Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Power-Operated Window, Partition, and Roof Panel Systems, 45143-45158 [E9-21042]

Agencies

• National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
• DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 168 (Tuesday, September 1, 2009)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 45143-45158]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-21042]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

49 CFR Part 571

[Docket No. NHTSA-2009-0154]
RIN 2127-AK52


Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Power-Operated Window, 
Partition, and Roof Panel Systems

AGENCY: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), 
Department of Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

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SUMMARY: The Cameron Gulbransen Kids Transportation Safety Act of 2007 
(the ``K.T. Safety Act of 2007'') directs NHTSA to consider amending 
the Federal motor vehicle safety standard aimed at minimizing the 
likelihood of death or injury from the accidental operation of power 
window systems. The amendment would require power windows and panels on 
motor vehicles to automatically reverse direction when such power 
windows and panels detect an obstruction to prevent children and others 
from being trapped, injured, or killed. In the event that NHTSA chooses 
not to require power windows and panels on motor vehicles to 
automatically reverse direction when such power windows and panels 
detect an obstruction, the Act requires that the agency submit a report 
to Congress describing why such standards were not prescribed and 
publish a list of vehicles that are or are not equipped with power 
windows and panels that automatically reverse direction when an 
obstruction is detected.
    In this document, NHTSA summarizes its most recent rulemakings 
related to power window hazards and the types of injuries and 
fatalities they were aimed at mitigating; discusses its current 
assessment of the number and causes of the remaining deaths and 
injuries related to power windows; and analyzes the means of mitigating 
those remaining injuries and fatalities. While the agency analyzed and 
considered the benefits of installing automatic reversal systems in all 
types of vehicle windows, including front and rear main windows, 
sunroofs, and small ``vent'' windows, NHTSA is proposing to require 
automatic reversal systems on ``express-up'' or ``one-touch closing'' 
windows, i.e., those windows that close without continuous actuation of 
the window switch by the window operator. We believe that this is an 
efficient, targeted rule that would close this gap in our power window 
safety requirements. We are also seeking comments on a broader 
requirement for automatic reversal systems, and could include such a 
requirement in a final rule. Additionally, we will be providing 
consumers with information regarding which vehicles are equipped with 
automatic reversal systems at https://www.safercar.gov by October 2009.

DATES: You should submit your comments early enough to ensure that 
Docket Management receives them not later than November 2, 2009.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments to the docket number identified in 
the heading of this document by any of the following methods:
     Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to https://www.regulations.gov. Follow the online instructions for submitting 
comments.

[[Page 45144]]

     Mail: Docket Management Facility: U.S. Department of 
Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., West Building Ground 
Floor, Room W12-140, Washington, DC 20590-0001.
     Hand Delivery or Courier: 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., 
West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. ET, 
Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
     Fax: 202-493-2251.
    Instructions: For detailed instructions on submitting comments and 
additional information on the rulemaking process, see the Public 
Participation heading of the Supplementary Information section of this 
document. Note that all comments received will be posted without change 
to https://www.regulations.gov, including any personal information 
provided. Please see the Privacy Act heading below.
    Privacy Act: Anyone is able to search the electronic form of all 
comments received into any of our dockets by the name of the individual 
submitting the comment (or signing the comment, if submitted on behalf 
of an association, business, labor union, etc.). You may review DOT's 
complete Privacy Act Statement in the Federal Register published on 
April 11, 2000 (65 FR 19477-78) or you may visit https://DocketInfo.dot.gov.
    Docket: For access to the docket to read background documents or 
comments received, go to https://www.regulations.gov or the street 
address listed above. Follow the online instructions for accessing the 
dockets.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For technical issues, you may contact 
Mr. Michael Pyne, Office of Rulemaking (E-mail: mike.pyne@dot.gov) 
(Telephone: 202-366-2720) (Fax: 202-493-2739). For legal issues, you 
may contact Mr. Ari Scott, Office of Chief Counsel (E-mail: 
ari.scott@dot.gov) (Telephone: 202-366-2992) (Fax: 202-366-3820). You 
may send mail to these officials at National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Table of Contents

I. Executive Summary
II. Cameron Gulbransen Kids Transportation Safety Act of 2007
III. Background
    a. Power Window Related Injuries and Past Efforts To Combat Them
    b. Information on Automatic Reversal Systems (ARS)
IV. Safety Issues Addressed in This Rulemaking
    a. Fatalities and Severe Injuries
    b. Less Severe Injuries
V. Current Regulatory Requirements for ARS
    a. Key Requirements of S4
    b. ARS Requirements of S5
    c. Safer Switches Requirements
    d. Requirements of ECE R21
VI. Current Implementation of ARS and Compliance With FMVSS No. 118 
in the United States
    a. Differences in FMVSS and ECE Performance Specifications
    b. Implementation of ARS in the U.S. and Other Countries
VII. Expanding ARS To Various Subsets of Windows
    a. Windows Equipped With ``Express-Up''
    b. Main Windows Not Equipped With Express-Up
    c. Sunroofs and Power Vent Windows
    d. Lockout Switch Considerations
VIII. Proposal To Mandate That Main Windows With Express-Up Be 
Equipped With ARS
    a. Costs and Benefits
    b. Listing of Power Windows Without ARS
IX. Public Participation
X. Regulatory Analyses
XI. Proposed Regulatory Text

