Self-Regulatory Organizations; New York Stock Exchange LLC; Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change Amending NYSE Rule 98 and Related Rules To Redefine Specialist Operations at the NYSE, 38274-38284 [E8-15165]
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38274
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 129 / Thursday, July 3, 2008 / Notices
III. Date of Effectiveness of the
Proposed Rule Change and Timing for
Commission Action
The proposed rule change has become
effective pursuant to Section 19(b)(3)(A)
of the Act 11 and Rule 19b–4(f)(6)
thereunder 12 because the foregoing
proposed rule change: (1) Does not
significantly affect the protection of
investors or the public interest; (2) does
not impose any significant burden on
competition; and (3) by its terms, does
not become operative for 30 days after
the date of filing, or such shorter time
as the Commission may designate if
consistent with the protection of
investors and the public interest.
A proposed rule change filed under
Rule 19b–4(f)(6) normally may not
become operative prior to 30 days after
the date of filing.13 However, Rule 19b–
4(f)(6)(iii) permits the Commission to
designate a shorter time if such action
is consistent with the protection of
investors and the public interest. The
Exchange has asked the Commission to
waive the 30-day operative delay, as
specified in Rule 19b–4(f)(6)(iii),14
which would make the rule change
effective and operative upon filing. The
Commission believes that waiving the
30-day operative delay is consistent
with the protection of investors and the
public interest because such waiver
would allow the Conditional
Transaction Pilot to continue without
interruption through September 30,
2008 and provide the Exchange and the
Commission additional time to evaluate
the pilot.15 Accordingly, the
Commission designates the proposed
rule change effective and operative
upon filing with the Commission.
At any time within 60 days of the
filing of the proposed rule change, the
Commission may summarily abrogate
such rule change if it appears to the
Commission that such action is
necessary or appropriate in the public
interest, for the protection of investors,
or otherwise in furtherance of the
purposes of the Act.
11 15
U.S.C. 78s(b)(3)(A).
CFR 240.19b–4(f)(6).
13 17 CFR 240.19b–4(f)(6)(iii). In addition, Rule
19b–4(f)(6)(iii) requires the self-regulatory
organization to give the Commission notice of its
intent to file the proposed rule change, along with
a brief description and text of the proposed rule
change, at least five business days prior to the date
of filing of the proposed rule change, or such
shorter time as designated by the Commission.
NYSE has satisfied this requirement.
14 17 CFR 240.19b–4(f)(6)(iii).
15 For purposes only of waiving the operative
delay for this proposal, the Commission has
considered the proposed rule’s impact on
efficiency, competition, and capital formation. See
15 U.S.C. 78c(f).
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12 17
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IV. Solicitation of Comments
Interested persons are invited to
submit written data, views, and
arguments concerning the foregoing,
including whether the proposed rule
change is consistent with the Act.
Comments may be submitted by any of
the following methods:
For the Commission, by the Division of
Trading and Markets, pursuant to delegated
authority.16
Florence E. Harmon,
Acting Secretary.
[FR Doc. E8–15100 Filed 7–2–08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8010–01–P
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION
Electronic Comments
• Use the Commission’s Internet
comment form (https://www.sec.gov/
rules/sro.shtml); or
• Send an e-mail to rulecomments@sec.gov. Please include File
Number SR–NYSE–2008–50 on the
subject line.
Paper Comments
[Release No. 34–58052; File No. SR–NYSE–
2008–45]
Self-Regulatory Organizations; New
York Stock Exchange LLC; Notice of
Filing of Proposed Rule Change
Amending NYSE Rule 98 and Related
Rules To Redefine Specialist
Operations at the NYSE
• Send paper comments in triplicate
to Secretary, Securities and Exchange
Commission, Station Place, 100 F Street,
NE., Washington, DC 20549–1090.
June 27, 2008.
amendments, all written statements
with respect to the proposed rule
change that are filed with the
Commission, and all written
communications relating to the
proposed rule change between the
Commission and any person, other than
those that may be withheld from the
public in accordance with the
provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be
available for inspection and copying in
the Commission’s Public Reference
Room, 100 F Street, NE., Washington,
DC 20549, on official business days
between the hours of 10 a.m. and 3 p.m.
Copies of such filing also will be
available for inspection and copying at
the principal office of the Exchange. All
comments received will be posted
without change; the Commission does
not edit personal identifying
information from submissions. You
should submit only information that
you wish to make publicly available. All
submissions should refer to File
Number SR–NYSE–2008–50 and should
be submitted on or before July 24, 2008.
I. Self-Regulatory Organization’s
Statement of the Terms of Substance of
the Proposed Rule Change
Pursuant to section 19(b)(1) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(‘‘Act’’) 1 and Rule 19b–4 thereunder,2
notice is hereby given that, on June 11,
All submissions should refer to File
2008, New York Stock Exchange LLC
(‘‘NYSE’’ or ‘‘Exchange’’) filed with the
Number SR–NYSE–2008–50. This file
Securities and Exchange Commission
number should be included on the
subject line if e-mail is used. To help the (‘‘Commission’’) the proposed rule
change as described in Items I, II, and
Commission process and review your
III below, which Items have been
comments more efficiently, please use
only one method. The Commission will substantially prepared by the Exchange.
post all comments on the Commission’s The Commission is publishing this
notice to solicit comments on the
Internet Web site (https://www.sec.gov/
proposed rule change from interested
rules/sro.shtml). Copies of the
persons.
submission, all subsequent
PO 00000
The Exchange proposes to amend
Rule 98 and related rules to redefine
specialist operations at the NYSE. The
text of the proposed rule change is
available at NYSE’s principal office, the
Commission’s Public Reference Room,
and https://www.nyse.com.
II. Self-Regulatory Organization’s
Statement of the Purpose of, and
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule
Change
In its filing with the Commission, the
Exchange included statements
concerning the purpose of, and basis for,
the proposed rule change and discussed
any comments it received on the
proposed rule change. The text of those
statements may be examined at the
places specified in Item IV below. The
Exchange has prepared summaries, set
forth in sections A, B, and C below, of
the most significant aspects of such
statements.
16 17
CFR 200.30–3(a)(12).
U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
2 17 CFR 240.19b–4.
1 15
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A. Self-Regulatory Organization’s
Statement of the Purpose of, and the
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule
Change
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1. Purpose
The NYSE is proposing to amend Rule
98 to reduce the regulatory burdens
imposed by the rule and to provide
flexibility to member organizations as to
how they can structure their specialist
operations and manage their risks. In
particular, because of changes to the
marketplace, including changes to the
specialist’s role as a result of the
increased use of electronic trading, the
Hybrid Market, and Regulation NMS,
as well as technological advances in
surveillance and internal controls, the
NYSE believes that current Rule 98
imposes unnecessary restrictions on
member organizations seeking to engage
in specialist operations at the Exchange.
Accordingly, the NYSE proposes
revising Rule 98 in its entirety to
provide a framework for specialist
operations that meet both the regulatory
concerns of the current rule and the
reality of today’s marketplace. In
addition to changes to Rule 98, the
NYSE proposes making conforming
changes to other NYSE rules that rely on
Rule 98 exemptions for approved
persons. As discussed in further detail
below, the revisions to Rule 98 would
include: (1) Redefining the persons to
whom Rule 98 would apply; (2)
allowing specialist operations to be
integrated into better capitalized
member organizations; (3) permitting a
specialist unit to share non-trading
related services with its parent member
organization or approved persons; and
(4) providing flexibility to member
organizations and their approved
persons in how to conduct risk
management of specialist operations.
To achieve these changes, the NYSE
proposes shifting the paradigm of Rule
98 from one that assumes that the
approved persons of a specialist
member organization are subject to
certain NYSE rules unless an exemption
is provided to one where NYSE
Regulation, Inc. (‘‘NYSE Regulation’’)
reviews whether a trading unit that
proposes to engage in specialist
operations is sufficiently walled off
from either its approved persons or
parent member organization. Under the
new paradigm, rules governing
specialist operations, such as Rule 104,
will apply only to the unit approved to
engage in specialist operations at the
NYSE.
As the NYSE market model continues
to evolve, the NYSE believes that the
proposed amendments to Rule 98 will
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provide a platform from which to
further modernize specialist operations.
A. Background
The NYSE adopted Rule 98 in 1987 in
response to consolidation in the
securities industry, when NYSE
specialist firms that had been
independent member-owned entities
increasingly became subsidiaries of
larger, better capitalized broker-dealers.
Because of the specialists’ unique
position within the markets, and the
restrictions on dealers under section
11(a) of the Act,3 the Exchange crafted
a rule that governed how larger member
organizations could be connected to
specialist firms.
The rule establishes a functional
separation between the specialist
organization and the rest of the brokerdealer. The purpose of that separation
was to eliminate or control conflicts of
interest between the specialist’s actions
as market maker in an issuer’s securities
and other interactions among the
specialist’s parent or sibling entities and
the issuer.
In its current form, Rule 98 applies to
specialist units and so-called ‘‘approved
persons’’ of a specialist organization—
that is, entities that are in a control
relationship with a specialist
organization, or share a common
corporate parent with the specialist
organization and are engaged in a
kindred business.4 Such entities are, by
virtue of their association with the
specialist organization, subject to the
rules and restrictions applicable to
specialists. These include, among other
things, restrictions on the approved
persons’ ability to trade in specialty
stock options, restrictions on certain of
their business transactions with issuers
for whom the specialist organization is
the registered specialist, and limits on
the amount of securities of such issuers
that the specialist and approved persons
may own in the aggregate.
So as not to unreasonably hamstring
a broker-dealer organization overall,
Rule 98(b) provides that an approved
person may seek Exchange approval to
be exempted from most of those
restrictions. To obtain a Rule 98(b)
exemption, the approved person must
establish policies and procedures that
are consistent with the Guidelines for
Approved Persons Associated with a
Specialist’s Member Organization
(‘‘Rule 98 Guidelines’’). These
guidelines set out in detail how
approved persons and associated
specialist organizations should structure
and conduct their respective businesses
PO 00000
3 See
4 See
15 U.S.C. 78k(a).
NYSE Rules 2(d) and 304(e).
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in order to ensure complete separation
between the specialist organization and
the rest of the member organization.
Among other things, the Rule 98
Guidelines provide that the specialist
member organization be housed in a
separate corporate entity and brokerdealer from its approved persons.
Further, to ensure that information does
not flow improperly from the specialist
organization to approved persons and
that approved persons do not have
undue influence over particular trading
decisions by the specialist, the
guidelines establish ‘‘functional
regulations’’ that enforce the required
separateness. These include
requirements that the organizations
maintain separate books and records,
separate financial accounting, and
separate required capital, and that each
organization have in place procedures to
safeguard confidential information
derived from business interactions with
the issuer or contained in draft research
reports prepared by the approved
person.
The assumption that all entities
affiliated with a specialist are subject to
specialist rules unless they have
obtained a Rule 98(b) exemption creates
a substantial administrative burden on
specialist organizations and their
approved persons: Each approved
person of a specialist organization must
establish and continually update a
separate exemption under Rule 98 if it
wishes to engage in activity that would
otherwise be restricted under applicable
specialist rules. This burden creates a
real and substantial barrier to entry for
new broker-dealers who may want to
establish specialist units.
In the face of significant structural
changes to the NYSE and the equity
markets, and in recognition of the vastly
different competitive landscape
compared to 1987, the Exchange
believes that Rule 98 must be updated
in order to provide both existing and
prospective specialist firms with the
necessary tools to remain competitive
while at the same time meeting their
obligations as specialists at the NYSE.
The proposed changes to Rule 98 also
address the Exchange’s desire to ease
the burdens of a new member
organization seeking entry to
supplement the six specialist firms
currently trading on the Exchange, or
the very real possibility of such a firm
replacing one or more of the existing
specialist firms if they withdraw from
the market. Concerning the latter
possibility, the NYSE notes that this is
not just a theoretical concern: Within
the past six months, two specialist firms
have already withdrawn.
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To address these very real concerns,
the Exchange proposes to fundamentally
amend Rule 98. The proposed rule is
described in detail below, but at root,
the amendment reverses the assumption
that all affiliated entities of a specialist
firm are automatically governed by the
rules applicable to specialists, and shifts
the focus of the rule onto the specialist
unit rather than the approved person.
As part of this restructuring, the
NYSE proposes to eliminate the
prescriptive approach of the current rule
and move towards a more principlebased approach. The NYSE believes that
a principle-based rule closely overseen
by NYSE Regulation can achieve the
same goals as a rule that attempts to
enumerate every possible situation that
must be avoided. For that, the proposed
rule still requires NYSE Regulation to
review whether a specialist unit’s
policies and procedures are reasonably
designed to protect confidential
information. However, the rule provides
sufficient flexibility so that as the type
of information that needs to be
protected and the manner in which such
information can be protected evolves
with changes to the trading
environment, so too can the manner in
which NYSE Regulation conducts its
review.
The NYSE believes that the proposed
changes to Rule 98 will minimize
regulatory burdens and barriers to entry
while at the same time provide the
necessary level of regulatory scrutiny to
ensure that confidential information
continues to be protected. In addition,
the proposed changes will reduce the
regulatory burdens on existing specialist
member organizations to enable them to
continue such operations at lower cost.
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B. Proposed Amendments to Rule 98
1. Applicability of Rule 98
Under the proposed rule, a member
organization seeking to operate a
specialist unit, either as its entire
business or as one of its trading units,
would need to apply for and be
approved by NYSE Regulation before it
can begin, or if applicable, continue
operations as a specialist unit. As
described in more detail below, NYSE
Regulation will review whether a
proposed specialist unit has: (1)
Adopted written policies and
procedures governing the conduct and
supervision of the business handled by
the specialist unit; (2) established a
process for regular review of such
written policies and procedures; and (3)
implemented controls and surveillances
reasonably designed to prevent and
detect violations of those policies and
procedures. Among other things, these
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policies and procedures must be
reasonably designed to protect specialist
confidential information and non-public
order information, as defined below.
