Definition of Eligible Portfolio Company Under the Investment Company Act of 1940, 29044-29052 [E8-11254]
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Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 98 / Tuesday, May 20, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation
safety, Incorporation by reference,
Safety.
Adoption of the Amendment
Acceptable External Skin Doublers Found at
Both Sides
(h) If, during the inspection required by
paragraph (g) of this AD, acceptable external
skin doublers in accordance with the alert
service bulletin are found installed at both
the left- and right-side S–6 lap splices, no
further work is required by this AD.
Accordingly, under the authority
delegated to me by the Administrator,
the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as
follows:
I
PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS
DIRECTIVES
1. The authority citation for part 39
continues to read as follows:
I
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
§ 39.13
(2) Within 8,000 flight cycles after a
modification was done in accordance with
Boeing Service Bulletin 747–53–2253.
(3) Within 15 days or 100 flight cycles after
the effective date of this AD, whichever
occurs first.
[Amended]
2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding
the following new AD:
I
2008–10–15 Boeing: Amendment 39–15522.
Docket No. FAA–2008–0554; Directorate
Identifier 2008–NM–100–AD.
Effective Date
(a) This airworthiness directive (AD) is
effective May 20, 2008.
Affected ADs
(b) None.
Acceptable External Skin Doublers Not
Found—Repetitive Related Investigative
Actions and Corrective Actions
(i) If, during the inspection required by
paragraph (g) of this AD, acceptable external
skin doublers in accordance with alert
service bulletin are not found installed at
either the left- or right-side S–6 lap splice:
Before further flight, do all applicable related
investigative and corrective actions by doing
all actions specified in Part 2 of the alert
service bulletin. Repeat the applicable related
investigative actions thereafter at intervals
not to exceed 300 flight cycles until the
modification specified in paragraph (j) of this
AD is done.
Unsafe Condition
(d) This AD results from a report of cracked
fastener holes at the right stringer 6 (S–6) lap
splice between station (STA) 340 and STA
380. We are issuing this AD to detect and
correct cracking in the fuselage skin, which
could result in rapid decompression and loss
of structural integrity.
Optional Terminating Modification
(j) Modifying the airplane by installing
acceptable external skin doublers at both the
left- and right-side S–6 lap splices (including
doing an open-hole HFEC inspection of the
skin for cracking, and trimming out cracking
as applicable) in accordance with the alert
service bulletin terminates the repetitive
related investigative actions required by this
AD.
Note 1: The alert service bulletin refers to
Boeing Service Bulletins 747–53–2253,
Revision 3, dated March 24, 1994; and 747–
53–2272, Revision 18, dated May 16, 2002; as
additional sources of service information for
accomplishment of the modification
(installation of acceptable external skin
doublers).
Compliance
(e) Comply with this AD within the
compliance times specified, unless already
done.
Note 2: AD 90–06–06, amendment 39–
6490, requires, among other actions, one of
the modification options specified in Boeing
Service Bulletin 747–53–2253, dated
December 14, 1984.
Service Bulletin Reference Paragraph
(f) The term ‘‘alert service bulletin,’’ as
used in this AD, means the Accomplishment
Instructions of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin
747–53A2748, dated May 9, 2008.
Note 3: AD 90–23–14, amendment 39–
6801, requires that inspections of
modifications done in accordance with
Boeing Service Bulletin 747–53–2253, and
applicable repairs, be done in accordance
with Boeing Service Bulletin 747–53–2253,
Revision 2, dated March 29, 1990.
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Applicability
(c) This AD applies to Boeing Model 747–
100, 747–100B, 747–200B, 747–200C, 747–
200F, 747–300, 747SR, and 747SP series
airplanes, certificated in any category; as
identified in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin
747–53A2748, dated May 9, 2008.
Inspection for Acceptable External Skin
Doublers
(g) For airplanes identified as Group 1,
Configuration 2, in Boeing Alert Service
Bulletin 747–53A2748, dated May 9, 2008: At
the latest of the times specified in paragraphs
(g)(1), (g)(2), and (g)(3) of this AD, do an
external general visual inspection to
determine if acceptable external skin
doublers are installed at the left- and rightside S–6 lap splices, in accordance with Part
1 of the alert service bulletin.
(1) Prior to the accumulation of 10,000
total flight cycles.
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Alternative Methods of Compliance
(AMOCs)
(k)(1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft
Certification Office, FAA, ATTN: Ivan Li,
Aerospace Engineer, Airframe Branch, ANM–
120S, FAA, Seattle Aircraft Certification
Office, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton,
Washington 98057–3356; telephone (425)
917–6437; fax (425) 917–6590; has the
authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if
requested using the procedures found in 14
CFR 39.19.
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(2) To request a different method of
compliance or a different compliance time
for this AD, follow the procedures in 14 CFR
39.19. Before using any approved AMOC on
any airplane to which the AMOC applies,
notify your appropriate principal inspector
(PI) in the FAA Flight Standards District
Office (FSDO), or lacking a PI, your local
FSDO.