I. Executive Summary

    Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 118, Power-
operated window, partition, and roof panel systems \1\ specifies 
requirements for power operated window, partition, and roof panel 
systems to minimize the likelihood of death or injury from the 
accidental operation. The National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration (NHTSA) has reevaluated the safety concerns inherent in 
the operation of power windows and is proposing an amendment to ensure 
that the requirements of the standard address a safety problem that is 
not addressed by the current requirements. This rulemaking is being 
undertaken in response to the Cameron Gulbransen Kids Transportation 
Safety Act of 2007 (the ``K.T. Safety Act of 2007''),\2\ in which 
Congress required NHTSA to consider requiring automatic reversal 
systems (ARS) on all power windows for light passenger vehicles.
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    \1\ 49 CFR 571.118.
    \2\ Pub. L. 100-189, February 28, 2008, 122 Stat 639.
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    While the K.T. Safety Act of 2007 required that NHTSA consider 
requiring ARS on all power windows in vehicles, the agency has 
tentatively determined that the scope of the power window safety issue 
can be effectively addressed without mandating ARS on all windows. In 
large part, this is because NHTSA has recently addressed the majority 
of the safety problem associated with power windows by establishing new 
``safer switch'' requirements. Under these new requirements, as of 
October 1, 2008, vehicles with power windows must have switches 
designed to prevent inadvertent actuation. In promulgating that earlier 
rule, we believed that the fatalities associated with power windows 
were largely due to this type of incident.\3\ We continue to believe 
that the ``safer switch'' rule will have the effect of eliminating the 
majority of the most severe power window-related incidents. Thus, in 
evaluating the remaining safety issues that an automatic reversal 
system could address, the data indicate that there are few if any 
fatalities and serious injuries remaining.
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    \3\ We note that these incidents typically occurred when 
children were left in vehicles with the ignition on. In these cases, 
removal of the ignition key would have disabled the power windows, 
as required by a longstanding FMVSS No. 118 criterion.
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    Despite the small relative size of the problem, NHTSA's assessment 
did show one area in which it may be possible to improve safety. This 
is with regard to windows that close with one touch of the switch 
(referred to as ``express-up'' functionality). Because closing these 
windows does not require the continuous engagement of a human operator, 
we believe there is a potential risk of injury to persons in or around 
the vehicle. We are accordingly proposing to require automatic reversal 
systems on those windows that close without continuous actuation of the 
window switch by the window operator. We are also seeking comments on a 
broader requirement for automatic reversal systems, and could include 
such a requirement in a final rule. Additionally, in order to provide 
comprehensive information on the subject and per the direction of the 
K.T. Safety Act of 2007, we will be providing consumers with 
information regarding which vehicles are equipped with ARS. We expect 
to provide this information on https://www.safercar.gov by October 2009.

II. Cameron Gulbransen Kids Transportation Safety Act of 2007

    Subsection (b) of the Cameron Gulbransen Kids Transportation Safety 
Act, directs the Secretary of Transportation to initiate a rulemaking 
to amend Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 118, Power-
operated window, partition, and roof panel systems, to consider 
requiring power windows and panels on motor vehicles to automatically 
reverse direction when they detect an obstruction.
    The relevant provisions in subsection (a) are as follows:

    (a) Power Window Safety.--
    (1) Consideration of Rule.--Not later than 18 months after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Transportation

[[Page 45145]]

(referred to in this Act as the ``Secretary'') shall initiate a 
rulemaking to consider prescribing or amending Federal motor vehicle 
safety standards to require power windows and panels on motor 
vehicles to automatically reverse direction when such power windows 
and panels detect an obstruction to prevent children and others from 
being trapped, injured, or killed.
    (2) Deadline for Decision.--If the Secretary determines such 
safety standards are reasonable, practicable, and appropriate, the 
Secretary shall prescribe, under section 30111 of title 49, United 
States Code, the safety standards described in paragraph (1) not 
later than 30 months after the date of enactment of this Act. If the 
Secretary determines that no additional safety standards are 
reasonable, practicable, and appropriate, the Secretary shall--
    (A) not later than 30 months after the date of enactment of this 
Act, transmit a report to the Committee on Energy and Commerce of 
the House of Representatives and the Committee on Commerce, Science, 
and Transportation of the Senate describing the reasons such 
standards were not prescribed; and
    (B) publish and otherwise make available to the public through 
the Internet and other means (such as the ``Buying a Safer Car'' 
brochure) information regarding which vehicles are or are not 
equipped with power windows and panels that automatically reverse 
direction when an obstruction is detected.
    (c) Phase-In Period--
    (1) Phase-In Period Required--The safety standards prescribed 
pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) shall establish a phase-in 
period for compliance, as determined by the Secretary, and require 
full compliance with the safety standards not later than 48 months 
after the date on which the final rule is issued.

Applicability

    With regard to the scope of vehicles covered by the mandate, the 
Act refers to all motor vehicles less than 10,000 pounds (except 
motorcycles and trailers) in gross vehicular weight. This language 
means that the revised regulation would apply to passenger cars, 
multipurpose passenger vehicles, buses, and trucks with a Gross Vehicle 
Weight Rating (GVWR) less than 10,000 lbs (4,536 kg).

Statutory Deadline

    The Cameron Gulbransen Kids Transportation Safety Act of 2007 
specified a rapid timeline for development and implementation of this 
rulemaking. Specifically, the Secretary is required to publish a final 
rule within 30 months of the passage of the Act (August 28, 2010). 
Moreover, the agency must initiate rulemaking within 18 months of the 
Act (August 28, 2009). However, it should be noted that under Section 4 
of the Act, if the Secretary determines that the deadlines applicable 
under this Act cannot be met, the Secretary shall establish new 
deadlines, and notify the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House 
of Representatives and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation of the Senate of the new deadlines and describe the 
reasons the deadlines specified under the Act could not be met.

