Program Integrity: Gainful Employment-Debt Measures, 34386-34539 [2011-13905]
Download as PDF
34386
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
34 CFR Part 668
RIN 1840–AD06
[Docket ID ED–2010–OPE–0012]
Program Integrity: Gainful
Employment—Debt Measures
Office of Postsecondary
Education, Department of Education.
ACTION: Final regulations.
AGENCY:
The Secretary amends the
Student Assistance General Provisions
regulations to improve disclosure of
relevant information and to establish
minimal measures for determining
whether certain postsecondary
educational programs lead to gainful
employment in recognized occupations,
and the conditions under which these
educational programs remain eligible for
the student financial assistance
programs authorized under title IV of
the Higher Education Act of 1965, as
amended (HEA).
DATES: These regulations are effective
July 1, 2012.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: John
Kolotos or Fred Sellers for general
information only. Telephone: (202) 502–
7805. Any other questions or requests
for information regarding these final
regulations must be submitted to: GEQuestions@ed.gov.
If you use a telecommunications
device for the deaf (TDD), call the
Federal Relay Service (FRS), toll free, at
1–800–877–8339.
Individuals with disabilities can
obtain this document in an accessible
format (e.g., braille, large print,
audiotape, or computer diskette) on
request to one of the contact persons
listed under FOR FURTHER INFORMATION
CONTACT.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
SUMMARY:
Executive Summary
Institutions providing gainful
employment programs offer important
opportunities to Americans seeking to
expand their skills and earn
postsecondary degrees and certificates.
For-profit institutions offer many
quality programs, but in some instances,
these programs leave large numbers of
students with unaffordable debts and
poor employment prospects.
The Department of Education has a
particularly strong interest in ensuring
that institutions that are heavily reliant
on Federal funding promote student
academic and career opportunities.
These final gainful employment
regulations are designed to (1) provide
institutions with better metrics and
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
more time to assess their program
outcomes and thereby a greater
opportunity to improve the performance
of their gainful employment programs
before those programs lose eligibility for
Federal student aid funds, and (2)
identify accurately the worst performing
gainful employment programs. At the
same time, the final regulations require
that these federally funded programs
meet minimal standards because
students and taxpayers have too much
at stake to allow otherwise.
The Higher Education Act of 1965, as
amended (HEA), has long provided for
the extension of financial aid to
students attending postsecondary
programs that ‘‘lead to gainful
employment in a recognized
occupation,’’ including nearly all
programs at for-profit institutions and
certificate programs at public and nonprofit institutions. For-profit
institutions, in particular, are a diverse,
innovative, and fast-growing group of
institutions. By pioneering creative
course schedules and online programs
and serving nontraditional students,
many of these institutions have
developed impressive, beneficial
practices that both public and non-profit
institutions might emulate. In recent
months, a number of institutions have
taken promising steps to improve the
value of the programs they offer to
students by offering free trial and
orientation periods, closing
underperforming programs, and
investing more in their faculty and
curricula. These reforms may serve
students well and improve performance
as measured under these final
regulations.
At the same time, for-profit
institutions typically charge higher
tuitions for their programs than do their
public and non-profit counterparts.
They also have higher net prices, a
measure of how much students pay after
receiving grant aid, such as Federal Pell
Grants. As a result, students on average
assume more debt to enroll in a program
than do their peers who attend public or
private, nonprofit institutions.
We also have concerns about
recruitment practices and completion
rates for particular programs offered by
for-profit institutions. The Government
Accountability Office (GAO) and other
investigators have found evidence of
high-pressure and deceptive recruiting
practices at for-profit institutions. These
recruiting practices may contribute to
low graduation rates. First-time students
enrolling in four-year institutions in
2004 were only about half as likely to
earn any kind of degree or certificate by
2009 if they began their postsecondary
education at a for-profit institution than
PO 00000
Frm 00002
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
if they began their postsecondary
education at a public institution.
National Center for Education Statistics,
2004/2009 Beginning Postsecondary
Students Longitudinal Study.
Proprietary institutions market their
programs to students by emphasizing
the value of the program against the cost
to the student. This approach is often
called the value proposition of the
program and is meant to portray to
students the value of the specific
program offerings to that student’s
career goals. It is this posture that
distinguishes programs ‘‘that lead to
gainful employment in a recognized
occupation’’ as set forth in the HEA.
These final regulations reflect the
Department’s policy determination that
students are not adequately protected by
the Department’s current regulatory
framework, which focuses on
institutional level information. By
defining what it means to provide
training leading to gainful employment
for each program that is eligible to
receive title IV, HEA funds, the
Department believes that students will
be better served and the Department
will have improved how it carries out
its obligation to ensure program
integrity.
Some have argued that cohort default
rates, measured at the institutional
level, already provide a measure of
whether student debt is at appropriate
levels. The Department believes that
those measures are properly
supplemented and complemented by
those outlined here. The Department’s
experience with the CDR is that it
operates for particular purposes and
that, among other things, it does not
identify the harm to students that can
come from enrolling in a specific
program that leaves them with high
education debts and limited job
opportunities. An institution’s average
default rate does not measure the effect
of any individual program, and that
information alone does not provide a
student with a measure of whether he or
she will be able to achieve a career goal
and pay off loan debt. Moreover, the
default rate does not take account of the
possibility that many students are
struggling to repay their loans, such as
those receiving economic hardship
deferments or who are in income-based
repayment. These are students who are
seeing their loans grow, rather than
shrink, because their incomes are low
and their debts are high. As a result the
default rate is a better measurement of
the potential loss to taxpayers than of
the repayment burden on borrowers.
The Department is adopting in these
final regulations a definition of
programs that provide training leading
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
to gainful employment in a recognized
occupation in order to provide students
with a measure of the particular
program they are considering taking.
This program-level assessment is further
reflected in the way in which we have
required disclosures of information and
in the care we have taken with
regulating the development of new
programs once a program has failed to
meet the measures in the regulation.
The regulations we are adopting will
help to protect students by removing
eligibility from the worst performing
programs that fail the minimum
requirements, while providing
institutions with incentives to improve
the performance of their programs under
the measures and create better outcomes
for the students enrolled in those
programs.
Institutional measures of eligibility
often fail to reveal the effects of
providing bad outcomes to students in
the particular programs that they offer.
Most of the revenues of for-profit
institutions come from Pell Grants and
Federal student loans. The revenues of
these institutions are dependent on the
number of students they enroll in their
programs; they are not otherwise
dependent on whether their students
graduate, find jobs, and ultimately repay
their loans. Thus, if one of these
students defaults on her or his loan, the
institution’s revenues are unlikely to be
affected and the blended cohort default
rates calculated for an institution tend
to mask the harms to students that are
coming from only a few bad programs
offered at an institution. For students,
however, the consequences of an
unaffordable loan are severe. For the
2008 cohort year, 46 percent of student
loans (weighted by dollars) borrowed by
students at two-year for-profit
institutions are expected to go into
default over the life of the loans,
compared to 16 percent of loans
borrowed by students across all types of
institutions.
Former students who are not gainfully
employed and cannot afford to repay
their loans face very serious challenges.
Discharging Federal student loans in
bankruptcy is very rare. The common
consequences of default include large
fees—collection costs that can add 25
percent to the outstanding loan
balance—and interest charges; struggles
to rent or buy a home, buy a car, or get
a job; collection agency actions,
including lawsuits and garnishment of
wages; and the loss of tax refunds and
even Social Security benefits. Moreover,
borrowers in default are no longer
entitled to any deferments or
forbearances and may be ineligible for
any additional student aid until they
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
have reestablished a good repayment
history.
Consistent with the HEA’s
requirements, to be eligible to
participate in the title IV, HEA
programs, certain institutions must
provide an eligible program leading to
gainful employment in a recognized
occupation. The Department’s goals in
promulgating these regulations are to
ensure that (1) students who enroll in
these programs do not have to face these
difficult challenges, because they are
equipped to secure gainful employment
rather than being left with unaffordable
debts and poor employment prospects,
and (2) the Federal investment of title
IV, HEA student aid dollars is well
spent.
The Department began its efforts in
this area with regulations designed to
help students make informed choices
about postsecondary education
programs in 2009 by conducting a series
of public hearings and negotiated
rulemaking sessions. It published two
notices of proposed rulemaking
(NPRMs) in 2010. The Department’s
proposed regulations emphasized the
use of disclosure mechanisms to
provide students and the public with
critical information about the
performance of gainful employment
programs. On October 29, 2010, the
Department published regulations (75
FR 66832) (Program Integrity Issues
final regulations) requiring institutions
with programs that prepare students for
gainful employment in a recognized
occupation to disclose key performance
information about each program on their
Web site and in promotional materials
to prospective students. The required
elements include the program cost, ontime completion rate, placement rate,
median loan debt, and other information
for programs that prepare students for
gainful employment in recognized
occupations.
Since publishing the final regulations,
the Department has published in the
Federal Register on April 13, 2011, a
draft disclosure template for public
comment (76 FR 20635). The
Department intends to finalize this
disclosure template by the fall of 2011
so that it is available for use by
institutions by July 1, 2012. The
disclosure template will automate the
process by which institutions can
prepare the required disclosures and
will include links to provide the
appropriate Web sites of other
institutions offering the same program
that participate in the title IV, HEA
student aid programs, thus allowing
students to compare similar programs.
With this template, and consistent with
section 4 of Executive Order 13563, the
PO 00000
Frm 00003
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
34387
Department is thus attempting to foster
informed decisions and to improve the
operation of the market through
‘‘disclosure requirements as well as
provision of information to the public in
a form that is clear and intelligible.’’
The Program Integrity Issues final
regulations also included significant
new regulations that we designed to
protect consumers from misleading or
overly aggressive recruiting practices,
and to clarify State oversight
responsibilities. These regulations took
significant steps to curbing fraud and
abuse in the Federal student aid
programs by strengthening existing
requirements that are designed to
protect students and taxpayers. Among
these changes were the strengthening of
our misrepresentation regulations to
provide the Department greater
authority to take action against
institutions engaging in deceptive
advertising, marketing, and sales
practices. The regulations also eliminate
‘‘safe harbors’’ that allowed questionable
recruitment practices that often
included institutions paying incentive
compensation to recruiters. Too often
this type of compensation leads to
overly aggressive recruiting practices
that encouraged students to take out
loans they could not afford or enroll in
programs for which they were
unqualified or in which it was unlikely
they could succeed. Additionally, the
Program Integrity Issues final
regulations took a needed step toward
ensuring that States are taking necessary
steps to ensure the appropriate oversight
of the postsecondary education being
provided by institutions by establishing
minimum steps that States must take to
meet their important responsibility
under the HEA to protect students,
including for institutions that offer
distance or correspondence education.
These final regulations, Gainful
Employment—Debt Measures, reflect a
number of significant changes and
improvements from the July 26, 2010
NPRM in response to public comments.
The changes and improvements are
designed to provide a better measure of
whether a program provides training
that will lead to gainful employment in
a recognized occupation. They reflect
alterations from the proposed
regulations designed to (1) Provide
better program information to students,
(2) identify the worst performing
programs, and (3) create appropriate
flexibility and provide institutions the
opportunity to improve their programs
before losing title IV, HEA program
eligibility. These changes are also
designed to minimize the costs for
regulated institutions, while providing
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
34388
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
considerable benefits both to students at
regulated institutions and to taxpayers.
The regulations emphasize the
importance of disclosing program
information and take several further
steps to promote informed decisions.
Thus, under the final regulations,
institutions must disclose to the public,
and the Secretary may also disseminate
to the public, information about how
each of an institution’s programs are
performing under the debt measures
that we are establishing in these final
regulations. The Department is
considering additional steps to promote
the comparison of programs and to
facilitate access to this information. In
keeping with the emphasis on
disclosure, the regulations also provide
that during the first two years that a
program fails the debt measures, the
institution must provide warnings to
students. To promote informed student
choice, these warnings must be
provided to students sufficiently in
advance of enrolling to permit the
student time to consider whether to
enroll in the program.
While increasing the level of
disclosure is critical, the Department
recognizes that information alone is
unlikely fully to promote the goals of
the HEA and to ensure that programs
provide training that leads to gainful
employment in a recognized
occupation. Students enrolling in a
postsecondary program often have
limited background information about a
program and little or no experience
choosing among postsecondary
programs. High-pressure sales tactics by
institutions may also make it difficult
for individuals to choose carefully
among programs. Therefore, the
Department is setting minimum
standards to measure whether programs
are providing training that leads to
gainful employment in a recognized
occupation.
To provide an additional layer of
protection for students and taxpayers,
the Department is defining a set of
measures that identifies the lowest
performing programs by focusing on the
ability of students to repay their student
loans. Under these measures, a program
is now considered to lead to gainful
employment if it has a repayment rate
of at least 35 percent or its annual loan
payment under the debt-to-earnings
ratios is 12 percent or less of annual
earnings or 30 percent or less of
discretionary income. Under the
regulations, only after failing both debt
measures for three out of four fiscal
years does a program lose eligibility.
These regulations set minimum
standards and are designed to provide
flexibility, specifically allowing
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
programs an opportunity to improve
their performance before losing title IV,
HEA program eligibility. The
Department believes that these measures
will improve the operation of free
markets by identifying the poorest
performing programs and strengthening
institutions’ incentive to provide an
affordable quality education.
Background of Rulemaking Proceedings
On September 9, 2009, the Secretary
announced the Department’s intent to
establish two negotiated rulemaking
committees to develop proposed
regulations under title IV of the HEA
through a notice in the Federal Register
(74 FR 46399). The Secretary
established one committee to develop
proposed regulations governing foreign
schools and another committee to
develop proposed regulations to
improve integrity in the title IV, HEA
programs. Team I—Program Integrity
Issues (Team I) met to develop proposed
regulations during the months of
November 2009 through January 2010;
however, no consensus on the proposed
regulations was reached during the
negotiations. After Team I’s negotiations
concluded, the Department published
two NPRMs.
On June 18, 2010, the Secretary
published the first NPRM in the Federal
Register (75 FR 34806) (June 18, 2010
NPRM) proposing to strengthen and
improve the administration of programs
authorized under title IV of the HEA.
With regard to gainful employment, the
June 18, 2010 NPRM included proposals
covering several technical, reporting,
and disclosure issues. The June 18, 2010
NPRM reserved for a second NPRM the
remaining gainful employment issues,
which addressed the extent to which
certain educational programs lead to
gainful employment and the conditions
under which those programs remain
eligible for title IV, HEA program funds.
On July 26, 2010, the Secretary
published a second NPRM for gainful
employment issues in the Federal
Register (75 FR 43616) (July 26, 2010
NPRM). In the July 26, 2010 NPRM, the
Secretary proposed to—
• Establish debt thresholds based on
debt-to-income and repayment rate
measures that a program at an
institution would need to meet in order
to demonstrate that it provides training
that leads to gainful employment in a
recognized occupation and
consequently to remain eligible for title
IV, HEA funds;
• Establish a tiered eligibility system
under which a program may have
unrestricted eligibility, may have
restricted eligibility, or may become
PO 00000
Frm 00004
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
ineligible to participate in the title IV,
HEA programs;
• Establish consequences for a
program with a restricted eligibility
status, including requirements to
provide debt warning disclosures to
current and prospective students that
they may have difficulty repaying loans
obtained for attending the program;
employer affirmations that the program
curriculum is appropriately aligned
with recognized occupations at the
employers’ businesses and that there is
a demand for those occupations; and
limits on enrollment of title IV, HEA
program recipients in that program;
• Provide that a program becomes
ineligible if it does not meet at least one
of the debt thresholds for one award
year;
• Specify that the institution may not
disburse any title IV, HEA program
funds to students who subsequently
begin attending a program determined
to be ineligible, but may disburse title
IV, HEA program funds to students who
began attending the program before it
became ineligible for the remainder of
the award year and for the award year
following the date of the Secretary’s
notice that the program is ineligible;
• Establish a transition year in which
the Secretary would cap the number of
programs that would be classified as
ineligible for the first year after the
regulations take effect;
• Add a definition of The
Classification of Instructional Programs
(CIP);
• Permit the Secretary to place on
provisional certification an institution
that has one or more of its programs
determined to be subject to the
eligibility limitations or determined
ineligible under the gainful employment
provisions; and
• Establish that in a termination
action against a program for not meeting
the gainful employment standards, the
hearing official would accept, as
accurate, earnings information for
students that was obtained by the
Department from another Federal
agency, but would consider alternate
earnings data as long as that data was
reliable for the same students.
The Department reviewed the
comments from both the June 18, 2010
NPRM and the July 26, 2010 NPRM and
divided the final regulations into three
separate documents. On October 29,
2010, the Secretary published both the
first and second sets of final regulations
in the Federal Register (75 FR 66832
and 75 FR 66665) (Program Integrity
Issues and Gainful Employment/New
Programs final regulations, respectively)
with effective dates, generally, of July 1,
2011.
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
The Program Integrity Issues final
regulations (75 FR 66832)—
• Clarified that only certificate or
credentialed nondegree programs of at
least one academic year that are offered
by a public or nonprofit institution of
higher education are gainful
employment programs;
• Updated the definition of the term
recognized occupation to reflect current
usage;
• Established requirements for
institutions to submit information on
students who attend or complete
programs that prepare students for
gainful employment in recognized
occupations; and
• Established requirements for
institutions to submit information on
students who attend or complete
programs that prepare students for
gainful employment in recognized
occupations; and
• Established requirements for
institutions to disclose on their Web site
and in promotional materials to
prospective students, the on-time
graduation rate for students completing
a program, placement rate, median loan
debt, program costs, and any other
information the Secretary provided to
the institution about the program.
The Gainful Employment/New
Programs final regulations (75 FR
66665)—
• Established a process under which
an institution applies to the Secretary
for approval to offer additional
educational programs that lead to
gainful employment in a recognized
occupation.
These final regulations, Gainful
Employment—Debt Measures, comprise
the third set of regulations and reflect a
number of significant changes from the
proposed regulations in response to
public comments. We received over
90,000 comments in response to the July
26, 2010 NPRM. These included tens of
thousands of comments supporting our
proposals and tens of thousands
opposing them. Subsequent to our
issuance of the Gainful Employment/
New Programs final regulations, we also
met with more than 100 individuals and
organizations to permit these
individuals and entities to clarify their
comments in person. The Department
extended its work on the regulations by
six additional months to consider fully
these comments. Consistent with
Executive Order 13563, the result of this
unprecedented public engagement is
stronger regulations that (1) Are based
on careful consideration of both the
costs and benefits (both quantitative and
qualitative) of the regulations; (2)
incorporate many suggestions to allow
flexible approaches for the regulated
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
entities; and (3) balance the concerns of
those on both sides of the ‘‘gainful
employment’’ issue.
The final regulations will:
• Give all programs three years to
improve their performance. The
Department will begin by giving
institutions data to help them identify
and improve their failing programs and
to help current and prospective students
make informed choices. The first
programs could lose eligibility based
upon their performance under the debt
measures calculated for fiscal year (FY)
2014 and released in 2015, rather than
FY 2012 as proposed.
• Target only the worst performing
failing programs by:
(1) Permitting an institution to
maintain a program’s title IV, HEA
program eligibility until the program
fails both the debt-to-earnings ratios and
repayment rate measures for three out of
four FYs, similar to the multi-year
measures used to assess cohort default
rates (CDRs) at an institution;
(2) Limiting the number of programs
that will lose eligibility based on the
debt measures calculated for only FY
2014 under § 668.7(k) to the worst
performing 5 percent of programs
(weighted by enrollment); and
(3) Eliminating enrollment restrictions
that the Department had proposed in the
July 26, 2010 NPRM to apply to all
programs with repayment rates below
45 percent and an annual loan payment
that is more than 20 percent of
discretionary income or 8 percent of
annual earnings.
• Improve the repayment rate and
debt-to-earnings ratios measures based
on extensive public comment by:
(1) Revising the measures such that a
program is now considered to lead to
gainful employment if it has a
repayment rate of at least 35 percent or
its annual loan payment under the debtto-earnings ratios is 12 percent or less of
annual earnings or 30 percent or less of
discretionary income;
(2) Allowing institutions to
demonstrate that their programs meet
the debt-to-earnings ratios with
alternative reliable earnings
information, including use of State data,
survey data, or Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS) data during a
transitional period;
(3) Measuring performance in years
three and four of repayment, rather than
years one through four, to examine more
typical years in the life cycle of a loan
(with a provision to use years three
through six where necessary to ensure
that more than 30 borrowers or
completers are included in the
measurement and additional
adjustments to address the needs of
PO 00000
Frm 00005
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
34389
programs that are improving their
performance, graduate programs, and
medical and dental programs);
(4) Measuring debt burdens based on
an assumption that loans are repaid over
10 to 20 years depending on the level
of degree, rather than 10 years for all
programs as was originally proposed.
Loan debt will be amortized over 10
years for undergraduate or postbaccalaureate certificate and associate’s
degree programs, 15 years for bachelor’s
and master’s degree programs, and 20
years for programs that lead to a
doctoral or first-professional degree;
(5) Limiting debt in the debt-toearnings ratio calculation to tuition and
fee charges for a specific educational
program, if this information is provided
by the institution, thereby providing
programs relief for loans taken for
indirect educational costs, including
living expenses;
(6) Providing that borrowers who
meet their obligations under incomesensitive repayment plans are
considered to be successfully repaying
their loans even if their payments are
smaller than accrued interest, so long as
the program at issue does not have
unusually large numbers of students in
those categories; and
(7) Providing that a program is
considered to satisfy the debt measures
if the number of students who
completed the program or the number of
borrowers whose loans entered
repayment during the relevant four-year
period is 30 or fewer.
• Improve the disclosure of
information about programs by:
(1) Providing in § 668.7(g)(6) that the
Secretary may disseminate the final debt
measures and information about, or
related to, the debt measures to the
public in any time, manner, and form,
including publishing information that
will allow the public to ascertain how
well programs perform under the debt
measures and other appropriate
objective metrics. The Department is
considering appropriate ways to provide
these metrics and other key indicators to
facilitate access to the information and
the comparison of programs;
(2) Requiring that an institution with
a failing program that does not meet the
minimum standards specified in the
regulations must provide warnings to
enrolled and prospective students;
(3) Requiring that the debt warnings
for prospective students must be
provided at the time the student first
contacts the institution to request
information about the program. The
institution may not enroll the student
until three days after the debt warnings
are first provided to the student. If more
than 30 days pass from the date the debt
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
34390
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
warnings are first provided to the
student and the date the student seeks
to enroll in the program, the institution
must provide the debt warnings again
and may not enroll the student until
three days after the debt warnings are
most recently provided to the student;
and
(4) Requiring an institution to disclose
the repayment rate and the debt-toearnings ratio (based on total earnings)
of its gainful employment programs.
• Establish restrictions on
reestablishing eligibility of ineligible
programs, new programs that are
substantially similar to an ineligible
program, and failing programs that are
voluntarily discontinued by the
institution.
In sum, the Department has revised
these regulations to promote disclosure,
to encourage institutions to improve
their occupational programs, and to
provide more time for this improvement
before revoking eligibility. The
Department believes that institutions
will strengthen their educational
programs to meet these higher
standards, and relatively few programs
will fail. Programs that offer a rewarding
education at an affordable price will
prosper, and institutions will continue
to innovate to serve students and
taxpayers.
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
Implementation Date of These
Regulations
Section 482(c) of the HEA requires
that regulations affecting programs
under title IV of the HEA be published
in final form by November 1 prior to the
start of the award year (July 1) to which
they apply. However, that section also
permits the Secretary to designate any
regulation as one that an entity subject
to the regulation may choose to
implement earlier and to specify the
conditions under which the entity may
implement the provisions early.
The Secretary has not designated any
of the provisions in these final
regulations for early implementation.
Therefore these final regulations are
effective July 1, 2012.
Commitment to Continuing
Retrospective Review
As discussed further under the
heading Executive Orders 12866 and
13563, consistent with Executive Order
13563’s emphasis on measuring ‘‘actual
results’’ and on retrospective review of
regulations, the Department intends to
monitor the implementation of these
regulations carefully, consider new data
as they become available to ensure
against unintended adverse
consequences, and reconsider relevant
issues if the evidence warrants. We
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
recognize that, despite the Department’s
diligent efforts and extensive public
input, there are limitations in the best
available data and there remains some
uncertainty about the impact of these
final regulations, such as the number of
programs that will be identified as
ineligible.
In early 2012, the Department will
calculate and share with institutions, for
informational purposes only,
performance data for programs subject
to these regulations. Thus, institutions
and the Department will have
preliminary information about the
performance of particular programs a
full year before any programs could be
labeled failing and three years before
any programs could lose eligibility. This
implementation schedule will allow the
Department ample time to consider
relevant evidence and data and to
examine the performance of programs
under the regulations. This collection of
data, in conjunction with the agency’s
intention to evaluate the outcomes of
these regulations, is consistent both
with Executive Order 13563 and the
Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs’ February 2, 2011 memorandum
(OMB M–11–19) on Executive Order
13563, which emphasizes the
importance of ‘‘empirical testing of the
effects of rules both in advance and
retrospectively,’’ and which encourages
future regulations to be ‘‘designed and
written in ways that facilitate evaluation
of their consequences and thus promote
retrospective analyses.’’ The Department
will continue to explore the effects of
the regulations. Among other things, the
Department will examine the type and
number of programs determined to be
failing and ineligible, and it will
consider whether these final regulations
should be reconsidered or amended in
furtherance of its goals of protecting
students and taxpayers against
educational programs that leave
students with unaffordable debts and
poor employment prospects.
Analysis of Comments and Changes
As indicated earlier, over 90,000
parties submitted comments on the July
26, 2010 NPRM. Many of these
comments were substantially similar.
We have reviewed all of the comments.
Generally, we do not address minor,
nonsubstantive changes, recommended
changes that the law does not authorize
the Secretary to make, or comments
pertaining to operational processes.
General
Comment Process
Comment: The Department received
over 90,000 comments on the July 26,
PO 00000
Frm 00006
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
2010 NPRM. Of those comments,
approximately 25 percent were in
support of our proposed regulations and
approximately 75 percent were
opposed. We received comments from
numerous categories of individuals,
including students, families, employees
of institutions of higher education,
school presidents, congressional and
other governmental leaders, advocacy
groups, State and local associations,
trade associations, and businesses. The
comments received varied in content
and length from extremely short
responses to complex and lengthy
economic and legal analyses. The vast
majority of the comments, however,
were similar, largely duplicative, and
apparently generated through petition
drives and letter-writing campaigns.
Generally, these commenters did not
provide any specific recommendations
beyond general support of or opposition
to the proposed regulations. Many of the
commenters—both those in support of,
and in opposition to, specific
provisions—indicated that they
supported the goals and intent behind
the proposed regulations. Specifically,
commenters across all sectors of higher
education as well as the student and
consumer advocacy groups believed that
the goal of ensuring student loan debt is
affordable is an admirable one.
Some of the commenters did not
express substantive comments on the
proposed regulations or their effects. For
instance, a number of the commenters,
particularly those from students, simply
said ‘‘No,’’ or asked that the Department
not ‘‘take away my student loans.’’
Supporters of the proposed
regulations praised the Department’s
transparency and commitment to
improving the integrity of the title IV,
HEA student aid programs. Some
commenters praised the amount of
information and data that the
Department released with the NPRM
and subsequently on the Department’s
Web site. Other commenters believed
that the Department had taken
appropriate steps to gather public input
and to craft regulations that protect
students by regulating programs that
claim to prepare students for gainful
employment, yet leave students with
large amounts of debt and unprepared
for employment in recognized
occupations. These commenters
suggested that the proposed regulations
would help to ensure that employers
can hire well-qualified employees and
that taxpayer dollars are spent wisely
and effectively. Some of the commenters
believed that the proposed regulations
provide for much-needed enforcement
authority.
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
Commenters who opposed the
proposed regulations believed that the
proposed regulations would have a
number of unintended effects and
suggested that the regulations would
produce results counter to the
President’s economic and educational
goals. These commenters also stated that
the proposed regulations would be
overly burdensome and discriminatory;
represent an overreaching of the
Department’s authority; unfairly punish
institutions for students’ choices after
graduating; disproportionately affect atrisk and underserved populations of
students; and limit the growth of, and
innovation in, new programs. The
commenters recommended that the
Department address these concerns by
delaying the implementation of the
regulations, considering alternatives to
the debt-to-earnings and repayment rate
metrics, and exempting certain types of
institutions or programs from
compliance with the regulations. While
making a number of suggestions and
recommendations, the commenters
generally expressed a desire to work
with the Department to provide
additional information and insight to
craft metrics that they believed would
achieve the intended result of reducing
student loan debt and helping students
to obtain gainful employment.
Discussion: The Department
appreciates the numerous comments we
received in support of the proposed
regulations as well as those we received
that expressed concerns about them.
Specific issues raised by the
commenters are addressed in the
relevant topical discussions. These
comments were instrumental in
identifying ways the Department could
design final regulations that provide
benefits to students, minimize costs to
regulated institutions, and provide
institutions with greater flexibility to
achieve regulatory compliance.
Changes: Changes made in response
to the commenters’ specific concerns are
addressed in the relevant topical
discussions.
Timing of Implementation
Comment: Some commenters urged
the Department to implement these
regulations as early as possible, arguing
that students, consumers, and taxpayers
need protection now and cannot afford
to wait for these regulations to go into
effect a few years in the future. Some of
these commenters noted that putting
provisions into effect, perhaps in a
transitional form, would spur
institutions with poorly performing
programs to invest in program
improvements and student services,
such as career counseling and job
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
placement assistance, to improve
student outcomes.
Some commenters asked the
Department to delay the implementation
of the regulations for a number of
reasons. Some asked for the Department
to delay implementation until the
results of a forthcoming GAO study on
proprietary schools are available. Other
commenters requested a delay to allow
Congress time to debate and pass a law
on the definition of ‘‘gainful
employment.’’ These commenters
argued that Congress, not the
Department, appropriately has this
authority. Some of the commenters also
suggested a delay to allow time to see
the effect of the additional disclosures
and reporting requirements under the
final regulations that will take effect
July 1, 2011 (75 FR 66833–66975). Some
commenters requested a delay until
Congress acts to provide authority to
institutions to limit loan funds to
institutional charges.
Commenters requested that the
Department apply the metrics only to
students who enroll after the final
regulations are published. These
commenters argued that schools should
not be held accountable for an outcome
that was not defined at the time the
students attended the program and that
it would be unfair to judge schools on
metrics that they could have influenced
at the time, when the quality of the
programs and the outcomes for the
students may be improving.
Commenters noted that the Department
should delay enforcing the regulations
so programs have an opportunity to
improve, and that programs that are
improving may not be able to satisfy the
metrics immediately given that the
metrics measure outcomes from
students who graduated in past years.
A few commenters asked the
Department to provide draft metrics to
institutions before their programs would
be subject to sanctions. The commenters
encouraged the Department to use the
new, three-year CDR as a model for how
any new metrics on gainful employment
could be phased in over time. They
further stated that delayed
implementation would give schools
time to improve their programs and debt
counseling advice to meet the metrics as
well as time to discontinue programs
that are not meeting the metrics.
Some commenters requested further
actions within the negotiated
rulemaking process. Commenters
requested that the Department issue
these regulations as an interim final rule
so that the public would have an
opportunity to submit additional
comments and, perhaps, to permit
further modifications to the regulations
PO 00000
Frm 00007
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
34391
based on those comments. Other
commenters recommended that the
Department extend the 45-day public
comment period to allow a full analysis
of the breadth and complexity of the
proposed regulations. They further
suggested that the Department would
benefit from further information from
institutions on the details involved with
compliance before implementation. A
few commenters requested that the
Department engage in another round of
negotiated rulemaking so that
participants could focus solely on an
appropriate definition of gainful
employment. These commenters
believed that more analysis and
discussion of the proposed regulations
are needed before they become final.
Some commenters suggested that the
gainful employment metrics should
apply no earlier than July 1, 2014, and
sanctions for ineligible programs should
apply on or after July 1, 2016, arguing
that these timeframes would give
institutions an adequate opportunity to
comply with the new requirements.
Discussion: We appreciate the
concerns of the commenters who urged
the Department to implement these
regulations as early as possible.
However, based on the concerns of other
commenters, we believe it is desirable to
extend the implementation schedule of
these final regulations. In that regard,
we agree that institutions should have
the opportunity to improve program
performance against the metrics before
being subject to significant sanctions.
The adjustments to the regulations
reflecting these changes are discussed
more fully under the relevant topical
discussions.
We do not agree with commenters
that we should delay implementing the
final regulations until a third party takes
some action such as waiting for a GAO
study to be available. We have already
undertaken extensive efforts to analyze
the impact of these regulations and
gather public comments. We also
believe the need to remove poorly
performing programs is too great to wait
for third-party actions.
We do not agree that further actions
need to be taken within the rulemaking
process such as issuing interim final
regulations, providing an additional
comment period, or renegotiating the
proposed regulations. Given the
Department’s extensive efforts to solicit
and respond to comments from the
public, including public hearings, three
sessions of negotiations, additional
meetings with interested parties, and
the over 90,000 comments received, we
do not believe it is necessary to reopen
the rulemaking process and delay
publishing these final regulations.
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
34392
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
Changes: Changes made in response
to the commenters’ specific concerns are
addressed in the relevant topical
discussions.
Legal Authority
Comments: A number of commenters
objected to the proposed regulations in
whole or in part, claiming that no
changes to the HEA require the
Secretary to define the term ‘‘gainful
employment,’’ and that the term cannot
now be defined since Congress left it
undisturbed during its periodic
reauthorizations of the HEA. Some
commenters expressed the view that the
framework of detailed requirements
under the HEA programs that includes
institutional measures using cohort
default rates, disclosure requirements
for institutions, restrictions on student
loan borrowing, and other financial aid
requirements prevents the Department
from adopting debt measures to
determine the eligibility for these
programs. Other commenters noted that
it was unfair for the Department to
propose these requirements for some
programs and not others. Some
commenters suggested that the phrase
‘‘to prepare students for gainful
employment’’ is unambiguous and
therefore not subject to further
definition. Some commenters claimed
that the Department has previously
defined the term ‘‘gainful employment
in a recognized occupation’’ in the
context of conducting administrative
hearings and argued that the
Department did not adequately explain
in the July 26, 2010 NPRM why it was
departing from its prior use of that term.
Discussion: The Department has broad
authority to promulgate regulations to
implement programs established by
statute. Under section 414 of the
Department of Education Organization
Act, 20 U.S.C. 3474, ‘‘[t]he Secretary is
authorized to prescribe such rules and
regulations as the Secretary determines
necessary or appropriate to administer
and manage the functions of the
Secretary or the Department.’’ Similarly,
section 410 of the General Education
Provisions Act, 20 U.S.C. 1221e–3,
provides that the Secretary may ‘‘make,
promulgate, issue, rescind, and amend
rules and regulations’’ for Department
programs, including the Federal student
aid programs.
The eligibility of programs leading to
gainful employment in a recognized
occupation is addressed in sections 101,
102 and 481(b) of the HEA. Section
481(b) of the HEA defines ‘‘eligible
program’’ to include a program that
offers at least a defined minimum
quantity of instruction that ‘‘provides a
program of training to prepare students
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
for gainful employment in a recognized
profession.’’ The HEA in section 102(a)
defines an ‘‘institution of higher
education for purposes of the student
assistance programs’’ and provides
further in section 102(b), that
proprietary institutions of higher
education, with limited exception,
‘‘provide[] an eligible program of
training to prepare students for gainful
employment in a recognized
occupation.’’ Similar requirements exist
in section 101(b)(1) for public and
private non-profit institutions of higher
education providing programs at least
one year in length, and section 102(c)
provides similar requirements for public
and private non-profit postsecondary
vocational institutions.
Under section 102(b) of the HEA,
programs offered at for-profit
institutions are only eligible for title IV,
HEA funds if they offer programs that
‘‘prepare students for gainful
employment in a recognized
occupation.’’ Such an institution is
required to offer at least one eligible
program leading to gainful employment
in a recognized occupation in order for
the institution to be eligible.
This structure for eligibility at the
program level and the institutional level
is longstanding and has been retained
through many amendments to the HEA.
Indeed, as recently as the enactment of
the Higher Education Opportunity Act
of 2008 (HEOA) (Pub. L. 110–315),
Congress retained this distinct treatment
of programs by exempting liberal arts
baccalaureate programs offered at some
for-profit institutions from the
requirement to provide gainful
employment in a recognized
occupation.
The HEA establishes eligibility
requirements for certain programs based
upon the program length and the type
of institution offering the program,
including such programs that lead to
gainful employment in a recognized
occupation. Other requirements apply to
certain types of institutions offering
eligible programs, such as providing
disclosures about revenue, and limiting
the percentage of revenue that can be
received from title IV, HEA programs.
Other requirements apply to all eligible
institutions, such as submitting annual
financial statements and compliance
audits, and meeting eligibility
requirements based upon the loan
cohort default rate calculated for an
institution. None of these requirements,
viewed alone or together, constitutes a
framework that prohibits the
Department from establishing the debt
measures in these regulations to
determine eligibility for programs
required to provide training leading to
PO 00000
Frm 00008
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
gainful employment in a recognized
occupation.
The legislative history of the gainful
employment requirement bears directly
on the issues now emerging in the data.
Congress was concerned that the
availability of Federal student aid,
particularly in the form of loans for
some types of programs and institutions
might lead to students taking on more
debt than is reasonable given the
earnings that could be expected.
Congress extended loan eligibility
beyond traditional degrees at traditional
institutions after considering testimony
regarding the connection between the
expected earnings of the graduates and
the debt burden they would incur from
this training. A Senate Report quotes
extensively from testimony provided by
University of Iowa professor Dr.
Kenneth B. Hoyt, who testified on
behalf of the American Personnel and
Guidance Association:
It seems evident that, in terms of this
sample of students, sufficient numbers were
working for sufficient wages so as to make
the concept of student loans to be [repaid]
following graduation a reasonable approach
to take. * * * I have found no reason to
believe that such funds are not needed, that
their availability would be unjustified in
terms of benefits accruing to both these
students and to society in general, nor that
they would represent a poor financial risk.
Sen. Rep. No. 758, 89th Cong., First Sess.
(1965) at 3745, 3748.
Congress cited the same affirmation
from an industry spokesman, Lattie
Upchurch, Jr., of Capitol Radio
Engineering Institution, Washington,
DC, who testified that ‘‘the purely
material rewards of continued education
are such that the students receiving
loans will, in almost every case, be
enabled to repay them out of the added
income resulting from their better
educational status.’’ Id. at 3752.
These final regulations address harms
to students that have been identified by
the GAO, and were identified in the
public hearings and in comments
submitted in response to the proposed
regulations, namely that program
completers are unable to obtain jobs for
which they received training. The
regulations are also designed to address
concerns about high levels of loan debt
for students enrolled in postsecondary
educational programs that, to qualify for
participation in the title IV, HEA
programs, must provide training that
leads to gainful employment in a
recognized occupation. These
regulations are of particular importance
because significant advances in
electronic reporting and analysis now
allow the Department to collect accurate
and timely data that could not have
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
been utilized in the past. These analyses
will provide the Department, students,
and the institutions offering these
programs with information about how
well the programs are performing under
the measures.
With respect to the general claims
from some commenters that the terms
‘‘gainful employment’’ and ‘‘gainful
employment in a recognized
occupation’’ are unambiguous and
cannot be defined in regulation, it is
clear from the thousands of comments
we received that the terms ‘‘gainful
employment’’ and ‘‘gainful employment
in a recognized occupation’’ are subject
to many different views and
interpretations. Thus, these regulations
represent a reasonable interpretation of
those terms and do so in a way that
responds to many of the concerns raised
in the comments. Adopting a definition
now gives meaning to an undefined
statutory term, thereby fulfilling the
Department’s duty to enforce the
provisions of the HEA in a clear and
meaningful way. And, although the term
has been used to refer to applicable
programs in the context of
administrative hearings at the
Department, that use does not limit the
Department’s use of its statutory
authority to create a regulatory
definition through the negotiated
rulemaking procedures established
under the HEA.
With respect to claims that the
Department should wait for Congress to
legislate before regulating, it is
important to note that the original
efforts by the Department to address
concerns about defaults in the Federal
student loan programs were realized
using the Secretary’s general authority
to regulate under section 414 of the
Department of Education Organization
Act. While Congress ultimately enacted
the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1990 (Pub. L. 101–508), which
provides statutory authority for much of
the cohort default rate provisions in
effect today, the Secretary’s authority
was nonetheless appropriately used to
issue regulations in this area to require,
for example, teach-out arrangements for
private institutions.
Changes: None.
Comment: Some commenters
suggested that the proposed definition
of gainful employment would be
unlawful because it would constitute
placing price controls on offering
gainful employment programs.
Discussion: We disagree that these
regulations would constitute price
controls for gainful employment
programs. The debt measures and
eligibility thresholds provide
institutions with multiple ways to
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
manage their programs to improve
performance.
Changes: None.
Thresholds for the Debt Measures
(§ 668.7(a)(1))
General
Comment: Commenters expressed
concerned that low-income and
minority students, many of whom are
Federal Pell Grant recipients, could be
harmed by the proposed loan repayment
rate and debt-to-income thresholds.
These commenters noted that Federal
Pell Grant recipients are likely to need
to borrow the maximum amount of title
IV, HEA loan funds and may have more
difficulty repaying their loans than
students who incur smaller levels of
debt. As a result, according to the
commenters, the schools these students
attend may not be able to meet the debt
measures and could be forced to close
or limit their enrollment to exclude
these students.
Some of the commenters cited
research by Mark Kantrowitz of
FinAid.org and FastWeb.com that they
believed showed that institutions with
50 percent or more Federal Pell Grant
recipients are unlikely to satisfy the
proposed 35 percent loan repayment
rate threshold, and institutions with 40
percent or more of Federal Pell Grant
recipients are unlikely to satisfy the
proposed 45 percent loan repayment
rate threshold. Similarly, other
commenters cited studies indicating
that minority students earn less than
their white counterparts. For lowincome students, the commenters
concluded that student access to higher
education would be adversely affected
because the proposed thresholds would
act as a disincentive to institutions to
admit these students. The commenters
suggested that, given these concerns, the
Department should allow lower
repayment rates and debt-to-earnings
ratios for institutions based on the
demographics of the institution’s
student body and its success rate in
graduating minority students. Other
commenters recommended that the
Department implement a sliding scale
repayment rate based on the number of
Federal Pell Grant recipients at an
institution. Under this approach,
institutions with a larger percentage of
Federal Pell Grant recipients would be
subject to a lower threshold for the loan
repayment rate. Commenters suggested
that, alternatively, the loan repayment
rates of Federal Pell Grant recipients
could be evaluated separately from the
loan repayment rates of non-Federal Pell
Grant recipients, with a lower threshold
established for Federal Pell Grant
PO 00000
Frm 00009
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
34393
recipients. Commenters also noted that
some of these same issues apply to
institutions and programs dominated by
women, because careers dominated by
women tend to be lower-paying and
many women take maternity leave or
work part-time and these circumstances
would lead to lower repayment rates
and earnings for women.
One commenter noted that the
Department’s repayment rate data, when
viewed across all sectors of the
education industry, show that
institutions with lower repayment rates
serve high-risk students. The
commenter argued that if the data
demonstrate anything, it is that ‘‘at-risk’’
students (working adults with family
commitments and no parental support,
or students from lower socioeconomic
backgrounds who are more susceptible
to forces that might cause them to leave
or take a break from school) have more
difficulty repaying their student loans or
are more inclined to use alternative
methods to repay their loans, regardless
of the type of school they attended.
Discussion: The Department does not
agree that the thresholds should be
adjusted to reflect the demographics or
economic status of the students enrolled
in gainful employment programs.
Students are not well served by
enrolling in programs that leave them
with debts they cannot afford to repay,
regardless of their background.
Moreover, as illustrated in the Student
Demographics section of the RIA, there
are institutions and programs achieving
strong results with students from
disadvantaged backgrounds, and many
programs serving even the most
disadvantaged students are performing
well under the debt measures.
Changes: None.
Comment: Some commenters stated
that because the loan repayment rate
was established outside the negotiated
rulemaking process, it lacked
transparency and the breadth of input
from stakeholders and the public that
would have assured its quality and
relevancy.
Discussion: The loan repayment rate
was discussed during the negotiated
rulemaking sessions in the context of
whether borrowers who attended a
program were repaying their loans. The
issue summaries used for the
rulemaking sessions describing the
repayment rate were published at that
time on the Department’s Web site and
are available at https://www2.ed.gov/
policy/highered/reg/hearulemaking/
2009/integrity.html. The negotiating
committee did not reach consensus on
proposed regulations (see 74 FR 43617).
As a result the Department was not
bound to any of the draft regulations for
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
34394
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
the issues in the manner those issues
were discussed with the committee.
Consequently, the Department chose to
propose a dollar-based repayment rate
instead of the borrower-based
repayment rate discussed by the
committee. As opposed to a borrowerbased calculation where all borrowers
have the same impact on the repayment
rate regardless of their debt loads, the
proposed dollar-based calculation
rewards, or gives more weight to,
borrowers with higher debt loads that
repay their loans. For example:
Borrowers A and B completed a
program with $12,000 and $15,000,
respectively, in loan debt. Borrowers C,
D, and E withdrew from the program
with loan debts of $3,000, $4,000, and
$6,000, respectively. Under the
proposed repayment rate, all loan debt
incurred by borrowers who attended the
program would be included in the
denominator ($40,000) of the ratio.
Presuming that program graduates are
more likely to repay their loans, i.e., that
Borrower A will repay the $12,000 debt
and Borrower B will repay the $15,000
debt, but Borrowers C, D, and E will not
repay their debts, the sum of Borrowers
A and B’s loans would be in the
numerator, resulting in a 67.5 percent
repayment rate ($27,000/$40,000).
Under a borrower-based calculation, the
repayment rate would be 40 percent
(two out of the five borrowers were
repaying their loans).
Changes: None.
Threshold for the Loan Repayment Rate
and Debt-to-Earnings Ratios
Comment: Some commenters
expressed concern that there was no
reasoned basis to support the
Department’s selection of 45 percent
and 35 percent as the repayment rate
thresholds for determining, in part, if
programs are fully eligible, restricted, or
ineligible to participate in the title IV,
HEA programs. The commenters
believed that this approach was simply
a way for the Department to try to close
as many private sector schools as
possible by adjusting the thresholds
based on the market’s ability to absorb
displaced students from private sector
schools.
On the other hand, some commenters
opined that the proposed loan
repayment rate needed to be
strengthened, and recommended that
the Department increase the threshold
for each tier by at least 10 percentage
points. Consequently, a program would
have to achieve a repayment rate of at
least 55 percent to remain fully eligible
for title IV, HEA funds. Other
commenters recommended a threshold
of 50 percent for the loan repayment
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
rate. Some commenters suggested that
programs with repayment rates below
25 or 35 percent should lose eligibility.
The commenters believed that it is
important to recognize that the
proposed thresholds are likely to
overstate actual repayment rates because
the proposed repayment rate excludes
both private loans and parent PLUS
loans and many students and families
may have accrued substantial amounts
of these types of debt for which
repayment is not being measured. The
commenters noted that in 2008–09,
these two forms of debt accounted for 20
percent of all postsecondary education
loans. The commenters believed that
these circumstances demonstrated both
the need to increase the repayment rate
thresholds and the importance of
including private loans in the debt-toearnings measure.
Other commenters believed that no
changes should be made in the
proposed thresholds. Others argued that
if a program satisfied the debt-toearnings threshold, then it should be
eligible for title IV, HEA funds. These
commenters believed the loan
repayment rate metric would not be a
quality test of the program’s results.
Another commenter argued that the
proposed standards for the loan
repayment rate were not strict enough
for ‘‘low-value programs,’’ which the
commenter identified as programs
where the percentage increase of postgraduate income is less than the
program’s debt-to-earnings ratio as a
percentage of annual earnings for the
program’s graduates. The commenter
recommended that the Department
require a low-value program to maintain
a 65 percent loan repayment rate in
order for the program to maintain full
eligibility.
A number of commenters noted that
the mean repayment rate for all
institutions is 48 percent and that an
overwhelming majority of minorityserving institutions and community
colleges, as well as many urban public
and independent colleges and
universities, would fail to meet the 45
percent repayment rate threshold if
adopted by the Department. The
commenters questioned the use of this
standard of quality that almost one-half
of all colleges would fail to meet. In
addition, the commenters believed that
repayment rates are influenced by a
number of factors that have no relation
to the quality of the educational
program.
Some commenters believed that the
Department did not justify its proposal
that a program must have an annual
loan payment of 8 percent or less of
average annual earnings in order to meet
PO 00000
Frm 00010
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
the debt thresholds. The commenters
suggested that the average annual
earnings threshold should be adjusted
from eight to at least 12 percent, which
would be less than half of the expected
upper level of spending on housing and
more accurately reflect the role of
education in a person’s life.
Alternatively, commenters suggested
the Department adopt a 10 percent
threshold, pointing to the GAO study
‘‘Monitoring Aid Greater Than Federally
Defined Need Could Help Address
Student Loan Indebtedness’’ (GAO–03–
508). The study indicated that 10
percent of first-year income is the
generally agreed-upon standard for
student loan repayment and that the
Department itself established a
performance indicator of maintaining
borrower indebtedness and average
borrower payments for Federal student
loans at less than 10 percent of borrower
income in the first repayment year in
the Department’s ‘‘FY 2002 Performance
and Accountability Report’’ (see page
165, https://www2.ed.gov/about/reports/
annual/2002report/).
Some commenters noted that Sandy
Baum and Saul Schwartz, economists
upon whose 2006 study ‘‘How Much
Debt is Too Much? Defining
Benchmarks for Manageable Student
Debt’’ the Department relied for the
discretionary earnings threshold in
proposed § 668.7(a)(1)(ii) and (iii) and
(a)(2)(ii), have criticized the 8 percent
metric as not necessarily applicable to
higher education loans because the 8
percent threshold (1) Reflects a lender’s
standard of borrowing, (2) is unrelated
to individual borrowers’ credit scores or
their economic situations, (3) reflects a
standard for potential homeowners
rather than for recent college graduates
who generally have a greater ability and
willingness to maintain higher debt
loads, and (4) does not account for
borrowers’ potential to earn a higher
income in the future. Commenters
emphasized that Baum and Schwartz
believe that using the difference
between the front-end and back-end
ratios historically used in the mortgage
industry as a benchmark for manageable
student loan borrowing has no
particular merit or justification.
Commenters also stated that the 8
percent debt-to-earnings threshold is not
supported by any standard economic
analysis of educational investment
decisions. According to the
commenters, such an analysis does not
imply a limit on annual debt payment
related to annual earnings, but uses a
cost-benefit model that includes the
gains to earnings resulting from
education. The commenters believed the
Department should recognize that
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
borrowing for education costs is
different than borrowing for a home
mortgage because education tends to
cause earnings to increase. As a result,
the commenters believed the
Department should increase the
threshold. For example, a commenter
suggested that a 12 percent threshold
would be more reasonable.
Some commenters did not agree with
the Department’s rationale for proposing
that a program’s annual loan payment
may be as high as 30 percent of
discretionary income under
§ 668.7(a)(1)(ii). The commenters argued
that the Department should simply
adopt the recommendations made by
Sandy Baum and Saul Schwartz in the
2006 College Board study that annual
student debt should not exceed 20
percent of discretionary income. The
commenters believed that the average
annual earnings threshold needed to be
strengthened noting that allowing a
threshold of up to 8 percent only for
student loan debt already fails to
account for a student’s other debts, but
allowing up to 12 percent is clearly
without a sound rationale and should be
eliminated from the regulations after a
phase-in period. The commenters also
noted that a student’s debt is likely to
be understated because the same
interest rate used for calculating the
annual debt service for Federal
unsubsidized loans would also be used
to calculate the debt service of private
education loans which are used more by
students attending for-profit
institutions. For these reasons, the
commenters argued that the Department
should avoid using any threshold higher
than 8 percent of annual earnings or 20
percent of discretionary income.
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
Discussion: In view of these
comments, the Department is replacing
the proposed two-tiered approach that
would establish upper and lower
thresholds for the debt measures with a
single set of minimum standards. Under
this simplified approach, the
Department is establishing a minimum
standard of 35 percent for the loan
repayment rate, and a maximum
standard of 30 percent of discretionary
income and 12 percent of annual
earnings for the debt-to-earnings ratios.
The Department set these thresholds
with the goal of identifying programs
that are failing to prepare students for
gainful employment in a recognized
occupation, as demonstrated by the
prevalence of unaffordable debts and
poor employment prospects among their
former students. In recognition of the
seriousness of steps to revoke eligibility,
the Department is defining standards
that identify the most clearly
problematic programs.
The debt-to-earnings ratios were set
after consideration of industry practice
and expert recommendations. The ratios
identify only programs where the
majority of graduates have debt-toearnings ratios that exceed
recommended levels by 50 percent.
Consistent with the views expressed in
the literature, it allows programs to
demonstrate that their debt is affordable
based upon either total earnings or
discretionary income. The combination
of these measures also recognizes that
borrowers can afford to contribute a
greater share of their income to debt
service as their incomes rise.
The repayment rate measure
demonstrates that former students are,
in fact, struggling to repay their loans.
PO 00000
Frm 00011
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
34395
It identifies the approximately onequarter of programs where 65 percent of
former students attempting to repay
their loans are nonetheless seeing their
loan balances continue to grow.
As shown in Table A, approximately
26 percent of programs across all sectors
with more than 30 borrowers in a fouryear period fall below the 35 percent
threshold based on one year of
repayment rate data. The public twoyear sector has the highest
concentration of programs below the
threshold, with 9.2 percent of programs
falling below the threshold. These
numbers are higher than the actual
number of programs we expect to fall
below the repayment rate threshold
because they may not fully account for
the treatment of borrowers who are
eligible for Public Service Loan
Forgiveness (PSLF) or in alternative
repayment plans that allow payments
that are equal to or less than accrued
interest, or an institution’s potential
responses to the regulations, such as
investments in debt counseling, which
could raise programs’ rates before the
first official rates for FY 2012 are
calculated in 2013. Moreover, the
repayment rate distribution presented in
Table A shows that two-fifths of
programs with repayment rates below
the 35 percent threshold were within 5
percentage points of meeting the
threshold. Once the aforementioned
factors are taken into account, the loan
repayment rate for numerous programs
would likely increase to over the 35
percent threshold, thereby meeting the
repayment rate measure.
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
Chart 1 shows the distribution of
repayment rates across all types of
institutions. The mean repayment rate
for all of these programs, using the loan
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
repayment rate specified in these final
regulations, is 51 percent. The mean
repayment rate for these programs at
public institutions is 49 percent, 60
PO 00000
Frm 00012
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
percent at private, non-profit
institutions, and 43 percent at private,
for-profit institutions.
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
ER13JN11.010
34396
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
34397
for these final regulations. Although we
have revised the methodology for
calculating the repayment rate, the 35
percent threshold remains close to the
25th percentile among gainful
employment programs. Table B shows
frequency statistics associated with the
new repayment rate measure across all
institutional types.
With regard to the study by the
College Board, economists Sandy Baum
and Saul Schwartz preferred a debtservice approach based on discretionary
income rather than total income. The
authors argued that a percentage based
on total income does not answer the
question of how much students can
borrow without having difficulties
repaying their loans because the
percentage of income that borrowers can
reasonably be expected to devote to
repaying their loans increases with
income. However, the authors did not
suggest that 20 percent is a reasonable
debt-service ratio for typical borrowers.
The authors suggested that the
maximum affordable debt-service ratio
is approximately 20 percent. In the July
26, 2010 NPRM, we adopted this
suggestion as the primary measurement
of affordable debt at most income levels.
However, because a gainful
employment program would fail the
discretionary income ratio whenever the
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
PO 00000
Frm 00013
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
ER13JN11.012
are, by definition, the worst performing
when measured against both the
repayment rate and debt-to-earnings
ratios. Setting the threshold for
eligibility at 35 percent identified
approximately the lowest-performing
quarter of programs.
A similar approach was taken in
developing the repayment rate threshold
ER13JN11.011
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
In developing the lower limit of the
repayment rate in the July 26, 2010
NPRM, we attempted to define a
relatively small subset of programs that
could potentially lose eligibility. At the
same time, we balanced that concern
against the need to make the measure a
meaningful performance standard. The
programs within the lower boundary
34398
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
income of the students who completed
the program was less than 150 percent
of the poverty guideline, we proposed a
second debt-to-earnings ratio where the
annual loan payment would not exceed
8 percent of total income. As noted in
the July 26, 2010 NPRM (see 75 FR
43620) and the Baum and Schwartz
study, 8 percent is a commonly used
standard for evaluating manageable debt
levels. Under this ‘‘best of both worlds’’
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
approach, programs could satisfy the
proposed debt-to-earnings ratios in one
of two ways. Programs whose graduates
have low earnings relative to debt
would benefit from the calculation
based on total income, and programs
whose graduates have higher debt loads
that are offset by higher earnings would
benefit from the calculation based on
discretionary income.
PO 00000
Frm 00014
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
Chart 2 represents the interaction
between the two debt measures and how
programs could retain eligibility under
either measure. Table C provides the
data underlying Chart 2 and indicates
the maximum median loan debt a
program may have so that the monthly
payment falls under the final debt
threshold.
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
For the loan repayment rate, the
Department proposed a threshold of 45
percent for full, unrestricted eligibility.
This represented the mean repayment
rate among institutions from all sectors
(the actual repayment mean was 48
percent which was rounded down to 45
percent to establish the threshold).
The 20 percent discretionary income
threshold, 8 percent total income
threshold, and 45 percent repayment
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
rate threshold in the proposed
regulations established reasonable debt
levels. Raising the baseline thresholds
for the debt-to-earnings ratios by 50
percent set the boundary above which it
could become increasingly more
difficult for a borrower to make loan
payments. In reducing the loan
repayment rate threshold to 35 percent,
which approximated the 25th percentile
PO 00000
Frm 00015
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
34399
of the distribution of repayment rates,
we set the boundary below which
programs could potentially become
ineligible for title IV, HEA funds. So,
under the July 26, 2010 NPRM,
programs that scored in between the
baseline and lower thresholds would
continue to qualify for title IV, HEA
funds, but would be subject to
restrictions.
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
ER13JN11.013
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
34400
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
Under the framework established in
these final regulations, the Department
shifts from focusing on programs that
have problematic debt levels (programs
subject to restrictions) to targeting the
lowest-performing programs (programs
where the annual loan payment exceeds
30 percent of discretionary income and
12 percent of annual earnings and
repayment rates less than 35 percent).
By adopting the more lenient thresholds
for the debt-to-earnings ratios, we
provide a tolerance of 50 percent over
the baseline amounts to identify the
lowest performing programs, as well as
account for former students who
completed a program but who may have
left the workforce voluntarily or are
working part-time. For the loan
repayment rate, the 35 percent threshold
continues to represent the 25th
percentile of repayment rates rounded
down to the nearest 5 percent, which in
our view, allows for a minimally
acceptable outcome where nearly twothirds of borrowers would not be
making payments sufficient to reduce by
at least one dollar the outstanding
balance of the loans they incurred for
enrolling in a program. In addition,
because a program now either passes or
fails the minimum standards, unlike the
approach in the July 26, 2010 NPRM we
are not placing any restrictions on
passing programs.
As discussed in more detail elsewhere
in this preamble, under these final
regulations, there will be some programs
for which the Department will not have
the data necessary to calculate the debt
measures. Accordingly, we are
clarifying that a program is considered
to provide training that leads to gainful
employment in a recognized occupation
if the data needed to determine whether
the program meets the minimum
standards are not available to the
Secretary.
With regard to the comment on ‘‘lowvalue programs,’’ although we find the
commenter’s suggestion intriguing, the
relationship between the variables (postgraduate income compared to the results
of the debt-to-earnings ratio) do not
provide a clear basis for setting the
repayment rate at 65 percent. In any
case, the suggested approach would add
significant complexity and uncertainty,
as institutions would not know what
threshold their programs are expected to
meet until they have determined their
performance on the other threshold.
More significantly, we are not
convinced this approach would be
better at identifying the poorest
performing programs.
Changes: Section 668.7(a)(1) has been
revised to establish minimum standards
for a gainful employment program. The
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
program satisfies the standards if its
loan repayment rate is at least 35
percent, or the program’s annual loan
payment is less than or equal to 30
percent of discretionary income or 12
percent of annual earnings. Section
668.7(a)(1) also has been revised to state
that a program is considered to meet the
minimum standards if the data needed
to determine whether a program
satisfies those standards are not
available to the Secretary.
Definitions
Definitions of ‘‘Program’’ (Proposed
§ 668.7(a)(3)(i)); Final § 668.7(a)(2)(i))
Comments: Commenters considered
the definition of the term program to be
too vague and requested additional
guidance. For example, commenters
questioned whether, under the proposed
regulations, a program would contain
multiple degree levels, whether the
Department would evaluate a program
at the institutional or branch level, and
whether a program could include
multiple areas or concentrations of
study. Similarly, other commenters
noted that because program
performance varies greatly by campus
location, the measures should be made
at the campus level, and successful
campuses would thus not be negatively
affected by the regulations.
Discussion: We agree that the
definition of the term program should
be clarified. To properly track programs
or associate the program with its debt
measures, we identify a program by a
unique combination of the institution’s
six-digit OPEID number, the program’s
six-digit CIP code, and credential level.
For this purpose, the credential levels
are undergraduate certificate, associate’s
degree, bachelor’s degree, postbaccalaureate certificate, master’s
degree, doctoral degree, and firstprofessional degree.
Under this definition, a program with
a unique identifier that is offered by an
institution at its main campus or at any
of its locations is considered the same
program for the purposes of the
reporting and disclosure requirements
in § 668.6 and the gainful employment
program requirements in § 668.7. In
addition, with regard to whether a
program could include multiple areas or
concentrations of study, we believe the
definition’s use of CIP codes alleviates
this concern as the CIP code evaluation
would take into account those issues.
We remind institutions that they are
responsible for accurately assigning CIP
codes to programs in their reporting to
the National Center for Educational
Statistics (NCES) under section
487(a)(17) of the HEA. The inaccurate
PO 00000
Frm 00016
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
assignment of CIP codes may adversely
affect the institution’s participation in
the title IV, HEA programs. The
Secretary would consider a CIP code
inaccurately assigned if the Secretary
determines that the program best
conforms to the description of another
CIP code.
The Department does not agree that
the debt measures should apply at a
campus level when a single institution
has multiple locations. In these
circumstances, a student may attend
courses for his or her program at more
than one location or take additional
courses online. Even if a program may
be attended, in its entirety, at individual
locations of an institution, the program
is essentially the same program at all of
the locations of the institution. We
believe that it would be difficult and
arbitrary to attempt to distinguish
among the various gradations in
patterns of student attendance.
Additionally, even though there may be
some variation between locations, such
as those resulting from locations in
different States subject to different State
licensure requirements for a particular
career, we do not believe such variation
justifies attempting to distinguish a
program’s performance based on being
offered at multiple locations. Moreover,
in many cases, dividing programs by
location would make it more difficult to
reliably assess performance due to the
fact that many institutions may have a
small number of students in a particular
location.
Changes: In § 668.7(a)(2), we have
revised the definition of program as
described in this discussion.
Comments: Commenters did not
believe the CIP code format is
sufficiently granular to adequately
distinguish among programs. The
commenters noted that currently there
are a number of gainful employment
programs that share the same CIP code.
For example, in the context of new and
emerging health care fields, multiple
programs may be designated in the
‘‘general’’ or ‘‘other’’ subcategories. The
commenters believed that, because the
CIP codes are not scheduled to be
updated until 2020, they will rapidly
become obsolete but will still be used to
assess program performance.
Discussion: We believe that using the
CIP codes is sufficient to identify a
program, particularly when used in
combination with the institution’s
OPEID and credential level as provided
under the definition of program. We
believe this coding convention greatly
mitigates any concern related to the
available codes under the CIP. We do
not view the decennial updating of the
CIP to be an impediment to the use of
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
these codes because new fields of study
may also use more generic CIP codes
until the next update of the CIP codes.
However, if the CIP codes prove
inadequate to reflect the diversity of
offerings at the postsecondary level, the
coding can be revised to reflect the
greater depth required before 2020. In
addition, through our oversight of
institutional reporting under the
Integrated Postsecondary Education
Data System (IPEDS) completions
survey, we can make adjustments to the
CIP code categories more frequently to
ensure that they appropriately reflect
the programs being offered by
institutions.
Changes: None.
Comment: One commenter stated that
59 percent of cosmetology schools,
many of which offer only one program,
were at risk of losing eligibility based on
the data contained in the document on
cumulative four-year institutional
repayment rates that the Department
released after issuing the July 26, 2010
NPRM. According to the commenter,
these schools could lose eligibility
because of the limited number of
borrowers who make up the school’s
cohort and the impact that a single or
relatively small number of borrowers
can have on the school’s repayment rate.
The commenter noted that for schools
with one or a limited number of
program offerings, the loss of one
program would result in the loss of the
institution. The commenter
recommended that the Department
provide for very limited exemptions
from the annual loan repayment rates
for institutions with a small number of
borrowers in repayment and consider
instead basing the threshold on fouryear cohorts of 120 students or less,
consistent with the low-volume
treatment for CDRs.
Discussion: The HEA identifies those
programs that must provide training that
leads to gainful employment in a
recognized occupation in order to
receive title IV, HEA funds. The statute
makes no exception for an institution
with only one program; accordingly, we
cannot exempt institutions offering only
one program from the debt measures.
However, we are providing in these
final regulations an exemption for a
program with a small number of
borrowers or completers because debt
measures based on a few students
completing the program or repaying
their loans may not accurately reflect
the program’s performance.
In general, under these regulations,
and as described in further detail under
the heading, Definitions of ‘‘Three-Year
Period (3YP)’’ and ‘‘Prior Three-Year
Period (P3YP)’’ (Proposed
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
§ 668.7(a)(3)(iii) and (iv)), we will assess
programs based on two years of
performance against both debt
measures. When a program has fewer
than 30 borrowers or program
completers in the two-year period,
however, we will assess the program’s
performance across a four-year period.
