Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Roof Crush Resistance; Phase-In Reporting Requirements, 22348-22393 [E9-10431]
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Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 90 / Tuesday, May 12, 2009 / Rules and Regulations
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration
49 CFR Parts 571 and 585
[Docket No. NHTSA–2009–0093]
RIN 2127–AG51
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety
Standards; Roof Crush Resistance;
Phase-In Reporting Requirements
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AGENCY: National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration (NHTSA),
Department of Transportation.
ACTION: Final rule.
SUMMARY: As part of a comprehensive
plan for reducing the risk of rollover
crashes and the risk of death and serious
injury in those crashes, this final rule
upgrades the agency’s safety standard
on roof crush resistance in several ways.
First, for the vehicles currently
subject to the standard, i.e., passenger
cars and multipurpose passenger
vehicles, trucks and buses with a Gross
Vehicle Weight Rating (GVWR) of 2,722
kilograms (6,000 pounds) or less, the
rule doubles the amount of force the
vehicle’s roof structure must withstand
in the specified test, from 1.5 times the
vehicle’s unloaded weight to 3.0 times
the vehicle’s unloaded weight. Second,
the rule extends the applicability of the
standard so that it will also apply to
vehicles with a GVWR greater than
2,722 kilograms (6,000 pounds), but not
greater than 4,536 kilograms (10,000
pounds). The rule establishes a force
requirement of 1.5 times the vehicle’s
unloaded weight for these newly
included vehicles. Third, the rule
requires all of the above vehicles to
meet the specified force requirements in
a two-sided test, instead of a singlesided test, i.e., the same vehicle must
meet the force requirements when tested
first on one side and then on the other
side of the vehicle. Fourth, the rule
establishes a new requirement for
maintenance of headroom, i.e., survival
space, during testing in addition to the
existing limit on the amount of roof
crush. The rule also includes a number
of special provisions, including ones
related to leadtime, to address the needs
of multi-stage manufacturers, alterers,
and small volume manufacturers.
DATES: If you wish to petition for
reconsideration of this rule, your
petition must be received by June 26,
2009.
Effective date: The date on which this
final rule amends the CFR is July 13,
2009. The incorporation by reference of
a publication listed in the rule is
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approved by the Director of the Federal
Register as of July 13, 2009.
Compliance dates:
Passenger cars and multipurpose
passenger vehicles, trucks and buses
with a GVWR of 2,722 kilograms (6,000
pounds) or less. This final rule adopts
a phase-in of the upgraded roof crush
resistance requirements for these
vehicles. The phase-in begins on
September 1, 2012. By September 1,
2015, all of these vehicles must meet the
upgraded requirements, with certain
exceptions. Vehicles produced in more
than one stage and altered vehicles need
not meet the upgraded requirements
until September 1, 2016.
Multipurpose passenger vehicles,
trucks and buses with a GVWR greater
than 2,722 kilograms (6,000 pounds)
and less than or equal to 4,536
kilograms (10,000 pounds). All of these
vehicles must meet the requirements
beginning September 1, 2016, with
certain exceptions. Vehicles produced
in more than one stage and altered
vehicles need not meet the requirements
until September 1, 2017.
ADDRESSES: If you wish to petition for
reconsideration of this rule, you should
refer in your petition to the docket
number of this document and submit
your petition to: Administrator,
National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, 1200 New Jersey
Avenue, SE., West Building,
Washington, DC 20590.
The petition will be placed in the
docket. Anyone is able to search the
electronic form of all documents
received into any of our dockets by the
name of the individual submitting the
document (or signing the document, if
submitted on behalf of an association,
business, labor union, etc.). You may
review DOT’s complete Privacy Act
Statement in the Federal Register
published on April 11, 2000 (Volume
65, Number 70; Pages 19477–78) or you
may visit https://www.dot.gov/
privacy.html.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
For
non-legal issues, you may call
Christopher J. Wiacek, NHTSA Office of
Crashworthiness Standards, telephone
202–366–4801. For legal issues, you
may call J. Edward Glancy, NHTSA
Office of Chief Counsel, telephone 202–
366–2992. You may send mail to these
officials at the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration, 1200 New Jersey
Avenue, SE., West Building,
Washington, DC 20590.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Table of Contents
I. Executive Summary
a. Final Rule
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b. How This Final Rule Differs From the
NPRM and/or SNPRM
II. Overall Rollover Problem and the
Agency’s Comprehensive Response
a. Prevention
b. Occupant Containment
c. Occupant Protection
III. The Role of Roof Intrusion in the Rollover
Problem
IV. The Agency’s Proposed Rule
a. NPRM
b. SNPRM
c. Congressional Mandate
V. Overview of Comments
VI. Agency Decision and Response to
Comments
a. Primary Decisions
1. Basic Nature of the Test Requirements—
Quasi-Static vs. Dynamic Tests
2. Vehicle Application
3. Single-Sided or Two-Sided Tests
4. Upgraded Force Requirement—Specified
Strength to Weight Ratio (SWR)
5. Performance Criteria—Headroom, Platen
Travel, or Both
6. Leadtime and Phase-In
b. Aspects of the Test Procedure
1. Tie-Down Procedure
2. Platen Angle and Size
3. Testing Without Windshields and/or
Other Glazing in Place
4. Deletion of Secondary Plate Positioning
Procedure
5. Removal of Roof Components
6. Tolerances
c. Requirements for Multi-Stage and
Altered Vehicles
d. Other Issues
1. Convertibles and Open Bodied Vehicles
2. Vehicles Without B-Pillars
3. Heavier Vehicles With a High Height to
Width Aspect Ratio
4. Active Roofs
5. Whether an Additional SNPRM Is
Needed
6. Rear Seat Occupants
7. New Car Assessment Program (NCAP)
8. Possible Energy Requirement
9. Advanced Restraints
VII. Costs and Benefits
VIII. Rulemaking Analyses and Notices
Appendix A—Analysis of Comments
Concerning Dynamic Testing
Appendix B—Two-Sided Test Results
Appendix C—Single-Sided Test Results
I. Executive Summary
a. Final Rule
As part of a comprehensive plan for
reducing the serious risk of rollover
crashes and the risk of death and serious
injury in those crashes, this final rule
upgrades Federal Motor Vehicle Safety
Standard (FMVSS) No. 216, Roof Crush
Resistance.
For the vehicles currently subject to
the standard, passenger cars and
multipurpose passenger vehicles, trucks
and buses with a GVWR of 2,722
kilograms (6,000 pounds) or less, the
rule doubles the amount of force the
vehicle’s roof structure must withstand
in the specified test, from 1.5 times the
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vehicle’s unloaded weight to 3.0 times
the vehicle’s unloaded weight. The rule
also extends the applicability of the
standard so that it will also apply to
vehicles with a GVWR greater than
2,722 kilograms (6,000 pounds), but not
greater than 4,536 kilograms (10,000
pounds), establishing a force
requirement of 1.5 times the vehicle’s
unloaded weight for these heavier
vehicles.
Under today’s rule, all of the above
vehicles must meet the specified force
requirements in a two-sided test instead
of a single-sided test, i.e., the same
vehicle must meet the force
requirements when tested first on one
side and then on the other side of the
vehicle. The rule also establishes a new
requirement for maintenance of
headroom, i.e., survival space, during
testing, in addition to the existing limit
on the amount of roof crush. The rule
also includes special provisions to
address the needs of multi-stage
manufacturers, alterers, and small
volume manufacturers.
NHTSA developed its proposal to
upgrade roof crush resistance
requirements after considerable analysis
and research, including considering
comments received in response to a
Request for Comments (RFC) notice
published in 2001. Prior to publishing
the RFC, the agency conducted a
research program to examine potential
methods for improving the roof crush
resistance requirements. The agency
testing program included full vehicle
dynamic rollover testing, inverted
vehicle drop testing, and comparing
inverted vehicle drop testing to a
modified FMVSS No. 216 test. After
considering the results of the testing and
other available information, the agency
concluded that the quasi-static
procedure provides a suitable
representation of the real-world
dynamic loading conditions, and the
most appropriate one on which to focus
our upgrade efforts.
Today’s rule reflects careful
consideration of comments we received
in response to the notice of proposed
rulemaking (NPRM) published in 2005
and a supplemental notice of proposed
rulemaking (SNPRM) published in
January 2008. NHTSA published the
SNPRM to obtain public comment on a
number of issues that might affect the
content of the final rule, including
possible variations in the proposed
requirements. In the SNPRM, the agency
also announced the release of the results
of various vehicle tests conducted since
the NPRM.
While this rulemaking action to
improve roof strength is part of our
comprehensive plan for addressing the
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serious problem of rollover crashes, this
action, by itself, addresses a relatively
small subset of that problem. There are
more than 10,000 fatalities in rollover
crashes each year. To address that
problem, our comprehensive plan
includes actions to (1) reduce the
occurrence of rollovers, (2) mitigate
ejection, and (3) enhance occupant
protection when rollovers occur
(improved roof crush resistance is
included in this third category).
Our analysis shows that of the more
than 10,000 fatalities that occur in
rollover crashes each year, roof strength
is relevant to only about seven percent
(about 667) of those fatalities. We
estimate that today’s rule will prevent
135 of those 667 fatalities.
The portions of our comprehensive
plan that will have the highest lifesaving benefits are the ones to reduce
the occurrence of rollovers (prevention)
and to mitigate ejection (occupant
containment). We estimate that by
preventing rollovers, electronic stability
control (ESC) will reduce the more than
10,000 fatalities that occur in rollover
crashes each year by 4,200 to 5,500
fatalities (and also provide significant
additional life-saving benefits by
preventing other types of crashes). In
the area of mitigating ejection,
significant life-benefits are and/or will
occur by our continuing efforts to
increase seat belt use and our upcoming
rulemaking on ejection mitigation. A
more complete discussion of our
comprehensive plan is discussed later
in this document.
b. How This Final Rule Differs From the
NPRM and/or SNPRM
The more noteworthy changes from
the NPRM are outlined below and
explained in detail later in this
preamble. More minor changes are
discussed in the appropriate sections of
this preamble.
Higher force requirement (strength-toweight ratio (SWR level)). While we
proposed an SWR level of 2.5 in the
NPRM for the vehicles that have been
subject to the standard, we noted in the
SNPRM that the agency could adopt a
higher or lower value for this final rule.
We are adopting an SWR of 3.0 for them
in this final rule. An SWR of 1.5 will
apply to the heavier light vehicles that
have previously not been subject to the
standard.
Two-sided test. While we proposed a
single-sided test in the NPRM, we
conducted additional testing and
addressed the possibility of a two-sided
test in the SNPRM. Today’s rule adopts
a two-sided test requirement for all
vehicles subject to the standard.
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Maintaining intrusion limit in
addition to new headroom requirement.
In the NPRM, we proposed to replace
the current limit on intrusion (platen
travel requirement) with a new
headroom requirement. For this final
rule, we are maintaining the intrusion
limit as well as adopting the proposed
headroom requirement.
Use of headform positioning fixture
instead of a test dummy. In the NPRM,
we proposed to use test dummies as part
of the test procedure for measuring
headroom. For this final rule, we are
using headform positioning fixtures for
this purpose.
Phase-in. We did not include a phasein in the NPRM. For this final rule, we
are phasing in the upgraded roof
strength requirements for the lighter
vehicles previously subject to FMVSS
No. 216, and providing longer leadtime
(without a phase-in) for the heavier light
vehicles.
Limited exclusion for certain multistage trucks. Due to concerns about
practicability, we are excluding from
FMVSS No. 216 a very limited group of
multistage trucks with a GVWR greater
than 2,722 kilograms (6,000 pounds),
ones not built on either a chassis cab or
an incomplete vehicle with a full
exterior van body.
Updated benefits and costs. We have
updated our analysis of benefits and
costs. Our analysis appears in summary
form in this document, and in its
entirety in the agency’s Final Regulatory
Impact Analysis (FRIA).
We estimate that the changes in
FMVSS No. 216 will prevent 135
fatalities and 1,065 nonfatal injuries
annually. The agency estimates that
compliance with the upgraded roof
strength standard will increase lifetime
consumer costs by $69–114 per affected
vehicle. Redesign costs are expected to
increase affected vehicle prices by an
average of about $54. Added weight is
estimated to increase the lifetime cost of
fuel usage by $15 to $62 for an average
affected vehicle. Total consumer costs
are expected to range from $875 million
to $1.4 billion annually.
Implied Preemption. We have
reconsidered the tentative position
presented in the NPRM. We do not
foresee any potential State tort
requirements that might conflict with
today’s final rule. Without any conflict,
there could not be any implied
preemption.
II. Overall Rollover Problem and the
Agency’s Comprehensive Response
Addressing vehicle rollovers is one of
NHTSA’s highest safety priorities.
According to 2007 FARS crash data,
10,196 people were killed as occupants
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in light vehicle rollover crashes, which
represents 35 percent of all occupants
killed that year in crashes. FARS
reported that approximately 57 percent
were partially or completely ejected
from the vehicle (including
approximately 47 percent who were
completely ejected).
Rollover crashes are complex and
chaotic events. Rollovers can range from
a single quarter turn to eight or more
quarter turns, with the duration of the
rollover crash lasting from one to
several seconds. The wide range of
rollover conditions occurs because these
crashes largely occur off road where the
vehicle motion is highly influenced by
roadside conditions. Also, rollover
crashes tend to occur at higher speeds
than other crash types due to the energy
required to initiate the rollover motion.
NHTSA has been pursuing a
comprehensive and systematic approach
towards reducing the fatalities and
serious injuries that result from rollover
crashes. As part of our safety standard
rulemaking, this approach establishes
various repeatable test procedures and
performance requirements that will
generate countermeasures effective in
the chaotic real-world events. Due to the
complex nature of a rollover event and
the particularized effect of each element
of the comprehensive approach taken by
the agency to address these crashes,
each element addresses a specific
segment of the total rollover problem.
Accordingly, each initiative has a
different target population and interacts
with each of the other rollover
strategies. NHTSA has initiatives in
place to:
1. Reduce the occurrence of rollover
crashes (e.g., the requirement for ESC on
all light vehicles and the NCAP rollover
ratings),
2. Keep occupants inside the vehicle
when rollovers occur (e.g., NHTSA’s
unyielding commitment to get
passengers to buckle their seat belts
every time they ride in a vehicle, as well
as the requirement for enhanced door
latches and the forthcoming rulemaking
for ejection mitigation), and
3. Better protect the occupants kept
inside the vehicle during the rollover
(e.g., the requirement for upper interior
head protection and this rulemaking for
enhanced roof crush resistance).
Each of these three initiatives must
work together to address the various
aspects of the rollover problem.
a. Prevention
The most effective way to reduce
deaths and injuries in rollover crashes is
to prevent the rollover crash from
occurring. On April 6, 2007, NHTSA
published a final rule establishing
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FMVSS No. 126, ‘‘Electronic stability
control systems,’’ to require ESC on
passenger cars, multipurpose passenger
vehicles, trucks, and buses with a
GVWR of 4,536 kilograms (10,000
pounds) or less. ESC systems use
automatic computer-controlled braking
of individual wheels to assist the driver
in maintaining control in critical driving
situations in which the vehicle is
beginning to lose directional stability at
the rear wheels or directional control at
the front wheels. ESC systems
effectively monitor driver steering input
and limit vehicle oversteer and
understeer, as appropriate. To comply
with the new ESC standard, vehicles
will need individually adjustable
braking at all four wheels, and computer
electronics to utilize this capability, a
means for engine torque adjustability
and various onboard sensors (to
measure yaw rate, lateral acceleration,
steering wheel angle and speed). The
agency estimates that ESC will save
5,300 to 9,600 lives in all types of
crashes annually once all light vehicles
on the road are equipped with ESC. The
agency further anticipates that ESC
systems will substantially reduce (by
4,200 to 5,500 deaths) the more than
10,000 deaths each year resulting from
rollover crashes.
Doors represent another common
ejection route. As part of the agency’s
comprehensive approach to rollover,
and to harmonize with the first Global
Technical Regulation, NHTSA upgraded
FMVSS No. 206, ‘‘Door locks and door
retention components,’’ in a final rule
published on February 6, 2007. This
final rule added test requirements for
sliding doors, upgraded the door
retention requirements, added
secondary latch requirements for doors
other than hinged side doors and back
doors, and provided a new test
procedure for assessing inertial forces.
To comply with the new requirements,
it is anticipated that passenger vehicles
with sliding doors designed with one
latch and pin locking mechanism will
need to be redesigned with two latches.
The technology needed to meet the
upgraded standard would benefit
vehicles in rollover crashes where door
openings were identified as a problem.
b. Occupant Containment
Studies have shown that the fatality
rate for an ejected vehicle occupant is
three times as great as that for an
occupant who remains inside of the
vehicle. Thus, mitigating ejections offers
potential for significant safety gains.
Safety belts are the most effective
crashworthiness countermeasure in
reducing ejected rollover fatalities.
Studies have found that safety belts
reduce fatalities in rollovers by 74
percent in passenger cars and 80 percent
for light trucks.1 NHTSA requires all
vehicles manufactured after 1968 to
have safety belts as standard equipment.
However, of the 6,164 ejected
occupant fatalities in light vehicle
rollover crashes, as reported by 2006
FARS, 1,135 were classified as partial
ejections. Fatal injuries from partial
ejection can occur even to belted
occupants, e.g., when their head
protrudes outside the window and
strikes the ground in a rollover.
Therefore, as mandated by SAFETEALU, NHTSA is working to establish
performance standards to reduce partial
and complete ejection from outboard
seating position windows.
III. The Role of Roof Intrusion in the
Rollover Problem
Due to the high effectiveness of ESC
in preventing an increasing number of
rollover crashes, and seat belts at
preventing ejection, the remaining target
population relevant to roof crush
occupant protection is a relatively small
subset of the occupants injured in
rollovers. For fatalities, the estimated
total for the target population 2 is about
seven percent (about 667) of all nonconvertible light vehicle rollover
fatalities. Although the target
population and potential for lives saved
are substantially smaller than can be
attained by the first two strategies of our
comprehensive rollover plan, it is
nevertheless a very important aspect of
the plan.
Looking at the target population
relevant to roof crush occupant
protection more specifically, Table 1
below shows a breakdown of the target
population that could potentially
benefit from roof crush improvements.
The target population for all light
vehicles is stratified by injury severity.
The injury mechanism due to roof crush
for belted occupants is that the roof
crushes during the roll event, intrudes
1 Kahane, C. J., Fatality Reduction by Safety Belts
for Front-Seat Occupants of Cars and Light Trucks:
Updated and Expanded Estimates Based on 1986–
99 FARS Data (NHTSA Report No. DOT HS 809
199).
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c. Occupant Protection
Finally, when a rollover crash does
occur and the occupants have been
contained within the vehicle
compartment, it is important for the roof
structure to remain intact and maintain
survival space. That is the safety need
addressed by today’s final rule.
2 The target population estimates were based
upon the results from the 1997–2006 National
Automotive Sampling System-Crashworthiness
Data System (NASS–CDS).
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into the occupant compartment, and
causes head, face, or neck injury. The
table demonstrates how the final target
population is derived from the broad
category of rollovers by eliminating
cases in which roof strength
improvements would not be effective in
reducing serious and fatal injuries. For
example, a stronger roof would not be
expected to provide benefits in cases
where the roof was not involved; where
the occupant was totally ejected from
the vehicle,3 or where the most serious
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injury was not to the head, neck, or face
due to the intruding roof.
The final target populations are
shown in bold at the bottom of the table.
A full discussion of the basis for the
target population is included in the
FRIA.
TABLE 1—TARGET POPULATION POTENTIALLY AFFECTED BY IMPROVED ROOF STRENGTH 4
AIS 1
AIS 2
AIS 3–5
Fatalities
All Light Vehicles
All Vehicles:
Non-Convertible Light Vehicles in Rollovers ............................................
Roof-Involved Rollover .............................................................................
Some Fixed Object Collision on Top ........................................................
Not Totally Ejected ...................................................................................
Using Safety Restraints ............................................................................
Outboard Seats ........................................................................................
Roof Component Intrusion .......................................................................
199,822
164,213
153,520
149,850
116,670
115,018
68,730
37,305
32,959
29,419
26,033
14,327
14,241
10,922
21,673
19,262
17,766
12,355
8,970
8,781
6,842
10,150
8,645
7,559
3,654
2,096
2,096
1,444
Head, Neck, or Face Injury From Intruding Roof Component .................
Injury—Not MAIS 5 ....................................................................................
Injury at MAIS—Not Sole Injury ...............................................................
24,035
0
¥17,818
6,580
¥1,900
¥292
2,993
¥1,252
¥253
957
¥237
¥53
Sole MAIS Injury ................................................................................
6,216
4,388
1,487
667
Light Vehicles With a GVWR of 2,722 Kilograms (6,000 Pounds) or Less
PC & LT < 6,000 lbs:
Non-Convertible Light Vehicles in Rollovers ............................................
Roof-Involved Rollover .............................................................................
Some Fixed Object Collision on Top ........................................................
Not Totally Ejected ...................................................................................
Using Safety Restraints ............................................................................
Outboard Seats ........................................................................................
Roof Component Intrusion .......................................................................
172,846
144,410
136,080
133,241
104,571
103,249
60,061
33,170
29,098
26,270
23,400
12,421
12,373
9,370
18,929
17,360
16,122
11,406
8,379
8,190
6,372
8,719
7,536
6,484
3,142
1,936
1,936
1,304
Head, Neck, or Face Injury From Intruding Roof Component .................
Injury—Not MAIS ......................................................................................
Injury at MAIS—Not Sole Injury .......................................................................
20,687
0
¥16,082
5,868
¥1,771
¥262
2,615
¥1,119
¥212
842
¥157
¥50
Sole MAIS Injury ................................................................................
4,605
3,835
1,283
635
Light Vehicles With a GVWR above 2,722 Kilograms (6,000 Pounds)
LT > 6,000 lbs:
Non-Convertible Light Vehicles in Rollovers ............................................
Roof-Involved Rollover .............................................................................
Some Fixed Object Collision on Top ........................................................
Not Totally Ejected ...................................................................................
Using Safety Restraints ............................................................................
Outboard Seats ........................................................................................
Roof Component Intrusion .......................................................................
26,975
19,803
17,440
16,608
12,099
11,770
8,669
4,135
3,861
3,149
2,634
1,906
1,868
1,552
2,744
1,902
1,644
949
591
591
471
1,431
1,110
1,075
511
160
160
140
Head, Neck, or Face Injury From Intruding Roof Component .................
Injury—Not MAIS ......................................................................................
Injury at MAIS—Not Sole Injury ...............................................................
3,348
0
¥1,736
712
¥128
¥31
378
¥133
¥40
116
¥80
¥3
Sole MAIS Injury ................................................................................
1,611
553
205
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The most significant exclusions
resulted from requirements that
fatalities occurred in rollovers in which
(1) the roof was damaged in a rollover,
(2) the damage was not caused by
collision with a fixed object, (3) the
fatally injured occupants were not
ejected, and (4) those occupants were
belted.
It is important to understand what
Table 1 indicates about the safety
3 Strashny, ‘‘The Role of Vertical Roof Intrusion
in Predicting Occupant Ejection,’’ 2009. Strashny
found that there was no statistically significant
relationship between the level of roof intrusion and
the probability of complete ejection. For this reason
completely ejection occupants were excluded from
the target population. However, partial ejections
that meet the established criteria are included.
4 Note: The relevant target population used for the
estimation of benefits is identified in the row titled
‘‘Sole MAIS Injury.’’ Also, the numbers reflect
rounding errors.
5 Injury—Not MAIS: This means that the most
serious injury was to a portion of the body other
than the head, neck or face.
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potential of addressing roof crush. Even
if there were some way to prevent every
single rollover death resulting from roof
crush, the total lives saved would be
667, not the approximately 10,000
deaths that result from rollover each
year. This is why each initiative in
NHTSA’s comprehensive program to
address the different aspects of the
rollover problem is so important.
The details of today’s rule upgrading
roof crush occupant protection,
including costs and benefits and the
agency’s analysis of the public
comments on our NPRM and SNPRM,
are discussed in the rest of this
document.
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IV. The Agency’s Proposed Rule
a. NPRM
On August 23, 2005, NHTSA
published in the Federal Register (70
FR 49223) a NPRM to upgrade FMVSS
No. 216, Roof Crush Resistance.6
FMVSS No. 216 seeks to reduce deaths
and serious injuries resulting from the
roof being crushed and pushed into the
occupant compartment when the roof
strikes the ground during rollover
crashes.
Current requirements.
FMVSS No. 216 currently applies to
passenger cars, and to multipurpose
passenger vehicles, trucks and buses
with a GVWR of 2,722 kilograms (6,000
pounds) or less.
The standard requires that when a
large steel test plate (sometimes referred
to as a platen) is placed in contact with
the roof of a vehicle and then pressed
downward, simulating contact of the
roof with the ground during a rollover
crash, with steadily increasing force
until a force equivalent to 1.5 times the
unloaded weight of the vehicle is
reached, the distance that the test plate
has moved from the point of contact
must not exceed 127 mm (5 inches). The
criterion of the test plate not being
permitted to move more than a specified
amount is sometimes referred to as the
‘‘platen travel’’ criterion. Under S5 of
the standard, the application of force is
limited to 22,240 Newtons (5,000
pounds) for passenger cars, even if the
unloaded weight of the car times 1.5 is
greater than that amount.
Proposed upgrade.
As discussed in the August 2005
NPRM, we developed our proposal to
upgrade roof crush resistance
requirements after considerable analysis
and research, including considering
comments received in response to a RFC
published in the Federal Register (66
FR 53376) 7 on October 22, 2001. Prior
6 Docket
7 Docket
No. NHTSA–2005–22143.
No. NHTSA–1999–5572.
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to publishing the RFC, the agency
conducted a research program to
examine potential methods for
improving the roof crush resistance
requirements. The agency testing
program included full vehicle dynamic
rollover testing, inverted vehicle drop
testing, and comparing inverted drop
testing to a modified FMVSS No. 216
test. After considering the results of the
testing and other available information,
the agency concluded that the quasistatic procedure provides a suitable
representation of the real-world
dynamic loading conditions, and the
most appropriate one on which to focus
our upgrade efforts.
In our August 2005 NPRM, to better
address fatalities and injuries occurring
in roof-involved rollover crashes, we
proposed to extend the application of
the standard to vehicles with a GVWR
of up to 4,536 kilograms (10,000
pounds), and to strengthen the
requirements of FMVSS No. 216 by
mandating that the vehicle roof
structures withstand a force equivalent
to 2.5 times the unloaded vehicle
weight, and to eliminate the 22,240
Newton (5,000 pound) force limit for
passenger cars.
Further, in recognition of the fact that
the pre-test distance between the
interior surface of the roof and a given
occupant’s head varies from vehicle
model to vehicle model, we proposed to
regulate roof strength by requiring that
the crush not exceed the available
headroom. Under the proposal, this
requirement would replace the current
limit on test plate movement.
The proposed new limit would
prohibit any roof component from
contacting the head of a seated 50th
percentile male dummy when the roof
is subjected to a force equivalent to 2.5
times the unloaded vehicle weight. We
note that this value is sometimes
referred to as the strength-to-weight
ratio (SWR), e.g., a SWR of 1.5, 2.5, and
so forth.
We also proposed to:
• Allow vehicles manufactured in
two or more stages, other than chassiscabs, to be certified to the roof crush
requirements of FMVSS No. 220, School
bus rollover protection, instead of
FMVSS No. 216.
• Clarify the definition and scope of
exclusion for convertibles.
• Revise the vehicle tie-down
procedure to minimize variability in
testing.
To accompany our proposal, we
prepared a Preliminary Regulatory
Impact Analysis (PRIA) describing the
costs and benefits. We estimated that, if
adopted, the proposal would result in
13–44 fewer fatalities and 498–793
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fewer non-fatal injuries each year. The
total estimated recurring fleet cost was
$88 to $95 million. We estimated that
approximately 32 percent of the current
vehicle fleet would need improvements
to meet the proposed upgraded
requirements.
b. SNPRM
On January 30, 2008, NHTSA
published in the Federal Register (73
FR 5484) an SNPRM for our ongoing
roof crush resistance rulemaking.8 In
that document, we asked for public
comment on a number of issues that
might affect the content of the final rule,
including possible variations in the
proposed requirements. We also
announced the release of the results of
various vehicle tests conducted since
the proposal.
In the SNPRM, we noted that we had
been carefully analyzing the numerous
comments we had received on the
NPRM, as well as the various additional
vehicle tests, including both singlesided tests and two-sided tests,
conducted since the NPRM. We invited
comments on how the agency should
factor the new information into its
decision. We noted that while the
NPRM focused on a specified force
equivalent to 2.5 times the unloaded
vehicle weight, the agency could adopt
a higher or lower value for the final rule.
We explained, with respect to two-sided
testing, that we believed there was now
sufficient available information for the
agency to consider a two-sided
requirement as an alternative to the
single-sided procedure described in the
NPRM. We stated that we planned to
evaluate both the single-sided and twosided testing alternatives for the final
rule and requested comments that
would help us reach a decision on that
issue.
We also noted in the SNPRM that the
agency had conducted additional
analysis concerning the role of vertical
roof intrusion and post-crash headroom
in predicting roof contact injuries to the
head, neck or face during FMVSS No.
216 rollovers. At the time of the NPRM,
the agency estimated benefits based on
post-crash headroom, the only basis for
which a statistical relationship with
injury reduction had been established.
After the NPRM, with additional years
of data available, a statistically
significant relationship between
intrusion and injury for belted
occupants was established.
c. Congressional Mandate
Section 10301 of SAFETEA–LU
generally required the Secretary to issue
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a final rule upgrading roof crush
resistance by July 1, 2008, while
providing for a later date under certain
circumstances. That section provides:
Sec. 10301. VEHICLE ROLLOVER
PREVENTION AND CRASH MITIGATION.
(a) In General.—Subchapter II of chapter
301 is amended by adding at the end the
following:
§ 30128. Vehicle rollover prevention and
crash mitigation
(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary shall
initiate rulemaking proceedings, for the
purpose of establishing rules or standards
that will reduce vehicle rollover crashes and
mitigate deaths and injuries associated with
such crashes for motor vehicles with a gross
vehicle weight rating of not more than 10,000
pounds.
*
*
*
*
*
(d) Protection of Occupants.—One of the
rulemaking proceedings initiated under
subsection (a) shall be to establish
performance criteria to upgrade Federal
Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 216
relating to roof strength for driver and
passenger sides. The Secretary may consider
industry and independent dynamic tests that
realistically duplicate the actual forces
transmitted during a rollover crash. The
Secretary shall issue a proposed rule by
December 31, 2005, and a final rule by July
1, 2008.
The statute provides that if the
Secretary determines that the July 1,
2008 deadline for the final rule cannot
be met, the Secretary is to notify
Congress and explain why that deadline
cannot be met, and establish a new date.
The Secretary provided such
notifications to Congress, and
established a date of April 30, 2009.
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V. Overview of Comments
NHTSA received comments from a
wide variety of interested parties,
including vehicle manufacturers and
their trade associations, suppliers of
automobile equipment and a supplier
trade association, consumer advocacy
and other organizations, trial lawyers,
engineering firms and consultants,
members of academia, elected officials
and government organizations, and
private individuals. All of the comments
may be found in the docket for the
NPRM or SNPRM. In this section, we
provide a broad overview of the
significant comments. Where we
identify specific commenters, we cite
representative comments.
General Approach and SWR
Vehicle manufacturers were generally
supportive of the agency’s proposal,
while recommending a number of
specific modifications. They generally
supported a SWR of 2.5, with caveats
about sufficient leadtime and test
procedure issues. They expressed
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concerns about SWRs higher than 2.5,
including potential adverse effects on
safety resulting from increased mass.
Consumer advocacy organizations and
a number of other commenters argued
that it is not enough to upgrade the
current quasi-static requirement, and
that a dynamic test requirement is
needed. While specific
recommendations varied, one was for
the agency to adopt an upgraded quasistatic requirement now, and to proceed
with further rulemaking for a dynamic
test.
Advocates for Highway Safety
(Advocates) stated that the proposed
quasi-static test cannot demonstrate
actual roof crush resistance in rollover
crashes and that a dynamic test would
address occupant kinematics and injury
responses in actual rollover crashes.
Public Citizen stated that a dynamic test
could simultaneously evaluate the
performance of seat belts, doors,
ejection and the roof. A number of
commenters supported specific dynamic
tests.
The Center for Auto Safety (CAS)
stated that while it strongly supports a
dynamic test, it believes rollover
protection can be dramatically
improved with a well-crafted quasistatic test. It argued that test procedure
changes related to roll angle and pitch
angle are needed to ensure that the roof
receives appropriate shear stress.
As to the SWR for an upgraded quasistatic test requirement, consumer
advocacy organizations and a number of
other commenters argued that the SWR
should be significantly higher than 2.5.
Many of these commenters
recommended a SWR of 3.5, with some
recommending higher levels.
The Insurance Institute for Highway
Safety (IIHS) submitted a new study
which it said supports increasing the
SWR beyond 2.5. It stated that based on
the current evidence, it supports a SWR
of 3.0 to 3.5.
Performance Criterion
The agency received a variety of
comments on the proposed headroom
reduction criterion. Some commenters,
including consumer groups, supported a
headroom reduction criterion but
argued that a platen travel criterion is
also needed. Several commenters
expressed concern that, for some
vehicles, the proposed headroom
reduction criterion would be less
stringent and less protective than the
current platen travel criterion. The
agency also received comments
recommending that the agency make
these criteria more stringent to protect
taller occupants, e.g., by using a 95th
percentile adult male dummy instead of
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22353
a 50th percentile adult male dummy to
measure headroom and by reducing the
amount of platen travel that is
permitted.
Vehicle manufacturers urged the
agency to retain the current platen travel
criterion instead of adopting a
headroom reduction criterion. They
argued, among other things, that using
the headroom reduction criterion would
add unnecessary complexity to the test
procedure and result in problems
related to repeatability and
practicability. Some manufacturers
stated that if the agency adopts a
headroom reduction criterion, it should
adopt a test procedure using a head
positioning fixture instead of a test
dummy.
IIHS stated that relating the allowable
amount of roof crush in the quasi-static
test to the headroom in specific vehicles
is a good concept but that, in practice,
the agency’s research tests have not
shown that replacing the 5-inch platen
travel criterion with the headroom
requirement would be a meaningful
change to the standard and may not
justify the added complications to the
test procedure.
Single- or Two-Sided Testing
Several consumer advocacy
organizations and other commenters
strongly supported two-sided testing.
Public Citizen stated that in a vast
majority of rollover cases, the injured
party was typically seated on the far
side, that is, the side of the second
impact. It argued that it is not possible
to upgrade FMVSS No. 216 without a
two-sided test requirement.
IIHS stated that while it supports any
changes that would increase the level of
roof strength of the vehicle fleet, it has
no real-world data to address the
potential benefits of two-sided testing. It
stated that a single-sided test with a
higher SWR may be more effective at
promoting robust roof designs than a
two-sided test with a lower SWR
requirement.
The comments of vehicle
manufacturers were somewhat mixed on
the issue of single- or two-sided testing.
The Alliance of Automobile
Manufacturers (Alliance) stated that it
believes the agency has provided
insufficient justification for two-sided
testing. It stated that the agency has not
provided analysis demonstrating that
two-sided testing relates to real-world
safety. The Alliance also expressed
concern that two-sided testing would
amplify variability and repeatability
problems.
The Association of International
Automobile Manufacturers (AIAM)
stated that based on the information and
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analysis provided by the agency
regarding the two-sided test, it believes
that the test shows enough potential to
merit further consideration by the
agency. AIAM argued that additional
analysis would be needed before it
could provide a preferred regulatory
approach, but indicated that the twosided approach would more directly
address the multiple roof contact
weakening phenomenon.
Leadtime
Vehicle manufacturers argued that a
phase-in is needed for the upgraded roof
crush requirements. The Alliance stated
that if the final rule reflected a
reasonable accommodation of the issues
raised in its comments, it would be
reasonable for a phase-in to begin, with
a compliance percentage of 20 percent,
on the first September 1, that occurred
more than 36 months after issuance of
the final rule. That organization stated
that it would not be practicable to apply
the upgraded requirements to all new
vehicles at once, since far more vehicle
models require redesigns than
anticipated by NHTSA. The Alliance
requested a phase-in that incorporates
carryforward credits. It stated that
additional leadtime would be necessary
if the agency adopted a head contact
criterion instead of platen travel, a twosided test or a SWR higher than 2.5.
Costs and Benefits
Many commenters addressed the
PRIA, which analyzed the costs and
benefits and other impacts of the
proposed rule, and a later discussion of
these impacts included in the SNPRM.
Among other things, commenters
addressed the target population, the
pass/fail rate of the current fleet, cost
and weight impacts, and estimates of
benefits.
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Preemption
We received numerous comments on
our discussion in the NPRM of the
possible preemptive effect of an
upgraded roof crush standard on State
common law tort claims. Vehicle
manufacturers and one organization
strongly supported the view that an
upgraded roof crush standard would
conflict with and therefore impliedly
preempt State rules of tort law imposing
more stringent requirements than the
one ultimately adopted by NHTSA.
Consumer advocacy groups, members of
Congress and State officials, trial
lawyers, consultants, members of
academia, and private individuals
strongly opposed that view. The
opposing comments from State officials
included one signed by 27 State
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Attorneys General and the National
Conference of State Legislatures.
Other Issues
We received comments on many other
issues. Commenters addressed a number
of issues concerning the FMVSS No. 216
test procedure, including the vehicle tiedown procedure, platen angle and size,
and whether the vehicle should be
tested with the windshield and/or other
glazing in place. Commenters also
addressed requirements for multi-stage
vehicles.
June 2008 Congressional Hearing and
Letters
On June 4, 2008. the Subcommittee on
Consumer Affairs, Insurance, and
Automotive Safety of the Senate
Commerce, Science and Transportation
Committee held an oversight hearing on
passenger vehicle roof strength. Former
NHTSA Deputy Administrator James
Ports testified at the hearing. At the
hearing and also in a subsequent letter
to Secretary Peters dated June 19, 2008,
several Senators encouraged the agency
to extend the July 1, 2008 date for
completing a final rule. They
encouraged the agency to ensure a
rulemaking that would maximize
vehicle safety and significantly reduce
deaths and injuries for drivers and
passengers in vehicle rollover crashes.
Several Senators encouraged NHTSA
to consider a two-sided test requirement
and a higher SWR requirement than the
proposed 2.5 level, and to provide
detailed information concerning
alternatives considered by the agency.
They also raised concerns about the use
of 50th percentile adult male test
dummies instead of ones representing
taller occupants. The Senators also
expressed significant concerns about
possible preemption of common law tort
actions, and asked that such a provision
not be included in the final rule.
In a letter to Secretary Peters dated
June 27, 2008, Chairman Henry
Waxman of the House Committee on
Oversight and Government Reform,
raised similar concerns to those of the
Senators.
New IIHS Roof Strength Consumer
Information Program
On February 19, 2009, IIHS met with
NHTSA representatives to provide the
agency information about a new roof
strength consumer information program
that the organization is initiating. IIHS
believes the FMVSS No. 216 test
procedure is a meaningful structural
assessment of real-world rollover
crashworthiness as shown by recent
studies it has conducted showing that
improved roof strength reduces injury
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risk in midsize SUVs and small cars.
That organization indicated that the
boundary for a good rating in the IIHS
program will be a SWR of 4.0 in a onesided platen test similar to the existing
FMVSS No 216 test procedure. IIHS
indicated that it does not plan to rate
the larger, heavier light vehicles, i.e.,
ones likely to have GVWRs greater than
2,722 kilograms (6,000 pounds).
On March 24, 2009, IIHS issued a
press release announcing a number of
details about its new rating system,
including ratings for 12 small SUVs. For
an acceptable rating, the minimum SWR
is 3.25. A marginal rating value is 2.5.
