Investigative Hearing, 39017-39018 [2013-15495]

Download as PDF tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 125 / Friday, June 28, 2013 / Notices would have been subject to recycling or otherwise disposed of under thenexisting authorities, including under General Records Schedule 20, Item 8 (1982), and are otherwise equivalent to backup tapes currently disposable under General Records Schedule 24, Item 4 (covering ‘‘system backup tapes’’ created in Information Technology Operations). As of November 1995, subsequent disaster recovery backup tapes created for the same VAX/All-in-1 System operated by the Office of Administration of EOP were specifically designated as temporary records with a 90 day maximum retention period for weekly backups. See records schedule approved by Archivist John Carlin, dated November 1995, re ‘‘OASIS All-in-1 Applications and other VAX Cluster Applications, Job. No. N1–429–95–2, Item 8), These authorities are consistent with the widely accepted principle that records appropriate for preservation should be maintained in recordkeeping systems rather than on disaster recovery backups. Cf. 36 CFR 1236.20(c) (‘‘System and file backup processes and media do not provide the appropriate recordkeeping functionalities and must not be used as the agency electronic recordkeeping system.’’). The sub-collections of backup tapes that have been retained and are now covered by this disposition notice consist of: (a) 2,835 ‘‘3480 cartridges’’ created by EOP staff between November 6, 1992 through January 20, 1993, during the George H.W. Bush Administration; (b) a preservation copy set of 2,835 media created by NARA staff in 1993 on receipt of the originals; (c) a second generation preservation copy set of 2,835 media created by NARA staff in 2003; (d) 2,156 ‘‘daily’’ and 6,514 ‘‘weekly’’ backups created by EOP staff between January 20, 1993 and July 15, 1994 during the Clinton Administration; and (e) a preservation copy set of 5,732 backups of Clinton daily and weekly backups created by EOP staff in 1996 and used for the 1996 Tape Restoration Project. A Stipulation and Order entered in the Armstrong case on January 27, 1994, allows for disposition of the preserved backups provided that NARA issues this form of public notice in the Federal Register. Additional information. The abovereferenced November 1995 records schedule for records created or received on the VAX/All-in-1 system covered additional software applications that generated user-created data during some or all of the time period between November 1992 and July 1994, but that were not made subject to the Tape Restoration Project as either Presidential VerDate Mar<15>2010 19:17 Jun 27, 2013 Jkt 229001 or Federal records. For the reasons stated above, NARA does not believe that additional recovery actions are warranted for the purpose of obtaining additional user-created data on the preserved backup tapes. The additional temporary record and non-record applications on the VAX/ All-in-1 system consisted of: (a) Indices (lists maintained on the system of the contents of electronic folders of OASIS All-in-1 users); (b) Distribution Lists (mailing lists created by users when sending email messages); (c) EOP Directory (names of individuals, with room and telephone numbers); (d) User Directory (provided users with short-cut to enter names of intended recipients); (e) Bulletin Board (notification of scheduled events, such as blood drives, classroom training and insurance open seasons); (f) User Set-up (passwords, locations, work hours, calendar and date formats, and log-in/log-out data); (g) System Distribution Lists (mailing lists created by system managers); (h) DB/2 Services Request Form (database administration requests); (i) Security Files (system generated data to monitor requests to access); (j) Supply Order Form; (k) Training Schedules; (l) Weekly Usage Reports; (m) Calculator; (n) Information Management (news and weather displays); (o) Lock Keyboard; (p) Personal Rolodex; (q) Training Routines and HELP files; (r) World Wide Time; (s) Personnel Vacancy Search Request (government wide vacancies); (t) Presidential Remarks On-Line (Library application providing access to public statements and speeches). As stated, copies of Presidential and Federal email with attachments, calendars, pager notes, and related records recovered as part of the 1996 Tape Restoration Project are being retained by NARA in separate electronic databases covering the George H.W. Bush and Clinton Administrations, respectively. However, NARA has no further need or use for the remaining original disaster recovery backup