Average Fuel Economy Standards Passenger Cars and Light Trucks Model Year 2011, 14196-14456 [E9-6839]
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Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 59 / Monday, March 30, 2009 / Rules and Regulations
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration
49 CFR Parts 523, 531, 533, 534, 536
and 537
[Docket No. NHTSA–2009–0062]
RIN 2127–AK29
Average Fuel Economy Standards
Passenger Cars and Light Trucks
Model Year 2011
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AGENCY: National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration (NHTSA),
Department of Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Final rule; record of decision.
SUMMARY: The future of this country’s
economy, security, and environment are
linked to one key challenge: energy. To
reduce fuel consumption, NHTSA has
been issuing Corporate Average Fuel
Economy (CAFE) standards since the
late 1970’s under the Energy Policy and
Conservation Act (EPCA). However, the
principal effects of these standards are
broader than their statutory purpose.
Reducing fuel consumption conserves
petroleum, a non-renewable energy
source, saves consumers money, and
promotes energy independence and
security by reducing dependence on
foreign oil. It also directly reduces the
motor vehicle tailpipe emissions of
carbon dioxide (CO2), which is the
principal greenhouse gas emitted by
motor vehicles.
The Energy Independence and
Security Act (EISA) amended EPCA by
mandating that the model year (MY)
2011–2020 CAFE standards be set
sufficiently high to ensure that the
industry-wide average of all new
passenger cars and light trucks,
combined, is not less than 35 miles per
gallon by MY 2020. This is a minimum
requirement, as NHTSA must set
standards at the maximum feasible level
in each model year. NHTSA will
determine, based on all of the relevant
circumstances, whether that additional
requirement calls for establishing
standards that reach the 35 mpg goal
earlier than MY 2020.
NHTSA published a proposal in May
2008 to begin implementing EISA by
establishing CAFE standards for MYs
2011–2015. A draft final rule for those
model years was completed, but not
issued.
In the context of his calls for the
development of new national policies to
prompt sustained domestic and
international actions to address the
closely intertwined issues of energy
independence, energy security and
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climate change, the President issued a
memorandum on January 26, 2009,
requesting NHTSA to divide its
rulemaking into two parts. First, he
requested the agency to issue a final rule
adopting CAFE standards for MY 2011
only. Given the substantial time and
analytical effort involved in developing
CAFE standards and the limited amount
of time before the statutory deadline of
March 30, 2009 for establishing the MY
2011 standards, the agency has
necessarily based this one year final rule
almost wholly on the information
available to it and the analysis
performed by it in support of the draft
final rule completed last fall.
Second, the President requested
NHTSA to establish standards for MY
2012 and later after considering the
appropriate legal factors, the comments
filed in response to the May 2008
proposal, the relevant technological and
scientific considerations, and, to the
extent feasible, a forthcoming report by
the National Academy of Sciences,
mandated under section 107 of EISA,
assessing existing and potential
automotive technologies and costs that
can practicably be used to improve fuel
economy. The deferral of action on
standards for the later model years
provides the agency with an
opportunity to review its approach to
CAFE standard setting, including its
methodologies, economic and
technological inputs and
decisionmaking criteria, so as to ensure
that it will produce standards that
contribute, to the maximum extent
possible within the limits of EPCA/
EISA, to meeting the energy and
environmental challenges and goals
outlined by the President.
NHTSA estimates that the MY 2011
standards will raise the industry-wide
combined average to 27.3 mpg, save 887
million gallons of fuel over the lifetime
of the MY 2011 cars and light trucks,
and reduce CO2 emissions by 8.3
million metric tons during that period.
DATES: This final rule is effective May
29, 2009.
Petitions for reconsideration must be
received by May 14, 2009.
ADDRESSES: Petitions for reconsideration
must be submitted to: Administrator,
National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, 1200 New Jersey
Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For
policy and technical issues: Ms. Julie
Abraham or Mr. Peter Feather, Office of
Rulemaking, National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration, 1200 New Jersey
Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590.
Telephone: Ms. Abraham (202) 366–
1455; Mr. Feather (202) 366–0846.
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For legal issues: Mr. Stephen Wood or
Ms. Rebecca Yoon, Office of the Chief
Counsel, National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration, 1200 New Jersey
Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590.
Telephone: (202) 366–2992.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Table of Contents
I. Executive overview
A. The President’s January 26, 2009
Memorandum on CAFE Standards for
Model Years 2011 and Beyond
1. Rulemaking Background
2. Requests in the President’s
Memorandum
(a) CAFE Standards for Model Year 2011
(b) CAFE Standards for Model Years 2012
and Beyond
3. Implementing the President’s
Memorandum
B. Energy Independence and Security Act
of 2007
C. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for MYs
2011–2015 and Request for New Product
Plans
1. Key Economic Values for Benefits
Computations and Standard Setting
2. Standards
(a) Classification of Vehicles
(b) Stringency
(c) Benefits and Costs
(i) Benefits
(ii) Costs
(d) Effect of Flexibilities on Benefits and
Costs
3. Credits
4. Preemption
D. Brief Summary of Public Comments on
the NPRM
E. New Information Received or Developed
by NHTSA Between the NPRM and Final
Rule
1. New Manufacturer Product Plans
2. Revised Assessment of Technology
Effectiveness and Costs
3. Final Environmental Impact Statement
F. Final Rule for MY 2011
1. Introduction
2. Key Economic Values for Benefits
Computations
3. Standards
(a) Classification
(b) Stringency
(c) Benefits and Costs
(i) Benefits
(ii) Costs
(d) Flexibilities
4. Credits
5. Preemption
II. Background
A. Role of Fuel Economy Improvements in
Promoting Energy Independence, Energy
Security, and a Low Carbon Economy
B. Contributions of Fuel Economy
Improvements to CO2 Tailpipe Emission
Reductions Since 1975
C. Chronology of Events Since the National
Academy of Sciences Called for
Reforming and Increasing CAFE
Standards
1. National Academy of Sciences Issues
Report on Future of CAFE Program
(February 2002)
(a) Significantly Increasing CAFE
Standards Without Making Them
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Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 59 / Monday, March 30, 2009 / Rules and Regulations
Attribute-Based Would Adversely Affect
Safety
(b) Climate Change and Other Externalities
Justify Increasing the CAFE Standards
2. NHTSA Issues Final Rule Establishing
Attribute-Based CAFE Standards for MY
2008–2011 Light Trucks (March 2006)
3. Supreme Court Issues Decision in
Massachusetts v. EPA (April 2007)
4. NHTSA and EPA Coordinate on
Development of Rulemaking Proposals
(Summer–Fall 2007)
5. Ninth Circuit Issues Decision Re Final
Rule for MY 2008–2011 Light Trucks
(November 2007)
6. Congress Enacts Energy Security and
Independence Act of 2007 (December
2007)
7. NHTSA Proposes CAFE Standards for
MYs 2011–2015 and Requests New
Product Plans for Those Years (April
2008)
8. NHTSA Contracts With ICF International
To Conduct Climate Modeling and Other
Analyses in Support of Draft and Final
Environmental Impact Statements (May
2008)
9. Manufacturers Submit New Product
Plans (June 2008)
10. NHTSA Contracts With Ricardo To Aid
in Assessing Public Comments On Cost
and Effectiveness of Fuel Saving
Technologies (June 2008)
11. Ninth Circuit Revises Its Decision Re
Final Rule for MY 2008–2011 Light
Trucks (August 2008)
12. NHTSA Releases Final Environmental
Impact Statement (October 2008)
13. Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs Completes Review of a Draft MY
2011–2015 Final Rule (November 2008)
14. Department of Treasury Extends Loans
to General Motors and Chrysler
(December 2008)
15. Department of Transportation Decides
Not To Issue MY 2011–2015 Final Rule
(January 2009)
16. The President Requests NHTSA To
Issue Final Rule for MY 2011 Only
(January 2009)
17. General Motors and Chrysler Submit
Restructuring Reports to Department of
Treasury (February 2009)
D. Energy Policy and Conservation Act, as
Amended
1. Vehicles Subject to Standards for
Automobiles
2. Mandate To Set Standards for
Automobiles
3. Attribute-Based Standards
4. Factors Considered in the Setting of
Standards
(a) Factors That Must Be Considered
(i) Technological Feasibility
(ii) Economic Practicability
(iii) The Effect of Other Motor Vehicle
Standards of the Government on Fuel
Economy
(iv) The Need of the United States To
Conserve Energy
1. Fuel Prices and the Value of Saving Fuel
2. Petroleum Consumption and Import
Externalities
3. Air Pollutant Emissions
(v) Other Factors—Safety
(b) Factors That Cannot Be Considered
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(c) Weighing and Balancing of Factors
5. Consultation in Setting Standards
6. Test Procedures for Measuring Fuel
Economy
7. Enforcement and Compliance Flexibility
III. The Anticipated Vehicles in the MY 2011
Fleets and NHTSA’s Baseline Market
Forecast
A. Why does NHTSA establish a baseline
market forecast?
B. How does NHTSA develop the baseline
market forecast?
1. NHTSA first asks manufacturers for
updated product plan data
(a) Why does NHTSA use manufacturer
product plans to develop the baseline?
(b) What product plan data did NHTSA use
in the NPRM?
(c) What product plan data did NHTSA
receive for the final rule?
(d) How is the product plan data received
for the final rule different from what the
agency used in the NPRM analysis, and
how does it impact the baseline?
2. Once NHTSA has the product plans,
how does it develop the baseline?
3. How does NHTSA’s market forecast
reflect current market conditions?
IV. Fuel Economy-Improving Technologies
A. NHTSA Analyzes What Technologies
Can Be Applied Beyond Those in the
Manufacturers’ Product Plans
B How NHTSA Decides Which
Technologies To Include
1. How NHTSA Did This Historically, and
How for the NPRM
2. NHTSA’s Contract With Ricardo for the
Final Rule
C. What technology assumptions has
NHTSA used for the final rule?
1. How do NHTSA’s technology
assumptions in the final rule differ from
those used in the NPRM?
2. How are the technologies applied in the
model?
3. Technology Application Decision Trees
4. Division of Vehicles Into Subclasses
Based on Technology Applicability, Cost
and Effectiveness
5. How did NHTSA develop technology
cost and effectiveness estimates for the
final rule?
6. Learning Curves
7. Technology Synergies
8. How does NHTSA use full vehicle
simulation?
9. Refresh and Redesign Schedule
10. Phase-In Caps
D. Specific Technologies Considered for
Application and NHTSA’s Estimates of
Their Incremental Costs and
Effectiveness
1. What data sources did NHTSA evaluate?
2. Individual Technology Descriptions and
Cost/Effectiveness Estimates
(a) Gasoline Engine Technologies
(i) Overview
(ii) Low Friction Lubricants (LUB)
(iii) Engine Friction Reduction (EFR)
(iv) Variable Valve Timing (VVT)
1. Intake Cam Phasing (ICP)
2. Coupled Cam Phasing (CCPS and CCPO)
3. Dual Cam Phasing (DCP)
(v) Discrete Variable Valve Lift (DVVLS,
DVVLD, DVVLO)
(vi) Continuously Variable Valve Lift
(CVVL)
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(vii) Cylinder Deactivation (DEACS,
DEACD, DEACO)
(viii) Conversion to Double Overhead
Camshaft Engine With Dual Cam Phasing
(CDOHC)
(ix) Stoichiometric Gasoline Direct
Injection (SGDI)
(x) Combustion Restart (CBRST)
(xi) Turbocharging and Downsizing
(TRBDS)
(xii) Cooled Exhaust Gas Recirculation
Boost (EGRB)
(b) Diesel Engine Technologies
(i) Diesel Engine With Lean NOX Trap
(LNT) Catalyst After-Treatment
(ii) Diesel Engine With Selective Catalytic
Reduction (SCR) After-Treatment
(c) Transmission Technologies
(i) Improved Transmission Controls and
Externals (IATC)
(ii) Automatic 6-, 7- and 8-Speed
Transmissions (NAUTO)
(iii) Dual Clutch Transmissions/Automated
Manual Transmissions (DCTAM)
(iv) Continuously Variable Transmission
(CVT)
(v) 6-Speed Manual Transmissions (6MAN)
(d) Hybrid and Electrification/Accessory
Technologies
(i) Overview
(ii) Hybrid System Sizing and Cost
Estimating Methodology
(iii) Electrical Power Steering (EPS)
(iv) Improved Accessories (IACC)
(v) 12V Micro Hybrid (MHEV)
(vi) High Voltage/Improved Alternator
(HVIA)
(vii) Integrated Starter Generator (ISG)
(viii) Power Split Hybrid
(ix) 2-Mode Hybrid
(x) Plug-In Hybrid
(e) Vehicle Technologies
(i) Material Substitution (MS1, MS2, MS5)
(ii) Low Drag Brakes (LDB)
(iii) Low Rolling Resistance Tires (ROLL)
(iv) Front or Secondary Axle Disconnect
for Four-Wheel Drive Systems (SAX)
(v) Aerodynamic Drag Reduction (AERO)
(f) Technologies Considered But Not
Included in the Final Rule Analysis
(i) Camless Valve Actuation
(ii) Lean-Burn Gasoline Direct Injection
Technology
(iii) Homogeneous Charge Compression
Ignition
(iv) Electric Assist Turbocharging
E. Cost and Effectiveness Tables
V. Economic Assumptions Used in NHTSA’s
Analysis
A. Introduction: How NHTSA Uses the
Economic Assumptions in Its Analysis
B. What economic assumptions does
NHTSA use in its analysis?
1. Determining Retail Price Equivalent
2. Potential Opportunity Costs of Improved
Fuel Economy
3. The On-Road Fuel Economy ‘Gap’
4. Fuel Prices and the Value of Saving Fuel
5. Consumer Valuation of Fuel Economy
and Payback Period
6. Vehicle Survival and Use Assumptions
7. Growth in Total Vehicle Use
8. Accounting for the Rebound Effect of
Higher Fuel Economy
9. Benefits From Increased Vehicle Use
10. Added Costs From Congestion, Crashes,
and Noise
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11. Petroleum Consumption and Import
Externalities
12. Air Pollutant Emissions
(a) Impacts on Criteria Pollutant Emissions
(b) Reductions in CO2 Emissions
(c) Economic Value of Reductions in CO2
Emissions
13. The Value of Increased Driving Range
14. Discounting Future Benefits and Costs
15. Accounting for Uncertainty in Benefits
and Costs
VI. How NHTSA Sets the CAFE Standards
A. Which attributes does NHTSA use to
determine the standards?
B. Which mathematical function does
NHTSA use to set the standards?
C. What other types of standards did
commenters propose?
D. How does NHTSA fit the curve and
estimate the stringency that maximizes
net benefits to society?
E. Why has NHTSA used the Volpe model
to support its analysis?
VII. Determining the Appropriate Level of the
Standards
A. Analyzing the Preferred Alternative
B. Alternative Levels of Stringency
Considered for Establishment as the
Maximum Feasible Level of Average
Fuel Economy
C. EPCA Provisions Relevant to the
Selection of the Final Standards
1. 35 in 2020
2. Annual Ratable Increase
3. Maximum Feasibility and the Four
Underlying EPCA Considerations
(a) Technological Feasibility
(b) Economic Practicability
(c) Effect of Other Motor Vehicle Standards
of the Government on Fuel Economy
(d) Need of the United States To Conserve
Energy
(i) Consumer Cost
(ii) National Balance of Payments
(iii) Environmental Implications
(iv) Foreign Policy Considerations
4. Comparison of Alternatives
5. Other Considerations Under EPCA
(a) Safety
(b) AMFA Credits
(c) Flexibility Mechanisms: Credits, Fines
D. Analysis of Environmental
Consequences in Selecting the Final
Standards
E. Picking the Final Standards
1. Eliminating the Alternatives Facially
Inconsistent With EPCA
(a) No-Action Alternative
(b) Technology Exhaustion Alternative
2. Choosing Among the Remaining
Alternatives
(a) Difficulty and Importance of Achieving
a Reasonable Balancing of the Factors
(b) The Correct Balancing of the Factors for
Setting the MY 2011 Standards Is To
Maximize Societal Net Benefits
VIII. Safety
A. Summary of NHTSA’s Approach in This
Final Rule
B. Background
1. NHTSA’s Early Studies
2. The 2002 National Academy of Sciences
Study
3. NHTSA’s updated 2003 Study
4. Summary of Studies Prior to This
Rulemaking
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B. Response to Comments in This
Rulemaking on Safety and Vehicle
Weight
1. Views of Other Government Agencies
2. Comments From Other Parties
C. Comments on Other Issues Related to
Safety
1. Vehicle Compatibility Design Issues
2. Whether Manufacturers Downweight in
Response to Increased CAFE Stringency
3. Whether Flat Standards Are More or
Less Harmful to Safety Than FootprintBased Standards
4. Whether NHTSA Should Set Identical
Targets for Passenger Cars and Light
Trucks for Safety Reasons
5. Whether NHTSA Should Have
Considered the 2002 NAS Report Dissent
in Deciding Not To Apply Material
Substitution for Vehicles Under 5,000
Pounds
IX. The Final Fuel Economy Standards for
MY 2011
A. Final Passenger Car Standard
B. Final Light Truck Standard
C. Energy and Environmental Backstop
D. Combined Fleet Performance
E. Costs and Benefits of Final Standards
1. Benefits
2. Costs
F. Environmental Impacts of Final
Standards
X. Other Fuel Economy Standards Required
by EISA
XI. Vehicle Classification
A. Summary of Comments
B. Response to Comments
1. This Rule Substantially Tightens
NHTSA’s Vehicle Classification
Definitions
(a) Under § 523.5(b), Only Vehicles That
Actually Have 4WD Will Be Classified as
4WD Vehicles
(b) The Final Rule Amends § 523.5(a)(4) To
Prevent Gaming That Might Jeopardize
Fuel Savings Created by NHTSA’s
Clarified Position on 2WD Vehicles
2. Especially as Tightened by This Rule,
NHTSA’s Classification Definitions Are
More Difficult to Game Than
Commenters Suggest
3. Additional Changes in NHTSA’s
Classification Definitions Would Not
Result in Greater Fuel Savings and
Lower CO2 Emissions
4. The Vehicle Classification Definitions
Embodied in This Final Rule Are
Consistent With NHTSA’s Statutory
Authority and Respond to the Ninth
Circuit’s Opinion
XII. Flexibility Mechanisms and Enforcement
A. NHTSA’s Request for Comment
Regarding Whether the Agency Should
Consider Raising the Civil Penalty for
CAFE Non-Compliance
B. CAFE Credits
C. Extension and Phasing Out of FlexibleFuel Incentive Program
XIII. Test Procedure for Measuring
Wheelbase and Track Width and
Calculating Footprint
A. Test Procedure Execution
B. Measured Value Tolerances
C. Administrative and Editorial Issues
XIV. Sensitivity and Monte Carlo Analysis
XV. NHTSA’s Record of Decision
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XVI. Regulatory Notices and Analyses
A. Executive Order 12866 and DOT
Regulatory Policies and Procedures
B. National Environmental Policy Act
1. Clean Air Act (CAA)
2. National Historic Preservation Act
(NHPA)
3. Executive Order 12898 (Environmental
Justice)
4. Fish and Wildlife Conservation Act
(FWCA)
5. Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA)
6. Endangered Species Act (ESA)
7. Floodplain Management (Executive
Order 11988 & DOT Order 5650.2)
8. Preservation of the Nation’s Wetlands
(Executive Order 11990 & DOT Order
5660.1a)
9. Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA), Bald
and Golden Eagle Protection Act
(BGEPA), Executive Order 13186
10. Department of Transportation Act
(Section 4(f))
C. Regulatory Flexibility Act
D. Executive Order 13132 (Federalism)
E. Executive Order 12988 (Civil Justice
Reform)
F. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
G. Paperwork Reduction Act
H. Regulation Identifier Number (RIN)
J. Executive Order 13045
K. National Technology Transfer and
Advancement Act
L. Executive Order 13211
M. Department of Energy Review
N. Privacy Act
XVII. Regulatory Text
I. Executive Overview
A. The President’s January 26, 2009
Memorandum on CAFE Standards for
Model Years 2011 and Beyond
1. Rulemaking Background
On May 2, 2008, NHTSA published a
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking entitled
Average Fuel Economy Standards,
Passenger Cars and Light Trucks; Model
Years 2011–2015, 73 FR 24352. In midOctober, the agency completed and
released a final environmental impact
statement in anticipation of issuing
standards for those years. Based on its
consideration of the public comments
and other available information,
including information on the financial
condition of the automotive industry,
the agency adjusted its analysis and the
standards and prepared a final rule for
MYs 2011–2015. On November 14, the
Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs (OIRA) of the Office of
Management and Budget cleared the
rule as consistent with the Order.1
However, issuance of the final rule was
held in abeyance. On January 7, 2009,
1 Record of OIRA’s action can be found at
https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/
eoHistReviewSearch (last visited March 8, 2009). To
find the report on the clearance of the draft final
rule, select ‘‘Department of Transportation’’ under
‘‘Economically Significant Reviews Completed’’
and select ‘‘2008’’ under ‘‘Select Calendar Year.’’
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the Department of Transportation
announced that the final rule would not
be issued, saying:
The Bush Administration will not finalize
its rulemaking on Corporate Fuel Economy
Standards. The recent financial difficulties of
the automobile industry will require the next
administration to conduct a thorough review
of matters affecting the industry, including
how to effectively implement the Energy
Independence and Security Act of 2007
(EISA). The National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration has done significant work
that will position the next Transportation
Secretary to finalize a rule before the April
1, 2009 deadline.2
2. Requests in the President’s
Memorandum
In light of the requirement to
prescribe standards for MY 2011 by
March 30, 2009 and in order to provide
additional time to consider issues
concerning the analysis used to
determine the appropriate level of
standards for MYs 2012 and beyond, the
President issued a memorandum on
January 26, 2009, requesting the
Secretary of Transportation and
Administrator 3 of the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration NHTSA to
divide the rulemaking into two parts: (1)
MY 2011 standards, and (2) standards
for MY 2012 and beyond.
(a) CAFE Standards for Model Year 2011
The request that the final rule
establishing CAFE standards for MY
2011 passenger cars and light trucks be
prescribed by March 30, 2009 was based
on several factors. One was the
requirement that the final rule regarding
fuel economy standards for a given
model year must be adopted at least 18
months before the beginning of that
model year (49 U.S.C. 32902(g)(2)). The
other was that the beginning of MY 2011
is considered for the purposes of CAFE
standard setting to be October 1, 2010.
As part of that final rule, the President
requested that NHTSA consider whether
any provisions regarding preemption are
consistent with the EISA, the Supreme
Court’s decision in Massachusetts v.
EPA and other relevant provisions of
law and the policies underlying them.
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(b) CAFE Standards for Model Years
2012 and Beyond
The President requested that, before
promulgating a final rule concerning the
model years after model year 2011,
NHTSA
2 The statement can be found at https://
www.dot.gov/affairs/dot0109.htm (last accessed
February 11, 2009).
3 Currently, the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration does not have an Administrator.
Ronald L. Medford is the Acting Deputy
Administrator.
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[C]onsider the appropriate legal factors
under the EISA, the comments filed in
response to the Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, the relevant technological and
scientific considerations, and to the extent
feasible, the forthcoming report by the
National Academy of Sciences mandated
under section 107 of EISA.
In addition, the President requested
that NHTSA further consider whether
any provisions regarding preemption are
appropriate under applicable law and
policy.
3. Implementing the President’s
Memorandum
In keeping with the President’s
remarks on January 26 for new national
policies to address the closely
intertwined issues of energy
independence, energy security and
climate change, and for the initiation of
serious and sustained domestic and
international action to address them,
NHTSA will develop CAFE standards
for MY 2012 and beyond only after
collecting new information, conducting
a careful review of technical and
economic inputs and assumptions, and
standard setting methodology, and
completing new analyses.
For MY 2011, however, time
limitations precluded the adoption of
this approach. As noted above, EPCA
requires that standards for that model
year be established by the end of March
of this year. Thus, immediate decisions
had to be made about the establishment
of the MY 2011 standards. There was
insufficient time between the issuance
of the President’s memorandum in late
January and the end of March to revisit
and, if and as appropriate, revise the
extensive and complex analysis in any
substantively significant way. This is
particularly so given the requirement
under EPCA to consult with the
Environmental Protection Agency and
the Department of Energy on these
complicated and important technical
matters. Decisions regarding those
matters potentially affect not just
NHTSA’s CAFE rulemaking, but also
programs of other departments and
agencies. Accordingly, the
methodologies, economic and
technological inputs and
decisionmaking criteria used in this rule
are necessarily largely those developed
by NHTSA in the fall of 2008.
In looking ahead to the next CAFE
rulemaking, the agency emphasizes that
while the methodologies, economic and
technological inputs and
decisionmaking criteria used in this rule
were well-supported choices for the
purposes of the MY 2011 rulemaking,
they were not the only reasonable
choices that the agency could have
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made for that purpose. Many of the key
aspects of this rulemaking reflect
decisions among several reasonable
alternatives. The choices made in the
context of last fall may or may not be
the choices that will be made in the
context of the follow-on rulemaking.
The deferral of action on the CAFE
standards for the years after MY 2011
provides the agency with an
opportunity to review its approach to
CAFE standard setting, including its
methodologies, economic and
technological inputs, and
decisionmaking criteria. It is reasonable
to anticipate that this process may lead
to changes, given the further review and
analysis that will be conducted
pursuant to the President’s request, and
given the steady and potentially
substantial evolution in technical and
policy factors relevant to the next CAFE
rulemaking. These factors include, but
are not limited to, energy and climate
change needs and policy choices
regarding goals and approaches to
achieving them, developments in
domestic legislation and international
negotiations regarding those goals and
approaches, the financial health of the
industry, technologies for reducing fuel
consumption, fuel prices, and climate
change science and damage valuation.
The goal of the review and reevaluation will be to ensure that the
approach used for MY 2012 and
thereafter produces standards that
contribute, to the maximum extent
possible under EPCA/EISA, to meeting
the energy and environmental
challenges and goals outlined by the
President. We will seek to craft our
program with the goal of creating the
maximum incentives for innovation,
providing flexibility to the regulated
parties, and meeting the goal of making
substantial and continuing reductions in
the consumption of fuel. To that end,
we are committed to ensuring that the
CAFE program for beyond MY 2011 is
based on the best scientific, technical,
and economic information available,
and that such information is developed
in close coordination with other federal
agencies and our stakeholders,
including the states and the vehicle
manufacturers.
We will also re-examine EPCA, as
amended by EISA, to consider whether
additional opportunities exist for
achieving the President’s goals. For
example, EPCA authorizes, within
relatively narrow limits and subject to
making specified findings, for
increasing the amount of civil penalties
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for violating the CAFE standards.4
Further, while EPCA prohibits updating
the test procedures used for measuring
passenger car fuel economy, it places no
such limitation on the test procedures
for light trucks.5 If the test procedures
used for light trucks were revised to
provide for the operation of air
conditioning during fuel economy
testing, vehicle manufacturers would
have a regulatory incentive to increase
the efficiency and reduce the weight of
air conditioning systems, thereby
reducing fuel consumption and tailpipe
emissions of CO2.
In response to the President’s request
that NHTSA consider whether any
provisions regarding preemption are
consistent with EISA, the Supreme
Court’s decision in Massachusetts v.
EPA and other relevant provisions of
law and the policies underlying them,
NHTSA has decided not to include any
provisions addressing preemption in the
Code of Federal Regulations at this time.
The agency will re-examine the issue of
preemption in the content of its
forthcoming rulemaking to establish
Corporate Average Fuel Economy
standards for 2012 and later model
years.
B. Energy Independence and Security
Act of 2007
The mandates in the Energy
Independence and Security Act of 2007
(EISA) 6 for reducing fuel consumption
by motor vehicles and expanding the
production of renewable fuels represent
major steps forward in promoting
energy independence and security and
in addressing climate change risks by
reducing CO2 emissions. EISA requires
the first statutory increase in fuel
economy standards for passenger
automobiles (referred to below as
‘‘passenger cars’’) since those standards
were originally mandated in 1975. It
also includes an important reform—
switching to ‘‘attribute-based
standards.’’ This switch will help to
ensure that increased fuel efficiency
does not come at the expense of
automotive safety.
More specifically, EISA made a
number of important changes to EPCA.
EISA:
• Establishes a statutory mandate to
establish passenger car standards for
each model year at the maximum
feasible level and eliminates the old
statutory default standard of 27.5 mpg
for passenger cars and the provision
giving us discretion to amend that
default standard. Thus, given that there
will no longer be a default standard, the
agency must act affirmatively to
establish a new passenger car standard
for each model year.
• Retains the requirement to establish
separate standards for passenger cars
and light trucks and to set them at the
maximum feasible level, but sets forth
special requirements for the MY 2011–
2020 standards.
• The standards must increase ratably
each year and, at a minimum, be set
sufficiently high to ensure that the
average fuel economy of the combined
industry-wide fleet of all new passenger
cars and light trucks sold in the United
States during MY 2020 is at least 35
mpg.7
• Mandates the reforming of CAFE
standards for passenger cars by
requiring that all CAFE standards be
based on one or more vehicle attributes
related to fuel economy (like size or
weight). Fuel economy targets are set for
individual vehicles and increase as the
attribute decreases and vice versa. For
example, size-based (i.e., size-indexed)
standards assign higher fuel economy
targets to smaller vehicles and lower
ones to larger vehicles. Use of this
approach helps to ensure that the
improvements in fuel economy do not
come at the expense of safety. NHTSA
pioneered that approach in its last
rulemaking on CAFE standards for light
trucks.
• Requires that for each model year,
beginning with MY 2011, each
manufacturer’s domesticallymanufactured passenger car fleet must
achieve a measured average fuel
economy that is not less than 92 percent
of the average fuel economy of the
combined industry-wide fleet of
domestic and non-domestic passenger
cars sold in the United States in that
model year.
• Limits to five the number of model
years for which standards can be
established in a single rulemaking.
• Provides greater flexibility for
automobile manufacturers by (a)
increasing from three to five the number
of years that a manufacturer can carry
forward the compliance credits it earns
by exceeding CAFE standards, (b)
allowing a manufacturer to transfer the
credits it has earned from one of its
compliance categories of automobiles to
another class, and (c) authorizing the
trading of credits between
manufacturers.
C. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for
MYs 2011–2015 and Request for New
Product Plans
1. Key Economic Values for Benefits
Computations and Standard Setting
NHTSA’s analysis of the proposed
and alternative CAFE standards in the
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
(NPRM) 8 relied on a range of
information, economic estimates, and
input parameters. These economic
assumptions play a role in the
determination of the level of the
standards, with some having greater
impacts than others. The cost of
technologies, the price of gasoline, and
discount rate used for discounting
future benefits had the greatest
influence over the level of the
standards. In order of impact, the full
list of the economic assumptions is as
follows: (1) Technology cost; (2) fuel
prices; (3) discount rate; (4) oil import
externalities; (5) rebound effect; (6)
criteria air pollutant damage costs; (7)
carbon costs. The table below shows the
NPRM assumptions on which the
agency received the most extensive
public comment.
TABLE I–1—NPRM KEY ECONOMIC VALUES FOR BENEFITS COMPUTATIONS (2006$) 9
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Fuel Prices (average retail gasoline price per gallon, 2011–30) ................................................................................................................
Discount Rate Applied to Future Benefits ...................................................................................................................................................
Economic Costs of Oil Imports ($/gallon):
‘‘Monopsony’’ Component ....................................................................................................................................................................
4 Under 49 U.S.C. 32904(c), EPA must ‘‘use the
same procedures for passenger automobiles the
Administrator used for model year 1975 (weighted
55 percent urban cycle and 45 percent highway
cycle), or procedures that give comparable results.’’
5 49 U.S.C. 32912(c).
6 Public Law 110–140, 121 Stat. 1492 (Dec. 18,
2007).
7 Although NHTSA previously established an
attribute-based standard for MY 2011 light trucks in
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its 2006 final rule, EISA mandates a new
rulemaking, reflecting new statutory considerations
and a new administrative record, and consistent
with EPCA as amended by EISA, to establish the
standard for those light trucks.
8 73 FR 24352, May 2, 2008. In a separate notice
published on the same day, the agency requested
automobile manufacturers to submit new product
plans for MYs 2011–15. 73 FR 24190.
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$2.34
7%
$0.182
9 Although Table V–3 Economic Values for
Benefits Computations in the NPRM indicated that
all of the values in that table were 2006$, several
values were actually in 2005$. Thus, the
monopsony component, which was shown in that
table as $0.176, should have been shown as $0.182.
Likewise, the price shock component should have
been $0.113, instead of $0.109. The sum of those
two values should have been $0.295, not $0.285.
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14201
TABLE I–1—NPRM KEY ECONOMIC VALUES FOR BENEFITS COMPUTATIONS (2006$) 9—Continued
Price Shock Component .......................................................................................................................................................................
Military Security Component ................................................................................................................................................................
$0.113
................
Total Economic Costs ...................................................................................................................................................................
Emission Damage Costs:
Carbon Dioxide ($/metric ton) ..............................................................................................................................................................
Annual Increase in CO2 Damage Cost ................................................................................................................................................
$0.295
2. Standards
(a) Classification of Vehicles
In the NPRM, the agency classified
the vehicles subject to the proposed
standards as passenger cars or as light
trucks in the same way that the vehicles
had been traditionally classified under
the CAFE program. In particular, sport
utility vehicles (SUVs), mini-vans and
pickup trucks were classified as light
trucks. However, the agency raised the
possibility of reclassifying many of the
two-wheel drive SUVs as passenger cars
for the purposes of the final rule.
(b) Stringency
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We proposed setting separate
attribute-based fuel economy standards
for passenger cars and light trucks
consistent with the size-based approach
that NHTSA used in establishing the
light truck standards for MY 2008–2011
light trucks.
Compared to the April 2006 final rule
that established those attribute-based
standards, the NPRM more thoroughly
evaluated the value of the costs and
benefits of setting CAFE standards. This
was important because assumptions
regarding projected gasoline prices,
along with assumptions about the value
of reducing the negative externalities
(economic and environmental) from
producing and consuming fuel, were
based on changed economic,
environmental, and energy security
conditions. These environmental
externalities include, among other
things, an estimation of the value of
reducing tailpipe emissions of CO2.10
10 The externalities included in our analysis do
not, however, include those associated with the
reduction of the other GHG emitted by automobiles,
i.e., methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), and
hydroflurocarbons (HFCs). Actual air conditioner
operation is not included in the test procedures
used to obtain both (1) emission rates for purposes
of determining compliance with EPA criteria
pollutant emission standards and (2) fuel economy
values for purposes of determining compliance with
NHTSA CAFE standards, although air conditioner
operation is included in ‘‘supplemental’’ federal
test procedures used to determine compliance with
corresponding and separate EPA criteria pollutant
emission standards. As noted above, EPCA
precludes basing passenger car standards on those
other test procedures, but places no such limit on
the test procedures used as the basis for light truck
standards.
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In light of EISA and the need to
balance the statutory considerations in a
way that reflects the current need of the
nation to conserve energy, including the
current assessment of climate change
risks, the agency revisited the various
assumptions used to determine the level
of the standards. Specifically, the
agency used higher gasoline prices and
higher estimates for energy security
values ($0.29 per gallon instead of $0.09
per gallon). The agency also monetized
carbon dioxide (at $7.00/ton), which it
did not do in the previous rulemaking,
and expanded the list of technologies it
used in assessing the capability of
manufacturers to improve fuel economy.
In addition, the agency used cost
estimates that reflect economies of scale
and estimated ‘‘learning’’-driven
reductions in the cost of technologies as
well as quicker penetration rates for
advanced technologies.
The agency could not set out the exact
level of CAFE that each manufacturer
would be required to meet for each
model year under the passenger car or
light truck standards since the levels
would depend on information that
would not be available until the end of
each of the model years, i.e., the final
actual production figures for each of
those years. The agency could, however,
project what the industry-wide level of
average fuel economy would be for
passenger cars and for light trucks if
each manufacturer produced its
expected mix of automobiles and just
met its obligations under the proposed
‘‘optimized’’ standards for each model
year. Adjacent to each average fuel
economy figure in the NPRM was the
estimated associated level of tailpipe
emissions of CO2 that would be
achieved.11
11 Given the contributions made by CAFE
standards to addressing not only energy
independence and security, but also to reducing
tailpipe emissions of CO2, fleet performance was
stated in the above discussion both in terms of fuel
economy and the associated reductions in tailpipe
emissions of CO2 since the CAFE standards would
have the practical effect of limiting those emissions
approximately to the indicated levels during the
official CAFE test procedures established by EPA.
The relationship between fuel consumption and
carbon dioxide emissions is discussed ubiquitously,
such as at www.fueleconomy.gov, a fuel economyrelated web site managed by DOE and EPA (see
https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/contentIncludes/
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$7.00
2.4%
For passenger cars:
MY 2011: 31.2 mpg (285 g/mi of tailpipe
emissions of CO2)
MY 2012: 32.8 mpg (271 g/mi of tailpipe
emissions of CO2)
MY 2013: 34.0 mpg (261 g/mi of tailpipe
emissions of CO2)
MY 2014: 34.8 mpg (255 g/mi of tailpipe
emissions of CO2)
MY 2015: 35.7 mpg (249 g/mi of tailpipe
emissions of CO2)
For light trucks:
MY 2011: 25.0 mpg (355 g/mi of tailpipe
emissions of CO2)
MY 2012: 26.4 mpg (337 g/mi of tailpipe
emissions of CO2)
MY 2013: 27.8 mpg (320 g/mi of tailpipe
emissions of CO2)
MY 2014: 28.2 mpg (315 g/mi of tailpipe
emissions of CO2)
MY 2015: 28.6 mpg (310 g/mi of tailpipe
emissions of CO2)
The combined industry-wide average
fuel economy (in miles per gallon, or
mpg) levels (in grams per mile, or g/mi)
for both cars and light trucks, if each
manufacturer just met its obligations
under the proposed ‘‘optimized’’
standards for each model year, would be
as follows:
MY 2011: 27.8 mpg (2.5 mpg increase
above MY 2010; 320 g/mi CO2)
MY 2012: 29.2 mpg (1.4 mpg increase
above MY 2011; 304 g/mi CO2)
MY 2013: 30.5 mpg (1.3 mpg increase
above MY 2012; 291 g/mi CO2)
MY 2014: 31.0 mpg (0.5 mpg increase
above MY 2013; 287 g/mi CO2)
MY 2015: 31.6 mpg (0.6 mpg increase
above MY 2014; 281 g/mi CO2)
The annual average increase during
this five year period was approximately
co2_inc.htm, which provides a rounded value of 20
pounds of CO2 per gallon of gasoline). (Last
accessed March 8, 2009.) The CO2 emission rates
shown were based on gasoline characteristics.
Because diesel fuel contains more carbon (per
gallon) than gasoline, the presence of diesel engines
in the fleet—which NHTSA expects to increase in
response to the proposed CAFE standards—will
cause the actual CO2 emission rate corresponding
to any given CAFE level to be slightly higher than
shown here. (The agency projected that 4 percent
of the MY 2015 passenger car fleet and 10 percent
of the MY 2015 light truck fleet would have diesel
engines.) Conversely (and hypothetically), applying
the same CO2 emission standard to both gasoline
and diesel vehicles would discourage
manufacturers from improving diesel engines,
which show considerable promise as a means to
improve fuel economy.
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4.5 percent. Due to the uneven
distribution of new model introductions
during this period and to the fact that
significant technological changes could
be most readily made in conjunction
with those introductions, the annual
percentage increases were greater in the
early years in this period.
(c) Benefits and Costs
(i) Benefits
We estimated that the proposed
standards for the five-year period would
save approximately 54.7 billion gallons
of fuel (18.7 billion gallons for
passenger cars and 36 billion gallons for
light trucks) and reduce tailpipe CO2
emissions by 521 million metric tons
(178 million metric tons for passenger
cars and 343 million metric tons for
light trucks) over the lifetime of the
vehicles sold during those model years,
compared to the fuel use and emissions
reductions that would occur if the
standards remained at the adjusted
baseline (i.e., the higher of
manufacturer’s plans and the
manufacturer’s required level of average
fuel economy for MY 2010).
We estimated that the value of the
total benefits of the proposed standards
would be approximately $88 billion
($31 billion for passenger cars and $57
billion for light trucks) over the lifetime
of the vehicles sold during those model
years.
(ii) Costs
The total costs for manufacturers to
comply with the standards for the fiveyear period would be approximately $47
billion ($16 billion for passenger cars
and $31 for light trucks) compared to
the costs they would incur if the
standards remained at the adjusted
baseline.
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(d) Effect of Flexibilities on Benefits and
Costs
The above benefit and cost estimates
did not reflect the availability and use
of flexibility mechanisms, such as
compliance credits and credit trading,
because EPCA prohibits NHTSA from
considering the effects of those
mechanisms in setting CAFE standards.
However, the agency noted that, in
reality, manufacturers were likely to
rely to some extent on flexibility
mechanisms provided by EPCA and
would thereby reduce the cost of
complying with the proposed standards
to a meaningful extent.
3. Credits
NHTSA also proposed a new Part 536
on trading and transferring ‘‘credits’’
earned for exceeding applicable CAFE
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standards.12 Under the proposed Part
536, credit holders (including, but not
limited to, manufacturers) would have
credit accounts with NHTSA, and
would be able to hold credits, apply
them to compliance with CAFE
standards, transfer them to another
‘‘compliance category’’ for application
to compliance there, or trade them.
Traded credits would be subject to an
‘‘adjustment factor’’ to ensure total oil
savings are preserved, as required by
EISA. EISA also prohibits credits earned
before MY 2011 from being transferred,
so NHTSA developed several regulatory
restrictions on trading and transferring
to facilitate Congress’ intent in this
regard.
4. Preemption
In the proposal, the agency continued
its discussion, conducted in a series of
rulemaking proposals and final rules
spanning a six-year period, of the issue
of preemption of state regulations
regulating tailpipe emissions of GHGs,
especially carbon dioxide.
D. Brief Summary of Public Comments
on the NPRM
Standard stringency: Automobile
manufacturers argued that the
standards, especially those for light
trucks in the early years, should be
lower. Environmental and consumer
groups and states wanted higher
standards throughout the five-year
period.
Footprint attribute: Commenters
generally supported the agency’s choice
of footprint as an attribute, although
several urged consideration of
additional attributes and a few argued
for different attributes.
Setting standards at levels at which
net benefits are projected to be
maximized (optimized standards) vs.
using other decision-making formulae:
A consumer group urged setting
standards at the optimized + 50%
alternative level, while some
environmental groups favored setting
them at levels at which total benefits
equal total costs. Manufacturers
contended that the optimized approach
does not assure economic practicability,
especially for manufacturers needing to
borrow at high interest rates to finance
design changes. A manufacturer
association and other commenters said
agency did not assess the ability of the
12 Congress required that DOT establish a credit
‘‘transferring’’ regulation, to allow individual
manufacturers to move credits from one of their
fleets to another (e.g., using a credit earned for
exceeding the light truck standard for compliance
in the domestic passenger car standard). Congress
allowed DOT to establish a credit ‘‘trading’’
regulation, so that credits may be bought and sold
between manufacturers and other parties.
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manufacturers to raise the capital
necessary to develop and implement
sufficient technologies.
Front-loading/ratable increase: Some
commenters, especially the
manufacturers, argued that the statutory
requirement for ‘‘ratable’’ increases in
standards means that the increases must
be proportional or at least must not be
disproportionately large or small in
relation to one another. They did not
discuss how that requirement is to be
read together with either the statutory
requirement to set standards for each
model year at the level that is the
maximum feasible level for that model
year, or the separate statutory
requirement for the overall fleet to
achieve at least 35 mpg.
Key economic and other assumptions
affecting stringency—
• Technology costs and
effectiveness—The manufacturers said
that NHTSA underestimated the costs.
A manufacturer association submitted a
study by Sierra Research challenging the
cost and effectiveness estimates
developed by NHTSA and EPA for the
NPRM.
• Fuel prices—A manufacturer
association and dealer associations said
that Energy Information
Administration’s (EIA) reference case
should be used. Environmental and
consumer groups, states and some
members of Congress said NHTSA
should use at least the EIA high price
case. The EIA Administrator stated at a
June 2008 Congressional hearing that
the then current prices were at or above
EIA’s high case and that he would use
that case in the CAFE rulemaking.
• Discount rate—The manufacturers
said the rate should be at least 7%,
while environmental and consumer
groups and states said it should not be
greater than 3 percent.
• Military costs—Many commenters
argued that NHTSA should place a
value other than zero on military
security externalities.
• Social cost of carbon—Some
commenters said the domestic value of
reducing CO2 emissions should be lower
than the NPRM value of $7;
environmental and consumer groups
and states said it should be much
higher. The former tended to favor a
value reflecting damage to the U.S. only,
while the latter favored a global value.
• Weight reduction—States and
environmental and consumer groups
said that NHTSA should consider
downweighting for vehicles under 5,000
lbs; an insurance safety research group
supported the proposal not to consider
that.
Rate of application of advanced
technologies (diesels and hybrids):
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Manufacturers argued that NHTSA was
overly optimistic; environmental/
consumer groups and states argued that
NHTSA relied too much on
manufacturer product plans and should
require manufacturers to improve fuel
economy more quickly.
Fitting of standard curve to data: A
manufacturer association and two
manufacturers questioned the empirical
and technical bases for the shape of the
curves.
Steepness of car standard curve: The
two manufacturer associations and
several environmental groups said that
the proposed car curves were too steep:
manufacturers did so because of
impracticability; environmental groups,
because of what they saw as an
incentive to increase vehicle size.
Backstop standard: Environmental
and consumer groups argued that
NHTSA must establish absolute
backstop standards for all vehicles.
Manufacturers argued that antibacksliding features of the attributebased standards function as a backstop.
‘‘SUV loophole’’: In general,
manufacturers agreed with the agency’s
decision to reclassify 2 WD SUVs from
the light truck fleet to the passenger car
fleet, as long as this change would take
effect after MY 2010. Environmental and
consumer groups argued that the
classification system should be further
revised to address ‘‘gaming’’ and did not
address the agency’s justification for the
proposed revisions.
Credits: Manufacturers argued that
earned carry forward/back credits, as
long as they were not acquired by
transfer or trade, should be available to
meet the minimum standard for
domestic cars. Manufacturers also
requested flexibility to manage their
own credit shortfalls, instead of having
the agency automatically decide upon
and implement plans for them. One
manufacturer asked that the new
statutory provision giving credits a 5
year life be applied to all existing
credits, instead of only those credits
earned in model year 2009 or thereafter.
Impact on small/limited-line
manufacturers: Small/limited-line
manufacturers argued that the proposed
standards impact them more than fullline manufacturers, and requested either
that the car standards be set based on
the plans of all car manufacturers,
instead of just the seven largest, or that
some alternative form of standard be set
for them.
Preemption: Manufacturers argued
that the effects of state regulation of CO2
emissions are ‘‘related to’’ the regulation
of fuel economy within the meaning of
section 32919(a) of EPCA;
environmental and consumer groups
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14203
and states argued that the purpose of
regulating CO2 emissions may overlap
with, but is different from the purpose
of regulating fuel economy
differentiated by vehicle class. The
agency also revised its phase-in
schedule of the technologies to account
more fully for needed lead time.
E. New Information Received or
Developed by NHTSA Between the
NPRM and Final Rule
There were a number of changes after
the NPRM that made possible analytical
improvements for the final rule. These
changes also caused the CAFE levels,
fuel savings, and CO2 emissions that are
attributable to each alternative and
scenario examined for this final rule to
differ from those presented in the
NPRM.
3. Final Environmental Impact
Statement
With the aid of an expert consulting
firm, the agency completed a final
environmental impact statement (FEIS),
the first FEIS prepared by a federal
agency to examine climate change
issues comprehensively.13 The FEIS
examines the climate change and other
environmental effects of the changes in
emissions of greenhouse gases and
criteria air pollutants resulting from a
wide variety of alternative standards.
For this purpose, the agency relied
extensively on the 2007 reports of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change and contracted with ICF
International to perform climate
modeling. That impact statement also
carefully assesses the cumulative
impacts of past, present and future
CAFE rulemakings.
1. New Manufacturer Product Plans
As discussed in the NPRM, the agency
requested new product plans from
manufacturers to aid in determining
appropriate standards for the final rule.
The product plans submitted in May
2007 naturally did not take into
consideration the later passage of EISA
and its minimum 35 mpg combined
fleet requirement by 2020. In addition,
during that time, the fuel prices rose
substantially.
The new product plans submitted in
the summer of 2008 in response to the
NPRM reflect those new realities in a
couple of ways. First, companies
provided product plans that reflected
the manufacturers’ implementation of
some of the cost-effective technologies
that the agency had projected in the
NPRM. This increased the baseline
against which the fuel saving from the
standards are calculated. As a result,
some of the savings and CO2 emission
reductions that were attributed in the
NPRM to the rulemaking action are now
attributed to actions taken
‘‘independently by the manufacturers,
as reflected in the improved product
plans. Second, the size of the overall
fleet had declined from the time of the
NPRM to the final rule, resulting in
fewer vehicle miles traveled.
2. Revised Assessment of Technology
Effectiveness and Costs
With the aid of an expert consulting
firm, NHTSA revised the technology
assumptions in the NPRM based on
comments and new information
received during the comment period
and used those revised assumptions for
analyzing alternatives and scenarios for
the Final Environmental Impact
Assessment (FEIS) and final rule. In
several cases, the agency concluded on
the basis of analysis of that additional
information that the costs in the NPRM
and Draft EIS were underestimated and
benefits overestimated, and in most
cases, these estimates were not well
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F. Final Rule for MY 2011
1. Introduction
As discussed above, and at length
later in this rule, NHTSA’s review and
analysis of comments on its proposal
have led the agency to make many
changes to its methods for analyzing
potential MY 2011 CAFE standards, as
well as to the data and other
information to which the agency has
applied these methods. The following
are some of the more prominent
changes:
• After receiving, reviewing, and
integrating updated product plans from
vehicle manufacturers, NHTSA has
revised its forecast of the future light
vehicle market.
• NHTSA has changed the methods
and inputs it uses to represent the
applicability, availability, cost, and
effectiveness of future fuel-saving
technologies.
• NHTSA has based its fuel price
forecast on the AEO 2008 High Case
price scenario instead of the AEO 2008
Reference Case.
• NHTSA has reduced mileage
accumulation estimates (i.e., vehicle
miles traveled) to levels consistent with
this increased fuel price forecast.
• NHTSA has applied increased
estimates for the value of oil import
externalities.
• NHTSA has now included all
manufacturers—not just the largest
13 The Final Environmental Impact Statement can
be found on the NHTSA website at https://
www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/DOT/NHTSA/
Rulemaking/Rules/Associated%20Files/
CAFE%20FEIS.pdf (last accessed March 8, 2009).
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seven—in the process used to fit the
curve and estimate the stringency at
which societal net benefits are
maximized.
• NHTSA has tightened its
application of the definition of
‘‘nonpassenger automobiles,’’ causing a
reassigning of over one million vehicles
from the light truck fleet to the
passenger car fleet.
• NHTSA has now fitted the shape of
the curve based on ‘‘exhaustion’’ of
available technologies instead of on
manufacturer-level optimization of
CAFE levels.
These changes affected both the shape
and stringency of the attribute-based
standards. Taken together, the last three
of the above changes reduced the
steepness of the curves defining fuel
economy targets for passenger cars, and
also less significantly reduced the
steepness of the light truck curves.
NHTSA recognizes that, when
considered in isolation, some of the
above changes might, on an ‘‘intuitive’’
basis, be expected to result in higher
average required fuel economy levels.
For example, setting aside other
changes, the increase in estimated fuel
prices and oil import externalities might
be expected to result in higher average
fuel economy requirements. On the
other hand, again setting aside other
changes, the updated characterization of
fuel-saving technologies, the
reassignment of over one million
vehicles to the passenger car fleet, the
reduction in mileage accumulation, and
the inclusion of all manufacturers in the
standard setting process might
intuitively be expected to result in
lower average fuel economy
requirements.
However, there are theoretical reasons
for which even such isolated
expectations might not be met. For
example, if a change in inputs caused
societal net benefits to increase equally
at all stringencies, the level of
stringency that maximized societal net
benefits would remain unchanged,
although it would produce greater net
benefits after the change in inputs.
Further, some of the changes listed
above are interdependent, making it
difficult, if not impossible, to isolate the
effect attributable to every change. For
example, NHTSA applied the reduced
mileage accumulation, which reduces
the benefits of adding technology, in
conjunction with applying increased
fuel prices, which increase the benefits
of adding technology.
There is no obvious way to determine
reliably the net effect of all these (and
other) changes short of applying all of
the revised values to the model and
looking at the results. We devote a good
deal of the preamble discussion to these
changes and their net implications for
the standards in this rule.
The final rule reflects the combined
effect of all of these changes, as well as
minor changes not listed above.
2. Key Economic Values for Benefits
Computations
NHTSA’s analysis of the final
standards and alternative CAFE
standards for MYs 2011 relied on an
expanded range of information and
revised economic estimates and input
parameters. These economic
assumptions played a role in the
determination of the level of the
standards, with some having greater
impacts than others. The agency,
following discussions with other
agencies of the U.S. government,
updated its estimate of the global value
of the social cost of carbon (i.e., the
value of reducing CO2 emissions) and
developed a domestic value, as well as
updated its estimates for other
externalities based on comments and
updated information received during
the comment period. Specifically, the
final standards are based the following
revised economic assumptions:
TABLE I–2—FINAL RULE KEY ECONOMIC VALUES FOR BENEFITS COMPUTATIONS (2007$)
Fuel Prices (average retail gasoline price per gallon, 2011–30) ..............................................................................................................
Discount Rates Applied to Future Benefits:
Reductions in CO2 Emissions ............................................................................................................................................................
Other Benefits .....................................................................................................................................................................................
Economic Costs of Oil Imports ($/gallon):
‘‘Monopsony’’ Component ..................................................................................................................................................................
Price Shock Component .....................................................................................................................................................................
Military Security Component ..............................................................................................................................................................
Total Economic Costs .................................................................................................................................................................
Emission Damage Costs:
Carbon Dioxide ($/metric ton):
(U.S. domestic value) ..................................................................................................................................................................
(Mean global value from Tol (2008)) ..........................................................................................................................................
(One standard deviation above mean global value) ...................................................................................................................
Annual Increase in CO2 Damage Cost ..............................................................................................................................................
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3. Standards
(a) Classification
In the NPRM, the two-wheel drive
sport-utility vehicles (2WD SUVs) were
classified in the same way they were
classified by their manufacturers in
their May 2007 product plans. For the
purposes of this final rule, however,
they were reclassified in accordance
with the discussion in the NPRM of the
proper classification of those vehicles.
14 Derived from NHTSA’s $33 per metric ton
estimate of the global value of reducing CO2
emissions.
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This resulted in the shifting of over one
million two-wheel drive vehicles from
the truck fleet to the car fleet. This shift
had the effect of lowering the average
fuel economy for cars due to the
inclusion of vehicles previously
categorized as trucks, and lowered
average fuel economy for trucks because
the truck category now has a larger
proportion of heavier trucks. Following
our careful consideration of the public
comments on that discussion, we
reaffirm the reasoning and conclusions
of that discussion.
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$3.33
3%
7%
$0.27
$0.12
..................
$0.39
14 $2.00
$33.00
$80.00
2.4%
(b) Stringency
This final rule establishes footprintbased fuel economy standards for MY
2011 passenger cars and light trucks.
Each vehicle manufacturer’s required
level of CAFE is based on target levels
of average fuel economy set for vehicles
of different sizes and on the distribution
of that manufacturer’s vehicles among
those sizes. Size is defined by vehicle
footprint. The curves defining the
performance target at each footprint
reflect the technological and economic
capabilities of the industry. The target
for each footprint is the same for all
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manufacturers, regardless of differences
in their overall fleet mix. Compliance
will be determined by comparing a
manufacturer’s harmonically averaged
fleet fuel economy levels in a model
year with a required fuel economy level
calculated using the manufacturer’s
actual production levels and the targets
for each footprint of the vehicles that it
produces.
The standards were developed with
the aid of a computer model (known as
the ‘‘Volpe Model’’). NHTSA uses the
Volpe model as a tool to inform its
consideration of potential CAFE
standards for MY 2011. The Volpe
model requires the following types of
information as inputs: (1) A forecast of
the future vehicle market, (2) estimates
of the availability, applicability, and
incremental effectiveness and cost of
fuel-saving technologies, (3) estimates of
vehicle survival and mileage
accumulation patterns, the rebound
effect, future fuel prices, the social cost
of carbon, and many other economic
factors, (4) fuel characteristics and
vehicular emissions rates, and (5)
coefficients defining the shape and level
of CAFE curves to be examined. These
inputs are selected by the agency based
on best available information and data.
The agency analyzed seven regulatory
alternatives, one of which maximizes
net benefits within the limits of
available information and is known as
the ‘‘optimized standards.’’ The
optimized standards are set at levels,
such that, considering all of the
manufacturers together, no other
alternative is estimated to produce
greater net benefits to society. Those net
benefits reflect the difference between
(1) the present value of all monetized
benefits of the standards, and (2) the
total costs of all technologies applied in
response to the standards. Many of the
other alternative standards exceed the
level at which the estimated net benefits
are maximized, including one
alternative in which standards are set at
a level at which total costs equal total
benefits and another alternative set at a
level of maximum technology
application without regard to cost. For
each alternative, the model estimates
the costs associated with additional
technology utilization, as well as
accompanying changes in travel
demand, fuel consumption, fuel outlays,
emissions, and economic externalities
related to petroleum consumption and
other factors. These comprehensive
analyses, which also included scenarios
with different economic input
assumptions as presented in the Final
Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS)
and the Final Regulatory Impact
Analysis (FRIA), informed and
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contributed to the agency’s
consideration of the ‘‘need of the United
States to conserve energy,’’ as well as
the other statutory factors in 49 U.S.C.
32902(f), and safety impacts. In
addition, they informed the agency’s
consideration of environmental impacts
under NEPA. The agency identified the
optimized standards as its preferred
alternative in the FEIS.
NHTSA considered the results of
analyses conducted on alternative
standards for MY 2011 by the Volpe
model and analyses conducted outside
of the Volpe model, including analysis
of the impacts of emissions of carbon
dioxide and criteria pollutants, and
analysis of which technologies are
available now and which will not be
available until the longer term, and
analysis of the extent to which changes
in vehicle prices and fuel economy
might affect vehicle production and
sales. Further, NHTSA considered
whether it could expedite the entry of
any technologies into the market
through these standards. Using all of
this information, the agency considered
the governing statutory factors, along
with environmental issues and other
relevant societal issues such as safety,
and is promulgating the maximum
feasible standards based on its best
judgment on how to balance these
factors.
Upon a considered analysis of all
information available, including all
information submitted to NHTSA in
comments, the agency is adopting the
‘‘optimized standard’’ alternative as the
final standards for MY 2011.15 We note
that we used the Volpe Model in the last
two light truck rulemakings and that we
adopted ‘‘optimized standards’’ in the
last light truck rulemaking. We believe
that use of the Volpe model is a valid
and objective way to establish attributebased standards under EPCA. Further,
by limiting the standards to levels that
can be achieved using technologies each
of which are estimated to provide
benefits that at least equal its costs, the
net benefit maximization approach
helps to assure the marketability of the
manufacturers’ vehicles and thus
economic practicability of the
standards.
Providing this assurance assumes
increased importance in view of current
and anticipated conditions in the
industry in particular and the economy
in general. As has been widely reported
in the public domain throughout this
rulemaking, and as shown in public
15 The agency notes, for NEPA purposes, that the
‘‘optimized standard’’ alternative adopted as the
final standards corresponds to the ‘‘Optimized Mid2’’ scenario described in Section 2.2.2 of the FEIS.
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comments, the national and global
economies raise serious concerns. Even
before those recent developments, the
automobile manufacturers were already
facing substantial difficulties. Together,
these problems have made NHTSA’s
economic practicability analysis
particularly important and challenging
in this rulemaking.
The agency cannot set out the exact
level of CAFE that each manufacturer
will be required to meet for MY 2011
under the passenger car or light truck
standards because the levels will
depend on information that will not be
available until the end of that model
year, i.e., the final actual production
figures for that year. The agency can,
however, project what the industrywide level of average fuel economy will
be for passenger cars and for light trucks
if each manufacturer produced its
expected mix of automobiles and just
met its obligations under the
‘‘optimized’’ standards. Adjacent to
each average fuel economy figure is the
estimated associated level of tailpipe
emissions of CO2 that will be
achieved.16
MY 2011 passenger cars: 30.2 mpg (294
g/mi of tailpipe emissions of CO2)
MY 2011 light trucks: 24.1 mpg (369 g/
mi of tailpipe emissions of CO2)
The combined industry-wide average
fuel economy (in miles per gallon, or
mpg) levels (in grams per mile, or g/mi)
for both cars and light trucks, if each
manufacturer just met its obligations
under the ‘‘optimized’’ standards, will
be as follows:
MY 2011: 27.3 mpg (2.0 mpg increase
above MY 2010; 326 g/mi CO2)
In addition, per EISA, each
manufacturer’s domestic passenger fleet
is required in MY 2011 to achieve 27.5
mpg or 92 percent of the CAFE of the
industry-wide combined fleet of
domestic and non-domestic passenger
cars 17 for that model year, whichever is
higher. This requirement results in the
following alternative minimum standard
(not attribute-based) for domestic
passenger cars:
MY 2011: 27.8 mpg (320 g/mi of tailpipe
emissions of CO2)
(c) Benefits and Costs
(i) Benefits
We estimate that the MY 2011
standards will save approximately 887
million gallons of fuel and reduce
tailpipe emissions of CO2 by 8.3 million
metric tons.
16 See
supra note 6.
numbers set out several paragraphs
17 Those
above.
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For passenger cars, the standards will
save approximately 463 million gallons
of fuel and reduce tailpipe CO2
emissions by 4.3 million metric tons
over the lifetime of the MY 2011
passenger cars, compared to the fuel
savings and emissions reductions that
would occur if the standards remained
at the adjusted baseline (i.e., the higher
of manufacturer’s plans and the
manufacturer’s required level of average
fuel economy for MY 2010). The value
of the total benefits of the passenger car
standards are estimated to be slight over
$1 billion 18 over the lifetime of the MY
2011 cars. This estimate of societal
benefits includes direct impacts from
lower fuel consumption as well as
externalities and also reflects offsetting
societal costs resulting from the rebound
effect.
We estimate that the standards for
light trucks will save approximately 424
million gallons of fuel and prevent the
tailpipe emission of 4.0 million metric
tons of CO2 over the lifetime of the light
trucks sold during those model years,
compared to the fuel savings and
emissions reductions that would occur
if the standards remained at the
adjusted baseline. The value of the total
benefits of the light truck standards will
be approximately $921 million 19 over
the lifetime of the MY 2011 light trucks.
This estimate of societal benefits
includes direct impacts from lower fuel
consumption as well as externalities
and also reflects offsetting societal costs
resulting from the rebound effect.
(ii) Costs
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NHTSA estimates that, as a result of
the final standards for MY 2011,
manufacturers will incur costs of
approximately $1.460 billion for
additional fuel-saving technologies,
compared to the costs they would incur
if the standards remained at MY 2010
levels.
For passenger cars, we estimate that
manufacturers will incur costs of
approximately $595 million for
additional fuel-saving technologies,
compared to the costs they would incur
if the standards remained at MY 2010
levels. Our estimate is that the resulting
vehicle price increases to buyers of MY
2011 passenger cars will be recovered or
paid back 20 in additional fuel savings in
an average of 4.4 years (53 months),
assuming fuel prices ranging from $2.95
18 The slightly over $1 billion estimate is based
on a 7 percent discount rate for valuing future
impacts.
19 The $921 million estimate is based on a 7
percent discount rate for valuing future impacts.
20 See Section V.B.5 below for discussion of
payback period.
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per gallon in 2011 to $3.62 per gallon
in 2030.21
The agency further estimates that, in
response to the final standards for MY
2011 light trucks, manufacturers will
incur costs of approximately $865
million for additional fuel-saving
technologies, compared to the costs they
would incur if the standards remained
at MY 2010 levels. We estimate that the
resulting vehicle price increases to
buyers of MY 2011 light trucks will be
paid back in additional fuel savings in
an average of 7.7 years (92 months),
assuming the same fuel prices as
mentioned above.
(d) Flexibilities
Manufacturers are likely to rely
extensively on flexibility mechanisms
provided by EPCA (as described in
Section XII) and will thereby reduce the
costs (and benefits) of complying with
the standards to a meaningful extent.
However, the benefit and compliance
cost estimates used by the agency in
determining the maximum feasible level
of the CAFE standards and shown above
assume that manufacturers will rely
solely on the installation of fuel
economy technology to achieve
compliance with the standards. The
estimates do not reflect the availability
and use of flexibility mechanisms, such
as compliance credits and credit
trading. The reason for this is because
EPCA prohibits NHTSA from
considering the effects of those
mechanisms in setting CAFE standards.
EPCA has precluded consideration of
the FFV adjustments ever since it was
amended to provide for those
adjustments. The prohibition against
considering compliance credits was
added by EISA.
4. Credits
NHTSA is also adopting a new Part
536 on use of ‘‘credits’’ earned for
exceeding applicable CAFE standards.
Part 536 will implement the provisions
in EISA authorizing NHTSA to establish
by regulation a credit trading program
and directing it to establish by
regulation a credit transfer program.22
Since its enactment, EPCA has
21 The fuel prices (shown here in 2007 dollars)
used to calculate the length of the payback period
are those projected (Annual Energy Outlook 2008)
by the Energy Information Administration over the
life of the MY 2011 light trucks, not current fuel
prices.
22 Congress required that DOT establish a credit
‘‘transferring’’ regulation, to allow individual
manufacturers to move credits from one of their
fleets to another (e.g., using a credit earned for
exceeding the light truck standard for compliance
with the domestic passenger car standard). Congress
allowed DOT to establish a credit ‘‘trading’’
regulation, so that credits may be bought and sold
between manufacturers and other parties.
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permitted manufacturers to earn credits
for exceeding the standards and to apply
those credits to compliance obligations
in years other than the model year in
which it was earned. EISA extended the
‘‘carry-forward’’ period to five model
years, and left the ‘‘carry-back’’ period
at three model years. Under Part 536,
credit holders (including, but not
limited to, manufacturers) will have
credit accounts with NHTSA, and will
be able to hold credits, apply them to
compliance with CAFE standards,
transfer them to another ‘‘compliance
category’’ for application to compliance
there, or trade them. A credit may also
be cancelled before its expiry date, if the
credit holder so chooses. Traded and
transferred credits will be subject to an
‘‘adjustment factor’’ to ensure total oil
savings are preserved, as required by
EISA. EISA also prohibits credits earned
before MY 2011 from being transferred,
so NHTSA has developed several
regulatory restrictions on trading and
transferring to facilitate Congress’ intent
in this regard. Additional information
on Part 536 is available in Section XII
below.
5. Preemption
As noted above, NHTSA has decided
not to include any preemption
provisions in the regulatory text at this
time and will re-examine the issue of
preemption in the context of the
rulemaking for MY 2012 and later years.
II. Background
A. Role of Fuel Economy Improvements
in Promoting Energy Independence,
Energy Security, and a Low Carbon
Economy
Improving vehicle fuel economy has
been long and widely recognized as one
of the key ways of achieving energy
independence, energy security, and a
low carbon economy.23 Most recently,
23 Among the reports and studies noting this
point are the following:
John Podesta, Todd Stern and Kim Batten,
‘‘Capturing the Energy Opportunity; Creating a
Low-Carbon Economy,’’ Center for American
Progress (November 2007), pp. 2, 6, 8, and 24–29,
Available at: https://www.americanprogress.org/
issues/2007/11/pdf/energy_chapter.pdf (last
accessed March 8, 2009).
Sarah Ladislaw, Kathryn Zyla, Jonathan Pershing,
Frank Verrastro, Jenna Goodward, David Pumphrey,
and Britt Staley, ‘‘A Roadmap for a Secure, LowCarbon Energy Economy; Balancing Energy Security
and Climate Change,’’ World Resources Institute
and Center for Strategic and International Studies
(January 2009), pp. 21–22; Available at: https://
pdf.wri.org/
secure_low_carbon_energy_economy_roadmap.pdf.
(last accessed March 7, 2009).
Alliance to Save Energy et al., ‘‘Reducing the Cost
of Addressing Climate Change Through Energy
Efficiency (2009). Available at: https://Aceee.org/
energy/climate/leg.htm. (last accessed March 7,
2009).
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the United Nations Environment
Programme, International Energy
Agency, International Transport Forum
and FIA Foundation released a report 24
in March 2009 calling for a 50 percent
increase in fuel economy in response to
predictions by the IEA that fuel
consumption and CO2 emissions from
the global light duty fleet will otherwise
roughly double between 2000 and 2050.
The significance accorded improving
fuel economy reflects several factors.
The emission of CO2 from the tailpipes
of cars and light trucks is one of the
largest sources of U.S. CO2 emissions.25
Further, using vehicle technology to
improve fuel economy, thereby reducing
tailpipe emissions of CO2, is one of the
three main measures of reducing those
tailpipe emissions of CO2.26 The two
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John DeCicco and Freda Fung, ‘‘Global Warming
on the Road; The Climate Impact of America’s
Automobiles,’’ Environmental Defense (2006) pp.
iv–vii; available at: https://www.edf.org/documents/
5301_Globalwarmingontheroad.pdf. (last accessed
March 7, 2009).
‘‘Why is Fuel Economy Important?,’’ a Web page
maintained by the Department of Energy and
Environmental Protection Agency, Available at
https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/why.shtml (last
accessed February 17, 2009);
Robert Socolow, Roberta Hotinski, Jeffery B.
Greenblatt, and Stephen Pacala, ‘‘Solving The
Climate Problem: Technologies Available to Curb
CO2 Emissions,’’ Environment, volume 46, no. 10,
2004. pages 8–19. Available at: https://
www.princeton.edu/∼cmi/resources/
CMI_Resources_new_files/Environ_08-21a.pdf. (last
accessed March 7, 2009).
24 ‘‘50BY50 Global Fuel Economy Initiative,
Making Cars 50% More Fuel Efficient by 2050
Worldwide,’’ Available at: https://
www.fiafoundation.org/50by50/Documents/
50BY50_report.pdf (last accessed March 7, 2009).
25 EPA Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas
Emissions and Sinks: 1990–2006 (April 2008), pp.
ES–4, ES–8, and 2–24.
26 Podesta et al., p. 25; Ladislaw et al. p. 21;
DeCicco et al. p. vii; ‘‘Reduce Climate Change,’’ a
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other measures for reducing the tailpipe
emissions of CO2 are switching to
vehicle fuels with lower carbon content
and changing driver behavior, i.e.,
inducing people to drive less.
In order to reduce the amount of
tailpipe emissions of CO2 per mile,
either the amount of fuel consumed per
mile must be reduced or lower carbon
intensive fuels must be used. While
there are emission control technologies
that can capture or destroy the
pollutants (e.g., carbon monoxide) that
are produced by imperfect combustion
of fuel, there is no current or anticipated
control technology for CO2. Thus, the
technologies for reducing tailpipe
emissions of CO2 are the technologies
that reduce fuel consumption and
thereby reduce CO2 emissions as well,
as well as the technologies for
accommodating the use of alternative
fuels. Consequently, substantially
reducing fuel use through using
automotive technology to improve fuel
economy is indispensable if automobile
manufacturers are to make substantial
and continuing progress in reducing
those emissions.
The relationship between improving
fuel economy and reducing CO2 tailpipe
emissions is a very direct and close one.
CO2 is the natural by-product of the
combustion of fuel in motor vehicle
engines. The more fuel efficient a
vehicle is, the less fuel it burns to travel
a given distance. The less fuel it burns,
the less CO2 it emits in traveling that
Web page maintained by the Department of Energy
and Environmental Protection Agency at https://
www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/climate.shtml (last
accessed March 7, 2009).
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distance.27 Since the amount of CO2
emissions is essentially constant per
gallon combusted of a given type of fuel,
the amount of fuel consumption per
mile is directly related to the amount of
CO2 emissions per mile. Thus, requiring
improvements in fuel economy
necessarily has the effect of requiring
reductions in tailpipe emissions of CO2
emissions.
This can be seen in the graph 28 and
table below. The graph shows how the
amount of CO2 emitted by a vehicle per
year varies according to the vehicle’s
fuel economy. The table shows the limit
that a CAFE standard would indirectly
place on tailpipe CO2 emissions. To take
the first value of fuel economy from the
table below as an example, a standard
of 21.0 mpg would indirectly place
substantially the same limit on tailpipe
CO2 emissions as a tailpipe CO2
emission standard of 423.2 g/mi of CO2,
and vice versa.29
27 Panel on Policy Implications of Greenhouse
Warming, National Academy of Sciences, National
Academy of Engineering, Institute of Medicine,
‘‘Policy Implications of Greenhouse Warming:
Mitigation, Adaptation, and the Science Base,’’
National Academies Press, 1992. p. 287.
28 The graph is the same as the one shown on
Reduce Climate Change, a Web page maintained by
the Department of Energy and Environmental
Protection Agency. Available at: https://
www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/climate.shtml (last
accessed March 8, 2009).
29 To the extent that manufacturers comply with
a CAFE standard with diesel automobiles instead of
gasoline ones, the level of CO2 tailpipe emissions
would be higher. As noted above, the agency
projects that 4 percent of the MY 2015 passenger
car fleet and 10 percent of the MY 2015 light truck
fleet will have diesel engines. The CO2 tailpipe
emissions of a diesel powered passenger car are 15
percent per mile higher than those of a comparable
gasoline powered-passenger car achieving the same
mpg.
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The relationship between improving
fuel economy and reducing tailpipe
emissions of CO2 is so strong that EPA
determines fuel economy by the simple
expedient of measuring the amount of
CO2 emitted from the tailpipe, not by
attempting to measure directly the
amount of fuel consumed during a
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vehicle test, a difficult task to
accomplish with precision. EPA then
uses the carbon content of the test fuel 30
to calculate the amount of fuel that had
to be consumed per mile in order to
produce that amount of CO2. Finally,
EPA converts that fuel figure into a
miles-per-gallon figure.
30 This is the method that EPA uses to determine
compliance with NHTSA’s CAFE standards.
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and continuing reductions in the CO2
tailpipe emissions of motor vehicles and
thus must be the core element of any
effort to achieve those reductions.
Second, the significant improvements
in fuel economy since 1975, due to the
CAFE standards and other market
conditions as well, have directly caused
reductions in the rate of CO2 tailpipe
emissions per vehicle.
In 1975, passenger cars manufactured
for sale in the U.S. averaged only 15.8
mpg (562.5 grams of CO2 per mile or
562.5 g/mi of CO2). By 2007, the average
fuel economy of new passenger cars had
increased to 31.3 mpg, causing the
emission of CO2 to fall to 283.9 g/mi.32
Similarly, in 1975, light trucks
produced for sale in the U.S. averaged
13.7 mpg (648.7 g/mi of CO2). By 2007,
the average fuel economy of new light
trucks had risen to 23.1 mpg, causing
emission of CO2 to fall to 384.7 g/mi.
31 IPCC (2007): Climate Change 2007: Mitigation
of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group
III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [B.
Metz, O. Davidson, P. Bosch, R. Dave, and L. Meyer
(eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA.
32 These figures are not real world fuel economy
figures. They are based on the laboratory figures
fuel economy test procedures used for the CAFE
program. Real world fuel economy figures would be
less (and CO2 emission figures higher).
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B. Contribution of Fuel Economy
Improvements to CO2 Tailpipe Emission
Reductions Since 1975
The need to take action to reduce
GHG emissions, e.g., motor vehicle
tailpipe emissions of CO2, in order to
forestall and even mitigate climate
change is well recognized.31 Less well
recognized are two related facts.
First, improving fuel economy is the
only method available to motor vehicle
manufacturers for making substantial
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If fuel economy had not increased above
the 1975 level, cars and light trucks
would have emitted an additional 11
billion metric tons of CO2 into the
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atmosphere between 1975 and 2005.
That is nearly the equivalent of
emissions from all U.S. fossil fuel
combustion for two years (2004 and
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2005). The figure below shows the
amount of CO2 emissions avoided due
to increases in fuel economy.
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BILLING CODE 4910–59–C
Some commenters on the NPRM
argued that some of improvements in
fuel economy, and thus some of the
reductions in CO2, shown in that figure
would have occurred in the absence of
any CAFE standards. We agree.
Similarly, and to the same extent, some
of the improvements in fuel economy
and accompanying reductions in CO2
that would occur under a regulation
directly regulating CO2 would occur in
the absence of any such regulation. We
note that no published research has
isolated the contribution of CAFE
standards themselves to historical
increases in fuel economy from those of
the many other factors that can affect
fuel economy.
C. Chronology of Events Since the
National Academy of Sciences Called
for Reforming and Increasing CAFE
Standards
1. National Academy of Sciences Issues
Report on Future of CAFE Program
(February 2002)
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(a) Significantly Increasing CAFE
Standards Without Making Them
Attribute-Based Would Adversely Affect
Safety
In the 2002 congressionally-mandated
report entitled ‘‘Effectiveness and
Impact of Corporate Average Fuel
Economy (CAFE) Standards,’’ 33 a
committee of the National Academy of
Sciences (NAS) (‘‘2002 NAS Report’’)
concluded that the then-existing form of
passenger car and light truck CAFE
standards permitted vehicle
manufacturers to comply in part by
downweighting and even downsizing
their vehicles and that these actions had
led to additional fatalities. The
committee explained that this safety
problem arose because, at that time, the
CAFE standards were not attributedbased and thus subjected all passenger
cars to the same fuel economy target and
all light trucks to the same target,
regardless of their weight, size, or loadcarrying capacity.34 The committee said
that this experience suggests that
consideration should be given to
developing a new system of fuel
33 National Research Council, ‘‘Effectiveness and
Impact of Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE)
Standards,’’ National Academy Press, Washington,
DC (2002). Available at https://www.nap.edu/
openbook.php?isbn=0309076013 (last accessed
March 8, 2009). The conference committee report
for the Department of Transportation and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act for FY 2001 (Pub. L.
106–346) directed NHTSA to fund a study by NAS
to evaluate the effectiveness and impacts of CAFE
standards (H. Rep. No. 106–940, p. 117–118). In
response to the direction from Congress, NAS
published this lengthy report.
34 NHTSA formerly used this approach for CAFE
standards. EISA prohibits its use after MY 2010.
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economy targets that reflects differences
in such vehicle attributes.
Looking to the future, the committee
made a critical distinction between
possible ways of improving fuel
economy and the ways likely to be
chosen for doing so. It said that while
it was technically feasible and
potentially economically practicable for
manufacturers to improve fuel economy
without reducing vehicle weight or size
and, therefore, without significantly
affecting the safety of motor vehicle
travel, the actual strategies chosen by
manufacturers to improve fuel economy
would depend on a variety of factors. In
the committee’s judgment, the extensive
downweighting and downsizing that
occurred after fuel economy
requirements were established in the
1970s suggested that the likelihood of a
similar response to further increases in
fuel economy requirements must be
considered seriously. Any reduction in
vehicle size and weight would have
safety implications.
The committee said, ‘‘to the extent
that the size and weight of the fleet have
been constrained by CAFE requirements
* * * those requirements have caused
more injuries and fatalities on the road
than would otherwise have
occurred.’’ 35 Specifically, it noted: ‘‘the
downweighting and downsizing that
occurred in the late 1970s and early
1980s, some of which was due to CAFE
standards, probably resulted in an
additional 1300 to 2600 traffic fatalities
in 1993.’’ 36
The committee cautioned that the
safety effects of future downsizing and
downweighting were likely to be hidden
by the generally increasing safety of the
light-duty vehicle fleet.37 It said that
some might argue that this improving
safety picture means that there is room
to improve fuel economy without
adverse safety consequences; however,
such an approach would not achieve the
goal of avoiding the adverse safety
consequences of fuel economy
increases. Rather, the safety penalty
imposed by increased fuel economy (if
weight reduction were used as one of
the fuel economy improving measures)
would be more difficult to identify in
light of the continuing improvement in
vehicle safety. NAS said that although it
anticipated that these safety innovations
would improve the safety of vehicles of
all sizes, that fact did not mean
downsizing to achieve fuel economy
improvements would not have any
35 NAS,
p. 29.
p. 3 (Finding 2).
37 Two of the 12 members of the committee
dissented from the majority’s safety analysis and
conclusions.
safety costs. If two vehicles of the same
size were modified, one both by
downsizing it and adding the safety
innovations and the other solely by
adding safety innovations, the latter
vehicle would in all likelihood be safer.
The committee concluded that if an
increase in fuel economy were
implemented pursuant to standards that
were structured so as to encourage
either downsizing or the increased
production of smaller vehicles, some
additional traffic fatalities would be
expected. It said that the larger and
faster the required increases, the more
likely adverse impacts. Without a
thoughtful restructuring of the program,
there would be the trade-offs that must
be made if CAFE standards were
increased by any significant amount.38
In response to these conclusions,
NHTSA issued attribute-based CAFE
standards for light trucks and sought
legislative authority to issue attributebased CAFE standards for passenger
cars before undertaking to raise the car
standards. Congress went a step further
in enacting EISA, not only authorizing
the issuance of attribute-based
standards, but also mandating them.
(b) Climate Change and Other
Externalities Justify Increasing the CAFE
Standards
The 2002 NAS report also concluded
that the CAFE standards have increased
fuel economy, which in turn has
reduced dependence on imported oil,
improved the nation’s terms of trade,
and reduced emissions of carbon
dioxide, (a principal GHG), relative to
what they otherwise would have been.
If fuel economy had not improved,
gasoline consumption (and crude oil
imports) in 2002 would have been about
2.8 million barrels per day (mmbd)
greater than it was then.39 As noted
above, reducing fuel consumption in
vehicles also reduces carbon dioxide
emissions. If the nation were using 2.8
mmbd more gasoline in 2002, carbon
emissions would have been more than
100 million metric tons of carbon
(mmtc) higher. Thus, improvements in
light-duty vehicle (4 wheeled motor
vehicles under 10,000 pounds gross
vehicle weight rating) fuel economy
reduced overall U.S. emissions by about
7 percent as of 2002.40
The report concluded that
technologies exist that could
significantly reduce fuel consumption
by passenger cars and light trucks
further within 15 years (i.e., by about
2017), while maintaining vehicle size,
36 NAS,
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38 NAS,
p. 9.
pp. 3 and 20.
40 NAS, p. 20.
39 NAS,
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weight, utility and performance.41
Given their lower fuel economy, light
duty trucks were said to offer the
greatest potential for reducing fuel
consumption.42 The report also noted
that vehicle development cycles—as
well as future economic, regulatory,
safety and consumer preferences—
would influence the extent to which
these technologies could lead to
increased fuel economy in the U.S.
market.
To assess the economic trade-offs
associated with the introduction of
existing and emerging technologies to
improve fuel economy, the NAS
conducted what it called a ‘‘costefficient analysis’’ based on the direct
benefits (value of saved fuel) to the
consumer—‘‘that is, the committee
identified packages of existing and
emerging technologies that could be
introduced over the next 10 to 15 years
that would improve fuel economy up to
the point where further increases in fuel
economy would not be reimbursed by
fuel savings.’’ 43
The committee emphasized that it is
critically important to be clear about the
reasons for considering improved fuel
economy. While it said that the dollar
value of the saved fuel would be the
largest portion of the potential benefits,
the committee noted that there is
theoretically insufficient reason for the
government to issue higher standards
just to obtain those direct benefits since
consumers have a wide variety of
opportunities to buy a fuel-efficient
vehicle.44
The committee said that there are two
compelling concerns that justify a
government-mandated increase in fuel
economy, both relating to externalities.
The first and most important concern, it
argued, is the accumulation in the
atmosphere of greenhouse gases,
principally carbon dioxide.45
A second concern is that petroleum
imports have been steadily rising
because of the nation’s increasing
demand for gasoline without a
corresponding increase in domestic
supply. The high cost of oil imports
poses two risks: downward pressure on
the strength of the dollar (which drives
up the cost of goods that Americans
import) and an increase in U.S.
vulnerability to macroeconomic shocks
that cost the economy considerable real
output.
To determine how much the fuel
economy standards should be increased,
p. 3 (Finding 5).
p. 4 (Finding 5).
43 NAS, pp. 4 (Finding 6) and 64).
44 NAS, pp. 8–9.
45 NAS, pp. 2, 13, and 83.
the committee urged that all social
benefits be considered. That is, it urged
not only that the dollar value of the
saved fuel be considered, but also that
the dollar value to society of the
resulting reductions in greenhouse gas
emissions and in dependence on
imported oil should be calculated and
considered. The committee said that if
it is possible to assign dollar values to
these favorable effects, it becomes
possible to make at least crude
comparisons between the socially
beneficial effects of measures to
improve fuel economy on the one hand,
and the costs (both out-of-pocket and
more subtle) on the other. The
committee chose a value of about $0.30/
gal of gasoline for the externalities
associated with the combined impacts
of fuel consumption on greenhouse gas
emissions and on world oil market
conditions.46
The report expressed concerns about
increasing the standards under the
CAFE program as currently structured.
While raising CAFE standards under the
existing structure would reduce fuel
consumption, doing so under alternative
structures ‘‘could accomplish the same
end at lower cost, provide more
flexibility to manufacturers, or address
inequities arising from the present’’
structure.47
To address those structural problems,
the report suggested various possible
reforms. The report found that the
‘‘CAFE program might be improved
significantly by converting it to a system
in which fuel targets depend on vehicle
attributes.’’ 48 The report noted further
that under an attribute-based approach,
the required CAFE levels could vary
among the manufacturers based on the
distribution of their product mix. NAS
stated that targets could vary among
passenger cars and among trucks, based
on some attribute of these vehicles such
as weight, size, or load-carrying
capacity. The report explained that a
particular manufacturer’s average target
for passenger cars or for trucks would
depend upon the fractions of vehicles it
sold with particular levels of these
attributes.49
2. NHTSA Issues Final Rule
Establishing Attribute-Based CAFE
Standards for MY 2008–2011 Light
Trucks (March 2006)
The 2006 final rule reformed the
structure of the CAFE program for light
trucks by introducing an attribute-based
approach and using that approach to
41 NAS,
42 NAS,
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46 NAS,
pp. 4 and 85–86.
pp. 4–5 (Finding 10).
48 NAS, p. 5 (Finding 12).
49 NAS, p. 87.
47 NAS,
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establish higher CAFE standards for MY
2008–2011 light trucks.50 Reforming the
CAFE program enables it to achieve
larger fuel savings, while enhancing
safety and preventing adverse economic
consequences.
As noted above, under Reformed
CAFE, fuel economy standards were
restructured so that they are based on a
vehicle attribute, a measure of vehicle
size called ‘‘footprint.’’ It is the product
of multiplying a vehicle’s wheelbase by
its track width. A target level of fuel
economy was established for each
increment in footprint (0.1 ft2). Trucks
with smaller footprints have higher fuel
economy targets; conversely, larger ones
have lower targets. A particular
manufacturer’s compliance obligation
for a model year is calculated as the
harmonic average of the fuel economy
targets for the manufacturer’s vehicles,
weighted by the distribution of the
manufacturer’s production volumes
among the footprint increments. Thus,
each manufacturer is required to comply
with a single overall average fuel
economy level for each model year of
production.
The approach for determining the fuel
economy targets was to set them just
below the level where the increased cost
of technologies that could be adopted by
manufacturers to improve fuel economy
would first outweigh the added benefits
that would result from those
technologies. These targets translate into
required levels of average fuel economy
that are technologically feasible because
manufacturers can achieve them using
technologies that are or will become
available. Those levels also reflect the
need of the nation to reduce energy
consumption because they reflect the
economic value of the savings in
resources, as well as of the reductions
in economic and environmental
externalities that result from producing
and using less fuel.
We carefully balanced the estimates
costs of the rule with the estimated
benefits of reducing energy
consumption. Compared to Unreformed
(non-attributed-based) CAFE, Reformed
CAFE enhances overall fuel savings
while providing vehicle manufacturers
with the flexibility they need to respond
to changing market conditions.
Reformed CAFE also provides a more
equitable regulatory framework by
creating a level playing field for
manufacturers, regardless of whether
they are full-line or limited-line
manufacturers. We were particularly
encouraged that Reformed CAFE will
confer no compliance advantage if
vehicle makers choose to downsize
50 71
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some of their fleet as a CAFE
compliance strategy, thereby reducing
the adverse safety risks associated with
the Unreformed CAFE program.
3. Supreme Court Issues Decision in
Massachusetts v. EPA (April 2007)
On April 2, 2007, the U.S. Supreme
Court issued its opinion in
Massachusetts v. EPA,51 a case
involving a 2003 order of the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
denying a petition for rulemaking to
regulate greenhouse gas emissions from
motor vehicles under the Clean Air
Act.52 The Court ruled that the state of
Massachusetts had standing to sue EPA
because it had already lost an amount of
land and stood to lose more due to
global warming-induced increases in sea
level; that some portion of this harm
was traceable to the absence of a
regulation issued by EPA requiring
reductions in GHG emissions (CO2
emissions, most notably) by motor
vehicles; and that EPA’s issuance of
such a regulation would reduce the risk
of further harm to Massachusetts.53 On
the merits, the Court ruled that
greenhouse gases are ‘‘pollutants’’ under
the Clean Air Act and that the Act
therefore authorizes EPA to regulate
greenhouse gas emissions from motor
vehicles if that agency makes the
necessary findings and determinations
under section 202 of the Act.
The Court considered EPCA briefly,
stating
[T]hat DOT sets mileage standards in no
way licenses EPA to shirk its environmental
responsibilities. EPA has been charged with
protecting the public’s ‘‘health’’ and
‘‘welfare,’’ 42 U.S.C. 7521(a)(1), a statutory
obligation wholly independent of DOT’s
mandate to promote energy efficiency. See
Energy Policy and Conservation Act, § 2(5),
89 Stat. 874, 42 U.S.C. 6201(5). The two
obligations may overlap, but there is no
reason to think the two agencies cannot both
administer their obligations and yet avoid
inconsistency.
127 S.Ct. at 1462.
The Supreme Court did not address or
define the nature or extent of the
overlap or explore the types of benefits
considered in establishing the levels of
the CAFE standards. Further, the Court
did not address the express preemption
provision in EPCA.
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51 127
S.Ct. 1438 (2007).
FR 52922, September 8, 2003.
53 As noted above, a CAFE standard and its
mathematically equivalent CO2 tailpipe emission
standard would each have the same effect on those
emissions and thus on the risk of further harm
except to the extent, as noted in a footnote above,
diesel engines are used to comply with the CAFE
standards.
52 68
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4. NHTSA and EPA Coordinate on
Development of Rulemaking Proposals
(Summer–Fall 2007)
5. Ninth Circuit Issues Decision Re Final
Rule for MY 2008–2011 Light Trucks
(November 2007)
In the wake of the Supreme Court’s
decision, on May 14, 2007, President
Bush responded to the Supreme Court’s
opinion, stating
On November 15, 2007, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit issued its decision in Center for
Biological Diversity v. NHTSA,54 the
challenge to the MY 2008–11 light truck
CAFE rule. The Court rejected the
petitioners’ argument that EPCA
precludes the use of a marginal costbenefit analysis that attempted to weigh
all of the social benefits (i.e.,
externalities as well as direct benefits to
consumers) of improved fuel savings in
determining the stringency of the CAFE
standards.
The Court found that NHTSA had
been arbitrary and capricious in the
following respects:
• NHTSA’s decision that it could not
monetize the benefit of reducing CO2
emissions for the purpose of conducting
its marginal benefit-cost analysis based
on its view that the value of the benefit
of CO2 emission reductions resulting
from fuel consumption reductions was
too uncertain to permit the agency to
determine a value for those emission
reductions; 55
• NHTSA’s lack, in the Court’s view,
of a reasoned explanation for its
decision not to establish a ‘‘backstop’’
(i.e., a fixed minimum CAFE standard
applicable to manufacturers); 56
• NHTSA’s lack, again in the Court’s
view, of a reasoned explanation for its
decision not to revise the regulatory
definitions for the passenger car and
light truck categories of automobiles so
that some vehicles currently classified
as light trucks are instead classified as
passenger cars; 57
• NHTSA’s decision not to subject
most medium- and heavy-duty pickups
and most medium- and heavy-duty
cargo vans (i.e., those between 8,500
and 10,000 pounds gross vehicle weight
* * * I’m directing the EPA and the
Departments of Transportation, Energy, and
Agriculture to take the first steps toward
regulations that would cut gasoline
consumption and greenhouse gas emissions
from motor vehicles * * *
On May 14, 2007, President Bush
issued Executive Order 13432, which
announces
[i]t is the policy of the United States to
ensure the coordinated and effective exercise
of the authorities of the President and the
heads of the Department of Transportation,
the Department of Energy, and the
Environmental Protection Agency to protect
the environment with respect to greenhouse
gas emissions from motor vehicles, nonroad
vehicles, and nonroad engines, in a manner
consistent with sound science, analysis of
benefits and costs, public safety, and
economic growth.
The Executive Order goes on to
require coordination among the agencies
when taking action to directly regulate
(or substantially and predictably affect)
greenhouse gas emissions from motor
vehicles, nonroad vehicles, and use of
motor vehicle fuels. Such action is to be
undertaken jointly ‘‘to the maximum
extent permitted by law and determined
by the head of the agency to be
practicable.’’
Consistent with these directives,
NHTSA and EPA took the first steps
toward regulations that would cut
gasoline consumption and greenhouse
gas emissions from motor vehicles
pursuant to Presidential directive.
NHTSA and EPA staff jointly assessed
which technologies would be available
and their effectiveness and cost. They
also jointly assessed the key economic
and other assumptions affecting the
stringency of future standards. Finally,
they worked together in updating and
further improving the Volpe model that
had been used to help determine the
stringency of the MY 2008–2011 light
truck CAFE standards. Much of the
work between NHTSA and EPA staff
was reflected in rulemaking proposals
being developed by NHTSA prior to the
enactment of EISA and was
substantially retained when NHTSA
revised its proposals to be consistent
with that legislation. Ultimately, the
NPRM published by the agency in May
and today’s final rule are based on
NHTSA’s assessments of how they meet
EPCA, as amended by EISA.
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54 508
F.3d 508.
noted above in the preamble, the agency has
developed a value for those reductions and used it
in the analyses underlying the standards adopted in
this final rule. For further discussion, see Section
V of this preamble.
56 EISA’s requirement that standards be based on
one or more vehicle attributes appears to preclude
the specification of such a backstop standard for the
latter two categories of automobiles. For further
discussion, see Section VI of this preamble.
57 In this final rule, NHTSA has moved 1.4
million 2 wheel drive SUVs from the light truck
class to the passenger car class. It re-examined the
legislative history of the statutory definitions of
‘‘automobile’’ and ‘‘passenger automobile’’ and the
term ‘‘nonpassenger automobile’’ and analyzed the
impact of that moving any vehicles out of the
nonpassenger automobile (light truck) category into
the passenger automobile (passenger car) category
would have the level of standards for both groups
of automobiles. For further discussion, see Section
XI of this preamble.
55 As
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rating (GVWR,) to the CAFE
standards; 58
• NHTSA’s decision to prepare and
publish an Environmental Assessment
(EA) and making a finding of no
significant impact notwithstanding what
the Court found to be an insufficiently
broad range of alternatives, insufficient
analysis of the climate change effects of
the CO2 emissions, and limited
assessment of cumulative impacts in its
EA under the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA).59
The Court did not vacate the
standards, but instead said it would
remand the rule to NHTSA to
promulgate new standards consistent
with its opinion ‘‘as expeditiously as
possible and for the earliest model year
practicable.60 Under the decision, the
standards established by the April 2006
final rule would remain in effect unless
and until amended by NHTSA. In
addition, it directed the agency to
prepare an Environmental Impact
Statement.
As of the date of the issuance of this
final rule, the Court has not yet issued
its mandate in this case.
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6. Congress Enacts Energy Security and
Independence Act of 2007 (December
2007)
As noted above in Section I.B., EISA
significantly changed the provisions of
EPCA governing the establishment of
future CAFE standards. These changes
made it necessary for NHTSA to pause
in its efforts so that it could assess the
implications of the amendments made
58 EISA removed these vehicles from the statutory
definition of ‘‘automobile’’ and mandated the
establishment of CAFE standards for them
following the completion of reports by the National
Academy of Sciences and NHTSA.
59 On February 6, 2008, the Government
petitioned for en banc rehearing by the 9th Circuit
on the limited issue of whether it was appropriate
for the panel, having held that the agency
insufficiently explored the environmental
implications of the MY 2008–11 rulemaking in its
EA, to order the agency to prepare an EIS rather
than simply remanding the matter to the agency for
further analysis. The Court subsequently modified
its order as described below.
60 The deadline in EPCA for issuing a final rule
establishing, for the first time, a CAFE standard for
a model year is 18 months before the beginning of
that model year. 49 U.S.C. 32902(g)(2). The same
deadline applies to issuing a final rule amending an
existing CAFE standard so as to increase its
stringency. Given that the agency has long regarded
October 1 as the beginning of a model year, the
statutory deadline for increasing the MY 2009
standard was March 30, 2007, and the deadline for
increasing the MY 2010 standard is March 30, 2008.
Thus, the only model year for which there was
sufficient time at the time of the Court’s decision
to gather all of the necessary information, conduct
the necessary analyses and complete a rulemaking
was MY 2011. As noted earlier in this notice,
however, EISA requires that a new standard be
established for that model year. This rulemaking
was conducted pursuant to that requirement.
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by EISA and then, as required, revise
some aspects of the proposals it had
been developing (e.g., the model years
covered and credit issues).
7. NHTSA Proposes CAFE Standards for
MYs 2011–2015 and Requests New
Product Plans for Those Years (April
2008) 61
8. NHTSA Contracts With ICF
International To Conduct Climate
Modeling and Other Analyses in
Support of Draft and Final
Environmental Impact Statements (May
2008)
NHTSA contracted with ICF
International (ICF) to support it in
conducting its environmental analyses
and preparing the draft and final
environmental impact statements. ICF
provides consulting services and
technology solutions in energy, climate
change, environment, transportation,
social programs, health, defense, and
emergency management.
9. Manufacturers Submit New Product
Plans (June 2008)
These product plans identify which
vehicle models manufacturers intend to
build and which technologies the
manufacturers intend to apply and
when to their vehicles. NHTSA began
its analysis of the MY 2011 CAFE
standards with the product plans and
used them to establish a baseline, which
is then used to evaluate different
potential levels of future CAFE
stringency.
10. NHTSA Contracts With Ricardo To
Aid in Assessing Public Comments on
Cost and Effectiveness of Fuel Saving
Technologies (June 2008)
NHTSA received numerous public
comments on the types of potential fuel
saving technologies that we discussed in
the NPRM, their costs and effectiveness
in improving fuel economy, and in
which model year and to which vehicles
they may be applied. To aid the agency
in analyzing and responding to these
comments, and to ensure that the
analysis for the final rule is thorough
and robust, NHTSA contracted with
Ricardo, a highly reputable and neutral
source of outside expertise in the areas
of powertrain and vehicle technologies.
NHTSA chose Ricardo because of its
extensive experience and expertise in
working with both government and
industry on fuel economy-improving
technology issues.
61 A
description of the NPRM appears in section
I.C of this preamble.
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11. Ninth Circuit Revises Its Decision Re
Final Rule for MY 2008–2011 Light
Trucks (August 2008)
In response to the Government
petition for rehearing, the Ninth Circuit
modified its decision by replacing its
direction to prepare an EIS with a
direction to prepare either a new EA or,
if necessary, an EIS.62
12. NHTSA Releases Final
Environmental Impact Statement
(October 2008)
On October 17, 2008, EPA published
a notice announcing the availability of
NHTSA’s final environmental impact
statement (FEIS) for this rulemaking.63
Throughout the FEIS, NHTSA relied
extensively on findings of the United
Nations Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC) and the U.S.
Climate Change Science Program
(USCCSP). In particular, the agency
relied heavily on the most recent,
thoroughly peer-reviewed, and credible
assessments of global climate change
and its impact on the United States: the
IPCC Fourth Assessment Report
Working Group I4 and II5 Reports, and
reports by the USCCSP that include
Scientific Assessments of the Effects of
Global Climate Change on the United
States and Synthesis and Assessment
Products.
In the FEIS, NHTSA compared the
environmental impacts of its preferred
alternative and those of reasonable
alternatives. It considered direct,
indirect, and cumulative impacts and
describes these impacts to inform the
decisionmaker and the public of the
environmental impacts of the various
alternatives.
Among other potential impacts,
NHTSA analyzed the direct and indirect
impacts related to fuel and energy use,
emissions, including carbon dioxide
and its effects on temperature and
climate change, air quality, natural
resources, and the human environment.
Specifically, the FEIS used a climate
model to estimate and report on four
direct and indirect effects of climate
change, driven by alternative scenarios
of GHG emissions, including:
1. Changes in CO2 concentrations;
2. Changes in global mean surface
temperature;
3. Changes in regional temperature
and precipitation; and
4. Changes in sea level.
NHTSA also considered the
cumulative impacts of the proposed
standards for MY 2011–2015 passenger
cars and light trucks, together with
62 See CBD v. NHTSA, 538 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir.
2008).
63 73 FR 61859.
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estimated impacts of NHTSA’s
implementation of the CAFE program
through MY 2010 and NHTSA’s future
CAFE rulemaking for MYs 2016–2020.
NHTSA intends to review all analyses
for model years after MY 2011 in
connection with the rulemaking for MY
2012 and thereafter, consistent with the
President’s Memorandum of January 26,
2009.
13. Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs Completes Review of a Draft MY
2011–2015 Final Rule (November 2008)
The Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs of the Office of
Management and Budget completed
review of the rule under Executive
Order 12866, Regulatory Planning and
Review, on November 14, 2008.64
14. Department of Treasury Extends
Loans to General Motors and Chrysler
(December 2008)
The Department of the Treasury
established the Automotive Industry
Financing Program ‘‘to prevent a
significant disruption of the American
automotive industry that poses a
systemic risk to financial market
stability and will have a negative effect
on the real economy of the United
States.’’ 65 Under that program, initial
loans were made to General Motors and
Chrysler.
15. Department of Transportation
Decides Not To Issue MY 2011–2015
Final Rule (January 2009)
On January 7, 2009, the Department of
Transportation announced that the Bush
Administration would not issue the
final rule.
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16. The President Requests NHTSA To
Issue Final Rule for MY 2011 Only
(January 2009)
As explained above, in his
memorandum of January 26, 2009, the
President requested the agency to issue
a final rule adopting CAFE standards for
MY 2011 only. Further, the President
requested NHTSA to establish standards
for MY 2012 and later after considering
the appropriate legal factors, the
comments filed in response to the May
2008 proposal, the relevant
technological and scientific
considerations, and, to the extent
feasible, a forthcoming report by the
National Academy of Sciences assessing
64 https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/
eoHistReviewSearch (last visited March 8, 2009). To
find the report on the clearance of the draft final
rule, select ‘‘Department of Transportation’’ under
‘‘Economically Significant Reviews Completed’’
and select ‘‘2008’’ under ‘‘Select Calendar Year.’’
65 https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/eesa/
program-descriptions/aifp.shtml (last visited March
8, 2009).
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automotive technologies that can
practicably be used to improve fuel
economy.
17. General Motors and Chrysler Submit
Restructuring Reports to Department of
the Treasury (February 2009)
The reports were required under the
terms of the loans made available to
these companies in December to assist
the domestic auto industry in becoming
financially viable.
D. Energy Policy and Conservation Act,
as Amended
EPCA, which was enacted in 1975,
mandates a motor vehicle fuel economy
regulatory program to meet the various
facets of the need to conserve energy,
including ones having environmental
and foreign policy implications. EPCA
allocates the responsibility for
implementing the program between
NHTSA and EPA as follows: NHTSA
sets CAFE standards for passenger cars
and light trucks; EPA establishes the
procedures for testing, test vehicles,
collects and analyzes manufacturers’
data, and calculates the average fuel
economy of each manufacturer’s
passenger cars and light trucks; and
NHTSA enforces the standards based on
EPA’s calculations.
We have summarized below EPCA, as
amended by EISA.
1. Vehicles Subject to Standards for
Automobiles
With two exceptions specified in
EPCA, all four-wheeled motor vehicles
with a gross vehicle weight rating of
10,000 pounds or less will be subject to
the CAFE standards, beginning with MY
2011. The exceptions will be work
trucks 66 and multi-stage vehicles. Work
trucks are defined as vehicles that are:
—Rated at between 8,500 and 10,000
pounds gross vehicle weight; and
—Are not a medium-duty passenger
vehicle (as defined in section
86.1803–01 of title 40, Code of
Federal Regulations, as in effect on
the date of the enactment of the Tenin-Ten Fuel Economy Act).67
Medium-duty passenger vehicles
(MDPV) include 8,500 to 10,000 lb.
GVWR sport utility vehicles (SUVs),
66 While EISA excluded work trucks from
‘‘automobiles,’’ it did not exclude them from
regulation under EPCA. As amended by EISA,
EPCA requires that work trucks be subjected to
average fuel economy standards (49 U.S.C.
32902(b)(1)(C)), but only after first the National
Academy of Sciences completes a study and then
NHTSA completes a follow-on study. Congress thus
recognized and made allowances for the practical
difficulties that led NHTSA to decline to include
work trucks in its final rule for MY 2008–11 light
trucks.
67 49 U.S.C. 32902(a)(19).
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short bed pick-up trucks, and passenger
vans, but exclude pickup trucks with
longer beds and cargo vans rated at
between 8,500 and 10,000 lb. GVWR. It
is those excluded pickup trucks and
cargo vans that are work trucks. ‘‘Multistage vehicle’’ includes any vehicle
manufactured in different stages by 2 or
more manufacturers, if no intermediate
or final-stage manufacturer of that
vehicle manufactures more than 10,000
multi-stage vehicles per year.68
Under EPCA, as it existed before
EISA, the agency had discretion
whether to regulate vehicles with a
GVWR between 6,000 lb and 10,000
GVWR. It could regulate the fuel
economy of vehicles with a GVWR
within that range under CAFE if it
determined that (1) standards were
feasible for these vehicles, and (2) either
(a) that these vehicles were used for the
same purpose as vehicles rated at not
more than 6,000 lbs. GVWR, or (b) that
their regulation would result in
significant energy conservation.
EISA eliminated the need for
administrative determinations in order
to subject vehicles between 6,000 and
10,000 lb. GVWR to the CAFE standards
for automobiles. Congress did so by
making the determination itself that all
vehicles within that GVWR range
should be included, with the exceptions
noted above.
2. Mandate To Set Standards for
Automobiles
For each future model year, EPCA
requires that the agency establish
standards for all new automobiles at the
maximum feasible levels for that model
year. EISA made no change in this
requirement. A manufacturer’s
individual passenger cars and light
trucks are not required to meet a
particular fuel economy level. Instead,
EPCA requires that the average fuel
economy of a manufacturer’s fleet of
passenger cars (or light trucks) in a
particular model year must meet the
standard for those automobiles for that
model year.
For MYs 2011–2020 and for MYs
2021–2030, EPCA specifies additional
requirements regarding standard setting.
Each of those requirements and the
maximum feasible requirement must be
interpreted in the context of the other
requirements. For MYs 2011–2020,
separate standards for passenger cars
and for light trucks must be set at high
enough levels to ensure that the CAFE
of the industry-wide combined fleet of
new passenger cars and light trucks for
MY 2020 is not less than 35 mpg.
68 49
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In light of the evident confusion of
some commenters about the 35 mpg
requirement, we want to emphasize that
that figure is not the CAFE level that
any individual manufacturer’s
combined CAFE will be required to
meet. The 35 mpg requirement applies
solely to the agency’s standard setting
and concerns the required combined
effect that the separate MY 2020
standards for passenger cars and light
trucks must achieve with respect to the
single fleet containing the MY 2020
passenger cars and light trucks of all
manufacturers. That single industrywide fleet must have a CAFE of at least
35 mpg. If that requirement were exactly
met, we anticipate that manufacturers
with relatively larger proportions of
smaller automobiles would be required
to achieve combined CAFEs greater than
35 mpg, while manufacturers with
relatively largely proportions of larger
automobiles would be required to
achieve combined CAFEs that might in
that year be somewhat below 35 mpg.
EISA does not specify precisely how
compliance with this minimum
requirement is to be ensured or how or
when the CAFE of the industry-wide
combined fleet for MY 2020 is to be
calculated for purposes of determining
the agency’s compliance.
If the current gap between passenger
car CAFE and light truck CAFE persists,
the standard for MY 2020 passenger cars
would likely, as a practical matter, need
to be set high enough to ensure that the
industry-wide level of average fuel
economy for passenger cars is not less
than 40 mpg in order for the CAFE of
the combined industry-wide fleet to
reach 35 mpg,. The standard for MY
2020 light trucks could be somewhat
below 35 mpg. Again, these are the
levels of stringency necessary to meet
the minimum requirement of an
industry-wide combined average of at
least 35 mpg in MY 2020. Reaching 35
mpg earlier than MY 2020 would
require even higher car and light truck
standards in MY 2020. In addition, the
CAFE of each manufacturer’s fleet of
domestic passenger cars must meet a
sliding, absolute minimum level in each
model year: 27.5 mpg or 92 percent of
the projected CAFE of the industry-wide
fleet of new domestic and non-domestic
passenger cars for that model year.
The standards for passenger cars and
those for light trucks must increase
ratably each year. We interpret this
requirement, in combination with the
requirement to set the standards for
each model year at the level determined
to be the maximum feasible level for
that model year, to mean that the annual
increases should not be
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disproportionately large or small in
relation to each other.
EPCA, as it existed before EISA,
required that light truck standards be set
at the maximum feasible level for each
model year, but simply specified a
default standard of 27.5 mpg for
passenger cars for MY 1985 and
thereafter. It permitted, but did not
require that NHTSA establish a higher
or lower standard for passenger cars if
the agency found that the maximum
feasible level of fuel economy is higher
or lower than 27.5 mpg. Henceforth, the
agency must establish a standard for
each model year at the maximum
feasible level.
3. Attribute-Based Standards
The standards for passenger cars and
light trucks must be based on one or
more vehicle attributes, like size or
weight, that correlate with fuel economy
and must be expressed in terms of a
mathematical function. Fuel economy
targets are set for individual vehicles
and increase as the attribute decreases
and vice versa. For example, size-based
(i.e., size-indexed) standards assign
higher fuel economy targets to smaller
(and generally, but not necessarily
lighter) vehicles and lower ones to
larger (and generally, but not necessarily
heavier) vehicles. The fleet wide average
fuel economy that a particular
manufacturer must achieve depends on
the size mix of its fleet, i.e., the
proportion of the fleet that is small-,
medium- or large-sized.
This approach can be used to require
virtually all manufacturers to increase
significantly the fuel economy of a
broad range of both passenger cars and
light trucks. Further, this approach can
do so without creating an incentive for
manufacturers to make small vehicles
smaller or large vehicles larger, with
attendant implications for safety.
4. Factors Considered in the Setting of
Standards
In determining the maximum feasible
level of average fuel economy for a
model year, EPCA requires that the
agency consider four factors:
Technological feasibility, economic
practicability, the effect of other
standards of the Government on fuel
economy, and the need of the nation to
conserve energy. EPCA does not define
these terms or specify what weight to
give each concern in balancing them;
thus, NHTSA defines them and
determines the appropriate weighting
based on the circumstances in each
CAFE standard rulemaking.
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(a) Factors That Must Be Considered
(i) Technological Feasibility
‘‘Technological feasibility’’ refers to
whether a particular method of
improving fuel economy can be
available for commercial application in
the model year for which a standard is
being established. Thus, the agency is
not limited in a CAFE rulemaking to
technology that is already being
commercially applied at that time.
(ii) Economic Practicability
‘‘Economic practicability’’ refers to
whether a standard is one ‘‘within the
financial capability of the industry, but
not so stringent as to’’ lead to ‘‘adverse
economic consequences, such as a
significant loss of jobs or the
unreasonable elimination of consumer
choice.’’ 69 In an attempt to ensure the
economic practicability of attribute
based standards, the agency considers a
variety of factors, including the annual
rate at which manufacturers can
increase the percentage of its fleet that
has a particular type of fuel saving
technology, and cost to consumers.
Since consumer acceptability is an
element of economic practicability, the
agency, in this rule, has limited its
consideration of fuel saving
technologies to be added to vehicles to
those that provide benefits that match
their costs. The agency believes this
approach is reasonable for the MY 2011
standards in view of the facts before it
at this time. The agency is aware,
however, that facts relating to a variety
of key issues in CAFE rulemaking are
steadily evolving and will review its
balancing of these factors in light of the
facts before it in the next rulemaking
proceeding.
At the same time, the law does not
preclude a CAFE standard that poses
considerable challenges to any
individual manufacturer. The
Conference Report for EPCA, as enacted
in 1975, makes clear, and the case law
affirms, ‘‘(A) determination of maximum
feasible average fuel economy should
not be keyed to the single manufacturer
which might have the most difficulty
achieving a given level of average fuel
economy.’’ 70 Instead, the agency is
compelled ‘‘to weigh the benefits to the
nation of a higher fuel economy
standard against the difficulties of
individual automobile manufacturers.’’
Id. The law permits CAFE standards
exceeding the projected capability of
any particular manufacturer as long as
the standard is economically practicable
for the industry as a whole. Thus, while
69 67
FR 77015, 77021; December 16, 2002.
793 F.2d 1322, 1352 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
70 CEI–I,
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a particular CAFE standard may pose
difficulties for one manufacturer, it may
also present opportunities for another.
The CAFE program is not necessarily
intended to maintain the competitive
positioning of each particular company.
Rather, it is intended to enhance fuel
economy of the vehicle fleet on
American roads, while protecting motor
vehicle safety and being mindful of the
risk of harm to the overall United States
economy.
(iii) The Effect of Other Motor Vehicle
Standards of the Government on Fuel
Economy
‘‘The effect of other motor vehicle
standards of the Government on fuel
economy’’ means, according to the
agency’s longstanding view, ‘‘the
unavoidable adverse effects on fuel
economy of compliance with emission,
safety, noise, or damageability
standards.’’ 71 The purpose of this
provision was to ensure that any
adverse effects of other standards on
fuel economy were taken into
consideration in connection with the
fuel economy standards. The concern
about adverse effects is evident in a
1974 report, entitled ‘‘Potential for
Motor Vehicle Fuel Economy
Improvement,’’ prepared and submitted
to Congress by the Department of
Transportation and Environmental
Protection Agency.72 That report noted
that the weight added by safety
standards would reduce, and one set of
emissions standards might temporarily
reduce, the level of achievable fuel
economy.73 The same concern can also
be found in the congressional committee
reports on the bills that became EPCA.74
In the case of emission standards, this
includes standards adopted by the
Federal government and can include
standards adopted by the States as well,
since in certain circumstances the Clean
Air Act allows States to adopt and
enforce State standards different from
the Federal ones.
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(iv) The Need of the United States To
Conserve Energy
‘‘The need of the United States to
conserve energy’’ means ‘‘the consumer
cost, national balance of payments,
environmental, and foreign policy
implications of our need for large
quantities of petroleum, especially
71 42 FR 63184, 63188; Dec. 15, 1977. See also 42
FR 33534, 33537; June 30, 1977.
72 This report was prepared in compliance with
Section 10 of the Energy Supply and Environmental
Coordination Act of 1974, Public Law 93–319.
73 See pages 6–8 and 91–93.
74 See page 22 of Senate Report 94–179, pages 88
and 90 of House Report 94–340, and pages 155–7
of the Conference Report, Senate Report 94–516.
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imported petroleum.’’ 75 Environmental
implications principally include
reductions in emissions of criteria
pollutants and carbon dioxide. A prime
example of foreign policy implications
are energy independence and security
concerns.
1. Fuel Prices and the Value of Saving
Fuel
Projected future fuel prices are a
critical input into the preliminary
economic analysis of alternative CAFE
standards, because they determine the
value of fuel savings both to new
vehicle buyers and to society. In this
rule, NHTSA relies on fuel price
projections from the U.S. Energy
Information Administration’s (EIA)
Annual Energy Outlook (AEO) for this
analysis.
2. Petroleum Consumption and Import
Externalities
U.S. consumption and imports of
petroleum products impose costs on the
domestic economy that are not reflected
in the market price for crude petroleum,
or in the prices paid by consumers of
petroleum products such as gasoline.
These costs include (1) higher prices for
petroleum products resulting from the
effect of U.S. oil import demand on the
world oil price; (2) the risk of
disruptions to the U.S. economy caused
by sudden reductions in the supply of
imported oil to the U.S.; and (3)
expenses for maintaining a U.S. military
presence to secure imported oil supplies
from unstable regions, and for
maintaining the strategic petroleum
reserve (SPR) to cushion against
resulting price increases. Higher U.S.
imports of crude oil or refined
petroleum products increase the
magnitude of these external economic
costs, thus increasing the true economic
cost of supplying transportation fuels
above the resource costs of producing
them. Conversely, reducing U.S. imports
of crude petroleum or refined fuels or
reducing fuel consumption can reduce
these external costs.
3. Air Pollutant Emissions
While reductions in domestic fuel
refining and distribution that result
from lower fuel consumption will
reduce U.S. emissions of various
pollutants, additional vehicle use
associated with the rebound effect from
higher fuel economy will increase
emissions of these pollutants. Thus, the
net effect of stricter CAFE standards on
emissions of each pollutant depends on
the relative magnitudes of its reduced
emissions in fuel refining and
75 42
PO 00000
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14217
distribution, and increases in its
emissions from vehicle use.
Fuel savings from stricter CAFE
standards also result in lower emissions
of CO2, the main greenhouse gas emitted
as a result of refining, distribution, and
use of transportation fuels. Lower fuel
consumption reduces carbon dioxide
emissions directly, because the primary
source of transportation-related CO2
emissions is fuel combustion in internal
combustion engines.
The agency has considered
environmental issues, both within the
context of EPCA and the National
Environmental Policy Act, in making
decisions about the setting of standards
from the earliest days of the CAFE
program. As courts of appeal have noted
in three decisions stretching over the
last 20 years,76 the agency defined the
‘‘need of the Nation to conserve energy’’
in the late 1970s as including ‘‘the
consumer cost, national balance of
payments, environmental, and foreign
policy implications of our need for large
quantities of petroleum, especially
imported petroleum.’’ 77 Pursuant to
that view, the agency declined in the
past to include diesel engines in
determining the maximum feasible level
of average fuel economy for passenger
cars and for light trucks because
particulate emissions from diesels were
then both a source of concern and
unregulated.78
In the late 1980s, NHTSA cited
concerns about climate change as one of
its reasons for limiting the extent of its
reduction of the CAFE standard for MY
1989 passenger cars 79 and for declining
to reduce the standard for MY 1990
passenger cars.80
Since then, DOT has considered the
indirect benefits of reducing tailpipe
carbon dioxide emissions in its fuel
economy rulemakings pursuant to the
statutory requirement to consider the
nation’s need to conserve energy by
reducing consumption. In this
rulemaking, consistent with the Ninth
Circuit’s decision and its observations
about the potential effect of changing
information about climate change on the
76 Center for Auto Safety v. NHTSA, 793 F.2d
1322, 1325 n. 12 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Public Citizen v.
NHTSA, 848 F.2d 256, 262–3 n. 27 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(noting that ‘‘NHTSA itself has interpreted the
factors it must consider in setting CAFE standards
as including environmental effects’’); and Center for
Biological Diversity v. NHTSA, 508 F.3d 508, 529
(9th Cir. 2007).
77 42 FR 63,184, 63,188 (Dec. 15, 1977) (emphasis
added).
78 For example, the final rules establishing CAFE
standards for MY 1981–84 passenger cars, 42 FR
33533, 33540–1 and 33551; June 30, 1977, and for
MY 1983–85 light trucks, 45 FR 81593, 81597;
December 11, 1980.
79 53 FR 39275, 39302; October 6, 1988.
80 54 FR 21985,
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balancing of the EPCA factors and aided
by the 2007 reports of the United
Nations Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change 81 and other
information, NHTSA has monetized the
reductions in tailpipe emissions of CO2
that will result from the CAFE standards
and is adopting CAFE standards for MY
2011 at levels that reflect an estimated
value of those reductions in CO2 as well
as the value of other benefits of those
standards. In setting these CAFE
standards, NHTSA also considered
environmental impacts under NEPA, 42
U.S.C. 4321–4347.
(v) Other Factors—Safety
In addition, the agency historically
has considered the potential for adverse
safety consequences when deciding
upon a maximum feasible level. This
practice is recognized approvingly in
case law.82
(b) Factors That Cannot be Considered
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EPCA provides that in determining
the level at which it should set CAFE
standards for a particular model year,
NHTSA may not consider the ability of
manufacturers to take advantage of
several EPCA provisions that facilitate
compliance with the CAFE standards
and thereby reduce the costs of
compliance.83 As noted below in
Section XII, manufacturers can earn
compliance credits by exceeding the
CAFE standards and then use those
credits to achieve compliance in years
in which their measured average fuel
economy falls below the standards.
Manufacturers can also increase their
CAFE levels through MY 2019 by
producing alternative fuel vehicles.
EPCA provides an incentive for
producing these vehicles by specifying
that their fuel economy is to be
determined using a special calculation
procedure that results in those vehicles
being assigned a high fuel economy
level.
81 The IPCC 2007 reports can be found at
https://www.ipcc.ch/. (Last accessed March 8, 2009.)
82 See, e.g., Center for Auto Safety v. NHTSA
(CAS), 793 F. 2d 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
(Administrator’s consideration of market demand as
component of economic practicability found to be
reasonable); Public Citizen 848 F.2d 256 (Congress
established broad guidelines in the fuel economy
statute; agency’s decision to set lower standard was
a reasonable accommodation of conflicting
policies). As the United Staets Court of Appeals
pointed out in upholding NHTSA’s exercise of
judgment in setting the 1987–1989 passenger car
standards, ‘‘NHTSA has always examined the safety
consequences of the CAFE standards in its overall
consideration of relevant factors since its earliest
rulemaking under the CAFE program.’’ Competitive
Enterprise Institute v. NHTSA (CEI I), 901 F.2d 107,
120 at n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
83 49 U.S.C. 32902(h).
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(c) Weighing and Balancing of Factors
EPCA did not define the factors or
specify the relative weight to be given
the factors in weighing and balancing
them. Instead, EPCA gave broad
guidelines within which the agency is to
exercise discretion in determining what
level of stringency is the maximum
feasible level of stringency. Thus, the
agency has substantial discretion in
defining and weighing the terms and
accommodating conflicting priorities
consistent with the purposes of EPCA.
5. Consultation in Setting Standards
EPCA provides that NHTSA is to
consult with the Department of Energy
(DOE) and Environmental Protection
Agency prior to prescribing CAFE
standards. It specifies further that
NHTSA is to provide DOE with an
opportunity to provide written
comments on draft proposed and final
CAFE standards.84
6. Test Procedures for Measuring Fuel
Economy
EPA’s fuel economy test procedures
specify equations for calculating fuel
economy. These equations are based on
the carbon balance technique which
allows fuel economy to be determined
from measurement of exhaust
emissions. As noted above, this
technique relies upon the premise that
the quantity of carbon in a vehicle’s
exhaust gas is equal to the quantity of
carbon consumed by the engine as fuel.
After measuring the amount of CO2
emitted from the tailpipe of a test
vehicle, as well as the amount of carbon
in hydrocarbon (HC) and carbon
monoxide (CO), EPA then uses the
carbon content of the test fuel to
calculate the amount of fuel that had to
be consumed per mile in order for the
vehicle to produce that amount of
carbon containing emissions.85 Finally,
84 In addition, Executive Order No. 13432
provides that a Federal agency undertaking a
regulatory action that can reasonably be expected to
regulate emissions directly, or to substantially and
predictably affect emissions, of greenhouse gases
from motor vehicles, shall act jointly and
consistently with other agencies to the extent
possible and to consider the views of other agencies
regarding such action.
85 Under the procedures established by EPA,
compliance with the CAFE standards is based on
the rates of emission of CO2, CO, and hydrocarbons
from covered vehicles, but primarily on the
emission rates of CO2. In the measurement and
calculation of a given vehicle model’s fuel economy
for purposes of determining a manufacturer’s
compliance with federal fuel economy standards,
the role of CO2 is approximately 100 times greater
than the combined role of the other two relevant
carbon exhaust gases. Given that the amount of CO2,
CO, and hydrocarbons emitted by a vehicle varies
directly with the amount of fuel it consumes, EPA
can reliably and accurately convert the amount of
those gases emitted by that vehicle into the miles
per gallon achieved by that vehicle.
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EPA converts that fuel figure into a
miles-per-gallon figure.
7. Enforcement and Compliance
Flexibility
EPA is responsible for measuring
automobile manufacturers’ CAFE so that
NHTSA can determine compliance with
the CAFE standards. In making these
measurements for passenger cars, EPA is
required by EPCA 86 to use the EPA test
procedures in place as of 1975 (or
procedures that give comparable
results), which are the city and highway
tests of today, with adjustments for
procedural changes that have occurred
since 1975. EPA uses similar procedures
for light trucks, although, as noted
above, EPCA does not require it to do
so.
When NHTSA finds that a
manufacturer is not in compliance, it
notifies the manufacturer. Surplus
credits generated from the five previous
years can be used to make up the deficit.
The amount of credit earned is
determined by multiplying the number
of tenths of a mpg by which a
manufacturer exceeds a standard for a
particular category of automobiles by
the total volume of automobiles of that
category manufactured by the
manufacturer for a given model year. If
there are no (or not enough) credits
available, then the manufacturer can
either pay the fine, or submit a carry
back plan to the agency. A carry back
plan describes what the manufacturer
plans to do in the following three model
years to earn enough credits to make up
for the deficit. NHTSA must examine
and determine whether to approve the
plan.
In the event that a manufacturer does
not comply with a CAFE standard, even
after the consideration of credits, EPCA
provides for the assessing of civil
penalties, unless, as provided below, the
manufacturer has earned credits for
exceeding a standard in an earlier year
or expects to earn credits in a later year.
The Act specifies a precise formula for
determining the amount of civil
penalties for such a noncompliance. The
penalty, as adjusted for inflation by law,
is $5.50 for each tenth of a mpg that a
manufacturer’s average fuel economy
falls short of the standard for a given
model year multiplied by the total
volume of those vehicles in the affected
fleet (i.e., import or domestic passenger
car, or light truck), manufactured for
that model year. The amount of the
penalty may not be reduced except
under the unusual or extreme
circumstances specified in the statute.
86 49
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Unlike the National Traffic and Motor
Vehicle Safety Act, EPCA does not
provide for recall and remedy in the
event of a noncompliance. The presence
of recall and remedy provisions 87 in the
Safety Act and their absence in EPCA is
believed to arise from the difference in
the application of the safety standards
and CAFE standards. A safety standard
applies to individual vehicles; that is,
each vehicle must possess the requisite
equipment or feature which must
provide the requisite type and level of
performance. If a vehicle does not, it is
noncompliant. Typically, a vehicle does
not entirely lack an item or equipment
or feature. Instead, the equipment or
features fails to perform adequately.
Recalling the vehicle to repair or replace
the noncompliant equipment or feature
can usually be readily accomplished.
In contrast, a CAFE standard applies
to a manufacturer’s entire fleet for a
model year. It does not require that a
particular individual vehicle be
equipped with any particular equipment
or feature or meet a particular level of
fuel economy. It does require that the
manufacturer’s fleet, as a whole,
comply. Further, although under the
attribute-based approach to setting
CAFE standards fuel economy targets
are established for individual vehicles
based on their footprints, the vehicles
are not required to comply with those
targets. However, as a practical matter,
if a manufacturer chooses to design
some vehicles so that fall below their
target levels of fuel economy, it will
need to design other vehicles so that
exceed their targets if the
manufacturer’s overall fleet average is to
meet the applicable standard.
Thus, under EPCA, there is no such
thing as a noncompliant vehicle, only a
noncompliant fleet. No particular
vehicle in a noncompliant fleet is any
more, or less, noncompliant than any
other vehicle in the fleet.
III. The Anticipated Vehicles in the MY
2011 Fleets and NHTSA’s Baseline
Market Forecast
NHTSA has a long-standing practice
of analyzing regulatory options in fuel
economy rulemakings based on the best
available information, including
information regarding the future vehicle
market and future fuel economy
technologies. The passenger cars and
light trucks currently sold in the United
States, and which are anticipated to be
sold in MY 2011, are highly varied and
satisfy a wide range of consumer needs.
From the two-seater Mercedes Benz
Smart (produced by Daimler) to the
87 49
U.S.C. 30120, Remedies for defects and
noncompliance.
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Ford F–150 pickup truck, from the
Honda CR–V to the Chrysler Town and
Country to the GMC Savana, American
consumers have a great number of
vehicle options to accommodate their
needs and preferences.
Automobile manufacturers generally
attempt to plan their motor vehicle
production several years in advance.
When a new vehicle is introduced, it is
the product of several years of design,
testing, product-specific tooling
investment, and regulatory certification.
In order to minimize costs,
manufacturers generally attempt to
place large automotive parts supply
contracts years in advance.
Manufacturers must therefore attempt to
predict the types, characteristics, and
quantities of vehicles that consumers
will wish to purchase a few years hence.
These plans include what is currently
known about the salability and
marketability of these future vehicles,
and hence consider the future state of
prices facing the consumer, including
that of gasoline. These plans also
contain not only the specific vehicle
models which manufacturers intend to
build and their planned annual
production, but also information about
specific design features and
configurations as well as the fuelefficient technologies they are planning
to incorporate in these vehicles.
Manufacturer’s plans rapidly become
embodied in special tooling and
production configurations in factories
and advance orders for component
parts. NHTSA requests, and
manufacturers provide, product plan
information to the agency during
rulemaking. NHTSA begins its analysis
with the submitted product plans and
uses them to establish a baseline, which
is used to analyze varying levels of
future CAFE standards.
In anticipation of the analysis to
support today’s final rule, NHTSA
issued a request in May 2008 that
manufacturers provide the agency with
updated product plans, as well as
estimates of the availability,
effectiveness, and cost of fuel-saving
technologies.88 Considering its past
experiences integrating manufacturers’
product plans, reviewing the content of
those plans, and seeking clarification
and appropriate correction of those
plans, the agency provided
manufacturers with updated tools to
facilitate manufacturers’ quality control
efforts. NHTSA also tripled the number
88 See 73 FR 24910 (May 2, 2008) for NHTSA’s
most recent request for comments, which
accompanied the NPRM.
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14219
of agency engineers assigned to
reviewing manufacturers’ plans.
A. Why does NHTSA establish a
baseline market forecast?
NHTSA begins its analysis by
establishing the baseline market
forecast. This forecast represents the
fleet that the agency believes would
exist in the absence of fuel economy
standards for MY 2011. A forecast is
necessary because the standards will
apply to a future fleet which does not
yet exist and therefore must be
predicted in order to estimate the costs
and benefits of CAFE standards, as well
as regulatory alternatives as required by
OMB and DOT.
B. How does NHTSA develop the
baseline market forecast?
1. NHTSA First Asks Manufacturers for
Updated Product Plan Data
NHTSA relies on product plans from
manufacturers to help the agency
determine the composition of the future
fleets. The product plan information is
provided in response to NHTSA’s
request for information from the
manufacturers, and responds to very
detailed questions about vehicle model
characteristics that influence fuel
economy.89 The baseline market
forecast that NHTSA uses in its analysis
is based significantly on this
confidential product plan information.
Individual manufacturers are better able
than any other entity to anticipate what
mix of products they are likely to sell
in the future. In this rulemaking as in
prior rulemakings, some commenters
requested that NHTSA make product
plan information public to allow
members of the public to comment more
fully on the baseline developed by the
agency. For example, the Attorneys
General commented that ‘‘the agency
should provide sufficient summaries or
aggregations of this information or make
special arrangements so that interested
parties such as the state Attorneys
General can view this confidential
information under a confidentiality
agreement.’’
NHTSA cannot make public the entire
contents of the product plans. The
submitted product plans contain
confidential business information,
which the agency is prohibited by
federal law from disclosing; 90 making
89 Id.
90 NHTSA grants confidentiality to
manufacturers’ future specific product plans under
49 CFR Part 512. Once NHTSA has granted a
manufacturer’s claim of confidentiality, NHTSA
may not release the covered information except in
certain circumstances listed in § 512.23, none of
which include increasing the ability of the public
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this information publicly available
would cause competitive harm to
manufacturers. See 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(4);
18 U.S.C. 1905; 49 U.S.C. 30167(a); 49
CFR part 512; Critical Mass Energy
Project v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n,
975 F.2d 871 (D.C. Cir. 1992). In its
publicly available rulemaking
documents the agency does, however,
provide aggregated information
compiled from individual manufacturer
submissions regarding its forecasts of
the future vehicle market in such a way
that confidential business information is
not disclosed. This aggregated
information, such as appears below and
in the accompanying Regulatory Impact
Analysis (RIA), includes vehicle fleet
size and composition (passenger cars
versus light trucks), overall fuel
economy baseline and major technology
applications and design trends.
(a) Why does NHTSA use manufacturer
product plans to develop the baseline?
In order to analyze potential new
CAFE standards in a way that tries to
simulate how manufacturers could
comply with them, NHTSA develops a
forecast of the future vehicle market on
a model-by-model, engine-by-engine,
and transmission-by-transmission basis,
such that each defined vehicle model
refers to a separately-defined engine and
a separately-defined transmission. For
the 2011 model year covered by this
final rule, the light vehicle (passenger
car and light truck) market forecast
included almost 1,400 vehicle models,
400 specific engines, and 300 specific
transmissions. NHTSA believes that this
level of detail in the representation of
the vehicle market is important both to
an accurate analysis of manufacturerspecific costs and to the analysis of
attribute-based CAFE standards.
Because CAFE standards apply to the
average fuel economy performance of
each manufacturer’s fleets of cars and
light trucks, the impact of potential
standards on individual manufacturers
is effectively estimated through analysis
of manufacturers’ planned fleets.
NHTSA has used this level of detail in
CAFE analysis throughout the history of
the program. Furthermore, because
required CAFE levels under an attributebased CAFE standard depend on
manufacturers’ fleet composition, the
stringency of an attribute-based
standard is effectively predicted by
performing analysis at this level of
detail.
EPCA does not require NHTSA to use
manufacturers’ product plans in order to
to comment on rulemakings employing the
confidential information, unless the manufacturers
consent to the disclosure.
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develop a baseline for purposes of
analyzing potential new CAFE
standards. The agency could use
exclusively non-confidential
information to develop a market forecast
at the same level of detail as mentioned
above, and has done exactly so for
purposes of analytical development and
testing, and to represent manufacturers
that have not provided product plans to
NHTSA. However, as discussed above,
the agency believes that one of the most
valuable sources of information about
future product mix projections is the
product plan information provided by
individual manufacturers, because
individual manufacturers are in a
unique position to anticipate what mix
of products they are likely to sell in the
future.
Manufacturers generally support
NHTSA’s use of product plan data in
developing the baseline. Other
commenters such as CFA and Public
Citizen, in contrast, stated that the
product plans relied upon in the NPRM
are outdated because they were
developed before EISA was enacted, and
that the agency should develop its own
projections of the vehicle fleets, which
could be made public, instead of relying
on confidential industry plans, which
could bias the standards in favor of the
industry. CFA suggested that NHTSA’s
analysis was based on only ‘‘a very thin
body of knowledge about the veracity,
relevance and predictive value of auto
manufacturer product plans, recent
changes in fuel economy and the
practices of automakers in adopting fuel
economy technologies.’’ Public Citizen
stated that because the product plans
are confidential, ‘‘This significantly
biases the standards in favor of industry
by shutting the public out of the
process,’’ and that ‘‘Consumers must
essentially trust that NHTSA has set
standards in their interest using
information provided by industry.’’
Public Citizen argued that ‘‘In the past,
* * * NHTSA has done its own
research and evaluation of these factors
which was more transparent.’’
NHTSA’s analysis of product plan
data is much more rigorous than
commenters suggest. NHTSA engineers
carefully examine the information
submitted by manufacturers, and upon
discovering what appear to be errors or
inconsistencies, request and receive
manufacturers’ explanations and, as
appropriate, corrections. For example,
the agency’s analysis in preparation for
the final rule revealed systematic errors
in plans submitted by two major
manufacturers, both of which
resubmitted their plans with
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corrections.91 In addition, the agency
found that two manufacturers
inappropriately planned to have some 2wheel drive sport-utility vehicles (2WD
SUVs) classified as light trucks, even
though the agency explained in the
NPRM that, for enforcement purposes, it
planned to classify such vehicles as
passenger cars, and other manufacturers
submitted product plans consistent with
the agency’s intentions. As discussed
below and in Section IX, NHTSA
performed its analysis with these
vehicles reassigned to the passenger car
fleet.
NHTSA also disagrees with Public
Citizen’s suggestion that the agency’s
use of product plans precludes public
participation in the rulemaking process.
As discussed, analysis of confidential
product plans has long been a core
feature of developing the CAFE
standards, and the agency is fully
transparent in providing aggregated
information about the plans as well as
detailed information about the agency’s
technology and economic assumptions
and the process the agency undertakes
to evaluate and set the standards.
NHTSA could potentially conduct
rulemaking analysis as Public Citizen
suggests using exclusively public
information, (including commercially
available information). Indeed, the
agency has done exactly so for purposes
of development and testing, and to
develop forecasts of fleets likely to be
produced by manufacturers that have
not responded to the agency’s request
for product plans. However, the agency
currently believes that an analysis based
exclusively on publicly- and
commercially-available information
would be less accurate—in terms of its
representation of the future light vehicle
market—than an analysis based in large
measure on product plan data. Most
publicly available information about
vehicles and vehicle technologies
concerns the current fleet, not potential
future fleets. In many cases,
manufacturers are prepared to provide
far more detail in confidential
submissions then they are prepared to
provide in public. This detail may
include the manufacturer’s expectation
of sales for particular future models;
which technologies are being applied to
particular vehicles; and the
manufacturer’s expectation of fuel
91 Specifically, one manufacturer had submitted
data with a structure that had inadvertently been
misaligned, such that many vehicle models were
incorrectly identified as using engines applicable to
other vehicle models (e.g., a vehicle known to use
an inline 4-cylinder engine might have been
identified as using a V–8 engines). Another
manufacturer had submitted vehicle dimensional
estimates based on an incorrect SAE measurement
procedure.
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economy for future vehicles. This
information is typically considered
business confidential by the
manufacturer, but is helpful in more
accurately ascertaining both the baseline
technology level and fuel economy of
manufacturer’s future sales as well as
the extent of opportunities for
improving fuel economy.
NHTSA notes that manufacturers’
public statements about future vehicles
have been very optimistic recently with
regard to fuel economy-enhancing
technologies, and NHTSA takes these
statements into account when
evaluating the submitted product plans.
When manufacturer statements about
future vehicles differ substantially from
the submitted product plans, NHTSA
generally contacts the manufacturer to
determine the reason for the
discrepancy. However, manufacturers
frequently make announcements
regarding vehicles or technologies they
hope to produce in the future. Often,
they are conditional statements and
plans, and whether they reach the point
of commercialization depends greatly
on how circumstances, including public
acceptance, evolve. Thus, for purposes
of analyzing the MY 2011 CAFE
standards, the agency currently
concludes that information
manufacturers provide confidentially to
NHTSA is more reliable than the
information appearing in public sources
such as press reports and speeches by
manufacturers’ employees, especially
given the short time period between the
submission of this information in 2008
and when manufacturers will begin
building their MY 2011 vehicles.
Nevertheless, EPCA does not require
NHTSA to use manufacturers’
confidential business information when
evaluating the maximum feasible levels
for new CAFE standards. The agency
will base its analysis for future
rulemakings on information—public,
commercially-available, or
confidential—it considers most
accurate.
NHTSA recognizes that automobile
manufacturers are facing a period of
uncertainty with respect to demand for
their products that is without parallel.
Recent swings in prices for fuel have
altered demand patterns, while
commodity prices have impacted costs
of production. Concurrently, turmoil in
the credit markets and recent upswings
in unemployment also affect the vehicle
market. The short and long term
implications of such volatility for future
sales will not be known for some time.
In light of such conditions, reliance on
product plans in this rulemaking helps
to align the analysis with the best
available information.
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NHTSA further recognizes that, in
connection with their recent requests for
federal assistance, some manufacturers
made statements in December 2008
regarding future technologies and fuel
economy levels, and that some of these
statements indicated plans to achieve
CAFE levels considerably higher than
reflected in the product plans submitted
to NHTSA in mid-2008.92 The
information provided in these
submissions to Congress reflects a level
of detail much less than NHTSA
typically receives in the confidential
product plan submissions, so it is
difficult for NHTSA to determine
whether these manufacturer statements
and submissions reflect the same
underlying assumptions as
manufacturers’ mid-2008 product plans.
More recently, in mid-February,
Chrysler and General Motors submitted
restructuring plans to the U.S.
Department of the Treasury to support
those companies’ requests for federal
loans. Like the information these
companies provided in December, these
plans do not contain complete and
detailed forecasts of the volume and
characteristics of specific vehicle
models Chrysler and General Motors
plan to produce. However, the
restructuring plans do contain specific
information regarding the CAFE levels
that these manufacturers expect to
achieve.
Chrysler’s plan shows that, during
MYs 2008–2015, Chrysler plans to
exceed required CAFE levels in some
model years and to apply credits it earns
in doing so toward shortfalls in other
model years.93 The charts in Chrysler’s
plans specifically reference the ‘‘Dec
2008 Draft Rule’’ (presumably, the final
standards NHTSA submitted to OMB in
November 2008), and indicate that
Chrysler appears to believe that
attribute-based CAFE standards for
those model years will result in required
CAFE levels for Chrysler similar to
those originally estimated by NHTSA
for MYs 2011–2015 based on the
product plan information that Chrysler
submitted to NHTSA in July 2008.
GM’s plan states that GM ‘‘is
committed to meeting or exceeding all
Federal fuel economy standards in the
2010–2015 model years’’, and shows the
CAFE levels that GM plans to achieve in
those model years, assuming ‘‘full usage
of all credit flexibilities under the CAFE
92 Available on the Internet at https://
financialservices.house.gov/autostabilization.html
(last accessed February 15, 2009).
93 Chrysler’s submission to the Treasury
Department, p. 117. Available at https://
www.treasury.gov/initiatives/eesa/agreements/autoreports/ChryslerRestructuringPlan.pdf, (last
accessed Feb. 19, 2009).
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14221
program.’’ 94 However, GM’s plan does
not show the CAFE levels expected to
be required of GM under new attributebased CAFE standards, and it is unclear
from GM’s plan how specific changes
(since July 2008) in the company’s plans
relate to its planned CAFE levels. For
example, while GM’s restructuring plan
refers to plans to increase hybrid vehicle
offerings, the plan does not include
production forecasts needed to
understand how those offerings affect
GM’s planned CAFE levels.
Considering the context for and
generality of the Chrysler and GM
restructuring plans, and the lack of such
plans from other manufacturers, and
notwithstanding the considerable
uncertainties currently surrounding the
future market for light vehicles, NHTSA
believes that its market forecast for MY
2011, as informed by product plans
submitted to the agency in mid-2008,
remains the most useful available point
of reference for the establishment of MY
2011 standards, and the evaluation of
the costs and benefits of these new
standards.
(b) What product plan data did NHTSA
use in the NPRM?
For the NPRM, NHTSA received
product plan information from Chrysler,
Ford, GM, Honda, Nissan, Mitsubishi,
Porsche and Toyota covering multiple
model years. The agency did not receive
any product plan information from
BMW, Ferrari, Hyundai, Mercedes
(Daimler) or VW. However, only
Chrysler and Mitsubishi provided us
with product plans that showed
differing production quantities, vehicle
introductions, vehicle redesign/refresh
changes, without any carryover
production quantities through MY 2015.
For the other companies that provided
data, the agency carried over production
quantities for their vehicles, allowing
for growth, starting with the year after
their product plan data showed changes
in production quantities or showed the
introduction or redesign/refresh of
vehicles.
Product plan information was
provided through MY 2013 by Ford and
Toyota, thus the first year that the
agency carried over production
quantities for those companies was MY
2014. Product plan information was
provided through MY 2012 for GM and
Nissan, thus the first year that the
agency carried over production
quantities for those companies was MY
2013. Product plan information was
94 GM’s submission to the Treasury Department,
p. 21. Available at, https://www.treasury.gov/
initiatives/eesa/agreements/auto-reports/
GMRestructuringPlan.pdf (last accessed Feb. 19,
2009).
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provided by Honda through MY 2008.
Honda asked the agency to carry over
those plans and also provided data for
the last redesign of a vehicle and asked
the agency to carry them forward.
Product plan information was provided
through MY 2008 for Porsche, thus the
first year that the agency carried over
production quantities for Porsche was
MY 2009.
Because Hyundai was one of the
seven largest vehicle manufacturers, and
thus factored explicitly into the
optimization process, and NHTSA
desired to conduct this process using
the best and most complete forecast of
the future vehicle market, NHTSA used
Hyundai’s mid-year 2007 data contained
in the agency’s CAFE database to
establish the baseline models and
production quantities for their
vehicles.95 For the other manufacturers
that did not submit product plans,
NHTSA used the 2005 information from
the database, the latest complete data set
that NHTSA had available for use.
As mentioned above, NHTSA
received comments that the product
plans it relied upon in the NPRM were
out of date and not reflective of recent
announcements from manufacturers
regarding new products. CFA referred to
NHTSA’s discussion in the NPRM of the
relative completion of various
manufacturers’ product plans to argue
that the product plans were incomplete
and inaccurate. Public Citizen argued
that the product plans were out of date.
The Attorneys General and NRDC
argued that NHTSA should update the
product plans, the baseline, and the
technology inputs to the Volpe model in
light of recent manufacturer statements
about their intent to introduce advanced
technologies, such as plug-in hybrid
vehicles, in the near future.
In response, as noted above, NHTSA
published a request for comments
seeking updated information from
manufacturers regarding their future
product plans in a companion notice to
the NPRM. In examining the updated
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95 Manufacturers must submit pre- and midmodel year CAFE reports to the agency as part of
the CAFE compliance process under 49 CFR part
537.
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product plans received in response to
the request for information, and as
discussed more fully below, NHTSA has
determined that the product plans for
MY 2011 provided incorporate these
announcements and reflect changes to
planned product introduction by
manufacturers in response to the recent
market shift towards more fuel-efficient
vehicles, particularly the shift towards
increased production of smaller cars.
(c) What product plan data did NHTSA
receive for the final rule?
For the final rule, NHTSA received
product plan information from Chrysler,
Ford (Ford’s product plans included
separate plans for Jaguar and Land
Rover vehicles, both of which are now
owned by Tata Motors and are thus
attributed to that company in the final
rule), GM, Honda, Hyundai, Mitsubishi,
Nissan, Porsche, Subaru, and Toyota,
covering multiple model years. The
agency did not receive product plan
information from BMW, Daimler
(Mercedes), Ferrari, Suzuki or VW.
Chrysler, Ford, Hyundai and Mitsubishi
provided us with product plans that
showed changes in production
quantities, vehicle introductions, and
vehicle redesigns/refreshes changes,
without any carryover production
quantities through MY 2015. For the
other companies that provided data, the
agency was careful to carry over
production quantities for their vehicles,
allowing for growth, starting with the
year after their product plan data
showed changes in production
quantities or showed the introduction or
redesign/refresh of vehicles.
Further, NHTSA used the pre-model
year 2008 CAFE reports as the basis for
the future MY 2011 product plans and
filled in gaps in the data (e.g., engine
specifications, wheelbase, track width,
etc.) for those manufacturers with
information gathered from the Web sites
of the individual manufacturers and
from general automotive Web sites such
as Edmunds.com, Cars.com, and
Wards.com.
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(d) How is the product plan data
received for the final rule different from
what the agency used in the NPRM
analysis, and how does it impact the
baseline?
Informed by the overall fleet size and
market share estimates applied by the
agency (and discussed below),
manufacturers’ plans changed
considerably between 2007 and 2008.
NHTSA’s forecast, based on the Energy
Information Administration’s (EIA’s)
Annual Energy Outlook (AEO) 2008, of
the total number of light vehicles likely
to be sold during MY 2011 through MY
2015 dropped from 85 to 83 million
vehicles—about 16.5 million vehicles
annually.96 Also, due in part to the
reclassification of roughly 1.4 million
2WD SUVs, the share of MY 2011
vehicles expected to be classified as
light trucks fell from 49 percent in
NHTSA’s 2007 market forecast to 42
percent in the agency’s current forecast.
The latter of the above changes is
reflected in the baseline distribution of
vehicle models with respect to fuel
economy and footprint. Figures III–1
and III–2 show passenger car and light
truck 2011 models, respectively, in the
2007 plans. Figures III–3 and III–4 show
passenger car and light truck models,
respectively, in the 2008 plans. A
comparison of Figures III–1 and III–3
shows that the number of passenger cars
models with footprints between roughly
41 and 52 square feet has increased
considerably, and that the number of
passenger car models with relatively
high fuel economy levels (e.g., above 35
mpg) has increased. Conversely, a
comparison of Figures III–2 and III–3
shows less pronounced differences
between the 2007 and 2008 plans,
although the number of small light truck
models decreased (due to
reclassification).
96 NHTSA recognizes that domestic vehicle sales
are currently well below this rate. However, as
discussed below, the agency considers this an
aspect (like gasoline prices near $2 per gallon) of
the current economy, and not an indicator of the
longer-term prospect for light vehicle sales in the
U.S. Just as the agency currently expects fuel prices
to return to high levels, it expects vehicle sales to
rise well above today’s rate.
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14225
changed since 2007. These changes are
reflected below in Table III–1, which
shows the agency’s 2007 and 2008 sales
forecasts for passenger cars and light
trucks.97
Additionally, for some advanced
technologies, the updated product plans
submitted by manufacturers for the final
rule include higher quantities in MY
2011 and beyond than the older product
plans used for the NPRM had indicated.
These changes are consistent with most
manufacturers’ indications that their
product planning was informed by
expectations that fuel prices
considerably higher than those in EIA’s
AEO 2008 reference case forecast would
prevail during the first half of the next
decade. Most recently, the restructuring
plans submitted by General Motors and
Chrysler offer additional information on
changes to product plans, albeit at an
aggregate level, that are deemed
necessary to achieve ‘‘operational and
functional viability.’’
Manufacturers’ most recently
submitted detailed plans (i.e., those
submitted to NHTSA in July 2008) show
significant application of the following
engine technologies in MY 2011
(percent of the entire fleet having that
technology is shown in the
parentheses): Intake cam phasing (34
percent), dual cam phasing (35 percent),
stoichiometric gasoline direction
injection (11 percent), and
turbocharging and engine downsizing (6
percent). Regarding transmission
technologies, manufacturers’ plans
show significant application of the
following technologies by MY 2011:
6-, 7-, or 8-speed automatic
transmissions (27 percent), and strong
hybrids (4 percent). Manufacturers’
plans also show significant application
of electric power steering (3 percent)
and integrated starter/generators (34
percent) by MY 2011.
Though not applicable to today’s
rulemaking, and while updated product
plans may reflect different rates of
technology application, manufacturers’
July 2008 plans also indicated
expectations that the use of some of
these and other technologies would
continue to increase after MY 2011. For
example, manufacturers’ product plans
indicated at the time that use of
stoichiometric gasoline direction
injection would increase from 11
percent of the fleet in MY 2011 to 15
percent of the fleet in MY 2015, and that
use of turbocharging and engine
downsizing would increase from 6
percent of the fleet in MY 2011 to 13
percent of the fleet in MY 2015. These
plans further indicated that use of dual
cam phasing, combustion restart, and
integrated starter/generators would
increase to 49 percent, 10 percent, and
49 percent, respectively, by MY 2015.
The restructuring plans Chrysler and
GM submitted to the Department of the
Treasury in February 2009 both indicate
intentions to increase the rate of
technology adoption and alter the mix
towards higher numbers of flexible fuel,
alternative fuel and electric vehicles.
Chrysler’s restructuring plan shows
plans to introduce three new electric or
hybrid-electric vehicle models in MYs
2010–2011, and an additional seven
such models during MYs 2012–2015.98
As mentioned above, Chrysler’s
restructuring plan is clearly informed by
and responsive to NHTSA’s 2008 draft
final standards for MYs 2011–2015.
Though less clear in terms of specific
requirements to the company, GM’s
restructuring plan also appears to be
responsive to those MYs 2011–2015
standards. GM’s restructuring plan
indicates that in MY 2012, the company
plans greater deployment of 2-step
variable valve timing, new 4-cylinder
gasoline engines, dry dual clutch
transmissions, ‘‘Gen 2’’ strong hybrids,
extended range electric vehicles, and
possibly compressed natural gas.99 The
plan further indicates that in MY 2015,
GM expects to introduce ‘‘Gen 3’’
hybrids, lean-burn homogeneous charge
compression ignition (HCCI) gasoline
engines, and fuel cell vehicles.
Manufacturers’ July 2008 product
plans also show increasing numbers of
mid-size ladder-frame SUVs being
planned for redesign as unibody SUVs/
crossover vehicles. Additionally, some
ladder-frame SUVs and mid-size pickup
97 As explained below, although NHTSA
normalized each manufacturer’s overall market
share to produce a realistically-sized fleet, the
product mix for each manufacturer that submitted
product plans was preserved. The agency has
reviewed manufacturers’ product plans in detail,
and understands that manufacturers do not sell the
same mix of vehicles in every model year.
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99 GM,
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p. 21.
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NHTSA’s expectations regarding
manufacturers’ market shares (the basis
for which is discussed below) have also
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Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 59 / Monday, March 30, 2009 / Rules and Regulations
appear to provide higher fuel economy,
with maximum power and torque
similar to the engines they are replacing.
It is not clear from manufacturers’
product plans whether and, if so, how
vehicle prices and other performance
measures (e.g., launch, gradeability) will
be affected.
When engines are planned to be
replaced with fewer-cylinder engines
(e.g., smaller V6 engines instead of large
V8 engines), the plans show some of
these engines having some form of
advanced valve actuation, combined
with direct injection and turbocharging.
Some of these engines also have
combustion restart. These engines also
provide maximum power and torque
similar to the engines they are replacing
while delivering higher fuel economy,
although impacts on price and
performance measures are also
uncertain.
For some selected technologies, Table
III–2 compares MY 2011 penetration
rates in manufacturers’ product plans
from the 2007 plans to those from the
2008 plans. This comparison reveals
both increases and decreases in planned
technology application for MY 2011,
including a doubling in the planned
production of hybrid electric vehicles
(here, including only ‘‘strong’’ hybrids
such as power-split hybrids and plug-in
hybrids). Because this comparison is
limited to MY 2011, it does not
evidence manufacturers’ plans—
discussed above—to redesign many
vehicles in MY 2012 (and later years)
and, in doing so, to increase further the
use of some fuel-saving technologies.
This also holds true for the GM and
Chrysler restructuring plans, which
describe limits to attaining anticipated
MY 2011 targets, in particular for GM
trucks in that year, but at the same time
differ markedly in terms of the estimates
of the total number of vehicles sold.
Information on the impact of
penetration rates is of course
conditioned on sales volumes, which
vary for MY 2011 from 11.1 million for
Chrysler to 14.3 million for GM. While
information regarding these later
technology improvements was provided
to NHTSA, it did not form the basis for
the establishment of the MY 2011 CAFE
standards.
Manufacturers have also, in 2008,
indicated plans to sell more dual-fuel or
flexible-fuel vehicles (FFVs) than
indicated in the plans they submitted to
NHTSA in 2007. FFVs create a potential
market for alternatives to petroleumbased gasoline and diesel fuel. For
purposes of determining compliance
with CAFE standards, the fuel economy
of a FFV is, subject to limitations,
adjusted upward to account for this
potential.100 However, NHTSA is
precluded from ‘‘taking credit’’ for the
compliance flexibility by accounting for
manufacturers’ ability to earn and use
credits in determining what standards
would be ‘‘maximum feasible.’’101 Some
manufacturers plan to produce a
considerably greater share of FFVs than
can earn full credit under EPCA. The
projected average FFV share of the
market in MY 2011 is 14 percent for the
NPRM and 17 percent for the final rule.
Consistent with these expected trends
toward wider application of fuel-saving
technologies, the product plan data
indicates that almost all manufacturers
expect to produce a more efficient fleet
than they had planned to produce in
2007. However, because manufacturers’
product plans also reflect simultaneous
changes in fleet mix and other vehicle
characteristics, the relationship between
increased technology utilization and
100 See
101 49
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trucks are planned to be discontinued
altogether and replaced with totally new
products that have unibody
construction. Some of the trend for midsize SUVs being replaced by unibody
vehicles is already visible in the
marketplace and reflected in NHTSA’s
forecast of the MY 2011 light vehicle
market.
Concerning engine trends, the
manufacturers’ plans show a significant
amount of engine downsizing. This
downsizing is of two major types: first,
replacing existing engines with smaller
displacement engines while keeping the
same number of cylinders per engine;
second, replacing existing engines with
engines having a smaller number of
cylinders (e.g., 6-cylinder engines
instead of 8-cylinder engines and 4cylinder engines instead of 6-cylinder
engines). The plans indicate that for
many of the engines being downsized,
the replacement engines have some
form of advanced valve actuation (e.g.,
variable valve lift) combined with other
technologies, such as engine friction
reduction or direct injection. When such
changes occur the replacement engines
Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 59 / Monday, March 30, 2009 / Rules and Regulations
14227
shows manufacturer-specific CAFE
levels (not counting CAFE credits that
some manufacturers expect to earn by
producing flexible fuel vehicles)
planned in 2007 for passenger cars and
light trucks. Table III–3b shows the
combined averages of these planned
CAFE levels. Tables III–4a and III–4b
show corresponding information from
manufacturers’ 2008 plans. These tables
demonstrate that, with very few
exceptions, manufacturers are planning
to increase overall average fuel economy
beyond the levels shown in the plans
they submitted in 2007. In addition,
according to the restructuring plans
submitted to the Treasury Department,
GM states that it will reach average fleet
fuel economy of 32.5 mpg for passenger
vehicles and 23.6 mpg for trucks in MY
2011, compared to the 30.3 and 21.4
reported in Table III–4a, below.102 Also,
Chrysler’s restructuring plan states that
the company plans to accelerate its
utilization of more fuel-efficient power
trains, for example, to improve fuel
efficiency on a remixed product line. In
addition, Chrysler plans, according to
the restructuring, to offer flexible fuel
capability in half of its light trucks by
2012.
102 Unlike the values shown in Table III–4a, the
average fuel economy levels shown in GM’s
restructuring plan reflect ‘‘full usage of all credit
flexibilities under the CAFE program.’’ It is not
clear how much of the difference between Table III–
4a and GM’s February 2009 estimates is accounted
for by such flexibilities.
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increased fuel economy cannot be
isolated with any certainty. To do so
would require an apples-to-apples
‘‘counterfactual’’ fleet of vehicles that
are, except for technology and fuel
economy, identical—for example, in
terms of fleet mix and vehicle
performance and utility. As a result,
NHTSA’s baseline market forecast
shows industry-wide average fuel
economy levels somewhat higher than
shown in the NPRM. Average fuel
economy for MY 2011 is 26.0 mpg in the
NPRM baseline forecast, and 26.5 mpg
in the final rule.
These changes are shown in greater
detail below in Table III–3a, which
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14229
reported previously. However, these
planned increases are, in the aggregate,
attributable to the reassignment of
vehicles from the light truck to the
passenger car fleet. The average planned
footprint among all planned passenger
cars and light trucks remained
unchanged.
Table III–6 shows that manufacturers’
latest plans reflect a small increase in
overall average vehicle weight.
However, for both the passenger car and
light truck fleets, the reassignment of
some light trucks to the passenger car
fleet caused the average curb weight for
both fleets to increase, even though
doing so did not (and, of course, could
not) change the overall average curb
weight. Without these reassignments,
the average curb weights of the
passenger car and light truck fleets
would have dropped by about 5 and 35
pounds, respectively.103
103 Notwithstanding the reassignment of some
vehicles to the passenger car fleet, manufacturers’
July 2008 product plans also indicated shifts in the
mix of passenger cars and light trucks, such that
overall average curb weight increased despite these
small decreases in average passenger car and
average light truck curb weight.
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do not identify manufacturers by name,
and do not present them in the same
sequence.
Table III–5 shows that manufacturers’
latest plans reflect a very slight (less
than 0.1 square feet) increase in overall
average passenger vehicle size, and
suggests that manufacturers currently
plan to sell larger trucks than they
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Tables III–5 through III–7 summarize
other changes in manufacturers’ product
plans between those submitted to
NHTSA in 2007 (for the NPRM) and
2008 (for the final rule). These tables
present average vehicle footprint, curb
weight, and power-to-weight ratios for
each of the seven largest manufacturers,
and for the overall industry. The tables
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than previously reported to NHTSA.
This trend is detectable by analysis of
the detailed product plans, and is
appears to be corroborated by the
reported change in intended product
mix that GM and Chrysler state in their
restructuring plans.
These overall trends mask the fact
that manufacturers’ plans did not all
change in the same ways. In terms of
planned average footprint, changes in
manufacturers’ plans ranged from a 4
percent decrease to a 5 percent increase.
In terms of planned average curb weight
and power-to-weight ratio, these ranges
covered -4 percent to 3 percent and -5
percent to 15 percent, respectively.
NHTSA recognizes that some
manufacturers’ plans to increase vehicle
performance reflect an intention to
apply some fuel-saving technologies in
ways that do not hold performance and
utility constant, and therefore do not
achieve the same fuel economy
increases that NHTSA would assume
when estimating the effect of adding
these technologies for the sole purpose
of complying with CAFE standards.
This continues what has long been
standard practice in the industry.
Vehicle performance, amenities, and
utility have been generally increasing
for more than a century, in response to
consumer demand. Manufacturers have
applied innumerable technological
advances during that time, and although
they have achieved significant fuel
economy gains, they have not applied
these technological advances for the
sole purpose of increasing fuel
economy. When applying a given
technology to a given vehicle, a
manufacturer does so in a way that
balances multiple vehicle
characteristics, including fuel economy.
For example, while a manufacturer
might make both a gasoline and diesel
version of a given sedan, the diesel
version might offer more weightincreasing amenities (e.g., luxury
seating) and significantly better
performance (e.g., torque). In this case,
the diesel version would have greater
value to the consumer, and would thus
command a higher price.
The Union of Concerned Scientists
(UCS) and some other commenters
suggested that manufacturers’ product
plans, and NHTSA’s use of these plans,
may have at least the appearance of
wrongdoing.104 Such comments cite a
‘‘lack of transparency’’ ultimately
traceable to the fact that the submitted
product plans contain confidential
business information, which the agency
is prohibited by federal law from
disclosing, as discussed above.
However, NHTSA believes these
perceptions may also arise because UCS
and others realize that manufacturers
often use technology to increase
performance (and other vehicle
characteristics), not just to increase fuel
economy, and thus may assign a fuel
economy ‘‘effectiveness’’ to a
technology in their product plans that is
lower than if the technology was used
solely to increase fuel economy. If so,
NHTSA rejects the notion that for
manufacturers to do so constitutes any
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in light truck curb weight, this suggests
that (1) the vehicles being reassigned to
the passenger car fleet are among the
less powerful (per pound) of the
vehicles previously assigned to the light
truck fleet and (2) manufacturers are
planning to install somewhat more
powerful engines in many light trucks
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Table III–7 shows that manufacturers’
latest plans reflect a small increase
(about 1.7 percent) in overall average
performance, and suggests that increases
will mostly occur in the light truck fleet.
Considering that this 3.5 percent
increase in light truck performance is
accompanied by a 2.7 percent increase
Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 59 / Monday, March 30, 2009 / Rules and Regulations
14231
seeking federal funds have reported
plans to alter their product mix in favor
of smaller, more fuel-efficient vehicles,
it is too soon to tell to what extent
consumers will adapt to such a product
mix for MY 2011 (which may, to a large
extent, depend on fuel prices), or
whether the rest of the industry will
follow or instead decide to serve the
market for larger performance vehicles
left behind by GM and Chrysler.
Expected model years in which each
vehicle model will be redesigned or
freshened constitute another important
aspect of NHTSA’s market forecast. As
discussed in Section IV, NHTSA’s
analysis supporting today’s rulemaking
times the addition of most technologies
to coincide with either a vehicle
redesign or a vehicle freshening.
Product plans submitted to NHTSA
preceding both the NPRM and the final
rule contained manufacturers’ estimates
of vehicle redesign and freshening
schedules. However, as discussed in
Section IV, NHTSA estimated that in the
future, most vehicles would be
redesigned on a five-year schedule, with
vehicle freshening (i.e., refresh)
occurring every two to three years after
a redesign. After applying these
estimates, the shares of manufacturers’
passenger car and light truck estimated
to be redesigned in MY 2011 were as
summarized below for the seven largest
manufacturers. Table III–8 shows the
percentages of each manufacturer’s
fleets expected to be redesigned in MY
2011 from the market forecast used by
NHTSA in the analysis documented in
the NPRM. To protect confidential
information, manufacturers are not
identified by name. Table III–9 presents
corresponding estimates from the
analysis supporting today’s final rule.