We also are revising the regulations to
provide that programs that have fewer
than 30 borrowers or program
completers in the four-year period are
considered to meet the debt measures
due to the difficulty in reliably assessing
the performance of programs with small
numbers of students.
In addition, because the Social
Security Administration (SSA) will
attempt to match the identity data of the
students included in a two- or four-year
period to the identity data that it
maintains, any mismatches may result
in SSA not including students in its
calculation of the mean and median
earnings for a program. Consequently,
there may be cases where more than 30
students completed a program, but SSA
calculates the mean and median
earnings for the program based on 30 or
fewer students. For these cases, as
discussed more fully under the heading,
Draft debt measures and data
corrections (§ 668.7(e)), Final debt
measures (§ 668.7(f)), and Alternative
earnings (§ 668.7(g)), the Department
will use the mean and median earnings
provided by SSA to calculate the debtto-earnings ratios for the program, but
where SSA is unable to provide
earnings data for one or more students,
the Department may adjust the median
loan debt for the program based on the
number of students that SSA excluded
in calculating the mean and median
earnings. SSA may not calculate the
mean and median earnings for a
program if the number of students
excluded falls below a threshold
established by SSA. In these cases, the
Department will consider the program
to have satisfied the debt measures.
Finally, we are revising the
regulations to provide that programs
with a median loan debt of zero are
meeting the measures. This clarification
is a logical extension of the debt
measures since programs with a median
loan debt of zero are not placing any
debt burden on the majority of their
students.
Changes: We have revised
§ 668.7(a)(2) to establish the term fouryear period (4YP), which is defined as
the period covering four consecutive
FYs that occur on the third, fourth, fifth,
and sixth FYs (4YP) prior to the most
recently completed FY for which the
debt measures are calculated. For a
program whose students are required to
PO 00000
Frm 00017
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
34401
complete a medical or dental internship
or residency, as identified by an
institution, the four-year period (4YP–R)
covers the sixth, seventh, eighth, and
ninth FYs (4YP–R) prior to the most
recently completed FY for which the
debt measures are calculated. We note
that debt measures for programs using
the 4YP–R will not be calculated until
data covering those years are available.
The definition of four-year period also
provides that a required medical or
dental internship or residency is a
supervised training program that
requires the student to hold a degree as
a doctor of medicine or osteopathy, or
a doctor of dental science; leads to a
degree or certificate awarded by an
institution of higher education, a
hospital, or a health-care facility that
offers post-graduate training; and must
be completed before the borrower may
be licensed by the State and board
certified for professional practice or
service.
In addition, we have revised
§ 668.7(d) to provide that the debt-toearnings ratios for a small program are
calculated using the 4YP or the 4YP–R
if 30 or fewer students completed a
program during the 2YP or the 2YP–R,
respectively. Similarly, the 4YP or the
4YP–R is used for the loan repayment
rate, if the corresponding 2YP or 2YP–
R represents 30 or fewer borrowers
whose loans entered repayment during
the 2YP or the 2YP–R, respectively.
The revised regulations in § 668.7(d)
provide that, in determining whether
the 2YP or the 2YP–R represents 30 or
fewer students or borrowers, we remove
from the applicable two-year period any
student or loan for a borrower that
meets the exclusion criteria under
§ 668.7(b)(4) or (c)(5). Under those
sections, we do not include a student or
loan for a borrower in the two- or fouryear periods used to calculate the debt
measures if the Department has
information that (1) for the loan
repayment rate, one or more of the
borrower’s loans were in an in-school or
a military-related deferment status or,
for the debt-to-earnings ratios, the
student’s loans were in a militaryrelated deferment status at any time
during the calendar year for which the
Department obtains earnings data from
SSA, (2) for both measures, the student
died, (3) for both measures, one or more
of the borrower’s loans were assigned or
transferred to the Department that are
being considered for discharge as a
result of the total and permanent
disability of the borrower, or were
discharged on that basis under 34 CFR
682.402(c) or 34 CFR 685.212(b), or (4)
for the debt-to-earnings ratios, the
student was enrolled in any other
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
34402
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
eligible program at the institution or at
another institution during the calendar
year for which the Secretary obtains
earnings information under
§ 668.7(c)(3).
We also have revised § 668.7(d)(2)(i)
to provide that a program satisfies the
debt measures if SSA does not provide
the mean and median earnings for the
program. In addition, the final
regulations provide that if the median
student loan debt of a program is equal
to zero, the program would meet the
debt measures.
Graduate Programs
Comment: Some commenters
recommended that the Department
exempt graduate programs from the
gainful employment requirements
because graduate students are
sufficiently sophisticated to determine
whether they can afford the education
they seek and how much debt to incur.
The commenters also noted that many
graduate students are already employed
and pose little risk of nonpayment, but
have extremely high loan limits
available to them, making them more
likely to consolidate their loans, repay
their loans under income-sensitive
repayment plans, and incur what may
be significant unpaid accrued interest
that is subject to capitalization. Other
commenters expressed concern that
graduate students in a program would
be likely to consolidate loans from the
graduate program with loans from their
undergraduate programs, and as a result
the graduate program could find it
harder to meet the repayment rate
threshold if it enrolls students who
enter with significant amounts of
student loan debt. Alternatively, some
commenters recommended that the
Department limit the amount of debt
counted in calculating the repayment
rate to the amount used to pay tuition
and fees for the program if the
Department chooses not to exempt
graduate programs. The commenters
believe this approach would ensure that
institutions are not improperly
penalized for decisions made by
students to borrow excessively,
including incurring private loan debt,
which may result in the institution
being unable to continue to offer the
graduate program of study.
Discussion: The HEA identifies those
programs that must provide training that
leads to gainful employment in a
recognized occupation in order to
receive title IV, HEA funds. These
include graduate programs; therefore,
we do not have a legal basis to
categorically exempt these programs
from the statutory requirements.
However, some distinctions are
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
recognized based upon the
characteristics of those programs, such
as the use of an extended repayment
period in the calculation of the debt to
earnings ratio. Based on the comments
noting that students attending graduate
programs may have different
expectations about how long it will take
to repay their loans due to the increased
costs associated with those programs,
we have extended the repayment period
for certain of those programs to up to 20
years for the purposes of calculating the
annual loan payment for the debt-toearnings ratios. In addition, we
recognize that many graduate students
have outstanding student loans from
prior postsecondary programs. When
calculating the repayment rate for postbaccalaureate programs, we will
consider a borrower with a
consolidation loan to be successfully
repaying his or her loans if the
outstanding balance does not increase
over the course of the most recently
completed FY.
Changes: See changes discussed
under the heading, Loan Amortization,
and under the heading, Loan Repayment
Rate Calculation.
Definitions of ‘‘Three-Year Period (3YP)’’
and ‘‘Prior Three-Year Period (P3YP)’’
(Proposed § 668.7(a)(3)(iii) and (iv))
Comments: Commenters disagreed
with the Department’s proposed
regulations to use starting salary data for
the ‘‘earnings’’ portion of the debt-toearnings ratio calculation. They were
concerned that 3YP data do not take
into account the lifelong benefit of
higher education and the fact that
graduates will earn more money as they
gain experience and responsibility.
Commenters recommended that the
Department eliminate the 3YP and P3YP
distinctions and replace these two
independent benchmarks with a single
benchmark based upon income data for
a six-year period.
A number of commenters indicated
that it is impossible for medical and
dental residents to satisfy the proposed
gainful employment standards, under
the proposed P3YP. According to the
commenters, the proposed P3YP fails to
account for the fact that most, but not
all, medical and dental residents will
undertake employment during years 4,
5, and 6 following graduation at entry
level salaries. For example, it takes a
minimum of three years of a residency
before a medical doctor can become
eligible for full licensure and able to
practice medicine without supervision
in all fifty States. Residencies in
categorical subspecialties, such as
neurology, anesthesia, or cardiology,
can take up to eight years.
PO 00000
Frm 00018
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
Along the same lines, commenters
representing several medical and dental
schools, and related residency programs
that award postgraduate certificates,
noted that the proposed repayment rate
regulations failed to consider the nature
of medical and dental training and
required residency periods. Because the
residency periods may be for three to
eight years following medical and
dental school graduation, the proposed
repayment rate for these programs
would be lower than it should be. The
commenters stated that the
compensation of medical residents is so
small that it is not a recognized
occupation according to the BLS and
that medical school graduates are not
gainfully employed until after they
complete their medical residencies.
Consequently, it could take several
years for a physician or surgeon to
achieve a median salary level. As a
result, many medical school graduates
opt for income-contingent, incomebased, or extended repayment plans and
consolidate their loans, leading to
significant amounts of capitalized
interest. The commenters stated that
under the proposed repayment rate
formula, the majority of U.S. medical
schools would fail to meet the 45
percent repayment rate standard.
Therefore, the commenters urged the
Department to exempt from the
regulations medical school programs
and postdoctoral dental residency
certificate programs.
Another commenter recommended
that the Department allow institutions
to base the loan repayment rate on
either the four most recent Federal FYs
or the prior set of four FYs (i.e., years
5 through 8) in order to better reflect
earnings after graduation. The
commenter offered that institutions
choosing the prior four-year period
should be required to comply with the
stricter 45 percent repayment rate
threshold. The commenter also noted
that this approach could provide an
option for schools during economic
recessions when external factors can
result in artificially reduced loan
repayment rates.
Discussion: The Department proposed
in § 668.7(a)(1)(ii) and (iii) to use the
most current earnings available of the
students who completed the program in
a 3YP to calculate debt-to-earnings
ratios. If an institution could show that
the earnings of students in a particular
program increase substantially after an
initial employment period, the
Department would use the P3YP. As
discussed more fully under the heading,
Earnings of program completers, those
calculations have been modified to use
two-year periods. This change to a two-
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
year period will allow an institution to
show improvement in a program’s
performance in a shorter cycle. Under
the proposed framework, approximately
one-third of the students who are
included in the 3YP would have
completed a program or entered
repayment during a particular year,
whereas under these final regulations
approximately one-half of the students
in the 2YP will represent a single year.
Accordingly, the current debt measures
for a program will not be affected by
former students in the program for more
than a two-year period.
The Department agrees that the
performance of programs whose
graduates are required to complete
medical or dental internships and
residencies before they can begin
professional practice should be
measured at a later point in repayment
than borrowers who would be expected
to obtain gainful employment
immediately after leaving a program.
Although borrowers earn money and
enter repayment, in a sense, the
internships and residencies are a
continuation of the educational
program. As long as an institution
identifies these programs, we will
calculate the repayment rate based on
the two-year cohort of borrowers who
first entered repayment on their loans in
the sixth and seventh years prior to the
year the repayment rate is calculated
rather than the third and fourth years
used for all other borrowers. The debtto-earnings ratios for these programs
will be calculated based on the two-year
cohort of borrowers who completed the
program in the sixth and seventh years
prior to the year the debt-to-earnings
ratios are calculated. In order to be clear
about those medical or dental internship
or residency programs for which the
2YP–R (as well as the 4YP–R) would
apply, we are providing in the
definitions of two-year period and fouryear period that a required medical or
dental internship or residence is a
supervised training program that
contains three elements. First, the
program must require the student to
hold a degree as a doctor of medicine or
osteopathy, or a doctor of dental
science. Second, the program must lead
to a degree or certificate awarded by an
institution of higher education, a
hospital, or a health-care facility that
offers post-graduate training. Third, the
program must be completed before the
borrower may be licensed by the State
and board certified for professional
practice or service.
To provide an alternative for
institutions that take immediate steps to
improve a program’s loan repayment
rate during the initial three-year
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
evaluation period, we will calculate the
repayment rate based on the most recent
two-year period, the two-year period
alternate (2YP–A), which includes loans
for borrowers who entered repayment
during the first and second FYs prior to
the most recently completed FY. We
believe this provision parallels the
alternative earnings approach described
elsewhere in this preamble under which
an institution may use alternative
earnings data to recalculate the debt-toearnings ratios for a failing program.
Unlike that approach, however, the
Department will automatically calculate
the loan repayment rate for a program
based on the 2YP and the 2YP–A
(provided that the 2YP–A represents
more than 30 borrowers whose loans
entered repayment) for the covered twoyear period and use the higher of those
rates to determine whether the program
satisfies the 35 percent repayment rate
standard. Because it is intended to
recognize rapidly improving programs
during a transition period, the 2YP–A is
available for repayment rates calculated
for FYs 2012, 2013, and 2014 only.
Changes: Proposed § 668.7(a)(3)(iii)
and (iv) defining a 3YP and P3YP have
been removed. In their place, we have
added a definition of two-year period in
§ 668.7(a)(2)(iv). Under this definition,
for most programs, a two-year period is
the period covering two consecutive
FYs that occur on the third and fourth
FYs (2YP) prior to the most recently
completed FY for which the debt
measures are calculated. For example, if
the most recently completed FY is 2012,
the 2YP is FYs 2008 and 2009. For a
program whose students are required to
complete a medical or dental internship
or residency, as identified by an
institution, a two-year period is the
period covered by the sixth and seventh
FYs (2YP–R) prior to the most recently
completed FY for which the debt
measures are calculated. For example, if
the most recently completed FY is 2012,
the 2YP–R is FYs 2005 and 2006.
We also have provided in the
definition of two-year period that a
required medical or dental internship or
residency is a supervised training
program that requires the student to
hold a degree as a doctor of medicine or
osteopathy, or a doctor of dental
science; leads to a degree or certificate
awarded by an institution of higher
education, a hospital, or a health-care
facility that offers post-graduate
training; and must be completed before
the borrower may be licensed by the
State and board certified for
professional practice or service.
Finally, for FYs 2012, 2013, and 2014,
the two-year period (2YP–A) is the
period covered by the first and second
PO 00000
Frm 00019
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
34403
FYs prior to the most recently
completed FY for which the loan
repayment rate is calculated. For
example, if the most recently completed
FY is 2012, the 2YP–A is FYs 2010 and
2011.
Restricted Programs (Proposed
§§ 668.7(a)(2) and 668.7(e)); Failing
Programs and Ineligible Programs (Final
§ 668.7(h) and (i))
Restricted Programs and Enrollment
Limits
Comment: Some commenters objected
to proposed § 668.7(e)(3), which would
limit enrollment of title IV, HEA
recipients in a restricted program to the
average number enrolled during the
prior three award years. The
commenters believed that these growth
restrictions, coupled with the employer
affirmations in proposed § 668.7(e)(1),
would result in the Department, rather
than the market, controlling how many
students are trained for a particular
profession. The commenters argued that
the Department would be exercising
power over the job market, even though
it is not equipped to assess the needs of
the job market. According to these
commenters, an analysis of whether a
job market is growing, contracting, or
otherwise changing requires
consideration of many complex and
interrelated factors, and that this
analysis is beyond the Department’s
expertise in the educational sector. In
addition, the commenters opined that
the proposed regulations would have
the effect of regulating job markets, not
debt levels or whether a program
prepares its students to earn an income.
The commenters noted that a short-term
oversupply of potential employees in a
certain field could cause a program to
become restricted, regardless of whether
the program adequately trained its
students for employment in that field.
Some commenters argued that title IV,
HEA funds are not intended to be used
only for a program that prepares a
student for an occupation that is in
demand at the time the student enters
the program. Another commenter
concluded that because restricted
programs would likely have a
significant number of Pell Grant
students, limiting the number of title IV,
HEA eligible students who can enroll in
those programs would impede President
Obama’s 2020 higher education goal,
because these are the types of students
that institutions need to educate to meet
that goal. In view of this consequence,
this commenter suggested that the
Department eliminate the proposed
growth restriction and employer
verification requirements and only
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
34404
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
require institutions to make debt
disclosure warnings to students in the
institutions’ promotional materials for
these programs.
Some commenters recommended that
the Department limit enrollment for a
restricted program to the number of
students enrolled during the previous
award year. The commenters noted that
under proposed § 668.7(e)(3), limiting
enrollment to the average number of
title IV, HEA eligible students enrolled
during the last three award years could
result in reducing enrollment. If a
program has been growing over the last
three years, the average enrollment for
the three-year period would be lower
than the highest enrollment for the most
recent year. For example, if a program
had an enrollment of 10 in year 1, 20 in
year 2, and 30 in year 3, the average
enrollment for all three years would be
20. The average enrollment would be 10
fewer than the highest enrollment for
the three-year period.
Similarly, other commenters believed
that reducing the number of title IV,
HEA eligible students in a restricted
program would likely cause institutions
to scale back resources. They noted,
however, that restricting enrollment to
the most current award year level would
drive improvement while still limiting
growth. The commenters believed that
this approach would avoid any
diminishing of program quality that
would otherwise occur when programs
that could meet the debt thresholds are
forced to scale back resources.
On the other hand, some commenters
noted that the proposed averageenrollment approach might not reflect
historic norms for a program
experiencing rapid enrollment growth
during the past three years and that a
baseline reflecting growth in just those
years might not provide an effective
limitation. The commenters
recommended that the Department
place stricter enrollment limitations on
restricted programs.
Commenters supporting the proposal
to restrict enrollment argued that the
restriction should be limited in
duration. The commenters were
concerned that institutions with large
programs could continue to enroll title
IV, HEA eligible students indefinitely
without improving quality. Commenters
also noted that nothing would prevent
institutions from enrolling non-title IV
students in restricted programs, thus
allowing those programs to continue to
grow. The commenters noted that many
institutions enroll large numbers of
borrowers who receive taxpayer-funded
assistance from other governmentfunded educational programs such as
the G.I. Bill. One of the commenters
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
stated that according to the Department
of Veterans Affairs, eight of the top 10
colleges with the most VA-funded
students are for-profit institutions. In
view of these concerns, the commenters
recommended that the Department (1)
require that a program on restricted
status must improve in order to
continue receiving Federal student aid,
and (2) make the program ineligible if it
is in a restricted status for three
consecutive years.
In addition, commenters had several
questions concerning the criteria the
Department would use in determining
how to count enrolled students for
purposes of the enrollment restrictions.
Discussion: See the following
discussion.
Ineligible Programs
Comment: Commenters expressed
concern that the proposed regulations
did not include a ‘‘grandfather’’
provision allowing students attending
programs deemed ineligible to complete
their program of study. The commenters
believed that students enrolled in
associate’s and bachelor’s degree
programs should be permitted to attend
the ineligible program and continue to
receive title IV, HEA funds for longer
than the one additional year proposed
in the regulations. Commenters
suggested alternative time periods
including allowing a student to
continue to receive title IV, HEA funds
(1) until he or she completes the
program, (2) up to the published length
of the program, or (3) up to one and onehalf times the length of the program.
The commenters believed these periods
were appropriate as long as the student
is continuously enrolled and complies
with satisfactory academic progress
standards.
Another commenter contended that
requiring a student in an ineligible
program to rely on transferring to
another institution to complete his or
her degree or credential would result in
substantial burdens for students,
including disrupting the student’s
academic progress, adjusting to a new
learning environment, and potentially
having difficulties in the job market,
including, but not limited to, having to
explain to employers the reason for
changing colleges midstream. The
commenter argued that this limitation
on student eligibility would not serve
the Department’s underlying policy
goals because it would require students
to decide among what the commenter
believed to be three unappealing
choices: (1) Remain in the program
without title IV, HEA program
assistance (but with a continued ability
to obtain private educational loans at
PO 00000
Frm 00020
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
higher interest rates); (2) transfer to
another program (with the
accompanying negative consequences);
or (3) leave the program without a
credential but with student loan debt.
To help ensure that students in an
ineligible program have adequate
alternative options for obtaining a
postsecondary education, other
commenters suggested that the
Department place an ineligible program
on a probationary status for the first and
second years after the year the program
has been determined to be ineligible.
The program would lose its eligibility
for title IV, HEA funds only if it failed
to meet the gainful employment
standards for a third successive year.
The commenters offered that, under this
approach, the Department could require
an institution to submit a plan to bring
the program into compliance with the
gainful employment standards, which
would result in the institution having a
reasonable amount of time to make
needed adjustments. Similarly, other
commenters recommended that in cases
where more than 50 percent of an
institution’s students are enrolled in a
particular program, the Department
should not impose sanctions unless the
program fails to meet the threshold
requirements for three consecutive
years.
Another commenter was concerned
that a significant number of students
enrolled in ineligible programs would
not have meaningful access to more
appropriate alternative educational
opportunities and that there would not
be the capacity to accommodate
students from programs that fail the
debt measures. The commenter opined
that the Department should work with
Congress to develop a transition plan to
increase postsecondary capacity to
address the needs of current and
prospective students displaced when
their program becomes ineligible under
the regulations. The plan, according to
the commenter, could include new
investments in a range of programs that
are currently authorized under the
Higher Education Opportunity Act of
2008 (Pub. L. 110–315) (HEOA) but have
never been funded, including the
‘‘Program to Increase College Persistence
and Success;’’ the ‘‘Bridges from Jobs to
Careers’’ grant program; and the
‘‘Business Workforce Partnerships for
Job Skill Training in High Growth
Occupation or Industries’’ grant
program. In addition, the commenter
believed that the Department should
consider developing regulations or
guidance to help ease student
transitions between postsecondary
institutions and other Federal training
and employment programs, building on
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
successful State and local ‘‘career
pathways’’ models that enable lowincome and other at-risk individuals to
acquire the skills they need for wellpaying jobs and careers.
Other commenters believed that
students who are unable or choose not
to complete an ineligible program, or
who are unable to or choose not to
transfer to another program within the
same institution, should have their
Federal student loan debts discharged
so that they have the opportunity to
move on without penalty. The
commenters noted that FFEL and Direct
Loans may be discharged under the
closed-school provisions of the title IV
regulations. Another commenter
suggested using the false certification
provisions as the basis for discharging
loans for students enrolled in ineligible
programs. Other commenters believed
that incurring loan debt for attending an
ineligible program should be an
allowable defense to collection for a
student who is later unable to make loan
payments.
Another commenter believed that the
Department should give an institution
an opportunity to lower tuition instead
of making the program immediately
ineligible. The commenter described a
program designed for speakers of the
Spanish language where a student takes
automobile mechanics classes that are
taught every day in the Spanish
language for four hours, and then takes
two hours of English as a Second
Language on the same day. The
commenter stated that the program is
highly effective, but because it costs
more than the institution’s traditional
programs it may become ineligible for
title IV, HEA funds under the proposed
metrics.
Commenters were also concerned that
the proposed regulations did not specify
when and under what standards an
institution could apply to have an
ineligible program regain its eligibility.
The commenters recommended that the
Department allow the institution to
apply to regain eligibility for a program
one full award year after the program
became ineligible and determine
whether the program regains its
eligibility under the standards proposed
for new programs.
Other commenters believed that no
penalties should be imposed on a
program for failing to meet a metric
until after an institution is notified and
provided with an opportunity to take
corrective action. The commenters
suggested that the Department allow the
institution to bring the ineligible
program into compliance during at least
the same period of time that a student
would be allowed to continue to receive
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
title IV, HEA program funds for
attending that program.
A commenter asked the Department to
clarify how a student would be affected
if a program is determined to be
ineligible during the course of the
student’s studies. The commenter also
questioned how the proposal
disallowing the award of title IV, HEA
program funds to students who begin
attending an ineligible program after a
specified date relates to a situation
where a student has taken a leave of
absence and the student resumes
attending the program after the program
became ineligible.
Discussion: As discussed under the
heading, Thresholds for the Debt
Measures (§ 668.7(a)(1)), we have
simplified the regulations by
establishing a single set of minimum
standards that are applied over at least
a three year period. Under the
simplified approach, a program either
passes or fails the minimum standards.
Consistent with the general emphasis on
disclosure and appropriate incentives,
the debt warnings provided students
during this extended period will play an
important role.
Because the debt warnings in these
final regulations are more extensive
than the requirements proposed in the
July 26, 2010 NPRM and the Department
is seeking to focus the sanctions on the
lowest-performing programs, we believe
it is no longer appropriate to limit
enrollment or place other restrictions on
a gainful employment program.
We agree with commenters that
institutions should be allowed some
time to improve a program before it
becomes ineligible for title IV, HEA
funds, and we have therefore adopted
the suggestion made by some of the
commenters that a program not be
subject to sanction for a three-year
period. In § 668.7(h), we are providing
that a failing program is one that does
not satisfy at least one of the minimum
standards for a FY. Under § 668.7(i), a
failing program becomes ineligible if it
fails the minimum standards for three
out of the last four most recently
completed FYs. If and when that occurs,
the Department notifies the institution
that the program is ineligible on this
basis and that the institution may no
longer disburse title IV, HEA funds to
students enrolled in that program except
as permitted using the procedures in
§ 668.26(d).
Using an extended period of three out
of four FYs of failing the measures to
make a program ineligible will provide
greater flexibility and offer a measure of
protection to programs that generally
pass at least one of the measures but
have an isolated and perhaps unusual
PO 00000
Frm 00021
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
34405
year in which the program fails both
debt measures. This change
simultaneously responds to some of the
concerns identified in the comments
about the possibility that merely one
year of failing the measures would
result in a program becoming ineligible
under the proposed regulations. In
particular, this approach significantly
reduces the chances that random
variations in the caliber of a specific
student cohort could put a program at
risk of losing its eligibility for title IV,
HEA funds. A good program could have
a bad year, but it is far less likely that
a good program could have three bad
years out of four years. Extending the
period of measurement to three out of
four years allows for a more accurate
reflection of typical performance.
Moreover, the approach helps to
control for recessions and other
variations in the labor market that could
make it difficult for students (including
those graduating from programs
performing well on the measures) to get
jobs. The average recession in the postWorld War II period lasted for 11
months. See https://www.nber.org/
cycles/US_Business_Cycle_Expansions_
and_Contractions_20100920.pdf. In
recent recoveries the unemployment
rate has remained elevated for longer
than the official recessionary period.
With a longer observation period of
three out of four years, programs will be
less at risk of being judged by business
cycle conditions that are out of their
control.
At the same time, if the regulations
had been altered to require two
consecutive years of failing both
measures for a program to lose
eligibility, it is likely that some
programs might not respond quickly
enough to make relevant improvements.
Using a period of three out of four
consecutive FYs to determine a
program’s eligibility will also have the
advantage of preventing a program that
generally fails both measures from
remaining eligible by simply passing
one of the debt measures in one year.
This extended period provides an
opportunity for the institution to make
a sustained assessment of the program’s
performance under both debt measures.
This approach also provides an
institution with time to make
improvements to the program and
evaluate whether it would be better to
discontinue the program voluntarily.
As discussed more fully under the
heading, Debt warning disclosures
(§ 668.7(j)), because prospective and
currently enrolled students face added
risks for enrolling or continuing in
failing programs, an institution must
inform students of those risks and of the
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
options available to those students for
continuing their education. The
information provided to students
through the debt warnings must address
the questions of how long an institution
may disburse funds to students enrolled
in failing and ineligible programs and
how students would be affected when a
program becomes ineligible while they
are enrolled. We believe that creating
required disclosures of information to
students while a program is failing and
using a longer period to determine if a
program is ineligible is better for
students than allowing currently
enrolled students in a program that
loses eligibility to continue receiving
Federal student aid funds.
With regard to the suggestions that the
Department discharge the loans for
students who are unable or unwilling to
complete a failing program or transfer to
another program, we note that the
current loan discharge provisions are
statutory and do not apply in these
circumstances. Accordingly, a change in
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
the law would be required to adopt
these suggestions.
In response to the question of how an
institution can reinstate the title IV
eligibility of a program that becomes
ineligible under these regulations, the
institution must comply with the
requirements under § 668.7(l). These
provisions, discussed under the
heading, Additional Programs
(proposed § 668.7(g)(2) and (3);
Restrictions for ineligible and
voluntarily discontinued failing
programs (final § 668.7(l)), describe the
process by which an institution can
reestablish the eligibility of an ineligible
program or a failing program that the
institution voluntarily discontinued, or
establish the eligibility of a program
substantially similar to an ineligible
program.
Regarding the commenters’ concern
that a significant number of students
enrolled in ineligible programs would
not have meaningful access to more
appropriate alternative educational
PO 00000
Frm 00022
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4725
opportunities and there would not be
the capacity to accommodate students
from programs that fail the debt
measures, past experience with student
loan default rates suggests that
educational opportunities can continue
to expand even if large numbers of
institutions lose student aid eligibility.
Pursuant to the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1990, between
1991 and 1996, we eliminated
approximately 1,148 schools from our
student loan programs based on three
consecutive years of unacceptably high
default rates. Table D uses data from the
National Postsecondary Student Aid
Study (NPSAS) to show student
enrollment between 1991 and 1996 by
various characteristics. Over the course
of this six-year period, schools that
remained eligible for Stafford loans
appear to have been able to
accommodate the number of students
who once attended, or otherwise would
have attended, schools that lost
eligibility.
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
ER13JN11.014
34406
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
As can be seen in Table D, overall
undergraduate enrollment increased by
some 400,000 in this timeframe, while
enrollment at for-profit institutions
declined by approximately one-third. In
this case, the students appear to have
increased their attendance at
community colleges, by approximately
1.25 million students, as well as at
public four-year universities.
The Department recognizes that the
higher education landscape has changed
since the early 1990s, with strong
growth in for-profit institutions and
innovations in online and distance
learning options that allow for
enrollment to expand at lower marginal
costs. Therefore, we expect that the
distribution of students leaving
programs that fail the debt measures
will differ from the situation in the
1990s, with a larger share of students
expected to remain at institutions
within the for-profit sector by moving to
successful programs that increase
enrollment in response to increased
demand created by the closure of
ineligible programs.
We appreciate comments suggesting
that the Department work with Congress
to develop a transition plan to increase
postsecondary capacity to address the
needs of potentially displaced students
by funding programs authorized but not
funded under the HEOA or to develop
regulations to help ease student
transitions between postsecondary
institutions and other Federal training
and employment programs.
Congressional action would be required
for these actions to occur.
The President’s 2020 higher education
goal is the guiding star for the
Department. All of our efforts are
directed to developing higher education
strategies that support institutions in
their efforts to better serve students and
prospective students, particularly those
who are from disadvantaged
backgrounds, minority students,
students with disabilities, working
adults, and others that are at risk.
However, the purposes of the 2020 goal
will not be achieved by allowing
institutions to continue offering lowperforming programs that upon
completion leave students with large
debts and poor employment prospects.
These regulations have been
developed specifically to provide
opportunities for institutions to improve
the gainful employment programs they
are providing. Today, the effective
programs must compete with ineffective
programs. These regulations will first
provide feedback to institutions so that
they can improve programs against the
debt measures. These regulations then
provide a significant period of time for
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
institutions to re-assess and re-design
marginally effective programs. Further,
the regulations would require
institutions to provide prospective
students and families with meaningful
consumer information that includes
these debt measures. Finally, and only
after three years of failing all three debt
measures within a four-year period,
programs become ineligible. This
approach balances the competing forces
of costs and benefits associated with
regulatory change to provide a path to
improving gainful employment
programs that will move us towards
meeting our national college completion
goals, while giving institutions the
flexibility they need to continue
generating quality, innovative education
programs.
The final regulations are intended to
strengthen programs, not cause them to
close, and institutions are already acting
to improve the performance of their
programs. The likely result is not only
better outcomes in terms of the debt
measures but also, as described in the
RIA, increased retention, in and
graduation from, gainful employment
programs. And if the institutions that
are currently offering poor performing
gainful employment programs fail to
make the necessary improvements, we
have no doubt that other for-profit
providers—particularly those that are
offering one of the many effective
programs today—will fill the gap left by
the termination of programs that fail
three out of four FYs. The gainful
employment regulations are a step
toward achieving the President’s 2020
goal.
With respect to the comments asking
for clarification about how a student
would be affected if a program is
determined to be ineligible while the
student was on a leave of absence, the
institution will need to follow the
procedures under § 668.26(d), regarding
disbursement of funds after a program
loses eligibility.
Changes: We have removed the
thresholds and conditions that would
have applied to restricted programs
under proposed § 668.7(a)(2) and (e). In
§ 668.7(h), we specify that, starting with
the debt measures calculated for FY
2012, a program fails for a FY if it does
not meet any of the minimum standards.
In new § 668.7(i) we provide that,
starting with the debt measures
calculated for FY 2012, a program will
become ineligible if it fails all of the
debt measures for three out of the four
most recent FYs.
PO 00000
Frm 00023
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
34407
Loan Repayment Rate (§ 668.7(b))
Loan Repayment Rate Calculation
Comment: Commenters argued that
the definition of ‘‘repayment’’ as it
relates to the repayment rate ignores
students who are actively repaying their
loans because the recognized repayment
is limited to payments that reduce loan
principal during a given FY. The
commenters pointed out that this
approach omits borrowers from the
numerator of the repayment rate who
are in good standing in repaying their
loans, including some borrowers
repaying under income-based, incomecontingent, or graduated repayment
plans. While the treatment is different
in each of these payment plans, each
can permit monthly payments that are
equal to or less than accrued interest. In
other words, under those plans, a
borrower can be making reduced
payments that leave interest unpaid. As
a result, the loan amount outstanding
does not decrease between the
beginning and end of the FY. The
commenters argued that because these
repayment plans are attractive to
borrowers who consolidate loans from
multiple lenders, and to borrowers with
loans from both undergraduate and
graduate programs, institutions should
not be penalized in the repayment rate
calculation for borrowers who choose
these plans. The commenters believed
that institutions would be penalized by
borrower choices beyond their control,
particularly since those plans are
promoted by the Department as a means
of responsible borrower debt
management.
Discussion: In the July 26, 2010
NPRM, the Department proposed
considering students making payments
under the income-contingent repayment
(ICR) and income-based repayment
(IBR) plans to be successfully repaying
their loans if they were paying more
than the interest accruing on their loans,
or if they were working in fields that
made them eligible for PSLF. The
Department recognizes that some
borrowers are meeting their obligations
under the IBR and ICR plans but are not
paying enough to reduce the
outstanding balance on their loans.
Considering all of these students to be
successfully repaying their loans would
create a loophole that would allow high
repayment rates for programs based
solely on enrollment in IBR and ICR, no
matter how large the debts and how low
the earnings of the programs’ graduates.
These plans are intended to help
borrowers in financial distress;
however, an educational program
generating large numbers of borrowers
in financial distress raises troubling
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
34408
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
questions about the affordability of
those debts. Therefore, we have struck
a balance in these final regulations that
recognizes the legitimate use of the ICR,
IBR, and other plans that provide for
scheduled payments that are equal to or
less than the interest accruing on the
loan but maintains protections against
excessive reliance on these plans among
a particular program’s former students.
The Department is replacing the term
Reduced Principal Loan (RPL) with the
term Payments-Made Loan (PML) to
clarify that under the revised
methodology for calculating the
repayment rate, payments made on a
loan include not only those payments
that reduce the outstanding balance but
also payments made under certain
repayment plans, or for certain
consolidation loans, payments that do
not reduce the outstanding balance.
Under these final regulations, PML
includes the loans of borrowers who are
repaying under all of the FFEL and
Direct Loan repayment plans, including
repayment under the IBR and ICR plans.
The Original Outstanding Principal
Balance (OOPB) on loans of borrowers
included in the applicable two- or fouryear period who make payments during
the most recently completed FY that
reduce the loan amount to an amount
that is less than the total outstanding
balance of the loan at the beginning of
that FY, will now be included in the
numerator of the repayment rate. The
final regulations clarify that loans that
have defaulted in the past, including
consolidation loans composed of at least
one defaulted loan, are excluded from
the numerator of the calculation, i.e.,
from the Loans Paid in Full (LPF) and
the PML. To be consistent with the
definition of PML, we are also clarifying
that LPF do not include loans that have
been in default.
When calculating the repayment rate
for post-baccalaureate certificate,
master’s degree, doctoral degree, or firstprofessional degree programs, we will
consider a borrower with a
consolidation loan to be successfully
repaying his or her loans if the
outstanding balance does not increase
over the course of the most recently
completed FY.
For borrowers repaying under the IBR,
ICR, and other plans that provide for
scheduled payments that are equal to or
less than the interest that accrues on the
loan, the OOPB of loans for borrowers
making scheduled payments under
those plans that are equal to or less than
the interest that accrues on the loan
during the FY will be included, on a
limited basis, as OOPB of PML in the
numerator of the repayment rate. This
approach will also benefit programs
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
whose borrowers may be repaying their
loans under these plans during and
shortly after completing required
medical or dental internships and
residencies. However, to ensure that
borrowers in gainful employment
programs are thoughtfully counseled
into entering the repayment plans that
best meet their needs and do not have
to rely excessively on the IBR or ICR
plans because their programs leave them
unable to secure sufficient employment
to repay their loans, the Department is
limiting the dollar amount of loans in
negative amortization or for which the
borrower is paying accrued interest only
that will be included in the numerator
as OOPB of PML to no more than 3
percent of the total amount of OOPB in
the denominator of the ratio (percent
limitation). This percent limitation is
based on available data on a program’s
borrowers who are making scheduled
payments under these repayment plans.
For the loans associated with a
particular institution for which the
Department has actual data on borrower
repayment plans and scheduled
payment amounts, that data will be used
to calculate the amount to be included
in the OOPB of PML. If the amount
calculated is higher than the percent
limitation, only the amount of the
percent limitation will be included in
the OOPB of PML.
The Department has information on
the repayment plans and scheduled
payments for Direct Loans and FFEL
loans held by the Department. However,
the Department does not currently
collect information about the repayment
plans and scheduled payments amounts
on FFEL loans that it does not hold. The
Department is developing plans to
collect this information on loans that it
does not hold. Until the Department
determines that there is sufficiently
complete data on program borrowers
with scheduled payments that are equal
to or less than accruing interest, the
Department will include in the
numerator 3 percent of the OOPB in the
denominator of the ratio for all
programs.
When applying the percent limitation
on the dollar amount of the interest-only
or negative amortization loans, the
Department may adjust the limitation by
publishing a notice in the Federal
Register. The adjusted limitation may
not be lower than the percent limitation
specified in § 668.7(b)(3)(i)(C)(1) or
higher than the estimated percentage of
all outstanding Federal student loan
dollars that are interest-only or negative
amortization loans.
To establish this limitation, the loan
servicing systems were queried to
determine the value of the loans
PO 00000
Frm 00024
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
entering repayment on or after October
1, 2003 that were in a repayment plan
that allowed a scheduled payment equal
to or less than accruing interest. That
query identified 1.1 percent of loans in
this status. We will not treat interestonly or negative amortization loans
unfavorably in the repayment rate
calculation so long as they do not
represent a disproportionate share of
borrowers. The limit on the percentage
of these loans that would count
positively in the numerator of the
repayment rate calculation was based on
this 1.1 percent figure and adjusted up
to 3 percent to provide some flexibility
with regard to using repayment plans
that allow a scheduled payment equal to
or less than accruing interest, but to
dissuade excessive use of these plans.
The regulations continue to recognize
in the repayment rate borrowers who are
full-time employees of public service
organizations and who are working to
qualify for PSLF under 34 CFR
685.219(c). The Department is
developing an employer certification
form that should be available by early
2012 and will allow borrowers, as
frequently as annually, to document that
they are engaged in PSLF qualifying
employment. The OOPB of loans for
borrowers who are in the process of
qualifying for PSLF will be included in
the numerator of the repayment rate as
part of the OOPB of PML if the borrower
submits a PSLF employment
certification form to the Department that
demonstrates that the borrower is
engaged in qualifying employment and
the borrower made qualifying payments
on the loan during the most recently
completed FY.
Changes: Section 668.7(b)(3) has been
revised by replacing Reduced Principal
Loan (RPL) in the numerator of the
repayment rate ratio with PaymentsMade Loans (PML). PML only includes
loans that have never been in default or,
in the case of a Federal Consolidation
Loan or a Direct Consolidation Loan,
neither the consolidation loan nor the
underlying loan or loans have ever been
in default.
PML includes a limited amount of the
OOPB of loans in which a borrower is
making scheduled payments under IBR,
ICR, or other repayment plans that are
equal to or less than the interest that
accrues on the loan. Section 668.7(b)(3)
clarifies the treatment of Federal
Consolidation Loans or Direct
Consolidation Loans (consolidation
loans) of a borrower who is repaying
loans related to a gainful employment
program when the borrower is reducing
the outstanding balance of the
consolidation loan to an amount that is
less than the outstanding balance of the
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
consolidation loan at the beginning of
that FY. Section 668.7(b)(3) also clarifies
that if the program is a postbaccalaureate certificate, master’s
degree, doctoral degree, or firstprofessional degree program, PML
includes the total outstanding balance of
a Federal or Direct Consolidation Loan
that at the end of the most recently
completed FY is less than or equal to
the total outstanding balance of the
consolidation loan at the beginning of
the FY, and that the outstanding balance
of a consolidation loan includes any
unpaid accrued interest that has not
been capitalized. Section 668.7(b)(3)
specifies the documentation on which
the Department will rely to include a
borrower in the process of qualifying for
PSLF in the loan repayment rate.
The definition of Loans Paid in Full
(LPF) has been revised to clarify that
these are loans that have never been in
default or, in the case of a Federal
Consolidation Loan or a Direct
Consolidation Loan, neither the
consolidation loan nor the underlying
loan or loans have ever been in default.
Comment: Some commenters
recommended that the Department
apply the repayment rate only to those
students who graduate or complete a
program. The commenters argued that if
the repayment rate is used as a proxy for
determining whether the program
prepares students for gainful
employment (i.e., whether graduates
have received the capabilities needed to
succeed in the particular occupation),
the relevant group measured should be
those who successfully complete the
program. The commenters believed that
if students who fail to complete the
program are included in the calculation,
the Department would be merely
rewriting the CDR provision. One of the
commenters stated that measuring
institutions based on former students
who are not paying their loans is not a
fair metric. The commenter stated that
only those students who have maximum
earnings potential because they
completed the full program should be
measured.
Discussion: The Department disagrees
with the commenters that the repayment
rate should focus only on program
completers. The Department believes
that in order to determine whether a
program is succeeding in its mission of
preparing students for gainful
employment using title IV, HEA funds,
it is important to examine the level of
success of all enrollees in the program.
Programs that experience a high number
of drop outs and withdrawals leaving
students with no employment skills and
student loan debt they have insufficient
means to repay cannot be said to be
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
preparing students for gainful
employment. Although we agree that
students who complete the program
have a better chance of repaying their
student loans, we believe that including
both program completers and
noncompleters in the repayment rate
calculation provides a more
comprehensive picture of the program’s
overall success. Additionally, students
enrolled in certain programs may not be
required to receive the program’s
academic credential in order to secure
employment or advance in their career
field, and as a result, may be repaying
their student loans. Regarding the
comment about CDR, we explain the
differences between the repayment rate
and CDR under the heading, Use of the
cohort default rate as an alternate
measure.
Changes: None.
Comment: Commenters questioned
the logic of including in the numerator
of the repayment rate only those loans
that were paid in full or whose principal
balance was reduced during the FY. The
commenters believed that institutions
should not be penalized for the Federal
government’s policy decision to issue
loans that are not credit based; offer
borrowers flexible repayment plans; and
promote deferments, forbearances, and
loan consolidation to borrowers in
repayment. The commenters
recommended that the Department
consider a loan to be in repayment for
purposes of the repayment rate
calculation if the borrower has made at
least four payments during the most
recent FY. Although the commenters
welcomed as a positive first step the
Department’s decision to exclude from
the repayment rate borrowers who are in
an in-school or military-related
deferment status, they argued that
borrowers who have valid reasons for
requesting deferment or forbearance,
such as unemployment, maternity leave,
disability, elder care, or economic
hardship, should be given equal
consideration. The commenters believed
that a deferment or forbearance granted
to a borrower who leaves the workforce
for a period of time to care for children
or a sick parent, or to undergo a medical
procedure, is as legitimate as an inschool deferment that primarily benefits
students at two and four-year public and
non-profit institutions, and middle class
students enrolled in graduate programs.
Consequently, the commenters
recommended that the Department
either exclude from the repayment
calculation all loans for which
deferment or forbearance is pending or
enact strict standards for issuing
deferments and forbearances.
PO 00000
Frm 00025
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
34409
Discussion: We disagree with the
notion that an institution should be
shielded from Federal policy decisions
regarding the student loan programs.
The Department makes available its
Federal student loan programs
regulations to institutions before the
institution agrees to participate in the
title IV, HEA programs. Moreover, we
believe the institution should be held
accountable for how it delivers
programs intended to provide gainful
employment, particularly when most of
its former student borrowers have to
rely on economic hardship deferments,
forbearances, and other means to avoid
defaulting on their loans or managing
life circumstances. To be sure,
deferments, forbearances, and other
program benefits are necessary to assist
borrowers in loan repayment, but
particularly heavy reliance on these
tools among former students of a
particular program raise questions about
the performance of that program.
Concerning the request to enact
stricter standards for deferment or
forbearance, any such changes are
outside the scope of the proposals we
included in the July 26, 2010 NPRM and
therefore we are not addressing them
here.
With regard to the request that the
Department exclude from the repayment
calculation all loans for which
deferment or forbearance is pending, we
are excluding in these final regulations
loans that are in deferment status for
reasons that are clearly unrelated to
whether a program prepares students for
gainful employment. Specifically, we
exclude from the repayment rate
calculation loans that were in an inschool or military-related deferment
status during any part of the FY, loans
that were discharged as a result of the
death of the borrower under 34 CFR
682.402(b) or 34 CFR 685.212(a), and
loans that were assigned or transferred
to the Department that we are
considering discharging, or were
discharged, on the basis of the total and
permanent disability of the borrower.
However, we are not excluding from the
repayment calculation all loans for
which deferment or forbearance is
pending because we believe that if an
institution provides a program that
leads to borrowers securing gainful
employment at sufficient salary levels to
repay their student loans, the program
will be able to meet the repayment rate
threshold of 35 percent even if
individual borrowers’ life circumstances
(e.g., needing to provide elder care or
taking maternity leave) result in some of
them using available deferment and
forbearance benefits. Thus, the
availability of deferment and
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
34410
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
forbearance will not prevent a program
from meeting the minimum loan
repayment rate standards. Moreover,
because the volume and frequency with
which former students of a program use
deferments and forbearances may be an
indicator of program success in
preparing students for gainful
employment, we are not excluding all
borrowers in deferment.
With regard to the comment that a
loan should be counted in the
numerator of the repayment rate if a
borrower makes four payments in a FY,
we believe that making only four
payments in a FY would indicate
strongly that the borrower does not have
the capacity to repay the loan.
Therefore, it would be inappropriate to
include the loan in the numerator of the
loan repayment rate.
Changes: Section 668.7(b) has been
revised to exclude from the repayment
rate calculation loans that were in an inschool or military-related deferment
status during any part of the FY, loans
that were discharged as a result of the
death of the borrower under 34 CFR
682.402(b) or 34 CFR 685.212(a), and
loans that were assigned or transferred
to the Department that we are
considering discharging, or were
discharged, on the basis of the total and
permanent disability of the borrower.
Treatment of Borrowers Carrying
Forward Accrued Unpaid Interest
Comment: One commenter, whose
analysis and recommendations were
cited by numerous commenters, pointed
out that although accrued interest is
generally capitalized when a borrower
first enters repayment, there are
circumstances under which accrued
unpaid interest remains outstanding and
is not capitalized. Under these
circumstances, due to the manner in
which loan payments are applied
(borrower payments are applied first to
collection charges and late fees, next to
accrued but unpaid interest, and finally
to principal), the commenter concluded
that there was an interest-related
problem and called it the ‘‘persistence of
interest.’’ The commenter noted that in
these circumstances, under the
proposed regulations, a borrower
making full monthly payments (i.e.,
payments that exceed the new interest
that accrues each month on the loan)
would not be counted in the numerator
of the repayment rate because the
borrower’s payments would be applied
to accrued, unpaid interest. According
to the commenter, the treatment of these
loans as nonperforming loans in the
repayment rate calculation not only
yields a lower repayment rate, but is
also based on the past status of the loan.
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
The commenter also pointed out that
even if outstanding accrued interest is
capitalized and added to principal, the
interest-related problem continues to
exist unless the capitalization takes
place at the beginning of the FY. The
commenter further stated that if the
capitalization takes place during the
course of the FY, it will appear to
increase the principal balance when
compared to the principal balance at the
beginning of the FY, even if the
borrower made payments that reduced
loan principal prior to the
capitalization.
The commenter also noted that there
are many instances in which accrued
outstanding interest stems from a past
loan status, such as a brief deferment or
forbearance period, that may leave the
loan in a nonperforming status for
purposes of the repayment rate for a
significant period of time into the
future. To address the ‘‘persistence of
interest’’ factor in the repayment rate
calculation, the commenter
recommended that the Department
modify the regulations to provide that
the calculation be based on a
comparison of the sum of the principal
balance and the accrued unpaid interest
on the loan at the beginning and the end
of the given FY rather than on a
comparison of the outstanding principal
balance. The commenter supported the
proposed approach of excluding from
the numerator of the repayment rate
borrowers’ loans in deferment or
forbearance status and loans for which
borrowers are paying a scheduled $0
monthly payment or a payment that is
less than the new accruing interest
under the IBR and ICR plans.
Discussion: To determine whether a
borrower’s OOPB should be included in
the numerator of the repayment rate, the
Department will determine whether the
total outstanding balance of a borrower’s
loan at the end of the FY for which the
rate is being calculated is less than the
total outstanding balance of the loan at
the beginning of that FY, and the
outstanding balance of a borrower’s
loan, at both the beginning and the end
of the FY, will include any outstanding
unpaid accrued interest that has not
been capitalized. We believe that by
including any outstanding unpaid
accrued interest that has not been
capitalized in the beginning year total
outstanding balance of the loan, a
borrower who makes full scheduled
monthly payments on a loan that are
greater than accruing interest will be
able to show a reduced total outstanding
balance for the loan by the end of the
FY, even if interest is not capitalized or
is capitalized at some point during the
year.
PO 00000
Frm 00026
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
Changes: The new term ‘‘PaymentsMade Loans’’ (PML) in § 668.7(b)(3)
specifies that the outstanding balance of
a loan used in calculating the repayment
rate includes any unpaid accrued
interest that has not been capitalized.
Treatment of Consolidation Loans
Comment: Commenters objected to
the Department’s decision to view loans
repaid through the consolidation
process as not being paid-in-full until
the consolidation loan is paid in full.
The commenters noted that the
Department has historically treated
consolidation loans as a positive step for
a borrower to take in managing student
loan debt and stated that the
Department was contradicting this
position by treating consolidation loans
unfavorably in the loan repayment
calculation. These commenters noted
that there is not sufficient data from the
National Student Loan Data System
(NSLDS) that would allow an institution
to track repayment of a consolidation
loan and recommended that such loans
be treated positively in the repayment
rate calculation (i.e., treated as in
repayment) until the data is available to
prove otherwise.
Other commenters questioned
§ 668.7(b)(2)(i) of the proposed
regulations, which provides that a
‘‘consolidation loan is not counted [in
the numerator] as paid in full.’’ The
commenters stated that it was unclear
whether the repayment rate calculations
would properly segregate consolidation
loans according to source institution.
The commenters believed that if the
repayment rate calculation fails to
properly attribute the underlying loans
repaid through the consolidation for a
borrower who consolidates during a
given FY, the borrower’s principal
balance at the end of the FY will be
greater than the principal balance at the
beginning of that FY. The commenters
believe this situation will also result in
an institution not receiving credit in the
numerator of the repayment rate for
payments the borrower made on loan
principal in the same FY in which the
borrower consolidated the loan. To
address this issue, the commenters
recommended that the Department
develop an acceptable and transparent
method for determining the amount of
a consolidation loan that is attributable
to a particular program.
Another commenter recommended
that any consolidation loan on which a
borrower has made scheduled
payments, including principal and
interest, during the immediate prior
calendar year should be treated as a
reduced principal loan in the repayment
rate calculation.
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
Discussion: Loan consolidation in the
Federal student loan programs is a
refinancing mechanism that allows a
borrower to aggregate a number of loans
to secure one repayment source, to
extend the maximum available
repayment period, and to reduce the
monthly payment amount. The
underlying loans are effectively
refinanced through the consolidation
process. Although the Department
agrees that loan consolidation may be a
positive step for a borrower, it does not
represent payment by the borrower of
the loans consolidated. The loans paid
off through the consolidation process
are reflected dollar-for-dollar in the new
consolidation loan debt. We see no basis
for treating a consolidation loan payoff
as successful borrower repayment, or
LPF, for purposes of the repayment rate.
The Department has a long history
under the CDR process of successfully
tracking loans that were in default and
then repaid through consolidation and
including those loans in the appropriate
institution’s CDR. For the repayment
rate calculation, the Department has
enhanced its capacity to look back
through multiple consolidation loans
and to assign loans repaid through
consolidation to a program at an
institution. Although a consolidation
loan is not considered LPF until the
entire consolidation loan is repaid, the
OOPB of the underlying loans
attributable to a gainful employment
program is included in the numerator
(i.e., PML of OOPB) if the borrower
makes payments that reduce the total
outstanding balance of the consolidation
loan by the end of the FY under review.
As part of the data correction process
contained in these final regulations, and
discussed more fully under the heading,
Data access and review, we will provide
access to the NSLDS data underlying the
repayment rates, including the
information associated with
consolidation loans. As a result,
institutions will be able to request
corrections to the assignment of
borrowers and loan amounts, including
the portion of consolidation loans, used
to calculate a program’s repayment rate.
Changes: Section 668.7(b)(1)(iii) has
been added to specify that for
consolidation loans, the OOPB is the
OOPB of the FFEL and Direct Loans
attributable to a borrower’s attendance
in the program. We have added
§ 668.7(b)(1)(iii) and revised
§ 668.7(b)(3)(i)(A) to clarify that if
certain consolidation loan payments are
made, the OOPB of the underlying loans
attributable to a gainful employment
program will be included in the
numerator of the repayment rate.
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
Use of the Cohort Default Rate as an
Alternate Measure
Comment: One commenter
recommended that the Department
eliminate the loan repayment rate and
replace it with the CDR. Alternatively,
the commenter suggested that the
repayment rate be modified to count
positively in the numerator all
borrowers who are not delinquent in
repaying their loans, including those
that use various program benefits such
as consolidation, forbearance, and
deferment.
Some of the commenters requested
that the Department clarify the
definition of a reduced principal loan in
the regulations. The commenters
indicated that it was unclear whether a
student would need to make more than
one payment that reduces principal in
the FY to be considered to have a
reduced outstanding principal balance.
Discussion: The Department does not
believe that the CDR is an appropriate
measure of whether the students who
attended a program are gainfully
employed. The CDR is an institutional
rate that only measures the number of
an institution’s borrowers who fail to
make payments on a loan for an
extended period of time. The CDR only
includes a small group of the borrowers
during a limited time period, and counts
many of those borrowers as successes
even if they are struggling to repay their
loans. Borrowers using reduced
payment plans may be seeing their loans
grow rather than shrink because their
incomes are low and their debts are
high. As a result, the CDR is a better
measure of potential loss to taxpayers
than of the repayment burden on
students.
Students attending programs leading
to gainful employment in a recognized
occupation often do so because they
have been told that they will be able to
secure employment that will allow them
to pay off their debts. The Department’s
experience with the CDR and other
institutional measures is that they may
mask an under-performing program and
obscure for students, the Department,
and institutions the harm that can result
from enrolling in a specific program. An
institution’s CDR may therefore be a
misleading measure of an individual
program’s success in providing students
with sufficient income to pay off
education loan debt.
The repayment rate is intended to
operate at the program level and track
the loan repayment by borrowers
formerly enrolled in specific programs,
not simply those who reach a certain
level of delinquency or who default.
Gainful employment should allow the
PO 00000
Frm 00027
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
34411
borrower to make all the scheduled
payments on the loan during the given
FY under review, not simply make
intermittent payments.
Regarding the commenter’s question
about clarifying the term ‘‘reduced
principal loan,’’ as previously discussed,
we have replaced the term ‘‘reduced
principal loan’’ with the term
‘‘payments-made loan’’. The reduction of
the borrower’s total outstanding balance
between the beginning and end of the
FY can be as little as one cent in order
for the OOPB of the loan to be included
in the numerator of the program
repayment rate. The outstanding
balance of a loan includes any unpaid
accrued interest that has not been
capitalized.
Changes: None.
Control Over Student Borrowing
Comment: Many commenters stated
that student overborrowing and related
repayment difficulties, as reflected in
repayment rates, are related to a
program’s inability to limit student
borrowing. The commenters objected to
the Federal requirement that a school
offer students the maximum loan
amount for which they are eligible even
when the program believes that a
student may have difficulty repaying the
loans and wishes to recommend a lesser
loan amount. The commenters believe
that if they are required to offer the
maximum loan amount to any student
who meets the admission requirements
and maintains satisfactory academic
progress, they should not be held
accountable for excessive borrowing and
a borrower’s failure to repay. Some of
these commenters questioned the need
for students to receive loan funds in
excess of direct tuition and fee costs and
requested authority to adopt
institutional policies of limiting annual
loan limits to direct costs. The
commenters did not believe an
institution’s programs should be
adversely impacted by debt a student
chooses to take on for discretionary
expenses. Several of these same
commenters recommended that a
school’s regulatory authority under the
Federal Perkins Loan program to
consider a borrower’s ‘‘willingness to
repay’’ a loan before making a Perkins
loan to a student should be applied to
Direct Loan program loans.
Discussion: To ensure access to
postsecondary education, the cost of
attendance provisions in section 472 of
the HEA recognize both direct costs
(tuition, fees, books, and supplies) and
indirect costs (room and board
allowance and allowances for other
educationally-related costs). Indirect
costs are not viewed as discretionary or
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
34412
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
unnecessary costs. The institution,
however, has the authority to decline to
originate a Direct Loan or to reduce a
Direct Loan amount in section 479A(c)
of the HEA. To prevent discrimination
against certain students or categories of
students that may result from the use of
across-the-board policies by an
institution, the HEA requires the
institution to exercise its authority
under this provision on a case-by-case,
documented basis with a written
explanation provided to the student.
This authority provides an institution
with the ability to address individual
cases of unnecessary, excessive
borrowing by students. Any change in
this authority would require a change in
the HEA.
In response to the statement that links
excessive borrowing to an institution
funding all admitted students who are
making satisfactory academic progress,
we note that the institution would have
to disburse title IV, HEA funds to any
student making satisfactory academic
progress regardless of the amount of
loans the student borrowed. For the
debt-to-earnings ratios, if the institution
identifies the amount of the tuition and
fees for each student to the Department,
we will limit the amount of loan debt
included in that calculation for a
student who completes a program to the
total amount of tuition and fees the
institution charged the student for
enrollment in all programs at the
institution. However, because the
repayment rate is looking at the
cumulative loan amounts in repayment,
it would be inconsistent and impractical
to limit the debt considered on a
borrower-by-borrower basis. Such a
limitation would require complex
adjustments that would attribute, over
time, the amount of the borrower’s loan
payments to a tuition-adjusted loan
amount. This approach could produce
an anomalous outcome where a
borrower who is otherwise severely
delinquent in repaying his or her loan
could nevertheless be counted as
successfully repaying the loan after any
loan payments made by the borrower
are attributed to the part of the loan
used for tuition and fees.
Finally, the application of
‘‘willingness to repay’’ as a criteria when
awarding Federal Direct Loans would
require a change in the HEA.
Changes: None.
Data Access and Review
Comment: Commenters objected to
the limited access institutions had
through the NSLDS to the data elements
that will be used to calculate the
repayment rate, including accurately
identifying the principal balance of a
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
loan at various points over the life of a
loan and whether a borrower had made
payments to reduce loan principal
during the FY. The commenters
requested that the Department disclose,
explain, and confirm the accuracy of the
data from NSLDS that it will use to
calculate programmatic repayment rates
so that institutions can internally
replicate and monitor their rates. The
commenters believe that this situation
denies them a reasonable opportunity to
revise their policies and procedures to
come into compliance before sanctions
may be imposed against them. They
urged the Department to revise the
repayment rate regulations to clearly
state that schools would not be
penalized for data for students who
were enrolled in or attended the school
prior to the regulation’s enactment, or
July 1, 2014, whichever is earlier. They
also asked the Department to provide
repayment rate data to institutions, with
available resources to explain the data,
similar to the process we use with
school CDR data. The commenters
believe this will provide the institutions
and the Department with time to test the
underlying information and time for
institutions to identify changes needed
in their programs to meet the gainful
employment regulations’ requirements.
Discussion: The Department believes
that § 668.7(e) of these final regulations
includes sufficient safeguards regarding
NSLDS data and reasonable access to
these data before they are finalized.
Specifically, as specified under
§ 668.7(e) and discussed more fully
under the heading, Draft debt measures
and data corrections (§ 668.7(e)), Final
debt measures (§ 668.7(f)), and
Alternative earnings (§ 668.7(g)), the
Department will generate draft rates for
institutional review prior to calculation
of the final repayment rate for each FY
for which rates are calculated. The
Department will provide for each
program the borrower-related data used
to calculate the draft rate and the
institution will be able to review and
challenge the accuracy of the data. The
Department believes that the
Department’s disclosure of draft rates
and a school’s ability to identify and
correct the data in the NSLDS used to
calculate the repayment rates prior to
the calculation of final rates provides
reasonable access to data for institutions
and will assure the accuracy of the final
rates.
Based on the effective date of these
regulations, the first final repayment
rates will be calculated for FY 2012 and
will examine borrowers who first
entered repayment in FY 2008 and FY
2009 and who have been in repayment
for three to four years. Thus, these final
PO 00000
Frm 00028
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
regulations would not result in any
program losing eligibility prior to the
final calculation of debt measures for FY
2014. With that said, there is a great
deal that institutions can do to ensure
an acceptable repayment rate by
working with former students to
encourage repayment rather than nonpayment. After considering the
comments, we determined that this
approach is in the best interest of the
former students and taxpayers.
Changes: Section 668.7 of the
regulations has been amended by
adding a new paragraph (e) under which
the Department notifies an institution of
draft results of the debt measures for
each of its programs. An institution may
review and challenge the accuracy of
the NSLDS loan data used to calculate
the draft loan repayment results. The
Department will not issue final
repayment rates for a program until all
of the data challenges for that program
are resolved. Further detail regarding
these changes is provided under the
heading, Draft debt measures and data
corrections (§ 668.7(e)), Final debt
measures (§ 668.7(f)), and Alternative
earnings (§ 668.7(g)).
Debt-to-Earnings Ratios (§ 668.7(c))
General
Comment: For an institution
undergoing a change of ownership that
results in a change in control from nonprofit to for-profit status, some
commenters suggested that the
Department compute the debt-toearnings ratios only after three years of
data are obtained from the newly
formed for-profit entity.
Discussion: In general, because the
debt measures are calculated on a
program basis, nothing about the
calculations will change if an institution
undergoes a change of ownership that
results in a change in control, as
described in 34 CFR 600.31. For
example, if the same program (same CIP
code and credential level) that was
offered by the acquired institution
continues to be offered after the change
in ownership, the debt measures are
calculated using data from before and
after the changes in ownership. If that
program was only offered by the
acquired institution, the debt measures
carry over to the acquiring institution.
However, in the commenter’s example
where control changes from a non-profit
institution to a for-profit institution, we
agree to delay calculating the debt
measures for the degree programs
previously offered by the non-profit
institution that are now gainful
employment programs of the for-profit
institution. For these programs, the
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
Department will calculate the debt
measures based on data provided under
§ 668.6(a) by the for-profit institution
after the change in control.
Changes: None.
Debt Portion of the Debt-to-Earnings
Ratios
Loan Debt
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
Comment: Some commenters argued
that if the proposed regulations are
intended to reduce student debt levels
by forcing institutions to reduce tuition
rates, this goal conflicts directly with
the current 90/10 provisions in § 668.28
which inhibit, and in many cases
effectively prohibit, for-profit
institutions from reducing tuition.
According to the commenters, the net
effect of the proposed regulations
combined with the 90/10 provisions
would be to force institutions to enroll
wealthier students and discourage
institutions from serving minority and
disadvantaged students. Similarly, other
commenters believed that using debt
measures to assess program quality may
lead to adverse consequences for
students by increasing pressure on
institutions to comply with the 90/10
provisions and creating incentives for
institutions to minimize risk by limiting
applicants who may adversely impact
the institution’s metrics. The
commenters contended that these
consequences would be further
exacerbated because temporary
provisions under the 90/10 provisions
in § 668.28(a)(6), related to counting as
cash a portion of unsubsidized Stafford
loan disbursements, will expire June 30,
2011.
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
Other commenters believed that the
90/10 provisions should be eliminated
because they serve no good purpose and
lead to price fixing or have compelled
institutions to price a program at the
maximum amount of title IV aid for
which low-income students qualify to
receive plus an additional 10 percent
that is funded by other sources.
Discussion: The 90/10 provisions,
which require a proprietary institution
to derive at least 10 percent of its
revenue from sources other than title IV,
HEA program funds, are statutory and
are therefore beyond the scope of these
regulations. However, we are not
persuaded that the 90/10 provisions
conflict with the gainful employment
measures. In a report published October
2010, the GAO did not find any
relationship between an institution’s
tuition rate and its likelihood of having
a very high 90/10 rate. This report,
United States Government
Accountability Office, ‘‘For Profit
Schools: Large Schools that Specialize
in Healthcare are More Likely to Rely
Heavily on Federal Student Aid,’’
October 2010, is available at https://
www.gao.gov/new.items/d114.pdf.
GAO’s regression analysis of 2008 data
indicated that schools that were (1)
Large, (2) specialized in healthcare, and
(3) did not grant academic degrees were
more likely to have 90/10 rates above 85
percent when controlling for other
characteristics. Other characteristics
associated with higher than average 90/
10 rates were (1) high proportions of
low-income students, (2) offering
distance education, (3) having a
publicly-traded parent company, and (4)
being part of a corporate chain. GAO
defined ‘‘very high’’ as a rate between 85
PO 00000
Frm 00029
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
34413
and 90 percent, and about 15 percent of
the for-profit institutions were in this
range. Also, GAO found that in general
there was no correlation between an
institution’s tuition rate and its average
90/10 rate. In one exception, GAO found
that institutions with tuition rates that
did not exceed the 2008–2009 Pell Grant
and Stafford Loan award limits (the
award amounts were for first-year
dependent undergraduates) had slightly
higher average 90/10 rates than other
institutions, at 68 versus 66 percent.
