customer property is insufficient to satisfy fully all SIPA customer claims, and losses are incurred, the broker-dealer SIPA customers could be potentially placed in financial distress causing adverse effects to the securities markets, in addition to the adverse effects resulting from the failure of the carrying brokerdealer.642 639 See 15 U.S.C. 78lll(a). 15 U.S.C. 78fff–2(c) and 15 U.S.C. 78fff– 3(a), respectively. Under SIPA, the term customer property includes ‘‘cash and securities . . . at any time received, acquired, or held by or for the account of the debtor from or for the securities accounts of a customer, and the proceeds of any such property transferred by the debtor, including property unlawfully converted.’’ Therefore, customer property includes those securities positions that are held for customers and the cash that is owed to customers. 15 U.S.C. 78lll(4). 641 See 15 U.S.C. 78fff–2(c). Broker-dealers, however, are not entitled to receive an advance from the SIPC fund. 15 U.S.C. 78fff–3(a). 642 As noted above, while broker-dealers are customers for the purposes of SIPA, they are not entitled to the advances from the SIPC fund of up to $500,000 (limited to $250,000 for cash claims) emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with RULES2 640 See VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:54 Aug 20, 2013 Jkt 229001 The amendments address the disparity between the customer reserve requirements in Rule 15c3–3 and the treatment of customers in a liquidation proceeding under SIPA by requiring broker-dealers to reserve for the amount that credits exceed debits with respect to broker-dealer accounts. The amendments create a process that protects customers and PAB account holders of a failed carrying brokerdealer, and are designed to provide such protection by mitigating the risk that there will be insufficient customer property to fully satisfy all customer claims in a SIPA liquidation. By requiring the protection of PAB account holders (who qualify as customers under SIPA), the amendments to Rule 15c3–3 also reduce the risk that advances from the SIPC fund would be necessary to protect customer claims. The amendments to Rule 15c3–1 are intended to prevent broker-dealers from including in their net capital amount assets that may not be readily available to be returned to such broker-dealer account holders because the assets would not be subject to the PAB account provisions under Rules 15c3–3 and 15c3–3a. The amendments to Rule 15c3–1 also provide consistency with the exclusions from the definition of PAB account in paragraph (a)(16) of Rule 15c3–3. Overall, the PAB-related amendments to Rules 15c3–3, 15c3–3a, and 15c3–1 should serve to reduce certain risks to investors and PAB account holders and, thereby, strengthen customer protection. The Commission requested comment on available metrics to quantify these benefits and any other benefits a commenter may identify. The Commission did not receive any comments in response to this request. (II). Baseline and Incremental Economic Effects Under the no-action relief set forth in the PAIB Letter,643 discussed in section II.A.2 of this release, broker-dealers currently perform a reserve computation for domestic broker-dealer accounts and have obtained the necessary agreements and notices from the banks holding their PAIB reserve deposits. Therefore, as compared to the baseline of current Rule 15c3–1 and existing interpretations and guidance thereunder, including the noaction relief set forth in the PAIB Letter, the amendments will likely result only in small incremental benefits and costs allowed under SIPA to make up for potential shortfalls after the pro rata distribution of customer property. 15 U.S.C. 78fff–3(a). 643 See PAIB Letter. PO 00000 Frm 00050 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 because the final rule codifies many of the provisions of the PAIB Letter.644 Incorporation of certain aspects of the PAIB Letter into Rule 15c3–3 is intended to provide broker-dealers with more certainty with respect to the PAB requirements because these requirements will be expressly stated in a Commission rule. Moreover, the PAB final rule amendments will not impose a significant additional burden on broker-dealers presently utilizing the interpretive relief provided in the PAIB Letter since the provisions of the final rule amendments are substantially similar. Relative to the baseline, there will be economic differences to the extent that carrying broker-dealers are currently not following the PAIB Letter, as compliance with conditions of the PAIB Letter are voluntary, while the PAB amendments to Rule 15c3–3 will be mandatory for the carrying brokerdealers subject to its requirements. Consequently, to the extent that carrying broker-dealers are not currently complying with the PAIB Letter, and to the extent the amendments as adopted differ from the PAIB Letter, they may incur incremental costs, including possible costs of capital as firms reallocate capital to comply with the rule amendments. (III). Alternatives In adopting these amendments, the Commission considered alternatives suggested by commenters on specific provisions of the rule, and incorporated some of these alternative approaches into the final rule amendments. Two commenters raised concerns about the proposed definition of the term PAB account, because by including proprietary accounts of foreign brokerdealers and foreign banks acting as broker-dealers within the definition, the definition would differ from provisions in the PAIB Letter, which excluded such accounts from a PAIB computation.645 The first commenter suggested allowing broker-dealers to ‘‘opt out’’ of the rule.646 The second commenter stated that foreign broker-dealers and foreign banks acting as broker-dealers should be allowed to subordinate their claims to customers and creditors of the brokerdealer to remove their accounts from PAB account treatment because under SIPA foreign broker-dealers and foreign banks acting as broker-dealers, under certain circumstances, will not be deemed customers and, therefore, 644 See section II.B. of this release. The PAIB Letter is being withdrawn as of the effective date of these rule amendments. 645 See Dresdner Kleinwort Letter; Deutsche Bank Securities Letter. 646 See Dresdner Kleinwort Letter. E:\FR\FM\21AUR2.SGM 21AUR2 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 162 / Wednesday, August 21, 2013 / Rules and Regulations would not be entitled to a pro rata share of the estate of customer property in a SIPA liquidation.647 More specifically, the commenter suggested that, to parallel the language in SIPA,648 the Commission modify the definition of PAB account to exclude ‘‘any foreign broker-dealer and foreign bank, to the extent that such entity has a claim for cash or securities that is subordinated to the claims of creditors of the carrying broker-dealer.’’ This commenter also recommended that the subordinating broker-dealer would need to follow the requirements for non-conforming subordinated loans to remove an account from being treated as a PAB account.649 In response to commenters’ concerns and suggested alternatives, the Commission is excluding from the PAB account definition accounts that have been subordinated to the claims of creditors of the carrying broker-dealer. Consequently, this provision will provide flexibility to carrying brokerdealers and their broker-dealer affiliates to structure their PAB account relationships in a manner that permits operational efficiencies (i.e., the ability to exclude these accounts from the PAB reserve computation) while still promoting the goal of the amendments to have a consistent treatment of these accounts under Rule 15c3–3 and SIPA, and thereby protect accounts holders that are customers under SIPA. As discussed below, however, the requirement to enter into a subordination agreement with certain account holders to exclude them from the definition of PAB account may result in a one-time cost to brokerdealers. In addition, in the proposing release, the Commission proposed to require that a carrying broker-dealer obtain written permission from a PAB account holder before it could use the securities of the PAB account holder in the ordinary course of its securities business. One commenter stated that this provision should be eliminated from the proposed amendments, arguing that it interferes unnecessarily in the contractual arrangements between broker-dealers, which are capable of 647 See Deutsche Bank Securities Letter. The definition of customer in SIPA excludes any person, to the extent that ‘‘such person has a claim for cash or securities which by contract, agreement, or understanding, or by operation of law, is part of the capital of the debtor, or is subordinated to the claims of any or all creditors of the debtor, notwithstanding that some ground exists for declaring such contract, agreement, or understanding void or voidable in a suit between the claimant and the debtor.’’ 15 U.S.C. 78lll(2)(C)(ii). 649 See Deutsche Bank Securities Letter. emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with RULES2 648 Id. VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:54 Aug 20, 2013 Jkt 229001 understanding the terms of standard industry custodial relationships and that the PAIB Letter did not contain any such requirements. The Commission considered this alternative and believes that an appropriate level of protection for PAB account holders will be achieved by requiring the carrying broker-dealer to provide written notice to the PAB account holders that the firm may use their non-margin securities in the ordinary course of its securities business. The written notice requirement in the final rule will increase protection for PAB account holders from the status quo without imposing substantial burdens on existing account relationships. The revised rule will alert PAB account holders to the fact that the carrying broker-dealer may use their securities in its business for its own benefit, thereby reducing possible contractual ambiguity between the PAB account holder and the broker-dealer. The revised rule also will provide a PAB account holder the opportunity to seek to move the account to another broker-dealer or to negotiate different terms with regard to the use of its securities. Finally, this amendment will eliminate the need for, and the costs that would result from, carrying broker-dealers reworking existing contracts. An alternative considered in adopting the PAB-related amendments to Rule 15c3–1 would have required a brokerdealer, when calculating net capital, to deduct from net worth cash and securities held in a securities account at another broker-dealer, if the other broker-dealer does not treat the account, and the assets in the account, in compliance with the applicable PAB requirements of the rule.650 Although the proposing release stated that the Commission did not expect brokerdealers to audit or examine their carrying broker-dealers to determine whether such firms were in compliance with the proposed rule, commenters expressed concern that the proposed rule text suggested that broker-dealers in fact would have such an obligation.651 There were also concerns expressed that a broker-dealer should not be deemed to have violated the net capital rule because its carrying firm fails to properly perform requirements solely applicable to the carrying firm and that Rule 15c3–1 should be modified to clarify that cash and securities held in a securities account at another brokerdealer are not subject to the deduction specified in paragraph (c)(2)(iv)(E) of 650 See 651 See PO 00000 section II.A.2.v. of this release. SIFMA 2 Letter. Frm 00051 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 51873 Rule 15c3–1.652 In response to these concerns, the Commission has modified the language in the Rule 15c3–1 to eliminate the proposed capital charge that would have resulted from a failure of a carrying broker-dealer to comply with the PAB requirements. Instead, the Commission has adopted amendments providing that a broker-dealer need not deduct cash and securities held in a securities account at another brokerdealer, with one exception. As discussed in section II.A.2. of this release, the exception generally parallels the exclusions from the definition of PAB account in Rule 15c3–3. (IV). Compliance Cost Estimates The Commission is mindful of the compliance costs associated with the final PAB rule amendments. In particular, the Commission recognizes that, though many requirements of the PAB rule amendments being adopted by the Commission today are incorporated from the PAIB Letter, there may be incremental imposed costs. For example, as discussed above in section II.A.2. of this release, because the possession and control and customer reserve account provisions of Rule 15c3–3 do not apply to PAB account holders by virtue of the definition of customer in the rule, the carrying broker-dealer is not restricted from using the securities and cash in those accounts for its own business purposes. Broker-dealers carrying PAB accounts will be required to comply with the final PAB rule amendments, in contrast to the provisions of the PAIB Letter, which are voluntary.653 To the extent that carrying broker-dealers are not currently complying with the PAIB Letter, or to the extent the amendments as adopted differ from the PAIB Letter, they may incur incremental costs, including possible costs of capital as firms reallocate capital to comply with the rule amendments. The requirement to enter into a subordination agreement with certain account holders to exclude them from the definition of PAB account,654 the requirement to provide written notice to PAB account holders that their securities may be used in the ordinary course of the carrying broker-dealer’s securities business,655 the requirement 652 Id. 653 See PAIB Letter. internal hours for this requirement would likely be performed by an in-house Attorney at $379 per hour. Therefore the estimated internal cost would be calculated as follows: $379 per hour × 13,420 hours = $5,086,180. See also section IV.D.3. of this release. 655 The internal hours required to draft the notice would likely be performed by an in-house Attorney 654 The E:\FR\FM\21AUR2.SGM Continued 21AUR2 51874 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 162 / Wednesday, August 21, 2013 / Rules and Regulations emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with RULES2 to amend the standard PAB agreement templates,656 and the need to update systems to implement the necessary changes 657 may also impose one-time costs. In addition, a carrying brokerdealer will incur postage costs as a result of the requirement to send written notices to PAB account holders regarding the use of their non-margin securities, as well as outside counsel fees to review the notice and standard PAB agreement template.658 Finally, the requirements to compute and establish a separate reserve for PAB accounts will result in annual costs to carrying brokerdealers to the extent that these requirements will lengthen the time needed to compute and establish the PAB reserve account under the PAIB Letter. The Commission estimates that these requirements would impose onetime and annual costs in the aggregate of approximately $6,434,840 659 and $2,709,210,660 respectively. As noted above, the Commission requested comment on the proposed cost estimates.661 In particular, the Commission requested comment on whether there would be additional costs to broker-dealers as a consequence of these proposals. The Commission requested comment on whether these requirements would result in such costs and, if so, how to quantify the costs. The Commission also requested comment on whether these proposals would impose costs on other market participants, at $379 per hour. The estimated internal cost would be calculated as follows: $379 per hour × 610 hours = $231,190. The internal hours required to send out the notices would likely be performed by a Compliance Clerk at $63 per hour, resulting in an internal estimated cost calculated as follows: $63 per hour × 259 hours = $16,317. See also section IV.D.4. of this release. 656 The internal hours would likely be performed by an in-house Attorney at $379 per hour, resulting in an internal estimated cost calculated as follows: $379 per hour × 1,220 hours = $462,380. See also section IV.D.4. of this release. 657 The internal hours would likely be performed by a Senior Programmer at $282 per hour, resulting in the estimated internal cost calculated as follows: $282 per hour × 1,830 hours = $516,060. See also section IV.D.4. of this release. 658 The estimated postage costs are calculated as follows: 1,551 notices × $0.46 = $713.46. To review and comment on the notice and PAB templates, the estimated outside counsel burden is $122,000, in aggregate. See also section IV.D.4. of this release. 659 See section IV.D.3 and 4. of this release ($5,086,180 + $231,190 + $16,317 + $462,380 + $516,060 + $713.46 + $122,000 = $6,434,840.46). 660 The internal hours would likely be performed by a Financial Reporting Manager at $294 per hour, resulting in the estimated internal cost calculated as follows: $294 per hour × 9,215 hours = $2,709,210. See also section IV.D.4. of this release. 661 See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12880. In the proposing release, the Commission estimated that the one-time and annual costs to broker-dealers resulting from these proposed amendments would be $603,000 and $2,599,399. Id. VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:54 Aug 20, 2013 Jkt 229001 including broker-dealer customers. Commenters were also asked to identify the metrics and sources of any empirical data that support their cost estimates. The Commission did not receive any comments in response to these requests. b. Banks Where Special Reserve Deposits May Be Held (I). Summary of Amendments As amended, paragraph (e) of Rule 15c3–3 requires carrying broker-dealers to deposit cash or qualified securities into their customer or PAB reserve account, which must be maintained at a ‘‘bank.’’ 662 As adopted, the final rule excludes when determining whether a broker-dealer maintains the minimum deposits required under paragraph (e) of Rule 15c3–3: (1) Cash deposited with an affiliated bank; and (2) cash deposited at a ‘‘non-affiliated bank to the extent that the amount of the deposit exceeds 15% of the bank’s equity capital as reported by the bank in its most recent Call Report or any successor form the bank is required to file by its appropriate Federal banking agency (as defined by Section 3 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1813)).’’ Under paragraph (f) of Rule 15c3–3, a broker-dealer is currently required to obtain a written contract from the bank wherein the bank agrees not to re-lend or hypothecate the qualified securities deposited into the reserve account.663 This means that the bank cannot use the qualified securities in its business, which provides a measure of protection by requiring that the securities will be available to the broker-dealer if the bank falls into financial difficulty. Cash deposits, however, may be freely used in the course of the bank’s commercial activities. Therefore, because they do not have that same type of protection, the amendments to Rule 15c3–3 enhance customer protection by prohibiting a carrying broker-dealer from holding customer cash deposits at its affiliated bank and establishing requirements designed to avoid the situation where a carrying brokerdealer’s cash deposits constitute a substantial portion of the bank’s deposits. Customer cash deposits may be at risk if a carrying broker-dealer does not 662 The term qualified securities is defined in paragraph (a)(6) of Rule 15c3–3 to mean securities issued by the United States or guaranteed by the United States with respect to principal and interest. 17 CFR 240.15c3–3(a)(6). The term bank is defined in paragraph (a)(7) of Rule 15c3–3 as a ‘‘bank as defined in section 3(a)(6) of the Act and will also mean any building and loan, savings and loan or similar banking institution subject to the supervision by a Federal banking authority.’’ See paragraph (a)(7) to Rule 15c3–3, as adopted. 663 17 CFR 240.15c3–3(f). PO 00000 Frm 00052 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 exercise due diligence when assessing the financial soundness of an affiliated bank with the same degree of impartiality and care as it would with an unaffiliated bank. The situation where a broker-dealer’s cash constitutes a substantial portion of a bank’s deposits also poses a risk that some or all of the cash deposits may not be readily available for quick withdrawal by the broker-dealer. Depending on the relative size of the deposit, a lost deposit that is large relative to the broker-dealer’s capital could cause the firm to fail.664 If the broker-dealer fails and the deposit is not recovered, the SIPC fund may not recover advances that it has made for the purpose of returning customer assets. To the extent that customer losses exceed the SIPA advance limits, customers may suffer permanent losses. The amendment to Rule 15c3–3 should serve to reduce certain risks to investors in the event of a bank’s failure and, thereby, enhance customer protection. The Commission requested comment on available metrics to quantify these benefits and any other benefits a commenter may identify. Commenters were also requested to identify sources of empirical data that could be used for the proposed metrics. The Commission did not receive any comments in response to these requests. (II). Baseline and Incremental Economic Effects The current baseline for the amendment to paragraph (e) of Rule 15c3–3 is the existing customer protection requirements under Rule 15c3–3 and interpretations of the rule. Under paragraph (e) of Rule 15c3–3, broker-dealers are currently required to deposit cash or qualified securities into the customer reserve account, which must be maintained at a ‘‘bank.’’ Under current interpretations, broker-dealers are limited in their reserve account cash deposits at parent or affiliated banks to 50% of the broker-dealer’s excess net capital or 10% of the bank’s equity capital.665 Current interpretations also place similar restrictions on certain types of products at unaffiliated banks, including restrictions on concentration in money market deposit accounts and time deposits.666 As compared to the baseline, the Commission estimates that the incremental costs resulting from this amendment will be limited. Using 664 See Amendment to the Financial Responsibility Rules for Broker-Dealers, 72 FR at 12880. 665 FINRA Interpretation 15c3–3(e)(3)/051. 666 See FINRA Interpretation 15c3–3(e)(1)/01 and /011. E:\FR\FM\21AUR2.SGM 21AUR2 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 162 / Wednesday, August 21, 2013 / Rules and Regulations emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with RULES2 FOCUS Report data, as of December 31, 2011, the Commission estimates that approximately 224 broker-dealers report reserve deposits.667 A considerable proportion of these broker-dealers, including some of the largest firms, meet their deposit requirements using mostly qualified securities as opposed to cash and, therefore, will be marginally impacted by this amendment. For example, based on FOCUS Report data, as of December 31, 2011, for the 224 broker-dealers with reserve deposits, 79% of the total customer reserve requirement was met using qualified securities that could still be deposited at affiliated banks to meet customer reserve requirements, under the rule, as adopted. The remaining customer reserve requirement could be met by using qualified securities (as opposed to cash) and/or opening one or more accounts at unaffiliated banks, which would hold the cash within the limits permitted under the rule. Relative to the current baseline, broker-dealers may incur two types of costs. The first type of cost relates to the costs of opening a new account at an unaffiliated bank for broker-dealers that currently hold cash in a reserve account at an affiliated bank. It is difficult to estimate the number of broker-dealers that hold cash reserve deposits at an affiliated bank because FOCUS Report data does not include the names of banks at which broker-dealers maintain their reserve accounts. Therefore, this data is not readily available to the Commission and commenters did not provide it. Based on an analysis of FOCUS Report data as of December 31, 2011, as well as available bank data,668 the Commission, however, estimates that there are approximately 50 brokerdealers 669 that have an affiliated bank and cash in their customer reserve accounts. The second type of cost relates to the costs of opening and maintaining multiple bank accounts if the cash deposit exceeds the 15% bank equity capital threshold as defined in the final rule, the likelihood of which the Commission expects to decrease because, with the relaxation of the bank equity capital threshold in the final rule, fewer broker-dealers will be required to 667 This estimate is based on FOCUS Report filings the 2011 year end. It is an update from the proposing release estimate of 216 broker-dealers. See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12881. 668 Data regarding a bank’s equity capital as of the 2011 year end is publicly available at https:// www2.fdic.gov/sdi/. 669 This estimate is based on a review of brokerdealers and affiliated banks based on legal names, as well as customer reserve account data, from FOCUS Report data. VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:54 Aug 20, 2013 Jkt 229001 open multiple accounts, relative to the current baseline. Broker-dealers, however, may replace these types of cost with the costs of converting cash into qualified securities to meet some or all of their reserve deposit requirements under Rule 15c3–3. Moreover, in an attempt to reduce search costs, the potential exists that broker-dealers will select one or a few large unaffiliated banks or create networks on the basis of reciprocity between broker-dealers and banks. This could result in a potential concentration of reserve cash deposits at a few banks. If as a result of such concentration, the carrying broker-dealer’s deposit constitutes a substantial portion of the bank’s total deposits, the risk increases that the bank may not have the liquidity to quickly return the deposit to the broker-dealer. Finally, the affiliated banks that are currently holding and using broker-dealer reserve cash deposits in the course of their business may incur funding costs, resulting from the possible transfer of cash deposits in the reserve account by broker-dealers to unaffiliated banks. These incremental funding costs to the affiliated banks may potentially be offset by the benefit of receiving cash deposits from unaffiliated broker-dealers. (III). Alternatives In adopting the final rule, the Commission considered several alternative approaches suggested by commenters. For example, commenters urged the Commission not to adopt the proposed prohibition on broker-dealers maintaining cash in reserve accounts at banks that are affiliates, stating that affiliated banks should be treated the same as unaffiliated banks because both groups are subject to the same financial regulation. One commenter noted that if a broker-dealer must move their reserve accounts to an unaffiliated bank this may require the broker-dealer to enter into new or additional banking relationships to comply with the amendment, which would increase the costs and administrative burdens of those reserve account funds.670 Several commenters suggested that the Commission allow cash reserve deposits without percentage restrictions at unaffiliated banks that are wellcapitalized or for which a broker-dealer has performed due diligence.671 One of these commenters cited a U.K. regulation that requires a firm selecting a bank to hold customer deposits to 670 See Raymond James 2 Letter. 671 See Raymond James Letter; JP Morgan Letter; The Clearing House Letter; ABASA Letter; PNC Letter; Deutsche Bank Securities Letter; E*Trade Letter; JP Morgan 2 Letter. PO 00000 Frm 00053 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 51875 undertake due diligence on the bank taking into consideration a number of factors including: (1) The capital of the bank; (2) the amount of client money placed, as a proportion of the bank’s capital and deposits; (3) the credit rating of the bank (if available); and (4) to the extent the information is available, the level of risk in the investment and loan activities undertaken by the bank and its affiliated companies.672 One commenter suggested that the Commission consider higher percentages for cash deposits at large money-center banks.673 This commenter also stated that the percentage thresholds would negatively impact small broker-dealers because they would cross the 50% of excess net capital threshold at lower deposit levels.674 Another commenter suggested that the Commission reconsider the proposed limitation on the amount of reserve account cash deposits that may be held at any one bank because the limitation would result in significant costs for broker-dealers and could potentially adversely impact the customers of broker-dealers.675 In the final rule, the language excluding customer and PAB reserve cash deposits at affiliated banks from counting towards a broker-dealer’s reserve requirement is being adopted as proposed. As discussed further below, relative to the proposed rule, in the final rule, the Commission eliminated the proposed language that would have excluded the amount of the deposit at an unaffiliated bank that exceeded 50% of a broker-dealer’s excess net capital and based on the Commission’s expert judgment, increased the bank equity capital threshold from 10% to 15%.676 In response to comments on the proposed rule (including comments suggesting a due diligence standard instead of an objective threshold), the Commission modified the final rule text in ways that are designed to substantially mitigate the costs identified by commenters. While the final rule amendment excludes the amount of any cash on deposit at an affiliated bank from being used to meet a broker-dealer’s reserve requirement, the Commission eliminated the provision that would have excluded the amount of a deposit that exceeds 50% of a broker-dealer’s excess net capital. This provision would have impacted small and mid-size broker-dealers when 672 See JP Morgan Letter. SIFMA 2 Letter; see also NIBA Letter. 674 See SIFMA 2 Letter. 675 See Raymond James 2 Letter. 676 See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12864. 673 See E:\FR\FM\21AUR2.SGM 21AUR2 emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with RULES2 51876 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 162 / Wednesday, August 21, 2013 / Rules and Regulations they deposited cash into large commercial banks since the cash deposits of these firms would exceed the broker-dealer excess net capital threshold before exceeding the bank equity capital threshold. The elimination of the broker-dealer excess net capital threshold, combined with the increase of the bank equity capital threshold from 10% to 15%, is intended to substantially mitigate the costs, burdens and inefficiencies that commenters believed would be imposed on small and mid-size broker-dealers if such firms had to open multiple bank accounts as a result of the proposed rule. The rule, as adopted, will allow small and mid-size broker-dealers to maintain reserve accounts at one bank if they so choose, provided that the bank equity capital threshold is not exceeded. In contrast to the proposed thresholds, the final rule amendments should reduce the costs associated with implementing the necessary changes to systems, operations, and contractual agreements related to a broker-dealer’s reserve bank accounts. Further, in response to comments, increasing the threshold from 10% to 15% of the bank’s equity capital is intended to address concerns raised by large broker-dealers with large deposit requirements that the 10% threshold would have resulted in increased costs of having to spread out deposits over a number of banks. The decrease in the cost of opening and maintaining multiple accounts resulting from the increased threshold to 15% of the bank’s equity capital may counterbalance the increase in the cost of transferring cash deposits to an unaffiliated bank. In summary, the rule, as adopted, with an increase to a 15% threshold will, in the Commission’s expert judgment, substantially mitigate the cost concerns raised by commenters, while still providing adequate customer protection consistent with the goal of the rule to promote the broker-dealer’s ability to have quick access to the deposit. With respect to qualified securities, one commenter argued that if a brokerdealer elects to use qualified securities as opposed to cash to meet its reserve requirement, the broker-dealer will likely have a significant amount of additional operational and transactional costs.677 In addition, this commenter 677 See JP Morgan Letter. The commenter noted that ‘‘[c]ertain broker-dealers may be required to hire additional staff to manage and maintain a securities portfolio.’’ Id. ‘‘Managing a pool of qualified securities involves a myriad of tasks such as monitoring income collection, redemption processing, marking the securities to market, collateral substitutions and collateral segregation VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:54 Aug 20, 2013 Jkt 229001 In the proposing release, in quantifying costs, the Commission estimated that, of the 216 firms with reserve deposit requirements, only 11 broker-dealers would need to open new bank accounts or substitute cash for qualified securities in an existing reserve account,680 and that this would result in an estimated total one-time cost of approximately $2,630 per brokerdealer 681 and approximately $28,930 in the aggregate.682 As noted above, the Commission requested comment on the proposed cost estimates. Commenters were asked to identify the metrics and sources of any empirical data that support their cost estimates. The Commission received seven comment letters in response to the proposed cost estimates.683 One commenter stated that the estimate is inaccurate and arbitrary, and does not take into account situations where a broker-dealer will need to establish numerous banking relationships.684 Commenters also stated that the Commission failed to consider the ongoing costs of maintaining and monitoring multiple bank accounts.685 One commenter believes that limiting Rule 15c3–3 deposits at a single bank to 50% of a broker-dealer’s excess net capital will require a significant number of brokerdealers to open a number of additional cash and/or securities accounts and devote ongoing operational resources to the management of such accounts.686 This commenter stated that at any one time, approximately 10% to 15% of broker-dealer customers could be impacted by the proposed rule change and many of those customers would be required to open accounts at multiple institutions.687 Commenters also stated that the proposed amendments would impose requirements whose costs are not adequately justified by their benefits and that the Commission substantially underestimated the costs.688 One commenter noted that there are significant costs associated with implementing the necessary changes to systems, operations, and contractual agreements that the Commission did not appear to take into account.689 Another commenter stated that the proposal also fails to quantify the inherent inefficiency of forcing broker-dealers to set up numerous bank accounts to satisfy the restrictive broker-dealer net capital and bank equity capital requirements.690 Another commenter suggested that the Commission consider higher percentage limits for cash deposits held at very large money center banks, stating that a higher percentage limit would strike a better balance between the Commission’s concerns regarding the safety of cash deposits and the substantial costs imposed on brokerdealers by overly restrictive deposit limitations.691 Two commenters amongst other tasks.’’ Id. The commenter did not quantify the costs of managing a pool of qualified securities or the costs of additional staff to manage the securities portfolio. 678 Id. 679 See JP Morgan Letter. 680 The Commission estimated in the proposing release that it would take approximately 10 hours to implement these changes. See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12881. 681 Id. 682 11 broker-dealers × $2,630 = $28,930. Id. at 12881. 683 See Curian Clearing Letter; SIFMA 2 Letter; Clearing House Letter; ABASA Letter; Deutsche Bank Letter; E*Trade Letter; P Morgan Letter. 684 See Curian Clearing Letter. 685 See Curian Clearing Letter; SIFMA 2 Letter; ABASA Letter; The Clearing House Letter; E*Trade Letter; JP Morgan Letter. 686 See JP Morgan Letter. 687 Id. 688 See SIFMA 2 Letter; ABASA Letter. 689 See SIFMA 2 Letter. 690 See ABASA Letter. 691 See SIFMA 2 Letter. stated that while large broker-dealers may be able to reallocate existing trading desk, operational, regulatory reporting, and treasury functions to assist in ongoing maintenance activities, small and mid-sized broker-dealers may be required to hire additional staff to manage and maintain a securities portfolio.678 In response to the commenter, many large broker-dealers already hold large amounts of their reserve deposits in qualified securities. As the commenter noted, if a large broker-dealer needed to shift more of its reserve deposits into qualified securities as opposed to cash, then these firms would most likely reallocate existing functions to assist in ongoing maintenance activities, thus offsetting any costs associated with the shift of reserve deposits into qualified securities. Finally, with the elimination of the 50% excess net capital threshold in the rule as amended, most small and mid-sized firms likely would not have ongoing costs, because under the final rules, all firms will now only have to comply with the bank equity capital threshold, which as confirmed by comments, would be of concern primarily for the large firms. Therefore, under the final rule, broker-dealers should not incur significant operational or transactional costs in complying with the amendment.679 (IV). Compliance Cost Estimates PO 00000 Frm 00054 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 E:\FR\FM\21AUR2.SGM 21AUR2 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 162 / Wednesday, August 21, 2013 / Rules and Regulations believed that the upfront and ongoing cost to each broker-dealer is far higher than the one-time estimate of $2,630 that the Commission estimated in the proposing release.692 One commenter stated that conducting due diligence and opening new accounts and the ongoing monitoring and periodic reevaluation of such additional accounts would require much more time than the 10 hours originally estimated by the Commission.693 One commenter, referencing the SIFMA 2 Letter, stated that it agreed with SIFMA that the Commission significantly underestimated the cost of the proposal to smaller firms.694 Finally, commenters did not provide the Commission with revised cost estimates or data related to these amendments. In quantifying costs, the Commission is increasing its estimate of the number of broker-dealers that will likely incur the cost of opening a new account at an unaffiliated bank (or substituting cash for qualified securities in their reserve accounts) from the estimated 11 brokerdealers in the proposing release to 50 broker-dealers, as described above.695 In addition, in response to the commenter’s concern that conducting due diligence and opening new accounts would require much more time than the 10 hours originally estimated by the Commission,696 the Commission also is increasing the one-time hour estimates discussed in the proposing release from 10 to 25 hours.697 In response to the commenters pointing that the amendments would require ongoing monitoring of bank equity capital levels,698 the Commission is including an annual cost estimate in this release (in addition to the estimated one-time costs) to account for incremental ongoing costs to monitor compliance with the rule.699 The 692 See JP Morgan Letter; E*Trade Letter. SIFMA 2 Letter. 694 See NIBA Letter. 695 The Commission estimates that the responsibility for the one-time opening a new reserve bank account or substituting qualified securities for cash in an existing account likely would be undertaken by a Senior Treasury/Cash Management Manager at $197 per hour. See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12881. 696 See SIFMA 2 Letter. 697 See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12881. The Commission estimates that the Senior Treasury/Cash Management Manager will spend approximately 25 hours performing these changes on a one-time basis. 698 See SIFMA 2 Letter. 699 The Commission estimates that the responsibility for the annual compliance review of these rule amendments likely would be split between a Senior Treasury/Cash Management Manager at $197 per hour and a Compliance Attorney at $310 per hour, and will likely take 50 hours per year. emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with RULES2 693 See VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:54 Aug 20, 2013 Jkt 229001 Commission further estimates that the average cost per firm to make these changes will be approximately $4,925 on a one-time basis and $12,675 on an annual basis.700 For these reasons, the Commission estimates that the total cost to broker-dealers will be approximately $246,250 on a one-time basis and $633,750 on an annual basis.701 Finally, using FOCUS Report data and top decile bank equity capital data at year end 2011,702 the Commission estimates that approximately 30 brokerdealers are no longer required to sustain the cost of maintaining multiple bank accounts, as a result of removing the 50% excess net capital threshold and increasing the bank equity capital threshold to 15%. This change to the final rule may result in potential cost savings to broker-dealers, which may have been required to maintain multiple bank accounts under the rule, as proposed. c. Allocation of Customers’ Fully Paid and Excess Margin Securities to Short Positions The amendment to paragraph (d)(4) of Rule 15c3–3 requires broker-dealers to take prompt steps to obtain possession or control over fully paid and excess margin securities on the broker-dealer’s books or records that allocate to a short position of the broker-dealer or a short position for another person, excluding positions covered by paragraph (m) of Rule 15c3–3, for more than 30 calendar days.703 This amendment protects broker-dealer customers by helping to ensure that customer securities are available to be returned in the event of a broker-dealer failure. Therefore, in addition to broker-dealer customers, the amendment benefits the SIPC fund to the extent that it mitigates potential outlays from the fund to make advances to customers of a failed broker-dealer that cannot return all customer securities. The Commission requested comment on available metrics to quantify these benefits and any other benefits a commenter may identify. In particular, the Commission requested comment on whether there would be additional costs to broker-dealers as a consequence of these proposals and whether these proposals would impose costs on other market participants, including brokerdealer customers. The Commission also requested that commenters identify sources of empirical data that could be 700 $197 per hour × 25 hours = $4,925; ($197 per hour × 25 hours) + ($310 × 25 hours) = $12,675. 701 50 broker-dealers × $4,925 = $246,250; 50 broker-dealers × $12,675 = $633,750. 702 See https://cdr.ffiec.gov/public/. 703 17 CFR 240.15c3–3(d)(4). PO 00000 Frm 00055 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 51877 used for the metrics they proposed. The Commission received one comment in response to these requests.704 The commenter stated that the proposed amendments would ‘‘greatly increase the cost of proprietary and customer short positions that were established and maintained in accordance with all applicable short sale regulations at the time entered.’’ 705 However, this commenter did not quantify its cost estimates in terms of dollars, nor did it provide data to support its conclusion. In response to this comment, modifications were made to the final rule that should mitigate the commenter’s concern because the changes were designed to reduce operational burdens and to more closely align the final rule with current regulations related to short sales. More specifically, as discussed in section II.A.4., as adopted, final paragraph (d)(4) of Rule 15c3–3 contains a uniform 30 calendar day period and clarifies that the 30 calendar day period with respect to a syndicate short position established in connection with an offering does not begin to run until the underwriter’s participation in the distribution is complete as determined pursuant to Rule 100(b) of Regulation M. In addition, the proposed amendment was designed to require that the aging process commence at the time a deficit in securities allocating to a short position arises. These modifications clarify the rule amendment, while continuing to strengthen customer protections under Rule 15c3–3. Three commenters argued that the credit item added to the reserve formula computation when a customer’s fully paid or excess margin securities are allocated to a short position provides the customer with adequate protection.706 The Commission considered this alternative, as well as the cost concerns raised above, in adopting these final rule amendments. It has been a long-standing industry practice for carrying broker-dealers to use securities of PAB account holders in their business activities. In contrast, as stated above in section II.A.4. of this release, customers under Rule 15c3–3, which include the carrying brokerdealer’s retail customers, have an expectation that the fully paid and excess margin securities reflected on their account statements are, in fact, in the possession or control of the carrying broker-dealer. However, as described above, this expectation may be 704 See Raymond James 2 Letter. 705 Id. 706 See First Clearing Letter; Deutsche Bank Securities Letter; Citigroup Letter. E:\FR\FM\21AUR2.SGM 21AUR2 51878 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 162 / Wednesday, August 21, 2013 / Rules and Regulations frustrated where the securities are allocated to a short position carried by the broker-dealer, as the securities are not in the possession or control of the carrying broker-dealer. This gap in the existing rule, in effect, permits the broker-dealer to partially monetize the Rule 15c3–3 customer’s securities. Also, under some circumstances (e.g., a change in the market value of the securities), the amount the broker-dealer may have on deposit in the reserve account as a consequence of the credit item may be less than the value of the securities. Consequently, if the brokerdealer fails, sufficient funds may not be readily available to purchase the securities to return them to customers. The use of customer securities in this manner is contrary to the customer protection goals of Rule 15c3–3 and the expectations of a broker-dealer’s customers.707 Therefore, the Commission believes that any increased costs related to this final rule amendment are justified by the enhancements to the customer protection goals of Rule 15c3–3. For these reasons, and those discussed throughout this release, the Commission is adopting the amendment. The Commission estimates this requirement will result in a one-time cost to firms that carry customer securities to update systems for complying with the possession or control requirements in Rule 15c3–3. Based on FOCUS Report data, as of December 31, 2011, the Commission estimates that approximately 287 broker-dealers carry customer accounts.708 The Commission further estimates these firms will spend, on average, approximately 40 hours of employee resources per firm updating their systems to implement changes that will be necessitated by the amendment.709 Therefore, the Commission estimates that the average cost per firm to make these changes will be approximately $11,280.710 The Commission estimates that the total onetime cost to broker-dealers will be approximately $3,237,360.711 In addition to systems costs, brokerdealers may incur other costs to comply emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with RULES2 707 See section II.A.1. of this release. 708 This is an update of the proposing release estimate of 350 broker-dealers. See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12881. 709 For the purposes of this cost analysis, the Commission estimates that this work will be undertaken by a Senior Programmer at $282 per hour. 710 $282 per hour × 40 hours = $11,280. 711 287 broker-dealers × $11,280 = $3,237,360. In the proposing release, the Commission estimated that the total one-time cost to broker-dealers would be $3,752,000. See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12881. VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:54 Aug 20, 2013 Jkt 229001 with the rule amendment because they may be required to change their existing practices. For example, the amendment could result in some broker-dealers borrowing securities to cover proprietary short positions rather than using customer securities, resulting in increased borrowing costs. However, under the current baseline, when broker-dealers use customer securities to cover short positions they are required to add a credit item in the Rule 15c3–3 reserve formula equal to the value of the securities. This credit item can result in higher reserve deposit requirements, which must be made using the broker-dealer’s own capital. Thus, in response to commenters concerns regarding the costs of this amendments,712 the increased costs associated with having to borrow securities to cover a short position likely will be offset by decreased costs associated with devoting capital to customer reserve requirements. d. Importation of Rule 15c3–2 Requirements Into Rule 15c3–3 Today’s amendment to Rules 15c3–2 and 15c3–3 imports requirements in Rule 15c3–2 713 to Rule 15c3–3 and eliminates Rule 15c3–2 as a separate rule in the Code of Federal Regulations.714 Rule 15c3–2 requires a broker-dealer holding free credit balances to provide its customers (defined as any person other than a broker-dealer) at least once every three months with a statement of the amount due the customer and a notice that the funds are not being segregated, but rather are being used in the brokerdealer’s business and that the funds are payable on demand. The Commission believes it is appropriate to eliminate Rule 15c3–2 because it is largely irrelevant in light of the requirements of Rule 15c3–3 (which was adopted after Rule 15c3–2). This amendment will benefit brokerdealers by streamlining and consolidating relevant provisions of Rule 15c3–2 into Rule 15c3–3, promoting efficiency in the rulemaking process while not modifying the legal requirements. These provisions include the requirements that broker-dealers inform customers of the amounts due to them and that such amounts are payable on demand, which have been moved to new paragraph (j)(1) of Rule 15c3–3.715 712 See First Clearing Letter; Deutsche Bank Securities Letter; Citigroup Letter. 713 17 CFR 240.15c3–2. 714 See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12867. 715 The provisions in Rule 15c3–2 that are being re-codified in Rule 15c3–3, include the requirements that broker-dealers inform customers PO 00000 Frm 00056 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 Finally, the definition of customer for purposes of the imported Rule 15c3–2 requirements will be the definition of customer in Rule 15c3–3,716 which is somewhat narrower than the definition in Rule 15c3–2. The application of the narrower definition of customer in Rule 15c3–3 should not increase related costs. Alternatively, it may result in decreased costs because the narrowing of the rule’s scope may reduce the compliance burden on broker-dealers. The Commission considered reasonable alternatives with regard to the proposed deletion of Rule 15c3–2 and the importation of certain requirements into paragraph (j)(1) of Rule 15c3–3. Not adopting the rule amendment and thus leaving Rule 15c3–2 in the Code of Federal Regulations was a considered alternative. The Commission, however, believes consolidating the relevant provisions in Rule 15c3–3 is a more appropriate alternative because it promotes efficiency in the rulemaking process, and streamlines the Commission’s customer protection rules. The amendments—because they only re-codify provisions of Rule 15c3–2 into Rule 15c3–3 717—should not be a new source of costs as compared to the baseline because these provisions are continuations of existing requirements. However, the re-codification and placement of these provisions into Rule 15c3–3 may cause broker-dealers to review and update their existing procedures from time-to-time and, therefore, could result in incremental costs.718 e. Treatment of Free Credit Balances (I). Summary of Amendments Today, the Commission is adopting the amendment to add new paragraph (j)(2) to Rule 15c3–3 that prohibits a broker-dealer from converting, investing, or transferring to another account or institution, free credit balances held in a customer’s account except as provided in paragraphs (j)(2)(i) and (ii) of the rule. As adopted, the amendment defines a Sweep Program as of the amounts due to them and that such amounts be payable on demand. In addition, Rule 15c3–2 contains an exemption for broker-dealers that are also banking institutions supervised by a Federal authority. This exemption will not be imported into Rule 15c3–3 because there are no broker-dealers that fit within this exemption. 716 17 CFR 240.15c3–3(a)(1). 717 See paragraph (j)(1) of Rule 15c3–3. 718 Based on the estimated hour burdens in section IV.D.5. of this release, there could be onetime internal costs of $1,464,750 and annual internal costs of $585,900, if the review and update is performed by a Compliance Attorney at $310 per hour. E:\FR\FM\21AUR2.SGM 21AUR2 emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with RULES2 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 162 / Wednesday, August 21, 2013 / Rules and Regulations ‘‘a service provided by a broker or dealer where it offers to its customer the option to automatically transfer free credit balances in the securities account of the customer to either a money market mutual fund product as described in § 270.2a–7 of this chapter or an account at a bank whose deposits are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.’’ 719 With regard to the treatment of free credit balances outside the context of a Sweep Program, paragraph (j)(2)(i) of Rule 15c3–3 permits a broker-dealer to invest or transfer to another account or institution free credit balances held in a customer’s account only upon a specific order, authorization, or draft from the customer, and only in the manner, and under the terms and conditions, specified in the order, authorization, or draft.720 Two commenters suggested that the proposal should be clarified to permit a broker-dealer to obtain a onetime consent to ongoing transfers of any free credit balances to a customer to another account, entity or product (outside of a Sweep Program). As discussed above, this scenario was covered by the proposed rule and is being adopted under paragraph (j)(2)(i) of Rule 15c3–3. With regard to the treatment of free credit balances in the context of a Sweep Program, new paragraph (j)(2)(ii) of Rule 15c3–3 requires broker-dealers to meet conditions that vary depending on the date when a customer’s account was opened. For accounts opened on or after the effective date of the rule, a broker-dealer must meet the conditions of (j)(2)(ii)(A) and (B) of the rule. For any account, the broker-dealer must meet the conditions in paragraphs (j)(2)(ii)(B) of the rule. Under paragraph (j)(2)(ii)(A), for accounts opened on or after the effective date of the rule, the amendment to Rule 15c3–3 requires a broker-dealer to obtain the written affirmative consent of a new customer to have free credit balances in the customer’s securities account included in the Sweep Program. Under paragraph (j)(2)(ii)(B), a broker-dealer must comply with the remaining three conditions for any account: (1) Providing the customer with the disclosures and notices regarding the Sweep Program required by each SRO of which the broker-dealer is a member; (2) providing notice to the customer, as part of the customer’s quarterly statement of account, that the balance in the bank deposit account or shares of the money market mutual funds in which the customer has a 719 See paragraph (a)(17) of Rule 15c3–3. Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12866. 720 See VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:54 Aug 20, 2013 Jkt 229001 beneficial interest can be liquidated on the customer’s order and the proceeds returned to the securities account or remitted to the customer; and (3) providing the customer written notice at least 30 calendar days before the brokerdealer makes certain changes to the Sweep Program and describes the options available to the customer if the customer does not accept the new terms and conditions or product.721 Free credit balances constitute money that a broker-dealer owes its customers. Customers may maintain these balances at the broker-dealer in anticipation of future stock purchases. Under current practices, customer account agreements set forth how the broker-dealer will invest these balances. For example, the broker-dealer may sweep them into a money market fund or, alternatively, pay an amount of interest on the funds. On occasion, broker-dealers may change the product to which a customer’s free credit balances are swept—most frequently from a money market fund to an interest bearing bank account. Because of differences in these two types of products, there may be investment consequences when changing from one to the other.722 New paragraph (j)(2) to Rule 15c3–3 should serve to enhance customer protection by prohibiting a brokerdealer from transforming the credit risk faced by a customer through transfer of the broker-dealer’s obligation to another entity without the required notice to, or approval from, the customer. (II). Baseline and Incremental Economic Effects In the absence of new paragraph (j)(2) of Rule 15c3–3, current practices represent the existing baseline. As compared to the baseline, new paragraph (j)(2) to Rule 15c3–3 will enhance customer protection by requiring broker-dealers to obtain the written affirmative consent of a new customer before including a customer’s free credit balances in a Sweep Program, as well as to provide certain disclosures and notices to all customers with regard to the broker-dealer’s Sweep Program. The Commission requested comment on available metrics to quantify these benefits and any other benefits a commenter may identify. The Commission did not receive any comments in response to this request. 721 See new paragraph (j)(ii)(B)(1)–(3) of Rule 15c3–3, as adopted. 722 Differences include the type of protection afforded the customer in the event of an insolvency, and the amount of interest or dividends earned on the product. See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12866. PO 00000 Frm 00057 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 51879 Relative to the baseline, brokerdealers carrying free credit balances will incur incremental one-time and periodic costs (e.g., systems changes, outside counsel, and notification costs) to comply with new paragraph (j)(2) of Rule 15c3–3. The Commission requested comment on whether there would be additional costs to brokerdealers as a consequence of the proposals. The Commission also requested comment on whether the proposals would impose costs on other market participants, including brokerdealer customers. Commenters were requested to identify sources of empirical data that could be used for the metrics they proposed. The Commission did not receive any comments in response to these requests. (III). Alternatives As stated above in section II.A.5.ii. of this release, the Commission is adopting new paragraph (j)(2) to Rule 15c3–3 with substantial modifications from the proposed rule in response to comments and to clarify certain portions of the rule. Commenters generally agreed with the fundamental principle embodied in the proposal—that customer free credit balances should not be transferred from an obligation of the broker-dealer to an obligation of another entity without the customer’s authorization.723 Other commenters supported the proposed disclosures but suggested additional disclosures be made to customers including clarification with respect to other protections available to the customer.724 Two commenters stated that the practice of sweep programs should be banned entirely or that the Commission should adopt a ‘‘harder stance’’ and require more than just disclosure.725 One commenter responded to the Commission’s request for comment as to the cost burdens that would result if the first condition (set forth in proposed paragraph (j)(2)(ii)(A)) to obtain a new customer’s prior agreement were to be applied to existing customers. The commenter stated that such costs would be substantial because broker-dealers would be required to amend their agreements with all 723 See SIFMA 2 Letter; First Clearing Letter; Pace Letter. 724 See SIPC Letter. 725 See Ellis Letter; Dworkin Letter. One commenter stated that broker-dealers profit from ‘‘excessive’’ fees charged to customers who opt out of the sweep programs. See Ellis Letter. The second commenter suggested that the broker-dealer’s ‘‘customer has been effectively denied the opportunity to opt out of bank account sweeps by [the broker-dealer] preventing him or her from utilizing any other vehicle to park his or her free credit balances . . . .’’ See Dworkin Letter. E:\FR\FM\21AUR2.SGM 21AUR2 51880 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 162 / Wednesday, August 21, 2013 / Rules and Regulations emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with RULES2 existing customers.726 One commenter stated that the amendments in the proposing release did not adequately address situations in which brokerdealers change customer account elections without first obtaining customer authorization.727 Commenters also raised concerns about limitations on the types of products broker-dealers can use for sweep arrangements.728 The Commission considered alternatives, including whether to adopt the amendments and, in adopting the final rule, the Commission modified the language in the final rule in response to commenters and to clarify its application. In response to comments that the Commission should ban sweep programs or adopt a ‘‘harder stance,’’ the Commission notes that sweep programs provide a mechanism for excess cash in a customer’s securities account to be held in a manner that allows the customer to earn interest on the funds but retain the flexibility to quickly access that cash to purchase securities or withdraw it.729 In effect, transferring this excess cash to a bank account or money market fund is an alternative to retaining a credit balance in the customer’s securities account. The final rule is intended to appropriately balance commenters’ concerns while providing broker-dealers with flexibility in the operation of sweep programs.730 In addition, in response to the comments that the Commission should not limit the types of products brokerdealers can use for sweep accounts to money market funds and bank deposit products,731 as discussed above in section II.A.5.ii. of this release, the Commission does not view sweep accounts as a mechanism for investing customers’ excess cash in longer term or more volatile assets without specific consent from customers. Therefore, the Commission believes that it is not appropriate to modify the final rule amendments to expand the permitted products for Sweep Programs. In response to commenters’ concern regarding cost burdens resulting from the application of the affirmative consent requirement to existing accounts, the final rule retains the proposed requirement to require a broker-dealer to obtain a customer’s prior affirmative consent for accounts 726 See SIFMA 2 Letter. Waddell Letter. 728 See SIFMA 2 Letter; First Clearing Letter; Raymond James 2 Letter. 729 See Ellis Letter; Dworkin Letter. 730 See Ellis Letter; Dworkin Letter; Waddell Letter. 731 See SIFMA 2 Letter; First Clearing Letter; Raymond James 2 Letter. 727 See VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:54 Aug 20, 2013 Jkt 229001 opened on or after the effective date of the rule before transferring the customer’s free credit balance to a product in the firm’s Sweep Program, and makes explicit that the consent must be in writing. This will provide new customers with the opportunity to evaluate the broker-dealer’s Sweep Program before consenting to the transfer of the customer’s free credit balances into such program. In the proposing release, the Commission requested comment as to the cost burdens that would result if the condition to obtain a new customer’s prior agreement were to be applied to existing customers. One commenter stated that such costs would be substantial because broker-dealers would be required to amend their agreements with existing customers. The Commission considered this alternative and agrees with the commenter that requiring a brokerdealer to amend its existing agreements with customers would be substantial. Therefore, to address the burden that would have been associated with having broker-dealers re-paper existing account documentation, the prior affirmative consent requirement will continue to apply only to accounts opened on or after the effective date of the rule. However, as discussed above in section II.A.5.ii. of this release, all customers will be provided written notice at least 30 days before a brokerdealer changes certain terms and conditions or products of its Sweep Program. This notice must also contain a description of the options available to the customer if the customer does not accept the new terms and conditions or product. This is intended to benefit new and existing customers by giving them sufficient opportunity to make an informed decision and evaluate the effects of changes in the terms and conditions or product of the sweep program and the options available. (IV). Compliance Cost Estimates Broker-dealers will incur one-time and periodic costs to implement the changes necessitated by the amendment. These changes include providing customers with the disclosures and notices (including the description of the options available if a customer does not accept the new terms or conditions or product) in order to have the flexibility to change the treatment of customers’ free credit balances. This would require that broker-dealers update their systems (including processes for generating customer account statements) to PO 00000 Frm 00058 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 incorporate the necessary changes.732 Additionally, broker-dealers may incur one-time costs of outside counsel in implementing these system changes, particularly with respect to the language in the disclosures and notices required by paragraph (j)(2) of the rule. The Commission further estimates that broker-dealers will incur costs to process an affirmative consent for new customers.733 Specifically, the Commission estimates that brokerdealers may incur aggregate one-time and annual costs of approximately $14.4 million 734 and $23.2 million,735 respectively related to the changes necessitated by these rule amendments.736 f. ‘‘Proprietary Accounts’’ Under the Commodity Exchange Act Some broker-dealers also are registered as futures commission merchants under the CEA. These firms carry both securities and commodities accounts for customers. The definition of free credit balances in paragraph (a)(8) of Rule 15c3–3 does not include funds carried in commodities accounts that are segregated in accordance with the requirements of the CEA.737 However, regulations promulgated under the CEA exclude proprietary accounts from the CEA’s segregation requirements.738 This exclusion from the segregation requirements under the CEA has raised a question as to whether a broker-dealer must treat payables to customers in proprietary commodities accounts as ‘‘free credit balances’’ when 732 The internal hours would likely be performed by a senior programmer. Therefore, the estimated internal costs for this hour burden would be calculated as follows: Senior Programmer at $282 per hours × 37,800 hours = $10,659,600. See section IV.D.6. of this release. 733 The internal hours would likely be performed by a compliance clerk. Therefore, the estimated internal costs for this hour burden would be calculated as follows: Compliance Clerk at $63 per hour × 368,311 hours = $23,203,593. See section IV.D.6. of this release. 734 See section IV.D.6. of this release. ($10,659,600 + $3,780,000 (outside counsel costs) = $14,439,600). 735 Id. ($23,203,593). 736 In the proposing release, the Commission estimated that broker-dealers would incur one-time costs of approximately $3.68 million ($2.68 million internal costs and $1.0 million for outside counsel) and annual costs of approximately $24.6 million. See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12882. 737 17 CFR 240.15c3–3(a)(8). 738 Rule 1.20 requires a futures commission merchant to segregate customer funds. See 17 CFR 1.20. Rule 1.3(k) defines the term customer for this purpose. See 17 CFR 1.3(k). The definition of customer excludes persons who own or hold a proprietary account as that term is defined in Rule 1.3(y). See 17 CFR 1.3(y). Generally, the definition of proprietary account refers to persons who have an ownership interest in the futures commission merchant. Id. E:\FR\FM\21AUR2.SGM 21AUR2 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 162 / Wednesday, August 21, 2013 / Rules and Regulations emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with RULES2 performing a customer reserve computation.739 For these reasons, the specific amendment to the definition of the term free credit balances in paragraph (a)(8) of Rule 15c3–3 clarifies that funds held in a commodities account meeting the definition of a proprietary account under CEA regulations are not to be included as free credit balances in the customer reserve formula. One commenter requested that the Commission clarify that the relevant definition of proprietary account for purposes of this amendment will be the definition contained in 17 CFR 1.3(y).740 The Commission considered this alternative suggested by the commenter. While Rule 1.3(y) under the CEA currently contains the relevant definition of proprietary account for the purpose of the amendment, the definition could be codified in a different rule in the future. Consequently, the Commission is adopting the final rule amendment to paragraph (a)(8) of Rule 15c3–3, as proposed. Thus, the final rule does not include specific references to a specific rule. Rather, the amendment to paragraph (a)(8) to Rule 15c3–3, as adopted, more generally refers to a ‘‘proprietary account as that term is defined in regulations under the Commodity Exchange Act.’’ In addition, one commenter stated that, due to the changes to the swap markets mandated by Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act, swap accounts (in addition to commodities accounts) are now subject to customer protection rules under the CEA. This commenter suggested that the Commission make it clear that funds in swap accounts also do not constitute free credit balances, whether those funds are required to be segregated by rules under the CEA (e.g., cleared swap accounts or uncleared swap accounts that have opted for segregation) or excepted from segregation under the CEA (e.g., cleared swaps proprietary accounts or uncleared swap accounts that have not opted for segregation). The commenter noted this treatment ‘‘would be consistent with the treatment of funds in commodities accounts and with the regulation of 739 See Part 241-Interpretive Releases Relating to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and General Rules and Regulations Thereunder, Exchange Act Release No. 9922 (Jan. 2, 1973), 38 FR 1737 (Jan. 18, 1973) (interpreting the credit balance used in Item 1 of the Rule 15c3–3a formula ‘‘to include the net balance due to customers in non-regulated commodities accounts reduced by any deposits of cash or securities with any clearing organization or clearing broker in connection with the open contracts in such accounts’’). 740 See SIFMA 2 Letter. VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:54 Aug 20, 2013 Jkt 229001 swap accounts under the CEA.’’ 741 The Commission agrees there may be additional accounts under the CEA, as amended by the Dodd-Frank Act that should explicitly be excluded from the definition of free credit balances under Rule 15c3–3. However, the amendments today are designed to clarify the specific question raised with respect to the treatment of funds in proprietary commodities accounts under the CEA and, consequently, the suggestions by this commenter are beyond the scope of this rulemaking. The Commission considered reasonable alternatives in adopting the final rule amendment. These alternatives included adopting the proposed rule, with modifications suggested by commenters described above, as well as leaving the current rule in place without the amendments. The Commission believes that the adoption of the final rule is the more appropriate approach at this time because the final rule amendment will benefit broker-dealers that are registered as futures commission merchants by eliminating any ambiguity with respect to such accounts and avoiding situations where they unnecessarily increase reserve amounts. The Commission does not anticipate that the amendments will result in any costs to broker-dealers and, as funds in certain commodities accounts are not protected under SIPA, will not expose the SIPC fund to increased liabilities. Because this amendment is intended to be a clarification of existing interpretations, broker-dealers are not expected to incur additional costs against the baseline of current Rule 15c3–3 and its existing interpretations. This clarification is designed to provide broker-dealers with more certainty as to the Commission’s stated legal requirements. ii. Consideration of Burden on Competition, and Promotion of Efficiency, Competition, and Capital Formation The amendments to the customer protection rule (Rule 15c3–3) regarding PAB accounts,742 cash deposits at special reserve bank accounts,743 allocation of short positions,744 the treatment of free credit balances,745 and the clarification of the treatment of proprietary accounts under the CEA are designed to protect and preserve customer property held at broker741 Id. 742 See section II.A.2. of this release. section II.A.3. of this release. 744 See section II.A.4. of this release. 745 See section II.A.5.ii. of this release. 743 See PO 00000 Frm 00059 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 51881 dealers.746 These protections are primarily intended to reduce the risks borne by investors. In particular, first, the final rule amendment on PAB accounts is intended to fill a gap in the definition of customer between Rule 15c3–3 and SIPA, reducing the risk that customers could face losses in the case of a liquidation of a carrying broker-dealer. The final rule codifies many of the provisions of the PAIB Letter. The Commission believes that it is prudent, and will provide greater regulatory clarity, to incorporate into Rule 15c3–3 specified provisions of the PAIB Letter. Further, the Commission understands that the relief in the PAIB Letter has been widely, if not universally, utilized by broker-dealers that carry customer accounts. Thus, the benefits associated with codifying specified provisions of the PAIB Letter will continue to provide SIPA customers with the protections currently provided by broker-dealers complying with the PAIB Letter. Setting forth these requirements in a Commission rule will benefit the securities markets by helping to diminish the risks and incidences of non-compliance. Second, the final rule amendments regarding the banks where reserve deposits may be held are intended to protect customers’ cash deposits by mitigating the risk that the funds in the customer reserve account will not be readily available to be withdrawn by the broker-dealer. Third, the final rule amendments regarding the allocation of customers’ fully paid and excess margin securities to a broker-dealer short position are designed to enhance the customer protection goals of Rule 15c3–3, which seek to ensure that broker-dealers do not use customer assets for proprietary activities. Fourth, the final rule amendments regarding the importation of Rule 15c3– 2 requirements into paragraph (j)(1) of Rule 15c3–3 and the elimination of Rule 15c3–2 streamline the regulatory requirements for broker-dealers. Also, the addition of new paragraph (j)(2) to Rule 15c3–3 is intended to protect a customer’s free credit balances from being swept to products or programs without the appropriate approval, notice or disclosure. Fifth, the final rule amendment establishing that the funds in certain commodities accounts need not be treated as free credit balances or other credit balances may enhance efficiency at the broker-dealers by freeing up cash that may have been required to be 746 See E:\FR\FM\21AUR2.SGM section II.A.6.i. of this release. 21AUR2 51882 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 162 / Wednesday, August 21, 2013 / Rules and Regulations deposited into a broker-dealer’s customer reserve account, and clarifying an ambiguity in Rule 15c3–3. By strengthening requirements designed to protect customer assets, these amendments will mitigate potential exposure to the SIPC fund that is used to make advances to customers whose securities or cash are unable to be returned by a failed broker-dealer. To the extent that the amendments to Rule 15c3–3 achieve this goal, investors might be more willing to transact business in securities with brokerdealers. The possible positive effects on investor participation in the securities markets may promote capital formation as investor assets are able to be allocated more efficiently across the opportunity set. As discussed above, the Commission recognizes that the amendments to Rule 15c3–3 adopted today may impose certain costs on broker-dealers that might place a burden on competition among broker-dealers. However, the Commission is of the opinion that these costs are justified by the significant benefits described in this economic analysis, as well as in the discussion of the rule amendments above. Amendments to Rule 15c3–3 should not place a burden on competition for noncarrying broker-dealers, which are generally small broker-dealers, because the amendments primarily affect brokerdealers that perform PAB and customer reserve computations, carry customer accounts, and carry free credit balances. In addition, for those carrying brokerdealers that already follow the PAIB Letter, any difference from the baseline with regard to cost burdens should be marginal. In sum, the costs of compliance resulting from the requirements in the amendments to Rule 15c3–3 should not impose a burden on competition not necessary or appropriate in furtherance of the purposes of the Exchange Act in light of the benefits discussed above. 2. Holding Futures Positions in a Securities Portfolio Margining Account emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with RULES2 i. Economic Analysis As discussed in section II.B. of this release, the Commission is adopting amendments to Rule 15c3–3 to accommodate futures positions in a securities account that is margined on a portfolio basis. The amendments revise the definition of free credit balances and other credit balances in paragraphs (a)(8) and (a)(9) of Rule 15c3–3, respectively, by expanding these definitions to include funds in a portfolio margin account relating to certain futures and futures options VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:54 Aug 20, 2013 Jkt 229001 positions. Consequently, as part of free credit balances and other credit balances, these funds will be included as a credit item on the credit side of the customer reserve formula. The Commission is also adopting, as proposed, an amendment to Rule 15c3– 3a Item 14 that permits a broker-dealer to include as a debit item, on the debit side of the customer reserve formula, the amount of customer margin required and on deposit at a derivatives clearing organization related to futures positions carried in a portfolio margin account. The amendments are designed to provide greater protection to customers with portfolio margin accounts, through the reserve requirements of Rule 15c3– 3 and SIPA, by requiring a broker-dealer to include all cash balances (including portfolio margin cash balances) of its customers’ securities accounts in the computation of the customer reserve. The customer reserve computation under Rule 15c3–3 is designed to ensure that the funds a broker-dealer owes to customers are available to be returned to customers in the event the broker-dealer fails. Subsequent to the Commission’s proposals, the Dodd-Frank Act amended the definitions of customer, customer property, and net equity in section 16 of SIPA to take into account futures and options on futures held in a portfolio margin account carried as a securities account pursuant to a Commissionapproved portfolio margining program.747 As a result, persons who hold futures positions in a portfolio margining account carried as a securities account are now entitled to SIPA protection. While the Dodd-Frank Act addressed the protection under SIPA of futures and futures options held in a securities portfolio margin account, the Commission’s amendments to Rule 15c3–3 and 15c3–3a will still serve an important purpose. In particular, they complement the Dodd-Frank SIPA amendments, and will provide additional protections to customers by requiring broker-dealers to treat these futures positions in accordance with the segregation requirements in Rules 15c3– 3 and 15c3–3a. Consequently, the Commission is adopting the amendments with modifications to address, in part, comments. As noted above, the requirements of Rule 15c3–3 and Rule 15c3–3a are designed to enable the prompt return of customer securities and cash in the event the broker-dealer falls into financial difficulty or becomes insolvent. The goal is to place a brokerdealer in a position where it is able to 747 See PO 00000 Public Law 111–203 § 983. Frm 00060 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 wind down in an orderly selfliquidation without the need for financial assistance from SIPC. The Commission received six comments on the proposed amendments.748 Three commenters generally supported the amendments.749 One commenter supported the development of rules for portfolio margining and the Commission’s effort to provide greater legal certainty regarding the SIPA treatment of futures positions in a portfolio margin account.750 This commenter, however, in a subsequent comment letter, stated that this amendment is no longer necessary in light of the Dodd-Frank Act amendments, and recommended that the Commission withdraw it.751 Another commenter stated that the Commission’s proposal is premature in that the inclusion of futures in a portfolio margin account, which is a securities account, would conflict with the segregation provisions under the CEA752 and that SIPC has not determined that protection should be extended to futures.753 Commenting in 2007 before the adoption of the DoddFrank Act, SIPC stated that the proposed rules seek to extend SIPC protection to all positions in the portfolio margin account, irrespective of whether the positions are securities under SIPA or are on deposit in connection with a securities transaction.754 The Commission agrees, in part, with the commenter who stated that the Dodd-Frank Act SIPA amendments make the Commission’s proposed amendments to Rules 15c3–3 and 15c3– 3a unnecessary.755 As noted above, the definitions of customer, customer property, and net equity in section 16 of SIPA were amended by the Dodd-Frank Act to take into account futures and options on futures held in a portfolio margin account carried as a securities account pursuant to a Commissionapproved portfolio margining program.756 Consequently, in a 748 See SIFMA 2 Letter; CME Letter; SIPC Letter; Citigroup Letter; American Bar Association Letter; SIFMA 4 Letter. 749 See SIFMA 2 Letter; Citigroup Letter; American Bar Association Letter. 750 See SIFMA 2 Letter. 751 See SIFMA 4 Letter. 752 See, e.g., 17 CFR 1.20–1.29. 753 See CME Letter; see also SIPC Letter (expressing ‘‘grave concerns’’ about potential conflict between the proposed amendments and SIPA). 754 See SIPC Letter. SIPC also urged the Commission to reconsider its adoption of the portfolio margin proposals, stating that if the changes are in order, the Commission should seek to have them made by legislative amendment and not rulemaking. 755 See SIFMA 4 Letter. 756 See Public Law 111–203 § 983. E:\FR\FM\21AUR2.SGM 21AUR2 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 162 / Wednesday, August 21, 2013 / Rules and Regulations emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with RULES2 proceeding under SIPA, futures and options on futures positions held in a portfolio margin account carried as a securities account would be included in determining a customer’s net equity claim.757 Therefore, the proposed amendment relating to the unrealized value of a futures option is not necessary to achieve the objective of providing SIPA protection for such positions. As a result, the Commission is modifying the final rule to delete the proposed language in paragraph (a)(8) of Rule 15c3–3 that would have treated the unrealized value of a futures option in a portfolio margin account on the filing date of a SIPA proceeding as a free credit balance for purposes of Rule 15c3–3.758 While the legislation provides additional certainty with respect to how futures in a portfolio margin account would be treated in a SIPA liquidation, the Commission’s amendments will require that positions are subject to the protections of Rule 15c3–3, thus enhancing customer protection. Therefore, while the Commission has considered the suggested alternatives in developing the final rule amendments (including not adopting the amendments), the Commission has determined that adopting the portfolio margining amendments was a more appropriate approach in furtherance of enhancing customer protection. The Commission requested comment on available metrics to quantify these benefits and any other benefits a commenter may identify, including the identification of sources of empirical data that could be used for such metrics. The Commission did not receive any comments in response to these requests. Current SRO portfolio margin rules permit futures to be held in a securities portfolio margin account.759 However, pending further regulatory action by the 757 Under the Dodd-Frank Act SIPA amendments, a customer’s net equity now includes all positions in futures contracts and options on futures contracts held in a portfolio margining account carried as a securities account pursuant to a portfolio margining program approved by the Commission, including all property collateralizing such positions, to the extent that such property is not otherwise included herein. See 15 U.S.C. 78lll(11)(A)(ii). Further, the amendments provided that a claim for a commodity futures contract received, acquired, or held in a portfolio margining account pursuant to a portfolio margining program approved by the Commission or a claim for a security futures contract, shall be deemed to be a claim with respect to such contract as of the filing date, and such claim shall be treated as a claim for cash. See 15 U.S.C. 78lll(11). 758 Specifically, the final rule does not include the proposed language: ‘‘, and, in the event the broker-dealer is the subject of a proceeding under SIPA, the market value as of the ‘‘filing date’’ as that term is defined in SIPA (15 U.S.C. 78lll(7)) of any long options on futures contracts.’’ 759 See, e.g., FINRA Rule 4210. VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:54 Aug 20, 2013 Jkt 229001 Commission and the CFTC, the ability to combine securities and futures products into a single portfolio margin account will be unavailable.760 Therefore, under the current baseline of SRO portfolio margin rules, with the inclusion of only securities positions in the securities account, this amendment would have no effect as compared to the baseline until the Commission and CFTC take such further action with respect to portfolio margining.761 The requirements imposed by the portfolio margin amendments will be elective. The requirements will apply only to broker-dealers choosing to offer their customers portfolio margin accounts. The Commission estimates that approximately 35 broker-dealers will elect to offer their customers portfolio margin accounts that will include futures and futures options.762 The amendment to the definition of free credit balances in Rule 15c3–3 will require broker-dealers to include in the reserve formula credit balances related to futures positions in a portfolio margin account. The amendment to Rule 15c3– 3a Item 14 in the reserve formula will enable broker-dealers to include as a debit item the amount of customer margin required and on deposit at a derivatives clearing organization. Accordingly, these amendments will require changes to the systems brokerdealers use to compute and account for their reserve requirements. Consistent with the proposing release,763 the Commission assumes that the responsibility for updating these systems will be undertaken by a Senior Programmer.764 Therefore, the 760 See Section 713 of the Dodd-Frank Act. Section 713 of the Dodd-Frank Act amends the Exchange Act and CEA to facilitate portfolio margining by allowing cash and securities to be held in a futures account and futures and options on futures and related collateral to be held in a securities account by a dually-registered brokerdealer and futures commission merchant pursuant to an approved portfolio margin program, subject to certain requirements, including regulatory action by the Commission and CFTC (pursuant to an exemption, or by rule or regulation). See generally, A Joint Report of the SEC and the CFTC on Harmonization of Regulation (Oct. 19, 2009). 761 See generally, A Joint Report of the SEC and the CFTC on Harmonization of Regulation (Oct. 19, 2009). 762 This estimate is based on OCUS Report data. This is an update from the estimate in the proposing release of 33 broker-dealers. See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12883. 763 See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12883. 764 The SIFMA 2012 Report as Modified indicates the average hourly cost of this position is approximately $282. Consistent with the proposing release, the Commission estimates the Senior Programmer will spend approximately 130 hours modifying software to conform it to the requirements of the amendments. See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12883. PO 00000 Frm 00061 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 51883 Commission estimates that the program and systems changes would result, on average, in a one-time cost of approximately $36,660 per brokerdealer.765 Thus, the Commission estimates the total one-time cost to broker-dealers will be approximately $1,283,100.766 The Commission requested comment on the proposed cost estimates. In particular, the Commission requested comment on additional costs to brokerdealers that would arise from the proposals, such as system costs in addition to those discussed above (e.g., costs associated with purchasing new software and updates to existing software). The Commission also requested comment on whether these proposals would impose costs on other market participants, including brokerdealer customers. Commenters were asked to identify the metrics and sources of any empirical data that supported their costs estimates. The Commission did not receive any comments in response to these requests. ii. Consideration of Burden on Competition, and Promotion of Efficiency, Competition, and Capital Formation The final rule amendments to Rule 15c3–3 to accommodate futures positions in a securities account margined on a portfolio basis 767 should complement the Congressional amendments and provide additional protections to portfolio margin customers through the strengthened reserve requirements of Rule 15c3–3. These additional protections may reduce the risk of loss of collateral to securities customers, promote participation in the securities markets, and enhance competition and price discovery. Moreover, these additional protections may make portfolio margining more attractive to investors. Portfolio margining may significantly reduce customer margin requirements by offsetting positions involving securities and futures products, which in turn reduces the costs of trading such products and enhances efficiency. Portfolio margining may also promote better price discovery across securities and futures products by allowing customers to offset a position assumed in one market with a product traded in 765 130 hours × $282 = $36,660. In the proposing release, the Commission estimated this cost would be $34,840. See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12883. 766 35 broker-dealers × $36,660 = $1,283,100. In the proposing release, the Commission estimated this cost would be $1,149,720. See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12883. 767 See section II.B. of this release. E:\FR\FM\21AUR2.SGM 21AUR2 51884 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 162 / Wednesday, August 21, 2013 / Rules and Regulations another market. The enhanced efficiencies as a result of increases in the use of portfolio margin accounts may facilitate capital formation through the availability of additional capital for customers as a result of reduced margin costs. While today’s amendments promote efficiency within the securities markets, the increased costs associated with the rule amendments may impose a burden on competition among broker-dealers. However, the Commission is of the opinion that these costs are justified by the significant benefits described in this economic analysis. In sum, the costs of compliance resulting from the requirements in the portfolio margining amendments to Rule 15c3–3 should not impose a burden on competition not necessary or appropriate in furtherance of the purposes of the Exchange Act in light of the benefits discussed above. 3. Amendments With Respect to Securities Lending and Borrowing and Repurchase/Reverse Repurchase Transactions emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with RULES2 i. Economic Analysis The Commission is adopting amendments to Rules 15c3–1 and 17a– 11 to strengthen the financial responsibility of broker-dealers engaging in a securities lending business. First, the amendment to subparagraph (c)(2)(iv)(B) of Rule 15c3–1 clarifies that broker-dealers providing securities lending and borrowing settlement services are deemed, for purposes of the rule, to be acting as principals and are subject to applicable capital deductions. Under the amendment, these deductions could be avoided if a broker-dealer takes certain steps to disclaim principal liability. Second, the amendment to paragraph (c)(5) of Rule 17a–11 requires a broker-dealer to: (1) File a notice with the Commission and its DEA whenever the total money payable against all securities loaned, subject to a reverse repurchase agreement or the contract value of all securities borrowed or subject to a repurchase agreement exceeds 2,500% of tentative net capital; or, alternatively, (2) report monthly its securities lending and repurchase activities to its DEA in a form acceptable to its DEA. Both amendments are intended to strengthen the financial responsibility of broker-dealers engaged in a securities lending or repurchase business. The first amendment to subparagraph (c)(2)(iv)(B) of Rule 15c3–1 will help eliminate the legal uncertainty among counterparties as to the role played by broker-dealers in such transactions and clarify the nature of the services that VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:54 Aug 20, 2013 Jkt 229001 securities lending intermediaries provide their counterparties. Thus, a broker-dealer will be considered a principal unless the broker-dealer has disclosed the identity of each party to the other, and the parties have agreed in writing that the obligations of the broker-dealer do not include a guarantee of performance by the other party and that in the event of default, neither party shall have the right of setoff against the obligations, if any, of the broker-dealer. In addition, this amendment will help avoid ambiguity regarding the applicability to a particular broker-dealer of the stock loan charges in the net capital rule. In response to comments that standard legal documents currently used in securities lending transactions provide sufficient legal certainty with respect to the status of the parties,768 the Commission considered whether to adopt the proposed approach or whether to rely on existing industry practice. The Commission considered the alternatives and believes that the rule as adopted appropriately balances the commenters’ objections to the proposal with the Commission’s concerns about stock lending practices, particularly with regard to the failure of MJK.769 In recognition of standard stock loan agreement templates, the Commission designed the amendment to accommodate the continued use of these industry model agreements by incorporating their use into the rule’s requirements. The second amendment to paragraph (c)(5) of Rule 17a–11 will help identify broker-dealers with highly leveraged non-government securities lending and borrowing and repo activity.770 This new provision requires that a brokerdealer notify the Commission whenever the total amount of money payable against all securities loaned or subject to a repurchase agreement, or the total contract value of all securities borrowed or subject to a reverse repurchase agreement exceeds 2,500% of tentative net capital; provided that, for purposes of this leverage threshold, transactions involving government securities, as defined in Section 3(a)(42) of the Exchange Act, are excluded from the calculation.771 The notice provision is designed to alert regulators to a sudden increase in a broker-dealer’s stock loan 768 See section II.C. of this release. See also SIFMA 2 Letter; Citigroup Letter. 769 See section II.C. of this release. 770 17 CFR 240.17a–11(c)(5). 771 15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(42). Government securities generally present less market risk than other types of securities used in securities lending and repo transactions. Consequently, they are excluded from the scope of this rule. PO 00000 Frm 00062 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 and repo positions, which could indicate that the broker-dealer is taking on new or additional risk that it may have limited experience or increased difficulty in managing. This amendment will assist securities regulators in monitoring such activities and responding to situations where a brokerdealer experiences financial difficulty due to a large securities lending or repo position. This may help prevent significant losses to the broker-dealer’s customers and other broker-dealers, and reduce systemic financial risk. As adopted, new paragraph (c)(5) of Rule 17a–11 also permits a brokerdealer to report monthly its stock loan and repo activity to its DEA in a form acceptable to its DEA in lieu of the notices required by paragraph (c)(5). This approach will provide each DEA with the flexibility to prescribe how the monthly reports are to be made and will accommodate a DEA that opts to use the FOCUS report as the reporting mechanism.772 This provision will also accommodate large broker-dealers that are active in this business and regularly maintain stock loan and repo balances that exceed the threshold. The Commission expects that these brokerdealers have experience in managing the risks associated with these types of transactions and have established controls to address those risks. Consequently, notice under Rule 17a–11 from these broker-dealers will not be as useful to regulators. On the other hand, the monthly reports will provide securities regulators with information useful, for example, to develop trend analysis, if deemed appropriate. This analysis can be used to identify leverage levels that are outside the normal trend range and that may be indicative of a material change in the firm’s business model (e.g., taking on higher levels of leverage, branching into new products, or experiencing operational or financial difficulties). The Commission requested comment on available metrics to quantify these benefits and any other benefits a commenter may identify. Commenters were requested to identify sources of empirical data that could be used for the metrics they propose. The Commission did not receive any comments in response to these requests. The Commission expects that brokerdealers may incur costs related to the implementation of the rule 772 As proposed, the amendment to Rule 17a–11 would have provided that a broker-dealer that submitted a monthly report of its stock loan and repo activity to its DEA not be required to file the Rule 17a–11 notices required by paragraph (c)(5). See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12870. E:\FR\FM\21AUR2.SGM 21AUR2 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 162 / Wednesday, August 21, 2013 / Rules and Regulations emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with RULES2 amendments. Using current Rule 15c3– 1 and Rule 17a–11 as a baseline, the Commission expects that some brokerdealers may incur costs in connection with the implementation of these rule amendments. With regard to the amendment to subparagraph (c)(2)(iv)(B) of Rule 15c3– 1, the Commission understands that most existing standard securities lending master agreements in use today already contain language requiring agent lenders to disclose principals and for principals to agree not to hold the agents liable for a counterparty default. Thus, the standard agreement used by the vast majority of broker-dealers should contain the representations and disclosures required by the proposed amendment. However, a small percentage of broker-dealers may need to modify their standard agreements. The Commission estimates that the total one-time cost to broker-dealers for this change will be approximately $45,480.773 The Commission requested comment on the cost estimates. In particular, the Commission requested comment on additional costs to broker-dealers that would arise from the proposals, such as costs arising from making systems changes. The Commission also requested comment on whether these proposals would impose costs on other market participants, including brokerdealer customers. Commenters were also asked to identify the metrics and sources of any empirical data that support their costs estimates. The Commission did not receive any comments in response to these requests. With regard to the amendment to Rule 17a–11, the Commission received several suggested alternatives from commenters which contributed to the modification of the final rule from the proposal. Three commenters addressed the proposed monthly notification requirement. They stated that the monthly report in lieu of the notification should be provided as part of the monthly FOCUS report many broker-dealers file with their DEA.774 The Commission agrees that the FOCUS report may be an appropriate mechanism for reporting stock loan and repo positions in lieu of the proposed 773 In the proposing release, the Commission estimated that the total one-time cost to brokerdealers would be approximately $62,604. See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12884. The internal hours would likely be performed by an in-house Attorney at $379 per hour, resulting in the estimated internal cost calculated as follows: 120 hours at $379 per hour = $45,480. See section IV.D.1. of this release. 774 See Abbey National Letter; Citigroup Letter; SIFMA 2 Letter. VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:54 Aug 20, 2013 Jkt 229001 monthly notification requirement.775 Consequently, the Commission modified the final rule amendment to delete the phrase ‘‘submits a monthly report of’’ and replace it with the phrase ‘‘reports monthly.’’ In addition, as adopted, in order to provide that the monthly report shall be sent to a brokerdealer’s DEA, the Commission added the phrase ‘‘to its designated examining authority in a form acceptable’’ before ‘‘to its designated examining authority.’’ This approach, as adopted, is intended to provide each DEA with the flexibility to tailor the reporting requirements. Based on FOCUS Report data, the Commission estimates that approximately one notice per year will be sent pursuant to this amendment.776 Therefore, approximately one brokerdealer per year will incur costs to prepare and send the notice.777 Consequently, the Commission estimates that the costs to broker-dealers associated with this requirement will be de minimis. In addition, the Commission estimates that six broker-dealers will choose the option of reporting monthly 778 and will incur a one-time cost to update their systems to generate the information for the report.779 The Commission also estimates that these broker-dealers will incur annual costs generating and filing the monthly reports or preparing the information to include in monthly FOCUS Reports (as applicable).780 Therefore, the Commission estimates that the total one-time cost and annual costs to broker-dealers will be 775 Carrying broker-dealers are generally required to submit FOCUS reports on a monthly basis. 776 This estimate is derived from FOCUS Report data, and adjusted based on staff experience. This estimate has been updated from the proposing release estimate of 11. No comments were received on this estimate. 777 The internal hours would likely be performed by junior stock loan manager for 10 minutes at $134 per hour × 1 notice = $22.33. See section IV.D.8. of this release. 778 This is an update from the proposing release estimate of 21 broker-dealers. See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12884. 779 The internal hours would likely be performed by a senior programmer. Therefore, the estimated internal costs for this hour burden would be calculated as follows: Senior Programmer for 100 hours at $282 per hour = $28,200. See section IV.D.8. of this release. This is an update from the proposing release estimate of $26,800. See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12884. 780 The internal hours would likely be performed by a junior stock loan manager. Therefore, the estimated internal costs for this hour burden would be calculated as follows: Junior Stock Loan Manager for 12 hours at $134 per hour = $1,608. See section IV.D.8. of this release. This is an update from the proposing release estimate of $2,496 per firm. See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12884. PO 00000 Frm 00063 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 51885 approximately $169,200 781 and $9,648 782 respectively. The Commission’s total one-time and annual cost estimates have decreased from the proposing release primarily due to an overall decrease in the number of broker-dealers. As noted above, the Commission requested comment on the proposed cost estimates. In particular, the Commission requested comment on additional costs to broker-dealers that would arise from the proposals. The Commission also requested comment on whether these proposals would impose costs on other market participants, including market participants active in the securities lending and repurchase markets. Commenters were asked to identify the metrics and sources of any empirical data that supported their cost estimates. The Commission did not receive any comments in response to these requests. ii. Consideration of Burden on Competition, and Promotion of Efficiency, Competition, and Capital Formation As described above, the amendment to subparagraph (c)(2)(iv)(B) of Rule 15c3–1 and new paragraph (c)(5) of Rule 17a–11 are designed to address two areas of concern that emerged from the Commission’s experience with the failure of MJK.783 First, broker-dealers with principal liability in a stock loan transaction may be deemed to be acting in an agency capacity and therefore not taking appropriate capital charges. Second, broker-dealers that historically have not been very active in stock loan activities may rapidly expand their balance sheets and increase leverage to a level that poses significant financial risk to the firm and counterparties. Either potential event could result in significant, adverse consequences for customers and counterparties of the broker-dealer. For the customers, the fact that the broker-dealer could avoid taking appropriate capital charges would imperil the broker-dealer’s ability to self-liquidate, thereby impeding the ability of customers to be promptly paid in full. For the counterparties, the fact that the broker-dealer could rapidly escalate its leverage increases the likelihood that the broker-dealer could fail and its counterparties could 781 6 firms × $28,200 = $169,200. This is an update from the proposing release estimate of $562,800. See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12884. 782 6 firms × $1,608 = $9,648. This is an update from the proposing release estimate of $52,416. See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12884. 783 See section II.C. of this release. E:\FR\FM\21AUR2.SGM 21AUR2 51886 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 162 / Wednesday, August 21, 2013 / Rules and Regulations experience, losses of value associated with the rapid unwinding of positions with the failing broker-dealer. Overall, the amendments to Rule 15c3–1 and Rule 17a–11 will help enhance the monitoring of securities lending or repurchase activities by securities regulators, thereby reducing the effect on customers and counterparties of the potential impact of a financial collapse of the brokerdealer.784 This will strengthen the securities markets and make them more attractive to investors, thereby enhancing efficiency and capital formation. Moreover, the language in the final rule that provides each DEA with the flexibility to prescribe how the monthly reports are to be made may enhance efficiencies for broker-dealers by providing the ability for a DEA to tailor the reporting requirements. Finally, the costs of compliance with the amendments to Rules 15c3–1 and 17a–11 should not impose a burden on competition not necessary or appropriate in the furtherance of the purposes of the Exchange Act in light of the benefits discussed above. emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with RULES2 4. Documentation of Risk Management Procedures i. Economic Analysis As discussed in section II.D. of this release, the Commission is adopting new paragraph (a)(23) to Rule 17a–3 to require certain broker-dealers to make and keep current a record documenting the credit, market, and liquidity risk management controls established and maintained by certain broker-dealers to assist them in analyzing and managing the risks associated with their business activities, including, for example, securities lending and repo transactions, OTC derivative transactions, proprietary trading, and margin lending.785 The amendment will apply only to brokerdealers that have more than $1,000,000 in aggregate credit items as computed under the customer reserve formula of Rule 15c3–3, or $20,000,000 in capital including debt subordinated in accordance with Appendix D to Rule 15c3–1. These amendments require large broker-dealers to document the controls they have implemented to address the risks they face as a result of their business activities. As proposed, the amendment would have required a broker-dealer to create a record documenting its ‘‘internal risk management controls,’’ rather than its market, credit, and liquidity risk controls. Commenters generally raised 786 See 784 Id. 785 17 concerns with the proposed amendment stating, for example, that the proposed documentation of internal management controls over risks arising from the broker-dealer’s business activities was overly broad and ambiguous.786 The Commission considered the proposed approach and, as discussed above, in part in response to comments, the Commission narrowed the application of the amendment so that the final rule now requires the documentation of internal risk management controls established to manage market, credit, and liquidity risk.787 The final rule benefits firms and their customers by mitigating the risk of losses associated with a firm’s normal activities, while at the same time placing an increased recordkeeping burden on broker-dealers by requiring them to document certain risks in writing. A well-documented system of internal controls designed to manage material risk exposures related to market, credit, and liquidity risk reflects the expectations of a firm’s management as to how its business activities should be conducted in light of such exposures. Written risk management procedures enable management to better identify, analyze, and manage the risks inherent in the firm’s business activities with a view to preventing material losses and to review whether the firm’s activities are being conducted in a manner that is consistent with such procedures and controls. This will likely benefit market participants and reduce systemic financial risk. In addition, by making the documented controls a required record under Rule 17a–3, a broker-dealer’s regulator likely will have better access to them, as this benefit will only be realized to the extent that a brokerdealer has existing market, credit, and liquidity risk management controls in place because the rule does not specify the type of controls a broker-dealer must establish to manage these risks. It simply requires documentation of the procedures that the broker-dealer has established. The final rule amendment will require any such records of the market, credit, and liquidity risk management controls to be available to the broker-dealer’s regulators so that they can review whether the brokerdealer is adhering to these controls. The Commission requested comment on available metrics to quantify these benefits and any other benefits a commenter may identify. Commenters were requested to identify sources of empirical data that could be used for the CFR 240.17a–3(a)(23). VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:54 Aug 20, 2013 787 See Jkt 229001 PO 00000 E*Trade Letter; Citigroup Letter. section II.D. of this release. Frm 00064 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 metrics they proposed. The Commission did not receive any comments in response to these requests. These amendments apply to a limited number of broker-dealers, namely, those firms with more than $1 million in customer credits or $20 million in capital and amend recordkeeping requirements in Rules 17a–3 and 17a–4. Therefore, against the existing baseline of these current rules, the Commission expects that the requirement will result in a one-time cost to some of these firms to the extent that they have established controls that have not been documented. However, since most firms are expected to be already compliant, the incremental costs are expected to be small. For example, broker-dealers that are approved to compute capital using internal models are already subject to Rule 15c3–4, which requires these firms to establish, document, and maintain a system of internal risk controls to assist them in managing the risks associated with its business activities, including market, credit, leverage, liquidity, legal, and operational risks.788 These firms would most likely incur no or minimal costs to comply with the final rule. In addition, this rule amendment does not mandate any specific control, procedure, or policy be established; rather, the Commission is requiring that a control, procedure, or policy be documented if it is in place. For these reasons, the Commission estimates that the one-time hourly burden to meet the requirements of these rules will range from zero hours for some firms to hundreds of hours for other firms. Taking this into account, the Commission estimates that the total onetime cost to broker-dealers to document controls in compliance with this amendment will be approximately $13,783,700.789 The Commission also estimates that the annual cost to brokerdealers to ensure compliance with the 788 17 CFR 240.15c3–4; 17 CFR 240.15c3– 1(a)(7)(iii). Based on staff experience monitoring broker-dealer risk management procedures, the internal hours would likely be coordinated by a broker-dealer’s in-house attorney (19,600 hours), working with operation specialists (24,500 hours), and overseen by an associate general counsel (4,900 hours). Therefore, the estimated internal costs for this hour burden would be calculated as follows: [(Attorney for 19,600 hours at $379 per hour) + (Operations Specialist for 24,500 hours at $126 per hour) + (Associate General Counsel for 4,900 hours at $467) = $12,803,700. Broker-dealers are also expected to incur one-time outside counsel costs of $980,000 for a total one-time cost of $13,783,700. See section IV.D.7. of this release. 789 See section IV.D.7. of this release. In the proposing release, the Commission estimated this cost would be approximately $14,201,990. See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12885. E:\FR\FM\21AUR2.SGM 21AUR2 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 162 / Wednesday, August 21, 2013 / Rules and Regulations amendment to Rule 17a–3 will be approximately $8,356,950.790 As noted above, the Commission requested comment on the proposed cost estimates. In particular, the Commission requested comment on additional costs to broker-dealers that would arise from the proposals, such as costs arising from making changes to systems and costs associated with maintaining these records. The Commission also requested comment on whether the proposals would impose costs on other market participants, including broker-dealer customers. Commenters were also asked to identify the metrics and sources of any empirical data that support their cost estimates. The Commission did not receive any comments in response to these requests. emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with RULES2 ii. Consideration of Burden on Competition, and Promotion of Efficiency, Competition, and Capital Formation The amendments to Rules 17a–3 and 17a–4 require firms to document their market, credit, and liquidity risk management controls. The amendments will help strengthen broker-dealer internal controls. Documenting internal controls will encourage enhanced consideration of, and thus a firmer grasp upon, the risks attendant to a brokerdealer’s business activities. This is designed to reduce the risks inherent to the business of operating as a brokerdealer. The final approach the Commission has taken with these rule amendments—encouraging effective internal controls while preserving flexibility—will enhance a brokerdealer’s financial soundness and, consequently, may help to reduce the likelihood of broker-dealer failures with possible positive effects on investor participation, competition, and capital formation. The amendments may also increase efficiencies in broker-dealer examinations through the ready availability of records for examiners. Finally, the Rule 17a–3 and 17a–4 amendments are not expected to place a burden on competition for small noncarrying broker-dealers because such firms would not be subject to these amendments.791 As discussed above, there will be some incremental costs to 790 The internal hours would likely be performed by a broker-dealer’s in-house attorney. Therefore, the estimated internal costs for this hour burden would be calculated as follows: Attorney at $379 per hour × 22,050 hours = $8,356,950. See section IV.D.7. of this release. 791 The amendments only apply to broker-dealers that have more than $1,000,000 in aggregate credit items as computed under the customer reserve formula of Rule 15c3–3, or $20,000,000 in capital including debt subordinated in accordance with Appendix D to Rule 15c3–1. VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:54 Aug 20, 2013 Jkt 229001 compliance related to these amendments for carrying broker-dealers but the costs of compliance should not impose a burden on competition not necessary or appropriate in furtherance of the purposes of the Exchange Act and in light of the benefits discussed above. 5. Amendments to the Net Capital Rule i. Economic Analysis a. Requirement To Deduct From Net Worth Certain Liabilities or Expenses Assumed by Third Parties (I). Summary of Amendments The amendments to Rule 15c3–1 add a new paragraph (c)(2)(i)(F) requiring a broker-dealer to adjust its net worth when calculating net capital by including any liabilities that are assumed by a third party if the brokerdealer cannot demonstrate that the third party has the resources, independent of the broker-dealer’s income and assets, to pay the liabilities. This amendment is intended to assist investors and regulators by requiring broker-dealers to provide a more accurate picture of their financial condition. This should help regulators react more quickly if a brokerdealer experiences financial difficulty and benefit customers of the troubled broker-dealer as well as its counterparties. The purpose of the requirement in new paragraph (c)(2)(i)(F) of Rule 15c3– 1 is to address the practices of a brokerdealer that raise concerns when a broker-dealer shifts liabilities to an entity with no revenue or assets independent of the broker-dealer to inappropriately increase its reported net capital, by excluding the liability from the calculation of net worth. The final rule is designed to prohibit a practice that could misrepresent a brokerdealer’s actual financial condition, mislead the firm’s customers, and hamper the ability of regulators to monitor the firm’s financial condition. The Commission requested comment on available metrics to quantify these benefits and any other benefits a commenter may identify. Commenters were requested to identify sources of empirical data that could be used for the metrics they proposed. The Commission did not receive any comments in response to these requests. (II). Baseline and Incremental Economic Effects As discussed in section II.E.1. of this release, the baseline of this rule amendment is current Rule 15c3–1 and existing guidance and interpretations. The Commission staff has provided guidance with respect to the treatment and recording of certain broker-dealer PO 00000 Frm 00065 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 51887 expenses and liabilities that is consistent with the rule amendment.792 Consequently, as against the current baseline, the Commission does not expect significant incremental benefits and costs to the extent that they already comply with existing guidance and interpretations.793 While the amendments apply to all broker-dealers, they will impact only those few that shift liabilities to entities with no revenue or assets independent of the broker-dealer (i.e., shell corporations) to boost the brokerdealer’s reported net capital. Based on staff experience in supervising brokerdealer compliance with Rule 15c3–1, the vast majority of broker-dealers likely either do not seek to transfer responsibility for their liabilities to a third party or, if they do so, rely on a third party that has the financial resources—independent of the assets and revenue of the broker-dealer—to pay the obligations as they become due. Because of this, it is difficult to quantify the benefits and costs impact of this rule amendment. The Commission conservatively estimates that the amendment may impact all broker-dealers that do not report any liabilities. FOCUS Report data, as of December 31, 2011, indicates that approximately 289 broker-dealers report having no liabilities. While this number is likely at the upper boundary of the total number of broker-dealers affected by this amendment, the number of broker-dealers reporting no liabilities likely represents a reasonable sample of broker-dealers on which to base the cost estimates. Requiring these broker-dealers to book liabilities will decrease the amount of equity capital held by the firms and in some cases may require them to obtain additional capital. The majority of broker-dealers reporting no liabilities are introducing broker-dealers that have a $5,000 minimum net capital requirement, while the reported average of total liabilities is approximately $491,355 per broker-dealer. Therefore, conservatively estimating that each of the 289 broker-dealers will have to raise $491,355 in additional capital as result of the requirement, the total aggregate 792 See, e.g., Third Party Expense Letter; see also FINRA Notice to Members 03–6, Expense Sharing Agreements. 793 Under this amendment, some broker-dealers may request permission in writing from their DEA to withdraw capital within one year of contribution under the rule, resulting in annual costs to brokerdealers of approximately $144,150 (465 hours × $310 per hour for a Compliance Attorney). See section IV.D.2. of this release. E:\FR\FM\21AUR2.SGM 21AUR2 51888 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 162 / Wednesday, August 21, 2013 / Rules and Regulations emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with RULES2 amount of additional capital that will need to be raised is $142 million.794 Further, relative to the proposing release, the Commission is revising the cost of capital from approximately 5%, which was determined based on historical interest rates published by the Federal Reserve, to 12% as the average cost of equity capital determined using the capital asset pricing model (‘‘CAPM’’).795 Therefore, the Commission conservatively estimates that the total annual cost to brokerdealers will be approximately $17 million,796 which is an increased estimate relative to the proposing release. For the broker-dealers to whom this increased estimate applies, the Commission expects that there would be greater costs imposed. However, the Commission expects that the benefits outlined above would also accrue to the customers of these broker-dealers. The Commission requested comment on the proposed cost estimates. In particular, the Commission requested comment on additional costs to brokerdealers that would arise from the proposals. The Commission also requested comment on whether these proposals would impose costs on other market participants, including brokerdealer customers. Commenters were also asked to identify the metrics and sources of any empirical data that support their costs estimates. The Commission received five comments in response to this request for comment.797 One commenter noted that the Commission has provided no evidence that the public has been endangered or has been left financially unprotected as a result of the practice of having another entity book some or all of a member’s liabilities.798 This commenter asserted 794 289 broker-dealers × $491,355 = $142,001,595. This is an update from the proposing release estimate of 702 broker-dealers with aggregate liabilities of $280,354 per firm, resulting in an estimated amount of additional capital that would have to be raised in the amount of $196,808,508 (702 broker-dealers × $280,354 = $196,808,508). See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12885, n.189 and accompanying text. 795 The CAPM is a central model in modern financial theory and is widely used in applications, such as estimating the cost of capital for firms and evaluating the performance of managed portfolios. Based on conventional assumptions and historical stock price data available on Bloomberg, the Commission estimates a risk-free rate of 2.5% and an equity risk premium of 7.8%. Using, five-year, as well as two-year, monthly returns for a sample of listed broker-dealers, the Commission estimates an adjusted beta of approximately 1.25. 796 $142,001,595 × 12.25% = $17,395,195. In the proposing release, the Commission estimated that this cost would be approximately $10 million. See Amendments to Financial Responsibilities Rules. 72 FR at 12995. 797 See Beer Letter; Beer 2 Letter; Lowenstein Letter; Levene Letter; NIBA 2 Letter. 798 See Lowenstein Letter. VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:54 Aug 20, 2013 Jkt 229001 that the amendment will affect 14% of total member firms and that member firms may be shut down, sold or merged as an unintended consequence of the amendment.799 The commenter questioned how many member firms will fail as a result of this proposal.800 Another commenter stated that the true costs of the amendment should be calculated and verified before a proposed amendment is offered and that the true costs of these amendments were given little time, research, and consideration.801 This commenter also argued that the estimated 5% cost of capital has no basis and a firm would be fortunate to borrow funds for double the estimate of 5%.802 This same commenter also stated that the proposal would require 702 debt-free introducing broker-dealers to needlessly take on debt of approximately $280,354.803 Another commenter stated that it is unclear and unlikely how this amendment would achieve any of the desired results and may conversely impair a firm’s ability to continue as a going concern.804 None of the commenters provided the Commission with revised cost estimates. One commenter stated that if small firms were required to raise over $300,000 in capital each, there would be the largest dissolution of small brokerdealers in the history of the regulated securities industry.805 This commenter also stated that the Commission’s estimate of a gross cost of capital of 7.5% (5% + 2.5%) is a totally unrealistic cost of capital for small broker-dealers and that these broker-dealers will categorically have costs significantly higher than 7.5%.806 Finally, the commenter stated that, until the Commission convenes a small brokerdealer representative panel to assist it with establishing such costs, the Commission is speculating on such costs, and is therefore without adequate information to consider the effects of such costs and changes on small firms.807 (III). Alternatives The Commission considered all comments received 808 and the alternative of not adopting the rule, and decided to adopt the amendments 800 Id. Beer 2 Letter. 802 Id. 803 See Beer Letter; Lowenstein Letter. Levene Letter. 805 See NIBA 2 Letter. 806 Id. 807 Id. 808 See Beer Letter; Beer 2 Letter; Lowenstein Letter; Levene Letter; NIBA 2 Letter. 804 See PO 00000 809 See NIBA 2 Letter. e.g., Third Party Expense Letter; see also FINRA Notice to Members 03–6, Expense Sharing Agreements. 811 17 CFR 240.17a–3; 17 CFR 240.17a–4. 812 17 CFR 240.17a–3(a)(2). 813 See Beer Letter; Beer 2 Letter; Lowenstein Letter; Levene Letter; NIBA 2 Letter. 814 See Levene Letter. 815 See NIBA 2 Letter. 816 See, e.g., Third Party Expense Letter; see also FINRA Notice to Members 03–6, Expense Sharing Agreements. 810 See, 799 Id. 801 See substantially as proposed. In response to the comment regarding the unrealistic cost of capital,809 the Commission has increased the cost of capital to 12% as an average cost of equity capital for broker-dealers. As discussed in section II.E.1 of this release, the baseline of this amendment is current Rule 15c3–1 and existing guidance and interpretations. The Commission staff has provided guidance with respect to the treatment and recording of certain broker-dealer expenses and liabilities that is consistent with the rule amendment.810 Existing broker-dealer recordkeeping rules require a broker-dealer to record its income and expenses.811 For example, paragraph (a)(2) of Rule 17a– 3 requires a broker-dealer to make and keep current ledgers (or other records) reflecting all assets and liabilities, income and expense and capital accounts.812 Consequently, as against the current baseline, the above estimates are intended to be conservative. The Commission expects that broker-dealers will incur costs to comply with this amendment, including costs to obtain additional capital, only to the extent they are not currently complying with existing guidance and interpretations. In response to comments,813 the Commission does not expect brokerdealers to incur significant costs to comply with this amendment to the extent that they are appropriately recording their assets and liabilities under current Commission rules and interpretive guidance, because these items will already appear on a brokerdealer’s balance sheet and be included in its net capital computation. Consequently, the rule amendment, as adopted, should not: (1) Cause firms to be classified as ‘‘a going concern;’’ 814 (2) cause firms to fail, dissolve, or otherwise close; 815 (3) impose undue burdens; or (4) present serious implementation difficulties to firms (small or large) if they are appropriately recording their assets and liabilities under current Commission rules and interpretive guidance.816 Further, as stated above, the estimates are intended to be conservative, and therefore, the Commission expects that the ‘‘true’’ Frm 00066 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 E:\FR\FM\21AUR2.SGM 21AUR2 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 162 / Wednesday, August 21, 2013 / Rules and Regulations costs 817 that may be incurred by brokerdealers should be less than the maximum estimated. Therefore, the Commission does not believe a longer time period for compliance or the formation of a small broker-dealer advisory cost committee is necessary.818 b. Requirement To Subtract From Net Worth Certain Non-Permanent Capital Contributions (I). Summary of Amendments As discussed in section II.E.2. of this release, the amendment adds paragraph (c)(2)(i)(G) to Rule 15c3–1, requiring a broker-dealer to treat as a liability any capital that is contributed under an agreement giving the investor the option to withdraw it. The rule, as adopted, also requires that a broker-dealer treat as a liability any capital contribution that is withdrawn within a year of its contribution unless the broker-dealer receives permission in writing from its DEA.819 The amendment to Rule 15c3– 1 is intended to assist investors and regulators by requiring broker-dealers to provide a more accurate picture of their financial condition. This amendment will help regulators react more quickly if a broker-dealer experiences financial difficulty and benefits customers of a troubled broker-dealer as well as its counterparties. The Commission requested comment on available metrics to quantify these benefits and any other benefits a commenter may identify. Commenters were requested to identify sources of empirical data that could be used for the metrics they proposed. The Commission did not receive any comments in response to these requests. (II). Baseline and Incremental Economic Effects As discussed in section II.E.2. of this release, the baseline of this rule amendment is current Rule 15c3–1 and existing guidance and interpretations. The Commission estimates that the amendments requiring broker-dealers to treat certain capital contributions as liabilities should not result in 817 See Beer 2 Letter. NIBA 2 Letter. 819 One commenter suggested that the rule be amended to explicitly exclude any withdrawals that would fall under paragraph (e)(4)(iii) of Rule 15c3– 1. See American Bar Association Letter. It is unnecessary to explicitly exclude any withdrawals that would fall under paragraph (e)(4)(iii) of Rule 15c3–1 because these requirements will not apply to withdrawals covered by paragraph (e)(4)(iii) of Rule 15c3–1, namely, withdrawals used to make tax payments or to pay reasonable compensation to partners. 17 CFR 240.15c3–1(e)(4)(iii). These types of payments are ordinary business expenditures and do not raise the types of concerns the proposed rule is designed to address. See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 74 FR at12872, n.79. emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with RULES2 818 See VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:54 Aug 20, 2013 Jkt 229001 significant incremental benefits and costs, as compared to the baseline. Because of existing Commission and staff guidance regarding the permanency of capital,820 broker-dealers typically do not enter into agreements permitting an owner to withdraw capital at any time. To the extent some firms may have engaged in this practice, they may need to raise capital to meet the rule requirement. While the amendments apply to all broker-dealers, they will impact only the few broker-dealers that provide investors with the option to withdraw capital at any time or within one year. Because of existing Commission and staff interpretations related to temporary capital contributions,821 most brokerdealers likely do not accept capital contributions under agreements permitting the investor to withdraw the capital at any time or within one year. Therefore, it is difficult to quantify the cost impact of this rule amendment. Based on staff experience with the treatment of capital contributions and the application of Rule 15c3–1, the Commission estimates that no more than $100 million in capital at brokerdealers is subject to such agreements.822 Further, with regard to the treatment of temporary capital contributions, in the proposing release, the Commission assumed an incremental cost of capital of 2.5%,823 and estimated that the amendment would result in an annual cost of approximately $2.5 million.824 The Commission requested comment on the proposed cost estimates. In particular, the Commission requested comment on additional costs to brokerdealers that would arise from the proposals. The Commission also requested comment on whether these proposals would impose costs on other market participants, including brokerdealer customers. Commenters were also asked to identify the metrics and sources of any empirical data that support their costs estimates. 820 See Net Capital Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 28927 (Feb. 28, 1991). See also Net Capital Requirements for Brokers and Dealers Exchange Act Release No. 18417 (Jan. 13, 1982), 47 FR 3512 (Jan. 25, 1982). See also Temporary Capital Letter; Study of Unsafe and Unsound Practices of Broker-Dealers, Report and Recommendations of the Securities and Exchange Commission, H.R. Doc. No. 92–231 (1971) (recommending improvement of adequacy and permanency of capital); and Letter from Nelson Kibler, Assistant Director, Division of Market Regulation to John Pinto, National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (Sept. 8, 1980). 821 See Net Capital Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 28927 (Feb. 28, 1991), 56 FR 9124 (Mar. 5, 1991); and Temporary Capital Letter. 822 See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12885. 823 Id. at 12886–12887. 