Self-Regulatory Organizations; C2 Options Exchange, Incorporated; Order Approving Proposed Rule Change to Establish a Pilot Program To List and Trade a p.m.-Settled Cash-Settled S&P 500 Index Option Product, 55969-55976 [2011-23045]

Download as PDF Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 175 / Friday, September 9, 2011 / Notices (B) institute proceedings to determine whether the proposed rule change should be disapproved. IV. Solicitation of Comments Interested persons are invited to submit written data, views, and arguments concerning the foregoing, including whether the proposed rule change is consistent with the Act. Comments may be submitted by any of the following methods: Electronic Comments • Use the Commission’s Internet comment form (https://www.sec.gov/ rules/sro.shtml); or • Send an e-mail to rulecomments@sec.gov. Please include File Number SR–NYSEArca–2011–63 on the subject line. mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES Paper comments • Send paper comments in triplicate to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street, NE., Washington, DC 20549–1090. All submissions should refer to File Number SR–NYSEArca–2011–63. This file number should be included on the subject line if e-mail is used. To help the Commission process and review your comments more efficiently, please use only one method. The Commission will post all comments on the Commission’s Internet Web site (https://www.sec.gov/ rules/sro.shtml). Copies of the submission, all subsequent amendments, all written statements with respect to the proposed rule change that are filed with the Commission, and all written communications relating to the proposed rule change between the Commission and any person, other than those that may be withheld from the public in accordance with the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be available for Web site viewing and printing in the Commission’s Public Reference Room, 100 F Street, NE., Washington, DC 20549, on official business days between the hours of 10 a.m. and 3 p.m. Copies of such filing also will be available for inspection and copying at the principal office of the Exchange. All comments received will be posted without change; the Commission does not edit personal identifying information from submissions. You should submit only information that you wish to make available publicly. All submissions should refer to File Number SR– NYSEArca–2011–63 and should be submitted on or before September 30, 2011. VerDate Mar<15>2010 16:58 Sep 08, 2011 Jkt 223001 For the Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets, pursuant to delegated authority.25 Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary. [FR Doc. 2011–23035 Filed 9–8–11; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 8011–01–P SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION [Release No. 34–65256; File No. SR–C2– 2011–008] Self-Regulatory Organizations; C2 Options Exchange, Incorporated; Order Approving Proposed Rule Change to Establish a Pilot Program To List and Trade a p.m.-Settled CashSettled S&P 500 Index Option Product September 2, 2011. I. Introduction On February 28, 2011, C2 Options Exchange, Incorporated (the ‘‘Exchange’’ or ‘‘C2’’) filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (‘‘Commission’’), pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (‘‘Act’’),1 and Rule 19b–4 thereunder,2 a proposed rule change to permit the listing and trading of p.m.-settled, cashsettled options on the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index (‘‘S&P 500’’). The proposed rule change was published for comment in the Federal Register on March 8, 2011.3 The Commission received seven comment letters on the proposal, some of which urged the Commission to disapprove the proposal.4 C2 responded to the comment letters in a response letter dated April 20, 2011.5 To ensure that the Commission had sufficient time to consider and take action on the Exchange’s proposal in light of, among other things, the comments received on the proposal, the Commission extended the time period in which to either approve the proposed rule change, disapprove the proposed rule change, or institute proceedings to determine 25 17 CFR 200.30–3(a)(12). U.S.C. 78s(b)(1). 2 17 CFR 240.19b–4. 3 See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 64011 (March 2, 2011), 76 FR 12775 (‘‘Notice’’). 4 See Letters to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, Commission, from Randall Mayne, Blue Capital Group, dated March 18, 2011 and April 28, 2011 (‘‘Mayne Letter 1’’ and ‘‘Mayne Letter 2’’); Michael J. Simon, Secretary, International Securities Exchange, LLC (‘‘ISE’’), dated March 29, 2011 and May 11, 2011 (‘‘ISE Letter 1’’ and ‘‘ISE Letter 2’’); Andrew Stevens, Legal Counsel, IMC Financial Markets, dated March 24, 2011 (‘‘IMC Letter’’); John Trader, dated April 20, 2011 (‘‘Trader Letter’’); and JP, dated April 30, 2011 (‘‘JP Letter’’). 5 See Letter to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, Commission, from Joanne Moffic-Silver, Secretary, C2, dated April 20, 2011 (‘‘C2 Response Letter’’). 1 15 PO 00000 Frm 00103 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 55969 whether to disapprove the proposed rule change, to June 6, 2011.6 In order to solicit additional input from interested parties, including relevant data and analysis, on the issues presented by C2’s proposed rule change, on June 3, 2011, the Commission instituted proceedings to determine whether to approve or disapprove C2’s proposal.7 In its order instituting the proceedings, the Commission specifically noted its interest in receiving additional data and analysis relating to the potential effect that proposed p.m.-settled index options could have on the underlying cash equities markets. In response to the proceedings, the Commission received an additional three comment letters on the proposal as well as a rebuttal letter from C2.8 This order approves the proposed rule change on a 14-month pilot basis. II. Description of the Proposal The Exchange’s proposal would permit it to list and trade cash-settled S&P 500 index options with thirdFriday-of-the-month (‘‘Expiration Friday’’) expiration dates for which the exercise settlement value will be based on the index value derived from the closing prices of component securities (‘‘p.m.-settled’’). The proposed contract (referred to as ‘‘SPXPM’’) would use a $100 multiplier, and the minimum trading increment would be $0.05 for options trading below $3.00 and $0.10 for all other series. Strike price intervals would be set no less than 5 points apart. Consistent with existing rules for index options, the Exchange would allow up to twelve near-term expiration months, as well as LEAPS. Expiration processing would occur on the Saturday following Expiration Friday. The product would have European-style exercise and would not be subject to position limits, though there would be enhanced reporting requirements. The Exchange proposes that the SPXPM product be approved on a pilot basis for an initial period of fourteen months. As part of the pilot program, the Exchange committed to submit a pilot program report to the Commission at least two months prior to the 6 See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 64266 (April 8, 2011), 76 FR 20757 (April 13, 2011). 7 See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 64599 (June 3, 2011), 76 FR 33798 (June 9, 2011). 8 See Letters to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, Commission, from Michael J. Simon, Secretary, International Securities Exchange, LLC dated July 11, 2011 (‘‘ISE Letter 3’’); William J. Brodsky, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, C2, dated July 11, 2011 (‘‘CBOE Letter 3’’); Thomas Foertsch, President, Exchange Capital Resources, dated July 11, 2011; and William J. Brodsky, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, C2, dated July 25, 2011. E:\FR\FM\09SEN1.SGM 09SEN1 55970 Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 175 / Friday, September 9, 2011 / Notices mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES expiration date of the program (the ‘‘annual report’’). The annual report would contain an analysis of volume, open interest, and trading patterns. The analysis would examine trading in the proposed option product as well as trading in the securities that comprise the S&P 500 index. In addition, for series that exceed certain minimum open interest parameters, the annual report would provide analysis of index price volatility and share trading activity. In addition to the annual report, the Exchange committed to provide the Commission with periodic interim reports while the pilot is in effect that would contain some, but not all, of the information contained in the annual report. In its filing, C2 notes that it would provide the annual and interim reports to the Commission on a confidential basis.9 III. Comments Received In response to the initial notice of C2’s proposal, the Commission received seven comment letters, some of which expressed concern with the proposal.10 One commenter specifically urges the Commission to disapprove the proposal.11 Commenters expressing concern with the proposal raised several issues, including: The potential for adverse effects on the underlying cash markets that could accompany the reintroduction of p.m. settlement; concern with the similarity (but lack of fungibility) between the existing S&P 500 index option traded on the Chicago Board Options Exchange, Incorporated (‘‘CBOE’’) and the proposed S&P 500 index option that would be traded on C2; the lack of proposed position limits for SPXPM; and issues regarding exclusive product licensing. Three commenters expressed support for the proposal.12 In the proceedings to determine whether to approve or disapprove the proposal, the Commission preliminarily summarized the issues raised by the commenters, and also set forth a series of questions and requests for data on the issue of p.m. settlement. In response to the proceedings, the Commission received three letters, including one from C2, one from ISE that expands on the concerns it previously raised and reiterates its recommendation for the Commission to disapprove the proposal, and one from a new commenter that supports the proposal because it will 9 See Notice, supra note 3, at 12777. Mayne Letter 1, ISE Letter 1, ISE Letter 2, and Trader Letter, supra note 4. 11 See ISE Letter 1 and ISE Letter 2, supra note 4. 12 See Mayne Letter 2, IMC Letter, and JP Letter, supra note 4. 10 See VerDate Mar<15>2010 16:58 Sep 08, 2011 Jkt 223001 offer investors greater flexibility.13 The Commission also received an additional letter from C2 responding to the comments of ISE.14 The comments received are addressed below. IV. Discussion and Commission Findings After careful consideration of the proposal and the comments received, the Commission finds that the proposed rule change is consistent with the requirements of the Act and the rules and regulations thereunder applicable to a national securities exchange,15 and, in particular, the requirements of Section 6 of the Act.16 Specifically, the Commission finds that the proposed rule change is consistent with Section 6(b)(5) of the Act,17 which requires that an exchange have rules designed to remove impediments to and perfect the mechanism of a free and open market and to protect investors and the public interest. A. Relationship to the National Market System One commenter believes that separate a.m. and p.m.-settled S&P 500 index options could potentially bifurcate the market for CBOE’s existing a.m.-settled SPX contract.18 This commenter notes that the SPX, which trades only on CBOE, accounts for 60% of all index options trading, and argues that the sole difference in settlement between SPX on CBOE and the proposed S&P 500 index options on C2 (i.e., a.m. vs. p.m. settlement) is a ‘‘sham’’ that is intended to ‘‘keep them non-fungible,’’ which would ‘‘make a mockery of Section 11A of the Act.’’ 19 The commenter states that the objectives of Section 11A are reflected in a national market system plan for options that requires exchanges to prevent trading through better priced quotations displayed on other options exchanges, and that making a p.m.settled S&P 500 index option nonfungible with CBOE’s SPX would allow the CBOE group to establish two ‘‘monopolies’’ in S&P 500 options, one floor-based (CBOE) and one electronic (C2) that would avoid the application of the limitation on trade throughs.20 The commenter also contends the proposal 13 See ECR Letter, supra note 8. C2 Rebuttal Letter, supra note 8. 15 In approving this proposed rule change, the Commission has considered the proposed rule’s impact on efficiency, competition, and capital formation. See 15 U.S.C. 78c(f). 16 15 U.S.C. 78f. 17 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(5). 18 See ISE Letter 1, supra note 4, at 4. 19 Id. at 2. See also ISE Letter 2, supra note 4, at 3–4. 20 See ISE Letter 1, supra note 4, at 3. 14 See PO 00000 Frm 00104 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 is designed to protect CBOE’s floorbased SPX trading without having to accommodate the more narrow quotes that would likely occur on C2 in an electronically-traded p.m.-settled product.21 Another commenter asserts that CBOE and C2 should trade a fungible S&P 500 index option in order to address what the commenter describes as ‘‘huge customer-unfriendly spreads’’ in SPX.22 The commenter argues that if the CBOE believes p.m. settlement is superior to a.m. settlement, then CBOE should file to change SPX to p.m. settlement so that the product traded on C2 would be fungible with that proposed to be traded on CBOE.23 In response, C2 argues that the difference between a.m.-settled and p.m.-settled S&P 500 index option would be a material term and that C2’s proposed S&P 500 index option could not be fungible with, nor could it be linked with, CBOE’s SPX option.24 The Commission agrees that the difference between a.m.-settled SPX and the proposed p.m.-settled SPXPM involves a materially different term (i.e., settlement time) that makes C2’s proposed SPXPM index option a different security than, and thus not fungible with, CBOE’s SPX option.25 The Commission notes that it has permitted very similar but different products to trade on the same exchange or on different exchanges without those separate products being fungible. For example, the Commission previously approved for CBOE the listing and trading of a.m.-settled S&P 500 index options during a time when CBOE also traded p.m.-settled S&P 500 index options, and the two separate products were not fungible.26 21 See ISE Letter 1, supra note 4, at 2. Trader Letter, supra note 4, at 1. See also JP Letter, supra note 4, at 1. 23 See Trader Letter, supra note 4, at 1. 24 See C2 Response Letter, supra note 5, at 3. 25 Consequently, rules applicable to prevent trading through better priced quotations in the same security displayed on other options exchanges would not be applicable for trading between these two products. Similarly, in response to a comment that investors would be confused by the presence of an a.m.-settled SPX on CBOE and a p.m.-settled S&P 500 index option on C2 (see ISE Letter 1, supra note 4, at 3), the Commission does not believe that SPX on CBOE and a p.m.-settled S&P 500 index option on C2 would cause investor confusion. The two products would trade under different ticker symbols and any potential for investor confusion could be mitigated though investor outreach and education initiatives. Furthermore, as C2 notes in its response letter, CBOE currently lists two options on the S&P 100 (American-style OEX and Europeanstyle XEO) and is not aware of any investor confusion among the products. See C2 Response Letter, supra note 5, at 3. 26 See infra note 44 (citing to Securities Exchange Act Release No. 24367). See also Securities 22 See E:\FR\FM\09SEN1.SGM 09SEN1 Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 175 / Friday, September 9, 2011 / Notices mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES One commenter also raises concerns about the potential effect on competition of C2 listing and trading an option product that is subject to an exclusive license, citing to concerns they express with respect to the SPX product traded on CBOE.27 The Commission recognizes the potential impact on competition resulting from the inability of other options exchanges to list and trade SPXPM. In acting on this proposal, however, the Commission has balanced the potentially negative competitive effects with the countervailing positive competitive effects of C2’s proposal. The Commission believes that the availability of SPXPM on the C2 exchange will enhance competition by providing investors with an additional investment vehicle, in a fully-electronic trading environment, through which investors can gain and hedge exposure to the S&P 500 stocks. Further, this product could offer a competitive alternative to other existing investment products that seek to allow investors to gain broad market exposure. Also, we note that it is possible for other exchanges to develop or license the use of a new or different index to compete with the S&P 500 index and seek Commission approval to list and trade options on such index. Accordingly, with respect to the Commission’s consideration of C2’s proposed rule change at this time, the Commission finds that it does not impose any burden on competition not Exchange Act Release No. 51619 (Apr. 27, 2005), 70 FR 22947 (May 3, 2005) (order approving ISE’s listing and trading of options on various Russell Indexes, including options based upon one-tenth values of the Russell Indexes). 