III. Background

a. Power Window Related Injuries and Past Efforts To Combat Them

    The matter of preventing injuries and fatalities that occur through 
the operation of power window systems is one that has been considered 
numerous times by NHTSA. These kinds of injuries fall into two 
predominant categories. Most severe, but most infrequent, are cases in 
which occupants, usually young children, are killed through 
strangulation or compression when trapped by a closing power window 
system. Even when no fatality occurs, serious brain or bodily injury 
can result when the neck, body, or a limb is trapped in a closing power 
window for a prolonged period of time. Much more common, although less 
severe, are injuries that occur when a power window closes on a 
person's hand or finger. Unlike the more severe types of incidents 
involving power windows, which usually involve occupants, these types 
of injuries also frequently involve non-occupants, such as those who 
are grasping the window or door frame from the outside of the vehicle, 
such as to open a vehicle door.
    Due to the nature of power window-related injuries and fatalities, 
many of which occur off of public roadways, or otherwise may not be 
reported to authorities as automobile-related incidents specifically, 
it has been difficult to quantify the exact extent of this problem. 
However, based on analysis described below and in the accompanying 
Preliminary Regulatory Evaluation (PRE), included in the docket with 
this notice, we estimate that approximately 6 fatalities and 1,955 
injuries result every year from the operation of vehicle power window 
systems.
    In order to prevent deaths and injuries that can occur from the 
operation of powered vehicle windows, there are several technical 
design features that can be implemented. These include modification of 
the window switch to prevent inadvertent actuation, additional window-
closing safeguards such as lockout switches that prevent children from 
operating the windows, or installation of an automatic reversal system 
(ARS), which would cause the window to stop and reverse direction when 
it senses an obstruction in the window-closing path.
    NHTSA has addressed the problem of power window safety through two 
prior rulemakings dealing with the switch design. Both of these 
rulemakings essentially addressed the same problem, which is what we 
call an ``inadvertent actuation'' of the window switch. Inadvertent 
actuation had been the root cause of the most serious and tragic power 
window safety incidents. In these events, an occupant, typically a 
toddler, would kneel, stand or lean on the door panel or armrest with 
his or her head or body outside an open window. Then the child occupant 
would inadvertently activate a ``toggle'' or ``rocker'' switch located 
in the armrest or door panel with his/her foot or knee, thereby closing 
the window. The result could be death or serious injury to the child.
    NHTSA's response was to create a performance requirement for the 
power window switch, which mandated that the switch not be able to be 
activated by application of a metal sphere with the approximate 
diameter of a child's knee (this procedure is commonly known as the 
``ball test'').\4\ Following passage of SAFETEA-LU,\5\ NHTSA further 
amended the standard to permit only ``pull-to-close'' window switch 
designs, which require that the user physically pull upward or outward 
on the switch in order to close the window.
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    \4\ 69 FR 55517, September 15, 2004.
    \5\ Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity 
Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU), Pub. L. 109-59, Sec.  1109, 
119 Stat. 1114, 1168 (2005).
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    In the K.T. Safety Act of 2007, Congress again addressed the issue 
of power window safety. This time, instead of focusing on the switches, 
Congress required the agency to consider the possibility of requiring 
automatic reversal systems (ARS) on all windows in passenger vehicles. 
Unlike safer switches, ARS can be effective in cases not only of 
inadvertent actuation, but also instances where the operator of a 
window is closing the window, but is unaware that another person's body 
may be obstructing the window. In this document, we are referring to 
this type of incident, generally, as an ``obstructed closing.''
    While incidents involving inadvertent actuation of the window 
switch account for a large proportion of severe injuries and 
fatalities, incidents involving obstructed closings are more common, 
but also generally less severe than inadvertent actuations. Based on 
our analysis of the data, the overwhelming

[[Page 45146]]

majority of these types of incidents involve injuries to fingers, 
hands, and arms that were caught in the path of a closing window as the 
occupant or driver closed a window. These injuries generally translate 
to the AIS 1 level on the Abbreviated Injury System (AIS) scale, the 
lowest classification available. However, there were still some 
instances in which obstructed closings led to more severe injuries, 
especially when a person's body, neck, or head was in the path of a 
window being closed. Other injuries were due to cases such as a piece 
of clothing or jewelry, such as an earring, becoming ensnared on a 
power window.
    Prior to the K.T. Safety Act of 2007, in response to petitions, 
NHTSA had evaluated the possibility of mandating ARS on all vehicle 
windows. However, in response to each petition, NHTSA declined to do 
so, because the requirements to prevent inadvertent actuation had 
addressed nearly all the safety risk from power windows. Most recently, 
in the rulemaking requiring safer switch designs, NHTSA again analyzed 
the possibility of requiring ARS, but concluded that the safer switch 
requirement would prevent a large proportion of the injuries associated 
with power windows.\6\
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    \6\ In the September 15, 2004 Final Rule (69 FR 55517), NHTSA 
denied three petitions, from Michael Garth Moore, David W. Little, 
and a coalition of auto safety advocates including Kids and Cars, 
requesting that the agency require ARS as a standard safety feature 
for power windows.
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    Despite NHTSA's past position, in this document we are taking a new 
look at ARS and attempting to determine whether it would be an 
effective means of enhancing safety at this time. In doing so, we 
conducted more detailed investigations into the number of incidents 
involving power windows, the percentage of those that could have been 
prevented by ARS, and the cost of installing ARS. We have further 
broken down the analysis to examine scenarios where ARS is installed on 
three different window groups, namely, those equipped with an express-
up feature, main (front and rear) power windows not equipped with 
express-up, as well as the possibility of installing ARS on sunroofs 
and power vent windows.

b. Information on Automatic Reversal Systems (ARS)

    Since the early 1990s when ARS was first introduced as a feature on 
a few luxury cars in the U.S., there have been a variety of 
technologies considered as the basis for ARS. These technologies fall 
into two main categories. The first category is contact-based or 
``force-sensing'' systems which require contact between the window and 
an obstruction, i.e., they sense the build-up of resistive force that 
occurs when an object like a person's hand or arm is trapped between 
the frame and glass of a closing window. The second category is non-
contact systems. Among the concepts in the latter category are light 
beam interruption (``electric eye'') systems, infrared and ultrasonic 
scanning systems, and capacitive sensing systems. (There is also a type 
of system that is integrated into window seals (seal-based) that 
requires incidental contact with the window perimeter to close an 
electric circuit. Since it does not rely on a build up of pinch force, 
it is included in the non-contact category.)
    In a 2004 final rule,\7\ NHTSA amended the FMVSS No. 118 automatic 
reversal requirements. These requirements, set forth is paragraph S5 of 
the standard, permit the windows to close in unsupervised situations, 
but require a higher level of reversal performance than many ARS in use 
today that are installed in S4-compliant (supervised closing only) 
vehicles. This amendment was made to accommodate an infrared ARS which 
was then under development by an automotive supplier. The amendment 
added to the standard new test rod specifications intended to 
facilitate testing of systems that sense obstructions by infrared 
reflection. However, to the best of our knowledge, no such system was 
ever put into production for use in U.S. vehicles.
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    \7\ 69 FR 55517, September 15, 2004.
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    It has been our observation that contact-based and force-sensing 
ARSs are the prevailing types of technology that have been broadly 
applied in light vehicles. They are designed to monitor electric 
current to the window drive motor and to reverse the motor by 
recognizing current spikes that exceed pre-determined limits. Force-
sensing systems have also been designed to function by counting 
rotations of the window drive motor. Through a logic circuit, they are 
able to identify the window position relative to fully closed and can 
reverse the motor if there is a sudden change in the rotations per unit 
time prior to the window reaching the fully closed position. Our 
understanding is that this latter technology is favored in contemporary 
automatic reversal systems.
    Over time, the technology has been improved where contact-based 
ARSs appear to have become sophisticated enough to differentiate 
between entrapments and other sources of window resistance and to have 
minimized some of the shortcomings that were characteristic of older 
force-sensing systems. At one time, the available ARS technology was 
somewhat unreliable when the presence of snow or ice, or even window 
seals that had become un-pliable in very cold conditions, resulting in 
high closing resistance and the likelihood of false reversals. 
Additionally, some current generation ARSs have been designed to be 
inactive during the normal closure mode (i.e., when the power window 
switch was continuously held in the window closing position), or they 
have an override feature. Although newer ARS operate more reliably 
under adverse conditions, they still provide this override feature.\8\
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    \8\ An ARS equipment supplier, Nartron, stated that another 
reason is to allow a customer the convenience of wedging something 
between the window glass and the seal or the hypothetical scenario 
where an intruder is trying to gain access into an occupied vehicle 
through an open window.
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    Despite the continual improvement in force-sensing ARS technology, 
no current systems are certified as meeting the requirements of S5.
    We have considered whether it may be possible for manufacturers to 
produce effective ARS systems that are less costly. We note that most 
current ARS are installed on a window-by-window basis, rather than 
using a centralized processor for the directional control of all of the 
windows. Therefore, each ARS-equipped window contains a motor, sensor, 
and processor to control the motor for ARS functionality (although the 
sensor and motor can be integrated into one unit). Because of this 
segmentation, the cost of installing ARS generally scales up with the 
number of windows it is installed on (e.g., the cost of installing ARS 
on four windows is approximately twice the cost of installing it on two 
windows).
    The agency considered whether centralized processors could be used 
to consolidate the costs of ARS applications in multiple windows 
(thereby only requiring the motor and sensor to be installed in the 
individual windows). However, our current information indicates that 
this would not be a way of reducing costs compared to putting an 
independent ARS in each equipped window, for reasons described below.
    There are several problems with installing centralized ARS 
processors that can lead to increased costs or degraded system 
performance. These problems include power/signal degradation through 
the wires connecting the window motors to the centralized processor, 
the need for ARS suppliers to have ``full system understanding,'' and 
the high cost of the

