Self-Regulatory Organizations; The NASDAQ Stock Market LLC; Notice of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of Proposed Rule Change To Modify Rule 7019, 57314-57318 [2010-23385]
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III. Date of Effectiveness of the Proposed
Rule Change and Timing for
Commission Action
The foregoing rule change has become
effective pursuant to Section 19(b)(3)(A)
of the Act 7 and subparagraph (f)(2) of
Rule 19b–4 8 thereunder. At any time
within 60 days of the filing of the
proposed rule change, the Commission
summarily may temporarily suspend
such rule change if it appears to the
Commission that such action is
necessary or appropriate in the public
interest, for the protection of investors,
or otherwise in furtherance of the
purposes of the Act.
IV. Solicitation of Comments
Interested persons are invited to
submit written data, views, and
arguments concerning the foregoing,
including whether the proposed rule
change is consistent with the Act.
Comments may be submitted by any of
the following methods:
Electronic Comments
• Use the Commission’s Internet
comment form (https://www.sec.gov/
rules/sro.shtml); or
• Send an e-mail to rulecomments@sec.gov. Please include File
Number SR–CBOE–2010–081 on the
subject line.
Paper Comments
• Send paper comments in triplicate
to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary,
Securities and Exchange Commission,
100 F Street, NE., Washington, DC
20549–1090.
All submissions should refer to File
Number SR–CBOE–2010–081. This file
number should be included on the
subject line if e-mail is used. To help the
Commission process and review your
comments more efficiently, please use
only one method. The Commission will
post all comments on the Commission’s
Internet Web site (https://www.sec.gov/
rules/sro.shtml). Copies of the
submission, all subsequent
amendments, all written statements
with respect to the proposed rule
change that are filed with the
Commission, and all written
communications relating to the
proposed rule change between the
Commission and any person, other than
those that may be withheld from the
public in accordance with the
provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be
available for Web site viewing and
printing in the Commission’s Public
Reference Room, 100 F Street, NE.,
Washington, DC 20549, on official
business days between the hours of 10
a.m. and 3 p.m. Copies of the filing also
will be available for inspection and
copying at the principal office of the
Exchange. All comments received will
be posted without change; the
Commission does not edit personal
identifying information from
submissions. You should submit only
information that you wish to make
available publicly. All submissions
should refer to File Number SR–CBOE–
2010–081 and should be submitted on
or before October 12, 2010.
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION
[Release No. 34–62907; File No. SR–
NASDAQ–2010–110]
Self-Regulatory Organizations; The
NASDAQ Stock Market LLC; Notice of
Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of
Proposed Rule Change To Modify Rule
7019
September 14, 2010.
Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the
‘‘Act’’) 1 and Rule 19b–4 thereunder,2
notice is hereby given that on
September 7, 2010, The NASDAQ Stock
Market LLC (‘‘NASDAQ’’ or the
‘‘Exchange’’) filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission (the
‘‘Commission’’) the proposed rule
change as described in Items I, II, and
III below, which Items have been
prepared by the Exchange. The
Commission is publishing this notice to
solicit comments on the proposed rule
change from interested persons.
I. Self-Regulatory Organization’s
Statement of the Terms of Substance of
the Proposed Rule Change
NASDAQ proposes to modify Rule
7019 to harmonize distributor and direct
access fees for depth-of-book proprietary
data products. The text of the proposed
rule change is below. Proposed new
language is in italics; proposed
deletions are in brackets.3
*
*
*
*
*
For the Commission, by the Division of
Trading and Markets, pursuant to delegated
authority.9
Florence E. Harmon,
Deputy Secretary.
7019. Market Data Distributor Fees
(a) No change.
(b) The charge to be paid by
Distributors of the following NASDAQ
Market Center real time data feeds shall
be:
[FR Doc. 2010–23384 Filed 9–17–10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8010–01–P
Monthly direct
access fee
Issue Specific Data ......................................................................................................................
Dynamic Intraday .........................................................................................................................
NASDAQ-listed security depth entitlements [TotalView] .............................................................
Non NASDAQ-listed security depth entitlements [OpenView] ....................................................
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*
(c)–(d) No change.
*
*
*
*
(b) Not applicable.
(c) Not applicable.
Monthly internal distributor
fee
Monthly external distributor
fee
........................
........................
$2,000
1,000
........................
........................
$1,000
500
........................
........................
$2,500
1,250
II. Self-Regulatory Organization’s
Statement of the Purpose of, and
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule
Change
In its filing with the Commission,
NASDAQ included statements
concerning the purpose of, and basis for,
7 15
1 15
8 17
U.S.C. 78s(b)(3)(A).
C.F.R. 240.19b–4(f)(2) [sic].
9 17 CFR 200.30–3(a)(12).
2 17
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CFR 240.19b–4.
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the proposed rule change. The text of
these statements may be examined at
the places specified in Item III below,
and is set forth in Sections A, B, and C
below.
3 Changes are marked to the rule text that appears
in the electronic manual of NASDAQ found at
https://nasdaqomx.cchwallstreet.com.
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A. Self-Regulatory Organization’s
Statement of the Purpose of, and the
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule
Change
1. Purpose
NASDAQ is proposing to modify Rule
7019, which governs market data
distribution fees, to harmonize the
distributor fees for depth products by
including Level 2, also known as NQDS,
under the current TotalView fee for
NASDAQ-listed securities. Currently,
distributors receiving the data feed that
contains the NASDAQ Level 2
entitlement and OpenView entitlement
pay distributor fees for non-NASDAQ
listed securities (under the OpenView
entitlement) but do not pay distributor
fees for NASDAQ-listed securities. By
contrast, distributors receiving
NASDAQ-listed data through TotalView
do pay the fee. Harmonization of the
depth distributor fee entitlement for
NASDAQ-listed securities on the Level
2 data product, consistent with other
NASDAQ depth products such as
TotalView, ensures product and policy
consistency. As mentioned above, the
NASDAQ Level 2 data feed contains two
different entitlements (the OpenView
entitlement and Level 2 entitlement).
The data feed is the physical stream of
data, whereas the entitlement is the
subscription for which customers signup.
The NASDAQ Level 2 entitlement
was created in 1983 at a time when all
real-time products fell under the
auspices of the UTP Plan. Subsequently,
NASDAQ created a separate security
information processor for UTP data in
2002 and petitioned the SEC to remove
the Level 2 entitlement from the UTP
Plan. When NASDAQ received
exchange status in 2006, Level 2 data
was removed from the UTP plan.
Currently, the Level 2 data feed carries
top-of-file exchange participant
quotations for both NASDAQ and
Consolidated Quotation System issues.