To further protect confidential
information, the numbering of
individual manufacturers is different
from that shown in Table III–8.
We continue, therefore, to estimate
that manufacturers’ redesigns will not
be uniformly distributed across model
years. This is in keeping with standard
industry practices, and reflects what
manufacturers actually do–NHTSA has
observed that manufacturers in fact do
redesign more vehicles in some years
than in others. NHTSA staff have
closely examined manufacturers’
planned redesign schedules, contacting
some manufacturers for clarification of
some plans, and confirmed that these
plans remain unevenly distributed over
time. For example, although Table 9
shows that NHTSA expects Company 2
to redesign 34 percent of its passenger
car models in MY 2011, current
information indicates that this company
will then redesign only (a different) 10
percent of its passenger cars in MY
2012. Similarly, although Table 9 shows
that NHTSA expects four of the largest
seven light truck manufacturers to
redesign virtually no light truck models
in MY 2011, current information also
indicates that these four manufacturers
will redesign 21–49 percent of their
light trucks in MY 2012. GM and
Chrysler’s recent restructuring plans
lend support to these observations.
Chrysler described its planned entries of
new vehicles (its ‘‘launch cadence’’) in
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form of ‘‘wrongdoing.’’ Manufacturers
compete in a marketplace that reflects
the values that consumers place on
vehicle amenities, performance, and
utility, as well as fuel economy.
When NHTSA estimates the cost and
effect of adding technologies in
response to CAFE standards, the agency
is treating these technologies as being
applied solely for that purpose;
therefore, the agency’s analysis reflects
an attempt to hold amenities,
performance, and utility constant. Thus,
NHTSA’s analysis estimates means by
which manufacturers could comply
with CAFE standards. Manufacturers,
however, determine how they actually
will comply. As an example, if a
manufacturer plans to apply
technologies in ways that increase
vehicle performance in addition to
increasing fuel economy, NHTSA would
have to find a way of accounting for the
value that those performance increases
represent. While the manufacturers
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its plan, and there is clear phasing, with
MY 2011 experiencing many new
introductions and some later years
having none.105
NHTSA understands that a
manufacturer may choose to time the
application of technologies to coincide
with planned redesigns, and elect in one
model year to apply more technology
than needed to meet its required CAFE
level in that year. However, NHTSA has
decided not to attempt to represent this
type of manufacturer response to the
MY 2011 CAFE standards because it is
not relevant for the current
rulemaking.106 NHTSA will consider
this issue further in future rulemaking
analyses.
2. Once NHTSA has the product plans,
how does it develop the baseline?
In all cases, manufacturers’ sales
volumes were normalized to produce
passenger car and light truck fleets
which reflected each manufacturers’ MY
2008 market shares within the aggregate
vehicle sales volume forecast in EIA’s
2008 Annual Energy Outlook. NHTSA
does this in order to develop a market
forecast that is realistic in terms of both
its overall size as well as manufacturers’
relative market shares. The product mix
for each manufacturer that submitted
product plans was preserved and, in the
case of those than did not submit plans,
the product mix used was the same as
indicated in their pre-model year 2008
CAFE data. As was discussed earlier,
the manufacturers themselves are
uncertain about future aggregate sales
volumes. Although the market is facing
a downturn of unprecedented
magnitude, NHTSA currently expects
that pent-up demand (driven, for
example, by the continued use and
eventual scrappage of existing vehicles)
and an eventual economic recovery will,
over time, bring sales back to more
historic levels.
CBD commented that this method of
establishing the baseline fleet ‘‘has
illegally constrained [NHTSA’s] analysis
by locking [NHTSA] into the
assumption that a manufacturer’s fleet
mix need not, and will not, change in
response to’’ increasing consumer
demand for vehicles with improved fuel
economy. Whether NHTSA should
incorporate market shifts in its
modeling has been a theme in
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105 Chrysler
plan, p. 135.
although the agency will
reconsider this issue in future rulemakings, at this
time the agency is not confident that it has the
statutory authority to base its determination of the
maximum feasible CAFE standard in a given model
year on manufacturers’ ability to over-comply
during prior model years in which more vehicles
were redesigned.
106 Additionally,
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comments for the past several CAFE
rulemakings. Comments with regard to
market shift tend to address two
different issues. First, commenters
request that NHTSA assume a higher
fuel economy baseline than
manufacturer product plans indicate,
due to market shifts occurring because
consumers demand higher fuel economy
even without CAFE standards. The
Mercatus Center, for example, raised
this point in comments to the NPRM.
Second, commenters suggest that
NHTSA should incorporate the market
shifts that result due to CAFE
regulation, as manufacturers adjust
vehicle prices and fuel economy levels,
and consumers respond to those
changes. The Alliance recommended
that NHTSA use NERA’s nested logit
model, for example, since it attempts to
account for ‘‘actual consumer demand
behavior’’ to address this issue.
NHTSA agrees in principle that some
kind of ‘‘market shift’’ model could
provide useful information regarding
the possible effects of potential new
CAFE standards, and has researched
how to integrate such a model into its
stringency analysis. NHTSA recognizes
that the product plans on which the
agency relies to determine CAFE
stringency represent a snapshot, and are
subject to change in response to
consumer demand, whether driven by
CAFE or by extrinsic factors. Although
NHTSA has now spent several years
considering how to incorporate market
shifts into its analysis of potential CAFE
standards, the agency has still not been
able to develop credible coefficients
specifying such a model, and we have
therefore continued to refrain in the
final rule from integrating a market
share model into the Volpe model.107
However, manufacturer product plans
for MY 2011 do already, at a minimum,
reflect whatever market shifts the
manufacturers believe will occur in the
absence of regulations. Additionally, the
agency conducts a separate analysis of
potential changes in manufacturers’
overall sales volumes. NHTSA will
continue to consider ways in which to
incorporate market shift modeling into
its analysis for future rulemakings.
Recent upheavals in the economy,
including historically quick run-ups in
gasoline prices followed by as dramatic
107 NHTSA
is aware that Resources for the Future
(RFF) has drafted a report regarding its examination
of consumer behavior modeling. Although a market
share model, as currently envisioned by NHTSA,
would also need to address manufacturer behavior
(in particular, regarding pricing), NHTSA will
consider RFF’s work in evaluating future changes
to NHTSA’s analytical methods. NHTSA has met
with EPA and RFF staff to discuss the status of
RFF’s efforts, and will consider any results RFF is
able to develop.
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declines, greatly affect consumer
demand for vehicles. Econometric
models such as nested logit are
necessarily calibrated on historic data
and thus, while offering a consistent
method for describing the future, are
constrained to reflect behavior based on
past reactions to events. The release of
the restructuring plans for GM and
Chrysler are cases in point. They show
considerable alterations in product
plans, including reduction of planned
sales volumes and nameplates, along
with introduction of new models and
accelerated adoption of technology, that
appear to reflect a break with historical
trends.
Thus, the baseline fleet for MY 2011,
or the baseline market forecast, consists
of the vehicles present in the
normalized and completed product
plans, before NHTSA applies
technologies to them. Manufacturers
typically provide product plans not only
for the years covered by a CAFE
rulemaking, but also for prior years—so,
for purposes of this rulemaking, NHTSA
has product plans from many
manufacturers beginning with MY 2008.
As discussed above, NHTSA uses the
baseline market forecast as a way of
gauging what manufacturer fuel
economy levels would exist in the
absence of new CAFE standards. In
order to provide a point of reference for
estimating the costs and benefits of new
standards, NHTSA assumes that,
without new standards, the fuel
economy standards would remain at the
level of the MY 2010 standards.108
However, the baseline market forecast,
which again, is based on the product
plans, does not show all manufacturers
in compliance with the MY 2010
standards. This results from
manufacturers’ ability to use
compliance flexibilities, like credits
(AMFA and otherwise) and fines, to
meet the standards, which NHTSA is
statutorily prohibited from considering
in setting the standards.
In order to ensure that our analysis
does not incorporate such flexibilities
and thus result in double-counting of
costs that were evaluated in the
previous rulemaking, NHTSA must
adjust the baseline market forecast
upwards. For manufacturers whose
108 As a point of reference for analysis, we note
that assuming that CAFE standards remain at 2010
levels is different from assuming that manufacturer
fuel economy levels remains at their 2010 levels. As
a legal matter under EISA, after MY 2011, if NHTSA
does not set standards for a model year, there are
no standards for that model year. However, as a
practical matter, it is reasonable to assume that
manufacturers would proceed as if the previous
year’s standard carried over, rather than changing
their vehicles and allowing fuel economy to fall
without limit.
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product plans show fuel economy levels
below the MY 2010 standards, NHTSA
adjusts them upwards by adding
technology to the manufacturer’s fleet in
order to get the manufacturer into
compliance without use of credits or
payment of fines. For manufacturers
whose product plans meet or exceed the
MY 2010 standards, NHTSA
incorporates them as-is. NHTSA
develops an adjusted baseline because
the costs and benefits of reaching the
MY 2010 standards were already
accounted for in prior rulemakings, just
as the costs and benefits of reaching the
MY 2011 standards are accounted for in
the current rulemaking. To avoid
double-counting the costs to
manufacturers or the benefits to society
required to meet the MY 2010
standards, NHTSA develops this
adjusted baseline, which the agency
then uses in analyzing the MY 2011
standards.
The Alliance commented that NHTSA
should use an ‘‘actual’’ baseline instead
of a ‘‘projected’’ baseline. The Alliance
stated that ‘‘NHTSA assumes that
manufacturers were going to increase
fuel economy significantly in numerous
ways apart from a congressional or
agency mandate to do so,’’ and argued
that ‘‘by failing to consider the price
increases needed to reach its ‘projected
baseline,’ NHTSA underestimates the
increase in vehicle prices by about $260
per vehicle for cars and $920 per vehicle
for trucks on average.’’
As explained, NHTSA would be
double-counting to incorporate the costs
of meeting the MY 2010 standards in the
cost/benefit analysis for the current
rulemaking. NHTSA discusses these
costs, however, in the FRIA in Chapter
I.
3. How does NHTSA’s market forecast
reflect current market conditions?
NHTSA’s market forecast for MY
2011, which is based significantly on
confidential product plans provided to
the agency by vehicle manufacturers,
reflects the agency’s best judgment at
the time it was developed.
Manufacturers submitted plans during
the summer of 2008. In preceding
months, the industry had begun to show
signs of stress, and the agency believes
manufacturers’ revised plans submitted
after the NPRM were informed by this.
NHTSA is well aware that market
conditions have deteriorated since late
summer, just as the agency is aware that
gasoline prices have fallen considerably
in recent months.
The agency notes, as mentioned
above, that manufacturers’ product
plans were submitted along with
manufacturers’ indications that these
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plans were generally informed by
expectations that relatively high fuel
prices would prevail in the future.
Although NHTSA did not request that
manufacturers provide comprehensive
and detailed forecasts of the world
economy, including markets for credit
and petroleum, the agency believes that
manufacturers anticipated that, at least
from MY 2011 forward, the economic
environment would look much less dire
than more recent events would suggest.
The agency believes these expectations
were consistent with those embodied in
the high price scenario in EIA’s AEO
2008, upon which the agency has based
the fuel prices and total light vehicle
market size used in the analysis
supporting today’s final rule.
NHTSA is cautiously hopeful that
market conditions will rebound, and our
market forecast remains consistent with
that expectation. The recent
restructuring plans submitted by
Chrysler and GM, while diverging in
absolute terms with respect to sales
volumes, also anticipate significant
sales growth by the middle part of the
decade. In any event, were NHTSA to
adopt more pessimistic expectations,
those expectations would need to be
reflected in other economic forecasts—
in particular of petroleum prices. Were
NHTSA to apply economic estimates
that assume credit markets remain very
constricted during MY 2011, it should,
for internal consistency, apply
considerably reduced estimates of the
overall number of light vehicles sold in
the U.S., and potentially lower estimates
of gasoline and diesel fuel prices during
the lifetimes of the vehicles covered by
the standards.
NHTSA has concluded that the
forecasts it has applied in its current
rulemaking for MY 2011 reflect the best
internally consistent information
available. The agency will, of course,
update these forecasts in future
rulemakings, and will base its analysis
in those rulemakings on information—
public, commercially-available, or
confidential—that it considers most
indicative of the fleets that
manufacturers are likely to produce in
future model years
IV. Fuel Economy-Improving
Technologies
As explained above, pursuant to the
President’s January 26, 2009
memorandum, this final rule establishes
passenger car and light truck CAFE
standards for one year, MY 2011.
Although this final rule establishes
standards for that year alone, the agency
undertook a comprehensive analysis of
fuel economy-improving technologies
with a time horizon similar to the one
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considered in the 2002 National
Academy of Sciences (NAS) CAFE
report. Like NAS, the agency considered
technologies that are readily available,
well known and could be incorporated
into vehicles once production decisions
are made (these are referred to as
‘‘production intent’’ technologies).
Other technologies considered, called
‘‘emerging’’, are beyond the research
phase and under development, but are
not widely used at this time. The agency
did not consider technologies in the
research stage because their costs and/
or performance are not presently well
known.
The agency has elected to include the
full analysis in this final rule for several
reasons. First, it supplements the
analysis of fuel saving technology
released by the 2002 NAS study.
Second, it places in meaningful context
the portion of the analysis that relates
directly to MY 2011, showing which
technologies are not available for that
year and why. The agency typically
evaluates technologies within a time
context spanning more than a single
model year, even if the rulemaking itself
addresses only a single year as in the
current rulemaking, because when
manufacturers add technologies to
vehicle models in order to meet CAFE
standards, they tend to phase them in
over several model years, consistent
with vehicle redesign and refresh
schedules, supplier contract procedures,
the need for testing and validation of
new technologies, and so forth.
Consequently, although the final rule
establishes standards for MY 2011 only,
NHTSA believes that including the
entire technology analysis will increase
public understanding of the agency’s
estimates for MY 2011 of technology
costs, effectiveness, and availability, as
well as manufacturer vehicle freshening
and redesign cycles.
With that in mind, the following
section details the cost and effectiveness
estimates completed for technologies in
the production intent or emerging
technology phase timeline. The
estimates are drawn from an analysis
conducted in the summer of 2008. It
relied as much as possible on published
studies and confidential product plan
data submitted by manufacturers on July
1, 2008 in response to the agency’s
NPRM request for comments published
May 2, 2008. The analysis was
conducted by engineers from DOT and
Ricardo, an international consulting
firm that specializes in automotive
engineering consulting (discussed
below). The engineering team used all
data available at that time, along with
their expert opinion to derive cost and
effectiveness estimates for technologies
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either in production or in the emerging
stage of production for purposes of this
rulemaking.
The agency believes that the resulting
estimates are the best available for MY
2011, given the information that existed
at the time. NHTSA recognizes,
however, that the analysis of and public
debate over the cost and effectiveness of
the various fuel saving technologies is
an ongoing one. It recognizes too that
aspects of its technology analysis will
likely require updating or otherwise
merit revision for the next CAFE
rulemaking. As time progresses, new
research occurs, new studies become
available and product plan information
changes. As with all CAFE rulemakings
and pursuant to the President’s
memorandum, the agency will take a
fresh look at all of its technology-related
assumptions for the purpose of future
rulemakings.
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A. NHTSA Analyzes What Technologies
Can Be Applied Beyond Those in the
Manufacturers’ Product Plans
One of the key statutory factors that
NHTSA must consider in setting
maximum feasible CAFE standards for
each model year is the availability and
feasibility of fuel saving technologies.
When manufacturers submit their
product plans to NHTSA, they identify
the technologies they are planning for
each vehicle model in each model year.
They also provide their assessments of
the costs and effectiveness of those fuel
saving technologies. The agency uses
the manufacturers’ product plan data to
ascertain the ‘‘baseline’’ capabilities and
average fuel economy of each
manufacturer. Given the agency’s need
to consider economic practicability in
determining how quickly additional fuel
saving technologies can be added to the
manufacturers’ vehicle planned fleets,
the agency researches and develops,
based on the best available information
and data, its own list of technologies
that it believes will be ready for
implementation during the model years
covered by the rulemaking. This
includes developing estimates of the
costs and effectiveness of each
technology and lead time needs. The
resultant technology assumptions form
an input into the Volpe model. The
model simulates how manufacturers can
comply with a given CAFE level by
adding technologies beyond those they
planned in a systematic, efficient and
reproducible manner. The following
sections describe NHTSA’s fuel-saving
technology assumptions and
methodology for estimating them, and
their applicability to MY 2011 vehicles.
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B. How NHTSA Decides Which
Technologies to Include
1. How NHTSA Did This Historically,
and How for the NPRM
In the agency’s last two CAFE
rulemakings, which established light
truck CAFE standards for MYs 2005–
2007 and MYs 2008–2011, NHTSA
relied on the 2002 National Academy of
Sciences’ report, ‘‘Effectiveness and
Impact of Corporate Average Fuel
Economy Standards’’ 109 (‘‘the 2002
NAS Report’’) for estimating potential
fuel economy effectiveness values and
associated retail costs of applying
combinations of technologies in 10
classes of production vehicles. The NAS
study was commissioned by the agency,
at the direction of Congress, in order to
provide independent and peer reviewed
estimates of cost and effectiveness
numbers. The NAS list was determined
by a panel of experts formed by the
National Academy of Sciences, and was
then peer-reviewed by individuals
chosen for their diverse perspectives
and technical expertise in accordance
with procedures approved by the Report
Review Committee of the National
Research.
In the NPRM for the MY 2011–2015
CAFE standards, NHTSA explained that
there has been substantial advancement
in fuel-saving automotive technologies
since the publication of the 2002 NAS
Report. New technologies, i.e., ones that
were not assessed in the NAS report,
have appeared in the market place or are
expected to appear in the timeframe of
the proposed rulemaking. Also, new
studies have been conducted and
reports issued by several other
organizations providing new or different
information regarding the fuel economy
technologies that will be available and
their costs and effectiveness values. To
aid the agency in assessing these
developments, NHTSA contracted with
the NAS to update the fuel economy
section, Chapter 3, of the 2002 NAS
Report. However, as NHTSA explained,
the NAS update was not available in
time for this rulemaking.
Accordingly, NHTSA worked with
EPA staff to update the technology
assumptions, and used the results as a
basis for its NPRM. EPA staff published
a related report and submitted it to the
NAS committee.110
109 National Research Council, ‘‘Effectiveness and
Impact of Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE)
Standards,’’ National Academy Press, Washington,
DC (2002). Available at https://www.nap.edu/
openbook.php?isbn=0309076013 (last accessed
October 11, 2008).
110 EPA Staff Technical Report: Cost and
Effectiveness Estimates of Technologies Used to
Reduce Light-Duty Vehicle Carbon Dioxide
Emissions, EPA 420–R–08–008, March 2008.
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2. NHTSA’s Contract with Ricardo for
the Final Rule
NHTSA specifically sought comment
on the estimates, which it had
developed jointly with EPA, of the
availability, applicability, cost, and
effectiveness of fuel-saving
technologies, and the order in which the
technologies were applied. See 73 FR
24352, 24367. To aid the agency in
analyzing those comments and
increasing the accuracy, clarity and
transparency of its technology
assumptions and methodologies
employed in developing them, it hired
an international consulting firm,
Ricardo, which specializes in
automotive engineering consulting.
Ricardo, which describes itself as an
eco-innovation technology company, is
a leading independent provider of
technology, product innovation,
engineering solutions, software and
strategic consulting. Its skill base
includes the state-of-the-art in low
emissions and fuel-efficient powertrain
and vehicle technology. Its customers
include government agencies here and
abroad and the world’s automotive,
transport and new-energy industries.111
For example, it has provided technical
consulting on low CO2 strategies to the
UK Department for Transport (DfT).112
Additionally, in December 2007,
Ricardo completed an important study
for EPA titled ‘‘A Study of Potential
Effectiveness of Carbon Dioxide
Reducing Vehicle Technologies.’’ 113
Ricardo’s role was as a technical
advisor to NHTSA staff. In this capacity,
Ricardo helped NHTSA undertake a
comprehensive review of the NPRM
technology assumptions and all
comments received on those
assumptions, based on both old and
new public and confidential
manufacturer information. NHTSA and
Ricardo staff reviewed and compared
comments on the availability and
applicability of technologies, and the
logical progression between them.
NHTSA also reviewed and compared
the methodologies used for determining
111 More information about Ricardo’s work is
available at their Web site, https://www.ricardo.com
(last accessed September 20, 2008). Its 2007 Annual
Report provides a comprehensive view of some of
its current work. See https://www.ricardo.com/
investors/download/annualreport2007.pdf (last
accessed September 22, 2008).
112 Ricardo UK Ltd., ‘‘Understanding
manufacturers’ responses to policy measures to
incentivise fuel efficiency,’’ Oct. 5, 2007. Available
at https://www.dft.gov.uk/consultations/closed/
co2emissions/ricardoreport.pdf (last accessed Oct.
4, 2008).
113 A slightly updated (June 2008) version of
Ricardo’s study for EPA is available on EPA’s Web
site, at https://www.epa.gov/otaq/technology/
420r08004a.pdf (last accessed September 20, 2008).
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the costs and effectiveness of the
technologies as well as the specific
estimates provided. Relying on the
technical expertise of Ricardo and
taking into consideration all the
information available, NHTSA revised
its estimates of the availability and
applicability of many technologies, and
revised its estimate of the order in
which the technologies were applied
and how they are differentiated by
vehicle class, as well as the costs and
effectiveness estimates and used the
revised numbers in analyzing
alternative levels of stringency.
While NHTSA sought Ricardo’s
expertise and relied significantly on
their assistance as a neutral expert in
developing its technical assumptions, it
retained responsibility for the final
estimates. The agency believes that the
representation of technologies for MY
2011—that is, estimates of the
availability, applicability, cost, and
effectiveness of fuel-saving
technologies, and the order in which the
technologies were applied—used in this
rulemaking is more accurate than that
used in the NPRM, and is the best
available for purposes of this
rulemaking.
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C. What Technology Assumptions has
NHTSA Used for the Final Rule?
1. How do NHTSA’s technology
assumptions in the final rule differ from
those used in the NPRM?
This final rule uses the same basic
framework as the NPRM. However,
NHTSA made several changes to its
technology assumptions based on
comments and information received
during the rulemaking. As in the NPRM
and the MY 2008–2011 light truck rule,
the agency relied on the Volpe model
CAFE Compliance and Effects Modeling
System which was developed by the
Department of Transportation’s Volpe
National Transportation Systems Center
(Volpe Center) to apply technologies.
The model, known as the Volpe model,
is the primary tool the agency has used
in conducting a ‘‘compliance analysis’’
of various CAFE stringencies. The Volpe
model relied on the same types of
technology related inputs as in previous
rules, including market data files,
technology cost and effectiveness
estimates by vehicle classification,
technology synergies, phase-in rates,
learning curve adjustments, and
technology decision trees.
Regarding the decision trees, both the
structure of the trees and ordering of the
technologies were revised. The decision
trees have been expanded so that
NHTSA is better able to track the
incremental and net/cumulative cost
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and effectiveness of each technology,
which substantially improves the
‘‘accounting’’ of costs and effectiveness
for the final rule.114 The revised
decision trees also have improved
integration, accuracy, and technology
representations.
In revising the decision trees, NHTSA
updated, combined, split and/or
renamed technologies. Several
technologies were added, while others
were deleted. The three technologies
that were deleted because they do not
appear in either public or confidential
data and are primarily in the research
phase of development are: Camless
Valve Actuation, Lean-Burn Gasoline
Direct-Injection and Homogenous
Charge Compression Ignition.115
NHTSA also added three advanced
technologies based on confidential
manufacturer submissions which
showed these technologies as being
emerging and currently under
development. These technologies are:
Combustion Restart, Exhaust Gas
Recirculation Boost, and Plug-in
Hybrids.
The Volpe model was modified to
allow a non-linear phase-in rate across
the five model years, rather than a
constant phase-in rate as was used in
the NPRM and in previous rules. Most
technology applications have tighter
phase-in caps in the early years to
provide for additional lead time.
114 In addition to the (simplified) decision trees,
as published in this document, NHTSA also
utilized ‘‘expanded’’ decision trees in the final rule
analysis. Expanded decision trees graphically
represent each unique path, considering the branch
points available to the Volpe model, which can be
utilized for applying fuel saving technologies. For
instance, the engine decision tree shown in this
document has 20 boxes representing engine
technologies, whereas the expanded engine
decision tree requires a total of 45 boxes to
accurately represent all available application
variants. Expanded decision trees presented a
significant improvement, compared to the NPRM
analysis, in the overall assessment and tracking of
applied technologies since they allowed NHTSA
staff to accurately view and assess both the
incremental and the accumulated, or net cost and
effectiveness at any stage of technology application
in a decision tree. Because of the large format of the
expanded decision trees, they could not be
included in the Federal Register, so NHTSA refers
the reader to Docket No. NHTSA–2008–0177.
Expanded decision trees for the engine,
electrification/transmission/hybridization, and the
vehicle technologies (three separate decision trees)
were developed for each of the 12 vehicle
technology application classes (the vehicle
subclasses discussed in Section IV.D.4) and the
three expanded decision trees for the Large Car
subclass have been placed in the docket as an
example for the reader’s information.
115 We note that GM included lean burn HCCI in
its restructuring plans submitted to Congress, but
the restructuring plans were submitted too late for
the agency to consider them in its technology
analysis, among other reasons. GM Restructuring
Plan, p. 22.
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In the NPRM, NHTSA applied
volume-based learning factors to
technology costs for the first time. These
learning factors were developed using
the parameters of learning threshold,
learning rate (decremented over two
cycles), and the initial (unlearned) cost.
In the NPRM, NHTSA applied a
learning rate discount of 20 percent
each time a technology was projected
for use on 25,000 vehicles per
manufacturer, which was the threshold
volume for learning rate discounts. The
discounts were only taken twice, at
25,000 and 50,000 vehicles. A
technology was viewed as being fully
learned out at 100,000 units.
The agency also reconsidered volumebased learning factors and made
significant revisions. First, the volume
learning is now applied on an industry
basis as opposed to a manufacturer
basis. This takes into account the fact
that the automobile industry shares best
practices and that manufacturers learn
from that sharing to produce their
vehicles at lower costs. For the final
rule, the revised learning threshold is
set to 300,000 vehicles per year by the
automobile industry. This number was
developed based on comments
indicating that many of the publicly
available technology cost estimates are
based on production quantities of
900,000 to 1.5 million vehicles by at
least 3 manufacturers. The agency notes,
however, that none of the technologies
applied in MY 2011 receive volumebased learning, due to the time frame
applicable.
For the technologies applied in the
final rule, a time-based learning factor
was used in response to public
comments from Ford and others. This
learning factor was not applied in the
NPRM. Time-based learning is applied
to widely available, high volume, stable
and mature technologies typically
purchased under negotiated multi-year
contractual agreement with suppliers.
This type of an agreement is typical of
most supplier-provided fuel saving
technologies. With time-based learning,
the initial cost of a technology is
reduced by a fixed amount in its second
and subsequent year of availability. A
fixed rate 3 percent year-over-year cost
reduction is applied up to a maximum
of 12 percent cost reduction.
In the NPRM NHTSA divided
vehicles into ten subclasses based on
technology applicability: four for cars
and six for trucks. NHTSA assigned
passenger cars into one of the following
subclasses: Subcompact, Compact,
Midsize, or Large Car. NHTSA assigned
light trucks into one of the following
subclasses: Minivan, Small SUV,
Medium SUV, Large SUV, Small Pickup
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Truck, or Large Pickup Truck. In its
2008 NPRM for MY 2011–2015, NHTSA
included some differentiation in cost
and effectiveness numbers between the
various classes to account for
differences in technology costs and
effectiveness that are observed when
technologies are applied on to different
classes and subclasses of vehicles.
For the final rule, NHTSA, working
with Ricardo, increased the accuracy of
its technology assumptions by
reexamining the subclasses developed
for the purpose of modeling technology
application. For passenger cars, NHTSA
divided vehicles into eight subclasses
based on technology applicability by
creating a performance class under each
of the four subclasses. For trucks,
NHTSA established four subclasses,
including a minivan subclass, and
small, midsize and large SUV/Pickup/
Van subclasses. NHTSA also provided
more differentiation in the costs and
effectiveness values by vehicle subclass.
The agency found it important to make
that differentiation because the agency
estimated that some technologies would
have different implications for large
vehicles than for smaller vehicles.
In summary, the revisions to
NHTSA’s methodology for technology
application and cost and effectiveness
estimates are designed to respond to
comments, many of which focused on
various inaccuracies and lack of clarity
in the NPRM. NHTSA believes that the
methodology for the final rule, as
compared to the NPRM methodology, is
much clearer, more accurate, and more
representative of likely manufacturer
behavior, although, of course,
manufacturers are free to respond to the
CAFE standards with whatever
application of technology they choose.
The revised technology related
assumptions help substantially ensure
the technological feasibility and
economic practicability of the MY 2011
CAFE standards promulgated in this
final rule.
2. How are the technologies applied in
the model?
For the final rule, as in the NPRM,
NHTSA made significant use of the
CAFE Volpe model as discussed above.
The NPRM contained a detailed
discussion of the Volpe model and
specifically stated its two primary
objectives as (1) identifying technologies
that manufacturers could apply in order
to comply with a specified CAFE
standard, and (2) calculating the cost
and effects of manufacturers’ technology
applications. The NPRM also discussed
other modeling systems and approaches
that NHTSA considered to accomplish
these same objectives, and also
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discusses why ultimately the agency
chose to use the Volpe model (see 79 FR
24352, 24391). However, having done so
for this final rule does not limit the
agency’s ability to use another approach
for future CAFE rulemakings, and
NHTSA will continue to consider other
methods for estimating the costs and
effects of adding technologies to
manufacturers’ future fleets.
The Volpe model relies on several
inputs and data files to conduct the
compliance analysis, and each of these
are discussed in detail in the NPRM.
Many of these inputs contain economic
and environmental data required for the
full CAFE analysis. However, for the
purposes of applying technologies, the
subject of this section, the Volpe model
primarily uses three data files, one that
contains data on the vehicles being
manufactured, one that identifies the
appropriate stage within the vehicle’s
life-cycle for the technology to be
applied, and one that contains data/
parameters regarding the available
technologies the model can apply.
These inputs are discussed below.
The Volpe model begins with an
‘‘initial state’’ of the domestic vehicle
market, which in this case is the market
for passenger cars and light trucks to be
sold during the period covered by the
final rule. The vehicle market is defined
on a model, engine, and transmission
basis, such that each defined vehicle
model refers to a separately-defined
engine and a separately-defined
transmission. For the final rule, this
represented roughly 5,500 cars and
trucks, 700 engines, and 600
transmissions. The information, which
is stored in a file called the ‘‘vehicle
market forecast,’’ is informed
significantly by product plans provided
to NHTSA by vehicle manufacturers.116
However, the Volpe model does not
require that the market forecast be based
on confidential product plans, and the
model is often tested using input files
developed using only publicly- and
commercially-available information.
Also, as discussed in Section III above,
EPCA does not require NHTSA to use
manufacturers’ confidential product
plans as a basis for setting future CAFE
standards, and the agency will continue
to base its market forecasts on whatever
it determines is the best available
information, whether from public,
116 The market forecast is developed by NHTSA
using the product plan information provided to the
agency by individual vehicle manufacturers in
response to NHTSA’s requests. The submitted
product plans contain confidential business
information (CBI), which the agency is prohibited
by federal law from disclosing.
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commercially-available, or confidential
sources.
In addition to containing data about
each vehicle, engine, and transmission,
this file contains information for each
technology under consideration as it
pertains to the specific vehicle (whether
the vehicle is equipped with it or not),
the model year the vehicle is
undergoing redesign, and information
about the vehicle’s subclass for
purposes of technology application.
The market forecast file provides
NHTSA the ability to identify, on a
technology by technology basis, which
technologies may already be present
(manufactured) on a particular vehicle,
engine, or transmission, or which
technologies are not applicable (due to
technical considerations) to a particular
vehicle, engine, or transmission. These
identifications are made on a model-bymodel, engine-by-engine, and
transmission-by-transmission basis. For
example, if Manufacturer X advises
NHTSA that Vehicle Y will be
manufactured with Technology Z, then
for this vehicle Technology Z will be
shown as used. Or alternatively, NHTSA
might conclude based on its own
assessment that for a given four cylinder
engine, Manufacturer A cannot utilize a
particular Technology C due to an
engineering issue that prohibits it. In
this case, NHTSA would, in the market
forecast file, indicate that Technology C
should not be applied to this particular
engine (i.e., is unavailable). Since
multiple vehicle models may be
equipped with this engine, this may
affect multiple models. In using this
aspect of the market forecast file,
NHTSA ensures the Volpe model only
applies technologies in an appropriate
manner, since before any application of
a technology can occur, the model
checks the market forecast to see if it is
either already present or unavailable.
Manufacturers typically plan vehicle
changes to coincide with certain stages
of a vehicle’s life cycle that are
appropriate for the change, or in this
case the technology being applied. For
instance, some technologies (e.g., those
that require significant revision) are
nearly always applied only when the
vehicle is expected to be redesigned.
Other technologies can be applied only
when the vehicle is expected to be
refreshed or redesigned and some others
can be applied at any time, regardless of
whether a refresh or redesign event is
conducted. Accordingly, the model will
only apply a technology at the particular
point deemed suitable. These
constraints are intended to produce
results consistent with manufacturers’
product planning practices. For each
technology under consideration,
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NHTSA stipulates whether it can be
applied any time, at refresh/redesign, or
only at redesign. The data forms another
input to the Volpe model, as discussed
in detail below, called the Technology
Refresh and Redesign Application table
(Table IV–6). Each manufacturer
identifies its planned redesign model
year for each of its vehicles, and this
data is also stored in the market forecast
file. Vehicle redesign/refresh
assumptions are discussed in Section
IV.C.9 below.
As discussed in Section IV.C.4 on
vehicle subclasses below, NHTSA
assigns one of 12 subclasses to each
vehicle manufactured in the rulemaking
period. The vehicle subclass data is
used for the purposes of technology
application. Each vehicle’s class is
stored in the market forecast file. When
conducting a compliance analysis, if the
Volpe model seeks to apply technology
to a particular vehicle, it checks the
market forecast to see if the technology
is available and if the refresh/redesign
criteria are met. If these conditions are
satisfied, the model determines the
vehicle’s subclass, which it then uses to
reference another input called the
technology input file.
In the technology input file, NHTSA
has developed a separate set of
technology data variables for each of the
twelve vehicle subclasses. Each set of
variables is referred to as an ‘‘input
sheet,’’ so for example, the subcompact
input sheet holds the technology data
that is appropriate for the subcompact
subclass. Each input sheet contains a
list of technologies available for
members of the particular vehicle
subclass. The following items are
provided for each technology: a brief
description, its abbreviation, the
decision tree with which it is
associated, the (first) year in which it is
available, the upper and lower cost and
effectiveness (fuel consumption
reduction) estimates, the learning type
and rate, the cost basis, its applicability,
and the phase-in values.
The input sheets are another method
NHTSA uses to determine how to
properly apply, or in some cases
constrain, a technology’s application, as
well as to establish the costs and fuel
consumption changes that occur as it is
applied. Examples of how technologies
are applied (or constrained) include the
‘‘Applicability’’ variable: if it is set to
‘‘TRUE,’’ then the technology can be
applied to all members of the vehicle
subclass (a value of ‘‘FALSE’’ would
prevent the Volpe model from applying
the technology to any member). Another
example would be the ‘‘Year Available’’
variable, which if set to ‘‘2012’’ means
the model can apply it to MY 2012 and
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later members, but cannot apply the
technology to MY 2011 models. The
‘‘Learning Type’’ and ‘‘Learning Rate’’
define reductions in technology costs, if
any are appropriate, that the Volpe
model may apply under certain
conditions, as discussed in the Learning
Curve section below. ‘‘Phase-in Values’’
are intended to address the various
constraints that limit a manufacturer’s
ability to apply technologies within a
short period of time. For phase-ins, once
the model applies a given technology to
a percentage of a given manufacturers’
fleet up to a specified phase-in cap, the
model then ceases to apply it further
instead applying other technologies.
Phase-in caps are also discussed below
in Section IV.C.10.
Perhaps the most important data
contained in the input sheets are the
cost and effectiveness information
associated with each technology. One
important concept to understand about
the cost and effectiveness values is that
they are ‘‘incremental’’ in nature,
meaning that the estimates are
‘‘referenced’’ to some prior technology
state in the decision tree in which the
applied technology is represented,
typically the preceding technology.
Therefore, when considering values
shown in the input sheet, the reader
must understand that in all but a few
cases they cannot fully deduce the
accumulated or ‘‘NET’’ cost and
effectiveness, referenced back to the
base condition (i.e., start of the decision
tree), without performing a more
detailed analysis. The method for
conducting this analysis, and a brief
example of how it is done, is discussed
in the Decision Tree section below. For
the final rule, to help readers better
understand Volpe model net or
accumulated costs and fuel
consumption reductions, NHTSA has
published net values to key technology
locations on the decision trees (e.g., to
diesel engine conversion, or a strong
hybrid). See the Tables showing
Approximate Net Technology Costs and
Approximate Net Technology
Effectiveness, located in Section IV.E
below. The tables have been produced
for each of the four vehicle subclasses
in the passenger car, performance
passenger car, and light truck vehicle
groups.
The incremental costs of some
technologies are dependent on certain
factors specific to the vehicle to which
they are applied. For instance, when the
Material Substitution technology is
applied, the cost of application is based
on a cost per unit weight reduction, in
dollars per pound, since the weight
removed is a percentage of the curb
weight of the vehicle (which differs
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from one vehicle to the next). Similarly,
some engine technologies need to be
calculated on a cost per cylinder basis,
or a cost per configuration basis (i.e., a
cost per bank basis, so that a
V-configured engine would cost twice as
much as an in-line, single bank engine).
For each technology, the input sheet
also contains a Cost Basis variable
which indicates whether the costs need
to be adjusted in this manner. This
functionality, some of which is new for
the final rule, allows NHTSA to estimate
more accurately the costs of technology
application, since in the NPRM the
vehicles in a subclass were assumed to
have common cylinder counts and
configurations (thus the costs were
underestimated for some vehicles and
overestimated for others).
Lastly for the technology input file,
the term ‘‘synergy’’ as it applies to the
Volpe modeling process refers to the
condition that occurs when two or more
technologies are applied to a vehicle
and their effects interact with each
other, resulting in a different net effect
than the combination of the individual
technologies. The term synergy usually
connotes a positive interaction (e.g.,
1 + 1 is more than 2), but as used here
it also includes negative interactions
(e.g., 1 + 1 is less than 2). Synergies are
discussed in greater detail below in
Section IV.C.7, and the values for the
synergy factors NHTSA used in the final
rule are stored in the technology input
file.
In some cases more than one decision
tree path can lead to a subsequently
applied technology. For example, the
power split hybrid technology can be
reached from one of two prior
transmission technologies (CVT or
DCTAM). Accordingly the incremental
cost and effectiveness for applying the
technology may vary depending on the
path and the modifications made in the
prior technology. To ensure accurate
tracking of net costs and effectiveness,
the Volpe model utilizes path correction
factors, as discussed further in the
decision tree discussion below. This
functionality is an improvement to the
final rule, and the specific factors used
are stored in the technology input
sheets. A copy of the final rule input
sheets, titled ‘‘2011–2015_LV_CAFE_
FinalRuleInputSheets20081019.pdf,’’
can be obtained from the final rule
docket.
One additional concept to understand
about how the Volpe model functions is
called an ‘‘engineering constraint,’’ a
programmatic method of controlling
technology application that is
independent of those discussed above.
NHTSA has determined that some
technologies are only suitable or
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unsuitable when certain vehicle, engine,
or transmission conditions exist. For
example, secondary axle disconnect is
only suitable for 4WD vehicles, and
cylinder deactivation is unsuitable for
any engine with fewer than 6 cylinders,
while material substitution is only
available for vehicles with curb weights
greater than 5,000 pounds. Additionally,
in response to comments received, an
engineering constraint was added for
purposes of the final rule to prevent the
cylinder deactivation technology from
being applied to vehicles equipped with
manual transmissions, due primarily to
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driveability and NVH concerns
documented by the commenter. Where
appropriate and required, NHTSA has
utilized engineering constraints to
ensure accurate application of the fuel
saving technologies.
3. Technology Application Decision
Trees
Several changes were made to the
Volpe model between the analysis
reported in the NPRM and the final rule.
This section will discuss two of those
changes: First, the updates to the set of
technologies; and second, the updates to
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the logical sequence for progressing
through these technologies, which
NHTSA describes as ‘‘decision trees.’’
As discussed above, the set of
technologies considered by the agency
has evolved since the NPRM. The set of
technologies now included in the Volpe
model is shown below in Table IV–1,
with abbreviations used by the model to
refer to each technology in the interest
of brevity. Section IV.D below explains
each technology in much greater detail,
including definitions and cost and
effectiveness values.
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As in the NPRM, each technology is
assigned to one of the five following
categories based on the system it affects
or impacts: engine, transmission,
electrification/accessory, hybrid or
vehicle. Each of these categories has its
own decision tree that the Volpe model
uses to apply technologies sequentially
during the compliance analysis. The
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decision trees were designed and
configured to allow the Volpe model to
apply technologies in a cost-effective,
logical order that also considers ease of
implementation. For example, effective
software or control logic changes are
implemented before replacing a
component or system with a completely
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redesigned one, which is typically a
much more expensive option.
Each technology within the decision
trees has an incremental cost and an
incremental effectiveness estimate
associated with it, and the estimates are
specific to a particular vehicle subclass
(see the tables provided below in
Section IV.D). Each technology’s
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incremental estimate takes into account
its position in the decision tree path. If
a technology is located further down the
decision tree, the estimates for the costs
and effectiveness values attributed to
that technology are influenced by the
incremental estimates of costs and
effectiveness values for prior technology
applications. In essence, this approach
accounts for ‘‘in-path’’ effectiveness
synergies and cost effects that occur
between the technologies in the same
path. When comparing cost and
effectiveness estimates from various
sources and those provided by
commenters, it is vital that the estimates
are evaluated in the proper context,
especially as concerns their likely
position in the decision trees and other
technologies that may be present or
missing. Not all estimates provided by
commenters can be considered an
‘‘apples-to-apples’’ comparison with
those used by the Volpe model, since in
some cases the order of application, or
included technology content, is
inconsistent with that assumed in the
decision tree.
For the final rule, significant revisions
have been made to the sequence of
technology applications within the
decision trees, and in some cases the
paths themselves have been modified
and additional paths have been added.
The additional paths allow for a more
accurate application of technology,
insofar as the model now considers the
existing configuration of the vehicle
when applying technology. In this
analysis, single overhead camshaft
(SOHC), dual overhead camshaft
(DOHC) and overhead valve (OHV)
configured engines now have separate
paths that allow for unique pathdependent versions of certain engine
technologies. Thus, the cylinder
deactivation technology (DEAC) now
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consists of three unique versions that
depend on whether the engine being
evaluated is an SOHC, DOHC or OHV
design; these technologies are
designated by the abbreviations DEACS,
DEACD and DEACO, respectively, to
designate which engine path they are
located on. Similarly the last letter for
the Coupled Cam Phasing (CCP) and
Discrete Variable Valve Lift (DVVL)
abbreviations are used to identify which
path the technology is applicable to.
Use of separate valvetrain paths and
unique path-dependent technology
variations also ensures that the
incremental cost and effectiveness
estimates properly account for
technology effects so as not to ‘‘doublecount.’’ For example, in the SOHC path,
the incremental effectiveness estimate
for DVVLS assumes that some pumping
loss reductions have already been
accomplished by the preceding
technology, CCPS, which reduces or
diminishes the effectiveness estimate for
DVVLS because part of the efficiency
gain associated with the reduction of the
pumping loss mechanism has already
occurred. Commenters pointed out
several instances in the NPRM where
double-counting appeared to have
occurred, and the accounting approach
used in the final rule resolves these
concerns.
In reviewing NPRM comments,
NHTSA noted several questions
regarding the retention of previously
applied technologies when more
advanced technologies (i.e., those
further down the decision tree) were
applied. In response, NHTSA has
clarified the final rule discussions on
this issue. In both the NPRM and final
rule, as appropriate and feasible,
previously-applied technologies are
retained in combination with the new
technology being applied, but this is not
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always the case. For instance, one
exception to this would be the
application of diesel technology, where
the entire engine is assumed to be
replaced, so gasoline engine
technologies cannot carry over. This
exception for diesels, along with a few
other technologies, is documented
below in the detailed discussion of
changes to each decision tree and
corresponding technologies.
As the Volpe model steps through the
decision trees and applies technologies,
it accumulates total or ‘‘NET’’ cost and
effectiveness values. Net costs are
accumulated using an additive approach
while net effectiveness estimates are
accumulated multiplicatively. To help
readers better understand the
accumulation process, and in response
to comments expressing confusion on
this subject, the following examples
demonstrate how the Volpe model
calculates net values.
Accumulation of net cost is explained
first as this is the simpler process. This
example uses the Electrification/
Accessory decision tree sequentially
applying the EPS, IACC, MHEV, HVIA
and ISG technologies to a subcompact
vehicle using the cost and effectiveness
estimates from its input sheet. As seen
in Table IV–2 below, the input sheet
cost estimates have a lower and upper
value which may be the same or a
different value (i.e., a single value or a
range) as shown in columns two and
three. The Volpe model first averages
the values (column 4), and then sums
the average values to calculate the net
cost of applying each technology
(column 5). Accordingly, the net cost to
apply the MHEV technology for
example would be ($112.50 + $192.00 +
$372.00 = $676.50). Net costs are
calculated in a similar manner for all
the decision trees.
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value. Therefore the reduction for an
additional incremental 1.5 percent
results in a new fuel consumption value
of 0.9702, or a net 2.98 percent
effectiveness, as shown in the table. Net
effectiveness is calculated in a similar
manner for the all decision trees. It
should be noted that all incremental
effectiveness estimates were derived
with this multiplicative approach in
mind; calculating the net effectiveness
using an additive approach will yield a
different and incorrect net effectiveness.
corrections were used when applying
cylinder deactivation (on the DOHC
path), turbocharging and downsizing,
diesel and strong hybrids. This is
essentially an accounting issue and the
path-dependent corrections are meant to
remedy the accuracy issues reported in
the NPRM comment responses.
The following paragraphs explain, in
greater detail, the revisions to the
decision trees and technologies from the
NPRM to the final rule. Revisions were
made in response to comments received
and pursuant to NHTSA’s analysis, and
were made to improve the accuracy of
the Volpe compliance analysis, or to
correct other concerns from the NPRM
analysis.
Figure IV–1 below shows the final
rule decision tree for the engine
technology category. For the final rule,
NHTSA removed camless valve
actuation (CVA), lean-burn GDI (LBDI),
and homogenous charge compression
ignition (HCCI) from the decision trees
because these technologies were
determined to be still in the research
phase of development. NHTSA did not
receive any new information or
comments that suggested these
technologies are under development, so
NHTSA removed them from the
decision trees. At the top of the engine
decision tree Low Friction Lubricants
(LUB) and Engine Friction Reduction
(EFR) technologies are retained as
utilized in the NPRM.
As stated above, SOHC, DOHC and
OHV engines have separate paths,
whereas as the NPRM only made the
distinction between OHC and OHV
engines. The separation of SOHC and
DOHC engines allowed the model to
more accurately apply unique pathdependent valvetrain technologies
including variations of Variable Valve
Timing (VVT), Variable Valve Lift (VVL)
and cylinder deactivation that are
tailored to either SOHC or DOHC
engines. This separation also allowed
for a more accurate method of
accounting for net cost and effectiveness
117 A decrease in fuel consumption (FC) means
the fuel economy (FE) will be increased since fuel
consumption and economy are related by the
equation FC = 1/FE.
118 The correction tables are used for path
deviations within the same decision tree. However,
there is one exception to this rule, specifically that
the tables are used to keep the model from doublecounting cost and effectiveness estimates when
both the CBRST and MHEV are applied to the same
vehicle. Both technologies try to accomplish the
same goal of reducing fuel consumption, by limiting
idle time, but through different means. If either of
these technologies exists on a vehicle and the Volpe
model applies the other, the correction tables are
used to remove the cost and effectiveness estimates
for CBRST, thus ensuring that double-counting does
not occur.
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Engine Technology Decision Tree
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(or 0.015 in decimal form, column 3),
when applied multiplicatively, means
that the vehicle’s current fuel
consumption ‘X’ would be reduced by a
factor of (1¥0.015) = 0.985,117 or
mathematically 0.985*X. To represent
the changed fuel consumption in the
normal fashion (as a percentage change),
this value is subtracted from 1 (or
100%) to show the net effectiveness in
column 5.
As the IACC technology is applied,
the vehicle’s fuel consumption is
already reduced to 0.985 of its original
To improve the accuracy of
accumulating net cost and effectiveness
estimates for the final rule, ‘‘pathdependent corrections’’ were employed.
The NPRM analysis had the potential to
either overestimate or underestimate net
cost and effectiveness depending on
which decision tree path the Volpe
model followed when applying the
technologies. For example, if in the
NPRM analysis a diesel technology was
applied to a vehicle that followed the
OHV path, the net cost and effectiveness
could be different from the net estimates
for a vehicle that followed the OHC path
even though the intention was to have
the same net cost and effectiveness. In
order to correct this issue, the final rule
analysis has added path-dependent
correction tables to the input sheets.
The model uses these tables to correct
net cost and effectiveness estimate
differences that occur when multiple
paths lead into a single technology that
is intended to have the same net cost
and effectiveness no matter which path
was followed.118 Path-dependent
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The same decision tree, technologies,
and vehicle are used for the example
demonstrating the model’s net
effectiveness calculation. Table IV–3
below shows average incremental
effectiveness estimates in column two;
this value is calculated in the same
manner as the cost estimates above
(average of lower and upper value taken
from the input sheet). To calculate the
change in fuel consumption due to
application of the EPS technology with
incremental effectiveness of 1.5 percent
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compared to the NPRM. For both the
SOHC and DOHC paths, VVL
technologies were moved upstream of
cylinder deactivation in response to
comments from the Alliance, additional
confidential manufacturer comments
and submitted product plan trends, and
NHTSA’s analysis. Confidential
comments stated that applying cylinder
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deactivation to an OHC engine is more
complex and expensive than applying it
to an OHV engine. The Alliance
additionally stated that cylinder
deactivation is very applicationdependent, and is more effective when
applied to vehicles with high power-toweight ratios. Taking in account the
application-specific nature of cylinder
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deactivation and the fact the VVL
technologies are more suitable to a
broader range of applications, NHTSA
moved VVL technologies ‘‘upstream’’ of
cylinder deactivation on the SOHC and
DOHC to more accurately represent how
a manufacturer might apply these
technologies.
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On the OHV path, the ordering of
cylinder deactivation (DEACO) then
Coupled Cam Phasing (CCPO), which is
opposite the order of the SOHC and
DOHC paths, was retained as defined in
the NPRM. This ordering depicts most
accurately how manufacturers would
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actually implement these technologies
and was reflected in the submitted
product plans for OHV engines, which
are largely used on trucks with high
power-to-weight ratios. After the
application of CCPO on the OHV
decision tree, the model chooses
between Discrete Variable Valve Lift
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(DVVLO) and the conversion to a dual
overhead camshaft engine (CDOHC).
This conversion now includes Dual Cam
Phasing (DCP) instead of Continuously
Variable Valve Lift (CVVL) because it is
assumed that DCP, with its higher
application rates, would more likely be
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applied than CVVL, with its lower
application rates.
At this stage, and similar to the
NPRM, the decision tree paths all
converge into Stoichiometric Gasoline
Direct Injection (SGDI). All previously
applied technologies are retained with
the assumption that SGDI is applied in
addition to the pre-existing engine
technologies. After SGDI, a newly
defined technology, Combustion Restart
(CBRST), has been added.
The ‘‘branch point’’ after CBRST has
been limited to two paths instead of the
three paths in NPRM. This is due to the
removal of HCCI from the final rule
decision trees. The final rule engine
decision tree allowed the model to
apply either Turbocharging and
Downsizing (TRBDS) or the conversion
to diesel (DSLC). TRBDS is considered
to be a completely new engine that has
been converted to DOHC, if not already
converted, with only LUB, EFR, DCP,
SGDI and CBRST applied.
The conversion to diesel is also
considered to be a completely new
engine that replaces the gasoline engine
(although it carries over the LUB and
EFR technologies). If the model chooses
to follow the TRBDS path, the next
technology that can be applied is
another newly-added technology, EGR
Boost (EGRB). After EGRB, the model is
allowed to then convert the engine to
diesel (DSLT). It should be noted that
the path-dependent variations of diesel,
(DSLC) and (DSLT), result in the exact
same technology. The net cost and
effectiveness estimates are the same for
both but DSLT’s incremental cost and
effectiveness estimates are slightly
lower to account for the TRBDS and
EGRB technologies that have already
been applied.
Electrification/Accessory Technology
Decision Tree
This path, shown in Figure IV–2, was
named simply ‘‘Accessory Technology’’
in the NPRM. Electric Power Steering
(EPS) is now the first technology in this
decision tree, since it is a primary
enabler for both mild and strong
hybrids. Improved Accessories (IACC)
has been redefined to include only an
intelligent cooling system and follows
EPS (in the NPRM, IACC was the first
technology in the tree). The 42-volt
Electrical System (42V) technology has
been removed because it is no longer
viewed as the voltage of choice by
manufactures and is being replaced by
higher voltage systems. Micro-Hybrid
(MHEV), which follows IACC, has been
added as a 12-volt stop/start system to
replace Integrated Starter/Generator
with Idle-Off (ISGO), which was on the
‘‘Transmission/Hybrid Technology’’
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decision tree in the NPRM. Higher
Voltage/Improved Alternator (HVIA), a
higher efficiency alternator that can
incorporate higher voltages (greater than
42V) follows MHEV. Integrated Starter
Generator Hybrid (ISG) replaced IMA/
ISAD/BSG Hybrid (which was also on
the Transmission/Hybrid Technology
decision tree in the NPRM) as a higher
voltage hybrid system with limited
regenerative capability. ISG takes into
account all the previously applied
Electrification/Accessory technologies
and is the final step necessary in order
to convert the vehicle to a (full) strong
hybrid. All Electrification/Accessory
technologies can be applied to both
automatic and manual transmission
vehicles.
Transmission Technology Decision Tree
This decision tree, shown in Figure
IV–2, contains two paths: one for
automatic transmissions and one for
manual transmissions. On the automatic
path, the Aggressive Shift Logic (ASL)
and Early Torque Converter Lockup
(TORQ) technologies from the NPRM
have been combined into an Improved
Auto Trans Controls/Externals (IATC)
technology, as both these technologies
typically include only software or
calibration-related transmission
modifications. This technology was
moved to the top of the decision tree
since it was deemed to be easier and
less expensive to implement than a
major redesign of the existing
transmission. The 5-Speed Automatic
Transmission (5SP) technology from the
NPRM has been deleted due to several
factors. First, the updated decision tree
logic seeks to optimize the current
hardware as an initial step, instead of
applying an expensive redesign
technology. Second, NHTSA
determined an industry trend of 4-speed
automatics going directly to 6-speed
automatics, as reflected in the submitted
product plans. And finally, confidential
manufacturer comments indicated that
in some cases 5-speed transmissions
offered little or no fuel economy
improvement over 4-speed
transmissions (primarily due to higher
internal mechanical and hydraulic
losses, and increased rotating mass),
making the technology less attractive
from a cost and effectiveness
perspective. In the final rule, both 4speed and 5-speed automatic
transmissions get the IATC technology
applied first, before progressing through
the rest of the transmission decision
tree.
After IATC the decision tree splits
into a ‘‘Unibody only’’ and ‘‘Unibody or
Ladder Frame’’ paths, which is identical
to the NRPM version of the decision
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tree. Both of these paths represent a
conversion to new and fully optimized
designs. The Unibody only path
contains the Continuously Variable
Transmission (CVT) technology, while
the Unibody or Ladder Frame path has
the 6-Speed Automatic Transmission
(6SP) technology being replaced by 6/7/
8-Speed Automatic Transmission with
Improved Internals (NAUTO). The
NAUTO technology represents a new
generation of automatics with lower
internal losses from gears and hydraulic
systems.
The NPRM technology ‘‘Automated
Manual Transmission (AMT)’’ has been
renamed Dual Clutch Transmission/
Automated Manual Transmission
(DCTAM) to more accurately reflect the
true intent of this technology to be a
Dual Clutch Transmission (DCT). The
NPRM’s use of the abbreviation ‘‘AMT’’
was confusing to many commenters,
including the Alliance, BorgWarner,
Chrysler, Ford and General Motors, and
appeared to indicate that the NPRM
analysis applied true automated manual
transmissions, which exhibit a torque
interrupt characteristic that many in the
industry feel will not be customer
acceptable. DCT does not have the
torque interrupt concern. The
technology DCTAM for the final rule
assumes the use of a DCT type
transmission only.
The manual transmission path only
has one technology application, like the
NPRM. However, the technology being
applied has been defined as conversion
to a 6-Speed Manual with Improved
Internals (6MAN) instead of a
conversion to a 6/7/8-Speed Manual
Transmission as defined in the NRPM.
Extremely limited use of manual
transmissions with more than 6 speeds
is indicated in the updated product
plans, so NHTSA believes this is a more
accurate option for replacing a 4 or 5speed manual transmission.
Hybrid Technology Decision Tree
The strong hybrid options, 2-Mode
(2MHEV) and Power Split (PSHEV), are
no longer sequential as defined in the
NPRM’s Transmission/Hybrid decision
tree. For the final rule, the model only
applies strong hybrid technologies when
both the Electrification/Accessory and
Transmission (automatic transmissions
only) technologies have been fully
added to the vehicle, as seen in Figure
IV–2. The final rule analysis and logic
ensures that the model does not doublecount the cost and effectiveness
estimates for previously applied
technologies that are included (e.g.,
EPS) or replaced (e.g., transmission) by
strong hybrid systems, which is
responsive to General Motors’ comment
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Transmission technologies have been
applied, the model is allowed to choose
between the application of 2MHEV,
PSHEV and the newly added Plug-in
Hybrid Vehicle (PHEV). The NPRM
decision tree required the Volpe model
to step through 2MHEV in order to
apply PSHEV. This updated final rule
decision tree is a more realistic
representation of how manufacturers
might apply strong hybrids, and allows
the Volpe model to choose the strong
hybrid that is most appropriate for each
vehicle based on its vehicle subclass or
the most cost-effective technology
application. The PHEV technology was
added to the decision tree in the final
rule based upon information in the
public domain and submitted product
plans showing that limited quantities of
these vehicles will be available from
some manufacturers in this timeframe.
Vehicle Technology Decision Tree
Tires (ROLL), Low Drag Brakes (LDB)
and Secondary Axle Disconnect (SAX)
now reside as a separate path, due to the
relocation of material substitution
technologies. Secondary Axle
Disconnect has been redefined for the
final rule to apply to 4WD vehicles only
to more accurately reflect feasible
applications of this technology.
Aerodynamic Drag Reduction (AERO)
remains a separate tree, and is now a 10
percent reduction for both car and truck
classes (excluding performance cars,
which are exempt).
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Material Substitution (MS1), (MS2),
and (MS5) are now located on dedicated
material substitution path in the Vehicle
Technology Decision Tree, shown in
Figure IV–3. Low Rolling Resistance
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stating that the NPRM analysis had the
potential to double-count effectiveness
estimates when applying strong hybrids.
For the final rule analysis, when the
Volpe model applies strong hybrids it
now takes into account that some of the
fuel consumption reductions have
already been accounted for when
technologies like EPS or IACC have
been previously applied. Once all the
Electrification/Accessory and
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4. Division of Vehicles Into Subclasses
Based on Technology Applicability,
Cost and Effectiveness
In assessing the feasibility of
technologies under consideration, the
agency evaluated whether each of these
technologies could be implemented on
all types and sizes of vehicles and
whether some differentiation is
necessary with respect to the potential
to apply certain technologies to certain
types and sizes of vehicles, and with
respect to the cost incurred and fuel
consumption achieved when doing so.
The 2002 NAS Report differentiated
technology application using ten vehicle
classes (4 cars classes and 6 truck
classes, including subcompact cars,
compact cars, midsize cars, large cars,
small SUVs, midsize SUVs, large SUVs,
small pickups, large pickups, and
minivans), but did not determine how
cost and effectiveness values differ from
‘‘class’’ to ‘‘class.’’ NAS’s purpose in
separating vehicles into these ‘‘classes’’
was to create groups of ‘‘like’’ vehicles,
i.e., vehicles similar in size, powertrain
configuration, weight, and consumer
use, and for which similar technologies
are applicable. This vehicle
differentiation is done solely for the
purpose of applying technologies to
vehicles and assessing their incremental
costs and effectiveness, and should not
be confused with, the regulatory
classifications pursuant to 49 CFR part
523 discussed in Chapter XI.
The Volpe model, which NHTSA has
used to perform analysis supporting
today’s notice, divides the vehicle fleet
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into subclasses based on model inputs,
and applies subclass-specific estimates,
also from model inputs, of the
applicability, cost, and effectiveness of
each fuel-saving technology. Therefore,
the model’s estimates of the cost to
improve the fuel economy of each
vehicle model depend upon the
subclass to which the vehicle model is
assigned.
In its MY 2005–2007 and MY 2008–
2011 light truck CAFE standards as well
as NPRM, NHTSA performed analysis
using the same vehicle classes defined
by NAS in its 2002 Report. In its 2008
NPRM for MY 2011–2015, NHTSA
included some differentiation in cost
and effectiveness numbers between the
various classes to account for
differences in technology costs and
effectiveness that are observed when
technologies are applied on to different
classes and subclasses of vehicles. The
agency found it important to make that
differentiation because the agency
estimated that, for example, engine
turbocharging and downsizing would
have different implications for large
vehicles than for smaller vehicles. For
the final rule, NHTSA, working with
Ricardo, increased the accuracy of its
technology assumptions by reexaming
the subclasses developed for the
purpose of modeling technology
application and by providing more
differentiation in the costs and
effectiveness values by vehicle subclass.
In the request for comments
accompanying the NPRM, NHTSA
asked manufacturers to identify the
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style of each vehicles model they submit
in their product plans from eight
possible groupings (convertible, coupe,
hatchback, pickup, sedan, sport utility,
van, or wagon) or sixteen possible
market segments (cargo van, compact
car, large car, large pickup, large station
wagon, midsize car, midsize station
wagon, mini-compact, minivan,
passenger van, small pickup, small
station wagon, special purpose, sport
utility truck, subcompact car, and twoseat car). NHTSA also requested that
manufacturers identify many specific
characteristics relevant to each vehicle
model, such as the number of cylinders
of the vehicle’s engine and other engine,
transmission and vehicle characteristics.
This information was evaluated by
NHTSA staff, entered in NHTSA’s
market data file, and used by NHTSA to
assess how to divide the vehicles into
subclasses for purposes of
differentiating the applicability,
effectiveness, and cost of available
technologies.
In response to the NPRM, the Alliance
commented that NHTSA’s classification
approach is not robust enough. With
regard to subclasses of cars, the Alliance
stated that NHTSA did not distinguish
high-performance and sports cars which
cannot accommodate certain
technologies without changing the
purpose and configuration of the
vehicle. With regard to subclasses of
trucks, the Alliance argued that SUVs
were not adequately distinguished by
size. The Alliance further stated the
classification used by Sierra Research in
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improvement in the accuracy of the
results. Sierra may have found this
additional differentiation important for
the full vehicle simulation approach
that the Alliance claimed should be
used throughout NHTSA’s analysis.
However, as discussed below, NHTSA
has concluded that this approach is
neither necessary nor practical for CAFE
analysis.
The agency agrees with the Alliance,
however, that some refinement in the
classification approach used by NHTSA
in the NPRM is merited in order to
ensure the practicability of technologies
being added. The agency also believes
that the limited differentiation in costs
and effectiveness values by vehicle class
needs to be expanded in order to better
account for fuel savings and costs.
For the final rule, NHTSA first
reexamined the Volpe model technology
output files from the NPRM to identify
where and why technologies may have
been inappropriately applied by the
model. Where this reexamination
revealed logical errors, the Volpe model
was revised accordingly. However, the
review revealed that most of the
observed inaccuracies resulted from the
manner in which vehicles were assigned
to subclasses for the purpose of
technology applications. NHTSA also
reviewed the confidential vehicle level
information received from
manufacturers, how manufacturers
classified their vehicles by style or
market segment groupings requested by
NHTSA and the specific engine,
transmission and other vehicle
characteristics identified by the
manufacturers for each vehicle model.
This conclusion was among those that
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led NHTSA to assign more staff to
perform quality control when reviewing
and integrating manufacturers’ product
plans.
In order to improve the accuracy of
technology application modeling,
NHTSA examined at the car and truck
segments separately. First, for the car
segment, NHTSA plotted the footprint
distribution of vehicles in the product
plans and divided that distribution into
four equivalent footprint range
segments. The footprint ranges were
named Subcompact, Compact, Midsize,
and Large classes in ascending order.
Cars were then assigned to one of these
classes based on their specific footprint
size. Vehicles in each range were then
manually reviewed by NHTSA staff to
evaluate and confirm that they
represented a fairly reasonable
homogeneity of size, weight,
powertrains, consumer use, etc.
However, as the Alliance pointed out,
some vehicles in each group were sports
or high-performance models. Since
different technologies and cost and
effectiveness estimates are appropriate
for these vehicles, NHTSA created a
performance subclass within each car
class to maximize the accuracy of
technology application. To determine
which cars would be assigned to the
performance subclasses, NHTSA
graphed (in ascending rank order) the
power-to-weight ratio for each vehicle
in a class. An example of the Compact
subclass plot is shown below. The
subpopulation was then manually
reviewed by NHTSA staff to determine
an appropriate transition point between
‘‘performance’’ and ‘‘non-performance’’
models within each class.
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its report to distinguish groups of like
vehicles for technology application
purposes was more realistic and
representative of differences in market
segments than NHTSA’s classification.
The Alliance suggested that NHTSA
consider the classes identified by Sierra
Research in the final rule.
NHTSA is not adopting Sierra’s
approach to classification for the
following reasons. First, Sierra’s
classification scheme is too dependent
on vehicle characteristics for which
NHTSA often did not receive complete
information from manufacturers. For
example, although NHTSA requested
that manufacturers provide estimates of
the aerodynamic drag coefficient of each
vehicle model planned for MY2011–
2015, the agency received no estimates
for many vehicles. NHTSA believes
manufacturers are too far from
production on many vehicles to
confidently provide such estimates.
Second, Sierra’s classification scheme
is, for NHTSA’s purposes, excessively
fine-grained. Sierra’s analysis relied on
25 subclasses in total, 13 for cars and 12
for trucks. While their report provided
tables comparing their classes to those
of NHTSA’s and cited product examples
for each class, it did not provide a
reason for why this detailed
differentiation would significantly
improve the outcome. NHTSA’s review
of the Sierra report did not reveal many
differences in technology-application
between these subclasses. In addition,
the agency does not believe that the
effort required by the agency to create a
more detailed yet more complex
modeling structure based on 25
subclasses would result in significant
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classification between the NPRM and
Final Rule and provides examples of the
types of vehicles assigned to each.
‘‘Vans,’’ NHTSA revisited how it
assigned the different types of ‘‘Vans.’’
Instead of merging minivans, cargo
vans, utility and multi-passenger type
vans under the same class, as it did for
the NPRM and in previous rules,
NHTSA formed a separate minivan
class, because minivans (e.g., the Honda
Odyssey) are expected to remain closer
in terms of structural and other
engineering characteristics than vans
(e.g., Ford’s E–Series—also known as
Econoline—vans) intended for more
passengers and/or heavier cargo.
The remaining vehicles (other vans,
pickups, and SUVs) were then
segregated into three footprint ranges
and assigned a class of Small Truck/
SUV, Midsize Truck/SUV, and Large
Truck/SUV based on their footprints.
NHTSA staff then manually reviewed
each population for inconsistent
vehicles based on engine cylinder
count, weight (curb and/or gross), or
intended usage, since these are
important considerations for technology
application, and reassigned vehicles to
classes as appropriate. This system
produced four truck segment classes—
minivans and small, medium, and large
SUVs/Pickups/Vans. The table below
shows the difference in the
classification between the NPRM and
Final Rule.
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Performance, Large, Large Performance.
In total, the number of cars that were
ultimately assigned to a performance
subclass was less than 10 percent. The
table below shows the difference in the
For light trucks, in reviewing the
updated manufacturer product plans
and in reconsidering how to divide
trucks into classes and subclasses based
on technology applicability, NHTSA
found less of a distinction between
SUVs and pickup trucks than appeared
to exist in earlier rulemakings.
Manufacturers appear to be planning
fewer ladder-frame and more unibody
pickups, and many pickups will share
common powertrains with SUVs.
Consequently, NHTSA condensed the
classes available to trucks, such that
SUVs and pickups are no longer
divided. Recognizing structural
differences between various types of
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A total of eight classes (including
performance subclasses) were identified
for the car segment: Subcompact,
Subcompact Performance, Compact,
Compact Performance, Midsize, Midsize
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5. How did NHTSA develop technology
cost and effectiveness estimates for the
final rule?
In the NPRM, NHTSA employed
technology cost and effectiveness
estimates developed in consultation
with EPA. They represented NHTSA
and EPA staff’s best assessment of the
costs for each technology considered
based on the available public and
confidential information and data
sources that the agencies had back in
2007 when the rulemaking was
initiated. EPA also published a report
and submitted it to the NRC committee
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on fuel economy of light-duty
vehicles.119
Public comments on the NPRM’s
technology cost estimates generally fell
into four categories: (1) That costs are
underestimated because NHTSA did not
account for all changes/costs required to
apply a technology or because although
NHTSA correctly identified all the
changes required, it did not cost those
changes appropriately; (2) that costs are
underestimated because the Retail Price
Equivalent (RPE) factors have been
applied incorrectly to technologies; (3)
that costs are either over- or
underestimated because learning curves
have been applied incorrectly to
technologies; and (4) that cost
assumptions are overly simplified as
applied to the full range of fleet vehicles
and do not properly account for the
differences in cost impacts across
vehicle and engine types (e.g.,
technologies applied to a sub-compact
car will be unique to those same
technologies applied to a large SUV).
Many commenters also stated that they
found it difficult to understand how
NHTSA and EPA had derived the cost
estimates. In addition to commenting on
NHTSA’s methodology, many
commenters, particularly
manufacturers, also submitted their own
cost estimates for each technology and
requested that NHTSA consider them
for the final rule.
As explained above, NHTSA
contracted with Ricardo to aid the
119 EPA Staff Technical Report: Cost and
Effectiveness Estimates of Technologies Used to
Reduce Light-Duty Vehicle Carbon Dioxide
Emissions. EPA420–R–08–008, March 2008.
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agency in analyzing the comments on
the technology assumptions used in the
NPRM, and relied considerably on
Ricardo’s expertise in developing the
final technology cost and effectiveness
estimates based on that analysis. For
every technology included in NHTSA’s
analysis of technology costs and
effectiveness, Ricardo and NHTSA
engineers reviewed the comments
thoroughly and exercised their expertise
in assessing the merits of the comments,
and in resolving the differences and
determining which estimates should be
used for the final rule.
For each technology, NHTSA relied
on Ricardo’s experience with ‘‘bill of
materials’’ (BOM) costing. Some
commenters criticized NHTSA for not
using a BOM as the basis for its cost
analysis. The 2008 Martec report,120
which updated the Martec report on
which the 2004 NESCCAF study was
based, was submitted by auto industry
commenters to NHTSA’s NPRM docket
for the agency’s consideration. This
report provides cost estimates
developed on a ‘‘bill of materials’’ basis
and methodology. NHTSA, with
Ricardo’s assistance, reviewed the ‘‘bill
of materials’’ methodology in the Martec
report and found it to be, compared to
the methodology used in the NPRM, a
more defensible and transparent basis
for evaluating the costs of applicable
technologies.
A bill of materials in a general sense
is a list of components that make up a
system—in this case, an item of fuel
economy-improving technology. In
120 Martec, ‘‘Variable Costs of Fuel Economy
Technologies,’’ June 1, 2008.
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Based on a close review of detailed
output from the Volpe model, NHTSA
has concluded that its revised
classification for purposes of technology
applicability substantially improves the
overall accuracy of the results as
compared to the system employed in the
NPRM. The new method uses footprint
as a first indicator for both the car and
truck segments, and all are then
manually reviewed for the types of
technologies applicable to them and
revised by NHTSA to ensure that they
have been properly assigned. The
addition of the performance subclasses
in the car segment and the condensing
of classes in the truck segment further
refine the system. The new method
increases the accuracy of technology
application without overly complicating
the Volpe modeling process, and the
revisions address comments received in
response to the NPRM.
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order to determine what a system costs,
one of the first steps is to determine its
components and what they cost. In
cases in which it was not practicable for
the agency and Ricardo to estimate the
cost of each component on a BOM basis
because there was a shift to a more
advanced technology and or because of
difficulty in accounting for the sum of
costs of all added components less the
sum of costs of all deleted components
(e.g., in the transition from a gas engine
to a diesel engine), incremental costs
were estimated to be those of the entire
new technology platform (in this
example, the diesel engine) less those of
the entire old technology platform (in
this example, the gas engine). This ‘‘net
difference’’ process was only used
where developing a ground-up
description of all component changes
necessitated by the incremental
technology was deemed to be
impracticable.
With that framework in mind, Ricardo
and NHTSA engineers proceeded with
reviewing cost information for each
major component of each technology.
They compared the multiple sources
available in the docket and assessed
their validity. While NHTSA and
Ricardo engineers relied considerably
on the 2008 Martec Report for costing
contents of some technologies, they did
not do so for all. When relevant publicly
available information and data sets,
including the 2008 Martec report, were
determined to be incomplete or nonexistent, NHTSA looked to prior
published data, including the NPRM, or
to values provided to NHTSA by
commenters familiar with the material
costs of the described technologies.
Generally, whenever cost information
for a technology component existed in
a non-confidential and publicly
available report submitted to the NPRM
docket and that information agreed with
Ricardo’s independent review of cost
estimates based on Ricardo’s historical
institutional knowledge, Ricardo and
NHTSA cited that information. Ricardo
and NHTSA were able to take that
approach frequently, as is evident in the
explanation of the cost figures of each
technology. When that approach was
not possible, but there was confidential
manufacturer data that had been
submitted to NHTSA in response to the
NPRM, and those costs were consistent
with Ricardo’s independently-reviewed
cost estimates, NHTSA and Ricardo
cited those data. When multiple
confidential data sources differed
greatly and conflicted with the Martec
valuation or when the technical
assumptions described by NHTSA for
purposes of this rulemaking did not
match exactly with the content costed
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by either Martec or other commenters,
NHTSA and Ricardo engineers used
component-level data to build up a
partial cost, substituting Ricardo’s
institutional knowledge for the
remaining gaps in component level data.
Occasionally, NHTSA and Ricardo
found that some cost information
submitted by the public was either not
very clearly described or revealed a lack
of knowledge on the part of the
commenter about NHTSA’s
methodology. In those cases, and in
cases for which no cost data (either
public or confidential) was available,
NHTSA worked with Ricardo either to
confirm the estimates it used in the
NPRM, or to revise and update them.
In several cases, values described in
the NPRM were simply adjusted from
2006 dollars to 2007 dollars, using a
ratio of GDP values for the associated
calendar years.121 In many instances, an
RPE factor of 1.5 was determined to
have been omitted from the cost
estimates provided in the NPRM, so
NHTSA applied the multiplier where
necessary to calculate the price to the
consumer.
Finally, in response to comments
stating that cost estimates for individual
technologies should be varied, based on
the type and size of vehicle to which
they are applied, NHTSA worked with
Ricardo to account for that.
Additionally, application of some
technologies might be more or less
expensive, depending on content (e.g.,
with or without a noise attenuation
package), for particular vehicles. In
these cases, NHTSA and Ricardo
described a range of costs for this
technology, and referred to sources that
indicate the appropriate boundaries of
that range.
The agency notes that several
technologies considered in the final rule
have been updated with substantially
different cost estimates relative to those
costs described in the NPRM. For
example, RPE estimates for
turbocharging and downsizing (TRBDS),
diesel technologies (DSLT) and hybrid
technologies (like ISG) are much higher
than the costs cited in the NPRM for
those technologies. This is due in large
part to the updated cost estimates of the
2008 Martec Report and others,
referenced in the final rule, which
reflect the dramatic rise of global costs
for raw materials associated with the
above technologies since the 2004
Martec report and other prior referenced
cost estimates were conducted. The
121 NHTSA examined the use of the CPI
multiplier instead of GDP for adjusting these dollar
values, but found the difference to be exceedingly
small—only $0.14 over $100.
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NPRM costs were not updated to reflect
that rise in commodities prices. As
described in the 2008 Martec Report,
advanced battery technologies with
substantial copper, nickel or lithium
content, and engine technologies
employing high temperature steels or
catalysts with considerable platinum
group metals usage, have experienced
tremendous inflation of raw material
prices since the cost studies referenced
in the NPRM were conducted. As of the
time the sources were developed, prices
of nickel, platinum, lithium, copper,
dysprosium and rhodium had
demonstrated cost inflation amounting
to between 300 and 750 percent of
global prices at the time of the original
NESCCAF study 122 and this is reflected
in the higher costs described in the 2008
Martec report, and thus in the final rule.
NHTSA is aware that commodity prices,
like those for steel and platinum group
metals described above, have dropped
over the last several months. However,
there is little information in the record
to determine how prices of components
used in MY 2011 could be impacted by
the prices of metals and other
commodities over the last few years. It
is not clear whether the prices of
components built and used in MY 2011
are more likely to reflect the high price
of commodities in the years prior to
2008, the current low prices of
commodities, the prices of commodities
closer to MY 2011, or some mixture of
these. The agency notes, though, as
mentioned above, that manufacturers’
product plans were submitted along
with manufacturers’ indications that
these plans were generally informed by
expectations that relatively high
commodity prices would prevail in the
future. Therefore, in the expectation that
economic conditions will improve by
MY 2011, the agency relies on the
commodity prices reflected in, for
example, the 2008 Martec report.
However, the agency further notes that
these decisions are limited to the MY
2011 rulemaking. We intend to monitor
commodity prices carefully and will
adjust affected technology costs as
appropriate in future rulemakings.
Some commenters referenced the
price differential between vehicles with
advanced technologies and more
standard versions as evidence of those
advanced technologies’ costs, and
argued that NHTSA should consider
these price differentials in its cost
estimation process. In response, NHTSA
believes that the ‘‘bottom-up, material
cost based’’ cost estimation
methodology employed for the final rule
is preferable to estimating costs based
122 2008
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on manufacturer price differentials
between versions of vehicle models.
Wherever possible, technologies were
costed based on the estimation of
variable material cost impacts to vehicle
manufacturers at a fixed point in time
(in 2007 dollar terms) for a prescribed
set of component changes anticipated to
be required in implementing the
technology on a particular platform
(e.g., wastegate turbo, increased high
nickel alloyed exhaust manifolds, air
charge cooler, etc. for TRBDS). The
content assumptions are modified or
scaled to account for differences across
the range of vehicle sizes and functional
requirements and associated material
cost impacts are adjusted to account for
the revised content. The material cost
impacts to the vehicle manufacturers are
then summed and converted to retail
price equivalent impacts by multiplying
by 1.5 to account for fixed costs and
other overheads incurred in the
implementation of new vehicle
technologies but not contained in the
variable material price impacts to the
manufacturers.
In employing this methodology,
NHTSA relied on information provided
to NHTSA by the suppliers and vehicle
manufacturers themselves. Though this
estimation process relies on often
confidential data and employs a
simplifying assumption in relating all
variable material costs to retail impacts
through the use of a consistent 1.5 RPE,
the methodology is preferable to a ‘‘topdown, retail price based’’ methodology
as might be used by comparing retail
price differences of vehicles with
different technologies. The ‘‘bottom-up’’
approach offers the benefits of providing
a consistent and reasonable assessment
of true, total costs for all technologies
independent of geographic, or strategic
pricing policies by vehicle
manufacturers that could result in
selling products at sub-standard or even
negative margins. For many vehicle
manufacturers, contribution to corporate
profit varies dramatically across vehicle
segment. Given that vehicle pricing is
often decoupled from true costs and will
vary with sales cycle, product maturity,
geography, vehicle class, and marque, a
‘‘top-down’’ approach, while offering
improved data transparency, is
inherently limited in providing a
consistent means of cost estimation. As
such, NHTSA has adopted the described
‘‘bottom-up’’ cost estimation approach
and has attempted to mitigate
transparency issues with a reliance on
Martec 2008 (where in agreement with
other provided cost data), because it
provides a detailed description of the
costed content. Fundamentally, NHTSA
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believes that a ‘‘bottom-up’’ cost
estimation methodology with a common
RPE adjustment factor offers an
intuitive, consistent process across all
technologies, whether mature or
otherwise, that avoids the pitfalls of
reliance on significantly more variable
and volatile pricing policies.
Regarding estimates for technology
effectiveness, NHTSA, working with
Ricardo, also reexamined its NPRM
estimates and those in the EPA Staff
Technical Report,123 which largely
mirrored NHTSA’s NPRM estimates. We
compared these estimates to estimates
provided in comments, reports and
confidential data received in response to
our NPRM. Comments on the NPRM’s
effectiveness estimates generally fell
into three categories: (1) That NHTSA
did not account sufficiently for fuel
economy or performance impacts
because it used the Volpe model
approach rather than full vehicle
simulation; (2) that the synergy values
used did not properly account for
technology interactions; and (3) that
NHTSA made errors when using
estimates provided by manufacturers. In
addition to commenting on NHTSA’s
methodology, many commenters,
particularly manufacturers, also
submitted their own fuel consumption
reduction estimates for each technology
and requested that NHTSA consider
them for the final rule. NHTSA
addresses comments relating to vehicle
simulation in Section IV.C.8 and
synergies in Section IV.C.7, but the
section below describes NHTSA’s
process for developing effectiveness
estimates for the final rule, which
addresses the comments regarding
NHTSA’s use of estimates submitted by
manufacturers.
For each technology, NHTSA also
relied on Ricardo’s experience with
‘‘bill of materials’’ (BOM) technology
descriptions. Some commenters argued
that the same BOM used as the basis for
the cost analysis could and should be
used to define the technologies being
studied for effectiveness. In fact,
Ricardo’s methodology for cost and
effectiveness estimates for this rule was
to define a vehicle class-specific BOM
or BOMs, depending upon the number
of variants possible within a class and
within a decision tree. These BOMs
were defined for the baseline
configuration for each class and then for
each incremental step in the decision
tree. Use of a consistently-defined BOM
is very important to estimating the
123 EPA Staff Technical Report: Cost and
Effectiveness Estimates of Technologies Used to
Reduce Light-Duty Vehicle Carbon Dioxide
Emissions. EPA420–R–08–008, March 2008.
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impacts of technologies accurately, as it
helps to ensure that technologies are not
applied to baseline vehicles that already
contain the technology (with the
exception of items that are not welldefined such as aerodynamic drag
reduction, reduced rolling resistance
tires, weight reduction, and engine
friction reduction.)
In defining these BOMs, Ricardo
relied on its experience working with
industry over many years and its recent
experience preparing the December
2007 study for EPA. Ricardo built on its
vehicle simulation work for EPA to help
NHTSA evaluate appropriate
effectiveness values for individual fuelsaving technologies. In considering the
comments, NHTSA and Ricardo
evaluated the 10 ‘‘vehicle subclasses’’
used in the NPRM for applicability of
technologies and determined that the
cost and effectiveness estimates could
be more accurate by revising the
‘‘vehicle subclasses’’ as described above
so that they better represented the
parameters of the vehicles they
included. This, in turn, enabled NHTSA
and Ricardo to distinguish more clearly
the differences in fuel consumption
reduction occurring when a technology
is added to different vehicles.
Then, with the BOM framework
applied to more precisely-defined
vehicle subclasses, NHTSA and Ricardo
engineers reviewed effectiveness
information from multiple sources for
each technology. Together, they
compared the multiple sources available
in the docket and assessed their
validity, taking care to ensure that
common BOM definitions and other
vehicle attributes such as performance,
refinement, and drivability were not
compromised.
Generally, whenever relevant
effectiveness information for a
technology component existed in a nonconfidential and publicly-available
report submitted to the NPRM docket,
and that information agreed with
Ricardo’s independent review of
estimates based on Ricardo’s historical
institutional knowledge, NHTSA and
Ricardo cited that information. NHTSA
and Ricardo were able to take that
approach frequently, as is evident in the
explanation of the effectiveness for each
technology. When that approach was
not possible, but there was confidential
manufacturer data that had been
submitted to NHTSA in response to the
NPRM, and those values were consistent
with Ricardo’s independently-reviewed
estimates, NHTSA and Ricardo cited
those data. When multiple confidential
data sources differed greatly or when
the technical assumptions described by
NHTSA for purposes of this rulemaking
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did not match the content included in
Ricardo’s study for EPA or in other
comments, NHTSA and Ricardo
engineers relied on Ricardo’s experience
and an understanding of the maximum
theoretical losses that could be
eliminated by particular technologies to
build up an effectiveness estimate,
substituting Ricardo’s institutional
knowledge for the remaining gaps in
data.
Occasionally, NHTSA and Ricardo
found that some fuel consumption
reduction information submitted by the
public was either not very clearly
described or revealed a lack of
knowledge on the part of the commenter
about NHTSA’s methodology. In those
cases, and in cases for which no
effectiveness data (either public or
confidential) was available, NHTSA
worked with Ricardo either to confirm
the estimates it used in the NPRM, or to
revise and enhance them. In other cases,
the commenters appeared unsure how
to evaluate the data from the NPRM, and
so NHTSA and Ricardo provided more
detailed explanations on the process
used or the components involved.
In response to comments stating that
estimates for individual technologies
should be varied based on the type and
size of vehicle to which they are
applied, NHTSA worked with Ricardo
to account for those differences mostly
through the refined vehicle subclass
definitions. However, even after making
these adjustments, there are still some
classes that require spanning different
engine architectures and performance
thresholds. Just as the application of
some technologies might be more or less
expensive, depending on content (e.g.,
with or without a noise attenuation
package), particular vehicle
technologies may have more or less
impact between classes where
maintaining equivalent performance led
to a reduced effectiveness. In these
cases, NHTSA and Ricardo described a
range of effectiveness values for this
technology, and referred to sources that
indicate the appropriate boundaries of
that range.
With Ricardo’s assistance, the
technology cost and effectiveness
estimates for the final rule were
developed consistently, using this
systematic approach. While NHTSA still
believes that the ideal estimates for the
final rule would be those that have been
through a peer-reviewed process such as
that used for the 2002 NAS Report, and
will continue to work with NAS, as
required by EISA, to update the
technology cost and effectiveness
estimates for subsequent CAFE
rulemakings, this approach, combined
with the BOM methodology for cost and
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effectiveness, expanded number and
types of vehicle subclasses and the
changes to the synergistic effects
described below, not only help to
address the concerns raised by
commenters, but also represent a
considerable improvement in terms of
accuracy and transparency over the
approach used to develop the cost and
effectiveness estimates in the NPRM.
6. Learning Curves
As explained in the NPRM,
historically NHTSA did not explicitly
account for the cost reductions a
manufacturer might realize through
learning achieved from experience in
actually applying a technology.
However, based on its work with EPA,
in the NPRM NHTSA employed a
learning factor for certain newer,
emerging technologies. The ‘‘learning
curve’’ describes the reduction in unit
incremental production costs as a
function of accumulated production
volume and small redesigns that reduce
costs. The NPRM implemented
technology learning curves by using
three parameters: (1) The initial
production volume that must be reached
before cost reductions begin to be
realized (referred to as ‘‘threshold
volume’’); (2) the percent reduction in
average unit cost that results from each
successive doubling of cumulative
production volume (usually referred to
as the ‘‘learning rate’’); and (3) the
initial cost of the technology. The
majority of technologies considered in
the NPRM did not have learning cost
reductions applied to them.
NHTSA assumed that learning-based
reductions in technology costs occur at
the point that a manufacturer applies
the given technology to the first 25,000
cars or trucks, and are repeated a second
time as it produces another 25,000 cars
or trucks for the second learning step.124
NHTSA explained that the volumes
chosen represented the agency’s best
estimate for where learning would
occur, and that they were better suited
to NHTSA’s analysis than using a single
number for the learning curve factor,
because each manufacturer would
implement technologies at its own pace
in the rule, rather than assuming that all
manufacturers implement identical
technology at the same time.
NHTSA further assumed that after
having produced 25,000 cars or trucks
with a specific part or system, sufficient
learning will have taken place such that
costs will be lower by 20 percent for
some technologies and 10 percent for
others. For those technologies, NHTSA
124 NHTSA treated car and truck volumes
separately for determining those sales volumes.
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additionally assumed that another cost
reduction would be realized after
another 25,000 units. If a technology
was already in widespread use (e.g., on
the order of several million units per
year) or expected to be so by the MY
2011–2012 time frame, NHTSA assumed
that the technology was ‘‘learned out,’’
and that no more cost reductions were
available for additional volume
increases. If a technology was not
estimated to be available until later in
the rulemaking period at that time, like
MY 2014–2015, NHTSA did not apply
learning for those technologies until
those model years. Most of the
technologies for which learning was
applied after MY 2014 were adopted
from the 2004 NESCCAF study, which
was completed by Martec. Whenever
source data, like the 2004 NESCCAF
study, indicated that manufacturer cost
reduction from future learning would
occur, NHTSA took that information
into account.
Comments received regarding
NHTSA’s approach to technology cost
reductions due to manufacturer learning
generally disagreed with the agency’s
method. The Alliance, AIAM, Honda,
GM, and Chrysler all commented that
NHTSA had substantially
overestimated, and essentially ‘‘doublecounted,’’ learning effects by applying
learning reductions to component costs,
specifically Martec estimates, which
were already at high volume. The
Alliance submitted the 2008 Martec
Report, which stated that NHTSA had
‘‘misstated’’ Martec’s approach to cost
reductions due to learning in the NPRM.
As Martec explained,
Martec did not ask suppliers to quote
prices that would be valid for three years,
and Martec did not receive cost reductions
from suppliers for some components in years
two and three. Rather, industry respondents
were asked to establish mature component
pricing on a forward basis given the
following conditions: At least three (3)
manufacturers demanding 500,000 units per
year and at least three (3) globally-capable
suppliers available to supply the needs of
each manufacturer.
In no case did Martec ask industry
respondents to provide low volume, launch
or transition costs for fuel consumption/CO2
reducing technologies. Martec specifically
designed the economic parameters in order to
capture the effects of learning which is a
reality in the low margin, high capital cost,
high volume, highly competitive global
automotive industry. Applying additional
reductions attributable to ‘‘learning’’ based
on 25,000 unit improvements in cumulative
volume after production launch (as described
on pages 118–125 of the NHTSA NPRM) on
top of Martec’s mature costs is an error.
Martec’s costs are based on 1.5–2.0
equivalent modules of powertrain capacity
(500,000 units/year) so 25,000 unit
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incremental changes in cumulative
production, as defined by NHTSA, will have
no effect on costs.
The 2008 Martec Report also stated
that current industry practice consists of
using competitive bidding based on
long-term, high-volume contracts that
are negotiated before technology
implementation decisions are made.
Martec stated that this practice
considers the effects of volume,
learning, and capital depreciation.
Martec also indicated that most of the
technologies evaluated in the study are
in high volume production in the global
automotive industry today, and thus
this forms a solid basis from which to
estimate future costs.
Honda also commented on NHTSA’s
25,000 unit (per manufacturer per year)
volume threshold stating that, in their
experience, costs were only likely to
decrease due to learning at volumes
exceeding about 300,000 units per year
per manufacturer. GM agreed, stating
that suppliers do not respond to, change
processes, or change contract terms for
relatively small volume changes like
NHTSA’s 25,000 unit increment, thus
volume changes of this magnitude have
no effect on component pricing. GM
also commented that its learning cycles
are based on time, not volume, and
agreed with Martec’s assessment that
contracts with suppliers typically
specify volumes and costs over a period,
which are usually equal to a product life
cycle, a 4- to 5-year period.
Ford commented that base costs in the
automotive industry are determined by
a target setting process, where
manufacturers develop pricing with
suppliers for a set period, and
manufacturers receive cost reductions
from the suppliers due to learning as
time passes, apparently at a set amount
year over year for several years. Ford
also commented that NHTSA’s
approach to learning curves had not
accounted for current economic factors,
like increases in commodity and energy
prices, and cited the example of costs of
batteries for hybrids and PHEVs which
Ford stated ‘‘are not likely to depend
solely on experience learned, but, to a
large extent, on the additional energy
and material costs they incur relative to
the vehicles without the new
technology.’’ Ford commented that
NHTSA should account for these costs,
and the factor of declining vehicle sales,
in its learning curve approach.
BorgWarner, a components supplier,
commented that learning-related costs
savings are valid for technologies that
‘‘start at low volume’’ (commenter’s
emphasis). BorgWarner argued,
however, that NHTSA’s assumed
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learning curve would not apply to the
technologies it supplies to
manufacturers,125 since these
components are well-developed and in
high volume use already, and are thus
already ‘‘learned out.’’ BorgWarner
further commented that an increase in
demand could in fact lead to higher
prices if demand for raw materials
exceeded supply.
UCS, in contrast, commented that
NHTSA had not accounted for enough
cost reductions due to learning. UCS
stated that NHTSA should have
provided ‘‘source data’’ for
manufacturer-specific learning curves,
and argued that NHTSA’s approach was
‘‘fundamentally flawed’’ for two
primary reasons: First, because NHTSA
had not considered the fact that
manufacturers engage in joint ventures
to develop new technologies, and
second, because manufacturers may also
learn from one another ‘‘through the
standard practice of tearing down
competitors’ products.’’ UCS argued that
NHTSA’s learning-based cost reductions
should account for these methods of
learning. UCS further stated that
NHTSA should not ‘‘treat[] car and
truck sales volumes separately when
estimating learning curves’’ because
there may be much overlap in terms of
technology application, especially for
vehicles like crossovers which may be
either cars or trucks. UCS concluded
that NHTSA should use EPA’s suggested
learning factor of 20 percent, citing
EPA’s Staff Technical Report.
Public Citizen agreed that NHTSA
should account for economies of scale,
but argued that NHTSA should not have
relied on initial cost estimates from
industry, which the commenter stated
were ‘‘often overestimated.’’ Public
Citizen cited a 1997 briefing paper by
the Economic Policy Institute in support
of this point, and argued that
compliance cost estimates were often
much lower than actual costs. Public
Citizen concluded that NHTSA’s use of
learning curve factors ‘‘impedes
transparency’’ in NHTSA’s analysis.
Agency response: Based on the
comments received and on its work
with Ricardo, NHTSA has revised its
approach to accounting for technology
cost reductions due to manufacturer
learning. The method of learning used
in the NPRM has been retained, but the
threshold volume has been revised and
is now calculated on an industry-wide
production basis. However, learning of
this type, which NHTSA now refers to
125 BorgWarner manufacturers and supplies
turbochargers, dual clutch transmissions, variable
valve timing systems, diesel engine components
(EGR and starting), aggressive shift logic and early
torque convertor lockup systems.
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as ‘‘volume-based’’ learning, is not
applicable to any technologies for MY
2011. Additionally, NHTSA has adopted
a fixed rate, year-over-year (YOY) cost
reduction for widely-available, highvolume, mature technologies, in
response to comments from Ford and
others. NHTSA refers to this type cost
reduction as ‘‘time-based’’ learning. For
each technology, if learning is
applicable, only one type of learning
would be applied, either volume-based
or time-based (i.e., the types are
independent of each other). These
revisions are discussed below.
For volume-based learning, NHTSA
considered comments from UCS and
decided to revise the method used to
calculate the threshold volume from a
per-manufacturer to an industry-wide
production volume basis. NHTSA
agreed with UCS’ comment that cars
and trucks may share common
components—this is true across many
makes and models which share common
engines, transmissions, accessory
systems, and mild or strong hybrid
systems, all of which can potentially
utilize the technologies under
consideration. These systems are often
manufactured by suppliers who contract
with multiple OEMs, all of whom
benefit (in the form of cost reductions
for the technology) from the supplier’s
learning. The 2008 Martec Report and
the BorgWarner comments additionally
both indicated that when manufacturers
demand components in high volumes,
suppliers are able to pass on learningbased savings to all manufacturers with
whom they contract. Thus, it made
sense to NHTSA to revise its method of
determining whether the threshold
volume has been achieved from an
annual per-manufacturer to an annual
industry-wide production volume basis.
NHTSA also changed the threshold
volume for volume-based learning from
25,000 to 300,000 units. The 2008
Martec Report and comments from
multiple manufacturers indicated that
25,000 units was far too small a
production volume to affect component
costs. In response, NHTSA began with
the Martec estimate that technologies
were fully learned-out at 1.5 million
units of production (which met the
production needs of three
manufacturers, according to that report).
NHTSA then applied two cycles of
learning in a reverse direction to
determine what the proper threshold
volume would be for these conditions.
One cycle would be applied at 750,000
units (1.5 million divided by 2, which
would represent the second volume
doubling) and one at 375,000 units
(750,000 divided by 2, which would
represent the first volume doubling).
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NHTSA thus estimated that the Martec
analysis would suggest a threshold
volume of 375,000 units. However, the
agency notes that Martec stated that it
chose the 1.5 million units number
specifically because Martec knew it was
well beyond the point where learning is
a factor, which means that 1.5 million
was beyond the cusp of the learning
threshold. NHTSA therefore concluded
that 375,000 units should represent the
upper bound for the threshold volume
for Martec’s analysis.
Having determined this, NHTSA
sought to establish a lower bound for
the threshold volume. The 2008 Martec
report indicated that production
efficiencies are maximized at 250,000–
350,000 units (which averages to
300,000 units), and that manufacturers
consequently target this range when
planning and developing manufacturing
operations. Honda also cited this
production volume. Thus, for three
manufacturers, the annual volume
requirement would be 900,000 units.126
NHTSA concluded this could also
represent high volume where learned
costs could be available, and considered
it as a lower bound estimate. With the
upper and lower values established, and
given that Martec specifically indicated
that 1.5 million did not represent the
cusp of the learning threshold, NHTSA
chose the mid-point of 1.2 million units
as the best estimate of annual industry
volumes where learned costs would be
experienced. For proper forward
learning, this would mean the first
learning cycle would occur at 300,000
and the second at 600,000. Accordingly
NHTSA has established the threshold
volume for the final rule at 300,000
industry units per year.
Having established the threshold
volume, NHTSA next considered which
technologies to apply volume learning
to. Comments confirmed that NHTSA
had been correct in the NPRM to assume
that learning would be applicable to
low-volume, emerging technologies that
could benefit from economies of scale,
so NHTSA consulted confidential
product plans to determine the volumes
of technologies to be applied by
manufacturers during the rulemaking
period. If the product plans indicated
that the technologies would be in highvolume use (i.e., above 600,000 units
produced annually for cars and trucks
by all manufacturers) at the beginning of
its first year of availability, then
volume-based learning was not
considered applicable, since at this
126 An
industry volume of 900,000 would imply
a threshold volume of 225,000 units according to
NHTSA’s analysis. This is still nine times the value
used at the NPRM.
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volume the technology would be
available at learned cost. If the volume
was below 600,000 units annually, then
NHTSA also looked at the Volpe
model’s application of the technology. If
the model applied more than 600,000
units within the first year of availability,
NHTSA did not apply volume-based
learning. If neither manufacturers nor
the model applied more than 600,000
units within the first year, then volume
learning was applied to the technology.
Based on this analysis, NHTSA
determined that volume-based learning
would be applicable to three
technologies for purposes of the final
rule: integrated starter generator, 2mode hybrid, and plug-in hybrid. For
these three technologies, and where the
agency’s initial cost estimates reflected
full learning, NHTSA reverse-learned
the cost by dividing the estimate by the
learning rate twice to properly offset the
learned cost estimate. NHTSA used a 20
percent learning rate in the NPRM for
these technologies, and concluded that
that rate was still applicable for the final
rule. This learning rate was validated
using manufacturer-submitted current
and forecast cost data for advancedbattery hybrid vehicle technology, and
accepted industry forecasts for U.S.
sales volumes of these same vehicles.
This limited study indicated that cost
efficiencies were approximately 20
percent for a doubling of U.S. market
annual sales of a particular advanced
battery technology, and the learning rate
was thus used as a proxy for other
advanced vehicle technologies.
Commenters also indicated that
learning-related cost reductions could
occur not only as a result of production
volume changes, but also as a function
of time. For example, Ford stated that
technology cost reductions were
negotiated as part of the contractual
agreement to purchase components from
suppliers, a target-setting process which
Ford described as common in the
automotive industry. In this
arrangement suppliers agree to reduce
costs on a fixed percentage year over
year according to negotiated terms. GM
described a cost reduction process that
occurs over the course of a product life
cycle, typically no less than 4–5 years,
where costs are reduced as production
experience increases. GM stated that its
cost reductions included engineering,
manufacturing, investment, and
material costs, and were also defined
through supplier contracts that
anticipate volume and costs over the
whole period. The components involved
are assumed to be high volume, mature
technologies being used in current
vehicle production. These are the types
of components that would typically be
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subject to ‘‘cost-down’’ 127 efforts that
target savings through small,
incremental design, manufacturing,
assembly, and material changes on a
recurring or periodic basis.
In response to these comments,
NHTSA has adopted this approach as an
additional type of learning related cost
reduction, referring to it as ‘‘time-based’’
learning. For purposes of the final rule,
time-based learning is applied to highvolume, mature technologies likely to be
purchased by OEMs on a long-term
contractual basis. This would include
most of the fuel-saving technologies
under consideration, except those where
volume-based learning is applied, or
those where components might consist
of commodity materials, such as oil or
rubber, where pricing fluctuations
prevent long-term or fixed value
contracts. NHTSA has used a 3 percent
reduction rate for time-based learning,
based on confidential manufacturer
information and NHTSA’s
understanding of current industry
practice. Thus, if time-based learning is
deemed applicable, then in year two of
a technology’s application, and in each
subsequent year (if any), the initial cost
is reduced by 3 percent. This approach
is responsive to comments about
compliance costs estimation, and
improves the accuracy of projecting
future costs compared to the NPRM.
With regard to the comments from
UCS, NHTSA recognizes that jointventure collaboration and competitor
tear-downs are methods used by
manufacturers for designing and
developing new products and
components, but notes that these
methods are used prior to the
manufacturing stage, and thus are not
considered manufacturing costs.
NHTSA has received no specific
manufacturer learning curve-related
data, and thus has no ‘‘source data’’ to
disclose. NHTSA continues to use a 20
percent learning factor for volume-based
learning, which is consistent with EPA’s
learning factor recommended by UCS
for NHTSA’s use.
With regard to the comments from
Public Citizen, although NHTSA
reviewed the paper cited by the
commenter, the agency found its
analysis largely irrelevant to NHTSA’s
estimation of cost reduction factors due
to automobile manufacturer learning,
and thus declines to adopt its findings.
Table IV–4 below shows the
applicability and type of learning
applied in the final rule.
BILLING CODE 4910–59–P
127 Cost-down efforts are a common practice in
competitive manufacturing environments like the
automotive industry.
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fuel consumption reduction may
sometimes be higher or lower than the
product of the individual effectiveness
7. Technology Synergies
When two or more technologies are
added to a particular vehicle model to
improve its fuel efficiency, the resultant
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values for those items.128 This may
128 More specifically, the products of the
differences between one and the technologyspecific levels of effectiveness in reducing fuel
consumption. For example, not accounting for
Continued
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occur because one or more technologies
applied to the same vehicle partially
address the same source or sources of
engine, drivetrain or vehicle losses.
Alternately, this effect may be seen
when one technology shifts the engine
operating points, and therefore increases
or reduces the fuel consumption
reduction achieved by another
technology or set of technologies. The
difference between the observed fuel
consumption reduction associated with
a set of technologies and the product of
the individual effectiveness values in
that set is referred to for purposes of this
rulemaking as a ‘‘synergy.’’ Synergies
may be positive (increased fuel
consumption reduction compared to the
product of the individual effects) or
negative (decreased fuel consumption
reduction).
For the NPRM, the Volpe model was
modified to estimate the interactions of
technologies using estimates of
incremental synergies associated with a
number of technology pairs identified
by NHTSA. The use of discrete
technology pair incremental synergies is
similar to that in DOE’s National Energy
Modeling System (NEMS).129 Inputs to
the Volpe model incorporate NEMSidentified pairs, as well as additional
pairs for the final rule from the set of
technologies considered in the Volpe
model. However, to maintain an
approach that was consistent with the
technology sequencing developed by
NHTSA, new incremental synergy
estimates for all pairs were obtained
from a first-order ‘‘lumped parameter’’
analysis tool created by EPA.130
The lumped parameter tool is a
spreadsheet model that represents
energy consumption in terms of average
performance over the fuel economy test
procedure, rather than explicitly
analyzing specific drive cycles. The tool
begins with an apportionment of fuel
consumption across several loss
mechanisms and accounts for the
average extent to which different
technologies affect these loss
mechanisms using estimates of engine,
drivetrain and vehicle characteristics
that are averaged over the EPA fuel
economy drive cycle. Results of this
analysis were generally consistent with
those of full-scale vehicle simulation
modeling performed by Ricardo, Inc.
However, regardless of a generally
consistent set of results for the vehicle
class and set of technologies studied,
the lumped parameter tool is not a full
vehicle simulation and cannot replicate
the physics of such a simulation.
Many comments were received that
stated this and pointed to errors in the
synergies listed in the NPRM being in
some cases inaccurate or even
directionally incorrect. NHTSA
recognizes that the estimated synergies
applied for the NPRM were not all
correct, and has reevaluated all
estimated synergies applied in the
analysis supporting today’s final rule. In
response to commenters calling for
NHTSA to use full vehicle simulation,
either in the first instance or as a check
on the synergy factors that NHTSA
developed, the agency has concluded
that the vehicle simulation analyses
conducted previously by Ricardo
provide a sufficient point of reference,
especially considering the time
constraints for establishing the final
rule. NHTSA did, however, improve the
predictive capability of the lumped
parameter tool.
The lumped parameter tool was first
updated with the new list of
technologies and their associated
effectiveness values. Second, NHTSA
conducted a more rigorous qualitative
analysis of the technologies for which a
competition for losses would be
expected, which led to a much larger
list of synergy pairings than was present
in the NRPM. The types of losses that
were analyzed were tractive effort,
transmission/drivetrain, engine
mechanical friction, engine pumping,
engine indicated (combustion)
efficiency and accessory (see Table IV–
5). As can be seen from Table IV–5,
engine mechanical friction, pumping
and accessory losses are improved by
various technologies from engine,
transmission, electrification and hybrid
decision trees and must be accounted
for within the model with a synergy
value. The updated lumped parameter
model was then re-run to develop new
synergy estimates for the expanded list
of pairings. That list is shown in Tables
IV–6a–d. The agency notes that
synergies that occur within a decision
tree are already addressed within the
incremental values assigned and
therefore do not require a synergy pair
to address. For example, all engine
technologies take into account
incremental synergy factors of preceding
engine technologies, and all
transmission technologies take into
account incremental synergy factors of
preceding transmission technologies.
These factors are expressed in the fuel
consumption improvement factors in
the input files used by the Volpe model.
For applying incremental synergy
factors in separate path technologies,
the Volpe model uses an input table (see
Tables IV–6a–d) which lists technology
pairings and incremental synergy factors
associated with those pairings, most of
which are between engine technologies
and transmission/electrification/hybrid
technologies. When a technology is
applied to a vehicle by the Volpe model,
all instances of that technology in the
incremental synergy table which match
technologies already applied to the
vehicle (either pre-existing or
previously applied by the Volpe model)
are summed and applied to the fuel
consumption improvement factor of the
technology being applied. Synergies for
the strong hybrid technology fuel
consumption reductions are included in
the incremental value for the specific
hybrid technology block since the
model applies technologies in the order
of the most effectiveness for least cost
and also applies all available
electrification and transmission
technologies before applying strong
hybrid technologies.
As another possible alternative to
using synergy factors, NHTSA has also
considered modifying the Volpe model
to apply inputs—for each vehicle
model—specifying the share of total fuel
consumption attributable to each of
several energy loss mechanisms. The
agency has determined that this
approach, discussed in greater detail
below, cannot be implemented at this
time because the requisite information
is not available.
interactions, if technologies A and B are estimated
to reduce fuel consumption by 10% (i.e., 0.1) and
20% (i.e., 0.2) respectively, the ‘‘product of the
individual effectiveness values’’ would be 1¥0.1
times 1¥0.2, or 0.9 times 0.8, which equals 0.72,
corresponding to a combined effectiveness of 28%
rather than the 30% obtained by adding 10% to
20%. The ‘‘synergy factors’’ discussed in this
section further adjust these multiplicatively
combined effectiveness values.
129 U.S. Department of Energy, Energy
Information Administration, Transportation Sector
Module of the National Energy Modeling System:
Model Documentation 2007, May 2007,
Washington, DC, DOE/EIAM070(2007), at 29–30.
Available at https://tonto.eia.doe.gov/ftproot/
modeldoc/m070(2007).pdf (last accessed Oct. 24,
2008).
130 EPA Staff Technical Report: Cost and
Effectiveness Estimates of Technologies Used to
Reduce Light-duty Vehicle Carbon Dioxide
Emissions; EPA420–R–08–008, March 2008.
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8. How does NHTSA use full vehicle
simulation?
For regulatory purposes, the fuel
economy of any given vehicle is
determined by placing the vehicle on a
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chassis dynamometer (akin to a large
treadmill that puts the vehicle’s wheels
in contact with one or more rollers,
rather than with a belt stretched
between rollers) in a controlled
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environment, driving the vehicle over a
specific driving cycle (in which driving
speed is specified for each second of
operation), measuring the amount of
carbon dioxide emitted from the
vehicle’s tailpipe, and calculating fuel
consumption based on the density and
carbon content of the fuel.
One means of determining the
effectiveness of a given technology as
applied to a given vehicle model would
be to measure the vehicle’s fuel
economy on a chassis dynamometer,
install the new technology, and then remeasure the vehicle’s fuel economy.
However, most technologies cannot
simply be ‘‘swapped out,’’ and even for
those that can, simply doing so without
additional engineering work may
change other vehicle characteristics
(e.g., ride, handling, performance, etc.),
producing an ‘‘apples to oranges’’
comparison.
Some technologies can also be more
narrowly characterized through bench
or engine dynamometer (i.e., in which
the engine drives a generator that is, in
turn, used to apply a controlled load to
the engine) testing. For example, engine
dynamometer testing could be used to
evaluate the brake-specific fuel
consumption (e.g., grams per kilowatthour) of a given engine before and after
replacing the engine oil with a less
viscous oil. However, such testing does
not provide a direct measure of overall
vehicle fuel economy or changes in
overall vehicle fuel economy.
For a vehicle that does not yet exist,
as in NHTSA’s analysis of CAFE
standards applicable to future model
years, even physical testing can provide
only an estimate of the vehicle’s
eventual fuel economy. Among the
alternatives to physical testing,
automotive engineers involved in
vehicle design make use of computerbased analysis tools, including a
powerful class of tools commonly
referred to as ‘‘full vehicle simulation.’’
Given highly detailed inputs regarding
vehicle engineering characteristics, full
vehicle simulation provides a means of
estimating vehicle fuel consumption
over a given drive cycle, based on the
explicit representation of the physical
laws governing vehicle propulsion and
dynamics. Some vehicle simulation
tools also incorporate combustion
simulation tools that represent the
combustion cycle in terms of governing
physical and chemical processes.
Although these tools are
computationally intensive and required
a great deal of input data, they provide
engineers involved in vehicle
development and design with an
alternative that can be considerably
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faster and less expensive than physical
experimentation and testing.
Properly executed, methods such as
physical testing and full vehicle
simulation can provide reasonably
(though not absolutely) certain estimates
of the vehicle fuel economy of specific
vehicles to be produced in the future.
However, when analyzing potential
CAFE standards, NHTSA is not actually
designing specific vehicles. The agency
is considering implications of new
standards that will apply to the average
performance of manufacturers’ entire
production lines. For this type of
analysis, precision in the estimation of
the fuel economy of individual vehicle
models is not essential; although it is
important that the agency avoid
systematic upward or downward bias,
uncertainty at the level of individual
models is mitigated by the fact that
compliance with CAFE standards is
based on average fleet performance.
As discussed above, the Volpe Model,
which the agency has used to perform
the analysis supporting today’s final
rule, applies an incrementally
multiplicative approach to estimating
the fuel savings achieved through the
progressive addition of fuel-saving
technologies. NAS’ use of the same
approach in its 2002 report was, at the
time and henceforth, criticized by a
small number of observers as being
prone to systematic overestimation of
available fuel savings. This assertion
was based on the fact that, among the
technologies present on any given
vehicle, more than one may address the
same energy loss mechanism (notably,
pumping losses on throttled engines).
Once all energy losses of a given type
are eliminated, even theoretical
improvements attributable to that loss
mechanism are no longer available.
The most direct critique of NAS’
methods appeared in a 2002 SAE paper
by four General Motors researchers
(Patton, et al.), who compared some of
NAS’ calculations to fuel consumption
estimates obtained through vehicle
testing and simulation, and concluded
that, as increasing numbers of
technologies were applied, NAS’
estimates became increasingly subject to
overestimation of available fuel
consumption reductions.131
In response to such concerns, which
had also been raised as the NAS
committee performed its analysis, the
NAS report concluded that vehicle
simulation performed for the committee
131 Patton, K.J., et al., General Motors Corporation,
‘‘Aggregating Technologies for Reduced Fuel
Consumption: A Review of the Technical Content in
the 2002 National Research Council Report on
CAFE’’, 2002–01–0628, Society of Automotive
Engineers, Inc., 2002.
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indicated that the report’s incremental
fuel savings estimates were ‘‘quite
reasonable’’ for the less aggressive two
of the three product development paths
it evaluated. The report did, however,
conclude that uncertainty increased
with consideration of more
technologies, especially under the more
aggressive ‘‘path 3’’ evaluated by the
committee. The report did not, however,
mention any directional bias to this
uncertainty.132
Notwithstanding this prior response
to concerns about the possible
overestimation of available fuel savings,
and considering that analyses
supporting the development of the
NPRM, the Volpe model applies
‘‘synergy factors’’ that adjust fuel
savings calculations when some pairs of
technologies are applied to the same
vehicle, as discussed above in Section
IV.C.7. These factors reduce uncertainty
and the potential for positive or negative
biases in the Volpe model’s estimates of
the effects of technologies.
As an alternative to estimating fuel
consumption through incremental
multiplication and the application of
‘‘synergy’’ factors to address technology
interactions, NHTSA considered basing
its analysis of fuel economy standards
on full vehicle simulation at every step.
However, considering the nature of
CAFE analysis (in particular, the
analysis of fleets projected to be sold in
the future by each manufacturer), as
well as the quantity and availability of
information required to perform vehicle
simulation, the agency explained that it
believed detailed simulation when
analyzing the entire fleet of future
vehicles is neither necessary nor
feasible. Still, when estimating
synergies between technologies, the
agency did make use of vehicle
simulation studies, as discussed above.
The agency has also done so when reestimating synergies before performing
the analysis supporting today’s final
rule.
NHTSA also considered estimating
changes in fuel consumption by
explicitly accounting for each of several
energy loss mechanisms—that is,
physical mechanisms to which the
consumption of (chemical) energy in
fuel may be attributed. This approach
would be similar to that proposed in
2002 by Patton et al. The agency invited
comment on this approach, requested
that manufacturers submit product
plans disaggregating fuel consumption
into each of nine loss mechanisms, and
sought estimates of the extent to which
fuel-saving technologies affect each of
these loss mechanisms.
132 NRC
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In response to the NPRM, the Alliance
presented a detailed analysis by Sierra
Research, which used a modified
version of VEHSIM (a vehicle
simulation tool) to estimate the fuel
consumption resulting from the
application of various vehicle
technologies to 25 vehicle categories
intended to represent the fleet. The
Alliance commented that this
simulation-based approach is more
accurate than that applied by NHTSA,
and indicated that Sierra’s ability to
perform this analysis demonstrates that
NHTSA should be able to do the same.
General Motors also raised questions
regarding the multiplicative approach to
fuel consumption estimation NHTSA
has implemented using the Volpe
model. GM indicated that the Volpe
model should be enhanced with
modifications to ‘‘take into account the
basic physics of vehicles.’’ 133 Although
GM’s comments did not explicitly
mention vehicle simulation, GM did
express full support for the Alliance’s
comments.
The California Air Resources Board
(CARB) presented comparisons of
different simulation studies,
commenting that these demonstrate that
the VEHSIM model used by Sierra
Research ‘‘cannot accurately simulate
vehicles that use advanced technologies
such as variable valve timing and lift
and advanced transmissions.’’ 134 CARB
also questioned Sierra Research’s
simulation capabilities and suggested
that, in support of actual product
development, manufacturers neither
contract with Sierra Research for such
services nor make use of VEHSIM.
CARB further commented that both AVL
(which performed simulation studies for
CARB’s evaluation of potential
greenhouse gas standards) and Ricardo
(which has recently performed
simulation studies and related analysis
for both EPA and NHTSA) provide such
services to manufacturers.135
However, the Alliance and GM have
criticized technical aspects of the AVL
133 GM comments at 2, Docket No. NHTSA–2008–
0089–0162.
134 CARB comments at 5, Docket No. NHTSA–
2008–0089–0173. In developing potential
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions standards for light
vehicles, CARB made significant use of vehicle
simulation results presented in ‘‘Reducing
Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Light-Duty Motor
Vehicles’’, which was published in 2004 by the
Northeast States Center for a Clean Air Future
(NESCCAF). As NHTSA discussed in the NPRM,
CARB’s and NESCCAF’s approach, which
effectively reduces each manufacturer’s fleet to five
‘‘representative’’ vehicles and two average vehicle
weights, is too limited for purposes of CAFE
analysis.
135 California Air Resources Board, ‘‘Air
Resources Board Staff Comments on Sierra and
Martec NRC Presentations’’, p. 2.
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and Ricardo vehicle simulation studies
mentioned by CARB. Regarding the AVL
vehicle simulations CARB utilized, GM
raised concerns that, among other
things, some of AVL’s simulations
assumed the use of premium-grade
gasoline, and some effectively assume
vehicle performance and utility would
be compromised.136 Similarly, the
Alliance raised concerns that some of
the simulations performed by Ricardo
for EPA assumed the use of premium
fuel, and that many of the simulations
assumed vehicle performance would be
reduced.137 The Alliance also indicated
that the five vehicles analyzed by
Ricardo for EPA were not representative
of all vehicles in the fleet, leading to
overstatement of the degree of
improvement potentially available to
vehicles that already use technologies
not present in the vehicles examined by
EPA. The Alliance further argued that
the report did not reveal sufficient detail
regarding important simulation details
(related, e.g., to cylinder deactivation),
that it failed to account for some
parasitic and accessory loads, and that
EPA directed Ricardo to unrealistically
assume universal improvements in
aerodynamics, tire efficiency, and
powertrain friction.138
Although submitted after the close of
the comment period specified in the
NPRM, comments by several state
Attorneys General and other state and
local official questioned the need and
merits of full vehicle simulation within
the context of CAFE analysis, stating
that
Computer simulation models such as
VEHSIM are not practical except perhaps
during vehicle development to determine the
performance of specific vehicle models
where all vehicle engineering parameters are
known and can be accounted for in the
inputs to the model. Such an exercise is
extremely data intensive, and extending it to
the entire fleet makes it subject to multiple
136 Testimony of Kenneth Patton (GM); Testimony
of Kevin McMahon (Martec); Plaintiffs’ Proposed
Findings of Fact, June 15, 2007, pp. 103 –113.
137 Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers,
‘‘Detailed Technical Comments on Ricardo ‘Study
of Potential Effectiveness of Carbon Dioxide
Reducing Vehicle Technologies’ Report’’, March 6,
2008.
138 For the reader’s reference, Ricardo’s study for
EPA was based on specific EPA-defined
requirements, such as performing full vehicle
simulations of 26 different technology packages on
the EPA-specified 5 baseline vehicles. Thus, to the
extent that Ricardo’s numbers do not reflect specific
differences in technology effectiveness by vehicle
model, in conducting the analysis for NHTSA’s
final rule, NHTSA and Ricardo drew on Ricardo’s
knowledge to develop incremental benefits based in
part on Ricardo’s simulation work. Ricardo also
noted differences between its report for EPA and
the EPA Staff Technical Report in terms of the
incremental benefits for individual technologies
developed by EPA based on Ricardo’s simulation.
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errors unless the specific parameters for each
vehicle model are known and accounted for
in the model inputs.139
Considering the comments
summarized above, the analyses to
which they refer, and the nature of the
analysis the agency performs when
evaluating potential CAFE standards,
NHTSA has concluded that full vehicle
simulation, though useful to
manufacturers’ own product
development efforts, remains neither
necessary nor feasible for the MY 2011
CAFE analysis. NHTSA’s basis for this
conclusion is as follows:
Full vehicle simulation involves
estimating the fuel consumption (and,
typically, emissions) of a specific
vehicle over a specific driving cycle.
Many engineering characteristics of the
vehicle must be specified, including,
but not limited to weight, rolling
resistance, tire radius, aerodynamic drag
coefficient, frontal area, engine maps140
and detailed transmission
characteristics (gear ratios, shift logic,
etc.), other drivetrain characteristics,
and accessory loads. Additional engine
test data would also be required in order
to update engine maps when evaluating
the application of advanced engine
technologies. Driving cycles—vehicle
speeds over time—are specified on a
second-by-second (or more finelygrained) basis. Using full vehicle
simulation to estimate average fuel
consumption under the test procedures
relevant to CAFE involves many
simulations to capture all the potential
combinations of technologies that could
be used.
Given all of the requisite data
representing a specific vehicle, full
vehicle simulation can provide a
powerful means of estimating vehicle
performance while accounting for
interactions between various vehicle
components and systems. Full
simulation can also provide a means of
estimating vehicle performance under
driving conditions not represented by
the fuel economy test procedures. For
139 Attorneys General of the States of California,
Arizona, Connecticut, Illinois, Maryland,
Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oregon,
and Vermont, the Executive Officer of the California
Air Resources Board, the Commissioner of the New
Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, the
Secretary of the New Mexico Environment
Department, the Secretary of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental
Protection, and the Corporation Counsel of the City
of New York, Supplemental Comments Regarding
Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers Comments,
Docket No. NHTSA–2008–0089–0495, October 8,
2008, p. 3.
140 An engine map specifies the engine’s
efficiency under many different operating
conditions, each of which is defined in terms of
rotational speed (i.e., revolutions per minute, or
RPM) and load (i.e., torque).
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an engineer involved in the design of a
specific vehicle or vehicle component or
system, or a manufacturer making
specific decisions regarding the fleet of
vehicles it will produce, vehicle
simulation can be a powerful tool.
However, even the most detailed
simulation involving full combustion
cycle simulation is not the ‘‘gold
standard’’ for product design. Chrysler,
for example, has portrayed simulation
as one of several tools in its CAFE
planning process, which also involves
physical testing (i.e., bench testing,
chassis dynamometer testing) of actual
components and assembled vehicles.141
In purpose and corresponding
requirements, NHTSA’s evaluation of
regulatory options is fundamentally
different from the type of product
planning and development that a
manufacturer conducts. A manufacturer
must make specific decisions regarding
every component that will be installed
in every vehicle it plans to produce, and
it must ultimately decide how many of
each vehicle it will produce. Although
manufacturers have some ability to
make ‘‘mid-course adjustments,’’ that
ability is limited by a range of factors,
such as contracts and tooling
investments. By comparison, NHTSA
attempts only to estimate how a given
manufacturer might attempt to comply
with a potential CAFE standard; given
the range of options available to each
manufacturer, NHTSA has little hope of
predicting specifically what a given
manufacturer will do. CAFE standards
require average levels of performance,
not specific technology outcomes.
Therefore, while it is important that
NHTSA avoid systematic bias when
estimating the potential to increase the
fuel economy of specific vehicle
models, it is not important that the
agency’s estimates precisely forecast
results for every future vehicle.
Furthermore, NHTSA evaluates the
impact of CAFE standards on all
manufacturers, based on a forecast of
specific vehicle models each
manufacturer will produce for sale in
the U.S. in the future. An analysis for
MY 2011 can involve thousands of
unique vehicle models, hundreds of
unique engines, and hundreds of unique
transmissions. Model-by-model
representation, as used in the analysis
for this final rule, allows the agency to,
among other things, account for
technologies expected to be present on
each vehicle under ‘‘business as usual’’
conditions, thereby avoiding errors
141 Fodale, F., Chrysler LLC, ‘‘Fuel Economy/
Fuels—Presented to NRC Committee on Fuel
Economy of Light-Duty Vehicles’’, November 27,
2007.
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regarding the potential to add further
technologies.
Because of the intense informational
and computational requirements,
industry-wide studies that rely on
vehicle simulation reduce the fleet to a
limited number of ‘‘representative’’
vehicles. This reduction limits the
ability to account for technological and
other heterogeneity of the fleet, virtually
ensuring the overestimation of
improvements available to some
vehicles (e.g., vehicles that begin with a
great deal of technology) and some
manufacturers (e.g., manufacturers that
sell many high-technology vehicles).
AVL’s analysis for NESCCAF and
Ricardo’s analysis for EPA, each of
which considered only five vehicle
models, are both, therefore, of severely
limited use for the kind of fleetwide
analysis used in this final rule, although
both provide useful information
regarding the range of fuel savings
achieved by specific technologies and
‘‘packages’’ of technologies.
The analysis conducted by Sierra
Research for the Alliance considers a
significantly greater number (25) of
‘‘representative’’ vehicles, drawing
important distinctions between
similarly-sized cars based on
performance. Sierra was able to do so in
part because it analyzed historical
vehicles. For example, Sierra indicates
that model year 1998 engines were used
to supply VEHSIM with baseline,
‘‘blended’’ engine maps applied
universally (rather than specific maps
for each manufacturer and vehicle
model) for vehicle model years out to
2020. Considering that, even without
increases in CAFE standards, many
vehicles produced for sale in the U.S.
during the time period considered in a
CAFE rulemaking are likely to have
technologies such as VVLT and cylinder
deactivation, NHTSA doubts ‘‘blended’’
1998 engines are as representative as
implied by Sierra’s analysis.
Although NHTSA could, in principle,
integrate full vehicle simulation of every
vehicle model into its analysis of the
future fleet, the agency expects that
manufacturers would be unable to
provide much of the required
information for future vehicles. Even if
manufacturers were to provide such
information, using full vehicle
simulation to estimate the effect of
further technological improvements to
future vehicles would involve uncertain
detailed estimates, such as valve timing,
cylinder deactivation operating
conditions, transmission shift points,
and hybrid vehicle energy management
strategies for each specific vehicle,
engine, and transmission combination.
Even setting aside the vast increases in
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computational demands that would
accompany the use of full vehicle
simulation in model-by-model analysis
of the entire fleet, the agency remains
convinced that the availability of
underlying information and data would
be too limited for this approach to be
practical.
As a third alternative, one that might
be more explicitly ‘‘physics-based’’ than
the use of synergy factors and vastly
more practical than full vehicle
simulation, NHTSA requested comment
on the use of partitioned fuel
consumption accounting. Aside from
GM’s nonspecific recommendation that
the Volpe model be modified to account
for the ‘‘basic physics of vehicles,’’
NHTSA did not receive comments
regarding the relative merits of
partitioning fuel consumption into
several energy loss mechanisms for
purposes of estimating the effects of
fuel-saving technologies, even though
the concept is similar to that proposed
by Patton, et al. in 2002.142 Some
manufacturers provided some of the
information that would have been
necessary for the implementation of this
approach. However, as a group,
manufacturers that submitted product
plan information to the agency provided
far too little disaggregated fuel
consumption information to support the
development of this approach. Although
NHTSA continues to believe that
partitioning fuel consumption into
various loss mechanisms could provide
a practical and sound basis for future
analysis, the information required to
support this approach is not available at
this time.
In conclusion, NHTSA observes that
with respect to the CAFE analysis
prepared for this final rule, full vehicle
simulation could theoretically be used
at three different levels. First, full
vehicle simulation could be used only
to provide specific estimates, that,
combined with other data (e.g., from
bench testing) would provide a basis for
estimates of the effectiveness of specific
individual technologies. While NHTSA
will continue considering this type of
analysis, the agency anticipates that it
will continue to be feasible and
informative to make somewhat greater
use of full vehicle simulation. Second,
full vehicle simulation could be fully
integrated into NHTSA’s model-bymodel analysis of the entire fleet to be
142 Patton, et al., present an energy balance
calculation that disaggregates fuel consumption into
six energy loss categories, indicating that ‘‘an
accounting of the effects of individual technologies
on energy losses within these categories provides a
practical, physically-based means to evaluate and
compare the fuel consumption effects of the various
technologies.’’ (Patton, et al., (2002), op. cit., p. 11.)
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projected to be produced in future
model years. NHTSA expects, however,
that this level of integration will remain
infeasible considering the size and
complexity of the fleet. Also,
considering the forward-looking nature
of NHTSA’s analysis, and the amount of
information required to perform full
vehicle simulation, NHTSA anticipates
that this level of integration would
involve misleadingly precise estimates
of fuel consumption, even for MY 2011.
Finally, full vehicle simulation can be
used to develop less complex
representations of interactions between
technologies (such as was done using
the lumped parameter model to develop
the synergies for the final rule), and to
perform reference points to which
vehicle-specific estimates may be
compared. NHTSA views this as a
practical and productive potential use of
full vehicle simulation, and will
consider following this approach in the
future. NHTSA has contracted with
NAS to, among other things, evaluate
the potential use of full vehicle
simulation and other fuel consumption
estimation methodologies. Nevertheless,
in addition to considering further
modifications to the Volpe model,
NHTSA will continue to consider other
methods for evaluating the cost and
effect of adding technology to
manufacturers’ fleets.
9. Refresh and Redesign Schedule
In addition to, and as discussed
below, developing analytical methods
that address limitations on overall rates
at which new technologies can be
expected to feasibly penetrate
manufacturers’ fleets, the agency has
also developed methods to address the
feasible scheduling of changes to
specific vehicle models. In the Volpe
model, which the agency has used to
support the current rulemaking, these
scheduling-related methods were first
applied in 2003, in response to concerns
that an early version of the model would
sometimes add and then subsequently
remove some technologies.143 By 2006,
these methods were integrated into a
new version of the model, one which
explicitly ‘‘carried forward’’
technologies added to one vehicle
model to succeeding vehicle models in
the next model year, and which timed
the application of many technologies to
coincide with the redesign or freshening
of any given vehicle model.144
Even within the context of the phasein caps discussed below, NHTSA
considers these model-by-model
scheduling constraints necessary in
143 68
144 71
FR 16874 (Apr. 7, 2003).
FR 17582 (Apr. 6, 2006).
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order to produce an analysis that
reasonably accounts for the need for a
period of stability following the
redesign of any given vehicle model. If
engineering, tooling, testing, and other
redesign-related resources were free,
every vehicle model could be
redesigned every year. In reality,
however, every vehicle redesign
consumes resources simply to address
the redesign. Phase-in caps, which are
applied at the level of manufacturer’s
entire fleet, do not constrain the
scheduling of changes to any particular
vehicle model. Conversely, scheduling
constraints to address vehicle
freshening and redesign do not
necessarily yield realistic overall
penetration rates (e.g., for strong
hybrids).
In the automobile industry there are
two terms that describe when changes to
vehicles occur: redesign and refresh
(i.e., freshening). Vehicle redesign
usually encompasses changes to a
vehicle’s appearance, shape,
dimensions, and powertrain, and is
traditionally associated with the
introduction of ‘‘new’’ vehicles into the
market, which is often characterized as
the next generation of a vehicle. In
contrast, vehicle refresh usually
encompasses only changes to a vehicle’s
appearance, and may include an
upgraded powertrain. Refresh is
traditionally associated with mid-cycle
cosmetic changes to a vehicle, within its
current generation, to make it appear
‘‘fresh.’’ Vehicle refresh traditionally
occurs no earlier than two years after a
vehicle redesign or at least two years
before a scheduled redesign. In the
NPRM, NHTSA tied the application of
the majority of the technologies to a
vehicle’s refresh/redesign cycle, because
their application was significant enough
that it could involve substantial
engineering, testing, and calibration
work.
NHTSA based the redesign and
refresh schedules used in the NPRM as
inputs to the Volpe model on a
combination of manufacturers’
confidential product plans and
NHTSA’s engineering judgment. In most
instances, NHTSA reviewed
manufacturers’ planned redesign and
refresh schedules and used them in the
same manner it did in past rulemakings.
However, in NHTSA’s judgment,
manufacturers’ planned redesign and
refresh schedules for some vehicle
models were unrealistically slow
considering overall market trends. In
these cases, the agency re-estimated
redesign and refresh schedules more
consistent with the agency’s
expectations, as discussed below. Also,
if companies did not provide product
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plan data, NHTSA used publicly
available data about vehicle redesigns to
project the redesign and refresh
schedules for the vehicles produced by
these companies.145
Unless a manufacturer submitted
plans for a more rapid redesign and
refresh schedule, NHTSA assumed that
passenger cars would normally be
redesigned every 5 years, based on the
trend over the last 10–15 years showing
that passenger cars are typically
redesigned every 5 years. These trends
were reflected in the manufacturer
product plans that NHTSA used in the
NPRM analysis, and were also
confirmed by many automakers in
meetings held with NHTSA to discuss
various general issues regarding the
rulemaking.
NHTSA explained that it believes that
the vehicle design process has
progressed and improved rapidly over
the last decade and that these
improvements have made it possible for
some manufacturers to shorten the
design process for some vehicles in
order to introduce vehicles more
frequently in response to competitive
market forces. Although manufacturers
have likely already taken advantage of
most available improvements, according
to public and confidential data available
to NHTSA, almost all passenger cars
will be on a 5-year redesign cycle by the
end of the decade, with the exception
being some high performance vehicles
and vehicles with specific market
niches.
NHTSA also stated in the NPRM that
light trucks are currently redesigned
every 5 to 7 years, with some vehicles
(like full-size vans) having longer
redesign periods. In the most
competitive SUV and crossover vehicle
segments, the redesign cycle currently
averages slightly above 5 years. NHTSA
explained that it is expected that the
light truck redesign schedule will be
shortened in the future due to
competitive market forces Thus, for
almost all light trucks scheduled for a
redesign in model year 2014 and later,
NHTSA projected a 5-year redesign
cycle. Exceptions were made for high
performance vehicles and other vehicles
that traditionally had longer than
average design cycles. For those
vehicles, NHTSA attempted to preserve
their historical redesign cycle rates.
NHTSA discussed these assumptions
with several manufacturers at the NPRM
stage, before the current economic
crisis. Two manufacturers indicated at
145 Sources included, but were not limited to
manufacturers’ web sites, industry trade
publications (e.g., Automotive News), and
commercial data sources (e.g., Wards Automotive,
etc.).
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that time that their vehicle redesign
cycles take at least five years for cars
and 6 years and longer for trucks
because they rely on those later years to
earn a profit on the vehicles. They
argued that they would not be able to
sustain their business if forced by CAFE
standards to a shorter redesign cycle.
The agency recognizes that some
manufacturers are severely stressed in
the current economic environment, and
that some manufacturers may be hoping
to delay planned vehicle redesigns in
order to conserve financial resources.
However, consistent with its forecast of
the overall size of the light vehicle
market from MY 2011 on, the agency
currently expects that the industry’s
status will improve, and that
manufacturers will typically redesign
both car and truck models every 5 years
in order to compete in that market.
NHTSA received relatively few
comments regarding its refresh/redesign
schedule assumptions. UCS commented
that redesign schedules should be
shortened to 3 years, based on recent
public statements by Ford that they
intended to move to that cycle, and
based on other recent manufacturer
behavior.
Although NHTSA agrees with UCS
that remarks by one Ford official at a
January 2008 conference suggest that
that company was then hoping to
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accelerate its vehicle ‘‘cycle time’’ to 3
years, the agency questions the context,
intended meaning and scope, and
representation of those remarks.146
Further, the agency notes that the article
referenced by UCS also indicates that
‘‘most manufacturers make changes to
their vehicle lines every four years or
more, depending on the segment of the
market, with mid-cycle freshenings
every two years or so.’’ 147 Although
some manufacturers have, in their
product plans, indicated that they plan
to redesign some vehicle models more
frequently than has been the industry
norm, all manufacturers have also
indicated that they expect to redesign
some other vehicle models considerably
less frequently. The CAR report
submitted by the Alliance, prepared by
the Center for Automotive Research and
EDF, states that ‘‘For a given vehicle
line, the time from conception to first
production may span two and one-half
to five years,’’ but that ‘‘The time from
first production (‘‘Job #1’’) to the last
vehicle off the line (‘‘Balance Out’’) may
span from four to five years to eight to
ten years or more, depending on the
dynamics of the market segment.’’ The
CAR report then states that ‘‘At the
point of final production of the current
vehicle line, a new model with the same
badge and similar characteristics may be
ready to take its place, continuing the
cycle, or the old model may be dropped
in favor of a different product.’’ 148
NHTSA believes that this description,
which states that a vehicle model will
be redesigned or dropped after 4–10
years, is consistent with other
characterizations of the redesign and
freshening process, and supports its 5year redesign assumption and its 2–3
year refresh cycle assumptions.149 Thus,
for purposes of the final rule, NHTSA is
retaining the 5-year redesign/2–3 year
refresh assumptions employed in the
NPRM. However, NHTSA will continue
to monitor manufacturing trends and
will reconsider these assumptions in
subsequent rulemakings if warranted.
For purposes of the final rule, NHTSA
has also considered confidential
product plans where applicable and
industry trends on refresh and redesign
timing as discussed above, to apply
specific technologies at redesign,
refresh, or any model years as shown in
Table IV–7 below.
BILLING CODE 4910–59–P
146 Zoia,
D.E. 2008. Ford to cut cycle times to
three years. Online at https://www.wardsauto.com.
January 24.
147 Id.
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148 See NHTSA–2008–0089–0170.1, Attachment
16, at 8 (393 of pdf).
149 See id., at 9 (394 of pdf).
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BILLING CODE 4910–59–C
As the table shows, most technologies
are applied by the Volpe model when a
specific vehicle is due for a redesign or
refresh. However, for low friction
lubricants, the model is not restricted to
applying it during a refresh/redesign
year and thus it was made available for
application at any time. Low friction
lubricants are very cost-effective, can
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apply to multiple vehicle models/
platforms and can be applied across
multiple vehicle models/platforms in
one year. Although they can also be
applied during a refresh/redesign year,
they are not restricted to that timeframe
because their application is not viewed
as necessitating a major engineering
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redesign and associated testing/
calibration.
For several technologies estimated in
the NPRM to be available for application
during any model year, NHTSA now
estimates that these technologies will be
available only at refresh or redesign.
Those technologies include aggressive
shift logic, improved accessories, low
rolling resistance tires and low drag
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brakes. Aggressive shift logic is now one
of the technologies included under
improved automatic transmission
controls. This technology requires a
recalibration specific to each vehicle,
such that it can therefore be applied
only at refresh or redesign model years.
The ‘‘improved accessories’’ technology
has been redefined to include intelligent
engine cooling systems, which require a
considerable change to the vehicle and
engine cooling system; therefore,
improved accessories also can be
applied only at refresh or redesign
model years. Also, NHTSA concurs with
manufacturers’ confidential statements
that indicating that low drag brakes and
low rolling resistance tires can be
applied only at refresh or redesign
model years due to the need for vehicle
testing and calibration (e.g., to ensure
safe handling and braking) when these
technologies are applied.
10. Phase-In Caps
In 2002, NHTSA proposed the first
increases in CAFE standards in six years
due to a previous statutorily-imposed
prohibition on setting new standards.
That proposal, for MY 2005–2007 light
truck standards, relied, in part, on a
precursor to the current Volpe model.
This earlier model used a ‘‘technology
application algorithm’’ to estimate the
technologies that manufacturers could
apply in order to comply with new
CAFE standards.
NHTSA received more than 65,000
comments on that proposal. Among
those were many manufacturer
comments concerning lead time and the
potential for rapid widespread use of
new technologies. The agency noted
that DaimlerChrysler and Ford ‘‘argued
that the agency had underestimated the
lead time necessary to incorporate fuel
economy improvements in vehicles, as
well as the difficulties of introducing
new technologies across a high volume
fleet.’’ Specific to Volpe’s technology
application algorithm, the agency noted
that General Motors took issue with the
algorithm’s ‘‘application of technologies
to all truck lines in a single model
year.’’ 150
In response to those concerns, Volpe’s
algorithm was modified ‘‘to recognize
that capital costs require employment of
technologies for several years, rather
than in a single year.’’ 151 Those changes
moderated the rates at which
technologies were estimated to
penetrate manufacturers’ fleets in
response to the new (MY 2005–MY
2007) CAFE standards. These changes
produced more realistic estimates of the
150 68
FR 16874 (Apr. 7, 2003).
at 16885.
151 Id.,
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technologies manufacturers could apply
in response to the new standards, and
thereby produced more realistic
estimates of the costs of those standards.
Prior to the next rulemaking, the
Volpe model underwent significant
integration and improvement, including
the accommodation of explicit ‘‘phasein caps’’ to constrain the rates at which
each technology would be estimated to
penetrate each manufacturer’s fleet in
response to new CAFE standards.152 As
documented in 2006, the agency’s final
standards for light trucks sold in MY
2008–MY 2011 were based on phase-in
caps ranging from 17 percent to 25
percent (corresponding to full
penetration of the fleet within 4 to 6
years) for most technologies, and from 3
percent to 10 percent (full penetration
within 10 to 33 years) for more
advanced technologies such as hybrid
electric vehicles.153 The agency based
these rates on consideration of
comments and on the 2002 NAS
Committee’s findings that ‘‘widespread
penetration of even existing
technologies will probably require 4 to
8 years’’ and that for emerging
technologies ‘‘that require additional
research and development, this time lag
can be considerably longer’’.154
In its 2008 NPRM proposing new
CAFE standards for passenger cars and
light trucks sold during MY 2011–MY
2015, NHTSA considered
manufacturers’ planned product
offerings and estimates of technology
availability, cost, and effectiveness, as
well as broader market conditions and
technology developments. The agency
concluded that many technologies could
be deployed more rapidly than it had
estimated during the prior
rulemaking.155 For most engine
technologies, the agency increased these
caps from 17 percent to 20 percent,
equivalent to reducing the estimated
time for potential fleet penetration from
6 years to 5 years. For stoichiometric
gasoline direct injection (GDI) engines,
the agency increased the phase-in cap
from 3 percent to 20 percent, equivalent
to estimating that such engines could
152 These caps constrain the extent to which
additional technology is applied by the model,
beyond the levels projected in each manufacturer’s
baseline fleet. Also, because manufacturers’ fleets
are comprised of vehicles, engines, and
transmissions sold in discrete volumes, phase-in
caps cannot be applied as precise limits. In some
cases (when a phase-in cap is small or a
manufacturer has a limited product line), doing so
would prevent the technology from being applied
at all. Therefore, the Volpe model enforces each
phase-in cap constraint as soon as it has been
exceeded by application of technologies to
manufacturers.
153 71 FR 17572, 17679 (Apr. 6, 2006).
154 Id. at 17572. See also 2002 NAS Report, at 5.
155 73 FR 24387–88 (May 2, 2008).
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potentially penetrate a given
manufacturer’s fleet in 5 years rather
than the previously-estimated 33 years.
However, as in its earlier CAFE
rulemakings, the agency continued to
recognize that myriad constraints
prohibit most technologies from being
applied across an entire fleet of vehicles
within a year, even if those technologies
are available in the market.
In addition to requesting further
explanation of NHTSA’s use of phase-in
caps, commenters addressing phase-in
caps generally asserted one of three
themes: (1) That hybrid phase-in caps
were much lower than market trends or
manufacturer announcements would
otherwise suggest; (2) that the phase-in
caps proposed in the NPRM were too
high in the early years of the rulemaking
and did not reflect the very small (from
a manufacturing perspective) amount of
lead-time between the final rule and the
MY 2011 standards, and/or were too
low in the later years of the rulemaking
given the relatively-increased amount of
lead-time for those model years; (3) that
there are insufficient resources (either in
terms of capital or engineering) to
implement the number of technologies
implied by the phase-in caps
simultaneously.
Agency response: NHTSA continues
to recognize that many factors constrain
the rates at which manufacturers will be
able to feasibly add fuel-saving
technologies to the fleets they will sell
in the United States. For a given
technology, examples of these factors
may include, but would not be limited
to the following:
• Is the technology ready for
commercial use? For example, can it
operate safely and reliably under realworld driving conditions for several
years and many miles?
• If the technology requires special
infrastructure (e.g., new electrical
generation and charging facilities), how
quickly will that be put in place?
• How quickly can suppliers ramp up
to produce the technology in mass
quantities? For example, how quickly
can they obtain the materials, tooling,
and engineering resources they will
need?
• Are original equipment
manufacturers (OEMs) ready to integrate
the technology into vehicles? For
example, how quickly can they obtain
the necessary tooling (e.g., retool
factories), engineering, and financial
resources?
• How long will it take to establish
failure and warranty data, and to make
sure dealers and maintenance and repair
businesses have any new training and
tooling required in order to work with
the new technology?
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• Will OEMs be able to reasonably
recoup prior investments for tooling and
other capital?
• To what extent are suppliers and
OEMs constrained by preexisting
contracts?
NHTSA cannot explicitly and
quantitatively evaluate every one of
these and other factors with respect to
each manufacturer’s potential
deployment of each technology
available during the production intent
or emerging technology framework.
Attempting to do so would require an
extraordinary effort by the agency, and
would likely be subject to tremendous
uncertainties. For example, in the
current economic and market
environment, the agency expects that it
would be impossible to reliably predict
specific characteristics of future supply
chains. Therefore, the agency has
concluded that it is appropriate to
continue using phase-in caps to apply
the agency’s best judgment of the extent
to which such factors combine to
constrain the rates at which
technologies may feasibly be deployed.
We note, however, that many of the
assumptions about phase-in caps made
in this final rule apply to years beyond
MY 2011, because as the NAS
Committee and commenters indicated,
technologies are phased in over several
years, so the agency evaluated the
phasing-in of technologies over the fiveyear period proposed in the NPRM.
NHTSA provides these assumptions
both in response to comments and to
provide context for the agency’s
decisions regarding MY 2011 phase-in
caps. We emphasize that all
assumptions for years other than MY
2011 will be reconsidered for future
rulemakings and may be subject to
change at that time.
Considering the above-mentioned
comments, NHTSA has concluded that
the phase-in caps it applied during its
analysis documented in the 2008 NPRM
resulted in technology penetration rates
that were unrealistically high in the
earlier model years covered by its
proposal, particularly for MY 2011. This
was a significant basis for the proposed
standards’ ‘‘front loading’’ about which
manufacturers expressed serious
concerns. In response, and based on this
conclusion, the Volpe model was
modified for purposes of the final rule
analysis to use phase-in caps for each
technology that vary from one year to
the next, and that in many cases would
have increased more rapidly in the later
years of the agency’s analysis than in
earlier years. In making these changes,
particularly to the MY 2011 phase-in
caps, the agency has been mindful of the
need to provide manufacturers
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sufficient lead time to add technologies
to their fleets. In the agency’s judgment,
its revised approach more realistically
represents manufacturers’ capabilities
and therefore produces more realistic
estimates of the costs of new CAFE
standards.
For some technologies, NHTSA also
concluded that slower overall rates of
fleet penetration are more likely than
the rates shown in the NPRM. The
agency estimates that cylinder
deactivation, stoichiometric GDI, and
turbocharging with downsizing would
be able to potentially be added to 12–
14 percent of the fleet per year on
average, rather than the 20 percent
phase-in caps used in the NPRM for
these technologies. Considering
manufacturers’ comments and some
aspects of its reevaluation of the
incremental benefits of available engine
technologies, the agency has concluded
that these technologies will, for some
engines, require more significant
hardware changes and certification
burden than previously recognized,
such that feasible deployment is likely
to be somewhat slower than estimated
in the NPRM.
NHTSA has also concluded,
considering the complexities involved
in deploying strongly hybridized
vehicles (i.e., power split, two mode,
and plug-in hybrids), it is unrealistic to
expect that, in response to new CAFE
standards, manufacturers can produce
more of such vehicles in MY 2011 than
they are already planning. Therefore,
NHTSA has set the MY 2011 phase-in
cap for strong hybrids to zero in that
model year. Based on new information
regarding engineering resources entailed
in developing new power split and twomode hybrid vehicles, the agency
estimated in its analysis that these
technologies could be added to up to 11
percent and 8 percent, respectively, of a
given manufacturer’s long run fleet,
rather than the 15 percent the agency
estimated for the NPRM. The agency
also considered a less aggressive 1
percent longer run phase-in cap for
plug-in hybrids, in part because
although the agency expects that plugin hybrids will rely on lithium-ion
batteries, it is not clear whether and, if
so, how the supply chain for large and
robust lithium-ion batteries will
develop.
On the other hand, NHTSA has also
concluded that some technologies can
potentially be deployed more widely
than estimated in the NPRM. For
example, the agency estimates that 6/7/
8-speed transmissions, dual clutch or
automated manual transmissions,
secondary axle disconnect, and
aerodynamic improvements can
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potentially (notwithstanding
engineering constraints that, for
example, preclude the application of
aerodynamic improvements to some
performance vehicles) be added at an
average rate of 20 percent per year of a
given manufacturer’s fleet rather than
the 14–17 percent average annual phasein caps used in the NPRM for these
technologies. In the agency’s judgment,
increased phase-in caps are appropriate
for these transmission technologies, in
part because the agency’s review of
confidential product plans which
indicated a higher than anticipated
application rate of these technologies
than existed at the time of the NPRM.
Additionally, several manufacturers
indicated a high likelihood of
significant usage of dual clutch
transmissions across their fleet of
vehicles. The secondary axle disconnect
technology was redefined for the final
rule to consist of a somewhat basic,
existing technology applicable only to 4
wheel-drive vehicles (a smaller
population) rather than the NPRMdefined technology (which was
applicable to both 4 and all wheel drive
vehicles). The agency has also
concluded that, because it has identified
performance vehicles as such, and has
estimated that aerodynamic
improvements are not applicable to
these vehicles, aerodynamic dynamic
improvements can be applied more
widely as long as they are applied
consistent with vehicle redesign
schedules. Furthermore, considering
changes in manufacturers’ stated
expectations regarding prospects for
diesel engines, the agency estimates that
diesel engines could be added to as
much as 4 percent of a manufacturer’s
light truck fleet each year on average,
rather than the 3 percent estimated in
the NPRM. These changes in NHTSA’s
estimates stem from the agency’s
reevaluation of the status of these
technologies, as revealed by
manufacturers’ plans and confidential
statements, as well as other related
comments submitted in response to the
NPRM.
Regarding comments that
manufacturers’ public statements reflect
the ability to deploy technology more
rapidly than reflected in the phase-in
caps NHTSA applied in the NPRM,
NHTSA notes that it did consider such
statements. Combined with other
information, these led the agency to
conclude that, as mentioned above,
some technologies could, particularly in
later years, be applied more widely than
the agency had previously estimated.
However, in their confidential
statements to NHTSA, manufacturers
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are typically more candid about
factors—both positive and negative—
that affects their ability to deploy new
technologies than they are in public
statements available to their
competitors. Therefore, NHTSA places
greater weight on manufacturers’
confidential statements, especially
when they are consistent with
statements made by other manufacturers
and/or suppliers. NHTSA also observes
that some organizations have exhibited
a tendency to take manufacturers’
statements out of context, or overlook
important caveats included in such
statements, which are largely used for
marketing purposes.
Table IV–8 below outlines the phasein caps for each discrete technology for
MY 2011. These phase-in caps, along
with the expanded number and types of
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vehicle subclasses, address the concerns
raised by commenters and represent a
substantial improvement in terms of
consideration of the factors affecting
technology penetration rates over those
used in the NPRM. Additional
considerations regarding specific phasein caps, including nonlinear increases
in these caps, are presented in the more
detailed technology-by-technology
analysis summarized below.
For some of the technologies applied
in the final rule, primarily the valvetrain
and diesel engine technologies, NHTSA
has utilized combined phase-ins caps
since the technologies are effectively the
same from the standpoints of
engineering and implementation. The
final rule represented diesel engines as
two technologies that both result in the
conversion of gasoline engine vehicles.
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The annual phase-in caps for these two
technologies, which are both set to a
maximum of 3 percent for passenger
cars (4 percent for light trucks) have
been combined so that the maximum
total application of either or both
technologies to any manufacturers’
passenger car fleet is limited to 3
percent (not 6 percent). For example, if
3 percent of a manufacturers’ passenger
car fleet has received diesel following
combustion restart in a given year,
diesel following turbocharging and
downsizing will not be applied because
the phase-in cap for diesels would have
been reached. These combined phase-in
caps are discussed below where
applicable to each technology.
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D. Specific Technologies Considered for
Application and NHTSA’s Estimates of
Their Incremental Costs and
Effectiveness
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1. What data sources did NHTSA
evaluate?
In developing the technology
assumptions in the final rule, NHTSA,
working with Ricardo, examined a wide
range of data sources and comments. We
reexamined the sources we relied on for
the NPRM such as the 2002 NAS Report,
the 2004 NESCCAF report developed for
CARB by AVL and Martec, the 2006
EEA report and the EPA certification
data. We also considered more recent
and updated sources of information and
reports submitted to the NPRM docket,
including the (1) Sierra Research report
submitted by the Alliance as an
attachment to its comments as another
set of estimates for fuel economy cost
and effectiveness,156 (2) CARB’s
156 Sierra
Research, ‘‘Attachment to Comment
Regarding the NHTSA Proposal for Average Fuel
Economy Standards Passenger Cars and light
Trucks Model Years 2011–2015,’’ June 27, 2008.
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response to aspects of that report, which
was filed as supplemental comment on
October 14, 2008, (3) the 2008 Martec
Report,157 which updated the Martec
report on which the 2004 NESCCAF
study was based, and the EPA Staff
Technical Report,158 which largely
mirrored NHTSA’s NPRM estimates.
The agency also evaluated
confidential data from a number of
vehicle manufacturers and technology
component suppliers.159 We note that
vehicle manufacturers updated their
Available at Docket No. NHTSA–2008–0089–
0179.1.
157 Martec, ‘‘Variable Costs of Fuel Economy
Technologies,’’ June 1, 2008. Available at Docket
No. NHTSA–2008–0089–0169.1.
158 EPA Staff Technical Report: Cost and
Effectiveness Estimates of Technologies Used to
Reduce Light-Duty Vehicle Carbon Dioxide
Emissions. EPA420–R–08–008, March 2008.
159 The major suppliers that provided NHTSA
with fuel economy cost and effectiveness estimates
in response to our request for comments included
Borg-Warner, Cummins, and Delphi, while BorgWarner, Bosch, Coring, Cummins, Delphi, and
Siemens also provided NHTSA with fuel economy
cost and effectiveness estimates during confidential
meetings.
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product plans in response to NHTSA’s
May 2008 Request for Comment.160
2. Individual technology descriptions
and cost/effectiveness estimates
(a) Gasoline Engine Technologies
(i) Overview
Most passenger cars and light trucks
in the U.S. have gasoline-fueled spark
ignition internal combustion engines.
These engines move the vehicle by
converting the chemical energy in
gasoline fuel to useful mechanical work
output as shaft torque and power
delivered to the transmission and to the
vehicle’s driving wheels. Vehicle fuel
economy is directly proportional to the
efficiency of the engine. Two common
terms are used to define the efficiency
of an engine are (1) Brake Specific Fuel
Consumption (BSFC), which is the ratio
of the mass of fuel used to the output
mechanical energy; and (2) Brake
Thermal Efficiency (BTE), which is the
ratio of the fuel chemical energy, known
160 Manufacturers that provided NHTSA with fuel
economy cost and effectiveness estimates in
response to our request for comments include
BMW, Chrysler, Daimler, Ford, GM, Honda, Nissan,
and Toyota.
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as calorific value, to the output
mechanical energy.
The efficiency of an automotive spark
ignition engine varies considerably with
the rotational speed and torque output
demanded from the engine. The most
efficient operating condition for most
current engine designs occurs around
medium speed (30–50 percent of the
maximum allowable engine rpm) and
typically between 70–85 percent of
maximum torque output at that speed.
At this operating condition, BTE is
typically 33–36 percent. However, at
lower engine speeds and torque outputs,
at which the engine operates in most
consumer vehicle use and on
standardized drive cycles, BTE typically
drops to 20–25 percent.
Spark ignition engine efficiency can
be improved by reducing the energy
losses that occur between the point of
combustion of the fuel in the cylinders
to the point where that energy reaches
the output crankshaft. Reduction in this
energy loss results in a greater
proportion of the chemical energy of the
fuel being converted into useful work.
For improving engine efficiency at
lighter engine load demand points,
which are most relevant for CAFE fuel
economy, the technologies that can be
added to a given engine may be
characterized by which type of energy
loss is reduced, as shown in Table IV–
9 below.
As Table IV–9 shows, the main types
of energy losses that can be reduced in
gasoline engines to improve fuel
economy are exhaust energy losses,
engine friction losses, and gas exchange
losses. Converting the gasoline engine to
a diesel engine can also reduce heat
losses.
the cycle thermodynamic efficiency.
The thermodynamic efficiency can be
improved by either increasing the
engine’s compression ratio or by
operating with a lean air/fuel ratio. The
latter is not considered to be at the
emerging technology point yet due to
the non-availability of lean NOX
aftertreatment, as discussed below.
However, the compression ratio may
potentially be raised by 1 to 1.5 ratios
using stoichiometric direct fuel
injection.
reduced through downsizing the engine
by means of increasing the enginespecific power output.
Exhaust energy includes the
kinematic and thermal energy of the
exhaust gases, as well as the wasted
chemical energy of unburned fuel.
These losses represent approximately 32
percent of the initial fuel chemical
energy and can be reduced in three
ways: first, by recovering mechanical or
electrical energy from the exhaust gases;
second, by improving the hydrocarbon
fuel conversion; and third, by improving
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Engine Friction Loss Reduction
Friction losses can represent a
significant proportion of the global
losses at low load. These losses are
dissipated through the cooling system in
the form of heat. Besides via direct
reduction measures, friction can also be
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The energy expended while
delivering the combustion air to the
cylinders and expelling the combustion
products is known as gas exchange loss,
commonly referred to as pumping loss.
The main source of pumping loss in a
gasoline engine is the use of an inlet air
throttle, which regulates engine output
by controlling the pre-combustion
cylinder air pressure, but is an
inefficient way to achieve this pressure
control. A more efficient way of
controlling the cylinder air pressure is
to modify the valve timing or lift.
Another way to reduce the average
pumping losses is to ‘‘downsize’’ the
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engine, making it run at higher loads or
higher pressures.
As illustrated in Table IV–9, several
different technologies target pumping
loss reduction, but it is important to
note that the fuel consumption
reduction from these technologies is not
necessarily cumulative. Once most of
the pumping work has been eliminated,
adding further technologies that also
target reduced pumping loss will have
little additional effectiveness. Thus, in
the revised decision trees, the
effectiveness value shown for additional
technologies targeting pumping loss
depends on the existing technology
combination already present on the
engine.
(ii) Low Friction Lubricants (LUB)
One of the most basic methods of
reducing fuel consumption in gasoline
engines is the use of lower viscosity
engine lubricants. More advanced multiviscosity engine oils are available today
with improved performance in a wider
temperature band and with better
lubricating properties. CAFE standards
notwithstanding, the trend towards
lower friction lubricants is widespread.
Within the next several year, most
vehicles are likely to use 5W–30 motor
oil, and some will use even less viscous
oils, such as 5W–20 or possibly even
0W–20, to reduce cold start friction.
The NPRM reflected NHTSA’s belief
that manufacturer estimates are the most
accurate, and it estimated that low
friction lubricants could reduce fuel
consumption by 0.5 percent for all
vehicle types at an incremental cost of
$3, which represented the mid-point of
manufacturer estimates range, rounded
up to the next dollar. For the final rule
NHTSA used the $3 cost from the
NPRM, updated it to 2007 dollars, and
marked it up to a retail price equivalent
(RPE) of $5. Several manufacturers
commented confidentially that low
friction lubricants could reduce fuel
consumption by 0 to 1 percent, and the
Alliance suggested 0.5 percent relative
to the baseline fleet. These comments
confirm NHTSA’s NPRM effectiveness
estimate, so NHTSA has retained it for
the final rule.
Low friction lubricants may be
applied to any class of vehicles. The
phase-in for low friction lubricants is
capped at 50 percent for MY 2011.
Honda commented that low friction
lubricants cannot be applied to engines
that have not been developed
specifically for them.161 NHTSA
understands that in some cases there
could be a need for design changes and
durability verification to implement low
161 Docket
NHTSA–2008–0089–0191.1.
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friction lubricants in existing engines.
However, aftermarket low friction
lubricant products already exist, and
have been approved for use in existing
engines.
(iii) Engine Friction Reduction (EFR)
Besides low friction lubricants,
manufacturers can also reduce friction
and improve fuel economy by
improving the design of engine
components and subsystems. Examples
include improvements in low-tension
piston rings, roller cam followers,
improved crankshaft design and
bearings, material coatings, material
substitution, more optimal thermal
management, and piston and cylinder
surface treatments.
In the NPRM, based on confidential
manufacturer data and the NAS,
NESCCAF, and EEA reports, NHTSA
estimated that friction reduction could
incrementally reduce fuel consumption
for all vehicles by 1 to 3 percent at a cost
of $0 to $21 per cylinder resulting in
cost estimates of $0–$84 for a 4cylinder, $0–$126 for a V–6, and $0–
$168 for a V–8. For the final rule,
NHTSA assumed there would be some
cost associated with reducing engine
friction, since at a minimum
engineering and validation testing is
required, in addition to any new
components required such as roller
followers or improved bearings.
Additionally some revised components,
such as improved surface materials/
treatments, piston rings, etc., have costs
that vary by component size which need
to account for the full range of engines
under consideration in the rulemaking,
from small displacement gasoline to
large displacement diesel engines.
Considering the above, NHTSA relied
on confidential manufacturer comments
in response to the NPRM to determine
a lower technology cost bound of $35
for a 4-cylinder engine and an upper
cost of $195 for a 6 cylinder engine.
These costs were marked up by a 1.5
RPE factor to arrive at per-cylinder costs
of $13 to $49 which were used to
establish costs based on cylinder count.
Costs of $52 to $196 for a 4-cylinder
engine, $78 to $294 for a 6-cylinder
engine, and $104 to $392 for an 8cylinder engine were used in the final
rule.
Confidential manufacturer comments
submitted in response to the NPRM
showed an effectiveness range of 0.3 to
2 percent for engine friction reduction.
Besides the comments received another
effectiveness estimate, a November 2007
press release from Renault, claimed a
gain of 2 percent over the NEDC
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cycle 162 from engine friction
reduction.163 Based on the available
sources, NHTSA established the fuel
consumption effectiveness estimate for
the final rule as 1 to 2 percent.
Engine friction-reducing technologies
are available from model year 2011 and
may be applied to all vehicle subclasses.
No learning factors were applied to
costs as the technology has a loosely
defined BOM which may in part consist
of materials (surface treatments, raw
materials) that are commodity based. As
was the case in the NPRM, an average
of 20 percent year-over-year phase-in
rate starting in 2011 was adopted. As
confirmed by manufacturers’ comments,
NHTSA has maintained the NPRM
position that engine friction reduction
may only be applied in conjunction
with a refresh cycle.
(iv) Variable Valve Timing (VVT)
Variable valve timing (VVT) is a
classification of valve-train designs that
alter the timing of the intake valve,
exhaust valve, or both, primarily to
reduce pumping losses, increase
specific power, and control the level of
residual gases in the cylinder. VVT
reduces pumping losses when the
engine is lightly loaded by positioning
the valve at the optimum position
needed to sustain horsepower and
torque. VVT can also improve thermal
efficiency at higher engine speeds and
loads. Additionally, VVT can be used to
alter (and optimize) the effective
compression ratio where it is
advantageous for certain engine
operating modes.
VVT has now become a widely
adopted technology: For the 2007 model
year, over half of all new cars and light
trucks have engines with some method
of variable valve timing. Therefore, the
degree of further improvement across
the fleet is limited by the level of
valvetrain technology already
162 Due to the advanced nature of many of the
technologies discussed in the NPRM, and in an
effort to find broad based rationale for the specific
benefits of each technology type, reference data has
been gathered that specifies fuel consumption
benefits as measured on the NEDC test cycle. To
make this conversion, data from the International
Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT) showed
excellent correlation between CAFE test cycle
results and NEDC test cycle results. While there was
an offset in the linear best fit, the slope was nearly
equal to 1; therefore, for this report, any percentage
improvement found on the NEDC cycle will be
assumed to be equivalent to gains found on the
CAFE test cycle.