tapes. Dated: June 25, 2013. Susan K. Donius, Director, Office of Presidential Libraries. [FR Doc. 2013–15564 Filed 6–27–13; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7515–01–P NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION Proposal Review Panel for Materials Research, Notice of Meeting In accordance with the Federal Advisory Committee Act (Pub. L. 92– 463 as amended), the National Science PO 00000 Frm 00106 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 39017 Foundation announces the following meeting: Name: Site visit review of the Materials Research Science and Engineering Center (MRSEC) at the University of Utah by the Division of Materials Research (DMR) #1203. Dates & Times: July 9, 2013, 7:15 a.m.–6:45 p.m. Place: University of Utah, Salt Lake City, UT. Type of Meeting: Part open. Contact Person: Dr. Chuck Bouldin, Program Director, Materials Research Science and Engineering Centers Program, Division of Materials Research, Room 1065, National Science Foundation, 4201 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, VA 22230, Telephone (703) 292–4920. Purpose of Meeting: To provide advice and recommendations concerning further support of the MRSEC at the University of Utah. Agenda: 7:15 a.m.–9:00 a.m. Closed—Executive Session 9:00 a.m.–3:00 p.m. Open—Review of the Utah MRSEC 3:00 p.m.–6:45 p.m. Closed—Executive Session Reason for Closing: The work being reviewed may include information of a proprietary or confidential nature, including technical information; financial data, such as salaries and personal information concerning individuals associated with the MRSEC. These matters are exempt under 5 U.S.C. 552 b(c), (4) and (6) of the Government in the Sunshine Act. Dated: June 25, 2013. Susanne Bolton, Committee Management Officer. [FR Doc. 2013–15519 Filed 6–27–13; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7555–01–P NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD Investigative Hearing On November 30, 2012, at 6:59 a.m. eastern standard time, southbound Consolidated Rail Corporation (Conrail) freight train FC4230, consisting of 2 locomotives and 82 cars, derailed 7 cars near milepost 13.7 on the Conrail Penn’s Grove secondary track in Paulsboro, New Jersey. The derailment occurred while the train crossed a movable bridge over Mantua Creek, resulting in 4 tank cars leaving the bridge and coming to rest partially submerged in Mantua Creek. As a result of the derailment, the coupler on one tank car punctured another tank car, releasing an estimated E:\FR\FM\28JNN1.SGM 28JNN1 tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES 39018 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 125 / Friday, June 28, 2013 / Notices 180,000 pounds of liquid vinyl chloride into Mantua Creek; the vinyl chloride vaporized and dispersed with the prevailing winds. Primarily used to make polyvinyl chloride (PVC), vinyl chloride is a highly flammable, colorless gas and a known carcinogen that may have an effect on the nervous system, eyes, liver, and respiratory tract through airborne exposure. The weather at the time was cloudy skies and calm winds with a temperature of 34°F. The 911 communications center was notified of the release at 7:01 a.m., and the first responders to the accident were members of the Paulsboro Fire and Police departments, assisted by hazardous materials specialists from a nearby refinery and the Gloucester County hazardous materials team. The first incident command was established about 50 yards from the bridge but was later moved a half mile away. Evacuation orders were imposed by local authorities shortly after the release, but subsequently were replaced with shelter-in-place recommendations. About 8 hours into the release, a unified command was established among the United States Coast Guard, New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, Paulsboro Fire Department, and Conrail. On the morning of the accident, 23 local residents were treated at a nearby hospital for possible vinyl chloride exposure. The train conductor and numerous emergency responders were also tested for vinyl chloride exposure. The investigative hearing will discuss Conrail operations and the emergency response to the hazardous materials release. Specific areas being discussed include Conrail bridge operations, Conrail procedures, incident command actions and emergency response decisions in the first day, hazardous materials emergency response operations, roles of the response teams, evacuations and communications, incident response protocols, hazmat training, oversight of Paulsboro emergency preparedness, roles of