This information is also carried in
TotalView along with the full
participant quotes. As such, Level 2 is
a subset of TotalView data. Like
TotalView and NASDAQ’s other data
products, the Level 2 data feed is offered
in a full range of network protocols.
In addition to the new distributor
fees, NASDAQ is expanding the direct
access fee to customers who subscribe to
the Level 2 entitlement. As with the
disparity in the TotalView distributor
fee, customers who access only the
Level 2 information through the Level 2
entitlement directly from the Exchange
are not charged a direct access fee (as
‘‘Direct Access’’ is defined in NASDAQ
Rule 7019). NASDAQ is seeking to
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remedy this so that these customers are
charged the same direct access fee as are
customers of TotalView and OpenView.
It is important to note that customers
will only be charged one direct access
fee for NASDAQ-listed securities and
one direct access fee for non-NASDAQ
listed securities, paralleling the
TotalView and OpenView direct access
entitlements.
The Exchange believes that the
harmonization of the distributor fee and
direct access fee makes NASDAQ’s
depth distributor fees and direct access
fees consistent across products and
allows NASDAQ to assess a fair price
for the value delivered through all of
NASDAQ’s depth products. Firms
would pay only one distributor fee and
one direct access fee for a non-NASDAQ
listed securities entitlement, regardless
of the number of feeds consumed.
Additionally, firms would only pay one
distributor fee and one direct access fee
for a NASDAQ-listed securities
entitlement, regardless of the number of
feeds consumed. This proposed rule
change also has no affect on
professional and non-professional user
fees, as this change is aimed solely at
the harmonization of distributor and
direct access fees.
NASDAQ will implement the changes
made by this proposed rule change on
September 1, 2010.
2. Statutory Basis
NASDAQ believes that the proposed
rule change is consistent with the
provisions of Section 6 of the Act,4 in
general, and with Section 6(b)(4) of the
Act,5 in particular, in that it provides an
equitable allocation of reasonable fees
among users and recipients of NASDAQ
data. In adopting Regulation NMS, the
Commission granted self-regulatory
organizations and broker-dealers
increased authority and flexibility to
offer new and unique market data to the
public. It was believed that this
authority would expand the amount of
data available to consumers, and also
spur innovation and competition for the
provision of market data.
The Commission concluded that
Regulation NMS—by deregulating the
market in proprietary data—would itself
further the Act’s goals of facilitating
efficiency and competition:
[E]fficiency is promoted when brokerdealers who do not need the data beyond the
prices, sizes, market center identifications of
the NBBO and consolidated last sale
information are not required to receive (and
pay for) such data. The Commission also
believes that efficiency is promoted when
4 15
5 15
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U.S.C. 78f(b)(4).
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broker-dealers may choose to receive (and
pay for) additional market data based on their
own internal analysis of the need for such
data.6
By removing ‘‘unnecessary regulatory
restrictions’’ on the ability of exchanges
to sell their own data, Regulation NMS
advanced the goals of the Act and the
principles reflected in its legislative
history. If the free market should
determine whether proprietary data is
sold to broker-dealers at all, it follows
that the price at which such data is sold
should be set by the market as well.
On July 21, 2010, President Barack
Obama signed into law H.R. 4173, the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act of 2010
(‘‘Dodd-Frank Act’’), which amended
Section 19 of the Act. Among other
things, Section 916 of the Dodd-Frank
Act amended paragraph (A) of Section
19(b)(3) of the Act by inserting the
phrase ‘‘on any person, whether or not
the person is a member of the selfregulatory organization’’ after ‘‘due, fee
or other charge imposed by the selfregulatory organization.’’ As a result, all
SRO rule proposals establishing or
changing dues, fees, or other charges are
immediately effective upon filing
regardless of whether such dues, fees, or
other charges are imposed on members
of the SRO, non-members, or both.
Section 916 further amended paragraph
(C) of Section 19(b)(3) of the Exchange
Act to read, in pertinent part, ‘‘At any
time within the 60-day period beginning
on the date of filing of such a proposed
rule change in accordance with the
provisions of paragraph (1) [of Section
19(b)], the Commission summarily may
temporarily suspend the change in the
rules of the self-regulatory organization
made thereby, if it appears to the
Commission that such action is
necessary or appropriate in the public
interest, for the protection of investors,
or otherwise in furtherance of the
purposes of this title. If the Commission
takes such action, the Commission shall
institute proceedings under paragraph
(2)(B) [of Section 19(b)] to determine
whether the proposed rule should be
approved or disapproved.’’
NASDAQ believes that these
amendments to Section 19 of the Act
reflect Congress’s intent to allow the
Commission to rely upon the forces of
competition to ensure that fees for
market data are reasonable and
equitably allocated. Although Section
19(b) had formerly authorized
immediate effectiveness for a ‘‘due, fee
or other charge imposed by the selfregulatory organization,’’ the
6 Securities Exchange Act Release No. 51808
(June 9, 2005), 70 FR 37496 (June 29, 2005).
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Commission adopted a policy and
subsequently a rule stipulating that fees
for data and other products available to
persons that are not members of the selfregulatory organization must be
approved by the Commission after first
being published for comment. At the
time, the Commission supported the
adoption of the policy and the rule by
pointing out that unlike members,
whose representation in self-regulatory
organization governance was mandated
by the Act, non-members should be
given the opportunity to comment on
fees before being required to pay them,
and that the Commission should
specifically approve all such fees.
NASDAQ believes that the amendment
to Section 19 reflects Congress’s
conclusion that the evolution of selfregulatory organization governance and
competitive market structure have
rendered the Commission’s prior policy
on non-member fees obsolete.
Specifically, many exchanges have
evolved from member-owned not-forprofit corporations into for-profit
investor-owned corporations (or
subsidiaries of investor-owned
corporations). Accordingly, exchanges
no longer have narrow incentives to
manage their affairs for the exclusive
benefit of their members, but rather
have incentives to maximize the appeal
of their products to all customers,
whether members or non-members, so
as to broaden distribution and grow
revenues. Moreover, we believe that the
change also reflects an endorsement of
the Commission’s determinations that
reliance on competitive markets is an
appropriate means to ensure equitable
and reasonable prices. Simply put, the
change reflects a presumption that all
fee changes should be permitted to take
effect immediately, since the level of all
fees are constrained by competitive
forces.
The recent decision of the United
States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit in NetCoaliton v.
