Self-Regulatory Organizations; BATS Exchange, Inc.; NASDAQ OMX BX, Inc.; Chicago Board Options Exchange, Incorporated; Chicago Stock Exchange, Inc.; EDGA Exchange, Inc.; EDGX Exchange, Inc.; International Securities Exchange LLC; The NASDAQ Stock Market LLC; New York Stock Exchange LLC; NYSE Amex LLC; NYSE Arca, Inc.; National Stock Exchange, Inc.; Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes Relating to Expanding the Pilot Rule for Trading Pauses Due to Extraordinary Market Volatility to the Russell 1000® Index and Specified Exchange Traded Products, 56618-56624 [2010-23074]
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56618
Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 179 / Thursday, September 16, 2010 / Notices
rules and regulations thereunder
applicable to national securities
exchanges. In particular, the
Commission finds that the proposed
rule changes submitted by the
Exchanges are consistent with the
requirements of Section 6(b) of the
Act 53 and with Section 6(b)(5) of the
Act 54 which, among other things,
requires that the rules of national
securities exchanges be designed to
prevent fraudulent and manipulative
acts and practices, to promote just and
equitable principles of trade, to remove
impediments to and perfect the
mechanism of a free and open market
and a national market system, and in
general, to protect investors and the
public interest.
In the Commission’s view, the
proposed rule changes will help assure
that the determination of whether a
clearly erroneous trade has occurred
will be based on clear and objective
criteria, and that the resolution of the
incident will occur promptly through a
transparent process. The proposed rule
changes also should help assure
consistent results in handling erroneous
trades across the U.S. markets, thus
furthering fair and orderly markets, the
protection of investors and the public
interest. Finally, the Commission notes
that the proposed rule changes are being
implemented on a pilot basis so that the
Commission and the Exchanges can
monitor the effects of the pilot on the
markets and investors, and consider
appropriate adjustments, as necessary.
IV. Conclusion
It is therefore ordered, pursuant to
Section 19(b)(2) of the Act,55 that the
proposed rule changes (SR–BATS–
2010–016; SR–BX–2010–040; SR–
CBOE–2010–056; SR–CHX–2010–13;
SR–EDGA–2010–03; SR–EDGX–2010–
03; SR–ISE–2010–62; SR–NASDAQ–
2010–076; SR–NSX–2010–07; SR–
NYSE–2010–47; SR–NYSEAmex–2010–
60; SR–NYSEArca–2010–58), be, and
hereby are, approved.
By the Commission.
Elizabeth M. Murphy,
Secretary.
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[FR Doc. 2010–23076 Filed 9–15–10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8010–01–P
U.S.C. 78f(b).
U.S.C. 78f(b)(5).
55 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(2).
54 15
19:19 Sep 15, 2010
[Release No. 34–62884; File Nos. SR–BATS–
2010–018; SR–BX–2010–044; SR–CBOE–
2010–065; SR–CHX–2010–14; SR–EDGA–
2010–05; SR–EDGX–2010–05; SR–ISE–
2010–66; SR–NASDAQ–2010–079; SR–
NYSE–2010–49; SR–NYSEAmex–2010–63;
SR–NYSEArca–2010–61; SR–NSX–2010–08]
Self-Regulatory Organizations; BATS
Exchange, Inc.; NASDAQ OMX BX,
Inc.; Chicago Board Options
Exchange, Incorporated; Chicago
Stock Exchange, Inc.; EDGA
Exchange, Inc.; EDGX Exchange, Inc.;
International Securities Exchange LLC;
The NASDAQ Stock Market LLC; New
York Stock Exchange LLC; NYSE
Amex LLC; NYSE Arca, Inc.; National
Stock Exchange, Inc.; Order Approving
Proposed Rule Changes Relating to
Expanding the Pilot Rule for Trading
Pauses Due to Extraordinary Market
Volatility to the Russell 1000® Index
and Specified Exchange Traded
Products
September 10, 2010.
I. Introduction
On June 30, 2010, each of BATS
Exchange, Inc. (‘‘BATS’’), NASDAQ
OMX BX, Inc. (‘‘BX’’), Chicago Board
Options Exchange, Incorporated
(‘‘CBOE’’), Chicago Stock Exchange, Inc.
(‘‘CHX’’), EDGA Exchange, Inc (‘‘EDGA’’),
EDGX Exchange, Inc. (‘‘EDGX’’),
International Securities Exchange LLC
(‘‘ISE’’), The NASDAQ Stock Market LLC
(‘‘NASDAQ’’), New York Stock Exchange
LLC (‘‘NYSE’’), NYSE Amex LLC (‘‘NYSE
Amex’’), NYSE Arca, Inc. (‘‘NYSE Arca’’),
and National Stock Exchange, Inc.
(‘‘NSX’’) filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (‘‘Commission’’),
pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) 1 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(‘‘Act’’),2 and Rule 19b–4 thereunder,3
proposed rule changes to amend certain
of their respective rules to expand the
trading pause pilot in individual stocks
comprising the S&P 500® Index (‘‘S&P
500’’) when the price moves ten percent
or more in the preceding five minute
period to securities included in the
Russell 1000® Index (‘‘Russell 1000’’)
and specified Exchange Traded
Products (‘‘ETPs’’).4 The proposed rule
1 15
U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
U.S.C. 78a.
3 17 CFR 240.19b–4.
4 The term ‘‘Exchanges’’ shall refer collectively to
all of the exchanges in this order. The term ‘‘Listing
Markets’’ refers collectively to NYSE, NYSE Amex,
NYSE Arca, and NASDAQ. The term ‘‘Nonlisting
Markets’’ refers collectively to the remaining
national securities exchanges.
The Commission notes that NYSE and NYSE
Amex do not currently trade ETPs. Therefore, the
2 15
53 15
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COMMISSION
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changes were published for comment in
the Federal Register on July 7, 2010.5
The Commission received 19 comments
on the proposal and on broader issues
relating to the effectiveness of the
circuit breaker pilot program to date.6
expansion of the pilot to the select list of ETPs does
not apply to these two markets.
For purposes of Phase II, ETPs consist of
exchange-traded funds (including widely traded
broad-based funds like SPY), exchange-traded
vehicles (which track the performance of an asset
or index, providing investors with exposure to
futures contracts, currencies and commodities
without actually trading futures or taking physical
delivery of the asset), and exchange-traded notes.
5 See Securities Exchange Act Release Nos. 62407
(June 30, 2010), 75 FR 39060 (July 7, 2010); 62415
(June 30, 2010), 75 FR 39086 (July 7, 2010); 62409
(June 30, 2010), 75 FR 39078 (July 7, 2010); 62408
(June 30, 2010), 75 FR 39065 (July 7, 2010); 62417
(June 30, 2010), 75 FR 39074 (July 7, 2010); 62418
(June 30, 2010), 75 FR 39084 (July 7, 2010); 62419
(June 30, 2010), 75 FR 39070 (July 7, 2010); 62414
(June 30, 2010), 75 FR 39081 (July 7, 2010); 62411
(June 30, 2010), 75 FR 39067 (July 7, 2010); 62412
(June 30, 2010), 75 FR 39073 (July 7, 2010); 62413
(June 30, 2010), 75 FR 39076 (July 7, 2010); and
62410 (June 30, 2010), 75 FR 39063 (July 7, 2010)
(‘‘Phase II Circuit Breaker Pilot Notices’’).
On June 30, 2010, FINRA filed a proposed rule
change, which was approved today. See Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 62416 (June 30, 2010), 75
FR 39069 (July 7, 2010); Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 62883 (September 10, 2010) (SR–
FINRA–2010–033).
6 The Commission considered letters received as
of August 25 discussing the concept of the
effectiveness of the individual stock circuit breaker
pilot to date as well as formal letters citing the rule
filings. See Letter from Paul Schott Stevens,
President & CEO, Investment Company Institute to
Chairman Schapiro, Commission, dated June 22,
2010 (‘‘ICI Letter’’); Letter from Craig S. Donohue,
CEO, CME Group, Inc. to Chairman Schapiro,
Commission, dated June 23, 2010 (‘‘CME Letter’’);
Letter from Ann L. Vlcek, Managing Director and
Associate General Counsel, Securities Industry and
Financial Markets Association to Elizabeth M.
Murphy, Secretary, Commission, dated June 25,
2010 (‘‘SIFMA Letter’’); Letter from Peter Skopp,
President, Molinete Trading Inc. to Elizabeth M.
Murphy, Secretary, Commission, dated July 8, 2010
(‘‘Molinete Letter’’); Letter from Sal L. Arnuk, CoHead, and Joseph Saluzzi, Co-Head, Themis
Trading to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary,
Commission, dated July 8, 2010 (‘‘Themis Letter’’);
Letter from Peter A. Ianello, Partner, CSS, LLC to
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, Commission, dated
July 15, 2010 (‘‘CSS Letter’’); Letter from Julie S.
Sweet, General Counsel, Secretary, Chief
Compliance Officer, Accenture plc to Elizabeth M.
Murphy, Secretary, Commission, dated July 15,
2010 (‘‘Accenture Letter’’); Letter from Patrick J.
Healy, CEO, Issuer Advisory Group, LLC,
Washington, District of Columbia to Elizabeth M.
Murphy, Secretary, Commission, dated July 18,
2010 (‘‘Issuer Advisory Group Letter’’); Letter from
Alexander M. Cutler, Chair, Business Roundtable
Corporate Leadership Initiative, Business
Roundtable, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary,
Commission, dated July 19, 2010 (‘‘Business
Roundtable Letter’’); Letter from Geva Patz, Android
Alpha Fund to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary,
Commission, dated July 19, 2010 (‘‘Android Alpha
Fund Letter’’); Letter from David C. Cushing,
Director of Global Equity Trading, Wellington
Management Company, LLP to Elizabeth M.
Murphy, Secretary, Commission, dated July 19,
2010 (‘‘Wellington Letter’’); Letter from Karrie
McMillan, General Counsel, Investment Company
Institute to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary,
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Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 179 / Thursday, September 16, 2010 / Notices
The NYSE responded to the comments
in a letter dated July 23, 2010,7 and in
a letter dated August 25, 2010.8 Nasdaq
submitted a response on August 26,
2010.9
The Commission finds that the
proposals are consistent with Section
6(b)(5) of the Act,10 as it believes that
expanding the uniform, market-wide
trading pauses will serve to prevent
potentially destabilizing price volatility
and will thereby help promote the goals
of investor protection and fair and
orderly markets. This order approves
the proposed rule changes.
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II. Description of the Proposals
On May 6, 2010, the U.S. equity
markets experienced a severe
disruption.11 Among other things, the
prices of a large number of individual
securities suddenly declined by
significant amounts in a very short time
Commission, dated July 19, 2010 (‘‘ICI 2 Letter’’);
Letter from Ira P. Shapiro, Managing Director,
BlackRock, Inc., San Francisco, California to
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, Commission, dated
July 19, 2010 (‘‘BlackRock Letter’’); Letter from Tom
Quaadman, Vice President, Center for Capital
Markets Competitiveness, Washington, District of
Columbia to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary,
Commission, dated July 19, 2010 (‘‘CCMC Letter’’);
Letter from James J. Angel, Associate Professor of
Finance, Georgetown University, dated June 19,
2010 [sic] (‘‘Angel Letter’’); Letter from John A.
McCarthy, General Counsel, GETCO to Elizabeth M.