(3) An AMOC that provides an acceptable
level of safety may be used for any repair
required by this AD, if it is approved by an
Authorized Representative for the Boeing
Commercial Airplanes Delegation Option
Authorization Organization who has been
authorized by the Manager, Seattle ACO, to
make those findings. For a repair method to
be approved, the repair must meet the
certification basis of the airplane and the
approval must specifically refer to this AD.
Material Incorporated by Reference
(l) You must use Boeing Alert Service
Bulletin 747–53A2748, dated May 9, 2008, to
do the actions required by this AD, unless the
AD specifies otherwise.
(1) The Director of the Federal Register
approved the incorporation by reference of
this service information under 5 U.S.C.
552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.
(2) For service information identified in
this AD, contact Boeing Commercial
Airplanes, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle,
Washington 98124–2207.
(3) You may review copies of the service
information incorporated by reference at the
FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601
Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington; or at
the National Archives and Records
Administration (NARA). For information on
the availability of this material at NARA, call
202–741–6030, or go to: https://
www.archives.gov/federal_register/
code_of_federal_regulations/
ibr_locations.html.
Issued in Renton, Washington, on May 13,
2008.
Ali Bahrami,
Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate,
Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. E8–11330 Filed 5–19–08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–13–P
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION
17 CFR Part 270
[Release No. IC–28266; File No. S7–37–04]
RIN 3235–AJ31
Definition of Eligible Portfolio
Company Under the Investment
Company Act of 1940
Securities and Exchange
Commission (the ‘‘Commission’’).
ACTION: Final rule.
AGENCY:
SUMMARY: The Commission is adopting
an amendment to a rule under the
Investment Company Act of 1940 to
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Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 98 / Tuesday, May 20, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
more closely align the definition of
eligible portfolio company, and the
investment activities of business
development companies (‘‘BDCs’’), with
the purpose that Congress intended. The
amendment expands the definition of
eligible portfolio company to include
certain companies that list their
securities on a national securities
exchange.
DATES: Effective Date: July 21, 2008.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Rochelle Kauffman Plesset, Senior
Counsel, Office of Chief Counsel,
Division of Investment Management,
(202) 551–6840, Securities and
Exchange Commission, 100 F Street,
NE., Washington, DC 20549–5030.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The
Commission today is adopting
amendments to Rule 2a–46 [17 CFR
270.2a–46] under the Investment
Company Act of 1940 [15 U.S.C. 80a]. 1
Table of Contents
I. Executive Summary
II. Background
III. Discussion
A. Rule 2a–46(b)
B. Use of Standard Based on Market
Capitalization
C. Dollar Level of Standard
IV. Cost-Benefit Analysis
V. Consideration of Promotion of Efficiency,
Competition and Capital Formation
VI. Paperwork Reduction Act
VII. Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
VIII. Statutory Authority
Text of Rule
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I. Executive Summary
A BDC is a closed-end investment
company that Congress established for
the purpose of making capital more
readily available to certain types of
companies. Under the Investment
Company Act (‘‘Investment Company
Act’’ or ‘‘Act’’), a BDC must invest at
least 70 percent of its assets in ‘‘eligible
portfolio company’’ securities and
certain other securities. Rule 2a–46
defines the term eligible portfolio
company to include any company
whose securities are not listed on a
national securities exchange
(‘‘Exchange’’). 2 When we adopted Rule
2a–46 in 2006, we also requested
comment on whether to further expand
the definition to include Exchangelisted companies that have (i) less than
$75 million in public float or (ii) less
1 The amendments were proposed in Definition
of Eligible Portfolio Company under the Investment
Company Act of 1940, Investment Company Act
Release No. 27539 (Oct. 25, 2006) [71 FR 64093
(Oct. 31, 2006)] (‘‘Reproposing Release’’).
2 Definition of Eligible Portfolio Company under
the Investment Company Act of 1940, Investment
Company Act Release No. 27538 (Oct. 25, 2006) [71
FR 64086 (Oct. 31, 2006)] (‘‘Adopting Release’’).
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than $150 million in market
capitalization or less than $250 million
in market capitalization. 3 Today we are
amending Rule 2a–46 to expand the
definition of eligible portfolio company
to include Exchange-listed companies
that have less than $250 million in
market capitalization.
II. Background
Congress established BDCs as a new
category of closed-end investment
companies when it enacted the Small
Business Investment Incentive Act
(‘‘SBIIA’’) in 1980. 4 Congress intended
that BDCs would make capital more
readily available to certain types of
companies. 5 To accomplish this
purpose, the Investment Company Act
generally prohibits a BDC from making
any investment unless, at the time of the
investment, at least 70 percent of its
total assets (‘‘70% basket’’) are invested
in securities of certain specific types of
companies, including ‘‘eligible portfolio
companies.’’ 6
The Investment Company Act defines
eligible portfolio company to include
any domestic operating company 7 that
does not have a class of securities with
respect to which a member of an
Exchange, broker, or dealer may extend
margin credit pursuant to rules
promulgated by the Federal Reserve
3 See
Reproposing Release, supra note 1.