Once approved, the NYSE specialist
rules, as defined below, including Rule
104, would generally only be applicable
to the approved specialist unit and not
to its approved persons or, if applicable,
parent member organization. As
discussed in more detail below, on a
case-by-case basis, NYSE Regulation
will assess whether an integrated
proprietary aggregation unit that
manages the risk for a specialist unit
could be subject to the specialist rules
if the integrated proprietary aggregation
unit causes the specialist unit to violate
its obligations.
The NYSE recognizes that despite the
proposed rule changes, an existing
specialist member organization may
determine to either keep its current
operational structure or wait before it
implements changes to its operational
structure, as permitted by the proposed
amended rule. Because current Rule 98
would still be applicable to those
specialist units that would not have yet
sought the relief available under
proposed Rule 98, the Exchange
proposes keeping current Rule 98 in its
rulebook as ‘‘Rule 98 (Former)’’ until
such time as all specialist units are
approved pursuant to proposed Rule
98(c). Any new entrant to become a
specialist unit would be required to
comply with proposed Rule 98; current
Rule 98 procedures would not be
available to new entrants to the
specialist business. As proposed,
current Rule 98(b) exemptive relief
would be available only so long as the
member organization and its approved
persons have not materially changed
their operational structure, internal
controls, or compliance and audit
procedures. In such case, the current
Rule 98, i.e. , Rule 98 (Former), would
govern the specialist member
organization and its approved persons.5
Any significant changes to the status
quo after the effective date of the
proposed new rule would require the
member organization to apply for
5 As discussed in more detail below, in addition
to amending Rule 98, the Exchange proposes to
amend related rules that reference the current Rule
98 exemptions for approved persons. To ensure that
member organizations operating pursuant to Rule
98 (Former) are subject to the appropriate rules, the
Exchange proposes to maintain two forms of the
related rules: the amended version and an
otherwise unchanged version, except for the title
‘‘(Former)’’ added to the unamended version of the
rule or, if applicable, the section affected by the
proposed rule change. Once all member
organizations are subject to the proposed Rule 98,
the Exchange will file to delete any ‘‘Former’’
versions of Rule 98 and the related rules or sections.
PO 00000
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approval pursuant to the procedures
described below.
The Exchange recognizes that an
existing specialist member organization
that does not implement structural
changes to its operations that would
require it to apply for approval under
the proposed rule may still need certain
relief available under the proposed
version of the Rule. Accordingly, the
Exchange proposes that a member
organization operating pursuant to Rule
98 (Former) may apply for relief
pursuant to proposed Rule 98(e), which
concerns sharing non-trading related
services, without first obtaining
approval under other provisions of
proposed Rule 98. In such situation, the
specialist member organization would
need to apply for approval from NYSE
Regulation to share non-trading related
services, as specified in proposed Rule
98(e). If approved, except for the sharing
of non-trading related services, such
member organization and its approved
persons would continue to be subject to
Rule 98 (Former) as well as the
‘‘(Former)’’ versions of NYSE rules that
reference exemptions from Rule 98 for
approved persons, as discussed in more
detail below.
Once approved pursuant to proposed
Rule 98 to operate a specialist unit,
share non-trading related services, or
engage in risk management, any
material changes in how a specialist
unit operates its business would require
the specialist unit to resubmit its
revised written policies and procedures
to NYSE Regulation for review. For
example, if a specialist unit is approved
to operate as a stand-alone aggregation
unit and would like to change its
business operations to include the
specialist unit as part of a larger
integrated proprietary aggregation unit,
as permitted by proposed Rule 98(d),
such change would require preapproval.
2. Proposed Definitions
To ensure clarity, the proposed
amendments include a number of
defined terms that are applicable
throughout the rule. These definitions
are designed to provide a level of
scalability to the rule so that as the
NYSE market model evolves, the
definitions used throughout the rule
will have common meaning. Among the
proposed definitions are:
• ‘‘Specialist unit’’—this definition is
intended to apply to any trading unit
that is seeking approval to operate as a
specialist at the Exchange. As proposed,
a specialist unit could be a stand-alone
member organization, an aggregation
unit within a member organization, or a
trading unit (or ‘‘desk’’) within a larger
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aggregation unit. Regardless of which
corporate structure a member
organization chooses, the term
‘‘specialist unit’’ would refer to the unit
that is responsible for specialist
activities at the Exchange. If approved
pursuant to proposed Rule 98(c), a
specialist unit would be eligible for
allocations under NYSE Rule 103B and
be subject to specialist rules. For
purposes of Exchange rules, the term
‘‘specialist unit’’ is synonymous with
the term ‘‘specialist organization’’ or
‘‘specialist member organization.’’
• ‘‘Specialist’s account’’—this
definition refers to any account through
which a specialist unit trades at the
Exchange. Sometimes referred to as a
dealer account, this revised definition
would encompass any of the variouslydefined accounts that a specialist unit
may use to trade at the Exchange.
• ‘‘Specialist rules’’—this definition
refers to those rules that govern
specialist conduct or trading at the
Exchange. Currently, the specialist rules
include, among others, Rules 104, 105,
and 113, but as the rules at the
Exchange change, these rule
designations may change. Accordingly,
so that proposed Rule 98 evolves along
with changes to other rules, this
proposed definition does not identify
specific rules.
• ‘‘Specialist confidential
information’’—this definition concerns
the principal or proprietary trading
activity of a specialist unit at the
Exchange in the securities allocated to
it pursuant to Rule 103B, including the
unit’s positions in those securities,
decisions relating to trading or quoting
in those securities, and any algorithm or
computer system that is responsible for
such trading activity and that interface
with Exchange systems, such as the
specialist application protocol interface
(‘‘specialist API’’).6 The definition does
not include information about nonpublic order information, as described
below.
• ‘‘Non-public order’’—this definition
refers to any information relating to
order flow at the Exchange, including
verbal indications of interest made with
an expectation of privacy, electronic
order interest, e-quotes, reserve interest,
or information about imbalances at the
Exchange, that is not publicly-available
on a real-time basis via an Exchangeprovided datafeed, such as NYSE
6 The specialist API is the electronic link between
specialist trading algorithms and the NYSE Display
Book. Via this interface, specialist organization
trading algorithms send quoting and trading
messages to the Exchange for implementation in the
NYSE Display Book, and the Exchange transmits
information necessary to acting as a specialist to
specialist organizations.
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OpenBook, or otherwise publiclyavailable. The definition also
encompasses information regarding a
reasonably imminent non-public
transaction or series of transactions. For
example, if in requesting information
about the state of the Book, a Floor
broker informs the specialist about an
order that he or she has, such
information would fall under the
definition of ‘‘non-public order.’’ As
defined, non-public orders include
order information at the open, any reopenings, the close, when the security is
trading in a slow mode (e.g., in a Gap
quote or LRP situation), and any other
information in the NYSE Display
Book 7 that is not available via NYSE
OpenBook.8 As proposed, the linchpin
to the definition of ‘‘non-public order’’
is that it is information not publicly
available on a real-time basis. Currently,
specialists have unique access to certain
non-public order information. However,
in its proposed new market model, the
Exchange will be proposing to change
the specialist’s access to such nonpublic order information. The proposed
definition is intended to take into
consideration such future changes so
that as the specialist’s or specialist API’s
access to non-public order information
changes, so will the specialist unit’s
responsibilities to protect that
information change, but without having
to revise Rule 98.
• ‘‘Investment banking department’’
and ‘‘Research department’’—these
definitions refer to the same
departments that are defined as such in
NYSE Rule 472 and NASD Rule 2711.
• ‘‘Customer-facing department’’—
this definition is intended to encompass
any department, division, marketmaking desk, aggregation unit, or
trading desk that receives, routes, or
executes orders for customer execution
or clearing accounts, regardless of
whether such unit also engages in
principal or proprietary trading. A
hallmark of this definition is that a
customer has an expectation of
confidentiality and best execution on its
behalf, which could include a customer
that is another broker-dealer. Examples
7 The Display Book system is an order
management and execution facility. The Display
Book system receives and displays orders to the
specialists, contains the Book, and provides a
mechanism to execute and report transactions and
publish results to the Consolidated Tape. The
Display Book system is connected to a number of
other Exchange systems for the purposes of
comparison, surveillance, and reporting
information to customers and other market data and
national market systems.
8 NYSE OpenBook provides aggregate limitorder volume that has been entered on the
Exchange at price points for all NYSE-traded
securities.
PO 00000
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of trading desks that would meet this
definition include a Nasdaq marketmaking desk and most block-trading
desks. However, this definition is not
intended to include an aggregation unit
that solely conducts proprietary trading
or proprietary market making
(sometimes referred to as electronic
market making).
• ‘‘Aggregation unit’’—this definition
adopts the standard of Rule 200(f) of
Regulation SHO.9 The proposed rule
uses this term throughout to refer to any
department, division, unit, or trading
desk that has been segregated pursuant
to the requirements of Regulation SHO.
The NYSE believes that the Regulation
SHO requirements for establishing an
aggregation unit, including any
requirements for information barriers,
would be sufficient for segregating a
specialist unit’s operations from the
remainder of a member organization or
its approved persons.
• ‘‘Non-trading related services’’—
this definition refers to the type of
support services that a specialist unit
may share with its parent member
organization or approved person. The
core of the proposed definition is that
the type of services are not related to
making decisions about the day-to-day
trading of the specialist unit or provide
trading support to such activity, such as
by a trading assistant or specialist clerk.
Examples of non-trading related services
include stock loan (so long as consistent
with Regulation SHO), clearing and
settlement, controllers (for financial
accounting purposes), technology
support, and personnel who develop
applications and algorithmic models.
• ‘‘Integrated proprietary aggregation
unit’’—this definition is intended to
encompass any aggregation unit that has
a trading objective to engage in
proprietary trading, including
proprietary market-making activities. As
defined, an integrated proprietary
aggregation unit must not include any
activities that would be performed by an
investment banking, research, or
customer-facing department. Subject to
proposed Rule 98(d), a specialist unit
could be part of a member
organization’s integrated proprietary
aggregation unit. Alternatively, an
approved person or member
organization could maintain an
integrated proprietary aggregation unit
separate from the specialist unit. In such
case, the definition of an integrated
proprietary aggregation unit becomes
relevant in connection with proposed
Rule 98(f)(3) and the ability of an
approved person to engage in risk
management activities on behalf of the
9 See
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17 CFR 242.200(f).
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specialist unit of an associated member
organization.
• ‘‘Related products’’—this definition
refers to any derivative instrument that
is related to a security allocated to a
specialist unit. It can include options,
warrants, hybrid securities, single-stock
futures, security-based swap
agreements, a forward contract, or any
other contract that is exercisable into or
whose price is based upon or derived
from a security listed at the Exchange.
The list referenced in the definition is
not intended to be exhaustive and the
definition is intended to cover any
existing or future products that could be
related to a security listed at the
Exchange.
3. Proposed Rule 98(c): Approval to
Operate a Specialist Unit
Pursuant to proposed Rule 98(c), a
member organization must obtain prior
written approval from NYSE Regulation
before it can operate a specialist unit.
For approval, a specialist unit must
demonstrate that it has: (i) Adopted and
implemented comprehensive written
procedures and guidelines governing
the conduct and supervision of business
handled by the specialist unit; (ii)
established a process for regular review
of such written policies and procedures;
and (iii) implemented controls and
surveillances reasonably designed to
prevent and detect violations of these
procedures and guidelines.
As proposed, these policies and
procedures must be reasonably designed
to provide that the specialist unit will
maintain the confidentiality of both
specialist confidential information and
non-public orders. The proposed rule
enumerates certain bright-line divisions
that the specialist unit must maintain,
including information barriers between
the specialist unit and investment
banking, research, and customer-facing
departments and approved persons.
Such information barriers should
guarantee confidentiality two ways: the
specialist unit cannot access material
non-public information about securities
allocated to that unit from either its
approved persons or non-specialist
operations of a parent member
organization and vice versa.
With respect to a specialist unit’s
internal controls and surveillances,
NYSE Regulation will be reviewing such
surveillance plans to determine whether
they are reasonably designed to protect
information as required under the
proposed rule. Where feasible, NYSE
Regulation will expect specialist units
to use automated surveillances to check
for breaches of the information barriers
required by the proposed rule. As with
the current rule, NYSE Regulation will
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also review whether a member
organization has implemented internal
audit procedures relating to compliance
with the proposed Rule 98 policies and
procedures.
In addition to the specific information
barriers enumerated in the proposed
rule, if a member organization proposes
to operate a specialist unit as a standalone unit, the Exchange proposes
importing the requirements of a
Regulation SHO independent trading
unit for specialist units. Accordingly, as
required by Rule 200(f) of Regulation
SHO,10 NYSE proposes requiring a
specialist unit to have a written plan of
organization that specifies its trading
objectives and meet all of the other
requirements of an independent trading
unit under Regulation SHO. If a
specialist unit seeks to avail itself of the
exemption from NYSE Rule 105 under
proposed Rule 98(f)(1), that written plan
of organization would need to include
its trading objectives for trading in
related products.
As with the current rule, proposed
Rule 98 would require the specialist
unit to maintain net capital sufficient to
meet the requirements of NYSE Rule
104.21. The NYSE believes that if a
specialist unit is integrated within a
larger member organization, the net
capital requirement can be met by
having the requisite capital amount
allocated to the specialist unit by the
member organization.
Despite the segregations required by
the rule, the NYSE believes that senior
managers who are not dedicated to the
specialist unit and are associated with
either an approved person or a member
organization that runs a specialist unit
should still be able to provide
management oversight to the specialist
unit. As proposed, the revised rule is
not intended to be more restrictive than
the current rule, which permits an
approved person to provide general
oversight over its associated specialist
member organization. The proposed
rule instead shifts from a detailed list of
specific types of oversight that is
permissible to a principle-based
approach that focuses on protecting
specialist confidential information and
non-public order information. As with
the current rule, as proposed, senior
management oversight of a specialist
unit should not conflict with or
compromise in any way with the
specialist unit’s market-making
obligations.