[[Page 45147]]

centralized processor itself, compared to the costs of individual 
processors for each window's ARS. Based on our understanding of various 
systems, these factors have the effect of increasing the costs of a 
centralized system beyond the costs of individualized sensors. However, 
NHTSA welcomes comments relating to centrally-controlled ARS, its 
costs, and its relative benefits or drawbacks.

IV. Safety Issues Addressed in This Rulemaking

    In two previous rulemakings relating to power window switches, we 
had estimated an average of only two fatalities occurred per year due 
to the operation of power windows. Those rulemakings, which mandated 
safer window switches designs in order to prevent inadvertent power 
window actuation, were estimated to have prevented half of all power 
window-related fatalities, on the order of one per year.
    In accordance with the mandate in the K.T. Safety Act of 2007, we 
have closely reexamined the fatalities and injuries associated with the 
functioning of power windows. We used a variety of surveys and case 
studies to obtain a more recent determination of fatalities and serious 
injuries relating to this issue. Additionally, we analyzed data taken 
from a sample of hospital emergency room records to compile a more 
comprehensive picture of the injuries associated with power windows. 
These studies presented a more comprehensive picture of the safety 
problem.
    We note that the initial iteration of the safer switches rule 
(mandating the ball test) only came into effect on September 1, 2008, 
and the second iteration (the ``pull-to-close'' requirement) is not 
fully effective until October 1, 2010. Therefore, given the overall 
population of vehicles and the dates of the data collected, the vast 
majority of injuries and fatalities captured by our studies occurred in 
vehicles that were not subject to these safer switch requirements.\9\ 
Based on the availability of information on more cases, the agency now 
estimates that safer switches are likely to prevent 50 to 75 percent of 
all power window-related fatalities. Therefore, in determining the 
likely benefits of mandating ARS technology, NHTSA is estimating that 
62.5 percent (the mid-point of this range) of the serious injuries and 
fatalities captured in our studies would have been prevented by safer 
switches (had they been installed fleet-wide), and therefore cannot be 
factored in when determining the benefits of mandatory ARS. This is a 
little higher than our earlier estimates for the benefits of the safer 
switches rulemaking.
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    \9\ As shown below and in the accompanying regulatory 
evaluation, most of the vehicles examined were built prior to 2006.
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    In order to develop an up-to-date and more comprehensive tabulation 
of the data on fatalities and severe injuries associated with power 
windows, NHTSA acquired data from a variety of sources. NHTSA obtained 
mortality data from the Center for Health Statistics' National Vital 
Statistics System (NVSS) for 2003 and 2004, using death certificates. 
We also used Special Crash Investigation (SCI) data to further develop 
our understanding of power window related incidents. While the SCI case 
reviews are not a comprehensive sample of all incidents, they provide 
detailed information about how the incidents occurred, and the data 
also can be also used to extrapolate the relative ratio of those 
incidents that would have been prevented by safer switches, and those 
that would have been mitigated if a vehicle had an ARS. Finally we 
searched for severe injuries in the Consumer Product Safety 
Commission's National Electronic Injury Surveillance System All Injury 
Program (NEISS-AIP) statistical sample of emergency department records 
from 2004 through 2007. The results of our searches are summarized in 
the following table:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                              Severe
               Data source                  Fatalities       injuries
------------------------------------------------------------------------
NVSS 2003-2004..........................              12  ..............
SCI Oct. 2006-Mar. 2009.................               2               1
NEISS-AIP 2004-2007.....................  ..............               3
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To better analyze the remaining safety problem associated with 
power windows, NHTSA wanted to focus on the injuries and fatalities 
that ARS could address. As such, for the purposes of this analysis, we 
have made a distinction between two broad types of injuries and 
fatalities. This is because they can occur for different reasons and 
require different preventative measures to mitigate them. The first 
type includes fatalities and severe injuries resulting from asphyxia 
when a power window is closed on the chest or neck of a victim. The 
second type includes the type of injuries that occur when fingers, 
hands, or limbs are trapped in power windows, which can result in 
bruises, broken bones, and more severe injuries.

a. Fatalities and Severe Injuries

    The most serious aspect of the safety concern is the fatalities and 
severe injuries that can result from asphyxiation when a child is 
trapped in a power window. There are several scenarios where this can 
occur. The most common is a situation that NHTSA has attempted to 
address in the past, which are inadvertent actuation scenarios where a 
child inadvertently activates the power window (typically, using his or 
her foot or knee), while leaning out the window. This problem, we 
believe, will largely be alleviated by the safer switches rulemakings, 
which prevent this sort of actuation by requiring that a switch require 
a pulling-out motion to close the window. All vehicles already are 
required to meet the performance specifications of the ball test, and 
will need to meet the pull-to-close specifications beginning October 1, 
2010. Therefore, when calculating the benefits of the installation of 
ARS, we exclude those injuries and fatalities that would have already 
been prevented had the vehicles been equipped with safer switches.
    However, asphyxiation can also occur when a driver closes another 
occupant's window from the driver controls, without knowing that a 
passenger is entrapped in the closing window. Given that this type of 
actuation has nothing to do with the switch design, we would not expect 
the safer switch regulations to have any effect on this type of 
incident. Nor would lockout switches have any effect, as the window is 
being operated by the driver, and not the occupant in the seat. 
Incidents like these may only be prevented by an ARS having appropriate 
override safeguards

