Self-Regulatory Organizations; The NASDAQ Stock Market LLC; Notice of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of Proposed Rule Change To Revise an Optional Depth Data Enterprise License Fee for Broker-Dealer Distribution of Depth-of-Book Data, 64379-64384 [2010-26208]

Download as PDF Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 201 / Tuesday, October 19, 2010 / Notices mstockstill on DSKH9S0YB1PROD with NOTICES potential to impair revenues from both products. ‘‘No one disputes that competition for order flow is ‘fierce’.’’ NetCoalition at 24. However, the existence of fierce competition for order flow implies a high degree of price sensitivity on the part of broker-dealers with order flow, since they may readily reduce costs by directing orders toward the lowest-cost trading venues. A broker-dealer that shifted its order flow from one platform to another in response to order execution price differentials would both reduce the value of that platform’s market data and reduce its own need to consume data from the disfavored platform. If a platform increases its market data fees, the change will affect the overall cost of doing business with the platform, and affected broker-dealers will assess whether they can lower their trading costs by directing orders elsewhere and thereby lessening the need for the more expensive data. Similarly, increases in the cost of NLS would impair the willingness of distributors to take a product for which there are numerous alternatives, impacting NLS data revenues, the value of NLS as a tool for attracting order flow, and ultimately, the volume of orders routed to NASDAQ and the value of its other data products. In establishing the price for the NASDAQ Last Sale Products, NASDAQ considered the competitiveness of the market for last sale data and all of the implications of that competition. NASDAQ believes that it has considered all relevant factors and has not considered irrelevant factors in order to establish a fair, reasonable, and not unreasonably discriminatory fees and an equitable allocation of fees among all users. The existence of numerous alternatives to NLS, including real-time consolidated data, free delayed consolidated data, and proprietary data from other sources ensures that NASDAQ cannot set unreasonable fees, or fees that are unreasonably discriminatory, without losing business to these alternatives. Accordingly, NASDAQ believes that the acceptance of the NLS product in the marketplace demonstrates the consistency of these fees with applicable statutory standards. C. Self-Regulatory Organization’s Statement on Comments on the Proposed Rule Change Received From Members, Participants, or Others Three comment letters were filed regarding the proposed rule change as originally published for comment NASDAQ responded to these comments in a letter dated December 13, 2007. Both the comment letters and NASDAQ’s response are available on VerDate Mar<15>2010 16:24 Oct 18, 2010 Jkt 223001 the SEC Web site at https://www.sec.gov/ comments/sr-nasdaq-2006–060/ nasdaq2006060.shtml. III. Date of Effectiveness of the Proposed Rule Change and Timing for Commission Action The foregoing rule change has become effective pursuant to Section 19(b)(3)(A)(ii) of the Act.7 At any time within 60 days of the filing of the proposed rule change, the Commission summarily may temporarily suspend such rule change if it appears to the Commission that such action is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, for the protection of investors, or otherwise in furtherance of the purposes of the Act. If the Commission takes such action, the Commission shall institute proceedings to determine whether the proposed rule should be approved or disapproved. IV. Solicitation of Comments Interested persons are invited to submit written data, views, and arguments concerning the foregoing, including whether the proposed rule change is consistent with the Act. Comments may be submitted by any of the following methods: Electronic Comments • Use the Commission’s Internet comment form (https://www.sec.gov/ rules/sro.shtml); or • Send an e-mail to rulecomments@sec.gov. Please include File Number SR–NASDAQ–2010–129 on the subject line. Paper Comments • Send paper comments in triplicate to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street, NE., Washington, DC 20549–1090. All submissions should refer to File Number SR–NASDAQ–2010–129. This file number should be included on the subject line if e-mail is used. To help the Commission process and review your comments more efficiently, please use only one method. The Commission will post all comments on the Commission’s Internet Web site (https://www.sec.gov/ rules/sro.shtml). Copies of the submission, all subsequent amendments, all written statements with respect to the proposed rule change that are filed with the Commission, and all written communications relating to the proposed rule change between the Commission and any person, other than those that may be withheld from the public in accordance with the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be available for Web site viewing and printing in the Commission’s Public Reference Room, on official business days between the hours of 10 a.m. and 3 p.m. Copies of the filing also will be available for inspection and copying at the principal office of the Exchange. All comments received will be posted without change; the Commission does not edit personal identifying information from submissions. You should submit only information that you wish to make available publicly. All submissions should refer to File Number SR–NASDAQ–2010–129 and should be submitted on or before November 9, 2010. For the Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets, pursuant to delegated authority.8 Florence E. Harmon, Deputy Secretary. [FR Doc. 2010–26246 Filed 10–18–10; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 8011–01–P SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION [Release No. 34–63084; File No. SR– NASDAQ–2010–125] Self-Regulatory Organizations; The NASDAQ Stock Market LLC; Notice of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of Proposed Rule Change To Revise an Optional Depth Data Enterprise License Fee for Broker-Dealer Distribution of Depth-of-Book Data October 13, 2010. Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the ‘‘Act’’) 1 and Rule 19b–4 thereunder,2 notice is hereby given that on September 30, 2010, The NASDAQ Stock Market LLC (‘‘NASDAQ’’ or the ‘‘Exchange’’) filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the ‘‘Commission’’) the proposed rule change as described in Items I, II, and III below, which Items have been prepared by the Exchange. The Commission is publishing this notice to solicit comments on the proposed rule change from interested persons. I. Self-Regulatory Organization’s Statement of the Terms of Substance of the Proposed Rule Change NASDAQ proposes to revise an optional Depth Data Enterprise License Fee for broker-dealer distribution of depth-of-book data to non-professional 8 17 CFR 200.30–3(a)(12). U.S.C. 78s(b)(1). 2 17 CFR 240.19b–4. 1 15 7 15 PO 00000 U.S.C. 78s(b)(3)(a)(ii). Frm 00137 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 64379 E:\FR\FM\19OCN1.SGM 19OCN1 64380 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 201 / Tuesday, October 19, 2010 / Notices (a) TotalView Entitlement The TotalView entitlement allows a subscriber to see all individual NASDAQ Market Center participant orders and quotes displayed in the system as well as the aggregate size of such orders and quotes at each price level in the execution functionality of the NASDAQ Market Center, including the NQDS feed. (1) (A)–(D) No change. (E) For a pilot period ending December 31, 2010, [As] as an alternative to (a)(1)(A), (B), and (C), a broker-dealer distributor may purchase an enterprise license at a rate of $325,000 [$300,000] for nonprofessional subscribers. The enterprise license entitles a distributor to provide NQDS (as set forth in Rule 7017), TotalView and OpenView to an unlimited number of [internal users, whether such users receive the data directly or through third-party vendors, and external] non-professional [user] subscribers with whom the firm has a brokerage relationship. The enterprise license shall not apply to relevant Level 1 fees. The enterprise license shall not apply to Depth Distributor Fees. (2) 30-Day Free-Trial Offer. NASDAQ shall offer all new individual subscribers and potential new individual subscribers a 30-day waiver of the user fees for TotalView. This waiver shall not include the incremental fees assessed for the NQDS-only service, which are $30 for professional users and $9 for non-professional users per month. This fee waiver period shall be applied on a rolling basis, determined by the date on which a new individual subscriber or potential individual subscriber is first entitled by a distributor to receive access to TotalView. A distributor may only provide this waiver to a specific individual subscriber once. For the period of the offer, the TotalView fee of $40 per professional user and $5 per non-professional user per month shall be waived. (b) No change. (c) No change. 1. Purpose Current Proposal. Effective September 1, 2010, NASDAQ began offering a voluntary Enterprise License for nonprofessional usage of the National Quotation Dissemination Service or NQDS (Rule 7017) and TotalView and OpenView, (Rule 7023) (collectively, ‘‘NASDAQ Depth Data’’).4 The Depth Data Enterprise License is available only to broker-dealers registered under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and it covers all non-professional usage fees to customers with whom the firm has a brokerage relationship with an allowance to distribute data to external professional subscribers with which the firm has a brokerage relationship. This Depth Data Enterprise License Fee includes non-professional usage fees, but does not include distributor fees. NASDAQ is amending the Depth Data Enterprise License in four ways: (1) Establishing the Enterprise License as a pilot program that will automatically sunset on December 31, 2010; (2) confirming that the program applies to non-professional users and eliminating confusing reference to internal users; (3) changing the fee from $300,000 to $325,000 per month to reflect the fact that the new Depth Data Enterprise License includes all of the data already available in the pre-existing nonprofessional enterprise license set forth in NASDAQ Rule 7023(a)(1)(C) at a cost of $25,000 per month; and (4) confirming in rule language that the Depth Data Enterprise License Fee does not include distributor fees applicable to distribution of the underlying depthof-book products. Background. NASDAQ disseminates market data feeds in two capacities. First, NASDAQ disseminates 3 Changes are marked to the rules of The NASDAQ Stock Market LLC found at https:// nasdaqomx.cchwallstreet.com. 4 See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 62908 (Sept. 14, 2010); 75 FR 57321 (Sept. 20, 20101 [sic]) (SR–NASDAQ–2010–111). 5 See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 59039 (Dec. 2, 2008) [sic] at p. 41. 