27 See ISE Letter 1, supra note 4, at 6–7 (arguing in part that ‘‘CBOE’s monopoly in the product imposes significant harm to investors,’’ including the fact that ‘‘CBOE charges for trading SPX options that are much greater than the fees for multiply listed options’’ and ‘‘the quotes in SPX options are much wider than they would be if there was competition from other exchanges,’’ as well as that ‘‘CBOE is able to use the monopolistic revenue stream from these options to subsidize other products * * *.’’) and ISE Letter 2, supra note 4, at 3–4 (arguing in part that ‘‘[t]he Proposal is harmful to investors because it * * * perpetuates the unreasonably high monopolistic pricing and artificially wide spreads that result from the lack of competition in this product.’’). The issue of state law intellectual property rights of index developers in the use of their indexes to trade derivatives is the subject of litigation between CBOE and ISE (as well as other parties). See Chicago Board Options Exchange, Incorporated et al. v. International Securities Exchange, et al., Case No. 06 CH 24798 (Cir. Ct. of Cook Cty., Ch. Div. July 8, 2010), appeal docketed, No. 1–10–2228 (Ill. App. Ct. August 9, 2010). See also Board of Trade of the City of Chicago v. Dow Jones & Co., Inc., 98 Ill.2d 109 (1983). In issuing this order, the Commission expresses no view with respect to the matters underlying this ongoing litigation, including their validity or the enforceability of the exclusivity agreement. VerDate Mar<15>2010 16:58 Sep 08, 2011 Jkt 223001 necessary or appropriate in furtherance of the purposes of the Act.28 B. Position Limits Under C2’s proposal, position limits would not apply to SPXPM. One commenter argues that position limits should apply to SPXPM.29 This commenter notes that, since 2001 when the Commission approved a CBOE rule filing to remove all position limits for SPX options,30 the Commission has generally expected exchanges to apply a model, such as the Dutt-Harris model, to determine the appropriate position limits for all new index options products.31 Because C2 claims that the product is new and non-fungible, the commenter argues that the Commission should apply the Dutt-Harris model to require C2 to impose position limits on SPXPM.32 In its response to comments, C2 notes that the Dutt-Harris Paper acknowledges that S&P 500 options have, and should have, extraordinarily large position limits and Dutt-Harris observes that position limits are most useful when market surveillance is inadequate.33 C2 argues that position limits suggested by the Dutt-Harris model for an S&P 500 index option would be so large as to be irrelevant and that positions of such magnitude would attract scrutiny from surveillance systems that would, as a consequence, serve as an effective substitute for position limits.34 Further, 28 The Commission may in the future determine it appropriate to consider or address competitive issues related to exclusive licensing of index option products on a more comprehensive level. 29 See ISE Letter 1, supra note 4, at 6. 30 See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 44994 (October 26, 2002), 66 FR 55722 (November 2, 2001). In this filing, the Commission relied in part on CBOE’s ability to provide enhanced surveillance and reporting safeguards to detect and deter trading abuses arising from the elimination of position and exercise limits in options on the S&P 500. 31 See ISE Letter 1, supra note 4, at 6. In a 2005 paper from Hans Dutt and Lawrence Harris, titled ‘‘Position Limits for Cash-Settled Derivative Contracts’’ (‘‘Dutt-Harris Paper’’) the authors developed a model to determine appropriate position limits for cash-settled index derivatives. The authors concluded that the then-prevailing position limits were lower than the model suggested would be appropriate for many derivative contracts. The authors also concluded, however, that position limits are not as important for broadbased index derivative contracts that are cash settled because they are composed of highly liquid and well-followed securities. As such, the authors note that it would require very high trading volumes to manipulate the underlying securities and, consequently, any attempted manipulation would be more easily detectable and prosecutable. 32 See ISE Letter 1, supra note 4, at 6. 33 See C2 Response Letter, supra note 5, at 5. 34 See id. Generally, position limits are intended to prevent the establishment of options positions that could be used or that might create incentives to manipulate or disrupt the underlying market to benefit the holder of the options. See, e.g., PO 00000 Frm 00105 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 55971 in its response letter, C2 summarizes the circumstances and considerations relied upon by the Commission when it approved the elimination of position limits on CBOE’s S&P 500 index option, including the enormous capitalization of the index and enhanced reporting and surveillance for the product.35 Thus, because of the enhanced reporting and surveillance for this product, described below, C2 argues that the absence of position limits on its proposed S&P 500 index option would not be inconsistent with Dutt-Harris.36 The Exchange represents, however, that it will implement enhanced reporting requirements pursuant to its Rule 4.13 (Reports Related to Position Limits) and Interpretation and Policy .03 to its Rule 24.4 (Position Limits for Broad-Based Index Options), which sets forth the reporting requirements for certain broad-based indexes that do not have position limits.37 In 2001, when the Commission permanently approved a CBOE rule (which had been in place for a two-year pilot period) to eliminate position limits on SPX (as well as options on the Dow Jones Industrial Average and the S&P 100 index),38 the Commission stated that because the S&P 500 index is a broad-based index with a considerable capitalization, manipulation of the 500 component stocks underlying the index would require extraordinarily large positions that would be readily detectable by enhanced surveillance procedures. In its approval order, the Commission relied in part on CBOE’s enhanced surveillance and reporting procedures that are intended to allow CBOE to detect and deter trading abuses in the absence of position limits. In particular, CBOE requires its members to submit a report to CBOE when the member builds a position of 100,000+ contracts. Among other things, the report includes a description of the Securities Exchange Act Release Nos. 39489 (December 24, 1997), 63 FR 276 (January 5, 1998) (SR–CBOE–97–11) (approving increases to the position and exercise limits for options on the Standard & Poor’s 100 Stock Index (‘‘OEX’’), the OEX firm facilitation exemption, and the OEX index hedge exemption); Dutt-Harris Paper, supra note 31 (‘‘Position limits directly limit manipulation by limiting the size of derivative positions that would benefit from manipulative practices.’’). 35 See C2 Response Letter, supra note 5, at 5–6. C2 represents in its response letter that it would monitor trading in p.m.-settled S&P 500 index options in the same manner as CBOE does for other broad-based index options with no position limits. See id. at 6. 36 See id. 37 See Notice, supra note 3, at note 4 and accompanying text. 38 See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 44994 (October 26, 2001), 66 FR 55722 (November 2, 2001) (SR–CBOE–2001–22). E:\FR\FM\09SEN1.SGM 09SEN1 55972 Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 175 / Friday, September 9, 2011 / Notices option position, whether the position is hedged (and, if so, a description of the hedge), and whether collateral was used (and, if so, a description of the collateral). This enhanced surveillance and reporting arrangement allows CBOE to continually monitor, assess, and respond to any concerns at an early stage. To complement its enhanced surveillance and reporting requirements, CBOE has the ability to intervene to impose additional margin or assess capital charges when warranted. Thus, together with the ‘‘enormous capitalization’’ 39 of the S&P 500 index and the deep and liquid markets for the S&P 500 stocks, the Commission found that CBOE’s enhanced surveillance procedures ‘‘reduce[] concerns regarding market manipulation or disruption in the underlying market.’’ 40 C2 has represented in this filing that its enhanced surveillance requirements and procedures for SPXPM would be identical to the surveillance and reporting requirements and procedures used by CBOE with respect to SPX. Accordingly, the Commission believes that position limits would not be necessary for SPXPM options as long as C2 has in place and enforces effective enhanced surveillance and reporting requirements. These enhanced procedures will allow the Exchange to see, with considerable advance notice, the accumulation of large positions, which it can then monitor more closely as necessary and take additional action if appropriate.41 C. Reintroduction of P.M. Settlement When cash-settled 42 index options were first introduced in the 1980s, they generally utilized closing-price settlement procedures (i.e., p.m. settlement).43 The Commission became 39 Id. at 55723. mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES 40 Id. 41 In addition, the Commission notes that C2 would have access to information through its membership in the Intermarket Surveillance Group with respect to the trading of the securities underlying the S&P 500 index, as well as tools such as large options positions reports to assist its surveillance of SPXPM options. In approving the proposed rule change, the Commission also has relied upon the Exchange’s representation that it has the necessary systems capacity to support new options series that will result from this proposal. See Notice, supra note 3, at 12777. 42 The seller of a ‘‘cash settled’’ index option pays out the cash value of the applicable index on expiration or exercise. A ‘‘physically settled’’ option, like equity and ETF options, involves the transfer of the underlying asset rather than cash. See Characteristics and Risks of Standardized Options, available at: https://www.theocc.com/ components/docs/riskstoc.pdf, for a discussion of settlement. 43 The exercise settlement value for a p.m.-settled index option is generally determined by reference VerDate Mar<15>2010 16:58 Sep 08, 2011 Jkt 223001 concerned about the impact of p.m. settlement on cash-settled index options on the markets for the underlying stocks at the close on expiration Fridays.44 These concerns were heightened during the quarterly expirations of the third Friday of March, June, September and December when options, index futures, and options on index futures all expire simultaneously. P.m.-settlement was believed to have contributed to aboveaverage volume and added market volatility on those days, which sometimes led to sharp price movements during the last hour of trading.45 As a consequence, the close of to the reported level of the index as derived from the closing prices of the component securities (generally based on the closing prices as reported by the primary exchange on which the stock is listed) on the last business day before expiration (e.g., the Friday before Saturday expiration). See Characteristics and Risks of Standardized Options, available at: https://www.theocc.com/components/ docs/riskstoc.pdf, for a discussion of settlement value. 44 See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act Release Nos. 45956 (May 17, 2002), 67 FR 36740 (May 24, 2002) (adopting release concerning cash settlement and regulatory halt requirements for security futures products) (‘‘Regulators and self-regulators were concerned that the liquidity constraints faced by the securities markets to accommodate expirationrelated buy or sell programs at the market close on expiration Fridays could exacerbate ongoing market swings during an expiration and could provide opportunities for entities to anticipate these pressures and enter orders as part of manipulative or abusive trading practices designed to artificially drive up or down share prices.’’); 24367 (April 17, 1987), 52 FR 13890 (April 27, 1987) (SR–CBOE–87– 11) (order approving a proposal for S&P 500 index options with an exercise settlement value based on an index value derived from opening, rather than closing, prices); and 32868 (September 10, 1993), 58 FR 48687 (September 10, 1993) (notice of filing and order granting accelerated approval of proposed rule change by the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. (‘‘NYSE’’) relating to changes in auxiliary closing procedures for expiration days) (stating, ‘‘[a]s long as some index derivative products continue to expire based on closing stock prices on expiration Fridays, the Commission agrees with the NYSE that such procedures are necessary to provide a mechanism to handle the potential large imbalances that can be engendered by firms unwinding index derivative related positions’’). The cash settlement provisions of stock index futures and options contracts facilitated the growth of sizeable index arbitrage activities by firms and professional traders and made it relatively easy for arbitrageurs to buy or sell the underlying stocks at or near the market close on expiration Fridays (i.e., the third Friday of the expiration month) in order to ‘‘unwind’’ arbitrage-related positions. These types of unwinding programs at the close on expiration Fridays often severely strained the liquidity of the securities markets as the markets, and in particular the specialists on the NYSE, faced pressure to attract contra-side interest in the limited time that was permitted to establish closing prices. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 44743 (August 24, 2001), 66 FR 45904 (August 30, 2001) (File No. S7–15–01) (proposing release concerning cash settlement and regulatory halt requirements for security futures products). 45 See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act Release Nos. 24276 (March 27, 1987); 52 FR 10836 (April 3, 1987) (notice of filing and order granting accelerated approval to a proposed rule change by PO 00000 Frm 00106 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 trading on the quarterly expiration Friday became known as the ‘‘triple witching hour.’’ Besides contributing to investor anxiety, heightened volatility during the expiration periods created the opportunity for manipulation and other abusive trading practices in anticipation of the liquidity constraints.46 In light of the concerns with p.m. settlement and to help ameliorate the price effects associated with expirations of p.m.-settled, cash-settled index products, in 1987, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (‘‘CFTC’’) approved a rule change by the Chicago Mercantile Exchange to provide for a.m. settlement for index futures, including futures on the S&P 500 index.47 The Commission subsequently approved a rule change by CBOE to list and trade a.m.-settled S&P 500 index options.48 In the NYSE relating to opening price settlement of expiring NYSE Composite and Beta Index options); 37894 (October 30, 1996), 61 FR 56987 (November 5, 1996) (notice of filing and order granting accelerated approval of proposed rule change by the NYSE permanently approving the expiration day auxiliary closing procedures pilot program); and 45956 (May 17, 2002), 67 FR 36740 (May 24, 2002) (adopting release concerning cash settlement and regulatory halt requirements for security futures products) (reaffirming the Commission’s view of the advantages of a.m. settlement). See also Hans Stoll and Robert Whaley, Expiration Day Effects of Index Options & Futures (March 15, 1986) (noting that share volume on the NYSE was much higher in the last hour of a quarterly expiration Friday when both options and futures expire than on non-expiration Fridays). 46 See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 45956 (May 17, 2002), 67 FR 36740 (May 24, 2002) (adopting release concerning cash settlement and regulatory halt requirements for security futures products) (explaining that entities could take advantage of illiquidity resulting from the unwinding of arbitrage-related positions on expiration Fridays to manipulate share prices). 47 See Proposed Amendments Relating to the Standard and Poor’s 500, the Standard and Poor’s 100 and the Standard Poor’s OTC Stock Price Index Futures Contract, 51 FR 47053 (December 30, 1986) (notice of proposed rule change from the Chicago Mercantile Exchange). See also Securities Exchange Act Release No. 24367 (April 17, 1987), 52 FR 13890 (April 27, 1987) (SR–CBOE–87–11) (noting that the Chicago Mercantile Exchange moved the S&P 500 futures contract’s settlement value to opening prices on the delivery date). The exercise settlement value for an a.m.