163 Renault press release, ‘‘Renault Introduces The
Ecological, Economical Logan ‘Renault Eco2’
Concept At The Michelin Organized Challenge
Bibendum, November 14, 2007. Available at
https://www. renault.com/renault_ com/en/images/
15181%2015181_DP_logan_eco2_Shanghai_14_
nov_DEF_DB_2_tcm1120-686305.pdf (last accessed
October 27, 2008).
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implemented on the vehicles.
Comments from Ford received in
response to the NPRM indicate that
many of its new and upgraded engines
during the specified time period will
launch with or upgrade to advanced
forms of VVT, which are discussed
below.164 Information found in the
submitted product plans is used to
determine the degree to which VVT
technologies have already been applied
to particular vehicles to ensure the
proper level of VVT technology, if any,
is applied. There are three different
implementation classifications of
variable valve timing: ICP (Intake Cam
Phasing), where a cam phaser is used to
adjust the timing of the inlet valves
only; CCP (Coupled Cam Phasing),
where a cam phaser is used to adjust the
timing of both the inlet and exhaust
valves equally; and DCP (Dual Cam
Phasing), where two cam phasers are
used to control the inlet and exhaust
valve timing independently. Each of
these three implementations of VVT
uses a cam phaser to adjust the camshaft
angular position relative to the
crankshaft position, referred to as
‘‘camshaft phasing.’’ This phase
adjustment results in changes to the
pumping work required by the engine to
accomplish the gas exchange process.
The majority of current cam phaser
applications use hydraulically actuated
units, powered by engine oil pressure
and managed by a solenoid that controls
the oil pressure supplied to the phaser.
Electrically actuated cam phasers are
relatively new, but are now in volume
production with Toyota, which suggests
that technical issues have been resolved.
Honda commented that VVT is not
applicable on existing engine designs
that do not already contain these
technologies due to durability, noisevibration-harshness (NVH), thermal,
packaging, and other constraints that
require engine redesign.
1. Intake Cam Phasing (ICP)
Valvetrains with ICP can modify the
timing of the inlet valves by phasing the
intake camshaft while the exhaust valve
timing remains fixed. This requires the
addition of a cam phaser on each bank
of intake valves on the engine. An inline 4-cylinder engine has one bank of
intake valves, while V-configured
engines have two banks of intake valves.
In the NPRM, NHTSA and EPA
estimated that ICP would cost $59 per
cam phaser or $59 for an in-line 4
cylinder engine and $119 for a V-type,
for an overall cost estimate of $59 to
$119, based on the NAS, NESCCAF, and
EEA reports and confidential
164 Docket
No. NHTSA–2008–0089–0202.1, at 4.
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manufacturer data. NHTSA received
several updated cost estimates
confidentially from manufacturers for
ICP costs in response to the NPRM that
varied over a wide range from $35 to
$300, and additionally looked to the
2008 Martec report for costing guidance.
According to the 2008 Martec report,
content assumptions for ICP costing
include the addition of a cam phaser
and oil control valves at $25 and $10
respectively, per bank, which agreed
with confidential manufacturer data
received in response to the NPRM.
These figures were then adjusted to
include an incremental camshaft sensor
per bank at $4, and an additional $2
increase to account for an ECU upgrade
as shown by confidential data. Using a
markup of 1.5 to yield a RPE value, the
incremental cost for ICP in the final rule
is estimated to be $61 per bank,
resulting in a $61 charge for in-line
engine configurations and $122 for Vengine configurations.
For fuel economy effectiveness
values, NHTSA tentatively concluded in
the NPRM that the incremental gain in
fuel consumption for ICP would be 1 to
2 percent depending on engine
configuration, in agreement with the
NESCCAF study. Confidential
manufacturer data submitted in
response to the NPRM showed a larger
effectiveness range of 1.0 to 3.4 percent,
although the majority of those estimates
fell at the lower end of that range. Based
on the comments received, NHTSA
retained the NPRM estimates of 1 to 2
percent incremental improvement in
fuel consumption due to ICP.
ICP is applicable to all vehicle classes
and can be applied at the refresh cycle.
For the final rule, NHTSA has combined
the phase-in caps for ICP, CCPS, CCPO
and DCP and capped the joint
penetration allowed at 15 percent in MY
2011 with time-based learning applied.
2. Coupled Cam Phasing (CCPS and
CCPO)
Valvetrains with coupled (or
coordinated) cam phasing can modify
the timing of both the inlet valves and
the exhaust valves an equal amount by
phasing the camshaft of a single
overhead cam (SOHC) engine or an
overhead valve (OHV) engine.165 For
overhead cam engines, this requires the
addition of a cam phaser on each bank
of the engine. Thus, an in-line 4cylinder engine has one cam phaser,
165 Although CCP appears only in the SOHC and
OHV branches of the decision tree, it is noted that
a single phaser with a secondary chain drive would
allow CCP to be applied to DOHC engines. Since
this would potentially be adopted on a limited
number of DOHC engines NHTSA did not include
it in that branch of the decision tree.
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while V-engines have two cam phasers.
For overhead valve (OHV) engines,
which have only one camshaft to
actuate both inlet and exhaust valves,
CCP is the only VVT implementation
option available.166
In the NPRM, NHTSA explained that
for an OHV engine, the same phaser
added for ICP would be used for CCP
control, so the cost for CCP should be
identical to that for ICP. For an OHV,
since only one phaser would be
required since only camshaft exists,
NHTSA estimated the cost for CCP at
$59 regardless of engine configuration,
using the logic provided for ICP. For
purposes of the final rule, the logic for
ICP also carries over to the cost
estimates for CCP. Cost assumptions for
CCP are the same as ICP resulting in
RPE-adjusted costs of $61 for in-line
SOHC or OHV engines and $122 for
SOHC V-engine configurations,
incremental to an engine without VVT.
For fuel economy effectiveness,
NHTSA estimated in the NPRM that the
incremental gain in fuel consumption
for CCP is 1 to 3 percent above that
obtained by ICP, in agreement with the
NESCCAF report and confidential
manufacturer data. Confidential
manufacturer data submitted in
response to the NPRM also showed an
effectiveness range of 1 to 3 percent for
CCP, although Ford has publicly
reported a 3.3 percent improvement for
CCP when applied to its 5.4 liter 3-valve
V8 engine (which has high EGR
tolerance due to the valve-masking
effect with the 3-valve design).167 Most
engines are not as EGR-tolerant and so
will not achieve as much effectiveness
from CCP as the Ford engine. For
purposes of the final rule, NHTSA
essentially carried over the NPRM
incremental effectiveness of applying
the CCP technologies to be 1 to 3
percent. CCP can be applied to any class
of vehicles at refresh. For the final rule,
NHTSA has combined the phase-in caps
for ICP, CCPS, CCPO and DCP and
capped the joint penetration at 15
percent in MY 2011. Since these
technologies are mature and in high
volume, time-based learning factors are
166 It is also noted that coaxial camshaft
developments would allow other VVT options to be
applied to OHV engines. However, since they
would potentially be adopted on a limited number
of OHV engines NHTSA did not include them in
the decision tree.
167 Robert Stein, Tachih Chou, and Jeffrey Lyjak,
‘‘The Combustion System Of The Ford 5.4 L 3 Valve
Engine,’’ Global Powertrain Congress 2003—
Advanced Engine Design & Performance, Sep 2003,
Volume 24. Available at https://www.gpc-icpem.org/
pages/publications.html (last accessed Nov. 8,
2008).
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3. Dual Cam Phasing (DCP)
The most flexible VVT design is dual
(independent) cam phasing, where the
intake and exhaust valve opening and
closing events are controlled
independently. This option allows the
option of controlling valve overlap,
which can be used as an internal EGR
strategy. At low engine loads, DCP
creates a reduction in pumping losses,
resulting in improved fuel consumption.
Additionally, increased internal EGR
results in lower engine-out NOX
emissions and improved fuel
consumption. This fuel economy
improvement depends on the residual
tolerance of the combustion system, as
noted in the CCP section above.
Additional improvements are observed
at idle, where low valve overlap can
result in improved combustion stability,
potentially reducing idle fuel
consumption.
In the NPRM, NHTSA estimated costs
for DCP by building upon the cost
estimates for ICP, where an additional
cam phaser is added to control each
bank of exhaust valves less the cost of
the EGR valve which can be deleted.
This resulted in an NPRM cost range of
$89 to $209. For purposes of the final
rule, cost assumptions for DCP, which
included inflation, were determined by
essentially doubling the ICP hardware,
yielding an incremental cost of $61 per
engine cylinder bank, over ICP. This
translates to a cost of $61 for in-line
engines and $122 for V-engine
configurations, incremental to ICP
technology.
For fuel economy effectiveness,
NHTSA estimated in the NPRM that the
incremental gain in fuel consumption
for DCP is 1 to 3 percent, in agreement
with the NESCCAF report and
confidential manufacturer data.
Confidential manufacturer data received
in response to the NPRM showed an
effectiveness range of 0.5 to 3.4 percent
for DCP. Publicly available data from
BMW 168 and Ford 169 show an
effectiveness of 5 percent for DCP over
engines without VVT, agreeing with the
upper bounds for ICP and DCP
combined. For purposes of the final
rule, NHTSA concluded that the
168 Meyer, BMW, ‘‘Turbo-Charging BMW’s SprayGuided DI Combustion System—Benefits and
Challenges,’’ Global Powertrain Congress,
September, 2005, vol. 33. Available at https://
www.gpc-icpem.org/pages/publications.html (last
accessed Nov. 8, 2008).
169 Ulrich Kramer and Patrick Phlips, ‘‘Phasing
Strategy For An Engine With Twin Variable Cam
Timing,’’ SAE Technical Paper 2002-01-1101, 2002.
Available at https://www.sae.org/technical/papers/
2002-01-1101. (last accessed Nov. 9, 2008),
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effectiveness for DCP should be at the
upper end of the CCP range due to the
additional flexibility gained through
independent control of intake and
exhaust valve timing, and therefore
estimated an incremental fuel
consumption reduction of 2 to 3 percent
for DCP incremental to the 1 to 2
percent for ICP.
There are no class-specific
applications of this technology and DCP
can be applied at the refresh cycle. For
the final rule, NHTSA has combined the
annual average phase-in caps for ICP,
CCPS, CCPO and DCP and capped the
joint penetration at 15 percent in MY
2011. The DCP technology is assumed to
be produced at high volume, thus timebased learning is applied.
(v) Discrete Variable Valve Lift (DVVLS,
DVVLD, DVVLO)
DVVL systems allow the selection
between two or three separate cam
profiles by means of a hydraulically
actuated mechanical system. By
optimizing the cam profile for specific
engine operating regions, the pumping
losses can be reduced by reducing the
amount of throttling required to produce
the desired engine power output. This
increases the efficiency of the engine.
DVVL is normally applied together with
VVT control. DVVL is also known as
Cam Profile Switching (CPS). DVVL is a
mature technology with low technical
risk.
In the NPRM, based on the NESCCAF
report and confidential manufacturer
data, NHTSA estimated the incremental
cost for DVVL at $169 to $322 compared
to VVT depending on engine size,
which included $25 for controls and
associated oil supply needs. In response
to the NPRM, confidential manufacturer
comments noted a cost range of $150 to
$600 for DVVL on OHC engines. Sierra
Research has noted costs ranging from
$518 to $656 for DVVL including dual
cam phasers on a mid-size car and $634
to $802 on trucks.170 For purposes of the
final rule, NHTSA has changed the
order of the technologies in the decision
trees which has changed how the DVVL
costs are handled.
For the overhead cam engines, SOHC
and DOHC, the costs were derived by
taking $30 per cylinder for lost motion
devices, adding a $4 incremental cost
for a camshaft position sensor upgrade
and $10 for an oil control valve on each
engine cylinder bank, as indicated by
the 2008 Martec report. This assumes
that one lost motion device is used to
control either a single intake valve on an
SOHC engine or a pair of intake valves
170 Docket No. NHTSA–2008–0089–0179.1, p 59
and Docket No. NHTSA–2008–0089–0046, p. 52.
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on a DOHC engine, as was done in the
NPRM. NHTSA’s independent review
concurred with data in the 2008 Martec
report because it contained the most
complete published description of
DVVL costs and it agreed with
confidential manufacturer data received
in response to the NPRM NHTSA
adopted these cost estimates for the
final rule, such that incremental costs
for DVVLS and DVVLD, including a 1.5
RPE markup, are $201 for an in-line 4cylinder engine, $306 for V–6 engines,
and $396 for V–8 engines. For overhead
valve engines, OHV, the costs for V6
and V8 engines do not include the lost
motion devices and control hardware
since DVVLO follows cylinder
deactivation on the OHV decision tree
path and employs similar lost motion
devices. Rather, the DVVLO cost is for
active engine mounts on V6 and V8
OHV engines which was based on $50
variable cost from Martec, adjusted to
2007 dollars and marked up with a 1.5
RPE factor to $76. For in-line 4-cylinder
engines cylinder deactivation is not
allowed so the cost for DVVLO is the
same as for DVVLS and DVVLD at $201.
For fuel economy effectiveness, in the
NPRM NHTSA estimated that DVVL
could incrementally reduce fuel
consumption by 0.5 to 3 percent
compared to VVT. Confidential
manufacturer comments received in
response to the NPRM indicated a 2
percent effectiveness for DVVL, while
the Alliance commented that a two-step
system with dual cam phasing could
reduce fuel consumption by 6.3 percent,
with 1.3 percent attributable to DVVL.
Publicly-available estimates suggest an
improvement over the NEDC test cycle
of 8 percent for DCP with 2 stage inlet
DVVL applied to a 1.6 liter DOHC 4
cylinder engine in a 1500 kg vehicle.171
With the DCP system expected to
deliver 5 percent effectiveness, this
suggests the DVVL system is giving
approximately 3 percent. The comments
received from manufacturers and
publicly available data are in alignment
with independent review suggesting a
range of 1 to 3 percent for overhead cam
engines with VVT. NHTSA has therefore
estimated an incremental reduction in
fuel consumption for DVVLS and
DVVLD of 1 to 3 percent for purposes
of the final rule. On OHV engines,
DVVLO is applied following both VVT
and cylinder deactivation, therefore the
fuel consumption effectiveness has been
171 Mark Sellnau and Eric Rask, ‘‘Two-Step
Variable Valve Actuation For Fuel Economy,
Emissions, and Performance, Delphi Research Labs,
SAE 2003–01–0029. Available at https://
www.sae.org/technical/papers/2003-01-0029. (last
accessed Nov. 9, 2008).
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reduced from 1 to 3 percent for OHC
engines to 0.5 to 2.6 percent.
This technology may be applied to
any class of vehicles with any kind of
engine at the redesign cycle. For the
final rule, NHTSA has combined the
phase-in caps for DVVLS, DVVLD,
DVVLO and CVVL and capped the joint
penetration allowed at 15 percent in MY
2011 with time-based learning applied.
Other technologies, such as
continuously variable valve lift (CVVL),
described below, will be implemented
in place of DVVL in some applications
where the fuel economy requirements
dictate further optimization of the
engine’s breathing characteristics to
improve efficiency.
(vi) Continuously Variable Valve Lift
(CVVL)
In CVVL systems, maximum valve lift
is varied by means of a mechanical
linkage, driven by an actuator controlled
by the engine control unit. The valve
opening and phasing vary as the
maximum lift is changed; the relation
depends on the geometry of the
mechanical system. BMW has the most
production experience with CVVL
systems and has sold port-injected
‘‘Valvetronic’’ engines since 2001. CVVL
allows the airflow into the engine to be
regulated by means of inlet valve
opening reduction, which improves
engine efficiency by reducing pumping
losses from throttling the intake system
further upstream as with a normally
throttled engine.
Variable valve lift gives a further
reduction in pumping losses compared
to that which can be obtained with cam
phase control only, with CVVL
providing greater effectiveness than
DVVL, since it can be fully optimized
for all engine speeds and loads, and is
not limited to a two or three step
compromise. There may also be a small
reduction in valvetrain friction when
operating at low valve lift. This results
in improved low load fuel consumption
for cam phase control with variable
valve lift as compared to cam phase
control only. Most of the fuel economy
effectiveness is achieved with variable
valve lift on the inlet valves only.
It is generally more difficult to
achieve good cylinder-to-cylinder
airflow balance at low load with a CVVL
valve-throttled engine due to the
sensitivity of airflow to small
differences in lift caused by
manufacturing tolerances. BMW has
reported mixture quality issues with
CVVL and port fuel injection, requiring
a compromise on pumping work
reduction to ensure good mixture
quality. In addition, a small amount of
throttling is necessary with CVVL to
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maintain the vacuum required for power
brake assist, unless a separate vacuum
pump is used. BMW calibrations
maintain a small amount of inlet
manifold depression on their
‘‘Valvetronic’’ engines to allow the
brake servo to function, which reduces
the efficiency gain from the system
somewhat. Tumble air motion generated
by the inlet port is not available in the
cylinder at low valve lift, which has an
effect on combustion characteristics.
The high gas velocities at the valve seat
generate high turbulence levels, but
most of this has decayed by the time of
ignition. This phenomenon could
potentially lead to sub-optimal
combustion characteristics, which
would reduce the fuel consumption
effectiveness of the technology.
In the NPRM, NHTSA estimated the
cost for CVVL of $254 to $508 compared
to VVT, with cost estimates varying
from $254 for a 4-cylinder engine, $466
for a 6-cylinder engine, and $508 for an
8-cylinder engine, based on confidential
manufacturer data and the NESCCAF
report, with more weight given to the
manufacturer data. As for DVVL, for
purposes of the final rule, NHTSA relied
primarily on the 2008 Martec report,
because it contained the most complete
published description of CVVL costs
and agreed with confidential
manufacturer data received in response
to the NPRM. The system consists of 1
stepper motor per bank to control an
eccentric shaft and the costs as
described by Martec include dual cam
phasing are $285 for an in-line
4-cylinder engine, $450 for a V–6
engine, and $550 for a V–8 engine.
Applying a 1.5 RPE markup factor to
these variable costs, and then deducting
$122 for the incremental cost of both
ICP and DCP per bank, the incremental
RPE cost is $306 for a 4-cylinder engine,
$432 for a 6-cylinder engine and $582
for an 8-cylinder engine.
For fuel economy effectiveness, in the
NPRM NHTSA estimated that CVVL
could incrementally reduce fuel
consumption by 1.5 to 4 percent
compared to VVT, based on confidential
manufacturer data and the NESCCAF
report. Confidential manufacturer
comments received in response to the
NPRM suggested a range of 3 to 7.4
percent incremental fuel consumption
savings. NHTSA also found several
sources reporting a 5 percent additional
fuel consumption effectiveness over the
NEDC cycle when applying CVVL to an
engine with dual cam phasers.172 For
172 See Johannes Liebl, Manfred Kluting, Jurgen
Poggel, and Stephen Missy, BMW, ‘‘The New BMW
4–Cylinder Engine with Valvetronic Part 2:
Thermodynamics and Functional Features,’’ MTZ
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purposes of the final rule, NHTSA has
estimated the reduction in fuel
consumption for CVVL at 1.5 to 3.5
percent over an engine with DCP. This
estimate is lower than the effectiveness
reported by BMW and allows the
application of CVVL without the need
for the high level of manufacturing
complexity inherent in BMW’s
‘‘Valvetronic’’ engines.
There are no class specific
applications of this technology,
although it appears in only the DOHC
portion of the decision tree. Due to the
changes required to implement DVVL
on an engine the Volpe model allows it
to be applied at redesign model years
only with time-based learning applied.
For the final rule, NHTSA has combined
the phase-in caps for DVVLS, DVVLD,
DVVLO and CVVL and capped the joint
penetration allowed at 20 percent per
year on average (15 percent in year one).
There is no technical reason this
technology could not be applied to all
DOHC engines, but due to engineering
resource limitations it is unlikely that
CVVL will be applied to all engines, and
that other technologies such as DVVL
will be used in some instances.
(vii) Cylinder Deactivation (DEACS,
DEACD, DEACO)
In conventional spark-ignited engines,
combustion occurs in all cylinders of
the engine (i.e., the engine is ‘‘firing on
all cylinders’’), and throttling the
airflow controls the engine output, or
load. This is an inefficient method of
operating the engine at low loads as
pumping losses result from throttling.
Cylinder deactivation (DEAC) can
improve engine efficiency by disabling
or deactivating half of the cylinders
when the load is less than half of the
engine’s total torque capability,
allowing the active cylinders to operate
at roughly twice the load level, and
thereby incur roughly half the pumping
losses.
Simplistically, cylinder deactivation
control strategy relies on setting
maximum and minimum manifold
absolute pressures (which are directly
proportional to load) within which it
can deactivate the cylinders. The engine
operating range over which cylinder
deactivation may be enabled is
restricted by other factors as well, with
Worldwide, July/Aug. 2001, pp 26–29. See also
Meyer, BMW, ‘‘Turbo-Charging BMW’s SprayGuided DI Combustion System—Benefits and
Challenges,’’ Global Powertrain Congress, Sept.
2005, vol. 33. Available at https://www.gpcicpem.org/pages/publications.html (last accessed
Nov. 8, 2008). See also Rainer Wurms, Philipp
Lobbert, Stefan Dengler, Ralf Budack, and Axel
Eiser, Audi, ‘‘How Much VVT Makes Sense?’’ Haus
der Technik Conference on Variable Valve Control,
Essen, Feb. 2007.
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noise, vibration, and harshness (NVH)
being the primary concern; these
restrictions all reduce the fuel economy
effectiveness achievable with cylinder
deactivation. In general, DEAC has very
high sensitivity of efficiency gain
relative to vehicle application,
according to comments from Ford,
Chrysler, the Alliance, and in
confidential comments submitted in
response to the NPRM.
Manufacturers have stated that use of
DEAC on 4-cylinder engines would
cause unacceptable NVH; therefore
NHTSA has not applied cylinder
deactivation to 4-cylinder engines. In
addition, to address NVH issues for V6
and V8 engines, active engine mounts
are included in the content list. Noise
quality from both intake and exhaust
systems has been problematic on some
vehicle applications, and in some cases,
has resulted in active exhaust systems
solutions with an ECU-controlled valve.
The NPRM reported an incremental
cost range for DEAC at $203 to $229,
citing manufacturer data as the most
credible, with the bill of materials
including lost motion devices for each
cylinder. The 2008 Martec report
estimated the additional hardware
necessary for cylinder deactivation
ranging between $50 for the addition of
two active engine mounts ($75 RPE
using 1.5 RPE factor) where DVVL
already exists. This value has been
adopted by NHTSA in the final rule so
DEACS and DEACD costs are $75. For
OHV engines NHTSA estimates the
costs for DEACO as being $306 for V6
engines and $400 for V8 engines that are
not already equipped with DVVL using
assumptions for lost motion devices
plus incremental costs for oil control
valves and camshaft position sensors as
noted in the DVVL section.
For fuel economy effectiveness, in the
NPRM NHTSA estimated that cylinder
deactivation could reduce fuel
consumption by 4.5 to 6 percent. As
noted, DEAC has very high sensitivity of
efficiency gain relative to vehicle
application. Chrysler, for example,
stated that the effectiveness could range
from 3 to 10 percent on the same engine
depending on the specific vehicle
application.173 Confidential
manufacturer comments received in
response to the NPRM reported a range
of 3 to 7.5 percent. For the final rule, the
incremental fuel consumption
effectiveness varies depending on which
branch of the decision tree it is on: For
DOHC engines which are already
equipped with DCP and DVVLD there is
little benefit that can be achieved since
the pumping work has already been
173 Docket
No. NHTSA–2008–0089–0215.1.
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minimized and internal EGR rates are
maximized, so the effectiveness ranges
from 0 to 0.5 percent for DEACD; for
SOHC engines which have CCP and
DVVLS applied, NHTSA estimates a 2.5
to 3 percent effectiveness for DEACS;
and for OHV engines, which do not
have VVT or VVL technologies, the
effectiveness for DEACO ranges from 3.9
to 5.5 percent.
This technology may be applied only
to V–6 and V–8 engines, as discussed
above, and so does not apply to vehicle
classes with I–4 engines. DEAC can be
applied during a redesign or refresh
model year with time-based learning.
NHTSA proposed to raise the phase-in
cap for this technology to 20 percent per
year in the NPRM. For the final rule,
NHTSA has combined the phase-in caps
for DEACS, DEACD and DEACO and
capped the joint penetration allowed at
9 percent in MY 2011.
(viii) Conversion to Double Overhead
Camshaft Engine With Dual Cam
Phasing (CDOHC)
This technology was named ‘‘Multivalve Overhead Camshaft Engine’’ in the
NPRM. Engines with overhead cams
(OHC) and more than two valves per
cylinder achieve increased airflow at
high engine speeds and reductions of
the valvetrain’s moving mass and enable
central positioning of the spark plug.
Such engines typically develop higher
power at high engine speeds. In the
NPRM, the model was generally not
allowed to apply multivalve OHC
technology to OHV engine, except
where continuous variable valve timing
and lift (CVVL) is applied to OHV
engine. In that case, the model assumed
conversion to a DOHC valvetrain,
because a DOHC valvetrain is a
prerequisite for the application of any
advanced engine technology over and
above CVVL. Since applying CVVL to an
OHV engine is the last improvement
that could be made, it was assumed that
manufacturers would redesign that
engine as a DOHC and include CVVL as
part of that redesign.
However, it appears likely that
vehicles will still use overhead valve
(OHV) engine with pushrods and one
intake and one exhaust valve per
cylinder into the next decade. For the
final rule, NHTSA assumed that
conversion of an OHV engine to a DOHC
engine would more likely be
accompanied by dual cam phasing
(DCP) than by CVVL, since DCP
application rates are higher than CVVL
rates.
For V8 engines, the incremental cost
to redesign an OHV engine as a DOHC
with DCP was estimated as $746 which
includes $415 for the engine conversion
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14277
to DOHC per the 2008 Martec report and
a 1.5 RPE factor, plus $122 for an
incremental cam phasing system
(reflecting the doubling of cam shafts).
For a V6 engine we estimated 75 percent
of the V8 engine cost to convert to
DOHC plus the same incremental
coupled cam phasing cost to arrive at
$590. For inline 4-cylinder engines, 50
percent of the V8 engine conversion
costs were assumed and one additional
cam phasing system yielding an
incremental cost including a 1.5 RPE
factor of $373.
For fuel economy effectiveness,
NHTSA estimated in the NPRM that the
incremental gain in fuel consumption
for conversion of an OHV engine with
cylinder deactivation and CCP to a
DOHC engine with CVVL at 1 to 4
percent, in agreement with the
NESCCAF report and confidential
manufacturer data. The fuel
consumption benefit for converting an
OHV engine to a DOHC engine with
DCP is due largely to friction reduction
according to a confidential
manufacturer comment. For the final
rule the upper bound stated in the
NPRM was reduced because DCP will
give less improvement than CVVL
compared to an engine that already has
cylinder deactivation and CCP applied.
NHTSA estimates the incremental fuel
consumption effectiveness at 1 to 2.6
percent independent of the number of
engine cylinders.
There are no class-specific
applications of this technology. In the
NPRM, NHTSA proposed raising the
phase-in cap to 20 percent per year, but
has concluded for the final rule that a
9 percent phase-in cap for MY 2011 is
more consistent with manufacturers’
comments. No comments were received
regarding phase-in rates of converting
OHV engines to DOHC. The conversion
from OHV to DOHC engine architecture
with DCP is a major engine redesign that
can be applied at redesign model years
only with time-based learning applied.
(ix) Stoichiometric Gasoline Direct
Injection (SGDI)
In gasoline direct injection (GDI)
engines, fuel is injected into the
cylinder rather than into the inlet
manifold or inlet port. GDI allows for
the compression ratio of the engine to be
increased by up to 1.5 units higher than
a port-injected engine at the same fuel
octane level. As a result of the higher
compression ratio, the thermodynamic
efficiency is improved, which is the
primary reason for the fuel economy
effectiveness with stoichiometric DI
systems. The compression ratio increase
comes about as a result of the incylinder air charge cooling that occurs
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as the fuel, which is sprayed directly
into the combustion chamber,
evaporates.
Volumetric efficiency in naturallyaspirated GDI engines can also be
improved by up to 2 percent, due to
charge cooling, which improves the full
load torque. The improved full load
torque capability of GDI engines can
have a secondary effect on fuel economy
by enabling engine downsizing, thereby
reducing fuel consumption.
Two operating strategies can be used
in gasoline DI engines, characterized by
the mixture preparation strategy. One
strategy is to use homogenous charge
where fuel is injected during the intake
stroke with a single injection. The aim
is to produce a homogeneous air-fuelresidual mixture by the time of ignition.
In this mode, a stoichiometric air/fuel
ratio can be used and the exhaust
aftertreatment system can be a relatively
low cost, conventional three-way
catalyst. Another strategy is to use
stratified charge where fuel is injected
late in the compression stroke with
single or multiple injections. The aim
here is to produce an overall lean,
stratified mixture, with a rich area in the
region of the spark plug to enable stable
ignition. Multiple injections can be used
per cycle to control the degree of
stratification. Use of lean mixtures
significantly improves efficiency by
reducing pumping work, but requires a
relatively high cost lean NOX trap in the
exhaust aftertreatment system.
For purposes of this rulemaking, only
homogeneous charge stoichiometric DI
systems were considered, due to the
anticipated unavailability of low sulfur
gasoline during the time period
considered. This decision was
supported by comments from Mercedes,
which sells lean burn DI engines in
other world markets, stating that lean
burn DI engines cannot function in the
absence of ultra-low sulfur gasoline.
Lean NOX trap technologies require
ultra-low sulfur gasoline to function at
high conversion efficiency over the
entire life cycle of a vehicle.
Gasoline DI systems effectiveness
from the increased efficiency of the
thermodynamic cycle. The fuel
consumption effectiveness from DI
technology is therefore cumulative to
technologies that target pumping losses,
such as the VVT and VVLT
technologies. The Sierra Research report
stated that Sierra Research could not
determine from the NPRM decision
trees if VVLT technologies were
retained when SGDI was applied. To
clarify, as the model progresses through
the decision trees, technologies
preceding SGDI are retained in the
cumulative effectiveness and cost.
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In the NPRM, NHTSA estimated the
incremental fuel consumption
effectiveness for naturally aspirated
SGDI 174 to be 1 to 2 percent. The
Alliance commented that it estimated 3
percent gains in fuel efficiency, as well
as a 7 percent improvement in torque,
which can be used to mildly downsize
the engine and give up to a 5.8 percent
increase in efficiency. Other published
literature reports a 3 percent
effectiveness for SGDI,175 and another
source reports a 5 percent improvement
on the NEDC drive cycle.176
Confidential manufacturer data
submitted in response to the NPRM
reported an efficiency effectiveness
range of 1 to 2 percent. For the final rule
NHTSA has estimated, following
independent review of all the sources
referenced above, the incremental gain
in fuel consumption for SGDI to be
approximately 2 to 3 percent.
Content assumptions for cost
estimating of SGDI include no major
changes to engine architecture
compared to a port fuel injection engine,
although cylinder head casting changes
are required to incorporate the fuel
injection system and the piston must
change as well to suit the revised
combustion chamber geometry. The fuel
injection system utilizes an electricallydriven low pressure fuel pump to feed
a high pressure mechanical pump,
supplying fuel at pressures up to 200
Bar. A common fuel rail supplies the
injectors, which produce a highly
atomized spray with a Sauter Mean
Diameter (SMD) of 15–20 microns,
which compares to approximately 50
microns for a port injector.
In the NPRM, NHTSA estimated the
following incremental cost ranges for
applying SGDI: $122 to $420 for an
inline 4-cylinder engine, $204 to $525
for a V6 engine, and $228 to $525 for a
V8 engine. The Alliance commented
that NHTSA had not accounted for the
costs required to address NVH concerns
associated with the implementation of
SGDI. For purposes of the final rule, all
costs have been based upon side mount
DI technology as these costs were
determined in the 2008 Martec Report to
174 SGDI was referred to as GDI or SIDI in the
NPRM.
175 Paul Whitaker, Ricardo, Inc., ‘‘Gasoline Engine
Performance and Emissions—Future Technologies
and Optimization,’’ ERC Symposium, Low Emission
Combustion Technologies for Future IC Engines,
Madison, WI, June 8–9, 2005. Available at https://
www.erc.wisc.edu/symposiums/2005_Symposium/
June%208%20PM/Whitaker_Ricardo.pdf (last
accessed Nov. 9, 2008).
176 Stefan Trampert, FEV Motorentechnik GmbH,
‘‘Engine and Transmission Development Trends—
Rising Fuel Cost Pushes Technology,’’ Symposium
on International Automotive Technology, Pune,
India, January 2007.
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be lower than center mount DI systems.
An applied RPE factor of 1.5 was used
in all cases, and a NVH package was
added to all engines in response to
Alliance comments, providing
incremental costs that ranged from $293
to $440 for an I4 engine, to $384 to $558
for a V6 engine and $512 to $744 for a
V8 engine.
Homogeneous, stoichiometric DI
systems are regarded as mature
technology with minimal technical risk
and are expected to be increasingly
incorporated into manufacturers’
product lineups. Time-based learning
has been applied to this technology due
to the fact that over 1.5 million vehicles
containing this technology are now
produced annually. Due to the changes
to the cylinder head and combustion
system and the control system
development required to adopt SGDI
technology, which are fairly extensive,
SGDI can be applied only at redesign
model years. There are no limitations on
applying SGDI to any vehicle class. The
phase-in cap for SGDI is applied at a 3
percent rate for MY 2011 in order to
account for the lead time required to
incorporate SGDI engines.
(x) Combustion Restart (CBRST)
Combustion restart allows ‘‘start-stop’’
functionality of DI engines through the
implementation of an upgraded starter
with bi-directional rotation to allow
precise crankshaft positioning prior to
subsequent fuel injection and spark
ignition, allowing engine restart. This
method of implementing engine stop/
start functionality allows not only the
fuel savings from not idling the engine,
but also reduces fuel consumption as
the engine speeds up to its operational
speed. A Direct Injection (DI) fuel
system is required for implementation
of this technology.
NHTSA has determined, upon
independent review, combustion restart
to be a high technical risk due to the
following unresolved issues. First, very
high or very low ambient air
temperatures may limit the ability to
start the engine in the described
manner. Although the starter motor can
provide fail-safe starting capability in
these temperature limited areas,
strategies must be developed to manage
the transitions. Additionally, a fail-safe
start strategy that recognizes failed
attempts and responds quickly enough
has yet to be demonstrated. The risk of
missed start events is currently
relatively high, which is unacceptable
from a production implementation
perspective. As a result, availability of
this technology was assessed as beyond
the emerging technology time frame for
purposes of this MY 2011 rulemaking.
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(xi) Turbocharging and Downsizing
(TRBDS)
Forced induction in the form of
turbocharging and supercharging has
been used on internal combustion
engines for many years. Their
traditional role has been to provide
enhanced performance for high-end or
sports car applications. However,
turbocharging and downsizing can also
be used to improve fuel economy. There
is a natural friction reduction with a
boosted downsized engine, because
engine friction torque is primarily a
function of engine displacement. When
comparing FMEP (Friction Mean
Effective Pressure—friction torque
normalized by displacement) there is
very little difference between the full
size naturally-aspirated engine and the
boosted downsized engine despite the
higher cylinder pressure associated with
higher BMEP. Turbocharging and
downsizing can also reduce pumping
losses (PMEP), because a turbocharged
downsized engine runs at higher BMEP
(Brake Mean Effective Pressure) levels,
and therefore higher manifold pressures,
than a naturally aspirated engine. The
upper limit of BMEP level that can be
expected from a naturally aspirated
engine is approximately 13.5 Bar,
whereas a turbocharged engine can
produce BMEP levels in excess of 20
Bar. Engines that are not downsized and
boosted use a throttle to regulate load,
but this causes pumping losses as
discussed previously. Thus, by using a
small displacement engine with a
turbocharger, the smaller engine works
harder (higher cylinder load), which
results in lower pumping loss since the
throttle must be further open to produce
the same road power output.
Due to the incremental nature of the
decision tree, engines having
turbocharging and downsizing applied
are assumed to have SGDI already
applied. In boosted engines, SGDI
allows improved scavenging of the
cylinder, which reduces the internal
exhaust gas residual level and the
charge temperature. This in turn allows
a higher compression ratio to be used
for a given fuel octane rating and can
therefore improve the fuel consumption
of boosted SGDI engines.
In most cases, a boosted downsized
engine can replace a conventional
naturally aspirated engine and achieve
equivalent or greater (albeit at the
expense of fuel economy) power and
torque. However, there are some
challenges associated with acceptance
of a down sized boosted engine,
including:
• Achievement of ‘‘seamless’’ power
delivery compared to the naturally
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18:39 Mar 27, 2009
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aspirated engine (no perceptible turbo
lag);
• A complication in emissions
regulatory compliance, because the
addition of a turbocharger causes
additional difficulty with catalyst light
off due to the thermal inertia of the
turbo itself;
• Potential issue with customer
acceptance of smaller-displacement
engines, given a common perception
that only larger-displacement engines
can be high-powered; and
• Additional base engine cost and
vehicle integration costs.
Manufacturers’ structural changes to
the base engine are generally focused on
increasing the structure’s capacity to
tolerate higher cylinder pressures.
NHTSA believes that it is reasonable to
expect that the maximum cylinder
pressure would increase by 25 to 30
percent over those typical of a naturally
aspirated engine. Another consideration
is that higher pressures lead to higher
thermal loads.
One potential disadvantage of
downsized and boosted engines is cost.
Turbocharging systems can be
expensive and are best combined with
direct injection and other engine
technologies. The Alliance expressed a
related concern that the fuel economy
effectiveness was based on the use of
premium grade fuel in direct injection
turbocharged engines, and argued that
as the baseline vehicles were not fueled
with premium gasoline, this gave the
direct injection turbocharged engines an
unrealistic advantage.177 However,
CARB stated in its comments that
premium fuel is not necessary for use
with turbocharged downsized engines
and that substantial effectiveness are
still available with regular fuel.178 In
fact, most turbocharged direct injection
engines will have a compression ratio
and calibration designed to give best
performance on premium fuel, although
they are safe to operate on regular fuel.
On regular fuel, the knock sensor output
is used to allow the ECU to keep the
engine safe by controlling boost and
ignition timing. Maximum torque is
reduced on the lower octane fuel due to
the ECU intervention strategy, but at
part load, where knock is not an issue,
the fuel economy will not be affected
adversely relative to the estimated
effectiveness. Additionally, the driver
retains the choice of obtaining more
performance by paying more for
premium fuel and will still obtain stated
fuel consumption effectiveness.
Nevertheless, the case for using
downsized boosted engines has
177 Docket
178 Docket
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No. NHTSA–2008–0089–0173.
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14279
strengthened with the wider
introduction of direct injection gasoline
engines. Downsized boosted engines
with stoichiometric direct injection
present minimal technical risk, although
there have been only limited
demonstrations of this technology
achieving SULEV emission levels.
In the NPRM, NHTSA estimated that
downsized and turbocharged engines
could incrementally reduce fuel
consumption from 5 to 7.5 percent.
CARB commented that Sierra Research
in its presentation to the NAS
committee on January 24, 2008,
suggested there is no carbon dioxide
reduction potential for turbocharging
and downsizing, but argued that this is
not supported by other vehicle
simulation efforts nor by manufacturer
plans to release systems such as the
Ford EcoBoost.179 The Alliance and
Sierra Research, in contrast, commented
that turbocharged and downsized
engines do not improve fuel economy
unless they are also equipped with DI
fuel systems and using premium fuel.180
NHTSA believes that turbocharging and
downsizing, when combined with SGDI,
offers benefits without the use of
premium fuel as noted above.
Confidential manufacturer data suggests
an incremental range of fuel
consumption reduction of 4.8 to 7.5
percent for turbocharging and
downsizing. Other publicly-available
sources suggest a fuel consumption
benefit of 8 to 13 percent compared to
current-production naturally-aspirated
engines without friction reduction or
other fuel economy technologies: A joint
technical paper by Bosch and Ricardo
suggesting an EPA fuel economy gain of
8 to 10 percent for downsizing from a
5.7 liter port injection V8 to a 3.6 liter
V6 with direct injection; 181 a Renault
report suggesting a 11.9 percent NEDC
fuel consumption gain for downsizing
from a 1.4 liter port injection in-line 4cylinder engine to a 1.0 liter in-line 4cylinder engine with direct injection; 182
and a Robert Bosch paper suggesting a
13 percent NEDC gain for downsizing to
a turbocharged DI engine.183 These
179 Docket
No. NHTSA–2008–0089–0173.4.
No. NHTSA–2008–0089–0046, Docket
No. NHTSA–2008–0089–0179.1.
181 David Woldring and Tilo Landenfeld of Bosch,
and Mark J. Christie of Ricardo, ‘‘DI Boost:
Application of a High Performance Gasoline Direct
Injection Concept,’’ SAE 2007–01–1410. Available
at https://www.sae.org/technical/papers/2007–01–
1410 (last accessed Nov. 9, 2008).
182 Yves Boccadoro, Loıc Kermanac’h, Laurent
¨
Siauve, and Jean-Michel Vincent, Renault
Powertrain Division, ‘‘The New Renault TCE 1.2L
Turbocharged Gasoline Engine,’’ 28th Vienna Motor
Symposium, April 2007.
183 Tobias Heiter, Matthias Philipp, Robert Bosch,
‘‘Gasoline Direct Injection: Is There a Simplified,
180 Docket
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Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 59 / Monday, March 30, 2009 / Rules and Regulations
reported fuel economy benefits show a
wide range in large part due to the
degree of vehicle attribute matching
(such as acceleration performance) that
was achieved.
For purposes of the final rule, NHTSA
estimated a net fuel consumption
reduction of approximately 14 percent
for a turbocharged downsized DOHC
engine with direct injection and DCP
over a baseline fixed-valve engine that
does not incorporate friction reducing
technologies. This equates to an
incremental fuel consumption reduction
of 2.1 to 5.2 percent for TRBDS, which
is incremental to an engine with SGDI
and previously applied technologies
(e.g., VVT and VVL) as defined by the
decision tree. This wide range is
dependent upon the decision tree path
that is followed or the configuration of
the engine prior to conversion to
TRBDS. The incremental fuel
consumption benefit for TRBDS is
estimated to range from 2.1 to 2.2
percent for V6 and V8 engines and from
4.5 to 5.2 percent for inline 4-cylinder
engines. As explained, the incremental
improvement from TRBDS must be
added to the previous technology point
on the decision tree. In the case of
SOHC and OHV engines, for example,
moving to the TRBDS technology also
assumes implementation of DOHC
engine architecture in addition to DCP
and SGDI.
In the NPRM, NHTSA estimated that
the cost for a boosted/downsized engine
system would be $690 for small cars,
$810 for large trucks, and $120 for all
other vehicle classes, based on the NAS
report, the EEA report, and confidential
manufacturer data, which assumed
downsizing allowed the removal to two
cylinders in most cases, except for small
cars and large trucks. CARB questioned
Martec’s cost estimates for
turbocharging and downsizing,
specifically the credit for downsizing a
V6 engine to an in-line 4 cylinder
dropped from their estimate used in the
NESCCAF report of $700 to $310 and
the use of more expensive hardware
than some manufacturers use. In
response, NHTSA’s independent review
of the cost to downsize a V6 DOHC
engine to a I4 DOHC engine closely
aligned with the 2008 Martec credit of
$310, while the report for NESCCAF
was not specific with regard to the
assumptions used to construct that
estimate. Additionally, confidential
manufacturer data submitted in
response to the NPRM provided a range
for TRBDS with SGDI of $600 to $1,400
Cost-Optimal System Approach for an Attractive
Future of Gasoline Engines?’’ AVL Engine &
Environment Conference, September 2005.
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18:39 Mar 27, 2009
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variable cost or $900 to $2,100 RPE
assuming a 1.5 markup factor. When
comparing the confidential
manufacturer cost range and the
incremental RPE cost estimates for the
final rule, it is important to realize the
incremental cost for TRBDS does not
include SGDI since it is considered a
separate technology.184
Some of the costs included in
turbocharging and downsizing come
from structural changes due to the
higher cylinder pressures and increased
cylinder temperatures, which also drive
additional cooling requirements (e.g.
water-cooled charge air cooler,
circulation pump, and thermostats) and
require improved exhaust valve
materials. High austenitic stainless steel
exhaust manifolds and upgraded main
bearings are some of the other hardware
upgrades required. For purposes of the
final rule, NHTSA used cost data from
the 2008 Martec report, but constructed
a bill of materials consistent with the
incremental TRBDS technology as
shown in the decision trees and based
on confidential manufacturer data. For
the vehicle subclasses which have a
baseline gasoline V8 engine, two
turbochargers rated for 1050 °C at $250
each were added, $270 was deducted for
downsizing to a V6 from a V8 engine,
$217 was added for engine upgrades to
handle higher operating pressures and
temperatures at, and a water-cooled
charge air cooler was added at $280.
The baseline SOHC engine was
converted to a DOHC engine with 4
valves per cylinder at a variable
incremental cost of $92. The total
variable costs summed to $819 and a 1.5
RPE factor was applied to arrive at
$1,229 incremental cost to
turbocharging and downsizing.
For the vehicle subclasses which have
a baseline gasoline V6 engine, a twinscroll turbocharger rated for 1050 °C
was added at a cost of $350, $310 was
deducted for downsizing to an I4 from
a V6 engine, $160 was added for engine
upgrades to handle higher operating
pressures and temperatures, and a
water-cooled charge air cooler was
added at $259. The baseline SOHC
engine was converted to a DOHC engine
with 4 valves per cylinder at a variable
184 NHTSA also examined the Jetta TDI as an
example of a current vehicle model that comes in
both diesel and gasoline-engine form, but in
attempting to do an apples-to-apples comparison
with the non-turbocharged/downsized version, the
SE, found indications that VW appears to be
keeping the cost of the TDI down by removing other
content (e.g., the SE has a sunroof, which normally
costs around $1,000, while the TDI does not). Thus,
NHTSA did not find VW’s price differential for the
two versions of the Jetta to be convincing evidence
of the actual cost of turbocharging and downsizing
an engine.
PO 00000
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Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
incremental cost of $87. The total
variable costs summed to $548 and a 1.5
RPE factor was applied to arrive at $822
incremental cost to turbocharging and
downsizing.
For the vehicle subclasses which have
a baseline gasoline I4 engine, a twinscroll turbocharger rated for 1050 °C
was added at a cost of $350, $160 was
added for engine upgrades to handle
higher operating pressures and
temperatures, and a water-cooled charge
air cooler was added at $259. The
baseline SOHC engine was converted to
a DOHC engine with 4 valves per
cylinder at a variable incremental cost
of $46. The total variable costs summed
to $815 and a 1.5 RPE factor was
applied to arrive at $1,223 incremental
cost for turbocharging and downsizing.
In summary, for the final rule NHTSA
estimated TRBDS to have an
incremental RPE cost of $1,223 for
vehicle classes with a baseline in-line 4cylinder engine downsized to a smaller
I–4 engine which are: Subcompact,
Performance Subcompact, Compact and
Midsize Car, and Small Truck. For
vehicle classes with a baseline V6
engine that was downsized to an I4
engine the RPE cost is estimated at
$822; these classes are the Performance
Compact, Performance Midsize and
Large Car, Minivan and Midsize Truck.
The two vehicle classes with baseline
V8 engines, Performance Large Car and
Large Truck, were downsized to V6
turbocharged engines at an incremental
RPE cost of $1,229.
Time-based learning has been applied
to TRBDS because submitted product
plan data indicated turbocharging and
downsizing would already be at high
volume in 2011. Due to the fact that a
turbocharged and downsized engine is
entirely different than the baseline
engine it can be applied only at redesign
model years. The phase-in cap for
TRBDS is applied at a 9 percent rate for
MY 2011 in order to account for the lead
time required to incorporate TRBDS
engines.
(xii) Cooled Exhaust Gas Recirculation
Boost (EGRB)
EGR Boost is a combustion concept
that involves utilizing EGR as a charge
dilutant for controlling combustion
temperatures. Fuel economy is therefore
increased by operating the engine at or
near the stoichiometric air/fuel ratio
over the entire speed and load range and
using higher exhaust gas residual levels
at part load conditions. Further fuel
economy increases can be achieved by
increased compression ratio enabled by
reduced knock sensitivity, which
enables higher thermal efficiency from
more advanced spark timing. Currently
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Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 59 / Monday, March 30, 2009 / Rules and Regulations
available turbo, charge air cooler, and
EGR cooler technologies are sufficient to
demonstrate the feasibility of this
concept.
However, this remains a technology
with a number of issues that still need
to be addressed and for which there is
no production experience. EGR system
fouling characteristics could be
potentially worse than diesel EGR
system fouling, due to the higher HC
levels found in gasoline exhaust.
Turbocharger compressor contamination
may also be an issue for low pressure
EGR systems. Additionally, transient
controls of boost pressure, EGR rate,
cam phasers and intake charge
temperature to exploit the cooled EGR
combustion concept fully will require
development beyond what has already
been accomplished by the automotive
industry. These are all ‘‘implementation
readiness’’ issues that must be resolved
prior to putting EGR Boost into volume
production.
Because of these issues NHTSA did
not consider EGR Boost in the NPRM,
and consequently had no tentative
conclusions with regard to its cost or
fuel economy effectiveness. For
purposes of the final rule, NHTSA
found no evidence from commenters or
elsewhere that these implementation
readiness issues could be resolved prior
to MY 2011. Therefore, in the final rule,
the phase-in cap for MY 2011 is zero.
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(b) Diesel Engine Technologies
Diesel engines, which currently make
up about 0.27 percent of engines in the
MY 2008 U.S. fleet, have several
characteristics that give them superior
fuel efficiency compared to
conventional gasoline, spark-ignited
engines. Pumping losses are much lower
due to lack of (or greatly reduced)
throttling. The diesel combustion cycle
operates at a higher compression ratio,
with a very lean air/fuel mixture, and
turbocharged light-duty diesels typically
achieve much higher torque levels at
lower engine speeds than equivalentdisplacement naturally-aspirated
gasoline engines. Additionally, diesel
fuel has higher energy content per
gallon.185
However, diesel engines, including
those on the many diesel vehicles sold
in Europe, have emissions
characteristics that present challenges to
meeting federal Tier 2 emissions
standards. It is a significant systemsengineering challenge to maintain the
fuel consumption advantage of the
185 Burning
one gallon of diesel fuel produces
about 11 percent more carbon dioxide than gasoline
due to the higher density and carbon to hydrogen
ratio.
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diesel engine while meeting U.S.
emissions regulations, since fuel
consumption is negatively impacted by
emissions reduction strategies. Emission
compliance strategies for diesel vehicles
sold in the U.S. are expected to include
a combination of combustion
improvements and aftertreatment. These
emission control strategies are currently
widely used in Europe, but will have to
be modified due to the fact that U.S.
emission standards, especially for NOX,
are much tighter than corresponding
European standards. To achieve U.S.
Tier 2 emissions limits, roughly 45 to 65
percent more NOX reduction is required
compared to the Euro VI standards.
Additionally, as discussed below, there
may be a fuel consumption penalty
associated with diesel aftertreatment
since extra fuel is needed for the
aftertreatment, subsequently this extra
fuel is not used in the combustion
process of the engine that provides
torque to propel the vehicle.
Nevertheless, emissions control
technologies do exist, and will enable
diesel engines to make considerable
headway in the U.S. fleet in coming
years. Several key advances in diesel
technology have made it possible to
reduce emissions coming from the
engine prior to aftertreatment. These
technologies include improved fuel
systems (higher pressures and more
responsive injectors), advanced controls
and sensors to optimize combustion and
emissions performance, higher EGR
levels and EGR cooling to reduce NOX,
lower compression ratios, and advanced
turbocharging systems.
The fuel systems on advanced diesel
engines are anticipated to be of a HighPressure Common Rail (HPCR) type
with piezoelectric injectors that operate
at pressures up to 1800 Bar or greater
and provide fast response to allow
multiple injections per cycle. The air
systems will include a variable
geometry turbocharger for 4-cylinder
inline engines with charge-air cooling
and high-pressure and low-pressure
EGR loops with EGR coolers. For V–6 or
V–8 engines the air systems will employ
series sequential turbo-charging with
one variable geometry turbocharger and
one fixed geometry turbocharger.
As suggested above, the traditional 3way catalyst aftertreatment found on
gasoline-powered vehicles is ineffective
due to the lean-burn combustion of a
diesel. All diesels will require a diesel
particulate filter (DPF), a diesel
oxidation catalyst (DOC), and a NOX
reduction strategy to comply with Tier
2 emissions standards. The most
common NOX reduction strategies
include the use of lean NOX traps (LNT)
PO 00000
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14281
or selective catalytic reduction (SCR),
which are outlined below.
(i) Diesel Engine With Lean NOX Trap
(LNT) Catalyst After-Treatment
A lean NOX trap operates, in
principle, by storing NOX (NO and NO2)
when the engine is running in its
normal (lean) state. When the control
system determines (via mathematical
model or a NOX sensor) that the trap is
saturated with NOX, it switches the
engine into a rich operating mode or
may in some cases inject fuel directly
into the exhaust stream to produce
excess hydrocarbons that act as a
reducing agent to convert the stored
NOX to N2 and water, thereby
‘‘regenerating’’ the LNT and opening up
more locations for NOX to be stored.
LNTs are sensitive to sulfur deposits
that can reduce catalytic performance,
but periodically undergo a
desulfurization engine-operating mode
to clean it of sulfur buildup.
The fuel consumption penalty
associated with aftertreatment systems,
including both DPF and LNT, is taken
into account in the reported values. In
the case of the DPF, extra fuel is needed
to raise the temperature of the DPF
above approximately 550°C to enable
active regeneration. A similar process is
needed to regenerate the LNT, but
instead of being used to remove
particulates and raise the temperature,
the excess fuel is used to provide a fuelrich condition at the LNT to convert the
trapped NOX on the LNT to nitrogen
gas. The estimated fuel consumption
penalty on the CAFE test cycle
associated with the LNT aftertreatment
system is 5 percent on the EPA city
cycle and 3 percent on the highway
cycle, as described in the report to the
EPA.186
In order to maintain equivalent
performance to comparable gasolineengine vehicles, an inline 4-cylinder (I–
4) diesel engine with displacement
varying around 2 liters to meet vehicle
performance requirements was assumed
for Subcompact, Performance
Subcompact, Compact, and Midsize
Passenger Car and Small Truck vehicle
subclasses, and it was also assumed that
these vehicles would utilize LNT
aftertreatment systems.
In the NPRM, NHTSA estimated that
LNT-based diesels could incrementally
reduce fuel consumption by 8 to 15
percent at an incremental RPE cost of
$1,500 to $1,600 compared to a direct
injected turbocharged and downsized
186 Ricardo, ‘‘A Study of Potential Effectiveness of
Carbon Dioxide Reducing Vehicle Technologies,
Revised Final Report,’’ at 62. Available at https://
www.epa.gov/otaq/technology/420r08004a.pdf (last
accessed Oct. 4, 2008).
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spark-ignition engine, in agreement with
confidential manufacturer data. These
costs were based on a ‘‘bottom up’’ cost
analysis that was performed with EPA,
which then subtracted the costs of all
previous steps on the decision tree prior
to diesel engines.
Comments submitted in response to
the NPRM including both
manufacturers’ confidential data and
non-confidential data sources for diesel
engines was in the range of 16.7 percent
to 26.7 187 percent fuel consumption
benefit over a baseline gasoline engine
at a variable cost of $2,000 to $11,200.
Confidentially submitted diesel cost and
effectiveness estimates generally did not
differentiate between car and truck
applications, engine size and
aftertreatement systems leading to large
ranges for both cost and effectiveness
estimates. Additionally, most of the
costs appeared to be stated as variable
costs not RPE but this was not always
completely discernible.
For purposes of the final rule, NHTSA
estimated the net fuel consumption
benefit for an I–4 diesel engine with
LNT aftertreatment to be approximately
20 to 26 percent improvement over a
baseline gasoline engine. This equates to
a 5.3 to 7.7 percent improvement for
DSLT, which is incremental to a
turbocharged downsized gasoline
engine (TRBDS) with EGRB, and a 15.0
to 15.3 percent incremental
improvement for DSLC, which is
incremental to a gasoline engine with
combustion restart (CBRST). The 2008
Martec report was relied upon for cost
estimates and the diesel cost was
adjusted by removing the downsizing
credit and applying a 1.5 RPE marked
up factor to arrive at a cost of $4007
compared to a baseline gasoline engine.
This results in an incremental RPE cost
of $1,567 to $1,858 for DSLT and $2,963
to $3,254 for DSLC. NHTSA’s
independent review concurred with all
the costs in this bill-of-material-based
cost analysis.
A large part of the explanation for the
cost increase since the NPRM is the
dramatic increase in commodity costs
for the aftertreatment systems, namely
the platinum group metals. The updated
cost estimates of Martec 2008 and others
reflect the rise of global costs for raw
materials since Martec 2004 and other
prior referenced cost estimates were
conducted. As described in Martec
187 The 26.7 percent fuel consumption reduction
is a maximum estimate cited in a June 2008 Sierra
Research report (Docket No. NHTSA–2008–089–
0179.1) for a CAFE estimate in a midsize car,
whereas an April 2008 Sierra report (Docket No.
NHTSA–2008–089–0046) cites a maximum estimate
of 22.4 percent for the same vehicle class; NHTSA
was unable to discern why the estimates differed.
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18:39 Mar 27, 2009
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2008, engine technologies employing
high temperature steels or catalysts with
considerable platinum group metals
usage have experienced tremendous
inflation of raw material prices. These
updated estimates account for current
spot prices of platinum and rhodium
which have demonstrated cost inflation
amounting to between 300 and 750
percent of global prices.188
(ii) Diesel Engine With Selective
Catalytic Reduction (SCR) AfterTreatment
An SCR aftertreatment system uses a
reductant (typically, ammonia derived
from urea) that is continuously injected
into the exhaust stream ahead of the
SCR catalyst. Ammonia combines with
NOX in the SCR catalyst to form N2 and
water. The hardware configuration for
an SCR system is more complicated
than that of an LNT, due to the onboard
urea storage and delivery system (which
requires a urea pump and injector into
the exhaust stream). While a rich
engine-operating mode is not required
for NOX reduction, the urea is typically
injected at a rate of 3 to 4 percent of the
fuel consumed. Manufacturers
designing SCR systems intend to align
urea tank refills with standard
maintenance practices such as oil
changes.
The fuel consumption penalty
associated with the SCR aftertreatment
system is taken into account in the
values reported here. Similar to the LNT
system, extra fuel is needed to warm up
the SCR system to an effective operating
temperature. The estimated fuel
consumption penalty on the CAFE test
cycle associated with the SCR
aftertreatment system is 5 percent on the
EPA city cycle and none on the highway
cycle, as described in the report to the
EPA.189 A recent report, however,
suggests a fuel economy benefit
associated with the use of a SCR system,
based on the supposition that the engine
calibration is shifted towards improved
fuel consumption and more of the NOX
reduction is being handled by the SCR
system.190 Nevertheless, since this
benefit is not yet proven for high188 Martec, ‘‘Variable Costs of Fuel Economy
Technologies,’’ June 1, 2008, at 13–20. Docket No.
NHTSA–2008–0089–0169.1.
189 Ricardo, ‘‘A Study of Potential Effectiveness of
Carbon Dioxide Reducing Vehicle Technologies,
Revised Final Report,’’ at 62. Available at https://
www.epa.gov/otaq/technology/420r08004a.pdf (last
accessed Oct. 4, 2008).
190 Timothy V. Johnson, ‘‘Diesel Emission Control
in Review,’’ Society of Automotive Engineers
Technical Series, 2008–01–0069, 2008. Available at
https://www.sae.org/technical/papers/2008-01-0069
(last accessed Nov. 9, 2008).
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volume production, it has not been
applied for purposes of the final rule.
In order to maintain equivalent
performance to comparable gasolineengine vehicles, a V–6 diesel engine,
with displacement varying around 3
liters was assumed for Performance
Compact, Performance Midsize, Large
Passenger Car, Minivan, and Midsize
Truck. A V–8 diesel engine, with
displacement varying around 4.5 liters
to meet vehicle performance
requirements, was assumed for Large
Truck and Performance Large Car
vehicle classes. It was also assumed that
these classes with V–6 and V–8 diesel
engines utilize SCR aftertreatment
systems instead of LNT.
In the NPRM, NHTSA estimated
incremental fuel consumption reduction
for diesel engines with an SCR system
to range from 11 to 20 percent at an
incremental RPE cost of $2,051 to
$2,411 compared to a direct injected
turbocharged and downsized sparkignition engine. These costs were based
on a ‘‘bottom up’’ cost analysis that was
performed with EPA, which then
subtracted the costs of all previous steps
on the decision tree prior to diesel
engines.
As explained above for LNT,
confidential manufacturer and nonconfidential comment data submitted in
response to the NPRM for diesel engines
was in the range of 16.7 percent to 26.7
percent fuel consumption benefit over a
baseline gasoline engine at variable cost
of $2,000 to $11,200 with no detail
about the aftertreatment, engine size or
application. Additionally, Ricardo’s
vehicle simulation work for EPA found
an incremental fuel economy benefit of
19 percent for a 4.8L diesel in a Large
Truck.191 However, when the baseline
4-speed automatic transmission shift
and torque converter lockup scheduling
was optimized for the diesel engine, an
additional 5 percent fuel economy
benefit was obtained to yield an
incremental benefit for a diesel of 24
percent. As noted in the report on page
84, however, this does not represent an
optimized result, as only the final
packages complete with all technologies
were optimized. Nevertheless, this is a
reasonable estimate for diesel engine
fuel economy benefit over a baseline
gasoline engine with coordinated cam
phasing (CCP). This estimate did not
have the aftertreatment penalty,
however, so applying the 5 percent
191 Ricardo, ‘‘A Study of Potential Effectiveness of
Carbon Dioxide Reducing Vehicle Technologies,
Revised Final Report,’’ Table 7–9 shows
incremental fuel economy and CO2 benfits for
Truck with technology package 11, p. 87. Available
at https://www.epa.gov/otaq/technology/
420r08004a.pdf (last accessed Oct. 4, 2008).
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penalty associated with diesel oxidation
catalyst, diesel particulate filter, and
SCR aftertreatment brings the fuel
economy benefit for diesel engine with
aftertreatment down to 19 percent,
which is equal to a 16 percent fuel
consumption benefit.
For purposes of the final rule, NHTSA
estimated the net fuel consumption
benefit for a V–6 diesel engine with SCR
aftertreatment to be approximately 20 to
26 percent improvement over a baseline
gasoline engine. This equates to a 4.0 to
7.7 percent improvement for DSLT,
which is incremental to a turbocharged
downsized gasoline engine (TRBDS)
with EGRB, and a 9.9 to 13.1 percent
incremental improvement for DSLC,
which is incremental to a gasoline
engine with combustion restart
(CBRST.) The 2008 Martec report was
relied upon for cost estimates and the
diesel cost was adjusted by removing
the downsizing credit and applying a
1.5 RPE marked up factor to arrive at a
cost of $5,603 compared to a baseline
gasoline engine. This results in an
incremental RPE cost of $3,110 to
$3,495 for DSLT and $4,105 to $4,490
for DSLC. NHTSA’s independent review
concurred with all the costs in this billof-material-based cost analysis for V–6
engines.
NHTSA estimated the net fuel
consumption benefit for a V–8 diesel
engine with SCR aftertreatment to be
approximately 19 to 25 percent
improvement over a baseline gasoline
engine. This equates to a 4.0 to 6.5
percent improvement for DSLT, which
is incremental to a turbocharged
downsized gasoline engine (TRBDS)
with EGRB, and a 10.0 to 12.0 percent
incremental improvement for DSLC,
which is incremental to CBRST. The
2008 Martec report was relied upon for
cost estimates and the diesel cost was
adjusted by removing the downsizing
credit and applying a 1.5 RPE marked
up factor to arrive at a cost of $7,002
compared to a baseline gasoline engine.
This results in an incremental RPE cost
of $3,723 to $4,215 for DSLT and $5,125
to $5,617 for DSLC. NHTSA’s
independent review concurred with all
the costs in this bill-of-material-based
cost analysis for V–8 engines.
The diesel engine with SCR has an
incremental cost that is significantly
higher for the final rule than the NPRM.
NHTSA believes the increase is
explained by the improved accuracy of
the final rule analysis which relied on
the updated cost estimates from the
2008 Martec Report as described
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previously 192. In addition, comments
from the Alliance suggested that the
incremental diesel cost for a midsize car
was $6,198 and $7,581 193 for a pickup
truck.
The economic breakeven point for
diesel engine aftertreatment options is
based on public information194 and on
recent discussions that NHTSA and EPA
have had with auto manufacturers and
aftertreatment device manufacturers.
NHTSA explained in the NPRM that it
had received strong indications that
LNT systems would probably be used
on smaller vehicles while the SCR
systems would be used on larger
vehicles and trucks. The economic
break-even point between LNT and SCR
is dependent on the quantity of catalyst
used, the market price for the metals in
those catalysts, and the cost of the urea
injection system. The NPRM estimated
that the breakeven point would occur
around 3 liters engine displacement,
based on discussions with auto
manufacturers and aftertreatment device
manufacturers. Thus, NHTSA
tentatively concluded that it would be
cheaper to manufacture diesel engines
smaller than 3 liters with an LNT
system, and that conversely, it would be
cheaper to manufacturer diesel engines
larger than 3.0 liters with a SCR system.
No comments were submitted to
NHTSA regarding the breakeven point
between a LNT and SCR system.
However, according to one source of
recently published data the breakeven
point occurs between 2.0 to 2.5L.195
Considering that continuing
developments are being made in this
area and the wide range of precious
metal content required, NHTSA believes
that an economic breakeven point of 2
to 3 liters is reasonable and that other
factors will strongly influence which
system is chosen by any given vehicle
manufacturer.
192 Martec, ‘‘Variable Costs of Fuel Economy
Technologies,’’ June 1, 2008, at 13–20. Docket No.
NHTSA–2008–0089–0169.1.
193 These cost estimates are taken from the April
2008 Sierra Research report (Docket No. NHTSA–
2008–089–0046). A June 2008 Sierra Research
report (Docket No. NHTSA–2008–089–0179.1)
contained lower estimates of $5,947 and $7,271 for
the same vehicles; NHTSA was unable to discern
the reason for the difference.
194 Timothy V. Johnson, ‘‘Diesel Emission Control
in Review,’’ Diesel Engine-Efficiency and Emissions
Research (DEER) Conference, Detroit, MI, August
20–24, 2006. Available at https://
www1.eere.energy.gov/vehiclesandfuels/pdfs/
deer_2006/session2/2006_deer_johnson.pdf (last
accessed Nov. 9, 2008). See also Tim Johnson,
‘‘Diesel Engine Emissions and Their Control,’’
Platinum Metals Review, 52, at 23–37 (2008).
Available at https://
www.platinummetalsreview.com/dynamic/article/
view/52-1-23-37 (last accessed Nov. 9, 2008)
195 Id.
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Cummins commented that LNT
systems should be considered for more
than just the compact and subcompact
vehicles, and stated that a number of
large vehicles and trucks currently use
LNT. Cummins argued that a LNT aftertreatment system can be a cost-effective
technology on both small and larger
engines. For the final rule, NHTSA
assumed the use of a LNT aftertreatment system for three additional
vehicle subclasses compared to the
NPRM. However, following the rationale
explained in the preceding paragraph,
the SCR type after-treatment system is
assumed for larger vehicle subclasses.
As is the case with all technologies in
the analysis, technology application
assumptions are based on the general
understanding of what a manufacturer
could do in response to meeting
emissions compliance but other
manufacturer specific factors will
dictate the actual technology
applications.
In the NPRM, NHTSA assumed a 3
percent phase in rate per year for diesel
technologies. For the final rule,
passenger cars, as defined by the
technology class, retained the 3 percent
combined (for DSLT and DSLC) phasein cap for MY 2011. However, diesel
technologies for truck technology
classes were allowed to be applied at a
4 percent combined (for DSLT and
DSLC) phase-in cap for MY 2011 to
account for the higher application rates
observed in the submitted product plans
and diesel’s favorable characteristics in
truck applications. Volume-based
learning was assumed for the NPRM,
however, confidential product plans
indicated that this technology would be
in high-volume in the 2011 time frame,
thus time-based learning was assumed
for the final rule. For the final rule,
diesel technologies can only be applied
at redesign, which is consistent with the
NPRM.
(c) Transmission Technologies
NHTSA has also reconsidered the way
it applies transmission technologies in
the Volpe model to obtain increased fuel
savings. The revised decision tree for
transmission technologies reflects the
fact that baseline vehicles now include
either 4- or 5-speed automatic
transmissions, given that many
manufacturers are already employing 5speed automatic transmissions or are
going directly to 6-speed automatics.196
The decision tree in the final rule also
combines ‘‘aggressive shift logic’’ and
196 Confidential product plans indicate that future
products manufactured within the rulemaking
period may not go from 4- or 5-speed transmission,
but will instead introduce 6- or 7-speed automatic
transmissions as replacements.
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‘‘early torque converter lockup,’’
although the NPRM considered them
separately, because NHTSA concluded
upon further review that the two
technologies could be optimized
simultaneously due to the fact that
adding both of them primarily required
only minor modifications to the
transmission or calibration software.
Cost and effectiveness numbers have
also been thoroughly reexamined, as
have learning rates and phase-in caps,
based on comments received. The
section below describes each of the
transmission technologies considered.
(i) Improved Transmission Controls and
Externals (IATC)
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During operation, an automatic
transmission’s controller manages the
operation of the transmission by
scheduling the upshift or downshift,
and locking or allowing the torque
converter to slip based on a
preprogrammed shift schedule. The
shift schedule contains a number of
lookup table functions, which define the
shift points and torque converter lockup
based on vehicle speed and throttle
position, and other parameters such as
temperature. Aggressive shift logic
(ASL) can be employed in such a way
as to maximize fuel efficiency by
modifying the shift schedule to upshift
earlier and inhibit downshifts under
some conditions, which reduces engine
pumping losses and engine friction as
noted in the gas engine section. Early
torque converter lockup 197 in
conjunction with ASL can further
improve fuel economy by locking the
torque converter sooner, thus reducing
inherent torque converter slippage or
losses. As discussed above, the NPRM
separated these two technologies, but
they are combined for purposes of the
final rule since the calibration software
can be optimized for both functions
simultaneously.
Calibrating the transmission shift
schedule to improve fuel consumption
reduces the average engine speed and
increases the average engine load,
which can lead to a perceptible increase
in engine harshness. The degree to
which the engine harshness can be
increased before it becomes noticeable
to the driver is strongly influenced by
characteristics of the vehicle, and
although it is somewhat subjective, it
197 Although only modifications to the
transmission calibration software are considered as
part of this technology, very aggressive early torque
converter lock up may require an adjustment to
damper stiffness and hysteresis inside the torque
converter. Internal transmission hardware changes
associated with this technology are addressed in
6/7/8–Speed Automatic Transmission with
Improved Internals section.
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always places a limit on how much fuel
consumption can be improved by
transmission control changes. The
Alliance agreed in its comments that
ASL can be used effectively to reduce
throttling losses, but at the expense of
noise-vibration-harshness (NVH) and
drivability concerns. The Alliance also
commented that losses in the torque
converter typically make automatic
transmissions less efficient than manual
transmissions, and suggested that
efficiency can be improved by
mechanically ‘‘locking up’’ the torque
converter earlier or replacing the torque
converter with a friction clutch of the
type used on a manual transmission.
Simply replacing a torque converter
with a friction clutch, however, ignores
the torque multiplication that torque
converters provide at vehicle launch.
In the NPRM, NHTSA estimated that
aggressive shift logic could
incrementally reduce fuel consumption
by 1 to 2 percent at an incremental cost
of $38 and early torque converter lockup
could incrementally reduce fuel
consumption by 0.5 percent at a $30
cost for the calibration effort.
Confidential manufacturer comments
suggested that less aggressive shift logic
must be employed on vehicles with low
acceleration reserve, but that a 1–3
percent improvement in fuel economy
was attainable on vehicles with
adequate acceleration reserve.
For the final rule, NHTSA combined
aggressive shift logic and early torque
converter lockup into the IATC
technology with an effectiveness
estimate of 1.5 to 2.5 percent in
agreement with most confidential
manufacturer estimates. As aggressive
shift logic and early torque converter
lockup are both achievable with a
similar calibration effort, the
incremental cost for improved
automatic transmission controls used
the higher value of $38, converted this
value to 2007 dollars, and applied a 1.5
RPE markup factor to arrive at an
incremental cost estimate of $59 for the
final rule.
The IATC technology is considered to
be available at the start of the 2011
model year, and as was the case in the
NPRM, NHTSA considers that it can be
applied during a refresh model year
since NVH concerns must be addressed.
The technology is applicable to all
vehicle subclasses and NHTSA
determined IATC type technologies will
be high volume within the 2011 time
frame so time-based learning is
assumed, with a phase-in cap for MY
2011 of 33 percent.
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(ii) Automatic 6-, 7- and 8-Speed
Transmissions (NAUTO)
Having more ‘‘speeds’’ on a
transmission (i.e., having more gear
ratios on the transmission) gives three
effects in terms of vehicle performance
and fuel economy. First, more gear
ratios allow deeper 1st and 2nd gear
ratios for improved launch performance,
or increased acceleration. Second, a
wider ratio spread also offers the ability
to reduce the steps between gear ratios,
which allows the engine to operate
closer to optimum speed and load
efficiency region. And third, a reduction
in gear ratio step size improves internal
transmission losses by reducing the
sliding speeds across the clutches, thus
reducing the viscous drag loss generated
between two surfaces rotating at
different speeds. Bearing spin losses are
also reduced as the differential speed
across the two bearing surfaces is
reduced. This allows the engine to
operate at a reduced load level to
improve fuel economy.
Although the additional gear ratios
improve shift feel, they also introduce
more frequent shifting between gears,
which can be perceived by consumers
as bothersome. Additionally, package
space limitations prevent 7- and 8-speed
automatics from being applicable to
front wheel drive vehicles.
Comparison between NPRM and final
rule cost and effectiveness estimates are
somewhat complicated by the revisions
in the decision trees and technology
assumptions. In the NPRM, NHTSA
estimated that 6-, 7- and 8-speed
transmissions could incrementally
reduce fuel consumption by 0.5 to 2.5
percent at an incremental cost of $76 to
$187, relative to a 5-speed automatic
transmission, a technology not used in
the final rule decision tree, and the
incremental cost for a 4-speed to a 5speed automatic transmission (again no
longer considered in the final rule) was
estimated to be $76 to $167.
In response to NHTSA’s request for
information, confidential manufacturer
data projected that 6-speed
transmissions could incrementally
reduce fuel consumption by 0 to 5
percent from a baseline 4-speed
automatic transmission, while an 8speed transmission could incrementally
reduce fuel consumption by up to 6
percent from a baseline 4-speed
automatic transmission. The 2008
Martec report estimated a cost of $323
(RPE adjusted) for converting a 4-speed
to a 6-speed transmission and a cost of
$638 (RPE adjusted) for converting a 4speed to an 8-speed transmission. GM
has publicly claimed a fuel economy
improvement of up to 4 percent for its
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new 6-speed automatic
transmissions.198 The 2008 EPA Staff
Technical Report found a 4.5 to 6.5
percent fuel consumption improvement
for a 6-speed over a 4-speed automatic
transmission.199
For the final rule, NHTSA estimated
that the conversion to a 6-, 7- and 8speed transmission (NAUTO) from a 4
or 5-speed automatic transmission with
IATC would have an incremental fuel
consumption benefit of 1.4 percent to
3.4 percent, for all vehicle subclasses.
The 2008 Martec report, which quoted
high volume, fully learned costs, was
relied on to develop the final rule cost
estimates. Subcompact, Compact,
Midsize, Large Car and Minivan
subclasses, which are typically
considered normal performance
passenger cars, are assumed to utilize a
6-speed automatic transmission only (as
opposed to 7 or 8 speeds) resulting in
an incremental RPE cost of $323 from
Martec 2008. For Performance
Subcompact, Performance Compact,
Performance Midsize, Performance
Large car and Small, Midsize and Large
truck, where performance and or
payload/towing may be a larger factor,
NHTSA assumed that 6-, 7- or 8-speed
transmissions are applicable thus the
incremental RPE cost range of $323–
$638 was established which used the
Martec 2008 six speed cost and 8-speed
costs for the estimates.
This technology will be available from
the start of the rulemaking period.
Confidential manufacturer data
indicates the widespread use of 6-speed
or greater automatic transmissions and
introductions into the fleet occur
primarily at vehicle redesign cycles.
This prompted NHTSA to set the phasein rate at 50 percent for MY 2011, but
also to consider that the technology can
only be applied at a redesign cycle, as
opposed to the refresh cycle application
of the NPRM. The technology is
determined to be at high volume in the
2011 timeframe, and since these are
mature and stable technologies, timebased learning factors are applied.
198 General Motors, news release, ‘‘From Hybrids
to Six-Speeds, Direct Injection And More, GM’s
2008 Global Powertrain Lineup Provides More
Miles with Less Fuel’’ (released Mar. 6, 2007).
Available at https://www.gm.com/experience/
fuel_economy/news/2007/adv_engines/2008powertrain-lineup-082707.jsp (last accessed Sept.
18, 2008).
199 Page 17, ‘‘EPA Staff Technical Report: Cost
and Effectiveness Estimates of Technologies Used to
Reduce Light-duty Vehicle Carbon Dioxide
Emissions’’ Environmental Protection Agency,
EPA420–R–08–008, March 2008.
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(iii) Dual Clutch Transmissions/
Automated Manual Transmissions
(DCTAM)
An automated manual transmission
(AMT) is similar in architecture to a
conventional manual transmission, but
shifting and launch functions are
performed through hydraulic or electric
actuation. There are two basic types of
AMTs, single-clutch and dual-clutch
transmission (DCT), both of which were
considered in the NPRM. Upon further
consideration and in response to
manufacturer comments to only include
dual-clutch AMTs, single-clutch AMTs
are not applied in the analysis for the
final rule.
Single clutch transmissions exhibit a
torque interruption when changing
gears because the clutch has to be
disengaged. In a conventional manual
transmission vehicle, the driver has
initiated the gear change, and so expects
to feel the resulting torque interruption.
With an AMT, in contrast, a control
system initiates the shift, which is
unexpected and can be disconcerting to
the driver. Comments from Ford in
response to the NPRM indicated that the
acceptability of this torque interruption
among U.S. drivers is poor, although
Ford also commented that DCTs do not
have the risk of customer acceptance
that AMTs do. BorgWarner, a DCT
supplier, echoed these comments. DCTs
do not display the torque interrupt
characteristic due to their use of two
clutch mechanisms which allow for
uninterrupted power transmission. To
assist with launch of a DCT equipped
vehicle, the first gear ratio can be
deepened to gain back some of the
performance advantage an automatic
transmission possesses due to the torque
converter’s torque multiplication factor.
There are two types of DCT systems,
wet clutch and dry clutch, which are
used for different types of vehicles. Wet
clutch DCTs offer a higher torque
capacity that comes from the use of a
hydraulic system that cools the
clutches, but that are less efficient than
the dry clutch type due to the losses
associated with hydraulic pumping.
Additionally, wet DCTs have a higher
cost due to the additional hydraulic
hardware required. Wet clutch DCT
systems have been available in the U.S.
market on imported products since
2005, and Chrysler has publicly stated
that it will have a DCT transmission in
its 2010 model year vehicle line-up.200
Consistent with manufacturers’
confidential comments and based on its
200 Chrysler blog, ‘‘Dual-Clutch Transmissions
Explained’’ (released October 3, 2007) available at
https://blog.chryslerllc.com/blog.do?p=entry&id=
113, last accessed September 18, 2008.
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own analysis, NHTSA determined that
dry clutch DCTs are applicable to
smaller front wheel drive cars, due to
their lower vehicle weight and torque
production, and wet clutch DCTs are
more applicable to higher torque
applications with higher power
requirements. Therefore lower cost,
higher efficiency dry clutch DCTs are
specified for the Subcompact and
Compact Car vehicle classes, while all
other classes required wet clutch DCTs.
In the NPRM, NHTSA estimated that
the incremental cost for DCTs was $141,
independent of vehicle class, which was
the midpoint of the NESCCAF estimates
and within the range provided
confidential manufacturer data. CARB
commented that NHTSA had incorrectly
cited the cost of AMTs from the
NESCCAF study in the NPRM, stating
that AMTs had been determined to be
cost neutral (zero cost) relative to
baseline transmission, as opposed to a
$0–$240 cost justification. Confidential
manufacturer data suggest additional
DCT costs from $80 to $740, with dry
clutch DCT costs being approximately
$100 less due to reduced hydraulic
system content. The 2008 Martec study
also reported variable costs for AMTs.
In the NPRM, NHTSA cited the
NESCCAF study as projecting that
AMTs could incrementally reduce fuel
consumption by 5 to 8 percent and
confidential manufacturer data
projected that AMTs could
incrementally reduce fuel consumption
by 2 to 5 percent. On the basis of these
estimates, NHTSA concluded in the
NPRM that AMTs could incrementally
reduce fuel consumption by 4.5 to 7.5
percent. Confidential manufacturer data
received in response to the NPRM
suggest a benefit of 2 to 12 percent for
DCTs over a 6-speed planetary
automatic, and one confidential
manufacturer estimates a benefit of 1 to
2 percent for a dry clutch DCT over a
wet clutch DCT. The 2008 EPA Staff
Technical Report also indicates a benefit
of 9.5 to 14.5 percent for a DCT (wet or
dry was not specified) over a 4-speed
planetary automatic transmission.
For the final rule, NHTSA estimated
a 5.5 to 9.5 percent improvement in fuel
consumption over a baseline 4/5-speed
automatic transmission for a wet clutch
DCT, which was assumed for all vehicle
subclasses except Subcompact and
Compact Car. This results in an
incremental effectiveness estimate of 2.7
to 4.1 percent over the NAUTO
technology. For Subcompact and
Compact Cars, which were assumed to
use a dry clutch DCT, NHTSA estimated
an 8 to 13 percent fuel consumption
improvement over a baseline 4/5-speed
automatic transmission, which equates
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to a 5.5 to 7.5 percent incremental
improvement over the NAUTO
technology.
The 2008 Martec report was utilized
to develop the cost estimates for the
final rule; it estimated an RPE cost of
$450 for a dry clutch DCT, and $600 for
a wet clutch DCT, both relative to a
baseline 4/5-speed. In the transmission
decision tree for the final rule, this
yielded a dry clutch DCT incremental
cost estimate of $68 for the Subcompact
and Compact Cars relative to the
NAUTO technology. For Midsize, Large
Car and Minivan classes the wet clutch
DCT incremental cost over NAUTO is
$218, which reflects the lower, 6-speed
only cost of the NAUTO technology
applied to these vehicles. The average
incremental cost for wet DCT for the
four Performance classes and the Small,
Midsize and Larger truck is $61, which
is lower than the other vehicle
subclasses due to the higher cost
NAUTO technology (up to 8-speeds)
that the DCTAM technology supersedes.
NHTSA relied upon confidential
manufacturer product plans showing
DCT production will be readily
available and at high volume by 2011.
Therefore volume-based learning is not
applicable, and since this is a mature
and stable technology, time-based
learning is applied. As production
facility conversion or construction may
be required to facilitate required
capacity, NHTSA limited the
production phase-in caps in MY 2011 to
20 percent. As with other transmission
technologies, application was allowed at
redesign only due to the vehicle changes
required to adapt a new type
transmission.
(iv) Continuously Variable Transmission
(CVT)
A continuously variable transmission
(CVT) is unique in that it does not use
gears to provide ratios for operation.
Most CVTs use either a belt or chain on
a system of two pulleys (the less
common toroidal CVTs replace belts
and pulleys with discs and rollers) that
progressively vary the ratio, thus
permitting an infinite number of
effective gear ratios between a
maximum and minimum value, and
often a wider range of ratios than
conventional automatic transmissions.
This enables even finer optimization of
the transmission ratio under different
operating conditions and, therefore,
some reduction of engine pumping and
friction losses. In theory, the CVT has
the ability to be the most fuel-efficient
kind of transmission due to the infinite
ability to optimize the ratio and operate
the engine at its most efficient point.
However, this effectiveness is reduced
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by the significant internal losses from
high-pressure, high-flow-rate hydraulic
pump, churning, friction loss, and
bearing losses required to generate the
high forces needed for traction.201
Some U.S. car manufacturers have
abandoned CVT applications because
they failed to deliver fuel economy
improvements over automatic
transmissions. GM abandoned the use of
CVT before 2006.202 Ford offered a CVT
in the Five Hundred and Freestyle from
MYs 2005–2007 and discontinued it
thereafter. However, Chrysler offers
CVTs in the Dodge Caliber, the Jeep
Compass, and the Jeep Patriot. Nissan
was using CVTs in many vehicles, but
appears to be restricting the use of this
technology to passenger cars only.
In the NPRM, NHTSA estimated a
CVT effectiveness of approximately 6
percent over a 4-speed automatic, which
was above the NESCCAF value but in
the range of NAS. For costs, NHTSA
concluded in the NPRM that the
adjusted costs presented in the 2002
NESCCAF study represent the best
available estimates, and thus estimated
that CVTs could incrementally reduce
fuel consumption by 3.5 percent when
compared to a conventional 5-speed
automatic transmission (which cost an
incremental $76–$167), a technology
which is considered a baseline
transmission option on the final rule
decision tree, at an incremental cost of
$100 to $139. After reviewing
confidential manufacturer data and the
Martec report, for the final rule NHTSA
is now estimating the incremental cost
of CVTs to be $300 for all vehicle
subclasses, except for large performance
cars, midsize light trucks and large light
trucks for which the technology is
incompatible.
Confidential manufacturer data in
response to the NPRM suggested that
the incremental effectiveness estimate
from CVTs may be 2 to 8 percent over
4-speed planetary transmissions in
simulation (however one commenter
reported a zero percent improvement in
dynamometer testing) at a cost of $140
to $800. Considering the NPRM
conclusion and confidential data
together with independent review,
NHTSA has estimated the fuel
201 ‘‘Transmission and Driveline—Major
contributors to FUEL efficiency, safety, fun to drive
and brand differentiation’’, Car Training Institute
Symposium, May 6–7, 2008—Plenary Speech,
Robert Lee, Vice President, Mircea Gradu, Director
Transmission and Driveline, Chrysler LLC, USA.
Available from the Car Training Institute, for
contact information see https://www.car-traininginstitute.com/cti_en/html/kontakt.html (last
accessed Nov. 9, 2008).
202 See https://car-reviews.automobile.com/news/
general-motors-to-kill-continually-variabletransmission/166/ (last accessed Oct. 23, 2008).
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consumption effectiveness for CVTs at
2.2 to 4.5 percent over a 4/5-speed
automatic transmission, which
translates into a 0.7 to 2.0 incremental
effectiveness improvement over the
IATC technology. NHTSA estimated the
CVT incremental cost to be $300 for the
final rule, noting that the NPRM costs
were incremental to a 5-speed
technology that is no longer represented
in the decision tree, hence the higher
final rule cost.203
CVTs are currently available, but due
to their limited torque-carrying
capability, they are not applied to
Performance Large cars and Midsize and
Large trucks. There is limited
production capability for CVTs, so the
phase-in cap for MY 2011 is limited to
5 percent to account for new plants and
tooling to be prepared. CVTs can be
introduced at product redesign intervals
only based on confidential manufacturer
data and consistent with the NPRM
approach (since it requires vehicle
attribute prove-out, test and certification
prior to introduction). Confidential
manufacturer data indicates that CVTs
will be at high volumes by 2011, and
this is a mature and stable technology,
therefore NHTSA applied time-based
learning factors.
(v) 6-Speed Manual Transmissions
(6MAN)
Manual transmissions are entirely
dependent upon driver input to change
gear ratio: the driver selects when to
perform the shift and which gear ratio
to select. This is the most efficient
transfer of energy of all transmission
layouts, because it has the lowest
internal gear losses, with a minimal
hydraulic system, and the driver
provides the energy to actuate the
clutch. From a systems viewpoint,
however, vehicles with manual
transmissions have the drawback that
the driver may not always select the
optimum gear ratio for fuel economy.
Nonetheless, increasing the number of
available ratios in a manual
transmission can improve fuel economy
by allowing the driver to select a ratio
that optimizes engine operation more
often. Typically, this is achieved
through adding overdrive ratios to
reduce engine speed at cruising
velocities (which saves fuel through
reduced pumping losses) and pushing
the torque required of the engine
towards the optimum level. However, if
the gear ratio steps are not properly
designed, this may require the driver to
203 Since the decision trees are configured
differently, the net cost to CVT in the NPRM
included 5-speed automatic transmission
technology costs that are not applied in the final
rule.
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14287
proportion of propulsion energy coming
from the fuel by increasing the
proportion of that energy coming from
electricity, there are other steps that can
be taken to improve the efficiency of
auxiliary functions (e.g., power-assisted
steering or air-conditioning) which also
reduce fuel consumption. These steps,
together with the hybrid technologies,
are collectively referred to as ‘‘vehicle
electrification’’ because they generally
use electricity instead of engine power.
Three ‘‘electrification’’ technologies are
considered in this analysis along with
the hybrid technologies: Electrical
power steering (EPS), improved
accessories (IACC), and high voltage or
improved efficiency alternator (HVIA).
(i) Overview
A hybrid describes a vehicle that
combines two or more sources of
energy, where one is a consumable
energy source (like gasoline) and one is
rechargeable (during operation, or by
another energy source). Hybrids reduce
fuel consumption through three major
mechanisms: (1) By turning off the
engine when it is not needed, such as
when the vehicle is coasting or when
stopped; (2) by recapturing lost braking
energy and storing it for later use; and
by (3) optimizing the operation of the
internal combustion engine to operate at
or near its most efficient point more of
the time. A fourth mechanism to reduce
fuel consumption, available only to
plug-in hybrids, is by substituting the
fuel energy with energy from another
source, such as the electric grid.
Engine start/stop is the most basic of
hybrid functions, and as the name
suggests, the engine is shut off when the
vehicle is not moving or when it is
coasting, and restarted when needed.
This saves the fuel that would normally
be utilized to spin the engine when it is
not needed. Regenerative braking is
another hybrid function which allows
some of the vehicle’s kinetic energy to
be recovered and later reused, as
opposed to being wasted as heat in the
brakes. The reused energy displaces
some of the fuel that would normally be
used to drive the vehicle, and thus
results in reduced fuel consumption.
Operating the engine at its most efficient
operating region more of the time is
made possible by adding electric motor
power to the engine’s power so that the
engine has a degree of independence
from the power required to drive the
vehicle. Fuel consumption is reduced
by more efficient engine operation, the
degree of which depends heavily on the
amount of power the electric motor can
provide. Hybrid vehicles with large
electric motors and battery packs can
take this to an extreme and drive the
wheels with electric power only and the
engine consuming no fuel. Plug-in
hybrid vehicles can substitute fuel
energy with electrical energy, further
reducing the fuel consumption.204
Hybrid vehicles utilize some
combination of the above mechanisms
to reduce fuel consumption. The
effectiveness of a hybrid, and generally
the complexity and cost, depends on the
utilization of the above mechanisms and
how aggressively they are pursued.
In addition to the purely hybrid
technologies, which decrease the
204 Substituting fuel energy with electrical energy
may not actually save total overall energy used,
when considering the inefficiencies of creating the
electricity at a power plant and storing it in a
battery pack, but it does enable use of other primary
energy sources, and reduces the vehicle’s fuel
consumption. Plug-in hybrids are also receiving
increasing attention because of their ability to use
‘‘clean energy’’ from the electric grid, such as that
solar or wind, which can reduce the overall
greenhouse gas output.
change gears more often in city driving
resulting in customer dissatisfaction.
Additionally, if gear ratios are selected
to achieve improved launch
performance instead of to improve fuel
economy, then no fuel saving
effectiveness is realized.
NHTSA recognizes that while the
manual transmission is very efficient, its
effect on fuel consumption relies
heavily upon driver input. In driving
environments where little shifting is
required, the manual transmission is the
most efficient because it has the lowest
internal losses of all transmissions.
However, the manual transmission may
have lower fuel efficiency on a drive
cycle when drivers shift at nonoptimum points.
In the NPRM, NHTSA estimated that
a 6-speed manual transmission could
incrementally reduce fuel consumption
by 0.5 percent when compared to a 5speed manual transmission, at an
incremental cost of $107. Confidential
manufacturer data received in response
to the NPRM suggests that manual
transmissions could incrementally
reduce fuel consumption by 0 to 1
percent over a base 5-speed manual
transmission at an incremental cost of
$40 to $900. Most confidential
comments suggested that the
incremental cost was within the lower
quartile of the full range, thus $225 (the
lower quartile upper-bound) was
multiplied by the 1.5 RPE markup factor
for a total of $338. Therefore, the final
rule states that the incremental fuel
consumption effectiveness for a 6-speed
manual transmission over a 5-speed
manual transmission is 0.5 percent at a
RPE cost of $338.
This technology is applicable to all
vehicle classes considered and can be
introduced at product redesign
intervals, consistent with the NPRM and
other final rule transmission
technologies. Six-speed manuals are
already in production at stable and
mature high volumes so time-based
learning is applied with a 33 percent
phase-in rate for MY 2011.
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(d) Hybrid and Electrification/Accessory
Technologies
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(ii) Hybrid System Sizing and Cost
Estimating Methodology
Estimates of cost and effectiveness for
hybrid and related electrical
technologies have been adjusted from
those described in the NPRM to address
commenters’ concerns that NHTSA
considered technologies not likely to be
adopted by automakers (e.g., 42V
electrical systems) or did not scale the
costs for likely technologies across the
range of vehicle subclasses considered.
To address these concerns, the portfolio
of vehicle electrification technologies
has been refined based on commenter
data as described below in the
individual hybrid technologies sections.
Ricardo and NHTSA have also
developed a ‘‘ground-up’’ hybrid
technology cost estimating methodology
and, where possible, validated it to
confidential manufacturer data. The
hybrid technology cost method accounts
for variation in component sizing across
both the hybrid type and the vehicle
platform. The method utilizes four
pieces of data: (1) Key component sizes
for a midsize car by hybrid system type;
(2) normalized costs for each key
component; (3) component scaling
factors that are applied to each vehicle
subclass by hybrid system type; and (4)
vehicle characteristics for the subclasses
which are used as the basis for the
scaling factors.
Component sizes were estimated for a
midsize car using publicly available
vehicle specification data and
commenter data for each type of hybrid
system as shown in Table IV–10.
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depth of discharge; and the capacity of
a new battery pack is 20 percent greater
than at end of life (i.e., range on a new
battery pack is 24 miles).
(4) All hybrid systems included a DC/
DC converter which was sized to
accommodate vehicle electrical loads
appropriate for increased vehicle
electrification in the time frame
considered.
(5) High voltage wiring scaled with
hybrid vehicle functionality and could
be represented as a fraction of strong
hybrid wiring. These ratios were
estimates based on the directional need
for increased functionality as system
complexity increases.
(6) All hybrid systems included a
supplemental heater to provide vehicle
heating when the engine is stopped,
however, only stronger hybrids
included electric air conditioning to
enable engine stop/start when vehicle
air conditioning was requested by the
operator.
In the hybrid technology cost
methodology developed for cost-scaling
purposes, several strong hybrid systems
replaced a conventional transmission
with a hybrid-specific transmission,
resulting in a cost offset for the removal
of a portion of the clutches and gear sets
within the transmission. The
transmission cost in Table IV–11 below
expresses hybrid transmission costs as a
percentage of traditional automatic
transmission cost, as described in the
2008 Martec Report, at $850. The
method assumed that the mechanical
aspect of a power-split transmission
with a reduced number of gear sets and
clutches resulted in a cost savings of 50
percent of a conventional transmission
with torque converter. For a 2-mode
hybrid, the mechanical aspects of the
transmission are similar in complexity
to a conventional transmission with a
torque converter, thus no mechanical
cost savings was appropriate. The plugin hybrid assumed a highly simplified
transmission for electric motor drive,
thus 25 percent of the base vehicle
transmission cost was applied.
Estimates for the cost basis of each
key component are shown in Table IV–
11 below along with the sources of those
estimates. The cost basis estimates
assume fully learned, high-volume
(greater than 1.2 million units per
annum) production. The costs shown
are variable costs that are not RPE
adjusted.
205 Anderman, Advanced Automotive Battery
Conference, May 2008. Proceedings available for
purchase at https://www.advancedautobat.com/
Proceedings/ (last accessed October 17,
2008).
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In developing Table IV–10, NHTSA
made several assumptions:
(1) Hybrid controls hardware varies
with the level of functionality offered by
the hybrid technology. Assumed hybrid
controls complexity for a 12V micro
hybrid (MHEV) was 25 percent of a
strong hybrid controls system and the
complexity for an Integrated Starter
Generator (ISG) was 50 percent. These
ratios were estimates based on the
directional need for increased
functionality as system complexity
increases.
(2) In the time frame considered, Liion battery packs will have limited
market penetration, with a majority of
hybrid vehicles using NiMH batteries.
One estimate from Anderman indicates
that Li-ion market penetration will
achieve 35 percent by 2015.205 For the
purposes of this analysis, it was
assumed that mild and strong hybrids
will use NiMH batteries and plug-in
hybrids will use Li-ion batteries.
(3) The plug-in hybrid battery pack
was sized for a mid-sized car by
assuming: the vehicle has a 20 mile all
electric range and consumes an average
of 300 W-hr per mile; the battery pack
can be discharged down to 50 percent
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characteristics for each type of hybrid
system as shown in Table IV–12 below.
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Component scaling factors were
determined based on vehicle
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these attributes were used as the basis
of the scaling factors.
Table IV–14 shows the costs for the
different types of hybrid systems on a
midsize vehicle. The individual
component costs were scaled from the
normalized costs shown in Table IV–11
according to the component size shown
in Table IV–10 and adjusted to a low
volume cost by backing out volume-
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characteristics for each vehicle subclass
as shown in Table IV–13 below, and
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NHTSA’s CAFE database was used to
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Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 59 / Monday, March 30, 2009 / Rules and Regulations
14291
hybrid technologies (Micro-hybrid
systems and Full Hybrid systems), and
the hybrid technology cost model agreed
well with this data. The scalable bill of
material based methodology described
above was determined to offer the best
solution for estimating component sizes
and costs across a range of hybrid
systems and vehicle platforms and the
validation of these cost outputs with
other data sources suggests that this
approach is a reasonable approach.
electric motor driving a hydraulic pump
(this is a subset of EPS systems known
as electro-hydraulic power steering) or
an electric motor directly assisting in
turning the steering column. EPS is seen
as an enabler for all vehicle
hybridization technologies, since it
provides power steering when the
engine is off. This was a primary
consideration in placing EPS at the top
of the Electrification/Accessory decision
tree.
In the NPRM, NHTSA estimated the
fuel consumption effectiveness for EPS
at 1.5 to 2 percent at an incremental cost
of $118 to $197, believing confidential
manufacturer data most accurate. In
response to the NPRM Sierra Research
suggested EPS and high efficiency
alternators combined is worth 1 to 1.8
percent on the CAFE test cycle,207 and
confidential manufacturer data
indicated a 0.7 to 2.9 percent fuel
consumption reduction. The cost range
from confidential manufacturer data
was $70 to $300. Sierra estimated EPS
for cars at $82 and $150 for trucks.208
A market study by Frost & Sullivan
207 Docket No. NHTSA–2008–0089–0179.1,
Attachment 2, at 53.
208 Docket No. NHTSA–2008–0089–0179.1,
Attachment 2, at 59.
Electrical Power Steering (EPS) is
advantageous over conventional
hydraulic power-assisted steering in
that it only draws power when the
vehicle is being steered, which is
typically a small percentage of the time
a vehicle is operating. In fact, on the
EPA test cycle no steering is done, so
the CAFE fuel consumption
effectiveness comes about by
eliminating the losses from driving the
hydraulic steering pump at engine
speed. EPS systems use either an
206 High volume costs are multiplied by a factor
of 1.56, which represents two cycles of 20 percent
reverse learning, to determine the appropriate low
volume, or unlearned costs.
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Wherever possible, the results of the
hybrid technology cost method were
compared with values as previously
described in the NPRM and the results
generally matched prior estimates.
Additionally, the results from the
hybrid technology cost method were
validated with public literature and
confidential manufactures test data as
allowed. Elements of the 2008 Martec
report identified cost data and a detailed
bill of materials for several comparable
(iii) Electrical Power Steering (EPS)
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based learning reductions.206 These
component costs were summed to get
the total low volume cost for each
hybrid type, and a 1.5 RPE adjustment
was applied. The ISG technology
replaces the MHEV technology on the
Electrification/Accessory technology
decision tree, therefore the MHEV
technology costs must be subtracted to
reflect true costs ($2,898¥$707 = $2,191
in this example).
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(iv) Improved Accessories (IACC)
Improved accessories (IACC) was
defined in the NPRM as improvements
in accessories such as the alternator,
coolant and oil pumps that are
traditionally driven by the engine.
Improving the efficiency or outright
electrification of these accessories
would provide opportunity to reduce
the accessory loads on the engine.
However, as the oil pump provides
lubrication to the engine’s sliding
surfaces such as bearings pistons, and
camshafts and oil flow is always
required when the engine is spinning,
and it is only supplied when the engine
is spinning, there is no efficiency to be
gained by electrifying the oil pump.210
Electrical air conditioning (EAC)
could reduce fuel consumption by
allowing the engine to be shut off when
it is not needed to drive the vehicle. For
this reason EAC is often used on hybrid
vehicles. In highway driving, however,
there is little opportunity to shut the
engine off; furthermore, EAC is less
efficient when the engine is running
because it requires mechanical energy
from the engine to be converted to
electrical energy and then back again to
mechanical. Since air conditioning is
not required on the EPA city or highway
test cycles, there is no CAFE fuel
consumption effectiveness from EAC.
Therefore, EAC does not improve
accessory efficiency apart from the
hybrid technologies. For the purposes of
the final rule, IACC refers strictly to
improved engine cooling, since
electrical lubrication and air
conditioning are not effective standalone fuel saving technologies and
improved alternator is considered as a
separate technology given its
importance to vehicle electrification.
Improved engine cooling, or
intelligent cooling, can save fuel
through two mechanisms: By reducing
engine friction as the engine warms up
faster; and by operating an electric
coolant pump at a lower speed than the
engine would (i.e., independent of
engine speed). Intelligent cooling can be
applied to vehicles that do not typically
carry heavy payloads. Larger vehicles
with towing capacity present a
challenge for electrical intelligent
cooling systems, as these vehicles have
high cooling fan loads. Therefore,
NHTSA did not apply IACC to the Large
Truck and SUV class.
In the NPRM, NHTSA estimated the
fuel consumption effectiveness for
improved accessories at 1 to 2 percent
at an incremental cost of $124 to $166
based on the 2002 NAS Report and
confidential manufacturer data.
Confidential manufacturer data received
in response to the NPRM and Sierra
Research both suggested a range for fuel
consumption effectiveness from 0.5 to 2
percent. A comment from MEMA
suggested that improved thermal control
of the engine could produce between 4
and 8 percent fuel economy
improvement; 211 however, NHTSA’s
209 Cost for EPS quoted at 48 Euros, at $1.35 per
Euro exchange rate (Oct. 7, 2008) equates to $65,
from Frost & Sullivan, Feb. 9, 2006 ‘‘Japanese
Steering System Market Moves Into High Gear,’’
https://www.theautochannel.com/news/2006/02/09/
210036.html (last accessed Nov. 2, 2008).
210 Oil pump electrification comes with an
additional potential technical and financial risk (to
warranty and consumer), in that significant engine
damage can occur should the system fail to provide
engine lubrication, even on a momentary basis.
211 Docket No. NHTSA–2008–0089–0193.1.
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indicated the cost of an EPS system at
roughly $65 more than a conventional
hydraulic (HPS) system.209 Because
there is a wide range in the effectiveness
for EPS depending on the vehicle size,
NHTSA has increased the range from
the NPRM to incorporate the lower
ranges suggested by most manufacturers
and estimates the fuel consumption
effectiveness for EPS at 1 to 2 percent
for the purpose of the final rule. The
incremental costs are also estimated on
range below the Sierra value for cars but
above the Frost & Sullivan estimate at a
piece cost range of $70 to $80 and
included a 1.5 RPE uplift to $105 to
$120 for the final rule.
EPS is currently in volume
production in small to mid-sized
vehicles with a standard 12V electrical
system; however, heavier vehicles may
require a higher voltage system, which
adds cost and complexity. The Chevy
Tahoe Hybrid, for example, uses a
higher voltage EPS system. For purposes
of the final rule, NHTSA has applied
EPS to all vehicle subclasses except for
Large trucks.
In the NPRM, NHTSA assumed a 25
percent phase in rate of EPS
technologies. For the purposes of the
final rule, EPS phase-in caps were
limited to 10 percent in MY 2011 to
address confidential manufacturer
concerns over lead time. In the NPRM,
NHTSA assumed a volume-based
learning effect for EPS. For the final
rule, however, NHTSA applied timebased learning for EPS since NHTSA’s
analysis indicated that this technology
would be in high-volume use at the
beginning of its first year of availability.
NHTSA also assumed in the NPRM that
EPS could be applied during refresh
model years, which was consistent with
information provided in confidential
product plans, therefore for the purpose
of the final rule, NHTSA again applied
EPS at refresh timing.
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independent review of intelligent
cooling suggests this estimate is high
and concurs with the estimates from
NAS. Independent review found the
cost for IACC at low volumes, assuming
the base vehicle already has an electric
fan, to be $180 to $220. These costs
were adjusted to account for volumebased learning and then marked up to
account for the 1.5 RPE factor. For the
purposes of the final rule, NHTSA
retained the fuel consumption
effectiveness at 1 to 2 percent and
estimated the incremental costs to be
$173 to $211.
MEMA also suggested that NHTSA
consider solar glass technology to
reduce cabin thermal loading; however,
air conditioning technologies were not
considered as part of this technology.
In the NPRM, NHTSA proposed a 25
percent phase-in cap for Improved
Accessories. To address manufacturer
concerns over lead time in the early
years, the IACC phase-in cap was
limited to 10 percent for MY 2011 for
the final rule. In the NPRM, NHTSA
assumed for improved accessories a
volume-based learning curve. For the
final rule, however, NHTSA applied
time-based learning for IACC since
NHTSA’s analysis indicated that this
technology would be in high-volume
use at the beginning of its first year of
availability. NHTSA assumed in the
NPRM that improved accessories could
be applied during any model year. For
the purpose of the final rule, NHTSA
applied intelligent cooling at refresh
model years due to the significant
changes required to the vehicle cooling
system that necessitate recertification
testing.
(v) 12V Micro Hybrid (MHEV)
12V Micro-Hybrid (MHEV) systems
are the most basic of hybrid systems and
offer mainly idle-stop capability. Their
low cost and easy adaptability to
existing powertrains and platforms can
make them attractive for some
applications. The conventional beltdriven alternator is replaced with a beltdriven, enhanced power starteralternator and a redesigned front-end
accessory drive system that facilitates
bi-directional torque application. Also,
during idle-stop, some functions such as
power steering and automatic
transmission hydraulic pressure are lost
with conventional arrangements; so
electric power steering and an auxiliary
transmission pump are needed. These
components are similar to those that
would be used in other hybrid designs.
Also included in this technology is the
Smart Starter Motor. This system is
comprised of an enhanced starter motor,
along with some electronic control that
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monitors the accelerator, brake, clutch
positions, and the battery voltage as
well as low-noise gears to provide fast
and quiet engine starts. Despite its
extended capabilities, the starter is
compact and thus relatively easy to
integrate in the vehicle.
12V micro hybrid was added to the
technology list to address concerns from
CARB and Delphi that the hybrid
classifications used in the NPRM did
not adequately represent these
technologies.212
The effectiveness estimates by
NHTSA for this technology are based on
confidential manufacturer data and
independent source data. For the
vehicles equipped with (baseline) inline
4, those with smaller displacements, the
effectiveness is between 1 and 2.9
percent, and for those equipped with V–
6 or V–8, the effectiveness is between
3.4 and 4 percent. The 1 to 2.9 percent
incremental fuel consumption savings
applies to the Sub-Compact Car,
Performance Sub-Compact Car, Compact
Car, Midsized Car, and Small Truck/
SUV variants. The 3.4 to 4 percent
incremental fuel consumption applies to
the remaining classes with the
exception of Large Truck/SUV where
MHEV is not applied due to payload
and towing requirements for this class.
Confidential manufacturer comments
submitted in response to the NPRM
indicated a $200 to $1000 cost for the
MHEV. The 12V micro-hybrid does not
have a high voltage battery, and thus
does not have a high-voltage wire cost.
The 12V micro-hybrid system for the
midsize vehicle has a 3kW electric
motor. This agrees well with two
commercially available systems used on
smaller engines.213 The value used for
the DC/DC converter represents the cost
for a 12V power conditioning circuit to
allow uninterrupted power to the radio
and a limited number of other
accessories when the engine starter is
engaged. The sizing for the rest of the
components is shown in Table IV–9.
The MHEV technology, which will be
available from the 2011 model year, is
projected to be in high volume use at
the beginning of its first year of
availability according to NHTSA’s
analysis, therefore volume based
learning reductions (two cycles at 20
percent) were applied to ‘‘learn’’ the
hybrid method costs and time based
learning factors were applied
throughout the remaining years. For the
212 Docket Nos. NHTSA–2008–0089–0173 and
–0144.1, respectively.
213 Citroen uses a 2kW system for a 1.4L diesel
engine, and Valeo has a 1.6kW system applicable
for engines up to 2L in displacement. The midsize
vehicle class has an average engine size of 2.9L, and
thus a 3kW starter is appropriate.
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final rule, NHTSA established
incremental costs ranging from $372 to
$549 with the highest cost applying to
the Performance Large Car class.
The 12V micro hybrid technology is
applicable across all the vehicle
segments except for the Large Truck/
SUV class. Although this technology
was not specifically stated in the NPRM,
a phase-in cap of 3 percent for MY 2011
was assumed for hybrid technologies.
For the final rule, this figure was
retained since it is generally supportable
within the industry as expressed at the
SAE HEV Symposium in San Diego in
Feb 2008.
The NPRM proposed that all of the
hybrid technologies could be introduced
during the redesign model year only.
This view is consistent with
manufacturer’s views, therefore, for this
rule making, NHTSA has assumed that
12V micro hybrids can only be
introduced at the redesign model years.
(vi) High Voltage/Improved Alternator
(HVIA)
In the NPRM, a 42V accessory
technology was identified in the
decision tree for Other Technologies.
Several confidential manufacturer
comments received by NHTSA related
to 42V technology, and indicated that
the effectiveness of 42V system were not
realized when electrical conversion
efficiencies were considered, and the
cost of transitioning the industry from a
12V to 42V system made the technology
unreasonable for deployment in the
emerging technology time frame. As a
result of these comments, NHTSA
revised the technology from 42V
technology to High Voltage/Improved
Alternator (HVIA).
The ‘‘High Voltage/Improved
Efficiency Alternator’’ technology block
represents technologies associated with
increased alternator efficiency. As most
alternators in production vehicles today
are optimized for cost and the process
for increasing the efficiency of an
alternator is well understood by the
industry, this technology is applicable
to all vehicle subclasses except Midsize
and Large Truck and SUV where it is
not considered applicable due to the
high utility of these classes.
The NPRM identified fuel economy
effectiveness that were based on 42V
accessory systems, and are not directly
applicable for this current technology
definition. Confidential manufacturer
data indicates that a midsized car with
an improved efficiency alternator
provided 0.2 to 0.9 percent fuel
consumption effectiveness over the
CAFE drive cycles, and a pickup truck
provided 0.6 percent fuel consumption
effectiveness over the same cycles. As
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this technology can be applied over a
range of vehicles, NHTSA believes the
fuel consumption effectiveness for
larger vehicles will be biased
downward. For purposes of this final
rule, NHTSA estimates the fuel
consumption effectiveness for High
Voltage/Improved Efficiency
Alternator’’ technology at 0.2 to 0.9
percent.
The NPRM identified several sources
for high voltage/improved efficiency
alternators incremental costs, but
focused this technology on 42V systems,
thus making some of these references
not representative of the current
technology description. The NPRM
‘‘Engine accessory improvement’’
technology discussion, however, did
quote the NESCCAF study that
indicated a $56 cost for a high efficiency
generator. An independent confidential
study estimated that the incremental
cost increase for a high efficiency
generator at high volume was similar to
the NESCCAF quoted cost, thus NHTSA
concludes that the NESCCAF study cost
of $56 is still a representative cost for
this technology. At a 1.5 RPE value, this
cost equates to $84.
As the definition of the technology
has been revised from the NPRM, phasein rates identified in the NPRM are not
applicable. NHTSA believes the High
voltage/Improved Efficiency Alternator
technology represents an adjustment to
the alternator manufacturing industry
infrastructure, so for purposes of this
final rule, phase-in caps for this
technology were estimated at 10 percent
for MY 2011.
Also, as the definition of the
technology has been revised from the
NPRM, learning curve assumptions from
the NPRM are not applicable. The high
voltage/improved alternator technology
costs were based on high volume
estimates, thus, for purposes of the final
rule, NHTSA assumed time-based
learning (3 percent YOY) for High
Voltage Systems/Improved Alternator
technology. For purposes of the final
rule, NHTSA assumed the technology
can be introduced during refresh or
redesign model changes only.
(vii) Integrated Starter Generator (ISG)
The next hybrid technology that is
considered is the Integrated Starter
Generator (ISG) technology. There are 2
types of integrated starter generator
hybrids that are considered: the belt
mounted type and the crank mounted
type.
A Belt Mounted Integrated Starter
Generator (BISG) system is similar to a
micro-hybrid system, except that here it
is defined as a system with a 110 to
144V battery pack which thus can
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perform some regenerative braking,
whereas the 12V micro-hybrid system
cannot. The larger electric machine and
battery enables additional hybrid
functions of regenerative braking and a
very limited degree of operating the
engine independently of vehicle load.
While having a larger electric machine
and more battery capacity than a MHEV,
this system has a smaller electric
machine than stronger hybrid systems
because of the limited torque capacity of
the belt driven design.
BISG systems replace the
conventional belt-driven alternator with
a belt-driven, enhanced power starteralternator and a redesigned front-end
accessory drive system that facilitates
bi-directional torque application
utilizing a common electric machine.
Also, during idle-stop, some functions
such as power steering and automatic
transmission hydraulic pressure are lost
with conventional arrangements; so
electric power steering and an auxiliary
transmission pump need to be added.
These components are similar to those
that would be used in other hybrid
designs.
A Crank Mounted Integrated Starter
Generator (CISG) hybrid system, also
called an Integrated Motor Assist (IMA)
system, utilizes a thin axial electric
motor (100–144V) bolted to the engine’s
crankshaft. The electric machine acts as
both a motor for helping to launch the
vehicle and a generator for recovering
energy while slowing down. It also acts
as the starter for the engine and is a
higher efficiency generator. An example
of this type of a system is found in the
Honda Civic Hybrid. For purposes of the
final rule, NHTSA assumed the electric
machine is rigidly fixed to the engine
crankshaft, thus making electric-only
drive not practical.214
The fuel consumption effectiveness of
the ISG systems are greater than those
of micro-hybrids, because they are able
to perform the additional hybrid
function of regenerative braking and
able to utilize the engine more
efficiently because some transient
power demands from the driver can be
separated from the engine operation.
Their transient performance can be
better as well, because the larger electric
machine can provide torque boost. The
ISG systems are more expensive than
the micro hybrids, but have lower cost
than the strong hybrids described below
because the electrical component sizes
214 A clutch between the engine and the electric
motor would enable pure electric drive, but the
Porsche Cayenne is the only example of such a
system that is planned in the rulemaking time
frame. Because of limited expected volumes of this
type of system, and in the interest of reducing
complexity, that variant is not included here.
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(batteries, electric machines, power
electronics, etc.) are sized in between
the micro-hybrid and the strong hybrid
components. The engineering effort
required to adapt conventional
powertrains to these configurations is
also in between that required for microhybrid and strong hybrid configurations.
Packaging is a greater concern due to the
fact that the engine-motor-transmission
assembly is physically longer, and the
battery pack, high voltage cabling and
power electronics are larger.
The hybrid decision tree was
modified to address several
manufacturer comments and comments
from CARB and Delphi asking for more
appropriate separation of hybrid
technology classifications (i.e., 12V
versus higher voltage Integrated Starter
Generators, etc.). The inclusion of the
ISG technology in the final rule is in
response to these comments and those
from subject matter experts.
The NPRM had proposed a fuel
consumption savings of between 5 and
10 percent for ISG systems, and between
3.5 and 8.5 percent for the Honda IMA
system, both of which fall in the ISG
category described above. Confidential
manufacturer comments submitted in
response to the NPRM indicated an
incremental 3.8 to 7.4 percent fuel
consumption effectiveness and a $1,500
to $2,400 cost as compared to the
baseline vehicle.
The incremental fuel consumption
savings for the Compact Car variant for
ISG over a 12V Micro-hybrid with start/
stop was calculated using published
data and confidential manufacturer
data, while published Honda Civic
Hybrid data was used to calculate the
fuel consumption gains due to the
hybrid system. For the final rule, gains
for the other technologies also included
on this vehicle were subtracted out to
give an incremental effectiveness of 5.7
to 6.5 percent for ISG. Data for these
individual gains was taken from
confidential manufacturer data. The 5.7
to 6.5 percent incremental fuel
consumption savings was carried over
from the Compact Car to all other
vehicle subclasses. A 2 percent
incremental effectiveness was
subtracted from the Performance
subclasses to allow for the improved
baseline performance
The NPRM proposed a cost of $1,636
to $2,274 for these systems. For the final
rule, NHTSA determined the cost for the
ISG system using system sizing data for
different available ISG hybrids. The
2006 Honda Civic has a Crank Mounted
ISG and uses a 0.87 kW-hr battery pack.
In light of the potential growth of
vehicle electrification, a 1 kW-hr pack
size was chosen for both the belt and
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crank mounted ISG systems. The crank
mounted ISG was sized as 11kW
continuous (15kW peak). This is an
average of the 10kW system on the 2003
Honda Civic and the 12kW system on
the 2005 Honda Accord. The 2006 Civic
has a 15kW system. The belt mounted
ISG has a slightly smaller electric
machine (7.5kW continuous and 10kW
peak) due to power transmission
limitations of the belt.
For the final rule, the hybrid
technology cost method projected costs
ranging from $2,475 to $3,290 for the
Sub-Compact car class through the
Midsize Truck classes as compared to
the conventional baseline vehicle and
the incremental costs of $1,713 to
$2,457 were calculated by backing out
the prior hybrid technology costs. The
ISG technology is projected to be in low
volume use at the beginning of the
rulemaking period therefore low volume
costs are used and volume-based
learning factors are applied.
Integrated starter generator systems
are applicable to all vehicle subclasses
except Large Truck. In the NPRM, a
phase-in cap of 3 percent was assumed
for both the ‘‘ISG with idle off’’ and
‘‘IMA’’ technologies. For the final rule,
NHTSA has retained the phase-in cap of
3 percent for MY 2011. These values are
generally supportable within the
industry as expressed at the SAE HEV
Symposium in San Diego in February
2008.
The NPRM proposed that all of the
hybrid technologies could be introduced
during the redesign model year only.
This view is consistent with
manufacturer’s views as well, because
all of the hybrid technologies under
consideration require redesign of the
powertrain (ranging from engine
accessory drive to transmission
redesign) and vehicle redesign to
package the hybrid components (from
high voltage cabling to the addition of
large battery packs). Given this, for
purposes of the final rule, they can only
be introduced in redesign model years.
(viii) Power Split Hybrid
The Power Split hybrid (PSHEV) is
described as a full or a strong hybrid
since it has the ability to move the
vehicle on electric power only. It
replaces the vehicle’s transmission with
a single planetary gear and a motor/
generator. A second, more powerful
motor/generator is directly connected to
the vehicle’s final drive. The planetary
gear splits the engine’s torque between
the first motor/generator and the final
drive. The first motor/generator uses
power from the engine to either charge
the battery or supply power to the
wheels. The speed of the first motor/
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generator determines the relative speed
of the engine to the wheels. In this way,
the planetary gear allows the engine to
operate independently of vehicle speed,
much like a CVT. The Toyota Prius and
the Ford Hybrid Escape are two
examples of power split hybrid vehicles.
In addition to providing the functions
of idle engine stop and subsequent
restart, regenerative braking, this hybrid
system allows for pure EV operation.
The two motor/generators are bigger and
more powerful than those in an ISG
hybrid, allowing the engine to be run in
efficient operating zones more often. For
these reasons, the power split system
provides very good fuel consumption in
city driving. During highway cycles, the
hybrid functions of regenerative
braking, engine start/stop and optimal
engine operation cannot be applied as
often as in city driving, and so the
effectiveness in fuel consumption are
less. Additionally, it is less efficient at
highway speeds due to the fact that the
first motor/generator must be spinning
at a relatively high speed and therefore
incurs losses.
The battery pack for PSHEV is
assumed to be 300V NiMH for the time
period considered in this rulemaking, as
is used in current PSHEV systems today.
Their reliability is proven (having been
in hybrids for over 10 years) and their
cost is lower than Li Ion, so it is likely
that the battery technology used in
HEVs will continue to be NiMH for the
near future for hybrids that do not
require high energy storage capability
like a plug-in hybrid does.
The Power Split hybrid also reduces
the cost of the transmission, replacing a
conventional multi-speed unit with a
single planetary gear. The electric
components are bigger than those in an
ISG configuration so the costs are
correspondingly higher.
However, the Power Split system is
not planned for use on full-size trucks
and SUVs due to its limited ability to
efficiently provide the torque needed by
these vehicles. The drive torque is
limited to the first motor/generator’s
capacity to resist the torque of the
engine. It is anticipated that Large
Trucks would use the 2-mode hybrid
system.
In the NPRM, a phase-in rate of 3
percent was assumed for the power split
technology. Although this system has
been engineered for some vehicles by a
couple of manufacturers, the required
engineering resources both at OEMs and
Tier 1 suppliers are high and most
importantly, require long product
development lead times. Thus NHTSA
believes it would be extremely difficult
for manufacturers to implement in
levels greater than that of the submitted
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product plans for MY 2011. For the final
rule, NHTSA limited the volumes of
power split hybrids to zero percent in
MY 2011. Power split hybrid cost and
effectiveness estimates will not be
discussed here, given that the
technology is not applied in MY 2011
beyond product plan levels in NHTSA’s
analysis, and NHTSA will consider
them further in its future rulemaking
actions.
The NPRM proposed that all of the
hybrid technologies could be introduced
during the redesign model year only,
consistent with manufacturer’s views.
Given this, for this final rule NHTSA
has retained the redesign application
timing.
(ix) 2-Mode Hybrid
The 2-mode hybrid (2MHEV) is
another strong hybrid system that has
all-electric drive capability. The 2MHEV
uses an adaptation of a conventional
stepped-ratio automatic transmission by
replacing some of the transmission
clutches with two electric motors,
which makes the transmission act like a
CVT. Like the Power Split hybrid, these
motors control the ratio of engine speed
to vehicle speed. But unlike the Power
Split system, clutches allow the motors
to be bypassed, which improves both
the transmission’s torque capacity and
efficiency for improved fuel economy at
highway speeds. This type of system is
used in the Chevy Tahoe Hybrid.
In addition to providing the hybrid
functions of engine stop and subsequent
restart and regenerative braking, the
2MHEV allows for pure EV operation.
The two motor/generators are bigger and
more powerful than those in an ISG
hybrid, allowing the engine to be run in
efficient operating zones more often. For
these reasons, the 2-mode system also
provides very good fuel economy in city
driving. The primary motor/generator is
comparable in size to that in the PSHEV
system, but the secondary motor/
generator is larger. The 2-mode system
cost is greater than that for the power
split system due to the additional
transmission complexity and secondary
motor sizing.
The battery pack for 2MHEV is
assumed to be 300V NiMH for the time
period considered in this rulemaking, as
is used in current 2MHEV systems
today. Their reliability is proven (having
been in hybrids for over 10 years) and
their cost is lower than Li Ion, so it is
likely that the batteries will continue to
be NiMH for the near future for hybrids
that do not require high energy storage
capability like a plug-in hybrid does.
Given the relatively large size of the
2 mode powertrain, this technology was
assumed to be applicable to the Small
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through Large Truck/SUV classes. In the
NPRM, a phase-in rate of 3 percent was
assumed for 2 mode hybrids. The 2modes have recently been introduced in
the marketplace on a few vehicle
platforms. The engineering resources
that are needed both at the OEMs and
Tier 1s to develop this across many
more platforms are considerable, as
discussed above for power split hybrids.
For purposes of the final rule, the phasein rate has been set to zero percent in
MY 2011. 2 mode hybrid cost and
effectiveness estimates will not be
discussed here, given that the
technology is not applied in MY 2011
beyond product plan levels in NHTSA’s
analysis, and NHTSA will consider
them further in its future rulemaking
actions.
The NPRM proposed that all of the
hybrid technologies could be introduced
during the redesign model year only,
consistent with manufacturer’s views.
Given this, for this final rule NHTSA
has retained the redesign application
timing.
(x) Plug-In Hybrid
Plug-In Hybrid Electric Vehicles
(PHEV) are very similar to other strong
hybrid electric vehicles, but with
significant functional differences. The
key distinguishing feature is the ability
to charge the battery pack from an
outside source of electricity (usually the
electric grid). A PHEV would have a
larger battery pack with greater energy
capacity, and an ability to be discharged
further (referred to as ‘‘depth of
discharge’’).215 No major manufacturer
currently has a PHEV in production,
although both GM and Toyota have
publicly announced that they will
launch plug-in hybrids in limited
volumes by 2010.
PHEVs offer a significant opportunity
to displace petroleum-derived fuels
with electricity from the electrical grid.
The reduction in petroleum use
depends on the electric-drive range
capability and the vehicle usage (i.e.,
trip distance between recharging,
ambient temperature, etc.). PHEVs can
have a wide variation in the All Electric
Range (AER) that they offer. Some
PHEVs are of the ‘‘blended’’ type where
the engine is on during most of the
vehicle operation, but the proportion of
electric energy that is used to propel the
vehicle is significantly higher than that
used in a PSHEV or 2MHEV.
215 NHTSA notes that the fuel consumption
effectiveness of PHEVs is heavily dependent on the
all-electric range, and hence the battery capacity.
However, the fuel consumption effectiveness from
a PHEV is currently difficult to quantify objectively
because there is no standardized fuel economy test
procedure yet for a PHEV.
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PHEVs were not projected to be in
volume use in the NPRM, but due to
confidential manufacturer product
plans, PHEVs do, in fact, appear in
limited volumes in the final rule
analysis, and therefore low volume,
unlearned costs are assumed. However,
the manufacturer-stated production
volumes of PHEVs are very low, so the
phase-in cap for MY 2011 is zero—given
the considerable engineering hurdles,
the low availability of Li-Ion batteries in
the MY 2011 time frame and the reasons
discussed above for power split and 2
mode hybrids, NHTSA did not believe
that PHEVs could be applied to more
MY 2011 vehicles beyond what was
indicated in the product plans.
Additionally, plug-in hybrid cost and
effectiveness estimates will not be
discussed here, given that the
technology is not applied in MY 2011
beyond product plan levels in NHTSA’s
analysis, and NHTSA will consider
them further in its future rulemaking
actions. The NPRM proposed that all of
the hybrid technologies could be
introduced during the redesign model
year only, consistent with
manufacturer’s views. Given this, for
this final rule NHTSA has allowed
application of PHEVs in redesign model
years only.
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(e) Vehicle Technologies
(i) Material Substitution (MS1, MS2,
MS5)
The term ‘‘material substitution’’
encompasses a variety of techniques
with a variety of costs and lead times.
These techniques may include using
lighter-weight and/or higher-strength
materials, redesigning components, and
size matching of components. Lighterweight materials involve using lowerdensity materials in vehicle
components, such as replacing steel
parts with aluminum or plastic. The use
of higher-strength materials involves the
substitution of one material for another
that possesses higher strength and less
weight. An example would be using
high strength alloy steel versus cold
rolled steel. Component redesign is an
ongoing process to reduce costs and/or
weight of components, while improving
performance and reliability. The
Aluminum Association commented that
lightweight structures are a significant
enabler for the new powertrain
technologies. Smaller and less
expensive powertrains are required and
the combination of reduced power and
weight reduction positively reinforce
and result in optimal fuel economy
performance. An example would be a
subsystem replacing multiple
components and mounting hardware.
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However, the cost of reducing weight
is difficult to determine and depends
upon the methods used. For example, a
change in design that reduces weight on
a new model may or may not save
money. On the other hand, material
substitution can result in an increase in
price per application of the technology
if more expensive materials are used. As
discussed further below in Section VIII,
for purposes of this final rule, NHTSA
has considered only vehicles weighing
greater than 5,000 lbs (curb weight) for
weight reduction through materials
substitution. A typical BOM for Material
Substitution would include primarily
substitution of high strength steels for
heavier steels or other structural,
materials on a vehicle. This BOM was
established for each class but was not
adjusted for each class due to the fact
that the vehicle technology of Material
Substitution is already scaled by it being
based on percent of curb weight at or
over 5,000 lbs.
In the NPRM, NHTSA estimated fuel
economy effectiveness of a 2 percent
incremental reduction in fuel
consumption per each 3 percent
reduction in vehicle weight. Nissan
commented that NHTSA’s modeling of
material substitution application was
overly optimistic, but did not elaborate
further. Confidential manufacturer
comments in response to the NPRM did
not provide standardized effectiveness
estimates, but ranged from 3.3 to 3.9
percent mpg improvement for a 10
percent reduction in mass, to 0.20 to
0.75 percent per 1 percent weight
reduction, to 1 percent reduction on the
FTP city cycle per 100 lbs reduced, with
a maximum possible weight reduction
of 5 percent.
Bearing in mind that NHTSA only
assumes material substitution for
vehicles at or above 5,000 lbs curb
weight and based on manufacturer
comments which together suggest an
incremental improvement in fuel
consumption of approximately 0.60
percent to 0.9 percent per 3 percent
reduction in material weight, NHTSA
has estimated an incremental
improvement in fuel consumption of 1
percent (corresponding to a 3 percent
reduction in vehicle weight, or roughly
0.35 percent fuel consumption per 1
percent reduction in vehicle weight).
This estimate is consistent with the
majority of the manufacturer comments.
As for costs, in the NPRM NHTSA
estimated incremental costs of $0.75 to
$1.25 per pound reduced through
material substitution. The costs for
material substitution were not clearly
commented on in the confidential
manufacturer responses. Confidential
manufacturer estimates ranged from $50
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to $511 for 1 percent reduction,
although in most cases the cost
estimates were not for the entire range
of substitution (1–5 percent) and did not
provide any additional clarification on
how they specifically applied to the
material substitution technology.
Consequently, for purposes of the final
rule NHTSA retained the existing NPRM
cost estimates with adjustments to 2007
dollar levels resulting in an incremental
$1 to $2 per pound of substituted
material, which applies to the MS1 and
MS2 technology, and $2 to $4 per
pound for the MS5 technology. Costs for
material substitution are not adjusted by
vehicle subclass, as the technology costs
are based on a percentage of the vehicle
weight (per pound) and limited to
Medium and Large Truck/SUV Van
subclasses above 5,000 lbs curb weight.
The agency notes that comments from
the Alliance and the Aluminum
Association associated engine
downsizing with weight reduction/
material substitution and quoted
effectiveness for this action as well.
NHTSA considers engine downsizing
separately from typical material
substitution efforts, and consequently
did not include those cost and fuel
economy effectiveness for this
technology.
In the NPRM, NHTSA assumed a 17
percent phase-in rate for material
substitution. NHTSA received only one
confidential manufacturer comment
regarding material substitution phase-in
percentage, suggesting 17 to 30 percent,
but the agency notes that it generally
received comments suggesting a nonlinear phase-in rate for this technology,
that would start at a rate lower than the
current NPRM value and increase over
time. In response to these comments,
NHTSA revised the MY 2011 phase-in
percentage to 5 percent to account for
lead time limitations.
For material substitution
technologies, neither volume-based cost
reductions nor time-based cost
reductions are applied. This technology
does not employ a particular list of
components to employ credible cost
reduction.
In the NPRM, NHTSA assumed that
material substitution (1 percent) could
be applied during a redesign model year
only. For this final rule, based on
confidential manufacturer comments,
NHTSA estimated that material
substitution (1 percent) could be
applied during either a refresh or a
redesign model year, due to minimal
design changes with minimal
component or vehicle-level testing
required. However, NHTSA retained the
assumption that material substitution (2
percent and 5 percent) could be applied
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during redesign model year only, as in
the NPRM, because the agency neither
received comments to contradict this
assumption nor found other data to
substantiate a change. The technology
title was changed from Material
Substitution (3 percent) to Material
Substitution (5 percent) to more
accurately represent the cumulative
amount for the technology.
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(ii) Low Drag Brakes (LDB)
Low drag brakes reduce the sliding
friction of disc brake pads on rotors
when the brakes are not engaged
because the brake pads are pulled away
from the rotating rotor. A typical BOM
for Low Drag Brakes would typically
include changes in brake caliper speed
by changing the brake control system,
springs, etc. on a vehicles brake system.
This BOM was established for each class
and was not adjusted for each class due
to the fact that the vehicle technology
BOM would not change by class across
vehicle classes. Confidential
manufacturer comments in response to
the NPRM indicated that most passenger
cars have already adopted this
technology, but that ladder frame trucks
have not yet adopted this technology.
Consequently, in the final rule this
technology was assumed to be
applicable only to the Large
Performance Passenger Car and Medium
and Large Truck classes.
In the NPRM, NHTSA assumed an
incremental improvement in fuel
consumption of 1 to 2 percent for low
drag brakes. Confidential manufacturer
comments submitted in response to the
NPRM indicated an effective range of
0.5–1.0 percent for this technology and
this range was applied in the final rule.
As for costs, NHTSA assumed in the
NPRM incremental costs of $85 to $90
for the addition of low drag brakes. For
the final rule, NHTSA took the average
and adjusted it to 2007 dollars to
establish an $89 final rule cost.
The NPRM assumed an annual
average phase-in rate for low drag
brakes of 25 percent. For the final rule,
the MY 2011 phase-in cap is 20 percent.
No learning curve was applied in the
NPRM, but for the final rule, low drag
brakes were considered a high volume,
mature and stable technology, and thus
time-based learning was applied. Low
drag brakes are assumed in the final rule
to be applicable at refresh cycle only.
(iii) Low Rolling Resistance Tires
(ROLL)
Tire rolling resistance is the frictional
loss associated mainly with the energy
dissipated in the deformation of the
tires under load—and thus, influence
fuel economy. Other tire design
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characteristics (e.g., materials,
construction, and tread design)
influence durability, traction control
(both wet and dry grip), vehicle
handling, and ride comfort in addition
to rolling resistance. A typical low
rolling resistance tires BOM would
include: tire inflation pressure, material
change, and constructions with less
hysteresis, geometry changes (e.g.,
reduced aspect ratios), reduction in
sidewall and tread deflection, potential
spring and shock tuning. Low rolling
resistance tires are applicable to all
classes of vehicles, except for ladder
frame light trucks and performance
vehicles. NHTSA assumed that this
technology should not be applied to
vehicles in the Large truck class due to
the increased traction and handling
requirements for off-road and braking
performance at payload and towing
limits which cannot be met with low
resistance tire designs. Likewise, this
technology was not applied to vehicles
in the Performance Car classes due to
increased traction requirements for
braking and handling which cannot be
met with low roll resistance tire designs.
Confidential manufacturer comments
received regarding applicability of this
technology to particular vehicle classes
confirmed NHTSA’s assumption.
In the NPRM, NHTSA assumed an
incremental reduction in fuel
consumption of 1 to 2 percent for
application of low rolling resistance
tires. Confidential manufacturer
comments varied widely and addressed
the conflicting objectives of increasing
safety by increasing rolling resistance
for better tire traction, and improving
fuel economy with lower rolling
resistance tires that provide reduced
traction. Confidential manufacturer
comments suggested fuel consumption
effectiveness of negative impact to a
positive 0.1 percent per year over the
next five years from 2008, while other
confidential manufacturer comments
indicate that the percentage
effectiveness of low rolling resistance
tires would increase each year, although
it would apply differently for
performance classes. Confidential
manufacturer comments also indicated
that some manufacturers have already
applied this technology and
consequently would receive no further
effectiveness from this technology. The
2002 NAS Report indicated that an
assumed 10 percent rolling resistance
reduction would provide an increase in
fuel economy of 1 to 2 percent. NHTSA
believes the NAS effectiveness is still
valid and used 1 to 2 percent
incremental reduction in fuel
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consumption for application of low
rolling resistance tires in the final rule.
NHTSA estimated the incremental
cost of four low rolling resistance tires
to be $6 per vehicle in the NPRM,
independent of vehicle class, although
not applicable to large trucks. NHTSA
received few specific comments on the
costs of applying low rolling resistance
tires however confidential manufacturer
comments that were received provided
widely ranging and higher costs.
NHTSA increased the range from the
NPRM cost estimates to $6 to $9 per
vehicle in the final rule.
In the NPRM, NHTSA assumed an
annual phase-in rate of 25 percent for
low rolling resistance tires. Confidential
manufacturer comments on the phase-in
rate for low rolling resistance tires
varied, with some suggesting that many
vehicle classes already had high phasein rates planned or accomplished. As
discussed above, the comments also
suggested a non-linear phase-in plan
over the 5-year period. Confidential
manufacturer data was in the 25–30
percent range. Based on confidential
manufacturer comments received and
NHTSA’s analysis, the final rule
includes a phase-in cap for low rolling
resistance tires with a phase-in rate of
20 percent for MY 2011.
For low rolling resistant tire
technology, neither volume-based cost
reductions nor time-based cost
reductions are applied. This technology
is presumed to be significantly
dependent on commodity raw material
prices and to be priced independent of
particular design or manufacturing
savings.
In the NPRM, NHTSA assumed that
low rolling resistance tires could be
applied during any model year.
However, based on confidential
manufacturer comments NHTSA
recognizes that there are some vehicle
attribute impacts which may result from
application of low rolling resistance
tires, such as changes to vehicle
dynamics and braking. Vehicle
validation testing for safety and vehicle
attribute prove-out is not usually
planned for every model year, so
NHTSA assumed that this technology
can be applied during a redesign or
refresh model year for purposes of the
final rule.
(iv) Front or Secondary Axle Disconnect
for Four-Wheel Drive Systems (SAX)
To provide shift-on-the-fly
capabilities, reduce wear and tear on
secondary axles, and improve
performance and fuel economy, many
part-time four-wheel drive (4WD)
systems use some type of axle
disconnect. Axle disconnects are
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typically used on 4WD vehicles with
two-wheel drive (2WD) operating
modes. When shifting from 2WD to
4WD ‘‘on the fly’’ (while moving), the
front axle disconnect couples the front
driveshaft to the front differential side
gear only when the transfer case’s
synchronizing mechanism has spun the
front driveshaft, transfer case chain or
gear set and differential carrier up to the
same speed as the rear driveshaft. 4WD
systems that have axle disconnect
typically do not have either manual- or
automatic-locking hubs. For example, to
isolate the front wheels from the rest of
the front driveline, front axle
disconnects use a sliding sleeve to
connect or disconnect an axle shaft from
the front differential side gear. The
effectiveness to fuel efficiency is created
by reducing inertial, chain, bearing and
gear losses (parasitic losses).
Full time 4WD or all-wheel-drive
(AWD) systems used for on-road
performance and safety do not use axle
disconnect systems due to the need for
instantaneous activation of torque to
wheels, and the agency is not aware of
any manufacturer or suppliers who are
developing a system to allow secondary
axle disconnect suitable for use on AWD
systems at this time. Secondary axle
disconnect technology is primarily
found on solid axle 4WD systems and
not on the transaxle and/or independent
axle systems typically found in AWD
vehicles; thus, the application of this
technology to AWD systems has not
been considered for purposes of this
rulemaking. The technology will be
evaluated in future rulemakings.
Vehicle technology BOM information
was not adjusted by vehicle classes due
to the fact that the vehicle technology is
limited to transfer case and front axle
design changes. Scaling of components
might be impacted but the components
themselves will be the same. This is
consistent with NHTSA’s assumptions
in the NPRM, and is supported by
comments from confidential supplier
and manufacturers. Secondary Axle
Disconnect BOM typically involves a
transfer case which includes electronic
solenoid with clutch system to
disconnect front drive and using axle
mounted vacuum or electric disconnect
that still allows driveshaft rotation
without connection to wheel ends.
In the NPRM, NHTSA employed
‘‘unibody’’ and ‘‘ladder frame’’ terms to
differentiate application of this
technology, and had suggested
‘‘unibody’’ AWD systems could apply
this same technology. In actuality, most
4WD vehicles are ‘‘ladder frame’’
technology and AWD are ‘‘unibody’’
designs (which for the reasons stated
above will not be considered for this
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technology). Ladder frame technology is
typically associated with greater
payload, towing, and off-road capability,
whereas unibody designs are typically
used in smaller, usually front-wheel
drive vehicles, and are typically not
associated with higher payload, towing,
and off-road use. For the final rule,
NHTSA removed these vehicle design
criteria since it is not a requirement to
incorporate axle disconnect technology,
only a historical design point and
vehicle manufacturers should not be
limited to a specific vehicle or chassis
configuration to apply this technology.
Therefore, this technology is applicable
to 4WD vehicles in all vehicle classes
(independent of chassis or frame
design).
In the NPRM, NHTSA estimated an
incremental reduction in fuel
consumption of 1 to 1.5 percent for axle
disconnect. Confidential manufacturer
comments suggested an incremental
effectiveness of 1 to 1.5 percent.
Supported by this confidential
manufacturer data, NHTSA maintained
an incremental effectiveness of 1 to 1.5
percent for axle disconnect for the final
rule.
As for costs, the NPRM estimated the
incremental cost for adding axle
disconnect technology at $114 for 4WD
systems and the $676 estimate was for
the AWD systems which are not applied
in the final rule. NHTSA received no
specific comments on costs for this
technology and found no additional
sources to support a change from this
value for the 4WD value of $114, so for
purposes of the final rule, NHTSA
revised the $114 figure to 2007 dollars
to establish a $117 final rule cost.
In the NPRM, NHTSA assumed a
phase-in cap of 17 percent for secondary
axle disconnect for each model year
covered by the rulemaking. No specific
comments were received regarding the
phase-in rate for this technology, but as
discussed above, manufacturers
generally argued for a non-linear phasein plan over the 5-year period covered
by the rulemaking. Based on general
comments received and NHTSA’s
analysis, the final rule includes a phasein rate for secondary axle disconnect of
17 percent in MY 2011.
In the NPRM, NHTSA assumed a
volume-based learning curve factor of
20 percent for secondary axle
disconnect. For the final rule, secondary
axle disconnect learning was
established as time-based due to
confidential manufacturer data
demonstrating that this is a mature
technology, such that additional
volumes will provide no additional
advantage for incorporation by
manufacturers.
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In the NPRM, NHTSA assumed that
secondary axle disconnect could be
applied to a vehicle either during
refresh or redesign model years. NHTSA
received no comments and found no
sources to disagree with this
assumption, and since testing to
validate the functional requirements
and vehicle attribute prove-out testing is
usually not planned for every model
year, NHTSA has retained this
assumption for the final rule.
(v) Aerodynamic Drag Reduction
(AERO)
Several factors affect a vehicle’s
aerodynamic drag and the resulting
power required to move it through the
air. While these values change with air
density and the square and cube of
vehicle speed, respectively, the overall
drag effect is determined by the product
of its frontal area and drag coefficient.
Reductions in these quantities can
therefore reduce fuel consumption.
While frontal areas tend to be relatively
similar within a vehicle class (mostly
due to market-competitive size
requirements), significant variations in
drag coefficient can be observed.
Significant fleet aerodynamic drag
reductions may require incorporation
into a manufacturer’s new model phasein schedules depending on the mix of
vehicle classes distributed across the
manufacturer’s lineup. However,
shorter-term aerodynamic reductions,
with less of a fuel economy
effectiveness, may be achieved through
the use of revised exterior components
(typically at a model refresh in midcycle) and add-on devices that are in
general circulation today. The latter list
would include revised front and rear
fascias, modified front air dams and rear
valances, addition of rear deck lips and
underbody panels, and more efficient
exterior mirrors.
Vehicle technology BOM information
was not adjusted by vehicle classes due
to the fact that Aero Drag Reductions are
already scaled based on percent overall
vehicle coefficient of drag CdA. Aero
Drag Reduction BOM could include (but
would not be limited to) the following
components or subsystems: Underbody
covers, front lower air dams, overall
front fascia changes, headlights, hood,
fenders, grill, windshield angle, A–
Pillar angle, door seal gaps, roof (which
would both be high impact and very
high cost), side view mirrors, door
handles (low impact), ride height, rear
deck lip, wheels, wheel covers, and
optimizing the cooling flow path.
In the NPRM, NHTSA estimated an
incremental aerodynamic drag
reduction of 20 percent for cars, and 10
percent for trucks. Confidential
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manufacturer comments received
indicated that the 20 percent reduction
for cars in the NPRM may have been
overly optimistic, as significant changes
in aero drag have already been applied
to those vehicle classes. However,
confidential manufacturer comments
agreed with the 10 percent aerodynamic
drag reduction for trucks, since there are
still significant opportunities to improve
aero drag in trucks designed for truckrelated utility. The Sierra Research
study submitted by the Alliance
concluded that a 10 percent incremental
aerodynamic drag reduction for midsize cars gives a 1.5 percent
improvement in vehicle fuel economy.
Thus, for purposes of the final rule,
NHTSA has estimated that a fleet
average of 10 percent total aerodynamic
drag reduction is attainable (with a
caveat for ‘‘high-performance’’ vehicles
described below), which equates to
incremental reductions in fuel
consumption of 2 percent and 3 percent
for cars and trucks, respectively. These
numbers are in agreement with
publicly-available technical
literature 216 and are supported by
confidential manufacturer information.
Performance car classes are excluded
from this technology improvement
because they have largely applied this
technology already.
As for costs, in the NPRM NHTSA
assumed an incremental cost of $0 to
$75 for aero drag reduction on both cars
and trucks. After reviewing the 2008
Martec Report, however, NHTSA
concluded that a lower-bound cost of $0
was not supportable. NHTSA replaced
the lower-bound cost with $40 (nonRPE) based on the assumptions that the
underbody cover and acoustic covers
described in the Martec report
approximates the cost for one large
underbody cover as might be required
for minimal aero drag reduction
actions.217 The upper limit was
determined by updating the NPRM
upper cost to 2007 dollars and applying
an RPE uplift thereby establishing the
incremental cost, independent of
vehicle class, to range from $60 to $116
(RPE) for the final rule
In the NPRM, NHTSA assumed a 17
percent phase-in rate for aero drag
216 Sue Elliott-Sink, ‘‘Improving Aerodynamics to
Boost Fuel Economy,’’ May 2, 2006. Available at
https://www.edmunds.com/advice/fueleconomy/
articles/106954/article.html (last accessed Oct. 5,
2008).
217 2008 Martec Report, at 25. NHTSA also
assumed that the cost of fuel pulsation dampening
technology noted in the Martec report grouped with
the underbody cover and acoustic covers does not
significantly impact the $40 cost as fuel pulsation
dampening technology is very low in cost relative
to the other actions. Therefore NHTSA did not
modify the $40 estimate.
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reduction for each model year covered
by the rulemaking. No specific
comments were received regarding the
phase-in rate for this technology, but as
discussed above, manufacturers
generally argued for a non-linear phasein plan over a 5-year period. Based on
comments received and NHTSA’s
analysis, the final rule includes a phasein rate for aero drag reduction of 17
percent for MY 2011. Neither volumebased cost reductions nor time-based
cost reductions are applied. In the
NPRM, NHTSA assumed that aero drag
reduction could be applied in either a
refresh or a redesign model year and
that assumption has been retained for
the final rule.
(f) Technologies Considered But Not
Included in the Final Rule Analysis
Although discussed and considered as
potentially viable in the NPRM, NHTSA
has determined that three technologies
will be unavailable in the time frame
considered. These technologies have
been identified as either pre-emerging or
not technologically feasible. Preemerging technologies are those that are
still in the research phase at this time,
and which are not expected to be under
development for production vehicles for
several years. In another case, the
technology depends on a fuel that is not
readily available. Thus, for the reasons
discussed below, these technologies
were not considered in NHTSA’s
analysis for the final rule. The
technologies are camless valve actuation
(CVA), lean burn gasoline direct
injection (LBDI), homogeneous charge
compression ignition (HCCI), and
electric assist turbocharging. Although
not applied in this rulemaking, NHTSA
will continue to monitor the industry
and system suppliers for progress on
these technologies, and should they
become available, consider them for use
in any future rulemaking activity.
(i) Camless Valve Actuation
Camless valve actuation relies on
electromechanical actuators instead of
camshafts to open and close the
cylinder valves. When
electromechanical actuators are used to
replace cams and coupled with sensors
and microprocessor controls, valve
timing and lift can be optimized over all
conditions. An engine valvetrain that
operates independently of any
mechanical means provides the ultimate
in flexibility for intake and exhaust
timing and lift optimization. With it
comes infinite valve overlap variability,
the rapid response required to change
between operating modes (such as HCCI
and GDI), intake valve throttling,
cylinder deactivation, and elimination
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of the camshafts (reduced friction). This
level of control can enable even further
incremental reductions in fuel
consumption.
As noted in the NPRM, this
technology has been under research for
many decades and although some
progress is being made, NHTSA has
found no evidence to support that the
technology can be successfully
implemented, costed, or have defined
fuel consumption effectiveness at this
time.
(ii) Lean-Burn Gasoline Direct Injection
Technology
One way to improve an engine’s
thermodynamic efficiency dramatically
is by operating at a lean air-fuel mixture
(excess air). Fuel system improvements,
changes in combustion chamber design
and repositioning of the injectors have
allowed for better air/fuel mixing and
combustion efficiency. There is
currently a shift from wall-guided
injection to spray guided injection,
which improves injection precision and
targeting towards the spark plug,
increasing lean combustion stability.
Combined with advances in NOX aftertreatment, lean-burn GDI engines may
eventually be a possibility in North
America.
However, as noted in the NPRM, a key
technical requirement for lean-burn GDI
engines to meet EPA’s Tier 2 NOX
emissions levels is the availability of
low-sulfur gasoline, which is projected
to be unavailable during the time frame
considered. Therefore the technology
was not applied in the final rule
(iii) Homogeneous Charge Compression
Ignition
Homogeneous charge compression
ignition (HCCI), also referred to as
controlled auto ignition (CAI), is an
alternate engine operating mode that
does not rely on a spark event to initiate
combustion. The principles are more
closely aligned with a diesel
combustion cycle, in which the
compressed charge exceeds a
temperature and pressure necessary for
spontaneous ignition. The resulting
burn is much shorter in duration with
higher thermal efficiency. Shorter
combustion times and higher EGR
tolerance permit very high compression
ratios (which also increase
thermodynamic efficiency), and
additionally, pumping losses are
reduced because the engine can run
unthrottled.
NHTSA noted in the NPRM that
several manufacturers had made public
statements about the viability of
incorporating HCCI into production
vehicles over the next 10 years. Upon
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further review of confidential product
plan information, and reviewing
comments received in response to the
NPRM, NHTSA has determined the
technology will not be available within
the time frame considered.
Consequently, the technology was not
applied in the final rule.
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(iv) Electric Assist Turbocharging
The Alliance commented that global
development of electric assist
turbocharging has not demonstrated the
fuel efficiency effectiveness of a 12V
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EAT up to 2kW power levels since the
2004 NESCCAF study, and stated that it
saw remote probability of its application
over the next decade.218 While hybrid
vehicles lower the incremental
hardware requirements for highervoltage, higher-power EAT systems,
NHTSA believes that significant
development work is required to
demonstrate effective systems and that
implementation in significant volumes
218 NHTSA–2008–0089–0169.1,
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will not occur in the time frame
considered. Thus, this technology was
not included on the decision trees.
E. Cost and Effectiveness Tables
The tables representing the Volpe
model input files for incremental
technology costs by vehicle subclass are
presented below. The tables have been
divided into passenger cars,
performance passenger cars, and light
trucks to make them easier to read.
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vehicle subclass are presented below.
The tables have been divided into
passenger cars, performance passenger
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cars, and light trucks to make them
easier to read.
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The tables representing the Volpe
model input files for incremental
technology effectiveness values by
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The tables representing the Volpe
model input files for approximate net
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(accumulated) technology costs by
vehicle subclass are presented below.
The tables have been divided into
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passenger cars, performance passenger
cars, and light trucks to make them
easier to read.
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values by vehicle subclass are presented
below. The tables have been divided
into passenger cars, performance
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passenger cars, and light trucks to make
them easier to read.
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The tables representing the Volpe
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(accumulated) technology effectiveness
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V. Economic Assumptions Used in
NHTSA’s Analysis
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A. Introduction: How NHTSA Uses the
Economic Assumptions in Its Analysis
NHTSA’s analysis of alternative CAFE
standards for model year 2011 passenger
cars and light trucks relies on a range of
market information, estimates of the
cost and effectiveness of technologies to
increase fuel economy, forecasts of
critical economic variables, and
estimates of the values of important
behavioral parameters. This section
describes the sources NHTSA has relied
upon to obtain this information, as well
as how the agency developed the
specific parameter values used in the
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analysis. Like the product plan
information it obtains from vehicle
manufacturers, these economic
variables, forecasts, and parameter
values play important roles in
determining the level of CAFE
standards, although some variables have
larger impacts on the final standards
than others.
As discussed above, the Volpe model
uses the estimates of the costs and
effectiveness of individual technologies
to simulate the improvements that
manufacturers could elect to make to
the fuel economy of their individual
vehicle models in order to comply with
higher CAFE standards at the lowest
cost, and to estimate each
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manufacturer’s total costs for meeting
new standards. To calculate the
reductions in fuel use over the lifetime
of each car and light truck model from
the resulting increases in fuel economy,
the model then combines those
increases with estimates of the fraction
of cars and light trucks that remain in
service at different ages, the number of
miles they are driven at each age, and
the size of the fuel economy rebound
effect. Forecasts of future fuel prices are
then applied to these fuel savings to
estimate their economic value during
each year the vehicles affected by the
higher CAFE standards are projected to
remain in service. The Volpe model also
uses estimates of the fractions of fuel
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savings that will reduce U.S. imports of
crude petroleum and refined fuel to
estimate the reduction in economic
externalities that result from U.S.
imports.
Using emission rates per mile driven
by different types of vehicles or per
gallon of fuel consumed, together with
estimates of emissions that occur within
the U.S. in the process of refining and
distributing fuel, the Volpe model
calculates changes in emissions of
regulated (or criteria) air pollutants and
carbon dioxide (CO2), the main
greenhouse gas emitted during fuel
production and vehicle use. These are
combined with estimates of the
economic damages to human health and
property caused by regulated air
pollutants, and by projected future
changes in the global climate resulting
from increases in CO2 emissions, to
estimate the benefits from the resulting
reductions in emissions. Finally, the
model calculates benefits to vehicle
owners from having to refuel less
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frequently based on the estimated
values of vehicle occupants’ time, the
decline in vehicle operating costs due to
lower fuel consumption, and the
increase in mobility afforded by added
rebound-effect driving.
As the following discussion makes
clear, the costs and effectiveness of fuel
economy technologies, forecasts of
future gasoline prices, and the discount
rate applied to future benefits have the
largest influence over the level of the
standards. In contrast, estimates of the
value of economic externalities
generated by U.S. petroleum imports,
the fuel economy rebound effect, the
gap between test and on-road fuel
economy, and the economic values of
reducing emissions of greenhouse gases
and regulated air pollutants each have
more modest effects on determining the
final CAFE standards. NHTSA has
analyzed the sensitivity of the final
standards and their resulting benefits to
plausible variation in the most
important of these inputs, both by
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14309
varying their values individually and
conducting a Monte Carlo-type analysis
of joint variation in their probably
values. NHTSA recognizes that there
may be other reasonable assumptions
that the agency could have made.
However, for purposes of the MY 2011
rulemaking, NHTSA continues to
believe that the assumptions made are
the most appropriate based on the
information available. The agency will,
however, review these assumptions in
future rulemakings, especially in light of
comments received and accounting for
changing circumstances, both
domestically and globally, and consider
whether other assumptions would be
more reasonable under the
circumstances at that time.
For the reader’s reference, Table V–1
below summarizes the values of many of
the variables NHTSA uses to estimate
the costs, fuel savings, and resulting
economic benefits from increases in car
and light truck CAFE standards.
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BILLING CODE 4910–59–C
B. What economic assumptions does
NHTSA use in its analysis?
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1. Determining Retail Price Equivalent
NHTSA explained in the NPRM that
the technology cost estimates used in
the agency’s analysis are intended to
represent manufacturers’ direct costs for
high-volume production of vehicles
with these technologies and sufficient
experience with their application so that
all cost reductions due to ‘‘learning
curve’’ effects were fully realized.
However, NHTSA recognized that
manufacturers may also incur additional
corporate overhead, marketing, or
219 Derived from NHTSA’s $33 per metric ton
estimate of the global value of reducing CO2
emissions.
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distribution and selling expenses as a
consequence of their efforts to improve
the fuel economy of individual vehicle
models and their overall product lines.
In order to account for these
additional costs, NHTSA applied an
indirect cost multiplier in the NPRM of
1.5 to the estimate of the vehicle
manufacturers’ direct costs for
producing or acquiring each fuel
economy-improving technology.
Historically, NHTSA used an almost
identical multiplier, 1.51, for the
markup from variable costs or direct
manufacturing costs to consumer costs.
The markup takes into account fixed
costs, burden, manufacturer’s profit, and
dealers’ profit. NHTSA’s methodology
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for determining this markup was peerreviewed in 2006.220
NHTSA stated in the NPRM that the
estimate of 1.5 was confirmed by
Argonne National Laboratory in a recent
review of vehicle manufacturers’
indirect costs. The Argonne study was
specifically intended to improve the
accuracy of future cost estimates for
production of vehicles that achieve high
fuel economy by employing many of the
same advanced technologies considered
in NHTSA’s analysis.221 Thus, NHTSA
stated in the NPRM that it believed that
220 See
Docket No. NHTSA–2007–27453, Item 4.
Anant, Dan Santini, and Roy Cuenca,
Comparison of Indirect Cost Multipliers for Vehicle
Manufacturing, Center for Transportation Research,
Argonne National Laboratory, April 2000. Available
at https://www.transportation.anl.gov/pdfs/TA/
57.pdf (last accessed August 14, 2008).
221 Vyas,
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applying a multiplier of 1.5 to direct
manufacturing costs to reflect
manufacturers’ increased indirect costs
for deploying advanced fuel economy
technologies is appropriate for use in
the analysis for this rulemaking. NHTSA
describes this multiplier in Section IV
above as the Retail Price Equivalent
factor, or RPE factor.
Some commenters argued that
NHTSA’s mark-up factor of 1.5 was too
high. NESCAUM commented that
NHTSA had relied on the 2004
NESCCAF study as one source for its
technology estimates, but appeared to
have incorrectly reported information
from that study with regard to the markup factor.222 NESCAUM stated that in
the report, entitled ‘‘Reducing
Greenhouse Gas Emissions from LightDuty Motor Vehicles,’’ NESCCAF only
used a 1.4 RPE, but ‘‘NHTSA applies a
1.5 retail price equivalent (RPE) factor to
the manufacturer costs presented in
Appendix C of the NESCCAF report,
and at other times uses a 1.4 RPE—and
presents both costs as NESCCAF costs.’’
NESCAUM argued that ‘‘The reporting
of costs using the 1.5 multiplier as
NESCCAF costs is incorrect and leads to
uncertainty as to how the costs were
developed.’’ 223 NESCAUM stated that
‘‘All reported costs and benefits,
attributed to NESCCAF by NHTSA,
[should] be reviewed carefully for errors
and amended accordingly.’’ CARB also
stated that there was ‘‘inconsistency
* * * in the treatment of NESCCAF
costs,’’ because NHTSA sometimes used
a 1.5 markup and sometimes 1.4, and
argued that ‘‘These errors in citing the
NESCCAF report raise doubts about
whether RPE costs from other sources
are cited accurately.’’
CARB further commented that
NHTSA had inconsistently added costs
for the engineering effort required to
add some technologies to vehicles,
when those costs should have been
covered by the RPE markup. CARB cited
NHTSA’s language in the NPRM that
‘‘manufacturers’ actual costs for
applying these technologies to specific
vehicle models are likely to include
222 NESCAUM stated that NESCCAF, or Northeast
States Center for a Clean Air Future, is an affiliate
organization of NESCAUM.
223 NESCAUM gave a specific example with
regard to the cost of a turbocharger, as follows:
NHTSA states the NESCCAF turbocharger cost is
$600. In this case, NHTSA applied a 1.5 RPE factor
to manufacturer costs presented in Appendix C of
the NESCCAF report to arrive at the $600 cost. This
is different from the cost that NESCCAF developed.
Conversely, on page 24369 of the Federal Register
notice, NHTSA accurately states the NESCCAF
cylinder deactivation costs ranged from $161 to
$210. This cost accurately reflects manufacturer
costs presented in Appendix C of the NESCCAF
report, multiplied by the 1.4 retail price equivalent
used by NESCCAF.
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additional outlays for accompanying
design or engineering changes to each
model, development and testing of
prototype versions, recalibrating engine
operating parameters, and integrating
the technology with other attributes of
the vehicle.’’ (Emphasis added) CARB
argued that adding additional costs for
engineering effort to any technology
amounted to double-counting. CARB
also commented that NHTSA’s
methodology for determining the
indirect cost markup was unsound,
because ‘‘the cost to incorporate a
technology is the same regardless of
vehicle production,’’ and because
‘‘manufacturers are moving toward
global vehicle architectures in an effort
to spread development costs across the
largest volume of vehicles possible, thus
reducing engineering costs.’’ CARB
argued that ‘‘The engineering cost
methodology cited in the NPRM
conflicts with this trend as well.’’
Other commenters argued that
NHTSA’s mark-up factor of 1.5 was too
low. The Alliance commented that the
RPE mark-up factor of 1.5 used by
NHTSA is ‘‘far too low,’’ and cited the
Sierra Research report and a study by
Wynn V. Bussman, submitted as an
attachment by the Alliance, as
concluding that ‘‘the best estimate for
RPE is more on the order of 2.0.’’ The
Alliance argued that NHTSA’s citation
of the Argonne study as support for an
RPE of 1.5 was incorrect and out of
context, stating that ‘‘As both Bussman
and Sierra noted, the Argonne National
Laboratory recommended use of 2.0 as
the RPE factor.’’ The Alliance stated that
the Argonne study had simply used a
1.5 RPE for outsourced components,
because ‘‘Manufacturers that outsource
components do not bear warranty and
other costs under typical contractual
arrangements.’’ The Alliance argued that
‘‘A 1.5 RPE * * * is simply
unrepresentative for components that
are developed in house by the original
equipment manufacturers (‘‘OEMs’’).’’
The Alliance further argued that ‘‘Use of
a 1.5 RPE for all purposes also glosses
over the fact that outsourced
components can nevertheless require
significant integration expenditures
from manufacturers putting together and
selling entire vehicles.’’ 224 Chrysler
concurred separately with the Alliance
that ‘‘NHTSA’s use of an RPE of 1.5
does not adequately account for the full
cost of implementing new
224 The Alliance cited the Sierra Research report
as stating that ‘‘* * * the 1.5 multiplier clearly
does not apply to changes in engines,
transmissions, or bodies in cases where the vehicle
manufacturer designs and produces its own
engines, transmissions, and bodies.’’ Sierra
Research report at 61.
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14311
technologies,’’ and stated that an RPE of
2.0 ‘‘is the appropriate factor to use for
new technologies.’’
The Alliance also commented that
Bussman had ‘‘considered the literature
on RPE factors extensively,’’ and
‘‘concluded that studies that advised
RPEs of approximately 1.5 were filled
with errors and that when these errors
were corrected, these studies also
supported the conclusion that the
proper RPE is 2.0.’’ The Alliance
concluded by arguing that the Sierra
Research report had found that ‘‘some
recent analyses of RPE are based on
unrepresentative and unsustainable
profit levels by manufacturers,’’ and that
‘‘If realistic long-term profit rates are
used, then the RPE increases from 2.0 to
a range of 2.09 to 2.15.’’
NADA did not expressly agree or
disagree with a mark-up factor of 1.5,
but commented that since the NPRM
states that the 1.5 multiplier includes
‘‘dealer profit’’ among other related
additional costs, NHTSA ‘‘should
review whether its estimates include all
dealer costs-of-sales when calculating
‘dealer profit’ and the extent to which
it has properly accounted for the finance
costs consumers typically pay when
purchasing new automobiles.’’