6 Id. 7023. NASDAQ TotalView mstockstill on DSKH9S0YB1PROD with NOTICES (d) No change. * * * consolidated or ‘‘core’’ data in its capacity as Securities Information Processor (‘‘SIP’’) for the national market system plan governing securities listed on NASDAQ as a national securities exchange (‘‘NASDAQ UTP Plan’’).5 Second, NASDAQ separately disseminates proprietary or ‘‘non-core’’ data in its capacity as a registered national securities exchange. Non-core data is any data generated by the NASDAQ Market Center Execution System that is voluntarily disseminated by NASDAQ separate and apart from the consolidated data.6 NASDAQ has numerous proprietary data products, such as NASDAQ TotalView, NASDAQ Last Sale, and NASDAQ Basic. NASDAQ continues to seek broader distribution of non-core data and to reduce the cost of providing non-core data to larger numbers of investors. In the past, NASDAQ has accomplished this goal in part by offering similar enterprise licenses for professional and non-professional usage of TotalView which contains the full depth of book data for the NASDAQ Market Center Execution System. NASDAQ believes that the adoption of enterprise licenses has led to greater distribution of market data, particularly among nonprofessional users. Based on input from market participants, NASDAQ believes that this increase in distribution is attributable in part to the relief it provides distributors from the NASDAQ requirement that distributors count and report each nonprofessional user of NASDAQ proprietary data. In addition to increased administrative flexibility, enterprise licenses also encourage broader distribution by firms that are currently over the fee cap as well as those that are approaching the cap and wish to take advantage of the benefits of the program. Further, NASDAQ believes that capping fees in this manner creates goodwill with broker-dealers and increases transparency for retail investors. Accordingly, effective September 1, 2010, NASDAQ established the Depth Data Enterprise License Fee under NASDAQ Rule 7023(a)(1)(E), an optional non-professional enterprise license for distributors of any NASDQ depth-of-book data product including the National Quotation Dissemination Service or NQDS (Rule 7017) and TotalView and OpenView, (Rule 7023) (collectively, ‘‘NASDAQ Depth Data’’). This Depth Data Enterprise License Fee includes non-professional usage fees, users with which the firm has a brokerage relationship. The text of the proposed rule change is below. Proposed new language is in italics; proposed deletions are in [brackets].3 * * * * * VerDate Mar<15>2010 16:24 Oct 18, 2010 Jkt 223001 * * II. Self-Regulatory Organization’s Statement of the Purpose of, and Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change In its filing with the Commission, NASDAQ included statements concerning the purpose of, and basis for, the proposed rule change. The text of these statements may be examined at the places specified in Item III below, and is set forth in Sections A, B, and C below. A. Self-Regulatory Organization’s Statement of the Purpose of, and the Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change PO 00000 Frm 00138 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 E:\FR\FM\19OCN1.SGM 19OCN1 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 201 / Tuesday, October 19, 2010 / Notices mstockstill on DSKH9S0YB1PROD with NOTICES but does not include distributor fees.7 This program is available only to brokerdealers registered under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and would cover all non professional usage fees to customers with whom the firm has a brokerage relationship with an allowance to distribute data to external professional subscribers with which the firm has a brokerage relationship. Nonbroker-dealer vendors and application service providers would not be eligible for the enterprise license; such firms typically pass through the cost of market data user fees to their customers.8 The Depth Data Enterprise License Fee covers usage fees for NASDAQ Depth Data received directly from NASDAQ as well as data received from third-party vendors (e.g., Bloomberg, Thomson-Reuters, etc.). Upon joining the program, firms may inform thirdparty market data vendors they utilize (through a NASDAQ -provided form) that, going forward, depth data usage by the broker-dealer may be reported to NASDAQ on a non-billable basis. Such a structure attempts to address a longstanding concern that broker-dealers are over-billed for market data consumed by one person through multiple marketdata display devices. At the same time, the proposed billing structure will continue to provide NASDAQ with accurate reporting information for purposes of usage monitoring and auditing. Rationale for Current Proposal. Effective October 1, 2010, NASDAQ is modifying the rule language governing the new Depth Data Enterprise License in four ways. First, NASDAQ is establishing the program as a pilot and setting the sunset date at December 31, 2010. This change signals to market participants that the program is experimental and that NASDAQ may choose not to continue the program at its discretion. Second, NASDAQ is clarifying that the new Depth Data Enterprise License is available for distribution to non-professionals with whom the distributor has a brokerage relationship. The scope of the prior language appeared ambiguous to some market participants due to the use of the term ‘‘internal users’’ in the original rule language. 7 Distributors who utilize the enterprise license would still be liable for the applicable distributor fees. 8 NASDAQ relies on distributor self-reporting of usage rather than on individual contact with each end-user customer. NASDAQ permits distributors to designate an entire user population as ‘‘nonprofessional’’ provided that the number of professional subscribers within that user population does not exceed ten percent (10%) of the total population. VerDate Mar<15>2010 16:24 Oct 18, 2010 Jkt 223001 Third, NASDAQ is changing the price of the new program from $300,000 to $325,000. This change recognizes that NASDAQ now offers distributors enterprise distinct non-professional enterprise licenses, one for nonprofessional use of TotalView and OpenView under Rule 7023(a)(1)(C) and the new Depth Data Enterprise License Fee under Rule 7023(a)(1)(E) which includes non-professional usage of TotalView, OpenView and NQDS. Effectively, the new Depth Data Enterprise License establishes a fee of $300,000 per month for NQDS. Fourth, NASDAQ is confirming in rule language that the Depth Data Enterprise License Fee does not include distributor fees applicable to distribution of the underlying depth-ofbook products. NASDAQ included this description in the purpose section of the original proposal. NASDAQ has been asked and has agreed to include that language in Rule 7023(a)(1)(E). The proposed Depth Data Enterprise License Fee remains completely optional and does not replace existing enterprise license fee alternatives set forth in Rule 7023. Additionally, the proposal does not impact individual usage fees for any product or in any way raise the costs of any user of any NASDAQ data product. To the contrary, it provides broker-dealers with an additional approach to providing more NASDAQ data at a lower cost. 2. Statutory Basis NASDAQ believes that the proposed rule change is consistent with the provisions of Section 6 of the Act,9 in general, and with Section 6(b)(4) of the Act,10 in particular, in that it provides an equitable allocation of reasonable fees among users and recipients of NASDAQ data. In adopting Regulation NMS, the Commission granted selfregulatory organizations and brokerdealers increased authority and flexibility to offer new and unique market data to the public. It was believed that this authority would expand the amount of data available to consumers, and also spur innovation and competition for the provision of market data. The Commission concluded that Regulation NMS—by deregulating the market in proprietary data—would itself further the Act’s goals of facilitating efficiency and competition: [E]fficiency is promoted when brokerdealers who do not need the data beyond the prices, sizes, market center identifications of the NBBO and consolidated last sale 9 15 U.S.C. 78f. U.S.C. 78f(b)(4). Frm 00139 Fmt 4703 information are not required to receive (and pay for) such data. The Commission also believes that efficiency is promoted when broker-dealers may choose to receive (and pay for) additional market data based on their own internal analysis of the need for such data.11 By removing ‘‘unnecessary regulatory restrictions’’ on the ability of exchanges to sell their own data, Regulation NMS advanced the goals of the Act and the principles reflected in its legislative history. If the free market should determine whether proprietary data is sold to broker-dealers at all, it follows that the price at which such data is sold should be set by the market as well. NQDS, TotalView and OpenView are precisely the sort of market data product that the Commission envisioned when it adopted Regulation NMS. On July 21, 2010, President Barak Obama signed into law H.R. 4173, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (‘‘Dodd-Frank Act’’), which amended Section 19 of the Act. Among other things, Section 916 of the Dodd-Frank Act amended paragraph (A) of Section 19(b)(3) of the Act by inserting the phrase ‘‘on any person, whether or not the person is a member of the selfregulatory organization’’ after ‘‘due, fee or other charge imposed by the selfregulatory organization.’’ As a result, all SRO rule proposals establishing or changing dues, fees, or other charges are immediately effective upon filing regardless of whether such dues, fees, or other charges are imposed on members of the SRO, non-members, or both. Section 916 further amended paragraph (C) of Section 19(b)(3) of the Exchange Act to read, in pertinent part, ‘‘At any time within the 60-day period beginning on the date of filing of such a proposed rule change in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (1) [of Section 19(b)], the Commission summarily may temporarily suspend the change in the rules of the self-regulatory organization made thereby, if it appears to the Commission that such action is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, for the protection of investors, or otherwise in furtherance of the purposes of this title. If the Commission takes such action, the Commission shall institute proceedings under paragraph (2)(B) [of Section 19(b)] to determine whether the proposed rule should be approved or disapproved.’’ NASDAQ believes that these amendments to Section 19 of the Act reflect Congress’s intent to allow the Commission to rely upon the forces of 11 Securities Exchange Act Release No. 51808 (June 9, 2005), 70 FR 37496 (June 29, 2005). 