Self-Regulatory Organizations; The NASDAQ Stock Market LLC; Notice of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of Proposed Rule Change To Establish a Fee for the NASDAQ MatchView Feed, 64158-64162 [2011-26672]
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Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 200 / Monday, October 17, 2011 / Notices
A. Self-Regulatory Organization’s
Statement of the Purpose of, and the
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule
Change
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION
[Release No. 34–65525; File No. SR–
NASDAQ–2011–139]
1. Purpose
Self-Regulatory Organizations; The
NASDAQ Stock Market LLC; Notice of
Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of
Proposed Rule Change To Establish a
Fee for the NASDAQ MatchView Feed
October 11, 2011.
Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(‘‘Act’’) 1 and Rule 19b–4 thereunder,2
notice is hereby given that on
September 29, 2011, The NASDAQ
Stock Market LLC (‘‘NASDAQ’’ or
‘‘Exchange’’) filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission (‘‘SEC’’ or
‘‘Commission’’) the proposed rule
change as described in Items I, II, and
III below, which Items have been
prepared by the Exchange. The
Commission is publishing this notice to
solicit comments on the proposed rule
change from interested persons.
I. Self-Regulatory Organization’s
Statement of the Terms of Substance of
the Proposed Rule Change
The Exchange proposes to establish a
fee for the NASDAQ MatchView Feed
(the ‘‘Feed’’). The Feed provides a view
of how the Exchange views the Best Bid
and Offer (‘‘BBO’’) available from away
market centers for each individual
security the Exchange trades. The text of
the proposed rule change is available on
the Exchange’s Web site at https://
nasdaq.cchwallstreet.com, at the
principal office of the Exchange, and at
the Commission’s Public Reference
Room.
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II. Self-Regulatory Organization’s
Statement of the Purpose of, and
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule
Change
In its filing with the Commission, the
Exchange included statements
concerning the purpose of and basis for
the proposed rule change and discussed
any comments it received on the
proposed rule change. The text of these
statements may be examined at the
places specified in Item IV below. The
Exchange has prepared summaries, set
forth in sections A, B, and C below, of
the most significant aspects of such
statements.
1 15
2 17
U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
CFR 240.19b–4.
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This proposal regards the NASDAQ
MatchView Feed (formerly known as
the NASDAQ Ouch BBO Feed). The
Feed is currently available to all
Exchange members and market
participants equally at no charge,
offering all participants transparent,
real-time data concerning the
Exchange’s view of the BBO data.
NASDAQ is proposing to establish the
following monthly distributor fees for
internal distribution:
Entitlement name
NASDAQ MatchView
NASDAQ MatchView
Enterprise License.
Monthly fee
$5,000 per firm for
1st server.
$10,000 per firm for
2+ servers.
This new Distributor fee for the
MatchView Feed is completely separate
from the underlying fees associated with
each data feed product used to calculate
the MatchView data. The Exchange
makes the Feed available on a
subscription basis to market participants
that are connected to the Exchange
whether through extranets, direct
connection, or Internet-based virtual
private networks.
MatchView reflects the Exchange’s
view of the BBO data, at any given time,
based on orders executed on the
Exchange and on quote information
from the network processors and
individual exchange bids and offers
received either from the network
processor or directly from an exchange
that disseminates bids and offers to
vendors via a proprietary data feed.3
The Feed contains the following data
elements: symbol, bid price, and ask
price.4 Unlike the Nasdaq TotalView
feed, the MatchView feed does not
contain information about individual
orders, either those residing within the
Exchange system or those executed or
routed by the Exchange. Unlike the
network processor feeds containing the
National Best Bid and Offer (‘‘NBBO’’),
the MatchView Feed does not identify
either the market center quoting the
BBO or the size of the BBO quotes. It
3 For
a more detailed description of the contents
of the MatchView Feed, see Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 65159 (Aug. 18, 2011); 76 FR 53007
(Aug. 24, 2011) (SR–NASDAQ–2011–118).
NASDAQ is proposing no changes to the
MatchView Feed from the existing, filed feed.
4 The Feed also contains a time stamp and
message type field for reference.
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merely contains the symbol and bid and
offer prices.
NASDAQ has continued to enhance
the Feed to increase market
transparency and foster competition
among orders and markets. NASDAQ
believes the Feed is valuable to member
firms in that they may use the Feed to
more accurately price their orders based
on the information within this product,
including bids and offers received via
proprietary data feeds. As a
consequence, member firms may more
accurately price their orders on the
Exchange, thereby avoiding price
adjustments by the Exchange based on
a quote that is no longer available.
Additionally, members can use the Feed
to price orders more aggressively to
narrow the BBO and provide better
reference prices for investors.
2. Statutory Basis
NASDAQ believes that the proposed
rule change is consistent with the
provisions of Section 6 of the Act,5 in
general, and with Section 6(b)(4) of the
Act,6 in particular, in that it provides an
equitable allocation of reasonable fees
among users and recipients of the data.
In adopting Regulation NMS, the
Commission granted self-regulatory
organizations (‘‘SROs’’) and brokerdealers (‘‘BDs’’) increased authority and
flexibility to offer new and unique
market data to the public. It was
believed that this authority would
expand the amount of data available to
consumers, and also spur innovation
and competition for the provision of
market data.
NASDAQ believes that its MatchView
data products are precisely the sort of
market data product that the
Commission envisioned when it
adopted Regulation NMS. The
Commission concluded that Regulation
NMS—by lessening regulation of the
market in proprietary data—would itself
further the Act’s goals of facilitating
efficiency and competition:
[E]fficiency is promoted when brokerdealers who do not need the data beyond the
prices, sizes, market center identifications of
the NBBO and consolidated last sale
information are not required to receive (and
pay for) such data. The Commission also
believes that efficiency is promoted when
broker-dealers may choose to receive (and
pay for) additional market data based on their
own internal analysis of the need for such
data.7
By removing unnecessary regulatory
restrictions on the ability of exchanges
to sell their own data, Regulation NMS
5 15
U.S.C. 78f.
U.S.C. 78f(b)(4).
7 Securities Exchange Act Release No. 51808
(June 9, 2005), 70 FR 37496 (June 29, 2005).
6 15
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advanced the goals of the Act and the
principles reflected in its legislative
history. If the free market should
determine whether proprietary data is
sold to BDs at all, it follows that the
price at which such data is sold should
be set by the market as well.
The recent decision of the United
States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit in NetCoaliton v.
SEC, 615 F.3d 525 (D.C. Cir. 2010),
upheld the Commission’s reliance upon
competitive markets to set reasonable
and equitably allocated fees for market
data. ‘‘In fact, the legislative history
indicates that the Congress intended
that the market system ‘evolve through
the interplay of competitive forces as
unnecessary regulatory restrictions are
removed’ and that the SEC wield its
regulatory power ‘in those situations
where competition may not be
sufficient,’ such as in the creation of a
‘consolidated transactional reporting
system.’ NetCoaltion, at 535 (quoting
H.R. Rep. No. 94–229, at 92 (1975), as
reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 321,
323).