Proposed Rule 98(c)(2)(E) provides
guidance on how a member organization
or approved person should handle
situations where a senior manager is
PO 00000
10 See
17 CFR part 242.200(f).
Frm 00107
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
called upon for risk management
purposes and in connection with that
role, gains access to specialist
confidential information or non-public
order information. The Exchange notes
that non-public order information could
become stale if the order is executed or
cancelled without the specialist’s
knowledge. To ensure that there is no
misuse of such information, whether
material or not, the senior manager must
not make (directly or indirectly)
specialist confidential information or
non-public order information available
to the persons or systems responsible for
making trading decisions in aggregation
units, departments, divisions, or trading
desks that are not part of the specialist
unit, including the customer-facing
departments. The senior manager also
must not use such information to
directly or indirectly influence the dayto-day trading decisions of the other
aggregation units of the member
organization or approved person with
respect to the securities allocated to the
specialist unit.
The NYSE believes that these
restrictions on the use of specialist
confidential information and non-public
order information are similar to how
broker-dealers currently handle
situations where a senior manager has
oversight over multiple aggregation
units and in such capacity, becomes
privy to confidential information of one
aggregation unit. For such situations,
broker-dealers have already developed
procedures for protecting confidential
information and the NYSE believes that
such procedures should be reasonable
for the oversight of a specialist unit as
well.
The Exchange notes that although the
proposed amendments to Rule 98
eliminate the exemption process under
current Rule 98(b), the review that
NYSE Regulation would conduct when
approving a specialist unit would be as
rigorous as the current review for
obtaining an exemption, just simply a
different focus of what is reviewed. As
with the current Rule 98 exemption
process, staff from both the Market
Surveillance Division of NYSE
Regulation as well as relevant staff from
the Financial Industry Regulatory
Authority, Inc. (‘‘FINRA’’), who are
responsible for the routine examinations
of specialist units, would be involved in
reviewing a specialist unit’s written
policies and procedures and proposed
automated surveillances and controls.11
11 In connection with the July 2007 transfer of
certain member firm regulation functions from
NYSE Regulation to FINRA, NYSE Regulation and
FINRA entered into a regulatory services agreement
(‘‘RSA’’) whereby FINRA agreed to provide NYSE
Regulation with certain services relating to NYSE’s
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For existing specialist firms, the
initial approval process associated with
any changes to how they operate may
require upfront work to ensure that the
specialist unit’s policies and procedures
are reasonably designed to meet the
requirements of the proposed rule.
However, unlike the current rule, as
proposed, specialist units would be
relieved of the requirement to update
any written statements to the Exchange
for changes in approved persons or
dually-affiliated employees. Once
approved, NYSE Regulation and FINRA
would examine whether a specialist
unit’s policies and procedures continue
to meet the rule requirements and
whether the implemented controls and
automated surveillances are functioning
as designed. As part of such
examination review, NYSE Regulation
and FINRA will conduct on-site reviews
of a specialist unit to review for
breaches of the controls or
surveillances. And, as noted above, if
the specialist unit proposes making any
material changes to its operations, it
would need to seek additional approval
before it can change its operations.
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4. Proposed Rule 98(d): Operating a
Specialist Unit Within an Integrated
Proprietary Unit
One of the goals of proposed Rule 98
is to provide a member organization
with greater flexibility in how it
manages the risk of a specialist unit. As
discussed below, in proposed Rule 98(f),
the NYSE proposes providing member
organizations with an array of options of
how to conduct risk management. The
NYSE believes that the flexibility
afforded by these options will meet the
varying business models of the member
organizations currently operating or
seeking to operate a specialist unit at the
Exchange.
As discussed in more detail below,
one proposed risk management model
would be to permit a member
organization to integrate a specialist
unit within a larger aggregation unit that
meets the requirements of an integrated
proprietary aggregation unit. Proposed
Rule 98(d) sets forth the minimum
requirements for how to structure such
an integrated unit. While such a unit
would be considered a single
aggregation unit for Regulation SHO
purposes, as proposed, the member
retained responsibilities to examine for compliance
with NYSE rules that govern trading on or through
the systems and facilities of the Exchange. In
particular, pursuant to the RSA, FINRA participates
in the current Rule 98(b) exemption process and
examines specialist firms for compliances with that
rule. As proposed, FINRA would continue to
participate in the approval process under the
proposed Rule 98 and examine specialist units for
compliance with the rule.
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organization would need to establish
information barriers within the
integrated proprietary aggregation unit
to restrict access to non-public order
information to the specialist unit only.
And depending on the risk management
model proposed by a specialist unit, a
member organization or approved
person may need to further segregate the
flow of information within a specialist
unit.
As proposed, the specialist unit that
would operate within the integrated
proprietary aggregation unit would need
to meet the requirements of proposed
Rule 98(c)(2)(A), (C), (D), and (E) of the
rule, which concern the information
barriers associated with the specialist
unit and non-specialist unit operations,
net capital requirements, and senior
management oversight. Because an
integrated proprietary aggregation unit
that includes a specialist unit would
likely already be subject to Rule 200(f)
of Regulation SHO that it qualify as an
independent trading unit, the specialist
unit operating within the integrated
proprietary aggregation unit would not
need to separately meet the Rule 200(f)
requirement for an independent trading
unit. Accordingly, as proposed, a
specialist unit that operates within an
integrated proprietary aggregation unit
would not need to meet the
requirements of proposed Rule
98(c)(2)(B), which requires a specialist
unit to separately comply with all of the
Regulation SHO independent trading
unit requirements.12
In addition to meeting certain
requirements of proposed Rule 98(c),
under proposed Rule 98(d)(2)(B), the
specialist unit must restrict access to
non-public order information or
specialist confidential information from
the rest of the integrated proprietary
aggregation unit. Such information
barriers must ensure that both
individuals and systems that are not
assigned to the specialist unit do not
have access to non-public order
information, or, unless otherwise
provided for in proposed Rule 98(f),
specialist confidential information.
The NYSE believes that as proposed,
Rule 98(d)(2)(B) provides sufficient
flexibility for how a member
organization structures its operations to
evolve as the NYSE market model
changes. For example, the specialist API
12 The Exchange recognizes that there may be
some Regulation SHO issues in connection with
how a member organization may choose to structure
its specialist unit within an integrated proprietary
aggregation unit or provide risk management to the
specialist unit pursuant to proposed Rule 98(f). In
such case, approval to operate under proposed Rule
98 would not be provided until all Regulation SHO
issues that may arise have been resolved.
PO 00000
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38279
currently has access to limited nonpublic order information, but does not
have access to information available in
the NYSE Display Book. So long as the
specialist API has access to that nonpublic order information, the Exchange
believes that systems not dedicated to
the specialist unit should not be
integrated with the specialist API.
Accordingly, the trading algorithms of
the integrated proprietary aggregation
unit that are not dedicated to the
specialist unit would not have access to
any non-public order information via
the specialist API, or any other system.
Proposed Rule 98(d)(2)(B)(iii)
addresses the situation of
communications from the Floor of the
Exchange to the rest of the integrated
proprietary aggregation unit. Currently,
specialist unit employees on the Floor
of the Exchange have access to nonpublic order information, whether via
access to information in the Display
Book or because of verbal
representations of imminent orders. The
NYSE believes that the best way to
ensure that such information is not
provided to individuals or systems not
dedicated to the specialist unit is to
restrict communications while the
employee is still on the Floor of the
Exchange.
Proposed Rule 98(d)(2)(B)(iv)
considers the possibility that an
individual who works on the Floor of
the Exchange 13 may also, on an intraday basis, move to an off-Floor location
and engage in a non-specialist related
role within the integrated proprietary
aggregation unit pursuant to proposed
Rule 98(d) or for an ‘‘upstairs’’ desk
trading in related products within the
specialist unit pursuant to proposed
Rule 98(f)(1). In such case, the
individual must not make any nonpublic order information or, unless
specifically provided for, specialist
confidential information, available to
individuals or systems that are not
dedicated to the specialist unit. Nor may
that individual use such non-public
information, or, except as provided for
in the Rule, specialist confidential
information, in any way in connection
with responsibilities that are not related
to Floor-based activities of the specialist
unit. For purposes of proposed Rule
98(f)(1), once off the Floor, a specialist
may not use non-public information to
directly or indirectly trade in related
products. However, nothing in the rule
13 Note that NYSE rules define being on the Floor
to include the trading Floor of the Exchange, and
the premises immediately adjacent thereto, such as
the various entrances and lobbies of 11 Wall Street,
18 New Street, 12 Broad Street, and 18 Broad Street,
as well as the telephone lobby in the first basement
of 11 Wall Street. See Rule 112(b).
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bars a specialist unit from moving
personnel among different positions
intraday, so long as the restrictions on
information flow and use are followed.
The NYSE believes that this would
provide member organizations with
sufficient flexibility to transfer its
employees among various roles,
including on the Floor of the Exchange
and in a specialist unit upstairs location
during a given trading day. For intra-day
transfers, the Exchange will expect
specialist units to have written policies
and procedures reasonably designed to
ensure that non-public order
information and specialist confidential
information (unless otherwise
permitted) would not be used from an
off-Floor location. The Exchange notes
that in addition to the information
barriers required by proposed Rule 98,
specialists must continue to abide by
Exchange rules that govern their access
to and use of non-public order
information.14
As noted above, an integrated
proprietary aggregation unit would need
to qualify as an aggregation unit, which
for Regulation SHO purposes, requires
the unit to net its positions. While the
proposed rule would no longer require
separate books and records for a
specialist unit, to ensure that NYSE
Regulation can review the trading
activity by the specialist unit at the
Exchange without having to parse
through commingled records, under
proposed Rule 98(d)(2)(C), in addition
to meeting Regulation SHO
requirements, an integrated proprietary
aggregation unit must maintain records
of its specialist’s accounts in a manner
that is separate from the accounts of the
integrated proprietary aggregation
unit.15
In addition to the above, the
integrated proprietary aggregation unit
must have written policies and
procedures that address how it will
ensure that the unit will not engage in
any activities that could violate other
Exchange rules or federal securities laws
and regulations, including Regulation
SHO. The policies and procedures must
address, at a minimum, how the unit
will ensure against front running, wash
sales, and market manipulation.
In connection with wash sales, a
potential concern for an integrated
proprietary aggregation unit is the
possibility that the specialist unit could
be selling (buying) one of the securities
14 See, e.g. , NYSE Rules 70.20(h)(ii), 104(b), 115,
and 115A.
15 The Exchange is engaging in a separate
discussion with Commission staff of the Regulation
SHO implications of requiring a specialist unit to
separately aggregate its trading positions for
purposes of Exchange rules.
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registered to it and an individual or
trading system of the integrated
proprietary aggregation unit could at the
same time be buying (selling) that same
security at the Exchange. With the
proper use of mnemonics associated
with those orders, Exchange systems are
capable of rejecting one side of those
orders. Because the presumption would
be in favor of the specialist unit trading,
i.e., to meet its affirmative obligations at
the Exchange, the NYSE proposes
rejecting the order from the integrated
proprietary aggregation unit.
The NYSE also proposes that to the
extent an integrated proprietary
aggregation unit directs its trading at the
Exchange in any security that has been
allocated to the specialist unit through
the specialist unit, such trading would
be subject to the specialist rules. In
other words, while the specialist unit
would be subject to certain marketmaking obligations while trading at the
Exchange, the integrated proprietary
aggregation unit’s independent
‘‘upstairs’’ operations would be able to
trade freely.
Finally, to ensure that NYSE
Regulation can review the trading
activities of the integrated proprietary
aggregation unit, proposed Rule 98(d)(4)
requires member organizations to
maintain audit trail information for any
trading by such unit, including trading
at the Exchange and at other market
centers. The NYSE proposes to amend
NYSE Rule 132B to have the Order
Tracking System (‘‘OTS’’) requirements
apply to trading by a specialist unit, and
if applicable, an integrated proprietary
aggregation unit. Member organizations
must maintain sufficient records to
reconstruct in a time-sequenced manner
its trading in securities allocated to the
specialist unit and any trading by the
integrated proprietary aggregation unit
in those securities in other market
centers or trading in related products.
As with the approval process under
proposed Rule 98(c), to obtain approval
to operate a specialist unit within an
integrated proprietary aggregation unit,
a member organization would need to
submit its written policies and
procedures to NYSE Regulation for
review of whether such policies and
procedures are reasonably designed to
meet the rule requirements. Once
approved under proposed Rule 98(d),
NYSE Regulation and FINRA would
continue to examine whether a
specialist unit’s policies and procedures
continue to meet the rule requirements
and whether the implemented controls
and surveillances plans are functioning
as designed.
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5. Proposed Rule 98(e): Sharing NonTrading Related Services
One of the restrictions of current Rule
98 is the limit on a specialist member
organization and its approved persons
to share operational support personnel.
In its current form, Rule 98(c) permits
dual affiliation only if the specialist
member organization and approved
person provide the Exchange with a
written statement of the duties of such
person and why it is necessary for the
individual to have a dual affiliation.
Any changes to dual affiliations must be
submitted to the Exchange for approval
in advance of making such change.
The NYSE believes that current Rule
98(c) unnecessarily restricts the ability
of a specialist member organization and
its approved person to share non-trading
related services, i.e., operational support
services. Accordingly, the NYSE
proposes amending Rule 98 to permit
the sharing of non-trading related
services, subject to the approval of
NYSE Regulation.
As with the approval process to
become a specialist unit, the approval
process for a specialist unit to share
non-trading related services with its
parent member organization or
approved person would require the
specialist unit to: (1) Adopt written
policies and procedures governing the
sharing or non-trading related services;
(2) establish a process for regular review
of such written policies and procedures;
and (3) implement controls and
surveillances reasonably designed to
prevent and detect violations of those
policies and procedures. In accordance
with the purpose of Rule 98, such
policies and procedures must be
reasonably designed to protect specialist
confidential information and non-public
order information.
The NYSE understands that personnel
or systems that provide non-trading
related services may have access to
specialist confidential information or
non-public order information. For
example, clearance and settlement
services would have knowledge of
specialist positions in securities, and
technological support personnel may
have knowledge of how a specialist
algorithm conducts its trading.
However, access to such information
should not be the basis for restricting
the sharing of such personnel or
systems. Rather, such personnel or
systems can be shared so long as the
specialist unit has controls reasonably
designed to ensure that the individuals
or systems who have access to specialist
confidential information or non-public
information neither provide nor make
available that information to any
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individuals or systems not part of the
specialist unit. In particular, under no
circumstances should non-public order
information or specialist confidential
information be made available to the
investment banking, research, or
customer-facing departments.