Murphy, Secretary, Commission, dated July 20,
2010 (‘‘GETCO Letter’’); Letter from Jose Marques,
Managing Director, Deutsche Bank Securities Inc. to
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, Commission, dated
July 21, 2010 (‘‘Deutsche Bank Letter’’); Letter from
Paul Schott Stevens, President & CEO, Investment
Company Institute to Chairman Schapiro,
Commission, dated July 27, 2010 (‘‘ICI 3 Letter’’);
Letter from Craig S. Donohue, Chief Executive
Officer, CME Group to Elizabeth M. Murphy,
Secretary, Commission, dated July 30, 2010 (CME
2 Letter’’).
7 See Letter from Janet M. Kissane, Senior Vice
President—Legal & Corporate Secretary, NYSE
Euronext to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary,
Commission, dated July 23, 2010 (‘‘Response
Letter’’).
8 See Letter from Janet M. Kissane, Senior Vice
President—Legal & Corporate Secretary, NYSE
Euronext to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary,
Commission, dated August 25, 2010.
9 See Letter from Thomas P. Moran, Associate
General Counsel, The NASDAQ Stock Market LLC
to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, Commission,
dated August 26, 2010.
10 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(5). That section, among other
things, requires that the rules of national securities
exchanges be designed to prevent fraudulent and
manipulative acts and practices, to promote just
and equitable principles of trade, to remove
impediments to and perfect the mechanism of a free
and open market and a national market system, and
in general, to protect investors and the public
interest.
11 The events of May 6 are described more fully
in the report of the staffs of the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission (‘‘CFTC’’) and the Commission,
titled Report of the CFTC and SEC to the Joint
Advisory Committee on Emerging Regulatory Issues,
‘‘Preliminary Findings Regarding the Market Events
of May 6, 2010,’’ dated May 18, 2010 (‘‘Joint
Report’’).
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period, before suddenly reversing to
prices consistent with their pre-decline
levels. This severe price volatility led to
a large number of trades being executed
at temporarily depressed prices,
including many that were more than
60% away from pre-decline prices and
were broken by the Exchanges. The
Commission is concerned that events
such as those that occurred on May 6
can seriously undermine the integrity of
the U.S. securities markets.
Accordingly, it is working on a variety
of fronts to assess the causes and
contributing factors of the May 6 market
disruption and to fashion policy
responses that will help prevent a
recurrence.
The Commission also recognizes the
importance of moving quickly to
implement appropriate steps that could
help limit potential harm from extreme
price volatility. In this regard, it is
pleased that the SROs began consulting
soon after May 6 in an effort to develop
consistent circuit breaker rules that
could be implemented on an expedited
basis. The SROs were able to reach
agreement on a consistent approach
and, on May 18 and 19, 2010, all of the
SROs filed proposed rule changes with
the Commission.
On June 10, 2010, the Commission
granted accelerated approval, for a pilot
period to end December 10, 2010, for
proposed rule changes by the Exchanges
to pause trading during periods of
extraordinary market volatility in S&P
500 stocks (the ‘‘Phase I Circuit Breaker
Pilot’’).12 The rules require the Listing
Markets to issue five-minute trading
pauses for individual securities for
which they are the primary Listing
Market if the transaction price of the
security moves ten percent or more from
a price in the preceding five-minute
period. The Listing Markets are required
to notify the other Exchanges and
market participants of the imposition of
a trading pause by immediately
disseminating a special indicator over
the consolidated tape. Under the rules,
once the Listing Market issues a trading
pause, the other Exchanges are required
to pause trading in the security on their
markets.
At the end of the five-minute pause,
the Listing Market reopens trading in
the security in accordance with its
procedures for doing so. Trading
resumes on other Exchanges and in the
over-the-counter (OTC) market once
trading has resumed on the Listing
Market. In the event of a significant
imbalance on the Listing Market at the
12 See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 62252
(June 10, 2010), 75 FR 34186 (June 16, 2010) (‘‘Phase
I Approval Order’’).
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56619
end of the trading pause, the Listing
Market may delay reopening. If the
Listing Market has not reopened within
ten minutes from the initiation of the
trading pause, however, the other
Exchanges may resume trading.13
Several commenters on the proposal
for the Phase I Circuit Breaker Pilot
expressed the view that the circuit
breaker pilot should be expanded
beyond S&P 500 stocks, particularly to
exchange traded funds (‘‘ETFs’’) and the
securities of other companies that were
most severely affected by the market
disruption on May 6, 2010.14 In the
approval order for the Phase I Circuit
Breaker Pilot, the Commission agreed
that consideration should be given by
the Exchanges to whether the circuit
breakers should be expanded to cover
additional securities, but did not believe
that there was a reason to delay
implementation of the Phase I Circuit
Breaker Pilot as a reasonable first step
to address potential market volatility.
Under the current proposal, the
Exchanges propose to add securities
included in the Russell 1000, as well as
specified ETPs, to the pilot (the ‘‘Phase
II Circuit Breaker Pilot’’) shortly after the
Commission approves the proposed rule
changes. The Exchanges believe that
adding these securities to the pilot
would have the beneficial effect of
applying the circuit breakers’
protections against excessive volatility
to a larger group of securities, while at
the same time allowing the opportunity,
during the pilot period, for continued
review of the operation of the circuit
breakers and an assessment of whether
the pilot should be further expanded or
modified.
The Exchanges believe that the
securities in the Russell 1000 have
similar trading characteristics to
securities included in the S&P 500, and
therefore the 10% price movement that
triggers a trading pause in the Phase I
Circuit Breaker Pilot is appropriate for
Russell 1000 securities. Based on the
analyses of certain of the Exchanges, the
number of times that the trading pause
would be triggered for Russell 1000
13 For more details on the operation of the
Exchanges’ rule, see Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 62252.
14 See, e.g., Letter from Jeffrey W. Rubin,
American Bar Association Business Law Section to
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, Commission, dated
June 3, 2010; Letter from Julie Sweet, Accenture plc
to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, Commission,
dated June 3, 2010; and Letter from Karrie
McMillan, Investment Company Institute to
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, Commission, dated
June 3, 2010 (expressing particular concern that if
circuit breakers exist for individual securities
contained in ETFs’ baskets, but not for the ETFs
themselves, ETFs could again suffer
disproportionately during a market event such as
that of May 6).
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mstockstill on DSKH9S0YB1PROD with NOTICES
securities would be similar to the
number of instances for S&P 500
securities.
In addition, the Exchanges proposed
to include in the Phase II Circuit
Breaker Pilot the more liquid ETPs—
specifically, those with a minimum
average daily volume of $2,000,000—
that tend to have similar trading
characteristics as securities in the S&P
500 and Russell 1000 and for which
they believe a 10% circuit breaker
trigger is appropriate.15 In addition, to
assure related ETPs are subject to
comparable circuit breakers, the
Exchanges proposed to include any ETP
that did not meet the $2,000,000 average
daily volume threshold, but tracked
similar stocks and indices as ETPs
meeting this criterion and proposed to
be included in the pilot. ETPs with
average-daily-volumes of less than
$2,000,000, and for which there were no
high-volume counterparts were not
included. Also excluded were leveraged
ETFs since those products by design are
more volatile than the underlying stocks
they track, and the current proposal
only contemplates adding securities for
which a 10% trigger is appropriate.16
As proposed, the list of ETPs includes
those that track broad-based equity
indices, which the Exchanges recognize
has caused some debate. For example,
as described in Section III, concerns
have been raised about the effect that
halting trading in an index-based ETP
may have on a related index-based
option or future. However, the
Exchanges believe that including broadbased index ETPs is appropriate so that
ETP investors are protected should the
component securities experience such
volatility that trading in the broad-based
ETP is affected. Because the proposal is
for a pilot period, the Exchanges will
continue to assess, among other things,
whether it is appropriate to have a
trading pause in broad-based index
ETPs when there is not a similar trading
pause in related index-based options or
futures.
15 For details on how the Exchanges developed
the pilot list of ETPs, see, e.g., Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 62413 (June 30, 2010), 75 FR 39076
(July 7, 2010) (SR–NYSEArca–2010–61).
16 One consequence of excluding leveraged ETFs
is that they could still suffer significant price
dislocations even though trading in the stocks they
track might be paused as discussed above.
The Exchanges do not believe that the 10% price
movement is an appropriate threshold for leveraged
ETPs because, by definition, leveraged ETPs are
based on multiples of price movements in the
underlying index. Accordingly, a 10% percent price
movement in a leveraged ETP may not signify
extraordinary volatility. Because the Exchanges are
not proposing to adopt revised price movement
thresholds at this time, they are not proposing to
include leveraged ETPs for now.
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In addition, during the pilot period,
the Exchanges will continue to assess
whether specific stocks or ETPs should
be added to, or removed from, the list
of securities subject to the circuit
breakers. The Exchanges will also
continue to assess whether the
parameters for invoking a trading pause
continue to be appropriate or should be
modified.17
III. Discussion of Comments and
Commission Findings
As of August 25, 2010, the
Commission received 19 comment
letters regarding the proposed rule
changes. Many commenters supported
the Phase II Circuit Breaker Pilot and its
expansion to the Russell 1000 and the
specified ETPs.18 For example, one
commenter encouraged the Commission
to act expeditiously to expand the scope
of the trading halt rules to securities
other than the S&P 500, particularly to
ETFs, and noted that ETFs experienced
significant volatility on May 6, 2010 and
would benefit from uniform pauses in
trading.19 Another commenter urged the
Commission to approve the Phase II
Circuit Breaker Pilot as quickly as
possible, arguing that many of the
securities that experienced the most
extreme trading jolts on May 6, 2010
were not included in the Phase I Circuit
Breaker Pilot, and that expansion of the
pilot was appropriate both to protect
additional companies from potential
aberrational price movements and
liquidity events affecting their
securities, and to provide investors with
greater certainty about the availability of
the circuit breakers.20 Yet another
commenter noted that expanding the
trading halt pilot to securities in the
Russell 1000 would protect investors in
publicly traded companies not in the
S&P 500 that experienced severely
aberrational trading on May 6.21
Some commenters raised concerns
about the proposed rule changes. The
two main areas of concern were: (1) The
ability of erroneous trades to trigger a
trading pause; and (2) whether ETPs—
particularly broad-based index
products—should be included in the
pilot.
17 See Phase II Circuit Breaker Pilot Notices,
supra note 5.
18 See Accenture Letter, Business Roundtable
Letter; CCMC Letter; ICI Letter; ICI 2 Letter; ICI 3
Letter; Issuer Advisory Group Letter; Wellington
Letter; Deutsche Bank Letter; SIFMA Letter; and
BlackRock Letter.
19 See SIFMA Letter.
20 See Business Roundtable Letter.
21 See Accenture Letter.
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1. Erroneous Trades Triggering the
Trading Pause
Several commenters pointed out that,
under the circuit breaker pilot,
erroneous trades can trigger—and have
triggered—trading pauses, when there
otherwise is no extraordinary market
volatility.22 One commenter asserted
that under the current circuit breaker
logic, erroneous trades would have
triggered a trading halt at least 238 times
in the past 18 months.23 This same
commenter pointed out that, as of the
date of its letter, three stocks had been
halted under the Phase I Circuit Breaker
Pilot, two of which were triggered on
markets with prices that were far away
from the current national best bid or
offer (‘‘NBBO’’) and prevailing prices at
other markets.24
Other commenters expressed concern
that any trader in the world, illintentioned 25 or not, has the power to
halt trading in a stock simply by
printing a trade outside the circuit
breaker range on a trade reporting
facility for the OTC market.26 One of
these commenters suggested that either
a minimum number of trades outside
the circuit breaker range occur before
trading is halted, or that the trade first
be checked for consistency with the
NBBO before trading is halted.27
Several commenters concerned with
erroneous trades triggering the circuit
breakers offered alternatives to the
‘‘trading pause’’ mechanism used in the
current pilot. A number of commenters
suggested that the Commission consider
moving to a ‘‘limit up/limit down’’
approach to moderate market volatility,
similar to that utilized in the futures
markets.28 Some commenters also
encouraged the Commission to consider
adopting collars on market orders and
eliminating stub quotes.29 One
commenter suggested that the markets
trigger the single stock circuit breakers
22 See, e.g., Themis Letter; Accenture Letter;
Molinete Letter; SIFMA Letter; and Angel Letter.