10 15 PO 00000 64381 Sfmt 4703 E:\FR\FM\19OCN1.SGM 19OCN1 mstockstill on DSKH9S0YB1PROD with NOTICES 64382 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 201 / Tuesday, October 19, 2010 / Notices competition to ensure that fees for market data are reasonable and equitably allocated. Although Section 19(b) had formerly authorized immediate effectiveness for a ‘‘due, fee or other charge imposed by the selfregulatory organization,’’ the Commission adopted a policy and subsequently a rule stipulating that fees for data and other products available to persons that are not members of the selfregulatory organization must be approved by the Commission after first being published for comment. At the time, the Commission supported the adoption of the policy and the rule by pointing out that unlike members, whose representation in self-regulatory organization governance was mandated by the Act, non-members should be given the opportunity to comment on fees before being required to pay them, and that the Commission should specifically approve all such fees. NASDAQ believes that the amendment to Section 19 reflects Congress’s conclusion that the evolution of selfregulatory organization governance and competitive market structure have rendered the Commission’s prior policy on non-member fees obsolete. Specifically, many exchanges have evolved from member-owned not-forprofit corporations into for-profit investor-owned corporations (or subsidiaries of investor-owned corporations). Accordingly, exchanges no longer have narrow incentives to manage their affairs for the exclusive benefit of their members, but rather have incentives to maximize the appeal of their products to all customers, whether members or non-members, so as to broaden distribution and grow revenues. Moreover, we believe that the change also reflects an endorsement of the Commission’s determinations that reliance on competitive markets is an appropriate means to ensure equitable and reasonable prices. Simply put, the change reflects a presumption that all fee changes should be permitted to take effect immediately, since the level of all fees are constrained by competitive forces. The recent decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in NetCoalition v. SEC [sic], No. 09–1042 (D.C. Cir. 2010), although reviewing a Commission decision made prior to the effective date of the Dodd-Frank Act, upheld the Commission’s reliance upon competitive markets to set reasonable and equitably allocated fees for market data. ‘‘In fact, the legislative history indicates that the Congress intended that the market system ‘evolve through VerDate Mar<15>2010 16:24 Oct 18, 2010 Jkt 223001 the interplay of competitive forces as unnecessary regulatory restrictions are removed’ and that the SEC wield its regulatory power ‘in those situations where competition may not be sufficient,’ such as in the creation of a ‘consolidated transactional reporting system.’ ’’ NetCoalition [sic], at 15 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94–229, at 92 (1975), as reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 321, 323). The court’s conclusions about Congressional intent are therefore reinforced by the DoddFrank Act amendments, which create a presumption that exchange fees, including market data fees, may take effect immediately, without prior Commission approval, and that the Commission should take action to suspend a fee change and institute a proceeding to determine whether the fee change should be approved or disapproved only where the Commission has concerns that the change may not be consistent with the Act. B. Self-Regulatory Organization’s Statement on Burden on Competition NASDAQ does not believe that the proposed rule change will result in any burden on competition that is not necessary or appropriate in furtherance of the purposes of the Act, as amended. Notwithstanding its determination that the Commission may rely upon competition to establish fair and equitably allocated fees for market data, the NetCoalition [sic] court found that the Commission had not, in that case, compiled a record that adequately supported its conclusion that the market for the data at issue in the case was competitive. For the reasons discussed above, NASDAQ believes that the DoddFrank Act amendments to Section 19 materially alter the scope of the Commission’s review of future market data filings, by creating a presumption that all fees may take effect immediately, without prior analysis by the Commission of the competitive environment. Even in the absence of this important statutory change, however, NASDAQ believes that a record may readily be established to demonstrate the competitive nature of the market in question. There is intense competition between trading platforms that provide transaction execution and routing services and proprietary data products. Transaction execution and proprietary data products are complementary in that market data is both an input and a byproduct of the execution service. In fact, market data and trade execution are a paradigmatic example of joint products with joint costs. The decision PO 00000 Frm 00140 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 whether and on which platform to post an order will depend on the attributes of the platform where the order can be posted, including the execution fees, data quality and price and distribution of its data products. Without the prospect of a taking order seeing and reacting to a posted order on a particular platform, the posting of the order would accomplish little. Without trade executions, exchange data products cannot exist. Data products are valuable to many end users only insofar as they provide information that end users expect will assist them or their customers in making trading decisions. The costs of producing market data include not only the costs of the data distribution infrastructure, but also the costs of designing, maintaining, and operating the exchange’s transaction execution platform and the cost of regulating the exchange to ensure its fair operation and maintain investor confidence. The total return that a trading platform earns reflects the revenues it receives from both products and the joint costs it incurs. Moreover, an exchange’s customers view the costs of transaction executions and of data as a unified cost of doing business with the exchange. A broker-dealer will direct orders to a particular exchange only if the expected revenues from executing trades on the exchange exceed net transaction execution costs and the cost of data that the broker-dealer chooses to buy to support its trading decisions (or those of its customers). The choice of data products is, in turn, a product of the value of the products in making profitable trading decisions. If the cost of the product exceeds its expected value, the broker-dealer will choose not to buy it. Moreover, as a broker-dealer chooses to direct fewer orders to a particular exchange, the value of the product to that broker-dealer decreases, for two reasons. First, the product will contain less information, because executions of the broker-dealer’s orders will not be reflected in it. Second, and perhaps more important, the product will be less valuable to that brokerdealer because it does not provide information about the venue to which it is directing its orders. Data from the competing venue to which the brokerdealer is directing orders will become correspondingly more valuable. Thus, a super-competitive increase in the fees charged for either transactions or data has the potential to impair revenues from both products. ‘‘No one disputes that competition for order flow is ‘fierce’.’’ NetCoalition at 24. However, the existence of fierce competition for order flow implies a high degree of price sensitivity on the part of broker-dealers E:\FR\FM\19OCN1.SGM 19OCN1 mstockstill on DSKH9S0YB1PROD with NOTICES Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 201 / Tuesday, October 19, 2010 / Notices with order flow, since they may readily reduce costs by directing orders toward the lowest-cost trading venues. A broker-dealer that shifted its order flow from one platform to another in response to order execution price differentials would both reduce the value of that platform’s market data and reduce its own need to consume data from the disfavored platform. Similarly, if a platform increases its market data fees, the change will affect the overall cost of doing business with the platform, and affected broker-dealers will assess whether they can lower their trading costs by directing orders elsewhere and thereby lessening the need for the more expensive data. Analyzing the cost of market data distribution in isolation from the cost of all of the inputs supporting the creation of market data will inevitably underestimate the cost of the data. Thus, because it is impossible to create data without a fast, technologically robust, and well-regulated execution system, system costs and regulatory costs affect the price of market data. It would be equally misleading, however, to attribute all of the exchange’s costs to the market data portion of an exchange’s joint product. Rather, all of the exchange’s costs are incurred for the unified purposes of attracting order flow, executing and/or routing orders, and generating and selling data about market activity. The total return that an exchange earns reflects the revenues it receives from the joint products and the total costs of the joint products. Competition among trading platforms can be expected to constrain the aggregate return each platform earns from the sale of its joint products, but different platforms may choose from a range of possible, and equally reasonable, pricing strategies as the means of recovering total costs. For example, some platform may choose to pay rebates to attract orders, charge relatively low prices for market information (or provide information free of charge) and charge relatively high prices for accessing posted liquidity. Other platforms may choose a strategy of paying lower rebates (or no rebates) to attract orders, setting relatively high prices for market information, and setting relatively low prices for accessing posted liquidity. In this environment, there is no economic basis for regulating maximum prices for one of the joint products in an industry in which suppliers face competitive constraints with regard to the joint offering. This would be akin to strictly regulating the price that an automobile manufacturer can charge for car sound systems despite the existence of a highly VerDate Mar<15>2010 16:24 Oct 18, 2010 Jkt 223001 competitive market for cars and the availability of after-market alternatives to the manufacturer-supplied system. The market for market data products is competitive and inherently contestable because there is fierce competition for the inputs necessary to the creation of proprietary data and strict pricing discipline for the proprietary products themselves. Numerous exchanges compete with each other for listings, trades, and market data itself, providing virtually limitless opportunities for entrepreneurs who wish to produce and distribute their own market data. This proprietary data is produced by each individual exchange, as well as other entities, in a vigorously competitive market. Broker-dealers currently have numerous alternative