Procedures for the Handling of Retaliation Complaints Under the Employee Protection Provision of the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982, 53544-53558 [2010-21125]

Agencies

• DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
• Occupational Safety and Health Administration

[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 168 (Tuesday, August 31, 2010)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 53544-53558]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-21125]


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DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

Occupational Safety and Health Administration

29 CFR Part 1978

[Docket Number OSHA-2008-0026]
RIN 1218-AC36


Procedures for the Handling of Retaliation Complaints Under the 
Employee Protection Provision of the Surface Transportation Assistance 
Act of 1982

AGENCY: Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Labor.

ACTION: Interim final rule; request for comments.

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SUMMARY: The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) is 
amending the regulations governing employee protection (or 
``whistleblower'') claims under the Surface Transportation Assistance 
Act of 1982 (STAA), 49 U.S.C. 31105. The amendments clarify and improve 
procedures for handling STAA whistleblower complaints and implement 
statutory changes enacted into law on August 3, 2007, as part of the 
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 
Commission Act), Public Law 110-53, 121 Stat. 266. These changes to the 
STAA whistleblower regulations also make the procedures for handling 
retaliation complaints under STAA more consistent with OSHA's 
procedures for handling retaliation complaints under Section 211 of the 
Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 (ERA), 42 U.S.C. 5851 and other 
whistleblower provisions.

DATES: This interim final rule is effective on August 31, 2010. 
Comments on the interim final rule must be submitted (postmarked, sent 
or received) on or before November 1, 2010.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments and additional materials by any of 
the following methods:
    Electronically: You may submit comments and attachments 
electronically at https://www.regulations.gov, which is the Federal 
eRulemaking Portal. Follow the instructions online for making 
electronic submissions.
    Fax: If your submissions, including attachments, do not exceed 10 
pages, you may fax them to the OSHA Docket Office at (202) 693-1648.
    Mail, hand delivery, express mail, messenger or courier service: 
You must submit your comments and attachments to the OSHA Docket 
Office, Docket No. OSHA-2008-0026, U.S. Department of Labor, Room N-
2625, 200 Constitution Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20210. Deliveries 
(hand, express mail, messenger and courier service) are accepted during 
the Department of Labor's and Docket Office's normal business hours, 
8:15 a.m.-4:45 p.m., e.t.
    Instructions: All submissions must include the agency name and the 
OSHA docket number for this rulemaking (Docket No. OSHA-2008-0026). 
Submissions, including any personal information you provide, are placed 
in the public docket without change and may be made available online at 
https://www.regulations.gov. Therefore, OSHA cautions you about 
submitting personal information such as Social Security numbers and 
birth dates.
    Docket: To read or download submissions or other material in the 
docket, go to https://www.regulations.gov or the OSHA Docket Office at 
the address above. All documents in the docket are listed in the https://www.regulations.gov index, however, some information (e.g., 
copyrighted material) is not publicly available to read or download 
through the Web site. All submissions, including copyrighted material, 
are available for inspection and copying at the OSHA Docket Office.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Nilgun Tolek, Director, Office of the 
Whistleblower Protection Program, Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration, U.S. Department of Labor, Room N-3610, 200 Constitution 
Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20210; telephone (202) 693-2199. This is 
not a toll-free number. The alternative formats available are large 
print, electronic file on computer disk (Word Perfect, ASCII, Mates 
with Duxbury Braille System) and audiotape.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Background

    Among other provisions of the 9/11 Commission Act, section 1536 
reenacted the whistleblower provision in STAA, 49 U.S.C. 31105 
(previously referred to as ``Section 405''), with certain amendments. 
The regulatory revisions described herein reflect these statutory 
changes and also seek to clarify and improve OSHA's procedures for 
handling STAA whistleblower claims. To the extent possible within the 
bounds of applicable statutory language, these revised regulations are 
designed to be consistent with the procedures applied to claims under 
other whistleblower statutes administered by OSHA, including the ERA, 
the Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st 
Century (AIR21), 49 U.S.C. 42121, and Title VIII of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002 (SOX), 18 U.S.C. 1514A. Responsibility for receiving and 
investigating complaints under 49 U.S.C. 31105 has been delegated to 
the Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and Health 
(Assistant Secretary) (Secretary's Order 5-2007, 72 FR 31160, June 5, 
2007). Hearings on determinations by the Assistant Secretary are 
conducted by the Office of Administrative Law Judges, and appeals from 
decisions by administrative law judges (ALJs) are decided by the 
Administrative Review Board (ARB) (Secretary's Order 1-2010 (Jan. 15, 
2010), 75 FR 3924-01 (Jan. 25, 2010)).

II. Summary of Statutory Changes to STAA Whistleblower Provisions

    The 9/11 Commission Act amended 49 U.S.C. 31105, and the related 
definitions provision at 49 U.S.C. 31101, by making the changes 
described below.

Expansion of Protected Activity

    Before passage of the 9/11 Commission Act, STAA protected certain 
activities related to commercial motor vehicle safety. The 9/11 
Commission Act expanded STAA's coverage to commercial motor vehicle 
security. In particular, 49 U.S.C. 31105(a)(1)(A) previously made it 
unlawful for a person to discharge, discipline, or discriminate against 
an employee regarding pay, terms, or privileges of employment because 
the employee, or another person at the employee's request, filed a 
complaint or began a proceeding related to a violation of a commercial 
motor vehicle safety regulation, standard or order, or testified or 
planned to testify in such a proceeding. The 9/11 Commission Act 
expanded this provision to include complaints and proceedings related 
to violations of commercial motor vehicle security regulations, 
standards, and orders.
    Prior to the 2007 amendments, paragraph (a)(1)(B) of STAA's 
whistleblower provision prohibited a person from discharging, 
disciplining, or discriminating against an employee regarding pay, 
terms or privileges of employment for refusing to operate a

[[Page 53545]]