23 See Molinete Letter.
24 Id. (referring to the trading pauses in Citigroup
on June 29, 2010 and in Anadarko Petroleum on
July 6, 2010). As of August 25, stock-specific circuit
breakers have been triggered seven times in six
stocks.
25 The Commission notes that anyone reporting a
trade with the intention of triggering a trading
pause could be charged with manipulation, fraud or
other violations of the Federal securities laws.
26 See Themis Letter and Angel Letter.
27 Id.
28 See SIFMA Letter; Accenture Letter;
Wellington Letter; and CME 2 Letter. Under this
approach, trades could occur within the established
price bands, so that erroneous trades would largely
be eliminated. In addition, there would not be a
complete trading halt—trading would be prevented
outside the applicable price band, but could
continue within it.
29 See SIFMA Letter and CME 2 Letter.
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mstockstill on DSKH9S0YB1PROD with NOTICES
off of changes to the NBBO rather than
to changes in the last trade price.30
The Commission believes that the
ability of an erroneous trade to trigger a
trading pause is a concern that the
Exchanges should seek to address
promptly. The Commission understands
that the Exchanges are working on a
variety of measures to reduce the
instances of erroneous trades and to
assure that, when they occur, they are
resolved promptly through a clear and
transparent process.31 The Commission
also notes that, under the pilot rules, the
Listing Market can exclude a transaction
price that results from an erroneous
execution from triggering a circuit
breaker. In this regard, the Commission
notes that the Listing Markets, pursuant
to this authority, intend to implement
automated processes to help prevent
trades that may be erroneous—
specifically, those outside the NBBO—
from triggering a circuit breaker.32
Various Exchanges have taken steps to
‘‘collar’’ market orders, which are
intended to prevent executions that
occur a specified percentage away from
the last sale,33 and Commission staff has
been working with the Exchanges on an
initiative to prevent stub quotes. The
Commission, in conjunction with the
Exchanges, will continue to evaluate
what further steps need to be taken to
reduce the likelihood of erroneous
trades and to improve the efficiency of
the pilot. However, the Commission
does not believe it is appropriate to
30 See Molinete Letter. As an alternative, this
commenter suggested requiring at least two
consecutive trades outside the NBBO to trigger the
circuit breaker, and the exclusion of manuallyentered trades from being potential triggers.
31 See SR–BATS–2010–016; SR–BX–2010–040;
SR–CBOE–2010–056; SR–CHX–2010–13; SR–
EDGA–2010–03; SR–EDGX–2010–03; SR–FINRA–
2010–032; SR–ISE–2010–62; SR–NASDAQ–2010–
076; SR–NSX–2010–07; SR–NYSE–2010–47; SR–
NYSEAmex–2010–60; SR–NYSEArca–2010–58
(proposed rule changes to amend certain SRO rules
to set forth clearer standards and curtail SRO
discretion with respect to breaking erroneous
trades).
32 See Letter from Janet M. Kissane, Senior Vice
President—Legal & Corporate Secretary, NYSE
Euronext to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary,
Commission, dated August 25, 2010; Letter from
Thomas P. Moran, Associate General Counsel, The
NASDAQ Stock Market LLC to Elizabeth M.
Murphy, Secretary, Commission, dated August 26,
2010. The Listing Markets may roll out these new
automated processes on a staggered basis.
In addition, the Commission understands FINRA
is developing more effective ways to prevent
erroneous OTC trades from being printed on a trade
reporting facility, and it encourages those efforts.
See, e.g., FINRA Trade Reporting Notice, dated
August 19, 2010 (issuing new guidance on the use
of the weighted-average price/special pricing
formula (.W) trade modifier for reporting certain
types of OTC trades in NMS stocks to FINRA).
33 See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act Release Nos.
62485 (July 13, 2010), 75 FR 41914 (July 19, 2010)
(SR–NYSEArca–2010–67); 60371 (July 23, 2009), 74
FR 38075 (July 30, 2009) (SR–NASDAQ–2009–70).
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delay implementation of the Phase II
Circuit Breaker Pilot pending the
conclusion of those efforts.
2. Inclusion of ETPs
Many commenters addressed the
inclusion of ETPs in the pilot
program.34 Several supported the
proposed expansion of the Phase II
Circuit Breaker Pilot to include ETPs.35
One of these commenters stated that
ETFs experienced significant volatility
on May 6, and would benefit from a
uniform trading pause.36 Another
commenter noted that the price of an
ETF is typically highly correlated to the
market price of its basket of component
securities.37 Under normal
circumstances, when trading has been
halted for one or two component
securities, an ETF may experience a
slight deviation from the price of its
basket because of the challenge of
pricing the non-trading security, and
may trade with a wider spread to
account for the associated risk. When
multiple underlying securities are
affected, however, the correlation
between the prices of an ETF and its
underlying basket may break down and
the ETF may experience more severe
price dislocation.38 While this
commenter thought that a different
circuit breaker trigger may be
appropriate for ETFs, it nonetheless
encouraged the Commission to include
all ETFs in the pilot where a substantial
number of the component securities are
subject to the circuit breakers.39 Doing
otherwise, in its view, creates risks that
ETFs could again suffer
disproportionately during a market
event similar to that of May 6.40
One commenter supported the
inclusion of ETFs in the pilot program,
in part because halting trading in the
underlying component securities, but
not in the ETF, would hinder the
arbitrage mechanism that is critical to
the ability of ETFs to track the
performance of their underlying basket
34 See Accenture Letter; Android Alpha Fund
Letter; BlackRock Letter; Business Roundtable
Letter; CME Letter; CME 2 Letter; CCMC Letter; ICI
Letter; ICI 2 Letter; ICI 3 Letter; Molinete Letter;
SIFMA Letter.
35 See Accenture Letter; BlackRock Letter;
Business Roundtable Letter; CCMC Letter; ICI
Letter; ICI 2 Letter; ICI 3 Letter; SIFMA Letter.
36 See SIFMA Letter at 2.
37 See ICI Letter and ICI 2 Letter.
38 Id.
39 See ICI Letter. In a subsequent letter, that
commenter supported examining the connection
between price discovery in the equities and the
futures markets, and potentially making rules
consistent across markets. See ICI 2 Letter.
According to this commenter, however, such an
examination should not prevent including broadbased index ETFs in the pilot program. Id.
40 See ICI 2 Letter.
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or benchmark index.41 According to this
commenter, if an ETF were allowed to
continue to trade while trading in the
majority of its underlying securities
were halted, the arbitrage mechanism
would not work effectively, with the
result that liquidity for the ETF would
diminish greatly, and perhaps lead to a
collapse in price similar to that which
occurred on May 6.42
Other commenters criticized various
aspects of the application of the
proposed rule change to ETPs. One
commenter described certain ETFs—
such as the S&P 500 SPDR (SPY)—as
‘‘systemically important,’’ and expressed
concern that halting trading in these
ETFs, especially as a result of erroneous
trades, might destabilize markets.
Because the SPY, for example, is used
as a hedging vehicle in many trading
strategies, halting trading in it could
cause liquidity providers broadly to
withdraw from the market, increasing
volatility and perhaps leading to a chain
reaction like that witnessed on May 6.43
This commenter did not believe that
allowing ETFs to continue to trade
while some of the underlying
component securities were halted
would be detrimental, because market
participants would determine their own
fair value of the halted component
securities.44
Another commenter expressed
significant concern with the proposed
expansion of the pilot to broad-based
equity index ETFs, as it believed there
could be potentially significant
disruptions to trading across related
markets.45 This commenter noted that
41 See BlackRock Letter. According to the
commenter, this arbitrage mechanism generally
requires liquidity providers to sell a basket of stocks
equivalent to an ETF’s underlying portfolio (or a
correlated derivative) as a hedge when purchasing
ETF shares.
42 Id. This commenter did, however, question the
exclusion of lower-volume ETFs from the Phase II
Circuit Breaker Pilot, and urged that these ETFs be
included in the pilot at the earliest opportunity. See
discussion on pages 6–7 describing the rationale for
selecting the list of ETPs for inclusion in the pilot
program.
43 See Molinete Letter at 4.
44 Id. at 4–5.
45 See CME Letter and CME 2 Letter. This
commenter expressed further concerns with the
prospect of multiple constituent stocks in an index
being halted without the market-wide circuit
breaker being triggered. The commenter thought
this would create complexity and confusion in
understanding the index calculation. In addition,
the commenter was of the view that the halting of
high capitalization, highly-liquid index components
would be disruptive because it could affect whether
the index triggers a market-wide circuit breaker, the
intra-day index values circulated for risk
management purposes may not be reflective of the
true value of the underlying market, and large
liquidity providers in index futures and ETFs may
have difficulty hedging with the result that they
withdraw from the market.
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the indices underlying the most active
ETFs are the same as those underlying
the most active cash index options,
index futures, and options on ETFs.46 If
a different circuit breaker mechanism
applied to broad-based equity index
ETFs and ETF options than applied to
index futures and index options, or
differed from the overall market-wide
circuit breakers, the commenter feared
this could lead to further market stress
during periods of turbulence, perhaps
impeding liquidity and exacerbating
risk management challenges.47 In
addition, the commenter thought that
the inability of market makers to hedge
using equity index ETFs during a
trading pause could lead to their
withdrawing liquidity across all
markets, including in the E-mini index
futures.48 Accordingly, the commenter
believed that the circuit breakers
applicable to equity index-based ETFs
(as well as index futures, index options,
options on ETFs, and swaps) should be
consistent with both the methodology
and levels of the market-wide circuit
breakers.49 Specifically, the commenter
recommended the adoption of uniform
price limits across all broad-based index
products based upon the S&P 500, the
DJIA, and the NASDAQ 100, which
would preclude trading beyond the
enumerated limit but not within it.50
This commenter also recommended that
automated risk and volatility mitigation
mechanisms be implemented in place of
trading halts in individual securities.51
46 Id. The commenter also noted that these
markets are very closely linked and the absence of
effective coordination across comparable markets
was one factor cited by many as having contributed
to certain market issues experienced on May 6. The
Commission addresses issues of cross-market
linkage in its discussion infra.
47 Id.
48 See CME Letter.
49 See CME Letter. This commenter also noted
that, while approximately 70% of the trades broken
on May 6, 2010 were in ETFs, they were not in the
most liquid domestic, large cap index products.
50 See CME 2 Letter. These price limits would be
established at the 5%, 10% and 20% levels, and
would be implemented for a 10 minute period, after
which trading would continue to the next
applicable limit.