Anything lower than that is rated as
poor. In order to earn IIHS’s ‘‘top safety
pick’’ award for 2010, vehicles will need
to have a good roof strength rating, i.e.,
SWR of 4.0. Of the 12 small SUVs tested
by IIHS, eight were rated by that
organization as good, five as acceptable,
two as marginal, and one as poor.
VI. Agency Decision and Response to
Comments
a. Primary Decisions
1. Basic Nature of the Test
Requirements—Quasi-Static vs.
Dynamic Tests
As noted above and discussed in
detail in the NPRM, we developed our
proposal to upgrade roof crush
resistance requirements after
considerable analysis and research,
including conducting a research
program to examine potential methods
for improving the roof crush resistance
requirements. The agency testing
program included full vehicle dynamic
rollover testing, inverted vehicle drop
testing, and comparing inverted drop
testing to a modified FMVSS No. 216
test. After considering the results of the
testing and other available information,
the agency concluded that the quasistatic procedure provides a suitable
representation of the real-world
dynamic loading conditions, and the
most appropriate one on which to focus
our upgrade efforts.
We did not propose a dynamic test
procedure in either the NPRM or the
SNPRM. We did discuss in the NPRM
a number of types of dynamic tests and
why we were not including them in the
proposal. We stated our belief that the
current quasi-static test procedure is
repeatable and capable of simulating
real-world deformation patterns. We
also stated that we were unaware of any
dynamic test procedure that provides a
sufficiently repeatable test environment.
Consumer advocacy organizations and
a number of other commenters argued
that it is not enough to upgrade the
current quasi-static requirement, and
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that a dynamic test requirement is
needed. While specific
recommendations varied, one was for
the agency to adopt an upgraded quasistatic requirement now, and to proceed
with further rulemaking at this time for
a dynamic test.
Advocates stated that the proposed
quasi-static test cannot demonstrate
actual roof crush resistance in rollover
crashes and that a dynamic test would
address occupant kinematics and injury
responses in actual rollover crashes.
Public Citizen stated that a dynamic test
could simultaneously evaluate the
performance of seat belts, doors,
ejection mitigation and the roof. A
number of commenters made specific
recommendations concerning the type
of dynamic test that the agency should
propose, e.g., with a number
recommending the FMVSS No. 208
dolly test and/or the Jordan Rollover
System (JRS) test.
As part of our considering the merits
of a dynamic test and comments on the
JRS, on February 23, 2007, NHTSA
representatives met with Xprts, LLC
(Xprts) at its test facility in Goleta, CA,
to view and discuss the device. CAS and
Center for Injury Research (CFIR) also
submitted additional test data to the
agency using the JRS.
We note that the agency is also aware
of tests used by manufacturers to assess
a vehicle’s rollover performance during
vehicle development and conditions
they are designed to represent such as
the curb trip, soil trip, the bounce over,
etc.9
As noted earlier in this document,
rollover crashes are complex and
chaotic events. Rollovers can range from
a single quarter turn to eight or more
quarter turns, with the duration of the
rollover crash lasting from one to
several seconds. The wide range of
rollover conditions occurs because these
crashes largely occur off road where the
vehicle motion is highly influenced by
roadside conditions.
The variety and complexity of realworld rollover crashes create significant
challenges in developing dynamic tests
suitable for a Federal motor vehicle
safety standard. Rollover crash tests can
have an undesirable amount of
variability in vehicle and occupant
kinematics.
In assessing whether a potential
dynamic test would be appropriate for
a Federal motor vehicle safety standard,
the agency must consider such issues as
(1) whether the test is representative of
real-world crashes with respect what
9 Viano D., Parenteau C., ‘‘Rollover Crash Sensing
and Safety Overview,’’ SAE International, 2004–01–
0342.
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happens to the vehicle and any
specified test dummies; (2) for the
specific aspect of performance at issue,
whether the test is sufficiently
representative of enough relevant realworld crashes to drive appropriate
countermeasures and, if not, the number
and nature of necessary tests to achieve
that purpose; (3) whether the test is
repeatable and reproducible so that the
standard will be objective; and (4)
whether the test dummies to be
specified are biofidelic for the purposes
used.
We have reviewed the comments
recommending a dynamic test and are
including our analysis of those
comments in an appendix to this
document. NHTSA appreciates the
information and data that have been
provided on this subject. We decline,
however, to pursue a dynamic test as
part of this rulemaking, or to initiate at
this time a separate rulemaking for a
dynamic test.
As noted above, we explained in the
NPRM that we were unaware of any
dynamic test procedure that provides a
sufficiently repeatable test environment.
After reviewing the public comments
and for reasons discussed in the
appendix, we continue to take that
position. While some commenters
argued that certain procedures are
repeatable, the agency was not
persuaded by the arguments and data
they presented. Moreover, for reasons
discussed in the appendix, there are
significant issues associated with each
of the cited dynamic test procedures
related to possible use in a Federal
motor vehicle safety standard.
Also of importance for this
rulemaking, even if NHTSA were to
identify a particular dynamic test
procedure, among the many known to
be available, as likely to be suitable for
assessing roof crush resistance
(something we have not been able to do
thus far), we would need additional
years of research to evaluate and refine,
as necessary, the procedure to develop
a proposal, including evaluating it in
the context of the current vehicle fleet.
It is also not known whether any
dynamic test requirement that might be
identified by NHTSA’s research would
produce significant additional benefits
beyond those that will be produced by
the substantial upgrade of the quasistatic procedure that we are adopting in
this rule.
NHTSA agrees, however, with
pursuing a dynamic test as our ultimate
goal. We would like to have one for
rollover crashes just as we do for front
and side crashes. Unfortunately, we
cannot adopt or even propose one now
because of issues related to test
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repeatability, a dummy, and lack of
injury criteria. We are pursuing further
research for a dynamic test, but we
expect that it will take a number of
years to resolve these issues. In the
meantime, we do not want to delay a
significant upgrade of FMVSS No. 216
that will save 135 lives each year.
2. Vehicle Application
FMVSS No. 216 currently applies to
passenger cars, and to multipurpose
passenger vehicles, trucks and buses
with a GVWR of 2,722 kilograms (6,000
pounds) or less. In our August 2005
NPRM, in addition to proposing
upgraded performance requirements, we
proposed to extend the application of
the standard to vehicles with a GVWR
of up to 4,536 kilograms (10,000
pounds). We proposed to permit
vehicles manufactured in two or more
stages, other than chassis-cabs, to be
certified to the roof crush requirements
of FMVSS No. 220, instead of FMVSS
No. 216. We stated that we believed that
the requirements of FMVSS No. 220
appeared to offer a reasonable avenue to
balance the desire to respond to the
needs of multi-stage manufacturers and
the need to increase safety in rollover
crashes.
The commenters generally supported
extending the application of FMVSS No.
216 to vehicles with a GVWR of up to
4,536 kilograms (10,000 pounds). The
National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB) stated that heavier vehicles such
as 12- and 15-passenger vans, not
currently subjected to the standard, are
experiencing patterns of roof intrusion
greater than vehicles already subject to
the requirements. That commenter also
cited two investigations it conducted
concerning the safety need for vehicles
between 6,000 and 10,000 pounds
GVWR to meet roof crush resistance
requirements.
We received a number of comments
concerning requirements for multi-stage
vehicles and vehicles with altered roofs,
including ones from Advocates, the
National Truck Equipment Association
(NTEA), the Recreation Vehicle Industry
Association (RVIA) and the National
Mobility Equipment Dealers Association
(NMEDA). The concerns and
recommendations of these commenters
varied considerably. We discuss and
address the comments later in this
document. For purposes of this more
general section concerning applicability,
we note that we are providing a FMVSS
No. 220 option for some but not all
multi-stage vehicles and for vehicles
which are altered in certain ways to
raise the height of the roof. We also note
that, for reasons discussed in that
section, we are excluding a narrow
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3. Single-Sided or Two-Sided Tests
Under the current version of FMVSS
No. 216, vehicles must meet the
standard’s requirements for both the
driver and passenger sides of the
vehicle. Thus, roof crush resistance
protection is required for both the driver
and passenger sides of the vehicle. The
standard specifies a single-sided test.
While a vehicle must meet the
standard’s test requirements, regardless
of whether it is tested on the driver or
passenger side, a particular vehicle is
tested on only one side.
As discussed in the NPRM, a number
of commenters on our 2001 RFC
suggested that the agency specify a twosided test requirement, i.e., a
requirement that each vehicle must
meet the standard’s test requirements
when tested sequentially, first on one
side of the vehicle, and then on the
other side. Commenters making this
recommendation included Public
Citizen and CFIR. The commenters
stated that vehicle occupants on the far
side of the rollover have a much greater
risk of serious injury than occupants on
the near side,11 and argued that a twosided requirement is needed to protect
far side occupants.
In the NPRM, the agency summarized
the results of six two-sided tests it had
conducted in light of those comments.
The testing sought to evaluate the
strength of the second side of the roof
of vehicles whose first side had already
been tested. In this testing, after the
force was applied to one side of the roof
over the front seat area of a vehicle, the
vehicle was repositioned and force was
then applied on the opposite side of the
roof over the front seat area. In
performing these tests on both sides of
a vehicle, the agency used the platen
angle currently specified in FMVSS No.
216 (5 degree pitch forward and 25
degree rotation outward, along its lateral
axis). We concluded that the strength of
the roof on the second side of some
vehicles may have been increased or
decreased as a result of the deformation
of the first side of the roof. The agency
indicated that it planned to conduct
further research before proposing
rulemaking in this area.
In commenting on the NPRM, a
number of consumer advocacy
organizations and other commenters
strongly supported a two-sided test
requirement. These commenters
included, among others, Public Citizen,
CFIR, CAS, and Advocates. Supporters
of a two-sided test requirement argued
that more damage occurs to the far (or
trailing) side of the vehicle in a rollover
crash, and a two-sided test would better
reflect this real-world intrusion. They
further argued that when the near side
roof and windshield are compromised
in a rollover, the far side will not be able
to withstand the forces of the event,
and, consequently, facilitate roof
collapse. ARCCA, Inc., Consumers
Union, and Safety Analysis and
Forensic Engineering (SAFE) suggested
a two-sided test would simulate the
impact that occurs in the majority of
rollover incidents.
In light of the substantial interest in
a two-sided test requirement, NHTSA
expanded the series of two-sided roof
crush tests discussed in the NPRM. In
our January 2008 SNPRM, we explained
that we had, by that time, conducted a
total of 26 sequential two-sided tests,
and announced that we were releasing
these data to the public in conjunction
with the SNPRM.
We stated in the SNPRM that the twosided test results showed the first side
test generally produces a weakening of
the structure. This was shown by the
fact that the recorded SWR for the
second side was generally lower than
for the first side. On average, the peak
strength for the second side was
reduced by 8.7 percent. However, for
several of the vehicles, we observed
considerably higher reductions in peak
strength. Of the 26 vehicles that had
been tested by that time, excluding the
Chevrolet Express, six experienced
reductions in strength of 19 percent or
greater. We excluded the Chevrolet
Express because of a test anomaly.12
With respect to two-sided vehicle
testing, we stated that we believed that
the post-NPRM tests provided the
agency with sufficient additional
10 This final rule will address the NTSB’s
recommendation H–03–16, to include 12- and 15passenger vans in FMVSS No. 216, to minimize the
extent to which survivable space is compromised in
the event of a rollover accident.
11 Near side is the side toward which the vehicle
begins to roll and the far side is the trailing side
of the roll.
12 Between the first and second side tests, the
front door on the tested side was opened. Because
of damage to the vehicle during the first side test,
the door would not properly close. The door was
clamped until the latch engaged, locking the door
in place. This may have compromised the structural
integrity of the roof and reduced the measured peak
load on the second side.
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category of multi-stage trucks from
FMVSS No. 216 altogether.
Subject to the limited exceptions/
alternatives/exclusions noted in the
previous paragraph or already included
in FMVSS No. 216, and for the reasons
discussed in the NPRM and in this
document, we are extending the
application of the standard to vehicles
with a GVWR of up to 4,536 kilograms
(10,000 pounds).10
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information for the agency to consider a
two-sided test requirement for the final
rule. We stated that we would evaluate
both the single-sided and two-sided
testing alternatives for the final rule,
and requested comments to help us
reach a decision on that issue.
Comments
In commenting on the SNPRM, a
number of consumer advocacy
organizations continued to strongly
support a two-sided test requirement.
Public Citizen stated that in a vast
majority of rollover cases, the injured
party was typically seated on the far
side, that is, the side of the second
impact. It argued that it is not possible
to upgrade FMVSS No. 216 without a
two-sided test requirement. Some
commenters argued, as they had in
commenting on the NPRM, that they
believe SAFETEA–LU requires a twosided test.
IIHS stated that while it supports any
changes that would increase the level of
roof strength of the vehicle fleet, it has
no real-world data to address the
potential benefits of two-sided testing. It
stated that a single-sided test with a
higher SWR may be more effective at
promoting robust roof designs than a
two-sided test with a lower SWR
requirement.
The Alliance stated that it believes the
agency has provided insufficient
justification for two-sided testing. It
stated that the agency has not provided
analysis demonstrating that two-sided
testing relates to real-world safety.
The Alliance also expressed concern
that two-sided testing would amplify
variability and repeatability problems.
That organization argued that the
agency’s limited repeatability testing for
a potential two-sided requirement
indicates poor repeatability in SWR
between the first and second side tests
for the same vehicle. The Alliance cited
agency tests of the Lincoln LS and Buick
LaCrosse.
According to the Alliance, these
differences may be due solely to lack of
test procedure repeatability and test lab
reproducibility, rather than any real
weakening or strengthening of the roof
structure due to the first side test. That
commenter stated that in a two-sided
scenario, the deformed shape of a
vehicle tested for roof strength on one
side between any two tests is not
identical. The starting point for the roofstrength testing on the second side is
therefore, according to the Alliance,
inherently different and results in
substantial variability in measured roof
strength.
AIAM stated that based on the
information and analysis provided by
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the agency regarding the two-sided test,
it believes that the test shows enough
potential to merit further consideration
by the agency. AIAM argued that
additional analysis would be needed
before it could provide a preferred
regulatory approach, but indicated that
the two-sided approach would more
directly address the multiple roof
contact weakening phenomenon.
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Agency Response
After carefully considering the
comments and available information,
we have decided, for the reasons
discussed below, to adopt a two-sided
test requirement.
In responding to the comments, we
begin by addressing the argument raised
by some commenters that SAFETEA–LU
requires a two-sided test. Public Citizen
stated that the agency has ‘‘ignored the
express requirement of a two-sided
test.’’ That organization cited the
statutory language requiring NHTSA to
upgrade FMVSS No. 216 related to roof
strength ‘‘for driver and passenger
sides.’’ (Emphasis added by Public
Citizen.)
As discussed earlier in this document,
under the current version of FMVSS No.
216, vehicles must meet the standard’s
requirements for both the driver and
passenger sides of the vehicle, i.e., a
vehicle must meet the standard’s test
requirements regardless of whether it is
tested on the driver or passenger side.
Thus, while the standard specifies a
single-sided test, roof crush resistance
protection is required for both the driver
and passenger sides of the vehicle.
Similarly, upgrading the current
performance requirements so that
vehicles must provide protection at a
significantly higher SWR under a singlesided test procedure would result in
upgraded protection for both the driver
and passenger sides. Thus, while we
understand the safety arguments raised
by Public Citizen and other commenters
favoring a two-sided test, we believe
that the language in SAFETEA–LU does
not mandate a two-sided test
requirement, only that upgraded
protection be provided for both the
driver and passenger sides.
We also note that the issue of whether
to adopt a two-sided test is related to the
decision of what stringency to adopt.
For any baseline single-sided test
requirement at a particular SWR, either
increasing the SWR for the single-sided
test or adding a two-sided test
requirement at the same SWR would
represent an increase in stringency.
Therefore, in reaching a decision on
these issues, we have considered them
together.
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To help evaluate the merits of a twosided test requirement, the agency
analyzed 1997 through 2006 NASS–CDS
rollover crash data, involving restrained
occupants.13 Only vehicles that
overturned and experienced 2 or more
quarter turns were included. This study
included 4,030 NASS–CDS investigated
vehicles, and excluded convertibles and
vehicles that had a concentrated loading
due to a collision between a fixed object
(pole or tree) and the roof.
The data were analyzed for
differences in injury risk for the near
and far side occupants and also to
ascertain any disparity in the amount of
roof intrusion. For all rollovers
involving two or more quarter turns, the
data showed that there are a similar
number of near and far side occupants
involved in the event. A further review
of the injury outcomes showed that the
injuries to far side occupants occur at a
slightly higher frequency than injuries
to near side occupants.
The occupant injury data were further
analyzed to determine whether the
relative proportion of near and far side
injured occupants varied with the
amount of roof intrusion. The injury
outcomes for occupants in vehicles with
less than 12 cm (5 inches) of near side
roof intrusion show higher frequency of
injury for the far side occupant at the
various injury levels. The outcomes for
injured occupants in vehicles with 12
cm (5 inches) or greater near side
intrusion have similar percentages of
severe injuries between near and far
occupants. Based on this analysis, the
data indicate there may be some higher
risk for far side occupants at lower
levels of intrusion; however, none of the
results was statistically significant.
The analysis investigated the
difference in roof intrusion between the
near and far side of the vehicle that
experienced two quarter turns or more.
For the 4,030 NASS–CDS vehicles, there
was a weighted average maximum
vertical intrusion of 7.9 cm (3.1 inches)
on the near side and 10.9 cm (4.3
inches) on the far side of the rolloverinvolved vehicle. The far side of the
vehicle averaged 3 cm (1.2 inches) more
vertical intrusion than the near side.
The analysis also investigated the
intrusion difference between the near
and far side grouped by the severity of
the rollover. (Severity of the rollover
was defined by single or multiple roofto-ground contacts). The data showed a
3 cm (1.2 inch) bias toward the far side
intrusion, independent of the severity of
the rollover. For example, vehicles
experiencing five or more quarter turns
13 See report Evaluation of 2 Side Roof Crush
Testing placed in the docket with this notice.
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had 9.2 cm (3.6 inches) of near-side
intrusion compared to 12.2 cm (4.8
inches) of far-side intrusion. The
analysis concluded for crashes with
multiple roof-to-ground contacts (or
severe rollovers), there is a statistically
insignificant bias on the far side.
Since the publication of the SNPRM,
the agency has conducted an additional
five tests 14 as part of its evaluation, for
a total of 31 two-sided tests.15 The test
results for all 31 two-sided tests are
summarized in Appendix B of this
document.
On average, the peak strength for the
second side was reduced by 8.4 percent.
This reduction in strength is consistent
with our NASS–CDS analysis, showing
a slight increase of intrusion on the
second side. This also may explain the
increased risk to injury for far side
occupants. In all the tests, the
windshield fractured during the first
side test and there was not a
catastrophic collapse of the roof on the
second side.
In general, there was a good
correlation in peak strength between the
first and second side. The agency did
test four vehicles that resulted in
increased strength on the second side.
However, for several of the vehicles, we
observed considerably higher reductions
in peak strength. Of the 31 vehicles
tested, again excluding the Chevrolet
Express, seven experienced reductions
in strength of 19 percent or greater. The
two-sided testing conducted by NHTSA
indicated an average difference of
approximately 7.1 percent lower peak
force for the second side in vehicles
under 2,722 kilograms (6,000 pounds)
GVWR and 14.9 percent lower peak
force for the second side in vehicles
over 2,722 kilograms (6,000 pounds)
GVWR.
We have decided to adopt a two-sided
test in light of several considerations.
First, we believe a two-sided test is
more representative of the higher
severity rollover crashes in which a
vehicle experiences multiple quarter
turns. In such crashes, the vehicles
sometimes experiences a significant
impact on one side of the vehicle and,
14 The test reports for the additional vehicle tests
conducted by NHTSA are being made available to
the public through the agency’s internet vehicle
crash test database. We are placing a memorandum
in the docket which provides the Web address for
that database and lists the vehicle models and test
numbers that are needed to reference the
information in the database. The agency
incorporates by reference these test reports as part
of the record for this rulemaking.
15 We note that we also conducted a test of a
Smart ForTwo. However, we did not include these
test results as part of our evaluation because the
vehicle is not typical of a significant number of
vehicles in the fleet.
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as the vehicle continues to turn, another
significant impact on the other side of
the vehicle. A two-sided test will help
ensure that the impact on the first side
of the vehicle does not cause excess
damage that will prevent the vehicle
from providing protection during the
impact on the second side of the
vehicle.
Moreover, as discussed in the FRIA,
the greater stringency associated with a
two-sided test requirement will provide
greater benefits.
While we recognize that a two-sided
test requirement affects the stringency of
the standard, as compared to a singlesided test requirement at the same SWR,
we believe that it does not raise
concerns related to test procedure
repeatability and test lab
reproducibility.
In addressing this issue, we note that
the test conducted on the second side is
identical to the test conducted on the
first side. Thus, the second side test by
itself is repeatable and reproducible, for
the same reasons the first side test is
repeatable and reproducible.
As noted by the Alliance, the ‘‘starting
point’’ for the second side test is
different than for the first side test in
that the vehicle may have experienced
damage during the first side test.
However, it is the purpose of a twosided test requirement to limit such
damage, to the extent such damage
would prevent compliance with the
standard’s performance requirements
during the second side test.
As to the Lincoln LS and Buick
Lacrosse repeat tests cited by the
Alliance, the change in peak SWR
between the first and second side test
was ¥21.3 percent and ¥8.7 percent for
the two Lincoln LS vehicles tested, and
¥13.5 percent and ¥3.4 percent for the
two Buick Lacrosse vehicles tested. For
the Lincoln LS, there was good
correlation between the loaddeformation curves on the first side in
the two tests. However, on the second
side, the load-deformation curves
diverge prior to the peak SWR. Further,
in one Lincoln LS test, the second side
correlated well with the first side. The
other test did not show the same
correlation on the second side, which
led us to believe internal structural
damage to the roof during the first side
test was the cause. With respect to the
Buick Lacrosse, the agency identified a
pre-test windshield crack as the likely
reason for the difference in outcome
between the two tests. The loaddeformation curves for the first side did
not reach the same peak load; however,
there is good correlation on the second
side. Thus, we believe the differences
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relate to vehicle performance instead of
test procedure issues.
It is important to note that the Lincoln
LS and Buick Lacrosse vehicles were
not subject to an FMVSS incorporating
a two-sided requirement or an SWR
requirement above 1.5, so they were not
designed to meet such a requirement
(two-sided test requirement at the tested
SWR). Manufacturers can ensure that a
vehicle meets a two-sided test
requirement by designing it so that they
will be able to meet the second-side test
despite whatever damage may occur in
the first side test. As a general matter,
the greater the structural damage that
occurs in the first-side test, the greater
the variability one would expect in the
second-side test. We note that the
performance requirement is not
expressed in terms of the percentage
difference in damage between the firstside test and the second test; instead,
the vehicle must meet the same
specified performance criteria in both
tests. We also note that the first-side test
is conducted only up to the SWR
specified in the standard.
Finally, we note that issues raised by
commenters concerning varying platen
angle and size for the second-side test
are addressed later in this document in
the section addressing aspects of the test
procedure.
4. Upgraded Force Requirement—
Specified Strength to Weight Ratio
(SWR)
As discussed earlier, FMVSS No. 216
currently requires that the lower surface
of the test platen not move more than
127 mm (5 inches), when it is used to
apply a force equal to 1.5 times the
unloaded vehicle weight to the roof over
the front seat area. In the NPRM, the
agency proposed to require that the roof
over the front seat area withstand a force
increase equal to 2.5 times the unloaded
weight of the vehicle, and to eliminate
the 22,240 Newton (5,000 pound) force
limit for passenger cars.
NHTSA explained that it believes that
FMVSS No. 216 could protect front seat
occupants better if the applied force
requirement reduced the extent of roof
crush occurring in real world crashes.
That is, the increased applied force
requirement would lead to stronger
roofs and reduce the roof crush severity
observed in real world crashes. We
observed that in many real-world
rollovers, vehicles subject to the
requirements of FMVSS No. 216
experienced vertical roof intrusion
greater than the test plate movement
limit of 127 mm (5 inches).
In explaining the proposed 2.5 value
for SWR, the agency noted that it
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previously conducted a study 16 (Rains
study) that measured peak forces
generated during quasi-static testing
under FMVSS No. 216 and under
Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE)
J996 inverted drop testing. In the Rains
study, nine quasi-static tests were first
conducted. The energy absorption was
measured and used to determine the
appropriate corresponding height for the
inverted drop conditions. Six of the
vehicles were then dropped onto a load
plate. The roof displacement was
measured using a string potentiometer
connected between the A-pillar and roof
attachment and the vehicle floor. The
peak force from the drop tests was
limited to only the first 74 mm (3
inches) of roof crush because some of
the vehicles rolled and contacted the
ground with the front of the hood.
Similarly, the peak quasi-static force
was limited during the first 127 mm (5
inches) of plate movement.
This report showed that for the nine
quasi-static tests, the peak force-toweight ratio ranged from 1.8 to 2.5. Six
of these vehicle models were dropped at
a height calculated to set the potential
energy of the suspended vehicle equal
to the static tests. For these dynamic
tests, the peak force-to-weight ratio
ranged from 2.1 to 3.1. In sum, the
agency tentatively concluded that 2.5
was a good representation of the
observed range of peak force-to-weight
ratio.
As to eliminating the 22,240 Newton
force limit for passenger cars, the agency
noted that the limit was included when
the standard was first issued. The effect
of the limit was that passenger cars
weighing more than 1,512 kilograms
(3,333 pounds) were subjected to less
stringent requirements. The purpose of
the limit was to avoid making it
necessary for manufacturers to redesign
large cars that could not meet the full
roof strength requirements of the
standard.17 At the time, the agency
believed that requiring larger passenger
cars to comply with the full (1.5 times
the unloaded vehicle weight)
requirement would be unnecessary
because heavy passenger cars had lower
rollover propensity. However, as
discussed in the NPRM, the agency
tentatively concluded that occupants of
passenger cars weighing more than
1,512 kilograms (3,333 pounds) are
sustaining rollover-related injuries and
that those cars should be able to comply
with the proposed requirements.
16 Glen C. Rains and Mike Van Voorhis, ‘‘Quasi
Static and Dynamic Roof Crush Testing,’’ DOT HS
808–873, 1998.
17 See 54 FR 46276.
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The agency stated in the NPRM that
it believed that manufacturers would
comply with the upgraded standard by
strengthening reinforcements in roof
pillars, by increasing the gauge of steel
used in roofs or by using higher strength
materials.
In the SNPRM, we noted that we had
been carefully analyzing the numerous
comments received in response to the
proposal, and the various additional
vehicle tests conducted after publication
of the NPRM. We invited comments on
how the agency should factor in this
new information into its decision. We
stated that while the NPRM focused on
a specified force equivalent to 2.5 times
the unloaded vehicle weight, the agency
could adopt a higher or lower value for
the final rule.
In the SNPRM, we observed from the
recent vehicle testing (focusing on the
single-sided test results) that the range
of SWRs for vehicles with a GVWR of
2,722 kilograms (6,000 pounds) or less
tended to be higher than the range of
SWRs for vehicles with a GVWR greater
than 2,722 kilograms (6,000 pounds).
The SWR of many late model vehicles
with a GVWR of 2,722 kilograms (6,000
pounds) or less was substantially higher
than the 2.5 value the agency focused on
in the NPRM. Conversely, only two
vehicles we tested with a GVWR greater
than 2,722 kilograms (6,000 pounds)
exceeded the 2.5 value.
We noted in the SNPRM that the PRIA
had examined the proposed SWR of 2.5
and the alternative SWR of 3.0 times the
unloaded vehicle weight. The agency
included in the SNPRM discussion and
analysis concerning a number of factors
expected to change the estimated
impacts, and sought comments
concerning impacts of SWR levels of
2.5, 3.0 and 3.5.
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Comments on the NPRM
In general, vehicle manufacturers
supported an SWR of 2.5, while safety
advocacy groups recommended a more
stringent standard with the majority
supporting a 3.5 SWR requirement.
Vehicle manufacturers, including
General Motors Corporation (GM), Ford
Motor Company (Ford), DaimlerChrysler
Corporation,18 Porsche Cars North
America (Porsche), Toyota Motor North
America (Toyota), and Nissan North
America (Nissan), and the Alliance
supported the proposed 2.5 SWR level,
with caveats about sufficient leadtime
and other requested changes to the test
18 In August 2007, Daimler and Chrysler
separated. All comments submitted to the agency
prior to that date will be noted in this document
as DaimlerChrysler. Mercedes-Benz USA and
Chrysler LLC submitted comments separately
afterwards and will be referenced accordingly.
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procedure, but expressed concern about
raising the SWR further. The Alliance
cautioned against increasing the SWR
beyond 2.5 due to the potential adverse
effects of increased mass. It stated that
recommendations in the docket for
higher levels did not attempt to account
for the potential effect on the static
stability factor (SSF) of adding structure
necessary to comply with higher
standards.
Commenters supporting a 3.5 SWR
included Lipsig, Shapey, Manus &
Moverman (LSMM), Consumers Union,
Center for the Study of Responsive Law
(CSRL), Mr. Sances, Perrone Forensic
Consulting (Perrone), Ms. Lawlor, Mr.
Clough, Xprts, Mr. Nash, Mr. Friedman,
and Forensic Engineering (FEI).
Consumers Union, LSMM, Ms. Lawlor,
Mr. Clough, and Mr. Sances supported
a 3.5 SWR based on, among other
things, the performance of the Volvo
XC90. Commenters stated that the Volvo
XC90 has heightened roof strength
resistance through light-weight
materials making it possible to avoid
any unnecessary increases in vehicle
weight which could adversely affect
rollover propensity. In supporting more
stringent roof crush resistance
requirements, the CSRL stated that
NHTSA should consider using its
technology-forcing authority.
Several commenters supported an
SWR of 4.0 or higher. These
commenters included Mr. Slavik,
ARCCA, Technical Services, and FEI.
The commenters suggested that higher
strength steel alloy, changes to the cross
sectional thickness of roof components,
and other design changes would make
increasing the SWR feasible and cost
effective.
In connection with arguments that the
agency should base the level of the
standard on the performance of the
Volvo XC90, Ford commented that in
considering the stringency of an SWR
requirement, roof SWR does not
discriminate vehicles by roof strength. It
noted that the roof strength required to
achieve a specific SWR depends on the
vehicle’s unloaded vehicle weight
(UVW). Ford stated that two vehicles
with the same SWR, but different
UVWs, may have roof strength levels
that are actually several thousand
pounds apart. That company argued that
the agency’s 2.5 SWR proposal is very
stringent. Ford stated that vehicle roof
designs are essentially the same for all
passenger carrying vehicles, and that A
pillars are A pillars and B pillars are B
pillars, regardless of vehicle type, i.e.,
the constraints on a roof system design
are applicable to all affected vehicles.
That company argued that because a
particular vehicle can achieve a roof
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SWR of 3.5, because it has a lower UVW
as compared to a full size pickup, does
not mean that 3.5 should be the
regulatory requirement.
Comments on the SNPRM
In commenting on the SNPRM,
vehicle manufacturers continued to
support an SWR of 2.5, with safety
advocacy groups recommending a more
stringent requirement.
The Alliance recommended that all
vehicles should be held to the same
requirements and that a separate
requirement should not be afforded for
heavy vehicles. Mercedes-Benz
suggested that, for a two-sided test
requirement, the SWR on the second
side should be lower than what would
be required for the first side. This would
reflect the lower force levels in a
rollover that it said the second side
would experience.
IIHS supported raising the SWR to 3.0
or higher in a one-sided test. IIHS stated
that its new analysis justifies such a
requirement.
Agency Decision and Response
After carefully considering the
comments and available information,
and for the reasons discussed below, we
have decided to adopt an SWR
requirement of 3.0 for vehicles with a
GVWR of 2,722 kilograms (6,000
pounds) or less, and 1.5 for vehicles
with a GVWR greater than 2,722
kilograms (6,000 pounds).
While this rulemaking involves a
number of key decisions, the selection
of an SWR requirement is the most
important one for both costs and
benefits. Our analysis, presented in
detail in the FRIA, shows that for the
alternatives we evaluated, benefits in
terms of reduced fatalities continue to
rise with higher SWR levels due to
reduced intrusion. The benefits
continue to rise because, for vehicles
designed to have higher SWR levels, the
vehicle roofs experience less intrusion
in higher severity crashes. However,
costs also increase substantially with
higher SWR levels, so NHTSA must
select the appropriate balance of safety
benefits to added costs.
Under the Safety Act, NHTSA must
issue safety standards that are both
practicable and meet the need for motor
vehicle safety. 49 U.S.C. 30111(a). The
agency considers economic factors,
including costs, as part of ensuring that
standards are reasonable, practicable,
and appropriate.
In Motor Vehicle Manufacturers
Association v. State Farm, 463 U.S. 29,
54–55 (1983), the Supreme Court
indicated that the agency must, in
making decisions about safety
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standards, consider reasonableness of
monetary and other costs associated
with the standard. It stated, however,
that ‘‘(i)n reaching its judgment, NHTSA
should bear in mind that Congress
intended safety to be the preeminent
factor under the Motor Vehicle Safety
Act:’’
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The Committee intends that safety shall be
the overriding consideration in the issuance
of standards under this bill. The Committee
recognizes * * * that the Secretary will
necessarily consider reasonableness of cost,
feasibility and adequate leadtime. S. Rep. No.
1301, at 6, U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News
1966, p. 2714.
In establishing standards the Secretary
must conform to the requirement that the
standard be practicable. This would require
consideration of all relevant factors,
including technological ability to achieve the
goal of a particular standard as well as
consideration of economic factors. Motor
vehicle safety is the paramount purpose of
this bill and each standard must be related
thereto. H.Rep. No. 1776, at 16.
Thus, in making our decision
concerning SWR, we are guided by the
statutory language, legislative history,
and the Supreme Court’s construction of
the Safety Act, as well as by the specific
requirement in SAFETEA–LU for us to
upgrade FMVSS No. 216 relating to roof
strength for driver and passenger sides
for motor vehicles with a GVWR of not
more than 4,536 kilograms (10,000
pounds). We consider both costs and
benefits, bearing in mind that Congress
intended safety to be the preeminent
factor under the Safety Act.
As indicated above, while benefits
continue to rise with higher SWR levels,
costs also increase substantially. The
challenge is to push to a level where the
safety benefits are still reasonable in
relation to the associated costs. As part
of this, we consider issues related to
cost effectiveness. The agency’s analysis
of cost effectiveness is presented in the
FRIA and summarized in this
document.
Another important factor in the
selection of the SWR requirements is
that there are much higher costs relative
to benefits associated with any level
SWR requirement for vehicles with a
GVWR greater than 2,722 kilograms
(6,000 pounds) as compared to the
lighter vehicles currently subject to the
standard.
There are a number of reasons for this
differential between heaver and lighter
vehicles. The absolute strength needed
to meet a specific SWR is a function of
the vehicle’s weight. By way of
example, to meet a 2.0 SWR, a vehicle
that weighs 1,360 kilograms (3,000
pounds) must have a roof structure
capable of withstanding 26,690 N (6,000
pounds) of force, while a vehicle that
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weighs 2,268 kilograms (5,000 pounds)
must have a roof structure capable of
withstanding 44,482 N (10,000 pounds)
of force. This means more structure or
reinforcement are needed for the heavier
vehicle, which means more cost and
weight. Moreover, vehicles in the
heavier category have not previously
been subject to FMVSS No. 216, so they
have not been required to meet the
existing 1.5 SWR single-sided
requirement.
At the same time, these heavier
vehicles account for only a very small
part of the target population of
occupants who might benefit from
improved roof strength. Only 5 percent
of the fatalities in the overall target
population (33 in terms of a specific
number) occur in vehicles over 2,722
kilograms (6,000 pounds) GVWR.
Ninety-five percent of the fatalities (635
in terms of a specific number) occur in
vehicles under 2,722 kilograms (6,000
pounds) GVWR. These differences
reflect the fact that there are far fewer
vehicles in this category in the on-road
fleet, and may also reflect the vehicles’
size and weight as well as their
frequency of use as working vehicles.
Heavier vehicles generally are less likely
to roll over than lighter vehicles.
We recognize the argument that all
light vehicles should meet the same
SWR requirements, to ensure the same
minimum level of protection in a
rollover crash. However, in selecting
particular requirements for a final rule,
we believe that our focus must be on
saving lives while also considering costs
and relative risk. What is necessary to
meet the need for safety and is
practicable for one type or size of
vehicle may not be necessary or
reasonable, practicable and appropriate
for another type or size of vehicle. Thus,
to the extent the goal of establishing the
same SWR requirements for all light
vehicles would have the effect of either
unnecessarily reducing the number of
lives saved in lighter vehicles or
imposing substantially higher,
unreasonable costs on heavier vehicles
despite their lesser relative risk, we
believe it is appropriate to adopt
different requirements for different
vehicles. We also observe that because
the same SWR requirement is
significantly more stringent for heavier
vehicles than lighter vehicles (due to
SWR being a multiple of unloaded
vehicle weight), establishing the same
SWR requirement for heavier vehicles is
not simply a matter of expecting
manufacturers to provide the same
countermeasures as they do for light
vehicles.
Vehicles with a GVWR of 2,722
kilograms (6,000 pounds) or less.
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Our decision to adopt a 3.0 SWR
requirement for vehicles with a GVWR
of 2,722 kilograms (6,000 pounds) or
less, i.e., the vehicles currently subject
to the standard, reflects the higher lifesaving benefits associated with that
requirement. It also reflects our
consideration of the test results of
current vehicles. We believe the high
SWR levels that are currently being
achieved for a range of light vehicles
demonstrate that manufacturers can
achieve this SWR level for these
vehicles.
An SWR requirement of 3.0 prevents
about 66 percent more fatalities than
one at 2.5, 133 instead of 80. However,
costs increase by a considerably higher
percentage, resulting in a less favorable
cost per equivalent life saved, $5.7
million to $8.5 million for 3.0 SWR as
compared to $3.8 million to $7.2 million
for 2.5 SWR.
In these particular circumstances, we
believe that a 3.0 SWR requirement is
appropriate and the costs reasonable
given the increased benefits. While the
cost per equivalent life saved is
relatively high compared to other
NHTSA rulemakings, we conclude that
the higher safety benefits, the legislative
mandate for an upgrade, the technical
feasibility of making roofs this strong,
and the fact that these costs are
generally within the range of accepted
values justify moving NHTSA’s roof
crush standards to a 3.0 SWR for
vehicles that have been subject to the
1.5 SWR requirements.
We decline, however, to adopt an
even higher SWR requirement. In
considering higher SWR requirements at
this level, costs continue to increase at
a considerably higher rate than benefits.
The FRIA estimates that while a 3.5
SWR requirement for these vehicles
would result in higher benefits,
preventing 175 instead of 133 fatalities,
total costs would increase to $1.6 billion
to $2.3 billion (about $800 million to
$1.1 billion above the total costs for the
3.0 SWR requirement) and the overall
cost per equivalent life saved for these
vehicles would increase to $8.8 to $12.3
million. A 3.5 SWR requirement would
thus result in an approximate doubling
of the costs beyond those of a 3.0 SWR
requirement, and deliver about 1⁄3 more
benefits.
Vehicles with a GVWR greater than
2,722 kilograms (6,000 pounds) and less
than or equal to 4,536 kilograms (10,000
pounds).
Vehicles with a GVWR greater than
2,722 kilograms (6,000 pounds) are not
currently subject to FMVSS No. 216
and, because of their greater unloaded
vehicle weight, these vehicles pose
greater design challenges. Moreover,
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given the relatively small target
population for these vehicles, the
benefits will necessarily be small
regardless of the SWR selected.
After considering our original
proposal of a SWR of 2.5 and the
available information, we have
concluded that a SWR of 1.5 is
appropriate for these heavier vehicles.