vehicle in violation of a regulation, standard, or order related to 
commercial motor vehicle safety or health. The statute also protected 
any employee who refused to operate a vehicle because he or she had a 
reasonable apprehension of serious injury to himself or herself or the 
public because of the vehicle's unsafe condition. The recent STAA 
amendments expanded these protections to cover: (1) Any employee who 
refuses to operate a vehicle in violation of regulations, standards, or 
orders related to commercial motor vehicle security; and (2) any 
employee who refuses to operate a vehicle because he or she has a 
reasonable apprehension of serious injury to himself or herself or the 
public due to the vehicle's hazardous security condition.
    Before the statutory amendments, paragraph (a)(2) of STAA's 
whistleblower provision provided that an employee's apprehension of 
serious injury was reasonable only if a reasonable person in the 
circumstances then confronting the employee would have concluded that 
the ``unsafe condition'' of the vehicle established a real danger of 
accident, injury, or serious impairment to health. Moreover, to qualify 
for protection under this provision the employee had to have sought 
from the employer, and been unable to obtain, correction of the 
``unsafe condition.'' The August 2007 amendments replaced the term 
``unsafe conditions'' with the phrase ``hazardous safety or security 
conditions'' throughout this paragraph.
    The 9/11 Commission Act added a new paragraph to 49 U.S.C. 31105, 
(a)(1)(A)(ii), making it unlawful for a person to discharge, discipline 
or discriminate against an employee regarding pay, terms or privileges 
of employment because of a perception that the employee has filed or is 
about to file a complaint or has begun or is about to bring a 
proceeding concerning a violation of a commercial motor vehicle safety 
or security regulation, standard, or order. Paragraph (a)(1)(C) of 49 
U.S.C. 31105 is also new and makes it unlawful to discharge, 
discipline, or discriminate against an employee regarding pay, terms, 
or privileges of employment because the employee accurately reports 
hours on duty pursuant to 49 U.S.C. chapter 315. The recent statutory 
amendments also added paragraph (a)(1)(D) to 49 U.S.C. 31105. This 
paragraph prohibits discharging, disciplining or discriminating against 
an employee regarding pay, terms or privileges of employment because 
the employee cooperates, or is perceived as being about to cooperate, 
with a safety or security investigation by the Secretary of 
Transportation, the Secretary of Homeland Security, or the National 
Transportation Safety Board. Finally, the 9/11 Commission Act inserted 
paragraph (a)(1)(E) into 49 U.S.C. 31105. This provision prohibits a 
person from discharging, disciplining, or discriminating against an 
employee regarding pay, terms or privileges of employment because the 
employee furnishes, or is perceived as having furnished or being about 
to furnish, information to the Secretary of Transportation, the 
Secretary of Homeland Security, the National Transportation Safety 
Board, or any Federal, State, or local regulatory or law enforcement 
agency about the facts concerning any accident or incident resulting in 
injury or death to an individual or damage to property occurring in 
connection with commercial motor vehicle transportation.

Legal Burdens of Proof for STAA Complaints

    Prior to the 9/11 Commission Act, the parties' burdens of proof in 
STAA actions were understood to be analogous to those developed for 
retaliation claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 
U.S.C. 2000e et seq. See, e.g., Clean Harbors Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. 
Herman, 146 F.3d 12, 21-22 (1st Cir. 1998); Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. 
v. Reich, 27 F.3d 1133, 1138 (6th Cir. 1994). The plaintiff's prima 
facie case could be carried by a sufficient showing that (1) he or she 
engaged in protected activity; (2) he or she suffered an adverse 
action; and (3) a causal connection existed between the two events. Id. 
The ARB also required proof that the employer was aware that the 
employee had engaged in the protected activity. See, e.g., Baughman v. 
J.P. Donmoyer, Inc., ARB No. 05-1505, ALJ No. 2005-STA-005, 2007 WL 
3286335, at *3 (Admin. Review Bd. Oct. 31, 2007).
    Once the complainant made this showing, an inference of retaliation 
arose and the burden shifted to the employer to produce evidence of a 
legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the adverse action. Clean 
Harbors, 146 F.3d at 21; Yellow Freight, 27 F.3d at 1138. If the 
employer met this burden of production, the inference of retaliation 
was rebutted and the burden shifted back to the complainant to show by 
a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reason was a 
pretext for unlawful retaliation. Id. Where there was evidence that the 
employer acted out of mixed motives, i.e., it acted for both 
permissible and impermissible reasons, the employer bore ``the burden 
of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have 
taken the adverse employment action in the absence of the employee's 
protected activity.'' Clean Harbors, 146 F.3d at 21-22.
    The 9/11 Commission Act amended paragraph (b)(1) of 49 U.S.C. 31105 
to state that STAA whistleblower complaints will be governed by the 
legal burdens of proof set forth in AIR21, 49 U.S.C. 42121(b), which 
contains whistleblower protections for employees in the aviation 
industry. AIR21 provides that a complaint must be dismissed (and no 
investigation will be conducted) unless the complainant makes a prima 
facie showing that a protected activity was a contributing factor in 
the adverse action described in the complaint. Notwithstanding a 
finding that the complainant has made the required prima facie showing, 
AIR21 states that no investigation will be conducted if the employer 
demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken 
the same adverse action in the absence of the protected conduct. Under 
AIR21, a violation may be found only if the complainant demonstrates 
that protected activity was a contributing factor in the adverse action 
described in the complaint. And relief is unavailable if the employer 
demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken 
the same adverse action in the absence of the protected activity. See 
Vieques Air Link, Inc. v. Dep't of Labor, 437 F.3d 102, 108-09 (1st 
Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (burdens of proof under AIR21).

Written Notification of Complaints and Findings

    Prior to the 9/11 Commission Act, STAA's whistleblower provision 
required the Secretary of Labor (Secretary) to notify persons when 
complaints were filed against them. The statute has now been amended at 
paragraph (b)(1) to clarify that this notice must be in writing. 
Similarly, the 9/11 Commission Act amended paragraph (b)(2)(A) of 49 
U.S.C. 31105 to clarify that the Secretary's findings must be in 
writing.

Expansion of Remedies

    Paragraph (b)(3)(A) of 49 U.S.C. 31105 previously compelled the 
Secretary, upon finding a violation of STAA's whistleblower provision, 
to order the employer to take affirmative abatement action, reinstate 
the complainant to his or her former position with the same pay and 
terms and privileges of employment, and pay compensatory damages, 
including backpay. The 9/11 Commission Act amended paragraph

[[Page 53546]]

(b)(3)(A)(iii) to reflect existing law on damages in STAA whistleblower 
cases and expressly provide for the award of interest on backpay as 
well as compensation for any special damages sustained as a result of 
the unlawful discrimination, including litigation costs, expert witness 
fees, and reasonable attorney fees. The 2007 amendments also added a 
new provision to 49 U.S.C. 31105, paragraph (b)(3)(C), authorizing 
punitive damage awards of up to $250,000.

De Novo Review

    The August 2007 amendments added paragraph (c) to 49 U.S.C. 31105. 
That paragraph provides for de novo review of a STAA whistleblower 
claim by a United States district court in the event that the Secretary 
has not issued a final decision within 210 days after the filing of a 
complaint and the delay is not due to the complainant's bad faith. The 
provision provides that the court will have jurisdiction over the 
action without regard to the amount in controversy and that the case 
will be tried before a jury at the request of either party.

Preemption and Employee Rights

    The 9/11 Commission Act added a new provision to 49 U.S.C. 31105 at 
paragraph (f) clarifying that nothing in the statute preempts or 
diminishes any other safeguards against discrimination provided by 
Federal or State law. The 2007 amendments to STAA also added a 
provision at paragraph (g) in 49 U.S.C. 31105 stating that nothing in 
STAA shall be deemed to diminish the rights, privileges, or remedies of 
any employee under any Federal or State law or under any collective 
bargaining agreement. New paragraph (g) further states that rights and 
remedies under 49 U.S.C. 31105 ``may not be waived by any agreement, 
policy, form, or condition of employment.''