Agency response: NHTSA notes that
the analysis for this final rule relies on
entirely new cost estimates for fuel
economy technologies developed by the
agency in response to comments and in
coordination with an international
engineering consulting firm, Ricardo,
Inc., based on a bill of materials
approach as described in Section IV of
this notice and not based on the 2004
NESCCAF study, so the issue of
apparent inconsistency in the RPE factor
applied to those estimates noted by
NESCAUM and CARB is no longer
relevant. The agency also notes that
both the production and application of
fuel economy-improving technologies
include separate engineering cost
components. Developing these
technologies and readying them for
high-volume production entails
significant initial investments in
product design and engineering, while
as the NPRM pointed out, applying
individual technologies to specific
vehicle models can entail significant
additional costs for accompanying
engineering changes to its existing drive
train, development and testing of
prototype versions, recalibrating engine
operating parameters, and integrating
the technology with other attributes of
the vehicle. While design and
engineering costs for developing fuel
economy-improving technologies are
included in the production cost
estimates for individual technologies,
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additional engineering costs incurred by
manufacturers in applying them to
specific vehicle models are included in
NHTSA’s estimate of the RPE factor.
Finally, the agency notes that its
estimate of the RPE factor includes highvolume production and application of
fuel economy technologies, because it
assumes that initial design and
engineering costs to develop and begin
production of these technologies will be
recovered over large production
volumes. Thus, NHTSA believes that
CARB’s concerns about potential
double-counting of engineering costs for
developing and applying fuel economy
technologies reflect a failure to
recognize that engineering costs arise in
both their development and application.
The agency also believes that CARB’s
concern about whether NHTSA’s RPE
factor assumes the spreading of initial
design and engineering costs for
developing these technologies over
insufficiently high production volumes
is unfounded.
In response to the concerns expressed
by the Alliance and others that
NHTSA’s RPE factor is too low, the
agency notes that the RPE factor of 2.0
reported in the Argonne and Sierra
Research studies includes various
categories of production overhead costs
(for product development and
engineering, depreciation and
amortization of production facilities,
and warranty) that are included in
NHTSA’s estimates of production costs
for fuel economy technologies. When
applied to technology production costs
defined to include these components,
the agency’s RPE factor of 1.5 is thus
consistent with full recovery of these
cost components. This conclusion is
independent of whether overhead costs
for developing and producing fuel
economy technologies are initially
borne by equipment suppliers or by
vehicle manufacturers themselves.
Consequently, NHTSA has continued to
employ an RPE factor of 1.5 in its
analysis for this final rule.
2. Potential Opportunity Costs of
Improved Fuel Economy
In the NPRM, NHTSA discussed the
issue of whether achieving the fuel
economy improvements required by
alternative CAFE standards would
require manufacturers to compromise
the performance, carrying capacity,
safety, or comfort of some vehicle
models. If so, the resulting reduction in
the value of those models to potential
buyers would represent an additional
cost of achieving the improvements in
fuel economy required by stricter CAFE
standards. While exact dollar values of
these attributes to consumers are
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difficult to infer from vehicle purchase
prices, changing vehicle attributes can
affect the utility that vehicles provide to
their owners, and thus their value to
potential buyers. This is not to suggest
that buyers typically attach low values
to fuel economy; rather, it recognizes
that buyers value many different
attributes, so that requiring
manufacturers to make tradeoffs among
them may alter the overall value of
certain vehicle models to individual
buyers.
NHTSA has approached this potential
problem by developing tentative cost
estimates for fuel economy-improving
technologies that include any additional
production costs necessary to maintain
the product plan levels of performance,
comfort, capacity, and safety of the
models on which they are used. In
doing so, NHTSA primarily followed
the precedent established by the 2002
NAS Report, although the NPRM
updated its assumptions as necessary
for purposes of the current rulemaking.
The NAS Report estimated ‘‘constant
performance and utility’’ costs for fuel
economy technologies, and NHTSA
used those as the basis for its further
efforts to develop the initial technology
costs employed in analyzing
manufacturers’ costs for complying with
alternative CAFE standards.
NHTSA acknowledged the difficulty
of estimating technology costs that
include costs for the accompanying
changes in vehicle design that are
necessary to maintain performance,
capacity, and utility. However, as
NHTSA stated in the NPRM, the agency
believes that the tentative cost estimates
for fuel economy-improving
technologies should be generally
sufficient to prevent significant
reductions in consumer welfare
provided by vehicle models to which
manufacturers apply those technologies.
Nonetheless, the NPRM sought
comment on alternative ways to address
these issues.
NHTSA did not receive comments
that explicitly addressed NHTSA’s
question of whether there are better
ways for the agency to estimate
technology costs that capture changes in
vehicle design so that fuel economy can
be improved while maintaining
performance, capacity, and utility. Some
comments, however, expressed concern
that the proposed CAFE standards, and
more stringent CAFE standards
generally, would prevent manufacturers
from maintaining intended levels of
performance, comfort, capacity, and/or
safety of at least some of their vehicle
models.
For example, the American Farm
Bureau Federation commented that the
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proposed standards would result in
‘‘more expensive trucks that lack the
power needed to perform the tasks
required’’ of them by farmers, and that
‘‘trucks laden with expensive untested
technologies may prove undependable
and costly to repair.’’ AFBF stated that
farmers need trucks that can haul and
tow heavy loads and trailers, which
requires ‘‘heavy frames, strong engines,
and adequate horsepower and torque.’’
AFBF argued that the proposal would
cause manufacturers either to downsize
and reduce power in their vehicles, or
to sell fewer powerful trucks and
increase their cost, all of which would
create hardship for farmers who need
such trucks for their livelihoods.
NADA similarly suggested in its
comments that the proposed standards
could constrain the ability of light truck
manufacturers to meet ‘‘market needs’’
for towing and hauling capability, as
well as space and power. NADA also
stated that manufacturers of small highperformance (i.e., sports) cars might be
forced by the stringency of the proposed
standards to exit the market or reduce
product offerings.
BMW expressed concern that the
proposed footprint-based standards will
‘‘provide a disincentive to install safety
devices on vehicles,’’ since ‘‘In general,
safety devices add mass,’’ and
‘‘additional mass will lead to higher fuel
consumption.’’ Thus, BMW argued, all
manufacturers will think twice before
adding safety equipment to a vehicle, in
order not to hurt their chances of
meeting the CAFE standards. Along
those lines, BMW argued that its
vehicles were ‘‘high feature-density
vehicles,’’ which it defined as ‘‘those
that include extraordinary safety,
comfort, and convenience features like
electronic/advanced stability, braking,
suspension, steering, lighting, and
security controls.’’ BMW stated that
these vehicles ‘‘have a high mass per
footprint density,’’ and suggested that
the proposed footprint-based standards
provide manufacturers with a
disincentive to continue offering this
type of vehicle.
Agency response: The agency did not
include a reduction in performance as
one of the countermeasures that the
manufacturers could take to meet the
final rule for two main reasons. First,
the agency believes that manufacturers
could meet the standards adopted in
this final rule at the estimated
compliance costs without noticeably
affecting vehicle performance or utility.
As noted previously, NHTSA’s cost
estimates for individual fuel economyimproving technologies are intended to
include any additional production costs
necessary to maintain the performance,
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comfort, capacity, and safety of the
models on which they are used. The
agency has reviewed its cost estimates
for individual fuel economy
technologies in detail, and is confident
that they include sufficient allowances
to prevent significant reductions in
these critical attributes, and this in the
utility that vehicle models to which
manufacturers apply those technologies
will provide to potential buyers.
Second, NHTSA believes that the
commenters’ concerns about potential
opportunity costs for reduced vehicle
performance and utility are largely
unfounded. Manufacturers are
technically capable of producing
vehicles with reduced performance, as
evidenced by the fact that most
manufacturers offer otherwise-similar
vehicle models that feature a range of
engine sizes, and thus different levels of
power and performance. Although some
manufacturers offer versions of the same
vehicle model with a smaller engine in
Europe than is sold in the United States,
their decisions not to market these
vehicles domestically demonstrates that
they do not believe that they can
produce and sell such vehicles to U.S.
buyers in sufficient quantities to be
profitable at this time. This is
presumably because in order to sell
vehicles that do not meet U.S. buyers’
preferences for power and performance,
manufacturers would be required to
discount their prices sufficiently to
compensate for their lower levels of
these attributes.
While it may be true that a
manufacturer could produce lowerperformance versions of its vehicle
models at reduced costs compared to a
higher-performance version of that same
model, this does not make performance
reduction a zero or negative cost
compliance option. Manufacturers
apparently estimate that the reduction
in the values of lower-performing
versions to their potential buyers
exceeds their savings in manufacturing
costs to produce them, since otherwise
they would already produce and offer
lower-performance versions of their
existing models for sale. The net cost of
reducing performance, which is
measured by the difference between the
reduced value of lower-performance
models to buyers and manufacturers’
cost savings for producing them,
represents a cost of employing
performance reduction as a compliance
strategy.
Both manufacturers and NHTSA
experience difficulty in determining
how much value consumers place on
performance, as well as in determining
whether this value would remain stable
over time. While NHTSA recognizes
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that there may be specific situations
where performance reduction may be a
cost-effective compliance strategy for
certain manufacturers, the agency
believes that the net cost of reducing
performance must generally be
comparable to or higher than that of
technological approaches to fuel
economy improvement. Thus the
outcome of this rulemaking process is
not significantly affected by omission of
performance reduction as an explicit
compliance strategy.
In response to BMW’s comment that
footprint-based standards may
discourage manufacturers from offering
safety and other features that increase
vehicle weight, NHTSA notes that
increased vehicle weight due to safety
and other features will make it more
difficult for manufacturers to comply
with any CAFE standard—whether
attribute-based or uniform—and not just
with footprint-based standards. Further,
NHTSA believes that manufacturers will
continue to include features whose
value to potential buyers exceeds
manufacturers’ costs for supplying
them. Those costs will include any
outlays for additional fuel economy
technologies that are necessary to
compensate for the fuel economy
penalties imposed by features that add
weight, and thus enable manufacturers
to comply with higher CAFE standards.
NHTSA notes, however, that buyers
generally appear to value such features
highly, as evidenced by the prices of car
and light truck models on which they
are featured, as well as by prices that
manufacturers generally charge when
they offer such features as options. Any
increase in costs to achieve CAFE
compliance that BMW or other
manufacturers might experience as a
result of providing these features likely
should not, therefore, affect significantly
the extent to which they are included as
standard features or offered as optional
features and purchased by vehicle
buyers.
3. The On-Road Fuel Economy ‘Gap’
NHTSA explained in the NPRM that
actual fuel economy levels achieved by
passenger cars and light trucks in onroad driving fall somewhat short of their
levels measured under the laboratorylike test conditions that EPA uses to
establish its published fuel economy
ratings. In analyzing the fuel savings
from alternative CAFE standards for
previous light truck rulemakings,
NHTSA adjusted the actual fuel
economy performance of each light
truck model downward by 15 percent
from its rated value to reflect the
expected size of this on-road fuel
economy ‘‘gap.’’
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However, in December 2006, EPA
adopted changes to its regulations on
fuel economy labeling which were
intended to bring vehicles’ rated fuel
economy levels closer to their actual onroad fuel economy levels.225 In its Final
Rule, EPA estimated that actual on-road
fuel economy for light-duty vehicles
averages 20 percent lower than
published fuel economy levels. For
example, if the overall EPA fuel
economy rating of a light truck is 20
mpg, the on-road fuel economy actually
achieved by a typical driver of that
vehicle is expected to be 16 mpg (20
mpg x 0.8). In the NPRM, NHTSA
employed EPA’s revised estimate of this
on-road fuel economy gap in its analysis
of the fuel savings resulting from the
proposed and alternative CAFE
standards.
NHTSA received no explicit
comments regarding the on-road fuel
economy gap. CARB submitted a report
by Greene et al. that addressed in-use
fuel economy, but was completed prior
to EPA’s changes to its labeling
regulations, and CARB did not indicate
in its comments how this report was
relevant to the CAFE rulemaking.226 The
report by Sierra Research included by
the Alliance did not comment
specifically on NHTSA’s use of EPA’s
estimate of the on-road fuel economy
gap, but employed different ‘‘adjustment
factors’’ ‘‘to translate CAFE to customer
service fuel economy,’’ using a factor of
0.85 to ‘‘adjust[] the ‘composite’ CAFE
value to what consumers are expected to
achieve in customer service when the
‘city’ mpg is discounted by 10% and the
‘highway’ mpg is discounted by 22%.’’
Sierra Research also used a 0.82
adjustment factor for hybrid vehicles.
However, these estimates were
presented as part of Sierra’s analysis
with no explanation of how they were
derived, nor why they differed from
EPA’s estimate of 20 percent (which was
available at the time when Sierra
developed its report).227 Moreover,
neither Sierra nor the Alliance
suggested that NHTSA use these
numbers instead of EPA’s for analyzing
fuel savings.
Because no substantive comments
were received on this issue, and because
no new information on the magnitude of
the on-road fuel economy gap has come
to NHTSA’s attention since the NPRM
was published, NHTSA has continued
225 71
FR 77871 (Dec. 27, 2006).
L. Greene et al., ‘‘Analysis of In-Use
Fuel Economy Shortfall Based on Voluntarily
Reported MPG Estimates,’’ 2005. Available at
Docket No. NHTSA–2008–0089–0173.11.
227 Sierra Research report, at 96–97. Available at
Docket No. NHTSA–2008–0089–0179.1,
Attachment 2.
226 David
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of this final rule.
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4. Fuel Prices and the Value of Saving
Fuel
NHTSA explained in the NPRM that
projected future fuel prices are a critical
input into the economic analysis of
alternative CAFE standards, because
they determine the value of fuel savings
both to new vehicle buyers and to
society. NHTSA relied on the most
recent fuel price projections from the
U.S. Energy Information
Administration’s (EIA) Annual Energy
Outlook (AEO) in analyzing the
proposed standards. Specifically, the
agency used the AEO 2008 Early Release
forecasts of inflation-adjusted (constantdollar) retail gasoline and diesel fuel
prices, which NHTSA stated represent
the most up-to-date estimate of the most
likely course of future prices for
petroleum products.228 Federal
government agencies generally use EIA’s
projections in their assessments of
future energy-related policies.
The retail fuel price forecasts
presented in AEO 2008 span the period
from 2008 through 2030. Measured in
constant 2006 dollars, the Reference
Case forecast of retail gasoline prices
during calendar year 2020 in the Early
Release was $2.36 per gallon, rising
gradually to $2.51 by the year 2030
(these values include federal, state, and
local taxes). However, NHTSA
explained in the NPRM that valuing fuel
savings over the 36-year maximum
lifetime of light trucks assumed in this
analysis required fuel price forecasts
that extended through 2050, the last
year during which a significant number
of MY 2015 vehicles would remain in
service.229 To obtain fuel price forecasts
for the years 2031 through 2050,
NHTSA assumed that retail fuel prices
would remain constant (in 2006 dollars)
from 2031 through 2050.
NHTSA stated that the value to buyers
of passenger cars and light trucks of fuel
228 U.S. Department of Energy, Energy
Information Administration, Annual Energy
Outlook 2008, Early Release, Reference Case Table
12. Available at https://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/
pdf/aeotab_12.pdf (last accessed October 10, 2008).
EIA released the full AEO 2008 in June 2008, which
NHTSA stated in the NPRM it would use in the
final rule. EIA explained upon releasing the full
AEO 2008 that it had been updated from the Early
Release to reflect EIA’s expectations of the effect of
EISA, which was enacted after the Early Release
was made public. The full AEO 2008 is available
at https://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/pdf/
0383(2008).pdf (last accessed October 10, 2008).
229 The agency defines the maximum lifetime of
vehicles as the highest age at which more than 2
percent of those originally produced during a model
year remain in service. For recent model years, this
age has typically been 25 years for passenger cars
and 36 years for light trucks.
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savings resulting from improved fuel
economy is determined by the retail
price of fuel, which includes federal,
state, and any local taxes imposed on
fuel sales. Total taxes on gasoline
averaged $0.47 per gallon during 2006,
while those levied on diesel averaged
$0.53. These figures include federal
taxes plus the sales-weighted average of
state fuel taxes. Because fuel taxes
represent transfers of resources from
fuel buyers to government agencies,
however, rather than real resources that
are consumed in the process of
supplying or using fuel, NHTSA
explained that their value must be
deducted from retail fuel prices to
determine the value of fuel savings
resulting from more stringent CAFE
standards to the U.S. economy.
In estimating the economy-wide or
‘‘social’’ value of fuel savings due to
increasing CAFE levels, NHTSA
assumed that current fuel taxes would
remain constant in real or inflationadjusted terms over the lifetimes of the
vehicles being regulated. In effect, this
assumed that the average value per
gallon of taxes on gasoline and diesel
fuel levied by all levels of government
would rise at the rate of inflation over
that period. This value was deducted
from each future year’s forecast of retail
gasoline and diesel prices reported in
the AEO 2008 Early Release to
determine the social value of each
gallon of fuel saved during that year as
a result of improved fuel economy.
Subtracting fuel taxes resulted in a
projected value for saving gasoline of
$1.83 per gallon during 2020, rising to
$2.02 per gallon by the year 2030.
In conducting the preliminary
uncertainty analysis of benefits and
costs from alternative CAFE standards,
as required by OMB, NHTSA also
considered higher and lower forecasts of
future fuel prices. The results of the
sensitivity runs were made available in
the PRIA. EIA includes a ‘‘High Price
Case’’ and a ‘‘Low Price Case’’ in each
annual edition of its AEO, which reflect
uncertainties regarding future
conditions in the world petroleum
market and the U.S. fuel refining and
distribution system. However, EIA does
not attach specific probabilities to either
its Reference Case forecast or these
alternative cases; instead, the High Price
and Low Price cases are intended to
illustrate the range of uncertainty that
exists.230
230 In AEO 2008, EIA explains the High Price Case
as follows:
The high price case assumes that non-OPEC
conventional oil resources are less plentiful, and
the overall costs of extraction are higher, than
assumed in the reference case. The high price case
also assumes that OPEC will choose to allow a
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The AEO 2008 Early Release included
only a Reference Case forecast of fuel
prices and did not include the High and
Low Price Cases, so NHTSA estimated
high and low fuel prices corresponding
to the AEO 2008 Reference Case forecast
by assuming that high and low price
forecasts would bear the same
relationship to the Reference Case
forecast as the High and Low Price cases
in AEO 2007.231 These alternative
scenarios projected retail gasoline prices
that range from a low of $1.94 per gallon
to a high of $3.26 per gallon during
2020, and from $2.03 to $3.70 per gallon
during 2030. In conjunction with
NHTSA’s assumption that fuel taxes
would remain constant in real or
inflation-adjusted terms over this
period, these forecasts implied social
values of fuel savings ranging from
$1.47 to $2.79 per gallon during 2020,
and from $1.56 to $3.23 per gallon in
2030.
NHTSA explained that EIA is widely
recognized as an impartial and
authoritative source of analysis and
forecasts of U.S. energy production,
consumption, and prices. EIA has
published annual forecasts of energy
prices and consumption levels for the
U.S. economy since 1982 in its Annual
Energy Outlooks. These forecasts have
been widely relied upon by federal
agencies for use in regulatory analysis
and for other purposes. Since 1994,
EIA’s annual forecasts have been based
upon that agency’s National Energy
Modeling System (NEMS), which
includes detailed representation of
supply pathways, sources of demand,
and their interaction to determine prices
for different forms of energy.
From 1982 through 1993, EIA’s
forecasts of world oil prices—the
primary determinant of prices for
gasoline, diesel, and other
transportation fuels derived from
petroleum—consistently overestimated
actual prices during future years, often
very significantly. Of the total of 119
forecasts of future world oil prices for
decline in its market share to 38 percent of total
world liquids production.
EIA also explains the Low Price Case as follows:
The low price case assumes that non-OPEC
conventional oil resources are more plentiful, and
the overall costs of extraction are lower, than in the
reference case, and that OPEC will choose to
increase its market share to 45 percent.
AEO 2008, at 51. As the reader can see, there is
nothing probabilistic about either the Low or High
`
Price Case vis-a-vis the Reference Case.
231 EIA, Annual Energy Outlook 2007, High Price
Case, Table 12, available at
https://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/pdf/
aeohptab_12.pdf (last accessed October 10, 2008);
and Annual Energy Outlook 2007, Low Price Case,
Table 12, available at https://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/
aeo/pdf/aeolptab_12.pdf (last accessed October 10,
2008).
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the years 1985 through 2005 that EIA
reported in its 1982–1993 editions of the
AEO, 109 overestimated the subsequent
actual values for those years, on average
exceeding their corresponding actual
values by 75 percent.
Since that time, however, EIA’s
forecasts of future world oil prices show
a more mixed record for accuracy. The
1994–2005 editions of the AEO reported
91 separate forecasts of world oil prices
for the years 1995–2005, of which 33
subsequently proved too high, while the
remaining 58 underestimated actual
prices. The average absolute (i.e.,
regardless of its direction) error of these
forecasts has been 21 percent, but overand underestimates have tended to
offset one another, so that on average
EIA’s more recent forecasts have
underestimated actual world oil prices
by 7 percent. Although both its
overestimates and underestimates of
future world oil prices for recent years
have often been large, the most recent
editions of the AEO have significantly
underestimated petroleum prices during
those years for which actual prices are
now available.
However, NHTSA explained that it
did not regard EIA’s recent tendency to
underestimate future prices for
petroleum and refined products or the
high level of current fuel prices as
adequate justification to employ
forecasts that differed from the
Reference Case forecast presented in the
Revised Early Release. NHTSA stated
that this was particularly the case
because this forecast was revised
upward significantly since the initial
release of AEO 2008, which in turn
represented a major upward revision
from EIA’s fuel price forecast reported
in AEO 2007. NHTSA also noted that
retail gasoline prices across the U.S. had
averaged $2.94 per gallon (expressed in
2005 dollars) for the first three months
of 2008, slightly below EIA’s revised
forecast that gasoline prices will average
$2.98 per gallon (also in 2005 dollars)
throughout 2008.
NHTSA also considered that
comparing different forecasts of world
oil prices showed that the Reference
Case forecast in AEO 2007 was actually
the highest of all six publicly-available
forecasts of world oil prices over the
2010–2030 time period.232 NHTSA
stated that because world petroleum
prices are the primary determinant of
retail prices for refined petroleum
products such as transportation fuels,
this suggested that the Reference Case
forecast of U.S. fuel prices reported in
AEO 2007 was likely to be the highest
232 See https://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/archive/
aeo07/pdf/forecast.pdf, Table 19, at 106.
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of those projected by major forecasting
services. Further, as indicated above,
EIA’s most recent fuel price forecasts
had been revised significantly upward
from those projected in AEO 2007.
NHTSA received several thousand
comments regarding its fuel price
assumptions, mostly from individuals
stating that current pump prices were
much higher than EIA’s Reference Case
forecasts for future prices, and arguing
that NHTSA should use higher fuel
price assumptions for setting more
stringent standards in the final rule.
Summaries of the comments are
presented below, grouped according to
the following categories: (1) Fuel prices
have the largest effect on CAFE
stringency of any of NHTSA’s economic
assumptions; (2) EIA’s Reference Case is
too low compared to current gas prices;
(3) current gas prices reflect a
fundamental change in market
conditions that will affect future prices;
(4) why NHTSA is incorrect in its
representation of the Reference Case as
the ‘‘most likely course’’ of future oil
prices; (5) NHTSA’s sensitivity analysis
in the PRIA indicates that higher fuel
price assumptions will lead to more
stringent standards; (6) EIA’s tendency
to underestimate in its fuel price
forecasts; (7) EIA’s recent changes to its
Short-Term Energy Outlook; (8) recent
public statements on NHTSA’s fuel
price assumptions; (9) comments in
favor of or neutral with regard to
NHTSA’s use of the Reference Case for
its fuel price assumptions; (10) what
fuel price assumptions NHTSA should
use in setting the standards in the final
rule; and (11) whether NHTSA should
hold public hearings regarding its fuel
price assumptions.
(1) Fuel Prices Have the Largest Effect
on CAFE Stringency of any of NHTSA’s
Economic Assumptions
Several commenters addressed the
impact that fuel price assumptions have
on NHTSA’s analysis of the appropriate
stringency of CAFE standards. The
Members of Congress233 stated that fuel
prices have the largest effect of ‘‘all the
factors that could be considered on how
high standards could be raised,’’ and
233 Representative Markey authored this
comment, which was signed by himself and 44
other Members of Congress. In this section, when
the term ‘‘Members of Congress’’ is used, this is the
comment to which the agency refers. Besides the
comments received from several Representatives
and Senators regarding the fuel prices employed in
NHTSA’s analysis for the NPRM, Representative
Markey and Senator Cantwell additionally
submitted bills in the House and Senate to require
NHTSA to use fuel prices at least as high as EIA’s
High Price Case in setting CAFE standards.
Representative Markey introduced H.R. 6643 on
July 29, 2008, and Senator Cantwell introduced S.
3403 on July 31, 2008.
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that therefore ‘‘NHTSA’s reliance on
these highly unrealistic projections have
the effect of artificially lowering the
calculated ‘maximum feasible’ fuel
economy standards that NHTSA is
directed by law to promulgate.’’ CFA
commented that the underestimation of
fuel prices affected every part of
NHTSA’s analysis, while CBD stated
that ‘‘The use of an inappropriate
gasoline price projection greatly skews
the results,’’ and argued that ‘‘NHTSA
has failed to analyze a gas price that
even approaches today’s prices, even in
the sensitivity analysis.’’ EDF argued
that because ‘‘Underestimating future
gasoline prices would lead NHTSA to
undervalue the benefits to the U.S. and
consumers from stronger fuel economy
standards and set inefficiently low
standards,’’ NHTSA should ‘‘perform
extensive sensitivity analyses using
higher gas price assumptions, including
but not limited to the EIA ‘high price’
projections.’’
(2) EIA’s Reference Case Is Too Low
Compared to Current Gas Prices
Many commenters, including CBD,
EDF, NRDC, Sierra Club et al., UCS,
CFA, the Attorneys General, NACAA,
NESCAUM, the mayor of the City of Key
West, 45 Members of Congress, and
several thousand individual
commenters, stated that NHTSA’s fuel
price assumptions based on EIA’s
Reference Case were unreasonably low
given current gasoline prices. CBD, for
example, commented that NHTSA’s use
of the Reference Case fuel price
estimates was ‘‘impossible to justify’’
given current fuel prices and the fact
that ‘‘there is every indication that the
price of oil will continue to increase
over the short term.’’ UCS argued that
although NHTSA ‘‘point[ed] to recent
increased fuel prices in AEO 2008 to
justify use of AEO Reference Case data,’’
the Reference Case projection ‘‘still falls
well below current gasoline prices.’’ The
Attorneys General commented that
EIA’s Reference Case forecast indicated
future fuel prices much lower than
current pump prices, and argued that
‘‘Unless NHTSA can provide publiclyavailable, mainstream documentation
supporting an almost fifty percent drop
from current prices, it must
substantially re-calibrate those
estimates.’’ CFA and the Attorneys
General further argued that even EIA’s
High Price Case was too low given
current gasoline prices.
UCS also submitted nearly 7,000 form
letters from individual citizens, which
generally stated that gas prices in their
home areas are currently significantly
higher than NHTSA’s fuel price
assumptions for the proposed standards.
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The individual citizens commented that
NHTSA should ‘‘correct’’ its fuel price
assumptions for the final rule, so as not
to ‘‘allow automakers to shave three to
four miles per gallon off of their CAFE
requirements,’’ and so as to achieve ‘‘a
fleet average of approximately 40 miles
per gallon by 2020,’’ which the letters
stated ‘‘is both feasible and cost
effective using technology already
available.’’ Sierra Club submitted over
3,000 form letters from individual
citizens commenting similarly that
NHTSA must use ‘‘realistic’’ fuel prices
for setting the standards in the final
rule, given pump prices at that time of
approximately $4 per gallon.
(3) Current Gas Prices Reflect a
Fundamental Change in Market
Conditions That Will Affect Future
Prices
A number of commenters argued that
changed oil market conditions both
make EIA’s Reference Case out-of-date
and will continue to impact future fuel
prices. Public Citizen stated that ‘‘Gas
prices have been rising steadily since
2004,’’ but that ‘‘the price increases in
the last six to 12 months have been
especially dramatic, rising by over a
third in the past six months, and by
nearly 170 percent in five years.’’
NESCAUM commented that current fuel
prices are due principally to ‘‘high
global demand in a supply constricted
market.’’ NESCAUM further argued that
‘‘There is little expectation that the gap
between supply and demand will be
narrowed in the foreseeable future,’’ so
‘‘the price of gasoline should remain
* * * well above the mid-$2.00 range.’’
CFA argued that ‘‘geopolitical factors’’
are responsible for gasoline prices
setting ‘‘record after record,’’ and stated
that the proposed standards ‘‘do not
reflect the fundamental reality of this
crisis’’ because NHTSA’s ‘‘analysis [is
not based] on a value of gasoline savings
that is consistent with the real world.’’
ACEEE argued that the ‘‘adherence [to
the Reference Case forecast] is not
justified, given recent changes in the oil
market.’’ However, ACEEE also argued
that the High Price Case does not
‘‘necessarily capture fully current
understanding of how high fuel prices
are likely to be in the coming decades.’’
CARB stated that NHTSA’s use of
EIA’s Reference Case ‘‘border[s] on the
absurd given recent fuel price hikes,
[and] recent assessments that the price
hikes are structural.’’ CARB cited and
attached to its comments an ‘‘Economic
Letter’’ by the Federal Reserve Bank of
Dallas from May 2008, which stated that
factors such as changes in global oil
supply and demand, the weakening of
the dollar, and the fact that much global
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oil production takes place in
‘‘politically unstable regions * * *
suggest the days of relatively cheap oil
are over and the global economy faces
a future of high energy prices.’’
NRDC stated that other analysts such
as Goldman Sachs and Citigroup predict
higher gasoline prices at least through
2011, due to lack of ‘‘spare capacity’’ in
either OPEC or non-OPEC supply.
NRDC also cited EIA’s June 25, 2008
International Energy Outlook (IEO),
which has a similar reference case to
AEO 2008, and which NRDC quoted as
stating that given ‘‘current market
conditions, it appears that world oil
prices are on a path that more closely
resembles the projection in the high
price case than in the reference
case.’’ 234
(4) Why NHTSA Is Incorrect in Its
Representation of the Reference Case as
the ‘‘Most Likely Course’’ of Future Oil
Prices
UCS stated that NHTSA was incorrect
to assume that EIA’s Reference Case
‘‘represent[s] the EIA’s most up-to-date
estimate of the most likely course of
future prices for petroleum products,’’
arguing that EIA itself does not refer to
the Reference Case projection as the
‘‘most likely course,’’ but states that the
Reference Case merely ‘‘assumes that
current policies affecting the energy
sector remain unchanged throughout the
projection period.’’
(5) NHTSA’s Sensitivity Analysis in the
PRIA Indicates That Higher Fuel Price
Assumptions Will Lead to More
Stringent Standards
A number of commenters, including
NACAA, Public Citizen, UCS, Sierra
Club et al. and ACEEE, cited NHTSA’s
sensitivity analysis using the EIA High
Price case as evidence that, as the
Members of Congress stated,
‘‘demonstrates that the technology is
available to cost-effectively achieve a
much higher fleet wide fuel economy of
nearly 35 mpg in 2015.’’ CFA also stated
that the High Price Case, which NHTSA
ran as a sensitivity analysis using
approximately $3.40 per gallon in 2008
dollars for 2015, was a ‘‘more realistic
fuel price scenario, one that is not
terribly high.’’
(6) EIA’s Tendency to Underestimate in
Its Fuel Price Forecasts
Several commenters, including UCS,
CFA, NRDC, CARB, and the Attorneys
General argued that EIA estimates were
unreliable because EIA had
234 Energy Information Administration (2008)
International Energy Outlook 2008: Complete
Highlights. June 25.
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underestimated in recent years. CARB
cited NHTSA’s statement on page 24406
of the NPRM (73 FR 24406, May 2,
2008) noting ‘‘EIA’s own recent
tendency to underestimate,’’ as CARB
put it, as indication that NHTSA’s use
of EIA’s Reference Case ‘‘border[s] on
the absurd.’’ CFA argued that ‘‘EIA’s
projections of gasoline prices have been
consistently low and NHTSA was not
obligated to use those projections.’’
NRDC analyzed EIA’s forecasting
accuracy in greater detail, concluding
that ‘‘The past five versions of the AEO
have all underestimated actual gasoline
prices,’’ in both the Reference and High
Case scenarios, and providing a table
comparing EIA Reference and High Case
projections from one year prior to the
actual average recorded price in 2003–
2008, which showed actual prices as
consistently higher than EIA
projections.
(7) EIA’s Recent Changes to Its ShortTerm Energy Outlook
Several commenters stated that recent
EIA upward revisions to its Short-Term
Energy Outlook fuel price forecasts
indicate that the longer-term Reference
Case forecasts are also in need of
upward revision. CARB, for example,
argued that recent EIA upward revisions
to its short-term fuel price forecasts
provide further evidence that ‘‘the
assumptions underlying the EIA longterm gasoline projections have
significantly changed since EIA last
made those long-term projections.’’ CFA
similarly argued that EIA needed to
adjust its long-term projections upward
given recent increases in short-term
projections, and stated that
extrapolating EIA’s short-term
projections linearly results in a gasoline
price in 2015 of $5.50 per gallon in 2008
dollars, which might not itself be
reliable for purposes of setting CAFE
standards, but is high enough to
indicate that ‘‘EIA’s high price scenario
seems much more appropriate as the
basis for NHTSA’s economic analysis.’’
NRDC and the Attorneys General made
similar arguments. The Attorneys
General suggested that consequently,
NHTSA should attempt to ‘‘obtain from
EIA a truly current projection for
gasoline prices over the relevant period’’
for use in the final rule.
(8) Recent Public Statements on
NHTSA’s Fuel Price Assumptions
Several commenters, including the
Members of Congress, Public Citizen,
UCS, NRDC, Sierra Club et al., and the
Attorneys General cited testimony by
EIA Administrator Guy Caruso on June
11, 2008, before the House Select
Committee on Energy Independence and
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Global Warming, as evidence that, as the
Attorneys General argued, ‘‘Even EIA
agrees that NHTSA should have not
used its reference case for the analysis
in this rulemaking, but instead should
have used EIA’s high price case.’’
Administrator Caruso testified, in
response to a question regarding
whether NHTSA should use EIA’s High
Price Case scenario to set CAFE
standards, that ‘‘We’re on the higher
price path right now. If you were to ask
me today what I would use, I would use
the higher price.’’ 235
The Members of Congress and Sierra
Club et al., also cited then-DOT
Secretary Peters’ May 17, 2008
statement that ‘‘As we look toward the
finalization of the rule and look again
what the average fuel costs are then, I
think we’re going to make more progress
on the miles per gallon at a lower
overall cost.’’ 236 The commenters
argued that this statement indicated an
expectation that fuel prices used in the
final rule would be higher than those
used in the NPRM.
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(9) Comments in Favor of or Neutral
With Regard to NHTSA’s Use of the
Reference Case for Its Fuel Price
Assumptions
NADA was the only commenter
arguing directly in favor of NHTSA
continuing ‘‘to rely on the most recent
reference case fuel price projections of
the U.S. Energy Information
Administration’s (EIA).’’ NADA
recognized that EIA has over- and
under-estimated fuel prices in the past,
but argued that ‘‘Despite the inherent
volatility or uncertainty of fuel prices,
EIA and NHTSA would be remiss if they
were to arbitrarily abandon the best
models and data available or to use
‘high’ or ‘low’ price case projections that
are inherently not probabilistic.’’ NADA
further commented that ‘‘the use of a
high price case to justify unduly costly
CAFE standards could lead to decreased
new motor vehicle sales and a
commensurate lower than projected rate
of fuel energy savings and greenhouse
gas reduction benefits.’’
The Alliance did not argue that
NHTSA should use any particular fuel
price in its economic assumptions, but
commented that NHTSA should not
conclude that ‘‘recent increases in
gasoline prices nationwide’’ would
justify more stringent CAFE standards.
235 UCS stated that this quote was taken from
‘‘Global Warming Hearing on the Future of Oil,’’
June 11, 2008, which it stated was available online
at https://speaker.house.gov/blog.
236 Sierra Club cited David Shepardson, ‘‘Gas
prices may spur revision of mpg plan,’’ Detroit
News Washington, Saturday, May 17, 2008, for this
quote from Secretary Peters.
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The Alliance cited the Sierra Research
and NERA reports, which it said
performed sensitivity analyses using all
of EIA’s price scenarios (Low,
Reference, and High), and ‘‘did not find
that use of the ‘high’ case significantly
altered its conclusions about the
feasibility of imposing much higher
costs on manufacturers.’’ Given that
Sierra and NERA both concluded that
the proposed standards were already too
stringent, this result is hardly
surprising.
(10) What Fuel Price Assumptions
NHTSA Should Use in Setting the
Standards in the Final Rule
Many commenters, including UCS,
CARB, ACEEE, Sierra Club et al., the
Attorneys General, and the Members of
Congress stated that NHTSA should set
standards in the final rule using fuel
price assumptions equivalent to at least
EIA’s High Price Case. Wisconsin DNR
suggested that NHTSA use the ‘‘high
price fuel scenario’’ in EIA’s
International Energy Outlook (2008) for
a ‘‘suitable higher estimate from a
recognized federal agency.’’ 237
Several commenters calling for ‘‘at
least’’ the High Price Case also
suggested other preferred alternatives.
CARB suggested that NHTSA delay the
final rule until ‘‘recent volatility has
stabilized and EIA can provide its final
2008 estimates in February 2009.’’ The
Attorneys General suggested NHTSA
obtain ‘‘relevant, up-to-date data
directly’’ from EIA ‘‘specifically for the
docket in this rulemaking,’’ or ‘‘wait for
EIA’s public, final 2008 estimates,
which are scheduled to be released in
December.’’ ACEEE commented that
NHTSA should ‘‘Work with EIA to
produce an up-to-date fuel price
projection for purposes of the final rule.
* * *’’ Sierra Club et al., stated that
NHTSA should also ‘‘examine other fuel
price estimates, such as the oil futures
market price predictions which project
prices for a barrel of oil through 2016.’’
Other commenters suggested that
NHTSA develop estimates based on
current pump-price equivalents for its
fuel price assumptions. Public Citizen
237 Wisconsin DNR cited the source of the ‘‘high
price fuel scenario’’ as ‘‘DOE–EIA Report #0484
(2008),’’ which is EIA’s International Energy
Outlook (IEO) for 2008. NHTSA assumes that the
commenter intended to cite this source, and not
AEO 2008. However, EIA describes the forecasts of
world oil prices—a primary determinant of U.S.
fuel prices—reported in IEO 2008 as ‘‘* * *
consistent with those in the Annual Energy Outlook
2008,’’ and cites AEO2008 as the source for those
oil price projections. See U.S. Energy Information
Administration, International Energy Outlook 2008,
Chapter 2, ‘‘Liquid Fuels,’’ Figure 30 and
accompanying text. Available at https://
www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/liquid_fuels.html (last
accessed October 4, 2008).
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commented that NHTSA should ‘‘base
its final rulemaking on a more realistic
estimate of future fuel price based on
the high estimate and an at-the-pump
price that pushes the standard in the
direction of real-world gas prices.’’
NESCAUM urged NHTSA ‘‘to reevaluate
the effect of a wider range of gasoline
prices to the $4.00 per gallon level and
above,’’ stating that it would raise
standards. EDF stated that NHTSA must
set standards that ‘‘reflect real world gas
prices.’’ CBD stated that ‘‘Today’s gas
price must form the starting point for
the analysis, and calculations must be
performed that consider the
overwhelmingly likely scenario that gas
prices will be significantly higher than
the projections used in the NPRM.’’
NRDC stated that because both the
Reference and High Case scenarios are
too low, ‘‘NHTSA should develop a
plausible and realistic projection of
future oil prices for use in determining
maximum feasible fuel economy
levels.’’
(11) Whether NHTSA Should Hold
Public Hearings Regarding Its Fuel Price
Assumptions
Several commenters called for
NHTSA to hold hearings regarding the
appropriate stringency of CAFE
standards, specifically in light of fuel
prices. CFA, in requesting hearings,
commented that EIA’s Reference Case
resulted in fuel prices that are too low,
and ‘‘have consistently been used [in
recent CAFE rulemakings] to undercut
the use of existing technology to meet
the statutory goals. CFA stated that ‘‘The
use of more realistic fuel prices make
more technology cost-justified and will
result in higher standards.’’
Environment America, National
Wildlife Federation, NRDC, Pew
Environment Group, Sierra Club, and
UCS also submitted a joint comment
requesting public hearings and citing
NHTSA’s fuel price assumptions. Like
CFA, the commenters stated that using
the EIA Reference Case ‘‘vastly
undercuts the potential for higher fuel
economy’’ and that ‘‘If NHTSA used
more realistic gas prices, we could be on
a path to achieving higher fuel economy
that is both technologically achievable
and cost effective.’’
Agency response: NHTSA has
carefully considered available evidence,
recent trends in petroleum and fuel
prices, and the comments it received on
the NPRM analysis. After doing so,
NHTSA has decided to use EIA’s High
Price Case forecast in its final rule
analysis and to determine the MY 2011
CAFE standards. As NHTSA recognized
in the NPRM, commenters are correct
that projected future fuel prices have the
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largest effect of all the economic
assumptions that NHTSA employs in
determining benefits both to new
vehicle buyers and to society, and thus
on CAFE stringency. This is why it is
vital that NHTSA base its fuel price
assumptions on what it believes to be
the most accurate forecast available that
covers the expected lifetimes of MY
2011 passenger cars and light trucks,
which can extend up to 25–35 years
from the date they are produced. The
long time horizon of NHTSA’s analysis
also makes it critical that the agency not
rely excessively on current price levels
as an indicator of the prices that are
likely to prevail over an extended future
period. Instead, NHTSA relies largely on
EIA’s professional expertise and
extensive experience in developing
forecasts of future trends in energy
prices, as do most other federal
agencies.
In addition, NHTSA notes that several
manufacturers employed fuel prices
consistent with or exceeding the AEO
2008 High Price Case for the time period
covered by the rulemaking in their
revised product plan estimates of fuel
economy and sales for individual
models. If the agency employs fuel price
forecasts that differ from those used by
manufacturers, it may incorrectly
attribute the fuel savings resulting from
increased market demand for fuel
economy to higher CAFE standards, or
conversely, underestimate the fuel
savings resulting from increased
standards by attributing too much of the
increase in fuel economy to higher
market demand. Given manufacturers’
assumptions about fuel prices, the
agency’s estimates of fuel savings and
economic benefits resulting from the
standards adopted in this final rule are
conservative, because they are likely to
underestimate fuel savings attributable
to the increase in fuel economy above
its market-determined level that CAFE
standards will require.
Although some commenters suggested
that NHTSA develop its own fuel price
forecasts based on then-current pump
prices, NHTSA does not believe that it
has the independent capability to
provide a more reliable prediction of
future fuel prices, or that it would have
the credibility of EIA’s forecasts. If
NHTSA had assumed that that fuel
prices would remain at their mid-2008
peak levels throughout the lifetimes of
MY 2011 cars and light trucks, the
agency would have overvalued the
benefits attributed to fuel savings, and
thus likely have established excessively
stringent MY 2011 standards. While
petroleum prices were rising at the time
the NPRM was published, eventually
reaching nearly $140 per barrel, since
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then global average prices for crude oil
have declined to levels as low as $35
per barrel.238 The recent extreme
volatility in petroleum and fuel prices
illustrates the danger in relying on
current prices as an indicator of their
likely future levels, and gives NHTSA
greater confidence in relying on EIA’s
forecasts of future movements in fuel
prices in response to changes in demand
and supply conditions in the
marketplace.
While NHTSA also agrees with the
commenters that the sensitivity analysis
demonstrates that higher CAFE
standards could be established if higher
fuel price assumptions were employed,
the agency cannot simply choose to
employ higher fuel price assumptions
because it wishes to raise CAFE levels.
Doing so would be inconsistent with the
agency’s approach of using what it
concludes is the most reliable estimate
of the benefits from conserving fuel
when establishing fuel economy
standards. NHTSA recognizes that
predicting future oil prices is difficult,
particularly during periods when world
economic conditions are as volatile as
they are today. Nevertheless, NHTSA
continues to believe that EIA’s fuel price
forecasts as reported in its AEO
represent the most reliable estimates of
future fuel prices, and thus of the
benefits from reducing fuel
consumption through higher CAFE
standards. While NHTSA recognizes
that other forecasts exist, the agency
believes the EIA forecasts are preferable
for its purposes, since they are the
product of an impartial government
agency with considerable and longstanding expertise in this field. Any
simple extrapolation of current or recent
retail fuel prices, which commenters
recognize have shown extreme volatility
in recent months, is likely to provide a
considerably less reliable forecast of
future prices than the current AEO.
Each time EIA issues a new AEO, it
considers recent and likely future
developments in the world oil market,
the effect of the current geopolitical
situation on oil supply and prices, and
conditions in the domestic fuel supply
industry that affect pump prices.239
238 Energy Information Administration, World
Crude Oil Prices, data for week ended 1/2/2009,
available at https://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/
pet_pri_wco_k_w.htm (last accessed February 12,
2009).
239 AEO 2008 states as follows with regard to
factors which EIA accounts for in developing the
Reference Case:
As noted in AEO2007, energy markets are
changing in response to readily observable factors,
which include, among others: Higher energy prices;
the growing influence of developing countries on
worldwide energy requirements; recently enacted
legislation and regulations in the United States;
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For example, the Overview section to
AEO 2008 states that because EISA was
passed between the Early Release and
the time of publication for AEO 2008,
EIA updated the Reference Case to
reflect the impact it expected EISA to
have on fuel prices. EIA also updated its
projections for the AEO 2008 Reference
Case ‘‘to better reflect trends that are
expected to persist in the economy and
in energy markets,’’ including a lower
projection for U.S. economic growth (a
key determinant of U.S. energy
demand), higher price projections for
crude oil and refined petroleum
products, slower projected growth in
energy demand, higher forecasts of
domestic oil production (particularly in
the near term), and slower projected
growth in U.S. oil imports.240 Thus
NHTSA is confident that EIA is aware
of and has accounted reasonably for
current political and economic
conditions that are likely to affect future
trends in fuel supply, demand, and
retail prices.
Although a majority of commenters
asserted that EIA’s Reference Case
forecast is likely to underestimate future
fuel prices significantly, and that
NHTSA’s reliance on the Reference Case
resulted in insufficiently stringent
proposed CAFE standards, they did so
in an environment when retail fuel
prices were at or above $4.00 per gallon.
Many commenters stated that at a
minimum, NHTSA should use EIA’s
High Price Case as the source for its fuel
price forecasts, primarily because those
appeared to be more consistent with
then-current fuel prices. As one
illustration, NRDC cited EIA’s own
International Energy Outlook 2008,
published the same month as the AEO
2008, which stated that given ‘‘* * *
current market conditions, it appears
that world oil prices are on a path that
more closely resembles the projection in
the high price case than in the reference
case.’’ 241 Commenters also cited EIA
Administrator Caruso’s June 2008
statement that ‘‘We’re on the higher
price path right now. If you were to ask
me today what I would use, I would use
the higher price.’’ NHTSA also notes
that several manufacturers in their
confidential product plan submissions
indicated that they had based their
product plans on gas price estimates
changing public perceptions on issues related to
emissions of air pollutants and greenhouse gases
and the use of alternative fuels; and the economic
viability of various energy technologies.
240 AEO 2008 Overview, at https://
www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/overview.html (last
accessed October 10, 2008).
241 Energy Information Administration (2008)
International Energy Outlook 2008: Complete
Highlights. June 25.
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that were either between EIA’s
Reference and High Price Cases, or
above even the High Price Case.
The AEO High Price Case is best
understood in the context of its
relationship to the Reference Case. EIA
described the Reference Case as follows
in AEO 2008:
The reference case represents EIA’s current
judgment regarding exploration and
development costs and accessibility of oil
resources in non-OPEC countries. It also
assumes that OPEC producers will choose to
maintain their share of the market and will
schedule investments in incremental
production capacity so that OPEC’s
conventional oil production will represent
about 40 percent of the world’s total liquids
production.242
In contrast, EIA describes its Low Price
case in the following terms:
The low price case assumes that OPEC
countries will increase their conventional oil
production to obtain approximately a 44percent share of total world liquids
production, and that conventional oil
resources in non-OPEC countries will be
more accessible and/or less costly to produce
(as a result of technology advances, more
attractive fiscal regimes, or both) than in the
reference case. With these assumptions, nonOPEC conventional oil production is higher
in the low price case than in the reference
case.243
Finally, EIA describes its High Price
case as follows:
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The high price case assumes that OPEC
countries will continue to hold their
production at approximately the current rate,
sacrificing market share as global liquids
production increases. It also assumes that oil
resources in non-OPEC countries will be less
accessible and/or more costly to produce
than assumed in the reference case.244
As these descriptions emphasize,
EIA’s Low and High Price Cases are
based on specific assumptions about the
possible behavior of oil-producing
countries and future developments
affecting global demand for petroleum
energy, and how these might differ from
the behavior assumed in constructing its
Reference Case. However, this
distinction does not necessarily imply
that EIA expects either its Low Price or
High Price Case forecast to be more
accurate than its Reference Case
forecast, since EIA offers no assessment
of which set of assumptions underlying
its Low Price, Reference, and High Price
cases it believes is most reliable.
EIA did recognize that world oil
prices at the time the final version of
AEO 2008 were above even those
242 AEO 2008, at 199. Available at https://
www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/pdf/0383(2008).pdf (last
accessed October 10, 2008).
243 Id.
244 Id.
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forecast in its High Price Case. However,
it attributed this situation to short-term
developments, most or all of which
were likely to prove transitory, as
evidenced by its statement in the
Overview to AEO 2008:
As a result of recent strong economic
growth worldwide, transitory shortages of
experienced personnel, equipment, and
construction materials in the oil industry,
and political instability in some major
producing regions, oil prices currently are
above EIA’s estimate of the long-run
equilibrium price.245
This observation is consistent with
EIA’s statement in IEO 2008 that current
market conditions appeared to place
world oil prices on a path closer to the
High Price Case than the Reference
Case. While EIA clearly expects prices
to remain high in the near term, this
does not necessarily imply that it
expects its High Price Case forecast to be
more reliable over the extended time
horizon spanned by AEO 2008.
NHTSA has seriously considered the
comments it received on the fuel price
forecasts used in the NPRM analysis,
and paid close attention to recent
developments in the world oil market
and in U.S. retail fuel prices. The
agency has also reviewed forecasts of
world oil prices and U.S. fuel prices
available from sources other than EIA,
as well as the views expressed by
petroleum market experts, professional
publications, and press reports.246 The
agency notes that although both the
views of experts and projections of
petroleum prices differ widely, the
emerging consensus appears to be that
world petroleum and U.S. retail fuel
prices are likely to remain at levels that
are more consistent with those forecast
in the AEO 2008 High Price Case than
245 Id.,
at 5.
include EIA, Short-Term Energy
Outlook, various issues, available at https://
www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/steo/pub/contents.html (last
accessed November 13, 2008); International Energy
Agency, World Energy Outlook 2008, summary
available at https://www.iea.org/Textbase/npsum/
WEO2008SUM.pdf (last accessed November 13,
2008); AJM Petroleum Consultants, The AJM Price
Forecast, available at https://
www.ajmpetroleumconsultants.com/
index.php?page=price-forecast (last accessed
Novemebr 13, 2008); PetroStrategies, Inc, Survey of
Oil Price Forecasts, available at https://
www.petrostrategies.org/Graphs/
Oil_Price_Forecasts.htm (last accessed November
13, 2008); International Monetary Fund, World
Economic Outlook, October 2008, Chapter 3: Is
Inflation Back? Commodity Prices and Inflation,
available at https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/
weo/2008/02/pdf/c3.pdf (last accessed November
13, 2008); and Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
Economic Letter, Volume 3, No. 5, May 2008,
available at https://www.dallasfed.org/research/
eclett/2008/el0805.html (last accessed November
13, 2008).
246 These
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14319
with the Reference Case forecasts over
the foreseeable future.247
Over the period from 2011, when the
standards adopted in this final rule
would take effect, and 2030, the outer
time horizon of the AEO 2008 forecasts,
retail gasoline prices in the AEO 2008
High Price case are projected to rise
steadily from $2.95 to $3.62 per gallon,
averaging $3.28 per gallon (all prices
expressed in 2007 dollars). For the years
2031 and beyond, the agency’s analysis
assumes that retail fuel prices will
remain at their forecast values for the
year 2030, or $3.62 per gallon. These
prices are significantly higher than the
AEO 2008 Revised Early Release
Reference Case forecast used in the
agency’s NPRM analysis, which
averaged $2.34 per gallon (in 2006
dollars) over that same period.248 After
deducting state and federal fuel taxes,
this revised forecast results in an
average value of $3.08 per gallon of fuel
saved over the lifetimes of 2011
passenger cars and light trucks. Because
of the uncertainty surrounding future
gasoline prices, the agency also
conducted sensitivity analyses using
EIA’s Reference and Low Price case
forecasts of retail fuel prices.
NHTSA is aware that EIA recently
released a preliminary version of its
Annual Energy Outlook 2009, which
appears to confirm then-EIA
Administrator Caruso’s testimony before
the House Select Committee in June
2008 that the future path of gasoline
prices likely more closely resembles the
AEO 2008 High Price Case than the
2008 Reference Case. However, the
agency has elected not to use this
247 In the AEO High Price Case, prices for
imported petroleum are projected to average about
$75 per barrel over the next 10 years, while U.S.
retail gasoline prices are forecast to average $2.90
per gallon over that same period; see AEO 2008,
High Price Case Table 12, available at https://
www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/excel/aeohptab_12.xls
(last accessed October 19, 2008).
248 The fuel price forecasts reported in EIA’s AEO
2008 Revised Early Release and Final Release
reflect the estimates effects of various provisions of
EISA—including the requirement to achieve a
combined CAFE level of 35 mpg by model year
2020—on the demand for and supply of gasoline
and other transportation fuels. Thus the fuel price
forecasts reported in these versions of AEO 2008
may already account for the reduction in fuel
demand expected to result from the CAFE standards
adopted in this Final Rule, whereas the agency’s
analysis of their effects would ideally use fuel price
forecasts that do not assume the adoption of higher
CAFE standards for model years 2011–20. However,
the agency notes that the difference between the
Reference Case forecasts of retail gasoline prices for
2011–30 between EIA’s Early Release of AEO 2008,
which did not incorporate the effects of EISA, and
its subsequent Revised Early Release, which did
reflect EISA, averaged only $0.0004 (i.e., less than
one-half cent) per gallon over the period 2011–30.
This suggests that accounting for the effect of EISA
would have had only a minimal effect on the fuel
price forecasts used in this analysis.
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newly-available forecast of fuel prices in
this final rule, in part because it did not
have adequate time to replicate the
entire analysis reported in this rule
using revised forecasts of fuel prices.249
Moreover, the forecast of gasoline prices
from AEO 2009 Early Release averages
$3.45 over the period from 2009–30,
only slightly higher than the comparable
figure for the AEO 2008 High Price
forecast the agency relied upon in
preparing this analysis. Thus
incorporating EIA’s newest forecast
would be unlikely to have an effect on
the fuel economy standards adopted in
this rule. The agency will continue to
monitor fuel price forecasts available
from all sources and other forecasts, and
consider their implications for its choice
among alternative price scenarios
developed by EIA.
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5. Consumer Valuation of Fuel Economy
and Payback Period
In the NPRM, NHTSA explained that
in estimating the value of fuel economy
improvements that would result from
alternative CAFE standards to potential
vehicle buyers, NHTSA assumed that
buyers value the resulting fuel savings
over only part of the expected lifetime
of the vehicles they purchase.
Specifically, we assume that buyers
value fuel savings over the first five
years of a new vehicle’s lifetime, and
that buyers behave as if they do not
discount the value of these future fuel
savings. NHTSA chose the five-year
figure because it represents the current
average term of consumer loans to
finance the purchase of new vehicles.
NHTSA recognized that the period over
which individual buyers finance new
vehicle purchases may not correspond
to the time horizons they apply in
valuing fuel savings from higher fuel
economy, but NHTSA expressed its
belief that five years represents a
reasonable estimate of the average
period over which buyers who finance
their purchases of new vehicles
receive—and thus are compelled to
recognize—the monetary value of future
fuel savings resulting from higher fuel
economy.
NHTSA explained that the value of
fuel savings over the first five years of
a vehicle model’s lifetime that would
result under each alternative fuel
economy standard is calculated using
the projections of retail fuel prices
described in the section above. The
value of fuel savings is then deducted
from the technology costs incurred by
249 U.S. Energy Information Administration,
Annual Energy Outlook 2009 Early Release,
available at https://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/
index.html (last accessed February 12, 2009).
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the vehicle’s manufacturer to produce
the improvement in that model’s fuel
economy estimated for each alternative
standard, to determine the increase in
the ‘‘effective price’’ to buyers of that
vehicle model. The Volpe model uses
these estimates of effective costs for
increasing the fuel economy of each
vehicle model to identify the order in
which manufacturers would be likely to
select models for the application of fuel
economy-improving technologies in
order to comply with stricter standards.
The average value of the resulting
increase in effective cost from each
manufacturer’s simulated compliance
strategy is also used to estimate the
impact of alternative standards on
manufacturers’ total sales for future
model years.
However, NHTSA stated that it is
important to recognize that the agency
estimates the aggregate value to the U.S.
economy of fuel savings resulting from
alternative standards—or their ‘‘social’’
value—over the entire expected
lifetimes of vehicles manufactured
under those standards, rather than over
this shorter ‘‘payback period’’ that
NHTSA assumes for vehicle buyers.
This point is discussed in the section
below titled ‘‘Vehicle survival and use
assumptions.’’ NHTSA noted that as
indicated previously, the maximum
vehicle lifetimes used to analyze the
effects of alternative fuel economy
standards are estimated to be 25 years
for passenger cars and 36 years for light
trucks.
NADA and Sierra Research agreed
with the agency’s assumption of a 5-year
payback period for consumer valuation
of fuel economy. NADA commented
that NHTSA’s assumption of a 5 year
payback period for consumer valuation
of fuel economy was reasonable. NADA
argued that ‘‘Even at high fuel prices,
consumers who view fuel economy as
an important purchase criteria are hard
pressed to make the case for buying a
more fuel efficient new vehicle if the
up-front capital costs associated with
doing so cannot be recouped in short
order.’’ Thus, NADA concluded,
‘‘NHTSA should assume that most
prospective purchasers will not invest
in fuel economy improvements that do
not exhibit a payback of five years or
sooner.’’ NADA also added that factors
other than the value of fuel savings
should also be taken into account in
calculating the length of the payback
period; specifically, it stated that ‘‘for
purposes of calculating payback, realworld purchaser finance costs,
opportunity costs, and additional
maintenance costs all should be
accounted for.’’
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The Sierra Research report submitted
by the Alliance as Attachment 2 to its
comments ‘‘considered fuel cost savings
over ‘payback’ periods of 5 and 20
years,’’ but stated parenthetically that
‘‘It is more likely that average
consumers would consider the savings
during the period of time they expect to
own the vehicle, likely closer to the
five-year period.’’
Other commenters disagreed with the
agency’s assumption of a 5-year payback
period for consumer valuation of fuel
economy. Mr. Delucchi stated simply
that NHTSA ‘‘should not do a ‘payback’
analysis with a zero discount rate and
a 5-year payback period, because there
is no economic theory or consumer
behavioral evidence to support this.’’
However, he offered no additional
suggestions as to what NHTSA should
use instead. Similarly, as part of its
discussion on fuel price estimates, the
Sierra Club commented that NHTSA
had ‘‘arbitrarily restricted’’ the
consumer payback period to 5 years, but
offered no further comments or
explanation of this point.
CFA commented that ‘‘the five year
payback constraint plays a critical role
in ordering the technologies that are
included in the fleet to comply with
various levels of the standard,’’ and
argued that while NHTSA should
perhaps not have included a payback
period at all, if it intended to do so, it
should justify the 5-year payback period
better and consider a longer payback
period. CFA commented that ‘‘it is not
clear that one must assume a payback
for any component of a vehicle
purchase. But if one does, the logical
connection is between the period of
ownership and the payback, not the
loan period.’’ CFA further commented
that NHTSA failed to recognize the
extent to which ‘‘consumers and the
market appreciate fuel economy,’’
arguing that ‘‘even if one looks at the
ownership period, most alternative
investment opportunities available to
consumers do not yield a five year
payback period; hybrids, many of which
have payback periods of ten years or
more, are flying off auto dealer lots.
Increasing the payback period by one
year raises the value of the fuel savings
substantially, by 20 percent.’’
Ford commented that NHTSA should
not have used the increase in the
‘‘effective price’’ to buyers to determine
consumer valuation of fuel economy, for
two reasons. First, Ford argued that
while NHTSA ‘‘implicitly assumed that
the technology costs incurred by the
manufactures can be fully passed on to
buyers,’’ this is not true ‘‘in the
competitive environment of the U.S.
automotive market.’’ Second, Ford
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commented that the estimates of
‘‘effective price’’ depend on fuel price
assumptions, such that ‘‘a higher
gasoline price assumption will lower
the effective price estimates, holding
everything else constant.’’ Ford cited the
June 26, 2008 analysis by Sierra
Research that ‘‘estimates that a
consumer would not break even over a
20 year period unless gas prices are
sustained at $4.47 a gallon. Sierra also
concluded that by using a more
conservative payback period of 5 years
the estimated breakeven gas price would
have to be $6.59.’’
Ford argued that NHTSA should
instead use ‘‘hedonic pricing technique
in estimating the consumer valuation of
fuel economy,’’ which ‘‘determines the
price of a vehicle by the characteristics
of the car such as towing, cargo volume,
performance etc.’’ Ford also argued that
NHTSA should not use ‘‘effective price’’
as a way of identifying in which order
manufacturers would apply
technologies, because ‘‘It is quite
unlikely that manufacturers are using
this metric for selecting models, since
most manufacturers do not assume the
technology costs can be fully passed on
to the buyers.’’
Agency response: NHTSA notes that
the payback period and the effective
cost calculation affect only the order in
which manufacturers are assumed to
apply technologies in order to improve
the fuel economy of specific vehicles,
and thus have no effect on the final
CAFE standards. Thus the assumptions
about the length of the payback period
and discount rate that affect these
calculations, while subject to some
uncertainty, are not a critical
determinant of CAFE standards
themselves. Instead, their main role is to
estimate the increase in the value to
potential buyers of the increases in fuel
economy of specific vehicle models, and
to provide some indication of the extent
to which manufacturers are likely to be
able to recoup their costs for complying
with higher CAFE standards through
increases in those vehicles’ sales prices.
The agency also reiterates that it
estimates the social benefits of fuel
savings resulting from alternative
standards over the entire expected
lifetimes of cars and light trucks subject
to higher CAFE standards, rather than
over the payback period assumed for
vehicle buyers. Although many
commenters mistakenly believe that the
payback period has an important effect
on the stringency of the fuel economy
standards and therefore were suggesting
different periods, no commenter
provided any data to support a different
number of years for payback. Thus
NHTSA has continued to employ the
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same assumptions used in the NPRM in
developing the CAFE standards adopted
in this final rule.
6. Vehicle Survival and Use
Assumptions
NHTSA stated in the NPRM that its
preliminary analysis of fuel savings and
related benefits from adopting
alternative standards for MY 2011–2015
passenger cars and light trucks was
based on estimates of the resulting
changes in fuel use over their entire
lifetimes in the U.S. vehicle fleet.
NHTSA’s first step in estimating
lifetime fuel consumption by vehicles
produced during a model year is to
calculate the number of vehicles that are
expected to remain in service during
each future year after they are produced
and sold.250 This number is calculated
by multiplying the number of vehicles
originally produced during a model year
by the proportion expected to remain in
service at the age they will have reached
during each subsequent year, often
referred to as a ‘‘survival rate.’’
NHTSA explained that for the number
of passenger cars and light trucks that
will be produced during future years, it
relies on projections reported by the EIA
in its AEO Reference Case forecast.251
For age-specific survival rates for cars
and light trucks, NHTSA uses updated
values estimated from yearly
registration data for vehicles produced
during recent model years, to ensure
that forecasts of the number of vehicles
in use reflect recent increases in the
durability and expected life spans of
cars and light trucks.252 These updated
survival rates suggest that the typical
expected lifetimes of recent-model
passenger cars and light trucks are 13.8
and 14.5 years, respectively.
NHTSA’s next step in estimating fuel
use was to calculate the total number of
miles that the cars and light trucks
250 Vehicles are defined to be of age 1 during the
calendar year corresponding to the model year in
which they are produced. Thus, for example, model
year 2000 vehicles are considered to be of age 1
during calendar year 2000, age 2 during calendar
year 2001, and to reach their maximum age of 26
years during calendar year 2025. NHTSA considers
the maximum lifetime of vehicles to be the age after
which less than 2 percent of the vehicles originally
produced during a model year remain in service.
Applying these conventions to vehicle registration
data indicates that passenger cars have a maximum
age of 26 years, while light trucks have a maximum
lifetime of 36 years. See Lu, S., NHTSA, Regulatory
Analysis and Evaluation Division, ‘‘Vehicle
Survivability and Travel Mileage Schedules,’’ DOT
HS 809 952 (January 2006), at 8–11. Available at
https://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/pdf/nrd-30/NCSA/
Rpts/2006/809952.pdf (last accessed August 21,
2008).
251 U.S. Energy Information Administration,
Annual Energy Outlook 200, Reference Case Table
43. Available at (last accessed October 4, 2008).
252 See Lu, supra note 250, at 8–11.
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produced in each model year affected by
the proposed CAFE standards will be
driven during each year of their
lifetimes. To estimate total miles driven,
the number of cars and light trucks
projected to remain in use during each
future year (calculated as described
above) was multiplied by the average
number of miles that they are expected
to be driven at the age they will have
reached in that year.
The agency initially estimated the
average number of miles driven
annually by cars and light trucks of each
age using data from the Federal
Highway Administration’s 2001
National Household Transportation
Survey (NHTS).253 The agency then
adjusted the NHTS estimates of annual
vehicle use to account for the effect of
differences in fuel cost per mile driven
between the date the NHTS was
conducted and the future years when
MY 2011 cars and light trucks would be
in use. This adjustment is intended to
account for the ‘‘rebound effect’’ on
vehicle use caused by changes in fuel
cost per mile (see Section V.B.8. below).
Fuel cost per mile driven is measured
by the retail price of fuel per gallon
forecast for a future calendar year,
divided by the estimated on-road fuel
economy in miles per gallon achieved
by vehicles of each model year that
remain in service during that future
year. The agency made this adjustment
by applying its estimate of the rebound
effect to the difference in fuel cost per
mile driven between 2001, when the
NHTS was conducted, and the projected
average fuel cost per mile over the
lifetimes of MY 2011 cars and light
trucks.
Finally, NHTSA estimated fuel
consumption during each calendar year
of model year 2011 vehicles’ lifetimes
by dividing the total number of miles
that that model year’s surviving vehicles
are driven by the fuel economy that they
are expected to achieve under each
alternative CAFE standard. Lifetime fuel
consumption by MY 2011 cars or light
trucks is the sum of the fuel use by the
vehicles produced during that model
year that are projected to remain in use
during each year of their expected
lifetimes. In turn, the savings in lifetime
fuel use by MY 2011 cars or light trucks
that would result from each alternative
CAFE standard would be the difference
between its lifetime fuel use at the fuel
economy level they are projected to
attain under the Baseline (No Action)
alternative, and their lifetime fuel use at
the higher fuel economy level they are
253 For a description of the NHTS, see https://
nhts.ornl.gov/quickStart.shtml (last accessed
August 21, 2008).
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projected to achieve under that
alternative standard.
As an illustration of this procedure,
the revised estimates of new vehicle
sales used in the final rule analysis
project that 6.85 million light trucks
will be produced during 2011, and
NHTSA’s updated survival rates showed
that slightly more than half of these—
50.1 percent, or 3.43 million—are
projected to remain in service during
the year 2025, when they will have
reached an age of 14 years. At that age,
the estimates of vehicle use employed in
this final rule analysis indicate that light
trucks achieving the fuel economy level
required under the Baseline alternative
would be driven an average of 9,385
miles, assuming that the AEO 2008 High
fuel price forecast proves to be correct.
Thus surviving model year 2011 light
trucks are projected to be driven a total
of 32.20 billion miles (= 3.43 million
surviving vehicles × 9,385 miles per
vehicle) during 2025. Summing the
results of similar calculations for each
year of their 36-year maximum lifetime,
the 6.85 million light trucks originally
produced during MY 2011 would be
driven a total of 1,185 billion miles
under the Baseline alternative.
Under the Baseline alternative, MY
2011 light trucks are projected to
achieve a test fuel economy level of 23.0
mpg, which corresponds to actual onroad fuel economy of 18.4 mpg (= mpg
× 80 percent). Thus, their lifetime fuel
use under the Baseline alternative is
projected to be 64.4 billion gallons
(1,185 billion miles divided by 18.4
miles per gallon). Under the Optimized
CAFE standard for MY 2011, light
trucks are projected to achieve a test
fuel economy of 25.0 mpg, which
corresponds to an actual on-road mpg of
20.0. After adjusting their average
annual mileage to reflect the increase in
usage that results from the rebound
effect of improved fuel economy, MY
2011 light trucks are projected to be
driven a total of 1,187 billion miles over
their expected lifetimes. Thus their
lifetime fuel consumption under the
Optimized CAFE standard is projected
to amount to 59.4 billion gallons (1,187
billion miles divided by 20.0 miles per
gallon), a reduction of 5.0 billion gallons
from the 64.4 billion gallons they would
consume under the Baseline alternative.
NHTSA received no specific
comments regarding the assumptions
about vehicle survival and use
described in the NPRM. The exact
figures for annual vehicle use that are
employed in the agency’s analysis
supporting the final rule are updated to
reflect differences in estimated fuel
economy levels under alternative CAFE
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standards, but are otherwise unchanged
from those used in the NPRM.
7. Growth in Total Vehicle Use
In the NPRM, NHTSA also explained
its assumptions for potential future
growth in average annual vehicle use.
By assuming that the average number of
miles driven by cars and light trucks at
each age—and thus their lifetime total
mileage—will remain constant over the
future, NHTSA effectively assumes that
future growth in total vehicle-miles
driven stems only from increases in the
number of vehicles in use, rather than
from continuing increases in the average
number of miles that cars and light
trucks are driven each year.254
Similarly, because the survival rates
used to estimate the number of cars and
light trucks remaining in service to
various ages are assumed to remain
fixed for future model years, growth in
the total number of cars and light trucks
in use is effectively assumed to result
only from increasing sales of new
vehicles. In order to determine the
validity of these assumptions, the
agency conducted a detailed analysis of
the causes of recent growth in total car
and light truck use.
From 1985 through 2005, the total
number of miles driven (usually referred
to as vehicle-miles traveled, or VMT) by
passenger cars increased 35 percent,
equivalent to a compound annual
growth rate of 1.5 percent.255 During
that time the total number of passenger
cars registered in the U.S. grew by about
0.3 percent annually, almost exclusively
as a result of increasing sales of new
cars.256 Thus, growth in the average
254 As described in the preceding section,
increases in fuel economy required by CAFE
standards are assumed to increase lifetime usage of
cars and light trucks due to the fuel economy
rebound effect. Because a vehicle’s fuel economy is
determined when it is produced, however, the
resulting changes in its average annual use at each
age and its expected lifetime mileage are also
determined when it is produced. While the fuel
economy rebound effect thus contributes to
differences in annual and lifetime vehicle use
between the Baseline alternative and Optimized
CAFE standards, it is not a source of continuing
growth in average annual miles per vehicle or in
total annual VMT over the future.
255 Calculated from data reported in FHWA,
Highway Statistics, Summary to 1995, Table VM–
201a, available at
https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ohim/summary95/
vm201a.xlw (last accessed August 20, 2008), and
Highway Statistics Publications, Annual Editions
1996–2005, Table VM–1, available at https://
www.fhwa.dot.gov/policy/ohpi/hss/hsspubs.cfm
(last accessed October 4, 2008); follow links to
individual annual editions, select Section V:
Roadway Extent Characteristics, and Performance,
scroll down to section entitled ‘‘Traffic and Travel
Data,’’ and select link to Table VM–1.
256 An increase in the fraction of new passenger
cars remaining in service beyond age 10 accounted
for approximately one-tenth of total growth in the
U.S. automobile fleet from 1985 to 2005, while the
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number of miles that passenger cars are
driven each year accounted for the
remaining 1.2 percent (= 1.5 percent—
0.3 percent) annual growth in total
passenger car use.257
The NPRM explained, however, that
over this same period, total VMT by
light trucks increased much faster,
growing at an annual rate of 5.1 percent.
In contrast to the causes of growth in
passenger car use, nearly all growth in
light truck use over these two decades
was attributable to rapid increases in the
number of light trucks in use. FHWA
data show that growth in total miles
driven by ‘‘Two-axle, four-tire trucks,’’ a
category that includes most or all light
trucks subject to CAFE standards,
averaged 5.1 percent annually from
1985 through 2005. However, the
number of miles that light trucks are
driven each year averaged 11,114 during
2005, almost unchanged from the
average figure of 11,016 miles during
1985.258 This means that virtually all of
the growth in total light truck VMT over
this period resulted from growth in the
number of these vehicles in service,
rather than from growth in their average
annual use. In turn, growth in the size
of the nation’s light truck fleet has
resulted almost exclusively from rising
production and sales of new light
trucks, since the fraction of new light
trucks remaining in service to various
ages has remained stable or declined
very slightly over the past two
decades.259
On the basis of this analysis, NHTSA
tentatively concluded in the NPRM that
its projections of future growth in light
truck VMT account fully for the primary
cause of its recent growth, which has
been the rapid increase in sales of new
light trucks during recent model years.
However, the assumption that average
annual use of passenger cars will remain
fixed over the future seemed to ignore
an important source of recent growth in
their total use, the gradual increase in
the average number of miles they are
driven. NHTSA explained that to the
extent that this factor continued to
represent a significant source of growth
in future passenger car use, the agency’s
analysis would be likely to
underestimate the reductions in fuel use
and related environmental impacts
resulting from more stringent CAFE
remaining 90 percent was accounted for by growth
in sales of new automobiles. The fraction of new
automobiles remaining in service to various ages
was computed from R.L. Polk vehicle registration
data for 1997 through 2005 by the agency’s Center
for Statistical Analysis.
257 Id.
258 Id.
259 See the Lu study, supra note 250.
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standards for passenger cars.260 NHTSA
stated that it planned to account
explicitly for potential future growth in
average annual use of both cars and
light trucks in the analysis for the final
rule. NHTSA received no specific
comments to the NPRM about vehicle
survival and use.
In its analysis for this final rule, the
agency has used estimates of the annual
number of miles driven by MY 2011
passenger cars and light trucks at each
age of their expected lifetimes that
reflect the previously-discussed
adjustment for increased use due to the
fuel economy rebound effect. Similarly,
these estimates also reflect the effect on
vehicle use of differences in fuel prices
between the year 2001, when the
National Household Travel Survey
(NHTS), the agency’s original source for
its estimates of annual vehicle use by
age, was conducted, and the AEO 2008
forecast of fuel prices for the period
when these vehicles will be in use. As
discussed briefly in the preceding
section and in more detail in the
following section, changes in fuel prices
are also assumed to cause a rebound
effect in vehicle use, because—like
increases in fuel economy—variation in
retail fuel prices directly affects
vehicles’ fuel cost per mile driven.
Because future fuel prices are projected
to be significantly higher than the $1.80
(2007 dollars) average that prevailed at
the time the NHTS was conducted, this
adjustment reduces projected average
vehicle use during future years, thus
partly offsetting the effect of higher fuel
economy.
Finally, the agency’s estimates of
vehicle use assume that the average
number of miles driven by passenger
cars will continue to rise by 1 percent
annually, slightly below its 1.2 percent
average annual growth rate over the past
two decades. This growth is assumed to
be independent of the changes in
passenger car use that are projected to
result from increased fuel economy and
higher fuel prices through the rebound
effect. Because average annual use of
260 NHTSA explained that assuming that average
annual miles driven per passenger car will continue
to increase over the future would increase the
agency’s estimates of total lifetime mileage for MY
2011 passenger cars. Their estimated lifetime fuel
use would also increase under each alternative
standard considered in the NPRM, but in inverse
relation to their fuel economy. Thus, NHTSA
explained, lifetime fuel use would increase by more
under the No Increase alternative than under any
of the alternatives that would increase passenger car
CAFE standards, and by progressively less for the
alternatives that impose stricter standards. NHTSA
stated that taking account of this factor would thus
increase the agency’s estimates of fuel savings for
those alternatives, just as omitting it would cause
the agency’s analysis to underestimate those fuel
savings.
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light trucks has not increased
significantly over the past two decades,
no future change in light truck use is
assumed to occur independently of
those attributable to higher fuel prices
and improved fuel economy through the
rebound effect.
NHTSA received no specific
comments regarding the assumptions
about growth in total vehicle use
presented in the NPRM. The
assumptions employed in the agency’s
analysis supporting the final rule
remain unchanged from those used in
the NPRM.
8. Accounting for the Rebound Effect of
Higher Fuel Economy
As discussed in the NPRM, the
rebound effect refers to the tendency of
vehicle use to increase in response to
higher fuel economy. The rebound effect
occurs because an increase in a vehicle’s
fuel economy reduces its fuel cost for
each mile driven (typically the largest
single component of the cost of
operating a vehicle), and vehicle owners
take advantage of this reduced cost by
driving more. Even with higher fuel
economy, this additional driving uses
some fuel, so the rebound effect reduces
the fuel savings that would otherwise
result when fuel economy standards
require manufacturers to increase fuel
economy. The rebound effect is usually
expressed as the percentage by which
annual vehicle use increases when the
cost of driving each mile declines, due
either to an increase in fuel economy or
a reduction in the retail price of fuel.
The rebound effect is an important
parameter in NHTSA’s evaluation of
alternative CAFE standards for future
model years, because it affects the actual
fuel savings that are likely to result from
adopting stricter standards. The
rebound effect can be measured by
estimating the elasticity of vehicle use
with respect either to fuel economy
itself, or to fuel cost per mile driven.261
When expressed as a positive
percentage, either of these parameters
gives the fraction of fuel savings that
would be expected to result from
increased fuel economy, but is offset by
the added fuel use that occurs when
vehicles with higher fuel economy are
driven more.
In the NPRM, NHTSA summarized
existing research on the rebound effect
in order to explain its rationale for
choosing the estimate of 15 percent it
employed in analyzing alternative MY
2011–2015 fuel economy standards; the
261 Fuel cost per mile is equal to the price of fuel
in dollars per gallon divided by fuel economy in
miles per gallon, so fuel cost per mile declines
when a vehicle’s fuel economy increases.
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following paragraphs repeat NHTSA’s
summary for the reader’s benefit.
Research on the magnitude of the
rebound effect in light-duty vehicle use
dates to the early 1980s, and almost
unanimously concludes that a
statistically-significant rebound effect
occurs when vehicle fuel efficiency
improves.262 The most common
approach to estimating its magnitude
has been to analyze household survey
data on vehicle use, fuel consumption,
fuel prices (often obtained from external
sources), and other determinants of
household travel demand to isolate the
response of vehicle use to higher fuel
economy. Other studies have relied on
econometric analysis of annual U.S.
data on vehicle use, fuel economy, fuel
prices, and other variables to identify
the response of total or average vehicle
use to changes in fuel economy. Two
recent studies analyzed yearly variation
in vehicle ownership and use, fuel
prices, and fuel economy among
individual states over an extended time
period in order to measure the response
of vehicle use to changing fuel
economy. Most studies measure the
influence of fuel economy on vehicle
use indirectly through its effect on fuel
cost per mile driven, although a few
attempt to measure the direct effect of
fuel economy on vehicle use.
An important distinction among
studies of the rebound effect is whether
they assume that the effect is constant,
or varies over time in response to
prevailing fuel prices, fuel economy
levels, personal income, and household
vehicle ownership. This distinction is
important because studies that allow the
rebound effect to vary in response to
changes in these factors are likely to
provide more reliable forecasts of its
future value.
In order to arrive at a preliminary
estimate of the rebound effect for use in
assessing the fuel savings, emissions
reductions, and other impacts of the
alternative standards, NHTSA reviewed
22 studies of the rebound effect
conducted from 1983 through 2007.
NHTSA then conducted a detailed
analysis of the 66 separate estimates of
the long-run rebound effect reported in
these studies, which is summarized in
262 Most studies estimate that the long-run
rebound effect is significantly larger than the
immediate response to increased fuel efficiency,
since over a longer period drivers have more
opportunities to adjust their vehicle use to changes
in fuel costs. This long-run effect is more
appropriate for evaluating the fuel savings likely to
result from stricter CAFE standards, since the
increases in fuel economy they require would
reduce fuel costs over the entire lifetimes of
vehicles they affect. These lifetimes can extend up
to 25 years for passenger cars, and up to 36 years
for light trucks.
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Table V–2 below.263 As the table
indicates, historical estimates of the
long-run rebound effect range from as
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263 Some studies did not separately present the
overall rebound effect, so NHTSA derived estimates
of the overall rebound effect when the studies
reported more detailed results. For example, when
studies estimated different rebound effects for
households owning different numbers of vehicles,
but did not report an overall rebound effect,
NHTSA computed a weighted average of the
reported values using the distribution of
households among vehicle ownership categories.
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low as 7 percent to as high as 75
percent, with a mean of 23 percent. A
higher rebound effect means that more
of the savings in fuel use expected to
result from higher fuel economy will be
offset by additional driving, so that less
fuel savings will actually result.
Limiting the sample of rebound effect
estimates to the 50 estimates reported in
the 17 published studies yields the same
range but a slightly higher mean (24
percent), while focusing on the authors’
preferred estimates from published
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these studies narrows this range and
lowers its average slightly. In all three
cases, the median estimate of the
rebound effect, which is less likely to be
influenced by unusually small and large
estimates, is 22 percent. As Table V–2
indicates, approximately two-thirds of
all estimates reviewed, all published
estimates, and authors’ preferred
estimates fall in the range of 10 to 30
percent.
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The type of data used and authors’
assumptions about whether the rebound
effect varies over time have important
effects on its estimated magnitude,
although the reasons for these patterns
are difficult to identify. As the table
shows, the 34 estimates derived from
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analysis of U.S. annual time-series data
produce a median estimate of 14 percent
for the long-run rebound effect, while
the median of the 23 estimates based on
household survey data is more than
twice as large (31 percent). The 37
estimates from studies that assume a
constant rebound effect produce a
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14325
median of 20 percent, while the 29
estimates from studies allowing the
rebound to vary have a slightly higher
median value (23 percent).
In selecting a value for the rebound
effect to use in analyzing alternative fuel
economy standards for this rulemaking,
NHTSA attached greater significance to
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studies that allow the rebound effect to
vary in response to changes in the
factors that affect its magnitude. The
agency’s view is that updating their
estimates to reflect current economic
conditions provides a more reliable
indication of its likely magnitude over
the lifetimes of vehicles that will be
affected by those standards. As Table V–
2 reports, recalculating these 29 original
estimates using 2006 values for retail
fuel prices, average fuel economy,
personal income, and household vehicle
ownership reduces their median
estimate to 16 percent.264 Considering
the empirical evidence on the rebound
effect as a whole, but according greater
importance to the updated estimates
from studies allowing the rebound effect
to vary, NHTSA selected a rebound
effect of 15 percent in the NPRM to
evaluate the fuel savings and other
effects of the alternative fuel economy
standards. However, NHTSA stated that
it did not believe that evidence of the
rebound effect’s dependence on fuel
prices or household income is
sufficiently convincing to justify
allowing its future value to vary in
response to forecast changes in these
variables. A range extending from 10
percent to at least 20 percent, and
perhaps as high as 25 percent, appeared
to NHTSA to be appropriate for the
required analysis of the uncertainty
surrounding these estimates. While the
agency selected 15 percent, it also
conducted analyses using rebound
effects of 10 and 20 percent. The results
of these sensitivity analyses are shown
in the FEIS at Section 3.4.4.2.
The only commenter suggesting that
NHTSA use a larger rebound effect than
264 As an illustration, Small and Van Dender
(2005) allow the rebound effect to vary over time
in response to changes in real per capita income as
well as in response to average fuel cost per mile
driven. While their estimate for the entire interval
(1966–2001) that they analyze is 22 percent,
updating this estimate using 2007 values of these
variables reduces the rebound effect to about 10
percent. Similarly, updating Greene’s 1992 original
estimate of a 15 percent rebound effect to reflect
2007 fuel prices and average fuel economy reduces
it to approximately 7 percent. See David L. Greene,
‘‘Vehicle Use and Fuel Economy: How Big is the
Rebound Effect?’’ The Energy Journal, 13:1 (1992),
at 117–143.
In contrast, the distribution of households among
vehicle ownership categories in the data samples
used by Hensher et al. (1990) and Greene et al.
(1999) are nearly identical to the most recent
estimates for the U.S., so updating their original
estimates to current U.S. conditions changes them
very little. See David A. Hensher, Frank W.
Milthorpe, and Nariida C. Smith, ‘‘The Demand for
Vehicle Use in the Urban Household Sector: Theory
and Empirical Evidence,’’ Journal of Transport
Economics and Policy, 24:2 (1990), at 119–137; see
also David L. Greene, James R. Kahn, and Robert C.
Gibson, ‘‘Fuel Economy Rebound Effect for
Household Vehicles,’’ The Energy Journal, 20:3
(1999), at 1–21.
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15 percent was the Alliance, which
based its comments on analyses it
commissioned from Sierra Research and
NERA Economic Consulting, Inc. Sierra
Research cited a 1999 paper by David
Greene, et al., at ORNL as evidence that
the long-run rebound effect should be
20 percent,265 and stated further that
NHTSA used a rebound effect of 20
percent in its April 2003 final rule
setting fuel economy standards for MY
2005–2007 light trucks. Sierra Research
assumed a 17 percent rebound effect in
its analysis for the Alliance ‘‘to be
conservative.’’ NERA’s report argued
that NHTSA should use a rebound effect
of 20 percent, because 15 percent gave
‘‘disproportionate weight’’ to the Small
and Van Dender study, which NERA
called ‘‘a single study with empirical
limitations.’’ NERA stated that its
analysis ‘‘corrected’’ the Small and Van
Dender model, the primary correction
apparently being to ‘‘properly account
for differences in the cost of living
across states,’’ with respect to income
and fuel prices. NERA consequently
used a 24 percent rebound effect for its
report.
Other commenters, including CARB,
UCS, EDF, Public Citizen, CFA, and
Mark Delucchi, argued that NHTSA
should use a lower rebound effect than
15 percent, generally because Small and
Van Dender’s recent study found a
lower rebound effect. CARB, for
example, commented that while it is
true that the consensus estimate of past
studies is that the rebound effect should
be 15 percent, Small and Van Dender
had found a long-run rebound effect of
4.9 percent for the 1997–2001 period in
California due to higher incomes, and
that it would decline even further by
2020. Thus, CARB argued, NHTSA
should accept ‘‘two critical findings’’ of
the Small and Van Dender study,
specifically that (1) the future value of
the rebound effect would decline as
household real income increases; and
that (2) as fuel prices increase, people
spend a larger share of their income on
fuel purchases, thus becoming more
sensitive to fuel prices. CARB stated
that NHTSA should use a rebound effect
of no higher than 10 percent, and
conduct a sensitivity analysis using a
rebound effect of 5 percent.
UCS similarly commented that if
NHTSA intends to ‘‘attach greater
significance’’ to the Small and Van
Dender study, as NHTSA stated in the
NPRM, then it must accept Small and
Van Dender’s conclusion ‘‘that the
rebound effect in the U.S. is small and
265 David L. Greene, et al., ‘‘Fuel Economy
Rebound Effect for U.S. Household Vehicles,’’ The
Energy Journal, Vol. 20, No. 3, 1999.
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has been getting smaller.’’ Thus, UCS
argued, NHTSA should employ a
rebound effect of no greater than 10
percent, and only if NHTSA used higher
fuel prices in the final rule. UCS
implied, however, that NHTSA should
apply no rebound effect at all unless it
used higher fuel prices in the final rule,
citing a 2005 final report by Small and
Van Dender to CARB as stating that
‘‘* * * [the authors] cannot prove that
there is any rebound effect resulting
from stricter fuel efficiency regulations
* * *.’’ Mr. Delucchi also commented
that NHTSA should use a lower
rebound effect because the agency
should ‘‘give more weight to Small and
Van Dender,’’ although he did not
explain how the agency should give this
additional weight. Mr. Delucchi also
stated that a recent study by Hughes et
al. ‘‘found a very low short-run price
elasticity of demand for gasoline.’’
EDF and Public Citizen focused on
other findings in the Small and Van
Dender study to argue for a lower
rebound effect. EDF commented that
NHTSA should not have selected a 15
percent rebound effect based on existing
rebound effect literature, because when
Small and Van Dender reviewed the
literature, the authors suggested ‘‘that
many prior studies have overestimated
the rebound effect because of some
model specification problems, such as
not allowing for the fact that fuel
efficiency is endogenous, i.e., driving
more efficient cars might encourage
more driving, but long commutes might
encourage purchase of more fuel
efficient vehicles.’’ EDF argued that
because Small and Van Dender’s study
did not have these biases, NHTSA
should use a 10 percent rebound effect,
‘‘to be consistent with the latest findings
and to reflect current conditions of
income, urbanization and fuel costs.’’
EDF also suggested that the rebound
effect may be zero, citing Greene’s 2005
testimony before the House of
Representatives Science Committee that
‘‘the rebound effect could be reduced to
negligible if we ‘[take] into account the
fact that increased fuel economy will
increase the price of vehicles together
with the likelihood that governments
will respond to losses in highway
revenues by raising motor fuel taxes.’ ’’
Public Citizen focused on Small and
Van Dender’s finding that ‘‘most
empirical measurements of the rebound
effect rely heavily on variations in the
fuel price,’’ stating that this ‘‘again
raises the question of whether NHTSA’s
assumptions about the rebound effect
are colored by the estimates of future
fuel prices.’’
CFA commented that NHTSA should
use a rebound effect of no higher than
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5 percent, citing a recent analysis by the
Congressional Budget Office that rising
real incomes have made consumers
much less responsive to short-run
changes in gasoline prices. CFA thus
argued that since gasoline is more
expensive now, NHTSA was incorrect to
assume ‘‘that consumers irrationally
burn up their fuel savings on increased
driving, rather than use it to buy other
goods and services and applied this
‘rebound’ effect to analyses where it
should not play a role.’’ CFA also
argued that NHTSA should have
identified and provided more
information about the conclusions in
each of the studies it reviewed in
developing its number for the rebound
effect.
Agency response: NHTSA has
updated the 29 estimates from studies
that allowed the rebound effect to vary
to reflect 2008 fuel prices, fuel
economy, vehicle ownership levels, and
household income. The resulting
updated estimates are significantly
higher than those reported in the NPRM,
primarily because of the large increase
in fuel prices since 2006 (the date to
which the estimates reported in the
NPRM were updated). The updated
2008 estimates of the fuel economy
rebound effect range from 8 percent to
46 percent, with a median value of 19
percent. Using the average retail
gasoline price forecast for 2011–30 from
the AEO 2008 High Price case, the
projected estimates of the rebound effect
for those years would range from 7
percent to 46 percent, with a median
value of 19 percent.
NHTSA also notes that the forecast of
fuel prices used to develop its adopted
CAFE standards for MY 2011 projects
that retail gasoline prices will continue
to rise by somewhat more than 1 percent
annually over the lifetimes of vehicles
affected by those standards. At the same
time, real household incomes are
projected to grow by about 2 percent
annually over this same period. Given
the relative sensitivity of the Small and
Van Dender rebound effect estimate to
changes in fuel prices and income, these
forecasts suggest that future growth in
fuel prices is likely to offset a significant
fraction of the projected decline in the
rebound effect that would result from
income growth.
In response to the comment by EDF
citing Greene’s statement that the
rebound effect could be negligible over
the foreseeable future, NHTSA notes
that increases in the purchase price or
ownership cost of vehicles may not
significantly affect the marginal cost of
additional vehicle use, since the
depreciation and financing components
of vehicle ownership costs vary only
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minimally with vehicle use. In addition,
the agency notes that Greene’s assertion
that governments are likely to respond
to losses in fuel tax revenues by raising
fuel tax rates (thus increasing retail fuel
prices) is highly speculative, and there
is limited evidence that this has actually
occurred in response to recent declines
in state fuel tax revenues.266
In light of these results, NHTSA has
elected to continue to use a 15 percent
rebound effect in its analysis of fuel
savings and other benefits from higher
CAFE standards for this final rule.
Recognizing the uncertainty
surrounding this estimate, the agency
has analyzed the sensitivity of its
benefits estimates to a range of values
for the rebound effect from 10 percent
to 20 percent. In its future CAFE
rulemaking activities, NHTSA will
review all new available data and
consider whether and to what extent
any assumptions regarding the rebound
effect merit revising based on that data.
9. Benefits From Increased Vehicle Use
The NPRM explained that NHTSA
also values the additional benefits that
derive from increased vehicle use due to
the rebound effect. This additional
mobility provides drivers and their
passengers better access to social and
economic opportunities away from
home, because they are able to make
longer or more frequent trips. The
amount by which the total benefits from
this additional travel exceed its costs
(for fuel and other operating expenses)
measures the net benefits that drivers
receive from the additional travel,
usually referred to as increased
consumer surplus. NHTSA’s analysis
estimates the economic value of this
increased consumer surplus using the
conventional approximation, which is
one half of the product of the decline in
vehicle operating costs per mile and the
resulting increase in the annual number
of miles driven. The NPRM noted that
the magnitude of these benefits
represents a small fraction of the total
benefits from the alternative fuel
economy standards considered.
In its comment on the NPRM, NERA
speculated that NHTSA ‘‘may have
miscalculated the ‘consumer surplus’
266 Federal Highway Administration data show
that fuel tax revenues declined in only 5 of the 50
states between 2000 and 2006, and that none of
these states raised gasoline taxes over that same
period; see FHWA, Highway Statistics 2006, Table
MF–205, available at https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/
policy/ohim/hs06/pdf/mf205.pdf (last accessed
November 13, 2008), Table MF–1 available at
https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policy/ohim/hs06/xls/
mf1.xls (last accessed November 13, 2008), and
Highway Statistics 2000, Table MF–1 available at
https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ohim/hs00/xls/mf1.xls
(last accessed November 13, 2008).
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associated with the additional driving
due to the rebound effect.’’ NERA stated
that NHTSA
* * * describes its calculation in terms of
the conventional triangle under the demand
curve but above the price paid. However, it
appears that instead NHTSA estimated the
total area under the demand curve for the
extra VMT traveled. That is appropriate if
NHTSA’s estimates of net savings in fuel
expenditures include additional
expenditures on the additional fuel
consumed as a result of the rebound effect.
NHTSA notes in response to NERA’s
comment that its estimates of net
savings in fuel expenditures do reflect
the costs for additional fuel consumed
as a result of increased rebound-effect
driving. Thus the agency has correctly
calculated the increase in consumer
surplus associated with the additional
driving due to the rebound effect. Since
it received no other comments on the
estimates of benefits from increased
vehicle use presented in the NPRM,
NHTSA has calculated these benefits
using the same procedure in its analysis
supporting this final rule.
10. Added Costs From Congestion,
Crashes, and Noise
NHTSA also factors in the additional
costs from increased traffic congestion,
motor vehicle accidents, and highway
noise that result from additional vehicle
use associated with the rebound effect.
Increased vehicle use can contribute to
traffic congestion and delays by
increasing traffic volumes on facilities
that are already heavily traveled, which
may cost drivers more in terms of
increased travel time and operating
expenses. Increased vehicle use can also
increase the external costs associated
with traffic accidents; although drivers
may consider the costs they (and their
passengers) might face from the
possibility of being involved in a traffic
accident when they decide to make
additional trips, it is very unlikely that
they account for the potential ‘‘external’’
costs that any accident imposes on the
occupants of other vehicles or on
pedestrians.
Finally, increased vehicle use can also
contribute to traffic noise, which causes
inconvenience, irritation, and
potentially even discomfort to
occupants of other vehicles, to
pedestrians and other bystanders, and to
residents or occupants of surrounding
property. Since drivers are unlikely to
consider the effect their vehicle’s noise
has on others, noise represents another
externality that NHTSA attempts to
account for. Any increase in these
externality costs, however, is dependent
on the traffic conditions under which
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additional rebound-effect driving takes
place.
In the NPRM, NHTSA relied on
estimates developed by the Federal
Highway Administration (FHWA) of the
increased external costs of congestion,
accidents (property damage and
injuries), and noise costs caused by
added driving due to the rebound
effect.267 These estimates are intended
to measure the increases in costs due to
these externalities caused by
automobiles and light trucks that are
borne by persons other than their
drivers, or ‘‘marginal’’ external costs.
Updated to 2007 dollars, FHWA’s
‘‘Middle’’ estimates for marginal
congestion, accident, and noise costs
caused by automobile use amount to 5.4
cents, 2.3 cents, and 0.1 cents per
vehicle-mile (or 7.8 cents per vehiclemile in total), while costs for light
trucks are 4.8 cents, 2.6 cents, and 0.1
cents per vehicle-mile (7.5 cents per
vehicle-mile in total).268 These costs are
multiplied by the annual increases in
automobile and light truck use from the
rebound effect to yield the estimated
increases in congestion, accident, and
noise externality costs during each
future year.
NHTSA received comments from the
Alliance and from the Mercatus Center
on the increased costs from congestion,
crashes, and noise due to the rebound
effect. The Alliance submitted an
analysis by NERA Economic Consulting
that argued that NHTSA had
underestimated the increased costs from
congestion, crashes, and noise. The
NERA analysis disagreed with NHTSA’s
method for updating the FHWA
estimates, arguing that it was unclear
exactly how NHTSA had updated the
FHWA values to 2006 dollars. The
NERA analysis also argued that FHWA’s
estimate was ‘‘based on a value of
$12.38 per vehicle hour (in 1994
dollars),’’ while NHTSA used a value of
$24 per vehicle hour ‘‘to value time
savings it estimates would result from
fewer fill-ups as a result of higher MPG
and increased range for a tank of fuel.’’
Thus, the NERA analysis concluded that
NHTSA had overvalued the time
savings, which NERA seemed to
attribute to its belief that NHTSA does
not value time spent in traffic
congestion ‘‘at least as highly as time
spent in service stations while filling
up.’’ 269 Thus, the NERA analysis argued
that congestion costs per mile would
increase by about 68 percent if NHTSA
had updated FHWA’s estimates in a
‘‘consistent’’ manner with ‘‘NHTSA’s
valuation of time savings for vehicle
occupants in another part of its
analysis.’’
The NERA analysis also argued that
the baseline 1997 congestion values
‘‘should be adjusted upward even more
to reflect increasing levels of congestion
between then and now and the further
increases likely’’ within the lifetimes of
the vehicles, the basis for NHTSA’s cost
analysis. The analysis stated that this
was because ‘‘With higher baseline
congestion, the marginal impact of
additional VMT will increase because
congestion, like other queuing
phenomena, increases at an increasing
rate as capacity utilization grows.’’
NERA also argued more generally that
increased costs from congestion,
crashes, and noise are proportional to
the rebound effect, which means that a
higher rebound effect would result in
higher costs.270
The NERA analysis did not cover
NHTSA’s estimates of accident and
noise costs per mile, but cited the same
RFF study referred to in the NPRM to
say that it ‘‘estimated a value per mile
roughly 20 percent higher ($0.030 vs.
$0.025) than NHTSA’s.’’
The Mercatus Center focused only on
congestion costs, and commented that
NHTSA should consider ‘‘The
possibility that the cost of increased
congestion, a product of the ‘rebound
effect,’ does not take into account likely
increasing marginal costs as considered
in NHTSA’s model.’’ The commenter
stated that NHTSA’s estimates
‘‘implicitly assume[] a constant
marginal cost of congestion across all
possible total quantities of vehicle miles
driven for each vehicle category.’’
However, it cited the FHWA study as
stating that congestion cost impacts are
‘‘extremely sensitive’’ to peak versus offpeak traffic periods. Thus, the
commenter argued, if the costs can vary
within a day (as during peak and offpeak periods), they must certainly vary
across years, if the total amount of
traffic varies across years as well. In
essence, if VMT increases, total
congestion and the marginal cost of
congestion must also increase, all other
things held constant.
267 These estimates were developed by FHWA for
use in its 1997 Federal Highway Cost Allocation
Study. See https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policy/hcas/
final/index.htm (last accessed October 5, 2008).
268 Id., at Tables V–22, V–23, and V–24 (last
accessed October 5, 2008).
269 NERA appears to suggest that time spent in
service stations while filling up includes the fact
that ‘‘stops at service stations often serve multiple
purposes, not just refueling.’’ NERA then appears to
suggest that people feel similarly about time spent
in traffic congestion.
270 NERA suggested using a rebound elasticity of
¥0.2 instead of ¥0.15, which it claimed would
increase the costs from congestion, crashes, and
noise by about one third.
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However, if all other things are not
held constant, e.g., if new roads are built
to handle increasing traffic, the
commenter argued that ‘‘total
congestion does not necessarily increase
with increases in total vehicle miles
driven.’’ The commenter argued that
NHTSA should include an estimate of
the costs of building additional roads or
altering existing ones to mitigate
congestion due to the rebound effect.
That estimate should include
accounting for ‘‘the increasing difficulty
of building a new road in an urbanized
area,’’ which the commenter stated is
‘‘probably one of the best examples of
an activity that has rapidly increasing
marginal costs,’’ as well as the
environmental costs of building new
roads, i.e., costs due to sprawl. The
commenter asserted that ‘‘It is
incumbent upon NHTSA and the
Environmental Protection Agency to
produce an inclusive estimate of the
costs of the rebound effect—one that
either includes both increasing marginal
cost of congestion and the cost of the
new roads that will lead to increased
congestion.’’
The Mercatus Center also pointed out
an apparent inconsistency in the NPRM
in the reporting of FHWA’s estimates of
passenger car versus light truck costs for
increased congestion, crashes, and
noise.
For this final rule, NHTSA has
corrected the inconsistency in the
NPRM’s reporting of external costs from
additional automobile and light truck
use noted by the Mercatus Center.
NHTSA notes that congestion cost
associated with additional travel may be
particularly high if it occurs during peak
travel periods and on facilities that are
already heavily utilized. However, the
FHWA estimates of increased
congestion costs from added vehicle use
assume that the increase in travel is
distributed over the hours of the day
and among specific routes in proportion
to the existing temporal and geographic
distributions of total VMT. Thus while
some of the additional travel may
impose significant costs for additional
congestion and delays, much of it is
likely to occur at times and locations
where excess roadway capacity is
available and congestion costs imposed
by added vehicle use are minimal.
NHTSA believes it is reasonable to
assume that additional vehicle use due
to the fuel economy rebound effect will
be distributed over the day and among
locations in much the same way as
current travel is distributed. As a
consequence, the FHWA estimates of
congestion costs from increased vehicle
use are likely to provide more accurate
estimates of the increased congestion
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costs caused by added rebound-effect
driving than are the estimates submitted
by commenters, which apply to peak
travel periods and locations that
experience high traffic volumes. Thus in
the analysis supporting the final rule,
NHTSA has continued to rely upon the
FHWA values to estimate the increase in
congestion costs likely to result from
added rebound-effect driving.
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11. Petroleum Consumption and Import
Externalities
The NPRM also discussed the fact that
U.S. consumption and imports of
petroleum products also impose costs
on the domestic economy that are not
reflected in the market price for crude
petroleum, or in the prices paid by
consumers of petroleum products such
as gasoline. In economics literature on
this subject, these costs include (1)
higher prices for petroleum products
resulting from the effect of U.S. oil
import demand on the world oil price;
(2) the risk of disruptions to the U.S.
economy caused by sudden reductions
in the supply of imported oil to the U.S.;
and (3) expenses for maintaining a U.S.
military presence to secure imported oil
supplies from unstable regions, and for
maintaining the Strategic Petroleum
Reserve (SPR) to cushion against
resulting price increases.271 Higher U.S.
imports of crude oil or refined
petroleum products increase the
magnitude of these external economic
costs, thus increasing the true economic
cost of supplying transportation fuels
above the resource costs of producing
them. Conversely, reducing U.S. imports
of crude petroleum or refined fuels or
reducing fuel consumption can reduce
these external costs. Any reduction in
their total value that results from
improved passenger car and light truck
fuel economy represents an economic
benefit of setting more stringent CAFE
standards, in addition to the value of
fuel savings and emissions reductions
themselves.
NHTSA explained that increased U.S.
oil imports can impose higher costs on
all purchasers of petroleum products,
because the U.S. is a sufficiently large
purchaser of foreign oil supplies that
changes in U.S. demand can affect the
world price. The effect of U.S.
petroleum imports on world oil prices is
271 See, e.g., Bohi, Douglas R. and W. David
Montgomery (1982). Oil Prices, Energy Security,
and Import Policy, Washington, DC, Resources for
the Future, Johns Hopkins University Press; Bohi,
D.R. and M.A. Toman (1993). ‘‘Energy and Security:
Externalities and Policies,’’ Energy Policy 21: 1093–
1109; and Toman, M.A. (1993). ‘‘The Economics of
Energy Security: Theory, Evidence, Policy,’’ in A.V.
Kneese and J.L. Sweeney, eds. (1993). Handbook of
Natural Resource and Energy Economics, Vol. III,
Amsterdam, pp. 1167–1218.
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determined by the degree of OPEC
monopoly power over global oil
supplies, and the degree of monopsony
power over world oil demand exerted
by the U.S. The combination of these
two factors means that increases in
domestic demand for petroleum
products that are met through higher oil
imports can cause the price of oil in the
world market to rise, which imposes
economic costs on all other purchasers
in the global petroleum market in excess
of the higher prices paid by U.S.
consumers.272 Conversely, reducing
U.S. oil imports can lower the world
petroleum price, and thus generate
benefits to other oil purchasers by
reducing these ‘‘monopsony costs.’’
NHTSA stated that although the
degree of current OPEC monopoly
power is subject to debate, the
consensus appears to be that OPEC
remains able to exercise some degree of
control over the response of world oil
supplies to variation in world oil price
so that the world oil market does not
behave completely competitively.273
The extent of U.S. monopsony power is
determined by a complex set of factors,
including the relative importance of
U.S. imports in the world oil market,
and the sensitivity of petroleum supply,
and demand to its world price among
other participants in the international
oil market. Most evidence appears to
suggest that variation in U.S. demand
for imported petroleum continues to
exert some influence on world oil
prices, although this influence appears
to be limited.274
The second component of external
economic costs imposed by U.S.
petroleum imports that NHTSA
considered arises partly because an
increase in oil prices triggered by a
disruption in the supply of imported oil
reduces the level of output that the U.S.
economy can produce. The reduction in
272 For example, if the U.S imports 10 million
barrels of petroleum per day at a world oil price of
$20 per barrel, its total daily import bill is $200
million. If increasing imports to 11 million barrels
per day causes the world oil price to rise to $21 per
barrel, the daily U.S. import bill rises to $231
million. The resulting increase of $31 million per
day is attributable to increasing daily imports by
only 1 million barrels. This means that the
incremental cost of importing each additional barrel
is $31, or $10 more than the newly-increased world
price of $21 per barrel. This additional $10 per
barrel represents a cost imposed on all other
purchasers in the global petroleum market by U.S.
buyers, in excess of the price they pay to obtain
those additional imports.
273 For a summary of this issue, see Leiby, Paul
N., Donald W. Jones, T. Randall Curlee, and Russell
Lee, Oil Imports: An Assessment of Benefits and
Costs, ORNL–6851, Oak Ridge National Laboratory,
November 1, 1997, at 17. Available at https://
pzl1.ed.ornl.gov/ORNL6851.pdf (last accessed
August 26, 2008).
274 Id., at 18–19.
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potential U.S. economic output depends
on the extent and duration of the
increases in petroleum product prices
that result from a disruption in the
supply of imported oil, as well as on
whether and how rapidly these prices
return to pre-disruption levels. Even if
prices for imported oil return
completely to their original level,
however, economic output will be at
least temporarily reduced from the level
that would have been possible without
a disruption in oil supplies.
Because supply disruptions and
resulting price increases tend to occur
suddenly rather than gradually, they can
also impose costs on businesses and
households for adjusting their use of
petroleum products more rapidly than if
the same price increase had occurred
gradually over time. These adjustments
impose costs because they temporarily
reduce economic output even below the
level that would ultimately be reached
once the U.S. economy completely
adapted to higher petroleum prices. The
additional costs to businesses and
households reflect their inability to
adjust prices, output levels, and their
use of energy and other resources
quickly and smoothly in response to
rapid changes in prices for petroleum
products.
Since future disruptions in foreign oil
supplies are an uncertain prospect, each
of these disruption costs must be
adjusted by the probability that the
supply of imported oil to the U.S. will
actually be disrupted. The ‘‘expected
value’’ of these costs—the product of the
probability that an oil import disruption
will occur and the costs of reduced
economic output and abrupt adjustment
to sharply higher petroleum prices—is
the appropriate measure of their
magnitude. Any reduction in these
expected disruption costs resulting from
a measure that lowers U.S. oil imports
represents an additional economic
benefit beyond the direct value of
savings from reduced purchases of
petroleum products.
While the vulnerability of the U.S.
economy to oil price shocks is widely
thought to depend on total petroleum
consumption rather than on the level of
oil imports, variation in imports is still
likely to have some effect on the
magnitude of price increases resulting
from a disruption of import supply. In
addition, changing the quantity of
petroleum imported into the U.S. may
also affect the probability that such a
disruption will occur. If either the size
of the likely price increase or the
probability that U.S. oil supplies will be
disrupted is affected by oil imports, the
expected value of the costs from a
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supply disruption will also depend on
the level of imports.
NHTSA explained that businesses and
households use a variety of market
mechanisms, including oil futures
markets, energy conservation measures,
and technologies that permit rapid fuel
switching to ‘‘insure’’ against higher
petroleum prices and reduce their costs
for adjusting to sudden price increases.
While the availability of these market
mechanisms has likely reduced the
potential costs of disruptions to the
supply of imported oil, consumers of
petroleum products are unlikely to take
account of costs they impose on others,
so those costs are probably not reflected
in the price of imported oil. Thus,
changes in oil import levels probably
continue to affect the expected cost to
the U.S. economy from potential oil
supply disruptions, although this
component of oil import costs is likely
to be significantly smaller than
estimated by studies conducted in the
wake of the oil supply disruptions
during the 1970s.
The third component that NHTSA
identified of the external economic costs
of importing oil into the U.S. includes
government outlays for maintaining a
military presence to secure the supply
of oil imports from potentially unstable
regions of the world and to protect
against their interruption. Some analysts
also include outlays for maintaining the
U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR),
which is intended to cushion the U.S.
economy against the consequences of
disruption in the supply of imported oil,
as additional costs of protecting the U.S.
economy from oil supply disruptions.
NHTSA expressed its belief that while
costs for U.S. military security may vary
over time in response to long-term
changes in the actual level of oil imports
into the U.S., these costs are unlikely to
decline in response to any reduction in
U.S. oil imports resulting from raising
future CAFE standards for passenger
cars and light trucks. U.S. military
activities in regions that represent vital
sources of oil imports also serve a
broader range of security and foreign
policy objectives than simply protecting
oil supplies, and as a consequence are
unlikely to vary significantly in
response to changes in the level of oil
imports prompted by higher standards.
Similarly, NHTSA stated that while
the optimal size of the SPR from the
standpoint of its potential influence on
domestic oil prices during a supply
disruption may be related to the level of
U.S. oil consumption and imports, its
actual size has not appeared to vary in
response to recent changes in oil
imports. Thus while the budgetary costs
for maintaining the SPR are similar to
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other external costs in that they are not
likely to be reflected in the market price
for imported oil, these costs do not
appear to have varied in response to
changes in oil import levels.
In analyzing benefits from its recent
actions to increase light truck CAFE
standards for model years 2005–2007
and 2008–2011, NHTSA relied on a
1997 study by Oak Ridge National
Laboratory (ORNL) to estimate the value
of reduced economic externalities from
petroleum consumption and imports.275
More recently, ORNL updated its
estimates of the value of these
externalities, using the analytic
framework developed in its original
1997 study in conjunction with recent
estimates of the variables and
parameters that determine their
value.276 These include world oil prices,
current and anticipated future levels of
OPEC petroleum production, U.S. oil
import levels, the estimated
responsiveness of oil supplies and
demands to prices in different regions of
the world, and the likelihood of oil
supply disruptions. ORNL prepared its
updated estimates of oil import
externalities for use by EPA in
evaluating the benefits of reductions in
U.S. oil consumption and imports
expected to result from its Renewable
Fuel Standard Rule of 2007 (RFS).277
The updated ORNL study was
subjected to a detailed peer review by
experts nominated by EPA, and its
estimates of the value of oil import
externalities were subsequently revised
to reflect their comments and
recommendations.278 Specifically,
reviewers recommended that ORNL
increase its estimates of the sensitivity
of oil supply by non-OPEC producers
and oil demand by nations other than
the U.S. to changes in the world oil
price, as well as reduce its estimate of
the sensitivity of U.S. GDP to potential
sudden increases in world oil prices.
After making the revisions
recommended by peer reviewers,
ORNL’s updated estimates of the
monopsony cost associated with U.S. oil
imports ranged from $2.77 to $13.11 per
barrel, with a most likely estimate of
$7.41 per barrel (in 2005 dollars). These
estimates imply that each gallon of fuel
saved as a result of adopting higher
275 Id.
276 Leiby, Paul N., ‘‘Estimating the Energy
Security Benefits of Reduced U.S. Oil Imports: Final
Report,’’ Oak Ridge National Laboratory, ORNL/
TM–2007/028, Revised March 14, 2008. Available
at https://pzl1.ed.ornl.gov/energysecurity.html (click
on link below ‘‘Oil Imports Costs and Benefits’’)
(last accessed August 26, 2008).
277 72 FR 23899 (May 1, 2007).
278 Peer Review Report Summary: Estimating the
Energy Security Benefits of Reduced U.S. Oil
Imports, ICF, Inc., September 2007.
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CAFE standards will reduce the
monopsony costs of U.S. oil imports by
$0.066 to $0.312, with the most likely
value $0.176 per gallon saved. ORNL’s
updated and revised estimates of the
increase in the expected costs associated
with oil supply disruptions to the U.S.
and the resulting rapid increase in
prices for petroleum products amount to
$2.10 to $7.40 per barrel, with a likely
estimate of $4.59 per barrel (again in
2005 dollars). According to these
estimates, each gallon of fuel saved will
reduce the expected cost disruption to
the U.S. economy by $0.050 to $0.176
per gallon, with the most likely value
$0.109 per gallon.
NHTSA stated that when updated to
2006 dollars, the updated and revised
ORNL estimates suggest that the
combined reduction in monopsony
costs and expected costs to the U.S.
economy from oil supply disruptions
resulting from lower fuel consumption
total $0.120 to $0.504 per gallon, with
a most likely estimate of $0.295 per
gallon. This represents the additional
economic benefit likely to result from
each gallon of fuel saved by higher
CAFE standards, beyond the savings in
resource costs for producing and
distributing each gallon of fuel saved.
NHTSA explained that it employed this
most likely estimate in its analysis of
the benefits from fuel savings projected
to result from alternative CAFE
standards for MYs 2011–2015. NHTSA
also analyzed the effect on these
benefits estimates from variation in this
value over the range from $0.120 to
$0.504 per gallon of fuel saved.
NHTSA’s analysis of benefits from
alternative CAFE standards for the
NPRM did not include cost savings from
either reduced outlays for U.S. military
operations or maintaining a smaller SPR
among the external benefits of reducing
gasoline consumption and petroleum
imports by means of tightening future
standards. NHTSA stated that this view
concurs with both the original ORNL
study of economic costs from U.S. oil
imports and its recent update, which
conclude that savings in government
outlays for these purposes are unlikely
to result from reductions in
consumption of petroleum products and
oil imports on the scale of those likely
to result from reductions in
consumption of petroleum products and
oil imports on the scale of those likely
to result from the alternative increases
in CAFE standards considered for MYs
2011–2015.
All commenters addressing the issue
of military costs argued that NHTSA
should use a value higher than zero. Mr.
Delucchi, CARB, and the Attorneys
General all cited Mr. Delucchi’s 2008
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peer-reviewed article in Energy
Policy 279 to argue that military costs
should be higher than zero. CARB
commented that the study ‘‘undermines
the 15-year-old logic from a
Congressional Research Study, which
NHTSA appears to adopt here (page
24411), which concluded we have so
many other security interests in the
Middle East that sharply reducing oil
imports, therefore, would not affect our
military expense there.’’ CARB argued
that ‘‘to the contrary, the Energy Policy
study authors conclude ‘spending on
defense of the Persian Gulf is in fact
related to U.S. interests in the region,
which are mainly, but not entirely, oil
interests.’ ’’ CARB cited the study as
stating that the ‘‘best estimate of this
relationship translates to $0.03–$0.15
per gallon * * *’’ The Attorneys
General also cited the Energy Policy
article as assigning ‘‘values to the
military savings attributable to
decreased oil imports,’’ and referenced
the same per-gallon conclusion.
The Attorneys General also argued
that given that ‘‘one of the primary
purposes of EISA is to achieve energy
security,’’ and given that the ‘‘impact of
higher CAFE standards on energy
security is not zero,’’ it was
‘‘astounding’’ that ‘‘NHTSA assigned a
value of zero to the government outlay
aspect of energy security (increased
military spending and purchases for the
Strategic Petroleum Reserve).’’
(Emphasis in original.) The Attorneys
General compared NHTSA’s decision
not to monetize military security costs
in the NPRM to NHTSA’s decision not
to monetize benefits from reducing CO2
emissions in the April 2006 light truck
CAFE rule, and argued that the Ninth
Circuit’s decision in CBD supports their
position that ‘‘Uncertainty about a
benefit’s value is not a valid reason to
assign that value at zero.’’ 280 The
Attorneys General also argued that just
as increases in CAFE standards cannot
eliminate global warming, but are part
of the overall global warming solution,
increases in CAFE standards similarly
‘‘will not’’ in and of itself, eliminate
these energy security costs,’’ but are ‘‘a
necessary piece of the puzzle in
assessing all of the costs and benefits of
a CAFE standard.’’
CFA cited the same Delucchi article to
comment that ‘‘A zero for the military
and strategic value of oil reduction is
simply wrong.’’ CFA argued that ‘‘There
is a substantial policy and academic
279 Mark A. Delucchi and James J. Murphy, ‘‘U.S.
military expenditures to protect the use of Persian
Gulf oil for motor vehicles,’’ 36 Energy Policy 2253
(2008). Available at Docket No. NHTSA–2008–
0089–0173.14.
280 Citing CBD v. NHTSA, 508 F.3d 508, 533–35.
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literature that believes oil has a military
value,’’ and that ‘‘The fact the statute
had energy independence and security
in its title should have alerted NHTSA
to the likelihood that Congress
considers the military and strategic
value of oil important.’’ CFA provided
a fairly long excerpt from the Delucchi
article to argue that there may be large
unquantifiable costs beyond specific
expenditures on the military with regard
to the ‘‘entire relevant military or
‘security’ cost of using oil,’’ including
reduced flexibility in the conduct of U.S.
foreign policy, strains on international
relations due to the activities of the U.S.
military and even due to competition for oil,
anti-American sentiment due to the presence
of the U.S. military in the Middle East,
political destabilization of the Middle East,
and the nonfinancial human-suffering cost of
war and political instability related to U.S.
demand for oil.281
CFA concluded that ‘‘NHTSA should
have quantified what it could in the
framework of the model,’’ and ‘‘To the
extent that there is a large and
significant unquantifiable value, it
should have oriented its considerations
toward greater energy conservation.’’
CFA suggested a value of $0.30 for
military costs, apparently on the basis of
this argument.
Public Citizen also commented that
NHTSA’s value for military security
costs should be higher than zero. Public
Citizen stated that NHTSA’s rationale
for assigning a zero value was similar to
its logic in assigning a value of zero to
reducing CO2 emissions in the 2006
light truck CAFE final rule, and argued
that the Ninth Circuit had ‘‘rejected this
justification in Center for Biological
Diversity v. NHTSA, finding that
uncertainty about how to assign a value
was not a justification for setting the
value at zero.’’ NRDC and the Sierra
Club et al. also made this point in their
comments.
NRDC stated that ‘‘the undisputed fact
that there are currently military
expenditures associated with the
protection of access to oil supplies
implies that there must be a positive
military cost associated with each gallon
of gasoline consumed.’’ NRDC argued
that ‘‘Since it can be assumed that the
United States would expend little or no
military resources to secure access to a
non-strategic commodity, there must
exist a positive benefit in moving the
consumption to the point where oil is
no longer a strategic commodity.’’ NRDC
described this value as ‘‘the country’s
opportunity to decrease military
expenditure or respond more flexibly to
supply threats, and must have a positive
281 CFA
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magnitude.’’ NRDC suggested several
‘‘aggregate expenditure estimates
[produced] through rigorous, datadriven analysis’’ for NHTSA to consider,
including the estimate of $0.03 to $0.17
from the Delucchi article, a 2004
analysis for the National Commission on
Energy Policy estimating a ‘‘peacetime
per gallon’’ cost of $0.23 to $0.28, 282
and estimates of $0.14 to $0.26 per
gallon based on a 2005 study by the
International Center for Technology
Assessment.283 NRDC stated, however,
that because ‘‘current expenditures may
pale in comparison to the total future
financial cost of military actions,’’ ‘‘this
presents a strong rationale for using pergallon cost estimates near the upper
bound of the determined range.’’ NRDC
argued that ‘‘The initial [literature]
review herein suggests that the per
gallon marginal benefit of reducing oil
consumption may be as high as 28 cents
per gallon of gasoline.’’
The Sierra Club et al. commented that
NHTSA must ‘‘provide an accurate
dollar value for’’ ‘‘the national security
costs of oil,’’ by ‘‘considering the
relevant research.’’ Sierra Club argued
that the national security costs of oil are
twofold, coming from both climate
change and oil dependence. Regarding
the national security costs expected
from climate change, Sierra Club
commented that a recent ‘‘report from
the National Intelligence Council * * *
found that climate change poses a
serious national security threat to our
country,’’ in the form of ‘‘humanitarian
disasters, economic migration, and food
and water shortages’’ due to climate
change contributing to ‘‘political
instability, disputes over resources, and
mass migrations’’ in many ‘‘at-risk
regions’’ of the world, that will have
economic impacts in the United States.
Regarding the national security costs of
oil dependence, Sierra Club cited the
2005 ICTA report mentioned by NRDC
as an example of the ‘‘numerous studies
* * * [that] document these costs.’’
Although UCS offered no discussion
of military costs in its primary comment
document, it submitted as an
attachment a report suggesting that
NHTSA use a value of $0.35 per gallon
(in 2006 dollars) for ‘‘improved oil
security.’’ The report cited ‘‘A recent
study from Oak Ridge National
282 Jaffe, Amy Myers (2004). United States and
the Middle East: Policies and Dilemmas. Analysis
commissioned by the National Commission on
Energy Policy.
283 International Center for Technology
Assessment (2005). ‘‘Gasoline Cost Externalities:
Security and Protection Services.’’ NRDC stated that
it adjusted the estimates found in the study from
2005 values of 13 to 23 cents into 2008 values using
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Laboratory [which] assesses these
energy security benefits of reduced oil
consumption at $14.51 per barrel, or
$0.35 per gallon.’’ 284 The report stated
that ‘‘This is a conservative assessment,
as it excludes all military program costs,
as well as the ‘difficult-to-quantify
foreign policy impact of oil import
reliance.’ (Leiby 2007)’’
NHTSA received no comments on the
estimates of monopsony costs or
potential costs from oil supply
disruptions. Thus it has continued to
employ the estimates of these costs
reported in the updated ORNL study in
establishing final CAFE standards and
evaluating their benefits. The agency
notes, however, that the monopsony
cost varies directly with world oil
prices, and that the forecast of world oil
prices used in this analysis differs
significantly from that assumed in the
ORNL study. Thus NHTSA has adjusted
the updated ORNL estimate of the
monopsony cost to reflect the AEO 2008
High Price Case forecast of world oil
prices, which averages $88 per barrel (in
2007 dollars) over the period from
2011–30. Expressed in 2007 dollars,
NHTSA’s revised estimates of the
reductions in monopsony costs and
expected costs from oil supply
disruptions are $0.266 and $0.116 per
gallon of fuel saved.
NHTSA disagrees with commenters
who asserted that fuel savings resulting
from higher CAFE standards are likely
to result directly in reductions in U.S.
military expenses to protect the supply
of petroleum imports, particularly from
the Persian Gulf region. NHTSA agrees
that by reducing fuel consumption and
U.S. petroleum imports from politically
unstable regions, higher CAFE standards
might reduce the military and political
risks posed by U.S. military
deployments in these regions. However,
the agency does not believe there is
convincing evidence at this time that
reducing these risks would necessarily
reduce U.S. military activities or
expenditures in the Persian Gulf or
elsewhere. None of the commenters
presented any evidence that reductions
in U.S. military spending would occur
in response to fuel savings and
reductions in U.S. petroleum imports,
nor do any of the references included in
their comments provide such evidence.
In particular, NHTSA does not agree
with Public Citizen’s analogy between
energy security and ‘‘global warming
costs.’’ Although the economic
valuation of climate-related benefits
from reducing carbon dioxide emissions
is uncertain, there is nevertheless a
284 The report noted that it had updated this value
from 2004 dollars to 2006 dollars.
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direct causal link between changes in
U.S. oil consumption and changes in
U.S. carbon dioxide emissions. In
contrast, no such causal linkage—either
scientific or empirical—exists between
changes in U.S. oil consumption or
imports and changes in U.S. military
expenditures in the Persian Gulf, or
elsewhere in the world. The agency
notes that one particularly
comprehensive and authoritative
treatment of the potential security
benefits from reducing U.S. energy
consumption reaches exactly this same
conclusion.285
Although one recent economic
analysis cited widely by commenters
did estimate the value of U.S. military
spending attributable to securing oil
imports from the Persian Gulf region,
this study does not estimate the extent
to which U.S. military spending is likely
to vary in response to changes in U.S.
imports of Persian Gulf oil. Nor does it
estimate the potential savings in U.S.
military outlays that might result from
reductions in U.S. oil imports of the
magnitude likely to result from higher
CAFE standards.286
The study argues that its purpose is to
develop ‘‘the military cost of highway
transportation.’’ The authors attempt to
do this in four steps:
• Estimate the amount spent annually
to defend all U.S. interests in the
Persian Gulf;
• Deduct the cost of defending U.S.
interests other than oil in the Persian
Gulf;
• Deduct the cost of defending against
the possibility of a worldwide recession
due to the effects of an oil price shock
or supply interruption originating in the
Persian Gulf on other countries; and
• Deduct the cost of defending the
use of oil in sectors of the U.S. economy
other than highway transportation.
This analysis yields an estimate of the
annual ‘‘military cost of oil use by motor
vehicles’’ in the United States ranging
from $5.8 billion to $25.4 billion in
2004. The authors then divide these
figures by 2004 U.S. gasoline and diesel
consumption by on-road motor vehicles
to arrive at an average ‘‘military cost of
highway transportation’’ ranging from
$0.03 to $0.15 per gallon of fuel.287
However, the authors do not argue
that U.S. military spending would be
285 Douglas R. Bohi and Michael A. Toman,
Economics of Energy Security, Kluwer Academic
Publishers, 1996.
286 See Mark A. Delucchi and James J. Murphy,
U.S. Military Expenditures to Protect the Use of
Persian Gulf Oil Imports, 36 Energy Policy 2253
(2008) (assigning a cost of between $0.03 and $0.15
per gallon). Available at Docket No. NHTSA–2008–
0089–0173.14.
287 Id., at 2260.
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reduced by this—or any other—amount
as a consequence of incremental
reductions in domestic consumption of
transportation fuels. Instead, they
describe their estimate in the following
terms: ‘‘The bottom line of our analysis
is that if all motor vehicles in the U.S.
(light-duty and heavy-duty) did not use
oil, Congress might reduce defense
spending by $6–$25 billion annually in
the long run. This amounts to about
$0.03–$0.15 per gallon ($0.01–$0.04 per
liter) of all gasoline and diesel motor
fuel in 2004.’’ (p. 2260; emphasis
added.)
Thus the values they report are clearly
intended as estimates of the total and
average per-gallon costs of U.S. military
activities in the Persian Gulf that might
reasonably be related to petroleum
consumption by U.S. motor vehicles,
and not as estimates of the extent to
which those costs might be reduced as
a consequence of lower fuel
consumption by U.S. motor vehicles.
Nothing in their analysis suggests that
this average value bears any necessary
relationship to the savings in military
outlays that might results from modest
reductions in U.S. petroleum
consumption or imports. Although the
authors speculate that the proportional
reduction in these outlays might be
larger than any proportional reduction
in U.S. petroleum imports from the
Persian Gulf region, they provide no
support for this hypothesis.288
Nor does this study attempt to
demonstrate any causal or empirical
linkage between domestic consumption
of transportation fuels and the level of
U.S. military activities or spending in
the Persian Gulf (or elsewhere), as
would be required to support any
argument that military outlays would
actually be reduced in response to lower
U.S. fuel consumption and petroleum
imports. As the authors clearly
acknowledge, achieving any reduction
in U.S. military spending that might be
facilitated by lower U.S. oil imports
would require specific actions by
Congress, and would not result
automatically or necessarily. However
carefully their analysis of military
spending might be done, defining some
fraction of U.S. military expenditures as
being allocated to the defense of oil
interests in the Persian Gulf, and then
dividing the resulting figure by some
quantity of petroleum use does not
demonstrate any causal linkage between
changes in the numerator (military
spending) and incremental changes in
the denominator (petroleum
consumption) of this calculation.
288 Id.,
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The analysis described above is
irrelevant to NHTSA’s analysis of fuel
economy standards, because NHTSA’s
cost-benefit analysis is properly
concerned with comparing two
alternative states of the world: (1) The
world as we expect it to exist over the
next few years, in the absence of any
new CAFE standards, compared with (2)
an alternative world that is identical in
every respect except that new CAFE
standards are in place. NHTSA should,
therefore, consider how U.S. defense
expenditures might vary between these
two states of the world. The relevant
question for a cost-benefit analysis is:
How much would U.S. military
expenditures change if U.S. passengercar and light-truck fuel consumption is
several percent lower in the next decade
than it otherwise would have been?
Neither the Congress nor the
Executive Branch has ever attempted to
calibrate U.S. military expenditures,
force levels, or deployments to any oil
market variable, or to some calculation
of the projected economic consequences
of hostilities in the Persian Gulf.
Instead, changes in U.S. force levels,
deployments, and thus military
spending in that region have been
largely governed by political events,
emerging threats, and other military and
political considerations, rather than by
shifts in U.S. oil consumption or
imports. NHTSA thus concludes that
the levels of U.S. military activity and
expenditures are likely to remain
unaffected by even relatively large
changes in light duty vehicle fuel
consumption.
Nevertheless, the agency conducted a
sensitivity analysis of the potential
effect of assuming that some reduction
in military spending would result from
fuel savings and reduced petroleum
imports in order to investigate its
impacts on the standards and fuel
savings. Assuming that the preceding
estimate of total U.S. military costs for
securing Persian Gulf oil supplies is
correct, and that approximately half of
these expenses could be reduced in
proportion to a reduction in U.S. oil
imports from the region, the estimated
savings would range from $0.02 to $0.08
(in 2007 dollars) for each gallon of fuel
savings that was reflected in lower U.S.
imports of petroleum from the Persian
Gulf. If the Persian Gulf region is
assumed to be the marginal source of
supply for U.S. imports of crude
petroleum and refined products, then
each gallon of fuel saved might reduce
U.S. military outlays by $0.05 per
gallon, the midpoint of this range.
NHTSA employs this estimate in its
sensitivity analysis.
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While NHTSA believes that military
expenditures appropriated by the U.S.
Congress are not directly related to
changes in domestic petroleum
consumption, the agency recognizes that
reductions in petroleum consumption
may provide other benefits that are more
difficult to quantify, by reducing some
constraints on U.S. diplomatic and
military action. U.S. foreign policy
decisions consider a wide range of U.S.
interests, including the maintenance of
secure petroleum supplies. Reduced
consumption of petroleum might allow
the U.S. to more vigorously pursue other
foreign policy interests, by reducing
concerns about the implications of
pursuing these other interests for the
availability and continuity of petroleum
imports.
The agency recognizes, however, that
both the effect of reducing U.S.
petroleum imports on the flexibility of
its foreign policy initiatives and the
economic value of such additional
flexibility are highly uncertain.
Reducing petroleum consumption is
likely to have unpredictable effects on
both military actions and diplomatic
initiatives, and even if the U.S.
government planned and signaled its
foreign policy intentions under various
levels of petroleum consumption in
advance, NHTSA is unaware of any
accepted methods for establishing the
economic value of increased freedom in
designing military or diplomatic
actions. And because the nation’s
foreign policy intentions are not
communicated in advance, the agency
would need to develop a procedure for
anticipating how military and
diplomatic actions would respond to
future changes in petroleum
consumption. Nevertheless, in its future
rulemaking activities, NHTSA will
investigate whether practical methods
for predicting and valuing in economic
terms any increased flexibility in U.S.
foreign policy that is likely to result
from reduced petroleum imports exist or
can be developed.
12. Air Pollutant Emissions
(a) Impacts on Criteria Pollutant
Emissions
Criteria air pollutants are common
pollutants that EPA regulates under the
Clean Air Act, by establishing
permissible concentrations on the basis
of human health-related or sciencebased criteria.289 NHTSA explained in
the NPRM that while reductions in
domestic fuel refining and distribution
that result from lower fuel consumption
will reduce U.S. emissions of criteria air
pollutants, additional vehicle use
associated with the rebound effect from
higher fuel economy will in turn
increase emissions of those pollutants.
Thus, the net effect of stricter CAFE
standards on emissions of each criteria
pollutant depends on the relative
magnitudes of its reduced emissions in
fuel refining and distribution, and
increases in its emissions from vehicle
use. Because the relationship between
emissions rates in fuel refining 290 and
in vehicle use 291 is different for each
criteria pollutant, the net effect of fuel
savings from the proposed standards on
total emissions of each pollutant is
likely to differ. Criteria air pollutants
emitted by vehicles and during fuel
production include carbon monoxide
(CO), hydrocarbon compounds (usually
referred to as ‘‘volatile organic
compounds’’ or VOCs), nitrogen oxides
(NOX), fine particulate matter (PM2.5)
and sulfur oxides (SOX).
For additional vehicle use due to the
rebound effect, NHTSA estimates the
increase in emissions of these pollutants
by multiplying the increase in total
miles driven by vehicles of each model
year and age by age-specific emission
rates per vehicle-mile for each pollutant.
NHTSA developed these emission rates
using EPA’s MOBILE6.2 motor vehicle
emissions factor model.292 Emissions of
these pollutants also occur during crude
oil extraction and transportation, fuel
refining, and fuel storage and
distribution. The reduction in total
emissions from each of these sources
thus depends on the extent to which
fuel savings result in lower imports of
refined fuel, or in reduced domestic fuel
refining. To a lesser extent, they also
depend on whether any reduction in
domestic gasoline refining is translated
into reduced imports of crude oil or
reduced domestic extraction of
petroleum.
Based on an analysis of changes in
U.S. gasoline imports and domestic
gasoline consumption forecast in AEO’s
2008 Early Release, NHTSA tentatively
estimated in the NPRM that 50 percent
of fuel savings resulting from higher
CAFE standards would result in
reduced imports of refined gasoline,
while the remaining 50 percent would
290 That
289 Criteria
pollutants regulated by EPA include
ozone, particulate matter, carbon monoxide,
nitrogen oxides, sulfur dioxide, and lead. For more
information, see https://www.epa.gov/air/urbanair/
(last accessed October 5, 2008).
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is, emissions per gallon of fuel refined.
is, emissions per mile driven.
292 U.S. EPA, MOBILE6 Vehicle Emission
Modeling Software, available at https://
www.epa.gov/otaq/m6.htm#m60 (last accessed
October 5, 2008).
291 That
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reduce domestic fuel refining.293 The
reduction in domestic refining was
assumed to leave its sources of crude
petroleum unchanged from the mix of
90 percent imports and 10 percent
domestic production projected by AEO.
For fuel refining and distribution,
NHTSA proposed to estimate criteria
pollutant emission reductions using
emission rates from Argonne National
Laboratories’ Greenhouse Gases and
Regulated Emissions in Transportation
(GREET) model.294 The GREET model
provides separate estimates of air
pollutant emissions that occur in four
phases of fuel production and
distribution: Crude oil extraction, crude
oil transportation and storage, fuel
refining, and fuel distribution and
storage.295 NHTSA tentatively assumed,
for purposes of the NPRM analysis, that
reductions in imports of refined fuel
would reduce criteria pollutant
emissions during fuel storage and
distribution only. Reductions in
domestic fuel refining using imported
crude oil as a feedstock were tentatively
assumed to reduce emissions during
crude oil transportation and storage, as
well as during gasoline refining,
distribution, and storage, because less of
each of these activities would be
occurring. Similarly, reduced domestic
fuel refining using domestically
produced crude oil was tentatively
assumed to reduce emissions during
phases of gasoline production and
distribution.296
The net changes in emissions of each
criteria pollutant were calculated by
293 Estimates of the response of gasoline imports
and domestic refining to fuel savings from stricter
standards are variable and highly uncertain, but
NHTSA’s preliminary analysis as of the time the
NPRM was published indicated that under any
reasonable assumption about these responses, the
magnitude of the net change in criteria pollutant
emissions (accounting for both the rebound effect
and changes in refining emissions) is extremely low
relative to their current total.
294 Argonne National Laboratories, The
Greenhouse Gas and Regulated Emissions from
Transportation (GREET) Model, Version 1.8.
Available at https://www.transportation.anl.gov/
software/GREET/ (last accessed October
5, 2008).
295 Emissions that occur during vehicle refueling
at service stations (primarily evaporative emissions
of VOCs) are already accounted for in the ‘‘tailpipe’’
emission factors used to estimate the emissions
generated by increased car and light truck use.
GREET estimates emissions in each phase of
gasoline production and distribution in mass per
unit of gasoline energy content; these factors are
then converted to mass per gallon of gasoline using
the average energy content of gasoline.
296 As NHTSA stated in the NPRM, in effect, this
assumes that the distances crude oil travels to U.S.
refineries are approximately the same whether the
oil travels from domestic oilfields or import
terminals, and that the distances that gasoline
travels from refineries to retail stations are
approximately the same as those from import
terminals to retail stations.
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adding the increases in their emissions
that result from increased vehicle use
and the reductions that result from
lower domestic fuel refining and
distribution. The net change in
emissions of each criteria pollutant was
converted to an economic value using
estimates of the economic damage costs
per ton emitted 297 developed by EPA
and submitted to OMB for review. For
certain criteria pollutants, EPA
estimates different per-ton costs for
emissions from vehicle use than for
emissions of the same pollutant during
fuel production, reflecting differences in
their typical geographic distributions,
contributions to ambient pollution
levels, and resulting population
exposure.
NHTSA received comments on this
issue from the Alliance, NADA, the Air
Improvement Resources Committee of
the Alamo Area Council of
Governments, and an individual, Mr.
Mark Delucchi. Mr. Delucchi
commented that NHTSA should clarify
what kinds of damages are included in
the per-ton damage cost estimates for
criteria pollutants and CO2. He
suggested that if NHTSA’s estimates are
based on EPA’s damage estimates, then
they do not include health damages,
visibility, crop damages, materials
damages, and natural-ecosystem
damages. Mr. Delucchi argued that
NHTSA should include estimates for
these additional categories of damage
due to pollutants, and that the agency
‘‘can find peer-reviewed estimates of
damages in most of these categories on
[his] faculty web page.’’
The Air Improvement Resources
Committee of the Alamo Area Council
of Governments (Texas) did not
comment specifically on NHTSA’s
estimates for criteria pollutants, but
simply expressed its support for the
proposed standards due to the fact that
they would ‘‘create net reductions in
oxides of nitrogen over the lifetimes of
Model Years 2011–2015 vehicles, and
the San Antonio region is NOX limited,
meaning reducing NOX emissions in the
region will have a greater impact on
ozone levels than would comparable
volatile organic compound (VOC)
reductions.’’ The AIRC stated that
‘‘Although the proposed rulemaking
would create a net increase in VOCs, the
NOX increase is of greater benefit for
ozone formation in our region,’’ and
therefore the AIRC supported the
proposed standards.
The Alliance commented more
specifically on NHTSA’s estimates for
criteria pollutants, arguing that
297 These costs result primarily from damages to
human health.
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NHTSA’s estimates of reductions in
ozone precursors were overstated for
two main reasons: First, because
‘‘NHTSA did not properly take into
account the new source review
standards [under the Clean Air Act], and
otherwise assumed away federal (and
state) laws that would have the effect of
requiring offsets from the upstream
refineries that NHTSA attempts to claim
credit for;’’ and second, because ‘‘there
is no indication that NHTSA has * * *
considered the fleet turnover effect,’’
‘‘meaning that the significant costs
NHTSA will add to the price of new
vehicles will delay the transition the
market would naturally make to more
fuel efficient and cleaner vehicles.’’
NADA also argued that the ‘‘Criteria
pollutant reduction benefits associated
with the proposed CAFE standards are
overstated as the negative impact of
inhibited fleet turnover was not
accounted for.’’
As support for its comment that
NHTSA had overlooked federal and
state laws that would impact upstream
criteria pollutant emissions, the
Alliance cited both the Sierra Research
and the NERA Reports it included as
attachments to its comments. Sierra
Research commented that ‘‘Most
upstream emissions associated with the
use of gasoline * * * in areas with air
pollution problems’’ are already subject
to air pollution control regulations, such
that ‘‘changes in fuel type or the volume
of fuel produced are governed by * * *
offset requirements and credit
provisions.’’ Sierra Research argued that
the GREET model used by NHTSA
ignores the impacts of these regulations,
by assuming that reductions in gasoline
consumption translate directly into
reductions in pollutant emissions.
However, Sierra argued, in tightly
regulated areas of the country, the air
pollution control system will be much
more complicated than that, such that
any ‘‘give’’ in one part of the pollution
control system will simply be absorbed
by another part, and there will be no net
reduction in emissions for that area.
Sierra also argued that the GREET
model does not properly account for
‘‘marketing’’ (i.e., from gasoline station)
emissions, which have been reduced in
recent years due to proliferating vapor
recovery system regulations at the state
and local levels.
The NERA Report first argued that
NHTSA had overestimated the amount
of criteria pollutant emissions that
would be reduced. It echoed Sierra
Research’s comment about New Source
Review standards impacting criteria
pollutant emissions, but argued further
that their analysis of total emissions
estimates for refineries in the National
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Emission Inventory database for 2002
suggested that NHTSA had substantially
overestimated NOX and PM2.5
emissions, by ‘‘more than two and three
times * * *, respectively.’’ NERA
compared NEI database refinery
emissions estimates for 2002 to
‘‘estimates of refining emissions based
on NHTSA’s emission factors for
refineries and U.S. production of
gasoline and diesel fuels in that same
year (EPA 2002),’’ assuming that
NHTSA’s estimates should be smaller,
since ‘‘refineries produce other products
besides gasoline and diesel fuel.’’
However, NERA found that ‘‘estimates
based on NHTSA’s rates for only two
refinery products (gasoline and diesel
fuel) are larger than the NEI estimates
for all refinery operations.’’ NERA thus
concluded that NHTSA had
overestimated the benefits associated
with reducing criteria pollutant
emissions, because it had overestimated
the amount of criteria pollutant
emissions that would be reduced. NERA
also stated that to the extent that fuel
consumption was reduced in the longrun, refineries would be subject to more
stringent emissions standards anyway,
or fuel imports would be reduced,
which would have no impact on U.S.
emissions, although NERA did not
attempt to quantify those effects.
The NERA Report next argued that
NHTSA had used ‘‘ad hoc’’ estimates of
the value per ton of criteria pollutants
based on recommendations from EPA’s
OTAQ, which were unverifiable. NERA
implied that NHTSA should instead use
‘‘values based on published EPA
estimates,’’ which it found included in
a 2006 report by OMB to Congress.
NERA stated that ‘‘OMB’s values are
slightly higher than NHTSA’s for VOCs,
but substantially lower for PM2.5 and
SOX.’’
The NERA Report finally argued that
‘‘increasing quality-adjusted new
vehicle prices will lead to an increase in
the average age of the vehicle fleet,
[which] will increase emissions both
because older vehicles faced less
stringent emission standards when sold
and because the effectiveness of controls
(especially those for NOX) declines as
the vehicle ages.’’ NERA did not,
however, attempt to quantify these
emissions impacts. The Alliance in its
comments emphasized this point about
the fleet turnover effect, stating that it
‘‘shows that most criteria pollutant and
air toxic levels will worsen for decades
in consequence of NHTSA’s proposed
standards, as consumers delay
purchasing new, more fuel-efficient
vehicles in the current marketplace
prior to an expensive new government
mandate.’’ The Alliance argued that
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EPCA and principles of administrative
law require NHTSA to consider this
effect.298
Agency response: In response to Mr.
Delucchi’s comment, NHTSA is
confident that the damage cost estimates
it used in the NPRM to value reductions
in criteria air pollutants and their
chemical precursors include the full
range of human health impacts known
to be associated with exposure to each
of these pollutants that current scientific
and economic knowledge allows to be
quantified and valued in economic
terms. Differences between these
damage costs and the estimates by OMB
cited by commenters reflect the fact that
the estimates provided to NHTSA by
EPA apply specifically to emissions by
motor vehicles, and include separate
costs for emissions from stationary
sources such as petroleum refineries
where such differences are appropriate.
The estimates provided by EPA also
reflect more up-to-date knowledge about
the human health impacts of exposure
to criteria air pollutants and the
economic costs associated with those
impacts than do the estimates reported
by OMB. Thus in the analysis it
conducted for this final rule, NHTSA
has continued to use the damage cost
estimates supplied by EPA to determine
the economic costs or benefits from
changes in emissions of criteria air
pollutants that result from higher CAFE
standards.
In response to comments provided by
NERA on behalf of the Alliance, NHTSA
acknowledges that it may have
overestimated reductions in upstream
emissions of some criteria air pollutants
(particularly PM and NOX) resulting
from fuel savings in the analysis it
conducted for the NPRM. NHTSA has
taken two steps to remedy this possible
overestimation. First, the agency used
updated emission factors supplied by
EPA for vehicles used to transport crude
petroleum and refined fuel, including
ocean tankers, railroad locomotives,
barges, and heavy-duty trucks, to
recalculate the emissions factors for
each stage of fuel production and
distribution in Argonne’s GREET model.
These updated emission factors reflect
298 NHTSA notes that the Alliance also included
a Sierra Research report previously submitted to
EPA in connection with California’s waiver
application regarding the fleet-turnover effect with
respect to California’s proposed GHG emissions
standards, as Attachment 14 to the Alliance’s
comments. NHTSA has not summarized the
findings of that report in detail because it believes
that the purpose for which the Alliance submitted
the report is already captured by the NERA Report
comments, and because the fleet-turnover effect due
to California’s proposed standards would have no
direct impact on NHTSA’s decision for the final
rule.
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the effects of recent and pending EPA
regulations on vehicle emissions and
fuel composition, and result in
significant reductions in the upstream
emission rates for fuel production and
distribution estimated using GREET.
These lower upstream emission rates
reduce NHTSA’s estimates of emissions
during fuel production and distribution
under both Baseline and alternative
CAFE standards, and by doing so also
lower the reductions in upstream
emissions projected to result from any
increase in CAFE standards from their
Baseline levels.
In addition, NHTSA notes that the
estimates of reductions in upstream
emissions it reported in the NPRM
incorrectly included reductions in
ocean tanker emissions for
transportation of crude petroleum from
overseas to ports or offshore oil
terminals in the U.S. Since most of these
emissions probably occur outside of the
U.S., they should not be included in
NHTSA’s estimates of upstream
emissions reductions, since those are
intended to represent changes in
domestic emissions of criteria air
pollutants.299 NHTSA has revised its
analysis for this final rule to exclude
reductions in ocean tanker emissions.
In response to comments by Sierra
Research and NERA submitted by the
Alliance, NHTSA notes that there are
currently two cap-and-trade programs
governing emissions of criteria
pollutants by large stationary sources.
The Acid Rain Program seeks to limit
NOX and SO2 emissions, but applies
only to electric generating facilities.300
The NOX Budget Trading Program is
also primarily intended to reduce
electric utility emissions, but does
include some other large industrial
sources such as refineries; however, as
of 2003, refineries participating in the
program accounted for less than 5
percent of total NOX emissions by U.S.
refineries.301 In addition, some
299 Emissions from ocean tankers while in port
areas, as well as pipeline or truck emissions
occurring during transportation of crude petroleum
from import terminals to U.S. refineries, do occur
within the U.S., and reductions in these emissions
should be included when estimating changes in
domestic emissions. However, it is not possible to
separate these emissions from those that occur in
foreign ports or on the open oceans, so NHTSA’s
analysis does not include reductions in them. As a
consequence, the analysis may underestimate
reductions in upstream emissions occurring within
the U.S.
300 For a detailed description of the Acid Rain
program, see https://www.epa.gov/airmarkt/
progsregs/arp/basic.html#princips (last accessed
October 6, 2008).
301 Estimated from EPA, NO Budget Trading
X
Program (SIP Call) 2003 Progress Report, Appendix
A, https://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/cmprpt/nox03/
NBP2003AppendixA.xls, and National Air Quality
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refineries could be included among the
sources of NOX emissions that will be
controlled under EPA’s Clean Air
Interstate Rule, which is scheduled to
take effect beginning in 2009. However,
refinery NOX emissions could only be
affected in states that specifically elect
to include sources other than electric
generating facilities in their plans to
comply with the rule, and EPA has
indicated that it expects states to
achieve the emissions reductions
required by the Clean Air Interstate Rule
primarily from the electric power
industry.302 Thus, the agency continues
to assume that the reduction in
domestic gasoline refining estimated to
result from the adopted CAFE standard
will be reflected in reduced refinery
emissions of criteria pollutants.
NHTSA also notes in response to
comments by Sierra Research and NERA
submitted by the Alliance that
emissions occurring during refueling at
retail stations are included in the
emissions factors estimated using EPA’s
MOBILE emission factor model, which
also accounts for expected future
reductions in these emissions. Thus,
NHTSA believes that reductions in
refueling emissions were correctly
estimated in its NPRM analysis, and has
not revised its procedures for doing so.
Finally, in response to comments by
the Alliance and NERA, NHTSA
acknowledges that the effect of higher
prices for new vehicles on the retention
and use of older vehicles is potentially
significant, depending on the magnitude
of expected price increases. As
indicated in the discussion of the
appropriate discount rate to use in
analyzing the impacts of alternative
CAFE standards (see Section V.B.14
below), however, NHTSA believes that
manufacturers are likely to experience
difficulty raising prices for new cars and
light trucks sufficiently to recover all
their costs for complying with higher
CAFE standards. Based on a detailed
econometric analysis of the effects of
new vehicle prices and other variables
on retirement rates for used vehicles
and Emissions Trends Report 2003, Table A–4,
https://www.epa.gov/air/airtrends/aqtrnd03/pdfs/
a4.pdf.
302 The Clean Air Interstate Rule also requires
reductions in SO2 emissions and establishes an
emissions trading program to achieve them, but
only electric generating facilities are included in the
rule’s SO2 emissions trading program; see EPA,
Clean Air Interstate Rule: Basic Information, https://
www.epa.gov/cair/basic.html#timeline (last
accessed October 6, 2008) and https://www.epa.gov/
cair/pdfs/cair_final_fact.pdf (last accessed October
6, 2008). Although the rule was held to exceed the
scope of EPA’s delegated authority under the CAA,
North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896 (2008), the
Court remanded the rule to EPA and so it remains
in force. Order of December 23, 2008 in No. 05–
1244.
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very similar to the analysis conducted
by NERA for the Alliance, NHTSA
concludes that price increases for MY
2011 cars and light trucks likely to
result from higher CAFE standards are
unlikely to cause significant or lasting
changes in retirement rates for older
vehicles. NHTSA also notes that the
vehicles whose retirement rates would
be most affected by increases in prices
for MY 2011 passenger cars and light
trucks are those that will be 10–15 years
of age at the time when 2011 vehicles
are offered for sale.303 These include
cars and light trucks produced during
model years 2001 through 2005, and
NHTSA’s analysis of their emission
rates at those ages predicted using EPA’s
MOBILE6.2 motor vehicle emission
factor model suggests that they will not
be dramatically higher than emission
rates for comparable new 2011 models.
Thus the effect on total motor vehicle
emissions of criteria air pollutants
resulting from any reduction in new
vehicle sales and accompanying
increase in use of older vehicles caused
by increased prices for new 2011 cars
and light trucks is likely to be modest.
In its future CAFE rulemaking
activities, NHTSA will coordinate with
EPA to develop updated estimates for
the economic benefits that are likely to
result from reducing motor vehicle
emissions of criteria air pollutants and
the resulting atmospheric
concentrations of these pollutants. EPA
maintains an on-going research program
to document, estimate, and value the
reduction in threats to human health
that occur in response to declines in
atmospheric pollutant levels and
population exposure to harmful
concentrations of these pollutants. At
the same time, the agency will
incorporate recent improvements in
EPA’s motor vehicle emission factor
models to increase the accuracy of its
estimates of changes in criteria pollutant
emissions resulting from increased fuel
economy. Similarly, the agency will also
support any efforts by EPA to develop
comparable estimates of the economic
value of reduced threats to human
health that result from lower emissions
of hazardous air pollutants by motor
vehicles, while continuing to improve
its methods for estimating reductions in
emissions of these pollutants that result
from increased fuel efficiency.
303 This conclusion is based on unpublished
econometric analysis of the effects of new vehicle
prices and other variables on retirement rates for
used vehicles conducted by the Volpe Center. This
analysis concluded that retirement rates for 10–15
year old vehicles are most sensitive to changes in
new vehicle prices.
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(b) Reductions in CO2 Emissions
In the NPRM, NHTSA also discussed
the fact that fuel savings from stricter
CAFE standards result in lower
emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2), the
main greenhouse gas emitted as a result
of refining, distributing, and using
transportation fuels. Lower fuel
consumption reduces CO2 emissions
directly, because the primary source of
transportation-related CO2 emissions is
fuel combustion in internal combustion
engines. NHTSA tentatively estimated
reductions in carbon dioxide emissions
resulting from fuel savings by assuming
that the entire carbon content of
gasoline, diesel, and other fuels is
converted to carbon dioxide during the
combustion process.304
Reduced fuel consumption also
reduces carbon dioxide emissions that
result from the use of carbon-based
energy sources during fuel production
and distribution.305 For purposes of the
NPRM, NHTSA estimated the
reductions in CO2 emissions during
each phase of fuel production and
distribution using CO2 emission rates
obtained from the GREET model
discussed above, using the previous
assumptions about how fuel savings are
reflected in reductions in each phase.
The total reduction in CO2 emissions
from the improvement in fuel economy
under each alternative CAFE standard is
the sum of the reductions in emissions
from reduced fuel use and from lower
fuel production and distribution.
NHTSA stated in the NPRM that it
had not attempted to estimate changes
in emissions of other GHGs, in
particular methane, nitrous oxide, and
304 NHTSA explained that this assumption results
in a slight overestimate of carbon dioxide
emissions, since a small fraction of the carbon
content of gasoline is emitted in the forms of carbon
monoxide and unburned hydrocarbons. However,
the magnitude of this overestimate is likely to be
extremely small. This approach is consistent with
the recommendation of the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change for ‘‘Tier 1’’ national greenhouse
gas emissions inventories. Cf. Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change, 2006 Guidelines for
National Greenhouse Gas Inventories, Volume 2,
Energy, Chapter 3, ‘‘Mobile Combustion,’’ at 3.16.
See https://www.ipcc-nggip.iges.or.jp/public/2006gl/
pdf/2_Volume2/V2_3_Ch3_Mobile_Combustion.pdf
(last accessed October 6, 2008).
305 NHTSA did not, for purposes of the NPRM,
attempt to estimate changes in upstream emissions
of GHGs other than CO2. This was because carbon
dioxide from final combustion itself accounts for
nearly 97 percent of the total CO2-equivalent
emissions from petroleum production and use, even
with other GHGs that result from those activities
(principally methane and nitrous oxide) weighed by
their higher global warming potentials (GWPs)
relative to CO2. Calculated from EPA’s Inventory of
U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks 1990–
2006, Tables 3–3, 3–39, and 3–41, EPA 430–R–08–
05, April 15, 2008. Available at https://www.epa.gov/
climatechange/emissions/downloads/08_CR.pdf
(last accessed August 15, 2008).
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hydrofluorocarbons,306 and invited
comment on the importance and
potential implications of doing so under
NEPA.
NHTSA received two comments on
this issue. The Alliance commented that
NHTSA’s decision not to address other
GHGs was within the agency’s
discretion for two reasons. First,
because as the Alliance stated that
NHTSA suggested in the NPRM,
‘‘analyzing the emissions of GHGs other
than CO2 simply does not have a large
effect on any analysis of potential GHG
benefits as connected to CAFE standard
setting,’’ which the Alliance argued
CARB also implicitly agreed with by
denominating other GHGs in CO2equivalents. The Alliance stated that
even though other GHGs have higher
global warming potentials than CO2,
‘‘even factoring GWP into the analysis
still leaves the other GHGs with little
significance to any consideration of the
benefits of more-stringent CAFE
standards.’’ The Alliance further argued
that the Ninth Circuit decision only
concerned NHTSA’s valuation of CO2,
so that NHTSA had no obligation under
case law to monetize the effects of other
GHGs as long as it evaluates them
qualitatively.307
CBD, in contrast, agreed with NHTSA
that other GHGs make up only a small
portion of the total GHGs emitted from
automobiles. However, CBD argued that
these other GHG emissions ‘‘* * *
nonetheless represent large amounts of
greenhouse gases and must be included
in both the economic and
environmental analyses.’’ CBD gave the
example that ‘‘* * * nitrous oxide
emissions with greenhouse gas impacts
equivalent to 29 million metric tons of
CO2 are far from insignificant.’’ NHTSA
also notes that EPA’s TSD on reducing
GHG emissions, which was submitted as
an attachment to EDF’s comments,
considers GHGs generally rather than
focusing on CO2.
In response to the comment from
CBD, NHTSA has prepared detailed
estimates of changes in emissions of
certain non-CO2 GHGs, including
methane and nitrous oxide, that would
result from alternative CAFE standards
for 2011–15 passenger cars and light
trucks. These estimates are reported in
the Final Environmental Impact
Statement accompanying this rule.308
Because the estimated reductions in
emissions of these non-CO2 GHGs
represent a small fraction of reductions
in CO2 emissions, however, and because
they are less reliable than the estimates
of reductions in CO2 itself, NHTSA has
not included the economic value of
reductions in non-CO2 GHGs in its
estimates of economic benefits from
higher CAFE standards.309
306 This was because methane and nitrous oxide
account for less than 3 percent of the tailpipe GHG
emissions from passenger cars and light trucks,
while CO2 emissions account for the remaining 97
percent. Of the total (including non-tailpipe) GHG
emissions from passenger cars and light trucks,
tailpipe CO2 represents about 93.1 percent, tailpipe
methane and nitrous oxide represent about 2.4
percent, and hydrofluorocarbons (from air
conditioner leaks) represent about 4.5 percent.
Calculated from EPA’s Inventory of U.S.
Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks 1990–2006,
Table 215, EPA 430–R–08–05, April 15, 2008.
Available at https://www.epa.gov/climatechange/
emissions/downloads/08_CR.pdf (last accessed
August 15, 2008).
307 The Alliance cited Center for Auto Safety v.
Peck, 751 F.2d 1336, 1367, 1368 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(Scalia, J.) (upholding agency decision predicated
upon weighing of non-monetized and monetized
benefits against monetized costs).
308 The FEIS is available at Docket No. NHTSA–
2008–0060–0605.
309 Expressed in CO -equivalent terms using
2
global warming potentials estimated by IPCC, the
reductions in methane and nitrous oxide emissions
represent only about 3% of the estimated reduction
in CO2 itself. NHTSA views its estimates of nonCO2 GHGs as less reliable than those of CO2 itself
partly because the vehicle emission factors for
methane and nitrous oxide obtained from
documentation for EPA’s MOVES motor vehicle
emission factor model assume little or no change
over future model years or with vehicle age, in
contrast to the pronounced declines projected for
emissions of criteria air pollutants and CO2.
Similarly, the emission factors for non-CO2 GHGs
during gasoline and diesel production and
distribution that are utilized in Argonne’s GREET
model are assumed to be fixed over the period
spanned by NHTSA’s analysis, again in contrast to
those for criteria air pollutants and CO2.
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(c) Economic Value of Reductions in
CO2 Emissions
Emissions of carbon dioxide and other
greenhouse gases (GHGs) occur
throughout the process of producing
and distributing transportation fuels, as
well as from fuel combustion itself. By
reducing the volume of fuel consumed
by passenger cars and light trucks,
higher CAFE standards will thus reduce
GHG emissions generated by fuel use, as
well as throughout the fuel supply
cycle. Lowering these emissions is
likely to slow the projected pace and
reduce the ultimate extent of future
changes in the global climate, thus
reducing future economic damages that
changes in the global climate are
otherwise expected to cause. Further, by
reducing the probability that climate
changes with potentially catastrophic
economic or environmental impacts will
occur, lowering GHG emissions may
also result in economic benefits that
exceed the resulting reduction in the
expected future economic costs caused
by gradual changes in the earth’s
climatic systems.
Quantifying and monetizing benefits
from reducing GHG emissions is thus an
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important step in estimating the total
economic benefits likely to result from
establishing higher CAFE standards.
Since direct estimates of the economic
benefits from reducing GHG emissions
are generally not reported in published
literature on the impacts of climate
change, these benefits are typically
assumed to be the ‘‘mirror image’’ of the
estimated incremental costs resulting
from an increase in those emissions.
That is, the benefits from reducing
emissions are usually measured by the
savings in estimated economic damages
that an equivalent increase in emissions
would otherwise have caused.
Researchers usually estimate the
economic costs of increased GHG
emissions in several steps. The first is
to project future changes in the global
climate and the resulting economic
damages that are expected to result
under a baseline projection of net global
GHG emissions. These projections are
usually developed using models that
relate concentrations of GHGs in the
earth’s atmosphere to changes in
summary measures of the global climate
such as temperature and sea levels, and
in turn estimate the reductions in global
economic output that are expected to
result from changes in climate. Since
the effects of GHG emissions on the
global climate occur decades or even
centuries later, and there is considerable
inertia in the earth’s climate systems,
changes in the global climate and the
resulting economic impacts must be
estimated over a comparably long future
period.
Next, this same process is used to
project future climate changes and
resulting economic damages under the
assumption that GHG emissions
increase by some increment during a
stated future year. The increase in
projected global economic damages
resulting from the assumed increase in
future GHG emissions, which also
occurs over a prolonged period
extending into the distant future,
represents the added economic costs
resulting from the assumed increase in
emissions. Discounted to its current
value as of the year when the increase
in emissions are expected to occur and
expressed per unit of GHG emissions
(usually per ton of carbon emissions,
with non-CO2 GHGs converted to their
equivalents in terms of carbon
emissions), the resulting value
represents the global economic cost of
increasing GHG emissions by one unit—
usually a metric ton of carbon—in a
stated future year. This value is often
referred to in published research and
debates over climate policy as the Social
Cost of Carbon (SCC), and applies
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specifically to increased emissions
during that year.
This process involves multiple
sources of uncertainty, including those
in scientific knowledge about the effects
of varying levels of GHG emissions on
the magnitude and timing of changes in
the functioning of regional and global
climatic and ecological systems. In
addition, significant uncertainty
surrounds the anticipated extent,
geographic distribution, and timing of
the resulting impacts on the economies
of nations located in different regions of
the globe. Because the climatic and
economic impacts of GHG emissions are
projected to occur over the distant
future, uncertainty about the correct rate
at which to discount these future
impacts also significantly affects the
estimated economic benefits of reducing
GHG emissions.
Researchers have not yet been able to
quantify many of the potentially
significant effects of GHG emissions and
their continued accumulation in the
earth’s atmosphere on the global
climate. Nor have they developed
complete models to represent the
anticipated impacts of changes in the
global climate on economic resources
and the productivity with which they
are used to generate economic output.
As a consequence, the estimates of
economic damages resulting from
increased GHG emissions that are
generated using integrated models of
climate and economic activity exclude
some potentially significant sources of
costs that are likely to result from
increased emissions. As a result,
estimates of economic benefits derived
from these models’ estimates of the
likely future climate-related economic
damages caused by increased GHG
emissions may underestimate the true
economic value of reducing emissions,
although the extent to which they are
likely to do so remains unknown.