The court agreed with the
Commission’s conclusion that
‘‘Congress intended that ‘competitive
forces should dictate the services and
practices that constitute the U.S.
national market system for trading
equitysecurities.’ ’’ 8
The Court in NetCoalition, while
upholding the Commission’s conclusion
that competitive forces may be relied
upon to establish the fairness of prices,
nevertheless concluded that the record
in that case did not adequately support
the Commission’s conclusions as to the
competitive nature of the market for
NYSEArca’s data product at issue in
that case. As explained below in
NASDAQ’s Statement on Burden on
Competition, however, NASDAQ
believes that there is substantial
evidence of competition in the
marketplace for data that was not in the
record in the NetCoalition case, and that
the Commission is entitled to rely upon
such evidence in concluding that the
fees established in this filing are the
product of competition, and therefore in
accordance with the relevant statutory
standards.9 Moreover, NASDAQ further
8 NetCoaliton,
at 535.
should also be noted that Section 916 of DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act of 2010 (‘‘Dodd-Frank Act’’) has amended
paragraph (A) of Section 19(b)(3) of the Act, 15
U.S.C. 78s(b)(3) to make it clear that all exchange
fees, including fees for market data, may be filed by
exchanges on an immediately effective basis.
Although this change in the law does not alter the
Commission’s authority to evaluate and ultimately
disapprove exchange rules if it concludes that they
are not consistent with the Act, it unambiguously
reflects a conclusion that market data fee changes
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notes that the product at issue in this
filing—a NASDAQ quotation data
product that replicates a subset of the
information available through ‘‘core’’
data products whose fees have been
reviewed and approved by the SEC—is
quite different from the NYSEArca
depth-of-book data product at issue in
NetCoalition. Accordingly, any findings
of the court with respect to that product
may not be relevant to the product at
issue in this filing.
B. Self-Regulatory Organization’s
Statement on Burden on Competition
NASDAQ does not believe that the
proposed rule change will result in any
burden on competition that is not
necessary or appropriate in furtherance
of the purposes of the Act, as amended.
NASDAQ’s ability to price its
MatchView Data Products is constrained
by (1) Competition between exchanges
and other trading platforms that
compete with each other in a variety of
dimensions; (2) the existence of
inexpensive real-time consolidated data
and market-specific data and free
delayed consolidated data; and (3) the
inherent contestability of the market for
proprietary quotation data.
The market for proprietary quotation
data products is currently competitive
and inherently contestable because
there is fierce competition for the inputs
necessary to the creation of proprietary
data and strict pricing discipline for the
proprietary products themselves.
Numerous exchanges compete with
each other for listings, trades, and
market data itself, providing virtually
limitless opportunities for entrepreneurs
who wish to produce and distribute
their own market data. This proprietary
data is produced by each individual
exchange, as well as other entities, in a
vigorously competitive market.
Transaction execution and proprietary
data products are complementary in that
market data is both an input and a
byproduct of the execution service.10 In
fact, market data and trade execution are
a paradigmatic example of joint
products with joint costs. The decision
whether and on which platform to post
an order will depend on the attributes
of the platform where the order can be
posted, including the execution fees,
data quality and price and distribution
of its data products. Without trade
do not require prior Commission review before
taking effect, and that a formal proceeding with
regard to a particular fee change is required only if
the Commission determines that it is necessary or
appropriate to suspend the fee and institute such
a proceeding.
10 See Exhibit 3, Statement of Janusz Ordover and
Gustavo Bamberger, Compass Lexecon LLC, dated
December 29, 2010.
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executions, exchange data products
cannot exist. Moreover, data products
are valuable to many end users only
insofar as they provide information that
end users expect will assist them or
their customers in making trading
decisions.
The costs of producing market data
include not only the costs of the data
distribution infrastructure, but also the
costs of designing, maintaining, and
operating the exchange’s transaction
execution platform and the cost of
regulating the exchange to ensure its fair
operation and maintain investor
confidence. The total return that a
trading platform earns reflects the
revenues it receives from both products
and the joint costs it incurs. Moreover,
the operation of the exchange is
characterized by high fixed costs and
low marginal costs. This cost structure
is common in content and content
distribution industries such as software,
where developing new software
typically requires a large initial
investment (and continuing large
investments to ‘‘upgrade’’ the software),
but once the software is developed, the
incremental cost of providing that
software to an additional user is
typically small, or even zero (e.g., if the
software can be downloaded over the
Internet after being purchased).11 In
NASDAQ’s case, it is costly to build and
maintain a trading platform, but the
incremental cost of trading each
additional share on an existing platform,
or distributing an additional instance of
data, is very low. Market information
and executions are each produced
jointly (in the sense that the activities of
trading and placing order are the source
of the information that is distributed)
and are each subject to significant scale
economies. In such cases, marginal cost
pricing is not feasible because if all sales
were priced at the margin, NASDAQ
would be unable to defray its platform
costs of providing the joint products.
An exchange’s BD customers view the
costs of transaction executions and of
data as a unified cost of doing business
with the exchange. A BD will direct
orders to a particular exchange only if
the expected revenues from executing
trades on the exchange exceed net
transaction execution costs and the cost
of data that the BD chooses to buy to
support its trading decisions (or those of
its customers). The choice of data
products is, in turn, a product of the
value of the products in making
profitable trading decisions. If the cost
11 See William J. Baumol and Daniel G. Swanson,
‘‘The New Economy and Ubiquitous Competitive
Price Discrimination: Identifying Defensible Criteria
of Market Power,’’ Antitrust Law Journal, Vol. 70,
No. 3 (2003).
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of the product exceeds its expected
value, the BD will choose not to buy it.
Moreover, as a BD chooses to direct
fewer orders to a particular exchange,
the value of the product to that BD
decreases, for two reasons. First, the
product will contain less information,
because executions of the BD’s trading
activity will not be reflected in it.
Second, and perhaps more important,
the product will be less valuable to that
BD because it does not provide
information about the venue to which it
is directing its orders. Data from the
competing venue to which the BD is
directing orders will become
correspondingly more valuable.
Similarly, in the case of products such
as MatchView that are distributed
through market data vendors, the
vendors provide price discipline for
proprietary data products because they
control the primary means of access to
end users. Vendors impose price
restraints based upon their business
models. For example, vendors such as
Bloomberg and Reuters that assess a
surcharge on data they sell may refuse
to offer proprietary products that end
users will not purchase in sufficient
numbers. Internet portals, such as
Google, impose a discipline by
providing only data that will enable
them to attract ‘‘eyeballs’’ that
contribute to their advertising revenue.