-settled index option is determined by reference to the reported level of the index as derived from the opening prices of the component securities on the business day before expiration. 48 See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 24367 (April 17, 1987), 52 FR 13890 (April 27, 1987) (SR– CBOE–87–11) (order approving a proposal for S&P 500 index options with an exercise settlement value based on an index value derived from opening, rather than closing, prices). At the time it approved CBOE’s introduction of a.m. settlement for cashsettled index options, the Commission identified two benefits to a.m. settlement for cash-settled index options. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 30944 (July 21, 1992), 57 FR 33376 (July 28, 1992) (SR–CBOE–92–09). First, it provides additional time to test price discovery, as market participants have the remainder of the regular E:\FR\FM\09SEN1.SGM 09SEN1 Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 175 / Friday, September 9, 2011 / Notices mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES 1992, the Commission approved CBOE’s proposal to transition all of its European-style cash-settled options on the S&P 500 index to a.m. settlement.49 Thereafter, the Commission approved proposals by the options markets to transfer most of their cash-settled index products to a.m. settlement.50 The Commission and the CFTC noted the benefits of a.m. settlement in a 2001 joint release concerning securities futures, where they observed that ‘‘the widespread adoption of opening-price settlement procedures in index futures and options has served to mitigate the liquidity strains that had previously been experienced in the securities markets on expirations.’’ 51 trading day to adjust to opening session price movements and determine whether those movements reflect changes in fundamental values or short-term supply and demand conditions. Second, it provides more opportunity to trade out of positions acquired during the opening auction. In this respect, attracting contra-side interest to a single-priced auction to offset an order imbalance (such as those attributable to index arbitrage) may more readily be achieved in an opening auction on Friday morning than a closing auction on Friday afternoon because the morning session allows market participants that have provided that liquidity to have the remainder of the regular trading day to liquidate their positions. In contrast, positions acquired in a Friday afternoon closing auction generally cannot be liquidated as readily and efficiently until the following Monday. Holding positions overnight, or over a weekend, may entail greater risk than holding intraday positions. To accept such risk (real or perceived), market participants generally will require a greater premium, which may translate into greater price concessions, and thus lead to greater volatility in the closing auction. In other words, a consequence of p.m. settlement may be enhanced volatility at the close. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 44743 (August 24, 2001), 66 FR 45904 at 45908 (August 30, 2001) (‘‘Steep discounts (premiums) were necessary in part because traders who bought (sold) stocks to offset unwinding programs had to maintain their newly acquired long (short) positions over the weekend—during which time they were subject to considerable market risk.’’). 49 See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 30944 (July 21, 1992), 57 FR 33376 (July 28, 1992) (SR– CBOE–92–09) (order approving CBOE’s proposal relating to position limits for SPX index options based on the opening price of component securities). 50 CBOE’s index options on the S&P 100 (OEX), however, kept their p.m. settlement. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 30944 (July 21, 1992), 57 FR 33376 (July 28, 1992) (SR–CBOE–92–09). No futures or options on futures trade on the S&P 100 index. Other types of options utilize p.m. settlement, including physically-settled single-stock options and options on ETFs. 51 See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 44743 (August 24, 2001), 66 FR 45904 at 45908 (August 30, 2001) (proposing release for a joint rule between the Commission and the CFTC generally stipulating, among other provisions, that the final settlement price for each cash-settled security futures product fairly reflect the opening price of the underlying security or securities). See also Securities Exchange Act Release No. 45956 (May 17, 2002), 67 FR 36740 at 36741–42 (May 24, 2002) (adopting release concerning cash settlement and regulatory halt requirements for security futures products in which the Commission reaffirmed the VerDate Mar<15>2010 16:58 Sep 08, 2011 Jkt 223001 Since 1992, the Commission has approved proposals that provide for cash-settled index options with p.m. settlement on a limited basis for options products that generally are characterized by lower relative volume and that generally do not involve settlement on the third Friday of a month.52 At the time of each approval, the Commission stated that limited approvals on a pilot basis would allow the exchange and the Commission to monitor the potential for adverse market effects and modify or terminate the pilots, if necessary. Notably, with the exception of FLEX Index options, these recently-approved p.m.-settled contracts do not involve expiration on the third Friday of the month. These new contracts, including FLEX, have also been characterized by limited volume, and would not be expected to have a pronounced effect on volatility in the underlying securities at the close as a result. In response to C2’s proposal, two commenters raise concerns over the reintroduction of p.m. settlement on a potentially popular index derivative and advantages of a.m. settlement) (‘‘[O]pening price settlement procedures offered several features that enabled the securities markets to better handle expiration-related unwinding programs.’’). 52 In particular, in 1993, the Commission approved CBOE’s proposal to list and trade p.m.settled, cash-settled options on certain broad-based indexes expiring on the first business day of the month following the end of each calendar quarter (‘‘Quarterly Index Expirations’’). See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 31800 (February 1, 1993), 58 FR 7274 (February 5, 1993) (SR–CBOE–92–13). In 2006, the Commission approved, on a pilot basis, CBOE’s listing of p.m.-settled index options expiring on the last business day of a calendar quarter (‘‘Quarterly Options Series’’). See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 54123 (July 11, 2006), 71 FR 40558 (July 17, 2006) (SR–CBOE–2006–65). In January 2010, the Commission approved CBOE’s listing of p.m.-settled FLEX options on a pilot basis.52 See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 61439 (January 28, 2010), 75 FR 5831 (February 4, 2010) (SR–CBOE–2009–087) (order approving rule change to establish a pilot program to modify FLEX option exercise settlement values and minimum value sizes). FLEX options provide investors with the ability to customize basic option features including size, expiration date, exercise style, and certain exercise prices. Prior to 2010, only a.m. settlement based on opening prices of the underlying components of an index could be used to settle a FLEX index option if it expired on, or within two business days of, a third-Friday-of-themonth expiration (‘‘Blackout Period’’). Last year, the Commission approved a pilot program to permit FLEX index options with p.m. settlement that expire within the Blackout Period. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 61439 (January 28, 2010), 75 FR 5831 (February 4, 2010) (SR–CBOE–2009– 087). In September 2010, the Commission approved CBOE’s listing of p.m.-settled End of Week expirations (expiring on each Friday, other than the third Friday) and End of Month expirations (expiring on the last trading day of the month) for options on broad-based indexes, also on a pilot basis. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 62911 (September 14, 2010), 75 FR 57539 (September 21, 2010) (SR–CBOE–2009–075). PO 00000 Frm 00107 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 55973 the possible impact that doing so could have on the underlying cash equities markets.53 One commenter urges the Commission to consider why markets went to a.m. settlement in the early 1990s and opines that hindsight supports the conclusion that a.m. settlement has been good for the markets.54 While acknowledging that the answer is not clear, the commenter asks the Commission to consider whether it is now safe to return to the dominance of p.m.-settled index options and futures.55 However, this commenter submitted a subsequent letter in which he agreed with the Exchange that ‘‘conditions today are vastly different’’ from those that drove the transition to a.m. settlement.56 The commenter concludes that C2’s proposal should be approved on a pilot basis, which would allow the Commission to collect data to closely analyze the impact of the proposal.57 A different commenter describes the history behind the transition to a.m. settlement and criticizes C2 for trivializing that history.58 This commenter argues that a mainstream return to the ‘‘discredited’’ p.m. settlement would ‘‘risk undermining the operation of fair and orderly financial markets.’’ 59 The commenter notes that experience with the ‘‘flash crash’’ of May 6, 2010 demonstrates that the current market structure struggles to find price equilibriums, and that dispersed trading is a ‘‘mirage’’ as participants often flock to the same liquidity centers in time of stress.60 In its July comment letter, the commenter took a slightly different approach by arguing that fragmentation is the biggest change to the markets since 1987 when markets moved to a.m. settlement.61 The commenter notes that even with almost all volume concentrated on one exchange back in the 1980s, the markets could not address closing liquidity and volatility concerns and prevent market disruptions on ‘‘triple witch’’ settlement 53 See ISE Letter 1, supra note 4, at 4–5; ISE Letter 2, supra note 4, at 2–3; and Mayne Letter 1, supra note 4, at 1–2. 54 See Mayne Letter 1, supra note 4, at 1 (noting that concerns with p.m. settlement ‘‘led to the advent of the far more innocuous, and perhaps more fair ‘AM–Print’ method of determining the final value for expiring index options. To judge by the abatement of the negative press, hindsight would seem to support that the AM–Print made for a more level playing field.’’) 55 See id. at 2. 56 See Mayne Letter 2, supra note 4, at 1. 57 See id. 58 See ISE Letter 1, supra note 4, at 4. 59 Id. 60 See id. 61 See ISE Letter 3, supra note 8, at 2. E:\FR\FM\09SEN1.SGM 09SEN1 55974 Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 175 / Friday, September 9, 2011 / Notices dates.62 The commenter believes that fragmentation makes it almost impossible for any single market to concentrate liquidity at the close to produce an effective clearing price at times of market volatility.63 In addition, the commenter argues that exchangespecific closing procedures are only applicable to trading on one exchange, which represents a small fraction of the overall market today, and therefore will have little ability to dampen market volatility.64 The commenter believes that C2’s proposal would exacerbate liquidity strains by reintroducing an extraordinary market event—the triple witching hour—and argues that allowing S&P 500 index options to be based on closing settlement prices, even on a pilot basis, would re-introduce the potential for extreme market volatility at expiration.65 In addition, the commenter states that Commission approval of C2’s proposal would lead to the reintroduction of multiple p.m.-settled derivatives and argues that while the SPXPM pilot would be troubling, having multiple pilots operating simultaneously would undermine the industry-wide move to a.m. settlement.66 The Commission generally considers relevant information available to it at the time it reviews each filing in evaluating whether the filing is consistent with the Act.67 Taking the opposite view, two commenters urge the Commission to approve the proposal on a pilot basis.68 One commenter asserts its belief that C2’s proposal will not cause greater volatility in the underlying securities of the S&P 500 index.69 This commenter opines that whether an options contract is p.m.-settled as opposed to a.m.-settled is not a contributing factor to volatility, and the commenter notes that there is more liquidity in the securities underlying the S&P 500 index at the close compared to the opening.70 The commenter states that exchanges are well equipped to handle end-of-day volume and that existing p.m.-settled products do not contribute to increased volatility.71 The other commenter states 62 See id. id. 64 See id. 65 See ISE Letter 1, supra note 4, at 5. This commenter also notes that recently-imposed circuit breakers in the cash equities markets do not apply in the final 25 minutes of trading. See id. 66 See ISE Letter 3, supra note 8, at 3. 67 See 15 U.S.C. 78s(b) (concerning Commission consideration of proposed rule changes submitted by self-regulatory organizations). 68 See IMC Letter, supra note 4, at 1–2 and JP Letter, supra note 4. 69 See IMC Letter, supra note 4, at 1. 70 See id. 71 See id. at 2. mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES 63 See VerDate Mar<15>2010 16:58 Sep 08, 2011 Jkt 223001 that the reintroduction of p.m. settlement is long overdue and would attract liquidity from dark pools, crossing mechanisms, and the over-thecounter markets.72 In its initial response to comments, C2 argues that the concerns from 18 years ago that led to the transition to a.m. settlement for index derivatives have been largely mitigated.73 C2 argues that expiration pressure in the underlying cash markets at the close has been greatly reduced with the advent of multiple primary listing and unlisted trading privilege markets, and that trading is now widely dispersed among many market centers.74 C2 further argues that opening procedures in the 1990s were deemed acceptable to mitigate one-sided order flow driven by index option expiration and that today’s more sophisticated automated closing procedures should afford a similar, if not greater, level of comfort.75 Specifically, C2 notes that many markets, notably The NASDAQ Stock Market LLC (‘‘Nasdaq’’) and the NYSE, now utilize automated closing cross procedures and have closing order types that facilitate orderly closings, and that these closing procedures are wellequipped to mitigate imbalance pressure at the close.76 In addition, C2 believes that after-hours trading now provides market participants with an alternative to help offset market-on-close imbalances.77 C2 also notes that for roughly five years (1987–1992) CBOE listed both a.m.- and p.m.-settled SPX and did not observe any related market disruptions during that period in connection with the dual a.m./p.m. settlement.78 Finally, C2 believes that p.m.-settled options predominate in the over-the-counter (‘‘OTC’’) market, and C2 is not aware of any adverse effects in the underlying cash markets attributable to the considerable volume of OTC trading.79 C2 asserts that given the changes since the 1980s, concerns with p.m. settlement are ‘‘misplaced’’ and have been ‘‘negated’’ now that closing procedures on the cash equities markets have become more automated with realtime data feeds that are distributed to a wider array of market participants.80 72 See JP Letter, supra note 4. C2 Response Letter, supra note 5, at 4. 74 See id. 75 See C2 Response Letter, supra note 5, at 4. 76 See id. 77 See id. at 2. 78 See Notice, supra note 3, at 12776. 79 See id. 80 See C2 Response Letter, supra note 5, at 2 and 4. In its comment letter, ISE notes that C2’s claim that electronic trading can smooth out the pricesetting process is ‘‘disingenuous’’ as recent history 73 See PO 00000 Frm 00108 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 The Commission agrees with C2 that the closing cross mechanisms on the primary listing stock markets have matured considerably since the late 1980s. Closing procedures used by the primary equity markets now offer a more transparent and automated process for attracting contra-side interest and determining closing prices in a manner that is comparable to the process used to determine opening prices.81 The Commission recognizes, however, that the ability of such procedures to counter-balance any potential negative effects that could stem from p.m. settlement is dependent on their ability to attract liquidity in a fragmented market to the primary listing exchanges during a very concentrated window of time at the close of trading on expiration Fridays. Consequently, the potential effect that p.m.-settlement of cashsettled index options could have on the underlying cash equities markets at expiration remains unclear and the Commission remains concerned about suggests that the opposite may be true in some cases (such as the market events of May 6, 2010). See ISE Letter 1, supra note 4, at 5. 