[[Page 45148]]

that function in such a way that they do not prevent an ARS from 
engaging when the window is operated by a single, continuous activation 
of the window switch.
    Our search of the mortality data uncovered 12 fatalities over a 
two-year-period that were likely related to power windows, all of which 
were caused by asphyxiation. Close examination of the death certificate 
records, however, provided only three cases where enough information 
was provided to determine what could have prevented the incident. Of 
those three, we believe that all three would have been prevented by 
safer switches.
    SCI investigations to date have produced three reports detailing 
severe injuries and fatalities relating to power windows. Of those, one 
appeared to be an inadvertent closing cause by a child and could have 
been prevented by safer switches. A second case involved an injury 
caused by a driver using her window controls to close a rear window, 
unaware that a child had become entrapped in the process, and may have 
been preventable with an ARS (assuming that the driver was not engaging 
an ARS override feature). In the third case, it is not clear whether 
the driver or the child caused the fatal window closure incident. It is 
our belief that ARS, with appropriate override safeguards, may be the 
only effective current technology that could prevent cases like the one 
in which the driver unknowingly closed the window on an adult rear seat 
occupant or unrestrained child rear seat occupant.
    An SCI case ultimately involving no serious injury has also been 
reported. In that case, an unattended child closed a rear window on 
herself and was strangled, but was discovered and released from the 
window in time to be revived via CPR. In that case, we believe safer 
switches would have prevented the entrapment.
    Finally, the search of the NEISS-AIP sample identified three cases 
of severe injuries (Maximum Abbreviated Injury Scale (MAIS) 5). In two 
of the cases, the child was left unsupervised or unattended inside the 
vehicle, and we believe that these cases would have been preventable 
with safer switches. The third case did not provide enough information 
to make a determination.
    In summary, the agency estimates that there are 6 fatalities and 12 
AIS 5 critical level non-fatal injuries annually due to power windows.

 b. Less Severe Injuries

    In addition to the MAIS 5 (critical injuries) and fatalities, 
NHTSA's examination of the data indicated that there were a substantial 
number of less severe injuries related to the operation of power 
windows. For purposes of this document, we classified as ``finger'' 
injuries those that could be translated to MAIS 1-3 injuries, which 
typically included bruises, broken bones, and severed fingers. Based on 
our data, we estimate that there are approximately 1,943 injuries of 
this type per year. This is broken down to 1,726 MAIS 1, 196 MAIS 2, 
and 21 MAIS 3 injuries. We also realize that this may be a low 
estimate, because our analysis was based primarily on narratives taken 
from emergency rooms. We do not believe that every injury caused by a 
power window entrapment of a limb would have resulted in immediate 
medical treatment, so we are reasonably confident that our analysis 
depicts a floor, rather than a ceiling, in terms of the overall number 
of finger injuries. We have detailed how we arrived at the estimate in 
the companion PRE.

V. Current Regulatory Requirements for ARS

    FMVSS No. 118 currently specifies requirements for power-operated 
window, partition, and roof panel systems \10\ in motor vehicles to 
minimize the risk of injury or death from their inadvertent operation. 
These requirements apply to passenger cars, multipurpose passenger 
vehicles, and trucks with a gross vehicle weight rating of 4,536 
kilograms (10,000 lbs.) or less, and provide a substantial degree of 
protection from injuries that can result from the operation of power 
windows, especially in relation to children. FMVSS No. 118 offers 
manufacturers several means of compliance, depending on design 
preferences. Among the provisions at issue, FMVSS No. 118 provides 
different means of protection to prevent unintentional window injuries, 
the ignition key requirements of paragraph S4 and the ARS requirements 
of S5. Paragraph S4 relies on the presence of the vehicle operator or 
ignition key holder to ensure safety, whereas paragraph S5 is a more 
technology-centric solution that allows greater design flexibility, 
although is costlier to comply with.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \10\ The term ``power window'' is used in the preamble of this 
final rule to refer to power-operated windows, interior partitions, 
and roof panels, all of which are covered by FMVSS No. 118. Power 
roof panels and partitions are similar to power windows in their 
operation. However, any distinctions in applicability among the 
three types of systems will be delineated clearly in both the 
preamble and the amended regulatory text.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Additionally, the agency has recently amended the standard to 
include a requirement (reflected in paragraph S6) that window switches 
be resistant to inadvertent actuation, a major contributor to power 
window related injuries to children. This requirement mandates that all 
power window switches be designed as ``pull-to-close'' switches. This 
type of switch can help to prevent a large percentage of the injuries 
that result when an object (e.g., a child's foot, knee, pet, or other 
object) might otherwise cause the power window to close at a time when 
the occupant does not intend to cause it to do so. This is a switch 
level of protection above the ``ball test'' effective September 1, 
2008.

 a. Key Requirements of S4

    The first level of protection, for windows that can only be 
activated when the ignition key is in (or near) the ignition, is 
enumerated in paragraph S4 of the standard. The provisions of S4 
include the fundamental requirement that power windows must not be 
operable unless the vehicle's ignition switch is in the ``On,'' 
``Start,'' or ``Accessory'' position. In this way, the standard 
provides a simple means (i.e., ignition key removal) by which a 
vehicle's windows can be disabled and thus safeguarded from inadvertent 
closure. Paragraph S4 specifies several exceptions where power windows 
may close without the vehicle's ignition being turned on (e.g., by use 
of a limited-range remote control), but each exception is specified in 
such a way that safety can still be assured by the presence of a 
responsible operator.
    The underlying rationale for the requirements in paragraph S4 is 
that, under its strictures, the windows of a vehicle cannot be operated 
outside of the presence of the vehicle operator. By simple ignition key 
removal from the vehicle, it ensures that children in a vehicle will 
not be able to operate the windows. In situations where the key is 
still in the ignition in the ``On,'' ``Start,'' or ``Accessory'' 
position, the driver or other responsible party is presumed to be in 
the vehicle, and can thus react to potential incidents involving the 
operation of the windows. Paragraph S4 also allows design flexibility, 
such as permitting a limited-range remote control to operate the 
vehicle windows, which allow users additional control over their 
systems, while limiting that control to situations where the vehicle 
operator is present to ensure that there is no danger from unattended, 
operational power windows.