Retail BDs, such as Schwab and
Fidelity, offer their customers
proprietary data only if it promotes
trading and generates sufficient
commission revenue. Although the
business models may differ, these
vendors’ pricing discipline is the same:
they can simply refuse to purchase any
proprietary data product that fails to
provide sufficient value. NASDAQ and
other producers of proprietary data
products must understand and respond
to these varying business models and
pricing disciplines in order to market
proprietary data products successfully.
Moreover, NASDAQ believes that
products such as MatchView can
enhance order flow to NASDAQ by
providing more widespread distribution
of information about transactions in real
time, thereby encouraging wider
participation in the market by investors
with access to the Internet or television.
Conversely, the value of such products
to distributors and investors decreases if
order flow falls, because the products
contain less content.
Analyzing the cost of market data
distribution in isolation from the cost of
all of the inputs supporting the creation
of market data will inevitably
underestimate the cost of the data. Thus,
because it is impossible to create data
without a fast, technologically robust,
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and well-regulated execution system,
system costs and regulatory costs affect
the price of market data. It would be
equally misleading, however, to
attribute all of the exchange’s costs to
the market data portion of an exchange’s
joint product. Rather, all of the
exchange’s costs are incurred for the
unified purposes of attracting order
flow, executing and/or routing orders,
and generating and selling data about
market activity. The total return that an
exchange earns reflects the revenues it
receives from the joint products and the
total costs of the joint products.
Competition among trading platforms
can be expected to constrain the
aggregate return each platform earns
from the sale of its joint products, but
different platforms may choose from a
range of possible, and equally
reasonable, pricing strategies as the
means of recovering total costs.
NASDAQ pays rebates to attract orders,
charges relatively low prices for market
information and charges relatively high
prices for accessing posted liquidity.
Other platforms may choose a strategy
of paying lower liquidity rebates to
attract orders, setting relatively low
prices for accessing posted liquidity,
and setting relatively high prices for
market information. Still others may
provide most data free of charge and
rely exclusively on transaction fees to
recover their costs. Finally, some
platforms may incentivize use by
providing opportunities for equity
ownership, which may allow them to
charge lower direct fees for executions
and data.
In this environment, there is no
economic basis for regulating maximum
prices for one of the joint products in an
industry in which suppliers face
competitive constraints with regard to
the joint offering. Such regulation is
unnecessary because an ‘‘excessive’’
price for one of the joint products will
ultimately have to be reflected in lower
prices for other products sold by the
firm, or otherwise the firm experience a
loss in the volume of its sales that will
be adverse to its overall profitability. In
other words, an increase in the price of
data will ultimately have to be
accompanied by a decrease in the cost
of executions, or the volume of both
data and executions will fall.
The level of competition and
contestability in the market is evident in
the numerous alternative venues that
compete for order flow, including
thirteen SRO markets, as well as
internalizing BDs and various forms of
alternative trading systems (‘‘ATSs’’),
including dark pools and electronic
communication networks (‘‘ECNs’’).
Each SRO market competes to produce
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transaction reports via trade executions,
and two FINRA-regulated Trade
Reporting Facilities (‘‘TRFs’’) compete
to attract internalized transaction
reports. It is common for BDs to further
and exploit this competition by sending
their order flow and transaction reports
to multiple markets, rather than
providing them all to a single market.
Competitive markets for order flow,
executions, and transaction reports
provide pricing discipline for the inputs
of proprietary data products.
The large number of SROs, TRFs, BDs,
and ATSs that currently produce
proprietary data or are currently capable
of producing it provides further pricing
discipline for proprietary data products.
Each SRO, TRF, ATS, and BD is
currently permitted to produce
proprietary data products, and many
currently do or have announced plans to
do so, including NASDAQ, NYSE,
NYSE Amex, NYSEArca, BATS, and
Direct Edge.
Any ATS or BD can combine with any
other ATS, BD, or multiple ATSs or BDs
to produce joint proprietary data
products. Additionally, order routers
and market data vendors can facilitate
single or multiple BDs’ production of
proprietary data products. The potential
sources of proprietary products are
virtually limitless.
The fact that proprietary data from
ATSs, BDs, and vendors can by-pass
SROs is significant in two respects.
First, non-SROs can compete directly
with SROs for the production and sale
of proprietary data products, as BATS
and Arca did before registering as
exchanges by publishing proprietary
book data on the Internet. Second,
because a single order or transaction
report can appear in a core data product,
an SRO proprietary product, and/or a
non-SRO proprietary product, the data
available in proprietary products is
exponentially greater than the actual
number of orders and transaction
reports that exist in the marketplace.
Indeed, in the case of MatchView, the
data provided through that product
appears both in (i) Real-time core data
products offered by the SIPs for a fee,
and (ii) free SIP data products with a 15minute time delay, and finds a close
substitute in quotation products of
competing venues.
In addition to the competition and
price discipline described above, the
market for proprietary data products is
also highly contestable because market
entry is rapid, inexpensive, and
profitable. The history of electronic
trading is replete with examples of
entrants that swiftly grew into some of
the largest electronic trading platforms
and proprietary data producers:
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Archipelago, Bloomberg Tradebook,
Island, RediBook, Attain, TracECN,
BATS Trading and Direct Edge. Today,
BATS and Direct Edge provide data at
no charge in order to attract order flow,
and use market data revenue rebates
from the resulting executions to
maintain low execution charges for their
users. A proliferation of dark pools and
other ATSs operate profitably with
fragmentary shares of consolidated
market volume.
Regulation NMS, by deregulating the
market for proprietary data, has
increased the contestability of that
market. While BDs have previously
published their proprietary data
individually, Regulation NMS
encourages market data vendors and
BDs to produce proprietary products
cooperatively in a manner never before
possible. Multiple market data vendors
already have the capability to aggregate
data and disseminate it on a profitable
scale, including Bloomberg and
Thomson Reuters.
Moreover, consolidated data provides
two additional measures of pricing
discipline for proprietary data products
that are a subset of the consolidated data
stream. First, the consolidated data is
widely available in real-time at $1 per
month for non-professional users.
Second, consolidated data is also
available at no cost with a 15- or 20minute delay. Because consolidated
data contains marketwide information,
it effectively places a cap on the fees
assessed for proprietary data (such as
quotation data) that is simply a subset
of the consolidated data. The mere
availability of low-cost or free
consolidated data provides a powerful
form of pricing discipline for
proprietary data products that contain
data elements that are a subset of the
consolidated data, by highlighting the
optional nature of proprietary products.
The competitive nature of the market
for products such as MatchView is
borne out by the performance of the
market. One example is the NASDAQ
Last Sale product, set forth in NASDAQ
Rule 7039. In May 2008, the internet
portal Yahoo! began offering its Web site
viewers real-time last sale data (as well
as best quote data) provided by BATS
Trading. In response, in June 2008,
NASDAQ launched NLS, which was
initially subject to an ‘‘enterprise cap’’
of $100,000 for customers receiving only
one of the NLS entitlements (including
only NASDAQ Listed securities), and
$150,000 for customers receiving both
entitlements (NASDAQ and NYSE/
AMEX Listed securities. The majority of
NASDAQ’s sales were at the capped
level. In early 2009, BATS expanded its
offering of free data to include depth-of-
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book data. Also in early 2009,
NYSEArca announced the launch of a
competitive last sale product with an
enterprise price of $30,000 per month.