The Department’s most recent data on
90/10, submitted to Congress in
February 2011 and available at https://
federalstudentaid.ed.gov/datacenter/
proprietary.html, show that only 8 of
1851 institutions had ratios over 90
percent and about 14 percent had ratios
in the very high range of 85 to 90
percent. The GAO report and the
Department’s data suggest that most
institutions could reduce tuition costs
without the consequences envisioned by
the commenters.
An analysis by the Department of the
repayment rate indicates that it is
entirely possible to meet both the 90/10
requirements of the existing statute and
the repayment rate thresholds in these
final regulations. Table E shows the
distribution of for-profit institutions by
90/10 rate category and their
performance on the repayment rate test.
The percent of schools falling below the
35 percent repayment rate threshold
increases with the 90/10 rate, indicating
that many schools score well on both
measures simultaneously. Moreover,
even in the highest 90/10 rate
categories, almost 50 percent of schools
pass the repayment rate.
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
Chart 3 is a scatter plot of paired
institutional 90/10 and repayment rates.
It includes the regression line that
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
describes the linear relationship
between the two rates when the 90/10
PO 00000
Frm 00030
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
ratio is used to predict the repayment
rate.
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
ER13JN11.015
34414
At the upper end of the repayment
rate distribution it appears there is
roughly an equal likelihood that
repayment rates will be either above or
below the regression line. In other
words, based simply on visual
inspection there appears to be little
relationship between 90/10 and
repayment rates for institutions with
relatively high 90/10 rates. A further
analysis of the 1,475 institutions with
both a repayment rate and 90/10
calculation reveals a correlation
coefficient (R) between the two variables
of ¥.483. That is, institutional 90/10
ratios tend to decline as their repayment
rates increase. A correlation coefficient
between 0.3 and 0.5 (irrespective of
sign) is indicative of a moderate effect;
a value greater than 0.5 is considered a
large effect. Thus, the relationship
between these two variables can be
described as moderate. Continuing the
analysis one step further, the R-Squared
value is .233, meaning that about 23
percent of the variation in the
repayment rates can be explained by the
90/10 rates. Thus we see no evidence
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
here supporting the notion that better
performance on the measures, i.e.
increasing repayment rates, will
adversely affect 90/10 calculations.
Several other factors also suggest that
any tension between the 90/10
requirements and the gainful
employment measures can be managed
by most institutions. First, even though
some of the provisions of the HEA that
make it easier for institutions to meet
the 90/10 requirements are time-limited,
other provisions enacted in 2008 as part
of the reauthorization of the HEA will
remain in effect, such as the ability to
count income from other programs that
are not eligible for HEA funds. Second,
institutions have opportunities to
recruit students that have all or a
portion of their costs paid from other
sources. The changes to the HEA in
2008 also permit an institution to fail
the 90/10 measure for one year without
losing eligibility, and the institution can
retain its eligibility so long as it does not
fail the 90/10 measure for two
consecutive years. Furthermore,
institutions that have students who
PO 00000
Frm 00031
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
34415
receive title IV, HEA funds to pay for
indirect costs such as living expenses
already are in the situation described by
the commenters where the amount of
title IV, HEA funds may exceed the
institutional costs. These institutions
are presumably managing their 90/10
measures using a combination of other
resources, and this result would also be
consistent with the findings in the GAO
report described above.
Changes: None.
Comment: Some commenters argued
that excluding parent PLUS loans from
median loan debt greatly understates the
debt levels associated with middle-class
students attending public and non-profit
institutions. At the same time, the
amount of debt students incur for
attending for-profit institutions is
greatly overstated because most of these
students are independent and lowincome and are therefore more likely to
receive additional support through
unsubsidized Stafford loans instead of
parent PLUS loans. Consequently, the
commenters believed that excluding
parent PLUS loans reflects the
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
ER13JN11.016
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
34416
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
Department’s bias in depicting
educational loan burdens and the costs
of education attributable to various
education sectors in general. Other
commenters opined that an effect of the
proposed regulations would be that an
institution would counsel parents to
incur more loan debt because parental
debt would not count against it under
the proposed metrics.
Discussion: Overall, only 3.5 percent
of the students enrolled in certificate
programs benefited from parent PLUS
loans. Including these loans would have
little impact on the debt measures.
Moreover, including parent PLUS loans
would distort the measures, which are
designed to measure and assess a
student’s debt burden, because the
student is not responsible for repaying
loans incurred by a parent.
Changes: None.
Comments: With regard to the
proposal that loan debt includes all debt
incurred by a student from a FFEL or
Direct Loan, a private education loan, or
an institutional loan, some commenters
opined that as a legal and practical
matter institutions cannot control
student debt in excess of tuition, fees,
books, and prescribed charges that are
part of the cost of attendance. The
commenters reasoned that because
excess debt varies depending on the
circumstances of the individual student,
not the educational program, it should
not be included in calculating the debtto-earnings ratios. Similarly, some
commenters believed that the proposed
regulations failed to address student
over borrowing because the Department
did not change current guidance
prohibiting schools from limiting
student indebtedness to the amount of
tuition and fees.
Along the same lines, other
commenters opined that the debt
portion of the debt-to-earnings ratios
would be a more realistic measurement
of the amount of debt for which an
institution should be responsible, if (1)
all private loans are excluded from the
calculation, unless institutions have
some method of approving or declining
student loan amounts, or have the
ability to impact the amount of funds a
student borrows, and (2) to alleviate the
impact that student over borrowing can
have on the debt-to-earnings ratios,
institutions are held accountable only
for debt incurred to pay actual
educational expenses and not for excess
amounts used for living and other
expenses. The commenters offered that
the amount incurred to pay actual
educational expenses can be derived by
using the amount institutions report as
the net price on the College Navigator
Web site. The reported net price minus
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
any grant or gift aid received by a
student would be the maximum amount
of debt that the student would need to
accumulate to pay actual education
expenses.
Commenters contended that the
proposed debt-to-earnings ratios would
not cause an institution to reduce
tuition and fees because the Department
did not provide a systematic way for the
institution to limit student borrowing.
The commenters noted that a student
would be eligible to receive the same
amount of student loan funds ($9,500)
for a one-year program costing $15,000
or for one costing $10,000. So without
any borrowing limits, a student who
receives $5,500 in Federal Pell Grant
funds could still borrow the maximum
loan amounts even if the institution
reduced the cost of the program by 33
percent to $10,000. Consequently, the
commenters reasoned that reducing
program costs, even by unrealistic levels
of 33 percent, would not guarantee a
reduction in student debt associated
with the program. The commenters
suggested that for the July 26, 2010
NPRM to have its intended effect of
reducing program costs, the total
amount of debt included in the debt-toearnings ratios should be capped at the
cost of tuition and fees. Other
commenters suggested that the amount
of loan debt should be capped at the
total of institutional charges less any
grant aid received by students.
Another commenter stated that while
the proposed regulations emphasized
protecting the taxpayer from wasteful
spending, the HEA encourages students
to over borrow by funding living
expenses instead of just tuition, fees,
and books. The commenter believed that
the HEA makes the taxpayer the
student’s individual bank, but under the
proposed regulations, institutions
would be the responsible party for these
expenses. The commenter provided an
example of an institution where student
loans totaled $7.34 million for the 2009–
10 award year, of which approximately
$1.75 million, or 24 percent, was used
for student living expenses. The year
before, living expenses accounted for
only 6 percent of total loans. The
commenter suggested that the
Department place limits on the amount
of a loan that could be used for living
expenses or not hold institutions
responsible for this portion of student
loan debt.
Discussion: Although a statutory
change would be required to allow an
institution to directly limit or control
student borrowing, we are not
persuaded that an institution that makes
reasonable efforts to counsel its students
about the dangers of over borrowing
PO 00000
Frm 00032
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
cannot affect student behavior.
Nevertheless, for the purpose of
calculating median loan debt the
Department agrees to limit the total
amount of loans a student incurs in
completing a program to the total
amount the institution charged the
student for tuition and fees if the
institution reports those amounts to the
Department. Using the actual amount
charged, instead of a derived or
estimated amount, allows the
Department to more accurately limit
loan debt for the ratio calculations.
We are revising § 668.7(c)(2) to reflect
this change. Under this section, an
institution may report the total amount
charged for tuition and fees for each
student who attended programs at the
institution. In cases where a student
attends more than one program, the
Department will compare the total
amount of tuition and fees the student
was charged for attending those
programs to the total amount of loan
debt the student incurred for attending
those programs. Of course, for a student
who attended only one program, we will
compare the amount of tuition and fees
charged to the loan debt incurred for
that program. For each student, we will
use the lower of the amount of tuition
and fees charged or the total loan debt
incurred for purposes of calculating the
median loan debt for the program.
However, because some programs
would not benefit from limiting loan
debt, reporting the amount charged is
optional for the institution. In any
event, the amount of the median loan
debt the Department will provide to
institutions for disclosure purposes
under § 668.6(b) will not be limited to
tuition and fees charges because we
believe a prospective student should
know how much loan debt a typical
student incurred in completing the
program.
In the Program Integrity Issues final
regulations, we discussed generally in
the preamble the process the
Department will use to calculate the
median loan debt of a program. In these
final regulations, we are establishing
how the Department determines the
loan debt of each student in a program
and derives the median loan debt of the
program.
Under these provisions:
(1) Loan debt includes FFEL and
Direct loans (except for parent PLUS or
TEACH Grant-related loans) owed by
the student for attendance in a program,
and as reported by the institution under
§ 668.6(a)(1)(i)(C)(2), the amounts the
student received from private education
loans for attendance in the program and
the amount from institutional financing
plans that the student owes the
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
34417
more than one institution offering
similar programs might have an
incentive under these regulations to
shift students between those institutions
to shield some portion of the
educational loan debt from the debt
included in the debt measures under
these final regulations. The provision in
§ 668.7(c)(4)(iii) will negate that
incentive by permitting the Department
to include that debt in the analysis. The
regulations also provide that a
determination of common ownership or
control will be made under 34 CFR
600.31, which sets forth the definitions
and concepts that the Department
routinely uses to review changes of
ownership, financial responsibility
determinations, and identifying past
performance liabilities at institutions.
(3) Under § 668.7(c)(5)(iv), the
Department will not include a student
in calculating the debt-to-earnings ratios
for the program the student completed
if the student is enrolled in another
eligible program at the institution or at
another institution. However, we clarify
that the student must be enrolled in
another program during the calendar
year for which the Department obtains
earnings data from SSA (the earnings
year). We exclude the enrolled student
based on the assumption that he or she
will not be employed for the earnings
year used to calculate the debt-toearnings ratios for the program the
student originally completed.
We illustrate in Table F how the
Department will implement this
process.
Changes: Section 668.7(c)(2) has been
revised to provide that an institution
has the option to report the total amount
of tuition and fees the institution
charged a student for attending
programs at the institution. This section
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
PO 00000
Frm 00033
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
ER13JN11.017
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
institution upon completing the
program.
(2) Loan debt does not include any
loan debt incurred by the student for
attendance in programs at other
institutions. However, the Department
may include loan debt incurred by the
student for attending other institutions
if the institution providing the program
for which the debt-to-earnings ratios are
calculated and the other institutions are
under common ownership or control, as
determined in accordance with 34 CFR
600.31. We generally do not include
educational loan debt from institutions
students previously attended because
those students made individual
decisions to enroll at other institutions
where they completed a program.
Entities with ownership and control of
34418
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
also has been revised to provide that the
Department calculates the median loan
debt of the program for each student
who completed the program during the
2YP, the 2YP–R, the 4YP, or the 4YP–
R based on the lesser of the total loan
debt incurred or the total amount of
tuition and fees the institution charged
the student for enrollment in all
programs at the institution, if the
institution provides this information to
the Department. Also, we have added
§ 668.7(c)(4) to specify how the
Department determines the loan debt for
a student.
Comment: Some commenters
expressed concern that the proposed
debt-to-earnings ratios inappropriately
inflate the cost of education by
incorrectly capitalizing unpaid interest
in determining median loan debt.
Discussion: The commenters are
correct in noting that the Department
will calculate median loan debt using
loan amounts for unsubsidized loans
that include capitalized interest.
However, we do not believe this
treatment inflates the cost of education
because the interest incurred during
program attendance is part of the cost of
the loan. Moreover, the total amount of
the student’s loan debt may now be
limited to the total cost of tuition and
fees.
Changes: None.
Loan Amortization
Comment: Commenters urged the
Department to calculate the annual loan
amount for the debt-to-earnings ratios
by using a more accurate loan
amortization schedule. Under the
proposed regulations, the annual loan
debt for a program is based on a 10-year
repayment schedule. The commenters
noted that a fixed, 10-year amortization
does not reflect the loan repayment
behavior of many borrowers, and
suggested that the Department
determine the average length of
repayment for borrowers who entered
repayment during the four most recently
completed FYs. Alternatively, the
commenters suggested that the loan
amortization rate should vary
depending on the program students
complete: 15 years for a certificate
program, 20 years for a bachelor’s
degree program, and 25 years for a
graduate degree program. The
commenters stated that these
amortization rates reflect the current
costs of education and student
repayment practices. Similarly, other
commenters suggested using loan
amortization schedules of 15 years for
non-degree programs and 20 years for
degree programs. Some commenters
recommended that the Department use
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
(1) the actual term of the loan applicable
to each student based on each student’s
payment plan in effect at the time the
ratios are calculated, and (2) each
student’s actual interest rate for the ratio
calculations.
Other commenters expressed concern
that using a debt-to-earnings metric that
tracks earnings only over a three-year
period while using a standard 10-year
amortization schedule for loan debt
over-weights the debt factor and underweights the benefits of higher education.
The commenters stated that if a
borrower enters a new career upon
completion of a degree program, the
borrower’s income is likely to increase
with each passing year, but limiting the
income timeframe to a three-year period
fails to fully consider the potential for
income gain in relation to debt. The
commenters were also concerned that
the debt-to-earnings metric did not take
into account other benefits of higher
education such as better health and life
insurance coverage, a lower
unemployment rate, and greater
mobility to change jobs.
Some commenters believed the
proposed regulations were heavily
biased against longer term and highercost programs (e.g., health care
programs). Students enrolled in highercost programs borrow more, but their
earnings in the first three years after
graduation are not likely to be
substantially greater than those students
who have earned less costly degrees.
According to the commenters, these
students may take seven years or more
after graduation to experience the real
financial advantage of the additional
education they obtained.
Discussion: In view of the comments
that a fixed 10-year repayment schedule
may not be appropriate for all programs,
the Department agrees to amortize the
median loan debt for a program based
on credential level. It would be
impractical to use the actual terms of
the loan for each borrower or the time
frame the borrower realizes the benefit
of higher education. Using the actual
borrower data could also lead to
repayment periods of less than 10 years.
The average repayment period for
Federal student loans remains a little
over 8 years. We recognize the
commenters’ concern that longer
programs could be significantly more
likely to fail the debt-to-earnings ratios
under the proposed 10-year repayment
schedule. Consequently, we are
adopting an approach along the lines
suggested by some of the commenters:
For undergraduate or post-baccalaureate
certificate programs and associate’s
degree programs, loan debt will be
amortized over 10 years; for bachelor’s
PO 00000
Frm 00034
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
and master’s degrees, 15 years, and for
programs that lead to a doctoral or firstprofessional degree, 20 years. We
believe this approach tracks the amount
of debt that students incur at each level
as they progress through their
postsecondary education and will
monitor the length of repayment by
credential level to make any necessary
future adjustments.
Changes: Section 668.7(c)(2)(ii) has
been revised, in part, to provide that the
Department will calculate the annual
loan payment for a program by using a
10-year schedule for undergraduate or
post-baccalaureate certificate programs
and associate’s degree programs, a 15year schedule for bachelor’s and
master’s degree programs, and a 20-year
schedule for doctoral and firstprofessional degree programs.
Earnings Portion of the Debt-toEarnings Ratios
Earnings of Program Completers
Comment: Some commenters opined
that calculating a program’s debt-toearnings ratio based on earnings
received during the first three years of
employment does not take into account
the lifelong benefit of higher education
because as earnings increase with
experience some graduates will be able
to pay off their loans in the 10th or 15th
year of repayment. Consequently, the
commenters argued that the Department
should use BLS data at the 50th
percentile because doing so will more
likely track what a student would make
within the first 10 years of his or her
career. For those professions not
requiring a graduate or first-professional
degree, the commenters suggested using
BLS data at the 75th percentile. Some
other commenters suggested that the
Department allow institutions to use
either SSA data or BLS wage data. For
BLS data, the commenters
recommended using wages at the 50th
percentile for degree programs and at
the 25th percentile for certificate
programs.
Similarly, some commenters opined
that a decision of whether to continue
schooling beyond high school should be
based on a comparison of the lifetime
benefits and costs of that schooling. The
commenters argued that using SSA data
for the income portion of the ratio
calculations does not accurately reflect
the impact that postsecondary education
will have on a student’s lifetime
earnings or the student’s ability to
ultimately repay his or her loan
obligations. While noting that the
Department’s likely intent is to ensure
that students are able to afford the
necessary loan payments in the early
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
years after leaving school, the
commenters cautioned that any
deviation from a comparison of lifetime
benefits to lifetime costs has the
potential to harm students. For example,
if education confers benefits to
students—such as increased earnings
throughout their careers—then
regulations that have the effect of
restricting students’ ability to borrow to
pay for that education can be
detrimental. In addition, the
commenters stated that because the
starting salaries are often not that high
for students enrolled in teacher
education programs, those programs
would perform poorly under the debtto-earnings ratios even though they offer
positive lifestyle benefits that are not
reflected in teacher income. Considering
the effect that low salaries have on the
debt burden test, the commenters
believed the proposed regulations
would create an incentive for
institutions to stop providing programs
that lead to low-paying public sector
employment.
Under proposed § 668.7(c)(3), the
Department would have required
institutions to prove that their
graduates’ salaries increased
substantially in order to use P3YP salary
data. Commenters stated that
institutions do not have this salary data.
Moreover, the commenters noted that
there does not appear to be a good
reason for requiring institutions to
provide this proof because the
Department can obtain income data for
the six prior years as easily as the three
prior years. Therefore, commenters
recommended that the Department
automatically calculate the debt-toearnings ratios over the proposed 3YP as
well as the P3YP and use the most
favorable result to determine whether a
program satisfies the debt-to-income
requirements.
Other commenters noted that due to
the extended length of required
residencies, most medical and dental
school graduates have relatively low
earnings for several years. The
commenters argued that because a
residency is post-graduate medical
education, the debt-to-earnings ratio for
medical school graduates should be
calculated not from the point when the
student graduates from medical school,
but rather from the start of the first full
year after the student completes his or
her medical residency.
Discussion: In response to concerns
that using earnings of recent program
graduates would penalize programs
whose students typically begin careers
in low-paying jobs, we agree to extend
the employment period. As discussed
more fully under the heading,
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
Definitions, instead of using the
earnings of students who completed a
program during the three most recent
award years (years 1 through 3), the
Department will use the earnings of
students who completed a program
during the third and fourth FYs (years
3 through 4) prior to the FY for which
the ratios are calculated. For example,
the ratios calculated for FY 2016 will
use the most recent earnings available
for students who completed a program
between FYs 2012 and 2013 (between
October 1, 2011 and September 30,
2013). Although a longer employment
period may better reflect the earnings
connected to the education and training
provided by a program, extending the
employment period without cause, or
extending it significantly as suggested
by commenters advocating the use of
lifetime earnings, may weaken or sever
that connection. It would also delay the
Department’s efforts in identifying
poorly performing programs. For
medical and dental school graduates
whose earnings are unquestionably
higher after completing a required
internship or residency, the Department
will use the earnings of students who
completed those medical and dental
programs during the sixth and seventh
FYs (years 6 through 7) prior to the FY
for which the ratios are calculated. For
example, the ratios calculated for FY
2016 will use the most recent earnings
available for students who completed a
program between FYs 2009 and 2010
(between October 1, 2008 and
September 30, 2010).
Finally, the public service programs
described in the comments would likely
fare well under the loan repayment rate
due to their former students’ potential
eligibility for Public Service Loan
Forgiveness.
With regard to the comments about
using the 50th or 75th percentile
earnings from BLS, doing so would
suggest that all programs yield similar
or better earnings results than average.
Moreover, because BLS includes wages
only for those employed in an
occupation (individuals trained in the
occupation but not working, are not
counted), adopting the 50th or 75th
percentile earnings would allow
significantly more debt than the typical
graduate of a program would likely
incur.
Changes: See the discussion of the
changes to § 668.7(a)(2), under the
heading, Definitions.
Actual Earnings From SSA and Bureau
of Labor Statistics (BLS) Wage Data
Comment: Some commenters objected
to the proposal that the Department
would use the actual average earnings of
PO 00000
Frm 00035
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
34419
program completers to calculate the
debt-to-earnings ratios because neither
the Department nor an institution would
have access to individual earnings data.
The commenters believed that an
institution would be entirely ignorant of
the figures used to determine whether a
program violates the gainful
employment regulations and would
have no ability to challenge the
underlying data. Furthermore, the
institution would learn of any
noncompliance only after the data set is
closed. The commenters argued that this
lack of access to the data compromises
the institution’s right to knowledge and
notice. For this reason, the commenters
suggested that the Department use
earnings data publicly available from
BLS to determine average annual
earnings. The commenters stated that
institutions have developed an
understanding of how actual wages
relate to BLS data and how BLS wage
data relate to program length and tuition
and fees. According to the commenters,
by using BLS data, an institution would
be in a better position to assist students
in determining and reducing their debtto-earnings ratios. Moreover, using BLS
data would allow an institution to
determine whether its programs satisfy
the gainful employment requirements
and to make necessary changes prior to
being subject to penalties for
noncompliance. For example, if an
institution determines it does not have
the ability to offer and satisfy the debtto-earnings ratios for a program, it can
revise the program or teach out students
enrolled in the program and discontinue
admissions. The commenters argued
that if the Department’s goal is to make
an institution more accountable for the
education it provides, then the
institution must be informed, in
advance, of the data the Department will
use to determine whether its programs
comply with the regulations. The
commenters believed that using BLS
data would further this goal as well as
enhance and encourage more
transparency throughout the admissions
and enrollment processes.
Along the same lines, other
commenters stated that institutions
would be unable to monitor program
performance under the debt-to-earnings
ratios. First, the commenters were
concerned that the proposed regulations
did not specify the source of the
earnings data and there was nothing in
the proposed regulations that would
limit the Department from changing the
data source. Second, because the
proposed regulations did not define the
term ‘‘earnings’’ the commenters
believed it was unclear as to what
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
34420
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
measure would be used to determine
whether a program satisfies the debt-toearnings ratios. Other commenters
questioned whether annual earnings
would equal a full 12 months of
earnings or be based on past calendar
earnings because, if based on calendar
year data, the data will not be
representative of graduates’ actual
earnings if employment began mid-year
or towards the end of the reporting
period. Third, even if the Department
specified SSA as the source of earnings
data and defined ‘‘earnings,’’ the
commenters stated that institutions
would still be unable to monitor
program performance under the
proposed debt-to-earnings metric
because institutions do not have access
to actual earnings for program graduates
from SSA or any other source.
Therefore, the commenters believed that
institutions would be deprived of
effective notice of the impact of the
debt-to-earnings ratios and could not
take effective action to improve program
performance before being subject to
sanctions. Finally, the commenters
stated that some program graduates
begin their careers in low paying jobs or
internships. For example, graduates of
the arts and fashion-based programs
typically know they must begin at a
low-paying position to prove themselves
and get a foothold in a competitive
market, or to retain the freedom to do
creative work of their choice. The
commenters were uncertain how the
Department would assess whether an
institution can show that students
completing a program ‘‘typically
experience a significant increase in
earnings after an initial employment
period’’ as described in the July 26, 2010
NPRM. Because of this uncertainty, the
unavailability of SSA data on the actual
earnings for program graduates, and the
unrealistic expectation that program
graduates would provide earnings data
to an institution four to six years after
completing a program, the commenters
concluded that institutions would not
be able to monitor program performance
under the debt-to-earnings ratios.
For the following reasons,
commenters opined that using actual
SSA wage data to calculate the debt-toearnings ratios would be arbitrary:
(1) Institutions have no access to the
SSA actual earnings data and therefore
have no way to determine whether their
programs comply with the ratio
requirements.
(2) By relying on actual earnings data,
the Department does not consider that
students may have valid reasons
unrelated to the value or quality of their
education for choosing not to seek
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
employment or seeking low-wage or
part-time employment.
(3) The proposed regulations fail to
account for macro-economic conditions
that could drive national unemployment
rates or that are beyond the control of
institutions.
(4) The SSA data fail to include
comparable earnings for self-employed
individuals and fail to include all of the
earnings for graduates who operate
small businesses or as independent
contractors.
In addition, some commenters opined
that because the proposed regulations
do not control for the population served
by institutions, the regulations
discriminate against programs in
economically disadvantaged areas. The
commenters recommended using data
from BLS or the U.S. Department of
Agriculture’s Economic Research
Service (ERS) noting that the ERS
provides wage data for metropolitan and
non-metropolitan labor markets.
Some commenters believed that the
proposed debt-to-earnings ratio does not
reflect gainful employment in a
recognized occupation but instead
measures the post-completion debt
retirement capacity of a program
completer regardless of whether (1) after
initial placement, he or she has been
continuously employed in the
occupation related to the program, or (2)
he or she received a waiver for
placement, or was never placed, because
of continuing education or another
acceptable reason allowed by an
accrediting agency under its placement
methodology. As a result, the
commenters contended that the
proposed regulations were heavily
biased against programs for the health
care professions that enroll principally
women (ages 18–34) who often leave the
workplace for child bearing during the
three-year period after graduation.
Some commenters believed that using
actual wage data from SSA might be
acceptable if the Department did not
count graduates who did not work,
maintained full-time employment for
short periods, or worked part time. The
commenters offered that these situations
could be more a reflection of the student
than the education provided and would
inappropriately lower the income used
in the calculation.
Other commenters conceded that BLS
earnings data and Standard
Occupational Classification (SOC) codes
may not be as complete as desired (the
BLS data do not account for earnings by
degree attainment and it is difficult to
properly align or determine the SOC
codes that apply to a particular
program), but nevertheless endorsed
using BLS data to provide a transparent
PO 00000
Frm 00036
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
way for institutions to manage their
compliance with the regulations. These
commenters supported using BLS data
at the 25th percentile for non-degree
programs and at the 50th percentile for
programs leading to bachelor’s degrees
and higher credentials.
Other commenters supported using
actual earnings and including all
graduates (thus counting those who
stray outside the strict mapping to an
occupation), but were concerned that
the Department did not propose to
provide debt-to-earnings data, or results,
on a quarterly, monthly, or more
frequent basis. The commenters
believed that failing to provide this data,
would prohibit institutions from
identifying negative trends and
responding to any problems before
being subject to sanctions.
Other commenters stated that because
the for-profit sector enrolls a higher
percentage of nontraditional and female
students, the Department should use
BLS median wages instead of SSA
actual wages to provide a fixed,
federally-targeted wage base that would
minimize detrimental, differential, and
possibly legally discriminatory,
population effects. The commenters also
suggested that the Department use the
BLS median wage instead of the
originally proposed 25th percentile
wage to better reflect the earnings in any
given occupation.
Other commenters believed that using
actual earnings of part-time workers
would force institutions to close down
quality programs because those
programs would not satisfy the debt-toearnings thresholds. According to the
commenters, program closures would
have an enormous effect on femaledominated occupations in health
sciences, where working mothers have
the opportunity to work part-time or
take leave from work to manage home
and family responsibilities, by leaving
thousands of predominantly lowincome women without the opportunity
for an education. To mitigate this
circumstance, the commenters
suggested that the Department use BLS
wage data instead of actual earnings to
calculate the debt-to-earnings ratios.
Alternatively, if actual earnings are
used, the commenters suggested that the
Department add a multiplier to the
average annual earnings that is
commensurate with the proportion of
enrolled women in a particular program.
Some commenters believed that the
proposed loan repayment rate undercuts
the validity and need for debt-toearnings tests. The commenters
reasoned that graduates who are
repaying their loans have sufficient
income, but if they are not repaying
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
their loans, the fact that their earnings
may exceed some threshold appears to
be irrelevant. These and other
commenters stated that even the
brightest, most skilled, and employable
graduates will face earnings limitations
in low-wage-earnings cities and
surrounding areas. Consequently,
because the proposed metrics do not
account for differences in regional
wages, the commenters were concerned
that programs offered in those areas
would fail the debt-to-earnings tests
thereby depriving employers of the
opportunity to hire qualified, welltrained graduates.
Some commenters believed that the
proposed gainful employment
regulations were irrational because
programs would be subject to a potential
loss of eligibility, strict enrollment
limits, and other punitive measures
based on metrics that did not exist at the
time that students incurred loan debt
that would now be subject to review
under the proposed measures. In
addition, the commenters stated that
because the Department would impose
punitive measures against programs
based on aggregate data, not on the basis
of individual student data, the proposed
regulations are ill-designed to achieve
the purposes identified by the
Department in the July 26, 2010 NPRM.
For this reason, the commenters opined
that the proposed regulations were
arbitrary and capricious because
educational choices would be
eliminated for students who were doing
well themselves by repaying their loans,
obtaining jobs in their field, and
contributing to society in general.
Other commenters echoed these
concerns noting that every student
whose data would be used under the
debt-to-earnings metric would have left
an institution before the implementation
date of the regulations, with some
students leaving as early as five years
before that date. In view of the
‘‘retroactive’’ nature of the proposed
regulations, the commenters concluded
that it would not be feasible for an
institution to take any corrective actions
before sanctions would be imposed by
the Department.
Some commenters believed that the
final regulations should not require
institutions to retroactively gather data
on individuals who previously enrolled
in programs leading to gainful
employment because many institutions
would be unable to do so.
Discussion: The Department has
several concerns about using BLS data
to calculate the debt-to-earnings ratios.
First, as a national earnings metric that
includes untrained, poorly-trained and
well-trained employees, BLS earnings
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
data do not distinguish between
excellent and low-performing programs
offering similar credentials. Second,
BLS earnings data do not relate directly
to a program—the data relate to a SOC
code or a family of SOC codes stemming
from the education and training
provided by the program. An institution
may identify the SOC codes by using the
BLS CIP-to-SOC crosswalk that lists the
various SOC codes associated with a
program, or the institution could
identify through its placement or
employment records the SOC codes for
which program completers find
employment. In either case, the BLS
data may not reflect the academic
content of the program, particularly for
degree programs. Assuming the SOC
codes can be properly identified, the
institution could then attempt to
associate the SOC codes to BLS earnings
data. BLS provides earnings data at
various percentiles (10, 25, 50, 75, and
90), but the percentile earnings do not
relate in any way to the educational
level or experience of the persons
employed in the SOC code. So, it would
be difficult for an institution to
determine the appropriate earnings,
particularly for students who complete
programs with the same CIP code but at
different credential levels. For example,
there is no difference in earnings in the
SOC codes associated with a certificate
program and an associate’s degree
program with the same CIP code.
Moreover, because BLS percentiles
simply reflect the distribution of
earnings of those employed in a SOC
code, selecting the appropriate
percentile is somewhat arbitrary. For
example, the 10th percentile does not
reflect entry-level earnings any more
than the 50th percentile reflects
earnings of persons employed for 10
years. Even if the institution could
reasonably associate the earnings for
each SOC code to a program, the
earnings vary, sometimes significantly,
between the associated SOC codes, so
the earnings would need to be averaged
or somehow weighted to derive an
amount that could be used in the
denominator for the debt-to-earnings
ratios. Finally, and perhaps most
significantly, BLS earnings do not
directly reflect the earnings of the
students who complete a program at an
institution. Instead, BLS earnings reflect
the earnings of workers in a particular
occupation, without any relationship to
what educational institutions those
workers attended. While it is reasonable
to use proxy earnings like those
available from BLS for research or
consumer information purposes, we
believe a direct measure of program
PO 00000
Frm 00037
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
34421
performance must be used in
determining whether a program remains
eligible for title IV, HEA funds. The
earnings data we obtain from SSA will
reflect the actual earnings of program
completers without the ambiguity and
complexity inherent with attempting to
use BLS data for a purpose outside of its
intended scope.
As noted by many of the commenters,
a tradeoff in using SSA data rather than
BLS data is timely access to the earnings
data needed for making strategic
decisions about program offerings and
managing programs to comply with the
gainful employment standards. Whereas
BLS data are readily and publicly
available, an institution will not have
SSA data for a particular FY until the
Department obtains the data from SSA.
This delay is unavoidable because the
Department will use the most recent
earnings data available from SSA to
calculate the debt-to-earnings ratios for
each FY. To mitigate issues related to
timely access, the Department will
implement the following approach:
• For the debt measures calculated for
FY 2011, we will provide for each
gainful employment program offered by
an institution the debt-to-earnings ratios
for the 2YP covering FYs 2007 and
2008. Along with the ratio results, we
will provide the associated median loan
debt and SSA earnings data (the mean
and median annual earnings). In
addition, we will provide the loan
repayment rates for each program for the
same two-year period. We intend to
provide the ratio results and underlying
data for these FYs to the affected
institution and only for informational
purposes. The Department will provide
the same data for each subsequent FY
the ratios are calculated.
• As discussed more fully under the
heading, Draft debt measures and data
corrections (§ 668.7(e)), Final debt
measures (§ 668.7(f)), and Alternative
earnings (§ 668.7(g)), the Department is
providing a process under which an
institution may demonstrate that a
failing program would satisfy a debt-toearnings standard by using alternative
earnings data from BLS, a Statesponsored data system, or from an
institutional survey conducted in
accordance with the National Center for
Education Statistics (NCES) standards,
to recalculate the debt-to-earnings
ratios. These options are responsive to
comments suggesting that the actual
earnings give an inaccurate view of a
program and that we allow other data
sources to be used for the earnings
calculation.
Under this approach, an institution
will have an early view of the
performance of its programs from which
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
it can make initial assessments and
plans for improving or discontinuing
failing programs. In addition, because a
program will not become ineligible until
the Department calculates the debt
measures for FY 2014, the institution
will have the SSA data for two
additional FYs (FYs 2012 and 2013) to
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
supplement and better inform its initial
assessments. Moreover, to allow more
time for improvements of potentially
failing programs, beginning with the
debt measures calculated for FY 2012,
the institution may use alternative
earnings data under the recalculation
process described more fully under the
PO 00000
Frm 00038
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4725
heading, Draft debt measures and data
corrections (§ 668.7(e)), Final debt
measures (§ 668.7(f)), and Alternative
earnings (§ 668.7(g)) to extend the
program’s eligibility. The following
Table G illustrates this approach.
BILLING CODE 4000–01–P
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
ER13JN11.018
34422
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
BILLING CODE 4000–01–C
A program that fails the debt
measures for FYs 2012, 2013, and 2014
becomes ineligible for title IV, HEA
funds after the final rates are released
for FY 2014. During this initial threeyear window, an institution may use
BLS earnings data to show that the
program satisfies the minimum
standards for one of the debt-to-earnings
ratios. Despite our concerns about using
BLS data, in view of the commenters’
beliefs that BLS data appropriately
provides some certainty to institutions
seeking to evaluate their programs
before actual earnings information is
available and mitigates the
consequences of employment choices or
the effects of macroeconomic conditions
that would otherwise be adversely
reflected in the debt measures, we have
established a way for an institution to
use BLS data under the recalculation
process for the initial evaluation period.
Doing so provides three more years for
many institutions to acclimate to the use
of actual earnings data from SSA by
allowing those institutions to extend the
eligibility of an otherwise failing
program to at least FY 2015. For FY
2015, the students in the 2YP (students
who completed a program in FYs 2011
and 2012) would have attended the
institution contemporaneously with the
development and publication of these
regulations and, therefore, the
‘‘retroactive implementation’’ that some
commenters identified will largely be
mitigated.
Moreover, an institution may be able
to extend the eligibility of a failing
program beyond FY 2015 by using
alternative earnings data from a Statesponsored data system or an NCESbased institutional survey. In either
case, we believe that providing an
institution the opportunity to extend a
failing program’s eligibility through or
beyond the initial three-year window
addresses the commenters’ concerns
that the regulations apply to students
who have already graduated from or
dropped out of a program.
With regard to the comments that SSA
data fail to include comparable earnings
for the self-employed or independent
contractors, we note that there are two
SSA files: One that includes only wage
earners and another that provides
earnings information on sole proprietors
and independent contractors. SSA will
provide combined earnings information
for the debt-to-earnings ratios.
In response to the comment about
using ERS data, we note that both BLS
and ERS data are for groups. BLS
provides data by occupation and ERS
provides data by the location of the
wage earner. It is not clear how either
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
of these data sources would be better
than actual earnings provided by SSA.
While it is possible that a State
longitudinal data system could also
provide accurate earnings data, neither
ERS nor BLS would achieve the same
coverage or accuracy.
The Department recognizes that some
graduates will work part-time, become
unemployed, or opt out of the labor
force. As a result, the actual earnings
data regarding a program’s graduates are
likely to include some individuals who
are not working full-time for the entire
year. However, we believe that actual
earnings should be used for the
following reasons. First, the quality of
the program may be related to its
graduates’ ability to find full-time
employment. As a result, when
examining a program that generates an
unusually large number of graduates
without full-time employment, it is
difficult to separate individual choices
from program performance. Second, the
Department designed the debt-toearnings ratio to identify programs
where the majority of program graduates
are carrying debts that far exceed levels
recommended by experts. If an
institution expects a program to
generate large numbers of graduates
who are not seeking employment or
who are seeking only part-time
employment, it should consider
reducing their debt levels rather than
expecting their students to bear even
higher debt burdens. Finally, if a
particular programs’ loans are
affordable, it should succeed under the
repayment test even if many of its
graduates are not working full time.
Changes: None in this section.
However, many of the changes in the
final regulations address the issues
raised in this section.
Comment: Commenters noted that the
Department did not indicate in the
proposed regulations whether earnings
data would include some or none of
following: gross income, investment
income, income from earnings, income
minus expenses for self-employed
individuals, or reported income.
Some commenters requested that the
Department clarify how graduates with
no income data in the SSA records
would be treated in calculating the debt
ratios. Other commenters suggested
including unemployment benefits as
part of actual average annual earnings.
Some commenters urged the
Department to use BLS wage data
instead of actual average earnings from
SSA because (1) according to these
commenters, earnings for self-employed
individuals are not reported to SSA, and
(2) for a sole proprietorship where the
company receives the income, the
PO 00000
Frm 00039
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
34423
employee/owner may receive only a
modest salary.
Discussion: In response to the
questions and comments about earnings,
the Department will use the data
reported by an institution under
§ 668.6(a) to compile a list of students
who completed a program at the
institution during the applicable two- or
four-year period and submit that list to
SSA. Based on the most recent earnings
data available, SSA will provide the
Department with the mean and median
annual earnings of the students on that
list.
SSA defines a person’s earnings for a
taxable year as the sum of pay for
services as an employee plus all net
earnings from self-employment (minus
any net loss from self-employment).
Earnings include:
• Most wages from employment
covered by Social Security;
• All cash pay for agricultural and
domestic work, even if it is not
considered ‘‘wages’’;
• Cash tips which equal or exceed
$20 a month from work for an employer;
• All pay for work not covered by
Social Security if the work is done in
the United States, including work for
Federal, State, and local units of
government; and
• All net earnings from selfemployment, including those not
covered by Social Security.
SSA data privacy requirements
restrict access to earnings on an
individual basis. Therefore, SSA will
provide the Department with the mean
and median earnings figures based on
all completers. However, because
neither the institution nor the
Department has access to the earnings
information for those individuals, the
process for correcting errors is limited to
ensuring that the institution provided
an accurate list of program completers,
that the list of program completers was
accurate when it was provided to SSA,
and that the calculation by SSA was
made for those individuals. With
respect to any concerns that the
earnings information maintained by
SSA is not accurate, it is the earnings
information reported to the Federal
government that is gathered, maintained
and disseminated under strict legal
standards to ensure its accuracy,
quality, objectivity, utility, and
integrity. SSA will provide safeguards
pursuant to section 6103(p)(4) of the
Internal Review Code of 1986, as
amended (IRC) for all Federal returns
and return information received from
taxpayers and the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS). Contractors receiving
returns or return information from the
SSA pursuant to section 6103(l)(5) of
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
34424
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
the IRC, in conjunction with section
6103(n) or (m)(7) of the IRC, are also
subject to the safeguard provisions in
section 6103(p)(4) of the IRC. In
addition, SSA employees, and
contractors employed under section
6103(l)(5) of the IRC, in conjunction
with section 6103(n) or (m)(7) of the
IRC, are subject to criminal and civil
penalties imposed by sections 7213,
7213A, and 7431 of the IRC. SSA will
ensure that all uses and redisclosures of
tax information will be in compliance
with the appropriate disclosure
authorities.
These legal standards also include
compliance with the requirements of the
Information Quality Act (IQA) (section
515 of the Treasury and General
Government Appropriations Act for FY
2001 (Public Law 106–554)), which
obligates Federal agencies, including the
SSA (see https://www.ssa.gov/515/
ssaguidelines.html), to disseminate
information in a manner that complies
with the IQA. We are not aware of any
authority that requires or even allows
the Department to question the quality,
objectivity, utility, and integrity of
SSA’s information under the provisions
of the IQA or otherwise. Further, these
data are used today by families to
complete the Free Application for
Federal Student Assistance and are
considered as accurate income
information for the purpose of
determining aid eligibility. Therefore,
the Department accepts this information
as reliable, and limits corrections to the
list of individuals for whom SSA
calculates mean and median earnings.
However, the Department has created an
opportunity for institutions to provide
alternative reliable earnings
information, including BLS data (see
discussion under the heading, Draft
debt measures and data corrections
(§ 668.7(e)), Final debt measures
(§ 668.7(f)), and Alternative earnings
(§ 668.7(g)).
With respect to the use of SSA data,
we also wish to clarify that the data
used will be for all program completers
not just those receiving title IV, HEA
program aid. Through these final
regulations, the Department is
establishing standards to determine the
eligibility of a gainful employment
program. These standards include
calculating the median loan debt for all
students enrolling in a program,
including students who are not
receiving title IV, HEA program funds.
These students may be covering tuition
costs from savings or scholarships, or
their tuition may be paid by an
employer, or through private
educational loans that would be tracked
by an institution and reported to the
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
Department. We are therefore requiring
institutions to collect this information
and report it to the Department as a part
of the determination of whether the
gainful employment program is eligible
for title IV, HEA program funds.
Changes: None.
Comments: Some commenters
suggested that the Department adjust the
SSA data because the actual income of
students for the first three years after
graduation does not provide a good or
reliable measure of their overall salary
levels. For example, many students
graduate from school mid-year, many
students may not be fully employed in
their first year for numerous reasons
unrelated to the quality of their
programs, or there may be a sharp
downturn in an economic sector or
geographic region. Because institutions
would bear the full risk that earnings
will be under-reported in these
circumstances, the commenters urged
the Department to annualize the wage
data.
Other commenters believed the
proposed metrics should take into
account high unemployment and
underemployment rates by (1) not
applying the metrics until the State or
regional unemployment rate applicable
to the institution (relevant
unemployment rate) returns to the level
existing on January 1, 2008 or some
other earlier date preceding the start of
the current economic malaise (reference
date), or (2) adjusting the upper
thresholds of the loan repayment rate
and debt-to-earnings ratios to reflect the
percentage change in the relevant
unemployment rate since the reference
date. For example, if the relevant
unemployment rate is now 12 percent
and it was 8 percent on the reference
date, it has increased by 50 percent so
the lowest acceptable loan repayment
rate should be decreased by 50 percent
from 35 percent to 17.5 percent and the
maximum debt-to-earnings threshold
should be increased from 12 percent to
18 percent and from 30 percent to 45
percent.
Similarly, other commenters believed
that the Department should have a
mechanism for considering the current
economic conditions when determining
the impact of repayment rates and debtto-earnings results. The commenters
recommended that the Department
suspend or adjust the gainful
employment calculations when the
national unemployment rate is above
seven percent, and suspend the
regulations for States or regions that
have more than a seven percent
unemployment rate even when the
national rate is less than seven percent.
PO 00000
Frm 00040
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
Some commenters stated that a 10
percent unemployment rate and
stagnant job growth may be a more
important cause of a program’s failure to
satisfy the proposed metrics than the
quality of the program. The commenters
cautioned that further analysis is
needed to gauge the impact of normal
economic cycles on metrics used to
determine program eligibility.
Other commenters believed that
institutions would be inappropriately
penalized when employment in a field
is suddenly and adversely affected by
regional economic downturns and when
recently placed graduates refuse, or are
economically unable, to relocate.
Discussion: In view of the suggestions
to somehow adjust the debt measures to
account for high unemployment or
underemployment, we will use the
higher of the mean or median annual
earnings obtained from SSA to calculate
the debt-to-earnings ratios. All things
equal, the value of mean or median
earnings is distribution dependent. In a
prosperous economy where fewer
people are unemployed and earnings are
generally higher, average earnings are
likely to be higher than median
earnings. Conversely, during an
economic downturn where more people
are unemployed and earnings are
depressed or stagnant, median earnings
are likely to be higher than average
earnings.
Programs that prepare students for
jobs that suddenly become unavailable
in a local community may begin to fail
the debt measures unless the institution
adjusts quickly to labor market
conditions. By allowing programs to
remain eligible until they have failed
both measures three out of four FYs, the
Department provides time for successful
programs to adjust to market conditions.
Changes: Section 668.7(c)(3) has been
revised to provide that the Department
will obtain from SSA the most currently
available mean and median annual
earnings of the students who completed
a program during the 2YP, the 2YP–R,
the 4YP, or the 4YP–R. We will use the
higher of the mean or median annual
earnings to calculate the debt-toearnings ratios.
Comment: Some commenters argued
that program completers who are
employed in mainly cash businesses,
such as massage therapy and
cosmetology, should not be included in
the debt-to-earnings calculations
because they may not fully report
earnings to the IRS. Although the
commenters did not condone the failure
of individuals to report earnings
accurately, they cited studies
illustrating the magnitude of unreported
or underreported earnings and urged the
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
Department to acknowledge this
‘‘underground’’ economy when
formulating the debt-to-earnings ratio it
will use as a measure of program
quality. The commenters believed that
using BLS earnings data, instead of
actual reported earnings, would reduce
the impact of program completers who
do not report their full income.
Discussion: The Department does not
condone any practice or behavior that
leads to underreporting of earnings and
will not otherwise encourage this
behavior by adjusting SSA earnings.
However, for a failing program, the
Department provides flexibility for an
institution to use alternative earnings
data under the recalculation process
(see the discussion under the heading,
Draft debt measures and data
corrections (§ 668.7(e)), Final debt
measures (§ 668.7(f)), and Alternative
earnings (§ 668.7(g)).
Changes: None.
Comment: With regard to the
proposed debt measure based on
discretionary income, some commenters
recommended that the measure account
for family size. The commenters noted
that a family of one earning $33,000 a
year would have $16,800 in
discretionary income, but a family of
four with the same income would have
no discretionary income. Because 48
percent of all undergraduates at forprofit institutions have dependent
children, and 28 percent have at least
two children, the commenters suggested
that the Department adjust the measure
for family size to reflect the real burden
on families with children by (1)
determining discretionary income based
on a family size of two instead of one,
(2) limiting the use of the discretionary
income measure to programs whose
graduates have average earnings
sufficiently high to guarantee that a
family’s basic expenses could be met,
regardless of family size, or (3)
eliminating the discretionary income
measure entirely to avoid leaving
families with children unprotected. On
the other hand, some commenters
believed that this measure improperly
failed to consider total family income,
most notably, spousal income.
Discussion: We do not believe that it
would be feasible to account for family
size in calculating the debt-to-earnings
ratio based on discretionary income.
The Department will not have
information about the current or future
family size of students who complete a
program. The Department cannot adopt
the commenters’ alternate suggestion to
use a family size of two, instead of one,
because we will not have information
about the earnings for any other member
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
of the family, or whether there is
another family member.
Changes: None.
Alternative Metrics
Comment: Some commenters argued
that the proposed gainful employment
metrics evaluate only one aspect of the
quality of programs—whether a
student’s initial debt burden was
reasonable—but fail to account for other
longstanding measures of program
quality or a student’s long-term return
on his or her educational investment.
The commenters believed that
structuring regulations in this manner
may discourage institutions from
offering training in jobs with the
potential for long-term salary growth for
fear of losing program eligibility. For
example, according to the commenters,
based on BLS data, entry-level salaries
for graduates from programs for auto
technicians range from $19,840–
$25,970. According to the commenters,
salaries for auto technicians may have
long-term growth potential because it
can take a technician 2 to 5 years after
graduation to become fully qualified.
Mastering additional complex
specialties also requires the technician
to have years of experience and
advanced training. Applying the
proposed gainful employment measures
to these programs may prevent students
from pursuing training in these
necessary fields. The commenters
offered that a more reasonable measure
of the quality of an educational program
would be the student’s return on
investment (ROI), not a first-year debt
service calculation. The commenters
argued that a student’s initial capacity
to service debt should be one
consideration in judging educational
program quality but is not the essential
metric, and that the analysis of a
program should also take into account a
student’s potential long-term benefits
and earnings.
Other commenters believed that,
according to finance theory, the only
correct method for determining the
value of a program would be a Net
Present Value (NPV) approach that
considers the present value of all
incremental lifetime earnings stemming
from the program and the present value
of the total costs of the program. The
commenters contended that even if it
were economically rational to base the
regulations on a non-NPV approach, the
proposed regulations are economically
irrational because the debt-to-earnings
and loan repayment tests are based on
arbitrary three- and four-year evaluation
periods that are too short to fairly reflect
the benefits of education.
PO 00000
Frm 00041
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
34425
Some commenters suggested a variety
of alternatives to the proposed gainful
employment regulations including using
retention rates, employment/job
placement rates adjusted for local and
economic conditions, and completion
and CDRs. Other commenters believed
there was no need to further define
gainful employment because (1)
national accrediting agencies require
that the majority of students graduate
and find jobs in the field in which they
were trained, or (2) students who pass
State licensing examinations are
gainfully employable. Some
commenters suggested that the
Department require for-profit
institutions to refund 100 percent of the
student loans for students who drop out
of a program, or not impose penalties on
institutions that make those refunds.
Other commenters suggested that the
Department use a composite score based
on default, graduation, and placement
rates. The commenters argued that
institutions with exceptional, industrydetermined rates have proven their
success in providing quality education
and therefore should be allowed to
continue serving their students without
impediments. The commenters noted
that Congressman Robert Andrews
pioneered a composite index in the
1990s and suggested using default,
graduation, and placement rates along
with the number of Pell Grant recipients
to determine an overall score for an
institution. According to the
commenters, factoring in Pell Grant
information would acknowledge the
unhappy truth that impoverished
students are less likely to complete
higher education programs. To avoid
punishing schools for accepting these
students into their programs, the
commenters suggested that the
Department use a sliding scale, or
‘‘grading on a curve’’, that would help to
equalize the additional difficulties faced
by lower socioeconomic students.
Some commenters supporting the
composite index approach suggested
weighting the placement rate at 50
percent, the CDR at 30 percent, and the
graduation rate at 20 percent. These
commenters also believed that the index
would need to be adjusted to reflect the
number of Pell Grant-eligible students at
an institution. The commenters argued
that the composite index approach is
superior to the proposed debt approach
in the following ways. First, the
composite index would not rely on one
characteristic (debt load) or a complex
loan repayment rate, but on a number of
outcomes, most importantly the
employment of graduates. Second, the
index could be implemented readily
since cohort default and graduation
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
34426
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
rates are already tracked by the
Department, and the great majority of
for-profit colleges already track student
placement. Third, this approach is
analogous to the currently used
financial responsibility composite score
that integrates a basket of three financial
measures into one index. Finally, it
measures outcomes at the institutional
level, rather than the program level,
which introduces complexity and
difficulty in implementing a gainful
employment standard. The commenters
stated that the index approach could be
implemented relatively rapidly without
disrupting the market and risking
unintended consequences. If the metrics
need refinement, the commenters
offered that the Department could
implement the index, and over the next
36 months (1) redefine how default rates
are measured (potentially moving to
measuring the repayment of principal in
dollars), (2) redefine how graduation
rates are measured (potentially moving
to track all students), or (3) apply the
index at the program level after the
relevant information is gathered and
analyzed.
Discussion: While we appreciate the
suggestion to incorporate a return on
investment calculation into the
measures, we believe there are
significant theoretical and practical
reasons for not doing so. Commenters
noted that finance theory dictates an
NPV approach for determining the value
of a program offered by an institution.
To be sure, an NPV approach helps to
distinguish among competing
investment opportunities. However,
inherent in an NPV calculation is a
specified discount rate so that all future
cash flows (income as well as expenses)
can be described in terms of present-day
values. Thus the selection of an
appropriate discount rate is key to this
calculation. Those with experience in
making investment decisions are likely
to have a good understanding of their
own discount rates. This cannot be said
for those with limited or no experience
in such matters. If the Department were
to incorporate an NPV calculation into
the measures, we would have no basis
for establishing a discount rate for
borrowers who make personal
investment decisions with respect to
pursuing postsecondary education
programs.
The Department agrees that there are
long-term benefits, in particular with
respect to increased lifetime earnings,
for those with formal education or
training beyond high school. We know
from The National Longitudinal Survey
of Youth conducted by BLS that the
length of time an employee remains
with the same employer tends to be
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
shorter for younger workers and that the
average worker will have about 11
different jobs in the first 25 years of his
or her working lifetime. However, we
are unaware of any ongoing, long-term
tracking of work-life earnings by
specific occupation. Thus, we lack a
means for measuring actual long-term
benefits and earnings by occupation.
We likewise appreciate the
suggestions to use retention rates,
employment/job placement rates, and
completion and CDRs as alternative
measures to the proposed measures.
While these are all valid and useful
indicators for specific purposes, they do
not directly measure whether, or the
extent to which, a student benefits from
taking a program intended to provide
gainful employment. For example,
placing a student in a job related to the
training provided by a program is a good
outcome, but without considering the
student’s earnings it is difficult to say
whether the student made a worthwhile
investment in taking the program or
whether the student has sufficient
earnings to make monthly loan
payments. Moreover, the specific
indicators suffer from important
shortcomings: Default rates measure
only a portion of the borrowers who
have had difficulty repaying their loans,
the statutory definition of graduation
rate excludes transfer and part-time
students, and placement rates are
defined differently by accrediting
agencies and States. Although the
concept of a composite index is
compelling, the suggested index uses
some of the same indicators, which in
our view fall short of directly evaluating
gainful employment. That aside,
applying a composite index at the
institutional level would mask poorperforming programs because only the
overall performance of the institution,
not each program, would be evaluated.
Moreover, if the institution’s overall
performance is subpar, the composite
index would jeopardize the eligibility of
the entire institution. By using purposebuilt measures applied at the program
level, these regulations effectively target
poor-performing programs without
necessarily placing the entire institution
at risk because only those programs
become ineligible for title IV, HEA
funds.
Changes: None.
Small Numbers (§ 668.7(d))
Comment: Some commenters argued
that program closures would be harmful
to students, especially if the loan
repayment rate is based on a small
sample of borrowers. Similarly, other
commenters requested that the
Department clarify how the debt-to-
PO 00000
Frm 00042
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
earnings ratios would be calculated for
a small number of program completers.
Discussion: We agree that a program
with a small number of borrowers or
completers should not lose its title IV,
HEA program eligibility based on its
small numbers and have adopted in
§ 668.7(d) the standard under the CDR
provisions in § 668.197 relating to
treatment of institutions with 30 or
fewer borrowers.
Changes: See the changes described
under the heading, Definitions.
Draft Debt Measures and Data
Corrections (§ 668.7(e)), Final Debt
Measures (§ 668.7(f)), and Alternative
Earnings (§ 668.7(g))
Comment: Some commenters noted
that in the Cohort Default Rate (CDR)
Guide, the Department provides
institutions with procedural rights to
review and challenge NSLDS data that
they believe is inaccurate. The
commenters recommended that the
Department provide a similar correction
and appeal process for an institution
that fails to meet the gainful
employment standards. Another
commenter recommended that the
Department include additional
regulatory language that would (1)
define an institution’s right to appeal
inaccurate data and include a
reasonable time for an institution to
review the Department’s data, and (2)
establish a process by which an
institution is allowed to review and
correct data to ensure inaccurate data is
not released to the public.
Other commenters believed that the
proposed regulations did not provide a
meaningful way for an institution to
appeal or contest the use of SSA wage
data. The commenters suggested that the
Department include a provision that
accounts for mitigating circumstances
beyond an institution’s control that
affect earnings data and allows the
institution to present data
demonstrating the long-term salary
potential of its program completers.
Some commenters urged the
Department to return to the approach
proposed during negotiated rulemaking
under which the debt-to-earnings ratios
would be calculated by using the higher
of BLS earnings data or actual earnings
of graduates. Specifically, some of the
commenters requested that the
Department use the higher of: (1) The
most current BLS national or regional
earnings data at the 50th percentile for
persons employed in occupations
related to training provided by a degree
program and the most current BLS
national or regional earnings data at the
25th percentile for persons employed in
occupations related to training provided
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
by a non-degree program; or (2) actual
earnings data submitted by the
institution that demonstrate a
substantial number of students who
completed the program during the threeyear period had earnings, from
occupations related to the training
provided by the program, that are higher
than the BLS earnings data. The
commenters recommended using BLS
wage data because actual earnings data
fail to capture wages in the occupation
or occupations for which the program
provided training to students. Under the
commenters’ approach, institutions
would also have the opportunity to
submit to the Department actual
earnings data that they collect about
students in a relevant occupational
field. In addition, the commenters
believed that a modest adjustment to the
Department’s negotiated rulemaking
proposal would be necessary to account
for inherent differences in the amount of
debt that students in degree programs
have compared to students in nondegree programs. The commenters
argued that the inherently higher debt
burden for students in degree programs
is not offset by initial earnings
immediately after students graduate
because degree students are making a
lifetime investment in their future.
According to the commenters, BLS
earnings data at the 50th percentile
properly reflect this lifetime investment
decision.
Commenters argued that the proposed
debt-to-earnings calculations do not
adequately take into account external
factors that may affect earnings of
program graduates. For example:
• A 10 percent unemployment rate
and stagnant job growth may contribute
more to a program’s failure to satisfy the
proposed metrics than the quality of the
program. The commenters cautioned
that further analysis is needed to gauge
the impact of normal economic cycles
on metrics used to determine program
eligibility.
• For the three-year cohort of program
completers, only the most recent annual
earnings are used to calculate the debtto-earnings ratios. However, completers
in the cohort could work full-time for
two years and then due to economic
conditions may be able to work only
part-time or may choose to work parttime.
• Using actual earnings data places
on the institution all of the risk that
students may underreport income to the
Federal agency.
In view of these factors, the
commenters suggested that the
regulations provide for mitigating
circumstances or allow institutions to
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
use BLS data to comply with the debtto-earnings metrics.
Discussion: We are persuaded that an
institution should be able to correct the
data used to calculate the debt-toearnings and loan repayment rates for a
program to determine with certainty
whether the program meets the
minimum standards and to guard
against requiring institutions to publicly
disclose incorrect rates. As suggested by
the commenters, we are adopting a data
challenge and correction process in
these final regulations that is similar to
the process used for CDRs.
We also agree that an institution
should be able to use alternative, but
reliable, earnings data to demonstrate
that a program meets the minimum
standards for the debt-to-earnings ratios.
The data collected by SSA is used to
determine the amount of Federal
benefits that a wage earner will
ultimately be eligible to receive. The
data collected also are used as a primary
source for earnings information for
Federal income tax purposes. As a
result, the data are extremely accurate
and likely will be the best source of
income data. The data the SSA collects,
maintains, and disseminates is
compliant with the requirements of the
IQA. Therefore, the Department accepts
this information as reliable, and in these
final regulations will limit corrections to
the list of individuals for whom SSA
calculates mean and median earnings.
However, we understand that
institutions will not have access to
individual wage records maintained by
the SSA. As a result, to provide
institutions with additional assurance
on the accuracy of the data and to
provide greater flexibility for
institutions, the Department will accept
alternative reliable earnings data on a
particular program’s graduates from
State longitudinal data systems and
from institutional surveys conducted in
accordance with NCES statistical
standards.
In addition, the Department
understands that data on typical
earnings by occupation are already
available from BLS, while SSA data will
not be available for a number of months.
Making earnings data available now will
help institutions analyze the impact of
the regulations on their programs and
set targets for improvement. As a result,
the Department is prepared to accept
BLS earnings data under certain
circumstances for debt measures
calculated for FYs 2012, 2013, and 2014.
Under § 668.7(e), Draft debt measures
and data corrections, we establish a
two-step process whereby an institution
first corrects information about the
students that will be included in the
PO 00000
Frm 00043
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
34427
draft debt-to-earnings ratios (pre-draft
corrections) and then corrects
information about borrowers and loan
amounts after the Department issues
draft debt measures (post-draft
correction process).
In the pre-draft corrections process,
an institution will be able to review and
correct the information about the
students that the Department intends to
use to calculate the draft debt-toearnings ratios. For each FY beginning
with FY 2012, we will provide to the
institution for each program a list of the
students in the applicable two- or fouryear period. Those lists will be based
initially on the information provided by
the institution under the program
reporting requirements in § 668.6(a) but
may be revised by the Department to
account for students who are excluded
from the ratio calculations under
§ 668.7(c)(5). We will identify the
students that we exclude. After the lists
are made available, the institution will
have 30 days to provide evidence
identifying the students who should be
included on or removed from the list
and to otherwise correct or update the
identity information provided by the
Department about each student. The
institution may not correct any
information about the students on a list
after this 30-day period. If the
information provided by the institution
is accurate, that information is used to
create the final list of students that the
Department submits to SSA. The
Department will calculate the draft debtto-earnings ratios based on the mean
and median earnings provided by SSA
for the students on the final list.
However, the institution may not
challenge the accuracy of the mean or
median annual earnings the Department
obtained from SSA to calculate the draft
debt-to-earnings ratios for the program.
We are establishing this process to
make certain that the list identifying the
students in the applicable two- or fouryear period is accurate before
transmitting the list to SSA. As
discussed earlier in this preamble, SSA
will perform an identity match to ensure
that the earnings data it maintains are
properly associated with the individuals
on the list. In cases where the identity
match fails, SSA will exclude those
students from its calculation of the
mean and median earnings for the
program. Where these instances arise or
for any other reason that SSA excludes
students, the Department will adjust the
median loan debt to compensate for the
loss of earnings of the excluded
students. Based on the Department’s
experience matching to SSA to
determine student eligibility, we
anticipate that identity mismatches or
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
34428
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
other exclusions by SSA will be very
limited—less than 2 percent of all
students submitted to SSA. As a result,
these mismatches will not materially
impact the debt-to-earnings ratios for
most programs. Therefore, as a practical
matter we will limit the median loan
adjustment to failing programs that have
at least one mismatch. In these cases
small variations in the ratio results
could be the difference between a
program failing and passing the
measures. The Department will adjust
the median loan debt for the program by
removing the highest loan debt
associated with the number of students
excluded by SSA. For example, SSA
excludes four students from the
calculation. The Department identifies
the students on the list with the highest
loan debts and removes those four
students from the calculation of the
median loan debt for the program. We
would then use the adjusted median
loan debt to recalculate the debt-toearnings ratios for the program.
In the post-draft corrections process,
for each FY beginning with FY 2012, we
will notify an institution of the draft
results of the debt measures for each of
its programs. No later than 45 days after
the Department issues the draft results,
the institution may challenge the
accuracy of the loan data for a borrower
that was used to calculate the draft loan
repayment rate, or the median loan debt
for the program that was used for the
numerator of the draft debt-to-earnings
ratios. To challenge the information, the
institution must submit evidence
showing that the borrower loan data or
the program median-loan debt is
inaccurate. For the draft loan repayment
rate, the institution may also challenge
the accuracy of the list of borrowers
included in the applicable two- or fouryear period used to calculate the draft
loan repayment rate by submitting
evidence showing that a borrower
should be included on or removed from
the list, or by correcting or updating the
identity information provided for a
borrower on the list, such as name,
social security number, or date of birth.
If the updated information provided
by the institution is accurate, the
information is used to recalculate the
debt measures for the program. Like the
CDR data challenges and appeals, no
sanctions will be imposed on an
institution during this corrections
process.
We note that the 45-day correction
period under the post-draft corrections
process begins on the date the
Department issues a particular draft
result. For example, we may issue a
draft loan repayment rate for a program
on May 1 but not issue the draft debt-
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
to-earnings ratios for that program until
June 1. The 45-day correction period for
the loan repayment rate would start on
May 1 and a separate 45-day period for
the debt-to-earnings ratios would start
on June 1.
In § 668.7(f), Final debt measures, we
specify that the recalculated debt
measures, and any draft debt measures
that are not challenged or are
unsuccessfully challenged, become the
final debt measures for the program. The
Secretary will notify the institution of
these final debt measures.
Under § 668.7(g), Alternative
earnings, we provide that an institution
may recalculate the final debt-toearnings ratios for a failing program to
show that the program would meet a
debt-to-earnings standard by using the
median loan debt for the program and
alternative earnings data from: A Statesponsored data system, an institutional
survey conducted in accordance with
NCES statistical standards, or BLS.
State data. An institution may
recalculate the final debt-to-earnings
ratios under § 668.7(g)(2) using State
data only if the institution obtains
earnings data from State-sponsored data
systems for more than 50 percent of the
students in the applicable two- or fouryear period, or a comparable two- or
four-year period, and that number of
students is more than 30. The
institution must use the actual, Statederived mean or median earnings of the
students in the applicable two- or fouryear period and demonstrate that it
accurately used the actual State-derived
data to recalculate the ratios.
Currently, only about half of the
States have longitudinal data systems
and those systems track employment
outcomes only for students who find
jobs within a State. Consequently, it
may be difficult for an institution to
obtain State earnings data if it offers a
program in several States or in States
with no data systems or if its program
graduates find employment outside the
State in which the institution is located.
Although we expect more States to
implement these systems, to make it
easier for an institution to use data from
multiple State systems under this
alternative:
(1) The regulations provide that the
institution must obtain State earnings
data for the majority of the students who
completed a program (more than 50
percent), not for all the students who
completed the program during the
applicable two- or four-year period.