local, state and Federal agencies in emergency hazmat response, and interaction between state and Federal agencies in establishing a unified command. The goals of this hearing are to gather additional factual information regarding the actions of the first responders in Paulsboro, to explore the hierarchy of New Jersey State and local emergency management, training, regulations and standards applicable to emergency response personnel, and to examine the oversight of the Paulsboro emergency operations. Parties to the hearing include the Federal Railroad Administration, VerDate Mar<15>2010 19:17 Jun 27, 2013 Jkt 229001 Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, United States Coast Guard, Conrail, Borough of Paulsboro, State of New Jersey, Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen, and the United Transportation Union. At the start of the hearing, the public docket will be opened. Included in the docket are photographs, interview transcripts, and numerous other documents. Order of Proceedings 1. Opening Statement by the Chairman of the Board of Inquiry 2. Introduction of the Board of Inquiry and Technical Panel 3. Introduction of the Parties to the Hearing 4. Introduction of Exhibits by Hearing Officer 5. Overview of the incident and the investigation by Investigator-InCharge 6. Calling of Witnesses by Hearing Officer and Examination of Witness by Board of Inquiry, Technical Panel, and Parties 7. Closing Statement by the Chairman of the Board of Inquiry The accident docket is DCA13MR002. The Investigative Hearing will be held in the NTSB Board Room and Conference Center, located at 429 L’Enfant Plaza E. SW., Washington, DC, Tuesday, July 9, and Wednesday, July 10, 2013, beginning at 9:00 a.m. The public can view the hearing in person or by live webcast at www.ntsb.gov. Webcast archives are generally available by the end of the next day following the hearing, and webcasts are archived for a period of 3 months from after the date of the event. Individuals requesting specific accommodations should contact Ms. Rochelle Hall at (202) 314–6305 or by email at Rochelle.Hall@ntsb.gov by Friday, July 5, 2013. NTSB Media Contact: Mr. Terry Williams—terry.williams@ntsb.gov. NTSB Investigative Hearing Officer: Mr. Matthew Nicholson— matthew.nicholson@ntsb.gov. Dated: June 24, 2013. Candi R. Bing, Federal Register Liaison Officer. [FR Doc. 2013–15495 Filed 6–27–13; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7533–01–P PO 00000 Frm 00107 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION [Docket Nos. 50–247 and 50–286; NRC– 2008–0672] Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.; Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit Nos. 2 and 3 Nuclear Regulatory Commission. ACTION: Supplement to Final Supplement 38 to the Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants; issuance. AGENCY: Notice is hereby given that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has published a supplement (Volume 4) to the final plant-specific supplement 38 to the ‘‘Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants (GEIS),’’ NUREG–1437, regarding the renewal of operating licenses DPR–26 and DPR–64 for an additional 20 years of operation for Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit Nos. 2 and 3 (IP2 and IP3). This supplement revises specific sections of the final plant-specific Supplement 38 to the GEIS, as indicated in the supplement. The IP2 and IP3 site is located approximately 24 miles north of New York, NY. Possible alternatives to the proposed action (license renewal) include no action and reasonable alternative. SUMMARY: Please refer to Docket ID NRC–2008–0672 when contacting the NRC about the availability of information regarding this document. You may access information related to this document using the following methods: • Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC–2008–0672. Address questions about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher; telephone: 301–492–3668; email: Carol.Gallagher@nrc.gov. For technical questions, contact the individual(s) listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of this document. • NRC’s Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS): You may access publiclyavailable documents online in the NRC Library at http://www.nrc.gov/readingrm/adams.html. To begin the search, select ‘‘ADAMS Public Documents’’ and then select ‘‘Begin Web-based ADAMS Search.’’ For problems with ADAMS, please contact the NRC’s Public Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1–800–397–4209, 301–415–4737, or by ADDRESSES: E:\FR\FM\28JNN1.SGM 28JNN1