Miscellaneous Provisions

    The 9/11 Commission Act added a new provision to 49 U.S.C. 31105 at 
paragraph (h) regarding the circumstances in which the Secretary of 
Transportation and the Secretary of Homeland Security may disclose the 
names of employees who have provided information about certain alleged 
violations. In addition, the amendments added a new paragraph (i) to 49 
U.S.C. 31105, which provides that the Secretary of Homeland Security 
will establish a process by which any person may report motor carrier 
vehicle security problems, deficiencies or vulnerabilities. Neither of 
these amendments significantly impacts OSHA's handling of whistleblower 
complaints under STAA.

Definition of ``Employee''

    Definitions applicable to STAA are found at 49 U.S.C 31101. That 
section defines ``employee'' as a driver of a commercial motor vehicle 
(including an independent contractor when personally operating a 
commercial motor vehicle), a mechanic, a freight handler, or an 
individual not an employer, who (i) directly affects commercial motor 
vehicle safety in the course of employment by a commercial motor 
carrier; and (ii) is not an employee of the Federal, State or local 
government acting in the course of employment. The 9/11 Commission Act 
incorporated this definition into the whistleblower section of STAA, 49 
U.S.C. 31105, at paragraph (j), and expanded it to include employees 
who directly affect commercial motor vehicle security in the course of 
employment by a commercial motor carrier.

III. Summary and Discussion of Regulatory Provisions

    The regulatory provisions in this part are being revised to reflect 
the 9/11 Commission Act's amendments to STAA, to clarify and improve 
the procedures for handling STAA whistleblower cases, and, to the 
extent possible within the bounds of applicable statutory language, to 
be consistent with regulations implementing the whistleblower 
provisions of the following statutes, among others, that are also 
administered and enforced by OSHA: the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 
U.S.C. 300j-9(i); the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. 
1367; the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. 2622; the Solid Waste 
Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. 6971; the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7622; the 
ERA; and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and 
Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. 9610, all regulations for these 
statutory provisions jointly codified at 29 CFR part 24; AIR21, 
codified at 29 CFR part 1979; SOX, codified at 29 CFR part 1980; and 
the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002, 49 U.S.C. 60129, codified 
at 29 CFR part 1981. The section numbers of these STAA regulations have 
been changed to correspond as closely as possible with the numbering in 
the regulations implementing other whistleblower statutes administered 
by OSHA.
    These regulatory amendments incorporate two nonsubstantive changes 
in terminology. First, cases brought under the whistleblower provisions 
of STAA will now be referred to as actions alleging ``retaliation'' 
rather than ``discrimination.'' This change in terminology, which has 
already been made in the regulations implementing the ERA and the other 
whistleblower statutes covered by 29 CFR part 24, is not intended to 
have substantive effect. It simply reflects the fact that claims 
brought under these whistleblower provisions are prototypical 
retaliation claims. A retaliation claim is a specific type of 
discrimination claim that focuses on actions taken as a result of an 
employee's protected activity rather than as a result of an employee's 
characteristics (e.g., race, gender, or religion).
    Second, these regulations previously referred to persons named in 
STAA whistleblower complaints as ``named persons,'' but in the revised 
regulations they will be referred to as ``respondents.'' Again, this 
change is not intended to have any substantive impact on the handling 
of STAA whistleblower cases. This revision simply reflects a preference 
for more conventional terminology.

Section 1978.100 Purpose and Scope

    This section describes the purpose of the regulations implementing 
STAA's whistleblower provision and provides an overview of the 
procedures contained in the regulations. Paragraph (a) of this section 
is being revised to include an updated citation reference to the 
correct section of the United States Code where STAA's whistleblower 
provision is located and to reflect the recent statutory amendments 
extending coverage to activities pertaining to commercial motor vehicle 
security matters. Minor editorial edits are being made to paragraph (b) 
of this section.

Section 1978.101 Definitions

    This section includes general definitions applicable to STAA's 
whistleblower provision. The definitions are being reorganized in 
alphabetical order and minor edits are being made to cleanup or clarify 
existing regulatory text.
    A new definition of ``business days'' is being added at paragraph 
(c) to clarify that that term means days other than Saturdays, Sundays, 
and Federal holidays. This definition is consistent with 29 CFR 
1903.22(c), an OSHA regulation interpreting the analogous term 
``working days'' in section 10 of the Occupational Safety and Health 
Act (OSH Act), 29 U.S.C. 659, in the same way.
    The regulations previously defined ``commercial motor carrier'' as 
a person who satisfied the definitions of ``motor carrier'' and ``motor 
private carrier'' in 49

[[Page 53547]]

U.S.C. 10102(13) and 10102(16). Those statutory references are out of 
date and are being replaced with: ``Commercial motor carrier means any 
person engaged in a business affecting commerce between States or 
between a State and a place outside thereof who owns or leases a 
commercial motor vehicle in connection with that business, or assigns 
employees to operate such a vehicle.'' The new definition of 
``commercial motor carrier'' reflects the Secretary's longstanding 
practice of giving that phrase expansive meaning, i.e., including 
within its reach all motor carriers in or affecting commerce. See, 
e.g., Arnold v. Associated Sand and Gravel Co., Case No. 92-STA-19, 
1992 WL 752791, at *3 (Office Admin. Appeals, Aug. 31, 1992) 
(appropriate to give the term ``commercial'' its legal meaning; 
``legislative history of the STAA * * * additionally militates in favor 
of construing the term expansively to describe motor carriers `in' or 
`affecting' commerce''). In addition, the revised definition of 
``commercial motor carrier'' is more consistent with the statutory 
definition of ``employer.'' See 49 U.S.C. 31101(3).
    The statutory definition of ``commercial motor vehicle'' is being 
added to this section at paragraph (e), and the definition of 
``employee'', now at paragraph (h), is being revised to reflect the 
statutory amendment expanding coverage to individuals whose work 
directly affects commercial motor vehicle security. In addition, the 
statutory definitions of ``employer'' and ``State'' are being added to 
this section at paragraphs (i) and (n) respectively, and a new 
paragraph is being added at the end of this section to clarify that any 
future statutory amendments will govern in lieu of the definitions 
contained in section 1978.101. A new definition of ``complaint'' is 
being added to this section at paragraph (g) to clarify the scope of 
activities protected by STAA's whistleblower provisions. See discussion 
of 1978.102 (Obligations and prohibited acts) below.