Before a specialist unit can share nontrading related services, NYSE
Regulation will review whether the
specialist unit has adopted policies and
procedures and controls and
surveillances reasonably designed to
protect specialist confidential
information and non-public order
information. Once approved, a specialist
unit would no longer need to provide
NYSE Regulation with a written
statement of why a certain individual
has a dual affiliation and update such
written statements if the individual
involved changes. On an ongoing basis,
NYSE Regulation and FINRA will
examine whether the specialist unit’s
policies and procedures and controls
comply with the requirements of the
rule.
6. Proposed Rule 98(f): Risk
Management
Specialist member organizations and
their approved persons are currently
limited in their ability to manage the
specialist member organization’s trading
risks: Rule 98 currently restricts an
approved person from being involved in
any trading decisions of an associated
specialist member organization; Rule
105 currently restricts the specialist
member organization’s ability to trade in
options and single-stock futures related
to the securities allocated to the
specialist member organization.
Together, these restrictions place
specialist member organizations at a
`
competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis other
market-making or trading firms.
The NYSE believes that the changes to
the marketplace that have occurred
since 1987, when Rule 98 was adopted,
call for an overhaul of how specialist
units are permitted to manage their risk.
For example, when Rule 98 was
adopted, the NYSE enjoyed an
approximately 85% market share in
trading of NYSE-listed securities and
specialists participated in
approximately 12% of the transactions
at the Exchange. Now, the NYSE’s
market share for listed securities hovers
under 40%, and of that, specialist
participation is in the range of two
percent. These numbers are telling:
Because of automatic executions at the
Exchange, specialists no longer have a
unique advantage over other market
participants. To the contrary, specialists
are now at a disadvantage to other
market participants because they must
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meet their affirmative and negative
obligations to the Exchange, yet cannot
participate in the type of hedging
activities that other market participants
may and can do.
Accordingly, the Exchange proposes
providing specialist units with the
ability to manage their risks by
broadening the ability to trade in related
products and expanding the universe of
who may be involved in managing the
risk of the specialist unit. Because there
is no single correct model for risk
management, the NYSE proposes
providing specialist units with options
of how to manage their risk, which they
can choose to use in combination or
alone. Regardless of which model a
specialist unit proposes to adopt for risk
management, at all times, the specialist
unit will be ultimately responsible for
its quoting or trading decisions at the
Exchange.
a. Specialist Unit Risk Management
In order to provide a specialist unit
with greater risk management tools, the
NYSE proposes permitting specialist
units to apply for an exemption from the
Rule 105(b)–(d) restrictions on trading
options and single-stock futures. In
connection with this change, the NYSE
proposes amending Rule 105 so that it
applies only to a specialist unit, and not
to any other departments or units of a
member organization or approved
person. If approved for an exemption
from Rule 105, a specialist unit would
be permitted to trade in related
products, subject to proposed Rule
98(f)(1).16
As proposed, to obtain an exemption
from Rule 105, the specialist unit must:
(i) Adopt and implement
comprehensive written procedures and
guidelines governing the conduct of
trading in related products; (ii) establish
a process for regular review of such
written procedures and guidelines; and
(iii) implement controls and
surveillances reasonably designed to
prevent and detect violations of these
procedures and guidelines.
These policies and procedures must
be reasonably designed to ensure that
the individuals or systems responsible
for trading related products do not have
access to non-public order information,
16 The Exchange also proposes amending section
(m) of the Rule 105 Guidelines to provide that a
specialist unit is not permitted to engage in marketmaking activities in single-stock futures or options.
However, if eligible for an exemption under Rule
105(b)–(d), nothing restricts a specialist unit from
having a trading desk that trades in options or
single-stock futures. Because an integrated
proprietary aggregation unit that includes a
specialist unit may engage in options market
making, the Exchange proposes eliminating sections
(m)(ii) and (iii) of the Rule 105 Guidelines.
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38281
or, unless otherwise specifically
provided for, specialist confidential
information. In addition, individuals
who work on the Floor of the Exchange
would not be permitted to trade or
direct trading in related products, nor
would the specialist API be permitted to
make any trading decisions in related
products. Accordingly, any trading in
related products by the specialist unit
must be conducted by an off-Floor, i.e.,
‘‘upstairs’’ office. All trading in related
products must be conducted by
individuals who are qualified and
registered to trade in the marketplaces
where such trading occurs. Moreover,
the member organization that houses the
specialist unit must be a member of
FINRA or other self-regulatory
organizations, as required by each
marketplace where the specialist unit
proposes to trade.
The NYSE believes that a specialist
unit should have the flexibility to
transfer its employees among different
functions within the unit. Accordingly,
the proposed rule does not expressly
prohibit specialists from trading in
related products; it only bars directly
entering or executing trades in related
products while on the Floor of the
Exchange.17 As proposed, a specialist
unit could transfer a specialist back and
forth from the Floor of the Exchange to
a specialist unit upstairs desk that
trades in related products, so long as
that specialist is registered and qualified
to trade in related products and nonpublic order information is not used
when trading in related products. In
such case, however, a specialist unit
must have policies and procedures
reasonably designed to ensure that a
specialist who moves off the Floor of the
Exchange does not make available or
use any non-public information or,
unless otherwise specified, specialist
confidential information, to which the
specialist may have had access while on
the Floor of the Exchange. As noted
above, while off the Floor of the
Exchange, specialists continue to be
subject to other NYSE rules that govern
their access to and use of non-public
order information.
To ensure that the specialist unit
upstairs desk that trades in related
products can effectively hedge the
specialist unit’s positions, the NYSE
proposes that the specialist unit upstairs
desk have electronic access to the trades
by the specialist unit at the Exchange in
securities allocated to the specialist unit
17 The Exchange notes that a specialist unit that
has not been approved for an exemption from Rule
105 under proposed Rule 98(f)(1) would still be
permitted to enter orders in options or single-stock
futures from the Floor, subject to the requirements
of Rule 105.
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that have been printed to the
Consolidated Tape.
Currently, senior managers of
specialist member organizations can be
privy to information about trading on
the Floor of the Exchange as well as any
hedging conducted by the specialist
member organization, even though such
hedging opportunities are limited. For
example, currently, a specialist on the
Floor can call his or her senior manager
to discuss hedging strategies. Under the
proposed exemption from Rule 105, the
NYSE believes that specialist unit senior
managers should be able to continue in
that role and provide oversight of both
Floor specialist operations and any
specialist unit upstairs trading in related
products. The NYSE believes that the
oversight model that works for larger
broker-dealers, whose senior managers
have a role with respect to multiple
aggregation units, should apply within a
specialist unit as well.
Accordingly, the NYSE proposes Rule
98(f)(1)(vi) to address how a senior
manager of a specialist unit should
handle situations where he or she has
access to non-public order information
in connection with his or her role as a
senior manager. As with proposed Rule
98(c)(2)(E), when trading in related
products, the specialist unit must have
policies and procedures reasonably
designed to ensure that the specialist
unit senior manager who has access to
non-public order information does not
provide such information to the
specialist unit upstairs trading desk
responsible for trading related products
or use such non-public information to
directly or indirectly influence trading
by that upstairs desk.
b. Integrated Proprietary Aggregation
Unit Risk Management
Proposed Rule 98(f)(2) addresses how
an integrated proprietary aggregation
unit that has been approved pursuant to
proposed Rule 98(d) to include a
specialist unit could engage in risk
management of the specialist unit’s
positions. At a minimum, an integrated
proprietary aggregation unit must have
policies and procedures that are
reasonably designed to meet the
protections enumerated in the rule,
including how it trades in related
products on behalf of a specialist unit
and how it electronically accesses the
specialist unit’s trades at the Exchange
in securities allocated to the specialist
unit that have been printed to the
Consolidated Tape.
In addition, proposed Rule
98(f)(2)(A)(i) would permit an integrated
proprietary aggregation unit to send
appetites of trading or quoting direction
to the specialist unit. In practice, this
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would permit a non-specialist unit
‘‘upstairs’’ risk management desk that
has real-time access both to the
specialist unit’s positions in securities
allocated to it and to the integrated
proprietary aggregation unit’s positions
in related products and other securities
to provide electronic direction to the
specialist unit of whether to trade or
quote in a certain direction. The
Exchange believes that permitting an
integrated proprietary aggregation unit
to send quoting messages that are based
on real-time positions of the unit as a
whole will enable a specialist unit to
better meet any quoting requirements at
the Exchange. In other words, the
specialist unit will no longer need to
operate in a vacuum when determining
how or when to quote at the Exchange.
As proposed, the specialist unit
would be ultimately responsible for
whether to accept the electronic trading
direction submitted by the integrated
proprietary aggregation unit upstairs
desk; a specialist unit must comply at
all times with its market-marking
obligations, including the specialist
rules, notwithstanding any electronic
trading directions received from that
upstairs desk. Stated otherwise, the
specialist unit would operate
independently and be free to accept or
reject the electronic trading directions
sent by the integrated proprietary
aggregation unit. However, to the extent
an integrated proprietary aggregation
unit causes a specialist unit to violate
one or more of the specialist rules, the
Exchange proposes that in such case,
the integrated proprietary aggregation
unit should also be held to those
standards.
At this time, as noted above, because
of access to non-public order
information, the NYSE does not believe
it would be feasible to permit
communications, whether verbal or
electronic, from the specialist or the
specialist API to the individuals or
systems responsible for trading in
related products and other securities
within the integrated proprietary
aggregation unit, or, if applicable, to an
upstairs desk within the specialist unit.
However, as the NYSE market model
evolves, the NYSE will continue to
review how best to integrate a specialist
unit within an integrated proprietary
aggregation unit, including the
possibility of fully integrating the
trading systems that interact with the
Exchange for the specialist unit and the
trading systems that trade in related
products and other securities. The
NYSE believes that ultimately, a
competitive trading model would
permit full integration, including
PO 00000
Frm 00111
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
permitting two-way communications
among trading desks.
c. Approved Person Risk Management
As proposed, another option available
to firms to manage the risk of the
specialist unit is to permit a separate
integrated proprietary aggregation unit
that is housed in either an approved
person or a member organization that
runs a specialist unit to provide the
same level of risk management as
proposed for an integrated proprietary
aggregation unit that includes a
specialist unit. This option would
provide flexibility for broker-dealers
that want to keep the specialist unit as
a separate member organization or
aggregation unit, yet still have an
approved person or separate aggregation
unit provide risk management services
for the specialist unit.
As with proposed Rule 98(f)(2),
proposed Rule 98(f)(3) would require
that the approved person not have
access to either specialist confidential
information and non-public order
information, except as provided for in
that section of the rule. Specifically, an
integrated proprietary aggregation unit
of an approved person could have
access to the trades by a specialist unit
at the Exchange in securities allocated
to that unit, so long as such trades have
been printed to the Consolidated Tape.
And as with proposed Rule 98(f)(2),
an approved person could send
electronic appetites of how the
specialist unit should trade or quote in
its allocated securities. As discussed
above, a specialist unit would be free to
reject or accept such electronic
directions as it sees fit to meet its
market-making obligations at the
Exchange.
The Exchange notes that an approved
person that provides risk management
under this proposed section may not
itself be an NYSE member organization.
In such case, the individuals at the
approved person responsible for making
risk management decisions on behalf of
the specialist unit should be dually
employed by the specialist unit that is
part of an NYSE member organization
and the approved person so that they
are subject to the jurisdiction of NYSE
Regulation.
7. Proposed Rule 98(g): Failure To
Maintain Confidentiality, Reporting
Obligations, and Breaches
The NYSE proposes to keep certain
provisions of current Rule 98, but adjust
them to reflect the changes to the rest of
the rule. In particular, current Rule 98(i)
has been amended and is included in
proposed Rule 98(g); current Rule 98(j)
has been amended and is included in
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proposed Rule 98(h); and, current Rule
98(k) has been amended and is included
in proposed Rule 98(i).
Under proposed Rule 98(g), as with
the current rule, if a specialist becomes
aware of non-public material
information from its approved person or
parent member organization, such
specialist may have to cease acting as a
specialist in the security involved,
which was formerly referred to as
‘‘giving up the Book.’’ The proposed
rule does not change how such
determinations would be made.
However, the proposed rule updates the
language of the rule and separates the
rule into easier-to-read subsections.
Under proposed Rule 98(h), the NYSE
proposes adding to the existing
reporting obligations that a specialist
unit must report any actual breaches or
internal investigations of possible
breaches of the information barriers
required by the rule. The reporting
obligation for internal investigations is
intended to be similar in effect to the
reporting obligation pursuant to NYSE
Rules 351(e) and 342.21. In particular,
under proposed Rule 98(h)(4), a
specialist unit will be required to
conduct an internal investigation into
any trading activity that may be a result
of a breach of the information barriers
required by proposed Rules 98(c), (d),
(e), and (f). On a quarterly basis, a
specialist unit must report in writing to
NYSE Regulation whether it has
commenced such an internal
investigation, the quarterly progress of
any open investigations, what remedial
measures, if any, were taken, and the
completion of any internal
investigation, including the
methodology and results of such
investigation, any internal disciplinary
action taken, and any referral of the
matter to the NYSE, another selfregulatory organization, or the
Commission.
Finally, as with the current rule,
proposed Rule 98(i) provides that any
breach of the proposed Rule could result
in disciplinary action, including the
withdrawal of one or more securities
allocated to the specialist unit or
withdrawal of approval to operate a
specialist unit. The Exchange notes that
as with the current rule, any trading by
any person while in possession of
material, non-public information
received as a result of any breach of
internal controls required by proposed
Rule 98 may violate Rule 10b–5 of the
Act,18 Rule 14e–3 of the Act,19 NYSE
Rule 104, just and equitable principles
of trade or one or more provisions of the
18 See
19 See
17 CFR Part 240.10b–5.
17 CFR Part 240.14e–3.
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16:46 Jul 02, 2008
Jkt 214001
Act, or regulations thereunder or rules
of the Exchange. The Exchange intends
to review carefully any such trading of
which it becomes aware with a view
towards determining whether any such
violation has occurred.