In response, NASDAQ combined the
enterprise cap for the NLS products and
reduced the cap to $50,000 (i.e., a
reduction of $100,000 per month).
Although each of these products offers
only a specific subset of data available
from the SIPs, NASDAQ believes that
the products are viewed as substitutes
for each other and for core data, rather
than as products that must be obtained
in tandem. For example, while the
internet portal Yahoo! continues to
disseminate only the BATS last sale
product, Google disseminates only
NASDAQ’s product.
In this environment, a supercompetitive increase in the fees charged
for either transactions or data has the
potential to impair revenues from both
products. ‘‘No one disputes that
competition for order flow is ‘fierce’.’’
NetCoalition at 24. The existence of
fierce competition for order flow
implies a high degree of price sensitivity
on the part of BDs with order flow, since
they may readily reduce costs by
directing orders toward the lowest-cost
trading venues. A BD that shifted its
order flow from one platform to another
in response to order execution price
differentials would both reduce the
value of that platform’s market data and
reduce its own need to consume data
from the disfavored platform. If a
platform increases its market data fees,
the change will affect the overall cost of
doing business with the platform, and
affected BDs will assess whether they
can lower their trading costs by
directing orders elsewhere and thereby
lessening the need for the more
expensive data. Similarly, increases in
the cost of MatchView would impair the
willingness of distributors to take a
product for which there are numerous
alternatives, impacting MatchView data
revenues, the value of MatchView as a
tool for attracting order flow, and
ultimately, the volume of orders routed
to NASDAQ and the value of its other
data products.
In establishing the price for the
MatchView Products, NASDAQ
considered the competitiveness of the
market for quotation data and all of the
implications of that competition.
NASDAQ believes that it has considered
all relevant factors and has not
considered irrelevant factors in order to
establish a fair, reasonable, and not
unreasonably discriminatory fees and an
equitable allocation of fees among all
users. The existence of numerous
alternatives to MatchView, including
real-time consolidated data, free delayed
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consolidated data, and proprietary data
from other sources ensures that
NASDAQ cannot set unreasonable fees,
or fees that are unreasonably
discriminatory, without losing business
to these alternatives. Accordingly,
NASDAQ believes that the acceptance
of the MatchView product in the
marketplace demonstrates the
consistency of these fees with
applicable statutory standards.
C. Self-Regulatory Organization’s
Statement on Comments on the
Proposed Rule Change Received From
Members, Participants, or Others
No written comments were either
solicited or received.
III. Date of Effectiveness of the
Proposed Rule Change and Timing for
Commission Action
The foregoing rule change has become
effective pursuant to Section
19(b)(3)(A)(ii) of the Act.12 At any time
within 60 days of the filing of the
proposed rule change, the Commission
summarily may temporarily suspend
such rule change if it appears to the
Commission that such action is
necessary or appropriate in the public
interest, for the protection of investors,
or otherwise in furtherance of the
purposes of the Act. If the Commission
takes such action, the Commission shall
institute proceedings to determine
whether the proposed rule should be
approved or disapproved.
IV. Solicitation of Comments
Interested persons are invited to
submit written data, views, and
arguments concerning the foregoing,
including whether the proposed rule
change is consistent with the Act.
Comments may be submitted by any of
the following methods:
Electronic Comments
• Use the Commission’s Internet
comment form (https://www.sec.gov/
rules/sro.shtml); or
• Send an e-mail to rulecomments@sec.gov. Please include File
Number SR–NASDAQ–2011–139 on the
subject line.
Paper Comments
• Send paper comments in triplicate
to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary,
Securities and Exchange Commission,
100 F Street, NE., Washington, DC
20549–1090.
All submissions should refer to File
Number SR–NASDAQ–2011–139. This
file number should be included on the
subject line if e-mail is used. To help the
12 15
E:\FR\FM\17OCN1.SGM
U.S.C. 78s(b)(3)(A)(ii).
17OCN1
64162
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 200 / Monday, October 17, 2011 / Notices
Commission process and review your
comments more efficiently, please use
only one method. The Commission will
post all comments on the Commission’s
Internet Web site (https://www.sec.gov/
rules/sro.shtml). Copies of the
submission, all subsequent
amendments, all written statements
with respect to the proposed rule
change that are filed with the
Commission, and all written
communications relating to the
proposed rule change between the
Commission and any person, other than
those that may be withheld from the
public in accordance with the
provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be
available for Web site viewing and
printing in the Commission’s Public
Reference Room, 100 F Street, NE.,
Washington, DC 20549, on official
business days between the hours of 10
a.m. and 3 p.m. Copies of the filing also
will be available for inspection and
copying at the principal office of the
Exchange. All comments received will
be posted without change; the
Commission does not edit personal
identifying information from
submissions. You should submit only
information that you wish to make
available publicly. All submissions
should refer to File Number SR–
NASDAQ–2011–139 and should be
submitted on or before November 7,
2011.
For the Commission, by the Division of
Trading and Markets, pursuant to delegated
authority.13
Elizabeth M. Murphy,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2011–26672 Filed 10–14–11; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011–01–P
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
[Public Notice 7647]
60-Day Notice of Proposed Department
of State Standard Terms and
Conditions for Domestic Federal
Assistance Awards
Notice of Standard Terms and
Conditions for Domestic Federal
Assistance Awards at the Department of
State.
ACTION:
The Department of State has
submitted the following Standard Terms
and Conditions in accordance with Title
2 Government-wide Grants and
Agreements that are subject to 2 CFR
part 215, Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) Circular A–110,
‘‘Uniform Administrative Requirements
jlentini on DSK4TPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
SUMMARY:
13 17
for Grants and Agreements with
Institutions of Higher Education,
Hospitals and Other Non-Profit
Organizations.’’ This request to the
Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) for approval is in accordance
with the Paperwork Reduction Act of
1995.
Dated: October 7, 2011.
Kimberly S. Butler,
Acting, Federal Assistance Director, Office
of the Procurement Executive, Department
of State.
Submit comments to the U.S.
Department of State, Federal Assistance
Division, Point of Contact Kimberly S.
Butler at: ButlerKS2@state.gov for up to
60 days from October 17, 2011.
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
DATES:
Direct comments to the
Department of State Desk Officer in the
Office of Procurement Executive,
Federal Assistance Division (A/OPE/
FA). You may submit comments by the
following methods:
• E-mail: Kimberly S. Butler,
ButlerKS2@state.gov. You must include
OMB control number in the subject line
of your message.