Section 1978.102 Obligations and Prohibited Acts

    This new section describes the activities that are protected under 
STAA and the conduct that is prohibited in response to any protected 
activities. Insertion of this new section resulted in the renumbering 
of many subsequent sections.
    Among other prohibited acts, it is unlawful under STAA for an 
employer to retaliate against an employee because the employee, or 
someone acting pursuant to the employee's request, has filed a 
complaint related to a violation of a commercial motor vehicle safety 
or security regulation, standard or order. 49 U.S.C. 31105(a)(1)(A)(i). 
STAA's whistleblower provision also protects employees who the employer 
perceives as having filed or being about to file such a complaint. 49 
U.S.C. 31105(a)(1)(A)(ii). The Secretary has long taken the position 
that these provisions of STAA, as well as similarly worded provisions 
in other whistleblower statutes enforced by OSHA, cover both written 
and oral complaints to the employer or a government agency. See, e.g., 
Harrison v. Roadway Express, Inc., No. 00-048, 2002 WL 31932546, at *4 
(Admin. Review Bd. Dec. 31, 2002) (``[C]omplaints about violations of 
commercial motor vehicle regulations may be oral, informal or 
unofficial.''), aff'd on other grounds, 390 F.3d 752 (2d Cir. 2004); 
see also, e.g., Calhoun v. Dep't of Labor, 576 F.3d 201, 212 (4th Cir. 
2009) (citing Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Reich, 8 F.3d 980, 986 (4th 
Cir. 1993) for the proposition that ``written or oral'' complaints can 
be protected under STAA); Power City Elec., Inc., No. C-77-197, 1979 WL 
23049, at *2 (E. D. Wash. Oct. 23, 1979) (noting that the term 
``filed'', as used in Section 11(c) of the OSH Act, ``is not limited to 
a written form of complaint.''). It is particularly important for STAA 
to cover oral as well as written complaints because in many cases truck 
drivers are out on the road and the only way they can communicate 
immediate concerns about violations of safety and security regulations 
is via CB radio or phone. For these reasons, sections 1978.102(b)(1) 
and 1978.102(e)(1) are intended to cover the filing of written and oral 
complaints with employers or government agencies, and a definition of 
the term ``complaint,'' reflecting this intent, has been added to 
section 1978.101.

Section 1978.103 Filing of Retaliation Complaints

    This section (formerly section 1978.102) is being revised to make 
it more consistent with the regulatory procedures for other OSHA-
administered whistleblower laws.
    Complaints filed under STAA's whistleblower provision need not be 
in any particular form. Complainants have always been permitted to file 
STAA whistleblower complaints either orally or in writing. In light of 
this longstanding practice, OSHA will continue to accept STAA 
whistleblower complaints in either oral or written form. Allowing STAA 
whistleblower complaints to be filed orally is also consistent with 
OSHA's practice in whistleblower cases under Section 11(c) of the OSH 
Act, 29 U.S.C. 660(c); Section 211 of the Asbestos Hazard Emergency 
Response Act (AHERA), 15 U.S.C. 2651; and Section 7 of the 
International Safe Container Act (ISCA), 46 U.S.C. 80507. And the final 
regulations implementing the ERA and the other whistleblower statutes 
covered by 29 CFR part 24 permit the filing of oral as well as written 
complaints. Language has been added to paragraph (b) to clarify that 
when a complaint is made orally, OSHA will reduce the complaint to 
writing. In addition, paragraph (b) is being updated to provide that if 
an employee is not able to file a complaint in English, OSHA will 
accept the complaint in any language.
    Language has been added to paragraph (d) to clarify the date on 
which a complaint will be considered ``filed,'' i.e., the date of 
postmark, facsimile transmittal, e-mail communication, telephone call, 
hand-delivery, delivery to a third-party commercial carrier, or in-
person filing at an OSHA office.
    Provisions in former paragraph (d) dealing with tolling of the 180-
day period for the filing of STAA whistleblower complaints have been 
deleted for consistency with other OSHA whistleblower regulations, 
which do not contain this language. This revision is not intended to 
change the way OSHA handles untimely complaints under any whistleblower 
laws. A new sentence in the regulatory text clarifies that filing 
deadlines may still be tolled based on principles developed in 
applicable case law. See, e.g., Donovan v. Hahner, Foreman & Harness, 
Inc., 736 F.2d 1421, 1423-29 (10th Cir. 1984).
    Finally, paragraph (e), ``Relationship to Section 11(c) 
complaints,'' has been revised to conform to similar provisions 
implementing other OSHA whistleblower programs and to more clearly 
describe the relationship between Section 11(c) complaints and STAA 
whistleblower complaints. Section 11(c) of the OSH Act generally 
prohibits employers from retaliating against employees for filing 
safety or health complaints or otherwise initiating or participating in 
proceedings under the OSH Act. In some circumstances an employee 
covered by STAA may engage in activities that are protected under both 
STAA and Section 11(c) of the OSH Act. For example, a freight handler 
loading cargo onto a commercial motor vehicle may complain about both 
the overloading of that vehicle (a safety complaint protected by STAA) 
and also about an unsafe forklift (a safety complaint

[[Page 53548]]

covered by the OSH Act). In practice, OSHA would investigate whether 
either or both of these protected activities caused the firing. 
Paragraph (e) now clarifies that STAA whistleblower complaints that 
also allege facts constituting an 11(c) violation will be deemed to 
have been filed under both statutes. Similarly, Section 11(c) 
complaints that allege facts constituting a violation of STAA's 
whistleblower provision will also be deemed to have been filed under 
both laws. In these cases, normal procedures and timeliness 
requirements under the respective statutes and regulations will be 
followed.