C. Proposed Amendments to Related
Rules
As noted above, because of the shift
in paradigm away from approved
persons, the NYSE proposes amending
those NYSE rules that refer to approved
persons and the need for an exemption
from Rule 98.
1. Proposed Amendments to Rule 98A
NYSE Rule 98A requires approved
persons to agree in writing not to cause
a specialist or odd-lot dealer to violate
rules applicable to the specialist or oddlot dealer. The rule further requires that
approved persons report to the
Exchange any off-Floor orders for
securities in which an associated
specialist member organization
specializes for any account in which the
approved person has a direct or indirect
interest.
Because of the proposed changes to
Rule 98, and in particular, the
recognition that an appropriately
walled-off specialist unit ameliorates
the need to scrutinize the trading by an
approved person, the NYSE proposes
eliminating those portions of Rule 98A
that concern approved persons.
However, the NYSE would keep the
limitation on an issuer, or a partner or
subsidiary thereof, from becoming an
approved person of a specialist unit.
2. Proposed Amendments to Rules 99,
102, 103B, 104, and 113
In their current form, NYSE Rules 99,
103B, 104, and 113 specifically apply to
approved persons, unless such
approved person has obtained an
exemption under Rule 98. To ensure
consistency among NYSE rules, and in
particular, to ensure that the revised
paradigm of proposed Rule 98 is
consistently applied, the NYSE
proposes to amend Rules 99, 103B, 104,
and 113 to eliminate the references to
approved persons.20
In addition, the Exchange proposes to
delete Rule 102, which concerns trading
in options by odd-lot dealers. Because
the Exchange no longer has separate
20 For the period of time that the current Rule 98
stays in the NYSE Rules as ‘‘NYSE Rule 98
(Former),’’ each of NYSE Rules 99, 103B, 104, and
113 will have two forms: one to meet the
requirements of NYSE Rule 98 (Former) and one to
meet the requirements of proposed Rule 98. The
version of the rules that relate to Rule 98 (Former)
will be similarly designated with the ‘‘(Former’’)
title either for the entire rule, or for a section of a
rule, as appropriate.
PO 00000
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Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
38283
odd-lot dealers and all specialists are
also responsible for odd-lot trading in
securities in which they are registered,
there is no need for a separate rule
governing trading in related products by
an odd-lot dealer. Accordingly, because
Rule 102 is duplicative of the standards
set forth in proposed Rules 98 and 105,
the Exchange proposes deleting that
rule.
3. Proposed Amendments to Rule 460
In addition to amending Rule 460 to
ensure consistent application of
proposed Rule 98 and making other
non-substantive changes, the NYSE
proposes eliminating Rule 460.20 that
approved persons of specialist member
organizations be held to any limits on
beneficial ownership of any equity
security in which an associated
specialist unit is registered. Instead, as
proposed, any limitations on beneficial
ownership should apply only to the
specialist unit that has been approved
pursuant to proposed Rule 98, and not
to any other aggregation unit or other
department or division of the member
organization.
With respect to the specialist unit’s
beneficial ownership of outstanding
shares of securities allocated to such
unit, the NYSE proposes to amend
NYSE Rule 460.10 to require that a
specialist unit report when its beneficial
ownership of outstanding shares
exceeds 5% and to update such report
if the beneficial ownership either falls
below 5% or exceeds 10%. The NYSE
thus proposes to eliminate the
requirement that a specialist unit seek
NYSE Regulation approval before it may
have more than 10% beneficial
ownership of a listed security. The
NYSE believes that because of the
reduced market share of the NYSE and
the limited impact of specialist trading
on securities allocated to a specialist
unit, the protections of the existing rule
are no longer necessary. However, the
NYSE proposes retaining the
prohibition on a specialist unit having
beneficial ownership of more than 25%
of the outstanding shares in a security
allocated to such unit. Because the
changes to the marketplace are in effect
now, the Exchange believes that the
changes to Rule 460 should be
implemented notwithstanding whether
a specialist member organization
continues to operate under Rule 98
(Former). Accordingly, the Exchange
proposes having a single version of Rule
460 to reflect the proposed
amendments.
2. Statutory Basis
The Exchange believes the proposed
rule change is consistent with and
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Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 129 / Thursday, July 3, 2008 / Notices
furthers the objectives of section 6(b)(5)
of the Act,21 in that it is designed to
prevent fraudulent and manipulative
acts and practices, to promote just and
equitable principles of trade, to remove
impediments to, and perfect the
mechanism of, a free and open market
and a national market system, and, in
general, to protect investors and the
public interest.
B. Self-Regulatory Organization’s
Statement on Burden on Competition
The Exchange does not believe that
the proposed rule change will impose
any burden on competition that is not
necessary or appropriate in furtherance
of the purposes of the Act.
II. Self-Regulatory Organization’s
Statement on Comments on the
Proposed Rule Change Received From
Members, Participants, or Others
No written comments were solicited
or received with respect to the proposed
rule change.
III. Date of Effectiveness of the
Proposed Rule Change and Timing for
Commission Action
Within 35 days of the date of
publication of this notice in the Federal
Register or within such longer period (i)
as the Commission may designate up to
90 days of such date if it finds such
longer period to be appropriate and
publishes its reasons for so finding or
(ii) as to which the self-regulatory
organization consents, the Commission
will:
(A) By order approve the proposed
rule change, or
(B) Institute proceedings to determine
whether the proposed rule change
should be disapproved.
IV. Solicitation of Comments
Commission, 100 F Street, NE.,
Washington, DC 20549–1090.
All submissions should refer to File
Number SR–NYSE–2008–45. This file
number should be included on the
subject line if e-mail is used. To help the
Commission process and review your
comments more efficiently, please use
only one method. The Commission will
post all comments on the Commission’s
Internet Web site (https://www.sec.gov/
rules/sro.shtml). Copies of the
submission, all subsequent
amendments, all written statements
with respect to the proposed rule
change that are filed with the
Commission, and all written
communications relating to the
proposed rule change between the
Commission and any person, other than
those that may be withheld from the
public in accordance with the
provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be
available for inspection and copying in
the Commission’s Public Reference
Room, 100 F Street, NE., Washington,
DC 20549, on official business days
between the hours of 10 a.m. and 3 p.m.
Copies of the filing also will be available
for inspection and copying at the
principal office of the NYSE. All
comments received will be posted
without change; the Commission does
not edit personal identifying
information from submissions. You
should submit only information that
you wish to make available publicly. All
submissions should refer to File
Number SR–NYSE–2008–45 and should
be submitted on or before July 24, 2008.
For the Commission, by the Division of
Trading and Markets, pursuant to delegated
authority.22
Florence E. Harmon,
Acting Secretary.
[FR Doc. E8–15165 Filed 7–2–08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8010–01–P
Electronic Comments
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Interested persons are invited to
submit written data, views, and
arguments concerning the foregoing,
including whether the proposed rule
change is consistent with the Act.
Comments may be submitted by any of
the following methods:
Self-Regulatory Organizations;
Philadelphia Stock Exchange, Inc.;
Notice of Filing and Immediate
Effectiveness of Proposed Rule
Change To Extend the Quarterly
Options Series Pilot Program
• Use the Commission’s Internet
comment form (https://www.sec.gov/
rules/sro.shtml); or
• Send an e-mail to rulecomments@sec.gov. Please include File
Number SR–NYSE–2008–45 on the
subject line.
Paper Comments
• Send paper comments in triplicate
to Secretary, Securities and Exchange
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION
[Release No. 34–58039; File No. SR–Phlx–
2008–44]
June 26, 2008.
Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(‘‘Act’’) 1 and Rule 19b–4 thereunder,2
U.S.C. 78f(b)(5).
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16:46 Jul 02, 2008
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PO 00000
I. Self-Regulatory Organization’s
Statement of the Terms of Substance of
the Proposed Rule Change
The Exchange proposes to amend its
Rules 1012 (Series of Options Open for
Trading) and 1101A (Terms of Option
Contracts), in order to extend for a
period of one year an Exchange pilot
program (the ‘‘Pilot Program’’) to permit
the listing and trading of options series
that may be opened for trading on any
business day and expire at the close of
business on the last business day of a
calendar quarter (‘‘Quarterly Options’’
or ‘‘Quarterly Options Series’’). The
Pilot Program currently continues
through July 10, 2008.5 The text of the
proposed rule change is available on the
Exchange’s Web site (https://
www.phlx.com/regulatory/
reg_rulefilings.aspx.), at the principal
office of the Exchange, and at the
Commission’s Public Reference Room.
II. Self-Regulatory Organization’s
Statement of the Purpose of, and
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule
Change
In its filing with the Commission, the
Exchange included statements
concerning the purpose of, and basis for,
the proposed rule change and discussed
any comments it received on the
proposed rule change. The text of these
statements may be examined at the
places specified in Item IV below. The
Exchange has prepared summaries, set
forth in sections A, B, and C below, of
the most significant aspects of such
statements.
3 15
U.S.C. 78s(b)(3)(A)(iii).
CFR 240.19b–4(f)(6).
5 See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 56030
(July 9, 2007), 72 FR 38645 (July 13, 2007) (SR–
Phlx–2007–42).
4 17
22 17
CFR 200.30–3(a)(12).
U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
2 17 CFR 240.19b–4.
1 15
21 15
notice is hereby given that on June 19,
2008, the Philadelphia Stock Exchange,
Inc. (‘‘Exchange’’ or ‘‘Phlx’’) filed with
the Securities and Exchange
Commission (‘‘Commission’’) the
proposed rule change as described in
Items I and II below, which Items have
been substantially prepared by the
Exchange. The Exchange has designated
this proposal as non-controversial under
Section 19(b)(3)(A)(iii) of the Act 3 and
Rule 19b–4(f)(6) thereunder,4 which
renders the proposed rule change
effective upon filing with the
Commission. The Commission is
publishing this notice to solicit
comments on the proposed rule change
from interested persons.
Frm 00113
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Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 129 (Thursday, July 3, 2008)]
[Notices]
[Pages 38274-38284]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-15165]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
[Release No. 34-58052; File No. SR-NYSE-2008-45]
Self-Regulatory Organizations; New York Stock Exchange LLC;
Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change Amending NYSE Rule 98 and
Related Rules To Redefine Specialist Operations at the NYSE
June 27, 2008.
Pursuant to section 19(b)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(``Act'') \1\ and Rule 19b-4 thereunder,\2\ notice is hereby given
that, on June 11, 2008, New York Stock Exchange LLC (``NYSE'' or
``Exchange'') filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(``Commission'') the proposed rule change as described in Items I, II,
and III below, which Items have been substantially prepared by the
Exchange. The Commission is publishing this notice to solicit comments
on the proposed rule change from interested persons.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
\2\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Terms of Substance
of the Proposed Rule Change
The Exchange proposes to amend Rule 98 and related rules to
redefine specialist operations at the NYSE. The text of the proposed
rule change is available at NYSE's principal office, the Commission's
Public Reference Room, and https://www.nyse.com.
II. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change
In its filing with the Commission, the Exchange included statements
concerning the purpose of, and basis for, the proposed rule change and
discussed any comments it received on the proposed rule change. The
text of those statements may be examined at the places specified in
Item IV below. The Exchange has prepared summaries, set forth in
sections A, B, and C below, of the most significant aspects of such
statements.
[[Page 38275]]
A. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and the
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change
1. Purpose
The NYSE is proposing to amend Rule 98 to reduce the regulatory
burdens imposed by the rule and to provide flexibility to member
organizations as to how they can structure their specialist operations
and manage their risks. In particular, because of changes to the
marketplace, including changes to the specialist's role as a result of
the increased use of electronic trading, the Hybrid Market[supreg], and
Regulation NMS, as well as technological advances in surveillance and
internal controls, the NYSE believes that current Rule 98 imposes
unnecessary restrictions on member organizations seeking to engage in
specialist operations at the Exchange.
Accordingly, the NYSE proposes revising Rule 98 in its entirety to
provide a framework for specialist operations that meet both the
regulatory concerns of the current rule and the reality of today's
marketplace. In addition to changes to Rule 98, the NYSE proposes
making conforming changes to other NYSE rules that rely on Rule 98
exemptions for approved persons. As discussed in further detail below,
the revisions to Rule 98 would include: (1) Redefining the persons to
whom Rule 98 would apply; (2) allowing specialist operations to be
integrated into better capitalized member organizations; (3) permitting
a specialist unit to share non-trading related services with its parent
member organization or approved persons; and (4) providing flexibility
to member organizations and their approved persons in how to conduct
risk management of specialist operations.
To achieve these changes, the NYSE proposes shifting the paradigm
of Rule 98 from one that assumes that the approved persons of a
specialist member organization are subject to certain NYSE rules unless
an exemption is provided to one where NYSE Regulation, Inc. (``NYSE
Regulation'') reviews whether a trading unit that proposes to engage in
specialist operations is sufficiently walled off from either its
approved persons or parent member organization. Under the new paradigm,
rules governing specialist operations, such as Rule 104, will apply
only to the unit approved to engage in specialist operations at the
NYSE.
As the NYSE market model continues to evolve, the NYSE believes
that the proposed amendments to Rule 98 will provide a platform from
which to further modernize specialist operations.
A. Background
The NYSE adopted Rule 98 in 1987 in response to consolidation in
the securities industry, when NYSE specialist firms that had been
independent member-owned entities increasingly became subsidiaries of
larger, better capitalized broker-dealers. Because of the specialists'
unique position within the markets, and the restrictions on dealers
under section 11(a) of the Act,\3\ the Exchange crafted a rule that
governed how larger member organizations could be connected to
specialist firms.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ See 15 U.S.C. 78k(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The rule establishes a functional separation between the specialist
organization and the rest of the broker-dealer. The purpose of that
separation was to eliminate or control conflicts of interest between
the specialist's actions as market maker in an issuer's securities and
other interactions among the specialist's parent or sibling entities
and the issuer.