The requirement we are adopting is
more stringent than the longstanding
requirement that has applied to lighter
vehicles until this rulemaking because it
is a two-sided requirement. The FRIA
estimates that two fatalities and 46
nonfatal injuries will be prevented
annually by this requirement. Because
of the high cost relative to the benefits
for all of the alternatives for these
heavier vehicles, from the 1.5 SWR
alternative and above, any alternative
we select would adversely affect the
overall cost effectiveness of this
rulemaking (covering all light vehicles).
We believe that a SWR of 1.5 is
appropriate for these heavier vehicles.
Given the requirements of SAFETEA–
LU, we need to ensure that the standard
results in improved real world roof
crush resistance for these vehicles. We
decline, however, to adopt a SWR
higher than 1.5 for vehicles with a
GVWR greater than 2,722 kilograms
(6,000 pounds), given the small
additional benefits (4 additional lives
saved) and substantially higher costs.
Adopting a SWR of 2.0 for these
vehicles would more than double the
costs of this rule for these vehicles to
prevent 4 additional fatalities and 137
nonfatal injuries.
Other issues related to strength
requirements and SWR.
As indicated above, the Alliance
cautioned against increasing the SWR
beyond 2.5 for lighter vehicles due to
the potential adverse effects of increased
mass. It stated that recommendations in
the docket for higher levels did not
attempt to account for the potential
effect on the SSF of adding structure
necessary to comply with higher
standards.
We do not believe that it is necessary
to account for that effect. We note that
the agency has considered a number of
issues related to added weight as part of
the FRIA, including possible adverse
effects to safety. Based on our analysis,
we believe that today’s rule will not
result in adverse effects to safety as a
result of added weight.
For a number of reasons, including
ones related to CAFE standards, fuel
prices, and rollover propensity, we
believe manufacturers will strive to
minimize the weight impacts of added
roof strength. While there is a great deal
of uncertainty regarding the actual
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changes that manufacturers will initiate
in response to this rule, there are
numerous ways to address both roof
strength and rollover propensity
simultaneously. This final rule provides
substantial leadtime within which to
choose among those ways and make
design changes that avoid adversely
affecting that propensity. There is
evidence from current NCAP ratings
that manufacturers are routinely doing
so. Manufacturers generally strive to
maintain or improve their NCAP ratings
to help market their vehicles. The
agency believes that this concern over
NCAP ratings would preclude a design
strategy that unnecessarily increases CG
and degrades SSF. Further, agency
testing of 10 redesigned vehicles with
higher roof strengths found that
manufacturers had maintained SSF
levels while increasing roof strength in
newly redesigned models.
A detailed discussion of issues related
to added weight and SSF is included in
the FRIA, and there is also additional
discussion later in this document.
Mercedes-Benz suggested that, for a
two-sided test requirement, the SWR on
the second side should be lower than
what would be required for the first
side. According to Mercedes, this would
reflect the lower force levels in a
rollover that it said the second side
would experience. However, as
discussed above in the section on
single-sided or two-sided tests, the
agency’s analysis of NASS data
indicates that vehicles experience more
intrusion on the far side (second side)
of the vehicle than the near side.
Therefore, we decline to adopt a lower
SWR requirement for the second side.
We note that the agency took into
account the costs and benefits of a twosided test requirement with the SWR at
the same level for both sides.
As to the issue raised by CSRL about
safety standards that are technologyforcing, that commenter did not provide
specific information concerning what it
contemplated in this area. As part of the
agency’s analysis of costs and benefits,
we considered the use of advanced
higher strength and lighter weight
materials. Our analysis assumes
significantly greater implementation
and use of these advanced materials.
Finally, we note that several
commenters suggested that the agency
use alternative approaches other than
unloaded vehicle weight for purposes of
calculating SWR. Recommendations
included using weight of the vehicle
plus two occupants, or GVWR plus two
occupants. We decline to change
FMVSS No. 216’s existing approach of
using a multiple of unloaded vehicle
weight for calculating the force
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22361
requirement that applies to each
vehicle. Using a weight higher than
unloaded vehicle weight would simply
represent another means of increasing
stringency and would be equivalent to
a requirement for a higher SWR.
However, the agency has already
considered alternative higher SWR
levels, as well as a two-sided test
requirement, which also represent an
increase in stringency. Thus, the other
issues we have considered ensure an
appropriate level of stringency.
5. Performance Criteria—Headroom,
Platen Travel, or Both
In the NPRM, we proposed to replace
the current limit on platen travel (test
plate movement) during the specified
quasi-static test with a requirement that
the crush not exceed the available
headroom. We were concerned that the
platen travel limit does not provide
adequate protection to front outboard
occupants of vehicles with a small
amount of occupant headroom. We also
stated that the current requirement may
impose a needless burden on vehicles
with a large amount of occupant
headroom.
Under our proposal, no roof
component or portion of the test device
could contact the head or neck of a
seated Hybrid III 50th percentile adult
male dummy during the specified test.
We believed that this direct headroom
reduction limit would ensure that
motorists receive an adequate level of
roof crush protection regardless of the
type of vehicle in which they ride. We
included a definition of the term ‘‘roof
component’’ as part of the proposal.
We noted a concern that there may be
some low roofline vehicles in which the
50th percentile Hybrid III dummy
would have relatively little available
headroom when positioned properly in
the seat. That is, we were concerned
that, in some limited circumstances, the
headroom between the head of a 50th
percentile male dummy and the roof
liner is so small that even minimal
deformation resulting from the
application of the required force would
lead to test failure. We requested
comments on whether any additional or
substitute requirements would be
appropriate for low roofline vehicles.
In the NPRM, the agency estimated
benefits based on post-crash headroom,
the only basis for which a statistical
relationship with injury reduction had
been established. In our January 2008
SNPRM, we explained that with
additional years of available data, a
statistically significant relationship
between intrusion and injury for belted
occupants had been established. A
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study regarding this relationship was
placed in the docket.19
We also noted in the January 2008
SNPRM that in the most recent agency
testing, headroom reduction had been
assessed using a head positioning
fixture (HPF) in lieu of a 50th percentile
adult male dummy. We stated that
reports on these tests explain the
procedure and type of fixture used to
assess headroom reduction, and that the
test reports were being made available
to the public. We noted further that the
agency was considering whether this
fixture should be specified in the final
rule.
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Comments
The agency received a variety of
comments on the proposed headroom
reduction criterion.
One group of commenters, including
safety advocacy organizations, generally
supported adding a headroom reduction
criterion but, in some cases, argued that
a platen travel criterion is also needed.
Some of these commenters also argued
that these criteria should be made more
stringent to protect taller occupants.
Another group of commenters,
including vehicle manufacturers, urged
the agency to retain the current platen
travel criterion instead of adopting a
headroom reduction criterion. They
argued, among other things, that using
the headroom reduction criterion would
add unnecessary complexity to the test
procedure and result in problems
related to repeatability and
practicability.
Specific issues raised by commenters
include:
Repeatability and practicability
issues. Several commenters, including
the Alliance, DaimlerChrysler, GM,
Ford, and Porsche, cited concerns
related to reliability and practicability of
using a test dummy for purposes of the
FMVSS No. 216 quasi-static test.
DaimlerChrysler, Ford and GM stated
that variations in test dummy placement
cause variability in the distance
between the dummy head and the roof
side rails. In test results cited by GM,
horizontal and vertical variations of an
inch or more occurred in the dummy’s
seating position. GM stated that this
variability is further complicated when
vehicles with different trim and seating
options (cloth or leather, manual or
power adjusters) are provided using the
same vehicle architecture structure. It
suggested that such options add to the
variability and make the proposed
19 Strashny, Alexander, ‘‘The Role of Vertical
Roof Intrusion and Post-Crash Headroom in
Predicting Roof Contact Injuries to the Head, Neck,
or Face during FMVSS 216 Rollovers.’’
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requirement of measuring roof crush
resistance with a seated Hybrid III
dummy non-repeatable and
impracticable.
Porsche also expressed concern with
controlling unwanted movement of the
dummy with its roof crush test set-up.
The Porsche roof crush test procedure
rotates the vehicle by 90 degrees
because their platen press applies a load
parallel to the ground. The dummy is
not fixed into position and, as a result,
would rotate and not be properly
positioned.
Complexity. IIHS stated that relating
the allowable amount of roof crush in
the quasi-static test to the headroom in
specific vehicles is a good concept but
that, in practice, the agency’s research
tests have not shown that replacing the
127 mm (5 inch) platen travel criterion
with the headroom requirement would
be a meaningful change to the standard
and may not justify the added
complications to the test procedure.
Possible conflicts with FMVSS No.
201 ‘‘Occupant protection in interior
impact.’’ A number of commenters,
including DaimlerChrysler, Ford, GM,
Ferrari and Toyota commented that the
proposed headroom requirement
conflicts with the intent of the upper
interior requirements of FMVSS No.
201, Occupant Protection in Interior
Impact. DaimlerChrysler and GM stated
that FMVSS No. 201U 20
countermeasures have been specifically
developed to manage head impact
energy and mitigate injury potential by
the dissipation of the impact energy
through deformation of the trim and
FMVSS No. 201U countermeasures
themselves. Ford stated that head
impact mitigation technologies often
result in the upper interior trim,
particularly the roof side rail trim, being
closer to the head of occupants, thereby
reducing the available distance for
achieving the SWR requirement prior to
headform contact. It stated that these
technologies are designed to reduce the
likelihood of head impact injuries, and
that the proposed no-contact
requirement does not account for the
potential benefits of these technologies
in a roof deformation situation. GM
further stated that NHTSA’s headroom
analysis does not establish a correlation
between injuries and head contact with
trim components.
Effects on vehicle manufacturing
process GM stated that since the vehicle
roof structure is designed very early in
the vehicle development process, it is
not possible to reliably predict the
20 FMVSS 201U, refers to those aspects of FMVSS
No. 201 pertaining to the upper interior trim head
protection requirements.
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performance or movement of interior
trim in a roof crush test. It stated that
structural designs must be completed
early in the vehicle development
process to facilitate tooling lead time.
According to GM, the interior trim
components (included in the proposed
definition of roof component) are not
designed in final form until much later
in the vehicle development process.
Therefore, according to that commenter,
the roof structure force deflection
characteristics are defined (and roof
crush properties established) before
manufacturers can take into account the
package space and deformation
requirements of the interior trim.
Reduced stringency of the standard
Several commenters, including Public
Citizen, IIHS, and LSMM expressed
concern that the proposed head contact
criteria could reduce the residual
occupant headroom required after
testing, be less stringent for vehicles
with existing headroom greater than 127
mm (5 inches), and thereby allow more
than 127 mm (5 inches) of crush. As a
result, according to these commenters,
the stringency would be reduced for
vehicles with greater than 127 mm (5
inches) of headroom, such as many
trucks and Sport Utility Vehicles
(SUVs). We note that Ford commented
that most of its light trucks,
multipurpose passenger vehicles and
vans (LTVs) have more than 127 mm (5
inches) of platen travel prior to head
contact, while passenger cars generally
have less.
Alternative headroom requirement
approaches A number of commenters
recommended alternative approaches to
the proposed headroom requirement.
Biomech Incorporated (Biomech)
suggested using a one gravity static
inversion test (using the FMVSS No. 301
fixture) to learn where the inverted
dummy head position would be. It
suggested that deformation in the roof
crush test should not be permitted to
reach the measured position of the
inverted dummy’s head.
GM, DaimlerChrysler, Toyota, Ferrari
and Porsche recommended that if the
agency establishes a headroom
reduction criterion, it consider using a
headform position procedure (HPF) that
essentially represents a headform
secured to an adjustable vertical support
that is rigidly attached to the floor pan
of the tested vehicle at the seat
anchorages.
A number of these commenters also
suggested that the agency consider
removing any roof trim components
(i.e., all headliner, trim, deployable
countermeasures and grab handles)
prior to testing. Further, these
commenters also recommended that
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head contact with the roof structure
itself be the only assessment criteria for
compliance certification. GM
recommended that manufacturers
provide the headform location to
NHTSA prior to a compliance test based
upon the nominal design seating
positions. Toyota, by contrast,
recommended the agency determine the
location for the 50th percentile male
head position with the Head Restraint
Measuring Device (HRMD) 21 after first
determining the H-point using the SAE
J826 procedure, and then position the
headform in the vehicle.
DaimlerChrysler recommended
verifying compliance by a 200 N (44
pounds) resultant contact force in the
upper neck load cell of a 50th percentile
adult male Hybrid III head fixture at the
location specified in the NPRM.
DaimlerChrysler recommended that in
the event the platen does not stop
quickly enough after the resultant neck
force reaches 200 N (44 pounds); the
head fixture should be designed to
either withdraw or become compliant
by using a force limiting device in order
to prevent any damage to the load cell
in the dummy’s head. GM also
recommended a similar approach and
suggested the agency consider a range of
loads on the headform of 100 N (22
pounds) to 400 N (88 pounds).
Advocates recommended a maximum
intrusion limit of no more than 76.2 mm
(3 inches) in order to protect occupants
taller than the 50th percentile male.
Public Citizen recommended that
NHTSA require that vehicle roof
structures resist more than 76.2 mm (3
inches) of roof crush, and maintain the
minimum amount of headroom
proposed in the NPRM in order to
reduce side window breakage and
prevent B-pillar deformation, which it
believes can alter seat belt geometry.
ARCCA, Mr. Slavik and the Advocates
also recommended the agency use a
95th percentile adult male dummy
instead of the smaller 50th percentile
male to increase the stringency of the
standard and further limit intrusion.
Testing with HPF: As noted above, the
agency indicated in the SNPRM that it
was considering whether to specify a
test using a HPF in the final rule. We
received a number of comments
concerning this issue.
The Alliance reiterated its
recommendation that NHTSA maintain
the use of the 127 mm (5 inch) platen
travel criterion. That organization stated
that it does not support a ‘‘no head
21 HRMD means the SAE J826 three-dimensional
manikin with a headform attached, representing the
head position of a seated 50th percentile male, with
sliding scale at the back of the head for the purpose
of measuring head restraint backset.
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15:39 May 11, 2009
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contact’’ criterion, whether it is
determined by use of a test dummy or
via the use of an HPF with an associated
contact force. The Alliance stated that
the platen travel requirement would
yield essentially the same roof strength
and avoid unnecessary test-to-test
variability and testing complexity. That
organization stated that if the agency
adopts a head contact criterion in the
final rule, it is essential that the head
contact device be a headform on a stand
located at a position specified by the
manufacturer and not a crash test
dummy or a headform located based on
what it claimed would be very
unreliable and unrepeatable location
data estimated from a test dummy or
SAE J826 manikin (OSCAR) location.
The Alliance stated that possible use of
a 222 N (50 pound) contact criterion has
not been supported by any scientific
data.
In commenting on the SNPRM, GM
stated that use of the 127 mm (5 inch)
platen travel criterion rather than either
a dummy or head contact fixture is
required to prevent unnecessary test
variation and complication while
maintaining a comparable level of
stringency.
AIAM did not endorse the HPF
approach but suggested that the fixture
might be equipped to measure neck
load, to exclude incidental contact with
trim items.
Public Citizen stated that defining
head contact with the HPF by using
force-deflection criteria would result in
a significant number of front seat
occupants suffering head and neck
injuries.
Agency Response
After carefully considering the
comments, the agency has decided to
adopt the proposed headroom
requirement, but with a different test
procedure. Instead of specifying a
procedure using a seated Hybrid III
adult male dummy, we are specifying
use of a HPF that positions the
headform at the location of a 50th
percentile adult male. To help ensure
objectivity and in light of concerns
about incidental contact with trim, head
contact is defined as occurring when a
222 N (50 pound) resultant load is
measured by a load cell on the HPF.
Finally, to better ensure safety, we are
retaining the current 127 mm (5 inch)
platen travel requirement as well as
adopting a headroom requirement.
Primary Rationale: At the time of the
NPRM, the agency estimated benefits
based on post-crash headroom, the only
basis for which a statistical relationship
with injury reduction had been
established. After the NPRM, with
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22363
additional years of data available, a
statistically significant relationship
between intrusion and injury for belted
occupants was established.
NHTSA cited its new headroom and
roof intrusion analysis 22 in the SNPRM.
The agency added two years of NASS–
CDS data to each analysis and found a
new, stronger negative correlation
between post-crash headroom and
maximum injury severity of head, neck
or face from roof contact. Also, for the
first time, the agency was able to find a
statistically significant correlation
between vertical roof intrusion and
head, neck, or face injury from roof
contact. Based upon this new analysis,
we believe that maintaining headroom,
as well as restricting the amount of
intrusion (retaining the platen travel
requirement) will yield benefits in
rollover crashes. Therefore, we believe
both criteria should be included in the
final rule.
Commenters opposing adoption of a
headroom requirement raised a number
of concerns, including ones related to
the test procedure, practicability
concerns, and whether a headroom
requirement would result in benefits
beyond those of the platen travel
requirement. The issues related to the
test procedure and practicability
concerns are addressed below.
As to the issue of additional benefits
associated with the headroom criterion,
we note that, based on our testing, in the
vast majority of vehicles it is likely that
the limit on platen travel will be
encountered before the one on
headroom reduction. For these vehicles,
the new requirement will not pose any
significant challenges for manufacturers,
particularly in light of the changes we
are making in the test procedure.
However, as we also consider vehicles
with less headroom and potential future
vehicles, we believe there is a need to
adopt a headroom reduction
requirement to help ensure post-crash
survival space.
In the NPRM, we raised a concern that
for vehicles with greater than 127 mm
(5 inches) of headroom, limiting platen
travel to 127 mm (5 inches) may impose
a needless burden on these vehicles.
However, manufacturers generally
supported retaining the platen travel
limit, suggesting that the requirement is
not burdensome. Moreover, as indicated
above, we now have a new analysis
showing a statistically significant
relationship between intrusion and
injury for belted occupants.
Basic Test Procedure for Measuring
Head Contact: To help analyze
comments raising repeatability concerns
22 ibid
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with the Hybrid III dummy and
identifying when head contact occurred,
the agency conducted a series of tests
using alternative approaches. In the first
series of tests conducted at NHTSA’s
Vehicle Research and Test Center
(VRTC), the agency used a head
positioning fixture developed by GM
(GM–HPF).23 The GM–HPF is a
headform secured to an adjustable
vertical support that is rigidly attached
to the floor pan at the seat anchorages.
The GM–HPF rigidly holds a headform
in the location of a normally-seated 50th
percentile male head and measures the
load on the headform from contact with
the interior roof as it is crushed.
The headform consists of a skull,
headskin, and 6-axis upper neck load
cell from a 50th percentile male HybridIII dummy (Part 572, subpart E). This
assembly is mounted to the end of a
channeled square tube (upper post). A
second, similar tube (lower post) is
perpendicularly mounted to a
rectangular aluminum mounting plate.
The upper and lower posts attach to
each other and are parallel. The upper
post can slide along the lower post. This
provides vertical adjustment of the
headform once the fixture is mounted in
the vehicle. The GM–HPF also includes
four metal support straps that attach
between the upper/lower post and the
mounting plate, in a pyramid
configuration. These straps provide
rigidity to the fixture and are attached
after final positioning of the headform.
In the testing conducted at VRTC,24
the head position of a normally seated
50th percentile male Hybrid-III dummy
was determined by placing the seat at
the mid-track position and using the
SAE J826 (OSCAR) device to locate the
H-point. A 50th percentile male HybridIII dummy was then positioned per the
FMVSS No. 208 seating procedure and
the head location was documented
using a 3-dimensional measurement
device. The dummy and seat were then
removed. The GM–HPF mounting plate
was attached to the vehicle floor and the
headform was then raised until its
vertical position matched that
determined from dummy placement.
After gaining experience with the
GM–HPF, the agency developed its own,
simpler HPF approach for evaluating
post crash headroom. In doing so, the
agency determined that it is not
necessary to use a test device with the
complexity of a headform based on the
Hybrid III dummy head, given the
nature of the performance criterion
being measured. Earlier testing had
Docket Number NHTSA–2005–22143–195
docket entry NHTSA 2008–0015–003 for
the vehicles tested with the GM–HPF.
shown that the skin on the Hybrid III
dummy’s head added a level of testing
complexity that was unnecessary to the
goal of identifying when roof contact
occurs at a point in space. Therefore, the
agency developed a simpler HPF using
an FMVSS No. 201 headform that is
currently used for testing instrument
panels and seat backs. (This headform is
effectively a 16.5 cm (6.5 inch) diameter
metallic hemisphere).
During roof crush test series
conducted at General Testing
Laboratories,25 the HPF was developed
by mounting the FMVSS No. 201
headform to a cantilevered levering arm
which was then attached to a tri-pod.
The levering arm was maintained in
position by air pressure and designed to
collapse after a 222 N (50 pound) load
was applied. The purpose of the
cantilever design was to allow some
downward movement so as not to
damage the device after head contact is
reached. The HPF was positioned in the
vehicle at the 50th percentile male head
position using the FMVSS No. 214
seating procedure recently adopted (72
FR 51908) and modified to use the
OSCAR with a Head Restraint
Measuring Device attached for
repeatable placement. The HPF tri-pod
apparatus was then rigidly secured to
the floor of the vehicle. The FMVSS No.
201 headform was mounted on a 3-axis
dummy neck load cell, and all loads and
moments were recorded. The roof was
then crushed until the unmodified
interior roof made contact with the HPF
and the resultant load, as measured by
the load cell, exceeded 222 N (50
pounds). During our evaluation we
defined ‘‘head contact’’ as occurring
when a 222 N (50 pound) load is
applied to the sphere, in the belief that
this load level would correspond to
structural roof contact rather than
interior trim components coming loose.
This was consistent with comments
from DaimlerChrysler and GM that used
a force load approach as a reliable
method of identifying head contact and
removing the uncertainty of random
interior trim contact.
Our test experience with the simpler
HPF proved to be repeatable in the tests
and easier than using the Hybrid III
dummy itself during the test.
We believe specification of the HPF
appropriately addresses commenters’
concerns regarding variability with
regard to locating the dummy’s head.
With the HPF rigidly fixed to the
vehicle, we also believe this addresses
the concerns of manufacturers, such as
Porsche, which alter the attitude of the
23 See
24 See
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25 See report Two-Sided Roof Crush Testing
Analysis placed in the docket with this notice.
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vehicle with respect to the load press
when conducting roof crush tests.
Because head contact is defined as a
load on the headform, the test result is
more objective/repeatable, and not
sensitive to incidental contact with
interior surfaces that may disengage
during testing.
We disagree with comments from
manufacturers that recommended the
removal of the roof’s interior trim prior
to testing in order to simplify the
procedure. The agency’s headroom
analysis established a correlation
between injuries and head contact with
a NASS–CDS roof component when the
injury source was the A–Pillar, B–Pillar,
front or rear header, roof rail or the roof
itself. These interior surfaces are
considered interior trim. We believe
they should be factored in when
considering the available headroom in
the test. By defining head contact as
occurring when a 222 N (50 pound) load
is applied to the headform, we are
addressing concerns about incidental
contact with trim. This definition of
head contact also addresses concerns
about possible conflicts with the intent
of FMVSS No. 201U, with respect to
concerns with incidental contact. If the
headform experiences a 222 N (50
pound) load, the contact is not
incidental and there is a safety issue
related to available headroom.
We also disagree with comments from
manufacturers recommending that the
head contact device be a headform on a
stand located at a position specified by
the manufacturer and not a crash test
dummy or a headform located based on
SAE J826 manikin (OSCAR) location.
The HPF test procedure (as would a test
procedure using a test dummy)
measures head contact in the vehicle
being tested. However, the approach of
using a headform on a stand located at
a position specified by the manufacturer
would not necessarily represent the
actual vehicle build.
We note that the SAE J826 mannequin
has long been incorporated in NHTSA’s
safety standards for purposes of
determining the H-point location. Issues
concerning the accuracy of
measurements using this device and the
HRMD were addressed at length in our
rulemaking upgrading our head
restraints standard. Manufacturers can
address concerns about different trim
and seating options by factoring in the
location where the headform (and also
the head of a typical average size male
occupant) will be under those different
options.
Definition of head contact:
As noted above, the Alliance stated
that possible use of a 222 N (50 pound)
contact criterion has not been supported
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by any scientific data. Public Citizen
expressed concern that defining head
contact with the HPF by means of forcedeflection criteria would result in a
significant number of front seat
occupants suffering head and neck
injuries.
We note that the load as defined is not
intended to be an injury criterion, for
which one would expect supporting
scientific data, but is instead simply an
objective way of defining head contact
and avoiding treating incidental contact
with loose trim as head contact. Our
testing has shown, on average, once
physical contact between the interior
roof trim and the headform occurred
resulting in the onset of a load on the
headform, the platen traveled 6 mm
(0.24 inches) prior to the load reaching
220 N (50 pounds). Therefore, we do not
expect increased head and neck injuries
from this approach. Moreover, retention
of the current platen travel requirement
will also prevent such increased
injuries. We selected the 222 N (50
pound) contact criterion based on
comments from GM and
DaimlerChrysler and our own testing
experience.
Possible Reduced Stringency:
IIHS, LSMM and Public Citizen
expressed concern that if the platen
travel requirement were not retained in
addition to adopting the headroom
criterion, adoption of the proposed
headroom criterion would represent a
decrease in stringency for the standard’s
performance criterion. This is not an
issue since we are retaining the platen
travel requirement.
Possible more restrictive
requirements. We disagree with
commenters which recommended that
the agency reduce the platen travel
requirement to 76.3 mm (3 inches).
On average, the vehicles the agency
has tested have reached the maximum
SWR in 90 mm (3.5 inches) of platen
travel. A requirement for reduced platen
travel would represent an increase in
stringency and, in many respects, would
be similar to a requirement for a higher
SWR. We note that the agency has
already been considering the possibility
of a higher SWR, as well as two-sided
test requirement, which would also
increase stringency. We have not
conducted testing to analyze the
appropriateness of applying a 3 inch
platen travel requirement to all vehicles.
However, we believe the other issues we
have considered ensure an appropriate
level of stringency.
We also do not agree with
commenters recommending the use of
the 95th percentile dummy (or
equivalent HPF) for measuring head
contact. Restricting headroom to a 95th
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percentile occupant is similar to
limiting the platen displacement to 76.3
mm (3 inches) in increasing stringency.
As indicated above, we believe the other
issues we have considered ensure an
appropriate level of stringency.
Moreover, we believe that the
relationship between vehicle headroom
and occupant size is insignificant in
most cases. It is likely that taller front
seat occupants adjust the seat positions
to prevent uncomfortable proximity to
the roof such as by lowering the seat
cushion bottom, increasing the seat back
angle and/or adjusting the seat position
further rearward.
Low roofline vehicles: In the NPRM,
we discussed possible concerns with
vehicles that have relatively little
available headroom when the 50th
percentile adult male dummy is
positioned properly in the seat. Vehicles
with these aerodynamically sloped roofs
will hereafter be referred as ‘‘low
roofline vehicles.’’ We stated that we
were concerned that, in some limited
circumstances, the headroom between
the head of a 50th percentile male
dummy and the interior headliner is so
small that even minimal deformation
resulting from the application of the
required force would lead to test failure.
NHTSA requested comments on
whether any additional or substitute
requirements would be appropriate for
low roofline vehicles in order to make
the standard practicable.
Several commenters, including
DaimlerChrysler, Ford, Porsche,
Mitsubishi Motors R&D of America, Inc.
(Mitsubishi) and Hyundai America
Technical Center, Inc. (Hyundai),
provided comments on low roofline
vehicles. The commenters
recommended that the requirements be
limited to 127 mm (5 inches) of
deflection for a load of 2.5 SWR in order
to minimize the negative impact on
continued availability of this type of
vehicle if the agency were to adopt a
headroom requirement. DaimlerChrysler
stated that the proposed standard was
not reasonable, practicable and
appropriate for these types of motor
vehicles as required by the Motor
Vehicle Safety Act. It further stated that
the agency had not demonstrated in the
NPRM or the PRIA, the feasibility of
going beyond 1.5 times the UVW in roof
strength without head contact for
vehicles with steeply raked windshields
and reduced headroom.
DaimlerChrysler suggested its
recommendation would be applicable to
the Chrysler Crossfire, Dodge Viper, and
McLaren Mercedes models and
successors, which are generally
designed with a steeply raked
windshield and a low roofline for
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22365
reduced frontal area and low drag. It
further stated that this modified
requirement should also apply to other
kinds of vehicles, such as any two-seater
that is designed with a more
aggressively raked windshield.
DaimlerChrysler recommended that
vehicles of this type could be identified
or defined based on a set of
characteristics such as the Static
Stability Factor (SSF) (e.g., ≥1.4), NCAP
rollover rating (e.g., ≥4 stars), height-towidth ratio (e.g., ≤0.75), windshield rake
angle, vehicle height, etc.
Ford stated that low roofline vehicles
are not the only vehicles that have
problems with limited headform
clearance. It stated that vehicles that
may be considered as ‘‘high roofline’’
can also have limited headform-to-roof
clearance due to interior package
design. Based on the interior package
design of a particular vehicle, regardless
of roof line characteristics, the critical
dimension (distance between the
outboard side of dummy’s headform and
the roof side rail trim) can be minimal.
Mitsubishi commented that headformto-roof clearance is a concern for not
only low roofline vehicles but may be
more generically classified as being an
issue for limited headroom vehicles.
Porsche expressed concern that low
roofline vehicles have less opportunity
for enhanced roof structures because the
focus on performance and aerodynamics
virtually eliminates the option of taller
pillar supports.
Hyundai stated it will be challenging
for low roofline vehicles and
particularly two door coupe vehicles to
meet the upgraded standard because of
the lack of headroom and the possibility
the B-pillar may not be loaded because
it is further away from the A-pillar
compared to a sedan. It requested that
the agency define a low roofline vehicle
to explicitly include two-door coupe
vehicles in the definition. It also
requested that these types of vehicles be
allowed to meet the current
requirements until it can be
demonstrated that practicability with
the upgrade is feasible.
Based on its analysis, the agency
believes the requirements it is adopting
will not create new problems for low
roofline vehicles. In our most recent
two-sided research program, the agency
tested a 2006 Chrysler Crossfire, a
vehicle identified as a low roofline
vehicle. During the first-side test, the
vehicle had a peak SWR of 2.9 at 97 mm
(3.85 inches) of platen displacement.
Head contact based upon our criteria
(222 N load on the headform) occurred
at 107 mm (4.21 inches) of platen travel.
This showed the maximum SWR was
reached prior to head contact. On the
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second side, the Crossfire reached a 2.7
SWR prior to head contact at 135 mm
(5.31 inches) of platen travel.
The agency tested another low
roofline vehicle, the 2007 Scion tC. This
vehicle achieved a maximum SWR of
4.6 on the first side at 113.3 mm (4.46
inches) of platen travel. Head contact
occurred at 119 mm (4.68 inches) of
platen travel. On the second side, the
Scion achieved a 4.1 SWR prior to head
contact at 95.0 mm (3.74 inches) of
platen travel. From these tests we
believe it is feasible and practicable for
smaller vehicles with less initial
headroom to meet the requirements.
Since both are two-door vehicles, we
disagree with Hyundai’s assertion that
two-door vehicles pose an unreasonable
challenge.
We agree with Ford’s observations
that some vehicles that may appear to be
‘‘high roofline’’ vehicles, but may
experience head contact in less platen
travel than a ‘‘low roofline’’ vehicle. The
2007 Buick Lucerne, a large full size
vehicle reached a maximum SWR of 2.3
at a platen displacement of 110 mm
(4.33 inches). The vehicle did not reach
the proposed SWR of 2.5. In this test,
platen travel at head contact was less
than the Crossfire. Therefore, the
arguments being made for excluding
low roofline vehicles may not be unique
to low roofline vehicles. Ford’s
comments also illustrate the difficulty
in identifying what is or is not a low
roofline vehicle.
DaimlerChrysler suggested SSF or
other vehicle parameters could be used
to define low roofline vehicles and
exclude them from the headroom
requirement. However, we believe that
this exclusion is not warranted based on
our testing. Moreover, we are concerned
about the safety impact of unnecessarily
excluding vehicles from the upgraded
requirements.
6. Leadtime and Phase-In
NHTSA proposed that manufacturers
be required to comply with the new
requirements three years after the
issuance of the final rule. At that time,
based upon vehicle testing, we
estimated that 68 percent of the current
fleet already complied with the
proposed roof strength criteria. We
anticipated the proposal would not
require fleet-wide roof structural
changes and believed the manufacturers
had engineering and manufacturing
resources to meet the new requirements
within that timeframe.
In commenting on the NPRM, vehicle
manufacturers and their associations
argued that additional leadtime was
needed, and that a significantly greater
portion of the fleet would require
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redesign than estimated by the agency.
The Alliance, Ford and GM stated that
approximately 60 percent of their fleets
would need to be redesigned, and
Hyundai commented that 75 percent of
its vehicles would need changes to
comply with the requirements.
Toyota, Ford, GM, Hyundai, Nissan
and DaimlerChrysler stated that the
agency underestimated the necessary
modifications to vehicle design and
manufacturing challenges that must be
overcome to comply with the proposal.
Ford, GM, DaimlerChrysler, and Toyota
stated that the challenges are especially
true for heavier vehicle over 2,722 kg
(6,000 pounds) GVWR which have not
been required to meet FMVSS No. 216.
GM and Ford stated that they rely on
outside suppliers for advanced high
strength material and currently there is
an insufficient supply base for high
strength steel. They also cited
significant manufacturing challenges
that must be overcome to adapt ultra
high strength steel to the mass
production environment. They argued
that leadtime with a phase-in is
necessary to permit growth in the
supply base and allow the
manufacturers to resolve
manufacturability issues for high
volume production requirements.
The vehicle manufacturers generally
requested a 3-year leadtime followed by
a multi-year phase-in. Most supported a
minimum 3-year phase-in. GM
requested a 4-year phase-in period, and
DaimlerChrysler requested a 5-year
phase-in only for vehicles over 3,855 kg
(8,500 pounds). The AIAM requested
compliance credits for an early phase in,
while the Alliance, Ford and Mitsubishi
requested carryforward credits. The
AIAM and Ferrari requested that small
volume manufacturers be permitted to
comply at the end of the phase-in due
to compliance difficulties, long product
cycles and cost penalties associated
with running structural changes to
vehicle programs.
In commenting on the SNPRM, the
Alliance reiterated points made in its
comment on the NPRM, stating that the
final rule needs to provide at least three
years initial leadtime followed by a
multi-year phase-in with carryforward
credits. It stated that additional time is
needed if the agency adopted the
proposed head contact criterion, a twoside test requirement, or an SWR higher
than 2.5. Ford suggested that if the
agency adopted a more stringent
requirement than the one it focused on
in the NPRM, that vehicles meeting a
2.5 SWR/one-sided test requirement
earn compliance credits before and
during the phase-in.
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Agency Decision/Response
After carefully considering the
comments and available information,
and for the reasons discussed below, we
have decided to adopt different
implementation schedules for vehicles
with a GVWR of 2,722 kilograms (6,000
pounds) or less, i.e., the vehicles
currently covered by FMVSS No. 216,
and those with a higher GVWR. The
implementation schedules we are
adopting are as follows:
Passenger cars, multipurpose
passenger vehicles, trucks and buses
with a GVWR of 2,722 kilograms (6,000
pounds) or less. We are adopting a
phase-in of the upgraded roof crush
resistance requirements for these
vehicles. The phase-in requirement for
manufacturers of these vehicles (with
certain exceptions) is as follows:
—25 percent of the vehicles
manufactured during the period from
September 1, 2012 to August 31, 2013;
—50 percent of the vehicles
manufactured during the period from
September 1, 2013 to August 31, 2014;
—75 percent of the vehicles
manufactured during the period from
September 1, 2014 to August 31, 2015;
—100 percent of light vehicles
manufactured on or after September 1,
2015.
Credits may be earned during the
phase-in, i.e., beginning September 1,
2012, and carried forward through
August 31, 2015.
Small volume manufacturers are not
subject to the phase-in but must meet
the requirements beginning on
September 1, 2015. Vehicles produced
in more than one stage and altered
vehicles must meet the upgraded
requirements beginning September 1,
2016.
Multipurpose passenger vehicles,
trucks and buses with a GVWR greater
than 2,722 kilograms (6,000 pounds)
and less than or equal to 4,536
kilograms (10,000 pounds). All of these
vehicles must meet the requirements
beginning September 1, 2016,26 with the
following exceptions. Vehicles
produced in more than one stage and
altered vehicles must meet the
requirements beginning September 1,
2017.
Our rationale for this implementation
schedule is as follows.
As discussed in the FRIA, a
significantly larger proportion of the
vehicle fleet will require changes than
estimated at the time of the NPRM. This
26 If heavier vehicles are designed to meet the
new requirements early, their production volumes
are not to be included when calculating the light
vehicle fleet phase-in percent compliance. The
phase-in schedule for the two fleets are separate.
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would be true even for a 2.5 SWR/onesided test requirement, and the
proportion is higher for the 3.0 SWR/
two-sided requirement. We therefore
agree that a combination of
approximately three years leadtime plus
a multi-year phase-in is appropriate.
In developing the implementation
schedule, we have considered costs and
benefits. The vast majority of the
benefits of the rule come from vehicles
with a GVWR of 2,722 kilograms (6,000
pounds) and less. Of the 135 fatalities
that will be prevented each year, 133
will come from these lighter vehicles.
Moreover, the lighter vehicles are
generally redesigned more often than
the heavier vehicles. Also,
manufacturers are familiar with
designing and testing the lighter
vehicles to meet the current FMVSS No.
216 requirements.
In order to implement the upgraded
requirements in a cost effective manner,
we believe it is appropriate to provide
approximately three years of leadtime
coupled with a 25 percent/50 percent/
75 percent/100 percent phase-in for the
lighter vehicles, and longer leadtime for
the heavier vehicles. The benefits for the
heavier vehicles are relatively small,
and approximately seven years leadtime
will generally permit manufacturers to
improve roof strength at the same time
they redesign these vehicles for other
purposes.
While vehicle manufacturers made
varying recommendations for the
specific provisions of a phase-in, the
phase-in we are adopting for lighter
vehicles is within the general range of
those recommendations. We recognize
that manufacturers argued that longer
leadtime should be provided for
requirements more stringent than a 2.5
SWR/one-sided test requirement.
However, while the 3.0 SWR/two-sided
test requirement will increase the
number of vehicles requiring redesign
and the specific countermeasures that
are needed, we believe that
approximately three years of leadtime
coupled with a 25 percent/50 percent/
75 percent/100 percent phase-in
provides sufficient time for
manufacturers to make these changes.
We note that the vehicles likely to
present the greatest design challenges
under our proposal were the ones with
a GVWR above 2,722 kilograms (6,000
pounds), for which we are providing
longer leadtime and a lower SWR
requirement. Vehicle manufacturers
have not provided persuasive evidence
that longer leadtime is needed, or that
a less stringent requirement should be
established for an initial period.
We believe that providing for carry
forward credits during the phase-in, but
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not the earning of advance credits prior
to the beginning of the phase-in,
balances encouraging early compliance
and manufacturer flexibility with also
encouraging manufacturers to continue
to improve roof strength during the
years of the phase-in.
As with a number of other
rulemakings, we are establishing special
requirements for small volume
manufacturers and for vehicles
produced in more than one stage and
altered vehicles.
Given the leadtime needed for
manufacturers to redesign their vehicles
to meet the upgraded roof crush
requirements, we find good cause for
the compliance dates included in this
document.
b. Aspects of the Test Procedure
1. Tie-down Procedure
In the NPRM, we proposed to revise
the vehicle tie-down procedure in order
to improve test repeatability.
Specifically, we proposed to specify that
the vehicle be secured with four vertical
supports welded or fixed to both the
vehicle and the test fixture. If the
vehicle support locations are not
metallic, a suitable epoxy or an adhesive
could be used in place of welding.
Under the proposal, the vertical
supports would be located at the
manufacturers’ designated jack points. If
the jack points were not sufficiently
defined, the vertical supports would be
located between the front and rear axles
on the vehicle body or frame such that
the distance between the fore and aft
locations was maximized. If the jack
points were located on the axles or
suspension members, the vertical stands
would be located between the front and
rear axles on the vehicle body or frame
such that the distance between the fore
and aft locations was maximized. All
non-rigid body mounts would be made
rigid to prevent motion of the vehicle
body relative to the vehicle frame.