venues for their order flow, including ten self-regulatory organization (‘‘SRO’’) markets, as well as internalizing broker-dealers (‘‘BDs’’) and various forms of alternative trading systems (‘‘ATSs’’), including dark pools and electronic communication networks (‘‘ECNs’’). Each SRO market competes to produce transaction reports via trade executions, and two FINRA-regulated Trade Reporting Facilities (‘‘TRFs’’) compete to attract internalized transaction reports. Competitive markets for order flow, executions, and transaction reports provide pricing discipline for the inputs of proprietary data products. The large number of SROs, TRFs, BDs, and ATSs that currently produce proprietary data or are currently capable of producing it provides further pricing discipline for proprietary data products. Each SRO, TRF, ATS, and BD is currently permitted to produce proprietary data products, and many currently do or have announced plans to do so, including NASDAQ, NYSE, NYSE Amex, NYSEArca, and BATS. Any ATS or BD can combine with any other ATS, BD, or multiple ATSs or BDs to produce joint proprietary data products. Additionally, order routers and market data vendors can facilitate single or multiple broker-dealers’ production of proprietary data products. The potential sources of proprietary products are virtually limitless. The fact that proprietary data from ATSs, BDs, and vendors can bypass SROs is significant in two respects. First, non-SROs can compete directly with SROs for the production and sale of proprietary data products, as BATS and Arca did before registering as exchanges by publishing proprietary book data on the Internet. Second, because a single order or transaction report can appear in an SRO proprietary product, a non-SRO proprietary PO 00000 Frm 00141 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 64383 product, or both, the data available in proprietary products is exponentially greater than the actual number of orders and transaction reports that exist in the marketplace. Market data vendors provide another form of price discipline for proprietary data products because they control the primary means of access to end users. Vendors impose price restraints based upon their business models. For example, vendors such as Bloomberg and Reuters that assess a surcharge on data they sell may refuse to offer proprietary products that end users will not purchase in sufficient numbers. Internet portals, such as Yahoo, impose discipline by providing only data that will enable them to attract ‘‘eyeballs’’ that contribute to their advertising revenue. Retail broker-dealers, such as Schwab and Fidelity, offer their customers proprietary data only if it promotes trading and generates sufficient commission revenue. Although the business models may differ, these vendors’ pricing discipline is the same: They can simply refuse to purchase any proprietary data product that fails to provide sufficient value. NASDAQ and other producers of proprietary data products must understand and respond to these varying business models and pricing disciplines in order to market proprietary data products successfully. In addition to the competition and price discipline described above, the market for proprietary data products is also highly contestable because market entry is rapid, inexpensive, and profitable. The history of electronic trading is replete with examples of entrants that swiftly grew into some of the largest electronic trading platforms and proprietary data producers: Archipelago, Bloomberg Tradebook, Island, RediBook, Attain, TracECN, BATS Trading and Direct Edge. A proliferation of dark pools and other ATSs operate profitably with fragmentary shares of consolidated market volume. Regulation NMS, by deregulating the market for proprietary data, has increased the contestability of that market. While broker-dealers have previously published their proprietary data individually, Regulation NMS encourages market data vendors and broker-dealers to produce proprietary products cooperatively in a manner never before possible. Multiple market data vendors already have the capability to aggregate data and disseminate it on a profitable scale, including Bloomberg, and Thomson-Reuters. The court in NetCoalition concluded that the Commission had failed to E:\FR\FM\19OCN1.SGM 19OCN1 mstockstill on DSKH9S0YB1PROD with NOTICES 64384 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 201 / Tuesday, October 19, 2010 / Notices demonstrate that the market for market data was competitive based on the reasoning of the Commission’s NetCoalition order because, in the court’s view, the Commission had not adequately demonstrated that the depthof-book data at issue in the case is used to attract order flow. NASDAQ believes, however, that evidence not before the court clearly demonstrates that availability of depth data attracts order flow. For example, NASDAQ submits that in and of itself, NASDAQ’s decision voluntarily to cap fees on existing products, as is the effect of an enterprise license, is evidence of market forces at work. In fact, the instant proposal creates a second enterprise license for non-professional usage of depth data to complement the existing enterprise license set forth at NASDAQ Rule 7023(a)(1)(C). Competition among platforms has driven NASDAQ continually to improve its platform data offerings and to cater to customers’ data needs. For example, NASDAQ has developed and maintained multiple delivery mechanisms (IP, multi-cast, and compression) that enable customers to receive data in the form and manner they prefer and at the lowest cost to them. NASDAQ offers front end applications such as its ‘‘Bookviewer’’ to help customers utilize data. NASDAQ has created new products like TotalView Aggregate to complement TotalView ITCH and Level 2, because offering data in multiple formatting allows NASDAQ to better fit customer needs. NASDAQ offers data via multiple extranet providers, thereby helping to reduce network and total cost for its data products. NASDAQ has developed an online administrative system to provide customers transparency into their data feed requests and streamline data usage reporting. NASDAQ has also expanded its Enterprise License options that reduce the administrative burden and costs to firms that purchase market data. Despite these enhancements and a dramatic increase in message traffic, NASDAQ’s fees for depth-of-book data have remained flat. In fact, as a percent of total customer costs, NASDAQ data fees have fallen relative to other data usage costs—including bandwidth, programming, and infrastructure—that have risen. The same holds true for execution services; despite numerous enhancements to NASDAQ’s trading platform, absolute and relative trading costs have declined. Platform competition has intensified as new entrants have emerged, constraining prices for both executions and for data. VerDate Mar<15>2010 16:24 Oct 18, 2010 Jkt 223001 C. Self-Regulatory Organization’s Statement on Comments on the Proposed Rule Change Received From Members, Participants, or Others Written comments were neither solicited nor received. III. Date of Effectiveness of the Proposed Rule Change and Timing for Commission Action The foregoing rule change has become effective pursuant to Section 19(b)(3)(A)(ii) of the Act.12 At any time within 60 days of the filing of the proposed rule change, the Commission summarily may temporarily suspend such rule change if it appears to the Commission that such action is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, for the protection of investors, or otherwise in furtherance of the purposes of the Act. If the Commission takes such action, the Commission shall institute proceedings to determine whether the proposed rule should be approved or disapproved. IV. Solicitation of Comments Interested persons are invited to submit written data, views, and arguments concerning the foregoing, including whether the proposed rule change is consistent with the Act. Comments may be submitted by any of the following methods: Electronic Comments • Use the Commission’s Internet comment form (https://www.sec.gov/ rules/sro.shtml); or • Send an e-mail to rulecomments@sec.gov. Please include File Number SR–NASDAQ–2010–125 on the subject line. Paper Comments • Send paper comments in triplicate to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street, NE., Washington, DC 20549–1090. All submissions should refer to File Number SR–NASDAQ–2010–125. This file number should be included on the subject line if e-mail is used. To help the Commission process and review your comments more efficiently, please use only one method. The Commission will post all comments on the Commission’s Internet Web site (https://www.sec.gov/ rules/sro.shtml). Copies of the submission, all subsequent amendments, all written statements with respect to the proposed rule change that are filed with the Commission, and all written communications relating to the proposed rule change between the Commission and any person, other than those that may be withheld from the public in accordance with the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be available for website viewing and printing in the Commission’s Public Reference Room, on official business days between the hours of 10 a.m. and 3 p.m. Copies of the filing also will be available for inspection and copying at the principal office of the Exchange. All comments received will be posted without change; the Commission does not edit personal identifying information from submissions. You should submit only information that you wish to make available publicly. All submissions should refer to File Number SR–NASDAQ–2010–125 and should be submitted on or before November 9, 2010. For the Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets, pursuant to delegated authority.13 Florence E. Harmon, Deputy Secretary. [FR Doc. 2010–26208 Filed 10–18–10; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 8011–01–P SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION [Release No. 34–63098; File No. SR– NASDAQ–2010–074] Self-Regulatory Organizations; The NASDAQ Stock Market LLC; Order Instituting Proceedings To Determine Whether To Disapprove Proposed Rule Change, as Modified by Amendment No. 1, To Adopt Rule 4753(c) as a Six Month Pilot in 100 NASDAQ-Listed Securities October 13, 2010. I. Introduction On June 18, 2010, The NASDAQ Stock Market LLC (‘‘Nasdaq’’ or the ‘‘Exchange’’) filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (‘‘Commission’’), pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (‘‘Act’’) 1 and Rule 19b–4 thereunder,2 a proposed rule change to implement, on a six-month pilot basis, a volatility-based trading pause in 100 Nasdaq-listed securities (‘‘Volatility Guard’’). On June 25, 2010, Nasdaq filed Amendment No. 1 to the proposed rule change. The proposed rule change, as amended, was published for comment in the Federal Register on July 15, 13 17 CFR 200.30–3(a)(12). U.S.C. 78s(b)(1). 2 17 CFR 240.19b–4. 1 15 12 15 PO 00000 U.S.C. 78s(b)(3)(a)(ii). Frm 00142 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 E:\FR\FM\19OCN1.SGM 19OCN1