 b. ARS Requirements of S5

    Paragraph S5 of FMVSS No. 118 allows an alternative means of 
compliance through the use of power

[[Page 45149]]

window automatic reversal systems. If such a system is used in a 
vehicle and it meets the specified performance requirements of the 
standard, then the vehicle is not required to meet the window operating 
restrictions of paragraph S4. The ARS requirements set forth in this 
paragraph allow power windows to be operated safely in circumstances 
where no supervision is present. For example, vehicles equipped with 
S5-compliant ARSs can have the windows close in the event that the 
vehicle detects precipitation or the windows are controlled remotely 
without being observed. In these situations, while there is the 
distinct possibility that an unattended child may be positioned in an 
otherwise dangerous manner with regard to the closing window, the ARS 
system assures that no injuries will result.
    The ARS performance requirements of paragraph S5 have the effect of 
requiring that a closing window stop and reverse direction in 0.015 
seconds.\11\ Additionally, the test procedure specifies the use of a 
rod that is not perpendicularly oriented (with respect to the window), 
which requires additional refinement of the ARS by the manufacturer due 
to the fact that an angled test rod, placed in the corner of a window, 
can cause the window to ``scissor'' rather than reverse, thereby 
failing the performance requirements of FMVSS No. 118. Most vehicle 
manufacturers (even those with an ARS), have certified compliance with 
the ignition key requirements of paragraph S4. We note that this does 
not necessarily mean that the windows would not have met the more 
stringent S5 requirements. Because ARS helps to ensure protection even 
when no supervision is present, they give vehicle manufacturers a 
compliance option with maximum design freedom compared to the 
relatively limited operating conditions allowed under section S4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \11\ Assuming a window closing speed of 100 mm/sec, and the test 
rod requirements of S8.1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    One option that is currently under consideration by NHTSA, although 
not in the proposed regulatory text in this document, is replacing the 
performance specification currently in paragraph S5 with the 
specifications listed in United Nations Economic Commission for Europe 
(ECE) R21. NHTSA is considering this as a possibility and notes that 
this might be included in the text of a final rule. As we have stated 
above and implied in previous notices, the primary difference, in terms 
of safety considerations, between the two specifications is the 
potential effect on very small fingers.\12\ NHTSA believes that the S5 
specification will prevent injury, with approximately a 98 percent 
success rate, to even a single child's finger entrapped in a closing 
window. Conversely, because the ECE specification does not require that 
the window reverse in the same timeframe, and tests the reversal 
feature only with a perpendicular-oriented test rod, there may be a 
greater possibility that children's fingers could be injured if an ARS 
were designed to meet only the ECE R21 specifications.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \12\ See, e.g., 58 FR 16782, at 16783, March 31, 1993. In that 
notice, NHTSA rejected the petitioner's 10 N/mm value for the test 
rod stiffness due to the estimated 10 mm of compression that would 
occur before reversal, instead using a test rod with a stiffness of 
65 N/mm, which would permit only 1.5 mm of compression before 
reversing. The agency stated that ``[a] child's finger placed in a 
10 mm opening could be severely injured in such a situation.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    NHTSA is requesting comment on the idea of replacing the ARS 
specification in paragraph S5 with the ECE specifications. By 
specifying a very ambitious S5 ARS requirement in order to prevent 
injuries to fingers, the difficulty and expense of meeting the S5 
requirement may have discouraged the implementation of perhaps only 
slightly less robust systems that could have prevented fatalities and 
serious injuries involving asphyxiation of young children.\13\ We also 
note that, unlike today, at the time of the development of the current 
performance requirements, the alternative requirements now specified in 
ECE R21 were not in widespread use. We request comment on whether there 
have been significant number of injuries to extremities caused by power 
windows equipped with ECE R21-compliant ARS.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \13\ We note that the agency estimated there are approximately 
two fatalities and four serious injuries per year that will not be 
prevented by safer switches. Either ECE R21-compliant or S5-
compliant ARS, however, would prevent these injuries and fatalities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    No vehicle manufacturer to date has certified a vehicle to comply 
with the S5 specification for ARS. Instead, all vehicles currently sold 
in the U.S. with power windows have been certified to comply with the 
key requirements of S4. This, by definition, prohibits the installation 
of original equipment ``smart windows,'' long-range remote controls, or 
other conveniences that are available only to vehicles certified to 
comply with S5. The agency believes there is a possibility, if the 
technical requirements for ARS were made to be more achievable and less 
expensive, that it would encourage manufacturers to install more of 
these advanced power window features. As such, we are requesting 
comment on replacing the specification for ARS currently contained in 
FMVSS No. 118 with the specification and test procedure for ARS in ECE 
R21. We are interested in receiving input from manufacturers and other 
interested parties as to whether such a change would encourage the 
installation of additional power windows with ARS and certification to 
the requirements of (a revised) paragraph S5.
    In requesting this information, NHTSA is also concerned that any 
reduction in the ARS performance specifications could result in 
increased finger injuries. In designing the S5 specification, NHTSA 
made a judgment that there was a risk that the German specification 
(that would ultimately form the basis for that part of ECE R21) might 
not prevent all injuries to children's fingers. Specifically, the 
agency was concerned that because the German specification permitted 
more compression (approximately 10 mm of compression before reversal) 
prior to reversal than the current S5 specification in FMVSS No. 118 
does (1.5 mm of compression before reversing), permitting it in windows 
that can close when unsupervised by an operator could permit injuries 
to fingers and hands that are caught in the windows that do not occur 
with the current regulatory provisions.\14\ However, we believe that 
there are good reasons to revisit those assumptions. First, we are 
aware that many installed ARSs in fact exceed the minimum-specified 
reversal requirements, so the danger to children's fingers and hands 
may be even less than originally considered. Second, ECE R21-compliant 
ARS windows have, since the 1993 final rule, been installed in numerous 
vehicles worldwide. This affords the opportunity for more data to have 
been accumulated than was available at the time the original S5 
specification was written, and we request comment on the number of 
estimated finger injuries, especially to children, that can be 
attributed to windows equipped with an ECE R21-compliant ARS.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \14\ The agency simply stated that, ``[t]he available crush 
space for small openings must be limited; fingers placed in a small 
opening can be injured even if the [window] opening is reduced by 
only a few millimeters.'' 58 FR 17683, March 31, 1993.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

 c. Safer Switches Requirements

    NHTSA amended FMVSS No. 118 in 2004 to safeguard the switches that 
operate power windows in vehicles. In that amendment, NHTSA introduced 
a switch test requirement, referred to as the ``ball test,'' adding a 
new section S6 to the safety standard. According to the new test 
procedure, a 1.5 inch diameter