In its current form, Rule 98 applies to specialist units and so-
called ``approved persons'' of a specialist organization--that is,
entities that are in a control relationship with a specialist
organization, or share a common corporate parent with the specialist
organization and are engaged in a kindred business.\4\ Such entities
are, by virtue of their association with the specialist organization,
subject to the rules and restrictions applicable to specialists. These
include, among other things, restrictions on the approved persons'
ability to trade in specialty stock options, restrictions on certain of
their business transactions with issuers for whom the specialist
organization is the registered specialist, and limits on the amount of
securities of such issuers that the specialist and approved persons may
own in the aggregate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ See NYSE Rules 2(d) and 304(e).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
So as not to unreasonably hamstring a broker-dealer organization
overall, Rule 98(b) provides that an approved person may seek Exchange
approval to be exempted from most of those restrictions. To obtain a
Rule 98(b) exemption, the approved person must establish policies and
procedures that are consistent with the Guidelines for Approved Persons
Associated with a Specialist's Member Organization (``Rule 98
Guidelines''). These guidelines set out in detail how approved persons
and associated specialist organizations should structure and conduct
their respective businesses in order to ensure complete separation
between the specialist organization and the rest of the member
organization.
Among other things, the Rule 98 Guidelines provide that the
specialist member organization be housed in a separate corporate entity
and broker-dealer from its approved persons. Further, to ensure that
information does not flow improperly from the specialist organization
to approved persons and that approved persons do not have undue
influence over particular trading decisions by the specialist, the
guidelines establish ``functional regulations'' that enforce the
required separateness. These include requirements that the
organizations maintain separate books and records, separate financial
accounting, and separate required capital, and that each organization
have in place procedures to safeguard confidential information derived
from business interactions with the issuer or contained in draft
research reports prepared by the approved person.
The assumption that all entities affiliated with a specialist are
subject to specialist rules unless they have obtained a Rule 98(b)
exemption creates a substantial administrative burden on specialist
organizations and their approved persons: Each approved person of a
specialist organization must establish and continually update a
separate exemption under Rule 98 if it wishes to engage in activity
that would otherwise be restricted under applicable specialist rules.
This burden creates a real and substantial barrier to entry for new
broker-dealers who may want to establish specialist units.
In the face of significant structural changes to the NYSE and the
equity markets, and in recognition of the vastly different competitive
landscape compared to 1987, the Exchange believes that Rule 98 must be
updated in order to provide both existing and prospective specialist
firms with the necessary tools to remain competitive while at the same
time meeting their obligations as specialists at the NYSE. The proposed
changes to Rule 98 also address the Exchange's desire to ease the
burdens of a new member organization seeking entry to supplement the
six specialist firms currently trading on the Exchange, or the very
real possibility of such a firm replacing one or more of the existing
specialist firms if they withdraw from the market. Concerning the
latter possibility, the NYSE notes that this is not just a theoretical
concern: Within the past six months, two specialist firms have already
withdrawn.
[[Page 38276]]
To address these very real concerns, the Exchange proposes to
fundamentally amend Rule 98. The proposed rule is described in detail
below, but at root, the amendment reverses the assumption that all
affiliated entities of a specialist firm are automatically governed by
the rules applicable to specialists, and shifts the focus of the rule
onto the specialist unit rather than the approved person.
As part of this restructuring, the NYSE proposes to eliminate the
prescriptive approach of the current rule and move towards a more
principle-based approach. The NYSE believes that a principle-based rule
closely overseen by NYSE Regulation can achieve the same goals as a
rule that attempts to enumerate every possible situation that must be
avoided. For that, the proposed rule still requires NYSE Regulation to
review whether a specialist unit's policies and procedures are
reasonably designed to protect confidential information. However, the
rule provides sufficient flexibility so that as the type of information
that needs to be protected and the manner in which such information can
be protected evolves with changes to the trading environment, so too
can the manner in which NYSE Regulation conducts its review.
The NYSE believes that the proposed changes to Rule 98 will
minimize regulatory burdens and barriers to entry while at the same
time provide the necessary level of regulatory scrutiny to ensure that
confidential information continues to be protected. In addition, the
proposed changes will reduce the regulatory burdens on existing
specialist member organizations to enable them to continue such
operations at lower cost.
B. Proposed Amendments to Rule 98
1. Applicability of Rule 98
Under the proposed rule, a member organization seeking to operate a
specialist unit, either as its entire business or as one of its trading
units, would need to apply for and be approved by NYSE Regulation
before it can begin, or if applicable, continue operations as a
specialist unit. As described in more detail below, NYSE Regulation
will review whether a proposed specialist unit has: (1) Adopted written
policies and procedures governing the conduct and supervision of the
business handled by the specialist unit; (2) established a process for
regular review of such written policies and procedures; and (3)
implemented controls and surveillances reasonably designed to prevent
and detect violations of those policies and procedures. Among other
things, these policies and procedures must be reasonably designed to
protect specialist confidential information and non-public order
information, as defined below.
Once approved, the NYSE specialist rules, as defined below,
including Rule 104, would generally only be applicable to the approved
specialist unit and not to its approved persons or, if applicable,
parent member organization. As discussed in more detail below, on a
case-by-case basis, NYSE Regulation will assess whether an integrated
proprietary aggregation unit that manages the risk for a specialist
unit could be subject to the specialist rules if the integrated
proprietary aggregation unit causes the specialist unit to violate its
obligations.
The NYSE recognizes that despite the proposed rule changes, an
existing specialist member organization may determine to either keep
its current operational structure or wait before it implements changes
to its operational structure, as permitted by the proposed amended
rule. Because current Rule 98 would still be applicable to those
specialist units that would not have yet sought the relief available
under proposed Rule 98, the Exchange proposes keeping current Rule 98
in its rulebook as ``Rule 98 (Former)'' until such time as all
specialist units are approved pursuant to proposed Rule 98(c). Any new
entrant to become a specialist unit would be required to comply with
proposed Rule 98; current Rule 98 procedures would not be available to
new entrants to the specialist business. As proposed, current Rule
98(b) exemptive relief would be available only so long as the member
organization and its approved persons have not materially changed their
operational structure, internal controls, or compliance and audit
procedures. In such case, the current Rule 98, i.e. , Rule 98 (Former),
would govern the specialist member organization and its approved
persons.\5\ Any significant changes to the status quo after the
effective date of the proposed new rule would require the member
organization to apply for approval pursuant to the procedures described
below.
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\5\ As discussed in more detail below, in addition to amending
Rule 98, the Exchange proposes to amend related rules that reference
the current Rule 98 exemptions for approved persons. To ensure that
member organizations operating pursuant to Rule 98 (Former) are
subject to the appropriate rules, the Exchange proposes to maintain
two forms of the related rules: the amended version and an otherwise
unchanged version, except for the title ``(Former)'' added to the
unamended version of the rule or, if applicable, the section
affected by the proposed rule change. Once all member organizations
are subject to the proposed Rule 98, the Exchange will file to
delete any ``Former'' versions of Rule 98 and the related rules or
sections.
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The Exchange recognizes that an existing specialist member
organization that does not implement structural changes to its
operations that would require it to apply for approval under the
proposed rule may still need certain relief available under the
proposed version of the Rule. Accordingly, the Exchange proposes that a
member organization operating pursuant to Rule 98 (Former) may apply
for relief pursuant to proposed Rule 98(e), which concerns sharing non-
trading related services, without first obtaining approval under other
provisions of proposed Rule 98. In such situation, the specialist
member organization would need to apply for approval from NYSE
Regulation to share non-trading related services, as specified in
proposed Rule 98(e). If approved, except for the sharing of non-trading
related services, such member organization and its approved persons
would continue to be subject to Rule 98 (Former) as well as the
``(Former)'' versions of NYSE rules that reference exemptions from Rule
98 for approved persons, as discussed in more detail below.
Once approved pursuant to proposed Rule 98 to operate a specialist
unit, share non-trading related services, or engage in risk management,
any material changes in how a specialist unit operates its business
would require the specialist unit to resubmit its revised written
policies and procedures to NYSE Regulation for review. For example, if
a specialist unit is approved to operate as a stand-alone aggregation
unit and would like to change its business operations to include the
specialist unit as part of a larger integrated proprietary aggregation
unit, as permitted by proposed Rule 98(d), such change would require
pre-approval.
2. Proposed Definitions
To ensure clarity, the proposed amendments include a number of
defined terms that are applicable throughout the rule. These
definitions are designed to provide a level of scalability to the rule
so that as the NYSE market model evolves, the definitions used
throughout the rule will have common meaning. Among the proposed
definitions are:
``Specialist unit''--this definition is intended to apply
to any trading unit that is seeking approval to operate as a specialist
at the Exchange. As proposed, a specialist unit could be a stand-alone
member organization, an aggregation unit within a member organization,
or a trading unit (or ``desk'') within a larger
[[Page 38277]]
aggregation unit. Regardless of which corporate structure a member
organization chooses, the term ``specialist unit'' would refer to the
unit that is responsible for specialist activities at the Exchange. If
approved pursuant to proposed Rule 98(c), a specialist unit would be
eligible for allocations under NYSE Rule 103B and be subject to
specialist rules. For purposes of Exchange rules, the term ``specialist
unit'' is synonymous with the term ``specialist organization'' or
``specialist member organization.''
``Specialist's account''--this definition refers to any
account through which a specialist unit trades at the Exchange.
Sometimes referred to as a dealer account, this revised definition
would encompass any of the variously-defined accounts that a specialist
unit may use to trade at the Exchange.
``Specialist rules''--this definition refers to those
rules that govern specialist conduct or trading at the Exchange.
Currently, the specialist rules include, among others, Rules 104, 105,
and 113, but as the rules at the Exchange change, these rule
designations may change. Accordingly, so that proposed Rule 98 evolves
along with changes to other rules, this proposed definition does not
identify specific rules.
``Specialist confidential information''--this definition
concerns the principal or proprietary trading activity of a specialist
unit at the Exchange in the securities allocated to it pursuant to Rule
103B, including the unit's positions in those securities, decisions
relating to trading or quoting in those securities, and any algorithm
or computer system that is responsible for such trading activity and
that interface with Exchange systems, such as the specialist
application protocol interface (``specialist API'').\6\ The definition
does not include information about non-public order information, as
described below.
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\6\ The specialist API is the electronic link between specialist
trading algorithms and the NYSE Display Book[supreg]. Via this
interface, specialist organization trading algorithms send quoting
and trading messages to the Exchange for implementation in the NYSE
Display Book[supreg], and the Exchange transmits information
necessary to acting as a specialist to specialist organizations.
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``Non-public order''--this definition refers to any
information relating to order flow at the Exchange, including verbal
indications of interest made with an expectation of privacy, electronic
order interest, e-quotes, reserve interest, or information about
imbalances at the Exchange, that is not publicly-available on a real-
time basis via an Exchange-provided datafeed, such as NYSE
OpenBook[supreg], or otherwise publicly-available. The definition also
encompasses information regarding a reasonably imminent non-public
transaction or series of transactions. For example, if in requesting
information about the state of the Book, a Floor broker informs the
specialist about an order that he or she has, such information would
fall under the definition of ``non-public order.'' As defined, non-
public orders include order information at the open, any re-openings,
the close, when the security is trading in a slow mode (e.g., in a Gap
quote or LRP situation), and any other information in the NYSE Display
Book[supreg] \7\ that is not available via NYSE OpenBook[supreg].\8\ As
proposed, the linchpin to the definition of ``non-public order'' is
that it is information not publicly available on a real-time basis.
Currently, specialists have unique access to certain non-public order
information. However, in its proposed new market model, the Exchange
will be proposing to change the specialist's access to such non-public
order information. The proposed definition is intended to take into
consideration such future changes so that as the specialist's or
specialist API's access to non-public order information changes, so
will the specialist unit's responsibilities to protect that information
change, but without having to revise Rule 98.
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\7\ The Display Book system is an order management and execution
facility. The Display Book system receives and displays orders to
the specialists, contains the Book, and provides a mechanism to
execute and report transactions and publish results to the
Consolidated Tape. The Display Book system is connected to a number
of other Exchange systems for the purposes of comparison,
surveillance, and reporting information to customers and other
market data and national market systems.
\8\ NYSE OpenBook[supreg] provides aggregate limit-order volume
that has been entered on the Exchange at price points for all NYSE-
traded securities.
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``Investment banking department'' and ``Research
department''--these definitions refer to the same departments that are
defined as such in NYSE Rule 472 and NASD Rule 2711.
``Customer-facing department''--this definition is
intended to encompass any department, division, market-making desk,
aggregation unit, or trading desk that receives, routes, or executes
orders for customer execution or clearing accounts, regardless of
whether such unit also engages in principal or proprietary trading. A
hallmark of this definition is that a customer has an expectation of
confidentiality and best execution on its behalf, which could include a
customer that is another broker-dealer. Examples of trading desks that
would meet this definition include a Nasdaq market-making desk and most
block-trading desks. However, this definition is not intended to
include an aggregation unit that solely conducts proprietary trading or
proprietary market making (sometimes referred to as electronic market
making).
``Aggregation unit''--this definition adopts the standard
of Rule 200(f) of Regulation SHO.\9\ The proposed rule uses this term
throughout to refer to any department, division, unit, or trading desk
that has been segregated pursuant to the requirements of Regulation
SHO. The NYSE believes that the Regulation SHO requirements for
establishing an aggregation unit, including any requirements for
information barriers, would be sufficient for segregating a specialist
unit's operations from the remainder of a member organization or its
approved persons.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ See 17 CFR 242.200(f).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
``Non-trading related services''--this definition refers
to the type of support services that a specialist unit may share with
its parent member organization or approved person. The core of the
proposed definition is that the type of services are not related to
making decisions about the day-to-day trading of the specialist unit or
provide trading support to such activity, such as by a trading
assistant or specialist clerk. Examples of non-trading related services
include stock loan (so long as consistent with Regulation SHO),
clearing and settlement, controllers (for financial accounting
purposes), technology support, and personnel who develop applications
and algorithmic models.
``Integrated proprietary aggregation unit''--this
definition is intended to encompass any aggregation unit that has a
trading objective to engage in proprietary trading, including
proprietary market-making activities. As defined, an integrated
proprietary aggregation unit must not include any activities that would
be performed by an investment banking, research, or customer-facing
department. Subject to proposed Rule 98(d), a specialist unit could be
part of a member organization's integrated proprietary aggregation
unit. Alternatively, an approved person or member organization could
maintain an integrated proprietary aggregation unit separate from the
specialist unit. In such case, the definition of an integrated
proprietary aggregation unit becomes relevant in connection with
proposed Rule 98(f)(3) and the ability of an approved person to engage
in risk management activities on behalf of the
[[Page 38278]]
specialist unit of an associated member organization.