Agencies

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 201 (Tuesday, October 19, 2010)]
[Notices]
[Pages 64379-64384]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-26208]

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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

[Release No. 34-63084; File No. SR-NASDAQ-2010-125]

Self-Regulatory Organizations; The NASDAQ Stock Market LLC;
Notice of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of Proposed Rule Change To
Revise an Optional Depth Data Enterprise License Fee for Broker-Dealer
Distribution of Depth-of-Book Data

October 13, 2010.
Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(the ``Act'') \1\ and Rule 19b-4 thereunder,\2\ notice is hereby given
that on September 30, 2010, The NASDAQ Stock Market LLC (``NASDAQ'' or
the ``Exchange'') filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(the ``Commission'') the proposed rule change as described in Items I,
II, and III below, which Items have been prepared by the Exchange. The
Commission is publishing this notice to solicit comments on the
proposed rule change from interested persons.
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\1\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
\2\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4.
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I. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Terms of Substance
of the Proposed Rule Change

NASDAQ proposes to revise an optional Depth Data Enterprise License
Fee for broker-dealer distribution of depth-of-book data to non-
professional

[[Page 64380]]

users with which the firm has a brokerage relationship.
The text of the proposed rule change is below. Proposed new
language is in italics; proposed deletions are in [brackets].\3\
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\3\ Changes are marked to the rules of The NASDAQ Stock Market
LLC found at https://nasdaqomx.cchwallstreet.com.
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* * * * *
7023. NASDAQ TotalView
(a) TotalView Entitlement
The TotalView entitlement allows a subscriber to see all individual
NASDAQ Market Center participant orders and quotes displayed in the
system as well as the aggregate size of such orders and quotes at each
price level in the execution functionality of the NASDAQ Market Center,
including the NQDS feed.
(1)
(A)-(D) No change.
(E) For a pilot period ending December 31, 2010, [As] as an
alternative to (a)(1)(A), (B), and (C), a broker-dealer distributor may
purchase an enterprise license at a rate of $325,000 [$300,000] for
non-professional subscribers. The enterprise license entitles a
distributor to provide NQDS (as set forth in Rule 7017), TotalView and
OpenView to an unlimited number of [internal users, whether such users
receive the data directly or through third-party vendors, and external]
non-professional [user] subscribers with whom the firm has a brokerage
relationship. The enterprise license shall not apply to relevant Level
1 fees. The enterprise license shall not apply to Depth Distributor
Fees.
(2) 30-Day Free-Trial Offer. NASDAQ shall offer all new individual
subscribers and potential new individual subscribers a 30-day waiver of
the user fees for TotalView. This waiver shall not include the
incremental fees assessed for the NQDS-only service, which are $30 for
professional users and $9 for non-professional users per month. This
fee waiver period shall be applied on a rolling basis, determined by
the date on which a new individual subscriber or potential individual
subscriber is first entitled by a distributor to receive access to
TotalView. A distributor may only provide this waiver to a specific
individual subscriber once.
For the period of the offer, the TotalView fee of $40 per
professional user and $5 per non-professional user per month shall be
waived.
(b) No change.
(c) No change.
(d) No change.
* * * * *

II. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change

In its filing with the Commission, NASDAQ included statements
concerning the purpose of, and basis for, the proposed rule change. The
text of these statements may be examined at the places specified in
Item III below, and is set forth in Sections A, B, and C below.

A. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and the
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change

1. Purpose
Current Proposal. Effective September 1, 2010, NASDAQ began
offering a voluntary Enterprise License for non-professional usage of
the National Quotation Dissemination Service or NQDS (Rule 7017) and
TotalView and OpenView, (Rule 7023) (collectively, ``NASDAQ Depth
Data'').\4\ The Depth Data Enterprise License is available only to
broker-dealers registered under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
and it covers all non-professional usage fees to customers with whom
the firm has a brokerage relationship with an allowance to distribute
data to external professional subscribers with which the firm has a
brokerage relationship. This Depth Data Enterprise License Fee includes
non-professional usage fees, but does not include distributor fees.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\4\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 62908 (Sept. 14,
2010); 75 FR 57321 (Sept. 20, 20101 [sic]) (SR-NASDAQ-2010-111).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