(2) For students who find
employment in a State outside the State
in which the institution is located, the
institution may enter into an agreement
with the other State in which the
PO 00000
Frm 00044
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
student is employed to obtain earnings
data for those students, if the other State
agrees to provide the data.
Survey using NCES Standards. An
institution may also recalculate the final
debt-to-earnings ratios for a failing
program under § 668.7(g)(3) using
reported earnings obtained from an
institutional survey conducted of the
students in the applicable two- or fouryear period, or a comparable two- or
four-year period, only if the survey data
is for more than 30 students. The
institution may use the mean or median
annual earnings derived from the survey
data. In addition, the institution must
submit (1) a copy of the survey and
certify that it was conducted in
accordance with the statistical standards
and procedures established by NCES
and available at https://nces.ed.gov, and
(2) an examination-level attestation by
an independent public accountant or
independent governmental auditor, as
appropriate, that the survey was
conducted in accordance with the
specified NCES standards and
procedures. The attestation must be
conducted in accordance with the
general, field work, and reporting
standards for attestation engagements
contained in the GAO’s Government
Auditing Standards, and with
procedures for attestations contained in
guides developed by and available from
the Department of Education’s Office of
Inspector General. The attestation is
required to ensure that the survey was
conducted properly, which allows for a
more expedited review by the
Department of the institution’s
recalculation submission.
The NCES standards were last revised
in 2002. They comprise the statistical
standards and guidelines for NCES, the
principal statistical agency within the
U.S. Department of Education. NCES’
primary goal in establishing these
standards was to provide high quality,
reliable, useful, and informative
statistical information to public policy
decision makers and to the general
public. In particular, the standards and
guidelines described in the following
paragraphs are intended for use by
NCES staff and contractors to guide
them in their data collection, analysis,
and dissemination activities. The
standards and guidelines serve to
provide a clear statement for data users
regarding how data should be collected
in NCES surveys and the limits of
acceptable applications and use.
In establishing the standards and
guidelines, NCES articulated a view that
other organizations involved in similar
public endeavors would find the
standards and guidelines useful in their
work as well. Accordingly, we believe
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
that the application of this existing
standard is appropriate given the need
for high-quality data on earnings to use
as an alternative source for earnings
data.
In evaluating whether an institution
has met the statistical standards and
guidelines, the Department will look to
determine particularly whether the
institution met the NCES standard
related to response rate. The purpose of
this standard is to specify design
parameters for survey response rates.
The following is a summary of the key
elements of the NCES response rate
standard. High survey response rates
help to ensure that the results are
representative of the target population.
Surveys conducted by or for an
institution must be designed and
executed to meet the highest practical
rates of response and to ensure that
nonresponse bias analyses are
conducted when response rates suggest
the potential for bias to occur.
When an institution collects data from
all program completers—a universe data
collection—it must be designed to meet
a target unit response rate of at least 95
percent. A unit-level nonresponse bias
analysis is recommended in the case
where the universe survey unit response
rate is less than 90 percent. When an
institution conducts a sample survey, a
unit response rate must be calculated
without substitutions (see NCES
Standard 1–3). A sample survey data
collection must be designed to meet
unit-level response rate parameters that
are at least consistent with historical
response rates from surveys conducted
with best practices. The following
parameters summarize current NCES
historical experiences: For longitudinal
sample surveys, the target school-level
unit response rate should be at least 70
percent. In the base year and each
follow-up, the target unit response rates
at each additional stage should be at
least 90 percent. For cross-sectional
samples, the target unit response rate
should be at least 85 percent at each
stage of data collection.
Sample survey data collections must
be designed to meet a target item
response rate of at least 90 percent for
each key item. For the purposes of
meeting the requirements related to
gainful employment, items related to
placement and earnings would be
considered key items. A nonresponse
bias analysis is required at any stage of
a data collection with a unit response
rate less than 85 percent. If the item
response rate is below 85 percent for
any items used in a report, a
nonresponse bias analysis is also
required for each of those items (this
does not include individual test items).
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
The extent of the analysis must reflect
the magnitude of the nonresponse. In
longitudinal sample surveys, item
nonresponse bias analyses need only be
done once for any individual item,
unless there is a substantial
deterioration in the item response rate.
BLS Data. An institution may also
recalculate the debt-to-earnings ratios
under § 668.7(g)(4) using BLS earnings
data only if the institution identifies and
provides documentation of the
occupation by SOC code, or
combination of SOC codes, in which
more than 50 percent of the students in
the 2YP or 4YP were placed or found
employment, and that number of
students is more than 30. The
institution may use placement records it
maintains to satisfy accrediting agency
or State requirements if those records
indicate the occupation in which the
student was placed. Otherwise, the
institution must submit employment
records or other documentation showing
the SOC code or codes in which the
students typically found employment.
For the identified SOC code or codes,
the institution must use the most
current BLS earnings data to calculate
the debt-to-earnings ratio. If more than
one SOC code is identified, the
institution must calculate the weighted
average earnings of those SOC codes
based on BLS employment data or
institutional placement data. In either
case, the institution must use BLS
earnings at no higher than the 25th
percentile.
With regard to the 50 percent
requirement, we believe that the BLS
earnings data associated with the SOC
codes must represent the majority of
students that were placed or found
employment to be used as an adequate
proxy for the actual earnings of the
program’s graduates. For this reason, the
Department may require the institution
to submit all the placement,
employment, and other records
maintained by the institution for the
program that the institution examined to
determine whether those records
identified the SOC codes for the
students who were placed or found
employment. In addition, for the same
reasons we do not calculate debt
measures for programs with small
numbers of borrowers or completers, an
institution may not use the BLS databased recalculation if 30 or fewer of the
program’s graduates were placed or
found employment during the
applicable two- or four-year period.
Finally, for the reasons discussed
under the heading, Actual earnings from
SSA and Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS) wage data, an institution may
PO 00000
Frm 00045
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
34429
recalculate the ratios using BLS data
only for FYs 2012, 2013, and 2014.
Under § 668.7(g)(5), an institution
must notify the Department of its intent
to use alternative earnings no later than
14 days after the date the institution is
notified of its final debt measures and
must submit all supporting
documentation related to the
recalculation of the debt-to-earnings
ratios using alternative earnings no later
than 60 days after the date the
institution is notified of its final debt
measures. Pending the Department’s
review of the institution’s recalculation,
the institution is not subject to the
requirements arising from the program’s
failure to satisfy the debt measures,
provided the submission was complete,
timely, and accurate. If we deny the
submission, we will notify the
institution of the reasons for the denial.
If the Department approves the
institution’s submission, the
recalculated debt-to-earnings ratios
become final for that FY.
Changes: New § 668.7(e), (f), and (g)
have been added to provide for the data
corrections, draft debt measures, final
debt measures, and alternative earnings
processes described in the Discussion
section.
Debt Warning Disclosures (§ 668.7(j))
General
Comment: Commenters raised a
number of concerns and questions
regarding the debt warning disclosures
described in proposed § 668.7(d). First,
commenters asked the Department to
clarify whether the prominent warning
referenced in paragraph (d)(1) and the
disclosure of repayment rates and debtto-earnings measures referenced in
paragraph (d)(2) applied to programs or
institutions. The commenters believed
that the proposed regulations could be
interpreted to require disclosures for all
programs and warnings for specific
programs or to require disclosures and
warnings for only restricted programs.
Second, commenters questioned
whether the debt warning disclosures
should be included with, or made
separately from, all other required
disclosures, and whether enrolled
students should be notified annually or
only when a program is in restricted
status. Third, some of the commenters
requested additional information about
the types of institutional materials that
would have to contain the warnings.
Giving the example of an institution that
provides numerous programs, only
some of which are subject to the debt
warning disclosures, the commenters
questioned whether the institution
would have to list the programs subject
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
34430
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
to the disclosures in all of its
promotional, enrollment, registration,
and other materials. Other commenters
recommended that the Department
revise the regulations to clarify that the
warnings must be placed on all
institutional materials that pertain to
any program required to provide a debt
warning. These commenters asked the
Department to clarify the meaning of a
‘‘prominent warning’’ and whether the
warning would have to be on every page
of an institution’s Web site or only on
the institution’s homepage.
Some commenters expressed concern
that institutions would try to hide the
required disclosures within their
institutional materials and Web sites
and suggested that the Department
provide more specificity in the final
regulations about the format and content
of the disclosures to prevent this
outcome.
Some commenters asked the
Department to clarify the phrase
‘‘admissions meetings’’ and the types of
interactions these meetings would
include. Some of these commenters
believed that this term could be
interpreted to mean only in-person
meetings and recommended specifying
that in-person meetings and online or
telephonic communications would all
be covered under this phrase.
To improve the clarity of the
regulations, commenters recommended
technical changes such as changing the
title of the paragraph from ‘‘debt
warning disclosures’’ to ‘‘debt warnings
and disclosures.’’ These commenters
argued that the suggested phrase would
more accurately describe the substance
of the requirements. The commenters
further noted that it is appropriate to
separate warnings and disclosures
because the two are very different in
nature: disclosures can provide
information without judgment, while
warnings can provide important context
about what the information means.
Commenters also asked the
Department to clarify the relationship
between the proposed disclosure
requirements and other disclosure
requirements under the title IV, HEA
regulations.
Discussion: See the discussion under
the heading, Implementation date.
Concerns About Properly Disclosing the
Debt Warnings
Comment: Some commenters
supported our proposal to require debt
warning disclosures. These commenters
believed that the disclosures would help
to ensure that prospective and enrolled
students have adequate information to
make decisions about where to pursue
a program of study. However, the
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
commenters believed that the proposed
regulatory language was ambiguous,
raising concerns that institutions would
attempt to circumvent the regulations by
(1) not providing students with enough
contextual information to fully
understand the meaning of a debt
warning disclosure, (2) using language
that would not be easily understood by
prospective or enrolled students, or (3)
manipulating the timing or delivery of
the debt warning disclosures to pressure
students to enroll. Specifically, the
commenters were concerned that the
proposed requirements would allow
institutions to include only a bare
minimum of information in the debt
warning disclosure and that this
information would not clearly convey to
a student the risks of borrowing to
attend a particular program.
To address the first issue, the
commenters recommended that the
Department require institutions to be
more specific about a program’s actual
status. According to the commenters,
this would help to ensure that students
would have as much information as
possible about the status of the program
in which they were enrolling and of the
potential impact that status could have
on the student’s Federal financial aid.
The commenters believed that using this
approach would better inform student
choices about what programs to attend
and would also encourage students to
compare different programs. Some of
the commenters suggested that, to
facilitate student analysis of different
programs, institutions’ debt warning
disclosures should also direct students
to the Federal Web site https://
www.collegenavigator.gov, which
provides a comparison of college costs
and programs. Similarly, other
commenters recommended that the
Department create a Web site that would
list programs that are in compliance
with the Federal requirements and
programs that are not, thereby allowing
students to compare programs at
different educational institutions. These
commenters recommended requiring
institutions to include a reference to this
Web site on the debt warning disclosure
to ensure that students are aware of
alternative school options, asserting
that, as a result of marketing and sales
strategies of some institutions, a student
may erroneously believe that a
particular school is unique in providing
the flexibility or curricular training that
the student needs.
With respect to the second issue
regarding ensuring clarity and
accessibility of the debt warning
disclosure, commenters agreed that the
Department should require that the
language used in disclosures be as
PO 00000
Frm 00046
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
transparent as possible. However, there
was disagreement among these
commenters about how prescriptive the
Department should be. Some of the
commenters believed that it would be
sufficient for the Department to specify
the minimum content that must be
included in a debt warning disclosure
but that institutions should develop the
disclosures. These commenters
recommended that the Department
develop and circulate examples of the
language that could be used by
institutions in lieu of mandating
specific wording. They asserted that this
would protect students by creating a
minimum threshold for the types of
information that must be included in
the debt warning disclosures so that
institutions would not have an
opportunity to leave out important
content, but would still provide
necessary flexibility for institutions.
Some of the commenters recommended
that institutions be allowed to add
context, such as the percentage of
borrowers in a given program of study,
to the disclosures to give students a
better understanding of the rates. The
commenters pointed out that a very
small population of borrowers could
dramatically skew the rates at an
institution and stated that institutions
should have the opportunity to explain
this anomaly to prospective and current
students. However, the commenters
recommended that the Department
monitor institutions providing this type
of contextual information closely and
strictly enforce existing regulations on
misrepresentation.
Another group of commenters
believed that the Department should be
far more prescriptive in mandating the
content, format, and location of the debt
warning disclosures to limit
institutions’ ability to mislead students.
In making these recommendations,
some of these commenters noted that
other agencies, such as the Federal
Reserve Board, have prescribed specific
formatting and layout standards for
disclosure requirements, and they
believed that the Department should
adopt a similar approach. Some
commenters recommended that the
Department develop, through a
collaborative process with students and
institutions designed to determine the
most effective language and delivery
mode, a standardized disclosure form
that explains to students the risks they
face in choosing to attend a school that
has failed to meet the Department’s debt
thresholds and advises students to
enroll in a school that is in compliance
with those thresholds.
Additionally, commenters stressed
that the Department should require that
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
debt warning disclosures be made in
understandable, plain English to ensure
that the information is accessible to
students and consumers. Some of these
commenters further recommended that
the Department require institutions to
provide, to the extent practicable, the
debt warning disclosures in a language
or at a level that students can
understand to ensure that students are
not misled by the disclosures because
they cannot fully access their meaning.
Some of the commenters also
suggested that the Department require
institutions to not only disclose the
program’s most recent loan repayment
rate and debt measures, but also to
define a ‘‘loan repayment rate’’ and to
provide context with regards to the
required repayment rates for program
eligibility. The commenters believed
that students would be misled or
confused by the disclosures unless they
understood what the terms meant and
could compare the rates against the
Department’s regulations and the rates
for similar programs at other schools.
With respect to the third issue
regarding timing of disclosures,
commenters were also concerned that
institutions would undermine the intent
of the regulations by unfairly
manipulating the timing of their
disclosures. Specifically, the
commenters raised the possibility that
students would not be provided with
the debt warning disclosures early
enough in the enrollment process or in
a manner appropriate to inform their
decisions about whether to enroll in a
program. Some commenters suggested
potential solutions to address this issue.
For example, some commenters
recommended that the Department
require institutions to provide the
disclosures to a student both orally
(unless there is no oral communication)
and in writing, at the first contact
between the prospective student and the
institution, rather than at the time of
enrollment. The commenters argued
that waiting to make the disclosure at
the time of enrollment is too late to
inform consumer decisions because the
student likely already feels committed
to the program at that point. They
believed that it was necessary to provide
the information orally because written
information is too easily glossed over,
particularly if it is mailed after the
admissions meetings are held. Other
commenters recommended requiring a
delay of seven days between the time
that an institution provides a student
with a disclosure and the date that the
institution may enroll the student.
Citing the legal precedent set by the
Mortgage Disclosure Improvement Act,
which mandates that creditors abide by
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
a seven-day cooling-off period before
closing a loan, the commenters believed
that the level of financial commitment
required in financing a higher education
is comparable to the commitment
involved in taking on mortgage debt.
Accordingly, they argued that
consumers should be afforded the same
sort of protections given to home
buyers, particularly because student
loan debt cannot be discharged in
bankruptcy and may be collected from
Federal tax refunds and social security
payments. The commenters further
believed that this waiting period is
necessary because it would allow
students time to digest the information
and research other program options
before enrolling, protecting students
from the coercive enrollment techniques
used at some institutions.
Discussion: See discussion under the
heading, Implementation date.
Concerns about feasibility and burden
of warnings
Comment: Some commenters believed
that the proposed debt warning
disclosures were not feasible. They
asserted that it would be unduly
burdensome for institutions to include
the prominent warnings in every
newspaper ad, television ad, and sign,
and in all materials used in meetings
with admissions representatives. The
commenters further believed that
including this information in their
materials would potentially confuse
students.
In addition to questioning the
feasibility of implementing the
proposed regulations, some of the
commenters argued that the Department
did not have the statutory authority to
require a prominent warning, stating
that this requirement was
unprecedented and too broad in scope.
The commenters noted that in the
regulations governing other disclosure
requirements under the HEA, the
Department has not mandated a specific
manner of disclosure, and they asserted
that the Department therefore should
not do so in this case.
As an alternative, some of the
commenters suggested that the
Department amend the proposed
regulations to require institutions to
only make these disclosures by
providing written information to each
applicant about its repayment rates
prior to the student’s enrollment. Other
commenters recommended that the
regulations require warnings to be
clearly stated on the institution’s Web
site and on the enrollment agreement,
and that the warnings be provided to the
student in writing by the admissions
representative before the prospective
student signs an enrollment agreement.
PO 00000
Frm 00047
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
34431
Discussion: See discussion under the
heading, Implementation date.
Implementation Date
Comment: Some commenters stressed
that the Department should make the
proposed provisions in § 668.7(d)
effective as soon as possible to help
inform consumer decisions. While
noting that program level assessments
may be unavailable immediately, the
commenters suggested requiring
institutions with both high rates of
borrowing and defaults to place this
information in a clear and conspicuous
location on the institution’s Web site
and marketing materials as a stop-gap
measure. The commenters argued that
this transparency might accelerate
efforts by institutions with at-risk
programs to revise program content and
instruction and provide more effective
job counseling, job placement, and other
support services that could reduce the
risk to students and taxpayers.
Discussion: In view of these
comments and other changes we are
making in these regulations, we have
made a number of changes to the
proposed regulations on debt warnings
and disclosures to students. We believe
that this new approach appropriately
distinguishes and clarifies the program
disclosure and debt warning
requirements, will help to ensure that
students are provided with sufficient
information about a program’s
continued eligibility for title IV, HEA
funds, and addresses commenter
concerns that institutions will
undermine the intent of the regulations.
We agree that disclosures and
warnings serve very different purposes
and students should have basic,
comparable information across all
gainful employment programs.
Accordingly, in these final regulations,
we are separating the disclosure and
warning requirements.
Under § 668.6(b) of the Program
Integrity Issues final regulations,
institutions are required to disclose, for
each gainful employment program, the
occupations that the program prepares
students to enter, the on-time
graduation rate, the tuition and fees
charged to a student for completing the
program within normal time, the
placement rate for students completing
the program, and the median loan debt
incurred by students who completed the
program, as well as any other
information the Secretary provided to
the institution about that program.
Under § 668.7(f), or § 668.7(g) if the
institution submitted a successful
request for recalculation, of these final
regulations, the Secretary will provide
to each institution the final repayment
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
34432
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
rate and debt-to-earnings ratios for each
gainful employment program at that
institution. Accordingly, an institution
must disclose the final repayment rate
and debt-to-earnings ratio (for total
earnings) for each gainful employment
program along with the other
information required in § 668.6(b),
regardless of whether the program
passed the debt measures in
§ 668.7(a)(1).
With respect to the disclosures
established in § 668.6(b)(1) in the
Program Integrity Issues final
regulations, we strongly encourage
institutions to timely update the
disclosures whenever a change occurs
in the information. We believe that it is
reasonable to expect that an institution
will update this information on the
program Web site as soon as
administratively feasible, but no later
than 30 days after the date the change
occurs. For example, if at any point
during the year, the institution changes
the amount of tuition and fees that it
charges a student for completing the
program within normal time, the
institution should update that
information on the Web page for that
program within 30 days. Similarly,
when an institution receives its final
repayment rate and debt-to-earnings
ratios, it should update that information
on the Web page for that program within
30 days. We encourage institutions to
have procedures in place to update
information on a regular basis to assure
that students and consumers have
accurate, current information for all of
the gainful employment programs at an
institution.
Under § 668.7(j) of these final
regulations, institutions must issue debt
warnings to prospective and enrolled
students for each gainful employment
program at the institution that is a
failing program to ensure that students
are aware of and understand that a
particular program has a greater risk
than another program. In response to the
suggestion that we develop
differentiated disclosure requirements
based on a program’s level of risk, we
have developed a two-tiered warning
system that we believe appropriately
balances the needs of students with the
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
level of risk that a program will fail to
remain eligible for title IV, HEA
program funds. On the one hand,
knowledge of a program’s failure to
meet the debt thresholds will inform a
student’s decision about which
institution to attend. On the other hand,
we recognize that the number of times
a program has failed translates into very
different levels of risk. We address these
considerations under this approach by
differentiating between a warning after
a first year failure (‘‘first year warning’’)
and a warning after a second year failure
(‘‘second year warning’’).
Under § 668.7(j)(1), if a failing
program does not meet the debt measure
minimum standards for a single FY, the
institution must issue a warning that
contains the following information. This
first year warning must directly alert
currently enrolled and prospective
students that the program has failed to
meet the minimum standards in
§ 668.7(a)(1), and, to ensure that
students understand the meaning and
context of this warning, the institution
must in plain language and in an easy
to understand format explain the debt
measures and show the amount by
which the program did not meet the
minimum standards. The first year
warning must further explain any steps
that the institution plans to take to
improve the program’s performance
under the debt measures. While this
warning requires a direct
communication with enrolled and
prospective students, it is not a publicly
disclosed warning. An institution must
continue to provide this warning to
enrolled and prospective students until
the institution has been notified by the
Secretary that the program has met one
of the minimum standards or the
institution is notified that it has not met
the minimum standards a second time.
We believe that a program that has
only failed the debt measures for one
year is still capable of significantly
improving, and we want to support the
development or improvement of
programs that provide strong, viable
opportunities for students to earn highvalue credentials. We are concerned that
requiring too harsh a warning early on
will result in unnecessary program
PO 00000
Frm 00048
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
closures. Accordingly, the first year
warning provides basic information that
will ensure that a student is aware of a
program’s performance on the debt
measures, and is able to evaluate, based
on the steps that the institution lays out
for improvement, whether to remain in
that program or explore other options.
An institution must issue a second
year warning after a failing program fails
to meet the minimum standards for two
consecutive FYs or for two of the three
most recently completed FYs. Given
that a program in this situation has only
one additional FY to meet the minimum
standards, it is critical that students be
made aware of the possibility that they
will no longer receive aid to attend that
program. In view of that, a second year
warning must, in addition to the
information required for a first year
warning, further include: (1) A plain
language explanation of the actions the
institution plans to take in response to
the second failure, including, if the
institution plans to discontinue the
program, the timeline for doing so and
the options available to the student;
(2) a plain language explanation of the
risks associated with enrolling or
continuing in the program, including
the potential consequences for, and
options available to, the student if the
program becomes ineligible for title IV,
HEA program funds; (3) a plain
language explanation of the resources
available, including https://
www.collegenavigator.gov, that the
student may use to research other
educational options and to compare
program costs; and (4) a clear and
conspicuous statement that a student
who enrolls or continues to enroll in the
program should expect to have
difficulty repaying his or her student
loans. An institution must continue to
provide this warning to enrolled and
prospective students until the program
has have met one or more of the
minimum standards for two of the three
most recently completed FYs. The
following Table H illustrates the
application of these requirements under
several different scenarios.
BILLING CODE 4000–01–P
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
PO 00000
Frm 00049
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4725
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
34433
ER13JN11.019
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
VerDate Mar<15>2010
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
PO 00000
Frm 00050
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4725
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
ER13JN11.020
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
34434
In general, an institution must
provide a student with the information
necessary to make reasoned and
informed choices about pursuing an
education. This includes any options
that the institution will provide to the
student. For example, in some cases, the
student may be able to transfer into
another program at the institution, or
the student may be able to arrange to
transfer credits to another institution in
the area. In other cases, an institution
may opt to permit a student to withdraw
from the program with a full refund for
the cost of the program. Whatever the
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
options, the institution must explain
them clearly to the student in an easily
understandable manner. Under this
approach, institutions have the
responsibility, but also the flexibility, to
create the best options for serving their
students in failing programs. The
institution must also describe the risk
and potential consequences of
remaining in the program, namely, that
the student will still be liable for any
student loan debt incurred if the student
is unable to complete the program.
Further, the institution must provide
students with resources that they can
PO 00000
Frm 00051
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
34435
use to research other education options
and program costs. We have specified
that an institution must direct students
to https://www.collegenavigator.com as
one resource available to students.
We agree with commenters that it
would be helpful for the Department to
separately publish information
regarding a program’s final debt
measures. This information can
complement other information about
gainful employment programs to help
students choose among well-performing
programs and avoid poorly performing
programs. Under § 668.7(g)(6), therefore,
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
ER13JN11.021
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
34436
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
we are providing that the Secretary may
disseminate the final debt measures or
information about, or related to, the
final debt measures to the public in any
time, manner, and form, including
publishing information that will allow
the public to ascertain how well
programs perform under the debt
measures and other appropriate
objective metrics. While institutions are
also required to disclose this
information, we think that the
Department’s dissemination of this
information will facilitate students’
access to the information and their
ability to draw comparisons of
programs.
We are requiring in § 668.7(j)(5) that,
if an institution voluntarily
discontinues a failing program under
§ 668.7(l)(1), it must notify enrolled
students at the same that it provides the
written notice to the Department that it
relinquishes the program’s title IV, HEA
program eligibility. We believe that this
is necessary to ensure that enrolled
students are notified promptly of any
plans by the institution to discontinue
a program so that they can make
reasoned and informed choices about
pursuing an education.
Under § 668.7(j)(4), for the second
year warning, the institution must
prominently display the debt warning
on the home page of the program Web
site and include the debt warning in all
promotional materials related to the
failing program that it makes available
to prospective students. The Department
considers promotional materials to
include a wide range of materials
pertaining to the program, from course
catalogues, to brochures, to television
ads, to poster advertisements. For
example, if a poster advertisement on a
public bus mentions a failing program,
even as part of a list of programs offered
at the institution, the warning must be
included on that poster. If the poster
advertises the institution as a whole, or
other programs at the institution that
have not failed the minimum standards
for more than one of the three most
recently completed FYs, then the
institution is not required to include the
warning in that material.
With respect to currently enrolled
students, we have clarified under
§ 668.7(j)(3)(i) that an institution must
provide the first or second year
warnings to these students as soon as
administratively feasible, but no later
than 30 days after the date the Secretary
notifies the institution that the program
failed the minimum standards. We
believe that this requirement balances
the need for students to be informed as
quickly as possible of the risk involved
in remaining in a program with the
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
recognition that in some cases, such as
a program with a high number of
students, it may take an institution more
than a few days to comply with the debt
warning requirement.
We agree with commenters that there
should be no undue pressure on
students to enroll in a particular
program, and are requiring under
§ 668.7(j)(3)(ii) that an institution
provide the first and second year
warnings to a prospective student at the
time the student first contacts the
institution requesting information about
the program. If the prospective student
intends to use title IV, HEA program
funds to attend the program, the
institution may not enroll the student
until three days after the debt warnings
are first provided to the student.
Additionally, if more than more 30 days
passes from the date the debt warnings
are first provided to the student and the
date the student seeks to enroll in the
program, the institution must provide
the debt warnings again. In this
situation, the institution may not enroll
the student until three days after the
debt warnings are most recently
provided to the student under this
section.
We believe that this approach will be
more effective than requiring
institutions to provide the debt
warnings only at the time that the
student enrolls in a program because, as
some of the commenters noted, by that
point a student most likely already feels
committed to enroll in the program.
Requiring that the debt warnings be
given at a point in time close to but
prior to the time that a student actually
enrolls will ensure that the information
is still fresh in the student’s mind,
particularly if this point in time is far
removed from the first point of contact.
It will also provide students a final
chance to consider the commitment
involved in taking on student loan debt
without the pressure to enroll
immediately. While we considered
limiting this cooling-off period to seven
days, as suggested by some of the
commenters, we believe that the longer
period of three to 30 days will allow and
encourage students to digest the
information in the debt warnings fully,
compare that information to the
information available from other
institutions offering similar programs,
evaluate the potential consequences of
enrolling in the program, and research
other education options. We also note
that institutions are expected to comply
with any applicable State laws
including those requiring a cooling-off
period.
In response to concerns that a
warning may be difficult to find or
PO 00000
Frm 00052
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
understand, we have clarified the
manner in which institutions must
provide these warnings. First, we have
specified that a first year warning must
be delivered directly to the student
orally or in writing in accordance with
the procedures established by the
institution. Delivering the debt warning
directly to the student includes
communicating with the student face-toface or telephonically, communicating
with the student along with other
affected students as part of a group
presentation, and sending the warning
to the student’s e-mail address. We
would expect this direct warning to
occur in the mode of correspondence
that the institution typically uses to
communicate with the student in order
to ensure that the student has received
the debt warning. For example, if an
institution regularly corresponds with
the student via electronic mail, it can be
reasonably certain the student received
the warning.
We are further providing in these final
regulations that, if an institution
chooses to communicate this first year
warning to a student orally, the
institution must maintain
documentation of how that information
was provided, including any materials
the institution used to deliver the
warning. We believe this would include
such materials as a copy of the script or
any other written materials used to
deliver the warning. Further, if an
institution provides the warning orally
to a group of affected students, it would
have to document each student’s
presence to demonstrate that the
warning was given directly to each
student. For a second year warning, an
institution may use any of the methods
described for the first year warning;
however, it must at a minimum provide
the warning to the student in writing.
So, if an institution opts to provide the
second year warning orally, it must be
provided in written form as well. We
believe that requiring that the warnings
be given directly to the student will
address the commenters’ concerns that
a student will overlook the warning
because the institution must ensure that
it is received.
Second, we have specified that both
the first and second year warnings must
be made in ‘‘plain language’’ and in an
‘‘easy to understand format’’ to require
that the warnings be understandable the
first time that an individual reads or
hears them. Although we are not
mandating the specific language that
must be used in the debt warnings, we
anticipate developing a model warning
form through the information collection
process under the Paperwork Reduction
Act of 1995 (PRA) to guide institutions
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
in providing these debt warnings to
students. In the meantime, the Web site,
https://www.plainlanguage.gov, contains
guidelines and numerous examples that
will be helpful to institutions in
complying with these regulations.
With respect to ensuring the
prominence of the debt warnings, we
are requiring in § 668.7(j)(4) that the
second year warning included in an
institution’s promotional materials must
be prominently displayed on the
program home page of the institution’
Web site. Institutions may not bury the
warnings for a program on a Web site
that students have to search for or are
unlikely to look at. The requirement to
prominently display the debt warning
‘‘on the program home page’’ means that
the actual information must be found on
that page. A link to a downloadable
document or to another page with the
information would not meet the
requirements of this section. We believe
that requiring the use of plain language,
specifying the content that must be
included, and prescribing where on the
Web site the warnings must be located
will go far to ensure that institutions
cannot hide this important information
from students.
Third, we have added a requirement
in § 668.7(j)(6) that, to the extent
practicable, an institution must provide
alternatives to English-language
warnings for those students for whom
English is not their first language. We
believe this is necessary because a
student receiving a warning in a
nonnative language may not be able to
fully appreciate the gravity of the
warning and its implications. This
means that, for example, an institution
that serves a large Hispanic population
would be expected to provide the debt
warnings in Spanish for students for
whom English is not their first language.
We have included the phrase ‘‘to the
extent practicable’’ to acknowledge that
an institution may serve students that
speak a wide variety of languages and
that it may not be feasible to provide the
warnings in every single language or
dialect. However, we believe that it is
appropriate to require the alternatives
wherever possible to ensure that
students can understand the meaning of
the debt warnings. We do not believe
that it is necessary to require alternate
warnings for students with lower
literacy levels, as suggested by some of
the commenters, because we believe
that the ‘‘plain language’’ requirements
address this issue. Using plain language
requires that the warning be presented
in simple, understandable terms that are
accessible to all audiences, including
students who have only basic literacy
skills.
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
For the disclosures under § 668.6(b)
that an institution must make for all of
its gainful employment programs, an
institution is strongly encouraged to
maintain accurate electronic and
printed materials. While the Program
Integrity Issues final regulations do not
specify a timeframe within which an
institution must update the Web site
and other promotional materials, the
Department expects that institutions
will make a good faith effort to maintain
current information. We believe that it
is reasonable to expect that any changes
will be made by no later than 30 days
after the date that the change in the
information occurred. For the disclosure
of the tuition and fees under
§ 668.6(b)(1)(iii), for example, we would
expect an institution to update any
electronic materials as soon as it is
administratively feasible but no later
than 30 days after the date that the
Department notifies the institution that
the program has failed. Along these
lines, we strongly encourage institutions
to include within any printed
promotional materials a link to the
electronic Web site that contains the
current disclosure information and an
explanation to students and consumers
that while the information in the
printed materials was accurate at the
time of printing, that they may obtain
more current information on the
homepage of the program Web site.
With respect to the relationship
between the disclosure requirements in
§§ 668.6(b) and 668.41 through 668.49,
the disclosure requirements in
§ 668.6(b) are more prescriptive than
those under the Student Right to Know
(SRK) provisions under § 668.41–.49.
We specified in the Program Integrity
Issues final regulations that the
disclosures in § 668.6(b) must be
prominently posted on the home page of
the program Web site and that the
institution must include a prominent
and direct link on any other Web page
containing general, academic, or
admissions information about the
program to the single Web page that
contains all of the required information.
By contrast, while the SRK disclosures
must be given to enrolled or prospective
students ‘‘through appropriate
publications, mailings, or electronic
media,’’ they are not required to be
included on the home page of a program
Web site. Specifically, under
§ 668.41(b), an institution may satisfy
the disclosure requirements by posting
the information on an Internet Web site
that is reasonably accessible to the
individuals to whom the information
must be disclosed. We remind
institutions that the provisions in
PO 00000
Frm 00053
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
34437
§ 668.6(b) that were published in the
Program Integrity Issues final
regulations go into effect on July 1, 2011
in accordance with the master calendar.
These disclosure requirements will
provide students with a level of
protection beginning this year. The
changes in § 668.7(j) in these final
regulations will go into effect one year
later on July 1, 2012, and the debt
warnings will enhance this protection
going forward.
Finally, we disagree with the
commenters who believed that the debt
warning requirements are too broad in
scope or that establishing them is
beyond our statutory authority. As
discussed earlier, the Department has
broad authority to promulgate
regulations regarding gainful
employment programs. In the context of
regulating these programs, we believe it
is critical to require debt warnings
because a program may lose its
eligibility when the next set of debt
measures becomes final, and an
institution may recruit students to
enroll in that program without
restriction unless, and until, the
program loses eligibility. By including
the stricter warning in all promotional
materials that mention the program by
name, students will be in a better
position to evaluate the marketing
information describing the program
before engaging in further contact with
the institution or its representatives.
This is particularly important when the
institution is recruiting students to
enroll in a program that may lose its
title IV, HEA program eligibility soon
after the student enrolls, since such a
change could significantly impair the
student’s ability to complete the
program. Institutions may also provide
prospective students with information
showing the improvements to the
program that have been made and other
similar actions taken to improve the
outcomes for program graduates. We
believe that requiring these debt
warnings in the marketing materials is
a reasonable step to protect students
while permitting institutions to
continue enrolling students in programs
that are at risk of losing eligibility under
the gainful employment metrics.
Changes: We have replaced proposed
§ 668.7(d) with new § 668.7(j). Under
§ 668.7(j)(1)(i), an institution must
provide enrolled and prospective
students in a failing program that has
failed the minimum standards for one
FY with a first year warning prepared in
plain language and presented in an easy
to understand format that explains the
debt measures and shows the amount by
which the program did not meet the
minimum standards and describes any
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
34438
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
actions the institution plans to take to
improve the program’s performance
under the debt measures. Under
§ 668.7(j)(1)(ii), an institution must
provide the debt warning orally or in
writing directly to the student, in
accordance with the procedures
established by the institution. The
regulation provides that delivering the
warning directly to the student includes
communicating with the student face-toface or telephonically, communicating
with the student along with other
affected students as part of a group
presentation, or sending the warning to
the student’s e-mail address. Under
§ 668.7(j)(1)(iii), an institution must
maintain documentation of any warning
that it gives to students orally, including
any materials the institution used to
deliver that warning and documentation
of the student’s presence at the time of
the warning. Under § 668.7(j)(1)(iv), an
institution must continue to provide the
debt warning until it is notified by the
Secretary that the failing program now
satisfies one of the minimum standards
in § 668.7(a)(1).
Under § 668.7(j)(2), an institution
must, in addition to the information in
§ 668.7(j)(1)(i), provide enrolled and
prospective students in a failing
program that has not met the minimum
standards for two consecutive FYs or for
two out of the three most recently
completed FYs a second year warning in
writing that, in plain language and an
easy to understand format, explains the
actions the institution’s plans to take in
response to the second failure. If the
institution plans to discontinue the
program, the explanation must include
the timeline for doing so and the
options that students have available as
a result of those plans; explains the risk
associated with enrolling or continuing
in the program, including the potential
consequences for and options available
to a student if the program becomes
ineligible for title IV, HEA program
funds; explains the resources available
to students, including https://
www.collegenavigator.gov, for the
purpose of researching other
educational options and comparing
program costs; and states in a clear and
conspicuous manner that a student who
enrolls or continues in the program
should expect to have difficulty
repaying his or her student loans. This
warning must be given in written form,
in addition to any other method chosen
by the institution.
Under § 668.7(j)(3), we have specified
when an institution must provide
prospective and enrolled students with
the first and second year debt warnings.
For an enrolled student, the institution
must provide the debt warnings as soon
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
as administratively feasible but no later
than 30 days after the date the Secretary
notifies the institution that the program
has failed the minimum standards. For
a prospective student, the institution
must provide the debt warnings at the
time the student first contacts the
institution requesting information about
the program. If the prospective student
intends to use title IV, HEA program
funds to attend the program, the
institution may not enroll the student
until three days after the debt warnings
are first provided to the student.
Additionally, if more than more 30 days
pass from the date the debt warnings are
first provided to the student and the
date the student seeks to enroll in the
program, the institution must provide
the debt warnings again. The institution
may not enroll the student until three
days after the debt warnings are most
recently provided to the student under
this section. In § 668.7(j)(4), we have
required institutions that must comply
with the requirements in § 668.7(j)(2) to
prominently display the debt warning
on the program home page of its Web
site and include the debt warning in all
promotional materials it makes available
to prospective students. These debt
warnings may be provided in
conjunction with the disclosures
required under § 668.7(b)(2).
In § 668.7(j)(5), we have specified that
if an institution voluntarily
discontinues a failing program under
§ 668.7(l)(1), it must notify enrolled
students at the same time that it
provides the written notice to the
Department that it relinquishes the
program’s title IV, HEA program
eligibility. Finally, in § 668.7(j)(6), we
have required institutions to provide
alternatives to English-language debt
warnings to students for whom English
is not their first language, to the extent
practicable.
In § 668.7(g)(6), we have provided that
the Secretary may disseminate the final
debt measures and information about, or
related to, the debt measures to the
public in any time, manner, and form,
including publishing information that
will allow the public to ascertain how
well programs perform under the debt
measures and other appropriate
objective metrics.
Additional Concerns on Reporting
Comments: Some commenters
believed that the final regulations
should ensure that student debts are
reasonable, both in relation to earnings
and whether the debts are repaid, by
discouraging borrowing altogether.
Consequently, the commenters
suggested that the Department provide
incentives to colleges to offer low-
PO 00000
Frm 00054
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
tuition programs or other mechanisms
that help students avoid borrowing. To
that end, the commenters stated that in
cases where fewer than 35 percent of a
program’s enrollees rely on Federal
loans, the program should not be subject
to any of the potential limitations under
proposed § 668.7. The commenters
reasoned that a program in which only
a small percentage of students take out
loans will, by definition, have a Federal
median loan debt of zero, and therefore
the program most likely would not be
limited under these regulations.
Therefore, the commenters believed it
would be counterproductive and
needlessly burdensome to subject
institutions to further reporting
requirements for such programs.
According to the commenters,
exempting these programs would ensure
that Federal oversight efforts and
institutional regulatory burden are
efficiently balanced.
Discussion: Although programs with
zero median loan debt will not be
adversely impacted under these
regulations, we do not agree that those
programs should be exempt from the
data reporting requirements under
§ 668.6 based solely on institutional
burden. On the contrary, isolating those
programs from an established reporting
stream may be more burdensome for an
institution. In any event, students
choosing among programs should have
access to information about the typical
debt burdens associated with those
programs, and the Department needs the
data to determine whether programs
satisfy the minimum standards for the
loan repayment rate under § 668.7(b).
Changes: None.
Transition Year (Proposed § 668.7(f);
Final § 668.7(k))
Comment: With respect to the
proposal under which the Department
would cap the number of ineligible
programs, commenters were concerned
that the proposed regulations did not
provide any means for institutions to
appeal or verify whether their programs
were accurately placed below the cap.
Commenters also requested that the
Department clarify (1) that the 5 percent
cap on ineligible programs applied only
to the transition year (2012–13 award
year), and (2) how the Department
would select the ineligible programs
falling below the cap based on the
number of students who completed
those programs. Other commenters
proposed extending the 5 percent cap
from one to two years as added
insurance against unintended, negative
consequences for students.
Commenters suggested that the
Department treat the 2012–13 award
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
year as an ‘‘information’’ year and begin
the actual ‘‘phase-in year’’ in award year
2013–14. Other commenters suggested a
three-year transition period so that the
Department and institutions have
sufficient time to collect the required
data and make accurate determinations.
Similarly, some commenters suggested
that the Department provide a three-year
transition period, from July 1, 2012 to
July 1, 2015, during which the
Department would simply notify
institutions of how their programs
performed under the gainful
employment metrics. Another
commenter recommended a transition
period of up to seven years to prevent
loss of student access to educational
programs, and to allow programs
sufficient time to implement the new
disclosure requirements under
§ 668.6(b) and other program changes
that could affect 3-year or 4-year student
cohorts entering repayment.
Finally, some commenters asked how
the 5 percent cap would be applied.
Specifically, the commenters asked
whether the cap would be applied by
sector or overall.
Discussion: In response to the
question of how an institution can
verify that a program fell below the 5
percent cap, under these regulations the
institution may challenge the accuracy
of the data used to calculate the
repayment rate that is subsequently
used by the Department to sort the
ineligible programs under the cap
provisions. The other data used for the
cap, students completing programs, are
reported by institutions and that data
will be publicly available.
The Department does not believe that
any additional time is needed beyond
the first year of eligibility because, as
discussed more fully under the heading,
Actual earnings from SSA and Bureau
of Labor Statistics (BLS) wage data an
institution will have gainful
employment data for several years
before a program could become
ineligible. The Department will apply
the 5 percent cap for programs that
become ineligible based on final debt
measures for FYs 2012, 2013, and 2014.
FY 2014 is now the first year that a
program could become ineligible. As set
forth in these final regulations, the cap
is set at 5 percent but that percentage
now applies to the total number of
students who completed gainful
employment programs in each of three
institutional categories—public, private
nonprofit, and proprietary, instead of
the proposed categories. We made this
change in response to concerns voiced
by proprietary institutions that the
impact of the new regulations would
have the biggest impact on them as a
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
sector. This change therefore allows no
sector to bear more than 5 percent of the
initial impact of the regulations.
With regard to how the Department
will select programs falling under the
cap, we assume the commenter is
referring to a situation where the
number of students completing a
program crosses over the 5 percent
mark. For example, a program is 10th on
the list of programs with the lowest
repayment rates. The total number of
students completing programs in that
institutional category is 100,000, so the
5 percent mark is 5,000. If the first nine
programs totaled 4,900 students and 200
students completed the 10th program,
the 10th program would not fall under
the cap because including the 200
students who completed it would cross
over the 5 percent mark and could not
be subject to the sanctions specified in
these final regulations.
Changes: We have redesignated
proposed § 668.7(f)(2), transition year, to
new § 668.7(k) and are providing that,
based on final debt measures for FYs
2012, 2013, and 2014, the Department
will cap the number of ineligible
programs by first sorting all programs by
category of institutions (public, private
non-profit, and proprietary), then by
loan repayment rate within that category
from the lowest to the highest rate, and
finally, starting with the ineligible
programs with the lowest repayment
rate, by determining ineligible programs
accounting for a combined number of
program completers during FY 2014 that
does not exceed 5 percent of the total
number of program completers in that
category.
Additional Programs (Proposed
§ 668.7(g)(2) and (3)); Restrictions for
Ineligible and Voluntarily Discontinued
Failing Programs (Final § 668.7(l))
Background: The July 26, 2010 NPRM
contained proposals regarding
Department approval of the eligibility of
new gainful employment programs.
Because the Department was concerned
that some institutions might attempt to
circumvent the proposed gainful
employment standards in § 668.7(a)(1)
of the July 26, 2010 NPRM by adding
new programs before those standards
could take effect, we published the
Gainful Employment/New Programs
final regulations, which take effect on
July 1, 2011. In the Gainful
Employment/New Programs final
regulations, we established
requirements in 34 CFR 600.10 and 34
CFR 600.20 under which an institution
must notify the Department at least 90
days before it intends to offer an
additional gainful employment program.
The notice must include a narrative
PO 00000
Frm 00055
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
34439
explaining among other things how the
institution determined the need for the
program and how the program was
designed to meet market needs. Under
these requirements, an institution is not
required to obtain approval from the
Department to offer the program unless
the Department alerts the institution at
least 30 days before the program’s first
day of classes that the program must be
approved for title IV, HEA program
purposes. A summary of the comments,
discussion, and the regulatory language
supporting these requirements is
contained in the Gainful Employment/
New Programs final regulations and can
be accessed at https://www.ifap.ed.gov/
fregisters/FR102910GainfulEmployment
Final.html.
We are not modifying this notification
and approval process for new gainful
employment programs in these final
regulations; however, the Department is
continuing to consider whether this
process may be simplified and narrowed
further after these new regulations are in
place. We may address these issues in
a separate rulemaking proceeding.
Note: We did not summarize or address in
the Gainful Employment/New Programs final
regulations the comments we received on
proposed § 668.7(g)(2), regarding restricting
approval of a program based on projected
growth estimates and institutional ability to
offer gainful employment programs, or (g)(3)
regarding calculation of the debt measures if
an additional program constitutes a
substantive change based on program
content. A summary of these comments and
our responses are included in the following
discussion.
Comments: Several commenters
argued that limiting an institution’s
ability to establish new programs should
only apply to an institution with a
record of poor performance, such as an
institution whose programs were
restricted or determined in the previous
three years to be ineligible under the
debt measures. The commenters
believed this approach would provide
an incentive to institutions to keep their
programs fully eligible and would
reduce the burden on institutions that
have a strong record of preparing
students for gainful employment. One
commenter suggested that the
Department modify the proposed
approval process so that it applies only
to an institution where over 50 percent
of the institution’s programs are on a
restricted status. Another commenter
recommended that institutions be
allowed to bypass Department approval
entirely if programs representing 50
percent or more of the institution’s total
enrollment or programs representing 50
percent of the institution’s enrollment
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
34440
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
in the same job family are not restricted
or ineligible.
Several commenters stated that
additional programs should be allowed
to prove their worth over time, and that
the Department should not calculate
debt measures until relevant data are
available. Along the same lines, another
commenter stated that an additional
program should not be required to meet
either the loan repayment rate or debtto-earnings standards until the program
has been in continuous operation for a
period sufficient to calculate the
program’s three-year CDR.
Some commenters expressed concerns
with proposed § 668.7(g)(3), under
which an additional program’s loan
repayment rate and debt-to-earnings
ratios would be based on data from the
additional program and, for the first
three years, loan data from all other
programs currently or previously offered
by the institution that are in the same
job family as the additional program.
(The BLS describes a job family as a
group of occupations based on work
performed, skills, education, training,
and credentials and identifies the SOC
code for each occupation in a job family
at: https://online.onetcenter.org/find/
family.) Under this proposal, if the
additional program constituted a
substantive change based solely on
program content as provided in
§ 602.22(a)(2)(iii), the program’s loan
repayment rate and debt-to-earnings
ratios would not be calculated until data
were available.
Commenters expressed concern that
applying the loan repayment rate and
debt-to-earnings standards to additional
programs in the same job family would
inhibit or prevent an institution from
improving, over time, the content and,
by extension, the loan repayment rate
and debt-to-earnings standards of
gainful employment programs currently
offered by the institution. Another
commenter opined that improvements
made to an existing gainful employment
program over time might constitute a
‘‘substantive change’’ but was concerned
that such a program would continue to
be subject to the standards of other
programs in the same job family instead
of a loan repayment rate and debt-toincome measure that was unique to that
program.
Other commenters argued that an
institution’s ability to offer effective and
affordable additional programs would
be stymied if the Department uses data
from programs in the same job family to
approve a new program. These
commenters urged the Department to
use data from the new programs as soon
as it became available. One of the
commenters cited an example of an
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
institution that offers a new one-year
certificate program in addition to or in
place of a two-year associate’s degree
program in the same area. According to
the commenter, under the Department’s
proposal, the metrics for the shorter
certificate program would be based on
data from the longer, more costly,
associate’s degree program, increasing
the likelihood that the additional
program would not be approved.
Another commenter expressed
concern that the loan repayment rates
and the debt-to-earnings ratios at new
schools and existing schools that offer
additional programs that constitute a
substantive change based solely on
program content may not be
representative of the true repayment and
income characteristics of the
institution’s students because the
metrics would be based on the
experience of recent graduates rather
than experienced graduates with higher
incomes and greater loan repayment
rates. The commenter suggested that the
Department permit an institution to rely
on job family data from similar gainful
employment programs at its institution
or at affiliated institutions to approve a
new program because these programs
will have graduates who have higher
incomes and higher loan repayment
rates.
Another commenter expressed
concern about the impact of the
Department’s proposals on the approval
of new green technology education
programs. The commenter objected to
the Department’s proposals because
approval of new green technology
programs would be based on data from
programs currently or previously offered
by the institution that are in the same
job family; however, the term ‘‘same job
family’’ does not exist for this category
of programs. The commenter feared that
applying this requirement to green
technology programs would devastate
the economy and provide no support to
President Obama’s stated goal of
creating a new economic segment in
emerging green technologies.
Commenters also asked the
Department to clarify whether a gainful
employment program would have to
reestablish eligibility, or be treated as a
new program, if the program became
ineligible but was allowed to continue
operating because it was ranked above
the 5 percent threshold for the transition
year.
Discussion: With regard to
commenters’ concerns about the use of
job families, we believe that the due
diligence undertaken by an institution
in developing and designing a program
that meets markets needs, as required
under 34 CFR 600.20(d), mitigates the
PO 00000
Frm 00056
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
need to condition the initial
performance of a new program based on
the performance under the debt
measures of related programs offered by
the institution. Moreover, in view of the
concerns raised that the proposed jobfamily approach may inhibit the
development of new programs or not
properly reflect the performance of new
programs, we are adopting the
suggestion made by the commenters that
we calculate the debt measures for all
new programs only when the data
become available for those programs.
So, in lieu of the job-family approach,
we provide under § 668.7(a)(1)(iii) that a
program is considered to provide
training that leads to gainful
employment if the data needed to
determine whether the program satisfies
the minimum standards are not
available to the Secretary.
We generally agree with the
commenters that restrictions on an
institution’s ability to offer new
programs should be based on the
performance of an institution’s program
under the debt measures. In keeping
with the focus in these final regulations
on the poorest performing programs, we
believe it is appropriate to prevent an
institution from immediately recycling
an ineligible program or a failing
program that the institution voluntarily
discontinued. Therefore, in new
§ 668.7(l) we are providing that an
ineligible or voluntarily discontinued
failing program remains ineligible for
title IV, HEA funds until the institution
reestablishes the program’s eligibility
under 34 CFR 600.20(d).
With respect to failing programs,
under these final regulations, we are
providing that an institution may not
reestablish the program’s eligibility for
two or three FYs following the FY the
program was discontinued depending
on when the institution voluntarily
discontinued the program. And, with
respect to ineligible programs, an
institution may not reestablish the
eligibility of that program or establish
the eligibility of a substantially similar
program until three FYs following the
FY the program became ineligible.
The Department is establishing these
‘‘wait-out’’ periods to provide incentives
for institutions to improve programs
rather than allow programs to fail and
lose eligibility for title IV, HEA funds.
Consistent with our approach in
defining the debt measures to identify
the poorest performing programs,
institutions should not be able to merely
reestablish the eligibility of failed
programs without taking the time to
substantially improve those programs or
making other adjustments to ensure that
the programs do not fail again.
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
A program that becomes ineligible
because it failed the measures three out
of four FYs is required to wait three
years before it may reestablish that
program’s eligibility or establish the
eligibility of program that is a
substantially similar program to the one
that became ineligible. The three year
wait-out period reflects the three years
the program failed the debt measures
and is severe enough that it provides an
added incentive to an institution to take
the actions needed to avoid a failing
program from becoming ineligible.
However, where a program becomes
ineligible, the Department is concerned
that an institution may attempt to evade
the wait-out period by repackaging that
program and establishing under 34 CFR
600.20(d) the eligibility of the
repackaged program as a new program.
Consequently, the wait-out period also
applies to a ‘‘substantially similar
program’’ to avoid the outcome where
the repackaged program, in the guise of
a new program, would not have any
prior history under the debt measures.
The wait-out period provides a material
break in the program’s eligibility for title
IV, HEA program funds to mark that the
prior history of that ineligible program
under the debt measures will not be
used if the program later reestablishes
its eligibility. This approach ensures
that students are not placed in a
program that may be so similar to the
failed program that they have a high
likelihood of finding themselves in
another failed program. We believe this
temporary limitation on an institution’s
ability to seek eligibility for a program
that is substantially similar to one that
lost eligibility is a reasonable
consequence of the institution’s
impaired capability to offer that
program under the measures in these
regulations.
An institution that voluntarily
discontinues a failing program will be
required to wait two or three years
before the Department will allow the
institution to reestablish the eligibility
of that program. The wait-out periods
generally reflect the number of years the
program failed the debt measures. So, an
institution that voluntarily discontinues
a program after being required to
provide the first-year debt warnings, or
within 90 days of receiving a notice
from the Department that it must
provide second year debt warnings, will
have to wait two years before it may
seek to reestablish the eligibility of that
program. On the other hand, an
institution that voluntarily discontinues
a failing program after the 90-day period
could continue to offer the program up
to the date that the program would
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
otherwise become ineligible under the
debt measures—three years. In this case,
there would be no material difference
between a failing program discontinued
by the institution and an ineligible
program. We note that an institution
retains the ability to seek to establish
the eligibility of a program substantially
similar to a voluntarily discontinued
program without any waiting period.
These temporary two or three year
restrictions do not affect the eligibility
of any other programs an institution
already offers that are substantially
similar to the program that lost
eligibility, nor does it prevent an
institution from seeking to establish the
eligibility of new programs that are not
substantially similar to the ineligible
program. The effective date for
reestablishing the eligibility of an
ineligible program or failing program
that was voluntarily discontinued is
July 1, 2012. However, the Department
will not issue FY 2012 final debt
measures until calendar year 2013.
With regard to the comment on the
status of an ineligible program measured
for the transition year, that year is
counted as a failing year even if the
program’s ranking is over the 5 percent
cap. That year will count as a failing
year for purposes of determining
whether the program meets the
eligibility requirements in subsequent
years.
Changes: New § 668.7(l) provides that
an ineligible program, or a failing
program that an institution voluntarily
discontinues, remains ineligible until
the institution reestablishes the
eligibility of the program under 34 CFR
600.20(d). For these purposes, an
institution is considered to have
voluntarily discontinued a failing
program on the date the institution
provides written notice to the Secretary
that it relinquishes title IV, HEA
program eligibility for the program.
We have also provided in § 668.7(l)
that an institution may not seek to
reestablish eligibility of a failing
program it voluntarily discontinued
until the end of the second FY following
the FY the program was discontinued if
the institution voluntarily discontinued
the program at any time after the
program is determined to be a failing
program, but no later than 90 days after
the date the Secretary notified the
institution that it must provide the
second year debt warnings under
§ 668.7(j)(2). For an institution that
voluntarily discontinues the failing
program more than 90 days after the
date the Secretary notifies the
institution that it must provide the
second year debt warnings, the
institution is prohibited from seeking to
PO 00000
Frm 00057
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
34441
reestablish eligibility for the program
until the end of the third FY following
the FY the program was voluntarily
discontinued.
In this new section, we also have
provided that an institution may not
seek to reestablish the eligibility of an
ineligible program, or to establish the
eligibility of a program that is
substantially similar to the ineligible
program until the end of the third FY
following the FY the program became
ineligible. Under the regulations, we
consider a program to be substantially
similar to an ineligible program if it has
the same credential level and the same
first four digits of the CIP code as that
of the ineligible program.
Certification Procedures (Proposed
§ 668.13(c)(1))
General
Comment: Commenters noted that
section 498(h)(1) of the HEA only
authorizes the Secretary to provisionally
certify an institution when considering
the institution for initial certification,
reviewing the institution’s
administrative capability and financial
responsibility for the first time,
reviewing an institution in connection
with a change of ownership, or when
reviewing the institution’s application
to renew its certification.
Therefore the commenters believe that
placing an institution on provisional
certification if a program is subject to
the eligibility limitations under the
gainful employment provisions in
proposed § 668.7(e) or becomes
ineligible under the gainful employment
provisions in proposed § 668.7(f) has no
foundation in the law and is not in line
with other conditions under § 668.13(c)
that could place in an institution on
provisional certification.
Commenters objected to provisionally
certifying an institution when a single
program is determined ineligible for not
meeting the standards for the gainful
employment provisions in § 668.7(a).
The commenters offered alternative
methods for determining if an
institution should be provisionally
certified. For example, a commenter
suggested the Department consider the
relationship between the number of
programs subject to gainful employment
sanctions and the total number of
programs offered or the average past
enrollment in sanctioned programs
compared to the enrollment in all
eligible programs.
Discussion: Section 668.13(c)
provides the circumstances for when the
Department may provisionally certify an
institution. We initially proposed to
amend § 668.13(c)(1)(i) to provide that
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
34442
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
the Department may provisionally
certify an institution if one or more
programs offered at the institution failed
to prepare students for gainful
employment in a recognized occupation
in accordance with § 668.7.
We believe § 668.7, as revised in these
final regulations, provides institutions
whose programs fail the gainful
employment debt measures with
sufficient and comprehensive
protections, such as the draft debt
measures and data corrections in
§ 668.7(e) and the alternative earnings
process specified in § 668.7(g), before
any of its programs lose eligibility for
title IV, HEA funds. Therefore, placing
these institutions on provisional
certification is no longer necessary.
Changes: We have removed proposed
§ 668.13(c)(1)(i)(F) from the regulations.
Therefore, we are not amending current
§ 668.13.
Initial and Final Decisions (Proposed
§ 668.90(a)(3))
Comment: Commenters were
concerned that the termination
proceedings against a program that does
not meet the standards for gainful
employment in proposed § 668.7(a)
would violate an institution’s due
process rights because the institution
would not be allowed to examine the
earnings of program completers
maintained by another Federal agency.
Some commenters referenced findings
from several court cases noting that
procedural due process requires that a
party against whom an agency has
proceeded to withdraw a benefit or
service be allowed to rebut evidence
offered by the agency. The commenters
stated that it would be difficult for an
institution to challenge data if the
institution could not access the
information against which it is being
measured to determine if it is accurate
data. The commenters believed the
courts would support the position that
not allowing an institution to examine
the earnings of program completers
maintained by another Federal agency
would violate the institution’s due
process rights.
Some commenters questioned how
the Department, SSA, or the hearing
official could confirm that the list of
program completers was accurate.
Commenters suggested that the source
of data used to calculate the debt-toearnings ratios under § 668.7(c) should
be data that can be made accessible to
institutions.
Other commenters noted that the
Department should clarify the evidence
an institution would need to supply to
document that its data is more reliable
than the Federal data and specify the
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
minimum standards that must be met.
For example, the minimum standards
might include income for all program
completers that can be documented by
employers unaffiliated with the
institution.
Some commenters noted that under
the Cohort Default Rate (CDR) Guide,
the Department provides procedural
rights to challenge NSLDS data that they
believe is inaccurate. The commenters
recommended that the Department
provide a similar process for an
institution that fails to meet the gainful
employment standards. Another
commenter recommended that language
be added to the final regulations that
would define an institution’s appeal
rights and establish a process by which
an institution is allowed to review and
correct data to ensure inaccurate data is
not released to the public.
A commenter was concerned that the
appeals process under proposed
§ 668.90(a)(3)(vii) may result in possible
abuses and delays similar to problems
experienced in the CDR sanction
process. The commenter believed
institutions were successful in changing
the CDR process to expand the appeal
process for reasons ranging from
hardship to mitigating circumstances.
The commenter stated that over time the
definition of ‘‘default rate’’ was
weakened and institutions continued to
increase enrollment while delaying final
action by appeals. The commenter
suggested that the hearings be limited to
appeals about the accuracy of the data
and recommended that the Department
clarify how an administrative law judge
should consider alternative evidence to
the government’s data.
Other commenters noted that the
Department did not specify who would
appoint the hearing official or the
required qualifications for this position
and recommended that the hearing
official be a trained, impartial
administrative law judge with no
affiliation to a proprietary institution.
Discussion: Section 668.90(a)(3) sets
forth the limitations on the matters and
decisions rendered in termination
proceedings by a hearing official in
accordance with subpart G of part 668.
We initially proposed to add a provision
under § 668.90(a)(3)(vii) that would
allow a termination action against a
program for not meeting the standards
for gainful employment in § 668.7(a).
The proposed regulations required the
hearing official to accept as accurate the
average annual earnings calculated by
another Federal agency, i.e., SSA, for
the list of program completers identified
by the institution and accepted by the
Department. An institution could
provide the hearing official with a
PO 00000
Frm 00058
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
different average annual amount to be
used to calculate the debt-to-earnings
ratio for the same list of program
completers that had been determined to
be reliable.
In response to concerns raised by
commenters about our proposal, we
have developed an administrative
process that implements many of the
suggestions made by commenters. This
process provides an institution with a
reasonable amount of access to
information and time to review draft
debt measures and to challenge the
accuracy of certain information used to
calculate the debt measures (loan
repayment rate and debt-to-earnings
ratio) similar to the process used to
review and challenge CDRs. For
instance, an institution that questions
the accuracy of the debt-to-earnings
ratios may review the list of students
that the Department will provide to SSA
to determine that the correct cohort of
students will be used by SSA to
calculate the mean or median annual
earnings. The institution may not
challenge the accuracy of the mean or
median annual earnings the Secretary
obtains from SSA. However, an
institution may challenge a final debt
measure for a program that does not
satisfy the debt-to-earnings ratios by
using earnings data from BLS during a
transitional period, a State-sponsored
data system, or an institutional survey
conducted in accordance with NCES
standards.
With regard to the comment that the
appeals process under proposed
§ 668.90(a)(3)(vii) may result in possible
abuses and delays similar to problems
experienced in the CDR sanction
process, the proposed change to
§ 668.90(a)(3)(vii) has been replaced
with procedures established under
§ 668.7. Section 668.7(d), (e), and (g)
limits challenges to the data used to
calculate the debt measures rather than
allowing for the various circumstances
under which an institution may
challenge, adjust, and appeal decisions
affecting the institution’s CDRs.
Therefore, we believe that the
procedures established under § 668.7
will be less susceptible to abuse and
delays than the CDR process. Also, by
removing proposed § 668.90(a)(3)(vii),
there is no longer a need to address in
the final regulations the appointment or
qualifications of the hearing official as
requested by some commenters.
Details of the administrative process
can be found under the preamble
discussion under the headings, Small
numbers (668.7(d)), and Draft debt
measures and data corrections
(§ 668.7(e)), Final debt measures
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
(§ 668.7(f)), and Alternative earnings
(§ 668.7(g)).
Changes: We have removed
§ 668.90(a)(3)(vii) of the proposed
regulations that would allow a
termination action against a program
that failed the gainful employment
standards in § 668.7(a). Therefore,
current § 668.90 will not be amended.
Executive Orders 12866 and 13563
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
Regulatory Impact Analysis
Under Executive Order 12866, the
Secretary must determine whether the
regulatory action is ‘‘significant’’ and
therefore subject to the requirements of
the Executive Order and subject to
review by the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB). Section 3(f) of Executive
Order 12866 defines a ‘‘significant
regulatory action’’ as an action likely to
result in regulations that may (1) Have
an annual effect on the economy of $100
million or more, or adversely affect a
sector of the economy, productivity,
competition, jobs, the environment,
public health or safety, or State, local or
tribal governments or communities in a
material way (also referred to as
‘‘economically significant’’ regulations);
(2) create serious inconsistency or
otherwise interfere with an action taken
or planned by another agency; (3)
materially alter the budgetary impacts of
entitlement grants, user fees, or loan
programs or the rights and obligations of
recipients thereof; or (4) raise novel
legal or policy issues arising out of legal
mandates, the President’s priorities, or
the principles set forth in the Executive
order.
Pursuant to the terms of the Executive
Order, we have determined this
regulatory action will have an annual
effect on the economy of more than
$100 million. Therefore, this action is
‘‘economically significant’’ and subject
to OMB review under section 3(f)(1) of
Executive Order 12866.
Notwithstanding this determination, we
have assessed the potential costs and
benefits—both quantitative and
qualitative—of this regulatory action.
The agency believes that the benefits
justify the costs.
The Department has also reviewed
these regulations pursuant to Executive
Order 13563, published on January 21,
2011 (76 FR 3821). Executive Order
13563 is supplemental to and explicitly
reaffirms the principles, structures, and
definitions governing regulatory review
established in Executive Order 12866.
To the extent permitted by law, agencies
are required by Executive Order 13563
to: (1) Propose or adopt regulations only
upon a reasoned determination that
their benefits justify their costs
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
(recognizing that some benefits and
costs are difficult to quantify); (2) tailor
their regulations to impose the least
burden on society, consistent with
obtaining regulatory objectives, taking
into account, among other things, and to
the extent practicable, the costs of
cumulative regulations; (3) select, in
choosing among alternative regulatory
approaches, those approaches that
maximize net benefits (including
potential economic, environmental,
public health and safety, and other
advantages; distributive impacts; and
equity); (4) the extent feasible, specify
performance objectives, rather than
specifying the behavior or manner of
compliance that regulated entities must
adopt; and (5) identify and assess
available alternatives to direct
regulation, including providing
economic incentives to encourage the
desired behavior, such as user fees or
marketable permits, or providing
information upon which choices can be
made by the public.