In the NPRM, NHTSA explained how
it accounted for the economic benefits
of reducing CO2 emissions in this
rulemaking, both in developing the
proposed CAFE standards and in
assessing the economic benefits of each
alternative that was considered. The
agency noted that the Ninth Circuit
found in CBD v. NHTSA that NHTSA
had been arbitrary and capricious in
deciding not to monetize the benefit of
reducing CO2 emissions, stating that the
agency had not substantiated the
conclusion in its April 2006 final rule
that the appropriate course was not to
monetize (i.e., quantify the value of)
carbon emissions reduction at all.
NHTSA’s discussion in the NPRM of
how it estimated the economic value of
reductions in CO2 emissions received a
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great deal of attention from commenters,
so for the reader’s benefit, it is largely
reproduced below.
To that end, NHTSA reviewed
published estimates of the ‘‘social cost
of carbon’’ (SCC) emissions. As noted
above, the SCC refers to the marginal
cost of additional damages caused by
the increase in expected climate impacts
resulting from the emission of each
additional metric ton of carbon, which
is emitted in the form of CO2.310 It is
typically estimated as the net present
value of the impact over some extended
time period (100 years or longer) of one
additional ton of carbon emitted into the
atmosphere. Because atmospheric
concentrations of greenhouse gases are
increasing over time, and the potential
damages from global climate are
believed to increase with higher
atmospheric GHG concentrations, the
economic damages resulting from an
additional ton of CO2 emissions are
expected to increase over time. Thus,
estimates of the SCC are typically
reported for a specific year, and these
estimates are generally larger for
emissions in more distant future years.
NHTSA found substantial variation
among different authors’ estimates of
the SCC, much of which can be traced
to differences in their underlying
assumptions about several variables.
These variables include the sensitivity
of global temperatures and other climate
attributes to increasing atmospheric
concentrations of GHGs, discount rates
applied to future economic damages
from climate change, whether damages
sustained by developing regions of the
world should be weighted more heavily
than damages to developed nations,
how long climate changes persist once
they occur, and the economic valuation
of specific climate impacts.311
NHTSA explained that, taken as a
whole, recent estimates of the SCC may
underestimate the true damage costs of
310 Carbon itself accounts for 12/44, or about 27
percent, of the mass of carbon dioxide (12/44 is the
ratio of the molecular weight of carbon to that of
carbon dioxide). Thus, each ton of carbon emitted
is associated with 44/12, or 3.67, tons of carbon
dioxide emissions. Estimates of the SCC are
typically reported in dollars per ton of carbon, and
must be divided by 3.67 to determine their
equivalent value per ton of carbon dioxide
emissions.
311 For a discussion of these factors, see Yohe,
G.W., R.D. Lasco, Q.K. Ahmad, N.W. Arnell, S.J.
Cohen, C. Hope, A.C. Janetos, and R.T. Perez,
‘‘Perspectives on climate change and
sustainability,’’ 2007, in Climate Change 2007:
Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability,
Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change, M.L. Parry, O.F. Canziani, L.P.
Palutikof, P.J. van der Linden and C.E. Hanson,
eds., Cambridge University Press, 2007, at 821–824.
Available at https://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/ar4wg2.htm (last accessed March 23, 2009).
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carbon emissions because they often
exclude damages caused by extreme
weather events or climate response
scenarios with low probabilities but
potentially extreme impacts, and may
underestimate the climate impacts and
damages that could result from multiple
stresses on the global climatic system.
At the same time, however, many
studies do not consider potentially
beneficial impacts of climate change,
and do not adequately account for how
future technological innovations,
development patterns, and adaptations
could reduce potential impacts from
climate change or the economic
damages they cause.
Given the uncertainty surrounding
estimates of the SCC, NHTSA suggested
that the use of any single study may not
be advisable, since its estimate of the
SCC will depend on many assumptions
made by its authors. NHTSA cited the
Working Group II’s contribution to the
Fourth Assessment Report of the United
Nations Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC) as noting that:
The large ranges of SCC are due in large
part to differences in assumptions regarding
climate sensitivity, response lags, the
treatment of risk and equity, economic and
non-economic impacts, the inclusion of
potentially catastrophic losses, and discount
rates.312
Although the IPCC is considered
authoritative on the topic of the SCC, it
did not recommend a single estimate.
However, the IPCC did cite the Tol
(2005) study on four separate occasions
as the only available survey of the peerreviewed literature that has itself been
subjected to peer review.313 Tol
developed a probability function using
the SCC estimates of the peer-reviewed
literature, which ranged from less than
zero to over $200 per metric ton of
carbon. In an effort to resolve some of
the uncertainty in reported estimates of
climate damage costs from carbon
emissions, Tol (2005) reviewed and
summarized 103 estimates of the SCC
from 28 published studies. He
concluded that when only peerreviewed studies published in
recognized journals are considered,
‘‘* * * climate change impacts may be
very uncertain but it is unlikely that the
marginal damage costs of carbon
dioxide emissions exceed $50 per
[metric] ton carbon,’’ 314 which is about
312 Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation
and Vulnerability, Contribution of Working Group
II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, at 17.
Available at https://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/ar4wg2.htm (last accessed March 23, 2009).
313 Id., at 17, 65, 813, and 822.
314 Tol, Richard S.J., ‘‘The marginal damage costs
of carbon dioxide emissions: an assessment of the
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$14 per metric ton of CO2. In the NPRM,
NHTSA assumed that the summary SCC
estimates reported by Tol were
denominated in U.S. dollars of the year
of his article’s publication, 2005.
NHTSA stated that because of the
number of assumptions required by
each study, the wide range of
uncertainty surrounding these
assumptions, and their critical influence
on the resulting estimates of climate
damage costs, some studies have
undoubtedly produced estimates of the
SCC that are unrealistically high, while
others are likely to have estimated
values that are improbably low. Using a
value for the SCC that reflects the
central tendency of estimates drawn
from many studies reduces the chances
of relying on a single estimate that
subsequently proves to be biased.
It is important to note that the
published estimates of the SCC almost
invariably include the value of
worldwide damages from potential
climate impacts caused by carbon
dioxide emissions, and are not confined
to damages likely to be suffered within
the U.S. In contrast, the other estimates
of costs and benefits of raising fuel
economy standards included in this
proposal include only the economic
values of impacts that occur within the
U.S. For example, the economic value of
reducing criteria air pollutant emissions
from overseas oil refineries is not
counted as a benefit resulting from this
rule, because any reduction in damages
to health and property caused by
overseas emissions are unlikely to be
experienced within the U.S.
In contrast, the reduced value of
transfer payments from U.S. oil
purchasers to foreign oil suppliers that
results when lower U.S. oil demand
reduces the world price of petroleum
(the reduced ‘‘monopsony effect’’) is
counted as a benefit of reducing fuel
use. 315 The agency states that if its
analysis were conducted from a
worldwide rather than a U.S.
perspective, however, the benefit from
reducing air pollution overseas would
be included, while reduced payments
from U.S. oil consumers to foreign
suppliers would not.
In the NPRM, NHTSA tentatively
concluded that in the interest of
analytical consistency, i.e., in order to
be consistent with the agency’s use of
exclusively domestic costs and benefits
in prior CAFE rulemakings, the
uncertainties,’’ Energy Policy 33 (2005), 2064–2074,
at 2072.
315 The reduction in payments from U.S. oil
purchasers to domestic petroleum producers is not
included as a benefit, however, since it represents
a transfer that occurs entirely within the U.S.
economy.
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appropriate value to be placed on
climate damages caused by carbon
emissions should be the one that reflects
the change in damages to the U.S. alone.
Accordingly, NHTSA noted that the
value for the benefits of reducing CO2
emissions might be restricted to the
fraction of those benefits that are likely
to be experienced within the U.S.
Although no estimates are currently
available for the benefits to the U.S.
itself that are likely to result from
reducing CO2 emissions, NHTSA
explained that it expected that if such
values were developed, the agency
would employ those, rather than global
benefit estimates, in its analysis.
NHTSA also stated that it anticipated
that if such values were developed, they
would be lower than comparable global
values, since the U.S. is likely to sustain
only a fraction of total global damages
resulting from climate change.
In the meantime, NHTSA explained
that it elected to use the mean value of
peer-reviewed estimated global value
reported by Tol (2005), which was $43
per metric ton of carbon, as an upper
bound on the global benefits resulting
from reducing each metric ton of U.S.
emissions.316 This value corresponds to
approximately $12 per metric ton of CO2
when expressed in 2006 dollars. The
Tol (2005) study is cited repeatedly as
an authoritative survey in various IPCC
reports, which are widely accepted as
representing the general consensus in
the scientific community on climate
change science.
Since Tol’s estimate includes the
worldwide costs of potential damages
from carbon dioxide emissions, NHTSA
elected to employ it as an upper bound
on the estimate value of the reduction
in U.S. domestic damage costs that is
likely to result from lower CO2
emissions.317 NHTSA noted that Tol
had a more recent (2007) and inclusive
survey published online with peerreview comments. NHTSA stated that it
had elected not to rely on this study, but
that it would consider doing so in its
analysis for the final rule if the survey
had been published, and would also
316 $43 per ton of carbon emissions was reported
by Tol (at 2070) as the mean of the ‘‘best’’ estimates
reported in peer-reviewed studies (at the time). It
thus differs from the mean of all estimates reported
in the peer-reviewed studies surveyed by Tol. The
$43 per ton value was also attributed to Tol by IPCC
Working Group II (2007), at 822.
317 For purposes of comparison, NHTSA noted
that in the rulemaking to establish CAFE standards
for MY 2008–11 light trucks, NRDC recommended
a value of $10-$25 per ton of CO2 emissions
reduced by fuel savings, and both EDF and UCS
recommended a value of $50 per ton of carbon,
which is equivalent to about $14 per ton of CO2
emissions.
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consider any other newly-published
evidence.
NHTSA noted that the IPCC Working
Group II Fourth Assessment Report
(2007, at 822) further suggests that the
SCC is growing at an annual rate of 2.4
percent, based on estimated increases in
damages from future emissions reported
in published studies. NHTSA also
elected to apply this growth rate to Tol’s
original 2005 estimate. Thus, by 2011,
NHTSA estimated that the upper bound
on the benefits of reducing CO2
emissions will have reached about $14
per metric ton of CO2, and will continue
to increase by 2.4 percent annually
thereafter.
In setting a lower bound, the agency
agreed with the IPCC Working Group II
report (2007) that ‘‘significant warming
across the globe and the locations of
significant observed changes in many
systems consistent with warming is very
unlikely to be due solely to natural
variability of temperatures or natural
variability of the systems.’’ (p. 9)
Although this finding suggests that the
global value of economic benefits from
reducing carbon dioxide emissions is
unlikely to be zero, NHTSA stated that
it does not necessarily rule out low or
zero values for the benefit to the U.S.
itself from reducing emissions.
In some of the analysis it performed
to develop the CAFE standards, NHTSA
employed a point estimate for the value
of reducing CO2 emissions. For this
estimate, the agency used the midpoint
of the range from $0 to $14, or $7.00, per
metric ton of CO2 as the initial value for
the year 2011, and assumed that this
value would grow at 2.4 percent
annually thereafter. This estimate was
employed for the analyses conducted
using the Volpe model to support
development of the proposed standards.
The agency also conducted sensitivity
analyses of the benefits from reducing
CO2 emissions using both the upper
($14/metric ton) and lower ($0/metric
ton) bounds of this range.
NHTSA sought comment on its
tentative conclusion for the value of the
SCC, the use of a domestic versus a
global value for the economic benefit of
reducing CO2 emissions, the rate at
which the value of the SCC grows over
time, the desirability of and procedures
for incorporating benefits from reducing
emissions of GHGs other than CO2, and
any other aspects of developing a
reliable SCC value for purposes of
establishing CAFE standards.
NHTSA received many comments on
its assumptions in the NPRM about the
SCC. The comment summaries are
presented below and grouped by topic:
(1) NHTSA’s proposal of a single
value for the SCC;
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(2) NHTSA’s proposal of $7 as the
value for the SCC;
(3) NHTSA’s proposal of $0 as the
lower bound estimate for the domestic
U.S. value for the SCC;
(4) NHTSA’s proposal of $14 as the
upper bound estimate for the domestic
U.S. value for the SCC;
(5) other values that NHTSA could
have proposed for the SCC;
(6) NHTSA’s use of a domestic versus
a global value for the economic benefit
of reducing CO2 emissions;
(7) the rate at which the SCC grows
over time;
(8) the discount rate that should be
used for SCC estimates; and
(9) other issues raised by commenters.
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(1) NHTSA’s Proposal of a Single Value
for the SCC
NHTSA received a comment on its
proposal of a single value for the SCC
from Prof. Gary Yohe, an economist who
has considered the SCC extensively and
whom NHTSA cited in the NPRM. Prof.
Yohe commented that the NPRM had
stated that ‘‘Using a value for the SCC
that reflects the central tendency of
estimates drawn from many studies
reduces the chances of relying on a
single estimate that subsequently proves
to be biased.’’ 318 Prof. Yohe argued that
proposing a single value for the SCC
inherently creates bias, because ‘‘Any
value is based on presumptions about
pure rate of time preference, risk and/
or inequity aversion, and climate
sensitivity.’’
(2) NHTSA’s Proposal of $7 as the Value
for the SCC
NHTSA received comments from 3
individuals, CARB, the Attorneys
General, 10 U.S. Senators, 10
environmental and consumer groups,
and the Alliance. Prof. Tol, whose 2005
paper provided the basis for NHTSA’s
proposal of an SCC number, commented
that contrary to NHTSA’s belief that the
dollars used in Tol (2005) were 2005
dollars, they were in fact 1995 dollars.
Prof. Tol also commented that NHTSA
should ‘‘alert the reader’’ that although
Tol (2007) was only ‘‘conditionally
accepted,’’ as NHTSA had noted in the
NPRM, the newer study ‘‘finds larger
estimates than the 2005 paper.’’ Sierra
Club et al., in its comments, also stated
that Prof. Tol had commented on the
NPRM, arguing that using 1995 instead
of 2005 dollars ‘‘would make his 1995
value of $14 closer to a 2005 value of
$19.26.’’
Several commenters disputed
NHTSA’s proposal of $7 as the midpoint
between $0 and $14. UCS argued that
318 73
FR 24414 (May 2, 2008).
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proposing $7 puts as much weight on $0
as on $14, even though failing to assign
a value was declared by the Ninth
Circuit to be arbitrary and capricious.
CBD commented that ‘‘NHTSA’s
methodology for the selection of an
estimate of the value of reducing
greenhouse gas emissions is arbitrary
and designed to minimize the estimate.’’
CBD argued that ‘‘* * * simply splitting
the difference between two points is not
a defensible methodology, particularly
when the low point of the range is not
part of a valid range but simply an
arbitrary selection of zero as an
endpoint.’’
EDF also commented NHTSA’s
decision to propose $7 because it is the
midpoint between $0 and $14 also
‘‘lacks a reasoned basis,’’ for which
‘‘NHTSA fails to provide any
justification.’’
The Sierra Club et al. commented that
NHTSA is wrong to place ‘‘equal
weighting and probability’’ on $0 and
$14 and pick the median, and that $7 is
‘‘far below current carbon estimates,’’
citing the 2006 Stern Review which
found an SCC of ‘‘on the order of’’ $85/
tonne CO2. The Sierra Club argued that
this shows how ‘‘misguided and
unrealistic NHTSA’s carbon pricing
really is.’’
The Attorneys General commented
that NHTSA’s decision to simply halve
Tol’s estimate was ‘‘not a reasoned
judgment.’’
Public Citizen argued that there is no
justification for using the midpoint, and
that NHTSA should instead ‘‘weight the
credibility of each estimate,’’ by making
‘‘apples to apples’’ comparisons
between the studies by ‘‘looking at
studies based on their assumptions.’’
Public Citizen argued that this will help
NHTSA avoid skewing the result of
averaging estimates from multiple
studies. NRDC similarly argued that
proposing $7 as ‘‘a simple average of its
proposed upper and lower bounds
* * * assumes a normal distribution of
damages, which is decidedly not the
distribution of social cost of carbon
estimates.’’ NRDC further argued that
‘‘* * * most social cost of carbon
estimates are biased downwards, for the
simple reason that almost all models
assume perfect substitutability between
normal consumption goods and
environmental goods.’’ NRDC cited 2007
research by Sterner and Persson
disaggregating ‘‘goods’’ into
‘‘environmental goods’’ and
‘‘consumption goods,’’ which found that
the price of an environmental good like
carbon reductions increased at a faster
rate as damage progressed than
consumption goods would increase.
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Accordingly, NRDC argued, ‘‘NHTSA’s
social cost of carbon is much too low.’’
Prof. Hanemann also commented that
NHTSA did not justify its decision to
pick the midpoint (between $0 and $14)
and then project it to 2011, although he
focused more particularly on NHTSA’s
not having applied ‘‘the escalation
factor of a 2.4 percent increase in real
terms beginning in 2005.’’
The Alliance commented that
proposing $7 as the midpoint between
$0 and $14 is incorrect. The Alliance
argued that NHTSA must try harder to
estimate the purely domestic effects of
CO2 emissions reductions, and stated
that NERA had found that the U.S.
portion of world gross product ‘‘is a
much better means of allocating the
United States’ share of any benefits in
reduced CO2 emissions’’ than picking
the midpoint of a range of global SCC
estimates. NERA assumed that the U.S.
portion is 20 percent, which ‘‘reduces
NHTSA’s estimate of CO2 benefits with
the ‘optimized standard’ for MY2015
from $869 million to $348 million.’’
NERA also argued that this was
conservative, since the U.S., as a
developed country, should be better
able to adapt to negative global warming
consequences.
Several commenters also criticized
Tol (2005) as being out of date. Prof.
Hanemann made this point, and
commented that ‘‘more recent analyses
show higher damage estimates.’’ The
Attorneys General similarly commented
that ‘‘It seems likely that there are better
estimates’’ than Tol’s, ‘‘Since [that]
article is now three years old, and it
itself explains in detail the many
deficiencies in the economic literature
at that time.’’ The Attorneys General
stated that ‘‘NHTSA should consult
with EPA on this issue, and conduct a
review of the current scientific and
economics literature.’’
Several commenters simply argued
that $7/ton is too low a value for the
SCC. CARB argued that ‘‘NHTSA’s
assumed social cost of carbon in the
future is also unreasonably low, and if
set at defensible levels that also
properly value cumulative impacts,
could affect the stringency of the
standards.’’ Carin Skoog, an individual,
similarly commented that ‘‘The arbitrary
decision to use $7/ton underestimates
the economic, social, and environmental
consequences of the impacts of global
warming.’’ ACEEE similarly commented
that NHTSA’s use of $7/ton is both
‘‘inconsistent with current estimates’’
and ‘‘fails to take into account the
potentially high probability of a
catastrophic climate change situation.’’
The 10 U.S. Senators who commented
stated that NHTSA’s value of $7 per ton
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is ‘‘underestimated,’’ and ‘‘likely to be
found arbitrary and capricious.’’
(3) NHTSA’s Proposal of $0 as the
Lower Bound Estimate for the Domestic
U.S. Value for the SCC
No commenters supported NHTSA’s
use of $0/ton as the lower bound
estimate for the U.S. domestic SCC.
Several commenters, including UCS,
EDF, and Prof. Hanemann cited the
IPCC Fourth Assessment Report as
evidence that, as Prof. Hanemann stated,
‘‘there is no credible evidence of any
significant net benefit to the U.S. from
the climate change scenarios developed
for the Fourth IPCC Report.’’ The U.S.
Senators who commented also stated
that in citing the IPCC as not precluding
low or zero values to the U.S., NHTSA
had ‘‘fail[ed] to recognize that IPCC was
looking at global estimates which are
not disaggregated.’’
Commenters also mentioned other
reports as providing evidence that there
would be some net adverse impact on
the U.S. from climate change, and thus
a lower bound value of $0 was
untenable. Prof. Hanemann cited the
recent USCCSP report ‘‘conclusively
eliminates the notion that climate
change is likely to have no net adverse
impact on the United States.’’
UCS argued that proposing $0 as the
lower bound ‘‘implies the possibility
that climate change won’t have any
negative consequences,’’ which ‘‘stands
in stark contrast to recent government
study findings on U.S. climate change
effects and findings from * * * the
Academies of Science for the G8+5.’’
EDF commented that ‘‘A recent
review of economic studies on the
predicted impacts of climate change on
different economic sectors in the U.S. by
the Center for Integrative Environmental
Research at the University of Maryland,
‘The US Economic Impacts of Climate
Change and the Costs of Inaction: A
Review and Assessment,’ also
demonstrates the range and scope of
adverse impacts that climate change
will have on different sectors and
regions of the U.S. economy.’’ EDF
stated that ‘‘The study concluded that
‘Scientific evidence is mounting that
climate change will directly or
indirectly affect all economic sectors
and regions of the country, though not
all equally. Although there may be
temporary benefits from a changing
climate, the costs of climate change
rapidly exceed benefits and place major
strains on public sector budgets,
personal income and job security.’ ’’
Sierra Club et al. commented that
‘‘several government reports [that] have
clearly stated that CO2 emissions do
have a significant impact on our
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economy.’’ NHTSA’s conclusion that ‘‘it
does not necessarily rule out low or zero
carbon values for the benefit to the U.S.
itself from reducing emissions’’ is
arbitrary given agency’s admission that
‘‘the global value of economic benefits
from reducing carbon dioxide emissions
is unlikely to be zero.’’
NRDC cited a U.S. government report
that ‘‘documents that many of the
projected impacts have already begun,’’
as well as the Stern Review which
‘‘estimated that impacts could result in
a loss of 5–20 percent of world GDP by
2100,’’ and its own May 2008 report
which ‘‘found U.S. damages from four
impacts alone would cost 1.8 percent of
GDP by 2100.’’
Several commenters instead raised
objections to studies that may show a
positive net benefit to the U.S. from
climate change, such that a domestic
SCC value could be $0. CBD stated that
NHTSA offered ‘‘absolutely no evidence
to support’’ proposing $0 as the lower
bound, and argued that ‘‘only one study
surveyed in Tol (2005) included central
estimates below $0.00; and that was a
non-peer-reviewed article, also authored
by Tol.’’ CBD further argued that Tol
(2005) never found, nor included as a
consideration in developing SCC
estimates, as NHTSA suggested in the
NPRM, that any studies failed ‘‘to
consider potentially beneficial impacts
of climate change,’’ or to account
adequately ‘‘for how future
development patterns and adaptations
could reduce potential impacts from
climate change or the economic
damages they cause.’’
Prof. Hanemann also argued that
studies suggesting any possible positive
net benefit to U.S. from global warming
‘‘have serious flaws and cannot
withstand serious scrutiny,’’ and
concluded that a value of $0 per ton is
‘‘wildly unrealistic’’ ‘‘even [for] a
sensitivity analysis.’’
NRDC commented that ‘‘NHTSA’s
lower bound seems to be based upon the
fact that some estimates exist that are
zero and even negative.’’ However,
NRDC argued that ‘‘These lower bound
estimates are likely based on outdated
science.’’ NRDC ‘‘urge[d] NHTSA to do
a rigorous re-examination of Tol’s work,
eliminating outdated zero estimates and
adjusting for fat tailed upper
distributions.’’
Several commenters also focused on
the CBD decision to argue that NHTSA
may not use $0 as the lower bound
estimate, because as UCS stated, ‘‘the
Ninth Circuit found a value of $0 to be
arbitrary and capricious.’’ EDF also
commented that NHTSA’s decision to
pick $0 as the lower bound ‘‘lacks a
reasoned basis,’’ given the Ninth Circuit
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14341
decision. Sierra Club et al. and the U.S.
Senators similarly commented that $0 as
the lower bound is contrary to CBD. The
comment by the U.S. Senators stated
that ‘‘* * * we can only conclude that
the purpose of this ‘low bound’ estimate
is to cut the more accurate value in half
in an arbitrary manner. We recommend
NHTSA remove or justify this low
bound estimate in its final CAFE
regulation.’’
(4) NHTSA’s Proposal of $14 as the
Upper Bound Estimate for the Domestic
U.S. Value for the SCC
No commenters supported NHTSA’s
proposal of $14/ton, based on Tol
(2005), as the upper bound estimate for
the domestic U.S. value for the SCC.
ACEEE argued that ‘‘NHTSA’s decision
to use Tol’s estimate of $14 as the upper
bound based on the argument that this
value includes the worldwide costs CO2
is flawed,’’ although the commenter did
not explain why.
Some commenters argued that
NHTSA should not have picked the
median from Tol (2005) as its upper
bound estimate.
The U.S. Senators who commented
stated that NHTSA is wrong to use $14
as the upper bound because Tol’s
median is an average of multiple
estimates, and averages should be used
as averages and not as maximums. The
Senators stated further that ‘‘NHTSA
selected the lower of Tol’s two estimates
without explanation.’’ The U.S. Senators
also commented that Tol (2007) updates
the previous study and finds a median
of over $19/ton. NRDC also cited Tol
(2007) as reflecting an increase in the
median from $14 to $20 dollars per ton
of CO2.
Sierra Club et al. commented that $14
is an incorrect ‘‘maximum,’’ because the
maximum that Tol ‘‘states that the
maximum carbon value is in the range
of $55–$95 per metric ton CO2.’’ The
commenter further argued that if
NHTSA could justify $0 as the lower
bound, ‘‘then it should not be able to
rule out the high value of $95 per ton
CO2 in the study, and the average value
would be much higher.’’
NRDC commented that NHTSA
should not have used Tol’s median
value of $14 as its upper bound for two
reasons. First, a median value is not
properly reflective of climate change
damage estimate distributions, which
are ‘‘asymmetric’’ with ‘‘fat’’ upper tails.
And second, because of the unique
aspects of climate change damage
estimates, such as ‘‘nonlinearities,
abrupt change, and thresholds,’’ ‘‘a full
probability density function should be
estimated, using the full range of all
[SCC] estimates from the studies, not
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simply a collection of their ‘bestguesses.’ ’’ [Emphasis in original.] NRDC
argued that research has shown that
‘‘When the same traditional social cost
of carbon analyses are rerun
incorporating the potential for nonlinear
change, the resulting policy conclusions
are changed considerably to greater
mitigation,’’ and that ‘‘Another recent
study has shown that incorporating the
potential for low-probability, highdamage events can increase the social
cost of carbon by a factor of 20.’’
NRDC also cited Prof. Weitzman to
argue that the complications of climate
change damage estimates require any
analysis to weigh more heavily the ‘‘low
probability/high catastrophic risks,’’
because these will otherwise be
insufficiently accounted for. In
discussing the uncertainties associated
with climate change, NRDC cited
Weitzman as stating that
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The result of this immense cascading of
huge uncertainties is a ‘‘reduced form’’ of
truly stupendous uncertainty about the
aggregate-utility impacts of catastrophic
climate change, which mathematically is
represented by a very-spread-out very-fattailed PDF [probability density function] of
what might be called (present discounted)
‘‘welfare sensitivity’’ * * * [T]he value of
‘‘welfare sensitivity’’ is effectively bounded
only by some very big number representing
something like the value of statistical
civilization as we know it or maybe even the
value of statistical life on earth as we know
it.
Thus, NRDC argued, using an upper
bound of $14 cannot possibly account
for the uncertainties and risk of climate
change. Like Sierra Club et al., NRDC
further argued that ‘‘* * * for
consistency with the rationale used for
proposing the lower bound, NHTSA’s
upper bound should be based upon
some function of the highest estimates
in the Tol 2005 study (the very highest
was $1,666).’’
Some commenters argued that
NHTSA had overlooked particular
aspects of the Tol (2005) study, and thus
arrived at $14 incorrectly.
CBD argued that NHTSA overlooked
key aspects of the Tol (2005) analysis in
proposing $14 per ton, including the
fact that Tol included significantly
higher estimates in his analysis. EDF
similarly commented that NHTSA had
failed to ‘‘discuss the significant gaps in
the existing research reviewed in [Tol
(2005)] and focuse[d] on a specific
estimate of the SCC that is biased
toward lower value estimates.’’ EDF
stated that NHTSA’s decision to use
only peer-reviewed studies from Tol
(2005) introduced particular bias,
because those studies ‘‘systematically
used higher discount rates * * * which
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may have biased their results
downward’’ compared to averaging all
the studies together.
Some commenters argued that Tol
(2005) was flawed to the point that it
could not provide a reliable basis for
NHTSA to use its median estimate as
the upper bound.
CBD commented that ‘‘the studies
cited in the Tol (2005) survey dated
back as much as 18 years, to 1991, and
25 of the 28 studies cited were
published more than five years ago,’’ so
given that climate change science is
progressing very rapidly, these studies
are probably outdated.
EDF also argued that ‘‘Most of the 28
studies surveyed by Tol’’ are outdated
and ‘‘consider only a limited number of
potential impacts from climate change,’’
as Tol recognizes by cautioning that the
estimates analyzed ‘‘may understate the
true cost of climate change.’’ EDF stated
that the IPCC’s ‘‘most recent
compilation of SCC research’’ agrees.
EDF also commented that Tol’s metaanalysis ‘‘compares studies with widely
different methodologies and
assumptions,’’ particularly discount
rates, which EDF stated NHTSA should
have controlled for because it ‘‘can have
a considerable impact on SCC
estimates.’’
NRDC criticized Tol (2005)
extensively in its comments. NRDC
stated that Tol’s estimate was based on
studies which exclude (1) ‘‘non-market
costs, such as damage to and loss of
entire ecosystems and species;’’ and (2)
‘‘studies of national security costs
caused by conflicts over stressed
resources and increased migration from
heavily impacted areas,’’ which
‘‘describe global warming as a ‘threat
multiplier.’ ’’ NRDC recognized that Tol
acknowledged that ‘‘costs such as those
described above are poorly accounted
for in current social cost of carbon
estimates,’’ but insisted that NHTSA
must nonetheless account for them.
NRDC also argued that Tol’s estimate
is based on outdated studies, because
‘‘there are smaller natural sinks for
carbon than Tol assumed, higher
emissions than he assumed, a higher
temperature response to emissions than
he assumed, and faster changes in
observed impacts than he assumed.’’
NRDC commented that recent events
like Hurricane Katrina are evidence that
the U.S. cannot adapt to climate changerelated disasters as fast as previously
thought. NRDC further commented that
it was unclear whether Tol’s estimate
‘‘included any valuation for lost lives,’’
suggesting that including this valuation
could raise SCC considerably, and
arguing that EPA accounts for it in
Clean Air Act rulemakings.
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(5) Other Values That NHTSA Could
Have Chosen for the SCC
Many commenters suggested other
SCC values that they thought NHTSA
should use instead of a value based on
Tol (2005).
Several commenters mentioned SCC
values produced by EPA. In March
2008, EPA produced an analysis for the
Senate Committee on Environment and
Public Works for S. 2191, ‘‘America’s
Climate Security Act,’’ also known as
the Lieberman-Warner bill.319 Public
Citizen commented that NHTSA’s upper
bound estimate should be at least as
high as EPA’s estimates for the
Lieberman-Warner bill, which Public
Citizen said ‘‘are more recent than the
Tol estimate cited in NHTSA’s notice.’’
Public Citizen commented that EPA
‘‘estimated the value of CO2 in 2015
between $22 and $40 per metric ton of
CO2, and cited two other analyses with
higher estimates of $48 and $50 per
metric ton CO2.’’ Sierra Club et al. also
commented that NHTSA must use a
higher SCC value, and stated that
‘‘EPA’s recent analysis of America’s
Climate Security Act of 2007 noted that
the value of a ton of CO2 could be as
high as $22–$40.28.’’ An individual,
Carin Skoog, also commented that ‘‘The
US EPA recently suggested the value of
a ton of CO2 could be as high as $22–
35.’’ ACEEE appeared to refer obliquely
to the EPA estimates, recommending
that NHTSA use a higher CO2 estimate.
ACEEE argued that ‘‘legislative efforts to
implement a carbon regime in which the
projected market cost of CO2 is expected
to lie between $20 and $30—
significantly higher than the average
damage cost assumed by NHTSA—
serves as evidence that the U.S. is now
beginning to contemplate the high risk
of rising greenhouse gas emissions.’’
NRDC commented that NHTSA cited
‘‘compliance cost estimates provided by
NRDC and others in the 2006 light truck
rulemaking’’ in describing its proposal
of the upper bound estimate. NRDC
argued that NHTSA should instead
consider damage costs and not rely on
compliance cost estimates. NRDC stated
that ‘‘If NHTSA were to consider
compliance costs it must consider
current analyses, such as EPA’s analysis
of S. 2191, which finds that CO2
allowances would cost 19 to 67 (2005)
dollars per ton of CO2-equivalent in
2012 rising at 5 percent per year real
(the range for EPA’s Core Scenario is
$19 to $35 in 2012, rising at 5 percent
per year real).’’
319 Available at https://www.epa.gov/
climatechange/downloads/s2191_EPA_Analysis.pdf
(last accessed March 23, 2009).
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no mention of EPA’s extensive research
and analysis in this area.’’
Other commenters argued that
NHTSA should have used or considered
the value at which CO2 allowances are
currently trading in the EU regulatory
system. UCS stated that using $14 as the
upper end is ‘‘unacceptably low,’’ given
that ‘‘The European Climate Exchange,
which provides a futures market value
for global warming pollution in
Europe’s carbon constrained market,
indicates 2011 contracts for carbon
dioxide at approximately $45 (U.S.) per
metric ton—well above the figure cited
by NHTSA.’’ UCS argued that ‘‘This
value represents a predicted marginal
abatement cost (the cost of avoiding
global warming pollution), and is likely
a conservative estimate of the benefit of
reducing global warming since the cost
of avoiding climate change is lower than
the cost of fixing the damage after it
occurs.’’ UCS further argued that this
number is also ‘‘generally consistent
with other recent allowance price
estimates, such as the EPA’s assessment
of GHG allowance prices under
Lieberman-Warner: $22–$40 in 2015
and $28–$51 in 2020 (EPA figures are in
2005 dollars per ton of CO2equivalent.)’’
Sierra Club et al., Public Citizen, and
CARB all also commented that NHTSA’s
value for the SCC is too low, and that
NHTSA should instead use a CO2
damage value based on the market value
in the European Trading System, either
the current value (which Public Citizen
stated was ‘‘recently * * * around Ö30
per allowance (one metric ton CO2
equivalent),’’ and CARB stated was
‘‘currently trading around $42 per ton’’),
or some future value. Sierra Club et al.
argued that ‘‘the futures market value
for a metric ton of CO2 in 2011 is
already up to $45,’’ while CARB went
on to argue that ‘‘* * * Germany
Deutsche Bank [is] forecasting EUA
prices of $60 for 2008 and EUA prices
as high as $100 by 2020 [citation
removed].’’
Other commenters suggested other
SCC values different from any discussed
so far. For example, Prof. Hanemann
argued that, based on his own research,
NHTSA use a value of ‘‘about $25 per
metric ton [of CO2] in 2005$,’’ and
should apply a real growth rate of 2.4
percent per year to determine the value
of reducing emissions in future years.
CARB, in contrast, commented that
‘‘NHTSA should also consider using
substantially higher estimates.’’ CARB
stated that ‘‘the International Energy
Agency (IEA) recently estimated that to
limit global CO2 emissions by the 50
percent GHG reduction that the IPCC
concluded is needed to keep global
Continued
EPA also recently released a
‘‘Technical Support Document on the
Benefits of Reducing GHG
Emissions,’’ 320 (TSD) to accompany an
Advance Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (ANPRM) on regulating
GHG emissions under the Clean Air
Act.321 EDF commented in its original
comments that ‘‘The higher SCC
estimates contained in EPA’s draft
ANPR, and EPA’s accompanying
discussion of the remaining omissions
and weaknesses in state-of-the-art SCC
research, further demonstrates that
NHTSA’s estimates are underestimating
the benefits of reducing carbon dioxide
emissions, and therefore setting CAFE
standards below optimal levels.’’ After
the TSD was released, EDF submitted it
to NHTSA’s NPRM docket, and
submitted late additional comments
arguing that NHTSA must ‘‘adjust its
final rulemaking action in accordance
with EPA’s assessment and findings,’’
because ‘‘EPA’s assessment is far more
rigorous than NHTSA’s proposal, and
EPA’s determinations are supported by
a considerable and well-reasoned
volume of information.’’ EDF stated that
EPA did its own meta-analysis
‘‘building on’’ Tol (2005) and (2007), but
including ‘‘only recent peer reviewed
studies that met a range of quality
criteria in its evaluation.’’ EDF further
stated that EPA arrived at an estimate of
$40/tCO2 (using a 3 percent discount
rate), or $60/tCO2 (using a 2 percent
discount rate). EDF commented that
EPA concluded that estimates ‘‘likely
underestimate costs of carbon dioxide
emissions,’’ because they do not account
for all the climate change impacts
identified by the IPCC, like ‘‘non-market
damages, the effects of climate
variability, risks of potential extreme
weather, socially contingent events
[(such as violent conflict)], and potential
long-term catastrophic events.’’
The U.S. Senators who commented
argued that NHTSA’s use of $14/ton
based on Tol (2005) as the ‘‘high bound’’
estimate was incorrect because EPA had
been working since 2007 ‘‘to develop
more accurate, ‘state-of-the-art’
estimates of the benefits of reducing
greenhouse gas pollution.’’ The Senators
stated that ‘‘Although EPA’s estimates
have not been finalized, the Agency
used $40 per ton as the value of
reducing carbon dioxide emissions.’’
The Senators further stated that
‘‘NHTSA’s draft rule inexplicably makes
320 Available at Docket No. NHTSA–2008–0089–
0456.2.
321 EPA’s ANPRM was signed July 11, 2008, after
NHTSA’s NPRM was published. See 73 FR 44353
(July 30, 2008).
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temperatures from rising more than two
degrees Celsius by 2050, CO2 offset
prices will need to rise to up to $200 per
ton * * *.’’ CARB further argued that
‘‘* * * even this higher market price for
carbon may not incorporate the true cost
of all natural resources damages, an
externality.’’
Mr. Montgomery commented that
NHTSA should use an SCC value of $0,
because he argued that ‘‘If a
comprehensive cap on [CO2] emissions
is put in place, as many commentators
and policymakers predict, then the
choice of policy instrument will have no
effect on the overall level of emissions,’’
such that ‘‘Tightening a CAFE standard
will only result in greater mitigation in
emissions from [motor vehicles] and
less mitigation in parts of the economy
where decisions are made in response to
carbon prices without specific
regulatory mandates.’’ Thus, Mr.
Montgomery concluded that ‘‘the
damages from global warming will be
the same no matter what the level of the
CAFE standard, so that the SCC used
should be zero.’’
Mr. Montgomery also commented that
an SCC based on Tol’s estimates will be
too high if the ‘‘global policy objective
toward greenhouse gas emissions * * *
is a lower concentration than that on
which the Tol estimates are based.’’ Mr.
Montgomery argued that ‘‘Marginal
damages depend on the level of GHG
concentrations at which they are
measured,’’ so that ‘‘If the goal for global
concentrations is set at a high level (e.g.,
750 ppm) then damages from an
additional ton of CO2 (due to higher
concentrations during the period of its
residence in the atmosphere) will be
higher than if the goal is set at a low
level (350 ppm) at which point most of
the damaging consequences have been
eliminated.’’
Ford redacted much of its discussion
of the SCC based on confidentiality
concerns, but seemed to argue generally
that reducing CO2 emissions from motor
vehicles is expensive compared to
reducing emissions in other sectors, and
commented that ‘‘All sectors must
contribute’’ to reducing emissions. Ford
‘‘recommended that NHTSA consider
using CO2 mitigation cost in their
analysis in lieu of emission damage
cost.’’
NADA commented that ‘‘NHTSA
should consider incorporating into its
analysis the $2.97 per metric ton
recently paid by the U.S. House of
Representatives for carbon offsets.’’ 322
322 NADA cited the ‘‘Statement of Daniel P.
Beard, Chief Administrative Officer, U.S. House of
Representatives, Concerning the Purchase of Carbon
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The Alliance was the only commenter
to suggest that NHTSA not quantify the
SCC at all. The Alliance argued that
‘‘* * * given the fact that no published
studies of which we are aware address
the SCC apportionment issue, NHTSA
would be well within its rights to decide
that SCC will be considered purely in a
qualitative balancing fashion and not
quantified.’’ The Alliance cited
Transmission Access Policy Study
Group v. FERC, 225 F.3d 667, 736 (D.C.
Cir. 2000) (‘‘Given that FERC’s
comparison of the frozen efficiency case
to its base case yielded little difference,
the agency had no reason to conduct
further analysis. By rigorously
examining the frozen efficiency case,
even though it believed the case to be
unreasonable, FERC ensured that its
decision was ‘fully informed’ and ‘wellconsidered.’ ’’).
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(6) NHTSA’s Use of a Domestic Versus
a Global Value for the Economic Benefit
of Reducing CO2 Emissions
NHTSA received a number of
comments on its tentative decision to
employ a domestic value for the SCC
instead of a global value. Several
commenters supported a domestic
value, while other commenters
supported a global value.
The Alliance argued that NHTSA
must consider only domestic impacts
both because of EPCA, which refers to
‘‘the need of the United States to
conserve energy,’’ and because of the
‘‘extraterritoriality’’ or ‘‘Aramco canon,’’
see EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co.,
499 U.S. 244, 260 (1991) (‘‘It is a
longstanding principle of American law
‘that legislation of Congress, unless a
contrary intent appears, is meant to
apply only within the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States.’)
(quoting Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S.
281, 285 (1949)). The Alliance further
argued that because NHTSA must
consider only domestic impacts, it must
‘‘develop some mechanism for scaling
down the global SCC estimates
produced in the published literature,’’
besides NHTSA’s proposal which just
took the midpoint between $0 and $14
as the domestic SCC value. The Alliance
argued that it would be inappropriate to
use land mass to determine the
domestic portion, since so much of the
land mass on the planet is uninhabited;
and also argued that it would be
inappropriate to use population, since
‘‘not all human beings live in areas that
are expected to be equally impacted by
Offsets,’’ which does not list the specific price paid
for the offsets described. Available at https://
cao.house.gov/press/cao-20080205.shtml (last
accessed March 23, 2009).
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climate change.’’ As discussed above,
the Alliance cited to the NERA Report
that it included with its comments as
having found that an SCC value based
on the U.S. share of world gross product
was more appropriate.
NADA similarly commented that
‘‘NHTSA should account only for any
domestic impacts of reducing the social
costs of motor vehicle CO2, given that
EPCA focuses on U.S. energy security
and all other costs and benefits
evaluated with respect to the proposed
CAFE standards are domestic only.’’
Mr. Delucchi agreed with NHTSA’s
discussion that ‘‘consistency requires’’
that only U.S. domestic ‘‘global
warming damages’’ be considered if
NHTSA also accounts for the
monopsony effect in the reduced value
of transfer payments from U.S. oil
purchasers to foreign oil suppliers. Mr.
Delucchi suggested that NHTSA use a
procedure described in his previous
research to estimate the fraction of
global damages from climate change that
would be borne within the U.S., and
apply this fraction to the estimated
global SCC to determine the value of
U.S. domestic benefits from reducing
emissions. This procedure adjusts the
fraction of global GDP accounted for by
the U.S. by the relative sensitivity of the
U.S. to climate damages compared to
the remainder of the world, which
Delucchi measures by the ratio of U.S.
dollar damages from climate change per
dollar of U.S. GDP to global economic
damages from climate change per dollar
of global GDP. Using this method, he
estimates that U.S. damages from
climate change are likely to represent 0–
14 percent of total global damages, and
thus that the value to the U.S. of
reducing carbon emissions is equal to
that same percentage of the estimated
global value of the SCC.323
Mr. Montgomery argued that a
domestic SCC value was appropriate,
commenting that ‘‘U.S. policy should be
based on marginal damages to the U.S.
from CO2 emissions in the U.S., as
stated in relevant OMB circulars on
cost-benefit analysis and suggested in
the draft.’’ Mr. Montgomery further
stated that ‘‘The consensus appears to
be that richer countries are less
vulnerable than poorer, and that
temperature increases will be least in
temperate regions like the U.S.’’ Thus,
Mr. Montgomery argued that a
323 Mark A. Delucchi, Summary of the NonMonetary Externalities of Motor Vehicle Use, UCD–ITS–RR–96–3 (9) rev.1, Institute of Transportation
Studies, University of California, Davis, originally
published September 1998, revised October 2004.
Available at https://www.its.ucdavis.edu/
publications/2004/UCD-ITS-RR-96-03(09)_rev1.pdf
(last accessed March 23, 2009).
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conservative estimate of U.S. damages
would be a calculation ‘‘based on the
ration of U.S. GDP to world GDP.’’
Other commenters argued that
NHTSA should use a global SCC value.
NRDC commented that because ‘‘Carbon
dioxide is a global pollutant, and much
of the damages other countries will
experience are a result of U.S.
emissions,’’ and because ‘‘emissions in
other countries will cause damages in
the U.S.,’’ that ‘‘It is fundamentally
inconsistent with the global circulation
of these pollutants to arbitrarily limit
assessment of the benefits of reducing
U.S. emissions to those accruing in our
own territory.’’ NRDC also commented
that national security studies show that
the global social costs of carbon will
‘‘spill over’’ to the U.S. and other
wealthy countries. EDF also commented
that NHTSA should use a global SCC
number rather than a domestic one,
because ‘‘Climate change is clearly a
global issue,’’ so EDF ‘‘recommend[s]
that benefits of reducing CO2
concentrations should reflect benefits to
society as a whole.’’
EDF and the U.S. Senators
commented that use of a global SCC
value would be consistent with OMB
guidance that international impacts of
regulations may be considered if
appropriate. The Senators also
commented that the U.S. must consider
the global climate change effects of its
regulations because it ratified the
United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change in 1992. If every
nation considers only domestic effects
of climate change, the Senators argued,
emissions reduction policies will fall
‘‘far short of the socially optimized
level.’’
CBD similarly commented that
NHTSA should use a global value for
CO2, arguing that using $7 ‘‘fails to
incorporate the full economic costs of
global climate change, values that are
difficult to monetize, and costs to the
world outside the boundaries of the
United States.’’ CBD stated that ‘‘In
general, the estimate of the social costs
of climate change fails to incorporate
the loss of biodiversity, complex and
large-scale ecosystem services, and the
disproportionate impacts of global
climate change on the developing
world.’’ CBD also stated that NHTSA’s
use of $0 as the lower bound estimate
is ‘‘[p]resumably * * * meant to imply
that the United States might benefit
economically by letting other countries
bear the costs of unabated American
greenhouse gas emissions. Setting aside
the tremendous ethical implications of
such a position, NHTSA provides
absolutely no evidence to support the
claim.’’
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In its late comments accompanying its
submission of EPA’s TSD, EDF argued
that EPA’s TSD concluded that a global
number is correct, for several reasons.
Because GHGs are global pollutants and
affect everyone, using ‘‘domestic only’’
estimates would ‘‘omit potential
impacts on the United States (e.g.,
economic or national security impacts)
resulting from climate change impacts
in other countries.’’ Consequently, a
global number must be used to avoid
missing any benefits and to maximize
global net benefits (i.e., ‘‘countries
would need to mitigate up to the point
where their domestic marginal cost
equals the global marginal benefit.’’ EDF
stated that EPA’s TSD cites Nordhaus
(2006), and says that ‘‘Net present value
estimates of global marginal benefits
internalize the global and
intergenerational externalities of
reducing a unit of emissions and can
therefore help guide policies towards an
efficient level of provision of the public
good.’’
(7) The Rate at Which the SCC Grows
Over Time
Several commenters cited the IPCC
Fourth Assessment Report with regard
to the rate at which the SCC should
increase over time. CBD commented
that as part of the Fourth Assessment
Report, the IPCC ‘‘* * * states that ‘It is
virtually certain that the real social cost
of carbon and other greenhouse gases
will increase over time; it is very likely
that the rate of increase will be 2% to
4% per year.’ ’’ The U.S. Senators
commented that the 2.4 percent per year
increase that NHTSA used in the NPRM
is incorrect, because ‘‘the IPCC report
states that ‘it is very likely that the rate
of increase will be 2% to 4% per year.’ ’’
EDF stated that IPCC’s
recommendation of a 2.4 percent growth
rate was meant to be used in
combination with a low,
intergenerational discount rate. EDF
further argued that after the Fourth
Assessment Report was released, one of
the lead authors recommended using a
growth rate of 3 percent, but that ‘‘The
OMB equivalent guidance for the UK
* * * recommend using a 2 percent
yearly increase.’’ EDF thus concluded
that the 2.4 percent growth rate could be
used, but only with a maximum 3
percent discount rate, and argued that a
range of growth rates should be run in
the sensitivity analysis ‘‘because of
considerable uncertainty.’’
(8) The Discount Rate That Should Be
Used for SCC Estimates
Commenters urged NHTSA to
consider a low or even negative
discount rate in choosing an estimate for
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the SCC. CBD, for example, stated that
Stern found that ‘‘ ‘If consumption falls
along a path, the discount rate can be
negative. If inequality rises over time,
this would work to reduce the discount
rate, for the social welfare functions
typically used. If uncertainty rises as
outcomes further into the future are
contemplated, this would work to
reduce the discount rate, with the
welfare functions typically used.’ ’’ CBD
then argued that ‘‘A negative discount
rate would dramatically increase the
cost of climate change in the costbenefit analyses in the proposed rule.’’
NRDC commented that NHTSA
should use a discount rate of no more
than 3 percent for the entire rulemaking,
and returned to this argument in its SCC
discussion, criticizing Tol’s estimate for
relying ‘‘primarily upon estimates that
did not use current accepted climate
change discounting procedures of a
declining discount rate over time.’’
In its initial comments, EDF stated
that NHTSA should only consider
recent studies that use a 3 percent
discount rate for estimating SCC. In its
late comments, EDF stated that EPA’s
TSD concluded that ‘‘a low discount
rate is most appropriate for SCC
estimation,’’ for several reasons. First,
because OMB Circular A–4 allows
agencies to use a lower discount rate
when there are inter-generational
benefits associated with a rulemaking.
Second, because ‘‘In this intergenerational context, a three percent
discount rate is consistent with
observed interest rates from long-term
intra-generational investments (net of
risk premiums) as well as interest rates
relevant for monetary estimates of the
impacts of climate change that are
primarily consumption effects.’’ Third,
because EPA had found that the
scientific literature supports the use of
a discount rate of 3 percent or lower, as
being ‘‘* * * more consistent with
conditions associated with long-run
uncertainty in economic growth and
interest rates, intergenerational
considerations, and the risk of high
impact climate damages (which could
reduce or reverse economic growth).’’
(9) Other Issues Raised by Commenters
The remaining issues raised by
commenters with regard to NHTSA’s
proposal regarding the value for the SCC
were as follows:
Public Citizen commented that
NHTSA should also have considered
‘‘the costs of inaction on reducing
greenhouse gas emissions and the
resultant consequences of global
warming,’’ including other
environmental and health consequences
such as those analyzed in NHTSA’s
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DEIS. Public Citizen cited EPA’s denial
of California’s waiver request and ‘‘a
recent report from the University of
Maryland’’ as evidence of some of these
costs, and argued that NHTSA needed to
estimate ‘‘the costs of inaction’’ in
making its final decision.
NRDC commented that emissions
reductions may be ‘‘greater than what
CAFE accomplishes,’’ such that the U.S.
would ‘‘get * * * a larger social cost of
carbon benefits stream,’’ if the U.S.
actions in ‘‘taking a lead in reducing
emissions * * * [helps to] induce other
countries, especially China and India, to
also reduce.’’ NRDC also argued that
‘‘Carbon dioxide has a very slow decay
rate in the atmosphere, lasting hundreds
of years into the future,’’ which means
that ‘‘the social costs of carbon extend
well past the life time of the vehicle.’’
Thus, ‘‘Any sensible benefits stream
would extend them at least several
decades past the lifetime of a vehicle.’’
In its original comments, EDF argued
that NHTSA should have considered
using a risk-management framework in
developing an SCC estimate, because
cost-benefit analysis ‘‘cannot capture
the range of uncertainty and risk that
characterizes climate change.’’ EDF
cited Prof. Weitzman’s work as
highlighting ‘‘that the expected damages
of climate change may be dominated by
the existence of consequences which
have very low probability but very high
damages (such as double-digit increases
in mean global temperature), or a ‘fat
tail’ in the distribution of possible
outcomes.’’ In its late comments, EDF
added that EPA’s TSD also suggested
that a risk assessment framework may
be more appropriate than cost-benefit
analysis ‘‘in light of the ethical
implications of climate change and the
difficulty in valuing catastrophic risks
to future generations.’’ The TSD went on
to say that ‘‘Economics alone cannot
answer the questions, policy, legal,
ethical considerations are relevant too,
and many cannot be quantified. When
there is much uncertainty, economics
recommends a risk management
framework for guiding policy.’’
Agency response: In determining its
responses to the public comments on
the value of reducing CO2 emissions, the
agency was mindful that the 9th Circuit
remanded rulemaking to NHTSA ‘‘for it
to include a monetized value for this
benefit [the reduced risk of global
warming as a result of reducing CO2
emissions] in its analysis of the proper
CAFE standards.’’ 324 (Emphasis added.)
NHTSA understands this directive to
require the agency to include within its
modeling, with at least some level of
324 CBD,
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specificity, actual values for the SCC.
Further, as in the case of other public
comments, the agency is required by the
Administrative Procedure Act to
respond to the relevant and significant
public comments, including those
central to the agency’s decision on
standards under EPCA, in a manner
reflecting consideration of the relevant
factors.
As noted above, in the NPRM, we
tentatively selected the mean value
($14) in Tol (2005) as a global value, and
announced plans to attempt to develop
and possibly use a domestic value for
the final rule. For most of the analysis
it performed to develop the proposed
standards using the Volpe CAFE model,
NHTSA used a single estimate for a
domestic value of reducing CO2
emissions. The agency thus elected to
use the midpoint of the range from $0
to $14 (or $7.00) per metric ton of CO2
as the initial value for the year 2011,
and assumed that this value would grow
at 2.4 percent annually thereafter. This
estimate was employed for the analyses
conducted using the Volpe CAFE model
to support development of the proposed
standards. The agency also conducted
sensitivity analyses of the benefits from
reducing CO2 emissions using both the
upper ($14 per metric ton, since the
domestic value could not exceed the
global one) and lower ($0 per metric
ton) bounds of this range.
After considering comments on the
approach it employed in the NPRM and
more recent estimates of the SCC,
NHTSA has decided to employ a range
of estimates for the value of reducing
GHG emissions in the analysis it
performed to support this Final Rule for
MY 2011 as discussed in further detail
below. To do so, the agency identified
a range of estimates from current peerreviewed estimates of the value of the
SCC, and then tested the sensitivity of
alternative CAFE standards to this range
of uncertainty while holding the other
economic parameters used in its
analysis fixed at their estimated values.
The range of estimates, which the
agency believes fairly represents the
uncertainty surrounding the value of the
SCC, consists of a domestic value ($2)
at the lower end, a global value ($33)
equal to the mean value in Tol (2008)
and a global value ($80) one standard
deviation above the mean value.
NHTSA believes that, based on
currently available information and
analysis, $2 is a reasonable domestic
value and $33 is a reasonable global
value, but notes the uncertainty
regarding both values. The agency tested
the sensitivity of alternative CAFE
standards to this range of uncertainty
while holding the other economic
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parameters used in its analysis fixed at
their estimated values.
On the basis of this analysis, the
agency has concluded that its adopted
standards for MY 2011 are not sensitive
to the alternative estimates of the value
of reducing CO2 emissions, so although
it has selected global and domestic
values for the SCC for use in analyzing
the effects of different SCC values on the
standards in this one-year rulemaking,
NHTSA believes that is not necessary
for purposes of this rulemaking to make
definitive, long term choices about the
most appropriate global or domestic
value or to choose between using a
global versus domestic value. This
approach is sufficient for this
rulemaking and will allow efforts to
make more specific choices to be
deferred until additional scientific and
economic evidence can be accumulated,
and the participation of other federal
agencies in those efforts can enable the
development of a consistent estimate for
use in those agencies’ respective
regulatory and policy-making activities,
including the next CAFE rulemaking.
The agency is well aware that
scientific and economic knowledge
about the contribution of GHG
emissions to changes in the future
global climate and the potential
resulting damages to the world economy
continues to evolve rapidly. Thus, any
value placed in this rulemaking on
reducing CO2 emissions is subject to
likely change. NHTSA recognizes the
importance of continuing to monitor
current research on the potential
economic damages resulting from
climate change, and of periodically
updating estimates of the value of
reducing CO2 emissions to reflect
continuing advances in scientific and
economic knowledge about the nature
and extent of climate change and the
threat it poses to world economic
development. NHTSA recognizes the
interest and expertise of other federal
agencies, particularly EPA and DOE, in
the issue of valuing the reductions in
climate damages that are likely to result
from those agencies’ own efforts to
reduce GHG emissions. NHTSA will
continue to work closely with those and
other federal agencies in the
development and review of the
economic values of reducing GHG
emissions that it plans to employ in its
next CAFE rulemaking.
Global Value of Reducing CO2
Emissions
To develop a range of estimates that
accurately reflects the uncertainty
surrounding the value of reducing
emissions, NHTSA relied on Tol’s
(2008) expanded and updated survey of
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211 estimates of the global SCC, which
was published after the agency
completed the analysis it conducted to
develop its proposed CAFE
standards.325 Tol’s 2008 survey
encompasses a larger number of
estimates for the global value of
reducing carbon emissions than its
previously-published counterpart, Tol
(2005), and continues to represent the
only recent, publicly-available
compendium of peer-reviewed estimates
of the SCC that has itself been peerreviewed and published. The wide
range of estimates it includes reflects
their authors’ varying assumptions
about critical parameters that affect the
SCC, including the sensitivity of the
global climate system to increasing
atmospheric concentrations of CO2 and
other GHGs, the extent of economic
damages likely to result from climate
change, the rate at which to discount
future damages, the relative valuation of
climate damages likely to be sustained
by nations with different income levels,
and the degree of collective aversion to
the risk of extreme climate change and
the resulting potential for equally
extreme economic damages. NHTSA
believes that Tol’s updated survey
provides a reliable and consistent
current basis for establishing a range of
plausible values for reducing CO2
emissions from fuel production and use.
Tol’s updated survey includes 125
estimates of the SCC published in peerreviewed journals through the year
2006. Each of these represents an
independent estimate of the world-wide
value of increased economic damages
from global climate change that would
be likely to result from a small increase
in carbon emissions, and by
implication, the global value of the
reduction in future economic damages
from climate change that would result
from an incremental decline in GHG
emissions. Tol reports that the mean
value of these estimates is $71 per ton
of carbon emissions, and that the
standard deviation of this estimate—a
measure of how much a typical estimate
differs from their average value—is $98
per ton; the fact that this latter measure
is significantly larger than the mean
value indicates the broad range spanned
by the estimates.
NHTSA staff confirmed in
conversations with the author that these
values apply to carbon emissions
occurring during the mid-1990s time
frame, and are expressed in
325 Richard S.J. Tol (2008), The social cost of
carbon: Trends, outliers, and catastrophes,
Economics—the Open-Access, Open-Assessment E–
Journal, 2 (25), 1–24.
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approximately 1995 dollars.326 The $71
mean value of the social cost of
increased carbon emissions reported by
Tol corresponds to a global value of $19
per metric ton of CO2 emissions reduced
or avoided when expressed in 1995
dollars, while the $98 standard
deviation for carbon emissions
corresponds to $27 per ton of CO2.327
Adjusted to reflect increases since the
mid-1990s in the marginal damage costs
of emissions at now-higher atmospheric
concentrations of GHGs, and expressed
in 2007 dollars, Tol’s mean value
corresponds to a global damage cost of
$33 per ton of CO2 emitted during the
year 2007, with a standard deviation of
nearly $47 per ton. Thus, the value that
is one standard deviation above the $33
figure is $80 per ton of CO2.
Many commenters noted that some
recent estimates of the SCC are
significantly higher that those reported
by Tol (2005), and suggested that
NHTSA employ these higher estimates
of the SCC to determine the value of
reducing CO2 emissions. Specifically,
commenters highlighted the widelycited Stern Review’s estimate that the
current SCC is likely to be in excess of
$300 per metric ton of carbon, or
approximately $80 per ton of CO2.328
Some commenters argued that Stern’s
estimate should be given substantial
weight in determining the value of
reducing CO2 emissions used to develop
the agency’s final CAFE standards.
Although Stern’s estimate is reported in
Tol’s 2008 survey, it is not included in
the estimates that form the basis for
NHTSA’s revised range of values,
because Stern’s study has not yet been
subjected to formal peer review.
NHTSA notes that the Stern Report’s
estimate of the SCC employs a low value
for the discount rate it applies to future
economic damages from climate change,
and that this assumption is largely
responsible for its high estimate of the
SCC. Hope and Newbury demonstrate
that substituting a more conventional
326 Tol
(2008), Table 1, p. 16.
noted in an earlier footnote, carbon itself
accounts for 12/44, or about 27 percent, of the mass
of carbon dioxide (12/44 is the ratio of the
molecular weight of carbon to that of carbon
dioxide). Thus, each ton of carbon emitted is
associated with 44/12, or 3.67, tons of carbon
dioxide emissions. Estimates of the SCC are
typically reported in dollars per ton of carbon, and
must be divided by 3.67 to determine their
equivalent value per ton of carbon dioxide
emissions.
328 Stern, N.H., S.Peters, V.Bakhshi, A.Bowen,
C.Cameron, S.Catovsky, D.Crane, S.Cruickshank,
S.Dietz, N.Edmonson, S.-L.Garbett, L.Hamid,
G.Hoffman, D.Ingram, B.Jones, N.Patmore,
H.Radcliffe, R.Sathiyarajah, M.Stock, C.Taylor,
T.Vernon, H.Wanjie, and D.Zenghelis (2006), Stern
Review: The Economics of Climate Change
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, England.
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327 As
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discount rate would reduce Stern’s
estimate of the benefits from reducing
emissions to the range of $20–25 per ton
of CO2, which is well within the range
of other estimates summarized in Tol’s
2008 survey, and significantly below the
$33 equivalent of the mean of peerreviewed estimates Tol reports.329
Other commenters noted that EPA has
recently developed preliminary
estimates of the value of reducing CO2
emissions, and recommended that
NHTSA employ these values in its
analysis of alternative CAFE standards.
EPA’s estimates are reported in that
agency’s Technical Support Document
on Benefits of Reducing GHG Emissions
(GHG Benefits TSD) accompanying its
Advance Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking on motor vehicle CO2
emissions.330 In that document, EPA
derives estimates of the SCC using the
subset of estimates included in Tol’s
2008 survey drawn from peer-reviewed
studies published after 1995 that do not
employ so-called equity weighting.331
Updated from their original mid-1990s
values to reflect increases in the
marginal damage costs of emissions at
growing atmospheric concentrations of
CO2 and expressed in 2006 dollars, EPA
reports average values of $40 per ton of
CO2 for studies using a 3 percent
discount rate, and $68 per ton for
studies using a 2 percent discount
rate.332 (The discount rates employed in
developing the 125 peer-reviewed
estimates surveyed by Tol ranged from
1 to 10 percent.333)
NHTSA recognizes that in a recent
rulemaking, DOE used a range of values
from $0 to $20 (in 2007 dollars) per ton
to estimate the benefits of reductions in
CO2 emissions resulting from new
energy conservation standards for
commercial air conditioning
329 See Hope, Chris, and David Newbery,
‘‘Calculating the Social Cost of Carbon,’’
unpublished paper, Cambridge University, May
2006, p. 15.
330 U.S. EPA, Technical Support Document on
Benefits of Reducing GHG Emissions, EPA–HQ–
OAR–2008–318–0078.pdf, June 12, 2008.
331 Equity weighting assigns higher weights per
dollar of economic damage from climate change
that are expected to be borne by lower-income
regions of the globe, in an attempt to make the
welfare changes corresponding to those damages
more comparable to the damages expected to be
sustained by higher-income world regions.
332 These values are reported in EPA, Table 1. p.
12. Using the original estimates included in Tol’s
2008 survey, which were supplied to NHTSA by the
author, the agency calculates these values at $38 per
ton and $62 per ton for 3% and 2% discount rates,
slightly below the estimates reported by EPA. These
differences may be attributable to the two agencies’
use of different measures of inflation to update the
original estimates from mid-1990s to 2007 price
levels (NHTSA employs the Implicit Price Deflator
for U.S. GDP, generally considered to be an accurate
index of economy-wide price inflation).
333 Tol (2008), Table A1.
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14347
equipment.334 DOE derived the upper
bound of this range from the mean of
published estimates of the SCC reported
in the same earlier survey by Tol (2005)
that NHTSA relied upon for the value it
used to analyze the CAFE standards
proposed in the NPRM, and the lower
bound from the assumption that
reducing CO2 emissions would produce
no economic benefit. However, NHTSA
believes that the estimates of the mean
and standard deviation derived from
Tol’s more recent (2008) and
comprehensive survey of published
estimates of the SCC provides a more
up-to-date range of values for reductions
in CO2 emissions resulting from higher
CAFE standards, primarily because
Tol’s 2008 survey includes a larger
number of estimates of the SCC, as well
as more recently-published estimates.
The agency is aware that rapid
advances in modeling climate change
and its potential economic damages
have occurred over the past decade, and
that the choice of discount rates has an
important influence on estimates of the
SCC. In its next CAFE rulemaking,
NHTSA will be working closely with
EPA and other federal agencies to
review the arguments for more selective
use of published estimates of the SCC
advocated by the EPA. However, based
on the information gathered and
analysis performed by the agency
through last fall, and in view of the fact
that this is a one model year rulemaking
and the agency will review matters in
considerable detail for the post MY 2011
proposal to be issued later this year,
NHTSA is not now taking that step.
Thus, for the purposes of this final rule,
NHTSA has elected to use all 125 SCC
estimates from peer-reviewed studies
reported by Tol, instead of the more
limited subset of these estimates relied
upon by EPA. Including the full array of
studies provides a reasonable basis for
valuing reductions in CO2 emissions.
Specifically, NHTSA believes that there
is still value at this time in considering
pre-1995 studies and those that employ
equity weighting (which account for 58
of the 125 peer-reviewed estimates
included in Tol’s survey), particularly
recognizing that those studies have been
published in peer-reviewed journals.335
334 Department of Energy, 10 CFR Part 431,
Energy Conservation Program for Commercial and
Industrial Equipment: Packaged Terminal Air
Conditioner and Packaged Terminal Heat Pump
Energy Conservation Standards: Final Rule, Federal
Register, October 7, 2008, pp. 58813–58814.
335 Again using the original estimates from Tol’s
2008 survey supplied by the author, NHTSA
estimates that excluding the 18 pre-1995 estimates
from the 125 used to develop the $33 per ton mean
estimate would increase it to $36 per ton, while
excluding the 40 estimates that employ equity
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For the purpose of this rulemaking,
NHTSA has also elected not to base its
estimates of the value of reducing CO2
emissions solely on estimates that
utilize a single discount rate. NHTSA
acknowledges that the varying discount
rates employed by different researchers
are an important source of the
significant differences in their resulting
estimates of the SCC. However, the
agency believes that the appropriate rate
at which to discount economic damages
occurring in the distant future is an
economic parameter whose correct
value for the purpose of analyzing
future climate change and the resulting
economic damages is subject to
significant uncertainty, analogous to
that surrounding other critical scientific
and economic parameters in climate
analysis. In the agency’s view, it is
reasonable to consider estimates based
on different discount rates at the present
time instead of attempting to resolve
this uncertainty in the time left to
complete this one-year rulemaking by
limiting the sample of estimates to those
that employ the single discount rate it
regards as most appropriate. In its next
CAFE rulemaking, NHTSA will work
with EPA, DOE and other federal
agencies to consider anew the issue of
whether to rely exclusively on values of
the SCC that are developed using
discount rates that are consistent with
the rate the agency uses to discount the
value of reductions in future GHG
emissions reductions to their present
values.336
weighting would reduce the mean estimate to $23
per ton. Excluding both pre-1995 estimates and
those that employ equity weighting would
eliminate a total of 58 of the 125 peer-reviewed
estimates, and reduce their mean value to $20 per
ton.
336 Climate economic studies report estimates of
the SCC for specific future years, often in the form
of a value for some stated base year and an estimate
of the annual rate at which it will grow, as total
atmospheric concentrations of GHGs are assumed to
increase. These studies use some assumed rate to
discount economic damages that are projected to
occur over a very long span of future years to their
present values as of the future year when emissions
increases are assumed to occur. These estimates of
the SCC during specific future years are used to
value the reductions in GHG emissions that would
result each year over the lifetimes of vehicles
affected by CAFE standards; for example, higher
CAFE standards for model year 2011 cars and light
trucks would reduce GHG emissions each year from
2011 through approximately 2047, and the value of
reducing those emissions by one ton will rise each
year over that span. The estimated economic values
of the reductions in GHG emissions during each of
those future years must in turn be discounted to
their present values as of today, so that they can be
compared with the present values of other benefits
and with vehicle manufacturers’ costs for meeting
higher CAFE standards. The rate used to perform
this latter discounting must be selected by NHTSA,
and the choice of its value is discussed in detail in
Section V.B.14.
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As some commenters pointed out,
another approach NHTSA could rely on
to estimate the value of reducing GHG
emissions would be to use actual or
projected prices for CO2 emission
permits in nations that have adopted or
proposed GHG emission cap and trade
systems. In theory, permit prices would
reflect the incremental costs for
achieving the last emissions reductions
necessary to comply with the overall
emissions cap. If this cap were based on
an estimate of the level of global
emissions required to prevent an
unacceptable degree of climate change,
permit prices could provide an estimate
of the benefits of reducing GHG
emissions to a level that forestalls
unacceptable climate change. A related
approach would be to use estimates of
the cost of reducing emissions from
specific sources other than passenger
cars or light trucks to estimate the value
of reducing CO2 emissions via higher
CAFE standards, under the reasoning
that requiring higher fuel economy for
cars and light trucks would allow these
costs to be avoided or saved.
NHTSA considered the use of CO2
permit prices to measure the benefits
from reducing emissions via higher
CAFE standards, but did not select this
approach primarily because of the
current difficulty in deciding what is
considered an ‘‘acceptable’’ degree of
climate change. The answer to that
question cannot be provided by
environmental, technological or
economic analyses alone or even in
combination; answering that question
also involves policy judgment. The
agency also notes that there would also
be considerable scientific uncertainty in
determining the level of emissions
reduction that would be necessary to
limit climate change to any degree that
was deemed acceptable, even if
agreement on the latter could be
achieved. Since permit prices would
depend on the level of emission
reduction that is required, they are
likely to reflect this uncertainty.
Additionally, as a general matter, permit
prices reflect avoided costs of emission
reductions and there is no direct or
necessary relationship between avoided
costs and benefits.
Finally, still other commenters urged
the agency to take into account the
economic value of any reduction in the
risk of catastrophic climate events
resulting from lower GHG emissions
when estimating the benefits from
reducing emissions. Most of the
estimates of the SCC that are included
in Tol’s updated review treat the risks
and potential damages from catastrophic
events using conventional probabilistic
methods to compute the ‘‘expected’’
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value of a wide range of potential
changes in climate and associated
economic damages. However, few
studies of the SCC attempt to include
explicit premiums that measure the
population’s aversion to accepting the
risks of catastrophic climate damages.337
Further, most published studies of
climate damages report insufficiently
detailed results to allow the calculation
of appropriate risk premiums.
NHTSA acknowledges that including
an appropriate premium to reflect the
value of reducing the risks of
catastrophic climate events could
significantly increase its estimate of the
value of reducing CO2 emissions, but it
has not attempted to do so at this
time.338 (For discussion of NHTSA’s
consideration of abrupt climate change,
see § 3.4.3.2.4 of the FEIS.) However, the
agency is aware of recent research
suggesting that including an appropriate
risk premium can significantly increase
estimates of the SCC, and by implication
increase the estimated value of reducing
CO2 emissions.339 In working with EPA,
DOE and other federal agencies in the
development of revised estimates of the
benefits from reducing CO2 emissions
that could be used in the next CAFE
rulemaking, NHTSA will carefully
consider any new research that
explicitly estimates risk premiums, and
evaluate their applicability to the issue
of estimating economic benefits from
reductions in CO2 emissions resulting
from future CAFE standards. The agency
will also work with those agencies and
departments in exploring the possibility
337 Under the conventional assumption that
successive increases in consumption produce
progressively smaller improvements in economic
welfare, the welfare level associated with the mean
of a range of possible consumption levels is higher
than the mean of the welfare levels associated with
each possible level of consumption. Moreover, the
difference between these welfare levels increases as
the span of possible consumption levels is
broadened, as would occur if increased GHG
emissions have the potential to cause drastic
climate changes and result in similarly drastic
economic damages. In this situation, the true
economic costs of increased emissions include not
only the resulting increase in the probabilistic
expected value of climate-related economic
damages, but also the compensation that those
suffering these damages would require in order to
willingly accept the increased risk of catastrophic
damages, even if that risk is extremely small.
Conversely, the value of reducing GHG emissions
should include not only the resulting reduction in
the expected value of future climate-related
economic damages, but also the added amount
people would be willing to pay for the associated
reduction in the risk that such catastrophic damage
might occur.
338 Tol estimates that including an appropriate
risk premium would increase the mean estimate of
the SCC included in his more recent survey by 15–
27%; see Tol (2008), Table 2.
339 Hope, Chris, and David Newbery (2006),
Calculating the social cost of carbon, University of
Cambridge, May 2, 2006.
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of calculating an appropriate risk
premium using results reported in
published studies of the SCC together
with any necessary assumptions about
the underlying economic behavior, such
as the response of welfare to successive
increases in consumption levels.
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Domestic Value of Reducing CO2
Emissions
The agency was able to develop a
domestic value by using the mean
estimate of the global value of reduced
economic damages from climate change
resulting from reducing CO2 emissions
as a starting point; estimating the
fraction of the reduction in global
damages that is likely to be experienced
within the U.S.; and applying this
fraction to the mean estimate of global
benefits from reducing emissions to
obtain an estimate of the U.S. domestic
benefits from lower GHG emissions.
The agency constructed an estimate of
the U.S. domestic benefits from
reducing CO2 emissions using estimates
of U.S. domestic and global benefits
from reducing greenhouse gas emissions
developed by EPA and reported in that
agency’s Technical Support Document
accompanying its advance notice of
proposed rulemaking on motor vehicle
CO2 emissions.340 Specifically, NHTSA
calculated the ratio of domestic to global
values of reducing CO2 emissions
estimated by EPA using the Climate
Framework for Uncertainty, Negotiation,
and Distribution (FUND) integrated
assessment model.
EPA’s central estimates of domestic
and global values for reducing GHG
emissions during 2007 using the FUND
model using a 3 percent discount rate
were $1 and $17 per metric ton (in
2006$), which suggests that benefits to
the U.S. from reducing CO2 emissions
are likely to represent about 6 percent
of their global total. The comparable
figures derived using a 2 percent
discount rate are $4 and $88 for 2007,
suggesting that U.S. domestic benefits
from reductions in CO2 emissions
would amount to less than 5 percent of
their global total. EPA’s results also
suggest that these fractions are likely to
remain roughly constant over future
decades.341 Applying the 5–6 percent
figure to the $33 per metric ton mean
estimate of the global value of reducing
CO2 emissions derived previously yields
an estimate of approximately $2 per
metric ton for the domestic benefit from
reducing U.S. CO2 emissions in 2007.
340 U.S. EPA, Technical Support Document on
Benefits of Reducing GHG Emissions, June 12, 2008.
341 These values are reported in EPA, Table 1. p.
12.
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NHTSA also constructed a second
estimate of the fraction of global
economic damages from climate change
likely to be borne by the U.S., using the
procedure described by Delucchi in his
comments on the NPRM.342 Delucchi
noted that the fraction of global damages
from climate change borne within the
U.S. can be estimated by adjusting the
U.S. share of world economic output,
measured by the ratio of U.S. GDP to
gross world product, by the relative
sensitivity of U.S. and world economic
output to damages resulting from
climate change. Using data on the U.S.
share of world economic output (which
ranges from 20–28 percent) and
published estimates of the relative
sensitivity of the U.S. economy to
climate damages compared to the world
economy as a whole, Delucchi estimated
that the U.S. fraction of global economic
damages from climate change is likely to
range from 0–14 percent. Applying the
midpoint of this range (7 percent) to the
$33 per ton mean estimate of the global
value of reducing CO2 emissions also
yields an estimate of approximately $2
per metric ton for the domestic benefit
from reducing U.S. CO2 emissions in
2007.
Choosing Between a Global Value and a
Domestic Value, and Estimating the
Global Values
As the IPCC has noted, CO2 and other
GHGs are chemically stable, and thus
remain in the atmosphere for periods of
a decade to centuries or even longer,
becoming well-mixed throughout the
earth’s atmosphere. As a consequence,
emissions of these gases have extremely
long-term effects on the global climate.
Further, emissions from any particular
geographic area (for example, the U.S.)
are expected to contribute to changes in
the global climate that will affect many
other countries around the world.
Similarly, emissions occurring in other
countries will contribute to changes in
the earth’s future climate that are
expected to affect the well-being of the
U.S. The long-lived nature of
atmospheric GHGs means that
emissions of these gases from any
location or source can affect the global
climate over a prolonged period, and
can thus result in economic damages to
many other nations as well as over
subsequent generations.
342 Mark A. Delucchi, Summary of the NonMonetary Externalities of Motor Vehicle Use, UCD–
ITS–RR–96–3 (9) rev. 1, Institute of Transportation
Studies, University of California, Davis, originally
published September 1998, revised October 2004,
pp. 49–51. Available at https://www.its.ucdavis.edu/
publications/2004/UCD-ITS-RR-96-03(09)_rev1.pdf
(last accessed March 23, 2009).
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In view of the global effects of GHG
emissions, reducing those emissions to
an economically efficient level, i.e., one
that maximizes the difference between
the total benefits from limiting the
extent of climate change and the total
costs of achieving the reduction in
emissions necessary to do so, would
require each individual nation to limit
its own domestic emissions to the point
where its domestic costs for further
reducing emissions within its borders
equal the global value of reduced
economic damages that result from
limiting climate change. NHTSA
believes that this argument has
considerable merit from the standpoint
of economic theory.
If individual nations were instead to
consider only the domestic benefits they
receive from limiting the pace or extent
of climate change, each nation would
reduce emissions only to the point
where its costs for achieving further
reductions equal the benefits to its
domestic economy from limiting the
impacts of climate change. As a result,
the combined global reduction in
emissions resulting from individual
nations’ comparisons of their domestic
benefits from limiting climate change to
their domestic costs for reducing
emissions might be inadequate to slow
or limit climate change.
At the same time, however, the
agency must also consider the
economic, environmental and other
effects on the U.S. that a choice of a
global value in this rulemaking might
have, given the current stage of ongoing
domestic legislative activity and
negotiations regarding effective
international cooperation and
coordination. NHTSA notes that there
might be risks to nations that
unilaterally attempt to reduce their
emissions by adopting policies or
regulations whose domestic marginal
costs equal the global marginal benefits
from reducing the threat of climate
change. Such actions could induce
economic activity within their borders—
particularly production by emissionsintensive industries—to shift to nations
that adopt less stringent regulations or
lower economic penalties on emissions
within their respective borders. Such a
shift would cause emissions abroad to
increase, offsetting at least some of the
benefits of domestic emissions
reductions.
The agency recognizes that the
arguments for using global versus
domestic values of reducing GHG
emissions are complex, and cannot be
resolved satisfactorily by the unilateral
actions of any single federal agency.
Instead, resolution of whether to use a
domestic or global value for reducing
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emissions, and developing reliable
estimates of those values, as relevant,
will require active participation by all
federal agencies whose regulatory and
policy-making activities will be affected
by this decision, as well as leadership
from the Administration. In reaching
such a consensus, participants will need
to assess not only the economic
arguments favoring global versus
domestic values of reducing emissions,
but also the prospects for effective
international cooperation to reduce
global GHG emissions, the likelihood
that leadership by the U.S. in seeking
emissions reductions would spur
international efforts to reduce
emissions, and the precedents
established by federal agencies that have
previously evaluated benefits from
regulations that lower GHG emissions.
They will also need to consider
arguments that U.S. citizens may attach
some value to reductions in the threat
of climate impacts occurring in other
regions of the globe, and that reducing
the impacts of climate change on other
nations may have important ‘‘spillover’’
benefits to the U.S. itself. A position has
not been adopted by the relevant
entities.
In these circumstances, NHTSA
decided to take a pragmatic approach to
estimating the value of reducing GHG
emissions for the immediate and limited
purpose of this rulemaking. As noted
above, we used the mean value in Tol
(2008). To develop a reasonable upperbound estimate of that value for
purposes of this rule, the agency used a
value one standard deviation above the
$33 mean value.343 As also noted above,
the standard deviation of peer-reviewed
estimates from Tol’s 2008 survey is $47
per ton when expressed in comparable
terms, which yields an upper-bound
estimate of $80 per ton (equal to $33
plus $47) of CO2 emissions avoided.344
Because the $80 per ton value is higher
than those corresponding to nearly 90%
of the 125 peer-reviewed estimates of
the SCC included in the survey, the
agency views it as a reasonable upper
bound on the likely global value of
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343 A
two-standard deviation range around the
agency’s $33 per ton central estimate would extend
from minus $59 to $126 per ton of CO2 emissions.
The agency notes that the lower end of this range
implies economic benefits of $59 for each
additional ton of CO2 emissions during 2007, while
its upper end significantly exceeds all but two of
the 125 peer-reviewed estimates included in Tol’s
2008 survey.
344 A value one standard deviation below the $33
mean would be ¥$14 per ton, which implies
economic benefits of $14 for each additional ton of
emissions. Because of this implication, NHTSA
regards the $2 per ton estimate of the domestic
value of reducing emissions as a more plausible
lower bound on the value of reducing emissions
than the $¥14 per ton figure.
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reducing CO2 emissions.345 For the
purposes of this rulemaking, NHTSA
believes that the range extending from
the $2 per ton estimate of the domestic
value of reducing CO2 emissions to the
$80 per ton estimate of the global value
is sufficiently broad to illustrate the
sensitivity of alternative MY 2011 CAFE
standards and the resulting fuel savings
and emissions reductions to plausible
differences in the SCC.
Rate of Growth of SCC
The marginal cost per ton of
additional CO2 emissions is generally
expected to rise over time, because the
increased pace and degree of climate
change—and thus the resulting
economic damages—caused by
additional emissions are both expected
to rise in proportion to the existing
concentration of CO2 in the earth’s
atmosphere. The IPCC Fourth
Assessment Report variously reported
that the climate-related economic
damages resulting from an additional
ton of carbon emissions are likely to
grow at a rate of 2.4 percent annually,
and at a rate of 2–4 percent annually.346
Virtually all commenters who addressed
this issue indicated that the IPCC
intended the 2.4 percent growth rate it
reported for the SCC in one passage to
instead read ‘‘2–4 percent,’’ and many
urged NHTSA to apply a 3 percent or
higher growth rate to determine the
future value of the SCC.
NHTSA staff reviewed the underlying
references from which the disputed
figure was derived, and those sources
clearly report the growth rate implied by
their estimates of the future value of the
SCC for different future years as 2.4
percent, instead of the 2–4 percent
asserted by commenters.347 Although
most studies that estimate economic
damages caused by increased GHG
emissions in future years produce an
implied growth rate in the SCC, neither
the rate itself nor the information
necessary to derive its implied value is
commonly reported. NHTSA has been
unable to locate other published
345 Tol reports that the 90% confidence limit of
the distribution of peer-reviewed values is $170 per
ton, while adding one standard deviation to his
reported mean yields a value of $169; see Tol
(2008), Table 1.
346 Yohe et al. (2007), p. 13 reports that ‘‘* * *
it is very likely that the rate of increase [in the
social cost of carbon] will be 2% to 4% per year.’’
However, p. 822 states that ‘‘* * * the SCC will
increase over time; current knowledge suggests a
2.4% per year rate of growth.’’
347 Hope, C.W. (2006), The Marginal Impact of
CO2 from PAGE2002: An Integrated Assessment
Model Incorporating the IPCC’s Five Reasons for
Concern, Integrated Assessment Journal, 6, (1), 19–
56; and Hope, Chris, and David Newbery (2006),
Calculating the social cost of carbon, University of
Cambridge, May 2, 2006.
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research that reports the likely future
rate of growth in damage costs from CO2
emissions or the information required to
derive it. NHTSA understands that other
researchers may be using alternative
growth rates. The agency may revise the
estimated rate of growth it uses in its
future analyses based on emerging
estimates in the literature and on
interagency coordination with the EPA,
DOE and other federal agencies.
For the purposes of this rulemaking,
NHTSA used the 2.4 percent annual
growth rate to calculate the future
increases in its estimates of both the
domestic ($2/metric ton in 2007) and
global ($33/metric ton and $80/metric
ton in 2007) values of reducing CO2
emissions. Over the lifetimes of cars and
light trucks subject to the CAFE
standards it is establishing for model
year 2011, these values average nearly
$4, $61, and $157 per ton of CO2
emissions, approximately twice their
estimated values during 2007. The
agency is unaware of the basis for EDF’s
assertion that the 2.4 percent growth
rate is to be used only in conjunction
with an intergenerational discount rate
with a maximum of 3 percent. Although
the agency’s analysis did follow EDF’s
suggestion in any case, NHTSA selected
the growth rate in the future value of
reducing CO2 emissions and the
discount rate applied to these benefits
for separate reasons, as discussed in
detail previously.
Insensitivity of MY 2011 Standards to
Different Values of SCC
NHTSA examined the sensitivity of
alternative CAFE standards for MY 2011
to the choice among three different
estimates of the value of reducing CO2
emissions from fuel production and use:
(1) The mean estimate of the global
value of reducing emissions derived as
discussed previously from Tol’s 2008
survey—$33 per ton; (2) a value one
standard deviation above this mean
estimate—$80 per ton; and (3) the
estimate of the value of U.S. domestic
benefits from lower emissions derived
as discussed above—$2 per ton.348
The agency tested the sensitivity of its
‘‘optimized’’ CAFE standards for MY
2011 passenger cars and light trucks to
348 In all analyses that employ its estimated value
of the global benefits from reducing CO2 emissions,
NHTSA reduces the value of the savings in
monopsony costs from lower U.S. petroleum
consumption and imports to zero. This is consistent
with the fact that when viewed from the same
global perspective that justifies the use of a global
value for reducing emissions, these monopsony
payments represent a transfer of economic
resources from consumers of petroleum products to
petroleum producers, rather than an actual savings
in economic resources, and thus do not constitute
a real economic benefit.
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the choice among those three alternative
values for reducing CO2 emissions. The
agency’s analysis revealed that the
optimized CAFE standards for MY 2011
cars and light trucks were unaffected by
the choice among those values for
reducing CO2 emissions from fuel
production and use. The detailed results
of this analysis are reported in the
agency’s previously-released Final
Environmental Impact Statement for MY
2011–15 CAFE standards.
There are several reasons for the
insensitivity of the MY 2011 standards
to the different values of the SCC. First,
not more than 15 percent of all models
are being redesigned for MY 2011, thus
limiting the changes that can be made.
Second, in any year, the value of
gasoline has a far greater effect on the
potential level of the CAFE standards
than the SCC. Third, in the analyses that
employ the $33 or $80 per ton global
values of the benefits from reducing CO2
emissions, NHTSA reduces the savings
in monopsony costs from lower U.S.
petroleum consumption and imports to
zero.349 This is done in order to be
consistent with the fact that monopsony
payments are a transfer rather than a
real economic benefit when viewed
from the same global perspective. This
reduction partly offsets the effect of the
higher CO2 value on the optimized
CAFE standards and resulting benefits.
It does not do so completely, however,
because the value of reducing CO2
emissions continues to grow at the
assumed 2.4 percent rate over the period
spanned by the analysis, nearly
doubling over the lifetimes of MY 2011
vehicles.
Decision Regarding the Value of SCC
Given the insensitivity of the
potential standards to the various values
of SCC used in the above analysis,
NHTSA concludes that it is unnecessary
for the agency to select a single estimate
of the value of reducing CO2 emissions
for inclusion in its analysis as part of
this rulemaking. For that reason and in
view of the significance that announcing
the selection of either a domestic or
global value in this rulemaking might
have in the context of ongoing
legislative activities and international
negotiations, we are deferring the choice
between a domestic SCC and a global
SCC and, for the appropriate choice, the
monetized value for the benefit of
reduction, until the next CAFE
rulemaking. This will provide the time
necessary for more refined analysis and
for the various affected federal agencies
349 As noted above earlier in the discussion of
SCC, NHTSA plans to review this practice in the
next CAFE rulemaking.
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to work together and identify a
consistent value for use in their
respective regulatory and policy-making
activities. NHTSA expects to participate
actively in the process of developing an
appropriate range of estimates for that
value. By the time we issue a proposal
this summer for MY 2012 and beyond,
we anticipate those activities and efforts
will have progressed sufficiently to
enable the federal agencies to make an
informed choice that we can use as a
basis for that rulemaking. NHTSA
expects that the economic value of
reducing CO2 emissions will play an
important role in developing and
analyzing standards in the next CAFE
rulemaking which, unlike this
rulemaking, we expect to be a five-year
rulemaking.
13. The Value of Increased Driving
Range
NHTSA also considered the fact that
improving vehicles’ fuel economy may
increase their driving range before they
require refueling. By reducing the
frequency with which drivers typically
refuel their vehicles, and by extending
the upper limit of the range they can
travel before requiring refueling,
improving fuel economy provides some
additional benefits to drivers.
Alternatively, if manufacturers respond
to improved fuel economy by reducing
the size of fuel tanks to maintain a
constant driving range, the resulting
savings in manufacturing costs will
presumably be reflected in lower
vehicle sales prices.
NHTSA stated in the NPRM that no
direct estimates of the value of extended
vehicle range are readily available, so
NHTSA’s analysis calculates the
reduction in the annual number of
refueling cycles that results from
improved fuel economy, and applies
DOT-recommended values of travel time
savings to convert the resulting time
savings to their economic value.350 The
NPRM provided the following
illustration of how the value of
extended refueling range is estimated: A
typical small light truck model has an
average fuel tank size of approximately
20 gallons. Assuming that drivers
typically refuel when their tanks are 20
percent full (i.e., 4 gallons in reserve),
increasing this model’s actual on-road
fuel economy from 24 to 25 mpg would
350 See Department of Transportation, Guidance
Memorandum, ‘‘The Value of Saving Travel Time:
Departmental Guidance for Conducting Economic
Evaluations,’’ Apr. 9, 1997. Available at https://
ostpxweb.dot.gov/policy/Data/VOT97guid.pdf (last
accessed August 20, 2008); update available at
https://ostpxweb.dot.gov/policy/Data/
VOTrevision1_2-11-03.pdf (last accessed August 20,
2008).
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14351
extend its driving range from 384 miles
(16 gallons × 24 mpg = 384 miles) to 400
miles (16 gallons × 25 mpg = 400 miles).
Assuming that the truck is driven
12,000 miles per year, this reduces the
number of times it needs to be refueled
from 31.3 (12,000 miles per year ÷ 384
miles per refueling) to 30.0 (12,000
miles per year ÷ 400 miles per
refueling), or by 1.3 refuelings per year.
Weighted by the nationwide mix of
urban (about 2/3) and rural (about 1/3)
driving and average vehicle occupancy
for all driving trips (1.6 persons), the
DOT-recommended value of travel time
per vehicle-hour is slightly below
$24.00 (in 2006 dollars).351 Assuming
that locating a station and filling up
requires ten minutes, the annual value
of time saved as a result of less frequent
refueling amounts to $5.20 (calculated
as 1.3 refuelings/year × 10/60 hours/
refueling × $24.00/hour). This
calculation is repeated for each future
calendar year that vehicles affected by
the alternative CAFE standards
evaluated in this rule would remain in
service. Like fuel savings and other
benefits, however, the total value of this
benefit for vehicles produced during a
model year declines over their expected
lifetime, because a smaller number of
those vehicles remain in service each
year, and those remaining in service are
driven fewer miles.
NHTSA received comments only from
the Alliance regarding the benefits that
drivers receive from increased driving
range. The Alliance stated that ‘‘NHTSA
incorrectly assumes that its new fuel
economy standards will improve
vehicle range and thus reduce the
number of times a vehicle owner would
have to refill the tank (creating
consumer benefits).’’ The Alliance
comments focused on two points: first,
that analysis by Sierra Research
demonstrates ‘‘the complete absence of
351 The average hourly wage rate during 2006 was
estimated to be approximately $25.00 per hour. For
urban travel, the DOT guidance recommends that
personal travel (which accounts for 94.4 percent of
urban automobile travel) be valued at 50 percent of
the hourly wage rate, while business travel (5.6
percent of urban auto travel) should be valued at
100 percent of the hourly wage rate. For intercity
travel, personal travel (which represents 87 percent
of intercity automobile travel) is valued at 70
percent of the wage rate, while business travel (the
remaining 13 percent) is valued at 100 percent of
the wage rate. The resulting average values of travel
time are $13.20 for urban travel and $18.48 for
intercity travel. Multiplying these by average
vehicle occupancy (1.6) produces estimates of
$21.12 and $29.56 for the value of time per vehiclehour in urban and rural travel. Using the fractions
of urban and rural travel reported above, the
weighted average of these values is $23.91 per hour.
Departmental Guidance for Valuation of Travel
Time in Economic Analysis, 1997. Available at
https://ostpxweb.dot.gov/policy/Data/
VOT97guid.pdf (last accessed Nov. 2, 2008).
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any relationship between fuel economy
and range in the light truck fleet,’’ and
second, that manufacturers ‘‘design fuelstorage capacity to achieve the basic
range requirements consumers
demand,’’ and will reduce the space
necessary for fuel tanks in order to
devote it to other uses (such as
increasing cargo space) if fuel economy
levels rise. The Alliance argued that
NHTSA’s assumption that raising fuel
economy levels will improve vehicle
range and thus result in more miles
driven (i.e., the rebound effect) are ‘‘not
supported by existing data’’ and
contradicted by the Sierra Research
analysis. For example, Sierra Research
found that the driving range for the
Chevrolet Suburban has decreased from
588 to 527 miles as its fuel economy has
improved from 1992 to 1999, because
the gas tank capacity was decreased in
the new body from 42 gallons to 31
gallons.
Agency response: In response to the
Alliance’s comments, NHTSA notes that
the most likely explanation for the
absence of a relationship between fuel
economy and refueling range is that
manufacturers adjust fuel tank size to
achieve some target level of refueling
range. If by doing so, manufacturers are
able to reduce the space occupied by
fuel tanks and devote it to increased
passenger or cargo carrying capacity, as
the Alliance asserts, this presumably
reflects manufacturers’ view that those
attributes are more valuable to vehicle
owners than increased refueling range,
or that the resulting savings in vehicle
production costs are more valuable to
buyers than extended refueling range. If
manufacturers respond in either of these
ways, they apparently estimate that the
resulting increase in the vehicle’s utility
to potential buyers is more valuable
than the increase in refueling range that
would result from holding tank size
fixed. Thus, NHTSA’s estimate of the
value of increased refueling range is
likely to underestimate the true benefits
from the resulting changes in vehicle
attributes or prices. As a consequence,
the agency has chosen not to modify the
procedure it uses to estimate the
economic value of this benefit.
14. Discounting Future Benefits and
Costs
The discount rate applied to future
benefits and costs of reduced fuel
consumption has a significant effect on
the stringency of the final standards.
Discounting converts the economic
values of benefits and costs that are
expected to occur in the future to their
equivalent values today (or present
values), to account for the reduction in
their value when they are deferred until
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some later date rather than received
immediately. Discounting reflects the
fact that most people view economic
outcomes that are not expected to occur
until some future date as less valuable
than equivalent outcomes that occur
sooner. Discounting is particularly
important to enable consistent
comparison of economic costs and
benefits that are expected to occur in the
future to those occurring in the present,
or when the future time profiles of
benefits and costs are not expected to be
similar. The discount rate expresses the
percent decline in the value of future
benefits or costs—as viewed from
today’s perspective—for each year they
are deferred into the future.
In the NPRM, NHTSA proposed to use
a rate of 7 percent per year to discount
the value of future fuel savings and
other benefits when analyzing the
potential impacts of alternative CAFE
standards. NHTSA relied primarily on
the 7 percent discount rate for two
reasons. First, OMB guidance states that
7 percent reflects the economy-wide
opportunity cost of capital, and that it
‘‘is the appropriate discount rate
whenever the main effect of a regulation
is to displace or alter the use of capital
in the private sector.’’ 352 NHTSA
believes that much of the cost of CAFE
compliance to manufacturers is likely to
come at the expense of other
investments the auto manufacturers
might otherwise make, for example, in
research and development of new
technologies. Second, NHTSA’s analysis
in the NPRM determined that 7 percent
is a reasonable estimate of the interest
rate that vehicle buyers who finance
their purchases are currently willing to
pay to defer the added costs of
purchasing vehicles with higher fuel
economy.353
However, the agency also performed
an analysis of benefits from alternative
increases in CAFE standards using a 3
percent discount rate, and sought
comment on whether the final rule
standards should be set using a 3
percent rate instead of a 7 percent rate.
OMB guidance also states that when a
regulation primarily and directly affects
private consumption (e.g., through
higher consumer prices for goods and
services), instead of primarily affecting
the allocation of capital, a lower
discount rate may be more appropriate.
OMB argues that the consumption rate
of time preference would be the most
352 Office of Management and Budget, Circular A–
4, ‘‘Regulatory Analysis,’’ September 17, 2003, at
33. Available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/
circulars/a004/a-4.pdf (last accessed November 13,
2008).
353 See NPRM discussion at 73 FR 24415–16 (May
2, 2008).
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appropriate discount rate in this
situation, since it reflects the rate at
which consumers discount future
consumption to determine its value at
the present time. One measure of the
consumption rate of time preference is
the rate at which savers are willing to
defer consumption into the future when
there is no risk that the borrower will
fail to repay them, and a readily
available source of this measure is the
real rate of return on long-term
government debt. After adjusting to
remove the effect of inflation, OMB
reports that this rate has averaged about
3 percent over the past 30 years.
The NPRM analyzed and sought
comment on both the 7 percent and 3
percent discount rates because in the
context of CAFE standards for motor
vehicles, the appropriate discount rate
depends on one’s view of how the costs
of complying with more stringent
standards are ultimately distributed
between vehicle manufacturers and
consumers. Compared to the proposed
standards set with the 7 percent
discount rate, NHTSA determined that
using a 3 percent discount rate would
raise the combined passenger car and
light truck standards by about 2 mpg in
MY 2015 (to 33.6 mpg from 31.6 mpg),
and would reduce lifetime CO2
emissions of the vehicles affected by the
proposed standards for MY 2011–15 by
an additional 29 percent (to 672 mmt,
instead of 521 mmt). However, NHTSA
estimated that complying with the
higher standards would cost an
additional 89 percent more in
technology outlays over the five model
years ($85 billion versus of $45 billion).
Commenters Calling for NHTSA To Use
a Lower Discount Rate
Several commenters, including
environmental and consumer groups,
state agencies and Attorneys General,
and three individuals, called for lower
discount rates than 7 percent. The
commenters’ argument for lower
discount rates is essentially two-fold.
First, commenters argued that the
proposed CAFE standards actually affect
private consumption and not capital
investments, so consistency with OMB
guidance requires NHTSA to use a
discount rate lower than 7 percent.
Second, commenters argued that
because reducing CO2 emissions and
thus the pace or degree of climate
change is an important component of
the benefits from higher CAFE
standards, the fact that these benefits are
likely to occur in the distant future—
and thus to be experienced by future
generations—requires NHTSA to apply
a lower ‘‘intergenerational’’ discount
rate. Commenters were unclear about
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whether this lower discount rate should
also be applied to the other components
of benefits resulting from higher CAFE
standards, which are expected to occur
within 25–35 years.
UCS, EDF, NRDC, CARB, and the
Attorneys General commented that
NHTSA should use a discount rate of 3
percent or less for setting the CAFE
standards. Some commenters, like UCS,
based their comments on OMB Circular
A–4. UCS commented that although
manufacturers will absorb some of the
costs of the standards by reallocating
capital from other potential uses, ‘‘the
amounts involved will be markedly
smaller than the benefits realized by
private consumers,’’ specifically, the
benefits due to reduced ‘‘private
consumption of vehicle fuels.’’ Thus,
UCS argued, the standards ‘‘primarily
and directly affect private
consumption’’ much more than the
allocation of capital, so a discount rate
of 3 percent should be used. CARB
similarly stated that the fuel economy
standards will affect private
consumption over the long-term, so
OMB guidance indicates that 3 percent
is a more appropriate discount rate. EDF
also drew on OMB guidance, but
emphasized the increased costs to
consumers of more-expensive passenger
cars and light trucks as justification for
using a 3 percent discount rate, rather
than the benefits from reduced fuel
consumption. Comments from the
Attorneys General included both points
in favor of a 3 percent discount rate
according to OMB guidance—that
consumers would face higher vehicle
costs, but also gain benefits like reduced
fuel consumption, a better environment,
and a more secure energy future.
Other comments made in favor of a 3
percent discount rate focused on the
‘‘intergenerational benefits’’ of reducing
climate change by raising fuel economy
standards. OMB Circular A–4 suggests
that it may be appropriate to use a lower
discount rate than those used for intragenerational analysis when comparing
costs and benefits that are likely to be
experienced by different generations.
Specifically, Circular A–4 notes that
‘‘Special ethical considerations arise
when comparing benefits and costs
across generations. Although most
people demonstrate time preference in
their own consumption behavior, it may
not be appropriate for society to
demonstrate a similar preference when
deciding between the well-being of
current and future generations.’’ (p. 35)
On this basis, OMB advises that ‘‘If your
rule will have important
intergenerational benefits or costs you
might consider a further sensitivity
analysis using a lower but positive
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discount rate in addition to calculating
net benefits using discount rates of 3
and 7 percent.’’ (p. 36)
EDF commented that ‘‘The benefits
from mitigating climate change will
occur over decades or even centuries; as
a result, CAFE’s implications for carbon
dioxide emissions should trigger EPA
and OMB guidelines for estimating costs
or benefits that affect multiple
generations.’’ EDF cited EPA’s draft
ANPRM on greenhouse gas regulation
under the Clean Air Act as stating that
‘‘[w]hen there are important benefits or
costs that affect multiple generations of
the population, EPA and the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) allow
for low but positive discount rates (e.g.
0.5–3 percent noted by US EPA, 1–3
percent by OMB). Rates of three percent
or lower are consistent with long-run
uncertainty in economic growth and
interest rates, considerations of issues
associated with the transfer of wealth
between generations, and the risk of
high impact climate damages.’’ 354 EDF
also stated that using a discount rate of
3 percent or lower ‘‘is also in full
agreement with the guidance with the
blue ribbon panel of economists,
including a Nobel laureate, who
recommended that the rate at which
future benefits and costs should be
discounted to present values will
generally not equal the rate of return on
private investment.’’ 355 Thus, EDF
argued that NHTSA should use a 3
percent discount rate, with a sensitivity
analysis using 0.5 and 1 percent.
NRDC offered a similar comment,
arguing that this is a multi-generational
rulemaking because it impacts climate
change, and that therefore an
‘‘intergenerational discount rate’’ must
be used of not more than 3 percent.
NRDC argued that ‘‘The discount rate is
often the single most important
parameter in benefit cost analyses of
environmental regulations, due to the
fact that high discount rates
disadvantage projects whose benefits
accrue in the future but whose costs are
borne up front.’’ NRDC’s comment
included four reasons why the
intergenerational discount rate must be
3 percent or less. First, NRDC argued
that a ‘‘social’’ discount rate must be
used when there are ‘‘social (i.e., nonprivate) costs and benefits.’’ The CAFE
354 EPA’s ANPRM is available at 73 FR 44354
(July 30, 2008). EDF also cited OMB Circular A–4
and EPA ‘‘Guidelines for Preparing Economic
Analyses,’’ EPA 240–R–00–003 (2000), available at
https://yosemite.epa.gov/EE/epa/eed.nsf/pages/
Guidelines.html (last accessed August 6, 2008).
355 EDF cited Kenneth J. Arrow et al., Is there a
Role for Benefit-Cost Analysis in Environmental,
Health, and Safety Regulation?, 272 Science 173,
221–222 (April 12, 1996).
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standards will reduce fuel consumption,
which means that society will
experience the benefits of reduced
global warming and other air pollution.
Second, NRDC stated that the proper
rate is the ‘‘net national welfare’’ or
NNW, which represents ‘‘the real rate of
growth in the economy, which takes
GDP and subtracts from it depreciation
of natural and man made capital,
pollution abatement expenses, and
negative externalities, and then adds to
it the value of non-market goods, such
as household labor.’’ NRDC asserted that
this rate is likely to range from 0 to 1
percent. Third, NRDC argued that
because CAFE standards are
‘‘precautionary’’ in nature and ‘‘reduce
the likelihood of potentially
catastrophic climate change or serious
military security costs,’’ society may be
willing to pay more to avoid these
extreme risks, such that a negative
social discount rate may be appropriate.
And finally, NRDC argued that ‘‘the use
of a declining discount rate is the newly
supported method for climate
damages.’’ For these reasons, NRDC
argued that NHTSA should use a
discount rate no higher than 3 percent
for setting CAFE standards, and should
conduct a sensitivity analysis using
lower rates.
An individual commenter, Mark Eads,
also stated that the choices made
primarily involve long-term intergenerational environmental benefits and
costs rather than intra-generational
benefits and costs. Mr. Eads presented
his summary and comparison of a
number of scholarly papers considering
discount rate over the past several years,
and suggested that NHTSA apply a
declining discount rate that begins at 2.6
percent in year one and declines to 0.6
percent in year 300.
UCS, EDF, NRDC, CARB, the
Attorneys General, and Mr. Eads did not
address the issue of whether a lower
intergenerational discount rate should
also be applied to the other components
of benefits resulting from higher CAFE
standards, which are likely to be
experienced by current generations.
Other commenters urged NHTSA to
use discount rates besides 7 or 3
percent. CBD commented that both 7
percent and 3 percent are too high,
arguing that they ‘‘artificially reduce’’
the value of future benefits from
improved fuel efficiency, and that using
a lower discount rate will result in
higher standards. Although CBD did not
specify what discount rate would be
preferable, other than to recommend a
lower one, CBD appeared to approve of
Stern’s use of a discount rate below 1
percent. CFA and NESCAUM, in
contrast, both supported NHTSA’s use
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of a 5 percent discount rate. CFA argued
that NHTSA should have ‘‘picked the
middle road’’ between 3 percent and 7
percent, to avoid ‘‘emphasizing the
importance of economic factors and
capital goods at the expense of the need
to conserve energy,’’ and used 3 and 7
percent for sensitivity analyses.
NESCAUM argued that a 7 percent
discount rate ‘‘inappropriately devalues
the technologies designed to achieve
increased fuel economy,’’ and stated
that EPA had used a 5 percent discount
rate in its 2000 rulemaking on Tier 2
emissions standards.356
Professor Michael Hanemann
commented that NHTSA’s decision to
use a discount rate of 7 percent was
‘‘utterly unfounded in the climate
change context,’’ and that NHTSA
should use a discount rate of no higher
than 4 percent, although even 4 percent
had been criticized in recent articles on
climate change economics. Thus, Prof.
Hanemann argued, NHTSA should use
a discount rate of no higher than 4
percent, and conduct sensitivity
analyses with lower numbers, like 2
percent. The Attorneys General
commented that NHTSA should take
account of Professor Hanemann’s
suggestion of 4 percent as an example of
‘‘the discount rates that scholars and
economists are using to evaluate the
costs and benefits related to global
warming.’’
Professor Gary Yohe commented that
the appropriate discount rate for
benefits from public investments in an
economy where returns to private
capital investment are taxed should be
lower than the rate of return on private
capital, in order to reflect the fact that
public investment can increase returns
to private investment by reducing
distortions caused by the corporate
profits tax. Although they are not
specifically public investments, Prof.
Yohe noted that investments that reduce
GHG emissions by improving vehicle
fuel economy are likely to increase
returns to a broad range of private
investments, including investments in
mechanisms that facilitate adaptation to
climate change. Although he did not
recommend a specific discount rate,
Prof. Yohe clearly suggested that the
appropriate rate should be below 7
percent. He also noted that OMB’s
definition and 3 percent estimate of the
social rate of time preference did not
356 EPA calculated the value of a statistical life
year for the Tier 2 benefits analysis by amortizing
the $5.9 million mean value of a statistical life
(VSL) estimate over the 35 years of life expectancy
associated with subjects in the labor market studies,
discounting it at 5 percent to get $360,000 per lifeyear saved in 1999 dollars. See 68 FR 6698, 6784,
fn. 107 (Feb. 10, 2000).
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correspond to the conventional
definition of that concept, which is a
constant-utility rather than a constantconsumption discount rate.
Commenters Calling for NHTSA To Use
a 7 Percent or Higher Discount Rate
Other commenters, including
manufacturers and dealers, as well as
one individual, called for NHTSA to use
a discount rate of 7 percent or higher.
AIAM commented simply that it
‘‘support[s] the discount rates used by
NHTSA as reasonable for analytical
purposes.’’ David Montgomery of CRA
International also commented that
NHTSA’s use of a 7 percent discount
rate was reasonable, arguing that ‘‘the
correct discount rate to use [for CAFE
purposes] is the marginal social return
on investment, which measures what
society would have earned on other
investment foregone in order to make
the investment in more costly motor
vehicles with higher fuel economy.’’ Mr.
Montgomery stated that ‘‘The chosen
7% real discount is a reasonable, and
probably conservative, estimate of the
long run, real, pre-tax return on
investment in the U.S.’’
Ford commented that the discount
rate ‘‘should represent society’s
opportunity cost of money, which
should be close to a ‘risk-free’ rate such
as that of the U.S. Treasury.’’ However,
Ford then argued that the short-term
costs to invest in technology are very
high for domestic manufacturers, and
that manufacturers must ‘‘borrow the
necessary capital for such investment.’’
Thus, Ford stated, it did not support the
use of a 3 percent discount rate,
although it did not recommend an
alternative discount rate.
NADA commented that NHTSA
should use a discount rate of at least 7
percent or higher to estimate the future
costs and benefits of the proposed
standards. NADA stated that ‘‘financing
rates on motor vehicle loans are
indicative of appropriate discount rates
since they reflect the real-world
opportunity costs faced by consumers
when buying vehicles’’ with higher fuel
economy, but argued that NHTSA had
not ‘‘generated accurate historical loan
rates, let alone justified projections for
what those rates will be in MY 2015.’’
NADA further stated that a too-low
discount rate ‘‘will result in overly
costly CAFE standards, decreased new
motor vehicle sales, and lower than
projected fuel savings and greenhouse
gas reduction benefits.’’
The Alliance commented that NHTSA
should use a discount rate closer to 12
percent, although it urged NHTSA to
rely on a ‘‘nested logit’’ model
developed by NERA for ‘‘modeling
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consumer behavior instead of the ad hoc
analysis NHTSA performs of private
benefits without attempting to explain
whether there is a market failure.’’ The
Alliance argued that OMB Circular A–
4 allows the use of a higher discount
rate than 7 percent in certain cases if
appropriate, and that ‘‘other prominent
studies relevant to this issue have
settled on much higher interest rates
than seven percent,’’ including the
Congressional Budget Office, which
‘‘discounts consumers’ fuel savings at a
rate of 12 percent per year,’’ and Sierra
Research’s study submitted by the
Alliance in support of its comments,
which used a rate of 12.4 percent. A
discount rate of 12 percent makes sense,
the Alliance argued, because
‘‘Consumers can be expected to
discount the value of future fuel savings
at a rate at least as high as their cost of
borrowing funds,’’ so they ‘‘would be
unwilling to spend an extra dollar on
fuel economy improvements that would
lower their fuel costs by ten cents per
year because the cost savings would be
less than the annual interest on that
dollar.’’
Responding to the Alliance’s assertion
that rates as high as 12 percent might be
appropriate for discounting future
benefits from fuel savings, the Attorneys
General noted in a supplemental
comment that a more recent study of
vehicle buyer’s tradeoffs between higher
purchase prices and savings in
operating expenses than that relied
upon by NERA estimates that buyers
discount future fuel savings using
nominal rates that average 9 percent.
After adjusting it to remove the effect of
expected future inflation, the Attorneys
General estimated that the
corresponding real discount rate was 5.4
percent, and urged NHTSA to use this
rate in its analysis of future benefits
from fuel savings and other
consequences of higher CAFE
standards.357
Agency response: In response to the
extensive comments it received to the
NPRM and the DEIS on this issue,
NHTSA has carefully reviewed
published research and OMB guidance
on appropriate discount rates, including
discount rates that should be applied to
benefits that are expected to occur in the
distant future and thus be experienced
357 The agency has reviewed the study relied
upon by the Attorneys General in its comment
recommending a 5.4 percent discount rate, and
notes that the estimates of vehicle buyers’ implicit
discount rates it reports average 10.2 percent before
adjusting for inflation, rather than the 9 percent
reported by the Attorneys General. Adjusting this
average rate to remove the effects of actual inflation
over the most recent decade produced a value of 7.5
percent, rather than the 5.4 percent reported in the
recent comment by the Attorneys General.
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mainly by future generations, and
discount rates that buyers of new
vehicles apply to savings in fuel costs
from higher fuel economy. For purposes
of this final rule, the agency has elected
to apply separate discount rates to the
benefits resulting from reduced CO2
emissions, which are expected to reduce
the rate or intensity of climate change
that will occur in the distant future, and
the economic value of fuel savings and
other benefits resulting from lower fuel
consumption, which will be
experienced over the limited lifetimes of
newly purchased vehicles. Specifically,
NHTSA has decided to discount future
benefits from reducing CO2 emissions
using a 3 percent rate, but to discount
all other benefits resulting from higher
CAFE standards for MY 2011 cars and
light trucks at 7 percent.
As some commenters pointed out,
OMB guidance on discounting permits
the use of lower rates to discount
benefits that are expected to occur in the
distant future, and will thus be
experienced by future generations.358
The main rationale for doing so is that
although most individuals demonstrate
a strong preference for current
consumption over consumption they
expect to occur later within their own
lifetimes, it may not be appropriate for
society to exercise a similarly strong
preference for consumption by current
generations over consumption
opportunities for future generations,
particularly when it is contemplating
actions that affect the relative income
levels of current and future generations.
In addition, while market interest rates
provide useful guidance about the rates
that should be used to discount future
benefits that will be experienced by
current generations, no comparable
market rates are available to guide the
choice of rates for discounting benefits
that will be received by future
generations.
For this final rule, NHTSA has elected
to use a rate of 3 percent to discount the
future economic benefits from reduced
emissions of CO2 that are projected to
result from decreased fuel production
and consumption. These benefits, which
include reductions in the expected
future economic damages caused by
increased global temperatures, a rise in
sea levels, and other projected impacts
of climate change, are anticipated to
extend over a period from
approximately fifty to two hundred or
more years after the impact of this rule
on emissions by MY 2011 cars and light
trucks occurs, and will thus be
358 White House Office of Management and
Budget, Circular A–4, September 17, 2003, pp. 35–
36.
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experienced primarily by generations
that are not now living. As indicated
previously, studies of the economic cost
of GHG emissions select a rate to
discount economic damages from
increased emissions. These damages are
typically projected to occur over an
extended time span beginning many
years after the future date when
emissions increase, and the chosen rate
is used to discount these distant future
damages to their present values as of the
date when the increased emissions that
cause them were assumed to occur.
This procedure yields estimates of the
damage costs from increased GHG
emissions during specific future years,
which NHTSA uses to value the
reductions in emissions that would
occur each year over the lifetimes of
vehicles affected by higher CAFE
standards. For example, higher CAFE
standards for MY 2011 cars and light
trucks would reduce GHG emissions
each year from 2011 through
approximately 2047, and the estimated
value of avoiding each ton of emissions
rises each year over that span. In turn,
the estimated economic values of the
reductions in GHG emissions during
each of those future years must be
discounted to their present values as of
today, so that they can be compared
with the present values of other benefits
from higher CAFE standards, and with
vehicle manufacturers’ costs for meeting
higher CAFE standards.
The 3 percent rate is consistent with
OMB guidance on appropriate discount
rates for benefits experienced by future
generations, as well as with those used
to develop many of the estimates of the
economic costs of future climate change
that form the basis for NHTSA’s
estimate of economic value of reducing
CO2 emissions.359 Of the 125 peerreviewed estimates of the social cost of
carbon included in Tol’s 2008 survey,
which provides the basis for NHTSA’s
estimated value of reducing CO2
emissions, 83 used assumptions that
imply discount rates of 3 percent or
higher.
Moreover, the 3 percent rate is
consistent with widely-used estimates
in economic analysis of climate change
of the appropriate rate of time
preference for current versus distant
future consumption, expected future
growth in real incomes, and the rate at
which the additional utility provided by
increased consumption declines as
income increases.360 The Ramsey
359 Richard S.J. Tol, The social cost of carbon:
trends, outliers, and catastrophes, Economics
Discussion Papers, July 23, 2008.
360 EPA notes that ‘‘In this inter-generational
context, a three percent discount rate is consistent
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14355
discounting rule is widely employed in
studies of potential economic damages
from climate changes in the distant
future. The Ramsey rule states that ¥r
= d + hg, where r is the consumption
discount rate, d is the pure rate of time
preference (or the marginal rate of
substitution between current and future
consumption under the assumption that
they are initially equal), g is the
expected (percentage) rate of growth in
future consumption, and h is the
elasticity of the marginal utility of
consumption with respect to changes in
the level of consumption itself.
Commonly used values of these
parameters in climate studies are d = ¥1
percent per year, h = ¥1, and g = 2
percent per year, which yield a value for
r of 3 percent per year.361
The remaining future benefits and
costs anticipated to result from higher
fuel economy are projected to occur
within the lifetimes of vehicles affected
by the CAFE standards for MY 2011,
which extend up to a maximum of 35
years from the dates those vehicles that
are produced and sold. Because the
vehicles originally produced during this
model year will gradually be retired
from service as they age, and those that
remain in service will be driven
progressively less, most of these benefits
will occur over the period from 2011
through approximately 2025. Thus, a
conventional or ‘‘intra-generational’’
discount rate is appropriate to use in
discounting these benefits and costs to
their present value when analyzing the
economic impacts of establishing higher
CAFE standards.362
The correct discount rate to apply to
these nearer-term benefits and costs
depends partly on how costs to vehicle
manufacturers for improving fuel
economy to comply with higher CAFE
standards will ultimately be distributed.
If manufacturers are unable to recover
their costs for increasing fuel economy
in the form of higher selling prices for
new vehicles, those outlays will
with observed interest rates from long-term intragenerational investments (net of risk premiums) as
well as interest rates relevant for monetary
estimates of the impacts of climate change that are
primarily consumption effects.’’ See U.S. EPA,
Technical Support Document on Benefits of
Reducing GHG Emissions, June 12, 2008, p. 9.
361 See Tol (2008), p. 3.
362 NHTSA acknowledges that using different
rates to discount the distant and nearer-term future
benefits from higher CAFE standards presents a
potential problem of time inconsistency, which
arises from the much greater uncertainty that
surrounds long-term future rates of growth in
investment, economic output, and consumption
than is associated with near-term estimates of these
variables. However, the agency believes that this
problem is less serious than those that would result
from using a single rate to discount benefits that
occur over the next 25–35 year sand those that are
likely to occur over a 100–200 year time frame.
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displace or alter other productive
investments that manufacturers could
make, and the appropriate discount rate
is their opportunity cost of capital
investment. In contrast, if manufacturers
are able to raise selling prices for new
vehicles sufficiently to recover all their
costs for improving fuel economy, those
costs will ultimately affect private
consumption decisions rather than
capital investment opportunities. Under
this second assumption, economic
theory and OMB guidance suggest that
a consumption discount rate, which
reflects the time preferences of
consumers rather than those of lenders
or investors, is appropriate for
discounting future benefits. Since the
time preferences of savers and investors
are probably similar, financial
intermediation would be expected to
equalize investment and consumption
discount rates. In the presence of
corporate income taxation, however,
consumption discount rates are
generally thought to be lower than the
opportunity cost of investment capital.
Finally, if competitive conditions in the
new vehicle market manufacturers and
potential buyers’ valuation of higher
fuel economy permit manufacturers to
recover only part of their costs for
meeting higher CAFE standards through
higher prices for new vehicles, a rate
between an investment discount rate
and the lower consumption discount
rate may be appropriate, with the exact
rate depending on the distribution of
compliance costs between vehicle
manufacturers and buyers.
OMB estimates that the real before-tax
rate of return on private capital
investment in the U.S. economy
averages approximately 7 percent per
year, and generally recommends this
figure for use as a real discount rate in
cases where the primary effect of a
regulation is to displace private capital
investment.363 However, this figure
represents an economy-wide average
estimate of the return on private
investment, which incorporates no risk
premium other than that associated with
uncertainty about future growth in total
economic output. As a consequence, it
may understate the opportunity cost of
capital for corporations facing firm- or
market-specific risks on future
investment returns. In addition,
domestic motor vehicle manufacturers
currently have little or no accumulated
earnings available to re-invest, and may
be required to enter private capital
markets to finance the investments
363 White House Office of Management and
Budget, Circular A–4, September 17, 2003, p. 33.
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necessary to allow them to comply with
higher CAFE standards.
OMB guidance estimates that an
appropriate current value for the
consumer rate of time preference—and
thus the discount rate that should be
used if the costs of complying with a
regulation are borne by consumers—is
approximately 3 percent. However, this
estimate is derived from rates of return
demanded by consumers on highly
liquid investments, and is intended to
apply to situations where there is little
or no risk that consumers will actually
realize the future benefits resulting from
a proposed regulation. In the case of
CAFE standards, buyers face
considerable uncertainty about future
fuel prices, and thus about the value of
fuel savings resulting from higher fuel
economy. Uncertainty about their future
levels of vehicle use and the actual
lifetimes of new vehicles also contribute
to buyers’ uncertainty about the value of
future fuel savings that is likely to result
from purchasing a vehicle with higher
fuel economy. In addition, buyers’
initial investments in higher fuel
economy are illiquid, and the extent to
which they will be able recover the
remaining value of an initial investment
in a new vehicle that achieves higher
fuel economy in the used vehicle market
is uncertain. Finally, unlike most of the
regulations that OMB Circular A–4 is
intended to address, most (75–80
percent) of the benefits from higher
CAFE standards accrue directly to the
parties they affect—vehicle buyers—
rather than to society at large. Taken
together, these circumstances may make
the use of a riskless consumption
discount rate, which is intended for use
in discounting the economy-wide effects
of a proposed regulation on
consumption, inappropriate for
discounting the future benefits that
result from requiring higher fuel
economy.
Empirical studies of the discount rates
that new vehicle buyers reveal by
trading off the higher purchase prices
for more fuel-efficient vehicles against
future savings in fuel costs resulting
from higher fuel economy, which
capture the effects of these
uncertainties, conclude that buyers
apply real discount rates well above the
3 percent rate recommended by OMB
for riskless situations. Dreyfus and
Viscusi estimate that, when adjusted to
reflect differences between the current
interest rate environment and rates at
the time the data for their study were
drawn, U.S. buyers apply real discount
rates in the range of 12 percent when
weighing expected future fuel savings
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against higher purchase prices.364
Verboven estimates that European
buyers’ nominal discount rates for fuel
savings resulting from buying more fuelefficient new vehicle models range from
5 to 13 percent, with an average
estimate of slightly above 10 percent.
Verboven’s estimate corresponds to a
real discount rate of approximately 7
percent when adjusted to reflect current
and recent U.S. inflation rates.365 These
studies may provide more reliable
estimates of the appropriate
consumption rate for discounting
benefits from higher fuel economy than
the 3 percent figure recommended in
OMB guidance.
Uncertainty about future
developments in the international oil
market, the U.S. economy, and the U.S.
market for new cars and light trucks
make it extremely difficult to anticipate
the extent to which vehicle
manufacturers will be able to recover
costs for complying with higher CAFE
standards in the form of higher selling
prices for new vehicles. If new vehicle
buyers expect fuel prices to remain
higher than those used by NHTSA to
establish CAFE standards for MY 2011,
they may be willing to pay the higher
prices necessary for manufacturers to
recover their costs for complying with
those standards.366 However, potential
buyers who expect future fuel prices to
be lower than the forecast NHTSA relies
upon are likely to resist manufacturers’
efforts to raise new vehicle prices
sufficiently to recover all of their CAFE
compliance costs, since those buyers’
assessment of the value of higher fuel
economy will be lower than that
reflected in the CAFE standards NHTSA
establishes.
From the manufacturer perspective,
the current financial condition of some
car and light truck producers suggests
364 See Dreyfus, Mark K. and W. Kip Viscusi.
1995. ‘‘Rates of Time Preference and Consumer
Valuations of Automobile Safety and Fuel
Efficiency.’’ Journal of Law and Economics. 38: 79–
98; and the adjustment of discount rates reported
in that source discussed in NERA, ‘‘Discount Rates
for Private Costs,’’ pp. 4–5, attachment to Alliance
of Automobile Manufacturers comment on NPRM,
Docket Item NHTSA–2008–0089–50.
365 See Verboven, Frank, ‘‘Implicit Interest Rates
in Consumer Durables Purchasing Decisions—
Evidence for Automobiles,’’ p. 22, attachment to
California Department of Justice, comment on
NPRM, Docket Item NHTSA–2008–0089–0495.
366 Whether they will be willing to do so,
however, depends partly on how the combined
value of the economic and environmental
externalities used to determine CAFE standards
compares to current fuel taxes. It also depends on
whether new vehicle buyers take account of the
value of fuel savings resulting from higher fuel
economy over the entire expected lifetimes of the
vehicles they purchase, or over only some part of
that lifetime (such as the period they expect to own
new vehicles).
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that they are likely to find it difficult to
absorb the full cost of complying with
higher CAFE standards. Because CAFE
standards apply to all manufacturers,
establishing higher standards may
provide a ready opportunity for all
producers to raise car and light truck
prices. However, this opportunity may
be restricted if producers that face very
low incremental costs for complying
with higher CAFE standards because of
higher fuel economy levels in their
planned model offerings compete
aggressively with others that face
significant costs for increasing fuel
economy levels in their product plans to
comply with higher CAFE standards.
After considering the comments
received and various arguments about
the ultimate incidence of manufacturers’
costs for complying with higher CAFE
standards, NHTSA has concluded that
the costs for complying with higher MY
2011 CAFE standards are likely to be
shared by manufacturers and purchasers
of new vehicles, but that the exact
distribution fraction of these costs
between manufacturers and buyers is
extremely difficult to anticipate.
Generally, NHTSA believes that
manufacturers are likely to be able to
raise prices only to the extent justified
by potential buyers’ assessments of the
value of future fuel savings that will
result from higher fuel economy, but the
agency recognizes that buyers’
valuations of fuel savings are inherently
uncertain, and undoubtedly vary widely
among individual buyers. As a
consequence, price increases for new
cars and light trucks are likely to allow
manufacturers to recoup some fraction
of their costs for complying with higher
CAFE standards, while the remainder of
those costs are likely to displace other
investment opportunities that would
otherwise be available to them.
Regardless of the ultimate incidence
of costs for complying with higher
CAFE standards, however, both
manufacturers’ opportunity costs for
capital investment and empirical
estimates of the discount rates that
buyers of new vehicles apply to future
fuel savings suggest that a rate in the
range of 7 percent is an appropriate rate
for discounting the nearer-term benefits
from increased fuel economy that will
occur over the lifetimes of MY 2011 cars
and light trucks. Thus for purposes of
establishing the CAFE standards
adopted in this final rule and estimating
their economic benefits, NHTSA has
continued to employ a 7 percent rate to
discount future benefits from higher
CAFE standards other than those
resulting from reduced CO2 emissions.
Recognizing the uncertainty
surrounding this assumption, NHTSA
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has also tested the sensitivity of the
level of the optimized CAFE standards
and their resulting economic benefits to
the use of a 3 percent discount rate for
all categories of benefits.
NHTSA will consider whether to
revise the discount rates used in this
analysis when it analyzes the
consequences of future CAFE standards.
At that time, the agency will consider
whether to apply a lower discount rate
than 3 percent to the benefits from
reducing future emissions of CO2 and
other greenhouse gases, as well as
whether to use a rate different from 7
percent to discount the nearer-term
benefits from raising CAFE standards. In
making these decisions, the agency will
consider guidance on discounting future
benefits—particularly those from
reducing the threat of climate-related
economic damages—issued by OMB,
EPA, and other government agencies,
and will also consider the discount rates
used by other federal agencies in similar
regulatory proceedings. NHTSA will
also consider recent research on
appropriate rates for discounting future
benefits from reducing the threat of
climate-related economic damages, as
well as on the discount rates that buyers
of new vehicles apply to the fuel savings
they obtain from purchasing models
with higher fuel economy, since such
research is particularly relevant to its
choice of discount rates. Beyond these
things, the agency will also review the
discount rate issue for future
rulemakings in light of the changing
economic situation, in terms of
manufacturers’ capabilities and
consumers’ preferences as fuel prices
fluctuate and concern for the effects of
climate change increases.
15. Accounting for Uncertainty in
Benefits and Costs
NHTSA explained in the NPRM that
in analyzing the uncertainty
surrounding its estimates of benefits and
costs from alternative CAFE standards,
NHTSA considered alternative estimates
of those assumptions and parameters
likely to have the largest effect. NHTSA
stated that these include the projected
costs of fuel economy-improving
technologies and their expected
effectiveness in reducing vehicle fuel
consumption, forecasts of future fuel
prices, the magnitude of the rebound
effect, the reduction in external
economic costs resulting from lower
U.S. oil imports, the value to the U.S.
economy of reducing carbon dioxide
emissions, and the discount rate applied
to future benefits and costs. The range
for each of these variables employed in
the agency’s uncertainty analysis is
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presented in the section of the NPRM
discussing each variable.
NHTSA explained that the
uncertainty analysis was conducted by
assuming independent normal
probability distributions for each of
these variables, using the low and high
estimates for each variable as the values
below which 5 percent and 95 percent
of observed values are believed to fall.
Each trial of the uncertainty analysis
employed a set of values randomly
drawn from each of these probability
distributions, assuming that the value of
each variable is independent of the
others. Benefits and costs of each
alternative standard were estimated
using each combination of variables. A
total of 1,000 trials were used to
establish the likely probability
distributions of estimated benefits and
costs for each alternative standard.
NHTSA received only one comment
on its methodology for accounting for
uncertainty in benefits and costs. The
Alliance commented that the results
presented by NHTSA of its sensitivity
analysis indicated increasing levels of
certainty in the ability of the proposed
standards to create net benefits—
specifically, NHTSA concluded that
there was at least a 99.3 percent
certainty that changes made to MY 2011
vehicles to achieve the higher CAFE
standards would produce a net benefit;
at least a 99.6 percent certainty for MY
2012 vehicles; and 100 percent certainty
for MY 2014–15 vehicles. The Alliance
argued that ‘‘Traditional discounting
analysis indicates that the effects of
policy changes are more uncertain at
points far into the future,’’ and that
‘‘NHTSA should recognize that its
predictive abilities in the area of
automotive technology dim the farther it
attempts to peer out into the future.’’
The Alliance commented that NHTSA
should ‘‘reevaluate its statistical model
in this light.’’
Agency response: NHTSA agrees that
uncertainty regarding both costs and
benefits from fuel enhancing
technologies increases at points farther
into the future. The Alliance comment
seems to suggest the application of an
increasingly wide spread of high and
low value parameters for technology
costs and effectiveness rates for each
successive model year. However,
recognizing this increasing uncertainty
could either increase or decrease the
probability that increases in CAFE
standards will produce net benefits. The
agency has no basis for determining
whether this increased uncertainty
would be likely to result in a higher
probability of net benefits or a higher
probability of net costs. A variety of
factors such as unforeseen technology
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breakthroughs or fluctuations in energy
and materials prices could influence
benefits and costs in the distant future,
and we see little merit in adding
additional assumptions about
conditions distant in time without a
reasonably solid basis for selecting such
assumptions.
We could simply increase the range
symmetrically by some arbitrary factor,
but, assuming the same normal
distribution that is employed for most of
the variables in our uncertainty
analysis, increasing the range of both
costs and benefits proportionally would
be unlikely to significantly impact the
conclusions of the uncertainty analysis.
Thus, the agency would not increase
this range of uncertainty by
progressively more for successive model
years, were this a multi-year
rulemaking. As it is not, the issue of
changing levels of uncertainty over time
is largely academic for purposes of this
rulemaking.
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VI. How NHTSA Sets the CAFE
Standards
A. Which attributes does NHTSA use to
determine the standards?
NHTSA explained in the NPRM that
it had taken a fresh look for purposes of
this rulemaking at the question of which
attribute or attributes would be most
appropriate for setting CAFE standards.
NHTSA preliminarily concluded that a
footprint-based function would be the
most effective and efficient for both
passenger car and light truck standards.
NHTSA explained that unlike a weightbased function, a footprint-based
function helps achieve greater fuel
economy/emissions reductions without
having a potentially negative impact on
safety and is more difficult to modify
than other attributes because it cannot
be easily altered outside the design
cycle in order to move a vehicle to a
point at which it is subject to a lower
fuel economy target. NHTSA also
discussed other attributes on which
functions could be based, including
curb weight, engine displacement,
interior volume, passenger capacity, and
towing or cargo-hauling capability, but
tentatively rejected those other
attributes as being generally easier to
game than footprint. NHTSA
nevertheless sought comment on
whether the proposed standard should
be based on vehicle footprint alone, or
whether other attributes such as the
ones described above should be
considered. NHTSA requested that if
any commenters advocated one or more
additional attributes, that they supply a
specific, objective measure for each
attribute that is accepted within the
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industry and that can be applied to the
full range of light-duty vehicles covered
by this rulemaking. NHTSA noted that
in addition to being able to be
objectively measured on all light-duty
vehicles, any attribute-based system
needs to (1) minimize the potential for
gaming (artificial manipulation of the
attribute(s) to achieve a more favorable
fuel economy target), (2) have an
observable relationship to fuel economy,
and (3) avoid adverse safety
consequences and undue relative
burden on full-line manufacturers.
The agency received many comments
on its choice of attribute. The
Aluminum Association, Honda, IIHS,
and UCS supported NHTSA’s proposal
of attribute-based standards depending
upon footprint alone. Honda cited the
use of footprint as a means of
maintaining consumer choice and
maintaining an incentive to make use of
lightweight materials. The Aluminum
Association indicated that footprintbased standards would assure stability
between model years. UCS claimed that
footprint compared favorably to other
attributes. Honda, the Aluminum
Association, and IIHS all argued that
footprint-based standards would
provide incentives well-aligned with
highway safety objectives. Honda
commented that incentives provided by
a footprint-based system are such that
footprint-based standards would be,
from a public policy perspective,
preferable to weight-based standards,
even though fuel economy is more
strongly related to weight.
On the other hand, some
organizations questioned the agency’s
proposal to continue basing light truck
CAFE standards on footprint and to
adopt new footprint-based standards for
passenger cars. Subaru (a subsidiary of
Fuji Heavy Industries) and BMW
expressed concern that footprint-based
standards discourage the introduction of
new ‘‘small vehicle concepts’’
encouraged by weight-based standards
under development in Europe and
Japan. Porsche suggested that rapid
changes in the light vehicle fleet call
into question the use of footprint as the
basis for CAFE standards. Porsche also
argued that footprint is not an ideal
attribute for passenger car standards
because passenger cars are less prone to
rollover than light trucks and the
steepness of the curves NHTSA
proposed for passenger cars would
provide an incentive for gaming. Ferrari
also expressed concern regarding the
potential to increase footprint by
mounting larger wheels, but did not
compare this risk to the risk of, for
example, increasing vehicle weight
under a weight-based standard. Wenzel
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and Ross questioned the agency’s
judgment regarding the safety benefits of
discouraging manufacturers from
responding to CAFE standards by
selling smaller vehicles. Cummins
argued that other attributes, in
particular weight, would provide a
better engineering relationship to fuel
economy, but acknowledged that
NHTSA proposed to rely on footprint as
a means to best ‘‘balance public policy
concerns.’’
GM expressed general support for
footprint-based standards, but also
proposed that the agency adopt a twoattribute system that would adjust
targets applicable to vehicles capable of
towing heavy loads. The Alliance,
which also supported this concept,
indicated that such vehicles ‘‘generally
achieve about five percent lower fuel
economy than similar vehicles not
designed for such duty cycles.’’ Other
commenters supporting adjustments for
‘‘tow-capable’’ vehicles included
Chrysler, Cummins, Ford, NADA, RVIA,
and several members of Congress. RVIA
suggested that without such an
adjustment, RV owners will ‘‘have no
choice but to attempt to pull travel
trailers with undersize vehicles,’’
thereby compromising highway safety.
Honda and Toyota both opposed the
concept based on concerns that such
adjustments would compromise
progress toward EISA’s requirement that
NHTSA ensure the new vehicle fleet
reaches an average of at least 35 mpg by
MY 2020.
Similarly, the Alliance, Chrysler, and
NADA proposed that the agency adjust
targets for ‘‘off-road capable’’ vehicles
including, but not limited to vehicles
with four-wheel drive. The Alliance and
Chrysler proposed downward
adjustments of 10 percent and 1 mpg,
respectively, based on past performance
of such vehicles. Toyota expressed
concern regarding the competitive
effects of such an adjustment.
In addition to these two-attribute
proposals, the agency also received a
proposal from Porsche for a threeattribute concept under which vehicle
targets would depend on footprint,
weight, and maximum torque. Subaru
and Volkswagen expressed support for
this concept. Porsche and Subaru
argued that this three-attribute concept
would provide a better statistical
relationship to fuel economy and would
help to reduce the steepness of the
curves NHTSA proposed for passenger
cars. Volkswagen indicated that the
concept would be less burdensome for
manufacturers with fleet mix
‘‘challenged by’’ a footprint-based
system. Ferrari also commented that,
considering the characteristics and fuel
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economy of performance vehicles, the
agency should adopt a two- or threeattribute system that also incorporates
curb weight, maximum power,
maximum torque, and/or engine
displacement.
Conversely, some organizations
expressed strong opposition regarding
standards that would rely on more than
one attribute. UCS questioned whether
any dual-attribute approach could
‘‘deliver the benefits’’ of a system based
on footprint alone. Honda argued that
NHTSA should ‘‘automatically reject’’
the inclusion of any additional attribute
that could decrease overall fuel savings
achieved by CAFE standards. Similarly,
as mentioned above, Toyota expressed
concern that inclusion of additional
attributes could compromise progress
toward EISA’s requirements.
Agency response: Having considered
the comments submitted to the agency
on what attribute(s) should be included
in attribute-based CAFE standards for
passenger cars and light trucks, NHTSA
is promulgating MY 2011 standards that
depend on vehicle footprint.
As discussed in Section VIII, in the
agency’s judgment, from the standpoint
of highway safety, it is important that
the agency promulgate CAFE standards
that do not encourage manufacturers to
respond by selling vehicles that are in
any way less safe. While the agency’s
research also indicates that reductions
in vehicle mass tend to compromise
highway safety, footprint-based
standards provide an incentive to use
advanced lightweight materials and
structures that would be discouraged by
weight-based standards.
Further, although NHTSA recognizes
that weight is better correlated with fuel
economy than is footprint, the agency
continues to believe that there is less
risk of ‘‘gaming’’ by increasing footprint
under footprint-based CAFE standards
than by increasing vehicle mass under
weight-based CAFE standards. The
agency also agrees with concerns raised
by some commenters that there would
be greater potential for gaming under
multi-attribute CAFE standards, such as
standards under which targets would
also depend on attributes such as
weight, torque, power, towing
capability, and/or off-road capability.
Standards that incorporate such
attributes in conjunction with footprint
would not only be significantly more
complex, but by providing degrees of
freedom with respect to more easilyadjusted attributes, they would make it
less certain that the future fleet would
actually achieve the average fuel
economy levels projected by the agency.
Although NHTSA recognizes that any
change in the structure of the CAFE
standards changes the relative challenge
posed by those standards to each
manufacturer, the agency notes that
compliance with CAFE standards is
determined based on average
performance, such that no specific
vehicle model need necessarily achieve
its fuel economy target. NHTSA
disagrees, therefore, that RV owners will
be forced to use ‘‘undersize’’ vehicles as
suggested by RVIA; rather, the agency
expects that manufacturers will
continue to provide a range of vehicles
with capabilities sought by vehicle
buyers.367
Furthermore, changes—discussed
below—to NHTSA’s procedure for
determining the shape and stringency of
CAFE standards for MY 2011 more fully
incorporate the capabilities of highperformance vehicles, tow-capable
vehicles, and off-road-capable vehicles.
In developing the CAFE standards
promulgated today, the agency has
included all vehicles produced by all
TARGET =
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manufacturers, including the highperformance vehicles produced by
companies such as Ferrari and Porsche.
Also, as discussed in Section IV, for
purposes of analyzing potential fuel
economy improvements to specific
vehicle models, the agency has
developed estimates specific to
performance vehicles of the availability,
cost, and effectiveness of different fuelsaving technologies. The final passenger
car standards thus give appropriate
weight to the capabilities of these
vehicles.
Also, as discussed below and in
sections III and XI, the agency is
tightening its definition of
‘‘nonpassenger automobile’’ such that
many vehicles will be newly classified
as passenger cars. Most of these changes
involve two-wheel drive vehicles with
relatively modest towing capacity, such
that vehicles with off-road capabilities
and/or more substantial towing capacity
comprise an even greater share of the
vehicles that will still be classified as
light trucks. Therefore, NHTSA has
established final light truck CAFE
standards that appropriately account for
the capabilities of such vehicles.
B. Which mathematical function does
NHTSA use to set the standards?
As discussed above, Congress also
recently mandated that NHTSA set
attribute-based fuel economy standards
‘‘and express each standard in the form
of a mathematical function.’’ 368 As
proposed in the NPRM, NHTSA is
finalizing CAFE standards that use a
continuous, constrained logistic
function for expressing the MY 2011
passenger car and light truck standards,
which takes the form of an S-curve, and
is defined according to the following
formula:
1
1 ⎛ 1 1 ⎞ e( FOOTPRINT − c ) /d
+⎜ − ⎟
a ⎝ b a ⎠ 1 + e( FOOTPRINT − c ) /d
feet) at which the inverse of the fuel
economy target falls halfway between
the inverses of the lower and upper
asymptotes, and d is a parameter (in
square feet) that determines how
gradually the fuel economy target
transitions from the upper toward the
lower asymptote as the footprint
increases. Figure VI–1 below shows an
example of a logistic target function,
where b = 20 mpg, a = 30 mpg, c = 40
square feet, and d = 5 square feet:
367 In any event, the agency doubts that RV
owners would, as asserted by RVIA, be likely to
violate guidelines and laws concerning towing
capacity.
368 49 U.S.C. 32902(a)(3)(A).
369 e is the irrational number for which the slope
of the function y = number x is equal to 1 when x
is equal to zero. The first 8 digits of e are 2.7182818.
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Here, TARGET is the fuel economy
target (in mpg) applicable to vehicles of
a given footprint (FOOTPRINT, in
square feet), b and a are the function’s
lower and upper asymptotes (also in
mpg), e is approximately equal to
2.718,369 c is the footprint (in square
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NHTSA is not required to use a
constrained logistic function and, as
discussed below, the agency may
consider defining future CAFE
standards in terms of a different
mathematical function.
Continuous function:
NHTSA explained in the NPRM that
it examined the relative merits of both
step functions and continuous functions
in its rulemaking for MY 2008–2011
light trucks, and described the agency’s
rationale for choosing a continuous
function for the CAFE program. A step
function, in the CAFE context, would
separate the vehicle models along the
spectrum of attribute magnitudes into
discrete groups, and each group would
be assigned a single fuel economy target,
so that the average of the groups would
be the average fleet fuel economy. A
continuous function, in contrast, would
assign each vehicle model (and indeed,
any potential vehicle model at any point
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along the spectrum) its own unique fuel
economy target, based on its particular
attribute magnitude. Thus, two vehicle
models built by different manufacturers
could have the same fuel economy
target, but only if they had identical
magnitudes of the relevant attribute. In
other words, a continuous function is a
mathematical function that defines
attribute-based targets across the entire
range of possible attribute values. These
targets are then applied through a
harmonically-weighted formula to
derive regulatory obligations for fleet
averages.
NHTSA decided against a step
function for several reasons. First, there
would be a strong incentive for
manufacturers to game the system at the
‘‘edges’’ of the steps, by increasing the
magnitude of a vehicle model’s attribute
only slightly in order to receive the
lower target of the next step. A
continuous function tends to reduce this
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incentive because on an uninterrupted
spectrum, the vehicle model’s
magnitude of the attribute must be
increased much more in order to gain a
significantly lower fuel economy
target—i.e., the necessary change in the
vehicle model must be greater in order
to receive the same level of benefit.
Second, the continuous function
minimizes the incentive to downsize a
vehicle, since any downsizing would
result in higher (or the same, at the
upper end of the curve) targets being
applicable. And finally, the continuous
function provides manufacturers with
greater regulatory certainty, since under
a step function, the boundaries of
categories (i.e., the size of the steps)
could be redefined in future
rulemakings. Thus, NHTSA tentatively
concluded that a continuous function
was the best choice for setting CAFE
standards.
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NHTSA received only three
comments regarding its use of the
continuous function. Ferrari commented
that it supports ‘‘the choice to use a
continuous function instead of a step
function, because for each vehicle
model is associated the corresponding
fuel economy target, regardless of
whether the attribute is the footprint
alone or another one or a combination
of two or more.’’
Fuji/Subaru commented that ‘‘In
general, Subaru conceptually supports
the NHTSA proposal to carryover the
attribute and continuous logistic
function structure from the prior 2008–
2011 light truck fuel economy
rulemaking.’’
IIHS commented that it ‘‘strongly
supports the extension of an attributebased system to cars and the agency’s
proposal to index fuel economy to a
continuous function.’’ IIHS stated that a
step function gives manufacturers an
incentive ‘‘to redesign vehicles with
minimally larger footprints to achieve
lower fuel economy targets or to
downsize vehicles to achieve weight
reductions within footprint categories.’’
This incentive exists, IIHS argued,
because of the fact that ‘‘By minimally
boosting the footprint of a vehicle near
an upper boundary, an automaker can
gain a large benefit in meeting fuel
economy targets,’’ and that ‘‘By the
same token, an automaker can
significantly decrease a vehicle’s size
and weight as long as the changes do
not place the vehicle below the lower
boundary of its current step,’’ which
IIHS argued presented significant safety
concerns. IIHS further stated that the
continuous function presented an added
benefit over a step function insofar as
‘‘car buyers would be more likely to
notice design changes incorporated to
achieve a substantial CAFE benefit in a
continuous function system.’’
Agency response: Notwithstanding
concerns regarding the steepness of an
attribute-based function—concerns that
are addressed below in Section VI.E—
these comments support the agency’s
decision to promulgate a final rule that
uses a continuous function to specify
fuel economy targets that depend on a
vehicle attribute.
Constrained Logistic Function
NHTSA explained in the NPRM that
there are a variety of mathematical
forms available to estimate the
relationship between an attribute and
fuel economy that could be used as a
continuous function, including simple
linear (straight-line) functions, quadratic
(U-shaped) functions, exponential
(curves that continuously become
steeper or shallower) functions, and
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unconstrained logistic (S-shaped)
functions. NHTSA examined these
alternative mathematical forms in the
MY 2008–2011 light truck CAFE
rulemaking,370 but concluded that none
of those functional forms as presented
would be appropriate for the CAFE
program because they tended toward
excessively high stringency levels at the
smaller end of the footprint range,
excessively low stringency levels at the
larger end of the footprint range, or
both. Too-high stringency levels for
smaller vehicles could potentially result
in target values beyond the
technological capabilities of
manufacturers, while too-low levels for
larger vehicles would reduce fuel
savings below that of the optimized
fleet. NHTSA determined that a
constrained logistic function, shaped
like an S-curve with plateaus at the top
and bottom rather than increasing/
decreasing to infinity, provided a
relatively good fit to the data points
without creating problems associated
with some or all of the other forms. The
constrained logistic function also
limited the potential for the curve to be
disproportionately influenced by outlier
vehicles.
NHTSA defined the constrained
logistic functions for the CAFE
standards using four parameters. Two
parameters, a and b, established the
function’s upper and lower bounds
(asymptotes), respectively. A third
parameter, c, specified the footprint at
which the function was halfway
between the upper and lower bounds.
The last parameter, d, established the
rate or ‘‘steepness’’ of the function’s
transition between the upper (at low
footprint) and lower (at high footprint)
boundaries. The resulting curve was an
elongated reverse ‘‘S’’ shape, with fuel
economy targets decreasing as footprint
increased. The definitions of the
constrained logistic functions and
NHTSA’s process for fitting the curves
is described in much more detail in
Section VI.E below.
NHTSA tentatively concluded in the
NPRM that a constrained logistic
function was appropriate for setting
CAFE standards for both passenger cars
and light trucks, but sought comment on
whether another mathematical function
might result in improved standards
consistent with EPCA and EISA.
Although NHTSA received a number
of comments requesting alternative
standards for certain manufacturers,
which are discussed in Section VI.D,
only Ferrari commented specifically
370 See 71 FR 17600–17607 (Apr. 6, 2007) for a
fuller discussion of the agency’s analysis in that
rule.
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regarding the constrained logistic
function. Ferrari stated that it agreed
with NHTSA ‘‘about the use of a
constrained logistic function to avoid a
too high standard for smaller vehicles,
and too low for larger vehicles, being
the attribute the footprint.’’ Ferrari
further stated that ‘‘the almost flattened
tails of the curve (i.e., asymptotes) are
helpful to avoid either vehicle
downsizing or over sizing which could
produce negative effects for safety and
vehicle compatibility in case of
accidents.’’
Agency response: As a potential
alternative to the constrained logistic
function, NHTSA did also present
information regarding a constrained
linear function. As shown in the NPRM,
a constrained linear function has the
potential to avoid creating a localized
region (in terms of vehicle footprint)
over which the slope of the function is
relatively steep. However, NHTSA did
not receive comments on this option,
and the agency remains concerned
about possible unintended
consequences of the ‘‘corners’’ in such
a function. Therefore, the agency is
promulgating standards for MY 2011
that, as proposed in the NPRM, use a
constrained logistic function to specify
attribute-based fuel economy targets.
The agency still believes a linear
function constrained by upper (on a
gpm basis) and possibly lower limits
may merit reconsideration in future
CAFE rulemakings.
C. What other types of standards did
commenters propose?
In the NPRM, NHTSA explained that
it is obligated under 49 U.S.C.
32902(a)(3)(A), recently added by
Congress, to set attribute-based fuel
economy standards for passenger cars
and light trucks.371 NHTSA stated that
it welcomed Congress’ affirmation
through EISA of the value of setting
attribute-based fuel economy standards,
because the agency believes that an
attribute-based structure is preferable to
a single-industry-wide average standard
in the context of CAFE for several
reasons. First, attribute-based standards
increase fuel savings and reduce
emissions when compared to an
equivalent industry-wide standard
under which each manufacturer is
subject to the same numerical
371 The statutory section states as follows:
(3) Authority of the Secretary.—The Secretary
shall—
(A) prescribe by regulation separate average fuel
economy standards for passenger and nonpassenger automobiles based on 1 or more vehicle
attributes related to fuel economy and express each
standard in the form of a mathematical function
* * *.
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requirement. Under such a single
industry-wide average standard, there
are always some manufacturers that are
not required to make any improvements
for the given year because they already
exceed the standard. Under an attributebased system, in contrast, every
manufacturer is more likely to be
required to continue improving each
year. Because each manufacturer
produces a different mix of vehicles,
attribute-based standards are
individualized for each manufacturer’s
different product mix. All
manufacturers must ensure that they
have used available technologies to
enhance the fuel economy levels of the
vehicles they sell. Therefore, fuel
savings and CO2 emissions reductions
will always be higher under an
attribute-based system than under a
comparable industry-wide standard.
Second, attribute-based standards
eliminate the incentive for
manufacturers to respond to CAFE
standards in ways harmful to safety.372
Because each vehicle model has its own
target (based on the attribute chosen),
attribute-based standards provide no
incentive to build smaller vehicles
simply to meet a fleet-wide average,
because the smaller vehicles will be
subject to more stringent fuel economy
targets.
Third, attribute-based standards
provide a more equitable regulatory
framework for different vehicle
manufacturers.373 A single industrywide average standard imposes
disproportionate cost burdens and
compliance difficulties on the
manufacturers that need to change their
product plans and no obligation on
those manufacturers that have no need
to change their plans. Attribute-based
standards spread the regulatory cost
burden for fuel economy more broadly
across all of the vehicle manufacturers
within the industry.
And fourth, attribute-based standards
respect economic conditions and
consumer choice, instead of having the
government mandate a certain fleet mix.
Manufacturers are required to invest in
technologies that improve the fuel
economy of the vehicles they sell,
regardless of size.
All commenters recognized that
NHTSA must set attribute-based
standards per Congress’ mandate in
EISA, but several commenters, mostly
small and limited-line manufacturers,
requested that NHTSA develop some
372 The 2002 NAS Report described at length and
quantified the potential safety problem with average
fuel economy standards that specify a single
numerical requirement for the entire industry. See
NAS Report at 5, finding 12.
373 Id. at 4–5, finding 10.
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kind of alternative standard besides the
attribute-based passenger car and light
truck standards proposed in the
NPRM.374 These manufacturers
generally argued that the proposed
passenger car standards were set
without regard to 15 percent of the
passenger car market and were
disproportionately burdensome to them
(NHTSA notes, however, that full-line
manufacturers argued to the contrary
that the proposed standards were
disproportionately burdensome to
them). Most requested that the agency
set an alternative standard that required
them to raise their CAFE levels by a
certain set percentage each year, rather
than at the rate required by the
proposed standards. Commenters
generally reasoned that these alternative
standards would improve fuel savings,
because otherwise small and limitedline manufacturers will be unable to
meet the proposed standards and will
just pay fines.
Several manufacturers suggested
alternative standards that increase at set
percentages each year. BMW suggested,
and Mitsubishi supported, an
alternative passenger car standard
allowing manufacturers for which the
ratio of the fleet standard to the
manufacturer’s average footprint is
higher than average to have the option
of using a flat standard. This flat
standard would increase at 4.5 percent
per year, which was the same
annualized increase as NHTSA’s
proposed passenger car standards. BMW
argued that the suggested approach
would be consistent with EISA because
it would be derived from the attributebased standards.
Ferrari also suggested that small
manufacturers (which it argued should
be re-defined as either producing less
than 5,000 vehicles annually for sale in
the U.S. or selling less than 15,000
vehicles annually in the U.S.) should be
provided an option to improve their fuel
economy by a certain percentage each
year. Ferrari did not suggest a particular
percentage by which standards should
increase. At the very least, Ferrari
argued that small manufacturers should
be given more lead-time than full-line
manufacturers for making CAFE
improvements.
Volkswagen also commented that
NHTSA should consider a percent
374 The Alliance comment on this issue simply
stated that ‘‘For some manufacturers, whose model
proliferation may not correlate well with footprintbased CAFE standards, the burden of required fuel
economy increases is particularly high,’’ and
suggested that ‘‘NHTSA should consider the
appropriateness of implementing an alternative fuel
economy standard option’’ for those manufacturers,
but left it to the individual manufacturers to
comment further.
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increase option for the manufacturers
(like Volkswagen) with fleets that
‘‘exhibit an unbalanced correlation to
the footprint attribute,’’ a concept which
Volkswagen suggested could be applied
to both passenger cars and light trucks.
If NHTSA declined to adopt such a
suggestion, Volkswagen requested that
manufacturers be allowed to comply
with the industry average target for each
model year.
Ford also argued in favor of passenger
car and light truck standards that
increase at a set percentage each year,
specifically at 3.8 percent per year,
which Ford estimated would achieve
similar CAFE levels by MY 2015. Ford’s
comment was based on its construction
of the EISA requirement that standards
‘‘increase ratably’’ between MY 2011
and MY 2020, and was discussed in the
section above addressing other
comments made regarding that
requirement.
Fuji/Subaru suggested that smallervolume manufacturers should have the
option of either meeting the average on
the proposed passenger car curve for the
fleet as a whole, or paying civil
penalties based on the target assigned
through the proposed passenger car
curve. These alternative options would
be available in the early years of the
rulemaking for manufacturers not able
to meet rapidly-increasing standards.
Fuji/Subaru argued that smaller
manufacturers could not feasibly meet
the proposed standards and that an
alternative option would be consistent
with EISA, because the fleet average
would be derived from the attributebased standards.
Similar to Fuji/Subaru, Porsche
argued that smaller limited-line
manufacturers should be allowed the
option to meet a fleet average equivalent
to the midpoint of the compliance curve
for the overall fleet in a given model
year, ‘‘rather than being forced to leave
the market, restrict product or pay
exorbitant civil penalties.’’ Porsche
argued that such a CAFE obligation
would be ‘‘challenging but achievable,’’
and given the rate of increase in
passenger car CAFE standards between
2007 and 2011, would be preferable to
paying ‘‘skyrocketing civil penalties.’’
Porsche additionally argued that EPCA/
EISA prohibits NHTSA from excluding
manufacturers in setting the CAFE
standards, because NHTSA must
‘‘prescribe by regulation average fuel
economy standards for automobiles
manufactured by a manufacturer in that
model year’’ according to 49 U.S.C.
§ 32902(a). Porsche argued that NHTSA
cannot set standards without reference
to a manufacturer’s fleet, and then
subject that manufacturer to
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enforcement penalties under those
standards.
Mercedes Benz also argued that
‘‘manufacturers not included in the
analysis’’ for passenger car standards,
i.e., limited-line manufacturers, should
be allowed either to meet the average
fuel economy specified for the vehicle
fleet, or ‘‘to improve their fleet fuel
economy by a percentage equal to the
percentage improvement NHTSA
estimates for the fleet as a whole.’’
Mercedes Benz suggested that NHTSA
could require manufacturers to comply
with the higher of the two options. The
commenter further argued that such an
approach would be legal under EPCA/
EISA because it ‘‘would be based on the
attribute based continuous function
curve,’’ and would be fairer because the
proposed attribute-based standards did
not take into account what the fleet as
a whole could achieve in terms of fuel
economy.
Agency response: NHTSA disagrees
that it has the authority to set such
suggested standards for any
manufacturers under EPCA and EISA
for purposes of this rulemaking. An
average standard that is ‘‘based on’’ an
attribute-based standard is not itself
attribute-based, as required by EISA.
Many of the manufacturers arguing for
an alternative standard were concerned
that the agency had excluded them from
consideration in developing the
proposed standards. In response, the
agency included all manufacturers
subject to the standards (excluding lowvolume manufacturers), to ensure that
the curves reflected the capabilities of
the entire fleet, and not just the seven
T ( x) =
14363
largest manufacturers. NHTSA believes
that this addresses many of the
commenters’ concerns.
D. How does NHTSA fit the curve and
estimate the stringency that maximizes
net benefits to society?
In the NPRM, NHTSA proposed
attribute-based passenger car and light
truck CAFE standards under which each
vehicle model has a fuel economy target
that is based on the vehicle model’s
footprint, and the CAFE levels required
of each manufacturer’s passenger car
and light truck fleets are determined by
calculating the sales-weighted harmonic
averages of those targets. NHTSA
proposed the following mathematical
function relating fuel economy targets to
footprint:
1
f ( x)
where
In the NPRM, NHTSA determined the
curves relating footprint to fuel
economy for a given model year and
vehicle type (passenger car or light
truck) for which the harmonic average
of the functional values are the
manufacturers’ fuel economy targets,
using the following five-step process. (In
the discussion below, we shall refer to
these ten curves—one for each model
year and vehicle type—as the ‘‘fuel
economy curves.’’)
In Step 1, NHTSA determined the
‘‘manufacturer-optimized’’ fuel
economies for each vehicle in the
product plans, submitted to NHTSA
prior to the NPRM, of the seven largest
manufacturers (Chrysler, Ford, General
Motors, Honda, Hyundai, Nissan,
Toyota). The ‘‘manufacturer-optimized’’
fuel economies were obtained by
applying fuel economy technologies to a
given manufacturer’s fleet of a given
vehicle type (cars or trucks) and model
year, until the incremental benefits are
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equal to the incremental costs. The
resulting fuel economies were
‘‘manufacturer-optimized’’ in the sense
that they maximize societal net benefits
at the level of the manufacturer, model
year, and vehicle type. This approach
was used to push each manufacturer’s
fleet to a point of equal effort. NHTSA
restricted data to the seven largest
manufacturers because those
manufacturers accounted for most of the
market and because a number of other
manufacturers did not submit product
plan data and/or had histories of paying
civil penalties rather than complying
with CAFE standards.
In Step 2, NHTSA determined initial
values for parameters A and B (values
revised in steps 4 and 5, described
below) for each vehicle class (passenger
car and light truck) and model year as
follows. For passenger cars (and light
trucks, respectively) in a given model
year, NHTSA set the initial value of the
parameter A to be the harmonic average
fuel economy among the vehicles of the
given model year and vehicle type
(produced by the seven largest
manufacturers) comprising the lower
third (respectively, eleventh) percentile
of footprint values. NHTSA set the
initial value of B to be the harmonic
average fuel economy among the
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vehicles of the given model year and
vehicle type (produced by the seven
largest manufacturers) comprising the
upper fourth (respectively, sixth)
percentile of footprint values. NHTSA
set A and B in this manner, rather than
fitting them, for example, through
regression, in order to ensure that the
upper and lower fuel economy values
reflect the smallest and largest models
in the fleet. NHTSA chose the percentile
values it used by examining the fuel
economies of the largest and smallest
car and truck models, and determining
its best assessment of appropriate
cohorts, acknowledging that there are no
canonical choices for the cohorts.
In Step 3, NHTSA determined initial
values for parameters C and D for each
vehicle type and model year as follows.
(Their values were revised for MYs
2012–2014 in Step 5.) For a given model
year and vehicle type, NHTSA set the
initial values of C and D to be the values
for which the average (equivalently,
sum) of the absolute values of the
differences between the manufactureroptimized fuel consumptions for the
given model year and vehicle type and
the values obtained by applying the
function f(x) (defined above) to the
corresponding vehicle footprints is
minimal, where the values of A and B
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ER30MR09.053
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and
T(x) = fuel economy target (mpg)
x = footprint (square feet)
A = highest mpg value of fuel economy target
B = lowest mpg value of fuel economy target
C = coefficient (in square feet) determining
horizontal midpoint of f(x)
D = coefficient (in square feet) determining
width of transition between A and B.
1 ⎛ 1 1 ⎞ e( x −C ) /D
+⎜ − ⎟
A ⎝ B A ⎠ 1 + e( x −C ) /D
ER30MR09.052
f ( x) =
14364
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are taken from those determined in Step
2 and where e denotes the base of the
natural logarithm (which is
approximately equal to 2.71828). That
is, NHTSA determined C and D by
minimizing the average absolute
residual, commonly known as the MAD
(Mean Absolute Deviation) approach, of
the corresponding constrained logistic
curve. NHTSA fit the curve in fuel
consumption space rather than fuel
economy space because the
manufacturer targets are in terms of the
harmonic average fuel economy, and so
it is more important that the curve fit
the fuel consumption data well than
that it fit the fuel economy data well.
NHTSA also explained in the NPRM
that it chose to use MAD in this Step
instead of minimizing the sum of the
square errors (‘‘least squares,’’ another
common approach in curve fitting) in
order to lessen the influence of outliers.
NHTSA believed that it was more
g ( x) =
using the values of A and B determined
in Step 2, and the values of C and D
determined in Step 3.375 NHTSA reset
the values of 1/A and 1/B to be 1/A +
0.0001t and 1/B + 0.0001t, respectively.
(These were not the final values of A
and B for model years 2012–2014,
which were further adjusted in Step 5.)
That is, NHTSA initially set the
stringency of the curves to maximize
societal net benefits.
In Step 5, NHTSA adjusted the values
of A, B, C, and D for passenger cars and
light trucks in MYs 2012–2014 as
follows. NHTSA replaced the values of
A, B, C, D for passenger cars
1 ⎛ 1 1 ⎞ e( x −C ) /D
+⎜ − ⎟
= 0.0001t
A ⎝ B A ⎠ 1 + e( x −C ) /D
(respectively, light trucks) in MYs 2012–
2014 with the values obtained by
making even annual steps between the
values obtained for MYs 2011 and 2015
under Step 4. For A and B, these steps
were made evenly on a gallon per mile
basis. For C and D, these steps were
made evenly on a square foot basis.
Having done so, NHTSA then repeated
Step 4 beginning with these adjusted
coefficients.
NHTSA explained in the NPRM that
it performed Step 5 because the MY
2011 car curve crossed the MY 2012 car
curve and the MY 2011 truck curve
crossed the MY 2012 truck curve. This
is undesirable because it implies that
the fuel economy target for a MY 2012
car in a certain range of footprint values
is lower than that for a MY 2011 car of
the same size (and likewise with trucks).