NASDAQ is amending the Depth Data Enterprise License in four ways:
(1) Establishing the Enterprise License as a pilot program that will
automatically sunset on December 31, 2010; (2) confirming that the
program applies to non-professional users and eliminating confusing
reference to internal users; (3) changing the fee from $300,000 to
$325,000 per month to reflect the fact that the new Depth Data
Enterprise License includes all of the data already available in the
pre-existing non-professional enterprise license set forth in NASDAQ
Rule 7023(a)(1)(C) at a cost of $25,000 per month; and (4) confirming
in rule language that the Depth Data Enterprise License Fee does not
include distributor fees applicable to distribution of the underlying
depth-of-book products.
Background. NASDAQ disseminates market data feeds in two
capacities. First, NASDAQ disseminates consolidated or ``core'' data in
its capacity as Securities Information Processor (``SIP'') for the
national market system plan governing securities listed on NASDAQ as a
national securities exchange (``NASDAQ UTP Plan'').\5\ Second, NASDAQ
separately disseminates proprietary or ``non-core'' data in its
capacity as a registered national securities exchange. Non-core data is
any data generated by the NASDAQ Market Center Execution System that is
voluntarily disseminated by NASDAQ separate and apart from the
consolidated data.\6\ NASDAQ has numerous proprietary data products,
such as NASDAQ TotalView, NASDAQ Last Sale, and NASDAQ Basic.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\5\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 59039 (Dec. 2, 2008)
[sic] at p. 41.
\6\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

NASDAQ continues to seek broader distribution of non-core data and
to reduce the cost of providing non-core data to larger numbers of
investors. In the past, NASDAQ has accomplished this goal in part by
offering similar enterprise licenses for professional and non-
professional usage of TotalView which contains the full depth of book
data for the NASDAQ Market Center Execution System. NASDAQ believes
that the adoption of enterprise licenses has led to greater
distribution of market data, particularly among non-professional users.
Based on input from market participants, NASDAQ believes that this
increase in distribution is attributable in part to the relief it
provides distributors from the NASDAQ requirement that distributors
count and report each non-professional user of NASDAQ proprietary data.
In addition to increased administrative flexibility, enterprise
licenses also encourage broader distribution by firms that are
currently over the fee cap as well as those that are approaching the
cap and wish to take advantage of the benefits of the program. Further,
NASDAQ believes that capping fees in this manner creates goodwill with
broker-dealers and increases transparency for retail investors.
Accordingly, effective September 1, 2010, NASDAQ established the
Depth Data Enterprise License Fee under NASDAQ Rule 7023(a)(1)(E), an
optional non-professional enterprise license for distributors of any
NASDQ depth-of-book data product including the National Quotation
Dissemination Service or NQDS (Rule 7017) and TotalView and OpenView,
(Rule 7023) (collectively, ``NASDAQ Depth Data''). This Depth Data
Enterprise License Fee includes non-professional usage fees,

[[Page 64381]]

but does not include distributor fees.\7\ This program is available
only to broker-dealers registered under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, and would cover all non professional usage fees to customers with
whom the firm has a brokerage relationship with an allowance to
distribute data to external professional subscribers with which the
firm has a brokerage relationship. Non-broker-dealer vendors and
application service providers would not be eligible for the enterprise
license; such firms typically pass through the cost of market data user
fees to their customers.\8\
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\7\ Distributors who utilize the enterprise license would still
be liable for the applicable distributor fees.
\8\ NASDAQ relies on distributor self-reporting of usage rather
than on individual contact with each end-user customer. NASDAQ
permits distributors to designate an entire user population as
``non-professional'' provided that the number of professional
subscribers within that user population does not exceed ten percent
(10%) of the total population.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Depth Data Enterprise License Fee covers usage fees for NASDAQ
Depth Data received directly from NASDAQ as well as data received from
third-party vendors (e.g., Bloomberg, Thomson-Reuters, etc.). Upon
joining the program, firms may inform third-party market data vendors
they utilize (through a NASDAQ -provided form) that, going forward,
depth data usage by the broker-dealer may be reported to NASDAQ on a
non-billable basis. Such a structure attempts to address a long-
standing concern that broker-dealers are over-billed for market data
consumed by one person through multiple market-data display devices. At
the same time, the proposed billing structure will continue to provide
NASDAQ with accurate reporting information for purposes of usage
monitoring and auditing.
Rationale for Current Proposal. Effective October 1, 2010, NASDAQ
is modifying the rule language governing the new Depth Data Enterprise
License in four ways. First, NASDAQ is establishing the program as a
pilot and setting the sunset date at December 31, 2010. This change
signals to market participants that the program is experimental and
that NASDAQ may choose not to continue the program at its discretion.
Second, NASDAQ is clarifying that the new Depth Data Enterprise License
is available for distribution to non-professionals with whom the
distributor has a brokerage relationship. The scope of the prior
language appeared ambiguous to some market participants due to the use
of the term ``internal users'' in the original rule language.
Third, NASDAQ is changing the price of the new program from
$300,000 to $325,000. This change recognizes that NASDAQ now offers
distributors enterprise distinct non-professional enterprise licenses,
one for non-professional use of TotalView and OpenView under Rule
7023(a)(1)(C) and the new Depth Data Enterprise License Fee under Rule
7023(a)(1)(E) which includes non-professional usage of TotalView,
OpenView and NQDS. Effectively, the new Depth Data Enterprise License
establishes a fee of $300,000 per month for NQDS.
Fourth, NASDAQ is confirming in rule language that the Depth Data
Enterprise License Fee does not include distributor fees applicable to
distribution of the underlying depth-of-book products. NASDAQ included
this description in the purpose section of the original proposal.
NASDAQ has been asked and has agreed to include that language in Rule
7023(a)(1)(E).
The proposed Depth Data Enterprise License Fee remains completely
optional and does not replace existing enterprise license fee
alternatives set forth in Rule 7023. Additionally, the proposal does
not impact individual usage fees for any product or in any way raise
the costs of any user of any NASDAQ data product. To the contrary, it
provides broker-dealers with an additional approach to providing more
NASDAQ data at a lower cost.
2. Statutory Basis
NASDAQ believes that the proposed rule change is consistent with
the provisions of Section 6 of the Act,\9\ in general, and with Section
6(b)(4) of the Act,\10\ in particular, in that it provides an equitable
allocation of reasonable fees among users and recipients of NASDAQ
data. In adopting Regulation NMS, the Commission granted self-
regulatory organizations and broker-dealers increased authority and
flexibility to offer new and unique market data to the public. It was
believed that this authority would expand the amount of data available
to consumers, and also spur innovation and competition for the
provision of market data.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\9\ 15 U.S.C. 78f.
\10\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(4).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Commission concluded that Regulation NMS--by deregulating the
market in proprietary data--would itself further the Act's goals of
facilitating efficiency and competition:

[E]fficiency is promoted when broker-dealers who do not need the
data beyond the prices, sizes, market center identifications of the
NBBO and consolidated last sale information are not required to
receive (and pay for) such data. The Commission also believes that
efficiency is promoted when broker-dealers may choose to receive
(and pay for) additional market data based on their own internal
analysis of the need for such data.\11\
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\11\ Securities Exchange Act Release No. 51808 (June 9, 2005),
70 FR 37496 (June 29, 2005).

By removing ``unnecessary regulatory restrictions'' on the ability
of exchanges to sell their own data, Regulation NMS advanced the goals
of the Act and the principles reflected in its legislative history. If
the free market should determine whether proprietary data is sold to
broker-dealers at all, it follows that the price at which such data is
sold should be set by the market as well. NQDS, TotalView and OpenView
are precisely the sort of market data product that the Commission
envisioned when it adopted Regulation NMS.
On July 21, 2010, President Barak Obama signed into law H.R. 4173,
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010
(``Dodd-Frank Act''), which amended Section 19 of the Act. Among other
things, Section 916 of the Dodd-Frank Act amended paragraph (A) of
Section 19(b)(3) of the Act by inserting the phrase ``on any person,
whether or not the person is a member of the self-regulatory
organization'' after ``due, fee or other charge imposed by the self-
regulatory organization.'' As a result, all SRO rule proposals
establishing or changing dues, fees, or other charges are immediately
effective upon filing regardless of whether such dues, fees, or other
charges are imposed on members of the SRO, non-members, or both.
Section 916 further amended paragraph (C) of Section 19(b)(3) of the
Exchange Act to read, in pertinent part, ``At any time within the 60-
day period beginning on the date of filing of such a proposed rule
change in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (1) [of Section
19(b)], the Commission summarily may temporarily suspend the change in
the rules of the self-regulatory organization made thereby, if it
appears to the Commission that such action is necessary or appropriate
in the public interest, for the protection of investors, or otherwise
in furtherance of the purposes of this title. If the Commission takes
such action, the Commission shall institute proceedings under paragraph
(2)(B) [of Section 19(b)] to determine whether the proposed rule should
be approved or disapproved.''
NASDAQ believes that these amendments to Section 19 of the Act
reflect Congress's intent to allow the Commission to rely upon the
forces of