We emphasize as well that Executive
Order 13563 requires agencies ‘‘to use
the best available techniques to quantify
anticipated present and future benefits
and costs as accurately as possible.’’ In
its February 2, 2011, memorandum (M–
11–10) on Executive Order 13563,
improving regulation and regulatory
review, the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs has emphasized that
such techniques may include
‘‘identifying changing future compliance
costs that might result from
technological innovation or anticipated
behavioral changes.’’
We are issuing these regulations only
upon a reasoned determination that
their benefits justify their costs and we
selected, in choosing among alternative
regulatory approaches, those approaches
that maximize net benefits. Based on
this analysis and for the additional
reasons stated in the preamble, the
Department believes that these final
regulations are consistent with the
principles in Executive Order 13563.
A detailed analysis, including the
Department’s Regulatory Flexibility Act
Analysis, is found in Appendix A to
these final regulations.
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995
Section 668.7 contains information
collection requirements. Under the
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44
U.S.C. 3507(d)), the Department has
submitted a copy of this section to OMB
for its review. In general, throughout the
preamble, we discuss debt-to-earnings
ratios, repayment rates, draft rates and
required disclosures of the final
repayment rate and the debt-to-earnings
ratios in the context of being calculated
PO 00000
Frm 00059
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
34443
in or beginning in FY 2012. We have
chosen in this section to reference FY
2013 so that our analysis can include
critical data tied to second year failure
of a debt measure and the level of debt
warning notice required after a second
year failure. We believe that only by
including this data in our analysis can
we provide complete and accurate
information regarding burden under
these final regulations.
Section 668.7(g)(6)(i) also contains
information collection requirements.
However, that burden is already
reflected under OMB Control Number
1845–0107.
Section 668.7—Gainful Employment in
a Recognized Occupation
Under § 668.7(c)(2)(i)(A)(2) of these
final regulations, institutions are
provided the option to report the total
amount of tuition and fees the
institution charged a student in a
gainful employment program. The
advantage of exercising this option
occurs when the debt-to-earnings ratios
are calculated. In cases where students
borrowed more than the amount of
tuition and fees (such as additional
amounts for room and board, books and
supplies, or for other living and
personal costs), the amount of
indebtedness used for the debt-toearnings calculation is limited to the
amount that the institution reported it
charged for tuition and fees.
We estimate there will be a very high
percentage of proprietary institutions
that will exercise this option. We
estimate that proprietary institutions
will choose this option for 99 percent of
the applicable 4,067,680 students for a
total of 4,027,003 students. On average,
we estimate that it will take the
institution 2 minutes (.03 hours) per
student to report this information for a
total of 120,810 hours of additional
burden under OMB Control Number
1845–0109.
We estimate there will be a high
percentage of private non-profit
institutions that will exercise this
option. We estimate that private nonprofit institutions will choose this
option for 90 percent of the applicable
242,705 students for a total of 218,435
students. On average, we estimate that
it will take the institution 2 minutes (.03
hours) per student to report this
information for a total of 6,553 hours of
additional burden under OMB Control
Number 1845–0109.
We estimate there will be a
moderately high percentage of public
institutions that will exercise this
option. We estimate public institutions
will choose this option for 80 percent of
the applicable 4,426,327 students for a
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
34444
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
total of 3,541,062 students. On average,
we estimate that it will take the
institution 2 minutes (.03 hours) per
student to report this information for a
total of 106,232 hours of additional
burden under OMB Control Number
1845–0109.
Collectively, we estimate that these
reporting requirements will increase
burden for institutions by 233,595 hours
under OMB Control Number 1845–0109.
Under § 668.7(e)(1) in these final
regulations, before issuing the draft
debt-to-earnings ratios, the Secretary
will provide to an institution a list of
the students who will be included in the
applicable two- or four-year period used
to calculate the debt-to-earnings ratios
beginning in FY 2012. No later than 30
days after the date the Secretary
provides the list to the institution, the
institution may (1) provide evidence
showing that a student should be
included on or removed from the list or,
(2) correct or update the student identity
information. While this will increase
burden to institutions participating in
the pre-draft data challenge, the increase
is estimated to be modest. In many
cases, institutions will be comparing the
information that they have previously
sent to the Department about their
students in gainful employment
programs with this pre-draft list. If the
corrected and updated information is
accurate, the corrected information will
be used to create a final list that will be
sent by the Department to SSA in order
to calculate the draft debt-to-earnings
ratios.
We estimate that only those
institutions who have concerns that
their programs may be failing or believe
that they have a failing program will
submit a pre-draft data challenge.
Therefore, we are multiplying by two
the total estimated number of failing
programs that will submit a pre-draft
data challenge.
We estimate that 601 gainful
employment programs will initially fail
the debt measures during FY 2013. We
estimate that 323 gainful employment
programs will fail the debt measures for
the second time during FY 2013 for a
total of 924 failing programs. We
estimate that twice that number of
failing programs or 1,848 pre-draft
corrections will be submitted.
We estimate that proprietary
institutions will submit a total of 1,552
pre-draft data challenges. On average,
we estimate that institutional staff will
take 1.5 hours per submission to analyze
the draft data supplied by the
Department to the institution and to
submit the institution’s pre-draft data
challenge for a total of 2,328 hours of
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
increased burden under OMB Control
Number 1845–0109.
We estimate that private non-profit
institutions will submit a total of 44 predraft data challenges. On average, we
estimate that institutional staff will take
1.5 hours per submission to analyze the
draft data supplied by the Department to
the institution and to submit its predraft data challenge for a total of 66
hours of increased burden under OMB
Control Number 1845–0109.
We estimate that public institutions
will submit a total of 252 pre-draft data
challenges. On average, we estimate that
institutional staff will take 1.5 hours per
submission to analyze the draft data
supplied by the Department to the
institution and to submit its pre-draft
data challenge for a total of 378 hours
of increased burden under OMB Control
Number 1845–0109.
Collectively, under § 668.7(e)(1), we
estimate pre-draft data challenges will
increase burden for institutions by 2,772
hours under OMB Control Number
1845–0109.
Under § 668.7(e)(2) in these final
regulations we will notify an institution
of the draft results of the debt-toearnings ratios for each gainful
employment program. No later than 45
days after the Secretary issues the draft
results of the debt-to-earnings ratios for
a program and no later than 45 days
after the Secretary issues the draft
results of the loan repayment rate for a
program, the institution may challenge
the accuracy of the loan data for a
borrower that was used to calculate the
draft loan repayment rate, or the median
loan debt for the program that was used
for the numerator of the draft debt-toearnings ratios. Institutions submitting a
post-draft corrections challenge will
provide evidence showing that the
borrower loan data or the program
median loan debt is inaccurate. The
institution may challenge the accuracy
of the list of borrowers included in the
applicable two- or four-year period used
to calculate the draft loan repayment
rate by submitting evidence showing
that a borrower should be included on
or removed from the list, or correcting
or updating identity information
provided for a borrower on the list, such
as the name, social security number, or
date of birth.
We estimate that 601 gainful
employment programs will fail the debt
measures issued for FY 2013. We
estimate that 323 gainful employment
programs will fail the debt measures
issued for FY 2013 for the second time
for a total of 924 failing programs.
We estimate that 776 programs will
fail the draft debt measures at
proprietary institutions. On average, we
PO 00000
Frm 00060
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
estimate that institutional staff will take
5 hours per program to analyze the draft
data supplied by the Department to the
institution and to submit its data
challenge for a total of 3,880 hours of
increased burden under OMB Control
Number 1845–0109.
We estimate that 22 programs will fail
the draft debt measures at private nonprofit institutions. On average, we
estimate that institutional staff will take
5 hours per program to analyze the draft
data supplied by the Department to the
institution and to submit its data
challenge for a total of 110 hours of
increased burden under OMB Control
Number 1845–0109.
We estimate that 126 programs will
fail the draft debt measures at public
institutions. On average, we estimate
that institutional staff will take 5 hours
per program to analyze the draft data
supplied by the Department to the
institution and to submit its data
challenge for a total of 630 hours of
increased burden under OMB Control
Number 1845–0109.
Collectively, under § 668.7(e), we
estimate debt measures challenges will
increase burden for institutions by 4,620
hours under OMB Control Number
1845–0109.
Under § 668.7(g), Alternative
earnings, in these final regulations we
provide that an institution may
demonstrate that a failing program
would meet a debt-to-earnings standard
by recalculating the debt-to-earnings
ratios using the median loan debt for the
program as determined under § 668.7(c)
and using alternative earnings from: A
State-sponsored data system; an
institutional survey conducted in
accordance with NCES standards; or, for
FYs 2012, 2013, and 2014, the Bureau
of Labor Statistics (BLS).
Under § 668.7(g)(2) of these final
regulations, for final debt-to-earnings
ratios for a failing program, an
institution may use State data to
recalculate those ratios for a failing
program only if the institution obtains
earnings data from State-sponsored data
systems for more than 50 percent of the
students in the applicable two- or fouryear period, or a comparable two- or
four-year period, and that number of
students is more than 30 students; and
the institution uses the actual, Statederived mean or median earnings of the
students in the applicable two- or fouryear period. In the institution’s
submission, it must demonstrate that it
accurately used the actual State-derived
data to recalculate the ratios.
We estimate that 18 percent of the 776
failed programs during the FY 2013
period at proprietary institutions will
choose to use State-sponsored system
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
data to provide alternative earnings.
Based on this estimate, proprietary
institutions will submit alternative
earnings data from State-sponsored
systems for 140 programs. On average,
we estimate that institutional staff will
take 2 hours per submission to acquire
the alternative earnings data from Statesponsored systems, recalculate the
ratios, and submit that data to the
Department for a total of 280 hours of
increased burden under OMB Control
Number 1845–0109.
We estimate that 5 percent of the 22
failed programs during the FY 2013
period at private non-profit institutions
will choose to use State-sponsored
system data to provide alternative
earnings. Based on this estimate,
proprietary institutions will submit
alternative earnings data from Statesponsored systems for one program. On
average, we estimate that institutional
staff will take 2 hours per submission to
acquire the alternative earnings data
from State-sponsored systems,
recalculate the ratios, and submit that
data to the Department for a total of 2
hours of increased burden under OMB
Control Number 1845–0109.
We estimate that 10 percent of the 126
failed programs during the FY 2013
period at public institutions will choose
to use State-sponsored system data to
provide alternative earnings. Based on
this estimate, proprietary institutions
will submit alternative earnings data
from State-sponsored systems for 13
programs. On average, we estimate that
institutional staff will take 2 hours per
submission to acquire the alternative
earnings data from State-sponsored
systems, recalculate the ratios, and
submit that data to the Department for
a total of 26 hours of increased burden
under OMB Control Number 1845–0109.
Collectively, under § 668.7(g)(2), we
estimate using State-sponsored system
data for alternative earnings will
increase burden for institutions by 308
hours under OMB Control Number
1845–0109.
Under § 668.7(g)(3) of these final
regulations, for final debt-to-earnings
ratios calculated by the Secretary for FY
2012 and any subsequent FY, an
institution may use survey data to
recalculate the ratios for a failing
program only if the institution: (1) Uses
reported earnings obtained from an
institutional survey conducted of the
students in the applicable two- or fouryear period, or a comparable two- or
four-year period, and the survey data is
for more than 30 students; (2) submits
a copy of the survey and certifies that
it was conducted in accordance with the
statistical standards and procedures
established by NCES and available at
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
https://nces.ed.gov; and (3) submits an
examination-level attestation by an
independent public accountant or
independent governmental auditor, as
appropriate, that the survey was
conducted in accordance with the
specified NCES standards and
procedures.
We estimate that 2 percent of the 776
failed programs during the FY 2013
period at proprietary institutions will
choose to use survey data to provide
alternative earnings. Based on this
estimate, proprietary institutions will
submit survey data to provide
alternative earnings for 16 programs. On
average, we estimate that institutional
staff will take 40 hours per submission
to attain survey data, to formulate the
alternative earnings based upon that
data, and to submit that data to the
Department for a total of 640 hours of
increased burden under OMB Control
Number 1845–0109.
We estimate that 0 percent of private
non-profit and public institutions will
choose to submit alternative earnings
data based upon an NCES compliant
survey.
Collectively, under § 668.7(g)(3), we
estimate the burden for institutions to
use an NCES compliant survey for
alternative earnings will increase
burden by 640 hours under OMB
Control Number 1845–0109.
Under § 668.7(g)(4) of these final
regulations, for the final debt-toearnings ratios calculated by the
Secretary for FYs 2012, 2013, and 2014,
an institution may use BLS earnings
data to recalculate those ratios for a
failing program only if the institution:
(1) Identifies and provides
documentation of the occupation by
SOC code, or combination of SOC
codes, in which more than 50 percent of
the students in the 2YP or 4YP were
placed or found employment, and that
number of students is more than 30; (2)
uses the most current BLS earnings data
for the identified SOC code to calculate
the debt-to-earnings ratio; and (3)
submits, upon request, all the
placement, employment, and other
records maintained by the institution for
the program under § 668.7(g)(4)(i) that
the institution examined to determine
whether those records identified the
SOC codes for the students who were
placed or found employment.
We estimate that 776 programs at
proprietary institutions will fail the
debt-to-earnings ratios issued for FY
2013 and choose to use BLS data to
provide alternative earnings. We
estimate that proprietary institutions
will provide alternative earnings
information using BLS data for 75
percent of the total number of failed
PO 00000
Frm 00061
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
34445
programs which equals 582 alternative
earnings submissions. On average, we
estimate that institutional staff will take
5 hours per submission to formulate the
alternative earnings based upon BLS
data and submit that data to the
Department for a total of 2,910 hours of
increased burden under OMB Control
Number 1845–0109.
We estimate that 22 programs at
private non-profit institutions will fail
the debt-to-earnings ratios issued for FY
2013 and choose to use BLS data to
provide alternative earnings. We
estimate that private non-profit
institutions will provide alternative
earnings information using BLS data for
55 percent of the total number of failed
programs, which equals 12 alternative
earnings submissions. On average, we
estimate that institutional staff will take
5 hours per submission to formulate the
alternative earnings based upon BLS
data and submit that data to the
Department for a total of 60 hours of
increased burden under OMB Control
Number 1845–0109.
We estimate that 126 programs at
public institutions will fail the debt-toearnings ratios issued for FY 2013 and
choose to use BLS data to provide
alternative earnings. We estimate that
public institutions will provide
alternative earnings information using
BLS data for 80 percent of the total
number of failed programs which equals
101 alternative earnings submissions.
On average, we estimate that
institutional staff will take 5 hours per
submission to formulate the alternative
earnings based upon BLS data and
submit that data to the Department for
a total of 505 hours of increased burden
under OMB Control Number 1845–0109.
Collectively, under § 668.7(g)(4), we
estimate using BLS data for alternative
earnings will increase burden for
institutions by 3,475 hours under OMB
Control Number 1845–0109.
Under § 668.7(g)(5) of these final
regulations, institutions must notify the
Secretary of the institution’s intent to
use alternative earnings no later than 14
days after the date the institution is
notified of its final debt measures.
Additionally, institutions must submit
all supporting documentation related to
recalculation of the debt-to-earnings
ratios using alternative earnings, no
later than 60 days after the institution is
notified of its final debt measures.
We estimate that proprietary
institutions will notify the Secretary of
their intent to use alternative earnings
in the recalculation of the debt-toearnings ratios and will submit their
documentation in a timely manner for
776 programs that failed the debt
measures issued for FY 2013. On
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
34446
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
average, we estimate that it will take
institutional staff 15 minutes (.25 hours)
to notify the Secretary of the
institution’s intent to use alternative
earnings no later than 14 days after the
date the institution is notified of its final
debt measures for a total of 194 hours
of increased burden under OMB Control
Number 1845–0109.
We estimate that private non-profit
institutions will notify the Secretary of
their intent to use alternative earnings
in the recalculation of the debt-toearnings ratios and will submit their
documentation in a timely manner for
22 programs that failed the debt
measures issued for FY 2013. On
average, we estimate that it will take
institutional staff 15 minutes (.25 hours)
to notify the Secretary of the
institution’s intent to use alternative
earnings no later than 14 days after the
date the institution is notified of its final
debt measures for a total of 6 hours of
increased burden under OMB Control
Number 1845–0109.
We estimate that public institutions
will notify the Secretary of their intent
to use alternative earnings in the
recalculation of the debt-to-earnings
ratios and will submit their
documentation in a timely manner for
126 programs that failed the debt
measures issued for FY 2013. On
average, we estimate that it will take
institutional staff 15 minutes (.25 hours)
to notify the Secretary of its intent to
use alternative earnings no later than 14
days after the date the institution is
notified of its final debt measures for a
total of 32 hours of increased burden
under OMB Control Number 1845–0109.
Collectively, under § 668.7(g)(5), we
estimate the burden for institutions to
notify the Secretary of their intent to use
alternative earnings to recalculate the
debt-to-earnings ratios and submit the
supporting documentation will increase
burden by 232 hours under OMB
Control Number 1845–0109.
Under § 668.7(j)(1) of these final
regulations, the institution is required to
provide for each enrolled and
prospective student a warning prepared
in plain language and presented either
orally or in writing directly to the
students when a program fails the debt
measures for the first time. The initial
warning explains the debt measures and
shows the amount by which the
program did not meet the minimum
standards. In addition, the initial
warning describes any actions the
institution plans to take to improve the
program’s performance. To the extent
that the institution delivers the initial
warning orally, it must maintain
documentation of how that information
was provided, including any materials
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
the institution used to deliver that
warning and any documentation of the
student’s presence at the time of the
warning.
Under § 668.7(j)(2) of these final
regulations, an institution that has a
program that has failed the debt
measures for two consecutive FYs or for
two out of the three most recently
completed FYs, must provide the debt
warning containing the requirements in
§ 668.7(j)(1) in writing, together with a
plain language explanation of what
actions the institution plans to take in
response to the second failure. If the
institution plans to discontinue the
program, it must provide the timeline
for doing so, and the options available
to the student. The second debt warning
must also explain the risks associated
with enrolling or continuing in the
program, including the potential
consequences for, and options available
to, the student if the program becomes
ineligible for title IV, HEA program
funds. Additionally, the second debt
warning must include a plain language
explanation of the resources available,
including https://
www.collegenavigator.gov, that the
student may use to research other
educational options and compare
program costs, and include a clear and
conspicuous statement that a student
who enrolls or continues in the program
should expect to have difficulty
repaying his or her student loans.
Under § 668.7(j)(4) of these final
regulations, the institution must
prominently display the second-year
debt warning on the program home page
of the institution’s Web site and include
the warning in all promotional materials
it makes available to prospective
students. We do not expect that the
following requirements will be overly
burdensome for institutions: (1)
Providing a plain language explanation
of the actions the institution plans to
take in response to the second failure;
the risks associated with enrolling or
continuing in the program; and the
resources available, including https://
www.collegenavigator.gov; (2) providing
a clear and conspicuous statement that
a student who enrolls in or continues in
the program should expect to have
difficulty repaying their student loan
debt; and (3) posting that information on
the program home page of the
institution’s Web site and in its
promotional materials.
We estimate that 493 programs at
proprietary institutions will fail the debt
measures issued for FY 2013 for the first
time. We estimate that an additional 283
programs at proprietary institutions will
fail the debt measures for the second
time during the same period of time. We
PO 00000
Frm 00062
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
estimate that on average, it will take
institutional staff 30 minutes (.5 hours)
to prepare and distribute a first or
second year warning as required for a
total of 776 affected programs, resulting
in an increase in burden of 388 hours
under OMB Control Number 1845–0109.
We estimate that 16 programs at
private non-profit institutions will fail
the debt measures issued for FY 2013
for the first time. We estimate that an
additional 6 programs at private nonprofit institutions will fail the debt
measures for the second time during the
same period of time. We estimate that
on average, it will take institutional staff
30 minutes (.5 hours) to prepare and
distribute a first or second year warning
as required for a total of 22 affected
programs times, resulting in an increase
in burden of 11 hours under OMB
Control Number 1845–0109.
We estimate that 92 programs at
public institutions will fail the debt
measures issued for FY 2013 for the first
time. We estimate that an additional 34
programs at public institutions will fail
the debt measures for the second time
during the same period of time. We
estimate that on average, it will take
institutional staff 30 minutes (.5 hours)
to prepare and distribute a first or
second year warning for a total of 126
affected programs times, resulting in an
increase in burden of 63 hours under
OMB Control Number 1845–0109.
Collectively, we estimate that the
burden for meeting these disclosure
requirements will increase burden for
institutions by 462 hours under OMB
Control Number 1845–0109.
Under § 668.7(j)(5) of these final
regulations, if an institution voluntarily
discontinues a failing program, it must
notify enrolled students at the same
time that it provides the written notice
to the Secretary that it relinquishes the
program’s title IV, HEA program
eligibility.
We estimate that for the period from
July 1, 2012 through June 30, 2013
proprietary institutions will have 493
programs that have failed the debt
measures once and 283 programs that
have failed the debt measures twice,
totaling 776 failing programs. We
estimate that 70 percent of that total
number of failing programs or 543
programs will be voluntarily
discontinued. On average, it will take
institutional staff 10 minutes (.17 hours)
to provide written notice to the
Secretary that it relinquishes the
program’s title IV, HEA program
eligibility for a total of 92 hours of
increased burden under OMB Control
Number 1845–0109.
We estimate that for the period from
July 1, 2012 through June 30, 2013
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
private non-profit institutions will have
16 programs that have failed the debt
measures once and 6 programs that have
failed the debt measures twice, totaling
22 failing programs. We estimate that 10
percent of that total number of failing
programs or 2 programs will be
voluntarily discontinued. On average, it
will take institutional staff 10 minutes
(.17 hours) to provide written notice to
the Secretary that it relinquishes the
program’s title IV, HEA program
eligibility for a total of 1 hour of
increased burden under OMB Control
Number 1845–0109.
We estimate that for the period from
July 1, 2012 through June 30, 2013
public institutions will have 92
programs that have failed the debt
measures once and 34 programs that
have failed the debt measures twice,
totaling 126 failing programs. We
estimate that 20 percent of that total
number of failing programs or 25
program will be voluntarily
discontinued. On average, it will take
institutional staff 10 minutes (.17 hours)
to provide written notice to the
Secretary that it relinquishes the
program’s title IV, HEA program
eligibility for a total of 4 hours of
increased burden under OMB Control
Number 1845–0109.
Collectively, under § 668.7(j)(5), we
estimate the burden for institutions to
notify the Secretary to relinquish the
program’s title IV, HEA program
eligibility will increase burden by 97
hours under OMB Control Number
1845–0109.
We estimate that for FY 2013 there
will be 8,736,711 students in 55,405
gainful employment programs which
yields an average program size of 158
students per program.
We estimated above that there will be
543 proprietary programs that are
voluntarily discontinued. Using the
average of 158 students per program,
proprietary institutions will be required
to notify 85,794 students that the
program is being discontinued. On
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
average, we estimate that it will take a
student 15 minutes (.25 hours) to read
the notice provided by the institution
and determine the impact on the
completion of the program without title
IV, HEA program assistance for a total
of 21,449 hours of increased burden
under OMB Control Number 1845–0109.
We estimated above that there will be
2 private non-profit programs that are
voluntarily discontinued. Using the
average of 158 students per program,
private non-profit institutions will be
required to notify 316 students that the
program is being discontinued. On
average, we estimate that it will take a
student 15 minutes (.25 hours) to read
the notice provided by the institution
and determine the impact on the
completion of the program without title
IV, HEA program assistance for a total
of 79 hours of increased burden under
OMB Control Number 1845–0109.
We estimated above that 25 public
programs will be voluntarily
discontinued. Using the average of 158
students per program, public
institutions will be required to notify
3,950 students that the program is being
discontinued. On average, we estimate
that it will take a student 15 minutes
(.25 hours) to read the notice provided
by the institution and determine the
impact on the completion of the
program without title IV, HEA program
assistance for a total of 988 hours of
increased burden under OMB Control
Number 1845–0109.
Collectively, under § 668.7(j)(5), we
estimate that for students to read the
notice provided by the institution about
the institution’s decision to voluntarily
a failing program will increase burden
by 22,516 hours under OMB 1845–0109.
Under § 688.7(j)(5) of these final
regulations, we estimate that 85,794
students will be enrolled at proprietary
institutions in failing programs that are
voluntarily discontinued. On average,
we estimate that it will take institutional
staff 10 minutes (.17 hours) per student
to prepare and mail a notice provided
PO 00000
Frm 00063
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
34447
by the institution indicating that the
failing gainful employment program is
being voluntarily discontinued and the
date that title IV, HEA program
assistance will no longer be available for
a total of 14,585 hours of increased
burden under OMB Control Number
1845–0109.
Under § 688.7(j)(5) of these final
regulations, we estimate that 316
students will be enrolled at private nonprofit institutions in failing programs
that are voluntarily discontinued. On
average, we estimate that it will take
institutional staff 10 minutes (.17 hours)
per student to prepare and mail a notice
provided by the institution indicating
that the failing gainful employment
program is being voluntarily
discontinued and the date that title IV,
HEA program assistance will no longer
be available for a total of 54 hours of
increased burden under OMB Control
Number 1845–0109.
Under § 688.7(j)(5) of these final
regulations, we estimate that 3,950
students will be enrolled at public
institutions in failing programs that are
voluntarily discontinued. On average,
we estimate that it will take institutional
staff 10 minutes (.17 hours) per student
to prepare and mail a notice provided
by the institution indicating that the
failing gainful employment program is
being voluntarily discontinued and the
date that title IV, HEA program
assistance will no longer be available for
a total of 672 hours of increased burden
under OMB Control Number 1845–0109.
Collectively, under § 688.7(j)(5) of
these final regulations, we estimate that
it will take institutional staff a total of
15,311 hours of increased burden under
OMB Control Number 1845–0109 to
prepare and mail a notice provided by
the institution indicating that the failing
gainful employment program is being
voluntarily discontinued and the date
that title IV, HEA program assistance
will no longer be available.
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
34448
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
COLLECTION OF INFORMATION
Regulatory
section
Information collection
Collection
668.7 ...........
This section provides institutions the option to submit the tuition and fee amount
charged a student in a gainful employment program. This section also provides for
draft data challenges whereby institutions will have the opportunity to challenge
the accuracy of the information used to calculate the debt measures in the event
that student identifying information was erroneously included or excluded. Institutions with programs that fail the debt measures will have an opportunity to provide
alternative earnings data from BLS data, State-sponsored earnings data, or the results of an institutional earnings survey as long as the survey meets NCES standards and an independent public accountant or independent governmental auditor,
as appropriate, has attested that the survey was conducted in accordance with the
specific NCES standards and procedures. This section also provides for institutions to notify the Secretary of the institution’s intent to use alternative earnings
data. This section provides that institutions must disclose debt warnings for first
year failures and second year failures to each enrolled student and prospective
student in a gainful employment program. Institutions that choose to voluntarily
discontinue a failing program must do so in writing to the Secretary relinquishing
the program’s title IV, HEA program eligibility and by notice to the enrolled students.
OMB Control Number 1845–0109. This
will be a new collection. The burden will
increase by 284,028 hours.
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of
1995
Section 202 of the Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act of 1995
(‘‘Unfunded Mandates Act’’), Public Law
104–4 (March 22, 1995), requires that an
agency prepare a budgetary impact
statement before promulgating
regulations that may result in
expenditure by State, local, and Tribal
governments, in the aggregate, or by the
private sector, of $100 million or more
in any one year. If a budgetary impact
statement is required, section 205 of the
Unfunded Mandates Act also requires
an agency to identify and consider a
reasonable number of regulatory
alternatives before promulgating a rule.
Please see the Regulatory Impact
Analysis, attached as Appendix A, for a
discussion of the budgetary impact of
these final regulations.
Assessment of Educational Impact
In accordance with section 411 of the
General Education Provisions Act, 20
U.S.C. 1221e–4, and based on our own
review, we have determined that these
final regulations do not require
transmission of information that any
other agency or authority of the United
States gathers or makes available.
Electronic Access to This Document:
The official version of this document is
the document published in the Federal
Register. Free Internet access to the
official edition of the Federal Register
and the Code of Federal Regulations is
available via the Federal Digital System
at: https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys. At this
site you can view this document, as well
as all other documents of this
Department published in the Federal
Register, in text or Adobe Portable
Document Format (PDF). To use PDF
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
you must have Adobe Acrobat Reader,
which is available free at the site.
You may also access documents of the
Department published in the Federal
Register by using the article search
feature at: https://
www.federalregister.gov. Specifically,
through the advanced search feature at
this site, you can limit your search to
documents published by the
Department.
(Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance
Numbers: 84.007 FSEOG; 84.032 Federal
Family Education Loan Program; 84.033
Federal Work-Study Program; 84.037 Federal
Perkins Loan Program; 84.063 Federal Pell
Grant Program; 84.069 LEAP; 84.268 William
D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program; 84.376
ACG/SMART; 84.379 TEACH Grant Program)
List of Subjects in 34 CFR Part 668
Administrative practice and
procedure, Aliens, Colleges and
universities, Consumer protection,
Grant programs—education,
Incorporation by reference, Loan
programs—education, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements, Selective
Service System, Student aid, Vocational
education.
Dated: June 1, 2011.
Arne Duncan,
Secretary of Education.
For the reasons discussed in the
preamble, the Secretary amends part
668 of title 34 of the Code of Federal
Regulations as follows:
PART 668—STUDENT ASSISTANCE
GENERAL PROVISIONS
1. The authority citation for part 668
continues to read as follows:
■
PO 00000
Frm 00064
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
Authority: 20 U.S.C. 1001, 1002, 1003,
1070g, 1085, 1088, 1091, 1092, 1094, 1099c,
and 1099c–1, unless otherwise noted.
2. Section 668.7 is added to read as
follows:
■
§ 668.7 Gainful employment in a
recognized occupation.
(a) Gainful employment. (1) Minimum
standards. A program is considered to
provide training that leads to gainful
employment in a recognized occupation
if—
(i) As determined under paragraph (b)
of this section, the program’s annual
loan repayment rate is at least 35
percent;
(ii) As determined under paragraph
(c) of this section, the program’s annual
loan payment is less than or equal to—
(A) 30 percent of discretionary
income (discretionary income
threshold); or
(B) 12 percent of annual earnings
(actual earnings threshold); or
(iii) The data needed to determine
whether a program satisfies the
minimum standards are not available to
the Secretary.
(2) General. For the purposes of this
section—
(i)(A) A program refers to an
educational program offered by an
institution under § 668.8(c)(3) or (d) that
is identified by a combination of the
institution’s six-digit OPEID number,
the program’s six-digit CIP code as
assigned by an institution or determined
by the Secretary, and credential level;
(B) The Secretary determines whether
an institution accurately assigns a CIP
code for a program based on the
classifications and program codes
established by the National Center for
Education Statistics (NCES); and
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
34449
internship or residency, as identified by
an institution, the sixth and seventh FYs
(2YP–R) prior to the most recently
completed FY for which the debt
measures are calculated. For example, if
the most recently completed FY is 2012,
the 2YP–R is FYs 2005 and 2006. For
this purpose, a required medical or
dental internship or residency is a
supervised training program that—
(1) Requires the student to hold a
degree as a doctor of medicine or
osteopathy, or a doctor of dental
science;
(2) Leads to a degree or certificate
awarded by an institution of higher
education, a hospital, or a health care
facility that offers post-graduate
training; and
(3) Must be completed before the
borrower may be licensed by the State
and board certified for professional
practice or service;
(v) A four-year period is the period
covering four consecutive FYs that
occur on—
(A) The third, fourth, fifth, and sixth
FYs (4YP) prior to the most recently
completed FY for which the debt
measures are calculated. For example, if
the most recently completed FY is 2017,
the 4YP is FYs 2011, 2012, 2013, and
2014; or
(B) For a program whose students are
required to complete a medical or dental
internship or residency, as identified by
an institution, the sixth, seventh, eighth,
and ninth FYs (4YP–R) prior to the most
recently completed FY for which the
debt measures are calculated. For
example, if the most recently completed
FY is 2017, the 4YP–R is FYs 2008,
2009, 2010, and 2011. For this purpose,
a required medical or dental internship
or residency is a supervised training
program that—
(1) Requires the student to hold a
degree as a doctor of medicine or
osteopathy, or a doctor of dental
science;
(2) Leads to a degree or certificate
awarded by an institution of higher
education, a hospital, or a health care
facility that offers post-graduate
training; and
(3) Must be completed before the
borrower may be licensed by the State
and board certified for professional
practice or service; and
(vi) Discretionary income is the
difference between the mean or median
annual earnings and 150 percent of the
most current Poverty Guideline for a
single person in the continental U.S.
The Poverty Guidelines are published
annually by the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) and
are available at https://aspe.hhs.gov/
poverty.
(b) Loan repayment rate. For the most
recently completed FY, the Secretary
calculates the loan repayment rate for a
program using the following ratio:
(1) Original Outstanding Principal
Balance (OOPB). (i) The OOPB is the
amount of the outstanding balance,
including capitalized interest, on FFEL
or Direct Loans owed by students for
attendance in the program on the date
those loans first entered repayment.
(ii) The OOPB includes FFEL and
Direct Loans that first entered
repayment during the 2YP, the 2YP–A,
the 2YP–R, the 4YP, or the 4YP–R. The
OOPB does not include PLUS loans
made to parent borrowers or TEACH
Grant-related unsubsidized loans.
(iii) For consolidation loans, the
OOPB is the OOPB of the FFEL and
Direct Loans attributable to a borrower’s
attendance in the program.
(iv) For FYs 2012, 2013, and 2014, the
Secretary calculates two loan repayment
rates for a program, one with the 2YP
and the other with the 2YP–A, so long
as the 2YP–A represents more than 30
borrowers whose loans entered
repayment. Provided that both loan
repayment rates are calculated, the
Secretary determines whether the
program meets the minimum standard
under paragraph (a)(1)(i) of this section
by using the higher of the 2YP rate or
the 2YP–A rate.
(2) Loans Paid in Full (LPF). (i) LPF
are loans that have never been in default
or, in the case of a Federal
Consolidation Loan or a Direct
Consolidation Loan, neither the
consolidation loan nor the underlying
loan or loans have ever been in default
and that have been paid in full by a
borrower. A loan that is paid through a
Federal Consolidation loan, a Direct
Consolidation loan, or under another
refinancing process provided for under
the HEA, is not counted as paid-in-full
for this purpose until the consolidation
loan or other financial instrument is
paid in full by the borrower.
(ii) The OOPB of LPF in the
numerator of the ratio is the total
amount of OOPB for these loans.
(3) Payments-Made Loans (PML). (i)
PML are loans that have never been in
default or, in the case of a Federal
Consolidation Loan or a Direct
Consolidation Loan, neither the
consolidation loan nor the underlying
loan or loans have ever been in default,
where—
(A)(1) Payments made by a borrower
during the most recently completed FY
reduce the outstanding balance of a
loan, including the outstanding balance
of a Federal Consolidation Loan or
Direct Consolidation Loan, to an amount
that is less than the outstanding balance
of the loan at the beginning of that FY.
The outstanding balance of a loan
includes any unpaid accrued interest
that has not been capitalized; or
(2) If the program is a postbaccalaureate certificate, master’s
degree, doctoral degree, or firstprofessional degree program, the total
outstanding balance of a Federal or
Direct Consolidation Loan at the end of
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
PO 00000
Frm 00065
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
ER13JN11.022
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
(C) The credential levels for
identifying a program are undergraduate
certificate, associate’s degree, bachelor’s
degree, post-baccalaureate certificate,
master’s degree, doctoral degree, and
first-professional degree;
(ii) Debt measures refers collectively
to the loan repayment rate and debt-toearnings ratios described in paragraphs
(b) and (c) of this section;
(iii) A fiscal year (FY) is the 12-month
period starting October 1 and ending
September 30 that is designated by the
calendar year in which it ends; for
example FY 2013 is from October 1,
2012 to September 30, 2013. That
designation also represents the FY for
which the Secretary calculates the debt
measures;
(iv) A two-year period is the period
covering two consecutive FYs that occur
on—
(A)(1) The third and fourth FYs (2YP)
prior to the most recently completed FY
for which the debt measures are
calculated. For example, if the most
recently completed FY is 2012, the 2YP
is FYs 2008 and 2009; or
(2) For FYs 2012, 2013, and 2014, the
first and second FYs (2YP–A) prior to
the most recently completed FY for
which the loan repayment rate is
calculated under paragraph (b) of this
section. For example, if the most
recently completed FY is 2012, the
2YP–A is FYs 2010 and 2011; or
(B) For a program whose students are
required to complete a medical or dental
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
34450
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
the most recently completed FY is less
than or equal to the total outstanding
balance of the consolidation loan at the
beginning of the FY. The outstanding
balance of the consolidation loan
includes any unpaid accrued interest
that has not been capitalized;
(B) A borrower is in the process of
qualifying for Public Service Loan
Forgiveness under 34 CFR 685.219(c)
and submits an employment
certification to the Secretary that
demonstrates the borrower is engaged in
qualifying employment and the
borrower made qualifying payments on
the loan during the most recently
completed FY; or
(C)(1) Except as provided under
paragraph (b)(3)(i)(C)(2) of this section,
a borrower in the income-based
repayment plan (IBR), income
contingent repayment plan (ICR), or any
other repayment plan makes scheduled
payments on the loan during the most
recently completed FY for an amount
that is equal to or less than the interest
that accrues on the loan during the FY.
The Secretary limits the dollar amount
of these interest-only or negative
amortization loans in the numerator of
the ratio to no more than 3 percent of
the total amount of OOPB in the
denominator of the ratio, based on
available data on a program’s borrowers
who are making scheduled payments
under these repayment plans.
(2) Until the Secretary determines that
there is sufficiently complete data on
which of the program’s borrowers have
scheduled payments that are equal to or
less than accruing interest, the Secretary
will include in the numerator 3 percent
of the OOPB in the denominator.
(3) Notwithstanding paragraph
(b)(3)(i)(C)(1) of this section, with regard
to applying the percent limitation on the
dollar amount of the interest-only or
negative amortization loans, the
Secretary may adjust the limitation by
publishing a notice in the Federal
Register. The adjusted limitation may
not be lower than the percent limitation
specified in paragraph (b)(3)(i)(C)(1) of
this section or higher than the estimated
percentage of all outstanding Federal
student loan dollars that are interestonly or negative amortization loans.
(ii) The OOPB of PML in the
numerator of the ratio is the total
amount of OOPB for the loans described
in paragraph (b)(3)(i) of this section.
(4) Exclusions. For the most recently
completed FY, the OOPB of the
following loans is excluded from both
the numerator and the denominator of
the ratio:
(i) Loans that were in an in-school
deferment status during any part of the
FY.
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
(ii) Loans that were in a militaryrelated deferment status during any part
of the FY.
(iii) Loans that were discharged as a
result of the death of the borrower under
34 CFR 682.402(b) or 34 CFR 685.212(a).
(iv) Loans that were assigned or
transferred to the Secretary that are
being considered for discharge as a
result of the total and permanent
disability of the borrower, or were
discharged by the Secretary on that
basis under 34 CFR 682.402(c) or 34
CFR 685.212(b).
(c) Debt-to-earnings ratios. (1)
General. For each FY, the Secretary
calculates the debt-to-earnings ratios
using the following formulas:
(i) Discretionary income rate =
Annual loan payment/(Mean or Median
Annual Earnings ¥(1.5 × Poverty
Guideline)).
(ii) Earnings rate = Annual loan
payment/Mean or Median Annual
Earnings.
(2) Annual loan payment. The
Secretary determines the annual loan
payment for a program by—
(i) Calculating the median loan debt of
the program by—
(A) For each student who completed
the program during the 2YP, the 2YP–
R, the 4YP, or the 4YP–R, determining
the lesser of—
(1) The amount of loan debt the
student incurred, as determined under
paragraph (c)(4) of this section; or
(2) If tuition and fee information is
provided by the institution, the total
amount of tuition and fees the
institution charged the student for
enrollment in all programs at the
institution; and
(B) Using the lower amount obtained
under paragraph (c)(2)(i)(A) of this
section for each student in the
calculation of the median loan debt for
the program; and
(ii) Using the median loan debt for the
program and the current annual interest
rate on Federal Direct Unsubsidized
Loans to calculate the annual loan
payment based on—
(A) A 10-year repayment schedule for
a program that leads to an
undergraduate or post-baccalaureate
certificate or to an associate’s degree;
(B) A 15-year repayment schedule for
a program that leads to a bachelor’s or
master’s degree; or
(C) A 20-year repayment schedule for
a program that leads to a doctoral or
first-professional degree.
(3) Annual earnings. The Secretary
obtains from the Social Security
Administration (SSA), or another
Federal agency, the most currently
available mean and median annual
earnings of the students who completed
PO 00000
Frm 00066
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
the program during the 2YP, the 2YP–
R, the 4YP, or the 4YP–R. The Secretary
calculates the debt-to-earnings ratios
using the higher of the mean or median
annual earnings.
(4) Loan debt. In determining the loan
debt for a student, the Secretary—
(i) Includes FFEL and Direct loans
(except for parent PLUS or TEACH
Grant-related loans) owed by the
student for attendance in a program, and
as reported under § 668.6(a)(1)(i)(C)(2),
any private education loans or debt
obligations arising from institutional
financing plans;
(ii) Attributes all the loan debt
incurred by the student for attendance
in programs at the institution to the
highest credentialed program
subsequently completed by the student
at the institution; and
(iii) Does not include any loan debt
incurred by the student for attendance
in programs at other institutions.
However, the Secretary may include
loan debt incurred by the student for
attending other institutions if the
institution and the other institutions are
under common ownership or control, as
determined by the Secretary in
accordance with 34 CFR 600.31.
(5) Exclusions. For the FY the
Secretary calculates the debt-to-earnings
ratios for a program, a student in the
applicable two- or four-year period that
completed the program is excluded from
the ratio calculations if the Secretary
determines that—
(i) One or more of the student’s loans
were in a military-related deferment
status at any time during the calendar
year for which the Secretary obtains
earnings information under paragraph
(c)(3) of this section;
(ii) The student died;
(iii) One or more of the student’s
loans were assigned or transferred to the
Secretary and are being considered for
discharge as a result of the total and
permanent disability of the student, or
were discharged by the Secretary on that
basis under 34 CFR 682.402(c) or 34
CFR 685.212(b); or
(iv) The student was enrolled in any
other eligible program at the institution
or at another institution during the
calendar year for which the Secretary
obtains earnings information under
paragraph (c)(3) of this section.
(d) Small numbers. (1) The Secretary
calculates the debt measures for a
program with a small number of
borrowers or completers by using the
4YP or the 4YP–R, as applicable, if—
(i) For the loan repayment rate, the
corresponding 2YP or the 2YP–R
represents 30 or fewer borrowers whose
loans entered repayment after any of
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
those loans are excluded under
paragraph (b)(4) of this section; or
(ii) For the debt-to-earnings ratios, the
corresponding 2YP or the 2YP–R
represents 30 or fewer students who
completed the program after any of
those students are excluded under
paragraph (c)(5) of this section.
(2) In lieu of the minimum standards
in paragraph (a)(1) of this section, the
program satisfies the debt measures if—
(i)(A) The 4YP or the 4YP–R
represents, after any exclusions under
paragraph (b)(4) or (c)(5) of this section,
30 or fewer borrowers whose loans
entered repayment or 30 or fewer
students who completed the program; or
(B) SSA did not provide the mean and
median earnings for the program as
provided under paragraph (c)(3) of this
section; or
(ii) The median loan debt calculated
under paragraph (c)(2)(i) of this section
is zero.
(e) Draft debt measures and data
corrections. For each FY beginning with
FY 2012, the Secretary issues draft
results of the debt measures for each
program offered by an institution. As
provided under this paragraph, the
institution may correct the data used to
calculate the draft results before the
Secretary issues final debt measures
under paragraph (f) of this section.
(1) Pre-draft corrections process for
the debt-to-earnings ratios. (i) Before
issuing the draft results of the debt-toearnings ratios for a program, the
Secretary provides to an institution a
list of the students who will be included
in the applicable two- or four-year
period for calculating the ratios. No later
than 30 days after the date the Secretary
provides the list to the institution, in
accordance with procedures established
by the Secretary, the institution may—
(A) Provide evidence showing that a
student should be included on or
removed from the list; or
(B) Correct or update the identity
information provided for a student on
the list, such as name, social security
number, or date of birth.
(ii) After the 30 day correction period,
the institution may no longer challenge
whether students should be included on
the list or update the identity
information of those students.
(iii) If the information provided by the
institution under paragraph (e)(1)(i) of
this section is accurate, the updated
information is used to create a final list
of students that the Secretary submits to
SSA. The Secretary calculates the draft
debt-to-earnings ratios based on the
mean and median earnings provided by
SSA for the students on the final list.
(iv) An institution may not challenge
the accuracy of the mean or median
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
annual earnings the Secretary obtained
from SSA to calculate the draft debt-toearnings ratios for the program.
(2) Post-draft corrections process for
the debt measures. No later than 45 days
after the Secretary issues the draft
results of the debt-to-earnings ratios for
a program and no later than 45 days
after the Secretary issues the draft
results of the loan repayment rate for a
program, respectively, in accordance
with procedures established by the
Secretary, an institution—
(i) May challenge the accuracy of the
loan data for a borrower that was used
to calculate the draft loan repayment
rate, or the median loan debt for the
program that was used for the
numerator of the draft debt-to-earnings
ratios, by submitting evidence showing
that the borrower loan data or the
program median loan debt is inaccurate;
and
(ii) May challenge the accuracy of the
list of borrowers included in the
applicable two- or four-year period used
to calculate the draft loan repayment
rate by—
(A) Submitting evidence showing that
a borrower should be included on or
removed from the list; or
(B) Correcting or updating the identity
information provided for a borrower on
the list, such as name, social security
number, or date of birth.
(3) Recalculated results. (i) Debt
measures. In general, if the information
provided by an institution under
paragraph (e)(2) of this section is
accurate, the Secretary uses the
corrected information to recalculate the
debt measures for the program.
(ii) Debt-to-earnings ratios. For a
failing program, if SSA is unable to
include in its calculation of the mean
and median earnings for the program
one or more students on the list
finalized under paragraph (e)(1)(iii) of
this section, the Secretary adjusts the
median loan debt by removing the
highest loan debt associated with the
number of students SSA is unable to
include in its calculation. For example,
if SSA is unable to include three
students in its calculation, the Secretary
removes the loan debt for the same
number of students on the list that had
the highest loan debt. The Secretary
recalculates the debt-to-earnings ratios
for the program based on the adjusted
median loan debt.
(f) Final debt measures. The Secretary
notifies an institution of any draft
results that are not challenged, or are
recalculated or unsuccessfully
challenged under paragraph (e) of this
section. These results become the final
debt measures for the program.
PO 00000
Frm 00067
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
34451
(g) Alternative earnings. (1) General.
An institution may demonstrate that a
failing program, as defined under
paragraph (h) of this section, would
meet a debt-to-earnings standard by
recalculating the debt-to-earnings ratios
using the median loan debt for the
program as determined under paragraph
(c) of this section, and alternative
earnings from: a State-sponsored data
system; an institutional survey
conducted in accordance with NCES
standards; or, for FYs 2012, 2013, and
2014, the Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS).
(2) State data. For final debt-toearnings ratios calculated by the
Secretary for FY 2012 and any
subsequent FY, an institution may use
State data to recalculate those ratios for
a failing program only if the
institution—
(i) Obtains earnings data from Statesponsored data systems for more than
50 percent of the students in the
applicable two- or four-year period, or a
comparable two- or four-year period,
and that number of students is more
than 30;
(ii) Uses the actual, State-derived
mean or median earnings of the students
in the applicable two- or four-year
period under paragraph (g)(2)(i) of this
section; and
(iii) Demonstrates that it accurately
used the actual State-derived data to
recalculate the ratios.
(3) Survey data. For final debt-toearnings ratios calculated by the
Secretary for FY 2012 and any
subsequent FY, an institution may use
survey data to recalculate those ratios
for a failing program only if the
institution—
(i) Uses reported earnings obtained
from an institutional survey conducted
of the students in the applicable two- or
four-year period, or a comparable twoor four-year period, and the survey data
is for more than 30 students. The
institution may use the mean or median
annual earnings derived from the survey
data;
(ii) Submits a copy of the survey and
certifies that it was conducted in
accordance with the statistical standards
and procedures established by NCES
and available at https://nces.ed.gov; and
(iii) Submits an examination-level
attestation by an independent public
accountant or independent
governmental auditor, as appropriate,
that the survey was conducted in
accordance with the specified NCES
standards and procedures. The
attestation must be conducted in
accordance with the general, field work,
and reporting standards for attestation
engagements contained in the GAO’s
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
34452
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
Government Auditing Standards, and
with procedures for attestations
contained in guides developed by and
available from the Department of
Education’s Office of Inspector General.
(4) BLS data. For the final debt-toearnings ratios calculated by the
Secretary for FYs 2012, 2013, and 2014,
an institution may use BLS earnings
data to recalculate those ratios for a
failing program only if the institution—
(i) Identifies and provides
documentation of the occupation by
SOC code, or combination of SOC
codes, in which more than 50 percent of
the students in the 2YP or 4YP were
placed or found employment, and that
number of students is more than 30. The
institution may use placement records it
maintains to satisfy accrediting agency
or State requirements if those records
indicate the occupation in which the
student was placed. Otherwise, the
institution must submit employment
records or other documentation showing
the SOC code or codes in which the
students typically found employment;
(ii) Uses the most current BLS
earnings data for the identified SOC
code to calculate the debt-to-earnings
ratio. If more than one SOC code is
identified under paragraph (g)(4)(i) of
this section, the institution must
calculate the weighted average earnings
of those SOC codes based on BLS
employment data or institutional
placement data. In either case, the
institution must use BLS earnings at no
higher than the 25th percentile; and
(iii) Submits, upon request, all the
placement, employment, and other
records maintained by the institution for
the program under paragraph (g)(4)(i) of
this section that the institution
examined to determine whether those
records identified the SOC codes for the
students who were placed or found
employment.
(5) Alternative earnings process. (i) In
accordance with procedures established
by the Secretary, the institution must—
(A) Notify the Secretary of its intent
to use alternative earnings no later than
14 days after the date the institution is
notified of its final debt measures under
paragraph (f) of this section; and
(B) Submit all supporting
documentation related to recalculating
the debt-to-earnings ratios using
alternative earnings no later than 60
days after the date the institution is
notified of its final debt measures under
paragraph (f) of this section.
(ii) Pending the Secretary’s review of
the institution’s submission, the
institution is not subject to the
requirements arising from the program’s
failure to satisfy the debt measures,
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
provided the submission was complete,
timely, and accurate.
(iii)(A) If the Secretary denies the
institution’s submission, the Secretary
notifies the institution of the reasons for
the denial and the debt measures under
paragraph (f) of this section become the
final measures for the FY; or
(B) If the Secretary approves the
institution’s submission, the
recalculated debt-to-earnings ratios
become final for that FY.
(6) Dissemination. After the Secretary
calculates the final debt measures,
including the recalculated debt-toearnings ratios under this section, and
provides those debt measures to an
institution—
(i) In accordance with § 668.6(b)(1)(v),
the institution must disclose for each of
its programs, the final loan repayment
rate under paragraph (b) of this section,
and final debt-to-earnings ratio under
paragraph (c)(1)(ii) of this section; and
(ii) The Secretary may disseminate the
final debt measures and information
about, or related to, the debt measures
to the public in any time, manner, and
form, including publishing information
that will allow the public to ascertain
how well programs perform under the
debt measures and other appropriate
objective metrics.
(h) Failing program. Except for the
small numbers provisions under
paragraph (d) of this section, starting
with the debt measures calculated for
FY 2012, a program fails for a FY if its
final debt measures do not meet any of
the minimum standards in paragraph
(a)(1)(i) or (ii) of this section.
(i) Ineligible program. Except as
provided under paragraph (k) of this
section, starting with the debt measures
calculated for FY 2012, a failing
program becomes ineligible if it does
not meet any of the minimum standards
in paragraph (a)(1) of this section for
three out of the four most recent FYs.
The Secretary notifies the institution
that the program is ineligible on this
basis, and the institution may no longer
disburse title IV, HEA program funds to
students enrolled in that program except
as permitted using the procedures in
§ 668.26(d).
(j) Debt warnings. Whenever the
Secretary notifies an institution under
paragraph (h) of this section of a failing
program, the institution must warn in a
timely manner currently enrolled and
prospective students of the
consequences of that failure.
(1) First year failure. (i) For a failing
program that does not meet the
minimum standards in paragraph (a)(1)
of this section for a single FY, the
institution must provide to each
enrolled and prospective student a
PO 00000
Frm 00068
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
warning prepared in plain language and
presented in an easy to understand
format that—
(A) Explains the debt measures and
shows the amount by which the
program did not meet the minimum
standards; and
(B) Describes any actions the
institution plans to take to improve the
program’s performance under the debt
measures.
(ii) The warning must be delivered
orally or in writing directly to the
student in accordance with the
procedures established by the
institution. Delivering the debt warning
directly to the student includes
communicating with the student face-toface or telephonically, communicating
with the student along with other
affected students as part of a group
presentation, and sending the warning
to the student’s e-mail address.
(iii) If an institution opts to deliver
the warning orally to a student, it must
maintain documentation of how that
information was provided, including
any materials the institution used to
deliver that warning and any
documentation of the student’s presence
at the time of the warning.
(iv) An institution must continue to
provide the debt warning until it is
notified by the Secretary that the failing
program now satisfies one of the
minimum standards in paragraph (a)(1)
of this section.
(2) Second year failure. (i) For a
failing program that does not meet the
minimum standards in paragraph (a)(1)
of this section for two consecutive FYs
or for two out of the three most recently
completed FYs, the institution must
provide the debt warning under
paragraph (j)(1) of this section in writing
in an easy to understand format and
include in that warning—
(A) A plain language explanation of
the actions the institution plans to take
in response to the second failure. If the
institution plans to discontinue the
program, it must provide the timeline
for doing so, and the options available
to the student;
(B) A plain language explanation of
the risks associated with enrolling or
continuing in the program, including
the potential consequences for, and
options available to, the student if the
program becomes ineligible for title IV,
HEA program funds;
(C) A plain language explanation of
the resources available, including https://
www.collegenavigator.gov, that the
student may use to research other
educational options and compare
program costs; and
(D) A clear and conspicuous
statement that a student who enrolls or
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
continues in the program should expect
to have difficulty repaying his or her
student loans.
(ii) An institution must continue to
provide this warning to enrolled and
prospective students until the program
has met one of the minimum standards
for two of the last three FYs.
(3) Timely warnings. An institution
must provide the warnings described in
this paragraph to—
(i) An enrolled student, as soon as
administratively feasible but no later
than 30 days after the date the Secretary
notifies the institution that the program
failed; and
(ii) A prospective student at the time
the student first contacts the institution
requesting information about the
program. If the prospective student
intends to use title IV, HEA program
funds to attend the program—
(A) The institution may not enroll the
student until three days after the debt
warnings are first provided to the
student under this paragraph; and
(B) If more than 30 days pass from the
date the debt warnings are first provided
to the student under this paragraph and
the date the student seeks to enroll in
the program, the institution must
provide the debt warnings again and
may not enroll the student until three
days after the debt warnings are most
recently provided to the student under
this paragraph.
(4) Web site and promotional
materials. For the second-year debt
warning in paragraph (j)(2) of this
section, an institution must prominently
display the debt warning on the
program home page of its Web site and
include the debt warning in all
promotional materials it makes available
to prospective students. These debt
warnings may be provided in
conjunction with the disclosures
required under § 668.6(b)(2).
(5) Voluntarily discontinued failing
program. An institution that voluntarily
discontinues a failing program under
paragraph (l)(1) of this section, must
notify enrolled students at the same
time that it provides the written notice
to the Secretary that it relinquishes the
program’s title IV, HEA program
eligibility.
(6) Alternative language. To the extent
practicable, the institution must provide
alternatives to English-language
warnings for those students for whom
English is not their first language.
(k) Transition year. For programs that
become ineligible under paragraph (i) of
this section based on final debt
measures for FYs 2012, 2013, and 2014,
the Secretary caps the number of those
ineligible programs by—
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
(1) Sorting all programs by category of
institution (public, private nonprofit,
and proprietary) and then by loan
repayment rate, from the lowest rate to
the highest rate; and
(2) For each category of institution,
beginning with the ineligible program
with the lowest loan repayment rate,
identifying the ineligible programs that
account for a combined number of
students who completed the programs
during FY 2014 that do not exceed 5
percent of the total number of students
who completed programs in that
category. For example, the Secretary
does not designate as ineligible a
program, or two or more programs that
have the same loan repayment rate, if
the total number of students who
completed that program or programs
would exceed the 5 percent cap for an
institutional category.
(l) Restrictions for ineligible and
voluntarily discontinued failing
programs. (1) General. An ineligible
program, or a failing program that an
institution voluntarily discontinues,
remains ineligible until the institution
reestablishes the eligibility of that
program under the provisions in 34 CFR
600.20(d). For this purpose, an
institution voluntarily discontinues a
failing program on the date the
institution provides written notice to
the Secretary that it relinquishes the
title IV, HEA program eligibility of that
program.
(2) Periods of ineligibility.
(i) Voluntarily discontinued failing
programs. An institution may not seek
under 34 CFR 600.20(d) to reestablish
the eligibility of a failing program that
it voluntarily discontinued until—
(A) The end of the second FY
following the FY the program was
voluntarily discontinued if the
institution voluntarily discontinued the
program at any time after the program
is determined to be a failing program,
but no later than 90 days after the date
the Secretary notified the institution
that it must provide the second year
debt warnings under paragraph (j)(2) of
this section; or
(B) The end of the third FY following
the FY the program was voluntarily
discontinued if the institution
voluntarily discontinued the program
more than 90 days after the date the
Secretary notified the institution that it
must provide the second year debt
warnings under paragraph (j)(2) of this
section.
(ii) Ineligible programs. An institution
may not seek under 34 CFR 600.20(d) to
reestablish the eligibility of an ineligible
program, or to establish the eligibility of
a program that is substantially similar to
the ineligible program, until the end of
PO 00000
Frm 00069
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
34453
the third FY following the FY the
program became ineligible. A program is
substantially similar to the ineligible
program if it has the same credential
level and the same first four digits of the
CIP code as that of the ineligible
program.
(Approved by the Office of Management and
Budget under control number 1845–0109)
(Authority: 20 U.S.C. 1001(b), 1002(b) and
(c))
Note: The following appendices will not
appear in the Code of Federal Regulations.
Appendix A—Regulatory Impact
Analysis
Introduction
Institutions providing gainful employment
programs offer important opportunities to
Americans seeking to expand their skills and
earn postsecondary degrees and certificates.
In too many instances, however, programs
leave large numbers of students with
unaffordable debts and poor employment
prospects. The Department of Education (the
Department) has a particularly strong interest
in ensuring that institutions that are heavily
reliant on Federal funding promote
successful student academic and career
opportunities. When colleges earn profits,
they should do so in the process of helping
their students achieve success.
These final gainful employment
regulations include a number of changes
from the proposed regulations published on
July 26, 2010, reflecting the extensive public
input received by the Department. The
changes are intended to give failing programs
an opportunity to improve, rather than
immediately removing their eligibility, and to
identify accurately the worst-performing
gainful employment programs. However, the
final regulations require that all federally
funded gainful employment programs meet
minimal standards because students and
taxpayers have too much at stake.
This Regulatory Impact Analysis is divided
into nine sections. In Need for Regulatory
Action, the Department discusses the
problems of high debt and poor employment
prospects at some postsecondary programs.
This information complements the analysis
presented in the notice of proposed
rulemaking (NPRM) and the preamble to
these final regulations. This section also
provides an overview of the Department’s
efforts to improve the functioning of the
market for postsecondary training by
informing student choices, collecting new
information and setting minimum
performance standards.
The section titled Summary of Changes
From the NPRM summarizes the most
important revisions the Department made in
these final regulations. These changes were
informed by the Department’s consideration
of over 90,000 public comments. The changes
are intended to give failing programs an
opportunity to improve, target the worst
performing programs, improve the repayment
rate and debt-to-earnings measurements, and
improve the information available to
students. At the time the Department
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
34454
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
released the NPRM, it estimated that
approximately 5 percent of programs would
lose student aid eligibility. Because the final
regulations give programs an opportunity to
improve, only 2 percent of programs are
expected to lose eligibility (based upon the
revised model described in this document
and excluding programs that are too small to
measure accurately). Under the final
regulations, 8 percent of programs subject to
the debt measures would fail them at least
once.
Under NPRM Comment Review, the
Department presents its statistical analysis of
one claim heard frequently in the comments:
That the NPRM would have threatened
access to education for low-income students
and members of racial and ethnic minorities.
The Department does not believe that
enrolling large numbers of disadvantaged
students justifies leaving those students with
debts they cannot afford. We also present
data demonstrating that student body
characteristics explain a small amount of the
variation in performance on the debt
measures, and many programs perform well
even if a large percentage of their students
come from disadvantaged backgrounds—
suggesting that certain programs do a better
job than others of working with these
populations. Under this section, the
Department also discusses two economic
analyses submitted as comments on the
NPRM.
In Analysis of Final Regulations, the
Department first describes the data and
analytic tools it developed to estimate the
impact of these regulations. It then presents
the estimated impact on programs, students,
and revenues under two sets of assumptions.
The Discussion of Costs and Benefits
section considers the implications of these
estimates for students, businesses, the
Federal Government, and State and local
governments. In some cases, these costs and
benefits are difficult to quantify. The benefits
of the final regulations for students that are
discussed in this section include:
• Improved market information and
development of measures linking programs to
labor market outcomes;
• Improved retention, graduation and
default rates; and
• Better return on money spent on
education.
The overall costs of the rule fall into three
categories: An increase in educational
expenses when students transfer from failing
programs to succeeding programs, paperwork
costs associated with complying with the
regulations, and other compliance costs that
may be incurred by institutions as they
attempt to improve their programs to avoid
losing their eligibility for title iv Higher
Education Act funds.
We also looked at distributional issues
associated with the impact of this regulation.
For institutions, the impact of the final
regulations is mixed. Institutions with failing
programs, including programs that lose
eligibility, are likely to see lower revenues.
On the other hand, institutions with highperforming programs are likely to see
growing enrollment and revenue and to
benefit from additional market information
that permits institutions to demonstrate the
value of their programs.
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
The impact of the regulations on Federal,
State, and local tax revenue is difficult to
estimate reliably. Tax revenues could fall to
the extent that companies that provide
postsecondary education and training pay
less in corporate taxes and lay off employees
and fewer students earn credentials. On the
other hand, tax revenues could rise due to
growth in programs with higher completion
rates that offer credentials that carry greater
economic benefits. Overall, however, as
discussed further in the Net Budget Impacts
section, we estimate that the final regulations
will save the Federal Government between
$23 million and $51 million on an
annualized basis.
Under Paperwork Burden Costs, the
Department estimates the paperwork burden
of these regulations on institutions and
students.
Under Net Budget Impacts, the Department
presents its estimate that the final regulations
will save the Federal Government between
$23 million and $51 million per year. The
largest factor in these savings is a reduced
expenditure on Pell Grants.
The Alternatives Considered section
describes different approaches for defining
‘‘gainful employment’’ proposed by
commenters. Some of these approaches,
including graduation and placement rates, a
higher repayment rate threshold, an index,
alternative debt measures, and default rates,
were previously discussed by the Department
in the negotiated rulemaking process, the
NPRM, or both.
Finally, the Final Regulatory Flexibility
Analysis considers issues relevant to small
businesses and nonprofit institutions.
Pursuant to the terms of the Executive
Order 12866, issued on September 30, 1993,
we have determined that this regulatory
action will have an annual effect on the
economy of more than $100 million.
Notwithstanding this determination, we have
assessed the potential costs and benefits—
both quantitative and qualitative—of this
regulatory action. The agency believes that
the benefits justify the costs.
The Department has also reviewed these
regulations pursuant to Executive Order
13563, issued on January 18, 2011. Executive
Order 13563 is supplemental to and
explicitly reaffirms the principles, structures,
and definitions governing regulatory review
established in Executive Order 12866. To the
extent permitted by law, agencies are
required by Executive Order 13563 to: (1)
Propose or adopt regulations only upon a
reasoned determination that their benefits
justify their costs (recognizing that some
benefits and costs are difficult to quantify);
(2) tailor their regulations to impose the least
burden on society, consistent with obtaining
regulatory objectives, taking into account,
among other things, and to the extent
practicable, the costs of cumulative
regulations; (3) select, in choosing among
alternative regulatory approaches, those
approaches that maximize net benefits
(including potential economic,
environmental, public health and safety, and
other advantages; distributive impacts; and
equity); (4) the extent feasible, specify
performance objectives, rather than
specifying the behavior or manner of
PO 00000
Frm 00070
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
compliance that regulated entities must
adopt; and (5) identify and assess available
alternatives to direct regulation, including
providing economic incentives to encourage
the desired behavior, such as user fees or
marketable permits, or providing information
upon which choices can be made by the
public.
We emphasize as well that Executive Order
13563 requires agencies ‘‘to use the best
available techniques to quantify anticipated
present and future benefits and costs as
accurately as possible.’’ In its February 2,
2011, memorandum
(M–11–10) on Executive Order 13563, the
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
within the Office of Management and Budget
emphasized that such techniques may
include ‘‘identifying changing future
compliance costs that might result from
technological innovation or anticipated
behavioral changes.’’
We are issuing these regulations only upon
a reasoned determination that their benefits
justify their costs and that we selected, in
choosing among alternative regulatory
approaches, those approaches that maximize
net benefits. Based on the analysis below, the
Department believes that these final
regulations are consistent with the principles
in Executive Order 13563.
I. Need for Regulatory Action
Executive Order 12866 emphasizes that
‘‘Federal agencies should promulgate only
such regulations as are required by law, are
necessary to interpret the law, or are made
necessary by compelling public need, such as
material failures of private markets to protect
or improve the health and safety of the
public, the environment, or the well-being of
the American people.’’ In this case, there is
indeed a compelling public need for
regulation. The Department’s goal in
regulating is to ensure that programs eligible
for funding under title IV of the Higher
Education Act of 1965, as amended (HEA),
are preparing students for gainful
employment, students seeking postsecondary
training are not left with unaffordable debts
and poor employment prospects, and the
Federal investment of student aid dollars is
well spent. Existing Federal law attempts to
meet these aims through the required
disclosure by institutions of information to
prospective and current students on a range
of issues including: cost of attendance, net
price, graduation rates, and student financial
aid (HEA Sec. 485 and Sec. 132).