SEC, No. 09–1042 (DC Cir. 2010),
although reviewing a Commission
decision made prior to the effective date
of the Dodd-Frank Act, upheld the
Commission’s reliance upon
competitive markets to set reasonable
and equitably allocated fees for market
data. ‘‘In fact, the legislative history
indicates that the Congress intended
that the market system ‘evolve through
the interplay of competitive forces as
unnecessary regulatory restrictions are
removed’ and that the SEC wield its
regulatory power ‘in those situations
where competition may not be
sufficient,’ such as in the creation of a
‘consolidated transactional reporting
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system.’ NetCoaltion, at 15 (quoting H.R.
Rep. No. 94–229, at 92 (1975), as
reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 321,
323). The court’s conclusions about
Congressional intent are therefore
reinforced by the Dodd-Frank Act
amendments, which create a
presumption that exchange fees,
including market data fees, may take
effect immediately, without prior
Commission approval, and that the
Commission should take action to
suspend a fee change and institute a
proceeding to determine whether the fee
change should be approved or
disapproved only where the
Commission has concerns that the
change may not be consistent with the
Act.
B. Self-Regulatory Organization’s
Statement on Burden on Competition
NASDAQ does not believe that the
proposed rule change will result in any
burden on competition that is not
necessary or appropriate in furtherance
of the purposes of the Act, as amended.
Notwithstanding its determination that
the Commission may rely upon
competition to establish fair and
equitably allocated fees for market data,
the NetCoaltion court found that the
Commission had not, in that case,
compiled a record that adequately
supported its conclusion that the market
for the data at issue in the case was
competitive. For the reasons discussed
above, NASDAQ believes that the DoddFrank Act amendments to Section 19
materially alter the scope of the
Commission’s review of future market
data filings, by creating a presumption
that all fees may take effect
immediately, without prior analysis by
the Commission of the competitive
environment. Even in the absence of
this important statutory change,
however, NASDAQ believes that a
record may readily be established to
demonstrate the competitive nature of
the market in question.
There is intense competition between
trading platforms that provide
transaction execution and routing
services and proprietary data products.
Transaction execution and proprietary
data products are complementary in that
market data is both an input and a
byproduct of the execution service. In
fact, market data and trade execution are
a paradigmatic example of joint
products with joint costs. The decision
whether and on which platform to post
an order will depend on the attributes
of the platform where the order can be
posted, including the execution fees,
data quality and price and distribution
of its data products. Without the
prospect of a taking order seeing and
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reacting to a posted order on a particular
platform, the posting of the order would
accomplish little. Without trade
executions, exchange data products
cannot exist. Data products are valuable
to many end users only insofar as they
provide information that end users
expect will assist them or their
customers in making trading decisions.
The costs of producing market data
include not only the costs of the data
distribution infrastructure, but also the
costs of designing, maintaining, and
operating the exchange’s transaction
execution platform and the cost of
regulating the exchange to ensure its fair
operation and maintain investor
confidence. The total return that a
trading platform earns reflects the
revenues it receives from both products
and the joint costs it incurs. Moreover,
an exchange’s customers view the costs
of transaction executions and of data as
a unified cost of doing business with the
exchange. A broker-dealer will direct
orders to a particular exchange only if
the expected revenues from executing
trades on the exchange exceed net
transaction execution costs and the cost
of data that the broker-dealer chooses to
buy to support its trading decisions (or
those of its customers). The choice of
data products is, in turn, a product of
the value of the products in making
profitable trading decisions. If the cost
of the product exceeds its expected
value, the broker-dealer will choose not
to buy it. Moreover, as a broker-dealer
chooses to direct fewer orders to a
particular exchange, the value of the
product to that broker-dealer decreases,
for two reasons. First, the product will
contain less information, because
executions of the broker-dealer’s orders
will not be reflected in it. Second, and
perhaps more important, the product
will be less valuable to that brokerdealer because it does not provide
information about the venue to which it
is directing its orders. Data from the
competing venue to which the brokerdealer is directing orders will become
correspondingly more valuable.
Thus, a super-competitive increase in
the fees charged for either transactions
or data has the potential to impair
revenues from both products. ‘‘No one
disputes that competition for order flow
is ‘fierce’.’’ NetCoalition at 24. However,
the existence of fierce competition for
order flow implies a high degree of price
sensitivity on the part of broker-dealers
with order flow, since they may readily
reduce costs by directing orders toward
the lowest-cost trading venues. A
broker-dealer that shifted its order flow
from one platform to another in
response to order execution price
differentials would both reduce the
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value of that platform’s market data and
reduce its own need to consume data
from the disfavored platform. Similarly,
if a platform increases its market data
fees, the change will affect the overall
cost of doing business with the
platform, and affected broker-dealers
will assess whether they can lower their
trading costs by directing orders
elsewhere and thereby lessening the
need for the more expensive data.
Analyzing the cost of market data
distribution in isolation from the cost of
all of the inputs supporting the creation
of market data will inevitably
underestimate the cost of the data. Thus,
because it is impossible to create data
without a fast, technologically robust,
and well-regulated execution system,
system costs and regulatory costs affect
the price of market data. It would be
equally misleading, however, to
attribute all of the exchange’s costs to
the market data portion of an exchange’s
joint product. Rather, all of the
exchange’s costs are incurred for the
unified purposes of attracting order
flow, executing and/or routing orders,
and generating and selling data about
market activity. The total return that an
exchange earns reflects the revenues it
receives from the joint products and the
total costs of the joint products.
Competition among trading platforms
can be expected to constrain the
aggregate return each platform earns
from the sale of its joint products, but
different platforms may choose from a
range of possible, and equally
reasonable, pricing strategies as the
means of recovering total costs. For
example, some platform may choose to
pay rebates to attract orders, charge
relatively low prices for market
information (or provide information free
of charge) and charge relatively high
prices for accessing posted liquidity.
Other platforms may choose a strategy
of paying lower rebates (or no rebates)
to attract orders, setting relatively high
prices for market information, and
setting relatively low prices for
accessing posted liquidity. In this
environment, there is no economic basis
for regulating maximum prices for one
of the joint products in an industry in
which suppliers face competitive
constraints with regard to the joint
offering. This would be akin to strictly
regulating the price that an automobile
manufacturer can charge for car sound
systems despite the existence of a highly
competitive market for cars and the
availability of after-market alternatives
to the manufacturer-supplied system.
The market for market data products
is competitive and inherently
contestable because there is fierce
competition for the inputs necessary to
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the creation of proprietary data and
strict pricing discipline for the
proprietary products themselves.
Numerous exchanges compete with
each other for listings, trades, and
market data itself, providing virtually
limitless opportunities for entrepreneurs
who wish to produce and distribute
their own market data. This proprietary
data is produced by each individual
exchange, as well as other entities, in a
vigorously competitive market.