Business Investment Incentive Act of
1980, Public Law No. 96–477, 94 Stat. 2274 (1980)
(codified at scattered sections of the United States
Code).
5 See generally H.R. Rep. No. 1341, 96th Cong.,
2d Sess. 21 (1980) (‘‘House Report’’).
6 See Section 2(a)(46) of the Investment Company
Act (statutory definition of eligible portfolio
company) [15 U.S.C. 80a–2(a)(46)]. See also Section
55(a) of the Investment Company Act (regulating
the activities of BDCs) [15 U.S.C. 80a–54(a)]. Among
other things, the 70% basket may include securities
of eligible portfolio companies purchased in
transactions not involving any public offering,
securities of eligible portfolio companies already
controlled by the BDC without regard to the nature
of the offering, and securities of certain financially
distressed companies that do not meet the
definition of eligible portfolio company and that are
purchased in transactions not involving any public
offering. See Section 55(a).
7 Section 2(a)(46) of the Investment Company Act
defines eligible portfolio company to include any
company that satisfies the criteria set forth in each
of Section 2(a)(46)(A) and Section 2(a)(46)(B) in
addition to one of the three criteria set forth in
Section 2(a)(46)(C). Section 2(a)(46)(A) defines
eligible portfolio company to include any company
organized under the laws of, and with its principal
place of business in, one or more states of the
United States. Section 2(a)(46)(B) of the Investment
Company Act generally excludes from the
definition of eligible portfolio company any
company that meets the definition of investment
company under Section 3 of the Investment
Company Act, or that is excluded from the
definition of investment company by Section 3(c)
of the Act, but includes as an eligible portfolio
company any small BDC that is licensed by the
Small Business Administration and that is a
wholly-owned subsidiary of a BDC.
4 Small
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Board under Section 7 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (‘‘Exchange
Act’’). 8 At the time that Section 2(a)(46)
was adopted, Congress generally
perceived the Federal Reserve Board’s
definition of ‘‘margin security’’ to be a
‘‘rational and objective test for
determining whether an issuer has
ready access to the securities
markets.’’ 9 Nevertheless, Congress
recognized that the definition of eligible
portfolio company as adopted, and, in
particular, the definition’s reliance on
the Federal Reserve Board’s margin
rules, might need to be adjusted in the
future. 10 Accordingly, Congress
specifically gave the Commission
rulemaking authority under Section
2(a)(46)(C)(iv) of the Investment
Company Act to expand the definition
of eligible portfolio company. 11
Since 1980, the Federal Reserve Board
has periodically amended its definition
of margin security to increase the types
of securities that would fall within that
definition under its rules. In 1998, for
reasons unrelated to small business
capital formation, the Federal Reserve
Board amended its definition of margin
8 Section 2(a)(46)(C)(i). See also Section
2(a)(46)(C)(ii) (defines eligible portfolio company to
include companies that are controlled by the
investing BDC or certain of its affiliates); Section
2(a)(46)(C)(iii) (defines eligible portfolio company
to include certain very small companies).
9 House Report at 31. The House Report also
indicated that Section 2(a)(46)(C)(i) was ‘‘intended
to cover companies which are unable to borrow
money through conventional sources or which do
not have ready access to the public capital
markets.’’ Id. at 30. In 1980, the Federal Reserve
Board periodically published lists of each company
that had a class of securities that was marginable
under its rules. Companies that were not listed as
having a class of marginable securities qualified as
eligible portfolio companies.
10 See House Report at 31.
11 Under Section 2(a)(46)(C)(iv), the term eligible
portfolio company includes any issuer that, in
addition to meeting the requirements of Sections
2(a)(46)(A) and (B), ‘‘meets such other criteria as the
Commission may, by rule, establish as consistent
with the public interest, the protection of investors,
and the purposes fairly intended by the policy and
provisions of [the Act].’’ See House Report at 23
(‘‘* * * the Commission is given rulemaking
authority to expand the class of eligible portfolio
companies, following certain specific standards.’’).
The legislative history of the SBIIA also makes clear
that the intent of this provision ‘‘is to enable the
Commission through the administrative process to
broaden, if appropriate, the category of eligible
portfolio company.’’ Congress also noted its
expectation that ‘‘the Commission would institute
[rulemaking] proceedings to consider whether the
definition of eligible portfolio company can be
expanded, consistent with the purpose of the
legislation, to increase the flow of capital to small,
developing businesses or financially troubled
businesses.’’ See House Report at 31. In providing
the Commission with rulemaking authority,
Congress noted ‘‘[a]mong the objective factors
which the Commission may consider in
[rulemaking] proceedings are the size of such
companies, the extent of their public ownership,
and their operating history as going concerns and
public companies.’’ Id.