81 Nasdaq (see Nasdaq Rule 4754), NYSE (see NYSE Rule 123C), and NYSE Amex LLC (‘‘NYSE Amex’’) (see NYSE Amex Rule 123C) all have automated closing cross procedures for their equities markets, which are designed to attract liquidity, to determine a price for a security that minimizes any imbalance, and to match orders at the 4:00 p.m. close. Participants of these exchanges generally receive frequently-disseminated market data reports reflecting any imbalance, which is intended to attract offsetting interest to minimize or eliminate an imbalance heading into the close. NYSE Arca, Inc. has closing procedures (NYSE Arca Rule 7.35), but it only conducts a closing cross for securities in which it is the primary listing market as well as for all exchange-listed derivatives. Additionally, to minimize the potential for price swings at the close, Nasdaq provides that the closing price must be within an acceptable range of 10% of the midpoint of the NBBO, while the NYSE permits the Designated Market Maker in a stock to request that the exchange extend its trading day to not longer than 4:30 p.m. to allow for the solicitation and entry of orders that are specifically solicited to offset an imbalance existing as of 4 p.m. To further minimize selling pressure at the NYSE, market-on-close and limit-on-close orders may be entered after 3:45 p.m. only if they offset an imbalance. The NYSE also provides for closing-only orders that only execute if they offset an imbalance. The Commission views these closing cross procedures as a significant change in how orders are handled at the close of trading that could potentially help reduce volatility at the close caused by p.m. settlement. C2 also notes that SPXPM expiration dates would be predetermined and known in advance and, as a consequence, this awareness could facilitate the generation of contra-side trading interest. See C2 Response Letter, supra note 5, at 3. The potential for reoccurring heightened volatility during these expiration periods may, however, increase the opportunity for manipulation and other abusive trading practices in anticipation of the liquidity constraints. To the extent such volatility was possible, active surveillance and robust enforcement activity by C2 and other self-regulatory organizations around expiration dates would help to address the potential for abusive trading. E:\FR\FM\09SEN1.SGM 09SEN1 Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 175 / Friday, September 9, 2011 / Notices mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES the possible effect on volatility at the close of a return to p.m. settlement for cash-settled index options.82 C2 cites to the Commission’s recent approval of a series of proposals that authorized the expansion of a limited subset of options products to p.m. settlement along with data collected in connection with those products as revealing no evidence that p.m. settlement is likely to have a disruptive effect on volatility at the close.83 We do not believe that such an inference necessarily can be drawn. These prior approvals involved sub-categories of options that are generally characterized by relatively low volume and thus would not be expected to have a pronounced effect on volatility in the underlying securities at the close on expiration.84 Further, many of these products are not authorized for listing with expiration on the third Friday of a month when other cash-settled index derivatives expire. For example, C2 mentions CBOE’s experience with Endof-Week p.m.-settled options (which it notes is the most heavily traded of CBOE’s new special-dated expiration products), and concludes that they fail to show any evidence of disruptive volatility on the settlement days for these contracts.85 Despite the fact that End-of-Week p.m.-settled options constitute over 7% of CBOE’s S&P 500 index option volume, their volume does not compare to that of CBOE’s SPX product, which accounts for 60% of all index options trading. For this reason, it is difficult to draw any conclusions about the potential impact of p.m.settled S&P 500 index options on the market for the underlying component stocks based on the existing p.m.-settled cash-settled options. Further, past experience suggests that the potential 82 The Commission’s concern with the potential effect that p.m.-settlement of cash-settled index options could have on the underlying cash equities markets at expiration takes into consideration, as C2 notes, that the use of closing prices by retail and institutions investors is widespread. See C2 Letter 3, supra note 8, at 6. For example, mutual funds use closing prices to calculate their net asset values. Therefore, any event or product that potentially introduces additional volatility into the process of determining closing prices has the potential to harm investors and the public interest. 83 See C2 Letter 3, supra note 8, at 4–5. 84 We note that historical experience with respect to more heavily traded index options and index futures indicates that p.m. settlement carries additional risks for enhanced volatility on settlement days. See, e.g., Hans Stoll and Robert Whaley, Expiration Day Effects of Index Options & Futures (March 15, 1986) (concluding that price effects ‘‘are observable on quarterly futures expirations * * * [and] [t]he volatility of prices is significantly higher on such expiration days, and the stock market indices tend to fall on such expiration days.’’). 85 See id. at 5. VerDate Mar<15>2010 16:58 Sep 08, 2011 Jkt 223001 impact would be more significant if both index options and index futures (and options on index futures) were offered with p.m. settlement. While the enhanced closing processes on the primary listing markets may serve to mitigate some of the risk that imbalances on the underlying cash markets prior to the close could lead to excess volatility, the extent of that mitigation is unclear. A pilot program would provide an opportunity to observe and analyze the actual effects on the underlying cash markets of SPXPM. Further, to the extent that trading interest is redirected to the primary markets during times of stress, as one commenter noted, it could be conducive to addressing an imbalance to concentrate liquidity on the primary markets during the close. In particular, those markets conduct automated closing cross procedures, described above,86 that are designed to more efficiently disseminate information broadly and attract and offset imbalances. We note, however, that despite C2’s emphasis on the higher volumes in today’s markets compared with the 1980s and the dispersion of trading to more venues,87 volume statistics are not necessarily indicative or predictive of the level of available liquidity.88 Finally, C2 estimates that 95% of OTC options based on the S&P 500 index are p.m.-settled,89 and states that SPXPM will attract some of that trading interest. C2 notes that doing so would be consistent with the objectives of the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act and could help mitigate counterparty risks faced by OTC market participants.90 The Commission agrees that the proposal could benefit investors to the extent it attracts trading in p.m.-settled S&P 500 index options from the opaque OTC market to the more transparent exchange-listed markets. Further, C2’s proposal will offer investors another investment option through which they could obtain and hedge exposure to the S&P 500 stocks. In addition, C2’s proposal will provide investors with the ability to trade an option on the S&P 500 index in an all86 See supra note 81. id. 88 See, e.g., Findings Regarding the Market Events of May 6, 2010, Report of the Staffs of the CFTC and SEC to the Joint Advisory Committee on Emerging Regulatory Issues, available at https:// www.sec.gov/news/studies/2010/marketeventsreport.pdf, at page 6 (‘‘As the events of May 6 demonstrate, especially in times of significant volatility, high trading volume is not necessarily a reliable indicator of market liquidity.’’). 89 See C2 Letter 3, supra note 8, at 13. 90 See id. 87 See PO 00000 Frm 00109 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 55975 electronic market, which may better meet the needs of investors who may prefer to trade electronically.91 Accordingly, C2’s proposal will provide investors with added flexibility through an additional product that may be better tailored to meet their particular investment, hedging, and trading needs. To assist the Commission in assessing any potential impact of a p.m.-settled S&P 500 index option on the options markets as well as the underlying cash equities markets, as discussed above,92 C2 has proposed to submit data to the Commission on a confidential basis in connection with the pilot. The Commission believes that C2’s proposed fourteen-month pilot, together with the data and analysis that C2 will provide to the Commission, will allow C2 and the Commission to monitor for and assess the potential for adverse market effects. Specifically, the data and analysis will assist the Commission in evaluating the effect of allowing p.m. settlement for S&P 500 index options on the underlying component stocks. In light of the fact that approval of C2’s proposal would be a change from a.m. settlement for cash-settled index options, the Commission instituted proceedings to determine whether to approve or disapprove the proposal. In particular, through specific requests for comment and data, the Commission solicited input from market participants on the potential impact on the markets, particularly the underlying cash equities markets. As discussed above, the Commission remains concerned about the potential impact on the market at expiration for the underlying component stocks for a p.m.-settled, cash-settled index option such as SPXPM. The potential impact today remains unclear, given the significant changes in the closing procedures of the primary markets over the past two decades. The Commission is mindful of the historical experience with the impact of p.m. settlement of cash-settled index derivatives on the underlying cash markets, discussed at length above, but recognizes, however, that these risks may be mitigated today by the enhanced closing procedures that are now in use at the primary equity markets. Finally, approval of C2’s proposal on a pilot basis will enable the Commission to collect current data to assess and monitor for any potential for impact on markets, including the underlying cash 91 See, e.g., Exchange Capital Resources Letter, supra note 8, at 3 (stating in part that ‘‘* * * the addition of the SPXPM product will offer the investor greater flexibility and opportunity to participate in S&P 500 option product line.’’) 92 See Section II (Description of the Proposal). E:\FR\FM\09SEN1.SGM 09SEN1 55976 Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 175 / Friday, September 9, 2011 / Notices equities markets. In particular, the data collected from C2’s pilot program will help inform the Commission’s consideration of whether the SPXPM pilot should be modified, discontinued, extended, or permanently approved. It also could benefit investors and the public interest to the extent it attracts trading in p.m.-settled S&P 500 index options from the opaque OTC market to the more transparent exchange-listed markets, where trading in the product will be subject to exchange trading rules and exchange surveillance. Thus, based on the discussion above, the Commission finds that C2’s current proposal is consistent with the Act, including Section 6(b)(5) thereof in that it is designed to remove impediments to and perfect the mechanism of a free and open market, and, in general, to protect investors and the public interest. In light of the enhanced closing procedures and the potential benefits to investors discussed above, the Commission finds that it is appropriate and consistent with the Act to approve C2’s proposal on a pilot basis. The collection of data during the pilot and C2’s active monitoring of any effects of SPXPM on the markets will help the Commission assess the impact of p.m. settlement in today’s market. V. Conclusion It Is Therefore Ordered, pursuant to Section 19(b)(2) of the Act,93 that the proposed rule change (SR–C2–2011– 008) be, and hereby is, approved on a 14-month pilot basis only. By the Commission. Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary. [FR Doc. 2011–23045 Filed 9–8–11; 8:45 am] mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES BILLING CODE 8011–01–P SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION [RELEASE NO. 34–65255; File No. SR– MSRB–2011–12] Self-Regulatory Organizations; Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board; Notice of Filing of Proposed New Rule G–42, on Political Contributions and Prohibitions on Municipal Advisory Activities; Proposed Amendments to Rules G–8, on Books and Records, G–9, on Preservation of Records, and G–37, on Political Contributions and Prohibitions on Municipal Securities Business; Proposed Form G–37/G–42 and Form G–37x/G–42x; and a Proposed Restatement of a Rule G–37 Interpretive Notice September 2, 2011. Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (‘‘the Exchange Act’’) 1 and Rule 19b–4 thereunder,2 notice is hereby given that on August 19, 2011, the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (‘‘Board’’ or ‘‘MSRB’’) filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (‘‘SEC’’ or ‘‘Commission’’) the proposed rule change as described in Items I, II, and III below, which Items have been prepared by the MSRB. The Commission is publishing this notice to solicit comments on the proposed rule change from interested persons. II. Self-Regulatory Organization’s Statement of the Purpose of, and Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change In its filing with the Commission, the MSRB included statements concerning the purpose of and basis for the proposed rule change and discussed any comments it received on the proposed rule change. The text of these statements may be examined at the places specified in Item IV below. The Board has prepared summaries, set forth in Sections A, B, and C below, of the most significant aspects of such statements. I. Self-Regulatory Organization’s Statement of the Terms of Substance of the Proposed Rule Change A. Self-Regulatory Organization’s Statement of the Purpose of, and Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change The MSRB is filing with the SEC a proposed rule change consisting of (i) Proposed MSRB Rule G–42 (on political contributions and prohibitions on municipal advisory activities); (ii) proposed amendments that would make conforming changes to MSRB Rules G– 8 (on books and records), G–9 (on preservation of records), and G–37 (on political contributions and prohibitions on municipal securities business); (iii) proposed Form G–37/G–42 and Form G–37x/G–42x; and (iv) a proposed restatement of a Rule G–37 interpretive notice issued by the MSRB in 1997 (‘‘Rule G–37 Interpretive Notice’’).3 The MSRB requests that, if approved by the Commission, the proposed rule change be made effective six months after the date on which the Commission first approves rules defining the term ‘‘municipal advisor’’ under the 1 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1). CFR 240.19b–4. 3 Interpretation of Prohibition on Municipal Securities Business Pursuant to Rule G–37 (February 21, 1997), reprinted in MSRB Rule Book. 2 17 93 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(2). VerDate Mar<15>2010 16:58 Sep 08, 2011 Jkt 223001 Exchange Act or such later date as the Commission approves the proposed rule change; provided, however, that the MSRB requests that no contribution made prior to the effective date of proposed Rule G–42 would result in a ban pursuant to proposed Rule G– 42(b)(i); 4 and, provided that any ban on municipal securities business under Rule G–37(b)(i) in existence prior to the effective date of proposed Rule G–42 would continue until it otherwise would have terminated under Rule G– 37(b)(i), as in effect prior to the effective date of proposed Rule G–42. The text of the proposed rule change is available on the MSRB’s Web site at https://www.msrb.org/Rules-andInterpretations/SEC–Filings/2011Filings.aspx, at the MSRB’s principal office, and at the Commission’s Public Reference Room. PO 00000 Frm 00110 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 1. Purpose The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (‘‘DoddFrank Act’’) 5 authorized the MSRB to establish a comprehensive body of regulation for municipal advisors and provided that municipal advisors to municipal entities have a Federal fiduciary duty.6 The Dodd-Frank Act required the MSRB to adopt rules for municipal advisors that, in addition to implementing the Federal fiduciary duty, are designed to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices and to promote just and equitable principles of trade.7 It also expanded the mission 4 As described in more detail below, under proposed Rule G–42(b)(i) certain contributions could result in a ban on municipal advisory business for compensation, a ban on solicitations of third-party business for compensation, and a ban on the receipt of compensation for the solicitation of third-party business. 5 Public Law No. 111–203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 6 See 15B(c)(1) of the Exchange Act. 7 See Section 15B(b)(2)(C) of the Exchange Act. E:\FR\FM\09SEN1.SGM 09SEN1