Broker-dealers currently have
numerous alternative venues for their
order flow, including ten self-regulatory
organization (‘‘SRO’’) markets, as well as
internalizing broker-dealers (‘‘BDs’’) and
various forms of alternative trading
systems (‘‘ATSs’’), including dark pools
and electronic communication networks
(‘‘ECNs’’). Each SRO market competes to
produce transaction reports via trade
executions, and two FINRA-regulated
Trade Reporting Facilities (‘‘TRFs’’)
compete to attract internalized
transaction reports. Competitive markets
for order flow, executions, and
transaction reports provide pricing
discipline for the inputs of proprietary
data products.
The large number of SROs, TRFs, BDs,
and ATSs that currently produce
proprietary data or are currently capable
of producing it provides further pricing
discipline for proprietary data products.
Each SRO, TRF, ATS, and BD is
currently permitted to produce
proprietary data products, and many
currently do or have announced plans to
do so, including NASDAQ, NYSE,
NYSE Amex, NYSEArca, and BATS.
Any ATS or BD can combine with any
other ATS, BD, or multiple ATSs or BDs
to produce joint proprietary data
products. Additionally, order routers
and market data vendors can facilitate
single or multiple broker-dealers’
production of proprietary data products.
The potential sources of proprietary
products are virtually limitless.
The fact that proprietary data from
ATSs, BDs, and vendors can by-pass
SROs is significant in two respects.
First, non-SROs can compete directly
with SROs for the production and sale
of proprietary data products, as BATS
and Arca did before registering as
exchanges by publishing proprietary
book data on the Internet. Second,
because a single order or transaction
report can appear in an SRO proprietary
product, a non-SRO proprietary
product, or both, the data available in
proprietary products is exponentially
greater than the actual number of orders
and transaction reports that exist in the
marketplace.
Market data vendors provide another
form of price discipline for proprietary
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data products because they control the
primary means of access to end users.
Vendors impose price restraints based
upon their business models. For
example, vendors such as Bloomberg
and Reuters that assess a surcharge on
data they sell may refuse to offer
proprietary products that end users will
not purchase in sufficient numbers.
Internet portals, such as Google, impose
a discipline by providing only data that
will enable them to attract ‘‘eyeballs’’
that contribute to their advertising
revenue. Retail broker-dealers, such as
Schwab and Fidelity, offer their
customers proprietary data only if it
promotes trading and generates
sufficient commission revenue.
Although the business models may
differ, these vendors’ pricing discipline
is the same: they can simply refuse to
purchase any proprietary data product
that fails to provide sufficient value.
NASDAQ and other producers of
proprietary data products must
understand and respond to these
varying business models and pricing
disciplines in order to market
proprietary data products successfully.
In addition to the competition and
price discipline described above, the
market for proprietary data products is
also highly contestable because market
entry is rapid, inexpensive, and
profitable. The history of electronic
trading is replete with examples of
entrants that swiftly grew into some of
the largest electronic trading platforms
and proprietary data producers:
Archipelago, Bloomberg Tradebook,
Island, RediBook, Attain, TracECN,
BATS Trading and Direct Edge. A
proliferation of dark pools and other
ATSs operate profitably with
fragmentary shares of consolidated
market volume.
Regulation NMS, by deregulating the
market for proprietary data, has
increased the contestability of that
market. While broker-dealers have
previously published their proprietary
data individually, Regulation NMS
encourages market data vendors and
broker-dealers to produce proprietary
products cooperatively in a manner
never before possible. Multiple market
data vendors already have the capability
to aggregate data and disseminate it on
a profitable scale, including Bloomberg,
and Thomson-Reuters.
The court in NetCoalition concluded
that the Commission had failed to
demonstrate that the market for market
data was competitive based on the
reasoning of the Commission’s
NetCoalition order because, in the
court’s view, the Commission had not
adequately demonstrated that the depthof-book data at issue in the case is used
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to attract order flow. NASDAQ believes,
however, that evidence not before the
court clearly demonstrates that
availability of data attracts order flow.
For example, as of July 2010, 92 of the
top 100 broker-dealers by shares
executed on NASDAQ consumed NQDS
and 80 of the top 100 broker-dealers
consumed TotalView. During that
month, the NQDS-users were
responsible for 94.44% of the orders
entered into NASDAQ and TotalView
users were responsible for 92.98%.
Competition among platforms has
driven NASDAQ continually to improve
its platform data offerings and to cater
to customers’ data needs. For example,
NASDAQ has developed and
maintained multiple delivery
mechanisms (IP, multi-cast, and
compression) that enable customers to
receive data in the form and manner
they prefer and at the lowest cost to
them. NASDAQ offers front end
applications such as its ‘‘Bookviewer’’ to
help customers utilize data. NASDAQ
has created new products like
TotalView Aggregate to complement
TotalView ITCH and Level 2, because
offering data in multiple formatting
allows NASDAQ to better fit customer
needs. NASDAQ offers data via multiple
extranet providers, thereby helping to
reduce network and total cost for its
data products. NASDAQ has developed
an online administrative system to
provide customers transparency into
their data feed requests and streamline
data usage reporting. NASDAQ has also
expanded its Enterprise License options
that reduce the administrative burden
and costs to firms that purchase market
data.
Despite these enhancements and a
dramatic increase in message traffic,
NASDAQ’s fees for market data have
remained flat. In fact, as a percent of
total customer costs, NASDAQ data fees
have fallen relative to other data usage
costs—including bandwidth,
programming, and infrastructure—that
have risen. The same holds true for
execution services; despite numerous
enhancements to NASDAQ’s trading
platform, absolute and relative trading
costs have declined. Platform
competition has intensified as new
entrants have emerged, constraining
prices for both executions and for data.
C. Self-Regulatory Organization’s
Statement on Comments on the
Proposed Rule Change Received From
Members, Participants, or Others
Written comments were neither
solicited nor received.
VerDate Mar<15>2010
15:00 Sep 17, 2010
Jkt 220001
III. Date of Effectiveness of the
Proposed Rule Change and Timing for
Commission Action
The foregoing rule change has become
effective pursuant to Section
19(b)(3)(A)(ii) of the Act.7 At any time
within 60 days of the filing of the
proposed rule change, the Commission
summarily may temporarily suspend
such rule change if it appears to the
Commission that such action is
necessary or appropriate in the public
interest, for the protection of investors,
or otherwise in furtherance of the
purposes of the Act. If the Commission
takes such action, the Commission shall
institute proceedings to determine
whether the proposed rule should be
approved or disapproved.
IV. Solicitation of Comments
Interested persons are invited to
submit written data, views, and
arguments concerning the foregoing,
including whether the proposed rule
change is consistent with the Act.