Nonetheless, there is evidence that students
have significant misperceptions about the
economic returns of pursuing a college
education, tending to significantly
overestimate their expected earnings as a
college graduate.1 Students and their families
also lack access to critical information
needed to navigate a nuanced higher
education marketplace in order to make more
optimal choices about where to pursue a
postsecondary education.2 Additionally,
1 Christopher Avery and Thomas Kane, ‘‘Student
Perceptions of College Opportunities,’’ https://
www.nber.org/chapters/c10104.pdf.
2 C. Anthony Broh and Dana Ansel, ‘‘Planning for
College: A Consumer Approach to the Higher
Education Marketplace,’’ Mass INC, February 2010,
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
limitations exist on the availability of
comparison indicators for educational quality
that help families balance the increased risks
associated with financing college.
Though the HEA does not enumerate
individual educational quality indicators that
students and families would need in order to
properly assess the value of college, it does
stipulate that vocationally oriented programs
must prepare students for ‘‘gainful
employment in a recognized occupation.’’
While institutions in all sectors offer
programs that are subject to this requirement,
for-profit institutions represent a
disproportionately large share of programs
that must meet this standard, as it appears in
the HEA. According to the Department’s
analysis of data from the Integrated
Postsecondary Education Data System
(IPEDS), for-profit institutions represent 7
percent of higher education programs
nationally and 12 percent of students
enrolled in postsecondary education. But forprofit institutions account for 46 percent of
students enrolled in programs that would be
subject to the final debt measures and for 38
percent of programs that would be subject to
the final debt measures. Moreover, data
collected by the Department and other
organizations, which are detailed below,
highlight a number of issues that suggest
many programs at for-profit institutions are
not providing students with training leading
to gainful employment in a recognized
occupation, leaving them with debts they
cannot afford and poor employment
prospects. These issues include: Greater
relative costs; high default rates that lead to
significantly deleterious effects on borrowers;
low completion and retention rates; and
high-pressure sales and marketing tactics and
a lack of access to information that deprive
potential students of the opportunity to make
thoughtful decisions.
Though for-profit institutions are a diverse,
innovative, and fast-growing group of
institutions that typically offer flexible
course schedules and online programs that
serve nontraditional students, they generally
charge higher tuitions than their public and
private nonprofit counterparts. According to
the College Board’s 2010 Trends in College
Pricing report, students attending for-profit
institutions faced an average tuition and fee
charge of $13,935—more than $6,300 higher
than the average cost of tuition and fees at
a public 4-year institution and over five times
the cost of a public 2-year institution.3 And
even though for-profit institutions do not
have to contend with the loss of tax revenue
and growing budget deficits that have caused
States to reduce support for public higher
education and raise tuition, the average cost
to attend a for-profit institution increased by
$524 and $124 more than public 2- and 4https://www.massinc.org/∼/media/Files/
Mass%20Inc/Research/
Executive%20Summary%20PDF%20files/
report_ES.ashx.
3 College Board, ‘‘Tuition and Fee and Room and
Board Charges, 2010–11,’’ available at https://trends.
collegeboard.org/college_pricing/report_findings/
indicator/Tuition_and_Fee_and_Room_and_Board_
Charges_2010_11.
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
year institutions, respectively, from 2009–10
to 2010–11.
Not only do students attending for-profit
institutions face higher tuition and fee
charges, but on average they receive less
grant assistance to lower their expenses.
According to an analysis of the 2007–08
National Postsecondary Student Aid Study
(NPSAS 2008) conducted by the National
Center for Education Statistics (NCES),
students attending for-profit institutions
received on average just $3,200 in total grant
aid, which includes Federal, State, local,
institutional, and all other sources.4 By
contrast, students at 4-year public and
private, nonprofit institutions on average
received $5,200 and $10,200, respectively.
As a result of higher tuition and lower
grant assistance, students are significantly
more likely to assume debt in order to attend
a for-profit institution than any other type of
college or university. According to NPSAS,
91.6 percent of students at for-profit
institutions borrowed to finance their
education in 2007–08. By contrast, the sector
with the next highest borrowing rate was at
4-year private nonprofit institutions, where
58.9 percent of students borrowed. At public
2- and 4-year institutions just 13.2 percent
and 46.2 percent, respectively, of students
borrowed. Not only do students at for-profit
institutions borrow at a greater rate than their
peers, on average, the amount they borrow is
greater than all but one sector. Students at
for-profit institutions on average borrowed
$8,100 compared to $6,600 for students at
public 4-year institutions and $4,100 for
students at public 2-year institutions. That
said, students attending private nonprofit 4year institutions did borrow $1,000 more on
average, but this fails to capture the fact that
the most popular programs at proprietary
institutions are typically closer in length to
those offered at community colleges, rather
than at 4-year universities.
Burdened with higher borrowing rates and
larger debt levels, borrowers at for-profit
institutions have worse repayment outcomes
than their peers at other institutions. For the
2008 cohort year, 46 percent of the student
loans (weighted in dollars) that are borrowed
by students at 2-year for-profit institutions
are expected to default over the life of the
loan, compared to 16 percent across all types
of institutions. Similarly, the Department’s
cohort default rate shows that for-profit
institutions account for a disproportionate
share of defaults. In the 2008 cohort, students
at for-profit institutions represented just 12
percent of students, but they accounted for
26 percent of borrowers and over 46 percent
of students who defaulted within three years
of leaving school.5 In fact, for-profit
institutions produced a larger share of
students who defaulted on their loans than
the entire public sector of higher education
combined.
Former students who cannot afford to
repay their loans face very serious
4 National Center for Education Statistics, ‘‘Trends
in Student Financing of Undergraduate Education:
Selected Years, 1995–96 to 2007–08,’’ available at
https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2011/2011218.pdf, Page 17.
5 Department analysis of unduplicated headcount
data from IPEDS and three-year cohort default rate
information from the Office of Federal Student Aid.
PO 00000
Frm 00071
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
34455
challenges. Discharging Federal student loans
in bankruptcy is very rare, and the common
consequences of default include large fees
and interest charges; struggles to rent or buy
a home, buy a car, or get a job; aggressive
actions by collection agencies, including
lawsuits and garnishment of wages; and the
loss of tax refunds and even Social Security
benefits. Collection costs can add 25 percent
to the outstanding loan balance, borrowers
are no longer entitled to any deferments or
forbearances, and students may be ineligible
for any additional student aid until they have
reestablished a good repayment history.
Retention and graduation rates vary
considerably among institutions and types of
institutions. According to NPSAS data, just
27.8 percent of students at for-profit
institutions who entered a bachelor’s degree
program in the 2003–04 academic year
attained that credential by 2009; the figures
at public and private nonprofit institutions
were 62.3 percent and 69.0 percent,
respectively.6 Though students entering
associate’s degree programs at for-profit
institutions earned that credential at a rate
slightly above their peers at public sector
institutions, even then, for every student who
began at an associate’s degree program at a
for-profit institution and earned that
credential, there were almost two others who
had left with no degree to show for their
time. As discussed more fully under the
Discussion of Costs and Benefits heading,
institutions with low repayment rates also
have lower retention and graduation rates
and higher default rates. These results are not
surprising, as multiple research studies have
demonstrated that program completion is one
of the most predictive factors of whether or
not a student will default on his or her
loans.7 This finding suggests that students
who enrolled but did not graduate have
lower income prospects than those who do.
There are also a number of studies that have
also found that borrowers with lower
incomes are more likely to default than those
with higher incomes.8
There is also evidence that for-profit
institutions have engaged in high-pressure or
deceptive sales tactics. In recent years,
evidence surfaced about some for-profit
institutions illegally paying their
representatives bonuses or commissions
based upon the number of students they
recruit or enroll. The Government
Accountability Office and other investigators
have also found evidence of high-pressure
6 Analysis of NPSAS data using the PowerStats
data analysis tool at https://nces.ed.gov/datalab/
powerstats/output.aspx.
7 For a review of research on the connection
between program completion and default, see Jacob
P.K. Gross, Osman Cekic, Don Hossler, and Nick
Hillman, ‘‘What Matters in Student Loan Default: A
Review of the Research Literature,’’ Journal of
Student Aid, Volume 39, No. 1, https://www.
nasfaa.org/WorkArea/linkit.aspx?LinkIdentifier=
id&ItemID=1312, Page 7.
8 Lance Lochner & Alexander Monge-Naranjo,
Education and Default Incentives with Government
Student Loan Programs, 2002; Robin McMillion,
‘‘Student Loan Default Literature Review,’’ Texas
Guaranty Agency, 2004.
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
34456
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
and deceptive recruiting practices at forprofit institutions.9
Students enrolling in a postsecondary
program often have limited information, little
or no experience choosing among
postsecondary programs, and asymmetric
information relative to the educational
institution. Studies indicate that these gaps
in information sometimes lead to students
and their families making suboptimal choices
in their educational pursuits, including what
institution to attend, how to weigh the costs
and benefits of attending, and how to finance
their postsecondary education.10 The
complexity of the choice structure falls short
of allowing students and their families to
appropriately weigh the costs and benefits of
their educational decisions. In this
environment, straightforward measures of a
student’s educational pursuits in relation to
their educational outcomes would promote
more optimal choices.
Executive Order 13563, Section 4, notes
that ‘‘Where relevant, feasible, and consistent
with regulatory objectives, and to the extent
permitted by law, each agency shall identify
and consider regulatory approaches that
reduce burdens and maintain flexibility and
freedom of choice for the public. These
approaches include warnings, appropriate
default rules, and disclosure requirements as
well as provision of information to the public
in a form that is clear and intelligible.’’
Consistent with this section of the Executive
Order the Department is enhancing the
information available to prospective and
enrolled students through both these final
regulations and earlier regulations released
last year. The Department began with efforts
to help students make good choices,
including disclosure requirements, the
provision of information, and warnings. On
October 29, 2010, the Department published
regulations (75 FR 66832) (Program Integrity
Issues final regulations) requiring institutions
with programs that prepare students for
gainful employment in a recognized
occupation to disclose key performance
information on their Web site and in
promotional materials to prospective
students. The required elements include the
on-time completion rate, placement rate,
median loan debt, program cost, and other
information. The Department is developing a
disclosure form with the benefit of public
comment.
In addition, subject to § 668.7(g)(6) as
established by these regulations, the
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
9 U.S. Government Accountability Office, ‘‘ForProfit Colleges: Undercover Testing Finds Colleges
Encouraged Fraud and Engaged in Deceptive and
Questionable Marketing Practices,’’ GAO–10–948T,
available at https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10948T.
10 Bridget Terry Long, ‘‘Grading Higher
Education,’’ Center for American Progress,
December 2010, https://www.americanprogress.org/
issues/2010/12/pdf/longpaper.pdf.
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
Secretary may disseminate the final debt
measures calculated under these regulations
at any time and in any manner and form. The
information provided in the repayment rate,
graduate earnings, and the debt-to-earnings
ratio is currently unavailable to most
students from any source. The Department is
considering steps to provide these metrics
and other key indicators to facilitate access
to the information and the comparison of
programs.
Another strategy to improve decisionmaking is the requirement that failing
programs provide debt warnings to
prospective and enrolled students under
§ 668.7(j) of these final regulations. After a
program fails the minimum standards one
time, the institution must alert prospective
and enrolled students that the program has
failed, explain the debt measures, show the
amount by which the program did not meet
the minimum standards, and describe any
steps the institution plans to take to improve
the program’s performance under the debt
measures. After a program fails the minimum
standards in two consecutive fiscal years
(FY) or in two of the three most recent FYs—
and thus is one year away from a potential
loss of eligibility—the institution must
provide prospective and enrolled students
with the same information as well as its
plans in response to the second failure,
including any plans to discontinue the
program, the risks for students if the program
loses title IV, HEA eligibility, the resources
available to students to research other
educational options, and a clear and
conspicuous statement that a student who
enrolls or continues to enroll in the program
should expect to have difficulty repaying his
or her student loans.
Despite the efforts described above, the
Department recognizes that information
alone is insufficient to ensure that students
are well served by their educational
programs. Exacerbating these challenges is a
failure to align institutional incentives with
student success because the amount of aid
students receive is based upon their
enrollment. While loan defaults cost students
and taxpayers, generally there are no
consequences for institutions (except in the
rare instances where at least 25 percent of
their students default within two years of
entering repayment for three consecutive
years).11 Recognizing students’ challenges in
choosing among available programs and the
poor alignment of incentives, the Department
is setting minimum performance standards
for gainful employment programs receiving
Federal funding.
To provide an additional layer of
protection for students and taxpayers and
ensure that institutions consider the
11 In 2014, the two-year cohort default rate will
be replaced with a three-year cohort default rate.
PO 00000
Frm 00072
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
affordability of the loans provided to their
students, the Department is defining a set of
measures that identifies the lowest
performing programs in terms of the ability
of students to repay their student loan debt.
The repayment rate threshold and the debtto-earnings ratios set minimum standards
and are designed to allow programs an
opportunity to improve before losing title IV,
HEA eligibility.
II. Summary of Changes From the NPRM
Definition of a Program
In response to uncertainty concerning the
definition of a program, the Department has
clarified that a program would be defined by
the combination of the six-digit Office of
Postsecondary Education ID (OPEID), sixdigit Classification of Instructional Programs
(CIP) code, and credential level. A program
offered at multiple locations reporting under
the same six-digit OPEID would be evaluated
as one program, and the credential levels to
be considered are undergraduate certificate,
associate’s degree, bachelor’s degree, postbaccalaureate certificate, master’s degree,
doctoral degree, and first-professional degree.
To estimate the number of programs for
this analysis, the Department identified the
six-digit CIP code and credential
combinations for which awards were granted
at each institution in the IPEDS data set
generated for the final regulations. For the
approximately 92 institutions that did not
have program information available, the
average number of regulated programs per
institution for their sector was applied.
Small Numbers Provision
The small numbers provision finalized in
§ 668.7(d) requires at least 30 completers in
the evaluation pool for the debt-to-earnings
measure and at least 30 borrowers entering
repayment in the evaluation period for
calculation of the repayment rate in order to
determine whether a program satisfies the
debt measures. Under the NPRM, the
treatment of programs with a small number
of completers was not fully determined.
Under the final regulations, programs that do
not meet the minimum threshold of 30
completers in the 2YP or the 2YP–R will be
evaluated for a four-year period consisting of
years three to six in repayment (4YP) or years
six to nine in repayment (4YP–R). Programs
that do not meet the 30 completer or
borrower requirement in the 4YP or 4YP–R
will not be evaluated for ineligibility.
Ultimately, if there are insufficient
observations, we will not assess an
institution’s performance against the debt
measures. Table 1 summarizes the estimated
number of total and regulated programs by
sector and the application of the small
numbers provision.
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
Program Eligibility for Continued Funding
Under § 668.7(i), a failing program becomes
ineligible after failing the minimum
standards for three out of the last four most
recently completed FYs—a change from the
proposed regulations in which a program
became ineligible after failing the minimum
standards in one year. Whenever that occurs,
the Department notifies the institution that
the program is ineligible and that the
institution may no longer disburse title IV,
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
HEA program funds to students enrolled in
or attending that program for any payment
period that begins after the date of the
Department’s notice, except as permitted
using the procedures in 34 CFR 668.26(d).
This is a change from the proposed
regulations, which allowed institutions to
disburse title IV, HEA program funds to
students already enrolled in programs for an
additional year beyond the payment period
in which the notice was received.
Repayment Rate Thresholds
Instead of the three-tiered approach
proposed in the NPRM that would have
established a restricted zone for programs
with repayment rates of at least 35 percent
but less than 45 percent, the regulations
establish a single, 35 percent repayment rate
threshold for eligibility.
Repayment Rate Evaluated Cohorts
The repayment rate calculated for the
NPRM evaluated borrowers one to four years
into repayment. For most programs, the final
regulations will evaluate borrowers three to
four years into repayment, so the rate
calculated with FY 2012 data and released in
2013 will be based on borrowers who entered
repayment in FYs 2008 and 2009. For a
program whose students are required to
complete a medical or dental internship or
residency, a two-year period is the sixth and
PO 00000
Frm 00073
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
seventh FYs (2YP–R) prior to the most
recently completed FY for which the
repayment rates are calculated. For example,
if the most recently completed FY is 2012,
the 2YP–R is FYs 2005 and 2006. Finally, to
provide an alternative for institutions that
take immediate steps to improve a program’s
loan repayment rate, we will calculate the
repayment rate based on a two-year period
(2YP–A) that includes loans for borrowers
who entered repayment during the first and
second FYs prior to the current FY. These
programs will be evaluated based on the
repayment rate from the 2YP or 2YP–A,
whichever is higher.
Repayment Rate Balance Comparison
The total balance (principal plus interest)
of a borrower’s loans associated with a
program will be evaluated for the borrower’s
inclusion in the numerator of the repayment
rate calculation instead of the approach
described in the NPRM of using only the
principal balance.
Borrowers in Alternative Repayment Plans
The final regulations limit the dollar
amount of loans in negative amortization or
for which the borrower is paying accrued
interest only that will be included in the
numerator as Original Outstanding Principal
Balance (OOPB) of Payments-Made Loans
(PML) to no more than 3 percent of the total
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
ER13JN11.023
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
This small numbers provision is designed
to address the greater risk of statistical
fluctuation in measuring the performance of
programs with small numbers of borrowers or
completers, the reduced risk to students or
taxpayers posed by these programs, and the
need to protect the privacy of individual
student borrowers. While the 30 completer
and borrower standards remove a number of
programs from possible ineligibility under
the debt measures, they reduce the chance
that the performance of one or two borrowers
could result in large variability in a
program’s performance on the debt measures
from year to year. Additionally, while the
percentage of programs affected by the small
numbers provision is high, especially at 4year institutions, the remaining regulated
programs still represent approximately 92
percent of all students enrolled in gainful
employment programs.
34457
34458
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
amount of OOPB in the denominator of the
ratio, instead of the approach described in
the NPRM. For the loans associated with a
particular program at an institution for which
the Department has actual data on borrower
repayment plans and scheduled payment
amounts, that data will be used to calculate
the amount to be included in the OOPB of
PML. For programs at institutions for which
the Department does not yet have sufficient
actual institutional data on a program’s
borrowers because the loans are not held and
serviced by the Department, 3 percent of the
OOPB of PML will be included in the
numerator. The Department may increase the
3 percent limitation through a notice
published in the Federal Register if
borrowers increase their reliance on interestonly or negative amortization loans over
time, except that the limitation may not
exceed the estimated percent of all
outstanding Federal student loan dollars that
are interest-only or negative amortization
loans.
Consolidation Loans of Students at PostBaccalaureate Programs
When calculating the repayment rate for
post-baccalaureate programs, we will
consider a borrower with a consolidation
loan to be successfully repaying his or her
loans if the outstanding balance does not
increase over the course of the most recently
completed FY.
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
Data Corrections for Repayment Rates
No later than 45 days after the Secretary
issues the draft loan repayment rate for a
program, in accordance with procedures
established by the Secretary, an institution
may challenge the accuracy of the loan data
for a borrower that was used to calculate the
draft loan repayment rate by submitting
evidence showing that the borrower loan data
is inaccurate. An institution may also
challenge the accuracy of the list of
borrowers included in the applicable two- or
four-year period used to calculate the draft
loan prepayment rate by submitting evidence
showing that a borrower should be included
on or removed from the list or correcting or
updating the identity information provided
for a borrower on the list, such as name,
Social Security Number, or date of birth. If
the information provided by the institution
through the data correction process is
accurate, the Secretary will use the corrected
information to recalculate the repayment rate
for the program. The Secretary notifies an
institution of any draft results that are not
challenged, are recalculated, or are
unsuccessfully challenged under the data
correction process described above. These
results become the final repayment rates for
the program.
Debt-to-Earnings Ratios Evaluated Cohorts
The debt-to-earnings ratios will now be
calculated based on program completers
three to four years after completion. For
example, if the most recently completed FY
is 2012, the 2YP is FYs 2008 and 2009. For
a program whose students are required to
complete a medical or dental internship or
residency, a two-year period is the sixth and
seventh FYs (2YP–R) prior to the most
recently completed FY for which the debt
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
measures are calculated. For example, if the
most recently completed FY is 2012, the
2YP–R is FYs 2005 and 2006.
Payment Amortization
Under the proposed regulations, a 10-year
amortization schedule would be used to
calculate the payment associated with the
program’s median debt. Under the final
regulations, the amortization schedule will
be 10 years for certificates and associate’s
degrees, 15 years for bachelor’s and master’s
degrees, and 20 years for first-professional
and doctoral degrees.
Mean or Median Earnings
Both measures will be obtained for
programs’ pools of completers and the higher
figure will be used in evaluation of the
program.
Debt Limited to Tuition and Fees
Institutions will have the option to submit
the tuition and fees charged for each student
in a gainful employment program. Student
debt included in the calculation of the
program’s median debt will be limited to that
used to pay tuition and fees.
Data Corrections and Challenges for Debt-toEarnings Ratios
Before issuing the draft results of the debtto-earnings ratios for a program, the Secretary
provides a list to an institution of the
students that will be included in the
applicable two- or four-year period for
calculating the ratios. No later than 30 days
after the date the Secretary provides the list
to the institution, in accordance with
procedures established by the Secretary, the
institution may provide evidence showing
that a student should be included on or
removed from the list, or correct or update
the identity information provided for a
student on the list, such as name, Social
Security Number, or date of birth. After the
30-day correction period, the institution may
no longer challenge the accuracy of the
students included on the list or update the
identity information of those students. If the
updated information is accurate, it is used to
create a final list of students that the
Secretary submits to SSA. The Secretary
calculates the draft debt-to-earnings ratios
based on the mean and median earnings
provided by SSA for the students on the final
list.
No later than 45 days after the draft debtto-earnings results have been issued, an
institution may challenge the accuracy of the
median loan debt for the program that was
used for the numerator of the draft debt-toearnings ratios by submitting evidence
showing the program’s median loan debt is
inaccurate. An institution may not challenge
the accuracy of the mean or median annual
earnings the Secretary obtained from SSA to
calculate the draft debt-to-earnings ratios for
the program. This limitation is a practical
implication of using privacy-protected SSA
data, as the Department will not receive
individual student earnings data. But
institutions will have the ability to challenge
the list of students sent over to SSA for
earnings information and may also use
alternative reliable earnings information,
including use of state data, survey data, or,
PO 00000
Frm 00074
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
during a transition period, Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS) data so long as the measures
chosen meet the requirements outlined in
§ 668.7(g).
In general, the Secretary uses the corrected
information obtained through the challenges
to the draft results to recalculate the debt-toearnings ratios for the program. For a failing
program, if SSA is unable to include in its
calculation of the mean and median earnings
for the program one or more students on the
list finalized under the 30-day data
correction process, the Secretary adjusts the
median loan debt by removing the highest
loan debt associated with the corresponding
number of students on the list. For example,
if SSA is unable to include three students in
its calculations, the Secretary removes the
loan debt for the same number of students on
the list that had the highest loan debt. The
Secretary recalculates the debt-to-earnings
ratios for the program based on the adjusted
median loan debt.
The Secretary notifies an institution of any
draft results that are not challenged, are
recalculated, or are unsuccessfully
challenged under the challenge process
described above. These results become the
final debt-to-earnings ratios for the program.
Proprietary Institutions Under Common
Ownership or Control
Loan debt does not include any loan debt
incurred by the student for attendance in
programs at other institutions, except if the
current institution and the other institutions
share common ownership or control. For
these final regulations, we clarify that the
exception is limited to proprietary
institutions, which have different ownership
structures than either private nonprofit
institutions or public institutions. We
generally do not include educational loan
debt from institutions students previously
attended because those students made
individual decisions to enroll at other
institutions where they completed a program.
Companies that own more than one
institution offering similar programs might
have an incentive under these regulations to
shift students between those institutions to
shield some portion of the educational loan
debt from the debt included in the debt
measures under these final regulations. This
provision will negate that incentive by
permitting the Department to include debt
from institutions under common ownership
in the analysis. These regulations provide
that a determination of common ownership
or control will be made using the definitions
and concepts that the Department routinely
uses to review changes of ownership,
financial responsibility determinations, and
identifying past performance liabilities at
institutions.
Summary of Results for the Final Regulations
Table 2 represents estimated changes to the
number of ineligible programs and the
number of students in ineligible programs.
Under the final regulations, we allow
institutions an opportunity to improve after
initially failing both measures. As a result,
when combined with the small numbers
provision, results in approximately 8 percent
of programs initially failing both measures,
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
34459
of those who dropped out or transferred the
first two times the program failed the debt
measures.
earn less than their white and male
counterparts. They argued that access would
be negatively affected because the proposed
thresholds would act as a disincentive to
admitting disadvantaged students. Other
commenters acknowledged that other factors
contribute to institutions’ repayment rate
performance, but urged the Department to
review the effect of the regulations on lowincome, first-generation, and minority
students.
The Department does not believe that
enrolling large numbers of students from
disadvantaged backgrounds legitimizes
leaving those students with unaffordable
debts and poor employment prospects. As
described in the preamble, the debt measures
identify programs where (1) typical student
debt service exceeds recommended levels by
more than 50 percent, and (2) fewer than 35
percent of students are paying down the
balance of their loans (with consideration
given to the variation in amounts borrowed).
Programs that help disadvantaged students
earn credentials and well-paying jobs are
performing a valuable service, but programs
that routinely leave their students with debts
they cannot afford to repay are not.
Moreover, many programs across the
country succeed in serving students from the
most challenging backgrounds. As explained
in further detail below, student body
characteristics explain a small share of the
variation in repayment rates among
institutions. Even among programs serving
the highest proportions of disadvantaged
students, many have repayment rates above
35 percent. As a result, all students have
choices among many programs that are
capable of serving them well. The following
paragraphs provide greater detail on the
interaction between demographics and
institutions’ repayment rates and debt-toearnings ratios.
Student Demographics
Several commenters discussed the
potential effect of the regulations on lowincome, minority, female, and firstgeneration students. As indicated in the
NPRM and the submitted comments, the
average share of Pell Grant recipients and
minority students is higher in the for-profit
sector than the public and private nonprofit
sectors. Many supporters of the regulations
point to the high concentration of
disadvantaged students in gainful
employment programs in certain sectors as a
reason the regulations are needed to protect
disadvantaged students. Conversely, many
opponents of the regulations believe access to
education for disadvantaged students would
be threatened by the loss of eligibility of
programs serving them.
Several commenters observed a link
between the demographics of an institution’s
student population and either its repayment
rate or debt-to-earnings ratios. Some
commenters believed that the debt measures
are primarily determined by the
characteristics of a program’s student body,
rather than the program’s performance.
Others said the debt-to-earnings ratio
penalizes programs serving disadvantaged
students because these individuals—
particularly minority and female students—
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
PO 00000
Frm 00075
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
Repayment Rates and Demographics
Some commenters described very high
correlations between student body
demographics and repayment rates. In
particular, several commenters cited one
analysis of the NPRM, which suggested that
the repayment rate specified in the NPRM
was highly correlated with the percentage of
students receiving Pell Grants.
This analysis, which used a regression
model based on the repayment rate specified
in the NPRM, demonstrated a nearly linear
relationship between the make-up of an
institution’s student body and its repayment
rate. However, because this analysis reduces
the data for thousands of institutions into
quintiles, it failed to capture the amount of
variation in repayment rates among
institutions serving a similar group of
students. As described below, when this
variation is taken into account, the data
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
ER13JN11.024
in those ineligible programs. The information
presented below for the final regulations
represents the results at the end of a four-year
period and the percent of students in
ineligible programs described below are net
III. NPRM Comment Review
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
but not losing Title IV, HEA eligibility.
Ultimately, under the final regulations we
estimate that approximately 2 percent of
programs will be deemed ineligible and
approximately 1.3 percent of students will be
34460
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
35 percent, including many serving large
numbers of Pell Grant recipients.
Institutional Characteristics—Resources
year public institutions) to explaining more
than half of the potential variance in
repayment rates (i.e., 72 percent for 4-year
public institutions; 57 percent for 2-year
nonprofit institutions; and 56 percent for 4year nonprofit institutions). The modeling is
summarized below. For each sector, three
facets of the modeling is detailed: (1)
Whether the full model was statistically
significant overall and the proportion of
variance in repayment rate the model could
explain; (2) the proportion of variance
explained by the percent of an institution’s
student body receiving Pell Grants when that
variable was the sole predictor in the model;
and (3) the proportion of variance explained
by the percent of an institution’s student
body identified as a racial/ethnic minority,
when that variable was the sole predictor in
the model.
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
(5) Per capita instructional expenses,
(6) Per capital core expenses,
(7) Growth rate, 2006 to 2009.
Institutional Characteristics—Graduation
Rate
(8) Graduation rate.
Because of the variables selected, only
institutions identified as enrolling
undergraduate students were included in the
regression analyses. Other factors, such as
missing data on predictors, also excluded
some institutions from analysis.
Summary of Results of Regression
As noted above nine separate, sector-wise
models were run to explore the relationship
between repayment rates and student- and
institution-level factors. Models ran from
being wholly non-predictive (i.e., less-than-2-
PO 00000
Frm 00076
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
ER13JN11.025
Moreover, Table 3 demonstrates that most
institutions have repayment rates that exceed
To examine the relationship between
repayment rates and student body
demographics more carefully, the
Department performed a series of
multivariate regression analyses, analyzing
each institutional sector separately. The
dependent (predicted) variable in each
analysis was repayment rate. The
independent (predictive) variables in each
analysis were informed by comments
received through the rule-making process,
and included:
Student Body Characteristics
(1) Percent of student body identified as
racial/ethnic minorities,
(2) Percent of student body receiving Pell
Grants,
(3) Percent of student body identified as
female,
(4) Percent of student body identified as
being under 25 years of age.
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
reveal a much lower correlation between an
institution’s concentration of students
receiving Pell Grants and its repayment rate.
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
12 Enrollment figures here and in the following
sections describing the model can be found in See
Table 10 in Knapp, L. (2010). Postsecondary
Institutions and Price of Attendance in the United
States: Fall 2009 and Degrees and Other Awards
Conferred: 2008–09, and 12–Month Enrollment
2008–09 (NCES 2010–161). Washington, DC: U.S.
Department of Education, Institute of Education
Sciences, National Center for Education Statistics.
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
(see Debt-to-Earnings Ratios and
Demographics).
Results for 4-Year Public Institutions
In academic year 2008–09, four-year public
institutions enrolled 9.0 million students,
approximately 33 percent of all students
enrolled in postsecondary education (46
percent of all students enrolled in public
institutions). The full regression model
explained 72 percent of the variance in
repayment rate, with the strongest single
predictor being the percentage of students
enrolled who received a Pell Grant.13 When
used as a sole predictor, the percentage of
Pell Grant recipients explained 49 percent of
the variance in repayment rate. However,
when used as a sole predictor, the percentage
of Pell Grant recipients was not a statistically
significant predictor.
Results for 4-Year Private Nonprofit
Institutions
In academic year 2008–09, 4-year private
nonprofit institutions enrolled 4.5 million
students, approximately 16 percent of all
students enrolled in postsecondary education
(98 percent of all students enrolled in private
nonprofit institutions). The full regression
model explained 56 percent of the variance
in repayment rate, and, as was the case
among 4-year public institutions, the
strongest single predictor in the model was
the percentage of students who received a
Pell Grant (which explained 41 percent of the
variance in repayment rates when used as a
standalone predictor). Similarly, the
racial/ethnic composition of an institution’s
13 Based upon the standardized metric (i.e., beta)
regression coefficient.
PO 00000
Frm 00077
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
student body was predictive of repayment
rates for 4-year nonprofit institutions, but as
a sole predictor it explained less than 2
percent of variance in repayment rates.
Results for 4-Year Private For-Profit
Institutions
In academic year 2008–09, 4-year private
for-profit institutions enrolled 2.1 million
students, approximately 8 percent of all
students enrolled in postsecondary education
(82 percent of all students enrolled in forprofit institutions). Approximately
22 percent of the variance in repayment rates
among 4-year private for-profit institutions
was explained by the full regression model.
Unlike other 4-year institutions, the most
predictive variable in the model was the
percentage of undergraduate enrollees who
were under 25 years of age. The racial/ethnic
composition of an institution’s student body
was not a statistically significant predictor
when used alone to model repayment rates,
and, although the percentage of students
receiving Pell Grants was predictive, it
explained only 7 percent of the variance in
repayment rates.
Results for 2-Year Public Institutions
In academic year 2008–09, 2-year public
institutions enrolled 10.5 million students,
approximately 38 percent of all students
enrolled in postsecondary education. Our
model predicted 13 percent of the variance
in repayment rates found at 2-year public
institutions. While the share of racial/ethnic
minority enrollment and Pell Grant receipt
were both predictive when entered in their
own models, both explained relatively little
variance (around 1 percent and 3 percent,
respectively).
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
ER13JN11.026
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
For the nine models, the findings suggest
that the relationship between repayment,
racial/ethnic composition, and Pell Grant
receipt varies considerably from sector to
sector. For example, the predictive power of
Pell Grants varied widely when entered as
the sole variable in the model, from 3.3
percent (2-year public institutions) to 49.2
percent (4-year public institutions).
Similarly, in four of the nine models, the
proportion of an institution’s student body
that was represented by students identified
as racial/ethnic minorities was a statistically
significant predictor. However, in no case did
it explain more than approximately 13
percent of variance in repayment rates.
Additional context for the results detailed
below comes from considering the ‘‘scope’’ of
the proposed regulations, in particular the
types of institutions likely to offer gainful
employment programs. For example,
although Pell Grant receipt explained
approximately 26 percent of the variance in
repayment rates at 2-year private for-profit
institutions, that sector enrolled only 3
percent of all students in postsecondary
education in 2008–09.12 Student
indebtedness at exit, another key component
to the proposed regulation, is discussed in
more detail in the next section of this filing
34461
34462
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
Results for 2-year private nonprofit
institutions
In academic year 2008–09, 2-year private
nonprofit institutions enrolled 59,000
students, less than 1 percent of all students
enrolled in postsecondary education. About
57 percent of the variance in repayment rates
at 2-year private nonprofit institutions was
explained by our model. Net of other
variables in the model, the percentage of
students receiving Pell Grants was the
strongest single predictor of repayment rates.
When used as the only predictor of
repayment rates, racial/ethnic minority share
of enrollment predicted approximately
13 percent of the potential variance. The
percentage of the student body receiving Pell
Grants explained 39 percent of the variance
in repayment rates when used as the sole
predictor.
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
Results for 2-year private for-profit
institutions
In academic year 2008–09, 2-year private
for-profit institutions enrolled 674,000
students, approximately 3 percent of all
students enrolled in postsecondary
education. Our regression model explained
44 percent of the variance found in
repayment rates at 2-year private for-profit
institutions. Pell Grant receipt was the single
strongest predictor in the full model and,
when used as a sole predictor, explained 26
percent of the variance in repayment rates.
Share of racial/ethnic minority enrollment
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
was not a statistically significant predictor
when used in its own model to predict
repayment rates.
Results for less-than-2-year public
institutions
In academic year 2008–09, less-than-2-year
public institutions enrolled 107,000 students,
less than 1 percent of all students enrolled
in postsecondary education. Overall, our
regression model was not statistically
significant for less-than-2-year public
institutions. When used as the only predictor
of repayment rates, share of racial/ethnic
minority enrollment was statistically
significant, explaining approximately 4
percent of the potential variance. The share
of students receiving Pell grants was not
statistically significant in its stand alone
model.
Results for less-than-2-year private nonprofit
institutions
In academic year 2008–09, less-than-2-year
private nonprofit institutions enrolled 24,000
students, less than 1 percent of all students
enrolled in postsecondary education.2 Our
regression model explained 39 percent of the
variance in repayment rates, with the share
of students receiving Pell Grants being the
single strongest predictor in the full model.
When used as the sole predictor of
repayment rates, the percentage of students
receiving Pell Grants explained
approximately 29 percent of the potential
variance. Share of racial/ethnic minority
PO 00000
Frm 00078
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
enrollment was not a statistically significant
predictor.
Results for Less-Than-2-Year Private ForProfit Institutions
In academic year 2008–09, less-than-2-year
private for-profit institutions enrolled
466,000 students, approximately 2 percent of
all students enrolled in postsecondary
education. Approximately 27 percent of the
variance noted in the repayment rates of lessthan-2-year private for-profit institutions
could be explained by our model. The
strongest single predictor was the percentage
of students receiving Pell Grants. In its stand
alone model, the percentage of students
receiving Pell Grants predicted 16 percent of
the variability in repayment rates among
these institutions. The percentage of students
identified as racial/ethnic minorities was not
statistically significant.
A visual representation, as seen in Chart A,
more clearly illustrates that there is only a
modest relationship between repayment rates
and an institution’s student demographics.
As noted above, the percentage of students
receiving Pell Grants explains 23 percent of
the total variance in repayment rates. Chart
B presents similar data on the relationship
between the percentage of the students that
are members of a minority group at an
institution and its repayment rate. The
percentage of the students that are members
of a minority group explains 1 percent of the
total variance in repayment rates.
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
PO 00000
Frm 00079
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4725
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
34463
ER13JN11.027
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
Debt-to-Earnings Ratios and Demographics
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
The Department also examined the
implications of the debt-to-earnings ratio on
students. Programs fail the debt-to-earnings
ratio if the debts for the majority of students
exceed both measures of affordability by at
least 50 percent. While the Department
recognizes that some groups may face greater
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
obstacles in the labor market than others, we
do not agree that the appropriate response to
those obstacles is to accept that
disadvantaged students will bear even higher
debt burdens.
Moreover, similar to the repayment rate,
earnings and debt data from the Missouri
Department of Higher Education reveal a
wide variation in performance on the debt-
PO 00000
Frm 00080
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
to-earnings ratio among programs serving
similar groups of students. As shown in
Chart C, many programs serving large
numbers of Pell Grant recipients have debtto-earnings ratios below 12 percent of total
income or 30 percent of discretionary
income. Each circle in the chart represents a
program.
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
ER13JN11.028
34464
Nor is it true that all low-income students
will face higher debt-to-earnings ratios after
graduation. While low-income students are
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
more likely to borrow money for college, the
amount of those loans is similar to those
borrowed by their higher-income peers. As
PO 00000
Frm 00081
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
34465
shown in Table 5, students who received a
Pell Grant and those who did not typically
graduate with similar levels of debt.
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
ER13JN11.029
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
Review of Submitted Analyses
Two comments written by economists
included detailed alternative estimates of the
impact of the regulations proposed in the
NPRM. The first, submitted by Jonathan
Guryan and Matthew Thompson of Charles
River Associates, questioned whether the
proposed regulations properly addressed
problems they are attempting to solve and
presented other ways to measure the returns
to education.14 The report also critiqued the
cost estimates proposed in the NPRM,
provided alternative numbers of the number
of students and programs that would be
affected, and provided some suggestions for
how the regulations should be changed.
The Charles River Associates report argued
that an analysis of earnings should focus on
income gains over a longer time period
because students take this into consideration
when making cost/benefit decisions about
whether to enroll in postsecondary education
and whether to use loans to finance its cost.
The report argues that it is appropriate to use
longer periods to measure the benefits from
schooling because research shows that the
annual earnings benefit for each year of
schooling is between 7 and 15 percent,
meaning that a student could recapture the
value of his or her education debt over time
because of the greater earning power
associated with each year of higher
education. These alternative measurements
are discussed in the Alternatives Considered
section of this RIA.
The Charles River Associates report
included its own estimate of the effects of the
NPRM using data from member institutions
from the Association of Private Sector
Colleges and Universities (then known as the
Career College Association), representing 308
14 The Charles River Associates report may be
found at: https://www.regulations.gov/
#!documentDetail;D=ED-2010-OPE-0012-13610.1.
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
institutions, 450 campuses, 10,000 programs,
and 600,000 students. Student and loan level
information was available based on the
population included in the 2006, 2007, and
2008 Cohort Default Rate calculations.
Adjustments were made based on IPEDS and
data from the 2008 NPSAS, both conducted
by the NCES, for students who did not take
out any loans and for students who borrowed
private loans in addition to Federal loans.
The Charles River Associates report
approximated the debt-to-earnings tests by
using information on specific occupations
from the Current Population Survey. It
calculated repayment rates by using
information about loans in repayment from
the cohort default rate files provided by
surveyed institutions.
The report’s initial results found that
7.1 percent of the programs for which data
were available would be ineligible under the
proposed regulations, a designation that
would affect 7.5 percent of students in the
report’s sample. After making some
adjustments to estimated repayment rates so
that they conformed more to the repayment
rates released by the Department, the report
revised its estimate to say that 8.8 percent of
programs in its sample would be ineligible,
affecting 13.0 percent of students. These
findings are similar to the Department’s
estimates that under the proposed regulations
16 percent of for-profit programs would lose
eligibility.
The report questioned the Department’s
estimates of the number of students that
would leave postsecondary education
altogether as a result of the regulations,
without providing any data that would
support alternative assumptions. Using
different assumptions about the percentage of
students that would drop out and whether
any programs in the then-proposed restricted
category would shut down, the report
estimated that between 1.1 million and 2.4
million students would be impacted by the
PO 00000
Frm 00082
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
regulations over a 10-year period. The
Department carefully considered the likely
behavior of students enrolled in failing and
ineligible program and is confident that it has
adopted a reasonable set of assumptions. We
have described the data and analysis we
relied upon in the section of this RIA titled
Estimation of Effects on Students under
Analysis of Final Regulations.
Finally, the Charles River Associates report
discussed the implications of ‘‘restricted’’
status, the regulations’ impact on new
programs, the regulations’ potential impact
on low-income students and members of
racial and ethnic minorities, and several
concerns about the implementation of the
regulations. These comments are discussed
in the Analysis of Comments and Changes
section of the preamble and the section of
this RIA titled Student Demographics.
In a second analysis, Roger Brinner of the
Parthenon Group argued that the Department
should have adjusted the Missouri sample
data to account for debt level, income level,
and repayment rate.15 Using those
adjustments, the study estimates that 30
percent of all students enrolled in programs
subject to gainful employment regulations
would be in ineligible programs, compared to
the Department’s estimate of 8 percent. The
Parthenon Group study attributed the
difference between its estimate and the
Department’s estimate to the Parthenon
Group’s inclusion of private student loan
debt and students without any earnings in
the debt-to-earnings calculation. The study
relied upon a BLS estimate that 17 percent
of students were out of the workforce the
whole year and therefore had zero income,
apparently based on the assumption that
15 Roger Brinner, The Parthenon Group,
Assessment of Missouri Estimate of Impact,
September 9, 2010, available at https://
www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=ED–
2010–OPE–0012–12859.1.
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
ER13JN11.030
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
34466
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
students completing career education
programs were no more likely to be
employed than other young adults.
In its analysis of the final regulations, the
Department revised its estimation
methodology to account for private student
loan debt and graduates without earnings.
The Federal debt in the data was adjusted to
an estimated total debt for a program,
including private loans, using NPSAS
information by institutional sector for the
2007–08 year. The earnings amounts were
adjusted to include 25 percent of exiters with
zero earnings and to represent earnings three
to four years into employment. These
adjustments are also described in the section
of this RIA titled Analysis of Final
Regulations.
The Parthenon Group study also
questioned the Department’s estimates of the
number of students who would decide to
transfer or drop out after their program lost
eligibility, asserting that for-profit and public
institutions would face capacity constraints
that would prevent more than about
60 percent (or 600,000) of the 1 million
displaced students from reenrolling
elsewhere. The Department does not agree
with these pessimistic projections. For-profit
institutions are capable of rapid growth. The
sector has recently grown by hundreds of
thousands of students a year, and its total
enrollment continued to grow in the mid1990s, even as hundreds of institutions lost
student aid eligibility due to their cohort
default rates. The Parthenon Group’s
conclusion that access would be constrained
is dependent on its belief that a large number
of students will leave their current program.
Its estimate that existing programs could
accommodate 600,000 additional students in
a year, for example, would appear to support
a conclusion that large numbers of students
could switch programs before limits are
reached.
Finally, the Parthenon Group study
estimated that these 400,000 students would
experience 15 percent lower income levels
due to not having a postsecondary education,
which would decrease government tax
revenues by $400 million. Looking at
student-to-employee ratios and economic
modeling multipliers, the study further
estimated that 95,000 employees would lose
their jobs due to the 400,000 students leaving
postsecondary education, and that those lost
jobs would decrease government tax
revenues by $2.9 billion. For students who
would continue their educations at public
and nonprofit schools, the study argued that
it costs taxpayers more for students to attend
public and private nonprofit schools than forprofit institutions. The study estimated that
students transferring to the public and
private nonprofit sectors would cost
taxpayers $2 billion based upon other
projected adjustments. While the final
regulations differ in a number of significant
respects from the proposal analyzed by the
Parthenon Group, the Department has
considered the approach and estimates in the
study when formulating its own estimates of
the impact of the final regulations on the
number of college graduates, jobs, and
government budgets. The economic
consequences outlined in the analysis are
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
dependent on the Parthenon Group’s
estimates of the number of programs that will
lose eligibility and the number of students
who will leave postsecondary education.
Moreover, the analysis fails to consider the
benefits to students, taxpayers, and the
economy as a whole from better performing
programs that are tied more closely to labor
market demands, lead to lower debt levels,
and typically achieve higher retention and
graduation rates. The Department presents its
view of the costs and benefits of the final
regulations in the Discussion of Costs and
Benefits section of this RIA.
IV. Analysis of Final Regulations
Data and Methodological Changes
The Department developed a set of data
analysis tools to assist in developing the debt
measures used in these regulations to define
compliance with the gainful employment
requirements for covered postsecondary
education and training programs. Briefly, the
Department examined two internal data sets
that it controls— NSLDS, maintained by the
Office of Federal Student Aid (FSA), and
IPEDS, maintained by NCES. Additionally,
the Department entered into a data sharing
agreement with the Missouri Department of
Higher Education (MDHE) that provided us
with critical information aggregated at the
program level—including work income—for
certain persons who participated in
identified postsecondary education and
training programs in public and for-profit
institutions in Missouri between 2006 and
2008.
The Department obtained from NSLDS the
total number of borrowers who attended a
particular institution and entered repayment
in FY 2006 or 2007, and identified the
borrowers in each group who had paid their
loans in full or had made payments sufficient
to reduce the outstanding balance on their
loans through FY 2010.16 We retrieved, for
these borrowers, the school-level total loan
balance upon entering repayment, and the
school-level total balance of loans upon
entering repayment for borrowers who paid
their loans in full or made payments
sufficient to reduce principal. We also
retrieved information regarding borrowers
who were repaying their loans under one of
the income-sensitive repayment plans (e.g.,
income-contingent repayment (ICR), incomebased repayment (IBR), and graduated plans).
The Department conducted further analysis
of the consolidation loans taken by those
borrowers to attribute the loans that were
consolidated to the respective institutions the
borrower attended when the loans were
made.
The Department extracted a series of data
elements from IPEDS for use in the gainful
employment analysis. Owing to the nature of
IPEDS, all information was developed at the
institutional level from data reported by the
institutions themselves. The institutionspecific information included enrollment, the
16 For an explanation of the NSLDS repayment
rate query, please see the repayment rate
calculation file available on the Department’s
gainful employment Web site, https://www2.ed.gov/
policy/highered/reg/hearulemaking/2009/integrityanalysis.html.
PO 00000
Frm 00083
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
34467
number of Pell Grant recipients,
identification of institutions that offered a
single program of study (mono-line
institutions), certain programmatic (based on
CIP code) information, revenues, expenses,
and graduation rates. The Department
merged these two data sets to produce a
single, institution-by-institution analysis file
comprised of the data elements described in
the preceding paragraph.
The MDHE provided information on
individuals who exited education and
training programs at public and private forprofit postsecondary institutions in the State
between 2006 and 2008. These data were
aggregated by program of study within
institutions and include both educationrelated and wage data. Additional educationrelated data—provided by the Department
from NSLDS—include the number of
program exiters who had Federal student
loan debt, were in repayment or default, and
were Pell Grant recipients. These data also
included mean and median student loan debt
and Pell Grant amount for program exiters.
Wage data included the number of exiters
captured in the Missouri Department of
Labor and Industrial Relations’
Unemployment Insurance program (UI)
database, and average annual wage and
quartile distribution of annual wages for
these exiters. In constructing this analysis file
for the Department’s use, MDHE employed a
protocol that appropriately shielded
personally identifiable information.
The characteristics of the individuals
represented in the MDHE-developed database
were generally comparable to the same
characteristics of the U.S. population across
several dimensions, including population
demographics such as age; race/ethnicity;
and enrollment in elementary, secondary,
and postsecondary education; as well as
income and race/ethnicity of persons
attending public and for-profit postsecondary
institutions. These comparisons can be found
in Table F of the Regulatory Impact Analysis
published with the NPRM. The comparisons,
as well as other details regarding the MDHEprovided data set, can also be found in the
document entitled, ‘‘Gainful Employment
Analysis—Missouri Methodological Notes’’
available on the Department’s Web site.17
The primary data set used to analyze the
regulations consists of 5,474 institutions
defined by a six-digit OPEID taken from
IPEDS and available at the gainful
employment Web site.18 Key information
available in this file includes enrollment,
revenues, expenses, graduation rates,
percentage of undergraduates with a Pell
Grant, and other characteristics. Repayment
rate information calculated from NSLDS was
added to the IPEDS information through the
OPEID and allowed institutions to be
classified according to an initial year of
repayment rate performance.
In matching the data sets, there were
approximately 710 institutions where no
repayment rate was generated, of which a
little over 30 percent came from the private
17 https://www2.ed.gov/policy/highered/reg/
hearulemaking/2009/integrity-analysis.html
18 https://www2.ed.gov/policy/highered/reg/
hearulemaking/2009/integrity-analysis.html.
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
34468
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
for-profit less-than-2-year sector and another
29 percent came from public 2-year
institutions. Many of these institutions did
not participate in the loan programs during
the period covered for this repayment rate
calculation, and others may represent newer
institutions in the IPEDS data or branches
whose information has been captured under
an aggregated OPEID. For the analysis,
institutions with no repayment rate have
been treated as eligible as they will not fail
under the regulations. A second set of
approximately 1,115 institutions appeared in
the repayment rate file but not in the IPEDS
data set. After accounting for foreign
institutions, closed schools, and schools with
changes in affiliation, approximately 145
institutions remained, of which 78 percent
would have a repayment rate borrower count
too small to be evaluated and thus could not
fail under the regulations. The matching of
repayment rates and IPEDS data was
necessary for this analysis, but will not be
required when program-level data is
available as the regulations are implemented.
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
Adjustments to Missouri Data
In response to comments and changes in
the regulations, the Department made some
adjustments to the Missouri data that was
used to provide some information on the
relationship between a program’s debt-toearnings performance and the school’s
repayment rate performance. Specific
adjustments were made to the data to better
represent the regulations and are included in
the data file available on the Department’s
gainful employment Web site.19 The earnings
amounts were adjusted to include 25 percent
of exiters with zero earnings and to represent
earnings three to four years into employment.
The Federal debt in the data was adjusted to
an estimated total debt for a program,
including private loans, using sector-level
information from NPSAS 2008. Data from
NPSAS 2008 were also used to limit the debt
to tuition and fees only. Finally, depending
upon the award level associated with the
program, a 10-, 15-, or 20-year amortization
period was applied to calculate the payment
to be evaluated. The relationship between
repayment rates and debt performance in the
Missouri data provides guidelines for the
debt performance distribution described
under the heading Summary of the Model of
this RIA. The model, however, assigned a
greater share of schools, programs, and
students to the failing debt categories to take
into account the unavailability of data for
some sectors and possible differences in
performance between programs in Missouri
and elsewhere.
Estimated Number of Affected Students
In the analysis for the NPRM, the number
of students subject to the regulations was
estimated using the applicable percentage for
each sector, with the percentage of
certificates awarded providing a guideline for
the public and private nonprofit sectors. For
the NPRM analysis, the estimated 3.2 million
students affected was based on the 12-month
full-time equivalent (FTE) enrollment, and in
19 https://www2.ed.gov/policy/highered/reg/
hearulemaking/2009/integrity-analysis.html.
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
this analysis those data have been updated to
the 12-month headcount enrollment to better
represent the number of students potentially
subject to the regulations. In the base data set
with IPEDS information for 2008–09, the
total 12-month enrollment is approximately
27.4 million students, of whom 7.3 million
are estimated to attend programs subject to
the regulations. When inflated by the
estimated enrollment growth specified in the
RIA Appendix for each scenario (RIA
Appendix A–1, RIA Appendix A–2, and RIA
Appendix A–3) to represent the first
calculation in FY 2012, the number of
students subject to the regulations is
approximately 8.4 million. As observed by
some of the analysts that commented on the
data used to estimate the effect of the
proposed regulation, the change to head
count enrollment better describes the
potential impact of the final regulation. This
number is derived from the percentage of
credentials granted in regulated programs
compared to the total credentials granted at
an institution. If program information was
not available for an institution, the average
percentage for that sector was used.
Summary of the Model
Significant changes were made to the
analysis done for the NPRM to estimate the
effects of the requirement that a program fail
three out of four FYs to be ineligible. These
changes are described below. The
assumptions and results related to each
scenario are presented in the RIA Appendix
A–1, RIA Appendix A–2, and RIA Appendix
A–3.
Data and Model Limitations
NSLDS has sufficient data to support the
calculation of a repayment rate for each
school participating in the Federal student
loan programs. NSLDS does not currently
collect enough data to allow this calculation
by program at an institution. The model
starts with school-level data, aggregates to the
sector level, and tracks numbers of schools,
programs, and students. The Department has
estimated debt-to-earnings ratios for
programs from the Missouri data set. The
model combines the Missouri debt-toearnings data with the national repayment
rate data with assumptions about the
relationship between the two measures
grounded in data from Missouri, where
available. Repayment rate data are available
for a single year. The model calculates
transitions from year to year based on rates
specified by the user that are informed by the
distribution of available repayment rate data.
Detailed tables of the assumptions for each
scenario are available in the Appendix for
each scenario.
There are several aspects of the regulations
that could not be incorporated into the
analysis. In particular, while the model does
allow students to transfer from failing
programs and separately allows programs to
shift between repayment categories, it does
not model an interaction between those
transitions and does not attempt to predict
the effect of the transferring students on the
receiving programs’ performance on the
gainful employment measures in subsequent
years. Other items that cannot be fully
PO 00000
Frm 00084
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
analyzed should only improve a program’s
performance and reduce the effects estimated
in this RIA. One item is the option to
calculate the repayment rate for FYs 2012,
2013, and 2014 using borrowers one to two
years in repayment. This option would allow
institutions to demonstrate program
improvements more quickly. In general, our
data suggest that the repayment rates
calculated with borrowers three to four years
into repayment are higher, but under this
option, the Department would calculate the
rate using both sets of borrowers and use the
higher one, which could only help programs.
The Department does not have any
repayment rate data for borrowers in the first
two years of repayment that reflects any
potential improvements in performance as a
result of the regulations and decided to
describe this factor that may reduce the
effects of the regulations instead of
quantifying it. Additionally, the repayment
rates used for modeling the effects of these
regulations do not include in the numerator
of the repayment rate the consolidation loans
with a balance that remained the same in the
most recent fiscal year of borrowers in a postbaccalaureate degree or certificate program.
The results presented below also do not
take into account the 5 percent cap on
ineligibility for the first year programs could
lose eligibility. The Secretary will cap the
number of ineligible programs by first sorting
institutions by category of institutions
(public, private nonprofit, and for-profit),
then by loan repayment rate within that
category, and finally, starting with the lowest
repayment rate, by determining ineligible
programs accounting for a combined number
of program completers during FY 2014 that
does not exceed 5 percent of the total number
of program completers in that category.
Finally, the limited availability of data
related to repayment plans did not allow us
to determine the effect of the provision
treating all borrowers eligible for Public
Service Loan Forgiveness as successfully in
repayment or the revised policy allowing the
OOPB of up to 3 percent of borrowers’
balances in alternative repayment plans and
not paying down principal to be included in
the numerator of the repayment rate
calculation. To account for the treatment of
loans in interest-only and negative
amortization repayment plans, graduate
student consolidation loans with a balance
that remains the same, the loans eligible for
Public Service Loan Forgiveness, and the
ability of schools to take action to increase
their repayment rates before the first official
calculation with FY 2012 data, the model
boosts the rates calculated from NSLDS by 5
percentage points. We believe this
adjustment is conservative in light of the fact
that up to 3 percent of OOPB will receive
adjustments for interest-only or negative
amortization status, the potentially large
numbers of borrowers eligible for Public
Service Loan Forgiveness, and a published
estimate that improved debt counseling
could boost repayment rates by 2 to 5
percentage points.20
20 Paul Ginocchio and Adrienne Colby, Deutsche
Bank, ‘‘Post 3Q Update on PE Drivers and Gainful
Employment,’’ November 12, 2010.
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
Initial Model State
The model starts with data for schools that
have programs subject to the gainful
employment regulations. These data include
the repayment rate calculated from NSLDS,
the estimated number of programs subject to
the regulations, and the number of students
enrolled in these programs. The repayment
rate is classified into three levels: Passing,
Near Failing, and Failing based on the 35
percent and 45 percent thresholds used in
the NPRM. School, program, and student
counts are then grouped by school sector and
repayment rate category.
Year One School Assessment
The outcome for each year depends upon
both repayment rate and debt-to-earnings
ratios. The latter is imputed using a specified
relationship between the two measures. This
relationship is assumed to vary by sector, and
to be static across years. The specification is
informed by schools from the Missouri data
for which both measures are available.
The imputation process returns the debt-toearnings ratios classified into three levels,
similar to the repayment rate. The
relationship is specified by loading rates into
a three-dimensional array indexed by sector,
repayment category, and debt category. These
rates indicate the relative likelihood that a
school in a given sector with a given
repayment category will exhibit a debt ratio
falling into each of the three categories. The
model allocates schools, programs, and
students to the debt categories according to
the specified rates.
Schools for which both measures are in the
third (Failing) category are classified as
failing to provide gainful employment. The
others are classified as passing.
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
Baseline Enrollment Growth Year One to
Year Two
The user specifies baseline enrollment
growth factors for each sector. These are
stored in a one-dimensional array indexed by
sector. The model applies the appropriate
factor to the student counts recorded for the
end of Year One to yield projected
enrollment by sector for Year Two. These
projections do not consider behavioral
changes associated with the students’
reactions to the Year One outcomes.
Year Two Student Reaction to Year One
Assessment
The user specifies transition rates for Year
Two students who would have attended
failing schools, but transfer to passing
schools or forego enrollment in reaction to
the Year One outcome. The rates are stored
in a two-dimensional array indexed by
starting school sector and student choice.
The students who would have attended a
school with a history of failure are assumed
to choose among 11 different options. The
assumed choices consist of enrolling in a
school with no prior failures in one of the
nine sectors, foregoing enrollment, or
ignoring the prior year outcomes and
enrolling in a school in the same sector and
with the same outcomes. The model reallocates Year Two students to new sectors
and Year One outcomes according to the
specified rates.
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
School Transition and Year Two Assessment
The user specifies transition rates among
repayment categories for Year Two schools.
The rates are stored in a two-dimensional
array indexed by Year One repayment
category and projected Year Two repayment
category. The model re-allocates schools,
programs, and students among new
repayment categories according to the
specified rates.
The model then invokes a user-specified
debt imputation array to assign a debt
category for Year Four according to the
school’s sector, repayment category, and
prior year’s performance on the debt-toearnings ratios. The model allocates schools,
programs, and students to the Year Two debt
categories according to the specified rates.
Schools for which both measures are in the
third (Failing) category are classified as
failing for Year Two, and the others are
classified as passing for Year Two.
Baseline Enrollment Growth Year Two to
Year Three
The user specifies baseline enrollment
growth factors for each sector. These are
stored in a one-dimensional array indexed by
sector. The model applies the appropriate
factor to the student counts recorded for the
end of Year Two to yield projected
enrollment by sector for Year Three. These
projections do not consider behavioral
changes associated with the students’
reactions to the prior year outcomes.
School Transition and Year Three
Assessment
The user specifies transition rates among
repayment categories for Year Three schools.
The rates are stored in a three-dimensional
array indexed by Year One repayment
category, imputed Year Two repayment
category, and projected Year Three
repayment category. The model re-allocates
schools, programs, and students among new
repayment categories according to the
specified rates.
The model then invokes a user-specified
debt imputation array to assign a debt
category for Year Four according to the
school’s sector, repayment category, and
prior year’s performance on the debt-toearnings tests. The model allocates schools,
programs, and students to the Year Three
debt categories according to the specified
rates. Schools for which both measures are in
the third (Failing) category are classified as
failing for Year Three, and the others are
classified as passing for Year Three. Schools
that failed in each of the three years are
classified as ineligible after Year Three.
34469
Year Four Student Reaction to Prior Year’s
Assessment
The user specifies transition rates for Year
Four students who would have attended
failing schools, but transfer to betterperforming schools or forego enrollment in
reaction to the Year One, Year Two, and Year
Three outcomes. The rates are stored in a
three-dimensional array indexed by the
school’s prior year outcomes (failed once,
twice, or three times), starting sector, and
student choice. The students who would
have attended a school with a history of
failure are assumed to choose among 20
different options. The assumed choices
consist of enrolling in a school with no prior
failures in one of the nine sectors, foregoing
enrollment, enrolling in a school with one
prior failure in one of the nine sectors, or
ignoring the prior year outcomes and
enrolling in a school in the same sector and
with the same outcomes. The model reallocates Year Four students to new sectors
and prior year outcomes according to the
specified rates.
School Transition and Year Four Assessment
The user specifies transition rates among
repayment categories for Year Four schools.
The rates are stored in a four-dimensional
array indexed by Year One repayment
category, imputed Year Two repayment
category, imputed Year Three repayment
category, and projected Year Three
repayment category. The model re-allocates
schools, programs, and students among new
repayment categories according to the
specified rates.
The model then invokes a user-specified
debt imputation array to assign a debt
category for Year Four according to the
school’s sector, repayment category, and
prior year’s performance on the debt-toearnings tests. The model allocates schools,
programs, and students to the Year Four debt
categories according to the specified rates.
Schools for which both measures are in the
third (Failing) category are classified as
failing for Year Four, and the others are
classified as passing for Year Four. Schools
that failed in Years One, Two, and Four are
classified as ineligible after Year Four.
Baseline Enrollment Growth Year Three to
Year Four
Baseline Enrollment Growth Year Four to
Year Five
The user specifies baseline enrollment
growth factors for each sector. These are
stored in a one-dimensional array indexed by
sector. The model applies the appropriate
factor to the student counts recorded for the
end of Year Four to yield projected
enrollment by sector for Year Five. These
projections do not consider behavioral
changes associated with the students’
reactions to the prior year outcomes.
The user specifies baseline enrollment
growth factors for each sector. These are
stored in a one dimensional array indexed by
sector. The model applies the appropriate
factor to the student counts recorded for the
end of Year Three to yield projected
enrollment by sector for Year Four. These
projections do not consider behavioral
changes associated with the students’
reactions to the prior year outcomes.
Year Five Student Reaction to Prior Year’s
Assessment
The user specifies transition rates for Year
Five students who would have attended
failing schools, but transfer to betterperforming schools or forego enrollment in
reaction to the Year One, Year Two, Year
Three, and Year Four outcomes. The rates are
stored in a three-dimensional array indexed
by the school’s prior year outcomes (failed
PO 00000
Frm 00085
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
once, failed twice, ineligible after Year Three,
and ineligible after Year Four), starting sector
and student choice. The students who would
have attended a school with a history of
failure are assumed to choose among 20
different options. The assumed choices
consist of enrolling in a school with no prior
failures in one of the nine sectors, foregoing
enrollment, enrolling in a school with one
prior failure in one of the nine sectors, or
ignoring the prior year outcomes and
enrolling in a school in the same sector and
with the same outcomes. The model reallocates Year Five students to new sectors
and prior year outcomes according to the
specified rates.
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
Estimation of Effects on Students
In developing the gainful employment
regulations, we established a model to
estimate the number of programs and
students that would be affected. As part of
that analysis, we considered whether
students enrolled at programs that were
failing or lost eligibility would transfer to
another institution, leave postsecondary
education entirely, or (if the program was
failing but remained eligible) remain
enrolled.
Before we could estimate these responses,
we first had to account for the high degree
of turnover that already occurs within the
various higher education sectors. For
example, data from the latest BPS show that
over 36 percent of students who begin at 2year for-profit institutions leave without
completing or transferring within one year.
Estimates for the percentage of students
that would have dropped out within their
first year regardless of the regulations also
came from BPS data. We looked at students’
one-year retention and attainment rate at
their initial institution, broken down by their
first institution’s sector. This information
allowed us to see, for example, that 33
percent of students who enter a for-profit
institution of two years or less had dropped
out within one year. The results of this
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
An additional 13.6 percent of students at
those institutions transfer within one year.
Applying our estimates of student behavior
before accounting for this significant egress
from institutions would overstate the effects
of the regulations and obscure some of the
very problems that they target.
Therefore, our estimates of the effects of
the regulations in terms of student transfer,
retention, and drop out are applied after
taking into account the movement that would
have occurred anyway. In other words, we
sought to ascertain what effect our
regulations would have on students who
would not have transferred out, already
completed, or dropped out. Below we discuss
some of the ways we modeled this initial
student movement.
We used BPS data to estimate the number
of students who would have transferred
regardless of the regulations. BPS is the best
data source for this purpose because it is
student-based, allowing us to track
individuals across multiple types of
institutions. As a result, we can better see the
movement of transfer students within and
between sectors. By contrast, information
reported in other databases like IPEDS come
from institutions and provide selective
information on the rate at which students
transfer out, but contain no data on the type
of institution at which they end up. The BPS
survey also considers a more expansive set of
students, including those who attend part
time or enroll at times other than the fall
semester, that are excluded from other
national databases.