``Related products''--this definition refers to any
derivative instrument that is related to a security allocated to a
specialist unit. It can include options, warrants, hybrid securities,
single-stock futures, security-based swap agreements, a forward
contract, or any other contract that is exercisable into or whose price
is based upon or derived from a security listed at the Exchange. The
list referenced in the definition is not intended to be exhaustive and
the definition is intended to cover any existing or future products
that could be related to a security listed at the Exchange.
3. Proposed Rule 98(c): Approval to Operate a Specialist Unit
Pursuant to proposed Rule 98(c), a member organization must obtain
prior written approval from NYSE Regulation before it can operate a
specialist unit. For approval, a specialist unit must demonstrate that
it has: (i) Adopted and implemented comprehensive written procedures
and guidelines governing the conduct and supervision of business
handled by the specialist unit; (ii) established a process for regular
review of such written policies and procedures; and (iii) implemented
controls and surveillances reasonably designed to prevent and detect
violations of these procedures and guidelines.
As proposed, these policies and procedures must be reasonably
designed to provide that the specialist unit will maintain the
confidentiality of both specialist confidential information and non-
public orders. The proposed rule enumerates certain bright-line
divisions that the specialist unit must maintain, including information
barriers between the specialist unit and investment banking, research,
and customer-facing departments and approved persons. Such information
barriers should guarantee confidentiality two ways: the specialist unit
cannot access material non-public information about securities
allocated to that unit from either its approved persons or non-
specialist operations of a parent member organization and vice versa.
With respect to a specialist unit's internal controls and
surveillances, NYSE Regulation will be reviewing such surveillance
plans to determine whether they are reasonably designed to protect
information as required under the proposed rule. Where feasible, NYSE
Regulation will expect specialist units to use automated surveillances
to check for breaches of the information barriers required by the
proposed rule. As with the current rule, NYSE Regulation will also
review whether a member organization has implemented internal audit
procedures relating to compliance with the proposed Rule 98 policies
and procedures.
In addition to the specific information barriers enumerated in the
proposed rule, if a member organization proposes to operate a
specialist unit as a stand-alone unit, the Exchange proposes importing
the requirements of a Regulation SHO independent trading unit for
specialist units. Accordingly, as required by Rule 200(f) of Regulation
SHO,\10\ NYSE proposes requiring a specialist unit to have a written
plan of organization that specifies its trading objectives and meet all
of the other requirements of an independent trading unit under
Regulation SHO. If a specialist unit seeks to avail itself of the
exemption from NYSE Rule 105 under proposed Rule 98(f)(1), that written
plan of organization would need to include its trading objectives for
trading in related products.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ See 17 CFR part 242.200(f).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As with the current rule, proposed Rule 98 would require the
specialist unit to maintain net capital sufficient to meet the
requirements of NYSE Rule 104.21. The NYSE believes that if a
specialist unit is integrated within a larger member organization, the
net capital requirement can be met by having the requisite capital
amount allocated to the specialist unit by the member organization.
Despite the segregations required by the rule, the NYSE believes
that senior managers who are not dedicated to the specialist unit and
are associated with either an approved person or a member organization
that runs a specialist unit should still be able to provide management
oversight to the specialist unit. As proposed, the revised rule is not
intended to be more restrictive than the current rule, which permits an
approved person to provide general oversight over its associated
specialist member organization. The proposed rule instead shifts from a
detailed list of specific types of oversight that is permissible to a
principle-based approach that focuses on protecting specialist
confidential information and non-public order information. As with the
current rule, as proposed, senior management oversight of a specialist
unit should not conflict with or compromise in any way with the
specialist unit's market-making obligations.
Proposed Rule 98(c)(2)(E) provides guidance on how a member
organization or approved person should handle situations where a senior
manager is called upon for risk management purposes and in connection
with that role, gains access to specialist confidential information or
non-public order information. The Exchange notes that non-public order
information could become stale if the order is executed or cancelled
without the specialist's knowledge. To ensure that there is no misuse
of such information, whether material or not, the senior manager must
not make (directly or indirectly) specialist confidential information
or non-public order information available to the persons or systems
responsible for making trading decisions in aggregation units,
departments, divisions, or trading desks that are not part of the
specialist unit, including the customer-facing departments. The senior
manager also must not use such information to directly or indirectly
influence the day-to-day trading decisions of the other aggregation
units of the member organization or approved person with respect to the
securities allocated to the specialist unit.
The NYSE believes that these restrictions on the use of specialist
confidential information and non-public order information are similar
to how broker-dealers currently handle situations where a senior
manager has oversight over multiple aggregation units and in such
capacity, becomes privy to confidential information of one aggregation
unit. For such situations, broker-dealers have already developed
procedures for protecting confidential information and the NYSE
believes that such procedures should be reasonable for the oversight of
a specialist unit as well.
The Exchange notes that although the proposed amendments to Rule 98
eliminate the exemption process under current Rule 98(b), the review
that NYSE Regulation would conduct when approving a specialist unit
would be as rigorous as the current review for obtaining an exemption,
just simply a different focus of what is reviewed. As with the current
Rule 98 exemption process, staff from both the Market Surveillance
Division of NYSE Regulation as well as relevant staff from the
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Inc. (``FINRA''), who are
responsible for the routine examinations of specialist units, would be
involved in reviewing a specialist unit's written policies and
procedures and proposed automated surveillances and controls.\11\
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\11\ In connection with the July 2007 transfer of certain member
firm regulation functions from NYSE Regulation to FINRA, NYSE
Regulation and FINRA entered into a regulatory services agreement
(``RSA'') whereby FINRA agreed to provide NYSE Regulation with
certain services relating to NYSE's retained responsibilities to
examine for compliance with NYSE rules that govern trading on or
through the systems and facilities of the Exchange. In particular,
pursuant to the RSA, FINRA participates in the current Rule 98(b)
exemption process and examines specialist firms for compliances with
that rule. As proposed, FINRA would continue to participate in the
approval process under the proposed Rule 98 and examine specialist
units for compliance with the rule.
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[[Page 38279]]
For existing specialist firms, the initial approval process
associated with any changes to how they operate may require upfront
work to ensure that the specialist unit's policies and procedures are
reasonably designed to meet the requirements of the proposed rule.
However, unlike the current rule, as proposed, specialist units would
be relieved of the requirement to update any written statements to the
Exchange for changes in approved persons or dually-affiliated
employees. Once approved, NYSE Regulation and FINRA would examine
whether a specialist unit's policies and procedures continue to meet
the rule requirements and whether the implemented controls and
automated surveillances are functioning as designed. As part of such
examination review, NYSE Regulation and FINRA will conduct on-site
reviews of a specialist unit to review for breaches of the controls or
surveillances. And, as noted above, if the specialist unit proposes
making any material changes to its operations, it would need to seek
additional approval before it can change its operations.
4. Proposed Rule 98(d): Operating a Specialist Unit Within an
Integrated Proprietary Unit
One of the goals of proposed Rule 98 is to provide a member
organization with greater flexibility in how it manages the risk of a
specialist unit. As discussed below, in proposed Rule 98(f), the NYSE
proposes providing member organizations with an array of options of how
to conduct risk management. The NYSE believes that the flexibility
afforded by these options will meet the varying business models of the
member organizations currently operating or seeking to operate a
specialist unit at the Exchange.
As discussed in more detail below, one proposed risk management
model would be to permit a member organization to integrate a
specialist unit within a larger aggregation unit that meets the
requirements of an integrated proprietary aggregation unit. Proposed
Rule 98(d) sets forth the minimum requirements for how to structure
such an integrated unit. While such a unit would be considered a single
aggregation unit for Regulation SHO purposes, as proposed, the member
organization would need to establish information barriers within the
integrated proprietary aggregation unit to restrict access to non-
public order information to the specialist unit only. And depending on
the risk management model proposed by a specialist unit, a member
organization or approved person may need to further segregate the flow
of information within a specialist unit.
As proposed, the specialist unit that would operate within the
integrated proprietary aggregation unit would need to meet the
requirements of proposed Rule 98(c)(2)(A), (C), (D), and (E) of the
rule, which concern the information barriers associated with the
specialist unit and non-specialist unit operations, net capital
requirements, and senior management oversight. Because an integrated
proprietary aggregation unit that includes a specialist unit would
likely already be subject to Rule 200(f) of Regulation SHO that it
qualify as an independent trading unit, the specialist unit operating
within the integrated proprietary aggregation unit would not need to
separately meet the Rule 200(f) requirement for an independent trading
unit. Accordingly, as proposed, a specialist unit that operates within
an integrated proprietary aggregation unit would not need to meet the
requirements of proposed Rule 98(c)(2)(B), which requires a specialist
unit to separately comply with all of the Regulation SHO independent
trading unit requirements.\12\
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\12\ The Exchange recognizes that there may be some Regulation
SHO issues in connection with how a member organization may choose
to structure its specialist unit within an integrated proprietary
aggregation unit or provide risk management to the specialist unit
pursuant to proposed Rule 98(f). In such case, approval to operate
under proposed Rule 98 would not be provided until all Regulation
SHO issues that may arise have been resolved.
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In addition to meeting certain requirements of proposed Rule 98(c),
under proposed Rule 98(d)(2)(B), the specialist unit must restrict
access to non-public order information or specialist confidential
information from the rest of the integrated proprietary aggregation
unit. Such information barriers must ensure that both individuals and
systems that are not assigned to the specialist unit do not have access
to non-public order information, or, unless otherwise provided for in
proposed Rule 98(f), specialist confidential information.
The NYSE believes that as proposed, Rule 98(d)(2)(B) provides
sufficient flexibility for how a member organization structures its
operations to evolve as the NYSE market model changes. For example, the
specialist API currently has access to limited non-public order
information, but does not have access to information available in the
NYSE Display Book. So long as the specialist API has access to that
non-public order information, the Exchange believes that systems not
dedicated to the specialist unit should not be integrated with the
specialist API. Accordingly, the trading algorithms of the integrated
proprietary aggregation unit that are not dedicated to the specialist
unit would not have access to any non-public order information via the
specialist API, or any other system.
Proposed Rule 98(d)(2)(B)(iii) addresses the situation of
communications from the Floor of the Exchange to the rest of the
integrated proprietary aggregation unit. Currently, specialist unit
employees on the Floor of the Exchange have access to non-public order
information, whether via access to information in the Display
Book[supreg] or because of verbal representations of imminent orders.
The NYSE believes that the best way to ensure that such information is
not provided to individuals or systems not dedicated to the specialist
unit is to restrict communications while the employee is still on the
Floor of the Exchange.
Proposed Rule 98(d)(2)(B)(iv) considers the possibility that an
individual who works on the Floor of the Exchange \13\ may also, on an
intra-day basis, move to an off-Floor location and engage in a non-
specialist related role within the integrated proprietary aggregation
unit pursuant to proposed Rule 98(d) or for an ``upstairs'' desk
trading in related products within the specialist unit pursuant to
proposed Rule 98(f)(1). In such case, the individual must not make any
non-public order information or, unless specifically provided for,
specialist confidential information, available to individuals or
systems that are not dedicated to the specialist unit. Nor may that
individual use such non-public information, or, except as provided for
in the Rule, specialist confidential information, in any way in
connection with responsibilities that are not related to Floor-based
activities of the specialist unit. For purposes of proposed Rule
98(f)(1), once off the Floor, a specialist may not use non-public
information to directly or indirectly trade in related products.
However, nothing in the rule
[[Page 38280]]
bars a specialist unit from moving personnel among different positions
intraday, so long as the restrictions on information flow and use are
followed. The NYSE believes that this would provide member
organizations with sufficient flexibility to transfer its employees
among various roles, including on the Floor of the Exchange and in a
specialist unit upstairs location during a given trading day. For
intra-day transfers, the Exchange will expect specialist units to have
written policies and procedures reasonably designed to ensure that non-
public order information and specialist confidential information
(unless otherwise permitted) would not be used from an off-Floor
location. The Exchange notes that in addition to the information
barriers required by proposed Rule 98, specialists must continue to
abide by Exchange rules that govern their access to and use of non-
public order information.\14\
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\13\ Note that NYSE rules define being on the Floor to include
the trading Floor of the Exchange, and the premises immediately
adjacent thereto, such as the various entrances and lobbies of 11
Wall Street, 18 New Street, 12 Broad Street, and 18 Broad Street, as
well as the telephone lobby in the first basement of 11 Wall Street.
See Rule 112(b).
\14\ See, e.g. , NYSE Rules 70.20(h)(ii), 104(b), 115, and 115A.
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As noted above, an integrated proprietary aggregation unit would
need to qualify as an aggregation unit, which for Regulation SHO
purposes, requires the unit to net its positions. While the proposed
rule would no longer require separate books and records for a
specialist unit, to ensure that NYSE Regulation can review the trading
activity by the specialist unit at the Exchange without having to parse
through commingled records, under proposed Rule 98(d)(2)(C), in
addition to meeting Regulation SHO requirements, an integrated
proprietary aggregation unit must maintain records of its specialist's
accounts in a manner that is separate from the accounts of the
integrated proprietary aggregation unit.\15\
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\15\ The Exchange is engaging in a separate discussion with
Commission staff of the Regulation SHO implications of requiring a
specialist unit to separately aggregate its trading positions for
purposes of Exchange rules.
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In addition to the above, the integrated proprietary aggregation
unit must have written policies and procedures that address how it will
ensure that the unit will not engage in any activities that could
violate other Exchange rules or federal securities laws and
regulations, including Regulation SHO. The policies and procedures must
address, at a minimum, how the unit will ensure against front running,
wash sales, and market manipulation.
In connection with wash sales, a potential concern for an
integrated proprietary aggregation unit is the possibility that the
specialist unit could be selling (buying) one of the securities
registered to it and an individual or trading system of the integrated
proprietary aggregation unit could at the same time be buying (selling)
that same security at the Exchange. With the proper use of mnemonics
associated with those orders, Exchange systems are capable of rejecting
one side of those orders. Because the presumption would be in favor of
the specialist unit trading, i.e., to meet its affirmative obligations
at the Exchange, the NYSE proposes rejecting the order from the
integrated proprietary aggregation unit.