824 $100,000,000 × 2.5% = $2,500,000. PO 00000 Frm 00067 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 51889 The Commission received three comments.825 One commenter stated that the Commission’s estimate that no more than $100 million of capital at broker-dealers is subject to agreements permitting an owner to withdraw capital at any time greatly underestimates the impact of the proposed rule.826 The commenter stated that the Commission makes no case for deviating from the already established standards.827 Another commenter believed that the proposal would raise its cost of capital to such an extent that it would be impossible for the firm to raise capital from unrelated third parties.828 One commenter stated that the Commission’s estimate of a gross cost of capital of 7.5% (5% + 2.5%) is a totally unrealistic cost of capital for small broker-dealers and that these brokerdealers will categorically have costs significantly higher than 7.5%.829 Finally, the commenter stated that, until the Commission convenes a small broker-dealer representative panel to assist it with establishing such costs, the Commission is ‘‘speculating’’ on such costs, and is therefore without adequate information to consider the effects of such costs and changes on small firms.830 In response to comments,831 the Commission is revising this estimate in the final rule to an estimated cost of capital of approximately 12%, which is determined as the average cost of equity capital of broker-dealers using the CAPM. The overall estimated cost of capital is not incremental to the amendment discussed above regarding third party liabilities. The estimated cost of capital would be 12% for a broker-dealer seeking additional equity capital. Therefore, with regard to the treatment of temporary capital contributions, the Commission estimates the amendment will result in an annual cost of approximately $12.0 million,832 which is an increased estimate relative to the proposing release. For the broker-dealers to whom this increased estimate applies, and who may not be complying with the rule amendments, the Commission expects that there would be greater costs imposed. However, the Commission expects that the benefits outlined above 825 See Chicago Capital Management Letter; SIG Letter; NIBA 2 Letter. 826 See SIG Letter. 827 Id. 828 See Chicago Capital Management Letter. 829 See NIBA 2 Letter. 830 Id. 831 See NIBA 2 Letter. 832 $100,000,000 × 12.25% = $12,250,000. E:\FR\FM\21AUR2.SGM 21AUR2 51890 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 162 / Wednesday, August 21, 2013 / Rules and Regulations would also accrue to the customers of these broker-dealers.833 (III). Alternatives The Commission considered all comments discussed above and the alternative of not adopting the rule, and decided to adopt the amendments substantially as proposed. In response to commenters’ concerns about the impact on capital and the $100 million estimate,834 as discussed above, the final rule amendment is a codification of existing Commission staff guidance,835 and thus should not represent a change for broker-dealers with respect to capital withdrawals. Moreover, with respect to commenters’ concerns about obtaining capital,836 the rule does not prohibit an investor from withdrawing capital at any time. Rather, it prohibits a broker-dealer from treating temporary cash infusions as capital for purposes of the net capital rule. Finally, the final rule amendment provides a mechanism for a broker-dealer to apply to its DEA to make a withdrawal within one year of the capital contribution without triggering the deduction under certain circumstances. In the final rule, the Commission has increased the estimated cost of capital from 2.5% to 12%, in response to comments regarding the unrealistic cost of capital, and because the estimated cost of capital is not incremental to the estimated cost of capital to the amendment to Rule 15c3–1 regarding third party liabilities.837 The estimated cost of capital would be 12% for a broker-dealer seeking a loan for any additional capital. In addition, based on staff experience with the treatment of capital contributions and for the reasons discussed above, the Commission continues to believe that the estimate of $100 million regarding the temporary capital contributions is reasonable.838 Further, the final rule amendments relating to temporary capital contributions have been revised to clarify that a withdrawal of capital made within one year of its contribution to the broker-dealer is deemed to have been intended to be withdrawn within one year, unless the withdrawal has been approved in writing by the brokerdealer’s DEA.839 The Commission made this change to eliminate a potential × 12.25% = $12,250,000. Chicago Capital Management Letter; SIG Letter; NIBA 2 Letter. 835 See Temporary Capital Letter. See also section II.E.2. of this release. 836 See Chicago Capital Management Letter; SIG Letter; NIBA 2 Letter. 837 See NIBA 2 Letter. 838 See SIG Letter. 839 See section II.E.2. of this release. emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with RULES2 833 $100,000,000 834 See VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:54 Aug 20, 2013 Jkt 229001 ambiguity as to whether a withdrawal of capital within one year could ever be approved by a broker-dealer’s DEA. The final rule amendment clarifies the intent to provide a mechanism for brokerdealers to apply for approval to withdraw capital within one year and to be granted such approval where appropriate. While owners of most broker-dealers have the option of withdrawing capital, most owners likely do not have agreements that provide the option of withdrawing capital at any time.840 Paragraph (e) of Rule 15c3–1 contains mechanisms to permit a broker-dealer to make capital withdrawals for specified purposes.841 If there is a specific need for a broker-dealer to seek permission to make a capital withdrawal within one year of contribution, the final rule already provides a mechanism for the broker-dealer to seek permission in writing from its DEA to make such a withdrawal.842 Based on the discussion above, the Commission believes the final cost estimates are appropriate.843 c. Requirement To Deduct the Amount by Which a Fidelity Bond Exceeds SRO Limits As discussed in section II.E.3. of this release, this amendment requires broker-dealers to deduct from net capital, with regard to fidelity bonding requirements prescribed by a brokerdealer’s examining authority, the excess of any deductible amount over the amount permitted by SRO rules. Under SRO rules, certain brokerdealers that do business with the public or are required to become SIPC members must comply with mandatory fidelity bonding requirements.844 SRO rules 840 See SIG Letter. paragraphs (e)(1)(iii)(B) and (e)(4)(iii) of Rule 15c3–1. See also Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12872, n.79 (‘‘These requirements would not apply to withdrawals covered by paragraph (e)(4)(iii) of Rule 15c3–1, namely, withdrawals used to make tax payments or pay reasonable compensation to partners. These types of payments are ordinary business expenditures and do not raise the types of concerns the proposed rule is designed to address.’’) 842 See paragraph (c)(2)(i)(G)(2) of Rule 15c3–1. 843 See NIBA 2 Letter. 844 See, e.g., FINRA Rule 4360, CBOE Rule 9.22, and NASDAQ OMX PHLX Rule 705. SRO fidelity bonding requirements typically contain agreements covering the following areas: A ‘‘Fidelity’’ insuring clause to indemnify against loss of property through dishonest or fraudulent acts of employees; an ‘‘On Premises’’ agreement insuring against losses resulting from crimes such as burglary and theft and from misplacement of property of the insured; an ‘‘In Transit’’ clause indemnifying against losses occurring while property is in transit; a ‘‘Forgery and Alteration’’ agreement insuring against loss due to forgery or alteration of various kinds of negotiable instruments; and a ‘‘Securities Loss’’ clause protecting against losses incurred through forgery and alteration of securities. Id. 841 See PO 00000 Frm 00068 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 typically permit a broker-dealer to have a deductible provision included in the bond; however, such rules provide that the deductible must not exceed certain amounts. With regard to firms that maintain deductible amounts over certain specified amounts, a number of SRO rules provide that the broker-dealer must deduct this specified amount from net worth when calculating net capital under Rule 15c3–1.845 Rule 15c3–1, however, does not specifically reference the SRO deductible requirements as a charge to net worth, meaning that a broker-dealer would not be required for the purposes of Commission rules to show the impact of the deduction in the net capital computation required by an SRO on the FOCUS Report.846 To address the reporting inconsistency, the Commission is amending Rule 15c3–1 to add paragraph (c)(2)(xiv), which will require broker-dealers to deduct the amount specified by rule of the Examining Authority of the brokerdealer with respect to a requirement to maintain fidelity bond coverage. This rule amendment will provide consistency in broker-dealer reporting requirements.847 This amendment will also codify in a Commission rule capital charges that broker-dealers are currently required to take pursuant to the rules of various SROs. Consequently, any economic effects, including costs and benefits, should be compared to a baseline of current practices. The amendment should not impose additional costs on broker-dealers with respect to the purchasing or carrying of fidelity bond coverage. Nor will the amendment cause broker-dealers to incur additional costs in determining or reporting excess deductible amounts over the deductible permitted. Broker-dealers already make such determinations under SROs rules, and the manner in which such excesses are typically reported (i.e., through periodic FOCUS Reports and other reports) would remain the same. The Commission received one comment opposing the fidelity bond amendment, stating that FINRA Rule 4360 and the Commission’s amendment would result in a de facto increase in minimum net capital requirements for some broker-dealers.848 Any increase in net capital cited by the commenter 845 See, e.g., FINRA Rule 4360 and CBOE Rule 9.22. 846 See 17 CFR 240.17a–5. not adopting this rule amendment would have resulted in continued inconsistency among existing SRO rules and Rule 15c3–1. 848 See NIBA 2 Letter. 847 Conversely, E:\FR\FM\21AUR2.SGM 21AUR2 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 162 / Wednesday, August 21, 2013 / Rules and Regulations would result from existing SRO rules.849 Stated differently, broker-dealers that are members of an SRO with such a fidelity bonding rule must already account for the deduction in complying with the net capital requirements of SROs and nothing in the Commission’s amendment to paragraph (c)(2)(xiv) of Rule 15c3–1 would alter this status quo. Consequently, while there is currently no deduction required under the baseline of current Rule 15c3–1 relating to fidelity bond deductibles, because SRO rules currently require this deduction, the adoption of this amendment under Rule 15c3–1 should not impose any additional costs on broker-dealers that they are not already incurring under existing SRO rules. emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with RULES2 d. Broker-Dealer Solvency Requirement As discussed in section II.E.4., the amendment to paragraph (a) of Rule 15c3–1 states that no broker-dealer shall be ‘‘insolvent’’ as that term is defined under paragraph (c)(16) of the rule. The companion amendment to paragraph (b)(1) of Rule 17a–11 requires insolvent broker-dealers to provide notice to regulatory authorities. Allowing an insolvent broker-dealer to continue conducting a securities business during the period of its insolvency, notwithstanding its net capital position, could jeopardize customers and other market participants because a broker-dealer that has made an admission of insolvency, or is otherwise deemed insolvent or entitled to protection from creditors, does not possess the financial resources necessary to operate a securities business. Continuing to operate in such circumstances poses a significant credit risk to counterparties and to the clearance and settlement system, and, in the event the firm ends up in a liquidation proceeding under SIPA, may impair the ability of the SIPA trustee to make the customers of the broker-dealer whole and satisfy the claims of other creditors out of the assets of the general estate.850 Consequently, the amendment to Rule 15c3–1 benefits the securities markets, 849 For example, the Commission approved FINRA Rule 4360 through the SRO rule filing process. See Order Approving Proposed Rule Change to Adopt FINRA Rule 4360 (Fidelity Bonds) in the Consolidated FINRA Rulebook, Exchange Act Release No. 63961 (Feb. 24, 2011), 76 FR 11542 (Mar. 2, 2011). Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the Exchange Act, each SRO must file with the Commission any proposed change in, addition to, or deletion from the rules of the exchange electronically on a Form 19b–4 through the Electronic Form 19b–4 Filing System, which is a secure Web site operated by the Commission. 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1) and 17 CFR 240.19b–4. 850 See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12872. VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:54 Aug 20, 2013 Jkt 229001 and indirectly, all other market participants, by removing risks associated with the continued operation of a financially unstable firm. For example, the amendment will limit the potential that an insolvent firm would take on new customers and place their assets at risk. Furthermore, the brokerdealer will not be able to enter into proprietary transactions with other broker-dealers and place them or clearing agencies at further risk of counterparty default. The brokerdealer’s existing customers also will benefit from preservation of any remaining capital of the firm, which could be used to facilitate an orderly liquidation. The amendment to Rule 17a-11 also benefits the securities markets in that it will provide regulators with the opportunity to more quickly take steps to protect customers and counterparties at the onset of the insolvency, including, if appropriate, notifying SIPC of the need to commence a SIPA liquidation. The baseline for this proposed amendment is current Rules 15c3–1 and 17a–11, which currently do not contain requirements to cease conducting a securities business (or to notify the Commission) if certain insolvency events were to occur. The amendments generally will have no impact on brokerdealers when compared to the current baseline. Should a broker-dealer become subject to an insolvency proceeding, it will incur the cost of sending notice of that fact to the Commission and its DEA. The Commission estimated in the PRA that it will occur approximately two 851 times a year for all broker-dealers.852 For these reasons, the Commission estimates that any costs arising from this amendment will be de minimis. One commenter stated that involuntary bankruptcy proceedings do not necessarily indicate that the brokerdealer is insolvent, as such proceedings can be frivolous, malicious, or otherwise lacking in merit, and noted standard industry forms generally provide a grace period for a party to such a proceeding to obtain a stay or dismissal before an event of default is deemed to have occurred. The Commission considered this alternative approach and notes that 851 This estimate is based on the 2012 SIPC Annual Report, which indicates that over the last ten year-period, the annual average of new customer protection proceedings was three. A copy of the 2012 Annual Report is available at https:// www.sipc.org/. 852 The internal hours would likely be performed by a compliance clerk. Therefore, the estimated internal costs for this hour burden would be calculated as follows: Compliance Clerk at $63 per hour × 20 minutes = $21.00. See section IV.D.8. of this release. PO 00000 Frm 00069 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 51891 if a firm believes that it is the subject of an unwarranted involuntary bankruptcy proceeding and that its case will not be dismissed within the 30 day timeframe, as is the case with existing net capital requirements, pursuant to Rule 15c3– 1(b)(3), the Commission may, upon written application, exempt the brokerdealer from the requirement. In addition, one commenter objected to the amendments as unnecessary, citing the Rule 15c3–1 prohibition on broker-dealers effecting securities transactions if their net capital is below certain minimums.853 The commenter stated that the net capital of an insolvent broker-dealer would, by definition, be below those minimums.854 The Commission considered the commenter’s view and the alternative of not adopting the amendments. The purpose of the amendment is to address cases where the broker-dealer is subject to an insolvency event but maintains that it is in compliance with the net capital rule. Therefore, the Commission is adopting this amendment, because, while such instances may be rare, an insolvent broker-dealer could seek the protection of the bankruptcy laws but continue to effect transactions with the public, potentially jeopardizing customers and other creditors of the broker-dealer, including counterparties. As noted above, the Commission requested comment on this cost estimate. In particular, the Commission requested comment on whether there would be costs to broker-dealers as a consequence of the proposal. The Commission also requested comment on whether this proposal would impose costs on other market participants, including broker-dealer customers. Commenters were asked to identify the metrics and sources of any empirical data that supported their costs estimates. The Commission did not receive any comments in response to these requests. e. Amendment To Rule Governing Restrictions of Withdrawals of Capital As discussed in section II.E.5. of this release, paragraph (e) of Rule 15c3–1, which places certain conditions on a broker-dealer when withdrawing capital,855 also allows the Commission to issue an order temporarily restricting a broker-dealer from withdrawing capital or making loans or advances to stockholders, insiders, and affiliates 853 See St. Bernard Financial Services Letter. 854 Id. 855 See E:\FR\FM\21AUR2.SGM 17 CFR 240.15c3–1(e). 21AUR2 51892 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 162 / Wednesday, August 21, 2013 / Rules and Regulations emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with RULES2 under certain circumstances.856 The rule, however, limits such orders to withdrawals, advances, or loans that, when aggregated with all other withdrawals, advances, or loans on a net basis during a 30 calendar day period, exceed 30% of the firm’s excess net capital.857 The Commission has determined that the requirement is difficult to enforce, as it generally would not be clear when the 30% threshold had been reached, due to the inherent unreliability of a troubled broker-dealer’s books and records. The Commission considered retaining the 30% threshold, but determined that a more appropriate approach would be to eliminate the 30% threshold requirement from the rule, rather than retain a provision that is difficult to enforce. Consequently, the Commission proposed, and is adopting, a change to delete this provision and instead to allow the Commission to restrict all withdrawals, advances, and loans so long as the other conditions under the rule (all of which remain unchanged) were met. The amendment to paragraph (e) of Rule 15c3–1 benefits the securities markets by protecting customers and counterparties of a financially stressed broker-dealer. For example, by prohibiting unsecured loans to a stockholder or withdrawal of equity capital while the order is outstanding, the amendment will help to preserve the assets and liquidity of the broker-dealer and enable the Commission and its staff, as well as other regulators, to examine the broker-dealer’s financial condition, net capital position, and the risk exposure to the customers and creditors of the broker-dealer. The current rule permitting the Commission to restrict withdrawals of capital from a financially distressed broker-dealer was adopted in 1991.858 This rule is the baseline for purposes of this economic analysis. When the Commission adopted this paragraph of Rule 15c3–1 more than twenty years ago, the Commission stated that it was intended to be an emergency provision, applicable only to the most exigent of circumstances where the continued viability of the broker-dealer appears to be at stake.859 In the ensuing years, the Commission has only utilized this provision one time.860 Based on this 856 See 17 CFR 240.15c3–1(e)(3). 857 Id. 858 See Net Capital Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 28927 (Feb. 28, 1991), 56 FR 9124 (Mar. 5, 1991). 859 Net Capital Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 28927, 56 FR 9124, 9128. 860 Order Regarding Withdrawals, Unsecured Loans or Advances from Refco Securities, LLC and VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:54 Aug 20, 2013 Jkt 229001 experience with the rule, and the fact that the rule is intended as an emergency provision only, as compared to the current baseline, the Commission estimates that the amendment will result in no or de minimis costs to broker-dealers. As noted above, the Commission requested comment on this cost estimate. The Commission also requested comment on whether the proposal would impose costs on other market participants. Commenters were asked to identify the metrics and sources of any empirical data that support their cost estimates. One commenter supported the amendment but believed that the rule is intended to protect the capitalization of large firms while ignoring small firms, and proposed that the Commission state all the conditions that need to exist for a firm to withdraw, repay or redeem any amount that does not endanger the firm or its customers.861 The commenter also stated that it opposes regulation that arbitrarily reduces the value of small broker-dealers and their competitive position relative to larger broker-dealers. A second commenter noted that the proposed amendment would impose additional compliance burdens on broker-dealers and would significantly limit broker-dealers’ flexibility in the event of a liquidity crisis.862 In adopting the final rule, the Commission considered the alternatives and modifications suggested by commenters. In response to these comments, the Commission notes that the amendment would eliminate the 30% threshold from paragraph (e)(3)(i) of Rule 15c3–1, which relates to the Commission’s authority to temporarily restrict withdrawals of net capital. It cannot impose these restrictions without concluding that ‘‘such withdrawal, advance or loan may be detrimental to the financial integrity of the broker or dealer, or may unduly jeopardize the broker or dealer’s ability to repay its customer claims or other liabilities which may cause a significant impact on the markets or expose the customers or creditors of the broker or dealer to loss without taking into account the application of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970.’’ 863 While paragraph (e)(3)(i) of Rule 15c3– 1 would apply to all broker-dealers, the stringent conditions under which the Commission may exert its authority under the rule to temporarily restrict a Refco Clearing, LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 52606 (Oct. 13, 2005). 861 See NIBA 2 Letter. 862 See Raymond James 2 Letter. 863 See 17 CFR 240.15c3–1(e)(3)(i). PO 00000 Frm 00070 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 broker-dealer’s withdrawals of net capital would apply to only the circumstances where the continued viability of the broker-dealer appears to be at stake.864 The Commission, however, agrees with the importance of maintaining flexibility in the context of ordering restrictions on withdrawals, advances, and loans. Therefore, the Commission modified the amendment, as adopted, to add language to paragraph (e)(3)(i) to state (following the phrase ‘‘employee or affiliate’’) that such orders will be issued, ‘‘under such terms and conditions as the Commission deems necessary or appropriate in the public interest or consistent with the protection of investors . . . .’’ 865 In summary, the Commission does not believe that the deletion of the 30% threshold will affect the competitiveness or unduly restrict the ongoing business operations of small broker-dealers as compared to larger firms. All broker-dealers remain subject to the other notice and withdrawal limitations on equity capital set forth in paragraphs (e)(1) and (e)(2) of Rule 15c3–1, which are not the subject of this rule amendment. f. Amendment to Rule 15c3–1 Appendix A As discussed in section II.E.6.i. of this release, the amendment to paragraph (b)(1)(vi) of Rule 15c3–1a will make permanent the reduced net capital requirements that apply to listed option positions in major market foreign currencies and high-capitalization and non-high-capitalization diversified indexes in non-clearing option specialist and market maker accounts. This change will benefit the brokerdealers that have been calculating charges under a temporary amendment the Commission originally adopted in 1997.866 The temporary amendment expired on September 1, 1997, subject to extension.867 The Commission staff subsequently issued a no-action letter on January 13, 2000, which stated that the staff would not recommend enforcement action if broker-dealers continued to rely on the temporary amendment.868 The Commission 864 Net Capital Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 28927, 56 FR 9124, 9128. 865 See paragraph (e) of Rule 17a–3, as adopted. See generally, 15 U.S.C. 78mm(a)(1). 866 See Net Capital Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 38248 (Feb. 6, 1997), 62 FR 6474 (Feb. 12, 1997). 867 See 17 CFR 15c3–1a(b)(1)(iv)(B). 868 Letter from Michael Macchiaroli, Associate Director, Division of Market Regulation, Commission, to Richard Lewandowski, Vice President, Regulatory Division, The Chicago Board Options Exchange, Inc. (Jan. 13, 2000) (stating that the Division of Trading and Markets ‘‘will not E:\FR\FM\21AUR2.SGM 21AUR2 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 162 / Wednesday, August 21, 2013 / Rules and Regulations emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with RULES2 considered whether to keep the amendment temporary but determined that making the temporary amendment permanent, as proposed, was the more appropriate alternative because it creates certainty for broker-dealers relying on the rule. Because this amendment seeks to match capital requirements with actual risks, it should not have an adverse impact on the financial strength of broker-dealers. Moreover, because broker-dealers are already operating under the temporary relief, which is the current baseline, the amendment should not result in any costs for broker-dealers as compared to the current baseline. The Commission requested comment on available metrics to quantify the benefits identified above and any other benefits the commenter may identify. In addition, the Commission requested comment on whether the proposal would result in any costs. Commenters were asked to identify the metrics and sources of any empirical data that support their cost estimates. The Commission did not receive any comments in response to these requests. ii. Consideration of Burden on Competition, and Promotion of Efficiency, Competition, and Capital Formation Rule 15c3–1 is designed to help ensure that a broker-dealer holds at all times liquid assets sufficient to pay its non-subordinated liabilities and retain a ‘‘cushion’’ of liquid assets used to pay customers without delay in the event that the broker-dealer fails. For example, a broker-dealer that inappropriately excludes certain liabilities when presenting its financial position 869 or includes non-permanent capital contributions in its financial statements 870 distorts the view of the firm’s financial condition and undermines the rule. In either event, such practices jeopardize the brokerdealer’s ability to self-liquidate and promptly pay customers. The Commission’s experience with the broker-dealer financial responsibility rules, underscored by the 2008 financial crisis, highlights the effects that the failure of a broker-dealer, particularly a large carrying brokerdealer, could have on customers and other market participants. Losses resulting from the disorderly winding recommend . . . enforcement action if non-clearing option specialists and market-makers continue to rely on subparagraph (b)(1)(iv) of Appendix A to Rule 15c3–1 under the Exchange Act until such time as the Commission has determined whether it should be extended’’). 869 See section II.E.1. of this release. 870 See section II.E.2. of this release. VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:54 Aug 20, 2013 Jkt 229001 down of a broker-dealer may often undermine the participation of investors in the U.S. capital markets, with possible negative effects on capital formation and market efficiency. Thus, it is imperative that broker-dealers operate in compliance with Rule 15c3– 1 and that the Commission takes the necessary steps to help ensure that broker-dealers are prohibited from engaging in practices that obscure noncompliance. The amendments to Rule 15c3–1 are designed to reduce the risk of a disorderly failure of a broker-dealer and lessen the potential that market participants may seek to rapidly withdraw assets and financing from broker-dealers during a time of market stress. These Rule 15c3–1 amendments may affect efficiency and capital formation through their positive impact on competition among broker-dealers. Specifically, markets that are competitive can, all other things equal, be expected to promote an efficient allocation of capital.871 The amendments to Rule 15c3–1—(1) Requiring a broker-dealer to account for certain liabilities or treat certain capital contributions as liabilities,872 (2) requiring a broker-dealer to deduct certain fidelity bond deductibles,873 (3) requiring an insolvent broker-dealer to cease conducting a securities business and provide notice under the amendment to Rule 17a–11,874 (4) eliminating the qualification on Commission orders restricting withdrawals, advances, and unsecured loans to instances where recent withdrawals, advances or loans, in the aggregate, exceed 30% of the brokerdealer’s excess net capital,875 and (5) making permanent the reduced net capital requirements under Appendix A for market makers 876—are consistent with promoting efficiency, competition, and capital formation in the market place. First, a broker-dealer that fails to include liabilities that depend on the broker-dealer’s assets and revenues and accepts temporary capital contributions is obscuring its true financial condition. This also interferes with the process by which regulators monitor the financial condition of broker-dealers and, 871 See Capital, Margin, and Segregation Requirements for Security-Based Swap Dealers and Major Security-Based Swap Participants and Capital Requirements for Broker-Dealers, Exchange Act Release No. 68071 (Oct. 18, 2012), 77 FR 70213, 70315 (Nov. 23, 2012). 872 See sections II.E.1. and 2. of this release. 873 See section II.E.3. of this release. 874 See section II.E.4. of this release. 875 See section II.E.5. of this release. 876 See section II.E.6.i. of this release. PO 00000 Frm 00071 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 51893 thereby, impedes their ability to take proactive steps to minimize the harm resulting from a broker-dealer failure to customers, counterparties, and clearing agencies. Second, requiring broker-dealers to take net capital charges for excess fidelity bond deductibles imposed under SRO rules will promote efficiency by providing consistency among Rule 15c3–1 and SRO rules. Because fidelity bond requirements provide a safeguard with regard to broker-dealer financial responsibility, the amendment will enhance competition through the operation of more financially sound firms. Third, the continued operation of an insolvent broker-dealer or the withdrawal of capital from a brokerdealer that may jeopardize such brokerdealer’s financial integrity poses financial risk to its customers, counterparties, and the registered clearing agencies. These risks increase costs and decrease efficiency of the marketplace. Fourth, the elimination of the limitation on Commission orders restricting capital withdrawals under paragraph (e)(3) of Rule 15c3–1 from a financially troubled broker-dealer will provide greater protection to customers and counterparties of the firm and registered clearing agencies. While such orders are expected to be infrequent, when issued they should lower costs to these entities associated with having an outstanding obligation from the troubled broker-dealer, thereby promoting efficiency and facilitating capital formation. One commenter expressed concern that the proposed amendments to Rule 15c3–1 would be particularly burdensome on small broker-dealers, negatively impacting capital formation for small issuers and increasing the cost of capital for small broker-dealers.877 For example, the commenter stated that it believed that the proposed changes requiring a broker-dealer to subtract from net worth certain non-permanent capital contributions and to deduct from net worth certain liabilities or expenses assumed by third parties would negatively impact capital formation for small issuers and increase the cost of capital for small broker-dealers.878 While the Commission is cognizant that the Rule 15c3–1 amendments may impose burdens on broker-dealers, including non-carrying broker-dealers, the commenter is treating the amendments as entirely new additions to the net capital rule. Yet, as discussed 877 See NIBA 2 Letter. 878 Id. E:\FR\FM\21AUR2.SGM 21AUR2 51894 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 162 / Wednesday, August 21, 2013 / Rules and Regulations in section II.E. of this release, the Commission has emphasized that capital contributions to broker-dealers should not be temporary. Further, the Commission staff has explained that a capital contribution should be treated as a liability if it is made with the understanding that such contribution can be withdrawn at the option of the investor.879 Based on the Commission’s experience with the application of Rule 15c3–1, the majority of broker-dealers operate consistent with past Commission and staff rules and guidance regarding the nature of capital and, thus, the Rule 15c3–1 amendments should not represent a substantial change for most broker-dealers. Therefore, the final rule should not negatively impact capital formation for small issuers, nor increase the cost of capital for small broker-dealers, to the extent that these firms already comply with current guidance and interpretations.880 For those firms that will need to raise capital to comply with the amendments to Rule 15c3–1, the rule amendments potentially may negatively impact capital formation. However, the potential costs to some broker-dealers could be offset by the aggregate increase in capital formation related to heightened confidence in broker-dealer financial requirements. Finally, the Commission recognizes that, as discussed above, the amendments to Rule 15c3–3 adopted today impose certain costs on brokerdealers that could affect competition among broker-dealers. However, the Commission is of the opinion that these costs are justified by the significant benefits described in this economic analysis. In sum, the costs of compliance resulting from the requirements in the amendments to Rule 15c3–3 should not impose a burden on competition not necessary or appropriate in furtherance of the purposes of the Exchange Act in light of the benefits discussed above. emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with RULES2 VI. Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis The Commission proposed amendments to Rules 15c3–1, 15c3–1a, 15c3–2, 15c3–3, 15c3–3a, 17a–3, 17a–4, and 17a–11 under the Exchange Act. An Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (‘‘IRFA’’) was included in the proposing release.881 This Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (‘‘FRFA’’) has been 879 See section II.E.2. of this release. NIBA 2 Letter. 881 See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR 12862. 880 See VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:54 Aug 20, 2013 Jkt 229001 prepared in accordance with the provisions of the RFA.882 The Commission requested comment with regard to matters discussed in the IRFA, including comments with respect to the number of small entities that may be affected by the proposed rule amendments.883 The Commission also requested that commenters specify the costs of compliance with the proposed amendments, and suggest alternatives that would accomplish the goals of the amendments.884 The Commission received one general comment on the IRFA.885 In addition, the Commission received a number of comments regarding the impact on small entities with respect to specific aspects of the proposed rule amendments, including comments relating to amendments under Rule 15c3–3 with respect to where special reserve deposits may be held, and amendments under Rule 15c3–1 relating to the requirement to subtract from net worth certain liabilities or expenses assumed by third parties.886 The general comment on the IRFA is discussed directly below. The specific comments are discussed in the applicable sections below. A. General Issues Raised by Public Comments The commenter stated that the Commission should pay ‘‘explicit attention to regulatory trends in the rest of the world’’ because doing so ‘‘benefits not only small entities (by reducing their regulatory burden) but all entities, as larger entities can experience more consistent regulatory procedures around the world.’’ 887 The commenter suggested that the Commission consider a ‘‘Basel II type approach to net capital requirements.’’ 888 In response to the commenter, the Commission notes that the amendments relate to discrete areas of the broker-dealer financial responsibility rules (i.e., they do not establish new financial responsibility standards such as would be the case if the Commission were to adopt a ‘‘Basel II type approach to net capital requirements.’’). As noted above, the commenter’s suggestion is beyond the scope of this rulemaking.889 882 5 U.S.C. 604(a). Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12888. 884 Id. 885 See Angel Letter. 886 These comments are discussed in the applicable section below. 887 See Angel Letter. 888 Id. 889 The commenter cited the JP Morgan Letter in support of the suggestion to ‘‘consider regulatory trends in the rest of the world.’’ Id. The JP Morgan Letter recommends that the Commission adopt a due diligence standard—citing a U.K. regulation— 883 See PO 00000 Frm 00072 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 B. Amendments to the Customer Protection Rule 1. Need for and Objectives of the Rule Amendments The final rule amends certain provisions of Rule 15c3–3.890 The amendment that requires broker-dealers to perform a PAB reserve computation is designed to address a disparity between Rule 15c3–3 and the SIPA, and to incorporate provisions of the PAIB Letter into Commission rules.891 The amendment that will require brokerdealers to exclude cash deposited at an affiliated bank and cash deposited with an unaffiliated bank to the extent that the amount exceeds 15% of the bank’s equity capital from being used to meet a broker-dealer’s reserve requirements is designed to avoid the situation where a carrying broker-dealer’s cash deposits constitute a substantial portion of the bank’s deposits.892 The amendment that will require broker-dealers to obtain possession and control of customers’ fully paid and excess margin securities allocated to a short position is designed to address the fact that Rule 15c3–3 currently permits a broker-dealer to monetize customer securities, which is contrary to the customer protection goals of Rule 15c3–3, which seeks to ensure that broker-dealer’s do not use customer assets for proprietary purposes.893 The amendment that will require broker-dealers to provide certain notices and disclosures before changing the terms and conditions under which the broker-dealer treats customer free credit balances is intended to help ensure that the use of customer free credit balances accords with customer preferences.894 The importation of certain provisions of Rule 15c3–2 into Rule 15c3–3 streamlines the customer protection rules and eliminates irrelevant provisions in Rule 15c3–2 due to Rule 15c3–3.895 The amendments clarifying that funds in certain commodities accounts are not to be treated as free credit balances or other credit balances are intended to remove uncertainty with respect to their treatment under Rule 15c3–3.896 The amendments to Rule 15c3–3 are intended to strengthen the protections afforded to customer assets held at a with respect to the amendments regarding customer reserve account cash deposits. See JP Morgan Letter. The Commission addresses this comment above in section V.D.1.i.b.(III) of this release. 890 17 CFR 240.15c3–3. 891 See section II.A.2. of this release. 892 See section II.A.3. of this release. 893 See section II.A.4. of this release. 894 See section II.A.5. of this release. 895 Id. 896 See section II.A.6. of this release. E:\FR\FM\21AUR2.SGM 21AUR2 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 162 / Wednesday, August 21, 2013 / Rules and Regulations broker-dealer. The amendments are designed to minimize the risk that customer assets will be lost, tied-up in a liquidation proceeding, or held in a manner that is inconsistent with a customer’s expectations. 2. Significant Issues Raised by Public Comment The Commission received numerous comments with respect to the amendment under paragraph (e)(5) of Rule 15c3–3 that will require brokerdealers to exclude cash deposited at an affiliated bank and cash deposited with an unaffiliated bank to the extent that the amount exceeds 15% of the bank’s equity capital from being used to meet a broker-dealer’s reserve requirements.897 As proposed, new paragraph (e)(5) of 15c3–3 would have provided that, in determining whether a broker-dealer maintains the minimum reserve deposits required (customer and PAB), the broker-dealer must exclude any cash deposited at an affiliated bank. In addition, the proposed amendment would have required a broker-dealer to also exclude cash deposited at an unaffiliated bank to the extent the cash deposited exceeds (1) 50% of the broker-dealer’s excess net capital (based on the broker-dealer’s most recently filed FOCUS Report),898 or (2) 10% of the bank’s equity capital (based on the bank’s most recently filed Call Report or Thrift Financial Report).899 With respect to the proposed limits on the amounts that could be deposited in unaffiliated banks, some commenters argued that the percentages were too restrictive while other commenters suggested alternative approaches to the proposed percentage limitations.900 One commenter stated that the percentage thresholds would negatively impact smaller broker-dealers because these firms would still be required under the proposed rule to maintain at least two reserve bank accounts at different banks.901 This commenter noted that limiting Rule 15c3–3 deposits at a single bank to 50% of a broker-dealer’s excess 897 See section II.A.3. of this release. Rule 17a–5 broker-dealers must file FOCUS Reports. 17 CFR 240.17a–5. 899 See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12864. 900 See Deutsche Bank Securities Letter; SIFMA 2 Letter; First Clearing Letter; ICI Letter; BlackRock Letter. 901 See SIFMA 2 Letter (‘‘[T]he [percentage] tests could prevent a smaller firm from maintaining reserve account deposits at any single bank, even though those deposits are relatively small compared to the size of the bank—e.g., a broker-dealer with excess net capital of $500,000 could not maintain more than $250,000 in reserve account cash deposits at any one bank, regardless of the ratio between such bash deposits and the overall size or equity capital of the bank.’’). emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with RULES2 898 Under VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:54 Aug 20, 2013 Jkt 229001 net capital could impact 10 to 15% of its broker-dealer customers in that many of these customers would be required to open accounts at multiple institutions.902 This commenter suggested the Commission consider higher percentages for cash deposits at large money-centered banks, since the proposed percentage thresholds would negatively impact small broker-dealers because they would exceed the 50% of excess net capital threshold at lower deposit levels.903 This commenter also noted that conducting due diligence and opening new accounts and the ongoing monitoring and periodic re-evaluation of such additional accounts would require much more time than the 10 hours originally estimated by the Commission.904 A second commenter concurred with this cost assessment, stating that the Commission significantly underestimated the cost of the proposal to smaller firms.905 With respect to the use of qualified securities to meet reserve requirements, one commenter noted that brokerdealers will ‘‘likely have a significant amount of additional operational and transactional costs.’’ 906 The commenter believes that ‘‘[w]hile larger brokerdealers may be able to reallocate existing trading desk, operational, regulatory reporting and treasury functions to assist in ongoing maintenance activities, midsized and smaller broker-dealers may be required to hire additional staff to manage and maintain a securities portfolio.’’ 907 In response to commenters concerns, the Commission has eliminated the provision that would have excluded the amount of a deposit that exceeds 50% of the broker-dealer’s excess net capital. After review of the comment letters, the Commission believes that this provision likely would have disproportionately impacted small and mid-size brokerdealers when they deposited cash into large commercial banks since they would exceed the excess net capital threshold well before exceeding the bank equity capital threshold.908 The bank equity capital threshold is the more important metric since it relates directly to the financial strength of the bank, which is the entity holding the 902 Id. 903 Id.; see also SIFMA 4 Letter. SIFMA 2 Letter. 905 See NIBA 2 Letter. 906 See JP Morgan Letter. 907 Id. The commenter noted that managing pools of qualified securities involves various tasks, such as ‘‘monitoring income collection, redemption processing, marking the securities to market, collateral substitutions and collateral segregation amongst other tasks.’’ Id. 908 See SIFMA 2 Letter; JP Morgan 2 Letter. 904 See PO 00000 Frm 00073 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 51895 account. In particular, if the carrying broker-dealer’s deposit constitutes a substantial portion of the bank’s total deposits, the bank may not have the liquidity to quickly return the deposit to the broker-dealer. The elimination of the excess net capital threshold should mitigate concerns expressed by small broker-dealers that they would need to open multiple bank accounts to make cash deposits or hire additional staff, if they sought to deposit qualified securities in a reserve account in order to avoid opening multiple accounts. This is because the excess net capital threshold likely would have impacted smaller broker-dealers, which— consistent with their size—maintain less net capital than larger firms. Second, with respect to the bank equity capital threshold, in response to comments, the Commission has increased the trigger level from 10% to 15% of the bank’s equity capital. The increase of the threshold to 15% is designed to address concerns raised by commenters that the proposed percentage tests were unduly restrictive in certain respects and should be modified, particularly with respect to large broker-dealers with large deposit requirements. Consequently, the increase from 10% to 15% is designed to mitigate commenters concerns that the 10% threshold would require broker-dealers to spread out deposits over an excessive number of banks, while still providing adequate protection against undue concentrations of deposits, particularly where smaller banks are concerned. The elimination of the 50% of excess net capital threshold and increase of the bank capital threshold from 10% to 15% is designed to appropriately address concerns raised by commenters that they would have to substantially alter their current cash deposit practices in light of the goal of the rule to promote the broker-dealer’s ability to have quick access to the deposit. With the elimination of the brokerdealer excess net capital threshold, and the increase in the bank equity capital threshold, it is likely that very few broker-dealers (including small brokerdealers) would be required to maintain reserve accounts at multiple banks, unless they chose to do so for operational, business or other reasons. Therefore for the reasons discussed above, as adopted, paragraph (e)(5) of Rule 15c3–3, should not significantly impact a substantial number of small entities. E:\FR\FM\21AUR2.SGM 21AUR2 51896 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 162 / Wednesday, August 21, 2013 / Rules and Regulations 3. Small Entities Subject to the Rule Paragraph (c)(1) of Rule 0–10 909 states that the term small business or small organization, when referring to a brokerdealer, means a broker or dealer that had total capital (net worth plus subordinated liabilities) of less than $500,000 on the date in the prior fiscal year as of which its audited financial statements were prepared pursuant to Rule 17a–5(d); 910 and is not affiliated with any person (other than a natural person) that is not a small business or small organization. Based on FOCUS Report data, as of December 31, 2011, the Commission estimates there are approximately 5 broker-dealers that performed a customer reserve computation pursuant to Rule 15c3–3 and were ‘‘small’’ for the purposes Rule 0–10. emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with RULES2 4. Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other Compliance Requirements The amendments (1) Require brokerdealers to perform a PAB reserve computation, (2) limit the amount that a broker-dealer may deposit in a reserve account at any individual bank in the form of cash, (3) require broker-dealers to obtain possession and control of customers’ fully paid and excess margin securities allocated to a short position by borrowing equivalent securities or through other means within a specified period of time, and (4) require brokerdealers to obtain the written affirmative consent of a new customer before including a customer’s free credit balances in a Sweep Program, as well as provide certain disclosures and notices to all customers with regard to the broker-dealer’s Sweep Program. 5. Agency Action To Minimize Effect on Small Entities The RFA directs the Commission to consider significant alternatives that would accomplish the stated objectives, while minimizing any significant adverse impact on small entities. In connection with adopting the final rules, the Commission considered, as alternatives, establishing different compliance or reporting requirements that take into account the resources available to smaller entities, exempting smaller entities from coverage of the disclosure requirements, and clarifying, consolidating, or simplifying disclosure for small entities.911 As discussed above, the impact on individual small broker-dealers, as well as all small broker-dealers, should be minimal, and thus the Commission is CFR 240.0–10(c)(1). CFR 240.17a–5(d). 911 5 U.S.C. 604(a)(5). not establishing different compliance or reporting requirements or timetables; clarifying, consolidating, or simplifying compliance and reporting requirements under the rule for small entities; or exempting small entities from coverage of the rule, or any part thereof. The amendments impose performance standards and do not dictate for entities of any size any particular design standards (e.g., technology) that must be employed to achieve the objectives of the amendments. 4. Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other Compliance Requirements C. Holding Futures Positions in a Securities Portfolio Margining Account 5. Agency Action To Minimize Effect on Small Entities 1. Need for and Objectives of the Amendments As stated above, the Commission does not believe that any of the brokerdealers that will elect to offer portfolio margining are ‘‘small’’ for purposes of Rule 0–10. Further, the requirements imposed by the portfolio margin amendments will be elective. Therefore, the Commission does not believe it is necessary or appropriate to establish different compliance or reporting requirements or timetables; clarify, consolidate, or simplify compliance and reporting requirements under the rule for small entities; or exempting small entities from coverage of the rule, or any part thereof. The amendments also contain performance standards and do not dictate for entities of any size any particular design standards (e.g., technology) that must be employed to achieve the objectives of the proposed amendments. The amendments to Rule 15c3–3 and 15c3–3a are designed to accommodate futures positions in a securities account that is margined on a portfolio basis.912 Under SRO portfolio margin rules, a broker-dealer can combine securities and futures positions in a portfolio margin securities account to compute margin requirements based on the net market risk of all positions in the account. The amendments to Rule 15c3– 3 and 15c3–3a complement the amendments to SIPA in the Dodd-Frank Act, as well as provide additional protections to customers through the strengthened reserve requirements of Rule 15c3–3. In particular, the changes will apply the protections in Rules 15c3–3 and Rule 15c3–3a to all positions in a portfolio margin account. These additional protections should make portfolio margining more attractive to investors. Portfolio margining can significantly reduce customer margin requirements for offsetting positions involving securities and futures products, which in turn reduces the costs of trading such products. 2. Significant Issues Raised by Public Comments The Commission did not receive any specific comments with respect to this portion of the IRFA. 3. Small Entities Subject to the Rules As discussed above in section V.D.2. of this release, based on FOCUS Report data, as of December 31, 2011, the Commission estimates that approximately 35 broker-dealers will elect to offer their customers portfolio margin accounts that will include futures and futures options. None of these broker-dealers are ‘‘small’’ for purposes of Rule 0–10. These amendments (1) revise the definition of free credit balances and other credit balances in Rule 15c3–3 to include funds in a portfolio margin account relating to certain futures and futures options positions, and (2) add a debit line item to the customer reserve formula in Rule 15c3–3a consisting of margin posted by a broker-dealer to a derivatives clearing organization. D. Securities Lending and Borrowing and Repurchase/Reverse Repurchase Transactions 1. Need for and Objectives of the Amendments These rules amend subparagraph (c)(2)(iv)(B) of Rule 15c3–3 to clarify that broker-dealers providing securities lending and borrowing settlement services are deemed, for purposes of the rule, to be acting as principals and are subject to applicable capital deductions, unless the broker-dealer takes certain steps to disclaim principal liability.913 In addition, the Commission is adopting paragraph (c)(5) to Rule 17a–11 to require that a broker-dealer notify the Commission whenever the total amount of money payable against all securities loaned or subject to a repurchase agreement exceeds 2,500 percent of tentative net capital.914 The final rule also exempts a broker-dealer from this 17a–11 notice requirement if it reports monthly its securities lending and borrowing and repurchase and reverse 909 17 910 17 VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:54 Aug 20, 2013 912 See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12868–12870. Jkt 229001 PO 00000 Frm 00074 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 913 See section II.C. of this release. 914 Id. E:\FR\FM\21AUR2.SGM 21AUR2 emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with RULES2 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 162 / Wednesday, August 21, 2013 / Rules and Regulations repurchase activity to its DEA in a form acceptable to its DEA. In 2001, MJK Clearing, a broker-dealer with a substantial number of customer accounts, failed when it could not meet its securities lending obligations. This failure has highlighted the risks associated with securities lending and repurchase and reverse repurchase agreements and the need to manage those risks. More specifically, two concerns arose from the failure of MJK, namely, (1) that broker-dealers with principal liability in a stock loan transaction may erroneously be considering themselves as acting in an agency capacity and, consequently, not taking appropriate capital charges; and (2) that broker-dealers that have historically not been very active in stock loan transactions may be rapidly expanding their balance sheets with such transactions, and thereby, increase leverage to a level that poses significant financial risk to the firm and its counterparties. These amendments are intended to strengthen the documentation controls broker-dealers employ to manage their securities lending and borrowing and securities repurchase and reverse repurchase activities and to enhance regulatory monitoring. The intended result of the amendments is to avoid ambiguity regarding the applicability of the stock loan charges in the net capital rule to a particular broker-dealer. As the failure of MJK illustrated, disputes can arise over whether a broker-dealer is acting as a principal or agent in a stock loan transaction.915 The amendments to paragraph (c)(5) to Rule 17a–11 will help identify broker-dealers with highly leveraged non-government securities lending and borrowing and repo operations and make it easier for regulators to respond more quickly and protect customers in the event a firm is approaching insolvency.916 This notice provision is designed to alert regulators to a sudden increase in a broker-dealer’s stock loan and repo positions, which could indicate that the broker-dealer is taking on new risk that it may have limited experience in managing, as well as to help identify those broker-dealers highly active in securities lending and repos. Finally, the objective of the exemption from the notice provision of paragraph (c)(5) of Rule 17a–11 through monthly reporting is designed to accommodate large broker-dealers that are active in this business and regularly 915 See, e.g., Nomura v. E*Trade, 280 F.Supp.2d 184 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 916 17 CFR 240.17a–11(c)(5). VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:54 Aug 20, 2013 Jkt 229001 maintain stock loan and repo balances that exceed the threshold. 2. Significant Issues Raised by Public Comments The Commission did not receive any specific comments with respect to this portion of the IRFA. 3. Small Entities Subject to the Rule Based on FOCUS Report data, as of December 31, 2011, the Commission estimates that none of the broker-dealers that engage in securities lending and borrowing or securities repurchase and reverse repurchase activity are ‘‘small’’ for the purposes Rule 0–10. Therefore, the amendments should not affect ‘‘small’’ broker-dealers. 4. Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other Compliance Requirements These amendments require brokerdealers to (1) disclose the principals and obtain certain agreements from the principals in a transaction where they provide settlement services in order to be considered an agent (as opposed to a principal) for the purposes of the net capital rule, and (2) provide notice to the Commission and other regulatory authorities if the broker-dealer’s securities lending or repo activity reaches a certain threshold or, alternatively, report monthly the brokerdealer’s securities lending and repo activity to the broker-dealer’s DEA, in a form acceptable to the DEA. 5. Agency Action To Minimize Effect on Small Entities As noted above, the Commission estimates that this amendment will have no impact on small entities. Thus, the Commission does not believe it is necessary or appropriate to establish different compliance or reporting requirements or timetables, nor is it clarifying, consolidating, or simplifying compliance and reporting requirements under the rule for small entities; or exempt small entities from coverage of the rule, or any part thereof. The amendments also use performance standards and do not dictate for entities of any size any particular design standards (e.g., technology) that must be employed to achieve the objectives of the proposed amendments. E. Documentation of Risk Management Procedures 1. Need for and Objectives of the Amendments Requiring certain large broker-dealers to document and preserve their internal credit, market, and liquidity risk management controls under paragraph (a)(23) to Rule 17a–3 and (e)(9) to Rule PO 00000 Frm 00075 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 51897 17a–4 will assist firms in evaluating and adhering to their established internal risk management controls and regulators in reviewing such controls.917 These amendments are intended to strengthen the controls certain large broker-dealers employ to manage risk. These amendments are designed to lower systemic risk primarily in the securities markets by enhancing risk management through reinforcement of documentation practices and making it easier for regulators to access a brokerdealer’s procedures and controls, to ensure a broker-dealer is adhering to such documented controls. Additionally, by making the documented controls a required record under Rule 17a–3, a broker-dealer’s regulator likely will have better access to them, as this benefit will only be realized to the extent a broker-dealer has existing market, credit and liquidity risk management controls in place because the rule does not specify the type of controls a broker-dealer must establish to manage these risks. It simply requires the documentation of the procedures the broker-dealer has established. The final rule amendment will require any such records of the market, credit, and liquidity risk management controls be available to the broker-dealer’s regulators so they can review whether the broker-dealer is adhering to these controls. 2. Significant Issues Raised by Public Comments The Commission did not receive any specific comments with respect to this portion of the IRFA. 3. Small Entities Subject to the Rule These amendments apply to a limited number of broker-dealers, namely, those firms with more than $1 million in customer credits or $20 million in capital. Based on FOCUS Report data, as of December 31, 2011, the Commission estimates that none of the broker-dealers that will be subject to this amendment will be ‘‘small’’ for the purposes Rule 0– 10. 4. Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other Compliance Requirements These amendments will require broker-dealers to document any credit, market, and liquidity risk management controls established and maintained by the broker-dealer to assist it in analyzing and managing the risks associated with its business activities. The Commission is not mandating any specific controls, procedures, or policies that must be established by a broker-dealer to manage 917 See E:\FR\FM\21AUR2.SGM section II.D. of this release. 21AUR2 51898 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 162 / Wednesday, August 21, 2013 / Rules and Regulations market, credit, or liquidity risk. Rather, the Commission is requiring that a control, procedure, or policy be documented if it is in place. 5. Agency Action To Minimize Effect on Small Entities As noted above, these amendments will have no impact on ‘‘small’’ brokerdealers. Thus, the Commission is not establishing different compliance or reporting requirements or timetables; clarifying, consolidating, or simplifying compliance and reporting requirements under the rule for small entities; nor exempting small entities from coverage of the rule, or any part thereof. The amendments also use performance standards and do not dictate for entities of any size any particular design standards (e.g., technology) that must be employed to achieve the objectives of the amendments. F. Amendments to the Net Capital Rule emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with RULES2 1. Need for and Objectives of the Amendments The amendments to Rule 15c3–1 are designed to address several areas of concern regarding the financial responsibility requirements for brokerdealers. Some broker-dealers have excluded from their regulatory financial reports certain liabilities that have been shifted to third parties that lack the resources—independent of the assets and revenue of the broker-dealer—to pay the liabilities, or have utilized infusions of temporary capital. These practices may misrepresent the true financial condition of the broker-dealer and, thereby, impede the ability of regulators to take proactive steps to reduce the harm to customers, counterparties and clearing agencies that may result from the broker-dealer’s failure. To address these issues, the Commission is adopting an amendment to Rule 15c3–1 to add a new paragraph (c)(2)(i)(F) requiring a broker-dealer to adjust its net worth when calculating net capital by including any liability or expense for which a third party has assumed the responsibility, unless the broker-dealer can demonstrate that the third party has adequate resources, independent of the broker-dealer to pay the liability or expense.918 In addition, the Commission is adopting amendments to paragraph (c)(2)(i)(G)(2) of Rule 15c3–1, to require a brokerdealer to subtract from net worth any contribution of capital to the brokerdealer: (1) Under an agreement that provides the investor with the option to 918 See section II.E.1. of this release. VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:54 Aug 20, 2013 Jkt 229001 withdraw the capital; or (2) that is intended to be withdrawn within a period of one year of its contribution. Under the final rule, any withdrawal of capital made within one year of its contribution is deemed to have been intended to be withdrawn within a period of one year, unless the withdrawal has been approved in writing by the broker-dealer’s DEA.919 Further, currently, broker-dealers are required to take net capital charges pursuant to SRO rules relating to fidelity bond deductibles, but Rule 15c3–1 does not explicitly incorporate such charges for purposes of computing net capital. To address this inconsistency, the Commission is adopting paragraph (c)(2)(xiv) to Rule 15c3–1.920 In addition, a number of brokerdealers have sought to obtain protection under the bankruptcy laws while still engaging in a securities business. Permitting an insolvent broker-dealer to continue to transact a securities business endangers its customers and counterparties and places securities clearing agencies at risk. To address this concern, the Commission is adopting an amendment to paragraph (a) of Rule 15c3–1 to require a broker-dealer to cease its securities business activities if certain insolvency events were to occur, as defined in new paragraph (c)(16) to Rule 15c3–1.921 Finally, an important goal of the Commission is to protect the financial integrity of the broker-dealer so that if the firm must liquidate it may do so in an orderly fashion. Allowing a capital withdrawal that may jeopardize the financial integrity of a broker-dealer exposes customers and creditors of the broker-dealer to unnecessary risk. Paragraph (e) of Rule 15c3–1, which places certain conditions on a brokerdealer when withdrawing capital,922 allows the Commission to issue an order temporarily restricting a broker-dealer from withdrawing capital or making loans or advances to stockholders, insiders, and affiliates under certain circumstances.923 The rule, however, limits such orders to withdrawals, advances, or loans that, when aggregated with all other withdrawals, advances, or loans on a net basis during a thirty calendar day period, exceed 30% of the firm’s excess net capital. The Commission is amending paragraph (e) to remove the 30% of excess net capital limitation because the Commission has 919 See section II.E.2. of this release. section II.E.4. of this release. 921 See section II.E.5. of this release. 922 See 17 CFR 240.15c3–1(e). 923 See 17 CFR 240.15c3–1(e)(3). 920 See PO 00000 Frm 00076 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 determined that the requirement is difficult to enforce, as it generally would not be clear when the 30% threshold had been reached, due to the inherent unreliability of a troubled broker-dealer’s books and records.924 Finally, the Commission is making permanent a temporary amendment to Appendix A of Rule 15c3–1, which permits broker-dealers to employ theoretical option pricing models to calculate haircuts for listed options and related positions that hedge those options.925 The temporary amendment decreased the range of pricing inputs to the approved option pricing models, which effectively reduced the haircuts applied by the carrying firm with respect to non-clearing option specialist and market maker accounts.926 The amendment is intended to better align the capital requirements with the risks these requirements are designed to address. 2. Significant Issues Raised by Public Comments The Commission received three comments in response to requests for comment related to the amendments to the net capital rule requiring brokerdealers to add back to its net worth certain liabilities assumed by third parties and treat certain temporary capital contributions as liabilities.927 One commenter noted that there should be no circumstance in which a broker-dealer accepted a capital contribution for net capital purposes that could be withdrawn at the option of the investor.928 This commenter also noted that if small firms were required to raise over $300,000 in capital each, there will be the largest dissolution of small broker-dealers in the history of the regulated securities industry.929 The commenter requested that the Commission state a reasonable time period for broker-dealers to raise capital 924 See section II.E.6. of this release. CFR 240.15c3–1a; See Net Capital Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 38248 (Feb. 6, 1997), 62 FR 6474 (Feb. 12, 1997). See also Letter from Michael Macchiaroli, Associate Director, Division of Market Regulation, Commission, to Richard Lewandowski, Vice President, Regulatory Division, The Chicago Board Options Exchange, Inc. (Jan. 13, 2000) (stating that the Division of Market Regulation ‘‘will not recommend . . . enforcement action if non-clearing option specialists and marketmakers continue to rely on subparagraph (b)(1)(iv) of Appendix A to Rule 15c3–1 under the Exchange Act until such time as the Commission has determined whether it should be extended’’). The letter did not grant any other relief. 926 See Net Capital Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 38248 (Feb. 6, 1997), 62 FR 6474 (Feb. 12, 1997). 927 See Beer Letter; Levene Letter; NIBA 2 Letter. 928 See NIBA 2 Letter. 929 Id. 925 17 E:\FR\FM\21AUR2.SGM 21AUR2 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 162 / Wednesday, August 21, 2013 / Rules and Regulations to meet these new standards.930 This commenter also stated that the Commission’s estimate of a gross cost of capital of 7.5% (5% + 2.5%) is a totally unrealistic cost of capital for small broker-dealers and that these brokerdealers will categorically have costs significantly higher than 7.5%.931 Further, the commenter stated that, until the Commission convenes a small broker-dealer representative panel to assist it with establishing such costs, the Commission is ‘‘speculating’’ on such costs, and is therefore without adequate information to consider the effects of such costs and changes on small firms.932 This commenter specifically requested the Commission consider the needs of small firms that will likely require additional net capital over the next decade.933 Additionally, this commenter believed that the rule is intended to protect the capitalization of large firms while ignoring small firms. The commenter also noted that it opposes regulation that arbitrarily reduces the value of small broker-dealers and their competitive position relative to larger broker-dealers.934 Finally, the commenter expressed concern that the proposed amendments to Rule 15c3–1 would be particularly burdensome on small broker-dealers, negatively impacting capital formation for small issuers and increasing the cost of capital for small broker-dealers.935 Another commenter stated that this proposal will require the 702 mentioned debt-free introducing broker-dealers to needlessly take on debt of approximately $280,354.936 Further, the commenter stated that, if the proposed is approved, it would force the majority of small firms out of business and ultimately deny investors the right and opportunity to deal with smaller, more 930 Id. 931 Id. emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with RULES2 932 Id. 933 Id. The commenter stated that any rule that would ‘‘restrict small broker-dealers from raising capital as a result of uncertainty of investors or owner-operators related to the return of their capital in a reasonable time frame will create a disproportionate and impossible hurdle for small broker-dealers to overcome.’’ See NIBA 2 Letter. 934 See NIBA 2 Letter. 935 Id. The commenter noted that broker-dealers ‘‘are dealing with a relatively static commission and fees matrix versus what they may charge customers.’’ Consequently, the commenter believes ‘‘broker-dealers will be unable to pass any of these costs increases directly to customers, irrespective of the type of customer or type of business that they are conducting with small broker-dealers, which further threatens the financial profit potential and return on equity of small broker-dealers.’’ Id. The commenter further believes that the cost increases over a short period of time will threaten the viability of all small broker-dealers. Id. 936 See Beer Letter. VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:54 Aug 20, 2013 Jkt 229001 personalized and debt-free member firms.937 One commenter stated that it also must be considered that any implementation and enforcement of these proposed changes should not be made retroactive, because to subject firms to a new set of rules and guidelines will effectively penalize small firms that have been in full compliance with the rules and regulations.938 The Commission considered all comments discussed above and the potential impact on small brokerdealers.939 The Commission continues to believe that the estimated cost of capital is not unrealistic for small broker-dealers. However, as discussed above in section V. of this release, in response to comments, the Commission increased the estimated cost of capital for these amendments is 12%. Moreover, as discussed in section II.E.1 and 2. of this release, the baseline of these rules is current Rule 15c3–1 and existing guidance and interpretations. The Commission staff has provided guidance with respect to the treatment and recording of certain broker-dealer expenses and liabilities that is consistent with the rule amendment.940 In addition, existing broker-dealer recordkeeping rules require that a broker-dealer record its income and expenses.941 For example, paragraph (a)(2) of Rule 17a–3, requires a broker-dealer to make and keep current ledgers (or other records) reflecting all assets and liabilities, income and expense and capital accounts.942 Therefore, the Commission does not expect small broker-dealers to incur significant costs or burdens to comply with the amendment regarding broker-dealers and payment of expenses by third parties.943 At the same time, the purpose of the requirement in new paragraph (c)(2)(i)(F) of Rule 15c3–1 is to address the practices of a broker-dealer that raise concerns when a broker-dealer shifts liabilities to an entity with no revenue or assets independent of the brokerdealer to inappropriately increase its reported net capital, by excluding the liability from the calculation of net worth. Therefore, the final rule, as discussed above in section II.E.1. of this release, is designed to prohibit a practice that could misrepresent a 51899 broker-dealer’s actual financial condition, deceive the firm’s customers, and hamper the ability of regulators to monitor the firm’s financial condition. Moreover, in response to comments,944 the rule amendment, as adopted, should not impose burdens or present serious implementation difficulties to small broker-dealers 945 that are appropriately recording their assets and liabilities under current Commission rules and interpretive guidance.946 These broker-dealers also should not be required to obtain loans to increase their capital as a result of the Rule 15c3–1 amendments. Therefore, the Commission does not believe a longer time period for compliance or the formation of a small broker-dealer advisory cost committee is necessary.947 In response to the commenters’ concerns about the negative impact of the rule amendments on the capital of small broker-dealers,948 as discussed above, the final rule amendment is a codification of existing Commission staff guidance,949 and thus should not represent a change for small brokerdealers with respect to capital withdrawals. Moreover, with respect to commenters’ concerns about obtaining capital,950 the rule does not prohibit an investor from withdrawing capital at any time. Rather, it prohibits a brokerdealer from treating temporary cash infusions as capital for purposes of the net capital rule. Finally, the final rule amendments provide a mechanism for a broker-dealer to apply to its DEA to make a withdrawal within one year of the capital contribution without triggering the deduction under certain circumstances (e.g., de minimis withdrawals). 3. Small Entities Subject to the Rule Based on FOCUS Report data, as of December 31, 2011, the Commission estimates that there are approximately 2,506 introducing and carrying brokerdealers that are ‘‘small’’ for the purposes Rule 0–10. The amendments relating to certain subtractions from net worth and the restrictions on the withdrawal of capital will apply to all ‘‘small’’ brokerdealers in that they will be subject to the requirements in the amendments. The amendment to Appendix A of Rule 15c3–1 likely should have no, or little, impact on ‘‘small’’ broker-dealers, because based on staff experience, most, 937 Id. 938 See 944 Id. 939 See 945 See Levene Letter. Beer Letter; Levene Letter; NIBA 2 Letter. 940 See, e.g., Third Party Expense Letter; see also FINRA Notice to Members 03–6, Expense Sharing Agreements. 941 17 CFR 240.17a–3; 17 CFR 240.17a–4. 942 17 CFR 240.17a–3(a)(2). 943 See NIBA 2 Letter. PO 00000 Frm 00077 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 Beer Letter; Levene Letter; NIBA 2 Letter. e.g., Third Party Expense Letter. 947 See NIBA 2 Letter. 948 See Beer Letter; Levene Letter; NIBA 2 Letter. 949 See Temporary Capital Letter. See also section II.E.2. of this release. 950 See Beer Letter; NIBA 2 Letter. 946 See, E:\FR\FM\21AUR2.SGM 21AUR2 51900 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 162 / Wednesday, August 21, 2013 / Rules and Regulations if not all, of these firms do not carry non-clearing option specialist or market maker accounts. 4. Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other Compliance Requirements The amendments will require an ‘‘insolvent’’ broker-dealer to cease conducting a securities business and provide the securities regulators with notice of its insolvency. The amendments also will require brokerdealers to deduct from net worth certain liabilities and certain temporary capital contributions, as well as require brokerdealers to deduct from net capital, certain specified amounts as required by SRO fidelity bond rules. Finally, under the amendment to the rule on Commission orders restricting withdrawals of capital, a broker-dealer subject to an order will not be permitted to withdraw capital. Finally, the amendments will make permanent a temporary rule that reduced the haircut for non-clearing options specialist and market maker accounts under Appendix A to Rule 15c3–1. emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with RULES2 5. Agency Action To Minimize Effect on Small Entities As discussed in detail above, the Commission considered all comments received and adopted the amendment substantially as proposed.951 The Commission understands the concerns relating to small broker-dealers raised by commenters 952 and reiterates that the rule is designed to address situations where there is no legitimate reason to book liabilities to a separate legal entity that otherwise would accrue to the broker-dealer. Moreover, the final rule is consistent with current staff interpretations regarding third-party expense sharing and thus should not represent a change for broker-dealers. The Commission also notes that the final rule is designed to prohibit a practice that could misrepresent a broker-dealer’s actual financial condition, deceive the firm’s customers, and hamper the ability of regulators to monitor the firm’s financial condition. Moreover, the rule change, as adopted, should not impose undue burdens or present serious implementation difficulties for large or small brokerdealers. As the Commission explained in the proposing release, a broker-dealer can demonstrate the adequacy of the third party’s financial resources by maintaining records such as the third party’s most recent (i.e., as of a date 951 See section II.E.1. of this release. Beer Letter; Beer 2 Letter; Levene Letter; Lowenstein Letter; NIBA 2 Letter. See also discussion in section II.E.1. of this release. 952 See VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:54 Aug 20, 2013 Jkt 229001 within the previous twelve months) audited financial statements, tax returns, or regulatory filings containing financial reports.953 Given that the entity to which the broker-dealer is seeking to shift one or more liabilities typically is an affiliate, the staff’s experience is that such records should be available to the broker-dealer. Further, because the proposed rule change is consistent with prior staff guidance regarding the need to be able to demonstrate the third party’s financial adequacy, the broker-dealer seeking to shift a liability to a third party already would, under existing staff interpretations, expect to be ready to provide such evidence of the third party’s financial resources. Taken together, these realities should mitigate the implementation and burden concerns raised by commenters as they relate to small broker-dealers. One or more of these record types are generally readily available. The general availability of a satisfactory measure of financial resources should mitigate the implementation and burden concerns raised by the commenters. As discussed above, given the minimal impact these amendments will have on small entities, the Commission is not establishing different compliance or reporting requirements or timetables; clarifying, consolidating, or simplifying compliance and reporting requirements under the rule for small entities; nor exempting small entities from coverage of the rule, or any part thereof. The amendments use performance standards and do not dictate for entities of any size any particular design standards (e.g., technology) that must be employed to achieve the objectives of the amendments. VII. Statutory Authority The Commission is adopting amendments to Rules 15c3–1, 15c3–3, 17a–3, 17a–4 and 17a–11 under the Exchange Act pursuant to the authority conferred by the Exchange Act, including Sections 15, 17, 23(a) and 36.954 Text of Final Rules List of Subjects in 17 CFR Part 240 Brokers, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Securities. In accordance with the foregoing, the Commission hereby amends Title 17, 953 Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12872. The Commission specifically requested comment regarding the records by which a broker-dealer could demonstrate financial resources. It received no comments in response to this request. 954 15 U.S.C. 78o, 78q, 78w and 78mm. PO 00000 Frm 00078 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 Chapter II of the Code of Federal Regulation as follows. PART 240—GENERAL RULES AND REGULATIONS, SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 1. The general authority for Part 240 continues to read as follows: ■ Authority: 15 U.S.C. 77c, 77d, 77g, 77j, 77s, 77z–2, 77z–3, 77eee, 77ggg, 77nnn, 77sss, 77ttt, 78c, 78c–3, 78c–5, 78d, 78e, 78f, 78g, 78i, 78j, 78j–1, 78k, 78k–1, 78l, 78m, 78n, 78n–1, 78o, 78o–4, 78o–10, 78p, 78q, 78q–1, 78s, 78u–5, 78w, 78x, 78ll, 78mm, 80a–20, 80a–23, 80a–29, 80a–37, 80b–3, 80b– 4, 80b–11, 7201 et. seq., and 8302; 7 U.S.C. 2(c)(2)(E); 12 U.S.C. 5221(e)(3); 18 U.S.C. 1350; and Pub. L. 111–203, 939A, 124 Stat. 1376, (2010), unless otherwise noted. * * * * * 2. Section 240.15c3–1 is amended by: a. Revising the first sentence of paragraph (a) introductory text; ■ b. Removing from paragraph (a)(6)(iii)(A) the phrase ‘‘paragraph (c)(2)(x)(A)(1) through (9) of this section’’ and in its place adding the phrase ‘‘Appendix A (§ 240.15c3–1a)’’; ■ c. Revising the paragraph (c)(2)(i) heading; ■ d. Adding paragraphs (c)(2)(i)(F) and (G); ■ e. Revising paragraphs (c)(2)(iv)(B), (c)(2)(iv)(E), and (c)(2)(vi)(D)(1); ■ f. Adding paragraph (c)(2)(xiv); ■ g. Adding paragraph (c)(16) and an undesignated center heading; ■ h. Revising paragraph (e)(3)(i); and ■ i. Removing from the second sentence in paragraph (e)(3)(ii) the text ‘‘The hearing’’ and in its place adding the phrase ‘‘A hearing on an order temporarily prohibiting the withdrawal of capital’’. The revisions and additions read as follows: ■ ■ § 240.15c3–1 Net capital requirements for brokers or dealers. (a) Every broker or dealer must at all times have and maintain net capital no less than the greater of the highest minimum requirement applicable to its ratio requirement under paragraph (a)(1) of this section, or to any of its activities under paragraph (a)(2) of this section, and must otherwise not be ‘‘insolvent’’ as that term is defined in paragraph (c)(16) of this section. * * * * * * * * (c) * * * (2) * * * (i) Adjustments to net worth related to unrealized profit or loss, deferred tax provisions, and certain liabilities.* * * * * * * * (F) Subtracting from net worth any liability or expense relating to the E:\FR\FM\21AUR2.SGM 21AUR2 emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with RULES2 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 162 / Wednesday, August 21, 2013 / Rules and Regulations business of the broker or dealer for which a third party has assumed the responsibility, unless the broker or dealer can demonstrate that the third party has adequate resources independent of the broker or dealer to pay the liability or expense. (G) Subtracting from net worth any contribution of capital to the broker or dealer: (1) Under an agreement that provides the investor with the option to withdraw the capital; or (2) That is intended to be withdrawn within a period of one year of contribution. Any withdrawal of capital made within one year of its contribution is deemed to have been intended to be withdrawn within a period of one year, unless the withdrawal has been approved in writing by the Examining Authority for the broker or dealer. * * * * * (iv) * * * (B) All unsecured advances and loans; deficits in customers’ and noncustomers’ unsecured and partly secured notes; deficits in omnibus credit accounts maintained in compliance with the requirements of 12 CFR 220.7(f) of Regulation T under the Act, or similar accounts carried on behalf of another broker or dealer, after application of calls for margin, marks to the market or other required deposits that are outstanding 5 business days or less; deficits in customers’ and noncustomers’ unsecured and partly secured accounts after application of calls for margin, marks to market or other required deposits that are outstanding 5 business days or less, except deficits in cash accounts as defined in 12 CFR 220.8 of Regulation T under the Act for which not more than one extension respecting a specified securities transaction has been requested and granted, and deducting for securities carried in any of such accounts the percentages specified in paragraph (c)(2)(vi) of this section or Appendix A, § 240.15c3–1a; the market value of stock loaned in excess of the value of any collateral received therefor; receivables arising out of free shipments of securities (other than mutual fund redemptions) in excess of $5,000 per shipment and all free shipments (other than mutual fund redemptions) outstanding more than 7 business days, and mutual fund redemptions outstanding more than 16 business days; and any collateral deficiencies in secured demand notes as defined in Appendix D, § 240.15c3–1d; a broker or dealer that participates in a loan of securities by one party to another party will be deemed a principal for the VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:54 Aug 20, 2013 Jkt 229001 purpose of the deductions required under this section, unless the broker or dealer has fully disclosed the identity of each party to the other and each party has expressly agreed in writing that the obligations of the broker or dealer do not include a guarantee of performance by the other party and that such party’s remedies in the event of a default by the other party do not include a right of setoff against obligations, if any, of the broker or dealer. * * * * * (E) Other Deductions. All other unsecured receivables; all assets doubtful of collection less any reserves established therefor; the amount by which the market value of securities failed to receive outstanding longer than thirty (30) calendar days exceeds the contract value of such fails to receive; and the funds on deposit in a ‘‘segregated trust account’’ in accordance with 17 CFR 270.27d–1 under the Investment Company Act of 1940, but only to the extent that the amount on deposit in such segregated trust account exceeds the amount of liability reserves established and maintained for refunds of charges required by sections 27(d) and 27(f) of the Investment Company Act of 1940; Provided, That the following need not be deducted: (1) Any amounts deposited in a Customer Reserve Bank Account or PAB Reserve Bank Account pursuant to § 240.15c3–3(e), (2) Cash and securities held in a securities account at a carrying broker or dealer (except where the account has been subordinated to the claims of creditors of the carrying broker or dealer), and (3) Clearing deposits. * * * * * (vi) * * * (D)(1) In the case of redeemable securities of an investment company registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940, which assets consist of cash or money market instruments and which is described in § 270.2a–7 of this chapter, the deduction will be 2% of the market value of the greater of the long or short position. * * * * * (xiv) Deduction from net worth for excess deductible amounts related to fidelity bond coverage. Deducting the amount specified by rule of the Examining Authority for the broker or dealer with respect to a requirement to maintain fidelity bond coverage. * * * * * PO 00000 Frm 00079 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 51901 Insolvent (16) For the purposes of this section, a broker or dealer is insolvent if the broker or dealer: (i) Is the subject of any bankruptcy, equity receivership proceeding or any other proceeding to reorganize, conserve, or liquidate such broker or dealer or its property or is applying for the appointment or election of a receiver, trustee, or liquidator or similar official for such broker or dealer or its property; (ii) Has made a general assignment for the benefit of creditors; (iii) Is insolvent within the meaning of section 101 of title 11 of the United States Code, or is unable to meet its obligations as they mature, and has made an admission to such effect in writing or in any court or before any agency of the United States or any State; or (iv) Is unable to make such computations as may be necessary to establish compliance with this section or with § 240.15c3–3. * * * * * (e) * * * (3)(i) Temporary restrictions on withdrawal of net capital. The Commission may by order restrict, for a period of up to twenty business days, any withdrawal by the broker or dealer of equity capital or unsecured loan or advance to a stockholder, partner, sole proprietor, member, employee or affiliate under such terms and conditions as the Commission deems necessary or appropriate in the public interest or consistent with the protection of investors if the Commission, based on the information available, concludes that such withdrawal, advance or loan may be detrimental to the financial integrity of the broker or dealer, or may unduly jeopardize the broker or dealer’s ability to repay its customer claims or other liabilities which may cause a significant impact on the markets or expose the customers or creditors of the broker or dealer to loss without taking into account the application of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970. * * * * * § 240.15c3–1a [Amended] 3. Section 240.15c3–1a is amended by: ■ a. Removing paragraph (b)(1)(iv)(B); and ■ b. Redesignating paragraphs (b)(1)(iv)(A) introductory text, (b)(1)(iv)(A)(1), (b)(1)(iv)(A)(2), and (b)(1)(iv)(A)(3) as paragraphs (b)(1)(iv) introductory text, (b)(1)(iv)(A), ■ E:\FR\FM\21AUR2.SGM 21AUR2 51902 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 162 / Wednesday, August 21, 2013 / Rules and Regulations (b)(1)(iv)(B), and (b)(1)(iv)(C) respectively. § 240.15c3–2 [Removed and Reserved] 4. Section 240.15c3–2 is removed and reserved. ■ 5. Section 240.15c3–3 is amended by: ■ a. Removing from paragraph (a)(1) introductory text, third sentence, the citation ‘‘220.19’’ and in its place adding the citation ‘‘220.12’’; ■ b. In paragraph (a)(1)(iii), after the phrase ‘‘(15 U.S.C. 78aaa et seq.)’’ adding ‘‘(SIPA)’’; ■ c. Removing the ‘‘;’’ at the end of paragraph (a)(1)(iv) and adding a period in its place; ■ d. Revising paragraphs (a)(3), (4), (7), (8), and (9); ■ e. Adding paragraphs (a)(16) and (17); ■ f. In paragraph (b)(2): ■ i. In the first sentence, removing the phrase ‘‘his physical possession or under his control’’ and in its place adding ‘‘the broker’s or dealer’s physical possession or under its control’’; ■ ii. In the second sentence, removing the word ‘‘he’’ and in its place adding ‘‘it’’; and ■ iii. In the second sentence, removing the word ‘‘his’’ and in its place adding ‘‘its’’; ■ g. Removing from paragraphs (b)(3)(iv) and (b)(4)(i)(C) the phrase ‘‘the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970’’ and in its place adding ‘‘SIPA’’; ■ h. At the end of paragraph (b)(4)(i)(C) adding the word ‘‘and,’’; ■ i. In paragraph (b)(4)(v), removing the word ‘‘his’’ and adding in its place ‘‘the person’s’’; ■ j. Adding paragraph (b)(5); ■ k. In paragraph (c)(2): ■ i. Removing ‘‘a special omnibus’’ and in its place adding ‘‘an omnibus credit’’; ■ ii. Removing the text ‘‘section 4(b) of Regulation T under the Act (12 CFR 220.4(b))’’ and in its place adding ‘‘section 7(f) of Regulation T (12 CFR 220.7(f))’’; and ■ iii. Removing the word ‘‘he’’ and in its place adding ‘‘it’’; ■ l. In paragraph (c)(3), removing the words ‘‘him’’ and ‘‘he’’ wherever they appear and in their place adding ‘‘the broker or dealer’’; ■ m. In the first sentence of paragraph (d) introductory text, removing the word ‘‘his’’ wherever it appears and in its place adding ‘‘its’’; ■ n. In paragraph (d)(2), removing the word ‘‘his’’ and in its place adding ‘‘the broker’s or dealer’s’’; ■ o. Removing the period at the end of paragraph (d)(3) and in its place adding ‘‘; or’’; ■ p. Redesignating paragraph (d)(4) as paragraph (d)(5); emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with RULES2 ■ VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:54 Aug 20, 2013 Jkt 229001 q. Adding a new paragraph (d)(4); r. Revising paragraphs (e) and (f); s. Revising the first sentence of paragraph (g); ■ t. Removing from paragraph (i) the text ‘‘his reserve bank account’’ and in its place adding ‘‘its Customer Reserve Bank Account, PAB Reserve Bank Account’’; ■ u. Adding paragraph (j); ■ v. In paragraph (k)(1)(i), removing the phrase ‘‘His dealer transactions’’ and in its place adding ‘‘The broker’s or dealer’s transactions as dealer’’, and removing the word ‘‘his’’ the second and third time the word ‘‘his’’ appears and in its place adding ‘‘its’’; ■ w. In paragraph (k)(1)(ii), removing the word ‘‘His’’ and in its place adding ‘‘The broker’s or dealer’s’’; ■ x. In paragraph (k)(1)(iii), removing the word ‘‘He’’ and in its place adding ‘‘The broker or dealer’’ and removing the word ‘‘his’’ and in its place adding ‘‘its’’; ■ y. In paragraph (k)(2)(i), removing the word ‘‘his’’ and in its place adding ‘‘its’’ wherever it appears; ■ z. Revising paragraph (l)(2); ■ aa. Removing from the last sentence in paragraph (m) before the Note, the text ‘‘a special omnibus’’ and in its place adding ‘‘an omnibus credit’’ and removing the text ‘‘section 4(b) of Regulation T [12 CFR 220.4(b)]’’ and in its place adding ‘‘section 7(f) of Regulation T (12 CFR 220.7(f))’’; ■ bb. Redesignate the Note following paragraph (m) as ‘‘Note to paragraph (m).’’; ■ cc. Removing from the first sentence in paragraph (n) the phrase ‘‘paragraphs (d)(2) and (3)’’ and in its place adding ‘‘paragraphs (d)(2) through (4)’’; and ■ dd. Removing from paragraph (o)(2)(i)(A) the phrase ‘‘the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15 U.S.C. 78aaa et seq.)’’ and in its place adding ‘‘SIPA’’; The revisions and additions read as follows: ■ ■ ■ § 240.15c3–3 Customer protection— reserves and custody of securities. (a) * * * (3) The term fully paid securities means all securities carried for the account of a customer in a cash account as defined in Regulation T (12 CFR 220.1 et seq.), as well as securities carried for the account of a customer in a margin account or any special account under Regulation T that have no loan value for margin purposes, and all margin equity securities in such accounts if they are fully paid: Provided, however, that the term fully paid securities does not apply to any securities purchased in transactions for PO 00000 Frm 00080 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 which the customer has not made full payment. (4) The term margin securities means those securities carried for the account of a customer in a margin account as defined in section 4 of Regulation T (12 CFR 220.4), as well as securities carried in any other account (such accounts hereinafter referred to as ‘‘margin accounts’’) other than the securities referred to in paragraph (a)(3) of this section. * * * * * (7) The term bank means a bank as defined in section 3(a)(6) of the Act and will also mean any building and loan, savings and loan or similar banking institution subject to supervision by a Federal banking authority. With respect to a broker or dealer that maintains its principal place of business in Canada, the term ‘‘bank’’ also means a Canadian bank subject to supervision by a Canadian authority. (8) The term free credit balances means liabilities of a broker or dealer to customers which are subject to immediate cash payment to customers on demand, whether resulting from sales of securities, dividends, interest, deposits or otherwise, excluding, however, funds in commodity accounts which are segregated in accordance with the Commodity Exchange Act or in a similar manner, or which are funds carried in a proprietary account as that term is defined in regulations under the Commodity Exchange Act. The term ‘‘free credit balances’’ also includes, if subject to immediate cash payment to customers on demand, funds carried in a securities account pursuant to a selfregulatory organization portfolio margining rule approved by the Commission under section 19(b) of the Act (15 U.S.C. 78s(b)) (‘‘SRO portfolio margining rule’’), including variation margin or initial margin, marks to market, and proceeds resulting from margin paid or released in connection with closing out, settling or exercising futures contracts and options thereon. (9) The term other credit balances means cash liabilities of a broker or dealer to customers other than free credit balances and funds in commodity accounts which are segregated in accordance with the Commodity Exchange Act or in a similar manner, or funds carried in a proprietary account as that term is defined in regulations under the Commodity Exchange Act. The term ‘‘other credit balances’’ also includes funds that are cash liabilities of a broker or dealer to customers other than free credit balances and are carried in a securities account pursuant to an SRO portfolio margining rule, including E:\FR\FM\21AUR2.SGM 21AUR2 emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with RULES2 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 162 / Wednesday, August 21, 2013 / Rules and Regulations variation margin or initial margin, marks to market, and proceeds resulting from margin paid or released in connection with closing out, settling or exercising futures contracts and options thereon. * * * * * (16) The term PAB account means a proprietary securities account of a broker or dealer (which includes a foreign broker or dealer, or a foreign bank acting as a broker or dealer) other than a delivery-versus-payment account or a receipt-versus-payment account. The term does not include an account that has been subordinated to the claims of creditors of the carrying broker or dealer. (17) The term Sweep Program means a service provided by a broker or dealer where it offers to its customer the option to automatically transfer free credit balances in the securities account of the customer to either a money market mutual fund product as described in § 270.2a–7 of this chapter or an account at a bank whose deposits are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. (b) * * * (5) A broker or dealer is required to obtain and thereafter maintain the physical possession or control of securities carried for a PAB account, unless the broker or dealer has provided written notice to the account holder that the securities may be used in the ordinary course of its securities business, and has provided an opportunity for the account holder to object. * * * * * (d) * * * (4) Securities included on the broker’s or dealer’s books or records that allocate to a short position of the broker or dealer or a short position for another person, excluding positions covered by paragraph (m) of this section, for more than 30 calendar days, then the broker or dealer must, not later than the business day following the day on which the determination is made, take prompt steps to obtain physical possession or control of such securities. For the purposes of this paragraph (d)(4), the 30 day time period will not begin to run with respect to a syndicate short position established in connection with an offering of securities until the completion of the underwriter’s participation in the distribution as determined pursuant to § 242.100(b) of Regulation M of this chapter (17 CFR 242.100 through 242.105); or * * * * * (e) Special reserve bank accounts for the exclusive benefit of customers and VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:54 Aug 20, 2013 Jkt 229001 PAB accounts. (1) Every broker or dealer must maintain with a bank or banks at all times when deposits are required or hereinafter specified a ‘‘Special Reserve Bank Account for the Exclusive Benefit of Customers’’ (hereinafter referred to as the Customer Reserve Bank Account) and a ‘‘Special Reserve Bank Account for Brokers and Dealers’’ (hereinafter referred to as the PAB Reserve Bank Account), each of which will be separate from the other and from any other bank account of the broker or dealer. Such broker or dealer must at all times maintain in the Customer Reserve Bank Account and the PAB Reserve Bank Account, through deposits made therein, cash and/or qualified securities in amounts computed in accordance with the formula attached as Exhibit A (17 CFR 240.15c3–3a), as applied to customer and PAB accounts respectively. (2) With respect to each computation required pursuant to paragraph (e)(1) of this section, a broker or dealer must not accept or use any of the amounts under items comprising Total Credits under the formula referred to in paragraph (e)(1) of this section except for the specified purposes indicated under items comprising Total Debits under the formula, and, to the extent Total Credits exceed Total Debits, at least the net amount thereof must be maintained in the Customer Reserve Bank Account and PAB Reserve Bank Account pursuant to paragraph (e)(1) of this section. (3) Reserve Bank Account computations. (i) Computations necessary to determine the amount required to be deposited in the Customer Reserve Bank Account and PAB Reserve Bank Account as specified in paragraph (e)(1) of this section must be made weekly, as of the close of the last business day of the week, and the deposit so computed must be made no later than one hour after the opening of banking business on the second following business day; provided, however, a broker or dealer which has aggregate indebtedness not exceeding 800 percent of net capital (as defined in § 240.15c3–1) and which carries aggregate customer funds (as defined in paragraph (a)(10) of this section), as computed at the last required computation pursuant to this section, not exceeding $1,000,000, may in the alternative make the Customer Reserve Bank Account computation monthly, as of the close of the last business day of the month, and, in such event, must deposit not less than 105 percent of the amount so computed no later than one hour after the opening of banking PO 00000 Frm 00081 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 51903 business on the second following business day. (ii) If a broker or dealer, computing on a monthly basis, has, at the time of any required computation, aggregate indebtedness in excess of 800 percent of net capital, such broker or dealer must thereafter compute weekly as aforesaid until four successive weekly Customer Reserve Bank Account computations are made, none of which were made at a time when its aggregate indebtedness exceeded 800 percent of its net capital. (iii) A broker or dealer that does not carry the accounts of a ‘‘customer’’ as defined by this section or conduct a proprietary trading business may make the computation to be performed with respect to PAB accounts under paragraph (e)(1) of this section monthly rather than weekly. If a broker or dealer performing the computation with respect to PAB accounts under paragraph (e)(1) of this section on a monthly basis is, at the time of any required computation, required to deposit additional cash or qualified securities in the PAB Reserve Bank Account, the broker or dealer must thereafter perform the computation required with respect to PAB accounts under paragraph (e)(1) of this section weekly until four successive weekly computations are made, none of which is made at a time when the broker or dealer was required to deposit additional cash or qualified securities in the PAB Reserve Bank Account. (iv) Computations in addition to the computations required in this paragraph (e)(3), may be made as of the close of any business day, and the deposits so computed must be made no later than one hour after the opening of banking business on the second following business day. (v) The broker or dealer must make and maintain a record of each such computation made pursuant to this paragraph (e)(3) or otherwise and preserve each such record in accordance with § 240.17a–4. (4) If the computation performed under paragraph (e)(3) of this section with respect to PAB accounts results in a deposit requirement, the requirement may be satisfied to the extent of any excess debit in the computation performed under paragraph (e)(3) of this section with respect to customer accounts of the same date. However, a deposit requirement resulting from the computation performed under paragraph (e)(3) of this section with respect to customer accounts cannot be satisfied with excess debits from the computation performed under paragraph (e)(3) of this section with respect to PAB accounts. E:\FR\FM\21AUR2.SGM 21AUR2 51904 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 162 / Wednesday, August 21, 2013 / Rules and Regulations (5) In determining whether a broker or dealer maintains the minimum deposits required under this section, the broker or dealer must exclude the total amount of any cash deposited with an affiliated bank. The broker or dealer also must exclude cash deposited with a nonaffiliated bank to the extent that the amount of the deposit exceeds 15% of the bank’s equity capital as reported by the bank in its most recent Call Report or any successor form the bank is required to file by its appropriate Federal banking agency (as defined by section 3 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1813)). (f) Notification of banks. A broker or dealer required to maintain a Customer Reserve Bank Account and PAB Reserve Bank Account prescribed by paragraph (e)(1) of this section or who maintains a Special Account referred to in paragraph (k) of this section must obtain and preserve in accordance with § 240.17a–4 a written notification from each bank with which it maintains a Customer Reserve Bank Account, a PAB Reserve Bank Account, or a Special Account that the bank was informed that all cash and/or qualified securities deposited therein are being held by the bank for the exclusive benefit of the customers and account holders of the broker or dealer in accordance with the regulations of the Commission, and are being kept separate from any other accounts maintained by the broker or dealer with the bank, and the broker or dealer must have a written contract with the bank which provides that the cash and/or qualified securities will at no time be used directly or indirectly as security for a loan to the broker or dealer by the bank and will not be subject to any right, charge, security interest, lien, or claim of any kind in favor of the bank or any person claiming through the bank. (g) Withdrawals from the reserve bank accounts. A broker or dealer may make withdrawals from a Customer Reserve Bank Account and a PAB Reserve Bank Account if and to the extent that at the time of the withdrawal the amount remaining in the Customer Reserve Bank Account and PAB Reserve Bank Account is not less than the amount then required by paragraph (e) of this section. * * * * * * * * (j) Treatment of free credit balances. (1) A broker or dealer must not accept or use any free credit balance carried for the account of any customer of the broker or dealer unless such broker or dealer has established adequate procedures pursuant to which each customer for whom a free credit balance is carried will be given or sent, together with or as part of the customer’s statement of account, whenever sent but not less frequently than once every three months, a written statement informing the customer of the amount due to the customer by the broker or dealer on the date of the statement, and that the funds are payable on demand of the customer. (2) A broker or dealer must not convert, invest, or transfer to another account or institution, credit balances held in a customer’s account except as provided in paragraphs (j)(2)(i) and (ii) of this section. (i) A broker or dealer is permitted to invest or transfer to another account or institution, free credit balances in a customer’s account only upon a specific order, authorization, or draft from the customer, and only in the manner, and under the terms and conditions, specified in the order, authorization, or draft. (ii) A broker or dealer is permitted to transfer free credit balances held in a customer’s securities account to a product in its Sweep Program or to transfer a customer’s interest in one product in a Sweep Program to another product in a Sweep Program, provided: (A) For an account opened on or after the effective date of this paragraph (j)(2)(ii), the customer gives prior written affirmative consent to having free credit balances in the customer’s securities account included in the Sweep Program after being notified: (1) Of the general terms and conditions of the products available through the Sweep Program; and (2) That the broker or dealer may change the products available under the Sweep Program. (B) For any account: (1) The broker or dealer provides the customer with the disclosures and notices regarding the Sweep Program required by each self-regulatory organization of which the broker or dealer is a member; (2) The broker or dealer provides notice to the customer, as part of the customer’s quarterly statement of account, that the balance in the bank deposit account or shares of the money market mutual fund in which the customer has a beneficial interest can be liquidated on the customer’s order and the proceeds returned to the securities account or remitted to the customer; and (3)(i) The broker or dealer provides the customer with written notice at least 30 calendar days before: (A) Making changes to the terms and conditions of the Sweep Program; (B) Making changes to the terms and conditions of a product currently available through the Sweep Program; (C) Changing, adding or deleting products available through the Sweep Program; or (D) Changing the customer’s investment through the Sweep Program from one product to another. (ii) The notice must describe the new terms and conditions of the Sweep Program or product or the new product, and the options available to the customer if the customer does not accept the new terms and conditions or product. * * * * * (l) Delivery of securities. * * * (2) Margin securities upon full payment by such customer to the broker or dealer of the customer’s indebtedness to the broker or dealer; and, subject to the right of the broker or dealer under Regulation T (12 CFR 220) to retain collateral for its own protection beyond the requirements of Regulation T, excess margin securities not reasonably required to collateralize such customer’s indebtedness to the broker or dealer. * * * * * ■ 6. Section 240.15c3–3a is revised to read as follows: § 240.15c3–3a Exhibit A—Formula for determination of customer and PAB account reserve requirements of brokers and dealers under § 240.15c3–3. emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with RULES2 Credits 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. Free credit balances and other credit balances in customers’ security accounts. (See Note A) ...................... Monies borrowed collateralized by securities carried for the accounts of customers (See Note B) .................. Monies payable against customers’ securities loaned (See Note C) ................................................................. Customers’ securities failed to receive (See Note D) ......................................................................................... Credit balances in firm accounts which are attributable to principal sales to customers. .................................. Market value of stock dividends, stock splits and similar distributions receivable outstanding over 30 calendar days ........................................................................................................................................................... 7. Market value of short security count differences over 30 calendar days old ..................................................... VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:54 Aug 20, 2013 Jkt 229001 PO 00000 Frm 00082 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 E:\FR\FM\21AUR2.SGM 21AUR2 Debits XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ ........................ XXX XXX ........................ ........................ Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 162 / Wednesday, August 21, 2013 / Rules and Regulations 51905 Credits emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with RULES2 8. Market value of short securities and credits (not to be offset by longs or by debits) in all suspense accounts over 30 calendar days ......................................................................................................................................... 9. Market value of securities which are in transfer in excess of 40 calendar days and have not been confirmed to be in transfer by the transfer agent or the issuer during the 40 days ............................................................ 10. Debit balances in customers’ cash and margin accounts excluding unsecured accounts and accounts doubtful of collection. (See Note E) ..................................................................................................................... 11. Securities borrowed to effectuate short sales by customers and securities borrowed to make delivery on customers’ securities failed to deliver .................................................................................................................. 12. Failed to deliver of customers’ securities not older than 30 calendar days ..................................................... 13. Margin required and on deposit with the Options Clearing Corporation for all option contracts written or purchased in customer accounts. (See Note F) .................................................................................................. 14. Margin required and on deposit with a clearing agency registered with the Commission under section 17A of the Act (15 U.S.C. 78q–1) or a derivatives clearing organization registered with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission under section 5b of the Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 7a–1) related to the following types of positions written, purchased or sold in customer accounts: (1) security futures products and (2) futures contracts (and options thereon) carried in a securities account pursuant to an SRO portfolio margining rule (See Note G) ...................................................................................................................................... Total credits ...................................................................................................................................................... Total debits ....................................................................................................................................................... 15. Excess of total credits (sum of items 1–9) over total debits (sum of items 10–14) required to be on deposit in the ‘‘Reserve Bank Account’’ (§ 240.15c3–3(e)). If the computation is made monthly as permitted by this section, the deposit must be not less than 105% of the excess of total credits over total debits. ..................... Notes Regarding the Customer Reserve Bank Account Computation Note A. Item 1 must include all outstanding drafts payable to customers which have been applied against free credit balances or other credit balances and must also include checks drawn in excess of bank balances per the records of the broker or dealer. Note B. Item 2 must include the amount of options-related or security futures product-related Letters of Credit obtained by a member of a registered clearing agency or a derivatives clearing organization which are collateralized by customers’ securities, to the extent of the member’s margin requirement at the registered clearing agency or derivatives clearing organization. Item 2 must also include the amount of Letters of Credit which are collateralized by customers’ securities and related to other futures contracts (and options thereon) carried in a securities account pursuant to an SRO portfolio margining rule. Note C. Item 3 must include in addition to monies payable against customers’ securities loaned the amount by which the market value of securities loaned exceeds the collateral value received from the lending of such securities. Note D. Item 4 must include in addition to customers’ securities failed to receive the amount by which the market value of securities failed to receive and outstanding more than thirty (30) calendar days exceeds their contract value. Note E. (1) Debit balances in margin accounts must be reduced by the amount by which a specific security (other than an exempted security) which is collateral for margin accounts exceeds VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:54 Aug 20, 2013 Jkt 229001 in aggregate value 15 percent of the aggregate value of all securities which collateralize all margin accounts receivable; provided, however, the required reduction must not be in excess of the amounts of the debit balance required to be excluded because of this concentration rule. A specified security is deemed to be collateral for a margin account only to the extent it represents in value not more than 140 percent of the customer debit balance in a margin account. (2) Debit balances in special omnibus accounts, maintained in compliance with the requirements of Section 7(f) of Regulation T (12 CFR 220.7(f)) or similar accounts carried on behalf of another broker or dealer, must be reduced by any deficits in such accounts (or if a credit, such credit must be increased) less any calls for margin, mark to the market, or other required deposits which are outstanding 5 business days or less. (3) Debit balances in customers’ cash and margin accounts included in the formula under Item 10 must be reduced by an amount equal to 1 percent of their aggregate value. (4) Debit balances in cash and margin accounts of household members and other persons related to principals of a broker or dealer and debit balances in cash and margin accounts of affiliated persons of a broker or dealer must be excluded from the Reserve Formula, unless the broker or dealer can demonstrate that such debit balances are directly related to credit items in the formula. (5) Debit balances in margin accounts (other than omnibus accounts) must be reduced by the amount by which any PO 00000 Frm 00083 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 Debits XXX ........................ XXX ........................ ........................ XXX ........................ ........................ XXX XXX ........................ XXX ........................ ........................ ........................ XXX ........................ ........................ ........................ XXX single customer’s debit balance exceeds 25% (to the extent such amount is greater than $50,000) of the brokerdealer’s tentative net capital (i.e., net capital prior to securities haircuts) unless the broker or dealer can demonstrate that the debit balance is directly related to credit items in the Reserve Formula. Related accounts (e.g., the separate accounts of an individual, accounts under common control or subject to cross guarantees) will be deemed to be a single customer’s accounts for purposes of this provision. If the registered national securities exchange or the registered national securities association having responsibility for examining the broker or dealer (‘‘designated examining authority’’) is satisfied, after taking into account the circumstances of the concentrated account including the quality, diversity, and marketability of the collateral securing the debit balances or margin accounts subject to this provision, that the concentration of debit balances is appropriate, then such designated examining authority may grant a partial or plenary exception from this provision. The debit balance may be included in the reserve formula computation for five business days from the day the request is made. (6) Debit balances in joint accounts, custodian accounts, participation in hedge funds or limited partnerships or similar type accounts or arrangements that include both assets of a person or persons who would be excluded from the definition of customer (‘‘noncustomer’’) and assets of a person or persons who would be included in the definition of customer must be included in the Reserve Formula in the E:\FR\FM\21AUR2.SGM 21AUR2 emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with RULES2 51906 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 162 / Wednesday, August 21, 2013 / Rules and Regulations following manner: If the percentage ownership of the non-customer is less than 5 percent then the entire debit balance shall be included in the formula; if such percentage ownership is between 5 percent and 50 percent then the portion of the debit balance attributable to the non-customer must be excluded from the formula unless the broker or dealer can demonstrate that the debit balance is directly related to credit items in the formula; or if such percentage ownership is greater than 50 percent, then the entire debit balance must be excluded from the formula unless the broker or dealer can demonstrate that the debit balance is directly related to credit items in the formula. Note F. Item 13 must include the amount of margin required and on deposit with the Options Clearing Corporation to the extent such margin is represented by cash, proprietary qualified securities and letters of credit collateralized by customers’ securities. Note G. (a) Item 14 must include the amount of margin required and on deposit with a clearing agency registered with the Commission under section 17A of the Act (15 U.S.C. 78q– 1) or a derivatives clearing organization registered with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission under section 5b of the Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 7a–1) for customer accounts to the extent that the margin is represented by cash, proprietary qualified securities, and letters of credit collateralized by customers’ securities. (b) Item 14 will apply only if the broker or dealer has the margin related to security futures products, or futures (and options thereon) carried in a securities account pursuant to an approved SRO portfolio margining program on deposit with: (1) A registered clearing agency or derivatives clearing organization that: (i) Maintains the highest investmentgrade rating from a nationally recognized statistical rating organization; or (ii) Maintains security deposits from clearing members in connection with regulated options or futures transactions and assessment power over member firms that equal a combined total of at least $2 billion, at least $500 million of which must be in the form of security deposits. For the purposes of this Note G, the term ‘‘security deposits’’ refers to a general fund, other than margin deposits or their equivalent, that consists of cash or securities held by a registered clearing agency or derivative clearing organization; or (iii) Maintains at least $3 billion in margin deposits; or VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:54 Aug 20, 2013 Jkt 229001 (iv) Does not meet the requirements of paragraphs (b)(1)(i) through (b)(1)(iii) of this Note G, if the Commission has determined, upon a written request for exemption by or for the benefit of the broker or dealer, that the broker or dealer may utilize such a registered clearing agency or derivatives clearing organization. The Commission may, in its sole discretion, grant such an exemption subject to such conditions as are appropriate under the circumstances, if the Commission determines that such conditional or unconditional exemption is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, and is consistent with the protection of investors; and (2) A registered clearing agency or derivatives clearing organization that, if it holds funds or securities deposited as margin for security futures products or futures in a portfolio margin account in a bank, as defined in section 3(a)(6) of the Act (15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(6)), obtains and preserves written notification from the bank at which it holds such funds and securities or at which such funds and securities are held on its behalf. The written notification will state that all funds and/or securities deposited with the bank as margin (including customer security futures products and futures in a portfolio margin account), or held by the bank and pledged to such registered clearing agency or derivatives clearing agency as margin, are being held by the bank for the exclusive benefit of clearing members of the registered clearing agency or derivatives clearing organization (subject to the interest of such registered clearing agency or derivatives clearing organization therein), and are being kept separate from any other accounts maintained by the registered clearing agency or derivatives clearing organization with the bank. The written notification also will provide that such funds and/or securities will at no time be used directly or indirectly as security for a loan to the registered clearing agency or derivatives clearing organization by the bank, and will be subject to no right, charge, security interest, lien, or claim of any kind in favor of the bank or any person claiming through the bank. This provision, however, will not prohibit a registered clearing agency or derivatives clearing organization from pledging customer funds or securities as collateral to a bank for any purpose that the rules of the Commission or the registered clearing agency or derivatives clearing organization otherwise permit; and (3) A registered clearing agency or derivatives clearing organization establishes, documents, and maintains: PO 00000 Frm 00084 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4700 (i) Safeguards in the handling, transfer, and delivery of cash and securities; (ii) Fidelity bond coverage for its employees and agents who handle customer funds or securities. In the case of agents of a registered clearing agency or derivatives clearing organization, the agent may provide the fidelity bond coverage; and (iii) Provisions for periodic examination by independent public accountants; and (iv) A derivatives clearing organization that, if it is not otherwise registered with the Commission, has provided the Commission with a written undertaking, in a form acceptable to the Commission, executed by a duly authorized person at the derivatives clearing organization, to the effect that, with respect to the clearance and settlement of the customer security futures products and futures in a portfolio margin account of the broker or dealer, the derivatives clearing organization will permit the Commission to examine the books and records of the derivatives clearing organization for compliance with the requirements set forth in § 240.15c3–3a, Note G (b)(1) through (3). (c) Item 14 will apply only if a broker or dealer determines, at least annually, that the registered clearing agency or derivatives clearing organization with which the broker or dealer has on deposit margin related to securities future products or futures in a portfolio margin account meets the conditions of this Note G. Notes Regarding the PAB Reserve Bank Account Computation Note 1. Broker-dealers should use the formula in Exhibit A for the purposes of computing the PAB reserve requirement, except that references to ‘‘accounts,’’ ‘‘customer accounts, or ‘‘customers’’ will be treated as references to PAB accounts. Note 2. Any credit (including a credit applied to reduce a debit) that is included in the computation required by § 240.15c3–3 with respect to customer accounts (the ‘‘customer reserve computation’’) may not be included as a credit in the computation required by § 240.15c3–3 with respect to PAB accounts (the ‘‘PAB reserve computation’’). Note 3. Note E(1) to § 240.15c3–3a does not apply to the PAB reserve computation. Note 4. Note E(3) to § 240.15c3–3a which reduces debit balances by 1% does not apply to the PAB reserve computation. E:\FR\FM\21AUR2.SGM 21AUR2 emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with RULES2 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 162 / Wednesday, August 21, 2013 / Rules and Regulations Note 5. Interest receivable, floor brokerage, and commissions receivable of another broker or dealer from the broker or dealer (excluding clearing deposits) that are otherwise allowable assets under § 240.15c3–1 need not be included in the PAB reserve computation, provided the amounts have been clearly identified as payables on the books of the broker or dealer. Commissions receivable and other receivables of another broker or dealer from the broker or dealer that are otherwise non-allowable assets under § 240.15c3–1 and clearing deposits of another broker or dealer may be included as ‘‘credit balances’’ for purposes of the PAB reserve computation, provided the commissions receivable and other receivables are subject to immediate cash payment to the other broker or dealer and the clearing deposit is subject to payment within 30 days. Note 6. Credits included in the PAB reserve computation that result from the use of securities held for a PAB account (‘‘PAB securities’’) that are pledged to meet intra-day margin calls in a crossmargin account established between the Options Clearing Corporation and any regulated derivatives clearing organization may be reduced to the extent that the excess margin held by the other clearing corporation in the cross-margin relationship is used the following business day to replace the PAB securities that were previously pledged. In addition, balances resulting from a portfolio margin account that are segregated pursuant to Commodity Futures Trading Commission regulations need not be included in the PAB Reserve Bank Account computation. Note 7. Deposits received prior to a transaction pending settlement which are $5 million or greater for any single transaction or $10 million in aggregate may be excluded as credits from the PAB reserve computation if such balances are placed and maintained in a separate PAB Reserve Bank Account by 12 p.m. Eastern Time on the following business day. Thereafter, the money representing any such deposits may be withdrawn to complete the related transactions without performing a new PAB reserve computation. Note 8. A credit balance resulting from a PAB reserve computation may be reduced by the amount that items representing such credits are swept into money market funds or mutual funds of an investment company registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940 on or prior to 10 a.m. Eastern Time on the deposit date provided that the credits swept into any such fund are not VerDate Mar<15>2010 17:54 Aug 20, 2013 Jkt 229001 subject to any right, charge, security interest, lien, or claim of any kind in favor of the investment company or the broker or dealer. Any credits that have been swept into money market funds or mutual funds must be maintained in the name of a particular broker or for the benefit of another broker. Note 9. Clearing deposits required to be maintained at registered clearing agencies may be included as debits in the PAB reserve computation to the extent the percentage of the deposit, which is based upon the clearing agency’s aggregate deposit requirements (e.g., dollar trading volume), that relates to the proprietary business of other brokers and dealers can be identified. Note 10. A broker or dealer that clears PAB accounts through an affiliate or third party clearing broker must include these PAB account balances and the omnibus PAB account balance in its PAB reserve computation. ■ 7. Section 240.17a–3 is amended by adding paragraph (a)(23) to read as follows: § 240.17a–3 Records to be made by certain exchange members, brokers and dealers. (a) * * * (23) A record documenting the credit, market, and liquidity risk management controls established and maintained by the broker or dealer to assist it in analyzing and managing the risks associated with its business activities, Provided, that the records required by this paragraph (a)(23) need only be made if the broker or dealer has more than: (i) $1,000,000 in aggregate credit items as computed under § 240.15c3–3a; or (ii) $20,000,000 in capital, which includes debt subordinated in accordance with § 240.15c3–1d. * * * * * ■ 8. Section 240.17a–4 is amended by: ■ a. Removing from paragraph (b)(1) the citation ‘‘§ 240.17a–3(f)’’ and its place adding the citation ‘‘§ 240.17a–3(g)’’; ■ b. Removing from paragraph (b)(9) the citation ‘‘§ 240.15c3–3(d)(4)’’ and in its place adding the citation ‘‘§ 240.15c3– 3(d)(5)’’; and ■ c. Adding paragraph (e)(9). The addition reads as follows: § 240.17a–4 Records to be preserved by certain exchange members, brokers and dealers. * * * * * (e) * * * (9) All records required pursuant to § 240.17a–3(a)(23) until three years after the termination of the use of the risk PO 00000 Frm 00085 Fmt 4701 Sfmt 9990 51907 management controls documented therein. * * * * * 9. Section 240.17a–11 is amended by: a. Revising the first sentence of paragraph (b)(1); ■ b. Removing from paragraph (c) introductory text ‘‘or (c)(4)’’ and in its place adding ‘‘, (c)(4) or (c)(5)’’; and ■ c. Adding paragraph (c)(5). The revision and addition read as follows: ■ ■ § 240.17a–11 Notification provisions for brokers and dealers * * * * * (b)(1) Every broker or dealer whose net capital declines below the minimum amount required pursuant to § 240.15c3–1, or is insolvent as that term is defined in § 240.15c3–1(c)(16), must give notice of such deficiency that same day in accordance with paragraph (g) of this section. * * * * * * * * (c) * * * (5) If a computation made by a broker or dealer pursuant to § 240.15c3–1 shows that the total amount of money payable against all securities loaned or subject to a repurchase agreement or the total contract value of all securities borrowed or subject to a reverse repurchase agreement is in excess of 2500 percent of its tentative net capital; provided, however, that for purposes of this leverage test transactions involving government securities, as defined in section 3(a)(42) of the Act (15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(42)), must be excluded from the calculation; provided further, however, that a broker or dealer will not be required to send the notice required by this paragraph (c)(5) if it reports monthly its securities lending and borrowing and repurchase and reverse repurchase activity (including the total amount of money payable against securities loaned or subject to a repurchase agreement and the total contract value of securities borrowed or subject to a reverse repurchase agreement) to its designated examining authority in a form acceptable to its designated examining authority. * * * * * By the Commission. Dated: July 30, 2013. Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary. [FR Doc. 2013–18734 Filed 8–20–13; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 8011–01–P E:\FR\FM\21AUR2.SGM 21AUR2