To create our estimate for transfer rates, we
first looked at the percentage of students who
first enrolled in 2003–04, stayed for at least
four months, and had transferred by the
2004–05 academic year, broken down by
institution control. This information gave us
an estimate for what percentage of students
would have transferred regardless of our
regulations and was used for contextualizing
our transfer rates for one year of failure. The
rates of those who entered in 2003–04 and
transferred by 2005–06 and 2006–07 were
used to contextualize our estimates of those
who transferred after two failures and
ineligibility, respectively.
These data also provided guidance for our
estimates of how students would transfer
between and within sectors in response to
the regulations. To do this, we selected only
those students who had stayed for at least
four months and had transferred by July 2004
to determine their first institution type and
the type of institution they transferred in to.
These results, which are depicted in Table 6,
showed us the dispersion pattern of students
who did transfer and demonstrated the
importance of public institutions as receiving
entities. However, we expect for-profit
institutions to have the flexibility to respond
to demand created by the closure of ineligible
programs. Therefore, we assigned a higher
share of transfers attributed to these
regulations to stay within the for-profit
sectors than is seen in the baseline data.
analysis for all sectors can be seen in
Table 7.
This information on the dropout rate by
sector also contributed to our estimates of the
percent of students that would drop out due
to the gainful employment regulations. The
dropout rate assumptions in the high dropout
and low dropout scenarios described in RIA
Appendix A–1 and RIA Appendix A–2 are
specified as the percentage of students who
drop out or new students who do not enroll
as a percentage of those remaining after the
baseline level of dropouts found in the BPS
data described above. The dropouts included
in the model represent the potential response
of students who would otherwise have
continued or started their education to a
program’s performance on the debt measures.
The Department does not have specific data
on student responsiveness to disclosure of
program performance on the debt measures
and the other information available under
these regulations and those published on
October 29, 2010 (75 FR 66832) (Program
PO 00000
Frm 00086
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
ER13JN11.031
34470
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
34471
the ability of those institutions to absorb
students. The low dropout scenario started
with a 5 percent dropout rate for a first
failure of the debt measures to a 22 percent
dropout rate of those remaining when a
program becomes ineligible. This escalation
is repeated in the high dropout scenario,
which starts with a 15 percent dropout rate
for a first failure and escalates up to 42
percent for ineligible programs in the for-
profit less-than-2-year sector. For each status
(fail once, fail twice, ineligible), the for-profit
sectors had a dropout rate 2 percentage
points higher than the public sector and
private nonprofit sectors, to reflect a
potential increased emphasis on program
performance in those sectors. While there
was some variation by sector, a program’s
status was the key determinant of the
dropout rate assigned to students.
Establishing rates of transfer and dropout
within each sector allowed us to determine
what percentage of students should be
removed from the model before estimating
the effects of our regulations. Running our
estimates of the effect of the regulations after
subtracting the students who would have left
an institution anyway contextualizes the
outcome of our regulations and
acknowledges the significant existing levels
of student movement that already occur in
many programs. For example, only 29
percent of students at 2-year for-profit
institutions who entered in 2003–04 were
still enrolled in 2004–05. The rate of transfers
and drops after one year was used to adjust
the transfer and dropout rates used in the
model after one year of failure while rates
after two and three years were used to
contextualize the model rates for two failures
and ineligibility. If we estimate that these
final regulations would cause 18 percent of
those remaining students to drop out, the
high existing dropout and transfer rate means
that 9 percent of the student body would
actually be affected. In this case, that result
would mean the effect on students from the
gainful employment regulations is
approximately half as large as our estimated
dropout effect and is roughly one-fifth as
large as student exit without completion.
Tables 9 to 12 summarize the estimated
results for programs, students, and revenues
for the scenarios evaluated. As shown in
Table 9, an estimated 1 percent of all
programs and 3 percent of all programs at forprofit institutions will lose eligibility by
2015. The Department also estimates that 7
percent of programs at 4-year for-profit
institutions and 6 percent of programs at 2year for-profit institutions will lose
eligibility.
Though a program must fail the debt
measures for three years in a four-year
period, we expect that students likely will
exhibit some degree of reaction to a program
failing once or twice, possibly by transferring
out of the program or stopping out altogether.
To reflect these behavioral considerations in
our analysis, we established two different
estimates of student movement in reaction to
debt measure performance—the high dropout
scenario and the low dropout scenario. In
each case, we created tables that lay out the
estimated percentage of students that will
drop out or transfer, with different results
assigned depending on a program’s sector
and performance on the debt measures. And
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
Summary of Results
While stepping through the events
described above, the model records the state
of the system at specific points in the
process. These snapshots of data are
combined, so that student shifts to different
schools and to passing or failing programs
can be displayed, across the modeled years.
The model can be run under different
scenarios by changing selected user-specified
input and saving the results. The results of
various scenarios may then be considered in
the analysis of the effects of the gainful
employment regulations on schools,
programs, and students. The Department’s
review of the effects of these regulations is
consistent with the principles of the
Executive Orders 13563 and 12866 and
represents a reasoned determination that the
benefits of the regulatory approach justify its
costs.
PO 00000
Frm 00087
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
ER13JN11.032
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
Integrity Issues final regulations). Therefore,
the high dropout and low dropout scenarios
described in RIA Appendix A–1 and RIA
Appendix A–2 established a range of
outcomes based on the Department’s
expertise and review of comments received
after the publication of the NPRM. Comments
received led to an increased dropout rate in
the high dropout scenario and increased
transfers to the for-profit sector because of
34472
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
the extent to which students respond
increases with the extent of the negative
result—meaning the transfer and dropout rate
is higher at a program that failed twice than
one in the same sector that has only failed
once. As a result, the extent to which
students react to the policy by switching
programs or dropping out will vary by
scenario, sector, and debt measure
performance.
In the high dropout scenario, we estimate
that students are more likely to respond to
poor debt measure performance by ceasing
their education. In this scenario, dropout
rates as a percent of remaining students range
from 15 percent at programs in the public 4year and private nonprofit 4-year sectors
where only one failure occurred to 42 percent
at programs in the for-profit less-than 2-year
sector that are ineligible. Transfer rates as a
percent of remaining students range from 20
percent at programs in the public 4-year and
private nonprofit 4-year sectors where only
one failure occurred to 40 percent at
programs in the for-profit less-than 2-year
sector that are ineligible. By contrast, the low
dropout scenario assumes that instead of
stopping out, students in programs that fare
poorly on the debt measures are more likely
to seek out another program for their
education or stay enrolled at their current
offering. In that instance, the rate of student
dropout is lower relative to our other
scenario, but the rate of student transfer is
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
higher. As a result of these different
assumptions, the rate of student dropouts in
the low dropout scenario ranges from 5
percent at programs in the public 4-year and
private nonprofit 4-year sectors where only
one failure occurred to 22 at programs in the
for-profit less-than 2-year sector that are
ineligible. Transfer rates as a percent of
remaining students range from 25 percent at
programs in the public 4-year and private
nonprofit 4-year sectors where only one
failure occurred to 50 percent at programs in
the for-profit less-than 2-year sector that are
ineligible. The appendix to this RIA contains
more detailed charts displaying our
assumptions around student transfer and
dropout, both in terms of the share of total
students in gainful employment programs
and as a share of the total student body after
removing the baseline dropout and transfers
that would have occurred without this
regulation.
As noted earlier, BPS provides information
regarding students’ first-to-second-year
persistence behaviors. We used these data to
inform our ‘‘steady-state’’ estimate for the
probability of dropping out. Using this
baseline, we established the drop-out rate
benchmarks for the various scenarios as
noted above. The school and program
assumptions for debt performance and
repayment category transitions vary slightly
as shown in RIA Appendix A–1 and RIA
Appendix A–2. The estimated drop-outs
PO 00000
Frm 00088
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
related to the regulations over the five years
ranged from 80,153 in the low dropout
scenario to 181,933 in the high dropout
scenario. The percentage of programs subject
to ineligibility ranges from 0.1 percent in the
public less-than-2-year sector to 3.9 percent
in the for-profit 4-year sector when the total
number of regulated programs, including
small programs, is used as the denominator.
If the denominator excludes programs with a
small number of borrowers or completers, the
percentage of programs that are ineligible
ranges from 0.2 percent to 7.1 percent. The
percentage of programs that have failed the
measures at least once in a four-year cycle
ranges from 1.1 percent for the public lessthan-2-year sector to 24.5 percent for the 4year for-profit sector.
When students transfer out of a sector or
drop out of education, revenues and
expenses associated with those students shift
among sectors or leave higher education.
Table 8 contains per enrollee revenue and
expense information used to estimate the
costs per sector of the student transfers set
out in Tables 10–A to 10–C and in the RIA
Appendices. These estimated direct costs are
set out in Tables 12–A to 12–C. Results for
programs are set out in Tables 11–A to 11–
C. We estimate the effects on revenue under
a scenario in which the maximum dropout
rate is 22 percent and a scenario in which the
maximum dropout rate is 42 percent.
BILLING CODE 4000–01–P
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
PO 00000
Frm 00089
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4725
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
34473
ER13JN11.033
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
VerDate Mar<15>2010
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
PO 00000
Frm 00090
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4725
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
ER13JN11.034
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
34474
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
PO 00000
Frm 00091
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4725
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
34475
ER13JN11.035
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
VerDate Mar<15>2010
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
PO 00000
Frm 00092
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4725
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
ER13JN11.036
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
34476
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
PO 00000
Frm 00093
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4725
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
34477
ER13JN11.037
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
VerDate Mar<15>2010
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
PO 00000
Frm 00094
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4725
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
ER13JN11.038
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
34478
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
PO 00000
Frm 00095
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4725
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
34479
ER13JN11.039
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
VerDate Mar<15>2010
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
PO 00000
Frm 00096
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4725
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
ER13JN11.040
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
34480
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
PO 00000
Frm 00097
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4725
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
34481
ER13JN11.041
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
BILLING CODE 4000–01–C
Data Sensitivity
The data used in this model are limited by
the fact that we are using data that were not
collected for this purpose. There is also
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
uncertainty in our assumptions because
predicting student behavior and employment
trends is well beyond what we are able to
model. The revenue and expense effects
presented in Table 12 represent the
Department’s best estimate of the net effects
PO 00000
Frm 00098
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
of these final regulations for the scenarios
presented in this RIA. However, we recognize
that elements in the analysis are sensitive to
the cost structure of programs and
innovations in the delivery of postsecondary
education. In particular, the marginal cost of
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
ER13JN11.042
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
34482
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
a student attending a program through online
delivery or a mix of online and in-person
classes could vary significantly from the
traditional model. Income statements for
publicly traded for-profit institutions show
that as the number of enrolled students grows
at an institution expenses grow at almost the
same rate as revenues. Accordingly, we
assume that when students transfer or drop
out the change in expenses is equal to 80
percent of the average existing cost per
student. However, given the data limitations
and the sensitivity of the net costs to the
assumptions made about the percent of
revenues lost and expenses saved when
students leave a program or the revenues
gained and expenses increased as students
enter programs, the Department ran an
alternative scenario featuring a reduction or
increase in expenses for student transfers of
40 percent of total expenses. RIA Appendix
B contains the equivalent of Table 12 for that
scenario.
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
While the Department has some data on
the prevalence of online delivery in gainful
employment programs, we have very limited
information on the cost structures of such
programs. In 2007–08, 58 percent of
undergraduate students at for-profit
institutions were enrolled in programs
delivered entirely through distance
education. At public and private non-profit
institutions, 24 percent and 37 percent of
students enrolled in certificate programs,
which also would be subject to the gainful
employment rule, were enrolled in programs
delivered entirely through distance learning.
However, these data do not help describe the
cost structure of such programs. It is possible
that the marginal savings from a student
leaving such a program or the marginal cost
of a student transferring into an online
program would be a significant portion of the
total expense associated with the program.
As can be seen in Table 13, the annualized
net losses from dropouts and inter-sector
PO 00000
Frm 00099
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
34483
transfers in the high dropout scenario range
from $112 million to $122 million,
depending on the composition of program
delivery and the expense reduction and
increases associated with different types of
program delivery. For the low dropout
scenario, this range runs from $108 million
to $160 million.
Consistent with Executive Order 13563’s
call to ‘‘measure, and seek to improve, the
actual results of regulatory requirements,’’ the
Department will continue to analyze the
effects of this regulation as the Department
gains more and better data. As noted in the
preamble to the final regulation, we will
begin to provide institutions with the results
of the debt calculation in 2012. These data,
along with data from subsequent years, will
enable the Department to determine whether
the final regulation addresses the issues that
prompted this regulatory action.
BILLING CODE 4000–01–P
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
BILLING CODE 4000–01–C
The effects described above represent the
estimated effects of the regulations during the
first four-year cycle leading to ineligibility,
an initial transition period as the regulations
come into effect. While the debt measures
will remain in place, we would expect the
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
effect to decline over time as programs that
could not comply are eliminated and
institutions have more data about program
performance and are familiar with complying
with the gainful employment debt measures.
We expect the pattern of program failure to
that which occurred when cohort default
PO 00000
Frm 00100
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
rates were introduced in 1989 with an initial
elimination of the worst-performing
programs followed by a new equilibrium in
which programs comply with the minimum
standards set out in the regulations, as shown
in Chart D.
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
ER13JN11.043
34484
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
Æ Costs
Æ Additional expense of educating transfer
students at programs doing well on the
debt measures
Æ Cost of paperwork burden
Æ Additional compliance costs as
programs take efforts to meet debt
measures
Æ Distributional Effects (Transfers)
Æ Transfers affecting institutional revenues
Æ Transfers affecting Federal, State, and
local governments
Æ Federal revenues
Æ State and local government costs
Accounting Statement
As required by OMB Circular A–4
(available at https://www.Whitehouse.gov/
omb/Circulars/a004/a-4.pdf), in Table 14, we
have prepared an accounting statement
showing the classification of the
PO 00000
Frm 00101
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
expenditures associated with the provisions
of these regulations. This table provides our
best estimate of the changes in Federal
student aid payments as a result of these
regulations. Expenditures are classified as
transfers from the Federal Government to
student loan borrowers and from lowperforming programs to performing
programs. Transfers are neither costs nor
benefits, but rather the reallocation of
resources from one party to another.
Table 14 also presents estimates of the
costs, benefits, and transfers associated with
students who switch programs or withdraw.
Because more students are projected to
transfer into lower-cost institutions, overall
educational expenditures are expected to
slightly decrease.
BILLING CODE 4000–01–P
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
ER13JN11.044
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
V. Discussion of Costs, Benefits and
Transfers
Consistent with the principles of Executive
Orders 12866 and 13563, the Department has
analyzed the impact of these regulations on
students, businesses, the Federal
Government, and State and local
governments. The analysis rests on the
projected impact of the regulations. The
benefits and costs discussed below include
the following:
Æ Private Benefits to Students and Borrowers
Æ Development of measures linking
programs to labor market outcomes
Æ Improved retention rates
Æ Increased graduation rates
Æ Improved default rates
Æ Social Benefits
Æ Improved market information
Æ Better return on money spent on
education
34485
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
BILLING CODE 4000–01–C
Private Benefits to Students and Borrowers
The regulations are primarily intended to
provide opportunities for better employment
and loan affordability outcomes for students,
particularly for those participating in the
Federal student aid programs. The final
regulations provide significant opportunities
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
for institutions to improve failing programs
against the debt measures.
Development of Measures Linking Programs
to Labor Market Outcomes
One improvement will result from
strengthening the connection between
training programs and the labor market. As
described under the heading, Need for
Regulatory Action, market mechanisms may
PO 00000
Frm 00102
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
not operate properly in the case of
educational markets where students have
incomplete information and educational
institutions are effectively insulated from the
effects of an excess supply of graduates in a
particular field.
By tying the state of the labor market to the
ability of for-profit institutions to generate
revenue, the final regulations compensate for
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
ER13JN11.045
34486
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
34487
credentials annually.21 But many of these
programs prepare students for low-paying
entry-level jobs in support occupations, such
as medical assistants, massage therapists, and
medical insurance coders. Though most of
those jobs have some labor market demand,
projections of future openings indicate there
is an oversupply of graduates for these
positions, while more highly compensated
occupations, such as registered nurses, are
facing significant shortages. Not only are
programs preparing students for these lowerpaying occupations creating an oversupply of
graduates, but this oversupply is almost
entirely produced by the for-profit sector.
The Center for American Progress report
found that of the 10 most popular health care
programs offered at for-profit institutions,
eight of them are in programs for which the
for-profit sector accounted for four-fifths or
more of the completions each year. In other
words, the for-profit sector was providing the
vast majority of the oversupply in these
health care fields with lesser earnings and
growth potential.
An analysis of national completion data
shows that the health care industry is not the
only area in which for-profit institutions are
providing a significant supply of completions
in areas where earnings and growth are low.
Table 15 shows the 15 most popular
instructional programs at for-profit
institutions, as measured by the number of
completions at any level. In nine of these
program types, for-profit institutions
accounted for over 60 percent of the annual
completions. In all but one of these
programs—registered nursing—for-profit
institutions represented a disproportionately
large share of the completions. As Table 15
demonstrates, the programs in which forprofit institutions are providing the vast
majority of completions tend to have lower
median wages, as measured by BLS data,
than the programs in which they have a
lower share of completions. This information
suggests that increasing programs in these
better paying areas—such as graduating more
registered nurses instead of medical
assistants—would help students obtain better
jobs, while also allowing programs to
perform better on the debt measures.
21 Julie Margetta Morgan and Ellen-Marie Whelan,
‘‘Profiting from Health Care: The Role of For-Profit
Schools in Training the Health Care Workforce,’’
Center for American Progress, January 2011, https://
www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/01/
profiting_from_health_care.html
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
PO 00000
Frm 00103
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4725
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
ER13JN11.046
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
this disconnect between student demand and
employer demand. First, earnings and
repayment information will provide a clear
indication to institutions about whether or
not their students are successful in securing
stable and well-paying positions. This
information will help institutions determine
when it would be prudent to expand some
programs or pare back others. Second,
meeting the debt-to-earnings ratio and
repayment rate thresholds will encourage
institutions to prepare students for jobs in
well-paying and in-demand fields. This effect
creates an incentive to move programs upmarket so that they prepare students for jobs
with better salaries and employment
prospects.
The health care industry is an example of
how the gainful employment regulations
could encourage institutions, particularly
those in the for-profit sectors, to adjust their
offerings to provide better opportunities to
students and to eliminate oversupply in the
job market. A report by the Center for
American Progress released in January found
that for-profit institutions currently supply a
significant percentage of health care
34488
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
students per year would be retained for a
second year.
While differences in the demographic
characteristics of students play a role in
retention—the retention rate at institutions
with the lowest percentage of students
receiving Pell Grants is 76 percent compared
to 62 percent at institutions with the highest
percentage of students receiving Pell
Grants—it is clear that improvements can be
made through investments in retention
efforts. While both institutional and student
demographic characteristics affect the
retention rate, it is important to note that
institutions that pass the repayment rate
measure had retention rates that were 27
percent higher than for those that failed the
repayment rate measure.
Increased Graduation Rates
or certificate. President Obama has called for
the United States to have the highest
proportion of young adults with college
degrees and certificates in the world by 2020.
The President’s 2020 goal is not simply a
restatement of the longstanding national
As important as retention rates are, the
ultimate goal is the completion of a degree
22 Source: U.S. Department of Education, National
Center for Education Statistics, 2003–04 Beginning
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
Postsecondary Students Longitudinal Study,
Second Follow-up (BPS:04/09)
PO 00000
Frm 00104
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
ER13JN11.048
before the second year and an additional 15
percent left before the third year.22
Institutions that are currently passing the
repayment rate threshold established under
the final regulations have retention rates that
are 27 percent higher than the rate for
institutions that have repayment rates that
fail the repayment rate measure (71 percent
vs. 56 percent).
ER13JN11.047
Critical to a student’s progress through any
educational institution or program is
retention. Data from BPS suggest that
retention early in a program of study is
particularly critical. Failure to return for the
second year accounts for 23 percent of all
unsuccessful departures from postsecondary
education. Another 21 percent fail to return
for the third year. For students who began in
a bachelor’s degree program, 13 percent left
If institutions successfully reform failing
programs, we would expect institutions to
bring their retention rates within the range
observed for programs that pass the
repayment rate measure. If currently failing
institutions were able to raise their retention
rate to the average for institutions passing the
repayment measure, nearly 60,000 more
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
Improved Retention Rates
Institutions can also improve their
performance on the debt measures by
improving their institutional retention and
graduation rates. Data on institutional
performance clearly show that improvements
in these areas are possible because many
institutions have significantly higher
retention and graduation rates even though
they serve low-income students.
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
established under these final regulations
have graduation rates that are 35 percent
higher than the rate for institutions that have
repayment rates that fail the repayment rate
measure (50 percent compared to 37 percent)
and the bachelor’s degree graduation rate was
61 percent higher for institutions that pass
the repayment rate measure than for
institutions that fail the repayment rate
measure (53 percent compared to 33 percent).
Like retention rates, if institutions
successfully reform programs, we would
PO 00000
Frm 00105
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4725
expect them to bring their graduation rates
within the range that is observed for
programs that pass the repayment rate
measure. If currently failing institutions were
able to raise their graduation rate to that of
the institutions that are passing the
repayment measure, nearly 70,000 more
students per year would receive a degree or
certificate.
BILLING CODE 4000–01–P
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
ER13JN11.049
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
policy of promoting access to higher
education but a reflection of the fact that the
United States needs more working adults
with degrees and certificates.
Degrees and certificates are only attained
through diligent effort by students enrolled at
institutions that place their success at the
center of the institution’s efforts. There are
many types of institutions—public; private
nonprofit; and for-profit—that have high
graduation rates. Programs that are currently
passing the repayment rate threshold
34489
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
BILLING CODE 4000–01–C
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
Improved Default Rates
Given the nature of the repayment rate, it
is not surprising that significantly lower
default rates are observed at institutions that
pass the repayment rate. But it is also
important to consider the cost of defaults on
former students who cannot afford to repay
their loans. These borrowers face very serious
problems if they cannot pay their loans.
Once a loan is assigned to a guaranty
agency or the Department for collection,
credit bureaus are notified, and the
borrower’s credit rating will suffer. In 2010,
6.4 million students had a Federal student
loan reported to one or more credit bureaus
as being in default. These circumstances
increase the cost of borrowing for the
defaulter and are likely to affect whether the
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
borrower can obtain a loan at all. Borrowers
who default on their loans often struggle to
rent or buy a home, or buy a car. Often a poor
credit rating adversely affects the borrower’s
ability to obtain a job. The borrower is
subject to administrative wage garnishment,
whereby the Department will require the
defaulted borrower’s employer to forward 15
percent of his or her disposable pay toward
repayment of the loan. Some borrowers have
lost their jobs because their employer did not
want to be responsible for the wage
garnishment or because the need to garnish
the employee’s wages called into question
the employee’s reliability. If the borrower is
a Federal employee, he or she faces the
possibility of having 15 percent of disposable
pay offset by the Department toward
repayment of the loan through Federal salary
offset. A borrower could also be limited in
PO 00000
Frm 00106
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
terms of obtaining a security clearance or a
job at some agencies including the
Department of Education. Further, the
Treasury Department offsets Federal tax
refunds and any other payments, as
authorized by law, to repay a defaulted loan.
In 2010, approximately 1 million students
had nearly $1.5 billion applied to their
defaulted Federal student loans from
withheld tax refunds, Social Security
benefits, and other Federal payments.
The borrower must pay additional
collection costs when a loan is assigned to a
private collection agency. The largest of these
costs is contingent fees that are incurred to
collect the loan. While the Department gives
the borrower repeated warnings before
referring a debt to a collection contractor, if
the borrower does not heed those warnings
and reach an agreement with the lender on
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
ER13JN11.050
34490
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
34491
Once a loan is declared in default, the
borrower is no longer entitled to any
deferments or forbearances. In addition, the
borrower cannot receive any additional title
IV, HEA student aid until he or she has made
payments of an approved amount for at least
six consecutive months. Each year the
Department denies aid to nearly 350,000
students who have defaulted on their loans
until those obligations are resolved.
Discharging Federal student loans in
bankruptcy is very rare.
These consequences of default are severe
and often go unacknowledged by those who
argue that the public costs of supporting
public higher education outweigh the costs of
default. These critics further ignore the
community and generational effects these
consequences have on postsecondary access
that are very significant but difficult to
quantify.
While the anticipated benefits in terms of
improved retention and graduation rates are
somewhat speculative, the impact on default
rates—with all the negative consequences
that accrue to borrowers, their families, and
the broader community—are more direct. If
institutions are successful in reforming
programs, cohort default rates will decline
dramatically. If these final regulations have a
positive impact by reducing the number of
borrowers defaulting on loans, the number of
borrowers entering default within three years
could decline by over 292,000 over the next
five years. This estimate was derived by
multiplying the number of borrowers
defaulting in programs that fell below the
threshold for passing the repayment rate
measure by the difference in the repayment
rate.
BILLING CODE 4000–01–C
will allow them to make better educational
choices. But better information also has a
social benefit component as well.
Strengthening the connection between
training programs and the labor market will
allow both to function more efficiently.
First, earnings and repayment information
will provide a clear indication to institutions
about whether or not their students are
successful in securing stable and well-paying
positions. This information will help
institutions determine when it would be
Social Benefits
Improved Market Information
Students will receive private benefits
associated with improved information, which
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
PO 00000
Frm 00107
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
BILLING CODE 4000–01–P
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
ER13JN11.051
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
repayment terms, the Department refers the
loan to collection contractors. These
contractors earn a commission, or contingent
fee, for any payments then made on the loans
referred. The Department charges each
borrower the cost of the commission earned
by the contractor, and applies payments from
the borrower, first to defray the contingent
fee earned for that payment, and second, to
the interest and principal owed on the debt.
As a result, the amount needed to satisfy a
student loan debt collected by the
Department’s collection contractors can be
up to 25 percent more than the principal and
interest repaid by the borrower. In 2010,
more than 1.5 million borrowers paid
approximately $380 million in contingent
fees to private collection agencies. Finally, if
these collection efforts are unsuccessful, the
Department may take additional legal action
to force a borrower to repay the loan.
34492
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
prudent to expand some programs or pare
back others. Second, meeting the debt-toearnings ratio and repayment rate thresholds
will encourage institutions to prepare
students for jobs in well-paying and indemand fields. This effect creates an
incentive to move programs up-market so
that they prepare students for jobs with better
salaries and employment prospects.
Finally, the better and clearer information
that will be available about programs leading
to gainful employment will also benefit
institutions with high-performing programs,
which can use their performance on the
measures to differentiate themselves from
competitors and lessen the need for complex
and expensive marketing efforts. Currently,
institutions must devote a significant amount
of revenues to marketing and recruiting costs
because available data do not allow them to
easily indicate quality.23 Graduation rates are
not broken down to the programmatic level
and fail to capture many students. Placement
rates are not comparable across institutions
because they are calculated in different
ways.24 Licensure rates provide little
indication of quality because the vast
majority of students pass their licensing
examinations.25 In place of these types of
marketing efforts, the gainful employment
regulations would allow an institution to
demonstrate to prospective students that its
programs provide better wages, lower debt
burdens, and a higher likelihood of
repayment than competitor offerings—easily
understandable data that tell a clear story
about student success.
Better Return on Money Spent on Education
The social benefits that should accrue as a
result of this rule largely result from a better
return on money spent on education
(associated with an increase in human
capital). While the focus of the rule is
necessarily on better returns to Federal
student aid, there will also likely be better
returns on other kinds of aid and cash tuition
payments. Because of the increasing
information provided to students and
programs that meet minimum performance
standards, students are expected to make
more optimal education choices, leading to
better income prospects. Since education has
positive spillover effects, a society would
23 For a discussion of the amounts spent on
marketing by for-profit colleges see interviews from
PBS Frontline with Mark DeFusco, a former director
at the University of Phoenix or Jeffrey Silber, a
senior analyst at BMO Capital Markets. The
interviews are available at https://www.pbs.org/
wgbh/pages/frontline/collegeinc/interviews/
defusco.html and https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/
frontline/collegeinc/interviews/silber.html.
24 Andrea Sykes, Laurium Evaluation Group,
‘‘Background Group: Calculating Job Placement
Rates under Gainful Employment Regulations,’’
February 2011.
25 For example, passage rates on barbering and
cosmetology examination results reported by the
State of California show that nearly 100 percent of
test takers pass their licensure exams. See https://
www.barbercosmo.ca.gov/applicants/
schls_rslts.shtml. Similarly, data from the National
Council of State Boards of Nursing show that 87
percent of first-time U.S. educated students pass the
national licensing test for licensed practical/
vocational nurses. See https://www.ncsbn.org/
Table_of_Pass_Rates_2010.pdf.
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
want to subsidize it. Increasing the returns
should not only increase the positive private
benefits to students but increase the positive
spillover effects to society.
While it is currently difficult to precisely
quantify the changes in positive spillover
effects that are attributable to this rule, the
Department will evaluate its ability to
measure these effects as additional
information regarding student earnings and
other aspects of this rule become available.
This is also consistent with Executive Order
13563, Section 1, which states that our
regulatory system ‘‘must measure, and seek to
improve, the actual results of regulatory
requirements.’’ Consistent with Section 1
principles of Executive Order 13563, the
agency must measure and seek to improve
the actual results of regulatory requirements.
Unlike many other efforts to improve
education and workforce training, efforts to
improve gainful employment programs in
response to these regulations will be
grounded in reliable data on the outcomes of
part of the overall investment in Federal
student aids, which in FY 2010, exceeded
$140 billion and provided aid to 14 million
students. While the rule only specifically
addresses programs which, by law, must lead
to gainful employment in a recognized
occupation, the resulting data and program
improvement efforts will have significant
spillover effects on the degree programs at
non-profit and public institutions.
Costs
A primary goal of this rule is to ensure that
Federal student aid funds, including student
loans that must be repaid whether a student
was satisfied with the program of study or
not, are well spent. In the process of
achieving that goal, there is an increase in
expenses that occurs as a result of students
transferring from failing to succeeding
programs, as well as two main compliance
costs that institutions will face as a result of
this regulation.
Increase in Expenses When Students Transfer
From Failing to Succeeding Programs
As a result of this rule, some segment of
students is likely to transfer from failing to
succeeding programs. In the process, many of
them will also be transferring among
postsecondary education sectors. In some
cases, students will move from more
expensive programs to less expensive
programs; in other cases, students will move
from less expensive programs to more
expensive programs.
Educating additional students requires a
postsecondary education institution to incur
additional costs—both fixed costs (for
example, additional classroom space) and
variable costs (such as hiring additional
instructors). As a result, there will be a shift
of certain costs from institutions with failing
programs to institutions with successful
programs. There is a net increase in expenses
that results when students transfer from
failing programs to successful programs. This
net increase in expenses per student being
educated amounts to a cost of $133 million
(under the high-dropout scenario) to $178
million (low-dropout scenario) per year. The
increase in expenses for programs may be
associated with better programs and services
PO 00000
Frm 00108
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
that help students succeed in the labor
market.
Paperwork Burdens
As detailed in the Paperwork Burden Costs
section, institutions will also accrue some
costs to comply with the data and reporting
pieces of the regulation. This occurs in the
form of time spent determining alternative
earnings information (if the institution
chooses to do so), challenging data for the
debt-to-earnings ratios and repayment rates,
providing debt warnings to students, and
providing notification that a failing program
has been voluntarily discontinued. These
costs are estimated in greater detail in the
Paperwork Burden Costs section, but we
project this element of compliance costs to be
$5.4 million a year.
Additional Compliance Costs Associated
With Meeting Debt Measures
Institutions will also bear some costs to
manage their performance under the debt
measures. Institutions concerned about
failing the debt measures might accrue costs
on services like increased loan counseling for
graduates that could help improve results on
measures like the repayment rate without any
substantive changes to their offerings.
It is important to note that these costs are
associated with improved outcomes, and are
essential to ensuring that federal money goes
toward providing students with a valuable
education.
Some institutions that are not at risk of
failing the debt measures may also choose to
improve their programs as a result of this
regulation’s emphasis on gainful
employment. These additional expenses
could come in many different forms. For
example, an institution may choose to spend
more on curriculum development to better
link a program’s content to the needs of indemand and well-paying jobs in the
workforce. Institutions could also allocate
more funds toward other functions, such as
instruction to hire better faculty; providing
training to existing faculty to improve
program outcomes; tutoring or other support
services to assist struggling students; career
counseling to help students find jobs; or
other areas where increased investment
could yield improved performance on the
gainful employment measures. These are
costs that would likely not occur only at
institutions with failing or barely-passing
programs, as institutions frequently take
steps to improve all facets of the product they
are providing students. Institutions could
recoup some or all of the costs associated
with program improvement from improving
the retention of students, which will generate
additional tuition and fee revenues.
Because there is significant variation in the
types of institutions that will take on these
improvement costs, the type of reforms they
will employ, it is difficult for us to quantify
the amount of these additional costs.
The Department will monitor
programmatic improvements against a wide
variety of performance measures as the rule
is implemented, consistent with Executive
Order 13563. While today, many
postsecondary education institutions use
general labor market data from the BLS to
evaluate the ‘‘value proposition’’ for
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
prospective students, these institutions, as
early as 2012, will have data on the actual
performance of their former students. This
information, which, as discussed above, will
be extremely important for prospective
students, also will help shape the changes
that are made to the programs offered to
ensure compliance with these rules.
Distributional Effects (Transfers)
While the overall costs and benefits of this
rule are discussed above, there are also
certain ‘‘transfers’’ or distributional effects
associated with the reallocation of resources
between different sectors of society.
Transfers Affecting Institutional Revenues
For institutions, the impact of the final
regulations is mixed. Institutions with failing
programs, including programs that lose
eligibility, are likely to see lower revenues.
On the other hand, institutions with highperforming programs are likely to see
growing enrollment and revenue and to
benefit from additional market information
that permits institutions to demonstrate the
value of their programs.
Under our two scenarios, we estimate that
the for-profit education sector would see a
cumulative drop in revenue annually, on
average, of $338.1 million a year. This
estimate does not include paperwork and
compliance costs, because it reflects only
transfers. The projected decrease in annual
revenue represents less than 2 percent of the
sector’s estimated $26 billion in revenue in
2009, the most recent year for which data are
available. By contrast, data reported by forprofit institutions to IPEDS show that schools
in the for-profit sector had an average
revenue growth of 13 percent per year over
the five-year period from 2004–05 to 2008–
09 (not including investment revenue). Some
of the decrease in revenue will take the form
of a transfer of tuition and fee revenues from
failing programs to other programs when
students change schools. Another portion
will take the form of a transfer of Federal
student aid money from failing programs to
the Federal government when students who
previously attended failing programs choose
not to pursue further education. Finally, a
portion of the decrease in revenue will take
the form of a transfer of loans and cash
tuition payments from failing programs to the
students themselves when students choose
not to pursue further education. See Table 14
for more details.
We estimate that the effects of these
regulations on net revenue for the for-profit
education industry will be less—$60.8
million per year on average. This estimate
does not include paperwork and compliance
costs, because it reflects only transfers. The
effects on net revenue are smaller because
schools will either reduce expenses due to a
lessened need for instructors or take in new
revenue as students transfer into successful
programs.
While the regulations will have the effect
of reducing the revenue of the for-profit
postsecondary education industry as a whole,
they also may have the effect of increasing
revenue for companies whose programs pass
the debt measures. The Department estimates
that, as a result of these regulations, between
115,000 and 141,000 students will transfer
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
between one for-profit institution and
another by 2015. The movement of students
from low performing programs at one
institution to a better performing program at
another institution will cause stronger
programs to grow and, likely, produce larger
profits.
Additional analysis of the regulations’
impact on small businesses is presented in
the Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
section of this RIA.
Transfers Affecting Federal, State, and Local
Governments
Several commenters argued that the cost
estimates of the effects of the proposed
regulations were incomplete because they
did not take into account the full cost of
other sectors of higher education, including
other government subsidies provided to
public or private nonprofit institutions. In
particular, the commenters noted that public
institutions receive direct funding from
States and private nonprofit institutions are
exempt from taxes. The commenters also
indicated that the Department had
misinterpreted a study by the Florida Office
of Program Policy and Government
Accountability about the costs of for-profit
and public sector institutions. Some
commenters provided estimates that
suggested including these subsidies in the
effects calculations would result in increased
costs to taxpayers if students shift from
institutions in the for-profit sectors to public
or private, nonprofit institutions. The largest
cost estimate came from the Parthenon
Group, which estimated that between
465,000 and 660,000 students would shift
from for-profit institutions to community
colleges each year, resulting in a cost of an
additional $2 billion annually for community
colleges to serve these students. However, we
estimate that most of those that fail to enroll
or leave a failing program will enroll in
another program offered by a for-profit
institution. The data that will be available
under the rule will be used by institutions
offering strong programs in terms of
economic return to differentiate those
programs from those of their less effective
competitors.
Federal Revenues
The cost implications for the Federal
Government result largely from changes to
tax revenues and changes to expenditures on
student aid. Federal tax revenues would fall
to the extent that for-profit education
companies pay less in corporate taxes,
institutions lay off employees, or fewer
students earn credentials that could increase
their earnings. On the other hand, Federal tax
revenue would increase to the extent that
institutions improve the performance of their
programs and students transfer to better
performing programs, which could lead to
higher completion rates and credentials that
carry greater economic benefits. As seen in
Table 14, there is also a small transfer of
money from failing programs to the Federal
Government when students who previously
received Federal aid drop out of those
programs. As discussed in more depth in the
Net Budget Impacts section, the net effect is
difficult to estimate reliably but is likely to
be small, around $23 million to $51 million
PO 00000
Frm 00109
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
34493
in savings to the Federal Government
annually, depending on whether one uses the
low dropout or high dropout scenario.
State and Local Government Costs
The impact of the regulations on State
income tax revenue will be similar to the
impact on Federal revenue, and it is also
likely to be small. There may also be an
impact on State and local expenditures on
higher education. We do not dictate to State
or local governments how they should
choose to spend their funds on higher
education. Nor do we interfere with their
own independent decisions to expand
enrollment, determinations that are typically
made as part of a long-term planning process.
Given that States possess full control over
whether or not to expand enrollment, it is
incorrect to attribute any costs associated
with these independent decisions to these
regulations.
The higher cost estimate suggested by some
commenters assumes States expanding
enrollment face marginal costs that are
similar to their average cost or that they will
only choose to expand through traditional
brick-and-mortar institutions. In fact, many
States across the country are experimenting
with innovative models that use different
methods of instruction and content delivery
that allow students to complete courses faster
and at a lower cost. Rather than adding
additional buildings or campuses, States may
instead opt to expand distance education
offerings or try innovative practices like
those used by the Western Governors
University, which awards credit when
students demonstrate they have mastered
competency of the material. Forecasting the
extent to which future growth would occur
in traditional settings versus distance
education or some other model is outside the
scope of this analysis.
Finally, a crucial assumption in estimating
the increase in cost is that the expense per
completion in the for-profit sector is lower
than it is in the public sector. Such
assumptions, however, fail to account for
concerns about the quality of a degree.
Producing large numbers of certificates or
degrees that leave students with
unmanageable debt burdens and poor
employment prospects is not preferable to
students earning credentials that, while more
expensive to obtain, result in students
earning higher and more stable incomes.
Reducing such discussions about cost solely
to monetary elements fails to recognize the
important dimension around quality that
these regulations also seek to capture. It also
fails to take into consideration the fact those
institutions offering strong programs, in
terms of economic return, will use this
information to differentiate the programs
they offer from those of their less effective
competitors and, thus, enroll more students.
VI. Paperwork Burden Costs
In assessing the potential impact of these
regulations, the Department recognizes that
certain provisions are likely to increase
workload for some program participants.
This additional workload is discussed in
more detail under the Paperwork Reduction
Act of 1995 section of the preamble.
Additional workload would normally be
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
34494
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
burden on institutions, using wage data
developed using BLS data, available at https://
www.bls.gov/ncs/ect/sp/ecsuphst.pdf, is
$5,443,820, as shown in Table 23. This cost
was based on an hourly rate of $22.12 that
was used to reflect increased management
time to establish new data collection
procedures associated with the gainful
employment provisions. The final regulations
will also increase the paperwork burden on
students by an estimated 22,516 hours as
they read the debt warnings from
institutions. The monetized cost of this
additional burden on students, using wage
data developed using BLS data, available at
https://www.bls.gov/ncs/ect/sp/ecsuphst.pdf,
is $376,468.
Table 22 relates the estimated burden for
institutions of each paperwork requirement
to the hours and costs estimated in the
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 section of
this preamble. The largest burden comes
from the optional reporting of tuition and
fees to limit the amount of debt included in
the debt-to-earnings calculation. The
estimated burden of reporting tuition and fee
information about students is 233,595 hours
and $5,167,121.
Prior to the issuance of the draft debt-toearnings ratios, the Secretary will provide a
list to institutions, of students that will be
included in the applicable two- or four-year
period used to calculate the debt-to-earnings
ratios beginning in FY 2012. Institutions will
have 30 days after the date the list is sent to
the institution to provide corrections such as
evidence that a student should be included
or excluded from the list or to submit
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
PO 00000
Frm 00110
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
BILLING CODE 4000–01–P
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
ER13JN11.052
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
expected to result in estimated costs
associated with either the hiring of additional
employees or opportunity costs related to the
reassignment of existing staff from other
activities. In total, these regulations are
estimated to increase burden on institutions
participating in the title IV, HEA student
assistance programs by 261,512 hours per
year. The monetized cost of this additional
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
corrected or updated student identity
information. The estimated burden from
these pre-draft data challenges is 2,772 hours
and $61,317. After the issuance of draft debt
measures, institutions will have the ability to
challenge the accuracy of the loan data for a
borrower that was used to calculate the draft
loan repayment rate, the list of borrowers
used to calculate the loan repayment rate, or
the median loan debt for the program that
was used in the numerator of the draft debtto-earnings ratio. The burden associated with
challenges to the draft debt measures is 4,620
hours annually at a cost of $102,194.
Programs that fail the debt measures may
demonstrate that a failing program would
meet a debt-to-earnings standard by
recalculating the debt-to-earnings ratios using
the median loan debt for the program and
using alternative earnings data from: a Statesponsored data system, an institutional
survey conducted in accordance with NCES
standards, or, for fiscal years 2012, 2013, and
2014, BLS data. The estimated burden of
notifying the Secretary of the intent to use
alternative earnings data and of supplying
the alternative earnings information is 4,655
hours and $102,969.
Additional items included in the burden
on institutions reported under OMB 1845–
0109 include an estimated burden of 15,311
hours for notifying students when an
institution voluntarily withdraws a failing
program from title IV, HEA participation and
the date when title IV, HEA aid will no
longer be available for the program and an
estimated 462 hours in issuing debt warnings
to current students. Together, these
provisions have an estimated cost to
institutions of $340,825. A total of 22,516
hours and $376,468 of burden on students for
reading the notice of voluntarily withdrawal
is recorded under OMB 1845–0109.
VII. Net Budget Impacts
The regulations are estimated to have a
positive net budget impact ranging between
$23 million (in the low dropout scenario) to
$51 million (in the high dropout scenario).
Consistent with the requirements of the
Credit Reform Act of 1990, budget cost
estimates for the student loan programs
reflect the estimated net present value of all
future non-administrative Federal costs
associated with a cohort of loans. (A cohort
reflects all loans originated in a given fiscal
year.)
These estimates were developed using the
Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB)
Credit Subsidy Calculator. The OMB
calculator takes projected future cash flows
from the Department’s student loan cost
estimation model and produces discounted
subsidy rates reflecting the net present value
of all future Federal costs associated with
awards made in a given fiscal year. Values
are calculated using a ‘‘basket of zeros’’
methodology under which each cash flow is
discounted using the interest rate of a zerocoupon Treasury bond with the same
maturity as that cash flow. To ensure
comparability across programs, this
methodology is incorporated into the
calculator and used government-wide to
develop estimates of the Federal cost of
credit programs. Accordingly, the
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
Department believes it is the appropriate
methodology to use in developing estimates
for these regulations. That said, in
developing the following Accounting
Statement, the Department consulted with
OMB on how to integrate our discounting
methodology with the discounting
methodology traditionally used in
developing regulatory impact analyses.
Absent evidence of the impact of these
regulations on student behavior, budget cost
estimates were based on behavior as reflected
in various Department data sets and
longitudinal surveys listed under
Assumptions, Limitations, and Data Sources.
Program cost estimates were generated by
running projected cash flows related to each
provision through the Department’s student
loan cost estimation model. Student loan cost
estimates are developed across five risk
categories: For-profit institutions (less than 2year), 2-year institutions, freshmen/
sophomores at 4-year institutions, juniors/
seniors at 4-year institutions, and graduate
students. Risk categories have separate
assumptions based on the historical pattern
of behavior—for example, the likelihood of
default or the likelihood to use statutory
deferment or discharge benefits—of
borrowers in each category.
The scenarios presented in these final
regulations anticipate some small savings in
Federal student aid programs as students
who would have attended programs that fail
the debt measures elect not to pursue
postsecondary education and do not take out
Federal loans or receive Pell Grants. In some
years, costs from students not taking Federal
loans offset savings from Pell Grants.
As we estimate that many students who
transfer out of failing programs will continue
to receive student aid, the estimates for the
effects on the Federal student aid programs
are based on the number of students expected
to drop out under the high dropout and low
dropout scenarios described in this RIA.
Since some prospective students will decide
not to enroll and students already enrolled
may decide to leave postsecondary education
rather than re-enroll at another institution,
we estimate a small net Federal savings. Of
these estimated savings, approximately $26.2
million in the high dropout scenario and
$59.1 million in the low dropout scenario
would be from reductions in Pell Grants,
which are offset by estimated increased costs
in student loans. These potential savings
represent our best estimate of the effect of the
regulations on the Federal student aid
programs, but student responsiveness to
program performance, programs’ efforts to
improve performance, and potential
increases in retention rates could offset the
estimated savings.
Assumptions, Limitations, and Data Sources
The impact estimates provided in the
preceding section reflect a baseline in which
the changes implemented in these
regulations do not exist. Costs have been
quantified for five years.
In developing these estimates, a wide range
of data sources was used, including data from
the NSLDS; operational and financial data
from Department of Education systems; and
data from a range of surveys conducted by
PO 00000
Frm 00111
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
34495
NCES such as the 2007–2008 NPSAS, the
2008–09 IPEDS, and the 2009 follow-up to
the 2004 BPS. Data from other sources, such
as the U.S. Census Bureau and the Missouri
Department of Higher Education, were also
used. Data on administrative burden at
participating institutions are extremely
limited; accordingly, in the NPRM, the
Department expressed interest in receiving
comments in this area. We recognize that,
despite the Department’s diligent efforts and
extensive public input, there are limitations
in the best available data and there remains
some uncertainty about the impact of these
final regulations. Therefore, the Department
intends to monitor the implementation of
these regulations carefully, consider new
data as they become available to ensure
against unintended adverse consequences,
and reconsider relevant issues if the evidence
warrants. As additional data become
available, the Department may update these
estimates.
We identify and explain burdens
specifically associated with information
collection requirements in the Paperwork
Reduction Act of 1995 section of the
preamble.
VIII. Alternatives Considered
A number of commenters suggested
fundamentally different approaches for
defining ‘‘gainful employment.’’ Some of
these approaches, including graduation and
placement rates, a higher repayment rate
threshold, an index, alternative debt
measures, and default rates, were alternatives
discussed by the Department in the
negotiated rulemaking process, the NPRM, or
both. The alternatives suggested by
commenters are discussed below.
Return on Investment and Net Present Value
Some commenters argued that the
proposed gainful employment debt measures
evaluate only one aspect of the quality of
programs—whether a student’s initial debt
burden was reasonable—but fail to account
for other long-standing measures of program
quality or a student’s long-term return on his
or her educational investment. The
commenters believed that structuring
regulations in this manner may discourage
institutions from offering training in jobs
with the potential for long-term salary growth
for fear of losing program eligibility. For
example, based on BLS data, entry-level
salaries for graduates from programs for auto
technicians range from $19,840 to $25,970.
According to the commenters, salaries for
auto technicians may have long-term growth
potential because it can take a technician two
to five years after graduation to become fully
qualified. Mastering additional complex
specialties also requires the technician to
have years of experience and advanced
training. According to the commenters,
applying the proposed gainful employment
measures to these programs may prevent
students from pursuing training in these
necessary fields.
Some commenters offered that a more
reasonable measure of the quality of an
educational program would be the student’s
return on investment (ROI), not a first-year
debt service calculation. The commenters
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
34496
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
argued that a student’s initial capacity to
service debt should be one consideration in
judging educational program quality, but not
the essential metric. Instead, the analysis of
a program should take into account the
potential long term benefits and earnings.
Other commenters believed that, according
to finance theory, the only correct method for
determining the value of a program would be
a Net Present Value (NPV) approach that
considers the present value of all incremental
lifetime earnings stemming from the program
and the present value of the total costs of the
program. The commenters contended that,
even if it were economically rational to base
the regulations on another approach, the
proposed regulations are economically
irrational because the debt-to-earnings and
loan repayment tests are based on arbitrary
three- and four-year evaluation periods that
are too short to fairly reflect the benefits of
education.
While we appreciate the suggestion to
incorporate a return on investment
calculation into these final regulations, we
believe there are significant theoretical and
practical reasons for not doing so. To be sure,
an ROI or NPV approach helps to distinguish
among competing investment opportunities.
However, inherent in an ROI or NPV
calculation is a specified discount rate so that
all future cash flows (income as well as
expenses) can be described in terms of
present-day values. Thus the selection of an
appropriate discount rate is key to this
calculation. If the Department were to
implement an ROI or NPV calculation in the
proposed metrics, it would have no basis for
establishing a discount rate for borrowers
who make personal investment decisions
with respect to pursuing postsecondary
education programs.
The Department agrees that there are longterm benefits, in particular with respect to
increased lifetime earnings, for those with
formal education or training beyond high
school. However, those earnings accrue of the
course of a career that could span three or
four decades. Measurements of program
performance 30 or 40 years in the past would
not be meaningful for helping institutions
improve or for protecting students against
low-quality programs. We do know from The
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
conducted by the BLS that the length of time
an employee remains with the same
employer tends to be shorter for younger
workers and that the average worker will
have about eleven different jobs in the first
25 years or so of his or her working
lifetime.26 However, we are unaware of any
on-going, longitudinal tracking of work-life
earnings by specific occupation.
Retention, Completion, and Placement Rates
Some commenters suggested a variety of
alternative measures for determining whether
a program leads to gainful employment
including retention rates, employment rates,
job placement rates adjusted for local
economic conditions, and completion rates.
Other commenters believed there was no
26 Bureau of Labor Statistics, National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth, available at https://
www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/nlsoy.pdf
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
need to further define gainful employment
because (1) national accrediting agencies
require that the majority of students graduate
and find jobs in the field in which they were
trained, or (2) students who pass State
licensing examinations are gainfully
employable.
We likewise appreciate the suggestions to
use retention rates, employment rates, job
placement rates, and completion rates as
alternative measures. During the negotiation
sessions, some non-Federal negotiators
objected to a proposal for using graduation
rates on the ground that the proposed
standard was too demanding, but they did
not propose an alternative. Some negotiators
also raised concerns about the ability of
institutions to obtain valid placement
information from graduates and employers.
In the Program Integrity Issues final
regulations published on October 29, 2010,
the Department required disclosure of
program-level graduation and placement
rates. Based on the information we have
available, using them as a measure of
whether a program leads to gainful
employment would be premature.
Default Rates
Some commenters suggested the use of
default rates to measure program
performance. The application of default rates
to institutional eligibility is one tool that
Congress has used that is related to debt
burdens. Under current law, prospective
students are not allowed to use their Federal
aid at an institution where its former
students had a high default rate. However,
the cohort default rate only includes
borrowers who defaulted by going 360 days
without making a payment within two years
of entering repayment. These borrowers
represent only a small portion of borrowers
who are struggling with their loans. The
default measurement does not include
borrowers who are in late stages of
delinquency, even if they default after two
years. The metric also does not include those
who are delinquent on their payments or
borrowers who cease making payments
without defaulting by receiving a forbearance
or deferment. A significant number of
borrowers fall into these categories.
According to a recent study of students in the
2005 cohort by the Institute for Higher
Education Policy, 26 percent of borrowers
became delinquent on their loans at some
point.27 Because of the concerns outlined
above, the repayment rate better captures the
experience of all these individuals who are
struggling to repay their loans.
Gainful Employment Index
Other commenters suggested that the
Department use a composite score based on
default, graduation, and placement rates. The
commenters argued that institutions with
exceptional, industry-determined rates have
proven their success in providing quality
education and therefore should be allowed to
27 Alisa F. Cunningham and Gregory S. Kienzl,
‘‘Delinquency: The Untold Story of Student Loan
Borrowing,’’ March 2011, available at https://
www.ihep.org/assets/files/publications/a-f/
DelinquencyThe_Untold_Story_FINAL_March_2011.pdf.
PO 00000
Frm 00112
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
continue serving their students without
impediments. The commenters noted that
Representative Robert Andrews pioneered a
composite index in the 1990s and suggested
using default, graduation, and placement
rates along with the number of Pell Grant
recipients to determine an overall score for
an institution. According to the commenters,
factoring in Pell Grant information would
acknowledge the unhappy truth that lowincome students are less likely to complete
higher education programs. To avoid
punishing schools for accepting these
students into their programs, the commenters
suggested the Department use a formula that
would acknowledge the extra difficulties
faced by students at a lower socioeconomic
level. Some commenters supporting the
composite index approach suggested
weighting the placement rate at 50 percent,
the cohort default rate at 30 percent, and the
graduation rate at 20 percent.
The commenters argued that a composite
index approach is superior to the proposed
debt measures in the following ways. First,
the composite index would not rely on one
characteristic (debt load) or a complex loan
repayment rate, but on a number of
outcomes, most importantly the employment
of graduates. Second, the index could be
implemented readily since cohort default and
graduation rates are already tracked by the
Department, and the great majority of forprofit colleges already track student
placement. Third, this approach is analogous
to the currently used financial responsibility
composite score for institutions that
integrates a basket of three financial
measures into one index. Finally, it measures
outcomes at the institutional level, rather
than the program level, reducing complexity
and difficulty in implementing a gainful
employment standard. The commenters
stated that the index approach could be
implemented relatively rapidly without
disrupting the market and risking unintended
consequences. If the metrics need refinement,
the commenters offered that the Department
could implement the index, and over the
next 36 months redefine how default rates
are measured (potentially moving to
measuring the repayment of principal in
dollars) and how graduation rates are
measured (potentially moving to track all
students). Alternatively, it could apply the
index at the program level after the relevant
information is gathered and analyzed.
Although the concept of a composite index
is appealing, the suggested index uses some
of the same indicators, which in our view fall
short of directly evaluating a program’s
performance. The specific indicators suffer
from important shortcomings: default rates
measure only a portion of the borrowers who
have had difficulty repaying their loans, the
statutory definition of graduation rate
excludes transfer and part-time students, and
placement rates are defined differently by
accrediting agencies and States. Applying the
composite index at the institutional level
would mask poorly performing programs
because only the overall performance of the
institution, not each program, would be
evaluated. Moreover, if the institution’s
overall performance was subpar, the
composite index would jeopardize the
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
eligibility of the entire institution. By using
purpose-built measures applied at the
program level, these regulations effectively
target poor-performing programs without
necessarily placing the entire institution at
risk because only those programs become
ineligible for title IV, HEA funds. Finally, the
Department does not believe that programs
enrolling lower-income students cannot help
those students achieve success and would be
concerned about the consequences for
writing into law lower expectations for the
future employment and debt repayment of
those students.
Earnings Comparison
Commenters also suggested that the
Department use, particularly for short-term
programs, a comparison of pre-program and
post-program earnings to capture the nearterm effect of the program. This approach has
some merit conceptually. However, earnings
immediately before enrollment may not be an
accurate measure of an individual’s baseline
earning potential without the program. Preenrollment earnings are particularly unlikely
to reflect earnings potential for dependent
students, workers returning to school after
becoming unemployed, or those using their
training to switch fields. Moreover, such a
measurement would not identify programs
where large numbers of students are taking
out debts they cannot afford to repay.
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
Disclosure
A number of commenters recommended
that the Department require additional
disclosures so that consumers can make
better-informed decisions. The final
regulations do create a number of additional
disclosures to help students make informed
choices among institutions and programs.
However, disclosures alone cannot serve as a
standard for determining whether a program
complies with the gainful employment
requirement in the statute. For example, with
a disclosure approach an institution might
report that one of its programs did not place
a single graduate into a job, yet the program
would remain eligible as ‘‘preparing students
for gainful employment in a recognized
occupation’’ because it disclosed the fact that
it had failed to do so.
Delay for Further Study and Data Collection
Some commenters recommended that the
Department delay the issuance of final
regulations to allow further study of the
issues around gainful employment programs.
Some commenters mentioned that the
Government Accountability Office is
currently studying related issues. Other
commenters expressed the view that the
Department should establish procedures to
calculate each program’s repayment rate and
debt-to-earnings ratios before using those
measures to set program eligibility to reduce
the uncertainty around the impact of the
regulations and give institutions more time to
improve their programs.
The Department believes that action is
urgently needed to address the problem of
poorly performing gainful employment
programs. Each year of delay would likely
mean hundreds of thousands of additional
students enrolling in programs that are likely
to leave them with unaffordable debts and
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
poor employment prospects. The process of
developing these regulations has taken nearly
two years and involved unprecedented levels
of public engagement, including three public
hearings in the spring of 2009, three
negotiated rulemaking sessions in the winter
of 2009–10, and the postponement of the
final regulations by eight months to allow the
careful consideration of over 90,000
comments, two additional public hearings in
October 2010, and dozens of additional
meetings with individuals and organizations
who commented on the NPRM. In addition,
the Department has carefully analyzed the
information and data available to it from
public sources, its research activities, and the
Federal financial aid program.
Finally, the Department has revised the
regulations to provide programs with an
opportunity to improve their performance
before losing eligibility. In 2011, the
Department will release data to institutions
on an informational basis, helping them
identify and improve their failing programs.
No programs will lose eligibility until they
have failed the debt measures for three out
of four FYs. When the first eligibility losses
occur in 2014, they will be limited to the
lowest-performing 5 percent of programs. To
help institutions anticipate the impact of the
regulations, the Department is prepared to
accept BLS earnings information during a
transition period of three years, and the
repayment rate measure has been designed to
recognize programs demonstrating rapid
improvement.
IX. Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
These gainful employment regulations will
affect institutions that participate in the title
IV, HEA programs, and individual students
and loan borrowers. The U.S. Small Business
Administration (SBA) Size Standards define
for-profit institutions as ‘‘small businesses’’ if
they are independently owned and operated
and not dominant in their field of operation
with total annual revenue below $7,000,000.
The SBA Size Standards define nonprofit
institutions as small organizations if they are
independently owned and operated and not
dominant in their field of operation, or as
small entities if they are institutions
controlled by governmental entities with
populations below 50,000. The revenues
involved in the sector affected by these
regulations, and the concentration of
ownership of institutions by private owners
or public systems means that the number of
title IV, HEA eligible institutions that are
small entities would be limited but for the
fact that the nonprofit entities fit within the
definition of a small organization regardless
of revenue. Additionally, the concentration
of small entities in the sectors directly
affected by these provisions and the potential
for some of the programs offered by those
entities to lose eligibility to participate in the
title IV, HEA programs led to the preparation
of this Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis.
Description of the Reasons That Action by
the Agency Is Being Considered
The Secretary is establishing through these
regulations a definition of gainful
employment in a recognized occupation by
establishing what we consider, for purposes
PO 00000
Frm 00113
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
34497
of meeting the requirements of section 102 of
the HEA, to be a reasonable relationship
between the loan debt incurred by students
in a training program and income earned
from employment after the student completes
the training. The regulations clarify, for
purposes of establishing a student’s
eligibility to receive title IV, HEA funds, a
program’s eligibility based on providing
training that leads to gainful employment in
a recognized occupation. An institution must
provide a warning to students and
prospective students if a program does not
pass any of the debt measures.
Student debt is more prevalent and
individual borrowers are incurring more debt
than ever before. Twenty years ago, only one
in six full-time freshmen at 4-year public
colleges and universities took out a Federal
student loan; now more than half do. Today,
nearly two-thirds of all graduating college
seniors carry student loan debt, up from less
than one-half a generation ago. All other
things being equal, any former students
would be better off leaving college without
debt. The less debt a student has, the more
funds they are able to devote to buying a
home, saving for retirement or for their
children’s education, or serving the
community. Student loan debt is worth
having if it makes it possible to gain the
education and training that enhances
productivity as a citizen, civic leader,
worker, or entrepreneur. To the extent that
the student loan debt brings little or no
benefit to the students (or to society), it is a
cost that public policy should attempt to
minimize or eliminate. It is in this context
that the requirement that a program of study
must lead to ‘‘gainful employment’’ can best
be understood. The cost of excess student
debt manifests in three significant ways:
payment burdens on the borrower; subsidies
from taxpayers; and the negative
consequences of default (which fall on the
borrower and taxpayers).
The concept of training leading to gainful
employment was intended to ensure that this
connection between debt and earnings would
not be lost. The Department, however, has
historically applied the barest minimum
enforcement: when applying to access
Federal funds, the institution must check a
box that says its programs ‘‘prepare students
for gainful employment in a recognized
occupation.’’ 28 While the Department does
audit and review other aspects of program
eligibility (such as the length of the program),
there is no standard for determining whether
a program in fact meets the gainful
employment requirement.
As described in this RIA, the trends in
graduates’ earnings, student loan debt,
defaults, and repayment underscore the need
for the Department to act. The gainful
employment standard takes into
consideration repayment rates on Federal
student loans and the relationship between
total student loan debt and earnings after
completion of a postsecondary program, and
in some cases of new or additional programs,
28 The application form is available at https://
www.eligcert.ed.gov/ows-doc/eapp.pdf. Most
institutions complete an electronic version of the
form.
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
the institution’s application to the
Department to target the worst-performing
programs and to encourage institutions to
improve their programs.
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
Succinct Statement of the Objectives of, and
Legal Basis for, the Regulations
As discussed under the heading Legal
Authority in the Analysis of Comments and
Changes section of the preamble, the gainful
employment regulations are intended to
address growing concerns about high levels
of loan debt for students enrolled in
postsecondary programs that presumptively
provide training that leads to gainful
employment in a recognized occupation. The
HEA applies different criteria for determining
the eligibility of programs and institutions for
title IV, HEA program funds. For public and
private nonprofit institutions, degree
programs of greater than one year in length
are generally eligible for title IV, HEA aid
regardless of the subject or purpose of the
program so long as they meet other
requirements. In the case of shorter programs
and programs of any length at for-profit
institutions, eligibility is restricted to
programs that ‘‘prepare students for gainful
The structure of the regulations and the
small numbers provisions in the final
regulations reduce the effect of the
regulations on small entities but complicate
the analysis. The regulations provide for the
evaluation of individual gainful employment
programs offered by postsecondary
institutions, but these programs are
administered by the institution, either at the
branch level or on a system-wide basis. Many
institutions have programs that would be
considered small, but the classification for
this analysis is at the institutional level since
a program that is determined ineligible under
the regulations would affect the institution’s
ability to operate. Of the 1,440 for-profit
institutions with less than $7 million in
revenues, approximately 76 percent have
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
Description of and, Where Feasible, an
Estimate of the Number of Small Entities to
Which the Regulations Will Apply
These final regulations apply to programs
eligible for title IV, HEA funding because
they prepare students for gainful
employment. At this time, the Department
does not have an accurate count of the
number of programs offered by institutions.
However, we estimate that as many as 13,728
programs offered by small entities could be
subject to these regulations. The proxy used
for the number of ‘‘programs’’ is IPEDS
Completions data. It counts each instance of
a six-digit CIP code (area of study) by award
level. So, for example, if an institution
awards a certificate in business as well as a
bachelor’s degree and a master’s degree, the
programs are counted as three separate
programs. The programs are aggregated to the
six-digit ID level so that they can be looked
at with the repayment data, and the number
of programs is unduplicated as a program
offered at multiple locations represented by
the six-digit OPEID is considered one
program. Given that the category of small
entities includes some private nonprofit
institutions regardless of revenues, a wide
range of small entities is covered by the
regulations. The entities may include
institutions with multiple programs, a few of
which are covered by the regulations, to
single-program institutions with well
established ties to a local employer base.
Many of the programs subject to the
regulations are offered by for-profit
institutions and public and private nonprofit
institutions with programs less than two
years in length. As demonstrated in Table 24,
these sectors have a greater concentration of
small entities. Across all sectors, the average
total revenue for entities with revenue below
$7 million is $2,439,483 based on IPEDS
2008–2009 data.
fewer than five programs and the loss of title
IV, HEA eligibility for any program would be
more likely to cause the institution to shut
down than would be the case for larger
entities with multiple programs.
The small numbers provision finalized in
these regulations requires 30 completers for
the debt-to-earnings ratios and 30 borrowers
entering repayment in the applicable 2YP,
2YP–A, 2YP–R, 4YP, or 4YP–R for
calculation of the debt measures in order for
a program to fail the debt measures and
potentially be found ineligible. To develop
the data necessary to calculate the debt
measures, the Department will be entering
into a data matching agreement with another
Federal agency that has income data, most
likely the SSA. The data matching agreement
will not permit us to be able to identify an
individual program completer’s income.
Therefore, we will need to assure that data
for particular individuals will not be
identifiable. To ensure individual data are
not identifiable, we will need to suppress
small cell sizes based on the requirements of
the other Federal agency, which currently
requires more than ten individuals.
Under the NPRM, the treatment of
programs with a small number of completers
was not fully determined. The Department
requested comments about small programs in
the NPRM, and many commenters did
request clarification on how programs with a
small number of completers would be
treated. While the possibility of rolling up
data first from six- to four-digit CIP codes,
employment in a recognized occupation.’’
This difference in eligibility is longstanding
and has been retained through many
amendments to the HEA. As recently as the
HEOA, Congress again adopted this distinct
treatment of for-profit institutions while
adding an exception for certain liberal arts
baccalaureate programs at some for-profit
institutions.
PO 00000
Frm 00114
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
ER13JN11.053
34498
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
then from four- to two-digit CIP code
families, then to the entire institution was
considered in the NPRM, this approach was
rejected.