• Fax: 703–875–6155. Attention:
Kimberly S. Butler, Desk Officer for the
Department of State.
ADDRESSES:
You
may obtain copies of the proposed via
Web site by going to https://
fa.statebuy.state.gov, click on ‘‘Proposed
Standard Terms and Conditions’’ for
comment.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background and Purpose of Today’s
Federal Register Notice: This proposal
establishes uniform administrative
requirements for the U.S. Department of
State Federal Assistance awards (Grants
and Cooperative Agreements) awarded
to institutions of higher education,
hospitals, other non-profit and
commercial organizations. The Grants
Officer shall incorporate this part into
federal assistance awards made to
organizations to which it will be
applied. The Department of State shall
not impose inconsistent requirements,
except as provided or required by
Federal statute or Executive Order. This
part applies to federal assistance, grants
and cooperative agreements awarded to
foreign governments, organizations
under the jurisdiction of foreign
governments and international
organizations unless otherwise
determined by the Grants Officer after
coordination with the appropriate
program officials. Non-profit
organizations that implement Federal
programs for States are also subject to
State requirements.
CFR 200.30–3(a)(12).
VerDate Mar<15>2010
16:32 Oct 14, 2011
Jkt 226001
PO 00000
Frm 00093
Fmt 4703
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[FR Doc. 2011–26781 Filed 10–14–11; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4710–19–P
Federal Aviation Administration
Notice of Intent To Rule on Passenger
Facility Charge (PFC) Application 10–
16–U–00–OAK To Use PFC Revenue,
Collected at Metropolitan Oakland
International Airport, Oakland, CA
Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Notice of Intent to Rule on
Application.
AGENCY:
The FAA proposes to rule and
invites public comment on the
application to use PFC revenue
collected at Metropolitan Oakland
International Airport, under the
provisions of the Aviation Safety and
Capacity Expansion Act of 1990 (Title
IX of the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1990) (Pub. L.
101–508) and Part 158 of the Federal
Aviation Regulations (Title 14 CFR part
158).
DATES: Comments must be received on
or before November 16, 2011.
ADDRESSES: Comments on this
application may be mailed or delivered
in triplicate to the FAA at the following
address: Federal Aviation
Administration, Airports Division,
15000 Aviation Blvd., Room 3012,
Lawndale, CA 90261. In addition, one
copy of any comments submitted to the
FAA must be mailed or delivered to Ms.
Deborah Ale-Flint, Director of Aviation,
Metropolitan Oakland International
Airport, at the following address: Port of
Oakland, 530 Water Street, Oakland,
California 94604. Air carriers and
foreign air carriers may submit copies of
written comments previously provided
to the Port of Oakland under section
158.23 of part 158.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Arlene Draper, Assistant Manager, San
Francisco Airports District Office, 831
Mitten Road, Room 210, Burlingame,
CA 94010–1303, Telephone: (650) 876–
2778, extension 601. The application
may be reviewed in person at this same
location.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The FAA
proposes to rule and invites public
comment on the application to use PFC
revenue collected at Metropolitan
SUMMARY:
E:\FR\FM\17OCN1.SGM
17OCN1
Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 200 (Monday, October 17, 2011)]
[Notices]
[Pages 64158-64162]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2011-26672]
[[Page 64158]]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
[Release No. 34-65525; File No. SR-NASDAQ-2011-139]
Self-Regulatory Organizations; The NASDAQ Stock Market LLC;
Notice of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of Proposed Rule Change To
Establish a Fee for the NASDAQ MatchView Feed
October 11, 2011.
Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(``Act'') \1\ and Rule 19b-4 thereunder,\2\ notice is hereby given that
on September 29, 2011, The NASDAQ Stock Market LLC (``NASDAQ'' or
``Exchange'') filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(``SEC'' or ``Commission'') the proposed rule change as described in
Items I, II, and III below, which Items have been prepared by the
Exchange. The Commission is publishing this notice to solicit comments
on the proposed rule change from interested persons.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
\2\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Terms of Substance
of the Proposed Rule Change
The Exchange proposes to establish a fee for the NASDAQ MatchView
Feed (the ``Feed''). The Feed provides a view of how the Exchange views
the Best Bid and Offer (``BBO'') available from away market centers for
each individual security the Exchange trades. The text of the proposed
rule change is available on the Exchange's Web site at https://nasdaq.cchwallstreet.com, at the principal office of the Exchange, and
at the Commission's Public Reference Room.
II. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change
In its filing with the Commission, the Exchange included statements
concerning the purpose of and basis for the proposed rule change and
discussed any comments it received on the proposed rule change. The
text of these statements may be examined at the places specified in
Item IV below. The Exchange has prepared summaries, set forth in
sections A, B, and C below, of the most significant aspects of such
statements.
A. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and the
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change
1. Purpose
This proposal regards the NASDAQ MatchView Feed (formerly known as
the NASDAQ Ouch BBO Feed). The Feed is currently available to all
Exchange members and market participants equally at no charge, offering
all participants transparent, real-time data concerning the Exchange's
view of the BBO data. NASDAQ is proposing to establish the following
monthly distributor fees for internal distribution:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Entitlement name Monthly fee
------------------------------------------------------------------------
NASDAQ MatchView.......................... $5,000 per firm for 1st
server.
NASDAQ MatchView Enterprise License....... $10,000 per firm for 2+
servers.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
This new Distributor fee for the MatchView Feed is completely
separate from the underlying fees associated with each data feed
product used to calculate the MatchView data. The Exchange makes the
Feed available on a subscription basis to market participants that are
connected to the Exchange whether through extranets, direct connection,
or Internet-based virtual private networks.
MatchView reflects the Exchange's view of the BBO data, at any
given time, based on orders executed on the Exchange and on quote
information from the network processors and individual exchange bids
and offers received either from the network processor or directly from
an exchange that disseminates bids and offers to vendors via a
proprietary data feed.\3\ The Feed contains the following data
elements: symbol, bid price, and ask price.\4\ Unlike the Nasdaq
TotalView feed, the MatchView feed does not contain information about
individual orders, either those residing within the Exchange system or
those executed or routed by the Exchange. Unlike the network processor
feeds containing the National Best Bid and Offer (``NBBO''), the
MatchView Feed does not identify either the market center quoting the
BBO or the size of the BBO quotes. It merely contains the symbol and
bid and offer prices.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ For a more detailed description of the contents of the
MatchView Feed, see Securities Exchange Act Release No. 65159 (Aug.
18, 2011); 76 FR 53007 (Aug. 24, 2011) (SR-NASDAQ-2011-118). NASDAQ
is proposing no changes to the MatchView Feed from the existing,
filed feed.