Comments may be submitted by any of
the following methods:
Electronic Comments
• Use the Commission’s Internet
comment form (https://www.sec.gov/
rules/sro.shtml); or
• Send an e-mail to rulecomments@sec.gov. Please include File
Number SR–NASDAQ–2010–110 on the
subject line.
Paper Comments
• Send paper comments in triplicate
to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary,
Securities and Exchange Commission,
100 F Street, NE., Washington, DC
20549–1090.
All submissions should refer to File
Number SR–NASDAQ–2010–110. This
file number should be included on the
subject line if e-mail is used. To help the
Commission process and review your
comments more efficiently, please use
only one method. The Commission will
post all comments on the Commission’s
Internet Web site (https://www.sec.gov/
rules/sro.shtml). Copies of the
submission, all subsequent
amendments, all written statements
with respect to the proposed rule
change that are filed with the
Commission, and all written
communications relating to the
proposed rule change between the
Commission and any person, other than
those that may be withheld from the
public in accordance with the
provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be
available for Web site viewing and
printing in the Commission’s Public
Reference Room, on official business
days between the hours of 10 a.m. and
3 p.m. Copies of the filing also will be
available for inspection and copying at
the principal office of the Exchange. All
comments received will be posted
without change; the Commission does
not edit personal identifying
information from submissions. You
should submit only information that
you wish to make available publicly. All
submissions should refer to File
Number SR–NASDAQ–2010–110 and
should be submitted on or before
October 12, 2010.
For the Commission, by the Division of
Trading and Markets, pursuant to delegated
authority.8
Florence E. Harmon,
Deputy Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2010–23385 Filed 9–17–10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8010–01–P
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION
[Release No. 34–62882; File No. SR–NSCC–
2010–09]
Self-Regulatory Organizations;
National Securities Clearing
Corporation; Notice of Filing of
Proposed Rule Change Regarding the
Creation of a Universal Trade Capture
Application and Automated Special
Representative Facility
September 10, 2010.
Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(‘‘Act’’),1 notice is hereby given that on
August 30, 2010, the National Securities
Clearing Corporation (‘‘NSCC’’) filed
with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (‘‘Commission’’) and on
September 9, 2010, amended the
proposed rule change described in Items
I and II below, which Items have been
prepared primarily by NSCC. The
Commission is publishing this notice to
solicit comments on the rule change
from interested parties.
I. Self-Regulatory Organization’s
Statement of the Terms of Substance of
the Proposed Rule Change
The proposed rule change would
modify NSCC’s rules and procedures
regarding the creation of a Universal
Trade Capture application and an
automated Special Representative
facility.
8 17
7 15
PO 00000
U.S.C. 78s(b)(3)(a)(ii).
Frm 00068
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
1 15
E:\FR\FM\20SEN1.SGM
CFR 200.30–3(a)(12).
U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
20SEN1
]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 181 (Monday, September 20, 2010)]
[Notices]
[Pages 57314-57318]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-23385]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
[Release No. 34-62907; File No. SR-NASDAQ-2010-110]
Self-Regulatory Organizations; The NASDAQ Stock Market LLC;
Notice of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of Proposed Rule Change To
Modify Rule 7019
September 14, 2010.
Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(the ``Act'') \1\ and Rule 19b-4 thereunder,\2\ notice is hereby given
that on September 7, 2010, The NASDAQ Stock Market LLC (``NASDAQ'' or
the ``Exchange'') filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(the ``Commission'') the proposed rule change as described in Items I,
II, and III below, which Items have been prepared by the Exchange. The
Commission is publishing this notice to solicit comments on the
proposed rule change from interested persons.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
\2\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Terms of Substance
of the Proposed Rule Change
NASDAQ proposes to modify Rule 7019 to harmonize distributor and
direct access fees for depth-of-book proprietary data products. The
text of the proposed rule change is below. Proposed new language is in
italics; proposed deletions are in brackets.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Changes are marked to the rule text that appears in the
electronic manual of NASDAQ found at https://nasdaqomx.cchwallstreet.com.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* * * * *
7019. Market Data Distributor Fees
(a) No change.
(b) The charge to be paid by Distributors of the following NASDAQ
Market Center real time data feeds shall be:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Monthly Monthly
Monthly direct internal external
access fee distributor distributor
fee fee
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Issue Specific Data............................................. .............. .............. ..............
Dynamic Intraday................................................ .............. .............. ..............
NASDAQ-listed security depth entitlements [TotalView]........... $2,000 $1,000 $2,500
Non NASDAQ-listed security depth entitlements [OpenView]........ 1,000 500 1,250
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(c)-(d) No change.
* * * * *
(b) Not applicable.
(c) Not applicable.
II. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change
In its filing with the Commission, NASDAQ included statements
concerning the purpose of, and basis for, the proposed rule change. The
text of these statements may be examined at the places specified in
Item III below, and is set forth in Sections A, B, and C below.
[[Page 57315]]
A. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and the
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change
1. Purpose
NASDAQ is proposing to modify Rule 7019, which governs market data
distribution fees, to harmonize the distributor fees for depth products
by including Level 2, also known as NQDS, under the current TotalView
fee for NASDAQ-listed securities. Currently, distributors receiving the
data feed that contains the NASDAQ Level 2 entitlement and OpenView
entitlement pay distributor fees for non-NASDAQ listed securities
(under the OpenView entitlement) but do not pay distributor fees for
NASDAQ-listed securities. By contrast, distributors receiving NASDAQ-
listed data through TotalView do pay the fee. Harmonization of the
depth distributor fee entitlement for NASDAQ-listed securities on the
Level 2 data product, consistent with other NASDAQ depth products such
as TotalView, ensures product and policy consistency. As mentioned
above, the NASDAQ Level 2 data feed contains two different entitlements
(the OpenView entitlement and Level 2 entitlement). The data feed is
the physical stream of data, whereas the entitlement is the
subscription for which customers sign-up.
The NASDAQ Level 2 entitlement was created in 1983 at a time when
all real-time products fell under the auspices of the UTP Plan.
Subsequently, NASDAQ created a separate security information processor
for UTP data in 2002 and petitioned the SEC to remove the Level 2
entitlement from the UTP Plan. When NASDAQ received exchange status in
2006, Level 2 data was removed from the UTP plan. Currently, the Level
2 data feed carries top-of-file exchange participant quotations for
both NASDAQ and Consolidated Quotation System issues. This information
is also carried in TotalView along with the full participant quotes. As
such, Level 2 is a subset of TotalView data. Like TotalView and
NASDAQ's other data products, the Level 2 data feed is offered in a
full range of network protocols.