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security to include all equity securities
that trade on an Exchange or are listed
on the NASDAQ Stock Market, and
most debt securities. This amendment
had the result of significantly reducing
the companies that qualify as eligible
portfolio companies under Section
2(a)(46) of the Investment Company
Act. 12
In 2006, we adopted two rules, Rules
2a–46 and 55a–1 under the Act, to
address the impact of the Federal
Reserve Board’s amendment to its
definition of margin security on the
definition of eligible portfolio
company. 13 Rule 2a–46 defines eligible
portfolio company to include all
domestic operating companies 14 whose
securities are not listed on an
Exchange. 15 Rule 55a–1 conditionally
permits a BDC to continue to invest in
any company that qualified as an
eligible portfolio company under Rule
2a–46 when the BDC made its initial
investment(s) in it, but that
subsequently does not meet the
definition of eligible portfolio company
because it no longer meets the
requirements of that rule. 16
When we adopted Rules 2a–46 and
55a–1, we also proposed to amend Rule
2a–46 to expand the definition of
eligible portfolio company to include
certain public domestic operating
companies that list their securities on an
Exchange. 17 This proposal was
designed to address concerns that part
of the rule (proposed in 2004, but not
adopted 18) would be unworkable and
too narrow. 19
In the Reproposing Release, we
requested comment on alternatives that
would expand the definition of eligible
portfolio company to include domestic
12 Securities Credit Transactions; Borrowing By
Brokers and Dealers, 63 FR 2805 (1998) (adopting
final rule amendment). As a result of these
amendments, companies that would have been
considered eligible portfolio companies in 1980
may no longer meet that definition. See Definition
of Eligible Portfolio Company under the Investment
Company Act of 1940, Investment Company Act
Release No. 26647 (Nov. 1, 2004) [69 FR 64815
(Nov. 8, 2004)] (‘‘2004 Proposing Release’’) at
nn.19–24.
13 See Adopting Release, supra note 2.
14 Rule 2a–46 incorporates the provisions of
Sections 2(a)(46)(A) and (B). See supra note 7.
15 17 CFR 270.2a–46.
16 17 CFR 270.55a–1.
17 See Reproposing Release, supra note 1.
18 See 2004 Proposing Release, supra note 12
(proposed a definition of eligible portfolio company
that would have included certain financiallytroubled Exchange-listed companies).
19 For example, some commenters had stated that
the proposed rule would not include some small
companies that list their securities on an Exchange
but that nevertheless may have difficulties
accessing conventional sources of capital and
raising additional capital on the public markets. See
Reproposing Release, supra note 1 at n.12 and
accompanying text.
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operating companies with securities
listed on an Exchange. We asked
whether we should expand the
definition to include any such company
with (i) a public float of less than $75
million or (ii) market capitalization of
less than $150 million or market
capitalization of less than $250
million. 20 We explained that the $75
million public float standard
incorporates the size-based standard
used in Form S–3 and Rule 12b–2
which the Commission has used to
delineate between small, unseasoned
companies, and larger seasoned
companies whose securities are listed
on an Exchange. 21 We explained that
the market capitalization alternatives
are similar to definitions of ‘‘micro-cap’’
company used generally by market
participants. 22 We also noted that some
who had commented on Rule 2a–46
when it was initially proposed had
stated that companies with market
capitalizations in this range generally
have limited (if any) analyst coverage,
have lower trading volume and are
owned by fewer institutional investors
than companies with higher market
capitalizations. 23 These commenters
concluded that such companies have
difficulty accessing the public capital
markets. 24
We received letters from fifteen
commenters (including eight BDCs and
one legal counsel to BDCs). 25 Fourteen
commenters favored the $250 million
market capitalization standard. 26
20 See
Reproposing Release, supra note 1.
e.g., Form S–3 [17 CFR 239.13]; Rule 12b–
2 under the Exchange Act [17 CFR 240.12b–2].
22 See Reproposing Release, supra note 1 at
nn.38–40 and accompanying text.
23 Id. at nn.34–43 and accompanying text.
24 E.g., comments of Williams & Jensen (Feb. 17,
2006); comments of Representatives Sue Kelly and
´
Nydia Velaszquez (Jan. 5, 2005) (commenting on the
2004 Proposing Release).
25 The eight BDCs were Allied Capital Corp.,
American Capital Strategies Ltd., Apollo Investment
Corp., Ares Capital Corp., Gladstone Management,
Harris & Harris Group, Inc., MCG Capital Corp. and
NGP Capital Resources Company. We also received
comments from two trade associations (The
Financial Roundtable and U.S. Chamber of
Commerce), one legal counsel to BDCs (Williams &
Jensen), one investment banker (Ferghana Partners
Inc.), one investment adviser (ThinkEquity Partners
LLC) and two individuals. These letters are
available for inspection in the Commission’s Public
Reference Room at 100 F Street, NE., Washington,
DC 20549 (File No. S7–37–04), and may be viewed
at https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73704.shtml
#27539.
26 One commenter did not address this issue.
Comments of Kathryn Ellis (Nov. 26, 2006). In
addition, commenters generally disagreed with the
adoption of a public float standard. See infra
Section III.B.
Two commenters also suggested that we include
a provision that would in the future adjust the
standard that we adopt today to reflect inflation.
Comments of American Capital Strategies Ltd. (Dec.
24, 2006); comments of Apollo Investment Corp.