Agencies

[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 175 (Friday, September 9, 2011)]
[Notices]
[Pages 55969-55976]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2011-23045]


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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

[Release No. 34-65256; File No. SR-C2-2011-008]


Self-Regulatory Organizations; C2 Options Exchange, Incorporated; 
Order Approving Proposed Rule Change to Establish a Pilot Program To 
List and Trade a p.m.-Settled Cash-Settled S&P 500 Index Option Product

September 2, 2011.

I. Introduction

    On February 28, 2011, C2 Options Exchange, Incorporated (the 
``Exchange'' or ``C2'') filed with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (``Commission''), pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (``Act''),\1\ and Rule 19b-4 
thereunder,\2\ a proposed rule change to permit the listing and trading 
of p.m.-settled, cash-settled options on the Standard & Poor's 500 
Index (``S&P 500''). The proposed rule change was published for comment 
in the Federal Register on March 8, 2011.\3\ The Commission received 
seven comment letters on the proposal, some of which urged the 
Commission to disapprove the proposal.\4\ C2 responded to the comment 
letters in a response letter dated April 20, 2011.\5\ To ensure that 
the Commission had sufficient time to consider and take action on the 
Exchange's proposal in light of, among other things, the comments 
received on the proposal, the Commission extended the time period in 
which to either approve the proposed rule change, disapprove the 
proposed rule change, or institute proceedings to determine whether to 
disapprove the proposed rule change, to June 6, 2011.\6\
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    \1\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
    \2\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4.
    \3\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 64011 (March 2, 
2011), 76 FR 12775 (``Notice'').
    \4\ See Letters to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, Commission, 
from Randall Mayne, Blue Capital Group, dated March 18, 2011 and 
April 28, 2011 (``Mayne Letter 1'' and ``Mayne Letter 2''); Michael 
J. Simon, Secretary, International Securities Exchange, LLC 
(``ISE''), dated March 29, 2011 and May 11, 2011 (``ISE Letter 1'' 
and ``ISE Letter 2''); Andrew Stevens, Legal Counsel, IMC Financial 
Markets, dated March 24, 2011 (``IMC Letter''); John Trader, dated 
April 20, 2011 (``Trader Letter''); and JP, dated April 30, 2011 
(``JP Letter'').
    \5\ See Letter to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, Commission, 
from Joanne Moffic-Silver, Secretary, C2, dated April 20, 2011 (``C2 
Response Letter'').
    \6\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 64266 (April 8, 
2011), 76 FR 20757 (April 13, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In order to solicit additional input from interested parties, 
including relevant data and analysis, on the issues presented by C2's 
proposed rule change, on June 3, 2011, the Commission instituted 
proceedings to determine whether to approve or disapprove C2's 
proposal.\7\ In its order instituting the proceedings, the Commission 
specifically noted its interest in receiving additional data and 
analysis relating to the potential effect that proposed p.m.-settled 
index options could have on the underlying cash equities markets. In 
response to the proceedings, the Commission received an additional 
three comment letters on the proposal as well as a rebuttal letter from 
C2.\8\ This order approves the proposed rule change on a 14-month pilot 
basis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \7\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 64599 (June 3, 
2011), 76 FR 33798 (June 9, 2011).
    \8\ See Letters to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, Commission, 
from Michael J. Simon, Secretary, International Securities Exchange, 
LLC dated July 11, 2011 (``ISE Letter 3''); William J. Brodsky, 
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, C2, dated July 11, 2011 
(``CBOE Letter 3''); Thomas Foertsch, President, Exchange Capital 
Resources, dated July 11, 2011; and William J. Brodsky, Chairman and 
Chief Executive Officer, C2, dated July 25, 2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

II. Description of the Proposal

    The Exchange's proposal would permit it to list and trade cash-
settled S&P 500 index options with third-Friday-of-the-month 
(``Expiration Friday'') expiration dates for which the exercise 
settlement value will be based on the index value derived from the 
closing prices of component securities (``p.m.-settled''). The proposed 
contract (referred to as ``SPXPM'') would use a $100 multiplier, and 
the minimum trading increment would be $0.05 for options trading below 
$3.00 and $0.10 for all other series. Strike price intervals would be 
set no less than 5 points apart. Consistent with existing rules for 
index options, the Exchange would allow up to twelve near-term 
expiration months, as well as LEAPS. Expiration processing would occur 
on the Saturday following Expiration Friday. The product would have 
European-style exercise and would not be subject to position limits, 
though there would be enhanced reporting requirements.
    The Exchange proposes that the SPXPM product be approved on a pilot 
basis for an initial period of fourteen months. As part of the pilot 
program, the Exchange committed to submit a pilot program report to the 
Commission at least two months prior to the

[[Page 55970]]

expiration date of the program (the ``annual report''). The annual 
report would contain an analysis of volume, open interest, and trading 
patterns. The analysis would examine trading in the proposed option 
product as well as trading in the securities that comprise the S&P 500 
index. In addition, for series that exceed certain minimum open 
interest parameters, the annual report would provide analysis of index 
price volatility and share trading activity. In addition to the annual 
report, the Exchange committed to provide the Commission with periodic 
interim reports while the pilot is in effect that would contain some, 
but not all, of the information contained in the annual report. In its 
filing, C2 notes that it would provide the annual and interim reports 
to the Commission on a confidential basis.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \9\ See Notice, supra note 3, at 12777.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

III. Comments Received

    In response to the initial notice of C2's proposal, the Commission 
received seven comment letters, some of which expressed concern with 
the proposal.\10\ One commenter specifically urges the Commission to 
disapprove the proposal.\11\ Commenters expressing concern with the 
proposal raised several issues, including: The potential for adverse 
effects on the underlying cash markets that could accompany the 
reintroduction of p.m. settlement; concern with the similarity (but 
lack of fungibility) between the existing S&P 500 index option traded 
on the Chicago Board Options Exchange, Incorporated (``CBOE'') and the 
proposed S&P 500 index option that would be traded on C2; the lack of 
proposed position limits for SPXPM; and issues regarding exclusive 
product licensing. Three commenters expressed support for the 
proposal.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \10\ See Mayne Letter 1, ISE Letter 1, ISE Letter 2, and Trader 
Letter, supra note 4.
    \11\ See ISE Letter 1 and ISE Letter 2, supra note 4.
    \12\ See Mayne Letter 2, IMC Letter, and JP Letter, supra note 
4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the proceedings to determine whether to approve or disapprove 
the proposal, the Commission preliminarily summarized the issues raised 
by the commenters, and also set forth a series of questions and 
requests for data on the issue of p.m. settlement. In response to the 
proceedings, the Commission received three letters, including one from 
C2, one from ISE that expands on the concerns it previously raised and 
reiterates its recommendation for the Commission to disapprove the 
proposal, and one from a new commenter that supports the proposal 
because it will offer investors greater flexibility.\13\ The Commission 
also received an additional letter from C2 responding to the comments 
of ISE.\14\ The comments received are addressed below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \13\ See ECR Letter, supra note 8.
    \14\ See C2 Rebuttal Letter, supra note 8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

IV. Discussion and Commission Findings

    After careful consideration of the proposal and the comments 
received, the Commission finds that the proposed rule change is 
consistent with the requirements of the Act and the rules and 
regulations thereunder applicable to a national securities 
exchange,\15\ and, in particular, the requirements of Section 6 of the 
Act.\16\ Specifically, the Commission finds that the proposed rule 
change is consistent with Section 6(b)(5) of the Act,\17\ which 
requires that an exchange have rules designed to remove impediments to 
and perfect the mechanism of a free and open market and to protect 
investors and the public interest.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \15\ In approving this proposed rule change, the Commission has 
considered the proposed rule's impact on efficiency, competition, 
and capital formation. See 15 U.S.C. 78c(f).
    \16\ 15 U.S.C. 78f.
    \17\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(5).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

A. Relationship to the National Market System

    One commenter believes that separate a.m. and p.m.-settled S&P 500 
index options could potentially bifurcate the market for CBOE's 
existing a.m.-settled SPX contract.\18\ This commenter notes that the 
SPX, which trades only on CBOE, accounts for 60% of all index options 
trading, and argues that the sole difference in settlement between SPX 
on CBOE and the proposed S&P 500 index options on C2 (i.e., a.m. vs. 
p.m. settlement) is a ``sham'' that is intended to ``keep them non-
fungible,'' which would ``make a mockery of Section 11A of the Act.'' 
\19\ The commenter states that the objectives of Section 11A are 
reflected in a national market system plan for options that requires 
exchanges to prevent trading through better priced quotations displayed 
on other options exchanges, and that making a p.m.-settled S&P 500 
index option non-fungible with CBOE's SPX would allow the CBOE group to 
establish two ``monopolies'' in S&P 500 options, one floor-based (CBOE) 
and one electronic (C2) that would avoid the application of the 
limitation on trade throughs.\20\ The commenter also contends the 
proposal is designed to protect CBOE's floor-based SPX trading without 
having to accommodate the more narrow quotes that would likely occur on 
C2 in an electronically-traded p.m.-settled product.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \18\ See ISE Letter 1, supra note 4, at 4.
    \19\ Id. at 2. See also ISE Letter 2, supra note 4, at 3-4.
    \20\ See ISE Letter 1, supra note 4, at 3.
    \21\ See ISE Letter 1, supra note 4, at 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Another commenter asserts that CBOE and C2 should trade a fungible 
S&P 500 index option in order to address what the commenter describes 
as ``huge customer-unfriendly spreads'' in SPX.\22\ The commenter 
argues that if the CBOE believes p.m. settlement is superior to a.m. 
settlement, then CBOE should file to change SPX to p.m. settlement so 
that the product traded on C2 would be fungible with that proposed to 
be traded on CBOE.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \22\ See Trader Letter, supra note 4, at 1. See also JP Letter, 
supra note 4, at 1.
    \23\ See Trader Letter, supra note 4, at 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In response, C2 argues that the difference between a.m.-settled and 
p.m.-settled S&P 500 index option would be a material term and that 
C2's proposed S&P 500 index option could not be fungible with, nor 
could it be linked with, CBOE's SPX option.\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \24\ See C2 Response Letter, supra note 5, at 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission agrees that the difference between a.m.-settled SPX 
and the proposed p.m.-settled SPXPM involves a materially different 
term (i.e., settlement time) that makes C2's proposed SPXPM index 
option a different security than, and thus not fungible with, CBOE's 
SPX option.\25\ The Commission notes that it has permitted very similar 
but different products to trade on the same exchange or on different 
exchanges without those separate products being fungible. For example, 
the Commission previously approved for CBOE the listing and trading of 
a.m.-settled S&P 500 index options during a time when CBOE also traded 
p.m.-settled S&P 500 index options, and the two separate products were 
not fungible.\26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \25\ Consequently, rules applicable to prevent trading through 
better priced quotations in the same security displayed on other 
options exchanges would not be applicable for trading between these 
two products.
    Similarly, in response to a comment that investors would be 
confused by the presence of an a.m.-settled SPX on CBOE and a p.m.-
settled S&P 500 index option on C2 (see ISE Letter 1, supra note 4, 
at 3), the Commission does not believe that SPX on CBOE and a p.m.-
settled S&P 500 index option on C2 would cause investor confusion. 
The two products would trade under different ticker symbols and any 
potential for investor confusion could be mitigated though investor 
outreach and education initiatives. Furthermore, as C2 notes in its 
response letter, CBOE currently lists two options on the S&P 100 
(American-style OEX and European-style XEO) and is not aware of any 
investor confusion among the products. See C2 Response Letter, supra 
note 5, at 3.
    \26\ See infra note 44 (citing to Securities Exchange Act 
Release No. 24367). See also Securities Exchange Act Release No. 
51619 (Apr. 27, 2005), 70 FR 22947 (May 3, 2005) (order approving 
ISE's listing and trading of options on various Russell Indexes, 
including options based upon one-tenth values of the Russell 
Indexes).