Under these final regulations, programs
that do not have a minimum of 30 completers
or borrowers in the 2YP, 2YP–A, or 2YP–R
will be evaluated for a four-year period
consisting of years three to six in repayment
(4Y–P) or years six to nine in repayment
(4YP–R). Programs that do not have a
minimum of 30 completers or borrowers in
the 4YP or 4YP–R will not be evaluated for
ineligibility. If the list of completers the
Department sends to SSA has more than 30
individuals, the mean or median earnings
calculated by SSA will be used to evaluate
the program’s debt-to-earnings ratios, even if
the number of completers used in the
calculation is less than 30 after SSA removes
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
any identity mismatches from the list of
completers. Programs with fewer than 10
completers in the relevant calculation period
cannot be evaluated with data from SSA and
the debt-to-earnings ratios will not be
produced for those programs. Ultimately, if
there are insufficient observations, we will
not be able to assess an institution’s
performance against the debt measures and,
in this circumstance, the program is
considered to satisfy the debt measures.
The small numbers provision brings the
estimated number of programs that could
become ineligible under the regulations
down from 55,405 to 21,049 programs at all
institutions and from 13,566 to 5,728
programs at small entities. Table 25
demonstrates the effect of the small numbers
provision on small entities by sector and
revenue category. Across all sectors and
PO 00000
Frm 00115
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
34499
revenue categories, approximately 62 percent
of regulated programs would not have
enough completers to be determined
ineligible based on existing completions data.
While the 30 completer or borrower
minimum means that a significant percentage
of programs will not be ineligible, it does
reduce the chance that the performance of
one or two borrowers could result in large
variability in a program’s performance on the
debt measures from year to year.
Additionally, while the percentage of
programs to which the small numbers
provision applies is high, especially for the
four-year institutions, the regulated programs
with at least 31 completers still represent
approximately 92 percent of enrollment in
regulated programs at small entities.
BILLING CODE 4000–01–P
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
The combination of the small numbers
provision and the estimated performance of
these programs on the debt measures limit
the number of programs at small entities as
defined by the Small Business
Administration that can be found ineligible
under the debt measures. While private
nonprofit institutions are classified as small
entities, our estimates indicate that no more
than 4.9 percent of programs at those
institutions are likely to fail the debt
measures, with an even smaller percentage
likely to be found ineligible. It is unlikely
that the number of ineligible programs would
reach the 5 percent ineligibility cap available
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
based on FY 2014 data. The governmental
entities controlling public sector institutions
are not expected to fall below the 50,000
threshold for small status under the SBA’s
Size Standards, but even if they do, programs
at public sector institutions are highly
unlikely to fail the debt measures. Therefore,
our analysis of the effects on small entities
focuses on the for-profit sectors. From the
estimates described in the Analysis of the
Regulations section above, the percentage of
programs subject to evaluation in the forprofit sectors likely to be found ineligible is
7.1 percent for 4-year institutions, 6.4 percent
for 2-year institutions, and 1.8 percent for
PO 00000
Frm 00116
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
less-than-2-year institutions. When modeled
using the small entities only, those
percentages were 6.3 percent, 4.5 percent,
and 1.4 percent respectively. Tables 26 A–C
and 27 A–C present the results for programs
when the model runs are limited to small
entities. As indicated above, these results are
slightly better than the performance of the
full set of institutions. Among programs that
are not subject to the small numbers
provision, small entities have a higher
percentage of programs with initial
repayment rates above 35 percent.
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
ER13JN11.054
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
34500
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
PO 00000
Frm 00117
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4725
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
34501
ER13JN11.055
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
VerDate Mar<15>2010
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
PO 00000
Frm 00118
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4725
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
ER13JN11.056
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
34502
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
enrollee average revenue and expense
amounts by sector for small entities.
PO 00000
Frm 00119
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
ER13JN11.057
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
The revenue profile and cost structure of
small entities vary from that of the overall set
of institutions. Table 28 provides per-
34503
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
The number of students from small entities
estimated to drop out of education or transfer
out of programs at small entities as a result
of those programs failing the gainful
employment debt measures or becoming
ineligible and the accompanying revenue
effects are shown in Table 30. The effects of
incoming transfers are estimated by applying
the share of small entities in a sector to the
estimated number of students transferring
into the sector in the results generated by the
model runs for the full set of institutions
described in this Regulatory Impact Analysis.
Small entities that fail the debt measures and
eventually become ineligible are more likely
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
to close than larger institutions with multiple
programs. As a result, the sector revenue
losses presented in Table 29 assume that
small entities lose 85 percent of total
revenues per enrollee leaving failing and
ineligible programs, while all institutions
lose 100 percent of tuition and fee revenues
per enrollee leaving failing and ineligible
programs. The estimated cumulative drop in
revenue from small entities resulting from
students transferring or dropping out of
programs that fail the gainful employment
debt measures is $91.8 million from
programs at for-profit institutions in a fouryear period, an average of $22.9 million
PO 00000
Frm 00120
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
annually. When offset by the potential
revenue gains or expense reductions, the
estimated net effects are a $49.5 million loss
over four years for programs at for-profit
institutions, an average annual loss of $12.4
million. This estimate does not include
paperwork and compliance costs, because it
reflects only transfers. These estimates are
based on student transfers coming in from
small entities only and inter-sector transfers
from small for-profit entities. Transfers in
from large entities could offer small entities
opportunities for additional net revenues that
would offset these estimated losses.
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
ER13JN11.058
34504
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
PO 00000
Frm 00121
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4725
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
34505
ER13JN11.059
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
VerDate Mar<15>2010
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
PO 00000
Frm 00122
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4725
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
ER13JN11.060
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
34506
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
While many programs at small entities
would not be determined ineligible under the
small numbers provisions and their
performance on the debt measures, it is still
important for the Department to have data on
all of these programs for several reasons. As
for all programs, they would be required to
disclose their performance. The Department
believes that students considering or
attending programs with small numbers of
borrowers or completers will find the debt
measures useful in their decision-making
process, even as the Department believes that
a larger sample is needed to make reliable
eligibility determinations. These data will
also be useful to institutions seeking to
improve the performance of their programs or
considering expanding enrollment in their
programs. Finally, examining these programs’
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
data over time will help the Department
evaluate the performance of all gainful
employment programs. The estimated costs
associated with complying with the data
collection and reporting requirements are
summarized below.
Description of the Projected Reporting,
Recordkeeping and Other Compliance
Requirements of the Regulations, Including
an Estimate of the Classes of Small Entities
That Will Be Subject to the Requirement and
the Type of Professional Skills Necessary for
Preparation of the Report or Record
Table 30 relates the estimated burden of
each information collection requirement to
the hours and costs estimated in the
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 section of
the preamble. This additional workload is
discussed in more detail under the
PO 00000
Frm 00123
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 section of
the preamble. Additional workload would
normally be expected to result in estimated
costs associated with either the hiring of
additional employees or opportunity costs
related to the reassignment of existing staff
from other activities. In total, these changes
are estimated to increase burden on small
entities participating in the title IV, HEA
programs by 30,339 hours per year. The
monetized cost of this additional burden on
institutions, using wage data developed using
BLS data available at https://www.bls.gov/ncs/
ect/sp/ecsuphst.pdf, is $671,093. This cost
was based on an hourly rate of $22.12 that
was used to reflect increased management
time to establish new data collection
procedures associated with the gainful
employment provisions.
BILLING CODE 4000–01–P
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
ER13JN11.061
BILLING CODE 4000–01–C
34507
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
Table 30 relates the estimated burden for
small entities of each paperwork requirement
to the hours and costs estimated in the
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 section of
this preamble. The largest burden comes
from the optional reporting of tuition and
fees to limit the amount of debt included in
the debt-to-earnings calculation. The
estimated burden for small entities of
reporting tuition and fee information about
students is 23,360 hours and $516,712.
Prior to the issuance of the draft debt-toearnings ratios, the Secretary will provide a
list to institutions of students that will be
included in the applicable two- or four-year
period used to calculate the debt-to-earnings
ratios beginning in FY 2012. Institutions will
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
have 30 days after the date the list is sent to
the institution, to provide corrections such
as, evidence that a student should be
included or excluded from the list or to
submit corrected or updated student identity
information. The estimated burden from
these pre-draft data challenges is 1,155 hours
and $25,742. After the issuance of draft debt
measures, institutions will have the ability to
challenge the accuracy of the loan data for a
borrower that was used to calculate the draft
loan repayment rate, the list of borrowers
used to calculate the loan repayment rate, or
the median loan debt for the program that
was used in the numerator of the draft debtto-earnings ratio. The burden associated with
challenges to the draft debt measures is 2,772
PO 00000
Frm 00124
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
hours annually at a cost of $61,317. Programs
that fail the debt measures may demonstrate
that a failing program would meet a debt-toearnings standard by recalculating the debtto-earnings ratios using the median loan debt
for the program and using alternative
earnings data from: a State-sponsored data
system, an institutional survey conducted in
accordance with NCES standards, or, for
fiscal years 2012, 2013, and 2014, BLS data.
The estimated burden of notifying the
Secretary of the intent to use alternative
earnings data and of supplying the
alternative earnings information is 1,164
hours and $25,742.
Additional items included in the burden
estimate for institutions reported under OMB
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
ER13JN11.062
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
34508
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
1845–0109 include an estimated burden of
3,852 hours for notifying the Secretary and
students when an institution voluntarily
withdraws a failing program from title IV,
HEA participation and the date when title IV,
HEA aid will no longer be available for the
program and an estimated 116 hours in
issuing debt warnings to current students.
Together, these provisions have an estimated
cost of $113,503 for small entities.
Identification, to the Extent Practicable, of
All Relevant Federal Regulations That May
Duplicate, Overlap, or Conflict With the
Regulations
The regulations are unlikely to conflict
with or duplicate existing Federal
regulations. Under existing law and
regulations administered by the Department,
institutions are required to disclose data in
a number of complementary areas related to
the regulations. For example, among the
information that institutions must disclose
under the HEA is price information including
a ‘‘net price’’ calculator and a pricing
summary page. The additional information
required by these final regulations will help
students make informed decisions about the
affordability of their student loan debts and
the performance of the covered programs.
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
Alternatives Considered
As described above, the Department
evaluated the regulations for their effect on
different types of institutions, including the
small entities that comprise approximately
60 percent of title IV, HEA eligible
institutions subject to these regulations. As
discussed in the Alternatives Considered
section of this RIA, several different
approaches were analyzed, including the use
of graduation and placement rates, disclosure
alone, a NPV return on investment analysis,
an index of factors, default rates, and higher
thresholds for the repayment rate. Default
rates are not used because a low default rate
is not synonymous with a low debt burden.
As noted earlier, forbearance, deferments for
economic hardship and unemployment, and
income-contingent and income-based
repayment are important consumer
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
protections that help keep former students
out of default; however cohort default rates,
alone, are not an adequate standard for
assessment of whether a program prepares
students for gainful employment. Nor can
disclosure serve as a standard for
determining whether a program complies
with the gainful employment requirement in
the statute. For example, with a disclosure
approach an institution might report that one
of its programs did not place a single
graduate into a job, yet the program would
remain eligible as ‘‘preparing students for
gainful employment in a recognized
occupation’’ because it disclosed the fact that
it had failed to do so. For graduation and
placement rates, non-Federal negotiators
raised concerns about the ability of
institutions to obtain valid placement
information from graduates and employers.
Based on the information we have available,
using them as a measure of gainful
employment would be premature. No
specific proposal was considered for an
index, nor is it clear how such an index
would logically measure gainful
employment. Furthermore, one should be
cautious about assuming that an institution
enrolling lower-income students should
necessarily have lower expectations for the
future employment or earnings of graduates.
An index could be a good approach to
provide incentives, perhaps as a method of
distributing funds in a program. While we
find the concept appealing, we are not
convinced that it is appropriate for
accomplishing the goals of these regulations.
As the analysis and comments from
outside parties shaped the proposal,
alternatives were developed that reduced the
proposal’s negative effects. These alternatives
include a delayed effective date for the
gainful employment standard, an ability of
institutions to request that a program’s
repayment rate be evaluated for those three
years further along in their careers, a cap
limiting the number of programs that could
lose eligibility in the first year after the
regulations take effect to the lowestperforming programs producing no more
than 5 percent of completers during the prior
PO 00000
Frm 00125
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
34509
award year, increased debt-to-earnings limits,
and a decreased repayment rate threshold.
These alternatives are not specifically
targeted at small entities, but the delayed
effective date and initial cap on the
regulations’ effect will provide time for small
entities to adapt to the regulations.
Clarification of the treatment of programs
with a small number of completers or
borrowers is particularly relevant for small
entities and, along with the changes to the
calculation of the debt measures and the
requirement that a program is not ineligible
until it fails the debt measures for three of
four FYs, reduces the effect of the regulations
on small entities and opens opportunities for
programs that serve students well.
RIA Technical Notes
All data analyzed as part of this regulatory
impact analysis, including the regressions
relating repayment rate to student and
institutional characteristics, is available online at https://www2.ed.gov/policy/highered/
reg/hearulemaking/2009/integrityanalysis.html. This file was created by
merging data provided from the National
Student Loan Data System (NSLDS) with
information collected by the National Center
for Education Statistics’ Integrated
Postsecondary Education Data System
(IPEDS). Analysts who wish to append
additional information to this file are
cautioned that all IPEDS data has been
aggregated by six-digit OPE IDs, because that
is the level at which repayment rates are
reported.
The RIA analysis file contains 5,495
unique records. The regressions reported in
this filing are limited to a subset of those
records, specifically: (a) Those that had
undergraduate offerings, (b) those that have
a non-missing repayment rate (e.g.,
institutions may participate in title IV, HEA
grant programs but not in the loan programs),
and (c) those that had no missing predictor
variables. The final analytic population is
4,255 institutions, or 77 percent of the total
RIA file.
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
The regression analysis has five
components:
(1) An ordinary least squares regression
relating repayment rate (RepayRateFinalRule)
to four possible sets of predictor variables;
a. Student body characteristics, including
the percentage of students at an institution
who are identified as racial/ethnic minorities
(PerMinority), the percentage of students at
an institution who receive Pell grants
(PellPerWinsor),29 the percentage of the
undergraduate student population
represented by women (pctugwomen), and
the percentage of the undergraduate student
population under the age of 25
(pctugunder25).
29 This variable has been winsorized to reduce
extreme observations.
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
PO 00000
Frm 00126
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
ER13JN11.063
34510
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
(4) All pairwise correlations between the
dependent and independent variables; and
(5) The semi-partial correlation between
repayment rate and each of the independent
variables used in the regression analysis.
In the discussion of the results of that
analysis, we rely on two concepts with which
not all readers may be familiar.
The standardized regression coefficient.
Comparing the strength of predictors in a
regression model is complicated by the fact
that not all independent variables are likely
to be in the same metric. Such is the case
here; for example, we include both rates (e.g.,
retention) and per-FTE expenses (e.g.,
instructional expenses). To increase
comparability, regression coefficients can be
standardized, so that all variables have the
same ‘‘scale.’’ The larger the absolute value of
a standardized regression coefficient, the
PO 00000
Frm 00127
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
greater the effect it has on the dependent
variable. Technically, the standardized
regression coefficient, beta, is read as: ‘‘A one
standard deviation change in x makes a beta
standard deviation change in y.’’
RIA Appendix A–1: High Dropout Scenario
This scenario features a drop-out starting at
15% of those remaining after baseline
dropouts and transfers for a single failure and
up to 42% for for-profit-less-than-2-year
institutions. The transfer rates associated
with this scenario run from 20% for a single
failure to 40% for ineligibility. The transfers
are distributed according to our opinion that
most transfers attributable to gainful
employment would occur within the sectors,
particularly the for-profit sectors. This is due
to the capacity and flexibility of successful
for-profit programs to expand at a faster rate
than public institutions.
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
ER13JN11.064
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
b. Measures of institutional spending and
growth, including instructional
(InstPerTotalExp) and non-instructional
(CorePerTotalExp) costs and the percentage
change in the size of the entering
undergraduate class at an institution between
2006 and 2009 (PctChangeEntering06_09).
c. Total graduation rate (GradRateTot).
d. And, among 4-year institutions, a
measure of institutional selectivity: An
institutions acceptance rate (AcceptRate08).
(2) An ordinary least squares regression
relating repayment rate (RepayRateFinalRule)
to the percentage of students at an institution
who are identified as racial/ethnic
minorities;
(3) An ordinary least squares regression
relating repayment rate (RepayRateFinalRule)
to the percentage of students at an institution
who receive Pell grants;
34511
VerDate Mar<15>2010
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
PO 00000
Frm 00128
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4725
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
ER13JN11.065
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
34512
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
PO 00000
Frm 00129
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4725
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
34513
ER13JN11.066
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
VerDate Mar<15>2010
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
PO 00000
Frm 00130
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4725
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
ER13JN11.067
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
34514
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
PO 00000
Frm 00131
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4725
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
34515
ER13JN11.068
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
VerDate Mar<15>2010
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
PO 00000
Frm 00132
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4725
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
ER13JN11.069
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
34516
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
PO 00000
Frm 00133
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4725
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
34517
ER13JN11.070
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
VerDate Mar<15>2010
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
PO 00000
Frm 00134
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
ER13JN11.071
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
34518
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
PO 00000
Frm 00135
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4725
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
34519
ER13JN11.072
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
VerDate Mar<15>2010
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
PO 00000
Frm 00136
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4725
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
ER13JN11.073
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
34520
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
PO 00000
Frm 00137
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4725
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
34521
ER13JN11.074
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
RIA Appendis A–2: Low Dropout Scenario
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
This scenario features a drop-out starting at
5% of those remaining after baseline
dropouts and transfers for a single failure and
up to 22% for for-profit-less-than-2-year
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
institutions. The transfer rates associated
with this scenario run from 25% for a single
failure to 50% for ineligibility, slightly higher
than under Scenario A–1 as fewer students
dropped out in this scenario. The transfers
are distributed according to our opinion that
PO 00000
Frm 00138
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
most transfers attributable to gainful
employment would occur within the sectors,
particularly the for-profit-sectors. This is due
to the capacity and flexibility of successful
for-profit programs to expand at a faster rate
than public institutions.
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
ER13JN11.075
34522
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
PO 00000
Frm 00139
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4725
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
34523
ER13JN11.076
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
VerDate Mar<15>2010
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
PO 00000
Frm 00140
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4725
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
ER13JN11.077
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
34524
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
PO 00000
Frm 00141
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4725
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
34525
ER13JN11.078
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
VerDate Mar<15>2010
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
PO 00000
Frm 00142
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4725
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
ER13JN11.079
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
34526
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
PO 00000
Frm 00143
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4725
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
34527
ER13JN11.080
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
VerDate Mar<15>2010
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
PO 00000
Frm 00144
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4725
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
ER13JN11.081
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
34528
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
PO 00000
Frm 00145
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
34529
ER13JN11.082
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
VerDate Mar<15>2010
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
PO 00000
Frm 00146
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4725
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
ER13JN11.083
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
34530
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
PO 00000
Frm 00147
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4725
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
34531
ER13JN11.084
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
VerDate Mar<15>2010
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
PO 00000
Frm 00148
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4725
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
ER13JN11.085
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
34532
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
dropout scenarios, with the data set limited
to small institutions only.
PO 00000
Frm 00149
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
ER13JN11.086
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
RIA Appendix A–3: Program Results for
Small Institutions
The scenarios described here mirror those
described in the high dropout and low
34533
VerDate Mar<15>2010
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
PO 00000
Frm 00150
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4725
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
ER13JN11.087
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
34534
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
PO 00000
Frm 00151
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4725
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
34535
ER13JN11.088
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
VerDate Mar<15>2010
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
PO 00000
Frm 00152
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4725
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
ER13JN11.089
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
34536
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
PO 00000
Frm 00153
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4725
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
34537
ER13JN11.090
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
VerDate Mar<15>2010
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
PO 00000
Frm 00154
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4725
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
ER13JN11.091
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
34538
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules and Regulations
34539
[FR Doc. 2011–13905 Filed 6–10–11; 8:45 am]
VerDate Mar<15>2010
18:34 Jun 10, 2011
Jkt 223001
PO 00000
Frm 00155
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 9990
E:\FR\FM\13JNR3.SGM
13JNR3
ER13JN11.092
emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with RULES3
BILLING CODE 4000–01–C
Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 113 (Monday, June 13, 2011)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 34386-34539]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2011-13905]
[[Page 34385]]
Vol. 76
Monday,
No. 113
June 13, 2011
Part III
Department of Education
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
34 CFR Part 668
Program Integrity: Gainful Employment--Debt Measures; Final Rule
Federal Register / Vol. 76 , No. 113 / Monday, June 13, 2011 / Rules
and Regulations
[[Page 34386]]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
34 CFR Part 668
RIN 1840-AD06
[Docket ID ED-2010-OPE-0012]
Program Integrity: Gainful Employment--Debt Measures
AGENCY: Office of Postsecondary Education, Department of Education.
ACTION: Final regulations.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The Secretary amends the Student Assistance General Provisions
regulations to improve disclosure of relevant information and to
establish minimal measures for determining whether certain
postsecondary educational programs lead to gainful employment in
recognized occupations, and the conditions under which these
educational programs remain eligible for the student financial
assistance programs authorized under title IV of the Higher Education
Act of 1965, as amended (HEA).
DATES: These regulations are effective July 1, 2012.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: John Kolotos or Fred Sellers for
general information only. Telephone: (202) 502-7805. Any other
questions or requests for information regarding these final regulations
must be submitted to: GE-Questions@ed.gov.
If you use a telecommunications device for the deaf (TDD), call the
Federal Relay Service (FRS), toll free, at 1-800-877-8339.
Individuals with disabilities can obtain this document in an
accessible format (e.g., braille, large print, audiotape, or computer
diskette) on request to one of the contact persons listed under FOR
FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Executive Summary
Institutions providing gainful employment programs offer important
opportunities to Americans seeking to expand their skills and earn
postsecondary degrees and certificates. For-profit institutions offer
many quality programs, but in some instances, these programs leave
large numbers of students with unaffordable debts and poor employment
prospects.
The Department of Education has a particularly strong interest in
ensuring that institutions that are heavily reliant on Federal funding
promote student academic and career opportunities. These final gainful
employment regulations are designed to (1) provide institutions with
better metrics and more time to assess their program outcomes and
thereby a greater opportunity to improve the performance of their
gainful employment programs before those programs lose eligibility for
Federal student aid funds, and (2) identify accurately the worst
performing gainful employment programs. At the same time, the final
regulations require that these federally funded programs meet minimal
standards because students and taxpayers have too much at stake to
allow otherwise.
The Higher Education Act of 1965, as amended (HEA), has long
provided for the extension of financial aid to students attending
postsecondary programs that ``lead to gainful employment in a
recognized occupation,'' including nearly all programs at for-profit
institutions and certificate programs at public and non-profit
institutions. For-profit institutions, in particular, are a diverse,
innovative, and fast-growing group of institutions. By pioneering
creative course schedules and online programs and serving
nontraditional students, many of these institutions have developed
impressive, beneficial practices that both public and non-profit
institutions might emulate. In recent months, a number of institutions
have taken promising steps to improve the value of the programs they
offer to students by offering free trial and orientation periods,
closing underperforming programs, and investing more in their faculty
and curricula. These reforms may serve students well and improve
performance as measured under these final regulations.
At the same time, for-profit institutions typically charge higher
tuitions for their programs than do their public and non-profit
counterparts. They also have higher net prices, a measure of how much
students pay after receiving grant aid, such as Federal Pell Grants. As
a result, students on average assume more debt to enroll in a program
than do their peers who attend public or private, nonprofit
institutions.
We also have concerns about recruitment practices and completion
rates for particular programs offered by for-profit institutions. The
Government Accountability Office (GAO) and other investigators have
found evidence of high-pressure and deceptive recruiting practices at
for-profit institutions. These recruiting practices may contribute to
low graduation rates. First-time students enrolling in four-year
institutions in 2004 were only about half as likely to earn any kind of
degree or certificate by 2009 if they began their postsecondary
education at a for-profit institution than if they began their
postsecondary education at a public institution. National Center for
Education Statistics, 2004/2009 Beginning Postsecondary Students
Longitudinal Study.
Proprietary institutions market their programs to students by
emphasizing the value of the program against the cost to the student.
This approach is often called the value proposition of the program and
is meant to portray to students the value of the specific program
offerings to that student's career goals. It is this posture that
distinguishes programs ``that lead to gainful employment in a
recognized occupation'' as set forth in the HEA.
These final regulations reflect the Department's policy
determination that students are not adequately protected by the
Department's current regulatory framework, which focuses on
institutional level information. By defining what it means to provide
training leading to gainful employment for each program that is
eligible to receive title IV, HEA funds, the Department believes that
students will be better served and the Department will have improved
how it carries out its obligation to ensure program integrity.
Some have argued that cohort default rates, measured at the
institutional level, already provide a measure of whether student debt
is at appropriate levels. The Department believes that those measures
are properly supplemented and complemented by those outlined here. The
Department's experience with the CDR is that it operates for particular
purposes and that, among other things, it does not identify the harm to
students that can come from enrolling in a specific program that leaves
them with high education debts and limited job opportunities. An
institution's average default rate does not measure the effect of any
individual program, and that information alone does not provide a
student with a measure of whether he or she will be able to achieve a
career goal and pay off loan debt. Moreover, the default rate does not
take account of the possibility that many students are struggling to
repay their loans, such as those receiving economic hardship deferments
or who are in income-based repayment. These are students who are seeing
their loans grow, rather than shrink, because their incomes are low and
their debts are high. As a result the default rate is a better
measurement of the potential loss to taxpayers than of the repayment
burden on borrowers.
The Department is adopting in these final regulations a definition
of programs that provide training leading
[[Page 34387]]
to gainful employment in a recognized occupation in order to provide
students with a measure of the particular program they are considering
taking. This program-level assessment is further reflected in the way
in which we have required disclosures of information and in the care we
have taken with regulating the development of new programs once a
program has failed to meet the measures in the regulation. The
regulations we are adopting will help to protect students by removing
eligibility from the worst performing programs that fail the minimum
requirements, while providing institutions with incentives to improve
the performance of their programs under the measures and create better
outcomes for the students enrolled in those programs.
Institutional measures of eligibility often fail to reveal the
effects of providing bad outcomes to students in the particular
programs that they offer. Most of the revenues of for-profit
institutions come from Pell Grants and Federal student loans. The
revenues of these institutions are dependent on the number of students
they enroll in their programs; they are not otherwise dependent on
whether their students graduate, find jobs, and ultimately repay their
loans. Thus, if one of these students defaults on her or his loan, the
institution's revenues are unlikely to be affected and the blended
cohort default rates calculated for an institution tend to mask the
harms to students that are coming from only a few bad programs offered
at an institution. For students, however, the consequences of an
unaffordable loan are severe. For the 2008 cohort year, 46 percent of
student loans (weighted by dollars) borrowed by students at two-year
for-profit institutions are expected to go into default over the life
of the loans, compared to 16 percent of loans borrowed by students
across all types of institutions.
Former students who are not gainfully employed and cannot afford to
repay their loans face very serious challenges. Discharging Federal
student loans in bankruptcy is very rare. The common consequences of
default include large fees--collection costs that can add 25 percent to
the outstanding loan balance--and interest charges; struggles to rent
or buy a home, buy a car, or get a job; collection agency actions,
including lawsuits and garnishment of wages; and the loss of tax
refunds and even Social Security benefits. Moreover, borrowers in
default are no longer entitled to any deferments or forbearances and
may be ineligible for any additional student aid until they have
reestablished a good repayment history.
Consistent with the HEA's requirements, to be eligible to
participate in the title IV, HEA programs, certain institutions must
provide an eligible program leading to gainful employment in a
recognized occupation. The Department's goals in promulgating these
regulations are to ensure that (1) students who enroll in these
programs do not have to face these difficult challenges, because they
are equipped to secure gainful employment rather than being left with
unaffordable debts and poor employment prospects, and (2) the Federal
investment of title IV, HEA student aid dollars is well spent.
The Department began its efforts in this area with regulations
designed to help students make informed choices about postsecondary
education programs in 2009 by conducting a series of public hearings
and negotiated rulemaking sessions. It published two notices of
proposed rulemaking (NPRMs) in 2010. The Department's proposed
regulations emphasized the use of disclosure mechanisms to provide
students and the public with critical information about the performance
of gainful employment programs. On October 29, 2010, the Department
published regulations (75 FR 66832) (Program Integrity Issues final
regulations) requiring institutions with programs that prepare students
for gainful employment in a recognized occupation to disclose key
performance information about each program on their Web site and in
promotional materials to prospective students. The required elements
include the program cost, on-time completion rate, placement rate,
median loan debt, and other information for programs that prepare
students for gainful employment in recognized occupations.
Since publishing the final regulations, the Department has
published in the Federal Register on April 13, 2011, a draft disclosure
template for public comment (76 FR 20635). The Department intends to
finalize this disclosure template by the fall of 2011 so that it is
available for use by institutions by July 1, 2012. The disclosure
template will automate the process by which institutions can prepare
the required disclosures and will include links to provide the
appropriate Web sites of other institutions offering the same program
that participate in the title IV, HEA student aid programs, thus
allowing students to compare similar programs. With this template, and
consistent with section 4 of Executive Order 13563, the Department is
thus attempting to foster informed decisions and to improve the
operation of the market through ``disclosure requirements as well as
provision of information to the public in a form that is clear and
intelligible.''
The Program Integrity Issues final regulations also included
significant new regulations that we designed to protect consumers from
misleading or overly aggressive recruiting practices, and to clarify
State oversight responsibilities. These regulations took significant
steps to curbing fraud and abuse in the Federal student aid programs by
strengthening existing requirements that are designed to protect
students and taxpayers. Among these changes were the strengthening of
our misrepresentation regulations to provide the Department greater
authority to take action against institutions engaging in deceptive
advertising, marketing, and sales practices. The regulations also
eliminate ``safe harbors'' that allowed questionable recruitment
practices that often included institutions paying incentive
compensation to recruiters. Too often this type of compensation leads
to overly aggressive recruiting practices that encouraged students to
take out loans they could not afford or enroll in programs for which
they were unqualified or in which it was unlikely they could succeed.
Additionally, the Program Integrity Issues final regulations took a
needed step toward ensuring that States are taking necessary steps to
ensure the appropriate oversight of the postsecondary education being
provided by institutions by establishing minimum steps that States must
take to meet their important responsibility under the HEA to protect
students, including for institutions that offer distance or
correspondence education.
These final regulations, Gainful Employment--Debt Measures, reflect
a number of significant changes and improvements from the July 26, 2010
NPRM in response to public comments. The changes and improvements are
designed to provide a better measure of whether a program provides
training that will lead to gainful employment in a recognized
occupation. They reflect alterations from the proposed regulations
designed to (1) Provide better program information to students, (2)
identify the worst performing programs, and (3) create appropriate
flexibility and provide institutions the opportunity to improve their
programs before losing title IV, HEA program eligibility. These changes
are also designed to minimize the costs for regulated institutions,
while providing
[[Page 34388]]
considerable benefits both to students at regulated institutions and to
taxpayers.
The regulations emphasize the importance of disclosing program
information and take several further steps to promote informed
decisions. Thus, under the final regulations, institutions must
disclose to the public, and the Secretary may also disseminate to the
public, information about how each of an institution's programs are
performing under the debt measures that we are establishing in these
final regulations. The Department is considering additional steps to
promote the comparison of programs and to facilitate access to this
information. In keeping with the emphasis on disclosure, the
regulations also provide that during the first two years that a program
fails the debt measures, the institution must provide warnings to
students. To promote informed student choice, these warnings must be
provided to students sufficiently in advance of enrolling to permit the
student time to consider whether to enroll in the program.
While increasing the level of disclosure is critical, the
Department recognizes that information alone is unlikely fully to
promote the goals of the HEA and to ensure that programs provide
training that leads to gainful employment in a recognized occupation.
Students enrolling in a postsecondary program often have limited
background information about a program and little or no experience
choosing among postsecondary programs. High-pressure sales tactics by
institutions may also make it difficult for individuals to choose
carefully among programs. Therefore, the Department is setting minimum
standards to measure whether programs are providing training that leads
to gainful employment in a recognized occupation.
To provide an additional layer of protection for students and
taxpayers, the Department is defining a set of measures that identifies
the lowest performing programs by focusing on the ability of students
to repay their student loans. Under these measures, a program is now
considered to lead to gainful employment if it has a repayment rate of
at least 35 percent or its annual loan payment under the debt-to-
earnings ratios is 12 percent or less of annual earnings or 30 percent
or less of discretionary income. Under the regulations, only after
failing both debt measures for three out of four fiscal years does a
program lose eligibility. These regulations set minimum standards and
are designed to provide flexibility, specifically allowing programs an
opportunity to improve their performance before losing title IV, HEA
program eligibility. The Department believes that these measures will
improve the operation of free markets by identifying the poorest
performing programs and strengthening institutions' incentive to
provide an affordable quality education.
Background of Rulemaking Proceedings
On September 9, 2009, the Secretary announced the Department's
intent to establish two negotiated rulemaking committees to develop
proposed regulations under title IV of the HEA through a notice in the
Federal Register (74 FR 46399). The Secretary established one committee
to develop proposed regulations governing foreign schools and another
committee to develop proposed regulations to improve integrity in the
title IV, HEA programs. Team I--Program Integrity Issues (Team I) met
to develop proposed regulations during the months of November 2009
through January 2010; however, no consensus on the proposed regulations
was reached during the negotiations. After Team I's negotiations
concluded, the Department published two NPRMs.
On June 18, 2010, the Secretary published the first NPRM in the
Federal Register (75 FR 34806) (June 18, 2010 NPRM) proposing to
strengthen and improve the administration of programs authorized under
title IV of the HEA. With regard to gainful employment, the June 18,
2010 NPRM included proposals covering several technical, reporting, and
disclosure issues. The June 18, 2010 NPRM reserved for a second NPRM
the remaining gainful employment issues, which addressed the extent to
which certain educational programs lead to gainful employment and the
conditions under which those programs remain eligible for title IV, HEA
program funds.
On July 26, 2010, the Secretary published a second NPRM for gainful
employment issues in the Federal Register (75 FR 43616) (July 26, 2010
NPRM). In the July 26, 2010 NPRM, the Secretary proposed to--
Establish debt thresholds based on debt-to-income and
repayment rate measures that a program at an institution would need to
meet in order to demonstrate that it provides training that leads to
gainful employment in a recognized occupation and consequently to
remain eligible for title IV, HEA funds;
Establish a tiered eligibility system under which a
program may have unrestricted eligibility, may have restricted
eligibility, or may become ineligible to participate in the title IV,
HEA programs;
Establish consequences for a program with a restricted
eligibility status, including requirements to provide debt warning
disclosures to current and prospective students that they may have
difficulty repaying loans obtained for attending the program; employer
affirmations that the program curriculum is appropriately aligned with
recognized occupations at the employers' businesses and that there is a
demand for those occupations; and limits on enrollment of title IV, HEA
program recipients in that program;
Provide that a program becomes ineligible if it does not
meet at least one of the debt thresholds for one award year;
Specify that the institution may not disburse any title
IV, HEA program funds to students who subsequently begin attending a
program determined to be ineligible, but may disburse title IV, HEA
program funds to students who began attending the program before it
became ineligible for the remainder of the award year and for the award
year following the date of the Secretary's notice that the program is
ineligible;
Establish a transition year in which the Secretary would
cap the number of programs that would be classified as ineligible for
the first year after the regulations take effect;
Add a definition of The Classification of Instructional
Programs (CIP);
Permit the Secretary to place on provisional certification
an institution that has one or more of its programs determined to be
subject to the eligibility limitations or determined ineligible under
the gainful employment provisions; and
Establish that in a termination action against a program
for not meeting the gainful employment standards, the hearing official
would accept, as accurate, earnings information for students that was
obtained by the Department from another Federal agency, but would
consider alternate earnings data as long as that data was reliable for
the same students.
The Department reviewed the comments from both the June 18, 2010
NPRM and the July 26, 2010 NPRM and divided the final regulations into
three separate documents. On October 29, 2010, the Secretary published
both the first and second sets of final regulations in the Federal
Register (75 FR 66832 and 75 FR 66665) (Program Integrity Issues and
Gainful Employment/New Programs final regulations, respectively) with
effective dates, generally, of July 1, 2011.
[[Page 34389]]
The Program Integrity Issues final regulations (75 FR 66832)--
Clarified that only certificate or credentialed nondegree
programs of at least one academic year that are offered by a public or
nonprofit institution of higher education are gainful employment
programs;
Updated the definition of the term recognized occupation
to reflect current usage;
Established requirements for institutions to submit
information on students who attend or complete programs that prepare
students for gainful employment in recognized occupations; and
Established requirements for institutions to submit
information on students who attend or complete programs that prepare
students for gainful employment in recognized occupations; and
Established requirements for institutions to disclose on
their Web site and in promotional materials to prospective students,
the on-time graduation rate for students completing a program,
placement rate, median loan debt, program costs, and any other
information the Secretary provided to the institution about the
program.
The Gainful Employment/New Programs final regulations (75 FR
66665)--
Established a process under which an institution applies
to the Secretary for approval to offer additional educational programs
that lead to gainful employment in a recognized occupation.
These final regulations, Gainful Employment--Debt Measures,
comprise the third set of regulations and reflect a number of
significant changes from the proposed regulations in response to public
comments. We received over 90,000 comments in response to the July 26,
2010 NPRM. These included tens of thousands of comments supporting our
proposals and tens of thousands opposing them. Subsequent to our
issuance of the Gainful Employment/New Programs final regulations, we
also met with more than 100 individuals and organizations to permit
these individuals and entities to clarify their comments in person. The
Department extended its work on the regulations by six additional
months to consider fully these comments. Consistent with Executive
Order 13563, the result of this unprecedented public engagement is
stronger regulations that (1) Are based on careful consideration of
both the costs and benefits (both quantitative and qualitative) of the
regulations; (2) incorporate many suggestions to allow flexible
approaches for the regulated entities; and (3) balance the concerns of
those on both sides of the ``gainful employment'' issue.
The final regulations will:
Give all programs three years to improve their
performance. The Department will begin by giving institutions data to
help them identify and improve their failing programs and to help
current and prospective students make informed choices. The first
programs could lose eligibility based upon their performance under the
debt measures calculated for fiscal year (FY) 2014 and released in
2015, rather than FY 2012 as proposed.
Target only the worst performing failing programs by:
(1) Permitting an institution to maintain a program's title IV, HEA
program eligibility until the program fails both the debt-to-earnings
ratios and repayment rate measures for three out of four FYs, similar
to the multi-year measures used to assess cohort default rates (CDRs)
at an institution;
(2) Limiting the number of programs that will lose eligibility
based on the debt measures calculated for only FY 2014 under Sec.
668.7(k) to the worst performing 5 percent of programs (weighted by
enrollment); and
(3) Eliminating enrollment restrictions that the Department had
proposed in the July 26, 2010 NPRM to apply to all programs with
repayment rates below 45 percent and an annual loan payment that is
more than 20 percent of discretionary income or 8 percent of annual
earnings.
Improve the repayment rate and debt-to-earnings ratios
measures based on extensive public comment by:
(1) Revising the measures such that a program is now considered to
lead to gainful employment if it has a repayment rate of at least 35
percent or its annual loan payment under the debt-to-earnings ratios is
12 percent or less of annual earnings or 30 percent or less of
discretionary income;
(2) Allowing institutions to demonstrate that their programs meet
the debt-to-earnings ratios with alternative reliable earnings
information, including use of State data, survey data, or Bureau of
Labor Statistics (BLS) data during a transitional period;
(3) Measuring performance in years three and four of repayment,
rather than years one through four, to examine more typical years in
the life cycle of a loan (with a provision to use years three through
six where necessary to ensure that more than 30 borrowers or completers
are included in the measurement and additional adjustments to address
the needs of programs that are improving their performance, graduate
programs, and medical and dental programs);
(4) Measuring debt burdens based on an assumption that loans are
repaid over 10 to 20 years depending on the level of degree, rather
than 10 years for all programs as was originally proposed. Loan debt
will be amortized over 10 years for undergraduate or post-baccalaureate
certificate and associate's degree programs, 15 years for bachelor's
and master's degree programs, and 20 years for programs that lead to a
doctoral or first-professional degree;
(5) Limiting debt in the debt-to-earnings ratio calculation to
tuition and fee charges for a specific educational program, if this
information is provided by the institution, thereby providing programs
relief for loans taken for indirect educational costs, including living
expenses;
(6) Providing that borrowers who meet their obligations under
income-sensitive repayment plans are considered to be successfully
repaying their loans even if their payments are smaller than accrued
interest, so long as the program at issue does not have unusually large
numbers of students in those categories; and
(7) Providing that a program is considered to satisfy the debt
measures if the number of students who completed the program or the
number of borrowers whose loans entered repayment during the relevant
four-year period is 30 or fewer.
Improve the disclosure of information about programs by:
(1) Providing in Sec. 668.7(g)(6) that the Secretary may
disseminate the final debt measures and information about, or related
to, the debt measures to the public in any time, manner, and form,
including publishing information that will allow the public to
ascertain how well programs perform under the debt measures and other
appropriate objective metrics. The Department is considering
appropriate ways to provide these metrics and other key indicators to
facilitate access to the information and the comparison of programs;
(2) Requiring that an institution with a failing program that does
not meet the minimum standards specified in the regulations must
provide warnings to enrolled and prospective students;
(3) Requiring that the debt warnings for prospective students must
be provided at the time the student first contacts the institution to
request information about the program. The institution may not enroll
the student until three days after the debt warnings are first provided
to the student. If more than 30 days pass from the date the debt
[[Page 34390]]
warnings are first provided to the student and the date the student
seeks to enroll in the program, the institution must provide the debt
warnings again and may not enroll the student until three days after
the debt warnings are most recently provided to the student; and
(4) Requiring an institution to disclose the repayment rate and the
debt-to-earnings ratio (based on total earnings) of its gainful
employment programs.
Establish restrictions on reestablishing eligibility of
ineligible programs, new programs that are substantially similar to an
ineligible program, and failing programs that are voluntarily
discontinued by the institution.
In sum, the Department has revised these regulations to promote
disclosure, to encourage institutions to improve their occupational
programs, and to provide more time for this improvement before revoking
eligibility. The Department believes that institutions will strengthen
their educational programs to meet these higher standards, and
relatively few programs will fail. Programs that offer a rewarding
education at an affordable price will prosper, and institutions will
continue to innovate to serve students and taxpayers.
Implementation Date of These Regulations
Section 482(c) of the HEA requires that regulations affecting
programs under title IV of the HEA be published in final form by
November 1 prior to the start of the award year (July 1) to which they
apply. However, that section also permits the Secretary to designate
any regulation as one that an entity subject to the regulation may
choose to implement earlier and to specify the conditions under which
the entity may implement the provisions early.
The Secretary has not designated any of the provisions in these
final regulations for early implementation. Therefore these final
regulations are effective July 1, 2012.
Commitment to Continuing Retrospective Review
As discussed further under the heading Executive Orders 12866 and
13563, consistent with Executive Order 13563's emphasis on measuring
``actual results'' and on retrospective review of regulations, the
Department intends to monitor the implementation of these regulations
carefully, consider new data as they become available to ensure against
unintended adverse consequences, and reconsider relevant issues if the
evidence warrants. We recognize that, despite the Department's diligent
efforts and extensive public input, there are limitations in the best
available data and there remains some uncertainty about the impact of
these final regulations, such as the number of programs that will be
identified as ineligible.
In early 2012, the Department will calculate and share with
institutions, for informational purposes only, performance data for
programs subject to these regulations. Thus, institutions and the
Department will have preliminary information about the performance of
particular programs a full year before any programs could be labeled
failing and three years before any programs could lose eligibility.
This implementation schedule will allow the Department ample time to
consider relevant evidence and data and to examine the performance of
programs under the regulations. This collection of data, in conjunction
with the agency's intention to evaluate the outcomes of these
regulations, is consistent both with Executive Order 13563 and the
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs' February 2, 2011
memorandum (OMB M-11-19) on Executive Order 13563, which emphasizes the
importance of ``empirical testing of the effects of rules both in
advance and retrospectively,'' and which encourages future regulations
to be ``designed and written in ways that facilitate evaluation of
their consequences and thus promote retrospective analyses.'' The
Department will continue to explore the effects of the regulations.
Among other things, the Department will examine the type and number of
programs determined to be failing and ineligible, and it will consider
whether these final regulations should be reconsidered or amended in
furtherance of its goals of protecting students and taxpayers against
educational programs that leave students with unaffordable debts and
poor employment prospects.
Analysis of Comments and Changes
As indicated earlier, over 90,000 parties submitted comments on the
July 26, 2010 NPRM. Many of these comments were substantially similar.
We have reviewed all of the comments. Generally, we do not address
minor, nonsubstantive changes, recommended changes that the law does
not authorize the Secretary to make, or comments pertaining to
operational processes.
General
Comment Process
Comment: The Department received over 90,000 comments on the July
26, 2010 NPRM. Of those comments, approximately 25 percent were in
support of our proposed regulations and approximately 75 percent were
opposed. We received comments from numerous categories of individuals,
including students, families, employees of institutions of higher
education, school presidents, congressional and other governmental
leaders, advocacy groups, State and local associations, trade
associations, and businesses. The comments received varied in content
and length from extremely short responses to complex and lengthy
economic and legal analyses. The vast majority of the comments,
however, were similar, largely duplicative, and apparently generated
through petition drives and letter-writing campaigns. Generally, these
commenters did not provide any specific recommendations beyond general
support of or opposition to the proposed regulations. Many of the
commenters--both those in support of, and in opposition to, specific
provisions--indicated that they supported the goals and intent behind
the proposed regulations. Specifically, commenters across all sectors
of higher education as well as the student and consumer advocacy groups
believed that the goal of ensuring student loan debt is affordable is
an admirable one.
Some of the commenters did not express substantive comments on the
proposed regulations or their effects. For instance, a number of the
commenters, particularly those from students, simply said ``No,'' or
asked that the Department not ``take away my student loans.''
Supporters of the proposed regulations praised the Department's
transparency and commitment to improving the integrity of the title IV,
HEA student aid programs. Some commenters praised the amount of
information and data that the Department released with the NPRM and
subsequently on the Department's Web site. Other commenters believed
that the Department had taken appropriate steps to gather public input
and to craft regulations that protect students by regulating programs
that claim to prepare students for gainful employment, yet leave
students with large amounts of debt and unprepared for employment in
recognized occupations. These commenters suggested that the proposed
regulations would help to ensure that employers can hire well-qualified
employees and that taxpayer dollars are spent wisely and effectively.
Some of the commenters believed that the proposed regulations provide
for much-needed enforcement authority.
[[Page 34391]]
Commenters who opposed the proposed regulations believed that the
proposed regulations would have a number of unintended effects and
suggested that the regulations would produce results counter to the
President's economic and educational goals. These commenters also
stated that the proposed regulations would be overly burdensome and
discriminatory; represent an overreaching of the Department's
authority; unfairly punish institutions for students' choices after
graduating; disproportionately affect at-risk and underserved
populations of students; and limit the growth of, and innovation in,
new programs. The commenters recommended that the Department address
these concerns by delaying the implementation of the regulations,
considering alternatives to the debt-to-earnings and repayment rate
metrics, and exempting certain types of institutions or programs from
compliance with the regulations. While making a number of suggestions
and recommendations, the commenters generally expressed a desire to
work with the Department to provide additional information and insight
to craft metrics that they believed would achieve the intended result
of reducing student loan debt and helping students to obtain gainful
employment.
Discussion: The Department appreciates the numerous comments we
received in support of the proposed regulations as well as those we
received that expressed concerns about them. Specific issues raised by
the commenters are addressed in the relevant topical discussions. These
comments were instrumental in identifying ways the Department could
design final regulations that provide benefits to students, minimize
costs to regulated institutions, and provide institutions with greater
flexibility to achieve regulatory compliance.
Changes: Changes made in response to the commenters' specific
concerns are addressed in the relevant topical discussions.
Timing of Implementation
Comment: Some commenters urged the Department to implement these
regulations as early as possible, arguing that students, consumers, and
taxpayers need protection now and cannot afford to wait for these
regulations to go into effect a few years in the future. Some of these
commenters noted that putting provisions into effect, perhaps in a
transitional form, would spur institutions with poorly performing
programs to invest in program improvements and student services, such
as career counseling and job placement assistance, to improve student
outcomes.
Some commenters asked the Department to delay the implementation of
the regulations for a number of reasons. Some asked for the Department
to delay implementation until the results of a forthcoming GAO study on
proprietary schools are available. Other commenters requested a delay
to allow Congress time to debate and pass a law on the definition of
``gainful employment.'' These commenters argued that Congress, not the
Department, appropriately has this authority. Some of the commenters
also suggested a delay to allow time to see the effect of the
additional disclosures and reporting requirements under the final
regulations that will take effect July 1, 2011 (75 FR 66833-66975).
Some commenters requested a delay until Congress acts to provide
authority to institutions to limit loan funds to institutional charges.
Commenters requested that the Department apply the metrics only to
students who enroll after the final regulations are published. These
commenters argued that schools should not be held accountable for an
outcome that was not defined at the time the students attended the
program and that it would be unfair to judge schools on metrics that
they could have influenced at the time, when the quality of the
programs and the outcomes for the students may be improving. Commenters
noted that the Department should delay enforcing the regulations so
programs have an opportunity to improve, and that programs that are
improving may not be able to satisfy the metrics immediately given that
the metrics measure outcomes from students who graduated in past years.
A few commenters asked the Department to provide draft metrics to
institutions before their programs would be subject to sanctions. The
commenters encouraged the Department to use the new, three-year CDR as
a model for how any new metrics on gainful employment could be phased
in over time. They further stated that delayed implementation would
give schools time to improve their programs and debt counseling advice
to meet the metrics as well as time to discontinue programs that are
not meeting the metrics.
Some commenters requested further actions within the negotiated
rulemaking process. Commenters requested that the Department issue
these regulations as an interim final rule so that the public would
have an opportunity to submit additional comments and, perhaps, to
permit further modifications to the regulations based on those
comments. Other commenters recommended that the Department extend the
45-day public comment period to allow a full analysis of the breadth
and complexity of the proposed regulations. They further suggested that
the Department would benefit from further information from institutions
on the details involved with compliance before implementation. A few
commenters requested that the Department engage in another round of
negotiated rulemaking so that participants could focus solely on an
appropriate definition of gainful employment. These commenters believed
that more analysis and discussion of the proposed regulations are
needed before they become final.
Some commenters suggested that the gainful employment metrics
should apply no earlier than July 1, 2014, and sanctions for ineligible
programs should apply on or after July 1, 2016, arguing that these
timeframes would give institutions an adequate opportunity to comply
with the new requirements.
Discussion: We appreciate the concerns of the commenters who urged
the Department to implement these regulations as early as possible.
However, based on the concerns of other commenters, we believe it is
desirable to extend the implementation schedule of these final
regulations. In that regard, we agree that institutions should have the
opportunity to improve program performance against the metrics before
being subject to significant sanctions. The adjustments to the
regulations reflecting these changes are discussed more fully under the
relevant topical discussions.
We do not agree with commenters that we should delay implementing
the final regulations until a third party takes some action such as
waiting for a GAO study to be available. We have already undertaken
extensive efforts to analyze the impact of these regulations and gather
public comments. We also believe the need to remove poorly performing
programs is too great to wait for third-party actions.
We do not agree that further actions need to be taken within the
rulemaking process such as issuing interim final regulations, providing
an additional comment period, or renegotiating the proposed
regulations. Given the Department's extensive efforts to solicit and
respond to comments from the public, including public hearings, three
sessions of negotiations, additional meetings with interested parties,
and the over 90,000 comments received, we do not believe it is
necessary to reopen the rulemaking process and delay publishing these
final regulations.
[[Page 34392]]
Changes: Changes made in response to the commenters' specific
concerns are addressed in the relevant topical discussions.
Legal Authority
Comments: A number of commenters objected to the proposed
regulations in whole or in part, claiming that no changes to the HEA
require the Secretary to define the term ``gainful employment,'' and
that the term cannot now be defined since Congress left it undisturbed
during its periodic reauthorizations of the HEA. Some commenters
expressed the view that the framework of detailed requirements under
the HEA programs that includes institutional measures using cohort
default rates, disclosure requirements for institutions, restrictions
on student loan borrowing, and other financial aid requirements
prevents the Department from adopting debt measures to determine the
eligibility for these programs. Other commenters noted that it was
unfair for the Department to propose these requirements for some
programs and not others. Some commenters suggested that the phrase ``to
prepare students for gainful employment'' is unambiguous and therefore
not subject to further definition. Some commenters claimed that the
Department has previously defined the term ``gainful employment in a
recognized occupation'' in the context of conducting administrative
hearings and argued that the Department did not adequately explain in
the July 26, 2010 NPRM why it was departing from its prior use of that
term.
Discussion: The Department has broad authority to promulgate
regulations to implement programs established by statute. Under section
414 of the Department of Education Organization Act, 20 U.S.C. 3474,
``[t]he Secretary is authorized to prescribe such rules and regulations
as the Secretary determines necessary or appropriate to administer and
manage the functions of the Secretary or the Department.'' Similarly,
section 410 of the General Education Provisions Act, 20 U.S.C. 1221e-3,
provides that the Secretary may ``make, promulgate, issue, rescind, and
amend rules and regulations'' for Department programs, including the
Federal student aid programs.
The eligibility of programs leading to gainful employment in a
recognized occupation is addressed in sections 101, 102 and 481(b) of
the HEA. Section 481(b) of the HEA defines ``eligible program'' to
include a program that offers at least a defined minimum quantity of
instruction that ``provides a program of training to prepare students
for gainful employment in a recognized profession.'' The HEA in section
102(a) defines an ``institution of higher education for purposes of the
student assistance programs'' and provides further in section 102(b),
that proprietary institutions of higher education, with limited
exception, ``provide[] an eligible program of training to prepare
students for gainful employment in a recognized occupation.'' Similar
requirements exist in section 101(b)(1) for public and private non-
profit institutions of higher education providing programs at least one
year in length, and section 102(c) provides similar requirements for
public and private non-profit postsecondary vocational institutions.
Under section 102(b) of the HEA, programs offered at for-profit
institutions are only eligible for title IV, HEA funds if they offer
programs that ``prepare students for gainful employment in a recognized
occupation.'' Such an institution is required to offer at least one
eligible program leading to gainful employment in a recognized
occupation in order for the institution to be eligible.
This structure for eligibility at the program level and the
institutional level is longstanding and has been retained through many
amendments to the HEA. Indeed, as recently as the enactment of the
Higher Education Opportunity Act of 2008 (HEOA) (Pub. L. 110-315),
Congress retained this distinct treatment of programs by exempting
liberal arts baccalaureate programs offered at some for-profit
institutions from the requirement to provide gainful employment in a
recognized occupation.
The HEA establishes eligibility requirements for certain programs
based upon the program length and the type of institution offering the
program, including such programs that lead to gainful employment in a
recognized occupation. Other requirements apply to certain types of
institutions offering eligible programs, such as providing disclosures
about revenue, and limiting the percentage of revenue that can be
received from title IV, HEA programs. Other requirements apply to all
eligible institutions, such as submitting annual financial statements
and compliance audits, and meeting eligibility requirements based upon
the loan cohort default rate calculated for an institution. None of
these requirements, viewed alone or together, constitutes a framework
that prohibits the Department from establishing the debt measures in
these regulations to determine eligibility for programs required to
provide training leading to gainful employment in a recognized
occupation.
The legislative history of the gainful employment requirement bears
directly on the issues now emerging in the data. Congress was concerned
that the availability of Federal student aid, particularly in the form
of loans for some types of programs and institutions might lead to
students taking on more debt than is reasonable given the earnings that
could be expected. Congress extended loan eligibility beyond
traditional degrees at traditional institutions after considering
testimony regarding the connection between the expected earnings of the
graduates and the debt burden they would incur from this training. A
Senate Report quotes extensively from testimony provided by University
of Iowa professor Dr. Kenneth B. Hoyt, who testified on behalf of the
American Personnel and Guidance Association:
It seems evident that, in terms of this sample of students,
sufficient numbers were working for sufficient wages so as to make
the concept of student loans to be [repaid] following graduation a
reasonable approach to take. * * * I have found no reason to believe
that such funds are not needed, that their availability would be
unjustified in terms of benefits accruing to both these students and
to society in general, nor that they would represent a poor
financial risk. Sen. Rep. No. 758, 89th Cong., First Sess. (1965) at
3745, 3748.
Congress cited the same affirmation from an industry spokesman, Lattie
Upchurch, Jr., of Capitol Radio Engineering Institution, Washington,
DC, who testified that ``the purely material rewards of continued
education are such that the students receiving loans will, in almost
every case, be enabled to repay them out of the added income resulting
from their better educational status.'' Id. at 3752.
These final regulations address harms to students that have been
identified by the GAO, and were identified in the public hearings and
in comments submitted in response to the proposed regulations, namely
that program completers are unable to obtain jobs for which they
received training. The regulations are also designed to address
concerns about high levels of loan debt for students enrolled in
postsecondary educational programs that, to qualify for participation
in the title IV, HEA programs, must provide training that leads to
gainful employment in a recognized occupation. These regulations are of
particular importance because significant advances in electronic
reporting and analysis now allow the Department to collect accurate and
timely data that could not have
[[Page 34393]]
been utilized in the past. These analyses will provide the Department,
students, and the institutions offering these programs with information
about how well the programs are performing under the measures.
With respect to the general claims from some commenters that the
terms ``gainful employment'' and ``gainful employment in a recognized
occupation'' are unambiguous and cannot be defined in regulation, it is
clear from the thousands of comments we received that the terms
``gainful employment'' and ``gainful employment in a recognized
occupation'' are subject to many different views and interpretations.
Thus, these regulations represent a reasonable interpretation of those
terms and do so in a way that responds to many of the concerns raised
in the comments. Adopting a definition now gives meaning to an
undefined statutory term, thereby fulfilling the Department's duty to
enforce the provisions of the HEA in a clear and meaningful way. And,
although the term has been used to refer to applicable programs in the
context of administrative hearings at the Department, that use does not
limit the Department's use of its statutory authority to create a
regulatory definition through the negotiated rulemaking procedures
established under the HEA.
With respect to claims that the Department should wait for Congress
to legislate before regulating, it is important to note that the
original efforts by the Department to address concerns about defaults
in the Federal student loan programs were realized using the
Secretary's general authority to regulate under section 414 of the
Department of Education Organization Act. While Congress ultimately
enacted the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 (Pub. L. 101-
508), which provides statutory authority for much of the cohort default
rate provisions in effect today, the Secretary's authority was
nonetheless appropriately used to issue regulations in this area to
require, for example, teach-out arrangements for private institutions.
Changes: None.
Comment: Some commenters suggested that the proposed definition of
gainful employment would be unlawful because it would constitute
placing price controls on offering gainful employment programs.
Discussion: We disagree that these regulations would constitute
price controls for gainful employment programs. The debt measures and
eligibility thresholds provide institutions with multiple ways to
manage their programs to improve performance.
Changes: None.
Thresholds for the Debt Measures (Sec. 668.7(a)(1))
General
Comment: Commenters expressed concerned that low-income and
minority students, many of whom are Federal Pell Grant recipients,
could be harmed by the proposed loan repayment rate and debt-to-income
thresholds. These commenters noted that Federal Pell Grant recipients
are likely to need to borrow the maximum amount of title IV, HEA loan
funds and may have more difficulty repaying their loans than students
who incur smaller levels of debt. As a result, according to the
commenters, the schools these students attend may not be able to meet
the debt measures and could be forced to close or limit their
enrollment to exclude these students.
Some of the commenters cited research by Mark Kantrowitz of
FinAid.org and FastWeb.com that they believed showed that institutions
with 50 percent or more Federal Pell Grant recipients are unlikely to
satisfy the proposed 35 percent loan repayment rate threshold, and
institutions with 40 percent or more of Federal Pell Grant recipients
are unlikely to satisfy the proposed 45 percent loan repayment rate
threshold. Similarly, other commenters cited studies indicating that
minority students earn less than their white counterparts. For low-
income students, the commenters concluded that student access to higher
education would be adversely affected because the proposed thresholds
would act as a disincentive to institutions to admit these students.
The commenters suggested that, given these concerns, the Department
should allow lower repayment rates and debt-to-earnings ratios for
institutions based on the demographics of the institution's student
body and its success rate in graduating minority students. Other
commenters recommended that the Department implement a sliding scale
repayment rate based on the number of Federal Pell Grant recipients at
an institution. Under this approach, institutions with a larger
percentage of Federal Pell Grant recipients would be subject to a lower
threshold for the loan repayment rate. Commenters suggested that,
alternatively, the loan repayment rates of Federal Pell Grant
recipients could be evaluated separately from the loan repayment rates
of non-Federal Pell Grant recipients, with a lower threshold
established for Federal Pell Grant recipients. Commenters also noted
that some of these same issues apply to institutions and programs
dominated by women, because careers dominated by women tend to be
lower-paying and many women take maternity leave or work part-time and
these circumstances would lead to lower repayment rates and earnings
for women.
One commenter noted that the Department's repayment rate data, when
viewed across all sectors of the education industry, show that
institutions with lower repayment rates serve high-risk students. The
commenter argued that if the data demonstrate anything, it is that
``at-risk'' students (working adults with family commitments and no
parental support, or students from lower socioeconomic backgrounds who
are more susceptible to forces that might cause them to leave or take a
break from school) have more difficulty repaying their student loans or
are more inclined to use alternative methods to repay their loans,
regardless of the type of school they attended.
Discussion: The Department does not agree that the thresholds
should be adjusted to reflect the demographics or economic status of
the students enrolled in gainful employment programs. Students are not
well served by enrolling in programs that leave them with debts they
cannot afford to repay, regardless of their background. Moreover, as
illustrated in the Student Demographics section of the RIA, there are
institutions and programs achieving strong results with students from
disadvantaged backgrounds, and many programs serving even the most
disadvantaged students are performing well under the debt measures.
Changes: None.
Comment: Some commenters stated that because the loan repayment
rate was established outside the negotiated rulemaking process, it
lacked transparency and the breadth of input from stakeholders and the
public that would have assured its quality and relevancy.
Discussion: The loan repayment rate was discussed during the
negotiated rulemaking sessions in the context of whether borrowers who
attended a program were repaying their loans. The issue summaries used
for the rulemaking sessions describing the repayment rate were
published at that time on the Department's Web site and are available
at https://www2.ed.gov/policy/highered/reg/hearulemaking/2009/integrity.html. The negotiating committee did not reach consensus on
proposed regulations (see 74 FR 43617). As a result the Department was
not bound to any of the draft regulations for
[[Page 34394]]
the issues in the manner those issues were discussed with the
committee. Consequently, the Department chose to propose a dollar-based
repayment rate instead of the borrower-based repayment rate discussed
by the committee. As opposed to a borrower-based calculation where all
borrowers have the same impact on the repayment rate regardless of
their debt loads, the proposed dollar-based calculation rewards, or
gives more weight to, borrowers with higher debt loads that repay their
loans. For example:
Borrowers A and B completed a program with $12,000 and $15,000,
respectively, in loan debt. Borrowers C, D, and E withdrew from the
program with loan debts of $3,000, $4,000, and $6,000, respectively.
Under the proposed repayment rate, all loan debt incurred by borrowers
who attended the program would be included in the denominator ($40,000)
of the ratio. Presuming that program graduates are more likely to repay
their loans, i.e., that Borrower A will repay the $12,000 debt and
Borrower B will repay the $15,000 debt, but Borrowers C, D, and E will
not repay their debts, the sum of Borrowers A and B's loans would be in
the numerator, resulting in a 67.5 percent repayment rate ($27,000/
$40,000). Under a borrower-based calculation, the repayment rate would
be 40 percent (two out of the five borrowers were repaying their
loans).
Changes: None.
Threshold for the Loan Repayment Rate and Debt-to-Earnings Ratios
Comment: Some commenters expressed concern that there was no
reasoned basis to support the Department's selection of 45 percent and
35 percent as the repayment rate thresholds for determining, in part,
if programs are fully eligible, restricted, or ineligible to
participate in the title IV, HEA programs. The commenters believed that
this approach was simply a way for the Department to try to close as
many private sector schools as possible by adjusting the thresholds
based on the market's ability to absorb displaced students from private
sector schools.
On the other hand, some commenters opined that the proposed loan
repayment rate needed to be strengthened, and recommended that the
Department increase the threshold for each tier by at least 10
percentage points. Consequently, a program would have to achieve a
repayment rate of at least 55 percent to remain fully eligible for
title IV, HEA funds. Other commenters recommended a threshold of 50
percent for the loan repayment rate. Some commenters suggested that
programs with repayment rates below 25 or 35 percent should lose
eligibility. The commenters believed that it is important to recognize
that the proposed thresholds are likely to overstate actual repayment
rates because the proposed repayment rate excludes both private loans
and parent PLUS loans and many students and families may have accrued
substantial amounts of these types of debt for which repayment is not
being measured. The commenters noted that in 2008-09, these two forms
of debt accounted for 20 percent of all postsecondary education loans.
The commenters believed that these circumstances demonstrated both the
need to increase the repayment rate thresholds and the importance of
including private loans in the debt-to-earnings measure.
Other commenters believed that no changes should be made in the
proposed thresholds. Others argued that if a program satisfied the
debt-to-earnings threshold, then it should be eligible for title IV,
HEA funds. These commenters believed the loan repayment rate metric
would not be a quality test of the program's results.
Another commenter argued that the proposed standards for the loan
repayment rate were not strict enough for ``low-value programs,'' which
the commenter identified as programs where the percentage increase of
post-graduate income is less than the program's debt-to-earnings ratio
as a percentage of annual earnings for the program's graduates. The
commenter recommended that the Department require a low-value program
to maintain a 65 percent loan repayment rate in order for the program
to maintain full eligibility.
A number of commenters noted that the mean repayment rate for all
institutions is 48 percent and that an overwhelming majority of
minority-serving institutions and community colleges, as well as many
urban public and independent colleges and universities, would fail to
meet the 45 percent repayment rate threshold if adopted by the
Department. The commenters questioned the use of this standard of
quality that almost one-half of all colleges would fail to meet. In
addition, the commenters b