Section 1978.104 Investigation

    This section (formerly section 1978.103) has been revised to more 
closely conform to the regulations implementing other whistleblower 
provisions administered by OSHA. Former paragraph (f) in section 
1978.102, which deals with the notice sent to employers when complaints 
are filed against them, is being moved to paragraph (a) in section 
1978.104, where it more appropriately appears under the 
``Investigation'' heading. In addition, minor revisions are being made 
to that paragraph to be more consistent with similar provisions in 
other OSHA whistleblower regulations. Of particular note, new language 
is being added requiring OSHA to send the Federal Motor Carrier Safety 
Administration (FMCSA) a copy of the notice that goes to the employer. 
This has been standard practice in any event.
    Former section 1978.103(a), which simply stated that OSHA would 
investigate and gather data as it deemed appropriate, is being deleted 
as unnecessary. Paragraph (b) is being revised to conform to other OSHA 
whistleblower regulations. Language describing the persons who can be 
present and the issues that can be addressed at OSHA's meetings with 
respondents is being deleted, but this is not intended to change the 
manner in which OSHA conducts these meetings.
    A new paragraph (c) specifies that throughout the investigation the 
agency will provide to the complainant (or the complainant's legal 
counsel if the complainant is represented by counsel) a copy of all of 
respondent's submissions to the agency that are responsive to the 
complainant's whistleblower complaint. Before providing such materials 
to the complainant, the agency will redact them in accordance with the 
Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. 552a, et seq., and other applicable 
confidentiality laws. The agency expects that sharing information with 
complainants in accordance with this new provision will enhance OSHA's 
ability to conduct full and fair investigations and permit the 
Assistant Secretary to more thoroughly assess defenses raised by 
respondents.
    A new paragraph (d) addresses confidentiality in investigations. In 
addition, a new paragraph is being added to this section at paragraph 
(e), which incorporates the AIR21 burdens of proof that were carried 
over to STAA's whistleblower provision by the 9/11 Commission Act. This 
paragraph generally conforms to similar provisions in the regulations 
implementing the AIR21 and ERA whistleblower laws. All of these 
statutes now require that a complainant make an initial prima facie 
showing that protected activity was ``a contributing factor'' in the 
adverse action alleged in the complaint, i.e., that the protected 
activity, alone or in combination with other factors, affected in some 
way the outcome of the employer's decision. The complainant will be 
considered to have met the required burden if the complaint on its 
face, supplemented as appropriate through interviews of the 
complainant, alleges the existence of facts and either direct or 
circumstantial evidence to meet the required showing. Complainant's 
burden may be satisfied, for example, if he or she shows that the 
adverse action took place shortly after protected activity, giving rise 
to the inference that it was a contributing factor in the adverse 
action. Language from some of OSHA's other whistleblower regulations, 
including those implementing AIR21 and ERA, setting forth specific 
elements of the complainant's prima facie case has been carried over 
into these regulations, although it has been modified slightly to 
reflect the new provisions in STAA specifically protecting employees 
who are ``perceived'' as having engaged in certain conduct. See Reich 
v. Hoy Shoe Co., 32 F.3d 361, 368 (8th Cir. 1994) (``Construing Sec.  
11(c), the OSH Act's anti-retaliation provision, to protect employees 
from adverse employment actions because they are suspected of having 
engaged in protected activity is consistent with * * * the specific 
purposes of the anti-retaliation provisions.'').
    If the complainant does not make the required prima facie showing, 
the investigation must be discontinued and the complaint dismissed. See 
Trimmer v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 174 F.3d 1098, 1101 (10th Cir. 1999) 
(noting that the burden-shifting framework of the ERA, which is the 
same framework now found in the AIR21 law and STAA, served a 
``gatekeeping function'' that ``stemm[ed] frivolous complaints''). Even 
in cases where the complainant successfully makes a prima facie 
showing, the investigation must be discontinued if the employer 
demonstrates, by clear and convincing evidence, that it would have 
taken the same adverse action in the absence of the protected activity. 
Thus, OSHA must dismiss a complaint under STAA and not investigate (or 
cease investigating) if either: (1) The complainant fails to meet the 
prima facie showing that protected activity or, where covered by STAA, 
the perception of protected activity, was a contributing factor in the 
adverse action; or (2) the employer rebuts that showing by clear and 
convincing evidence that it would have taken the same adverse action 
absent the protected activity or the perception thereof.
    Former section 1978.103(c) is being moved to paragraph (f) of this 
section. Minor revisions are being made to this paragraph to conform to 
similar paragraphs in the regulations implementing the AIR21 and SOX 
whistleblower provisions. This includes allowing ten business days 
(rather than five days) for the respondent to present evidence in 
support of its position against an order of preliminary reinstatement.

Section 1978.105 Issuance of Findings and Preliminary Orders

    Former paragraph (a) in section 1978.104, now at paragraph (a) in 
this section, is being updated to reflect the recent amendments to STAA 
expanding available remedies. If the Assistant Secretary concludes that 
there is reasonable cause to believe that a violation has occurred, he 
or she will order appropriate relief, including preliminary 
reinstatement. In appropriate circumstances, in lieu of preliminary 
reinstatement, OSHA may order that the complainant receive the same pay 
and benefits that he or she received prior to his or her termination, 
but not actually return to work. Such ``economic reinstatement'' is 
employed in cases arising under Section 105(c) of the Federal Mine 
Safety and Health Act of 1977. See, e.g., Secretary of Labor on behalf 
of York v. BR&D Enters., Inc., 23 FMSHRC 697, 2001 WL 1806020, at *1 
(June 26, 2001). Congress intended that complainants be preliminarily 
reinstated to their positions if OSHA finds reasonable cause that they 
were discharged in violation of STAA's whistleblower provision. When a 
violation is found, the norm is for OSHA to order immediate, 
preliminary reinstatement. An employer does not have a statutory right 
to choose

[[Page 53549]]

economic reinstatement. Rather, economic reinstatement is designed to 
accommodate situations in which evidence establishes to OSHA's 
satisfaction that reinstatement is inadvisable for some reason, 
notwithstanding the employer's retaliatory discharge of the 
complainant. In such situations, actual reinstatement might be delayed 
until after the administrative adjudication is completed as long as the 
complainant continues to receive his or her pay and benefits and is not 
otherwise disadvantaged by a delay in reinstatement. There is no 
statutory basis for allowing the employer to recover the costs of 
economically reinstating a complainant should the employer ultimately 
prevail in the whistleblower litigation.
    A new provision is being added at paragraph (a)(2) of this section 
requiring the Assistant Secretary to notify the parties if it finds 
that a violation has not occurred. Former section 1978.104(c), which 
provided for the suspension of 11(c) complaints pending the outcome of 
STAA proceedings, is being deleted. As described above, section 
1978.103(e) now adequately describes the relationship between STAA and 
11(c) complaints.
    Paragraph (b) is being revised to clarify that OSHA need not send 
the original complaint to the Chief Administrative Law Judge when it 
issues its findings and preliminary order; a copy of the complaint will 
suffice. Former section 1978.105(b)(1) is being moved to section 
1978.105(c). This paragraph states that the Assistant Secretary's 
preliminary order will be effective 30 days after receipt, or on the 
compliance date set forth in the preliminary order, whichever is later, 
unless an objection is filed. It also clarifies that any preliminary 
order requiring reinstatement will be effective immediately. This 
paragraph mirrors existing provisions in other OSHA whistleblower 
regulations.

Subpart B--Litigation

Section 1978.106 Objections to the Findings and the Preliminary Order 
and Request for a Hearing

    Minor revisions are being made to paragraph (a), formerly section 
1978.105(a), to conform to other OSHA whistleblower regulations. The 
new paragraph now clarifies that with respect to objections to the 
findings and preliminary order, the date of the postmark, fax, or e-
mail communication is considered the date of the filing; if the 
objection is filed in person, by hand-delivery or other means, the 
objection is filed upon receipt. The filing of objections is also 
considered a request for a hearing before an ALJ. The amended language 
also clarifies that in addition to filing objections with the Chief 
Administrative Law Judge, the parties must serve a copy of their 
objections on the other parties of record, the OSHA official who issued 
the findings and order, the Assistant Secretary, and the Associate 
Solicitor for Occupational Safety and Health. A failure to serve copies 
of the objections on the appropriate parties does not affect the ALJ's 
jurisdiction to hear and decide the merits of the case. See Shirani v. 
Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Inc., ARB No. 04-101, ALJ No. 2004-
ERA-9, 2005 WL 2865915, at *7 (Admin. Review Bd. Oct. 31, 2005).
    The title to former section 1978.105(b) is being deleted because it 
is unnecessary. In addition, as previously mentioned, former paragraph 
(b)(1) in section 1978.105 is being moved to new paragraph (c) in 
section 1978.105. Finally, some minor, nonsubstantive revisions are 
being made to former 1978.105(b)(2), now at 1978.106(b), and additional 
language is being added to that paragraph to clarify that all 
provisions of the ALJ's order, with the exception of any order for 
preliminary reinstatement, will be stayed upon the filing of a timely 
objection. The respondent may file a motion for a stay of a preliminary 
reinstatement order.