51 Id. Specifically, the commenter recommended
that all markets adopt: (1) Automated means—
similar to the commenter’s stop logic
functionality—to briefly pause the market in the
event that cascading sell orders precipitate a
material market decline because of a transitory
dearth of liquidity; (2) functionality—similar to the
commenter’s protection point functionality—to
automatically apply limit prices to all orders,
including market and stop orders; and (3)
automated price banding functionality and
maximum order size restrictions to help prevent
erroneous trades. For as long as single stock circuit
breakers continue to be employed, however, the
commenter believed regulators and the markets
should establish uniform policies and procedures to
address situations where the computation of the
market-wide circuit breaker index value is
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In its response to comments, NYSE
stated that the ‘‘prompt review and
implementation of revised and
coordinated market wide circuit
breakers is * * * a high priority.’’ 52
NYSE also indicated that it would
continue to review the operation of the
pilot, including its effect on how indexbased products trade across multiple
markets, and would propose ‘‘such
changes as may be warranted for those
securities.’’ 53
The Commission believes that, on
balance, the inclusion of ETPs,
including broad-based index equity
ETFs, in the Phase II Circuit Breaker
Pilot is warranted and consistent with
the Act. The Commission notes that
there are a number of scenarios in
which the application of a circuit
breaker to trading in an ETF would
promote market stability. For example,
if an ETF triggers a circuit breaker when
none of its component stocks is
experiencing abnormal moves, then it is
likely that the ETF is suffering from a
temporary liquidity imbalance. In that
case, the ETF would no longer be
suitable for use as a hedging instrument
because its price would no longer reflect
an accurate consensus market value of
the ETF or its underlying stocks. By
pausing the ETF under these
circumstances, the Exchanges would
allow liquidity to rebuild and provide
time for the market to self-correct
without allowing the aberrant price of
the ETF to adversely affect the trading
and pricing of the underlying stocks,
other ETFs or other related products.
In another scenario, an ETF might
trigger a circuit breaker, even though its
component stocks have not, because the
ETF is leading its underlying stocks in
price discovery. In that case, the prices
of many of the underlying stocks may
follow, triggering their own circuit
breakers shortly after the ETF does. In
a broad market event such as this, the
net result would be that trading in the
ETF and individual stocks have each
been paused, providing time for the
market as a whole to re-evaluate prices.
In yet another scenario, a number of
individual component stocks might
trigger their circuit breakers even
though the related ETF has not yet done
so. In that case, different market
participants may very well have
differing opinions on the market value
for the ETF because they will be
required to estimate the value of those
component stocks that have been
paused. If only a small number of
component stocks is paused (perhaps
due to some temporary liquidity
imbalances in those stocks) then there
likely would be minimal effect on the
ETF, and the ETF circuit breakers
appropriately would not be triggered.
But if a large number of component
stocks trigger halts, the market likely is
experiencing a broad-based move, either
for fundamental reasons, or because of
a large-scale liquidity imbalance similar
to that of May 6. As noted above, if
many component stocks of an ETF are
paused, but the ETF itself continues to
trade, the arbitrage relationship between
the ETF and its component stocks likely
will break down as market participants
find they cannot hedge their exposures
and, as a consequence, cease to provide
liquidity. Without a circuit breaker
mechanism that also applies to ETFs,
the ETF could experience excessive
volatility that is not necessarily driven
by the prices of its underlying stocks. By
pausing the ETF, market participants
would be given time to re-evaluate
prices and replenish liquidity as
needed.
The Commission acknowledges that a
variety of ETFs do indeed trade without
incident when most, and sometimes all,
of their underlying components are not
trading (e.g., ETFs on international
stocks). However, market makers and
other participants trading these ETFs
account for this known and permanent
structural difference by building
alternative methods for hedging and
pricing into their trading models.
Market participants trading ETFs for
which the component stocks normally
trade at the same time would not
necessarily have the opportunity to
implement new hedging and pricing
strategies in real time if underlying
component stocks were suddenly
paused. Rather, they would most likely
withdraw from the market leaving the
ETF with little liquidity and even
further need for a trading pause.54
The above arguments demonstrating
the need to couple pauses in ETFs with
pauses in underlying stocks are equally
applicable to the futures market, and the
Commission acknowledges the
comments and concerns of the CME for
consistent treatment across instrument
types. However, the Commission notes
that the CME’s markets already have
mechanisms for limiting or pausing
trading, and thus some inconsistency
exists today between the two markets.
Maintaining the status quo, moreover,
negatively affected due to the triggering of stock
specific circuit breakers on the component
securities.
52 See Response Letter.
53 Id.
54 The Commission notes that a pause in the ETF
could also affect trading in underlying component
stocks that were not otherwise halted to the extent
that the ETF was no longer available as a hedging
mechanism.
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would leave ETFs without a trading
pause mechanism. In addition, the
Commission notes that there will need
to be substantial work to determine how
best to make the volatility constraints in
the futures markets and the securities
markets consistent.
Commenters also raised related
concerns that a pause in a broad-based
ETF (such as the SPY) could lead to
significant liquidity pressures on other
index-based products in the futures
market (such as the E-mini).55 Although
this is a potential point of concern, as
noted above the futures markets already
have in place volatility mechanisms that
should help mitigate the effect of such
an event. Moreover, it should be noted
that currently there could be a pause on
the futures market (e.g., in the E-mini)
which could create liquidity pressure
for corresponding ETFs—but there is
currently no mechanism to protect the
ETF against aberrant prices as a result
of such liquidity pressures.
NYSE also recognized these concerns
in its response to comments, and
committed to working with regulators
and other markets in coordinating alerts
to trading interruptions ‘‘so consistent
application of pauses will be effected.’’56
NYSE also described ‘‘the prompt
review and implementation of revised
and coordinated market wide circuit
breakers’’ as ‘‘a high priority.’’57
In response to the comment that the
Commission instead implement
automated risk and volatility mitigation
mechanisms—such as price banding or
stop logic functionality—the
Commission notes that, even as the
circuit breaker pilot is being expanded,
the Commission is simultaneously
exploring possible alternatives to a
circuit breaker approach that may
include price limit bands or other
mechanisms described by the
commenters.
One commenter noted that the
proposal would exclude many ETFs
with trading volumes below the criteria
set by the Exchanges and FINRA,
although such ETFs were significantly
affected in the cancelled trades of May
6.58 The Commission acknowledges that
fact, but notes that, as the Exchanges
have indicated, the potential application
of the circuit breakers to less liquid
securities is more complex, as different
triggering thresholds may be appropriate
for them. As the pilot progresses, the
Commission will work with the SROs to
consider expanding the circuit breakers
55 See
CME Letter.
56 See NYSE Response Letter.
57 Id.
58 See BlackRock Letter.
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to cover additional securities in an
appropriate manner.
The Commission acknowledges the
point made by commenters that broadbased index products were not
significantly implicated in the cancelled
trades on May 6.59 However, the
Commission notes that broad-based
index products did experience
substantial volatility on May 6 60 and,
like other securities, could benefit from
the protections of a circuit breaker. In
addition, a sudden change in price, due
to a loss of liquidity or otherwise, to a
widely traded ETF could have an
adverse market-wide effect even more
far-reaching than that of May 6. It is
important that the use of circuit
breakers not be limited to only those
ETFs that happened to have
experienced severe dislocations on May
6, since there is no fundamental reason
why broad-based ETFs could not
experience a similar liquidity crisis. In
addition, there were no circuit breakers
in effect for underlying stocks on May
6. If a similar event occurred when
many underlying stocks in an index
were halted by circuit breakers, broadbased ETFs could experience greater
volatility than occurred on May 6.
3. Other Areas of Comment
Other areas of comment included
potential ways to expand or modify the
circuit breaker pilot going forward,61 the
need to carefully study the effect of the
pilot,62 the effect and continued
advisability of individual market
volatility moderators in addition to the
uniform single-stock circuit breakers,63
and possible modifications to the
market-wide circuit breakers.64
With regard to expanding or
modifying the circuit breaker pilot, as
noted above, the Commission intends to
continue working with the Exchanges to
consider expanding the pilot to include
additional securities, or modifying the
circuit breaker mechanism or pursuing
other approaches to moderating market
volatility, in the coming months. In
addition, as noted in the Joint Report,
the Commission currently is evaluating
59 See
CME Letter.
Joint Report, supra note 11, at 39 (noting
that many ETFs ‘‘experienced extreme daily lows’’
on May 6, and that a ‘‘significant number of ETFs’’
experienced extreme daily highs on May 6).
61 See Angel Letter (recommending that the
trading pause be expanded to cover the open, close,
and after-hours trading); ICI Letter (recommending
examining whether a different circuit breaker
trigger is appropriate for ETFs); Wellington Letter
(recommending that the Commission require the
Exchanges to continuously disclose the high/low
trigger of a security and its maximum remaining
life).
62 See Android Alpha Fund Letter.
63 See Deutsche Bank Letter.
64 See CME 2 Letter; SIFMA Letter.
60 See
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56623
the extent to which individual market
volatility moderators exacerbated the
market instability that occurred on May
6, 2010, and expects to develop
appropriate policy recommendations
based on the outcome of that analysis.
Finally, as noted in the Joint Report, the
Commission intends to work with the
CFTC to consider whether modifications
to the existing market-wide circuit
breakers are warranted in light of the
events of May 6. While all of these
issues warrant further study in the
coming months, the Commission does
not believe they provide a basis for not
approving the Phase II Circuit Breaker
Pilot at this time. The fact that better
alternatives to address inordinate
market volatility ultimately may be
developed does not provide a basis for
the Commission not to approve the
Exchanges’ proposals if, as the
Commission believes, the proposed rule
changes are consistent with Section
6(b)(5) of the Act.
4. Findings
The Commission finds that the
proposed rule changes are consistent
with the requirements of the Act and the
rules and regulations thereunder
applicable to national securities
exchanges. In particular, the
Commission finds that the proposals are
consistent with Section 6(b)(5) of the
Act,65 which among other things
requires that the rules of national
securities exchanges be designed to
prevent fraudulent and manipulative
acts and practices, to promote just and
equitable principles of trade, to remove
impediments to and perfect the
mechanism of a free and open market
and a national market system, and in
general, to protect investors and the
public interest.66
The proposed rule changes will
expand the trading pause pilot to
include the securities in the Russell
1000 and specified ETPs. The
Commission believes that expanding the
uniform, market-wide trading pauses
will serve to prevent potentially
destabilizing price volatility and will
thereby help promote the goals of
investor protection and fair and orderly
markets.
IV. Conclusion
It is therefore ordered, pursuant to
Section 19(b)(2) of the Act,67 that the
proposed rule changes (SR–BATS–
2010–018; SR–BX–2010–044; SR–
65 15
U.S.C. 78f(b)(5).
approving the proposed rule change, the
Commission notes that it has considered the
proposed rules’ impact on efficiency, competition,
and capital formation. 15 U.S.C. 78c(f).
67 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(2).
66 In
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CBOE–2010–065; SR–CHX–2010–14;
SR–EDGA–2010–05; SR–EDGX–2010–
05; SR–ISE–2010–66; SR–NASDAQ–
2010–079; SR–NYSE–2010–49; SR–
NYSEAmex–2010–63; SR–NYSEArca–
2010–61; SR–NSX–2010–08) be, and
hereby are, approved.
proposed rule change. The text of these
statements may be examined at the
places specified in Item IV below. The
Exchange has prepared summaries, set
forth in sections A, B, and C below, of
the most significant aspects of such
statements.
By the Commission.
Elizabeth M. Murphy,
Secretary.
A. Self-Regulatory Organization’s
Statement of the Purpose of, and
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule
Change
[FR Doc. 2010–23074 Filed 9–15–10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8010–01–P
1. Purpose
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION
[Release No. 34–62876; File No. SR–Phlx2010–120]
Self-Regulatory Organizations; Notice
of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness
of Proposed Rule Change by NASDAQ
OMX PHLX, Inc. To Establish Fees for
NASDAQ OMX PSX
September 9, 2010.
Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(‘‘Act’’) 1, and Rule 19b–4 thereunder,2
notice is hereby given that on August
31, 2010, NASDAQ OMX PHLX, Inc.