We explained that we believed this
method of securing the vehicle would
increase test repeatability. Welding the
support stands to the vehicle would
reduce testing complexity and
variability of results associated with the
use of chains and jackstands. We also
stated that we believed that using the
jacking point for vertical support
attachment is appropriate because the
jacking points are designed to
accommodate attachments and
withstand certain loads without
damaging the vehicle.
Comments
Commenters on the proposed tiedown procedure included the Alliance,
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DaimlerChrysler, Ford, GM, Toyota,
AIAM, Mr. Chu, Hyundai and BMW
Group (BMW). A number of commenters
agreed with the agency’s intention to
revise the tie-down procedure for the
quasi-static test to improve test
repeatability. However, manufacturers
raised specific concerns about the
proposed procedure. AIAM, Mr. Chu,
Hyundai and BMW alternatively
recommended retention of the current
tie-down procedure. Advocates and
SAFE supported the revised tie-down
procedure because it has the potential to
ensure less vehicle movement during
testing.
Ford suggested that the proposed tiedown procedure can cause localized,
unrealistic floor pan deformations that
can reduce the measured strength of the
roof. The Alliance, DaimlerChrysler,
Ford, GM and Toyota recommended
providing one vehicle support per
vehicle pillar. However, they
recommended placing the support along
the sill, as opposed to the jack points,
since they stated that jack points are not
designed to withstand the forces
generated during a roof crush test. The
commenters suggested that this would
minimize unwanted body displacement
by providing a direct load path during
testing which the proposal does not
address. For body-on-frame vehicles,
DaimlerChrysler also recommended
support of the vehicle frame, in addition
to the pillar supports, to further prevent
sag of the body. In the event that the
agency adopts the practice of supporting
the body at the pillars, the Alliance,
GM, and BMW also requested that a
minimum area of support be provided to
avoid concentrated loading.
The Alliance, BMW and Ford also had
concerns about welding supports to the
vehicle body. The commenters stated
that welding could decrease the material
properties of the body reducing the
measured roof strength, and welding
might not be practical or possible for
non-ferrous or composite materials.
BMW alternatively recommended
clamping instead of welding, citing
concerns about welding certain
materials and the possibility of failure of
the sills due to the welding. Ford
recommended contacting the
manufacturer for instructions about
welding aluminum sills, if the agency
proceeded with the welding protocol.
AIAM, Mr. Chu, Hyundai and Nissan
recommended maintaining the existing
procedure that supports the entire
length of the sill in order to reduce
complexities and unwanted body
deformation with the tie-down proposal.
Nissan suggested supporting the
wheelbase at the sill flange pinch welds
between the two channels that grab the
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pinch weld on the bottom of the sill.
The side sill flange would be
constrained to prevent transverse body
movement when tested. Hyundai
recommended that the current
procedure be permitted at the
manufacturer’s option since it believes
the revised tie down procedure is
burdensome. DaimlerChrysler and
Toyota also recommended continuous
mounting along the sills suggesting this
would prevent unwanted body
deformation at the jack point locations.
For vehicles without B-pillars, the
Alliance, Ford, and GM recommended
that a support be placed at the seam
between the doors as if a pillar existed
between the doors. The Alliance stated
that doors connected without a pillar
often have reinforcements to
compensate for the structure that would
be afforded by a pillar if it were part of
the vehicle design, and therefore, the
joint between the doors will act as one
of the direct load paths from the roof to
the rocker. Without a support at the
door joint, the Alliance suggested that
the roof strength cannot be accurately
measured in these types of vehicles.
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Agency Response
As part of analyzing the comments on
the proposed tie-down procedure for the
quasi-static test, the agency conducted
analytical simulations using a finite
element model on a late model Ford
Explorer.27 First the agency performed
an analysis of the proposed procedure
where the vehicle was supported at the
jack locations. Two additional models
were also developed to evaluate
supporting the vehicle body under the
pillars and continuously along the
length of the body sill, as the
commenters suggested.
The Ford Explorer was modeled
because it is a body-on-frame 28 vehicle,
and according to the comments, the
proposed procedure would not
accurately evaluate the roof strength of
that type of vehicle. The first Explorer
tie-down model followed the NPRM
procedure where the vehicle was
supported at its jack point locations.
This was along the frame mounted
inward of the vehicle body sill in the
case of the Explorer. The analysis
showed that the NPRM procedure
produced compression of the body-toframe rubber body mounts. We believe
this tie-down simulation did not
27 See report, Finite Element Simulation of
FMVSS No. 216 Test Procedures, placed in the
docket with this notice.
28 A body-on-frame vehicle is constructed by
attaching a vehicle body to a rigid frame which
supports the drivetrain. At the attachment points,
rubber body mounts are used to isolate the body
from vibration.
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accurately evaluate the strength of the
roof because the body was not isolated
in the simulation. The loading of the
body mounts is also unrealistic in a
rollover. The results were consistent
with Ford’s comment that suggested
supporting a vehicle by its frame at the
body mount locations could cause floor
pan deformation and thereby reduce the
measured strength of the roof.
The results of the other simulations
(vehicle secured under the pillars and
vehicle secured along the rocker/sill)
showed higher roof strength than the
NPRM procedure. There was nearly a 7
percent increase in roof strength within
127 mm (5 inches) of platen travel when
the vehicle’s body was supported under
the pillars compared to the NPRM
procedure. The simulation results using
the continuous sill support tie-down
showed a 3 percent increase in roof
strength compared to the NPRM
procedure. Overall, in both simulations,
the body sag in the floor pan did not
appear to be a concern and produced a
more realistic loading of the roof. The
load-deformations curves were also
similar, whereas the results from the
simulation using the NPRM tie-down
procedure diverged early in the analysis
at approximately 18,000 N or 0.8 SWR.
We note that the full sill tie-down
procedure generated a lower peak force
when compared to the vehicle
supported under the pillars. The
simulation for the full sill tie-down
procedure did not include any
constraints for the Explorer’s frame.
However, when the vehicle body was
supported under each pillar, a number
of vertical supports were added to
support the mass of the frame. This
could explain the slight difference in
the maximum strength of the roof.
However, we believe the difference is
negligible.
After considering the comments and
the computer simulations, we decided,
for purposes of fleet testing, to revise the
tie-down procedure to support the
vehicle continuously under the sill. We
believe this approach further reduces
any variability compared to the Alliance
recommendation because the entire
wheelbase of the vehicle is supported
and not just under each pillar. Also, the
peak force difference in the computer
models was not a significant issue
because both methods addressed the
commenters’ main concern of
inappropriate floor pan deformation.
For body-on-frame vehicles, additional
supports would be placed under the
frame as this constraint was not
included in the computer simulation
and might account for the difference in
peak force. The full sill tie-down
procedure is consistent with the existing
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FMVSS No. 216 requirement supported
by AIAM, Mr. Chu, Hyundai, and
Nissan.
For the fleet testing,29 the vehicle’s
sill at the body flange weld was fully
supported along the wheelbase between
two box tubes and securely fixed into
place with high strength epoxy. For
body-on-frame vehicles, additional
supports were placed under the frame to
reduce body sag created by an
unsupported frame, as recommended by
DaimlerChrysler. Epoxy was selected in
response to the Alliance, BMW and
Ford’s comments that welding may
adversely alter the vehicle’s structure
prior to testing. We believe the epoxy
will not alter the material properties of
the vehicle structure or cause
complications for sills made of nonferrous or composite materials. The
revised test procedure provided support
for each of the vehicle pillars and
provided a stable load path when tested,
consistent with the recommendations by
the Alliance, DaimlerChrysler, Ford, GM
and Toyota. Also, by supporting the
vehicle along the wheelbase, which
includes the door seam for vehicles
without a B-pillar (the joint between the
doors), a reactionary surface is provided
for the applied load when tested,
addressing the Alliance, GM and Ford’s
concerns.
During our evaluation of the tie-down
procedure,30 dial indicators were placed
at the sill below the vehicle’s pillars on
the opposite side of the platen travel to
check for vehicle displacement during
the test. The tie-down procedure
showed on average less than a
millimeter (0.04 inches) of body
displacement at all measurement
locations, parallel to the direction of
platen motion for both unibody and
body-on-frame vehicles. For
comparison, the agency also tested a
Buick Lacrosse that was rigidly
supported along the entire wheelbase
and compared the result to another
Lacrosse test where the sill was
supported along the wheelbase only at
152.4 mm (6 inch) increments. The
Lacrosse was also supported under the
pillars, as recommended by the
29 See report, Two-Sided Roof Crush Strength
Analysis, placed in the docket of this notice.
30 The agency measured the sill displacement at
three locations along the wheelbase on the side
opposite to the force application on the roof, for 13
vehicles. Ten of the tests were single-sided and
three were two-sided. The sill displacement ranged
from 0 to 2.3 mm (0.09 inches). The VW Jetta
achieved the highest SWR level at 5.7 in this data
set and experienced almost no sill movement. In the
three two-sided tests in this series, conducted with
the Subaru Tribeca and two Buick Lacrosses, the
agency did not observe any significant difference in
sill displacement on the second side compared to
the first.
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Alliance. The results showed that the
body displacement was lower for the
full sill tie-down when compared to the
results where the sill was only partially
supported.
After considering the comments and
in light of the testing and simulations,
we are adopting the revised tie-down
procedure, where the vehicle is
supported at the sill, along the entire
wheelbase. This procedure reduces
vehicle displacement, more accurately
measures the strength of the roof, and is
more robust than the procedure
recommended by the Alliance and its
members. Furthermore, the revised test
procedure addresses the comments to
the NPRM because it supports the
vehicle pillars during testing and
reduces the likelihood of vertical and
horizontal translation of the body.
We note that, in light of the fact that
the test procedure is consistent with the
current FMVSS No. 216 test procedure
while providing improved clarity, the
agency has adopted it for use in current
FMVSS No. 216 31 compliance tests.
This procedure has been used for 19
fiscal year 2007 and 2008 OVSC
compliance tests.
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2. Platen Angle and Size
In the NPRM, we did not propose to
change the test device orientation or the
size of the test plate. However, we
included a discussion of comments
related to test device orientation and
size that we had received in response to
the October 2001 RFC.
Under the current test procedure
specified in FMVSS No. 216, the test
plate is tilted forward at a 5-degree pitch
angle, along its longitudinal axis, and
rotated outward at a 25-degree angle,
along its lateral axis, so that the plate’s
outboard side is lower than its inboard
side. The test plate size of 762 mm (30
inches) wide by 1,829 mm (72 inches)
long is designed to load the roof over
the occupant compartment. The edges of
the test plate are positioned based on
fixed points on the vehicle’s roof. The
forward edge of the plate is positioned
254 mm (10 inches) forward of the
forwardmost point on the roof,
including the windshield trim. We note
that, as discussed later in this
document, there is a secondary test
procedure for certain vehicles with
raised roofs or altered roofs, which we
proposed to eliminate.
Comments
The agency received numerous
comments and recommendations to
change the platen test angle and size. A
31 TP–216–05 Laboratory Test Procedure for
FMVSS No. 216, November 16, 2006.
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number of the comments were from
safety advocacy groups. Some
commenters recommending a 2-sided
test requirement recommended that we
use different criteria for the two tests.
Consumers Union cited comments it
had made on the agency’s 2001 RFC and
the agency’s discussion in the NPRM.
That commenter noted that it had
recommended that the agency modify
the test plate load and size. It stated that
it continues to believe that the current
plate load and size does not reflect realworld rollover conditions. Consumers
Union stated that it believes that more
of the roof crush force is absorbed by the
A-pillar than accounted for by the
current or proposed procedure. It
recommended that the agency conduct
additional studies concerning this issue.
IIHS commented that testing roof
crush strength at multiple load angles
would add to the meaningfulness of the
quasi-static test requirement that
NHTSA currently specifies. However, it
also stated that in the absence of a range
of plate angles, any distinct test angle
choice should be supported by evidence
that such an angle is representative of a
significant percentage of real-world
rollovers.
Various commenters recommended
that the agency change the platen pitch
in ways they believe would better reflect
the more aggressive loading angles that
are frequently sustained in real-world
rollover crashes, particularly for SUVs
and pickups. The general
recommendation was to increase the
pitch angle of the platen to 10 degrees
because commenters believed the
proposed 5 degree pitch is not realistic.
CAS stated that the pitch angle must
be increased to at least 10 degrees to
emulate actual rollovers where damage
to front fenders is testimony to the fact
that in a rollover, the pitch angles are
this high. Advocates suggested that
vehicles be evaluated at different platen
angles, up to and including 10 degrees
pitch × 45 degrees roll.
Mr. Chu suggested a series of
procedures he believed would best
address the plate angle issue. His 6-step
procedure would test each front corner
of the roof three times, with the roll
angle of the plate maintained at 25
degrees, and the pitch angle from 5 to
10 degrees.
Consumers Union and Mr. Friedman
encouraged the agency to consider the
use of a smaller platen in order to load
the A-Pillar and not extensively load the
B-pillar. Mr. Friedman submitted twosided test data published in a recent
technical publication using a smaller
platen 301 mm (11.8 inches) wide by
610 mm (24 inches) long and at different
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pitch and roll angles.32 The commenter
stated that the smaller plate more
aggressively loads the A-pillar. It
showed the roof achieved a lower SWR
on the second side by as much as 40–
70 percent compared to the current
FMVSS No. 216 procedure.
Agency Response
After carefully considering the
comments, we have decided to maintain
the current platen size and the pitch and
roll angle. We note that many of the
issues raised by the commenters were
ones that were also raised in comments
on the 2001 RFC.
Prior to issuing the NPRM, the agency
conducted a test series to evaluate
alternative platen angles using the
FMVSS No 216 platen.33 A finite
element study was first conducted to
evaluate a range of platen configurations
and to select appropriate conditions for
testing. NHTSA tested four vehicle pairs
using 5 degree × 25 degree and 10
degree × 45 degree platen angles. The
peak SWR from these tests did not
demonstrate a consistent pattern
between the two test conditions. For
two vehicle models, the 10 degree × 45
degree tests generated a higher peak
SWR, whereas, the 10 degree × 45
degree tests generated a lower peak
SWR in the others. Therefore, the test
results were inconclusive.
To help evaluate the comments
submitted in the NPRM docket, the
agency extended the previous finite
element studies to evaluate alternative
platen angles in conjunction with a
smaller platen.34 The finite element
model of a 1997 Dodge Caravan was
used to evaluate two-sided simulations
with a 5 degree × 25 degree orientation
on the first side and a 10 degree × 45
degree orientation on the second side.
The reduction in peak SWR for using a
10 degree × 45 degree platen angle on
a second side test was 18.7 percent. The
18 percent reduction in peak SWR,
while significant, is much less than the
40 to 70 percent shown in the test
results submitted to the docket. The
results were also in line with our twosided vehicle test results using the 5
degree × 25 degree platen orientation for
both sides. On average there was an 8.7
percent reduction of strength on the
second side compared to the first.
Furthermore, we found an average
32 Friedman D., et al., ‘‘Result From Two Sided
Quasi-Static (M216) and Repeatable Dynamic
Rollover Test (JRS) Relative to FVMSS 216 Tests,’’
20th ESV Conference, Lyon, France, 2007.
33 See Docket NHTSA 2005–22143–57: Load Plate
Angle Determination and Initial Fleet Evaluation.
34 See, Finite Element Simulation of FMVSS No.
216 Test Procedures, placed in the docket with this
notice.
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difference of approximately 7.1 percent
lower peak force for the second side in
vehicles under 2,722 kilograms (6,000
pounds) GVWR and 14.9 percent lower
peak force for the second side in
vehicles over 2,722 kilograms (6,000
pounds) GVWR.
To evaluate how a smaller platen
affects roof strength measurements, the
agency also conducted simulations with
a smaller 305 × 610 mm (12 × 24 inch)
platen using a 10 degree × 45 degree
platen angle on a Dodge Caravan model.
The results showed an approximate six
percent decrease in peak force
compared to our baseline results with a
larger platen using the same
configuration. However, the simulations
showed the potential for platen edge-toroof contact. Since the platen-to-roof
contact is intended to be a surrogate for
vehicles rolling on the ground, localized
loading from the platen edge can cause
unrealistic loading conditions.
Therefore, the results demonstrated how
a smaller platen localized the stress on
the A-pillar, reducing the measured
strength during the evaluation, but the
crush deformation does not appear to
represent real-world crash results.
Many of the commenters assumed
that a higher pitch angle leads to a more
demanding test procedure and also
assumed it is more reflective of real
world rollovers, particularly for pickups
and SUVs. However, only limited
anecdotal evidence (based on
interpretation of crash photos) was
provided to support these conclusions.
Due to the extremely complex and
chaotic nature of rollover crashes, it is
impossible for any one test to fully
replicate all of the loading forces that
occur in all real-world crashes.
However, we believe the platen size and
pitch/roll angles proposed and currently
incorporated in the standard produce
roof crush damage patterns that are
representative of the crash damage
patterns observed in real-world
crashes.35 The use of the smaller platen
would result in edge contact and
unrealistic buckling of the roof. We did
not propose to alter these parameters in
the NPRM or SNPRM.
We are also not persuaded by
commenters that recommended varying
the pitch and roll angle in a two-sided
test. As discussed above, the agency
conducted analytical simulations
varying the platen angles. Based on the
similarity of the post test damage
pattern in that research, there was not
sufficient evidence to justify changing
the load plate configuration from our
current protocol. We are further not
persuaded by CFIR, Mr. Chu, and LSSM
comments to require testing on both
sides with a smaller platen size.
Analytical simulations 36 conducted by
the agency using a Dodge Caravan
showed that a smaller platen is sensitive
to positioning and can result in edge
contact. As a result, a smaller test plate
can produce unrealistic contact with the
roof and highly localized loading,
inconsistent with real world rollover
crashes. CFIR’s finding of a 40–70
percent reduction in roof strength for
the second side tests it conducted may
be attributed to its smaller platen adding
unrealistic stress on the roof.
35 See Docket NHTSA 2005–22143–56: Roof
Crush Analysis Using 1997–2001 NASS Case
Review, 2004.
36 See, Finite Element Simulation of FMVSS No.
216 Test Procedures, placed in the docket with this
notice.
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3. Testing Without Windshields and/or
Other Glazing in Place
We did not propose to change the
current FMVSS No. 216 procedure and
test the vehicle without the windshield
or side windows in place. In the NPRM,
we stated:
The agency believes that windshields
provide some structural support to the roof
even after the windshield breaks because the
force-deflection plots in some of the recent
test vehicles (e.g., Ford Explorer, Ford
Mustang, Toyota Camry, Honda CRV) show
little or no drop off in force level after the
windshield integrity was compromised.
Further examination of real-world crashes
indicates that the windshield rarely separates
from the vehicle, and therefore, does provide
some crush resistance. Because NHTSA
believes that the vehicle should be tested
with all structural components that would be
present in a real-world rollover crash, we
decline to propose testing without the
windshield or other glazing. 70 FR 49238.
A number of commenters, including
ones from safety advocacy groups,
questioned the contribution of the
windshield to the overall strength of the
roof and generally recommended the
windshield be removed prior to the test.
Advocates, Boyle, et al., CFIR,
Consumers Union, DVExperts, IIHS,
Public Citizens, Penn Engineering, and
Perrone commented that windshields
often break in a rollover, and stated that
the agency should not specify a test
procedure with windshields in place.
Consumers Union expressed concern
about aftermarket windshield
installation and the unquantifiable
strength of the windshield in a crash.
The Engineering Institute (EI) and Mr.
Hauschild recommended that if the
agency maintains the 2.5 SWR
requirement then the windshield should
be removed. Mr. Slavik stated he
conducted tests which confirm that on
some vehicles, damage to the
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windshield significantly reduces the
force and energy required to produce an
incremental amount of intrusion.
Technical Services recommended that
the side window glass should be
required to be preserved during testing
to improve vehicle rollover
performance. Xprts and Mr. Friedman
also recommended that the side
windows should not be permitted to fail
during the test. Both commenters
referenced Volvo’s internal criteria and
suggested that tempered glass windows
can remain intact.
ARCCA, Consumer Union, Specialty
Equipment Market Association (SEMA)
and Hyundai raised concerns with
regard to vehicles equipped with
sunroofs. ARCCA and Consumers Union
suggested vehicles equipped with
sunroofs meet the roof crush
requirements. Hyundai noted that
vehicles equipped with sunroofs have
reduced headroom compared with those
without sunroofs. SEMA requested the
agency ensure aftermarket sunroofs be
permitted because they are installed
inside the roof’s perimeter cage.
Agency Response
After considering the comments, we
decline to change the current test
procedure in which the windshield and
side windows remain in place during
FMVSS No. 216 tests. We also disagree
with the recommendation that the
agency require side windows to be
preserved during test. The agency was
not presented with new information
showing windshield breakage in a
rollover significantly contributed to a
reduction in roof strength.
We have examined the post crash
windshield status for 1997–2006 NASS
investigated rollover crashes with
greater than one quarter turn. The
majority of the windshields were coded
as either ‘‘in place and cracked’’ or ‘‘in
place and holed.’’ Less than 10 percent
of weighted incidents indicate the
windshield is ‘‘out of place.’’
While Mr. Slavik stated he conducted
testing, the agency was not provided
data to evaluate. He asserted that there
is anecdotal acknowledgement by some
manufacturers that the windshield
provides upwards of 30 percent of the
measured roof strength. We note that
that the agency’s testing showed that
windshield breakage has not been a
factor in the maximum strength of the
roof for some vehicles.37 The peak load
continued to increase after windshield
breakage in the testing of the 2003 Ford
Focus, 2003 Chevrolet Cavalier, and
2002 Nissan Xterra. In the case of the
37 See NHTSA–2005–22143–0049: Roof Crush
Research: Phase 3—Expanded Fleet Evaluation.
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Cavalier, the windshield did not
contribute to a decrease in strength until
170 mm (6.7 inches) of platen travel.
The windshield is a structural
element for some vehicles, and we
continue to believe that vehicles should
be tested with all structural components
that would be present in a real-world
rollover crash. We declined to propose
testing without the windshield or other
glazing for that reason, and we are not
persuaded that there is sufficient
justification to revise our position.
The agency also wanted to ascertain
the influence of sunroofs on roof
strength. The Scion tC, Cadillac SRX
and Ford Edge were tested with large
panoramic sunroofs. The glass panel
sunroof in the Scion tC shattered during
the two-sided test, yet the glass panel in
the SRX did not fail during the singlesided only test. After review of the loaddeformation curves for both vehicles,
the test results showed the effect of the
sunroof was insignificant to the overall
strength of the roof. In the case of the
Scion tC, at the point when the sunroof
glass broke during the first side test,
there was no change in the platen load.
In the case of the Ford Edge, the rear
glass panel of the sun roof failed in the
second-sided test; however, the front
glass panel over the front row occupants
remained intact. This occurred well
after 125 mm of platen travel. As a
result, we believe it is practicable for
vehicles with sunroofs (including large
panoramic roofs) to meet the
requirements and we do not foresee this
upgrade inhibiting aftermarket sunroofs
mounted within the roof structure.
In response to Consumers Union, the
possibility exists that aftermarket
windshield installations may not
perform to OEM standards. However,
we do not believe this possibility
justifies changing roof strength
requirements for all new vehicles.
Xprts and Mr. Friedman
recommended a requirement that the
side windows not break during the roof
strength test. The agency investigated
the contribution of side windows to the
strength of the roof structure. Our
testing showed that side window
breakage is directly correlated to platen
displacement with limited effect on the
strength of the roof. In reviewing the
load-deformation curves at the point
where the side glass breaks, there is no
measurable drop in load of the roof and
it generally occurs well after the peak
strength of the roof has been reached.38
For completeness, the agency also
assessed the impact of rear window
breakage. The rear windows broke well
after peak strength was reached and
38 Ibid.
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generally past 127 mm (5 inches) of
platen travel. The breakage of the rear
window glass resulted in a slight drop
in the strength of the roof particularly in
pick-up trucks where the vertical glass
is loaded by the test device and can add
some strength. Overall, the impact of the
side and rear glass had little impact on
the strength of the roof. We also note
that such a requirement is outside the
scope of notice of the proposal.
4. Deletion of Secondary Plate
Positioning Procedure
In the NPRM, we proposed to apply
the primary plate procedure for all
vehicles, removing the secondary plate
procedure that applies to some raised
and altered roof vehicles. We explained
that the secondary plate positioning
procedure produces rear edge plate
loading onto the roof of some raised and
altered roof vehicles that may cause
excessive deformation uncharacteristic
of real-world rollover crashes. Because
an optimum plate position cannot be
established for all roof shapes, the
testing of some raised and altered roof
vehicles will result in loading the roof
rearward of the front seat area. We
stated that we believe this is preferable
to edge contact because edge contact
produces localized concentrated forces
upon the roof typically resulting in
excessive shear deformation of a small
region. We also stated that we believe
that removing the secondary plate
position would make the test more
objective and practicable.
Advocates was the only commenter
on this issue and opposed eliminating
the secondary plate positioning. It stated
that reverting back to the primary plate
position for aerodynamic roof vehicles
would induce unrealistic loads in that
the proportion of force applied to the
roof is excessively concentrated over the
B-pillars. It stated that as a consequence,
test conditions and roof response to
plate loading can be substantially
different than the loading that actually
occurs in real-world rollovers of these
vehicles where the A-pillars receive a
proportionately greater force. Advocates
suggested this is crucial because some
vehicles with severely sloped A-pillars
are candidates for A-pillar collapse in
rollover crashes and the percentage of
new vehicles with severely raked Apillars and aerodynamically sloped
roofs has increased each year since their
use began in the early to mid-1990s.
Agency Response
After considering Advocates’
comment, we have decided to remove
the secondary plate procedure. We do
not agree that the FMVSS No. 216
platen size and positioning produces
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unrealistic loading of aerodynamic
roofs. This issue was considered in the
1999 final rule (64 FR 22567) where the
agency adopted a revised platen
positioning procedure to reduce the
likelihood of unrealistic loading on
vehicles with rounded roofs. The
agency’s recent testing of modern
vehicles has shown the current plate
positioning procedure does distribute
the load between the A- and B-pillars.
Generally, the plate’s initial point of
contact with the roof is slightly behind
the A-pillar including the Volvo XC90
which had a large amount of curvature
to the roof in the test area compared to
most vehicles tested.
However, we continue to believe that
edge contact induced by the secondary
plate procedure results in unrealistic
loading specifically when the roof is
raised or altered. In some
circumstances, the plate will essentially
punch through the sheetmetal instead of
loading the roof structure. We also do
not believe vehicles with steeply raked
A-pillars are common architectures for
raised and altered roof vehicles. Vans
with more upright A-pillars are
generally modified to have their roofs
raised or altered. We are not aware of
such changes to traditional passenger
cars with steeply raked A-pillars.
5. Removal of Roof Components
FMVSS No. 216 currently specifies
removal of roof racks prior to platen
positioning or load application. We did
not propose to change this provision.
Xprts recommended that the roof be
tested as the vehicle is to be sold, with
roof racks or other equipment in place.
That commenters stated that removal of
roof racks prior to conducting the roof
crush test eliminates a typical roof
failure mode. It states that roof rack
mountings initiate buckling of the roof,
increasing the risk of occupant injury
from roof panel buckling.
After considering this comment, we
decline to change the current test
procedure. No data were provided by
Xprts to support its contention that roof
racks result in a typical roof failure
mode and thereby increase the risk of
occupant injury from roof panel
buckling. We reviewed several NASS–
CDS cases 39 of utility vehicles with roof
racks that had undergone rollover
crashes. Our review did not support the
contention that the presence of a roof
rack initiated buckling of the roof and
increased the risk of occupant injury.
There was also no general trend
39 Photographs collected from NASS–CDS Case
Query Page. NASS–CDS cases examined: 100121,
102005185, 146004985, 161005827, 656500082,
471300143, and 129005218.
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concerning injury severity and presence
of a roof rack in the reviewed cases.
We further reviewed our fatal
hardcopy case files 40 and could not
identify a single case where the roof
rack appeared to aggravate the
deformation of the roof structure.
6. Tolerances
In response to comments from the
Alliance and Chrysler LLC, we are
adding several tolerances in the
regulatory text to help improve test
repeatability. We note that platen angles
are measured from the horizontal and
not from the vehicle’s frame of
reference. Measuring platen angles with
respect to the ground is more objective
than using the test vehicle’s frame of
reference because the latter would
introduce manufacturing variability. We
note that we are not including a
specification concerning platen
overshoot on the first side test since we
will not conduct compliance tests
beyond the specified SWR.
We decline to add a calibration
procedure for the test device or to make
changes relating to load application rate
or to add platen material specifications.
The basic FMVSS No. 216 test
procedure has been used for many
years, and the commenters did not
provide persuasive evidence that
changes are needed in these areas. As to
platen materials, we believe the current
specification for a rigid unyielding
block is sufficient.
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c. Requirements for Multi-Stage and
Altered Vehicles
For vehicles manufactured in two or
more stages,41 other than vehicles
incorporating chassis-cabs,42 we
proposed to give manufacturers the
option of certifying to either the existing
roof crush requirements of FMVSS No.
220, School Bus Rollover Protection, or
the new roof crush requirements of
FMVSS No. 216. FMVSS No. 220 uses
a horizontal plate, instead of the angled
plate of Standard No. 216.
As explained in the NPRM, multistage vehicles are aimed at a variety of
niche markets, most of which are too
small to be serviced economically by
single stage manufacturers. Some multi40 See Docket Number NHTSA 2005–22143–56:
Roof Crush Analysis Using 1997–2001 NASS Case
Review.
41 Vehicles manufactured in two or more stages
are assembled by several independent entities with
the ‘‘final stage’’ manufacturer in most cases
assuming the ultimate responsibility for certifying
the completed vehicle.
42 Under 49 CFR § 567.3, chassis-cab means an
incomplete vehicle, with a completed occupant
compartment, that requires only the addition of
cargo-carrying, work-performing, or load-bearing
components to perform its intended functions.
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stage vehicles are built from chassiscabs that, by definition, have a
completed occupant compartment. A
chassis-cab’s roof is an integral part of
its body structure surrounding the seats
for the occupants. Other vehicles are
built using incomplete vehicles that do
not have a completed occupant
compartment. These include a van
cutaway, which consists of the frame,
drive train, steering, suspension, brakes,
axles, and the front body section of a
van that has no body structure behind
the two front seats. Another example is
a stripped chassis. A final stage
manufacturer would typically complete
the occupant compartments of these
incomplete vehicles by adding body
components to produce a truck (e.g.,
work truck) or multipurpose passenger
vehicle (e.g., motor home).
In developing our proposal, we
considered whether the proposed
standard would be appropriate for the
type of motor vehicle for which it would
be prescribed. We stated that we
believed it was appropriate to consider
incomplete vehicles, other than those
incorporating chassis-cabs, as a vehicle
type subject to different regulatory
requirements. We anticipated that final
stage manufacturers using chassis cabs
to produce multi-stage vehicles would
be in position to take advantage of
‘‘pass-through certification’’ of chassiscabs, and therefore did not believe the
option of alternative compliance with
FMVSS No. 220 was appropriate.
We noted that while we believed that
the requirements in FMVSS No. 220
have been effective for school buses, we
were concerned that they may not be as
effective for other vehicle types. As
noted above, the FMVSS No. 216 test
procedure results in roof deformations
that are consistent with the observed
crush patterns in the real world for light
vehicles. Because of this, we explained
that our preference would be to use the
FMVSS No. 216 test procedure for light
vehicles. We believed, however, that
this approach would fail to consider the
practicability problems and special
issues for multi-stage manufacturers.
We stated that in these circumstances,
we believed that the requirements of
FMVSS No. 220 appeared to offer a
reasonable avenue to balance the desire
to respond to the needs of multi-stage
manufacturers and the need to increase
safety in rollover crashes. Several states
already require ‘‘para-transit’’ vans and
other buses, which are typically
manufactured in multiple stages, to
comply with the roof crush
requirements of FMVSS No. 220. These
states include Pennsylvania, Minnesota,
Wisconsin, Tennessee, Michigan, Utah,
Alabama, and California. We tentatively
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concluded that these state requirements
show the burden on multi-stage
manufacturers for evaluating roof
strength in accordance with FMVSS No.
220 is not unreasonable, and applying
FMVSS No. 220 to these vehicles would
ensure that there are some requirements
for roof crush protection where none
currently exist.
Comments
We received comments concerning
requirements for multi-stage and altered
vehicles from Advocates, NTEA,
NMEDA and RVIA.
Advocates stated that it opposes
permitting FMVSS No. 220 as an
alternative for multi-stage vehicles. It
claimed that FMVSS No. 220 is a
‘‘weak’’ standard whose effects on roof
strength in actual rollover crashes are
mostly unknown.
NTEA recommended that all multistage vehicles be excluded from roof
crush resistance requirements. It stated
that manufacturers of non-chassis-cab
vehicles will not be able to conduct the
tests or perform engineering analysis to
ensure conformance to FMVSS No. 220.
NTEA also disagreed with the
assumption that the presence of state
requirements for FMVSS No. 220
compliance demonstrates that final
stage manufacturers can actually
comply. It stated that the ability of
school bus and para-transit bus
manufacturers to comply with FMVSS
No. 220 does not reflect the ability of
typical final stage manufacturers to
comply with FMVSS No. 220.
NTEA also stated it is impractical for
the agency to assume manufacturers of
multi-stage vehicles built on chassiscabs will be able to use pass-through
certification for compliance. That
organization stated that these type of
vehicles are generally unique and built
to customer specifications. It also raised
a concern that some manufacturers of
chassis-cabs may not provide the
necessary specifications for the final
stage manufacturer to rely on passthrough certification as it applies to roof
strength. It argued that the final stage
manufacturer would therefore be
responsible for conducting costly
analysis and testing to verify
compliance with FMVSS No. 216.
NMEDA expressed concern that the
FMVSS No. 220 option would only be
available for multi-stage vehicles. It
asked that the FMVSS No. 220 option be
extended to raised or altered roof
vehicles. To encompass the modifiers in
the proposed upgrade to FMVSS No.
216, NMEDA asked that a vehicle roof
that is altered after first retail sale be
considered in compliance if it meets the
requirements of FMVSS No. 216 or
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FMVSS No. 220. NMEDA also stated
that raising a roof increases the available
headroom and that the roof therefore
can crush more before there is any
contact with an occupants head.
NMEDA requested the agency account
for the additional headroom beyond the
original vehicle’s headroom in
establishing any requirement.
RVIA supported our proposal to
permit FMVSS No. 220 as an option for
small motor homes as this would allow
manufacturers to address the unique
issues concerning such specialized
vehicles built in two or more stages.
Agency Response
After carefully considering the
comments and as explained below, we
are providing a FMVSS No. 220 option
for multi-stage vehicles, except those
built on chassis-cab incomplete
vehicles, and for vehicles which are
changed in certain ways to raise the
height of the roof. For example, a van
may be altered by replacing its roof with
a taller structure (referred to as a raised
roof) to better accommodate a person in
a wheelchair. We are also excluding a
narrow category of multi-stage vehicles
from FMVSS No. 216 altogether, multistage trucks built on incomplete
vehicles other than chassis cabs.
In discussing the issues raised by
commenters, we begin by addressing the
comment of Advocates. That
organization opposed permitting
FMVSS No. 220 as an alternative for
multi-stage vehicles because it believes
that FMVSS No. 220 is not sufficiently
stringent and that its effects on actual
rollover crashes are mostly unknown.
As we discussed in the NPRM, we
believe the requirements in FMVSS No.
220 have been effective for school buses,
but we are concerned that they may not
be as effective for other vehicle types.
We explained that our preference would
be to use the FMVSS No. 216 test
procedure for light vehicles, but that
this approach would fail to consider the
practicability problems and special
issues for multi-stage manufacturers.
Advocates did not provide analysis or
data addressing the special
circumstances faced by multi-stage
manufacturers, or explain why it
believes these manufacturers can certify
compliance of their vehicles to FMVSS
No. 216. Therefore, that commenter has
not provided a basis for us to take a
different position than we took in the
NPRM.
We next turn to the issues raised by
NTEA. As a general matter, we believe
that it is neither necessary nor would it
be appropriate to exclude all multi-stage
vehicles from roof crush resistance
requirements. The purpose of FMVSS
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No. 216 is to improve occupant safety in
the event of a rollover. If a multi-stage
vehicle is involved in a rollover, the
vehicle’s roof strength will be an
important factor in providing occupant
protection. Therefore, while we seek to
address the special needs and
circumstances of multi-stage
manufacturers, we decline to provide
any blanket exclusion for all multi-stage
vehicles. We will address the issues
raised by that commenter separately for
multi-stage vehicles built on chassis-cab
incomplete vehicles, multi-stage trucks
with a GVWR greater than 2,722
kilograms (6,000 pounds) not built on a
chassis cab and not built on an
incomplete vehicle with a full exterior
van body, and other multi-stage vehicles
not built on chassis cabs.
Multi-stage vehicles built on chassiscab incomplete vehicles.
A chassis-cab is an incomplete
vehicle, with a completed occupant
compartment, that requires only the
addition of cargo-carrying, workperforming, or load-bearing components
to perform its intended functions. As
such, chassis-cabs have intact roof
designs. Chassis-cabs are based on
vehicles that are sold as complete
vehicles, e.g., medium and full size
pickup trucks, so their roof structure
will be designed to meet the upgraded
requirements of FMVSS No. 216.
After considering the comments of
NTEA, we believe that final stage
manufacturers can rely on the
incomplete vehicle documents (IVD) for
pass-through certification of compliance
with FMVSS No. 216 for vehicles built
using chassis cabs. To do this, final
stage manufacturers will need to remain
within specifications contained in the
IVD. Since the stringency of FMVSS No.
216 is dependent on a vehicle’s
unloaded vehicle weight, the final stage
manufacturer would need to remain
within the specification for unloaded
vehicle weight. If they did not, the roof
would not likely have the strength to
comply with FMVSS No. 216. Also,
final stage manufacturers will need to
avoid changes to the vehicle that would
affect roof strength.
We note that some changes made by
final stage manufacturers could affect
the ability to conduct an FMVSS No.
216 test, e.g., for a truck, the addition of
a cargo box structure higher than the
occupant compartment, which could
interfere with the placement of the
FMVSS No. 216 test device. To address
this concern, we are including a
specification in the final rule that such
structures are removed prior to testing.
(They are still counted as part of a
vehicle’s unloaded weight.)
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Multi-stage trucks with a GVWR
greater than 2,722 kilograms (6,000
pounds) not built on a chassis cab and
not built on an incomplete vehicle with
a full exterior van body.
We have decided to exclude from
FMVSS No. 216 a very limited group of
multi-stage trucks with a GVWR greater
than 2,722 kilograms (6,000 pounds),
ones not built on a chassis cab and ones
not built on an incomplete vehicle with
a full exterior van body. We note that
some incomplete vehicles with a full
exterior van body might not be included
in the definition of chassis-cab but
would still have an intact roof design.
For the reasons discussed in the
previous section, final stage
manufacturers can rely on the IVD for
pass-through certification of compliance
with FMVSS No. 216 for vehicles built
using chassis cabs. For multi-stage
trucks built on an incomplete vehicle
with a full exterior van body, the
manufacturer can rely on either the IVD
for pass-through certification of
compliance with FMVSS No. 216, or use
the FMVSS No. 220 option. Since the
incomplete vehicle will have an intact
roof design and will be similar to ones
sold as non-multi-stage vehicles, the
roof will have been designed to comply
with FMVSS No. 216. Therefore, it is
likely that the final stage manufacturer
can pass through FMVSS No. 216
certification. Since the vehicle at issue
will be based on an incomplete vehicle
with a full exterior van body, the
FMVSS No. 220 procedure is likely to
also be an appropriate one for the final
stage vehicle.
We are concerned, however, that for
other multi-stage trucks, e.g., van
cutaways, there may be practicability
problems for final stage manufacturers.