Section 1978.107 Hearings

    Former section 1978.106, which has become section 1978.107, was 
titled ``Scope of rules; applicability of other rules; notice of 
hearing.'' The title is being changed to ``Hearings,'' the title 
assigned to similar sections in other OSHA whistleblower regulations.
    Minor revisions are being made to paragraph (a), which adopts the 
rules of practice and procedure and the rules of evidence for 
administrative hearings before the Office of Administrative Law Judges, 
codified at 29 CFR part 18. Changes are also being made to paragraph 
(b) to conform to other OSHA whistleblower regulations. The 
requirements for the ALJ to set a hearing date within seven days, and 
to commence a hearing within 30 days, have been deleted, and new 
language is being added to clarify that hearings will commence 
expeditiously and be conducted de novo and on the record. The new 
language is not intended to change current case-handling practices.
    Paragraph (c), which deals with situations in which both the 
complainant and the respondent object to the findings and/or 
preliminary order, is being revised, consistent with the changes made 
to paragraph (b), to remove language stating that hearings shall 
commence within 30 days of the last objection received.
    Former paragraph (d), dealing with the ALJ's discretion to order 
the filing of prehearing statements, is being deleted as unnecessary.

Section 1978.108 Role of Federal Agencies

    Former section 1978.107, titled ``Parties,'' is now at section 
1978.108 with the new title ``Role of Federal agencies.'' This conforms 
to the terminology used in OSHA's other whistleblower regulations.
    Former paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) in section 1978.107 are now 
combined in section 1978.108(a)(1). The changes made to these 
paragraphs are not intended to be substantive, i.e., there is no intent 
to change the rights to party status currently afforded the Assistant 
Secretary, complainants, or respondents. The Assistant Secretary, 
represented by an attorney from the appropriate Regional Solicitor's 
Office, will still generally assume the role of prosecuting party in 
STAA whistleblower cases in which the respondent objects to the 
findings or preliminary order. This continues longstanding practice in 
STAA cases and the Secretary believes that the public interest 
generally requires the Assistant Secretary's continued participation in 
such matters. It has been the Secretary's experience that relatively 
few private attorneys have developed adequate expertise in representing 
STAA whistleblower complainants and that complainants in the motor 
carrier industry have been more likely to proceed pro se than employees 
covered by OSHA's other whistleblower programs. Where the complainant, 
but not the respondent, objects to the findings or order, the 
regulations retain the Assistant Secretary's discretion to participate 
as a party or amicus curiae at any stage of the proceedings, including 
the right to petition for review of an ALJ decision.
    A new paragraph (a)(2) clarifies that if the Assistant Secretary 
assumes the role of prosecuting party in accordance with paragraph 
(a)(1), he or she may, upon written notice to the other parties, 
withdraw as the prosecuting party in the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion. If the Assistant Secretary withdraws, the complainant will 
become the prosecuting party and the ALJ will issue appropriate orders 
to regulate the course of future proceedings. Section 1978.111(d)(3) 
(discussed below) retains language clarifying that the Assistant 
Secretary may decline the role of

[[Page 53550]]

prosecuting party if the complainant rejects a reasonable settlement 
offer.
    New paragraphs (a)(3) and (b) are being added to this section. 
Paragraph (a)(3) simply provides that in all cases in which the 
Assistant Secretary is participating in the proceeding, copies of 
documents must be sent to the Assistant Secretary and the Associate 
Solicitor for Occupational Safety and Health, as well as to all other 
parties. In cases in which the Assistant Secretary is not a party, 
copies of documents must be sent to the Assistant Secretary and all 
parties, but not to the Associate Solicitor.
    Paragraph (b) states that the FMCSA may participate in the 
proceedings as amicus curiae at its own discretion. This paragraph also 
permits the FMCSA to request copies of all documents, regardless of 
whether it is participating in the case. This provision mirrors similar 
language in the regulations implementing other OSHA-administered 
whistleblower laws.
    The provisions formerly at section 1978.108, which described the 
manner in which STAA whistleblower cases would be captioned or titled, 
are being deleted. It is unnecessary to continue to include that 
material in these regulations.

Section 1978.109 Decision and Orders of the Administrative Law Judge

    This section sets forth the content of the decision and order of 
the ALJ, and includes the standards for finding a violation under 
STAA's whistleblower provision. The title of this section is being 
revised to conform to the title assigned to similar provisions in other 
OSHA whistleblower regulations. Previously, section 1978.109 addressed 
decisions of both the ALJs and the ARB. In conformance with other OSHA 
whistleblower regulations, these two topics are now being separated 
into individual sections. Section 1978.109 now covers only ALJ 
decisions and section 1978.110 addresses ARB decisions.
    Former paragraph (a) is being divided among multiple paragraphs in 
this section and otherwise revised to reflect the parties' new burdens 
of proof and to conform more closely to the regulations implementing 
other OSHA-administered whistleblower laws. In litigation, the 
statutory burdens of proof require a complainant to prove that the 
alleged protected activity or, when covered by STAA, the perception of 
protected activity, was a ``contributing factor'' in the alleged 
adverse action. If the complainant satisfies his or her burden, the 
employer, to escape liability, must prove by ``clear and convincing 
evidence'' that it would have taken the same action in the absence of 
the protected activity or the perception thereof.
    A contributing factor is ``any factor which, alone or in connection 
with other factors, tends to affect in any way the outcome of the 
decision.'' Marano v. Dep't of Justice, 2 F.3d 1137, 1140 (Fed. Cir. 
1993) (Whistleblower Protection Act, 5 U.S.C. 1221(e)(1)). In proving 
that protected activity was a contributing factor in the adverse 
action, ``a complainant need not necessarily prove that the 
respondent's articulated reason was a pretext in order to prevail,'' 
because a complainant alternatively can prevail by showing that the 
respondent's ``reason, while true, is only one of the reasons for its 
conduct,'' and that another reason was a prohibited one. See 
Klopfenstein v. PCC Flow Techs. Holdings, Inc., ARB No. 04-149, ALJ No. 
04-SOX-11, 2006 WL 3246904, at *13 (Admin. Review Bd. May 31, 2006) 
(discussing contributing factor test under SOX) (citing Rachid v. Jack 
in the Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2004)).
    The AIR21 burdens of proof, now incorporated in STAA, do not 
address the evidentiary standard that applies to a complainant's proof 
that protected activity was a contributing factor in an adverse action. 
AIR 21 simply provides that the Secretary may find a violation only 
``if the complainant demonstrates'' that protected activity was a 
contributing factor in the alleged adverse action. 49 U.S.C. 
42121(b)(2)(B)(iii). It is the Secretary's position that the 
complainant must prove by a ``preponderance of the evidence'' that his 
or her protected activity or, when covered by STAA, the perception of 
protected activity, contributed to the adverse action at issue; 
otherwise, the burden never shifts to the employer to establish its 
defense by clear and convincing evidence. See, e.g., Allen v. Admin. 
Review Bd., 514 F.3d 468, 475 n.1 (5th Cir. 2008) (``The term 
`demonstrates' means to prove by a preponderance of the evidence.''). 
Once the complainant establishes that protected activity was a 
contributing factor in an adverse action, the employer can escape 
liability only by proving by clear and convincing evidence that it 
would have reached the same decision even in the absence of the 
protected activity. The clear and convincing evidence standard is a 
higher burden of proof than a preponderance of the evidence standard.
    The requirement that the ALJ issue a decision within 30 days after 
the close of the record, and the related provision requiring the ALJ to 
close the record within 30 days after the filing of the objection, have 
been eliminated because procedures for issuing decisions, including 
their timeliness, are addressed by the Rules of Practice and Procedure 
for Administrative Hearings Before the Office of Administrative Law 
Judges at 29 CFR 18.57.
    New section 1978.109(c), which is similar to provisions in other 
OSHA whistleblower regulations, provides that the Assistant Secretary's 
determinations about when to proceed with an investigation and when to 
dismiss a complaint without completing an investigation are 
discretionary decisions not subject to review by the ALJ. The ALJ hears 
cases de novo and, therefore, as a general matter, may not remand cases 
to the Assistant Secretary to conduct an investigation or make further 
factual findings. If there otherwise is jurisdiction, the ALJ will hear 
the case on the merits or dispose of the matter without a hearing if 
warranted by the facts and circumstances.
    1978.109(d)(1) now describes the relief the ALJ can award upon 
finding a violation and reflects the recent statutory amendments. (See 
earlier discussion of section 1978.105(a).) In addition, new paragraph 
(d)(2) in this section requires the ALJ to issue an order denying the 
complaint if he or she determines that the respondent has not violated 
STAA.
    Previously under these regulations, ALJs' decisions and orders were 
subject to automatic review by the ARB. These procedures were unique to 
STAA whistleblower cases and resulted in a heavy STAA caseload for the 
ARB. This has made it more difficult for the ARB to promptly resolve 
the cases on its docket and has delayed the resolution of STAA cases in 
which the parties are mutually satisfied with the ALJ's decision and 
order. Overall, requiring mandatory ARB review of every STAA 
whistleblower case is an inefficient use of limited resources. In 
conformance with the procedures used under the other whistleblower 
provisions administered by OSHA and adjudicated by ALJs, these 
regulations are being revised to provide for ARB review of an ALJ's 
decision only if one or more of the parties to the case files a 
petition requesting such review. These new procedures for review of ALJ 
decisions will apply to all ALJ decisions issued on or after the 
effective date of these regulations.
    Former section 1978.109(b) is being deleted, although much of its 
content is being moved to paragraph (e). New section 1978.109(e), which 
borrows