We note that no further curve crossings
occurred. That is, the passenger car
(respectively, light truck) curves for
MYs 2011–2015 that resulted upon the
completion of Step 5 were mutually
non-intersecting.
NHTSA thus set the fuel economy
curve for a given model year and vehicle
type to be
consumption space, not fuel economy
space.) The values of A, B, C, and D in
the NPRM for each vehicle type and
model year were as follows.
NHTSA noted in the NPRM that a
manufacturer’s CAFE standard may
decrease in a given year, compared to
the prior year, even though the
passenger car (respectively, light truck)
fuel economy curves increase in
functional values with increasing model
year. A manufacturer’s standard may
decrease as a result of increasing the
375 This procedure uniformly shifts the upward
and downward (depending on whether t is positive
or negative), but on the same gallon per mile basis
corresponding to the harmonic averaging of fuel
economy values.
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ER30MR09.056
where A, B, C, and D assume the final
values determined in Steps 1–5. (Recall
that the function f(x) above is in fuel
ER30MR09.055
1
1
=
f ( x) 1 ⎛ 1 1 ⎞ e( x −C ) /D
+⎜ − ⎟
A ⎝ B A ⎠ 1 + e( x −C ) /D
ER30MR09.054
T ( x) =
appropriate to use unweighted data in
fitting the curve rather than weighting
the data by sales because of large
variations in model sales.
In Step 4, NHTSA determined for
each model year and vehicle class the
integer value of t that maximized the
societal net benefits (considering the
seven largest manufacturers) achieved
by a fuel economy standard under
which fuel consumption targets were
defined by the function
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footprints of the vehicles it produces in
the later of the two years by a
sufficiently large amount. (In the NPRM,
NHTSA referred to the decrease in
vehicle or manufacturer fuel economy
targets from one year to the next as
‘‘backsliding.’’) However, as explained
in the NPRM, NHTSA believes it is
unlikely that any manufacturer would
take such a step in the final rule time
frame, given what appears to be a
growing consumer preference for
smaller, higher-fuel economy vehicles.
NHTSA noted in the NPRM that the
curves obtained for passenger cars might
be undesirably steep near the inflection
point, where small changes in footprint
can lead to not so small changes in
target fuel economy. NHTSA requested
particular comment on this issue and a
number of other issues, including the
determination of cohorts used to set
values for the asymptotes A and B, the
manner in which C and D are
determined, the treatment of outliers,
and curve crossing.
NHTSA received several comments
concerning the manner in which it fit
the fuel economy curves.
Comments Regarding the Fact That the
Car and Truck Curves Are Set
Independently
Three commenters (Honda, Wenzel
and Ross, and Public Citizen) stated it
would or might be better if rather than
setting the car and truck curves
independently, the car and truck fuel
consumption data were pooled and a
single curve fit to the pooled data.
Honda commented that this would
result in standards that treat cars and
trucks more equally and could fix the
steepness problem with the car curve.
Wenzel and Ross argued that setting the
same standards for passenger cars and
light trucks would lead to
manufacturers producing relatively
fewer pickups and truck-based SUVs,
compared to cars and crossover SUVs,
and this would result in fewer deaths
and injuries resulting from crashes of
incompatibly-sized vehicles and greater
fuel savings. Public Citizen simply
stated that NHTSA failed to set ‘‘one
continuous standard for passenger cars
and light trucks.’’
Agency response: In the NPRM,
NHTSA did examine the standards that
would result from pooling the data in
this manner. However, NHTSA is
required by statute to set separate
average fuel economy standards for cars
and trucks, and upon further reflection
we believe this requirement extends to
how the agency develops the curves.
Pooling data for both fleets would mean
applying to passenger cars a standard
based, in part, on the technological
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capabilities of light trucks, and vice
versa. NHTSA is promulgating final
standards for MY 2011 that, as
proposed, base the curve applied to
each fleet only on the capabilities of
vehicles that would be covered the
curve.
Comments Concerning the
Manufacturers Whose Data to Which the
Curves Were Fit
BMW, Mercedes, Mitsubishi, Porsche,
Subaru, and the Alliance commented
that the fuel economy curves should be
fit to data from all manufacturers to
which the fuel economy standards
apply, and not just to data from the
seven largest manufacturers. Some
commenters (BMW, Mercedes,
Mitsubishi, Porsche) argued that
limiting to data from the seven largest
manufacturers results in
disproportionate burdens to other
manufacturers subject to the standards.
Mitsubishi stated that all manufacturers
need to be included in setting the
standards in order for the standards to
comprehensively reflect the
technological and economic feasibility
for the U.S. auto industry.
Agency response: Upon further
consideration, NHTSA agrees with the
commenters and has revised its
methodology to include all
manufacturers to which the MY 2011
standards apply: BMW, Chrysler,
Daimler, Ferrari, Ford, General Motors,
Honda, Hyundai, Maserati, Mitsubishi,
Nissan, Porsche, Subaru, Suzuki, Tata,
Toyota, Volkswagen. That is, NHTSA
has revised Step 1 above to include the
vehicles of the given model year and
vehicle type for all 17 of these
manufacturers.376
In developing the standards
promulgated today, NHTSA included all
manufacturers both in the curve fitting
process and in the process by which the
agency determined the final stringency
of the standards. In addition, NHTSA
has used the manufacturers’ updated
product plan submissions in Step 1 for
the final rule, as opposed to the 2007
product plans used in the NPRM.
Comments Concerning the Steepness of
the Car Curve
Several commenters (Chrysler, Honda,
Nissan, Ferrari, Porsche, Subaru,
Toyota, Volkswagen, the Union of
Concerned Scientists, AIAM, ACEEE)
expressed concern that the car curve
was too steep and that this could lead
to manufacturers to artificially increase
the footprint of car models they produce
376 However, Ferrari and Maserati are not
expected to manufacturer light trucks for sale in the
United States in MY 2011.
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14365
near the point of inflection in order to
reduce their fuel economy targets. In
addition, Volkswagen and AIAM
commented that the steepness of the car
curve could pose inequitable burdens to
manufacturers. ACEEE stated that the
steepness of the car curve could lead to
gaming of the classification of vehicles
as passenger cars or light trucks.
Chrysler argued that the steepness
problem could become more serious in
the face of changing consumer
preferences.
Conversely, the Alliance expressed
concern that flattening the curves might
unjustifiably lower the fuel economy
targets for the smallest vehicles and
raise the targets for the largest vehicles.
ACEEE suggested that the steepness of
the car curve is explained largely by the
fact that larger cars have more
horsepower on average than smaller
cars, over and above what is needed for
comparable performance. ACEEE argued
that excessive horsepower has adverse
effects on safety and that NHTSA
should consider ways to discourage the
continued growth in horsepower in the
U.S. car market.
Commenters suggested a number of
potential solutions to flatten the car
curve. Honda suggested pooling the car
and truck data when fitting the curves.
Nissan suggested increasing D by a
factor between 0.6 and 0.9. Ferrari
suggested employing additional
attributes besides footprint to set the
curves. AIAM suggested using a variant
of ‘‘shadow size’’ instead of footprint,
changing the methodology used to
determine the value of the parameter D,
adding data from more companies,
using additional attributes, or adding an
alternative compliance option. ACEEE
suggested revisiting the idea of
normalizing car footprint to reduce the
steepness of the car curve. Toyota
suggested determining the value of the
parameter D before determining the
values of A and B. Chrysler suggested
reducing the value of A or increasing
the value of D.
Agency response: NHTSA is
incorporating AIAM’s suggestion to
include data from more manufacturers,
as discussed in the section ‘‘Comments
concerning the manufacturers whose
data to which the curves were fit’’
above. NHTSA reviewed the methods it
presented in the NPRM for flattening the
curve and the commenters’ response to
these methods. NHTSA has
substantially revised its approach to
mitigating the curve steepness issue,
and believes that this revised approach
provides a more rational solution than
those presented either by NHTSA in the
NPRM or by commenters in response to
the NPRM.
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consumer tolerance for fuel economy
technologies on the least expensive
vehicles.
Honda and Toyota argued that A and
B should not be set as the average fuel
economies of cohort sets of vehicles, but
rather be determined in a metricoptimizing way similar to the
determination of C and D. Both
manufacturers suggested setting D first
through some means, followed by
determining A, B, and C by optimizing
a curve-fitting metric. Toyota suggested
this would help with the steepness
problem for cars. In addition, Toyota
stated that the process used to select the
cohorts in the NPRM appeared to lack
a clear technical or empirical basis.
Agency response: NHTSA continues
to believe that the values of A and B
should be set as the average values of
cohorts, rather than to optimize a curvefitting metric. NHTSA believes that it is
more important that the largest and
smallest target values for the fuel
economies of individual vehicle models
reflect the smallest and largest vehicles
in the fleet, and do so in a manner that
is relatively stable, than that their values
freely optimize a curve-fitting metric.
The analysis presented in NHTSA’s
2006 final rule establishing standards
for MY 2008–2011 light trucks
demonstrated that freely fitting all four
constants of the logistic curve produces
unstable and potentially extreme
functional limits.377 As the agency
explained in that notice, such results
can produce impossibly stringent
Comments Concerning the
standards for manufacturers that only
Determination of the Asymptotes (A and produce small vehicles, and/or unduly
B)
low targets for large vehicles. These
Chrysler, GM, Honda, and Toyota
problems led the agency to conclude
expressed a variety of concerns about
then, as it concludes today, that the
the manner in which the values of the
limits of the logistic curve must be
constrained, and that the constraints
parameters A and B were determined.
GM commented that the values of A
should be based on the potential
and B in the NPRM could discourage the performance of identified cohorts of
production of larger vehicles. In
vehicles with the smallest and largest
addition, GM argued that the cohort
footprints.
Given a cohort setting approach,
used to determine the value of A for cars
NHTSA agrees with GM’s comment to
did not contain sufficiently many
enlarge the cohort used to determine the
domestic cars to provide a value for A
value of A for cars to include more
that reflects small cars as a whole (both
domestic small cars. NHTSA enlarged
foreign and domestic). GM suggested
this cohort to comprise the lower tenth
increasing A by 10 percent and
percentile of footprints (based now on
decreasing B by 5 percent.
Chrysler suggested reducing the value
377 71 FR 17600–06 (Apr. 6, 2006).
of A in a manner that reflects lower
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Specifically, for the final rule, NHTSA
has revised Step 1 as follows: First,
rather than limiting this Step solely to
the seven largest manufacturers, NHTSA
included all manufacturers. Second,
rather than identifying CAFE levels that
maximized net societal benefits
attributable (separately) to each
individual manufacturer, the agency
identified CAFE levels that cause each
manufacturer to exhaust available
technologies. In doing so, the agency
has focused this Step on the engineering
aspects of available technologies,
essentially setting aside economic
considerations at this point.
The agency believes that using this
technology exhaustion approach and
pooling product plan data from all
model years better equalizes the effort,
or fuel saving potential, for each
manufacturer’s fleet and provides a
better estimation of the statistical
relationship between vehicle size and
fuel economy.
As mentioned above, NHTSA’s NPRM
discussed a constrained linear function
as a possible alternative to the
constrained logistic function used in
today’s final rule. Although the agency
has concluded that, for this rulemaking,
the risks of unintended consequences
near the ‘‘kinks’’ in a constrained linear
function outweigh that function’s lesser
tendency toward steepness, the agency
believes that this function may warrant
further consideration in future CAFE
rulemakings.
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the data from the seventeen
manufacturers to which the standards
apply). In addition, upon reviewing the
updated product plans from the
seventeen manufacturers, all of whose
product plans we now use to determine
cohorts, NHTSA has slightly changed
the percentiles used to determine the
remaining cohorts as follows: the
percentile used to determine the value
of A for light trucks was changed to 10
from 11, while that used to determine B
for passenger cars (respectively, light
trucks) was changed from 4
(respectively, 6) to 9 (respectively, 6).
Again, the agency recognizes that there
are no canonical choices for the
percentiles used to determine the
cohorts. The cohorts NHTSA has set for
the final rule reflect the agency’s best
assessment of the passenger car and
light truck fleets. Also, because the
agency is now pooling data from five
model years when fitting the fuel
economy curves for MY 2011, as
described below in ‘‘Comments
concerning curve crossing,’’ these
percentiles are applied to the pooled
model year data, rather than to each
model year’s dataset.
That is, for the final rule, NHTSA has
revised Step 2 as follows. For passenger
cars (respectively, light trucks), NHTSA
set the initial value of the parameter A
to be the harmonic average fuel
economy among the vehicles of the
given vehicle type (produced by the
seventeen manufacturers used in Step 1)
comprising the lower tenth
(respectively, tenth) percentile of
footprint values. NHTSA set the initial
value of B to be the harmonic average
fuel economy among the vehicles of the
given vehicle type (produced by the
seventeen manufacturers) comprising
the upper ninth (respectively, sixth)
percentile of footprint values. (As with
the NPRM, these harmonic averages
constitute the initial values of A and B,
which will later be revised in Step 4.)
Note that the revised Step 2 fits only
two values for A (one for cars and one
for trucks), and likewise two values for
B, whereas the version of Step 2 applied
in the NPRM fitted 10 values for each
(one for each vehicle type and model
year).
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Comments Concerning the Curve-Fitting
Metric and Treatment of Outliers
Honda expressed concern about
NHTSA’s use of unweighted data (i.e.,
data not weighted by sales) in the curvefitting metric, stating that vehicle
models that are similar to a number of
other vehicle models would have an
undue influence on the curve under an
unweighted curve-fitting metric.
Subaru suggested that the initial
curves should be fit to each
manufacturer separately and then the
results pooled in some fashion.
Commenters expressed differing
views regarding how outliers should be
treated. Public Citizen stated that
removing outliers has the effect of
reducing the stringency of the
standards, and so all outliers should be
included when fitting the curve.
Conversely, Honda stated that outliers
should be eliminated, presumably
because of a concern that they have an
undue influence on the standards.
Agency response: NHTSA further
considered the potential to exclude
outliers from the curve fitting and/or
stringency determination processes.
However, even considering all related
comments, the agency has been unable
to arrive at a definition of ‘‘outlier’’ as
it would apply to these processes. Even
after the maximal application of
technology (described above) to
manufacturers’ fleets, some vehicle
models have fuel economy values well
below or well above those of other
vehicle models with similar footprint.
However, these vehicles contain
information about the capability of some
types of vehicles. Similarly, some
vehicles with considerable quantities of
technology do not achieve unusually
high fuel economy values. Therefore,
NHTSA finds that neither performancenor technology-based outliers can be
definitively, objectively identified.
Furthermore, because NHTSA is using
the minimization of mean absolute
deviation (MAD) for curve fitting in this
final rule, outliers have far less
influence on the solution than they
would had the agency relied on
conventional least-square regression.
NHTSA has also continued to use an
unweighted curve-fitting metric, rather
than weighting the data by sales. Each
vehicle model provides an equal
amount of information concerning the
underlying relationship between
footprint and fuel economy. As
explained in the NPRM, sales-weighted
regression would give some vehicle
models vastly more emphasis than other
vehicle models. On the other hand,
Honda expressed concern that, under
unweighted regression, vehicle models
that have been disaggregated into
multiple virtually identical ‘‘models.’’
To address this concern, the agency has
attempted to identify such models (e.g.,
vehicle models that appear to differ only
in trim level), and to consolidate them
into single entries. Even so, the
potential distortions by such
f ( x) =
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to the corresponding vehicle footprints
is minimal, where the values of A and
B are taken from those determined in
Step 2 and where e denotes the base of
the natural logarithm (which is
approximately equal to 2.71828). That
is, NHTSA determined C and D by
minimizing the average absolute
residual of the pooled MY 2011–2015
data under the corresponding
constrained logistic curve. Note that the
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1 ⎛ 1 1 ⎞ e( x −C ) /D
+⎜ − ⎟
A ⎝ B A ⎠ 1 + e( x −C ) /D
revised Step 3 fits only two values for
C (one for cars and one for trucks), and
likewise two values for D, whereas the
version of Step 3 applied in the NPRM
fitted 10 values for each (one for each
vehicle type and model year). We also
note that because Step 5 has been
eliminated in this final rule, for reasons
described in ‘‘Comments concerning
curve crossing’’ below, the values of C
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disaggregation are far smaller than the
potential distortions associated with
sales-weighted analysis.
In response to Subaru’s suggestion,
NHTSA believes that there is an
insufficient amount of data at the
manufacturer level (particularly in light
of NHTSA’s decision to use data from
all manufacturers, including a number
of smaller manufacturers) to generate
reliable curves at an individualmanufacturer level.
As explained above, NHTSA has
concluded, based on further analysis
and taking into account all related
comments, that unweighted MAD
provides a better approach for setting
the MY 2011 standards. However we
note that because we pool the model
year data when fitting the curve in the
final rule, for reasons described in
‘‘Comments concerning curve crossing’’
below, unweighted MAD will be
applied to the pooled model year data
for a given vehicle class.
That is, for the final rule, NHTSA has
revised Step 3 as follows: NHTSA
determined values for parameters C and
D for each vehicle type as follows. For
a given vehicle type, NHTSA set the
initial values of C and D to be the values
for which the average (equivalently,
sum) of the absolute values of the
differences between the optimized fuel
consumption from Step 1 for the given
vehicle type (all model years) and the
values obtained by applying the
following function
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and D determined in Step 3 are the final
values of these parameters.
For passenger cars, this procedure
yielded a curve with the following
coefficients: A = 37.82 mpg, B = 27.70
mpg, C = 51.41 square feet, D = 1.91
square feet. This curve, shown below on
a fuel consumption (i.e., gpm) basis,
produced an average absolute difference
of 18 percent.
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Step 4 has not yet been applied. Note
that the corresponding chart in the
NPRM (Figure V–7 in the NPRM)
presented five curves, instead of one,
since Steps 2 and 3 in the NPRM fit five
car curves (one for each model year)
instead of one. The sole curve in the
above chart reflects the underlying
relationship between the footprint of
cars and the fuel economy achievable in
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them using technologies we know of
today.
For light trucks, the same procedure
yielded a curve with the following
coefficients: A = 36.43 mpg, B = 26.43
mpg, C = 56.41 square feet, and D = 4.28
square feet. This curve, shown below on
a fuel consumption (i.e., gpm) basis,
produced an average absolute difference
of 14 percent.
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Each data point in this graph
represents a car model in the updated
(May 2008) product plans, and the fuel
consumption values for these data
points reflect the ‘‘technology
exhaustion’’ fuel consumption (i.e., the
lowest fuel consumption achievable
using technologies known about today).
The curve in this graph is the
constrained logistic curve defined by
the parameters determined in Step 3.
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Comments Concerning Curve-Crossing
ER30MR09.062
model years (for the given vehicle type)
in fitting the curve, as the underlying
relationship between fuel economy and
footprint should not change from one
year to the next. (However, the
relationship can change as new
technologies develop to improve fuel
economy.) That is, we now determine A
and B using pooled model year data in
Step 2, and fit C and D using pooled
model year data in Step 3. As a
consequence of eliminating Step 5, the
values of C and D for cars (and likewise
trucks) agree in each model year. (Step
4 remains unchanged in this final rule.)
The inclusion of data from all model
years eliminates the possibility of curve
crossing, and so NHTSA is eliminating
Step 5 in this final rule.
With regard to Toyota’s comment, the
agency believes that the revised
approach to curve fitting significantly
improves the objectivity of the process
for determining maximum feasible
standards.
The parameter values in this final rule
are as follows.
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NHTSA received comments on both
sides of the curve-crossing issue. While
Nissan shared NHTSA’s concern about
curve crossing, Toyota commented that
curve crossing did not necessarily pose
a problem because it believed that
manufacturers were not likely to reduce
a vehicle’s fuel economy in a year in
which its target fuel economy declined
from the previous year. Additionally,
Toyota argued that NHTSA’s means of
addressing curve crossing lacked an
empirical basis and clear objective
factors.
Nissan and Toyota proposed different
solutions to address the curve crossing
issue: Nissan suggested increasing D by
a factor between 0.6 and 0.9. Although
it did not feel that curve crossing was
necessarily problematic, Toyota
presented an alternative methodology
for addressing the curve crossing issue
by smoothing the rate of increase
between model years.
Agency response: NHTSA agrees with
Nissan that curve crossing is
problematic, since it makes little sense
for a vehicle’s fuel economy target to
decrease from one model year to the
next. However, NHTSA disagrees with
the solutions proposed to address curve
crossing for the following reasons.
Nissan’s suggestion to increase D by a
factor between 0.6 and 0.9 appears to
have no rational basis for choosing such
a factor. Toyota’s proposed alternative
methodology, on the other hand, is
designed to produce standards that align
with historic planning cycles and
allocation of engineering resources.
While it is desirable for the fuel
economy standards to be consistent
with historic planning cycles and
resource allocation, NHTSA believes
that it is more important that the
standards are the maximum feasible,
and artificially ‘‘smoothing’’ the rate of
increase could not guarantee that
standards are the maximum feasible in
each model year.
Given that NHTSA is now applying
maximized fuel economies in Step 1,
NHTSA has concluded that it is
beneficial to include data from all
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Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 59 / Monday, March 30, 2009 / Rules and Regulations
E. Why has NHTSA used the Volpe
model to support its analysis?
In developing today’s final CAFE
standards, NHTSA has made significant
use of results produced by the CAFE
Compliance and Effects Model
(commonly referred to as the Volpe
model), which DOT’s Volpe National
Transportation Systems Center
developed specifically to support
NHTSA’s CAFE rulemakings.
As discussed above, the agency uses
the Volpe model to estimate the extent
to which manufacturers could attempt
to comply with a given CAFE standard
by adding technology to fleets that the
agency anticipates they will produce in
future model years. This exercise
constitutes a simulation of
manufacturers’ decisions regarding
compliance with CAFE standards.
The model also calculates the costs,
effects, and benefits of technologies it
estimates could be added in response to
a given CAFE standard. It calculates
costs by applying the cost estimation
techniques discussed above in Section
IV and by accounting for the number of
affected vehicles. It accounts for effects
such as changes in vehicle travel,
changes in fuel consumption, and
changes in greenhouse gas and criteria
pollutant emissions. It does so by
applying the fuel consumption
estimation techniques also discussed in
Section IV, and the vehicle survival and
mileage accumulation forecasts, the
rebound effect estimate and the fuel
properties and emission factors
discussed in discussed in Section V.
Considering changes in travel demand
and fuel consumption, the model
estimates the monetized value of
accompanying benefits to society, as
discussed in Section V. The model
calculates both the current (i.e.,
undiscounted) and present (i.e.,
discounted) value of these benefits.
The Volpe model has other
capabilities that facilitate the
development of a CAFE standard. It can
be used to fit a mathematical function
forming the basis for an attribute-based
CAFE standard, following the steps
described below. It can also be used to
evaluate many (e.g., 200 per model year)
potential levels of stringency
sequentially, and identify the stringency
at which specific criteria are met. For
example, it can identify the stringency
at which net benefits to society are
maximized, the stringency at which a
specified total cost is reached, or the
stringency at which a given average
required fuel economy level is attained.
The model can also be used to perform
uncertainty analysis (i.e., Monte Carlo
simulation), in which input estimates
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are varied randomly according to
specified probability distributions, such
that the uncertainty of key measures
(e.g., fuel consumption, costs, benefits)
can be evaluated.
Nothing in EPCA requires NHTSA to
use the Volpe model. In principle,
NHTSA could perform all of these tasks
through other means. For example, in
developing the MY 2011 standards
promulgated today, the agency did not
use the Volpe model’s curve fitting
routines, because they could not be
modified in time to implement the
changes discussed below to this aspect
of the agency’s analysis. In general,
though, these model capabilities greatly
increase the agency’s ability to rapidly,
systematically, and reproducibly
conduct key analyses relevant to the
formulation and evaluation of new
CAFE standards.
NHTSA received comments from the
Alliance and CARB encouraging
NHTSA to examine the usefulness of
other models. Examples of other models
and analyses that NHTSA and Volpe
Center staff have considered for the final
rule include DOE’s NEMS, Oak Ridge
National Laboratory’s (ORNL)
Transitional Alternative Fuels and
Vehicles (TAFV) model, Sierra
Research’s VEHSIM model and the
California Air Resources Board’s (CARB)
analysis supporting California’s adopted
greenhouse gas emissions standards for
light vehicles.
DOE’s NEMS represents the light-duty
fleet in terms of five car
‘‘manufacturers’’ and four truck
‘‘manufacturers,’’ twelve vehicle market
classes (e.g., ‘‘standard pickup’’), and
sixteen powertrain/fuel combinations
(e.g., methanol fuel-cell vehicle).
Therefore, as currently structured,
NEMS is unable to estimate
manufacturer-specific implications of
attribute-based CAFE standards. The
analysis of manufacturer-specific
implications is useful in setting the
standard, because any given standard
will have differential impacts on
individual manufacturers, depending on
the composition of their vehicle fleets.
In order to balance national-level costs
and benefits, assessment of individual
manufacturer’s costs and compliance
strategies is appropriate.378
TAFV accounts for many powertrain/
fuel combinations, having been
378 In principle, if all manufacturers freely traded
fuel economy credits among themselves, fleetwide
estimates of compliance costs and benefits would
approximate the sum of individual manufacturer
costs and benefits. However, major manufacturers
have repeatedly indicated that they do not intend
to trade credits, and statutory language prohibits
NHTSA from considering the benefits of trading in
setting standards.
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14371
originally designed to aid understanding
of possible transitions to alternative
fueled vehicles, but it also represents
the light duty fleet as four aggregated
(i.e., industry-wide) categories of
vehicles: Small cars, large cars, small
light trucks, and large light trucks. Thus,
again, as currently structured, TAFV is
unable to estimate manufacturerspecific implications of attribute-based
CAFE standards.
Sierra Research’s vehicle simulation
model, VEHSIM, which was originally
developed by General Motors, calculates
the fuel economy for a specified vehicle
design over a specified driving cycle.
Despite theoretical advantages in terms
of explicit representation of physical
phenomena underlying fuel
consumption, VEHSIM has significant
shortcomings as a tool for model-bymodel evaluation of the entire future
light vehicle fleet. Although submitted
after the close of the comment period
specified in the NPRM, comments by
several state Attorneys General and
other state and local official questioned
the need and merits of full vehicle
simulation within the context of CAFE
analysis, stating that
Computer simulation models such as
VEHSIM are not practical except perhaps
during vehicle development to determine the
performance of specific vehicle models
where all vehicle engineering parameters are
known and can be accounted for in the
inputs to the model. Such an exercise is
extremely data intensive, and extending it to
the entire fleet makes it subject to multiple
errors unless the specific parameters for each
vehicle model are known and accounted for
in the model inputs.379
Nevertheless, the Volpe model could,
in principle, be modified to use
VEHSIM or any other vehicle simulation
tool to estimate fuel consumption.
However, in practice, NHTSA and
Volpe Center staff are skeptical that
doing so will be either feasible or
meaningful as long as CAFE analysis
continues to be informed by forecasts of
the future vehicle market—forecasts
that, though detailed, will not
foreseeably contain the extensive
information needed to perform full
vehicle simulation. The information
required for full vehicle simulation is
379 Attorneys General of the States of California,
Arizona, Connecticut, Illinois, Maryland,
Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oregon,
and Vermont, the Executive Officer of the California
Air Resources Board, the Commissioner of the New
Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, the
Secretary of the New Mexico Environment
Department, the Secretary of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental
Protection, and the Corporation Counsel of the City
of New York, Supplemental Comments Regarding
Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers Comments,
Docket No. NHTSA–2008–0089–0495, October 8,
2008, p. 3.
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not only exponentially greater than
NHTSA currently requests of
manufacturers, but for future vehicles,
the information may not yet exist, as
manufacturers may not have completed
the design of future vehicles. See
Section IV.C.8 for a fuller discussion of
full vehicle simulation in the context of
CAFE.
CARB’s analysis of light vehicle GHG
emissions standards uses two levels of
accounting. First, based on a report
prepared for NESCCAF, CARB
represents the light-duty fleet in terms
of five ‘‘representative’’ vehicles, each
with engineering properties estimated
by CARB to meaningfully typify the
engineering characteristics of a given
type of vehicle (e.g., small cars). NHTSA
is concerned that such a limited a
number of such vehicles does not
reasonably represent the engineering
properties of individual vehicle models
that vary widely both among
manufacturers and within
manufacturers’ individual fleets. This
concern was reflected in comments by
the Alliance. For each of these five
vehicles, NESCCAF’s report contains
the results of full vehicle simulation
given several pre-specified technology
‘‘packages.’’ Second, to evaluate
manufacturer-specific regulatory costs,
CARB represents each manufacturer’s
fleet as two average test weights, one for
each of California’s two proposed
regulatory classes. Even for a flat
standard such as that considered by
California, NHTSA is concerned that
this level of aggregation would hinder
reasonable estimation of compliance
costs faced by individual manufacturers.
Further, use of CARB’s methods would
not enable NHTSA to estimate
manufacturer-specific implications of
the attribute-based CAFE standards.
Under an attribute-based standard, the
CAFE level required of a given
manufacturer depends on the specific
mix of vehicles sold by that
manufacturer, not the average properties
of that manufacturers’ fleet. As noted
above, it is useful to estimate national
level costs and benefits of a standard
applied at the level of individual
manufacturer’s fleets by assessing
individual manufacturer’s costs and
compliance strategies.
On the other hand, NHTSA recognizes
that a more aggregated representation of
the fleet—such as CARB’s five-vehicle
approach—may be the only way that
full vehicle simulation could be
integrated into CAFE analysis. Although
NHTSA has not yet been able to conduct
an analysis with the advantages of both
detailed representation of
manufacturers’ fleets and full
integration of full vehicle simulation,
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the agency cannot rule out the
possibility of such an analysis in the
future.
Although the Volpe model has
limitations, having considered other
tools and analytical approaches, NHTSA
concludes that for this final rule, the
Volpe model is a sound and reliable tool
for the development and evaluation of
potential CAFE standards. However, the
agency will continue to consider other
methods for evaluating potential CAFE
standards in the future as well as to
examine ways to improve the Volpe
model.
NHTSA notes that some commenters
questioned the transparency of the
Volpe model, which Public Citizen and
the Center for Biological Diversity (CBD)
referred to as a ‘‘black box.’’ In response
to these comments, the agency notes
that model documentation, which is
publicly available in the rulemaking
docket, explains how the model is
installed, how the model inputs (all of
which, except for manufacturers’
confidential product plans, are available
to the public) and outputs are
structured, and how the model is used.
The model can be used on any
Windows-based personal computer with
Microsoft Office 2003 and the Microsoft
.NET framework installed (the latter
available without charge from
Microsoft). The executable version of
the model is available upon request, and
has been provided to manufacturers,
consulting firms, academic institutions,
governmental and nongovernmental
organizations, research institutes,
foreign government officials, and a
variety of other organizations. The
current version of the model was
developed using Microsoft Development
Environment 2003, and every line of
computer code (primarily in C#.NET)
has been made available to individuals
who have requested the code. With the
code, anyone is capable of running the
model using market forecast data that
they obtain or estimate on their own.
Given the comprehensive disclosure of
information about the Volpe model and
the fact that many entities and
individuals have made use of it, the
characterization of the Volpe model as
a ‘‘black box’’ is not accurate.
Although NHTSA currently uses the
Volpe model as a tool to inform its
consideration of potential CAFE
standards, contrary to the assertions of
some commenters, the Volpe model
does not determine the CAFE standards
NHTSA proposes or promulgates as
final regulations. The results it produces
are completely dependent on inputs
selected by NHTSA, based on the best
available information and data available
in the agency’s estimation at the time
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standards are set. In addition to
identifying the input assumptions
underlying its decisions, NHTSA
provides the rationale and justification
for selecting those inputs as described
in Sections III through V of this notice.
NHTSA also determines whether to use
the model to estimate at what stringency
net benefits are maximized, or to
estimate other stringency levels, such as
the point where total costs equal total
benefits. NHTSA also determines
whether to use the model to evaluate the
costs and effects of stringencies that fall
outside of the scope of maximum
feasible. For example, the standards for
the ‘‘Technology Exhaustion’’
Alternative examined by NHTSA and
discussed later in this section, were
estimated outside the model, which was
subsequently used to estimate
corresponding costs and effects.380
Finally, NHTSA is guided by the
statutory requirements of EPCA as
amended by EISA in the ultimate
selection of a CAFE standard.
NHTSA does not agree with Public
Citizen that the agency ‘‘does not
establish what is technologically
feasible and economically practicable
based on an independent assessment of
the current vehicle fleet and the
available technology to improve the
fleet, but rather accepts industry inputs,
which are run through the black box of
the Volpe model and a variety of
‘optimization’ factors, which are tied to
maximizing industry-wide benefits.’’
The manufacturers’ plans are only the
starting point for the agency’s
determination of how much technology
can and should be required consistent
with the statutory factors, and the Volpe
model is often tested using inputs
developed without reliance on
manufacturers’ product plans. NHTSA
considers the results of analyses
conducted by the Volpe model and
analyses conducted outside of the Volpe
model, including analysis of the impacts
of carbon dioxide and criteria pollutant
emissions, analysis of technologies that
may be available in the long term and
whether NHTSA could expedite their
entry into the market through these
standards, and analysis of the extent to
which changes in vehicle prices and
fuel economy might affect vehicle
production and sales. Using all of this
information—not solely that from the
Volpe model—the agency considers the
governing statutory factors, along with
environmental issues and other relevant
societal issues such as safety, and
promulgates the maximum feasible
380 By definition, the ‘‘maximum technology’’
scenario far exceeds the maximum feasible CAFE
standard.
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standards based on its best judgment on
how to balance these factors.
This is why the agency considered
seven regulatory alternatives, only one
of which maximizes net benefits based
on the agency’s determinations and
assumptions. The others assess
alternative standards that in many cases
exceed the point at which net benefits
are maximized. These comprehensive
analyses, which also included scenarios
with different economic input
assumptions as presented in the FEIS
and FRIA, are intended to inform and
contribute to the agency’s consideration
of the ‘‘need of the United States to
conserve energy,’’ as well as the other
statutory factors. 49 U.S.C. 32902(f).
Additionally, the agency’s analysis
considers the need of the nation to
conserve energy by accounting for
economic externalities of petroleum
consumption and monetizing the
economic costs of incremental CO2
emissions in the social cost of carbon.
As mentioned above, NHTSA will
continue to consider other methods for
determining future CAFE standards in
future rulemakings.
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VII. Determining the Appropriate Level
of the Standards
A. Analyzing the Preferred Alternative
As discussed above, EPCA requires
the agency to determine what level of
CAFE stringency would be ‘‘maximum
feasible’’ for each model year by
considering the four factors of
technological feasibility, economic
practicability, the effect of other motor
vehicle standards of the Government on
fuel economy, and the need of the
United States to conserve energy. NEPA
directs that environmental
considerations be integrated into that
process. To accomplish that purpose,
NEPA requires an agency to compare
the potential environmental impacts of
its proposed action to those of a
reasonable range of alternatives. NHTSA
compared and analyzed these impacts
in the DEIS and the FEIS. The proposed
standards for passenger cars and light
trucks were set at the point where
societal net benefits were maximized in
the agency’s analysis. NHTSA referred
to those standards as the ‘‘Optimized’’
Alternative in the NPRM, DEIS, and
FEIS. In the DEIS and the FEIS, the
agency identified the Optimized
Alternative (maximizing societal net
benefits) as NHTSA’s Preferred
Alternative. The agency carefully
considered and analyzed each of the
individual economic assumptions to
determine which assumptions most
accurately represent future economic
conditions. For a discussion of the
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economic assumptions relied on by the
agency in this final rule, see Section V
above. The economic assumptions used
by the agency in this final rule
correspond to the ‘‘Mid-2 Scenario’’ set
of assumptions identified in the FEIS.
See FEIS § 2.2. The Optimized
Alternative utilizing the Mid-2 Scenario
economic assumptions, which were
prompted in part by public comments,
is squarely within the spectrum of
alternatives set forth in the DEIS and the
FEIS, and all relevant environmental
impacts associated with the Optimized
Alternative have been presented in the
DEIS and FEIS, and considered by
NHTSA.
B. Alternative Levels of Stringency
Considered for Establishment as the
Maximum Feasible Level of Average
Fuel Economy
NHTSA recognizes that alternative
stringencies are possible, depending on
how the agency balances the four factors
underlying the selection of maximum
feasible level of average fuel economy
and the attendant environmental
concerns. To aid it in determining the
maximum feasible level, NHTSA chose
six alternative regulatory actions. Each
alternative reflects a balancing of the
four factors that differs from the
balancing on which the agency’s
Preferred Alternative is based. In CBD v.
NHTSA, the Ninth Circuit recognized
that EPCA gives ‘‘NHTSA discretion to
decide how to balance the statutory
factors—as long as NHTSA’s balancing
does not undermine the fundamental
purpose of EPCA: energy conservation.’’
538 F.3d 1172, 1195 (9th Cir. 2008). The
Court also raised the possibility that
NHTSA’s current balancing of the
statutory factors might be different from
the agency’s balancing in the past, given
the greater importance today of the need
to conserve energy and the more
advanced understanding of climate
change. Id. at 1197–98. In the
rulemaking for MY 2012 and beyond,
NHTSA will carefully re-evaluate the
facts relevant to assessing the need to
conserve energy, including the latest
developments in the understanding of
climate change and its effects, and will
balance the factors accordingly.
CEQ regulations state that
consideration of alternatives is the
‘‘heart’’ of an EIS. 40 CFR 1502.14.
However, under CEQ regulations,
NHTSA is not required to include every
conceivable ‘‘alternative’’ in an EIS.
Rather, an agency is to consider
‘‘reasonable’’ alternatives. See id. CEQ
guidance also instructs that ‘‘[w]hen
there are potentially a very large number
of alternatives, only a reasonable
number of examples, covering the full
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14373
spectrum of alternatives, must be
analyzed and compared in the EIS.’’
Forty Most Asked Questions Concerning
CEQ’s National Environmental Policy
Act Regulations, 46 FR 18026, 18027
(March 23, 1981).
Here, an infinite number of
alternatives could theoretically have
been defined along a continuum of
potential CAFE standards. Given the
infinite number of alternatives, and
informed by CEQ regulations and
guidance, NHTSA’s Environmental
Impact Statement identifies and
analyzes six alternatives. Specifically,
NHTSA evaluates the six alternatives
proposed in the NPRM as its reasonable
range of alternatives. The agency
examined the six specific alternatives
described below to illustrate the effect
of balancing the four factors differently
on the range of potential stringency
levels, the relationship of economic
benefits to compliance costs, and the
resulting environmental impacts. These
alternatives capture a full spectrum of
potential environmental impacts,
ranging from vehicles continuing to
maintain their MY 2010 fuel economy to
standards based on the maximum
technology expected to be available over
the five-year period proposed in the
NPRM (i.e., MYs 2011–2015).
The six alternatives considered in this
rulemaking, and analyzed in NHTSA’s
the Environmental Impact Statement,
are described as follows:
• The ‘‘no increase’’ or ‘‘baseline’’
alternative assumes that NHTSA would
not issue a rule regarding CAFE
standards, or alternatively, that NHTSA
would issue a rule continuing current
standards during the time frame of the
final rule standards. Either way, the
‘‘baseline’’ alternative thus assumes that
average fuel economy levels in the
absence of CAFE standards beyond 2010
would equal the higher of a
manufacturer’s product plans or the
manufacturer’s required level of average
fuel economy for MY 2010. The MY
2010 fuel economy standards in mpg
(27.5 mpg for cars and 23.3 mpg for light
trucks) represent the average fuel
economy levels the agency believes
manufacturers would continue to
achieve, assuming the agency does not
issue a rule.381 The baseline alternative
provides a useful reference point for
measuring the impact of the new
authorities granted to NHTSA under
EISA. The agency uses this baseline in
both its NEPA and EPCA analyses.
381 In the FEIS, NHTSA refers to this alternative
as the ‘‘No Action’’ alternative. CEQ regulations
require agencies to consider a no action alternative
as part of their NEPA analysis. See 40 CFR 1502.2(e)
and 1502.14(d).
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• The ‘‘25 percent below optimized’’
alternative reflects standards that are
more stringent than the ‘‘baseline’’
alternative, but less stringent than the
‘‘optimized’’ alternative. The required
average CAFE levels under this
alternative are less stringent than those
under the optimized alternative by 25
percent of the difference in required fuel
economy between the optimized
alternative and the ‘‘total costs equal
total benefits’’ alternative. For purposes
of comparison, we note that the average
fuel economy levels required by this
alternative fall below those under the
optimized alternative by the same
absolute amount by which the levels
under the ‘‘25 percent above optimized’’
alternative exceed those under the
optimized alternative.
• The ‘‘25 percent above optimized’’
alternative reflects standards that
exceed the required average fuel
economy levels of the optimized
alternative by 25 percent of the
difference between the average fuel
economy levels required by the
optimized alternative and those
required by the total costs equal total
benefits alternative.
• The ‘‘50 percent above optimized’’
alternative reflects standards that
exceed the required average fuel
economy levels of the optimized
alternative by 50 percent of the
difference between the average fuel
economy levels required by the
optimized alternative and those
required by the total costs equal total
benefits alternative.
• The ‘‘total costs equal total
benefits’’ alternative requires average
fuel economy levels that result from
increasing fuel economy targets until
the total cost of all applied technologies
equals the total benefits of all applied
technologies. Adopting this alternative
would result in zero net benefits in the
agency’s analysis because the benefits to
society are completely offset by the
costs.382
• The ‘‘technology exhaustion’’
alternative reflects standards that are
based on progressively increasing
stringency in a given model year until
every manufacturer without a history of
paying civil penalties has exhausted all
technologies estimated to be available
during that model year. Except for
phase-in constraints, this analysis was
382 This analysis produced stringencies at which
benefits were approximately, but not necessarily
exactly, equal to costs. The precision of this
exercise is limited by several factors, including (1)
the discrete amounts by which NHTSA varied
stringency levels under consideration, (2) ‘‘carrying
over’’ of technologies between model years, and (3)
rounding of fuel economy levels, CAFE levels, and
required CAFE levels.
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performed using the same technologyrelated estimates (e.g., incremental
costs, incremental fuel savings,
availability, applicability, and
dependency on vehicle redesign and
refresh cycles) as used for the other
alternatives. For the technology
exhaustion alternative, NHTSA removed
phase-in constraints in order to develop
an estimate of the effects of fuel
economy increases that might be
achieved if manufacturers could apply
as much technology as theoretically
possible, while recognizing that some
technologies require major changes to
vehicle architecture and can therefore
be applied only as part of a redesign or
refresh. Thus, in each year, NHTSA
increased the stringency until the first
manufacturer exhausted available
technologies; beyond this stringency,
NHTSA estimated that the manufacturer
would be unable to comply (NHTSA is
precluded from considering
manufacturers’ ability to use CAFE
credits in setting standards) and would
be forced to pay civil penalties. NHTSA
then increased the stringency until the
next manufacturer was unable to
comply, and continued to increase the
stringency of the standard until every
manufacturer was unable to apply
enough technology to comply.
C. EPCA Provisions Relevant to the
Selection of the Final Standards
1. 35 in 2020
Section 102(a)(2) of EISA adds to 49
U.S.C. § 32902(b) a requirement that
states as follows:
(A) AUTOMOBILE FUEL ECONOMY
AVERAGE FOR MODEL YEARS 2011
THROUGH 2020—The Secretary shall
prescribe a separate fuel economy standard
for passenger automobiles and a separate
average fuel economy standard for nonpassenger automobiles for each model year
beginning with model year 2011 to achieve
a combined fuel economy average for model
year 2020 of at least 35 miles per gallon for
the total fleet of passenger and non-passenger
automobiles manufactured for sale in the
United States for that model year.
(Emphasis added.) As discussed, this
requirement is one of several that EISA
mandated for CAFE standards between
MY 2011 and MY 2020. Subsection
32902(a) contains a general requirement,
not limited to any particular model year
or period of model years, that the
standards for a model year must be the
‘‘maximum feasible’’ standards for that
model year. Subsections 32902(b)(2)(A)
and (C) set forth three requirements
specific to MYs 2011–2020. The
standards for those years must be
sufficiently high to result in a combined
(passenger car and light truck) fleet fuel
economy of at least 35 mpg by MY 2020,
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they must increase annually, and they
must increase ratably. Each of these
general and specific requirements must
be interpreted in light of the other
requirements.383
In the NPRM, NHTSA explained that
the 35 mpg figure is not a standard and
is not a requirement applicable to any
individual manufacturer or group of
manufacturers. Instead, it is a
requirement applicable to the agency
regarding the combined effect of the
separate standards for passenger cars
and light trucks that NHTSA is to
establish for the years leading up to MY
2020 and most particularly for MY 2020
itself. EISA does not specify precisely
how compliance with this requirement
is to be ensured or how or when the
CAFE of the industry-wide combined
fleet for MY 2020 is to be calculated for
purposes of determining compliance. As
a practical matter, to ensure that an
industry-wide combined average fuel
economy for passenger cars and light
trucks of at least 35 mpg is achieved, the
standard for MY 2020 passenger cars
would have to produce an industrywide average for passenger cars that is
significantly above 35 mpg and the one
for MY 2020 light trucks in an industrywide average for light trucks that might
or might not be below 35 mpg.
Similarly, the CAFE of some
manufacturers’ combined fleet of MY
2020 passenger cars and light trucks
would be above 35 mpg, while the
combined fleet of others might or might
not be below 35 mpg.
NHTSA received numerous comments
regarding the 35 mpg-in-2020
requirement referring to the 35 mpg
requirement as a floor and not a ceiling
and urging the agency to set standards
that raise the industry-wide combined
average to 35 mpg sooner, as early as
MY 2015.
On the other hand, many
manufacturers commented that the
proposed standards were too aggressive
in the first couple of years and even
overall for the full 5-year period. They
argued that there was insufficient lead
time. Some manufacturers said NHTSA
should revert to setting standards based
383 We note that the requirement in subsection
32902(b)(2)(B) specific to the MY 2021–2030
standards is markedly different from the
requirements in subsections 32902(b)(2)(A) and (C)
specific to the MY 2011–2020 standards. The single
model year specific requirement in subsection
32902(b)(2)(B) simply repeats the general
requirement in subsection 32902(a), i.e., that the
standards must be set at the maximum feasible
level. In contrast, the model year-specific
requirements in subsections 32902(b)(2(A) and (C)
do not repeat the general requirement. Instead, they
constitute separate and additional requirements
regarding the stringency of the MY 2011–2020
standards.
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on the capabilities of the least capable
manufacturer.
NHTSA is well aware that the 35
mpg-in-2020 requirement is a floor and
not a ceiling. EISA specifically states
that the industry-wide combined
average must be at least 35 mpg.
However, the agency must also issue
standards at the maximum feasible level
in each model year, as discussed below.
The agency has discretion as to how it
makes that determination, with due
regard to the 35 mpg-in-2020
requirement, and has done so based on
the best available information and data
and with full awareness of the three
obligations under EISA (maximum
feasible standards for each model year,
annual ratable increases and a combined
fleet average of at least 35 mpg in 2020)
and environmental concerns under
NEPA. The standards for MY 2010 are
27.5 mpg for passenger cars and 23.5
mpg for light trucks. The final standards
for MY 2011 are 30.2 mpg for passenger
cars and 24.1 mpg for light trucks,
which represents a rise of 2.7 mpg and
0.6 mpg, respectively, over the
standards for MY 2010. NHTSA is
confident that the final MY 2011
standards represent full compliance
with these obligations and will continue
to monitor manufacturers’ achieved
average fuel economy levels and
capabilities to ensure that the minimum
35 mpg fleet requirement will be met as
expeditiously as possible.
2. Annual Ratable Increase
Section 102(a)(2) of EISA also adds to
49 U.S.C. § 32902(b) a requirement that
states as follows:
(C) PROGRESS TOWARD STANDARD
REQUIRED—In prescribing average fuel
economy standards under subparagraph (A),
the Secretary shall prescribe annual fuel
economy standard increases that increase the
applicable average fuel economy standard
ratably beginning with model year 2011 and
ending with model year 2020.
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(Emphasis added.) Congress gave no
indication in EISA itself as to what it
meant by the term ‘‘ratably,’’ but
NHTSA notes that Representative
Markey inserted an extension of remarks
into the Congressional Record stating as
follows:
In asking for ‘‘ratable’’ progress, the intent of
Congress is to seek relatively proportional
increases in fuel economy standards each
year, such that no single year through 2020
should experience a significantly higher
increase than the previous year.384
In the NPRM, NHTSA stated that ‘‘EPCA
requires that the MY 2011–2019 CAFE
384 153
CONG. REC. H14253 (editor’s note) and
H14444 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 2007) (statement of Rep.
Markey).
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standards for passenger cars and for
light trucks must both increase ratably
to at least the levels necessary to meet
[the] 35 mpg requirement for MY
2020.’’ 385 NHTSA interpreted the
‘‘increase ratably’’ requirement ‘‘to
mean that the standards must make
steady progress toward the levels
necessary for the average fuel economy
of the combined industry wide fleet of
all new passenger cars and light trucks
sold in the United States during MY
2020 to reach at least 35 mpg.’’ 386
Several commenters argued that
NHTSA had interpreted the ‘‘increase
ratably’’ requirement incorrectly,
frequently linking this argument to a
criticism of the front-loading of the
proposed standards as inconsistent with
the ‘‘increase ratably’’ requirement.
The Alliance commented that NHTSA
had provided insufficient explanation or
analysis of its interpretation that
‘‘ratable’’ meant ‘‘steady progress’’
within the context of EISA. The
Alliance speculated that NHTSA may
have based its interpretation on the title
of the EISA section adding the ‘‘increase
ratably’’ requirement, ‘‘Progress Toward
Standard Required,’’ but argued that
titles of sections should only be used for
interpretive clues if the text of the
section is ambiguous, and that NHTSA
should undertake a full definitional
analysis of ‘‘ratably’’ in order to
determine its meaning in the context of
EISA.
The Alliance commented that the two
primary dictionary definitions of
‘‘ratable’’ are ‘‘capable of being rated,
estimated, or appraised,’’ and
‘‘proportional.’’ 387 The Alliance argued
that the meaning of ‘‘proportionally’’
made more sense in the context of EISA,
without providing any particular
explanation of why it believed that that
definition made more sense, but citing
NHTSA’s use of the term ‘‘diminishes
ratably’’ later in the NPRM with
reference to the proportional phase-out
of the AMFA credit.388
The Alliance further argued that
NHTSA appeared to be incorrect in
equating ‘‘ratable increase’’ with ‘‘steady
progress,’’ since the term ‘‘steady
progress’’ appeared in an earlier version
of EPCA and there is a presumption
against equating different statutory
words chosen by Congress. However,
the Alliance commented that if NHTSA
is indeed correct that ‘‘ratable increase’’
meant ‘‘steady progress,’’ then NHTSA
385 73
FR 24364 (May 2, 2008).
386 Id.
387 Alliance comment at 45, Docket No. NHTSA–
2008–0089–0179.1, citing American Heritage
Dictionary 1027 (2d college ed. 1991).
388 73 FR 24456 (May 2, 2008).
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14375
should consider how it interpreted
‘‘steady progress’’ in prior
rulemakings—that is, as requiring
‘‘annual increases in average fuel
economy, but with none of the annual
increments varying dramatically from
the other annual increases.’’ 389
The Alliance concluded by arguing
that whether ‘‘ratably’’ means ‘‘steady
progress’’ or ‘‘proportionally,’’ ‘‘it seems
clear that ‘ratably’ is intended to impose
some limitation on the variability in the
rate of increase of CAFE standards over
time.’’ 390 The Alliance stated that
NHTSA should undertake a more
complete analysis of the ‘‘increase
ratably’’ requirement for the final rule,
and address how the ‘‘front-loaded’’
proposed standards ‘‘square with EISA’s
directive.’’ 391
GM supported the Alliance
comments, and further urged NHTSA to
consider a more gradual, less ‘‘front
loaded’’ increase in the CAFE standards
adopted in the final rule. GM argued
that ‘‘standards [should be] more
aligned with the ratable levels of
increase noted in [EISA], i.e., a
progression that is more even, less
aggressive than the proposed aggressive
and front loaded 4.5%/yr rate, and more
in line with the approximately 3%/yr
rates needed to achieve the goal of
EISA.’’ 392
Ford also supported the Alliance
comments, and commented that the
dictionary definition of ‘‘ratable’’ must
be ‘‘proportional’’ in the context of
EISA, because ‘‘capable of being rated’’
‘‘does not make sense in the context of
CAFE standard setting.’’ 393 Thus, Ford
argued, the ‘‘current, front-loaded
proposal does not appear to reflect a
series of ‘ratable’ increases,’’ if ‘‘the rate
of increase [should be] roughly constant
from year to year.’’ 394 Ford additionally
commented that NHTSA had provided
no justification for how the proposed
standards reflected a ‘‘ratable increase.’’
Ford suggested that to solve this
problem of the proposed standards not
being ‘‘ratable,’’ NHTSA should
determine fuel economy targets for
passenger cars and light trucks for MY
2015, and then set footprint-based
constrained logistic function standards
for MY 2011–2014 at approximately a
3.8 percent per year increase to reach
the calculated MY 2015 levels. Ford
stated that the 3.8 percent per year
389 Alliance comments at 48, citing 42 FR 33537
(June 30, 1977).
390 Id. at 49.
391 Id.
392 GM comments at 8 of 10, Docket No. NHTSA–
2008–0089–0182.
393 Ford comments at 11, fn 1, Docket No.
NHTSA–2008–0089–0202.1.
394 Id.
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increase would be ‘‘more equalized
(‘ratable’).’’ 395
Toyota also combined its comments
on the ‘‘increase ratably’’ requirement
with criticism of the rate of increase in
the stringency of the proposed
standards. Toyota argued that ‘‘While
the term ‘ratable’ was not defined in
EISA, Toyota believes this language was
intended to recognize that large and/or
inconsistent jumps in fuel economy
targets are difficult for manufacturers to
plan for because of product cycles and
the lead time needed to incorporate
technology throughout the fleet
consistent with these product
cycles.’’ 396 Toyota further argued that
the 4.5 percent average rate of increase
in the proposed standards was far
greater than the ‘‘nominal 3.3% implied
by the term ‘ratable’ in EISA.’’ 397
Toyota added, however, with reference
to the rate of increase in stringency of
targets for smaller-footprint light trucks,
that nothing in EISA suggested that
‘‘ratable’’ applied to individual footprint
targets.398 Toyota urged NHTSA to
‘‘reduce the disparity in year-to-year
fuel economy increases to be more
‘ratable.’ ’’
Other commenters on the ‘‘increase
ratably’’ requirement included the
Washington Legal Foundation (WLF)
and the American Council for an Energy
Efficient Economy (ACEEE). WLF stated
that it agreed with the Alliance
comments that the ‘‘front-loading
approach is inconsistent with EISA,
which requires the yearly standards to
be set ‘ratably’ over the ten-year
period,’’ although it did not explain
further what it thought the ‘‘increase
ratably’’ requirement meant.399 ACEEE
made no attempt to define or interpret
‘‘ratable,’’ but commented that NHTSA
should ensure ‘‘ratable’’ progress toward
an average of at least 35 mpg in MY
2020 by including in the final rule ‘‘an
express provision requiring NHTSA to
periodically review progress toward the
required fuel economy level and revise
the standards accordingly.’’ 400 This
provision would mandate ‘‘mid-course
corrections’’ in the standards if
necessary.
NHTSA has further considered the
‘‘increase ratably’’ requirement in light
of the comments received, bearing in
mind that the three basic requirements
of EISA for the MY 2011–2020
395 Id.
at 11–12.
comments at 2 of 15, Docket No.
NHTSA–2008–0089–0212.
397 Id.
398 Id. at 8 of 15.
399 WLF comments at 4, Docket No. NHTSA–
2008–0089–0228.1.
400 ACEEE comments at 5, Docket No. NHTSA–
2008–0089–0211.1.
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396 Toyota
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standards—35 mpg in 2020, increase
annually and ratably, and maximum
feasible—must be interpreted together
so as to best achieve EPCA and EISA’s
overarching goal of energy conservation.
NHTSA does not believe that the 35
mpg-in-2020 requirement implies any
intent by Congress to limit ‘‘ratable’’
increases to a particular percentage as
suggested by several commenters. As
discussed above, 35 mpg in 2020 is a
floor, not a ceiling, and increasing
standards at the percentage rate required
just to meet the 35-in-2020 target would
not necessarily be consistent with the
agency’s assessment of what standards
will be maximum feasible in future
model years.
NHTSA does agree with the
commenters, however, that Congress’
use of the term ‘‘ratably’’ appears to be
intended to impose some limitation on
the variability in the rate of increase of
CAFE standards over time. Given the
other statutory requirements of EPCA
and EISA, NHTSA currently concludes
that the best interpretation of the
‘‘increase ratably’’ requirement remains
similar to the 1980s requirement that
CAFE standards increase annually, but
with none of the annual increments
varying disproportionately from the
other annual increases. This
interpretation is consistent with
Representative Markey’s views
expressed in his extension of remarks.
From MY 1978 to MY 1985, for
example, passenger car standards
increased anywhere from 0.5 to 2.0 mpg
per year, a range of 1.5 mpg. The ratio
of the smallest to largest increase was 1
to 4.
While it is difficult in setting only one
year of CAFE standards to demonstrate
that the increase is ‘‘ratable,’’ the final
combined standards for MY 2011 are
27.3 mpg, which represents a rise of 2
mpg over the combined standards for
MY 2010. This is consistent with both
historical increases in CAFE and with
Congress’ other requirements in EISA.
NHTSA believes, therefore, that the MY
2011 standards represent a ‘‘ratable’’
increase over the MY 2010 standards.
With regard to the comment by
ACEEE that NHTSA should include an
express provision in the final rule that
NHTSA must undertake ‘‘mid-course
corrections’’ to ensure ‘‘ratable’’
progress toward the 35 mpg requirement
in 2020, NHTSA does not believe that
such an addition is necessary. The
agency is required to set standards at the
maximum feasible level for each model
year, and has the authority under 49
U.S.C. § 32902(g) to revise standards
upward if necessary to reflect a new
determination of maximum feasible, as
long as it does so 18 months before the
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beginning of the model year whose
standards are in question. NHTSA will
carefully monitor manufacturers’
achieved levels of average fuel
economy, as well as changes in their
capabilities, and set standards
accordingly.
3. Maximum Feasibility and the Four
Underlying EPCA Considerations
As explained above, EPCA requires
the agency to set fuel economy
standards for each model year and for
each fleet separately at the ‘‘maximum
feasible’’ level for that model year and
fleet. 49 U.S.C. § 32902(a). In
determining the maximum feasible level
of average fuel economy, the agency
considers four statutory factors as
required by 49 U.S.C. 32902(f):
technological feasibility, economic
practicability, the effect of other motor
vehicle standards of the Government on
fuel economy, and the need of the
United States to conserve energy, which
includes environmental considerations,
along with additional relevant factors
such as safety. In balancing these
considerations, we are also mindful of
EPCA’s overarching purpose of energy
conservation, as well as the
requirements that standards must
increase ratably to at least the level at
which the combined U.S. fleet achieves
35 mpg in MY 2020. We are also
mindful that environmental concerns
are important to making the correct
decision in this rulemaking. NHTSA’s
NEPA analysis for this rulemaking has
informed the agency’s final action.
Section VI discussed how the agency
fits the target curves and analyzes
different levels of CAFE stringency. This
section sets forth the agency’s
interpretation of the four EPCA statutory
factors, and how NHTSA has balanced
the factors with NEPA considerations in
deciding what final standards would be
the maximum feasible ones for MY
2011.
(a) Technological Feasibility
NHTSA defines ‘‘technological
feasibility’’ as pertaining to whether a
particular method of improving fuel
economy can be available for
commercial application in the model
year for which a standard is being
established. NHTSA explained in the
NPRM that whether a technology may
be feasibly applied in a given model
year is not simply a function of whether
the technology will exist in some form
in that model year, but also whether the
data sources reviewed by the agency
support a conclusion that the
technology will be mature enough to be
commercially applied in that model
year, whether it will conflict with other
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technologies being applied, etc. Many
commenters stated that ‘‘the technology
is available to make all cars go farther
on a gallon of gas—farther than NHTSA
proposes.’’ 401 According to NHTSA’s
final rule analysis, manufacturers
overall will likely need to apply
advanced fuel-saving technologies at
significantly higher levels in order to
meet the standards than NHTSA
estimated in the NPRM,402 although we
note that manufacturers are free to meet
the standards using whatever
technologies they choose.
However, as NHTSA described in
Chapter IV above, simply because a
technology exists does not make it
feasible to apply it to all vehicles during
MY 2011. While NHTSA recognizes, for
example, that hybrid vehicles like the
Toyota Prius are very popular currently
with many American consumers, and
that diesel vehicles on the road in
Europe generally achieve higher fuel
economy levels than otherwiseequivalent gasoline-engine vehicles
here, it would still not be
technologically feasible for NHTSA to
set standards at the level that require all
vehicles sold in the U.S. to be either
hybrids or diesels by MY 2011. As
discussed at much greater length in
Chapter IV, component supply issues,
engineering resource issues, federal
emissions regulation issues (in the case
of diesels), etc., together make such a
level of technology application
infeasible in the time frame covered by
the rulemaking.
NHTSA also recognizes, however, that
there are potentially levels of
technological feasibility between the
level at which NHTSA has set the
standards and the hypothetical example
given above of a completely dieselizedhybridized MY 2011 fleet. Nevertheless,
technological feasibility is but one of
four EPCA factors that the agency must
balance. While higher stringency levels
might still be technologically feasible,
they might not be consistent with the
demands of the other factors, and in fact
might be outweighed by those factors.
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(b) Economic Practicability
As explained in the NPRM, NHTSA
has historically assessed whether a
potential CAFE standard is
economically practicable in terms of
whether the standard is one ‘‘within the
financial capability of the industry, but
not so stringent as to threaten
substantial economic hardship for the
industry.’’ See, e.g., Public Citizen v.
401 See, e.g., Docket No. NHTSA–2008–0089–
0192.1.
402 See Tables IX–3 and IX–4 below.
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NHTSA, 848 F.2d 256, 264 (DC Cir.
1988).
As has been widely reported in the
public domain throughout this
rulemaking, and as shown in public
comments, the national and global
economies are in crisis. Even before
those recent developments, the
automobile manufacturers were already
facing substantial difficulties. Together,
these problems have made NHTSA’s
economic practicability analysis
particularly important and challenging
in this rulemaking.
Automobile sales have dropped
significantly. U.S. motor vehicle sales in
2008 were 18 percent below 2007 levels.
January 2009 industry sales were 37
percent lower than in January 2008.403
The sales of every major manufacturer
declined. Vehicle manufacturers have
not been able to raise prices to offset
declining unit sales.404
The financial state of the major U.S.
automotive manufacturers is
particularly difficult. General Motors’
2008 U.S. vehicle sales were down 23
percent, and January 2009 sales were
down 51 percent.405 GM last earned an
accounting profit in 2004, and has lost
a cumulative $72 billion between 2005
and the third quarter of 2008.406 GM has
a negative net worth of $60 billion, and
consumed more than $3.5 billion in
cash in the third quarter. GM is largely
unable to borrow additional funds in
capital markets, and must rely on a
dwindling pool of cash to fund any
further operating losses and capital
investments.
Ford Motor Company’s 2008 sales
declined 20 percent.407 The firm has
lost nearly $30 billion since 2006. The
firm has a negative net worth of $2
billion, and consumed some $5.5 billion
in cash in the fourth quarter of 2008.408
Ford is also largely unable to borrow
additional funds in capital markets, and
403 Ward’s Automotive, ‘‘Ward’s U.S. Light
Vehicle Sales Summary,’’ December 2008. Available
at: https://wardsauto.com/keydata/
USSalesSummary0812.xls / (Last accessed February
6, 2008).
404 Commerce Department data indicates no
apparent change in nominal prices of new vehicle
sales over the past few years.
405 General Motors Corp, monthly sales report for
December 2008. Available at: https://www.gm.com/
corporate/investor_information/sales_prod/
hist_sales.jsp (last accessed February 6, 2009).
406 General Motors Corp. annual report for 2007,
quarterly earnings announcement for the third
quarter of 2008. Available at https://www.gm.com/
corporate/investor_information/earnings/index.jsp
(last accessed November 12, 2008).
407 Ford Motor Company, Fourth quarter 2008
financial results. Available at: https://www.ford.com/
about-ford/investor-relations/company-reports/
financial-results (last accessed February 6, 2009).
408 Ford Motor Company, Annual Report 2007, p.
121 and fourth quarter 2008 earning release, Slide
26.
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14377
must also rely on a dwindling pool of
cash to fund any further operating losses
and capital investments.
Chrysler is closely held, and
consequently does not publish financial
statements. However, Chrysler’s 2008
unit sales were 30 percent below last
year’s sales, and January 2009 sales
were off 55 percent.409 In a report
submitted to the Senate Banking
Committee in December 2008, Chrysler
indicated that, if the Federal
Government provided $13 billion in
financing, Chrysler expected to end
2009 with some $6.7 billion in net
cash.410 However, absent federal
intervention, it is not clear that Chrysler
would be able to survive 2009 in one
piece.
As the figures set forth above
demonstrate, the automobile industry is
already experiencing substantial
economic hardship, even in the absence
of new fuel economy standards. All
three firms have announced a steady
stream of plant closings, layoffs, and
employment of new employees at
reduced wages.
NHTSA believes these hardships have
much to do with the condition of the
national economy and perhaps the price
of gasoline, and little, if anything, to do
with the stringency of CAFE standards
for the current or recent model years.
We believe that given the scale of the
recent decline in industry sales, and the
restrictiveness of private credit markets,
that near-term developments will be
compelled by the industry’s immediate
financial situation, rather than by the
long-term financial consequences of this
rulemaking.
Market forces are already requiring
manufacturers to improve the fuel
economy of their vehicles, as shown
both by changes in product plans
reported to NHTSA, and by automaker
announcements in recent weeks. The
improvements in fleet fuel economy
required by this rule are consistent with
the pressure induced by changing
consumer preferences.
The various compliance flexibility
mechanisms permitted by EISA,
including flexible and alternative fuel
vehicles, banking, averaging, and
trading of fuel economy credits will also
reduce compliance costs to some degree.
By statute, NHTSA is not permitted to
consider the benefits of flexibility
409 Ward’s
Automotive, op. cit.
Nardelli, ‘‘Chrysler’s Plan for ShortTerm and Long-Term Viability,’’ submitted to
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs, December 2, 2008. Available at: https://
banking.senate.gov/public/files/
ChryslerUSSenateViabilityPlan.pdf (last accessed
February 6, 2009).
410 Robert
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mechanisms in assessing the costs and
benefits of the rule.
On the other hand, the agency is
mindful that CAFE standards do affect
the relative competitiveness of different
vehicle manufacturers, and recognizes
that standards more stringent than those
promulgated here could have a more
detrimental effect.
However, the core of the problem for
the agency is to determine what new
standards might be economically
practicable within the MY 2011 time
frame, given the state of both the
domestic and the international auto
industries. The complexity of an
economic practicability determination
has been materially increased by the
decision of GM and Chrysler to seek,
and the U.S. Government to provide,
substantial financial assistance.
Congress has appropriated $7.5 billion
(to support a maximum of $25 billion in
loans under Section 136 of EISA to
support the development of advanced
technology vehicles and components in
the United States.411 DOE reports that
75 requests for funding, totaling some
$38 billion have been received by the
deadline date, of which 23 requests
were deemed ‘‘substantially complete,’’
and hence eligible for further
consideration among the initial tranche
of projects.
The Treasury Department has also
advanced substantial funding to GM,
Chrysler and GMAC under the Troubled
Asset Relief Program (TARP). (Ford
elected not to accept public funding
under the TARP). GM received a loan of
$13.4 billion, while Chrysler received
$4 billion.412 GM and Chrysler have also
submitted restructuring plans to the
Treasury Department in February 2009
requesting additional Federal assistance
to ‘‘achieve and sustain long-term
viability’’ while ‘‘comply[ing] with
applicable Federal fuel efficiency and
emission requirements.’’ Since this rule
had not been promulgated at the time
the report was submitted, GM and
Chrysler were left with a degree of
doubt about exactly what CAFE
standards would apply to MYs 2011 and
thereafter.
Given the foregoing, therefore, the
agency has decided that in this
exceptional situation, economic
practicability must be determined based
on whether the expenditures needed to
achieve compliance with the final MY
2011 standards are ‘‘within the financial
capability of the industry, but not so
stringent as to threaten substantial
economic hardship for the industry,’’ no
matter who contributes the funds. This
is an operational definition of a
standard set using cost-benefit analysis.
We have attempted to set the MY 2011
CAFE standards so that they are both
technologically and economically
feasible while providing the maximum
national public social benefit. In
principle, most vehicles meeting the
standard will provide social benefits to
the public at large and private benefits
to automobile owners greater than their
extra cost.
One of the primary ways in which the
agency seeks to ensure that its standards
are within the financial capability of the
industry is to attempt to ensure that
manufacturers have sufficient lead time
to modify their manufacturing plans to
comply with the final standards in the
model years covered by them.
Employing appropriate assumptions
about lead time in our analysis helps to
avoid applying technologies before they
are ready to be applied, or when their
benefits are insufficient to justify their
costs. It also helps avoid basing
standards on the assumption that
technologies could be applied more
rapidly than practically achievable by
manufacturers. NHTSA considers these
matters in its analysis of issues
including refresh and redesign
schedules, phase-in caps, and learning
rates.
A number of manufacturers
commented that the proposed standards
were too stringent in the early years and
were therefore not economically
practicable. In reevaluating the range of
fuel-saving technologies expected to be
available in MY 2011, the agency has
developed more realistic estimates of
the set of technologies available, the
extent to which these technologies are
most likely to be applied either at a
vehicle freshening or redesign, and the
limits (i.e., caps) that should be applied
to the rates at which these technologies
can be phased in. NHTSA believes the
resultant MY 2011 standards, which
also reflect all other inputs to NHTSA
analysis, are not inappropriately ‘‘front
loaded,’’ particularly given that they
cover only one model year.
NHTSA also considers the potential
impact on employment. There are three
potential areas of employment that fuel
economy standards could affect
employment. The first is the hiring of
additional engineers by automobile
companies and their suppliers to do
research and development and testing
on new technologies to determine their
capabilities, durability, platform
introduction, etc. The second area is the
impact that new technologies would
have on the production line. The third
area is the potential impact that sales
gains or losses could have on
production employment.
Chapter VII of the FRIA contains
estimates of employment impacts. The
calculations assume that compliance
costs are passed onto consumers in the
form of higher prices. These higher
vehicle prices (net of the benefits of
added fuel savings and added resale
value) lead to reduced demand for
vehicles. Estimates of sales losses are
made using the price changes and the
elasticity of demand for new vehicles
(¥1.0). Losses in sales are translated
into losses in jobs by dividing through
by the average number of vehicles
produced per full time jobs in the
automotive industry (approximately
10.5 vehicles per job). In some rare
cases, the fuel savings benefits exceed
the compliance costs leading a
reduction in price, and increase in sales,
and an increase in employment.
The estimated job losses in 2011 for
the six alternatives appear in Table VII–
1 for the passenger car and light truck
fleets. The first two alternatives (25
Percent Below Optimized, Optimized)
have roughly similar losses in
employment: 714 to 1,024 jobs lost in
2011. The next most stringent
alternative (25 Percent Above
Optimized) results in job losses that are
triple the losses in the Optimized
alternative. Job losses from the next two
alternatives (50 Percent Above
Optimized and TC = TB) are 4.5 times
and 8 times higher than the Optimized
alternative, but are still not a large
number (8,232 for TC= TB). The
Technology Exhaustion alternative
would result in significant impacts on
employment (55,740).
411 The authorizing language for this provision is
in Section 136 of EISA. This language is amended
and funds are appropriated in the Emergency
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (H.R. 1424, Pub.
L. 110–343). See also the DOE Advanced
Technology Vehicle Manufacturing Loan Program
Web site: https://www.atvmloan.energy.gov/ (last
accessed February 6, 2009).
412 U.S. Department of the Treasury, ‘‘Indicative
Summary of Terms for Secured Term Loan
Facility,’’ December 19, 2008, for Chrsyler and GM.
Available at https://www.treasury.gov/press/
releases/hp1333.htm (last accessed February 6,
2009).
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frame of the regulations, i.e., during MY
2011, we consider the Federal Motor
Vehicle Safety Standards set by NHTSA
and the Federal motor vehicle emissions
standards set by EPA which become
effective during the time frame.
The final rule requires 75 percent of
all light vehicles to meet the ESC
requirement for MY 2010, 95 percent of
all light vehicles to meet the ESC
requirements by MY 2011, and all light
vehicles must meet the requirements by
MY 2012.
The agency’s analysis of weight
impacts found that ABS adds 10.7 lbs.
and ESC adds 1.8 lbs. per vehicle for a
total of 12.5 lbs. Based on
manufacturers’ plans for voluntary
installation of ESC, 85 percent of
passenger cars in MY 2010 would have
ABS and 52 percent would have ESC.
Thus, the total incremental added
weight over manufacturers’ plans in MY
2011 for passenger cars would be about
1.8 lbs. (0.10*10.7 + 0.43*1.8). Light
trucks manufacturers’ plans show that
99 percent of all light trucks would have
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards
Weight Impacts of Required Safety
Standards (Final Rules)
NHTSA has issued two final rules on
safety standards that become effective
for passenger cars and light trucks for
MY 2011. These have been analyzed for
their potential impact on passenger car
and light truck weights, using
manufacturers’ voluntary plans as a
baseline.
1. FMVSS No. 126, Electronic Stability
Control
2. FMVSS No. 214, Side Impact Oblique
Pole Test
FMVSS No. 126, Electronic Stability
Control
The phase-in schedule for vehicle
manufacturers is as follows:
ABS and that 74 percent would have
ESC by MY 2010. Thus, for light trucks
the incremental weight impacts of
adding ESC would be 0.4 lbs. (0.21*1.8)
in MY 2011.
FMVSS No. 214, Oblique Pole Side
Impact Test
The phase-in requirements for the
side impact test are as follows:
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NHTSA has evaluated the impact of
the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety
Standards (FMVSS) using MY 2010
vehicles as a baseline. NHTSA has
issued or proposed to issue a number of
FMVSSs or amendments to FMVSSs
scheduled to become effective between
the baseline year and MY 2011. These
have been analyzed for their potential
impact on vehicle weight for vehicles
manufactured in these years—as noted
above, the fuel economy impact, if any,
of these new requirements will take the
form of increased vehicle weight
resulting from the design changes
needed to meet the new FMVSSs.
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(c) Effect of Other Motor Vehicle
Standards of the Government on Fuel
Economy
This EPCA statutory factor constitutes
an express recognition that fuel
economy standards should not be set
without giving due consideration to the
effects of efforts to address other
regulatory concerns, such as motor
vehicle safety and pollutant emissions.
The primary influence of many of these
regulations is the addition of weight to
the vehicle, with the commensurate
reduction in fuel economy.
Manufacturers incorporate this added
weight in their product plans, which
have informed the market forecast the
agency has used as a starting point for
analysis that the agency has conducted
to set the standards. Because the
addition of weight to the vehicle is only
relevant if it occurs within the time
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Proposed FMVSS No. 216, Roof Crush
weight.415 The NPRM proposed to
extend the standard to vehicles with a
GVWR of 10,000 pounds or less, thus
including many light trucks that had not
been required to meet the standard in
the past. The proposed effective date
was the first September 1 occurring
three years after publication of the final
rule. A Supplemental NPRM was
published by the agency in January
2008, asking for public comment on a
number of issues that may affect the
content of the final rule, including
possible variations in the proposed
requirements. In the PRIA, the average
passenger car weight was estimated to
increase by 4.0 pounds and the average
light truck weight was estimated to
increase by 6.1 pounds for a 2.5 strength
to weight ratio. Based on comments to
the NPRM, the agency believes that this
weight estimate is likely to increase.
However, the agency does not yet have
an estimate for the final rule.
Regardless, the final rule will not be
effective for MY 2011 vehicles.
On August 23, 2005, NHTSA
proposed amending the roof crush
standard to increase the roof crush
standard from 1.5 times the vehicle
weight to 2.5 times the vehicle
Planned NHTSA Initiative on Ejection
Mitigation
The agency is planning on issuing a
proposal on ejection mitigation. The
likely result of the planned proposal is
A teardown study of 5 thorax air bags
resulted in an average weight increase
per vehicle of 4.77 pounds (2.17 kg).413
A second study 414 performed teardowns
of 5 window curtain systems. One of the
window curtain systems was very heavy
(23.45 pounds). The other four window
curtain systems had an average weight
increase per vehicle of 6.78 pounds
(3.08 kg), a figure which is assumed to
be average for all vehicles in the future.
Based on manufacturers’ plans to
voluntarily provide window curtains
and torso bags, we estimate that 90
percent of passenger cars and light
trucks would have window curtains for
MY 2010 and 72 percent would have
torso bags. A very similar percentage is
estimated for MY 2011. Thus, the final
rule requiring 20 percent compliance is
not likely to impact manufacturers’
weights in MY 2011.
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Weight Impacts of Proposed/Planned
Safety Standards
413 Khadilkar, et al. ‘‘Teardown Cost Estimates of
Automotive Equipment Manufactured to Comply
with Motor Vehicle Standard—FMVSS 214(D)—
Side Impact Protection, Side Air Bag Features’’,
April 2003, DOT HS 809 809.
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414 Ludtke & Associates, ‘‘Perform Cost and
Weight Analysis, Head Protection Air Bag Systems,
FMVSS 201’’, page 4–3 to 4–5, DOT HS 809 842.
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for window curtain side air bags (likely
to be used to meet the FMVSS No. 214
oblique pole test in all vehicles) to be
larger and for a rollover sensor to be
installed. Preliminary agency estimates
are that current curtain bags need be
widened by 28 percent to fully cover the
window opening area. According to a
cost and weight analysis (DOT HS 809
842), head air bags (loomed cloth)
installed in a vehicle weigh 2.59 lbs and
the inflators weigh 4.73 lbs. Thus, the
incremental weight would be about 2
lbs. (2.59 lbs + 4.73 lbs) x 0.28 = 2 lbs.
However, this analysis is not complete
at this time and will not be effective for
MY 2011 vehicles.
Summary—Overview of Anticipated
Weight Increases
The table below summarizes estimates
made by NHTSA regarding the weight
added by the above discussed standards
or likely rulemakings. NHTSA estimates
that weight additions required by final
rules and likely NHTSA regulations
effective in MY 2011, compared to the
MY 2010 fleet and manufacturers’ plans,
will increase passenger car weight by at
least 10.4 lbs. and light truck weight by
at least 10.6 lbs.
415 See 70 FR 53753, the PRIA is in Docket No.
22143, entry #2 ‘‘Preliminary Regulatory Impact
Analysis, FMVSS 216, Roof Crush Resistance,’’
August 2005.
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Federal Motor Vehicle Emissions
Standards
As discussed above, because the
addition of weight to a vehicle is only
relevant to its ability to achieve the MY
2011 CAFE standards if it occurs in that
time frame, NHTSA only considers
Federal motor vehicle emissions
standards that become effective during
the time frame.
In the NPRM, NHTSA explained that
on December 27, 2007, EPA published
a final rule for fuel economy labeling
that employs a new vehicle-specific, 5cycle approach to calculating fuel
economy labels which incorporates
estimates of the fuel efficiency of each
vehicle during high speed, aggressive
driving, air conditioning operation and
cold temperatures into each vehicle’s
fuel economy label.416 The rule took
effect starting with MY 2008, and will
not impact CAFE standards or test
procedures, or add weight to a vehicle
or directly impact a manufacturer’s
ability to meet the CAFE standards. It
will, however, allow for the collection
of appropriate fuel economy data to
ensure that existing test procedures
better represent real-world conditions,
and provide consumers with a more
accurate estimate of fuel economy based
on more comprehensive factors
reflecting real-world driving use.
CARB commented that the NPRM had
not addressed certain federal and
California emissions regulations that
NHTSA had analyzed in previous
rulemakings, and stated that ‘‘NHTSA
must analyze the potential effect of
these emissions regulations on its
proposed standards.’’ CARB further
416 See
71 FR 77872 (Dec. 27, 2006).
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stated that ‘‘the NPRM must analyze the
impact of California’s ZEV regulations
through at least MY 2011,’’ which the
commenter stated would ‘‘require
NHTSA to consider the impact of
rapidly shifting technologies that
manufacturers will apply to meet a
combination of government mandates
and market conditions, most notably the
electrification of vehicle
drivetrains.’’ 417
In response, NHTSA reiterates that
emissions standards that are completely
phased in before MY 2011 are already
accounted for in the agency’s baseline
for this rulemaking. EPA’s ‘‘Tier 2’’
standards, which apply to all vehicles
currently subject to CAFE and are
designed to focus on reducing the
emissions most responsible for the
ozone and particulate matter (PM)
impact from these vehicles, are
scheduled to be completely phased in
by 2009.418 EPA’s onboard vapor
recovery (ORVR) system standards,
which apply to all passenger cars and
light trucks below 8,500 pounds GVWR,
were completely phased in by MY
2008.419 Thus, there is no additional
effect of these emissions regulations on
MY 2011 vehicles for NHTSA to
analyze, beyond what manufacturers
have already included in their product
plans in order to comply with these
regulations, which NHTSA already
accounts for.420
NHTSA agrees with CARB, however,
that portions of the ZEV standards come
into effect during MY 2011, although
compliance with these standards is also
already accounted for in manufacturers’
product plans and thus forms part of
NHTSA’s baseline analysis. The State of
California has established several
417 CARB comments at 10–11, Docket No.
NHTSA–2008–0089–0173.
418 See 65 FR 6698 (Feb. 10, 2000).
419 See 59 FR 16262 (Apr. 6, 1994).
420 Additionally, in calculating criteria pollutant
emissions factors for analyzing air quality impacts,
MOBILE6.2 accounted for EPA’s emission control
requirements for passenger cars and light trucks,
including exhaust (tailpipe) emissions, evaporative
emissions, and the Tier 2 program. See FEIS § 3.3.2.
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emission requirements under section
209(b) of the Clean Air Act as part of its
Low Emission Vehicle (LEV) program.
California initially promulgated these
section 209(b) standards in its LEV I
standards, and has subsequently
adopted more stringent LEV II
standards, also under section 209(b).
The relevant LEV II regulations have
been completely phased in for passenger
cars and light trucks as of MY 2007.
The LEV II Program has requirements
for ‘‘zero emission vehicles’’ (ZEVs) that
apply to passenger cars and light trucks
up to 3,750 pounds loaded vehicle
weight (LVW) beginning in MY 2005,
while trucks between 3,750 and 8,500
pounds are phased in to the ZEV
regulation from 2007–2012. The ZEV
requirements begin at 10 percent of
vehicles sold by a manufacturer in
California in 2005, and ramp up to 16
percent for 2018 under different paths.
California will allow the 16 percent
requirement to be met by greater
numbers of ‘‘partial ZEVs’’ until 2018,
which include ultra-clean gasolineengine vehicles and hybrids.
Compliance with the ZEV standards is
most often achieved through more
sophisticated combustion management,
frequently involving some of the
technologies considered by NHTSA in
its analysis. The associated
improvements and refinement in engine
controls generally improve fuel
efficiency and have a positive impact on
fuel economy.421 However, such gains
may be diminished because the
advanced technologies required by the
program can affect the impact of other
fuel economy improvements, primarily
due to increased weight. The agency has
considered this potential impact in our
evaluation of manufacturer product
plans, many of which voluntarily
identified particular models as ZEV or
PZEV-compliant. This indicates to
NHTSA that the manufacturers have
already included compliance with these
421 NESCAUM, ‘‘White Paper: Comparing the
Emissions Reductions of the LEV II Program to the
Tier 2 Program,’’ October, 2003.
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Based on NHTSA’s weight-versusfuel-economy algorithms, a 3–4 pound
increase in weight equates to a loss of
0.01 mpg in fuel economy. Thus, the
agency’s estimate of the safety/weight
effects for cars is 0.006 mpg or less and
for light trucks is 0.001 mpg or less for
already-issued or likely future safety
standards.
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Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 59 / Monday, March 30, 2009 / Rules and Regulations
standards in their product plans, which
in turn indicates that compliance with
these standards is already accounted for
in the agency’s baseline.
CARB also commented that ‘‘NHTSA
will need to consider the impact of
California and other adopting states’
motor vehicle GHG emission standard
when those standards receive a waiver
of preemption under the Clean Air Act;
this may require reopening this
rulemaking or starting a new one.’’ In
response, NHTSA notes again that EPA
denied California’s request for a waiver,
and while NHTSA recognizes that EPA
is seeking comment anew on the waiver
issue, the agency cannot prejudge how
it would respond to any EPA decision
until EPA makes a decision. Thus,
NHTSA need not determine at this time
that it should reopen the rulemaking or
begin a new one in the event that EPA
decided to grant the waiver.
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(d) Need of the United States to
Conserve Energy
Congress’ requirement to set
standards at the maximum feasible level
and inclusion of the need of the nation
to conserve energy as a factor to
consider in setting CAFE standards
ensures that standard setting decisions
are made with this purpose and all of
the associated benefits in mind. As
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discussed above, ‘‘the need of the
United States to conserve energy’’ is a
broad concept encompassing ‘‘the
consumer cost, national balance of
payments, environmental, and foreign
policy implications of our need for large
quantities of petroleum, especially
imported petroleum.’’ 422 Due to the
breadth and scope of these issues,
NHTSA does not believe that the need
of the United States to conserve energy
need be limited to consideration of
purely domestic effects. While the
overarching goal of EPCA is energy
conservation, this energy savings factor
(and related environmental concerns in
connection with climate change) must
nonetheless be balanced with the other
EPCA factors. EPCA does not require or
authorize the issuance of standards that
require the reducing of fuel
consumption regardless of cost. The
benefits of the energy savings from
overly high standards would not
outweigh countervailing severe
economic costs. See, e.g., Public Citizen
v. NHTSA, 248 F.2d 256, 265 (DC Cir.
1988). Environmental implications
principally include reductions in
emissions of criteria pollutants and
422 42
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Fmt 4701
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carbon dioxide and the associated
public health and climate effects.
The need to reduce energy
consumption is, from several different
standpoints, more crucial today than it
was at the time of EPCA’s enactment in
the late 1970s. U.S. energy consumption
has been outstripping U.S. energy
production at an increasing rate. At the
time of this final rule, crude oil prices
are currently around $40 per barrel,
having peaked at $134 in mid-July 2008,
despite having averaged about $13 per
barrel as recently as 1998, and gasoline
prices have doubled in this period.423
Net petroleum imports now account for
60 percent of U.S. domestic petroleum
consumption.424 World crude oil
production continues to be highly
concentrated, exacerbating the risks of
supply disruptions and their negative
effects on both the U.S. and global
economies. Figure VII–1 below shows
the increase of crude oil imports and the
decline of U.S. oil production since
1920.
423 Energy Information Administration, Annual
Energy Review 2006, Table 5.21, p. 171. Available
at https://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/aer/pdf/pages/
sec5_51.pdf (last accessed Nov. 29, 2007).
424 Energy Information Administration, Annual
Energy Review 2006, Table 5.1, p. 125. Available at
https://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/aer/pdf/pages/
sec5_5.pdf (last accessed Nov. 29, 2007).
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The need of the nation to reduce
energy consumption would be reflected
in the buying decisions of vehicle
purchasers, if:
• Vehicle buyers behaved as if they
had unbiased expectations of their
future driving patterns and fuel prices;
• The public social, economic,
security, and environmental impacts of
petroleum consumption were fully
identified, quantified and reflected in
current and future gasoline prices; and
• Vehicle buyers behaved as if they
accounted for the impact of fuel
economy on their future driving costs in
their purchasing decisions.
Basic economic theory suggests that the
price of vehicles should reflect the value
that the consumer places on the fuel
economy attribute of his or her vehicle.
It is not clear that consumers have the
information or inclination to value the
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impact of fuel economy in their vehicle
purchasing decisions. Consumers
generally have no direct incentive to
value benefits that are not included in
the price of fuel—for example, benefits
such as energy security and limiting
global climate change. These are the
market failures that EPCA requires
NHTSA to address as part of
considering the need of the nation to
conserve energy.
In this rulemkaing, NHTSA quantifies
the need of the nation to conserve
energy by calculating how much a
vehicle buyer ought to value fuel
economy, based both on fuel prices and
potentially estimable externalities
(including energy security, the benefits
of mitigating a ton of CO2 emissions,
criteria pollutant emissions, noise,
safety, and others). NHTSA discusses
the specific issues related to the need of
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the United States to conserve energy in
more detail below.
(i) Consumer Cost
The Bureau of Labor Statistics
estimates that about 4.9 percent of
personal consumption expenditures in
2006 were accounted for by vehicle fuel
and oil.425 Given much higher gasoline
prices since, the figure will certainly be
higher in 2007–2008. Historically,
gasoline consumption has been
relatively insensitive to fluctuations in
both price and consumer income, in
large part because consumers are largely
‘‘locked in’’ in the short run to
particular travel patterns by their choice
of job, housing, schools, and lifestyle.
People in most parts of the country tend
425 Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2006 Consumer
Expenditure Survey, https://www.bls.gov/cex/#tables
(last accessed Oct. 23, 2008).
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to view gasoline consumption as a nondiscretionary expense.
Other non-discretionary expenses
such as housing (34 percent of
expenditures) and insurance/social
security (11 percent), and health
expenditures (6 percent) are larger, but
more predictable. The mirror image of
the relative stability in gasoline
consumption is instability in the
amount of money available in
household budgets for everything else,
and particularly for savings and
discretionary expenses. When gasoline’s
share in consumer expenditures rises,
the public experiences fiscal distress.
This fiscal distress can, in some cases,
have macroeconomic consequences for
the economy at large.
NHTSA incorporates the impacts of
consumer cost into its analysis through
the use of fuel price projections in
setting fuel economy standards. It
should be noted that fuel economy is
not free for consumers: consumers must
‘‘pay’’ for fuel economy through some
combination of higher vehicle prices or
loss of valued vehicle attributes. Vehicle
purchases accounted for 7 percent of
consumer expenditures in 2006. NHTSA
uses cost-benefit analysis to help ensure
that consumers do not lose more
through higher vehicle costs than they
gain through lower fuel consumption.
(ii) National Balance of Payments
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According to EIA, imports of crude oil
and petroleum products accounted for
about 65 percent of U.S. petroleum
consumption in 2007.426 Since U.S.
crude oil and liquids production is only
affected by fluctuations in crude oil
prices over a period of years, any
changes in petroleum consumption
largely flow into changes in the quantity
of imports; and any changes in crude oil
or wholesale products prices directly
flow into changes in the value of
imports. Thus, any improvement in
light duty vehicle fuel economy will
flow into a corresponding reduction in
merchandise imports, just as higher
prices flow into an increase in the value
of imports.
According to the Census, in 2007, the
United States imported $293 billion in
crude oil and petroleum products,
accounting for 36 percent of the dollar
value of U.S. imports of goods.427 In the
first eight months of 2008, petroleum
426 Energy Information Administration, Petroleum
Supply Annual 2007, https://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/
pet/pet_sum_snd_d_nus_mbbl_a_cur.htm (last
accessed Oct. 23, 2008).
427 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the
Census, FT900, U.S. International Trade in Goods
and Services, August 2008. https://www.census.gov/
foreign-trade/Press-Release/current_press_release/
press.html (last accessed October 21, 2008).
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accounted for 49 percent of the dollar
value of U.S. merchandise imports. The
United States gross domestic product is
about $14 trillion per year, so petroleum
imports only account for about 2
percent of GDP. Nonetheless, petroleum
imports are large enough to create a
discernable fiscal drag, particularly
since the usual macroeconomic
adjustment mechanisms, such as price
or income elasticity, or offsetting
changes in currency valuation, are not
very effective in reducing petroleum
imports. Hence, most of the burden for
any necessary macroeconomic
adjustment will be borne by other
sectors of the economy, and unrelated
imports. Conversely, however, measures
that reduce petroleum consumption,
such as fuel economy standards, will
flow directly into the balance-ofpayments account, and strengthen the
domestic economy to some degree.
(iii) Environmental Implications
The need to conserve energy is also
more crucial today because of growing
greenhouse gas emissions from growing
petroleum consumption by the on-theroad fleet of motor vehicles, and
growing concerns about the climate
effects of those emissions. Since 1999,
the transportation sector has led all U.S.
end-use sectors in emissions of CO2.
Transportation sector CO2 emissions in
2006 were 407.5 million metric tons
higher than in 1990, an increase that
represents 46.4 percent of the growth in
unadjusted energy related CO2
emissions from all sectors over the
period. Petroleum consumption, which
is directly and substantially related to
fuel economy, is the largest source of
CO2 emissions in the transportation
sector.428 Moreover, transportation
sector emissions from gasoline and
diesel fuel combustion generally
parallel total vehicle miles traveled. The
need of the nation to conserve energy
encompasses all of these issues, since
CO2 emissions from passenger cars and
light trucks decrease as fuel economy
improves and more energy is
conserved.429 Indeed, the only way to
make the substantial necessary
reductions in CO2 tailpipe emissions is
to improve fuel economy.
428 However, increases in ethanol fuel
consumption have mitigated the growth in
transportation-related emissions somewhat
(emissions from energy inputs to ethanol
production plants are counted in the industrial
sector).
429 The above statistics are derived from Energy
Information Administration, ‘‘Emissions of
Greenhouse Gases Report,’’ Report # DOE/EIA–0573
(2006), released November 28, 2007. Available at
https://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/1605/ggrpt/
carbon.html (last accessed Oct. 23, 2008).
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These MY 2011 CAFE standards will
reduce passenger car and light truck fuel
consumption and CO2 tailpipe
emissions over the next several decades,
responding to the need of the nation to
conserve energy, as EPCA intended.
More specifically, the final standards
will save over 9 billion gallons of fuel
and avoid over 8 million metric tons of
CO2 tailpipe emissions over the lifetime
of the regulated vehicles.
NHTSA evaluated in great detail the
potential environmental impacts
associated with such CO2 emissions
reductions and other environmental
impacts of the proposed standards
through the Final Environmental Impact
Statement prepared in conjunction with
this rulemaking.430 They take the form
of unambiguous reductions in emissions
of CO2, and very small and uncertain
changes in emissions of urban air
pollutants and toxic pollutants, with
reductions in emissions of most
pollutants.
(iv) Foreign Policy Considerations
Fuel economy standards have only an
indirect and general impact on U.S.
foreign policy. U.S. foreign policy has
been affected for decades by rising U.S.
and world dependency of crude oil as
the basis for modern transportation
systems. In general, the United States
and oil exporting states have a powerful
long-term mutual interest in a smoothly
functioning international oil market.
However, other governments sometimes
behave erratically, and, on occasion,
will pursue short-term benefits at the
expense of long-term advantage.
• The political stability of major oil
exporting states and states controlling
petroleum transportation routes is
important to the United States, because
chaos could lead to an interruption of
oil production or shipments and
worldwide increases in oil prices
affecting the U.S. and world economy.
Physical shortages of petroleum would
be even more disruptive than high
prices.
• The United States may give
additional consideration to the political
views of the governments of current or
potential future oil exporting states,
because the United States would like to
influence these governments to invest in
increased oil production capacity, to
produce more oil, to sell their oil at
reasonable prices, and to encourage
other oil exporters to do the same.
430 The Final Environmental Impact Statement
(FEIS) is available on NHTSA’s Web site at
https://www.nhtsa.gov, under ‘‘Fuel Economy.’’ On
October 17, 2008, EPA published a notice
announcing the availability of NHTSA’s EIS for this
rulemaking. 73 FR 61859.
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• The United States may, under some
circumstances, be prepared to overlook
otherwise objectionable behavior by
actual or potential oil exporters.
• The United States must take an
interest in the military security of major
foreign oil production, refining, export,
and transportation facilities because
damage to these facilities could affect
the U.S. and world economy, even if the
affected facilities do not produce or ship
petroleum for the U.S. market.
• To the extent that oil exporting
states accumulate large foreign currency
reserves as a result of cumulative
balance-of-payments surpluses, the
United States may have additional
reasons for giving such states additional
consideration.
NHTSA considers oil price
externalities that cover the benefits
associated with reduced risk of an oil
price spike, possibly induced by foreign
political developments. However, other
externalities in connection with foreign
policy considerations such as those set
forth above are exceedingly difficult to
quantify, much less monetize as a
discrete economic value. No commenter
set forth a methodology by which
NHTSA could reasonably quantify this
particular set of externalities, and
NHTSA is unaware of literature which
addresses quantifying these
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considerations. Nevertheless, in
considering the need of the nation to
conserve energy, NHTSA has taken
foreign policy considerations into
account as a part of its qualitative
analysis. For further discussion of how
NHTSA accounts for petroleum
consumption and import externalities in
its analysis, see section V.B.11 above.
Accordingly, upon consideration of
the entire record, and on the basis of all
public comments and applicable law,
NHTSA has considered the need of the
nation to conserve energy.
4. Comparison of Alternatives
NHTSA’s analyses of the levels of
CAFE that would be required under the
alternatives considered by the agency
and the associated costs are described
below and then summarized in Tables
VII–2 through VII–6:
VII–2. Average Required CAFE Levels:
Under an attribute-based CAFE
standard, the CAFE level required of
each manufacturer depends on the
distribution of footprint values and
projected sales of individual models
comprising the fleet of vehicles it
produces. Table VII–2 contains a salesweighted harmonic average of these
requirements.
VII–3. Average CAFE Shortfall: If a
manufacturer is not expected to achieve
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14385
the required CAFE level, either because
of an expected economic decision or
because all opportunities to add
technology are expected to be
exhausted, the manufacturer is expected
to have a shortfall that will result in
civil penalties (unless sufficient CAFE
credits are available to offset the
shortfall). Table VII–3 summarizes these
shortfalls (where they exist) at the
industry-wide level.
VII–4. Total Benefits (versus
Baseline): The societal benefits resulting
from each alternative are calculated
relative to the baseline CAFE standards.
Section V discusses the components of
these benefits. Table VII–4 shows the
discounted present value of benefits
accrued over the useful life of vehicles
sold in MY 2011.
VII–5. Total Costs (versus Baseline):
The total costs of each alternative are
measured by the estimated industrywide increase in technology outlays
from those under baseline CAFE
standards.
VII–6. Net Benefits (versus Baseline):
Net benefits reflect the amount by
which total benefits exceed total costs.
In Table VII–6, negative values (in
parentheses) indicate instances in
which total costs exceed total benefits.
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NHTSA believes that some differences
among specific alternatives analyzed are
worth noting here. As Tables VII–4 and
VII–5 reveal, costs increase more rapidly
than do benefits as required CAFE levels
increase, particularly beyond the level
at which total costs equal total benefits.
Increasing compliance costs reduce both
431 Negative values mean that costs exceed
benefits.
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new vehicle sales and employment.
Each of the alternatives that is more
stringent than the Optimized
Alternative will reduce sales and
employment from the levels observed
under the Optimized Alternative, as
documented in the FRIA in Chapter VII.
Additionally, under the more stringent
alternatives, the agency predicts that
increasing numbers of manufacturers
will run out of technology to apply, and
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potentially resort to paying statutory
penalties. The CAFE shortfalls shown in
Table VII–3 measure how widespread
this outcome could become. Underlying
the differences in costs, benefits, and
net benefits among the alternatives are
differences in the extent to which
NHTSA has estimated that fuel
economy technologies would be applied
in response to the standards
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corresponding to each of these
alternatives.
Along the continuum, each alternative
represents a different way in which
NHTSA could conceivably balance the
four EPCA factors and the attendant
environmental concerns. The
alternatives that fall above the
Optimized Alternative (the +25, +50, TC
= TB, and Technology Exhaustion
alternatives), if chosen, would represent
an agency decision to put progressively
more emphasis on reducing energy
consumption and CO2 emissions, due to
the need of the nation to conserve
energy, and less on the other factors,
such as economic practicability and the
impacts of higher stringencies on the
industry. The ¥25% alternative, in
contrast, would represent an agency
decision to put more emphasis on the
economic situation of the industry and
its ability to apply advanced
technologies in the relevant timeframe,
while placing less on the other factors,
such as the need of the nation to
conserve energy.
per gallon higher than it would
otherwise be. After MY 2014, Congress
has set a schedule by which the dualfuel incentive diminishes partially each
year until it is extinguished after MY
2019.433 This issue is discussed further
in Section XII.C below.
Although manufacturers may use this
additional credit for their CAFE
compliance, NHTSA may not consider it
in setting standards. As above, this
prohibition prevents NHTSA from
raising CAFE standards by averaging
these vehicles into our determination of
a manufacturer’s maximum feasible fuel
economy level.
No comments were received regarding
the statutory prohibition on NHTSA’s
consideration of these alternative-fuel
vehicle incentives, but the agency notes
that given that the MY 2011 standards
`
increase more rapidly vis-a-vis the MY
2010 standards than any CAFE
standards since the inception of the
CAFE program, we believe it likely that
manufacturers will use the incentive to
a considerable degree.
5. Other Considerations Under EPCA
(b) AMFA Credits
49 U.S.C. § 32902(h) expressly
prohibits NHTSA from considering the
fuel economy of ‘‘dedicated’’
automobiles in setting CAFE standards.
Dedicated automobiles are those that
operate only on an alternative fuel, like
all-electric or natural gas vehicles.432
Dedicated vehicles often achieve higher
mile per gallon (or equivalent) ratings
than regular gasoline vehicles, so this
prohibition prevents NHTSA from
raising CAFE standards by averaging
these vehicles into our determination of
a manufacturer’s maximum feasible fuel
economy level.
Section 32902(h) also directs NHTSA
to ignore the fuel economy incentives
for dual-fueled (e.g., E85-capable)
automobiles in setting CAFE standards.
§ 32905(b) and (d) use special
calculations for determining the fuel
economy of dual-fueled automobiles
that give those vehicles higher fuel
economy ratings than otherwiseidentical regular automobiles. Through
MY 2014, manufacturers may use this
‘‘dual-fuel’’ incentive to raise their
average fuel economy up to 1.2 miles
(c) Flexibility Mechanisms: Credits,
Fines
As discussed at length below in
Chapter XII, EPCA and EISA also allow
manufacturers to use credits (either
earned or purchased) and to pay fines in
order to meet CAFE standards.
However, 49 U.S.C. 32902(h)(3)
expressly states that NHTSA ‘‘may not
consider, when prescribing a fuel
economy standard, the trading,
transferring, or availability of credits
under section 32903.’’ Thus, NHTSA
may not raise CAFE standards because
manufacturers have enough credits to
meet higher standards, nor may NHTSA
lower standards because manufacturers
do not have enough credits to meet
existing standards.
A number of commenters, including
AIAM, Mercedes, Ferrari, NADA, and
ACEEE, suggested that the use of the
credit trading system which NHTSA
proposed to develop under the new
authority given by EISA would not
likely be very extensive, at least
initially, due to competitive concerns
among manufacturers. Whether this
prediction will be borne out remains to
be seen, but the agency notes that credit
trading gives more flexibility and could
potentially lower compliance costs for
manufacturers, which should provide
an incentive for manufacturers to engage
in trading.
As for fines, CFA commented that
‘‘NHTSA allows the historical desire of
432 49 U.S.C. 32901(a)(7). ‘‘All-electric’’ would
thus not include a plug-in hybrid (PHEV), since that
vehicle is also capable of operating on gasoline.
433 49 U.S.C. 32906(a). NHTSA notes that if there
is any possible misinterpretation of this table, the
schedule laid out by Congress in EISA controls.
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(a) Safety
NHTSA explains in Section VIII
below that it has historically considered
safety in setting the CAFE standards.
NHTSA refers the reader to that
discussion.
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14387
automakers to avoid paying fines to pull
down the level of the standard, by
assuming that setting standards at a
level that might cause automakers to
pay fines does no good.’’ CFA suggested
that fines are ‘‘not only punitive; they
are motivational.’’
NHTSA considers the levels of
stringency at which different
manufacturers are estimated to run out
of technology and begin paying fines.
NHTSA agrees that fines may be
motivational, but believes that CFA
misunderstands how fines function in
standard setting. All manufacturers
(except the few that have paid fines
historically) are assumed to be willing
to pay any price, no matter how high,
in order to avoid paying fines. In the
agency’s analysis, as implemented using
the Volpe model, manufacturers cease
adding technology to achieve
compliance only when there are no
more technologies available to add.
This is not because NHTSA wishes to
protect the manufacturers from having
to pay fines, but for the following two
reasons: First, because the point at
which manufacturers run out of
technology gives NHTSA a strong
indication of what would be
economically practicable and
technologically feasible, and second,
because if manufacturers are paying
fines instead of meeting the CAFE
standards, the projected level of fuel
savings is not being achieved. NHTSA
recognizes that fines are motivational
for manufacturers, particularly for the
U.S. domestic manufacturers, but
continues to believe that setting
standards above the levels achievable
through fuel saving technologies at
reasonable cost because we think that
manufacturers might be motivated to
avoid paying fines would only result in
higher standards, without resulting in
additional fuel savings.
D. Analysis of Environmental
Consequences in Selecting the Final
Standards
The FEIS analyzes in detail the
potential direct, indirect, and
cumulative impacts of the alternatives.
NHTSA’s Preferred Alternative, the
Optimized CAFE Standards, was one of
the alternatives that was explicitly
evaluated in the FEIS.434 As discussed
in Section XVI.B of this Final Rule, the
FEIS evaluates the aggregate
environmental impacts associated with
each alternative for the entire five-year
period (i.e., the environmental impacts
that would result if MY 2011–2015
passenger cars and light trucks met the
434 See generally FEIS, available at Docket No.
NHTSA–2008–0060–0605.
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higher, proposed CAFE standards for
those years). In this section we also
present selected consequences
associated with each alternative’s CAFE
standards for MY 2011 passenger cars
and light trucks. These consequences
include the effects of alternative
standards on fuel consumption and
associated emissions of greenhouse
gases, as well as on emissions of criteria
and hazardous air pollutants.
Environmental impacts associated with
the alternative CAFE standards for MY
2011 passenger cars and light trucks
remain aggregated for MYs 2011–2015,
and are reported in the FEIS. See
Chapter 3, Chapter 4 and Appendix B of
the FEIS. The aggregate impacts
analyzed in the FEIS remain relevant,
since the MY 2011 impacts associated
with the CAFE standards fall within the
spectrum of those aggregated impacts.
The Technology Exhaustion
Alternative is the overall
Environmentally Preferable Alternative.
Specifically, the Technology Exhaustion
Alternative is the Environmentally
Preferable Alternative in terms of the
following reductions: Fuel use, CO2
emissions, criteria air pollutant
emissions, and their resulting health
impacts, and emissions of almost all
mobile source air toxics (MSATs).
Because it would impose the highest
car and light truck CAFE standards for
MY 2011 among the alternatives
considered, the Technology Exhaustion
Alternative would result in the largest
reductions in fuel use and GHG
emissions. As explained in Chapter 5 of
the FEIS, the reductions in fuel
consumption resulting from higher fuel
economy cause emissions during fuel
refining and distribution to decline. For
most pollutants, this decline is more
than sufficient to offset the increase in
tailpipe emissions that results from
increased driving due to the rebound
effect of higher fuel economy, leading to
a net reduction in total emissions from
fuel production, distribution, and use.
Because of this effect, the Technology
Exhaustion Alternative would also lead
to the largest reductions in emissions of
criteria air pollutants and their resulting
health impacts, as well as the largest
reductions in emissions of almost all
mobile source air toxics (MSATs).
NHTSA’s environmental analysis
indicates that emissions of the MSATs
acrolein would increase under some
alternatives, with the largest increases
in emissions of these MSATs projected
to occur under the Technology
Exhaustion Alternative. The analysis of
acrolein emissions presented in the
FEIS, however, is incomplete, because
emissions factors for acrolein during
fuel production and distribution are
unavailable, so that the agency is thus
unable to estimate the net change in
total acrolein emissions likely to result
under each alternative. If the agency had
been able to estimate reductions in
‘‘upstream’’ emissions of acrolein as
part of its analysis, total acrolein
emissions under each alternative would
increase by smaller amounts than those
amounts reported in the EIS, or even
decline. However, given that the agency
is unable to estimate the net change in
total acrolein emissions, the agency is
unable to conclude which alternative is
environmentally preferable with respect
to acrolein emissions.
Overall, however, the Technology
Exhaustion alternative is the agency’s
Environmentally Preferable Alternative.
For additional discussion regarding the
alternatives considered by the agency in
reaching its decision, including the
Environmentally Preferable Alternative,
see Section VII of this Final Rule. For a
discussion of the environmental impacts
associated with each alternative, see
Chapter 3, Chapter 4 and Appendix B of
the FEIS.
The effects of the alternative’s CAFE
standards on the global climate—
including temperatures, precipitation,
and sea-level—have been the subject of
particular public interest and comment.
Reducing the effects of fuel use and
GHG emissions on the global climate
can translate into impacts on key
resources, including freshwater
resources, terrestrial ecosystems, coastal
ecosystems, land use, human health,
and environmental justice. Although
some of the alternative’s CAFE
standards considered for MY 2011 have
the potential to substantially reduce
future GHG emissions from cars and
light trucks, none of them would reduce
emissions sufficiently to reverse
projected future growth in total U.S.
transportation-sector emissions, or to
avoid the projected effects of climate
change caused by manmade emissions.
As noted in the FEIS, even for those
alternatives that would lead to the
largest reductions in GHG emissions,
however, the magnitudes of any changes
in projected climate effects that could be
forestalled are likely to be on the order
of one one-hundredth of a degree
Celsius in surface temperatures, a
reduction of 0.02 percent to 0.03 percent
in the rate of precipitation increase, and
1 millimeter or less of sea-level change.
435 The estimates of fuel consumption and fuel
savings presented in Table VII–9 correspond to the
‘‘Mid-2’’ case described in the Final EIS.
The potential impacts on key resources
that might be avoided if these changes
in climate could be forestalled are too
small to meaningfully address
quantitatively in terms of their impacts
on resources. Given the enormous global
values of these resources, these
distinctions are nevertheless likely to be
important, but they are simply too small
for current quantitative techniques to
resolve. Consequently, the discussion of
resource impacts does not distinguish
among the CAFE alternatives, but rather
provides a qualitative review of the
benefits of reducing GHG emissions and
the magnitude of the risks involved in
climate change.
Table VII–9 compares fuel
consumption by the entire U.S.
passenger car fleet during selected
future years under alternative CAFE
standards for MY 2011.435 Each of these
estimates assumes that the standard
established for MY 2011 would apply to
all subsequent model years.436 As the
table shows, total fuel consumption by
passenger cars would increase over the
period from 2020–2060 under each
alternative. Table VII–9 also reports the
reduction in fuel use under each
alternative from the level that would
result if the MY 2010 CAFE standard for
passenger cars instead remained in
effect indefinitely (the ‘‘No Action’’
alternative). Fuel savings under each
alternative increase in CAFE standards
would rise progressively over the period
shown, as an increasing fraction of
passenger cars in use complied with the
standard established for MY 2011.
Table VII–10 reports estimated fuel
consumption by the U.S. light truck
fleet during future years under
alternative CAFE standards for MY
2011, as well as the reductions in fuel
use that would result under each
alternative that would raise CAFE
standards for MY 2011. As with the
previous table, the estimates of fuel use
reported in Table VII–10 assume that
the light truck CAFE standard
established for MY 2011 would apply to
all subsequent model years, and these
estimates show that total fuel use by
light trucks would increase over the
foreseeable future under each
alternative. As with passenger cars, the
reductions in fuel consumption by the
U.S. light trucks fleet under each
alternative increase in CAFE standards
would rise progressively through 2060,
as an increasing fraction of light trucks
in use complied with the standard
established for MY 2011.
436 However, this assumption overstates impacts,
because EISA requires standards to increase each
model year between MY 2011 and MY 2020.
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from 2010 through 2100 under each
alternative for MY 2011 CAFE
standards. As in the preceding tables,
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these estimates assume that the CAFE
standards established for MY 2011
under each alternative would apply to
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Table VII–11 projects cumulative total
emissions of CO2 by all U.S. passenger
cars and light trucks over the period
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remained in effect throughout this
period (the ‘‘No Action’’ alternative).
The reductions in cumulative CO2
emissions over an extended period such
as that shown in Table VII–11 (2010–
2100) provide a more meaningful
comparison of the impacts of alternative
CAFE standards for MY 2011 on the
potential for global climate change than
would the reductions in CO2 emissions
for individual future years. This is
because CO2 remains in the earth’s
atmosphere for a prolonged period once
it has been emitted, and the likely
increase in future global temperatures is
determined by the cumulative
atmospheric concentration of CO2 (and
other GHGs). Thus the most accurate
measure of the impact of higher CAFE
standards on the potential for global
climate change is the resulting
reduction in cumulative CO2 emissions
by cars and light trucks over an
extended period, as vehicles meeting
those higher standards are gradually
incorporated into the U.S. vehicle fleet.
NHTSA’s Final EIS presented a
detailed analysis of the potential effects
of alternative car and light truck CAFE
standards for MY 2011–2015 on
anticipated future changes in the global
climate. This analysis was based on
estimates of the effects of alternative
increases in CAFE standards for those
model years on fuel consumption and
emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG),
analogous to those reported in Tables
VII–9 through VII–11 for the MY 2011
CAFE standards. The agency projected
the extent to which these projected
reductions in GHG emissions might
lower future atmospheric concentrations
of GHGs, and utilized a global climate
modeling system to simulate the
consequences of reduced GHG
concentrations for future increases in
mean surface temperatures, the
projected future rise in sea levels, and
regional precipitation patterns. For
additional discussion of the FEIS
climate analysis, see FEIS § 3.4 and 4.4.
NHTSA analyzed the air quality
impacts of alternative CAFE standards
for MY 2011 cars and light trucks by
estimating the changes in total
emissions of criteria air pollutants and
selected mobile source air toxics
(MSATs) from their Baseline levels that
would occur under each Action
alternative. The agency’s analysis
considered emissions of these pollutants
during vehicle use (‘‘tailpipe’’
emissions), as well as emissions
throughout the processes of producing
and distributing fuel (‘‘upstream’’
emissions).437 Because improving fuel
economy results in an increase in the
number of miles passenger cars and
light trucks are driven (the ‘‘rebound’’
effect), tailpipe emissions of each
pollutant are projected to increase by
progressively larger amounts under
alternatives that require higher fuel
economy levels. In contrast, higher
CAFE standards reduce the volume of
fuel supplied, thus reducing emissions
throughout the fuel production and
distribution process.
The net effect of each alternative is
equal to the increase in tailpipe
emissions resulting from added
rebound-effect driving, minus the
reduction in upstream emissions
resulting from the lower volume of fuel
that must be supplied. Although the
relative magnitude of these two effects
differs among individual pollutants, the
reduction in upstream emissions of
most (but not all) pollutants outweighs
the increase in tailpipe emissions,
leading to a net reduction in their total
emissions. Similarly, the net reduction
in total emissions of each pollutant is
usually—although not always—larger
for alternatives that require higher fuel
economy levels. For further explanation
of the air quality methodology, see FEIS
§ 3.3.2.
Table VII–12 reports total emissions
of criteria air pollutants from passenger
cars and light trucks during selected
future years with alternative CAFE
standards for MY 2011.438 Total
emissions of each pollutant include
those that occur during vehicle use, as
well as from fuel production and
distribution. These emissions estimates
assume that each alternative CAFE
standard for MY 2011 cars and light
trucks would remain in effect during
subsequent model years, so that over
time an increasing fraction of all cars
and light trucks in use will have met
those standards. As the table indicates,
emissions of carbon monoxide (CO),
nitrogen oxides (NOx), and volatile
organic compounds (VOC) are projected
to decline over the future as
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437 Emissions of volatile organic compounds
(VOC) during vehicle operation include evaporative
emissions that occur when vehicles are parked or
stored, and while they are being refueled at retail
stations.
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438 Unlike GHGs, criteria and hazardous air
pollutants are relatively short-lived; thus their
concentrations in the atmosphere and the resulting
impacts on human health depend primarily on
emissions during the immediate period being
analyzed, rather than on their cumulative emissions
over an extended period.
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all subsequent model years, and include
emissions occurring during fuel
production, distribution, and use. Table
VII–11 also reports the reductions in
cumulative CO2 emissions from 2010–
2100 under each alternative that would
increase passenger car and light truck
CAFE standards for MY 2011 (the
‘‘Action’’ alternatives); these reductions
are measured from the level of
emissions that would occur if the MY
2010 car and light truck CAFE standards
were extended to MY 2011 and
Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 59 / Monday, March 30, 2009 / Rules and Regulations
(PM2.5) and sulfur oxides (SOx) are
projected to increase.
production and distribution grow in
proportion to the larger fuel savings that
result from more stringent standards,
and more than offset the larger increases
in tailpipe emissions from additional
driving that result from increased fuel
economy. The table also shows that the
reductions in emissions are projected to
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grow over the future under each
alternative, as an increasing fraction of
cars and light trucks in service consists
of those required to meet the alternative
CAFE standards considered for MY
2011.
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Table VII–13 shows that emissions of
each criteria pollutant are projected to
decline from their levels under the No
Action Alternative by progressively
larger amounts as CAFE standards for
MY 2011 cars and light trucks become
more stringent. This occurs because the
reductions in emissions from fuel
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improvements in emissions controls
offset the effect of increasing vehicle
use, while emissions of fine particulates
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Establishing higher CAFE standards
for MY 2011 cars and light trucks is also
expected to affect emissions of some
hazardous air pollutants (also known as
mobile source air toxics, or MSATs) that
occur during fuel production and use.
NHTSA examined the effect of
alternative CAFE standards on
emissions of the MSATs acetaldehyde,
acrolein, benzene, 1, 3-butadiene, diesel
particulate matter (DPM), and
formaldehyde, which EPA and the
Federal Highway Administration have
identified as a primary concern when
assessing the environmental impacts of
motor vehicle use.
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Table VII–14 reports total emissions
of these air toxics by passenger cars and
light trucks during selected future years
under alternative CAFE standards for
MY 2011. As in the agency’s analysis of
criteria air pollutant emissions, these
estimates include emissions during
vehicle use as well as from fuel
production and distribution, and also
assume that each alternative CAFE
standard for MY 2011 cars and light
trucks would remain in effect for
subsequent model years. The table
indicates that emissions of
acetaldehyde, acrolein, benzene, 1,3Butadiene, and formaldehyde are
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projected to decline significantly in
future years under each alternative,
including the Baseline or No Action
alternative. This occurs because the
rates at which these MSATs are emitted
during vehicle operation, fuel
production, and fuel distribution are
projected to decline steadily throughout
the future. In contrast, future emissions
of diesel particulate matter (DPM) are
projected to increase under each
alternative standard, as manufacturers
increasingly rely on converting gasoline
models to diesel power in order to
achieve higher fuel economy.
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Table VII–15 reports the changes in
emissions of each MSAT from their
levels under the Baseline or No Action
alternative that are projected to occur
under alternative CAFE standards for
MY 2011 cars and light trucks. The table
shows that in most future years future
emissions of acetaldehyde, benzene, 1,3butadiene, and DPM would decline
from their Baseline levels under each
alternative CAFE standard considered
for MY 2011. The reductions in
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emissions of these MSATs would
generally increase over the future, as an
increasing fraction of cars and light
trucks in use met the MY 2011 CAFE
standards. As with criteria pollutants,
the reductions in emissions of these
MSATs are expected to be larger under
alternatives that would impose higher
CAFE standards, because the declines in
emissions resulting from reduced fuel
production and distribution grow in
proportion to the larger fuel savings that
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14393
result from more stringent standards,
and more than offset the larger increases
in tailpipe emissions from additional
driving that result from increased fuel
economy. In contrast, emissions of
acrolein and, under some alternatives,
formaldehyde are projected to increase
slightly from their levels under the
Baseline alternative, since the increases
in tailpipe emissions of these MSATs
outweigh the reductions in emissions
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For additional detail on this analysis see
FEIS § 3.3.3; Chapter 5.
The declines in future emissions of
criteria air pollutants and MSATs
resulting from the final MY 2011 CAFE
standards would be expected to reduce
the adverse health effects stemming
from population exposure to harmful
accumulations of these pollutants. In
the Final EIS, the agency presented a
detailed analysis of the air quality and
439 The projected increases in future emissions of
acrolein may result from the agency’s inability to
obtain ‘‘upstream’’ emission factors for this
pollutant, which prevented it from estimating the
reduction in acrolein emissions resulting from
lower fuel production and distribution. It is
possible that if the agency had been able to do so,
lower acrolein emissions during fuel production
and distribution would have more than offset the
increase in emissions from fuel use by cars and
light trucks, causing total acrolein emissions to
decline.
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from fuel refining and distribution.439
For additional detail on this analysis see
FEIS § 3.3.3; Chapter 5.
Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 59 / Monday, March 30, 2009 / Rules and Regulations
health effects of reductions in
population exposure to criteria air
pollutants and MSATs that were
projected to result from alternative
CAFE standards for MY 2011–15. That
analysis suggested that significant
reductions in adverse health effects and
economic damages caused by exposure
to these pollutants (primarily PM2.5, the
largest known contributor to adverse
health effects) could result if higher
CAFE standards were adopted for those
model years. (See § 3.3.2.4.2 of the FEIS
for a detailed description of NHTSA’s
approach for developing the
quantitative estimates of changes in
health effects from exposure to air
pollution resulting from alternative
CAFE standards for MY 2011–15.)
E. Picking the Final Standards
1. Eliminating the Alternatives Facially
Inconsistent With EPCA
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(a) No-Action Alternative
Two of the alternatives analyzed by
NHTSA are facially inconsistent with
EPCA. Regardless of how this
alternative is defined, i.e., either in
terms of setting no standard or setting
the MY 2011 standards at the MY 2010
level, the ‘‘no-action’’ or ‘‘baseline’’
alternative violates EPCA. Under the
former definition, the no-action
alternative violates, among other EPCA
provisions, subsections 32902(a) and
(b)(1) and (2), each of which requires the
Secretary to establish CAFE standards
for each model year separately. Under
the latter definition, the no-action
alternative violates subsection
32902(b)(2)(A) which requires the MY
2011–2020 standards to be set high
enough to ensure that the industry-wide
fleet achieves a combined passenger car/
light truck average fuel economy of at
least 35 mpg. It also violates the
requirement in subsection
32902(b)(2)(B) that the standards for
MYs 2011–2020 increase annually and
ratably.
(b) Technology Exhaustion Alternative
Although the technology exhaustion
alternative is the environmentally
preferable alternative for NEPA
purposes, it does not reflect any
consideration of economic practicability
or technological feasibility. This
omission violates subsections 32902(a)
and (b), which require setting standards
at the maximum feasible level, and
subsection 32902(f), which requires that
‘‘(w)hen deciding maximum feasible
average fuel economy under this
section, the Secretary of Transportation
shall consider technological feasibility,
economic practicability, the effect of
other motor vehicle standards of the
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Government on fuel economy, and the
need of the United States to conserve
energy.’’ (Emphasis added.)
2. Choosing Among the Remaining
Alternatives
(a) Difficulty and importance of
Achieving a Reasonable Balancing of the
Factors
Section 1(a) of E.O. 12866 provides
that ‘‘(i)n choosing among alternative
regulatory approaches, agencies should
select those approaches that maximize
net benefits (including potential
economic, environmental, public health
and safety, and other advantages;
distributive impacts; and equity), unless
a statute requires another regulatory
approach.’’ The Ninth Circuit ruled in
CBD v. NHTSA, 538 F.3d 1172, 1197,
that EPCA does not require another
regulatory approach.
We recognize that the Ninth Circuit
coupled that ruling with the following
cautionary statement about basing
decisions about the stringency of CAFE
standards on the principle of
maximizing net benefits:
(W)e reject only Petitioners’ contention
that EPCA prohibits NHTSA’s use of
marginal cost-benefit analysis to set CAFE
standards. Whatever method it uses, NHTSA
cannot set fuel economy standards that are
contrary to Congress’s purpose in enacting
the EPCA-energy conservation. We must still
review whether NHTSA’s balancing of the
statutory factors is arbitrary and capricious.
Additionally, the persuasiveness of the
analysis in Public Citizen and Center for
Auto Safety is limited by the fact that they
were decided two decades ago, when
scientific knowledge of climate change and
its causes were not as advanced as they are
today. * * * The need of the nation to
conserve energy is even more pressing today
than it was at the time of EPCA’s enactment.
* * *
What was a reasonable balancing of
competing statutory priorities twenty years
ago may not be a reasonable balancing of
those priorities today. (footnotes omitted)
538 F.3d 1172, 1197–98.
As discussed below, achieving a
reasonable balancing of the factors is
critical. While, as the Court suggested,
there are risks associated with setting
standards that are too low, there are also
considerable risks associated with
setting standards that are too high. Both
types of risks must be part of the
balancing process.
We recognize that the on-road fleet of
passenger cars and light trucks is one of
largest consumers of petroleum and
emitters of CO2 in the U.S. economy. We
recognize too that global CO2 emissions
have been exceeding the highest of the
IPCC 2007 scenarios. We appreciate
that, among the remaining alternatives,
the total cost/total benefit alternative is
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14395
the one that reduces those emissions the
most.
At the same time, we cannot fail to
recognize and fully take into account
the very serious conditions of the
automobile industry, the national
economy, and even the global economy.
We understand that some aid has been
authorized and appropriated for the
automobile industry and that the
possibility of other aid has been
broached, but the extent to which that
aid will mitigate the industry’s
downward spiral is uncertain. What is
certain is that the mere fact substantial
aid is even being discussed is a
reflection of the unusual and extremely
serious conditions we face.
(b) The Correct Balancing of the Factors
for Setting the MY 2011 Standards Is To
Maximize Societal Net Benefits
We have discussed above how
NHTSA considered and balanced the
four statutory factors. This section
discusses NHTSA’s decision that the
final standards are the maximum
feasible for MY 2011.
Congress left the determination of
what levels of CAFE standards are
‘‘maximum feasible’’ to NHTSA’s
discretion, requiring only that NHTSA
consider the four statutory factors. 49
U.S.C. 32902. NEPA applies
independently to require consideration
of environmental factors in the decisionmaking process. The EPCA factors are in
tension and tend to pull in opposite
directions in terms of stringency, with
technological feasibility and especially
the need of the nation to conserve
energy pointing toward higher standards
and economic practicability pointing
toward lower ones. Accordingly,
NHTSA has historically considered the
factors from the perspective of balancing
them, given EPCA’s overarching
purpose of energy conservation.440
Thus, NHTSA determines that standards
are the maximum feasible if they
represent the proper balancing of the
four statutory factors, based on all the
information before the agency and the
entire record.
The ‘‘need of the United States to
conserve energy’’ primarily functions to
encourage NHTSA to set standards ever
higher. Many commenters cast the need
of the nation to conserve energy in
terms of the impact of CAFE standards
on global warming, and urged NHTSA
to give this factor more weight than the
others in its determination of the
maximum feasible standards, in order to
440 The Ninth Circuit in CBD agreed that NHTSA
has discretion to balance the factors in determining
what level of stringency is maximum feasible. CBD,
538 F.3d 1172, 1197 (9th Cir. 2008).
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have the maximum possible beneficial
impact. Many of these commenters
suggested that if NHTSA gave more
weight to the need of the nation to
conserve energy, it would set standards
at levels substantially higher, for
example, than those necessary to raise
the industry-wide combined average to
35 mpg by MY 2015, or at the level at
which total costs equal total benefits,
and so forth.
NHTSA recognizes that seriousness of
the global warming problem facing the
nation and the world today, and that
CAFE is one of many actions needed
around the world to address that
problem. NHTSA also recognizes that
the higher CAFE standards are, the less
they add to global warming and other
environmental impacts (as
demonstrated in our FEIS), just as the
higher CAFE standards are, the less oil
the United States must purchase from
abroad, with the corresponding impacts
on consumer costs, national balance of
payments, and foreign policy objectives.
The final standards for MY 2011 push
CAFE higher and faster than any set of
standards since the earliest years of the
program, and, we believe, likely put the
agency on track to meet EISA’s MY 2020
requirement of an industry-wide
combined average of at least 35 mpg
several years ahead of time.
However, NHTSA reiterates that it is
required to consider and balance the
other three factors in addition to the
need of the nation to conserve energy in
determining the maximum feasible level
of the standards. While considering the
need of the nation to conserve energy
alone might counsel for setting the
standards at the levels suggested by
proponents of higher standards, NHTSA
does not believe that those standards
would be consistent with economic
practicability or technological
feasibility.
Manufacturers commented that even
standards set at the proposed levels
would be above the maximum feasible
level because, in their view, NHTSA
had overestimated benefits and
underestimated costs of the fuel-saving
technologies. Conversely, many other
commenters argued that the proposed
standards were below the maximum
feasible level because, in their view,
NHTSA had underestimated benefits
and overestimated costs of the
technologies.
To respond to these commenters, and
aid in resolving their conflicting views
and arguments, NHTSA re-examined all
of its technology assumptions, with the
assistance of Ricardo, as described in
Chapter IV. This effort resulted in the
agency’s revising the methodology
underlying the development of many of
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its technology assumptions in ways that
the agency believes makes its final rule
analysis substantially more robust than
its NPRM analysis. NHTSA is confident
that its revised analysis ensures that the
standards adopted in this final rule are
technologically feasible. The effect of
other motor vehicle standards of the
Government on fuel economy is
incorporated into the agency’s analysis
through the baseline and the
manufacturers’ product plans.
Yet the question of economic
practicability and what level of
stringency would cause manufacturers
substantial economic hardship must be
considered not only in terms of
technological feasibility, but also in
terms of the economic situation today
and as it is anticipated to be in the
period leading up to and including MY
2011. The current economic realities are
markedly different from those at the
time of the NPRM; just several months
later, the national and global economies
are in crisis and by all accounts in
recession. As the economy contracts and
consumers reassess their personal
spending priorities, manufacturers are
increasingly less able to pass the costs
of fuel economy-improving technologies
on to consumers. As discussed above in
the section on economic practicability,
manufacturers have only so much
ability to absorb those costs, especially
given the financial difficulties of some
of the larger manufacturers.
NHTSA additionally notes that the
agency has the authority under 49
U.S.C. § 32902(c) to amend the
standards for a model year to a level that
the Secretary decides is the maximum
feasible average fuel economy level for
that model year. NHTSA has previously
used this authority to lower the MY
1986 passenger car standards because
they were deemed to be beyond
maximum feasible. However, NHTSA
believes that the authority to lower
CAFE standards in MYs 2011–2020 has
been constricted by the EISA
requirements that standards increase
annually and ratably and result in a
combined fleetwide average fuel
economy of at least 35 mpg in MY 2020.
Thus, being unable to predict the
economic situation in MY 2011, NHTSA
is particularly mindful of economic
practicability in establishing the current
standards.
For this MY 2011 final rule, in
balancing the EPCA factors against one
another and carefully considering the
environmental impacts associated with
the various alternatives evaluated,
NHTSA continues to believe that the
proper overall balance of all relevant
consideration is the point at which
social net benefits are maximized, and
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results in CAFE standards that are the
maximum feasible for MY 2011. As
mentioned above, in identifying this
point for this model year, NHTSA
evaluated more than 100 alternative
stringency levels, and for each one,
calculated net benefits in a manner that
explicitly accounted for the need of the
nation to conserve energy, and for the
benefits of reducing greenhouse gas
emissions. EPCA’s overarching purpose
of energy conservation is met by setting
standards at the maximum feasible
level—EPCA does not require or even
permit that standards be set beyond the
maximum feasible level in order to
achieve more energy conservation.
NEPA’s purpose is to integrate
environmental considerations into that
decision-making process. Setting
standards at the point at which social
net benefits are maximized in NHTSA’s
analysis results in standards that still
increase higher and faster than any
standards since the earliest years of the
program, do not require the addition of
technologies that the agency does not
believe will pay for themselves, and
result in measurable environmental
benefits. The standards thus fulfill
NEPA’s objectives and, under EPCA, the
need of the nation to conserve energy,
while not imposing substantial
economic hardship on the industry,
while taking into account the feasibility
of applying technologies appropriately
and consistent with manufacturers’
natural cycles, and the other motor
vehicle standards of the government
which manufacturers have to comply
with. NHTSA is exercising its discretion
and informed judgment, based upon the
entire record and including the FEIS, as
to the precise levels of CAFE that are the
maximum feasible for MY 2011
passenger cars and light trucks, as
mandated by 49 U.S.C. 32902. NHTSA
emphasizes that it will continue to
evaluate alternative approaches for
determining the maximum feasible
standards for future CAFE rulemakings,
and is deciding no more than that the
approach taken for MY 2011 is
reasonable under the circumstances
surrounding this rulemaking.
VIII. Safety
A. Summary of NHTSA’s Approach in
This Final Rule
NHTSA has devoted substantial
efforts over the years studying the
relationship between vehicle weight
reductions and vehicle injuries and
deaths based upon a broad base of
available empirical data. More recently,
NHTSA addressed these issues in a
1997 study, which was reviewed by the
National Academy in its 2002 report.
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This 1997 study, led by Dr. Charles
Kahane of NHTSA, ‘‘stands alone as a
comprehensive, scientific analysis of the
vehicle weight and safety issue.’’ 441
Thereafter, in a 2003 study, again led
by Dr. Kahane, NHTSA analyzed
historical fatality rates in crashes
involving MY 1991–1999 vehicles, both
passenger cars and light trucks.
NHTSA’s 2003 study built upon and
updated the earlier 1997 study analyzed
by the National Academy. Among other
things, the 2003 study concluded that
there is a ‘‘crossover weight,’’ a
statistically derived weight above which
vehicle weight reductions have a net
benefit, instead of a net harm, in terms
of reduced vehicle injuries and deaths
to society. The 2003 study found that
this crossover point occurs somewhere
in the range of 4,224 pounds to 6,121
pounds. The 2003 study concluded that
the most likely location of the crossover
point is 5,085 pounds.
Based upon the findings of the 2003
study, in setting fuel economy levels in
this final rule, NHTSA did not assume
that manufacturers would reduce
vehicle weight to improve fuel economy
for vehicles of 5,000 pounds or less.
NHTSA has taken this approach so that
manufacturers are not encouraged to
downsize vehicles in a way that would
be likely to cause a significant number
of deaths and injuries. Conversely,
NHTSA has considered reduced vehicle
weight in its standard-setting analysis
for vehicles above 5,000 pounds, since
the data indicates no safety penalty is
likely for reducing weight for such
vehicles. Nevertheless, the agency will
continue to consider whether it should
set future CAFE standards in a manner
that assumes manufacturers may,
without compromising highway safety,
reduce the mass of vehicles below 5,000
pounds.
B. Background
As the courts have recognized,
‘‘NHTSA has always examined the
safety consequences of the CAFE
standards in its overall consideration of
relevant factors since its earliest
rulemaking under the CAFE program.’’
Competitive Enterprise Institute v.
NHTSA, 901 F.2d 107, 120 n. 11 (D.C.
Cir. 1990) (‘‘CEI I’’) (citing 42 FR 33534,
33551 (June 30, 1977)). The courts have
consistently upheld NHTSA’s
implementation of EPCA in this
manner. See, e.g., Competitive
Enterprise Institute v. NHTSA, 956 F.2d
321, 322 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (‘‘CEI II’’) (in
determining the maximum feasible fuel
441 Effectiveness and Impact of Corporate Average
Fuel Economy (CAFE) Standards (NRC, 2002), at
118.
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economy standard, ‘‘NHTSA has always
taken passenger safety into account.’’)
(citing CEI I, 901 F.2d at 120 n. 11);
Competitive Enterprise Institute v.
NHTSA, 45 F.3d 481, 482–83 (D.C. Cir.
1995) (‘‘CEI III’’) (same); Center for
Biological Diversity v. NHTSA, 538 F.3d
1172, 1203–04 (9th Cir. 2008)
(upholding NHTSA’s analysis of vehicle
safety issues associated with weight in
connection with the MY 2008–11 light
truck CAFE rule). As early as 1974,
before Congress even enacted EPCA, the
Department of Transportation and EPA
warned Congress of potential adverse
safety effects associated with increasing
fuel economy requirements for vehicles.
See CEI I, 901 F.2d at 120 n. 11 (citing
53 FR 39275, 39294 (1988), in turn
citing a report from the Department of
Transportation and EPA, ‘‘Potential for
Motor Vehicle Fuel Economy
Improvements: Report to the Congress,’’
(Oct. 24, 1974), which discussed ‘‘the
possible trade offs in the areas of
improved fuel economy, lower
emissions, and increased occupant
safety,’’ noting that ‘‘a sustained or
increased shift to small cars * * *
would likely lead to an increase in the
rate of highway deaths and serious
injuries’’).
The relationship of vehicle weight to
safety has been a contentious issue for
many years. This contentiousness arises,
at least in part, from the difficulty of
isolating vehicle weight from other
confounding factors (e.g., driver factors,
such as age and gender, other vehicle
factors, such as engine size and
wheelbase, and environmental factors,
such as rural/urban). In addition,
several vehicle factors are closely
related, such as vehicle mass,
wheelbase, track width, and structural
integrity. (Historically, as vehicles got
longer and wider, they also got heavier).
The papers that were initially published
addressing vehicle size and safety did
not attempt to fully address all of these
factors.
1. NHTSA’s Early Studies
It was important for NHTSA to help
move the debate forward with more
serious analyses. After all, NHTSA must
understand the relationship between
vehicle factors and safety, both for
establishing our safety standards and for
establishing our CAFE standards. In July
1991, NHTSA published a study of the
effects of passenger car downsizing
during 1970–1982 titled Effect of Car
Size on Fatality and Injury Risk. In this
report, NHTSA concluded that changes
in the size and weight composition of
the new car fleet from 1970 to 1982
resulted in increases of nearly 2,000
deaths and 20,000 serious injuries per
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14397
year over the number of deaths and
serious injuries that would have
occurred absent this downsizing.
Parties reviewing NHTSA’s 1991
report identified a number of areas that
could be improved. Suggestions
included extending the analyses to
include light trucks and vans,
examining finer gradations to
distinguish the relative impacts of
weight reduction for the heavier cars
from the lighter cars, analyzing all crash
modes, and doing more to isolate the
effects of vehicle mass from behavioral
and environmental variables.
NHTSA agreed that these suggestions
would make the study more useful as a
tool for NHTSA decisions on safety and
fuel economy standards. Accordingly,
NHTSA developed a more
comprehensive analytic model to
encompass all light vehicles, and to
allow a finer look at safety impacts in
different segments of the light vehicle
population. This study was NHTSA’s
first effort to estimate the effect of a 100pound weight reduction in each of the
important crash modes, and to do this
separately for cars and light trucks.
NHTSA recognized that the findings,
whatever they were, would likely be
controversial, so the agency chose to
have the draft report peer-reviewed by
the National Academy of Sciences
before publishing the document. The
Academy published its review on June
12, 1996.442 The report expressed
concerns about the methods used in the
analyses and concluded, in part, ‘‘the
Committee finds itself unable to endorse
the qualitative conclusions in the
reports about projected highway
fatalities and injuries because of large
uncertainties associated with the results
* * *.’’ These reservations were
principally concerned with the question
of whether the NHTSA analyses had
adequately controlled for confounding
factors, such as driver age, gender, and
aggressiveness.
NHTSA responded at length to the
committee report, and revised its report
to address the committee
recommendations. The revised report
was published as a finished document
in 1997,443 with a new Appendix F
titled ‘‘Summary and Response to TRB’s
Recommendations on the Draft Report.’’
442 Transportation Research Board, Letter
Report—Committee to Review Federal Estimates of
the Relationship of Vehicle Weight to Fatality and
Injury Risk, Accession Number 00723787. See
https://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/reports/
letrept.html (last accessed Nov. 11, 2008).
443 Kahane, C. J., 1997. Relationships Between
Vehicle Size and Fatality Risk in Model Year 1985–
93 Passenger Cars and Light Trucks, NHTSA
Technical Report, DOT HS 808 570. Springfield,
VA: National Technical Information Services.
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In this 1997 report, NHTSA
concluded that, calibrated from 1985–93
cars and light trucks involved in crashes
in calendar years 1989–1993, there was
little overall effect for a 100-pound
weight reduction in light trucks and
vans, because increased fatalities of
truck occupants were offset by a
reduction of fatalities in the vehicles
that collided with the lighter trucks,
whereas a 100-pound reduction in cars
was associated with an increase of about
300 fatalities per year. Based on this
analysis and subsequent activities, the
safety consequences of weight reduction
have been considered by NHTSA in
deciding upon the appropriate
stringency of each of the new safety and
fuel economy requirements since that
time.
NHTSA’s 1997 report did not end the
public discussion of this issue. NHTSA
followed its standard practice of
publishing a notice announcing the
report and inviting public comment on
the 1997 report.444 In addition to
comments to NHTSA’s docket, other
papers analyzing the relationship of
vehicle weight and safety were
published. For instance, Dr. David L.
Greene of the U.S. Department of
Energy’s Oak Ridge National Laboratory
published a report titled Why CAFE
Worked soon after NHTSA’s 1997 report
was released.445 In section 5.2 of this
report, Dr. Greene’s introductory
paragraph reads as follows:
It is noteworthy that Dr. Greene’s
published work explicitly acknowledges
the vehicle weight-safety trade-off
documented by NHTSA’s studies of the
real world crash data. As to Dr. Greene’s
concerns that the trade-off will be
misunderstood, NHTSA has been clear
on this point. NHTSA wants to ensure
that the public, manufacturers, and
governments are aware of the empirical
data that demonstrate that there is a
trade-off between vehicle mass and
safety. Parties must understand this
trade-off exists and the size of the tradeoff should be quantified as accurately as
possible, so it can be considered as part
of the decision on average fuel economy
standards.
2. The 2002 National Academy of
Sciences Study
The next significant event in the
vehicle weight and safety discussion
began in October 2000, when the
Department of Transportation’s
Appropriations Act for fiscal year 2001
was signed into law. That
appropriations law included a provision
directing DOT to fund a National
Academy of Sciences (NAS) study on
the effectiveness and impacts of CAFE
standards. NAS released its final study
in January 2002 (hereafter, the 2002
NAS Report).446
As part of a comprehensive look at the
impacts of CAFE standards, it was
necessary for the 2002 NAS Report to
address the safety impacts of CAFE
Vehicle weight significantly affects the
standards. In Chapter 2 of the study,
safety of the vehicle’s occupants. Enough
NAS looked back at the safety impacts
credible work has been done on this subject
of past CAFE standards. Among other
that this assertion cannot be seriously
questioned (citations omitted). On the other
observations, NAS recognized that
hand, the nature of the trade-off between
much of the increase in fuel economy
vehicle mass and safety is often
between 1975 and 1988 was due to
misunderstood, and the implications for fuel
reductions in the size and weight of
economy regulations are generally
vehicles, which led to increased safety
misinterpreted. The relationship between fuel
447 In fact, NAS noted that ‘‘the
economy, mass, and public safety is complex, risks.
preponderance of evidence indicates
yet it is probably reasonable to conclude that
that this downsizing of the vehicle fleet
reducing vehicle mass to improve fuel
resulted in a hidden safety cost, namely
economy will require some trade-off with
safety. The rational person will realize that
travel safety would have improved even
individuals, manufacturers, and governments more had vehicles not been
are constantly making trade-offs between
downsized.’’ 448
safety and cost, safety and other vehicle
The committee then focused its
attributes, safety and convenience, etc.
analysis on the 1997 NHTSA analysis
(citation omitted). An essential feature of a
led by Dr. Kahane. Since there are many
rational economic consumer is the
published papers on this subject in the
willingness to trade-off risk for money and,
literature, the question must be asked,
since fuel economy saves money, to trade-off
safety for fuel economy.
‘‘Why did the National Academy of
Sciences choose the NHTSA analyses
David L. Greene, 1997, Why CAFE
out of all the published papers?’’ The
Worked, ORNL/CP–94482, Oak Ridge
NAS committee clearly and
National Laboratory, Oak Ridge,
unequivocally answered this in its
Tennessee, at 22 (Emphases added).
report, where it found that ‘‘NHTSA’s
444 See
62 FR 34491 (June 26, 1997).
Greene’s report is available online at
https://www.osti.gov/bridge/servlets/purl/625225–
KPQDOu/webviewable/625225.pdf (last accessed
October 28, 2008).
445 Dr.
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446 Effectiveness and Impact of Corporate Average
Fuel Economy (CAFE) Standards (NRC, 2002).
447 Id., at 24.
448 Id., at 69–70.
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fatality analyses are still the most
complete available in that they
accounted for all crash types in which
vehicles might be involved, for all
involved road users, and for changes in
crash likelihood as well as
crashworthiness.’’ 449 The NAS
committee went on to find that ‘‘The
April 1997 NHTSA analyses allow the
committee to reestimate the
approximate effect of downsizing the
fleet between the mid-1970s and 1993.’’
In other words, a committee of the
National Academy of Sciences found
that NHTSA’s analyses were the most
thorough of all the published papers,
and that NHTSA’s analyses were
sufficiently persuasive and rigorous to
permit a reasonable estimate of the
safety penalty associated with
downsizing the fleet. In the committee’s
words:
Thus, the majority of this committee
believes that the evidence is clear that past
downweighting and downsizing of the lightduty vehicle fleet, while resulting in
significant fuel savings, has also resulted in
a safety penalty. In 1993, it would appear
that the safety penalty included between
1,300 and 2,600 motor vehicle crash deaths
that would not have occurred had vehicles
been as large and heavy as in 1976.450
While this look back is informative, the
greater challenge is to use this
understanding of the past to guide
future actions. Again the NAS
committee offered clear guidance in this
regard. The NAS Report said:
In summary, the majority of the committee
finds that the downsizing and weight
reduction that occurred in the late 1970s and
early 1980s most likely produced between
1,300 and 2,600 crash fatalities and between
13,000 and 26,000 serious injuries in 1993.
The proportion of these casualties
attributable to CAFE standards is uncertain.
It is not clear that significant weight
reduction can be achieved in the future
without some downsizing, and similar
downsizing would be expected to produce
similar results. Even if weight reduction
occurred without any downsizing, casualties
would be expected to increase. Thus, any
increase in CAFE as currently structured
could produce additional road casualties,
unless it is specifically targeted at the largest,
heaviest light trucks.
For fuel economy regulations not to have
an adverse impact on safety, they must be
implemented using more fuel-efficient
technology. Current CAFE requirements are
neutral with regard to whether fuel economy
is improved by increasing efficiency or by
decreasing vehicle weight. One way to
reduce the adverse impact on safety would be
to establish fuel economy requirements as a
function of vehicle attributes, particularly
vehicle weight (see Chapter 5). * * *
449 Id.,
450 Id.,
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If an increase in fuel economy is effected
by a system that encourages either
downweighting or the production and sale of
more small cars, some additional traffic
fatalities would be expected. Without a
thoughtful restructuring of the program, that
would be the trade-off that must be made if
CAFE standards are increased by any
significant amount.451
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This discussion by the NAS committee
was an impetus for NHTSA to use its
existing statutory authority to reform its
light truck CAFE program. This
involved moving away from the single
flat standard for light trucks, because
those standards’ neutrality with regard
to decreasing vehicle weight, in lieu of
increasing efficiency to improve fuel
economy, means they necessarily have a
potential safety trade-off. In place of the
single flat standard, NHTSA established
an attribute-based standard that is a
function of the vehicle’s footprint.
Under this attribute-based standard, the
fuel economy target for a vehicle
increases as the vehicle is downsized.
As long as vehicle manufacturers have
to expend the same levels of advanced
technology for each footprint size, there
is no incentive to change the vehicle to
get a less-demanding fuel economy
target. Thus, the necessary safety tradeoff under the single flat standard system
does not arise under an attribute-based
system. That is not to suggest there are
no safety consequences if vehicle mass
is reduced—there are, as documented by
NHTSA and explained by the National
Academy of Sciences. However, the
standards are no longer structured to
confer an advantage to a manufacturer
that makes downsizing trade-offs. This
is a key feature of the attribute-based
fuel economy program NHTSA
implemented for light trucks.
Two of the 13 NAS committee
members dissented on the safety
issues.452 The dissent acknowledges
that, ‘‘Despite these limitations,
Kahane’s analysis is far and away the
most comprehensive and thorough
analysis’’ of the safety issue.453 The
dissent’s primary disagreement with the
other 11 committee members centers on
the large uncertainties associated with
NHTSA’s analyses. The dissent
acknowledges NHTSA’s efforts in the
study led by Dr. Kahane to quantify the
safety penalty, but concludes that the
number of factors in real world crashes
is so large and the controls used by the
analytical models introduce so much
uncertainty that it is not possible to
definitively make any statements about
a safety penalty.454
It should also be noted that the
majority of the committee responded to
the dissent by saying:
However, the committee does not agree
that these concerns should prevent the use of
NHTSA’s careful analyses to provide some
understanding of the likely effects of future
improvements in fuel economy, if those
improvements involve vehicle downsizing.
The committee notes that many of the points
raised in the dissent (for example, the
dependence of the NHTSA results on specific
estimates of age, sex, aggressive driving and
urban vs. rural location) have been explicitly
addressed in Kahane’s response to the [NAS]
review and were reflected in the final 1997
report. The estimated relationship between
mass and safety were (sic) remarkably robust
in response to changes in the estimated
effects of these parameters. The committee
also notes that the most recent NHTSA
analyses yield results that are consistent with
the agency’s own prior estimates of the effect
of vehicle downsizing (citations omitted) and
with other studies of the likely effects of
weight and size changes in the vehicle fleet
(citation omitted). The consistency over time
and methodology provides further evidence
of the robustness of the adverse safety effects
of vehicle size and weight reduction.455
In addition, the NAS Committee
unanimously agreed that NHTSA
should undertake additional research on
the subject of fuel economy and safety,
‘‘including (but not limited to) a
replication, using current field data, of
its 1997 analysis of the relationship
between vehicle size and fatality
risk.’’ 456 NHTSA concurred with this
recommendation, and thereafter,
NHTSA undertook a replication of the
1997 study, using the additional field
data that had become available:
NHTSA’s 2003 study, led again by Dr.
Kahane.
As Congress was developing the bill
that ultimately became EISA, Congress
considered NHTSA’s reformed light
truck CAFE program established under
existing NHTSA authority in deciding
what additional CAFE authority NHTSA
should be given and what constraints
should be put on that authority.
Ultimately, EISA was enacted, which
mandates that NHTSA establish an
attribute-based CAFE system for cars
and light trucks.
3. NHTSA’s Updated 2003 Study
In October 2003, NHTSA published
its updated study.457 NHTSA’s update
454 2002
NAS Report, at Appendix A.
at 27–28.
456 Id., at 6.
457 Charles J. Kahane, ‘‘Vehicle Weight, Fatality
Risk, and Crash Compatibility of Model Year 1991–
99 Passenger Cars and Light Trucks,’’ DOT HS 809
662, October 2003. This report is available online
at https://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/cars/rules/regrev/
455 Id.,
451 Id.,
at 77.
of the two dissenters was Dr. David
Greene, the author of the 1997 report Why CAFE
Worked, discussed supra.
453 Effectiveness and Impact of Corporate Average
Fuel Economy (CAFE) Standards, at 118.
452 One
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14399
again used regression models to
calibrate crash fatality rates per billion
miles for model year 1991–1999
passenger cars, pickup trucks, SUVs,
and vans during calendar years 1995–
2000. These rates were calibrated
separately by vehicle weight, vehicle
type, driver age and gender, urban/rural
and other vehicle, driver, and
environmental factors. One major point
of note is that, as the analyses get more
sophisticated and able to differentiate
the safety trade-off among different
types of vehicles, each analysis NHTSA
has ever conducted continues to show
that there is a safety trade-off for the
existing light vehicle fleet as vehicle
mass is reduced.
After controlling for vehicle, driver
and environmental factors, the new
study found that:
• The association between vehicle
weight and overall crash fatality rates in
the heavier 1991–1999 light trucks and
vans was not significant. Thus, there
was no safety penalty for reducing
weight in these vehicles.
• In the other three groups of 1991–
1999 vehicles—the lighter light trucks
and vans, the heavier cars, and
especially the lighter cars—fatality rates
increased as weights decreased.
Æ Lighter light trucks and vans would
have an increase of 234 fatalities per
year per 100-pound weight reduction.
Æ Heavier cars would have an
increase of 216 fatalities per year per
100-pound weight reduction.
Æ Lighter cars would have an increase
of 597 fatalities per year per 100-pound
weight reduction.
• There is a crossover weight, above
which crash fatality rates increase for
heavier light trucks and vans, because
the added harm for other road users
from the additional weight exceeds any
benefits for the occupants of the
vehicles. This occurs in the interval of
4,224 pounds to 6,121 pounds, with the
most likely single point being 5,085
pounds. The fatality rate changes by less
than ±1 percent per 100-pound weight
increase over this range.
The draft report was reviewed before
publication by experts in statistical
analysis of crash data and related
vehicle weight and safety issues: Drs.
James H. Hedlund, Adrian K. Lund, and
Donald W. Reinfurt. The review process
is on record—the comments on the draft
are available in Docket NHTSA–2003–
16318–0004. Consistent with NHTSA’s
standard practice, NHTSA published its
analysis and sought public comment on
it.458 NHTSA then docketed a response
evaluate/pdf/809662.pdf (last accessed Oct. 28,
2008).
458 See 68 FR 66153 (Nov. 5, 2003).
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to the public comments on November 9,
2004.459 There were three principal
criticisms of NHTSA’s updated study,
which are summarized below together
with NHTSA’s response.
(1) The analyses only considered the
relationship of vehicle mass to fatality
risk. It did not consider other attributes
of vehicle size, such as track width and
wheelbase. Dynamic Research Inc. (DRI)
presented analyses that included all
three of these variables, and its analysis
indicated that mass was harmful (i.e.,
reducing it would be positive for safety)
while track width and wheelbase were
beneficial. If true, this meant that weight
reduction would benefit safety if track
width and wheelbase were maintained.
Agency response: The DRI results
were strongly biased as a consequence
of including 2-door cars in the analysis.
Two-door muscle and sports cars stand
apart from all other groups of cars by
having a short wheelbase relative to
their weight. They also have by far the
highest fatality rates of all cars, for
reasons mostly related to the drivers.
The regression analysis immediately
identifies short wheelbase with high
weight as a disastrous combination.
Being a regression, it tells you that you
can make any car safer, including 4-door
cars, by increasing wheelbase and/or
reducing weight. This bias is amplified
by treating highly correlated size
attributes as independent factors in the
model.
To clarify this latter concern,
NHTSA’s analyses are calibrating the
historical relationship of vehicle mass
and fatality risk. In this type of analysis,
‘‘vehicle mass’’ incorporates not only
the effects of vehicle mass per se, but
also the effects of many other size
attributes that are historically and/or
causally related to mass, such as
wheelbase, track width, and structural
integrity. If historical relationships
between mass and these other size
attributes continue, future changes in
mass will continue to be associated with
similar changes in fatality risk. If the
historical relationships change, one will
be able to analyze the mass and size
attributes independently, but it will take
some years to get such data.
However, as a check of DRI’s
suggestion that mass was not as
significant as track width and
wheelbase, NHTSA ran both its 1997
and 2003 analyses of 4-door cars only
with mass, track width, and wheelbase
as separate variables. When we did this,
we saw that mass continued to have a
substantial effect, even independent of
track width and wheelbase in all crash
modes except rollovers. In fact, only
459 Docket
No. NHTSA–2003–16318–0016.
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curb weight had a consistent, significant
effect in both the data sets used in
NHTSA’s 1997 analyses and his 2003
analyses. This was publicly reported
over four years ago, in NHTSA’s
November 2004 response to the
comments on his 2003 analyses.
After considering the DRI submission,
NHTSA made no change to the findings
in its 2003 report.
(2) Marc Ross, of the University of
Michigan, and Tom Wenzel, of
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory,
commented that vehicle ‘‘quality’’ has a
much stronger relationship with fatality
risk than vehicle mass. They suggest
that lighter cars have a higher fatality
risk on average because they are usually
the least expensive cars and, in many
cases, the ‘‘poorest quality’’ cars. If true,
weight reduction is fairly harmless, as
long as the lighter cars are of the same
‘‘quality’’ as the heavier cars they
replace.
Agency response: In their analyses,
Ross and Wenzel did not adjust their
rates for driver age and gender. Absent
those adjustments, the analysis mingles
the effects of what sort of people buy
and drive the car with the intrinsic
safety of the car, making its conclusions
about the intrinsic safety of the car
suspect, at best. On average, and
considering all crash modes as well as
both weight groups of cars, controlling
for price has little effect on the weightsafety coefficients in NHTSA’s analyses.
As a final check, NHTSA ran an analysis
of head-on collisions of two 1991–99
cars, since this is a pure measure of the
vehicle’s performance. The results were
that the more expensive vehicle’s driver
had a slightly higher fatality risk than
the less expensive vehicle’s driver,
although the difference was not
statistically significant. This indicates
that the lower fatality rates for more
expensive cars in Ross and Wenzel’s
study are not due to expensive cars’
superior performance in crashes.
Accordingly, NHTSA the Ross and
Wenzel comment did not warrant a
change in NHTSA’s report.
(3) The Alliance of Automobile
Manufacturers, DaimlerChrysler,
William E. Wecker Associates, and
Environmental Defense all question the
accuracy and robustness of the report’s
calculation of a ‘‘crossover weight,’’
above which weight reductions have a
net benefit, instead of harm. NHTSA’s
report said that this crossover point
occurs somewhere in the range of 4,224
pounds to 6,121 pounds (this is the
‘‘interval estimate’’); with the most
likely location of the crossover point at
5,085 pounds (this is the ‘‘point
estimate’’). Wecker suggested that
NHTSA’s interval estimate of from 4,224
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to 6,121 pounds only takes sampling
error into account. Wecker identified
additional factors that make this
estimate not robust, and suggests that
the interval estimate should be wider.
The Alliance and DaimlerChrysler
suggested that the crossover weight
could be substantially greater than 5,085
pounds, in which case weight
reductions for light trucks and vans in
the 5–6,000 pound range would have
detrimental net effects on safety.
Conversely, Environmental Defense
believes the crossover weight is well
below 5,085 pounds, in which case
there would be opportunities to reduce
vehicle mass in many light trucks and
vans without any safety penalty.
Agency response: While NHTSA’s
report estimates the crossover weight,
the report expressly acknowledged the
uncertainty about the exact location of
the crossover weight. That is why the
report highlighted the interval estimate,
instead of the point estimate. It is
important to note that the net weightsafety relationship remains close to zero
for many hundreds of pounds above and
below the point estimate for the
crossover weight. As shown on pages
163–166 of NHTSA’s 2003 report, the
crash fatality rate changes by less than
±1 percent per 100-pound weight
increase over a 1,200 pound range on
either side of the point estimate for the
crossover weight. The data and analysis
in the report will not show a statistically
significant relationship, in either
direction, between weight and safety for
the heavier light trucks and vans. That
is the important information the report
puts in front of the decision maker—that
the robust relationship between weight
and safety that exists for most vehicles
does not exist for the heavier light
trucks and vans. With the available data,
one cannot develop a precise point
estimate for this crossover weight.
Thus, NHTSA determined that its
report did not require changes in
response to these comments.
4. Summary of Studies Prior to This
Rulemaking
Several important observations can be
made based on the various studies
performed in the years preceding this
rulemaking on the relationship between
safety and vehicle weight in the context
of fuel economy:
1. The question of the effect of weight
on vehicle safety is a complex question
that poses serious analytic challenges.
The issue has been addressed in the
literature for more than two decades.
2. NHTSA has been actively engaged
in this discussion.
3. All of NHTSA’s analyses have
found that there is a strong correlation
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between vehicle mass and vehicle safety
for cars and light trucks, up to a certain
weight range.
a. Given the historic fact that vehicles
have been made primarily of steel, there
are a number of other parameters that
are highly correlated with vehicle mass.
These factors include vehicle size (e.g.,
track width and wheelbase).
b. The precise weight point at which
the safety penalty ends is difficult to
pinpoint, because the fatality rate curve
is so flat at that point. NHTSA can say
with high confidence that the crossover
point is in the range of 4,224 to 6,121
pounds. There are safety penalties for
reductions of weight below this
crossover weight. There is no reduced
societal safety for reducing weight on
vehicles that weigh more than this
crossover point, because the reduced
risk for other road users would exceed
any reduced benefits for the occupants
of the heavy vehicle.
4. The National Academy of Sciences
has twice peer-reviewed NHTSA’s work
in this area. The 2002 NAS Report
found that there was a safety penalty for
reducing weight in all but the heaviest
light trucks. The study stated that ‘‘the
downsizing and weight reduction that
occurred in the late 1970s and early
1980s most likely produced between
1,300 and 2,600 crash fatalities in
1993.’’
a. Neither the Academy nor NHTSA is
suggesting that all of the downsizing
and weight reduction were a direct
response to the CAFE standards. It is
difficult to objectively quantify what
amount of downsizing was a response to
CAFE standards, and what was a
response to other real or perceived
market forces. However, the Academy
stated that some of the downsizing was
in response to CAFE standards.
b. NHTSA does not accord the safety
dissent, which represented the views of
two of the 13 committee members, the
same stature as the views expressed in
the body of the report, which represents
the views of 11 of the 13 committee
members.
5. In response to the National
Academy’s unanimous 2002
recommendation, NHTSA updated its
previous work on weight and safety in
2003 to reflect the most recent data.
This update found that the trends were
similar, and if anything the safety
penalty was now higher for reducing
weight in small cars. This update also
found that there is a crossover weight,
which occurs somewhere between 4,264
and 6,121 pounds, with a point estimate
at 5,085 pounds, above which there is
no safety penalty for reducing vehicle
weight. This is because the added harm
for other road users from the additional
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weight exceeds any benefits for the
occupants of the vehicles. NHTSA
embodied this finding in its CAFE
rulemaking by restricting materials
substitution in its development of
stringency levels to vehicles over 5,000
pounds.
6. NHTSA published its update and
asked for public comments on the
updated document.
7. In response to the request for
comments, NHTSA received two recent
studies to review. After reviewing these
studies, NHTSA concluded that both
studies had inadvertently introduced
significant biases in their analyses.
NHTSA made public its review of these
studies in November 2004.
a. One of these studies was a 2002
study by DRI that purported to analyze
mass, track width, and wheelbase as
independent variables. DRI’s 2002 paper
indicated that reducing mass would be
beneficial, while reducing track width
and wheelbase would be harmful. If
true, this meant that weight reduction
would benefit safety if track width and
wheelbase were maintained. As
discussed above, NHTSA concluded
that the DRI results were strongly biased
as a consequence of including 2-door
cars in the analysis and explained why
this was so.460
b. The other of these studies was a
2002 analysis by Ross and Wenzel that
suggested that lighter cars have a higher
fatality risk because they are the least
expensive and, in many cases, the
poorest quality cars. The implication of
this analysis was that weight reduction
is fairly harmless, as long as the lighter
cars are of the same ‘‘quality’’ as the
heavier cars they replace. NHTSA noted
that the Ross and Wenzel analyses did
not adjust for driver age and gender.
Absent those adjustments, the analysis
mingles the effects of what sort of
people buy and drive the car with the
intrinsic safety of the car, making its
conclusions about the intrinsic safety of
the car suspect, at best.
B. Response to Comments in This
Rulemaking on Safety and Vehicle
Weight
With this background, NHTSA will
now address the comments it received
on safety in response to its NPRM. First,
however, it is important to understand
how NHTSA has embodied the
accumulated knowledge and expertise
from the studies explained above in this
final rule. The rule is a performance
standard that does not dictate the way
460 As discussed below, DRI acknowledged this
observation to be accurate and submitted a new
2005 analysis that excludes 2-door cars in response
to NHTSA’s suggestions.
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manufacturers satisfy the standard. It
does not preclude manufacturers from
reducing the weight of future vehicles.
Instead, in calculating its stringency
standards, NHTSA has not considered
weight-reducing materials substitution
as a methodology for improving fuel
economy of vehicles of 5,000 pounds or
less. NHTSA has done so based on
available data in order not to encourage
downsizing of vehicles in a way that
would be likely to cause a significant
number of deaths and injuries. At the
same time, for vehicles above 5,000
pounds, where the data indicate no
safety penalty is likely for reducing
weight, NHTSA has considered
materials substitution in its standardsetting analysis. The effect of this is to
encourage weight reductions to improve
fuel economy where doing so is not
likely to endanger lives. We believe this
careful drawing of a data-based line in
our analysis is the best way to serve
both safety and fuel economy.
As an overview, many commenters
questioned the continuing validity of
the 2002 NAS Report, the 2003 NHTSA
study led by Dr. Kahane, or both.
NHTSA notes both these reports were
based on considerable empirical data
and thoroughly peer-reviewed. More
recent studies will need to be of a very
high quality for NHTSA to adopt them
in lieu of the the 2002 NAS Report and
the 2003 NHTSA analyses.