21 See,
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Several commenters specifically noted
that companies meeting such a standard
‘‘often have difficulty accessing
traditional capital sources.’’ 27
Commenters also stated that the $250
million market capitalization standard
is similar to what most market
participants use to identify micro-cap
companies, and that these companies
have less analyst coverage, institutional
ownership and lower trading volume. 28
In addition, in support of the $250
million market capitalization standard,
one commenter provided information
about public companies that have
received financing over the past several
years and the types of financing that
they have received. 29 Specifically, the
commenter submitted information
regarding public companies that were
able to access the public markets, either
by engaging in initial public offerings or
by issuing follow-on equity and debt
financing. 30 The commenter also
provided information regarding the
public companies that had obtained
capital through private investment
transactions. 31 In addition, the
commenter provided information
regarding the average institutional
leveraged loan size and average high
yield issuance size. 32 Based on this
information, the commenter concluded
that companies with less than $250
million market capitalization are having
difficulty accessing traditional capital
sources. 33 Accordingly, the commenter
urged the Commission to adopt the $250
(Jan. 2, 2007). We did not propose such a provision
and therefore have not included it in Rule 2a–46.
27 See, e.g., comments of Apollo Investment Corp.
(Jan. 2, 2007); comments of Gladstone Management
(Nov. 2, 2006). See also comments of Allied Capital
Management (Dec. 21, 2006) (‘‘Public companies
with a market capitalization of up to $250 million
. . . often have trouble accessing the traditional
capital markets despite the fact that their shares are
listed on an exchange.’’).
28 See, e.g., comments of Gladstone Management
(Nov. 2, 2006); comments of American Capital
Strategies Ltd. (Dec. 24, 2006); comments of Apollo
Investment Corp. (Jan. 2, 2007).
29 Comments of Williams & Jensen (Apr. 19, 2007,
May 30, 2007). This commenter also provided
information regarding the investment practices of
BDCs. The commenter, focusing on five of the
largest BDCs, provided a description of each BDC’s
investment focus, the number of companies in each
BDC’s portfolio, and the number of individual
investments each BDC made that was greater than
$100 million. The commenter also provided the
average revenue of the portfolio companies that are
held by four BDCs. Comments of Williams & Jensen
(May 30, 2007).
30 Comments of Williams & Jensen (Apr. 19,
2007).
31 Comments of Williams & Jensen (May 30,
2007).
32 Id.
33 Comments of Williams & Jensen (Apr. 19, 2007,
May 30, 2007).
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million market capitalization
standard. 34
III. Discussion
A. Rule 2a–46(b)
After carefully considering the
comments received in response to both
the Reproposing Release and the 2004
Proposing Release, we are amending
Rule 2a–46 to include new paragraph
(b). 35 Rule 2a–46(b) expands the
definition of eligible portfolio company
to include any domestic operating
company that has a class of securities
listed on an Exchange and that has a
market capitalization 36 of less than
$250 million (calculated using the price
at which the company’s common equity
is last sold, or the average of the bid and
asked prices of the company’s common
equity, in the principal market for such
common equity) on any day in the 60day period immediately before the
BDC’s acquisition of its securities. 37 We
believe that the new rule is consistent
with the public interest, the protection
of investors and the purposes fairly
intended by the policy and provisions of
the Investment Company Act.
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B. Use of Standard Based on Market
Capitalization
As discussed above, one of the
alternatives that we proposed used a
public float standard, and the options
proposed in the other alternative used a
market capitalization standard. 38 We
have decided to adopt a market
capitalization standard for the reasons
discussed below. For purposes of Rule
2a–46(b), market capitalization is the
aggregate value of a company’s
outstanding voting and non-voting
equity securities. 39 In contrast, a
company’s public float is a company’s
market capitalization minus the
aggregate market value of common
34 Comments of Williams & Jensen (Feb. 17, 2006,
Apr. 19, 2007, May 30, 2007).
35 We are also designating the current text of Rule
2a–46 as paragraph (a) of the rule.
36 A company’s market capitalization for
purposes of the rule is the aggregate market value
of the company’s outstanding voting and non-voting
common equity securities. See, e.g., Reproposing
Release, supra note 1 at n.16.
37 Rule 2a–46(b). This method of calculating
market capitalization was used in both of the
proposed market capitalization alternatives in the
reproposal. See Reproposing Release, supra note 1
at n.16. We received no comment on this method,
and we are adopting it as proposed.
We note that the method of calculating market
capitalization is stated solely for purposes of
determining a company’s qualification as an eligible
portfolio company. A BDC is required to value its
interests in portfolio companies for purposes of
calculating the BDC’s net asset value consistent
with Section 2(a)(41) of the Investment Company
Act.
38 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
39 See supra note 36.
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equity held by the company’s
affiliates. 40
We requested comment on whether it
would be burdensome for a BDC to
determine a company’s eligible portfolio
company status if the standard is based
on public float rather than market
capitalization. 41 Adopting a public float
standard in Rule 2a–46(b) would have
imposed burdens that are not present in
other Commission rules that incorporate
such a standard. These other
Commission rules typically are rules in
which a company is responsible for
calculating its own public float to
determine its eligibility in connection
with certain registration or reporting
requirements. 42 Section 55 of the
Investment Company Act, however,
effectively requires a BDC to determine
whether a target company qualifies as
an eligible portfolio company before
investing in it as part of the BDC’s 70%
basket. 43 Consequently it is the BDC,
rather than the target company, that
must determine whether a target
company meets the definition of eligible
portfolio company under Rule 2a–46(b).