(‘‘Phlx’’ or ‘‘Exchange’’) filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission
(‘‘SEC’’ or ‘‘Commission’’) the proposed
rule change as described in Items I, II,
and III, below, which Items have been
prepared by the Exchange. The
Commission is publishing this notice to
solicit comments on the proposed rule
change from interested persons.
mstockstill on DSKH9S0YB1PROD with NOTICES
I. Self-Regulatory Organization’s
Statement of the Terms of Substance of
the Proposed Rule Change
The Exchange proposes to adopt new
fees in connection with the trading of
NMS stocks through the new NASDAQ
OMX PSX system (‘‘PSX’’). The text of
the proposed rule change is available on
the Exchange’s Web site at https://
nasdaqtrader.com/
micro.aspx?id=PHLXfilings, on the
Commission’s Web site at https://
www.sec.gov, at the principal office of
the Exchange, and at the Commission’s
Public Reference Room.
II. Self-Regulatory Organization’s
Statement of the Purpose of, and
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule
Change
In its filing with the Commission, the
Exchange included statements
concerning the purpose of and basis for
the proposed rule change and discussed
any comments it received on the
1 15
2 17
U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
CFR 240.19b–4.
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Shortly after its acquisition by The
NASDAQ OMX Group, Inc. (‘‘NASDAQ
OMX’’) in 2008, the Exchange ceased
operation of XLE, its former system for
trading NMS stocks.3 Earlier this year,
the Exchange filed a proposed rule
change to resume trading NMS stocks
through a new electronic platform
known as NASDAQ OMX PSX.4 In
anticipation of approval and launch of
PSX, the Exchange is filing this
proposed rule change to establish fees,
dues, and other charges applicable to
PSX. The proposed fees are structurally
similar to those of the Exchange’s
affiliated exchanges, The NASDAQ
Stock Market LLC (the ‘‘NASDAQ
Exchange’’) and NASDAQ OMX BX, Inc.
(‘‘BX’’), but with the omission of fees
that are not pertinent to the Exchange’s
planned business and with differences
in the level of certain fees.
Order Execution Fees
Order execution fees will be uniform
for all types of securities and member
organizations. Specifically, for securities
executed at prices of $1 or more, the
Exchange will charge $0.0013 per share
executed and pay a liquidity provider
rebate of $0.0020 per share executed.
For executions below $1, the execution
fee will be 0.2% of the total transaction
cost, and the rebate will be $0. The
Exchange proposes this ‘‘inverted’’
pricing structure as a temporary
promotional mechanism to attract
liquidity to PSX. Other exchanges and
trading venues have adopted inverted
pricing in the past as a means to
promote the development of a new
market entrant.5
3 Securities Exchange Act Release No. 58613
(September 22, 2008), 73 FR 57181 (October 1,
2008) (SR–PHLX–2008–65).
4 Securities Exchange Act Release No. 62519 (July
16, 2010), 75 FR 43597 (July 26, 2010) (SR–PHLX–
2010–79).
5 See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act Release No.
59452 (February 25, 2009), 74 FR 9456 (March 4,
2009) (SR–BX–2009–012) (temporarily decreasing
order execution fee to a level below prevailing
liquidity provider rebate); BATS ECN Unveils UltraAggressive January Pricing Special (December 19,
2006) (available at https://www.batstrading.com/
resources/press_releases/BATS%20ECN%20
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PSX TotalView
The Exchange proposes to establish
fees for its PSX TotalView data product.
Like NASDAQ TotalView and BX
TotalView, PSX TotalView will provide
all Displayed Orders in the market at
every price level.6 In recognition of the
start-up nature of the new market, the
data feed will be provided free of charge
to subscribers and distributors for a
period ending on the last day of the
twelfth full calendar month of PSX’s
operation. Thus, if PSX commences
operations on September 27, 2010, PSX
TotalView fees will be waived until
October 1, 2011.
After the initial free period, the
Exchange will offer users a range of
pricing options. In general, charges will
be assessed to distributors of PSX Total
View on a per distributor basis, with
additional charges assessed on a per
subscriber basis for each subscriber
receiving the data from a distributor. A
‘‘distributor’’ is defined as any entity that
receives a feed or data file of Exchange
data directly from the Exchange (a
‘‘direct distributor’’) or indirectly
through another entity (an ‘‘indirect
distributor’’) and then distributes the
data either internally (within that entity)
or externally (outside that entity).
Distributors of PSX TotalView will pay
a $1,000 monthly fee to receive the data
directly from the Exchange (including
from the Exchange through an extranet);
indirect distributors would not pay this
charge. Distributors will also pay either
a $500 monthly fee to distribute the data
feed internally (i.e., to employees) or a
$1,250 monthly fee to distribute to
external customers (as well as
internally, if applicable). All of the
foregoing fees will be waived during the
initial free period. Finally, distributors
receiving any PSX TotalView or any
other PSX data feed will be charged an
annual administrative fee: either $500
for delayed distribution of data, or
$1,000 for real-time distribution.7 The
administrative fees, which are assessed
annually, will be charged at the
beginning of the first calendar year after
the launch of PSX, rather than being
subject to the one-year free period
applicable to other data fees. If, as the
Exchange expects, PSX launches in
Unveils%20Ultra-Aggressive%20January%20
Pricing%20Special.pdf).
6 In contrast with the NASDAQ Exchange and BX,
however, all orders designated as Displayed Orders
will be displayed without attribution to the entering
market participant.
7 These annual administrative fees may be waived
for colleges and universities receiving the data for
research and educational purposes.
E:\FR\FM\16SEN1.SGM
16SEN1
]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 179 (Thursday, September 16, 2010)]
[Notices]
[Pages 56618-56624]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-23074]
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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
[Release No. 34-62884; File Nos. SR-BATS-2010-018; SR-BX-2010-044; SR-
CBOE-2010-065; SR-CHX-2010-14; SR-EDGA-2010-05; SR-EDGX-2010-05; SR-
ISE-2010-66; SR-NASDAQ-2010-079; SR-NYSE-2010-49; SR-NYSEAmex-2010-63;
SR-NYSEArca-2010-61; SR-NSX-2010-08]
Self-Regulatory Organizations; BATS Exchange, Inc.; NASDAQ OMX
BX, Inc.; Chicago Board Options Exchange, Incorporated; Chicago Stock
Exchange, Inc.; EDGA Exchange, Inc.; EDGX Exchange, Inc.; International
Securities Exchange LLC; The NASDAQ Stock Market LLC; New York Stock
Exchange LLC; NYSE Amex LLC; NYSE Arca, Inc.; National Stock Exchange,
Inc.; Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes Relating to Expanding the
Pilot Rule for Trading Pauses Due to Extraordinary Market Volatility to
the Russell 1000[supreg] Index and Specified Exchange Traded Products
September 10, 2010.
I. Introduction
On June 30, 2010, each of BATS Exchange, Inc. (``BATS''), NASDAQ
OMX BX, Inc. (``BX''), Chicago Board Options Exchange, Incorporated
(``CBOE''), Chicago Stock Exchange, Inc. (``CHX''), EDGA Exchange, Inc
(``EDGA''), EDGX Exchange, Inc. (``EDGX''), International Securities
Exchange LLC (``ISE''), The NASDAQ Stock Market LLC (``NASDAQ''), New
York Stock Exchange LLC (``NYSE''), NYSE Amex LLC (``NYSE Amex''), NYSE
Arca, Inc. (``NYSE Arca''), and National Stock Exchange, Inc. (``NSX'')
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (``Commission''),
pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) \1\ of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(``Act''),\2\ and Rule 19b-4 thereunder,\3\ proposed rule changes to
amend certain of their respective rules to expand the trading pause
pilot in individual stocks comprising the S&P 500[reg] Index (``S&P
500'') when the price moves ten percent or more in the preceding five
minute period to securities included in the Russell 1000[reg] Index
(``Russell 1000'') and specified Exchange Traded Products
(``ETPs'').\4\ The proposed rule changes were published for comment in
the Federal Register on July 7, 2010.\5\ The Commission received 19
comments on the proposal and on broader issues relating to the
effectiveness of the circuit breaker pilot program to date.\6\
[[Page 56619]]
The NYSE responded to the comments in a letter dated July 23, 2010,\7\
and in a letter dated August 25, 2010.\8\ Nasdaq submitted a response
on August 26, 2010.\9\
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\1\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
\2\ 15 U.S.C. 78a.
\3\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4.
\4\ The term ``Exchanges'' shall refer collectively to all of
the exchanges in this order. The term ``Listing Markets'' refers
collectively to NYSE, NYSE Amex, NYSE Arca, and NASDAQ. The term
``Nonlisting Markets'' refers collectively to the remaining national
securities exchanges.
The Commission notes that NYSE and NYSE Amex do not currently
trade ETPs. Therefore, the expansion of the pilot to the select list
of ETPs does not apply to these two markets.
For purposes of Phase II, ETPs consist of exchange-traded funds
(including widely traded broad-based funds like SPY), exchange-
traded vehicles (which track the performance of an asset or index,
providing investors with exposure to futures contracts, currencies
and commodities without actually trading futures or taking physical
delivery of the asset), and exchange-traded notes.
\5\ See Securities Exchange Act Release Nos. 62407 (June 30,
2010), 75 FR 39060 (July 7, 2010); 62415 (June 30, 2010), 75 FR
39086 (July 7, 2010); 62409 (June 30, 2010), 75 FR 39078 (July 7,
2010); 62408 (June 30, 2010), 75 FR 39065 (July 7, 2010); 62417
(June 30, 2010), 75 FR 39074 (July 7, 2010); 62418 (June 30, 2010),
75 FR 39084 (July 7, 2010); 62419 (June 30, 2010), 75 FR 39070 (July
7, 2010); 62414 (June 30, 2010), 75 FR 39081 (July 7, 2010); 62411
(June 30, 2010), 75 FR 39067 (July 7, 2010); 62412 (June 30, 2010),
75 FR 39073 (July 7, 2010); 62413 (June 30, 2010), 75 FR 39076 (July
7, 2010); and 62410 (June 30, 2010), 75 FR 39063 (July 7, 2010)
(``Phase II Circuit Breaker Pilot Notices'').
On June 30, 2010, FINRA filed a proposed rule change, which was
approved today. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 62416 (June
30, 2010), 75 FR 39069 (July 7, 2010); Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 62883 (September 10, 2010) (SR-FINRA-2010-033).
\6\ The Commission considered letters received as of August 25
discussing the concept of the effectiveness of the individual stock
circuit breaker pilot to date as well as formal letters citing the
rule filings. See Letter from Paul Schott Stevens, President & CEO,
Investment Company Institute to Chairman Schapiro, Commission, dated
June 22, 2010 (``ICI Letter''); Letter from Craig S. Donohue, CEO,
CME Group, Inc. to Chairman Schapiro, Commission, dated June 23,
2010 (``CME Letter''); Letter from Ann L. Vlcek, Managing Director
and Associate General Counsel, Securities Industry and Financial
Markets Association to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, Commission,
dated June 25, 2010 (``SIFMA Letter''); Letter from Peter Skopp,
President, Molinete Trading Inc. to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary,
Commission, dated July 8, 2010 (``Molinete Letter''); Letter from
Sal L. Arnuk, Co-Head, and Joseph Saluzzi, Co-Head, Themis Trading
to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, Commission, dated July 8, 2010
(``Themis Letter''); Letter from Peter A. Ianello, Partner, CSS, LLC
to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, Commission, dated July 15, 2010
(``CSS Letter''); Letter from Julie S. Sweet, General Counsel,
Secretary, Chief Compliance Officer, Accenture plc to Elizabeth M.
Murphy, Secretary, Commission, dated July 15, 2010 (``Accenture
Letter''); Letter from Patrick J. Healy, CEO, Issuer Advisory Group,
LLC, Washington, District of Columbia to Elizabeth M. Murphy,
Secretary, Commission, dated July 18, 2010 (``Issuer Advisory Group
Letter''); Letter from Alexander M. Cutler, Chair, Business
Roundtable Corporate Leadership Initiative, Business Roundtable, to
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, Commission, dated July 19, 2010
(``Business Roundtable Letter''); Letter from Geva Patz, Android
Alpha Fund to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, Commission, dated July
19, 2010 (``Android Alpha Fund Letter''); Letter from David C.