Agencies

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

[Federal Register Volume 78, Number 162 (Wednesday, August 21, 2013)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 51823-51907]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2013-18734]

[[Page 51823]]

Vol. 78

Wednesday,

No. 162

August 21, 2013

Part II

Securities and Exchange Commission

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17 CFR Part 240

Financial Responsibility Rules for Broker-Dealers; Final Rule

Federal Register / Vol. 78 , No. 162 / Wednesday, August 21, 2013 /
Rules and Regulations

[[Page 51824]]

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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

17 CFR Part 240

[Release No. 34-70072; File No. S7-08-07]
RIN 3235-AJ85

Financial Responsibility Rules for Broker-Dealers

AGENCY: Securities and Exchange Commission.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: The Securities and Exchange Commission (``Commission'') is
adopting amendments to the net capital, customer protection, books and
records, and notification rules for broker-dealers promulgated under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (``Exchange Act''). These
amendments are designed to address several areas of concern regarding
the financial responsibility requirements for broker-dealers. The
amendments also update certain financial responsibility requirements
and make certain technical amendments.

DATES: Effective Date: October 21, 2013.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Michael A. Macchiaroli, Associate
Director, at (202) 551-5525; Thomas K. McGowan, Deputy Associate
Director, at (202) 551-5521; Randall Roy, Assistant Director, at (202)
551-5522; Raymond Lombardo, Branch Chief, at (202) 551-5755; Sheila
Dombal Swartz, Special Counsel, (202) 551-5545; Carrie A. O'Brien,
Special Counsel, (202) 551-5640; or Kimberly N. Chehardy, Attorney
Advisor, (202) 551-5791; Division of Trading and Markets, Securities
and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE., Washington, DC 20549-7010.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Table of Contents

I. Background
II. Amendments
A. Amendments to the Customer Protection Rule
1. Background
2. Proprietary Accounts of Broker-Dealers
i. Definition of ``PAB Account'' under Rule 15c3-3(a)(16)
ii. Written Permission To Use PAB Account Securities
iii. PAB Reserve Bank Accounts
iv. Other PAB Issues Raised by Commenters
v. Amendment to Rule 15c3-1(c)(2)(iv)(E) Related to PAB Accounts
3. Banks Where Special Reserve Deposits May Be Held
4. Allocation of Customers' Fully Paid and Excess Margin
Securities to Short Positions
5. Importation of Rule 15c3-2 Requirements Into Rule 15c3-3 and
Treatment of Free Credit Balances
i. Importation of Rule 15c3-2
ii. Treatment of Free Credit Balances
a. Treatment of Free Credit Balances Outside of a Sweep Program
b. Treatment of Free Credit Balances in a Sweep Program
6. ``Proprietary Accounts'' Under the Commodity Exchange Act
7. Expansion of the Definition of ``Qualified Securities'' To
Include Certain Money Market Funds
B. Holding Futures Positions in a Securities Portfolio Margin
Account
C. Amendments With Respect to Securities Lending and Borrowing
and Repurchase/Reverse Repurchase Transactions
D. Documentation of Risk Management Procedures
E. Amendments to the Net Capital Rule
1. Requirement To Deduct From Net Worth Certain Liabilities or
Expenses Assumed by Third Parties
2. Requirement To Subtract From Net Worth Certain Non-Permanent
Capital Contributions
3. Requirement To Deduct the Amount by Which a Fidelity Bond
Deductible Exceeds SRO Limits
4. Broker-Dealer Solvency Requirement
5. Amendment to Rule Governing Orders Restricting Withdrawal of
Capital From a Broker-Dealer
6. Adjusted Net Capital Requirements
i. Amendment to Appendix A of Rule 15c3-1
ii. Money Market Funds
a. Clarification
b. Proposed Haircut Reduction From 2% to 1%
c. Aggregate Debit Items Charge
F. Technical Amendments
III. Responses to Specific Requests for Comment
IV. Paperwork Reduction Act
A. Summary of the Collection of Information Requirements
B. Use of Information
C. Respondents
D. Total Annual Reporting and Recordkeeping Burden
1. Securities Lending Agreements and Disclosures
2. DEA Permission To Withdraw Capital Within One Year of
Contribution
3. Written Subordination Agreements Under Rule 15c3-3
4. PAB Reserve Bank Account Recordkeeping Requirements
5. Adequate Procedures Required Under Paragraph (j)(1) of Rule
15c3-3
6. Treatment of Free Credit Balances
7. Documentation of Risk Management Procedures
8. Notice Requirements
E. Collection of Information Is Mandatory
F. Confidentiality
G. Record Retention Period
V. Economic Analysis
A. Introduction
B. Economic Baseline
C. Discussion of General Comments Received
D. Economic Analysis of the Amendments and Alternatives
1. Amendments to the Customer Protection Rule
i. Economic Analysis
a. Proprietary Accounts of Broker-Dealers
(I). Summary of Amendments
(II). Baseline and Incremental Economic Effects
(III). Alternatives
(IV). Compliance Cost Estimates
b. Banks Where Special Reserve Deposits May Be Held
(I). Summary of Amendments
(II). Baseline and Incremental Economic Effects
(III). Alternatives
(IV). Compliance Cost Estimates
c. Allocation of Customers' Fully Paid and Excess Margin
Securities to Short Positions
d. Importation of Rule 15c3-2 Requirements Into Rule 15c3-3
e. Treatment of Free Credit Balances
(I). Summary of Amendments
(II). Baseline and Incremental Economic Effects
(III). Alternatives
(IV). Compliance Cost Estimates
f. ``Proprietary Accounts'' Under the Commodity Exchange Act
ii. Consideration of Burden on Competition, and Promotion of
Efficiency, Competition, and Capital Formation
2. Holding Futures Positions in a Securities Portfolio Margining
Account
i. Economic Analysis
ii. Consideration of Burden on Competition, and Promotion of
Efficiency, Competition, and Capital Formation
3. Amendments With Respect to Securities Lending and Borrowing
and Repurchase/Reverse Repurchase Transactions
i. Economic Analysis
ii. Consideration of Burden on Competition, and Promotion of
Efficiency, Competition, and Capital Formation
4. Documentation of Risk Management Procedures
i. Economic Analysis
ii. Consideration of Burden on Competition, and Promotion of
Efficiency, Competition, and Capital Formation
5. Amendments to the Net Capital Rule
i. Economic Analysis
a. Requirement To Deduct From Net Worth Certain Liabilities or
Expenses Assumed By Third Parties
(I). Summary of Amendments
(II). Baseline and Incremental Economic Effects
(III). Alternatives
b. Requirement To Subtract From Net Worth Certain Non-Permanent
Capital Contributions
(I). Summary of Amendments
(II). Baseline and Incremental Economic Effects
(III). Alternatives
c. Requirement To Deduct the Amount by Which a Fidelity Bond
Exceeds SRO Limits
d. Broker-Dealer Solvency Requirement
e. Amendment to Rule Governing Restrictions of Withdrawals of
Capital

[[Page 51825]]

f. Amendment to Rule 15c3-1 Appendix A
ii. Consideration of Burden on Competition, and Promotion of
Efficiency, Competition, and Capital Formation
VI. Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
A. General Issues Raised by Public Comments
B. Amendments to the Customer Protection Rule
1. Need for and Objectives of the Rule Amendments
2. Significant Issues Raised by Public Comment
3. Small Entities Subject to the Rules
4. Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other Compliance Requirements
5. Agency Action To Minimize Effect on Small Entities
D. Securities Lending and Borrowing and Repurchase/Reverse
Repurchase Transactions
1. Need for and Objectives of the Amendments
2. Significant Issues Raised by the Public Comments
3. Small Entities Subject to the Rule
4. Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other Compliance Requirements
5. Agency Action To Minimize Effect on Small Entities
E. Documentation of Risk Management Procedures
1. Need for and Objectives of the Amendments
2. Significant Issues Raised by Public Comments
3. Small Entities Subject to the Rule
4. Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other Compliance Requirements
5. Agency Action To Minimize Effect on Small Entities
F. Amendments to the Net Capital Rule
1. Need for and Objectives of the Amendments
2. Significant Issues Raised by Public Comments
3. Small Entities Subject to the Rule
4. Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other Compliance Requirements
5. Agency Action to Minimize Effect on Small Entities
VII. Statutory Authority

I. Background

The Commission is adopting amendments to the broker-dealer net
capital rule (Rule 15c3-1),\1\ customer protection rule (Rule 15c3-
3),\2\ books and records rules (Rules 17a-3 and 17a-4), and
notification rule (Rule 17a-11).\3\ The Commission proposed these rule
changes on March 9, 2007.\4\ The Commission re-opened the public
comment period on May 3, 2012.\5\ The Commission received a total of 97
comment letters on the proposed amendments.\6\ Sixty comment letters

[[Page 51826]]

were received prior to the re-opening of the comment period, and 37
were received after it. The Commission carefully considered all of the
comment letters, and as discussed in detail below, modified the
amendments in certain respects in light of the comments received. In
addition, the Commission has determined to defer consideration of
action at this time with respect to certain of the proposed amendments.
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\1\ 17 CFR 240.15c3-1.
\2\ 17 CFR 240.15c3-3.
\3\ 17 CFR 240.17a-3; 17 CFR 240.17a-4; and 17 CFR 240.17a-11.
\4\ See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules for Broker-
Dealers, Exchange Act Release No. 55431 (Mar. 9, 2007), 72 FR 12862
(Mar. 19, 2007) (``Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules'').
As part of this release, the Commission also requested comment on
three additional matters: reducing the Rule 17a-11 (17 CFR 240.17a-
11) early warning level for broker-dealers that carry over $10
billion in debits; harmonization of the net capital deductions
required by paragraph (c)(2)(iv)(B) of Rule 15c3-1 for securities
lending and borrowing transactions with the deductions required
under paragraph (c)(2)(iv)(F) for securities repurchase and reverse
repurchase agreement transactions (17 CFR 240 240.15c3-
1(c)(2)(iv)(B) and (c)(2)(iv)(F), respectively); and accounting for
third-party liens on customer securities held at a broker-dealer. As
discussed below in section III. of this release, the Commission
received comments in response to these requests but has determined
to defer consideration of actions with respect to these specific
matters at this time.
\5\ Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules for Broker-
Dealers, Exchange Act Release No. 66910 (May 3, 2012), 77 FR 27150
(May 9, 2012).
\6\ Comments on the amendments are available at https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-08-07/s70807.shtml. See also letter dated
April 22, 2007 from Peter G. Crane, President, Crane Data LLC
(``Crane Data Letter''); letter dated April 22, 2007 from David
Michael Bishop (``Bishop Letter''); letter dated April 27, 2007 from
Ted Beer, Broker/Dealer Principal (``Beer Letter''); letter dated
April 28, 2007 from Ted Beer, Broker/Dealer Principal (``Beer 2
Letter''); letter dated April 29, 2007 from R.A. Lowenstein, FinOps
Compliance Consultant (``Lowenstein Letter''); letter dated April
29, 2007 from G. Kirk Ellis (``Ellis Letter''); letter dated May 1,
2007 from Stuart J. Kaswell and David J. Harris, Dechert LLP on
behalf of Federated Investors (``Federated Letter''); letter dated
May 2, 2007 from Daniel R. Levene, President, small NASD broker-
dealer (``Levene Letter''); letter dated May 4, 2007 from Gerard J.
Quinn, Vice President and Associate General Counsel, SIFMA (``SIFMA
Letter''); letter dated May 7, 2007 from Michael Bell, President and
CEO, Curian Clearing, LLC (``Curian Clearing Letter''); letter dated
May 10, 2007 from Richard B. Franz II, Senior Vice-President,
Treasurer and Chief Financial Officer, Raymond James & Associates
(``Raymond James Letter''); letter dated May 16, 2007 from Steven R.
Gerbel, Chicago Capital Management LP (``Chicago Capital Letter'');
letter dated May 17, 2007 from Jeffrey L. Kiss, Principal,
PackerKiss Securities, Inc. (``PackerKiss Letter''); letter dated
May 17, 2007 from Josephine Wang, General Counsel, SIPC (``SIPC
Letter''); letter dated May 18, 2007 from Kimberly Taylor, Managing
Director and Clearing House President, Chicago Mercantile Exchange
Inc. (``CME Letter''); letter dated May 18, 2007 from Diane V.
Esheleman, Executive Vice President, JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.
(``JP Morgan Letter''); letter dated May 21, 2007 from Faith Colish,
Carter Ledyard Milburn LLP (``Colish Letter''); letter dated May 23,
2007 from Charles R. Manzoni, Jr., General Counsel, FAF Advisors,
Inc. (``FAF Advisors Letter''); letter dated May 27, 2007 from Joyce
Glenn (``Glenn Letter''); letter dated May 28, 2007 from William
Bare (``Bare Letter''); letter dated May 29, 2007 from Robert
Keenan, CEO, St. Bernard Financial Services, Inc. (``St. Bernard
Financial Services Letter''); letter dated May 31, 2007 from John C.
Melton, Sr., Executive Vice President, Coastal Securities (``Coastal
Letter''); letter dated June 3, 2007 from Anonymous (``Anonymous
Letter''); letter dated June 5, 2007 from Kelly S. McEntire,
Executor, Retired State Administrator/Executor of Janus Capital
Investments (``McEntire Letter''); letter dated June 13, 2007 from
Bruce Bent, Chairman, The Reserve (``Reserve Letter''); letter dated
June 14, 2007 from Amal El Said, Accounting and Regulatory, Abbey
National (``Abbey National Letter''); letter dated June 14, 2007
from Frank A. Perrone, Senior Vice President, Brown Brothers
Harriman & Co. (``Brown Brothers Harriman Letter''); letter dated
June 15, 2007 from James J. Angel, Ph.D., CFA, Associate Professor
of Finance, McDonough School of Business, Georgetown University
(``Angel Letter''); letter dated June 15, 2007 from Matthew M.
Hughey, Chief Financial Officer, First Clearing, LLC (``First
Clearing Letter''); letter dated June 15, 2007 from Marshall J.
Levinson, Senior Managing Director, Bear, Stearns & Co. Inc., Chair,
SIFMA Capital Committee (``SIFMA 2 Letter''); letter dated June 15,
2007 from Christopher Williams, Director and Senior Counsel, and
Barbara Brooks, Principal Financial Officer, Dresdner Kleinwort
(``Dresdner Kleinwort Letter''); letter dated June 18, 2007 from
Michael Dworkin (``Dworkin Letter''); letter dated June 18, 2007
from Keith Weller, Executive Director and Senior Associate General
Counsel, UBS Global Asset Management (Americas) Inc. (``UBS
Letter''); letter dated June 18, 2007 from Marcelo Riffaud, Managing
Director, Legal Department, Deutsche Bank Securities Inc.
(``Deutsche Bank Securities Letter''); letter dated June 18, 2007
from Jill Gross and Rahat Sarmast, Pace Investor Rights Project
(``Pace Letter''); letter dated June 18, 2007 from Robert E. Putney,
III, Director and Senior Counsel, BlackRock, Inc. (``BlackRock
Letter''); letter dated June 18, 2007 from James S. Keller, Chief
Regulatory, the PNC Financial Services Group, Inc. (``PNC Letter'');
letter dated June 18, 2007 from Sarah A. Miller, General Counsel,
American ABA Securities Association (``ABASA Letter''); letter dated
June 18, 2007 from David Hirschmann, Executive Vice President,
National Chamber Foundation of U.S. Chamber of Commerce (``National
Chamber Foundation Letter''); letter dated June 18, 2007 from
Michael W. Fields, Chief Fixed Income Officers, American Beacon
Advisors (``American Beacon Letter''); letter dated June 18, 2007
from David Lonergan, Head of U.S. Cash Management, Barclays Global
Investors (``Barclays Letter''); letter dated June 18, 2007 from
Howard Spindel, Senior Managing Directors, Integrated Management
Solutions (``Integrated Management Letter''); letter dated June 18,
2007 from Jane G. Heinrichs, Associate Counsel, Investment Company
Institute (``ICI Letter''); letter dated June 18, 2007 from Jeffrey
P. Neubert, CEO, Clearinghouse Association L.L.C. (``Clearing House
Letter''); letter dated June 19, 2007 from James T. McHale,
Associate General Counsel, E*Trade Brokerage Holdings, Inc.
(``E*Trade Letter''); letter dated June 25, 2007 from Cliff Verron,
Managing Director, Deputy Chief Financial Officers and John Ramsay,
Managing Director, Deputy General Counsel, Citigroup Global Markets
Inc. (``Citigroup Letter''); letter dated June 25, 2007 from AMEX,
CBOE, ISE, OCC, and NYSE/ARCA (``AMEX Letter''); letter dated July
3, 2007 from Keith F. Higgins, Chair, Committee on Federal
Regulation of Securities, American Bar Association (``American Bar
Association Letter''); letter dated July 23, 2007 from Charles S.
Morrison, Senior Vice President and Money Market Group Leader,
Fidelity Management & Research Company, and John Valenti, Vice
President, National Financial Securities LLC (``Fidelity/NFS
Letter''); letter dated August 6, 2007 from Stuart Kaswell, Dechert
LLP, on behalf of Federated Investors, Inc. (``Federated 2
Letter''); letter dated October 9, 2007 from Stuart Kaswell, Dechert
LLP on behalf of Federated Investors, Inc. (``Federated 3 Letter'');
letter dated November 16, 2007 from Marshall J. Levinson, Chair,
Capital Committee, SIFMA (``SIFMA 3 Letter''); letter dated January
7, 2008 from Stuart J. Kaswell, Dechert LLP, on behalf of Federated
Investors, Inc. (``Federated 4 Letter''); letter dated August 7,
2008 from Stuart J. Kaswell, Bryan Cave LLP, on behalf of Federated
Investors, Inc. (``Federated 5 Letter''); letter dated November 10,
2008 from Lee A. Pickard, Pickard & Djinis LLP on behalf of
Federated Investors (``Federated 6 Letter''); letter dated November
25, 2008 from Lee A. Pickard, Pickard & Djinis LLP on behalf of
Federated Investors (``Federated 7 Letter''); letter dated December
18, 2008 from Lee A. Pickard, Pickard & Djinis LLP on behalf of
Federated Investors (``Federated 8 Letter''); letter dated July 28,
2009 from Richard J. McDonald, Chief Regulatory Counsel, Susquehanna
International Group LLP (``SIG Letter''); letter dated June 8, 2010
from The Honorable Gregory W. Meeks (``Meeks Letter''); letter dated
October 14, 2011 from The Honorable Gregory W. Meeks (``Meeks 2
Letter''); letter dated May 5, 2012 from Edward P. Cernocky
(``Cernocky Letter''); letter dated May 11, 2012 from Chris Barnard
(``Barnard Letter''); letter dated May 15, 2012 from Helen M.
Saarinen (``Saarinen Letter''); letter dated May 18, 2012 from Laura
H. Hearne (``Hearne Letter''); letter dated May 24, 2012 from Dick
Fuld (``Fuld Letter''); letter dated May 30, 2012 from Bruce J.
Womack (``Womack Letter''); letter dated June 1, 2012 from Lee A.
Pickard, Pickard & Djinis LLP, on behalf of Federated Investors
(``Federated 9 Letter''); letter dated June 4, 2012 from Michael
Scillia, Director, National Investment Banking Association (``NIBA
Letter''); letter dated June 7, 2012 from Anthony Fitzgerald
(``Fitzgerald Letter''); letter dated June 7, 2012 from Tom Vincent,
Senior V.P., Corporate Governance and Wealth Management Compliance,
BOK Financial Corporation (``BOK Letter''); letter dated June 8,
2012 from Denise Dolphin (``Dolphin Letter''); letter dated June 8,
2012 from Colin W. McKechnie, Managing Director, JP Morgan Chase
Bank, N. A (``JP Morgan 2 Letter''); letter dated June 8, 2012 from
William A. Jacobson, Associate Clinical Professor, Cornell Law
School, and Director, Cornell Securities Law Clinic, Ithaca, New
York (``Cornell Letter''); letter dated June 8, 2012 from Ryan K.
Bakhtiari, Aidikoff, Uhl & Bakhtiari, on behalf of the Public
Investors Arbitration Bar Association (``PIABA Letter''); letter
dated June 8, 2012 from Kenneth E. Bentsen, Jr., Executive Vice
President, Public Policy and Advocacy, SIFMA (``SIFMA 4 Letter'');
letter dated June 8, 2012 from Sarah A. Miller, Chief Executive
Officer, Institute of International Bankers (``IIB Letter''); letter
dated June 8, 2012 from James T. McHale, Global Head of Compliance,
E*TRADE Financial Corporation (``E*Trade 2 Letter''); letter dated
June 11, 2012 from Steve M. Brewer, Sr., ASG Securities, LLC,
Houston, Texas (``ASG Securities Letter''); letter dated June 25,
2012 from Gene L. Finn (``Finn Letter''); letter dated June 26, 2012
from Cindy Walsh (``Walsh Letter''); letter dated July 12, 2012 from
Michael Scillia, Director, National Investment Banking Association
(``NIBA 2 Letter''); letter dated July 18, 2012 from Gene L. Finn
(``Finn 2 Letter''); letter dated July 30, 2012 from David Waddell
(``Waddell Letter''); letter dated August 6, 2012 from Gene Finn
(``Finn 3 Letter''); letter dated August 15, 2012 from Echeal R.
Sigan (``Sigan Letter''); letter dated August 26, 2012 from Mark
Irwin (``Irwin Letter''); letter dated September 17, 2012 from Gene
L. Finn (``Finn 4 Letter''); letter dated September 27, 2012 from
Jeff S. Clark (``Clark Letter''); letter dated September 28, 2012
from Robert LaPlante, M.P.A. (``LaPlante Letter''); letter dated
October 19, 2012 from Rick Louderbough (``Louderbough Letter'');
letter dated October 24, 2012 from Paul L. Matecki, Senior Vice
President, General Counsel, Raymond James Financial, Inc. (``Raymond
James 2 Letter''); letter dated October 25, 2012 from Eric Gamble,
Ph.D. (``Gamble Letter''); letter dated November 1, 2012 from Percy
R. Moorman, Esq. (``Moorman Letter''); letter dated January 4, 2013
from Marquis Wilkins (``Wilkins Letter''); letter dated January 5,
2013 from Anonymous SEC Fan (``Anonymous SEC Letter''); letter dated
January 24, 2013 from Robert Fournier (``Fournier Letter''); and
letter dated January 28, 2013 from Scott E. Shjefte (``Shjefte
Letter''). Comment letters and specific comments outside the scope
of this rulemaking are not addressed in this release.
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II. Amendments

A. Amendments to the Customer Protection Rule

1. Background
The Commission adopted Rule 15c3-3 in 1972 in response to a
congressional directive to strengthen the financial responsibility
requirements for broker-dealers that hold securities and cash for
customers.\7\ In particular, Rule 15c3-3 is designed ``to give more
specific protection to customer funds and securities, in effect
forbidding brokers and dealers from using customer assets to finance
any part of their businesses unrelated to servicing securities
customers; e.g., a firm is virtually precluded from using customer
funds to buy securities for its own account.'' \8\ To meet this
objective, Rule 15c3-3 requires a broker-dealer that maintains custody
of customer securities and cash (a ``carrying broker-dealer'') to take
two primary steps to safeguard these assets. The steps are designed to
protect customers \9\ by segregating their securities and cash from the
broker-dealer's proprietary business activities. If the broker-dealer
fails financially, the securities and cash should be readily available
to be returned to the customers. In addition, if the failed broker-
dealer is liquidated in a formal proceeding under the Securities
Investor Protection Act of 1970 (``SIPA''), the securities and cash
would be isolated and readily identifiable as ``customer property''
and, consequently, available to be distributed to customers ahead of
other creditors.\10\
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\7\ See Broker-dealers; Maintenance of Certain Basic Reserves,
Exchange Act Release No. 9856 (Nov. 10, 1972), 37 FR 25224 (Nov. 29,
1972).
\8\ See Net Capital Requirements for Brokers and Dealers,
Exchange Act Release No. 21651 (Jan. 11, 1985), 50 FR 2690, 2690
(Jan. 18, 1985). See also Broker-Dealers; Maintenance of Certain
Basic Reserves, Exchange Act Release No. 9856 (Nov. 10, 1972), 37 FR
25224, 25224 (Nov. 29, 1972).
\9\ Rule 15c3-3 defines customer as ``any person from whom or on
whose behalf a broker or dealer has received or acquired or holds
funds or securities for the account of that person.'' The rule
excludes certain categories of persons from the definition,
including broker-dealers, municipal securities dealers, and
government securities broker-dealers. It also excludes general
partners, directors, and principal officers of the broker-dealer and
any other person to the extent that the person has a claim for
property or funds which by contract, agreement or understanding, or
by operation of law, is part of the capital of the broker-dealer or
is subordinated to the claims of creditors of the broker-dealer. 17
CFR 240.15c3-3(a)(1).
\10\ See 15 U.S.C. 78aaa et seq.
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The first step required by Rule 15c3-3 is that a carrying broker-
dealer must maintain physical possession or control over customers'
fully paid and excess margin securities.\11\ Physical possession or
control means the broker-dealer must hold these securities in one of
several locations specified in Rule 15c3-3 and free of liens or any
other interest that could be exercised by a third party to secure an
obligation of the broker-dealer.\12\ Permissible locations include a
bank, as defined in section 3(a)(6) of the Exchange Act, and a clearing
agency.\13\
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\11\ See 17 CFR 240.15c3-3(b) and (d). The term fully paid
securities includes all securities carried for the account of a
customer in a special cash account as defined in Regulation T
promulgated by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
as well as margin equity securities within the meaning of Regulation
T which are carried for the account of a customer in a general
account or any special account under Regulation T during any period
when section 8 of Regulation T (12 CFR 220.8) specifies that margin
equity securities shall have no loan value in a general account or
special convertible debt security account, and all such margin
equity securities in such account if they are fully paid: provided,
however, that the term fully paid securities shall not apply to any
securities which are purchased in transactions for which the
customer has not made full payment. 17 CFR 240.15c3-3(a)(3). The
term margin securities means those securities carried for the
account of a customer in a general account as defined in Regulation
T, as well as securities carried in any special account other than
the securities referred to in paragraph (a)(3) of Rule 15c3-3. 17
CFR 240.15c3-3(a)(4). The term excess margin securities means those
securities referred to in paragraph (a)(4) of Rule 15c3-3 carried
for the account of a customer having a market value in excess of 140
percent of the total of the debit balances in the customer's account
or accounts encompassed by paragraph (a)(4) of Rule 15c3-3 which the
broker-dealer identifies as not constituting margin securities. 17
CFR 240.15c3-3(a)(5). As discussed in section II.F. of this release,
the Commission is adopting technical amendments to the definitions
of the terms fully paid securities and margin securities under Rule
15c3-3. See paragraphs (a)(3) and (4) of Rule 15c3-3, as adopted.
\12\ See 17 CFR 240.15c3-3(c). Customer securities held by the
carrying broker-dealer are not assets of the firm. Rather, the
carrying broker-dealer holds them in a custodial capacity and the
possession and control requirement is designed to ensure that the
carrying broker-dealer treats them in a manner that allows for their
prompt return.
\13\ Id.
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The second step is that a carrying broker-dealer must maintain a
reserve of cash or qualified securities in an account at a bank that is
at least equal in value to the net cash owed to customers, including
cash obtained from the use of customer securities.\14\ The account must
be titled ``Special Reserve Bank Account for the Exclusive

[[Page 51827]]

Benefit of Customers.'' \15\ The amount of net cash owed to customers
is computed pursuant to a formula set forth in Exhibit A to Rule 15c3-
3.\16\ Under the customer reserve formula, the broker-dealer adds up
customer credit items (e.g., cash in customer securities accounts and
cash obtained through the use of customer margin securities) and then
subtracts from that amount customer debit items (e.g., margin
loans).\17\ If credit items exceed debit items, the net amount must be
on deposit in the customer reserve account in the form of cash and/or
qualified securities.\18\ A broker-dealer cannot make a withdrawal from
the customer reserve account until the next computation and even then
only if the computation shows that the reserve requirement has
decreased.\19\ The broker-dealer must make a deposit into the customer
reserve account if the computation shows an increase in the reserve
requirement.
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\14\ 17 CFR 240.15c3-3(e). The term qualified security is
defined in Rule 15c3-3 to mean a security issued by the United
States or a security in respect of which the principal and interest
are guaranteed by the United States. See 17 CFR 240.15c3-3(a)(6).
\15\ See 17 CFR 240.15c3-3(e)(1). The purpose of giving the
account this title is to alert the bank and creditors of the broker-
dealer that this account is to be used to meet the broker-dealer's
obligations to customers (and not the claims of general creditors)
in the event the broker-dealer must be liquidated in a formal
proceeding.
\16\ 17 CFR 240.15c3-3a.
\17\ Id.
\18\ 17 CFR 240.15c3-3(e). Customer cash is a balance sheet item
of the carrying broker-dealer (i.e., the amount of cash received
from a customer increases the amount of the carrying broker-dealer's
assets and creates a corresponding liability to the customer). The
customer reserve formula is designed to isolate these broker-dealer
assets so that an amount equal to the net liabilities to customers
is held as a reserve in the form of cash or qualified securities.
The requirement to establish this reserve is designed to effectively
prevent the carrying broker-dealer from using customer funds for
proprietary business activities such as investing in securities. The
goal is to put the carrying broker-dealer in a position to be able
to readily meet its cash obligations to customers by requiring the
firm to make deposits of cash and/or qualified securities into the
customer reserve account in the amount of the net cash owed to
customers. Capital, Margin, and Segregation Requirements for
Security-Based Swap Dealers and Major Security-Based Swap
Participants and Capital Requirements for Broker-Dealers, Exchange
Act Release No. 68071 (Oct. 18, 2012), 77 FR 70213, 70277 n.671
(Nov. 23, 2012).
\19\ See 17 CFR 240.15c3-3(e). Under paragraph (e), broker-
dealers are generally required to perform the customer reserve
computation as of the close of business on the last business day of
the week. Broker-dealers from time to time may perform a mid-week
computation if it would permit them to make a withdrawal. 17 CFR
240.15c3-3(g).
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In addition, the customer reserve formula permits the broker-dealer
to offset customer credit items only with customer debit items.\20\
This means the broker-dealer can use customer cash to facilitate
customer transactions such as financing customer margin loans and
borrowing securities to make deliveries of securities that customers
have sold short.\21\ Broker-dealer margin rules require securities
customers to maintain a minimum level of equity in their securities
accounts.\22\ In addition to protecting the broker-dealer from the
consequences of a customer default, this equity serves to over-
collateralize the customers' obligations to the broker-dealer and
thereby protect customers whose cash was used to facilitate the broker-
dealer's financing of securities purchases and short sales by other
customers. For example, if the broker-dealer fails, the customer
debits, because they generally are over-collateralized, should be
attractive assets for another broker-dealer to purchase or, if not
purchased by another broker-dealer, they should be able to be
liquidated to a net positive equity.\23\ The proceeds of the debits
sale or liquidation can be used to repay the customer cash used to
finance the customer obligations. This cash plus the funds and/or
qualified securities held in the customer reserve account should equal
or exceed the total amount of customer credit items (i.e., the total
amount owed by the broker-dealer to its customers).\24\
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\20\ See 17 CFR 240.15c3-3a.
\21\ For example, if a broker-dealer holds $100 for customer A,
the broker-dealer can use that $100 to finance a security purchase
of customer B. The $100 the broker-dealer owes customer A is a
credit in the formula and the $100 customer B owes the broker-dealer
is a debit in the formula. Therefore, under the customer reserve
formula there would be no requirement to maintain cash and/or U.S.
government securities in the customer reserve account. However, if
the broker-dealer did not use the $100 held in customer A's account
for this purpose, there would be no offsetting debit and,
consequently, the broker-dealer would need to have on deposit in the
customer reserve account cash and/or qualified securities in an
amount at least equal to $100.
\22\ Broker-dealers are subject to margin requirements in
Regulation T promulgated by the Federal Reserve (see 12 CFR 220.1,
et seq.), in rules promulgated by the self-regulatory organizations
(``SROs'') (see, e.g., FINRA Rules 4210-4240), and with respect to
security futures, in rules jointly promulgated by the Commission and
the CFTC (see 17 CFR 242.400-406).
\23\ The attractiveness of the over-collateralized debits
facilitates the bulk transfer of customer accounts from a failing or
failed broker-dealer to another broker-dealer.
\24\ See Net Capital Requirements for Broker-Dealers; Amended
Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 18417 (Jan. 13, 1982), 47 FR 3512,
3513 (Jan. 25, 1982) (``The alternative method is founded on the
concept that if the debit items in the Reserve Formula can be
liquidated at or near their contract values, these assets, along
with any cash required to be on deposit under the [customer
protection] rule, will be sufficient to satisfy all customer-related
liabilities (which are represented as credit items in the Reserve
Formula'').
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2. Proprietary Accounts of Broker-Dealers
A carrying broker-dealer may carry accounts that hold proprietary
securities and cash of other broker-dealers (``PAB accounts''). As
noted above, broker-dealers are not within the definition of customer
for purposes of Rule 15c3-3.\25\ Accordingly, a carrying broker-dealer
that carries PAB accounts is not required to treat these accounts as
customer accounts for the purposes of Rule 15c3-3. This means the
carrying broker-dealer is not required to maintain possession or
control of the securities of PAB account holders that are not securing
margin loans to the account holders (``non-margin securities'') or
include credit and debit items associated with those accounts in its
customer reserve computation. The definition of customer in SIPA,
however, is broader than the definition in Rule 15c3-3 in that the SIPA
definition does not exclude broker-dealers.\26\ Customers under SIPA
(``SIPA customers'') generally are entitled to a number of protections,
including the right to share pro rata with other SIPA customers in the
customer property held by the broker-dealer and, if the customer
property is insufficient to make each SIPA customer whole, the
entitlement to receive an advance from the Securities Investor
Protection Corporation (``SIPC'') of up to $500,000 (of which $250,000
currently can be used to cover cash claims).\27\ Broker-dealers as SIPA
customers have the right to a pro rata share of the customer property,
but are not entitled to receive an advance from the SIPC fund.\28\
Consequently, when a carrying broker-dealer is liquidated in a SIPA
proceeding, each customer (including a SIPA customer that is a broker-
dealer) has a claim on the customer property. Because the possession
and control and customer reserve account provisions of Rule 15c3-3 do
not apply to PAB account holders by virtue of the definition of
customer in the rule, the carrying broker-dealer is not restricted by
Rule 15c3-3 from using the securities and cash in these accounts for
its own business purposes.
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\25\ 17 CFR 240.15c3-3(a)(1).
\26\ See 15 U.S.C. 78lll(2).
\27\ See 15 U.S.C. 78fff-2(c) and 15 U.S.C. 78fff-3(a),
respectively. Under SIPA, customer property includes ``cash and
securities (except customer name securities delivered to the
customer) at any time received, acquired, or held by or for the
account of the debtor from or for the securities accounts of a
customer, and the proceeds of any such property transferred by the
debtor, including property unlawfully converted.'' 15 U.S.C.
78lll(4). Therefore, customer property includes those securities
positions that are held for customers and the cash that is owed to
customers.
\28\ See 15 U.S.C. 78fff-2(c); see also 15 U.S.C. 78fff-3(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The treatment of PAB account holders as SIPA customers but not as
customers for the purposes of Rule 15c3-3

[[Page 51828]]

increases the risk that, in the event a carrying broker-dealer is
liquidated under SIPA, the claims of SIPA customers (i.e., customers
and PAB account holders) will exceed the amount of customer property
available and, thereby, expose the SIPC fund and potentially SIPA
customers to losses. In addition, if the customer property is
insufficient to fully satisfy all SIPA customer claims and losses are
incurred, the PAB account holders could be placed in financial distress
causing adverse impacts to the securities markets beyond those
resulting from the failure of the carrying broker-dealer.\29\
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\29\ As noted above, while broker-dealers are customers for the
purposes of SIPA, they are not entitled to the advances from the
SIPC fund to make up for shortfalls after the pro rata distribution
of customer property. 15 U.S.C. 78fff-3(a)(5).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

To address the disparity in treatment between customers and PAB
account holders, the Commission proposed amendments to Rules 15c3-3 and
15c3-3a that would have required a broker-dealer that carries PAB
accounts to perform a PAB reserve computation with respect to those
accounts, generally as of the close of business on the last business
day of the week.\30\ The amendments, as proposed, would have required
the carrying broker-dealer to add up the debits and credits relating to
PAB accounts--including credits arising from the use of securities held
in PAB accounts--and maintain cash or qualified securities in a PAB
reserve account in an amount equal to or greater than the amount that
the credits exceed the debits.
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\30\ See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at
12863. A broker-dealer that does not carry an account of a customer
as defined under Rule 15c3-3 or conduct a proprietary trading
business would be permitted to make the computation monthly rather
than weekly. See paragraph (e)(3)(iii) of Rule 15c3-3, as adopted.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Seven commenters responded to the Commission's request for comment
on the proposed amendments.\31\ As discussed below, the Commission has
modified the final rule in certain respects to address, among other
things, issues raised by commenters. As adopted, the Commission's
amendments to Rules 15c3-3 and 15c3-3a require carrying broker-dealers
to: (1) Perform a separate reserve computation for PAB accounts (in
addition to the customer reserve computation currently required for
Rule 15c3-3 customer accounts); (2) establish and fund a separate
reserve account for the benefit of PAB account holders; and (3) obtain
and maintain physical possession or control of non-margin securities
carried for PAB accounts unless the carrying broker has provided
written notice to the PAB account holders that it will use those
securities in the ordinary course of its securities business, and has
provided opportunity for the PAB account holder to object to such
use.\32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\31\ See SIFMA 2 Letter; SIFMA 4 Letter; Dresdner Kleinwort
Letter; Deutsche Bank Securities Letter; SIPC Letter; Abbey National
Letter; First Clearing Letter; Cornell Letter.
\32\ See infra section II.A.2.ii. of this release for a
discussion of the Commission's rationale for the change in the final
rule to require a carrying broker-dealer provide notice to, rather
than obtain written permission from, a PAB account holder in order
for its securities to be used in the ordinary course of the carrying
firm's securities business.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

These amendments, in part, incorporate many of the provisions of a
no-action letter regarding PAB accounts issued by Commission staff in
1998.\33\ The PAIB Letter stated that the staff would not recommend
enforcement action to the Commission if a broker-dealer did not take a
net capital deduction under Rule 15c3-1 for cash held in a securities
account at another broker-dealer,\34\ provided the other broker-dealer
agrees to: (1) Perform a reserve computation for PAB accounts; \35\ (2)
establish a separate special reserve bank account; and (3) maintain
cash or qualified securities in the reserve account equal to the
computed reserve requirement (``PAIB agreement''). Broker-dealers that
carry PAB accounts have the incentive to enter into PAIB agreements to
prevent their PAB account holders from choosing to open an account or
enter into a clearing agreement with another broker-dealer. Because
many of the provisions in the PAIB Letter are being incorporated in
this rulemaking, the Commission is directing the Commission staff to
withdraw the PAIB Letter as of the effective date of these rule
amendments.
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\33\ See Letter from Michael A. Macchiaroli, Associate Director,
Division of Market Regulation, Commission, to Raymond J. Hennessy,
Vice President, NYSE, and Thomas Cassella, Vice President, NASD
Regulation, Inc. (Nov. 3, 1998) (``PAIB Letter'').
\34\ Under Rule 15c3-1, broker-dealers are generally required to
deduct unsecured receivables from their net worth when computing
their net capital.
\35\ Under new paragraph (e)(3), broker-dealers will be required
to perform the PAB reserve account computation (and its customer
reserve account computation, if applicable) on a weekly basis, as of
the close of business on the last business day of the week. With
regard to PAB accounts, a broker-dealer that does not carry an
account of a customer as defined under Rule 15c3-3 or conduct a
proprietary trading business may make the PAB reserve account
computation monthly rather than weekly. See new paragraph
(e)(3)(iii) of Rule 15c3-3.
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i. Definition of ``PAB Account'' Under Rule 15c3-3(a)(16)
The Commission proposed, among other things, to add paragraph
(a)(16) to Rule 15c3-3 that would have defined the term PAB account as
``a proprietary securities account of a broker or dealer (which
includes a foreign broker or dealer, or a foreign bank acting as a
broker or dealer), but shall not include an account where the account
owner is a guaranteed subsidiary of the carrying broker or dealer, the
account owner guarantees all liabilities and obligations of the
carrying broker or dealer, or the account is a delivery-versus-payment
account or receipt-versus-payment account.'' \36\ Two commenters raised
concerns about the proposed definition because--by including
proprietary accounts of foreign broker-dealers and foreign banks acting
as broker-dealers within the term PAB account--it differed from
provisions in the PAIB Letter, which excluded such accounts from a PAIB
computation.\37\ One of these commenters stated that broker-dealers
(including foreign banks acting as broker-dealers) should be allowed to
opt-out of PAB account treatment because they do not require the same
protections as customers as defined in Rule 15c3-3.\38\ The commenter
stated that broker-dealers are able to understand the insolvency risk
of the broker-dealers at which they maintain proprietary accounts.\39\
This commenter noted that broker-dealer customers often self-insure or
otherwise account for such exposure regardless of their status under
SIPA.\40\ The second commenter stated that foreign broker-dealers and
foreign banks acting as broker-dealers should be allowed to subordinate
their claims to customers and creditors of the broker-dealer in order
to remove their accounts from PAB account treatment because under SIPA
foreign broker-dealers and foreign banks acting as broker-dealers,
under certain circumstances, will not be deemed customers and,
therefore, would not be entitled to a pro rata share of the estate of
customer property in a SIPA liquidation.\41\ More specifically, the
commenter suggested that the Commission modify the definition of PAB
account, to exclude ``any foreign broker-dealer and foreign bank to the
extent that such entity has a claim for cash or securities that is
subordinated to the claims of creditors of the carrying broker-dealer''
in order to parallel the

[[Page 51829]]

language in SIPA.\42\ This commenter also recommended requiring the
``subordinating'' broker-dealer to follow the requirements for non-
conforming subordinated loans to remove an account from PAB account
treatment.\43\
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\36\ See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at
12895.
\37\ See Dresdner Kleinwort Letter; Deutsche Bank Securities
Letter. Though SIFMA initially raised concerns about the proposed
definition, it later withdrew its recommendation that proprietary
accounts of affiliated non-U.S. broker-dealers and non-U.S. banks be
excluded from the PAB account definition. See SIFMA 2 Letter; SIFMA
4 Letter.
\38\ See Dresdner Kleinwort Letter.
\39\ Id.
\40\ See Dresdner Kleinwort Letter.
\41\ See Deutsche Bank Securities Letter.
\42\ The definition of customer in SIPA excludes any person, to
the extent that ``such person has a claim for cash or securities
which by contract, agreement, or understanding, or by operation of
law, is part of the capital of the debtor, or is subordinated to the
claims of any and all creditors of the debtor, notwithstanding that
some grounds exist for declaring such contract, agreement, or
understanding void or voidable in a suit between the claimant and
the debtor.'' See 15 U.S.C. 78lll(2)(C)(iii).
\43\ See Deutsche Bank Securities Letter. See also SIFMA 4
Letter. Under Rule 15c3-1, a broker-dealer can exclude liabilities
that are subordinated to the claims of creditors pursuant to a
satisfactory subordination agreement, as defined in Appendix D to
Rule 15c3-1, for purposes determining its net capital. See 17 CFR
240.15c3-1(c)(2)(ii) and 17 CFR 240.15c3-1d. See also 17 CFR
240.15c3-1(c)(i)(x). A non-conforming subordination agreement
generally would not meet all the requirements of Appendix D to Rule
15c3-1, and, therefore, a broker-dealer could not exclude the
liability resulting from the loan agreement in computing its net
capital. See 17 CFR 240.15c3-1(c)(2)(ii).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Another commenter stated that the Commission's desire to close the
gap between Rule 15c3-3 and SIPA must be balanced against the
potentially significant practical issues the Commission's proposal
would raise in the case of accounts carried for affiliated entities
operating in non-U.S. jurisdictions.\44\ In a subsequent letter, this
commenter stated that while it would prefer a more flexible solution
that would allow broker-dealers and non-U.S. banks acting as broker-
dealers (especially non-U.S. affiliates) to opt to have their accounts
treated as neither customer accounts under SIPA nor PAB accounts, the
commenter recognized that there is a clear need for an immediate
solution that cannot be delayed until appropriate amendments to SIPA
are adopted.\45\ Consequently, the commenter withdrew its
recommendation that the proprietary accounts of affiliated non-U.S.
broker-dealers and affiliated non-U.S. banks be excluded from the ``PAB
account'' definition, but continued to endorse its previous comments to
achieve the goal of correcting the gap between Rule 15c3-3 and SIPA
without creating undue or unintended burdens.\46\
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\44\ See SIFMA 2 Letter. This commenter specifically raised
concerns that it would be cumbersome to subject transactions between
a carrying broker-dealer and its foreign affiliates to the proposed
PAB requirements because of the integrated securities processing and
settlement activities of these entities, which would limit the
ability of the group as a whole to provide competitive services to
U.S. investors.
\45\ See SIFMA 4 Letter.
\46\ See SIFMA 4 Letter. Among other things, the commenter
suggested that the Commission modify the proposed definition of PAB
account to exclude any customer as defined in Rule 15c3-3 and also
to exclude the other types of persons who are specifically excluded
from the definition of customer. This suggestion included excluding
accounts whose claims are subordinated to the claims of other
creditors of the carrying broker-dealer. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The goal of the proposed amendments is to create a process that
protects Rule 15c3-3 customers and PAB account holders of a failed
carrying broker-dealer. The amendments are designed to provide such
protection by mitigating the risk that there will be insufficient
customer property to fully satisfy all customer claims in a SIPA
liquidation. The entitlement of PAB account holders to a pro rata share
of the fund of customer property places all SIPA customers at risk if
the carrying firm does not establish a PAB reserve account for excess
credits owed to PAB account holders.
At the same time, the Commission appreciates the need to consider
both the practical issues raised by commenters and its objective to
eliminate the inconsistency between Rule 15c3-3 and SIPA.\47\
Accordingly, in response to commenters, the final rule adopted by the
Commission excludes from the definition of PAB account in paragraph
(a)(16) of Rule 15c3-3 ``an account that has been subordinated to the
claims of creditors of the carrying broker or dealer.'' \48\ A PAB
account holder that has subordinated its claims with respect to that
account to claims of creditors of the carrying broker-dealer will not
be entitled to SIPA protection for that account.\49\ Consequently, this
provision will provide flexibility to carrying broker-dealers and their
broker-dealer affiliates to structure their PAB account relationships
in a manner that permits operational efficiencies (i.e., the ability to
exclude these accounts from the PAB reserve computation) while still
promoting the goal of the amendments to have a consistent treatment of
these accounts under Rule 15c3-3 and SIPA, and thereby protect accounts
holders that are ``customers'' under SIPA.\50\ If a U.S. broker-dealer,
however, chooses to subordinate its claims to assets in that account to
the claims of other creditors of the carrying broker-dealer, it will
not be able to include those assets as allowable for its own net
capital computation.\51\
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\47\ See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at
12863.
\48\ The agreement would not need to be conforming for purposes
of Exchange Act Rule 15c3-1d (Satisfactory Subordination
Agreements).
\49\ See 15 U.S.C. 78lll(2).
\50\ See 17 CFR 240.15c3-3(a)(1) and 15 U.S.C. 78lll(2)(C)(ii).
These accounts will be excluded from both the definition of PAB
account, as well from the definition of customer under SIPA. See
Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12863.
Consequently, these account holders will not be entitled to the
protections in SIPA applicable to customers.
\51\ See 17 CFR 240.15c3-1(c)(2)(iv)(E).
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Further, as was proposed, the definition of PAB account in the
final rule excludes accounts that operate on a delivery-versus-payment
or a receipt-versus-payment basis, or ``DVP/RVP'' basis, because these
accounts generally hold securities and cash for short durations.\52\
The provision relating to DVP/RVP accounts is being adopted
substantially as proposed, though paragraph (a)(16), as adopted, has
been modified by splitting the text into two sentences. As adopted, the
reference to the DVP/RVP accounts provision was moved to the first
sentence. The Commission is not adopting the proposed exclusions from
the PAB reserve computation requirement related to accounts established
by a PAB account holder that fully guarantee the obligations of, or
whose accounts are fully guaranteed by, the carrying broker-dealer.
Rather than create a specific exemption for such account holders, the
Commission believes the better approach is to allow these accounts to
enter into subordination agreements with the carrying broker-dealer, in
order for these accounts to be excluded from the definition of PAB
account. This approach simplifies the final rule, while continuing to
provide a means for these account holders to be excluded from its
scope. Consequently, as adopted, paragraph (a)(16) to Rule 15c3-3
defines the term PAB account to mean ``a proprietary securities account
of a broker or dealer (which includes a foreign broker or dealer, or a
foreign bank acting as a broker or dealer) other than a delivery-
versus-payment account or a receipt-versus-payment account.'' \53\ The
definition of PAB Account does not include accounts that have been
subordinated to the claims of a carrying broker-dealer's creditors.\54\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\52\ See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at
12863, n.17 (``[T]he amendment would exclude delivery-versus-payment
and receipt-versus-payment accounts. These types of accounts pose
little risk of reducing the estate of customer property in a SIPA
liquidation since they only hold assets for short periods of
time.'').
\53\ See paragraph (a)(16) to Rule 15c3-3, as adopted.
\54\ Id.
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ii. Written Permission To Use PAB Account Securities
Because PAB account holders are not customers for purposes of Rule
15c3-3, a carrying broker-dealer is not required to maintain possession
or control of their non-margin securities. Consequently, it has been a
long-

[[Page 51830]]

standing industry practice for carrying broker-dealers to use these PAB
securities in their business activities. Under the final rule, a
carrying broker-dealer that uses these PAB securities will need to
include the market value of the securities as a credit in the formula
when performing the PAB reserve computation. Thus, the amount that the
carrying broker-dealer must maintain in its PAB reserve account will
increase by the amount of these credits because there would be no
corresponding debit item.\55\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\55\ 17 CFR 240.15c-3-3a.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Using non-margin securities of PAB account holders presents the
risk that securities may increase in market value between PAB reserve
computations and, therefore, the amount of the credit items in the
formula may be less than the value of the securities for a short period
of time. To accommodate industry practice, however, the Commission did
not propose amending Rule 15c3-3 to apply the possession or control
requirements to PAB accounts. The Commission proposed adding paragraph
(b)(5) to Rule 15c3-3 that would have required the carrying broker-
dealer to obtain written permission from a PAB account holder before it
could use the PAB account holder's securities in the ordinary course of
its securities business. In this way, the Commission proposed
increasing the protections for PAB account holders without interfering
with long-standing industry practice of carrying broker-dealers using
the securities of their broker-dealer account holders. However,
securities not being used by the broker-dealer must be maintained in
accordance with the possession or control requirements of Rule 15c3-3.
One commenter stated that this provision should be eliminated from
the proposed amendments, arguing that ``[t]he proposal interferes
unnecessarily in the contractual arrangements between broker-dealers,
which are capable of understanding the terms of standard industry
custodial relationships.'' \56\ The commenter also noted that the PAIB
Letter did not contain any such requirement.\57\ The Commission agrees
with the commenter that broker-dealers should be able to understand the
implications of granting another broker-dealer the ability to use their
non-margin securities and, therefore, the final rule requires written
notice rather than written permission. An appropriate level of
protection for the PAB account holder may be achieved without requiring
the carrying broker-dealer to maintain possession or control of
securities carried for a PAB account, provided that the carrying
broker-dealer gives written notice to its PAB account holders that it
may use their non-margin securities.\58\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\56\ See SIFMA 2 Letter.
\57\ Id.
\58\ The Commission has deleted the phrase ``obtained the
written permission of the account owner to use the securities in the
ordinary course of its securities business'' from paragraph (b)(5)
of the final rule and replaced it with ``provided written notice to
the account holder that the securities may be used in the ordinary
course of its securities business, and has provided an opportunity
for the account holder to object.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Commission acknowledges that this change, as compared to the
proposed rule, will shift the burden to the PAB account holder to
proactively object to the carrying broker-dealer using the account
holder's securities. However, the new written notice requirement
increases the protections for PAB account holders from the status quo
without imposing substantial burdens on existing account relationships.
The revised rule is intended to provide to the PAB account holders the
opportunity to negotiate different terms if they do not want their
securities used, while eliminating the need for, and the costs that
would result from, carrying broker-dealers reworking existing
contracts.
As adopted, the Commission is modifying the final rule to add the
phrase ``and has provided an opportunity for the account holder to
object'' following the phrase ``ordinary course of its securities
business.'' \59\ This language was added to the final rule to impose a
requirement that the carrying broker-dealer provide the PAB account
holders an opportunity to object to the use of their non-margin
securities after they receive the written notice from the carrying
broker-dealer. The rule does not prescribe the form in which a PAB
account holder must provide notice to the carrying broker-dealer of its
objection. This will provide the PAB account holder with flexibility to
communicate the objection in a manner the account holder determines is
most effective in terms of conveying such objection to the carrying
broker-dealer. If the PAB account holder objects, the carrying broker-
dealer could not use the securities. Further, the PAB account holder
could seek to move the account to another carrying broker-dealer or
negotiate different terms with the carrying broker-dealer with regard
to the use of its securities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\59\ See paragraph (b)(5) of Rule 15c3-3, as adopted.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Finally, the Commission has modified proposed paragraph (b)(5) to
clarify in the final rule that a broker-dealer is affirmatively
required to maintain possession and control of non-margin securities
unless the broker-dealer has provided written notice to the PAB account
holder.\60\ As modified, paragraph (b)(5) reads: ``A broker or dealer
is required to obtain and thereafter maintain the physical possession
or control of securities carried for a PAB account, unless the broker
or dealer has provided written notice to the account holder that the
securities may be used in the ordinary course of its securities
business, and has provided an opportunity for the account holder to
object.'' \61\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\60\ The modifications replaced the phrase ``shall not be
required'' with the phrase ``is required'' and replaced the phrase
``provided that'' with the word ``unless.''
\61\ See paragraph (b)(5) of Rule 15c3-3, as adopted.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

iii. PAB Reserve Bank Accounts
The Commission proposed amendments to paragraph (e) of Rule 15c3-3
to require a carrying broker with PAB accounts to establish and
maintain a PAB reserve account for PAB accounts, perform a separate PAB
reserve computation for PAB accounts, and maintain cash or qualified
securities in the PAB reserve account in an amount equal to the PAB
reserve requirement.\62\ The Commission also proposed amendments to
paragraph (f) of Rule 15c3-3 to require carrying broker-dealers with
PAB accounts to notify the bank about the status of the PAB reserve
account and obtain an agreement and notification from the bank that the
PAB reserve account will be maintained for the benefit of the PAB
account holders.\63\ The Commission is adopting these amendments to
paragraphs (e) and (f) of Rule 15c3-3 substantially as proposed, with
some technical modifications suggested by one commenter, including
making terminology consistent throughout the paragraphs.\64\ In
addition, the Commission is adopting substantially as proposed the
amendments to paragraph (g) of Rule 15c3-3 which specifies when the
carrying broker-dealer can make withdrawals from a PAB reserve
account.\65\ Finally, the Commission is

[[Page 51831]]

adopting, as proposed, new paragraph (e)(4) to Rule 15c3-3, which
allows a carrying broker-dealer to use credits related to PAB accounts
to finance Rule 15c3-3 customer debits, but does not allow a carrying
broker-dealer to use Rule 15c3-3 customer credits to finance PAB
debits.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\62\ See section II.A.3. of this release for a discussion of
changes to paragraph (e)(5) of Rule 15c3-3 with respect to banks
where customer or PAB reserve accounts may be held.
\63\ 17 CFR 240.15c3-3(f).
\64\ See SIFMA 2 Letter.
\65\ 17 CFR 240.15c3-3(g). In this paragraph, the Commission
deleted the phrase ``his Reserve Bank Accounts'' and replaced it
with the phrase ``a Customer Reserve Bank Account and PAB Reserve
Bank Account.'' The Commission also deleted the phrase ``each
Reserve Bank Account'' and replaced it with the phrase ``the
Customer Reserve Bank Account and PAB Reserve Bank Account.'' These
were the only changes made to the final rule in paragraph (g) of
Rule 15c3-3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

iv. Other PAB Issues Raised by Commenters
In addition to specific comments on the proposed rule language, one
commenter had other interpretive questions and comments about the
proposed PAB requirements.\66\ The commenter requested that the
Commission clarify whether PAB account holders must obtain from their
carrying broker-dealers a written agreement to perform the calculation
as required by the PAIB Letter.\67\ Under the amendments, there is no
requirement that PAB account holders obtain a written agreement from
the carrying firm that it will perform the PAB reserve computation.
Rule 15c3-3, as amended, requires the carrying firm to perform the PAB
reserve computation. As stated above, Rule 15c3-3 prescribes the
requirements for carrying firms with respect to PAB accounts, and the
PAIB Letter is being withdrawn.\68\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\66\ See SIMFA 2 Letter.
\67\ Id.
\68\ As discussed above in this section II.A.2., the Commission
is directing the staff to withdraw the PAIB Letter as of the
effective date of these rules.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In addition, the commenter requested the Commission to clarify that
existing PAIB reserve accounts need not be re-titled to comply with the
proposed amendments.\69\ Item 4 of the PAIB Letter required that a
carrying broker-dealer, ``establish and maintain a separate `Special
Reserve Account for the Exclusive Benefit of Customers' with a bank in
conformity with the standards of paragraph (f) of Rule 15c3-3.''
Paragraph (e)(1) of Rule 15c3-3, however, requires that a carrying
broker-dealer establish and maintain a ``Special Reserve Bank Account
for Brokers and Dealers.'' Given the small differences in nomenclature
and the time and expense associated with broker-dealers re-titling
these accounts, a carrying broker-dealer that has properly established
PAB reserve account in the manner described in Item 4 of the PAIB
Letter need not re-title the account and obtain a new notification from
the bank.\70\ However, all PAB reserve accounts established on or after
the effective date of these amendments must title the account in
accordance with paragraph (e)(1) of Rule 15c3-3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\69\ See SIFMA 2 Letter.
\70\ See PAIB Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Finally, the commenter urged the Commission to clarify whether, for
purposes of Rule 15c3-1, the term aggregate debit items means total
aggregate debit items computed in accordance with the customer reserve
formula or the total aggregate debit items computed in accordance with
both the customer reserve formula and the PAB reserve formula.\71\
Aggregate debit items are used in the net capital rule to determine the
minimum net capital requirement for broker-dealers that elect to use
the alternative standard in computing their minimum net capital
requirement. Specifically, the net capital rule requires broker-dealers
using the alternative standard to maintain net capital of at least the
greater of $250,000 or 2% of aggregate debit items.\72\ Including PAB
aggregate debit items in this computation would significantly increase
net capital requirements for broker-dealers that use the alternative
method. The intended purpose of this rule change is to address the
inconsistencies between Rule 15c3-3 and SIPA--not to increase net
capital requirements. Consequently, the requirements in Rules 15c3-1,
15c3-1d, and 17a-11 that refer to aggregate debit items continue to be
based only on aggregate debit items computed in accordance with the
customer reserve computation, and do not include aggregate debit items
computed in accordance with the PAB reserve computation.\73\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\71\ See SIFMA 2 Letter; SIFMA 4 Letter.
\72\ 17 CFR 240.15c3-1(a)(1)(ii). In addition, certain other
financial responsibility rules require that a broker-dealer that
computes net capital pursuant to the alternative method either
report to the Commission, limit its ability to obtain, pre-pay, or
repay subordinated debt, or limit its business if its net capital
falls below a certain level based on a percentage of aggregate debit
items (see, e.g., Rules 15c3-1(e)(2)(vi), 15c3-1d(b)(6)(iii), 15c3-
1d(b)(7), 15c3-1d(b)(8)(i)(A), 15c3-1d(b)(10)(ii)(B), 15c3-1d(c)(2),
15c3-1d(c)(5)(ii)(A), and 17a-11(c)(2)).
\73\ Under paragraph (e)(4) to Rule 15c3-3, a carrying broker-
dealer will be permitted to use credits related to PAB accounts to
finance Rule 15c3-3 customer debits. This rule, however, does not
affect the use of aggregate debit items in computing a broker-
dealer's net capital under the alternative standard pursuant to
paragraph (a)(1)(ii) of Rule 15c3-1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

v. Amendment to Rule 15c3-1(c)(2)(iv)(E) Related to PAB Accounts
Finally, the Commission proposed an amendment to Rule 15c3-1 \74\
that would have required a broker-dealer, when calculating net capital,
to deduct from net worth cash and securities held in a securities
account at another broker-dealer if the other broker-dealer does not
treat the account, and the assets therein, in compliance with the
applicable PAB reserve account requirements of Rules 15c3-3 and 15c3-
3a.\75\ A commenter suggested modifying this proposed amendment,\76\
arguing that ``[a]lthough the Proposing Release states that the
Commission `would not expect broker-dealers to audit or examine their
carrying broker-dealers to determine whether the carrying broker-dealer
is in compliance with [the proposed rules],' the text of the proposed
amendment suggests that they in fact would have such an obligation.''
\77\ The commenter also stated that a broker-dealer should not be
deemed to have violated Rule 15c3-1 merely because its carrying firm
fails to properly perform requirements solely applicable to the
carrying firm and that paragraph (c)(2)(iv)(E) under Rule 15c3-1 should
be explicitly modified to clarify that cash and securities held in a
securities account at another broker-dealer are not subject to the
deduction specified in that paragraph.\78\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\74\ 17 CFR 240.15c3-1(c)(2)(iv)(E).
\75\ See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at
12864.
\76\ See SIFMA 2 Letter.
\77\ Id.
\78\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

While the Commission did not intend to impose any monitoring
requirement on the PAB account holder, the Commission recognizes that
the language, as proposed, could have implied such a requirement and
agrees with the commenter that a broker-dealer should not be deemed to
have violated Rule 15c3-1 with respect to requirements that are solely
applicable to the carrying broker-dealer. To address this concern, the
Commission has modified the language in paragraph (c)(2)(iv)(E) under
Rule 15c3-1 to eliminate the proposed capital charge of Rule 15c3-1
that would have resulted from a failure of a carrying broker-dealer to
comply with the PAB requirements in Rule 15c3-3.\79\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\79\ More specifically, the Commission has deleted the proposed
language referring to ``cash and securities held in a securities
account at another broker-dealer if the other broker-dealer does not
treat the account, and the assets therein in compliance with
paragraphs (b)(5) and (e) of Sec. 240.15c3-3. . . .''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Instead, the Commission has adopted amendments to Rule 15c3-1
providing that a broker-dealer need not deduct cash and securities held
in a securities account at a carrying broker-dealer except where the
account has been subordinated to the claims of creditors of the
carrying broker-dealer.\80\ This provision is intended to prevent
broker-dealers from including assets in their net capital that may not
be readily available to be returned because they

[[Page 51832]]

would not be subject to the PAB account provisions discussed above.
Accordingly, the amendments to paragraph (c)(2)(iv)(E) of Rule 15c3-1
are consistent with the exclusions from the definition of PAB account
in paragraph (a)(16) of Rule 15c3-3.\81\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\80\ 17 CFR 240.15c3-1(c)(2)(iv)(E).
\81\ 17 CFR 15c3-3(a)(16).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Banks Where Special Reserve Deposits May Be Held
As amended, paragraph (e) of Rule 15c3-3 requires a broker-dealer
to deposit cash or qualified securities into the customer or PAB
reserve account,\82\ which must be maintained at a bank.\83\ While cash
deposits at a bank are fungible and may be used by the bank in its
lending and investment activities, paragraph (f) of Rule 15c3-3
requires that a broker-dealer obtain a written contract from the bank
wherein the bank agrees not to re-lend or hypothecate securities
deposited into the reserve account.\84\ This means the bank cannot use
the securities in its business, which provides a measure of protection
by requiring that the securities will be available to the broker-dealer
if the bank falls into financial difficulty. Cash deposits, however,
may be freely used in the course of the bank's commercial
activities.\85\ Therefore, to the extent a broker-dealer deposits cash
in a reserve account, there is a risk the cash could become
inaccessible if the bank experiences financial difficulties.\86\ This
could adversely impact the broker-dealer and its customers.\87\ To
limit these risks, the Commission proposed amendments to Rule 15c3-3
that would have: (1) Prohibited a broker-dealer from maintaining cash
deposits in the reserve accounts for customers and PAB account holders
if the bank was affiliated; and (2) limited the amount of cash that
could be deposited in both types of reserve accounts at non-affiliated
banks.\88\ These restrictions would not have applied to securities held
in the reserve accounts because, as noted above, the bank must agree
not to use the securities in its business. The goal of the proposals
was to limit cash reserve account deposits to reasonably safe amounts
as measured against the capitalization of the broker-dealer and the
bank.\89\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\82\ The PAB reserve account and the customer reserve account
are collectively referred to as the ``reserve accounts'' or a
``reserve account.''
\83\ The term bank is defined in paragraph (a)(7) of Rule 15c3-3
as a ``bank as defined in section 3(a)(6) of the Exchange Act and
will also mean any building and loan, savings and loan or similar
banking institution subject to the supervision by a Federal banking
authority.'' See paragraph (a)(7) to Rule 15c3-3, as adopted.
\84\ See 17 CFR 240.15c3-3(f).
\85\ See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at
12864.
\86\ Id.
\87\ Id.
\88\ Id.
\89\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Specifically, as proposed, paragraph (e)(5) of 15c3-3 provided that
a carrying broker-dealer would have been required to exclude the amount
of cash deposited into reserve accounts at affiliated banks when
determining whether it maintained the minimum amount required to be on
deposit in the reserve accounts for its customers and PAB account
holders. In addition, the proposed amendment would have required a
carrying broker-dealer to exclude cash deposited in a reserve account
at an unaffiliated bank to the extent the amount of the cash deposited
exceeded: (1) 50% of the broker-dealer's excess net capital (based on
the broker-dealer's most recently filed FOCUS Report); \90\ or (2) 10%
of the bank's equity capital (based on the bank's most recently filed
Call Report or Thrift Financial Report).\91\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\90\ Under Rule 17a-5, broker-dealers must file periodic reports
on Form X-17a-5 (Financial and Operational Combined Uniform Single
Reports) (``FOCUS Reports''). See 17 CFR 240.17a-5(a). The FOCUS
Report requires, among other financial information, a balance sheet,
income statement, and net capital and customer reserve computations.
Excess net capital is the amount that a broker-dealer's net capital
exceeds its minimum requirement.
\91\ See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at
12864. On July 21, 2011, supervisory responsibility for federal
savings associations was transferred from the Office of Thrift
Supervision (``OTS'') to the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (``OCC''). As of the quarter ending March 31, 2012, savings
associations were required to file a Call Report in lieu of a Thrift
Financial Report. See Proposed Agency Information Collection
Activities; Comment Request, 76 FR 7082 (Feb. 8, 2011). The Call
Report includes a line item for total bank equity capital. A report
for a specific institution is available at https://cdr.ffiec.gov/public/. See also, FINRA, Interpretations of Financial and
Operational Rules, Interpretations 15c3-3(e)(1)/01 and/011
(establishing similar threshold restrictions on using money market
deposit accounts or time deposits, respectively, to meet customer
reserve account requirements), and Interpretation 15c3-3(e)(3)/051
(establishing similar threshold restrictions with respect to meeting
the customer reserve requirement by depositing cash at an affiliated
bank).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Commission is adopting the amendments with modifications
designed to address issues identified by commenters. Twenty-three
commenters addressed the proposed amendments.\92\ Fifteen commenters
urged the Commission not to adopt the proposed prohibition on broker-
dealers maintaining cash in reserve accounts at affiliated banks.\93\
These commenters generally stated that, with regard to cash in reserve
accounts, affiliated banks should be treated the same as unaffiliated
banks because both groups are subject to the same financial
regulation.\94\ These commenters noted that banks are subject to safety
and soundness requirements of their respective banking regulators and,
therefore, the commenters argued that the proposed restriction with
respect to affiliated banks is unwarranted.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\92\ See Federated Letter; Curian Clearing Letter; Raymond James
Letter; JP Morgan Letter; Reserve Letter; Dresdner Kleinwort Letter;
SIFMA 2 Letter; SIFMA 4 Letter; First Clearing Letter; Clearing
House Letter; ICI Letter; Barclays Letter; ABASA Letter; PNC Letter;
BlackRock Letter; Deutsche Bank Securities Letter; E*Trade Letter;
Citigroup Letter; American Bar Association Letter; Fidelity/NFS
Letter; BOK Letter; JP Morgan 3 Letter; IIB Letter; Raymond James 2
Letter.
\93\ See Federated Letter; JP Morgan Letter; Dresdner Kleinwort
Letter; SIFMA 4 Letter; First Clearing Letter; ICI Letter; ABASA
Letter; E*Trade Letter; Citigroup Letter; American Bar Association
Letter; Fidelity/NFS Letter; Curian Letter; BOK Letter; JP Morgan 2
Letter; IIB Letter.
\94\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

One commenter also stated that the Commission's distinction between
affiliated and unaffiliated banks was not sufficiently supported in the
proposing release.\95\ More specifically, this commenter stated that
the Commission's ``bare statement that a broker-dealer `may not
exercise due diligence with the same degree of impartiality when
assessing the soundness of an affiliate bank as it would with a non-
affiliate . . .' does not suffice to justify the disparate treatment''
with regard to the treatment of affiliated banks under the proposed
rule.\96\ This commenter also stated that it is just as easy to argue
that broker-dealers are in a much better position to know about the
soundness of an affiliated bank then to learn about the soundness of a
unaffiliated bank, which may not be willing to provide complete and
accurate information.\97\ In addition, another commenter stated that
the Commission cited no empirical or anecdotal evidence to support its
reasons for prohibiting cash reserve deposits at an affiliated
bank.\98\ This commenter also stated that the Commission's concerns
discount the operational efficiencies to be gained between an
affiliated broker-dealer and its bank, including: Commonality between
certain policies and procedures; greater ease in communication
internally; and greater operational efficiencies leading to reduced
operational risk in the transfer of funds to and from the bank.\99\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\95\ See Dresdner Kleinwort Letter.
\96\ Id.
\97\ Id.
\98\ See Citigroup Letter.
\99\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

One commenter stated that it took no issue with the proposed
restriction on

[[Page 51833]]

affiliated banks.\100\ Another commenter noted that the financial
industry has seen a remarkable consolidation of the banking and
securities industries, and, as a result, the number of broker dealers
affiliated with banks has increased, along with the number of those
broker-dealers maintaining deposits at affiliated banks.\101\ This
commenter stated that broker-dealers would be required to move deposits
from one institution and divide that amount among several banks,
resulting in credit risk to the broker-dealer, as well as an increase
in operational risk.\102\ Finally, the commenter observed that the
Commission did not provide any specific examples of bank failures
impacting affiliated broker-dealers, which led the commenter to
question whether there is any realistic benefit to offset the increased
risk that broker-dealers would be required to take on as a result of
the proposal to place restrictions on cash deposits in reserve accounts
at affiliated and unaffiliated banks.\103\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\100\ See Raymond James Letter. In a subsequent comment letter,
this commenter stated that if this proposal is adopted, registered
broker-dealers holding customer funds may be required to move their
reserve accounts if those accounts are currently held at affiliated
banks, which would increase costs. See Raymond James 2 Letter.
\101\ See BOK Letter.
\102\ Id.
\103\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Commission recognizes that all banks, whether or not affiliated
with a broker-dealer, are subject to regulation by their respective
banking regulators. The Commission's continuing concern, however, is
that a carrying broker-dealer may not exercise due diligence with the
same degree of impartiality and care when assessing the financial
soundness of an affiliated bank as it would with an unaffiliated
bank.\104\ Moreover, the goal of protecting the carrying broker-
dealer's customers through the Rule 15c3-3 reserve requirement may be
undermined in the event a holding company becomes insolvent, with
corresponding adverse consequences to both the bank and broker-dealer
subsidiaries.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\104\ See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at
12864.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In some cases, a broker-dealer may have access to more information
about an affiliated bank in comparison to an unaffiliated bank for
purposes of conducting due diligence. However, having more information
would not be of benefit if the individuals making the decision on where
to maintain the reserve account are not objective in their decision
making. The Commission is concerned that a broker-dealer's decision to
hold cash in a reserve account at an affiliated bank may be driven in
part by profit or reasons based on the affiliation, regardless of any
due diligence it may conduct or the overall safety and soundness of the
bank.
In addition, in response to the comments regarding affiliated
banks, the Commission notes that substantial numbers of banks have
failed or required government assistance in recent years.\105\ While a
particular bank failure may not have materially impacted an affiliated
broker-dealer to date,\106\ the risk remains that the financial
difficulty of an entity that is part of a holding company structure may
adversely impact other affiliated entities, including affiliated
broker-dealers and banks.\107\ Therefore, the final rule retains the
prohibition on maintaining customer reserve cash deposits at an
affiliated bank.\108\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\105\ According to the FDIC, the number of FDIC-insured
institutions that failed in the U.S. over the last four years are:
(1) 140 in 2009; (2) 157 in 2010; (3) 92 in 2011; and (4) 51 in
2012. A complete list of failed banks since October 1, 2000, is
available at www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/banklist.html.
\106\ See BOK Letter; Dresdner Kleinwort Letter.
\107\ See, e.g., Lehman Brothers Inc.--Trustee's Preliminary
Investigation Report and Recommendations (Case No. 08-01420 (JMP)
SIPA), available at https://bankrupt.com/misc/sipareport0904.pdf.
\108\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