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 55971]]

    One commenter also raises concerns about the potential effect on 
competition of C2 listing and trading an option product that is subject 
to an exclusive license, citing to concerns they express with respect 
to the SPX product traded on CBOE.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \27\ See ISE Letter 1, supra note 4, at 6-7 (arguing in part 
that ``CBOE's monopoly in the product imposes significant harm to 
investors,'' including the fact that ``CBOE charges for trading SPX 
options that are much greater than the fees for multiply listed 
options'' and ``the quotes in SPX options are much wider than they 
would be if there was competition from other exchanges,'' as well as 
that ``CBOE is able to use the monopolistic revenue stream from 
these options to subsidize other products * * *.'') and ISE Letter 
2, supra note 4, at 3-4 (arguing in part that ``[t]he Proposal is 
harmful to investors because it * * * perpetuates the unreasonably 
high monopolistic pricing and artificially wide spreads that result 
from the lack of competition in this product.'').
    The issue of state law intellectual property rights of index 
developers in the use of their indexes to trade derivatives is the 
subject of litigation between CBOE and ISE (as well as other 
parties). See Chicago Board Options Exchange, Incorporated et al. v. 
International Securities Exchange, et al., Case No. 06 CH 24798 
(Cir. Ct. of Cook Cty., Ch. Div. July 8, 2010), appeal docketed, No. 
1-10-2228 (Ill. App. Ct. August 9, 2010). See also Board of Trade of 
the City of Chicago v. Dow Jones & Co., Inc., 98 Ill.2d 109 (1983). 
In issuing this order, the Commission expresses no view with respect 
to the matters underlying this ongoing litigation, including their 
validity or the enforceability of the exclusivity agreement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission recognizes the potential impact on competition 
resulting from the inability of other options exchanges to list and 
trade SPXPM. In acting on this proposal, however, the Commission has 
balanced the potentially negative competitive effects with the 
countervailing positive competitive effects of C2's proposal. The 
Commission believes that the availability of SPXPM on the C2 exchange 
will enhance competition by providing investors with an additional 
investment vehicle, in a fully-electronic trading environment, through 
which investors can gain and hedge exposure to the S&P 500 stocks. 
Further, this product could offer a competitive alternative to other 
existing investment products that seek to allow investors to gain broad 
market exposure. Also, we note that it is possible for other exchanges 
to develop or license the use of a new or different index to compete 
with the S&P 500 index and seek Commission approval to list and trade 
options on such index.
    Accordingly, with respect to the Commission's consideration of C2's 
proposed rule change at this time, the Commission finds that it does 
not impose any burden on competition not necessary or appropriate in 
furtherance of the purposes of the Act.\28\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \28\ The Commission may in the future determine it appropriate 
to consider or address competitive issues related to exclusive 
licensing of index option products on a more comprehensive level.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Position Limits

    Under C2's proposal, position limits would not apply to SPXPM. One 
commenter argues that position limits should apply to SPXPM.\29\ This 
commenter notes that, since 2001 when the Commission approved a CBOE 
rule filing to remove all position limits for SPX options,\30\ the 
Commission has generally expected exchanges to apply a model, such as 
the Dutt-Harris model, to determine the appropriate position limits for 
all new index options products.\31\ Because C2 claims that the product 
is new and non-fungible, the commenter argues that the Commission 
should apply the Dutt-Harris model to require C2 to impose position 
limits on SPXPM.\32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \29\ See ISE Letter 1, supra note 4, at 6.
    \30\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 44994 (October 26, 
2002), 66 FR 55722 (November 2, 2001). In this filing, the 
Commission relied in part on CBOE's ability to provide enhanced 
surveillance and reporting safeguards to detect and deter trading 
abuses arising from the elimination of position and exercise limits 
in options on the S&P 500.
    \31\ See ISE Letter 1, supra note 4, at 6. In a 2005 paper from 
Hans Dutt and Lawrence Harris, titled ``Position Limits for Cash-
Settled Derivative Contracts'' (``Dutt-Harris Paper'') the authors 
developed a model to determine appropriate position limits for cash-
settled index derivatives. The authors concluded that the then-
prevailing position limits were lower than the model suggested would 
be appropriate for many derivative contracts. The authors also 
concluded, however, that position limits are not as important for 
broad-based index derivative contracts that are cash settled because 
they are composed of highly liquid and well-followed securities. As 
such, the authors note that it would require very high trading 
volumes to manipulate the underlying securities and, consequently, 
any attempted manipulation would be more easily detectable and 
prosecutable.
    \32\ See ISE Letter 1, supra note 4, at 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In its response to comments, C2 notes that the Dutt-Harris Paper 
acknowledges that S&P 500 options have, and should have, 
extraordinarily large position limits and Dutt-Harris observes that 
position limits are most useful when market surveillance is 
inadequate.\33\ C2 argues that position limits suggested by the Dutt-
Harris model for an S&P 500 index option would be so large as to be 
irrelevant and that positions of such magnitude would attract scrutiny 
from surveillance systems that would, as a consequence, serve as an 
effective substitute for position limits.\34\ Further, in its response 
letter, C2 summarizes the circumstances and considerations relied upon 
by the Commission when it approved the elimination of position limits 
on CBOE's S&P 500 index option, including the enormous capitalization 
of the index and enhanced reporting and surveillance for the 
product.\35\ Thus, because of the enhanced reporting and surveillance 
for this product, described below, C2 argues that the absence of 
position limits on its proposed S&P 500 index option would not be 
inconsistent with Dutt-Harris.\36\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \33\ See C2 Response Letter, supra note 5, at 5.
    \34\ See id. Generally, position limits are intended to prevent 
the establishment of options positions that could be used or that 
might create incentives to manipulate or disrupt the underlying 
market to benefit the holder of the options. See, e.g., Securities 
Exchange Act Release Nos. 39489 (December 24, 1997), 63 FR 276 
(January 5, 1998) (SR-CBOE-97-11) (approving increases to the 
position and exercise limits for options on the Standard & Poor's 
100 Stock Index (``OEX''), the OEX firm facilitation exemption, and 
the OEX index hedge exemption); Dutt-Harris Paper, supra note 31 
(``Position limits directly limit manipulation by limiting the size 
of derivative positions that would benefit from manipulative 
practices.'').
    \35\ See C2 Response Letter, supra note 5, at 5-6. C2 represents 
in its response letter that it would monitor trading in p.m.-settled 
S&P 500 index options in the same manner as CBOE does for other 
broad-based index options with no position limits. See id. at 6.
    \36\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Exchange represents, however, that it will implement enhanced 
reporting requirements pursuant to its Rule 4.13 (Reports Related to 
Position Limits) and Interpretation and Policy .03 to its Rule 24.4 
(Position Limits for Broad-Based Index Options), which sets forth the 
reporting requirements for certain broad-based indexes that do not have 
position limits.\37\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \37\ See Notice, supra note 3, at note 4 and accompanying text.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In 2001, when the Commission permanently approved a CBOE rule 
(which had been in place for a two-year pilot period) to eliminate 
position limits on SPX (as well as options on the Dow Jones Industrial 
Average and the S&P 100 index),\38\ the Commission stated that because 
the S&P 500 index is a broad-based index with a considerable 
capitalization, manipulation of the 500 component stocks underlying the 
index would require extraordinarily large positions that would be 
readily detectable by enhanced surveillance procedures. In its approval 
order, the Commission relied in part on CBOE's enhanced surveillance 
and reporting procedures that are intended to allow CBOE to detect and 
deter trading abuses in the absence of position limits. In particular, 
CBOE requires its members to submit a report to CBOE when the member 
builds a position of 100,000+ contracts. Among other things, the report 
includes a description of the

[[Page 55972]]

option position, whether the position is hedged (and, if so, a 
description of the hedge), and whether collateral was used (and, if so, 
a description of the collateral). This enhanced surveillance and 
reporting arrangement allows CBOE to continually monitor, assess, and 
respond to any concerns at an early stage. To complement its enhanced 
surveillance and reporting requirements, CBOE has the ability to 
intervene to impose additional margin or assess capital charges when 
warranted. Thus, together with the ``enormous capitalization'' \39\ of 
the S&P 500 index and the deep and liquid markets for the S&P 500 
stocks, the Commission found that CBOE's enhanced surveillance 
procedures ``reduce[] concerns regarding market manipulation or 
disruption in the underlying market.'' \40\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \38\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 44994 (October 26, 
2001), 66 FR 55722 (November 2, 2001) (SR-CBOE-2001-22).
    \39\ Id. at 55723.
    \40\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    C2 has represented in this filing that its enhanced surveillance 
requirements and procedures for SPXPM would be identical to the 
surveillance and reporting requirements and procedures used by CBOE 
with respect to SPX. Accordingly, the Commission believes that position 
limits would not be necessary for SPXPM options as long as C2 has in 
place and enforces effective enhanced surveillance and reporting 
requirements. These enhanced procedures will allow the Exchange to see, 
with considerable advance notice, the accumulation of large positions, 
which it can then monitor more closely as necessary and take additional 
action if appropriate.\41\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \41\ In addition, the Commission notes that C2 would have access 
to information through its membership in the Intermarket 
Surveillance Group with respect to the trading of the securities 
underlying the S&P 500 index, as well as tools such as large options 
positions reports to assist its surveillance of SPXPM options.
    In approving the proposed rule change, the Commission also has 
relied upon the Exchange's representation that it has the necessary 
systems capacity to support new options series that will result from 
this proposal. See Notice, supra note 3, at 12777.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

C. Reintroduction of P.M. Settlement

    When cash-settled \42\ index options were first introduced in the 
1980s, they generally utilized closing-price settlement procedures 
(i.e., p.m. settlement).\43\ The Commission became concerned about the 
impact of p.m. settlement on cash-settled index options on the markets 
for the underlying stocks at the close on expiration Fridays.\44\ These 
concerns were heightened during the quarterly expirations of the third 
Friday of March, June, September and December when options, index 
futures, and options on index futures all expire simultaneously. P.m.-
settlement was believed to have contributed to above-average volume and 
added market volatility on those days, which sometimes led to sharp 
price movements during the last hour of trading.\45\ As a consequence, 
the close of trading on the quarterly expiration Friday became known as 
the ``triple witching hour.'' Besides contributing to investor anxiety, 
heightened volatility during the expiration periods created the 
opportunity for manipulation and other abusive trading practices in 
anticipation of the liquidity constraints.\46\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \42\ The seller of a ``cash settled'' index option pays out the 
cash value of the applicable index on expiration or exercise. A 
``physically settled'' option, like equity and ETF options, involves 
the transfer of the underlying asset rather than cash. See 
Characteristics and Risks of Standardized Options, available at: 
https://www.theocc.com/components/docs/riskstoc.pdf, for a discussion 
of settlement.
    \43\ The exercise settlement value for a p.m.-settled index 
option is generally determined by reference to the reported level of 
the index as derived from the closing prices of the component 
securities (generally based on the closing prices as reported by the 
primary exchange on which the stock is listed) on the last business 
day before expiration (e.g., the Friday before Saturday expiration). 
See Characteristics and Risks of Standardized Options, available at: 
https://www.theocc.com/components/docs/riskstoc.pdf, for a discussion 
of settlement value.
    \44\ See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act Release Nos. 45956 (May 
17, 2002), 67 FR 36740 (May 24, 2002) (adopting release concerning 
cash settlement and regulatory halt requirements for security 
futures products) (``Regulators and self-regulators were concerned 
that the liquidity constraints faced by the securities markets to 
accommodate expiration-related buy or sell programs at the market 
close on expiration Fridays could exacerbate ongoing market swings 
during an expiration and could provide opportunities for entities to 
anticipate these pressures and enter orders as part of manipulative 
or abusive trading practices designed to artificially drive up or 
down share prices.''); 24367 (April 17, 1987), 52 FR 13890 (April 
27, 1987) (SR-CBOE-87-11) (order approving a proposal for S&P 500 
index options with an exercise settlement value based on an index 
value derived from opening, rather than closing, prices); and 32868 
(September 10, 1993), 58 FR 48687 (September 10, 1993) (notice of 
filing and order granting accelerated approval of proposed rule 
change by the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. (``NYSE'') relating to 
changes in auxiliary closing procedures for expiration days) 
(stating, ``[a]s long as some index derivative products continue to 
expire based on closing stock prices on expiration Fridays, the 
Commission agrees with the NYSE that such procedures are necessary 
to provide a mechanism to handle the potential large imbalances that 
can be engendered by firms unwinding index derivative related 
positions''). The cash settlement provisions of stock index futures 
and options contracts facilitated the growth of sizeable index 
arbitrage activities by firms and professional traders and made it 
relatively easy for arbitrageurs to buy or sell the underlying 
stocks at or near the market close on expiration Fridays (i.e., the 
third Friday of the expiration month) in order to ``unwind'' 
arbitrage-related positions. These types of unwinding programs at 
the close on expiration Fridays often severely strained the 
liquidity of the securities markets as the markets, and in 
particular the specialists on the NYSE, faced pressure to attract 
contra-side interest in the limited time that was permitted to 
establish closing prices. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 
44743 (August 24, 2001), 66 FR 45904 (August 30, 2001) (File No. S7-
15-01) (proposing release concerning cash settlement and regulatory 
halt requirements for security futures products).
    \45\ See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act Release Nos. 24276 
(March 27, 1987); 52 FR 10836 (April 3, 1987) (notice of filing and 
order granting accelerated approval to a proposed rule change by the 
NYSE relating to opening price settlement of expiring NYSE Composite 
and Beta Index options); 37894 (October 30, 1996), 61 FR 56987 
(November 5, 1996) (notice of filing and order granting accelerated 
approval of proposed rule change by the NYSE permanently approving 
the expiration day auxiliary closing procedures pilot program); and 
45956 (May 17, 2002), 67 FR 36740 (May 24, 2002) (adopting release 
concerning cash settlement and regulatory halt requirements for 
security futures products) (reaffirming the Commission's view of the 
advantages of a.m. settlement). See also Hans Stoll and Robert 
Whaley, Expiration Day Effects of Index Options & Futures (March 15, 
1986) (noting that share volume on the NYSE was much higher in the 
last hour of a quarterly expiration Friday when both options and 
futures expire than on non-expiration Fridays).
    \46\ See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 45956 (May 
17, 2002), 67 FR 36740 (May 24, 2002) (adopting release concerning 
cash settlement and regulatory halt requirements for security 
futures products) (explaining that entities could take advantage of 
illiquidity resulting from the unwinding of arbitrage-related 
positions on expiration Fridays to manipulate share prices).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In light of the concerns with p.m. settlement and to help 
ameliorate the price effects associated with expirations of p.m.-
settled, cash-settled index products, in 1987, the Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission (``CFTC'') approved a rule change by the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange to provide for a.m. settlement for index futures, 
including futures on the S&P 500 index.\47\ The Commission subsequently 
approved a rule change by CBOE to list and trade a.m.-settled S&P 500 
index options.\48\ In