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[Federal Register Volume 78, Number 125 (Friday, June 28, 2013)]
[Notices]
[Pages 39017-39018]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2013-15495]


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NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD


Investigative Hearing

    On November 30, 2012, at 6:59 a.m. eastern standard time, 
southbound Consolidated Rail Corporation (Conrail) freight train 
FC4230, consisting of 2 locomotives and 82 cars, derailed 7 cars near 
milepost 13.7 on the Conrail Penn's Grove secondary track in Paulsboro, 
New Jersey. The derailment occurred while the train crossed a movable 
bridge over Mantua Creek, resulting in 4 tank cars leaving the bridge 
and coming to rest partially submerged in Mantua Creek. As a result of 
the derailment, the coupler on one tank car punctured another tank car, 
releasing an estimated

[[Page 39018]]

180,000 pounds of liquid vinyl chloride into Mantua Creek; the vinyl 
chloride vaporized and dispersed with the prevailing winds. Primarily 
used to make polyvinyl chloride (PVC), vinyl chloride is a highly 
flammable, colorless gas and a known carcinogen that may have an effect 
on the nervous system, eyes, liver, and respiratory tract through 
airborne exposure. The weather at the time was cloudy skies and calm 
winds with a temperature of 34[deg]F.
    The 911 communications center was notified of the release at 7:01 
a.m., and the first responders to the accident were members of the 
Paulsboro Fire and Police departments, assisted by hazardous materials 
specialists from a nearby refinery and the Gloucester County hazardous 
materials team. The first incident command was established about 50 
yards from the bridge but was later moved a half mile away. Evacuation 
orders were imposed by local authorities shortly after the release, but 
subsequently were replaced with shelter-in-place recommendations. About 
8 hours into the release, a unified command was established among the 
United States Coast Guard, New Jersey Department of Environmental 
Protection, Paulsboro Fire Department, and Conrail. On the morning of 
the accident, 23 local residents were treated at a nearby hospital for 
possible vinyl chloride exposure. The train conductor and numerous 
emergency responders were also tested for vinyl chloride exposure.
    The investigative hearing will discuss Conrail operations and the 
emergency response to the hazardous materials release. Specific areas 
being discussed include Conrail bridge operations, Conrail procedures, 
incident command actions and emergency response decisions in the first 
day, hazardous materials emergency response operations, roles of the 
response teams, evacuations and communications, incident response 
protocols, hazmat training, oversight of Paulsboro emergency 
preparedness, roles of local, state and Federal agencies in emergency 
hazmat response, and interaction between state and Federal agencies in 
establishing a unified command. The goals of this hearing are to gather 
additional factual information regarding the actions of the first 
responders in Paulsboro, to explore the hierarchy of New Jersey State 
and local emergency management, training, regulations and standards 
applicable to emergency response personnel, and to examine the 
oversight of the Paulsboro emergency operations.
    Parties to the hearing include the Federal Railroad Administration, 
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, United States 
Coast Guard, Conrail, Borough of Paulsboro, State of New Jersey, 
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen, and the United 
Transportation Union.
    At the start of the hearing, the public docket will be opened. 
Included in the docket are photographs, interview transcripts, and 
numerous other documents.

Order of Proceedings

1. Opening Statement by the Chairman of the Board of Inquiry
2. Introduction of the Board of Inquiry and Technical Panel
3. Introduction of the Parties to the Hearing
4. Introduction of Exhibits by Hearing Officer
5. Overview of the incident and the investigation by Investigator-In-
Charge
6. Calling of Witnesses by Hearing Officer and Examination of Witness 
by Board of Inquiry, Technical Panel, and Parties
7. Closing Statement by the Chairman of the Board of Inquiry

    The accident docket is DCA13MR002.
    The Investigative Hearing will be held in the NTSB Board Room and 
Conference Center, located at 429 L'Enfant Plaza E. SW., Washington, 
DC, Tuesday, July 9, and Wednesday, July 10, 2013, beginning at 9:00 
a.m. The public can view the hearing in person or by live webcast at 
www.ntsb.gov. Webcast archives are generally available by the end of 
the next day following the hearing, and webcasts are archived for a 
period of 3 months from after the date of the event.
    Individuals requesting specific accommodations should contact Ms. 
Rochelle Hall at (202) 314-6305 or by email at Rochelle.Hall@ntsb.gov 
by Friday, July 5, 2013.
    NTSB Media Contact: Mr. Terry Williams_terry.williams@ntsb.gov.
    NTSB Investigative Hearing Officer: Mr. Matthew Nicholson_
matthew.nicholson@ntsb.gov.

    Dated: June 24, 2013.
Candi R. Bing,
Federal Register Liaison Officer.
[FR Doc. 2013-15495 Filed 6-27-13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7533-01-P