1. Views of Other Government Agencies
After our proposed rule was
published and after the comment period
had closed for the proposal, EPA
published an Advance Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) on
regulating greenhouse gas emissions
under the Clean Air Act.461 The ANPRM
was accompanied by a Vehicle
Technical Support Document—Mobile
Source.462 The Technical Support
Document contains a discussion on pp.
15–17 of the safety issues. EPA provided
a brief summary of the issues involved
and cited no new work in that area.
Agency response: The work cited by
EPA has already been addressed by
NHTSA within the discussion of the
2002 NAS study and within NHTSA’s
responses to other comments to the
NPRM docket regarding the Wenzel and
Ross study.
CARB also commented on the
relationship between vehicle weight and
safety. CARB stated that the NHTSA
study led by Dr. Kahane ‘‘assumed that
weight and size are completely
correlated,’’ and argued that NHTSA
should have focused more closely on
461 73
FR 44354 (July 30, 2008).
No. EPA–HQ–OAR–2008–0318–0084.
462 Docket
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which, they say, limited some of their
analyses to 4-door cars excluding police
cars. DRI further claimed that it could
now mimic NHTSA’s logistic regression
approach for an analysis of model year
1991–98 4-door cars in calendar year
1995–1999 crashes. DRI claims that its
new analysis still shows results
directionally similar to its earlier
work—increased risk for lower track
width and wheelbase, reduced risk for
lower mass—although DRI
acknowledges that the wheelbase and
mass effects are no longer statistically
significant after removing the 2-door
cars from the analysis.
NHTSA does not accept the updated
DRI analysis because it contains results
that are inconsistent with results
NHTSA has seen and, in light of this,
DRI has not justified its results. For
example in MY 1991–1998, the average
car weighing x + 100 pounds had a track
width that was 0.34 inches larger and a
wheelbase that was 1.01 inch longer.
Thus, we could say that a ‘‘historical’’
100-pound weight reduction would
have been accompanied by a 0.34 inch
track width reduction and a 1.01 inch
wheelbase reduction. However, using a
reasonable check, if one dissociates
weight, track width, and wheelbase and
treats them as independent parameters,
DRI’s logistic regression of model year
1991–1998 4-door cars excluding police
cars attributes the following effects:
2003 report, except for limiting the data
to model years 1991–98, instead of
1991–99, the results are not at all like
DRI’s. For NHTSA, mass still has the
largest effect, exceeding track width,
and it moves in the expected direction.
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some variations in the track widths and
wheelbases of vehicle make-models at
that curb weight. However, these
variations are not random—they are
nearly always correlated with the
vehicle’s market class or design group.
NHTSA agrees that, conceptually,
substitution of strong, lightweight
materials should be a less harmful way
to downweight than reducing the size of
the vehicle. CARB has not supported its
concept by presenting information on
how this would be achieved or the
consequences on the feasibility and
practicability of doing so. There is not
yet sufficient empirical evidence to
conclude that material substitution is
harmless, let alone beneficial to safety.
NHTSA is proceeding cautiously and
erring on the side of the safety of the
public until there is more convincing
evidence that requiring investments by
vehicle makers in greater fuel efficiency
through use of lightweight materials
will not have the significant unintended
consequence of simultaneously
reducing the safety protection afforded
to the American people, and attendant
deaths as have occurred in the past.
As for the DRI reports, NHTSA
reviewed its 2002 report and publicly
responded in 2004 that the DRI results
were strongly biased as a result of
including 2-door cars in the analysis. To
DRI’s credit, they reviewed their report
and agreed that this flaw needed to be
corrected. DRI submitted a new study
Now if we apply NHTSA’s logistic
regression analyses to NHTSA’s
database, exactly as described in the
agency’s response to comments on its
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the DRI reports and other recent studies,
which it said concluded that ‘‘safety is
primarily a design issue, not a weight
issue.’’ CARB included with its
comments an ‘‘expert report by David
Greene,’’ which it said concluded after
reviewing the existing research that
‘‘there has been no relationship between
fuel economy and traffic fatalities and
that there should be none in the future.’’
CARB also commented that it
believed that NHTSA was inconsistent
by restricting materials substitution in
its analysis to only vehicles over 5,000
pounds, but also stating in the NPRM
that footprint-based standards would
facilitate the use of lightweight
materials that are not yet cost-effective,
which could eventually improve both
safety and fuel economy. CARB argued
that ‘‘NHTSA should expand the
applicability of weight reduction
technologies to vehicles under 5,000
pounds,’’ because weight reduction can
be ‘‘a viable technology if accompanied
by proper vehicle design to assure
vehicle safety is not compromised.’’
Agency response: The available
empirical data are derived from vehicles
that are in use on the public roads, and
weight and size are highly correlated in
those vehicles. Underlying this, larger
vehicles contain more steel and weigh
more. NHTSA has not and is not now
claiming that weight and size are
completely correlated. Thus, for any
given curb weight, there may not be
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NHTSA obtains its estimates by
adding the results from 12 individual
logistic regressions: six types of crashes
multiplied by two car-weight groups
(less than 2,950 pounds; 2,950 pounds
or more).463 DRI has apparently not
followed the same procedures, based on
the widely differing results.
Based on the evidence before us now,
NHTSA is not persuaded by the DRI
analysis. Even though NHTSA’s
analyses continue to attribute a much
larger effect for mass than for track
width or wheelbase in small cars,
NHTSA has never said that mass alone
is the single factor that increases or
decreases fatality risk. There may not be
a single factor, but rather it may be that
mass and some of the other factors that
are historically correlated with mass,
such as wheelbase and track width,
together are the factors. We can say that
NHTSA’s analyses do not corroborate
the 2005 DRI analysis, suggesting that
mass can be reduced without safety
harm and perhaps with safety benefit.
We would note that comparatively, it
would seem the least harmful way to
reduce mass would be from materials
substitution, where one replaces a heavy
material with a lighter one that delivers
the same performance, or other designs
that reduce mass while maintaining
wheelbase and track width. There is an
absence of supporting data for the thrust
of the 2005 DRI analysis. We cannot
analyze data on that yet, because those
changes have not happened to any
substantial number of vehicles. We do
know that mass has historically been
correlated with wheelbase and track
width, and that reductions in mass have
also reduced those other factors. Until
there is a more credible analysis than
the 2005 DRI study that demonstrates
that mass does not matter for safety,
NHTSA concludes it should be guided
by the decades’ worth of studies
suggesting that mass is the most
important of the related factors.
The report by Dr. David Greene that
was submitted by CARB as part of its
comments is a document submitted by
Dr. Greene when he was an expert
witness in a lawsuit.464 We note that Dr.
Greene was one of the two dissenters to
the 2002 NAS report. Dr. Greene
reiterates the arguments in his dissent to
the 2002 NAS Report; namely, mass
alone should not have any safety effect
except in crashes where two vehicles
collide with each other (which
undisputedly occurs, with fatal results).
e.g., Kahane (2003), Table 2 on P. xi.
is the same Dr. Greene who concluded in
his 1997 report, cited above, that ‘‘it is probably
reasonable to conclude that reducing vehicle mass
to improve vehicle economy will require some
trade-off with safety.’’
In light of this view, all the empirical
data showing higher fatality rates for
lighter vehicles in single-vehicle crashes
and elsewhere are due to something
other than mass. Therefore, we conclude
mass may be reduced without harming
safety. But, as explained above, mass
has been historically correlated with
other factors, such as size and structural
integrity. Unless NHTSA can determine
based on data what the significant
parameters are and demonstrate ways to
reduce mass without affecting the
significant parameters, NHTSA cannot
simply ignore the empirical data
showing higher fatality rates for lighter
vehicles.
Dr. Greene’s expert report refers to the
Ross and Wenzel and DRI studies,
which have been discussed at length
above. Dr. Greene also refers to a study
titled ‘‘The Effect of Fuel Economy on
Automobile Safety: A
Reexamination.’’ 465 This report is a
long-term (1966–2002) time-series
analysis of the annual number of crash
fatalities in the United States, the
average fuel economy of the vehicles on
the road that year, and some other
factors such as the price of fuel, the
national speed limit, population, and
annual vehicle miles traveled. The
conclusion is that national fatalities did
not increase, in fact tended to decrease,
from the early 1970s forward, while fuel
economy improved. Therefore, fuel
economy has not had an adverse effect
on safety. Suffice it to say that this is an
exceedingly ‘‘macro’’ level to examine
the relationships between fuel economy
and fatality risk. Long-term time-series
analyses are unlikely to separate the
effects of downsizing for the other
demographic, economic, and
technological trends that have had an
impact on fatality rates over the period.
For instance, seat belt use has risen from
14 percent to 82 percent, many lifesaving safety features (e.g., front and
side airbags) have been added to
vehicles, impaired driving is not as
accepted, and so forth. It is general
knowledge that traffic fatalities are now
lower than 1970, primarily as a result of
the major safety advances just
mentioned. The reexamination ignores
the effects of these variables and leaps
to the conclusion that fuel economy did
not have an adverse effect on safety—a
conclusion that is at odds with the 2002
NAS study. But the relevant question in
the safety/fuel economy context is,
‘‘Would fatalities have been even lower
463 See,
464 This
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465 Sanjana Ahmad and David L. Greene, 2005,
‘‘Effect of Fuel Economy on Automobile Safety: A
Reexamination,’’ Transportation Research Record
1941, Transportation Research Board of the
National Academy of Sciences.
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14403
if cars had not been downsized?’’ To
analyze that relationship accurately, it
would be necessary to compare the
fatality risk of small and large vehicles,
not just the trend in total fatalities, over
this long period.
With respect to CARB’s suggestion
that NHTSA expand the applicability of
weight reduction technologies to
vehicles under 5,000 pounds, because
weight reduction can be accompanied
by proper vehicle design to assure
vehicle safety is not compromised, the
agency repeats its general view that
there may be possibilities in the use
materials substitution and other
processes to reduce weight without
reducing vehicle safety. This should be
explored. However, there are no data or
analyses that show this to be true today.
NHTSA specifically does not find either
the 2002 or 2005 DRI analyses to be
demonstrative, since the former study
was strongly biased by including 2-door
cars and the latter study says it
mimicked NHTSA’s database and
NHTSA’s analysis method, but got
results that are substantially different.
Until NHTSA can see thorough
evidence using a significant and valid
empirical data set, which is yet to be
presented, that weight reduction can be
accomplished without safety trade-offs,
the agency will continue to set its CAFE
standards at levels that do not
encourage weight reduction in vehicles
that weigh less than the safety crossover
identified in NHTSA’s 2003 analyses.
We recognize that given the lives at
stake, this reflects caution, but we
believe it is also prudent.
We also note that the California CO2
emissions standards for which
California requested a waiver under the
Clean Air Act sets up a program that
uses the same ‘‘flat standards’’ approach
for its standards that the 2002 NAS
Report found gives rise to the safety
concerns identified in that report. The
consequences of this structure for the
program have been identified by 2002
report: ‘‘If an increase in fuel economy
is effected by a system that encourages
either downweighting or the production
and sale of more small cars, some
additional traffic fatalities would be
expected. Without a thoughtful
restructuring of the program, that would
be the trade-off that must be made if
CAFE standards are increased by any
significant amount.’’ 466
2. Comments From Other Parties
Several comments were received from
parties other than government agencies
on the weight-safety issue. NRDC argued
that NHTSA should not have relied on
466 2002
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only on its 2003 study led by Dr.
Kahane, because Wenzel and Ross had
commented to NHTSA’s 2005 light
truck CAFE NPRM that ‘‘the
relationship between car weight and
safety is tenuous at best,’’ and because
Dr. Kahane himself stated that his study
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‘‘does not claim that mass per se is the
specific factor that increases or decreases
fatality risk* * *’’ ‘‘In that sense, it is
irrelevant whether mass, wheelbase, track
width or some other attribute is the principal
causal factor on fatality risk. If you decrease
mass, you will also tend to reduce wheelbase,
track width and other dimensions of size.’’
NRDC stated that this may no longer be
correct for future vehicle designs, and
argued that NHTSA had recognized as
much in the NPRM by stating that highstrength, light-weight materials may
help manufacturers reduce vehicle
weight without reducing size or safety.
NRDC further argued that vehicle
design, ‘‘which could in fact be
enhanced with lightweight materials,’’
is much more relevant to safety. Thus,
NRDC concluded that NHTSA should
apply material substitution to lighter
vehicles in its analysis.
The comments received from Wenzel
and Ross stand in direct contradiction to
the 2002 NAS Report, which said,
‘‘Thus, the majority of this committee
believes that the evidence is clear that
past downweighting and downsizing of
the light-duty vehicle fleet, while
resulting in significant fuel savings, has
also resulted in a safety penalty.’’ The
Wenzel and Ross comment was also
based on their study, discussed earlier,
which NHTSA said in 2004 is flawed,
since it did not control for driver age
and gender. Thus, the findings of
Wenzel and Ross are not helpful since
they mingle the effects of what sort of
people buy and drive the car with the
intrinsic safety of the car, making its
conclusions about the intrinsic safety of
the car suspect, at best.
NRDC is correct insofar as NHTSA
has not claimed that mass alone is the
single factor that is entirely responsible
for the safety factor, and in the future
there may be demonstrations that
weight (the amount has not been
identified) can be removed without
adversely affecting safety. However, as
we said in response to the same point
from CARB, when setting CAFE
standards, NHTSA will continue to
limit its consideration of weight
reduction to vehicles over 5,000 pounds
until there is convincing empirical
evidence that there are no negative
safety consequences from removing
weight from lighter vehicles.
Sierra Club et al. also commented that
vehicle design is more important than
weight to vehicle safety. This is largely
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the same point made by other
commenters. The point is very general,
and there are no analyses that
demonstrate this proposition is true.
Sierra Club also argued that NHTSA
should not use its retrospective 2003
study to analyze future standards,
because of the design improvements and
because ‘‘[s]ubstitution of light weight,
high strength materials such as low
alloy steels and aluminum will decrease
both primary and secondary vehicle
weight while maintaining vehicle size
and increasing crashworthiness.’’
NHTSA believes that it would be
irresponsible to set standards by
ignoring the available data, based on the
hope that a promising development will
come to fruition. The available data
indicate that there is a safety penalty for
weight reductions in vehicles under a
certain weight.
Sierra Club et al. also stated that ‘‘The
industry’s long history of consistent
opposition to the CAFE law has relied
on a flawed size/safety argument,’’
which it suggested also affected
Congress’ action in establishing EISA.
Sierra Club argued, however, that that
argument was disproven by the fact that
manufacturers can obviously build
vehicles that ‘‘demonstrate size, safety,
and fuel economy performance’’ such as
the Prius or the hybrid Escape. These
vehicles tend to be cited for use of
hybrid propulsion systems. They often
have heavy battery systems but lighter
engines. In any event, manufacturers
continue to offer a full range of vehicles,
and they strive to deliver safety, fuel
economy, and value in all of their
vehicles. However, the available data at
the level of the entire fleet demonstrate
that, below a certain weight range, there
has been a safety penalty from
downweighting vehicles. The
introduction of new vehicle models
does nothing to change that historical
record and it is unknown how the new
models will affect the fleet wide fatality
risk in future years.
Sierra Club additionally repeated the
oft-stated assertion that smaller cars
continue to become safer as
manufacturers ‘‘apply side airbags,
design vehicles to better protect
occupants, and utilize light weight
materials that enhance safety.’’ It is of
course true that, with the advent of
important safety features like side air
bags and Electronic Stability Control,
combined with higher levels of seat belt
use, today’s small vehicles should have
a better safety record than those
produced a decade ago. However, that is
not really the question that is being
considered in deciding on the safety
penalty for weight reduction—the
question is whether today’s small
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vehicles have a safety penalty compared
to today’s vehicles that weigh 100
pounds more. Unless there are some
safety technologies that are offered only
on small cars, or that are more effective
on small cars, the additional safety
technologies will not affect the relative
safety performance between vehicles
with a 100-pound weight difference. It
is proper to compare vehicles of the
same time period, not a light vehicle
today with air bags and a heavy vehicle
of years ago without air bags. If offered
today, the heavy vehicle would have air
bags and better safety performance.
Sierra Club also argued that a study
by the Center for Auto Safety and UCS
‘‘found that applying existing fuelsaving and safety technology to a
conventional Ford Explorer would
result in a 71 percent improvement in
fuel economy and 2,900 fewer traffic
fatalities if all SUVs met equivalent
safety standards,’’ while ‘‘At the same
time, the redesigned vehicle resulted in
greater consumer savings and lower
global warming emissions as a result of
the improved fuel economy.’’ 467 The
document generated by the Center for
Auto Safety and UCS does not address
the safety penalty as weight is reduced.
This document asserts that if several
safety and fuel-savings technologies
were used on a 2001 Ford Explorer, it
would achieve greater fuel economy and
have a better safety record. The safety
and fuel savings benefits, along with the
costs, are extrapolated from different
sources. The paper does state that the
redesign would reduce the test weight of
the vehicle by 10 percent, to 4100
pounds (p. 10). However, the question
of the safety consequences of reducing
the vehicle mass by 400 pounds is not
answered by any data, since the
redesigned vehicle does not exist. As
such, this document is not persuasive.
Sierra Club additionally cited studies
on materials by the Aluminum
Association’s Auto and Light Truck
Group, Automotive Composites
Alliance, and World Autosteel as
offering ‘‘evidence that proper
application of weight saving materials
from engine blocks to hoods and beyond
provide opportunities for broader
consideration of weight reduction.’’
NHTSA understands that materials
substitution is possible. The question
here is whether weight reduction
through materials substitution should be
considered in establishing the CAFE
standards. As explained previously,
467 Sierra Club et al. cited ‘‘Building a Better SUV:
A Blueprint for Saving Lives, Money and Gasoline,’’
by CAS and UCS. This 2003 pamphlet is accessible
online at https://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/
clean_vehicles/building_a_better_suv_web.pdf (last
accessed October 28, 2008).
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NHTSA is not considering weight
reduction for vehicles below 5,000
pounds in this round of CAFE
rulemaking, because there has been no
demonstration that there would not be
an adverse safety effect from doing so.
In subsequent CAFE rulemakings,
NHTSA will re-examine what has been
demonstrated and decide whether its
previous position should be adjusted.
However, based on the data and
analyses available now, NHTSA has
decided not to consider weight
reduction for vehicles below 5,000
pounds in setting the standards. Sierra
Club specifically identified the Jaguar XJ
as an ‘‘[a]luminum intensive vehicle’’
that ‘‘demonstrate[s] that properly
designed lighter weight vehicles can
excel at safety.’’ This is a restatement of
Sierra Club’s prior comment that the
Toyota Prius and the hybrid Ford
Escape show there is no safety penalty,
and NHTSA’s response is the same as
shown above. Sierra Club concluded
that ‘‘Since vehicle safety is an
important consideration in and of itself,
NHTSA should use its legal authority to
set tighter safety standards for the
purpose of addressing important public
safety considerations.’’ This is an
argument put forward with the best of
intentions, but it is not germane to the
safety penalty issue. If all vehicles have
new safety standard requirements, they
would all have a somewhat reduced
absolute fatality risk. However, the
safety penalty arises relative to peer
vehicles. Unless there is some safety
standard that is most effective for small
vehicles and less effective for larger
vehicles, new safety standards will not
affect the relative safety risk between
larger and smaller vehicles.
The Aluminum Association also
commented that vehicle safety is more
tied to vehicle design (using aluminum)
than to vehicle weight. The Aluminum
Association suggested that NHTSA’s
2003 study is outdated, as it ‘‘was
retrospective and looked at 1990-era
vehicles,’’ and not predictive of the
future. The Aluminum Association
argued that vehicles in the MY 2011–
2015 time frame will be much safer,
subject to increasing numbers of safety
standards and new safety initiatives for
rollover and compatibility, and subject
also to attribute-based CAFE standards,
which the NPRM had suggested would
improve vehicle safety. The Aluminum
Association argued that the vehicles
evaluated in the 2003 NHTSA study
were not subject to these factors, and
thus concluded that ‘‘the historical
proposition that lighter vehicles must be
smaller (and potentially less safe) is no
longer valid.’’ To repeat, until there is
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an analysis showing this to be true,
NHTSA will not consider weight
reductions for vehicles below 5,000
pounds, since the data show that there
has been a safety penalty for those
vehicles from weight reduction in the
past.
C. Comments on Other Issues Related to
Safety
1. Vehicle Compatibility Design Issues
Other commenters addressed vehicle
compatibility design specifically, rather
than design overall. Public Citizen,
Sierra Club et al., and the Aluminum
Association commented that NHTSA
should consider vehicle safety and
downweighting in terms of
compatibility in multi-vehicle crashes,
rather than in terms of individual
vehicle weight. Public Citizen suggested
that NHTSA’s decision not to include
downweighting for lighter vehicles was
‘‘inconsistent with its own research on
incompatibility,’’ and stated that
because Senator Feinstein had
attempted to include provisions in EISA
requiring NHTSA to undertake
rulemakings to improve vehicle
compatibility but had not been
successful, NHTSA should initiate such
rulemaking on its own.
Agency response: Compatibility is a
safety concern that NHTSA has been
investigating for some time now.
Moreover, the commenters’ point that
any compatibility benefits should be
weighed against any disbenefits
associated with downweighting is
logically correct. However, NHTSA
research on compatibility has shown
that compatibility is substantially
influenced by factors other than mass,
including vehicle geometry, stiffness,
and crush space. For example, full size
pick-up trucks are higher and stiffer
than subcompact cars.
While we do not know the precise
effect of these factors, it is fair to say
that simply downweighting heavier
vehicles would not effectively address
the compatibility issue. Thus, there are
no currently available analyses that
would allow NHTSA or anyone to
quantify the compatibility benefits
simply from weight reduction. In
addition, NHTSA has taken action to
address compatibility for existing
vehicles. Beginning September 1, 2010,
new requirements for head protection in
side impact crashes will start being
phased-in for all light vehicles sold in
the United States. This will require a
first-in-the-world pole test, and become
the first side impact standard in the
world to require that performance be
assessed with both a mid-sized adult
male and a small adult female. Even
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14405
with the huge benefits of Electronic
Stability Control factored into the
analysis, NHTSA estimates this
technology will save 1,029 lives each
year once implemented on the fleet.468
However, as explained above, these
absolute benefits do not change the
higher relative safety risk lighter
vehicles have in collisions with heavier
vehicles.
Sierra Club et al. commented that ‘‘the
disparity in the weights of vehicles is
much more important to occupant safety
than the average weight of all vehicles
sharing the road.’’ Sierra Club stated
that the disparity in vehicle weight
among passenger cars has decreased
since 1975, and that ‘‘[o]verall the
passenger fleet has homogenized toward
a 3,500 pound vehicle.’’ Sierra Club
then argued that relative upweighting
with improvements in fuel economy
among small cars have provided a net
safety gain in the vehicle fleet, which
would be even greater ‘‘but for the
super-sizing of pickups and SUVs in
this time frame.’’ However, Sierra Club
argued that ‘‘[t]he days of the supersized
SUVs and pickups are over due to
higher fuel prices,’’ and that ‘‘[w]hen
the next EPA Trends Report comes out,
the light duty truck fleet will have been
homogenized to a safer, more fuel
efficient fleet as was the passenger car
fleet earlier, eliminating the more severe
crashes.’’ Sierra Club concluded that
NHTSA should have accounted for the
safety benefits of this mix shift in its
analysis. These assertions were not
supported by data or analyses.
Moreover, Sierra Club has not explained
why a parent of a large family would
buy a subcompact instead of a minivan,
or a contractor or tradesman would not
buy a full size pick-up truck or van.
The Aluminum Association cited the
DRI analysis with regard to vehicle
compatibility, which it described as
showing ‘‘that vehicle crash
compatibility can be improved by
providing increased crush space and
better energy management; and with the
size-based approach, if there was a 20%
weight reduction across the vehicle size
classes, heavier vehicles would shed
significantly more weight than smaller
vehicles, also improving fleet
compatibility.’’ As explained above, the
DRI analyses are not persuasive.
468 Final Regulatory Impact Analysis, FMVSS 214
Amending Side Impact Dynamic Test Adding
Oblique Pole Test, Docket No. NHTSA–2007–
29134–0004, Table V–A on p. V–2.
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2. Whether Manufacturers Downweight
in Response to Increased CAFE
Stringency
The Alliance, Subaru, Washington
Legal Foundation, and the American
Iron and Steel Institute suggested that
the stringency of the standards, as
measured by their rate of increase
(particularly in the earlier years covered
by the rulemaking), could encourage
manufacturers to employ
downweighting as a means of
compliance, which could lead to
adverse safety consequences. Thus, even
though NHTSA did not include material
substitution or downweighting for
lighter vehicles in its analysis,
commenters indicated that
downweighting was nonetheless a likely
response to the proposed standards.
The CAFE standards are now
established as a continuous function
varying according to the size of the
vehicle’s footprint. To the extent the
vehicle manufacturers choose to
downweight their vehicles by making
them smaller, they are faced with a
higher CAFE target. To the extent the
function is not artificially constrained, it
will require approximately equal
amounts of additional technology for
each point on the curve. For example,
if an additional $200 worth of fuel
savings technology have to be added to
a vehicle to meet its fuel economy
target, then downsizing it will still
require at least $200 in additional fuel
savings technology. In the latter case,
the manufacturer would also have the
cost of downsizing the model.
Accordingly, NHTSA is confident that
the attribute-based system is oriented
not to bestow benefits for downsizing a
vehicle model.
The CAFE program is a performancebased program. NHTSA does not dictate
the design of a particular passenger car
or light truck. The program is not
intended to ensure that no vehicle
maker ever downsizes a vehicle. If a
vehicle maker decides to downsize a
model, it would be because the
manufacturer perceives that to be more
effective, taking all factors into account,
than other strategies for increasing fuel
economy in that model.
We understand that this leaves open
the possibility that manufacturers could
reduce the vehicle weight, but keep the
vehicle size constant. In theory, the way
to do this would be through materials
substitution, where one replaces a heavy
material with a lighter one. NHTSA is
intentionally not discouraging materials
substitution, because we agree that this
approach is conceptually appealing as
long as safety is not compromised.
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Public Citizen argued, in contrast, that
downweighting of lighter vehicles is not
a common compliance strategy, and that
manufacturers had primarily responded
to NHTSA’s earliest CAFE standards in
the 1980s by applying technologies,
with ‘‘only 15 percent came from weight
reductions, and then weight was only
removed from the heaviest vehicles.’’
NHTSA notes that the 1992 study cited
by Public Citizen concerning
manufacturers’ reactions to the early
1980s passenger car standards is now 16
years old. Since that date, the 2002 NAS
Report concluded a decade later that
some of the downsizing and
downweighting that occurred between
the late 1970s and 1993 was due to
CAFE standards and that ‘‘the evidence
is clear that past downweighting and
downsizing of the light-duty vehicle
fleet, while resulting in significant fuel
savings, has also resulted in a safety
penalty. In 1993, it would appear that
the safety penalty included between
1,300 and 2,600 motor vehicle crash
deaths that would not have occurred
had vehicles been as large and heavy as
in 1976.’’ We find the NAS report more
persuasive than the 1992 study cited by
Public Citizen.
Public Citizen went on to suggest that
NHTSA was ‘‘reinforc[ing] the common
myth that fuel economy standards
reduce vehicle safety by promoting
downweighting.’’ Again NHTSA notes
the findings of the 2002 NAS report on
the adverse safety impact of downsizing
and that Public Citizen provides no
evidence to support its view that this is
a ‘‘myth.’’
3. Whether Flat Standards Are More or
Less Harmful to Safety Than FootprintBased Standards
The Alliance, the Aluminum
Association, and the Washington Legal
Foundation agreed with the agency’s
assessment that a footprint-based
standard is safer than a flat standard.
Public Citizen, in contrast, suggested
that under the flat standards of the
1980s, manufacturers primarily
responded by applying additional
technologies, and only reduced weight
from the heaviest vehicles, which would
suggest no safety risk from
downweighting due to flat standards.
Public Citizen’s repeated citations of
a 1992 study do not make it more
persuasive. A decade after that study, a
NAS panel found that manufacturers
downweighted and downsized the fleet,
partly in response to the CAFE
standards. This directly contradicts the
1992 study cited by Public Citizen. As
of this rulemaking, the National
Academy of Sciences has published a
seminal report stating that there is a
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safety concern with flat standards. The
fact that two of the 13 members
dissented does not diminish the import
of that. Informed by this conclusion,
EPCA, as amended by EISA, now
prohibits NHTSA from establishing flat
CAFE standards, subject to required
minimum standard for domestic
passenger cars. With the passage of this
law, for the purposes of this rule, the
debate is resolved and Federal fuel
economy regulations will be attributebased, not flat standards.
4. Whether NHTSA Should Set Identical
Targets for Passenger Cars and Light
Trucks for Safety Reasons
Public Citizen suggested that the fact
that fuel economy targets may be
different for identical-footprint cars and
light trucks encourages manufacturers to
build a vehicle as a truck instead of as
a car, and argued that NHTSA should
change the regulatory definitions of
passenger cars and light trucks to
improve safety. Public Citizen also
argued that the attribute-based CAFE
standards ‘‘eliminate[] the leveling
effect of the corporate average (that is,
balancing lighter vehicles against
heavier ones).’’
Regardless of the merits of Public
Citizen’s comment, the law specifies
that NHTSA must establish separate
standards for cars and light trucks. The
agency believes that this requirement
also mandates that the agency consider
the capabilities of the car and light truck
fleets separately. The standards for the
light truck fleet (and thus the footprint/
mpg targets for that fleet) tend to be
lower than those of the passenger car
fleet because light trucks simply do not
have the capability to reach standards as
high as the passenger car standards.
NHTSA does not believe it could
establish identical separate standards,
because identical standards would not
be ‘‘maximum feasible’’ for both cars
and light trucks. See 49 USC 32902(a),
(b), and (f). NHTSA has addressed the
regulatory definitions for passenger cars
and light trucks in Section XI.
5. Whether NHTSA Should Have
Considered the 2002 NAS Report
Dissent in Deciding Not To Apply
Material Substitution for Vehicles
Under 5,000 Pounds
CBD stated that NHTSA had
‘‘misrepresented’’ the findings of the
2002 NAS Report by stating only the
conclusion of the majority and not
additionally stating the finding of two
dissenting members ‘‘that weight
reduction for vehicles greater than 4,000
lbs. curb weight would result in a safety
benefit, as was discussed in detail in the
recent Ninth Circuit opinion.’’ Public
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maximize net benefits to society. Before
setting these final standards the agency
also considered under NEPA the
environmental impacts of these
standards, as detailed in the FEIS.
The reason NHTSA does not accord
the same significance to the dissent as
to the majority is explained above.
Essentially, when 11 members of a
committee support a position and
present it in the body of the report, that
is given more weight than the opinion
of two dissenting members that appears
in an appendix to the report. NHTSA
believes that the information in the
report is the information that is put out
with the full imprimatur of the National
Academy committee.
Where, per the adjusted continuous function
formula above in Section VI:
A = the maximum fuel economy target (in
mpg)
B = the minimum fuel economy target (in
mpg)
C = the footprint value (in square feet) at
which the fuel economy target is midway
between a and b
D = the parameter (in square feet) defining
the rate at which the value of targets
The resultant target function has the
following shape:
Based on the product plan
information provided by manufacturers
in response to the May 2008 request for
information and the incorporation of
publicly available supplemental data
and information, NHTSA has estimated
the required average fuel economy
levels under the final standard for MY
2011 passenger cars as follows:
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For both passenger cars and light
trucks, the agency is determining final
CAFE standards estimated, as for the
previously-promulgated reformed MY
2008–2011 light truck standards, to
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We have determined that the final
standard for MY 2011 passenger cars
result in a required fuel economy level
that is technologically feasible,
economically practicable, and set by
taking into account the effect of other
motor vehicle standards of the
Government on fuel economy, the need
of the United States to conserve energy,
and additional environmental
considerations under NEPA. Values for
the parameters defining the target
function for this final standard for cars
are as follows:
decline from the largest to smallest
values
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ER30MR09.080
IX. The Final Fuel Economy Standards
for MY 2011
A. Final Passenger Car Standard
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Citizen also referred to the NAS dissent
in arguing that ‘‘Kahane’s study
oversimplifies the relationship between
weight and safety, obfuscates findings
which show that reducing weight from
only the heaviest vehicles actually
improves safety, and overlooks the
relationship between the difference in
vehicle weight, rather than simply the
weight of the vehicle.’’ Sierra Club et al.
also referred to the NAS dissent in
stating that ‘‘According to K.G. Duleep,
who served as a consultant to the NAS
Committee, had the NAS incorporated
appropriate weight reductions into the
ranges of possible fuel economy
improvements, in addition to the NAS
report’s mostly drive train
improvements, its total fuel economy
recommendations would have been
20% higher.’’
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NHTSA is also finalizing the light
truck fuel economy standard for MY
2011. In taking a fresh look at what
truck standard should be established for
MY 2011, as required by EISA, NHTSA
used the newer set of assumptions that
it had developed for the final standards.
The agency used the EIA High Price
Case projections for available gasoline
prices, which are on average
approximately $0.40 per gallon higher
than the projections used in the NPRM.
Other differences in assumptions
include more current product plan
information, an updated technology list
and updated costs and effectiveness
estimates and penetration rates for
technologies, and updated values for
externalities such as carbon dioxide
emission reductions.
The final standard is ‘‘optimized’’ for
MY 2011 light trucks—the process for
establishing it is described at length
above, but it may be briefly described as
maximizing net social benefits plus antibacksliding measures. We have
determined that the final light truck
standard for MY 2011 represents the
maximum feasible fuel economy level
for that approach. In reaching this
conclusion, we have balanced the
express statutory factors and other
relevant considerations, such as safety
and effects on employment, and have
considered the NEPA analysis and
conclusions in the FEIS with regard to
the chosen agency action.
The final standard is determined by a
continuous function specifying fuel
economy targets applicable at different
vehicle footprint sizes, the equation for
which is given above in Section VI.
Values for the parameters defining the
final standard target function for light
trucks are as follows:
Where:
A = the maximum fuel economy target (in
mpg)
B = the minimum fuel economy target (in
mpg)
C = the footprint value (in square feet) at
which the fuel economy target is midway
between a and b
D = the parameter (in square feet) defining
the rate at which the value of targets
decline from the largest to smallest
values
ER30MR09.082
The resultant target function has the
following shape:
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average fuel economy levels under the
final optimized standard for MY 2011 as
follows:
We note that a manufacturer’s
required fuel economy level for a model
year under the final standards would be
based on its actual production numbers
in that model year. Therefore, its official
required fuel economy level would not
be known until the end of that model
year. However, because the targets for
each vehicle footprint would be
established in advance of the model
year, a manufacturer should be able to
estimate its required level accurately.
C. Energy and Environmental Backstop
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As discussed in the NPRM, EISA
expressly requires each manufacturer to
meet a minimum fuel economy standard
for domestically manufactured
passenger cars in addition to meeting
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the incorporation of publicly available
supplemental data and information, the
agency has estimated the required
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Based on the product plans provided
by manufacturers in response to the
May 2008 request for information and
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the standards set by NHTSA. The
minimum standard ‘‘shall be the greater
of (A) 27.5 miles per gallon; or (B) 92
percent of the average fuel economy
projected by the Secretary for the
combined domestic and non-domestic
passenger automobile fleets
manufactured for sale in the United
States by all manufacturers in the model
year. * * *’’ 469 The agency must
publish the projected minimum
standards in the Federal Register when
the passenger car standards for the
model year in question are promulgated.
NHTSA calculated 92 percent of the
final projected passenger car standards
as the minimum standard, which for
MY 2011 is 27.8. The final calculated
minimum standards will be updated to
reflect any changes in the projected
passenger car standards.
In CBD v NHTSA, the Ninth Circuit
agreed with the agency that EPCA, as it
was then written, did not explicitly
require the adoption of a backstop, i.e.,
a minimum CAFE standard that is fixed.
A fixed minimum standard is one that
does not change in response to changes
in a manufacturer’s vehicle mix.
The Court said, however, that the
issue was not whether the adoption was
expressly required, but whether it was
arbitrary and capricious for the agency
to decline to adopt a backstop. The
Court said that Congress was silent in
EPCA on this issue. The Court
concluded that it was arbitrary and
capricious for the agency to decline to
adopt a backstop because it did not, in
the view of the Court, address the
statutory factors for determining the
maximum feasible level of average fuel
economy. The Court remanded the
matter back to NHTSA to reconsider the
issue under the appropriate standard.
NHTSA explained in the NPRM that
it believes that it considered and
discussed the express statutory factors
such as technological feasibility and
economic practicability and related
factors such as safety in deciding not to
adopt a backstop. The agency stated that
further discussion is not warranted
because Congress has spoken directly on
this issue since the Ninth Circuit’s
decision by enacting EISA. Congress
expressly mandated that CAFE
standards for automobiles be attributebased and they must adjust in response
to changes in vehicle mix. NHTSA
suggested that this mandate precludes
the agency from adopting a fixed
minimum standard, except in the one
case in which Congress mandated a
469 49
U.S.C. 32902(b)(4).
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fixed and flat 470 minimum standard for
domestic passenger cars—not in the
cases of nondomestic passenger cars or
light trucks.
Given the requirement for attributebased standards and the limited express
exception to that requirement, NHTSA
tentatively concluded in the NPRM that
had Congress intended backstops to be
established for either of the other two
compliance categories, it would have
required them. Absent explicit statutory
language that provides the agency
authority to set flat standards, the
agency suggested that the setting of a
supplementary minimum flat standard
for the other two compliance categories
would be contrary to the requirement to
set an attribute-based standard under
EISA.
The agency noted, however, that the
curve of an attribute-based standard has
several features that limit backsliding,
some of which NHTSA added as it
refined the Volpe model for the purpose
of this rulemaking, and some of which
(such as the lower asymptote, which
serves as a backstop) are inherent in the
logistic function. NHTSA stated that it
believed that these features help address
the concern that has been expressed
regarding the possibility of vehicle
upsizing without compromising the
benefits of reform. NHTSA also noted
that the 35 mpg requirement in and of
itself serves as a backstop, because the
agency must set the standards high
enough to ensure that the average fuel
economy level of the combined car and
light fleet is making steady progress
toward and achieves the statutory
requirement of at least 35 mpg by 2020.
NHTSA explained that if the agency
finds that this requirement might not be
achieved, it will consider setting
standards for model years 2016 through
2020 early enough and in any event
high enough to ensure reaching the 35
mpg requirement.
The Attorneys General, Sierra Club et
al., UCS, and ACEEE opposed NHTSA’s
view not to adopt a backstop for
imported passenger cars and light trucks
and argued that the agency must adopt
backstop standards, while AIAM and
NADA supported the agency’s decision.
The Attorneys General argued that
because Congress had not changed the
definition of ‘‘maximum feasible fuel
economy,’’ NHTSA remained
‘‘obligated’’ by the Ninth Circuit
opinion to consider a backstop for those
additional fleets. The Attorneys General
stated that the possibility that attributebased standards ‘‘will cause a ‘race to
470 A flat standard is one that requires each
manufacturer to achieve the same numerical level
of CAFE.
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the bottom’ ’’ still existed, and that the
agency must therefore consider a
backstop.
Sierra Club et al. also argued that
NHTSA had misinterpreted Congress’
intent in EISA. Sierra Club stated that
Congressman Markey’s extended
remarks inserted into the Congressional
Record were clear evidence of Congress’
intent with regard to the backstop.
Sierra Club also argued that a September
2007 letter from the United Auto
Workers to Speaker Nancy Pelosi and
Majority Leader Harry Reid, which
suggested that the domestic minimum
passenger car standard was intended to
protect jobs in the U.S., was evidence
that ‘‘the provision in EISA is tied to
employment, not oil conservation.’’
Sierra Club concluded that NHTSA is
not precluded from adopting backstop
standards for imported passenger cars
and light trucks, and is required to do
so by the Ninth Circuit opinion. Sierra
Club additionally cited EPA’s ANPRM,
which it stated indicates that EPA will
pursue an ‘‘environmental backstop.’’
UCS agreed that the 35-in-2020
requirement is a kind of backstop, and
that the ratable-increase requirement
between MY 2011 and 2020 is an
‘‘implied’’ backstop, but nevertheless
argued that NHTSA should implement a
regulated backstop for the other fleets.
UCS commented that ‘‘the same
concerns of the Ninth Circuit court
persist,’’ because ‘‘there is no
mechanism to ensure the market does
not undermine [the proposed]
standards.’’ UCS stated that this could
occur because ‘‘if maximum feasible
fuel economy levels are found to exceed
35 mpg, the legislated minimum will
not ensure those levels (and, thus,
maximum feasible energy savings) are
achieved.’’
ACEEE commented that the lower
asymptote is not an adequate backstop,
because the lower asymptote in 2015
resulted in ‘‘a combined value of 27.5
mpg, assuming a 48% sales share for
cars,’’ which ACEEE said ‘‘is scarcely
higher than today’s combined standard
and certainly does not constitute ratable
progress toward achieving 35 mpg in
2020.’’ ACEEE argued that the lower
asymptotes could not guarantee that ‘‘oil
savings from the CAFE program will not
fall short of the savings anticipated with
the passage of the law.’’ ACEEE stated
that to ensure ratable progress toward an
average of at least 35 mpg in 2020 and
to mitigate ‘‘the dangers of upsizing and
otherwise gaming the standards,’’
NHTSA should commit to ‘‘mid-course
corrections’’ between MY 2011 and
2020 as necessary.
In contrast, AIAM supported
NHTSA’s decision not to adopt a
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backstop for imported passenger cars
and light trucks. AIAM argued that a
backstop for those fleets would ‘‘defeat
the purpose of the attribute format by
limiting the flexibility of manufacturers
to respond to shifts in market demand,’’
and that the lower asymptote ‘‘provides
a disincentive to upsizing of vehicles [in
that footprint range], since the standard
would become increasingly difficult to
meet.’’ AIAM also suggested that a
backstop would not likely increase fuel
savings since consumers appear to be
moving away from large cars and trucks.
While NADA agreed with NHTSA
regarding the clarity of Congress’
decision not to adopt backstops, it also
argued that NHTSA ‘‘should not attempt
to artificially create backstops’’ through
the lower asymptotes of the car and
light truck curves. NADA stated that
NHTSA should instead ‘‘let the curves
end in conformance with the largest
vehicle’s footprint.’’
NHTSA respectfully disagrees with
the characterization raised by the
Attorneys General and other
commenters that it ‘‘did not consider’’ a
backstop in the NPRM. As made clear
by the NPRM and as discussed above,
the opposite is true. The agency also
respectfully disagrees with UCS’
characterization of the Ninth Circuit
CBD opinion as it concerns the backstop
issue. As discussed in the NPRM,
Congress’ enactment of EISA addressed
the backstop issue by clearly specifying
a flat minimum standard for domestic
passenger cars, and by not clearly
specifying a flat minimum standard for
imported passenger cars and light
trucks. Congress was aware of this issue
from the 2006 light truck final rule and
the CBD decision, but expressly
required a backstop for only one fleet of
vehicles.
NHTSA notes the very limited nature
of EISA’s legislative history with regard
to the backstop issue. No Senate, House,
or conference reports were created
during the legislative process that
culminated in EISA. The floor
statements during Congressional
consideration of EISA are also sparse. In
any event, however, floor statements,
regardless of who made them, are
entitled to less weight than conference
reports because, in the views of many
courts, they do not represent statements
on the final terms of a bill agreed to by
both houses. See, e.g., In re Burns, 887
F.2d 1541 (11th Cir. 1989), in which the
Court of Appeals was called upon to
interpret provisions of the Bankruptcy
Act which were arguably ambiguous.
The Court noted that ‘‘[w]hatever degree
of solicitude is due to legislative history
materials in the usual cast, ‘[s]trict
adherence to the language and structure
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of the Act is particularly appropriate
where, as here, a statute is the result of
a series of carefully crafted
compromises.’ ’’ Id. at 1545 (citing
Community for Creative Non-Violence v.
Reid, 490 U.S. 730, n. 14 (1989)).
‘‘Accordingly, the best indicators of
congressional intent in this narrow
instance are the language and structure
of the Code itself, not the accompanying
statements of legislators that carry the
potential for reclaiming that which was
yielded in the actual drafting
compromise.’’ Id. See also In re Kelly,
841 F.2d 908, 913 n. 3 (9th Cir. 1988)
(‘‘Stray comments by individual
legislators, not otherwise supported by
statutory language or committee reports,
cannot be attributed to the full body that
voted on the bill. The opposite inference
is far more likely.’’)
Here, there are no floor statements to
provide guidance on the backstop issue.
Rather, various members, including
Representative Markey, inserted
material into the Congressional Record
after floor action. There is no indication
that the material inserted into the record
was raised, debated, or otherwise before
the full House or Senate during floor
consideration. Materials inserted by
members after congressional action are
not indicative of congressional intent.
Instead, ‘‘[t]he intent of Congress as a
whole is more apparent from the words
of the statute itself than from a
patchwork record of statements inserted
by individual legislators and proposals
that may never have been adopted by a
committee, much less an entire
legislative body—a truth which gives
rise to ‘the strong presumption that
Congress expresses its intent through
the language it chooses.’ ’’ Sigmon Coal
Co., Inc. v. Apfel, 226 F.3d 291, 304–05
(4th Cir 2000) (quoting INS v. CardozaFonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432 n. 12
(1987)), aff’d sub. nom., Barnhart v.
Sigmon Coal Co., Inc., 534 U.S. 438
(2002). The Supreme Court in Sigmon
similarly held that ‘‘[f]loor statements
from two Senators cannot amend the
clear and unambiguous language of a
statute.’’ Guided by the Supreme Court’s
guidance on this issue, ‘‘[w]e see no
reason to give greater weight to the
views of two Senators than to the
collective votes of both Houses, which
are memorialized in the unambiguous
statutory text.’’ 534 U.S. at 457. ‘‘We are
not aware of any case * * * in which
we have given authoritative weight to a
single passage of legislative history that
is in no way anchored in the text of the
statute.’’ Shannon v. United States, 512
U.S. 573, 583 (1994).
The agency disagrees that there is any
indication that the September 2007
UAW letter to Speaker Pelosi and
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Majority Leader Reid, relied upon by the
Sierra Club, constitutes the legislative
intent for including the EISA backstop
requirement for domesticallymanufactured passenger cars in addition
to meeting the standards set by NHTSA,
i.e., tied to employment concerns and
not energy conservation. The UAW’s
letter, by itself and without any
supporting statement or information in
the legislative history, cannot
reasonably be presumed to constitute
that the intent of the backstop was
employment.
Thus, consistent with applicable case
law, NHTSA must interpret the words of
EISA itself. NHTSA continues to believe
that the 35 mpg requirement of EISA is
an inherent backstop, as UCS noted in
its comments. NHTSA also agrees with
the ACEEE comment insofar as the
agency will continue to monitor
manufacturer progress toward meeting
the required fuel economy stringencies.
The agency must set the standards high
enough to ensure that the average fuel
economy level of the combined car and
light truck fleet is increasing ratably
toward and achieves the statutory
requirement of at least 35 mpg by 2020.
If the agency finds that this requirement
might not be achieved, it will consider
setting standards for model years up to
and including MY 2020 early enough
and in any event high enough to ensure
reaching the 35 mpg requirement.
However, NHTSA disagrees with the
AIAM comments that a backstop
standard would defeat the purpose of
the attribute-based CAFE system by
limiting the flexibility of manufacturers
to respond to shifts in market demand.
NHTSA also disagrees with NADA’s
comment that, beyond Congress
explicitly enacting a backstop for
domestically-manufactured passenger
cars at 27.5 mpg or 92 percent of the
industry-wide domestic passenger car
fleet in any given model year,
whichever is higher, the agency cannot
impose additional anti-backsliding
measures. EPCA requires the agency to
balance the four statutory factors when
determining maximum feasible CAFE
standards, and the agency has
considered these factors—particularly
the need of the nation to conserve
energy—in deciding whether to adopt
additional measures that operate as
‘‘backstops.’’ Thus, in balancing the four
EPCA factors under 49 U.S.C. § 32902(f),
the agency has adopted in these
standards additional measures which
operate as ‘‘backstops’’ applicable to all
CAFE-regulated vehicles. First, as set
forth in Section VI above, the MY 2011
curves have features that limit
backsliding, some of which were added
by NHTSA as the agency refined and
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modified the Volpe model for purposes
of this rulemaking. Second, the lower
asymptote, which serves as a backstop,
is inherent in the logistic function.
While the agency respectfully disagrees
with ACEEE’s comment regarding the
sufficiency of the lower asymptote as a
backstop, as discussed above, it is not
the only ‘‘backstop’’ embodied in this
rule.
In having considered carefully the
comments to the NPRM, however,
NHTSA nonetheless accepts at least the
possibility that Congress’ silence in
EISA regarding backstops for imported
passenger cars and light trucks could be
reasonably interpreted as permissive
rather than restrictive. For purposes of
the MY 2011 standards, however, and
upon consideration of the entire record,
NHTSA declines to adopt ‘‘backstops’’
beyond that set forth in this section. The
‘‘race to the bottom’’ feared by
commenters seems unlikely as a result
of the MY 2011 standards, particularly
given the lack of lead time available to
manufacturers to change their MY 2011
vehicles and the public’s apparently
growing preference for smaller vehicles.
Moreover, the backstop and antibacksliding mechanisms described
above not only address the ‘‘race to the
bottom’’ concern, but are also consistent
with the attribute-based approach of
Reformed CAFE. NHTSA continues to
believe that backstop standards for
imported passenger cars and light trucks
are neither legally required nor
necessary at this time to ensure fuel
savings. However, the agency will
continue to monitor manufacturers’
product plans and CAFE compliance,
and will revisit the backstop issue in
subsequent rulemakings if it becomes
necessary to ensure that expected fuel
savings are ultimately realized.
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D. Combined Fleet Performance
The combined industry wide average
fuel economy (in mpg) levels for both
cars and light trucks, if each
manufacturer just met its obligations
under the final ‘‘optimized’’ standards
for MY 2011, would be 27.3 mpg, or
325.5 grams CO2 per mile. This
represents an increase of approximately
7.9 percent over the previous model
year’s standards.
E. Costs and Benefits of Final Standards
1. Benefits
NHTSA estimates that the final
standard for MY 2011 passenger cars
would save approximately 0.5 billion
gallons of fuel and prevent 4.3 million
metric tons of tailpipe CO2 emissions
over the lifetime of the passenger cars
sold during that model year, compared
to the fuel savings and emissions
reductions that would occur if the
standards remained at the adjusted
baseline (i.e., the higher of
manufacturer’s plans and the
manufacturer’s required level of average
fuel economy for MY 2010).
NHTSA also estimates that the value
of the total benefits of the final standard
for MY 2011 passenger cars would be
$1.03 billion 471 over the lifetime of the
vehicles manufactured in that model
year. This estimate of societal benefits
includes direct impacts from lower fuel
consumption as well as externalities,
and also reflects offsetting societal costs
resulting from the rebound effect. Direct
471 The $1.0 billion estimate is based on a 7
percent discount rate for valuing future impacts.
NHTSA estimated stringencies that would
maximize net societal benefits using both 7 percent
and 3 percent discount rates. For the reader’s
reference, total consumer benefits for passenger car
CAFE improvements total $2.6 billion using a 3
percent discount rate.
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benefits to consumers, including fuel
savings, consumer surplus from
additional driving, and reduced
refueling time, account for 88 percent
($1.0 billion) of the $1.1 billion in
gross 472 consumer benefits resulting
from increased passenger car CAFE.
Petroleum market externalities account
for roughly 10 percent ($0.1 billion).
Environmental externalities, i.e.,
reduction of air pollutants, account for
roughly 2 percent ($0.03 billion), about
31 percent ($0.01 billion) of which is
the result of greenhouse gas (primarily
CO2) reduction. Increased congestion,
noise and accidents from increased
driving will offset approximately $0.1
billion of the $1.1 billion in consumer
benefits, leaving net consumer benefits
of $1.0 billion.
The following table sets out the
relative dollar value of the various
benefits of this rulemaking on a per
gallon saved basis and averaging across
the passenger car and light truck fleets:
472 Gross consumer benefits are benefits measured
prior to accounting for the negative impacts of the
rebound effect. They include fuel savings,
consumer surplus from additional driving, reduced
refueling time, reduced petroleum market
externalities, reduced criteria pollutants, and
reduced greenhouse gas production. Negative
impacts from the rebound effect include added
congestion, noise, and crash costs due to additional
driving.
473 Based on a value of $2.00 per ton of carbon
dioxide. At a value of $33.00 per ton of carbon
dioxide, the benefit per gallon of reducing in CO2
emissions would be $0.29; and at a value of $80.00
per ton of carbon dioxide, the benefit per gallon
would be $0.71. However, to calculate the gross and
net benefits per gallon of fuel saved using global
SCC values, one would need to remove monopsony
costs, which would make the value per gallon of
‘‘Reduction in Oil Import Externalities’’ equal to
$0.11.
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in gross consumer benefits resulting
from increased light truck CAFE.
Petroleum market externalities account
for roughly 10 percent ($0.1 billion).
Environmental externalities, i.e.,
reduction of air pollutants, account for
roughly 2 percent ($0.02 billion), about
32 percent of which is the result of
greenhouse gas (primarily CO2)
reduction ($0.01 billion). Increased
congestion, noise and accidents from
increased driving will offset roughly
$0.07 billion of the $1.0 billion in
consumer benefits, leaving net
consumer benefits of $0.9 billion.
Comparison of estimated benefits to
estimated costs
car and light truck CAFE standards, in
millions of dollars.
2. Costs
The total costs for manufacturers just
complying with the standard for MY
2011 passenger cars would be
approximately $0.5 billion, compared to
the costs they would incur if the
standard remained at the adjusted
baseline. The resulting vehicle price
increases to buyers of MY 2011
passenger cars would be recovered or
paid back 475 in additional fuel savings
in an average of 4.4 years (average 2011
per car price increase, excluding civil
penalties owed by manufacturers
estimated to owe them, was $64),
assuming fuel prices ranging from $2.97
per gallon in 2016 to $3.62 per gallon
in 2030.476
The total costs for manufacturers just
complying with the standard for MY
2011 light trucks would be
approximately $0.65 billion, compared
to the costs they would incur if the
standard remained at the adjusted
baseline. The resulting vehicle price
increases to buyers of MY 2011 light
trucks would be paid back in additional
fuel savings in an average of 7.7 years
(average 2011 per truck price increase,
excluding civil penalties owed by
manufacturers estimated to owe them, is
$126) assuming fuel prices ranging from
$2.97 to $3.62 per gallon.
474 The $0.9 billion estimate is based on a 7
percent discount rate for valuing future impacts.
NHTSA estimated stringencies that would
maximize net societal benefits using both 7 percent
and 3 percent discount rates. For the reader’s
reference, total consumer benefits for light truck
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CAFE improvements are $1.2 billion under a 3
percent discount rate.
475 See Section V.B.5 above for discussion of
payback period.
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476 The fuel prices (shown here in 2006 dollars)
used to calculate the length of the payback period
are those projected (Annual Energy Outlook 2008,
final release) by the Energy Information
Administration over the life of the MY 2011–2015
light trucks, not current fuel prices.
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The table below compares the
incremental benefits and costs for the
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NHTSA further estimates that the
final standard for light trucks would
save approximately 0.42 billion gallons
of fuel and prevent 4.03 million metric
tons of tailpipe CO2 emissions over the
lifetime of the light trucks sold during
MY 2011, compared to the fuel savings
and emissions reductions that would
occur if the standards remained at the
adjusted baseline.
For light trucks, NHTSA estimates
that the value of the total benefits of the
final MY 2011 standard would be $0.92
billion 474 over the lifetime of the light
trucks sold in that year. This estimate of
societal benefits includes direct impacts
from lower fuel consumption as well as
externalities and also reflects offsetting
societal costs resulting from the rebound
effect. Direct benefits to consumers,
including fuel savings, consumer
surplus from additional driving, and
reduced refueling time, account for 88
percent ($0.9 billion) of the $1.0 billion
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The average annual per vehicle cost
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F. Environmental Impacts of Final
Standards
On October 17, 2008, the EPA
published a Notice of Availability of
NHTSA’s Final Environmental Impact
Statement (FEIS), which, as required by
the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., analyzed
the potential environmental impacts of
alternative CAFE standards being
considered by the agency. 73 FR 61859.
In response to comments on the DEIS,
the FEIS, among other things, analyzed
how the agency’s alternatives were
affected by variations in certain
economic assumptions. The agency
carefully considered and analyzed each
of the individual economic assumptions
to determine which assumptions most
accurately represent future economic
conditions. For a discussion of the
economic assumptions relied on by the
agency in this final rule, see Section V.
The economic assumptions used by
the agency in this final rule correspond
to the ‘‘Mid-2’’ Scenario set of
assumption analyzed in the FEIS. See
FEIS § 2.2. The Optimized Alternative
utilizing the Mid-2 Scenario economic
assumptions, which were prompted in
part by public comments, falls within
the spectrum of alternatives set forth in
the DEIS and the FEIS, and all relevant
environmental impacts associated with
the Optimized Alternative have been
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considered by NHTSA. The
environmental impacts calculated to
result under the Optimized Alternative
utilizing the Mid-2 Scenario economic
assumptions were presented in
Appendix B of the FEIS, and discussed
in Chapters 3 and 4 of the FEIS. The
tables that follow in this section were
developed from the tables provided in
Appendix B of the FEIS.
As discussed in Section XVI of this
Final Rule, the FEIS evaluates the
aggregate environmental impacts
associated with each alternative for a
five-year period (i.e., the environmental
impacts that would result if MY 2011–
2015 passenger cars and light trucks met
the higher, proposed CAFE standards
for those years). However, the impacts
resulting from this Final Rule, covering
MY 2011 alone, fall within the spectrum
of environmental impacts analyzed in
the FEIS under the Optimized
Alternative, Mid-2 Scenario.
This section presents selected
consequences that would be associated
with the final CAFE standards for MY
2011 passenger cars and light trucks
(i.e., the Optimized Alternative, Mid-2
Scenario CAFE standards for MY 2011).
These consequences include the effects
of the MY 2011 standards on fuel
consumption and associated emissions
of greenhouse gases, as well as on
emissions of criteria and hazardous air
pollutants. Environmental impacts
associated with the final CAFE
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standards for MY 2011 passenger cars
and light trucks remain aggregated for
MYs 2011–2015, and are reported in the
FEIS. See Chapter 3, Chapter 4 and
Appendix B of the FEIS. The aggregate
impacts analyzed in the FEIS remain
relevant, since the MY 2011 impacts
associated with the CAFE standards fall
within the spectrum of those aggregated
impacts.
Table IX.F–1 shows the estimated
impact of the final CAFE standards for
MY 2011 on fuel consumption by
passenger cars and light trucks during
selected years from 2020 to 2060.
Because the estimates of fuel
consumption shown in the table assume
that the CAFE standards established for
MY 2011 would apply to all subsequent
model years produced over this period,
the proportion of the U.S. fleet
consisting of cars and light trucks that
met the MY 2011 CAFE standards
would increase over the time period it
spans. The table reports total fuel
consumption for passenger cars and
light trucks, including both gasoline and
diesel, under the No Action Alternative
(Baseline) and under the final standards
chosen by the agency (the Optimized
Alternative). The impact of the chosen
standards on future fuel consumption
by cars and light trucks is measured by
the reduction from its level under the
No Action or Baseline alternative that is
projected to occur with the final
standard in effect.
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CAFE standards would also apply to
subsequent model years. The fuel
savings shown in the table grow not
only as they are estimated for
progressively longer time spans, but also
because an increasing fraction of cars
and light trucks in service during future
years consists of models that meet the
higher CAFE standards adopted
beginning with MY 2011.
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of these gases in the earth’s atmosphere,
and any resulting impact on the global
climate. Table IX.F–2 projects future
fuel use by U.S. passenger cars and light
trucks under the Baseline or No Action
alternative and the final CAFE standards
for MY 2011, and shows the reductions
in fuel use that will result from adopting
the MY 2011 standards. As with the
estimates of fuel consumption reported
in the previous table, those shown in
Table IX.F–2 assume that the MY 2011
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A more informative measure of the
impact of the final MY 2011 CAFE
standards than the reductions in fuel
use during any specific future year is
their effect on cumulative fuel
consumption by the U.S. car and light
truck fleet over an extended future
period. This is because the reduction in
cumulative fuel consumption over the
future that results from higher CAFE
standards determines their impact on
total GHG emissions, the accumulation
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progressively larger amounts under
alternatives that require higher fuel
economy levels. In contrast, each action
alternative reduces the volume of fuel
that must be supplied, thus reducing
emissions throughout the fuel
production and distribution process.
The net effect of each alternative is
equal to the increase in tailpipe
emissions resulting from added
rebound-effect driving, minus the
reduction in upstream emissions
resulting from the lower volume of fuel
that must be supplied. Although the
relative magnitude of these two effects
differs among individual pollutants, the
reduction in upstream emissions of
most (but not all) pollutants outweighs
the increase in tailpipe emissions,
leading to a net reduction in their total
emissions. Similarly, the net reduction
in total emissions of each pollutant is
usually—although not always—larger
for alternatives that require higher fuel
economy levels. For further explanation
of the air quality methodology, see FEIS
§ 3.3.2.
Table IX.F–3 reports nationwide
emissions of criteria air pollutants from
passenger cars and light trucks
(including both tailpipe and upstream
emissions) under the Baseline
alternative for selected years, and
compares these to emissions levels
expected to result from the final CAFE
standards for MY 2011.478 As the table
shows, total emissions of each criteria
pollutant are projected to decline as a
consequence of the final MY 2011 CAFE
standards, as reductions in upstream
emissions due to the lower volume of
fuel production and distribution more
than offset any increases in tailpipe
emissions resulting from additional
driving.
477 In the case of volatile organic compounds
(VOC), emissions from vehicle operation also
include evaporative emissions that occur when
vehicles are parked or stored, and while they are
being refueled at retail stations. Emissions from
vehicle operation are estimated by multiplying the
total number of miles that cars and light trucks are
driven annually by emissions factors for each
pollutant, measured in grams of pollutant emitted
per mile traveled. Emissions from fuel production
and distribution are estimated by multiplying the
total volume of fuel consumed by cars and light
trucks by emissions per gallon during each phase
of fuel supply, including petroleum extraction and
transportation, fuel refining, storage, and
distribution to retail outlets.
478 Unlike GHGs, criteria and hazardous air
pollutants are relatively short-lived; thus their
concentrations in the atmosphere and the resulting
impacts on human health depend primarily on
emissions during the immediate period being
analyzed, rather than on their cumulative emissions
over an extended period.
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NHTSA analyzed the air quality
consequences of alternative CAFE
standards by estimating total emissions
of each criteria air pollutant and mobile
source air toxic (MSAT) attributable to
passenger cars and light trucks under
each alternative, and assessing the
changes in emissions of each pollutant
from their Baseline levels that would
occur under alternative standards.
Emissions of these pollutants include
those that occur while vehicles are
being operated (‘‘tailpipe’’ emissions),
as well as emissions that occur
throughout the processes of producing
and distributing fuel (‘‘upstream’’
emissions).477 Because improving fuel
economy results in an increase in the
number of miles passenger cars and
light trucks are driven (the ‘‘rebound’’
effect), tailpipe emissions of each
pollutant are projected to increase by
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14417
the environmental impacts of motor
vehicle use.
Table IX.F–4 reports total nationwide
emissions of these air toxics by
passenger cars and light trucks during
selected future years under the Baseline
or No Action alternative, as well as with
the final MY 2011 CAFE standards in
effect. As in the previous analyses of
GHG and criteria air pollutant
emissions, these estimates assume that
the MY 2011 CAFE standards for cars
and light trucks would also apply to
subsequent model years. The table
shows that emissions of acetaldehyde,
benzene, 1,3-butadiene, DPM, and
formaldehyde during future years would
decline from their Baseline levels with
the final CAFE standards for MY 2011
in effect. In contrast, emissions of
acrolein are projected to increase
slightly during some future years from
their levels under the Baseline
alternative with the final MY 2011
CAFE standards in effect.479 For
additional detail on this analysis see
FEIS § 3.3.3; Chapter 5.
479 The projected increases in future emissions of
acrolein may result from the agency’s inability to
obtain ‘‘upstream’’ emission factors for this
pollutant, which prevented it from estimating the
reduction in acrolein emissions resulting from
lower fuel production and distribution. It is
possible that if the agency had been able to do so,
lower acrolein emissions during fuel production
and distribution would have more than offset the
increase in emissions from fuel use by cars and
light trucks, causing total acrolein emissions to
decline.
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In addition to their effects on
emissions of criteria air pollutants, the
final CAFE standards for MY 2011 are
expected to affect emissions of some
hazardous air pollutants (also known as
mobile source air toxics, or MSATs)
from fuel production and use. The
MSATs included in this analysis are
acetaldehyde, acrolein, benzene,
1,3-butadiene, diesel particulate matter
(DPM), and formaldehyde, which EPA
and the Federal Highway
Administration have identified as the
MSATs of primary concern for assessing
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The declines in future emissions of
criteria air pollutants and MSATs
resulting from the final MY 2011 CAFE
standards would be expected to reduce
the adverse health effects stemming
from population exposure to harmful
accumulations of these pollutants. In
the Final EIS, the agency presented a
detailed analysis of the air quality and
health effects of reductions in
population exposure to criteria air
pollutants and MSATs projected to
result from alternative CAFE standards
for MY 2011–2015. That analysis
suggested that significant reductions in
adverse health effects and economic
damages caused by exposure to these
pollutants (primarily PM2.5, the largest
known contributor to adverse health
effects) could result if higher CAFE
standards were adopted for model years
2011 through 2020. See § 3.3.2.4.2 of the
FEIS for a description of NHTSA’s
approach to providing these quantitative
estimates of adverse health effects of
conventional health pollutants
associated with the final CAFE
standards.
NHTSA’s Final EIS also presented a
detailed analysis of the potential effects
of alternative car and light truck CAFE
standards for MY 2011–2015 on the
global climate. This analysis first
estimated the effects of alternative
increases in CAFE standards on fuel
consumption and resulting emissions of
greenhouse gases (GHG) over an
extended future period beginning when
those standards would take effect. Next,
the agency projected the extent to which
these projected reductions in GHG
emissions might lower future
atmospheric concentrations of GHGs.
Finally, the agency utilized a widelyrecognized global climate modeling
system, known as MAGICC (Model for
the Assessment of Greenhouse-gas
Induced Climate Change), to simulate
the consequences of reduced GHG
concentrations for future increases in
global mean surface temperatures and
the projected future rise in sea levels,
and approximated the likely
consequences of these developments for
regional precipitation patterns. For
additional discussion of the FEIS
climate analysis, see FEIS § 3.4 and 4.4.
The agency’s analysis demonstrated
that small but potentially important
beneficial effects on the pace and extent
of future climate change were likely to
result from the long-term reductions in
GHG emissions that would result from
adopting higher CAFE standards for
model years 2011 through 2015,
particularly if increases in CAFE
standards continued through model year
2020.
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X. Other Fuel Economy Standards
Required by EISA
In the NPRM, NHTSA explained that
it is not promulgating standards for
commercial medium- and heavy-duty
on-highway vehicles or work trucks as
part of this rule, because Congress was
clear in EISA that several steps were
necessary before such a rulemaking
could begin. Section 103 of EISA added
the following definitions to 49 U.S.C.
32901(a) for these vehicles:
• ‘‘Commercial medium- and heavy-duty onhighway vehicle’’ means an on-highway
vehicle with a gross vehicle weight rating
of 10,000 pounds or more; and
• ‘‘Work truck’’ means a vehicle that—
(A) is rated at between 8,500 and 10,000
pounds gross vehicle weight; and
(B) is not a medium-duty passenger vehicle
(as defined in 40 CFR 86.1803–01, as in
effect on the date of EISA’s enactment).
EISA added a new provision to 49
U.S.C. 32902 requiring DOT, in
consultation with DOE and EPA, to
examine the fuel efficiency of these
vehicles and determine the appropriate
test procedures and methodologies for
measuring the fuel efficiency of these
vehicles, as well as the appropriate
metric for measuring and expressing
their fuel efficiency performance and
the range of factors that affect their fuel
efficiency. This study would need to be
performed within 1 year of the
publication of the NAS study required
by section 108 of EISA.480
Then, within two years of the
completion of the study, DOT, in
consultation with DOE and EPA, would
need to undertake rulemaking to
determine * * * how to implement a
commercial medium- and heavy-duty onhighway vehicle and work truck fuel
efficiency improvement program designed to
achieve the maximum feasible improvement,
and shall adopt and implement appropriate
test methods, measurement metrics, fuel
economy standards, and compliance and
enforcement protocols that are appropriate,
cost-effective, and technologically feasible for
commercial medium- and heavy-duty onhighway vehicles and work trucks.481
EISA also requires a four-year lead time
for fuel economy standards promulgated
under this section, and would allow
separate standards to be prescribed for
different classes of vehicles.482
NHTSA received relatively few
comments on this issue, perhaps not
surprising since it is essentially
concerned with a future rulemaking.
Two commenters disagreed with
NHTSA’s characterization of Section
480 49 U.S.C. 32902(k)(1). The NAS study is
currently underway as of the publication of this
final rule.
481 49 U.S.C. 32902(k)(2).
482 49 U.S.C. 32902(k)(2) and (3).
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102 of EISA ‘‘mandating’’ or ‘‘requiring’’
that NHTSA develop CAFE standards
for commercial medium- and heavyduty on-highway vehicles and work
trucks. Both Cummins, Inc. and EMA
commented that NHTSA should change
terminology used in footnotes 38 and 41
of the NPRM suggesting that CAFE
standards were ‘‘mandated’’ for these
vehicles. Both commenters argued that
Congress did not necessarily have
CAFE-type standards in mind for these
vehicles in Section 102, as evidenced by
the fact that Congress required a NAS
study to be followed by another study
by DOT in consultation with EPA and
DOE. The commenters stated that
Section 102 simply requires that
NHTSA eventually implement a ‘‘fuel
efficiency improvement program’’ with
‘‘fuel economy standards,’’ but not
necessarily CAFE standards. As
Cummins argued, because the ‘‘truck
sector has no broadly accepted metric
for measuring fuel efficiency,’’ ‘‘there
could be major unintended
consequences’’ if NHTSA implemented
‘‘a CAFE-like system that regulates by a
miles per gallon metric,’’ because such
a system ‘‘could improve fuel economy
but cause overall worse fuel efficiency
by promoting multiple smaller trucks to
do the same work that one does today.’’
Cummins and EMA stated that NHTSA
should therefore remove all terminology
in the final rule suggesting that NHTSA
would apply the ‘‘CAFE system’’ to
commercial medium- and heavy-duty
on-highway vehicles and work trucks.
Agency response: NHTSA disagrees
with Cummins and EMA that CAFE
standards for commercial medium- and
heavy-duty on-highway vehicles and
work trucks were not mandated by
Section 102 of EISA. Congress was clear
in Section 102 that, following
completion of the required NAS and
agency studies, NHTSA must engage in
rulemaking to subject these vehicles to
average fuel economy standards under
EPCA and EISA, as the commenters
recognized. Whether or not the precise
contours of those standards are the same
as the attribute-based average fuel
economy standards established for
passenger cars and light trucks, they
will still be average fuel economy
standards for fleets of particular
vehicles. NHTSA sees no reason not to
call these ‘‘corporate average fuel
economy’’ or ‘‘CAFE’’ standards, and
does not believe that such term
connotes any pre-judgment on the part
of the agency with respect to the
outcomes of the required studies or
eventual regulations.
NHTSA also received comments from
NACAA and the Wisconsin DNR stating
that CAFE standards should be applied
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to all passenger cars and light trucks up
to 10,000 pounds GVWR. Wisconsin
DNR argued that extending the
standards to these vehicles would
‘‘capture the full range of noncommercial passenger vehicles.’’
Agency response: NHTSA explained
in the NPRM that all four-wheeled
motor vehicles with a gross vehicle
weight rating of 10,000 pounds or less
will be subject to the CAFE standards
beginning in MY 2011, with the
exception of commercial medium- and
heavy-duty on-highway vehicles and
work trucks, as discussed above. This
follows up on NHTSA’s statements in
the 2006 final rule setting CAFE
standards for MY 2008–2011 light
trucks, where the agency said that it
would begin regulating medium-duty
passenger vehicles (MDPVs) under the
light truck CAFE standards in MY 2011.
MDPVs have been included in the final
rule standards, although they make up
a very small percentage (less than 1
percent) of light trucks in that model
year.
XI. Vehicle Classification
Vehicle classification, for purposes of
the CAFE program, refers to whether
NHTSA considers a vehicle to be a
passenger automobile or light truck, and
thus subject to either the passenger
automobile or the light truck standards.
NHTSA created regulatory definitions
for passenger automobiles and light
trucks, found at 49 CFR part 523, to
guide the agency and manufacturers in
determining which vehicles are which.
As NHTSA explained in the NPRM,
the statutory language is clear that some
vehicles must be passenger automobiles
(cars) and some must be non-passenger
automobiles (light trucks). Passenger
automobiles were defined in EPCA as
‘‘any automobile (other than an
automobile capable of off-highway
operation) which the Secretary [i.e.,
NHTSA] decides by rule is
manufactured primarily for use in the
transportation of not more than 10
individuals.’’ EPCA § 501(2), 89 Stat.
901.
Thus, under EPCA, there are two
general groups of automobiles that
qualify as non-passenger automobiles or
light trucks: (1) those defined by
NHTSA in its regulations as other than
passenger automobiles due to their
having not been manufactured
‘‘primarily’’ for transporting up to ten
individuals; and (2) those expressly
excluded from the passenger category by
statute due to their capability for offhighway operation, regardless of
whether they were manufactured
primarily for passenger transportation.
NHTSA’s classification rule directly
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tracks those two broad groups of nonpassenger automobiles in subsections (a)
and (b), respectively, of 49 CFR 523.5.
In the NPRM, NHTSA took a fresh
look at the regulatory definitions in light
of its desire to ensure clarity in how
vehicles are classified, the passage of
EISA, and the Ninth Circuit’s decision
in CBD. NHTSA explained the origin of
the current definitions of passenger
automobiles and light trucks by tracing
them back through the history of the
CAFE program, and did not propose to
change the definitions themselves at
that time, because the agency tentatively
concluded that doing so would not lead
to increased fuel savings. The NPRM
did, however, propose to tighten the
coverage of its regulatory definition of
‘‘light truck’’ to ensure that, starting in
MY 2011, 2WD versions of SUVs are no
longer classified as off-highway capable
light trucks under 49 CFR 523.5(b),
simply because the SUV also comes in
a 4WD version. This tightening of
NHTSA’s definitions will, as explained
below, have significant impacts on fuel
savings and preventing increased
emission of carbon dioxide.
A. Summary of Comments
NHTSA received a number of
comments on the vehicle classification
issue from a range of organizations.
Many commenters (including the
Alliance, GM, Ford, and Toyota)
supported the clarification in the NPRM
concerning how 2WD vehicles should
be classified. These commenters sought
clarification that the change in how
these 2WD vehicles are classified would
become effective in MY 2011 and not
earlier. Others (Nissan, NADA, and
AIAM) questioned NHTSA’s position on
that issue, arguing that 2WD vehicles
should be classified in the same way as
4WD versions of the same model. Some
(Alliance, Ford, Toyota, and the Sierra
Club) noted that moving large numbers
of 2WD vehicles from the light truck
category to the passenger category may
have a significant impact on the
stringency of the curves, and that the
NPRM curves did not reflect this
impact.
Several commenters (Public Citizen,
Honda, UCS, CBD, and Sierra Club)
argued that the rule’s classification
definitions needed to be revised. The
commenters relied on several
arguments: first, that the current
definitions did not comport with the
Ninth Circuit’s opinion in CBD (which
directed NHTSA either to ‘‘revise its
regulatory definitions of passenger
automobile and light trucks or provide
a valid reason for not doing so’’) and do
not reflect the fact that many light
trucks are used as passenger vehicles;
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second, that they were not ratified by
Congress in EISA; third, they do not
ensure that some vehicles that these
commenters believe should be classified
as passenger cars are in fact classified as
such; and fourth, that they allow
manufacturers to ‘‘game’’ the definitions
by making minor changes to vehicles to
obtain a light truck classification and
thus, a lower fuel economy target. One
commenter (GM) urged NHTSA to
define ‘‘base form’’ (a term used in a
1981 interpretation concerning the
classification of 2WD vehicles) and
‘‘model type,’’ contending that these
new definitions would help clarify how
certain vehicles should be classified.
NHTSA responds to these comments
below.
B. Response to Comments
1. This Rule Substantially Tightens
NHTSA’s Vehicle Classification
Definitions
(a) Under § 523.5(b), Only Vehicles That
Actually Have 4WD Will Be Classified
as 4WD Vehicles
As proposed in the NPRM, NHTSA
has tightened the coverage of its
regulatory definition of ‘‘light truck’’ to
ensure that 2 wheel drive (2WD)
versions of an SUV are not classified as
light trucks under 49 CFR § 523.5(b)
simply because the SUV also comes in
a 4WD version. In order to be properly
classifiable as a light truck under Part
523, a 2WD SUV must either be over
6,000 lbs GVWR and meet 4 out of 5
ground clearance characteristics to make
it off-highway capable under § 523.5(b),
or meet one of the functional
characteristics under § 523.5(a) (e.g.,
greater cargo carrying capacity than
passenger carrying capacity). In other
words, a 2WD vehicle of 6,000 lbs
GVWR or less, even if it has a sufficient
number of clearance characteristics,
cannot be considered off-highway
capable. This is based on the plain
meaning of § 523.5(b) (which refers to a
vehicle that ‘‘has’’ 4WD) and the statute
(49 U.S.C. 32901(a)(18)(b) speaks of a
vehicle that ‘‘is a 4-wheel drive
automobile’’). No change in the
regulatory definition is needed. The
clarification accomplishes NHTSA’s
purpose. This clarification, which the
vehicle manufacturers largely
supported, resulted in the reclassification of approximately 1.5
million 2WD SUVs from light trucks to
passenger cars in MY 2011. The result
of this re-classification is an increase of
0.3 mpg in the combined passenger car
and light truck standards for MY 2011.
As noted above, several commenters
agreed with NHTSA’s clarification on
the 2WD vehicles but asked for
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assurance that it would be applied only
to MY 2011 and later production. The
Alliance commented that it agreed that
NHTSA’s vehicle classification
‘‘regulations are consistent with
congressional intent as expressed by
EPCA and EISA,’’ and that it did ‘‘not
object to NHTSA’s interpretations and
its proposed regulatory revisions to 49
CFR Part 523, provided that these are
effective with the 2011 model year.’’
The Alliance argued that this would
help avoid ‘‘the need to reexamine and
re-issue standards for 2009 and 2010
model years,’’ which the Alliance stated
had been ‘‘developed based on a data set
with 4x2 utilities included in the truck
fleet.’’ Ford agreed, arguing that
reclassifying 2WD SUVs for MYs 2008–
2010 would ‘‘make it more difficult for
many manufacturers to meet the light
truck standards (as well as the car
standards) and would amount to an
improper increase in the stringency of
the MY 2008–2010 standards.’’ NHTSA
hereby clarifies that its intention is that
its clarification on the treatment of 2WD
vehicles under § 523.5(b) become
effective with regard to MY 2011
vehicles. Applying that treatment earlier
would require the agency to change the
standards for those model years, which
the agency is statutorily prevented from
doing later than 18 months before the
start of the model year to which the
amended standard applies, if the
standards would be more stringent.483
Some commenters noted that this
clarification, although thoroughly
discussed in the NPRM, was not
reflected in the stringency curves of the
proposed standard. NHTSA believes
that its announced intention to apply
this clarification in the final rule was
adequate notice to all concerned that the
stringency levels of the final rule would
reflect the concomitant movement of
many 2WD vehicles from the light truck
to the passenger car fleet. Commenters
who are manufacturers had every
opportunity to analyze how the change
might affect their fleets and comment
accordingly. In the period since
issuance of the NPRM, NHTSA has had
the opportunity to evaluate new
manufacturer product plans in order to
analyze the full impact of the
clarification on the standard. As noted
above, this change has resulted in an
increase in the standards and fuel
savings for MY 2011. The final curves
for passenger cars and light trucks
reflect this change.
Nissan disagreed with NHTSA’s
proposal to classify certain 2WD SUVs
as passenger cars, offering the following
basic arguments: (1) That NHTSA has
483 49
U.S.C. 32902 (g)(2).
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always interpreted and set standards
with 2WD SUVs as light trucks, even in
the MY 2008–2011 CAFE rule (as
evidenced, for example, by the CAFE
reporting requirements that specify that
a manufacturer must indicate whether a
light truck has 4WD—Nissan argued
that that presumed that some light
trucks did not); (2) that NHTSA’s 1981
interpretation states that vehicle
classification is determined by the base
vehicle; (3) that classifying 2WD SUVs
as light trucks because they also come
in 4WD is consistent with EPA
emissions test procedures which
describe equipment as ‘‘optional’’ if a
manufacturer expects less than onethird of the models sold to be equipped
with it;484 and (4) that NHTSA must
provide notice and comment before
changing the standards.
With regard to Nissan’s comment that
NHTSA has always interpreted and set
standards with 2WD SUVs as light
trucks, even in the MY 2008–2011 CAFE
rule, NHTSA has never stated that 2WD
SUVs are necessarily light trucks simply
because they also come in 4WD, and in
fact has stated to the contrary. As early
as 1980, in the final rule promulgating
light truck CAFE standards for MYs
1983–1985, NHTSA responded to a
comment from GM requesting a change
to the regulatory definitions to ensure
that 2WD SUVs may be classified as
light trucks even if their GVWR fell
below 6,000 pounds. NHTSA stated
that, ‘‘Under the agency’s current
regulations in 49 CFR Part 523, such a
change in the vehicle’s GVWR would
result in their being classified as
passenger automobiles.’’ Although
NHTSA’s technical analysis for the 1980
final rule ‘‘treat[ed] 4x2 utility vehicles
* * * as light trucks, consistent with
the classification of current vehicles,’’
NHTSA expressly cautioned that ‘‘this
treatment should not be interpreted as a
statement by the agency that all future
designs of 4x2 utility vehicles * * *
will continue to be classified as light
trucks.’’ 485 NHTSA also stated as much
in a 1981 letter of interpretation,
discussed in greater detail below. Thus,
in response to Nissan’s comment, while
NHTSA has previously set standards
with 2WD SUVs as light trucks, the
agency has long held that 2WD SUVs
are not inherently light trucks, and that
the definitions could be tightened in the
future. The fact that the reporting
requirements include ‘‘4WD (yes/no)’’
does not, as Nissan suggests, indicate
484 Thus, according to Nissan, if less than onethird of the ‘‘variants’’ of an SUV sold are 2WD,
those 2WD variants are properly classified along
with the 4WD ‘‘base’’ vehicle.
485 45 FR 81593, 81599–60 (Dec. 11, 1980).
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that 2WD SUVs may be light trucks
under § 523.5(b) if their GVWR is less
than 6,000 pounds.
Nissan’s comments focus on how it
believes NHTSA has construed and
applied its definitions in the past. But
Nissan does not make an argument that
NHTSA’s reading of its own rules, as
proposed in the NPRM, is not a
reasonable reading of those rules. In
fact, NHTSA believes that it is
reasonable to read a rule
(§ 523.5(b)(1)(i)) that refers to a vehicle
that ‘‘has 4-wheel drive’’ as
encompassing only vehicles that have
4WD. The same is true with regard to
the statute (49 U.S.C. 32901(a)(18)(B)),
which speaks of a vehicle that ‘‘is a 4wheel drive automobile.’’ NHTSA
merely intends to read the rule and
statute according to their plain meaning.
NHTSA also disagrees that the
November 1981 letter of interpretation
indicates that vehicle classification is
always determined by the base vehicle.
In that letter, NHTSA used the term
‘‘base vehicle’’ for classifying vehicles
under § 523.5(a), not § 523.5(b). NHTSA
has never used the term ‘‘base vehicle’’
to describe a vehicle as off-highway
capable and thus properly classifiable
under § 523.5(b). A vehicle either is or
is not off-highway capable—the fact that
the vehicle may also come in 4WD does
not make the 2WD version off-highway
capable.
With regard to Nissan’s comment
about EPA emissions test procedures
describing equipment as ‘‘optional’’ if a
manufacturer expects less than onethird of the models sold to be equipped
with it, NHTSA has examined EPA’s
regulations and remains unconvinced
that 2WD would be the kind of
‘‘optional’’ equipment covered. EPA
regulations describe ‘‘optional’’
equipment as an ‘‘item’’ that could add
weight or influence emissions in the
test. If anything was ‘‘optional’’
equipment, then, it would appear to be
the presence of 4WD, which both adds
weight to a vehicle and causes it to emit
more pollution, compared to 2WD.486
NHTSA would of course defer to EPA’s
interpretation of its own regulations, but
does not find Nissan’s argument
convincing for purposes of this
rulemaking.
And finally, with regard to Nissan’s
comment that the agency was
reclassifying 2WD SUVs without
providing notice and comment, NHTSA
disagrees—these changes have been
made with full notice, as provided in
the NPRM, and an opportunity for
comment, and are appropriate and
timely revisions to NHTSA’s application
486 See,
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of Part 523. In the NPRM, NHTSA
specifically sought comment on the
proposed changes to the vehicle
classification system and whether
further changes were appropriate.
AIAM also disagreed with NHTSA’s
proposal to classify certain 2WD SUVs
as passenger cars. AIAM stated that
larger 2WD SUVs had originally been
classifiable as light trucks per the
statutory off-highway definition, but
that over time ‘‘smaller, more fuel
efficient versions of SUVs were offered
in the U.S. market.’’ AIAM thus
suggested that NHTSA should classify
‘‘all SUVs in the same category and
provide lead-time for manufacturers
before the new criteria take effect,’’ as
NHTSA had done for minivans and the
‘‘three row’’ requirement in its 2006 rule
on light truck standards. In response,
the agency notes that a vehicle’s fuel
economy capability has no bearing on
its proper classification as a passenger
car or as a light truck. NHTSA believes
that the lead time between when the
final rule standards are promulgated
and when the revised definitions take
effect (MY 2011) should be sufficient for
manufacturers, particularly given the
increasing consumer preference for
higher fuel economy vehicles and
NHTSA’s announced intention to move
in this direction in the NPRM.
In summary, NHTSA believes its
clarification of how, starting with MY
2011, it will apply § 523.5(b) to 2WD
vehicles of 6,000 lbs or less GVWR
constitutes a reasonable and significant
tightening of its definitions related to
vehicle classification. As a result, in MY
2011, approximately 1.5 million
vehicles formerly classified as light
trucks will be classified as passenger
automobiles, which will produce an
average increase of 0.3 mpg in the
combined passenger car and light truck
standards in those years.
(b) The Final Rule Amends § 523.5(a)(4)
To Prevent Gaming That Might
Jeopardize Fuel Savings Created by
NHTSA’s Clarified Position on 2WD
Vehicles
In explaining in the NPRM (73 FR
24459) that 2WD SUVs would no longer
be classifiable as light trucks simply
because a version is also available in
4WD, NHTSA noted that, alternatively,
a 2WD automobile may properly be
classified as a light truck under
§ 523.5(a)(4) if it provides ‘‘greater
cargo-carrying than passenger-carrying
volume.’’ In that context, NHTSA
mentioned a 1981 letter of interpretation
to GM.487 The 1981 letter stated that
487 See
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‘‘two-wheel drive utility vehicles which
are truck derivatives and which, in base
form, have greater cargo-carrying
volume than passenger-carrying volume
should be classified as light trucks for
fuel economy purposes.’’ NHTSA stated
in the NPRM that ‘‘base form’’ means
‘‘the version of the vehicle sold as
‘standard,’ without optional equipment
installed, and does not include a version
that would meet the cargo volume
criterion only if ‘delete options’ were
exercised to remove standard
equipment.’’ NHTSA gave the example
of a base vehicle that comes equipped
with a standard second-row seat, which
the agency stated could not be classified
as a light truck simply on the basis that
the purchaser has an option to delete
that second-row seat.488
In its comments, GM urged NHTSA to
incorporate the definition of ‘‘base
form’’ into Part 523. However, it is
possible that a literal application of the
1981 letter’s definition of ‘‘base form’’
could result in gaming of the
classification system. For example, with
regard to a particular vehicle, a
manufacturer could describe as optional
a second-row seat that is in fact an item
that the manufacturer expects to install
in nearly every vehicle of that model. In
fact, even with regard to a vehicle that
has long come equipped with a secondrow seat as standard equipment, the
manufacturer could suddenly describe
that seat as optional. Even if most, or
even all, vehicles of that model
continued to be sold with second-row
seats, the manufacturer’s mere
description of the seat as optional could,
if the manufacturer’s description of the
vehicle’s ‘‘base form’’ were the only
consideration, allow the manufacturer
to argue that the vehicle is a light truck
because its base form has greater cargocarrying than passenger-carrying
volume.
The vehicles described by GM in the
1981 correspondence have little relation
to the 2WD SUVs of today. To the best
of the agency’s knowledge, most 2WD
SUVs are routinely offered with a
standard full bench or pair of captain’s
chairs in the second row. Additionally,
far fewer 2WD SUVs manufactured
today are based on a truck chassis. To
permit a manufacturer to continue to
sell 2WD SUVs with second-row seats
and consider them light trucks merely
because the manufacturer has decided
to list those seats as an option rather
than as a standard feature of the base
vehicle would be to stand the November
1981 interpretation on its head. That
September 23, 2008) for the full text of the letter
of interpretation to GM.
488 73 FR 24459, fn. 207 (May 2, 2008).
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interpretation was intended to prevent
gaming of the ‘‘greater cargo-carrying
volume’’ category of light trucks by
limiting it to vehicles where carrying
cargo was clearly the primary function
for which the vehicle was designed. We
cannot permit that interpretation to be
used to produce the precisely opposite
result, i.e., to categorize 2WD vehicles
that are primarily designed to be sold
with a second-row seat for passengers as
light trucks merely because the
manufacturer suddenly labels the
second-row seat as an option.
Therefore, in response to comments
and consistent with Congress’ intent in
EISA, starting with MY 2011, 2WD
SUVs (including crossovers that are
2WD) may only be properly classified as
light trucks under § 523.5(a)(4) if they
are, like cargo vans, designed and sold
primarily to serve a cargo-carrying
function. The final rule amends that
section to say: ‘‘Provide, as sold to the
first retail purchaser, greater cargocarrying than passenger-carrying
volume, such as in a cargo van; if a
vehicle is sold with a second-row seat,
its cargo-carrying volume is determined
with that seat installed, regardless of
whether the manufacturer has described
that seat as optional.’’ In light of this
clarifying rule text, there is no need at
this time to provide a definition for
‘‘base form.’’ The manufacturer must
categorize its vehicles based upon the
vehicle attributes when it is sold. If a
cargo van is manufactured as such with
no rear seating and is sold in that
configuration then it can be considered
a light truck under § 523.5(a)(4). If the
same vehicle is sold with rear seating,
it cannot be a truck under § 523.5(a)(4).
GM’s HHR provides an example of this
concept. The HHR is available and sold
in a ‘‘panel’’ version with no rear
seating and a passenger version with
rear seating. The panel version if
actually sold that way can be a light
truck under § 523.5(a)(4); the passenger
version, when sold with rear seating,
cannot be a truck under § 523.5(a)(4)
even if the manufacturer were to label
that seating as optional.
Thus, through interpretation and
changes to the rule text, NHTSA has
significantly tightened the definitions
governing which vehicles may be
classified as light trucks. 2WD SUVs of
6,000 lbs or less GVWR may no longer
be properly classified as light trucks
under § 523.5(b) simply because they
also come in 4WD. Additionally, 2WD
SUVs may not be properly classified as
light trucks simply because a
manufacturer asserts that their base
form has no back seat and thus would
‘‘provide greater cargo-carrying than
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passenger-carrying volume’’ according
to § 523.5(a)(4).
2. Especially as Tightened by This Rule,
NHTSA’s Classification Definitions Are
More Difficult To Game Than
Commenters Suggest
As described above, this final rule
effectuates significant changes in
NHTSA’s definitions and their
interpretation that will substantially
reduce any opportunities to game those
definitions. NHTSA disagrees with the
commenters’ argument that the
standards allow manufacturers to
‘‘game’’ the definitions by making minor
changes to vehicles to obtain a light
truck classification and thus, a lower
fuel economy target.
Several commenters, including Sierra
Club et al., UCS, and Honda commented
that manufacturers are ‘‘gaming’’ the
existing definitions by making changes
to passenger cars in order to classify
them as light trucks and obtain the
benefit of lower fuel economy targets.
UCS suggested that the ‘‘loophole’’ is a
function of both the statutory
requirement to set separate standards for
passenger cars and light trucks, which
‘‘accommodat[es] an industry interest in
having non-passenger vehicles held to
less stringent fuel economy standards
than passenger vehicles of the same
attribute,’’ and of NHTSA’s ‘‘equating
SUVs, minivans, crossovers and even
some station wagons with nonpassenger vehicles.’’ UCS argued that
‘‘The association of these categories has
allowed automakers to tweak passenger
vehicle characteristics in order to have
them classified as light trucks that are
held to lower fuel economy standards.’’
The Sierra Club stated that the current
definitions are being abused, with
manufacturers classifying as light trucks
‘‘obvious examples [of] many sedans
and station wagons, such as the Chrysler
PT Cruiser, Dodge Magnum, and the
Subaru Outback sedan,’’ as well as
‘‘SUVs and minivans [which] are
advertised, sold, and used as passenger
vehicles.’’ Sierra Club argued that the
attribute-based system, under which
manufacturers are subject to standards
based on their fleet mix, encourages
further gaming, as evidenced by the
‘‘surge in ‘crossover’ vehicles that are
more car-like and intended as passenger
vehicles but are still classified as nonpassenger vehicles and can therefore
meet a lower fuel economy than cars.’’
Honda stated that NHTSA should
change the light truck definitions
because ‘‘the current system is much too
easy to game, which creates competitive
impacts and diverts limited engineering
resources to figuring out how to game
the latest rules instead of improving fuel
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economy,’’ and ‘‘in the long run, * * *
will also encourage shifting sales
towards vehicles classified as light
trucks and cause increases in real world
fuel consumption.’’
In response to the above comments,
NHTSA notes that separate standards
for passenger cars and light trucks are a
statutory requirement under EISA.
NHTSA believes, as explained
elsewhere in this notice, that that
requirement extends to setting the target
curves for the passenger car fleet based
only on the passenger cars, and the
target curves for the light truck fleet
based only on the light trucks. NHTSA
does not believe that it has the authority
to combine the fleets for the purposes of
setting the standards.
Moreover, with regard to ‘‘crossovers’’
and commenters’ examples of ‘‘many
sedans and station wagons’’ being
classified as light trucks, the agency
notes that as a result of the tightened
implementation of our vehicle
definitions, many crossovers are in fact
now properly classified as passenger
cars. To the extent that crossovers are
not classified as passenger cars, it is, we
believe, only because they either (1)
have 4WD and meet 4 out of 5 ground
clearance characteristics; (2) are over
6,000 lbs GVWR and meet 4 out of 5
ground clearance characteristics; or (3)
have three rows of seats and the
capability to expand cargo-carrying
volume through folding or removing
seats.
Of the specific examples of the PT
Cruiser, the Dodge Magnum, and the
Subaru Outback sedan, NHTSA believes
that manufacturers currently classify
these vehicles as light trucks either
because they come in four-wheel drive
and have the required ground clearance,
or because their rear seats may be easily
removed to create a flat, floor level
surface that increases cargo-carrying
capacity. After MY 2011, vehicles may
only be classified as light trucks on the
basis of permitting expanded use of the
vehicle for cargo-carrying purposes if
they have three rows of standard
designated seating positions that fold
flat or are removable. As currently
designed, the PT Cruiser and the
Magnum do not meet this requirement,
so NHTSA would likely classify these
vehicles as passenger cars as well. If the
Outback sedan does in fact have 4WD
(or AWD) and meet the required ground
clearance characteristics, NHTSA is
required by EPCA and EISA to consider
it a light truck, regardless of its body
shape.
Finally, NHTSA believes that minor
changes are not sufficient, and that
fairly major changes would be necessary
in order to reclassify a passenger car as
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a light truck. To make a 2WD SUV a
light truck, for example, manufacturers
would need either to add a third row of
seats to it (and otherwise meet the
requirements for expanded cargo space)
convert it to 4WD, or raise its GVWR
over 6,000 lbs and ensure that it met 4
out of the 5 ground clearance
characteristics. These changes are not
minor, and likely can be made only
every few years at the time of one of the
periodic vehicle redesigns.
Additionally, the minor benefit to be
gained in terms of a lower target must
be balanced against consumer demand.
In a time of high gas prices and
increasing consumer interest in high
fuel economy vehicles, it seems unlikely
to NHTSA that manufacturers would
take the risk of turning passenger cars
into light trucks solely to obtain the
slightly lower light truck target
standard.
3. Additional Changes in NHTSA’s
Classification Definitions Would Not
Result in Greater Fuel Savings and
Lower CO2 Emissions
We have explained above the
recategorization of 2WD vehicles that
will result from NHTSA’s tightening of
its classification definitions. NHTSA
considered whether recategorization of
additional vehicles through further
changes to its classification definitions
would result in additional fuel economy
improvements and therefore lower
emissions of carbon dioxide. One of the
concerns underlying the Ninth Circuit’s
decision in CBD was the potential
impact of vehicle categorization on the
ultimate fuel economy for light trucks.
The commenters, too, were concerned
about this in general. NHTSA has
considered this issue carefully. In 2006,
when NHTSA issued its MY 2008–2011
light truck fuel economy rule, and in
2007, when the Ninth Circuit issued its
initial opinion in CBD concerning that
2006 light truck rule, EISA had not been
enacted. Under EPCA as it then existed,
the passenger car standard was a flat
27.5 mpg average requirement. Reclassifying light trucks (which had a
standard far below 27.5 mpg) as
passenger cars, in the flat pre-EISA
world, intuitively would have resulted
in their having to meet a higher
standard, or in the manufacturers’
having to build more small, lightweight
vehicles in order to balance out former
light trucks newly subject to the higher
passenger standard, and could have
resulted in more fuel savings. This
assumption may no longer be correct,
because such a recategorization could
now result in lower standards for
passenger automobiles.
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lower the average fuel economy level
required of passenger cars, depending
on how the size and potential fuel
economy of the given SUV compares to
those of the vehicles that were already
classified as passenger cars.
NHTSA’s analysis indicates that the
direction and magnitude of the net
effects of vehicle re-classification
depend on the composition of the fleet
and the specific nature of the change in
classification. As shown in Figure XI–1,
assigning 2WD SUVs and those vehicles
that do not meet the third row
requirement to the passenger car fleet
would add to the passenger car fleet a
set of vehicles (labeled ‘‘PC Formerly
Classified as LT’’) with fuel economy
levels that are generally (though not
universally) in the same range as those
of passenger cars of similar footprint.
However, further reassigning to the
passenger car fleet minivans and
vehicles that do meet the third row
requirement, as commenters appear to
suggest, would add to the passenger car
fleet a set of vehicles (labeled ‘‘LT
Reassigned to PC under Alternative
Definition’’) with fuel economy levels
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that are generally (though not
universally) lower than those of
passenger cars of similar footprint.
Figure XI–2 shows how the composition
of the light truck fleet is affected by
such shifts. Reassigning either the
smaller or larger group of vehicles to the
passenger car fleet removes from the
light truck fleet vehicles that are
generally (though not universally)
smaller and more efficient than the
vehicles that remain in the light truck
fleet.
In contrast, a number of commenters,
including CBD, Sierra Club et al., and
UCS, did not address NHTSA’s
discussion and commented that NHTSA
should revise the definitions of
passenger car and light truck in
accordance with the Ninth Circuit’s
opinion, generally for the purpose of
increasing fuel savings. Honda also
commented that NHTSA should revise
its definitions to be consistent with that
opinion. None of those commenters
specified precisely which vehicles
should be reclassified as passenger cars
instead of light trucks.
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In EISA, Congress made both the
passenger car and light truck standards
attribute-based, which means that the
fuel economy target curves for each
standard are a function of the fleet
subject to that standard. In developing
the curves that determine fuel economy
targets for each vehicle footprint,
NHTSA fits the curve based in part on
the sizes (footprint) and fuel economy
levels (given the estimated effects of
adding fuel-saving technologies) of the
vehicles in each regulatory class.
Consider, for example, a small SUV
typically classified as a light truck, and
assume that the small SUV gets
relatively good fuel economy for a truck.
Moving the small SUV out of the truck
fleet may reduce the overall average fuel
economy level required of light trucks,
because the vehicles remaining in that
regulatory class will be the larger ones
that have relatively lower fuel economy.
Averaging their capabilities will result
in a lower target than if the small SUV
in question remained in the light truck
fleet. Moving the SUV into the
passenger car fleet may either boost or
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vehicles that do not meet the third row
requirement would have changed
average required CAFE levels. The
overall averages reflect changes in the
size of each fleet under each approach
to vehicle classification, again bearing
Similarly, the next table shows how
these changes in vehicle classification
affected the amount of fuel consumed
in mind that ‘‘Alternative Definition’’ in
the tables refers to moving all light
trucks that meet the 3-rows criterion of
§ 523.5(a)(5)(ii) into the passenger car
fleet.
over the useful lives of vehicles in the
MY 2011 fleet.
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The following table shows how, for
MY 2011, reclassifying 2WD SUVs by
virtue of NHTSA’s tightened
classification decisions changed average
required CAFE levels, and how
additionally reclassifying minivans and
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As discussed above, in the context of
the MY 2011 passenger car and light
truck standards, moving about 1.5
million 2WD SUVs from the light truck
to the passenger car fleet results in an
average increase of 0.3 mpg in the
combined passenger car and light truck
standards for MY 2011. However,
specific fleet differences are such that
this change leads to increases in lifetime
fuel consumption and carbon dioxide
emissions of about 0.03 billion gallons
and 0.06 million metric tons,
respectively, than under standards that
would apply under the former
definitions.489 This is due to the fact
that the reassignment of vehicles
changed the shapes of the passenger car
and light truck target curves, which
caused different results for different
manufacturers depending on their fleet
mixes. Although the overall combined
average required fuel economy increases
by 0.3 mpg, the overall average achieved
fuel economy decreases very slightly (by
about 0.009 mpg), such that total fuel
consumption and emissions are very
slightly higher, as noted. This occurs
because for both Ford and General
Motors, the reassignment of vehicles
causes the planned CAFE levels of these
manufacturers’ light truck fleets to fall
by 0.7 mpg (Ford) and 0.8 mpg (General
Motors), but causes the corresponding
required CAFE to fall by only 0.3 mpg,
and causes the corresponding achieved
CAFE levels to fall by 1.2 mpg (Ford)
and 0.8 mpg (General Motors).490
It is possible, as some industry
commenters suggested, that
manufacturers will respond to the
tightening of the definition by ceasing to
build 2WD versions of SUVs, which
could reduce fuel savings. However,
NHTSA expects that manufacturer
decisions will be driven in much greater
measure by consumer demand than by
NHTSA’s regulatory definitions. In this
era of high gasoline prices and
increasing consumer interest in high
fuel economy vehicles, NHTSA believes
that there will still be demand for 2WD
SUVs, whether they are classified for
CAFE purposes as passenger cars or as
light trucks.491
489 NHTSA’s analysis of the effects of thenpending MY 2011–2015 standards, documented in
the October 2008 EIS, indicated that the
reclassification reflected in today’s final rule would
reduce the total lifetime fuel consumption and
carbon dioxide emissions (p. 10–229) of vehicles
sold during this period.
490 We note that in both cases, NHTSA’s analysis
did not identify a set of technologies that enabled
these manufacturers to attain the required light
truck CAFE levels.
491 Of course, the agency recognizes that if
manufacturers do cease to build and sell 2WD SUVs
in response to this tightening of the definition, fuel
savings would likely decrease relative to NHTSA’s
estimates in this final rule.
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Nevertheless, going further and
reclassifying other light trucks as
passenger cars, as some commenters
would have NHTSA do, would change
the form and stringency of the curves for
the maximum feasible standards. It
would reduce the overall average
required CAFE level by an average of 0.1
mpg MY 2011 and reduce lifetime fuel
and carbon dioxide savings by about
0.13 billion gallons and 0.64 million
metric tons, respectively.492
Accordingly, EPCA and EISA’s
overarching purpose of energy
conservation would not be better
fulfilled by further changing the vehicle
classifications.
4. The Vehicle Classification Definitions
Embodied in This Final Rule Are
Consistent With NHTSA’s Statutory
Authority and Respond to the Ninth
Circuit’s Opinion
Some commenters (Public Citizen,
Sierra Club, CBD) argued broadly that
the standards do not reflect the fact that
many light trucks are used as passenger
vehicles, and that, therefore, more of
them should be classified as passenger
cars. NHTSA discussed at length in the
NPRM that the fact that vehicles are
used for personal transportation does
not make them passenger cars for
purposes of CAFE. The commenters’
argument overlooks the statutory
definition of passenger automobile.
Passenger automobiles were defined in
EPCA as ‘‘any automobile (other than an
automobile capable of off-highway
operation) which the Secretary [i.e.,
NHTSA] decides by rule is
manufactured primarily for use in the
transportation of not more than 10
individuals.’’ EPCA § 501(2), 89 Stat.
901. The statute does not employ the
word ‘‘used.’’ If Congress had wanted all
vehicles used to transport passengers to
be classified as passenger automobiles,
it would have said ‘‘used primarily’’ in
EPCA, instead of ‘‘manufactured
primarily.’’ The definition of ‘‘passenger
automobile’’ itself excludes two types of
passenger-carrying vehicles: (1) Vehicles
capable of off-highway operation
regardless of whether they transport any
number of passengers, and (2) vehicles
manufactured primarily to transport
more than 10 passengers. This indicates
that Congress envisioned from the start
of the program that some vehicles
492 The October 2008 EIS also indicates that for
the analysis of the effects of then-pending MY
2011–2015 standards, the reclassification of
minivans and 2WD SUVs with 3 rows would reduce
overall average required CAFE levels by an average
of 0.4 mpg during MYs 2011–2015, raising total
lifetime fuel consumption and carbon dioxide
emissions (p. 10–231) of vehicles sold during this
period.
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14425
would be used for passenger
transportation but, for fuel economy
purposes, not be classified as passenger
automobiles. Congress also authorized
NHTSA to define, by rule, those
vehicles ‘‘manufactured primarily’’ for
carrying 10 or fewer passengers,
indicating that Congress also envisioned
that other passenger-carrying vehicles
would be excluded from the definition
if manufactured primarily for another
purpose.
NHTSA refers readers to the
discussion in the NPRM at 73 FR
24458–24461 (May 2, 2008) for
additional information on this issue. See
further the discussion of EPCA’s
legislative history in the proposal and
final rule establishing NHTSA’s vehicle
definition regulation. 41 FR 55368,
55369–55371, December 20, 1976, and
42 FR 38362, 38365–38367, July 28,
1977. That discussion, and not the
incorrect and anomalous description of
it in a preliminary notice published by
the agency in late 2003 (68 FR 74908,
74926, December 29, 2003), represents
the agency’s historical position.
NHTSA also explained in the NPRM
that in EISA Congress specifically
addressed the vehicle classification
issue. It redefined ‘‘automobile,’’ added
a definition of ‘‘commercial mediumand heavy-duty on-highway vehicle,’’
defined ‘‘non-passenger automobile’’
and defined ‘‘work truck.’’ Significantly,
it did not change other definitions and
its new definition of ‘‘non-passenger
automobile,’’ which is most relevant in
this context, in no way contradicted
how NHTSA has long construed that
term. In enacting EISA, Congress
demonstrated its full awareness of how
NHTSA classifies vehicles for fuel
economy purposes and chose not to
alter those classifications. That strongly
suggests Congressional approval of the
agency’s 30-year approach to vehicle
classification.
Moreover, Congress has given clear
direction that overall objectives must be
obtained regardless of vehicle
classification. EISA adds a significant
requirement to EPCA—the combined car
and light truck fleet must achieve at
least 35 mpg in the 2020 model year.
Thus, regardless of whether the entire
fleet is classified as cars or light trucks,
or any proportion of each, the result
must still be a fleet performance of at
least 35 mpg in 2020. This suggests that
Congress did not want to spend
additional time on the subject of
whether vehicles are cars or light trucks.
Instead, Congress focused on mandating
fuel economy performance, regardless of
classifications.
A number of commenters, including
Sierra Club, UCS, and Honda, disagreed
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with the idea that Congress had
expressed approval of NHTSA’s
classification system through its
changes in EISA. The commenters
argued instead that Congress’s failure to
address NHTSA’s definitions for
passenger car and light truck could just
as well represent Congress’s agreement
with the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in CBD,
which found NHTSA’s failure to revise
its definitions or adequately explain its
decision not to revise them to be
arbitrary and capricious. UCS referred to
Representative Edward Markey’s (D–
MA) extended comments on the Senate
amendments to H.R. 6, which he
submitted to the Congressional Record
upon EISA’s passage, and in which he
stated that
Section 106 is intended to clarify that Title
I does not impact fuel economy standards or
the standard-setting process for vehicles
manufactured before model year 2011. This
section is not intended to codify, or
otherwise support or reject, any standards
applying before model year 2011, and is not
intended to reverse, supersede, overrule, or
in any way limit the November 15, 2007
decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit in Center for Biological
Diversity v. National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (No. 06–71891).493
Sierra Club and UCS argued that Rep.
Markey’s extended remarks indicate that
Congress did not intend to nullify the
decision of the Ninth Circuit. Honda
also argued that ‘‘If [Congress] did not
agree with the court order, they would
have addressed it in EISA.’’
NHTSA has carefully considered the
discussion of this issue in the extension
of remarks by Rep. Markey. No Senate,
House, or conference reports were
created during the legislative process
that culminated in EISA. The floor
statements during Congressional
consideration of EISA are also sparse. In
any event, however, floor statements,
regardless of who made them, are
entitled to less weight than conference
reports (even if they existed here)
because they may not represent
statements on the final terms of a bill
agreed to by both houses.494 Various
members, including Representative
Markey, also inserted material into the
Congressional Record after floor debate.
Materials inserted by members after
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493 See,
e.g., Representative Markey’s insertions at
153 CONG. REC. H14253 (editor’s note) and H14444
(daily ed. Dec. 6, 2007) (statement of Cong. Markey).
494 See, e.g., In re Burns, 887 F.2d 1541 (11th Cir.
1989). See also In re Kelly, 841 F.2d 908, 913 n. 3
(9th Cir. 1988) (‘‘Stray comments by individual
legislators, not otherwise supported by statutory
language or committee reports, cannot be attributed
to the fully body that voted on the bill. The
opposite inference is far more likely.’’)
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congressional action are not indicative
of congressional intent.495
Regardless of the weight that might be
accorded to Rep. Markey’s remarks,
Congress did not amend the definition
of ‘‘passenger automobile’’ or direct the
agency to amend the definition of that
term in the agency’s classification
regulation, and Rep. Markey’s remarks
do not contradict, much less address,
these points.
Moreover, even if Congress’ intent
was not to disturb the Ninth Circuit’s
decision with regard to vehicle
classification, NHTSA’s action is
responsive to the Court’s concerns and
consistent with the Court’s decision.
The court said, ‘‘Thus, we remand to
NHTSA to revise its regulatory
definitions of passenger automobile and
light truck or provide a valid reason for
not doing so.’’ 538 F.3d at 1209. In
reaching its conclusion, the court stated
that NHTSA had failed to follow a NAS
recommendation that NHTSA ‘‘tighten’’
its definition of light truck, ‘‘a step EPA
has already taken for emissions
standards purposes.’’ Id. The court did
not indicate specifically how it thought
NHTSA should change its definitions or
what would constitute a valid reason for
not doing so.
As explained at length above, NHTSA
has, since the court’s decision, made
significant changes in how it applies its
light truck definition and, in this final
rule, in one aspect of the definition
itself. In order to be classified as offhighway capable, a vehicle weighing
6,000 lbs GVWR or less must actually
have 4WD. And, only vehicles actually
manufactured and sold without secondrow seats will be considered as having
greater cargo-carrying volume than
passenger-carrying volume. The first
change has resulted in moving
approximately 1.5 million vehicles from
the light truck category to the passenger
category in the years covered by this
rule, which raises the MY 2011
combined standards by 0.3 mpg. The
second change will help prevent any
gaming of the tightened definition based
on a manufacturer’s arbitrary
declaration of what constitutes a
vehicle’s ‘‘base form.’’ These changes
constitute a very significant tightening
of NHTSA’s vehicle classification
standards, which is what the court
indicated was necessary. Moreover, the
agency has also explained above in great
detail why further changes to its
definitions would not improve, and
495 See, e.g., Sigmon Coal Co., Inc. v. Apfel, 226
F.3d 291, 304–05 (4th Cir 2000) (quoting INS v.
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432 n. 12 (1987)),
aff’d sub. nom., Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., Inc.,
534 U.S. 438 (2002), and Shannon v. United States,
512 U.S. 573, 583 (1994).
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would in fact weaken, the fuel economy
standards and accompanying fuel
savings.
With regard to the argument that
EPA’s definitions are ‘‘tighter’’ than
NHTSA’s, NHTSA notes that this is not
an apt comparison for several reasons.
First, the NAS Report and the Ninth
Circuit are referring to EPA’s Tier 2
criteria pollutant emissions
requirements for mobile sources.496
These requirements are different from
the CAFE requirements. The effect of
having more light trucks on the roads
(and thus wanting to limit their
classification as light trucks) is greater
for criteria pollutant emissions purposes
than for CAFE purposes.
Second, EPA continues to use the
same definitions as NHTSA does for
CAFE purposes.497 Even though EPA
has changed its definitions for Tier 2
purposes, the effect of those changes
was to move only four vehicle models—
the Chrysler PT Cruiser, the Chevrolet
HHR, the Honda Element, and the
Dodge Magnum—whose combined
production is currently less than
250,000 per year (less than 20 percent
of the number of vehicles reclassified as
a result of our tightening the
implementation of our vehicle
definitions). As discussed above, none
of these vehicles currently come in 4WD
or meet the 3-row fold-flat requirement,
so as currently designed, starting in MY
2012, NHTSA would likely classify
these vehicles as passenger cars as well.
And third, after MY 2009, EPA will
have no distinction between passenger
cars and light trucks for Tier 2
purposes—all vehicles will be subject to
the same standard. In summary, EPA’s
action has little relevance to vehicle
classification for CAFE purposes. This is
proved by the fact that EPA ultimately
intends to do away with the distinction
between passenger car requirements and
light truck requirements in Tier 2, an
option that EPCA would not permit
NHTSA to implement for CAFE.
Accordingly, NHTSA believes that the
vehicle classification standards and
clarification of those standards
embodied in this final rule are
consistent with Congress’s directives in
EPCA and EISA, and respond to the
Ninth Circuit’s decision with regard to
vehicle classification.
XII. Flexibility Mechanisms and
Enforcement
This section addresses comments
received on the enforcement aspects of
the flexibility mechanisms provided by
EPCA and EISA for manufacturers in
496 NAS
497 See
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complying with the CAFE standards.
These mechanisms include payment of
civil penalties or fines; trade, transfer,
and application of credits earned for
over-compliance; and the manufacturing
incentive for dual-fueled automobiles.
Section VII.C.5 above addresses
comments received with respect to how
these flexibility mechanisms interact
with the standard-setting process.
Additionally, although this section does
not repeat NHTSA’s overview in the
NPRM of the CAFE enforcement
program, because no comments were
received on it, NHTSA refers interested
readers to the discussion in that
document at 73 FR 24461 (May 2, 2008).
A. NHTSA’s Request for Comment
Regarding Whether the Agency Should
Consider Raising the Civil Penalty for
CAFE Non-Compliance
In the NPRM, NHTSA explained that
the civil penalty for failing to comply
with a CAFE standard, as adjusted for
inflation by law,498 is $5.50 for each
tenth of a mpg that a manufacturer’s
average fuel economy falls short of the
standard for a given model year
multiplied by the total volume of those
vehicles in the affected fleet (i.e., import
or domestic passenger car, or light
truck), manufactured for that model
year. NHTSA has collected $772.9
million in total penalties as of January
16, 2009.
NHTSA also explained that EPCA
authorizes increasing the civil penalty
up to $10, exclusive of inflationary
adjustments, if NHTSA decides that the
increase in the penalty—
(i) Will result in, or substantially
further, substantial energy conservation
for automobiles in model years in which
the increased penalty may be imposed;
and
(ii) Will not have a substantial
deleterious impact on the economy of
the United States, a State, or a region of
a State.499
NHTSA explained that it did not
intend to change the penalty in this
rulemaking, but sought comment on
whether it should initiate a proceeding
to consider raising the civil penalty,
since it recognized that paying penalties
could be a less expensive way for
manufacturers to comply with CAFE
standards than by applying technology
or by buying credits from other
manufacturers.
GM, Ferrari, Porsche, Volkswagen,
Mercedes, and NADA commented that
NHTSA should not raise fines and
498 Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment
Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. 2461 note, as amended by
the Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996, Pub.
L. 104–134, 110 Stat. 1320, § 31001(s).
499 49 U.S.C. 32912(c).
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should not initiate rulemaking to
consider doing so, because doing so
would not substantially improve energy
conservation. All manufacturers who
commented on this issue took exception
with what they considered to be
NHTSA’s characterization in the NPRM
that manufacturers were choosing to pay
penalties as a strategic decision instead
of adding fuel saving technology to their
vehicles. Ferrari, Porsche, Volkswagen,
and Mercedes generally argued that
because of the nature of their products,
increasing fines would not improve
their vehicles’ fuel economy
performance, due to the demands of the
market for luxury performance vehicles.
Volkswagen and Mercedes both stated
that they had already employed many if
not all of the technologies considered by
NHTSA in the NPRM, and that higher
penalties thus would be no incentive for
them to apply more technology. Porsche
and Mercedes argued that raising
penalties would only serve to punish
‘‘niche manufacturers’’ offering a
limited line of vehicles.
Mercedes also argued that NHTSA
had suggested in the NPRM that an
increase in civil penalties would be
ameliorated by the new regulation
permitting credit trading, because
Mercedes anticipated that the credit
trading market would not likely be very
robust.
NADA commented that it is
‘‘premature’’ to initiate proceedings to
raise the civil penalties, because ‘‘While
historically a few manufacturers have
found paying civil penalties to be
substantially less expensive than
installing fuel saving technologies, no
evidence exists to suggest that vehicle
manufacturers that have never paid a
fine will choose to do so rather than
attempt to comply with the 2011–2015
standards.’’ NADA argued that NHTSA
should only initiate rulemaking to
increase penalties when it ‘‘can show
that vehicle manufacturers are electing
to pay fines as an alternative to
investing in fuel saving technologies.’’
In contrast, UCS and ACEEE
commented that NHTSA should raise
fines in order to compel manufacturers
to add more fuel economy-improving
technologies to their vehicles. UCS
commented that because the NPRM
indicated that ‘‘a significant number of
manufacturers will opt for civil
penalties over compliance with fuel
economy requirements,’’ thus,
‘‘Increasing the civil penalty would
ensure the benefits are actually
realized.’’ UCS stated that the penalty
has been $5 since EPCA was enacted in
1975, and argued that ‘‘inflation has
devalued that penalty’’ over time, such
that ‘‘A fine of equivalent value today
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14427
would need to be more than $20 per 0.1
mpg.’’ 500 UCS argued that NHTSA
should ‘‘use existing authority to
increase the CAFE noncompliance civil
penalty from $5 to $10 per 0.1 mpg,’’ in
order to increase its effectiveness in
light of the ‘‘escalating economic and
environmental importance of energy
conservation.’’
ACEEE also commented that NHTSA
should consider raising the penalty.
Although ACEEE recognized that
historically ‘‘the incentive to meet CAFE
has been for some manufacturers far
greater than the avoided cost of CAFE
fines, because those companies, or their
shareholders, attach great importance to
complying with all applicable laws,’’ it
argued that ‘‘DaimlerChrysler’s payment
of substantial fines for MY 2006 may
signal increased willingness on the part
of manufacturers to fall short of CAFE
standards, even if this means incurring
fines.’’ Thus, since even NHTSA
recognized that paying penalties may be
less expensive than applying
technologies to meet CAFE standards,
ACEEE concluded that NHTSA should
consider raising the penalty.
Agency response: NHTSA will take
these comments into consideration in
deciding whether to initiate rulemaking
to raise the civil penalty for CAFE noncompliance. However, NHTSA wishes
to respond to three points raised by
commenters at this time. First, as
discussed in the NPRM, the CAFE
penalty was raised to $5.50 by
application of an act of Congress,
effective in model year 1998, to account
for inflation, and prior to that was $5
since 1975 as stated by UCS. Second, in
contrast to Mercedes’ comments,
NHTSA never suggested in the NPRM
that it would consider raising penalties
because of the additional compliance
flexibility allowed by the credit transfer
and trading programs. NHTSA may only
raise penalties if doing so would ‘‘result
in, or substantially further, substantial
energy conservation,’’ as established by
statute. With regard to the
manufacturers who argued that their
fleet mix forces them to pay penalties,
NHTSA would like to clarify that under
the attribute-based Reformed CAFE
system, each manufacturer has its own
required fuel economy level based on its
particular mix of vehicles. NHTSA will
continue to review the statutory criteria
(i.e., whether increased penalties would
substantially further energy
conservation and the likely economic
effects of higher penalties) in deciding
whether to initiate rulemaking to raise
500 UCS cited https://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/
cpicalc.pl, stating ‘‘Comparison between 1975 and
2008.’’
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the civil penalty for CAFE noncompliance.
B. CAFE Credits
As discussed in the NPRM, the ability
to earn and apply credits has existed
since EPCA’s original enactment,501 but
the potential for trading credits, i.e.,
selling credits to other manufacturers or
buying credits from them, was first
raised in the 2002 NAS Report. NAS
found that
Changing the current CAFE system to one
featuring tradable fuel economy credits and
a ‘‘cap’’ on the price of these credits appears
to be particularly attractive. It would provide
incentives for all manufacturers, including
those that exceed the fuel economy targets,
to continually increase fuel economy, while
allowing manufacturers flexibility to meet
consumer preferences.502
However, as also discussed in the
NPRM, Congress did not grant NHTSA
authority to implement credit trading
and transfer programs 503 until the
passage of EISA in December 2007.
Section 104 of EISA not only gave
NHTSA authority to implement credit
trading and transfer programs, but also
extended the carry-forward period for
credits from 3 to 5 years.
In the NPRM, NHTSA proposed a new
Part 536 setting up these two credit
programs, and sought comment
generally on (1) whether the agency had
correctly interpreted Congress’ intent;
(2) whether there were any ways to
improve the proposed credit trading and
transferring systems consistent with
EISA and Congress’ intent that the
agency might have overlooked; and (3)
whether any of the aspects of the
programs proposed by the agency were
either inconsistent with EISA and
Congress’ intent or the rest of the CAFE
regulations, or were otherwise
unworkable.
NHTSA received a number of
comments on the proposed Part 536,
which the agency has divided by issue
below.
Comments Regarding Credits Generally
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Who may be credit holders?
NHTSA stated in the NPRM that
although only manufacturers may earn
credits and apply them toward
compliance, NHTSA would allow
credits to be purchased or traded by
both manufacturers and non501 The credit provision (currently codified at 49
U.S.C. 32903) was originally section 508 of EPCA’s
Public Law version.
502 NAS Report, Finding 11, at 113.
503 ‘‘Trading’’ refers to movement of credits
between the earning manufacturer and another
entity. ‘‘Transfer’’ refers to application of a
manufacturer’s credits to one of its fleets other than
the fleet in which the credits were earned.
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manufacturers in order to facilitate
greater flexibility in the credit market.
NHTSA received comments regarding
this proposed decision from AIAM,
NADA, and the Wisconsin DNR, all of
which were in favor of the decision, and
generally stated that the additional
flexibility in the credit market would
facilitate and improve the market for
credits. NADA cautioned that it did not
believe the market would be particularly
robust due to competitive concerns, but
did suggest that the market would be
enhanced by allowing nonmanufacturers to purchase and sell
credits.
Agency response: Comments favored
the decision to allow non-manufacturers
to be credit holders, and because
NHTSA continues to believe that this
broad definition of ‘‘credit holders’’ best
serves the purposes of the credit trading
program, this definition will be
maintained in the final rule.
When a manufacturer has a shortfall,
should NHTSA automatically apply
oldest credits first or transfer credits to
make up that shortfall?
In the proposed § 536.5, NHTSA
proposed to manage some aspects of
credit use by manufacturers
automatically. For example, NHTSA
would debit credits automatically from
a manufacturer if the manufacturer fell
below the standard in a compliance
category, beginning with the oldest
credits held by the manufacturer in that
compliance category, transferring the
oldest available credits in other
categories if necessary, and notifying the
manufacturer of its need to purchase
additional credits, develop a carry-back
plan, or pay fines if there were still
insufficient credits to achieve
compliance.504 NHTSA was silent in the
preamble with respect to its rationale for
this proposal.
The Alliance, AIAM, Toyota, and
Ford commented on NHTSA’s proposal
to use a manufacturer’s oldest credits
first and to transfer credits
automatically if the manufacturer did
not have sufficient credits in the
original compliance category to make up
the shortfall. The commenters generally
argued that NHTSA was unduly
restricting manufacturers’ flexibility to
manage credits at their own discretion,
and that such a proposal was
inconsistent with EISA.
The Alliance argued that the
‘‘automatic transfer is inconsistent with
the history of NHTSA’s administration
of the CAFE program and EISA,’’ stating
that ‘‘Congress intended for the
504 Proposed § 536.5(d), at 73 FR 24485 (May 2,
2008).
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manufacturer to manage its own
credits’’ as ‘‘acknowledged in the
NPRM.’’ The Alliance suggested that
NHTSA’s explanation in the NPRM that
manufacturers should instruct NHTSA
which credits to transfer when it wanted
to transfer credits indicated that the
agency recognized manufacturers’ right
to control credit transfers. The Alliance
argued that ‘‘A manufacturer facing a
shortfall in a given fleet should retain
the flexibility to manage that shortfall as
it sees fit, including filing a carryback
plan, acquiring traded credits or by a
combination of various actions.’’
AIAM agreed that NHTSA’s approach
of debiting oldest credits first ‘‘should
be followed in most cases,’’ but
commented that in cases where ‘‘a
manufacturer prefers to use available
credits from some other compliance
category or time period first, NHTSA
should, upon request by the
manufacturer, provide the manufacturer
that flexibility.’’ AIAM suggested that
manufacturers might ‘‘wish to preserve
credits in a particular category and year
to enhance trading opportunities or to
comply with inter-category credit
transfer limitations.’’ AIAM also stated
that ‘‘nothing in [EISA] * * * mandates
that manufacturers must use available
credits in any particular order.’’
Toyota also commented that EISA did
not specify a particular order in which
credits should be applied, and argued
that NHTSA should maximize flexibility
in manufacturers’ use of credits and
allow manufacturers to make their own
decisions unless they made decisions
inconsistent with the law or unless
there was ‘‘some clear reason’’ to restrict
flexibility.
Ford argued that NHTSA’s proposal to
transfer credits automatically to make
up manufacturer shortfalls was
‘‘inconsistent with EISA,’’ because the
statutory language with regard to the
credit transfer program was permissive,
stating that the Secretary of
Transportation shall establish a
regulation to ‘‘allow’’ manufacturers to
transfer credits and apply them to
different compliance categories in order
to achieve compliance. Ford suggested
that the automatic transfer of credits by
NHTSA would interfere with
manufacturers’ flexibility to decide how
to manage a shortfall. For example, Ford
argued, a manufacturer may prefer to
submit a carry-back plan rather than to
transfer surplus credit to another
category, and EISA did not give NHTSA
the discretion to interfere in the
manufacturer’s decision in that regard.
Agency response: NHTSA did not
intend to allocate credits without
allowing the manufacturer an
opportunity to comment. NHTSA agrees
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with the commenters that manufacturers
must ultimately be responsible for how
their shortfalls are addressed, and has
revised the regulatory text accordingly.
EPCA originally stated, with regard to
conventional carry-forward/carry-back
credits, that application of credits was
to occur automatically (‘‘shall apply’’) if
a manufacturer was short of the average
fuel economy required and had credits
available. The application of those
credits offset any penalty to be paid by
the manufacturer. 49 U.S.C. 32903(d).
EISA did not change that provision.
However, EISA did introduce the two
new credit programs for transfers and
trades.
In the past, NHTSA developed carryforward plans for manufacturers
automatically if carry-forward credits
existed, and submitted the plan to the
manufacturer so that it could comment
on the proposed allocation plan. Only if
no carry-forward credits were available
would NHTSA ask the manufacturer to
submit a carry-back plan or to pay a
fine.
Upon further review the agency has
decided that Congress clearly intended
to give the manufacturer an opportunity
to comment before any application of
credits occurs. See 49 U.S.C. 32903(d).
Accordingly, we have revised the text so
that instead of NHTSA allocating credits
automatically, a manufacturer with
credits available will be required to
submit a credit allocation plan to offset
its confirmed shortfall. NHTSA will
require manufacturers to submit a plan
whenever NHTSA is informed by EPA
that a manufacturer has not met the
CAFE standards in a particular
compliance category. An enforcement
action will be initiated each time the
agency receives notification from EPA
that a standard has not been met. An
enforcement letter will be sent to the
responsible manufacturer identifying
available credits and requesting that a
credit allocation plan be submitted or
penalty be paid. NHTSA will review
and accept plans as received and
allocate credits accordingly.
Should credits be denominated in mpg
or in gallons for purposes of transfers
and trades?
49 U.S.C. 32903(c) indicates that
Congress intended credits to be
denominated in tenths of a mpg, but 49
U.S.C. 32903(f) states that total oil
savings must be preserved when trading
credits. Because there is no similar
caution that total oil savings must be
preserved when transferring credits,
NHTSA proposed in the NPRM to
denominate credits in mpg rather than
in gallons, but the agency also sought
comment on whether transferred credits
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should be denominated in gallons to
ensure that no transfers resulted in any
loss of fuel savings. When using the
terms ‘‘denominating credits in
gallons,’’ the agency meant that credits
be adjusted to preserve total oil savings
as specified for credit trades in
§ 32903(f). Section § 32903(c) defines
credits as the number of tenths of a mile
per gallon the average fuel economy of
a fleet exceeds the standard times the
number of vehicles in that
manufacturer’s fleet. Therefore, credits
should always be denominated in miles
per gallon. In the comments below,
those who argue that credits should be
denominated in mpg are opposing any
adjustment to credit transfers to prevent
losses in fuel savings.
The Alliance, AIAM, NADA, and
Toyota commented that NHTSA should
denominate credits in mpg. The
commenters generally argued that
because § 32903(c) indicates that credits
are to be denominated in tenths of mpg,
and because Congress did not specify in
EISA that oil savings must be preserved
in credit transfers, the agency should
not attempt to read anything into the
statute that is not plainly there. AIAM
also stated that, ‘‘Using different units
for transferred credits and other credits,
as mentioned by the agency, would
create unnecessary confusion and could
create accounting problems.’’ Toyota
argued that ‘‘Since Congress specified
the application of an adjustment factor
for traded credits but did not specify
such a requirement for transferred
credits, the clear intent of Congress is
that it intended transferred credits to be
calculated in the same manner as
carryforward/carryback credits.’’
Honda and EDF commented that
NHTSA should denominate credits in
gallons rather than in mpg. Honda
stated that ‘‘trading MPG will erode the
total fuel/GHG reductions, which is not
appropriate,’’ and argued that EISA did
not prohibit trading credits in gallons
instead of mpg, because it simply
addresses the maximum increase that
manufacturers may obtain from
transferred credits, not the maximum
decrease.
EDF commented that denominating
credits in gallons instead of mpg
‘‘would be a more straightforward and
simple way for the Agency to ensure
that total oil savings are preserved in
trading, banking and borrowing of CAFE
credits,’’ and would also ‘‘maximize the
environmental integrity of the
program.’’ EDF stated that NHTSA had
correctly identified the risk that
‘‘increasing fuel economy by one mpg at
a higher fuel economy level results in
less oil savings (and therefore less
reductions in GHGs) than increasing
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14429
fuel economy by one mpg at a lower fuel
economy level.’’ EDF argued that in
order to promote the need of the nation
to conserve energy, ‘‘Expressing CAFE
credits in gallons of fuel saved, rather
than in mpg, would be a natural, and
less confusing, way to present the oil
saving benefits from exceeding the
standard (or the ‘oil-saving-deficit’ as a
result of non-compliance).’’
Agency response: From the discussion
above, it is clear that credits must be
denominated in mpg per § 32903(c)(1).
The question is whether all credits,
traded and transferred, should be
adjusted to preserve fuel oil savings. As
discussed, § 32903(c) states that credits
are earned in tenths of a mile per gallon;
§ 32903(d) and (e) refer to applying
credits on a mile per gallon basis,
§ 32903(f) states that total oil savings
must be preserved only when credits are
traded. There is no other clear
expression of congressional intent in the
text of the statute suggesting that
NHTSA would have authority to adjust
transferred credits, even in the interest
of preserving oil savings. However, the
goal of the CAFE program is energy
conservation; ultimately the U.S. would
reap a greater benefit from ensuring that
fuel oil savings are preserved for both
trades and transfers. Furthermore,
accounting for traded credits differently
than for transferred credits does add
unnecessary burden on program
enforcement. Thus, NHTSA will adjust
credits both when they are traded and
when they are transferred so that no loss
in fuel savings occurs.
Comments Regarding Carry-Forward/
Carry-Back Credits
When should EISA’s extension of the
carry-forward period from 3 to 5 years
take effect?
When Congress changed the carryforward period from 3 to 5 years in
EISA, it did not clearly specify to which
credits that change was to apply. EISA’s
effective date was December 20, 2007,
and NHTSA has historically defined the
model year as beginning on October 1 of
the previous calendar year (thus, the
agency would define MY 2008 as
beginning on October 1, 2007).505 In the
NPRM, NHTSA concluded that because
EISA was enacted in the middle of MY
2008, the best interpretation of when the
extension of the carry-forward period
should take effect was to apply it only
505 See Letter of Interpretation to William Shapiro
of Volvo Cars, Jan. 13, 2000, available at https://
isearch.nhtsa.gov/files/18644KWII.ogms.html (last
accessed Sept. 18, 2008), and Letter of
Interpretation to William F. Canever of Ford Motor
Company, Oct. 22, 1990, available at https://
isearch.nhtsa.gov/files/2741y.html (last accessed
Sept. 18, 2008).
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to vehicles manufactured in or after MY
2009. Interpreting the change as
applying to all subsequent MY 2008
vehicles would have required the
agency to find some way to prorate the
change in credit lifespan, which the
agency concluded would present
considerable administrative difficulty,
especially given that credits are
denominated by year of origin and not
month and year of origin. Thus, the
agency added regulatory text stating that
credits earned in MY 2008 or before had
a 3-year carry-forward lifespan, and
credits earned in MY 2009 or later had
a 5-year carry-forward lifespan.
AIAM, Toyota, Chrysler, and NADA
commented on this issue, and all argued
that Congress intended the 5-year carryforward provision to be effective
concurrent with EISA’s effective date.
AIAM stated that it believed that any
credits earned and not expired as of the
effective date of EISA, including MY
2005–2007 credits, must be available for
use in any of the five following model
years. AIAM argued that if Congress had
intended the 5-year carry-forward
period to begin in MY 2009, it would
have included such a limitation, as it
included the provision disallowing
transfers of credits earned before MY
2011. AIAM thus concluded that to
maximize flexibility in use of credits,
‘‘enhancements to the credit system
mandated by Congress must be made
effective immediately, except where
Congress has specified otherwise.’’
Toyota also commented that because
Congress included an express start date
for credit transfers, it must have
intended that the 5-year carry-forward
provision be effective on EISA’s
effective date. Toyota argued that
Congress did address which credits
could be used for 5-year carry-forward
plans by stating in 49 U.S.C. § 32903(a)
that when a manufacturer earns credits
under this section, those ‘‘credits may
be applied to—
(1) Any of the 3 consecutive model
years immediately before the model year
for which the credits are earned; and
(2) to the extent not used by
paragraph (1) of this subsection, any of
the 5 consecutive model years
immediately after the model year for
which the credits are earned. (Toyota’s
emphasis)
Toyota argued that Congress thus
‘‘clearly identifies the credits that are
available for the 5-year carry-forward
provision as being those that are not
applied to the 3-year carry-back
provision,’’ and that Congress put no
other limitation on when the 5-year
carry-forward credits may be used.
Toyota concluded that because the
intent of Congress is clear in the
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statutory language, the agency has no
room for interpretation under Chevron.
NADA also commented that ‘‘Credit
system changes set out in EISA should
take effect immediately, except as
otherwise specified.’’ NADA argued that
even though the transfer provisions
‘‘may not take effect until MY 2011, any
existing and future earned credits
should immediately be available for the
new five year carry-forward period and
for trading.’’
Chrysler also commented that because
Congress had chosen to put specific
effective dates in some credit provisions
but not in the carry-forward provision,
the 5-year carry-forward provision must
be applicable to MY 2008 credits.
Chrysler argued that NHTSA’s
arguments regarding the difficulty of
prorating MY 2008 credits were
unavailing, because NHTSA could
simply apply the 5-year carry-forward
provision to all credits earned in MY
2008 and after. Chrysler further argued
that NHTSA has ‘‘not felt it necessary to
pro-rate credits (or penalties) when
transfers of ownership take place,
instead assigning the full year’s credits
(or penalties) to a single manufacturer,
as agreed to among the parties
involved.’’ Chrysler also stated that
‘‘when carry-forward/carry-back credits
were extended from 1 to 3 years as a
result of the Automobile Fuel Efficiency
Act of 1980 * * * NHTSA did not see
any need to pro-rate credits. Instead, the
agency’s final rule [ ] had an
immediate effective date.’’ Chrysler
suggested that if the agency is
determined to prorate the MY 2008
credits, ‘‘it can simply divide the
number of days after enactment but
before October 1, 2009 (which is 285
days) by 365 and then multiply the
credits earned in MY 2008 by the
resultant (0.781).’’
Agency response: NHTSA has
decided to revise the implementation of
the 5 year carry-forward allowance by
changing the effective date from MY
2009 to MY 2008. As discussed, because
EISA was enacted in the middle of MY
2008, NHTSA concluded in the NPRM
that the best interpretation of this
change in lifespan was to apply it only
to vehicles manufactured in or after MY
2009, because the alternative of finding
some way to prorate the change in
lifespan presented considerable
administrative difficulties.
However, 49 U.S.C. 32903(b)(2)
specifies that credits are available to a
manufacturer at the end of the model
year in which earned. Due to the fact
that the MY 2008 credits were not
finalized when EISA became effective,
the agency agrees that it is reasonable to
begin the 5-year carry-forward provision
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in MY 2008. The agency does not
believe that this provision should be
applied to all unexpired credits (MYs
2005–2007) as suggested by AIAM, but
only to those credits that are actually
earned in MY 2008 or after.
Can carry-forward/carry-back credits not
acquired by trade or transfer be used to
meet the minimum domestic passenger
car standard?
Through EISA, Congress clearly
intended to limit the use of traded or
transferred credits by manufacturers in
order to achieve compliance with the
minimum domestic passenger car
standards specified in Section 102(b)(4).
See Section 104(a)(4), codified (in
relevant part) at 49 U.S.C. § 32903(f)(2)
and (g)(4), respectively. In NHTSA’s
proposed regulatory text, the agency
included these prohibitions, and also
stated as follows:
If a manufacturer’s average fuel economy
level for domestically manufactured
passenger cars is lower than both the
attribute-based standard and the minimum
standard, then the difference between the
attribute-based standard and the minimum
standard may be relieved by the use of
credits, but the difference between the
minimum standard and the manufacturer’s
actual fuel economy level may not be
relieved by credits and will be subject to
penalties.506
NHTSA did not explain its reasoning in
the NPRM for this provision, which
prompted comments from a number of
companies, including the Alliance,
Chrysler, Ford, GM, and Toyota.
The commenters stated that the
proposed § 536.9(d) improperly
prevents manufacturers from employing
carry-back and carry-forward credits to
meet the minimum domestic passenger
car standard. The commenters argued
that Congress only explicitly prohibited
the use of traded and transferred credits
to meet the minimum domestic
passenger car standard, but did not
explicitly prohibit the use of originating
manufacturer carry-forward/-back
credits, and that therefore NHTSA
should not assume that Congress
intended more than it expressly stated.
The commenters further stated that
NHTSA was unduly and unnecessarily
restricting manufacturers’ flexibility in
using credits to meet the standards,
when the purpose of the carry-forward/
carry-back allowances was to maximize
flexibility.
Chrysler further argued that although
‘‘NHTSA may have assumed that the
use of the word minimum [in EISA
§ 102(b)(4)] might imply that the actual
506 73 FR 24487 (May 2, 2008); proposed section
49 CFR 536.9(d).
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level of the standard each year may be
attained to ensure compliance,’’ this
would be inconsistent with NHTSA’s
own regulations that allow the use of
credits to meet average fuel economy
standards for cars and light trucks that
NHTSA refers to as ‘‘minimum’’
levels.507 Chrysler suggested that the
minimum domestic passenger car
standard was simply a ‘‘new category’’
of standards, and that ‘‘allowing the use
of carry-forward/carry-back credits does
not spoil the statutory scheme nor does
it result in reduced fleet fuel economy,
since credits for exceeding the
minimum standard must ultimately be
earned.’’
Ford also further argued that because
the compliance provision of EPCA, 49
U.S.C. 32911(b), includes all fuel
economy standards under § 32902, and
states that ‘‘Compliance is determined
after considering credits available to the
manufacturer under section 32903 of
this title,’’ that credits may be used to
meet the minimum domestic passenger
car standard just as they may be used to
meet the passenger car and light truck
standards.
Agency response: NHTSA agrees with
the commenters that Congress did not
clearly establish in EISA that carryforward and carry-back credits may not
be used to comply with the minimum
domestic passenger car standard, unlike
traded and transferred credits which
clearly may not be used, per
§ 32903(f)(2) and (g)(4). As Ford argued
in its comments, 49 U.S.C. 32903(a),
which provides for the carry-forward
and carry-back periods, expressly states
that credits may be earned for exceeding
‘‘an applicable average fuel economy
standard under subsections (a) through
(d) of section 32902.’’ Congress included
the minimum domestic passenger car
standard requirement in § 32902(b)(4),
which may suggest that Congress both
intended for manufacturers to be able to
earn credits for exceeding it, and to be
able to use carry-forward and carry-back
credits to achieve compliance with it.
NHTSA has some concern that if the
purpose of the minimum domestic
passenger car standard required by
Congress is to ensure a certain
minimum level of fuel savings, that
Congress may not have intended that
credits be used to meet it, but NHTSA
accepts that the language of the statute
does not clearly indicate such a lack of
intent.
A manufacturer’s actual CAFE value
may be above or below both or only one
of its corresponding attribute-based or
minimum standards. Also, a
manufacturer’s attribute-based standard
507 Chrysler
cited 49 CFR 531.2 and 533.2.
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may be above or below its
corresponding minimum standard. For
each situation it must be clear how
credits can be earned and allocated. 49
U.S.C. § 32903(a) states that credits are
earned when a manufacturer ‘‘exceeds
an applicable average fuel economy
standard under subsections (a) through
(d) of section 32902,’’ which appears to
include the minimum domestic
passenger car standard under
32902(b)(4). To determine a credit
excess or shortfall, a manufacturer’s
actual CAFE value is compared against
either the attribute-based standard value
or the minimum standard value,
whichever is larger. Also, if a
manufacturer’s actual CAFE value is
less than the minimum standard, only
conventional carry-forward and carryback credits earned by the originating
manufacturer can be used to offset the
shortfall between the actual CAFE value
and the minimum standard.
Whether Pre-MY 2011 Passenger Car
Credits May Be Carried Forward for 5
Years
AIAM requested that ‘‘NHTSA
confirm that pre-2011 passenger auto
credits, which are compiled separately
for domestic and import fleets of a
manufacturer, may be carried forward
into 2011 and later years (subject to the
5 year limitation).’’
Agency response: As NHTSA
explained above, the agency has
decided to apply the 5-year carryforward provision to all credits earned
in MY 2008 and after. Thus, credits
earned in MYs 2008, 2009, and 2010
would be available to manufacturers
through MY 2013, 2014, and 2015,
respectively. However, credits earned
before MY 2008 remain subject to the 3year carry-forward lifespan, which
means that a credit earned in MY 2007
would expire at the end of the MY 2010
model year, and not be available for MY
2011 or later.
Whether There is a Cut-Off Date for
Consideration and use of Carry-Back
Credits
AIAM also requested that NHTSA
confirm that the proposed § 536.7(e) ‘‘is
not intended to establish an arbitrary
cut-off date for consideration of carryback credits.’’ The proposed § 536.7(e)
states that carry-back credits ‘‘from any
source’’ may not be used for compliance
more than three years after the noncompliance. AIAM argued that because
‘‘Precise final CAFE values are not
established by the end of a model year,’’
and because ‘‘Final determination of
CAFE may be delayed for a significant
period of time, due to the need for EPA
to verify the data and to report to
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14431
NHTSA,’’ that therefore ‘‘Manufacturers
should be permitted to develop a
compliance approach based on credits,
even if the final accounting takes place
more than 3 years after the
noncompliance.’’ AIAM concluded that
‘‘A manufacturer should not be
prohibited from carrying back credits for
the three model year period based on
administrative delays in establishing
final CAFE calculations.’’
Agency response: NHTSA did not
intend for the proposed § 536.7(e) to
suggest that the agency meant to change
the 3-year carry-back provision. As
specified in § 536.7(a), credits earned in
any model year may be used in carryback plans approved by NHTSA,
pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 32903(b), for up
to three model years prior to the years
in which the credits were earned. As
further specified in § 536.7(c), NHTSA
will determine ultimate compliance
with the approved carry-back plan upon
receipt of the final verified CAFE model
year figures received from EPA. NHTSA
recognizes that because manufacturers
have 90 days after the end of the model
year to submit final CAFE fleet numbers
to EPA, and because it may take up to
several months after that before EPA can
validate the final data and report back
to the manufacturer and NHTSA, it is
possible that the literal 3-year period
may be exceeded. NHTSA will revise
the regulatory text to clarify that there
is no expiration or cut-off date
associated with this process or with
available carry-back credits.
Comments Regarding Credit Trading
Issues
When should the credit trading program
begin?
In the NPRM, NHTSA proposed to
begin the credit trading program with
credits earned in MY 2011 or later.
AIAM commented that because EISA
established a 2011 effective date for
credit transfers, but added no specific
effective date for credit trades, Congress
must have intended ‘‘to not limit the
trading system.’’ Thus, AIAM supported
an immediate effective date for trading
of all credits in existence as of
December 20, 2007.
Agency response: NHTSA disagrees
with AIAM that it must allow all credits
in existence as of December 20, 2007 to
be immediately tradable. Although
Congress mandated in EISA that
NHTSA establish a credit transfer
program, it gave the agency discretion to
establish a credit trading program. Part
of the agency’s discretion in establishing
a credit trading program lies in deciding
when it should begin. While NHTSA
supports flexibility in manufacturer use
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of credits, NHTSA believes that it is
logical for credit trading to begin in MY
2011, at the same time as the new
standards take effect, and be limited to
credits earned in or after MY 2011.
Allowing credit trading to include
credits earned prior to MY 2011 could
provide a windfall of credits for
manufacturers currently exceeding, for
example, the 27.5 mpg passenger car
standard, which NHTSA believes would
be inconsistent with Congress’ intent in
allowing the agency to develop a credit
trading program. Additionally, for ease
of implementation and management of
the credit trading and transferring
programs, the agency continues to
believe that both programs should
commence for credits earned after 2010,
as Congress has stipulated for
transferred credits.
How should NHTSA calculate the
adjustment factor to preserve total oil
savings?
Congress stated in EISA that any
credit trading program established must
be set up ‘‘such that the total oil savings
associated with manufacturers that
exceed the prescribed standards are
preserved when trading credits to
manufacturers that fail to achieve the
prescribed standards.’’ EISA Sec. 104, to
be codified at 49 U.S.C. § 32903(f)(1).
NHTSA explained in the NPRM that
EISA requires total oil savings to be
preserved because one credit is not
necessarily equal to another, as
Congress realized. For example, the fuel
savings lost if the average fuel economy
of a manufacturer falls one-tenth of a
mpg below the level of a relatively low
standard are greater than the average
fuel savings gained by raising the
average fuel economy of a manufacturer
one-tenth of a mpg above the level of a
relatively high CAFE standard.
In order to ensure that total oil
savings are preserved in credit trades,
NHTSA proposed to subject traded
credits to an adjustment factor. NHTSA
explained that the effect of applying the
adjustment factor would be to increase
the value of credits that were earned for
exceeding a relatively low CAFE
standard and are intended to be applied
to a compliance category with a
relatively high CAFE standard, and to
decrease the value of credits that were
earned for exceeding a relatively high
CAFE standard and are intended to be
applied to a compliance category with a
relatively low CAFE standard. NHTSA
proposed to multiply the value of each
credit (with a nominal value of 0.1 mpg
per vehicle) by an adjustment factor
calculated by the following formula:
⎛
1
⎛⎛ 1 ⎞ ⎛
⎞⎞ ⎞
⎜ VMTe ∗ ⎜ ⎜
⎟−⎜
⎟⎟ ⎟
⎝ ⎝ MPGe ⎠ ⎝ MPGe − 0.1 ⎠ ⎠ ⎟
/A=⎜
⎜
⎛⎛ 1 ⎞ ⎛
1
⎞⎞ ⎟
⎜ VMTu ∗ ⎜ ⎜
⎟−⎜
⎟⎟ ⎟
⎝ ⎝ MPGu ⎠ ⎝ MPGu − 0.1 ⎠ ⎠ ⎠
⎝
NHTSA further explained it was
proposing to use the fuel economy
standard in the formula rather than the
actual fuel economy or some average of
the two, primarily because we believe it
will be more predictable for credit
holders and traders. However, we
sought comment on those two
alternatives, since they may be more
precise in their ability to account for
fuel savings.
Several commenters addressed
NHTSA’s proposal to use the fuel
economy standard rather than the actual
fuel economy in the adjustment factor
formula. AIAM ‘‘agree[d] that
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[NHTSA’s] approach is sensible and
facilitates record keeping,’’ and argued
that ‘‘The proposed approach would
encourage credit trading by valuing
credits at a higher level, thereby
providing an additional incentive for
manufacturers to exceed the standards
by substantial margins.’’
Cummins, Inc., commented instead
that the adjustment factor formula
should include ‘‘actual fuel economy’’
achieved by the manufacturer instead of
‘‘target fuel economy,’’ because doing so
‘‘would ensure that total fuel savings are
preserved.’’ Cummins further
commented that NHTSA should apply
the adjustment factor to both trades and
transfers, which would ‘‘ensure that we
are meeting the EISA’s objective of
reducing the United States’ dependence
on oil.
Wisconsin DNR commented that
using either actual fuel economy or an
average of actual and formula-based fuel
economy in calculating the adjustment
factor would be preferable to NHTSA’s
proposed approach of using the fuel
economy standard. Wisconsin DNR
argued that ‘‘The proposed approach
inflates the actual fuel economy
achieved and reduces the net benefit in
terms of fuel savings and pollution
reductions.’’
ACEEE, in contrast, commented that
the adjustment factor formula ‘‘does not
ensure oil savings,’’ and that the use of
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any formula is inappropriate, because
‘‘The increase in fuel economy in one
compliance category needed to offset
the additional fuel consumption
associated with a shortfall in fuel
economy in another compliance
category can be expressed precisely, in
closed form, and this should be required
by the rule.’’ ACEEE argued that the
formula’s use of a ‘‘linear approximation
to a non-linear function’’ makes it
inherently imprecise, and that that
imprecision may result in errors that are
‘‘far from negligible.’’ ACEEE presented
the following example:
If * * * one manufacturer exceeds a 22
mpg standard by 2 mpg and wishes to trade
credits to a manufacturer falling short of a 34
mpg target (in a compliance category with the
same lifetime vehicle miles traveled), the
proposed adjustment factor would allow the
second manufacturer to use those credits to
comply at 29.2 mpg. The result would be that
the extra fuel consumed by the second
manufacturer’s vehicles exceeds the fuel
saved by the first manufacturer’s vehicles by
21 percent.
ACEEE argued that this result was
unacceptable and ‘‘inconsistent with the
requirements of EISA.’’
Honda and Toyota both commented
on the ‘‘lifetime vehicle miles traveled’’
estimates used as constants in the
adjustment factor formula. Honda
expressed concern ‘‘about the use of
different lifetime mileage for cars versus
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Where A = adjustment factor applied to
traded credits by multiplying mpg for a
particular credit;
VMTe = lifetime vehicle miles traveled for
the compliance category in which the
credit was earned (152,000 miles for
domestic and imported passenger cars;
179,000 miles for light trucks);
VMTu = lifetime vehicle miles traveled for
the compliance category in which the
credit is used for compliance (152,000
miles for domestic and imported
passenger cars; 179,000 miles for light
trucks);
MPGe = fuel economy standard for the
originating manufacturer, compliance
category, and model year in which the
credit was earned;
MPGu = fuel economy standard for the
manufacturer, compliance category, and
model year in which the credit will be
used.
Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 59 / Monday, March 30, 2009 / Rules and Regulations
14433
relationship between fuel (gallons)
saved or lost as fuel economy (mpg)
increases or decreases is non-linear. The
effect of applying an adjustment factor
would be to increase the value of credits
that were earned for exceeding a
relatively low CAFE standard and to
decrease the value of credits that were
earned for exceeding a relatively high
CAFE standard. Furthermore, the fuel
savings lost if the average fuel economy
of a manufacturer falls one-tenth of a
mpg below the level of a given standard
are greater than the fuel savings gained
by raising the average fuel economy of
a manufacturer one-tenth of a mpg
above the level of the same or higher
CAFE standard.
The NPRM formula set the adjustment
factor at the ratio of the inverse of the
earner’s (seller) and the user’s (buyer)
CAFE target standard values, modified
for the total vehicle miles traveled
(VMT) by compliance category. For
example, if one manufacturer had an
attribute-weighted target standard of 21
mpg, and another manufacturer had an
attribute-weighted target standard of 25
mpg, and the VMT was constant, then
the adjustment factor was
approximately 1.19 (the ratio of the
inverse of the two target standard
values, 25/21 = 1.19). This adjustment
factor is accurate as long as the actual
fuel economy values of the earner and
user are close to their respective CAFE
target standard values. However, ACEEE
commented correctly that if the actual
fuel economy values for the seller and/
or buyer are several mpg different from
their respective target standard values,
using only the CAFE standard in the
adjustment factor formula could
produce an adjustment factor that
provides the buyer with more fuel
savings than the seller actually saved.
NHTSA believes that this issue can be
resolved with a revised adjustment
factor formula that sets the adjustment
factor at the ratio of the average fuel
savings per mpg achieved by the
originating manufacturer and average
fuel savings needed per mpg required by
the user (which, in the case of credit
transfers, would be the same
manufacturer). This approach ensures
that fuel oil savings are preserved by
applying an adjustment to each credit
based upon each credit’s ‘‘fuel oil
value.’’ As an example, in a trade
situation there is a seller (earner) who
has excess credits to sell and a buyer
(user) who has a credit deficit. Consider
a seller and a buyer with the following
situations, as described in the table
below:
Assume that the buyer wants to
purchase only enough seller credits to
offset half of its 400,000 credit shortfall.
The buyer needs to purchase 9,437,000
(18,874,000/2) gallons worth of credits
from the seller. If each seller credit is
worth 16.2357 gallons as calculated
above then the number of seller credits
that must be purchased by the buyer is
(9,437,000 gal)/(16.2357 gal/credit) =
581,250 credits
Thus, the buyer must purchase 581,250
credits of the seller’s 7,000,000 available
credits.
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light trucks,’’ due to the rise in fuel
prices changing driving behavior, and
stated that ‘‘the separate lifetime
mileage for cars and light trucks based
upon historical data may be
inappropriate when applied to current
and future markets.’’
Toyota commented that ‘‘NHTSA may
need to adjust those mileage
accumulation rates to reflect alignment
with the types of vehicles that NHTSA
expects to be classified as cars and
trucks in the future,’’ suggesting that, as
an example, ‘‘moving some portion of
2WD SUVs to the car compliance
category would tend to raise the average
car lifetime mileage accumulation and
lower the average truck lifetime mileage
accumulation.’’ Toyota argued that ‘‘To
the extent possible, NHTSA should
ensure that the VMT rates in the
adjustment equation reflect the vehicles
in each category.’’
Agency response: The agency has reevaluated the adjustment factor
proposed in the NPRM based upon the
comments received. Various formulas
for the adjustment factor could be
derived in an attempt to ensure total
fuel oil savings are preserved, which are
dependent on assumptions made
relating to fuel prices, rebound affects
and vehicle miles traveled (VMT). The
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Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 59 / Monday, March 30, 2009 / Rules and Regulations
To depict this relationship as an
adjustment factor A = (buyer gal/credit)/
(seller gal/credit)
A = 47.1850/16.2357 = 2.9062
(rounded to four decimal places)
The buyer has to multiply the credit
shortfall it wants to offset by the
adjustment factor to determine the
number of seller credits that must be
obtained from the seller as follows:
(200,000 credit shortfall) x (A) = 581,240
seller credits required
(rounded to the nearest integer)
The following adjustment factor
equation is derived from the above
example:
⎛ VMTu ∗ MPGae ∗ MPGse ⎞
A=⎜
⎟
⎝ VMTe ∗ MPGau ∗ MPGsu ⎠
The revised adjustment factor thus
includes both actual fuel economy value
and the fuel economy targets to which
the buyer and seller are subject, and
helps to ensure that total fuel savings
are preserved in trades. Additionally, as
discussed above, given that the
overarching purpose of the CAFE
program is energy conservation, the
nation would ultimately gain greater
energy benefits by ensuring that total
fuel savings are preserved in both credit
trades and credit transfers. Thus,
NHTSA has decided to adjust credits
both when they are traded and when
they are transferred so that no loss of
fuel savings occurs. The same
adjustment factor will be calculated and
applied to transferred credits as was
explained above for traded credits.
Additionally, as noted above, Honda
and Toyota commented that the agency
should evaluate and possibly revise the
values of the passenger car and light
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truck total vehicle miles traveled (VMT)
values used in the adjustment factor
equation.
Agency response: The agency agrees
with the commenters that the VMT
values should be revised. VMT is an
important value used in the adjustment
equation because it defines a vehicle’s
total lifetime miles traveled. The agency
has moved approximately 1.5 million
MY 2011 2WD sport utility vehicles
from the light truck fleet into the
passenger car fleet. Also, the agency has
moved to a higher fuel price forecast,
which by way of the rebound effect
lowers the VMT each year in every
vehicle compliance category. For
modeling purposes, four classes of VMT
are used: passenger car, pickup, van and
SUV. Table X–1 below shows the
survival rates for passenger cars and
light trucks (one survival rate applies to
all three truck classes) and the average
annual miles driven for each vehicle
class.
In general, light trucks are driven
more miles per year and survive more
years than passenger cars. Among the
light truck vehicle classes, SUVs are
driven the most miles, while vans are
driven the least. Changes in the analysis
from the NPRM to the final rule include
moving over 1.5 million SUVs from MY
2011 that were classified as light trucks
in the NPRM to the passenger car
classification in the final rule. This
means that the car VMT described in the
NPRM must be adjusted to include these
reclassified vehicles. The light truck
fleet VMT must also be adjusted because
the light truck fleet now has less SUVs.
Considering EISA’s revisions to EPCA’s
credit carry-forward and carry-back
provisions which allow credits to be
used over a longer time frame, with
greater potential variation in VMT
factors for a given credit, NHTSA has
concluded that VMT factors for use in
credit calculations should reflect model
years beyond MY 2011. Compared to
developing VMT factors specific to MY
2011, NHTSA believes this approach
will better ensure preservation of fuel
savings over time.
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Over the five model years addressed
by the NPRM, the passenger car fleet
now contains 47.04 million vehicles.
There are 39.86 million vehicles that
were classified as passenger cars in the
NPRM (84.7 percent), plus 7.18 million
SUVs (15.3 percent) that are reclassified
as passenger cars in the final rule. The
truck fleet over the five model years
contains 35.77 million vehicles—41.4
percent are pickups, 43.9 percent are
SUVs, and 14.7 percent are vans. This
reflects a reduction in SUVs in the truck
fleet from the NPRM to the final rule.
In each fleet, the adjusted VMT in
each year is the sum of the vehicle
classes weighted by survival rate and
market share. Adjusted car VMT equals
the car VMT times the car survival rate
times the car market share (84.7
percent), plus the SUV VMT times the
SUV survival rate times the proportion
of SUVs in the car fleet (15.3 percent).
Adjusted Car VMTt = Car VMTt * Car
Survivalt * 0.847 + SUV VMTt * SUV
Survivalt * 0.153, where t denotes model
year
Adjusted truck VMT equals the pickup
truck VMT times the pickup truck
survival rate times the pickup truck
market share (41.4 percent), plus the
SUV VMT times the SUV survival rate
times the proportion of SUVs in the
truck fleet (43.9 percent), plus the van
VMT times the van survival rate times
the proportion of vans in the truck fleet
(14.7 percent).
Adjusted Truck VMTt = Pickup VMTt *
Pickup Survivalt * 0.414 + SUV VMTt *
SUV Survivalt * 0.439 + Van VMTt * Van
Survivalt * 0.147, where t denotes model
year
Total VMT is the sum over 36 years for
the adjusted car and truck VMT. For
passenger cars, the adjusted VMT is
150,922 miles. For light trucks, the
adjusted VMT is 172,552 miles. NHTSA
expects to reevaluate trends in vehicle
survival and mileage accumulation in
the future, and to adjust these VMT
factors accordingly in future CAFE
rulemakings.
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Where:
A = Adjustment Factor applied to traded or
transferred credits to ensure fuel oil
savings is preserved (rounded to four
decimal places);
VMTe = Lifetime vehicle miles traveled for
the compliance category in which the
credit was earned: 150,992 miles for
domestically manufactured and
imported passenger cars, 172,552 miles
for light trucks;
VMTu = Lifetime vehicle miles traveled for
the compliance category in which the
credit is used for compliance: 150,992
miles for domestically manufactured and
imported passenger cars, 175,552 miles
for light trucks;
MPGse = Fuel economy target standard for
the originating manufacturer,
compliance category, and model year in
which the credit was earned;
MPGae = Actual fuel economy value for the
originating manufacturer, compliance
category, and model year in which the
credit was earned.
MPGsu = Fuel economy target standard for
the user, compliance category, and
model year in which the credit is used
for compliance;
MPGau = Actual fuel economy value for the
user manufacturer, compliance category,
and model year in which the credit is
used for compliance.
Comments Regarding Credit Transfer
Issues
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Whether NHTSA Should Prevent
Credits Received by Trade From Being
Transferred in Quantities Beyond the
Transfer Cap
In the NPRM, NHTSA proposed to
allow manufacturers to transfer credits
that they had obtained by trade from
one compliance category to another, but
not to allow credits obtained by trade
and subsequently transferred to be used
to exceed the statutory cap on increases
in a manufacturer’s fuel economy
attributable to transferred credits under
49 U.S.C. 32903(g)(3).
AIAM and Volkswagen commented
that NHTSA should not limit the benefit
of cross-compliance category trades via
the cap on transfers. AIAM argued that
a trade from, for example, Manufacturer
A’s passenger car fleet to Manufacturer
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B’s light truck fleet should be
considered a direct trade, rather than a
trade followed by a transfer as NHTSA
indicated in the NPRM. AIAM stated
that ‘‘The agency’s limitation is
inconsistent with the express language
of Congress in applying the maximum
credit limit only to credit transfers.’’ VW
argued that unlimited trading should be
allowed because the adjustment factor is
in place to preserve total oil savings.
Agency response: NHTSA disagrees
with the commenters that the example
given by AIAM would be a direct trade
rather than a trade followed by a
transfer. Allowing traded credits to be
used in the manner suggested by AIAM
would circumvent the limit
requirements set up by Congress for
credit transfers. EISA provided NHTSA
with the authority to develop a credit
trading program along with the
mandated credit transferring program.
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14435
As part of the trading program, the
agency decided not to specify limits on
trades within the same compliance
category. Further, the agency is
clarifying the definition of ‘‘trade’’ in
the regulatory text to make plain its
intent that trades occur between
manufacturers within the same
compliance category only. Still, the
agency believes that the limits that
apply to transfers should apply to all
transfers, including the transfer of
credits earned by an originating
manufacturer between its compliance
categories and transfers of credits
acquired by trade.
Further, NHTSA believes that VW is
mistaken that the adjustment factor
means that trading may be unlimited.