Because the incomplete vehicle will not
have an intact roof and because the
strength of the roof may be dependent
on the structure to be added by the final
stage manufacturer, the incomplete
vehicle manufacturer may not provide
IVD or similar information that would
permit pass-through certification.
Moreover, the design of the completed
truck may be such that it is not possible
to test the vehicle to FMVSS No. 216
(due to interference with the FMVSS
test device) or inappropriate for testing
with FMVSS No. 220. As noted earlier,
the FMVSS No. 220 test was designed
for school buses and uses a horizontal
plate over the driver and passenger
compartment instead of the angled plate
of Standard No. 216. This test may not
be appropriate for a truck with a cargo
box that is higher than the occupant
compartment.
Given these practicability issues, we
have decided to exclude this limited
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group of multi-stage trucks from the
requirements of FMVSS No. 216.
Other multi-stage vehicles not built on
chassis cabs.
For other multi-stage vehicles not
built on chassis cabs, we continue to
believe, for the reasons discussed in the
NPRM, that permitting FMVSS No. 220
as an option is a reasonable way to
balance the desire to respond to the
needs of multi-stage manufacturers and
the need to increase safety in rollover
crashes. As we noted, several states
already require ‘‘para-transit’’ vans and
other buses, which are typically
manufactured in multiple stages, to
comply with the roof crush
requirements of FMVSS No. 220. We
also note that RVIA supported our
proposal.
Multi-stage vehicles and complete
vehicles with a GVWR greater than
2,722 kilograms (6,000 pounds) which
have been changed by raising their
original roof.
In response to the comments of
NMEDA, we agree that the FMVSS No.
220 option should be available to multistage and complete vehicles with a
GVWR greater than 2,722 kilograms
(6,000 pounds) which have been
changed by raising their original roof.
In considering this issue, we note that
in 1999 the agency published a final
rule (64 FR 22567) that was in part in
response to an RVIA petition to allow
vans, motor homes and other
multipurpose vehicles with raised roofs
the option to certify to FMVSS No. 220.
The RVIA had argued first that since
raised roof vehicles would have met
FMVSS No. 216 requirements prior to
modification of their roofs, the A-Pillar
strength has already been demonstrated.
Second, RVIA had claimed that the
modifications usually do not affect the
roof strength near the A-pillar. RVIA
believed that the FMVSS No 220 test
procedure could be used to test the
strength of the entire modified vehicle
roof without repeating the FMVSS No.
216 certification test. In the final rule,
we stated that we disagreed with RVIA’s
analysis that concluded FMVSS No. 220
is comparable to FMVSS No. 216 and is
preferable for testing vehicles with
raised or modified roofs. We stated that
that the agency stood by its tentative
conclusions stated in the NPRM that the
FMVSS No. 220 test is less stringent
than FMVSS No. 216 for testing the
appropriate roof area.
In considering the issues raise by
NMEDA, we note that the discussion we
included in the 1999 final rule was in
the context of the version of FMVSS No.
216 that existed at that time. The
standard was applicable to vehicles
with a GVWR of 2,722 kilograms (6,000
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Jkt 217001
pounds) or less. Here we are discussing
vehicles with a GVWR greater than
2,722 kilograms (6000 pounds).
We believe that practicability issues
arise for vehicles with a GVWR greater
than 2,722 kilograms (6,000 pounds)
whose roofs are raised. Moreover, we
believe that the FMVSS No. 220 option
is appropriate for the ‘‘para-transit’’
vans and buses. The FMVSS No. 220
option will help ensure that these
occupants are afforded a level of
protection that is currently not required.
We are not providing this option to
vehicles with raised roofs and a GVWR
of less than or equal to 2,722 kilograms
(6,000 pounds).
We believe that the practicability
issues for vehicle alterers which raise
roofs on the vehicles at issue are
comparable to those of final stage
manufacturers. An alterer may raise a
roof on a vehicle that was originally
certified to FMVSS No. 216. We believe
that permitting alterers which raise
roofs on these vehicles the option of
certifying to FMVSS No. 220 balances
potential practicability issues with the
need to increase safety in rollovers.
The FMVSS No. 220 130 mm (5.1
inches) limit of platen travel established
at the point of contact with the raised
roof is consistent with FMVSS No. 216
requirements. As discussed elsewhere
in this document, we are maintaining
the current platen travel requirement as
well as adding a headroom requirement
in FMVSS No. 216. Therefore, even if a
roof is raised and the manufacturer or
alterer selects the FMVSS No. 220
option, we believe the platen travel
requirement should be the same, even if
there is additional headroom.
In arguing for an alternative
requirement in this area, NMEDA raised
a concern about higher center of gravity.
NMEDA surveyed its members to
obtain, amongst a number of things, an
estimate of the height of raised roofs. It
found that some raised roofs can be as
high as 762 mm (30 inches). It was
concerned about the resulting center of
gravity’s effect on rollover propensity of
these vehicles.
We note that in raising the roof of a
vehicle, a final stage manufacturer or
alterer will likely increase the center of
gravity of the vehicle, independent of
any roof crush resistance requirements.
We believe that it is important that
manufacturers carefully analyze the
impacts of their changes, and choose
appropriate vehicles for such
modifications. We also believe that if
final stage manufacturers or alterers
raise the roof of a vehicle, it is still
necessary that the vehicle have
appropriate roof strength to provide
protection in potential rollovers.
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As to NMEDA’s specific
recommendation, we believe that
organization has not demonstrated a
need for a different requirement in this
area. According to that organization, the
typical height of a raised roof is 356–406
mm (14–16 inches). Its members have
designed raised roofs that meet FMVSS
No. 220, and FMVSS No. 216 as
amended will permit this option. In
addition, vans which are typically
altered or modified in this manner will
have an electronic stability control
system as standard equipment. Also,
different vehicles can be used for higher
raised roofs, i.e., those with dual rear
wheels. We note that the GVWR of those
vehicles is greater than 4,536 kg (10,000
pounds) and FMVSS No. 216 would not
apply.
d. Other Issues
1. Convertibles and Open Bodied
Vehicles
Convertibles are excluded from the
requirements of FMVSS No. 216. In the
NPRM, we sought to clarify the
definition and scope of exclusion for
convertibles.
We explained that FMVSS No. 216
does not define the term ‘‘convertible.’’
We noted, however, that S3 of 49 CFR
571.201 defines convertibles as vehicles
whose A-pillars are not joined with the
B-pillars (or rearmost pillars) by a fixed,
rigid structural member. In a previous
rulemaking, NHTSA stated that ‘‘openbody type vehicles’’ 43 are a subset of
convertibles and are therefore excluded
from the requirements of FMVSS No.
216.44
We stated in the NPRM that we had
reassessed our position with respect to
‘‘open-body type vehicles.’’ Specifically,
we believed that we were incorrect in
stating that ‘‘open-body type vehicles’’
are a subset of convertibles because
some open-body type vehicles do not
fall under the definition of convertibles
in S3 of FMVSS No. 201. We cited the
example of a Jeep Wrangler, which we
believed to have a rigid structural
member that connects the A-pillars to
the B-pillars.
We stated in the NPRM that we
believe that ‘‘open-body type vehicles
are capable of offering roof crush
protection over the front seat area.’’
Accordingly, we proposed to limit the
exclusion of convertibles from the
requirements of FMVSS No. 216 to only
those vehicles whose A-pillars are not
43 An open-body type vehicle is a vehicle having
no occupant compartment top or an occupant
compartment top that can be installed or removed
by the user at his convenience. See Part 49 CFR
571.3.
44 See 56 FR 15510 (April 17, 1991).
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joined with the B-pillars, thus providing
consistency with the definition of a
convertible in S3 of FMVSS No. 201. We
proposed to add the definition of
convertibles contained in S3 of 49 CFR
§ 571.201 to the definition section in
FMVSS No. 216.
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Comments
The agency received comments on
this issue from Advocates, the Alliance,
AIAM, BMW, DaimlerChrysler, Ferrari
and Porsche. Vehicle manufacturers
supported continuing to exclude
convertibles from the requirements;
however they raised some concerns
with regard to the proposed definition.
The Alliance commented that there is
no evidence that it is practicable for
convertibles or open body vehicles to
comply.
DaimlerChrysler disagreed with the
agency’s position that the Wrangler is
not a convertible. It claimed that the
Wrangler does not have an A-pillar,
since the structure is not rigid and is
hinged to fold down. Further, that
company stated that the padded tube
connecting the windshield frame and
the sport bar is not rigid because it is
attached with easily-removable screws.
Several commenters addressed the
proposed definition of convertible.
Ferrari suggested that the definition of
convertible include ‘‘above the window
opening light lowermost point.’’ AIAM
recommended two changes: to add ‘‘not
permanently joined’’ and to make it
clear that the referenced connection is
‘‘above the lowest point of the side
window opening.’’ This would lead to
the following complete definition: ‘‘A
convertible is a vehicle whose A-pillars
are not permanently joined with the Bpillars (or rearmost pillars) by a fixed,
rigid structural member above the
lowest point of the window opening.’’
DaimlerChrysler suggested changing the
convertible definition to ‘‘vehicles with
folding tops or removable hardtops with
A-pillars not joined to the B-pillars (or
rearmost pillars) or joined with
removable parts to the B-pillars (or
rearmost pillars).’’
Advocates disagreed with excluding
convertibles from FMVSS No. 216 and
stated further that the agency should
establish rollover requirements for
convertibles that limit ejections and
head and neck injuries.
Agency Response
After considering the comments, we
are adopting the proposed definition of
convertible for the final rule and we are
continuing to exclude convertibles
within that definition from the FMVSS
No. 216 requirements. This includes
retractable hard top convertibles. We
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believe that to establish a roof crush
requirement on vehicles that do not
have a permanent roof structure would
not be practical from a countermeasure
perspective. A convertible roof would
have to be strong enough to pass the
quasi-static test, yet flexible enough to
fold into the vehicle. Since we are not
aware of any such designs, we do not
agree with Advocates on this point. We
also note that new rollover and ejection
requirements for convertibles are
outside the scope of this rulemaking.
On the issue of open-body vehicles,
we agree with DaimlerChrysler that the
agency misidentified the Wrangler as an
open-body vehicle in the NPRM when it
should have been considered a
convertible (since the A-pillar is not
rigid and fixed to the B-pillar or other
rearmost pillar). At the time, we were
unaware that the windshield and
support bars were designed to be
disassembled.
Our position on open-body vehicles
has not changed. Under the new
definition, open-body vehicles will be
subject to FMVSS No. 216, since they
are capable of offering roof crush
protection over the front seat area. We
note, however, that given
DaimlerChrysler’s comment about the
Jeep Wrangler, we are not aware of other
vehicles currently available for sale that
are considered open-body vehicles.
We disagree with the Alliance’s
assertion that it is not practicable for
open-body vehicles to meet the
requirements of FMVSS No. 216. We
believe that if a vehicle otherwise
similar to the Wrangler had roof
supports that are fixed (as in a roll cage),
it should be capable of providing
protection to the occupants as required
by today’s final rule.
We are also not making the changes
to the proposed definition of convertible
suggested by some commenters. The
definition proposed was previously
adopted in FMVSS No. 201 (62 FR
16725), and the agency believes the
applicability is the same and is unaware
of any concerns. Furthermore, we do not
believe further specificity is warranted
given our revised position on the
Wrangler. We believe our discussion in
the NPRM concerning the Wrangler may
have caused confusion. We also do not
agree that there is a need to specify that
convertibles have folding hardtops or
removable hardtops. These roof systems
are not intended as significant structural
elements but are designed primarily to
provide protection from inclement
weather, improve theft protection and
are generally offered as a luxury item.
These types of roof systems are also
designed of lighter weight materials,
such as aluminum or composites, for
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22375
ease of folding and storage within the
vehicle or removal by the consumer.
and we believe consumers readily
recognize they will afford the occupants
limited protection in a rollover.
2. Vehicles Without B-Pillars
In the NPRM, we did not specifically
discuss vehicles that are designed
without B-pillars. At the time we were
unaware of any technical concerns the
manufacturers might have with these
vehicle, to meet the proposed
requirements.
Ford identified a number of design
challenges for vehicles without Bpillars. That company’s concerns were
focused on pickup trucks without Bpillars that have a GVWR of 3,856
kilograms (8,500 pounds) or more.
These vehicles have a front-forward
opening and a rear-rearward opening
side door configuration that latch
together without a fixed, structural Bpillar. Ford expressed concern that there
is no direct load path to resist the platen
during testing and as a result, there are
significant design and manufacturing
issues that must be addressed while
avoiding a major incremental weight
penalty. Ford did not make any specific
recommendations.
Agency Response
We agree with Ford’s analysis that
certain vehicles without B-pillars may
raise additional technical challenges
compared to other vehicles, particularly
for heavier vehicles. However, based
upon our fleet testing, we believe that a
structure can be designed at the joint
between the doors that acts as a
surrogate B-pillar to resist roof
displacement during testing. We note
that the Alliance’s comments on how
the proposed tie-down procedure
adversely affects vehicles without Bpillars reinforce this view. The revised
tie-down procedure for the final rule
will aid vehicles without B-pillars in
complying since support will be placed
along the complete body sill.
NHTSA tested two vehicles without
B-pillars, the 2004 Chevrolet Silverado
HD and 2005 Nissan Frontier. This
testing confirmed that the load can be
successfully transferred to the joint
between adjacent doors where a B-pillar
would be in a conventional vehicle
design. The Silverado did not meet the
2.5 SWR proposed in the NPRM, but it
did exceed 1.5. The Frontier achieved a
peak SWR of almost 4.0 within the
allocated platen displacement.
While we appreciate the challenges
manufacturers will incur to meet the
new requirements, we believe the
upgrade is feasible for vehicles without
B-pillars. We note that one of the
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reasons we are providing a phase-in is
to permit manufacturers additional time
to make the design changes needed to
enable some of the more challenging
vehicles to comply with the
requirements of the final rule.
3. Heavier Vehicles With a High Height
to Width Aspect Ratio
The Alliance and Mercedes–Benz
USA requested that vehicles with a
GVWR above 3,856 kilograms (8,500
pounds) GVWR and a height to width
aspect ratio greater than 1.2 be
permitted to certify to FMVSS No. 220
as an option or, at a minimum, use the
larger platen specified for FMVSS No.
220. They argued that the FMVSS No.
216 platen results in unrealistic roof
deformation for these particular
vehicles.
Agency Response
While we have considered this
comment, we believe that the
commenters have not provided
persuasive evidence that a special
requirement is needed for these
vehicles. While we did observe edge
contact in our testing of the Sprinter, it
was not of a nature that prevents
compliant designs. We note that the 1.5
SWR we are adopting for vehicles
within this weight range reduces
possible concerns in this area.
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4. Active Roofs
Autoliv North America (Autoliv)
stated that the quasi-static test
procedure does not have a provision for
active roof structure systems. Active
roof structures are being developed to
provide added stiffness during an actual
rollover event. The effectiveness of such
a system may be transient, deployed
during a rollover initiation and lasting
only as long as required to reduce
intrusion. The quasi-static test specifies
a deformation rate of not more than 13
millimeters per second with the total
time for crush not to exceed 120
seconds. According to Autoliv, the
duration of this test may exceed the
time in which certain active roof
structures can be effective.
Agency Response
We are not aware of the near term
implementation or effectiveness of
active roof structure technology. In
developing performance requirements,
we seek to develop ones that are
appropriate for, and do not
unnecessarily discourage, new
technologies. However, our ability to do
this is dependent on the amount of
information we have. We do not have
sufficient information at this time to
indicate the quasi-static test will
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prevent implementation of active roof
systems.
5. Whether an Additional SNPRM Is
Needed
Several commenters argued that the
agency’s January 2008 SNPRM did not
provide sufficient information about the
alternatives we were considering and
that an additional SNPRM should be
published.
Public Citizen claimed that the
January 2008 SNPRM failed to provide
enough information for meaningful
public comment. It stated that the
agency did not spell out the explicit
safety benefits of mandating a two-sided
test, or how using the one-sided test
would meet the statutory requirement
relating to roof strength for driver and
passenger sides. Public Citizen argued
that a new SNPRM is needed.
Advocates claimed that the January
2008 SNPRM offered several regulatory
alternatives without support from a
cost-benefits analysis. That commenter
stated that this denied the public an
opportunity to evaluate the agency’s
comparative estimates of costs and
benefits before submitting comments.
Advocates argued that the SNPRM did
not fulfill agency’s obligation to present
the public with the regulatory
alternatives it is considering.
The AIAM stated that it believes there
would not be a fair opportunity for
public comment on a two-sided test
requirement without an opportunity of
review of revised cost-benefit analysis.
Agency Response
We reject the commenters’ arguments
that the agency did not provide a
meaningful opportunity for comment. In
conjunction with the August 2005
NPRM, the agency’s PRIA included an
assessment of the 2.5 and 3.0 SWR
alternatives. As discussed above, in our
January 2008 SNPRM, we asked for
public comment on a number of issues
that might affect the content of the final
rule, including possible variations in the
proposed requirements. We also
announced the release of the results of
various vehicle tests conducted since
the proposal. In the SNPRM, we noted
that we had been carefully analyzing the
numerous comments we had received
on the NPRM, as well as the various
additional vehicle tests, including both
single-side tests and two-sided tests,
conducted since the NPRM. We invited
comments on how the agency should
factor the new information into its
decision. We noted that while the
NPRM focused on a specified force
equivalent to 2.5 times the unloaded
vehicle weight, the agency could adopt
a higher or lower value for the final rule.
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We explained, with respect to two-sided
vehicle testing, that we believed there
was now sufficient available
information for the agency to consider a
two-sided requirement as an alternative
to the single-sided procedure described
in the NPRM. We stated that we
planned to evaluate both the singlesided and two-sided testing alternatives
for the final rule and requested
comments that would help us reach a
decision on that issue.
While the agency did not provide
complete new cost-benefits analyses to
accompany the SNPRM, we included a
detailed discussion in the SNPRM of
how estimated impacts of the final rule
would be changed by a number of
relevant factors. See 73 FR 5488–5490.
These factors included the pass/fail rate
of the vehicle fleet, the impact of the
ESC standard on potential benefits,
revised cost and weight estimates, twosided testing implications, and other
factors.
Thus, in the NPRM and SNPRM, we
provided detailed information
concerning the alternatives we were
considering and the relevant issues. We
also note that both Public Citizen and
Advocates supported a two-sided test
requirement, the alternative we are
adopting in today’s rule.
6. Rear Seat Occupants
As a general comment to the NPRM,
the Advocates raised a concern that the
quasi-static platen test is not applicable
to rear seat occupants including small
children seated in the rear.
Agency Response
We note that the large size of the
FMVSS No. 216 platen covers the rear
seat in most vehicles to help ensure
protection for rear seat occupants. We
believe that one of the countermeasures
that vehicle manufacturers will use to
meet the upgraded roof strength
requirements is strengthening the Bpillars. In terms of possible benefits to
small children, belted occupant injuries
sustained due to rollover roof crush are
to the head, neck, and face from contact
with roof structures. Appropriately
restrained children are generally not tall
enough to sustain such injuries.
7. New Car Assessment Program (NCAP)
Several commenters suggested that
the agency develop a 5-star rating
system concerning roof strength for our
NCAP program to provide the public
with information on roof strength and to
encourage manufacturers to improve the
roof strength of their vehicles.
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Agency Response
The purpose of this rulemaking is to
upgrade our roof strength standard. The
issue of whether roof strength might be
addressed in some way in our NCAP
program would be considered separately
in the context of that program.
8. Possible Energy Requirement
We did not propose an energy
requirement in the NPRM but indicated
that we would welcome comments on
an energy absorption test that had
previously been suggested by SAFE and
Syson-Hille and Associates (Syson).
Agency Response
We received several comments. We
appreciate the information provided in
the comments but note that we are not
considering rulemaking in this area.
9. Advanced Restraints
In the NPRM, we presented a
summary of our advanced restraints
research and requested comments in
this area.
Agency Response
While advanced restraints are not part
of this rulemaking, the agency is
continuing research in this area and
appreciates the comments that were
provided.
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VII. Costs and Benefits
At the time of the NPRM, the agency
prepared a PRIA describing the
estimated costs and benefits of the
proposal. While the agency did not
provide complete new cost-benefits
analyses to accompany the SNPRM, we
included a detailed discussion in the
SNPRM of how estimated impacts of the
final rule would be changed by a
number of relevant factors. See 73 FR
5488–5490. These factors included the
pass/fail rate of the vehicle fleet, the
impact of the ESC standard on potential
benefits, revised cost and weight
estimates, two-sided testing
implications, and other factors.
Many commenters addressed the
PRIA and the later discussion of these
impacts included in the SNPRM.
Among other things, commenters
addressed the target population, the
pass/fail rate of the current fleet, cost
and weight impacts, and estimates of
benefits.
The agency addresses the comments
concerning its analysis of costs and
benefits in detail in the FRIA. In this
document, we summarize the agency’s
estimates of costs and benefits and
discuss the comments concerning target
population and roof crush as a cause of
injury.
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a. Conclusions of the FRIA
The conclusions of the FRIA can be
summarized as follows:
Countermeasures
The agency believes that
manufacturers will meet this standard
by strengthening reinforcements in roof
pillars, by increasing the gauge of steel
used in roofs, and/or by using higher
strength materials. The agency believes
that pressure to improve fuel economy
in vehicles, driven by more stringent
Corporate Average Fuel Economy
(CAFE) standards as well as by market
forces, together with safety
considerations, will provide a strong
incentive for manufacturers to achieve
increased roof strength through use of
light weight materials and stronger roof
designs initiated during the redesign
cycle. The agency believes that the
phase-in schedule provided in this rule
will allow manufacturers to establish
such designs in an efficient manner. The
agency estimates that about 82 percent
of all current passenger car and light
truck models with GVWRs less than
2,722 kilograms (6,000 pounds) will
need changes to meet the 3.0 SWR
requirement, and that 40 percent of
vehicles over 2,722 kilograms (6,000
pounds) GVWR will need changes to
meet the 1.5 SWR requirement.
Benefits
The agency estimates that the changes
in FMVSS No. 216 will prevent 135
fatalities and 1,065 nonfatal injuries
annually.
Costs
The design changes made to comply
with higher test load requirements will
add both cost and weight to the vehicle.
This will increase the initial purchase
price and will increase lifetime fuel
usage costs.
Taking account of both the costs of
design changes and lifetime fuel usage
costs, the agency estimates that
compliance with the upgraded roof
strength standard will increase lifetime
consumer costs by $69–$114 per
affected vehicle. Redesign costs are
expected to increase affected vehicle
prices by an average of about $54.
Added weight is estimated to increase
the lifetime cost of fuel usage by $15 to
$62 for an average affected vehicle. The
range in fuel costs reflects different
discount rate assumptions of 7% and
3%, as well as a range of assumptions
regarding the ability of manufacturers to
incorporate advanced weight saving
technology into their redesigned fleet.
Total consumer costs are expected to
range from $875 million to $1.4 billion
annually.
Cost Effectiveness and Net Benefits
Cost effectiveness is a measure of the
economic investment that is required to
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prevent a fatality. The cost effectiveness
of this rule was estimated under both
3% and 7% discount rate assumptions
for each alternative. Nonfatal injuries
were translated into fatality equivalents
based on comprehensive valuations that
included both economic impacts and
valuations of lost quality of life. To
reflect the present value of benefits that
would be experienced over the vehicle’s
useful life, the resulting equivalent
fatalities were discounted over the
vehicle’s life based on annual exposure
to crash involvement as measured by
annual miles traveled. The 135 fatalities
and 1,065 nonfatal injuries that will be
prevented translate into 190 equivalent
fatalities, which are valued at 156
equivalent fatalities under a 3%
discount rate, and 125 equivalent
fatalities under a 7% discount rate.
When compared to total costs, the
results indicate that the new standard
will cost from $6.1 million to $9.8
million per equivalent life saved.
Net benefits represent the difference
between total costs and the total
monetary value of benefits. DOT’s
guidance specifies a value of $5.8
million as the value of a statistical life
(VSL), with a range of uncertainty
covering $3.2 million to $8.4 million.
The monetary value of benefits was
estimated by assigning a value of $6.1
million to each equivalent fatality
prevented. This value includes the $5.8
million VSL plus approximately
$300,000 of economic savings to
represent the comprehensive societal
benefit from preventing a fatality. This
means that the standard would be
considered to result in net benefits only
if the cost per equivalent life saved was
below $6.1 million.
Net benefits represent the difference
between total costs and the total
monetary value of benefits. The
monetary value of benefits was
estimated by assigning a value of $6.1
million to each equivalent fatality
prevented. This value consists of a value
per statistical life saved (VSL) of $5.8
million plus $300,000 in economic costs
prevented. For the 3.0/1.5 load
requirements of the final rule, the net
impact would range from a net benefit
of $6 million to a net loss of $458
million. Using an alternate
comprehensive value of $8.7 million
(which consists of a VSL of $8.4 million
plus $300,000 in economic savings), the
standard could result in a net benefit of
$388 million to a net loss of $151
million. Using an alternate
comprehensive value of $3.5 million
(which consists of a VSL of $3.2 million
plus $300,000 in economic savings), the
standard could result in a net loss
ranging from $376 million to $824
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million. These impacts are
disproportionately influenced by the
relatively large contributions to costs
and small contributions to benefits from
vehicles over 6,000 lbs. GVWR. Nearly
all alternatives covering vehicles from
6,001 to 10,000 lbs. GVWR yield net
losses rather than net savings to society.
The following table summarizes the
cost and benefits of this final rule.
TABLE 2—COST AND BENEFIT SUMMARY
Total Cost .................................................................................................
Cost per Affected Vehicle .........................................................................
Benefits .....................................................................................................
Cost per Equivalent Life Saved ................................................................
Net Benefits ..............................................................................................
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b. Comments
Target Population
The agency received numerous
comments concerning the target
population. CAS and Advocates argued
that improving roof strength would
impact ejection and that mitigated
ejections should therefore be included
in the agency’s benefit calculations.
Advocates also argued that rear seat
occupants should be covered by the
revised standard. SAFE argued that roof
crush increases the likelihood of glass
fracture and vehicle structure
deformation, thereby increasing the
possibility of ejection. It also argued that
roof crush reduces the effectiveness of
restraint systems, decreases the
effectiveness of rollover air curtains,
and decreases the ability of occupants to
be extricated from the vehicle. The
Xprts disagreed with several of
NHTSA’s target population restrictions.
It stated that ejected occupants, rear seat
occupants, and children under 12
should be included. It also argued that
roof crush can cause thoracic and spinal
injuries, and that upper extremity
injuries from ejection through side
windows should also be included. Many
of these arguments were repeated in a
separate submission by CFIR signed by
one of the Xprts authors. Consumers
Union and Public Citizen also argued
that stronger roofs would reduce
ejections and better maintain the
performance of other safety features
such as safety belts, air bags, and door
locks. Public Citizen also argued that
unbelted occupants would benefit from
stronger roofs.
Agency response. We begin our
response by noting that Table 1, set
forth earlier in this document, shows a
breakdown of the target population that
could potentially benefit from roof
crush improvements.
To examine the inclusion of different
categories of injuries in the target
population, the agency has conducted
several analyses of ejections in
rollovers. The first study was a
statistical analysis examining the
relationship between intrusion and
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$875 to $1,391 million.
$69 to $114.
135 fatalities, 1,065 injuries, 190 equivalent fatalities.
$6.1million to $9.8 million.
$6 million to ¥$458.
ejection. In this study,45 Strashny
examined 36 different Probit models
examining belted cases, unbelted cases,
complete ejections, all ejections
(including both complete and partial
ejection), continuous models,
dichotomous models, adjusted models
based on both quarter turns and roof
exposures, as well as unadjusted
models. In all, there were 18 models for
complete ejections and 18 for all
ejections. Strashny found that there was
no significant relationship between the
level of intrusion and the probability of
complete ejection in any of the 18 full
ejection models. For all ejections, which
include partial ejections, he found some
level of significance for 8 of the 18
models, indicating that a minority of the
models found a possibility that some
partial ejections might be influenced by
stronger roofs. However, 12 of the
models found no statistically significant
relationship between intrusion and all
ejections. We note that partial ejections
that meet the other inclusion criteria are
a part of the target population for this
rulemaking.
The agency then conducted a detailed
examination of all fatal complete
ejection cases that were excluded from
the target population. A panel of three
NHTSA safety engineers independently
examined each case to determine
whether (a) for ejections through open
doors, there was deformation in the
door latch area where the root cause
could be directly attributed to roof
crush, and (b) for ejections through
windows, if the broken glass through
which the occupant was ejected was
directly related to deformation of the
roof rather than dynamic crash impulse
loads or side window/door to ground
contact. The panel concluded that there
were no cases that met either of these
criteria. Therefore, based on these
findings and Strashny’s finding of no
statistically significant correlation
between intrusion and ejection
probability, all cases of total ejection
45 Strashny, Alexander, ‘‘The Role of Vertical
Roof Intrusion in Predicting Occupant Ejection,’’
National Center for Statistics and Analysis, 2009.
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were excluded from the target
population unless their MAIS level
injury occurred inside the vehicle prior
to ejection.
For occupants who were unbelted but
not fully ejected, we could not establish
a relationship between roof crush
injuries and the magnitude of roof
crush. Strashny analyzed the
relationship between intrusion and
injuries to unbelted occupants and
found no significant correlation. This is
not unexpected because unbelted
occupants essentially become flying
objects inside vehicles as they roll over,
and head injuries can occur at multiple
interior locations. Therefore, only belted
occupants are included in the target
population.
Regarding the other categories of
injuries noted in the comments,
partially ejected occupants were already
included in the target population, and
the agency has decided to include rear
seat occupants in the target population.
We note that B pillar strength upgrades
were included in all of our finite
element countermeasure analyses, and
this support also provides protection for
rear occupants. Moreover, vehicle
schematics submitted by both industry
and contractors indicate that some
design solutions contemplated for
increased roof strength include not only
stronger A- and B-pillars but also a
stronger B- to C-pillar load path to resist
platen movement. Such solutions may
benefit rear seat occupants as well as
front seat occupants. The agency has
also decided to include belted children
in the target population.
Roof Crush as a Cause of Injury
A number of commenters including
GM, Ford, Nissan, and SAFE stated that
the statistical correlation Strashny
found between roof intrusion and injury
does not establish a causal relationship
between roof deformation and injury.
SAFE stated that the studies by both
Rains and Strashny merely suggest that
there is a relationship. SAFE stated that
‘‘ * * * when you compare rollover
accidents that have significant roof/
pillar deformation with other rollover
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accidents that have very little or no
roof/pillar deformation, you are not
comparing similar accidents with
respect to roof-to-ground impact
severity. Just the fact that two vehicles
are in a rollover with greater than 2
quarter turns does not mean they are in
the same or even similar impact
severities.’’ SAFE also noted an earlier
study (matched pair comparison project)
in which production and roll barequipped vehicles were tested where
the comprehensive forces measured on
test dummies were similar regardless of
the vehicle roof crush. Ford stated that
‘‘The amount of roof deformation is only
an indication of the severity of the
impact between the roof and the ground
* * *.’’ GM stated that ‘‘Observations of
injury occurrence at the end of a
rollover collision reveal nothing
regarding the relationship of roof
deformation, roof strength, or roof
strength-to-weight ratio injury
causation.’’ Nissan stated that
deformation and injury severity are both
independently associated with roof
impact severity.
Agency Response
The agency agrees that as a general
principle, a statistical correlation does
not in itself prove that a causal
relationship exists. However, the
Strashny study was designed with a
strict focus to only include injury
scenarios where the intruding roof was
the injury source. The study compared
cases where there was intrusion to cases
where there was no intrusion and found
that as intrusion increases, the
probability of, and severity of injury
also increases. The study controlled for
crash severity using quarter turns,
which is the best available metric for
rollover severity. Contrary to SAFE’s
contention, the study does not compare
crashes over 2 quarter turns as a group.
Rather, it compares only crashes of
similar severity as defined by each
iterative quarter turn exposure. Thus, a
vehicle that experienced 3 quarter turns
would only be compared to other
vehicles that experienced 3 quarter
turns. SAFE’s and Ford’s arguments
appear to imply that any difference in
roof intrusion must be due to a
difference in impact severity rather than
roof strength or design, whereas the
Strashny study, by controlling for
quarter turns, attempts to minimize
differences due to impact severity.
Further, the study included only belted
cases which minimized the impact of
‘‘diving’’ as an injury cause.
There are logical reasons to believe
that a collapsing roof that strikes an
occupant’s head at the nearly
instantaneous impact velocity
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experienced when structures deform
might cause serious injury. These types
of injuries were documented by
Rechnitzer and Lane in a detailed
investigation of 43 rollover crashes.46
The agency believes that the statistically
significant relationship between roof
intrusion and belted occupant injury
found in the Strashny study indicates
not just a suggestion, but a probability
that increasing roof strength reduces
injuries.
Regarding the SAFE matched pair
comparison project, the agency notes
that the dummy necks used in the tests
were not biofidelic. They are rigid
structures that do not allow for the
normal bending that occurs in the
human spine. The agency believes that
lateral bending plays an important role
in determining the degree of injury
sustained by humans in rollovers, and
does not view these results as an
adequate assessment of injury in
humans during rollover crashes.
VIII. Rulemaking Analyses and Notices
a. Executive Order 12866 (Regulatory
Planning and Review) and DOT
Regulatory Policies and Procedures
The agency has considered the impact
of this rulemaking action under
Executive Order 12866 and the
Department of Transportation’s
regulatory policies and procedures. This
rulemaking is economically significant
and was reviewed by the Office of
Management and Budget under E.O.
12866, ‘‘Regulatory Planning and
Review.’’ The rulemaking action has
also been determined to be significant
under the Department’s regulatory
policies and procedures. The FRIA fully
discusses the estimated costs and
benefits of this rulemaking action. The
costs and benefits are summarized in
section VII of this preamble, supra.
b. Regulatory Flexibility Act
The Regulatory Flexibility Act of
1980, as amended, requires agencies to
evaluate the potential effects of their
proposed and final rules on small
businesses, small organizations and
small governmental jurisdictions. I
hereby certify that this rule will not
have a significant economic impact on
a substantial number of small entities.
Small organizations and small
governmental units will not be
significantly affected since the potential
cost impacts associated with this action
will not significantly affect the price of
new motor vehicles.
46 Rechnutzer, George and Lane, John, ‘‘Rollover
Crash Study, Vehicle Design and Occupant
Injuries’’, Monash University, 1994.
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The rule directly affects motor vehicle
manufacturers, second stage or final
manufacturers, and alterers. The
majority of motor vehicle manufacturers
would not qualify as a small business.
There are six manufacturers of
passenger cars that are small
businesses.47 These manufacturers,
along with manufacturers that do not
qualify as a small business, are already
required to comply with the current
requirements of FMVSS No. 216 for
vehicles with a GVWR of 2,722
kilograms (6,000 pounds) or less.
Improving performance as necessary to
meet the upgraded requirements, and
for the requirements for heavier light
vehicles, can be achieved by means
including strengthening reinforcements
in roof pillars, by increasing the gauge
of steel used in roofs and by using
higher strength materials.
All of these small manufacturers
could be affected by the upgraded
requirements. However, the economic
impact upon these entities will not be
significant for the following reasons.
(1) Potential cost increases are very
small compared to the price of the
vehicles being manufactured and can be
passed on to the consumer.
(2) Some of the vehicles manufactured
by these small businesses are
convertibles not subject to this
requirement.
(3) The rule provides several years
leadtime, and small volume
manufacturers are given the option of
waiting until the end of the phase-in
(until September 1, 2015) to meet the
upgraded requirements for lighter
vehicles. All manufacturers are given
until September 1, 2016 to meet the
requirements for the heavier light
vehicles.
Most of the intermediate and final
stage manufacturers of vehicles built in
two or more stages and alterers have
1,000 or fewer employees. Some of these
companies already are required to
comply with the current requirements of
FMVSS No. 216 for vehicles with a
GVWR of 2,722 kilograms (6,000
pounds) or less. We have included
several provisions in the final rule to
address the special needs of multi-stage
manufacturers and alterers. While the
number of these small businesses
potentially affected by this rule is
substantial, the economic impact upon
these entities will not be significant for
the following reasons:
(1) We are providing a FMVSS No.
220 option for multi-stage vehicles,
except those built on chassis-cab
incomplete vehicles, and for vehicles
47 Fisker, Mosler, Panoz, Saleen, Standard Taxi,
Tesla.
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which are changed in certain ways to
raise the height of the roof. This aspect
of our rule affords significant economic
relief to small businesses, some of
which are already required by States to
certify to the requirements of FMVSS
No. 220.
(2) Small businesses using chassis
cabs will be in position to take
advantage of ‘‘pass-through
certification,’’ and therefore are not
expected to incur any additional
expenditures.
(3) We are excluding a narrow
category of multi-stage vehicles from
FMVSS No. 216 altogether, multi-stage
trucks built on incomplete vehicles
other than chassis cabs.
(4) Some of the vehicles manufactured
by these small businesses are
convertibles.
(5) Final stage manufacturers and
alterers can wait until one year after the
end of the phase-in to meet the new
requirements.
Accordingly, there will not be a
significant economic impact on small
businesses, small organizations, or small
governmental units by these
amendments. For these reasons, the
agency has not prepared a regulatory
flexibility analysis.
c. Executive Order 13132 (Federalism)
NHTSA has examined today’s final
rule pursuant to Executive Order 13132
(64 FR 43255, August 10, 1999) and
concluded that no additional
consultation with States, local
governments or their representatives is
mandated beyond the rulemaking
process. The agency has concluded that
the rule does not have federalism
implications because the rule does not
have ‘‘substantial direct effects on the
States, on the relationship between the
national government and the States, or
on the distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various
levels of government.’’
Further, after careful consideration of
the public comments and further
analysis of the issues, NHTSA
concludes that no consultation is
needed to discuss the preemptive effect
of today’s rule. NHTSA’s safety
standards can have preemptive effect in
at least two ways. First, the National
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act
contains an express preemption
provision: ‘‘When a motor vehicle safety
standard is in effect under this chapter,
a State or a political subdivision of a
State may prescribe or continue in effect
a standard applicable to the same aspect
of performance of a motor vehicle or
motor vehicle equipment only if the
standard is identical to the standard
prescribed under this chapter.’’ 49
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U.S.C. 30103(b)(1). It is this statutory
command that unavoidably preempts
non-identical State legislative and
administrative law, not today’s
rulemaking, so consultation would be
unnecessary.
Second, the Supreme Court has
recognized the possibility of implied
preemption: State requirements
imposed on motor vehicle
manufacturers, including sanctions
imposed by State tort law, can stand as
an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of a NHTSA safety standard.
When such a conflict is discerned, the
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution
makes the State requirements
unenforceable. See Geier v. American
Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000).
For the reasons explained below, the
agency has reconsidered the tentative
position presented in the NPRM and
does not currently foresee any potential
State tort requirements that might
conflict with today’s final rule.
In the NPRM, NHTSA considered the
objectives of the proposed roof crush
resistance upgrade in the context of the
agency’s overall rollover plan and
addressed whether there might be
specific conflicts between the standard
and anticipated State tort law. The
agency opined on the possibility that
certain State tort law actions might
conflict with an improved Federal roof
crush resistance standard and that those
conflicts could result in those actions
being determined by a court to be
impliedly preempted. It presented the
following tentative conclusions:
• Overall, safety would best be
promoted by the careful balance it had
struck in the proposal among a variety
of considerations and objectives
regarding rollover safety.
• The proposal to upgrade roof crush
resistance was a part of a
comprehensive plan for reducing the
serious risk of rollover crashes and the
risk of death and serious injury in those
crashes. The objective of the proposal
was to increase the requirement for roof
crush resistance only to the extent that
it can be done without creating too
much risk of negatively affecting vehicle
dynamics and rollover propensity.
Excessively increasing current roof
crush resistance requirements could
lead vehicle manufacturers to add
weight to vehicle roof and pillars,
thereby raising the vehicle center of
gravity (CG) and increasing rollover
propensity.