Accordingly, although several
commenters stated that both public float
and market capitalization are good
indicators of whether a company is
small and unseasoned, all commenters
who addressed this issue preferred a
market capitalization standard. 44
Commenters stated that information
about a company’s market capitalization
is readily available through third-party
sources, while information about a
company’s public float is not. 45
Commenters generally explained that, in
order for a BDC to calculate a company’s
public float, as proposed, it would have
to determine the number of shares
owned by the company’s affiliates,
which is information not readily
available on a current basis through
third-party sources. 46 The BDC
40 See, e.g., Reproposing Release, supra note 1 at
n.16.
41 Id. at text following n.51.
42 See supra note 21.
43 Section 55(a) of the Investment Company Act.
44 See, e.g., comments of American Capital
Strategies Ltd. (Dec. 24, 2006); comments of
Gladstone Management (Nov. 2, 2006); comments of
Apollo Investment Corp. (Jan. 3, 2007).
45 See, e.g., id.
46 See, e.g., comments of American Capital
Strategies Ltd. (Dec. 24, 2006); comments of Ares
Capital Corp. (Jan. 2, 2007). Although Exchange Act
reporting companies are required to disclose their
public float on the cover of Form 10–K [17 CFR
249.310], the form requires a filer to disclose its
public float as of the last business day of the filer’s
most recently completed second fiscal quarter.
Because Rule 2a–46(b) defines an eligible portfolio
company to be a company that meets the requisite
size standard on any day in the 60-day period
immediately before the BDC’s acquisition of the
company’s securities, the public float information
on a company’s Form 10–K always would have
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therefore would have to communicate
with possible target companies to
determine whether they would qualify
under the definition of eligible portfolio
company before making any investment
decision.
Commenters argued that requiring
BDCs to determine a company’s public
float within the requirements of the
proposed rule would place an
unnecessary burden on BDCs and
thereby impede appropriate investment
activity. 47 In contrast, under the
adopted market capitalization standard,
a BDC may use information obtained
from third parties to assist it in
determining whether a possible
investment target is an eligible portfolio
company. In this regard, we note that
under the adopted market capitalization
standard, a BDC may use information
obtained from independent third parties
to assist it in determining whether a
possible target company is an eligible
portfolio company without
communicating with the target company
directly. In light of these burdens and
the general public availability of
information regarding a company’s
market capitalization, we agree with
commenters that a market capitalization
standard is appropriate for purposes of
Rule 2a–46.
C. Dollar Level of Standard
We are adopting new Rule 2a–46(b) to
define eligible portfolio company to
include any company that is listed on
an Exchange with market capitalization
of less than $250 million. The new
standard, consistent with legislative
intent, broadens the definition of
eligible portfolio company. 48 We
estimate that, based on January 31, 2008
data, 6,062 companies, representing
61.3% (6,062/9,883) of all public
domestic operating companies, qualify
as eligible portfolio companies under
Rule 2a–46(a). We further estimate that
1,649 Exchange-listed companies
qualify as eligible portfolio companies
under Rule 2a–46(b). 49 Accordingly, we
estimate that 7,711 companies,
representing 78% (7,711/9,883) of all
public domestic operating companies
been outdated for purposes of the proposed public
float alternative.
47 See, e.g., comments of American Capital
Strategies Ltd. (Dec. 24, 2006).
48 Supra note 11. As discussed above, the $250
million market capitalization standard is a level
similar to what most market participants generally
view to be ‘‘micro-cap’’ companies, a term used to
identify small public companies. See Reproposing
Release, supra note 1 at nn.38–40 and
accompanying text.
49 We note that our estimates reflect only
companies with less than $250 million market
capitalization whose securities are listed on
Nasdaq, the New York Stock Exchange (‘‘NYSE’’)
and the American Stock Exchange (‘‘Amex’’).
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qualify as eligible portfolio companies
under Rule 2a–46 as amended.
In the Reproposing Release, we noted
a general concern raised by commenters
in response to the 2004 Proposing
Release 50 that companies with market
capitalization up to $300 million are
followed by fewer analysts, have lower
institutional ownership and have lower
trading volume than companies at
higher levels of market capitalization. 51
These commenters concluded that
companies having market capitalization
below that amount may have more
difficulty accessing public capital. We
generally agreed that there may be some
correlation between the size of a
company, based on these factors, and
the ability of a company to access public
capital. 52 We specifically requested
comment on whether any of the
alternative standards would better align
the definition of eligible portfolio
company with the purpose that
Congress intended when it adopted the
SBIIA.