The traded credit adjustment factor and
the limits applied to transferred credits
are two separate requirements. The
adjustment factor is applied to ensure
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14436
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C. Extension and Phasing out of
Flexible-Fuel Incentive Program
NHTSA explained in the NPRM that
EPCA encourages manufacturers to
build alternative-fueled and dual-fueled
vehicles by using a special, statutorilyspecified calculation procedure for
determining the fuel economy of these
vehicles. The fuel economy calculation
is based on the assumption that the
vehicle operates on the alternative fuel
a significant portion of the time. This
approach gives such vehicles a muchhigher fuel economy level compared to
similar gasoline-fueled vehicles, and
lets those vehicles be factored into a
manufacturer’s general fleet fuel
economy calculation, but only to the
extent that the overall fleet fuel
economy rises 1.2 mpg per compliance
category in a model year.
Congress extended the incentive in
EISA for dual-fueled automobiles
through MY 2019, but provided for its
phase out between MYs 2015 and
2019.508 The maximum fuel economy
increase which may be attributed to the
incentive is thus as follows:
NHTSA further explained in the
NPRM that 49 CFR Part 538 implements
the statutory alternative-fueled and
dual-fueled automobile manufacturing
incentive, and that NHTSA was not
proposing to amend Part 538 in this
rulemaking to reflect the changes in
EISA, but that the agency would
undertake this task in a future
rulemaking.
NHTSA received two comments on
this issue. Cummins, Inc. stated that it
‘‘supports the continuation of the flexfuel credit,’’ because ‘‘The use of
alternative fuels such as biodiesel can
reduce the dependence on foreign oil
and produce domestic economic
benefits for local producers of these
fuels.’’
The Alliance commented that despite
NHTSA’s statement in the NPRM that it
would not be including changes to Part
538 in this rulemaking, it would ‘‘not be
difficult to implement’’ changes in this
rulemaking, and would not require
supplemental notice and comment. The
Alliance offered proposed text
amending 49 CFR § 538.9, and argued
that the proposal was simply a
‘‘ministerial implementation of 49
U.S.C. § 32906(a),’’ as ‘‘Existing Section
538.9 of the Title 49 Code of Federal
Regulations is clearly a ministerial
application of EPCA.’’
Agency response: NHTSA agrees with
the Alliance that amending 49 CFR
§ 538.9 would be simply a ministerial
implementation of 49 U.S.C. § 32906(a),
but reiterates that it will undertake this
task in a near-future rulemaking.
Meanwhile, to the extent that 49 U.S.C.
32906(a) differs from 49 CFR 538.9, the
statute supersedes the regulation, and
regulated parties may rely on the text of
the statute. NHTSA appreciates the
comment from Cummins, but notes that
the decision to extend the
manufacturing incentive was that of
Congress and not of the agency.
in the NPRM, the OVSC has developed
a draft test procedure for measuring
production vehicle wheelbase and track
width dimensions. This test procedure
was made available on NHTSA’s
website.509 It will be used by NHTSA
and will not be a requirement that
manufacturers must follow.
Accordingly, NHTSA is not required to
provide notice and an opportunity to
comment on its procedure.
Nevertheless, the agency sought
comments in the NPRM on the draft test
procedure. In response, the Alliance and
SEA, Ltd., submitted comments that are
categorized into three subject areas,
including test procedure execution,
measured value tolerances, and
administrative or editorial issues. All of
the comments were considered. An
updated revision to the procedure will
be posted on the NHTSA web site
concurrent with the final rule.
Following is a brief discussion of the
key issues in each of these three areas.
508 49 U.S.C. 32906(a). NHTSA notes that the
incentive for dedicated alternative-fuel
automobiles, automobiles that run exclusively on
an alternative fuel, at 49 U.S.C. § 32905(a), was not
phased-out by EISA.
509 Available at https://www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/
DOT/NHTSA/Vehicle%20Safety/Test%20
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XIII. Test Procedure for Measuring
Wheelbase and Track Width and
Calculating Footprint
The reformed CAFE program requires
manufacturers to use vehicle wheelbase
and track width data to establish target
standards for each of its compliance
categories. Manufacturers are required
to provide these data to the agency in
the pre-model year reports as specified
in 49 CFR part 537, ‘‘Automotive Fuel
Economy Reports.’’ As part of its
assigned CAFE responsibilities,
NHTSA’s Office of Vehicle Safety
Compliance (OVSC) is establishing a
program to validate the wheelbase and
track width data for selected vehicle
configurations (models). As mentioned
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A. Test Procedure Execution
The Alliance commented that the base
tires and test weight should be
confirmed prior to executing the test.
Vehicle track width is determined with
a vehicle equipped with the base tire.
The test procedure already included
identification of the base tire
Procedures/Associated%20Files/TP%20537–
00%20Draft.pdf (last accessed Oct. 1, 2008).
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that credit values are standardized
across different manufacturers, which
ultimately preserves total oil savings.
The credit transfer limits, in contrast,
ensure that only a specified amount of
a manufacturer’s noncompliant fuel
economy value can be offset by
transferred credits. A traded credit that
is subsequently transferred for
compliance is adjusted to ensure total
oil saving is preserved and is subject to
the transfer limitations of Section
536.5(d)(3).
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information. However, in response to
the Alliance’s comment, we are
modifying 49 CFR Part 537 to include a
requirement for manufacturers to
provide base tire information in their
pre-model year CAFE reports. As for
confirming the vehicle weight, it is
NHTSA’s intent to conduct testing at the
vehicle’s unloaded vehicle weight. The
test procedure has been revised to
specify this loading condition.
Additionally, NHTSA does not
currently have a definition for ‘‘base
tire.’’ Recent discussions with
manufacturers have indicated to the
agency that there is some confusion
with regard to what the term means.
Since different tire sizes may affect
vehicle track width, and thus affect
footprint, a precise definition for ‘‘base
tire’’ is necessary to prevent gaming. A
definition has been added to 49 CFR
523.2.
The Alliance further stated that the
actual measurement point for the track
width is under the tire at the geometric
center of the tire tread patch when in
contact with the ground (tire to ground
interface). NHTSA’s draft procedure,
which called for measuring the track
width at the front center of the front
tires and at the rear center of the rear
tires at ground level, provided a means
for measuring the approximate front and
rear track widths. The differences
between the two measurement
techniques are unknown but would be
impacted by camber and toe angles.
NHTSA has evaluated other approaches
that may be more accurate for measuring
the vehicle track width. The Alliance
suggested a possible technique of rolling
the vehicle over an impressionable
material and measuring the
perpendicular distance between the
corresponding axle tire patch tread
centers. A second technique for
determining the track width from the
geometric center of the tire tread patch
was provided in the comments from
SEA, Ltd. SEA, Ltd. has been
conducting track width and wheelbase
measurements for NHTSA’s NCAP
rollover static stability factor (SSF)
program for the past seven years. The
NCAP procedure involves measuring
the inside and outside, front and rear
width dimensions between the tires on
each axle and then averaging those
measured dimensions to calculate an
accurate front and rear axle track width.
Averaging the measurements mitigate
the potential for measurement errors
caused by a vehicle’s toe and camber
angles. NHTSA has decided to follow
the approach used by the NCAP and has
revised the test procedure accordingly.
The Alliance also commented on the
procedure used to verify that the front
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tires are pointed in the forward
direction during testing. NHTSA agrees
that placement of tires, including
steering angle and suspension
adjustments can have an impact on
measured results. During testing the
front tires will be placed in a ‘‘straight
ahead position’’ parallel to the
longitudinal axis of the vehicle,
although the agency does not believe
that it is necessary to specify particular
tolerances. The test procedure has been
modified to include an additional step
of rolling the vehicle in a straight line
forward and backwards once positioned
on the test surface to ensure any steering
and suspension loading and imbalances
caused from steering the vehicle onto
the test surface are removed.
Furthermore, NHTSA is confident that
by adopting the NCAP test technique
the placement of the front tires is no
longer a critical issue affecting the track
width measurements.
B. Measured Value Tolerances
The Alliance questioned what
tolerances the agency will allow
between manufacturer-provided
wheelbase, track width and footprint
data, and the corresponding agencymeasured and -calculated wheelbase,
track width and footprint data. The
Alliance argued that just being off by 1⁄8inch for the wheelbase and 1⁄8-inch for
the track width can result in a 0.2
square foot difference in footprint.
NHTSA understands that both test
instrumentation accuracy and the
inherent measurement variations
between design dimensions and
physical measurements must be
considered when determining an
acceptable tolerance between
manufacturer-reported data and
NHTSA-measured data. In the short
term, the agency plans to collect
physical data by measuring wheelbase
and track width dimensions of
production vehicles in the field. Also,
the agency is in the process of asking
each manufacturer for data relating to
known tolerances between design and
production measurements and
analyzing the tolerances from the
vehicles measured by the NCAP
program. The agency plans to collect
and analyze these data along with the
field data to understand better the
tolerances that can be expected. NHTSA
plans to revise its test procedure
accordingly to address the issue raised.
The Alliance also expressed concern
with the accuracy of the hand level and
tape measure proposed to be used in the
draft test procedure, and argued that
more accurate means exist and should
be employed in order to eliminate any
sources that would cause discrepancies
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14437
between design data and field
measurements. The agency agrees with
the Alliance and has identified more
accurate instrumentation that is now
referenced in the test procedure and
will be used for measuring wheelbase
and track width dimensions. Further
research is ongoing to identify
instrumentation that can be easily
adapted to this kind of application. The
agency is open to any further
suggestions that the Alliance or anyone
else has for identifying other
inexpensive and portable tools and
instrumentation that can be used with a
high level of accuracy and repeatability
for making field measurements. When
instrumentation changes are made the
NHTSA test procedure will reflect them
accordingly.
The Alliance also commented that
wheelbase and track width
measurement procedures round the
measurements to a finer level than is
repeatable. The Alliance appeared to be
referencing the statements in the test
procedure which allow for recording the
track width and wheelbase
measurements to the nearest 1⁄8-inch
and then rounding to the nearest 1⁄10inch. Measuring the wheelbase and
track width in inches and rounding to
the nearest 1⁄10-inch is required by the
definition of footprint as specified in 49
CFR Part 523. The test procedure has
been revised to remove references to
recording the measurements to the
nearest 1⁄8″ and now incorporates
making the measurement to a more
precise value of millimeters that
correlates to the measuring instruments
the agency has decided to use. However,
the test procedure will retain
requirements for rounding wheelbase
and track width measurements to the
nearest 1⁄10-inch after converting from
metric units to English units.
C. Administrative and Editorial Issues
The Alliance suggested that the test
procedure reference SAE J1100 (W101).
‘‘L101 Wheelbase’’ and ‘‘W101–1, 2
Tread Width Front & Rear Tires’’ are the
applicable SAE items equivalent to the
agency’s definitions of wheelbase and
track width in Part 523. The Alliance
argued that the use of these dimensions
is a standard practice for the industry
and should be incorporated in NHTSA’s
test procedure.
In response to the Alliance’s
comment, the agency notes that the
definitions for wheelbase in SAE J1100
and 49 CFR part 523 are the same. Both
SAE J1100 and 49 CFR 523.2 define
‘‘wheelbase’’ as the longitudinal
distance between front and rear wheel
centerlines. However, differences exist
in SAE J1100 and the Part 523
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definitions for track width. SAE J1100
defines ‘‘track width’’ as the lateral
distance between the centerlines of the
tires at ground, whereas Part 523
specifies the lateral distance between
the centerlines of the base tires at
ground, including the camber angle.
Base tire size and camber angle impact
the track width dimension. Vehicle
manufacturers must report wheelbase
and track width dimensions per the part
523 definitions in MY 2008 and later
pre-model year CAFE reports required
by 49 CFR part 537. However, plan view
and profile view figures depicting the
vehicle wheelbase and track width
measurements, similar to what is
provided in SAE J1100, will be added to
the NHTSA test procedure for
clarification.
The Alliance also commented that
manufacturers already attest in the preMY report that they follow 49 CFR part
537 for things like analytically-derived
fuel economy, and argued that this
official certification should extend to
the wheelbase, track width and footprint
data provided. The Alliance appears to
suggest that the agency should accept
the data submitted by the vehicle
manufacturers without implementing
any type of validation enforcement
program. The primary mission of
NHTSA’s enforcement is to ensure and
verify that manufacturers conform to
appropriate Federal regulations and
comply with required Federal motor
vehicle safety standards. Verification of
the key data used to calculate the
manufacturer’s fuel economy standards
required by 49 CFR parts 531 and 533
is essential to meeting this mission.
The Alliance also questioned the use
of the term ‘‘Apparent Noncompliance’’
in the test procedure and requested
clarification regarding what would
constitute a failure. In response, the
OVSC test data collected will be used to
validate wheelbase and track width data
submitted by each manufacturer
required by 49 CFR Part 537. Collected
data may identify possible discrepancies
between manufacturer-submitted data
and production vehicle measurements.
Footprint calculations derived from the
wheelbase and track width
measurements are critical for
determining compliance with CAFE
standards. Any noted discrepancies will
have to be discussed with the respective
vehicle manufacturer and resolved prior
to the manufacturer submittal of final
data to the Environmental Protection
Agency. If the vehicle manufacturer’s
data are found to be in error, it could be
classified as a non-conformance to the
CAFE pre-model year reporting
requirements of 49 CFR part 537. This
would not qualify as a non-compliance
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to a safety standard. The test procedure
text will be updated to reflect this
distinction. However, a nonconformance to the CAFE footprint
requirements could result in a redetermination of applicable fuel
economy target standards for each
respective vehicle model and
compliance category.
Finally, the Alliance argued that the
procedure should measure dimensions
using metric units of measure and a
conversion to English should follow at
the end only to generate English
equivalents for secondary reporting. The
Alliance stated that ‘‘The manufacturers
that comprise the Alliance of
Automobile Manufacturers, are citizens
of the world and it makes our great
country look arrogant when we continue
to author Technical Procedures based
on English units.’’ It is the agency’s
common practice in development of test
procedures to follow the unit of measure
format used in the corresponding
regulation or standard. The agency has
worked for several years to issue revised
and new regulations and standards
employing the metric system of
measures. However, to date, not all of
the agency regulations and standards
have been converted. 49 CFR Part 523
specifies wheelbase and track width
dimensions to be measured in inches
and rounded to the nearest tenth of an
inch. In this case, we have decided to
accept the Alliance’s recommendation
and have revised the test procedure to
measure dimensions in metric units and
then convert to English-equivalent
units.
XIV. Sensitivity and Monte Carlo
Analysis
NHTSA is establishing fuel economy
standards, based on the Volpe model
analysis, that maximize net societal
benefits—that is, where the estimated
benefits to society exceed the estimated
cost of the rule by the highest amount.
This analysis is based, among other
things, on many underlying estimates,
all of which entail uncertainty. Future
fuel prices, the cost and effectiveness of
available technologies, the damage cost
of carbon dioxide emissions, the
economic externalities of petroleum
consumption, and other factors cannot
be predicted with certainty.
Recognizing these uncertainties,
NHTSA has used the Volpe model to
conduct both sensitivity analyses, by
changing one factor at a time, and a
probabilistic uncertainty analysis (a
Monte Carlo analysis that allows
simultaneous variation in these factors)
to examine how key measures (e.g., mpg
levels of the standard, total costs and
PO 00000
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total benefits) vary in response to
changes in these factors.
However, NHTSA has not conducted
a probabilistic uncertainty analysis to
evaluate how optimized stringency
levels respond to such changes in these
factors. The Volpe model currently does
not have the capability to integrate
Monte Carlo simulation with stringency
optimization.
The agency has performed several
sensitivity analyses to examine
important assumptions. The analyses
include:
(1) The value of reducing CO2
emissions. We examined $2 per metric
ton as a domestic value, $33 per metric
ton as a global value and $80 per metric
ton as a global value, with the main
analysis using a value of $2 per metric
ton as a domestic value. These values
can be translated into dollars per gallon
by multiplying by 0.0089 metric tons
per gallon 510, as shown below:
$2 per ton CO2 = $2*0.0089 = $0.0178
per gallon
$33.00 per ton CO2 = $33*0.0089 =
$0.2937 per gallon
$80.00 per ton CO2 = $80*0.0089 =
$0.712 per gallon
(2) The value of monopsony costs. For
domestic values of CO2, the main
analysis uses $0.266 per gallon for
monopsony costs. At the low end of the
range for domestic values, the
sensitivity analysis uses a value of
$0.210. For global values of CO2, a $0
value of monopsony cost is appropriate.
As discussed previously in Section V,
this is consistent with the fact that
monopsony payments are a transfer
rather than a real economic benefit
when viewed from the same global
perspective, and thus have a net value
of zero.
(3) The price of gasoline. The main
analysis uses the AEO 2008 High Price
case forecast for the price of gasoline
(see Table VIII–3). In this sensitivity
analysis we also examine the AEO 2008
Reference Case forecast of the price of
gasoline.
(4) Military security. For one of the
scenarios, we assumed a $0.05
reduction in military security costs for
each gallon of fuel saved. The derivation
of this estimate is discussed in detail in
Section V.
Sensitivity analyses were performed on
only the optimized (7%) alternative. In
the PRIA, we examined the sensitivity
510 The molecular weight of Carbon (C) is 12, and
the molecular weight of Oxygen (O) is 16, thus the
molecular weight of CO2 is 44. One ton of C = 44/
12 tons CO2 = 3.67 tons CO2. 1 gallon of gas weighs
2,819 grams, of that 2,433 grams are carbon. $1.00
CO2 = $3.67 C and $3.67/ton * ton/1000kg * kg/
1000g * 2433g/gallon = (3.67 * 2433)/1000 * 1000
= $0.0089/gallon
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of the price of gasoline (low, reference,
and high case), values of reducing CO2
emissions ($0 to $14 per ton), combined
externalities ($0.120 and $0.504 per
gallon), and the rebound effect (10 to 20
percent). Only the price of gasoline had
a significant impact on the results.
The results of the sensitivity analyses
indicate that the much wider values of
CO2 examined have almost no impact
on the achieved mpg levels for
passenger cars and a small impact on
the levels for light trucks. This occurs
because the effect of the higher global
values for reducing CO2 emissions is
partly offset by the accompanying
reduction of the benefit from savings in
monopsony costs from its domestic
value of $0.266 per gallon to its global
value of $0.000. However, the extent to
which eliminating the monopsony
benefit offsets the higher values of
reducing CO2 emissions is limited by
the fact that these values continue to
grow at the assumed 2.4 percent rate
over the period spanned by the analysis,
while the monopsony benefit remains
fixed.
The lower fuel prices forecast in the
AEO 2008 Reference Case have no
discernible difference in the projected
achievable levels for passenger cars but
result in a lower projected achievable
level (by 0.3 mpg) for light trucks in MY
2011. Assuming a savings in military
security costs of $0.05 per gallon has no
significant impact on the level of the
standards.
OMB Circular A–4 requires formal
probabilistic uncertainty analysis of
complex rules where there are large,
multiple uncertainties whose analysis
raises technical challenges or where
effects cascade and where the impacts of
the rule exceed $1 billion. The agency
identified and quantified the major
uncertainties in the preliminary
regulatory impact analysis and
estimated the probability distribution of
how those uncertainties affect the
benefits, costs, and net benefits of the
alternatives considered in a Monte Carlo
analysis. The results of that analysis,
summarized for the combined passenger
car and light truck fleet across both the
7 percent (typically the lower range) and
3 percent (typically upper range)
discount rates511 are as follows:
Fuel Savings: The analysis indicates
that MY 2011 vehicles (both passenger
cars and light trucks) will experience
between 732 million and 1,114 million
511 In a few cases the upper range results were
obtained from the 7% rate and the lower range
results were obtained from the 3% rate. While this
may seem counterintuitive, it results from the
random selection process that is inherent in the
Monte Carlo technique.
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gallons of fuel savings over their useful
lifespan.
Total Costs: The analysis indicates
that vehicle manufacturers will invest
between $760 million and $2,235
million to improve the fuel economy of
MY 2011 passenger cars and light
trucks.
Societal Benefits: The analysis
indicates that changes to MY 2011
passenger cars and light trucks to meet
the proposed CAFE standards will
produce overall societal benefits valued
between $1,003 million and $2,229
million.
Net Benefits: The uncertainty analysis
indicates that the net impact of the
higher CAFE requirements for MY 2011
passenger cars and light trucks will
range from a net loss of $913 million to
a net benefit of $1,224 million. There is
at least an 80 percent certainty (the
lower of the passenger car and light
truck certainty levels) that changes
made to MY 2011 vehicles to achieve
the higher CAFE standards will produce
a net benefit.
XV. NHTSA’s Record of Decision
On January 7, 2009, the Department of
Transportation announced that the Bush
Administration decided not to finalize
its rulemaking on CAFE, stating that
‘‘recent financial difficulties of the
automobile industry will require the
next administration to conduct a
thorough review of matters affecting the
industry, including how to effectively
implement the Energy Independence
and Security Act of 2007 (EISA).’’
Statement from the U.S. Department of
Transportation, available at https://
www.dot.gov/affairs/dot0109.htm (last
accessed Feb. 9, 2009).
On January 26, 2009, President
Obama issued a memorandum to the
Secretary of Transportation and the
Administrator of NHTSA, directing
NHTSA ‘‘to publish in the Federal
Register by March 30, 2009, a final rule
prescribing increased fuel economy for
model year 2011.’’ See 74 FR 4907.
President Obama also requested that
‘‘before promulgating a final rule
concerning model years after model year
2011, [the agency] consider the
appropriate legal factors under EISA,
the comments filed in response to the
[NPRM], the relevant technological and
scientific considerations, and to the
extent feasible, the forthcoming report
by the National Academy of Sciences
mandated under section 107 of EISA.
* * *’’ Id. President Obama also
requested that NHTSA ‘‘consider
whether any provisions regarding
preemption are consistent with the
EISA, the Supreme Court’s decision in
Massachusetts v. EPA and other
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14439
relevant provisions of law and the
policies underlying them.’’ See id.
In accordance with President Obama’s
directive, this Final Rule promulgates
the fuel economy standards for MY 2011
only. The agency is deferring further
action at this time in order to evaluate
the appropriate course of action
concerning fuel economy standards for
model years after MY 2011. This Final
Rule constitutes the Record of Decision
(ROD) for NHTSA’s MY 2011 CAFE
standards, pursuant to the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and
the Council on Environmental Quality’s
(CEQ) implementing regulations.512 See
40 CFR § 1505.2.
As required by CEQ regulations, this
Final Rule and ROD sets forth the
following: (1) The agency’s decision; (2)
alternatives considered by NHTSA in
reaching its decision, including the
environmentally preferable alternative;
(3) the factors balanced by NHTSA in
making its decision, including
considerations of national policy; (4)
how these factors and considerations
entered into its decision; and (5) the
agency’s preferences among alternatives
based on relevant factors, including
economic and technical considerations
and agency statutory missions. This
Final Rule also addresses mitigation as
required by CEQ regulations and
applicable laws.
The Agency’s Decision
After carefully reviewing and
analyzing all of the information in the
public record including technical
support documents, the FEIS, public
and agency comments submitted on the
Draft Environmental Impact Statement
(DEIS), public and agency comments
submitted on the FEIS, and public and
agency comments submitted on the
NPRM, NHTSA’s decision is to proceed
with the Optimized Alternative, Mid-2
Scenario for MY 2011 (NHTSA’s
Decision).513 Specifically, the agency’s
decision is to implement the following
CAFE standards for MY 2011: 30.2 mpg
for passenger cars and 24.1 mpg for light
trucks. In the DEIS and the FEIS, the
agency identified the Optimized
Alternative (maximizing societal net
benefits) as NHTSA’s Preferred
Alternative. For a discussion of the
agency’s selection of the Optimized
512 NEPA is codified at 42 U.S.C. 4321–47. CEQ
NEPA implementing regulations are codified at 40
Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 1500–08.
513 NHTSA’s Decision to proceed with the
Optimized Alternative using economic assumptions
that are reflected in the Mid-2 Scenario, which were
prompted in part by public comments, is within the
spectrum of alternatives set forth in the DEIS and
the FEIS, and the environmental impacts of this
decision are within the spectrum of impacts
analyzed in the DEIS and the FEIS.
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Alternative, see Section VII(E)(2)(b) of
this Final Rule.
Alternatives Considered by NHTSA in
Reaching its Decision, Including the
Environmentally Preferable Alternative
When preparing an EIS, NEPA
requires an agency to compare the
potential environmental impacts of its
proposed action and a reasonable range
of alternatives. NHTSA identified
alternative stringencies that represent
the full spectrum of potential
environmental impacts and safety
considerations. Specifically, the DEIS
and FEIS analyzed the impacts of the
following six ‘‘action’’ alternatives: 25
Percent Below Optimized, Optimized,
25 Percent Above Optimized, 50 Percent
Above Optimized, Total Costs Equal
Total Benefits, and Technology
Exhaustion. The DEIS and FEIS also
analyzed the impacts that would be
expected if NHTSA imposed no new
requirements (the No Action
Alternative). In accordance with CEQ
regulations, the agency selected a
Preferred Alternative in the DEIS and
FEIS (the Optimized Alternative).
In response to public comments, the
FEIS expanded the analysis to
determine how the proposed
alternatives are affected by variations in
the economic assumptions input into
the computer model NHTSA uses to
calculate the costs and benefits of
various potential CAFE standards (the
Volpe model). Specifically, the agency
calculated and analyzed mpg standards
and environmental impacts associated
with each alternative under four model
input scenarios: Reference Case, High
Scenario, Mid-1 Scenario, and Mid-2
Scenario. See FEIS § 2.2.2. With this
expanded analysis, the FEIS presented
the agency with a broad, comprehensive
spectrum of the alternatives, varied
economic inputs, and potential
environmental impacts.
The agency compared the potential
environmental impacts of alternative
mpg levels, analyzing direct, indirect,
and cumulative impacts. For a
discussion of the environmental impacts
associated with each of the alternatives,
including the Optimized Alternative
using the Mid-2 Scenario, see Chapter 3,
Chapter 4 and Appendix B to the FEIS.
The agency considered and analyzed
each of the individual economic
assumptions to determine which
assumptions most accurately represent
future economic conditions. For a
discussion of the analysis supporting
the selection of the economic
assumptions relied on by the agency in
this Final Rule, see Section V. The
economic assumptions used by the
agency in this Final Rule are reflected
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in the Mid-2 Scenario set of
assumptions analyzed in the FEIS. See
FEIS § 2.2.
The Technology Exhaustion
Alternative is the overall
Environmentally Preferable Alternative.
Specifically, the Technology Exhaustion
Alternative is the Environmentally
Preferable Alternative in terms of the
following reductions: Fuel use, CO2
emissions, criteria air pollutant
emissions, and their resulting health
impacts, and emissions of almost all
mobile source air toxics (MSATs).
Because it would impose the highest
car and light truck CAFE standards for
MY 2011 among the alternatives
considered, the Technology Exhaustion
Alternative would result in the largest
reductions in fuel use and GHG
emissions. As explained in Chapter 5 of
the FEIS, the reductions in fuel
consumption resulting from higher fuel
economy cause emissions during fuel
refining and distribution to decline. For
most pollutants, this decline is more
than sufficient to offset the increase in
tailpipe emissions that results from
increased driving due to the rebound
effect of higher fuel economy, leading to
a net reduction in total emissions from
fuel production, distribution, and use.
Because of this effect, the Technology
Exhaustion Alternative would also lead
to the largest reductions in emissions of
criteria air pollutants and their resulting
health impacts, as well as the largest
reductions in emissions of almost all
mobile source air toxics (MSATs).
NHTSA’s environmental analysis
indicates that emissions of the MSATs
acrolein would increase under some
alternatives, with the largest increases
in emissions of these MSATs projected
to occur under the Technology
Exhaustion Alternative. The analysis of
acrolein emissions presented in the
FEIS, however, is incomplete, because
emissions factors for acrolein during
fuel production and distribution are
unavailable, so that the agency is thus
unable to estimate the net change in
total acrolein emissions likely to result
under each alternative. If the agency had
been able to estimate reductions in
‘‘upstream’’ emissions of acrolein as
part of its analysis, total acrolein
emissions under each alternative would
increase by smaller amounts than those
amounts reported in the EIS, or even
decline. However, given that the agency
is unable to estimate the net change in
total acrolein emissions, the agency is
unable to conclude which alternative is
environmentally preferable with respect
to acrolein emissions.
Overall, however, the Technology
Exhaustion alternative is the agency’s
Environmentally Preferable Alternative.
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For additional discussion regarding the
alternatives considered by the agency in
reaching its decision, including the
Environmentally Preferable Alternative,
see Section VII of this Final Rule. For a
discussion of the environmental impacts
associated with each alternative, see
Chapter 3, Chapter 4 and Appendix B of
the FEIS.
Factors Balanced By NHTSA In Making
Its Decision, Including Considerations
Of National Policy
Section VII of this Final Rule
discusses the factors balanced by
NHTSA in making its decision. Notably,
49 U.S.C. 32902(b)(2)(A) and (C) set
forth the following three requirements
specific to MYs 2011–2020: (1) The
standards must be sufficiently high to
result in a combined (passenger car and
light truck) fleet fuel economy of at least
35 mpg by MY 2020; (2) the standards
must increase annually; and (3) the
standards must increase ratably.
EPCA also requires the agency to
determine what level of CAFE
stringency would be ‘‘maximum
feasible’’ for each model year by
considering the four competing factors
of technological feasibility, economic
practicability, the effect of other motor
vehicle standards of the Government on
fuel economy, and the need of the
United States to conserve energy, which
includes environmental considerations,
along with additional relevant factors
such as safety.
‘‘The need of the United States to
conserve energy’’ is a broad concept
encompassing ‘‘the consumer cost,
national balance of payments,
environmental, and foreign policy
implications of our need for large
quantities of petroleum, especially
imported petroleum.’’514 NHTSA has
historically considered safety in setting
the CAFE standards. For an explanation
of the agency’s historical consideration
of safety in setting the CAFE standards,
see Section VIII.
Finally, NEPA directs that
environmental considerations are a
factor integrated into the agency’s
decisionmaking process. To accomplish
that purpose, NEPA requires an agency
to compare the potential environmental
impacts of its proposed action to those
of a reasonable range of alternatives.
For further discussion of the factors
balanced by NHTSA in making its
decision, including considerations of
national policy, see Section VII of this
Final Rule.
514 42
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How the Factors and Considerations
Balanced by NHTSA Entered Into its
Decision
The agency recognizes that the CAFE
program is designed to raise fuel
economy standards for both passenger
cars and light trucks. The agency also
recognizes that the enactment of EISA
represents a major step forward in,
among other things, reducing oil
consumption and reducing CO2
emissions in order to combat global
climate change. While the agency’s
balancing of the need of the nation
factor ensures consideration of climate
change issues, the NEPA analysis also
promotes consideration of the
environmental factor by NHTSA when
making its decision. The agency further
recognizes that under EPCA, it is
required to set fuel economy standards
for each model year and for each fleet
separately at the ‘‘maximum feasible’’
level for that model year and fleet by
balancing the factors identified above.
49 U.S.C. 32902(a). In doing so, while
considering the need of the nation to
conserve energy alone might counsel for
setting the standards at the levels
suggested by proponents of higher
standards, NHTSA does not believe that
such an action would be consistent
with, among other things, economic
practicability, which it is required to
consider under EPCA.
As has been widely reported in public
throughout this rulemaking, and as
shown in public comments, the national
and global economies are in crisis. Even
before the recent economic
developments, the automobile
manufacturers were already facing
substantial difficulties. Further, at this
time, NHTSA cannot know the full
scope, depth or duration of the crisis
unfolding in the national and world
economies. These problems have made
NHTSA’s economic practicability
analysis particularly important and
challenging in this rulemaking.
NHTSA’s Decision attempts to
balance the factors by setting the CAFE
standards so that they are both
technologically and economically
feasible, especially in light of the
current economic climate, while
providing the maximum national public
social benefit.
For further discussion of how the
factors and considerations balanced by
the agency entered into NHTSA’s
Decision, see Sections VII and IX.F of
this Final Rule.
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The Agency’s Preferences Among
Alternatives Based on Relevant Factors,
Including Economic and Technical
Considerations and Agency Statutory
Missions
With regard to MY 2011, the No
Action Alternative and Technology
Exhaustion Alternative, while useful for
illustrative purposes, is facially
inconsistent with the requirements of
EPCA, and thus was not selected as the
agency’s decision. The No Action
Alternative violates EPCA because it (1)
does not fulfill the requirement that the
Secretary establish CAFE standards for
each model year separately; (2) does not
fulfill the requirement that MY 2011–
2020 standards are to be set high enough
to ensure that the industry-wide fleet
achieves a combined passenger car/light
truck average fuel economy of at least 35
mpg; and (3) does not fulfill the
requirement that the standards for MYs
2011–2020 increase annually and
ratably. Although the Technology
Exhaustion Alternative is the
environmentally preferable alternative
for NEPA purposes, it does not reflect
any consideration of economic
practicability, and thus is facially
inconsistent with the requirements of
EPCA.
Considering the remaining
alternatives available for MY 2011, the
agency chose the Optimized Alternative
because maximizing benefits helps
ensure that manufacturers are not forced
to apply technologies that will not pay
for themselves. NEPA’s purpose is to
integrate environmental considerations
into the decision-making process. For
MY 2011, setting standards at the point
at which social net benefits are
maximized in NHTSA’s analysis results
in standards that still increase higher
and faster than any standards since the
earliest years of the program, do not
require the addition of technologies that
the agency does not believe will pay for
themselves, and result in measurable
environmental benefits. The standards
for MY 2011 thus fulfill EPCA’s
objectives regarding the need of the
nation to conserve energy, while not
imposing substantial economic hardship
on the industry, while taking into
account the feasibility of applying
technologies appropriately and
consistent with manufacturers’ natural
cycles, and the other motor vehicle
standards of the government with which
manufacturers have to comply.
In short, in balancing the EPCA
factors against one another and carefully
considering the environmental impacts
associated with the various alternatives
evaluated, NHTSA continues to believe
that the proper overall balance of all
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relevant consideration is the point at
which social net benefits are
maximized, and results in CAFE
standards that are the maximum feasible
for MY 2011.
For further discussion of the agency’s
preferences among alternatives based on
relevant factors, including economic
and technical considerations, see
Sections VII.E and IX.F of this Final
Rule.
Mitigation
NHTSA’s Decision results in a
decrease in CO2 emissions and
associated climate change effects, a
reduction in total criteria air pollutant
emissions and toxic air pollutant
emissions, and a decrease in energy
consumption as compared to the No
Action Alternative. In addition, the
Optimized Alternative will reduce
adverse health outcomes and health
costs related to motor vehicle air
pollution. The Optimized Alternative
will generally have beneficial
environmental impacts and health
effects.
Under NEPA, an EIS is required to
contain ‘‘ ‘a reasonably complete
discussion of possible mitigation
measures.’ ’’ Northern Alaska
Environmental Center v. Kempthorne,
457 F.3d 969, 979 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing
Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens
Council, 490 U.S. 332, 352 (1989)).
Essentially, ‘‘[t]he mitigation must ‘‘ ‘be
discussed in sufficient detail to ensure
that environmental consequences have
been fairly evaluated.’ ’’ Id. (citing City
of Carmel-By-The-Sea v. U.S. Dept. of
Transp., 123 F.3d 1142, 1154 (9th Cir.
1997)). NEPA, however, ‘‘does not
require an agency to formulate and
adopt a complete mitigation plan.’’ 515
An agency is not required to mitigate
adverse consequences of an
environmental action; it is only required
to analyze them.516 Indeed, ‘‘ ‘it would
be inconsistent with NEPA’s reliance on
procedural mechanisms—as opposed to
substantive, result-based standards—to
demand the presence of a fully
developed plan that will mitigate
environmental harm before an agency
515 Id. (citing Robertson, 490 U.S. at 352 (noting
that NEPA does not contain a substantive
requirement that a complete mitigation plan be
actually formulated and adopted)). See also Valley
Community Preservation Com’n v. Mineta, 231 F.
Supp. 2d 23, 41 (D.D.C. 2002) (noting that NEPA
does not require that a complete mitigation plan be
formulated and incorporated into an EIS).
516 See Robertson, 490 U.S. at 333 (holding, inter
alia, that ‘‘NEPA does not impose a substantive
duty on agencies to mitigate adverse environmental
effects or to include in each EIS a fully developed
mitigation plan’’). See also Valley Community
Preservation Com’n, 231 F. Supp. 2d 23.
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can act.’ ’’ Id. (citing Robertson, 490 U.S.
at 333).
Chapter 5 of the FEIS explains that
Federal transportation funds
administered by the Federal Highway
Administration (FHWA) might be
available to assist in funding projects to
reduce any increases in MSATs.
NHTSA acknowledges that the
absolute level of GHG emissions will
continue to rise over current levels. This
was explained in the FEIS. See Figure
3.4–4 and Table 3.4–1 of the FEIS. The
increase in emissions from factors such
as an increase in vehicle miles traveled
(VMT) is beyond NHTSA’s jurisdiction
to control under EPCA, as amended by
EISA. Essentially, NHTSA does not have
the statutory authority to reduce the
total amount of GHGs emitted by all
vehicles driven, because NHTSA, under
its statutory authority conferred by
EPCA, cannot control how many miles
citizens elect to drive. See FEIS §§ 10.1–
10.2. In view of this statutory directive,
it is not reasonable for NHTSA to
explore mitigation strategies related to
the quantity of vehicle miles traveled by
the public.
Based on the agency’s current
understanding of global climate change,
certain effects are likely to occur due to
the increasing global GHG emissions
entering the atmosphere. The Optimized
Alternative will not prevent these
effects. Instead, the Optimized
Alternative may diminish the effects of
climate change by contributing to global
GHG reductions from currently
anticipated trends. As such, the
Optimized Alternative will generally
have beneficial environmental impacts
and health effects.
XVI. Regulatory Notices and Analyses
The following discussion of relevant
regulatory notices and analyses
considers both the final rule and the
FEIS together.
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A. Executive Order 12866 and DOT
Regulatory Policies and Procedures
Executive Order 12866, ‘‘Regulatory
Planning and Review’’ (58 FR 51735,
Oct. 4, 1993), provides for making
determinations whether a regulatory
action is ‘‘significant’’ and therefore
subject to OMB review and to the
requirements of the Executive Order.
The Order defines a ‘‘significant
regulatory action’’ as one that is likely
to result in a rule that may:
(1) Have an annual effect on the
economy of $100 million or more or
adversely affect in a material way the
economy, a sector of the economy,
productivity, competition, jobs, the
environment, public health or safety, or
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State, local or Tribal governments or
communities;
(2) Create a serious inconsistency or
otherwise interfere with an action taken
or planned by another agency;
(3) Materially alter the budgetary
impact of entitlements, grants, user fees,
or loan programs or the rights and
obligations of recipients thereof; or
(4) Raise novel legal or policy issues
arising out of legal mandates, the
President’s priorities, or the principles
set forth in the Executive Order.
This rulemaking is economically
significant. Accordingly, OMB reviewed
it under Executive Order 12866. The
rule is significant within the meaning of
the Department of Transportation’s
Regulatory Policies and Procedures.
The benefits and costs of this final
rule are described above. Because the
rule is economically significant under
both the Department of Transportation’s
procedures and OMB guidelines, the
agency has prepared a Final Regulatory
Impact Analysis (FRIA) and placed it in
the docket and on the agency’s Web site.
Further, pursuant to OMB Circular A–4,
we have prepared a formal probabilistic
uncertainty analysis for this proposal.
The circular requires such an analysis
for complex rules where there are large,
multiple uncertainties whose analysis
raises technical challenges or where
effects cascade and where the impacts of
the rule exceed $1 billion. This rule
meets these criteria on all counts.
B. National Environmental Policy Act
Under NEPA, a Federal agency must
prepare an Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS) on proposed actions
that could significantly impact the
quality of the human environment. The
requirement is designed to serve three
major functions: (1) To provide the
decisionmaker(s) with a detailed
description of the potential
environmental impacts of a proposed
action prior to its adoption, (2) to
rigorously explore and evaluate all
reasonable alternatives, and (3) to
inform the public of, and allow
comment on, such efforts.
NHTSA prepared a draft EIS (DEIS),
solicited and analyzed public comments
thereon, including both a public hearing
and written comments, and prepared a
final EIS (FEIS), which responds to
public comments and incorporates the
information relevant to the effects of
each of the alternatives considered in
the EIS. Specifically, in March 2008,
NHTSA issued a Notice of Intent (NOI)
to prepare an EIS for the MY 2011–2015
CAFE standards. 73 FR 16615; see 40
CFR 1501.7. In April 2008, NHTSA
issued a supplemental NOI. 73 FR
22913. On June 26, 2008, NHTSA
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submitted the DEIS to the
Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA). On July 2, 2008, NHTSA
published a Federal Register Notice of
Availability of its DEIS. See 73 FR
37922. NHTSA’s Notice of Availability
also made public the date and location
of a public hearing, and invited the
public to participate at the hearing on
August 4, 2008, in Washington, DC. See
id. On July 3, 2008, the EPA issued its
Notice of Availability of the DEIS,
triggering the 45-day public comment
period. See 73 FR 38204. See also 40
CFR 1506.10. In accordance with CEQ
regulations, the public was invited to
submit written comments on the DEIS
until August 18, 2008. See 40 CFR 1503,
et seq.
NHTSA mailed approximately 200
copies of the DEIS to interested parties,
including federal, state, and local
officials and agencies; elected officials,
environmental and public interest
groups; Native American tribes; and
other interested individuals, as listed in
Chapter 9 of the DEIS. NHTSA held a
public hearing on the DEIS at the
National Transportation Safety Board
Conference Center in Washington, DC,
on August 4, 2008.
NHTSA received 66 written
comments from interested stakeholders,
including the EPA, the Centers for
Disease Control (CDC), state and local
agencies, elected officials, automobile
trade associations, organizations, and
individuals. In addition, NHTSA
received one petition with 10,540
signatures. During the public comment
hearing in Washington, DC, 44
individuals provided oral statements.
The transcript from the public hearing
and written comments submitted to
NHTSA are part of the administrative
record, and are available on the Federal
Docket, which can be found on the Web
at https://www.regulations.gov, Reference
Docket No. NHTSA–2008–0060. Written
comments and the public hearing
transcript can also be viewed in their
entirety in Appendix D of the FEIS.
NHTSA reviewed and analyzed all
written and oral comments received
during the public comment period in
the preparation of the FEIS. NHTSA
revised the FEIS in response to
comments on the DEIS.517 For a more
detailed discussion of NHTSA’s scoping
and comment periods, please see
Section 1.3 and Chapter 10 of the FEIS.
On October 10, 2008, NHTSA
submitted the FEIS to the EPA. On
October 17, 2008, the EPA published a
517 The agency also changed the FEIS as a result
of updated information that became available after
issuance of the DEIS.
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Notice of Availability of the FEIS in the
Federal Register. See 73 FR 61859.
This Final Rule constitutes the Record
of Decision (ROD) for NHTSA’s MY
2011 CAFE standards, pursuant to the
National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) and Council on Environmental
Quality’s (CEQ) implementing
regulations.518 See 40 CFR § 1505.2. For
additional information regarding
NHTSA’s compliance with 40 CFR
§ 1505.2, see Section XV of this Final
Rule.
The MY 2011 CAFE standards
adopted in this Final Rule have been
informed by analyses contained in the
Final Environmental Impact Statement,
Corporate Average Fuel Economy
Standards, Passenger Cars and Light
Trucks, Model Years 2011—2015,
Docket No. NHTSA–2008–0060–0605
(FEIS).519 For purposes of this
rulemaking, the agency referred to an
extensive compilation of technical and
policy documents available in the
dockets for the NPRM and Final Rule
and for the EIS. The EIS docket and the
rulemaking docket are available on the
Federal Docket, which can be found on
the Web at https://www.regulations.gov,
Reference Docket Nos.: NHTSA–2008–
0060 (EIS) and NHTSA–2008–0089
(Rulemaking).
The NPRM proposed fuel economy
standards for MYs 2011–2015.
Consistent with that proposal, the
agency designed the FEIS to evaluate
the aggregate environmental impacts
associated with each alternative for the
entire five-year period (i.e., the
environmental impacts that would
likely result if MY 2011—2015
passenger cars and light trucks met the
higher, proposed CAFE standards for
those years). The aggregate
environmental impacts provided in the
FEIS remain relevant, since the MY
2011 impacts associated with the CAFE
standards fall within the spectrum of
those aggregated impacts. See Chapter 3,
Chapter 4 and Appendix B of the FEIS.
Sections VII.D and IX.F of this Final
Rule present the following
consequences associated with each
alternative, including NHTSA’s
Decision, for MY 2011 passenger cars
and light trucks: fuel consumption and
associated emissions of greenhouse
gases, as well as on emissions of criteria
and hazardous air pollutants.
Given the unusual circumstances
surrounding this rulemaking (i.e., the
Bush Administration’s decision to
518 NEPA
is codified at 42 U.S.C. 4321–47. CEQ
NEPA implementing regulations are codified at 40
Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 1500–08.
519 The Notice of Availability of the FEIS was
published in the Federal Register by the EPA on
October 17, 2008.
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postpone issuing CAFE standards and
the Obama Administration’s decision to
sever the rulemaking so that it addresses
only MY 2011), which are a matter of
public record, one issue presented is
whether the existing EIS remained
sufficient, without change, to
adequately inform the agency. Under
CEQ Regulations, an agency shall
prepare a supplemental EIS if ‘‘(i) The
agency makes substantial changes in the
proposed action that are relevant to
environmental concerns; or (ii) There
are significant new circumstances or
information relevant to environmental
concerns and bearing on the proposed
action or its impacts.’’ 40 CFR
§ 1502.9(c).
Reviewing courts apply the ‘‘arbitrary
and capricious’’ standard of the
Administrative Procedure Act when
evaluating whether an agency decision
not to prepare a supplemental EIS was
proper under NEPA. See Marsh v.
Oregon Natural Resources Council, et
al., 490 U.S. 360, 375–76 (1989) (noting
that an agency should apply a ‘‘rule of
reason’’ when deciding whether to
prepare a supplemental EIS). A
supplemental EIS is required if ‘‘there
remains a major federal action to occur
and if the new information is sufficient
to show that the remaining action will
affec[t] the quality of the human
environment in a significant manner or
to a significant extent not already
considered * * *.’’ Marsh, 490 U.S. at
374 (citations omitted) (quotations
omitted). See also Operation of the
Missouri River System Litigation v. U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers, et al., 516
F.3d 688 (8th Cir. 2008) (holding that a
supplemental EIS is not required if the
relevant environmental impacts were
already considered by the agency).
Courts have upheld agencies’
decisions not to supplement where the
relevant environmental impacts of the
proposed change have been fully
considered. Thus, courts have
interpreted the ‘‘substantial change’’
provision of the CEQ regulations to
require agencies to issue a supplement
if the changes will impact the
environment ‘‘in a significant manner
* * * not already considered by the
federal agency.’’ Ark. Wildlife Fed’n v.
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 431 F.3d
1096, 1102 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting
Airport Impact Relief, Inc. v. Wykle, 192
F.3d 197, 204 (1st Cir. 1999)). That is,
a change is considered ‘‘substantial’’
under the regulations only where ‘‘it
presents a ‘seriously different picture of
the environmental impact’ ’’ than that
previously considered. Id. (quoting
South Trenton Residents Against 29 v.
Fed. Highway Admin., 176 F.3d 658,
663 (3d Cir. 1999)).
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In addition to asking whether the
agency has fully considered the
environmental impact of the proposed
change, courts have also asked whether
the change is ‘‘ ‘qualitatively within the
spectrum of alternatives that were
discussed’ in a prior FEIS.’’ In re
Operation of the Missouri River System
Litigation, 516 F.3d at 693 (quoting
Dubois v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 102 F.3d
1273, 1292 (1st Cir. 1996)). This
language first appeared in a 1981 CEQ
guidance document, commonly referred
to as the CEQ ‘‘Forty Questions.’’ See
Forty Most Asked Questions Concerning
CEQ’s National Environmental Policy
Act Regulations, 46 FR 18026, 18035
(1981).
Under applicable law, NHTSA has
decided that a supplemental NEPA
analysis for MY 2011 fuel economy
standards is not required. Here, NHTSA
analyzed alternatives in the FEIS for five
model years so that the agency could
capture a full spectrum of potential
environmental impacts, ranging from
vehicles continuing to maintain their
MY 2010 fuel economy to standards
based on the maximum technology
expected to be available over a five-year
period. NHTSA’s FEIS presented the
agency and the public with a
comprehensive analysis of this
spectrum of environmental impacts. In
regard to NHTSA’s Decision, the
environmental impacts fall within the
spectrum of environmental impacts
analyzed under the Optimized Mid-2
Scenario 520 in the FEIS, which the
agency developed after consideration of
public comments.
In light of the President’s January 26,
2009 Memorandum directing NHTSA to
issue a final rule for MY 2011 only, and
consistent with NEPA’s rule of reason
and applicable case law, the relevant
environmental impacts for MY 2011
have been fully considered within the
broader FEIS prepared for MYs 2011–
2015, and the President’s directive to
issue a final rule for a single model year
does not present a seriously different
picture of the environmental impacts
that NHTSA analyzed, both
incrementally and cumulatively, in its
broader FEIS. In fact, the impacts
analyzed in the FEIS are more
comprehensive than any NEPA analysis
that NHTSA could prepare in the short
time between the President’s January 26,
2009 Memorandum and today’s final
rule.521 In short, the FEIS served to
520 The Mid-2 Scenario is summarized in Section
V of this Final Rule. See also FEIS Chapter 3,
Chapter 4 and Appendix B.
521 If, on account of the unforeseen current
events, NHTSA were to attempt to isolate the
environmental impacts of its Decision on its own,
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inform the agency and support today’s
decision, and no rule of reason could
require the preparation of a
supplemental environmental analysis
for a single model year of fuel economy
standards already contained within a
comprehensive analysis for five model
years. For a discussion of NHTSA’s
Decision, see Section VII of this Final
Rule.
Based on the foregoing, the agency
concludes that the environmental
analysis and public involvement
process complies with both the letter
and spirit of NEPA implementing
regulations issued by CEQ, DOT Order
5610.1C, and NHTSA regulations.522
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1. Clean Air Act (CAA)
The CAA (42 U.S.C. 7401) is the
primary Federal legislation that
addresses air quality. Under the
authority of the CAA and subsequent
amendments, the EPA has established
National Ambient Air Quality Standards
(NAAQS) for six criteria pollutants,
which are relatively commonplace
pollutants that can accumulate in the
atmosphere as a result of normal levels
of human activity. The EPA is required
to review the NAAQS every five years
and to change the levels of the standards
if warranted by new scientific
information.
The air quality of a geographic region
is usually assessed by comparing the
levels of criteria air pollutants found in
the atmosphere to the levels established
by the NAAQS. Concentrations of
criteria pollutants within the air mass of
a region are measured in parts of a
pollutant per million parts of air (ppm)
or in micrograms of a pollutant per
cubic meter (μg/m3) of air present in
repeated air samples taken at designated
monitoring locations. These ambient
concentrations of each criteria pollutant
are compared to the permissible levels
specified by the NAAQS in order to
assess whether the region’s air quality is
potentially unhealthful.
When the measured concentrations of
a criteria pollutant within a geographic
region are below those permitted by the
NAAQS, the region is designated by the
EPA as an attainment area for that
the agency would fail to issue MY 2011 standards
by March 30, 2009. As a result, the agency would
fail to fulfill its EPCA statutory mandate of issuing
fuel economy standards ratably beginning with MY
2011 and President Obama’s directive of issuing
MY 2011 standards by March 30, 2009. NHTSA’s
failure to issue standards would also enable
automobile manufacturers to establish any standard
they deemed appropriate, or no standard
whatsoever.
522 NEPA is codified at 42 U.S.C. 4321–4347.
CEQ’s NEPA implementing regulations are codified
at 40 CFR Pts. 1500–1508, and NHTSA’s NEPA
implementing regulations are codified at 49 CFR
part 520.
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pollutant, while regions where
concentrations of criteria pollutants
exceed Federal standards are called
nonattainment areas (NAAs). Former
NAAs that have attained the NAAQS are
designated as maintenance areas. Each
NAA is required to develop and
implement a State Implementation Plan
(SIP), which documents how the region
will reach attainment levels within time
periods specified in the CAA. In
maintenance areas, the SIP documents
how the State intends to maintain
compliance with the NAAQS. When
EPA changes a NAAQS, States must
revise their SIPs to address how they
will attain the new standard.
Section 176(c) of the CAA prohibits
Federal agencies from taking actions in
nonattainment or maintenance areas
that do not ‘‘conform’’ to the State
Implementation Plan (SIP). The purpose
of this conformity requirement is to
ensure that Federal activities do not
interfere with meeting the emissions
targets in the SIPs, do not cause or
contribute to new violations of the
NAAQS, and do not impede the ability
to attain or maintain the NAAQS. The
EPA has issued two sets of regulations
to implement CAA Section 176(c):
• The Transportation Conformity
Rules (40 CFR 51 Subpart T), which
apply to transportation plans, programs,
and projects funded under title 23
United States Code (U.S.C.) or the
Federal Transit Act. Highway and
transit infrastructure projects funded by
FHWA or the Federal Transit
Administration (FTA) usually are
subject to transportation conformity.
• The General Conformity Rules (40
CFR part 51 Subpart W) apply to all
other Federal actions not covered under
transportation conformity. The General
Conformity Rules established emissions
thresholds, or de minimis levels, for use
in evaluating the conformity of a
project. If the net emission increases
due to the project are less than these
thresholds, then the project is presumed
to conform and no further conformity
evaluation is required. If the emission
increases exceed any of these
thresholds, then a conformity
determination is required. The
conformity determination may entail air
quality modeling studies, consultation
with EPA and State air quality agencies,
and commitments to revise the SIP or to
implement measures to mitigate air
quality impacts.
The CAFE standards and associated
program activities are not funded under
title 23 U.S.C. or the Federal Transit
Act. Further, CAFE standards are
established by NHTSA and are not an
action undertaken by FHWA or FTA.
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Accordingly, the CAFE standards are
not subject to transportation conformity.
The General Conformity Rules contain
several exemptions applicable to
‘‘Federal actions,’’ which the conformity
regulations define as: ‘‘any activity
engaged in by a department, agency, or
instrumentality of the Federal
Government, or any activity that a
department, agency or instrumentality
of the Federal Government supports in
any way, provides financial assistance
for, licenses, permits, or approves, other
than activities [subject to transportation
conformity].’’ 40 CFR 51.852.
‘‘Rulemaking and policy development
and issuance’’ are exempted at 40 CFR
51.853(c)(2)(iii). Since NHTSA’s CAFE
standards involve a rulemaking process,
its action is exempt from general
conformity. Also, emissions for which a
Federal agency does not have a
‘‘continuing program responsibility’’ are
not considered ‘‘indirect emissions’’
subject to general conformity under 40
CFR 51.852. ‘‘Emissions that a Federal
agency has a continuing program
responsibility for means emissions that
are specifically caused by an agency
carrying out its authorities, and does not
include emissions that occur due to
subsequent activities, unless such
activities are required by the Federal
agency.’’ 40 CFR 51.852. Emissions that
occur as a result of the final CAFE
standards are not caused by NHTSA
carrying out its statutory authorities and
clearly occur due to subsequent
activities, including vehicle
manufacturers’ production of passenger
car and light truck fleets and consumer
purchases and driving behavior. Thus,
changes in any emissions that result
from NHTSA’s final CAFE standards are
not those for which the agency has a
‘‘continuing program responsibility’’
and NHTSA is confident that a general
conformity determination is not
required. NHTSA is evaluating the
potential impacts of air emissions under
NEPA.
2. National Historic Preservation Act
(NHPA)
The NHPA (16 U.S.C. 470) sets forth
government policy and procedures
regarding ‘‘historic properties’’—that is,
districts, sites, buildings, structures, and
objects included in or eligible for the
National Register of Historic Places
(NRHP). See also 36 CFR part 800.
Section 106 of the NHPA requires
federal agencies to ‘‘take into account’’
the effects of their actions on historic
properties. The agency concludes that
the NHPA is not applicable to NHTSA’s
Decision, because it does not directly
involve historic properties. The agency
has, however, conducted a qualitative
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review of the related direct, indirect,
and cumulative impacts, positive or
negative, of the alternatives on
potentially affected resources, including
historic and cultural resources. See
Section 3.5.7 of the FEIS.
3. Executive Order 12898
(Environmental Justice)
Under Executive Order 12898, Federal
agencies are required to identify and
address any disproportionately high and
adverse human health or environmental
effects of its programs, policies, and
activities on minority populations and
low-income populations. NHTSA
complied with this order by identifying
and addressing the potential effects of
the alternatives on minority and lowincome populations in Section 3.5.9. In
Section 4.6 of the FEIS, the agency set
forth a qualitative analysis of the
cumulative effects of the alternatives on
these populations. Given the foregoing,
the agency concludes that it complied
with Executive Order 12898.
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4. Fish and Wildlife Conservation Act
(FWCA)
The FWCA (16 U.S.C. 2900) provides
financial and technical assistance to
States for the development, revision,
and implementation of conservation
plans and programs for nongame fish
and wildlife. In addition, the Act
encourages all Federal agencies and
departments to utilize their authority to
conserve and to promote conservation of
nongame fish and wildlife and their
habitats. The agency concludes that the
FWCA is not applicable to NHTSA’s
Decision, because it does not directly
involve fish and wildlife.
5. Coastal Zone Management Act
(CZMA)
The Coastal Zone Management Act
(16 U.S.C. 1450) provides for the
preservation, protection, development,
and (where possible) restoration and
enhancement of the nation’s coastal
zone resources. Under the statute, States
are provided with funds and technical
assistance in developing coastal zone
management programs. Each
participating State must submit its
program to the Secretary of Commerce
for approval. Once the program has been
approved, any activity of a Federal
agency, either within or outside of the
coastal zone, that affects any land or
water use or natural resource of the
coastal zone must be carried out in a
manner that is consistent, to the
maximum extent practicable, with the
enforceable policies of the State’s
program.
The agency concludes that the CZMA
is not applicable to NHTSA’s Decision,
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because it does not involve an activity
within, or outside of, the nation’s
coastal zones. The agency has, however,
conducted a qualitative review of the
related direct, indirect, and cumulative
impacts, positive or negative, of the
alternatives on potentially affected
resources, including coastal zones. See
Section 4.5.5 of the FEIS.
6. Endangered Species Act (ESA)
The ESA (16 U.S.C. 1531) provides for
the protection of species that are at risk
of extinction throughout all or a
significant portion of their range, and
for the protection of ecosystems on
which they depend. Under Section 7 of
the ESA, all Federal agencies are
required to undertake programs for the
conservation of endangered and
threatened species.
Federal agencies are responsible for
determining whether their proposed
action requires consultation with Fish
and Wildlife Service or National Marine
Fisheries Service under Section 7 of the
ESA. To make this determination, an
agency examines the direct and indirect
effects of its proposed action to see if
the action ‘‘may affect’’ a listed species.
For indirect effects, the impact to the
species must be later in time, must be
caused by the proposed action, and
must be reasonably certain to occur.
As stated in the FEIS, the action
alternatives, including NHTSA’s
Decision, show a reduction in emissions
of CO2, NOX, PM2.5, SOX, VOC, DPM,
benzene, and 1,3-butadiene compared to
the No Action Alternative. The FEIS
also quantified the resulting decreases
in sea-level rise, changes in
precipitation, and temperature
decreases for each of the alternatives
from decreasing CO2 emissions. NHTSA
then qualitatively discussed the impacts
to ecosystems, ocean acidification,
natural resources, wildlife, and many
other factors. Because it is beyond the
ability of current modeling and the level
of uncertainty is very high, it was not
possible to quantitatively calculate the
effects of the CO2 reduction on specific
localized ecosystems. See United States
Department of Interior, Fish and
Wildlife Service, Memorandum,
‘‘Expectations for Consultations on
Actions that would Emit Greenhouse
Gases,’’ dated May 14, 2008. NHTSA
discussed the issue with the U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service to ensure proper
compliance. Without sufficient data to
establish the required causal connection
(to the level of reasonable certainty)
between the proposed rulemaking, GHG
emissions, and the subsequent impacts
to listed species or critical habitat,
Section 7 consultation is not required.
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For additional discussion regarding
NHTSA’s compliance with Section 7 of
the ESA, please see Section 10.3.6.1,
Section 3.5.2.2, and Section 4.7.2.1 of
the FEIS.
7. Floodplain Management (Executive
Order 11988 & DOT Order 5650.2)
These Orders require Federal agencies
to avoid the long- and short-term
adverse impacts associated with the
occupancy and modification of
floodplains, and to restore and preserve
the natural and beneficial values served
by floodplains. Executive Order 11988
also directs agencies to minimize the
impact of floods on human safety,
health and welfare, and to restore and
preserve the natural and beneficial
values served by floodplains through
evaluating the potential effects of any
actions the agency may take in a
floodplain and ensuring that its program
planning and budget requests reflect
consideration of flood hazards and
floodplain management. DOT Order
5650.2 sets forth DOT policies and
procedures for implementing Executive
Order 11988. The DOT Order requires
that the agency determine if a proposed
action is within the limits of a base
floodplain, meaning it is encroaching on
the floodplain, and whether this
encroachment is significant. If
significant, the agency is required to
conduct further analysis of the proposed
action and any practicable alternatives.
If a practicable alternative avoids
floodplain encroachment, then the
agency is required to implement it.
In this rulemaking, the agency is not
occupying, modifying and/or
encroaching on floodplains. The agency,
therefore, concludes that the Orders are
not applicable to NHTSA’s Decision.
The agency has, however, conducted a
review of the alternatives on potentially
affected resources, including
floodplains. See Chapters 3 and 4 of the
FEIS.
8. Preservation of the Nation’s Wetlands
(Executive Order 11990 & DOT Order
5660.1a)
These Orders require Federal agencies
to avoid, to the extent possible,
undertaking or providing assistance for
new construction located in wetlands
unless the agency head finds that there
is no practicable alternative to such
construction and that the proposed
action includes all practicable measures
to minimize harms to wetlands that may
result from such use. Executive Order
11990 also directs agencies to take
action to minimize the destruction, loss
or degradation of wetlands in
‘‘conducting Federal activities and
programs affecting land use, including
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but not limited to water and related land
resources planning, regulating, and
licensing activities.’’ DOT Order 5660.1a
sets forth DOT policy for interpreting
Executive Order 11990 and requires that
transportation projects ‘‘located in or
having an impact on wetlands’’ should
be conducted to assure protection of the
Nation’s wetlands. If a project does have
a significant impact on wetlands, an EIS
must be prepared.
The agency is not undertaking or
providing assistance for new
construction located in wetlands. The
agency, therefore, concludes that these
Orders do not apply to NHTSA’s
Decision. The agency has, however,
conducted a review of the alternatives
on potentially affected resources,
including wetlands. See Chapters 3 and
4 of the FEIS.
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9. Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA),
Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act
(BGEPA), Executive Order 13186.
The MBTA provides for the protection
of migratory birds that are native to the
United States by making it illegal for
anyone to pursue, hunt, take, attempt to
take, kill, capture, collect, possess, buy,
sell, trade, ship, import, or export any
migratory bird covered under the
statute. The statute prohibits both
intentional and unintentional acts.
Therefore, the statute is violated if an
agency acts in a manner that harms a
migratory bird, whether it was intended
or not. See, e.g., United States v. FMC
Corp., 572 F.2d 902 (2nd Cir. 1978).
The BGEPA (16 U.S.C. 668) prohibits
any form of possession or taking of both
bald and golden eagles. Under the
BGEPA, violators are subject to criminal
and civil sanctions as well as an
enhanced penalty provision for
subsequent offenses.
Executive Order 13186,
‘‘Responsibilities of Federal Agencies to
Protect Migratory Birds,’’ helps to
further the purposes of the MBTA by
requiring a Federal agency to develop a
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
with the Fish and Wildlife Service when
it is taking an action that has (or is likely
to have) a measurable negative impact
on migratory bird populations.
The agency concludes that the MBTA,
BGEPA, and Executive Order 13186 do
not apply to NHTSA’s Decision, because
there is no disturbance and/or take
involved in NHTSA’s Decision.
10. Department of Transportation Act
(Section 4(f))
Section 4(f) of the Department of
Transportation Act of 1966 (49 U.S.C.
303), as amended by Public Law § 109–
59, is designed to preserve publicly
owned parklands, waterfowl and
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wildlife refuges, and significant historic
sites. Specifically, Section 4(f) of the
Department of Transportation Act
provides that DOT agencies cannot
approve a transportation program or
project that requires the use of any
publicly owned land from a significant
public park, recreation area, or wildlife
and waterfowl refuge, or any land from
a significant historic site, unless a
determination is made that:
• There is no feasible and prudent
alternative to the use of land, and
• The program or project includes all
possible planning to minimize harm to
the property resulting from use, or
• A transportation use of Section 4(f)
property results in a de minimis impact.
The agency concludes that the Section
4(f) is not applicable to NHTSA’s
Decision because this rulemaking does
not require the use of any publicly
owned land. For a more detailed
discussion, please see Section 3.5.6 of
the FEIS.
C. Regulatory Flexibility Act
Pursuant to the Regulatory Flexibility
Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq., as amended by
the Small Business Regulatory
Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) of
1996), whenever an agency is required
to publish a notice of rulemaking for
any proposed or final rule, it must
prepare and make available for public
comment a regulatory flexibility
analysis that describes the effect of the
rule on small entities (i.e., small
businesses, small organizations, and
small governmental jurisdictions). The
Small Business Administration’s
regulations at 13 CFR part 121 define a
small business, in part, as a business
entity ‘‘which operates primarily within
the United States.’’ 13 CFR 121.105(a).
No regulatory flexibility analysis is
required if the head of an agency
certifies the rule will not have a
significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities.
I certify that the final rule will not
have a significant economic impact on
a substantial number of small entities.
The following is NHTSA’s statement
providing the factual basis for the
certification (5 U.S.C. 605(b)).
The final rule directly affects
seventeen large single stage motor
vehicle manufacturers.523 The final rule
also affects four small domestic single
stage motor vehicle manufacturers.524
523 BMW, Mercedes, Chrysler, Ferrari, Ford,
Subaru, General Motors, Honda, Hyundai, Lotus,
Maserati, Mitsubishi, Nissan, Porsche, Suzuki,
Toyota, and Volkswagen.
524 The Regulatory Flexibility Act only requires
analysis of small domestic manufacturers. There are
four passenger car manufacturers we know of and
no light truck manufacturers: Avanti, Panoz, Saleen,
and Shelby.
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According to the Small Business
Administration’s small business size
standards (see 13 CFR 121.201), a single
stage automobile or light truck
manufacturer (NAICS code 336111,
Automobile Manufacturing; 336112,
Light Truck and Utility Vehicle
Manufacturing) must have 1,000 or
fewer employees to qualify as a small
business. All four of the vehicle
manufacturers have less than 1,000
employees and make less than 1,000
vehicles per year. The rulemaking
would not have a significant economic
impact on the small vehicle
manufacturers because under Part 525,
passenger car manufacturer making less
than 10,000 vehicles per year can
petition NHTSA to have alternative
standards set for those manufacturers.
These manufacturers currently do not
meet the 27.5 mpg standard and must
already petition the agency for relief. If
the standard is raised, it has no
meaningful impact on these
manufacturers, and they still must go
through the same process and petition
for relief. Given that there already is a
mechanism for handling small
businesses, which is the purpose of the
Regulatory Flexibility Act, a regulatory
flexibility analysis was not prepared.
NHTSA received comments on its
discussion of the Regulatory Flexibility
Act from Ferrari and NADA. Ferrari
argued that the proposed standards did
impact small manufacturers because
they must pay fines in lieu of
compliance and alternative standards
are not available for manufacturers
producing over 10,000 vehicles per year.
Ferrari further argued that these fines
would be particularly onerous if
NHTSA raised the fine amount. In
response, NHTSA notes that it has not
yet initiated rulemaking to consider
raising the penalties for CAFE noncompliance, and that the regulations are
clear that manufacturers producing
more than 10,000 vehicles per year are
not small manufacturers, while
manufacturers producing less may
petition the agency. While the decision
whether to grant the petition is within
the agency’s discretion, NHTSA has no
interest in merely forcing manufacturers
to pay fines. If an alternative standard
is appropriate, NHTSA will set one.
NADA commented that NHTSA
should have undertaken a full
regulatory flexibility analysis in order to
evaluate the impact of the standards on
U.S. car and truck dealers, arguing that
many of these are small businesses as
defined by the Small Business
Administration. NHTSA disagrees that
these entities are directly impacted by
the CAFE standards, as they are not a
regulated entity under CAFE. As stated
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above, a regulatory flexibility analysis is
not necessary for this rulemaking.
D. Executive Order 13132 (Federalism)
Executive Order 13132 requires
NHTSA to develop an accountable
process to ensure ‘‘meaningful and
timely input by State and local officials
in the development of regulatory
policies that have federalism
implications.’’ The Order defines the
term ‘‘Policies that have federalism
implications’’ to include regulations
that have ‘‘substantial direct effects on
the States, on the relationship between
the national government and the States,
or on the distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various
levels of government.’’ Under the Order,
NHTSA may not issue a regulation that
has federalism implications, that
imposes substantial direct compliance
costs, and that is not required by statute,
unless the Federal government provides
the funds necessary to pay the direct
compliance costs incurred by State and
local governments, or NHTSA consults
with State and local officials early in the
process of developing the proposed
regulation.
As noted above, the President has
requested that NHTSA consider whether
any provisions regarding preemption are
consistent with EISA, the Supreme
Court’s decision in Massachusetts v.
EPA and other relevant provisions of
law and the policies underlying them.
To provide time for further careful
consideration of these issues, NHTSA
has decided not to include any
preemption provisions in the regulatory
text at this time and will examine those
issues in the context of the rulemaking
for MY 2012 and later years.
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E. Executive Order 12988 (Civil Justice
Reform)
Pursuant to Executive Order 12988,
‘‘Civil Justice Reform,’’ 525 NHTSA has
considered whether this rulemaking
would have any retroactive effect. This
final rule does not have any retroactive
effect.
F. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
Section 202 of the Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA)
requires Federal agencies to prepare a
written assessment of the costs, benefits,
and other effects of a proposed or final
rule that includes a Federal mandate
likely to result in the expenditure by
State, local, or tribal governments, in the
aggregate, or by the private sector, of
more than $100 million in any one year
(adjusted for inflation with base year of
1995). Adjusting this amount by the
525 61
FR 4729 (Feb. 7, 1996).
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implicit gross domestic product price
deflator for 2006 results in $126 million
(116.043/92.106 = 1.26). Before
promulgating a rule for which a written
statement is needed, section 205 of
UMRA generally requires NHTSA to
identify and consider a reasonable
number of regulatory alternatives and
adopt the least costly, most costeffective, or least burdensome
alternative that achieves the objectives
of the rule. The provisions of section
205 do not apply when they are
inconsistent with applicable law.
Moreover, section 205 allows NHTSA to
adopt an alternative other than the least
costly, most cost-effective, or least
burdensome alternative if the agency
publishes with the final rule an
explanation why that alternative was
not adopted.
This final rule will not result in the
expenditure by State, local, or tribal
governments, in the aggregate, of more
than $126 million annually, but it will
result in the expenditure of that
magnitude by vehicle manufacturers
and/or their suppliers. In promulgating
this final rule, NHTSA considered a
variety of alternative average fuel
economy standards lower and higher
than those promulgated. NHTSA is
statutorily required to set standards at
the maximum feasible level achievable
by manufacturers and has concluded
that the final fuel economy standards
are the maximum feasible standards for
the MY 2011 passenger car and light
truck fleets in light of the statutory
considerations.
G. Paperwork Reduction Act
Under the procedures established by
the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, a
person is not required to respond to a
collection of information by a Federal
agency unless the collection displays a
valid OMB control number. The final
rule amends the reporting requirements
under 49 CFR part 537, Automotive
Fuel Economy Reports. In addition to
the vehicle model information collected
under the approved data collection
(OMB control number 2127–0019) in
part 537, passenger car manufacturers
will also be required to provide data on
vehicle footprint. Manufacturers and
other persons wishing to trade fuel
economy credits would be required to
provide an instruction to NHTSA on the
credits to be traded. For these changes,
NHTSA is submitting to OMB a request
for approval of the following collection
of information.
In compliance with the PRA, this
notice announces that the Information
Collection Request (ICR) abstracted
below has been forwarded to OMB for
review and comment. The ICR describes
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the nature of the information collections
and their expected burden. This is a
request for an amendment of an existing
collection.
Agency: National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration (NHTSA).
Title: 49 CFR part 537, Automotive
Fuel Economy (F.E.) Reports.
Type of Request: Amend existing
collection.
OMB Clearance Number: 2127–0019.
Form Number: This collection of
information will not use any standard
forms.
Requested Expiration Date of
Approval: Three years from the date of
approval.
Summary of the Collection of
Information
So that NHTSA can determine a
manufacturer’s required fuel economy
level, NHTSA would require
manufacturers to provide data on
vehicle (including passenger car and
light truck) footprint. This information
collection would be included as part of
the existing fuel economy reporting
requirements. NHTSA would also
require that manufacturers and other
persons wishing to trade fuel economy
credits provide an instruction to
NHTSA on the credits to be traded.
Description of the Need for the
Information and Use of the Information
NHTSA needs the footprint
information to determine a
manufacturer’s required fuel economy
level and its compliance with that level.
NHTSA needs the credit trading
instruction to ensure that its records of
a manufacturer’s available credits are
accurate in order to determine whether
a manufacturer has sufficient credits
available to offset any non-compliance
with the CAFE requirements in a given
year.
Description of the Likely Respondents
(Including Estimated Number, and
Proposed Frequency of Response to the
Collection of Information)
NHTSA estimates that 20
manufacturers would submit the
required information. The frequency of
reporting would not change from that
currently authorized under collection
number 2127–0019.
Estimate of the Total Annual Reporting
and Recordkeeping Burden Resulting
From the Collection of Information
For footprint, NHTSA estimates that
each passenger car manufacturer would
incur an additional 10 burden hours per
year. This estimate is based on the fact
that data collection would involve only
computer tabulation. Thus, each
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passenger car manufacturer would incur
an additional burden of 10 hours or a
total on industry of an additional 200
hours a year (assuming there are 20
manufacturers). At an assumed rate of
$21.23 an hour, the annual, estimated
cost of collecting and preparing the
additional passenger car footprint
information is $4,246.
For credit trading, NHTSA estimates
that each instruction would incur an
additional burden hour per year. This
estimate is based on the fact that the
data required is already available and
thus the only burden is the actual
preparation of the instruction. NHTSA
estimates that the maximum
instructions it would receive each year
is 20. While non-manufacturers may
also participate in credit trading,
NHTSA does not believe that every
manufacturer would need to, or be able
to, participate in credit trading every
year. NHTSA does not, at this time,
have a way of estimating how many
non-manufacturers may participate in
credit trading. Therefore NHTSA
believes that the total number of
manufacturers is a reasonable estimate,
for a total annual additional burden of
20 hours a year. At an assumed rate of
$21.23 an hour, the annual estimated
cost of collecting and preparing the
credit trading instruction is $425.
NHTSA estimates that the
recordkeeping burden resulting from the
collection of information would be 0
hours because the information would be
retained on each manufacturer’s existing
computer systems for each
manufacturer’s internal administrative
purposes. There would be no capital or
start-up costs as a result of this
collection. Manufacturers can collect
and tabulate the information by using
existing equipment. Thus, there would
be no additional costs to respondents or
record keepers.
Comments are invited on:
• Whether the collection of
information is necessary for the proper
performance of the functions of the
Department, including whether the
information will have practical utility.
• Whether the Department’s estimate
for the burden of the information
collection is accurate.
• Ways to minimize the burden of the
collection of information on
respondents, including the use of
automated collection techniques or
other forms of information technology.
A comment to OMB is most effective
if OMB receives it within 30 days of
publication. Send comments to the
Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs, Office of Management and
Budget, 725 17th Street, NW.,
Washington, DC 20503, Attn: NHTSA
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Desk Officer. PRA comments are due
within 30 days following publication of
this document in the Federal Register.
The agency recognizes that the
amendment to the existing collection of
information contained in today’s final
rule may be subject to revision in
response to public comments and the
OMB review. For further information
please contact Peter Feather, Division
Chief, Fuel Economy Division, Office of
International Policy, Fuel Economy, and
Consumer Programs, National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration, 1200 New
Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC
20590. You may also contact him by
phone at (202) 366–0846 or by fax at
(202) 493–2290.
H. Regulation Identifier Number (RIN)
The Department of Transportation
assigns a regulation identifier number
(RIN) to each regulatory action listed in
the Unified Agenda of Federal
Regulations. The Regulatory Information
Service Center publishes the Unified
Agenda in April and October of each
year. You may use the RIN contained in
the heading at the beginning of this
document to find this action in the
Unified Agenda.
J. Executive Order 13045
Executive Order 13045526 applies to
any rule that: (1) is determined to be
economically significant as defined
under E.O. 12866, and (2) concerns an
environmental, health or safety risk that
NHTSA has reason to believe may have
a disproportionate effect on children. If
the regulatory action meets both criteria,
we must evaluate the environmental
health or safety effects of the final rule
on children, and explain why the final
regulation is preferable to other
potentially effective and reasonably
feasible alternatives considered by us.
This final rule does not pose such a
risk for children. The primary effects of
this final rule are to conserve energy
and to reduce tailpipe emissions of CO2,
the primary greenhouse gas, by setting
fuel economy standards for motor
vehicles.
K. National Technology Transfer and
Advancement Act
Section 12(d) of the National
Technology Transfer and Advancement
Act (NTTAA) requires NHTSA to
evaluate and use existing voluntary
consensus standards in its regulatory
activities unless doing so would be
inconsistent with applicable law (e.g.,
the statutory provisions regarding
NHTSA’s vehicle safety authority) or
otherwise impractical.
526 62
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FR 19885 (Apr. 23, 1997).
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Voluntary consensus standards are
technical standards developed or
adopted by voluntary consensus
standards bodies. Technical standards
are defined by the NTTAA as
‘‘performance-based or design-specific
technical specification and related
management systems practices.’’ They
pertain to ‘‘products and processes,
such as size, strength, or technical
performance of a product, process or
material.’’
Examples of organizations generally
regarded as voluntary consensus
standards bodies include the American
Society for Testing and Materials
(ASTM), the Society of Automotive
Engineers (SAE), and the American
National Standards Institute (ANSI). If
NHTSA does not use available and
potentially applicable voluntary
consensus standards, we are required by
the Act to provide Congress, through
OMB, an explanation of the reasons for
not using such standards.
The final rule categorizes passenger
cars according to vehicle footprint
(average track width X wheelbase). For
purposes of this calculation, NHTSA
will base these measurements on those
developed by the automotive industry.
Determination of wheelbase would be
consistent with L101-wheelbase,
defined in SAE J1100 MAY95, Motor
vehicle dimensions. NHTSA’s final rule
uses a modified version of the SAE
definitions for track width (W101-treadfront and W102-tread-rear as defined in
SAE J1100 MAY95). The definition of
track width reduces a manufacturer’s
ability to adjust a vehicle’s track width
through minor alterations.
L. Executive Order 13211
Executive Order 13211527 applies to
any rule that: (1) Is determined to be
economically significant as defined
under E.O. 12866, and is likely to have
a significant adverse effect on the
supply, distribution, or use of energy; or
(2) that is designated by the
Administrator of the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs as a
significant energy action. If the
regulatory action meets either criterion,
we must evaluate the adverse energy
effects of the final rule and explain why
the final regulation is preferable to other
potentially effective and reasonably
feasible alternatives considered by us.
The final rule seeks to establish
passenger car and light truck fuel
economy standards that will reduce the
consumption of petroleum and will not
have any adverse energy effects.
Accordingly, this final rulemaking
527 66
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action is not designated as a significant
energy action.
M. Department of Energy Review
In accordance with 49 U.S.C.
32902(j)(2), NHTSA submitted this final
rule to the Department of Energy for
review.
N. Privacy Act
Anyone is able to search the
electronic form of all comments
received into any of our dockets by the
name of the individual submitting the
comment (or signing the comment, if
submitted on behalf of an organization,
business, labor union, etc.). You may
review DOT’s complete Privacy Act
statement in the Federal Register
published on April 11, 2000 (Volume
65, Number 70; Pages 19477–78) or you
may visit https://www.dot.gov/
privacy.html.
XVII. Regulatory Text
List of Subjects in 49 CFR Parts 523,
531, 533, 534, 535, 536, and 537
Fuel economy, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements.
■ For the reasons discussed in the
preamble, under the authority of 49
U.S.C. 32901, 32902, 32903, and 32907,
and delegation of authority at 49 CFR
1.50, NHTSA amends 49 CFR Chapter V
as follows:
PART 523—VEHICLE CLASSIFICATION
1. Revise the authority citation for part
523 to read as follows:
■
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 32901, delegation of
authority at 49 CFR 1.50.
2. Amend § 523.2 by adding, in
alphabetical order, definitions of ‘‘Base
tire,’’ ‘‘Light truck,’’ and ‘‘Work truck,’’
and revising the definition of
‘‘footprint’’ to read as follows:
■
§ 523.2
Definitions.
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*
*
*
*
*
Base tire means the tire specified as
standard equipment by a manufacturer
on each vehicle configuration of a
model type.
*
*
*
*
*
Footprint is defined as the product of
track width (measured in inches,
calculated as the average of front and
rear track widths, and rounded to the
nearest tenth of an inch) times
wheelbase (measured in inches and
rounded to the nearest tenth of an inch),
divided by 144 and then rounded to the
nearest tenth of a square foot. For
purposes of this definition, track width
is the lateral distance between the
centerlines of the base tires at ground,
including the camber angle. For
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purposes of this definition, wheelbase is
the longitudinal distance between front
and rear wheel centerlines.
*
*
*
*
*
Light truck means a non-passenger
automobile as defined in § 523.5.
*
*
*
*
*
Work truck means a vehicle that is
rated at more than 8,500 and less than
or equal to 10,000 pounds gross vehicle
weight, and is not a medium-duty
passenger vehicle as defined in 40 CFR
86.1803–01 effective as of December 20,
2007.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 3. Amend § 523.3 by revising
paragraph (a) to read as follows:
§ 523.3
Automobile.
(a) An automobile is any 4-wheeled
vehicle that is propelled by fuel, or by
alternative fuel, manufactured primarily
for use on public streets, roads, and
highways and rated at less than 10,000
pounds gross vehicle weight, except:
(1) A vehicle operated only on a rail
line;
(2) A vehicle manufactured in
different stages by 2 or more
manufacturers, if no intermediate or
final-stage manufacturer of that vehicle
manufactures more than 10,000 multistage vehicles per year; or
(3) A work truck.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 4. Revise § 523.5 to read as follows:
§ 523.5
Non-passenger automobile.
A non-passenger automobile means
an automobile that is not a passenger
automobile or a work truck and includes
vehicles described in paragraphs (a) and
(b) of this section:
(a) An automobile designed to
perform at least one of the following
functions:
(1) Transport more than 10 persons;
(2) Provide temporary living quarters;
(3) Transport property on an open
bed;
(4) Provide, as sold to the first retail
purchaser, greater cargo-carrying than
passenger-carrying volume, such as in a
cargo van; if a vehicle is sold with a
second-row seat, its cargo-carrying
volume is determined with that seat
installed, regardless of whether the
manufacturer has described that seat as
optional; or
(5) Permit expanded use of the
automobile for cargo-carrying purposes
or other nonpassenger-carrying
purposes through:
(i) For non-passenger automobiles
manufactured prior to model year 2012,
the removal of seats by means installed
for that purpose by the automobile’s
manufacturer or with simple tools, such
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14449
as screwdrivers and wrenches, so as to
create a flat, floor level, surface
extending from the forwardmost point
of installation of those seats to the rear
of the automobile’s interior; or
(ii) For non-passenger automobiles
manufactured in model year 2008 and
beyond, for vehicles equipped with at
least 3 rows of designated seating
positions as standard equipment, permit
expanded use of the automobile for
cargo-carrying purposes or other
nonpassenger-carrying purposes
through the removal or stowing of
foldable or pivoting seats so as to create
a flat, leveled cargo surface extending
from the forwardmost point of
installation of those seats to the rear of
the automobile’s interior.
(b) An automobile capable of offhighway operation, as indicated by the
fact that it:
(1)(i) Has 4-wheel drive; or
(ii) Is rated at more than 6,000 pounds
gross vehicle weight; and
(2) Has at least four of the following
characteristics calculated when the
automobile is at curb weight, on a level
surface, with the front wheels parallel to
the automobile’s longitudinal
centerline, and the tires inflated to the
manufacturer’s recommended
pressure—
(i) Approach angle of not less than 28
degrees.
(ii) Breakover angle of not less than 14
degrees.
(iii) Departure angle of not less than
20 degrees.
(iv) Running clearance of not less than
20 centimeters.
(v) Front and rear axle clearances of
not less than 18 centimeters each.
(Sec. 9, Pub. L. 89–670, 80 Stat. 981 (49
U.S.C. 1657); sec. 301, Pub. L. 94–163, 89
Stat. 901 (15 U.S.C. 2002); delegation of
authority at 41 FR 25015, June 22, 1976.)
PART 531—PASSENGER
AUTOMOBILE AVERAGE FUEL
ECONOMY STANDARDS
5. The authority citation for part 531
continues to read as follows:
■
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 32902; delegation of
authority at 49 CFR 1.50.
6. Amend § 531.5 by revising
paragraph (a), redesignating paragraph
(b) as paragraph (d), and adding new
paragraphs (b) and (c) to read as follows:
■
§ 531.5
Fuel economy standards.
(a) Except as provided in paragraph
(d) of this section, each manufacturer of
passenger automobiles shall comply
with the average fuel economy
standards in Table I, expressed in miles
per gallon, in the model year specified
as applicable:
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economy level calculated for that model
year according to Figure 1 and the
appropriate values in Table II.
Where:
N is the total number (sum) of passenger
automobiles produced by a
manufacturer,
Ni is the number (sum) of the ith model
passenger automobile produced by the
manufacturer, and
Ti is fuel economy target of the ith model
passenger automobile, which is
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T=
Where:
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N
N
∑ Ti
i
i
1
1 ⎛ 1 1 ⎞ e( x − c ) /d
+⎜ − ⎟
a ⎝ b a ⎠ 1 + e( x − c ) /d
Parameters a, b, c, and d are defined in
Table II;
e = 2.718; and
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determined according to the following
formula, rounded to the nearest
hundredth:
ER30MR09.103
Required _ Fuel _ Economy _ Level =
FIGURE 1:
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x = footprint (in square feet, rounded to the
nearest tenth) of the vehicle model
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(b) For model year 2011, a
manufacturer’s passenger automobile
fleet shall comply with the fuel
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14451
(c) In addition to the requirement of
paragraph (b) of this section, each
manufacturer shall also meet the
minimum standard for domestically
manufactured passenger automobiles
expressed in Table III:
*
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 32902; delegation of
authority at 49 CFR 1.50.
§ 533.5
*
*
*
*
PART 533—LIGHT TRUCK FUEL
ECONOMY STANDARDS
(a) * * *
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7. The authority citation for part 533
continues to read as follows:
8. Amend § 533.5 by revising Table V
of paragraph (a) and paragraph (h) to
read as follows:
Requirements.
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*
*
*
*
*
(h) For model year 2011, a
manufacturer’s light truck fleet shall
comply with the fuel economy level
calculated for that model year according
to Figure 1 and the appropriate values
in Table V.
PART 534—RIGHTS AND
RESPONSIBILITIES OF
MANUFACTURERS IN THE CONTEXT
OF CHANGES IN CORPORATE
RELATIONSHIPS
9. The authority citation for part 534
continues to read as follows:
■
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 32901; delegation of
authority at 49 CFR 1.50.
10. Amend § 534.4 by revising
paragraphs (c) and (d) to read as follows:
■
PART 534—RIGHTS AND
RESPONSIBILITIES OF
MANUFACTURERS IN THE CONTEXT
OF CHANGES IN CORPORATE
RELATIONSHIPS
9. The authority citation for part 534
continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 32901; delegation of
authority at 49 CFR 1.50.
10. Amend § 534.4 by revising
paragraphs (c) and (d) to read as follows:
§ 534.4
Successors and predecessors.
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*
*
*
*
*
(c) Credits earned by a predecessor
before or during model year 2007 may
be used by a successor, subject to the
availability of credits and the general
three-year restriction on carrying credits
forward and the general three-year
restriction on carrying credits backward.
Credits earned by a predecessor after
model year 2007 may be used by a
successor, subject to the availability of
credits and the general five-year
restriction on carrying credits forward
and the general three-year restriction on
carrying credits backward.
(d) Credits earned by a successor
before or during model year 2007 may
be used to offset a predecessor’s
shortfall, subject to the availability of
credits and the general three-year
restriction on carrying credits forward
and the general three-year restriction on
carrying credits backward. Credits
earned by a successor after model year
2007 may be used to offset a
predecessor’s shortfall, subject to the
availability of credits and the general
five-year restriction on carrying credits
forward and the general three-year
restriction on carrying credits backward.
11. Amend § 534.5 by revising
paragraphs (c) and (d) to read as follows:
■
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§ 534.5 Manufacturers within control
relationships.
*
*
*
*
*
(c) Credits of a manufacturer within a
control relationship may be used by the
group of manufacturers within the
control relationship to offset shortfalls,
subject to the agreement of the other
manufacturers, the availability of the
credits, and the general three-year
restriction on carrying credits forward
or backward prior to or during model
year 2007, or the general five-year
restriction on carrying credits forward
and the general three-year restriction on
carrying credits backward after model
year 2007.
(d) If a manufacturer within a group
of manufacturers is sold or otherwise
spun off so that it is no longer within
that control relationship, the
manufacturer may use credits that were
earned by the group of manufacturers
within the control relationship while
the manufacturer was within that
relationship, subject to the agreement of
the other manufacturers, the availability
of the credits, and the general three-year
restriction on carrying credits forward
or backward prior to or during model
year 2007, or the general five-year
restriction on carrying credits forward
and the general three-year restriction on
carrying credits backward after model
year 2007.
PART 535—[REMOVED]
12. Remove Part 535.
13. Part 536 is added to read as
follows:
■
■
PART 536—TRANSFER AND TRADING
OF FUEL ECONOMY CREDITS
Sec.
536.1 Scope.
536.2 Application.
536.3 Definitions.
536.4 Credits.
536.5 Trading infrastructure.
536.6 Treatment of credits earned prior to
model year 2011.
536.7 Treatment of carryback credits.
536.8 Conditions for trading of credits.
536.9 Use of credits with regard to the
domestically manufactured passenger
automobile minimum standard.
536.10 Treatment of dual-fuel and
alternative fuel vehicles—consistency
with 49 CFR Part 538.
Authority: Sec. 104, Pub. L. 110–140 (49
U.S.C. 32903); delegation of authority at 49
CFR 1.50.
§ 536.1
Scope.
This part establishes regulations
governing the use and application of
CAFE credits up to three model years
before and five model years after the
model year in which the credit was
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earned. It also specifies requirements for
manufacturers wishing to transfer fuel
economy credits between their fleets
and for manufacturers and other persons
wishing to trade fuel economy credits to
achieve compliance with prescribed fuel
economy standards.
§ 536.2
Application.
This part applies to all credits earned
(and transferable and tradable) for
exceeding applicable average fuel
economy standards in a given model
year for domestically manufactured
passenger cars, imported passenger cars,
and light trucks.
§ 536.3
Definitions.
(a) Statutory terms. All terms defined
in 49 U.S.C. § 32901(a) are used
pursuant to their statutory meaning.
(b) Other terms.
Above standard fuel economy means,
with respect to a compliance category,
that the automobiles manufactured by a
manufacturer in that compliance
category in a particular model year have
greater average fuel economy (calculated
in a manner that reflects the incentives
for alternative fuel automobiles per 49
U.S.C. 32905) than that manufacturer’s
fuel economy standard for that
compliance category and model year.
Adjustment factor means a factor used
to adjust the value of a traded or
transferred credit for compliance
purposes to ensure that the compliance
value of the credit when used reflects
the total volume of oil saved when the
credit was earned.
Below standard fuel economy means,
with respect to a compliance category,
that the automobiles manufactured by a
manufacturer in that compliance
category in a particular model year have
lower average fuel economy (calculated
in a manner that reflects the incentives
for alternative fuel automobiles per 49
U.S.C. 32905) than that manufacturer’s
fuel economy standard for that
compliance category and model year.
Compliance means a manufacturer
achieves compliance in a particular
compliance category when
(1) The average fuel economy of the
vehicles in that category exceed or meet
the fuel economy standard for that
category, or
(2) The average fuel economy of the
vehicles in that category do not meet the
fuel economy standard for that category,
but the manufacturer proffers a
sufficient number of valid credits,
adjusted for total oil savings, to cover
the gap between the average fuel
economy of the vehicles in that category
and the required average fuel economy.
A manufacturer achieves compliance
for its fleet if the above conditions (1)
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or (2) are simultaneously met for all
compliance categories.
Compliance category means any of
three categories of automobiles subject
to Federal fuel economy regulations.
The three compliance categories
recognized by 49 U.S.C. 32903(g)(6) are
domestically manufactured passenger
automobiles, imported passenger
automobiles, and non-passenger
automobiles (‘‘light trucks’’).
Credit holder (or holder) means a legal
person that has valid possession of
credits, either because they are a
manufacturer who has earned credits by
exceeding an applicable fuel economy
standard, or because they are a
designated recipient who has received
credits from another holder. Credit
holders need not be manufacturers,
although all manufacturers may be
credit holders.
Credits (or fuel economy credits)
means an earned or purchased
allowance recognizing that the average
fuel economy of a particular
manufacturer’s vehicles within a
particular compliance category and
model year exceeds that manufacturer’s
fuel economy standard for that
compliance category and model year.
One credit is equal to 1⁄10 of a mile per
gallon above the fuel economy standard
per one vehicle within a compliance
category. Credits are denominated
according to model year in which they
are earned (vintage), originating
manufacturer, and compliance category.
Expiry date means the model year
after which fuel economy credits may
no longer be used to achieve compliance
with fuel economy regulations. Expiry
Dates are calculated in terms of model
years: for example, if a manufacturer
earns credits for model year 2011, these
credits may be used for compliance in
model years 2008–2016.
Fleet means all automobiles that are
manufactured by a manufacturer in a
particular model year and are subject to
fuel economy standards under 49 CFR
parts 531 and 533. For the purposes of
this regulation, a manufacturer’s fleet
means all domestically manufactured
and imported passenger automobiles
and non-passenger automobiles (‘‘light
trucks’’). ‘‘Work trucks’’ and medium
and heavy trucks are not included in
this definition for purposes of this
regulation.
Light truck means the same as ‘‘nonpassenger automobile,’’ as that term is
defined in 49 U.S.C. 32901(a)(17), and
as ‘‘light truck,’’ as that term is defined
at 49 CFR 523.5.
Originating manufacturer means the
manufacturer that originally earned a
particular credit. Each credit earned will
be identified with the name of the
originating manufacturer.
Trade means the receipt by NHTSA of
an instruction from a credit holder to
place one of its credits in the account of
another credit holder. A credit that has
been traded can be identified because
the originating manufacturer will be a
different party than the current credit
holder. Traded credits are moved from
one credit holder to the recipient credit
holder within the same compliance
category for which the credits were
originally earned. If a credit has been
traded to another credit holder and is
subsequently traded back to the
originating manufacturer, it will be
deemed not to have been traded for
compliance purposes.
Transfer means the application by a
manufacturer of credits earned by that
manufacturer in one compliance
category or credits acquired by trade
(and originally earned by another
manufacturer in that category) to
achieve compliance with fuel economy
standards with respect to a different
compliance category. For example, a
manufacturer may purchase light truck
credits from another manufacturer, and
transfer them to achieve compliance in
the manufacturer’s domestically
manufactured passenger car fleet.
14453
Vintage means, with respect to a
credit, the model year in which the
credit was earned.
§ 536.4
Credits.
(a) Type and vintage. All credits are
identified and distinguished in the
accounts by originating manufacturer,
compliance category, and model year of
origin (vintage).
(b) Application of credits. All credits
earned and applied are calculated, per
49 U.S.C. 32903(c), in tenths of a mile
per gallon by which the average fuel
economy of vehicles in a particular
compliance category manufactured by a
manufacturer in the model year in
which the credits are earned exceeds the
applicable average fuel economy
standard, multiplied by the number of
vehicles sold in that compliance
category. However, credits that have
been traded between credit holders or
transferred between compliance
categories are valued for compliance
purposes using the adjustment factor
specified in paragraph (c) of this
section, pursuant to the ‘‘total oil
savings’’ requirement of 49 U.S.C.
32903(f)(1).
(c) Adjustment factor. When traded or
transferred and used, fuel economy
credits are adjusted to ensure fuel oil
savings is preserved. For traded credits,
the user (or buyer) of credits must
multiply the calculated adjustment
factor by the number of its shortfall
credits it plans to offset in order to
determine the number of equivalent
credits to acquire from the earner (or
seller). For transferred credits, the user
of credits must multiply the calculated
adjustment factor by the number of its
shortfall credits it plans to offset in
order to determine the number of
equivalent credits to transfer from the
compliance category holding the
available credits. The adjustment factor
is calculated by the following formula:
Where A = Adjustment Factor applied to
traded or transferred credits;
VMTe = Lifetime vehicle miles traveled for
the compliance category in which the
credit was earned: 150,922 miles for
domestically manufactured and
imported passenger cars, 172,552 miles
for light trucks;
VMTu = Lifetime vehicle miles traveled for
the compliance category in which the
credit is used for compliance: 150,922
miles for domestically manufactured and
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imported passenger cars, 172,552 miles
for light trucks;
MPGse = Required fuel economy standard for
the originating (earning) manufacturer,
compliance category, and model year in
which the credit was earned;
MPGae = Actual fuel economy for the
originating manufacturer, compliance
category, and model year in which the
credit was earned;
MPGsu = Required fuel economy standard for
the user (buying) manufacturer,
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compliance category, and model year in
which the credit is used for compliance;
MPGau = Actual fuel economy for the user
manufacturer, compliance category, and
model year in which the credit is used
for compliance.
§ 536.5
Trading Infrastructure.
(a) Accounts. NHTSA maintains
‘‘accounts’’ for each credit holder. The
account consists of a balance of credits
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A=⎜
⎟
⎝ VMTe ∗ MPGau ∗ MPGsu ⎠
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in each compliance category and vintage
held by the holder.
(b) Who may hold credits. Every
manufacturer subject to fuel economy
standards under 49 CFR parts 531 or
533 is automatically an account holder.
If the manufacturer earns credits
pursuant to this regulation, or receives
credits from another party, so that the
manufacturer’s account has a non-zero
balance, then the manufacturer is also a
credit holder. Any party designated as a
recipient of credits by a current credit
holder will receive an account from
NHTSA and become a credit holder,
subject to the following conditions:
(1) A designated recipient must
provide name, address, contacting
information, and a valid taxpayer
identification number or social security
number;
(2) NHTSA does not grant a request to
open a new account by any party other
than a party designated as a recipient of
credits by a credit holder;
(3) NHTSA maintains accounts with
zero balances for a period of time, but
reserves the right to close accounts that
have had zero balances for more than
one year.
(c) Automatic debits and credits of
accounts.
(1) Upon receipt of a verified
instruction to trade credits from an
existing credit holder, NHTSA verifies
the presence of sufficient credits in the
account of the trader, then debits the
account of the trader and credits the
account of the recipient with credits of
the vintage, origin, and compliance
category designated. Traded credits
identified by a specific compliance
category are deposited into the
recipient’s account in that same
compliance category. If the recipient is
not a current account holder, NHTSA
establishes the account subject to the
conditions described in § 536.5(b), and
adds the credits to the newly-opened
account.
(2) NHTSA automatically deletes
unused credits from holders’ accounts
as they reach their expiry date.
(d) Compliance. (1) NHTSA assesses
compliance with fuel economy
standards each year, utilizing the
certified and reported CAFE data
provided by the Environmental
Protection Agency for enforcement of
the CAFE program pursuant to 49 U.S.C.
32904(e). Credit values are calculated
based on the CAFE data from the EPA.
If a particular compliance category
within a manufacturer’s fleet has above
standard fuel economy, NHTSA adds
credits to the manufacturer’s account for
that compliance category and vintage in
the appropriate amount by which the
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manufacturer has exceeded the
applicable standard.
(2) If a manufacturer’s vehicles in a
particular compliance category have
below standard fuel economy, NHTSA
will provide written notification to the
manufacturer that it has failed to meet
a particular fleet target standard. The
manufacturer will be required to
confirm the shortfall and must either:
submit a plan indicating how it will
allocate existing credits or earn, transfer
and/or acquire credits; or pay the
appropriate civil penalty. The
manufacturer must submit a plan or
payment within 60 days of receiving
agency notification.
(3) Credits used to offset shortfalls are
subject to the three and five year
limitations as described in § 536.6.
(4) Transferred credits are subject to
the limitations specified by 49 U.S.C.
32903(g)(3) and this regulation.
(5) The value, when used for
compliance, of any credits received via
trade or transfer is adjusted, using the
adjustment factor described in
§ 536.4(c), pursuant to 49 U.S.C.
32903(f)(1).
(6) Credit allocation plans received
from a manufacturer will be reviewed
and approved by NHTSA. NHTSA will
approve a credit allocation plan unless
it finds that the proposed credits are
unavailable or that it is unlikely that the
plan will result in the manufacturer
earning sufficient credits to offset the
subject credit shortfall. If a plan is
approved, NHTSA will revise the
respective manufacturer’s credit account
accordingly. If a plan is rejected,
NHTSA will notify the respective
manufacturer and request a revised plan
or payment of the appropriate fine.
(e) Reporting. (1) NHTSA periodically
publishes the names and credit holdings
of all credit holders. NHTSA does not
publish individual transactions, nor
respond to individual requests for
updated balances from any party other
than the account holder.
(2) NHTSA issues an annual credit
status letter to each party that is a credit
holder at that time. The letter to a credit
holder includes a credit accounting
record that identifies the credit status of
the credit holder including any activity
(earned, expired, transferred, traded,
carry-forward and carry-back credit
transactions/allocations) that took place
during the identified activity period.
§ 536.6 Treatment of credits earned prior
to model year 2011.
(a) Credits earned in a compliance
category before model year 2008 may be
applied by the manufacturer that earned
them to carryback plans for that
compliance category approved up to
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three model years prior to the year in
which the credits were earned, or may
be applied to compliance in that
compliance category for up to three
model years after the year in which the
credits were earned.
(b) Credits earned in a compliance
category during and after model year
2008 may be applied by the
manufacturer that earned them to
carryback plans for that compliance
category approved up to three years
prior to the year in which the credits
were earned, or may be held or applied
for up to five model years after the year
in which the credits were earned.
(c) Credits earned in a compliance
category prior to model year 2011 may
not be transferred or traded.
§ 536.7
Treatment of carryback credits.
(a) Carryback credits earned in a
compliance category in any model year
may be used in carryback plans
approved by NHTSA, pursuant to 49
U.S.C. 32903(b), for up to three model
years prior to the year in which the
credit was earned.
(b) For purposes of this regulation,
NHTSA will treat the use of future
credits for compliance, as through a
carryback plan, as a deferral of penalties
for non-compliance with an applicable
fuel economy standard.
(c) If NHTSA receives and approves a
manufacturer’s carryback plan to earn
future credits within the following three
model years in order to comply with
current regulatory obligations, NHTSA
will defer levying fines for noncompliance until the date(s) when the
manufacturer’s approved plan indicates
that credits will be earned or acquired
to achieve compliance, and upon
receiving confirmed CAFE data from
EPA. If the manufacturer fails to acquire
or earn sufficient credits by the plan
dates, NHTSA will initiate compliance
proceedings.
(d) In the event that NHTSA fails to
receive or approve a plan for a noncompliant manufacturer, NHTSA will
levy fines pursuant to statute. If within
three years, the non-compliant
manufacturer earns or acquires
additional credits to reduce or eliminate
the non-compliance, NHTSA will
reduce any fines owed, or repay fines to
the extent that credits received reduce
the non-compliance.
(e) No credits from any source
(earned, transferred and/or traded) will
be accepted in lieu of compliance if
those credits are not identified as
originating within one of the three
model years after the model year of the
confirmed shortfall.
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§ 536.8
Conditions for trading of credits.
(a) Trading of credits. If a credit
holder wishes to trade credits to another
party, the current credit holder and the
receiving party must jointly issue an
instruction to NHTSA, identifying the
quantity, vintage, compliance category,
and originator of the credits to be
traded. If the recipient is not a current
account holder, the recipient must
provide sufficient information for
NHTSA to establish an account for the
recipient. Once an account has been
established or identified for the
recipient, NHTSA completes the trade
by debiting the transferor’s account and
crediting the recipient’s account.
NHTSA will track the quantity, vintage,
compliance category, and originator of
all credits held or traded by all accountholders.
(b) Trading between and within
compliance categories. For credits
earned in model year 2011 or thereafter,
and used to satisfy compliance
obligations for model year 2011 or
thereafter:
(1) Manufacturers may use credits
originally earned by another
manufacturer in a particular compliance
category to satisfy compliance
obligations within the same compliance
category.
(2) Once a manufacturer acquires by
trade credits originally earned by
another manufacturer in a particular
compliance category, the manufacturer
may transfer the credits to satisfy its
compliance obligations in a different
compliance category, but only to the
extent that the CAFE increase
attributable to the transferred credits
does not exceed the limits in 49 U.S.C.
32903(g)(3). For any compliance
category, the sum of a manufacturer’s
transferred credits earned by that
manufacturer and transferred credits
obtained by that manufacturer through
trade must not exceed that limit.
(c) Changes in corporate ownership
and control. Manufacturers must inform
NHTSA of corporate relationship
changes to ensure that credit accounts
are identified correctly and credits are
assigned and allocated properly.
(1) In general, if two manufacturers
merge in any way, they must inform
NHTSA how they plan to merge their
credit accounts. NHTSA will
subsequently assess corporate fuel
economy and compliance status of the
merged fleet instead of the original
separate fleets.
(2) If a manufacturer divides or
divests itself of a portion of its
automobile manufacturing business, it
must inform NHTSA how it plans to
divide the manufacturer’s credit
holdings into two or more accounts.
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18:39 Mar 27, 2009
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NHTSA will subsequently distribute
holdings as directed by the
manufacturer, subject to provision for
reasonably anticipated compliance
obligations.
(3) If a manufacturer is a successor to
another manufacturer’s business, it must
inform NHTSA how it plans to allocate
credits and resolve liabilities per 49 CFR
Part 534, Rights and Responsibilities of
Manufacturers in the Context of
Corporate Relationships.
(d) No short or forward sales. NHTSA
will not honor any instructions to trade
or transfer more credits than are
currently held in any account. NHTSA
will not honor instructions to trade or
transfer credits from any future vintage
(i.e., credits not yet earned). NHTSA
will not participate in or facilitate
contingent trades.
(e) Cancellation of credits. A credit
holder may instruct NHTSA to cancel
its currently held credits, specifying the
originating manufacturer, vintage, and
compliance category of the credits to be
cancelled. These credits will be
permanently null and void; NHTSA will
remove the specific credits from the
credit holder’s account, and will not
reissue them to any other party.
(f) Errors or fraud in earning credits.
If NHTSA determines that a
manufacturer has been credited, through
error or fraud, with earning credits,
NHTSA will cancel those credits if
possible. If the manufacturer credited
with having earned those credits has
already traded them when the error or
fraud is discovered, NHTSA will hold
the receiving manufacturer responsible
for returning the same or equivalent
credits to NHTSA for cancellation.
(g) Error or fraud in trading. In
general, all trades are final and
irrevocable once executed, and may
only be reversed by a new, mutuallyagreed transaction. If NHTSA executes
an erroneous instruction to trade credits
from one holder to another through
error or fraud, NHTSA will reverse the
transaction if possible. If those credits
have been traded away, the recipient
holder is responsible for obtaining the
same or equivalent credits for return to
the previous holder.
§ 536.9 Use of credits with regard to the
domestically manufactured passenger
automobile minimum standard.
(a) Each manufacturer is responsible
for compliance with both the minimum
standard and the attribute-based
standard.
(b) In any particular model year, the
domestically manufactured passenger
automobile compliance category credit
excess or shortfall is determined by
comparing the actual CAFE value
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14455
against either the required standard
value or the minimum standard value,
whichever is larger.
(c) Transferred or traded credits may
not be used, pursuant to 49 U.S.C.
32903(g)(4) and (f)(2), to meet the
domestically manufactured passenger
automobile minimum standard
specified in 49 U.S.C. 32902(b)(4).
(d) If a manufacturer’s average fuel
economy level for domestically
manufactured passenger automobiles is
lower than the attribute-based standard,
but higher than the minimum standard,
then the manufacturer may achieve
compliance with the attribute-based
standard by applying credits.
(e) If a manufacturer’s average fuel
economy level for domestically
manufactured passenger automobiles is
lower than the minimum standard, then
the difference between the minimum
standard and the manufacturer’s actual
fuel economy level may only be relieved
by the use of credits earned by that
manufacturer within the domestic
passenger car compliance category
which have not been transferred or
traded. If the manufacturer does not
have available earned credits to offset a
credit shortage below the minimum
standard then the manufacturer can
submit a carry-back plan that indicates
sufficient future credits will be earned
in its domestic passenger car
compliance category or will be subject
to penalties.
§ 536.10 Treatment of dual-fuel and
alternative fuel vehicles—consistency with
49 CFR Part 538.
(a) Statutory alternative fuel and dualfuel vehicle fuel economy calculations
are treated as a change in the underlying
fuel economy of the vehicle for
purposes of this regulation, not as a
credit that may be transferred or traded.
Improvements in alternative fuel or dual
fuel vehicle fuel economy as calculated
pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 32905 and limited
by 49 U.S.C. 32906 are therefore
attributable only to the particular
compliance category and model year to
which the alternative or dual-fuel
vehicle belongs.
(b) If a manufacturer’s calculated fuel
economy for a particular compliance
category, including any required
calculations for alternative fuel and dual
fuel vehicles, is higher or lower than the
applicable fuel economy standard,
manufacturers will earn credits or must
apply credits or pay fines equal to the
difference between the calculated fuel
economy level in that compliance
category and the applicable standard.
Credits earned are the same as any other
credits, and may be held, transferred, or
traded by the manufacturer subject to
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the limitations of the statute and this
regulation.
(c) If a manufacturer builds enough
alternative fuel or dual fuel vehicles to
improve the calculated fuel economy in
a particular compliance category by
more than the limits set forth in 49
U.S.C. 32906(a), the improvement in
fuel economy for compliance purposes
is restricted to the statutory limit.
Manufacturers may not earn credits nor
reduce the application of credits or fines
for calculated improvements in fuel
economy based on alternative or dual
fuel vehicles beyond the statutory limit.
PART 537—AUTOMOTIVE FUEL
ECONOMY REPORTS
14. Revise the authority citation for
part 537 to read as follows:
■
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 32907, delegation of
authority at 49 CFR 1.50.
15. Amend § 537.7 by revising
paragraphs (b), (c)(4)(xvi)(A), and
(c)(4)(xvi)(B) to read as follows:
■
§ 537.7 Pre-model year and mid-model
year reports.
*
*
*
*
(b) Projected average and required
fuel economy. (1) State the projected
average fuel economy for the
manufacturer’s automobiles determined
in accordance with § 537.9 and based
upon the fuel economy values and
projected sales figures provided under
paragraph (c)(2) of this section.
(2) State the projected final average
fuel economy that the manufacturer
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*
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18:39 Mar 27, 2009
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anticipates having if changes
implemented during the model year will
cause that average to be different from
the average fuel economy projected
under paragraph (b)(1) of this section.
(3) State the projected required fuel
economy for the manufacturer’s
passenger automobiles and light trucks
determined in accordance with 49 CFR
531.5(c) and 49 CFR 533.5(h) and based
upon the projected sales figures
provided under paragraph (c)(2) of this
section.
(4) State the projected final required
fuel economy that the manufacturer
anticipates having if changes
implemented during the model year will
cause the targets to be different from the
target fuel economy projected under
paragraph (b)(3) of this section.
(5) State whether the manufacturer
believes that the projections it provides
under paragraphs (b)(2) and (b)(4) of this
section, or if it does not provide an
average or target under those
paragraphs, the projections it provides
under paragraphs (b)(1) and (b)(3) of this
section, sufficiently represent the
manufacturer’s average and target fuel
economy for the current model year for
purposes of the Act. In the case of a
manufacturer that believes that the
projections are not sufficiently
representative for those purposes, state
the specific nature of any reason for the
insufficiency and the specific additional
testing or derivation of fuel economy
values by analytical methods believed
by the manufacturer necessary to
eliminate the insufficiency and any
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plans of the manufacturer to undertake
that testing or derivation voluntarily
and submit the resulting data to the
Environmental Protection Agency under
40 CFR 600.509.
(c) * * *
(4) * * *
(xvi)(A) In the case of passenger
automobiles:
(1) Interior volume index, determined
in accordance with subpart D of 40 CFR
part 600,
(2) Body style,
(3) Beginning model year 2010, base
tire as defined in 49 CFR 523.2,
(4) Beginning model year 2010, track
width as defined in 49 CFR 523.2,
(5) Beginning model year 2010,
wheelbase as defined in 49 CFR 523.2,
and
(6) Beginning model year 2010,
footprint as defined in 49 CFR 523.2.
(B) In the case of light trucks:
(1) Passenger-carrying volume,
(2) Cargo-carrying volume,
(3) Beginning model year 2008, base
tire as defined in 49 CFR 523.2,
(4) Beginning model year 2008, track
width as defined in 49 CFR 523.2,
(5) Beginning model year 2008,
wheelbase as defined in 49 CFR 523.2,
and
(6) Beginning model year 2008,
footprint as defined in 49 CFR 523.2.
Issued: March 23, 2009.
Ronald L. Medford,
Acting Deputy Administrator.
[FR Doc. E9–6839 Filed 3–27–09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–59–P
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Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 59 (Monday, March 30, 2009)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 14196-14456]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-6839]
[[Page 14195]]
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Part II
Department of Transportation
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National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
49 CFR Parts 523, 531, 533, et al.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Average Fuel Economy Standards Passenger Cars and Light Trucks Model
Year 2011; Final Rule
Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 59 / Monday, March 30, 2009 / Rules
and Regulations
[[Page 14196]]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
49 CFR Parts 523, 531, 533, 534, 536 and 537
[Docket No. NHTSA-2009-0062]
RIN 2127-AK29
Average Fuel Economy Standards Passenger Cars and Light Trucks
Model Year 2011
AGENCY: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA),
Department of Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Final rule; record of decision.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The future of this country's economy, security, and
environment are linked to one key challenge: energy. To reduce fuel
consumption, NHTSA has been issuing Corporate Average Fuel Economy
(CAFE) standards since the late 1970's under the Energy Policy and
Conservation Act (EPCA). However, the principal effects of these
standards are broader than their statutory purpose. Reducing fuel
consumption conserves petroleum, a non-renewable energy source, saves
consumers money, and promotes energy independence and security by
reducing dependence on foreign oil. It also directly reduces the motor
vehicle tailpipe emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2), which is
the principal greenhouse gas emitted by motor vehicles.
The Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA) amended EPCA by
mandating that the model year (MY) 2011-2020 CAFE standards be set
sufficiently high to ensure that the industry-wide average of all new
passenger cars and light trucks, combined, is not less than 35 miles
per gallon by MY 2020. This is a minimum requirement, as NHTSA must set
standards at the maximum feasible level in each model year. NHTSA will
determine, based on all of the relevant circumstances, whether that
additional requirement calls for establishing standards that reach the
35 mpg goal earlier than MY 2020.
NHTSA published a proposal in May 2008 to begin implementing EISA
by establishing CAFE standards for MYs 2011-2015. A draft final rule
for those model years was completed, but not issued.
In the context of his calls for the development of new national
policies to prompt sustained domestic and international actions to
address the closely intertwined issues of energy independence, energy
security and climate change, the President issued a memorandum on
January 26, 2009, requesting NHTSA to divide its rulemaking into two
parts. First, he requested the agency to issue a final rule adopting
CAFE standards for MY 2011 only. Given the substantial time and
analytical effort involved in developing CAFE standards and the limited
amount of time before the statutory deadline of March 30, 2009 for
establishing the MY 2011 standards, the agency has necessarily based
this one year final rule almost wholly on the information available to
it and the analysis performed by it in support of the draft final rule
completed last fall.
Second, the President requested NHTSA to establish standards for MY
2012 and later after considering the appropriate legal factors, the
comments filed in response to the May 2008 proposal, the relevant
technological and scientific considerations, and, to the extent
feasible, a forthcoming report by the National Academy of Sciences,
mandated under section 107 of EISA, assessing existing and potential
automotive technologies and costs that can practicably be used to
improve fuel economy. The deferral of action on standards for the later
model years provides the agency with an opportunity to review its
approach to CAFE standard setting, including its methodologies,
economic and technological inputs and decisionmaking criteria, so as to
ensure that it will produce standards that contribute, to the maximum
extent possible within the limits of EPCA/EISA, to meeting the energy
and environmental challenges and goals outlined by the President.
NHTSA estimates that the MY 2011 standards will raise the industry-
wide combined average to 27.3 mpg, save 887 million gallons of fuel
over the lifetime of the MY 2011 cars and light trucks, and reduce
CO2 emissions by 8.3 million metric tons during that period.
DATES: This final rule is effective May 29, 2009.
Petitions for reconsideration must be received by May 14, 2009.
ADDRESSES: Petitions for reconsideration must be submitted to:
Administrator, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 1200 New
Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For policy and technical issues: Ms.
Julie Abraham or Mr. Peter Feather, Office of Rulemaking, National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE.,
Washington, DC 20590. Telephone: Ms. Abraham (202) 366-1455; Mr.
Feather (202) 366-0846.
For legal issues: Mr. Stephen Wood or Ms. Rebecca Yoon, Office of
the Chief Counsel, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 1200
New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590. Telephone: (202) 366-
2992.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Table of Contents
I. Executive overview
A. The President's January 26, 2009 Memorandum on CAFE Standards
for Model Years 2011 and Beyond
1. Rulemaking Background
2. Requests in the President's Memorandum
(a) CAFE Standards for Model Year 2011
(b) CAFE Standards for Model Years 2012 and Beyond
3. Implementing the President's Memorandum
B. Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007
C. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for MYs 2011-2015 and Request
for New Product Plans
1. Key Economic Values for Benefits Computations and Standard
Setting
2. Standards
(a) Classification of Vehicles
(b) Stringency
(c) Benefits and Costs
(i) Benefits
(ii) Costs
(d) Effect of Flexibilities on Benefits and Costs
3. Credits
4. Preemption
D. Brief Summary of Public Comments on the NPRM
E. New Information Received or Developed by NHTSA Between the
NPRM and Final Rule
1. New Manufacturer Product Plans
2. Revised Assessment of Technology Effectiveness and Costs
3. Final Environmental Impact Statement
F. Final Rule for MY 2011
1. Introduction
2. Key Economic Values for Benefits Computations
3. Standards
(a) Classification
(b) Stringency
(c) Benefits and Costs
(i) Benefits
(ii) Costs
(d) Flexibilities
4. Credits
5. Preemption
II. Background
A. Role of Fuel Economy Improvements in Promoting Energy
Independence, Energy Security, and a Low Carbon Economy
B. Contributions of Fuel Economy Improvements to CO2
Tailpipe Emission Reductions Since 1975
C. Chronology of Events Since the National Academy of Sciences
Called for Reforming and Increasing CAFE Standards
1. National Academy of Sciences Issues Report on Future of CAFE
Program (February 2002)
(a) Significantly Increasing CAFE Standards Without Making Them
[[Page 14197]]
Attribute-Based Would Adversely Affect Safety
(b) Climate Change and Other Externalities Justify Increasing
the CAFE Standards
2. NHTSA Issues Final Rule Establishing Attribute-Based CAFE
Standards for MY 2008-2011 Light Trucks (March 2006)
3. Supreme Court Issues Decision in Massachusetts v. EPA (April
2007)
4. NHTSA and EPA Coordinate on Development of Rulemaking
Proposals (Summer-Fall 2007)
5. Ninth Circuit Issues Decision Re Final Rule for MY 2008-2011
Light Trucks (November 2007)
6. Congress Enacts Energy Security and Independence Act of 2007
(December 2007)
7. NHTSA Proposes CAFE Standards for MYs 2011-2015 and Requests
New Product Plans for Those Years (April 2008)
8. NHTSA Contracts With ICF International To Conduct Climate
Modeling and Other Analyses in Support of Draft and Final
Environmental Impact Statements (May 2008)
9. Manufacturers Submit New Product Plans (June 2008)
10. NHTSA Contracts With Ricardo To Aid in Assessing Public
Comments On Cost and Effectiveness of Fuel Saving Technologies (June
2008)
11. Ninth Circuit Revises Its Decision Re Final Rule for MY
2008-2011 Light Trucks (August 2008)
12. NHTSA Releases Final Environmental Impact Statement (October
2008)
13. Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs Completes
Review of a Draft MY 2011-2015 Final Rule (November 2008)
14. Department of Treasury Extends Loans to General Motors and
Chrysler (December 2008)
15. Department of Transportation Decides Not To Issue MY 2011-
2015 Final Rule (January 2009)
16. The President Requests NHTSA To Issue Final Rule for MY 2011
Only (January 2009)
17. General Motors and Chrysler Submit Restructuring Reports to
Department of Treasury (February 2009)
D. Energy Policy and Conservation Act, as Amended
1. Vehicles Subject to Standards for Automobiles
2. Mandate To Set Standards for Automobiles
3. Attribute-Based Standards
4. Factors Considered in the Setting of Standards
(a) Factors That Must Be Considered
(i) Technological Feasibility
(ii) Economic Practicability
(iii) The Effect of Other Motor Vehicle Standards of the
Government on Fuel Economy
(iv) The Need of the United States To Conserve Energy
1. Fuel Prices and the Value of Saving Fuel
2. Petroleum Consumption and Import Externalities
3. Air Pollutant Emissions
(v) Other Factors--Safety
(b) Factors That Cannot Be Considered
(c) Weighing and Balancing of Factors
5. Consultation in Setting Standards
6. Test Procedures for Measuring Fuel Economy
7. Enforcement and Compliance Flexibility
III. The Anticipated Vehicles in the MY 2011 Fleets and NHTSA's
Baseline Market Forecast
A. Why does NHTSA establish a baseline market forecast?
B. How does NHTSA develop the baseline market forecast?
1. NHTSA first asks manufacturers for updated product plan data
(a) Why does NHTSA use manufacturer product plans to develop the
baseline?
(b) What product plan data did NHTSA use in the NPRM?
(c) What product plan data did NHTSA receive for the final rule?
(d) How is the product plan data received for the final rule
different from what the agency used in the NPRM analysis, and how
does it impact the baseline?
2. Once NHTSA has the product plans, how does it develop the
baseline?
3. How does NHTSA's market forecast reflect current market
conditions?
IV. Fuel Economy-Improving Technologies
A. NHTSA Analyzes What Technologies Can Be Applied Beyond Those
in the Manufacturers' Product Plans
B How NHTSA Decides Which Technologies To Include
1. How NHTSA Did This Historically, and How for the NPRM
2. NHTSA's Contract With Ricardo for the Final Rule
C. What technology assumptions has NHTSA used for the final
rule?
1. How do NHTSA's technology assumptions in the final rule
differ from those used in the NPRM?
2. How are the technologies applied in the model?
3. Technology Application Decision Trees
4. Division of Vehicles Into Subclasses Based on Technology
Applicability, Cost and Effectiveness
5. How did NHTSA develop technology cost and effectiveness
estimates for the final rule?
6. Learning Curves
7. Technology Synergies
8. How does NHTSA use full vehicle simulation?
9. Refresh and Redesign Schedule
10. Phase-In Caps
D. Specific Technologies Considered for Application and NHTSA's
Estimates of Their Incremental Costs and Effectiveness
1. What data sources did NHTSA evaluate?
2. Individual Technology Descriptions and Cost/Effectiveness
Estimates
(a) Gasoline Engine Technologies
(i) Overview
(ii) Low Friction Lubricants (LUB)
(iii) Engine Friction Reduction (EFR)
(iv) Variable Valve Timing (VVT)
1. Intake Cam Phasing (ICP)
2. Coupled Cam Phasing (CCPS and CCPO)
3. Dual Cam Phasing (DCP)
(v) Discrete Variable Valve Lift (DVVLS, DVVLD, DVVLO)
(vi) Continuously Variable Valve Lift (CVVL)
(vii) Cylinder Deactivation (DEACS, DEACD, DEACO)
(viii) Conversion to Double Overhead Camshaft Engine With Dual
Cam Phasing (CDOHC)
(ix) Stoichiometric Gasoline Direct Injection (SGDI)
(x) Combustion Restart (CBRST)
(xi) Turbocharging and Downsizing (TRBDS)
(xii) Cooled Exhaust Gas Recirculation Boost (EGRB)
(b) Diesel Engine Technologies
(i) Diesel Engine With Lean NOX Trap (LNT) Catalyst
After-Treatment
(ii) Diesel Engine With Selective Catalytic Reduction (SCR)
After-Treatment
(c) Transmission Technologies
(i) Improved Transmission Controls and Externals (IATC)
(ii) Automatic 6-, 7- and 8-Speed Transmissions (NAUTO)
(iii) Dual Clutch Transmissions/Automated Manual Transmissions
(DCTAM)
(iv) Continuously Variable Transmission (CVT)
(v) 6-Speed Manual Transmissions (6MAN)
(d) Hybrid and Electrification/Accessory Technologies
(i) Overview
(ii) Hybrid System Sizing and Cost Estimating Methodology
(iii) Electrical Power Steering (EPS)
(iv) Improved Accessories (IACC)
(v) 12V Micro Hybrid (MHEV)
(vi) High Voltage/Improved Alternator (HVIA)
(vii) Integrated Starter Generator (ISG)
(viii) Power Split Hybrid
(ix) 2-Mode Hybrid
(x) Plug-In Hybrid
(e) Vehicle Technologies
(i) Material Substitution (MS1, MS2, MS5)
(ii) Low Drag Brakes (LDB)
(iii) Low Rolling Resistance Tires (ROLL)
(iv) Front or Secondary Axle Disconnect for Four-Wheel Drive
Systems (SAX)
(v) Aerodynamic Drag Reduction (AERO)
(f) Technologies Considered But Not Included in the Final Rule
Analysis
(i) Camless Valve Actuation
(ii) Lean-Burn Gasoline Direct Injection Technology
(iii) Homogeneous Charge Compression Ignition
(iv) Electric Assist Turbocharging
E. Cost and Effectiveness Tables
V. Economic Assumptions Used in NHTSA's Analysis
A. Introduction: How NHTSA Uses the Economic Assumptions in Its
Analysis
B. What economic assumptions does NHTSA use in its analysis?
1. Determining Retail Price Equivalent
2. Potential Opportunity Costs of Improved Fuel Economy
3. The On-Road Fuel Economy `Gap'
4. Fuel Prices and the Value of Saving Fuel
5. Consumer Valuation of Fuel Economy and Payback Period
6. Vehicle Survival and Use Assumptions
7. Growth in Total Vehicle Use
8. Accounting for the Rebound Effect of Higher Fuel Economy
9. Benefits From Increased Vehicle Use
10. Added Costs From Congestion, Crashes, and Noise
[[Page 14198]]
11. Petroleum Consumption and Import Externalities
12. Air Pollutant Emissions
(a) Impacts on Criteria Pollutant Emissions
(b) Reductions in CO2 Emissions
(c) Economic Value of Reductions in CO2 Emissions
13. The Value of Increased Driving Range
14. Discounting Future Benefits and Costs
15. Accounting for Uncertainty in Benefits and Costs
VI. How NHTSA Sets the CAFE Standards
A. Which attributes does NHTSA use to determine the standards?
B. Which mathematical function does NHTSA use to set the
standards?
C. What other types of standards did commenters propose?
D. How does NHTSA fit the curve and estimate the stringency that
maximizes net benefits to society?
E. Why has NHTSA used the Volpe model to support its analysis?
VII. Determining the Appropriate Level of the Standards
A. Analyzing the Preferred Alternative
B. Alternative Levels of Stringency Considered for Establishment
as the Maximum Feasible Level of Average Fuel Economy
C. EPCA Provisions Relevant to the Selection of the Final
Standards
1. 35 in 2020
2. Annual Ratable Increase
3. Maximum Feasibility and the Four Underlying EPCA
Considerations
(a) Technological Feasibility
(b) Economic Practicability
(c) Effect of Other Motor Vehicle Standards of the Government on
Fuel Economy
(d) Need of the United States To Conserve Energy
(i) Consumer Cost
(ii) National Balance of Payments
(iii) Environmental Implications
(iv) Foreign Policy Considerations
4. Comparison of Alternatives
5. Other Considerations Under EPCA
(a) Safety
(b) AMFA Credits
(c) Flexibility Mechanisms: Credits, Fines
D. Analysis of Environmental Consequences in Selecting the Final
Standards
E. Picking the Final Standards
1. Eliminating the Alternatives Facially Inconsistent With EPCA
(a) No-Action Alternative
(b) Technology Exhaustion Alternative
2. Choosing Among the Remaining Alternatives
(a) Difficulty and Importance of Achieving a Reasonable
Balancing of the Factors
(b) The Correct Balancing of the Factors for Setting the MY 2011
Standards Is To Maximize Societal Net Benefits
VIII. Safety
A. Summary of NHTSA's Approach in This Final Rule
B. Background
1. NHTSA's Early Studies
2. The 2002 National Academy of Sciences Study
3. NHTSA's updated 2003 Study
4. Summary of Studies Prior to This Rulemaking
B. Response to Comments in This Rulemaking on Safety and Vehicle
Weight
1. Views of Other Government Agencies
2. Comments From Other Parties
C. Comments on Other Issues Related to Safety
1. Vehicle Compatibility Design Issues
2. Whether Manufacturers Downweight in Response to Increased
CAFE Stringency
3. Whether Flat Standards Are More or Less Harmful to Safety
Than Footprint-Based Standards
4. Whether NHTSA Should Set Identical Targets for Passenger Cars
and Light Trucks for Safety Reasons
5. Whether NHTSA Should Have Considered the 2002 NAS Report
Dissent in Deciding Not To Apply Material Substitution for Vehicles
Under 5,000 Pounds
IX. The Final Fuel Economy Standards for MY 2011
A. Final Passenger Car Standard
B. Final Light Truck Standard
C. Energy and Environmental Backstop
D. Combined Fleet Performance
E. Costs and Benefits of Final Standards
1. Benefits
2. Costs
F. Environmental Impacts of Final Standards
X. Other Fuel Economy Standards Required by EISA
XI. Vehicle Classification
A. Summary of Comments
B. Response to Comments
1. This Rule Substantially Tightens NHTSA's Vehicle
Classification Definitions
(a) Under Sec. 523.5(b), Only Vehicles That Actually Have 4WD
Will Be Classified as 4WD Vehicles
(b) The Final Rule Amends Sec. 523.5(a)(4) To Prevent Gaming
That Might Jeopardize Fuel Savings Created by NHTSA's Clarified
Position on 2WD Vehicles
2. Especially as Tightened by This Rule, NHTSA's Classification
Definitions Are More Difficult to Game Than Commenters Suggest
3. Additional Changes in NHTSA's Classification Definitions
Would Not Result in Greater Fuel Savings and Lower CO2
Emissions
4. The Vehicle Classification Definitions Embodied in This Final
Rule Are Consistent With NHTSA's Statutory Authority and Respond to
the Ninth Circuit's Opinion
XII. Flexibility Mechanisms and Enforcement
A. NHTSA's Request for Comment Regarding Whether the Agency
Should Consider Raising the Civil Penalty for CAFE Non-Compliance
B. CAFE Credits
C. Extension and Phasing Out of Flexible-Fuel Incentive Program
XIII. Test Procedure for Measuring Wheelbase and Track Width and
Calculating Footprint
A. Test Procedure Execution
B. Measured Value Tolerances
C. Administrative and Editorial Issues
XIV. Sensitivity and Monte Carlo Analysis
XV. NHTSA's Record of Decision
XVI. Regulatory Notices and Analyses
A. Executive Order 12866 and DOT Regulatory Policies and
Procedures
B. National Environmental Policy Act
1. Clean Air Act (CAA)
2. National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA)
3. Executive Order 12898 (Environmental Justice)
4. Fish and Wildlife Conservation Act (FWCA)
5. Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA)
6. Endangered Species Act (ESA)
7. Floodplain Management (Executive Order 11988 & DOT Order
5650.2)
8. Preservation of the Nation's Wetlands (Executive Order 11990
& DOT Order 5660.1a)
9. Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA), Bald and Golden Eagle
Protection Act (BGEPA), Executive Order 13186
10. Department of Transportation Act (Section 4(f))
C. Regulatory Flexibility Act
D. Executive Order 13132 (Federalism)
E. Executive Order 12988 (Civil Justice Reform)
F. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
G. Paperwork Reduction Act
H. Regulation Identifier Number (RIN)
J. Executive Order 13045
K. National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act
L. Executive Order 13211
M. Department of Energy Review
N. Privacy Act
XVII. Regulatory Text
I. Executive Overview
A. The President's January 26, 2009 Memorandum on CAFE Standards for
Model Years 2011 and Beyond
1. Rulemaking Background
On May 2, 2008, NHTSA published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
entitled Average Fuel Economy Standards, Passenger Cars and Light
Trucks; Model Years 2011-2015, 73 FR 24352. In mid-October, the agency
completed and released a final environmental impact statement in
anticipation of issuing standards for those years. Based on its
consideration of the public comments and other available information,
including information on the financial condition of the automotive
industry, the agency adjusted its analysis and the standards and
prepared a final rule for MYs 2011-2015. On November 14, the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) of the Office of Management
and Budget cleared the rule as consistent with the Order.\1\ However,
issuance of the final rule was held in abeyance. On January 7, 2009,
[[Page 14199]]
the Department of Transportation announced that the final rule would
not be issued, saying:
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\1\ Record of OIRA's action can be found at https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eoHistReviewSearch (last visited March 8,
2009). To find the report on the clearance of the draft final rule,
select ``Department of Transportation'' under ``Economically
Significant Reviews Completed'' and select ``2008'' under ``Select
Calendar Year.''
The Bush Administration will not finalize its rulemaking on
Corporate Fuel Economy Standards. The recent financial difficulties
of the automobile industry will require the next administration to
conduct a thorough review of matters affecting the industry,
including how to effectively implement the Energy Independence and
Security Act of 2007 (EISA). The National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration has done significant work that will position the next
Transportation Secretary to finalize a rule before the April 1, 2009
deadline.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ The statement can be found at https://www.dot.gov/affairs/dot0109.htm (last accessed February 11, 2009).
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2. Requests in the President's Memorandum
In light of the requirement to prescribe standards for MY 2011 by
March 30, 2009 and in order to provide additional time to consider
issues concerning the analysis used to determine the appropriate level
of standards for MYs 2012 and beyond, the President issued a memorandum
on January 26, 2009, requesting the Secretary of Transportation and
Administrator \3\ of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
NHTSA to divide the rulemaking into two parts: (1) MY 2011 standards,
and (2) standards for MY 2012 and beyond.
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\3\ Currently, the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration does not have an Administrator. Ronald L. Medford is
the Acting Deputy Administrator.
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(a) CAFE Standards for Model Year 2011
The request that the final rule establishing CAFE standards for MY
2011 passenger cars and light trucks be prescribed by March 30, 2009
was based on several factors. One was the requirement that the final
rule regarding fuel economy standards for a given model year must be
adopted at least 18 months before the beginning of that model year (49
U.S.C. 32902(g)(2)). The other was that the beginning of MY 2011 is
considered for the purposes of CAFE standard setting to be October 1,
2010. As part of that final rule, the President requested that NHTSA
consider whether any provisions regarding preemption are consistent
with the EISA, the Supreme Court's decision in Massachusetts v. EPA and
other relevant provisions of law and the policies underlying them.
(b) CAFE Standards for Model Years 2012 and Beyond
The President requested that, before promulgating a final rule
concerning the model years after model year 2011, NHTSA
[C]onsider the appropriate legal factors under the EISA, the
comments filed in response to the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, the
relevant technological and scientific considerations, and to the
extent feasible, the forthcoming report by the National Academy of
Sciences mandated under section 107 of EISA.
In addition, the President requested that NHTSA further consider
whether any provisions regarding preemption are appropriate under
applicable law and policy.
3. Implementing the President's Memorandum
In keeping with the President's remarks on January 26 for new
national policies to address the closely intertwined issues of energy
independence, energy security and climate change, and for the
initiation of serious and sustained domestic and international action
to address them, NHTSA will develop CAFE standards for MY 2012 and
beyond only after collecting new information, conducting a careful
review of technical and economic inputs and assumptions, and standard
setting methodology, and completing new analyses.
For MY 2011, however, time limitations precluded the adoption of
this approach. As noted above, EPCA requires that standards for that
model year be established by the end of March of this year. Thus,
immediate decisions had to be made about the establishment of the MY
2011 standards. There was insufficient time between the issuance of the
President's memorandum in late January and the end of March to revisit
and, if and as appropriate, revise the extensive and complex analysis
in any substantively significant way. This is particularly so given the
requirement under EPCA to consult with the Environmental Protection
Agency and the Department of Energy on these complicated and important
technical matters. Decisions regarding those matters potentially affect
not just NHTSA's CAFE rulemaking, but also programs of other
departments and agencies. Accordingly, the methodologies, economic and
technological inputs and decisionmaking criteria used in this rule are
necessarily largely those developed by NHTSA in the fall of 2008.
In looking ahead to the next CAFE rulemaking, the agency emphasizes
that while the methodologies, economic and technological inputs and
decisionmaking criteria used in this rule were well-supported choices
for the purposes of the MY 2011 rulemaking, they were not the only
reasonable choices that the agency could have made for that purpose.
Many of the key aspects of this rulemaking reflect decisions among
several reasonable alternatives. The choices made in the context of
last fall may or may not be the choices that will be made in the
context of the follow-on rulemaking.
The deferral of action on the CAFE standards for the years after MY
2011 provides the agency with an opportunity to review its approach to
CAFE standard setting, including its methodologies, economic and
technological inputs, and decisionmaking criteria. It is reasonable to
anticipate that this process may lead to changes, given the further
review and analysis that will be conducted pursuant to the President's
request, and given the steady and potentially substantial evolution in
technical and policy factors relevant to the next CAFE rulemaking.
These factors include, but are not limited to, energy and climate
change needs and policy choices regarding goals and approaches to
achieving them, developments in domestic legislation and international
negotiations regarding those goals and approaches, the financial health
of the industry, technologies for reducing fuel consumption, fuel
prices, and climate change science and damage valuation.
The goal of the review and re-evaluation will be to ensure that the
approach used for MY 2012 and thereafter produces standards that
contribute, to the maximum extent possible under EPCA/EISA, to meeting
the energy and environmental challenges and goals outlined by the
President. We will seek to craft our program with the goal of creating
the maximum incentives for innovation, providing flexibility to the
regulated parties, and meeting the goal of making substantial and
continuing reductions in the consumption of fuel. To that end, we are
committed to ensuring that the CAFE program for beyond MY 2011 is based
on the best scientific, technical, and economic information available,
and that such information is developed in close coordination with other
federal agencies and our stakeholders, including the states and the
vehicle manufacturers.
We will also re-examine EPCA, as amended by EISA, to consider
whether additional opportunities exist for achieving the President's
goals. For example, EPCA authorizes, within relatively narrow limits
and subject to making specified findings, for increasing the amount of
civil penalties
[[Page 14200]]
for violating the CAFE standards.\4\ Further, while EPCA prohibits
updating the test procedures used for measuring passenger car fuel
economy, it places no such limitation on the test procedures for light
trucks.\5\ If the test procedures used for light trucks were revised to
provide for the operation of air conditioning during fuel economy
testing, vehicle manufacturers would have a regulatory incentive to
increase the efficiency and reduce the weight of air conditioning
systems, thereby reducing fuel consumption and tailpipe emissions of
CO2.
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\4\ Under 49 U.S.C. 32904(c), EPA must ``use the same procedures
for passenger automobiles the Administrator used for model year 1975
(weighted 55 percent urban cycle and 45 percent highway cycle), or
procedures that give comparable results.''
\5\ 49 U.S.C. 32912(c).
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In response to the President's request that NHTSA consider whether
any provisions regarding preemption are consistent with EISA, the
Supreme Court's decision in Massachusetts v. EPA and other relevant
provisions of law and the policies underlying them, NHTSA has decided
not to include any provisions addressing preemption in the Code of
Federal Regulations at this time. The agency will re-examine the issue
of preemption in the content of its forthcoming rulemaking to establish
Corporate Average Fuel Economy standards for 2012 and later model
years.
B. Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007
The mandates in the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007
(EISA) \6\ for reducing fuel consumption by motor vehicles and
expanding the production of renewable fuels represent major steps
forward in promoting energy independence and security and in addressing
climate change risks by reducing CO2 emissions. EISA
requires the first statutory increase in fuel economy standards for
passenger automobiles (referred to below as ``passenger cars'') since
those standards were originally mandated in 1975. It also includes an
important reform--switching to ``attribute-based standards.'' This
switch will help to ensure that increased fuel efficiency does not come
at the expense of automotive safety.
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\6\ Public Law 110-140, 121 Stat. 1492 (Dec. 18, 2007).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
More specifically, EISA made a number of important changes to EPCA.
EISA:
Establishes a statutory mandate to establish passenger car
standards for each model year at the maximum feasible level and
eliminates the old statutory default standard of 27.5 mpg for passenger
cars and the provision giving us discretion to amend that default
standard. Thus, given that there will no longer be a default standard,
the agency must act affirmatively to establish a new passenger car
standard for each model year.
Retains the requirement to establish separate standards
for passenger cars and light trucks and to set them at the maximum
feasible level, but sets forth special requirements for the MY 2011-
2020 standards.
The standards must increase ratably each year and, at a
minimum, be set sufficiently high to ensure that the average fuel
economy of the combined industry-wide fleet of all new passenger cars
and light trucks sold in the United States during MY 2020 is at least
35 mpg.\7\
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\7\ Although NHTSA previously established an attribute-based
standard for MY 2011 light trucks in its 2006 final rule, EISA
mandates a new rulemaking, reflecting new statutory considerations
and a new administrative record, and consistent with EPCA as amended
by EISA, to establish the standard for those light trucks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mandates the reforming of CAFE standards for passenger
cars by requiring that all CAFE standards be based on one or more
vehicle attributes related to fuel economy (like size or weight). Fuel
economy targets are set for individual vehicles and increase as the
attribute decreases and vice versa. For example, size-based (i.e.,
size-indexed) standards assign higher fuel economy targets to smaller
vehicles and lower ones to larger vehicles. Use of this approach helps
to ensure that the improvements in fuel economy do not come at the
expense of safety. NHTSA pioneered that approach in its last rulemaking
on CAFE standards for light trucks.
Requires that for each model year, beginning with MY 2011,
each manufacturer's domestically-manufactured passenger car fleet must
achieve a measured average fuel economy that is not less than 92
percent of the average fuel economy of the combined industry-wide fleet
of domestic and non-domestic passenger cars sold in the United States
in that model year.
Limits to five the number of model years for which
standards can be established in a single rulemaking.
Provides greater flexibility for automobile manufacturers
by (a) increasing from three to five the number of years that a
manufacturer can carry forward the compliance credits it earns by
exceeding CAFE standards, (b) allowing a manufacturer to transfer the
credits it has earned from one of its compliance categories of
automobiles to another class, and (c) authorizing the trading of
credits between manufacturers.
C. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for MYs 2011-2015 and Request for New
Product Plans
1. Key Economic Values for Benefits Computations and Standard Setting
NHTSA's analysis of the proposed and alternative CAFE standards in
the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) \8\ relied on a range of
information, economic estimates, and input parameters. These economic
assumptions play a role in the determination of the level of the
standards, with some having greater impacts than others. The cost of
technologies, the price of gasoline, and discount rate used for
discounting future benefits had the greatest influence over the level
of the standards. In order of impact, the full list of the economic
assumptions is as follows: (1) Technology cost; (2) fuel prices; (3)
discount rate; (4) oil import externalities; (5) rebound effect; (6)
criteria air pollutant damage costs; (7) carbon costs. The table below
shows the NPRM assumptions on which the agency received the most
extensive public comment.
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\8\ 73 FR 24352, May 2, 2008. In a separate notice published on
the same day, the agency requested automobile manufacturers to
submit new product plans for MYs 2011-15. 73 FR 24190.
\9\ Although Table V-3 Economic Values for Benefits Computations
in the NPRM indicated that all of the values in that table were
2006$, several values were actually in 2005$. Thus, the monopsony
component, which was shown in that table as $0.176, should have been
shown as $0.182. Likewise, the price shock component should have
been $0.113, instead of $0.109. The sum of those two values should
have been $0.295, not $0.285.
Table I-1--NPRM Key Economic Values for Benefits Computations (2006$)
\9\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fuel Prices (average retail gasoline price per gallon, 2011- $2.34
30).........................................................
Discount Rate Applied to Future Benefits..................... 7%
Economic Costs of Oil Imports ($/gallon):
``Monopsony'' Component.................................. $0.182
[[Page 14201]]
Price Shock Component.................................... $0.113
Military Security Component.............................. .........
----------
Total Economic Costs................................. $0.295
Emission Damage Costs:
Carbon Dioxide ($/metric ton)............................ $7.00
Annual Increase in CO2 Damage Cost....................... 2.4%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. Standards
(a) Classification of Vehicles
In the NPRM, the agency classified the vehicles subject to the
proposed standards as passenger cars or as light trucks in the same way
that the vehicles had been traditionally classified under the CAFE
program. In particular, sport utility vehicles (SUVs), mini-vans and
pickup trucks were classified as light trucks. However, the agency
raised the possibility of reclassifying many of the two-wheel drive
SUVs as passenger cars for the purposes of the final rule.
(b) Stringency
We proposed setting separate attribute-based fuel economy standards
for passenger cars and light trucks consistent with the size-based
approach that NHTSA used in establishing the light truck standards for
MY 2008-2011 light trucks.
Compared to the April 2006 final rule that established those
attribute-based standards, the NPRM more thoroughly evaluated the value
of the costs and benefits of setting CAFE standards. This was important
because assumptions regarding projected gasoline prices, along with
assumptions about the value of reducing the negative externalities
(economic and environmental) from producing and consuming fuel, were
based on changed economic, environmental, and energy security
conditions. These environmental externalities include, among other
things, an estimation of the value of reducing tailpipe emissions of
CO2.\10\
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\10\ The externalities included in our analysis do not, however,
include those associated with the reduction of the other GHG emitted
by automobiles, i.e., methane (CH4), nitrous oxide
(N2O), and hydroflurocarbons (HFCs). Actual air
conditioner operation is not included in the test procedures used to
obtain both (1) emission rates for purposes of determining
compliance with EPA criteria pollutant emission standards and (2)
fuel economy values for purposes of determining compliance with
NHTSA CAFE standards, although air conditioner operation is included
in ``supplemental'' federal test procedures used to determine
compliance with corresponding and separate EPA criteria pollutant
emission standards. As noted above, EPCA precludes basing passenger
car standards on those other test procedures, but places no such
limit on the test procedures used as the basis for light truck
standards.
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In light of EISA and the need to balance the statutory
considerations in a way that reflects the current need of the nation to
conserve energy, including the current assessment of climate change
risks, the agency revisited the various assumptions used to determine
the level of the standards. Specifically, the agency used higher
gasoline prices and higher estimates for energy security values ($0.29
per gallon instead of $0.09 per gallon). The agency also monetized
carbon dioxide (at $7.00/ton), which it did not do in the previous
rulemaking, and expanded the list of technologies it used in assessing
the capability of manufacturers to improve fuel economy. In addition,
the agency used cost estimates that reflect economies of scale and
estimated ``learning''-driven reductions in the cost of technologies as
well as quicker penetration rates for advanced technologies.
The agency could not set out the exact level of CAFE that each
manufacturer would be required to meet for each model year under the
passenger car or light truck standards since the levels would depend on
information that would not be available until the end of each of the
model years, i.e., the final actual production figures for each of
those years. The agency could, however, project what the industry-wide
level of average fuel economy would be for passenger cars and for light
trucks if each manufacturer produced its expected mix of automobiles
and just met its obligations under the proposed ``optimized'' standards
for each model year. Adjacent to each average fuel economy figure in
the NPRM was the estimated associated level of tailpipe emissions of
CO2 that would be achieved.\11\
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\11\ Given the contributions made by CAFE standards to
addressing not only energy independence and security, but also to
reducing tailpipe emissions of CO2, fleet performance was
stated in the above discussion both in terms of fuel economy and the
associated reductions in tailpipe emissions of CO2 since
the CAFE standards would have the practical effect of limiting those
emissions approximately to the indicated levels during the official
CAFE test procedures established by EPA. The relationship between
fuel consumption and carbon dioxide emissions is discussed
ubiquitously, such as at www.fueleconomy.gov, a fuel economy-related
web site managed by DOE and EPA (see https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/contentIncludes/co2_inc.htm, which provides a rounded value of 20
pounds of CO2 per gallon of gasoline). (Last accessed
March 8, 2009.) The CO2 emission rates shown were based
on gasoline characteristics. Because diesel fuel contains more
carbon (per gallon) than gasoline, the presence of diesel engines in
the fleet--which NHTSA expects to increase in response to the
proposed CAFE standards--will cause the actual CO2
emission rate corresponding to any given CAFE level to be slightly
higher than shown here. (The agency projected that 4 percent of the
MY 2015 passenger car fleet and 10 percent of the MY 2015 light
truck fleet would have diesel engines.) Conversely (and
hypothetically), applying the same CO2 emission standard
to both gasoline and diesel vehicles would discourage manufacturers
from improving diesel engines, which show considerable promise as a
means to improve fuel economy.
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For passenger cars:
MY 2011: 31.2 mpg (285 g/mi of tailpipe emissions of CO2)
MY 2012: 32.8 mpg (271 g/mi of tailpipe emissions of CO2)
MY 2013: 34.0 mpg (261 g/mi of tailpipe emissions of CO2)
MY 2014: 34.8 mpg (255 g/mi of tailpipe emissions of CO2)
MY 2015: 35.7 mpg (249 g/mi of tailpipe emissions of CO2)
For light trucks:
MY 2011: 25.0 mpg (355 g/mi of tailpipe emissions of CO2)
MY 2012: 26.4 mpg (337 g/mi of tailpipe emissions of CO2)
MY 2013: 27.8 mpg (320 g/mi of tailpipe emissions of CO2)
MY 2014: 28.2 mpg (315 g/mi of tailpipe emissions of CO2)
MY 2015: 28.6 mpg (310 g/mi of tailpipe emissions of CO2)
The combined industry-wide average fuel economy (in miles per
gallon, or mpg) levels (in grams per mile, or g/mi) for both cars and
light trucks, if each manufacturer just met its obligations under the
proposed ``optimized'' standards for each model year, would be as
follows:
MY 2011: 27.8 mpg (2.5 mpg increase above MY 2010; 320 g/mi
CO2)
MY 2012: 29.2 mpg (1.4 mpg increase above MY 2011; 304 g/mi
CO2)
MY 2013: 30.5 mpg (1.3 mpg increase above MY 2012; 291 g/mi
CO2)
MY 2014: 31.0 mpg (0.5 mpg increase above MY 2013; 287 g/mi
CO2)
MY 2015: 31.6 mpg (0.6 mpg increase above MY 2014; 281 g/mi
CO2)
The annual average increase during this five year period was
approximately
[[Page 14202]]
4.5 percent. Due to the uneven distribution of new model introductions
during this period and to the fact that significant technological
changes could be most readily made in conjunction with those
introductions, the annual percentage increases were greater in the
early years in this period.
(c) Benefits and Costs
(i) Benefits
We estimated that the proposed standards for the five-year period
would save approximately 54.7 billion gallons of fuel (18.7 billion
gallons for passenger cars and 36 billion gallons for light trucks) and
reduce tailpipe CO2 emissions by 521 million metric tons
(178 million metric tons for passenger cars and 343 million metric tons
for light trucks) over the lifetime of the vehicles sold during those
model years, compared to the fuel use and emissions reductions that
would occur if the standards remained at the adjusted baseline (i.e.,
the higher of manufacturer's plans and the manufacturer's required
level of average fuel economy for MY 2010).
We estimated that the value of the total benefits of the proposed
standards would be approximately $88 billion ($31 billion for passenger
cars and $57 billion for light trucks) over the lifetime of the
vehicles sold during those model years.
(ii) Costs
The total costs for manufacturers to comply with the standards for
the five-year period would be approximately $47 billion ($16 billion
for passenger cars and $31 for light trucks) compared to the costs they
would incur if the standards remained at the adjusted baseline.
(d) Effect of Flexibilities on Benefits and Costs
The above benefit and cost estimates did not reflect the
availability and use of flexibility mechanisms, such as compliance
credits and credit trading, because EPCA prohibits NHTSA from
considering the effects of those mechanisms in setting CAFE standards.
However, the agency noted that, in reality, manufacturers were likely
to rely to some extent on flexibility mechanisms provided by EPCA and
would thereby reduce the cost of complying with the proposed standards
to a meaningful extent.
3. Credits
NHTSA also proposed a new Part 536 on trading and transferring
``credits'' earned for exceeding applicable CAFE standards.\12\ Under
the proposed Part 536, credit holders (including, but not limited to,
manufacturers) would have credit accounts with NHTSA, and would be able
to hold credits, apply them to compliance with CAFE standards, transfer
them to another ``compliance category'' for application to compliance
there, or trade them. Traded credits would be subject to an
``adjustment factor'' to ensure total oil savings are preserved, as
required by EISA. EISA also prohibits credits earned before MY 2011
from being transferred, so NHTSA developed several regulatory
restrictions on trading and transferring to facilitate Congress' intent
in this regard.
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\12\ Congress required that DOT establish a credit
``transferring'' regulation, to allow individual manufacturers to
move credits from one of their fleets to another (e.g., using a
credit earned for exceeding the light truck standard for compliance
in the domestic passenger car standard). Congress allowed DOT to
establish a credit ``trading'' regulation, so that credits may be
bought and sold between manufacturers and other parties.
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4. Preemption
In the proposal, the agency continued its discussion, conducted in
a series of rulemaking proposals and final rules spanning a six-year
period, of the issue of preemption of state regulations regulating
tailpipe emissions of GHGs, especially carbon dioxide.
D. Brief Summary of Public Comments on the NPRM
Standard stringency: Automobile manufacturers argued that the
standards, especially those for light trucks in the early years, should
be lower. Environmental and consumer groups and states wanted higher
standards throughout the five-year period.
Footprint attribute: Commenters generally supported the agency's
choice of footprint as an attribute, although several urged
consideration of additional attributes and a few argued for different
attributes.
Setting standards at levels at which net benefits are projected to
be maximized (optimized standards) vs. using other decision-making
formulae: A consumer group urged setting standards at the optimized +
50% alternative level, while some environmental groups favored setting
them at levels at which total benefits equal total costs. Manufacturers
contended that the optimized approach does not assure economic
practicability, especially for manufacturers needing to borrow at high
interest rates to finance design changes. A manufacturer association
and other commenters said agency did not assess the ability of the
manufacturers to raise the capital necessary to develop and implement
sufficient technologies.
Front-loading/ratable increase: Some commenters, especially the
manufacturers, argued that the statutory requirement for ``ratable''
increases in standards means that the increases must be proportional or
at least must not be disproportionately large or small in relation to
one another. They did not discuss how that requirement is to be read
together with either the statutory requirement to set standards for
each model year at the level that is the maximum feasible level for
that model year, or the separate statutory requirement for the overall
fleet to achieve at least 35 mpg.
Key economic and other assumptions affecting stringency--
Technology costs and effectiveness--The manufacturers said
that NHTSA underestimated the costs. A manufacturer association
submitted a study by Sierra Research challenging the cost and
effectiveness estimates developed by NHTSA and EPA for the NPRM.
Fuel prices--A manufacturer association and dealer
associations said that Energy Information Administration's (EIA)
reference case should be used. Environmental and consumer groups,
states and some members of Congress said NHTSA should use at least the
EIA high price case. The EIA Administrator stated at a June 2008
Congressional hearing that the then current prices were at or above
EIA's high case and that he would use that case in the CAFE rulemaking.
Discount rate--The manufacturers said the rate should be
at least 7%, while environmental and consumer groups and states said it
should not be greater than 3 percent.
Military costs--Many commenters argued that NHTSA should
place a value other than zero on military security externalities.
Social cost of carbon--Some commenters said the domestic
value of reducing CO2 emissions should be lower than the
NPRM value of $7; environmental and consumer groups and states said it
should be much higher. The former tended to favor a value reflecting
damage to the U.S. only, while the latter favored a global value.
Weight reduction--States and environmental and consumer
groups said that NHTSA should consider downweighting for vehicles under
5,000 lbs; an insurance safety research group supported the proposal
not to consider that.
Rate of application of advanced technologies (diesels and hybrids):
[[Page 14203]]
Manufacturers argued that NHTSA was overly optimistic; environmental/
consumer groups and states argued that NHTSA relied too much on
manufacturer product plans and should require manufacturers to improve
fuel economy more quickly.
Fitting of standard curve to data: A manufacturer association and
two manufacturers questioned the empirical and technical bases for the
shape of the curves.
Steepness of car standard curve: The two manufacturer associations
and several environmental groups said that the proposed car curves were
too steep: manufacturers did so because of impracticability;
environmental groups, because of what they saw as an incentive to
increase vehicle size.
Backstop standard: Environmental and consumer groups argued that
NHTSA must establish absolute backstop standards for all vehicles.
Manufacturers argued that anti-backsliding features of the attribute-
based standards function as a backstop.
``SUV loophole'': In general, manufacturers agreed with the
agency's decision to reclassify 2 WD SUVs from the light truck fleet to
the passenger car fleet, as long as this change would take effect after
MY 2010. Environmental and consumer groups argued that the
classification system should be further revised to address ``gaming''
and did not address the agency's justification for the proposed
revisions.
Credits: Manufacturers argued that earned carry forward/back
credits, as long as they were not acquired by transfer or trade, should
be available to meet the minimum standard for domestic cars.
Manufacturers also requested flexibility to manage their own credit
shortfalls, instead of having the agency automatically decide upon and
implement plans for them. One manufacturer asked that the new statutory
provision giving credits a 5 year life be applied to all existing
credits, instead of only those credits earned in model year 2009 or
thereafter.
Impact on small/limited-line manufacturers: Small/limited-line
manufacturers argued that the proposed standards impact them more than
full-line manufacturers, and requested either that the car standards be
set based on the plans of all car manufacturers, instead of just the
seven largest, or that some alternative form of standard be set for
them.
Preemption: Manufacturers argued that the effects of state
regulation of CO2 emissions are ``related to'' the
regulation of fuel economy within the meaning of section 32919(a) of
EPCA; environmental and consumer groups and states argued that the
purpose of regulating CO2 emissions may overlap with, but is
different from the purpose of regulating fuel economy
E. New Information Received or Developed by NHTSA Between the NPRM and
Final Rule
There were a number of changes after the NPRM that made possible
analytical improvements for the final rule. These changes also caused
the CAFE levels, fuel savings, and CO2 emissions that are
attributable to each alternative and scenario examined for this final
rule to differ from those presented in the NPRM.
1. New Manufacturer Product Plans
As discussed in the NPRM, the agency requested new product plans
from manufacturers to aid in determining appropriate standards for the
final rule. The product plans submitted in May 2007 naturally did not
take into consideration the later passage of EISA and its minimum 35
mpg combined fleet requirement by 2020. In addition, during that time,
the fuel prices rose substantially.
The new product plans submitted in the summer of 2008 in response
to the NPRM reflect those new realities in a couple of ways. First,
companies provided product plans that reflected the manufacturers'
implementation of some of the cost-effective technologies that the
agency had projected in the NPRM. This increased the baseline against
which the fuel saving from the standards are calculated. As a result,
some of the savings and CO2 emission reductions that were
attributed in the NPRM to the rulemaking action are now attributed to
actions taken ``independently by the manufacturers, as reflected in the
improved product plans. Second, the size of the overall fleet had
declined from the time of the NPRM to the final rule, resulting in
fewer vehicle miles traveled.
2. Revised Assessment of Technology Effectiveness and Costs
With the aid of an expert consulting firm, NHTSA revised the
technology assumptions in the NPRM based on comments and new
information received during the comment period and used those revised
assumptions for analyzing alternatives and scenarios for the Final
Environmental Impact Assessment (FEIS) and final rule. In several
cases, the agency concluded on the basis of analysis of that additional
information that the costs in the NPRM and Draft EIS were
underestimated and benefits overestimated, and in most cases, these
estimates were not well differentiated by vehicle class. The agency
also revised its phase-in schedule of the technologies to account more
fully for needed lead time.
3. Final Environmental Impact Statement
With the aid of an expert consulting firm, the agency completed a
final environmental impact statement (FEIS), the first FEIS prepared by
a federal agency to examine climate change issues comprehensively.\13\
The FEIS examines the climate change and other environmental effects of
the changes in emissions of greenhouse gases and criteria air
pollutants resulting from a wide variety of alternative standards. For
this purpose, the agency relied extensively on the 2007 reports of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and contracted with ICF
International to perform climate modeling. That impact statement also
carefully assesses the cumulative impacts of past, present and future
CAFE rulemakings.
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\13\ The Final Environmental Impact Statement can be found on
the NHTSA website at https://www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/DOT/NHTSA/Rulemaking/Rules/Associated%20Files/CAFE%20FEIS.pdf (last accessed
March 8, 2009).
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F. Final Rule for MY 2011
1. Introduction
As discussed above, and at length later in this rule, NHTSA's
review and analysis of comments on its proposal have led the agency to
make many changes to its methods for analyzing potential MY 2011 CAFE
standards, as well as to the data and other information to which the
agency has applied these methods. The following are some of the more
prominent changes:
After receiving, reviewing, and integrating updated
product plans from vehicle manufacturers, NHTSA has revised its
forecast of the future light vehicle market.
NHTSA has changed the methods and inputs it uses to
represent the applicability, availability, cost, and effectiveness of
future fuel-saving technologies.
NHTSA has based its fuel price forecast on the AEO 2008
High Case price scenario instead of the AEO 2008 Reference Case.
NHTSA has reduced mileage accumulation estimates (i.e.,
vehicle miles traveled) to levels consistent with this increased fuel
price forecast.
NHTSA has applied increased estimates for the value of oil
import externalities.
NHTSA has now included all manufacturers--not just the
largest
[[Page 14204]]
seven--in the process used to fit the curve and estimate the stringency
at which societal net benefits are maximized.
NHTSA has tightened its application of the definition of
``nonpassenger automobiles,'' causing a reassigning of over one million
vehicles from the light truck fleet to the passenger car fleet.
NHTSA has now fitted the shape of the curve based on
``exhaustion'' of available technologies instead of on manufacturer-
level optimization of CAFE levels.
These changes affected both the shape and stringency of the
attribute-based standards. Taken together, the last three of the above
changes reduced the steepness of the curves defining fuel economy
targets for passenger cars, and also less significantly reduced the
steepness of the light truck curves.
NHTSA recognizes that, when considered in isolation, some of the
above changes might, on an ``intuitive'' basis, be expected to result
in higher average required fuel economy levels. For example, setting
aside other changes, the increase in estimated fuel prices and oil
import externalities might be expected to result in higher average fuel
economy requirements. On the other hand, again setting aside other
changes, the updated characterization of fuel-saving technologies, the
reassignment of over one million vehicles to the passenger car fleet,
the reduction in mileage accumulation, and the inclusion of all
manufacturers in the standard setting process might intuitively be
expected to result in lower average fuel economy requirements.
However, there are theoretical reasons for which even such isolated
expectations might not be met. For example, if a change in inputs
caused societal net benefits to increase equally at all stringencies,
the level of stringency that maximized societal net benefits would
remain unchanged, although it would produce greater net benefits after
the change in inputs. Further, some of the changes listed above are
interdependent, making it difficult, if not impossible, to isolate the
effect attributable to every change. For example, NHTSA applied the
reduced mileage accumulation, which reduces the benefits of adding
technology, in conjunction with applying increased fuel prices, which
increase the benefits of adding technology.
There is no obvious way to determine reliably the net effect of all
these (and other) changes short of applying all of the revised values
to the model and looking at the results. We devote a good deal of the
preamble discussion to these changes and their net implications for the
standards in this rule.
The final rule reflects the combined effect of all of these
changes, as well as minor changes not listed above.
2. Key Economic Values for Benefits Computations
NHTSA's analysis of the final standards and alternative CAFE
standards for MYs 2011 relied on an expanded range of information and
revised economic estimates and input parameters. These economic
assumptions played a role in the determination of the level of the
standards, with some having greater impacts than others. The agency,
following discussions with other agencies of the U.S. government,
updated its estimate of the global value of the social cost of carbon
(i.e., the value of reducing CO2 emissions) and developed a
domestic value, as well as updated its estimates for other
externalities based on comments and updated information received during
the comment period. Specifically, the final standards are based the
following revised economic assumptions:
Table I-2--Final Rule Key