This prohibition does not apply to securities on deposit at an
affiliated bank, but only cash deposits because, as noted above, the
latter are fungible with other deposits carried by the bank and may be
freely used in the course of the bank's commercial activities.\109\
Consequently, to the extent that operational or other efficiencies can
be achieved through the use of an affiliated bank, the carrying broker-
dealer can use qualified securities held at an affiliated bank to meet
its reserve deposit requirements.\110\ The ability to use qualified
securities alleviates concerns that a broker-dealer would be required
to take deposits from one institution and divide that amount among
several banks, resulting in credit risk to the broker-dealer, as well
as an increase in operational risk.\111\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\109\ See Federal Reserve, Division of Banking Supervision and
Regulation, Commercial Bank Examination Manual, Section 3000.1,
Deposit Accounts (stating that deposits are the primary funding
source for most banks and that banks use deposits in a variety of
ways, primarily to fund loans and investments), available at https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/supmanual/cbem/3000.pdf. See also
OCC Banking Circular (BC-196), Securities Lending (May 7, 1985)
(stating securities should be lent only pursuant to a written
agreement between the lender institution and the owner of the
securities specifically authorizing the institution to offer the
securities for loan), available at https://www.occ.gov/static/news-issuances/bulletins/pre-1994/banking-circulars/bc-1985-196.pdf.
\110\ See Citigroup Letter.
\111\ See BOK Letter. Based on FOCUS Report data, as of December
31, 2011, 79% of the total customer reserve requirement across all
carrying broker-dealers was met using qualified securities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In summary, while the Commission acknowledges concerns raised by
commenters, the Commission continues to believe that it is appropriate
to exclude cash deposited in affiliated banks from the calculation to
determine whether a broker-dealer has met its reserve account
requirements. Therefore, the final rule excludes the amount of any cash
on deposit in an affiliated bank of the broker-dealer from being used
to meet the reserve requirements.\112\ Broker-dealers that use
affiliated banks for holding cash customer reserve accounts will need
to either deposit qualified securities into the accounts or move their
accounts to non-affiliated banks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\112\ See paragraph (e)(5) of Rule 15c3-3, as adopted.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

As for the limits on the amounts of cash that could be deposited in
one unaffiliated bank, some commenters argued that the proposed
thresholds were too restrictive. One commenter urged the Commission to
reconsider the proposed limits, noting that the proposed amendment will
impose significant costs on broker-dealers and potentially adversely
impact the broker-dealers' customers.\113\ Several commenters suggested
that the Commission allow cash reserve deposits without the percentage
restrictions at unaffiliated banks that are well-capitalized or for
which the broker-dealer has performed due diligence.\114\ One commenter
suggested that the Commission consider higher percentages for cash
deposits at large money-center banks.\115\ This commenter stated that
this would strike a better balance between the Commission's concerns
regarding the safety of cash deposits and the costs imposed on broker-
dealers arising from having to use qualified securities (as opposed to
cash) to meet deposit requirements or having to maintain reserve
accounts at multiple banks.\116\ This commenter also stated that the
percentage thresholds would negatively impact smaller broker-dealers
because they would exceed the 50% of excess net capital threshold at
lower deposit levels.\117\ Two

[[Page 51834]]

commenters noted that the proposed 10% bank equity capital limitation
appears to be derived from a 1988 NYSE staff interpretation, which
stated that customer reserve accounts may be maintained in money market
deposit accounts if the total of such deposits in any one bank does not
exceed 50% of the broker-dealer's excess net capital or 10% of the
bank's equity capital.\118\ These commenters pointed out that
significant changes have taken place with respect to federal bank
regulatory agency oversight of the safety and soundness of banks since
1988, including the imposition of prompt corrective action
provisions.\119\ These commenters stated that the concerns that gave
rise to the 1988 interpretation have been mitigated by current statutes
and regulations requiring prompt corrective action in the event that a
bank's capital position deteriorates.\120\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\113\ See Raymond James 2 Letter.
\114\ See Raymond James Letter; JP Morgan Letter; Clearing House
Letter; ABASA Letter; PNC Letter; Deutsche Bank Securities Letter;
E*Trade Letter; JP Morgan 2 Letter.
\115\ See SIFMA 2 Letter; SIFMA 4 Letter.
\116\ See SIFMA 2 Letter.
\117\ Id.
\118\ See PNC Letter; ABASA Letter.
\119\ See PNC Letter; ABASA Letter.
\120\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

As stated above, substantial numbers of banks have failed or
required government assistance in recent years.\121\ Consequently, the
rule, as adopted, establishes requirements designed to avoid the
situation where a carrying broker-dealer's cash deposits constitute a
substantial portion of the bank's deposits. At the same time, the
proposal has been modified to mitigate concerns raised by commenters
that broker-dealers would have to maintain reserve accounts at multiple
banks. First, the Commission has eliminated the provision that would
have excluded the amount of a cash deposit that exceeds 50% of the
broker-dealer's excess net capital. As noted by comments, this
provision likely would have disproportionately impacted small and mid-
size broker-dealers when they deposited cash into large commercial
banks since they would exceed the excess net capital threshold well
before exceeding the bank equity capital threshold.\122\ Also, based on
staff experience monitoring larger broker-dealers, firms that maintain
large amounts of cash in their customer reserve accounts generally use
more than one non-affiliated bank to maintain these accounts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\121\ See www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/banklist.html.
\122\ See SIFMA 2 Letter; JP Morgan 2 Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The bank equity capital threshold is the more important metric
since it relates directly to the financial strength of the bank, which
is the entity holding the account. Thus, this metric more directly
addresses the risk at issue: The potential impairment of the bank's
ability to quickly return the customer reserve deposit to the broker-
dealer.
Second, with respect to the bank equity capital threshold, in
response to comments, the Commission has increased the threshold from
10% to 15% of the bank's equity capital. The increase of the threshold
to 15% is designed to address concerns raised by commenters that the
proposed percentage tests were unduly restrictive in certain respects
and should be modified, particularly with respect to large broker-
dealers with large deposit requirements. Consequently, the increase
from 10% to 15% is designed to mitigate commenters' concerns that the
10% threshold would require broker-dealers to spread out cash deposits
over a number of banks, while still providing adequate protection
against the risk that arises when a bank's deposit base is overly
reliant on a single depositor.
The elimination of the 50% of excess net capital threshold and
increase in the bank capital threshold from 10% to 15% is intended to
address concerns raised by commenters that they would have to
substantially alter their current cash deposit practices in light of
the goal of the rule to promote the broker-dealer's ability to have
quick access to the deposit.
As proposed, the equity capital threshold would have been based on
equity capital ``as reported by the bank in its most recent Call Report
or Thrift Financial Report.'' Under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act (``Dodd-Frank Act''),\123\ the supervision
of savings associations was transferred from the OTS to the OCC (for
federal savings associations) and the FDIC (for state savings
associations).\124\ Also, beginning in the period ending March 31,
2012, savings associations began to file a Call Report in lieu of a
Thrift Financial Report, thereby ending the use of the Thrift Financial
Report.\125\ Therefore, due to the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act and
the elimination of the Thrift Financial Report, as well as to provide
more flexibility with regard to any successor reports that may be
required to be filed by a bank, the Commission is modifying the phrase
``Call Report or Thrift Financial Report'' to read ``Call Report or any
successor form the bank is required to file by its appropriate Federal
banking agency (as defined by section 3 of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1813))''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\123\ Public Law 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
\124\ Id. at Sec. Sec. 300-378. See also List of OTS
Regulations to be Enforced by the OCC and the FDIC Pursuant to the
Dodd-Frank Act, OCC, FDIC, (June 14, 2011), 76 FR 39246 (July 6,
2011). Supervision of savings and loan holding companies and their
subsidiaries (other than depository institutions) was transferred
from the OTS to the Federal Reserve.
\125\ See Proposed Agency Information Collection Activities;
Comment Request, 76 FR 7082 (Feb. 8, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Two commenters expressed concern about the use of a Call Report to
determine a bank's ``equity capital'' under the rule.\126\ These
commenters noted that there is no equity capital line item in the Call
Reports of U.S. branches of foreign banks due to these branches not
being separately incorporated legal entities.\127\ Therefore, the
proposed Call Report provision potentially excluded U.S. branches of
foreign banks from holding reserve accounts. The commenters stated that
for foreign banks, the equity capital can be found in other forms, such
as Form FR Y-7, Form FR Y-70, Form 6-K, and Form F-20, among other
financial statements filed with U.S. regulators.\128\ One commenter
suggested the Commission revise the proposed provision to read: ``The
amount of the deposit exceeds 10% of the bank's equity capital (as
reported by the bank in its most recent Call Report or Thrift Financial
Report if such report includes a line item for `equity capital').''
\129\ Alternatively, these commenters suggested that in lieu of a Call
Report a U.S. branch of a foreign bank could periodically obtain a
certificate from the bank stating its equity capital (or stating that
its equity capital exceeds a specified level).\130\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\126\ See IIB Letter; SIFMA 4 Letter.
\127\ Id.
\128\ Id.
\129\ See IIB Letter.
\130\ See IIB Letter; SIFMA 4 Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Commission recognizes that the U.S. branches of some foreign
banks may meet the definition of bank under section (3)(a)(6) of the
Exchange Act and, therefore, also under paragraph (a)(7) of Rule 15c3-
3.\131\ However, the

[[Page 51835]]

Commission is retaining the requirement that the bank's equity be
determined using its most recent Call Report because U.S. branches of
foreign banks generally are not FDIC-insured.\132\ Consequently,
deposits at these institutions would not receive the protections of
FDIC insurance in the event of a bank failure. FDIC insurance provides
additional protections to cash deposited in a reserve account at a bank
in the event of a bank failure that would not be available at an
uninsured bank.\133\ The Commission, however, will consider requests
for exemptive relief from broker-dealers that wish to hold a reserve
account at a U.S. branch of a foreign bank.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\131\ The term bank as defined in section 3(a)(6) of the
Exchange Act is limited to banks directly regulated by U.S. state or
federal bank regulators. The determination whether any particular
financial institution meets the requirements of section 3(a)(6) is
the responsibility of the financial institution and its counsel. See
15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(6); cf. Securities Issued Or Guaranteed By United
States Branches Or Agencies of Foreign Banks; Interpretive Release,
Securities Act Release No. 6661 (Sept. 23, 1986), 51 FR 34460 (Sept.
29, 1986) (determination as to whether branch or agency of foreign
bank falls within the definition of bank under section 3(a)(2) of
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. 77c(a)(2), is responsibility of
issuers and their counsel). However, section 4(d) of the
International Banking Act, 12 U.S.C. 3102(d), expressly prohibits
agencies of foreign banks established under federal law from
receiving deposits or exercising fiduciary powers, criteria
necessary for qualification as a bank under section 3(a)(6)(C) of
the Exchange Act. See 12 U.S.C. 3102(d); see also Conference of
State Bank Supervisors v. Conover, 715 F.2d 604 (D.C. Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 466 U.S. 927 (1984) (stating that federally-chartered
agencies of foreign banks are prohibited from receiving deposits
from foreign, as well as domestic, sources).
\132\ The FDIC protects depositors' funds in the event of the
financial failure of their bank or savings institution. FDIC deposit
insurance covers the balance of each depositor's account, dollar-
for-dollar, up to the insurance limit, including principal and any
accrued interest through the date of the insured bank's closing. No
depositor has suffered a loss of insured deposits since the FDIC was
created in 1933. See FDIC, When a Bank Fails--Facts for Depositors,
Creditors, and Borrowers, available at https://fdic.gov/consumers/banking/facts/. See also Federal Reserve, Structure and
Share Data for U.S. Offices of Foreign Banks, available at https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/iba/.
\133\ Id. Therefore, the availability of FDIC insurance could
also be a contributing factor to mitigating the risk that an
impairment of the reserve deposit at an unaffiliated bank will have
a material negative impact on the broker-dealer's ability to meet
its obligations to customers and PAB account holders. See Amendments
to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12864.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

For these reasons, the Commission is adopting the final rule to
exclude, when determining whether a broker-dealer maintains the minimum
deposits required under paragraph (e) of Rule 15c3-3, cash deposited
with an affiliated bank as well as cash deposited with an unaffiliated
bank ``to the extent that the amount of the deposit exceeds 15% of the
bank's equity capital as reported by the bank in its most recent Call
Report or any successor form the bank is required to file by its
appropriate Federal banking agency (as defined by section 3 of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1813)).'' \134\ As discussed
above, the Commission is deleting from the final rule the provision
that would have excluded the amount of cash on deposit that exceeds 50%
of the broker-dealer's excess net capital.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\134\ See paragraph (e)(5) of Rule 15c3-3, as adopted.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

4. Allocation of Customers' Fully Paid and Excess Margin Securities to
Short Positions
Paragraph (d) of Rule 15c3-3 currently sets forth steps a broker-
dealer must take to retrieve securities from non-control locations if
there is a shortfall in the fully paid or excess margin securities it
is required to hold for its customers. The actions prescribed in the
rule do not include a requirement that the broker-dealer obtain
possession or control of a fully paid or excess margin security that is
reflected on the broker-dealer's stock record as a long position of a
customer that allocates to a broker-dealer or non-customer short
position. In the simplest case, this occurs when the carrying broker-
dealer as principal sells short a security to its own customer.
Currently, in such a case, the broker-dealer is not required to have
possession or control of the security even though its customer has paid
for the security in full. Rather, the broker-dealer must include the
mark-to-market value of the security as a credit item in the reserve
formula. The broker-dealer can use the cash paid by the customer to
purchase the security to make any increased deposit requirement caused
by the credit item.\135\ As the Commission stated in the proposing
release, this permits the broker-dealer, in effect, to partially
monetize the customer's security.\136\ This result is contrary to the
customer protection goals of Rule 15c3-3, which seek to ensure that
broker-dealers do not use customer assets for proprietary
purposes.\137\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\135\ In effect, the broker-dealer has monetized the customer's
security and has to purchase or borrow it, at a future date, to
return the customer's fully paid securities.
\136\ See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at
12865.
\137\ See, e.g., Customer Protection Rule, Exchange Act Release
No. 22499 (Oct. 3, 1985), 50 FR 41337 (Oct. 10, 1985).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

To address these concerns, the Commission proposed an amendment to
Rule 15c3-3 that would have required a broker-dealer to obtain physical
possession or control of customer fully paid and excess margin
securities that allocate to a broker-dealer short position.\138\
Specifically, the proposed amendment would have added a fifth step to
take when a deficit arose in the amount of securities the broker-dealer
was required to maintain in possession or control; namely that for
``[s]ecurities included on [the broker-dealer's] books or records as a
proprietary short position or as a short position for another person,
excluding positions covered by paragraph (m) of this section, for more
than 10 business days (or more than 30 calendar days if the broker or
dealer is a market maker in the securities), [. . .] the broker or
dealer shall, not later than the business day following the day on
which the determination is made, take prompt steps to obtain physical
possession or control of such securities.'' \139\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\138\ See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at
12865.
\139\ Id. at 12895.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Eleven commenters addressed this proposed amendment.\140\ Three
commenters urged the Commission to disallow naked short selling of
securities and one argued that the Commission should force short
sellers to pre-borrow.\141\ Three commenters generally opposed the
proposed rule. They argued that the credit item added to the reserve
formula computation when a customer's fully paid or excess margin
security allocates to a short position provides the customer with
adequate protection.\142\ Two of these commenters requested that the 30
calendar days allowed for a broker-dealer acting as a market maker to
obtain possession or control over securities allocating to a short
position be expanded to include all situations where a broker-dealer
must act pursuant to the rule (i.e., not be limited to market maker
positions).\143\ These commenters argued that it would be difficult to
distinguish between market maker and non-market maker positions in
complying with the proposed rule. Another commenter requested that the
Commission reevaluate the proposed amendment because of its potential
effects on investment and hedging strategies in addition to the heavy

[[Page 51836]]

burden it will impose on short sales.\144\ One commenter supported the
amendments noting that it had ``come to believe . . . that the
Commission's proposal is consistent with the direction of the
Commission's other short sale regulations. . . .'' \145\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\140\ See Glenn Letter; Bare Letter; Anonymous Letter; SIFMA 2
Letter; First Clearing Letter; Hearne Letter; Deutsche Bank
Securities Letter; Citigroup Letter; AMEX Letter; SIFMA 4 Letter;
Federated 6 Letter; Raymond James 2 Letter.
\141\ See Glenn Letter; Bare Letter; Anonymous Letter; Hearne
Letter. The Commission has taken a number of measures to strengthen
investor protections against potentially abusive ``naked'' short
selling, including adopting rules requiring that fails to deliver
resulting from short sales immediately be closed-out and expressly
targeting fraud in short selling transactions. See Amendments to
Regulation SHO, Exchange Act Release No. 60388 (July 27, 2009), 74
FR 38266 (July 31, 2009); ``Naked'' Short Selling Antifraud Rule,
Exchange Act Release No. 58774 (Oct. 14, 2008), 73 FR 61666 (Oct.
17, 2008). In addition, the Commission adopted a short sale-related
price test that, if triggered, imposes a restriction on the prices
at which securities may be sold short. See Amendments to Regulation
SHO, Exchange Act Release No. 61595 (Feb. 26, 2010), 75 FR 11232
(Mar. 10, 2010).
\142\ See First Clearing Letter; Deutsche Bank Securities
Letter; Citigroup Letter.
\143\ See Citigroup Letter; Deutsche Bank Securities Letter.
\144\ See Raymond James 2 Letter.
\145\ See SIFMA 4 Letter. SIFMA originally opposed the proposed
amendments. See SIFMA 2 Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

As discussed above in section II.A.2.ii. of this release, the
Commission has determined that a credit item is sufficient to protect
PAB account holders if the carrying broker-dealer provides them with
notice that it may be using their non-margin securities, as well as the
opportunity to object to such use. The use of the non-margin securities
of PAB account holders is a long-standing industry practice. In
contrast, customers under Rule 15c3-3, which include the carrying
broker-dealer's retail customers, have an expectation that the fully
paid and excess margin securities reflected on their account statements
are, in fact, in the possession or control of the carrying broker-
dealer. However, as described above, this expectation may be frustrated
where the securities are allocated to a short position carried by the
broker-dealer, as the securities are not in the possession or control
of the broker-dealer.
This gap in the existing rule, in effect, permits the broker-dealer
to partially monetize the customer's security. Also, under some
circumstances (e.g., a change in the market value of the securities),
the amount the broker-dealer may have on deposit in the customer
reserve account as a consequence of the credit item may be less than
the value of the securities. Consequently, if the broker-dealer fails,
sufficient funds may not be readily available to purchase the
securities to return them to customers. The use of customer securities
in this manner is contrary to the customer protection goals of Rule
15c3-3 and the expectations of a broker-dealer's customers.\146\ For
these reasons, the Commission is adopting the amendment.\147\ The
Commission agrees, however, that the proposed distinction based upon a
broker-dealer's market maker status could present operational
challenges and, consequently, the final rule has been modified to allow
a uniform period of 30 calendar days before the possession and control
requirement is triggered.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\146\ See supra notes 12 and 18, and accompanying text.
\147\ Current paragraph (d)(4) of Rule 15c3-3 is being re-
designated paragraph (d)(5), as proposed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Specifically, as adopted, paragraph (d)(4) of Rule 15c3-3 requires
a broker-dealer to take prompt steps to obtain physical possession or
control over securities of the same issue and class as those included
``on the broker's or dealer's books or records that allocate to a short
position of the broker or dealer or a short position for another
person, excluding positions covered by paragraph (m) of this section,
for more than 30 calendar days. . . .'' \148\ The Commission does not
believe that lengthening the time from 10 business days to 30 calendar
days for non-market maker positions will significantly diminish the
protections provided by the new rule.\149\ Therefore, the Commission is
adopting a uniform 30 calendar day time period in the final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\148\ See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at
12865-12866. The amendment will not apply to securities that are
sold long for a customer but not obtained from the customer within
ten days after the settlement date. This circumstance is addressed
by paragraph (m) of Rule 15c3-3, which requires the broker-dealer to
close the transaction by purchasing securities of like kind and
quantity. 17 CFR 240.15c3-3(m).
\149\ For example, the rule currently has a thirty calendar day
time period for securities failed to receive and a forty-five
calendar day time period for securities receivable as a result of
corporate actions (e.g., stock splits) before the broker-dealer must
take prompt steps to obtain possession or control of such
securities. See 17 CFR 240.15c3-3(d)(2)-(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Three commenters requested that the Commission clarify that the
aging process begins when the Rule 15c3-3 possession and control
deficit arises and not when the short transaction is executed.\150\ The
proposed amendment was designed to require that the aging process
commence at the time a deficit in securities allocating to a short
position arises. One commenter \151\ also requested that the Commission
modify the proposed amendment to specifically exclude an underwriter's
short position created in connection with a distribution of securities
until after the later of the completion of such underwriter's
participation in the distribution (as defined in Rule 100 of Regulation
M) \152\ or the delivery date for securities acquired in the exercise
of any overallotment option (or ``Green Shoe'').\153\ The Commission
agrees with the commenter that there should be consistency between the
final rule and Regulation M.\154\ Consequently, the Commission has
added a sentence to the final rule to clarify that the 30 calendar day
period with respect to a syndicate short position established in
connection with an offering does not begin to run until the
underwriter's participation in the distribution is complete as
determined pursuant to Rule 100(b) of Regulation M.\155\ Finally, the
Commission is adopting the revision to paragraph (n) as proposed to
permit broker-dealers to apply to their designated examining authority
(``DEA'') for extensions of time related to paragraph (d)(4).\156\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\150\ See Deutsche Bank Securities Letter; Citigroup Letter;
SIFMA 2 Letter.
\151\ See SIFMA 2 Letter. The commenter stated: ``Regulation M
embodies a carefully crafted scheme for the regulation of secondary
market transactions by underwriters and other distribution
participants, including the regulation of `syndicate covering
transactions,' which should not be disrupted by proposed paragraph
(d)(4).'' Id. In addition, SIFMA commented that where an underwriter
sells short to a customer in anticipation of obtaining the
securities through the exercise of an overallotment option,
paragraph (d)(4) should not require the premature exercise of the
overallotment option or the use of secondary market purchases
instead of the overallotment option. Id.
\152\ 17 CFR 242.100 through 242.105. More specifically, Rule
100 of Regulation M provides: ``For purposes of regulation M . . .
the following definitions shall apply: . . . Completion of
participation in a distribution. . . . A person shall be deemed to
have completed its participation in a distribution as follows: . . .
(2) [a]n underwriter, when such person's participation has been
distributed, including all other securities of the same class that
are acquired in connection with the distribution, and any
stabilization arrangements and trading restrictions in connection
with the distribution have been terminated; Provided, however, that
an underwriter's participation will not be deemed to have been
completed if a syndicate overallotment option is exercised in an
amount that exceeds the net syndicate short position at the time of
such exercise. . . .'' 17 CFR 242.100(b).
\153\ A green shoe or overallotment option is a provision
contained in an underwriting agreement that gives the underwriting
syndicate the right to purchase additional shares from the issuer or
selling security holders (in addition to those initially
underwritten by the syndicate) for the purpose of covering any
overallotments that are made on behalf of the syndicate in
connection with an offering of securities.
\154\ Rule 100 of Regulation M also provides that an
underwriter's participation will not be deemed to have been
completed if a syndicate overallotment option is exercised in an
amount that exceeds the net syndicate short position at the time of
exercise. 17 CFR 242.100(b).
\155\ 17 CFR 242.100(b).
\156\ SROs generally have procedures in place for broker-dealers
to apply for extensions of time under paragraph (n) of Rule 15c3-3.
See, e.g., FINRA Rule 4230.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

5. Importation of Rule 15c3-2 Requirements Into Rule 15c3-3 and
Treatment of Free Credit Balances
i. Importation of Rule 15c3-2
Rule 15c3-2 requires a broker-dealer holding free credit balances
to provide its customers (defined as any person other than a broker-
dealer) at least once every three months with a statement of the amount
due the customer and a notice that: (1) the funds are not being
segregated, but rather are being used in the broker-dealer's business;
and (2) the funds are payable on demand. The rule was adopted in 1964,
before the

[[Page 51837]]

adoption of Rule 15c3-3 in 1972.\157\ Since the adoption of Rule 15c3-
3, broker-dealers have been limited in their use of customer free
credit balances. The Commission proposed importing requirements in Rule
15c3-2 \158\ into Rule 15c3-3 and eliminating Rule 15c3-2 as a separate
rule in the Code of Federal Regulations.\159\ The Commission received
two comments supporting the proposal.\160\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\157\ See Customers' Free Credit Balances, Exchange Act Release
No. 7266 (Mar. 12, 1964), 29 FR 7239 (June 3, 1964).
\158\ 17 CFR 240.15c3-2.
\159\ See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at
12867.
\160\ See SIFMA 2 Letter; SIFMA 4 Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Commission is adopting the amendments substantially as
proposed--deleting Rule 15c3-2 and adding paragraph (j)(1) to Rule
15c3-3. The Commission believes it is appropriate to eliminate Rule
15c3-2 as a separate rule because it is largely irrelevant in light of
the requirements in Rule 15c3-3. Further, the provisions in Rule 15c3-2
that the Commission wishes to retain are being re-codified in Rule
15c3-3. These provisions include the requirement that broker-dealers
inform customers of the amounts due to them and that such amounts are
payable on demand.\161\ Consequently, the Commission is amending Rule
15c3-3 to add new paragraph (j)(1), which provides that ``[a] broker or
dealer must not accept or use any free credit balance carried for the
account of any customer of the broker or dealer unless such broker or
dealer has established adequate procedures pursuant to which each
customer for whom a free credit balance is carried will be given or
sent, together with or as part of the customer's statement of account,
whenever sent but not less frequently than once every three months, a
written statement informing the customer of the amount due to the
customer by the broker or dealer on the date of the statement, and that
the funds are payable on demand of the customer.'' \162\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\161\ Rule 15c3-2 contains an exemption for broker-dealers that
also are banking institutions supervised by a Federal authority.
This exemption will not be imported into Rule 15c3-3 because there
are no broker-dealers left that fit within the exemption. Further,
the definition of customer for purposes of the imported 15c3-2
requirements will be the definition of customer in Rule 15c3-3,
which is somewhat narrower than the definition in Rule 15c3-2.
\162\ See paragraph (j)(1) of Rule 15c3-3, as adopted. The
Commission also modified the phrase ``[i]t shall be unlawful for a
broker or dealer to'' to the phrase ``[a] broker or dealer must
not'' in order to avoid using the term ``unlawful.'' Any violation
of the rules and regulations promulgated under the Exchange Act is
unlawful and therefore it is unnecessary to use this phrase in the
final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

ii. Treatment of Free Credit Balances
Free credit balances are funds payable by a broker-dealer to its
customers on demand.\163\ They may result from cash deposited by the
customer to purchase securities, proceeds from the sale of securities
or other assets held in the customer's account, or earnings from
dividends and interest on securities and other assets held in the
customer's account. Broker-dealers may, among other things, pay
interest to customers on their free credit balances or offer to
routinely transfer (``sweep'') them to a money market fund or bank
account. On occasion, broker-dealers have changed the product to which
a customer's free credit balances are swept--in recent years, most
frequently from a money market fund to an interest bearing bank
account. Because of differences in these two types of products,
including the type of protection afforded the customer in the event of
insolvency, there may be investment consequences to the customer when
changing from one product to the other. The money market shares--as
securities--would receive up to $500,000 in SIPA protection in the
event the broker-dealer failed. The bank deposits--as cash--would
receive up to $250,000 in protection from the FDIC in the event the
bank failed. On the other hand, the money market fund shares may incur
market losses; whereas, the full amount of the bank deposit would be
guaranteed up to the FDIC's $250,000 limit. There also may be
differences in the amount of interest earned from the two products. In
short, there may be consequences to moving a customer's free credit
balances from one product to another, and, accordingly, customers
should have a sufficient opportunity to make an informed decision.\164\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\163\ See 17 CFR 240.15c3-3(a)(8).
\164\ See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at
12866.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Commission proposed amendments to Rule 15c3-3 that would have
established conditions required to be met in order for a broker-dealer
to use or transfer free credit balances in a customer's securities
account.\165\ More specifically, as initially proposed, the amendments
would have structured the new rule to make it unlawful for a broker-
dealer to convert, invest, or otherwise transfer to another account or
institution free credit balances held in a customer's account except as
provided in the proposed rule.\166\ The proposed rule then prescribed
three conditions to address three different scenarios involving the use
or transfer of customer free credit balances. The first scenario
involved the use or transfer of free credit balances outside the
context of a routine sweep to a money market fund or bank. As discussed
below, proposed paragraph (j)(2)(i) would have prohibited the use or
transfer of free credit balances in this scenario unless the customer
had specifically ordered or authorized the transaction. The second and
third scenarios involved the use or transfer of free credit balances in
the context of a program to routinely sweep them to a money market fund
or bank account (a ``sweep program''). As discussed below, proposed
paragraph (j)(2)(ii) would have addressed sweep program requirements
for accounts opened after the effective date of the rule (``new
accounts'') and proposed paragraph (j)(2)(iii) would have addressed
sweep program requirements for accounts existing as of the effective
date of the rule (existing accounts). The Commission is adopting new
paragraph (j)(2) to Rule 15c3-3 with substantial modifications from the
proposed rule in response to comments and to clarify certain portions
of the rule.\167\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\165\ Id. at 12866-12867.
\166\ Id. at 12866.
\167\ In 2005, the NYSE addressed the issue of disclosure in a
sweep program context by issuing an information memo to its members
discussing, among other things, the disclosure responsibilities of a
broker-dealer offering a sweep program to its customers. See
Information Memo 05-11 (Feb. 15, 2005). The memo stated that broker-
dealers should disclose material differences in interest rates
between the different sweep products and, with respect to the bank
sweep program, further disclose the terms and conditions, risks and
features, conflicts of interest, current interest rates, manner by
which future interest rates will be determined, and the nature and
extent of FDIC and SIPC protection.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

As proposed, the first sentence of paragraph (j)(2) of the rule
would have established the prohibition with respect to the treatment of
free credit balances by providing that ``[i]t shall be unlawful for a
broker or dealer to convert, invest, or otherwise transfer to another
account or institution, free credit balances held in a customer's
account except as provided in paragraphs (j)(2)(i), (ii) and (iii).''
\168\ The Commission received one comment in response to the proposed
text of this first sentence.\169\ The commenter expressed concern that
the proposed text in the first sentence of paragraph (j)(2) could be
construed broadly, in effect, to prohibit a broker-dealer from using,
investing, or transferring cash deposits that are not swept to other
investments or products (and are included as credits in the reserve
formula) in the normal course of the broker-dealer's business, as is
currently permitted by Rule 15c3-3. The commenter suggested that the
text be

[[Page 51838]]

revised to clarify the scope of the proposed rule by prohibiting a
broker-dealer from deducting a free credit balance from the customer's
account at the broker-dealer and transferring it to another institution
and investing it in another instrument on behalf of the customer,
except as permitted under paragraph (j)(2).\170\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\168\ See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at
12896.
\169\ See SIFMA 2 Letter.
\170\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In response to the comment, as a preliminary matter, cash balances
in customer securities accounts must be included as credits in the
customer reserve formula. Further, the net amount of the credits over
debits must be deposited in a customer reserve account in the form of
cash or qualified securities. However, cash credit items that are net
of debit items can be used by the broker-dealer for the limited purpose
of facilitating transactions of its customers.\171\ The commenter
suggested that proposed paragraph (j)(2) of Rule 15c3-3 could be
interpreted to impose new limits on a broker-dealer's ability to use
cash that is an asset on the firm's balance sheet. In response to this
concern, the Commission notes that the prohibition in the first
sentence of proposed paragraph (j)(2) of Rule 15c3-3 is intended to
place conditions only on the broker-dealer's ability to convert the
cash asset of the customer (i.e., a receivable from the broker-dealer)
into a different type of asset (e.g., a security or an obligation of
another institution outside the context of a sweep program) or to
transfer the customer's cash asset to another account.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\171\ See 17 CFR 240.15c3-3(e)(2) (``It shall be unlawful for
any broker or dealer to accept or use any of the amounts under items
comprising Total Credits under the formula referred to in paragraph
(e)(1) of this section except for the specified purposes indicated
under items comprising Total Debits under the formula, and, to the
extent Total Credits exceed Total Debits, at least the net amount
thereof shall be maintained in the Reserve Bank Account pursuant to
paragraph (e)(1) of this section.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Commission is adopting paragraph (j)(2) of Rule 15c3-3 with
certain technical modifications.\172\ As adopted paragraph (j)(2)
reads: ``A broker or dealer must not convert, invest, or transfer to
another account or institution, credit balances held in a customer's
account except as provided in paragraphs (j)(2)(i) and (ii) of this
section.'' \173\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\172\ Specifically, the Commission is replacing the phrase
``[i]t shall be unlawful for a broker or dealer to'' with the phrase
``[a] broker or dealer must not'' because--as noted above--any
violation of the rules and regulations promulgated under the
Exchange Act is unlawful and therefore it is unnecessary to use this
phrase in the final rule. The Commission also is replacing the
phrase ``free credit balance'' with the phrase ``credit balances''
to clarify that this provision covers both free credit balances and
other credit balances. See 17 CFR 240.15c3-3(a)(8)-(9) (defining
free credit balances and other credit balances). The Commission is
deleting the word ``otherwise'' because it would be redundant.
Finally, the rule text does not include a reference to paragraph
(j)(2)(iii), as proposed, because this paragraph was deleted from
the final rule text.
\173\ See paragraph (j)(2) of Rule 15c3-3, as adopted.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

a. Treatment of Free Credit Balances Outside of a Sweep Program
As proposed, paragraph (j)(2)(i) of Rule 15c3-3 would have
permitted a broker-dealer to convert, invest or otherwise transfer to
another account or institution free credit balances held in a
customer's account only upon a specific order, authorization, or draft
from the customer, and only in the manner, and under the terms and
conditions, specified in the order, authorization, or draft.\174\ This
catchall provision would have applied to any use or transfer of
customer free credit balances outside the context of a sweep program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\174\ See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at
12866.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Commission proposed paragraph (j)(2)(i) in order to
comprehensively cover the range of possibilities with respect to the
disposition of free credit balances in a customer account other than
pursuant to a sweep program. The Commission received two comments
recommending that proposed paragraph (j)(2)(i) be clarified to permit a
broker-dealer to obtain a one-time consent to ongoing transfers of any
free credit balances to a customer to another account, entity or
product (outside of a sweep program).\175\ The commenters noted that
customers, for example, may prefer that free credit balances be
regularly transferred to a linked account in their name at another
broker-dealer or bank that is not part of a sweep program, and that
this clarification would enable a broker-dealer to efficiently handle
such customer requests by eliminating the need to obtain individual
``specific orders'' for repeated transfers that are substantially
identical.\176\ The Commission agrees with the commenters that a
customer may consent to ongoing routine transfers from the customer's
account outside of a sweep program without obtaining the customer's
specific consent for each individual transfer, provided the customer
has consented to the ongoing transfers under paragraph (j)(2)(i) of
Rule 15c3-3. This scenario would already be covered by the proposed
rule, and, therefore, the Commission is adopting paragraph (j)(2)(i)
substantially as proposed, with certain technical modifications.\177\
As adopted, paragraph (j)(2)(i) of Rule 15c3-3 reads: ``A broker or
dealer is permitted to invest or transfer to another account or
institution, free credit balances in a customer's account only upon a
specific order, authorization, or draft from the customer, and only in
the manner, and under the terms and conditions, specified in the order,
authorization, or draft.'' \178\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\175\ See SIFMA 2 Letter; E*Trade 2 Letter.
\176\ Id.
\177\ See paragraph (j)(2)(i) of Rule 15c3-3, as adopted. The
technical changes delete the words ``convert'' and ``otherwise''
from the final rule because a broker-dealer would be prohibited from
``converting'' a customer's free credit balances and, therefore, it
is not necessary to include the word in the final rule. The word
``otherwise'' is redundant.
\178\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Finally, one commenter stated that both regulators and firms need
the flexibility to remove funds from a reserve account to cover
extraordinary requests for payment of customer free credit
balances.\179\ However, the commenter noted that ``in light of recent
market events, we withdraw our earlier proposal to allow such
withdrawals under specified conditions and instead recommend that such
withdrawals be permitted only by approval of Commission staff or a
broker-dealer's [DEA].'' \180\ Broker-dealers currently may make
withdrawals under paragraph (g) of Rule 15c3-3.\181\ In light of the
risks that could arise to customer funds, the Commission does not
believe it would be appropriate at this time to expand a firm's ability
to make additional withdrawals from its reserve account.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\179\ See SIFMA 4 Letter.
\180\ Id. In its June 15, 2007 comment letter, SIFMA urged ``the
Commission to consider allowing a broker-dealer to remove funds from
a reserve account to cover a large same-day request for payment of a
free credit balance, as long as the free credit balance was included
in the latest Rule 15c3-3 reserve computation and the broker-dealer
begins a new reserve computation as of that date.'' See SIFMA 2
Letter.
\181\ 17 CFR 240.15c3-3(g).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

b. Treatment of Free Credit Balances in a Sweep Program
The second and third set of conditions in the proposed rules
addressed using or transferring free credit balances in the context of
a sweep program.\182\ In particular, the Commission proposed four
conditions with respect to using or transferring free credit balances
in a sweep program. A broker-dealer would have been required to meet:
(1) all four conditions with respect to free credit balances in new
accounts; \183\ and (2) the second, third, and fourth conditions with
respect to

[[Page 51839]]

free credit balances in existing accounts.\184\ The four conditions
were:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\182\ See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at
12866.
\183\ See paragraph (j)(2)(ii)(A)-(D) of Rule 15c3-3, as
adopted.
\184\ See paragraph (j)(2)(iii)(A)-(C) of Rule 15c3-3, as
adopted.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. The customer has previously affirmatively consented to such
treatment of the free credit balances after being notified of the
different general types of money market mutual fund and bank account
products in which the broker or dealer may transfer the free credit
balances and the applicable terms and conditions that would apply if
the broker or dealer changes the product or type of product in which
free credit balances are transferred;
2. The broker or dealer provides the customer on an ongoing basis
with all disclosures and notices regarding the investment and deposit
of free credit balances as required by the self-regulatory
organizations for which the broker or dealer is a member;
3. The broker or dealer provides notice to the customer as part of
the customer's quarterly statement of account that the money market
mutual funds or bank deposits to which the free credit balances have
been transferred can be liquidated on the customer's demand and held as
free credit balances; and
4. The broker or dealer provides the customer with at least 30
calendar days notice before the free credit balances would begin being
transferred to a different product, different product type, or into the
same product but under materially different terms and conditions. The
notice must describe the new money market fund, bank deposit type, or
terms and conditions, and how the customer can notify the broker or
dealer if the customer chooses not to have the free credit balances
transferred to the new product or product type, or under the new terms
and conditions.
Commenters generally agreed with the fundamental principle embodied in
the proposal--that customer free credit balances should not be
transferred from an obligation of the broker-dealer to an obligation of
another entity without the customer's authorization.\185\ Other
commenters supported the proposed disclosures but suggested additional
disclosures be made to customers, including clarification with respect
to other protections available to the customer.\186\ Two commenters
stated that the practice of sweep programs should be banned entirely or
that the Commission should adopt a ``harder stance'' and require more
than just disclosure.\187\ One commenter responded to the Commission's
request for comment as to the cost burdens that would result if the
first condition (set forth in proposed paragraph (j)(2)(ii)(A)) to
obtain a new customer's prior agreement were to be applied to existing
customers. The commenter stated that such costs would be substantial
because broker-dealers would be required to amend their agreements with
all existing customers.\188\ One commenter stated that the amendments
in the proposing release did not adequately address situations in which
broker-dealers change customer account elections without first
obtaining customer authorization.\189\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\185\ See SIFMA 2 Letter; First Clearing Letter; Pace Letter.
\186\ See SIPC Letter.
\187\ See Ellis Letter; Dworkin Letter. One commenter stated
that broker-dealers profit from ``excessive'' fees charged to
clients who opt out of the sweep programs. See Ellis Letter. The
second commenter suggested that the broker-dealer's ``customer has
been effectively denied the opportunity to opt out of bank account
sweeps by [the broker-dealer] preventing him or her from utilizing
any other vehicle to park his or her free credit balances. . . .''
See Dworkin Letter. The commenter noted that by opting out of the
sweep, the customer is ``confined to a situation where the free
credit balance cannot earn any kind of return at all[.]'' Id.
\188\ See SIFMA 2 Letter.
\189\ See Waddell Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In adopting the final rule, the Commission has made some
modifications to the language in the proposed rule in response to
commenters and to clarify its application. For clarification and in
response to comments, the Commission has defined the term Sweep Program
in paragraph (a)(17) of Rule 15c3-3 to identify the types of
transactions and products to which the new provisions apply.
Commenters raised concerns about limitations on the types of
products broker-dealers could use for sweep arrangements under the
proposed amendments. Three commenters suggested that the Commission
should not limit the types of products broker-dealers can use for sweep
arrangements to money market funds and bank deposit products.\190\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\190\ See SIFMA 2 Letter; First Clearing Letter; Raymond James 2
Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sweep programs provide a mechanism for excess cash in a customer's
securities account to be held in a manner that allows the customer to
earn interest on the funds but retain the flexibility to quickly access
that cash to purchase securities or withdraw it.\191\ In effect,
transferring this excess cash to a bank account or money market fund is
an alternative to retaining a credit balance in the customer's
securities account. The final rule is designed to accommodate this
alternative by providing broker-dealers with flexibility in the
operation of sweep programs. The Commission believes it is appropriate
to confine this flexibility to products that approximate the holding of
a customer's excess cash in a securities account. The Commission does
not view sweep accounts as a mechanism for investing customers' excess
cash without their specific consent in longer term or more volatile
assets. For these reasons, the Commission does not believe it would be
appropriate to expand the products covered by the final rule beyond
money market funds as described in Rule 2a-7 under the Investment
Company Act of 1940 or an account at an insured bank as described in
paragraph (a)(17) of Rule 15c3-3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\191\ See Ellis Letter; Dworkin Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Consequently, paragraph (a)(17) of Rule 15c3-3, as adopted, states
``[t]he term Sweep Program means a service provided by a broker or
dealer where it offers to its customers the option to automatically
transfer free credit balances in the securities account of the customer
to either a money market mutual fund product as described in [Rule 2a-
7] or an account at a bank whose deposits are insured by the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation.'' \192\ The Commission intended that the
definition of Sweep Program provide that the bank to which free credits
are swept be insured by the FDIC.\193\ The revised text of the rule
makes this explicit. Finally, under this definition, a one-time or
other special transfer of a customer's free credit balances would not
qualify as a Sweep Program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\192\ See paragraph (a)(17) of Rule 15c3-3, as adopted.
\193\ See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at
12866 (``[T]he bank deposit would be guaranteed up to the FDIC's
$100,000 limit.''). FDIC insurance covers all deposit accounts,
including checking and savings accounts, money market deposit
accounts and certificates of deposit. The standard insurance amount
is currently $250,000 per depositor, per insured bank, for each
account ownership category. 12 CFR 330.1(o).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Three commenters raised the issue of bulk transfers.\194\ They
argued that the rule should allow broker-dealers to process bulk
transfers of customer assets between, for instance, one money market
fund and another money market fund or a bank deposit product and a
money market fund. These commenters identify a potential ambiguity in
the rule as proposed; namely, how transfers from one Sweep Program
product to another Sweep Program product are to be handled under the
rule if they do not involve passing funds through the

[[Page 51840]]

customer's securities account. To address this issue, paragraph
(j)(2)(ii) of Rule 15c3-3 is being modified from the proposal to
clarify that the conditions for operating a Sweep Program (which are
set forth in paragraphs (j)(2)(ii)(A) and (B)) will apply to: (1) The
transfer of free credit balances from a customer's securities account
to a product in a Sweep Program; and (2) the transfer of a customer's
interest in one Sweep Program product to another Sweep Program product.
This will address both bulk transfers \195\ of customer positions from
one product (e.g., a money market fund) to another (e.g., a bank
deposit product) and transfers of individual customer positions from
one product to another.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\194\ See SIFMA 2 Letter; First Clearing Letter; E*Trade 2
Letter.
\195\ See also NASD Rule 2510 (Discretionary Accounts)
(providing an exception from the NASD rule for ``bulk exchanges at
net asset value of money market mutual funds . . . utilizing
negative response letters provided: (A) The bulk exchange is limited
to situations involving mergers and acquisitions of funds, changes
of clearing members and exchanges of funds used in sweep accounts;
(B) The negative response letter contains a tabular comparison of
the nature and amount of the fees charged by each fund; (C) The
negative response letter contains a comparative description of the
investment objectives of each fund and a prospectus of the fund to
be purchased; and (D) The negative response feature will not be
activated until at least 30 days after the date on which the letter
was mailed.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Commission is modifying paragraph (j)(2)(ii) of Rule 15c3-3
from the proposal to delete the phrase ``to either a money market
mutual fund as described in Sec. 270.2a-7 of this chapter or an
interest bearing account at a bank without a specific order,
authorization or draft for each such transfer, provided'' and instead
to use the term Sweep Program as defined in paragraph (a)(17) of the
final rule. The Commission also replaced the phrase ``the account of a
customer'' with the phrase ``a customer's securities account'' to
clarify that paragraph (j)(2)(ii) and its required conditions apply to
the transfer of free credit balances in connection with a customer's
securities account, in addition to the bulk transfers described
above.\196\ As adopted, paragraph (j)(2)(ii) to Rule 15c3-3 reads, in
pertinent part: ``[a] broker or dealer is permitted to transfer free
credit balances held in a customer's securities account to a product in
its Sweep Program or to transfer a customer's interest in one product
in a Sweep Program to another product in a Sweep Program, provided''
the conditions set forth in paragraphs (j)(2)(ii)(A) and (B) are
met.\197\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\196\ The final rule also deletes the phrase ``opened on or
after the effective date of this paragraph'' from paragraph
(j)(2)(ii) and moves it to paragraph (j)(2)(ii)(A), as described
below.
\197\ See paragraph (j)(2)(ii) of Rule 15c3-3, as adopted.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

As adopted, paragraphs (j)(2)(ii)(A) and (B) establish four
conditions that must be met to lawfully transfer a customer's free
credit balances to a product in a Sweep Program or to transfer a
customer's interest directly from one product in a Sweep Program to
another product in a Sweep Program. The first condition--set forth in
paragraph (j)(2)(ii)(A)--applies only with respect to accounts opened
on or after the effective date of the rule. This addresses the burden
that would have been associated with having broker-dealers re-document
existing accounts. The remaining three conditions--set forth in
paragraph (j)(2)(ii)(B)(1) through (3)--apply to both existing and new
accounts.
Paragraph (j)(2)(ii)(A), as adopted, provides that for an account
opened on or after the effective date of the rule, the customer must
give prior written affirmative consent to having free credit balances
in the customer's securities account included in the Sweep Program
after being notified: (1) Of the general terms and conditions of the
products available through the Sweep Program; and (2) that the broker
or dealer may change the products available under the Sweep
Program.\198\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\198\ See paragraph (j)(2)(ii)(A) of Rule 15c3-3, as adopted.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

As stated above, the Commission has modified paragraph
(j)(2)(ii)(A) in the final rule to read ``the customer gives prior
written affirmative consent to having free credit balances in the
customer's securities account included in the Sweep Program after being
notified. . . .'' \199\ The Commission modified this paragraph to
incorporate the term Sweep Program as defined in paragraph (a)(17) of
the rule and the reference to the ``customer's securities account'' to
make this paragraph consistent with other modifications to paragraph
(j)(2) of the final rule. Additionally, the Commission modified this
paragraph to clarify that the customer's consent must be written,
consistent with the discussion in the proposing release, which noted
customer consent could be given in an account opening agreement.\200\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\199\ Id. The proposed rule stated the ``customer has previously
affirmatively consented to such treatment of the free credit
balances after being notified of . . . .'' In addition, as noted
above, the phrase ``accounts opened on or after the effective date
of this paragraph'' was deleted from proposed paragraph (j)(2)(ii)
and moved to paragraph (j)(2)(ii)(A), with the reference to specific
paragraph (j)(2)(ii) inserted after the word ``paragraph.'' Moving
this phrase to paragraph (j)(2)(ii)(A) simplifies the final rule by
eliminating the necessity of codifying two largely overlapping sets
of conditions, with three of the conditions being repeated in both
paragraphs. The effect of this change is to make the first condition
only applicable to new accounts and the remaining conditions
(paragraph (j)(2)(ii)(B)(1) through (3)) applicable to both new and
existing accounts. The word ``accounts'' also has been replaced with
the phrase ``an account.''
\200\ See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at
12866 (``[T]he customer would need to agree prior to the change
(e.g., in the account opening agreement) that the broker-dealer
could switch the sweep option between those two types of
products.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Commission received one comment stating that the text of
proposed paragraph (j)(2)(ii)(A) that would have required the
disclosure of ``applicable terms and conditions that will apply if the
broker or dealer changes the product or type of product'' could be read
to require highly specific disclosure about product terms and
conditions that may only be established or modified in the future and,
therefore, are unknown at the time the customer opens an account with
the broker-dealer.\201\ In addition, the commenter stated that under
proposed paragraph (j)(2)(ii)(D), a broker-dealer would already be
required to describe any changes to the terms and conditions it makes
contemporaneously with such changes. Given this type of notice, the
commenter stated that there is no need for the type of generalized (and
therefore less effective) disclosure that would have been required by
paragraph (j)(2)(ii)(A). The Commission agrees with the commenter and,
therefore, has deleted the phrase ``transfer the free credit balances
and the applicable terms and conditions that will apply if the broker
or dealer changes the product or type of product in which the free
credit balances are transferred. . . .'' In its place, the Commission
is adopting language in paragraph (j)(2)(ii)(A)(2) of Rule 15c3-3 under
which the broker-dealer must notify the customer that the broker or
dealer may change the products available under the Sweep Program.\202\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\201\ See SIFMA 2 Letter.
\202\ See paragraph (j)(2)(ii)(A)(2) of Rule 15c3-3, as adopted.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Paragraph (j)(2)(ii)(B), as adopted, prescribes the following three
conditions to sweeping the customer's free credit balances in a new or
existing account:

The broker-dealer provides the customer with the
disclosures and notices regarding the Sweep Program required by each
SRO of which the broker-dealer is a member; \203\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\203\ See paragraph (j)(2)(ii)(B) of Rule 15c3-3, as adopted.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The broker-dealer provides notice to the customer, as
part of the customer's quarterly statement of account, that the
balance in the bank deposit account or shares of the money market
mutual fund in which the customer has a beneficial interest can be
liquidated on the customer's order and the proceeds

[[Page 51841]]

returned to the securities account or remitted to the customer;
\204\ and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\204\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The broker-dealer provides the customer with written
notice at least 30 calendar days before: (1) Making changes to the
terms and conditions of the Sweep Program; (2) making changes to the
terms and conditions of a product currently available through the
Sweep Program; (3) changing, adding or deleting products available
through the Sweep Program; or (4) changing the customer's investment
through the Sweep Program from one product to another; and the
notice describes the new terms and conditions of the Sweep Program
or product or the new product, and the options available to the
customer if the customer does not accept the new terms and
conditions or product.\205\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\205\ Id.

As proposed, paragraph (j)(2)(ii)(B) of Rule 15c3-3 would have
required that the broker-dealer provide these disclosures and notices
``on an ongoing basis.'' Three commenters stated that there are no
current SRO requirements that broker-dealers make disclosures
concerning sweep arrangements on an ``ongoing basis'' and that the
Commission should clarify the source and meaning of this
requirement.\206\ The Commission has deleted the phrase ``ongoing
basis'' from the final rule. As adopted, the Commission has also
modified the text in paragraph (j)(2)(ii)(B), now paragraph
(j)(2)(ii)(B)(1), to delete the phrase ``investment and deposit of free
credit balances as'' and inserted the phrase ``Sweep Program'' to
incorporate the definition in paragraph (a)(17). Finally, the
Commission has modified the phrase ``the self-regulatory
organizations'' to read ``each self-regulatory organization of'' to
clarify that the broker-dealer must provide the notices and disclosures
required by each SRO of which it is a member (including an SRO that is
not its DEA).\207\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\206\ See SIFMA 2 Letter; First Clearing Letter; Raymond James 2
Letter.
\207\ See 17 CFR 240.17d-1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

As adopted, paragraph (j)(2)(ii)(B)(2) states that the broker-
dealer must provide information on a quarterly basis with respect to
the customer's balance in an account or fund ``in which the customer
has a beneficial interest.'' \208\ The rule text has been modified to
account for the fact that customers can have a beneficial interest in
accounts in their name and in omnibus accounts in the name of a
custodian in which the assets of multiple customers are commingled.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\208\ See paragraph (j)(2)(ii)(B)(2) of Rule 15c3-3, as adopted.
More specifically, the Commission modified the phrase ``that the
money market mutual funds or bank deposits to which the free credit
balances have been transferred'' to read ``that the balance in the
bank deposit account or shares of the money market mutual fund in
which the customer has a beneficial interest. . . .''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Commission also modified language in paragraph (j)(2)(ii)(B)(2)
of Rule 15c3-3 to replace the phrase ``on the customer's demand'' with
the phrase ``on the customer's order'' to address concerns by two
commenters that the former phrase could lead customers to believe that
they will receive immediate re-payment of those funds, or they could
revert to holding those funds as free credit balances at the broker-
dealer.\209\ These commenters pointed out that the disclosed terms of
most sweep programs allow the money market fund or bank up to seven
days to meet requests for withdrawals. Further, there are some broker-
dealers that do not allow customers to maintain free credit balances in
securities accounts. In response to these comments, the Commission has
deleted the phrase ``demand and held as free credit balances'' and
replaced it with the phrase ``and the proceeds returned to the
securities account or remitted to the customer.'' This language is
designed to account for broker-dealers that do not offer customers the
option of having their funds held as free credit balances. In such
cases, the broker-dealer would remit the funds withdrawn from the bank
or derived from redeeming money market shares directly to the customer
(e.g., by transferring them to the customer's bank account).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\209\ See SIFMA 2 Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Proposed paragraphs (j)(2)(ii)(D) and (iii)(C)--now paragraph
(j)(2)(ii)(B)(3)--would have required the broker-dealer to provide the
customer with notice at least thirty days before the broker-dealer
begins transferring the customer's free credit balances to a different
product or product type, or into the same product but under materially
different terms and conditions.\210\ As adopted, paragraph
(j)(2)(ii)(B)(3) will require broker-dealers to provide customers
written notice at least 30 calendar days before the broker-dealer: (1)
Makes changes to the terms and conditions of the Sweep Program; (2)
makes changes to the terms and conditions of a product currently
available through the Sweep Program; (3) changes, adds, or deletes
products available through the Sweep Program; or (4) changes the
customer's investment through the Sweep Program from one product to
another.\211\ This modification to the final rule is in response to
commenters' requests that the Commission provide clarity with respect
to when the thirty day notice requirement would be triggered.\212\ In
response to comments, the final rule is designed to make clear that the
triggering event for the thirty day notice is not exclusively related
to the transfer of the customer's free credit balances, but rather
changes relating to the terms and conditions of the Sweep Program, as
well as, the products available through the Sweep Program. This greater
specificity should enhance the protections under the final rule by
providing greater certainty that the customer will have time to
evaluate available options before a change to the Sweep Program is put
into effect.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\210\ See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at
12896.
\211\ A broker-dealer could request exemptive relief from the
rule in unusual or emergency cases where it may be impractical or
contrary to investor protection for a broker-dealer to first provide
customers 30 days' written notice under the rule before taking one
of these actions. See, e.g., paragraph (k)(3) to Rule 15c3-3.
\212\ See SIFMA 2 Letter; First Clearing Letter; Cornell Letter;
E*Trade Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In addition, paragraphs (j)(2)(ii)(B)(3)(i)(A)-(D) of Rule 15c3-3
require the broker-dealer to provide the customer with written notice
at least 30 calendar days before: (1) Making changes to the terms and
conditions of the Sweep Program; (2) making changes to the terms and
conditions of a product currently available through the Sweep Program;
(3) changing, adding or deleting products available through the Sweep
Program; or (4) changing the customer's investment through the Sweep
Program from one product to another.\213\ Collectively, these
provisions provide more specificity about the types of disclosures and
notices required under the final rule than under the proposal. Further,
the final rule includes the word ``written'' before the word ``notice''
to make explicit that a written notice is required.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\213\ See paragraph (j)(2)(ii)(B)(3)(i) of Rule 15c3-3, as
adopted. The requirements set forth in final paragraph
(j)(2)(ii)(B)(3)(i) were proposed as paragraphs (j)(2)(ii)(D) and
(iii)(C).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

As adopted, paragraph (j)(2)(ii)(B)(3)(ii) requires that ``[t]he
notice must describe the new terms and conditions of the Sweep Program
or product or the new product, and the options available to the
customer if the customer does not accept the new terms and conditions
or product.'' \214\ The Commission modified the final rule in response
to a comment regarding the text of proposed paragraphs (j)(2)(ii)(D)
and (iii)(C).\215\ The commenter stated that, as drafted, proposed
paragraphs (j)(2)(ii)(D) and (iii)(C) would have required a broker-
dealer to disclose

[[Page 51842]]

``how the customer can notify the [broker-dealer] if the customer
chooses not to have the free credit balances transferred to the new
product or product type, or under new terms and conditions.'' \216\ The
commenter stated that these paragraphs appear to assume that the
customer will have the option of continuing to have free credit
balances treated as they were prior to the change to the sweep
arrangement.\217\ The commenter pointed out that, in fact, the broker-
dealer may elect not to continue offering the prior sweep options and
not to offer another sweep product.\218\ To account for this
possibility, the Commission has revised the text in paragraph
(j)(2)(ii)(B)(3)(ii) \219\ to require the broker-dealer to provide the
customer with a notice that contains a description of the options
available to the customer if the customer does not wish to accept the
new terms and conditions or product.\220\ This is intended to give
customers sufficient opportunity to make an informed decision in
connection with a Sweep Program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\214\ See paragraph (j)(2)(ii)(B)(ii) of Rule 15c3-3, as
adopted. The final rule codifies this text in a separate paragraph
in order to emphasize the specific items the notice must contain.
\215\ See SIFMA 2 Letter.
\216\ Id.
\217\ Id.
\218\ Id.
\219\ More specifically, paragraph (j)(2)(ii)(B)(3)(ii) provides
that ``the notice must describe the new terms and conditions of the
Sweep Program or product or the new product, and the options
available to the customer if the customer does not accept the new
terms and conditions or product.'' A customer that does not accept
the new terms and conditions or product would need to change how
free credit balances are treated by, for example, selecting
investments outside the Sweep Program or having the balances
transferred to an account at another financial institution.
\220\ See Dworkin Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

6. ``Proprietary Accounts'' Under the Commodity Exchange Act
Some broker-dealers also are registered as futures commission
merchants under the Commodity Exchange Act (``CEA''). These firms carry
both securities and commodities accounts for customers. The definition
of free credit balances in paragraph (a)(8) of Rule 15c3-3 does not
include funds carried in commodities accounts that are segregated in
accordance with the requirements of the CEA.\221\ However, regulations
promulgated under the CEA exclude certain types of accounts
(``proprietary accounts'') from the CEA's segregation
requirements.\222\ This exclusion from the segregation requirements
under the CEA has raised a question as to whether a broker-dealer must
treat payables to customers in proprietary commodities accounts as
``free credit balances'' when performing a customer reserve
computation.\223\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\221\ 17 CFR 240.15c3-3(a)(8).
\222\ Rule 1.20 requires a futures commission merchant to
segregate customer funds. See 17 CFR 1.20. Rule 1.3(k) defines the
term customer for this purpose. See 17 CFR 1.3(k). The definition of
customer excludes persons who own or hold a proprietary account as
that term is defined in Rule 1.3(y). See 17 CFR 1.3(y). Generally,
the definition of proprietary account refers to persons who have an
ownership interest in the futures commission merchant. Id.
\223\ See Part 241-Interpretive Releases Relating to the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and General Rules and Regulations
Thereunder, Exchange Act Release No. 9922 (Jan. 2, 1973), 38 FR 1737
(Jan. 18, 1973) (interpreting the credit balance used in Item 1 of
the Rule 15c3-3a formula ``to include the net balance due to
customers in non-regulated commodities accounts reduced by any
deposits of cash or securities with any clearing organization or
clearing broker in connection with the open contracts in such
accounts'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In response to this question, the Commission notes that the
objective of the customer reserve requirement in Rule 15c3-3 is to
require broker-dealers to hold sufficient funds or qualified securities
to facilitate the prompt return of customer property to customers
either before or during a liquidation proceeding if the firm
fails.\224\ Under SIPA, customer property generally does not include
funds held in a commodities account.\225\ Therefore, funds held in a
proprietary commodities account generally would not constitute customer
property and persons having claims to those funds would not be
customers under SIPA.\226\ Moreover, the regulations under the CEA
similarly provide the persons having claims to funds in proprietary
commodities accounts are not customers for purposes of those
regulations.\227\ For these reasons, the Commission proposed a specific
amendment to the definition of the term free credit balances in
paragraph (a)(8) of Rule 15c3-3 that would have clarified that funds
held in a commodities account meeting the definition of a proprietary
account under CEA regulations are not to be included as free credit
balances in the customer reserve formula.\228\ As discussed below, the
Commission is adopting the amendment substantially as proposed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\224\ See Capital, Margin, and Segregation Requirements for
Security-Based Swap Dealers and Major Security-Based Swap
Participants and Capital Requirements for Broker-Dealers, Exchange
Act Release No. 68071 (Oct. 18, 2012), 77 FR 70214, 70274 (Nov. 23,
2012) (describing rationale and requirements of Rule 15c3-3
segregation requirements). See also Broker-Dealers; Maintenance of
Certain Basic Reserves, Exchange Act Release No. 9856 (Nov. 10,
1972), 37 FR 25224, 25225 (Nov. 29, 1972) (stating that the intent
of Rule 15c3-3 is, among other things, to ``facilitate the
liquidations of insolvent broker-dealers and to protect customer
assets in the event of a SIPC liquidation through a clear
delineation in Exchange Act Rule 15c3-3 of specifically identifiable
property of customers.''); Amendments to Financial Responsibility
Rules, 72 FR at 12862, 12868.
\225\ As noted above, customer property under SIPA includes
``cash and securities (except customer name securities delivered to
the customer) at any time received, acquired, or held by or for the
account of the debtor from or for the securities accounts of a
customer, and the proceeds of any such property transferred by the
debtor, including property unlawfully converted.'' 15 U.S.C.
78lll(4). To receive protection under SIPA, a claimant must first
qualify as a customer as that term is defined in the statute.
Generally, a customer is any person who has: (1) ``a claim on
account of securities received, acquired, or held by the [broker-
dealer];'' (2) ``deposited cash with the debtor for the purposes of
purchasing securities;'' (3) ``a claim against the debtor for. .
.[positions]. . .received, acquired, or held in a portfolio margin
account carried as a securities account pursuant to a portfolio
margining program approved by the Commission;'' or (4) ``a claim
against the [broker-dealer] arising out of sales or conversions of
such securities.'' See 15 U.S.C. 78lll(2)(A)-(B). The definition of
security in SIPA specifically excludes commodities and non-
securities futures contracts and, thus, a person with a claim for
such assets (not held in a portfolio margin account carried as a
securities account) would not meet the definition of customer. See
15 U.S.C. 78lll(14).
\226\ Id.
\227\ See 17 CFR 1.3(k).
\228\ See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at
12868. The Commission proposed additional amendments to paragraph
(a)(8) of Rule 15c3-3 related to portfolio margining. See also
discussion below in section II.B. of this release.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Commission received three comments in support of the proposed
rule change.\229\ One commenter requested that the Commission clarify
that the relevant definition of proprietary account for these purposes
is the definition contained in Rule 1.3(y) under the CEA. While Rule
1.3(y) under the CEA currently contains the relevant definition of
proprietary account for the purpose of the amendment, the definition
could be codified in a different rule in the future. Consequently, the
Commission is adopting the final rule amendment to paragraph (a)(8) of
Rule 15c3-3, as proposed. Thus, the final rule does not include
specific references to a specific rule. Rather, the amendment to
paragraph (a)(8) to Rule 15c3-3, as adopted, more generally refers to a
``proprietary account as that term is defined in regulations under the
Commodity Exchange Act.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\229\ See SIPC Letter; SIFMA 2 Letter; SIFMA 4 Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

As stated above, this amendment to paragraph (a)(8) of Rule 15c3-3
is designed to clarify that funds held in a commodities account meeting
the definition of a proprietary account under CEA regulations are not
to be included as ``free credit balances'' in the customer reserve
formula. Under Item 1 of Rule 15c3-3a, however, cash balances that do
not meet the definition of free credit balances (e.g., because they are
not subject to immediate payment) are included in the customer reserve
formula if they meet the definition of other credit balances under
paragraph

[[Page 51843]]

(a)(9) of Rule 15c3-3.\230\ Therefore, in order to remove any ambiguity
as to the proper exclusion of proprietary accounts under the CEA from
Rule 15c3-3, the Commission also is amending the definition of the term
other credit balances in the final rule to delete the words ``as
aforesaid'' and insert the phrase ``in accordance with the Commodity
Exchange Act or in a similar manner, or funds carried in a proprietary
account as that term is defined in regulations under the Commodity
Exchange Act.'' \231\ Consequently, the amendments clarify that both
free credit balances and other credit balances as defined in Rule 15c3-
3 do not include funds carried in proprietary accounts under the CEA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\230\ Item 1 of Rule 15c3-3a requires a broker-dealer to include
in the customer reserve formula ``free credit balances and other
credit balances in customers' security accounts.'' Paragraph (a)(9)
of Rule 15c3-3 defines other credit balances as ``cash liabilities
of a broker or dealer to customers other than free credit balances
and funds in commodities accounts segregated as aforesaid.'' 17 CFR
240.15c3-3(a)(9).
\231\ See paragraph (a)(9) to Rule 15c3-3. See also comments and
additional amendments to paragraph (a)(9) of Rule 15c3-3 discussed
in section II.B. of this release.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

One commenter also suggested that due to the changes to the swap
markets mandated by Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act, swap accounts (in
addition to commodities accounts) are now subject to customer
protection rules under the CEA.\232\ This commenter suggested that the
Commission make it clear that funds in swap accounts also do not
constitute free credit balances, whether those funds are required to be
segregated by rules under the CEA (e.g., cleared swap accounts or
uncleared swap accounts that have opted for segregation) or excepted
from segregation under the CEA (e.g., cleared swaps proprietary
accounts or uncleared swap accounts that have not opted for
segregation). The commenter noted this treatment ``would be consistent
with the treatment of funds in commodities accounts and with the
regulation of swap accounts under the CEA.'' \233\ The Commission
agrees there may be additional accounts under the CEA, as amended by
the Dodd-Frank Act, that should explicitly be excluded from the
definition of free credit balances under Rule 15c3-3. However, the
amendments today are designed to clarify the specific question raised
with respect to the treatment of funds in proprietary commodities
accounts under the CEA and, consequently, the suggestions by the
commenter are beyond the scope of this rulemaking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\232\ See SIFMA 4 Letter.
\233\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

7. Expansion of the Definition of ``Qualified Securities'' To Include
Certain Money Market Funds
A broker-dealer is limited to depositing cash or qualified
securities into the bank account it maintains to meet its customer (and
now PAB account) reserve deposit requirements under Rule 15c3-3.
Paragraph (a)(6) of Rule 15c3-3 defines qualified securities to mean
securities issued by the United States or guaranteed by the United
States with respect to principal and interest.\234\ This strictly
limits the types of assets that can be used to fund a broker-dealer's
customer or PAB reserve account. The strict limitation is designed to
further the purpose of Rule 15c3-3; namely, that customer assets be
segregated and held in a manner that makes them readily available to be
returned to the customer. As the Commission noted when first proposing
Rule 15c3-3:

\234\ 17 CFR 240.15c3-3(a)(6).

The operative procedures of the Special [Reserve] Account are
designed to protect the integrity of customer-generated funds by
insulating them against inroads from the broker-dealer's firm
activities, whether they be underwriting, market making, other
trading, investing, or mere speculation in securities, meeting
overhead or any other nature whatever. The Special [Reserve] Account
should achieve a virtual 100% protection to customers with respect
to the carrying and use of customers' deposits or credit balances
which is mandated by Section 7(d) of the SIPC Act.\235\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\235\ Reserves and Related Measures Respecting the Financial
Responsibility of Brokers and Dealers, Exchange Act Release No. 9388
(Nov. 8, 1971), 36 FR 22312 (Nov. 24, 1971).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In response to a petition for rulemaking,\236\ the Commission
proposed a limited expansion of the definition of qualified security to
include shares of an unaffiliated money market fund that: (1) Is
described in Rule 2a-7 under the Investment Company Act of 1940; (2)
invests solely in securities issued by the United States or guaranteed
by the United States as to interest and principal; (3) agrees to redeem
fund shares in cash no later than the business day following a
redemption request by a shareholder; and (4) has net assets equal to at
least 10 times the value of the shares deposited by the broker-dealer
in its customer reserve account.\237\ Twenty commenters addressed the
proposed amendment.\238\ A majority of commenters supported the
proposal and generally argued that the definition of qualified security
should be expanded further to include more types of instruments. One
commenter noted that permitting the use of certain money market funds
to make up the required reserve account deposit would introduce ``an
intermediary (namely, the holding company or money market fund) at
which problems might arise.'' \239\ The commenter also noted that a
number of SIPA liquidations have involved the mishandling of money
market or mutual fund shares or the confirmations of purchases of
nonexistent ``money market funds.'' \240\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\236\ As discussed in the proposing release, Federated submitted
a petition for rulemaking on April 3, 2003, which it later amended
on April 4, 2005. See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules,
72 FR at 12865, 12874. More specifically, Federated's petition
requested that the Commission amend: (i) Rule 15c3-1 to lower the
haircut for certain money market funds to 0%; and (ii) Rule 15c3-3
to: (a) permit a broker-dealer to pledge such money market funds
when borrowing fully paid or excess margin securities from a
customer under paragraph (b)(3); and (b) treat such money market
funds as ``qualified securities'' that may be deposited into a
broker-dealer's customer reserve account. On February 9, 2009,
Federated submitted another request for rulemaking (Petition 4-577),
reiterating its first petition with respect to amending Rule 15c3-3
to allow a broker-dealer to treat certain money market funds as
``qualified securities'' that may be deposited into a reserve
account. However, this new petition changed the definition of the
types of funds that could be treated as qualified securities. More
specifically, the new petition proposed amending Rule 15c3-3(a)(6)
to define the term qualified securities to include, ``a redeemable
security of an investment company registered under the Investment
Company Act of 1940 and described in 17 CFR 270.2a-7, unaffiliated
with the broker-dealer and which limits its investments to
securities issued or guaranteed by the United States Government or
its agencies or instrumentalities (including repurchase
transactions).'' See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules,
72 FR at 12874 and n.112; see also Public Petitions for Rulemaking
No. 4-478 (Apr. 3, 2003) (available at https://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/petn4-478.htm), as amended (Apr. 4, 2005) (amendment
available at https://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/petn4-478a.pdf), and
No. 4-577 (Feb. 3, 2009) (available at https://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2009/petn4-577.pdf).
\237\ See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at
12865.
\238\ See Federated Letter; Federated 2 Letter; Federated 3
Letter; Federated 4 Letter; Federated 5 Letter; Federated 6 Letter;
Federated 7 Letter; Federated 8 Letter; Meeks Letter; Meeks 2
Letter; Crane Data Letter; SIPC Letter; Curian Letter; FAF Letter;
Reserve Letter; Brown Brothers Letter; SIFMA Letter; First Clearing
Letter; ICI Letter; Barclays Letter; American Beacon Letter; Chamber
of Commerce Letter; ABASA Letter; UBS Letter; Fidelity/NFS Letter;
Barnard Letter; Federated 9 Letter; BOK Letter; Cornell Letter.
\239\ See SIPC Letter.
\240\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Commission recently has proposed substantial amendments to its
rules on money market funds.\241\ In light

[[Page 51844]]

of these proposed amendments,\242\ the Commission is deferring
consideration of any further expansion of the definition of qualified
security in Rule 15c3-3 at this time. This will allow the Commission to
assess the potential impact of any money market fund reforms it may
adopt and whether any such impact would have consequences for the
customer protection objective of the reserve account requirement in
Rule 15c3-3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\241\ Money Market Fund Reform; Amendments to Form PF, Release
No. IC-30551 (June 5, 2013), 78 FR 36834 (June 19, 2013) (The rule
proposal includes two principal alternative reforms that could be
adopted alone or in combination. One alternative would require a
floating net asset value or ``NAV'' for prime institutional money
market funds. The other alternative would allow the use of liquidity
fees and redemption gates in times of stress. The proposal also
includes additional diversification and disclosure measures that
would apply under either alternative.). See also Division of Risk,
Strategy, and Financial Innovation, Commission, Responses to
Questions Posed by Commissioners Aguilar, Paredes, and Gallagher
(Nov. 30, 2012) (responding to questions posed by Commissioners
Aguilar, Paredes, and Gallagher regarding effectiveness of the 2010
money market fund reforms, as well as how future reforms might
affect demand for investments in money market fund substitutes and
the implications for investors, financial institutions, corporate
borrowers, municipalities, and states that sell their debt to money
market funds), available at https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2012/money-market-funds-memo-2012.pdf.
\242\ Money Market Fund Reform; Amendments to Form PF, Release
No. IC-30551 (June 5, 2013), 78 FR 36834 (June 19, 2013).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Holding Futures Positions in a Securities Portfolio Margin Account

Under SRO portfolio margin rules (``portfolio margin rules''),\243\
a broker-dealer can combine securities and futures positions in a
portfolio margin securities account to compute margin requirements
based on the net market risk of all positions in the account.\244\
Until the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, however, SIPA only protected
customer claims for securities and cash, and specifically excluded from
protection futures contracts that are not also securities. This fact
created a potential ambiguity as to how futures positions in a
portfolio margin securities account would be treated in a SIPA
liquidation. Consequently, the Commission proposed amendments to Rule
15c3-3 to accommodate the holding of futures positions in a securities
account that is margined on a portfolio basis.\245\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\243\ See Exchange Act Release No. 55471 (Mar. 14, 2007), 72 FR
13149 (Mar. 20, 2007) (SR-NASD-2007-013); Exchange Act Release No.
54918 (Dec. 12, 2006), 72 FR 1044 (Jan. 9, 2007) (SR-NYSE-2006-13);
Exchange Act Release No. 54919 (Dec. 12, 2006), (SR-CBOE-2006-14);
Exchange Act Release No. 54125 (July 11, 2006), 71 FR 40766 (July
18, 2006) (SR-NYSE-2005-93); Exchange Act Release No. 52031 (July
14, 2005), 70 FR 42130 (July 21, 2005) (SR-NYSE-2002-19); Exchange
Act Release No. 52032 (July 14, 2005), 70 FR 42118 (July 21, 2005)
(SR-CBOE-2002-03); see also Exchange Act Release No. 58251 (July 30,
2008), 73 FR 46111 (Aug. 7, 2008) (SR-FINRA-2008-041); Exchange Act
Release No. 58243 (July 28, 2008), 73 FR 45505 (Aug. 5, 2008) (SR-
CBOE-2008-73); and Exchange Act Release No. 58261 (July 30, 2008),
73 FR 46116 (Aug. 7, 2008) (SR-NYSE-2008-66) (making portfolio
margin rules permanent).
\244\ See, e.g., FINRA Rule 4210(g) and CBOE Rule 12.4.
\245\ See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at
12868-12870.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Subsequent to the Commission's proposals, the Dodd-Frank Act
amended the definitions of customer, customer property, and net equity
in section 16 of SIPA to take into account futures and options on
futures held in a portfolio margin account carried as a securities
account pursuant to a Commission-approved portfolio margining
program.\246\ As a result, persons who hold futures positions in a
portfolio margining account carried as a securities account are now
entitled to SIPA protection.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\246\ See Public Law 111-203 Sec. 983.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

While the Dodd-Frank Act addressed the protection under SIPA of
futures and futures options held in a securities portfolio margin
account, the Commission's proposed amendments to Rule 15c3-3 and 15c3-
3a will still serve an important purpose. In particular, they
complement the Dodd-Frank SIPA amendments, and will provide additional
protections to customers by requiring broker-dealers to treat these
futures positions in accordance with the segregation requirements in
Rules 15c3-3 and 15c3-3a. Consequently, the Commission is adopting the
amendments with modifications to address, in part, comments.
To accommodate securities and futures portfolio margining, the
Commission's proposals included several amendments. First, the
Commission proposed amending the definition of free credit balance in
paragraph (a)(8) of Rule 15c3-3 to provide that the term shall also
include such liabilities carried in a securities account pursuant to an
SRO portfolio margining rule approved by the Commission under section
19(b) of the Act (``SRO portfolio margining rule''), including daily
marks to market, and proceeds resulting from closing out futures
contracts and options thereon, and, in the event the broker-dealer is
the subject of a proceeding under SIPA, the market value as of the
filing date as that term is defined in SIPA (15 U.S.C. 78lll(7)) of any
long options on futures contracts.
In addition, the Commission proposed amendments to treat the
unrealized value of a futures option in a portfolio margin account on
the SIPA filing date \247\ as a free credit balance for purposes of
Rule 15c3-3. This amendment was designed to clarify that the market
value of such assets should be included in determining a customer's net
equity claim in a SIPA proceeding. Unlike futures contracts, futures
options do not generate cash balances on a daily basis in the account
(i.e., they have unrealized market value at the end of a trading day).
Since the broker-dealer is not holding cash for the customer, there is
no need to treat the futures options as a free credit balance for
purposes of the reserve formula. However, if the broker-dealer was
liquidated under SIPA, the unrealized gains or losses of the futures
options should be included in calculating the customer's net equity in
the account (along with the securities positions and all futures-
related and securities-related cash balances).\248\ The proposed
amendments were designed to provide for this outcome by defining the
market value of the futures options as a free credit balance as of the
filing date of a SIPA liquidation of the broker-dealer. As free credit
balances, funds originating from futures transactions (e.g., margin
deposits and daily marks to market) and the market value of futures
options as of the SIPA filing date would constitute claims for cash in
a SIPA proceeding and, therefore, become a part of a customer's net
equity claim entitling the customer to up to $250,000 in advances to
make up for shortfalls.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\247\ The term filing date is defined in SIPA as, generally,
being the date a SIPA proceeding is commenced. See 15 U.S.C.
78lll(7).
\248\ See 15 U.S.C 78lll(11); see also Public Law 111-203 Sec.
983 (revising definition of net equity).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Commission received six comments on the proposed
amendments.\249\ Three commenters generally supported the
amendments.\250\ One commenter stated that the amendments represent a
positive step forward in resolving certain regulatory obstacles in
connection with the inclusion of futures contracts in a portfolio
margin account.\251\ Another commenter stated that it supported the
Commission's efforts to facilitate the cross-margining of futures and
securities in the portfolio margin account by clarifying the treatment
of futures and options positions under SIPA.\252\ A commenter expressed
support for the development of rules for portfolio margining, and
supported the

[[Page 51845]]

Commission's effort to provide greater legal certainty regarding the
SIPA treatment of futures positions in a portfolio margin account.\253\
In a subsequent comment letter, however, this commenter stated that
this amendment is no longer necessary in light of the Dodd-Frank Act
amendments, and recommended the Commission withdraw it.\254\ Another
commenter stated that the Commission's proposal is premature in that
including futures in a portfolio margin account, which is a securities
account, would conflict with the segregation provisions under the CEA
\255\ and that SIPC has not determined that protection should be
extended to futures.\256\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\249\ See SIFMA 2 Letter; CME Letter; SIPC Letter; Citigroup
Letter; American Bar Association Letter; SIFMA 4 Letter. The comment
letters received as a result of the original solicitation of comment
pre-date the Dodd-Frank Act. As such, these comment letters address
the proposed amendments prior to the enactment of the Dodd-Frank
SIPA amendments related to portfolio margining. The comment letters
received subsequent to the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act address the
SIPA amendments.
\250\ See SIFMA 2 Letter; Citigroup Letter; American Bar
Association Letter.
\251\ See Citigroup Letter.
\252\ See American Bar Association Letter.
\253\ See SIFMA 2 Letter.
\254\ See SIFMA 4 Letter.
\255\ See, e.g., 17 CFR 1.20-1.29.
\256\ See CME Letter. See also SIPC Letter (expressing ``grave
concerns'' about potential conflict between the proposed amendments
and SIPA).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Commission agrees, in part, with the commenter who stated that
the Dodd-Frank Act SIPA amendments make the Commission's proposed
amendments to Rules 15c3-3 and 15c3-3a unnecessary.\257\ As noted
above, the definitions of customer, customer property, and net equity
in section 16 of SIPA were amended by the Dodd-Frank Act to take into
account futures and options on futures held in a portfolio margin
account carried as a securities account pursuant to a Commission-
approved portfolio margining program.\258\ Consequently, in a
proceeding under SIPA, futures and options on futures positions held in
a portfolio margin account carried as a securities account would be
included in determining a customer's net equity claim.\259\ Therefore,
the proposed amendment relating to the unrealized value of a futures
option is not necessary to achieve the objective of providing SIPA
protection for such positions. As a result, the Commission is modifying
the final rule to delete the proposed language in paragraph (a)(8) of
Rule 15c3-3 that would have treated the unrealized value of a futures
option in a portfolio margin account on the filing date of a SIPA
proceeding as a free credit balance for purposes of Rule 15c3-3.\260\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\257\ See SIFMA 4 Letter.
\258\ See Public Law 111-203 Sec. 983.
\259\ Under the Dodd-Frank Act SIPA amendments, a customer's net
equity now includes all positions in futures contracts and options
on futures contracts held in a portfolio margining account carried
as a securities account pursuant to a portfolio margining program
approved by the Commission, including all property collateralizing
such positions, to the extent that such property is not otherwise
included herein. See 15 U.S.C. 78lll(11)(A)(ii). Further, the
amendment provided that a claim for a commodity futures contract
received, acquired, or held in a portfolio margining account
pursuant to a portfolio margining program approved by the Commission
or a claim for a security futures contract, shall be deemed to be a
claim with respect to such contract as of the filing date, and such
claim shall be treated as a claim for cash. See 15 U.S.C. 78lll(11).
\260\ Specifically, the final rule does not include the proposed
language: ``, and, in the event the broker-dealer is the subject of
a proceeding under SIPA, the market value as of the ``filing date''
as that term is defined in SIPA (15 U.S.C. 78lll(7)) of any long
options on futures contracts.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

As stated above, however, the remaining rule amendments to Rules
15c3-3 and 15c3-3a complement the amendments to SIPA and provide
additional protections to customers. Consequently, the Commission is
adopting them with some technical modifications in response to
suggestions offered by commenters.
One commenter suggested a change to paragraph (a)(8) of Rule 15c3-3
that would expand the definition of free credit balances to include
cash balances related to futures positions and the value of futures
options positions on the SIPA filing date.\261\ First, the commenter
noted that paragraph (a)(8) of Rule 15c3-3 concerns free credit
balances, which are funds subject to immediate payment (among other
limitations).\262\ The commenter expressed concern that the
Commission's proposal could have been construed as excluding cash
balances in a portfolio margin account that are not subject to
immediate payment. The Commission agrees that the proposal could have
been interpreted as requiring that futures-related cash balances be
treated differently depending on whether or not they are subject to
immediate payment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\261\ See SIFMA 2 Letter.
\262\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The amendments to Rule 15c3-3 are designed to provide the same
treatment to futures-related cash balances in a portfolio margin
account as applies to securities-related cash balances. As discussed
above, under Item 1 of Rule 15c3-3a, cash balances that do not meet the
definition of free credit balances (e.g., because they are not subject
to immediate payment) are included in the customer reserve formula if
they meet the definition of other credit balances under paragraph
(a)(9) of Rule 15c3-3.\263\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\263\ Item 1 of Rule 15c3-3a requires a broker-dealer to include
in the customer reserve formula free credit balances and other
credit balances in customers' securities accounts. Paragraph (a)(9)
of Rule 15c3-3 defines other credit balances as ``cash liabilities
of a broker or dealer to customers other than free credit balances
and funds in commodities accounts segregated as aforesaid.'' 17 CFR
240.15c3-3(a)(9).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Consequently, to remove any ambiguity as to the effect of the rule
changes in response to the comments noted above, the Commission is
amending paragraph (a)(9) of Rule 15c3-3--which defines other credit
balances--to include futures-related cash balances other than free
credit balances. In addition, the Commission has deleted the phrase
``shall include such liabilities,'' in the amendment to proposed
paragraph (a)(8) and replaced it with ``includes, if subject to
immediate cash payment to customers on demand, funds . . .'' to clarify
that this paragraph relates to cash balances in a portfolio margin
account that are subject to immediate payment and, hence, that
paragraph (a)(9) relates to other cash balances in a portfolio margin
account.
One commenter suggested changes with respect to the marks to market
language in the rule, stating that the phrase relating to daily marks
to market be modified to read ``variation margin or initial margin
marks to market'' and the phrase in the proposal that read ``proceeds
resulting from closing out futures contracts and options thereon'' be
modified to read ``proceeds resulting from margin paid or released in
connection with closing out, settling or exercising futures contracts
and options thereon.'' \264\ The Commission agrees with these technical
suggestions because they clarify the rule by incorporating appropriate
futures terminology.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\264\ See SIFMA 2 Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Consequently, as adopted, the text in paragraphs (a)(8) and (a)(9)
of Rule 15c3-3 expands the terms free credit balance and other credit
balances to include ``funds carried in a securities account pursuant to
a self-regulatory organization portfolio margin rule approved by the
Commission . . . including variation margin or initial margin, marks to
market, and proceeds resulting from margin paid or released in
connection with closing out, settling or exercising futures contracts
and options thereon.'' \265\ The amendments, as adopted, more precisely
capture the Commission's intent in terms of identifying the types of
futures-related cash balances that may be held in a portfolio margin
account than the language in the proposed rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\265\ See also section II.A.6. of this release.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

On the debit side of the customer reserve formula, the Commission
is adopting, substantially as proposed, an amendment to Rule 15c3-3a
Item 14 that permits a broker-dealer to include as a debit item the
amount of customer margin required and on deposit at a derivatives
clearing organization related to futures positions carried in a
portfolio

[[Page 51846]]

margin account.\266\ Under SIPA, the term customer property includes,
``resources provided through the use or realization of customers' debit
cash balances and other customer-related debit items as defined by the
Commission by rule,'' as well as, ``in the case of a portfolio
margining account of a customer that is carried as a securities account
pursuant to a portfolio margining program approved by the Commission, a
futures contract or an option on a futures contract received, acquired,
or held by or for the account of a debtor from or for such portfolio
margining account, and the proceeds thereof.'' \267\ Under this
provision of SIPA, this amendment to Rule 15c3-3 makes the margin
required and on deposit at a derivatives clearing organization part of
the ``customer property'' in the event the broker-dealer is placed in a
SIPA liquidation. Thus, it would be available for distribution to the
failed firm's customers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\266\ The Commission also is amending Item 14 of Rule 15c3-3a to
replace the phrase ``Security futures products'' with the phrase
``security futures products.'' In addition, the Commission adopting
some non-substantive amendments to Note G to Item 14, including: (1)
In paragraph (a) replacing the word ``shall'' with the word
``must''; (2) in paragraph (b) replacing the word ``shall'' with the
word ``will''; in the second line in paragraph (b)(2) inserting the
phrase ``futures in a'' before the phrase ``portfolio margin
account'' and deleting the word ``margin''; (3) in paragraph (b)(2)
replacing the word ``shall'' with the word ``will'' in three places;
(4) in the sixth and seventh lines of paragraph (b)(2), inserting
the phrase ``futures in a'' before the phrase ``portfolio margin
account'' and deleting the phrase ``futures margin''; in paragraph
(b)(3)(iv) replacing the word ``securities'' with the word
``security'', inserting the phrase ``futures in a'' before the
phrase ``portfolio margin account'' and deleting the word
``futures''; and (4) in paragraph (c), replacing the word ``shall''
with the word ``will'', inserting the phrase ``futures in a'' before
the phrase ``portfolio margin account'' and deleting the word
``futures.''
\267\ 15 U.S.C. 78lll(4)(B) and (D); see also Dodd-Frank Act
Section 983.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Finally, one commenter suggested changes to Commission rules beyond
those in the proposing release. This commenter urged the Commission to
consider amending Rules 8c-1, 15c2-1, and 15c3-3 to provide that their
provisions could be waived by customers that are entitled to engage in
derivative transactions in a portfolio margin account, provided the
customer agrees in writing to waive SIPA protection.\268\ According to
the commenter, a customer executing such a waiver would not be entitled
to the protections under SIPA for customers and would be deemed a
general creditor of the broker-dealer with respect to claims arising
from their portfolio margin accounts. At this time, the Commission does
not believe it would be appropriate to amend the rules as recommended
by the commenter because such changes are beyond the scope of this
rulemaking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\268\ See American Bar Association Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

C. Amendments With Respect to Securities Lending and Borrowing and
Repurchase/Reverse Repurchase Transactions

In the proposing release, the Commission noted two concerns about
stock lending that arose from the failure of the registered broker-
dealer MJK Clearing, Inc. (``MJK''); \269\ namely: (1) That broker-
dealers with principal liability in a stock loan transaction may
purport to be acting in an agency capacity and, consequently, not
taking appropriate capital charges; and (2) that broker-dealers that
historically have not been active in stock loan activities may rapidly
expand their balance sheets with such transactions and, thereby,
increase leverage to a level that poses significant financial risk to
the firm and its counterparties. In response, the Commission proposed,
and is now adopting, amendments to Rules 15c3-1 and 17a-11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\269\ See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at
12869. The failure of MJK raised several concerns regarding
securities lending transactions. As explained in more detail in the
proposing release, at the time of its failure, MJK owed cash
collateral to several borrowing broker-dealers. Id. at 12862, 12869-
12870. These broker-dealers suffered losses caused by MJK's failures
and, in later proceedings related to these losses, questions arose
as to whether these broker-dealers were acting as principal or
agent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

With respect to the Rule 15c3-1 proposal, the Commission is
adopting the amendment, as proposed. This amendment to subparagraph
(c)(2)(iv)(B) of Rule 15c3-1 clarifies that broker-dealers providing
securities lending and borrowing settlement services are deemed, for
purposes of the rule, to be acting as principal and are subject to
applicable capital deductions.\270\ Under the amendment, these
deductions can be avoided if a broker-dealer takes certain steps to
disclaim principal liability. In particular, the final rule provides
that ``a broker or dealer that participates in a loan of securities by
one party to another party will be deemed a principal for the purpose
of the deductions required under this section, [i.e., deductions from
net worth] unless the broker or dealer has fully disclosed the identity
of each party to the other and each party has expressly agreed in
writing that the obligations of the broker or dealer do not include a
guarantee of performance by the other party and that such party's
remedies in the event of a default by the other party do not include a
right of setoff against obligations, if any, of the broker or dealer.''
\271\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\270\ A broker-dealer is required to deduct from net worth most
unsecured receivables, including the amount that the market value of
a securities loan exceeds the value of collateral obtained for the
loan. See 17 CFR 240.15c3-1(c)(2)(iv)(B). Similarly, with respect to
repo transactions, a broker-dealer obligated to resell securities
must, in computing net capital, deduct the amount that the market
value of the securities is less than the resale price. See 17 CFR
240.15c3-1(c)(2)(iv)(F). A broker-dealer obligated to repurchase
securities must, in computing net capital, deduct the amount that
the market value of the securities is greater than the repurchase
price to the extent the excess is greater than certain percentages.
See 17 CFR 240.15c3-1(c)(2)(iv)(F).
\271\ See paragraph (c)(2)(iv)(B) of Rule 15c3-1, as adopted.
Standard master securities loan agreements (including the annexes
thereto) commonly used by the parties to a securities lending
transaction contain provisions for establishing agent (as opposed to
principal) status in a securities lending and borrowing transaction
that are consistent with the requirements in paragraph (c)(2)(iv)(B)
of Rule 15c3-1, as amended. See, e.g., 2000 Master Securities Loan
Agreement, Annex I, published by SIFMA, available at www.sifma.org.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Commission received five comments on the proposed
amendment.\272\ Two commenters objected to this amendment, stating that
they believed the standard legal documents used in securities lending
transactions provide sufficient legal certainty on the status of the
parties.\273\ The Commission, in recognition of standard stock loan
agreement templates, designed the amendment to accommodate the
continued use of these industry model agreements by incorporating their
use into the rule's requirements. For the purposes of establishing a
broker-dealer's status as agent or lender, these agreements may be
sufficiently detailed to satisfy the new requirements. However, it
would be the broker-dealer's responsibility to ensure that any
``standard'' agreement contains the necessary provisions to comply with
this amendment, and that such provisions are not weakened by any other
language in the agreement or any subsequent amendment. The goal is to
avoid ambiguity about a broker-dealer's status as agent or principal
regarding the applicability of the stock loan charges in the net
capital rule. As the failure of MJK illustrated, disputes can arise
over whether a broker-dealer is acting as a principal or agent in a
stock loan transaction.\274\ Under the formulation of the rule, a
broker-dealer is presumed to be acting in a principal capacity unless
it can demonstrate through its agreements with the other participants
in the transaction that it is acting as agent. In this regard, a
broker-

[[Page 51847]]

dealer will be responsible for determining that its agreements are
fully consistent with the standards of the rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\272\ See Abbey National Letter; Dresdner Kleinwort Letter;
SIFMA 2 Letter; Citigroup Letter; Cornell Letter.
\273\ See SIFMA 2 Letter; Citigroup Letter.
\274\ See, e.g., Nomura v. E*Trade, 280 F.Supp.2d 184 (S.D.N.Y.
2003).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

One commenter asked for clarification on the timing of when the
agent lender must disclose the principal parties to one another in
order to disclaim principal liability under the rule.\275\ This
commenter stated that the amendment should be modified so as not to
require pre-trade disclosure of the identity of the principal, since
under the agency annex to standardized master lending agreements such
disclosure can be made on the next business day.\276\ The amendment is
intended to accommodate the continued use of these industry model
agreements by incorporating their use into the rule's requirements.
Consequently, disclosure of principals in conformance with the
requirements of the ``standard'' stock loan agreement templates would
be consistent with the requirements of the rule (as long as the
identity of the borrower and the lender is disclosed within one
business day after the trade date), which is designed to ensure that
firms are taking the required net capital charges related to the
securities lending activity to the extent they have principal
liability.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\275\ See SIFMA 2 Letter.
\276\ See, e.g., www.sifma.org for sample Master Securities Loan
Agreements (and annex).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Commission also is adding new paragraph (c)(5) to Rule 17a-11
to help identify broker-dealers with highly leveraged non-government
securities lending and borrowing and repurchase operations.\277\ This
new provision requires a broker-dealer to notify the Commission
whenever the total amount of money payable against all securities
loaned or subject to a repurchase agreement, or the total contract
value of all securities borrowed or subject to a reverse repurchase
agreement, exceeds 2,500 percent of tentative net capital; provided
that, for purposes of this leverage threshold, transactions involving
government securities as defined in section 3(a)(42) of the Exchange
Act, are excluded from the calculation.\278\ The amendment is designed
to alert regulators to a sudden increase in a broker-dealer's stock
loan and repo positions, which could indicate that the broker-dealer is
taking on new risk that it may have limited experience in managing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\277\ See paragraph (c)(5) of Rule 17a-11, as adopted.
\278\ 15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(42). ``Government securities'' generally
present less market risk than other types of securities used in
securities lending and repo transactions. Consequently, they are
excluded from the scope of the rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