[[Page 53551]]

language from similar provisions in other OSHA whistleblower 
regulations, gives parties ten business days after the date of the 
ALJ's decision to file a petition for review with the ARB. If no 
petition for review is filed within that timeframe, the ALJ's decision 
is final and all portions of the order become effective. New paragraph 
(e), in addition to giving parties ten business days to seek review 
before the ARB, clarifies that any orders relating to reinstatement 
will be effective immediately upon receipt of the decision by the 
respondent.
    All of the provisions in former section 1978.109, which codified 
the automatic review process, primarily former paragraphs (c)(1) and 
(c)(2), are being deleted. The content of former paragraph (c)(3), 
regarding the standard for ARB review of ALJ decisions, is being moved 
to new section 1978.110(b). The content of former paragraph (c)(4), 
which required the ARB to issue an order denying the complaint if it 
determined that the respondent had not violated the law, is now at 
section 1978.110(e). Former paragraph (c)(5), which required service of 
the ARB decision on all parties, has become a part of new section 
1978.110(c).

Section 1978.110 Decision and Orders of the Administrative Review Board

    This is a new section, borrowed largely from existing regulations 
implementing other OSHA whistleblower laws. In accordance with the 
decision to discontinue automatic ARB review of ALJ decisions, 
paragraph (a) of this section gives the parties ten business days from 
the date of the ALJ's decision to file a petition for review with the 
ARB. The decision of the ALJ becomes the final decision of the 
Secretary, and is not subject to judicial review, if no timely petition 
for review is filed. Paragraph (a) also clarifies that the date of the 
postmark, fax, e-mail communication, or hand-delivery will be deemed 
the date of filing; if the petition is filed in person, by hand-
delivery or other means, the petition is considered filed upon receipt.
    Consistent with the procedures for ARB appeals under other OSHA-
administered whistleblower laws, paragraph (b) provides that the ARB 
has discretion to accept or reject review in STAA whistleblower cases. 
Congress intended these whistleblower actions to be expedited, as 
reflected by the recent amendment to STAA providing for a hearing de 
novo in district court if the Secretary has not issued a final decision 
within 210 days of the filing of the complaint. Making review of STAA 
whistleblower cases discretionary may assist in furthering that goal. 
The parties should identify in their petitions for review the 
conclusions and orders to which they object, or the objections will 
ordinarily be deemed waived. The ARB has 30 days to decide whether to 
grant a petition for review. If the ARB does not grant the petition, 
the decision of the ALJ becomes the final decision of the Secretary. 
This section further provides that when the ARB accepts a petition for 
review, it will review the ALJ's factual determinations under the 
substantial evidence standard, a standard previously set forth in 
section 1978.109(c)(3). If a timely petition for review is filed with 
the ARB, relief ordered by the ALJ is inoperative while the matter is 
pending before the ARB, except that orders of reinstatement will be 
effective pending review. Paragraph (b) does provide that in 
exceptional circumstances the ARB may grant a motion to stay an ALJ's 
order of reinstatement. The Secretary believes that a stay of a 
reinstatement order is only appropriate when the respondent can 
establish the necessary criteria for equitable injunctive relief, i.e., 
irreparable injury, likelihood of success on the merits, and a 
balancing of possible harms to the parties and the public favoring a 
stay.
    Paragraph (c) of section 1978.110 incorporates the statutory 
requirement that the Secretary's final decision be issued within 120 
days of the conclusion of the hearing. The hearing is deemed concluded 
ten business days after the date of the ALJ's decision unless a motion 
for reconsideration has been filed with the ALJ, in which case the 
hearing is concluded on the date the motion for reconsideration is 
denied or ten business days after a new ALJ decision is issued. 
(Previously, section 1978.109(a) provided that the issuance of the 
ALJ's decision would be deemed the conclusion of the hearing. The new 
provision is more consistent with procedures used under other OSHA-
administered whistleblower provisions and the new procedures for 
seeking ARB review of ALJ decisions in STAA whistleblower cases.) This 
paragraph further provides for the ARB's decision in all cases to be 
served on all parties, the Chief Administrative Law Judge, the 
Assistant Secretary, and the Associate Solicitor for Occupational 
Safety and Health.
    Paragraph (d) describes the remedies the ARB can award if it 
concludes that the respondent has violated STAA's whistleblower 
provision. In addition, under paragraph (e), if the ARB determines that 
the respondent has not violated STAA, it will issue an order denying 
the complaint. Paragraph (f) clarifies that the new procedures for 
seeking review before the ARB apply to all cases in which ALJ decisions 
are issued on or after the effective date of these regulations.