[[Page 55973]]

1992, the Commission approved CBOE's proposal to transition all of its 
European-style cash-settled options on the S&P 500 index to a.m. 
settlement.\49\ Thereafter, the Commission approved proposals by the 
options markets to transfer most of their cash-settled index products 
to a.m. settlement.\50\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \47\ See Proposed Amendments Relating to the Standard and Poor's 
500, the Standard and Poor's 100 and the Standard Poor's OTC Stock 
Price Index Futures Contract, 51 FR 47053 (December 30, 1986) 
(notice of proposed rule change from the Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange). See also Securities Exchange Act Release No. 24367 (April 
17, 1987), 52 FR 13890 (April 27, 1987) (SR-CBOE-87-11) (noting that 
the Chicago Mercantile Exchange moved the S&P 500 futures contract's 
settlement value to opening prices on the delivery date).
    The exercise settlement value for an a.m.-settled index option 
is determined by reference to the reported level of the index as 
derived from the opening prices of the component securities on the 
business day before expiration.
    \48\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 24367 (April 17, 
1987), 52 FR 13890 (April 27, 1987) (SR-CBOE-87-11) (order approving 
a proposal for S&P 500 index options with an exercise settlement 
value based on an index value derived from opening, rather than 
closing, prices). At the time it approved CBOE's introduction of 
a.m. settlement for cash-settled index options, the Commission 
identified two benefits to a.m. settlement for cash-settled index 
options. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 30944 (July 21, 
1992), 57 FR 33376 (July 28, 1992) (SR-CBOE-92-09). First, it 
provides additional time to test price discovery, as market 
participants have the remainder of the regular trading day to adjust 
to opening session price movements and determine whether those 
movements reflect changes in fundamental values or short-term supply 
and demand conditions. Second, it provides more opportunity to trade 
out of positions acquired during the opening auction. In this 
respect, attracting contra-side interest to a single-priced auction 
to offset an order imbalance (such as those attributable to index 
arbitrage) may more readily be achieved in an opening auction on 
Friday morning than a closing auction on Friday afternoon because 
the morning session allows market participants that have provided 
that liquidity to have the remainder of the regular trading day to 
liquidate their positions. In contrast, positions acquired in a 
Friday afternoon closing auction generally cannot be liquidated as 
readily and efficiently until the following Monday. Holding 
positions overnight, or over a weekend, may entail greater risk than 
holding intraday positions. To accept such risk (real or perceived), 
market participants generally will require a greater premium, which 
may translate into greater price concessions, and thus lead to 
greater volatility in the closing auction. In other words, a 
consequence of p.m. settlement may be enhanced volatility at the 
close. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 44743 (August 
24, 2001), 66 FR 45904 at 45908 (August 30, 2001) (``Steep discounts 
(premiums) were necessary in part because traders who bought (sold) 
stocks to offset unwinding programs had to maintain their newly 
acquired long (short) positions over the weekend--during which time 
they were subject to considerable market risk.'').
    \49\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 30944 (July 21, 
1992), 57 FR 33376 (July 28, 1992) (SR-CBOE-92-09) (order approving 
CBOE's proposal relating to position limits for SPX index options 
based on the opening price of component securities).
    \50\ CBOE's index options on the S&P 100 (OEX), however, kept 
their p.m. settlement. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 30944 
(July 21, 1992), 57 FR 33376 (July 28, 1992) (SR-CBOE-92-09). No 
futures or options on futures trade on the S&P 100 index. Other 
types of options utilize p.m. settlement, including physically-
settled single-stock options and options on ETFs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission and the CFTC noted the benefits of a.m. settlement 
in a 2001 joint release concerning securities futures, where they 
observed that ``the widespread adoption of opening-price settlement 
procedures in index futures and options has served to mitigate the 
liquidity strains that had previously been experienced in the 
securities markets on expirations.'' \51\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \51\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 44743 (August 24, 
2001), 66 FR 45904 at 45908 (August 30, 2001) (proposing release for 
a joint rule between the Commission and the CFTC generally 
stipulating, among other provisions, that the final settlement price 
for each cash-settled security futures product fairly reflect the 
opening price of the underlying security or securities). See also 
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 45956 (May 17, 2002), 67 FR 
36740 at 36741-42 (May 24, 2002) (adopting release concerning cash 
settlement and regulatory halt requirements for security futures 
products in which the Commission reaffirmed the advantages of a.m. 
settlement) (``[O]pening price settlement procedures offered several 
features that enabled the securities markets to better handle 
expiration-related unwinding programs.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Since 1992, the Commission has approved proposals that provide for 
cash-settled index options with p.m. settlement on a limited basis for 
options products that generally are characterized by lower relative 
volume and that generally do not involve settlement on the third Friday 
of a month.\52\ At the time of each approval, the Commission stated 
that limited approvals on a pilot basis would allow the exchange and 
the Commission to monitor the potential for adverse market effects and 
modify or terminate the pilots, if necessary. Notably, with the 
exception of FLEX Index options, these recently-approved p.m.-settled 
contracts do not involve expiration on the third Friday of the month. 
These new contracts, including FLEX, have also been characterized by 
limited volume, and would not be expected to have a pronounced effect 
on volatility in the underlying securities at the close as a result.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \52\ In particular, in 1993, the Commission approved CBOE's 
proposal to list and trade p.m.-settled, cash-settled options on 
certain broad-based indexes expiring on the first business day of 
the month following the end of each calendar quarter (``Quarterly 
Index Expirations''). See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 31800 
(February 1, 1993), 58 FR 7274 (February 5, 1993) (SR-CBOE-92-13). 
In 2006, the Commission approved, on a pilot basis, CBOE's listing 
of p.m.-settled index options expiring on the last business day of a 
calendar quarter (``Quarterly Options Series''). See Securities 
Exchange Act Release No. 54123 (July 11, 2006), 71 FR 40558 (July 
17, 2006) (SR-CBOE-2006-65). In January 2010, the Commission 
approved CBOE's listing of p.m.-settled FLEX options on a pilot 
basis.\52\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 61439 (January 
28, 2010), 75 FR 5831 (February 4, 2010) (SR-CBOE-2009-087) (order 
approving rule change to establish a pilot program to modify FLEX 
option exercise settlement values and minimum value sizes). FLEX 
options provide investors with the ability to customize basic option 
features including size, expiration date, exercise style, and 
certain exercise prices. Prior to 2010, only a.m. settlement based 
on opening prices of the underlying components of an index could be 
used to settle a FLEX index option if it expired on, or within two 
business days of, a third-Friday-of-the-month expiration (``Blackout 
Period''). Last year, the Commission approved a pilot program to 
permit FLEX index options with p.m. settlement that expire within 
the Blackout Period. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 61439 
(January 28, 2010), 75 FR 5831 (February 4, 2010) (SR-CBOE-2009-
087). In September 2010, the Commission approved CBOE's listing of 
p.m.-settled End of Week expirations (expiring on each Friday, other 
than the third Friday) and End of Month expirations (expiring on the 
last trading day of the month) for options on broad-based indexes, 
also on a pilot basis. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 62911 
(September 14, 2010), 75 FR 57539 (September 21, 2010) (SR-CBOE-
2009-075).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In response to C2's proposal, two commenters raise concerns over 
the reintroduction of p.m. settlement on a potentially popular index 
derivative and the possible impact that doing so could have on the 
underlying cash equities markets.\53\ One commenter urges the 
Commission to consider why markets went to a.m. settlement in the early 
1990s and opines that hindsight supports the conclusion that a.m. 
settlement has been good for the markets.\54\ While acknowledging that 
the answer is not clear, the commenter asks the Commission to consider 
whether it is now safe to return to the dominance of p.m.-settled index 
options and futures.\55\ However, this commenter submitted a subsequent 
letter in which he agreed with the Exchange that ``conditions today are 
vastly different'' from those that drove the transition to a.m. 
settlement.\56\ The commenter concludes that C2's proposal should be 
approved on a pilot basis, which would allow the Commission to collect 
data to closely analyze the impact of the proposal.\57\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \53\ See ISE Letter 1, supra note 4, at 4-5; ISE Letter 2, supra 
note 4, at 2-3; and Mayne Letter 1, supra note 4, at 1-2.
    \54\ See Mayne Letter 1, supra note 4, at 1 (noting that 
concerns with p.m. settlement ``led to the advent of the far more 
innocuous, and perhaps more fair `AM-Print' method of determining 
the final value for expiring index options. To judge by the 
abatement of the negative press, hindsight would seem to support 
that the AM-Print made for a more level playing field.'')
    \55\ See id. at 2.
    \56\ See Mayne Letter 2, supra note 4, at 1.
    \57\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A different commenter describes the history behind the transition 
to a.m. settlement and criticizes C2 for trivializing that history.\58\ 
This commenter argues that a mainstream return to the ``discredited'' 
p.m. settlement would ``risk undermining the operation of fair and 
orderly financial markets.'' \59\ The commenter notes that experience 
with the ``flash crash'' of May 6, 2010 demonstrates that the current 
market structure struggles to find price equilibriums, and that 
dispersed trading is a ``mirage'' as participants often flock to the 
same liquidity centers in time of stress.\60\ In its July comment 
letter, the commenter took a slightly different approach by arguing 
that fragmentation is the biggest change to the markets since 1987 when 
markets moved to a.m. settlement.\61\ The commenter notes that even 
with almost all volume concentrated on one exchange back in the 1980s, 
the markets could not address closing liquidity and volatility concerns 
and prevent market disruptions on ``triple witch'' settlement