One commenter supported the proposed amendment and believes the
notification could serve as ``an early warning'' that a firm is
approaching insolvency and generally supports the Commission's efforts
to protect customers from broker-dealers who recklessly rely on
excessively leveraged transactions.\279\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\279\ See Cornell Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In the proposing release, the Commission estimated that a leverage
threshold of 25 times tentative net capital would be triggered by 21
broker-dealers on a regular basis.\280\ The Commission stated that this
establishes a threshold high enough to only capture on a regular basis
those few firms highly active in securities lending and repo
transactions. The Commission did not receive any comments regarding the
2,500% tentative net capital threshold in the proposing release. Based
on FOCUS Report data, as of December 31, 2011, there were six broker-
dealers whose securities loaned and securities borrowed transactions
exceeded 25 times their tentative net capital. The Commission continues
to believe that the 2,500% threshold is an appropriate notice trigger
for a firm that historically has not been as active in these
transactions but rapidly leverages up its securities lending and repo
positions. Given the updated estimates of how many broker-dealers would
trigger this threshold, the Commission believes the proposed threshold
is high enough to capture on a regular basis only those few firms
highly active in securities lending and repo transactions. Therefore,
the Commission is retaining this 2,500% threshold in the final rule
without revision.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\280\ See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at
12870 (providing rationale for 2,500% threshold).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

As proposed, the amendment to Rule 17a-11 also would have provided
that a broker-dealer that submitted a monthly report of its stock loan
and repo activity to its DEA need not file the notices. This provision
was designed to accommodate large broker-dealers that are active in
this business and regularly maintain stock loan and repo balances that
exceed the threshold. The Commission expects that these broker-dealers
have experience in managing the risks specific to these types of
transactions and have established controls to address those risks.
Consequently, a notice under paragraph (c)(5) from these broker-dealers
might not be as useful in providing risk assessment information to
regulators. Instead, the monthly reports will provide the Commission
and other financial regulators with information with which to develop
trend analysis, when deemed appropriate. They could use this analysis
to identify leverage levels that are outside the normal trend range,
and which may be indicative of a material change in the firm's business
model that could indicate it was taking on higher levels of leverage,
branching into new products, or experiencing operational or financial
difficulties (e.g., the firm could be reducing leverage rapidly because
creditors were not willing to enter into new transactions).
Three commenters addressed the proposed monthly notification
requirement.\281\ They stated that the monthly report in lieu of the
notification should be provided as part of the monthly FOCUS report
many broker-dealers file with their DEA.\282\ The Commission agrees
that the FOCUS report may be an appropriate mechanism for reporting
stock loan and repo positions in lieu of the proposed monthly
notification requirement.\283\ Consequently, the Commission has
modified the final rule to delete the phrase ``submits a monthly report
of'' and replace it with ``reports monthly.'' \284\ In addition, as
adopted, in order to provide that the monthly report be sent to a
broker-dealer's DEA, the Commission added the phrase ``to its
designated examining authority in a form acceptable'' before ``to its
designated examining authority.'' \285\ This language, as adopted, will
provide each DEA with the flexibility to prescribe how the monthly
reports are to be made and will accommodate a DEA that opts to use the
FOCUS report as the reporting mechanism.\286\ In summary, as adopted,
the notice exemption in paragraph (c)(5) will state ``provided further,
however, that a broker or dealer will not be required to send the
notice required by this paragraph (c)(5) if it reports monthly its
securities lending and borrowing and repurchase and reverse repurchase
activity (including the total amount of money payable against
securities loaned or subject to a repurchase agreement and the total
contract value of securities borrowed or subject to a reverse
repurchase agreement) to its designated

[[Page 51848]]

examining authority in a form acceptable to its designated examining
authority.'' \287\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\281\ See Abbey National Letter; Citigroup Letter; SIFMA 2
Letter; SIFMA 4 Letter.
\282\ See Abbey National Letter; Citigroup Letter; SIFMA 2
Letter.
\283\ Carrying broker-dealers generally are required to submit
FOCUS reports on a monthly basis.
\284\ See paragraph (c)(5) of Rule 17a-11, as adopted.
\285\ Id.
\286\ See also SIFMA 4 Letter.
\287\ See paragraph (c)(5) of Rule 17a-11, as adopted. The
Commission also inserted the text ``(c)(5)'' in the final rule
before the phrase ``if it reports monthly'' to make the paragraph
reference more explicit.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

A commenter asked the Commission to clarify that the new reporting
provision of paragraph (c)(5) of Rule 17a-11 is triggered only by
principal activity meeting or exceeding stated thresholds.\288\ The
notification provision applies when a broker-dealer is acting as
principal and exceeds the stated thresholds, and a broker-dealer will
not need to include transactions for which it does not have principal
liability in determining whether the notification threshold has been
triggered.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\288\ See Dresdner Kleinwort Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

D. Documentation of Risk Management Procedures

It is important for broker-dealers to document the controls they
establish for managing the material risk exposures that arise from
their business activities. For example, a broker-dealer active in
securities lending is exposed to a variety of risks, including market
risk,\289\ credit risk,\290\ and liquidity risk.\291\ Other broker-
dealer activities give rise to these risks as well, including managing
a repo book, dealing in OTC derivatives, trading proprietary positions,
and lending on margin. A well-documented system of internal controls
designed to manage material risk exposures reflects the determination
of a firm's management as to how its business activities should be
conducted in light of such exposures. It also enables management to
better identify, analyze, and manage the risks inherent in the firm's
business activities with a view to preventing material losses and to
review whether the firm's activities are being conducted in a manner
that is consistent with such procedures and controls as well as in
accordance with the Federal securities laws. Risk management controls
are particularly important for the largest broker-dealers, which
generally engage in a wide range of highly complex activities across
many different markets and geographical locations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\289\ Generally, market risk is the risk that prices, values, or
rates will adversely change.
\290\ Generally, credit risk is the risk of loss resulting from
a counterparty or other type of obligor failing to meet an
obligation, including an obligation with respect to a loan,
security, swap, option, or settlement.
\291\ Generally, funding liquidity risk is the risk that a firm
will not be able to meet cash demands as they become due and asset
liquidity risk is the risk that an asset will not be able to be sold
quickly at its market value.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

While most broker-dealers already have well-documented procedures
and controls for managing risks as a matter of business practice, it is
important to reinforce the practice and make it easier for regulators
to understand a broker-dealer's procedures and controls so that they
can review whether the broker-dealer is adhering to them. Consequently,
the Commission proposed an amendment to Rule 17a-3 that would have
required a broker-dealer to create a record documenting its ``internal
risk management controls.'' \292\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\292\ See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at
12899.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Commenters raised concerns that the proposed amendment would be
``overly broad and ambiguous'' \293\ and ``so broad as to create
uncertainty.'' \294\ Three commenters argued that the requirement, if
adopted, should be limited to market, credit, and liquidity risk
management.\295\ Another commenter recommended that the Commission
propose the minimum elements required to be documented, such as market
risk, credit risk, liquidity risk, and operational risk.\296\ While
market, credit, and liquidity risk were among the specific examples of
risk identified in the proposed rule,\297\ the Commission agrees that
the phrase ``risk controls'' could be interpreted very broadly. To
address this concern, the Commission has modified the final rule to
clarify its application. The final rule requires the documentation of
controls established specifically to manage market, credit, and
liquidity risk, ``which have more commonly understood meanings within
the industry.'' \298\ This also focuses the rule on the key risks
inherent in conducting a securities business.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\293\ See E*Trade Letter.
\294\ See Citigroup Letter.
\295\ See E*Trade Letter; SIFMA 2 Letter; Citigroup Letter.
\296\ See Barnard Letter.
\297\ See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at
12870.
\298\ E*Trade Letter. The final rule also deletes the term
``internal'' because it would be redundant.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Commenters also requested that the Commission clarify that, when a
broker-dealer is part of a corporate family, risk management controls
could be applicable to multiple entities within the corporate family,
including the broker-dealer.\299\ In response, the final rule does not
specify the type of controls a broker-dealer must establish to manage
these risks. It simply requires the documentation of the procedures the
broker-dealer has established. Broker-dealers that are part of holding
companies may be subject to procedures that are used globally
throughout the organization. As long as the broker-dealer maintains
documented procedures of controls pertaining to the designated entity,
the requirements of the rule would be met.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\299\ See E*Trade Letter; SIFMA 2 Letter; Citigroup Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Other commenters requested that the Commission clarify that the
risk management controls do not have to include any minimum elements
\300\ and that the rule does not impose any qualitative
requirements.\301\ Two commenters suggested that because there were no
stated content requirements for the risk management controls, it would
be difficult for a firm to prove that their risk management procedures
were adequate, which could lead to a ``subjective process'' \302\ or to
examiners applying a ``one size fits all'' best practices
standard.\303\ One commenter suggested that to address this issue, the
Commission should articulate the process that examiners will follow
when examining risk management controls.\304\ Finally, one commenter
encouraged the Commission to consider strengthening this requirement in
terms of both its scope and applicability.\305\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\300\ See SIFMA 2 Letter.
\301\ See Citigroup Letter.
\302\ See Coastal Securities Letter.
\303\ See American Bar Association Letter.
\304\ Id.
\305\ See Cornell Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Commission is not mandating any specific controls, procedures,
or policies that must be established by a broker-dealer to manage
market, credit, or liquidity risk, nor is it requiring any minimum
elements or specifying any procedures that would be required to be
included in a firm's market, credit, and liquidity risk management
policies. Rather, the Commission is requiring that a control,
procedure, or policy be documented if it is in place. Based on staff
experience monitoring large broker-dealers, the Commission anticipates
that most brokers-dealers that will be subject to this rule already
have documented controls, procedures, and policies as part of their
overall risk management processes. The purpose of this amendment is not
to change the controls, procedures, and policies that are in place, but
to require that they be adequately documented.
For the foregoing reasons, paragraph (a)(23) to Rule 17a-3, as
adopted, requires certain broker-dealers to make and keep current a
record documenting the credit, market, and liquidity risk

[[Page 51849]]

management controls established and maintained by the broker-dealer to
assist it in analyzing and managing the risks associated with its
business activities.\306\ This documentation requirement applies only
to broker-dealers that have more than (1) $1,000,000 in aggregate
credit items as computed under the customer reserve formula of Rule
15c3-3, or (2) $20,000,000 in capital, including debt subordinated in
accordance with Appendix D to Rule 15c3-1.\307\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\306\ See paragraph (a)(23) of Rule 17a-3, as adopted.
\307\ The Commission also has modified paragraph (a)(23) of Rule
17a-3 from the proposed rule to delete the reference to the term
``member'' in two places in the final rule because the reference to
``member'' is unnecessary. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Commission also proposed adding paragraph (e)(9) to Rule 17a-4
to require a broker-dealer to retain the documented risk management
controls or procedures until three years after the broker-dealer
terminates the use of the system of controls or procedures documented
therein. One commenter stated that given the minimal cost of electronic
storage, the commenter believes that the retention period could be
extended beyond three years.\308\ Conversely, two commenters suggested
that Rule 17a-4 be revised so that a broker-dealer would not be
required to maintain outdated versions of its risk management
controls.\309\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\308\ Id.
\309\ See E*Trade Letter; SIFMA 2 Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Commission is adding paragraph (e)(9) to Rule 17a-4, with a
minor modification from the proposed amendment. Specifically, the final
rule is modified to require retention of the records until three years
after termination of the use of the risk management controls documented
therein by replacing the phrase ``systems of controls or procedures''
with the phrase ``risk management controls.'' \310\ This modification
maintains consistency with the terminology in paragraph (a)(23) of Rule
17a-3, as adopted, which requires broker-dealers to make and keep
current a ``record documenting the credit, market, and liquidity risk
management controls established and maintained by the broker or
dealer.'' \311\ Finally, the three year retention period is designed to
establish an audit trail between the risk management controls that have
most recently been made inoperative and the risk management controls
currently in effect to provide sufficient opportunity to review the
former during the broker-dealer's exam cycle. Three years also is
consistent with the retention period for many of the records required
to be preserved under Rule 17a-4.\312\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\310\ See paragraph (e)(9) of Rule 17a-4, as adopted. The
Commission also modified the final rule to delete the phrase
``paragraph (a)(23) of'' and insert ``(a)(23)'' immediately
following ``17a-3'' to make the referenced citation consistent with
other parts of the rule.
\311\ See paragraph (a)(23) of Rule 17a-3, as adopted.
\312\ See 17 CFR 240.17a-4(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Finally, one commenter noted that the proposed amendment does not
impose any requirements beyond those applicable under Rule 15c3-4.\313\
Accordingly, the commenter urged the Commission to create an exception
from the proposed amendment to Rule 17a-3 for a broker-dealer that is
effectively subject to Rule 15c3-4. With the modifications to the final
rule to include only market, credit, and liquidity risk, a broker-
dealer subject to the conditions of Rule 15c3-4 would already comply
with this amendment given that these risks are included in the risks a
broker-dealer would be required to address under Rule 15c3-4.
Therefore, an exception from the rule is unnecessary.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\313\ See SIFMA 2 Letter. See also 17 CFR 240.15c3-4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

E. Amendments to the Net Capital Rule

Under Rule 15c3-1, broker-dealers are required to maintain, at all
times, a minimum amount of net capital.\314\ The capital standard in
Rule 15c3-1 is a net liquid assets test. This standard is designed to
allow a broker-dealer the flexibility to engage in activities that are
part of conducting a securities business (e.g., taking securities into
inventory) but in a manner that places the firm in the position of
holding at all times more than one dollar of highly liquid assets for
each dollar of unsubordinated liabilities (e.g., money owed to
customers, counterparties, and creditors).\315\ For example, Rule 15c3-
1 allows securities positions to count as allowable net capital,
subject to standardized or model-based deductions (``haircuts'').\316\
The rule, however, does not permit most unsecured receivables to count
as allowable net capital.\317\ This aspect of the rule severely limits
the ability of broker-dealers to engage in activities that generate
unsecured receivables (e.g., lending money without obtaining
collateral). The rule also does not permit fixed assets or other
illiquid assets to count as allowable net capital, which creates
disincentives for broker-dealers to own real estate and other fixed
assets that cannot be readily converted into cash.\318\ For these
reasons, Rule 15c3-1 incentivizes broker-dealers to confine their
business activities and devote capital to activities such as
underwriting, market making, and advising on and facilitating customer
securities transactions.\319\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\314\ See 17 CFR 240.15c3-1.
\315\ See, e.g., Interpretation Guide to Net Capital Computation
for Brokers and Dealers, Exchange Act Release No. 8024 (Jan. 18,
1967), 32 FR 856 (Jan. 25, 1967) (``Rule 15c3-1 (17 CFR 240.15c3-1)
was adopted to provide safeguards for public investors by setting
standards of financial responsibility to be met by brokers and
dealers. The basic concept of the rule is liquidity; its object
being to require a broker-dealer to have at all times sufficient
liquid assets to cover his current indebtedness.'') (Footnotes
omitted); Net Capital Treatment of Securities Positions, Obligations
and Transactions in Suspended Securities, Exchange Act Release No.
10209 (June 8, 1973), 38 FR 16774 (June 26, 1973) (Commission
release of a letter from the Division of Market Regulation) (``The
purpose of the net capital rule is to require a broker or dealer to
have at all times sufficient liquid assets to cover its current
indebtedness. The need for liquidity has long been recognized as
vital to the public interest and for the protection of investors and
is predicated on the belief that accounts are not opened and
maintained with broker-dealers in anticipation of relying upon suit,
judgment and execution to collect claims but rather on a reasonable
demand one can liquidate his cash or securities positions.''); Net
Capital Requirements for Brokers and Dealers, Exchange Act Release
No. 15426 (Dec. 21, 1978), 44 FR 1754 (Jan. 8, 1979) (``The rule
requires brokers or dealers to have sufficient cash or liquid assets
to protect the cash or securities positions carried in their
customers' accounts. The thrust of the rule is to insure that a
broker or dealer has sufficient liquid assets to cover current
indebtedness.''); Net Capital Requirements for Brokers and Dealers,
Exchange Act Release No. 26402 (Dec. 28, 1989), 54 FR 315 (Jan. 5,
1989) (``The rule's design is that broker-dealers maintain liquid
assets in sufficient amounts to enable them to satisfy promptly
their liabilities. The rule accomplishes this by requiring broker-
dealers to maintain liquid assets in excess of their liabilities to
protect against potential market and credit risks.'') (Footnote
omitted).
\316\ See 17 CFR 240.15c3-1(c)(2)(vi); 17 CFR 240.15c3-1e; 17
CFR 240.15c3-1f .
\317\ See 17 CFR 240.15c3-1(c)(2)(iv).
\318\ See, e.g., 17 CFR 240.15c3-1(c)(2)(iv)(A).
\319\ See Capital, Margin, and Segregation Requirements for
Security-Based Swap Dealers and Major Security-Based Swap
Participants and Capital Requirements for Broker-Dealers, Exchange
Act Release No. 68071 (Oct. 18, 2012), 77 FR 70214, 70219 (Nov. 23,
2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Rule 15c3-1 requires broker-dealers to maintain a minimum level of
net capital (meaning highly liquid capital) at all times.\320\ The rule
requires that a broker-dealer perform two calculations: (1) A
computation of the minimum amount of net capital the broker-dealer must
maintain; \321\ and (2) a computation of the amount of net capital the
broker-dealer is maintaining.\322\ The minimum net capital requirement
is the greater of a fixed-dollar amount specified in the rule and an
amount determined by applying one of two financial ratios: The 15-to-1
aggregate indebtedness to net

[[Page 51850]]

capital ratio or the 2% of aggregate debit items ratio.\323\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\320\ See 17 CFR 240.15c3-1.
\321\ See 17 CFR 240.15c3-1(a).
\322\ See 17 CFR 240.15c3-1(c)(2). The computation of net
capital is based on the definition of net capital in paragraph
(c)(2) of Rule 15c3-1. Id.
\323\ See 17 CFR 240.15c3-1(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In computing net capital, the broker-dealer must, among other
things, make certain adjustments to net worth such as deducting
illiquid assets, taking other capital charges, and adding qualifying
subordinated loans.\324\ The amount remaining after these adjustments
is defined as tentative net capital.\325\ The final step in computing
net capital is to take prescribed percentage deductions (``standardized
haircuts'') from the mark-to-market value of the proprietary positions
(e.g., securities, money market instruments, and commodities) that are
included in its tentative net capital.\326\ The standardized haircuts
are designed to account for the market risk inherent in these positions
and to create a buffer of liquidity to protect against other risks
associated with the securities business.\327\ Alternative Net Capital
or ``ANC'' broker-dealers and a type of limited purpose broker-dealer
that deals solely in OTC derivatives (``OTC derivative dealers'') are
permitted, with Commission approval, to, among other things, use
internal models as the basis for taking market risk charges as an
alternative approach in lieu of the standardized haircuts for classes
of positions for which they have been approved to use models.\328\ Rule
15c3-1 imposes substantially higher minimum capital requirements for
ANC broker-dealers and OTC derivatives dealers, as compared to other
types of broker-dealers, because, among other reasons, the use of
internal models to compute net capital can substantially reduce the
deductions for securities and money market positions as compared with
the standardized haircuts.\329\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\324\ See 17 CFR 240.15c3-1(c)(2)(i)-(xiii).
\325\ See 17 CFR 240.15c3-1(c)(15).
\326\ See 17 CFR 240.15c3-1(c)(2)(vi).
\327\ See, e.g., Uniform Net Capital Rule, Exchange Act Release
No. 13635 (June 16, 1977), 42 FR 31778 (June 23, 1977) (``[Haircuts]
are intended to enable net capital computations to reflect the
market risk inherent in the positioning of the particular types of
securities enumerated in [the rule]''); Net Capital Rule, Exchange
Act Release No. 22532 (Oct. 15, 1985), 50 FR 42961 (Oct. 23, 1985)
(``These percentage deductions, or `haircuts', take into account
elements of market and credit risk that the broker-dealer is exposed
to when holding a particular position.''); Net Capital Rule,
Exchange Act Release No. 39455 (Dec. 17, 1997), 62 FR 67996 (Dec.
30, 1997) (``Reducing the value of securities owned by broker-
dealers for net capital purposes provides a capital cushion against
adverse market movements and other risks faced by the firms,
including liquidity and operational risks.'') (Footnote omitted).
\328\ See 17 CFR 240.15c3-1(a)(5) and (a)(7); 17 CFR 240.15c3-
1e; 17 CFR 240.15c3-1f.
\329\ See 17 CFR 240.15c3-1(a)(5) and (a)(7). See also Capital,
Margin, and Segregation Requirements for Security-Based Swap Dealers
and Major Security-Based Swap Participants and Capital Requirements
for Broker-Dealers, Exchange Act Release No. 68071, 77 FR at 70219
(``[T]he use of internal models to compute net capital can
substantially reduce the deductions for securities and money market
positions as compared with the standardized haircuts.'');
Alternative Net Capital Requirements for Broker-Dealers that are
Part of Consolidated Supervised Entities, Exchange Act Release No.
49830 (June 8, 2004), 69 FR 34428, 34431 (June 21, 2004) (``We
expect that use of the alternative net capital computation will
reduce deductions for market and credit risk substantially for
broker-dealers that use that method.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. Requirement To Deduct From Net Worth Certain Liabilities or Expenses
Assumed by Third Parties
In the proposing release, the Commission expressed concern that
some broker-dealers may be excluding from their calculations of net
worth certain liabilities that relate directly to expenses or debts
incurred by the broker-dealer.\330\ The accounting justification for
the exclusion is that a third party (usually a parent or affiliate) has
assumed responsibility for these expenses and debts through an expense
sharing agreement.\331\ In some cases, however, the third party does
not have the resources --independent of the broker-dealer's revenues
and assets--to assume these liabilities. Thus, the third party is
dependent on the resources of the broker-dealer to pay the expenses and
debts. Excluding liabilities from the broker-dealer's net worth
calculation in these situations may misrepresent the firm's actual
financial condition, deceive the firm's customers, and hamper the
ability of regulators to monitor the firm's financial condition.\332\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\330\ See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at
12871.
\331\ See, e.g., Letter from Michael A. Macchiaroli, Associate
Director, Division of Market Regulation, Commission, to Elaine
Michitsch, Member Firm Operations, NYSE, and Susan DeMando,
Director, Financial Operations, NASD Regulation, Inc. (July 11,
2003) (``Third Party Expense Letter''); see also FINRA Notice to
Members 03-63, Expense-Sharing Agreements (Oct. 2003) (discussing
the issuance of the Third Party Expense Letter).
\332\ See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at
12871.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

To address this issue, the Commission proposed--and is now adopting
substantially as proposed--an amendment to Rule 15c3-1 to add a new
paragraph (c)(2)(i)(F) that will require a broker-dealer, in
calculating net capital, to take into account any liabilities that are
assumed by a third party if the broker-dealer cannot demonstrate that
the third party has the resources--independent of the broker-dealer's
income and assets--to pay the liabilities.\333\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\333\ As adopted, the final rule does not include the ``-'' in
the phrase ``third-party.'' In addition, the final rule uses the
phrase ``broker or dealer'' in the place of the phrase ``broker-
dealer'' (which appeared in two places) to maintain consistency
throughout Rule 15c3-1, which uses the phrase ``broker or dealer.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Commission received five comments regarding this proposal.\334\
Two commenters stated that the amendment was overly burdensome and that
it would not result in a more accurate picture of a broker-dealer's
financial condition than obtained through current requirements.\335\
One of these commenters added that any implementation and enforcement
of the amendments ``should not be made retroactive.''\336\ This
commenter stated that it is unclear how, and unlikely that, this
amendment would achieve any of the desired results and argued that it
could conversely impair a firm's ability to continue as a going
concern.\337\ Finally, this commenter also argued that this amendment
would affect capital transactions that originate at the holding company
level.\338\ Two commenters agreed in principle with the amendments but
urged the Commission to carefully consider the potential consequences
of implementation and to provide clarification on the standard for
demonstrating that the third party has adequate financial resources,
including factors beyond those referred to in the proposing release
that they believed would be potentially relevant.\339\ One commenter
supported the Commission's goal of clarifying disclosures relating to
expense sharing or obligations.\340\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\334\ See Beer Letter; Levene Letter; Lowenstein Letter; SIFMA 2
Letter; NIBA 2 Letter.
\335\ See Beer Letter; Levene Letter.
\336\ See Levene Letter.
\337\ Id.
\338\ Id.
\339\ See Lowenstein Letter; SIFMA 2 Letter.
\340\ See NIBA 2 Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

As with the proposal, the amendment, as adopted, is designed to
prohibit a practice that could misrepresent a broker-dealer's actual
financial condition, deceive the firm's customers, and hamper the
ability of regulators to monitor the firm's financial condition.
Moreover, the amendment, as adopted, should not impose undue burdens or
present serious implementation difficulties because the requirement is
consistent with prior staff guidance regarding the treatment of broker-
dealer expenses assumed by a third party.\341\ Finally, as compared to
staff guidance, a federal regulation offers broker-dealers greater
certainty as to how to treat expense sharing agreements under Rule
15c3-1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\341\ See, e.g., Third Party Expense Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In response to the comments discussed above, and as the Commission
explained in the proposing release, a broker-dealer can demonstrate the
adequacy of the third party's financial

[[Page 51851]]

resources by maintaining records such as the third party's most recent
(i.e., as of a date within the previous twelve months) audited
financial statements, tax returns, or regulatory filings containing
financial reports.\342\ Given that the entity to which the broker-
dealer is seeking to shift one or more liabilities typically is an
affiliate, the staff's experience is that such records should be
available to the broker-dealer. Further, because the proposed rule
change is consistent with prior staff guidance regarding the need to be
able to demonstrate the third party's financial adequacy,\343\ a
broker-dealer seeking to shift a liability to a third party already
would be expected to provide such evidence of the third party's
financial resources. For these reasons, the change from staff guidance
to Commission rule should not result in implementation and burden
concerns of the magnitude raised by the two commenters.\344\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\342\ See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at
12872. The Commission specifically requested comment regarding the
records by which a broker-dealer could demonstrate financial
resources. It received no comments in response to this request.
\343\ See, e.g., Third Party Expense Letter.
\344\ See Lowenstein Letter; SIFMA 2 Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Finally, one commenter noted it would be helpful if the Commission
would clarify whether this amendment supersedes the Commission staff
guidance in the Third Party Expense Letter.\345\ Unlike the PAIB Letter
discussed above, the Commission is not directing the staff to withdraw
the Third Party Expense Letter on the effective date of these
amendments. The Third Party Expense Letter will still be relevant as
staff guidance, notwithstanding that it contains a condition that has
been codified into Rule 15c3-1 (i.e., that an expense of the broker-
dealer assumed by a third party will be considered a liability for net
capital purposes unless the broker-dealer can demonstrate that the
third party has adequate resources independent of the broker-dealer to
pay the liability or expense).\346\ In particular, the letter contains
additional staff guidance not incorporated into the rule that will be
relevant as staff guidance with respect to complying with the amendment
to Rule 15c3-1 being adopted today. For example, the letter contains
staff guidance with respect to the records a broker-dealer would be
expected to make, keep current, and preserve under Rules 17a-3 and 17a-
4 with respect to broker-dealer liabilities and expenses assumed by a
third party, as well as requirements regarding written expense sharing
agreements.\347\ Broker-dealers can continue to rely on the guidance in
the Third Party Expense Letter with respect to these matters in
complying with today's amendment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\345\ See SIFMA 2 Letter.
\346\ See Third Party Expense Letter, at 2-3.
\347\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Requirement To Subtract From Net Worth Certain Non-Permanent Capital
Contributions
In the proposing release, the Commission noted its concern that
broker-dealers may be receiving capital contributions from investors
that are subsequently withdrawn after a short period of time (often
less than a year).\348\ In some cases, the capital may be contributed
under an agreement giving the investor the option to withdraw it at the
investor's discretion. In the past, the Commission has emphasized that
capital contributions to broker-dealers should not be temporary,\349\
and the Commission staff has explained that a capital contribution
should be treated as a liability if it is made with the understanding
that the contribution can be withdrawn at the option of the
investor.\350\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\348\ See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at
12873.
\349\ See Net Capital Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 28927 (Feb.
28, 1991), 56 FR 9124 (Mar. 5, 1991). See also Study of Unsafe and
Unsound Practices of Broker-Dealers, Report and Recommendations of
the Securities and Exchange Commission, H.R. Doc. No. 92-231 (1971),
at 17, 42 (recommending improvement of adequacy and permanency of
capital) (``During the 1967-1970 period under review, many broker-
dealers, some of them large retail houses, were found to have
inadequate and impermanent capital in relation to their
business.'').
\350\ Letter from Michael A. Macchiaroli, Associate Director,
Division of Market Regulation, Commission, to Raymond J. Hennessy,
Vice President, NYSE, and Susan DeMando, Vice President, NASD
Regulation, Inc. (Feb. 23, 2000) (``Temporary Capital Letter'')
(``It is the view of the Division that, for net capital purposes, if
an individual investor contributes capital to a broker-dealer with
an understanding that the contribution can be withdrawn at the
option of the individual investor, the contribution may not be
included in the firm's net capital computation and must be re-
characterized as a liability. Any withdrawal of capital as to that
investor within a period of one year, other than a withdrawal
described in paragraph (e)(4)(iii) of Rule 15c3-1, shall be presumed
to have been contemplated at the time of the contribution.'')
(footnote omitted); see also Net Capital Rule, Exchange Act Release
No. 28927 (Feb. 28, 1991), 56 FR 9124 (Mar. 5, 1991).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Consistent with these Commission and staff positions that capital
is not temporary,\351\ and given the importance of this issue and the
Commission's concern that broker-dealers may not be properly treating
short-term capital contributions as liabilities, the Commission
proposed amending Rule 15c3-1 to add paragraph (c)(2)(i)(G) to further
incorporate these positions into the rule.\352\ The proposed change
would require a broker-dealer to treat as a liability any capital that
is contributed under an agreement giving the investor the option to
withdraw it or that is contributed with the intent to withdraw the
capital within one year. The Commission further proposed that capital
withdrawn within one year would be presumptively subject to treatment
as a liability (i.e., it would be presumed to have been contributed
with the intent to withdraw within one year).\353\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\351\ See Net Capital Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 28927 (Feb.
28, 1991), 56 FR 9124 (Mar. 5, 1991).
\352\ See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 74 FR at
12871-12872.
\353\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Commission is adopting the final rule amendment with certain
modifications. As adopted, the rule requires that a broker-dealer treat
as a liability any capital that is contributed under an agreement
giving the investor the option to withdraw it. The rule, as adopted,
also requires that a broker-dealer treat as a liability any capital
contribution that is intended to be withdrawn within one year of its
contribution. In addition, the final rule provides that capital
withdrawn within one year of contribution is deemed to have been
intended to be withdrawn within one year unless the broker-dealer
receives permission in writing for the withdrawal from its DEA.\354\
The ability of a broker-dealer to seek permission in writing from its
DEA to withdraw capital contributed within one year will provide a
means for firms to seek to withdraw capital in limited circumstances
after review by its DEA without having to reclassify the withdrawn
capital as a liability for net capital purposes.\355\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\354\ These requirements will not apply to withdrawals covered
by paragraph (e)(4)(iii) of Rule 15c3-1, namely, withdrawals used to
make tax payments or to pay reasonable compensation to partners. See
17 CFR 240.15c3-1(e)(4)(iii). These types of payments are ordinary
business expenditures and do not raise the types of concerns the
proposed rule is designed to address. One commenter suggested that
the rule be amended to explicitly exclude any withdrawals that would
fall under paragraph (e)(4)(iii) of Rule 15c3-1.
\355\ See FINRA Rule 4110(c)(1) (providing, in part, that no
equity capital of a member may be withdrawn for a period of one year
from the date such equity capital is contributed, unless otherwise
permitted by FINRA in writing).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In the final rule, the Commission has modified the proposed
language by moving the qualifier that the DEA can approve a withdrawal
so that it modifies this presumption. Specifically, as proposed, the
rule provided that a contribution of capital had to be subtracted from
net worth if it ``is

[[Page 51852]]

intended to be withdrawn within a period of one year unless the
withdrawal has been approved in writing by the Examining Authority for
the broker or dealer.'' As adopted, the rule provides that ``[a]ny
withdrawal of capital made within one year of its contribution is
deemed to have been intended to be withdrawn within a period of one
year, unless the withdrawal has been approved in writing by the
Examining Authority for the broker or dealer.'' \356\ The change is
intended to eliminate a potential ambiguity in the proposal as to
whether a withdrawal of capital within one year could ever be approved
by the firm's DEA and, therefore, afford the intended relief from the
deduction.\357\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\356\ See paragraph (c)(2)(i)(G)(2) of Rule 15c3-1, as adopted.
\357\ The phrase ``to the broker or dealer'' following ``one
year of its contribution'' is not included in the final rule because
it would be redundant, as the contributions covered in the amendment
all involve contributions to the broker-dealer.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Commission received five comments regarding the amendment to
paragraph (c)(2)(i)(G)(2) of Rule 15c3-1.\358\ In addition to the
general request for comment included in the proposing release, the
Commission also requested specific comment on whether the time period
within which withdrawn and intended-to-be-withdrawn contributions must
be treated as liabilities should be longer than one year.\359\ While
the commenters agreed in principle that contributions of capital to
broker-dealers should not be subject to withdrawal at will, they
expressed concerns regarding the negative effect that overly
restrictive limitations on withdrawals of capital could have on
obtaining capital contributions and, therefore, on the financial health
of broker-dealers. One commenter, a registered broker-dealer, stated
that it believed that the amendment would raise its cost of capital to
the point where it would be impossible to obtain capital from unrelated
third parties at all.\360\ Two commenters also expressed concerns about
the potential burden posed by the amendment to broker-dealers in need
of capital.\361\ One suggested the addition of exceptions to the rule
for de minimis withdrawals and dividends or distributions.\362\ Another
commenter suggested that the proposal should be amended to exclude a
redemption right--a form of option--provided to the investor in
connection with the investor's capital contribution to the broker-
dealer, where (i) the redemption right may only be exercised by the
investor commencing more than one year following the date of the
capital contribution to the broker-dealer and (ii) the redemption right
would not be mandatorily redeemable.\363\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\358\ See Chicago Capital Management Letter; SIFMA 2 Letter;
American Bar Association Letter; SIG Letter; NIBA 2 Letter.
\359\ See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at
12871-12872.
\360\ See Chicago Capital Management Letter.
\361\ See American Bar Association Letter; SIFMA 2 Letter.
\362\ See SIFMA 2 Letter.
\363\ See American Bar Association Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Another commenter opposed the rule, stating that it contravenes
pertinent legal and accounting standards and is unnecessary in view of
existing capital withdrawal limitations and notification
requirements.\364\ This commenter stated that neither GAAP nor Rule
15c3-1 contain a requirement that capital must be permanent, and the
word ``capital'' has no intrinsic meaning that requires it to be
permanent.\365\ This commenter stated that if any further limitations
on capital withdrawals are adopted beyond the current provisions of the
net capital rule, they should be designed to allow for the ability of
broker-dealer holding companies to withdraw excess net capital at their
option for legitimate purposes.\366\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\364\ See SIG Letter.
\365\ Id.
\366\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The fifth commenter agreed that there should be no circumstance in
which a broker-dealer accepted a capital contribution for net capital
purposes that could be withdrawn at the option of the investor.\367\
This commenter, however, also stated that the standard for withdrawals
should be shortened from one year to nine or six months to increase the
availability of funds from investors and owners, allowing more broker-
dealers to raise capital and strengthen their financial stability.\368\
The commenter requested that the Commission consider the needs of small
firms that it said likely will require additional net capital over the
next decade.\369\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\367\ See NIBA 2 Letter.
\368\ Id.
\369\ Id. The commenter also stated that rules that ``restrict
small broker-dealers from raising capital as a result of uncertainty
of investors or owner-operators related to the return of their
capital in a reasonable time frame will create a disproportionate
and impossible hurdle for small broker-dealers to overcome.'' Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In response to the commenters' concerns about firms' ability to
obtain capital and that the amendment contravenes pertinent legal and
accounting standards, the amended rule merely clarifies what
constitutes a broker-dealer's permanent capital under Rule 15c3-1 and
further emphasizes the requirement that capital contributions cannot be
temporary.\370\ Rule 15c3-1 imposes a capital standard that is distinct
from the use of the term ``capital'' in other legal and accounting
contexts, and the rule amendments under paragraph (c)(2)(i)(G) of Rule
15c3-1 are consistent with the Commission's and staff's views that
capital under Rule 15c3-1 should not be temporary.\371\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\370\ See Net Capital Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 28927 (Feb.
28, 1991) (``The Commission wishes to emphasize that the net capital
maintained in a broker-dealer should be permanent capital and not
merely a temporary infusion of funds from an affiliate or other
sources. For example, there are instances where a broker-dealer
receives funds from an affiliate in an amount that would enable the
broker-dealer to engage in a transaction that it would otherwise be
prohibited from doing because of minimum net capital requirements.
If the funds are transferred back to the affiliate within a
relatively short period of time after the transaction, the
Commission questions whether the funds transferred into the broker-
dealer entity could properly be characterized as capital of the
firm. Instead, the transaction could be viewed as a loan by the
affiliate to the broker-dealer, with the result that the broker-
dealer would have to treat the transaction as a liability.''). See
also Net Capital Requirements for Brokers and Dealers, Exchange Act
Release No. 18417 (Jan. 13, 1982), 47 FR 3512 (Jan. 25, 1982)
(describing subordination agreement requirements under Appendix D to
Rule 15c3-1, including that, among other things, no prepayment may
be made (except under the strictly defined limitations of paragraph
(c)(5) of Appendix D) before the expiration of one year from the
effective date of the subordination agreement, and noting this
provision was designed to insure the adequacy as well as the
permanence of capital in the industry.); Temporary Capital Letter;
Study of Unsafe and Unsound Practices of Broker-Dealers, Report and
Recommendations of the Securities and Exchange Commission, H.R. Doc.
No. 92-231 (1971) (recommending improvement of adequacy and
permanency of capital); and Letter from Nelson Kibler, Assistant
Director, Division of Market Regulation to John Pinto, National
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (Sept. 8, 1980).
\371\ See Study of Unsafe and Unsound Practices of Broker-
Dealers, Report and Recommendations of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, H.R. Doc. No. 92-231 (1971), at p. 15 (``The unfortunate
use of the term ``net capital'' in the financial responsibility
rules of the Commission and the various exchanges resulted in a
semantic confusion which too frequently has led to the mistaken
belief that a broker-dealer's net capital is the equivalent of or
has some relationship to the concept of ``capital'', as that term is
commonly understood. ``Net Capital'' applies only to a hard core
residue of net liquid assets designed to enable a broker-dealer to
meet all rightful current demands of customers for their funds and
securities.''). See also Capital, Margin, and Segregation
Requirements for Security-Based Swap Dealers and Major Security-
Based Swap Participants and Capital Requirements for Broker-Dealers,
77 FR at 70230 (``The net liquid assets test is imposed through the
mechanics of how a broker-dealer is required to compute net capital
pursuant to Rule 15c3-1. These requirements are set forth in
paragraph (c)(2) of Rule 15c3-1, which defines the term net capital.
The first step is to compute the broker-dealer's net worth under
GAAP. Next, the broker-dealer must make certain adjustments to its
net worth to calculate net capital. These adjustments are designed
to leave the firm in a position where each dollar of unsubordinated
liabilities is matched by more than a dollar of highly liquid
assets. There are thirteen categories of net worth adjustments
required by the rule.'') (footnotes omitted).

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 51853]]

The Commission also considered the commenter's suggestion that
there be exceptions for de minimis withdrawals, dividends, or
distributions. As previously stated, however, the Commission has
emphasized that capital contributions should not be temporary.\372\
Moreover, paragraph (e) of Rule 15c3-1 already contains mechanisms to
permit a broker-dealer to make capital withdrawals for specified
purposes.\373\ Finally, if a broker-dealer believes it has a basis to
appropriately withdraw capital within one year of contribution because,
for example, the withdrawal would be de minimis, the final rule
provides a mechanism for the broker-dealer to seek permission in
writing from its DEA to make such a withdrawal.\374\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\372\ See Study of Unsafe and Unsound Practices of Broker-
Dealers, Report and Recommendations of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, H.R. Doc. No. 92-231 (1971), at p. 15; Capital, Margin,
and Segregation Requirements for Security-Based Swap Dealers and
Major Security-Based Swap Participants and Capital Requirements for
Broker-Dealers, 77 FR at 70230.
\373\ See 17 CFR 240.15c3-1(e)(1)(iii)(B) and (e)(4)(iii). See
also Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12872,
n.79 (``These requirements would not apply to withdrawals covered by
paragraph (e)(4)(iii) of Rule 15c3-1, namely, withdrawals used to
make tax payments or pay reasonable compensation to partners. These
types of payments are ordinary business expenditures and do not
raise the types of concerns the proposed rule is designed to
address.'').
\374\ See paragraph (c)(2)(i)(G)(2) of Rule 15c3-1, as adopted.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

With respect to a commenter's view that the standard for withdrawal
should be less than one year (e.g., six or nine months), the Commission
continues to believe that one year is an appropriate amount of time
that a broker-dealer must retain a contribution in order to classify it
as capital and not a liability. This is the standard that the
Commission staff and FINRA have applied for a number of years and there
is no compelling reason to change it.\375\ Because the final rule
change is an incorporation of, among other things, existing Commission
staff guidance into Rule 15c3-1, the requirement should not
significantly alter current practice.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\375\ See Temporary Capital Letter; FINRA Rule 4110(c)(1) (``No
equity capital of a member may be withdrawn for a period of one year
from the date such equity capital is contributed, unless otherwise
permitted by FINRA in writing.''). See also Exchange Act Release No.
60933 (Nov. 4, 2009), 74 FR 58334 (Nov. 12, 2009) (SR-FINRA-2008-
067); Net Capital Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 28927 (Feb. 28,
1991) (emphasizing ``that the net capital maintained in a broker-
dealer should be permanent capital and not merely a temporary
infusion of funds from an affiliate or other sources'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Moreover, with respect to commenters' concerns about the ability to
obtain capital, the rule does not prohibit an investor from withdrawing
capital at any time. It prohibits a broker-dealer from treating
temporary cash infusions as capital for purposes of Rule 15c3-1.
Finally, as stated above, the final rule provides a mechanism for a
broker-dealer to apply to its DEA to make a withdrawal without
triggering the deduction.\376\ This provides a process for firms to
affect withdrawals within one year where appropriate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\376\ The final rule does not distinguish between complete and
partial withdrawals of capital and, consequently, the deduction
could be triggered in either event. Moreover, a partial withdrawal
would require a deduction of the full amount of the original
contribution as it would indicate that the contribution was merely
temporary in nature.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In summary, the Commission is adding paragraph (c)(2)(i)(G) to Rule
15c3-1 to require a broker-dealer to subtract from net worth any
contribution of capital to the broker or dealer: ``(1) [u]nder an
agreement that provides the investor with the option to withdraw the
capital; or (2) [t]hat is intended to be withdrawn within a period of
one year of contribution.'' \377\ The final rule further provides that
``[a]ny withdrawal of capital made within one year of its contribution
is deemed to have been intended to be withdrawn within a period of one
year, unless the withdrawal has been approved in writing by the
Examining Authority for the broker or dealer.'' \378\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\377\ See paragraph (c)(2)(i)(G) of Rule 15c3-1, as adopted.
\378\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Requirement To Deduct the Amount by Which a Fidelity Bond Deductible
Exceeds SRO Limits
Under SRO rules, certain broker-dealers that do business with the
public or that are required to become members of SIPC must comply with
mandatory fidelity bonding requirements.\379\ SRO rules typically
permit a broker-dealer to have a deductible provision included in the
bond; however, such rules provide that the deductible may not exceed
certain amounts. With regard to firms that maintain deductible amounts
over the maximum amount specified, several SRO rules provide that the
broker-dealer must deduct this excess amount from its net worth when
calculating net capital under Rule 15c3-1.\380\ Other SROs require that
any deductible amount elected by a broker-dealer that is greater than
10% of the coverage purchased by the broker-dealer must be deducted
from the broker-dealer's net worth when calculating net capital under
Rule 15c3-1.\381\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\379\ See, e.g., FINRA Rule 4360, CBOE Rule 9.22, and NASDAQ OMX
PHLX Rule 705. SRO fidelity bonding requirements typically contain
agreements covering areas such as: a ``Fidelity'' insuring clause to
indemnify against loss of property through dishonest or fraudulent
acts of employees; an ``On Premises'' agreement insuring against
losses resulting from crimes such as burglary and theft and from
misplacement of property of the insured; an ``In Transit'' clause
indemnifying against losses occurring while property is in transit;
a ``Forgery and Alteration'' agreement insuring against loss due to
forgery or alteration of various kinds of negotiable instruments;
and a ``Securities Loss'' clause protecting against losses incurred
through forgery and alteration of securities. Id.
\380\ See, e.g., CBOE Rule 9.22.
\381\ See, e.g., FINRA Rule 4360.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Rule 15c3-1, however, does not specifically reference the SRO
deductible requirements as a charge to net worth. Therefore, a broker-
dealer would not be required to account for the deduction required by
an SRO rule in computing net capital under Rule 15c3-1 or in the net
capital computation reflected on the broker-dealer's FOCUS report. To
address this inconsistency, the Commission proposed to amend Rule 15c3-
1 to add paragraph (c)(2)(xiv) to require a broker-dealer to deduct,
with regard to fidelity bonding requirements, the amount required by
the rules of the broker-dealer's DEA, i.e., the amount in excess of the
deductible prescribed in the applicable DEA's fidelity bond rule.\382\
The Commission received one comment supporting the proposal and one
opposing it.\383\ The commenter opposing the amendment noted that
amending Rule 15c3-1 to conform to FINRA Rule 4360 would create an
increase in minimum net capital requirements for some broker-
dealers.\384\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\382\ See 17 CFR 240.15c3-1(c)(12) (defining examining authority
for purposes of Exchange Act Rule 15c3-1).
\383\ See SIFMA 2 Letter; NIBA 2 Letter.
\384\ See NIBA 2 Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

SRO rules prescribing fidelity bond deductibles, and capital
charges for deductibles in excess of a certain amount, are designed to
incentivize broker-dealers to carry fidelity bonds with a deductible
low enough to help ensure customer protection. Moreover, in response to
the comment that this amendment would increase minimum net capital
requirements, the Commission notes that broker-dealers that are members
of an SRO with such a fidelity bonding rule already must account for
the deduction in complying with the net capital requirements of the
SROs and nothing in the Commission's amendment to paragraph (c)(2)(xiv)
of Rule 15c3-1 would alter this status quo. Rather, the proposed rule
change would conform the capital calculation under paragraph
(c)(2)(xiv) of Rule 15c3-1 to that required by the broker-dealer's SRO.
For these reasons, the Commission is adopting paragraph (c)(2)(xiv)
to Rule 15c3-1 with technical revisions to the proposed rule text to
make the text of

[[Page 51854]]

the final rule, as adopted, a more generic cross reference to SRO
fidelity bond requirements. The technical changes are designed to
increase the flexibility of the final rule so that revisions to SRO
fidelity bond requirements pursuant to section 19(b) of the Exchange
Act \385\ will not require conforming amendments to paragraph
(c)(2)(xiv) of Rule 15c3-1.\386\ More specifically, the proposed rule
text, as set forth in the proposing release, would have required the
broker-dealer to deduct ``with respect to fidelity bond coverage, the
excess of any deductible amount over the maximum deductible amount
permitted by the Examining Authority for the broker or dealer.'' \387\
The final rule, as adopted, provides that the broker-dealer must deduct
``the amount specified by rule of the Examining Authority for the
broker or dealer with respect to a requirement to maintain fidelity
bond coverage.'' \388\ Thus, the final rule does not include the phrase
``maximum permissible deductible amounts.'' This phrase was borrowed
from SRO fidelity bond rules. Because the construction of the SRO rules
may change over time, the Commission is making the cross-reference to
the SRO rules more general.\389\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\385\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b).
\386\ See, e.g., FINRA Rule 4360.
\387\ See, e.g., Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules,
72 FR at 12872.
\388\ See paragraph (c)(2)(xiv) of Rule 15c3-1, as adopted.
\389\ See, e.g., FINRA Rule 4360. See also Exchange Act Release
No. 63961 (Feb. 24, 2011), 76 FR 11542 (Mar. 2, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

4. Broker-Dealer Solvency Requirement
The Commission is adopting an amendment to paragraph (a) of Rule
15c3-1 to require a broker-dealer to cease conducting a securities
business if certain insolvency events were to occur. Specifically, as
adopted, amended paragraph (a) of Rule 15c3-1 provides that a broker-
dealer must not be insolvent as that term is defined in new paragraph
(c)(16) of the rule.\390\ By making solvency a requirement of Rule
15c3-1, this amendment will require an insolvent \391\ broker-dealer to
cease conducting a securities business pursuant to section 15(c)(3) of
the Exchange Act, which generally prohibits a broker-dealer from
effecting any transaction in, or inducing or attempting to induce the
purchase or sale of, any security in contravention of the Commission's
financial responsibility rules (which include Rule 15c3-1).\392\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\390\ The final rule also has been modified by replacing the
word ``shall'' with the word ``must.''
\391\ The definition of insolvent is intended to be broad enough
to encompass any type of insolvency proceeding or condition of
insolvency; for example, the proposed definition incorporates
concepts of insolvency in the U.S. Bankruptcy Code and SIPA. See 11
U.S.C. 101; 15 U.S.C. 78eee(b)(1).
\392\ 15 U.S.C. 78o.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

As proposed, paragraph (c)(16) of Rule 15c3-1 would have defined
the term insolvent as, among other things, a broker-dealer's placement
in a voluntary or involuntary bankruptcy or similar proceeding; the
appointment of a trustee, receiver, or similar official; a general
assignment by the broker-dealer for the benefit of its creditors; an
admission of insolvency; or the inability to make computations
necessary to establish compliance with Rule 15c3-1.\393\ As discussed
more specifically below, the Commission modified paragraph (c)(16) of
Rule 15c3-1 in the final rule in response to concerns raised by
commenters.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\393\ See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at
12872-12873. A broker-dealer's inability to make computations
necessary to establish compliance with Rule 15c3-1 may also impact
the broker-dealer's ability to make the computations necessary to
establish compliance with Rule 15c3-3 and vice versa. See, e.g.,
Rule 15c3-1(a)(1)(ii) (incorporating computations under Rule 15c3-3
into the minimum net capital requirement).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In the proposing release, the Commission solicited comment on
whether there are other insolvency events that should be captured in
the proposed definition.\394\ One commenter noted that involuntary
insolvency proceedings do not necessarily indicate that the broker-
dealer is insolvent, as such proceedings can be frivolous, malicious,
or otherwise lacking in merit.\395\ The commenter also noted that
industry standard contract forms generally provide a grace period for a
party to such a proceeding to obtain a stay or dismissal before an
event of default is deemed to occur.\396\ In response to this comment,
the Commission notes that the number of broker-dealer bankruptcy
filings (voluntary or involuntary) is small, and therefore, the
institution of a frivolous involuntary proceeding involving a broker-
dealer likely is a very rare event. Thus, the Commission must consider
the potential need for an automatic grace period to address the
potential for a frivolous involuntary bankruptcy as well as the harm
that could result from allowing a broker-dealer to continue to effect
securities transactions for a period of time even though it is properly
the subject of a bankruptcy proceeding. The Commission believes the
more appropriate approach is to address potentially frivolous
proceedings on a case-by-case basis. In the event that a case arises
where there would be a need to fashion relief for a broker-dealer that
was the subject of a frivolous or meritless involuntary petition, the
Commission's existing authority permits it sufficient flexibility to
fashion exemptions under appropriate circumstances.\397\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\394\ See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at
12873.
\395\ See SIFMA 2 Letter.
\396\ Id.
\397\ See 15 U.S.C. 78mm(a). See also 17 CFR 240.15c3-1(b)(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In addition to the comment discussed above, the Commission received
four other comment letters that addressed these amendments.\398\ One
commenter objected to the amendments as unnecessary, citing the Rule
15c3-1 prohibition on broker-dealers effecting securities transactions
if their net capital is below certain minimums and noting that a
broker-dealer that was insolvent would ``by definition'' be below those
minimums.\399\ In response to this comment, the Commission notes that
the purpose of the amendment is to address cases where a broker-dealer
is subject to an insolvency event but takes the position that it is in
compliance with the net capital rule. While such instances may be rare,
an insolvent broker-dealer could seek the protection of the bankruptcy
laws but continue to effect transactions with the public, potentially
jeopardizing customers and other creditors of the broker-dealer,
including counterparties.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\398\ See SIPC Letter; St. Bernard Financial Services Letter;
American Bar Association Letter; Cornell Letter.
\399\ See St. Bernard Financial Services Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Another commenter requested that the Commission modify the
definition of insolvent to carve out market-wide disruptions that
prevent the computation of net capital but are unrelated to the
solvency of the broker-dealer.\400\ In response to this suggestion, the
Commission notes that if appropriate and necessary, such an event can
be addressed through the Commission's exemptive authority, rather than
by a specific exception in the rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\400\ See American Bar Association Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

One commenter, while supporting the amendment, objected to the
incorporation of the definition of insolvent from section 101 of the
Bankruptcy Code.\401\ This commenter argued a bankruptcy-based standard
for insolvency was appropriate for a notice requirement but that the
proper standard for determining whether a broker-dealer should be
prohibited from continuing to conduct a securities business is its
amount of net capital. As noted above, allowing an insolvent

[[Page 51855]]

broker-dealer to continue conducting a securities business during the
period of its insolvency, notwithstanding its net capital position,
could jeopardize customers and other market participants because a
broker-dealer that has made an admission of insolvency, or is otherwise
deemed insolvent or entitled to protection from creditors, does not
possess the financial resources necessary to operate a securities
business.\402\ Continuing to operate in such circumstances poses a
significant credit risk to counterparties and to the clearance and
settlement system, and, in the event the firm subsequently is placed in
a liquidation proceeding under SIPA, may impair the ability of the SIPA
trustee to make customers of the broker-dealer whole and satisfy claims
of other creditors out of the assets of the general estate.\403\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\401\ See SIFMA 2 Letter.
\402\ See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at
12872.
\403\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In addition, this commenter also was concerned that under the
proposed amendment a firm would be prevented from effecting hedging or
liquidating transactions intended to reduce the risk the firm poses to
the financial markets and its customers. The commenter noted that such
limitations also would be at odds with section 5(a)(2) of SIPA, which
contemplates that a broker-dealer that is in, or approaching, financial
difficulty may undertake to liquidate or reduce its business either
voluntarily or pursuant to the direction of an SRO.\404\ The final rule
amendment is not intended to affect in any a broker-dealer's ability to
act under section 5(a)(2) of SIPA.\405\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\404\ See SIFMA 2 Letter; SIPC Letter. See also 15 U.S.C.
78eee(a)(5).
\405\ See15 U.S.C. 78eee(a)(5). Further, the amendment is not
intended to affect in any way a SIPA trustee's ability to liquidate
a broker-dealer. Effectively, a SIPA trustee steps into the shoes of
the debtor broker-dealer in order to liquidate the broker-dealer and
protect its customers' interests.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In addition, the Commission is amending the final rule to
incorporate within the term insolvency the circumstance in which a
broker-dealer is unable to make such computations as may be necessary
to establish compliance with Rule 15c3-3.\406\ In the proposing
release, the Commission stated that the ``proposed definition of
`insolvent' is intended to be broad enough to encompass any type of
insolvency proceeding or condition of insolvency,'' \407\ and noted
that the proposed definition incorporates concepts of insolvency from
the U.S. Bankruptcy Code and SIPA.\408\ Consequently, consistent with
the discussion in the proposing release, the modification in the final
rule will more closely align the definition of insolvent under
paragraph (c)(16) of Rule 15c3-1 with the grounds for the commencement
of a proceeding under SIPA,\409\ which includes the circumstance that a
broker-dealer is unable to make computations necessary to establish
compliance with the financial responsibility or hypothecation
rules.\410\ Rule 3a40-1 defines the term financial responsibility rules
to include, among others, any rule adopted by the Commission pursuant
to section 15(c)(3) of the Exchange Act--Rules 15c3-1 and 15c3-3 were
adopted under section 15(c)(3). As a financial responsibility rule, the
inability of a broker-dealer to make a computation necessary to
establish compliance with Rule 15c3-3 constitutes a basis for
commencing a SIPA proceeding. Consequently, this modification to the
proposed definition of insolvency under paragraph (c)(16) of Rule 15c3-
1 will more closely align the definition with SIPA.\411\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\406\ The final rule adds the phrase ``or with Sec. 240.15c3-
3'' to follow the phrase ``[i]s unable to make such computations as
may be necessary to establish compliance with this section.'' See
paragraph (c)(16)(iv) of Rule 15c3-1. See also generally, SIPC
Letter (favoring an amendment requiring broker-dealers to cease
doing business if insolvent as defined under proposed Rule 15c3-
l(c)(16) and noting that the circumstances under which the broker
would be required to cease doing business are consistent with the
circumstances under which SIPC may seek to place a firm in
liquidation).
\407\ See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at
12872.
\408\ Id. at n.85.
\409\ See 15 U.S.C. 78eee(b).
\410\ See 15 U.S.C. 78eee(b)(l)(D). See also 17 CFR 240.3a40-1
(defining the term financial responsibility rules for purposes of
SIPA to include Rule 15c3-3).
\411\ The Commission also has made three technical modifications
to the text of the insolvency definition. In response to a comment,
the phrase ``broker-dealer'' was replaced with the phrase ``broker
or dealer'' to be consistent with the use of the phrase in Rule
15c3-1. In addition, the phrase ``for purposes of this section'' was
moved to the beginning of paragraph (c)(16) in order to clarify that
the term insolvency is defined for purposes of Rule 15c3-1 in its
entirety. Finally, the final rule does not include the phrase
``whether commenced voluntarily or involuntarily'' because the
phrase would be redundant.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Commission also is adopting an amendment to the first sentence
of paragraph (b)(1) of Rule 17a-11 to require that a broker-dealer
meeting the definition of insolvent must provide immediate notice to
the Commission, the firm's DEA and, if applicable, the CFTC. One
commenter specifically favored this amendment.\412\ This notice will
assist regulators in taking steps to protect the insolvent firm's
customers, including, if appropriate, notifying SIPC of the need to
commence a SIPA proceeding. The Commission is adopting the amendment to
paragraph (b)(1) of Rule 17a-11, with one technical modification.\413\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\412\ See SIPC Letter.
\413\ The Commission is deleting the phrase ``paragraph (c)(16)
of'' and inserting ``(c)(16)'' immediately following the second
``15c3-1''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

5. Amendment To Rule Governing Orders Restricting Withdrawal of Capital
From a Broker-Dealer
Paragraph (e) of Rule 15c3-1, which places certain conditions on a
broker-dealer when withdrawing capital,\414\ also allows the Commission
to issue an order temporarily restricting a broker-dealer from
withdrawing capital or making loans or advances to stockholders,
insiders, and affiliates under certain circumstances.\415\ The rule,
however, limits such orders to withdrawals, advances, or loans that,
when aggregated with all other withdrawals, advances, or loans on a net
basis during a 30 calendar day period, exceed 30 percent of the firm's
excess net capital.\416\ When the Commission adopted this paragraph of
Rule 15c3-1 more than 20 years ago, the Commission stated that it
intended this section to be applied only where the continued viability
of a broker-dealer appeared to be at stake.\417\ In the ensuing years,
the Commission has utilized this provision only one time.\418\ The
Commission has determined that the requirement is difficult to enforce,
as it generally would not be clear when the 30% threshold had been
reached, due to the inherent unreliability of a troubled broker-
dealer's books and records. Consequently, the Commission proposed, and
is adopting, a change to delete this provision and instead to allow the
Commission to restrict all withdrawals, advances, and loans so long as
the other conditions under the rule (all of which remain unchanged) are
met.\419\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\414\ See 17 CFR 240.15c3-1(e).
\415\ See 17 CFR 240.15c3-1(e)(3).
\416\ Id.
\417\ Net Capital Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 28927 (Feb. 28,
1991), 56 FR 9124, 9128 (Mar. 5, 1991).
\418\ Order Regarding Withdrawals, Unsecured Loans or Advances
from Refco Securities, LLC and Refco Clearing, LLC, Exchange Act
Release No. 52606 (Oct. 13, 2005).
\419\ The Commission also proposed revising the second sentence
in paragraph (e)(3)(ii) to remove the text ``The hearing'' and in
its place adding the text ``A hearing on an order temporarily
prohibiting the withdrawal of capital.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Commission received three comment letters addressing this
proposal.\420\ One commenter supported the deletion of the 30%
threshold, but believed its removal reflected the

[[Page 51856]]

Commission's desire to regulate large firms with complex capitalization
without considering the needs of smaller firms.\421\ This commenter
recommended the Commission set forth all conditions required for a firm
to withdraw, repay, or redeem any amount that affects its overall
capitalization.\422\ Specifically, the commenter suggested the
following non-exclusive list of conditions for consideration: (1)
``[r]egulatory minimum capital requirement related to all lines of
business''; (2) ``[e]xcess mandated by that firms' accruals for that
period''; (3) ``[e]xcess mandated by the firms' upcoming one-time non-
recurring costs within that quarter''; (4) ``[e]xcess mandated by
operating costs expected[,] but not related to accruals for that
period''; (5) [c]osts related to increased personnel coverage or
recruitment within that quarter''; and (6) ``[d]etermination of the
Board of the firm that there is no reasonable expectation at the time
of its approval of the capital withdrawal, repayment or redemption,
that the firm would be required to, or advisable to, increase its net
capital excess.''
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\420\ See NIBA 2 Letter; SIFMA 2 Letter; Raymond James 2 Letter.
\421\ See NIBA 2 Letter. As noted above, the 30% threshold
provision only applied in emergency situations and has only been
used once before. As such, its deletion should only affect a limited
number of broker-dealers.
\422\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The second commenter recommended several modifications to the
amendment, including: (1) Clarifying that in addition to ordering
complete restrictions on withdrawals, advances, and loans, the
Commission may also issue orders imposing partial or conditional
restrictions; (2) explicitly permitting certain types of withdrawals,
advances, or loans, such as those in paragraphs (e)(4)(ii) and (iii) of
Rule 15c3-1 (e.g., required tax payments or payments to partners for
reasonable compensation) even after the issuance of a temporary
restrictive order; and (3) clarifying that the provision in paragraph
(e)(3)(ii) of the rule allowing a broker-dealer to request and receive
a hearing on an order temporarily restricting withdrawals also applies
to orders temporarily restricting advances and loans (in addition to
withdrawals).\423\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\423\ See SIFMA 2 Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Finally, the third commenter noted that the proposed amendment
would eliminate the 30% requirement limit and allow the Commission to
restrict all withdrawals, advances, and loans under specific
circumstances.\424\ The commenter believes this action will impose an
additional compliance burden on broker-dealers and will significantly
limit the flexibility of broker-dealers in the event of a liquidity
crisis.\425\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\424\ See Raymond James 2 Letter.
\425\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In response to these comments, the Commission notes that the 30%
threshold pertains only to paragraph (e)(3)(i) of Rule 15c3-1, which
relates to the Commission's authority to temporarily restrict
withdrawals of net capital. The Commission cannot impose these
restrictions without concluding under subparagraph (e)(3)(i) that
``such withdrawal, advance or loan may be detrimental to the financial
integrity of the broker or dealer, or may unduly jeopardize the broker
or dealer's ability to repay its customer claims or other liabilities
which may cause a significant impact on the markets or expose the
customers or creditors of the broker or dealer to loss without taking
into account the application of the Securities Investor Protection Act
of 1970.'' \426\ While paragraph (e)(3)(i) of Rule 15c3-1 would apply
to all broker-dealers, the conditions under which the Commission may
exercise its authority under the rule apply only to circumstances where
the continued viability of the broker-dealer appears to be at
stake.\427\ As noted above, the Commission has only utilized this
provision once.\428\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\426\ See paragraph (e)(3)(i) of Rule 15c3-1, as adopted.
\427\ Net Capital Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 28927 (Feb. 28,
1991), 56 FR 9124, 9128 (Mar. 5, 1991).
\428\ Order Regarding Withdrawals, Unsecured Loans or Advances
from Refco Securities, LLC and Refco Clearing, LLC, Exchange Act
Release No. 52606 (Oct. 13, 2005).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Commission, however, agrees with the importance of maintaining
flexibility in the context of ordering restrictions on withdrawals,
advances, and loans. Therefore, the Commission is modifying the
amendment, as adopted, to add language to paragraph (e)(3)(i) to state
(following the phrase ``employee or affiliate'') that such orders will
be issued, ``under such terms and conditions as the Commission deems
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or consistent with the
protection of investors. . . .'' \429\ With respect to the suggestion
that the Commission explicitly permit certain types of withdrawals,
advances, or loans even after the issuance of a temporary order, the
Commission does not believe that it would be appropriate to permit--by
codifying in the rule--a broker-dealer to take the actions described if
the Commission has issued an order placing temporary restrictions on a
broker-dealer's ability to withdraw net capital under paragraph (e)(3)
of the rule. The order would be intended to protect the customers and
creditors of the broker-dealer, and permitting the actions by rule
could undermine those protections. Moreover, there is no need to
explicitly permit certain types of withdrawals, advances or loans
because if there were circumstances that merited the broker-dealer
making such payments, the Commission order could be fashioned as
appropriate to permit those payments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\429\ See paragraph (e)(3)(i) of Rule 15c3-1, as adopted. See
also 17 CFR 15c3-1(e). See generally, 15 U.S.C. 78mm(a)(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

With respect to the suggestion that the Commission clarify in
paragraph (e)(3)(ii) of Rule 15c3-1 that a broker-dealer may request
and receive a hearing on orders temporarily restricting advances and
loans (in addition to withdrawals), under the existing rule, a broker-
dealer may request a hearing if the Commission has issued an order
temporarily restricting advances and loans by a broker-dealer, in
addition to withdrawals, and the Commission is therefore adopting the
amendment to paragraph (e)(3)(ii), as proposed.\430\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\430\ 17 CFR 240.15c3-1(e)(3)(ii). The Commission also is
adopting revisions to the second sentence of paragraph (e)(3)(ii),
replacing the phrase ``The hearing'' with the phrase ``A hearing on
an order temporarily prohibiting the withdrawal of capital.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

6. Adjusted Net Capital Requirements
i. Amendment to Appendix A of Rule 15c3-1
The Commission is adopting an amendment to Appendix A of Rule 15c3-
1, which permits broker-dealers to employ theoretical option pricing
models to calculate haircuts for listed options and related positions
that hedge those options.\431\ The amendment makes permanent a
temporary amendment the Commission originally adopted in 1997.\432\ The
temporary amendment expired on September 1, 1997, unless it was
otherwise extended by the Commission.\433\ The Commission staff
subsequently issued a no-action letter on January 13, 2000, which
stated that the staff would not recommend enforcement action if broker-
dealers continued to rely on the temporary amendment.\434\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\431\ 17 CFR 240.15c3-1a.
\432\ See Net Capital Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 38248 (Feb.
6, 1997), 62 FR 6474 (Feb. 12, 1997).
\433\ See 17 CFR 15c3-1a(b)(1)(iv)(B).
\434\ Letter from Michael Macchiaroli, Associate Director,
Division of Market Regulation, Commission, to Richard Lewandowski,
Vice President, Regulatory Division, The Chicago Board Options
Exchange, Inc. (Jan. 13, 2000) (stating that the Division of Market
Regulation ``will not recommend . . . enforcement action if non-
clearing option specialists and market-makers continue to rely on
subparagraph (b)(1)(iv) of Appendix A to Rule 15c3-1 under the
Exchange Act until such time as the Commission has determined
whether it should be extended''). The letter did not grant any other
relief.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 51857]]

The temporary amendment decreased the range of pricing inputs to
the approved option pricing models, which effectively reduced the
haircuts applied by the carrying firm with respect to non-clearing
option specialist and market maker accounts.\435\ The temporary
amendment, which applied only to these types of accounts, was limited
to major market foreign currencies and diversified indexes. Even during
periods of substantial volatility, there have been no significant
increases in the number of deficits in non-clearing option specialist
and market-maker accounts, nor did the lower capital charges under
paragraph (b)(1)(iv) result in excessive leverage. Consequently, this
amendment appropriately aligns the net capital requirements of affected
firms with the risks Rule 15c3-1 seeks to mitigate. The Commission
received one comment letter regarding this aspect of the proposing
release. The commenter concurred with the Commission's conclusions as
to the effect of the temporary amendment and supported the proposal to
make it permanent.\436\ Accordingly, the Commission is amending
paragraph (b)(1)(iv) of Appendix A to Rule 15c3-1, as proposed, to make
the temporary amendment permanent.\437\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\435\ See Net Capital Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 38248 (Feb.
6, 1997), 62 FR 6474 (Feb. 12, 1997). Under Appendix A to Rule 15c3-
1, a broker-dealer calculating net capital charges for its options
portfolios shocks the products in each portfolio (grouped by
underlying instrument) at ten equidistant points along a potential
market move range. The market move ranges for major market foreign
currencies, high-capitalization diversified indexes, and non-high-
capitalization diversified indexes are, respectively: +(-) 6%, +(-)
10% and +(-) 15%. The temporary rule lowered these market move
ranges to respectively: +(-) 4[frac12]%, + 6% (-) 8% and +(-) 10% in
terms of calculating haircuts for positions of non-clearing options
specialists and market makers. Id.
\436\ See SIFMA 2 Letter.
\437\ As a result, the Commission also is redesignating
paragraphs (b)(1)(iv)(A), (b)(1)(iv)(A)(1), (b)(1)(iv)(A)(2), and
(b)(1)(iv)(A)(3) as paragraphs (b)(1)(iv), (b)(1)(iv)(A),
(b)(1)(iv)(B), and (b)(1)(iv)(C), respectively.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

ii. Money Market Funds
a. Clarification
The Commission is adopting an amendment to paragraph
(c)(2)(vi)(D)(1) of Rule 15c3-1 to clarify that a money market fund,
for the purposes of paragraph (c)(2)(vi)(D)(1), is a fund described in
Rule 2a-7 under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (``Rule 2a-
7'').\438\ The Commission did not receive any comments on this proposal
and is adopting it, as proposed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\438\ See 17 CFR 270.2a-7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

b. Proposed Haircut Reduction From 2% to 1%
The Commission proposed an amendment to reduce the ``haircut'' that
broker-dealers apply under Rule 15c3-1 for money market funds.\439\ In
1982, the Commission adopted a 2% haircut requirement for redeemable
securities of money market funds.\440\ In 1991, the Commission adopted
certain amendments to Rule 2a-7 that strengthened the risk-limiting
investment restrictions for money market funds.\441\ Based on the
enhancements to Rule 2a-7, the Commission proposed to amend paragraph
(c)(2)(vi)(D)(1) of Rule 15c3-1 to reduce the haircut on such funds
from 2% to 1% in order to better align the net capital charge with the
risk associated with holding shares of a money market fund.\442\ In
addition to the general request for comments in the proposing release,
the Commission also specifically requested comments regarding whether
the haircut for certain types of money market funds should be reduced
to 0% as suggested in a petition for rulemaking submitted to the
Commission.\443\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\439\ See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at
12874.
\440\ Net Capital Requirements for Brokers and Dealers, Exchange
Act Release No. 18737 (May 13, 1982), 47 FR 21759 (May 20, 1982).
See 17 CFR 240.15c3-1(c)(2)(vi)(D)(1).
\441\ Revisions to Rules Regulating Money Market Funds,
Investment Company Act Release No. 18005 (Feb. 20, 1991), 56 FR 8113
(Feb. 27, 1991).
\442\ See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at
12874.
\443\ See Public Petitions for Rulemaking No. 4-478 (Apr. 3,
2003) (available at https://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/petn4-478.htm), as amended (Apr. 4, 2005) (available at https://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/petn4-478a.pdf), and No. 4-577 (Feb. 3,
2009) (available at https://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2009/petn4-577.pdf).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Commission received a total of 14 responses from 12 different
commenters regarding this proposed amendment. All of the commenters
supported a reduction in the haircut for money market funds and urged
that the haircut be reduced below the proposed 1%, with the majority
proposing a haircut of 0% for ``top-rated'' money market funds (i.e.,
those with the highest ratings).\444\ Commenters cited the safety
record of money market funds, in particular AAA-rated money market
funds, in support of imposing lower haircuts.\445\ Several commenters
argued that top-rated money market funds were more liquid and posed
less credit and interest rate risk than other instruments and suggested
haircuts of 1/8 of 1% or even 0%.\446\ One commenter argued that since
broker-dealers (like investors) view money market funds as cash
equivalents, they would view a 1% haircut as a significant cost and
would therefore avoid using money market funds.\447\ Two commenters
suggested that if the Commission determined it necessary to impose a
haircut on some Rule 2a-7 money market funds, it should implement a
bifurcated scheme under which money market funds that qualify for
deposit into a broker-dealer's reserve account under Rule 15c3-3 would
be subject to a 0% haircut,\448\ with one arguing that such qualifying
money market funds should in any case receive a haircut no greater than
1/8 of 1%.\449\ Another commenter suggested that the proposed
amendments to reduce the haircut for money market funds should be
deferred until the results of the Commission's money market reforms are
known.\450\ Another commenter suggested a haircut of 5/8 of 1%, based
on a combination of the 1/8 of 1% haircut applied to highly rated
shorter-term (at least 30 but less than 91 days to maturity) commercial
paper and municipal securities and an additional charge of 1/2 of 1% to
account for any minimal risk associated with the nature or operation of
mutual funds.\451\ Finally, one commenter supported a 0% haircut for
applied to money market funds that: (1) Do not hold investments in
their affiliates or holding companies; and (2) are not affiliated with
the bank in which the broker-dealer holds its cash reserves and
operating funds.\452\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\444\ See Federated Letter; Federated 3 Letter; Curion Clearing
Letter; FAF Advisors Letter; Brown Brothers Harriman Letter; SIFMA 2
Letter; ICI Letter; Barclays Letter; National Chamber Foundation
Letter; Blackrock Letter; Deutsche Bank Securities Letter; UBS
Letter; SIFMA 4 Letter; NIBA 2 Letter.
\445\ See, e.g., Barclays Letter.
\446\ See, e.g., FAF Advisors Letter.
\447\ See Federated Letter.
\448\ See Blackrock Letter; ICI Letter.
\449\ See Blackrock Letter.
\450\ See SIFMA 4 Letter.
\451\ See SIFMA 2 Letter.
\452\ See NIBA 2 Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

As discussed above in section II.E.6.ii. of this release, the
Commission recently proposed substantial amendments to its money market
fund rules.\453\ In light of these proposed amendments,\454\ the
Commission is deferring consideration of a reduction of the haircut for
money market funds in Rule 15c3-1 at this time. Therefore, the haircut
that broker-dealers apply for money market funds will remain at 2%
under paragraph

[[Page 51858]]

(c)(2)(vi)(D)(1) of Rule 15c3-1. Deferring action will allow the
Commission to assess the potential impact of any money market fund
reforms it may adopt and whether any such impact would have
consequences for the net liquid asset standard of Rule 15c3-1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\453\ See Money Market Fund Reform; Amendments to Form PF,
Release No. IC-30551 (June 5, 2013), 78 FR 36834 (June 19, 2013).
\454\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

c. Aggregate Debit Items Charge
The Commission proposed amendments to Rule 15c3-1 that would have
eliminated a reduction to aggregate debit items that certain broker-
dealers must take when computing their reserve requirements under Rule
15c3-3.\455\ Under paragraph (a)(1)(ii)(A) of Rule 15c3-1, a broker-
dealer using the ``alternative standard'' \456\ to compute its minimum
net capital requirement must reduce aggregate debit items by 3% when
computing its customer reserve requirement under Rule 15c3-3.
Conversely, Note E(3) to the customer reserve formula (Rule 15c3-3a)
requires a broker-dealer using the ``basic method'' of computing net
capital under Rule 15c3-1 to reduce by 1% the total debits in Item 10
of the formula (i.e., debit balances in customer cash and margin
accounts).\457\ Both of these provisions serve to increase the amount
of funds a broker-dealer must deposit into its customer reserve
account; however, the deduction applicable to alternative standard
firms can result in an even larger reserve deposit requirement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\455\ See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at
12867.
\456\ Under the ``alternative standard,'' a broker-dealer's
minimum net capital requirement is equal to 2% of the firm's
aggregate debit items. 17 CFR 240.15c3-1(a)(1)(ii).
\457\ Under the ``basic method,'' a broker-dealer cannot permit
its aggregate indebtedness (generally total money liabilities) to
exceed 1500% of its net capital. 17 CFR 15c3-1(a)(1)(i).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Commission received four comment letters regarding these
amendments and all were supportive.\458\ However, recent market turmoil
has highlighted the importance of maintaining adequate amounts of funds
and qualified securities in the customer reserve account under Rule
15c3-3 to protect customers. Consequently, it would be imprudent to
lower the debit reduction requirement for broker-dealers using the
alternative standard at this time (especially given the fact that this
standard is primarily used by firms with a substantial customer
business). Therefore, the Commission has determined to defer
consideration of action on this amendment at this time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\458\ See Curian Clearing Letter; SIFMA 2 Letter; Deutsche Bank
Securities Letter; Citigroup Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

F. Technical Amendments

The Commission proposed a number of technical amendments to these
rules, including changes to the definitions of fully paid securities,
margin securities, and bank in Rule 15c3-3.\459\ These proposed
technical amendments were not designed to substantively change the
meanings of these defined terms but, rather, to amend out-of-date
citations and remove text that the Commission believed to be
superfluous or redundant.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\459\ 17 CFR 240.15c3-3(a)(3), (4), and (7), respectively.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Two commenters \460\ opposed the proposed technical amendments to
the Rule 15c3-3 definition of fully paid securities. As proposed, the
definition of fully paid securities would have included ``all
securities carried for the account of a customer unless such securities
are purchased in a transaction for which the customer has not made full
payment.'' \461\ The commenters contend that the amendments to the
definition of fully paid securities would significantly expand the
universe of fully paid securities because these securities generally
are carried in a cash account, and under the proposed definition any
security, in any account, including a margin account, could be
considered a fully paid security (and subject to possession and control
requirements) if it has been paid for in full. As such, the commenter
noted that the term fully paid securities, as proposed, would require
broker-dealers to determine whether securities in a margin account are
fully paid (in which case they could not be hypothecated even if they
are not excess margin securities). As a result, the commenter suggested
that this definition should be limited to include only securities in a
cash account that have been paid for in full. After careful
consideration, and in response to the comment, the Commission has
modified the text of paragraph (a)(3) to Rule 15c3-3 to more closely
follow the original definition, while still adopting the updated
references and terminology to reflect changes made to Regulation T
since 1972. As adopted, the term fully paid securities includes ``all
securities carried for the account of a customer in a cash account as
defined in Regulation T (12 CFR 220.1 et seq.), as well as securities
carried for the account of a customer in a margin account or any
special account under Regulation T that have no loan value for margin
purposes, and all margin equity securities in such account if they are
fully paid. . . .'' \462\ The definition also states that, ``the term
``fully paid securities'' does not apply to any securities purchased in
transactions for which the customer has not made full payment.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\460\ See SIFMA 2 Letter; Angel Letter.
\461\ See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at
12894.
\462\ See paragraph (a)(3) of Rule 15c3-3, as adopted.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Commission did not receive any comments on the proposed
amendments to the definition of margin securities under paragraph
(a)(4) of Rule 15c3-3. The Commission is adopting this definition as
proposed. In addition, the Commission did not receive any comments to
the proposed amendments to the definition of bank under paragraph
(a)(7) of Rule 15c3-3. The Commission, however, has modified the
language in this paragraph to make the paragraph gender neutral by
replacing the phrase ``who maintains his principal place of business''
with the phrase ``that maintains its principal place of business.''
The Commission also has amended other provisions of Rule 15c3-3 to
make the rule gender neutral. Finally, the Commission has replaced the
word ``shall'' throughout the rule, as amended, with clearer words,
such as ``will'' or ``must.'' This change will not change either the
nature or substance of the affected rule provisions.

III. Responses to Specific Requests for Comment

In the proposing release, the Commission requested comment on
certain specific matters, in addition to the proposed rule
amendments.\463\ These matters included: (1) A proposal to reduce the
Rule 17a-11 notice requirement for broker-dealers that carry over $10
billion in debits; (2) whether to harmonize the net capital deductions
required under paragraph (c)(2)(iv)(B) of Rule 15c3-1 for securities
lending and borrowing transactions with the deductions required under
paragraph (c)(2)(iv)(F) for securities repo transactions; and (3)
solicitation of comment on how third-party liens against customer fully
paid securities carried by a broker-dealer should be treated under the
financial responsibility rules, including Rule 15c3-3, Rule 17a-3 and
Rule 17a-4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\463\ Id. at 12874.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Commission received seven comment letters that addressed the
solicitation of comments for these matters.\464\ With respect to the
early warning level proposal, one commenter proposed modifying the
Commission's

[[Page 51859]]

early warning levels for very large ``alternative standard'' firms with
more than $10 billion in debits.\465\ The commenter recommended this
approach because of the increase in debit items at large broker-dealers
and the increased focus on effective risk management practices.\466\
Another comment supported the amendment, suggesting that the
notification could serve as an early warning if a firm is approaching
insolvency.\467\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\464\ See SIFMA 2 Letter; SIFMA 4 Letter; First Clearing Letter;
Citigroup Letter; American Bar Association Letter; Cornell Letter;
Raymond James 2 Letter.
\465\ See SIFMA 2 Letter.
\466\ Id.
\467\ See Cornell Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In addition, the Commission received three comments with respect to
harmonizing the net capital deductions required under paragraph
(c)(2)(iv)(B) of Rule 15c3-1 for securities lending and borrowing
transactions with the deductions required under paragraph (c)(2)(iv)(F)
for securities repo transactions.\468\ These commenters stated that the
Commission should consider the potential disruption to the marketplace
that may arise in connection with any effort to harmonize capital
charges.\469\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\468\ See SIFMA 2 Letter; Citigroup Letter; Raymond James 2
Letter.
\469\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Commission also received seven comments in response to the
solicitation of comment on how third-party liens against customer fully
paid securities carried by a broker-dealer should be treated under the
financial responsibility rules, including Rule 15c3-3, Rule 17a-3 and
Rule 17a-4.\470\ Two commenters stated that the Commission should not
require that a broker-dealer include third party liens as a credit in
the reserve formula and stated that this is an area in which it would
be productive to have a detailed discussion between Commission staff
and the industry before any amendments are proposed.\471\ Another
commenter stated that each of the suggested approaches in the proposing
release imposes burdens and requirements on broker-dealers that do not
serve to address the concerns noted by the Commission.\472\ Two
commenters stated that the most effective way to avoid confusion
regarding third party liens in a SIPC liquidation would be to segregate
securities subject to a lien to a separate pledge account in the name
of the pledgee.\473\ Finally, one commenter argued that requiring
broker-dealers to include the amount of liens as a credit item in the
reserve formula was not necessary to achieve customer protection and
would impose significant costs and burdens on the broker-dealers.\474\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\470\ See SIFMA 2 Letter; SIFMA 4 Letter; First Clearing Letter;
Citigroup Letter; American Bar Association Letter; NIBA 2 Letter;
Raymond James 2 Letter.
\471\ See SIFMA 2 Letter; SIFMA 4 Letter; Citigroup Letter.
\472\ See First Clearing Letter.
\473\ See American Bar Association Letter; NIBA 2 Letter.
\474\ See Raymond James 2 Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Commission will consider the comments received in developing
any proposals should the Commission decide to take further action in
any of these areas.

IV. Paperwork Reduction Act

Certain provisions of the amendments contain ``collection of
information'' requirements within the meaning of the Paperwork
Reduction Act of 1995 (``PRA'').\475\ The Commission published a notice
requesting comment on the collection of information requirements in the
proposing release \476\ and submitted the amendments to the Office of
Management and Budget (``OMB'') for review in accordance with the
PRA.\477\ An agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not
required to respond to, a collection of information unless it displays
a currently valid control number. The amended rules--Rule 15c3-1, Rule
15c3-3, Rule 17a-3, Rule 17a-4 and Rule 17a-11--contain currently
approved collections of information under, respectively, OMB control
numbers 3235-0200, 3235-0078, 3235-0033, 3235-0279 and 3235-0085.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\475\ 44 U.S.C. 3501, et seq.
\476\ See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at
12875.
\477\ 44 U.S.C. 3507(d); 5 CFR 1320.11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In response to comments received regarding the proposed amendments
in the proposing release, the Commission has modified the language in
the final rules being adopted, as discussed above. These comments and
their impact on PRA estimates are discussed below. In addition, the
initial burden estimates in the proposing release have been
adjusted,\478\ as discussed below, to reflect updated information used
to make the current estimates, including updated FOCUS Report
data.\479\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\478\ See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at
12875.
\479\ The PRA estimates derived from FOCUS Reports filed by
broker-dealers pursuant to Section 17 of the Exchange Act and Rule
17a-5 have been updated in this final release to reflect more
recently available information, including FOCUS Report data as of
December 31, 2011. The PRA estimates in the proposing release
derived from FOCUS reports were from 2004 year end data. See
Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12875.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Finally, one commenter specifically stated that the estimates the
Commission provided utilized only that number of broker-dealers in its
estimates that the Commission ``justifiably considers to be affected by
the proposals.'' \480\ The commenter, however, believes that most, if
not all, broker-dealers will spend over 90 hours each analyzing the
effects of the rules as implemented, will spend many more than 90 hours
each in implementing procedures and modifying their written supervisory
procedures to comply with the new rules, will spend in excess of 240
hours each in the monitoring of such rules, and will spend in excess of
$15,000 each for outside counsel and auditor opinions or work
product.\481\ This commenter did not provide additional detail about
the basis for its view that the Commission's estimates were too low.
The Commission agrees with the commenter that broker-dealers directly
affected by the rule amendments may be required to implement procedures
or modify their written supervisory procedures in order to comply with
the rule amendments. In cases where the rule amendments are requiring a
broker-dealer to implement or document certain policies and procedures,
these hour burdens are already included in the final hour estimates
discussed below.\482\ In addition, the Commission acknowledges that a
broker-dealer may need to review its operations to determine whether or
not it has any obligations under the rule amendments. Even if a broker-
dealer is not directly affected by the rule amendments, such a review
may result in an indirect effect on its operations. These indirect
effects or costs, however, are more appropriately addressed in the
Economic Analysis in section V. of this release because they relate to
the overall impact of the amendments, rather than to the specific
collections of information discussed below. Consequently, the
Commission addresses the commenter's concerns that directly relate to
the collections of information below, and the indirect burdens and
costs in the Economic Analysis in section V. of this release.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\480\ See NIBA 2 Letter.
\481\ Id.
\482\ See, e.g., paragraph (j)(1) of Rule 15c3-3 and paragraph
(a)(23) of Rule 17a-3, as adopted.
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A. Summary of the Collection of Information Requirements

The rule amendments contain recordkeeping and disclosure
requirements that are subject to the PRA. In summary, the amendments
may require a broker-dealer, under certain circumstances, to: (1)
Disclose the principals and obtain certain agreements from the
principals in a securities lending transaction where it performs
settlement services if it is to be

[[Page 51860]]

considered an agent (as opposed to a principal) for the purposes of the
net capital rule \483\; (2) obtain permission in writing from its DEA
to withdraw capital within one year of contribution \484\; (3) enter
into a subordination agreement with an account holder in order to
exclude such account holder from the definition of PAB account \485\;
(4) provide written notice to PAB account holders that their securities
may be used in the ordinary course of its securities business \486\;
(5) perform a PAB reserve computation \487\; (6) obtain written
notification from each bank with which it maintains a PAB reserve
account that the bank was informed that all cash and/or qualified
securities being held by the bank are being held for the exclusive
benefit of brokers and dealers \488\; (7) enter into a written contract
with a bank with which it maintains its PAB reserve accounts providing
that the cash and/or qualified securities shall at no time be used
directly or indirectly as security for a loan to the broker-dealer by
the bank, and shall be subject to no right, charge, security interest,
lien, or claim of any kind in favor of the bank or any person claiming
through the bank \489\; (8) develop adequate procedures to ensure a
customer for whom a free credit balance is carried is sent a written
statement regarding the customer's free credit balances, including
information regarding the amount due to the customer and that the funds
are payable on demand, prior to using funds arising from free credit
balances in the broker-dealer's operations \490\; (9) obtain the
written affirmative consent of a new customer before including the
customer's free credit balances in a Sweep Program, as well as provide
certain disclosures and notices to all customers with regard to the
broker-dealer's Sweep Program \491\; (10) make and maintain records
documenting its credit, market, and liquidity risk management controls
to assist the broker-dealer in analyzing the risks associated with its
business activities \492\; (11) provide notice to the Commission and
other regulatory authorities if the broker-dealer becomes insolvent
\493\; and (12) provide notice to the Commission and other regulatory
authorities if the broker-dealer's securities borrowed and loaned or
securities repurchase/reverse repurchase activity reaches a certain
threshold or, alternatively, report monthly its securities borrowed and
loan or securities repurchase/reverse repurchase activity to its DEA in
a form acceptable to its DEA.\494\
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\483\ See paragraph (c)(2)(iv)(B) of Rule 15c3-1, as adopted.
\484\ See paragraph (c)(2)(i)(G) to Rule 15c3-1, as adopted.
\485\ See paragraph (a)(16) to Rule 15c3-3, as adopted.
\486\ See paragraph (b)(5) to Rule 15c3-3, as adopted.
\487\ See paragraph (e)(1) and (e)(3) of Rule 15c3-3, as
adopted.
\488\ See paragraph (f) of Rule 15c3-3, as adopted.
\489\ Id.
\490\ See paragraph (j)(1) to Rule 15c3-3, as adopted.
\491\ See paragraph (j)(2) to Rule 15c3-3, as adopted.
\492\ See paragraph (a)(23) to Rule 17a-3 and paragraph (e)(9)
of Rule 17a-4, as adopted.
\493\ See paragraph (b)(1) of Rule 17a-11, as adopted.
\494\ See paragraph (c)(5) to Rule 17a-11, as adopted.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Use of Information

The Commission, its staff, and SROs will use the information
collected under the amendments to Rule 15c3-1 and Rule 15c3-3 to
determine whether the broker-dealer is in compliance with each rule and
to help fulfill their oversight responsibilities. The collections of
information would also help to ensure that broker-dealers are meeting
their obligations under the rule amendments and have any required
policies and procedures in place.
In particular, the record with respect to acting as agent in a
securities loan transaction will assist examiners in verifying that the
broker-dealer is properly accounting for securities loan deficits under
Rule 15c3-1. The records with respect to obtaining DEA approval prior
to withdrawing capital within one year of contribution under Rule 15c3-
1 will assist examiners in determining if a broker-dealer is computing
its net capital accurately with regard to the proper classification of
its capital contributions, and will help to ensure the DEA only
approves capital withdrawals which are appropriate in light of the
firm's current financial condition at the time of the requested
withdrawal. The amendments to Rule 15c3-1 also will facilitate the
monitoring of the financial condition of broker-dealers by the
Commission and its staff, as well as by SROs.
The records with respect to the PAB accounts will assist examiners
in verifying that: (1) A carrying broker-dealer has properly excluded
certain accounts from being treated as PAB accounts by entering into
subordination agreements with particular account holders; (2) a
carrying broker-dealer sent written notices to PAB accountholders to
use their PAB securities; (3) the broker-dealer performed the PAB
reserve computation; and (4) the bank holding the PAB reserve account
agreed to do so free of lien by entering into a written contract with
the broker-dealer.
The records with respect to customer's free credit balances will
assist examiners in verifying that: (1) A carrying broker-dealer has
obtained the written affirmative consent of a new customer before
including a customer's free credit balances in a Sweep Program; (2) a
carrying broker-dealer has provided the required disclosures and
notices to all customers with regard to the broker-dealer's Sweep
Program; and (3) the broker-dealer has maintained adequate procedures
with regard to the use of a customer's free credit balances prior to
using such customer's free credit balances in its operations. The
amendments to Rule 15c3-3 will facilitate the process by which the
Commission, its staff, and SROs monitor how broker-dealers are
fulfilling the customer protection requirements of the rule. The
written affirmative consent, disclosures and notices required to be
provided to customers also will alert customers to the alternatives
available to them with respect to their free credit balances.
The Commission, its staff, and SROs will use the information
collected under the amendments to Rules 17a-3 and 17a-4 to determine
whether the broker-dealer is adhering to its documented credit, market,
and liquidity risk management controls, as well as to evaluate the
effectiveness of these controls.
The Commission, its staff, and SROs will use the information
collected under the amendments to Rule 17a-11 to identify a broker-
dealer experiencing financial difficulty. This information will assist
the Commission and other regulators in promptly taking appropriate
steps to protect customers, creditors, and counterparties. In
particular, a notice of insolvency will assist regulators in responding
more quickly to protect customers of a failing institution. The notices
and reports with respect to securities lending and repos will assist
regulators in identifying broker-dealers that are active in these
transactions or suddenly take on large positions and thereby assist in
monitoring systemic risk.