\4\ The Feed also contains a time stamp and message type field
for reference.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NASDAQ has continued to enhance the Feed to increase market
transparency and foster competition among orders and markets. NASDAQ
believes the Feed is valuable to member firms in that they may use the
Feed to more accurately price their orders based on the information
within this product, including bids and offers received via proprietary
data feeds. As a consequence, member firms may more accurately price
their orders on the Exchange, thereby avoiding price adjustments by the
Exchange based on a quote that is no longer available. Additionally,
members can use the Feed to price orders more aggressively to narrow
the BBO and provide better reference prices for investors.
2. Statutory Basis
NASDAQ believes that the proposed rule change is consistent with
the provisions of Section 6 of the Act,\5\ in general, and with Section
6(b)(4) of the Act,\6\ in particular, in that it provides an equitable
allocation of reasonable fees among users and recipients of the data.
In adopting Regulation NMS, the Commission granted self-regulatory
organizations (``SROs'') and broker-dealers (``BDs'') increased
authority and flexibility to offer new and unique market data to the
public. It was believed that this authority would expand the amount of
data available to consumers, and also spur innovation and competition
for the provision of market data.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ 15 U.S.C. 78f.
\6\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(4).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NASDAQ believes that its MatchView data products are precisely the
sort of market data product that the Commission envisioned when it
adopted Regulation NMS. The Commission concluded that Regulation NMS--
by lessening regulation of the market in proprietary data--would itself
further the Act's goals of facilitating efficiency and competition:
[E]fficiency is promoted when broker-dealers who do not need the
data beyond the prices, sizes, market center identifications of the
NBBO and consolidated last sale information are not required to
receive (and pay for) such data. The Commission also believes that
efficiency is promoted when broker-dealers may choose to receive
(and pay for) additional market data based on their own internal
analysis of the need for such data.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Securities Exchange Act Release No. 51808 (June 9, 2005), 70
FR 37496 (June 29, 2005).
By removing unnecessary regulatory restrictions on the ability of
exchanges to sell their own data, Regulation NMS
[[Page 64159]]
advanced the goals of the Act and the principles reflected in its
legislative history. If the free market should determine whether
proprietary data is sold to BDs at all, it follows that the price at
which such data is sold should be set by the market as well.
The recent decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit in NetCoaliton v. SEC, 615 F.3d 525 (D.C.
Cir. 2010), upheld the Commission's reliance upon competitive markets
to set reasonable and equitably allocated fees for market data. ``In
fact, the legislative history indicates that the Congress intended that
the market system `evolve through the interplay of competitive forces
as unnecessary regulatory restrictions are removed' and that the SEC
wield its regulatory power `in those situations where competition may
not be sufficient,' such as in the creation of a `consolidated
transactional reporting system.' NetCoaltion, at 535 (quoting H.R. Rep.
No. 94-229, at 92 (1975), as reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 321, 323).
The court agreed with the Commission's conclusion that ``Congress
intended that `competitive forces should dictate the services and
practices that constitute the U.S. national market system for trading
equitysecurities.' '' \8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ NetCoaliton, at 535.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Court in NetCoalition, while upholding the Commission's
conclusion that competitive forces may be relied upon to establish the
fairness of prices, nevertheless concluded that the record in that case
did not adequately support the Commission's conclusions as to the
competitive nature of the market for NYSEArca's data product at issue
in that case. As explained below in NASDAQ's Statement on Burden on
Competition, however, NASDAQ believes that there is substantial
evidence of competition in the marketplace for data that was not in the
record in the NetCoalition case, and that the Commission is entitled to
rely upon such evidence in concluding that the fees established in this
filing are the product of competition, and therefore in accordance with
the relevant statutory standards.\9\ Moreover, NASDAQ further notes
that the product at issue in this filing--a NASDAQ quotation data
product that replicates a subset of the information available through
``core'' data products whose fees have been reviewed and approved by
the SEC--is quite different from the NYSEArca depth-of-book data
product at issue in NetCoalition. Accordingly, any findings of the
court with respect to that product may not be relevant to the product
at issue in this filing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ It should also be noted that Section 916 of Dodd- Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (``Dodd-Frank
Act'') has amended paragraph (A) of Section 19(b)(3) of the Act, 15
U.S.C. 78s(b)(3) to make it clear that all exchange fees, including
fees for market data, may be filed by exchanges on an immediately
effective basis. Although this change in the law does not alter the
Commission's authority to evaluate and ultimately disapprove
exchange rules if it concludes that they are not consistent with the
Act, it unambiguously reflects a conclusion that market data fee
changes do not require prior Commission review before taking effect,
and that a formal proceeding with regard to a particular fee change
is required only if the Commission determines that it is necessary
or appropriate to suspend the fee and institute such a proceeding.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
B. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Burden on Competition
NASDAQ does not believe that the proposed rule change will result
in any burden on competition that is not necessary or appropriate in
furtherance of the purposes of the Act, as amended. NASDAQ's ability to
price its MatchView Data Products is constrained by (1) Competition
between exchanges and other trading platforms that compete with each
other in a variety of dimensions; (2) the existence of inexpensive
real-time consolidated data and market-specific data and free delayed
consolidated data; and (3) the inherent contestability of the market
for proprietary quotation data.
The market for proprietary quotation data products is currently
competitive and inherently contestable because there is fierce
competition for the inputs necessary to the creation of proprietary
data and strict pricing discipline for the proprietary products
themselves. Numerous exchanges compete with each other for listings,
trades, and market data itself, providing virtually limitless
opportunities for entrepreneurs who wish to produce and distribute
their own market data. This proprietary data is produced by each
individual exchange, as well as other entities, in a vigorously
competitive market.
Transaction execution and proprietary data products are
complementary in that market data is both an input and a byproduct of
the execution service.\10\ In fact, market data and trade execution are
a paradigmatic example of joint products with joint costs. The decision
whether and on which platform to post an order will depend on the
attributes of the platform where the order can be posted, including the
execution fees, data quality and price and distribution of its data
products. Without trade executions, exchange data products cannot
exist. Moreover, data products are valuable to many end users only
insofar as they provide information that end users expect will assist
them or their customers in making trading decisions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ See Exhibit 3, Statement of Janusz Ordover and Gustavo
Bamberger, Compass Lexecon LLC, dated December 29, 2010.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The costs of producing market data include not only the costs of
the data distribution infrastructure, but also the costs of designing,
maintaining, and operating the exchange's transaction execution
platform and the cost of regulating the exchange to ensure its fair
operation and maintain investor confidence. The total return that a
trading platform earns reflects the revenues it receives from both
products and the joint costs it incurs. Moreover, the operation of the
exchange is characterized by high fixed costs and low marginal costs.