Cushing, Director of Global Equity Trading, Wellington Management
Company, LLP to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, Commission, dated
July 19, 2010 (``Wellington Letter''); Letter from Karrie McMillan,
General Counsel, Investment Company Institute to Elizabeth M.
Murphy, Secretary, Commission, dated July 19, 2010 (``ICI 2
Letter''); Letter from Ira P. Shapiro, Managing Director, BlackRock,
Inc., San Francisco, California to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary,
Commission, dated July 19, 2010 (``BlackRock Letter''); Letter from
Tom Quaadman, Vice President, Center for Capital Markets
Competitiveness, Washington, District of Columbia to Elizabeth M.
Murphy, Secretary, Commission, dated July 19, 2010 (``CCMC
Letter''); Letter from James J. Angel, Associate Professor of
Finance, Georgetown University, dated June 19, 2010 [sic] (``Angel
Letter''); Letter from John A. McCarthy, General Counsel, GETCO to
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, Commission, dated July 20, 2010
(``GETCO Letter''); Letter from Jose Marques, Managing Director,
Deutsche Bank Securities Inc. to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary,
Commission, dated July 21, 2010 (``Deutsche Bank Letter''); Letter
from Paul Schott Stevens, President & CEO, Investment Company
Institute to Chairman Schapiro, Commission, dated July 27, 2010
(``ICI 3 Letter''); Letter from Craig S. Donohue, Chief Executive
Officer, CME Group to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, Commission,
dated July 30, 2010 (CME 2 Letter'').
\7\ See Letter from Janet M. Kissane, Senior Vice President--
Legal & Corporate Secretary, NYSE Euronext to Elizabeth M. Murphy,
Secretary, Commission, dated July 23, 2010 (``Response Letter'').
\8\ See Letter from Janet M. Kissane, Senior Vice President--
Legal & Corporate Secretary, NYSE Euronext to Elizabeth M. Murphy,
Secretary, Commission, dated August 25, 2010.
\9\ See Letter from Thomas P. Moran, Associate General Counsel,
The NASDAQ Stock Market LLC to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary,
Commission, dated August 26, 2010.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission finds that the proposals are consistent with Section
6(b)(5) of the Act,\10\ as it believes that expanding the uniform,
market-wide trading pauses will serve to prevent potentially
destabilizing price volatility and will thereby help promote the goals
of investor protection and fair and orderly markets. This order
approves the proposed rule changes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(5). That section, among other things,
requires that the rules of national securities exchanges be designed
to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices, to
promote just and equitable principles of trade, to remove
impediments to and perfect the mechanism of a free and open market
and a national market system, and in general, to protect investors
and the public interest.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
II. Description of the Proposals
On May 6, 2010, the U.S. equity markets experienced a severe
disruption.\11\ Among other things, the prices of a large number of
individual securities suddenly declined by significant amounts in a
very short time period, before suddenly reversing to prices consistent
with their pre-decline levels. This severe price volatility led to a
large number of trades being executed at temporarily depressed prices,
including many that were more than 60% away from pre-decline prices and
were broken by the Exchanges. The Commission is concerned that events
such as those that occurred on May 6 can seriously undermine the
integrity of the U.S. securities markets. Accordingly, it is working on
a variety of fronts to assess the causes and contributing factors of
the May 6 market disruption and to fashion policy responses that will
help prevent a recurrence.
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\11\ The events of May 6 are described more fully in the report
of the staffs of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (``CFTC'')
and the Commission, titled Report of the CFTC and SEC to the Joint
Advisory Committee on Emerging Regulatory Issues, ``Preliminary
Findings Regarding the Market Events of May 6, 2010,'' dated May 18,
2010 (``Joint Report'').
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The Commission also recognizes the importance of moving quickly to
implement appropriate steps that could help limit potential harm from
extreme price volatility. In this regard, it is pleased that the SROs
began consulting soon after May 6 in an effort to develop consistent
circuit breaker rules that could be implemented on an expedited basis.
The SROs were able to reach agreement on a consistent approach and, on
May 18 and 19, 2010, all of the SROs filed proposed rule changes with
the Commission.
On June 10, 2010, the Commission granted accelerated approval, for
a pilot period to end December 10, 2010, for proposed rule changes by
the Exchanges to pause trading during periods of extraordinary market
volatility in S&P 500 stocks (the ``Phase I Circuit Breaker
Pilot'').\12\ The rules require the Listing Markets to issue five-
minute trading pauses for individual securities for which they are the
primary Listing Market if the transaction price of the security moves
ten percent or more from a price in the preceding five-minute period.
The Listing Markets are required to notify the other Exchanges and
market participants of the imposition of a trading pause by immediately
disseminating a special indicator over the consolidated tape. Under the
rules, once the Listing Market issues a trading pause, the other
Exchanges are required to pause trading in the security on their
markets.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 62252 (June 10,
2010), 75 FR 34186 (June 16, 2010) (``Phase I Approval Order'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At the end of the five-minute pause, the Listing Market reopens
trading in the security in accordance with its procedures for doing so.
Trading resumes on other Exchanges and in the over-the-counter (OTC)
market once trading has resumed on the Listing Market. In the event of
a significant imbalance on the Listing Market at the end of the trading
pause, the Listing Market may delay reopening. If the Listing Market
has not reopened within ten minutes from the initiation of the trading
pause, however, the other Exchanges may resume trading.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ For more details on the operation of the Exchanges' rule,
see Securities Exchange Act Release No. 62252.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Several commenters on the proposal for the Phase I Circuit Breaker
Pilot expressed the view that the circuit breaker pilot should be
expanded beyond S&P 500 stocks, particularly to exchange traded funds
(``ETFs'') and the securities of other companies that were most
severely affected by the market disruption on May 6, 2010.\14\ In the
approval order for the Phase I Circuit Breaker Pilot, the Commission
agreed that consideration should be given by the Exchanges to whether
the circuit breakers should be expanded to cover additional securities,
but did not believe that there was a reason to delay implementation of
the Phase I Circuit Breaker Pilot as a reasonable first step to address
potential market volatility.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ See, e.g., Letter from Jeffrey W. Rubin, American Bar
Association Business Law Section to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary,
Commission, dated June 3, 2010; Letter from Julie Sweet, Accenture
plc to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, Commission, dated June 3,
2010; and Letter from Karrie McMillan, Investment Company Institute
to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, Commission, dated June 3, 2010
(expressing particular concern that if circuit breakers exist for
individual securities contained in ETFs' baskets, but not for the
ETFs themselves, ETFs could again suffer disproportionately during a
market event such as that of May 6).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Under the current proposal, the Exchanges propose to add securities
included in the Russell 1000, as well as specified ETPs, to the pilot
(the ``Phase II Circuit Breaker Pilot'') shortly after the Commission
approves the proposed rule changes. The Exchanges believe that adding
these securities to the pilot would have the beneficial effect of
applying the circuit breakers' protections against excessive volatility
to a larger group of securities, while at the same time allowing the
opportunity, during the pilot period, for continued review of the
operation of the circuit breakers and an assessment of whether the
pilot should be further expanded or modified.
The Exchanges believe that the securities in the Russell 1000 have
similar trading characteristics to securities included in the S&P 500,
and therefore the 10% price movement that triggers a trading pause in
the Phase I Circuit Breaker Pilot is appropriate for Russell 1000
securities. Based on the analyses of certain of the Exchanges, the
number of times that the trading pause would be triggered for Russell
1000
[[Page 56620]]
securities would be similar to the number of instances for S&P 500
securities.
In addition, the Exchanges proposed to include in the Phase II
Circuit Breaker Pilot the more liquid ETPs--specifically, those with a
minimum average daily volume of $2,000,000--that tend to have similar
trading characteristics as securities in the S&P 500 and Russell 1000
and for which they believe a 10% circuit breaker trigger is
appropriate.\15\ In addition, to assure related ETPs are subject to
comparable circuit breakers, the Exchanges proposed to include any ETP
that did not meet the $2,000,000 average daily volume threshold, but
tracked similar stocks and indices as ETPs meeting this criterion and
proposed to be included in the pilot. ETPs with average-daily-volumes
of less than $2,000,000, and for which there were no high-volume
counterparts were not included. Also excluded were leveraged ETFs since
those products by design are more volatile than the underlying stocks
they track, and the current proposal only contemplates adding
securities for which a 10% trigger is appropriate.\16\
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\15\ For details on how the Exchanges developed the pilot list
of ETPs, see, e.g., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 62413 (June
30, 2010), 75 FR 39076 (July 7, 2010) (SR-NYSEArca-2010-61).
\16\ One consequence of excluding leveraged ETFs is that they
could still suffer significant price dislocations even though
trading in the stocks they track might be paused as discussed above.
The Exchanges do not believe that the 10% price movement is an
appropriate threshold for leveraged ETPs because, by definition,
leveraged ETPs are based on multiples of price movements in the
underlying index. Accordingly, a 10% percent price movement in a
leveraged ETP may not signify extraordinary volatility. Because the
Exchanges are not proposing to adopt revised price movement
thresholds at this time, they are not proposing to include leveraged
ETPs for now.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As proposed, the list of ETPs includes those that track broad-based
equity indices, which the Exchanges recognize has caused some debate.
For example, as described in Section III, concerns have been raised
about the effect that halting trading in an index-based ETP may have on
a related index-based option or future. However, the Exchanges believe
that including broad-based index ETPs is appropriate so that ETP
investors are protected should the component securities experience such
volatility that trading in the broad-based ETP is affected. Because the
proposal is for a pilot period, the Exchanges will continue to assess,
among other things, whether it is appropriate to have a trading pause
in broad-based index ETPs when there is not a similar trading pause in
related index-based options or futures.
In addition, during the pilot period, the Exchanges will continue
to assess whether specific stocks or ETPs should be added to, or
removed from, the list of securities subject to the circuit breakers.
The Exchanges will also continue to assess whether the parameters for
invoking a trading pause continue to be appropriate or should be
modified.\17\
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\17\ See Phase II Circuit Breaker Pilot Notices, supra note 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
III. Discussion of Comments and Commission Findings
As of August 25, 2010, the Commission received 19 comment letters
regarding the proposed rule changes. Many commenters supported the
Phase II Circuit Breaker Pilot and its expansion to the Russell 1000
and the specified ETPs.\18\ For example, one commenter encouraged the
Commission to act expeditiously to expand the scope of the trading halt
rules to securities other than the S&P 500, particularly to ETFs, and
noted that ETFs experienced significant volatility on May 6, 2010 and
would benefit from uniform pauses in trading.\19\ Another commenter
urged the Commission to approve the Phase II Circuit Breaker Pilot as
quickly as possible, arguing that many of the securities that
experienced the most extreme trading jolts on May 6, 2010 were not
included in the Phase I Circuit Breaker Pilot, and that expansion of
the pilot was appropriate both to protect additional companies from
potential aberrational price movements and liquidity events affecting
their securities, and to provide investors with greater certainty about
the availability of the circuit breakers.\20\ Yet another commenter
noted that expanding the trading halt pilot to securities in the
Russell 1000 would protect investors in publicly traded companies not
in the S&P 500 that experienced severely aberrational trading on May
6.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ See Accenture Letter, Business Roundtable Letter; CCMC
Letter; ICI Letter; ICI 2 Letter; ICI 3 Letter; Issuer Advisory
Group Letter; Wellington Letter; Deutsche Bank Letter; SIFMA Letter;
and BlackRock Letter.
\19\ See SIFMA Letter.