C. Respondents

The final estimates of respondents below have been updated to
reflect more recent information.\495\ The amendment

[[Page 51861]]

to Rule 15c3-1 requiring a broker-dealer to make disclosures to, and
obtain certain agreements from, securities lending principals will
apply only to those firms that participate in the settlement of
securities lending transactions as agents. The Commission estimates
that approximately 122 broker-dealers will be affected by this
requirement.\496\ This estimate has been updated from the estimate of
170 broker-dealers in the proposing release.\497\ No comments were
received on this estimate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\495\ The final estimates of respondents derived from FOCUS
Reports filed by broker-dealers pursuant to Section 17 of the
Exchange Act and Rule 17a-5 have been updated in this final release
to reflect more recently available information, including FOCUS
Report data as of December 31, 2011. The estimates of respondents in
the proposing release derived from FOCUS reports were from 2004 year
end data. See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at
12876.
\496\ This estimate is derived from FOCUS Reports.
\497\ See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at
12876.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The amendment to Rule 15c3-1 with respect to a broker-dealer
obtaining permission in writing from its DEA prior to withdrawing
capital within one year of contribution under Rule 15c3-1 will apply to
any broker-dealer who wishes to withdraw such capital. Because most
broker-dealers already comply with existing interpretations regarding
the treatment of temporary capital contributions and similar SRO
requirements, or are familiar with such interpretations and
requirements, this part of the amendment to Rule 15c3-1 regarding
temporary capital contributions likely will impact only a small number
of the approximately 4,709 broker-dealers registered with the
Commission, as of December 31, 2011 (based on FOCUS Report data).\498\
Therefore, the Commission estimates that approximately 90 broker-
dealers will seek permission from their DEA in writing to withdraw
capital within one year of its contribution under the amendment.\499\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\498\ Temporary Capital Letter; see also Net Capital Rule,
Exchange Act Release No. 28927 (Feb. 28, 1991), 56 FR 9124 (Mar. 5,
1991); and FINRA Rule 4110(c).
\499\ The Commission received 900 broker-dealer capital
withdrawal notices under paragraph (e) of Rule 15c3-1 in 2012.
Because this amendment is consistent with prior Commission and staff
positions that capital is not temporary, as well as current SRO
requirements, it is likely that only a small number of these notices
are capital withdrawals made within one year of contribution, and
therefore, based on staff experience with the application of Rule
15c3-1, the Commission estimates that approximately 90 broker-
dealers (10% of 900) will seek permission from their DEA in writing
to withdraw capital under the amendment. See Net Capital Rule,
Exchange Act Release No. 28927 (Feb. 28, 1991); Temporary Capital
Letter; and FINRA Rule 4110.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The amendments to Rule 15c3-3 requiring a broker-dealer to perform
a PAB reserve computation and to obtain certain agreements and notices
related to its PAB accounts will affect only those firms that carry
such accounts. Based on FOCUS Report data, as of December 31, 2011, the
Commission estimates that approximately 61 broker-dealers will carry
such accounts.\500\ The amendment to Rule 15c3-3 requiring a broker-
dealer to obtain the affirmative consent of a new customer before
changing the terms under which the customer's free credit balances are
maintained will apply only to firms that carry free credit balances for
customers. Based on FOCUS Report data, as of December 31, 2011, the
Commission estimates that approximately 189 broker-dealers carry free
credit balances.\501\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\500\ This estimate has been updated from our estimate of 75
broker-dealers in the proposing release. See Amendments to Financial
Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12876. No comments were received on
this estimate.
\501\ In the proposing release, the Commission estimated
approximately 256 broker-dealers carried free credit balances. See
Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12876. No
comments were received on this estimate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Commission estimates that the amendment to Rule 15c3-3
permitting a broker-dealer to exclude certain accounts from being
treated as PAB accounts under Rule 15c3-3 by entering into
subordination agreements with certain account holders will apply to all
61 broker-dealers that will carry such accounts. The Commission
estimates that these 61 broker-dealers each will enter into an average
of 11 subordination agreements.\502\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\502\ See Order Granting Conditional Exemption Under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in Connection with Portfolio
Margining of Swaps and Security-Based Swaps, Exchange Act Release
No. 68433 (Dec. 14, 2012), 77 FR 75211, 75222 n.69 (Dec. 19, 2012).
(``FINRA CRD data indicate that the 17 largest broker-dealers (i.e.,
those with total assets of $50 billion or more) reported a total of
188 affiliates that are themselves registered with the SEC (i.e.,
they have their own CRD numbers), representing approximately 11
affiliates per broker-dealer.''). Carrying firms likely will enter
into subordination agreements with affiliates, including foreign
banks or foreign broker-dealers affiliated with the carrying broker-
dealer to exclude such accounts from the rule. See SIFMA 2 Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The amendments to Rules 17a-3 and 17a-4 requiring a broker-dealer
to make and maintain records documenting the credit, market and
liquidity risk management control for analyzing and managing risks will
apply only to firms that have more than $1,000,000 in aggregate credit
items, or $20,000,000 in capital. Thus, its impact will be limited to
larger broker-dealers. Accordingly, the number of respondents will
equal the number of broker-dealers meeting the thresholds set forth in
the amendment. The Commission estimates that approximately 490 broker-
dealers will meet at least one of these thresholds.\503\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\503\ This estimate has been updated from the proposing release
estimate of 517 broker-dealers. See Amendments to Financial
Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12876. No comments were received on
this estimate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

One amendment to Rule 17a-11 will require a broker-dealer to
provide the Commission with notice if it becomes subject to certain
insolvency events. The Commission estimates that approximately two
broker-dealers will become subject to one of these events in a given
year.\504\ Another amendment to Rule 17a-11 will require a broker-
dealer to provide notice to the Commission if its securities borrowed
or loaned, or its securities repurchase or reverse repurchase activity
reaches a certain threshold or, alternatively, provide monthly reports
to its DEA about such activities. This amendment will only affect a
limited number of firms per year. The Commission estimates that
approximately one broker-dealer \505\ will provide notice and six
broker-dealers \506\ will opt to send the monthly reports in a given
year.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\504\ This estimate is based on the 2012 SIPC Annual Report,
which indicates that over the last ten-year-period, the annual
average of new customer protection proceedings was two. A copy of
the 2012 Annual Report is available at https://www.sipc.org/. This
estimate has been updated from our proposing release estimate of 6,
which was based on the SIPC 2005 Annual Report. See Amendments to
Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12876. No comments were
received on this estimate.
\505\ This estimate is derived from information filed by broker-
dealers in their FOCUS Reports. This estimate has been updated from
the proposing release estimate of 11. See Amendments to Financial
Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12876. No comments were received on
this estimate. Based on FOCUS Report data, as of December 31, 2011,
there were seven broker-dealers whose securities borrowed or
securities loaned exceeded 80% of 25 times their tentative net
capital, and there were six broker-dealers whose securities borrowed
or securities loaned exceeded 25 times their tentative net capital.
Therefore, the Commission assumes for purposes of the PRA that six
broker-dealers would chose to file monthly reports in lieu of the
notice requirements, and that one would file a notice.
\506\ This estimate is derived from information filed by broker-
dealers in their FOCUS Reports. Based on FOCUS Report data, as of
December 31, 2011, there were six broker-dealers whose securities
borrowed or securities loaned exceeded 25 times their tentative net
capital. These firms likely will opt to file the monthly report
under the proposed amendments to Rule 17a-11. This estimate has been
updated from our proposing release estimate of 21 broker-dealers.
See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12876. No
comments were received on this estimate. The estimated number of
firms filing notices and monthly reports has decreased largely due
to an overall decrease in the number of broker-dealers. See also id.
at 12870 (discussing rationale for 2,500% threshold).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

D. Total Annual Reporting and Recordkeeping Burden

1. Securities Lending Agreements and Disclosures
The amendments to paragraph (c)(2)(iv)(B) of Rule 15c3-1 will
require a broker-dealer to make disclosures to,

[[Page 51862]]

and obtain certain agreements from, securities lending principals in
situations where the firm participates in the settlement of a
securities lending transaction but wants to be deemed an agent for
purposes of Rule 15c3-1.\507\ The Commission has adopted the final rule
substantially as proposed, and consequently, there were no changes to
the final rule amendments that would affect the Commission's PRA
estimates. In addition, the Commission did not receive any comments on
the estimates in the proposing release,\508\ and is therefore is
retaining the amendment's PRA hour burden estimates without revision.
The Commission, however, is updating the number of respondents to
reflect more recently-available data from broker-dealer FOCUS Reports.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\507\ 17 CFR 240.15c3-1(c)(2)(iv)(B).
\508\ See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at
12876.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

As discussed above in section II.C. of this release, the
Commission, in recognition of standard stock loan agreements, designed
the amendment to accommodate the continued use of these industry model
agreements by incorporating their use into the rule's requirements. For
the purpose of establishing a broker-dealer's status as agent or
lender, these agreements may be sufficiently detailed to satisfy the
new requirements. Thus, the standard agreement used by the vast
majority of broker-dealers may contain the representations and
disclosures required by the amendment. Nevertheless, based on staff
experience with securities lending agreements and disclosure and the
application of Rule 15c3-1, the Commission continues to believe that a
small percentage of broker-dealers may need to modify their standard
agreements. In the proposing release, the Commission estimated that 5%
\509\ of broker-dealers may need to modify their standard agreements.
No comments were received on this estimate and the Commission believes
5% continues to be an appropriate estimate for the final rule
amendments. Thus, the Commission estimates that 5% of the approximately
122 firms engaged in this business, or approximately 6 firms, will not
have used the standard agreements.\510\ The Commission estimates each
of these firms will spend approximately 20 hours of employee resources
updating their standard agreement template.\511\ Therefore, the
Commission estimates that the total one-time burden to broker-dealers
as a result of this requirement will be approximately 120 hours.\512\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\509\ Id.
\510\ This estimate is updated from the estimate of 9 firms (5%
of 170 firms) in the proposing release. Id.
\511\ Because these firms are already engaging in stock loan and
repo activities, these functions likely will be performed by in-
house employees, rather than outside counsel.
\512\ 6 broker-dealers x 20 hours per firm = 120 hours. This is
an update from the proposing release estimate of 9 broker-dealers x
20 hours = 180 hours. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. DEA Permission To Withdraw Capital within One Year of Contribution
The amendment to paragraph (c)(2)(i)(G)(2) of Rule 15c3-1 will
require that a broker-dealer treat as a liability any capital
contribution that is intended to be withdrawn within one year of its
contribution.\513\ The rule amendment also includes the presumption
that capital withdrawn within one year of contribution is presumed to
have been intended to be withdrawn within one year, unless the broker-
dealer receives permission in writing for the withdrawal from its DEA.
This amendment likely will impose annual recordkeeping burdens on
broker-dealers making the request.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\513\ 17 CFR 240.15c3-1(c)(2)(i)(G)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Commission estimates that 90 broker-dealers will seek to obtain
permission from their DEA in writing to withdraw capital within one
year of its contribution, and that it will take a broker-dealer
approximately one hour to prepare and submit the request to its DEA to
withdraw capital.\514\ Therefore, the Commission estimates that the
total annual hour burden with respect to the rule amendment will be
approximately 90 hours.\515\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\514\ See section IV.C. of this release.
\515\ 90 broker-dealers x 1 hour = 90 hours.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Written Subordination Agreements under Rule 15c3-3
As discussed above in section II.A.2. of this release, in response
to comments, the final rule amendment adopted by the Commission
excludes from the definition of PAB account in paragraph (a)(16) of
Rule 15c3-3, an account that ``has been subordinated to the claims of
creditors of the carrying broker or dealer.'' \516\ This modification
to the final rule will result in one-time burdens under the collection
of information for Rule 15c3-3.\517\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\516\ 17 CFR 240.15c3-3(a)(16).
\517\ The proposing release did not contain any proposals with
regard to subordination agreements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In light of comments received \518\ and based on staff experience,
the Commission understands most PAB account holders that enter into a
subordinated loan agreement with a carrying broker-dealer in order to
not be treated as PAB accounts under paragraph (a)(16) likely will be
affiliates of the broker-dealer.\519\ The Commission estimates that the
61 broker-dealers that carry PAB accounts will enter into an average of
11 subordination agreements as a result of the rule amendment.\520\ The
Commission estimates that it will take a carrying broker-dealer
approximately 20 hours to develop a subordination agreement, based on
the Commission's prior experience with the development of subordination
agreements.\521\ Therefore, the Commission estimates that the total
one-time hour burden resulting from this requirement will be 13,420
hours.\522\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\518\ See SIFMA 2 Letter; SIFMA 4 Letter; Deutsche Bank
Securities Letter.
\519\ See Deutsche Bank Letter; SIFMA 2 Letter.
\520\ See section IV.C. of this release.
\521\ See Capital, Margin, and Segregation Requirements for
Security-Based Swap Dealers and Major Security-Based Swap
Participants and Capital Requirements for Broker-Dealers, Exchange
Act Release No. 68071, 77 FR at 70299. See also Order Granting
Conditional Exemption Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in
Connection with Portfolio Margining of Swaps and Security-Based
Swaps, Exchange Act Release No. 68433 (Dec. 14, 2012), 77 FR 75211
(Dec. 19, 2012).
\522\ 61 broker-dealers x 11 accounts x 20 hours = 13,420 hours.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

4. PAB Reserve Bank Account Recordkeeping Requirements
The amendments to Rules 15c3-3 and 15c3-3a require carrying broker-
dealers to: (1) Perform a separate reserve computation for PAB accounts
(in addition to the reserve computation currently required for Rule
15c3-3 customer accounts); (2) establish and fund a separate PAB
reserve account; and (3) obtain and maintain physical possession or
control of non-margin securities carried in PAB accounts unless the
carrying broker-dealer has provided written notice to the PAB account
holders that it will use those securities in the ordinary course of its
securities business, and has provided opportunity for the PAB account
holder to object to such use.
In the proposing release, the Commission proposed to require that
the carrying broker-dealer obtain written permission from a PAB account
holder before it could use the securities of the PAB account holder in
the ordinary course of its securities business. The Commission
estimated that, based on FOCUS Report data, there were approximately
2,533 existing PAB customers, and therefore, broker-dealers would have
to amend approximately 2,533 existing PAB agreements.\523\ The
Commission further estimated that, on average, a firm would spend
approximately 10 hours of employee

[[Page 51863]]

resources amending each agreement and that 75 firms would spend 20
hours amending their standard PAB agreement template, for a total of
26,830 hours.\524\ The Commission did not receive any comments
regarding these estimates in the proposing release.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\523\ See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at
12877.
\524\ (2,533 PAB customers x 10 hours per customer) + (75 firms
x 20 hours per firm) = 26,830. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In response to comments, as discussed above, the Commission
determined not to adopt the requirement, as proposed. Instead,
paragraph (b)(5) of Rule 15c3-3 requires the carrying broker-dealer to
provide PAB account holders with written notice that the account
holder's non-margin securities may be used in the ordinary course of
its business.\525\ Therefore, the Commission is revising the final one-
time hour burden in light of the change in the rule to a notice
requirement, which is expected to be less burdensome than the proposed
customer consent provision while still providing customers with
necessary information. The Commission estimates, based on FOCUS Report
data, that approximately 61 broker-dealers carry PAB accounts.\526\ The
Commission further estimates, based on similar collections of
information and the fact that these firms already carry PAB accounts,
and on average, a firm will spend approximately 10 hours of employee
resources drafting a standard notice template, for a total one-time
burden of 610 hours.\527\ In addition, based on FOCUS Report data, the
Commission estimates that there are approximately 1,551 existing PAB
customers and, therefore, broker-dealers will have to send
approximately 1,551 written notices.\528\ The Commission estimates,
based on staff experience, that a firm will spend approximately 10
minutes per account sending out the required written notice, for a
total one-time burden of 259 hours.\529\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\525\ 17 CFR 240.15c3-3(b)(5).
\526\ This estimate is based on the number of broker-dealers
carrying PAB accounts as of December 31, 2011. This is an update
from the proposing release estimate of approximately 75 broker-
dealers that carry PAB accounts. See Amendments to Financial
Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12877.
\527\ 61 firms x 10 hours = 610 hours. See also Capital, Margin,
and Segregation Requirements for Security-Based Swap Dealers and
Major Security-Based Swap Participants and Capital Requirements for
Broker-Dealers, Exchange Act Release No. 68071, 77 FR at 70298
(estimating that the notice required to be sent by a security based
swap dealer to a counterparty pursuant to section 3E(f) of the
Exchange Act would take an outside counsel 10 hours to draft).
\528\ The number of customers also is updated from the proposing
release estimate of 2,533 customers. See Amendments to Financial
Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12877.
\529\ 1,551 PAB account holders x 10 minutes = 15,510 minutes/60
minutes = 258.5 hours (rounded to 259 hours). See generally,
Exchange Act Release No. 68071, 77 FR at 70298 (estimating that the
notice required to be sent by a security based swap dealer to a
counterparty pursuant to section 3E(f) of the Exchange Act would
take 10 minutes to send).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Commission estimates that a broker-dealer will incur postage
costs sending out the required written notice to customers. These
carrying broker-dealers likely will use the least cost method to comply
with this requirement and may include this notification with other
mailings sent to PAB account holders. The Commission, however,
conservatively estimates that the postage cost of for each
notification, using the current price of first class postage, will be
approximately $.46 per document sent. Therefore, the staff estimates
that the cost of sending the required written notification to PAB
account holders will be approximately $713.\530\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\530\ 1,551 notices x $0.46 = $713.46.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Based on FOCUS Report data, the Commission also estimates that
approximately 61 broker-dealers carry PAB accounts, and based upon
differences between the PAIB Letter and the final rule, these 61 firms
would have to amend their standard PAB agreement template. The
Commission estimates a firm will spend, on average, approximately 20
hours of employee resources on this task, for a total of 1,220
hours.\531\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\531\ 61 firms x 20 hours = 1,220.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In light of the changes to the final rule amendments which require
a broker-dealer to send a written notice, rather than obtain a
customer's consent regarding the use of a PAB account holder's
securities, the 61 broker-dealers carrying PAB accounts likely will
engage outside counsel \532\ to review the required notice,\533\ as
well as the standard PAB template agreement under the final rule
amendments to Rule 15c3-3. As a result, the Commission estimates that
these 61 broker-dealers will likely incur $2,000 in legal costs,\534\
or $122,000 \535\ in aggregate initial burden to review and comment on
these materials.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\532\ See NIBA 2 Letter.
\533\ 17 CFR 240.15c3-3(b)(5).
\534\ 5 hours x $400 per hour = $2,000. The Commission estimates
the review of the notice and standard PAB template would require 5
hours of outside counsel time, which is the same estimate used for
outside counsel review in another recent release. Based on staff
experience with the PAIB Letter and the application of Rule 15c3-3,
the Commission estimates the outside counsel review related to the
PAB amendments will take a comparable amount of time. See Capital,
Margin, and Segregation Requirements for Security-Based Swap Dealers
and Major Security-Based Swap Participants and Capital Requirements
for Broker-Dealers, Exchange Act Release 68071, 77 FR at 70297,
n.904. The Commission estimates that the outside counsel would cost
$400 per hour, which is the same estimate used by the Commission in
other recent releases. See Capital, Margin, and Segregation
Requirements for Security-Based Swap Dealers and Major Security-
Based Swap Participants and Capital Requirements for Broker-Dealers,
Exchange Act Release 68071, 77 FR at 70297; Further Definition of
``Swap,'' ``Security-Based Swap,'' and ``Security-Based Swap
Agreement''; Mixed Swaps; Security-Based Swap Agreement
Recordkeeping, Exchange Act Release No. 67453 (July 18, 2012), 77 FR
48208 (Aug. 13, 2012).
\535\ 61 firms x $2,000 legal cost = $122,000.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The requirements to perform a PAB reserve computation and obtain
agreements and notices from banks holding PAB accounts will result in
annual burdens based on the number of broker-dealers that hold PAB
accounts and the number of times per year these broker-dealers open new
PAB reserve accounts. Currently, to obtain the relief provided in the
PAIB Letter, broker-dealers are required to obtain the agreements and
notices from the banks.\536\ The Commission understands that broker-
dealers generally already obtain these agreements and notices.
Therefore, the Commission estimates there will be no additional burden
imposed by this requirement.\537\ The Commission did not receive any
comments on this estimate from the proposing release.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\536\ See PAIB Letter.
\537\ In addition, the hour burdens for broker-dealers to open
new customer reserve bank account under Rule 15c3-3 are already
included within the currently approved collection of information for
Rule 15c3-3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The amendment requiring a PAB reserve computation will produce a
one-time burden. Based on FOCUS Report data, as of December 31, 2011,
the Commission estimates that approximately 61 broker-dealers will
perform a PAB reserve computation.\538\ These firms already perform a
reserve computation for domestic broker-dealer customers under the PAIB
Letter. Nonetheless, the Commission estimates these firms will spend,
on average, approximately 30 hours of employee resources per firm
updating their systems to implement changes that will be necessitated
by the amendment. Therefore, consistent with the hour estimates in the
proposing release, the Commission estimates that the total one-time
burden to broker-dealers arising from updating their systems to comply

[[Page 51864]]

with this requirement will be approximately 1,830 hours.\539\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\538\ This estimate is based on the number of broker-dealers
which currently perform a PAB computation as of December 31, 2011.
This is an update from the estimate in the proposing release of 75
broker-dealers.
\539\ 61 broker-dealers x 30 hours per firm = 1,830 hours. This
is an update from the proposing release estimate of 75 firms x 30
hours per firm = 2,250 hours. See Amendments to Financial
Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12877.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The amendment requiring a PAB reserve computation also will produce
an annual burden. Based on FOCUS Report data, the Commission estimates
that of the 61 broker-dealers estimated to perform a PAB reserve
computation, approximately 56 of the current PAB filers will perform
the PAB reserve computation on a weekly basis, two broker-dealers will
perform it on a monthly basis, and three broker-dealers will perform
the PAB reserve computation on a daily basis.\540\ The Commission
further estimates that a broker-dealer will spend, on average,
approximately 2.5 hours to complete the PAB reserve computation in
order to make a record of such computation under Rule 15c3-3 as a
result of the amendment.\541\ Therefore, consistent with the hour
burden estimates in the proposing release, the Commission estimates
that the total annual burden to broker-dealers from this requirement
will be approximately 9,215 hours.\542\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\540\ These estimates are based on the number of broker-dealers
performing a PAB reserve computation monthly, weekly, and daily, as
of December 31, 2011. This is an update from the estimate in the
proposing release, which provided that of the 75 broker-dealers
estimated to perform a PAB computation, 71 broker-dealers would
prefer PAB computations on a weekly basis and four broker-dealers
would perform it on a monthly basis. See Amendments to Financial
Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12877. No broker-dealers performed
daily PAB computations as of the date of the proposing release. No
comments were received on this estimate.
\541\ This estimate is based on staff experience with the
current estimate of 2.5 hours under the current collection of
information for Rule 15c3-3 to make a record of each reserve
computation. See 17 CFR 240.15c3-3(e)(3).
\542\ (56 weekly filers x 52 weeks x 2.5 hours per computation)
+ (2 monthly filers x 12 months x 2.5 hours per computation) + (3
daily filers x 250 business days per year x 2.5 hours per
computation) = 9,215 total hours. This is an update from the
proposing release estimate of 9,350 hours. See Amendments to
Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12877, n.137.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

5. Adequate Procedures Required Under Paragraph (j)(1) of Rule 15c3-3
The Commission proposed importing requirements in Rule 15c3-2 into
Rule 15c3-3 and eliminating Rule 15c3-2 as a stand-alone rule in the
Code of Federal Regulations, and adopting new paragraph (j)(1) to Rule
15c3-3, which includes a condition that a broker-dealer must establish
adequate procedures that will impose a paperwork burden if a broker-
dealer wishes to accept or use any free credit balance for the account
of any customer of the broker-dealer. The Commission is adopting this
amendment substantially as proposed, which provides, ``[a] broker or
dealer must not accept or use any free credit balance carried for the
account of any customer of the broker or dealer unless such broker or
dealer has established adequate procedures pursuant to which each
customer for whom a free credit balance is carried will be given or
sent, together with or as part of the customer's statement of account,
whenever sent but not less frequently than once every three months, a
written statement informing the customer of the amount due to the
customer by the broker or dealer on the date of the statement, and that
the funds are payable on demand of the customer.'' \543\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\543\ 17 CFR 240.15c3-3(j)(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The requirement that broker-dealers establish adequate procedures
with regard to free credit balances will result in one-time and annual
hours burdens for broker-dealers subject to the requirements of new
paragraph (j)(1) to Rule 15c3-3. Based on FOCUS Report data, the
Commission estimates that 189 broker-dealers carry free credit
balances. Most firms may already have such procedures in place with
regard to the requirements of the rule, because these provisions are
being imported from current Rule 15c3-2, which is being eliminated as a
result of these amendments. Therefore, the Commission estimates that a
broker-dealer will spend approximately 25 additional hours reviewing
and updating its procedures to ensure it is in compliance with new
paragraph (j)(1) to Rule 15c3-3 and approximately 10 additional hours
per year reviewing and updating its procedures, for a total one-time
and annual hour burden of 4,725 hours \544\ and 1,890 hours,\545\
respectively.\546\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\544\ 189 broker-dealers x 25 hours = 4,725 hours. The 25 and 10
hour estimates are based on similar collections of information and
the Commission's belief that many of these broker-dealers already
have procedures in place and, therefore, most broker-dealers will
only be revising and updating their current policies and procedures
to ensure compliance with the rule. See Removal of Certain
References to Credit Ratings Under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, Exchange Act Release No. 64532 (Apr. 27, 2011), 76 FR 26550,
26568 (May 6, 2011).
\545\ 189 broker-dealers x 10 hours = 1,890 hours.
\546\ See NIBA 2 Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

6. Treatment of Free Credit Balances
New paragraph (j)(2) to Rule 15c3-3 will require a broker-dealer to
obtain the written affirmative consent of a new customer before
including a customer's free credit balances in a Sweep Program, as well
as to provide certain disclosures and notices to all customers with
regard to the broker-dealer's Sweep Program.
These requirements will result in one-time and annual burdens to
broker-dealers subject to its provisions. However, these requirements
will apply only to a firm that carries customer free credit balances
and opts to have the ability to change how its customers' free credit
balances are treated. The Commission did not receive comments regarding
the hour burden estimates relating to the treatment of free credit
balances in the proposing release.
In the proposing release, the Commission estimated that
approximately 50 broker-dealers \547\ would choose to provide new
customers with the disclosures and notices required under the amendment
in order to have the ability to change how their customers' free credit
balances were treated. The Commission did not receive any comments on
this estimate. The Commission, however, is revising this estimate for
the final rule to include all 189 broker-dealers that carry free credit
balances to reflect the fact that these firms may have to update their
systems to comply with these new requirements. The Commission further
estimates these firms will spend, on average, approximately 200 hours
of employee resources per firm updating their current systems
(including processes for generating customer account statements) to
incorporate changes that will be necessitated by the amendment.
Therefore, the Commission estimates that the total one-time burden to
broker-dealers arising from this requirement will be approximately
37,800 hours.\548\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\547\ See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at
12877.
\548\ 189 broker-dealers x 200 hours per firm = 37,800.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Commission also estimates that these firms will consult with
outside counsel in making these systems changes, particularly with
respect to the language in the disclosures and notices under new
paragraph (j)(2) to Rule 15c3-3. The Commission estimates that an
outside counsel will spend, on average, approximately 50 hours
assisting a broker-dealer in updating its systems \549\ for a one-time
aggregate burden to broker-dealers of 9,450 hours.\550\ The Commission
estimates that the average hourly cost for an outside counsel will be
approximately

[[Page 51865]]

$400 per hour.\551\ For these reasons, consistent with its estimate in
the proposing release, the Commission estimates that the average one-
time cost to a broker-dealer will be approximately $20,000 \552\ and
the one-time cost to broker-dealers will be approximately
$3,780,000.\553\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\549\ Because broker-dealers affected by these amendments are
likely to already have existing sweep programs in place, a broker-
dealer likely will need to update its existing systems, rather than
be required to purchase additional hardware to comply with these
rule amendments.
\550\ 189 broker-dealers x 50 hours per firm = 9,450 hours.
\551\ Based on staff experience, the Commission used the
estimate of $400 per hour for legal services provided by outside
counsel, which is the same estimate used by the Commission in other
recent releases. See Capital, Margin, and Segregation Requirements
for Security-Based Swap Dealers and Major Security-Based Swap
Participants and Capital Requirements for Broker-Dealers, Exchange
Act Release 68071, 77 FR at 70297; Further Definition of ``Swap,''
``Security-Based Swap,'' and ``Security-Based Swap Agreement'';
Mixed Swaps; Security-Based Swap Agreement Recordkeeping; Final
Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 67453 (July 18, 2012), 77 FR 48208
(Aug. 13, 2012).
\552\ $400 per hour x 50 hours = $20,000.
\553\ 189 broker-dealers x $20,000 = $3,780,000.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

As for the annual hour burden, the Commission estimates, consistent
with its estimate in the proposing release, these requirements will
impact 5% \554\ of the total broker-dealer customer accounts per year.
Based on FOCUS Report data, the Commission estimates there are
approximately 110,493,215 customer accounts and, consequently, 5% of
the accounts (5,524,661 accounts per year) will be impacted.\555\ Based
on staff experience with similar requirements under the existing PRA
collection for Rule 17a-3, the Commission further estimates that a
broker-dealer will spend, on average, four minutes \556\ of employee
resources to process a written affirmative consent for new customers,
as well as disclosures required under paragraph (j) to Rule 15c3-3.
Therefore, the Commission estimates that the annual burden to broker-
dealers arising from the requirement will be approximately 368,311
hours.\557\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\554\ See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at
12877.
\555\ These estimates have been updated from the proposing
release estimates of 109,300,000 customer accounts and 5% of the
customer account or 5,465,000 accounts. Id.
\556\ Id.
\557\ [5,524,661 accounts x 4 minutes/account]/60 minutes =
368,311 hours. This is an update from our proposing release estimate
of 5,465,000 accounts x 4 minutes/account = 364,333 hours. Id. at
12878.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

7. Documentation of Risk Management Procedures
The amendments to Rules 17a-3 and 17a-4 will require certain large
broker-dealers to make and keep current a record documenting credit,
market, and liquidity risk management controls established and
maintained by the broker-dealer to assist it in analyzing and managing
the risks associated with its business activities. The amendment only
will apply to broker-dealers that have more than (1) $1,000,000 in
aggregate credit items as computed under the customer reserve formula
of Rule 15c3-3, or (2) $20,000,000 in capital, including debt
subordinated in accordance with Appendix D to Rule 15c3-1.
As proposed, the amendment would have required a broker-dealer to
create a record documenting its ``internal risk management controls.''
\558\ To address commenters' concerns that the proposed rule language
was ambiguous and that the Commission should narrow the application of
the rule, the Commission modified new paragraph (a)(23) to Rule 17a-3,
as stated above, so that the final rule requires certain broker-dealers
to document risk management controls established to manage market,
credit, and liquidity risk, rather than all of its ``internal risk
management controls.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\558\ Id. at 12899.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In the proposing release, the Commission estimated that based on
FOCUS Report data, that there would be approximately 517 broker-dealers
that would meet the applicability threshold of this amendment
($1,000,000 in credits or $20,000,000 in capital), and therefore would
be subject to the proposed rule.\559\ The Commission also estimated
that this requirement would result in a one-time burden to broker-
dealers of approximately 62,040 hours, based on the estimate that a
broker-dealer would spend approximately 120 hours of employee resources
augmenting its procedures to comply with the proposed rule.\560\ The
Commission did not receive any comments on this estimate in the
proposing release.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\559\ Id. at 12878.
\560\ 517 broker-dealers x 120 hours = 62,040 hours.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In light of the change in the final rule text to require the
documentation of controls established to manage market, credit, and
liquidity risk, rather than all of its ``internal risk management
controls,'' the Commission is reducing the final PRA estimate for Rule
17a-3 because the final rule narrows the scope of internal risk
management controls the broker-dealer is required to document.
Consequently, the change to the final rule should result in a reduction
in the one-time hour burden estimate. The rule does not specify the
type of controls a broker-dealer must establish to manage these risks.
It simply requires the documentation of the procedures the broker-
dealer has established. Broker-dealers that are part of holding
companies may be subject to procedures that are used globally
throughout the organization. As long as the broker-dealer maintains
documented procedures of controls pertaining to the designated entity,
the requirements of the rule would be met. The one-time hour burden to
comply with the rule will vary depending on the size and complexity of
a firm. In addition, some larger broker-dealers required to comply with
Rule 15c3-4 (Internal Risk Management Control Systems for OTC
Derivatives Dealers) already would be required to document their
internal risk management control systems related to market, credit, and
liquidity risk.\561\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\561\ See 17 CFR 240.15c3-4(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Taking this into account, as well as based on staff experience
monitoring compliance of risk management controls of broker-dealers,
the Commission estimates that a broker-dealer will spend, on average,
approximately 100 hours of employee resources to comply with this
amendment to ensure its market, credit, and liquidity risk controls are
documented. For the reasons discussed above, including narrowing the
scope of the final rule, the estimate of 100 hours reflects a 20%
reduction from the estimate in the proposing release of 120 hours.
Based on FOCUS Report data, as of December 31, 2011, the Commission
estimates there are approximately 490 broker-dealers that would be
subject to the final rule amendment (because the firm has $1,000,000 in
credits or $20,000,000 in capital). Therefore, the Commission estimates
the total one-time burden to broker-dealers will be approximately
49,000 hours.\562\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\562\ 490 broker-dealers x 100 hours = 49,000 hours.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In addition to the one-time hour burden discussed in the proposing
release,\563\ based on similar collections of information requiring the
documentation of risk management controls,\564\ large broker-dealers
required to comply with the amendment as adopted likely will incur
annual hour burdens.\565\ Consequently, the Commission is incorporating
annual hour burdens for this collection of information in the final
rule amendments.\566\ Therefore, the Commission estimates that a
broker-

[[Page 51866]]

dealer would spend approximately 45 hours per year to ensure its
compliance with the amendment to Rule 17a-3, for a total annual hour
burden to the industry of 22,050 hours.\567\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\563\ See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at
12878.
\564\ See Risk Management Controls for Brokers or Dealers with
Market Access; Final Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 63241 (Nov. 3,
2010), 75 FR 69792, 69815 (Nov. 15, 2013). See also Capital, Margin,
and Segregation Requirements for Security-Based Swap Dealers and
Major Security-Based Swap Participants and Capital Requirements for
Broker-Dealers, Exchange Act Release 68071, 77 FR at 70295 and
70297.
\565\ See NIBA 2 Letter.
\566\ The proposing release did not contain annual hour burden
estimates for this collection of information.
\567\ 490 broker-dealers x 45 hours = 22,050 hours. The 45 per
hour annual estimate is based on a similar collection of
information. See Risk Management Controls for Brokers or Dealers
with Market Access; Final Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 63241 (Nov.
3, 2010), 75 FR 69792, 69815 (Nov. 15, 2010).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Additionally, the proposing release did not specifically allocate
the estimated hour burdens with respect to the amendments to Rule 17a-3
and 17a-4 between these two rules.\568\ As discussed above, and based
on staff experience with the application of Rule 17a-4, the Commission
estimates that broker-dealers meeting the threshold requirements of
paragraph (a)(23) of Rule 17a-3 will already have documented their
established procedures and controls to manage the risks arising from
their business. Consequently, the amendment to Rule 17a-4 to require a
broker-dealer to preserve the records required pursuant to paragraph
(a)(23) of Rule 17a-3 until three years after the termination of the
use of the risk management controls documented therein should have a
minimal impact on the current annual hour burden for Rule 17a-4 because
the paperwork burden associated with this amendment derives from the
substance of the amendments to paragraph (a)(23) of Rule 17a-3.
Therefore, the Commission is retaining the current annual hour burden
for Rule 17a-4 without change.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\568\ See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at
12878.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Because the final rule amendment requires a broker-dealer to
document its liquidity, credit, and market risk management controls, if
it has established such controls, these broker-dealers may incur one-
time startup costs to hire outside counsel to review the documented
controls to ensure the broker-dealer is meeting the requirements of the
rule. Based on staff experience with similar reviews, the Commission
estimates that these broker-dealers would incur $2,000 in legal
costs,\569\ or $980,000,\570\ in the aggregate, initial one-time burden
to review and comment on the documented risk management controls.\571\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\569\ The Commission staff estimates that the review of the
documented controls would require 5 hours of outside counsel time at
a cost of $400 per hour. See also Capital, Margin, and Segregation
Requirements for Security-Based Swap Dealers and Major Security-
Based Swap Participants and Capital Requirements for Broker-Dealers,
Exchange Act Release 68071, 77 FR at 70297, n.904.
\570\ 490 broker-dealers x $2,000 = $980,000.
\571\ See NIBA 2 Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

8. Notice Requirements
The amendment to Rule 17a-11 requiring notice when a broker-dealer
becomes subject to certain insolvency events will result in irregular
filings from a small number of broker-dealers. As noted above, SIPC's
2012 annual report indicates that the average annual number of broker-
dealers which have become subject to a liquidation proceeding under
SIPA over the last ten years is two. Accordingly, the Commission
estimates that approximately two insolvency notices will be sent per
year and that a broker-dealer will spend, on average, approximately ten
minutes of employee resources to prepare and send the notice.\572\ The
Commission did not receive any comments on its estimates from the
proposing release. Therefore, the Commission estimates that the total
annual burden to broker-dealers arising from this amendment will be
approximately 20 minutes.\573\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\572\ This is an update from the proposing release estimate of
an average of six broker-dealers per year have become subject to a
liquidation proceeding under SIPA, based on SIPC's 2005 annual
report. The proposing release also contained a 10 minute estimate
per broker-dealer (6 notices x 10 minutes per notice = 1 hour). See
Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12878.
\573\ 2 notices x 10 minutes per notice = 20 minutes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The amendment to Rule 17a-11 requires broker-dealers engaged in
securities lending or repurchase activities to either: (1) File a
notice with the Commission and their DEA whenever the total money
payable against all securities loaned, subject to a reverse repurchase
agreement or the contract value of all securities borrowed or subject
to a repurchase agreement, exceeds 2,500% of tentative net capital; or,
alternatively, (2) report monthly their securities lending and
repurchase activities to their DEA in a form acceptable to their DEA.
The Commission did not receive any comments on these specific estimates
in the proposing release and continues to believe they are appropriate.
As such, the Commission is adopting this amendment with a minor
modification that does not impact the collection of information.
In addition, based on FOCUS Report data, as of December 31, 2011,
the Commission estimates that approximately one stock loan/borrow
notice will be sent per year.\574\ The Commission further estimates
that a broker-dealer will spend, on average, approximately ten minutes
of employee resources to prepare and send the notice. Therefore, the
Commission estimates that the total annual burden to broker-dealers
arising from this amendment will be approximately ten minutes.\575\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\574\ This estimate is an update of the proposing release
estimate that twelve notices will be sent per year based on FOCUS
data. See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at
12878. As of December 31, 2011, there were seven broker-dealers
whose securities borrowed or securities loaned exceeded 80% of 25
times their tentative net capital, and there were six broker-dealers
whose securities borrowed or securities loaned exceeded 25 times
their tentative net capital. The Commission assumes for purposes of
the PRA that six broker-dealers would chose to file monthly reports
in lieu of the notice requirements, and that one would file a
notice.
\575\ 1 notice x 10 minutes per notice = 10 minutes. This is an
update of the proposing release estimate of 2 hours (12 notices x 10
minutes per notice). See Amendments to Financial Responsibility
Rules, 72 FR at 12878. The Commission does not expect broker-dealers
to incur postage costs as a result of this amendment because most
broker-dealers file these notices via facsimile or email. Therefore,
any incremental postages costs will likely be minimal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Based on FOCUS Report data, as of December 31, 2011, and staff
experience, the Commission estimates that, annually, six broker-dealers
will submit the monthly stock loan/borrow report.\576\ Based on staff
experience, the Commission estimates each firm will spend, on average,
approximately 100 hours of employee resources updating its systems to
generate the information required in the monthly report. Therefore, the
Commission estimates that the total one-time burden to broker-dealers
arising from this requirement will be approximately 600 hours.\577\
With respect to the annual hour burden, the Commission estimates each
firm will spend, on average, approximately one hour per month (or
twelve hours per year) of employee resources to prepare and send the
report or to prepare the information for the FOCUS report (as required
by the firm's DEA, if applicable). Therefore, the Commission estimates
the total annual burden arising from this amendment will be
approximately 72 hours.\578\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\576\ This is an update from the proposing release estimate that
21 broker-would submit a monthly report. See Amendments to Financial
Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12878.
\577\ 6 broker-dealers x 100 hours per firm = 600 hours. This is
an update from our proposing release estimate of 2,100 hours (21
broker-dealers x 100 hours per firm). See Amendments to Financial
Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12878.
\578\ 6 broker-dealers x 12 hours per year = 72 hours. This is
an update from the proposing release estimate of 252 hours (21
broker-dealers x 12 hours per year). See Amendments to Financial
Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12878.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 51867]]

E. Collection of Information Is Mandatory

These recordkeeping and notice requirements are mandatory with the
exception of: (1) The option for a broker-dealer to report monthly its
securities lending activities to its DEA in lieu of filing the notice
required under paragraph (c)(5) of Rule 17a-11; (2) the option for a
broker-dealer to request written approval from its DEA in order to
withdraw capital that has been contributed within one year under
paragraph (c)(2)(i)(G)(2) of Rule 15c3-1; and (3) the option of a
carrying broker-dealer to enter into a subordination agreement with an
account holder in order to exclude such account holder's account from
being treated as a PAB account under paragraph (a)(16) of Rule 15c3-3.

F. Confidentiality

Some of the information the Commission expects to receive may be
confidential information. The information collected under the
amendments to Rules 15c3-1, 15c3-3, 17a-3, and 17a-4 would be stored by
the broker-dealers and made available to the Commission, Commission
staff, and SROs, as required in connection with examinations,
investigations, and enforcement proceedings. The information collected
under the amendments to Rule 17a-11 would be generated from the
internal records of the broker-dealers. It would be provided to the
Commission, its staff, and SROs but not on a regular basis (except for
the optional monthly reports).
To the extent that the Commission receives confidential information
pursuant to these collections of information, the Commission is
committed to protecting the confidentiality of such information to the
extent permitted by law.\579\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\579\ See, e.g., Exchange Act Section 24, 15 U.S.C. 78x
(governing the public availability of information obtained by the
Commission) and 5 U.S.C. 552 et seq. (Freedom of Information Act--
``FOIA''). FOIA provides at least two pertinent exemptions under
which the Commission has authority to withhold certain information.
FOIA Exemption 4 provides an exemption for ``trade secrets and
commercial or financial information obtained from a person and
privileged or confidential.'' 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(4). FOIA Exemption 8
provides an exemption for matters that are ``contained in or related
to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on
behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the
regulation or supervision of financial institutions.'' 5 U.S.C.
552(b)(8).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Broker-dealers will send required written notices regarding use of
a PAB account holder's securities to its customers, as required by Rule
15c3-3.\580\ In addition, broker-dealers will send certain notices and
disclosures to customers regarding the treatment of their free credit
balances under new paragraph (j)(2) to Rule 15c3-3. To the extent these
standard notices and disclosures are made available to the Commission,
they may not be kept confidential.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\580\ See 17 CFR 15c3-3(b)(5).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

G. Record Retention Period

One amendment to Rule 15c3-1 will require broker-dealers to make
disclosures to principals and obtain agreements from principals with
respect to securities lending transactions where the broker-dealer acts
as agent. In addition, the amendment to Rule 15c3-3 to define the term
PAB account will require carrying broker-dealers to enter into
subordination agreements with certain account holders if they wish
their account to be excluded from the definition. These records will
have to be maintained for not less than three years under paragraph
(b)(7) of Rule 17a-4.\581\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\581\ 17 CFR 240.17a-4(b)(7).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The amendments to Rule 15c3-3 require broker-dealers to provide PAB
account holders with written notice that the securities may be used in
the ordinary course of its business, obtain the written affirmative
consent of a new customer before including a customer's free credit
balances in a Sweep Program, and provide certain disclosures and
notices to all customers with regard to the broker-dealer's Sweep
Program. These agreements relate to the terms and conditions of the
maintenance of the customer's account and, accordingly, fall within the
record retention requirements of paragraph (c) of Rule 17a-4.\582\
Under this paragraph, the records must be retained until six years
after the closing of the customer's account. The amendments to Rule
15c3-3 also require broker-dealers to obtain notices and contracts from
the banks holding their PAB reserve accounts. In order to comply with
Rule 15c3-3, broker-dealers must have these notices and contracts in
place and documented. These records will have to be maintained for not
less than three years under the requirements of Rule 17a-4.\583\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\582\ 17 CFR 240.17a-4(c).
\583\ 17 CFR 240.17a-4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The amendments to Rules 17a-3 and 17a-4 require broker-dealers to
document credit, market, and liquidity risk management controls. The
amendments to Rule 17a-4 include the establishment of a retention
period for these records, which will be until three years after the
termination of the use of the risk management controls documented
therein under new paragraph (e)(9) of Rule 17a-4. The three-year
retention period is designed to document former and current procedures
and to provide sufficient opportunity to review the records during the
broker-dealer's normal exam cycle.
The amendments to Rule 17a-11 will require broker-dealers to
provide notice or report monthly to the Commission and other regulatory
authorities under certain circumstances. These notices and reports will
constitute communications relating to a broker-dealer's ``business as
such'' and, therefore, will need to be retained for three years.\584\
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\584\ 17 CFR 240.17a-4(b)(4).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

V. Economic Analysis

A. Introduction

The Commission is sensitive to the costs and benefits of its rules.
When engaging in rulemaking that requires the Commission to consider or
determine whether an action is necessary or appropriate in the public
interest, section 3(f) of the Exchange Act requires that the Commission
consider, in addition to the protection of investors, whether the
action will promote efficiency, competition, and capital
formation.\585\ In addition, section 23(a)(2) of the Exchange Act
requires the Commission to consider the effects on competition of any
rules the Commission adopts under the Exchange Act, and prohibits the
Commission from adopting any rule that would impose a burden on
competition not necessary or appropriate in furtherance of the purposes
of the Exchange Act.\586\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\585\ 15 U.S.C. 78c(f).
\586\ 15 U.S.C. 78w(a)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In the proposing release,\587\ the Commission solicited comment on
the costs and benefits of the proposed amendments including whether
these costs and benefits were accurate.\588\ The

[[Page 51868]]

Commission also requested that commenters identify and assess any costs
and benefits not discussed in the proposing release. The Commission
further encouraged commenters to provide specific data and analysis in
support of their views.\589\ The Commission also requested comment on
whether the proposed amendments would place a burden on competition,
and promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation.\590\ In May
2012, the Commission re-opened the comment period to permit commenters
additional opportunity to address these, and any other, issues raised
by the proposed rule amendments.\591\ The general comments received, as
well as comments received relating to specific rule amendments, are
discussed below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\587\ See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at
12879; see also Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules for
Broker-Dealers, Exchange Act Release No. 66910 (May 3, 2012), 77 FR
27150 (May 9, 2012) (re-opening of comment period).
\588\ For the purposes of this final economic analysis, the
Commission is using salary data from the SIFMA Management &
Professional Earnings in the Securities Industry 2012, which
provides base salary and bonus information for middle-management and
professional positions within the securities industry. The salary
costs derived from the report and referenced in this cost/benefit
section, are modified to account for an 1800-hour work year and
multiplied by 5.35 to account for bonuses, firm size, employee
benefits and overhead. Hereinafter, references to data derived from
the report as modified in the manner described above will be cited
as ``SIFMA 2012 Report as Modified.'' The proposing release used
salary information for New York based employees derived from the SIA
Report on Management and Professional Earnings in the Securities
Industry 2005. See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72
FR at 12879, n.151.
\589\ Id. at 12879.
\590\ Id.
\591\ Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules for Broker-
Dealers, Exchange Act Release No. 66910 (May 3, 2012), 77 FR 27150
(May 9, 2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In adopting the rule amendments, the Commission has been mindful of
the associated costs and benefits. The discussion focuses on the
Commission's reasons for adopting these amendments, the affected
parties, the costs and benefits of the amendments compared to a
baseline, and alternative courses of action. The discussion of the
costs of the rule amendments includes a discussion of certain
implementation burdens and related costs,\592\ which may include
assessment costs, personnel costs, and other costs (e.g., technology
costs).\593\ The cost estimates and related data derived from FOCUS
Reports discussed in the proposing release have also been updated in
this final release to reflect more recently available data.\594\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\592\ In the proposing release, the Commission estimated that
the one-time and annual costs to broker-dealers would be $32,814,454
and $39,651,716, respectively. See Amendments to Financial
Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12887.
\593\ As discussed in section IV. of this release, the
Commission has estimated certain indirect burdens and related costs
of these implementation requirements.
\594\ See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at
12887. The FOCUS Report data from the proposing release was derived
from 2004 year end numbers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Many of the benefits and costs discussed below are difficult to
quantify, in particular when discussing enhancements in investor
protection. For example, it is unknown how much the amendments to the
financial responsibility rules will result in enhanced compliance with
those rules. Therefore, much of the discussion is qualitative in nature
but, where possible, the Commission has attempted to quantify the
costs. However, the inability to quantify these costs and benefits does
not mean that the costs and benefits of these rule amendments are any
less significant.
As discussed throughout this release, in part in response to
comments, the Commission has modified the proposed rules to reduce
compliance burdens where consistent with investor protection. In
addition, where commenters identified additional costs, the Commission
has revised its economic analysis of the final rules to take these
costs into account. Finally, the Commission has considered all comment
letters received related to the impact of the proposed amendments on
efficiency, competition, and capital formation, and responds to these
comments in the sections below discussing individual rule amendments.

B. Economic Baseline

The regulatory changes adopted today amend requirements that apply
to broker-dealers registered with the Commission. The discussion below
includes the approximate numbers of broker-dealers that will be
affected by today's amendments and a description of the economic
baseline against which the costs and benefits, as well as the impact on
efficiency, competition, and capital formation, of today's amendments
are measured.
The broker-dealers registered with the Commission vary
significantly in terms of their size, business activities, and the
complexities of their operations. For example, carrying broker-dealers
hold customer securities and funds.\595\ Clearing broker-dealers clear
transactions as members of security exchanges, the Depository Trust &
Clearing Corporation and the Options Clearing Corporation.\596\ Many
clearing broker-dealers are carrying broker-dealers, but some clearing
broker-dealers clear only their own transactions and do not hold
customer securities and cash.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\595\ Rule 15c3-1 specifies that a broker-dealer shall be deemed
to carry customer accounts ``if, in connection with its activities
as a broker or dealer, it receives checks, drafts, or other
evidences of indebtedness made payable to itself or persons other
than the requisite registered broker or dealer carrying the account
of a customer, escrow agent, issuer, underwriter, sponsor, or other
distributor of securities'' or ``if it does not promptly forward or
promptly deliver all of the securities of customers or of other
brokers or dealers received by the firm in connection with its
activities as a broker or dealer.'' 17 CFR 240.15c3-1(a)(2)(i). Rule
15c3-3 defines the term securities carried for the account of a
customer to mean ``securities received by or on behalf of a broker
or dealer for the account of any customer and securities carried
long by a broker or dealer for the account of any customer,'' as
well as securities sold to, or bought for, a customer by a broker-
dealer. 17 CFR 240.15c3-3(a)(2).
\596\ See Definitions of Terms and Exemptions Relating to the
``Broker'' Exceptions for Banks, Exchange Act Release No. 56501
(Sept. 24, 2007), 72 FR 56514 (Oct. 3, 2007), at n.269.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In addition, a broker-dealer that does not hold customer securities
and/or cash is generally referred to as a ``non-carrying broker-
dealer.'' Non-carrying broker-dealers include ``introducing brokers.''
\597\ These introducing broker-dealers accept customer orders and
introduce their customers to carrying broker-dealers that hold the
securities and cash of the customers of the introducing broker-dealers
along with the securities and cash of their direct customers. A
carrying broker-dealer generally receives and executes orders of the
introducing broker-dealers' customers.\598\ Carrying broker-dealers
generally also prepare trade confirmations, settle trades, and organize
book entries of the securities purchased and sold.\599\ Introducing
broker-dealers also may use carrying broker-dealers to clear the
introducing firm's proprietary trades and carry the firm's securities.
Another group of non-carrying broker-dealers effects transactions in
securities like mutual funds on a subscription-way basis, where
customers generally purchase the securities by providing the funds
directly to the issuer.\600\ Finally, some non-carrying broker-dealers
act as finders by referring prospective purchasers of securities to
issuers.\601\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\597\ Id. at ] 1.15; see also Net Capital Rule, Exchange Act
Release No. 31511 (Nov. 24, 1992), 57 FR 56973 (Dec. 2, 1992)
(describing role of introducing broker-dealers).
\598\ Net Capital Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 31511 (Nov. 24,
1992), 57 FR 56973 (Dec. 2, 1992).
\599\ See, e.g., FINRA Rule 4311 (Carrying Agreements). This
FINRA rule governs the requirements applicable to FINRA members when
entering into agreements for the carrying of any customer accounts
in which securities transactions can be effected. Historically, the
purpose of this rule has been to ensure that certain functions and
responsibilities are clearly allocated to either the introducing or
carrying firm, consistent with the requirements of the SRO's and
Commission's financial responsibility and other rules and
regulations, as applicable. See also Notice of Filing of Amendment
No. 1 and Order Granting Accelerated Approval of a Proposed Rule
Change Adopting, as Modified by Amendment No. 1, Rules Governing
Guarantees, Carrying Agreements, Security Counts and Supervision of
General Ledger Accounts in the Consolidated FINRA Rulebook, Exchange
Act Release No. 63999 (Mar. 7, 2011), 76 FR 12380 (Mar. 7, 2011).
\600\ See Books and Records Requirement for Brokers and Dealers
Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No.
44992 (Nov. 2, 2001) (``[T]he Commission recognizes that for some
types of transactions, such as purchases of mutual funds or variable
annuities, the customer may simply fill out an application or a
subscription agreement that the broker-dealer then forwards directly
to the issuer.'').
\601\ See American Bar Association, Report and Recommendations
of the Task Force on Private Placement Broker-Dealers 23-24 (2005);
see also Net Capital Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 31511 (Nov. 24,
1992), 57 FR 56973 (Dec. 2, 1992).

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 51869]]

While these amendments will impact investors and markets more
generally, the broker-dealer industry is the primary industry directly
affected by the rule amendments. In some cases, the amendments impose
requirements on certain types of broker-dealers that engage in specific
activities. For example, only carrying broker-dealers that carry free
credit balances would be subject to the requirements regarding the
treatment of free credit balances under paragraph (j) of Rule 15c3-3.
All broker-dealers would be subject to the requirements to deduct from
net worth certain liabilities or expenses assumed by third parties
under Rule 15c3-1.
To establish a baseline for competition among broker-dealers, the
Commission looked at the status of the broker-dealer industry detailed
below. In terms of size, the following table provides the distribution
of broker-dealers by total capital levels and the aggregate total
capital within each capital bracket.

Broker-Dealer Capital at Calendar Year End 2011 \602\
[$ millions]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number of Aggregate
Capital firms total capital
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Less than $500,000...................... 2,506 $347
Greater than or equal to $500,000 and 1,320 2,212
less than $5 million...................
Greater than or equal to $5 million and 608 10,520
less than $50 million..................
Greater than or equal to $50 million and 80 5,672
less than $100 million.................
Greater than or equal to $100 million 125 26,655
and less than $500 million.............
Greater than or equal to $500 million 28 19,248
and less than $1 billion...............
Greater than or equal to $1 billion and 27 61,284
less than $5 billion...................
Greater than or equal to $5 billion and 6 41,175
less than $10 billion..................
Greater than or equal to $10 billion.... 9 175,585
-------------------------------
Total............................... 4,709 342,698
------------------------------------------------------------------------

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\602\ The information in this chart is based on FOCUS Report
data filed by broker-dealers in 2011. The information in the
``Aggregate Total Capital'' column is based on data reported on line
3530 of the FOCUS Report, which includes total capital and allowable
subordinated liabilities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

According to FOCUS Report data, as of December 31, 2011, there were
approximately 4,709 broker-dealers registered with the Commission. Nine
broker-dealers hold over half of broker-dealers' total capital.
Further, based on FOCUS Report data, as of December 31, 2011, the
Commission also estimates that there are approximately 287 broker-
dealers that are clearing or carrying firms that do not claim
exemptions pursuant to paragraph (k) of Rule 15c3-3. Based on FOCUS
Report data, as of December 31, 2011, approximately 189 of these
broker-dealers carry free credit balances, while 61 broker-dealers
carry PAB accounts.
For the purposes of this economic analysis, the baseline is the
current customer protection, net capital, books and records, and
notification requirements for broker-dealers promulgated under the
Exchange Act and existing interpretations thereunder, and how they
affect broker-dealers.
As discussed above in section II.A.1. of this release, Rule 15c3-
3--the customer protection rule--in effect mandates a separation of
customer assets from broker-dealer assets through two fundamental
requirements: (1) That a carrying broker-dealer must maintain physical
possession or control over customers' fully paid and excess margin
securities; and (2) that a carrying broker-dealer must maintain a
reserve of cash or qualified securities \603\ in an account at a bank
that is at least equal in value to the net cash owed to customers,
including cash obtained from the use of customer securities. These
provisions are designed to require the broker-dealer to hold customer
securities and cash in a manner that enables the prompt return of these
assets in the event that the firm falls into financial difficulty or
becomes insolvent. The goal of the rule is to place a broker-dealer in
a position where it is able to wind down in an orderly self-liquidation
without the need for financial assistance from SIPC through a formal
proceeding under SIPA.\604\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\603\ Rule 15c3-3 defines qualified securities as securities
issued by the United States or guaranteed by the United States with
respect to principal and interest. 17 CFR 240.15c3-3(a)(6).
\604\ 15 U.S.C. 78aaa et seq.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

As discussed above in section II.E. of this release, Rule 15c3-1--
the net capital rule--requires broker-dealers to maintain a minimum
level of net capital (meaning highly liquid capital) at all times.\605\
The rule requires that a broker-dealer perform two calculations: (1) A
computation of the minimum amount of net capital the broker-dealer must
maintain; \606\ and (2) a computation of the amount of net capital the
broker-dealer is maintaining.\607\ The minimum net capital requirement
is the greater of a fixed-dollar amount specified in the rule and an
amount determined by applying one of two financial ratios: the 15-to-1
aggregate indebtedness to net capital ratio or the 2% of aggregate
debit items ratio.\608\ In computing net capital, the broker-dealer
must, among other things, make certain adjustments to net worth, such
as deducting illiquid assets, taking other capital charges, and adding
qualifying subordinated loans.\609\ The amount remaining after these
adjustments is defined as tentative net capital.\610\ The final step in
computing net capital is to take prescribed percentage deductions
(``standardized haircuts'') from the mark-to-market value of the
proprietary positions (e.g., securities, money market instruments, and
commodities) that are included in its tentative net capital.\611\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\605\ See 17 CFR 240.15c3-1.
\606\ See 17 CFR 240.15c3-1(a).
\607\ See 17 CFR 240.15c3-1(c)(2). The computation of net
capital is based on the definition of net capital in paragraph
(c)(2) of Rule 15c3-1. Id.
\608\ See 17 CFR 240.15c3-1(a).
\609\ See 17 CFR 240.15c3-1(c)(2)(i)-(xiii).
\610\ See 17 CFR 240.15c3-1(c)(15).
\611\ See 17 CFR 240.15c3-1(c)(2)(vi).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

As discussed above in section II.D. of this release, Rule 17a-3 and
17a-4--the books and records rules--require broker-dealers to make and
keep current certain records (e.g., trade blotters, asset and liability
ledgers, income ledgers, customer account ledgers, etc.), which must be
maintained in a specific manner for required retention

[[Page 51870]]

periods.\612\ Finally, Rule 17a-11--the notification rule--requires a
broker-dealer to notify the Commission and its DEA when certain events
occur, such as if it fails to maintain certain levels of net
capital.\613\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\612\ 17 CFR 240.17a-3; 17 CFR 240.17a-4.
\613\ 17 CFR 240.17a-11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The specific requirements as well as the benefits and costs of each
amendment and how broker-dealers will be affected are discussed in more
detail in the sections below.

C. Discussion of General Comments Received

As stated above, in the proposing release, the Commission requested
comment on estimates and views regarding the costs and benefits for
particular types of market participants, as well as any other costs and
benefits that may result from the adoption of the proposed rules.\614\
In response to this specific request, the Commission received two
comment letters.\615\ The first commenter who was explicitly addressing
the Commission's Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis stated that
the Commission should pay ``explicit attention to regulatory trends in
the rest of the world'' because doing so ``benefits not only small
entities [the focus of the Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis] (by
reducing their regulatory burden) but all entities, as larger entities
can experience more consistent regulatory procedures around the
world.'' \616\ The commenter suggested that the Commission consider a
``Basel II type approach to net capital requirements.'' \617\ The
second commenter requested that the Commission publish an update to all
statistics and costs referenced in the proposing release.\618\ The
commenter further requested that, once published, the Commission reopen
the comment period so that comments could be provided based on
``current conditions and statistics.'' \619\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\614\ See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at
12879.
\615\ See Angel Letter; NIBA 2 Letter.
\616\ See Angel Letter.
\617\ Id.
\618\ See NIBA 2 Letter.
\619\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In response to the first commenter's request that the Commission
should explicitly examine the alternatives used by regulators in other
jurisdictions,\620\ in adopting the final rule amendments today, as
discussed throughout this section, the Commission considered reasonable
alternatives, including alternatives in other jurisdictions, as well as
the costs and benefits of the amendments. Moreover, the amendments
relate to discrete areas of the broker-dealer financial responsibility
rules (i.e., they do not establish new financial responsibility
standards such as would be the case if the Commission were to adopt a
``Basel II type approach to net capital requirements.''). Consequently,
the commenter's suggestion is beyond the scope of this rulemaking.\621\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\620\ See Angel Letter.
\621\ The commenter cited the JP Morgan Letter in support of the
suggestion to ``consider regulatory trends in the rest of the
world.'' Id. The JP Morgan Letter recommends that the Commission
adopt a due diligence standard--citing a U.K. regulation--with
respect to the amendments regarding customer reserve account cash
deposits. See JP Morgan Letter. The Commission addresses this
comment below in section V.D.1.i.b.(III) of this release.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In response to the second commenter, the Commission is publishing
updated costs and statistics in this release. The Commission, however,
believes that it is unnecessary to reopen the comment period to obtain
comment on the updated statistics for several reasons. First, in
proposing the rule changes, the Commission included then current
estimates in the proposing release. Second, as noted above, the
Commission reopened the comment period in 2012.\622\ The reopening of
the comment period afforded commenters an additional opportunity to
comment on the proposed rules (including estimated costs and benefits),
given the economic events since the rule amendments were proposed, the
regulatory developments, the comments received on the proposed
amendments, the continuing public interest in the proposed amendments,
and the passage of time.\623\ The Commission received a total of 97
comment letters on the proposed amendments.\624\ As discussed below, in
many cases, the revised data included in this release reflects a
decrease in overall costs because of the decline in the total number of
broker-dealers (including the number of broker-dealers that will be
affected by each of these rule amendments). As of the 2004 year end,
the number of registered broker-dealers was 6,339. As of the 2011 year
end, the number of registered broker-dealers was 4,709, reflecting a
net decrease of 1,630 (or 26%) in the number of registered broker-
dealers. Consequently, many of the aggregate costs included in the
proposing release have declined due to the decrease in the number of
registered broker-dealers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\622\ Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules for Broker-
Dealers, Exchange Act Release No. 66910 (May 3, 2012), 77 FR 27150
(May 9, 2012).
\623\ Id.
\624\ See supra note 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Further, the costs incurred by a broker-dealer to comply with the
rule amendments will generally depend, among other factors, on the size
and complexity of its business activities. Because the size and
complexity of broker-dealers varies significantly, their costs also
could vary significantly. In some cases, the Commission provided in the
proposing release, and is providing here, estimates of the average cost
per broker-dealer, taking into consideration the variance in size and
complexity of the business activities of broker-dealers. In other
cases, the cost impact to broker-dealers will depend on whether the
broker-dealer is conducting activities that are subject to the rule
amendments. For example, the amendments to Rule 15c3-3 will apply, for
the most part, only to broker-dealers that carry PAB accounts (e.g.,
PAB account amendment), have a reserve deposit requirement (e.g.,
reserve bank account amendments), or carry free credit balances (e.g.,
free credit balance amendments). These amendments would have no direct
cost impact on non-carrying broker-dealers, many of which are small
broker-dealers. Moreover, given that some amendments are largely
codifications of existing Commission and staff guidance (e.g.,
amendments related to PAB accounts, third parties assuming broker-
dealer liabilities, temporary capital contributions, and fidelity bond
deductions), any economic effects, including costs and benefits, should
be compared to the baseline of current practice. Broker-dealers that
are already complying with these requirements would not be expected to
incur substantial costs to comply with these amendments.
The second commenter also stated that broker-dealers are dealing
with relatively static commission and fee schedules in comparison to
what they might charge customers, and, as such, broker-dealers will be
unable to pass on any cost increases resulting from these rule
amendments directly to customers.\625\ The commenter stated that these
cost increases over a relatively short period of time threaten the
viability of all small broker-dealers, irrespective of their business
line types or classes.\626\ The commenter noted that the estimates
provided by the Commission utilized only the number of broker-dealers
in its estimate that the Commission justifiably considered to be
affected by the proposals.\627\ In contrast, the commenter believes
that most, if not all broker-dealers will spend over 90 hours each
analyzing the effects of these

[[Page 51871]]

proposals and, if the rules are implemented, will spend much more than
90 hours each in implementing procedures to comply with the new rules.
The commenter also believes that implementation will require broker-
dealers to modify their written supervisory procedures and supervisory
controls, and broker-dealers will spend in excess of 240 hours each in
the monitoring of such rules on an ongoing basis. Consequently, the
commenter believes that each broker-dealer will spend in excess of
$15,000 for outside counsel and auditor opinions or work product.\628\
This commenter did not provide additional detail about the basis for
its view that the Commission's estimates were too low.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\625\ See NIBA 2 Letter.
\626\ Id.
\627\ Id.
\628\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

As stated above in section IV. of this release, the Commission
agrees with the commenter that the broker-dealers directly affected by
the rule amendments may be required to implement procedures or modify
their written supervisory procedures to comply with the rule
amendments. In cases where the rule amendments require a broker-dealer
to directly implement or document certain policies and procedures,
these hour burdens and costs already are incorporated into the PRA
costs discussed above in section IV. of this release, and incorporated
into the discussion below.\629\ In response to the commenter, the
Commission also acknowledges that a broker-dealer may need to review
its operations to determine whether it has any obligations under the
rule amendments. Even if the broker-dealer is not affected by the rule
amendments, such a review may result in an indirect effect on its
operations. These indirect costs are discussed in more detail below. In
adopting these final rules, as discussed throughout the release,
including this economic analysis, the Commission has sought to take
into account the costs and benefits associated with each particular
rule amendment. The Commission has also considered the indirect costs
that a broker-dealer would incur to assess the impact of these final
rule amendments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\629\ See, e.g., paragraph (j)(1) of Rule 15c3-3 and paragraph
(a)(23) of Rule 17a-3, as adopted.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Commission estimates that a broker-dealer likely will hire
outside counsel to assess the impact of the final rules on the broker-
dealer's operations because all broker-dealers may be affected by the
final rules, including non-carrying broker-dealers that may be affected
by certain amendments, such as the Rule 15c3-1 amendments regarding
third party liabilities or temporary capital contributions. Whether a
broker-dealer determines to incur such assessment costs will depend on
the nature and size of the broker-dealer's business and the range of
activities the broker-dealer conducts. Therefore, while the Commission
cannot estimate an aggregate assessment cost for all broker-dealers,
the Commission estimates that these assessment costs would range
approximately from $2,000 to $30,000 \630\ per broker-dealer.\631\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\630\ These costs estimates include hour estimates in the range
of 5 hours to 75 hours for outside counsel assessment review. A
small broker-dealer may hire outside counsel to review only 1 or 2
of the final rule amendments for approximately 5 hours x $400 per
hour = $2,000. See Business Conduct Standards for Security-Based
Swap Dealers and Major Security-Based Swap Participants, Exchange
Act Release No. 64766, 76 FR 42396 (June 29, 2011), 76 FR 42396
(July 18, 2011) (applying the estimated cost of $400 for legal
services by outside counsel). See also Further Definition of ``Swap
Dealer,'' ``Security-Based Swap Dealer,'' ``Major Swap
Participant,'' ``Major Security-Based Swap Participant'' and
``Eligible Contract Participant'', Exchange Act Release No. 66868
(Apr. 27, 2012), 77 FR 30596 (May 23, 2012) (noting that the review
of the final rules by outside counsel for a large firm would
generally cost more because the review would be more complex).
\631\ As discussed above, and in section IV. of this release,
broker-dealers directly affected by a specific rule amendment may be
required to implement procedures or modify their written supervisory
procedures in order to comply with the rule amendments. The hours
and related costs are discussed in section IV. of this release, and
are incorporated into the specific sections below discussing each
rule amendment. Therefore, while the range of hours is less than 90
hours (as suggested by the commenter), the Commission has adjusted
other specific hour and cost estimates (in sections IV. and V. of
this release) in response to the commenter's concerns, and believes
these adjusted estimates, in totality, for the reasons discussed
above, adequately address the estimated costs as well as the
commenter's concerns. See NIBA 2 Letter.
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D. Economic Analysis of the Amendments and Alternatives

This section discusses costs and benefits of the rule amendments
for the affected parties against the economic baseline identified
above, both in terms of each of the specific changes from the baseline
and in terms of the overall impact. In considering costs, benefits, and
overall impact, this discussion addresses comments received,
modifications made to the proposed amendments, and reasonable
alternatives, where applicable.
This section also discusses the Commission's considerations on the
burden on competition, and the promotion of efficiency, competition,
and capital formation.\632\ In significant part, the effects of the
final rules on efficiency and capital formation are linked to the
effects of these rules on competition. Competitive markets are
generally expected to promote an efficient allocation of capital. Rules
that promote, or do not unduly restrict, investor participation and
competition in the broker-dealer industry can be accompanied by
regulatory benefits that may reduce the risk of market failure and thus
promote market efficiency and capital formation.
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\632\ In the proposing release, the Commission stated that its
preliminary view was that the proposed amendments promote
efficiency, competition, and capital formation and would not have
any anti-competitive effects. See Amendments to Financial
Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12887.
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1. Amendments to the Customer Protection Rule
i. Economic Analysis
a. Proprietary Accounts of Broker-Dealers
(I). Summary of Amendments
Today's amendments to Rules 15c3-3 and 15c3-3a require carrying
broker-dealers to: (1) Perform a separate reserve computation for PAB
accounts (in addition to the customer reserve computation currently
required under Rule 15c3-3); \633\ (2) establish and fund a separate
reserve account for the benefit of the PAB account holders; \634\ and
(3) obtain and maintain physical possession or control of securities
carried for a PAB account, unless the carrying broker-dealer has
provided written notice to the PAB account holder that the securities
may be used in the ordinary course of its securities business, and has
provided opportunity for the PAB account holder to object.\635\ In
addition to the amendments to Rules 15c3-3 and 15c3-3a, the Commission
is adopting amendments to Rule 15c3-1 that will require a broker-dealer
to deduct from net capital cash and securities held in a securities
account at a carrying broker-dealer except where the account has been
subordinated to the claims of creditors of the carrying broker-
dealer.\636\
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\633\ 17 CFR 250.15c3-3(e)(3).
\634\ 17 CFR 240.15c3-3(e)(1).
\635\ 17 CFR 240.15c3-3(b)(5).
\636\ 17 CFR 240.15c3-1(c)(2)(iv)(E).
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As discussed above in section II.A.2. of this release, there is a
disparity between the customer reserve requirements in Rule 15c3-3 and
the treatment of customers in a liquidation proceeding under SIPA.\637\
Broker-dealers are not within the definition of customer for the
purposes of Rule 15c3-3.\638\ Accordingly, a carrying broker-dealer
that carries PAB accounts is not required to treat these accounts as
customer accounts for the purposes of Rule 15c3-3. However, the
definition of customer in SIPA is broader than the

[[Page 51872]]

definition in Rule 15c3-3 in that the SIPA definition does not exclude
broker-dealers.\639\
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\637\ 15 U.S.C. 78aaa et seq.
\638\ 17 CFR 240.15c3-3(a)(1).
\639\ See 15 U.S.C. 78lll(a).
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SIPA customers are entitled to a number of protections if their
broker-dealer fails and is liquidated in a SIPA proceeding, including
the right to share pro rata with other SIPA customers in the customer
property held by the broker-dealer and, if the fund of customer
property is insufficient to make each SIPA customer whole, the
entitlement to receive an advance from the SIPC fund of up to $500,000
(of which only $250,000 can be used to cover cash claims).\640\ Broker-
dealers that are SIPA customers have the right to share pro rata in
customer property.\641\ Consequently, when a carrying broker-dealer is
liquidated in a SIPA proceeding, each customer (including a SIPA
customer that is a broker-dealer) has a claim on the customer property.
However, because the possession and control and customer reserve
account provisions of Rule 15c3-3 do not apply to PAB account holders
by virtue of the definition of customer in the rule, the carrying
broker-dealer is not restricted from using the securities and cash in
these accounts for its business purposes.
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\640\ See 15 U.S.C. 78fff-2(c) and 15 U.S.C. 78fff-3(a),
respectively. Under SIPA, the term customer property includes ``cash
and securities . . . at any time received, acquired, or held by or
for the account of the debtor from or for the securities accounts of
a customer, and the proceeds of any such property transferred by the
debtor, including property unlawfully converted.'' Therefore,
customer property includes those securities positions that are held
for customers and the cash that is owed to customers. 15 U.S.C.
78lll(4).
\641\ See 15 U.S.C. 78fff-2(c). Broker-dealers, however, are not
entitled to receive an advance from the SIPC fund. 15 U.S.C. 78fff-
3(a).
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The treatment of PAB account holders as customers for the purposes
of SIPA but not as customers for the purposes of Rule 15c3-3 increases
the risk that, in the event that a carrying broker-dealer is liquidated
under SIPA, the claims of all SIPA customers will exceed the amount of
customer property available and, thereby, expose the SIPC fund and
potentially SIPA customers to losses. In addition, if the customer
property is insufficient to satisfy fully all SIPA customer claims, and
losses are incurred, the broker-dealer SIPA customers could be
potentially placed in financial distress causing adverse effects to the
securities markets, in addition to the adverse effects resulting from
the failure of the carrying broker-dealer.\642\
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\642\ As noted above, while broker-dealers are customers for the
purposes of SIPA, they are not entitled to the advances from the
SIPC fund of up to $500,000 (limited to $250,000 for cash claims)
allowed under SIPA to make up for potential shortfalls after the pro
rata distribution of customer property. 15 U.S.C. 78fff-3(a).
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The amendments address the disparity between the customer reserve
requirements in Rule 15c3-3 and the treatment of customers in a
liquidation proceeding under SIPA by requiring broker-dealers to
reserve for the amount that credits exceed debits with respect to
broker-dealer accounts. The amendments create a process that protects
customers and PAB account holders of a failed carrying broker-dealer,
and are designed to provide such protection by mitigating the risk that
there will be insufficient customer property to fully satisfy all
customer claims in a SIPA liquidation. By requiring the protection of
PAB account holders (who qualify as customers under SIPA), the
amendments to Rule 15c3-3 also reduce the risk that advances from the
SIPC fund would be necessary to protect customer claims.
The amendments to Rule 15c3-1 are intended to prevent broker-
dealers from including in their net capital amount assets that may not
be readily available to be returned to such broker-dealer account
holders because the assets would not be subject to the PAB account
provisions under Rules 15c3-3 and 15c3-3a. The amendments to Rule 15c3-
1 also provide consistency with the exclusions from the definition of
PAB account in paragraph (a)(16) of Rule 15c3-3.
Overall, the PAB-related amendments to Rules 15c3-3, 15c3-3a, and
15c3-1 should serve to reduce certain risks to investors and PAB
account holders and, thereby, strengthen customer protection. The
Commission requested comment on available metrics to quantify these
benefits and any other benefits a commenter may identify. The
Commission did not receive any comments in response to this request.
(II). Baseline and Incremental Economic Effects
Under the no-action relief set forth in the PAIB Letter,\643\
discussed in section II.A.2 of this release, broker-dealers currently
perform a reserve computation for domestic broker-dealer accounts and
have obtained the necessary agreements and notices from the banks
holding their PAIB reserve deposits. Therefore, as compared to the
baseline of current Rule 15c3-1 and existing interpretations and
guidance thereunder, including the no-action relief set forth in the
PAIB Letter, the amendments will likely result only in small
incremental benefits and costs because the final rule codifies many of
the provisions of the PAIB Letter.\644\
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\643\ See PAIB Letter.
\644\ See section II.B. of this release. The PAIB Letter is
being withdrawn as of the effective date of these rule amendments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Incorporation of certain aspects of the PAIB Letter into Rule 15c3-
3 is intended to provide broker-dealers with more certainty with
respect to the PAB requirements because these requirements will be
expressly stated in a Commission rule. Moreover, the PAB final rule
amendments will not impose a significant additional burden on broker-
dealers presently utilizing the interpretive relief provided in the
PAIB Letter since the provisions of the final rule amendments are
substantially similar. Relative to the baseline, there will be economic
differences to the extent that carrying broker-dealers are currently
not following the PAIB Letter, as compliance with conditions of the
PAIB Letter are voluntary, while the PAB amendments to Rule 15c3-3 will
be mandatory for the carrying broker-dealers subject to its
requirements. Consequently, to the extent that carrying broker-dealers
are not currently complying with the PAIB Letter, and to the extent the
amendments as adopted differ from the PAIB Letter, they may incur
incremental costs, including possible costs of capital as firms
reallocate capital to comply with the rule amendments.
(III). Alternatives
In adopting these amendments, the Commission considered
alternatives suggested by commenters on specific provisions of the
rule, and incorporated some of these alternative approaches into the
final rule amendments.
Two commenters raised concerns about the proposed definition of the
term PAB account, because by including proprietary accounts of foreign
broker-dealers and foreign banks acting as broker-dealers within the
definition, the definition would differ from provisions in the PAIB
Letter, which excluded such accounts from a PAIB computation.\645\ The
first commenter suggested allowing broker-dealers to ``opt out'' of the
rule.\646\ The second commenter stated that foreign broker-dealers and
foreign banks acting as broker-dealers should be allowed to subordinate
their claims to customers and creditors of the broker-dealer to remove
their accounts from PAB account treatment because under SIPA foreign
broker-dealers and foreign banks acting as broker-dealers, under
certain circumstances, will not be deemed customers and, therefore,

[[Page 51873]]

would not be entitled to a pro rata share of the estate of customer
property in a SIPA liquidation.\647\ More specifically, the commenter
suggested that, to parallel the language in SIPA,\648\ the Commission
modify the definition of PAB account to exclude ``any foreign broker-
dealer and foreign bank, to the extent that such entity has a claim for
cash or securities that is subordinated to the claims of creditors of
the carrying broker-dealer.'' This commenter also recommended that the
subordinating broker-dealer would need to follow the requirements for
non-conforming subordinated loans to remove an account from being
treated as a PAB account.\649\
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\645\ See Dresdner Kleinwort Letter; Deutsche Bank Securities
Letter.
\646\ See Dresdner Kleinwort Letter.
\647\ See Deutsche Bank Securities Letter.
\648\ Id. The definition of customer in SIPA excludes any
person, to the extent that ``such person has a claim for cash or
securities which by contract, agreement, or understanding, or by
operation of law, is part of the capital of the debtor, or is
subordinated to the claims of any or all creditors of the debtor,
notwithstanding that some ground exists for declaring such contract,
agreement, or understanding void or voidable in a suit between the
claimant and the debtor.'' 15 U.S.C. 78lll(2)(C)(ii).
\649\ See Deutsche Bank Securities Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In response to commenters' concerns and suggested alternatives, the
Commission is excluding from the PAB account definition accounts that
have been subordinated to the claims of creditors of the carrying
broker-dealer. Consequently, this provision will provide flexibility to
carrying broker-dealers and their broker-dealer affiliates to structure
their PAB account relationships in a manner that permits operational
efficiencies (i.e., the ability to exclude these accounts from the PAB
reserve computation) while still promoting the goal of the amendments
to have a consistent treatment of these accounts under Rule 15c3-3 and
SIPA, and thereby protect accounts holders that are customers under
SIPA. As discussed below, however, the requirement to enter into a
subordination agreement with certain account holders to exclude them
from the definition of PAB account may result in a one-time cost to
broker-dealers.
In addition, in the proposing release, the Commission proposed to
require that a carrying broker-dealer obtain written permission from a
PAB account holder before it could use the securities of the PAB
account holder in the ordinary course of its securities business. One
commenter stated that this provision should be eliminated from the
proposed amendments, arguing that it interferes unnecessarily in the
contractual arrangements between broker-dealers, which are capable of
understanding the terms of standard industry custodial relationships
and that the PAIB Letter did not contain any such requirements. The
Commission considered this alternative and believes that an appropriate
level of protection for PAB account holders will be achieved by
requiring the carrying broker-dealer to provide written notice to the
PAB account holders that the firm may use their non-margin securities
in the ordinary course of its securities business. The written notice
requirement in the final rule will increase protection for PAB account
holders from the status quo without imposing substantial burdens on
existing account relationships. The revised rule will alert PAB account
holders to the fact that the carrying broker-dealer may use their
securities in its business for its own benefit, thereby reducing
possible contractual ambiguity between the PAB account holder and the
broker-dealer. The revised rule also will provide a PAB account holder
the opportunity to seek to move the account to another broker-dealer or
to negotiate different terms with regard to the use of its securities.
Finally, this amendment will eliminate the need for, and the costs that
would result from, carrying broker-dealers reworking existing
contracts.
An alternative considered in adopting the PAB-related amendments to
Rule 15c3-1 would have required a broker-dealer, when calculating net
capital, to deduct from net worth cash and securities held in a
securities account at another broker-dealer, if the other broker-dealer
does not treat the account, and the assets in the account, in
compliance with the applicable PAB requirements of the rule.\650\
Although the proposing release stated that the Commission did not
expect broker-dealers to audit or examine their carrying broker-dealers
to determine whether such firms were in compliance with the proposed
rule, commenters expressed concern that the proposed rule text
suggested that broker-dealers in fact would have such an
obligation.\651\ There were also concerns expressed that a broker-
dealer should not be deemed to have violated the net capital rule
because its carrying firm fails to properly perform requirements solely
applicable to the carrying firm and that Rule 15c3-1 should be modified
to clarify that cash and securities held in a securities account at
another broker-dealer are not subject to the deduction specified in
paragraph (c)(2)(iv)(E) of Rule 15c3-1.\652\ In response to these
concerns, the Commission has modified the language in the Rule 15c3-1
to eliminate the proposed capital charge that would have resulted from
a failure of a carrying broker-dealer to comply with the PAB
requirements. Instead, the Commission has adopted amendments providing
that a broker-dealer need not deduct cash and securities held in a
securities account at another broker-dealer, with one exception. As
discussed in section II.A.2. of this release, the exception generally
parallels the exclusions from the definition of PAB account in Rule
15c3-3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\650\ See section II.A.2.v. of this release.
\651\ See SIFMA 2 Letter.
\652\ Id.
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(IV). Compliance Cost Estimates
The Commission is mindful of the compliance costs associated with
the final PAB rule amendments. In particular, the Commission recognizes
that, though many requirements of the PAB rule amendments being adopted
by the Commission today are incorporated from the PAIB Letter, there
may be incremental imposed costs. For example, as discussed above in
section II.A.2. of this release, because the possession and control and
customer reserve account provisions of Rule 15c3-3 do not apply to PAB
account holders by virtue of the definition of customer in the rule,
the carrying broker-dealer is not restricted from using the securities
and cash in those accounts for its own business purposes. Broker-
dealers carrying PAB accounts will be required to comply with the final
PAB rule amendments, in contrast to the provisions of the PAIB Letter,
which are voluntary.\653\ To the extent that carrying broker-dealers
are not currently complying with the PAIB Letter, or to the extent the
amendments as adopted differ from the PAIB Letter, they may incur
incremental costs, including possible costs of capital as firms
reallocate capital to comply with the rule amendments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\653\ See PAIB Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The requirement to enter into a subordination agreement with
certain account holders to exclude them from the definition of PAB
account,\654\ the requirement to provide written notice to PAB account
holders that their securities may be used in the ordinary course of the
carrying broker-dealer's securities business,\655\ the requirement

[[Page 51874]]

to amend the standard PAB agreement templates,\656\ and the need to
update systems to implement the necessary changes \657\ may also impose
one-time costs. In addition, a carrying broker-dealer will incur
postage costs as a result of the requirement to send written notices to
PAB account holders regarding the use of their non-margin securities,
as well as outside counsel fees to review the notice and standard PAB
agreement template.\658\ Finally, the requirements to compute and
establish a separate reserve for PAB accounts will result in annual
costs to carrying broker-dealers to the extent that these requirements
will lengthen the time needed to compute and establish the PAB reserve
account under the PAIB Letter. The Commission estimates that these
requirements would impose one-time and annual costs in the aggregate of
approximately $6,434,840 \659\ and $2,709,210,\660\ respectively.
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\654\ The internal hours for this requirement would likely be
performed by an in-house Attorney at $379 per hour. Therefore the
estimated internal cost would be calculated as follows: $379 per
hour x 13,420 hours = $5,086,180. See also section IV.D.3. of this
release.
\655\ The internal hours required to draft the notice would
likely be performed by an in-house Attorney at $379 per hour. The
estimated internal cost would be calculated as follows: $379 per
hour x 610 hours = $231,190. The internal hours required to send out
the notices would likely be performed by a Compliance Clerk at $63
per hour, resulting in an internal estimated cost calculated as
follows: $63 per hour x 259 hours = $16,317. See also section
IV.D.4. of this release.
\656\ The internal hours would likely be performed by an in-
house Attorney at $379 per hour, resulting in an internal estimated
cost calculated as follows: $379 per hour x 1,220 hours = $462,380.
See also section IV.D.4. of this release.
\657\ The internal hours would likely be performed by a Senior
Programmer at $282 per hour, resulting in the estimated internal
cost calculated as follows: $282 per hour x 1,830 hours = $516,060.
See also section IV.D.4. of this release.
\658\ The estimated postage costs are calculated as follows:
1,551 notices x $0.46 = $713.46. To review and comment on the notice
and PAB templates, the estimated outside counsel burden is $122,000,
in aggregate. See also section IV.D.4. of this release.
\659\ See section IV.D.3 and 4. of this release ($5,086,180 +
$231,190 + $16,317 + $462,380 + $516,060 + $713.46 + $122,000 =
$6,434,840.46).
\660\ The internal hours would likely be performed by a
Financial Reporting Manager at $294 per hour, resulting in the
estimated internal cost calculated as follows: $294 per hour x 9,215
hours = $2,709,210. See also section IV.D.4. of this release.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

As noted above, the Commission requested comment on the proposed
cost estimates.\661\ In particular, the Commission requested comment on
whether there would be additional costs to broker-dealers as a
consequence of these proposals. The Commission requested comment on
whether these requirements would result in such costs and, if so, how
to quantify the costs. The Commission also requested comment on whether
these proposals would impose costs on other market participants,
including broker-dealer customers. Commenters were also asked to
identify the metrics and sources of any empirical data that support
their cost estimates. The Commission did not receive any comments in
response to these requests.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\661\ See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at
12880. In the proposing release, the Commission estimated that the
one-time and annual costs to broker-dealers resulting from these
proposed amendments would be $603,000 and $2,599,399. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

b. Banks Where Special Reserve Deposits May Be Held
(I). Summary of Amendments
As amended, paragraph (e) of Rule 15c3-3 requires carrying broker-
dealers to deposit cash or qualified securities into their customer or
PAB reserve account, which must be maintained at a ``bank.'' \662\ As
adopted, the final rule excludes when determining whether a broker-
dealer maintains the minimum deposits required under paragraph (e) of
Rule 15c3-3: (1) Cash deposited with an affiliated bank; and (2) cash
deposited at a ``non-affiliated bank to the extent that the amount of
the deposit exceeds 15% of the bank's equity capital as reported by the
bank in its most recent Call Report or any successor form the bank is
required to file by its appropriate Federal banking agency (as defined
by Section 3 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1813)).''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\662\ The term qualified securities is defined in paragraph
(a)(6) of Rule 15c3-3 to mean securities issued by the United States
or guaranteed by the United States with respect to principal and
interest. 17 CFR 240.15c3-3(a)(6). The term bank is defined in
paragraph (a)(7) of Rule 15c3-3 as a ``bank as defined in section
3(a)(6) of the Act and will also mean any building and loan, savings
and loan or similar banking institution subject to the supervision
by a Federal banking authority.'' See paragraph (a)(7) to Rule 15c3-
3, as adopted.
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Under paragraph (f) of Rule 15c3-3, a broker-dealer is currently
required to obtain a written contract from the bank wherein the bank
agrees not to re-lend or hypothecate the qualified securities deposited
into the reserve account.\663\ This means that the bank cannot use the
qualified securities in its business, which provides a measure of
protection by requiring that the securities will be available to the
broker-dealer if the bank falls into financial difficulty. Cash
deposits, however, may be freely used in the course of the bank's
commercial activities. Therefore, because they do not have that same
type of protection, the amendments to Rule 15c3-3 enhance customer
protection by prohibiting a carrying broker-dealer from holding
customer cash deposits at its affiliated bank and establishing
requirements designed to avoid the situation where a carrying broker-
dealer's cash deposits constitute a substantial portion of the bank's
deposits.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\663\ 17 CFR 240.15c3-3(f).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Customer cash deposits may be at risk if a carrying broker-dealer
does not exercise due diligence when assessing the financial soundness
of an affiliated bank with the same degree of impartiality and care as
it would with an unaffiliated bank. The situation where a broker-
dealer's cash constitutes a substantial portion of a bank's deposits
also poses a risk that some or all of the cash deposits may not be
readily available for quick withdrawal by the broker-dealer. Depending
on the relative size of the deposit, a lost deposit that is large
relative to the broker-dealer's capital could cause the firm to
fail.\664\ If the broker-dealer fails and the deposit is not recovered,
the SIPC fund may not recover advances that it has made for the purpose
of returning customer assets. To the extent that customer losses exceed
the SIPA advance limits, customers may suffer permanent losses.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\664\ See Amendment to the Financial Responsibility Rules for
Broker-Dealers, 72 FR at 12880.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The amendment to Rule 15c3-3 should serve to reduce certain risks
to investors in the event of a bank's failure and, thereby, enhance
customer protection. The Commission requested comment on available
metrics to quantify these benefits and any other benefits a commenter
may identify. Commenters were also requested to identify sources of
empirical data that could be used for the proposed metrics. The
Commission did not receive any comments in response to these requests.
(II). Baseline and Incremental Economic Effects
The current baseline for the amendment to paragraph (e) of Rule
15c3-3 is the existing customer protection requirements under Rule
15c3-3 and interpretations of the rule. Under paragraph (e) of Rule
15c3-3, broker-dealers are currently required to deposit cash or
qualified securities into the customer reserve account, which must be
maintained at a ``bank.'' Under current interpretations, broker-dealers
are limited in their reserve account cash deposits at parent or
affiliated banks to 50% of the broker-dealer's excess net capital or
10% of the bank's equity capital.\665\ Current interpretations also
place similar restrictions on certain types of products at unaffiliated
banks, including restrictions on concentration in money market deposit
accounts and time deposits.\666\
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\665\ FINRA Interpretation 15c3-3(e)(3)/051.
\666\ See FINRA Interpretation 15c3-3(e)(1)/01 and /011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

As compared to the baseline, the Commission estimates that the
incremental costs resulting from this amendment will be limited. Using

[[Page 51875]]

FOCUS Report data, as of December 31, 2011, the Commission estimates
that approximately 224 broker-dealers report reserve deposits.\667\ A
considerable proportion of these broker-dealers, including some of the
largest firms, meet their deposit requirements using mostly qualified
securities as opposed to cash and, therefore, will be marginally
impacted by this amendment. For example, based on FOCUS Report data, as
of December 31, 2011, for the 224 broker-dealers with reserve deposits,
79% of the total customer reserve requirement was met using qualified
securities that could still be deposited at affiliated banks to meet
customer reserve requirements, under the rule, as adopted. The
remaining customer reserve requirement could be met by using qualified
securities (as opposed to cash) and/or opening one or more accounts at
unaffiliated banks, which would hold the cash within the limits
permitted under the rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\667\ This estimate is based on FOCUS Report filings the 2011
year end. It is an update from the proposing release estimate of 216
broker-dealers. See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72
FR at 12881.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Relative to the current baseline, broker-dealers may incur two
types of costs. The first type of cost relates to the costs of opening
a new account at an unaffiliated bank for broker-dealers that currently
hold cash in a reserve account at an affiliated bank. It is difficult
to estimate the number of broker-dealers that hold cash reserve
deposits at an affiliated bank because FOCUS Report data does not
include the names of banks at which broker-dealers maintain their
reserve accounts. Therefore, this data is not readily available to the
Commission and commenters did not provide it. Based on an analysis of
FOCUS Report data as of December 31, 2011, as well as available bank
data,\668\ the Commission, however, estimates that there are
approximately 50 broker-dealers \669\ that have an affiliated bank and
cash in their customer reserve accounts.
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\668\ Data regarding a bank's equity capital as of the 2011 year
end is publicly available at https://www2.fdic.gov/sdi/.
\669\ This estimate is based on a review of broker-dealers and
affiliated banks based on legal names, as well as customer reserve
account data, from FOCUS Report data.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The second type of cost relates to the costs of opening and
maintaining multiple bank accounts if the cash deposit exceeds the 15%
bank equity capital threshold as defined in the final rule, the
likelihood of which the Commission expects to decrease because, with
the relaxation of the bank equity capital threshold in the final rule,
fewer broker-dealers will be required to open multiple accounts,
relative to the current baseline. Broker-dealers, however, may replace
these types of cost with the costs of converting cash into qualified
securities to meet some or all of their reserve deposit requirements
under Rule 15c3-3.
Moreover, in an attempt to reduce search costs, the potential
exists that broker-dealers will select one or a few large unaffiliated
banks or create networks on the basis of reciprocity between broker-
dealers and banks. This could result in a potential concentration of
reserve cash deposits at a few banks. If as a result of such
concentration, the carrying broker-dealer's deposit constitutes a
substantial portion of the bank's total deposits, the risk increases
that the bank may not have the liquidity to quickly return the deposit
to the broker-dealer. Finally, the affiliated banks that are currently
holding and using broker-dealer reserve cash deposits in the course of
their business may incur funding costs, resulting from the possible
transfer of cash deposits in the reserve account by broker-dealers to
unaffiliated banks. These incremental funding costs to the affiliated
banks may potentially be offset by the benefit of receiving cash
deposits from unaffiliated broker-dealers.
(III). Alternatives
In adopting the final rule, the Commission considered several
alternative approaches suggested by commenters. For example, commenters
urged the Commission not to adopt the proposed prohibition on broker-
dealers maintaining cash in reserve accounts at banks that are
affiliates, stating that affiliated banks should be treated the same as
unaffiliated banks because both groups are subject to the same
financial regulation. One commenter noted that if a broker-dealer must
move their reserve accounts to an unaffiliated bank this may require
the broker-dealer to enter into new or additional banking relationships
to comply with the amendment, which would increase the costs and
administrative burdens of those reserve account funds.\670\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\670\ See Raymond James 2 Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Several commenters suggested that the Commission allow cash reserve
deposits without percentage restrictions at unaffiliated banks that are
well-capitalized or for which a broker-dealer has performed due
diligence.\671\ One of these commenters cited a U.K. regulation that
requires a firm selecting a bank to hold customer deposits to undertake
due diligence on the bank taking into consideration a number of factors
including: (1) The capital of the bank; (2) the amount of client money
placed, as a proportion of the bank's capital and deposits; (3) the
credit rating of the bank (if available); and (4) to the extent the
information is available, the level of risk in the investment and loan
activities undertaken by the bank and its affiliated companies.\672\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\671\ See Raymond James Letter; JP Morgan Letter; The Clearing
House Letter; ABASA Letter; PNC Letter; Deutsche Bank Securities
Letter; E*Trade Letter; JP Morgan 2 Letter.
\672\ See JP Morgan Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

One commenter suggested that the Commission consider higher
percentages for cash deposits at large money-center banks.\673\ This
commenter also stated that the percentage thresholds would negatively
impact small broker-dealers because they would cross the 50% of excess
net capital threshold at lower deposit levels.\674\ Another commenter
suggested that the Commission reconsider the proposed limitation on the
amount of reserve account cash deposits that may be held at any one
bank because the limitation would result in significant costs for
broker-dealers and could potentially adversely impact the customers of
broker-dealers.\675\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\673\ See SIFMA 2 Letter; see also NIBA Letter.
\674\ See SIFMA 2 Letter.
\675\ See Raymond James 2 Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In the final rule, the language excluding customer and PAB reserve
cash deposits at affiliated banks from counting towards a broker-
dealer's reserve requirement is being adopted as proposed. As discussed
further below, relative to the proposed rule, in the final rule, the
Commission eliminated the proposed language that would have excluded
the amount of the deposit at an unaffiliated bank that exceeded 50% of
a broker-dealer's excess net capital and based on the Commission's
expert judgment, increased the bank equity capital threshold from 10%
to 15%.\676\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\676\ See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at
12864.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In response to comments on the proposed rule (including comments
suggesting a due diligence standard instead of an objective threshold),
the Commission modified the final rule text in ways that are designed
to substantially mitigate the costs identified by commenters. While the
final rule amendment excludes the amount of any cash on deposit at an
affiliated bank from being used to meet a broker-dealer's reserve
requirement, the Commission eliminated the provision that would have
excluded the amount of a deposit that exceeds 50% of a broker-dealer's
excess net capital. This provision would have impacted small and mid-
size broker-dealers when