• Some methods of improving roof
crush resistance are costlier than others
and the resources diverted to increasing
roof strength using one of the costlier
methods could delay or even prevent
vehicle manufacturers from equipping
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their vehicles with advanced vehicle
technologies for reducing rollovers.
• Either a broad State performance
requirement for levels of roof crush
resistance greater than those proposed
or a narrower requirement mandating
that increased roof strength be achieved
by a particular specified means, could
frustrate the agency’s objectives by
upsetting the balance between efforts to
increase roof strength and reduce
rollover propensity.
• Based on this conflict analysis, if
the proposal were adopted as a final
rule, all conflicting State common law
requirements, including rules of tort
law, would be subject to being found to
be impliedly preempted.
1. Public Comments About NHTSA’s
Tentative Views on Conflict and
Preemption
Vehicle manufacturers and one legal
advocacy organization strongly
supported the view that an upgraded
roof crush standard would conflict with
and therefore impliedly preempt State
rules of tort law imposing more
stringent requirements than the one
ultimately adopted by NHTSA.
Consumer advocacy groups, members
of Congress and State officials, trial
lawyers, consultants and members of
academia, and private individuals
strongly opposed our view that there
could be conflict. The opposing letters
from State officials included one signed
by 27 State Attorneys General and the
National Conference of State
Legislatures.
A summary of the primary arguments
of the commenters on each side follows:
A. Primary Arguments for the Existence
of Conflict
• There is a limit to the increases in
roof crush resistance or stiffening that
can practicably be achieved across the
fleet without introducing unacceptable
risk of undesirable effects, such as
increases in the height of the center of
gravity of the vehicle or diverting
resources away from other promising
advanced vehicle technologies for
reducing rollovers.
• Small additions of weight and small
changes in center of gravity height will,
based on NHTSA’s analysis presented in
Appendix A of the PRIA, have large
consequences on the level of rollover
risk and risk of associated fatalities and
injuries. Moreover, the weight impacts
of meeting requirements at different
SWR levels are greater than estimated
by the agency in the PRIA.
• There is a conflict between the
agency’s comprehensive rollover policy
and some state common law rules
related to roof strength. Any state
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common law rule that would purport to
impose a duty to design vehicles’ roofs
to meet a more stringent strength
requirement has the potential, as a
practical matter, to result in a reduction
in vehicle stability (as measured by
average SSF), at least for some vehicle
models in the fleet. Such a result would
undercut NHTSA’s overall rollover
mitigation policy that has been
developed to balance the competing
goals of preventing rollover crashes in
the first place and of reducing the risk
of injury when such crashes
nevertheless occur.
• The creation of a patchwork of
different State roof crush resistance
requirements across the country would
not contribute toward achievement of an
appropriate balancing of roof strength
and rollover propensity.
• Being required to devote resources
to increasing roof strength using one of
the costlier methods could delay or even
prevent manufacturers from installing
advanced vehicle technologies for
reducing rollovers.
• The agency should also be
concerned about another potential
safety conflict, in the area of vehicle
compatibility, as the addition of weight
increases the chances of vehicle mass
mismatch in a collision.
B. Primary Arguments Against the
Existence of Conflict
• NHTSA’s claims that a more
stringent standard could result in
increased vehicle weight and decreased
stability are not supported by the
record.
• Manufacturers can strengthen roofs
by a variety of means without
significantly increasing weight, and
advanced steels and other lightweight
materials can be used to strengthen
roofs without a weight increase.
• NHTSA’s data show that increases
in roof structural strength will not have
a physically measurable influence on
CG height. Production of vehicles that
exceed the NHTSA standard would
enhance the safety objectives of that
standard.
• NHTSA did not provide any
examples of vehicles with elevated
rollover risk due to weight added to the
roof. An examination of the vehicle
fleet, including the Volvo XC90 and
vehicles with high SWRs tested after
publication of the NPRM, shows that the
agency’s concerns are unfounded.
• The agency’s statement that
resources used to increase roof strength
could divert resources away from other
promising advanced vehicle
technologies for reducing rollovers is
unsupported and speculative.
Manufacturers can do both.
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• Given the agency’s New Car
Assessment Program, manufacturers
would improve roof strength using
design changes that avoid a lower star
rating.
• The tort system would provide the
best incentive for manufacturers to
make design decisions that will not
increase rollover propensity.
• The premise behind NHTSA’s
analysis is incorrect because plaintiffs
alleging a design defect must prove that
the alternative design would not have
created more injuries in other accidents.
• The Geier case does not support
preemption as the situation it addressed
involved two key factors that are not
present here: Consumer resistance to air
bags and the need to foster innovation
in passive restraint technology.
Preemption in this case is inconsistent
with the statutory savings clause.
• The agency’s statement is overbroad
in being applied to all vehicles covered
by the standard, without regard to their
individual design characteristics or their
manufacturers’ ability to exceed the
standard without negatively affecting
vehicle dynamics and rollover
propensity.
2. Preemption, Geier and the National
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act
In Geier, 529 U.S. 861 (2000), the
Supreme Court specifically addressed
the possible preemptive effect of the
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle
Safety Act, taken together with Federal
motor vehicle safety standards issued
under that Act, on common law tort
claims. The issue before the court was
whether the Safety Act, together with
FMVSS No. 208, preempted a lawsuit
claiming a 1987 car was defective for
lacking a driver air bag. When the car
was manufactured, FMVSS No. 208 had
required manufacturers to equip some
but not all of their vehicles with passive
restraints.
The conclusions of Geier can be
summarized as follows:
• The Safety Act’s provision
expressly preempting state ‘‘standards’’
does not preempt common law tort
claims. The issue of whether the term
‘‘standards’’ includes tort law actions is
resolved by another provision in the
Safety Act—the ‘‘savings’’ clause. That
provision states that ‘‘(c)ompliance
with’’ a Federal safety standard ‘‘does
not exempt any person from any
liability under common law.’’
• The savings clause preserves those
tort actions that seek to establish greater
safety than the minimum safety
achieved by a Federal regulation
intended to provide a floor.
• The savings clause does not bar the
working of conflict preemption
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22381
principles. Nor does the preemption
provision, the saving provision, or both
read together, create some kind of
‘‘special burden’’ beyond that inherent
in ordinary preemption principles that
would specially disfavor pre-emption.
The two provisions, read together,
reflect a neutral policy, not a specially
favorable or unfavorable policy, toward
the application of ordinary conflict
preemption principles.
• The preemption provision itself
reflects a desire to subject the industry
to a single, uniform set of Federal safety
standards. On the other hand, the
savings clause reflects a congressional
determination that occasional
nonuniformity is a small price to pay for
a system in which juries not only create,
but also enforce, safety standards, while
simultaneously providing necessary
compensation to victims. Nothing in
any natural reading of the two
provisions favors one set of policies
over the other where a jury-imposed
safety standard actually conflicts with a
Federal safety standard.
• A court should not find preemption
too readily in the absence of clear
evidence of a conflict.
• The common-law ‘‘no airbag’’
action before the Court was preempted
because it actually conflicted with
FMVSS No. 208. That standard sought
a gradually developing mix of
alternative passive restraint devices for
safety-related reasons. The rule of state
tort law sought by the petitioner would
have required manufacturers of all
similar cars to install air bags rather
than other passive restraint systems,
thereby presenting an obstacle to the
variety and mix of devices that the
Federal regulation sought.
3. Agency Testing and Discussion
In the NPRM, we noted the wellestablished physical relationship
between center of gravity (CG) and
rollover propensity. It is reflected in our
NCAP ratings program. All other things
being equal, increasing the CG of a
vehicle increases its rollover propensity.
We also posited a second relationship,
one between CG and SWR. We
identified a hypothetical fleet impact in
which the weight and center of gravity
effects of complying with a 2.5 SWR
requirement could result in additional
rollovers and added fatalities. This
analysis was presented in Appendix A
of the PRIA. As discussed in that
document, there were various
uncertainties and caveats associated
with the analysis. The agency believed
that manufacturers would take steps to
avoid negative effects on rollover
propensity.
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We note that NHTSA has updated that
analysis for the FRIA, addressing 2.5,
3.0 and 3.5 SWR alternatives. As
discussed in the FRIA, the agency
believes that, for the alternatives
analyzed, manufacturers could and
would take steps sufficient to avoid
negative effects on rollover propensity if
sufficient leadtime is provided for them
to do so.
As noted earlier, NHTSA has done
testing of vehicles measuring roof crush
resistance performance, much of it
completed after publication of the
NPRM. Twelve of the vehicles tested by
NHTSA after the NPRM had (one-sided)
SWRs of 3.9 or higher. As part of our
fleet testing, NHTSA has also tested
three paired vehicles 48 for which
manufacturers significantly increased
SWR as part of redesigning the vehicle.
In each case, SWR was increased
without increasing rollover propensity
as measured by SSF. In two of the cases,
CG stayed about the same (it did not
increase); in the other, CG did increase
but other changes (track width) offset
the negative effect of higher CG.
4. Agency Views About Conflict
Preemption
As discussed above, the Supreme
Court has recognized the possibility of
implied preemption: State requirements
imposed on motor vehicle
manufacturers, including sanctions
imposed by State tort law, can stand as
obstacles to the accomplishment and
execution of a NHTSA safety standard.
When such a conflict is discerned, the
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution
makes the State requirements
unenforceable.
Since implied preemption turns upon
the existence of an actual conflict, we,
as the agency charged with effectively
carrying out the Act and possessing
substantial technical expertise regarding
the subject matter and purposes of the
Federal motor vehicle safety standards
and the Vehicle Safety Act, address
whether conflicts exist in our
rulemaking notices. In most
rulemakings, we do not foresee the
possibility of there being any state
requirements that would create
conflicts.
Following the principles set forth in
Geier, we are providing our views
concerning the issue of whether
conflicts may exist in connection with
the requirements being adopted in this
final rule. We believe that this is
appropriately responsive to statements
by several Supreme Court justices
encouraging agencies to consider and
48 2002 and 2007 Toyota Camry; 2003 and 2007
Toyota Tacoma; 2004 and 2008 Honda Accord.
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discuss the possible preemptive effects
of their rulemakings.49
After considering the public
comments on the proposal and
considering today’s final rule, NHTSA
has reconsidered the tentative position
presented in the NPRM and do not
currently foresee any potential State tort
requirements that might conflict with
today’s final rule. Without any conflict,
there could not be any implied
preemption.
In the NPRM, we stated that it was
our tentative judgment that safety would
be best promoted by the balance we had
struck in the proposal among a variety
of considerations and objectives
regarding rollover safety. We explained
that it was the objective of the proposal
to increase the requirement for roof
crush resistance only to the extent that
it could be done without creating too
much risk of negatively affecting vehicle
dynamics and rollover propensity. We
expressed concern that excessively
increasing current roof crush resistance
requirements could lead vehicle
manufacturers to add weight to vehicle
roof and pillars, thereby raising the
vehicle center of gravity (CG) and
increasing rollover propensity. As part
of our tentative position, we indicated
in the NPRM that a broad State
performance requirement for more
stringent levels of roof crush resistance
could frustrate the agency’s objectives
by upsetting the balance between efforts
to increase roof strength and reduce
rollover propensity.
Based on the record for this final rule,
we cannot identify a level of stringency
of roof crush resistance above which tort
laws would conflict. For example, we
cannot say that any particular levels of
roof crush resistance above those
required by today’s rule would likely
result in unacceptable levels of rollover
resistance. Similarly, we cannot identify
any level of roof crush resistance above
which it would be expected that net
safety benefits would diminish.
As discussed earlier, there are ways of
improving roof strength that avoid or
minimize adding weight high in the
vehicle (e.g., use of advanced
lightweight materials), and there are
other design characteristics that can be
used to offset or eliminate any potential
change in rollover stability due to
increased CG (e.g., increased track
width). Moreover, during our fleet
testing, we observed three paired
vehicles for which manufacturers
49 See, e.g., Hillsborough County v. Automated
Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 718 (1985);
Medtronic, Inc., v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 506 (1996)
(Justice Breyer, in concurrence); and Geier v.
American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 908
(2000) (Justice Stevens, in dissent).
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significantly increased SWR as part of
redesigning the vehicle, without
increasing rollover propensity as
measured by SSF. Finally, while there
would be increasing technical
challenges for vehicle manufacturers to
meet successively higher SWR levels
above the alternatives we analyzed,
those challenges would vary
considerably depending on the nature of
the vehicle, e.g., weight, size, geometry,
etc., making it essentially impossible for
NHTSA to define a level of roof crush
stringency likely to cause a conflict with
our rollover resistance objectives.
As to another concern we identified
in the NPRM, the possibility that some
kinds of State tort laws requiring
improved roof crush resistance might
cause a diversion of resources away
from manufacturer efforts to use
advanced technologies to reduce
rollovers, we have concluded that it is
not possible to identify how such
resources would otherwise have been
used. Specifically, there is not a basis to
conclude that such resources would
otherwise have been used for improving
rollover resistance or improving safety.
Therefore, we believe that such tort laws
do not create a conflict on these
grounds.
Finally, as noted earlier, vehicle
manufacturers suggested that we
consider a potential policy conflict in
the area of vehicle compatibility. They
stated that the addition of weight would
increase the chances of vehicle mass
mismatch in a collision. However, mass
mismatch is only one key aspect of
vehicle-to-vehicle crash compatibility,
particularly in frontal crashes. Vehicle
stiffness and geometric alignment are
also important factors in vehicle
compatibility. While it is hypothetically
possible that some kinds of tort laws on
roof strength could contribute toward
greater differential in weight between
some vehicles, e.g., if they resulted in
manufacturers adding significant weight
to heavier vehicles, we believe it is not
possible to define any level of
stringency of roof crush resistance above
which tort laws would create a conflict
with our vehicle compatibility
objectives. We note that in redesigning
vehicles in ways that improve roof
strength and also minimize impacts on
vehicle mass, manufacturers have many
design options to avoid or minimize
adding weight (e.g., use of advanced
light materials in various parts of the
vehicle, including ones other than those
related to the roof). There may also be
ways of offsetting any possible
incremental change in fleet
compatibility due to increased weight
mismatch that might occur with vehicle
geometric and/or stiffness design
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modifications. We note that the vehicle
manufacturers did not provide technical
analysis addressing the latter issue.
Therefore, although under the
principles enunciated in Geier it is
possible that a rule of State tort law
could conflict with a NHTSA safety
standard if it created an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of that
standard, we do not currently foresee
the likelihood of any such tort
requirements and do not have a basis for
concluding that any particular levels of
stringency would create such a conflict.
d. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
of 1995 (UMRA) requires Federal
agencies to prepare a written assessment
of the costs, benefits and other effects of
proposed or final rules that include a
Federal mandate likely to result in the
expenditure by State, local or tribal
governments, in the aggregate, or by the
private sector, of more than $100
million annually (adjusted annually for
inflation, with base year of 1995). These
effects are discussed earlier in this
preamble and in the FRIA. UMRA also
requires an agency issuing a final rule
subject to the Act to select the ‘‘least
costly, most cost-effective or least
burdensome alternative that achieves
the objectives of the rule.’’
The preamble and the FRIA identify
and consider a number of alternatives,
concerning factors such as single- or
two-sided test requirements, different
SWR levels, and phase-in schedule.
Alternatives considered by and rejected
by us would not fully achieve the
objectives of the alternative preferred by
NHTSA (a reasonable balance between
the benefits and costs). The agency
believes that it has selected the most
cost-effective alternative that achieves
the objectives of the rulemaking.
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e. National Environmental Policy Act
NHTSA has analyzed this final rule
for the purposes of the National
Environmental Policy Act. The agency
has determined that implementation of
this action will not have any significant
impact on the quality of the human
environment.
f. Executive Order 12778 (Civil Justice
Reform)
With respect to the review of the
promulgation of a new regulation,
section 3(b) of Executive Order 12988,
‘‘Civil Justice Reform’’ (61 FR 4729,
February 7, 1996) requires that
Executive agencies make every
reasonable effort to ensure that the
regulation: (1) Clearly specifies the
preemptive effect; (2) clearly specifies
the effect on existing Federal law or
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regulation; (3) provides a clear legal
standard for affected conduct, while
promoting simplification and burden
reduction; (4) clearly specifies the
retroactive effect, if any; (5) adequately
defines key terms; and (6) addresses
other important issues affecting clarity
and general draftsmanship under any
guidelines issued by the Attorney
General. This document is consistent
with that requirement.
Pursuant to this Order, NHTSA notes
as follows. The preemptive effect of this
rule is discussed above. NHTSA notes
further that there is no requirement that
individuals submit a petition for
reconsideration or pursue other
administrative proceeding before they
may file suit in court.
g. Plain Language
Executive Order 12866 requires each
agency to write all rules in plain
language. Application of the principles
of plain language includes consideration
of the following questions:
• Have we organized the material to
suit the public’s needs?
• Are the requirements in the rule
clearly stated?
• Does the rule contain technical
language or jargon that isn’t clear?
• Would a different format (grouping
and order of sections, use of headings,
paragraphing) make the rule easier to
understand?
• Would more (but shorter) sections
be better?
• Could we improve clarity by adding
tables, lists, or diagrams?
• What else could we do to make the
rule easier to understand?
If you have any responses to these
questions, please write to us with your
views.
h. Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA)
Under the PRA of 1995, a person is
not required to respond to a collection
of information by a Federal agency
unless the collection displays a valid
OMB control number. The final rule
contains a collection of information
because of the proposed phase-in
reporting requirements. There is no
burden to the general public.
The collection of information requires
manufacturers of passenger cars and
multipurpose passenger vehicles, trucks
and buses with a GVWR of 2,722
kilograms (6,000 pounds) or less to
annually submit a report, and maintain
records related to the report, concerning
the number of such vehicles that meet
the upgraded roof strength
requirements. The phase-in will cover
three years. The purpose of the
reporting and recordkeeping
requirements is to assist the agency in
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22383
determining whether a manufacturer of
vehicles has complied with the
requirements during the phase-in
period.
We will submit a request for OMB
clearance of the collection of
information required under today’s final
rule in time to obtain clearance prior to
the beginning of the phase-in at the
beginning of September 2012.
These requirements and our estimates
of the burden to vehicle manufacturers
are as follows:
NHTSA estimates that there are 21
manufacturers of passenger cars,
multipurpose passenger vehicles,
trucks, and buses with a GVWR of 2,722
kilograms (6,000 pounds) or less;
NHTSA estimates that the total
annual reporting and recordkeeping
burden resulting from the collection of
information is 1,260 hours;
NHTSA estimates that the total
annual cost burden, in U.S. dollars, will
be $0. No additional resources will be
expended by vehicle manufacturers to
gather annual production information
because they already compile this data
for their own use.
A Federal Register document must
provide a 60-day comment period
concerning the collection of
information. The Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) promulgated
regulations describing what must be
included in such a document. Under
OMB’s regulations (5 CFR 320.8(d)),
agencies must ask for public comment
on the following:
(1) Whether the collection of
information is necessary for the proper
performance of the functions of the
agency, including whether the
information will have practical utility;
(2) The accuracy of the agency’s
estimate of the burden of the proposed
collection of information, including the
validity of the methodology and
assumptions used;
(3) How to enhance the quality,
utility, and clarity of the information to
be collected; and,
(4) How to minimize the burden of the
collection of information on those who
are to respond, including the use of
appropriate automated, electronic,
mechanical, or other technological
collection techniques or other forms of
information technology, e.g., permitting
electronic submission of responses.
i. National Technology Transfer and
Advancement Act
Under the National Technology
Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995
(NTTAA) (Pub. L. 104–113),
All Federal agencies and departments shall
use technical standards that are developed or
adopted by voluntary consensus standards
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bodies, using such technical standards as a
means to carry out policy objectives or
activities determined by the agencies and
departments.
Voluntary consensus standards are
technical standards (e.g., materials
specifications, test methods, sampling
procedures, and business practices) that
are developed or adopted by voluntary
consensus standards bodies, such as the
International Organization for
Standardization (ISO) and the Society of
Automotive Engineers (SAE). The
NTTAA directs us to provide Congress,
through OMB, explanations when we
decide not to use available and
applicable voluntary consensus
standards.
We are incorporating the voluntary
consensus standard SAE Standard J826
‘‘Devices for Use in Defining and
Measuring Vehicle Seating
Accommodation,’’ SAE J826 (rev. July
1995) into the requirements of FMVSS
No. 216a as part of this rulemaking. As
discussed in the NPRM, we evaluated
the SAE inverted drop testing
procedure, but decided against
proposing it.
List of Subjects
49 CFR Part 571
Imports, Incorporation by reference,
Motor vehicle safety, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements, Tires.
49 CFR Part 585
Motor vehicle safety, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements.
■ In consideration of the foregoing,
NHTSA amends 49 CFR Chapter V as
set forth below.
PART 571—FEDERAL MOTOR
VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARDS
1. The authority citation for part 571
of title 49 continues to read as follows:
■
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 322, 30111, 30115,
30117, and 30166; delegation of authority at
49 CFR 1.50.
2. Section 571.216 is amended by
revising the section heading and S3 to
read as follows:
■
§ 571.216 Standard No. 216; Roof crush
resistance; Applicable unless a vehicle is
certified to § 571.216a.
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*
*
*
*
*
S3. Application.
(a) This standard applies to passenger
cars, and to multipurpose passenger
vehicles, trucks and buses with a GVWR
of 2,722 kilograms (6,000 pounds) or
less. However, it does not apply to—
(a) School buses;
(b) Vehicles that conform to the
rollover test requirements (S5.3) of
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Standard No. 208 (§ 571.208) by means
that require no action by vehicle
occupants;
(c) Convertibles, except for optional
compliance with the standard as an
alternative to the rollover test
requirements in S5.3 of Standard No.
208; or
(d) Vehicles certified to comply with
§ 571.216a.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 3. Section 571.216a is added to read
as follows:
§ 571.216a Standard No. 216a; Roof crush
resistance; Upgraded standard.
S1. Scope. This standard establishes
strength requirements for the passenger
compartment roof.
S2. Purpose. The purpose of this
standard is to reduce deaths and injuries
due to the crushing of the roof into the
occupant compartment in rollover
crashes.
S3. Application, incorporation by
reference, and selection of compliance
options.
S3.1 Application.
(a) This standard applies to passenger
cars, and to multipurpose passenger
vehicles, trucks and buses with a GVWR
of 4,536 kilograms (10,000 pounds) or
less, according to the implementation
schedule specified in S8 and S9 of this
section. However, it does not apply to—
(1) School buses;
(2) Vehicles that conform to the
rollover test requirements (S5.3) of
Standard No. 208 (§ 571.208) by means
that require no action by vehicle
occupants;
(3) Convertibles, except for optional
compliance with the standard as an
alternative to the rollover test
requirement (S5.3) of Standard No. 208;
or
(4) Trucks built in two or more stages
with a GVWR greater than 2,722
kilograms (6,000 pounds) not built using
a chassis cab.
(b) At the option of the manufacturer,
vehicles within either of the following
categories may comply with the roof
crush requirements (S4) of Standard No.
220 (§ 571.220) instead of the
requirements of this standard:
(1) Vehicles built in two or more
stages, other than vehicles built using a
chassis cab;
(2) Vehicles with a GVWR greater
than 2,722 kilograms (6,000 pounds)
that have an altered roof as defined by
S4 of this section.
(c) Manufacturers may comply with
the standard in this § 571.216a as an
alternative to § 571.216.
S3.2 Incorporation by reference.
Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE)
Standard J826 ‘‘Devices for Use in
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Defining and Measuring Vehicle Seating
Accommodation,’’ SAE J826 (rev. July
1995) is incorporated by reference in
S7.2 of this section. The Director of the
Federal Register has approved the
incorporation by reference of this
material in accordance with 5 U.S.C.
552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. A copy of SAE
J826 (rev. Jul 95) may be obtained from
SAE at the Society of Automotive
Engineers, Inc., 400 Commonwealth
Drive, Warrendale, PA 15096. Phone:
1–724–776–4841; Web: https://
www.sae.org. A copy of SAE J826 (July
1995) may be inspected at NHTSA’s
Technical Information Services, 1200
New Jersey Avenue, Washington, DC
20590, or at the National Archives and
Records Administration (NARA). For
information on the availability of this
material at NARA, call 202–741–6030,
or go to: https://www.archives.gov/
federal_register/
code_of_federal_regulations/
ibr_locations.html.
S3.3 Selection of compliance option.
Where manufacturer options are
specified, the manufacturer shall select
the option by the time it certifies the
vehicle and may not thereafter select a
different option for the vehicle. Each
manufacturer shall, upon the request
from the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration, provide
information regarding which of the
compliance options it selected for a
particular vehicle or make/model.
S4. Definitions.
Altered roof means the replacement
roof on a motor vehicle whose original
roof has been removed, in part or in
total, and replaced by a roof that is
higher than the original roof. The
replacement roof on a motor vehicle
whose original roof has been replaced,
in whole or in part, by a roof that
consists of glazing materials, such as
those in T-tops and sunroofs, and is
located at the level of the original roof,
is not considered to be an altered roof.
Convertible means a vehicle whose Apillars are not joined with the B-pillars
(or rearmost pillars) by a fixed, rigid
structural member.
S5. Requirements.
S5.1 When the test device described
in S6 is used to apply a force to a
vehicle’s roof in accordance with S7,
first to one side of the roof and then to
the other side of the roof:
(a) The lower surface of the test
device must not move more than 127
millimeters, and
(b) No load greater than 222 Newtons
(50 pounds) may be applied to the head
form specified in S5.2 of 49 CFR
571.201 located at the head position of
a 50th percentile adult male in
accordance with S7.2 of this section.
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S5.2 The maximum applied force to
the vehicle’s roof in Newtons is:
(a) For vehicles with a GVWR of 2,722
kilograms (6,000 pounds) or less, any
value up to and including 3.0 times the
unloaded vehicle weight of the vehicle,
measured in kilograms and multiplied
by 9.8, and
(b) For vehicles with a GVWR greater
than 2,722 kilograms (6,000 pounds),
any value up to and including 1.5 times
the unloaded vehicle weight of the
vehicle, measured in kilograms and
multiplied by 9.8.
S6. Test device. The test device is a
rigid unyielding block whose lower
surface is a flat rectangle measuring 762
millimeters by 1,829 millimeters.
S7. Test procedure. Each vehicle must
be capable of meeting the requirements
of S5 when tested in accordance with
the procedure in S7.1 through S7.6.
S7.1 Support the vehicle off its
suspension and rigidly secure the sills
and the chassis frame (when applicable)
of the vehicle on a rigid horizontal
surface(s) at a longitudinal attitude of 0
degrees ± 0.5 degrees. Measure the
longitudinal vehicle attitude along both
the driver and passenger sill. Determine
the lateral vehicle attitude by measuring
the vertical distance between a level
surface and a standard reference point
on the bottom of the driver and
passenger side sills. The difference
between the vertical distance measured
on the driver side and the passenger
side sills is not more than ± 10 mm.
Close all windows, close and lock all
doors, and close and secure any
moveable roof panel, moveable shade,
or removable roof structure in place
over the occupant compartment.
Remove roof racks or other nonstructural components. For a vehicle
built on a chassis-cab incomplete
vehicle that has some portion of the
added body structure above the height
of the incomplete vehicle, remove the
entire added body structure prior to
testing (the vehicle’s unloaded vehicle
weight as specified in S5 includes the
weight of the added body structure).
S7.2 Adjust the seats in accordance
with S8.3 of 49 CFR 571.214. Position
the top center of the head form specified
in S5.2 of 49 CFR 571.201 at the
location of the top center of the Head
Restraint Measurement Device (HRMD)
specified in 49 CFR 571.202a, in the
front outboard designated seating
position on the side of the vehicle being
tested as follows:
(a) Position the three dimensional
manikin specified in Society of
Automotive Engineers (SAE) Surface
Vehicle Standard J826, revised July
1995, ‘‘Devices for Use in Defining and
Measuring Vehicle Seating
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Accommodation,’’ (incorporated by
reference, see paragraph S3.2), in
accordance to the seating procedure
specified in that document, except that
the length of the lower leg and thigh
segments of the H-point machine are
adjusted to 414 and 401 millimeters,
respectively, instead of the 50th
percentile values specified in Table 1 of
SAE J826 (July 1995).
(b) Remove four torso weights from
the three-dimensional manikin specified
in SAE J826 (July 1995) (two from the
left side and two from the right side),
replace with two HRMD torso weights
(one on each side), and attach and level
the HRMD head form.
(c) Mark the location of the top center
of the HRMD in three dimensional space
to locate the top center of the head form
specified in S5.2 of 49 CFR 571.201.
S7.3 Orient the test device as shown
in Figure 1 of this section, so that—
(a) Its longitudinal axis is at a forward
angle (in side view) of 5 degrees (± 0.5
degrees) below the horizontal, and is
parallel to the vertical plane through the
vehicle’s longitudinal centerline;
(b) Its transverse axis is at an outboard
angle, in the front view projection, of 25
degrees below the horizontal (± 0.5
degrees).
S7.4 Maintaining the orientation
specified in S7.3 of this section—
(a) Lower the test device until it
initially makes contact with the roof of
the vehicle.
(b) Position the test device so that—
(1) The longitudinal centerline on its
lower surface is within 10 mm of the
initial point of contact, or on the center
of the initial contact area, with the roof;
and
(2) The midpoint of the forward edge
of the lower surface of the test device is
within 10 mm of the transverse vertical
plane 254 mm forward of the
forwardmost point on the exterior
surface of the roof, including
windshield trim, that lies in the
longitudinal vertical plane passing
through the vehicle’s longitudinal
centerline.
S7.5 Apply force so that the test
device moves in a downward direction
perpendicular to the lower surface of
the test device at a rate of not more than
13 millimeters per second until reaching
the force level specified in S5. Guide the
test device so that throughout the test it
moves, without rotation, in a straight
line with its lower surface oriented as
specified in S7.3(a) and S7.3(b).
Complete the test within 120 seconds.
S7.6 Repeat the test on the other
side of the vehicle.
S8. Phase-in schedule for vehicles
with a GVWR of 2,722 kilograms (6,000
pounds) or less.
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22385
S8.1 Vehicles manufactured on or
after September 1, 2012, and before
September 1, 2013. For vehicles
manufactured on or after September 1,
2012, and before September 1, 2013, the
number of vehicles complying with this
standard must not be less than 25
percent of:
(a) The manufacturer’s average annual
production of vehicles manufactured on
or after September 1, 2009, and before
September 1, 2012; or
(b) The manufacturer’s production on
or after September 1, 2012, and before
September 1, 2013.
S8.2 Vehicles manufactured on or
after September 1, 2013, and before
September 1, 2014. For vehicles
manufactured on or after September 1,
2013, and before September 1, 2014, the
number of vehicles complying with this
standard must not be less than 50
percent of:
(a) The manufacturer’s average annual
production of vehicles manufactured on
or after September 1, 2010, and before
September 1, 2013; or
(b) The manufacturer’s production on
or after September 1, 2013, and before
September 1, 2014.
S8.3 Vehicles manufactured on or
after September 1, 2014, and before
September 1, 2015. For vehicles
manufactured on or after September 1,
2014, and before September 1, 2015, the
number of vehicles complying with this
standard must not be less than 75
percent of:
(a) The manufacturer’s average annual
production of vehicles manufactured on
or after September 1, 2011, and before
September 1, 2014; or
(b) The manufacturer’s production on
or after September 1, 2014, and before
September 1, 2015.
S8.4 Vehicles manufactured on or
after September 1, 2015. Except as
provided in S8.8, each vehicle
manufactured on or after September 1,
2015 must comply with this standard.
S8.5 Calculation of complying
vehicles.
(a) For purpose of complying with
S8.1, a manufacturer may count a
vehicle if it is certified as complying
with this standard and is manufactured
on or after September 1, 2012, but before
September 1, 2013.
(b) For purposes of complying with
S8.2, a manufacturer may count a
vehicle if it:
(1) Is certified as complying with this
standard and is manufactured on or
after September 1, 2012, but before
September 1, 2014; and
(2) Is not counted toward compliance
with S8.1.
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(c) For purposes of complying with
S8.3, a manufacturer may count a
vehicle if it:
(1) Is certified as complying with this
standard and is manufactured on or
after September 1, 2012, but before
September 1, 2015; and
(2) Is not counted toward compliance
with S8.1 or S8.2.
S8.6 Vehicles produced by more than
one manufacturer.
S8.6.1 For the purpose of calculating
average annual production of vehicles
for each manufacturer and the number
of vehicles manufactured by each
manufacturer under S8.1 through S8.3,
a vehicle produced by more than one
manufacturer must be attributed to a
single manufacturer as follows, subject
to S8.6.2:
(a) A vehicle that is imported must be
attributed to the importer.
(b) A vehicle manufactured in the
United States by more than one
manufacturer, one of which also
markets the vehicle, must be attributed
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to the manufacturer that markets the
vehicle.
S8.6.2 A vehicle produced by more
than one manufacturer must be
attributed to any one of the vehicle’s
manufacturers specified by an express
written contract, reported to the
National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration under 49 CFR Part 585,
between the manufacturer so specified
and the manufacturer to which the
vehicle would otherwise be attributed
under S8.6.1.
S8.7 Small volume manufacturers.
Vehicles manufactured during any of
the three years of the September 1, 2012
through August 31, 2015 phase-in by a
manufacturer that produces fewer than
5,000 vehicles for sale in the United
States during that year are not subject to
the requirements of S8.1, S8.2, and S8.3.
S8.8 Final-stage manufacturers and
alterers.
Vehicles that are manufactured in two
or more stages or that are altered (within
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Sfmt 4700
the meaning of 49 CFR 567.7) after
having previously been certified in
accordance with Part 567 of this chapter
are not subject to the requirements of
S8.1 through S8.3. Instead, all vehicles
produced by these manufacturers on or
after September 1, 2016 must comply
with this standard.
S9 Vehicles with a GVWR above 2,722
kilograms (6,000 pounds).
(a) Except as provided in S9(b), each
vehicle manufactured on or after
September 1, 2016 must comply with
this standard.
(b) Vehicles that are manufactured in
two or more stages or that are altered
(within the meaning of 49 CFR 567.7)
after having previously been certified in
accordance with Part 567 of this chapter
are not subject to the requirements of
S8.1 through S8.3. Instead, all vehicles
produced by these manufacturers on or
after September 1, 2017 must comply
with this standard.
BILLING CODE P
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6. The authority citation for Part 585
continues to read as follows:
■
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Authority: 49 U.S.C. 322, 30111, 30115,
30117, and 30166; delegation of authority at
49 CFR 1.50.
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22387
PART 585—[AMENDED]
7. Part 585 is amended by adding
Subpart L to read as follows:
■
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22388
Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 90 / Tuesday, May 12, 2009 / Rules and Regulations
Subpart L—Roof Crush Resistance Phasein Reporting Requirements
Sec.
585.111 Scope.
585.112 Purpose.
585.113 Applicability.
585.114 Definitions.
585.115 Response to inquiries.
585.116 Reporting requirements.
585.117 Records.
Subpart L—Roof Crush Resistance
Phase-in Reporting Requirements
§ 585.111
Scope.
This subpart establishes requirements
for manufacturers of passenger cars,
multipurpose passenger vehicles,
trucks, and buses with a gross vehicle
weight rating of 2,722 kilograms (6,000
pounds) or less to submit a report, and
maintain records related to the report,
concerning the number of such vehicles
that meet the requirements of Standard
No. 216a; Roof crush resistance;
Upgraded standard (49 CFR 571.216a).
§ 585.112
Purpose.
The purpose of these reporting
requirements is to assist the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration
in determining whether a manufacturer
has complied with Standard No. 216a
(49 CFR 571.216a).
§ 585.113
Applicability.
This subpart applies to manufacturers
of passenger cars, multipurpose
passenger vehicles, trucks, and buses
with a gross vehicle weight rating of
2,722 kilograms (6,000 pounds) or less.
However, this subpart does not apply to
manufacturers whose production
consists exclusively of vehicles
manufactured in two or more stages,
and vehicles that are altered after
previously having been certified in
accordance with part 567 of this
chapter. In addition, this subpart does
not apply to manufacturers whose
production of motor vehicles for the
United States market is less than 5,000
vehicles in a production year.
§ 585.114
Definitions.
For the purposes of this subpart:
Production year means the 12-month
period between September 1 of one year
and August 31 of the following year,
inclusive.
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§ 585.115
Response to inquiries.
At any time prior to August 31, 2018,
each manufacturer must, upon request
from the Office of Vehicle Safety
Compliance, provide information
identifying the vehicles (by make,
model, and vehicle identification
number) that have been certified as
complying with Standard No. 216a (49
CFR 571.216a). The manufacturer’s
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designation of a vehicle as a certified
vehicle is irrevocable. Upon request, the
manufacturer also must specify whether
it intends to utilize carry-forward
credits, and the vehicles to which those
credits relate.
§ 585.116
Reporting requirements.
(a) General reporting requirements.
Within 60 days after the end of the
production years ending August 31,
2013, August 31, 2014, and August 31,
2015, each manufacturer must submit a
report to the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration concerning its
compliance with Standard No. 216a (49
CFR 571.216a) for its passenger cars,
multipurpose passenger vehicles,
trucks, and buses with a gross vehicle
weight rating of less than 2,722
kilograms (6,000 pounds) produced in
that year. Each report must —
(1) Identify the manufacturer;
(2) State the full name, title, and
address of the official responsible for
preparing the report;
(3) Identify the production year being
reported on;
(4) Contain a statement regarding
whether or not the manufacturer
complied with the requirements of
Standard No. 216a (49 CFR 571.216a)
for the period covered by the report and
the basis for that statement;
(5) Provide the information specified
in paragraph (b) of this section;
(6) Be written in the English language;
and
(7) Be submitted to: Administrator,
National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, 1200 New Jersey
Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590.
(b) Report content—(1) Basis for
statement of compliance. Each
manufacturer must provide the number
of passenger cars, multipurpose
passenger vehicles, trucks, and buses
with a gross vehicle weight rating of
2,722 kilograms (6,000 pounds) or less,
manufactured for sale in the United
States for each of the three previous
production years, or, at the
manufacturer’s option, for the current
production year. A new manufacturer
that has not previously manufactured
these vehicles for sale in the United
States must report the number of such
vehicles manufactured during the
current production year.
(2) Production. Each manufacturer
must report for the production year for
which the report is filed: the number of
passenger cars, multipurpose passenger
vehicles, trucks, and buses with a gross
vehicle weight rating of 2,722 kilograms
(6,000 pounds) or less that meet
Standard No. 216a (49 CFR 571.216a).
(3) Statement regarding compliance.
Each manufacturer must provide a
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statement regarding whether or not the
manufacturer complied with the
requirements of Standard No. 216a (49
CFR 571.216a) as applicable to the
period covered by the report, and the
basis for that statement. This statement
must include an explanation concerning
the use of any carry-forward credits.
(4) Vehicles produced by more than
one manufacturer. Each manufacturer
whose reporting of information is
affected by one or more of the express
written contracts permitted by S8.6.2 of
Standard No. 216a (49 CFR 571.216a)
must:
(i) Report the existence of each
contract, including the names of all
parties to the contract, and explain how
the contract affects the report being
submitted.
(ii) Report the actual number of
vehicles covered by each contract.
§ 585.117
Records.
Each manufacturer must maintain
records of the Vehicle Identification
Number for each vehicle for which
information is reported under
§ 585.116(b)(2) until December 31, 2018.
Issued on: April 30, 2009.
Ronald L. Medford,
Acting Deputy Administrator.
Appendix A—Analysis of Comments
Concerning Dynamic Testing
NHTSA did not propose a dynamic test
procedure in the NPRM or the SNPRM.