[[Page 64382]]

competition to ensure that fees for market data are reasonable and
equitably allocated. Although Section 19(b) had formerly authorized
immediate effectiveness for a ``due, fee or other charge imposed by the
self-regulatory organization,'' the Commission adopted a policy and
subsequently a rule stipulating that fees for data and other products
available to persons that are not members of the self-regulatory
organization must be approved by the Commission after first being
published for comment. At the time, the Commission supported the
adoption of the policy and the rule by pointing out that unlike
members, whose representation in self-regulatory organization
governance was mandated by the Act, non-members should be given the
opportunity to comment on fees before being required to pay them, and
that the Commission should specifically approve all such fees. NASDAQ
believes that the amendment to Section 19 reflects Congress's
conclusion that the evolution of self-regulatory organization
governance and competitive market structure have rendered the
Commission's prior policy on non-member fees obsolete. Specifically,
many exchanges have evolved from member-owned not-for-profit
corporations into for-profit investor-owned corporations (or
subsidiaries of investor-owned corporations). Accordingly, exchanges no
longer have narrow incentives to manage their affairs for the exclusive
benefit of their members, but rather have incentives to maximize the
appeal of their products to all customers, whether members or non-
members, so as to broaden distribution and grow revenues. Moreover, we
believe that the change also reflects an endorsement of the
Commission's determinations that reliance on competitive markets is an
appropriate means to ensure equitable and reasonable prices. Simply
put, the change reflects a presumption that all fee changes should be
permitted to take effect immediately, since the level of all fees are
constrained by competitive forces.
The recent decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit in NetCoalition v. SEC [sic], No. 09-1042
(D.C. Cir. 2010), although reviewing a Commission decision made prior
to the effective date of the Dodd-Frank Act, upheld the Commission's
reliance upon competitive markets to set reasonable and equitably
allocated fees for market data. ``In fact, the legislative history
indicates that the Congress intended that the market system `evolve
through the interplay of competitive forces as unnecessary regulatory
restrictions are removed' and that the SEC wield its regulatory power
`in those situations where competition may not be sufficient,' such as
in the creation of a `consolidated transactional reporting system.' ''
NetCoalition [sic], at 15 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94-229, at 92 (1975),
as reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 321, 323). The court's conclusions
about Congressional intent are therefore reinforced by the Dodd-Frank
Act amendments, which create a presumption that exchange fees,
including market data fees, may take effect immediately, without prior
Commission approval, and that the Commission should take action to
suspend a fee change and institute a proceeding to determine whether
the fee change should be approved or disapproved only where the
Commission has concerns that the change may not be consistent with the
Act.

B. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Burden on Competition

NASDAQ does not believe that the proposed rule change will result
in any burden on competition that is not necessary or appropriate in
furtherance of the purposes of the Act, as amended. Notwithstanding its
determination that the Commission may rely upon competition to
establish fair and equitably allocated fees for market data, the
NetCoalition [sic] court found that the Commission had not, in that
case, compiled a record that adequately supported its conclusion that
the market for the data at issue in the case was competitive. For the
reasons discussed above, NASDAQ believes that the Dodd-Frank Act
amendments to Section 19 materially alter the scope of the Commission's
review of future market data filings, by creating a presumption that
all fees may take effect immediately, without prior analysis by the
Commission of the competitive environment. Even in the absence of this
important statutory change, however, NASDAQ believes that a record may
readily be established to demonstrate the competitive nature of the
market in question.
There is intense competition between trading platforms that provide
transaction execution and routing services and proprietary data
products. Transaction execution and proprietary data products are
complementary in that market data is both an input and a byproduct of
the execution service. In fact, market data and trade execution are a
paradigmatic example of joint products with joint costs. The decision
whether and on which platform to post an order will depend on the
attributes of the platform where the order can be posted, including the
execution fees, data quality and price and distribution of its data
products. Without the prospect of a taking order seeing and reacting to
a posted order on a particular platform, the posting of the order would
accomplish little. Without trade executions, exchange data products
cannot exist. Data products are valuable to many end users only insofar
as they provide information that end users expect will assist them or
their customers in making trading decisions.
The costs of producing market data include not only the costs of
the data distribution infrastructure, but also the costs of designing,
maintaining, and operating the exchange's transaction execution
platform and the cost of regulating the exchange to ensure its fair
operation and maintain investor confidence. The total return that a
trading platform earns reflects the revenues it receives from both
products and the joint costs it incurs. Moreover, an exchange's
customers view the costs of transaction executions and of data as a
unified cost of doing business with the exchange. A broker-dealer will
direct orders to a particular exchange only if the expected revenues
from executing trades on the exchange exceed net transaction execution
costs and the cost of data that the broker-dealer chooses to buy to
support its trading decisions (or those of its customers). The choice
of data products is, in turn, a product of the value of the products in
making profitable trading decisions. If the cost of the product exceeds
its expected value, the broker-dealer will choose not to buy it.
Moreover, as a broker-dealer chooses to direct fewer orders to a
particular exchange, the value of the product to that broker-dealer
decreases, for two reasons. First, the product will contain less
information, because executions of the broker-dealer's orders will not
be reflected in it. Second, and perhaps more important, the product
will be less valuable to that broker-dealer because it does not provide
information about the venue to which it is directing its orders. Data
from the competing venue to which the broker-dealer is directing orders
will become correspondingly more valuable.
Thus, a super-competitive increase in the fees charged for either
transactions or data has the potential to impair revenues from both
products. ``No one disputes that competition for order flow is
`fierce'.'' NetCoalition at 24. However, the existence of fierce
competition for order flow implies a high degree of price sensitivity
on the part of broker-dealers

[[Page 64383]]