Subpart C--Miscellaneous Provisions

Section 1978.111 Withdrawal of STAA Complaints, Objections, and 
Petitions for Review; Settlement

    This section provides procedures and time periods for the 
withdrawal of complaints, the withdrawal of findings and/or preliminary 
orders by the Assistant Secretary, the withdrawal of objections to 
findings and/or preliminary orders, and the withdrawal of petitions for 
review of ALJ decisions. It also provides for the approval of 
settlements at the investigative and adjudicative stages of the case.
    A new sentence is being added to paragraph (a) to clarify that 
complaints that are withdrawn pursuant to settlement agreements prior 
to the filing of objections must be approved in accordance with the 
settlement approval procedures in paragraph (d). In addition, paragraph 
(a) now clarifies that the complainant may not withdraw his or her 
complaint after the filing of objections to the Assistant Secretary's 
findings and/or preliminary order. Significant revisions are being made 
to paragraph (c), which addresses situations in which parties seek to 
withdraw either objections to the Assistant Secretary's findings and/or 
preliminary order or petitions for review of ALJ decisions. Paragraph 
(c) provides that a party may withdraw its objections to the Assistant 
Secretary's findings and/or preliminary order at any time before the 
findings and preliminary order become final by filing a written 
withdrawal with the ALJ. Similarly, if a case is on review with the 
ARB, a party may withdraw its petition for review of an ALJ's decision 
at any time before that decision becomes final by filing a written 
withdrawal with the ARB. The ALJ or the ARB, depending on where the 
case is pending, will determine whether to approve the withdrawal of 
the objections or the petition for review. Paragraph (c) clarifies that 
if the ALJ approves a request to withdraw objections to the Assistant 
Secretary's findings and/or preliminary order, and there are no other 
pending objections, the Assistant Secretary's findings and preliminary 
order will become the final order of the Secretary. Likewise, if the 
ARB approves a request to withdraw a petition for review of an ALJ 
decision, and there are no other pending petitions for review of that 
decision, the ALJ's

[[Page 53552]]

decision will become the final order of the Secretary. Finally, 
paragraph (c) provides that if objections or a petition for review are 
withdrawn because of settlement, the settlement must be submitted for 
approval in accordance with paragraph (d).
    Paragraph (d)(1) states that a case may be settled at the 
investigative stage if the Assistant Secretary, the complainant, and 
the respondent agree. The Assistant Secretary's approval of a 
settlement reached by the respondent and the complainant demonstrates 
his or her consent and achieves the consent of all three parties. 
Minor, nonsubstantive changes are being made to paragraphs (d)(2) and 
(d)(3). Paragraph (d)(3), which addresses the Assistant Secretary's 
authority to withdraw as the prosecuting party if the complainant 
refuses to accept a fair and equitable settlement, is being retained in 
these revised regulations. See supra (discussion of section 1978.108).
    A new paragraph (e) is being added to this section. Borrowing 
language from similar provisions in other OSHA whistleblower 
regulations, this paragraph simply clarifies that settlements approved 
by the Assistant Secretary, the ALJ, or the ARB will constitute the 
final order of the Secretary and may be enforced pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 
31105(e) and section 1978.113 (judicial enforcement).

Section 1978.112 Judicial Review

    This section, formerly section 1978.110, describes the statutory 
provisions for judicial review of decisions of the Secretary and, in 
cases where judicial review is sought, requires the ARB to submit the 
record of proceedings to the appropriate court pursuant to the Federal 
Rules of Appellate Procedure and the local rules of such court. 
Nonsubstantive revisions are being made to paragraphs (a), (b), and 
(c).
    Former section 1978.112, which addressed deference to other forums, 
including grievance arbitration proceedings under collective bargaining 
agreements, has been deleted to conform to other OSHA whistleblower 
regulations, which do not contain similar provisions.

Section 1978.113 Judicial Enforcement

    Nonsubstantive revisions are being made to this section, which 
describes the Secretary's power under STAA's whistleblower provision to 
obtain judicial enforcement of orders, including orders approving 
settlement agreements.

Section 1978.114 District Court Jurisdiction of Retaliation Complaints 
Under STAA

    This new section incorporates into the regulations the recent 
amendment to STAA allowing a complainant in a whistleblower case to 
bring an action in district court for de novo review if there has been 
no final decision of the Secretary within 210 days of the filing of the 
complaint and the delay was not due to the complainant's bad faith. 
Section 1978.114 has been drafted to reflect the Secretary's position 
that it would not be reasonable to construe the statute to permit a 
complainant to initiate an action in Federal court after the Secretary 
issues a final decision, even if the date of the final decision is more 
than 210 days after the filing of the administrative complaint. In the 
Secretary's view, the purpose of the ``kick out'' provision is to aid 
the complainant in receiving a prompt decision. That goal is not 
implicated in a situation where the complainant already has received a 
final decision from the Secretary. In addition, permitting the 
complainant to file a new case in district court in such circumstances 
could conflict with the parties' rights to seek judicial review of the 
Secretary's final decision in the court of appeals. The regulations 
have been drafted in accordance with this position.
    Paragraph (b) provides that complainants must give notice fifteen 
days in advance of their intent to file a complaint in district court. 
This is borrowed from some of OSHA's other regulations implementing 
similar ``kick out'' provisions. In addition, under paragraph (b), the 
complainant must file and serve the district court complaint on all 
parties to the proceeding as well as OSHA's Regional Administrator, the 
Assistant Secretary, and the Associate Solicitor for Occupational 
Safety and Health.

Section 1978.115 Special Circumstances; Waiver of Rules

    This section provides that in circumstances not contemplated by 
these rules or for good cause the ALJ or the ARB may, upon application 
and three days notice to the parties, waive any rule or issue such 
orders as justice or the administration of STAA's whistleblower 
provision requires.
    OSHA has deleted former section 1978.114, which provided that the 
time requirements imposed on the Secretary by these regulations are 
directory in nature and that a failure to meet those requirements did 
not invalidate any action by the Assistant Secretary or Secretary under 
STAA. These principles are well-established in the case law, see, e.g., 
Roadway Express v. Dole, 929 F.2d 1060, 1066 (5th Cir. 1991), and this 
provision, which was unique to OSHA's STAA regulations, is unnecessary. 
The Secretary views the deletion of this provision as a nonsubstantive 
amendment. No significant change in STAA practices or procedures is 
intended.

IV. Paperwork Reduction Act

    This rule does not contain a reporting provision that is subject to 
review by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) under the 
provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104-13).

V. Administrative Procedure Act

    The notice and comment rulemaking procedures of Section 553 of the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) do not apply ``to interpretative 
rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, 
procedure, or practice.'' 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(A). This is a rule of agency 
procedure and practice