However, in the NPRM, we discussed
comments received in response to our
October 2001 RFC concerning whether we
should include some type of dynamic test as
part of the roof crush resistance standard. We
discussed several types of dynamic tests,
including the inverted drop test, the FMVSS
No. 208 dolly test, the Controlled Rollover
Impact System (CRIS) test, and the Jordan
Rollover System (JRS) test. We identified a
number of concerns about using these tests
in FMVSS No. 216. We noted our belief that
the current quasi-static test procedure is
repeatable and capable of simulating realworld rollover deformation patterns. We also
stated that we were unaware of any dynamic
test procedures that provide a sufficiently
repeatable test environment.
Several consumer advocacy organizations
and a number of other commenters argued
that the agency should propose a dynamic
test procedure in lieu of the proposed quasistatic test. Ms. Lawlor and Mr. Clough
suggested a dynamic rollover test is more
reflective of real-world rollovers. Boyle et al.
suggested that a dynamic test would provide
the most accurate data for regulation. Mr.
Turner recommended that such a test would
better measure the comprehensive interaction
among safety systems in a rollover crash. Mr.
Friedman and the Center for Injury Research
(CFIR) recommended the use of the JRS or a
modified FMVSS No. 208 dolly rollover test.
Mr. Friedman further stated that when given
the chance, engineers design the structure to
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deal with the dynamic impact realities
required to protect occupants and not to meet
what he characterized as a vaguely related
criteria like SWR.
DVExperts asserted that a static test, such
as FMVSS No. 216 or any variation on this,
is not an effective rollover performance test,
just as a load test would be considered
defective for frontal or side impacts. Public
Citizen recommended a dynamic test because
it can be improved to better simulate a
rollover. It believes a static test is
inappropriate for a roof crush test.
Advocates stated that a dynamic test would
show how to model occupant injury
mechanisms and their prevention to provide
substantially enhanced roof crush resistance.
Both Advocates and Public Citizen
recommended the development of a
biofidelic rollover anthropomorphic test
device (ATD) to measure forces accurately in
a dynamic test. Syson stated that although
some aspects of real rollover crashes are not
representative in dynamic tests, useful
engineering information can be obtained
from the results. Syson also expressed
concern with including a dummy in dynamic
testing because biofidelic problems may help
obscure the consequences of roof failure or
safety belt performance.
As indicated above, some of the
commenters recommending a dynamic test
cited potential benefits related to aspects of
performance other than roof crush resistance,
e.g., measuring the performance of seat belts,
doors, ejection. We note that the suitability
of a particular dynamic test must be assessed
separately for each aspect of performance
that would be addressed. In this rulemaking,
we are addressing roof crush resistance, and
our discussion and analysis of the comments
focus on that issue. Our discussion and
analysis below in some instances cite
potential problems related to measuring other
aspects of performance which might be
measured during a test that evaluates roof
crush resistance. However, we emphasize
that our discussion/analysis does not in any
way represent an assessment by the agency
as to whether any of the tests would be
suitable for addressing aspects of
performance other than roof crush resistance.
FMVSS No. 208 Dolly Rollover Test
Section 5.3 of FMVSS No. 208 contains a
dynamic test commonly known as the ‘‘dolly
rollover test.’’ This test was part of early
provisions in FMVSS No. 208 which
permitted manufacturers the option of
providing automatic crash protection in
lateral and rollover crashes instead of seat
belts. We believe that no manufacturer ever
selected the option for purposes of
complying with FMVSS No. 208. Selection of
the option was ultimately precluded by the
Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency
Act of 1991, which required the installation
of lap/shoulder belts. FMVSS No. 216 has
long contained a provision that excludes
vehicles that conform to the S5.3 rollover test
requirements of FMVSS No. 208 by means
that require no action by vehicle occupants.
We are unaware of any vehicle that has been
certified to S5.3 in lieu of FMVSS No. 216.
As discussed in our August 2005 NPRM,
the FMVSS No. 208 dolly test was originally
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developed only as an occupant containment
test and not to evaluate the loads on specified
vehicle components. While S5.3 of FMVSS
No. 208 specifies that an unbelted Hybrid III
50th percentile adult male dummy must be
retained inside the vehicle during the test, it
does not specify roof strength performance
criteria or injury assessment reference values
that must be met. We stated in the NPRM that
we believed that this test lacks sufficient
repeatability to serve as a structural
component compliance requirement.
A number of commenters recommended
that the agency propose a dolly rollover test.
Advocates, Bidez & Associates (Bidez), SRS,
Public Citizen, CFIR and Mr. Friedman cited
use of the dolly rollover test in the Volvo
XC90 development program. Several
commenters stated that the dolly rollover test
remains an option for certification in lieu of
FMVSS No. 216.
Advocates and Bidez disagreed with the
agency’s statement that the dolly rollover test
is not sufficiently repeatable. Bidez presented
data from three dolly rollover tests conducted
for Ford at the Autoliv Test Center to support
its position. Bidez concluded that the test
was repeatable based on the timing
similarities of the peak neck forces and
moments.
Ford submitted additional comments
refuting Bidez’s conclusions and claimed the
wide range of amplitude and timing for the
occupant injury measures were not
repeatable.
CFIR also stated that dynamic rollover tests
have been widely used to qualify safety
devices. It stated they are repeatable in that
the initial conditions are highly controlled,
and it stated that a vehicle designed to pass
can do so repeatedly. CFIR also
acknowledged, however, that dolly rollover
tests do not reproduce the same initial roofto-ground contact conditions and small
changes can cause large differences in
vehicle trajectory and dummy kinematics.
In support of a dynamic test such as the
dolly test, Technical Services commented
that while dolly rollover tests do not produce
occupant kinematics that are representative
of highway rollovers, they represent a more
difficult test for the vehicle because of the
lateral component.
Agency Response
While the FMVSS No. 208 dolly rollover
test has long been an option for
manufacturers in lieu of the FMVSS No. 216
test, it is an option that they have never used.
Thus, there has not been any experience with
using that test for purposes of compliance
with an FMVSS.
Moreover, as noted above, the test was not
developed to evaluate the loads on specified
vehicle components. While S5.3 of FMVSS
No. 208 specifies that an unbelted Hybrid III
50th percentile adult male dummy be
retained inside the vehicle, it does not
specify roof strength performance criteria or
injury assessment reference values that must
be met.
Some commenters stated the dolly test was
used in the development of the Volvo XC90
and is therefore an accepted industry
practice. We note, however, that there is a
significant difference between vehicle
development work by manufacturers and
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22389
objective test procedures needed for a
FMVSS.
No commenters provided data
demonstrating that the agency’s concerns
about the dolly test lacking sufficient
repeatability to serve as a vehicle structural
component compliance requirement for
assessing roof strength are unfounded. We
note that our research is consistent with the
comments from CFIR concerning
reproducibility problems with respect to
initial roof to ground contact conditions. We
believe that reproducibility in that area
would be an important issue for
measurement of roof intrusion in an FMVSS.
In response to Bidez, we agree that the
‘‘timing’’ of peak axial neck force was similar
in their submitted test data; however, we also
noted that the magnitudes of the neck forces
varied considerably (from 260 N to 5,933 N)
for the passenger side dummy of a driver side
leading test. Further, the moments and forces
for the driver side dummy also experienced
wide ranges in values despite the similar
timing of the event. Given the wide range of
reported peak loads and moments, we are not
convinced that repeatable timing is more
important than repeatable peak values in the
injury measurements.
The Bidez test data further showed the
variation in the range of post-test headroom
for these three dolly rollover tests. In two
tests, the driver post test headroom increased
212 mm and 444 mm (8.3 inches and 15.5
inches), but in the third test, it decreased 31
mm (¥5.9 inches). The passenger side
showed similar results. It should also be
noted that the measured headroom difference
between the driver’s and passenger’s side in
each test were relatively similar. This
suggested that the roof deformed equally on
both sides but the amount of deformation
differed from test to test. These results
suggest that the current dolly rollover test is
not repeatable as a roof crush test.
As stated in the NPRM, the agency has
conducted prior dolly testing (similar to the
FMVSS No. 208 dolly rollover test) and
determined that the test conditions were so
severe that it was difficult to identify which
vehicles had better performing roofs. Based
on these, and other dynamic tests, the agency
decided that it was best to pursue an
upgraded quasi-static test for this
rulemaking.
Jordan Rollover System (JRS)
There were a range of comments related to
the Jordan Rollover System (JRS) test. The
JRS device rotates a vehicle body structure on
a rotating apparatus (‘‘spit’’) while the road
surface platform moves a track underneath
the vehicle and contacts the roof structure.
Comments on the JRS were submitted by the
following groups: Advocates, CFIR,
DVExperts, Xprts, and Public Citizen. Some
commenters recommended developing a
safety standard using the test procedure,
while others recommended that the agency
undertake a research program and investigate
the JRS fully.
Advocates recommended using the JRS
procedure. CFIR provided information
concerning the JRS test procedure and
addressing repeatability of the initial
conditions, including data from their JRS
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research program. DVExperts claimed the JRS
is a repeatable, practical, and scientifically
valid dynamic rollover test procedure. Xprts
submitted summary results from JRS testing
of a Jeep Grand Cherokee. It identified roof
intrusion velocities and roof deformation
behavior (buckling) as important criteria for
determining injury. Public Citizen
commented that NHTSA should thoroughly
investigate the JRS. Public Citizen and CFIR
also commented that the JRS test can be
conducted with dummies that demonstrate
whether vehicle roof performance meets
objective injury and ejection criteria for
belted and unbelted occupants.
CFIR also recommended a maximum axial
neck load injury measurement (Fz) of 7,000
N 50 (1,574 pounds) using the Hybrid III
dummy in the JRS. The recommendation was
based on cadaver and dummy drop and
impact tests. CFIR also acknowledged that
the Hybrid III dummy has poor biofidelity in
the rollover mode. As an alternative, it
recommended using the roof velocity and
intrusion amplitude, as measured by an array
of string potentiometers attached to the roof.
The criteria were based on its axial neck load
research. CFIR claimed to have found a good
correlation between neck injury and the
speed of head impact.
In response to the SNPRM, CAS and CFIR
submitted additional instrumented test data
using the JRS 51 equipped with a Hybrid III
dummy. The test vehicles were selected from
the agency’s fleet evaluation. They argued,
based upon the data, the JRS is highly
controlled and repeatable. They further
suggested that the equipment, and the test
costs are modest. The test conditions can be
widely varied to emulate actual rollover
conditions.
Mr. Nash provided an analysis of NASS
rollover cases. He concluded that the FMVSS
No. 216 platen test would not stress the
windshield header and create the type of
buckling shown in the NASS cases. Mr. Nash
claimed that the dynamic JRS test would
identify the header deformation.
Agency Response
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While a number of commenters indicated
support for the JRS dynamic test procedure,
and the developers submitted data for
multiple tests, the agency has remaining
questions regarding the setup, conduct, and
evaluation of the JRS test procedure despite
witnessing the JRS testing in February 2007
and multiple other meetings. All commenters
relied on the JRS tests conducted and
reported by CFIR and Xprts.
After considering the data submitted, we
believe there are a large number of
unresolved technical issues related to the JRS
with respect to whether it would be suitable
as a potential test procedure to replicate realworld crash damage patterns for a safety
standard evaluating vehicle roof crush
structural integrity. These include:
50 Friedman D., Nash C.E., ‘‘Advanced Roof
Design for Occupant Protection,’’ 17th ESV
Conference, Amsterdam, 2002
51 See Docket NHTSA 2008–0015: 2003 Subaru
Forester, 2004 Subaru Forest, 2004 Volvo XC90,
2006 Chrysler 300, 2006 Hyundai Sonata.
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15:39 May 11, 2009
Jkt 217001
Test Parameters
• Determination of the drop height (for
different vehicles)—The JRS releases the test
vehicle from a predetermined drop height to
fall onto a moving roadway. The ideal drop
height is not known. If the drop height is not
correlated with real world data, some
vehicles could be overloaded beyond what
would be representative of real world
crashes. Other vehicles could be underexercised based on accident conditions. A
specific drop height or drop height
methodology would need to be sensitive to
the vehicle types and crash conditions in the
fleet.
• Determination of the roll rate and roll
angle at vehicle release (for different
vehicles)—The JRS releases the test vehicle at
a predetermined roll rate. The roll rate, drop
height, and angle at which the vehicle is
released are carefully coordinated to obtain
an initial contact between the vehicle and the
moving roadway at the nearside A-pillar/roof
junction. While advocates of the test present
anecdotal support for the test conditions, the
appropriateness of the specific test
conditions is not clear. There may be many
vehicles that miss contacting the near side
A-pillar/roof junction and have first contact
with the far side of the roof. Roll rate has a
role in the duration of the load on the roof
and could have a significant effect on the roof
performance during the test. If the roll rate
is too slow, intrusion could be minimal. If
the roll rate is too fast, intrusion could be
excessive. We believe there is a need to
correlate these parameters to real world data,
which we do not have.
• Determination of the roadway speed and
road surface—The JRS drops the vehicle onto
an instrumented moving roadway that is
covered with sandpaper to represent the
vehicle-to-ground interaction. The roadway
speed and the vehicle-to-ground friction play
a significant role in controlling the transfer
of momentum between the rotating vehicle
and the moving roadway. Changing the
roadway speed may affect how the vehicle
interacts with the ground for the far side
contact. Research would be necessary to
understand this interaction and how the
initial contact conditions affect the JRS test
kinematics.
• Repeatability of the drop height, roll
rate, release angle, initial contact with the
roadway and roadway speed—Any
regulatory test needs to be repeatable and
enforceable. The agency does not have any
experience with the JRS to know what its
operating tolerances are. If it is possible to
first determine optimum or representative
conditions, it is then necessary to determine
the accuracy and repeatability that a test
device can provide for those conditions using
a wide variety of vehicle sizes and shapes.
For example, there are some concerns about
whether some vehicle sizes or shapes (such
as the Sprinter van) would be suitable for
testing with a JRS device.
• Vehicle performance criteria and
instrumentation—There are no generally
accepted criteria to evaluate vehicle
performance in rollover crashes. We would
need to investigate measurement devices for
relevancy with the JRS.
• Initial lateral acceleration—The JRS does
not take into account the initial lateral
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Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
acceleration in a real world rollover. This
may have implications when testing with a
dummy and potentially measuring
performance related to some safety
countermeasures (e.g., ejection containment
side curtain bags and pretensioners). If a
dummy’s position in the test is not correlated
to real-world rollovers, then the assessment
of pretensioners and side window air bags in
the JRS test is put into question.
Lack of Real-World Data To Feed Into the
Test Parameters
• At this time, NHTSA has only limited
event data recorder (EDR) data from rollover
sensor-equipped vehicles. It is hoped that
data from these vehicles can provide a better
understanding of the range of initial roll rate
and trip angles for real world rollover
crashes. As voluntarily-installed EDRs
continue to be installed in the fleet, the
agency will gather an increasing amount of
data on real world rollover crashes.
Currently, the agency does not have enough
of these data to evaluate how the JRS test
might be optimized to real world rollover
conditions.
• The ongoing implementation of ESC
systems complicates the evaluation of real
world rollover crashes. ESC systems are
anticipated to be highly effective in reducing
single vehicle rollover crashes. These crashes
tend to have the highest number of quarter
turns. The federally mandated
implementation of ESC systems is expected
to dramatically alter the distribution of
rollover crash conditions.
• Assuming that real world representative
test conditions could be established, NHTSA
would still need to conduct a fleet study to
examine the safety performance in a JRS test,
evaluate how well the test results relate to
real world safety performance, and determine
whether or not there would be any
appreciable safety improvement beyond
existing FMVSSs.
Test Dummy Issues
• Lack of test dummy and injury criteria—
At this time, no anthropomorphic test device
(ATD) or crash test dummy, has been
designed for use in rollover crash tests.
Existing ATDs used in rollover crash tests,
such as the Hybrid III dummy lack lateral
kinematic behavior as well as lateral impact
biofidelity. In addition, new injury criteria
beyond those currently developed for frontal
and side impacts would need to be
developed for the types of loading conditions
that result in head, neck, and face injuries
associated with roof contact.
• Repeatability of test dummy and initial
restraint positioning—Because the JRS is
spinning prior to initiating the vehicle test,
there are concerns about how to establish the
initial belt position on the ATD in a manner
that is consistent with real world conditions.
The lateral acceleration prior to rollover
initiation (as discussed previously) can cause
a belted occupant to introduce slack in the
belt. There is also the additional
complication of the timing for firing the
rollover curtains and/or pretensioners in the
JRS pre-spin cycle.
There are also issues concerning the
biomechanical basis for the CFIR
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recommended performance criteria.
Specifically, we have concerns about CFIR
recommended axial neck load criteria, and
the surrogate (intrusion speed and
amplitude), having potential to predict neck
injury in the real world. We note that in
response to CFIR’s injury metrics, Nissan
submitted an analysis conducted by David C.
Viano, Ph.D. from ProBiomechanics
evaluating their findings. Viano found no
correlation between impact force and head
impact velocity based upon the available
cadaver data CFIR used in its analysis. We
believe this is an important issue, and believe
that lateral moments may be equally or more
significant than axial force in predicting
cervical spine injuries. Absent other
information we believe further research
would be needed as to whether the
recommended neck axial loads and/or roof
intrusion velocity are appropriate criteria.
As to the issue raised by Mr. Nash, the
agency reviewed the Toyota NASS cases he
provided, and the damage patterns to the roof
were consistent with other cases the agency
has analyzed. Neither the agency nor Mr.
Nash identified a catastrophic collapse of the
header. The integrity of the roof was
maintained in all but one of the crash events
cited. NHTSA also reviewed the JRS 2007
Toyota Camry tests and compared the results
to the NASS data. The Camry was tested
twice on the driver’s side of the vehicle.
When the driver’s side was tested the first
time, there was no appreciable damage to the
header. The driver’s side of the same vehicle
was then tested again and showed some
minor header damage. This test methodology
is inconsistent with a real world rollover as
the far side of the vehicle was not damaged
in either JRS test and yet the driver’s side
was tested twice.
While we appreciate the information
provided by the commenters, we do not
believe that the information is sufficient for
consideration of the JRS as a possible test
device for a Federal motor vehicle safety
standard at this time. The concept and the
ability of the fixture to rotate a vehicle and
contact the roadway have been demonstrated.
However, as indicated above, there are
numerous technical issues related to the test
and potential parameters as well as a suitable
ATD and associated injury criteria or other
metric.
Controlled Rollover Impact System (CRIS)
In the NPRM, NHTSA stated its belief that
the CRIS device is helpful in understanding
occupant kinematics during rollover crashes.
However, we also stated that we believe that
the device does not provide the level of
repeatability needed for a regulatory
requirement, because the CRIS test is
repeatable only up to the initial contact with
the ground. After initial roof impact, the
CRIS test allows the vehicle to continue
rolling, resulting in an unrepeatable test
condition.
Two commenters provided support for the
CRIS test procedure. The commenters were
CFIR 52 and Technical Services. CFIR
provided summary information on the
repeatability of the initial conditions, and
certain occupant injury measures for the
CRIS test procedure. Technical Services
recommended that the CRIS test should be
considered by the agency for dynamic roof
crush testing.
Agency Response
The CRIS test procedure was developed to
produce repeatable vehicle and occupant
kinematics for the initial vehicle-to-ground
contact. No data have been provided
indicating that the procedure is repeatable
after initial ground contact, and we would
not expect it to be given that the CRIS test
allows the vehicle to continue rolling. While
it is notable that some of the injury criteria
appear to be repeatable for the first ground
contact, the relevance of the dummy
measurements for rollover impacts has not
been established. Evaluating performance
criteria for the CRIS test would depend upon
the development of an ATD with biofidelity
in rollover crash tests. We believe a long-term
research program would be necessary to
develop performance measures, evaluate the
repeatability, reproducibility, and any
potential real world correlation of this test
procedure.
Inverted Vehicle Drop Test
In the NPRM, the agency stated that its
research found that the inverted drop test
does not replicate real-world rollovers better
than the current quasi-static test. We stated
further that the inverted drop test does not
produce results as repeatable as the quasistatic method.
The agency received three comments on
the inverted vehicle drop test. Commenters
included SAFE, Syson, and Technical
Services. SAFE commented that the inverted
drop test is superior to the quasi-static test
because: (1) It is a dynamic evaluation; (2) it
could evaluate multiple rollover safety
systems; (3) it could incorporate restraint
system effectiveness; and (4) it is a simple
test procedure. Syson stated that the inverted
vehicle drop test procedure provides more
useful information about roof structure
performance. Technical Services questioned
the value of an inverted vehicle drop test less
than 3 feet in height and the lack of lateral
loading, when compared to other dynamic
dolly rollover tests.
Agency Response
We discussed issues related to the inverted
drop test procedure at some length in the
NPRM, including a discussion of agency
research. NHTSA has previously conducted a
test program to evaluate the relative merits of
drop testing compared to the current quasistatic test procedure. The previous evaluation
concluded that without a rollover ATD the
roof drop test could not provide a complete
safety performance test. If the test
requirement is limited to measuring roof
deformation as a surrogate for occupant
injury potential, then the more controlled
and repeatable quasi-static test procedure is
preferable. The agency’s research indicated
that the static test can be related to the drop
test with a moderate degree of accuracy.
Because of an additional number of
uncontrolled variables, such as consistent
vehicle release, impact location and
deformation measurements, drop test results
can be expected to vary significantly, even
for seemingly comparable test conditions.53
Adding a lateral component to this test
procedure to address concerns identified by
Technical Services would add another level
of complexity. The comments do not provide
data or arguments to refute the positions
taken by NHTSA in the NPRM.
Weight Drop Onto the Roof Test (WDORT)
In the NPRM, NHTSA did not discuss the
weight drop onto the roof test (WDORT)
since commenters on the prior roof crush
resistance notice had not addressed this test.
One commenter, Mr. Chu, recommended that
NHTSA develop a dynamic WDORT and set
the dynamic intrusion limit as a percentage
of the headroom before impact. Chu stated
the WDORT is not sensitive to a vehicle’s CG
like the inverted vehicle drop test and the
test weight can be calibrated and guided
within four rails during the drop. Mr. Chu
did not provide a detailed test setup,
procedure or test data to support his
recommendation.
Agency Response
No details or test data were provided for
the WDORT concept. Consequently, a
considerable research effort would be
required to evaluate the appropriateness and
practicability of such an approach and
whether it would provide any safety benefit
beyond the quasi-static procedure.
Appendix B—Two-Sided Test Results
Peak SWR prior to
127 mm of platen
travel or head contact
(except as noted)
Vehicle
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1st Side
2007 Toyota Tundra ........................................................................................................................................
2008 Honda Accord ** .....................................................................................................................................
52 Peltez submitted comments from the Center for
Injury Research (CFIR) dated March 22, 2004. This
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15:39 May 11, 2009
Jkt 217001
was originally submitted to Docket 1999–5572
(submission #12).
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Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
3.3
3.5
Peak force
change
(percent)
2nd Side
2.2
4.0
¥17.5
n/a
53 Glen C. Rains and Mike Van Voorhis, ‘‘Quasi
Static and Dynamic Roof Crush Testing,’’ DOT HS
808–873, 1998.
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Peak SWR prior to
127 mm of platen
travel or head contact
(except as noted)
Vehicle
1st Side
2007
2007
2007
2007
2007
2007
2005
2007
2003
2007
2007
2007
2005
2007
2007
2003
2004
2006
2007
2006
2007
2007
2005
2004
2001
2007
2004
2007
2004
Ford Edge ...............................................................................................................................................
Chevrolet Colorado .................................................................................................................................
Toyota Tacoma .......................................................................................................................................
Chevrolet Express *** .............................................................................................................................
Jeep Grand Cherokee ............................................................................................................................
Pontiac G6 ..............................................................................................................................................
Lincoln LS * .............................................................................................................................................
Saturn Outlook ........................................................................................................................................
Ford Crown Victoria * ..............................................................................................................................
Ford F–150 .............................................................................................................................................
Chevrolet Tahoe .....................................................................................................................................
Toyota Yaris ...........................................................................................................................................
Buick LaCrosse ......................................................................................................................................
Toyota Tacoma .......................................................................................................................................
Buick Lucerne .........................................................................................................................................
Chevrolet Impala * ..................................................................................................................................
Lincoln LS * .............................................................................................................................................
Subaru Tribeca .......................................................................................................................................
Scion tC ..................................................................................................................................................
Chrysler Crossfire ...................................................................................................................................
Dodge Caravan ......................................................................................................................................
Honda CRV ............................................................................................................................................
Buick LaCrosse ......................................................................................................................................
Nissan Quest * ........................................................................................................................................
GMC Sierra * ...........................................................................................................................................
Chrysler 300 ...........................................................................................................................................
Chrysler Pacifica * ...................................................................................................................................
Toyota Camry .........................................................................................................................................
Land Rover Freelander * ........................................................................................................................
3.3
2.2
3.3
2.3
2.2
2.3
2.6
2.7
2.0
2.3
2.1
4.0
2.6
4.4
2.3
2.9
2.5
3.9
4.6
2.9
3.0
2.6
2.4
2.8
1.9
2.5
2.2
4.3
1.7
Peak force
change
(percent)
2nd Side
3.2
1.7
3.7
1.7
1.6
1.7
2.0
2.2
1.7
1.9
1.7
3.4
2.2
3.9
2.1
2.5
2.2
3.5
4.3
2.7
2.9
2.5
2.3
2.7
1.9
2.5
2.4
4.7
2.0
¥3.6
¥21.4
12.4
¥27.3
¥27.1
¥23.8
¥21.3
¥20.8
¥19.5
¥19.0
¥16.4
¥15.8
¥13.5
¥12.2
¥10.8
¥9.9
¥8.7
¥8.3
¥6.7
¥5.6
¥5.3
¥4.9
¥3.4
¥3.0
¥1.3
1.6
7.0
9.0
19.2
* Crush of first side stopped at windshield cracking.
** First side test stopped at predetermined SWR.
*** Between the first and second side tests, the front door on the tested side was opened. Because of damage to the vehicle during the first
side test, the door would not properly close. The door was clamped until the latch engaged, locking the door in place. This may have compromised the structural integrity of the roof and reduced the measured peak load on the second side.
Appendix C—Single-Sided Test Results
Unloaded
vehicle
weight
(kg)
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Vehicle
2006
2007
2006
2006
2007
2006
2007
2007
2006
2007
2006
2006
2008
2006
2007
2007
2007
2006
2007
2006
2004
2007
2006
2005
2006
VW Jetta .......................................................................................
Scion tC ........................................................................................
Volvo XC90 ...................................................................................
Honda Civic ..................................................................................
Toyota Tacoma .............................................................................
Mazda 5 ........................................................................................
Toyota Camry ...............................................................................
Toyota Yaris ..................................................................................
Ford 500 .......................................................................................
Nissan Frontier .............................................................................
Subaru Tribeca .............................................................................
Mitsubishi Eclipse .........................................................................
Honda Accord ** ............................................................................
Hummer H3 ..................................................................................
Toyota Tacoma .............................................................................
Toyota Tundra ..............................................................................
Ford Edge .....................................................................................
Hyundai Sonata ............................................................................
Dodge Caravan .............................................................................
Chrysler Crossfire .........................................................................
Honda Accord ...............................................................................
Saturn Outlook * ............................................................................
Ford Mustang ................................................................................
Buick Lacrosse .............................................................................
Sprinter Van * ................................................................................
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15:39 May 11, 2009
Jkt 217001
PO 00000
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Fmt 4701
1,443
1,326
2,020
1,251
1,489
1,535
1,468
1,038
1,657
1,615
1,907
1,485
1,476
2,128
1,752
2,345
1,919
1,505
1,759
1,357
1,413
2,133
1,527
1,590
1,946
Sfmt 4700
Peak strength within
127 mm of platen
travel
N
72,613
59,749
90,188
55,207
64,441
66,621
62,097
41,073
63,181
62,828
72,306
51,711
50,959
70,264
56,555
76,216
61,910
46,662
52,436
38,179
38,281
57,222
40,101
40,345
49,073
Peak strength prior to
head contact
N
SWR
5.1
4.6
4.6
4.5
4.4
4.4
4.3
4
3.9
3.9
3.9
3.6
3.5
3.4
3.3
3.3
3.3
3.2
3
2.9
2.8
2.7
2.7
2.6
2.6
E:\FR\FM\12MYR2.SGM
72,613
59,749
N/A
55,207
64,441
66,621
62,097
41,073
63,181
62,828
72,306
51,711
50,959
70,264
56,555
76,216
61,910
46,662
52,436
38,179
38,281
57,222
41,822
40,345
N/A
12MYR2
SWR
5.1
4.6
N/A
4.5
4.4
4.4
4.3
4
3.9
3.9
3.9
3.6
3.5
3.4
3.3
3.3
3.3
3.2
3
2.9
2.8
2.7
2.8
2.6
N/A
Platen
travel
at head
contact
(mm)
158
113
N/A
177
123
155
N/A
115
150
167
112
127
N/A
185
N/A
N/A
N/A
131
N/A
107
140
N/A
132
126
N/A
22393
Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 90 / Tuesday, May 12, 2009 / Rules and Regulations
Unloaded
vehicle
weight
(kg)
Vehicle
2004
2007
2007
2005
2006
2007
2007
2004
2007
2007
2007
2007
2007
2006
2003
Cadillac SRX .................................................................................
Honda CRV ...................................................................................
Chrysler 300 .................................................................................
Buick Lacrosse .............................................................................
Honda Ridgeline ...........................................................................
Ford F–150 * .................................................................................
Buick Lucerne ...............................................................................
Chevrolet 2500 HD * .....................................................................
Pontiac G6 ....................................................................................
Chevrolet Express * .......................................................................
Jeep Grand Cherokee ..................................................................
Chevrolet Colorado .......................................................................
Chevrolet Tahoe * .........................................................................
Dodge Ram * .................................................................................
Ford F–250 * .................................................................................
1,961
1,529
1,684
1,588
2,036
2,413
1,690
2,450
1,497
2,471
1,941
1,560
2,462
2,287
2,658
Peak strength within
127 mm of platen
travel
N
50,346
38,637
41,257
37,196
47,334
54,829
38,268
55,934
33,393
55,038
41,582
33,299
49,878
37,596
44,776
Peak strength prior to
head contact
N
SWR
2.6
2.6
2.5
2.4
2.4
2.3
2.3
2.3
2.3
2.3
2.2
2.2
2.1
1.7
1.7
50,346
38,637
41,257
37,196
47,334
54,829
38,268
56,294
33,393
55,038
41,582
33,299
49,878
42,578
44,776
* GVWR
** Test
greater than 6,000 pounds.
stopped at 3.5 SWR.
[FR Doc. E9–10431 Filed 5–11–09; 8:45 am]
tjames on PRODPC75 with RULES2
BILLING CODE C
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Frm 00047
Fmt 4701
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12MYR2
SWR
2.6
2.6
2.5
2.4
2.4
2.3
2.3
2.3
2.3
2.3
2.2
2.2
2.1
1.9
1.7
Platen
travel
at head
contact
(mm)
138
N/A
N/A
123
172
N/A
N/A
171
124
N/A
117
N/A
N/A
158
205
Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 90 (Tuesday, May 12, 2009)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 22348-22393]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-10431]
[[Page 22347]]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Part IV
Department of Transportation
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
49 CFR Parts 571 and 585
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Roof Crush Resistance; Phase-In
Reporting Requirements; Final Rule
Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 90 / Tuesday, May 12, 2009 / Rules
and Regulations
[[Page 22348]]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
49 CFR Parts 571 and 585
[Docket No. NHTSA-2009-0093]
RIN 2127-AG51
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Roof Crush Resistance;
Phase-In Reporting Requirements
AGENCY: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA),
Department of Transportation.
ACTION: Final rule.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: As part of a comprehensive plan for reducing the risk of
rollover crashes and the risk of death and serious injury in those
crashes, this final rule upgrades the agency's safety standard on roof
crush resistance in several ways.
First, for the vehicles currently subject to the standard, i.e.,
passenger cars and multipurpose passenger vehicles, trucks and buses
with a Gross Vehicle Weight Rating (GVWR) of 2,722 kilograms (6,000
pounds) or less, the rule doubles the amount of force the vehicle's
roof structure must withstand in the specified test, from 1.5 times the
vehicle's unloaded weight to 3.0 times the vehicle's unloaded weight.
Second, the rule extends the applicability of the standard so that it
will also apply to vehicles with a GVWR greater than 2,722 kilograms
(6,000 pounds), but not greater than 4,536 kilograms (10,000 pounds).
The rule establishes a force requirement of 1.5 times the vehicle's
unloaded weight for these newly included vehicles. Third, the rule
requires all of the above vehicles to meet the specified force
requirements in a two-sided test, instead of a single-sided test, i.e.,
the same vehicle must meet the force requirements when tested first on
one side and then on the other side of the vehicle. Fourth, the rule
establishes a new requirement for maintenance of headroom, i.e.,
survival space, during testing in addition to the existing limit on the
amount of roof crush. The rule also includes a number of special
provisions, including ones related to leadtime, to address the needs of
multi-stage manufacturers, alterers, and small volume manufacturers.
DATES: If you wish to petition for reconsideration of this rule, your
petition must be received by June 26, 2009.
Effective date: The date on which this final rule amends the CFR is
July 13, 2009. The incorporation by reference of a publication listed
in the rule is approved by the Director of the Federal Register as of
July 13, 2009.
Compliance dates:
Passenger cars and multipurpose passenger vehicles, trucks and
buses with a GVWR of 2,722 kilograms (6,000 pounds) or less. This final
rule adopts a phase-in of the upgraded roof crush resistance
requirements for these vehicles. The phase-in begins on September 1,
2012. By September 1, 2015, all of these vehicles must meet the
upgraded requirements, with certain exceptions. Vehicles produced in
more than one stage and altered vehicles need not meet the upgraded
requirements until September 1, 2016.
Multipurpose passenger vehicles, trucks and buses with a GVWR
greater than 2,722 kilograms (6,000 pounds) and less than or equal to
4,536 kilograms (10,000 pounds). All of these vehicles must meet the
requirements beginning September 1, 2016, with certain exceptions.
Vehicles produced in more than one stage and altered vehicles need not
meet the requirements until September 1, 2017.
ADDRESSES: If you wish to petition for reconsideration of this rule,
you should refer in your petition to the docket number of this document
and submit your petition to: Administrator, National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., West Building,
Washington, DC 20590.
The petition will be placed in the docket. Anyone is able to search
the electronic form of all documents received into any of our dockets
by the name of the individual submitting the document (or signing the
document, if submitted on behalf of an association, business, labor
union, etc.). You may review DOT's complete Privacy Act Statement in
the Federal Register published on April 11, 2000 (Volume 65, Number 70;
Pages 19477-78) or you may visit https://www.dot.gov/privacy.html.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For non-legal issues, you may call
Christopher J. Wiacek, NHTSA Office of Crashworthiness Standards,
telephone 202-366-4801. For legal issues, you may call J. Edward
Glancy, NHTSA Office of Chief Counsel, telephone 202-366-2992. You may
send mail to these officials at the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., West Building, Washington,
DC 20590.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Table of Contents
I. Executive Summary
a. Final Rule
b. How This Final Rule Differs From the NPRM and/or SNPRM
II. Overall Rollover Problem and the Agency's Comprehensive Response
a. Prevention
b. Occupant Containment
c. Occupant Protection
III. The Role of Roof Intrusion in the Rollover Problem
IV. The Agency's Proposed Rule
a. NPRM
b. SNPRM
c. Congressional Mandate
V. Overview of Comments
VI. Agency Decision and Response to Comments
a. Primary Decisions
1. Basic Nature of the Test Requirements--Quasi-Static vs.
Dynamic Tests
2. Vehicle Application
3. Single-Sided or Two-Sided Tests
4. Upgraded Force Requirement--Specified Strength to Weight
Ratio (SWR)
5. Performance Criteria--Headroom, Platen Travel, or Both
6. Leadtime and Phase-In
b. Aspects of the Test Procedure
1. Tie-Down Procedure
2. Platen Angle and Size
3. Testing Without Windshields and/or Other Glazing in Place
4. Deletion of Secondary Plate Positioning Procedure
5. Removal of Roof Components
6. Tolerances
c. Requirements for Multi-Stage and Altered Vehicles
d. Other Issues
1. Convertibles and Open Bodied Vehicles
2. Vehicles Without B-Pillars
3. Heavier Vehicles With a High Height to Width Aspect Ratio
4. Active Roofs
5. Whether an Additional SNPRM Is Needed
6. Rear Seat Occupants
7. New Car Assessment Program (NCAP)
8. Possible Energy Requirement
9. Advanced Restraints
VII. Costs and Benefits
VIII. Rulemaking Analyses and Notices
Appendix A--Analysis of Comments Concerning Dynamic Testing
Appendix B--Two-Sided Test Results
Appendix C--Single-Sided Test Results
I. Executive Summary
a. Final Rule
As part of a comprehensive plan for reducing the serious risk of
rollover crashes and the risk of death and serious injury in those
crashes, this final rule upgrades Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard
(FMVSS) No. 216, Roof Crush Resistance.
For the vehicles currently subject to the standard, passenger cars
and multipurpose passenger vehicles, trucks and buses with a GVWR of
2,722 kilograms (6,000 pounds) or less, the rule doubles the amount of
force the vehicle's roof structure must withstand in the specified
test, from 1.5 times the
[[Page 22349]]
vehicle's unloaded weight to 3.0 times the vehicle's unloaded weight.
The rule also extends the applicability of the standard so that it will
also apply to vehicles with a GVWR greater than 2,722 kilograms (6,000
pounds), but not greater than 4,536 kilograms (10,000 pounds),
establishing a force requirement of 1.5 times the vehicle's unloaded
weight for these heavier vehicles.
Under today's rule, all of the above vehicles must meet the
specified force requirements in a two-sided test instead of a single-
sided test, i.e., the same vehicle must meet the force requirements
when tested first on one side and then on the other side of the
vehicle. The rule also establishes a new requirement for maintenance of
headroom, i.e., survival space, during testing, in addition to the
existing limit on the amount of roof crush. The rule also includes
special provisions to address the needs of multi-stage manufacturers,
alterers, and small volume manufacturers.
NHTSA developed its proposal to upgrade roof crush resistance
requirements after considerable analysis and research, including
considering comments received in response to a Request for Comments
(RFC) notice published in 2001. Prior to publishing the RFC, the agency
conducted a research program to examine potential methods for improving
the roof crush resistance requirements. The agency testing program
included full vehicle dynamic rollover testing, inverted vehicle drop
testing, and comparing inverted vehicle drop testing to a modified
FMVSS No. 216 test. After considering the results of the testing and
other available information, the agency concluded that the quasi-static
procedure provides a suitable representation of the real-world dynamic
loading conditions, and the most appropriate one on which to focus our
upgrade efforts.
Today's rule reflects careful consideration of comments we received
in response to the notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) published in
2005 and a supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking (SNPRM) published
in January 2008. NHTSA published the SNPRM to obtain public comment on
a number of issues that might affect the content of the final rule,
including possible variations in the proposed requirements. In the
SNPRM, the agency also announced the release of the results of various
vehicle tests conducted since the NPRM.
While this rulemaking action to improve roof strength is part of
our comprehensive plan for addressing the serious problem of rollover
crashes, this action, by itself, addresses a relatively small subset of
that problem. There are more than 10,000 fatalities in rollover crashes
each year. To address that problem, our comprehensive plan includes
actions to (1) reduce the occurrence of rollovers, (2) mitigate
ejection, and (3) enhance occupant protection when rollovers occur
(improved roof crush resistance is included in this third category).
Our analysis shows that of the more than 10,000 fatalities that
occur in rollover crashes each year, roof strength is relevant to only
about seven percent (about 667) of those fatalities. We estimate that
today's rule will prevent 135 of those 667 fatalities.
The portions of our comprehensive plan that will have the highest
life-saving benefits are the ones to reduce the occurrence of rollovers
(prevention) and to mitigate ejection (occupant containment). We
estimate that by preventing rollovers, electronic stability control
(ESC) will reduce the more than 10,000 fatalities that occur in
rollover crashes each year by 4,200 to 5,500 fatalities (and also
provide significant additional life-saving benefits by preventing other
types of crashes). In the area of mitigating ejection, significant
life-benefits are and/or will occur by our continuing efforts to
increase seat belt use and our upcoming rulemaking on ejection
mitigation. A more complete discussion of our comprehensive plan is
discussed later in this document.
b. How This Final Rule Differs From the NPRM and/or SNPRM
The more noteworthy changes from the NPRM are outlined below and
explained in detail later in this preamble. More minor changes are
discussed in the appropriate sections of this preamble.