In addition to the new distributor fees, NASDAQ is expanding the
direct access fee to customers who subscribe to the Level 2
entitlement. As with the disparity in the TotalView distributor fee,
customers who access only the Level 2 information through the Level 2
entitlement directly from the Exchange are not charged a direct access
fee (as ``Direct Access'' is defined in NASDAQ Rule 7019). NASDAQ is
seeking to remedy this so that these customers are charged the same
direct access fee as are customers of TotalView and OpenView. It is
important to note that customers will only be charged one direct access
fee for NASDAQ-listed securities and one direct access fee for non-
NASDAQ listed securities, paralleling the TotalView and OpenView direct
access entitlements.
The Exchange believes that the harmonization of the distributor fee
and direct access fee makes NASDAQ's depth distributor fees and direct
access fees consistent across products and allows NASDAQ to assess a
fair price for the value delivered through all of NASDAQ's depth
products. Firms would pay only one distributor fee and one direct
access fee for a non-NASDAQ listed securities entitlement, regardless
of the number of feeds consumed. Additionally, firms would only pay one
distributor fee and one direct access fee for a NASDAQ-listed
securities entitlement, regardless of the number of feeds consumed.
This proposed rule change also has no affect on professional and non-
professional user fees, as this change is aimed solely at the
harmonization of distributor and direct access fees.
NASDAQ will implement the changes made by this proposed rule change
on September 1, 2010.
2. Statutory Basis
NASDAQ believes that the proposed rule change is consistent with
the provisions of Section 6 of the Act,\4\ in general, and with Section
6(b)(4) of the Act,\5\ in particular, in that it provides an equitable
allocation of reasonable fees among users and recipients of NASDAQ
data. In adopting Regulation NMS, the Commission granted self-
regulatory organizations and broker-dealers increased authority and
flexibility to offer new and unique market data to the public. It was
believed that this authority would expand the amount of data available
to consumers, and also spur innovation and competition for the
provision of market data.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ 15 U.S.C. 78f.
\5\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(4).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission concluded that Regulation NMS--by deregulating the
market in proprietary data--would itself further the Act's goals of
facilitating efficiency and competition:
[E]fficiency is promoted when broker-dealers who do not need the
data beyond the prices, sizes, market center identifications of the
NBBO and consolidated last sale information are not required to
receive (and pay for) such data. The Commission also believes that
efficiency is promoted when broker-dealers may choose to receive
(and pay for) additional market data based on their own internal
analysis of the need for such data.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Securities Exchange Act Release No. 51808 (June 9, 2005), 70
FR 37496 (June 29, 2005).
By removing ``unnecessary regulatory restrictions'' on the ability of
exchanges to sell their own data, Regulation NMS advanced the goals of
the Act and the principles reflected in its legislative history. If the
free market should determine whether proprietary data is sold to
broker-dealers at all, it follows that the price at which such data is
sold should be set by the market as well.
On July 21, 2010, President Barack Obama signed into law H.R. 4173,
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010
(``Dodd-Frank Act''), which amended Section 19 of the Act. Among other
things, Section 916 of the Dodd-Frank Act amended paragraph (A) of
Section 19(b)(3) of the Act by inserting the phrase ``on any person,
whether or not the person is a member of the self-regulatory
organization'' after ``due, fee or other charge imposed by the self-
regulatory organization.'' As a result, all SRO rule proposals
establishing or changing dues, fees, or other charges are immediately
effective upon filing regardless of whether such dues, fees, or other
charges are imposed on members of the SRO, non-members, or both.
Section 916 further amended paragraph (C) of Section 19(b)(3) of the
Exchange Act to read, in pertinent part, ``At any time within the 60-
day period beginning on the date of filing of such a proposed rule
change in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (1) [of Section
19(b)], the Commission summarily may temporarily suspend the change in
the rules of the self-regulatory organization made thereby, if it
appears to the Commission that such action is necessary or appropriate
in the public interest, for the protection of investors, or otherwise
in furtherance of the purposes of this title. If the Commission takes
such action, the Commission shall institute proceedings under paragraph
(2)(B) [of Section 19(b)] to determine whether the proposed rule should
be approved or disapproved.''
NASDAQ believes that these amendments to Section 19 of the Act
reflect Congress's intent to allow the Commission to rely upon the
forces of competition to ensure that fees for market data are
reasonable and equitably allocated. Although Section 19(b) had formerly
authorized immediate effectiveness for a ``due, fee or other charge
imposed by the self-regulatory organization,'' the
[[Page 57316]]
Commission adopted a policy and subsequently a rule stipulating that
fees for data and other products available to persons that are not
members of the self-regulatory organization must be approved by the
Commission after first being published for comment. At the time, the
Commission supported the adoption of the policy and the rule by
pointing out that unlike members, whose representation in self-
regulatory organization governance was mandated by the Act, non-members
should be given the opportunity to comment on fees before being
required to pay them, and that the Commission should specifically
approve all such fees. NASDAQ believes that the amendment to Section 19
reflects Congress's conclusion that the evolution of self-regulatory
organization governance and competitive market structure have rendered
the Commission's prior policy on non-member fees obsolete.
Specifically, many exchanges have evolved from member-owned not-for-
profit corporations into for-profit investor-owned corporations (or
subsidiaries of investor-owned corporations). Accordingly, exchanges no
longer have narrow incentives to manage their affairs for the exclusive
benefit of their members, but rather have incentives to maximize the
appeal of their products to all customers, whether members or non-
members, so as to broaden distribution and grow revenues. Moreover, we
believe that the change also reflects an endorsement of the
Commission's determinations that reliance on competitive markets is an
appropriate means to ensure equitable and reasonable prices. Simply
put, the change reflects a presumption that all fee changes should be
permitted to take effect immediately, since the level of all fees are
constrained by competitive forces.
The recent decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit in NetCoaliton v. SEC, No. 09-1042 (DC
Cir. 2010), although reviewing a Commission decision made prior to the
effective date of the Dodd-Frank Act, upheld the Commission's reliance
upon competitive markets to set reasonable and equitably allocated fees
for market data. ``In fact, the legislative history indicates that the
Congress intended that the market system `evolve through the interplay
of competitive forces as unnecessary regulatory restrictions are
removed' and that the SEC wield its regulatory power `in those
situations where competition may not be sufficient,' such as in the
creation of a `consolidated transactional reporting system.'
NetCoaltion, at 15 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94-229, at 92 (1975), as
reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 321, 323). The court's conclusions about
Congressional intent are therefore reinforced by the Dodd-Frank Act
amendments, which create a presumption that exchange fees, including
market data fees, may take effect immediately, without prior Commission
approval, and that the Commission should take action to suspend a fee
change and institute a proceeding to determine whether the fee change
should be approved or disapproved only where the Commission has
concerns that the change may not be consistent with the Act.
B. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Burden on Competition
NASDAQ does not believe that the proposed rule change will result
in any burden on competition that is not necessary or appropriate in
furtherance of the purposes of the Act, as amended. Notwithstanding its
determination that the Commission may rely upon competition to
establish fair and equitably allocated fees for market data, the
NetCoaltion court found that the Commission had not, in that case,
compiled a record that adequately supported its conclusion that the
market for the data at issue in the case was competitive. For the
reasons discussed above, NASDAQ believes that the Dodd-Frank Act
amendments to Section 19 materially alter the scope of the Commission's
review of future market data filings, by creating a presumption that
all fees may take effect immediately, without prior analysis by the
Commission of the competitive environment. Even in the absence of this
important statutory change, however, NASDAQ believes that a record may
readily be established to demonstrate the competitive nature of the
market in question.
There is intense competition between trading platforms that provide
transaction execution and routing services and proprietary data
products. Transaction execution and proprietary data products are
complementary in that market data is both an input and a byproduct of
the execution service. In fact, market data and trade execution are a
paradigmatic example of joint products with joint costs. The decision
whether and on which platform to post an order will depend on the
attributes of the platform where the order can be posted, including the
execution fees, data quality and price and distribution of its data
products. Without the prospect of a taking order seeing and reacting to
a posted order on a particular platform, the posting of the order would
accomplish little. Without trade executions, exchange data products
cannot exist. Data products are valuable to many end users only insofar
as they provide information that end users expect will assist them or
their customers in making trading decisions.
The costs of producing market data include not only the costs of
the data distribution infrastructure, but also the costs of designing,
maintaining, and operating the exchange's transaction execution
platform and the cost of regulating the exchange to ensure its fair
operation and maintain investor confidence. The total return that a
trading platform earns reflects the revenues it receives from both
products and the joint costs it incurs. Moreover, an exchange's
customers view the costs of transaction executions and of data as a
unified cost of doing business with the exchange. A broker-dealer will
direct orders to a particular exchange only if the expected revenues
from executing trades on the exchange exceed net transaction execution
costs and the cost of data that the broker-dealer chooses to buy to
support its trading decisions (or those of its customers). The choice
of data products is, in turn, a product of the value of the products in
making profitable trading decisions. If the cost of the product exceeds
its expected value, the broker-dealer will choose not to buy it.
Moreover, as a broker-dealer chooses to direct fewer orders to a
particular exchange, the value of the product to that broker-dealer
decreases, for two reasons. First, the product will contain less
information, because executions of the broker-dealer's orders will not
be reflected in it. Second, and perhaps more important, the product
will be less valuable to that broker-dealer because it does not provide
information about the venue to which it is directing its orders. Data
from the competing venue to which the broker-dealer is directing orders
will become correspondingly more valuable.
Thus, a super-competitive increase in the fees charged for either
transactions or data has the potential to impair revenues from both
products. ``No one disputes that competition for order flow is
`fierce'.'' NetCoalition at 24. However, the existence of fierce
competition for order flow implies a high degree of price sensitivity
on the part of broker-dealers with order flow, since they may readily
reduce costs by directing orders toward the lowest-cost trading venues.
A broker-dealer that shifted its order flow from one platform to
another in response to order execution price differentials would both
reduce the
[[Page 57317]]
value of that platform's market data and reduce its own need to consume
data from the disfavored platform. Similarly, if a platform increases
its market data fees, the change will affect the overall cost of doing
business with the platform, and affected broker-dealers will assess
whether they can lower their trading costs by directing orders
elsewhere and thereby lessening the need for the more expensive data.
Analyzing the cost of market data distribution in isolation from
the cost of all of the inputs supporting the creation of market data
will inevitably underestimate the cost of the data. Thus, because it is
impossible to create data without a fast, technologically robust, and
well-regulated execution system, system costs and regulatory costs
affect the price of market data. It would be equally misleading,
however, to attribute all of the exchange's costs to the market data
portion of an exchange's joint product. Rather, all of the exchange's
costs are incurred for the unified purposes of attracting order flow,
executing and/or routing orders, and generating and selling data about
market activity. The total return that an exchange earns reflects the
revenues it receives from the joint products and the total costs of the
joint products.
Competition among trading platforms can be expected to constrain
the aggregate return each platform earns from the sale of its joint
products, but different platforms may choose from a range of possible,
and equally reasonable, pricing strategies as the means of recovering
total costs. For example, some platform may choose to pay rebates to
attract orders, charge relatively low prices for market information (or
provide information free of charge) and charge relatively high prices
for accessing posted liquidity. Other platforms may choose a strategy
of paying lower rebates (or no rebates) to attract orders, setting
relatively high prices for market information, and setting relatively
low prices for accessing posted liquidity. In this environment, there
is no economic basis for regulating maximum prices for one of the joint
products in an industry in which suppliers face competitive constraints
with regard to the joint offering. This would be akin to strictly
regulating the price that an automobile manufacturer can charge for car
sound systems despite the existence of a highly competitive market for
cars and the availability of after-market alternatives to the
manufacturer-supplied system.
The market for market data products is competitive and inherently
contestable because there is fierce competition for the inputs
necessary to the creation of proprietary data and strict pricing
discipline for the proprietary products themselves. Numerous exchanges
compete with each other for listings, trades, and market data itself,
providing virtually limitless opportunities for entrepreneurs who wish
to produce and distribute their own market data. This proprietary data
is produced by each individual exchange, as well as other entities, in
a vigorously competitive market.
Broker-dealers currently have numerous alternative venues for their
order flow, including ten self-regulatory organization (``SRO'')
markets, as well as internalizing broker-dealers (``BDs'') and various
forms of alternative trading systems (``ATSs''), including dark pools
and electronic communication networks (``ECNs''). Each SRO market
competes to produce transaction reports via trade executions, and two
FINRA-regulated Trade Reporting Facilities (``TRFs'') compete to
attract internalized transaction reports. Competitive markets for order
flow, executions, and transaction reports provide pricing discipline
for the inputs of proprietary data products.
The large number of SROs, TRFs, BDs, and ATSs that currently
produce proprietary data or are currently capable of producing it
provides further pricing discipline for proprietary data products. Each
SRO, TRF, ATS, and BD is currently permitted to produce proprietary
data products, and many currently do or have announced plans to do so,
including NASDAQ, NYSE, NYSE Amex, NYSEArca, and BATS.
Any ATS or BD can combine with any other ATS, BD, or multiple ATSs
or BDs to produce joint proprietary data products. Additionally, order
routers and market data vendors can facilitate single or multiple
broker-dealers' production of proprietary data products. The potential
sources of proprietary products are virtually limitless.