\20\ See Business Roundtable Letter.
\21\ See Accenture Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Some commenters raised concerns about the proposed rule changes.
The two main areas of concern were: (1) The ability of erroneous trades
to trigger a trading pause; and (2) whether ETPs--particularly broad-
based index products--should be included in the pilot.
1. Erroneous Trades Triggering the Trading Pause
Several commenters pointed out that, under the circuit breaker
pilot, erroneous trades can trigger--and have triggered--trading
pauses, when there otherwise is no extraordinary market volatility.\22\
One commenter asserted that under the current circuit breaker logic,
erroneous trades would have triggered a trading halt at least 238 times
in the past 18 months.\23\ This same commenter pointed out that, as of
the date of its letter, three stocks had been halted under the Phase I
Circuit Breaker Pilot, two of which were triggered on markets with
prices that were far away from the current national best bid or offer
(``NBBO'') and prevailing prices at other markets.\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ See, e.g., Themis Letter; Accenture Letter; Molinete
Letter; SIFMA Letter; and Angel Letter.
\23\ See Molinete Letter.
\24\ Id. (referring to the trading pauses in Citigroup on June
29, 2010 and in Anadarko Petroleum on July 6, 2010). As of August
25, stock-specific circuit breakers have been triggered seven times
in six stocks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Other commenters expressed concern that any trader in the world,
ill-intentioned \25\ or not, has the power to halt trading in a stock
simply by printing a trade outside the circuit breaker range on a trade
reporting facility for the OTC market.\26\ One of these commenters
suggested that either a minimum number of trades outside the circuit
breaker range occur before trading is halted, or that the trade first
be checked for consistency with the NBBO before trading is halted.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ The Commission notes that anyone reporting a trade with the
intention of triggering a trading pause could be charged with
manipulation, fraud or other violations of the Federal securities
laws.
\26\ See Themis Letter and Angel Letter.
\27\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Several commenters concerned with erroneous trades triggering the
circuit breakers offered alternatives to the ``trading pause''
mechanism used in the current pilot. A number of commenters suggested
that the Commission consider moving to a ``limit up/limit down''
approach to moderate market volatility, similar to that utilized in the
futures markets.\28\ Some commenters also encouraged the Commission to
consider adopting collars on market orders and eliminating stub
quotes.\29\ One commenter suggested that the markets trigger the single
stock circuit breakers
[[Page 56621]]
off of changes to the NBBO rather than to changes in the last trade
price.\30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ See SIFMA Letter; Accenture Letter; Wellington Letter; and
CME 2 Letter. Under this approach, trades could occur within the
established price bands, so that erroneous trades would largely be
eliminated. In addition, there would not be a complete trading
halt--trading would be prevented outside the applicable price band,
but could continue within it.
\29\ See SIFMA Letter and CME 2 Letter.
\30\ See Molinete Letter. As an alternative, this commenter
suggested requiring at least two consecutive trades outside the NBBO
to trigger the circuit breaker, and the exclusion of manually-
entered trades from being potential triggers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission believes that the ability of an erroneous trade to
trigger a trading pause is a concern that the Exchanges should seek to
address promptly. The Commission understands that the Exchanges are
working on a variety of measures to reduce the instances of erroneous
trades and to assure that, when they occur, they are resolved promptly
through a clear and transparent process.\31\ The Commission also notes
that, under the pilot rules, the Listing Market can exclude a
transaction price that results from an erroneous execution from
triggering a circuit breaker. In this regard, the Commission notes that
the Listing Markets, pursuant to this authority, intend to implement
automated processes to help prevent trades that may be erroneous--
specifically, those outside the NBBO--from triggering a circuit
breaker.\32\ Various Exchanges have taken steps to ``collar'' market
orders, which are intended to prevent executions that occur a specified
percentage away from the last sale,\33\ and Commission staff has been
working with the Exchanges on an initiative to prevent stub quotes. The
Commission, in conjunction with the Exchanges, will continue to
evaluate what further steps need to be taken to reduce the likelihood
of erroneous trades and to improve the efficiency of the pilot.
However, the Commission does not believe it is appropriate to delay
implementation of the Phase II Circuit Breaker Pilot pending the
conclusion of those efforts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ See SR-BATS-2010-016; SR-BX-2010-040; SR-CBOE-2010-056; SR-
CHX-2010-13; SR-EDGA-2010-03; SR-EDGX-2010-03; SR-FINRA-2010-032;
SR-ISE-2010-62; SR-NASDAQ-2010-076; SR-NSX-2010-07; SR-NYSE-2010-47;
SR-NYSEAmex-2010-60; SR-NYSEArca-2010-58 (proposed rule changes to
amend certain SRO rules to set forth clearer standards and curtail
SRO discretion with respect to breaking erroneous trades).
\32\ See Letter from Janet M. Kissane, Senior Vice President--
Legal & Corporate Secretary, NYSE Euronext to Elizabeth M. Murphy,
Secretary, Commission, dated August 25, 2010; Letter from Thomas P.
Moran, Associate General Counsel, The NASDAQ Stock Market LLC to
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, Commission, dated August 26, 2010.
The Listing Markets may roll out these new automated processes on a
staggered basis.
In addition, the Commission understands FINRA is developing more
effective ways to prevent erroneous OTC trades from being printed on
a trade reporting facility, and it encourages those efforts. See,
e.g., FINRA Trade Reporting Notice, dated August 19, 2010 (issuing
new guidance on the use of the weighted-average price/special
pricing formula (.W) trade modifier for reporting certain types of
OTC trades in NMS stocks to FINRA).
\33\ See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act Release Nos. 62485 (July
13, 2010), 75 FR 41914 (July 19, 2010) (SR-NYSEArca-2010-67); 60371
(July 23, 2009), 74 FR 38075 (July 30, 2009) (SR-NASDAQ-2009-70).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. Inclusion of ETPs
Many commenters addressed the inclusion of ETPs in the pilot
program.\34\ Several supported the proposed expansion of the Phase II
Circuit Breaker Pilot to include ETPs.\35\ One of these commenters
stated that ETFs experienced significant volatility on May 6, and would
benefit from a uniform trading pause.\36\ Another commenter noted that
the price of an ETF is typically highly correlated to the market price
of its basket of component securities.\37\ Under normal circumstances,
when trading has been halted for one or two component securities, an
ETF may experience a slight deviation from the price of its basket
because of the challenge of pricing the non-trading security, and may
trade with a wider spread to account for the associated risk. When
multiple underlying securities are affected, however, the correlation
between the prices of an ETF and its underlying basket may break down
and the ETF may experience more severe price dislocation.\38\ While
this commenter thought that a different circuit breaker trigger may be
appropriate for ETFs, it nonetheless encouraged the Commission to
include all ETFs in the pilot where a substantial number of the
component securities are subject to the circuit breakers.\39\ Doing
otherwise, in its view, creates risks that ETFs could again suffer
disproportionately during a market event similar to that of May 6.\40\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\34\ See Accenture Letter; Android Alpha Fund Letter; BlackRock
Letter; Business Roundtable Letter; CME Letter; CME 2 Letter; CCMC
Letter; ICI Letter; ICI 2 Letter; ICI 3 Letter; Molinete Letter;
SIFMA Letter.
\35\ See Accenture Letter; BlackRock Letter; Business Roundtable
Letter; CCMC Letter; ICI Letter; ICI 2 Letter; ICI 3 Letter; SIFMA
Letter.
\36\ See SIFMA Letter at 2.
\37\ See ICI Letter and ICI 2 Letter.
\38\ Id.
\39\ See ICI Letter. In a subsequent letter, that commenter
supported examining the connection between price discovery in the
equities and the futures markets, and potentially making rules
consistent across markets. See ICI 2 Letter. According to this
commenter, however, such an examination should not prevent including
broad-based index ETFs in the pilot program. Id.
\40\ See ICI 2 Letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
One commenter supported the inclusion of ETFs in the pilot program,
in part because halting trading in the underlying component securities,
but not in the ETF, would hinder the arbitrage mechanism that is
critical to the ability of ETFs to track the performance of their
underlying basket or benchmark index.\41\ According to this commenter,
if an ETF were allowed to continue to trade while trading in the
majority of its underlying securities were halted, the arbitrage
mechanism would not work effectively, with the result that liquidity
for the ETF would diminish greatly, and perhaps lead to a collapse in
price similar to that which occurred on May 6.\42\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\41\ See BlackRock Letter. According to the commenter, this
arbitrage mechanism generally requires liquidity providers to sell a
basket of stocks equivalent to an ETF's underlying portfolio (or a
correlated derivative) as a hedge when purchasing ETF shares.
\42\ Id. This commenter did, however, question the exclusion of
lower-volume ETFs from the Phase II Circuit Breaker Pilot, and urged
that these ETFs be included in the pilot at the earliest
opportunity. See discussion on pages 6-7 describing the rationale
for selecting the list of ETPs for inclusion in the pilot program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Other commenters criticized various aspects of the application of
the proposed rule change to ETPs. One commenter described certain
ETFs--such as the S&P 500 SPDR (SPY)--as ``systemically important,''
and expressed concern that halting trading in these ETFs, especially as
a result of erroneous trades, might destabilize markets. Because the
SPY, for example, is used as a hedging vehicle in many trading
strategies, halting trading in it could cause liquidity providers
broadly to withdraw from the market, increasing volatility and perhaps
leading to a chain reaction like that witnessed on May 6.\43\ This
commenter did not believe that allowing ETFs to continue to trade while
some of the underlying component securities were halted would be
detrimental, because market participants would determine their own fair
value of the halted component securities.\44\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\43\ See Molinete Letter at 4.
\44\ Id. at 4-5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Another commenter expressed significant concern with the proposed
expansion of the pilot to broad-based equity index ETFs, as it believed
there could be potentially significant disruptions to trading across
related markets.\45\ This commenter noted that
[[Page 56622]]
the indices underlying the most active ETFs are the same as those
underlying the most active cash index options, index futures, and
options on ETFs.\46\ If a different circuit breaker mechanism applied
to broad-based equity index ETFs and ETF options than applied to index
futures and index options, or differed from the overall market-wide
circuit breakers, the commenter feared this could lead to further
market stress during periods of turbulence, perhaps impeding liquidity
and exacerbating risk management challenges.\47\ In addition, the
commenter thought that the inability of market makers to hedge using
equity index ETFs during a trading pause could lead to their
withdrawing liquidity across all markets, including in the E-mini index
futures.\48\ Accordingly, the commenter believed that the circuit
breakers applicable to equity index-based ETFs (as well as index
futures, index options, options on ETFs, and swaps) should be
consistent with both the methodology and levels of the market-wide
circuit breakers.\49\ Specifically, the commenter recommended the
adoption of uniform price limits across all broad-based index products
based upon the S&P 500, the DJIA, and the NASDAQ 100, which would
preclude trading beyond the enumerated limit but not within it.\50\
This commenter also recommended that automated risk and volatility
mitigation mechanisms be implemented in place of trading halts in
individual securities.\51\
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\45\ See CME Letter and CME 2 Letter. This commenter expressed
further concerns with the prospect of multiple constituent stocks in
an index being halted without the market-wide circuit breaker being
triggered. The commenter thought this would create complexity and
confusion in understanding the index calculation. In addition, the
commenter was of the view that the halting of high capitalization,
highly-liquid index components would be disruptive because it could
affect whether the index triggers a market-wide circuit breaker, the
intra-day index values circulated for risk management purposes may
not be reflective of the true value of the underlying market, and
large liquidity providers in index futures and ETFs may have
difficulty hedging with the result that they withdraw from the
market.