Higher force requirement (strength-to-weight ratio (SWR level)).
While we proposed an SWR level of 2.5 in the NPRM for the vehicles that
have been subject to the standard, we noted in the SNPRM that the
agency could adopt a higher or lower value for this final rule. We are
adopting an SWR of 3.0 for them in this final rule. An SWR of 1.5 will
apply to the heavier light vehicles that have previously not been
subject to the standard.
Two-sided test. While we proposed a single-sided test in the NPRM,
we conducted additional testing and addressed the possibility of a two-
sided test in the SNPRM. Today's rule adopts a two-sided test
requirement for all vehicles subject to the standard.
Maintaining intrusion limit in addition to new headroom
requirement. In the NPRM, we proposed to replace the current limit on
intrusion (platen travel requirement) with a new headroom requirement.
For this final rule, we are maintaining the intrusion limit as well as
adopting the proposed headroom requirement.
Use of headform positioning fixture instead of a test dummy. In the
NPRM, we proposed to use test dummies as part of the test procedure for
measuring headroom. For this final rule, we are using headform
positioning fixtures for this purpose.
Phase-in. We did not include a phase-in in the NPRM. For this final
rule, we are phasing in the upgraded roof strength requirements for the
lighter vehicles previously subject to FMVSS No. 216, and providing
longer leadtime (without a phase-in) for the heavier light vehicles.
Limited exclusion for certain multi-stage trucks. Due to concerns
about practicability, we are excluding from FMVSS No. 216 a very
limited group of multistage trucks with a GVWR greater than 2,722
kilograms (6,000 pounds), ones not built on either a chassis cab or an
incomplete vehicle with a full exterior van body.
Updated benefits and costs. We have updated our analysis of
benefits and costs. Our analysis appears in summary form in this
document, and in its entirety in the agency's Final Regulatory Impact
Analysis (FRIA).
We estimate that the changes in FMVSS No. 216 will prevent 135
fatalities and 1,065 nonfatal injuries annually. The agency estimates
that compliance with the upgraded roof strength standard will increase
lifetime consumer costs by $69-114 per affected vehicle. Redesign costs
are expected to increase affected vehicle prices by an average of about
$54. Added weight is estimated to increase the lifetime cost of fuel
usage by $15 to $62 for an average affected vehicle. Total consumer
costs are expected to range from $875 million to $1.4 billion annually.
Implied Preemption. We have reconsidered the tentative position
presented in the NPRM. We do not foresee any potential State tort
requirements that might conflict with today's final rule. Without any
conflict, there could not be any implied preemption.
II. Overall Rollover Problem and the Agency's Comprehensive Response
Addressing vehicle rollovers is one of NHTSA's highest safety
priorities. According to 2007 FARS crash data, 10,196 people were
killed as occupants
[[Page 22350]]
in light vehicle rollover crashes, which represents 35 percent of all
occupants killed that year in crashes. FARS reported that approximately
57 percent were partially or completely ejected from the vehicle
(including approximately 47 percent who were completely ejected).
Rollover crashes are complex and chaotic events. Rollovers can
range from a single quarter turn to eight or more quarter turns, with
the duration of the rollover crash lasting from one to several seconds.
The wide range of rollover conditions occurs because these crashes
largely occur off road where the vehicle motion is highly influenced by
roadside conditions. Also, rollover crashes tend to occur at higher
speeds than other crash types due to the energy required to initiate
the rollover motion.
NHTSA has been pursuing a comprehensive and systematic approach
towards reducing the fatalities and serious injuries that result from
rollover crashes. As part of our safety standard rulemaking, this
approach establishes various repeatable test procedures and performance
requirements that will generate countermeasures effective in the
chaotic real-world events. Due to the complex nature of a rollover
event and the particularized effect of each element of the
comprehensive approach taken by the agency to address these crashes,
each element addresses a specific segment of the total rollover
problem. Accordingly, each initiative has a different target population
and interacts with each of the other rollover strategies. NHTSA has
initiatives in place to:
1. Reduce the occurrence of rollover crashes (e.g., the requirement
for ESC on all light vehicles and the NCAP rollover ratings),
2. Keep occupants inside the vehicle when rollovers occur (e.g.,
NHTSA's unyielding commitment to get passengers to buckle their seat
belts every time they ride in a vehicle, as well as the requirement for
enhanced door latches and the forthcoming rulemaking for ejection
mitigation), and
3. Better protect the occupants kept inside the vehicle during the
rollover (e.g., the requirement for upper interior head protection and
this rulemaking for enhanced roof crush resistance).
Each of these three initiatives must work together to address the
various aspects of the rollover problem.
a. Prevention
The most effective way to reduce deaths and injuries in rollover
crashes is to prevent the rollover crash from occurring. On April 6,
2007, NHTSA published a final rule establishing FMVSS No. 126,
``Electronic stability control systems,'' to require ESC on passenger
cars, multipurpose passenger vehicles, trucks, and buses with a GVWR of
4,536 kilograms (10,000 pounds) or less. ESC systems use automatic
computer-controlled braking of individual wheels to assist the driver
in maintaining control in critical driving situations in which the
vehicle is beginning to lose directional stability at the rear wheels
or directional control at the front wheels. ESC systems effectively
monitor driver steering input and limit vehicle oversteer and
understeer, as appropriate. To comply with the new ESC standard,
vehicles will need individually adjustable braking at all four wheels,
and computer electronics to utilize this capability, a means for engine
torque adjustability and various onboard sensors (to measure yaw rate,
lateral acceleration, steering wheel angle and speed). The agency
estimates that ESC will save 5,300 to 9,600 lives in all types of
crashes annually once all light vehicles on the road are equipped with
ESC. The agency further anticipates that ESC systems will substantially
reduce (by 4,200 to 5,500 deaths) the more than 10,000 deaths each year
resulting from rollover crashes.
b. Occupant Containment
Studies have shown that the fatality rate for an ejected vehicle
occupant is three times as great as that for an occupant who remains
inside of the vehicle. Thus, mitigating ejections offers potential for
significant safety gains. Safety belts are the most effective
crashworthiness countermeasure in reducing ejected rollover fatalities.
Studies have found that safety belts reduce fatalities in rollovers by
74 percent in passenger cars and 80 percent for light trucks.\1\ NHTSA
requires all vehicles manufactured after 1968 to have safety belts as
standard equipment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Kahane, C. J., Fatality Reduction by Safety Belts for Front-
Seat Occupants of Cars and Light Trucks: Updated and Expanded
Estimates Based on 1986-99 FARS Data (NHTSA Report No. DOT HS 809
199).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, of the 6,164 ejected occupant fatalities in light vehicle
rollover crashes, as reported by 2006 FARS, 1,135 were classified as
partial ejections. Fatal injuries from partial ejection can occur even
to belted occupants, e.g., when their head protrudes outside the window
and strikes the ground in a rollover. Therefore, as mandated by
SAFETEA-LU, NHTSA is working to establish performance standards to
reduce partial and complete ejection from outboard seating position
windows.
Doors represent another common ejection route. As part of the
agency's comprehensive approach to rollover, and to harmonize with the
first Global Technical Regulation, NHTSA upgraded FMVSS No. 206, ``Door
locks and door retention components,'' in a final rule published on
February 6, 2007. This final rule added test requirements for sliding
doors, upgraded the door retention requirements, added secondary latch
requirements for doors other than hinged side doors and back doors, and
provided a new test procedure for assessing inertial forces. To comply
with the new requirements, it is anticipated that passenger vehicles
with sliding doors designed with one latch and pin locking mechanism
will need to be redesigned with two latches. The technology needed to
meet the upgraded standard would benefit vehicles in rollover crashes
where door openings were identified as a problem.
c. Occupant Protection
Finally, when a rollover crash does occur and the occupants have
been contained within the vehicle compartment, it is important for the
roof structure to remain intact and maintain survival space. That is
the safety need addressed by today's final rule.
III. The Role of Roof Intrusion in the Rollover Problem
Due to the high effectiveness of ESC in preventing an increasing
number of rollover crashes, and seat belts at preventing ejection, the
remaining target population relevant to roof crush occupant protection
is a relatively small subset of the occupants injured in rollovers. For
fatalities, the estimated total for the target population \2\ is about
seven percent (about 667) of all non-convertible light vehicle rollover
fatalities. Although the target population and potential for lives
saved are substantially smaller than can be attained by the first two
strategies of our comprehensive rollover plan, it is nevertheless a
very important aspect of the plan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ The target population estimates were based upon the results
from the 1997-2006 National Automotive Sampling System-
Crashworthiness Data System (NASS-CDS).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Looking at the target population relevant to roof crush occupant
protection more specifically, Table 1 below shows a breakdown of the
target population that could potentially benefit from roof crush
improvements. The target population for all light vehicles is
stratified by injury severity. The injury mechanism due to roof crush
for belted occupants is that the roof crushes during the roll event,
intrudes
[[Page 22351]]
into the occupant compartment, and causes head, face, or neck injury.
The table demonstrates how the final target population is derived from
the broad category of rollovers by eliminating cases in which roof
strength improvements would not be effective in reducing serious and
fatal injuries. For example, a stronger roof would not be expected to
provide benefits in cases where the roof was not involved; where the
occupant was totally ejected from the vehicle,\3\ or where the most
serious injury was not to the head, neck, or face due to the intruding
roof.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Strashny, ``The Role of Vertical Roof Intrusion in
Predicting Occupant Ejection,'' 2009. Strashny found that there was
no statistically significant relationship between the level of roof
intrusion and the probability of complete ejection. For this reason
completely ejection occupants were excluded from the target
population. However, partial ejections that meet the established
criteria are included.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The final target populations are shown in bold at the bottom of the
table. A full discussion of the basis for the target population is
included in the FRIA.
Table 1--Target Population Potentially Affected by Improved Roof Strength \4\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AIS 1 AIS 2 AIS 3-5 Fatalities
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
All Light Vehicles
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
All Vehicles:
Non-Convertible Light Vehicles in Rollovers. 199,822 37,305 21,673 10,150
Roof-Involved Rollover...................... 164,213 32,959 19,262 8,645
Some Fixed Object Collision on Top.......... 153,520 29,419 17,766 7,559
Not Totally Ejected......................... 149,850 26,033 12,355 3,654
Using Safety Restraints..................... 116,670 14,327 8,970 2,096
Outboard Seats.............................. 115,018 14,241 8,781 2,096
Roof Component Intrusion.................... 68,730 10,922 6,842 1,444
===============================================================
Head, Neck, or Face Injury From Intruding 24,035 6,580 2,993 957
Roof Component.............................
Injury--Not MAIS \5\........................ 0 -1,900 -1,252 -237
Injury at MAIS--Not Sole Injury............. -17,818 -292 -253 -53
---------------------------------------------------------------
Sole MAIS Injury........................ 6,216 4,388 1,487 667
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Light Vehicles With a GVWR of 2,722 Kilograms (6,000 Pounds) or Less
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PC & LT < 6,000 lbs:
Non-Convertible Light Vehicles in Rollovers. 172,846 33,170 18,929 8,719
Roof-Involved Rollover...................... 144,410 29,098 17,360 7,536
Some Fixed Object Collision on Top.......... 136,080 26,270 16,122 6,484
Not Totally Ejected......................... 133,241 23,400 11,406 3,142
Using Safety Restraints..................... 104,571 12,421 8,379 1,936
Outboard Seats.............................. 103,249 12,373 8,190 1,936
Roof Component Intrusion.................... 60,061 9,370 6,372 1,304
===============================================================
Head, Neck, or Face Injury From Intruding 20,687 5,868 2,615 842
Roof Component.............................
Injury--Not MAIS............................ 0 -1,771 -1,119 -157
Injury at MAIS--Not Sole Injury................. -16,082 -262 -212 -50
---------------------------------------------------------------
Sole MAIS Injury........................ 4,605 3,835 1,283 635
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Light Vehicles With a GVWR above 2,722 Kilograms (6,000 Pounds)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LT > 6,000 lbs:
Non-Convertible Light Vehicles in Rollovers. 26,975 4,135 2,744 1,431
Roof-Involved Rollover...................... 19,803 3,861 1,902 1,110
Some Fixed Object Collision on Top.......... 17,440 3,149 1,644 1,075
Not Totally Ejected......................... 16,608 2,634 949 511
Using Safety Restraints..................... 12,099 1,906 591 160
Outboard Seats.............................. 11,770 1,868 591 160
Roof Component Intrusion.................... 8,669 1,552 471 140
===============================================================
Head, Neck, or Face Injury From Intruding 3,348 712 378 116
Roof Component.............................
Injury--Not MAIS............................ 0 -128 -133 -80
Injury at MAIS--Not Sole Injury............. -1,736 -31 -40 -3
---------------------------------------------------------------
Sole MAIS Injury........................ 1,611 553 205 33
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The most significant exclusions resulted from requirements that
fatalities occurred in rollovers in which (1) the roof was damaged in a
rollover, (2) the damage was not caused by collision with a fixed
object, (3) the fatally injured occupants were not ejected, and (4)
those occupants were belted.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Note: The relevant target population used for the estimation
of benefits is identified in the row titled ``Sole MAIS Injury.''
Also, the numbers reflect rounding errors.
\5\ Injury--Not MAIS: This means that the most serious injury
was to a portion of the body other than the head, neck or face.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It is important to understand what Table 1 indicates about the
safety
[[Page 22352]]
potential of addressing roof crush. Even if there were some way to
prevent every single rollover death resulting from roof crush, the
total lives saved would be 667, not the approximately 10,000 deaths
that result from rollover each year. This is why each initiative in
NHTSA's comprehensive program to address the different aspects of the
rollover problem is so important.
The details of today's rule upgrading roof crush occupant
protection, including costs and benefits and the agency's analysis of
the public comments on our NPRM and SNPRM, are discussed in the rest of
this document.
IV. The Agency's Proposed Rule
a. NPRM
On August 23, 2005, NHTSA published in the Federal Register (70 FR
49223) a NPRM to upgrade FMVSS No. 216, Roof Crush Resistance.\6\ FMVSS
No. 216 seeks to reduce deaths and serious injuries resulting from the
roof being crushed and pushed into the occupant compartment when the
roof strikes the ground during rollover crashes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Docket No. NHTSA-2005-22143.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current requirements.
FMVSS No. 216 currently applies to passenger cars, and to
multipurpose passenger vehicles, trucks and buses with a GVWR of 2,722
kilograms (6,000 pounds) or less.
The standard requires that when a large steel test plate (sometimes
referred to as a platen) is placed in contact with the roof of a
vehicle and then pressed downward, simulating contact of the roof with
the ground during a rollover crash, with steadily increasing force
until a force equivalent to 1.5 times the unloaded weight of the
vehicle is reached, the distance that the test plate has moved from the
point of contact must not exceed 127 mm (5 inches). The criterion of
the test plate not being permitted to move more than a specified amount
is sometimes referred to as the ``platen travel'' criterion. Under S5
of the standard, the application of force is limited to 22,240 Newtons
(5,000 pounds) for passenger cars, even if the unloaded weight of the
car times 1.5 is greater than that amount.
Proposed upgrade.
As discussed in the August 2005 NPRM, we developed our proposal to
upgrade roof crush resistance requirements after considerable analysis
and research, including considering comments received in response to a
RFC published in the Federal Register (66 FR 53376) \7\ on October 22,
2001. Prior to publishing the RFC, the agency conducted a research
program to examine potential methods for improving the roof crush
resistance requirements. The agency testing program included full
vehicle dynamic rollover testing, inverted vehicle drop testing, and
comparing inverted drop testing to a modified FMVSS No. 216 test. After
considering the results of the testing and other available information,
the agency concluded that the quasi-static procedure provides a
suitable representation of the real-world dynamic loading conditions,
and the most appropriate one on which to focus our upgrade efforts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Docket No. NHTSA-1999-5572.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In our August 2005 NPRM, to better address fatalities and injuries
occurring in roof-involved rollover crashes, we proposed to extend the
application of the standard to vehicles with a GVWR of up to 4,536
kilograms (10,000 pounds), and to strengthen the requirements of FMVSS
No. 216 by mandating that the vehicle roof structures withstand a force
equivalent to 2.5 times the unloaded vehicle weight, and to eliminate
the 22,240 Newton (5,000 pound) force limit for passenger cars.
Further, in recognition of the fact that the pre-test distance
between the interior surface of the roof and a given occupant's head
varies from vehicle model to vehicle model, we proposed to regulate
roof strength by requiring that the crush not exceed the available
headroom. Under the proposal, this requirement would replace the
current limit on test plate movement.
The proposed new limit would prohibit any roof component from
contacting the head of a seated 50th percentile male dummy when the
roof is subjected to a force equivalent to 2.5 times the unloaded
vehicle weight. We note that this value is sometimes referred to as the
strength-to-weight ratio (SWR), e.g., a SWR of 1.5, 2.5, and so forth.
We also proposed to:
Allow vehicles manufactured in two or more stages, other
than chassis-cabs, to be certified to the roof crush requirements of
FMVSS No. 220, School bus rollover protection, instead of FMVSS No.
216.
Clarify the definition and scope of exclusion for
convertibles.
Revise the vehicle tie-down procedure to minimize
variability in testing.
To accompany our proposal, we prepared a Preliminary Regulatory
Impact Analysis (PRIA) describing the costs and benefits. We estimated
that, if adopted, the proposal would result in 13-44 fewer fatalities
and 498-793 fewer non-fatal injuries each year. The total estimated
recurring fleet cost was $88 to $95 million. We estimated that
approximately 32 percent of the current vehicle fleet would need
improvements to meet the proposed upgraded requirements.
b. SNPRM
On January 30, 2008, NHTSA published in the Federal Register (73 FR
5484) an SNPRM for our ongoing roof crush resistance rulemaking.\8\ In
that document, we asked for public comment on a number of issues that
might affect the content of the final rule, including possible
variations in the proposed requirements. We also announced the release
of the results of various vehicle tests conducted since the proposal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Docket No. NHTSA-2008-0015.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the SNPRM, we noted that we had been carefully analyzing the
numerous comments we had received on the NPRM, as well as the various
additional vehicle tests, including both single-sided tests and two-
sided tests, conducted since the NPRM. We invited comments on how the
agency should factor the new information into its decision. We noted
that while the NPRM focused on a specified force equivalent to 2.5
times the unloaded vehicle weight, the agency could adopt a higher or
lower value for the final rule. We explained, with respect to two-sided
testing, that we believed there was now sufficient available
information for the agency to consider a two-sided requirement as an
alternative to the single-sided procedure described in the NPRM. We
stated that we planned to evaluate both the single-sided and two-sided
testing alternatives for the final rule and requested comments that
would help us reach a decision on that issue.
We also noted in the SNPRM that the agency had conducted additional
analysis concerning the role of vertical roof intrusion and post-crash
headroom in predicting roof contact injuries to the head, neck or face
during FMVSS No. 216 rollovers. At the time of the NPRM, the agency
estimated benefits based on post-crash headroom, the only basis for
which a statistical relationship with injury reduction had been
established. After the NPRM, with additional years of data available, a
statistically significant relationship between intrusion and injury for
belted occupants was established.
c. Congressional Mandate
Section 10301 of SAFETEA-LU generally required the Secretary to
issue
[[Page 22353]]
a final rule upgrading roof crush resistance by July 1, 2008, while
providing for a later date under certain circumstances. That section
provides:
Sec. 10301. VEHICLE ROLLOVER PREVENTION AND CRASH MITIGATION.
(a) In General.--Subchapter II of chapter 301 is amended by
adding at the end the following:
Sec. 30128. Vehicle rollover prevention and crash mitigation
(a) IN GENERAL.--The Secretary shall initiate rulemaking
proceedings, for the purpose of establishing rules or standards that
will reduce vehicle rollover crashes and mitigate deaths and
injuries associated with such crashes for motor vehicles with a
gross vehicle weight rating of not more than 10,000 pounds.
* * * * *
(d) Protection of Occupants.--One of the rulemaking proceedings
initiated under subsection (a) shall be to establish performance
criteria to upgrade Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 216
relating to roof strength for driver and passenger sides. The
Secretary may consider industry and independent dynamic tests that
realistically duplicate the actual forces transmitted during a
rollover crash. The Secretary shall issue a proposed rule by
December 31, 2005, and a final rule by July 1, 2008.
The statute provides that if the Secretary determines that the July
1, 2008 deadline for the final rule cannot be met, the Secretary is to
notify Congress and explain why that deadline cannot be met, and
establish a new date. The Secretary provided such notifications to
Congress, and established a date of April 30, 2009.
V. Overview of Comments
NHTSA received comments from a wide variety of interested parties,
including vehicle manufacturers and their trade associations, suppliers
of automobile equipment and a supplier trade association, consumer
advocacy and other organizations, trial lawyers, engineering firms and
consultants, members of academia, elected officials and government
organizations, and private individuals. All of the comments may be
found in the docket for the NPRM or SNPRM. In this section, we provide
a broad overview of the significant comments. Where we identify
specific commenters, we cite representative comments.
General Approach and SWR
Vehicle manufacturers were generally supportive of the agency's
proposal, while recommending a number of specific modifications. They
generally supported a SWR of 2.5, with caveats about sufficient
leadtime and test procedure issues. They expressed concerns about SWRs
higher than 2.5, including potential adverse effects on safety
resulting from increased mass.
Consumer advocacy organizations and a number of other commenters
argued that it is not enough to upgrade the current quasi-static
requirement, and that a dynamic test requirement is needed. While
specific recommendations varied, one was for the agency to adopt an
upgraded quasi-static requirement now, and to proceed with further
rulemaking for a dynamic test.
Advocates for Highway Safety (Advocates) stated that the proposed
quasi-static test cannot demonstrate actual roof crush resistance in
rollover crashes and that a dynamic test would address occupant
kinematics and injury responses in actual rollover crashes. Public
Citizen stated that a dynamic test could simultaneously evaluate the
performance of seat belts, doors, ejection and the roof. A number of
commenters supported specific dynamic tests.
The Center for Auto Safety (CAS) stated that while it strongly
supports a dynamic test, it believes rollover protection can be
dramatically improved with a well-crafted quasi-static test. It argued
that test procedure changes related to roll angle and pitch angle are
needed to ensure that the roof receives appropriate shear stress.
As to the SWR for an upgraded quasi-static test requirement,
consumer advocacy organizations and a number of other commenters argued
that the SWR should be significantly higher than 2.5. Many of these
commenters recommended a SWR of 3.5, with some recommending higher
levels.
The Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS) submitted a new
study which it said supports increasing the SWR beyond 2.5. It stated
that based on the current evidence, it supports a SWR of 3.0 to 3.5.
Performance Criterion
The agency received a variety of comments on the proposed headroom
reduction criterion. Some commenters, including consumer groups,
supported a headroom reduction criterion but argued that a platen
travel criterion is also needed. Several commenters expressed concern
that, for some vehicles, the proposed headroom reduction criterion
would be less stringent and less protective than the current platen
travel criterion. The agency also received comments recommending that
the agency make these criteria more stringent to protect taller
occupants, e.g., by using a 95th percentile adult male dummy instead of
a 50th percentile adult male dummy to measure headroom and by reducing
the amount of platen travel that is permitted.
Vehicle manufacturers urged the agency to retain the current platen
travel criterion instead of adopting a headroom reduction criterion.
They argued, among other things, that using the headroom reduction
criterion would add unnecessary complexity to the test procedure and
result in problems related to repeatability and practicability. Some
manufacturers stated that if the agency adopts a headroom reduction
criterion, it should adopt a test procedure using a head positioning
fixture instead of a test dummy.
IIHS stated that relating the allowable amount of roof crush in the
quasi-static test to the headroom in specific vehicles is a good
concept but that, in practice, the agency's research tests have not
shown that replacing the 5-inch platen travel criterion with the
headroom requirement would be a meaningful change to the standard and
may not justify the added complications to the test procedure.
Single- or Two-Sided Testing
Several consumer advocacy organizations and other commenters
strongly supported two-sided testing. Public Citizen stated that in a
vast majority of rollover cases, the injured party was typically seated
on the far side, that is, the side of the second impact. It argued that
it is not possible to upgrade FMVSS No. 216 without a two-sided test
requirement.
IIHS stated that while it supports any changes that would increase
the level of roof strength of the vehicle fleet, it has no real-world
data to address the potential benefits of two-sided testing. It stated
that a single-sided test with a higher SWR may be more effective at
promoting robust roof designs than a two-sided test with a lower SWR
requirement.
The comments of vehicle manufacturers were somewhat mixed on the
issue of single- or two-sided testing. The Alliance of Automobile
Manufacturers (Alliance) stated that it believes the agency has
provided insufficient justification for two-sided testing. It stated
that the agency has not provided analysis demonstrating that two-sided
testing relates to real-world safety. The Alliance also expressed
concern that two-sided testing would amplify variability and
repeatability problems.
The Association of International Automobile Manufacturers (AIAM)
stated that based on the information and
[[Page 22354]]
analysis provided by the agency regarding the two-sided test, it
believes that the test shows enough potential to merit further
consideration by the agency. AIAM argued that additional analysis would
be needed before it could provide a preferred regulatory approach, but
indicated that the two-sided approach would more directly address the
multiple roof contact weakening phenomenon.
Leadtime
Vehicle manufacturers argued that a phase-in is needed for the
upgraded roof crush requirements. The Alliance stated that if the final
rule reflected a reasonable accommodation of the issues raised in its
comments, it would be reasonable for a phase-in to begin, with a
compliance percentage of 20 percent, on the first September 1, that
occurred more than 36 months after issuance of the final rule. That
organization stated that it would not be practicable to apply the
upgraded requirements to all new vehicles at once, since far more
vehicle models require redesigns than anticipated by NHTSA. The
Alliance requested a phase-in that incorporates carryforward credits.
It stated that additional leadtime would be necessary if the agency
adopted a head contact criterion instead of platen travel, a two-sided
test or a SWR higher than 2.5.
Costs and Benefits
Many commenters addressed the PRIA, which analyzed the costs and
benefits and other impacts of the proposed rule, and a later discussion
of these impacts included in the SNPRM. Among other things, commenters
addressed the target population, the pass/fail rate of the current
fleet, cost and weight impacts, and estimates of benefits.
Preemption
We received numerous comments on our discussion in the NPRM of the
possible preemptive effect of an upgraded roof crush standard on State
common law tort claims. Vehicle manufacturers and one organization
strongly supported the view that an upgraded roof crush standard would
conflict with and therefore impliedly preempt State rules of tort law
imposing more stringent requirements than the one ultimately adopted by
NHTSA. Consumer advocacy groups, members of Congress and State
officials, trial lawyers, consultants, members of academia, and private
individuals strongly opposed that view. The opposing comments from
State officials included one signed by 27 State Attorneys General and
the National Conference of State Legislatures.
Other Issues
We received comments on many other issues. Commenters addressed a
number of issues concerning the FMVSS No. 216 test procedure, including
the vehicle tie-down procedure, platen angle and size, and whether the
vehicle should be tested with the windshield and/or other glazing in
place. Commenters also addressed requirements for multi-stage vehicles.
June 2008 Congressional Hearing and Letters
On June 4, 2008. the Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs, Insurance,
and Automotive Safety of the Senate Commerce, Science and
Transportation Committee held an oversight hearing on passenger vehicle
roof strength. Former NHTSA Deputy Administrator James Ports testified
at the hearing. At the hearing and also in a subsequent letter to
Secretary Peters dated June 19, 2008, several Senators encouraged the
agency to extend the July 1, 2008 date for completing a final rule.
They encouraged the agency to ensure a rulemaking that would maximize
vehicle safety and significantly reduce deaths and injuries for drivers
and passengers in vehicle rollover crashes.
Several Senators encouraged NHTSA to consider a two-sided test
requirement and a higher SWR requirement than the proposed 2.5 level,
and to provide detailed information concerning alternatives considered
by the agency. They also raised concerns about the use of 50th
percentile adult male test dummies instead of ones representing taller
occupants. The Senators also expressed significant concerns about
possible preemption of common law tort actions, and asked that such a
provision not be included in the final rule.
In a letter to Secretary Peters dated June 27, 2008, Chairman Henry
Waxman of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
raised similar concerns to those of the Senators.
New IIHS Roof Strength Consumer Information Program
On February 19, 2009, IIHS met with NHTSA representatives to
provide the agency information about a new roof strength consumer
information program that the organization is initiating. IIHS believes
the FMVSS No. 216 test procedure is a meaningful structural assessment
of real-world rollover crashworthiness as shown by recent studies it
has conducted showing that improved roof strength reduces injury risk
in midsize SUVs and small cars. That organization indicated that the
boundary for a good rating in the IIHS program will be a SWR of 4.0 in
a one-sided platen test similar to the existing FMVSS No 216 test
procedure. IIHS indicated that it does not plan to rate the larger,
heavier light vehicles, i.e., ones likely to have GVWRs greater than
2,722 kilograms (6,000 pounds).
On March 24, 2009, IIHS issued a press release announcing a number
of details about its new rating system, including ratings for 12 small
SUVs. For an acceptable rating, the minimum SWR is 3.25. A marginal
rating value is 2.5. Anything lower than that is rated as poor. In
order to earn IIHS's ``top safety pick'' award for 2010, vehicles will
need to have a good roof strength rating, i.e., SWR of 4.0. Of the 12
small SUVs tested by IIHS, eight were rated by that organization as
good, five as acceptable, two as marginal, and one as poor.
VI. Agency Decision and Response to Comments
a. Primary Decisions
1. Basic Nature of the Test Requirements--Quasi-Static vs. Dynamic
Tests
As noted above and discussed in detail in the NPRM, we developed
our proposal to upgrade roof crush resistance requirements after
considerable analysis and research, including conducting a research
program to examine potential methods for improving the roof crush
resistance requirements. The agency testing program included full
vehicle dynamic rollover testing, inverted vehicle drop testing, and
comparing inverted drop testing to a modified FMVSS No. 216 test. After
considering the results of the testing and other available information,
the agency concluded that the quasi-static procedure provides a
suitable representation of the real-world dynamic loading conditions,
and the most appropriate one on which to focus our upgrade efforts.
We did not propose a dynamic test procedure in either the NPRM or
the SNPRM. We did discuss in the NPRM a number of types of dynamic
tests and why we were not including them in the proposal. We stated our
belief that the current quasi-static test procedure is repeatable and
capable of simulating real-world deformation patterns. We also stated
that we were unaware of any dynamic test procedure that provides a
sufficiently repeatable test environment.
Consumer advocacy organizations and a number of other commenters
argued that it is not enough to upgrade the current quasi-static
requirement, and
[[Page 22355]]
that a dynamic test requirement is needed. While specific
recommendations varied, one was for the agency to adopt an upgraded
quasi-static requirement now, and to proceed with further rulemaking at
this time for a dynamic test.
Advocates stated that the proposed quasi-static test cannot
demonstrate actual roof crush resistance in rollover crashes and that a
dynamic test would address occupant kinematics and injury responses in
actual rollover crashes. Public Citizen stated that a dynamic test
could simultaneously evaluate the performance of seat belts, doors,
ejection mitigation and the roof. A number of commenters made specific
recommendations concerning the type of dynamic test that the agency
should propose, e.g., with a number recommending the FMVSS No. 208
dolly test and/or the Jordan Rollover System (JRS) test.
As part of our considering the merits of a dynamic test and
comments on the JRS, on February 23, 2007, NHTSA representatives met
with Xprts, LLC (Xprts) at its test facility in Goleta, CA, to view and
discuss the device. CAS and Center for Injury Research (CFIR) also
submitted additional test data to the agency using the JRS.
We note that the agency is also aware of tests used by
manufacturers to assess a vehicle's rollover performance during vehicle
development and conditions they are designed to represent such as the
curb trip, soil trip, the bounce over, etc.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Viano D., Parenteau C., ``Rollover Crash Sensing and Safety
Overview,'' SAE International, 2004-01-0342.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As noted earlier in this document, rollover crashes are complex and
chaotic events. Rollovers can range from a single quarter turn to eight
or more quarter turns, with the duration of the rollover crash lasting
from one to several seconds. The wide range of rollover conditions
occurs because these crashes largely occur off road where the vehicle
motion is highly influenced by roadside conditions.
The variety and complexity of real-world rollover crashes create
significant challenges in developing dynamic tests suitable for a
Federal motor vehicle safety standard. Rollover crash tests can have an
undesirable amount of variability in vehicle and occupant kinematics.
In assessing whether a potential dynamic test would be appropriate
for a Federal motor vehicle safety standard, the agency must consider
such issues as (1) whether the test is representative of real-world
crashes with respect what happens to the vehicle and any specified test
dummies; (2) for the specific aspect of performance at issue, whether
the test is sufficiently representative of enough relevant real-world
crashes to drive appropriate countermeasures and, if not, the number
and nature of necessary tests to achieve that purpose; (3) whether the
test is repeatable and reproducible so that the standard will be
objective; and (4) whether the test dummies to be specified are
biofidelic for the purposes used.
We have reviewed the comments recommending a dynamic test and are
including our analysis of those comments in an appendix to this
document. NHTSA appreciates the information and data that have been
provided on this subject. We decline, however, to pursue a dynamic test
as part of this rulemaking, or to initiate at this time a separate
rulemaking for a dynamic test.
As noted above, we explained in the NPRM that we were unaware of
any dynamic test procedure that provides a sufficiently repeatable test
environment. After reviewing the public comments and for reasons
discussed in the appendix, we continue to take that position. While
some commenters argued that certain procedures are repeatable, the
agency was not persuaded by the arguments and data they presented.
Moreover, for reasons discussed in the appendix, there are significant
issues associated with each of the cited dynamic test procedures
related to possible use in a Federal motor vehicle safety standard.
Also of importance for this rulemaking, even if NHTSA were to
identify a particular dynamic test procedure, among the many known to
be available, as likely to be suitable for assessing roof crush
resistance (something we have not been able to do thus far), we would
need additional years of research to evaluate and refine, as necessary,
the procedure to develop a proposal, including evaluating it in the
context of the current vehicle fleet. It is also not known whether any
dynamic test requirement that might be identified by NHTSA's research
would produce significant additional benefits beyond those that will be
produced by the substantial upgrade of the quasi-static procedure that
we are adopting in this rule.
NHTSA agrees, however, with pursuing a dynamic test as our ultimate
goal. We would like to have one for rollover crashes just as we do for
front and side crashes. Unfortunately, we cannot adopt or even propose
one now because of issues related to test repeatability, a dummy, and
lack of injury criteria. We are pursuing further research for a dynamic
test, but we expect that it will take a number of years to resolve
these issues. In the meantime, we do not want to delay a significant
upgrade of FMVSS No. 216 that will save 135 lives each year.
2. Vehicle Application
FMVSS No. 216 currently applies to passenger cars, and to
multipurpose passenger vehicles, trucks and buses with a GVWR of 2,722
kilograms (6,000 pounds) or less. In our August 2005 NPRM, in addition
to proposing upgraded performance requirements, we proposed to extend
the application of the standard to vehicles with a GVWR of up to 4,536
kilograms (10,000 pounds). We proposed to permit vehicles manufactured
in two or more stages, other than chassis-cabs, to be certified to the
roof crush requirements of FMVSS No. 220, instead of FMVSS No. 216. We
stated that we believed that the requirements of FMVSS No. 220 appeared
to offer a reasonable avenue to balance the desire to respond to the
needs of multi-stage manufacturers and the need to increase safety in
rollover crashes.
The commenters generally supported extending the application of
FMVSS No. 216 to vehicles with a GVWR of up to 4,536 kilograms (10,000
pounds). The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) stated that
heavier vehicles such as 12- and 15-passenger vans, not currently
subjected to the standard, are experiencing patterns of roof intrusion
greater than vehicles already subject to the requirements. That
commenter also cited two investigations it conducted concerning the
safety need for vehicles between 6,000 and 10,000 pounds GVWR to meet
roof crush resistance requirements.
We received a number of comments concerning requirements for multi-
stage vehicles and vehicles with altered roofs, including ones from
Advocates, the National Truck Equipment Association (NTEA), the
Recreation Vehicle Industry Association (RVIA) and the National
Mobility Equipment Dealers Association (NMEDA). The concerns and
recommendations of these commenters varied considerably. We discuss and
address the comments later in this document. For purposes of this more
general section concerning applicability, we note that we are providing
a FMVSS No. 220 option for some but not all multi-stage vehicles and
for vehicles which are altered in certain ways to raise the height of
the roof. We also note that, for reasons discussed in that section, we
are excluding a narrow
[[Page 22356]]
category of multi-stage trucks from FMVSS No. 216 altogether.
Subject to the limited exceptions/alternatives/exclusions noted in
the previous paragraph or already included in FMVSS No. 216, and for
the reasons discussed in the NPRM and in this document, we are
extending the application of the standard to vehicles with a GVWR of up
to 4,536 kilograms (10,000 pounds).\10\
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\10\ This final rule will address the NTSB's recommendation H-
03-16, to include 12- and 15-passenger vans in FMVSS No. 216, to
minimize the extent to which survivable space is compromised in the
event of a rollover accident.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. Single-Sided or Two-Sided Tests
Under the current version of FMVSS No. 216, vehicles must meet the
standard's requirements for both the driver and passenger sides of the
vehicle. Thus, roof crush resistance protection is required for both
the driver and passenger sides of the vehicle. The standard specifies a
single-sided test. While a vehicle must meet the standard's test
requirements, regardless of whether it is tested on the driver or
passenger side, a particular vehicle is tested on only one side.
As discussed in the NPRM, a number of commenters on our 2001 RFC
suggested that the agency specify a two-sided test requirement, i.e., a
requirement that each vehicle must meet the standard's test
requirements when tested sequentially, first on one side of the
vehicle, and then on the other side. Commenters making this
recommendation included Public Citizen and CFIR. The commenters stated
that vehicle occupants on the far side of the rollover have a much
greater risk of serious injury than occupants on the near side,\11\ and
argued that a two-sided requirement is needed to protect far side
occupants.
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\11\ Near side is the side toward which the vehicle begins to
roll and the far side is the trailing side of the roll.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the NPRM, the agency summarized the results of six two-sided
tests it had conducted in light of those comments. The testing sought
to evaluate the strength of the second side of the roof of vehicles
whose first side had already been tested. In this testing, after the
force was applied to one side of the roof over the front seat area of a
vehicle, the vehicle was repositioned and force was then applied on the
opposite side of the roof over the front seat area. In performing these
tests on both sides of a vehicle, the agency used the platen angle
currently specified in FMVSS No. 216 (5 degree pitch forward and 25
degree rotation outward, along its lateral axis). We concluded that the
strength of the roof on the second side of some vehicles may have been
increased or decreased as a result of the deformation of the first side
of the roof. The agency indicated that it planned to conduct further
research before proposing rulemaking in this area.
In commenting on the NPRM, a number of consumer advocacy
organizations and other commenters strongly supported a two-sided test
requirement. These commenters included, among others, Public Citizen,
CFIR, CAS, and Advocates. Supporters of a two-sided test requirement
argued that more damage occurs to the far (or trailing) side of the
vehicle in a rollover crash, and a two-sided test would better reflect
this real-world intrusion. They further argued that when the near side
roof and windshield are compromised in a rollover, the far side will
not be able to withstand the forces of the event, and, consequently,
facilitate roof collapse. ARCCA, Inc., Consumers Union, and Safety
Analysis and Forensic Engineering (SAFE) suggested a two-sided test
would simulate the impact that occurs in the majority of rollover
incidents.
In light of the substantial interest in a two-sided test
requirement, NHTSA expanded the series of two-sided roof crush tests
discussed in the NPRM. In our January 2008 SNPRM, we explained that we
had, by that time, conducted a total of 26 sequential two-sided tests,
and announced that we were releasing these data to the public in
con