This cost structure is common in content and content distribution
industries such as software, where developing new software typically
requires a large initial investment (and continuing large investments
to ``upgrade'' the software), but once the software is developed, the
incremental cost of providing that software to an additional user is
typically small, or even zero (e.g., if the software can be downloaded
over the Internet after being purchased).\11\ In NASDAQ's case, it is
costly to build and maintain a trading platform, but the incremental
cost of trading each additional share on an existing platform, or
distributing an additional instance of data, is very low. Market
information and executions are each produced jointly (in the sense that
the activities of trading and placing order are the source of the
information that is distributed) and are each subject to significant
scale economies. In such cases, marginal cost pricing is not feasible
because if all sales were priced at the margin, NASDAQ would be unable
to defray its platform costs of providing the joint products.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ See William J. Baumol and Daniel G. Swanson, ``The New
Economy and Ubiquitous Competitive Price Discrimination: Identifying
Defensible Criteria of Market Power,'' Antitrust Law Journal, Vol.
70, No. 3 (2003).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
An exchange's BD customers view the costs of transaction executions
and of data as a unified cost of doing business with the exchange. A BD
will direct orders to a particular exchange only if the expected
revenues from executing trades on the exchange exceed net transaction
execution costs and the cost of data that the BD chooses to buy to
support its trading decisions (or those of its customers). The choice
of data products is, in turn, a product of the value of the products in
making profitable trading decisions. If the cost
[[Page 64160]]
of the product exceeds its expected value, the BD will choose not to
buy it. Moreover, as a BD chooses to direct fewer orders to a
particular exchange, the value of the product to that BD decreases, for
two reasons. First, the product will contain less information, because
executions of the BD's trading activity will not be reflected in it.
Second, and perhaps more important, the product will be less valuable
to that BD because it does not provide information about the venue to
which it is directing its orders. Data from the competing venue to
which the BD is directing orders will become correspondingly more
valuable.
Similarly, in the case of products such as MatchView that are
distributed through market data vendors, the vendors provide price
discipline for proprietary data products because they control the
primary means of access to end users. Vendors impose price restraints
based upon their business models. For example, vendors such as
Bloomberg and Reuters that assess a surcharge on data they sell may
refuse to offer proprietary products that end users will not purchase
in sufficient numbers. Internet portals, such as Google, impose a
discipline by providing only data that will enable them to attract
``eyeballs'' that contribute to their advertising revenue. Retail BDs,
such as Schwab and Fidelity, offer their customers proprietary data
only if it promotes trading and generates sufficient commission
revenue. Although the business models may differ, these vendors'
pricing discipline is the same: they can simply refuse to purchase any
proprietary data product that fails to provide sufficient value. NASDAQ
and other producers of proprietary data products must understand and
respond to these varying business models and pricing disciplines in
order to market proprietary data products successfully. Moreover,
NASDAQ believes that products such as MatchView can enhance order flow
to NASDAQ by providing more widespread distribution of information
about transactions in real time, thereby encouraging wider
participation in the market by investors with access to the Internet or
television. Conversely, the value of such products to distributors and
investors decreases if order flow falls, because the products contain
less content.
Analyzing the cost of market data distribution in isolation from
the cost of all of the inputs supporting the creation of market data
will inevitably underestimate the cost of the data. Thus, because it is
impossible to create data without a fast, technologically robust, and
well-regulated execution system, system costs and regulatory costs
affect the price of market data. It would be equally misleading,
however, to attribute all of the exchange's costs to the market data
portion of an exchange's joint product. Rather, all of the exchange's
costs are incurred for the unified purposes of attracting order flow,
executing and/or routing orders, and generating and selling data about
market activity. The total return that an exchange earns reflects the
revenues it receives from the joint products and the total costs of the
joint products.
Competition among trading platforms can be expected to constrain
the aggregate return each platform earns from the sale of its joint
products, but different platforms may choose from a range of possible,
and equally reasonable, pricing strategies as the means of recovering
total costs. NASDAQ pays rebates to attract orders, charges relatively
low prices for market information and charges relatively high prices
for accessing posted liquidity. Other platforms may choose a strategy
of paying lower liquidity rebates to attract orders, setting relatively
low prices for accessing posted liquidity, and setting relatively high
prices for market information. Still others may provide most data free
of charge and rely exclusively on transaction fees to recover their
costs. Finally, some platforms may incentivize use by providing
opportunities for equity ownership, which may allow them to charge
lower direct fees for executions and data.
In this environment, there is no economic basis for regulating
maximum prices for one of the joint products in an industry in which
suppliers face competitive constraints with regard to the joint
offering. Such regulation is unnecessary because an ``excessive'' price
for one of the joint products will ultimately have to be reflected in
lower prices for other products sold by the firm, or otherwise the firm
experience a loss in the volume of its sales that will be adverse to
its overall profitability. In other words, an increase in the price of
data will ultimately have to be accompanied by a decrease in the cost
of executions, or the volume of both data and executions will fall.
The level of competition and contestability in the market is
evident in the numerous alternative venues that compete for order flow,
including thirteen SRO markets, as well as internalizing BDs and
various forms of alternative trading systems (``ATSs''), including dark
pools and electronic communication networks (``ECNs''). Each SRO market
competes to produce transaction reports via trade executions, and two
FINRA-regulated Trade Reporting Facilities (``TRFs'') compete to
attract internalized transaction reports. It is common for BDs to
further and exploit this competition by sending their order flow and
transaction reports to multiple markets, rather than providing them all
to a single market. Competitive markets for order flow, executions, and
transaction reports provide pricing discipline for the inputs of
proprietary data products.
The large number of SROs, TRFs, BDs, and ATSs that currently
produce proprietary data or are currently capable of producing it
provides further pricing discipline for proprietary data products. Each
SRO, TRF, ATS, and BD is currently permitted to produce proprietary
data products, and many currently do or have announced plans to do so,
including NASDAQ, NYSE, NYSE Amex, NYSEArca, BATS, and Direct Edge.
Any ATS or BD can combine with any other ATS, BD, or multiple ATSs
or BDs to produce joint proprietary data products. Additionally, order
routers and market data vendors can facilitate single or multiple BDs'
production of proprietary data products. The potential sources of
proprietary products are virtually limitless.
The fact that proprietary data from ATSs, BDs, and vendors can by-
pass SROs is significant in two respects. First, non-SROs can compete
directly with SROs for the production and sale of proprietary data
products, as BATS and Arca did before registering as exchanges by
publishing proprietary book data on the Internet. Second, because a
single order or transaction report can appear in a core data product,
an SRO proprietary product, and/or a non-SRO proprietary product, the
data available in proprietary products is exponentially greater than
the actual number of orders and transaction reports that exist in the
marketplace. Indeed, in the case of MatchView, the data provided
through that product appears both in (i) Real-time core data products
offered by the SIPs for a fee, and (ii) free SIP data products with a
15-minute time delay, and finds a close substitute in quotation
products of competing venues.
In addition to the competition and price discipline described
above, the market for proprietary data products is also highly
contestable because market entry is rapid, inexpensive, and profitable.