[[Page 45150]]

rigid ball is applied with a specified force and direction to each 
switch which controls the closing of a power window or sunroof.\15\ 
This test methodology was conceived of as simulating the action of a 
small child's knee on a switch. To pass the test, a switch has to be 
adequately recessed, shrouded, or otherwise configured so as to resist 
actuation by the test ball, and the window must be prevented from 
closing when contacted by the ball, thus preventing window closure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \15\ Overhead switches are exempted, as are switches for S5-
compliant windows, although these switches are not exempted from the 
``pull-to-close'' requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The requirements of the new section S6 took effect on October 1, 
2008, meaning that the power window switches in all vehicles 
manufactured on or after that date subject to FMVSS No. 118 must comply 
with the ball test. Later in 2004, Congress enacted the SAFETEA-LU 
legislation which included a mandate for NHTSA. Acting on this mandate, 
the agency again issued an amendment of FMVSS No. 118 affecting power 
window switches. SAFETEA-LU mandated that NHTSA limit power window 
switches to a pull-to-close type, thereby prohibiting other types of 
switches which may have complied with the ball test, such as recessed 
toggle or rocker switches. Between the two rulemakings, the agency 
believes that it has eliminated all of the injuries and fatalities that 
were caused by inadvertent actuation of power windows.

d. Requirements of ECE R21

    The European safety requirements for power windows are included in 
an Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) regulation. That regulation, 
ECE No. 21, is titled Uniform Provisions Concerning the Approval of 
Vehicles with Regard to Their Interior Fittings. It covers the safety 
and other regulated aspects of numerous parts in the passenger 
compartments of vehicles, including, among others, controls, fittings, 
seat backs, and also power-operated windows.
    The power window requirements are set forth in section 5.8 of ECE 
R21. There are two main sections, section 5.8.2 which deals with normal 
power window operating requirements, and section 5.8.3 which deals with 
automatic-reversing requirements.
    Section 5.8.2 of ECE R21 specifies that windows can operate only 
under certain limited conditions, primarily with the ignition key in 
the ignition. It also allows window operation by a key lock on the 
exterior of the vehicle, by limited range remote controls, and during 
the time interval between removal of the ignition key and opening of a 
front door.
    Section 5.8.3 states that power windows equipped with auto-
reversing capability do not have to meet section 5.8.2 if the auto-
reversing feature meets a certain minimum level of performance. Section 
5.8.3 specifies the necessary performance, including the allowable 
pinch-force level and procedures for measuring it.
    Additionally, ECE R21 includes section 5.8.4 which limits the 
locations allowed for power window switches and also requires a driver-
controlled lock-out switch for any windows for use by rear seat 
occupants. Other power window requirements are enumerated in sections 
5.8.5 through 5.8.7 of ECE R21 to cover overload protection, owner's 
manual instructions, and alternative approval requirements.

VI. Current Implementation of ARS and Compliance With FMVSS No. 118 in 
the United States

    Currently, in certifying compliance with FMVSS No. 118, 
manufacturers have the option to certify that their vehicles comply 
with the requirements of paragraph S4 or S5. Although a variety of 
current vehicles are equipped with automatic reversal capability on one 
or more of their windows, we are not aware of any systems that are 
certified as complying with paragraph S5 of FMVSS No. 118. Instead, all 
current vehicles are certified to paragraph S4, even if they are 
equipped with ARS.

a. Differences in FMVSS and ECE Performance Specifications

    Like FMVSS No. 118, ECE R21 permits design flexibility in terms of 
power windows if ARS is installed. Both ECE R21 and FMVSS No. 118 allow 
power windows to be safeguarded by means other than auto-reversal 
capability--mainly by ignition key removal and related strictures. 
However, the ECE specification for ARS is slightly different from the 
specification contained in paragraph S5 of FMVSS No. 118. This section 
describes the similarities between the two standards, as well as 
crucial differences in stopping speed and testing procedures.
    To begin, ECE R21 Section 5.8.2 is analogous to FMVSS No. 118 
section S4 in that it enumerates the specific conditions under which 
window closure is allowable. Like the FMVSS, the ECE regulation makes 
ignition key insertion in the vehicle's ignition the primary 
restriction on power window operation. Other allowable conditions 
listed in ECE section 5.8.2 correspond closely with those listed in 
section S4 of FMVSS No. 118. For example, both standards specify that 
windows may be closed by remote control with a range of no greater than 
6 meters, or 11 meters for remote controls requiring direct line-of-
sight, and both standards allow the windows to operate after ignition 
key removal up until the time either of the vehicle's front doors is 
opened to allow egress of the driver.
    With respect to ARS requirements, the U.S. and European standards 
are also highly similar. Like FMVSS No. 118, ECE R21 does not mandate 
the use of ARS. Instead, it allows power windows to close under 
conditions other than the listed ones, i.e., without any ignition key 
restrictions, as long as the windows are ARS-equipped and the automatic 
reversal functions according to a certain level of performance. The 
automatic reversal compliance option appears in section 5.8.3 of ECE 
R21 along with the performance characteristics for that reversal 
capability. ECE R21 section 5.8.3 and FMVSS No. 118 section S5 are 
analogous in this respect. Both standards require that ARSs be tested 
by using rigid test rods that are placed within window openings while 
the power windows are closed on them. The rods can be any size within a 
prescribed range to simulate the various body parts of occupants which 
are most likely to be entrapped by power windows. The range is from a 
minimum of 4 mm (0.16 inches), equivalent to a small child's finger, to 
a maximum of 200 mm (about eight inches), equivalent to the greatest 
width of the head of a 95th percentile adult male.
    Both standards set a limit of 100 Newtons of pinch force over the 
entire range of window openings from 4 mm to 200 mm, and they both 
specify three alternative positions to which the window must open after 
reversal. However, there are two key differences between the two 
standards, both of which arise with respect to the procedure for 
measuring ARS pinch force.
    First, while both standards stipulate the use of cylindrical test 
rods ranging from 4 mm to 200 mm in diameter to evaluate ARS 
performance, ECE R21 specifies that the test rods used must have a 
stiffness, i.e., force-deflection ratio, of 10 Newtons per millimeter 
(N/mm) for any size test rod in the range, which equates to a 10 mm 
maximum compression at the maximum allowed 100 Newton force. This 
contrasts with the requirements in FMVSS No. 118, where a rod stiffness 
of 20 N/mm (allowing up to 5 mm compression) is specified for larger 
test rods (between 25 mm and 200 mm diameter) to represent