with order flow, since they may readily reduce costs by directing
orders toward the lowest-cost trading venues. A broker-dealer that
shifted its order flow from one platform to another in response to
order execution price differentials would both reduce the value of that
platform's market data and reduce its own need to consume data from the
disfavored platform. Similarly, if a platform increases its market data
fees, the change will affect the overall cost of doing business with
the platform, and affected broker-dealers will assess whether they can
lower their trading costs by directing orders elsewhere and thereby
lessening the need for the more expensive data.
Analyzing the cost of market data distribution in isolation from
the cost of all of the inputs supporting the creation of market data
will inevitably underestimate the cost of the data. Thus, because it is
impossible to create data without a fast, technologically robust, and
well-regulated execution system, system costs and regulatory costs
affect the price of market data. It would be equally misleading,
however, to attribute all of the exchange's costs to the market data
portion of an exchange's joint product. Rather, all of the exchange's
costs are incurred for the unified purposes of attracting order flow,
executing and/or routing orders, and generating and selling data about
market activity. The total return that an exchange earns reflects the
revenues it receives from the joint products and the total costs of the
joint products.
Competition among trading platforms can be expected to constrain
the aggregate return each platform earns from the sale of its joint
products, but different platforms may choose from a range of possible,
and equally reasonable, pricing strategies as the means of recovering
total costs. For example, some platform may choose to pay rebates to
attract orders, charge relatively low prices for market information (or
provide information free of charge) and charge relatively high prices
for accessing posted liquidity. Other platforms may choose a strategy
of paying lower rebates (or no rebates) to attract orders, setting
relatively high prices for market information, and setting relatively
low prices for accessing posted liquidity. In this environment, there
is no economic basis for regulating maximum prices for one of the joint
products in an industry in which suppliers face competitive constraints
with regard to the joint offering. This would be akin to strictly
regulating the price that an automobile manufacturer can charge for car
sound systems despite the existence of a highly competitive market for
cars and the availability of after-market alternatives to the
manufacturer-supplied system.
The market for market data products is competitive and inherently
contestable because there is fierce competition for the inputs
necessary to the creation of proprietary data and strict pricing
discipline for the proprietary products themselves. Numerous exchanges
compete with each other for listings, trades, and market data itself,
providing virtually limitless opportunities for entrepreneurs who wish
to produce and distribute their own market data. This proprietary data
is produced by each individual exchange, as well as other entities, in
a vigorously competitive market.
Broker-dealers currently have numerous alternative venues for their
order flow, including ten self-regulatory organization (``SRO'')
markets, as well as internalizing broker-dealers (``BDs'') and various
forms of alternative trading systems (``ATSs''), including dark pools
and electronic communication networks (``ECNs''). Each SRO market
competes to produce transaction reports via trade executions, and two
FINRA-regulated Trade Reporting Facilities (``TRFs'') compete to
attract internalized transaction reports. Competitive markets for order
flow, executions, and transaction reports provide pricing discipline
for the inputs of proprietary data products.
The large number of SROs, TRFs, BDs, and ATSs that currently
produce proprietary data or are currently capable of producing it
provides further pricing discipline for proprietary data products. Each
SRO, TRF, ATS, and BD is currently permitted to produce proprietary
data products, and many currently do or have announced plans to do so,
including NASDAQ, NYSE, NYSE Amex, NYSEArca, and BATS.
Any ATS or BD can combine with any other ATS, BD, or multiple ATSs
or BDs to produce joint proprietary data products. Additionally, order
routers and market data vendors can facilitate single or multiple
broker-dealers' production of proprietary data products. The potential
sources of proprietary products are virtually limitless.
The fact that proprietary data from ATSs, BDs, and vendors can
bypass SROs is significant in two respects. First, non-SROs can compete
directly with SROs for the production and sale of proprietary data
products, as BATS and Arca did before registering as exchanges by
publishing proprietary book data on the Internet. Second, because a
single order or transaction report can appear in an SRO proprietary
product, a non-SRO proprietary product, or both, the data available in
proprietary products is exponentially greater than the actual number of
orders and transaction reports that exist in the marketplace.
Market data vendors provide another form of price discipline for
proprietary data products because they control the primary means of
access to end users. Vendors impose price restraints based upon their
business models. For example, vendors such as Bloomberg and Reuters
that assess a surcharge on data they sell may refuse to offer
proprietary products that end users will not purchase in sufficient
numbers. Internet portals, such as Yahoo, impose discipline by
providing only data that will enable them to attract ``eyeballs'' that
contribute to their advertising revenue. Retail broker-dealers, such as
Schwab and Fidelity, offer their customers proprietary data only if it
promotes trading and generates sufficient commission revenue. Although
the business models may differ, these vendors' pricing discipline is
the same: They can simply refuse to purchase any proprietary data
product that fails to provide sufficient value. NASDAQ and other
producers of proprietary data products must understand and respond to
these varying business models and pricing disciplines in order to
market proprietary data products successfully.
In addition to the competition and price discipline described
above, the market for proprietary data products is also highly
contestable because market entry is rapid, inexpensive, and profitable.
The history of electronic trading is replete with examples of entrants
that swiftly grew into some of the largest electronic trading platforms
and proprietary data producers: Archipelago, Bloomberg Tradebook,
Island, RediBook, Attain, TracECN, BATS Trading and Direct Edge. A
proliferation of dark pools and other ATSs operate profitably with
fragmentary shares of consolidated market volume.
Regulation NMS, by deregulating the market for proprietary data,
has increased the contestability of that market. While broker-dealers
have previously published their proprietary data individually,
Regulation NMS encourages market data vendors and broker-dealers to
produce proprietary products cooperatively in a manner never before
possible. Multiple market data vendors already have the capability to
aggregate data and disseminate it on a profitable scale, including
Bloomberg, and Thomson-Reuters.
The court in NetCoalition concluded that the Commission had failed
to

[[Page 64384]]

demonstrate that the market for market data was competitive based on
the reasoning of the Commission's NetCoalition order because, in the
court's view, the Commission had not adequately demonstrated that the
depth-of-book data at issue in the case is used to attract order flow.
NASDAQ believes, however, that evidence not before the court clearly
demonstrates that availability of depth data attracts order flow. For
example, NASDAQ submits that in and of itself, NASDAQ's decision
voluntarily to cap fees on existing products, as is the effect of an
enterprise license, is evidence of market forces at work. In fact, the
instant proposal creates a second enterprise license for non-
professional usage of depth data to complement the existing enterprise
license set forth at NASDAQ Rule 7023(a)(1)(C).
Competition among platforms has driven NASDAQ continually to
improve its platform data offerings and to cater to customers' data
needs. For example, NASDAQ has developed and maintained multiple
delivery mechanisms (IP, multi-cast, and compression) that enable
customers to receive data in the form and manner they prefer and at the
lowest cost to them. NASDAQ offers front end applications such as its
``Bookviewer'' to help customers utilize data. NASDAQ has created new
products like TotalView Aggregate to complement TotalView ITCH and
Level 2, because offering data in multiple formatting allows NASDAQ to
better fit customer needs. NASDAQ offers data via multiple extranet
providers, thereby helping to reduce network and total cost for its
data products. NASDAQ has developed an online administrative system to
provide customers transparency into their data feed requests and
streamline data usage reporting. NASDAQ has also expanded its
Enterprise License options that reduce the administrative burden and
costs to firms that purchase market data.
Despite these enhancements and a dramatic increase in message
traffic, NASDAQ's fees for depth-of-book data have remained flat. In
fact, as a percent of total customer costs, NASDAQ data fees have
fallen relative to other data usage costs--including bandwidth,
programming, and infrastructure--that have risen. The same holds true
for execution services; despite numerous enhancements to NASDAQ's
trading platform, absolute and relative trading costs have declined.
Platform competition has intensified as new entrants have emerged,
constraining prices for both executions and for data.

C. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Comments on the Proposed
Rule Change Received From Members, Participants, or Others

Written comments were neither solicited nor received.

III. Date of Effectiveness of the Proposed Rule Change and Timing for
Commission Action

The foregoing rule change has become effective pursuant to Section
19(b)(3)(A)(ii) of the Act.\12\ At any time within 60 days of the
filing of the proposed rule change, the Commission summarily may
temporarily suspend such rule change if it appears to the Commission
that such action is necessary or appropriate in the public interest,
for the protection of investors, or otherwise in furtherance of the
purposes of the Act. If the Commission takes such action, the
Commission shall institute proceedings to determine whether the
proposed rule should be approved or disapproved.
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\12\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(3)(a)(ii).
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IV. Solicitation of Comments

Interested persons are invited to submit written data, views, and
arguments concerning the foregoing, including whether the proposed rule
change is consistent with the Act. Comments may be submitted by any of
the following methods:

Electronic Comments

Use the Commission's Internet comment form (https://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml); or
Send an e-mail to rule-comments@sec.gov. Please include
File Number SR-NASDAQ-2010-125 on the subject line.

Paper Comments

Send paper comments in triplicate to Elizabeth M. Murphy,
Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street, NE.,
Washington, DC 20549-1090.

All submissions should refer to File Number SR-NASDAQ-2010-125. This
file number should be included on the subject line if e-mail is used.
To help the Commission process and review your comments more
efficiently, please use only one method. The Commission will post all
comments on the Commission's Internet Web site (https://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml). Copies of the submission, all subsequent amendments,
all written statements with respect to the proposed rule change that
are filed with the Commission, and all written communications relating
to the proposed rule change between the Commission and any person,
other than those that may be withheld from the public in accordance
with the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be available for website
viewing and printing in the Commission's Public Reference Room, on
official business days between the hours of 10 a.m. and 3 p.m. Copies
of the filing also will be available for inspection and copying at the
principal office of the Exchange. All comments received will be posted
without change; the Commission does not edit personal identifying
information from submissions. You should submit only information that
you wish to make available publicly. All submissions should refer to
File Number SR-NASDAQ-2010-125 and should be submitted on or before
November 9, 2010.

For the Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets,
pursuant to delegated authority.\13\
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\13\ 17 CFR 200.30-3(a)(12).
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Florence E. Harmon,
Deputy Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2010-26208 Filed 10-18-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011-01-P

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