Commenters universally favored the
$250 million market capitalization
standard. Commenters argued that
companies with market capitalization of
less than $250 million often have
difficulty accessing traditional forms of
capital and that adoption of the
standard thus would be consistent with
Congressional intent. 53 One commenter
also provided information regarding the
limited number of follow-on offerings of
equity and debt securities by Exchangelisted companies and stated that this
information ‘‘clearly demonstrates that
the vast majority of companies with
market capitalizations of $250 million
or less * * * have significantly limited
access’’ to the public equity and debt
markets. 54 This commenter also argued
that market participants that provide
public capital are not servicing the
needs of these companies. 55
Most commenters responding to the
alternatives proposed in the
Reproposing Release also argued that
companies with less than $250 million
50 Supra
note 12.
of Representatives Sue Kelly and
´
Nydia Velazquez at n.12 (Jan. 5, 2005); comments
of Williams & Jensen (Feb. 17, 2006). These
commenters also referred to analysis prepared by
our Office of Economic Affairs (‘‘OEA’’) in
connection with Securities Offering Reform. See
memorandum dated December 3, 2004 (‘‘OEA
Memorandum’’) attached to comments of Williams
& Jensen (Feb. 17, 2006), infra note 58.
52 See Reproposing Release, supra note 1 at text
following n.36.
53 E.g., comments of Allied Capital Management
(Dec. 21, 2006); comments of Apollo Investment
Corp. (Jan. 2, 2007).
54 See comments of Williams & Jensen (Apr. 19,
2007).
55 Comments of Williams & Jensen (May 30,
2007).
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51 Comments
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market capitalization have difficulty
accessing public capital because
generally these companies are followed
by fewer analysts, have lower
institutional ownership and lower
trading volume than larger
companies. 56 One commenter
specifically noted that companies with
less than $250 million market
capitalization ‘‘have spotty analyst
coverage at best, * * * few or no
institutional investors, and * * * thin
trading volumes’’ and that ‘‘these are
characteristics of companies that would
not in today’s market have ready access
to public capital.’’ 57 This commenter
referred to information developed by
our Office of Economic Analysis
(‘‘OEA’’) about those factors that were
prepared for purposes other than this
rulemaking. 58
As we stated in the Reproposing
Release, we believe that there is some
correlation between analyst coverage,
institutional ownership and trading
volume and the ability of a company to
access public capital. 59 Based on the
comments we received, and our review
of those factors with respect to
companies with less than $250 million
market capitalization, we believe that a
distinction can be made with respect to
a company’s ability to access public
capital at $250 million market
capitalization. OEA has considered this
information and determined that fewer
than 50% of companies with market
capitalizations of less than $250 million
are followed by more than two analysts
and that these companies generally have
lower institutional ownership and are
56 See, e.g., comments of Gladstone Management
(Nov. 2, 2006); comments of Apollo Investment
Corp. (Jan. 2, 2007); comments of Ares Capital Corp.
(Jan. 2, 2007).
57 Comments of Williams & Jensen (Apr. 19,
2007).
58 The commenter had attached to its comment
letter statistics that were prepared in connection
with the Final Report of the Advisory Committee
on Smaller Public Companies. See Background
Statistics: Market Capitalization & Revenue of
Public Companies, August 1, 2005, at Table 7
(Analyst Coverage and Institutional Holdings by
Market Capitalization), attached to comments of
Williams & Jensen (Apr. 19, 2007). This commenter
had attached to a prior comment letter an earlier
memorandum prepared by OEA that sets forth data
regarding analyst coverage, institutional ownership
and average daily trading for publicly traded
companies between 1997 and 2003. See OEA
Memorandum dated December 3, 2004 attached to
comments of Williams & Jensen (Feb. 17, 2006)
(exhibit entitled ‘‘SEC Data Demonstrates Lack of
Market Following for Companies with Market
Capitalizations of $300 million or Less’’). OEA
prepared this memorandum in connection with the
Securities Offering Reform rulemaking. See
Securities Offering Reform, Securities Act Release
No. 8591 (July 19, 2005) [70 FR 44722 (Aug. 3,
2005)].
59 See Reproposing Release, supra note 1 at n.37
and accompanying text.
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more thinly traded than larger
companies.
Moreover, in the Reproposing Release
we requested comment on whether
adoption of a $250 million market
capitalization standard would result in
BDCs focusing their investment
activities in companies at the higher end
of the standard to the detriment of
smaller companies. 60 Commenters
responded that adoption of a $250
million market capitalization standard
would not have this result, with some
arguing further that larger companies do
not necessarily present a more attractive
investment in comparison to smaller
companies. 61 Commenters also argued
that historically, BDCs have not
invested in larger non-public companies
at the expense of smaller non-public
companies, and that there is no reason
to suggest that this would occur in the
context of public companies. 62 In light
of these comments, we are persuaded
that our adoption of the $250 million
market capitalization standard is not
likely to result in BDCs focusing their
investment activity on larger companies
to the detriment of smaller companies.