\46\ Id. The commenter also noted that these markets are very
closely linked and the absence of effective coordination across
comparable markets was one factor cited by many as having
contributed to certain market issues experienced on May 6. The
Commission addresses issues of cross-market linkage in its
discussion infra.
\47\ Id.
\48\ See CME Letter.
\49\ See CME Letter. This commenter also noted that, while
approximately 70% of the trades broken on May 6, 2010 were in ETFs,
they were not in the most liquid domestic, large cap index products.
\50\ See CME 2 Letter. These price limits would be established
at the 5%, 10% and 20% levels, and would be implemented for a 10
minute period, after which trading would continue to the next
applicable limit.
\51\ Id. Specifically, the commenter recommended that all
markets adopt: (1) Automated means--similar to the commenter's stop
logic functionality--to briefly pause the market in the event that
cascading sell orders precipitate a material market decline because
of a transitory dearth of liquidity; (2) functionality--similar to
the commenter's protection point functionality--to automatically
apply limit prices to all orders, including market and stop orders;
and (3) automated price banding functionality and maximum order size
restrictions to help prevent erroneous trades. For as long as single
stock circuit breakers continue to be employed, however, the
commenter believed regulators and the markets should establish
uniform policies and procedures to address situations where the
computation of the market-wide circuit breaker index value is
negatively affected due to the triggering of stock specific circuit
breakers on the component securities.
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In its response to comments, NYSE stated that the ``prompt review
and implementation of revised and coordinated market wide circuit
breakers is * * * a high priority.'' \52\ NYSE also indicated that it
would continue to review the operation of the pilot, including its
effect on how index-based products trade across multiple markets, and
would propose ``such changes as may be warranted for those
securities.'' \53\
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\52\ See Response Letter.
\53\ Id.
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The Commission believes that, on balance, the inclusion of ETPs,
including broad-based index equity ETFs, in the Phase II Circuit
Breaker Pilot is warranted and consistent with the Act. The Commission
notes that there are a number of scenarios in which the application of
a circuit breaker to trading in an ETF would promote market stability.
For example, if an ETF triggers a circuit breaker when none of its
component stocks is experiencing abnormal moves, then it is likely that
the ETF is suffering from a temporary liquidity imbalance. In that
case, the ETF would no longer be suitable for use as a hedging
instrument because its price would no longer reflect an accurate
consensus market value of the ETF or its underlying stocks. By pausing
the ETF under these circumstances, the Exchanges would allow liquidity
to rebuild and provide time for the market to self-correct without
allowing the aberrant price of the ETF to adversely affect the trading
and pricing of the underlying stocks, other ETFs or other related
products.
In another scenario, an ETF might trigger a circuit breaker, even
though its component stocks have not, because the ETF is leading its
underlying stocks in price discovery. In that case, the prices of many
of the underlying stocks may follow, triggering their own circuit
breakers shortly after the ETF does. In a broad market event such as
this, the net result would be that trading in the ETF and individual
stocks have each been paused, providing time for the market as a whole
to re-evaluate prices.
In yet another scenario, a number of individual component stocks
might trigger their circuit breakers even though the related ETF has
not yet done so. In that case, different market participants may very
well have differing opinions on the market value for the ETF because
they will be required to estimate the value of those component stocks
that have been paused. If only a small number of component stocks is
paused (perhaps due to some temporary liquidity imbalances in those
stocks) then there likely would be minimal effect on the ETF, and the
ETF circuit breakers appropriately would not be triggered. But if a
large number of component stocks trigger halts, the market likely is
experiencing a broad-based move, either for fundamental reasons, or
because of a large-scale liquidity imbalance similar to that of May 6.
As noted above, if many component stocks of an ETF are paused, but the
ETF itself continues to trade, the arbitrage relationship between the
ETF and its component stocks likely will break down as market
participants find they cannot hedge their exposures and, as a
consequence, cease to provide liquidity. Without a circuit breaker
mechanism that also applies to ETFs, the ETF could experience excessive
volatility that is not necessarily driven by the prices of its
underlying stocks. By pausing the ETF, market participants would be
given time to re-evaluate prices and replenish liquidity as needed.
The Commission acknowledges that a variety of ETFs do indeed trade
without incident when most, and sometimes all, of their underlying
components are not trading (e.g., ETFs on international stocks).
However, market makers and other participants trading these ETFs
account for this known and permanent structural difference by building
alternative methods for hedging and pricing into their trading models.
Market participants trading ETFs for which the component stocks
normally trade at the same time would not necessarily have the
opportunity to implement new hedging and pricing strategies in real
time if underlying component stocks were suddenly paused. Rather, they
would most likely withdraw from the market leaving the ETF with little
liquidity and even further need for a trading pause.\54\
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\54\ The Commission notes that a pause in the ETF could also
affect trading in underlying component stocks that were not
otherwise halted to the extent that the ETF was no longer available
as a hedging mechanism.
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The above arguments demonstrating the need to couple pauses in ETFs
with pauses in underlying stocks are equally applicable to the futures
market, and the Commission acknowledges the comments and concerns of
the CME for consistent treatment across instrument types. However, the
Commission notes that the CME's markets already have mechanisms for
limiting or pausing trading, and thus some inconsistency exists today
between the two markets. Maintaining the status quo, moreover,
[[Page 56623]]
would leave ETFs without a trading pause mechanism. In addition, the
Commission notes that there will need to be substantial work to
determine how best to make the volatility constraints in the futures
markets and the securities markets consistent.
Commenters also raised related concerns that a pause in a broad-
based ETF (such as the SPY) could lead to significant liquidity
pressures on other index-based products in the futures market (such as
the E-mini).\55\ Although this is a potential point of concern, as
noted above the futures markets already have in place volatility
mechanisms that should help mitigate the effect of such an event.
Moreover, it should be noted that currently there could be a pause on
the futures market (e.g., in the E-mini) which could create liquidity
pressure for corresponding ETFs--but there is currently no mechanism to
protect the ETF against aberrant prices as a result of such liquidity
pressures.
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\55\ See CME Letter.
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NYSE also recognized these concerns in its response to comments,
and committed to working with regulators and other markets in
coordinating alerts to trading interruptions ``so consistent
application of pauses will be effected.''\56\ NYSE also described ``the
prompt review and implementation of revised and coordinated market wide
circuit breakers'' as ``a high priority.''\57\
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\56\ See NYSE Response Letter.
\57\ Id.
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In response to the comment that the Commission instead implement
automated risk and volatility mitigation mechanisms--such as price
banding or stop logic functionality--the Commission notes that, even as
the circuit breaker pilot is being expanded, the Commission is
simultaneously exploring possible alternatives to a circuit breaker
approach that may include price limit bands or other mechanisms
described by the commenters.
One commenter noted that the proposal would exclude many ETFs with
trading volumes below the criteria set by the Exchanges and FINRA,
although such ETFs were significantly affected in the cancelled trades
of May 6.\58\ The Commission acknowledges that fact, but notes that, as
the Exchanges have indicated, the potential application of the circuit
breakers to less liquid securities is more complex, as different
triggering thresholds may be appropriate for them. As the pilot
progresses, the Commission will work with the SROs to consider
expanding the circuit breakers to cover additional securities in an
appropriate manner.
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\58\ See BlackRock Letter.
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The Commission acknowledges the point made by commenters that
broad-based index products were not significantly implicated in the
cancelled trades on May 6.\59\ However, the Commission notes that
broad-based index products did experience substantial volatility on May
6 \60\ and, like other securities, could benefit from the protections
of a circuit breaker. In addition, a sudden change in price, due to a
loss of liquidity or otherwise, to a widely traded ETF could have an
adverse market-wide effect even more far-reaching than that of May 6.
It is important that the use of circuit breakers not be limited to only
those ETFs that happened to have experienced severe dislocations on May
6, since there is no fundamental reason why broad-based ETFs could not
experience a similar liquidity crisis. In addition, there were no
circuit breakers in effect for underlying stocks on May 6. If a similar
event occurred when many underlying stocks in an index were halted by
circuit breakers, broad-based ETFs could experience greater volatility
than occurred on May 6.
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\59\ See CME Letter.
\60\ See Joint Report, supra note 11, at 39 (noting that many
ETFs ``experienced extreme daily lows'' on May 6, and that a
``significant number of ETFs'' experienced extreme daily highs on
May 6).
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3. Other Areas of Comment
Other areas of comment included potential ways to expand or modify
the circuit breaker pilot going forward,\61\ the need to carefully
study the effect of the pilot,\62\ the effect and continued
advisability of individual market volatility moderators in addition to
the uniform single-stock circuit breakers,\63\ and possible
modifications to the market-wide circuit breakers.\64\
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\61\ See Angel Letter (recommending that the trading pause be
expanded to cover the open, close, and after-hours trading); ICI
Letter (recommending examining whether a different circuit breaker
trigger is appropriate for ETFs); Wellington Letter (recommending
that the Commission require the Exchanges to continuously disclose
the high/low trigger of a security and its maximum remaining life).
\62\ See Android Alpha Fund Letter.
\63\ See Deutsche Bank Letter.
\64\ See CME 2 Letter; SIFMA Letter.
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With regard to expanding or modifying the circuit breaker pilot, as
noted above, the Commission intends to continue working with the
Exchanges to consider expanding the pilot to include additional
securities, or modifying the circuit breaker mechanism or pursuing
other approaches to moderating market volatility, in the coming months.
In addition, as noted in the Joint Report, the Commission currently is
evaluating the extent to which individual market volatility moderators
exacerbated the market instability that occurred on May 6, 2010, and
expects to develop appropriate policy recommendations based on the
outcome of that analysis. Finally, as noted in the Joint Report, the
Commission intends to work with the CFTC to consider whether
modifications to the existing market-wide circuit breakers are
warranted in light of the events of May 6. While all of these issues
warrant further study in the coming months, the Commission does not
believe they provide a basis for not approving the Phase II Circuit
Breaker Pilot at this time. The fact that better alternatives to
address inordinate market volatility ultimately may be developed does
not provide a basis for the Commission not to approve the Exchanges'
proposals if, as the Commission believes, the proposed rule changes are
consistent with Section 6(b)(5) of the Act.
4. Findings
The Commission finds that the proposed rule changes are consistent
with the requirements of the Act and the rules and regulations
thereunder applicable to national securities exchanges. In particular,
the Commission finds that the proposals are consistent with Section
6(b)(5) of the Act,\65\ which among other things requires that the
rules of national securities exchanges be designed to prevent
fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices, to promote just and
equitable principles of trade, to remove impediments to and perfect the
mechanism of a free and open market and a national market system, and
in general, to protect investors and the public interest.\66\
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\65\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(5).
\66\ In approving the proposed rule change, the Commission notes
that it has considered the proposed rules' impact on efficiency,
competition, and capital formation. 15 U.S.C. 78c(f).
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The proposed rule changes will expand the trading pause pilot to
include the securities in the Russell 1000 and specified ETPs. The
Commission believes that expanding the uniform, market-wide trading
pauses will serve to prevent potentially destabilizing price volatility
and will thereby help promote the goals of investor protection and fair
and orderly markets.
IV. Conclusion
It is therefore ordered, pursuant to Section 19(b)(2) of the
Act,\67\ that the proposed rule changes (SR-BATS-2010-018; SR-BX-2010-
044; SR-
[[Page 56624]]
CBOE-2010-065; SR-CHX-2010-14; SR-EDGA-2010-05; SR-EDGX-2010-05; SR-
ISE-2010-66; SR-NASDAQ-2010-079; SR-NYSE-2010-49; SR-NYSEAmex-2010-63;
SR-NYSEArca-2010-61; SR-NSX-2010-08) be, and hereby are, approved.
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\67\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(2).
By the Commission.
Elizabeth M. Murphy,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2010-23074 Filed 9-15-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8010-01-P