[[Page 51876]]

they deposited cash into large commercial banks since the cash deposits
of these firms would exceed the broker-dealer excess net capital
threshold before exceeding the bank equity capital threshold.
The elimination of the broker-dealer excess net capital threshold,
combined with the increase of the bank equity capital threshold from
10% to 15%, is intended to substantially mitigate the costs, burdens
and inefficiencies that commenters believed would be imposed on small
and mid-size broker-dealers if such firms had to open multiple bank
accounts as a result of the proposed rule. The rule, as adopted, will
allow small and mid-size broker-dealers to maintain reserve accounts at
one bank if they so choose, provided that the bank equity capital
threshold is not exceeded. In contrast to the proposed thresholds, the
final rule amendments should reduce the costs associated with
implementing the necessary changes to systems, operations, and
contractual agreements related to a broker-dealer's reserve bank
accounts.
Further, in response to comments, increasing the threshold from 10%
to 15% of the bank's equity capital is intended to address concerns
raised by large broker-dealers with large deposit requirements that the
10% threshold would have resulted in increased costs of having to
spread out deposits over a number of banks. The decrease in the cost of
opening and maintaining multiple accounts resulting from the increased
threshold to 15% of the bank's equity capital may counterbalance the
increase in the cost of transferring cash deposits to an unaffiliated
bank. In summary, the rule, as adopted, with an increase to a 15%
threshold will, in the Commission's expert judgment, substantially
mitigate the cost concerns raised by commenters, while still providing
adequate customer protection consistent with the goal of the rule to
promote the broker-dealer's ability to have quick access to the
deposit.
With respect to qualified securities, one commenter argued that if
a broker-dealer elects to use qualified securities as opposed to cash
to meet its reserve requirement, the broker-dealer will likely have a
significant amount of additional operational and transactional
costs.\677\ In addition, this commenter stated that while large broker-
dealers may be able to reallocate existing trading desk, operational,
regulatory reporting, and treasury functions to assist in ongoing
maintenance activities, small and mid-sized broker-dealers may be
required to hire additional staff to manage and maintain a securities
portfolio.\678\ In response to the commenter, many large broker-dealers
already hold large amounts of their reserve deposits in qualified
securities. As the commenter noted, if a large broker-dealer needed to
shift more of its reserve deposits into qualified securities as opposed
to cash, then these firms would most likely reallocate existing
functions to assist in ongoing maintenance activities, thus offsetting
any costs associated with the shift of reserve deposits into qualified
securities. Finally, with the elimination of the 50% excess net capital
threshold in the rule as amended, most small and mid-sized firms likely
would not have ongoing costs, because under the final rules, all firms
will now only have to comply with the bank equity capital threshold,
which as confirmed by comments, would be of concern primarily for the
large firms. Therefore, under the final rule, broker-dealers should not
incur significant operational or transactional costs in complying with
the amendment.\679\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\677\ See JP Morgan Letter. The commenter noted that ``[c]ertain
broker-dealers may be required to hire additional staff to manage
and maintain a securities portfolio.'' Id. ``Managing a pool of
qualified securities involves a myriad of tasks such as monitoring
income collection, redemption processing, marking the securities to
market, collateral substitutions and collateral segregation amongst
other tasks.'' Id. The commenter did not quantify the costs of
managing a pool of qualified securities or the costs of additional
staff to manage the securities portfolio.
\678\ Id.
\679\ See JP Morgan Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

(IV). Compliance Cost Estimates
In the proposing release, in quantifying costs, the Commission
estimated that, of the 216 firms with reserve deposit requirements,
only 11 broker-dealers would need to open new bank accounts or
substitute cash for qualified securities in an existing reserve
account,\680\ and that this would result in an estimated total one-time
cost of approximately $2,630 per broker-dealer \681\ and approximately
$28,930 in the aggregate.\682\ As noted above, the Commission requested
comment on the proposed cost estimates. Commenters were asked to
identify the metrics and sources of any empirical data that support
their cost estimates. The Commission received seven comment letters in
response to the proposed cost estimates.\683\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\680\ The Commission estimated in the proposing release that it
would take approximately 10 hours to implement these changes. See
Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12881.
\681\ Id.
\682\ 11 broker-dealers x $2,630 = $28,930. Id. at 12881.
\683\ See Curian Clearing Letter; SIFMA 2 Letter; Clearing House
Letter; ABASA Letter; Deutsche Bank Letter; E*Trade Letter; P Morgan
Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

One commenter stated that the estimate is inaccurate and arbitrary,
and does not take into account situations where a broker-dealer will
need to establish numerous banking relationships.\684\ Commenters also
stated that the Commission failed to consider the ongoing costs of
maintaining and monitoring multiple bank accounts.\685\ One commenter
believes that limiting Rule 15c3-3 deposits at a single bank to 50% of
a broker-dealer's excess net capital will require a significant number
of broker-dealers to open a number of additional cash and/or securities
accounts and devote ongoing operational resources to the management of
such accounts.\686\ This commenter stated that at any one time,
approximately 10% to 15% of broker-dealer customers could be impacted
by the proposed rule change and many of those customers would be
required to open accounts at multiple institutions.\687\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\684\ See Curian Clearing Letter.
\685\ See Curian Clearing Letter; SIFMA 2 Letter; ABASA Letter;
The Clearing House Letter; E*Trade Letter; JP Morgan Letter.
\686\ See JP Morgan Letter.
\687\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Commenters also stated that the proposed amendments would impose
requirements whose costs are not adequately justified by their benefits
and that the Commission substantially underestimated the costs.\688\
One commenter noted that there are significant costs associated with
implementing the necessary changes to systems, operations, and
contractual agreements that the Commission did not appear to take into
account.\689\ Another commenter stated that the proposal also fails to
quantify the inherent inefficiency of forcing broker-dealers to set up
numerous bank accounts to satisfy the restrictive broker-dealer net
capital and bank equity capital requirements.\690\ Another commenter
suggested that the Commission consider higher percentage limits for
cash deposits held at very large money center banks, stating that a
higher percentage limit would strike a better balance between the
Commission's concerns regarding the safety of cash deposits and the
substantial costs imposed on broker-dealers by overly restrictive
deposit limitations.\691\ Two commenters

[[Page 51877]]

believed that the upfront and ongoing cost to each broker-dealer is far
higher than the one-time estimate of $2,630 that the Commission
estimated in the proposing release.\692\ One commenter stated that
conducting due diligence and opening new accounts and the ongoing
monitoring and periodic re-evaluation of such additional accounts would
require much more time than the 10 hours originally estimated by the
Commission.\693\ One commenter, referencing the SIFMA 2 Letter, stated
that it agreed with SIFMA that the Commission significantly
underestimated the cost of the proposal to smaller firms.\694\ Finally,
commenters did not provide the Commission with revised cost estimates
or data related to these amendments.
In quantifying costs, the Commission is increasing its estimate of
the number of broker-dealers that will likely incur the cost of opening
a new account at an unaffiliated bank (or substituting cash for
qualified securities in their reserve accounts) from the estimated 11
broker-dealers in the proposing release to 50 broker-dealers, as
described above.\695\ In addition, in response to the commenter's
concern that conducting due diligence and opening new accounts would
require much more time than the 10 hours originally estimated by the
Commission,\696\ the Commission also is increasing the one-time hour
estimates discussed in the proposing release from 10 to 25 hours.\697\
In response to the commenters pointing that the amendments would
require ongoing monitoring of bank equity capital levels,\698\ the
Commission is including an annual cost estimate in this release (in
addition to the estimated one-time costs) to account for incremental
ongoing costs to monitor compliance with the rule.\699\ The Commission
further estimates that the average cost per firm to make these changes
will be approximately $4,925 on a one-time basis and $12,675 on an
annual basis.\700\ For these reasons, the Commission estimates that the
total cost to broker-dealers will be approximately $246,250 on a one-
time basis and $633,750 on an annual basis.\701\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\688\ See SIFMA 2 Letter; ABASA Letter.
\689\ See SIFMA 2 Letter.
\690\ See ABASA Letter.
\691\ See SIFMA 2 Letter.
\692\ See JP Morgan Letter; E*Trade Letter.
\693\ See SIFMA 2 Letter.
\694\ See NIBA Letter.
\695\ The Commission estimates that the responsibility for the
one-time opening a new reserve bank account or substituting
qualified securities for cash in an existing account likely would be
undertaken by a Senior Treasury/Cash Management Manager at $197 per
hour. See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at
12881.
\696\ See SIFMA 2 Letter.
\697\ See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at
12881. The Commission estimates that the Senior Treasury/Cash
Management Manager will spend approximately 25 hours performing
these changes on a one-time basis.
\698\ See SIFMA 2 Letter.
\699\ The Commission estimates that the responsibility for the
annual compliance review of these rule amendments likely would be
split between a Senior Treasury/Cash Management Manager at $197 per
hour and a Compliance Attorney at $310 per hour, and will likely
take 50 hours per year.
\700\ $197 per hour x 25 hours = $4,925; ($197 per hour x 25
hours) + ($310 x 25 hours) = $12,675.
\701\ 50 broker-dealers x $4,925 = $246,250; 50 broker-dealers x
$12,675 = $633,750.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Finally, using FOCUS Report data and top decile bank equity capital
data at year end 2011,\702\ the Commission estimates that approximately
30 broker-dealers are no longer required to sustain the cost of
maintaining multiple bank accounts, as a result of removing the 50%
excess net capital threshold and increasing the bank equity capital
threshold to 15%. This change to the final rule may result in potential
cost savings to broker-dealers, which may have been required to
maintain multiple bank accounts under the rule, as proposed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\702\ See https://cdr.ffiec.gov/public/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

c. Allocation of Customers' Fully Paid and Excess Margin Securities to
Short Positions
The amendment to paragraph (d)(4) of Rule 15c3-3 requires broker-
dealers to take prompt steps to obtain possession or control over fully
paid and excess margin securities on the broker-dealer's books or
records that allocate to a short position of the broker-dealer or a
short position for another person, excluding positions covered by
paragraph (m) of Rule 15c3-3, for more than 30 calendar days.\703\ This
amendment protects broker-dealer customers by helping to ensure that
customer securities are available to be returned in the event of a
broker-dealer failure. Therefore, in addition to broker-dealer
customers, the amendment benefits the SIPC fund to the extent that it
mitigates potential outlays from the fund to make advances to customers
of a failed broker-dealer that cannot return all customer securities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\703\ 17 CFR 240.15c3-3(d)(4).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Commission requested comment on available metrics to quantify
these benefits and any other benefits a commenter may identify. In
particular, the Commission requested comment on whether there would be
additional costs to broker-dealers as a consequence of these proposals
and whether these proposals would impose costs on other market
participants, including broker-dealer customers. The Commission also
requested that commenters identify sources of empirical data that could
be used for the metrics they proposed. The Commission received one
comment in response to these requests.\704\ The commenter stated that
the proposed amendments would ``greatly increase the cost of
proprietary and customer short positions that were established and
maintained in accordance with all applicable short sale regulations at
the time entered.'' \705\ However, this commenter did not quantify its
cost estimates in terms of dollars, nor did it provide data to support
its conclusion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\704\ See Raymond James 2 Letter.
\705\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In response to this comment, modifications were made to the final
rule that should mitigate the commenter's concern because the changes
were designed to reduce operational burdens and to more closely align
the final rule with current regulations related to short sales. More
specifically, as discussed in section II.A.4., as adopted, final
paragraph (d)(4) of Rule 15c3-3 contains a uniform 30 calendar day
period and clarifies that the 30 calendar day period with respect to a
syndicate short position established in connection with an offering
does not begin to run until the underwriter's participation in the
distribution is complete as determined pursuant to Rule 100(b) of
Regulation M. In addition, the proposed amendment was designed to
require that the aging process commence at the time a deficit in
securities allocating to a short position arises. These modifications
clarify the rule amendment, while continuing to strengthen customer
protections under Rule 15c3-3.
Three commenters argued that the credit item added to the reserve
formula computation when a customer's fully paid or excess margin
securities are allocated to a short position provides the customer with
adequate protection.\706\ The Commission considered this alternative,
as well as the cost concerns raised above, in adopting these final rule
amendments. It has been a long-standing industry practice for carrying
broker-dealers to use securities of PAB account holders in their
business activities. In contrast, as stated above in section II.A.4. of
this release, customers under Rule 15c3-3, which include the carrying
broker-dealer's retail customers, have an expectation that the fully
paid and excess margin securities reflected on their account statements
are, in fact, in the possession or control of the carrying broker-
dealer. However, as described above, this expectation may be

[[Page 51878]]

frustrated where the securities are allocated to a short position
carried by the broker-dealer, as the securities are not in the
possession or control of the carrying broker-dealer. This gap in the
existing rule, in effect, permits the broker-dealer to partially
monetize the Rule 15c3-3 customer's securities. Also, under some
circumstances (e.g., a change in the market value of the securities),
the amount the broker-dealer may have on deposit in the reserve account
as a consequence of the credit item may be less than the value of the
securities. Consequently, if the broker-dealer fails, sufficient funds
may not be readily available to purchase the securities to return them
to customers. The use of customer securities in this manner is contrary
to the customer protection goals of Rule 15c3-3 and the expectations of
a broker-dealer's customers.\707\ Therefore, the Commission believes
that any increased costs related to this final rule amendment are
justified by the enhancements to the customer protection goals of Rule
15c3-3. For these reasons, and those discussed throughout this release,
the Commission is adopting the amendment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\706\ See First Clearing Letter; Deutsche Bank Securities
Letter; Citigroup Letter.
\707\ See section II.A.1. of this release.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Commission estimates this requirement will result in a one-time
cost to firms that carry customer securities to update systems for
complying with the possession or control requirements in Rule 15c3-3.
Based on FOCUS Report data, as of December 31, 2011, the Commission
estimates that approximately 287 broker-dealers carry customer
accounts.\708\ The Commission further estimates these firms will spend,
on average, approximately 40 hours of employee resources per firm
updating their systems to implement changes that will be necessitated
by the amendment.\709\ Therefore, the Commission estimates that the
average cost per firm to make these changes will be approximately
$11,280.\710\ The Commission estimates that the total one-time cost to
broker-dealers will be approximately $3,237,360.\711\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\708\ This is an update of the proposing release estimate of 350
broker-dealers. See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72
FR at 12881.
\709\ For the purposes of this cost analysis, the Commission
estimates that this work will be undertaken by a Senior Programmer
at $282 per hour.
\710\ $282 per hour x 40 hours = $11,280.
\711\ 287 broker-dealers x $11,280 = $3,237,360. In the
proposing release, the Commission estimated that the total one-time
cost to broker-dealers would be $3,752,000. See Amendments to
Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12881.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In addition to systems costs, broker-dealers may incur other costs
to comply with the rule amendment because they may be required to
change their existing practices. For example, the amendment could
result in some broker-dealers borrowing securities to cover proprietary
short positions rather than using customer securities, resulting in
increased borrowing costs. However, under the current baseline, when
broker-dealers use customer securities to cover short positions they
are required to add a credit item in the Rule 15c3-3 reserve formula
equal to the value of the securities. This credit item can result in
higher reserve deposit requirements, which must be made using the
broker-dealer's own capital. Thus, in response to commenters concerns
regarding the costs of this amendments,\712\ the increased costs
associated with having to borrow securities to cover a short position
likely will be offset by decreased costs associated with devoting
capital to customer reserve requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\712\ See First Clearing Letter; Deutsche Bank Securities
Letter; Citigroup Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

d. Importation of Rule 15c3-2 Requirements Into Rule 15c3-3
Today's amendment to Rules 15c3-2 and 15c3-3 imports requirements
in Rule 15c3-2 \713\ to Rule 15c3-3 and eliminates Rule 15c3-2 as a
separate rule in the Code of Federal Regulations.\714\ Rule 15c3-2
requires a broker-dealer holding free credit balances to provide its
customers (defined as any person other than a broker-dealer) at least
once every three months with a statement of the amount due the customer
and a notice that the funds are not being segregated, but rather are
being used in the broker-dealer's business and that the funds are
payable on demand. The Commission believes it is appropriate to
eliminate Rule 15c3-2 because it is largely irrelevant in light of the
requirements of Rule 15c3-3 (which was adopted after Rule 15c3-2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\713\ 17 CFR 240.15c3-2.
\714\ See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at
12867.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

This amendment will benefit broker-dealers by streamlining and
consolidating relevant provisions of Rule 15c3-2 into Rule 15c3-3,
promoting efficiency in the rulemaking process while not modifying the
legal requirements. These provisions include the requirements that
broker-dealers inform customers of the amounts due to them and that
such amounts are payable on demand, which have been moved to new
paragraph (j)(1) of Rule 15c3-3.\715\ Finally, the definition of
customer for purposes of the imported Rule 15c3-2 requirements will be
the definition of customer in Rule 15c3-3,\716\ which is somewhat
narrower than the definition in Rule 15c3-2. The application of the
narrower definition of customer in Rule 15c3-3 should not increase
related costs. Alternatively, it may result in decreased costs because
the narrowing of the rule's scope may reduce the compliance burden on
broker-dealers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\715\ The provisions in Rule 15c3-2 that are being re-codified
in Rule 15c3-3, include the requirements that broker-dealers inform
customers of the amounts due to them and that such amounts be
payable on demand. In addition, Rule 15c3-2 contains an exemption
for broker-dealers that are also banking institutions supervised by
a Federal authority. This exemption will not be imported into Rule
15c3-3 because there are no broker-dealers that fit within this
exemption.
\716\ 17 CFR 240.15c3-3(a)(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Commission considered reasonable alternatives with regard to
the proposed deletion of Rule 15c3-2 and the importation of certain
requirements into paragraph (j)(1) of Rule 15c3-3. Not adopting the
rule amendment and thus leaving Rule 15c3-2 in the Code of Federal
Regulations was a considered alternative. The Commission, however,
believes consolidating the relevant provisions in Rule 15c3-3 is a more
appropriate alternative because it promotes efficiency in the
rulemaking process, and streamlines the Commission's customer
protection rules.
The amendments--because they only re-codify provisions of Rule
15c3-2 into Rule 15c3-3 \717\--should not be a new source of costs as
compared to the baseline because these provisions are continuations of
existing requirements. However, the re-codification and placement of
these provisions into Rule 15c3-3 may cause broker-dealers to review
and update their existing procedures from time-to-time and, therefore,
could result in incremental costs.\718\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\717\ See paragraph (j)(1) of Rule 15c3-3.
\718\ Based on the estimated hour burdens in section IV.D.5. of
this release, there could be one-time internal costs of $1,464,750
and annual internal costs of $585,900, if the review and update is
performed by a Compliance Attorney at $310 per hour.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

e. Treatment of Free Credit Balances
(I). Summary of Amendments
Today, the Commission is adopting the amendment to add new
paragraph (j)(2) to Rule 15c3-3 that prohibits a broker-dealer from
converting, investing, or transferring to another account or
institution, free credit balances held in a customer's account except
as provided in paragraphs (j)(2)(i) and (ii) of the rule. As adopted,
the amendment defines a Sweep Program as

[[Page 51879]]

``a service provided by a broker or dealer where it offers to its
customer the option to automatically transfer free credit balances in
the securities account of the customer to either a money market mutual
fund product as described in Sec. 270.2a-7 of this chapter or an
account at a bank whose deposits are insured by the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation.'' \719\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\719\ See paragraph (a)(17) of Rule 15c3-3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

With regard to the treatment of free credit balances outside the
context of a Sweep Program, paragraph (j)(2)(i) of Rule 15c3-3 permits
a broker-dealer to invest or transfer to another account or institution
free credit balances held in a customer's account only upon a specific
order, authorization, or draft from the customer, and only in the
manner, and under the terms and conditions, specified in the order,
authorization, or draft.\720\ Two commenters suggested that the
proposal should be clarified to permit a broker-dealer to obtain a one-
time consent to ongoing transfers of any free credit balances to a
customer to another account, entity or product (outside of a Sweep
Program). As discussed above, this scenario was covered by the proposed
rule and is being adopted under paragraph (j)(2)(i) of Rule 15c3-3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\720\ See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at
12866.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

With regard to the treatment of free credit balances in the context
of a Sweep Program, new paragraph (j)(2)(ii) of Rule 15c3-3 requires
broker-dealers to meet conditions that vary depending on the date when
a customer's account was opened. For accounts opened on or after the
effective date of the rule, a broker-dealer must meet the conditions of
(j)(2)(ii)(A) and (B) of the rule. For any account, the broker-dealer
must meet the conditions in paragraphs (j)(2)(ii)(B) of the rule. Under
paragraph (j)(2)(ii)(A), for accounts opened on or after the effective
date of the rule, the amendment to Rule 15c3-3 requires a broker-dealer
to obtain the written affirmative consent of a new customer to have
free credit balances in the customer's securities account included in
the Sweep Program. Under paragraph (j)(2)(ii)(B), a broker-dealer must
comply with the remaining three conditions for any account: (1)
Providing the customer with the disclosures and notices regarding the
Sweep Program required by each SRO of which the broker-dealer is a
member; (2) providing notice to the customer, as part of the customer's
quarterly statement of account, that the balance in the bank deposit
account or shares of the money market mutual funds in which the
customer has a beneficial interest can be liquidated on the customer's
order and the proceeds returned to the securities account or remitted
to the customer; and (3) providing the customer written notice at least
30 calendar days before the broker-dealer makes certain changes to the
Sweep Program and describes the options available to the customer if
the customer does not accept the new terms and conditions or
product.\721\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\721\ See new paragraph (j)(ii)(B)(1)-(3) of Rule 15c3-3, as
adopted.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Free credit balances constitute money that a broker-dealer owes its
customers. Customers may maintain these balances at the broker-dealer
in anticipation of future stock purchases. Under current practices,
customer account agreements set forth how the broker-dealer will invest
these balances. For example, the broker-dealer may sweep them into a
money market fund or, alternatively, pay an amount of interest on the
funds. On occasion, broker-dealers may change the product to which a
customer's free credit balances are swept--most frequently from a money
market fund to an interest bearing bank account. Because of differences
in these two types of products, there may be investment consequences
when changing from one to the other.\722\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\722\ Differences include the type of protection afforded the
customer in the event of an insolvency, and the amount of interest
or dividends earned on the product. See Amendments to Financial
Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12866.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

New paragraph (j)(2) to Rule 15c3-3 should serve to enhance
customer protection by prohibiting a broker-dealer from transforming
the credit risk faced by a customer through transfer of the broker-
dealer's obligation to another entity without the required notice to,
or approval from, the customer.
(II). Baseline and Incremental Economic Effects
In the absence of new paragraph (j)(2) of Rule 15c3-3, current
practices represent the existing baseline. As compared to the baseline,
new paragraph (j)(2) to Rule 15c3-3 will enhance customer protection by
requiring broker-dealers to obtain the written affirmative consent of a
new customer before including a customer's free credit balances in a
Sweep Program, as well as to provide certain disclosures and notices to
all customers with regard to the broker-dealer's Sweep Program. The
Commission requested comment on available metrics to quantify these
benefits and any other benefits a commenter may identify. The
Commission did not receive any comments in response to this request.
Relative to the baseline, broker-dealers carrying free credit
balances will incur incremental one-time and periodic costs (e.g.,
systems changes, outside counsel, and notification costs) to comply
with new paragraph (j)(2) of Rule 15c3-3. The Commission requested
comment on whether there would be additional costs to broker-dealers as
a consequence of the proposals. The Commission also requested comment
on whether the proposals would impose costs on other market
participants, including broker-dealer customers. Commenters were
requested to identify sources of empirical data that could be used for
the metrics they proposed. The Commission did not receive any comments
in response to these requests.
(III). Alternatives
As stated above in section II.A.5.ii. of this release, the
Commission is adopting new paragraph (j)(2) to Rule 15c3-3 with
substantial modifications from the proposed rule in response to
comments and to clarify certain portions of the rule.
Commenters generally agreed with the fundamental principle embodied
in the proposal--that customer free credit balances should not be
transferred from an obligation of the broker-dealer to an obligation of
another entity without the customer's authorization.\723\ Other
commenters supported the proposed disclosures but suggested additional
disclosures be made to customers including clarification with respect
to other protections available to the customer.\724\ Two commenters
stated that the practice of sweep programs should be banned entirely or
that the Commission should adopt a ``harder stance'' and require more
than just disclosure.\725\ One commenter responded to the Commission's
request for comment as to the cost burdens that would result if the
first condition (set forth in proposed paragraph (j)(2)(ii)(A)) to
obtain a new customer's prior agreement were to be applied to existing
customers. The commenter stated that such costs would be substantial
because broker-dealers would be required to amend their agreements with
all

[[Page 51880]]

existing customers.\726\ One commenter stated that the amendments in
the proposing release did not adequately address situations in which
broker-dealers change customer account elections without first
obtaining customer authorization.\727\ Commenters also raised concerns
about limitations on the types of products broker-dealers can use for
sweep arrangements.\728\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\723\ See SIFMA 2 Letter; First Clearing Letter; Pace Letter.
\724\ See SIPC Letter.
\725\ See Ellis Letter; Dworkin Letter. One commenter stated
that broker-dealers profit from ``excessive'' fees charged to
customers who opt out of the sweep programs. See Ellis Letter. The
second commenter suggested that the broker-dealer's ``customer has
been effectively denied the opportunity to opt out of bank account
sweeps by [the broker-dealer] preventing him or her from utilizing
any other vehicle to park his or her free credit balances . . . .''
See Dworkin Letter.
\726\ See SIFMA 2 Letter.
\727\ See Waddell Letter.
\728\ See SIFMA 2 Letter; First Clearing Letter; Raymond James 2
Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Commission considered alternatives, including whether to adopt
the amendments and, in adopting the final rule, the Commission modified
the language in the final rule in response to commenters and to clarify
its application. In response to comments that the Commission should ban
sweep programs or adopt a ``harder stance,'' the Commission notes that
sweep programs provide a mechanism for excess cash in a customer's
securities account to be held in a manner that allows the customer to
earn interest on the funds but retain the flexibility to quickly access
that cash to purchase securities or withdraw it.\729\ In effect,
transferring this excess cash to a bank account or money market fund is
an alternative to retaining a credit balance in the customer's
securities account. The final rule is intended to appropriately balance
commenters' concerns while providing broker-dealers with flexibility in
the operation of sweep programs.\730\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\729\ See Ellis Letter; Dworkin Letter.
\730\ See Ellis Letter; Dworkin Letter; Waddell Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In addition, in response to the comments that the Commission should
not limit the types of products broker-dealers can use for sweep
accounts to money market funds and bank deposit products,\731\ as
discussed above in section II.A.5.ii. of this release, the Commission
does not view sweep accounts as a mechanism for investing customers'
excess cash in longer term or more volatile assets without specific
consent from customers. Therefore, the Commission believes that it is
not appropriate to modify the final rule amendments to expand the
permitted products for Sweep Programs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\731\ See SIFMA 2 Letter; First Clearing Letter; Raymond James 2
Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In response to commenters' concern regarding cost burdens resulting
from the application of the affirmative consent requirement to existing
accounts, the final rule retains the proposed requirement to require a
broker-dealer to obtain a customer's prior affirmative consent for
accounts opened on or after the effective date of the rule before
transferring the customer's free credit balance to a product in the
firm's Sweep Program, and makes explicit that the consent must be in
writing. This will provide new customers with the opportunity to
evaluate the broker-dealer's Sweep Program before consenting to the
transfer of the customer's free credit balances into such program. In
the proposing release, the Commission requested comment as to the cost
burdens that would result if the condition to obtain a new customer's
prior agreement were to be applied to existing customers. One commenter
stated that such costs would be substantial because broker-dealers
would be required to amend their agreements with existing customers.
The Commission considered this alternative and agrees with the
commenter that requiring a broker-dealer to amend its existing
agreements with customers would be substantial. Therefore, to address
the burden that would have been associated with having broker-dealers
re-paper existing account documentation, the prior affirmative consent
requirement will continue to apply only to accounts opened on or after
the effective date of the rule.
However, as discussed above in section II.A.5.ii. of this release,
all customers will be provided written notice at least 30 days before a
broker-dealer changes certain terms and conditions or products of its
Sweep Program. This notice must also contain a description of the
options available to the customer if the customer does not accept the
new terms and conditions or product. This is intended to benefit new
and existing customers by giving them sufficient opportunity to make an
informed decision and evaluate the effects of changes in the terms and
conditions or product of the sweep program and the options available.
(IV). Compliance Cost Estimates
Broker-dealers will incur one-time and periodic costs to implement
the changes necessitated by the amendment. These changes include
providing customers with the disclosures and notices (including the
description of the options available if a customer does not accept the
new terms or conditions or product) in order to have the flexibility to
change the treatment of customers' free credit balances. This would
require that broker-dealers update their systems (including processes
for generating customer account statements) to incorporate the
necessary changes.\732\ Additionally, broker-dealers may incur one-time
costs of outside counsel in implementing these system changes,
particularly with respect to the language in the disclosures and
notices required by paragraph (j)(2) of the rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\732\ The internal hours would likely be performed by a senior
programmer. Therefore, the estimated internal costs for this hour
burden would be calculated as follows: Senior Programmer at $282 per
hours x 37,800 hours = $10,659,600. See section IV.D.6. of this
release.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Commission further estimates that broker-dealers will incur
costs to process an affirmative consent for new customers.\733\
Specifically, the Commission estimates that broker-dealers may incur
aggregate one-time and annual costs of approximately $14.4 million
\734\ and $23.2 million,\735\ respectively related to the changes
necessitated by these rule amendments.\736\
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\733\ The internal hours would likely be performed by a
compliance clerk. Therefore, the estimated internal costs for this
hour burden would be calculated as follows: Compliance Clerk at $63
per hour x 368,311 hours = $23,203,593. See section IV.D.6. of this
release.
\734\ See section IV.D.6. of this release. ($10,659,600 +
$3,780,000 (outside counsel costs) = $14,439,600).
\735\ Id. ($23,203,593).
\736\ In the proposing release, the Commission estimated that
broker-dealers would incur one-time costs of approximately $3.68
million ($2.68 million internal costs and $1.0 million for outside
counsel) and annual costs of approximately $24.6 million. See
Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12882.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

f. ``Proprietary Accounts'' Under the Commodity Exchange Act
Some broker-dealers also are registered as futures commission
merchants under the CEA. These firms carry both securities and
commodities accounts for customers. The definition of free credit
balances in paragraph (a)(8) of Rule 15c3-3 does not include funds
carried in commodities accounts that are segregated in accordance with
the requirements of the CEA.\737\ However, regulations promulgated
under the CEA exclude proprietary accounts from the CEA's segregation
requirements.\738\ This exclusion from the segregation requirements
under the CEA has raised a question as to whether a broker-dealer must
treat payables to customers in proprietary commodities accounts as
``free credit balances'' when

[[Page 51881]]

performing a customer reserve computation.\739\ For these reasons, the
specific amendment to the definition of the term free credit balances
in paragraph (a)(8) of Rule 15c3-3 clarifies that funds held in a
commodities account meeting the definition of a proprietary account
under CEA regulations are not to be included as free credit balances in
the customer reserve formula.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\737\ 17 CFR 240.15c3-3(a)(8).
\738\ Rule 1.20 requires a futures commission merchant to
segregate customer funds. See 17 CFR 1.20. Rule 1.3(k) defines the
term customer for this purpose. See 17 CFR 1.3(k). The definition of
customer excludes persons who own or hold a proprietary account as
that term is defined in Rule 1.3(y). See 17 CFR 1.3(y). Generally,
the definition of proprietary account refers to persons who have an
ownership interest in the futures commission merchant. Id.
\739\ See Part 241-Interpretive Releases Relating to the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and General Rules and Regulations
Thereunder, Exchange Act Release No. 9922 (Jan. 2, 1973), 38 FR 1737
(Jan. 18, 1973) (interpreting the credit balance used in Item 1 of
the Rule 15c3-3a formula ``to include the net balance due to
customers in non-regulated commodities accounts reduced by any
deposits of cash or securities with any clearing organization or
clearing broker in connection with the open contracts in such
accounts'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

One commenter requested that the Commission clarify that the
relevant definition of proprietary account for purposes of this
amendment will be the definition contained in 17 CFR 1.3(y).\740\ The
Commission considered this alternative suggested by the commenter.
While Rule 1.3(y) under the CEA currently contains the relevant
definition of proprietary account for the purpose of the amendment, the
definition could be codified in a different rule in the future.
Consequently, the Commission is adopting the final rule amendment to
paragraph (a)(8) of Rule 15c3-3, as proposed. Thus, the final rule does
not include specific references to a specific rule. Rather, the
amendment to paragraph (a)(8) to Rule 15c3-3, as adopted, more
generally refers to a ``proprietary account as that term is defined in
regulations under the Commodity Exchange Act.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\740\ See SIFMA 2 Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In addition, one commenter stated that, due to the changes to the
swap markets mandated by Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act, swap accounts
(in addition to commodities accounts) are now subject to customer
protection rules under the CEA. This commenter suggested that the
Commission make it clear that funds in swap accounts also do not
constitute free credit balances, whether those funds are required to be
segregated by rules under the CEA (e.g., cleared swap accounts or
uncleared swap accounts that have opted for segregation) or excepted
from segregation under the CEA (e.g., cleared swaps proprietary
accounts or uncleared swap accounts that have not opted for
segregation). The commenter noted this treatment ``would be consistent
with the treatment of funds in commodities accounts and with the
regulation of swap accounts under the CEA.'' \741\ The Commission
agrees there may be additional accounts under the CEA, as amended by
the Dodd-Frank Act that should explicitly be excluded from the
definition of free credit balances under Rule 15c3-3. However, the
amendments today are designed to clarify the specific question raised
with respect to the treatment of funds in proprietary commodities
accounts under the CEA and, consequently, the suggestions by this
commenter are beyond the scope of this rulemaking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\741\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Commission considered reasonable alternatives in adopting the
final rule amendment. These alternatives included adopting the proposed
rule, with modifications suggested by commenters described above, as
well as leaving the current rule in place without the amendments. The
Commission believes that the adoption of the final rule is the more
appropriate approach at this time because the final rule amendment will
benefit broker-dealers that are registered as futures commission
merchants by eliminating any ambiguity with respect to such accounts
and avoiding situations where they unnecessarily increase reserve
amounts.
The Commission does not anticipate that the amendments will result
in any costs to broker-dealers and, as funds in certain commodities
accounts are not protected under SIPA, will not expose the SIPC fund to
increased liabilities. Because this amendment is intended to be a
clarification of existing interpretations, broker-dealers are not
expected to incur additional costs against the baseline of current Rule
15c3-3 and its existing interpretations. This clarification is designed
to provide broker-dealers with more certainty as to the Commission's
stated legal requirements.
ii. Consideration of Burden on Competition, and Promotion of
Efficiency, Competition, and Capital Formation
The amendments to the customer protection rule (Rule 15c3-3)
regarding PAB accounts,\742\ cash deposits at special reserve bank
accounts,\743\ allocation of short positions,\744\ the treatment of
free credit balances,\745\ and the clarification of the treatment of
proprietary accounts under the CEA are designed to protect and preserve
customer property held at broker-dealers.\746\ These protections are
primarily intended to reduce the risks borne by investors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\742\ See section II.A.2. of this release.
\743\ See section II.A.3. of this release.
\744\ See section II.A.4. of this release.
\745\ See section II.A.5.ii. of this release.
\746\ See section II.A.6.i. of this release.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In particular, first, the final rule amendment on PAB accounts is
intended to fill a gap in the definition of customer between Rule 15c3-
3 and SIPA, reducing the risk that customers could face losses in the
case of a liquidation of a carrying broker-dealer. The final rule
codifies many of the provisions of the PAIB Letter. The Commission
believes that it is prudent, and will provide greater regulatory
clarity, to incorporate into Rule 15c3-3 specified provisions of the
PAIB Letter. Further, the Commission understands that the relief in the
PAIB Letter has been widely, if not universally, utilized by broker-
dealers that carry customer accounts. Thus, the benefits associated
with codifying specified provisions of the PAIB Letter will continue to
provide SIPA customers with the protections currently provided by
broker-dealers complying with the PAIB Letter. Setting forth these
requirements in a Commission rule will benefit the securities markets
by helping to diminish the risks and incidences of non-compliance.
Second, the final rule amendments regarding the banks where reserve
deposits may be held are intended to protect customers' cash deposits
by mitigating the risk that the funds in the customer reserve account
will not be readily available to be withdrawn by the broker-dealer.
Third, the final rule amendments regarding the allocation of
customers' fully paid and excess margin securities to a broker-dealer
short position are designed to enhance the customer protection goals of
Rule 15c3-3, which seek to ensure that broker-dealers do not use
customer assets for proprietary activities.
Fourth, the final rule amendments regarding the importation of Rule
15c3-2 requirements into paragraph (j)(1) of Rule 15c3-3 and the
elimination of Rule 15c3-2 streamline the regulatory requirements for
broker-dealers. Also, the addition of new paragraph (j)(2) to Rule
15c3-3 is intended to protect a customer's free credit balances from
being swept to products or programs without the appropriate approval,
notice or disclosure.
Fifth, the final rule amendment establishing that the funds in
certain commodities accounts need not be treated as free credit
balances or other credit balances may enhance efficiency at the broker-
dealers by freeing up cash that may have been required to be

[[Page 51882]]

deposited into a broker-dealer's customer reserve account, and
clarifying an ambiguity in Rule 15c3-3.
By strengthening requirements designed to protect customer assets,
these amendments will mitigate potential exposure to the SIPC fund that
is used to make advances to customers whose securities or cash are
unable to be returned by a failed broker-dealer. To the extent that the
amendments to Rule 15c3-3 achieve this goal, investors might be more
willing to transact business in securities with broker-dealers. The
possible positive effects on investor participation in the securities
markets may promote capital formation as investor assets are able to be
allocated more efficiently across the opportunity set.
As discussed above, the Commission recognizes that the amendments
to Rule 15c3-3 adopted today may impose certain costs on broker-dealers
that might place a burden on competition among broker-dealers. However,
the Commission is of the opinion that these costs are justified by the
significant benefits described in this economic analysis, as well as in
the discussion of the rule amendments above. Amendments to Rule 15c3-3
should not place a burden on competition for non-carrying broker-
dealers, which are generally small broker-dealers, because the
amendments primarily affect broker-dealers that perform PAB and
customer reserve computations, carry customer accounts, and carry free
credit balances. In addition, for those carrying broker-dealers that
already follow the PAIB Letter, any difference from the baseline with
regard to cost burdens should be marginal. In sum, the costs of
compliance resulting from the requirements in the amendments to Rule
15c3-3 should not impose a burden on competition not necessary or
appropriate in furtherance of the purposes of the Exchange Act in light
of the benefits discussed above.
2. Holding Futures Positions in a Securities Portfolio Margining
Account
i. Economic Analysis
As discussed in section II.B. of this release, the Commission is
adopting amendments to Rule 15c3-3 to accommodate futures positions in
a securities account that is margined on a portfolio basis. The
amendments revise the definition of free credit balances and other
credit balances in paragraphs (a)(8) and (a)(9) of Rule 15c3-3,
respectively, by expanding these definitions to include funds in a
portfolio margin account relating to certain futures and futures
options positions. Consequently, as part of free credit balances and
other credit balances, these funds will be included as a credit item on
the credit side of the customer reserve formula. The Commission is also
adopting, as proposed, an amendment to Rule 15c3-3a Item 14 that
permits a broker-dealer to include as a debit item, on the debit side
of the customer reserve formula, the amount of customer margin required
and on deposit at a derivatives clearing organization related to
futures positions carried in a portfolio margin account.
The amendments are designed to provide greater protection to
customers with portfolio margin accounts, through the reserve
requirements of Rule 15c3-3 and SIPA, by requiring a broker-dealer to
include all cash balances (including portfolio margin cash balances) of
its customers' securities accounts in the computation of the customer
reserve. The customer reserve computation under Rule 15c3-3 is designed
to ensure that the funds a broker-dealer owes to customers are
available to be returned to customers in the event the broker-dealer
fails.
Subsequent to the Commission's proposals, the Dodd-Frank Act
amended the definitions of customer, customer property, and net equity
in section 16 of SIPA to take into account futures and options on
futures held in a portfolio margin account carried as a securities
account pursuant to a Commission-approved portfolio margining
program.\747\ As a result, persons who hold futures positions in a
portfolio margining account carried as a securities account are now
entitled to SIPA protection.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\747\ See Public Law 111-203 Sec. 983.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

While the Dodd-Frank Act addressed the protection under SIPA of
futures and futures options held in a securities portfolio margin
account, the Commission's amendments to Rule 15c3-3 and 15c3-3a will
still serve an important purpose. In particular, they complement the
Dodd-Frank SIPA amendments, and will provide additional protections to
customers by requiring broker-dealers to treat these futures positions
in accordance with the segregation requirements in Rules 15c3-3 and
15c3-3a. Consequently, the Commission is adopting the amendments with
modifications to address, in part, comments. As noted above, the
requirements of Rule 15c3-3 and Rule 15c3-3a are designed to enable the
prompt return of customer securities and cash in the event the broker-
dealer falls into financial difficulty or becomes insolvent. The goal
is to place a broker-dealer in a position where it is able to wind down
in an orderly self-liquidation without the need for financial
assistance from SIPC.
The Commission received six comments on the proposed
amendments.\748\ Three commenters generally supported the
amendments.\749\ One commenter supported the development of rules for
portfolio margining and the Commission's effort to provide greater
legal certainty regarding the SIPA treatment of futures positions in a
portfolio margin account.\750\ This commenter, however, in a subsequent
comment letter, stated that this amendment is no longer necessary in
light of the Dodd-Frank Act amendments, and recommended that the
Commission withdraw it.\751\ Another commenter stated that the
Commission's proposal is premature in that the inclusion of futures in
a portfolio margin account, which is a securities account, would
conflict with the segregation provisions under the CEA\752\ and that
SIPC has not determined that protection should be extended to
futures.\753\ Commenting in 2007 before the adoption of the Dodd-Frank
Act, SIPC stated that the proposed rules seek to extend SIPC protection
to all positions in the portfolio margin account, irrespective of
whether the positions are securities under SIPA or are on deposit in
connection with a securities transaction.\754\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\748\ See SIFMA 2 Letter; CME Letter; SIPC Letter; Citigroup
Letter; American Bar Association Letter; SIFMA 4 Letter.
\749\ See SIFMA 2 Letter; Citigroup Letter; American Bar
Association Letter.
\750\ See SIFMA 2 Letter.
\751\ See SIFMA 4 Letter.
\752\ See, e.g., 17 CFR 1.20-1.29.
\753\ See CME Letter; see also SIPC Letter (expressing ``grave
concerns'' about potential conflict between the proposed amendments
and SIPA).
\754\ See SIPC Letter. SIPC also urged the Commission to
reconsider its adoption of the portfolio margin proposals, stating
that if the changes are in order, the Commission should seek to have
them made by legislative amendment and not rulemaking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 51883]]

proceeding under SIPA, futures and options on futures positions held in
a portfolio margin account carried as a securities account would be
included in determining a customer's net equity claim.\757\ Therefore,
the proposed amendment relating to the unrealized value of a futures
option is not necessary to achieve the objective of providing SIPA
protection for such positions. As a result, the Commission is modifying
the final rule to delete the proposed language in paragraph (a)(8) of
Rule 15c3-3 that would have treated the unrealized value of a futures
option in a portfolio margin account on the filing date of a SIPA
proceeding as a free credit balance for purposes of Rule 15c3-3.\758\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\755\ See SIFMA 4 Letter.
\756\ See Public Law 111-203 Sec. 983.
\757\ Under the Dodd-Frank Act SIPA amendments, a customer's net
equity now includes all positions in futures contracts and options
on futures contracts held in a portfolio margining account carried
as a securities account pursuant to a portfolio margining program
approved by the Commission, including all property collateralizing
such positions, to the extent that such property is not otherwise
included herein. See 15 U.S.C. 78lll(11)(A)(ii). Further, the
amendments provided that a claim for a commodity futures contract
received, acquired, or held in a portfolio margining account
pursuant to a portfolio margining program approved by the Commission
or a claim for a security futures contract, shall be deemed to be a
claim with respect to such contract as of the filing date, and such
claim shall be treated as a claim for cash. See 15 U.S.C. 78lll(11).
\758\ Specifically, the final rule does not include the proposed
language: ``, and, in the event the broker-dealer is the subject of
a proceeding under SIPA, the market value as of the ``filing date''
as that term is defined in SIPA (15 U.S.C. 78lll(7)) of any long
options on futures contracts.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

While the legislation provides additional certainty with respect to
how futures in a portfolio margin account would be treated in a SIPA
liquidation, the Commission's amendments will require that positions
are subject to the protections of Rule 15c3-3, thus enhancing customer
protection. Therefore, while the Commission has considered the
suggested alternatives in developing the final rule amendments
(including not adopting the amendments), the Commission has determined
that adopting the portfolio margining amendments was a more appropriate
approach in furtherance of enhancing customer protection.
The Commission requested comment on available metrics to quantify
these benefits and any other benefits a commenter may identify,
including the identification of sources of empirical data that could be
used for such metrics. The Commission did not receive any comments in
response to these requests.
Current SRO portfolio margin rules permit futures to be held in a
securities portfolio margin account.\759\ However, pending further
regulatory action by the Commission and the CFTC, the ability to
combine securities and futures products into a single portfolio margin
account will be unavailable.\760\ Therefore, under the current baseline
of SRO portfolio margin rules, with the inclusion of only securities
positions in the securities account, this amendment would have no
effect as compared to the baseline until the Commission and CFTC take
such further action with respect to portfolio margining.\761\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\759\ See, e.g., FINRA Rule 4210.
\760\ See Section 713 of the Dodd-Frank Act. Section 713 of the
Dodd-Frank Act amends the Exchange Act and CEA to facilitate
portfolio margining by allowing cash and securities to be held in a
futures account and futures and options on futures and related
collateral to be held in a securities account by a dually-registered
broker-dealer and futures commission merchant pursuant to an
approved portfolio margin program, subject to certain requirements,
including regulatory action by the Commission and CFTC (pursuant to
an exemption, or by rule or regulation). See generally, A Joint
Report of the SEC and the CFTC on Harmonization of Regulation (Oct.
19, 2009).
\761\ See generally, A Joint Report of the SEC and the CFTC on
Harmonization of Regulation (Oct. 19, 2009).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The requirements imposed by the portfolio margin amendments will be
elective. The requirements will apply only to broker-dealers choosing
to offer their customers portfolio margin accounts. The Commission
estimates that approximately 35 broker-dealers will elect to offer
their customers portfolio margin accounts that will include futures and
futures options.\762\ The amendment to the definition of free credit
balances in Rule 15c3-3 will require broker-dealers to include in the
reserve formula credit balances related to futures positions in a
portfolio margin account. The amendment to Rule 15c3-3a Item 14 in the
reserve formula will enable broker-dealers to include as a debit item
the amount of customer margin required and on deposit at a derivatives
clearing organization. Accordingly, these amendments will require
changes to the systems broker-dealers use to compute and account for
their reserve requirements. Consistent with the proposing release,\763\
the Commission assumes that the responsibility for updating these
systems will be undertaken by a Senior Programmer.\764\ Therefore, the
Commission estimates that the program and systems changes would result,
on average, in a one-time cost of approximately $36,660 per broker-
dealer.\765\ Thus, the Commission estimates the total one-time cost to
broker-dealers will be approximately $1,283,100.\766\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\762\ This estimate is based on OCUS Report data. This is an
update from the estimate in the proposing release of 33 broker-
dealers. See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at
12883.
\763\ See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at
12883.
\764\ The SIFMA 2012 Report as Modified indicates the average
hourly cost of this position is approximately $282. Consistent with
the proposing release, the Commission estimates the Senior
Programmer will spend approximately 130 hours modifying software to
conform it to the requirements of the amendments. See Amendments to
Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12883.
\765\ 130 hours x $282 = $36,660. In the proposing release, the
Commission estimated this cost would be $34,840. See Amendments to
Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12883.
\766\ 35 broker-dealers x $36,660 = $1,283,100. In the proposing
release, the Commission estimated this cost would be $1,149,720. See
Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12883.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Commission requested comment on the proposed cost estimates. In
particular, the Commission requested comment on additional costs to
broker-dealers that would arise from the proposals, such as system
costs in addition to those discussed above (e.g., costs associated with
purchasing new software and updates to existing software). The
Commission also requested comment on whether these proposals would
impose costs on other market participants, including broker-dealer
customers. Commenters were asked to identify the metrics and sources of
any empirical data that supported their costs estimates. The Commission
did not receive any comments in response to these requests.
ii. Consideration of Burden on Competition, and Promotion of
Efficiency, Competition, and Capital Formation
The final rule amendments to Rule 15c3-3 to accommodate futures
positions in a securities account margined on a portfolio basis \767\
should complement the Congressional amendments and provide additional
protections to portfolio margin customers through the strengthened
reserve requirements of Rule 15c3-3. These additional protections may
reduce the risk of loss of collateral to securities customers, promote
participation in the securities markets, and enhance competition and
price discovery. Moreover, these additional protections may make
portfolio margining more attractive to investors. Portfolio margining
may significantly reduce customer margin requirements by offsetting
positions involving securities and futures products, which in turn
reduces the costs of trading such products and enhances efficiency.
Portfolio margining may also promote better price discovery across
securities and futures products by allowing customers to offset a
position assumed in one market with a product traded in

[[Page 51884]]

another market. The enhanced efficiencies as a result of increases in
the use of portfolio margin accounts may facilitate capital formation
through the availability of additional capital for customers as a
result of reduced margin costs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\767\ See section II.B. of this release.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

While today's amendments promote efficiency within the securities
markets, the increased costs associated with the rule amendments may
impose a burden on competition among broker-dealers. However, the
Commission is of the opinion that these costs are justified by the
significant benefits described in this economic analysis. In sum, the
costs of compliance resulting from the requirements in the portfolio
margining amendments to Rule 15c3-3 should not impose a burden on
competition not necessary or appropriate in furtherance of the purposes
of the Exchange Act in light of the benefits discussed above.
3. Amendments With Respect to Securities Lending and Borrowing and
Repurchase/Reverse Repurchase Transactions
i. Economic Analysis
The Commission is adopting amendments to Rules 15c3-1 and 17a-11 to
strengthen the financial responsibility of broker-dealers engaging in a
securities lending business. First, the amendment to subparagraph
(c)(2)(iv)(B) of Rule 15c3-1 clarifies that broker-dealers providing
securities lending and borrowing settlement services are deemed, for
purposes of the rule, to be acting as principals and are subject to
applicable capital deductions. Under the amendment, these deductions
could be avoided if a broker-dealer takes certain steps to disclaim
principal liability. Second, the amendment to paragraph (c)(5) of Rule
17a-11 requires a broker-dealer to: (1) File a notice with the
Commission and its DEA whenever the total money payable against all
securities loaned, subject to a reverse repurchase agreement or the
contract value of all securities borrowed or subject to a repurchase
agreement exceeds 2,500% of tentative net capital; or, alternatively,
(2) report monthly its securities lending and repurchase activities to
its DEA in a form acceptable to its DEA.
Both amendments are intended to strengthen the financial
responsibility of broker-dealers engaged in a securities lending or
repurchase business. The first amendment to subparagraph (c)(2)(iv)(B)
of Rule 15c3-1 will help eliminate the legal uncertainty among
counterparties as to the role played by broker-dealers in such
transactions and clarify the nature of the services that securities
lending intermediaries provide their counterparties.
Thus, a broker-dealer will be considered a principal unless the
broker-dealer has disclosed the identity of each party to the other,
and the parties have agreed in writing that the obligations of the
broker-dealer do not include a guarantee of performance by the other
party and that in the event of default, neither party shall have the
right of setoff against the obligations, if any, of the broker-dealer.
In addition, this amendment will help avoid ambiguity regarding the
applicability to a particular broker-dealer of the stock loan charges
in the net capital rule.
In response to comments that standard legal documents currently
used in securities lending transactions provide sufficient legal
certainty with respect to the status of the parties,\768\ the
Commission considered whether to adopt the proposed approach or whether
to rely on existing industry practice. The Commission considered the
alternatives and believes that the rule as adopted appropriately
balances the commenters' objections to the proposal with the
Commission's concerns about stock lending practices, particularly with
regard to the failure of MJK.\769\ In recognition of standard stock
loan agreement templates, the Commission designed the amendment to
accommodate the continued use of these industry model agreements by
incorporating their use into the rule's requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\768\ See section II.C. of this release. See also SIFMA 2
Letter; Citigroup Letter.
\769\ See section II.C. of this release.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The second amendment to paragraph (c)(5) of Rule 17a-11 will help
identify broker-dealers with highly leveraged non-government securities
lending and borrowing and repo activity.\770\ This new provision
requires that a broker-dealer notify the Commission whenever the total
amount of money payable against all securities loaned or subject to a
repurchase agreement, or the total contract value of all securities
borrowed or subject to a reverse repurchase agreement exceeds 2,500% of
tentative net capital; provided that, for purposes of this leverage
threshold, transactions involving government securities, as defined in
Section 3(a)(42) of the Exchange Act, are excluded from the
calculation.\771\ The notice provision is designed to alert regulators
to a sudden increase in a broker-dealer's stock loan and repo
positions, which could indicate that the broker-dealer is taking on new
or additional risk that it may have limited experience or increased
difficulty in managing. This amendment will assist securities
regulators in monitoring such activities and responding to situations
where a broker-dealer experiences financial difficulty due to a large
securities lending or repo position. This may help prevent significant
losses to the broker-dealer's customers and other broker-dealers, and
reduce systemic financial risk.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\770\ 17 CFR 240.17a-11(c)(5).
\771\ 15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(42). Government securities generally
present less market risk than other types of securities used in
securities lending and repo transactions. Consequently, they are
excluded from the scope of this rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

As adopted, new paragraph (c)(5) of Rule 17a-11 also permits a
broker-dealer to report monthly its stock loan and repo activity to its
DEA in a form acceptable to its DEA in lieu of the notices required by
paragraph (c)(5). This approach will provide each DEA with the
flexibility to prescribe how the monthly reports are to be made and
will accommodate a DEA that opts to use the FOCUS report as the
reporting mechanism.\772\ This provision will also accommodate large
broker-dealers that are active in this business and regularly maintain
stock loan and repo balances that exceed the threshold. The Commission
expects that these broker-dealers have experience in managing the risks
associated with these types of transactions and have established
controls to address those risks. Consequently, notice under Rule 17a-11
from these broker-dealers will not be as useful to regulators. On the
other hand, the monthly reports will provide securities regulators with
information useful, for example, to develop trend analysis, if deemed
appropriate. This analysis can be used to identify leverage levels that
are outside the normal trend range and that may be indicative of a
material change in the firm's business model (e.g., taking on higher
levels of leverage, branching into new products, or experiencing
operational or financial difficulties).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\772\ As proposed, the amendment to Rule 17a-11 would have
provided that a broker-dealer that submitted a monthly report of its
stock loan and repo activity to its DEA not be required to file the
Rule 17a-11 notices required by paragraph (c)(5). See Amendments to
Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12870.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 51885]]

amendments. Using current Rule 15c3-1 and Rule 17a-11 as a baseline,
the Commission expects that some broker-dealers may incur costs in
connection with the implementation of these rule amendments.
With regard to the amendment to subparagraph (c)(2)(iv)(B) of Rule
15c3-1, the Commission understands that most existing standard
securities lending master agreements in use today already contain
language requiring agent lenders to disclose principals and for
principals to agree not to hold the agents liable for a counterparty
default. Thus, the standard agreement used by the vast majority of
broker-dealers should contain the representations and disclosures
required by the proposed amendment. However, a small percentage of
broker-dealers may need to modify their standard agreements. The
Commission estimates that the total one-time cost to broker-dealers for
this change will be approximately $45,480.\773\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\773\ In the proposing release, the Commission estimated that
the total one-time cost to broker-dealers would be approximately
$62,604. See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at
12884. The internal hours would likely be performed by an in-house
Attorney at $379 per hour, resulting in the estimated internal cost
calculated as follows: 120 hours at $379 per hour = $45,480. See
section IV.D.1. of this release.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Commission requested comment on the cost estimates. In
particular, the Commission requested comment on additional costs to
broker-dealers that would arise from the proposals, such as costs
arising from making systems changes. The Commission also requested
comment on whether these proposals would impose costs on other market
participants, including broker-dealer customers. Commenters were also
asked to identify the metrics and sources of any empirical data that
support their costs estimates. The Commission did not receive any
comments in response to these requests.
With regard to the amendment to Rule 17a-11, the Commission
received several suggested alternatives from commenters which
contributed to the modification of the final rule from the proposal.
Three commenters addressed the proposed monthly notification
requirement. They stated that the monthly report in lieu of the
notification should be provided as part of the monthly FOCUS report
many broker-dealers file with their DEA.\774\ The Commission agrees
that the FOCUS report may be an appropriate mechanism for reporting
stock loan and repo positions in lieu of the proposed monthly
notification requirement.\775\ Consequently, the Commission modified
the final rule amendment to delete the phrase ``submits a monthly
report of'' and replace it with the phrase ``reports monthly.'' In
addition, as adopted, in order to provide that the monthly report shall
be sent to a broker-dealer's DEA, the Commission added the phrase ``to
its designated examining authority in a form acceptable'' before ``to
its designated examining authority.'' This approach, as adopted, is
intended to provide each DEA with the flexibility to tailor the
reporting requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\774\ See Abbey National Letter; Citigroup Letter; SIFMA 2
Letter.
\775\ Carrying broker-dealers are generally required to submit
FOCUS reports on a monthly basis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Based on FOCUS Report data, the Commission estimates that
approximately one notice per year will be sent pursuant to this
amendment.\776\ Therefore, approximately one broker-dealer per year
will incur costs to prepare and send the notice.\777\ Consequently, the
Commission estimates that the costs to broker-dealers associated with
this requirement will be de minimis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\776\ This estimate is derived from FOCUS Report data, and
adjusted based on staff experience. This estimate has been updated
from the proposing release estimate of 11. No comments were received
on this estimate.
\777\ The internal hours would likely be performed by junior
stock loan manager for 10 minutes at $134 per hour x 1 notice =
$22.33. See section IV.D.8. of this release.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In addition, the Commission estimates that six broker-dealers will
choose the option of reporting monthly \778\ and will incur a one-time
cost to update their systems to generate the information for the
report.\779\ The Commission also estimates that these broker-dealers
will incur annual costs generating and filing the monthly reports or
preparing the information to include in monthly FOCUS Reports (as
applicable).\780\ Therefore, the Commission estimates that the total
one-time cost and annual costs to broker-dealers will be approximately
$169,200 \781\ and $9,648 \782\ respectively. The Commission's total
one-time and annual cost estimates have decreased from the proposing
release primarily due to an overall decrease in the number of broker-
dealers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\778\ This is an update from the proposing release estimate of
21 broker-dealers. See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules,
72 FR at 12884.
\779\ The internal hours would likely be performed by a senior
programmer. Therefore, the estimated internal costs for this hour
burden would be calculated as follows: Senior Programmer for 100
hours at $282 per hour = $28,200. See section IV.D.8. of this
release. This is an update from the proposing release estimate of
$26,800. See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at
12884.
\780\ The internal hours would likely be performed by a junior
stock loan manager. Therefore, the estimated internal costs for this
hour burden would be calculated as follows: Junior Stock Loan
Manager for 12 hours at $134 per hour = $1,608. See section IV.D.8.
of this release. This is an update from the proposing release
estimate of $2,496 per firm. See Amendments to Financial
Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12884.
\781\ 6 firms x $28,200 = $169,200. This is an update from the
proposing release estimate of $562,800. See Amendments to Financial
Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12884.
\782\ 6 firms x $1,608 = $9,648. This is an update from the
proposing release estimate of $52,416. See Amendments to Financial
Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at 12884.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

As noted above, the Commission requested comment on the proposed
cost estimates. In particular, the Commission requested comment on
additional costs to broker-dealers that would arise from the proposals.
The Commission also requested comment on whether these proposals would
impose costs on other market participants, including market
participants active in the securities lending and repurchase markets.
Commenters were asked to identify the metrics and sources of any
empirical data that supported their cost estimates. The Commission did
not receive any comments in response to these requests.
ii. Consideration of Burden on Competition, and Promotion of
Efficiency, Competition, and Capital Formation
As described above, the amendment to subparagraph (c)(2)(iv)(B) of
Rule 15c3-1 and new paragraph (c)(5) of Rule 17a-11 are designed to
address two areas of concern that emerged from the Commission's
experience with the failure of MJK.\783\ First, broker-dealers with
principal liability in a stock loan transaction may be deemed to be
acting in an agency capacity and therefore not taking appropriate
capital charges. Second, broker-dealers that historically have not been
very active in stock loan activities may rapidly expand their balance
sheets and increase leverage to a level that poses significant
financial risk to the firm and counterparties. Either potential event
could result in significant, adverse consequences for customers and
counterparties of the broker-dealer. For the customers, the fact that
the broker-dealer could avoid taking appropriate capital charges would
imperil the broker-dealer's ability to self-liquidate, thereby impeding
the ability of customers to be promptly paid in full. For the
counterparties, the fact that the broker-dealer could rapidly escalate
its leverage increases the likelihood that the broker-dealer could fail
and its counterparties could

[[Page 51886]]

experience, losses of value associated with the rapid unwinding of
positions with the failing broker-dealer.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\783\ See section II.C. of this release.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Overall, the amendments to Rule 15c3-1 and Rule 17a-11 will help
enhance the monitoring of securities lending or repurchase activities
by securities regulators, thereby reducing the effect on customers and
counterparties of the potential impact of a financial collapse of the
broker-dealer.\784\ This will strengthen the securities markets and
make them more attractive to investors, thereby enhancing efficiency
and capital formation. Moreover, the language in the final rule that
provides each DEA with the flexibility to prescribe how the monthly
reports are to be made may enhance efficiencies for broker-dealers by
providing the ability for a DEA to tailor the reporting requirements.
Finally, the costs of compliance with the amendments to Rules 15c3-1
and 17a-11 should not impose a burden on competition not necessary or
appropriate in the furtherance of the purposes of the Exchange Act in
light of the benefits discussed above.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\784\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

4. Documentation of Risk Management Procedures
i. Economic Analysis
As discussed in section II.D. of this release, the Commission is
adopting new paragraph (a)(23) to Rule 17a-3 to require certain broker-
dealers to make and keep current a record documenting the credit,
market, and liquidity risk management controls established and
maintained by certain broker-dealers to assist them in analyzing and
managing the risks associated with their business activities,
including, for example, securities lending and repo transactions, OTC
derivative transactions, proprietary trading, and margin lending.\785\
The amendment will apply only to broker-dealers that have more than
$1,000,000 in aggregate credit items as computed under the customer
reserve formula of Rule 15c3-3, or $20,000,000 in capital including
debt subordinated in accordance with Appendix D to Rule 15c3-1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\785\ 17 CFR 240.17a-3(a)(23).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

These amendments require large broker-dealers to document the
controls they have implemented to address the risks they face as a
result of their business activities. As proposed, the amendment would
have required a broker-dealer to create a record documenting its
``internal risk management controls,'' rather than its market, credit,
and liquidity risk controls. Commenters generally raised concerns with
the proposed amendment stating, for example, that the proposed
documentation of internal management controls over risks arising from
the broker-dealer's business activities was overly broad and
ambiguous.\786\ The Commission considered the proposed approach and, as
discussed above, in part in response to comments, the Commission
narrowed the application of the amendment so that the final rule now
requires the documentation of internal risk management controls
established to manage market, credit, and liquidity risk.\787\ The
final rule benefits firms and their customers by mitigating the risk of
losses associated with a firm's normal activities, while at the same
time placing an increased recordkeeping burden on broker-dealers by
requiring them to document certain risks in writing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\786\ See E*Trade Letter; Citigroup Letter.
\787\ See section II.D. of this release.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

A well-documented system of internal controls designed to manage
material risk exposures related to market, credit, and liquidity risk
reflects the expectations of a firm's management as to how its business
activities should be conducted in light of such exposures. Written risk
management procedures enable management to better identify, analyze,
and manage the risks inherent in the firm's business activities with a
view to preventing material losses and to review whether the firm's
activities are being conducted in a manner that is consistent with such
procedures and controls. This will likely benefit market participants
and reduce systemic financial risk.
In addition, by making the documented controls a required record
under Rule 17a-3, a broker-dealer's regulator likely will have better
access to them, as this benefit will only be realized to the extent
that a broker-dealer has existing market, credit, and liquidity risk
management controls in place because the rule does not specify the type
of controls a broker-dealer must establish to manage these risks. It
simply requires documentation of the procedures that the broker-dealer
has established. The final rule amendment will require any such records
of the market, credit, and liquidity risk management controls to be
available to the broker-dealer's regulators so that they can review
whether the broker-dealer is adhering to these controls.
The Commission requested comment on available metrics to quantify
these benefits and any other benefits a commenter may identify.
Commenters were requested to identify sources of empirical data that
could be used for the metrics they proposed. The Commission did not
receive any comments in response to these requests.
These amendments apply to a limited number of broker-dealers,
namely, those firms with more than $1 million in customer credits or
$20 million in capital and amend recordkeeping requirements in Rules
17a-3 and 17a-4. Therefore, against the existing baseline of these
current rules, the Commission expects that the requirement will result
in a one-time cost to some of these firms to the extent that they have
established controls that have not been documented. However, since most
firms are expected to be already compliant, the incremental costs are
expected to be small. For example, broker-dealers that are approved to
compute capital using internal models are already subject to Rule 15c3-
4, which requires these firms to establish, document, and maintain a
system of internal risk controls to assist them in managing the risks
associated with its business activities, including market, credit,
leverage, liquidity, legal, and operational risks.\788\ These firms
would most likely incur no or minimal costs to comply with the final
rule. In addition, this rule amendment does not mandate any specific
control, procedure, or policy be established; rather, the Commission is
requiring that a control, procedure, or policy be documented if it is
in place. For these reasons, the Commission estimates that the one-time
hourly burden to meet the requirements of these rules will range from
zero hours for some firms to hundreds of hours for other firms. Taking
this into account, the Commission estimates that the total one-time
cost to broker-dealers to document controls in compliance with this
amendment will be approximately $13,783,700.\789\ The Commission also
estimates that the annual cost to broker-dealers to ensure compliance
with the

[[Page 51887]]

amendment to Rule 17a-3 will be approximately $8,356,950.\790\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\788\ 17 CFR 240.15c3-4; 17 CFR 240.15c3-1(a)(7)(iii). Based on
staff experience monitoring broker-dealer risk management
procedures, the internal hours would likely be coordinated by a
broker-dealer's in-house attorney (19,600 hours), working with
operation specialists (24,500 hours), and overseen by an associate
general counsel (4,900 hours). Therefore, the estimated internal
costs for this hour burden would be calculated as follows:
[(Attorney for 19,600 hours at $379 per hour) + (Operations
Specialist for 24,500 hours at $126 per hour) + (Associate General
Counsel for 4,900 hours at $467) = $12,803,700. Broker-dealers are
also expected to incur one-time outside counsel costs of $980,000
for a total one-time cost of $13,783,700. See section IV.D.7. of
this release.
\789\ See section IV.D.7. of this release. In the proposing
release, the Commission estimated this cost would be approximately
$14,201,990. See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR
at 12885.
\790\ The internal hours would likely be performed by a broker-
dealer's in-house attorney. Therefore, the estimated internal costs
for this hour burden would be calculated as follows: Attorney at
$379 per hour x 22,050 hours = $8,356,950. See section IV.D.7. of
this release.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

As noted above, the Commission requested comment on the proposed
cost estimates. In particular, the Commission requested comment on
additional costs to broker-dealers that would arise from the proposals,
such as costs arising from making changes to systems and costs
associated with maintaining these records. The Commission also
requested comment on whether the proposals would impose costs on other
market participants, including broker-dealer customers. Commenters were
also asked to identify the metrics and sources of any empirical data
that support their cost estimates. The Commission did not receive any
comments in response to these requests.
ii. Consideration of Burden on Competition, and Promotion of
Efficiency, Competition, and Capital Formation
The amendments to Rules 17a-3 and 17a-4 require firms to document
their market, credit, and liquidity risk management controls. The
amendments will help strengthen broker-dealer internal controls.
Documenting internal controls will encourage enhanced consideration of,
and thus a firmer grasp upon, the risks attendant to a broker-dealer's
business activities. This is designed to reduce the risks inherent to
the business of operating as a broker-dealer. The final approach the
Commission has taken with these rule amendments--encouraging effective
internal controls while preserving flexibility--will enhance a broker-
dealer's financial soundness and, consequently, may help to reduce the
likelihood of broker-dealer failures with possible positive effects on
investor participation, competition, and capital formation. The
amendments may also increase efficiencies in broker-dealer examinations
through the ready availability of records for examiners.
Finally, the Rule 17a-3 and 17a-4 amendments are not expected to
place a burden on competition for small non-carrying broker-dealers
because such firms would not be subject to these amendments.\791\ As
discussed above, there will be some incremental costs to compliance
related to these amendments for carrying broker-dealers but the costs
of compliance should not impose a burden on competition not necessary
or appropriate in furtherance of the purposes of the Exchange Act and
in light of the benefits discussed above.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\791\ The amendments only apply to broker-dealers that have more
than $1,000,000 in aggregate credit items as computed under the
customer reserve formula of Rule 15c3-3, or $20,000,000 in capital
including debt subordinated in accordance with Appendix D to Rule
15c3-1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

5. Amendments to the Net Capital Rule
i. Economic Analysis
a. Requirement To Deduct From Net Worth Certain Liabilities or Expenses
Assumed by Third Parties
(I). Summary of Amendments
The amendments to Rule 15c3-1 add a new paragraph (c)(2)(i)(F)
requiring a broker-dealer to adjust its net worth when calculating net
capital by including any liabilities that are assumed by a third party
if the broker-dealer cannot demonstrate that the third party has the
resources, independent of the broker-dealer's income and assets, to pay
the liabilities. This amendment is intended to assist investors and
regulators by requiring broker-dealers to provide a more accurate
picture of their financial condition. This should help regulators react
more quickly if a broker-dealer experiences financial difficulty and
benefit customers of the troubled broker-dealer as well as its
counterparties.
The purpose of the requirement in new paragraph (c)(2)(i)(F) of
Rule 15c3-1 is to address the practices of a broker-dealer that raise
concerns when a broker-dealer shifts liabilities to an entity with no
revenue or assets independent of the broker-dealer to inappropriately
increase its reported net capital, by excluding the liability from the
calculation of net worth. The final rule is designed to prohibit a
practice that could misrepresent a broker-dealer's actual financial
condition, mislead the firm's customers, and hamper the ability of
regulators to monitor the firm's financial condition.
The Commission requested comment on available metrics to quantify
these benefits and any other benefits a commenter may identify.
Commenters were requested to identify sources of empirical data that
could be used for the metrics they proposed. The Commission did not
receive any comments in response to these requests.
(II). Baseline and Incremental Economic Effects
As discussed in section II.E.1. of this release, the baseline of
this rule amendment is current Rule 15c3-1 and existing guidance and
interpretations. The Commission staff has provided guidance with
respect to the treatment and recording of certain broker-dealer
expenses and liabilities that is consistent with the rule
amendment.\792\ Consequently, as against the current baseline, the
Commission does not expect significant incremental benefits and costs
to the extent that they already comply with existing guidance and
interpretations.\793\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\792\ See, e.g., Third Party Expense Letter; see also FINRA
Notice to Members 03-6, Expense Sharing Agreements.
\793\ Under this amendment, some broker-dealers may request
permission in writing from their DEA to withdraw capital within one
year of contribution under the rule, resulting in annual costs to
broker-dealers of approximately $144,150 (465 hours x $310 per hour
for a Compliance Attorney). See section IV.D.2. of this release.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

While the amendments apply to all broker-dealers, they will impact
only those few that shift liabilities to entities with no revenue or
assets independent of the broker-dealer (i.e., shell corporations) to
boost the broker-dealer's reported net capital. Based on staff
experience in supervising broker-dealer compliance with Rule 15c3-1,
the vast majority of broker-dealers likely either do not seek to
transfer responsibility for their liabilities to a third party or, if
they do so, rely on a third party that has the financial resources--
independent of the assets and revenue of the broker-dealer--to pay the
obligations as they become due. Because of this, it is difficult to
quantify the benefits and costs impact of this rule amendment.
The Commission conservatively estimates that the amendment may
impact all broker-dealers that do not report any liabilities. FOCUS
Report data, as of December 31, 2011, indicates that approximately 289
broker-dealers report having no liabilities. While this number is
likely at the upper boundary of the total number of broker-dealers
affected by this amendment, the number of broker-dealers reporting no
liabilities likely represents a reasonable sample of broker-dealers on
which to base the cost estimates.
Requiring these broker-dealers to book liabilities will decrease
the amount of equity capital held by the firms and in some cases may
require them to obtain additional capital. The majority of broker-
dealers reporting no liabilities are introducing broker-dealers that
have a $5,000 minimum net capital requirement, while the reported
average of total liabilities is approximately $491,355 per broker-
dealer. Therefore, conservatively estimating that each of the 289
broker-dealers will have to raise $491,355 in additional capital as
result of the requirement, the total aggregate

[[Page 51888]]

amount of additional capital that will need to be raised is $142
million.\794\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\794\ 289 broker-dealers x $491,355 = $142,001,595. This is an
update from the proposing release estimate of 702 broker-dealers
with aggregate liabilities of $280,354 per firm, resulting in an
estimated amount of additional capital that would have to be raised
in the amount of $196,808,508 (702 broker-dealers x $280,354 =
$196,808,508). See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72
FR at 12885, n.189 and accompanying text.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Further, relative to the proposing release, the Commission is
revising the cost of capital from approximately 5%, which was
determined based on historical interest rates published by the Federal
Reserve, to 12% as the average cost of equity capital determined using
the capital asset pricing model (``CAPM'').\795\ Therefore, the
Commission conservatively estimates that the total annual cost to
broker-dealers will be approximately $17 million,\796\ which is an
increased estimate relative to the proposing release. For the broker-
dealers to whom this increased estimate applies, the Commission expects
that there would be greater costs imposed. However, the Commission
expects that the benefits outlined above would also accrue to the
customers of these broker-dealers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\795\ The CAPM is a central model in modern financial theory and
is widely used in applications, such as estimating the cost of
capital for firms and evaluating the performance of managed
portfolios. Based on conventional assumptions and historical stock
price data available on Bloomberg, the Commission estimates a risk-
free rate of 2.5% and an equity risk premium of 7.8%. Using, five-
year, as well as two-year, monthly returns for a sample of listed
broker-dealers, the Commission estimates an adjusted beta of
approximately 1.25.
\796\ $142,001,595 x 12.25% = $17,395,195. In the proposing
release, the Commission estimated that this cost would be
approximately $10 million. See Amendments to Financial
Responsibilities Rules. 72 FR at 12995.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Commission requested comment on the proposed cost estimates. In
particular, the Commission requested comment on additional costs to
broker-dealers that would arise from the proposals. The Commission also
requested comment on whether these proposals would impose costs on
other market participants, including broker-dealer customers.
Commenters were also asked to identify the metrics and sources of any
empirical data that support their costs estimates. The Commission
received five comments in response to this request for comment.\797\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\797\ See Beer Letter; Beer 2 Letter; Lowenstein Letter; Levene
Letter; NIBA 2 Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

One commenter noted that the Commission has provided no evidence
that the public has been endangered or has been left financially
unprotected as a result of the practice of having another entity book
some or all of a member's liabilities.\798\ This commenter asserted
that the amendment will affect 14% of total member firms and that
member firms may be shut down, sold or merged as an unintended
consequence of the amendment.\799\ The commenter questioned how many
member firms will fail as a result of this proposal.\800\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\798\ See Lowenstein Letter.
\799\ Id.
\800\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Another commenter stated that the true costs of the amendment
should be calculated and verified before a proposed amendment is
offered and that the true costs of these amendments were given little
time, research, and consideration.\801\ This commenter also argued that
the estimated 5% cost of capital has no basis and a firm would be
fortunate to borrow funds for double the estimate of 5%.\802\ This same
commenter also stated that the proposal would require 702 debt-free
introducing broker-dealers to needlessly take on debt of approximately
$280,354.\803\ Another commenter stated that it is unclear and unlikely
how this amendment would achieve any of the desired results and may
conversely impair a firm's ability to continue as a going concern.\804\
None of the commenters provided the Commission with revised cost
estimates.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\801\ See Beer 2 Letter.
\802\ Id.
\803\ See Beer Letter; Lowenstein Letter.
\804\ See Levene Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

One commenter stated that if small firms were required to raise
over $300,000 in capital each, there would be the largest dissolution
of small broker-dealers in the history of the regulated securities
industry.\805\ This commenter also stated that the Commission's
estimate of a gross cost of capital of 7.5% (5% + 2.5%) is a totally
unrealistic cost of capital for small broker-dealers and that these
broker-dealers will categorically have costs significantly higher than
7.5%.\806\ Finally, the commenter stated that, until the Commission
convenes a small broker-dealer representative panel to assist it with
establishing such costs, the Commission is speculating on such costs,
and is therefore without adequate information to consider the effects
of such costs and changes on small firms.\807\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\805\ See NIBA 2 Letter.
\806\ Id.
\807\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

(III). Alternatives
The Commission considered all comments received \808\ and the
alternative of not adopting the rule, and decided to adopt the
amendments substantially as proposed. In response to the comment
regarding the unrealistic cost of capital,\809\ the Commission has
increased the cost of capital to 12% as an average cost of equity
capital for broker-dealers. As discussed in section II.E.1 of this
release, the baseline of this amendment is current Rule 15c3-1 and
existing guidance and interpretations. The Commission staff has
provided guidance with respect to the treatment and recording of
certain broker-dealer expenses and liabilities that is consistent with
the rule amendment.\810\ Existing broker-dealer recordkeeping rules
require a broker-dealer to record its income and expenses.\811\ For
example, paragraph (a)(2) of Rule 17a-3 requires a broker-dealer to
make and keep current ledgers (or other records) reflecting all assets
and liabilities, income and expense and capital accounts.\812\
Consequently, as against the current baseline, the above estimates are
intended to be conservative. The Commission expects that broker-dealers
will incur costs to comply with this amendment, including costs to
obtain additional capital, only to the extent they are not currently
complying with existing guidance and interpretations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\808\ See Beer Letter; Beer 2 Letter; Lowenstein Letter; Levene
Letter; NIBA 2 Letter.
\809\ See NIBA 2 Letter.
\810\ See, e.g., Third Party Expense Letter; see also FINRA
Notice to Members 03-6, Expense Sharing Agreements.
\811\ 17 CFR 240.17a-3; 17 CFR 240.17a-4.
\812\ 17 CFR 240.17a-3(a)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In response to comments,\813\ the Commission does not expect
broker-dealers to incur significant costs to comply with this amendment
to the extent that they are appropriately recording their assets and
liabilities under current Commission rules and interpretive guidance,
because these items will already appear on a broker-dealer's balance
sheet and be included in its net capital computation. Consequently, the
rule amendment, as adopted, should not: (1) Cause firms to be
classified as ``a going concern;'' \814\ (2) cause firms to fail,
dissolve, or otherwise close; \815\ (3) impose undue burdens; or (4)
present serious implementation difficulties to firms (small or large)
if they are appropriately recording their assets and liabilities under
current Commission rules and interpretive guidance.\816\ Further, as
stated above, the estimates are intended to be conservative, and
therefore, the Commission expects that the ``true''

[[Page 51889]]

costs \817\ that may be incurred by broker-dealers should be less than
the maximum estimated. Therefore, the Commission does not believe a
longer time period for compliance or the formation of a small broker-
dealer advisory cost committee is necessary.\818\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\813\ See Beer Letter; Beer 2 Letter; Lowenstein Letter; Levene
Letter; NIBA 2 Letter.
\814\ See Levene Letter.
\815\ See NIBA 2 Letter.
\816\ See, e.g., Third Party Expense Letter; see also FINRA
Notice to Members 03-6, Expense Sharing Agreements.
\817\ See Beer 2 Letter.
\818\ See NIBA 2 Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

b. Requirement To Subtract From Net Worth Certain Non-Permanent Capital
Contributions
(I). Summary of Amendments
As discussed in section II.E.2. of this release, the amendment adds
paragraph (c)(2)(i)(G) to Rule 15c3-1, requiring a broker-dealer to
treat as a liability any capital that is contributed under an agreement
giving the investor the option to withdraw it. The rule, as adopted,
also requires that a broker-dealer treat as a liability any capital
contribution that is withdrawn within a year of its contribution unless
the broker-dealer receives permission in writing from its DEA.\819\ The
amendment to Rule 15c3-1 is intended to assist investors and regulators
by requiring broker-dealers to provide a more accurate picture of their
financial condition. This amendment will help regulators react more
quickly if a broker-dealer experiences financial difficulty and
benefits customers of a troubled broker-dealer as well as its
counterparties.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\819\ One commenter suggested that the rule be amended to
explicitly exclude any withdrawals that would fall under paragraph
(e)(4)(iii) of Rule 15c3-1. See American Bar Association Letter. It
is unnecessary to explicitly exclude any withdrawals that would fall
under paragraph (e)(4)(iii) of Rule 15c3-1 because these
requirements will not apply to withdrawals covered by paragraph
(e)(4)(iii) of Rule 15c3-1, namely, withdrawals used to make tax
payments or to pay reasonable compensation to partners. 17 CFR
240.15c3-1(e)(4)(iii). These types of payments are ordinary business
expenditures and do not raise the types of concerns the proposed
rule is designed to address. See Amendments to Financial
Responsibility Rules, 74 FR at12872, n.79.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Commission requested comment on available metrics to quantify
these benefits and any other benefits a commenter may identify.
Commenters were requested to identify sources of empirical data that
could be used for the metrics they proposed. The Commission did not
receive any comments in response to these requests.
(II). Baseline and Incremental Economic Effects
As discussed in section II.E.2. of this release, the baseline of
this rule amendment is current Rule 15c3-1 and existing guidance and
interpretations. The Commission estimates that the amendments requiring
broker-dealers to treat certain capital contributions as liabilities
should not result in significant incremental benefits and costs, as
compared to the baseline. Because of existing Commission and staff
guidance regarding the permanency of capital,\820\ broker-dealers
typically do not enter into agreements permitting an owner to withdraw
capital at any time. To the extent some firms may have engaged in this
practice, they may need to raise capital to meet the rule requirement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\820\ See Net Capital Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 28927 (Feb.
28, 1991). See also Net Capital Requirements for Brokers and Dealers
Exchange Act Release No. 18417 (Jan. 13, 1982), 47 FR 3512 (Jan. 25,
1982). See also Temporary Capital Letter; Study of Unsafe and
Unsound Practices of Broker-Dealers, Report and Recommendations of
the Securities and Exchange Commission, H.R. Doc. No. 92-231 (1971)
(recommending improvement of adequacy and permanency of capital);
and Letter from Nelson Kibler, Assistant Director, Division of
Market Regulation to John Pinto, National Association of Securities
Dealers, Inc. (Sept. 8, 1980).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

While the amendments apply to all broker-dealers, they will impact
only the few broker-dealers that provide investors with the option to
withdraw capital at any time or within one year. Because of existing
Commission and staff interpretations related to temporary capital
contributions,\821\ most broker-dealers likely do not accept capital
contributions under agreements permitting the investor to withdraw the
capital at any time or within one year. Therefore, it is difficult to
quantify the cost impact of this rule amendment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\821\ See Net Capital Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 28927 (Feb.
28, 1991), 56 FR 9124 (Mar. 5, 1991); and Temporary Capital Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Based on staff experience with the treatment of capital
contributions and the application of Rule 15c3-1, the Commission
estimates that no more than $100 million in capital at broker-dealers
is subject to such agreements.\822\ Further, with regard to the
treatment of temporary capital contributions, in the proposing release,
the Commission assumed an incremental cost of capital of 2.5%,\823\ and
estimated that the amendment would result in an annual cost of
approximately $2.5 million.\824\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\822\ See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at
12885.
\823\ Id. at 12886-12887.
\824\ $100,000,000 x 2.5% = $2,500,000.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Commission requested comment on the proposed cost estimates. In
particular, the Commission requested comment on additional costs to
broker-dealers that would arise from the proposals. The Commission also
requested comment on whether these proposals would impose costs on
other market participants, including broker-dealer customers.
Commenters were also asked to identify the metrics and sources of any
empirical data that support their costs estimates.
The Commission received three comments.\825\ One commenter stated
that the Commission's estimate that no more than $100 million of
capital at broker-dealers is subject to agreements permitting an owner
to withdraw capital at any time greatly underestimates the impact of
the proposed rule.\826\ The commenter stated that the Commission makes
no case for deviating from the already established standards.\827\
Another commenter believed that the proposal would raise its cost of
capital to such an extent that it would be impossible for the firm to
raise capital from unrelated third parties.\828\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\825\ See Chicago Capital Management Letter; SIG Letter; NIBA 2
Letter.
\826\ See SIG Letter.
\827\ Id.
\828\ See Chicago Capital Management Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

One commenter stated that the Commission's estimate of a gross cost
of capital of 7.5% (5% + 2.5%) is a totally unrealistic cost of capital
for small broker-dealers and that these broker-dealers will
categorically have costs significantly higher than 7.5%.\829\ Finally,
the commenter stated that, until the Commission convenes a small
broker-dealer representative panel to assist it with establishing such
costs, the Commission is ``speculating'' on such costs, and is
therefore without adequate information to consider the effects of such
costs and changes on small firms.\830\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\829\ See NIBA 2 Letter.
\830\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In response to comments,\831\ the Commission is revising this
estimate in the final rule to an estimated cost of capital of
approximately 12%, which is determined as the average cost of equity
capital of broker-dealers using the CAPM. The overall estimated cost of
capital is not incremental to the amendment discussed above regarding
third party liabilities. The estimated cost of capital would be 12% for
a broker-dealer seeking additional equity capital. Therefore, with
regard to the treatment of temporary capital contributions, the
Commission estimates the amendment will result in an annual cost of
approximately $12.0 million,\832\ which is an increased estimate
relative to the proposing release. For the broker-dealers to whom this
increased estimate applies, and who may not be complying with the rule
amendments, the Commission expects that there would be greater costs
imposed. However, the Commission expects that the benefits outlined
above

[[Page 51890]]

would also accrue to the customers of these broker-dealers.\833\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\831\ See NIBA 2 Letter.
\832\ $100,000,000 x 12.25% = $12,250,000.
\833\ $100,000,000 x 12.25% = $12,250,000.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

(III). Alternatives
The Commission considered all comments discussed above and the
alternative of not adopting the rule, and decided to adopt the
amendments substantially as proposed. In response to commenters'
concerns about the impact on capital and the $100 million
estimate,\834\ as discussed above, the final rule amendment is a
codification of existing Commission staff guidance,\835\ and thus
should not represent a change for broker-dealers with respect to
capital withdrawals. Moreover, with respect to commenters' concerns
about obtaining capital,\836\ the rule does not prohibit an investor
from withdrawing capital at any time. Rather, it prohibits a broker-
dealer from treating temporary cash infusions as capital for purposes
of the net capital rule. Finally, the final rule amendment provides a
mechanism for a broker-dealer to apply to its DEA to make a withdrawal
within one year of the capital contribution without triggering the
deduction under certain circumstances.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\834\ See Chicago Capital Management Letter; SIG Letter; NIBA 2
Letter.
\835\ See Temporary Capital Letter. See also section II.E.2. of
this release.
\836\ See Chicago Capital Management Letter; SIG Letter; NIBA 2
Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In the final rule, the Commission has increased the estimated cost
of capital from 2.5% to 12%, in response to comments regarding the
unrealistic cost of capital, and because the estimated cost of capital
is not incremental to the estimated cost of capital to the amendment to
Rule 15c3-1 regarding third party liabilities.\837\ The estimated cost
of capital would be 12% for a broker-dealer seeking a loan for any
additional capital. In addition, based on staff experience with the
treatment of capital contributions and for the reasons discussed above,
the Commission continues to believe that the estimate of $100 million
regarding the temporary capital contributions is reasonable.\838\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\837\ See NIBA 2 Letter.
\838\ See SIG Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Further, the final rule amendments relating to temporary capital
contributions have been revised to clarify that a withdrawal of capital
made within one year of its contribution to the broker-dealer is deemed
to have been intended to be withdrawn within one year, unless the
withdrawal has been approved in writing by the broker-dealer's
DEA.\839\ The Commission made this change to eliminate a potential
ambiguity as to whether a withdrawal of capital within one year could
ever be approved by a broker-dealer's DEA. The final rule amendment
clarifies the intent to provide a mechanism for broker-dealers to apply
for approval to withdraw capital within one year and to be granted such
approval where appropriate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\839\ See section II.E.2. of this release.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

While owners of most broker-dealers have the option of withdrawing
capital, most owners likely do not have agreements that provide the
option of withdrawing capital at any time.\840\ Paragraph (e) of Rule
15c3-1 contains mechanisms to permit a broker-dealer to make capital
withdrawals for specified purposes.\841\ If there is a specific need
for a broker-dealer to seek permission to make a capital withdrawal
within one year of contribution, the final rule already provides a
mechanism for the broker-dealer to seek permission in writing from its
DEA to make such a withdrawal.\842\ Based on the discussion above, the
Commission believes the final cost estimates are appropriate.\843\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\840\ See SIG Letter.
\841\ See paragraphs (e)(1)(iii)(B) and (e)(4)(iii) of Rule
15c3-1. See also Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR
at 12872, n.79 (``These requirements would not apply to withdrawals
covered by paragraph (e)(4)(iii) of Rule 15c3-1, namely, withdrawals
used to make tax payments or pay reasonable compensation to
partners. These types of payments are ordinary business expenditures
and do not raise the types of concerns the proposed rule is designed
to address.'')
\842\ See paragraph (c)(2)(i)(G)(2) of Rule 15c3-1.
\843\ See NIBA 2 Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

c. Requirement To Deduct the Amount by Which a Fidelity Bond Exceeds
SRO Limits
As discussed in section II.E.3. of this release, this amendment
requires broker-dealers to deduct from net capital, with regard to
fidelity bonding requirements prescribed by a broker-dealer's examining
authority, the excess of any deductible amount over the amount
permitted by SRO rules.
Under SRO rules, certain broker-dealers that do business with the
public or are required to become SIPC members must comply with
mandatory fidelity bonding requirements.\844\ SRO rules typically
permit a broker-dealer to have a deductible provision included in the
bond; however, such rules provide that the deductible must not exceed
certain amounts. With regard to firms that maintain deductible amounts
over certain specified amounts, a number of SRO rules provide that the
broker-dealer must deduct this specified amount from net worth when
calculating net capital under Rule 15c3-1.\845\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\844\ See, e.g., FINRA Rule 4360, CBOE Rule 9.22, and NASDAQ OMX
PHLX Rule 705. SRO fidelity bonding requirements typically contain
agreements covering the following areas: A ``Fidelity'' insuring
clause to indemnify against loss of property through dishonest or
fraudulent acts of employees; an ``On Premises'' agreement insuring
against losses resulting from crimes such as burglary and theft and
from misplacement of property of the insured; an ``In Transit''
clause indemnifying against losses occurring while property is in
transit; a ``Forgery and Alteration'' agreement insuring against
loss due to forgery or alteration of various kinds of negotiable
instruments; and a ``Securities Loss'' clause protecting against
losses incurred through forgery and alteration of securities. Id.
\845\ See, e.g., FINRA Rule 4360 and CBOE Rule 9.22.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Rule 15c3-1, however, does not specifically reference the SRO
deductible requirements as a charge to net worth, meaning that a
broker-dealer would not be required for the purposes of Commission
rules to show the impact of the deduction in the net capital
computation required by an SRO on the FOCUS Report.\846\ To address the
reporting inconsistency, the Commission is amending Rule 15c3-1 to add
paragraph (c)(2)(xiv), which will require broker-dealers to deduct the
amount specified by rule of the Examining Authority of the broker-
dealer with respect to a requirement to maintain fidelity bond
coverage. This rule amendment will provide consistency in broker-dealer
reporting requirements.\847\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\846\ See 17 CFR 240.17a-5.
\847\ Conversely, not adopting this rule amendment would have
resulted in continued inconsistency among existing SRO rules and
Rule 15c3-1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

This amendment will also codify in a Commission rule capital
charges that broker-dealers are currently required to take pursuant to
the rules of various SROs. Consequently, any economic effects,
including costs and benefits, should be compared to a baseline of
current practices. The amendment should not impose additional costs on
broker-dealers with respect to the purchasing or carrying of fidelity
bond coverage. Nor will the amendment cause broker-dealers to incur
additional costs in determining or reporting excess deductible amounts
over the deductible permitted. Broker-dealers already make such
determinations under SROs rules, and the manner in which such excesses
are typically reported (i.e., through periodic FOCUS Reports and other
reports) would remain the same.
The Commission received one comment opposing the fidelity bond
amendment, stating that FINRA Rule 4360 and the Commission's amendment
would result in a de facto increase in minimum net capital requirements
for some broker-dealers.\848\ Any increase in net capital cited by the
commenter

[[Page 51891]]

would result from existing SRO rules.\849\ Stated differently, broker-
dealers that are members of an SRO with such a fidelity bonding rule
must already account for the deduction in complying with the net
capital requirements of SROs and nothing in the Commission's amendment
to paragraph (c)(2)(xiv) of Rule 15c3-1 would alter this status quo.
Consequently, while there is currently no deduction required under the
baseline of current Rule 15c3-1 relating to fidelity bond deductibles,
because SRO rules currently require this deduction, the adoption of
this amendment under Rule 15c3-1 should not impose any additional costs
on broker-dealers that they are not already incurring under existing
SRO rules.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\848\ See NIBA 2 Letter.
\849\ For example, the Commission approved FINRA Rule 4360
through the SRO rule filing process. See Order Approving Proposed
Rule Change to Adopt FINRA Rule 4360 (Fidelity Bonds) in the
Consolidated FINRA Rulebook, Exchange Act Release No. 63961 (Feb.
24, 2011), 76 FR 11542 (Mar. 2, 2011). Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1)
of the Exchange Act, each SRO must file with the Commission any
proposed change in, addition to, or deletion from the rules of the
exchange electronically on a Form 19b-4 through the Electronic Form
19b-4 Filing System, which is a secure Web site operated by the
Commission. 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1) and 17 CFR 240.19b-4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

d. Broker-Dealer Solvency Requirement
As discussed in section II.E.4., the amendment to paragraph (a) of
Rule 15c3-1 states that no broker-dealer shall be ``insolvent'' as that
term is defined under paragraph (c)(16) of the rule. The companion
amendment to paragraph (b)(1) of Rule 17a-11 requires insolvent broker-
dealers to provide notice to regulatory authorities.
Allowing an insolvent broker-dealer to continue conducting a
securities business during the period of its insolvency,
notwithstanding its net capital position, could jeopardize customers
and other market participants because a broker-dealer that has made an
admission of insolvency, or is otherwise deemed insolvent or entitled
to protection from creditors, does not possess the financial resources
necessary to operate a securities business. Continuing to operate in
such circumstances poses a significant credit risk to counterparties
and to the clearance and settlement system, and, in the event the firm
ends up in a liquidation proceeding under SIPA, may impair the ability
of the SIPA trustee to make the customers of the broker-dealer whole
and satisfy the claims of other creditors out of the assets of the
general estate.\850\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\850\ See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at
12872.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Consequently, the amendment to Rule 15c3-1 benefits the securities
markets, and indirectly, all other market participants, by removing
risks associated with the continued operation of a financially unstable
firm. For example, the amendment will limit the potential that an
insolvent firm would take on new customers and place their assets at
risk. Furthermore, the broker-dealer will not be able to enter into
proprietary transactions with other broker-dealers and place them or
clearing agencies at further risk of counterparty default. The broker-
dealer's existing customers also will benefit from preservation of any
remaining capital of the firm, which could be used to facilitate an
orderly liquidation.
The amendment to Rule 17a-11 also benefits the securities markets
in that it will provide regulators with the opportunity to more quickly
take steps to protect customers and counterparties at the onset of the
insolvency, including, if appropriate, notifying SIPC of the need to
commence a SIPA liquidation.
The baseline for this proposed amendment is current Rules 15c3-1
and 17a-11, which currently do not contain requirements to cease
conducting a securities business (or to notify the Commission) if
certain insolvency events were to occur. The amendments generally will
have no impact on broker-dealers when compared to the current baseline.
Should a broker-dealer become subject to an insolvency proceeding, it
will incur the cost of sending notice of that fact to the Commission
and its DEA. The Commission estimated in the PRA that it will occur
approximately two \851\ times a year for all broker-dealers.\852\ For
these reasons, the Commission estimates that any costs arising from
this amendment will be de minimis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\851\ This estimate is based on the 2012 SIPC Annual Report,
which indicates that over the last ten year-period, the annual
average of new customer protection proceedings was three. A copy of
the 2012 Annual Report is available at https://www.sipc.org/.
\852\ The internal hours would likely be performed by a
compliance clerk. Therefore, the estimated internal costs for this
hour burden would be calculated as follows: Compliance Clerk at $63
per hour x 20 minutes = $21.00. See section IV.D.8. of this release.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