[[Page 55974]]

dates.\62\ The commenter believes that fragmentation makes it almost 
impossible for any single market to concentrate liquidity at the close 
to produce an effective clearing price at times of market 
volatility.\63\ In addition, the commenter argues that exchange-
specific closing procedures are only applicable to trading on one 
exchange, which represents a small fraction of the overall market 
today, and therefore will have little ability to dampen market 
volatility.\64\ The commenter believes that C2's proposal would 
exacerbate liquidity strains by reintroducing an extraordinary market 
event--the triple witching hour--and argues that allowing S&P 500 index 
options to be based on closing settlement prices, even on a pilot 
basis, would re-introduce the potential for extreme market volatility 
at expiration.\65\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \58\ See ISE Letter 1, supra note 4, at 4.
    \59\ Id.
    \60\ See id.
    \61\ See ISE Letter 3, supra note 8, at 2.
    \62\ See id.
    \63\ See id.
    \64\ See id.
    \65\ See ISE Letter 1, supra note 4, at 5. This commenter also 
notes that recently-imposed circuit breakers in the cash equities 
markets do not apply in the final 25 minutes of trading. See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, the commenter states that Commission approval of C2's 
proposal would lead to the reintroduction of multiple p.m.-settled 
derivatives and argues that while the SPXPM pilot would be troubling, 
having multiple pilots operating simultaneously would undermine the 
industry-wide move to a.m. settlement.\66\ The Commission generally 
considers relevant information available to it at the time it reviews 
each filing in evaluating whether the filing is consistent with the 
Act.\67\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \66\ See ISE Letter 3, supra note 8, at 3.
    \67\ See 15 U.S.C. 78s(b) (concerning Commission consideration 
of proposed rule changes submitted by self-regulatory 
organizations).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Taking the opposite view, two commenters urge the Commission to 
approve the proposal on a pilot basis.\68\ One commenter asserts its 
belief that C2's proposal will not cause greater volatility in the 
underlying securities of the S&P 500 index.\69\ This commenter opines 
that whether an options contract is p.m.-settled as opposed to a.m.-
settled is not a contributing factor to volatility, and the commenter 
notes that there is more liquidity in the securities underlying the S&P 
500 index at the close compared to the opening.\70\ The commenter 
states that exchanges are well equipped to handle end-of-day volume and 
that existing p.m.-settled products do not contribute to increased 
volatility.\71\ The other commenter states that the reintroduction of 
p.m. settlement is long overdue and would attract liquidity from dark 
pools, crossing mechanisms, and the over-the-counter markets.\72\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \68\ See IMC Letter, supra note 4, at 1-2 and JP Letter, supra 
note 4.
    \69\ See IMC Letter, supra note 4, at 1.
    \70\ See id.
    \71\ See id. at 2.
    \72\ See JP Letter, supra note 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In its initial response to comments, C2 argues that the concerns 
from 18 years ago that led to the transition to a.m. settlement for 
index derivatives have been largely mitigated.\73\ C2 argues that 
expiration pressure in the underlying cash markets at the close has 
been greatly reduced with the advent of multiple primary listing and 
unlisted trading privilege markets, and that trading is now widely 
dispersed among many market centers.\74\ C2 further argues that opening 
procedures in the 1990s were deemed acceptable to mitigate one-sided 
order flow driven by index option expiration and that today's more 
sophisticated automated closing procedures should afford a similar, if 
not greater, level of comfort.\75\ Specifically, C2 notes that many 
markets, notably The NASDAQ Stock Market LLC (``Nasdaq'') and the NYSE, 
now utilize automated closing cross procedures and have closing order 
types that facilitate orderly closings, and that these closing 
procedures are well-equipped to mitigate imbalance pressure at the 
close.\76\ In addition, C2 believes that after-hours trading now 
provides market participants with an alternative to help offset market-
on-close imbalances.\77\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \73\ See C2 Response Letter, supra note 5, at 4.
    \74\ See id.
    \75\ See C2 Response Letter, supra note 5, at 4.
    \76\ See id.
    \77\ See id. at 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    C2 also notes that for roughly five years (1987-1992) CBOE listed 
both a.m.- and p.m.-settled SPX and did not observe any related market 
disruptions during that period in connection with the dual a.m./p.m. 
settlement.\78\ Finally, C2 believes that p.m.-settled options 
predominate in the over-the-counter (``OTC'') market, and C2 is not 
aware of any adverse effects in the underlying cash markets 
attributable to the considerable volume of OTC trading.\79\ C2 asserts 
that given the changes since the 1980s, concerns with p.m. settlement 
are ``misplaced'' and have been ``negated'' now that closing procedures 
on the cash equities markets have become more automated with real-time 
data feeds that are distributed to a wider array of market 
participants.\80\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \78\ See Notice, supra note 3, at 12776.
    \79\ See id.
    \80\ See C2 Response Letter, supra note 5, at 2 and 4. In its 
comment letter, ISE notes that C2's claim that electronic trading 
can smooth out the price-setting process is ``disingenuous'' as 
recent history suggests that the opposite may be true in some cases 
(such as the market events of May 6, 2010). See ISE Letter 1, supra 
note 4, at 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission agrees with C2 that the closing cross mechanisms on 
the primary listing stock markets have matured considerably since the 
late 1980s. Closing procedures used by the primary equity markets now 
offer a more transparent and automated process for attracting contra-
side interest and determining closing prices in a manner that is 
comparable to the process used to determine opening prices.\81\ The 
Commission recognizes, however, that the ability of such procedures to 
counter-balance any potential negative effects that could stem from 
p.m. settlement is dependent on their ability to attract liquidity in a 
fragmented market to the primary listing exchanges during a very 
concentrated window of time at the close of trading on expiration 
Fridays. Consequently, the potential effect that p.m.-settlement of 
cash-settled index options could have on the underlying cash equities 
markets at expiration remains unclear and the Commission remains 
concerned about

[[Page 55975]]

the possible effect on volatility at the close of a return to p.m. 
settlement for cash-settled index options.\82\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \81\ Nasdaq (see Nasdaq Rule 4754), NYSE (see NYSE Rule 123C), 
and NYSE Amex LLC (``NYSE Amex'') (see NYSE Amex Rule 123C) all have 
automated closing cross procedures for their equities markets, which 
are designed to attract liquidity, to determine a price for a 
security that minimizes any imbalance, and to match orders at the 
4:00 p.m. close. Participants of these exchanges generally receive 
frequently-disseminated market data reports reflecting any 
imbalance, which is intended to attract offsetting interest to 
minimize or eliminate an imbalance heading into the close. NYSE 
Arca, Inc. has closing procedures (NYSE Arca Rule 7.35), but it only 
conducts a closing cross for securities in which it is the primary 
listing market as well as for all exchange-listed derivatives.
    Additionally, to minimize the potential for price swings at the 
close, Nasdaq provides that the closing price must be within an 
acceptable range of 10% of the midpoint of the NBBO, while the NYSE 
permits the Designated Market Maker in a stock to request that the 
exchange extend its trading day to not longer than 4:30 p.m. to 
allow for the solicitation and entry of orders that are specifically 
solicited to offset an imbalance existing as of 4 p.m. To further 
minimize selling pressure at the NYSE, market-on-close and limit-on-
close orders may be entered after 3:45 p.m. only if they offset an 
imbalance. The NYSE also provides for closing-only orders that only 
execute if they offset an imbalance. The Commission views these 
closing cross procedures as a significant change in how orders are 
handled at the close of trading that could potentially help reduce 
volatility at the close caused by p.m. settlement.
    C2 also notes that SPXPM expiration dates would be predetermined 
and known in advance and, as a consequence, this awareness could 
facilitate the generation of contra-side trading interest. See C2 
Response Letter, supra note 5, at 3. The potential for reoccurring 
heightened volatility during these expiration periods may, however, 
increase the opportunity for manipulation and other abusive trading 
practices in anticipation of the liquidity constraints. To the 
extent such volatility was possible, active surveillance and robust 
enforcement activity by C2 and other self-regulatory organizations 
around expiration dates would help to address the potential for 
abusive trading.
    \82\ The Commission's concern with the potential effect that 
p.m.-settlement of cash-settled index options could have on the 
underlying cash equities markets at expiration takes into 
consideration, as C2 notes, that the use of closing prices by retail 
and institutions investors is widespread. See C2 Letter 3, supra 
note 8, at 6. For example, mutual funds use closing prices to 
calculate their net asset values. Therefore, any event or product 
that potentially introduces additional volatility into the process 
of determining closing prices has the potential to harm investors 
and the public interest.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    C2 cites to the Commission's recent approval of a series of 
proposals that authorized the expansion of a limited subset of options 
products to p.m. settlement along with data collected in connection 
with those products as revealing no evidence that p.m. settlement is 
likely to have a disruptive effect on volatility at the close.\83\ We 
do not believe that such an inference necessarily can be drawn. These 
prior approvals involved sub-categories of options that are generally 
characterized by relatively low volume and thus would not be expected 
to have a pronounced effect on volatility in the underlying securities 
at the close on expiration.\84\ Further, many of these products are not 
authorized for listing with expiration on the third Friday of a month 
when other cash-settled index derivatives expire. For example, C2 
mentions CBOE's experience with End-of-Week p.m.-settled options (which 
it notes is the most heavily traded of CBOE's new special-dated 
expiration products), and concludes that they fail to show any evidence 
of disruptive volatility on the settlement days for these 
contracts.\85\ Despite the fact that End-of-Week p.m.-settled options 
constitute over 7% of CBOE's S&P 500 index option volume, their volume 
does not compare to that of CBOE's SPX product, which accounts for 60% 
of all index options trading. For this reason, it is difficult to draw 
any conclusions about the potential impact of p.m.-settled S&P 500 
index options on the market for the underlying component stocks based 
on the existing p.m.-settled cash-settled options. Further, past 
experience suggests that the potential impact would be more significant 
if both index options and index futures (and options on index futures) 
were offered with p.m. settlement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \83\ See C2 Letter 3, supra note 8, at 4-5.
    \84\ We note that historical experience with respect to more 
heavily traded index options and index futures indicates that p.m. 
settlement carries additional risks for enhanced volatility on 
settlement days. See, e.g., Hans Stoll and Robert Whaley, Expiration 
Day Effects of Index Options & Futures (March 15, 1986) (concluding 
that price effects ``are observable on quarterly futures expirations 
* * * [and] [t]he volatility of prices is significantly higher on 
such expiration days, and the stock market indices tend to fall on 
such expiration days.'').
    \85\ See id. at 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    While the enhanced closing processes on the primary listing markets 
may serve to mitigate some of the risk that imbalances on the 
underlying cash markets prior to the close could lead to excess 
volatility, the extent of that mitigation is unclear. A pilot program 
would provide an opportunity to observe and analyze the actual effects 
on the underlying cash markets of SPXPM. Further, to the extent that 
trading interest is redirected to the primary markets during times of 
stress, as one commenter noted, it could be conducive to addressing an 
imbalance to concentrate liquidity on the primary markets during the 
close. In particular, those markets conduct automated closing cross 
procedures, described above,\86\ that are designed to more efficiently 
disseminate information broadly and attract and offset imbalances. We 
note, however, that despite C2's emphasis on the higher volumes in 
today's markets compared with the 1980s and the dispersion of trading 
to more venues,\87\ volume statistics are not necessarily indicative or 
predictive of the level of available liquidity.\88\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \86\ See supra note 81.
    \87\ See id.
    \88\ See, e.g., Findings Regarding the Market Events of May 6, 
2010, Report of the Staffs of the CFTC and SEC to the Joint Advisory 
Committee on Emerging Regulatory Issues, available at https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2010/marketevents-report.pdf, at page 6 
(``As the events of May 6 demonstrate, especially in times of 
significant volatility, high trading volume is not necessarily a 
reliable indicator of market liquidity.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, C2 estimates that 95% of OTC options based on the S&P 500 
index are p.m.-settled,\89\ and states that SPXPM will attract some of 
that trading interest. C2 notes that doing so would be consistent with 
the objectives of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act and could help mitigate counterparty risks faced by OTC 
market participants.\90\ The Commission agrees that the proposal could 
benefit investors to the extent it attracts trading in p.m.-settled S&P 
500 index options from the opaque OTC market to the more transparent 
exchange-listed markets.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \89\ See C2 Letter 3, supra note 8, at 13.
    \90\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Further, C2's proposal will offer investors another investment 
option through which they could obtain and hedge exposure to the S&P 
500 stocks. In addition, C2's proposal will provide investors with the 
ability to trade an option on the S&P 500 index in an all-electronic 
market, which may better meet the needs of investors who may prefer to 
trade electronically.\91\ Accordingly, C2's proposal will provide 
investors with added flexibility through an additional product that may 
be better tailored to meet their particular investment, hedging, and 
trading needs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \91\ See, e.g., Exchange Capital Resources Letter, supra note 8, 
at 3 (stating in part that ``* * * the addition of the SPXPM product 
will offer the investor greater flexibility and opportunity to 
participate in S&P 500 option product line.'')
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To assist the Commission in assessing any potential impact of a 
p.m.-settled S&P 500 index option on the options markets as well as the 
underlying cash equities markets, as discussed above,\92\ C2 has 
proposed to submit data to the Commission on a confidential basis in 
connection with the pilot. The Commission believes that C2's proposed 
fourteen-month pilot, together with the data and analysis that C2 will 
provide to the Commission, will allow C2 and the Commission to monitor 
for and assess the potential for adverse market effects. Specifically, 
the data and analysis will assist the Commission in evaluating the 
effect of allowing p.m. settlement for S&P 500 index options on the 
underlying component stocks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \92\ See Section II (Description of the Proposal).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In light of the fact that approval of C2's proposal would be a 
change from a.m. settlement for cash-settled index options, the 
Commission instituted proceedings to determine whether to approve or 
disapprove the proposal. In particular, through specific requests for 
comment and data, the Commission solicited input from market 
participants on the potential impact on the markets, particularly the 
underlying cash equities markets.
    As discussed above, the Commission remains concerned about the 
potential impact on the market at expiration for the underlying 
component stocks for a p.m.-settled, cash-settled index option such as 
SPXPM. The potential impact today remains unclear, given the 
significant changes in the closing procedures of the primary markets 
over the past two decades. The Commission is mindful of the historical 
experience with the impact of p.m. settlement of cash-settled index 
derivatives on the underlying cash markets, discussed at length above, 
but recognizes, however, that these risks may be mitigated today by the 
enhanced closing procedures that are now in use at the primary equity 
markets.
    Finally, approval of C2's proposal on a pilot basis will enable the 
Commission to collect current data to assess and monitor for any 
potential for impact on markets, including the underlying cash

[[Page 55976]]

equities markets. In particular, the data collected from C2's pilot 
program will help inform the Commission's consideration of whether the 
SPXPM pilot should be modified, discontinued, extended, or permanently 
approved. It also could benefit investors and the public interest to 
the extent it attracts trading in p.m.-settled S&P 500 index options 
from the opaque OTC market to the more transparent exchange-listed 
markets, where trading in the product will b
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