The history of electronic trading is replete with examples of entrants
that swiftly grew into some of the largest electronic trading platforms
and proprietary data producers:
[[Page 64161]]
Archipelago, Bloomberg Tradebook, Island, RediBook, Attain, TracECN,
BATS Trading and Direct Edge. Today, BATS and Direct Edge provide data
at no charge in order to attract order flow, and use market data
revenue rebates from the resulting executions to maintain low execution
charges for their users. A proliferation of dark pools and other ATSs
operate profitably with fragmentary shares of consolidated market
volume.
Regulation NMS, by deregulating the market for proprietary data,
has increased the contestability of that market. While BDs have
previously published their proprietary data individually, Regulation
NMS encourages market data vendors and BDs to produce proprietary
products cooperatively in a manner never before possible. Multiple
market data vendors already have the capability to aggregate data and
disseminate it on a profitable scale, including Bloomberg and Thomson
Reuters.
Moreover, consolidated data provides two additional measures of
pricing discipline for proprietary data products that are a subset of
the consolidated data stream. First, the consolidated data is widely
available in real-time at $1 per month for non-professional users.
Second, consolidated data is also available at no cost with a 15- or
20- minute delay. Because consolidated data contains marketwide
information, it effectively places a cap on the fees assessed for
proprietary data (such as quotation data) that is simply a subset of
the consolidated data. The mere availability of low-cost or free
consolidated data provides a powerful form of pricing discipline for
proprietary data products that contain data elements that are a subset
of the consolidated data, by highlighting the optional nature of
proprietary products.
The competitive nature of the market for products such as MatchView
is borne out by the performance of the market. One example is the
NASDAQ Last Sale product, set forth in NASDAQ Rule 7039. In May 2008,
the internet portal Yahoo! began offering its Web site viewers real-
time last sale data (as well as best quote data) provided by BATS
Trading. In response, in June 2008, NASDAQ launched NLS, which was
initially subject to an ``enterprise cap'' of $100,000 for customers
receiving only one of the NLS entitlements (including only NASDAQ
Listed securities), and $150,000 for customers receiving both
entitlements (NASDAQ and NYSE/AMEX Listed securities. The majority of
NASDAQ's sales were at the capped level. In early 2009, BATS expanded
its offering of free data to include depth-of-book data. Also in early
2009, NYSEArca announced the launch of a competitive last sale product
with an enterprise price of $30,000 per month. In response, NASDAQ
combined the enterprise cap for the NLS products and reduced the cap to
$50,000 (i.e., a reduction of $100,000 per month). Although each of
these products offers only a specific subset of data available from the
SIPs, NASDAQ believes that the products are viewed as substitutes for
each other and for core data, rather than as products that must be
obtained in tandem. For example, while the internet portal Yahoo!
continues to disseminate only the BATS last sale product, Google
disseminates only NASDAQ's product.
In this environment, a super-competitive increase in the fees
charged for either transactions or data has the potential to impair
revenues from both products. ``No one disputes that competition for
order flow is `fierce'.'' NetCoalition at 24. The existence of fierce
competition for order flow implies a high degree of price sensitivity
on the part of BDs with order flow, since they may readily reduce costs
by directing orders toward the lowest-cost trading venues. A BD that
shifted its order flow from one platform to another in response to
order execution price differentials would both reduce the value of that
platform's market data and reduce its own need to consume data from the
disfavored platform. If a platform increases its market data fees, the
change will affect the overall cost of doing business with the
platform, and affected BDs will assess whether they can lower their
trading costs by directing orders elsewhere and thereby lessening the
need for the more expensive data. Similarly, increases in the cost of
MatchView would impair the willingness of distributors to take a
product for which there are numerous alternatives, impacting MatchView
data revenues, the value of MatchView as a tool for attracting order
flow, and ultimately, the volume of orders routed to NASDAQ and the
value of its other data products.
In establishing the price for the MatchView Products, NASDAQ
considered the competitiveness of the market for quotation data and all
of the implications of that competition. NASDAQ believes that it has
considered all relevant factors and has not considered irrelevant
factors in order to establish a fair, reasonable, and not unreasonably
discriminatory fees and an equitable allocation of fees among all
users. The existence of numerous alternatives to MatchView, including
real-time consolidated data, free delayed consolidated data, and
proprietary data from other sources ensures that NASDAQ cannot set
unreasonable fees, or fees that are unreasonably discriminatory,
without losing business to these alternatives. Accordingly, NASDAQ
believes that the acceptance of the MatchView product in the
marketplace demonstrates the consistency of these fees with applicable
statutory standards.
C. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Comments on the Proposed
Rule Change Received From Members, Participants, or Others
No written comments were either solicited or received.
III. Date of Effectiveness of the Proposed Rule Change and Timing for
Commission Action
The foregoing rule change has become effective pursuant to Section
19(b)(3)(A)(ii) of the Act.\12\ At any time within 60 days of the
filing of the proposed rule change, the Commission summarily may
temporarily suspend such rule change if it appears to the Commission
that such action is necessary or appropriate in the public interest,
for the protection of investors, or otherwise in furtherance of the
purposes of the Act. If the Commission takes such action, the
Commission shall institute proceedings to determine whether the
proposed rule should be approved or disapproved.
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\12\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(3)(A)(ii).
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IV. Solicitation of Comments
Interested persons are invited to submit written data, views, and
arguments concerning the foregoing, including whether the proposed rule
change is consistent with the Act. Comments may be submitted by any of
the following methods:
Electronic Comments
Use the Commission's Internet comment form (https://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml); or
Send an e-mail to rule-comments@sec.gov. Please include
File Number SR-NASDAQ-2011-139 on the subject line.
Paper Comments
Send paper comments in triplicate to Elizabeth M. Murphy,
Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street, NE.,
Washington, DC 20549-1090.
All submissions should refer to File Number SR-NASDAQ-2011-139. This
file number should be included on the subject line if e-mail is used.
To help the
[[Page 64162]]
Commission process and review your comments more efficiently, please
use only one method. The Commission will post all comments on the
Commission's Internet Web site (https://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml).
Copies of the submission, all subsequent amendments, all written
statements with respect to the proposed rule change that are filed with
the Commission, and all written communications relating to the proposed
rule change between the Commission and any person, other than those
that may be withheld from the public in accordance with the provisions
of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be available for Web site viewing and printing in
the Commission's Public Reference Room, 100 F Street, NE., Washington,
DC 20549, on official business days between the hours of 10 a.m. and 3
p.m. Copies of the filing also will be available for inspection and
copying at the principal office of the Exchange. All comments received
will be posted without change; the Commission does not edit personal
identifying information from submissions. You should submit only
information that you wish to make available publicly. All submissions
should refer to File Number SR-NASDAQ-2011-139 and should be submitted
on or before November 7, 2011.
For the Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets,
pursuant to delegated authority.\13\
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\13\ 17 CFR 200.30-3(a)(12).
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Elizabeth M. Murphy,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2011-26672 Filed 10-14-11; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011-01-P