One commenter stated that involuntary bankruptcy proceedings do not
necessarily indicate that the broker-dealer is insolvent, as such
proceedings can be frivolous, malicious, or otherwise lacking in merit,
and noted standard industry forms generally provide a grace period for
a party to such a proceeding to obtain a stay or dismissal before an
event of default is deemed to have occurred. The Commission considered
this alternative approach and notes that if a firm believes that it is
the subject of an unwarranted involuntary bankruptcy proceeding and
that its case will not be dismissed within the 30 day timeframe, as is
the case with existing net capital requirements, pursuant to Rule 15c3-
1(b)(3), the Commission may, upon written application, exempt the
broker-dealer from the requirement.
In addition, one commenter objected to the amendments as
unnecessary, citing the Rule 15c3-1 prohibition on broker-dealers
effecting securities transactions if their net capital is below certain
minimums.\853\ The commenter stated that the net capital of an
insolvent broker-dealer would, by definition, be below those
minimums.\854\ The Commission considered the commenter's view and the
alternative of not adopting the amendments. The purpose of the
amendment is to address cases where the broker-dealer is subject to an
insolvency event but maintains that it is in compliance with the net
capital rule. Therefore, the Commission is adopting this amendment,
because, while such instances may be rare, an insolvent broker-dealer
could seek the protection of the bankruptcy laws but continue to effect
transactions with the public, potentially jeopardizing customers and
other creditors of the broker-dealer, including counterparties.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\853\ See St. Bernard Financial Services Letter.
\854\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

As noted above, the Commission requested comment on this cost
estimate. In particular, the Commission requested comment on whether
there would be costs to broker-dealers as a consequence of the
proposal. The Commission also requested comment on whether this
proposal would impose costs on other market participants, including
broker-dealer customers. Commenters were asked to identify the metrics
and sources of any empirical data that supported their costs estimates.
The Commission did not receive any comments in response to these
requests.
e. Amendment To Rule Governing Restrictions of Withdrawals of Capital
As discussed in section II.E.5. of this release, paragraph (e) of
Rule 15c3-1, which places certain conditions on a broker-dealer when
withdrawing capital,\855\ also allows the Commission to issue an order
temporarily restricting a broker-dealer from withdrawing capital or
making loans or advances to stockholders, insiders, and affiliates

[[Page 51892]]

under certain circumstances.\856\ The rule, however, limits such orders
to withdrawals, advances, or loans that, when aggregated with all other
withdrawals, advances, or loans on a net basis during a 30 calendar day
period, exceed 30% of the firm's excess net capital.\857\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\855\ See 17 CFR 240.15c3-1(e).
\856\ See 17 CFR 240.15c3-1(e)(3).
\857\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Commission has determined that the requirement is difficult to
enforce, as it generally would not be clear when the 30% threshold had
been reached, due to the inherent unreliability of a troubled broker-
dealer's books and records. The Commission considered retaining the 30%
threshold, but determined that a more appropriate approach would be to
eliminate the 30% threshold requirement from the rule, rather than
retain a provision that is difficult to enforce. Consequently, the
Commission proposed, and is adopting, a change to delete this provision
and instead to allow the Commission to restrict all withdrawals,
advances, and loans so long as the other conditions under the rule (all
of which remain unchanged) were met.
The amendment to paragraph (e) of Rule 15c3-1 benefits the
securities markets by protecting customers and counterparties of a
financially stressed broker-dealer. For example, by prohibiting
unsecured loans to a stockholder or withdrawal of equity capital while
the order is outstanding, the amendment will help to preserve the
assets and liquidity of the broker-dealer and enable the Commission and
its staff, as well as other regulators, to examine the broker-dealer's
financial condition, net capital position, and the risk exposure to the
customers and creditors of the broker-dealer.
The current rule permitting the Commission to restrict withdrawals
of capital from a financially distressed broker-dealer was adopted in
1991.\858\ This rule is the baseline for purposes of this economic
analysis. When the Commission adopted this paragraph of Rule 15c3-1
more than twenty years ago, the Commission stated that it was intended
to be an emergency provision, applicable only to the most exigent of
circumstances where the continued viability of the broker-dealer
appears to be at stake.\859\ In the ensuing years, the Commission has
only utilized this provision one time.\860\ Based on this experience
with the rule, and the fact that the rule is intended as an emergency
provision only, as compared to the current baseline, the Commission
estimates that the amendment will result in no or de minimis costs to
broker-dealers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\858\ See Net Capital Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 28927 (Feb.
28, 1991), 56 FR 9124 (Mar. 5, 1991).
\859\ Net Capital Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 28927, 56 FR
9124, 9128.
\860\ Order Regarding Withdrawals, Unsecured Loans or Advances
from Refco Securities, LLC and Refco Clearing, LLC, Exchange Act
Release No. 52606 (Oct. 13, 2005).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

As noted above, the Commission requested comment on this cost
estimate. The Commission also requested comment on whether the proposal
would impose costs on other market participants. Commenters were asked
to identify the metrics and sources of any empirical data that support
their cost estimates. One commenter supported the amendment but
believed that the rule is intended to protect the capitalization of
large firms while ignoring small firms, and proposed that the
Commission state all the conditions that need to exist for a firm to
withdraw, repay or redeem any amount that does not endanger the firm or
its customers.\861\ The commenter also stated that it opposes
regulation that arbitrarily reduces the value of small broker-dealers
and their competitive position relative to larger broker-dealers. A
second commenter noted that the proposed amendment would impose
additional compliance burdens on broker-dealers and would significantly
limit broker-dealers' flexibility in the event of a liquidity
crisis.\862\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\861\ See NIBA 2 Letter.
\862\ See Raymond James 2 Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In adopting the final rule, the Commission considered the
alternatives and modifications suggested by commenters. In response to
these comments, the Commission notes that the amendment would eliminate
the 30% threshold from paragraph (e)(3)(i) of Rule 15c3-1, which
relates to the Commission's authority to temporarily restrict
withdrawals of net capital. It cannot impose these restrictions without
concluding that ``such withdrawal, advance or loan may be detrimental
to the financial integrity of the broker or dealer, or may unduly
jeopardize the broker or dealer's ability to repay its customer claims
or other liabilities which may cause a significant impact on the
markets or expose the customers or creditors of the broker or dealer to
loss without taking into account the application of the Securities
Investor Protection Act of 1970.'' \863\ While paragraph (e)(3)(i) of
Rule 15c3-1 would apply to all broker-dealers, the stringent conditions
under which the Commission may exert its authority under the rule to
temporarily restrict a broker-dealer's withdrawals of net capital would
apply to only the circumstances where the continued viability of the
broker-dealer appears to be at stake.\864\ The Commission, however,
agrees with the importance of maintaining flexibility in the context of
ordering restrictions on withdrawals, advances, and loans. Therefore,
the Commission modified the amendment, as adopted, to add language to
paragraph (e)(3)(i) to state (following the phrase ``employee or
affiliate'') that such orders will be issued, ``under such terms and
conditions as the Commission deems necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or consistent with the protection of investors . . .
.'' \865\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\863\ See 17 CFR 240.15c3-1(e)(3)(i).
\864\ Net Capital Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 28927, 56 FR
9124, 9128.
\865\ See paragraph (e) of Rule 17a-3, as adopted. See
generally, 15 U.S.C. 78mm(a)(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In summary, the Commission does not believe that the deletion of
the 30% threshold will affect the competitiveness or unduly restrict
the ongoing business operations of small broker-dealers as compared to
larger firms. All broker-dealers remain subject to the other notice and
withdrawal limitations on equity capital set forth in paragraphs (e)(1)
and (e)(2) of Rule 15c3-1, which are not the subject of this rule
amendment.
f. Amendment to Rule 15c3-1 Appendix A
As discussed in section II.E.6.i. of this release, the amendment to
paragraph (b)(1)(vi) of Rule 15c3-1a will make permanent the reduced
net capital requirements that apply to listed option positions in major
market foreign currencies and high-capitalization and non-high-
capitalization diversified indexes in non-clearing option specialist
and market maker accounts. This change will benefit the broker-dealers
that have been calculating charges under a temporary amendment the
Commission originally adopted in 1997.\866\ The temporary amendment
expired on September 1, 1997, subject to extension.\867\ The Commission
staff subsequently issued a no-action letter on January 13, 2000, which
stated that the staff would not recommend enforcement action if broker-
dealers continued to rely on the temporary amendment.\868\ The
Commission

[[Page 51893]]

considered whether to keep the amendment temporary but determined that
making the temporary amendment permanent, as proposed, was the more
appropriate alternative because it creates certainty for broker-dealers
relying on the rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\866\ See Net Capital Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 38248 (Feb.
6, 1997), 62 FR 6474 (Feb. 12, 1997).
\867\ See 17 CFR 15c3-1a(b)(1)(iv)(B).
\868\ Letter from Michael Macchiaroli, Associate Director,
Division of Market Regulation, Commission, to Richard Lewandowski,
Vice President, Regulatory Division, The Chicago Board Options
Exchange, Inc. (Jan. 13, 2000) (stating that the Division of Trading
and Markets ``will not recommend . . . enforcement action if non-
clearing option specialists and market-makers continue to rely on
subparagraph (b)(1)(iv) of Appendix A to Rule 15c3-1 under the
Exchange Act until such time as the Commission has determined
whether it should be extended'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Because this amendment seeks to match capital requirements with
actual risks, it should not have an adverse impact on the financial
strength of broker-dealers. Moreover, because broker-dealers are
already operating under the temporary relief, which is the current
baseline, the amendment should not result in any costs for broker-
dealers as compared to the current baseline.
The Commission requested comment on available metrics to quantify
the benefits identified above and any other benefits the commenter may
identify. In addition, the Commission requested comment on whether the
proposal would result in any costs. Commenters were asked to identify
the metrics and sources of any empirical data that support their cost
estimates. The Commission did not receive any comments in response to
these requests.
ii. Consideration of Burden on Competition, and Promotion of
Efficiency, Competition, and Capital Formation
Rule 15c3-1 is designed to help ensure that a broker-dealer holds
at all times liquid assets sufficient to pay its non-subordinated
liabilities and retain a ``cushion'' of liquid assets used to pay
customers without delay in the event that the broker-dealer fails. For
example, a broker-dealer that inappropriately excludes certain
liabilities when presenting its financial position \869\ or includes
non-permanent capital contributions in its financial statements \870\
distorts the view of the firm's financial condition and undermines the
rule. In either event, such practices jeopardize the broker-dealer's
ability to self-liquidate and promptly pay customers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\869\ See section II.E.1. of this release.
\870\ See section II.E.2. of this release.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Commission's experience with the broker-dealer financial
responsibility rules, underscored by the 2008 financial crisis,
highlights the effects that the failure of a broker-dealer,
particularly a large carrying broker-dealer, could have on customers
and other market participants. Losses resulting from the disorderly
winding down of a broker-dealer may often undermine the participation
of investors in the U.S. capital markets, with possible negative
effects on capital formation and market efficiency. Thus, it is
imperative that broker-dealers operate in compliance with Rule 15c3-1
and that the Commission takes the necessary steps to help ensure that
broker-dealers are prohibited from engaging in practices that obscure
noncompliance.
The amendments to Rule 15c3-1 are designed to reduce the risk of a
disorderly failure of a broker-dealer and lessen the potential that
market participants may seek to rapidly withdraw assets and financing
from broker-dealers during a time of market stress. These Rule 15c3-1
amendments may affect efficiency and capital formation through their
positive impact on competition among broker-dealers. Specifically,
markets that are competitive can, all other things equal, be expected
to promote an efficient allocation of capital.\871\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\871\ See Capital, Margin, and Segregation Requirements for
Security-Based Swap Dealers and Major Security-Based Swap
Participants and Capital Requirements for Broker-Dealers, Exchange
Act Release No. 68071 (Oct. 18, 2012), 77 FR 70213, 70315 (Nov. 23,
2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The amendments to Rule 15c3-1--(1) Requiring a broker-dealer to
account for certain liabilities or treat certain capital contributions
as liabilities,\872\ (2) requiring a broker-dealer to deduct certain
fidelity bond deductibles,\873\ (3) requiring an insolvent broker-
dealer to cease conducting a securities business and provide notice
under the amendment to Rule 17a-11,\874\ (4) eliminating the
qualification on Commission orders restricting withdrawals, advances,
and unsecured loans to instances where recent withdrawals, advances or
loans, in the aggregate, exceed 30% of the broker-dealer's excess net
capital,\875\ and (5) making permanent the reduced net capital
requirements under Appendix A for market makers \876\--are consistent
with promoting efficiency, competition, and capital formation in the
market place.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\872\ See sections II.E.1. and 2. of this release.
\873\ See section II.E.3. of this release.
\874\ See section II.E.4. of this release.
\875\ See section II.E.5. of this release.
\876\ See section II.E.6.i. of this release.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

First, a broker-dealer that fails to include liabilities that
depend on the broker-dealer's assets and revenues and accepts temporary
capital contributions is obscuring its true financial condition. This
also interferes with the process by which regulators monitor the
financial condition of broker-dealers and, thereby, impedes their
ability to take proactive steps to minimize the harm resulting from a
broker-dealer failure to customers, counterparties, and clearing
agencies.
Second, requiring broker-dealers to take net capital charges for
excess fidelity bond deductibles imposed under SRO rules will promote
efficiency by providing consistency among Rule 15c3-1 and SRO rules.
Because fidelity bond requirements provide a safeguard with regard to
broker-dealer financial responsibility, the amendment will enhance
competition through the operation of more financially sound firms.
Third, the continued operation of an insolvent broker-dealer or the
withdrawal of capital from a broker-dealer that may jeopardize such
broker-dealer's financial integrity poses financial risk to its
customers, counterparties, and the registered clearing agencies. These
risks increase costs and decrease efficiency of the marketplace.
Fourth, the elimination of the limitation on Commission orders
restricting capital withdrawals under paragraph (e)(3) of Rule 15c3-1
from a financially troubled broker-dealer will provide greater
protection to customers and counterparties of the firm and registered
clearing agencies. While such orders are expected to be infrequent,
when issued they should lower costs to these entities associated with
having an outstanding obligation from the troubled broker-dealer,
thereby promoting efficiency and facilitating capital formation.
One commenter expressed concern that the proposed amendments to
Rule 15c3-1 would be particularly burdensome on small broker-dealers,
negatively impacting capital formation for small issuers and increasing
the cost of capital for small broker-dealers.\877\ For example, the
commenter stated that it believed that the proposed changes requiring a
broker-dealer to subtract from net worth certain non-permanent capital
contributions and to deduct from net worth certain liabilities or
expenses assumed by third parties would negatively impact capital
formation for small issuers and increase the cost of capital for small
broker-dealers.\878\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\877\ See NIBA 2 Letter.
\878\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

While the Commission is cognizant that the Rule 15c3-1 amendments
may impose burdens on broker-dealers, including non-carrying broker-
dealers, the commenter is treating the amendments as entirely new
additions to the net capital rule. Yet, as discussed

[[Page 51894]]

in section II.E. of this release, the Commission has emphasized that
capital contributions to broker-dealers should not be temporary.
Further, the Commission staff has explained that a capital contribution
should be treated as a liability if it is made with the understanding
that such contribution can be withdrawn at the option of the
investor.\879\ Based on the Commission's experience with the
application of Rule 15c3-1, the majority of broker-dealers operate
consistent with past Commission and staff rules and guidance regarding
the nature of capital and, thus, the Rule 15c3-1 amendments should not
represent a substantial change for most broker-dealers. Therefore, the
final rule should not negatively impact capital formation for small
issuers, nor increase the cost of capital for small broker-dealers, to
the extent that these firms already comply with current guidance and
interpretations.\880\ For those firms that will need to raise capital
to comply with the amendments to Rule 15c3-1, the rule amendments
potentially may negatively impact capital formation. However, the
potential costs to some broker-dealers could be offset by the aggregate
increase in capital formation related to heightened confidence in
broker-dealer financial requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\879\ See section II.E.2. of this release.
\880\ See NIBA 2 Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Finally, the Commission recognizes that, as discussed above, the
amendments to Rule 15c3-3 adopted today impose certain costs on broker-
dealers that could affect competition among broker-dealers. However,
the Commission is of the opinion that these costs are justified by the
significant benefits described in this economic analysis. In sum, the
costs of compliance resulting from the requirements in the amendments
to Rule 15c3-3 should not impose a burden on competition not necessary
or appropriate in furtherance of the purposes of the Exchange Act in
light of the benefits discussed above.

VI. Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis

The Commission proposed amendments to Rules 15c3-1, 15c3-1a, 15c3-
2, 15c3-3, 15c3-3a, 17a-3, 17a-4, and 17a-11 under the Exchange Act. An
Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (``IRFA'') was included in the
proposing release.\881\ This Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
(``FRFA'') has been prepared in accordance with the provisions of the
RFA.\882\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\881\ See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR
12862.
\882\ 5 U.S.C. 604(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Commission requested comment with regard to matters discussed
in the IRFA, including comments with respect to the number of small
entities that may be affected by the proposed rule amendments.\883\ The
Commission also requested that commenters specify the costs of
compliance with the proposed amendments, and suggest alternatives that
would accomplish the goals of the amendments.\884\ The Commission
received one general comment on the IRFA.\885\ In addition, the
Commission received a number of comments regarding the impact on small
entities with respect to specific aspects of the proposed rule
amendments, including comments relating to amendments under Rule 15c3-3
with respect to where special reserve deposits may be held, and
amendments under Rule 15c3-1 relating to the requirement to subtract
from net worth certain liabilities or expenses assumed by third
parties.\886\ The general comment on the IRFA is discussed directly
below. The specific comments are discussed in the applicable sections
below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\883\ See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at
12888.
\884\ Id.
\885\ See Angel Letter.
\886\ These comments are discussed in the applicable section
below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

A. General Issues Raised by Public Comments

The commenter stated that the Commission should pay ``explicit
attention to regulatory trends in the rest of the world'' because doing
so ``benefits not only small entities (by reducing their regulatory
burden) but all entities, as larger entities can experience more
consistent regulatory procedures around the world.'' \887\ The
commenter suggested that the Commission consider a ``Basel II type
approach to net capital requirements.'' \888\ In response to the
commenter, the Commission notes that the amendments relate to discrete
areas of the broker-dealer financial responsibility rules (i.e., they
do not establish new financial responsibility standards such as would
be the case if the Commission were to adopt a ``Basel II type approach
to net capital requirements.''). As noted above, the commenter's
suggestion is beyond the scope of this rulemaking.\889\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\887\ See Angel Letter.
\888\ Id.
\889\ The commenter cited the JP Morgan Letter in support of the
suggestion to ``consider regulatory trends in the rest of the
world.'' Id. The JP Morgan Letter recommends that the Commission
adopt a due diligence standard--citing a U.K. regulation--with
respect to the amendments regarding customer reserve account cash
deposits. See JP Morgan Letter. The Commission addresses this
comment above in section V.D.1.i.b.(III) of this release.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Amendments to the Customer Protection Rule

1. Need for and Objectives of the Rule Amendments
The final rule amends certain provisions of Rule 15c3-3.\890\ The
amendment that requires broker-dealers to perform a PAB reserve
computation is designed to address a disparity between Rule 15c3-3 and
the SIPA, and to incorporate provisions of the PAIB Letter into
Commission rules.\891\ The amendment that will require broker-dealers
to exclude cash deposited at an affiliated bank and cash deposited with
an unaffiliated bank to the extent that the amount exceeds 15% of the
bank's equity capital from being used to meet a broker-dealer's reserve
requirements is designed to avoid the situation where a carrying
broker-dealer's cash deposits constitute a substantial portion of the
bank's deposits.\892\ The amendment that will require broker-dealers to
obtain possession and control of customers' fully paid and excess
margin securities allocated to a short position is designed to address
the fact that Rule 15c3-3 currently permits a broker-dealer to monetize
customer securities, which is contrary to the customer protection goals
of Rule 15c3-3, which seeks to ensure that broker-dealer's do not use
customer assets for proprietary purposes.\893\ The amendment that will
require broker-dealers to provide certain notices and disclosures
before changing the terms and conditions under which the broker-dealer
treats customer free credit balances is intended to help ensure that
the use of customer free credit balances accords with customer
preferences.\894\ The importation of certain provisions of Rule 15c3-2
into Rule 15c3-3 streamlines the customer protection rules and
eliminates irrelevant provisions in Rule 15c3-2 due to Rule 15c3-
3.\895\ The amendments clarifying that funds in certain commodities
accounts are not to be treated as free credit balances or other credit
balances are intended to remove uncertainty with respect to their
treatment under Rule 15c3-3.\896\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\890\ 17 CFR 240.15c3-3.
\891\ See section II.A.2. of this release.
\892\ See section II.A.3. of this release.
\893\ See section II.A.4. of this release.
\894\ See section II.A.5. of this release.
\895\ Id.
\896\ See section II.A.6. of this release.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The amendments to Rule 15c3-3 are intended to strengthen the
protections afforded to customer assets held at a

[[Page 51895]]

broker-dealer. The amendments are designed to minimize the risk that
customer assets will be lost, tied-up in a liquidation proceeding, or
held in a manner that is inconsistent with a customer's expectations.
2. Significant Issues Raised by Public Comment
The Commission received numerous comments with respect to the
amendment under paragraph (e)(5) of Rule 15c3-3 that will require
broker-dealers to exclude cash deposited at an affiliated bank and cash
deposited with an unaffiliated bank to the extent that the amount
exceeds 15% of the bank's equity capital from being used to meet a
broker-dealer's reserve requirements.\897\ As proposed, new paragraph
(e)(5) of 15c3-3 would have provided that, in determining whether a
broker-dealer maintains the minimum reserve deposits required (customer
and PAB), the broker-dealer must exclude any cash deposited at an
affiliated bank. In addition, the proposed amendment would have
required a broker-dealer to also exclude cash deposited at an
unaffiliated bank to the extent the cash deposited exceeds (1) 50% of
the broker-dealer's excess net capital (based on the broker-dealer's
most recently filed FOCUS Report),\898\ or (2) 10% of the bank's equity
capital (based on the bank's most recently filed Call Report or Thrift
Financial Report).\899\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\897\ See section II.A.3. of this release.
\898\ Under Rule 17a-5 broker-dealers must file FOCUS Reports.
17 CFR 240.17a-5.
\899\ See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at
12864.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

With respect to the proposed limits on the amounts that could be
deposited in unaffiliated banks, some commenters argued that the
percentages were too restrictive while other commenters suggested
alternative approaches to the proposed percentage limitations.\900\ One
commenter stated that the percentage thresholds would negatively impact
smaller broker-dealers because these firms would still be required
under the proposed rule to maintain at least two reserve bank accounts
at different banks.\901\ This commenter noted that limiting Rule 15c3-3
deposits at a single bank to 50% of a broker-dealer's excess net
capital could impact 10 to 15% of its broker-dealer customers in that
many of these customers would be required to open accounts at multiple
institutions.\902\ This commenter suggested the Commission consider
higher percentages for cash deposits at large money-centered banks,
since the proposed percentage thresholds would negatively impact small
broker-dealers because they would exceed the 50% of excess net capital
threshold at lower deposit levels.\903\ This commenter also noted that
conducting due diligence and opening new accounts and the ongoing
monitoring and periodic re-evaluation of such additional accounts would
require much more time than the 10 hours originally estimated by the
Commission.\904\ A second commenter concurred with this cost
assessment, stating that the Commission significantly underestimated
the cost of the proposal to smaller firms.\905\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\900\ See Deutsche Bank Securities Letter; SIFMA 2 Letter; First
Clearing Letter; ICI Letter; BlackRock Letter.
\901\ See SIFMA 2 Letter (``[T]he [percentage] tests could
prevent a smaller firm from maintaining reserve account deposits at
any single bank, even though those deposits are relatively small
compared to the size of the bank--e.g., a broker-dealer with excess
net capital of $500,000 could not maintain more than $250,000 in
reserve account cash deposits at any one bank, regardless of the
ratio between such bash deposits and the overall size or equity
capital of the bank.'').
\902\ Id.
\903\ Id.; see also SIFMA 4 Letter.
\904\ See SIFMA 2 Letter.
\905\ See NIBA 2 Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

With respect to the use of qualified securities to meet reserve
requirements, one commenter noted that broker-dealers will ``likely
have a significant amount of additional operational and transactional
costs.'' \906\ The commenter believes that ``[w]hile larger broker-
dealers may be able to reallocate existing trading desk, operational,
regulatory reporting and treasury functions to assist in ongoing
maintenance activities, midsized and smaller broker-dealers may be
required to hire additional staff to manage and maintain a securities
portfolio.'' \907\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\906\ See JP Morgan Letter.
\907\ Id. The commenter noted that managing pools of qualified
securities involves various tasks, such as ``monitoring income
collection, redemption processing, marking the securities to market,
collateral substitutions and collateral segregation amongst other
tasks.'' Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In response to commenters concerns, the Commission has eliminated
the provision that would have excluded the amount of a deposit that
exceeds 50% of the broker-dealer's excess net capital. After review of
the comment letters, the Commission believes that this provision likely
would have disproportionately impacted small and mid-size broker-
dealers when they deposited cash into large commercial banks since they
would exceed the excess net capital threshold well before exceeding the
bank equity capital threshold.\908\ The bank equity capital threshold
is the more important metric since it relates directly to the financial
strength of the bank, which is the entity holding the account. In
particular, if the carrying broker-dealer's deposit constitutes a
substantial portion of the bank's total deposits, the bank may not have
the liquidity to quickly return the deposit to the broker-dealer. The
elimination of the excess net capital threshold should mitigate
concerns expressed by small broker-dealers that they would need to open
multiple bank accounts to make cash deposits or hire additional staff,
if they sought to deposit qualified securities in a reserve account in
order to avoid opening multiple accounts. This is because the excess
net capital threshold likely would have impacted smaller broker-
dealers, which--consistent with their size--maintain less net capital
than larger firms.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\908\ See SIFMA 2 Letter; JP Morgan 2 Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Second, with respect to the bank equity capital threshold, in
response to comments, the Commission has increased the trigger level
from 10% to 15% of the bank's equity capital. The increase of the
threshold to 15% is designed to address concerns raised by commenters
that the proposed percentage tests were unduly restrictive in certain
respects and should be modified, particularly with respect to large
broker-dealers with large deposit requirements. Consequently, the
increase from 10% to 15% is designed to mitigate commenters concerns
that the 10% threshold would require broker-dealers to spread out
deposits over an excessive number of banks, while still providing
adequate protection against undue concentrations of deposits,
particularly where smaller banks are concerned.
The elimination of the 50% of excess net capital threshold and
increase of the bank capital threshold from 10% to 15% is designed to
appropriately address concerns raised by commenters that they would
have to substantially alter their current cash deposit practices in
light of the goal of the rule to promote the broker-dealer's ability to
have quick access to the deposit.
With the elimination of the broker-dealer excess net capital
threshold, and the increase in the bank equity capital threshold, it is
likely that very few broker-dealers (including small broker-dealers)
would be required to maintain reserve accounts at multiple banks,
unless they chose to do so for operational, business or other reasons.
Therefore for the reasons discussed above, as adopted, paragraph (e)(5)
of Rule 15c3-3, should not significantly impact a substantial number of
small entities.

[[Page 51896]]

3. Small Entities Subject to the Rule
Paragraph (c)(1) of Rule 0-10 \909\ states that the term small
business or small organization, when referring to a broker-dealer,
means a broker or dealer that had total capital (net worth plus
subordinated liabilities) of less than $500,000 on the date in the
prior fiscal year as of which its audited financial statements were
prepared pursuant to Rule 17a-5(d); \910\ and is not affiliated with
any person (other than a natural person) that is not a small business
or small organization.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\909\ 17 CFR 240.0-10(c)(1).
\910\ 17 CFR 240.17a-5(d).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Based on FOCUS Report data, as of December 31, 2011, the Commission
estimates there are approximately 5 broker-dealers that performed a
customer reserve computation pursuant to Rule 15c3-3 and were ``small''
for the purposes Rule 0-10.
4. Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other Compliance Requirements
The amendments (1) Require broker-dealers to perform a PAB reserve
computation, (2) limit the amount that a broker-dealer may deposit in a
reserve account at any individual bank in the form of cash, (3) require
broker-dealers to obtain possession and control of customers' fully
paid and excess margin securities allocated to a short position by
borrowing equivalent securities or through other means within a
specified period of time, and (4) require broker-dealers to obtain the
written affirmative consent of a new customer before including a
customer's free credit balances in a Sweep Program, as well as provide
certain disclosures and notices to all customers with regard to the
broker-dealer's Sweep Program.
5. Agency Action To Minimize Effect on Small Entities
The RFA directs the Commission to consider significant alternatives
that would accomplish the stated objectives, while minimizing any
significant adverse impact on small entities. In connection with
adopting the final rules, the Commission considered, as alternatives,
establishing different compliance or reporting requirements that take
into account the resources available to smaller entities, exempting
smaller entities from coverage of the disclosure requirements, and
clarifying, consolidating, or simplifying disclosure for small
entities.\911\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\911\ 5 U.S.C. 604(a)(5).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

As discussed above, the impact on individual small broker-dealers,
as well as all small broker-dealers, should be minimal, and thus the
Commission is not establishing different compliance or reporting
requirements or timetables; clarifying, consolidating, or simplifying
compliance and reporting requirements under the rule for small
entities; or exempting small entities from coverage of the rule, or any
part thereof. The amendments impose performance standards and do not
dictate for entities of any size any particular design standards (e.g.,
technology) that must be employed to achieve the objectives of the
amendments.

C. Holding Futures Positions in a Securities Portfolio Margining
Account

1. Need for and Objectives of the Amendments
The amendments to Rule 15c3-3 and 15c3-3a are designed to
accommodate futures positions in a securities account that is margined
on a portfolio basis.\912\ Under SRO portfolio margin rules, a broker-
dealer can combine securities and futures positions in a portfolio
margin securities account to compute margin requirements based on the
net market risk of all positions in the account. The amendments to Rule
15c3-3 and 15c3-3a complement the amendments to SIPA in the Dodd-Frank
Act, as well as provide additional protections to customers through the
strengthened reserve requirements of Rule 15c3-3. In particular, the
changes will apply the protections in Rules 15c3-3 and Rule 15c3-3a to
all positions in a portfolio margin account.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\912\ See Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at
12868-12870.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

These additional protections should make portfolio margining more
attractive to investors. Portfolio margining can significantly reduce
customer margin requirements for offsetting positions involving
securities and futures products, which in turn reduces the costs of
trading such products.
2. Significant Issues Raised by Public Comments
The Commission did not receive any specific comments with respect
to this portion of the IRFA.
3. Small Entities Subject to the Rules
As discussed above in section V.D.2. of this release, based on
FOCUS Report data, as of December 31, 2011, the Commission estimates
that approximately 35 broker-dealers will elect to offer their
customers portfolio margin accounts that will include futures and
futures options. None of these broker-dealers are ``small'' for
purposes of Rule 0-10.
4. Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other Compliance Requirements
These amendments (1) revise the definition of free credit balances
and other credit balances in Rule 15c3-3 to include funds in a
portfolio margin account relating to certain futures and futures
options positions, and (2) add a debit line item to the customer
reserve formula in Rule 15c3-3a consisting of margin posted by a
broker-dealer to a derivatives clearing organization.
5. Agency Action To Minimize Effect on Small Entities
As stated above, the Commission does not believe that any of the
broker-dealers that will elect to offer portfolio margining are
``small'' for purposes of Rule 0-10. Further, the requirements imposed
by the portfolio margin amendments will be elective. Therefore, the
Commission does not believe it is necessary or appropriate to establish
different compliance or reporting requirements or timetables; clarify,
consolidate, or simplify compliance and reporting requirements under
the rule for small entities; or exempting small entities from coverage
of the rule, or any part thereof. The amendments also contain
performance standards and do not dictate for entities of any size any
particular design standards (e.g., technology) that must be employed to
achieve the objectives of the proposed amendments.

D. Securities Lending and Borrowing and Repurchase/Reverse Repurchase
Transactions

1. Need for and Objectives of the Amendments
These rules amend subparagraph (c)(2)(iv)(B) of Rule 15c3-3 to
clarify that broker-dealers providing securities lending and borrowing
settlement services are deemed, for purposes of the rule, to be acting
as principals and are subject to applicable capital deductions, unless
the broker-dealer takes certain steps to disclaim principal
liability.\913\ In addition, the Commission is adopting paragraph
(c)(5) to Rule 17a-11 to require that a broker-dealer notify the
Commission whenever the total amount of money payable against all
securities loaned or subject to a repurchase agreement exceeds 2,500
percent of tentative net capital.\914\ The final rule also exempts a
broker-dealer from this 17a-11 notice requirement if it reports monthly
its securities lending and borrowing and repurchase and reverse

[[Page 51897]]

repurchase activity to its DEA in a form acceptable to its DEA.
In 2001, MJK Clearing, a broker-dealer with a substantial number of
customer accounts, failed when it could not meet its securities lending
obligations. This failure has highlighted the risks associated with
securities lending and repurchase and reverse repurchase agreements and
the need to manage those risks. More specifically, two concerns arose
from the failure of MJK, namely, (1) that broker-dealers with principal
liability in a stock loan transaction may erroneously be considering
themselves as acting in an agency capacity and, consequently, not
taking appropriate capital charges; and (2) that broker-dealers that
have historically not been very active in stock loan transactions may
be rapidly expanding their balance sheets with such transactions, and
thereby, increase leverage to a level that poses significant financial
risk to the firm and its counterparties.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\913\ See section II.C. of this release.
\914\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

These amendments are intended to strengthen the documentation
controls broker-dealers employ to manage their securities lending and
borrowing and securities repurchase and reverse repurchase activities
and to enhance regulatory monitoring. The intended result of the
amendments is to avoid ambiguity regarding the applicability of the
stock loan charges in the net capital rule to a particular broker-
dealer. As the failure of MJK illustrated, disputes can arise over
whether a broker-dealer is acting as a principal or agent in a stock
loan transaction.\915\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\915\ See, e.g., Nomura v. E*Trade, 280 F.Supp.2d 184 (S.D.N.Y.
2003).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The amendments to paragraph (c)(5) to Rule 17a-11 will help
identify broker-dealers with highly leveraged non-government securities
lending and borrowing and repo operations and make it easier for
regulators to respond more quickly and protect customers in the event a
firm is approaching insolvency.\916\ This notice provision is designed
to alert regulators to a sudden increase in a broker-dealer's stock
loan and repo positions, which could indicate that the broker-dealer is
taking on new risk that it may have limited experience in managing, as
well as to help identify those broker-dealers highly active in
securities lending and repos. Finally, the objective of the exemption
from the notice provision of paragraph (c)(5) of Rule 17a-11 through
monthly reporting is designed to accommodate large broker-dealers that
are active in this business and regularly maintain stock loan and repo
balances that exceed the threshold.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\916\ 17 CFR 240.17a-11(c)(5).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Significant Issues Raised by Public Comments
The Commission did not receive any specific comments with respect
to this portion of the IRFA.
3. Small Entities Subject to the Rule
Based on FOCUS Report data, as of December 31, 2011, the Commission
estimates that none of the broker-dealers that engage in securities
lending and borrowing or securities repurchase and reverse repurchase
activity are ``small'' for the purposes Rule 0-10. Therefore, the
amendments should not affect ``small'' broker-dealers.
4. Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other Compliance Requirements
These amendments require broker-dealers to (1) disclose the
principals and obtain certain agreements from the principals in a
transaction where they provide settlement services in order to be
considered an agent (as opposed to a principal) for the purposes of the
net capital rule, and (2) provide notice to the Commission and other
regulatory authorities if the broker-dealer's securities lending or
repo activity reaches a certain threshold or, alternatively, report
monthly the broker-dealer's securities lending and repo activity to the
broker-dealer's DEA, in a form acceptable to the DEA.
5. Agency Action To Minimize Effect on Small Entities
As noted above, the Commission estimates that this amendment will
have no impact on small entities. Thus, the Commission does not believe
it is necessary or appropriate to establish different compliance or
reporting requirements or timetables, nor is it clarifying,
consolidating, or simplifying compliance and reporting requirements
under the rule for small entities; or exempt small entities from
coverage of the rule, or any part thereof. The amendments also use
performance standards and do not dictate for entities of any size any
particular design standards (e.g., technology) that must be employed to
achieve the objectives of the proposed amendments.

E. Documentation of Risk Management Procedures

1. Need for and Objectives of the Amendments
Requiring certain large broker-dealers to document and preserve
their internal credit, market, and liquidity risk management controls
under paragraph (a)(23) to Rule 17a-3 and (e)(9) to Rule 17a-4 will
assist firms in evaluating and adhering to their established internal
risk management controls and regulators in reviewing such
controls.\917\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\917\ See section II.D. of this release.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

These amendments are intended to strengthen the controls certain
large broker-dealers employ to manage risk. These amendments are
designed to lower systemic risk primarily in the securities markets by
enhancing risk management through reinforcement of documentation
practices and making it easier for regulators to access a broker-
dealer's procedures and controls, to ensure a broker-dealer is adhering
to such documented controls.
Additionally, by making the documented controls a required record
under Rule 17a-3, a broker-dealer's regulator likely will have better
access to them, as this benefit will only be realized to the extent a
broker-dealer has existing market, credit and liquidity risk management
controls in place because the rule does not specify the type of
controls a broker-dealer must establish to manage these risks. It
simply requires the documentation of the procedures the broker-dealer
has established. The final rule amendment will require any such records
of the market, credit, and liquidity risk management controls be
available to the broker-dealer's regulators so they can review whether
the broker-dealer is adhering to these controls.
2. Significant Issues Raised by Public Comments
The Commission did not receive any specific comments with respect
to this portion of the IRFA.
3. Small Entities Subject to the Rule
These amendments apply to a limited number of broker-dealers,
namely, those firms with more than $1 million in customer credits or
$20 million in capital. Based on FOCUS Report data, as of December 31,
2011, the Commission estimates that none of the broker-dealers that
will be subject to this amendment will be ``small'' for the purposes
Rule 0-10.
4. Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other Compliance Requirements
These amendments will require broker-dealers to document any
credit, market, and liquidity risk management controls established and
maintained by the broker-dealer to assist it in analyzing and managing
the risks associated with its business activities. The Commission is
not mandating any specific controls, procedures, or policies that must
be established by a broker-dealer to manage

[[Page 51898]]

market, credit, or liquidity risk. Rather, the Commission is requiring
that a control, procedure, or policy be documented if it is in place.
5. Agency Action To Minimize Effect on Small Entities
As noted above, these amendments will have no impact on ``small''
broker-dealers. Thus, the Commission is not establishing different
compliance or reporting requirements or timetables; clarifying,
consolidating, or simplifying compliance and reporting requirements
under the rule for small entities; nor exempting small entities from
coverage of the rule, or any part thereof.
The amendments also use performance standards and do not dictate
for entities of any size any particular design standards (e.g.,
technology) that must be employed to achieve the objectives of the
amendments.

F. Amendments to the Net Capital Rule

1. Need for and Objectives of the Amendments
The amendments to Rule 15c3-1 are designed to address several areas
of concern regarding the financial responsibility requirements for
broker-dealers. Some broker-dealers have excluded from their regulatory
financial reports certain liabilities that have been shifted to third
parties that lack the resources--independent of the assets and revenue
of the broker-dealer--to pay the liabilities, or have utilized
infusions of temporary capital. These practices may misrepresent the
true financial condition of the broker-dealer and, thereby, impede the
ability of regulators to take proactive steps to reduce the harm to
customers, counterparties and clearing agencies that may result from
the broker-dealer's failure. To address these issues, the Commission is
adopting an amendment to Rule 15c3-1 to add a new paragraph
(c)(2)(i)(F) requiring a broker-dealer to adjust its net worth when
calculating net capital by including any liability or expense for which
a third party has assumed the responsibility, unless the broker-dealer
can demonstrate that the third party has adequate resources,
independent of the broker-dealer to pay the liability or expense.\918\
In addition, the Commission is adopting amendments to paragraph
(c)(2)(i)(G)(2) of Rule 15c3-1, to require a broker-dealer to subtract
from net worth any contribution of capital to the broker-dealer: (1)
Under an agreement that provides the investor with the option to
withdraw the capital; or (2) that is intended to be withdrawn within a
period of one year of its contribution. Under the final rule, any
withdrawal of capital made within one year of its contribution is
deemed to have been intended to be withdrawn within a period of one
year, unless the withdrawal has been approved in writing by the broker-
dealer's DEA.\919\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\918\ See section II.E.1. of this release.
\919\ See section II.E.2. of this release.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Further, currently, broker-dealers are required to take net capital
charges pursuant to SRO rules relating to fidelity bond deductibles,
but Rule 15c3-1 does not explicitly incorporate such charges for
purposes of computing net capital. To address this inconsistency, the
Commission is adopting paragraph (c)(2)(xiv) to Rule 15c3-1.\920\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\920\ See section II.E.4. of this release.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In addition, a number of broker-dealers have sought to obtain
protection under the bankruptcy laws while still engaging in a
securities business. Permitting an insolvent broker-dealer to continue
to transact a securities business endangers its customers and
counterparties and places securities clearing agencies at risk. To
address this concern, the Commission is adopting an amendment to
paragraph (a) of Rule 15c3-1 to require a broker-dealer to cease its
securities business activities if certain insolvency events were to
occur, as defined in new paragraph (c)(16) to Rule 15c3-1.\921\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\921\ See section II.E.5. of this release.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Finally, an important goal of the Commission is to protect the
financial integrity of the broker-dealer so that if the firm must
liquidate it may do so in an orderly fashion. Allowing a capital
withdrawal that may jeopardize the financial integrity of a broker-
dealer exposes customers and creditors of the broker-dealer to
unnecessary risk. Paragraph (e) of Rule 15c3-1, which places certain
conditions on a broker-dealer when withdrawing capital,\922\ allows the
Commission to issue an order temporarily restricting a broker-dealer
from withdrawing capital or making loans or advances to stockholders,
insiders, and affiliates under certain circumstances.\923\ The rule,
however, limits such orders to withdrawals, advances, or loans that,
when aggregated with all other withdrawals, advances, or loans on a net
basis during a thirty calendar day period, exceed 30% of the firm's
excess net capital. The Commission is amending paragraph (e) to remove
the 30% of excess net capital limitation because the Commission has
determined that the requirement is difficult to enforce, as it
generally would not be clear when the 30% threshold had been reached,
due to the inherent unreliability of a troubled broker-dealer's books
and records.\924\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\922\ See 17 CFR 240.15c3-1(e).
\923\ See 17 CFR 240.15c3-1(e)(3).
\924\ See section II.E.6. of this release.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Finally, the Commission is making permanent a temporary amendment
to Appendix A of Rule 15c3-1, which permits broker-dealers to employ
theoretical option pricing models to calculate haircuts for listed
options and related positions that hedge those options.\925\ The
temporary amendment decreased the range of pricing inputs to the
approved option pricing models, which effectively reduced the haircuts
applied by the carrying firm with respect to non-clearing option
specialist and market maker accounts.\926\ The amendment is intended to
better align the capital requirements with the risks these requirements
are designed to address.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\925\ 17 CFR 240.15c3-1a; See Net Capital Rule, Exchange Act
Release No. 38248 (Feb. 6, 1997), 62 FR 6474 (Feb. 12, 1997). See
also Letter from Michael Macchiaroli, Associate Director, Division
of Market Regulation, Commission, to Richard Lewandowski, Vice
President, Regulatory Division, The Chicago Board Options Exchange,
Inc. (Jan. 13, 2000) (stating that the Division of Market Regulation
``will not recommend . . . enforcement action if non-clearing option
specialists and market-makers continue to rely on subparagraph
(b)(1)(iv) of Appendix A to Rule 15c3-1 under the Exchange Act until
such time as the Commission has determined whether it should be
extended''). The letter did not grant any other relief.
\926\ See Net Capital Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 38248 (Feb.
6, 1997), 62 FR 6474 (Feb. 12, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Significant Issues Raised by Public Comments
The Commission received three comments in response to requests for
comment related to the amendments to the net capital rule requiring
broker-dealers to add back to its net worth certain liabilities assumed
by third parties and treat certain temporary capital contributions as
liabilities.\927\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\927\ See Beer Letter; Levene Letter; NIBA 2 Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

One commenter noted that there should be no circumstance in which a
broker-dealer accepted a capital contribution for net capital purposes
that could be withdrawn at the option of the investor.\928\ This
commenter also noted that if small firms were required to raise over
$300,000 in capital each, there will be the largest dissolution of
small broker-dealers in the history of the regulated securities
industry.\929\ The commenter requested that the Commission state a
reasonable time period for broker-dealers to raise capital

[[Page 51899]]

to meet these new standards.\930\ This commenter also stated that the
Commission's estimate of a gross cost of capital of 7.5% (5% + 2.5%) is
a totally unrealistic cost of capital for small broker-dealers and that
these broker-dealers will categorically have costs significantly higher
than 7.5%.\931\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\928\ See NIBA 2 Letter.
\929\ Id.
\930\ Id.
\931\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Further, the commenter stated that, until the Commission convenes a
small broker-dealer representative panel to assist it with establishing
such costs, the Commission is ``speculating'' on such costs, and is
therefore without adequate information to consider the effects of such
costs and changes on small firms.\932\ This commenter specifically
requested the Commission consider the needs of small firms that will
likely require additional net capital over the next decade.\933\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\932\ Id.
\933\ Id. The commenter stated that any rule that would
``restrict small broker-dealers from raising capital as a result of
uncertainty of investors or owner-operators related to the return of
their capital in a reasonable time frame will create a
disproportionate and impossible hurdle for small broker-dealers to
overcome.'' See NIBA 2 Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Additionally, this commenter believed that the rule is intended to
protect the capitalization of large firms while ignoring small firms.
The commenter also noted that it opposes regulation that arbitrarily
reduces the value of small broker-dealers and their competitive
position relative to larger broker-dealers.\934\ Finally, the commenter
expressed concern that the proposed amendments to Rule 15c3-1 would be
particularly burdensome on small broker-dealers, negatively impacting
capital formation for small issuers and increasing the cost of capital
for small broker-dealers.\935\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\934\ See NIBA 2 Letter.
\935\ Id. The commenter noted that broker-dealers ``are dealing
with a relatively static commission and fees matrix versus what they
may charge customers.'' Consequently, the commenter believes
``broker-dealers will be unable to pass any of these costs increases
directly to customers, irrespective of the type of customer or type
of business that they are conducting with small broker-dealers,
which further threatens the financial profit potential and return on
equity of small broker-dealers.'' Id. The commenter further believes
that the cost increases over a short period of time will threaten
the viability of all small broker-dealers. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Another commenter stated that this proposal will require the 702
mentioned debt-free introducing broker-dealers to needlessly take on
debt of approximately $280,354.\936\ Further, the commenter stated
that, if the proposed is approved, it would force the majority of small
firms out of business and ultimately deny investors the right and
opportunity to deal with smaller, more personalized and debt-free
member firms.\937\ One commenter stated that it also must be considered
that any implementation and enforcement of these proposed changes
should not be made retroactive, because to subject firms to a new set
of rules and guidelines will effectively penalize small firms that have
been in full compliance with the rules and regulations.\938\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\936\ See Beer Letter.
\937\ Id.
\938\ See Levene Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Commission considered all comments discussed above and the
potential impact on small broker-dealers.\939\ The Commission continues
to believe that the estimated cost of capital is not unrealistic for
small broker-dealers. However, as discussed above in section V. of this
release, in response to comments, the Commission increased the
estimated cost of capital for these amendments is 12%.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\939\ See Beer Letter; Levene Letter; NIBA 2 Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Moreover, as discussed in section II.E.1 and 2. of this release,
the baseline of these rules is current Rule 15c3-1 and existing
guidance and interpretations. The Commission staff has provided
guidance with respect to the treatment and recording of certain broker-
dealer expenses and liabilities that is consistent with the rule
amendment.\940\ In addition, existing broker-dealer recordkeeping rules
require that a broker-dealer record its income and expenses.\941\ For
example, paragraph (a)(2) of Rule 17a-3, requires a broker-dealer to
make and keep current ledgers (or other records) reflecting all assets
and liabilities, income and expense and capital accounts.\942\
Therefore, the Commission does not expect small broker-dealers to incur
significant costs or burdens to comply with the amendment regarding
broker-dealers and payment of expenses by third parties.\943\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\940\ See, e.g., Third Party Expense Letter; see also FINRA
Notice to Members 03-6, Expense Sharing Agreements.
\941\ 17 CFR 240.17a-3; 17 CFR 240.17a-4.
\942\ 17 CFR 240.17a-3(a)(2).
\943\ See NIBA 2 Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

At the same time, the purpose of the requirement in new paragraph
(c)(2)(i)(F) of Rule 15c3-1 is to address the practices of a broker-
dealer that raise concerns when a broker-dealer shifts liabilities to
an entity with no revenue or assets independent of the broker-dealer to
inappropriately increase its reported net capital, by excluding the
liability from the calculation of net worth. Therefore, the final rule,
as discussed above in section II.E.1. of this release, is designed to
prohibit a practice that could misrepresent a broker-dealer's actual
financial condition, deceive the firm's customers, and hamper the
ability of regulators to monitor the firm's financial condition.
Moreover, in response to comments,\944\ the rule amendment, as
adopted, should not impose burdens or present serious implementation
difficulties to small broker-dealers \945\ that are appropriately
recording their assets and liabilities under current Commission rules
and interpretive guidance.\946\ These broker-dealers also should not be
required to obtain loans to increase their capital as a result of the
Rule 15c3-1 amendments. Therefore, the Commission does not believe a
longer time period for compliance or the formation of a small broker-
dealer advisory cost committee is necessary.\947\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\944\ Id.
\945\ See Beer Letter; Levene Letter; NIBA 2 Letter.
\946\ See, e.g., Third Party Expense Letter.
\947\ See NIBA 2 Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In response to the commenters' concerns about the negative impact
of the rule amendments on the capital of small broker-dealers,\948\ as
discussed above, the final rule amendment is a codification of existing
Commission staff guidance,\949\ and thus should not represent a change
for small broker-dealers with respect to capital withdrawals. Moreover,
with respect to commenters' concerns about obtaining capital,\950\ the
rule does not prohibit an investor from withdrawing capital at any
time. Rather, it prohibits a broker-dealer from treating temporary cash
infusions as capital for purposes of the net capital rule. Finally, the
final rule amendments provide a mechanism for a broker-dealer to apply
to its DEA to make a withdrawal within one year of the capital
contribution without triggering the deduction under certain
circumstances (e.g., de minimis withdrawals).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\948\ See Beer Letter; Levene Letter; NIBA 2 Letter.
\949\ See Temporary Capital Letter. See also section II.E.2. of
this release.
\950\ See Beer Letter; NIBA 2 Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Small Entities Subject to the Rule

Based on FOCUS Report data, as of December 31, 2011, the Commission
estimates that there are approximately 2,506 introducing and carrying
broker-dealers that are ``small'' for the purposes Rule 0-10. The
amendments relating to certain subtractions from net worth and the
restrictions on the withdrawal of capital will apply to all ``small''
broker-dealers in that they will be subject to the requirements in the
amendments. The amendment to Appendix A of Rule 15c3-1 likely should
have no, or little, impact on ``small'' broker-dealers, because based
on staff experience, most,

[[Page 51900]]

if not all, of these firms do not carry non-clearing option specialist
or market maker accounts.
4. Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other Compliance Requirements
The amendments will require an ``insolvent'' broker-dealer to cease
conducting a securities business and provide the securities regulators
with notice of its insolvency. The amendments also will require broker-
dealers to deduct from net worth certain liabilities and certain
temporary capital contributions, as well as require broker-dealers to
deduct from net capital, certain specified amounts as required by SRO
fidelity bond rules. Finally, under the amendment to the rule on
Commission orders restricting withdrawals of capital, a broker-dealer
subject to an order will not be permitted to withdraw capital. Finally,
the amendments will make permanent a temporary rule that reduced the
haircut for non-clearing options specialist and market maker accounts
under Appendix A to Rule 15c3-1.
5. Agency Action To Minimize Effect on Small Entities
As discussed in detail above, the Commission considered all
comments received and adopted the amendment substantially as
proposed.\951\ The Commission understands the concerns relating to
small broker-dealers raised by commenters \952\ and reiterates that the
rule is designed to address situations where there is no legitimate
reason to book liabilities to a separate legal entity that otherwise
would accrue to the broker-dealer. Moreover, the final rule is
consistent with current staff interpretations regarding third-party
expense sharing and thus should not represent a change for broker-
dealers. The Commission also notes that the final rule is designed to
prohibit a practice that could misrepresent a broker-dealer's actual
financial condition, deceive the firm's customers, and hamper the
ability of regulators to monitor the firm's financial condition.
Moreover, the rule change, as adopted, should not impose undue burdens
or present serious implementation difficulties for large or small
broker-dealers. As the Commission explained in the proposing release, a
broker-dealer can demonstrate the adequacy of the third party's
financial resources by maintaining records such as the third party's
most recent (i.e., as of a date within the previous twelve months)
audited financial statements, tax returns, or regulatory filings
containing financial reports.\953\ Given that the entity to which the
broker-dealer is seeking to shift one or more liabilities typically is
an affiliate, the staff's experience is that such records should be
available to the broker-dealer. Further, because the proposed rule
change is consistent with prior staff guidance regarding the need to be
able to demonstrate the third party's financial adequacy, the broker-
dealer seeking to shift a liability to a third party already would,
under existing staff interpretations, expect to be ready to provide
such evidence of the third party's financial resources. Taken together,
these realities should mitigate the implementation and burden concerns
raised by commenters as they relate to small broker-dealers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\951\ See section II.E.1. of this release.
\952\ See Beer Letter; Beer 2 Letter; Levene Letter; Lowenstein
Letter; NIBA 2 Letter. See also discussion in section II.E.1. of
this release.
\953\ Amendments to Financial Responsibility Rules, 72 FR at
12872. The Commission specifically requested comment regarding the
records by which a broker-dealer could demonstrate financial
resources. It received no comments in response to this request.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

One or more of these record types are generally readily available.
The general availability of a satisfactory measure of financial
resources should mitigate the implementation and burden concerns raised
by the commenters.
As discussed above, given the minimal impact these amendments will
have on small entities, the Commission is not establishing different
compliance or reporting requirements or timetables; clarifying,
consolidating, or simplifying compliance and reporting requirements
under the rule for small entities; nor exempting small entities from
coverage of the rule, or any part thereof.
The amendments use performance standards and do not dictate for
entities of any size any particular design standards (e.g., technology)
that must be employed to achieve the objectives of the amendments.

VII. Statutory Authority

The Commission is adopting amendments to Rules 15c3-1, 15c3-3, 17a-
3, 17a-4 and 17a-11 under the Exchange Act pursuant to the authority
conferred by the Exchange Act, including Sections 15, 17, 23(a) and
36.\954\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\954\ 15 U.S.C. 78o, 78q, 78w and 78mm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Text of Final Rules

List of Subjects in 17 CFR Part 240

Brokers, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Securities.
In accordance with the foregoing, the Commission hereby amends
Title 17, Chapter II of the Code of Federal Regulation as follows.

PART 240--GENERAL RULES AND REGULATIONS, SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF
1934

0
1. The general authority for Part 240 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 15 U.S.C. 77c, 77d, 77g, 77j, 77s, 77z-2, 77z-3,
77eee, 77ggg, 77nnn, 77sss, 77ttt, 78c, 78c-3, 78c-5, 78d, 78e, 78f,
78g, 78i, 78j, 78j-1, 78k, 78k-1, 78l, 78m, 78n, 78n-1, 78o, 78o-4,
78o-10, 78p, 78q, 78q-1, 78s, 78u-5, 78w, 78x, 78ll, 78mm, 80a-20,
80a-23, 80a-29, 80a-37, 80b-3, 80b-4, 80b-11, 7201 et. seq., and
8302; 7 U.S.C. 2(c)(2)(E); 12 U.S.C. 5221(e)(3); 18 U.S.C. 1350; and
Pub. L. 111-203, 939A, 124 Stat. 1376, (2010), unless otherwise
noted.
* * * * *

0
2. Section 240.15c3-1 is amended by:
0
a. Revising the first sentence of paragraph (a) introductory text;
0
b. Removing from paragraph (a)(6)(iii)(A) the phrase ``paragraph
(c)(2)(x)(A)(1) through (9) of this section'' and in its place adding
the phrase ``Appendix A (Sec. 240.15c3-1a)'';
0
c. Revising the paragraph (c)(2)(i) heading;
0
d. Adding paragraphs (c)(2)(i)(F) and (G);
0
e. Revising paragraphs (c)(2)(iv)(B), (c)(2)(iv)(E), and
(c)(2)(vi)(D)(1);
0
f. Adding paragraph (c)(2)(xiv);
0
g. Adding paragraph (c)(16) and an undesignated center heading;
0
h. Revising paragraph (e)(3)(i); and
0
i. Removing from the second sentence in paragraph (e)(3)(ii) the text
``The hearing'' and in its place adding the phrase ``A hearing on an
order temporarily prohibiting the withdrawal of capital''.
The revisions and additions read as follows:

Sec. 240.15c3-1 Net capital requirements for brokers or dealers.

(a) Every broker or dealer must at all times have and maintain net
capital no less than the greater of the highest minimum requirement
applicable to its ratio requirement under paragraph (a)(1) of this
section, or to any of its activities under paragraph (a)(2) of this
section, and must otherwise not be ``insolvent'' as that term is
defined in paragraph (c)(16) of this section. * * *
* * * * *
(c) * * *
(2) * * *
(i) Adjustments to net worth related to unrealized profit or loss,
deferred tax provisions, and certain liabilities.* * *
* * * * *
(F) Subtracting from net worth any liability or expense relating to
the

[[Page 51901]]

business of the broker or dealer for which a third party has assumed
the responsibility, unless the broker or dealer can demonstrate that
the third party has adequate resources independent of the broker or
dealer to pay the liability or expense.
(G) Subtracting from net worth any contribution of capital to the
broker or dealer:
(1) Under an agreement that provides the investor with the option
to withdraw the capital; or
(2) That is intended to be withdrawn within a period of one year of
contribution. Any withdrawal of capital made within one year of its
contribution is deemed to have been intended to be withdrawn within a
period of one year, unless the withdrawal has been approved in writing
by the Examining Authority for the broker or dealer.
* * * * *
(iv) * * *
(B) All unsecured advances and loans; deficits in customers' and
non-customers' unsecured and partly secured notes; deficits in omnibus
credit accounts maintained in compliance with the requirements of 12
CFR 220.7(f) of Regulation T under the Act, or similar accounts carried
on behalf of another broker or dealer, after application of calls for
margin, marks to the market or other required deposits that are
outstanding 5 business days or less; deficits in customers' and non-
customers' unsecured and partly secured accounts after application of
calls for margin, marks to market or other required deposits that are
outstanding 5 business days or less, except deficits in cash accounts
as defined in 12 CFR 220.8 of Regulation T under the Act for which not
more than one extension respecting a specified securities transaction
has been requested and granted, and deducting for securities carried in
any of such accounts the percentages specified in paragraph (c)(2)(vi)
of this section or Appendix A, Sec. 240.15c3-1a; the market value of
stock loaned in excess of the value of any collateral received
therefor; receivables arising out of free shipments of securities
(other than mutual fund redemptions) in excess of $5,000 per shipment
and all free shipments (other than mutual fund redemptions) outstanding
more than 7 business days, and mutual fund redemptions outstanding more
than 16 business days; and any collateral deficiencies in secured
demand notes as defined in Appendix D, Sec. 240.15c3-1d; a broker or
dealer that participates in a loan of securities by one party to
another party will be deemed a principal for the purpose of the
deductions required under this section, unless the broker or dealer has
fully disclosed the identity of each party to the other and each party
has expressly agreed in writing that the obligations of the broker or
dealer do not include a guarantee of performance by the other party and
that such party's remedies in the event of a default by the other party
do not include a right of setoff against obligations, if any, of the
broker or dealer.
* * * * *
(E) Other Deductions. All other unsecured receivables; all assets
doubtful of collection less any reserves established therefor; the
amount by which the market value of securities failed to receive
outstanding longer than thirty (30) calendar days exceeds the contract
value of such fails to receive; and the funds on deposit in a
``segregated trust account'' in accordance with 17 CFR 270.27d-1 under
the Investment Company Act of 1940, but only to the extent that the
amount on deposit in such segregated trust account exceeds the amount
of liability reserves established and maintained for refunds of charges
required by sections 27(d) and 27(f) of the Investment Company Act of
1940; Provided, That the following need not be deducted:
(1) Any amounts deposited in a Customer Reserve Bank Account or PAB
Reserve Bank Account pursuant to Sec. 240.15c3-3(e),
(2) Cash and securities held in a securities account at a carrying
broker or dealer (except where the account has been subordinated to the
claims of creditors of the carrying broker or dealer), and
(3) Clearing deposits.
* * * * *
(vi) * * *
(D)(1) In the case of redeemable securities of an investment
company registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940, which
assets consist of cash or money market instruments and which is
described in Sec. 270.2a-7 of this chapter, the deduction will be 2%
of the market value of the greater of the long or short position.
* * * * *
(xiv) Deduction from net worth for excess deductible amounts
related to fidelity bond coverage. Deducting the amount specified by
rule of the Examining Authority for the broker or dealer with respect
to a requirement to maintain fidelity bond coverage.
* * * * *

Insolvent

(16) For the purposes of this section, a broker or dealer is
insolvent if the broker or dealer:
(i) Is the subject of any bankruptcy, equity receivership
proceeding or any other proceeding to reorganize, conserve, or
liquidate such broker or dealer or its property or is applying for the
appointment or election of a receiver, trustee, or liquidator or
similar official for such broker or dealer or its property;
(ii) Has made a general assignment for the benefit of creditors;
(iii) Is insolvent within the meaning of section 101 of title 11 of
the United States Code, or is unable to meet its obligations as they
mature, and has made an admission to such effect in writing or in any
court or before any agency of the United States or any State; or
(iv) Is unable to make such computations as may be necessary to
establish compliance with this section or with Sec. 240.15c3-3.
* * * * *
(e) * * *
(3)(i) Temporary restrictions on withdrawal of net capital. The
Commission may by order restrict, for a period of up to twenty business
days, any withdrawal by the broker or dealer of equity capital or
unsecured loan or advance to a stockholder, partner, sole proprietor,
member, employee or affiliate under such terms and conditions as the
Commission deems necessary or appropriate in the public interest or
consistent with the protection of investors if the Commission, based on
the information available, concludes that such withdrawal, advance or
loan may be detrimental to the financial integrity of the broker or
dealer, or may unduly jeopardize the broker or dealer's ability to
repay its customer claims or other liabilities which may cause a
significant impact on the markets or expose the customers or creditors
of the broker or dealer to loss without taking into account the
application of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970.
* * * * *

Sec. 240.15c3-1a [Amended]

0
3. Section 240.15c3-1a is amended by:
0
a. Removing paragraph (b)(1)(iv)(B); and
0
b. Redesignating paragraphs (b)(1)(iv)(A) introductory text,
(b)(1)(iv)(A)(1), (b)(1)(iv)(A)(2), and (b)(1)(iv)(A)(3) as paragraphs
(b)(1)(iv) introductory text, (b)(1)(iv)(A),

[[Page 51902]]

(b)(1)(iv)(B), and (b)(1)(iv)(C) respectively.

Sec. 240.15c3-2 [Removed and Reserved]

0
4. Section 240.15c3-2 is removed and reserved.

0
5. Section 240.15c3-3 is amended by:
0
a. Removing from paragraph (a)(1) introductory text, third sentence,
the citation ``220.19'' and in its place adding the citation
``220.12'';
0
b. In paragraph (a)(1)(iii), after the phrase ``(15 U.S.C. 78aaa et
seq.)'' adding ``(SIPA)'';
0
c. Removing the ``;'' at the end of paragraph (a)(1)(iv) and adding a
period in its place;
0
d. Revising paragraphs (a)(3), (4), (7), (8), and (9);
0
e. Adding paragraphs (a)(16) and (17);
0
f. In paragraph (b)(2):
0
i. In the first sentence, removing the phrase ``his physical possession
or under his control'' and in its place adding ``the broker's or
dealer's physical possession or under its control'';
0
ii. In the second sentence, removing the word ``he'' and in its place
adding ``it''; and
0
iii. In the second sentence, removing the word ``his'' and in its place
adding ``its'';
0
g. Removing from paragraphs (b)(3)(iv) and (b)(4)(i)(C) the phrase
``the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970'' and in its place
adding ``SIPA'';
0
h. At the end of paragraph (b)(4)(i)(C) adding the word ``and,'';
0
i. In paragraph (b)(4)(v), removing the word ``his'' and adding in its
place ``the person's'';
0
j. Adding paragraph (b)(5);
0
k. In paragraph (c)(2):
0
i. Removing ``a special omnibus'' and in its place adding ``an omnibus
credit'';
0
ii. Removing the text ``section 4(b) of Regulation T under the Act (12
CFR 220.4(b))'' and in its place adding ``section 7(f) of Regulation T
(12 CFR 220.7(f))''; and
0
iii. Removing the word ``he'' and in its place adding ``it'';
0
l. In paragraph (c)(3), removing the words ``him'' and ``he'' wherever
they appear and in their place adding ``the broker or dealer'';
0
m. In the first sentence of paragraph (d) introductory text, removing
the word ``his'' wherever it appears and in its place adding ``its'';
0
n. In paragraph (d)(2), removing the word ``his'' and in its place
adding ``the broker's or dealer's'';
0
o. Removing the period at the end of paragraph (d)(3) and in its place
adding ``; or'';
0
p. Redesignating paragraph (d)(4) as paragraph (d)(5);
0
q. Adding a new paragraph (d)(4);
0
r. Revising paragraphs (e) and (f);
0
s. Revising the first sentence of paragraph (g);
0
t. Removing from paragraph (i) the text ``his reserve bank account''
and in its place adding ``its Customer Reserve Bank Account, PAB
Reserve Bank Account'';
0
u. Adding paragraph (j);
0
v. In paragraph (k)(1)(i), removing the phrase ``His dealer
transactions'' and in its place adding ``The broker's or dealer's
transactions as dealer'', and removing the word ``his'' the second and
third time the word ``his'' appears and in its place adding ``its'';
0
w. In paragraph (k)(1)(ii), removing the word ``His'' and in its place
adding ``The broker's or dealer's'';
0
x. In paragraph (k)(1)(iii), removing the word ``He'' and in its place
adding ``The broker or dealer'' and removing the word ``his'' and in
its place adding ``its'';
0
y. In paragraph (k)(2)(i), removing the word ``his'' and in its place
adding ``its'' wherever it appears;
0
z. Revising paragraph (l)(2);
0
aa. Removing from the last sentence in paragraph (m) before the Note,
the text ``a special omnibus'' and in its place adding ``an omnibus
credit'' and removing the text ``section 4(b) of Regulation T [12 CFR
220.4(b)]'' and in its place adding ``section 7(f) of Regulation T (12
CFR 220.7(f))'';
0
bb. Redesignate the Note following paragraph (m) as ``Note to paragraph
(m).'';
0
cc. Removing from the first sentence in paragraph (n) the phrase
``paragraphs (d)(2) and (3)'' and in its place adding ``paragraphs
(d)(2) through (4)''; and
0
dd. Removing from paragraph (o)(2)(i)(A) the phrase ``the Securities
Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15 U.S.C. 78aaa et seq.)'' and in its
place adding ``SIPA'';
The revisions and additions read as follows:

Sec. 240.15c3-3 Customer protection--reserves and custody of
securities.

(a) * * *
(3) The term fully paid securities means all securities carried for
the account of a customer in a cash account as defined in Regulation T
(12 CFR 220.1 et seq.), as well as securities carried for the account
of a customer in a margin account or any special account under
Regulation T that have no loan value for margin purposes, and all
margin equity securities in such accounts if they are fully paid:
Provided, however, that the term fully paid securities does not apply
to any securities purchased in transactions for which the customer has
not made full payment.
(4) The term margin securities means those securities carried for
the account of a customer in a margin account as defined in section 4
of Regulation T (12 CFR 220.4), as well as securities carried in any
other account (such accounts hereinafter referred to as ``margin
accounts'') other than the securities referred to in paragraph (a)(3)
of this section.
* * * * *
(7) The term bank means a bank as defined in section 3(a)(6) of the
Act and will also mean any building and loan, savings and loan or
similar banking institution subject to supervision by a Federal banking
authority. With respect to a broker or dealer that maintains its
principal place of business in Canada, the term ``bank'' also means a
Canadian bank subject to supervision by a Canadian authority.
(8) The term free credit balances means liabilities of a broker or
dealer to customers which are subject to immediate cash payment to
customers on demand, whether resulting from sales of securities,
dividends, interest, deposits or otherwise, excluding, however, funds
in commodity accounts which are segregated in accordance with the
Commodity Exchange Act or in a similar manner, or which are funds
carried in a proprietary account as that term is defined in regulations
under the Commodity Exchange Act. The term ``free credit balances''
also includes, if subject to immediate cash payment to customers on
demand, funds carried in a securities account pursuant to a self-
regulatory organization portfolio margining rule approved by the
Commission under section 19(b) of the Act (15 U.S.C. 78s(b)) (``SRO
portfolio margining rule''), including variation margin or initial
margin, marks to market, and proceeds resulting from margin paid or
released in connection with closing out, settling or exercising futures
contracts and options thereon.
(9) The term other credit balances means cash liabilities of a
broker or dealer to customers other than free credit balances and funds
in commodity accounts which are segregated in accordance with the
Commodity Exchange Act or in a similar manner, or funds carried in a
proprietary account as that term is defined in regulations under the
Commodity Exchange Act. The term ``other credit balances'' also
includes funds that are cash liabilities of a broker or dealer to
customers other than free credit balances and are carried in a
securities account pursuant to an SRO portfolio margining rule,
including

[[Page 51903]]

variation margin or initial margin, marks to market, and proceeds
resulting from margin paid or released in connection with closing out,
settling or exercising futures contracts and options thereon.
* * * * *
(16) The term PAB account means a proprietary securities account of
a broker or dealer (which includes a foreign broker or dealer, or a
foreign bank acting as a broker or dealer) other than a delivery-
versus-payment account or a receipt-versus-payment account. The term
does not include an account that has been subordinated to the claims of
creditors of the carrying broker or dealer.
(17) The term Sweep Program means a service provided by a broker or
dealer where it offers to its customer the option to automatically
transfer free credit balances in the securities account of the customer
to either a money market mutual fund product as described in Sec.
270.2a-7 of this chapter or an account at a bank whose deposits are
insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
(b) * * *
(5) A broker or dealer is required to obtain and thereafter
maintain the physical possession or control of securities carried for a
PAB account, unless the broker or dealer has provided written notice to
the account holder that the securities may be used in the ordinary
course of its securities business, and has provided an opportunity for
the account holder to object.
* * * * *
(d) * * *
(4) Securities included on the broker's or dealer's books or
records that allocate to a short position of the broker or dealer or a
short position for another person, excluding positions covered by
paragraph (m) of this section, for more than 30 calendar days, then the
broker or dealer must, not later than the business day following the
day on which the determination is made, take prompt steps to obtain
physical possession or control of such securities. For the purposes of
this paragraph (d)(4), the 30 day time period will not begin to run
with respect to a syndicate short position established in connection
with an offering of securities until the completion of the
underwriter's participation in the distribution as determined pursuant
to Sec. 242.100(b) of Regulation M of this chapter (17 CFR 242.100
through 242.105); or
* * * * *
(e) Special reserve bank accounts for the exclusive benefit of
customers and PAB accounts. (1) Every broker or dealer must maintain
with a bank or banks at all times when deposits are required or
hereinafter specified a ``Special Reserve Bank Account for the
Exclusive Benefit of Customers'' (hereinafter referred to as the
Customer Reserve Bank Account) and a ``Special Reserve Bank Account for
Brokers and Dealers'' (hereinafter referred to as the PAB Reserve Bank
Account), each of which will be separate from the other and from any
other bank account of the broker or dealer. Such broker or dealer must
at all times maintain in the Customer Reserve Bank Account and the PAB
Reserve Bank Account, through deposits made therein, cash and/or
qualified securities in amounts computed in accordance with the formula
attached as Exhibit A (17 CFR 240.15c3-3a), as applied to customer and
PAB accounts respectively.
(2) With respect to each computation required pursuant to paragraph
(e)(1) of this section, a broker or dealer must not accept or use any
of the amounts under items comprising Total Credits under the formula
referred to in paragraph (e)(1) of this section except for the
specified purposes indicated under items comprising Total Debits under
the formula, and, to the extent Total Credits exceed Total Debits, at
least the net amount thereof must be maintained in the Customer Reserve
Bank Account and PAB Reserve Bank Account pursuant to paragraph (e)(1)
of this section.
(3) Reserve Bank Account computations. (i) Computations necessary
to determine the amount required to be deposited in the Customer
Reserve Bank Account and PAB Reserve Bank Account as specified in
paragraph (e)(1) of this section must be made weekly, as of the close
of the last business day of the week, and the deposit so computed must
be made no later than one hour after the opening of banking business on
the second following business day; provided, however, a broker or
dealer which has aggregate indebtedness not exceeding 800 percent of
net capital (as defined in Sec. 240.15c3-1) and which carries
aggregate customer funds (as defined in paragraph (a)(10) of this
section), as computed at the last required computation pursuant to this
section, not exceeding $1,000,000, may in the alternative make the
Customer Reserve Bank Account computation monthly, as of the close of
the last business day of the month, and, in such event, must deposit
not less than 105 percent of the amount so computed no later than one
hour after the opening of banking business on the second following
business day.
(ii) If a broker or dealer, computing on a monthly basis, has, at
the time of any required computation, aggregate indebtedness in excess
of 800 percent of net capital, such broker or dealer must thereafter
compute weekly as aforesaid until four successive weekly Customer
Reserve Bank Account computations are made, none of which were made at
a time when its aggregate indebtedness exceeded 800 percent of its net
capital.
(iii) A broker or dealer that does not carry the accounts of a
``customer'' as defined by this section or conduct a proprietary
trading business may make the computation to be performed with respect
to PAB accounts under paragraph (e)(1) of this section monthly rather
than weekly. If a broker or dealer performing the computation with
respect to PAB accounts under paragraph (e)(1) of this section on a
monthly basis is, at the time of any required computation, required to
deposit additional cash or qualified securities in the PAB Reserve Bank
Account, the broker or dealer must thereafter perform the computation
required with respect to PAB accounts under paragraph (e)(1) of this
section weekly until four successive weekly computations are made, none
of which is made at a time when the broker or dealer was required to
deposit additional cash or qualified securities in the PAB Reserve Bank
Account.
(iv) Computations in addition to the computations required in this
paragraph (e)(3), may be made as of the close of any business day, and
the deposits so computed must be made no later than one hour after the
opening of banking business on the second following business day.
(v) The broker or dealer must make and maintain a record of each
such computation made pursuant to this paragraph (e)(3) or otherwise
and preserve each such record in accordance with Sec. 240.17a-4.
(4) If the computation performed under paragraph (e)(3) of this
section with respect to PAB accounts results in a deposit requirement,
the requirement may be satisfied to the extent of any excess debit in
the computation performed under paragraph (e)(3) of this section with
respect to customer accounts of the same date. However, a deposit
requirement resulting from the computation performed under paragraph
(e)(3) of this section with respect to customer accounts cannot be
satisfied with excess debits from the computation performed under
paragraph (e)(3) of this section with respect to PAB accounts.

[[Page 51904]]

(5) In determining whether a broker or dealer maintains the minimum
deposits required under this section, the broker or dealer must exclude
the total amount of any cash deposited with an affiliated bank. The
broker or dealer also must exclude cash deposited with a non-affiliated
bank to the extent that the amount of the deposit exceeds 15% of the
bank's equity capital as reported by the bank in its most recent Call
Report or any successor form the bank is required to file by its
appropriate Federal banking agency (as defined by section 3 of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1813)).
(f) Notification of banks. A broker or dealer required to maintain
a Customer Reserve Bank Account and PAB Reserve Bank Account prescribed
by paragraph (e)(1) of this section or who maintains a Special Account
referred to in paragraph (k) of this section must obtain and preserve
in accordance with Sec. 240.17a-4 a written notification from each
bank with which it maintains a Customer Reserve Bank Account, a PAB
Reserve Bank Account, or a Special Account that the bank was informed
that all cash and/or qualified securities deposited therein are being
held by the bank for the exclusive benefit of the customers and account
holders of the broker or dealer in accordance with the regulations of
the Commission, and are being kept separate from any other accounts
maintained by the broker or dealer with the bank, and the broker or
dealer must have a written contract with the bank which provides that
the cash and/or qualified securities will at no time be used directly
or indirectly as security for a loan to the broker or dealer by the
bank and will not be subject to any right, charge, security interest,
lien, or claim of any kind in favor of the bank or any person claiming
through the bank.
(g) Withdrawals from the reserve bank accounts. A broker or dealer
may make withdrawals from a Customer Reserve Bank Account and a PAB
Reserve Bank Account if and to the extent that at the time of the
withdrawal the amount remaining in the Customer Reserve Bank Account
and PAB Reserve Bank Account is not less than the amount then required
by paragraph (e) of this section. * * *
* * * * *
(j) Treatment of free credit balances. (1) A broker or dealer must
not accept or use any free credit balance carried for the account of
any customer of the broker or dealer unless such broker or dealer has
established adequate procedures pursuant to which each customer for
whom a free credit balance is carried will be given or sent, together
with or as part of the customer's statement of account, whenever sent
but not less frequently than once every three months, a written
statement informing the customer of the amount due to the customer by
the broker or dealer on the date of the statement, and that the funds
are payable on demand of the customer.
(2) A broker or dealer must not convert, invest, or transfer to
another account or institution, credit balances held in a customer's
account except as provided in paragraphs (j)(2)(i) and (ii) of this
section.
(i) A broker or dealer is permitted to invest or transfer to
another account or institution, free credit balances in a customer's
account only upon a specific order, authorization, or draft from the
customer, and only in the manner, and under the terms and conditions,
specified in the order, authorization, or draft.
(ii) A broker or dealer is permitted to transfer free credit
balances held in a customer's securities account to a product in its
Sweep Program or to transfer a customer's interest in one product in a
Sweep Program to another product in a Sweep Program, provided:
(A) For an account opened on or after the effective date of this
paragraph (j)(2)(ii), the customer gives prior written affirmative
consent to having free credit balances in the customer's securities
account included in the Sweep Program after being notified:
(1) Of the general terms and conditions of the products available
through the Sweep Program; and
(2) That the broker or dealer may change the products available
under the Sweep Program.
(B) For any account:
(1) The broker or dealer provides the customer with the disclosures
and notices regarding the Sweep Program required by each self-
regulatory organization of which the broker or dealer is a member;
(2) The broker or dealer provides notice to the customer, as part
of the customer's quarterly statement of account, that the balance in
the bank deposit account or shares of the money market mutual fund in
which the customer has a beneficial interest can be liquidated on the
customer's order and the proceeds returned to the securities account or
remitted to the customer; and
(3)(i) The broker or dealer provides the customer with written
notice at least 30 calendar days before:
(A) Making changes to the terms and conditions of the Sweep
Program;
(B) Making changes to the terms and conditions of a product
currently available through the Sweep Program;
(C) Changing, adding or deleting products available through the
Sweep Program; or
(D) Changing the customer's investment through the Sweep Program
from one product to another.
(ii) The notice must describe the new terms and conditions of the
Sweep Program or product or the new product, and the options available
to the customer if the customer does not accept the new terms and
conditions or product.
* * * * *
(l) Delivery of securities. * * *
(2) Margin securities upon full payment by such customer to the
broker or dealer of the customer's indebtedness to the broker or
dealer; and, subject to the right of the broker or dealer under
Regulation T (12 CFR 220) to retain collateral for its own protection
beyond the requirements of Regulation T, excess margin securities not
reasonably required to collateralize such customer's indebtedness to
the broker or dealer.
* * * * *

0
6. Section 240.15c3-3a is revised to read as follows:

Sec. 240.15c3-3a Exhibit A--Formula for determination of customer and
PAB account reserve requirements of brokers and dealers under Sec.
240.15c3-3.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Credits Debits
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Free credit balances and other credit balances in customers' security XXX ...............
accounts. (See Note A).......................................................
2. Monies borrowed collateralized by securities carried for the accounts of XXX ...............
customers (See Note B).......................................................
3. Monies payable against customers' securities loaned (See Note C)........... XXX ...............
4. Customers' securities failed to receive (See Note D)....................... XXX ...............
5. Credit balances in firm accounts which are attributable to principal sales XXX ...............
to customers.................................................................
6. Market value of stock dividends, stock splits and similar distributions XXX ...............
receivable outstanding over 30 calendar days.................................
7. Market value of short security count differences over 30 calendar days old. XXX ...............

[[Page 51905]]

8. Market value of short securities and credits (not to be offset by longs or XXX ...............
by debits) in all suspense accounts over 30 calendar days....................
9. Market value of securities which are in transfer in excess of 40 calendar XXX ...............
days and have not been confirmed to be in transfer by the transfer agent or
the issuer during the 40 days................................................
10. Debit balances in customers' cash and margin accounts excluding unsecured ............... XXX
accounts and accounts doubtful of collection. (See Note E)...................
11. Securities borrowed to effectuate short sales by customers and securities ............... XXX
borrowed to make delivery on customers' securities failed to deliver.........
12. Failed to deliver of customers' securities not older than 30 calendar days ............... XXX
13. Margin required and on deposit with the Options Clearing Corporation for ............... XXX
all option contracts written or purchased in customer accounts. (See Note F).
14. Margin required and on deposit with a clearing agency registered with the ............... XXX
Commission under section 17A of the Act (15 U.S.C. 78q-1) or a derivatives
clearing organization registered with the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission under section 5b of the Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 7a-1)
related to the following types of positions written, purchased or sold in
customer accounts: (1) security futures products and (2) futures contracts
(and options thereon) carried in a securities account pursuant to an SRO
portfolio margining rule (See Note G)........................................
Total credits............................................................. ............... ...............
Total debits.............................................................. ............... ...............
15. Excess of total credits (sum of items 1-9) over total debits (sum of items ............... XXX
10-14) required to be on deposit in the ``Reserve Bank Account'' (Sec.
240.15c3-3(e)). If the computation is made monthly as permitted by this
section, the deposit must be not less than 105% of the excess of total
credits over total debits....................................................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Notes Regarding the Customer Reserve Bank Account Computation

Note A. Item 1 must include all outstanding drafts payable to
customers which have been applied against free credit balances or other
credit balances and must also include checks drawn in excess of bank
balances per the records of the broker or dealer.
Note B. Item 2 must include the amount of options-related or
security futures product-related Letters of Credit obtained by a member
of a registered clearing agency or a derivatives clearing organization
which are collateralized by customers' securities, to the extent of the
member's margin requirement at the registered clearing agency or
derivatives clearing organization. Item 2 must also include the amount
of Letters of Credit which are collateralized by customers' securities
and related to other futures contracts (and options thereon) carried in
a securities account pursuant to an SRO portfolio margining rule.
Note C. Item 3 must include in addition to monies payable against
customers' securities loaned the amount by which the market value of
securities loaned exceeds the collateral value received from the
lending of such securities.
Note D. Item 4 must include in addition to customers' securities
failed to receive the amount by which the market value of securities
failed to receive and outstanding more than thirty (30) calendar days
exceeds their contract value.
Note E. (1) Debit balances in margin accounts must be reduced by
the amount by which a specific security (other than an exempted
security) which is collateral for margin accounts exceeds in aggregate
value 15 percent of the aggregate value of all securities which
collateralize all margin accounts receivable; provided, however, the
required reduction must not be in excess of the amounts of the debit
balance required to be excluded because of this concentration rule. A
specified security is deemed to be collateral for a margin account only
to the extent it represents in value not more than 140 percent of the
customer debit balance in a margin account.
(2) Debit balances in special omnibus accounts, maintained in
compliance with the requirements of Section 7(f) of Regulation T (12
CFR 220.7(f)) or similar accounts carried on behalf of another broker
or dealer, must be reduced by any deficits in such accounts (or if a
credit, such credit must be increased) less any calls for margin, mark
to the market, or other required deposits which are outstanding 5
business days or less.
(3) Debit balances in customers' cash and margin accounts included
in the formula under Item 10 must be reduced by an amount equal to 1
percent of their aggregate value.
(4) Debit balances in cash and margin accounts of household members
and other persons related to principals of a broker or dealer and debit
balances in cash and margin accounts of affiliated persons of a broker
or dealer must be excluded from the Reserve Formula, unless the broker
or dealer can demonstrate that such debit balances are directly related
to credit items in the formula.
(5) Debit balances in margin accounts (other than omnibus accounts)
must be reduced by the amount by which any single customer's debit
balance exceeds 25% (to the extent such amount is greater than $50,000)
of the broker-dealer's tentative net capital (i.e., net capital prior
to securities haircuts) unless the broker or dealer can demonstrate
that the debit balance is directly related to credit items in the
Reserve Formula. Related accounts (e.g., the separate accounts of an
individual, accounts under common control or subject to cross
guarantees) will be deemed to be a single customer's accounts for
purposes of this provision.
If the registered national securities exchange or the registered
national securities association having responsibility for examining the
broker or dealer (``designated examining authority'') is satisfied,
after taking into account the circumstances of the concentrated account
including the quality, diversity, and marketability of the collateral
securing the debit balances or margin accounts subject to this
provision, that the concentration of debit balances is appropriate,
then such designated examining authority may grant a partial or plenary
exception from this provision. The debit balance may be included in the
reserve formula computation for five business days from the day the
request is made.
(6) Debit balances in joint accounts, custodian accounts,
participation in hedge funds or limited partnerships or similar type
accounts or arrangements that include both assets of a person or
persons who would be excluded from the definition of customer
(``noncustomer'') and assets of a person or persons who would be
included in the definition of customer must be included in the Reserve
Formula in the

[[Page 51906]]

following manner: If the percentage ownership of the non-customer is
less than 5 percent then the entire debit balance shall be included in
the formula; if such percentage ownership is between 5 percent and 50
percent then the portion of the debit balance attributable to the non-
customer must be excluded from the formula unless the broker or dealer
can demonstrate that the debit balance is directly related to credit
items in the formula; or if such percentage ownership is greater than
50 percent, then the entire debit balance must be excluded from the
formula unless the broker or dealer can demonstrate that the debit
balance is directly related to credit items in the formula.
Note F. Item 13 must include the amount of margin required and on
deposit with the Options Clearing Corporation to the extent such margin
is represented by cash, proprietary qualified securities and letters of
credit collateralized by customers' securities.
Note G. (a) Item 14 must include the amount of margin required and
on deposit with a clearing agency registered with the Commission under
section 17A of the Act (15 U.S.C. 78q-1) or a derivatives clearing
organization registered with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
under section 5b of the Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 7a-1) for
customer accounts to the extent that the margin is represented by cash,
proprietary qualified securities, and letters of credit collateralized
by customers' securities.
(b) Item 14 will apply only if the broker or dealer has the margin
related to security futures products, or futures (and options thereon)
carried in a securities account pursuant to an approved SRO portfolio
margining program on deposit with:
(1) A registered clearing agency or derivatives clearing
organization that:
(i) Maintains the highest investment-grade rating from a nationally
recognized statistical rating organization; or
(ii) Maintains security deposits from clearing members in
connection with regulated options or futures transactions and
assessment power over member firms that equal a combined total of at
least $2 billion, at least $500 million of which must be in the form of
security deposits. For the purposes of this Note G, the term ``security
deposits'' refers to a general fund, other than margin deposits or
their equivalent, that consists of cash or securities held by a
registered clearing agency or derivative clearing organization; or
(iii) Maintains at least $3 billion in margin deposits; or
(iv) Does not meet the requirements of paragraphs (b)(1)(i) through
(b)(1)(iii) of this Note G, if the Commission has determined, upon a
written request for exemption by or for the benefit of the broker or
dealer, that the broker or dealer may utilize such a registered
clearing agency or derivatives clearing organization. The Commission
may, in its sole discretion, grant such an exemption subject to such
conditions as are appropriate under the circumstances, if the
Commission determines that such conditional or unconditional exemption
is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, and is consistent
with the protection of investors; and
(2) A registered clearing agency or derivatives clearing
organization that, if it holds funds or securities deposited as margin
for security futures products or futures in a portfolio margin account
in a bank, as defined in section 3(a)(6) of the Act (15 U.S.C.
78c(a)(6)), obtains and preserves written notification from the bank at
which it holds such funds and securities or at which such funds and
securities are held on its behalf. The written notification will state
that all funds and/or securities deposited with the bank as margin
(including customer security futures products and futures in a
portfolio margin account), or held by the bank and pledged to such
registered clearing agency or derivatives clearing agency as margin,
are being held by the bank for the exclusive benefit of clearing
members of the registered clearing agency or derivatives clearing
organization (subject to the interest of such registered clearing
agency or derivatives clearing organization therein), and are being
kept separate from any other accounts maintained by the registered
clearing agency or derivatives clearing organization with the bank. The
written notification also will provide that such funds and/or
securities will at no time be used directly or indirectly as security
for a loan to the registered clearing agency or derivatives clearing
organization by the bank, and will be subject to no right, charge,
security interest, lien, or claim of any kind in favor of the bank or
any person claiming through the bank. This provision, however, will not
prohibit a registered clearing agency or derivatives clearing
organization from pledging customer funds or securities as collateral
to a bank for any purpose that the rules of the Commission or the
registered clearing agency or derivatives clearing organization
otherwise permit; and
(3) A registered clearing agency or derivatives clearing
organization establishes, documents, and maintains:
(i) Safeguards in the handling, transfer, and delivery of cash and
securities;
(ii) Fidelity bond coverage for its employees and agents who handle
customer funds or securities. In the case of agents of a registered
clearing agency or derivatives clearing organization, the agent may
provide the fidelity bond coverage; and
(iii) Provisions for periodic examination by independent public
accountants; and
(iv) A derivatives clearing organization that, if it is not
otherwise registered with the Commission, has provided the Commission
with a written undertaking, in a form acceptable to the Commission,
executed by a duly authorized person at the derivatives clearing
organization, to the effect that, with respect to the clearance and
settlement of the customer security futures products and futures in a
portfolio margin account of the broker or dealer, the derivatives
clearing organization will permit the Commission to examine the books
and records of the derivatives clearing organization for compliance
with the requirements set forth in Sec. 240.15c3-3a, Note G (b)(1)
through (3).
(c) Item 14 will apply only if a broker or dealer determines, at
least annually, that the registered clearing agency or derivatives
clearing organization with which the broker or dealer has on deposit
margin related to securities future products or futures in a portfolio
margin account meets the conditions of this Note G.

Notes Regarding the PAB Reserve Bank Account Computation

Note 1. Broker-dealers should use the formula in Exhibit A for the
purposes of computing the PAB reserve requirement, except that
references to ``accounts,'' ``customer accounts, or ``customers'' will
be treated as references to PAB accounts.
Note 2. Any credit (including a credit applied to reduce a debit)
that is included in the computation required by Sec. 240.15c3-3 with
respect to customer accounts (the ``customer reserve computation'') may
not be included as a credit in the computation required by Sec.
240.15c3-3 with respect to PAB accounts (the ``PAB reserve
computation'').
Note 3. Note E(1) to Sec. 240.15c3-3a does not apply to the PAB
reserve computation.
Note 4. Note E(3) to Sec. 240.15c3-3a which reduces debit balances
by 1% does not apply to the PAB reserve computation.

[[Page 51907]]

Note 5. Interest receivable, floor brokerage, and commissions
receivable of another broker or dealer from the broker or dealer
(excluding clearing deposits) that are otherwise allowable assets under
Sec. 240.15c3-1 need not be included in the PAB reserve computation,
provided the amounts have been clearly identified as payables on the
books of the broker or dealer. Commissions receivable and other
receivables of another broker or dealer from the broker or dealer that
are otherwise non-allowable assets under Sec. 240.15c3-1 and clearing
deposits of another broker or dealer may be included as ``credit
balances'' for purposes of the PAB reserve computation, provided the
commissions receivable and other receivables are subject to immediate
cash payment to the other broker or dealer and the clearing deposit is
subject to payment within 30 days.
Note 6. Credits included in the PAB reserve computation that result
from the use of securities held for a PAB account (``PAB securities'')
that are pledged to meet intra-day margin calls in a cross-margin
account established between the Options Clearing Corporation and any
regulated derivatives clearing organization may be reduced to the
extent that the excess margin held by the other clearing corporation in
the cross-margin relationship is used the following business day to
replace the PAB securities that were previously pledged. In addition,
balances resulting from a portfolio margin account that are segregated
pursuant to Commodity Futures Trading Commission regulations need not
be included in the PAB Reserve Bank Account computation.
Note 7. Deposits received prior to a transaction pending settlement
which are $5 million or greater for any single transaction or $10
million in aggregate may be excluded as credits from the PAB reserve
computation if such balances are placed and maintained in a separate
PAB Reserve Bank Account by 12 p.m. Eastern Time on the following
business day. Thereafter, the money representing any such deposits may
be withdrawn to complete the related transactions without performing a
new PAB reserve computation.
Note 8. A credit balance resulting from a PAB reserve computation
may be reduced by the amount that items representing such credits are
swept into money market funds or mutual funds of an investment company
registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940 on or prior to 10
a.m. Eastern Time on the deposit date provided that the credits swept
into any such fund are not subject to any right, charge, security
interest, lien, or claim of any kind in favor of the investment company
or the broker or dealer. Any credits that have been swept into money
market funds or mutual funds must be maintained in the name of a
particular broker or for the benefit of another broker.
Note 9. Clearing deposits required to be maintained at registered
clearing agencies may be included as debits in the PAB reserve
computation to the extent the percentage of the deposit, which is based
upon the clearing agency's aggregate deposit requirements (e.g., dollar
trading volume), that relates to the proprietary business of other
brokers and dealers can be identified.
Note 10. A broker or dealer that clears PAB accounts through an
affiliate or third party clearing broker must include these PAB account
balances and the omnibus PAB account balance in its PAB reserve
computation.

0
7. Section 240.17a-3 is amended by adding paragraph (a)(23) to read as
follows:

Sec. 240.17a-3 Records to be made by certain exchange members,
brokers and dealers.

(a) * * *
(23) A record documenting the credit, market, and liquidity risk
management controls established and maintained by the broker or dealer
to assist it in analyzing and managing the risks associated with its
business activities, Provided, that the records required by this
paragraph (a)(23) need only be made if the broker or dealer has more
than:
(i) $1,000,000 in aggregate credit items as computed under Sec.
240.15c3-3a; or
(ii) $20,000,000 in capital, which includes debt subordinated in
accordance with Sec. 240.15c3-1d.
* * * * *

0
8. Section 240.17a-4 is amended by:
0
a. Removing from paragraph (b)(1) the citation ``Sec. 240.17a-3(f)''
and its place adding the citation ``Sec. 240.17a-3(g)'';
0
b. Removing from paragraph (b)(9) the citation ``Sec. 240.15c3-
3(d)(4)'' and in its place adding the citation ``Sec. 240.15c3-
3(d)(5)''; and
0
c. Adding paragraph (e)(9).
The addition reads as follows:

Sec. 240.17a-4 Records to be preserved by certain exchange members,
brokers and dealers.

* * * * *
(e) * * *
(9) All records required pursuant to Sec. 240.17a-3(a)(23) until
three years after the termination of the use of the risk management
controls documented therein.
* * * * *

0
9. Section 240.17a-11 is amended by:
0
a. Revising the first sentence of paragraph (b)(1);
0
b. Removing from paragraph (c) introductory text ``or (c)(4)'' and in
its place adding ``, (c)(4) or (c)(5)''; and
0
c. Adding paragraph (c)(5).
The revision and addition read as follows:

Sec. 240.17a-11 Notification provisions for brokers and dealers

* * * * *
(b)(1) Every broker or dealer whose net capital declines below the
minimum amount required pursuant to Sec. 240.15c3-1, or is insolvent
as that term is defined in Sec. 240.15c3-1(c)(16), must give notice of
such deficiency that same day in accordance with paragraph (g) of this
section. * * *
* * * * *
(c) * * *
(5) If a computation made by a broker or dealer pursuant to Sec.
240.15c3-1 shows that the total amount of money payable against all
securities loaned or subject to a repurchase agreement or the total
contract value of all securities borrowed or subject to a reverse
repurchase agreement is in excess of 2500 percent of its tentative net
capital; provided, however, that for purposes of this leverage test
transactions involving government securities, as defined in section
3(a)(42) of the Act (15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(42)), must be excluded from the
calculation; provided further, however, that a broker or dealer will
not be required to send the notice required by this paragraph (c)(5) if
it reports monthly its securities lending and borrowing and repurchase
and reverse repurchase activity (including the total amount of money
payable against securities loaned or subject to a repurchase agreement
and the total contract value of securities borrowed or subject to a
reverse repurchase agreement) to its designated examining authority in
a form acceptable to its designated examining authority.
* * * * *

By the Commission.

Dated: July 30, 2013.
Elizabeth M. Murphy,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2013-18734 Filed 8-20-13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011-01-P

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