[[Page 45151]]

larger body parts like arms or heads, and 65 N/mm (allowing a mere 1.5 
mm of compression) for smaller test rods (25 mm diameter or less), the 
latter used to simulate fingers.
    Inclusion of these stiffness specifications is essential because it 
is impossible for a power window that is in motion to instantaneously 
stop and reverse itself. Instead, a window must have some finite time 
interval and distance of travel over which it decelerates to a stop and 
then begins to accelerate in the reverse direction. Minimizing this 
reaction time is a fundamental challenge in the design of an ARS, 
especially given that there are many other important design factors to 
be considered.
    The different test rod specification means that an S5-compliant ARS 
must be designed to stop and reverse a closing window more quickly than 
an ECE R21-compliant ARS. Under S5, a closing window must decelerate 
and stop over a distance of no more than 1.5 mm, corresponding to 0.015 
seconds of reaction time at a typical closing speed of 100 mm/sec, 
after contacting a test rod before reversal is initiated; for 
obstructions larger than 25 mm, as much as 5 mm of window movement, 
corresponding to 0.05 seconds, could occur before reversal. Under ECE 
R21, a window could continue closing by as much as 10 mm after initial 
contact with a test rod, equating to a reaction time of 0.1 seconds 
before reversal is triggered.
    The significance of this difference is that small parts of the body 
like fingers could be less protected under ECE R21 than they are under 
FMVSS No. 118, and even larger body parts would be subject to as much 
as twice the compression under the ECE standard before reversal is 
triggered. This is especially relevant with regard to finger injuries. 
If a small finger is caught between the window and the frame, a window 
traveling an additional 10 mm (between initial contact and the time 
when it stops) before reversing could still do substantial damage to 
the finger, yet a larger body part, such as an arm, is likely to suffer 
far less damage from being momentarily compressed the same 10 mm 
distance.
    However, the actual design of an ARS is such that this difference 
in required reversal sensitivity between the U.S. and European 
standards may not be important in all instances. For one thing, the 
analysis above assumes that an ECE R21-compliant ARS performs exactly 
at the limits of the specification, whereas an actual ARS is likely to 
outperform those limits. Furthermore, either type of system would be 
effective in preventing the most catastrophic events, i.e., 
strangulation or amputation of limbs which, from a safety standpoint, 
are the types of incidents which are of the greatest importance.
    Because there have been no certified S5-compliant ARSs in the 
vehicle fleet, there are no data to compare its effectiveness to that 
of ECE R21-compliant systems. To the best of our knowledge, there has 
never been a significant injury caused by any of the many ARS-equipped 
power windows that have been in service in a variety of U.S. vehicles 
over many model years. This is true even though existing automatic 
reversal systems, while mostly ECE R21-compliant, include systems that 
do not even necessarily meet ECE R21. This fact attests to the relative 
effectiveness of ARS in general, at least with regard to severe 
injuries and fatalities, regardless of the exact specifications in 
terms of force deflection and reversal speed, that it may meet.
    A second key difference between U.S. and European ARS test 
procedures relates to the orientation of test rods when they are placed 
in window openings. Unlike FMVSS No. 118, ECE R21 indicates that rods 
must remain perpendicular to the window during testing. This 
distinction can, under certain circumstances, make ECE R21 easier to 
meet from a design standpoint. However, this is very much dependent on 
particulars of the window design such as the shape of the mating 
surface of the frame where the window glass seats upon closure and the 
contour and density of weather stripping. These factors can vary 
substantially from one vehicle model to another.
    A third, less significant, difference between the U.S. and European 
standards involves the positions that a window must open to after an 
automatic reversal takes place. ECE R21 and FMVSS No. 118 both specify 
three possible opening positions, and two of those are identical in 
both standards. However, for the third optional opening position, ECE 
R21 specifies that the window be ``at least 50 mm more open than the 
position when reversal was initiated.'' The corresponding option in 
FMVSS No. 118 specifies a position of at least ``125 mm more open than 
when reversal was initiated.'' The consequence of this difference is 
that, for an ECE R21-compliant ARS designed to meet this option, a 
window which has reversed automatically upon contact with a person's 
neck would re-open sufficiently to relieve all pinching force on the 
person but not necessarily far enough to allow the person to completely 
extract his head from the window opening. Under the corresponding FMVSS 
No. 118 specification, a person would have plenty of clearance to 
easily extract his or her head from the window opening after window 
reversal.

b. Implementation of ARS in the U.S. and Other Countries

    As stated above, NHTSA is not aware of any vehicles that are 
certified to comply with the requirements of paragraph S5 of FMVSS No. 
118. Instead, discussions with vehicle manufacturers and ARS suppliers 
appear to indicate that most if not all current automatic reversal 
systems installed in power windows in the U.S. (usually, in conjunction 
with an express-up feature) meet the European reversal test procedural 
requirements contained within ECE R21. Further it is noted that we are 
unaware of any manufacturers that utilize any technologies for ARS 
other than physical contact systems, although we are aware of some 
proximity detection systems, such as those based on capacitive or 
infrared technologies that may be used in the future.
    Based on NHTSA's sampling of a MY 2010 fleet with an estimated 13 
million passenger cars and light trucks, ECE-compliant ARS already 
exists in approximately 39 percent of the total population of power 
windows; that is, approximately 19.2 million of the 49.0 million power 
windows in vehicles produced annually (not counting roof panels, or 
power vent windows), are equipped with an ARS. Another 4.9 million 
windows have ARS that are not claimed to be ECE-compliant. In all of 
these cases, the ARS is installed as a supplemental safety system for a 
design that complies with the requirements of paragraph S4 of FMVSS No. 
118. The distribution of ARS windows by seating position are 9.1 
million driver's side front windows, 6.2 million passenger side front 
windows, and 8.8 million rear windows. Almost all of these windows are 
equipped with express-up systems, for which ARS acts as a supplemental 
safety system. NHTSA is aware of severa