The fact that proprietary data from ATSs, BDs, and vendors can by-
pass SROs is significant in two respects. First, non-SROs can compete
directly with SROs for the production and sale of proprietary data
products, as BATS and Arca did before registering as exchanges by
publishing proprietary book data on the Internet. Second, because a
single order or transaction report can appear in an SRO proprietary
product, a non-SRO proprietary product, or both, the data available in
proprietary products is exponentially greater than the actual number of
orders and transaction reports that exist in the marketplace.
Market data vendors provide another form of price discipline for
proprietary data products because they control the primary means of
access to end users. Vendors impose price restraints based upon their
business models. For example, vendors such as Bloomberg and Reuters
that assess a surcharge on data they sell may refuse to offer
proprietary products that end users will not purchase in sufficient
numbers. Internet portals, such as Google, impose a discipline by
providing only data that will enable them to attract ``eyeballs'' that
contribute to their advertising revenue. Retail broker-dealers, such as
Schwab and Fidelity, offer their customers proprietary data only if it
promotes trading and generates sufficient commission revenue. Although
the business models may differ, these vendors' pricing discipline is
the same: they can simply refuse to purchase any proprietary data
product that fails to provide sufficient value. NASDAQ and other
producers of proprietary data products must understand and respond to
these varying business models and pricing disciplines in order to
market proprietary data products successfully.
In addition to the competition and price discipline described
above, the market for proprietary data products is also highly
contestable because market entry is rapid, inexpensive, and profitable.
The history of electronic trading is replete with examples of entrants
that swiftly grew into some of the largest electronic trading platforms
and proprietary data producers: Archipelago, Bloomberg Tradebook,
Island, RediBook, Attain, TracECN, BATS Trading and Direct Edge. A
proliferation of dark pools and other ATSs operate profitably with
fragmentary shares of consolidated market volume.
Regulation NMS, by deregulating the market for proprietary data,
has increased the contestability of that market. While broker-dealers
have previously published their proprietary data individually,
Regulation NMS encourages market data vendors and broker-dealers to
produce proprietary products cooperatively in a manner never before
possible. Multiple market data vendors already have the capability to
aggregate data and disseminate it on a profitable scale, including
Bloomberg, and Thomson-Reuters.
The court in NetCoalition concluded that the Commission had failed
to demonstrate that the market for market data was competitive based on
the reasoning of the Commission's NetCoalition order because, in the
court's view, the Commission had not adequately demonstrated that the
depth-of-book data at issue in the case is used
[[Page 57318]]
to attract order flow. NASDAQ believes, however, that evidence not
before the court clearly demonstrates that availability of data
attracts order flow. For example, as of July 2010, 92 of the top 100
broker-dealers by shares executed on NASDAQ consumed NQDS and 80 of the
top 100 broker-dealers consumed TotalView. During that month, the NQDS-
users were responsible for 94.44% of the orders entered into NASDAQ and
TotalView users were responsible for 92.98%.
Competition among platforms has driven NASDAQ continually to
improve its platform data offerings and to cater to customers' data
needs. For example, NASDAQ has developed and maintained multiple
delivery mechanisms (IP, multi-cast, and compression) that enable
customers to receive data in the form and manner they prefer and at the
lowest cost to them. NASDAQ offers front end applications such as its
``Bookviewer'' to help customers utilize data. NASDAQ has created new
products like TotalView Aggregate to complement TotalView ITCH and
Level 2, because offering data in multiple formatting allows NASDAQ to
better fit customer needs. NASDAQ offers data via multiple extranet
providers, thereby helping to reduce network and total cost for its
data products. NASDAQ has developed an online administrative system to
provide customers transparency into their data feed requests and
streamline data usage reporting. NASDAQ has also expanded its
Enterprise License options that reduce the administrative burden and
costs to firms that purchase market data.
Despite these enhancements and a dramatic increase in message
traffic, NASDAQ's fees for market data have remained flat. In fact, as
a percent of total customer costs, NASDAQ data fees have fallen
relative to other data usage costs--including bandwidth, programming,
and infrastructure--that have risen. The same holds true for execution
services; despite numerous enhancements to NASDAQ's trading platform,
absolute and relative trading costs have declined. Platform competition
has intensified as new entrants have emerged, constraining prices for
both executions and for data.
C. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Comments on the Proposed
Rule Change Received From Members, Participants, or Others
Written comments were neither solicited nor received.
III. Date of Effectiveness of the Proposed Rule Change and Timing for
Commission Action
The foregoing rule change has become effective pursuant to Section
19(b)(3)(A)(ii) of the Act.\7\ At any time within 60 days of the filing
of the proposed rule change, the Commission summarily may temporarily
suspend such rule change if it appears to the Commission that such
action is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, for the
protection of investors, or otherwise in furtherance of the purposes of
the Act. If the Commission takes such action, the Commission shall
institute proceedings to determine whether the proposed rule should be
approved or disapproved.
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\7\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(3)(a)(ii).
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IV. Solicitation of Comments
Interested persons are invited to submit written data, views, and
arguments concerning the foregoing, including whether the proposed rule
change is consistent with the Act. Comments may be submitted by any of
the following methods:
Electronic Comments
Use the Commission's Internet comment form (https://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml); or
Send an e-mail to rule-comments@sec.gov. Please include
File Number SR-NASDAQ-2010-110 on the subject line.
Paper Comments
Send paper comments in triplicate to Elizabeth M. Murphy,
Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street, NE.,
Washington, DC 20549-1090.
All submissions should refer to File Number SR-NASDAQ-2010-110. This
file number should be included on the subject line if e-mail is used.
To help the Commission process and review your comments more
efficiently, please use only one method. The Commission will post all
comments on the Commission's Internet Web site (https://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml). Copies of the submission, all subsequent amendments,
all written statements with respect to the proposed rule change that
are filed with the Commission, and all written communications relating
to the proposed rule change between the Commission and any person,
other than those that may be withheld from the public in accordance
with the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be available for Web site
viewing and printing in the Commission's Public Reference Room, on
official business days between the hours of 10 a.m. and 3 p.m. Copies
of the filing also will be available for inspection and copying at the
principal office of the Exchange. All comments received will be posted
without change; the Commission does not edit personal identifying
information from submissions. You should submit only information that
you wish to make available publicly. All submissions should refer to
File Number SR-NASDAQ-2010-110 and should be submitted on or before
October 12, 2010.
For the Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets,
pursuant to delegated authority.\8\
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\8\ 17 CFR 200.30-3(a)(12).
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Florence E. Harmon,
Deputy Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2010-23385 Filed 9-17-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8010-01-P