The NYSE also proposes that to the extent an integrated proprietary
aggregation unit directs its trading at the Exchange in any security
that has been allocated to the specialist unit through the specialist
unit, such trading would be subject to the specialist rules. In other
words, while the specialist unit would be subject to certain market-
making obligations while trading at the Exchange, the integrated
proprietary aggregation unit's independent ``upstairs'' operations
would be able to trade freely.
Finally, to ensure that NYSE Regulation can review the trading
activities of the integrated proprietary aggregation unit, proposed
Rule 98(d)(4) requires member organizations to maintain audit trail
information for any trading by such unit, including trading at the
Exchange and at other market centers. The NYSE proposes to amend NYSE
Rule 132B to have the Order Tracking System (``OTS'') requirements
apply to trading by a specialist unit, and if applicable, an integrated
proprietary aggregation unit. Member organizations must maintain
sufficient records to reconstruct in a time-sequenced manner its
trading in securities allocated to the specialist unit and any trading
by the integrated proprietary aggregation unit in those securities in
other market centers or trading in related products.
As with the approval process under proposed Rule 98(c), to obtain
approval to operate a specialist unit within an integrated proprietary
aggregation unit, a member organization would need to submit its
written policies and procedures to NYSE Regulation for review of
whether such policies and procedures are reasonably designed to meet
the rule requirements. Once approved under proposed Rule 98(d), NYSE
Regulation and FINRA would continue to examine whether a specialist
unit's policies and procedures continue to meet the rule requirements
and whether the implemented controls and surveillances plans are
functioning as designed.
5. Proposed Rule 98(e): Sharing Non-Trading Related Services
One of the restrictions of current Rule 98 is the limit on a
specialist member organization and its approved persons to share
operational support personnel. In its current form, Rule 98(c) permits
dual affiliation only if the specialist member organization and
approved person provide the Exchange with a written statement of the
duties of such person and why it is necessary for the individual to
have a dual affiliation. Any changes to dual affiliations must be
submitted to the Exchange for approval in advance of making such
change.
The NYSE believes that current Rule 98(c) unnecessarily restricts
the ability of a specialist member organization and its approved person
to share non-trading related services, i.e., operational support
services. Accordingly, the NYSE proposes amending Rule 98 to permit the
sharing of non-trading related services, subject to the approval of
NYSE Regulation.
As with the approval process to become a specialist unit, the
approval process for a specialist unit to share non-trading related
services with its parent member organization or approved person would
require the specialist unit to: (1) Adopt written policies and
procedures governing the sharing or non-trading related services; (2)
establish a process for regular review of such written policies and
procedures; and (3) implement controls and surveillances reasonably
designed to prevent and detect violations of those policies and
procedures. In accordance with the purpose of Rule 98, such policies
and procedures must be reasonably designed to protect specialist
confidential information and non-public order information.
The NYSE understands that personnel or systems that provide non-
trading related services may have access to specialist confidential
information or non-public order information. For example, clearance and
settlement services would have knowledge of specialist positions in
securities, and technological support personnel may have knowledge of
how a specialist algorithm conducts its trading. However, access to
such information should not be the basis for restricting the sharing of
such personnel or systems. Rather, such personnel or systems can be
shared so long as the specialist unit has controls reasonably designed
to ensure that the individuals or systems who have access to specialist
confidential information or non-public information neither provide nor
make available that information to any
[[Page 38281]]
individuals or systems not part of the specialist unit. In particular,
under no circumstances should non-public order information or
specialist confidential information be made available to the investment
banking, research, or customer-facing departments.
Before a specialist unit can share non-trading related services,
NYSE Regulation will review whether the specialist unit has adopted
policies and procedures and controls and surveillances reasonably
designed to protect specialist confidential information and non-public
order information. Once approved, a specialist unit would no longer
need to provide NYSE Regulation with a written statement of why a
certain individual has a dual affiliation and update such written
statements if the individual involved changes. On an ongoing basis,
NYSE Regulation and FINRA will examine whether the specialist unit's
policies and procedures and controls comply with the requirements of
the rule.
6. Proposed Rule 98(f): Risk Management
Specialist member organizations and their approved persons are
currently limited in their ability to manage the specialist member
organization's trading risks: Rule 98 currently restricts an approved
person from being involved in any trading decisions of an associated
specialist member organization; Rule 105 currently restricts the
specialist member organization's ability to trade in options and
single-stock futures related to the securities allocated to the
specialist member organization. Together, these restrictions place
specialist member organizations at a competitive disadvantage vis-
[agrave]-vis other market-making or trading firms.
The NYSE believes that the changes to the marketplace that have
occurred since 1987, when Rule 98 was adopted, call for an overhaul of
how specialist units are permitted to manage their risk. For example,
when Rule 98 was adopted, the NYSE enjoyed an approximately 85% market
share in trading of NYSE-listed securities and specialists participated
in approximately 12% of the transactions at the Exchange. Now, the
NYSE's market share for listed securities hovers under 40%, and of
that, specialist participation is in the range of two percent. These
numbers are telling: Because of automatic executions at the Exchange,
specialists no longer have a unique advantage over other market
participants. To the contrary, specialists are now at a disadvantage to
other market participants because they must meet their affirmative and
negative obligations to the Exchange, yet cannot participate in the
type of hedging activities that other market participants may and can
do.
Accordingly, the Exchange proposes providing specialist units with
the ability to manage their risks by broadening the ability to trade in
related products and expanding the universe of who may be involved in
managing the risk of the specialist unit. Because there is no single
correct model for risk management, the NYSE proposes providing
specialist units with options of how to manage their risk, which they
can choose to use in combination or alone. Regardless of which model a
specialist unit proposes to adopt for risk management, at all times,
the specialist unit will be ultimately responsible for its quoting or
trading decisions at the Exchange.
a. Specialist Unit Risk Management
In order to provide a specialist unit with greater risk management
tools, the NYSE proposes permitting specialist units to apply for an
exemption from the Rule 105(b)-(d) restrictions on trading options and
single-stock futures. In connection with this change, the NYSE proposes
amending Rule 105 so that it applies only to a specialist unit, and not
to any other departments or units of a member organization or approved
person. If approved for an exemption from Rule 105, a specialist unit
would be permitted to trade in related products, subject to proposed
Rule 98(f)(1).\16\
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\16\ The Exchange also proposes amending section (m) of the Rule
105 Guidelines to provide that a specialist unit is not permitted to
engage in market-making activities in single-stock futures or
options. However, if eligible for an exemption under Rule 105(b)-
(d), nothing restricts a specialist unit from having a trading desk
that trades in options or single-stock futures. Because an
integrated proprietary aggregation unit that includes a specialist
unit may engage in options market making, the Exchange proposes
eliminating sections (m)(ii) and (iii) of the Rule 105 Guidelines.
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As proposed, to obtain an exemption from Rule 105, the specialist
unit must: (i) Adopt and implement comprehensive written procedures and
guidelines governing the conduct of trading in related products; (ii)
establish a process for regular review of such written procedures and
guidelines; and (iii) implement controls and surveillances reasonably
designed to prevent and detect violations of these procedures and
guidelines.
These policies and procedures must be reasonably designed to ensure
that the individuals or systems responsible for trading related
products do not have access to non-public order information, or, unless
otherwise specifically provided for, specialist confidential
information. In addition, individuals who work on the Floor of the
Exchange would not be permitted to trade or direct trading in related
products, nor would the specialist API be permitted to make any trading
decisions in related products. Accordingly, any trading in related
products by the specialist unit must be conducted by an off-Floor,
i.e., ``upstairs'' office. All trading in related products must be
conducted by individuals who are qualified and registered to trade in
the marketplaces where such trading occurs. Moreover, the member
organization that houses the specialist unit must be a member of FINRA
or other self-regulatory organizations, as required by each marketplace
where the specialist unit proposes to trade.
The NYSE believes that a specialist unit should have the
flexibility to transfer its employees among different functions within
the unit. Accordingly, the proposed rule does not expressly prohibit
specialists from trading in related products; it only bars directly
entering or executing trades in related products while on the Floor of
the Exchange.\17\ As proposed, a specialist unit could transfer a
specialist back and forth from the Floor of the Exchange to a
specialist unit upstairs desk that trades in related products, so long
as that specialist is registered and qualified to trade in related
products and non-public order information is not used when trading in
related products. In such case, however, a specialist unit must have
policies and procedures reasonably designed to ensure that a specialist
who moves off the Floor of the Exchange does not make available or use
any non-public information or, unless otherwise specified, specialist
confidential information, to which the specialist may have had access
while on the Floor of the Exchange. As noted above, while off the Floor
of the Exchange, specialists continue to be subject to other NYSE rules
that govern their access to and use of non-public order information.
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\17\ The Exchange notes that a specialist unit that has not been
approved for an exemption from Rule 105 under proposed Rule 98(f)(1)
would still be permitted to enter orders in options or single-stock
futures from the Floor, subject to the requirements of Rule 105.
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To ensure that the specialist unit upstairs desk that trades in
related products can effectively hedge the specialist unit's positions,
the NYSE proposes that the specialist unit upstairs desk have
electronic access to the trades by the specialist unit at the Exchange
in securities allocated to the specialist unit
[[Page 38282]]
that have been printed to the Consolidated Tape.
Currently, senior managers of specialist member organizations can
be privy to information about trading on the Floor of the Exchange as
well as any hedging conducted by the specialist member organization,
even though such hedging opportunities are limited. For example,
currently, a specialist on the Floor can call his or her senior manager
to discuss hedging strategies. Under the proposed exemption from Rule
105, the NYSE believes that specialist unit senior managers should be
able to continue in that role and provide oversight of both Floor
specialist operations and any specialist unit upstairs trading in
related products. The NYSE believes that the oversight model that works
for larger broker-dealers, whose senior managers have a role with
respect to multiple aggregation units, should apply within a specialist
unit as well.
Accordingly, the NYSE proposes Rule 98(f)(1)(vi) to address how a
senior manager of a specialist unit should handle situations where he
or she has access to non-public order information in connection with
his or her role as a senior manager. As with proposed Rule 98(c)(2)(E),
when trading in related products, the specialist unit must have
policies and procedures reasonably designed to ensure that the
specialist unit senior manager who has access to non-public order
information does not provide such information to the specialist unit
upstairs trading desk responsible for trading related products or use
such non-public information to directly or indirectly influence trading
by that upstairs desk.
b. Integrated Proprietary Aggregation Unit Risk Management
Proposed Rule 98(f)(2) addresses how an integrated proprietary
aggregation unit that has been approved pursuant to proposed Rule 98(d)
to include a specialist unit could engage in risk management of the
specialist unit's positions. At a minimum, an integrated proprietary
aggregation unit must have policies and procedures that are reasonably
designed to meet the protections enumerated in the rule, including how
it trades in related products on behalf of a specialist unit and how it
electronically accesses the specialist unit's trades at the Exchange in
securities allocated to the specialist unit that have been printed to
the Consolidated Tape.
In addition, proposed Rule 98(f)(2)(A)(i) would permit an
integrated proprietary aggregation unit to send appetites of trading or
quoting direction to the specialist unit. In practice, this would
permit a non-specialist unit ``upstairs'' risk management desk that has
real-time access both to the specialist unit's positions in securities
allocated to it and to the integrated proprietary aggregation unit's
positions in related products and other securities to provide
electronic direction to the specialist unit of whether to trade or
quote in a certain direction. The Exchange believes that permitting an
integrated proprietary aggregation unit to send quoting messages that
are based on real-time positions of the unit as a whole will enable a
specialist unit to better meet any quoting requirements at the
Exchange. In other words, the specialist unit will no longer need to
operate in a vacuum when determining how or when to quote at the
Exchange.
As proposed, the specialist unit would be ultimately responsible
for whether to accept the electronic trading direction submitted by the
integrated proprietary aggregation unit upstairs desk; a specialist
unit must comply at all times with its market-marking obligations,
including the specialist rules, notwithstanding any electronic trading
directions received from that upstairs desk. Stated otherwise, the
specialist unit would operate independently and be free to accept or
reject the electronic trading directions sent by the integrated
proprietary aggregation unit. However, to the extent an integrated
proprietary aggregation unit causes a specialist unit to violate one or
more of the specialist rules, the Exchange proposes that in such case,
the integrated proprietary aggregation unit should also be held to
those standards.
At this time, as noted above, because of access to non-public order
information, the NYSE does not believe it would be feasible to permit
communications, whether verbal or electronic, from the specialist or
the specialist API to the individuals or systems responsible for
trading in related products and other securities within the integrated
proprietary aggregation unit, or, if applicable, to an upstairs desk
within the specialist unit. However, as the NYSE market model evolves,
the NYSE will continue to review how best to integrate a specialist
unit within an integrated proprietary aggregation unit, including the
possibility of fully integrating the trading systems that interact with
the Exchange for the specialist unit and the trading systems that trade
in related products and other securities. The NYSE believes that
ultimately, a competitive trading model would permit full integration,
including permitting two-way communications among trading desks.
c. Approved Person Risk Management
As proposed, another option available to firms to manage the risk
of the specialist unit is to permit a separate integrated proprietary
aggregation unit that is housed in either an approved person or a
member organization that runs a specialist unit to provide the same
level of risk management as proposed for an integrated proprietary
aggregation unit that includes a specialist unit. This option would
provide flexibility for broker-dealers that want to keep the specialist
unit as a separate member organization or aggregation unit, yet still
have an approved person or separate aggregation unit provide risk
management services for the specialist unit.
As with proposed Rule 98(f)(2), proposed Rule 98(f)(3) would
require that the approved person not have access to either specialist
confidential information and non-public order information, except as
provided for in that section of the rule. Specifically, an integrated
proprietary aggregation unit of an approved person could have access to
the trades by a specialist unit at the Exchange in securities allocated
to that unit, so long as such trades have been printed to the
Consolidated Tape.
And as with proposed Rule 98(f)(2), an approved person could send
electronic appetites of how the speci