Accordingly, we conclude that
adoption of the $250 million market
capitalization standard is an appropriate
standard for purposes of the amended
rule and we believe that it is consistent
with the public interest, the protection
of investors and the purposes fairly
intended by the policies and provisions
of the Investment Company Act. 63
60 See id. at n.47 and accompanying text. We
requested comment on this issue in response to a
comment made by one commenter to the 2004
Proposing Release. This commenter raised the
concern that BDCs might not provide financing for
smaller Exchange-listed companies if the
Commission adopts a standard higher than $100
million market capitalization. See comments of
Capital Southwest Corp. (Dec. 28, 2004).
61 See, e.g., comments of MCG Capital Corp. (Dec.
27, 2006); comments of American Capital Strategies
Ltd. (Dec. 24, 2006).
62 See comments of Harris & Harris Group (Jan.
3, 2007); comments of ThinkEquity Partners LLC
(Dec. 6, 2006).
63 We are persuaded that our adoption of the
$250 million market capitalization standard is not
inconsistent with our other rules that distinguish
between smaller and larger companies because of
the different purposes of these rules. For example,
Form S–3 incorporates a $75 million public float
standard (in addition to other factors) to identify
those companies about which sufficient information
is publicly available to allow them to take
advantage of our integrated disclosure system. See
Revisions to the Eligibility Requirements for
Primary Securities Offerings on Forms S–3 and F–
3, Securities Act Release No. 8878 (Dec. 19, 2007)
[72 FR 73534 (Dec. 27, 2007)]; Simplification of
Registration for Primary Securities Offerings,
Securities Act Release No. 6943 (July 16, 1992) [57
FR 32461 (July 22, 1992)]. In contrast, Rule 2a–46(b)
incorporates a $250 million market capitalization
standard to identify companies that are having
difficulty accessing public capital and may benefit
from greater access to BDC financing.
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jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES
IV. Cost-Benefit Analysis
We are sensitive to the costs and
benefits that result from our rules. In the
Reproposing Release we requested
public comment and specific data
regarding the costs and benefits of
reproposed Rule 2a–46(b). As discussed
below, we received one comment
regarding the Commission’s estimate of
the companies that would benefit from
the reproposed rule. 64
A. Benefits
Rule 2a–46(b) more closely aligns the
definition of eligible portfolio company,
and the investment activities of BDCs,
with the purpose that Congress
intended. Specifically, Rule 2a–46(b)
expands the definition of eligible
portfolio company to include any
domestic operating company with a
class of securities listed on an Exchange
that has a market capitalization of less
than $250 million.
Many public companies that are
included as eligible portfolio companies
under Rule 2a–46(b) may need capital
for continued development and growth,
but, notwithstanding that their
securities are listed on an Exchange,
may find it difficult to raise capital
through additional offerings or borrow
money through other sources. By
amending the definition of eligible
portfolio company to include these
companies, such companies will benefit
because of the expanded sources of
capital from which the companies may
seek to obtain financing. Increased
competition among capital providers
will benefit shareholders of companies
seeking capital.
Rule 2a–46(b) also benefits BDCs by
expanding the universe of investments
that BDCs may include as part of their
70% basket. This will allow BDCs to
make additional investments to
companies that qualify as eligible
portfolio companies under the rule,
which in turn could benefit BDC
shareholders. Rule 2a–46(b) also
benefits BDCs by addressing the
uncertainty caused by changes in the
margin rules in the operation of BDCs.
In the Reproposing Release, OEA
estimated, using June 30, 2006 data, that
there were a total of 1,562 domestic
operating companies whose securities
were listed on Nasdaq, the NYSE and
Amex that have a market capitalization
of less than $250 million. At that time
OEA estimated that 6,041 domestic
operating companies that qualified as
eligible portfolio companies under Rule
2a–46 as initially adopted. Accordingly,
OEA calculated that 7,603 companies,
64 Comments of Williams & Jensen (Apr. 19,
2007).
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representing 77.2% (7,603/9,845 65) of
public domestic operating companies,
would qualify as eligible portfolio
companies if the $250 million market
capitalization standard was adopted.
Using January 31, 2008 data, OEA
estimates that there were a total of 1,649
domestic operating companies whose
securities were listed on Nasdaq, the
NYSE and the Amex that have a market
capitalization of less than $250 million.
OEA further estimates that
approximately 6,062 companies qualify
as eligible portfolio companies under
Rule 2a–46, as initially adopted (now
Rule 2a–46(a)). Accordingly, OEA
calculates that 7,711 companies,
representing 78% percent (7,711/
9,883 66) of public domestic operating
companies, qualify as eligible portfolio
companies under amended Rule 2a–46.
OEA reached its estimates by first
calculating the number of companies
whose securities were listed on Nasdaq,
the NYSE and the Amex. OEA then
deducted from this estimate all foreign
companies, investment companies and
companies that are excluded from the
definition of investment company by
Section 3(c) of the Investment Company
Act (because both Section 2(a)(46) of the
Investment Company Act and Rule 2a–
46 exclude these types of companies
from the definition of eligible portfolio
company), and corrected for cases
where individual companies had
multiple classes of securities listed.
OEA then determined the number of
companies that had a market
capitalization of less than $250
million. 67 Using the same methodology,
OEA determined the number of
companies that qualify as eligible
portfolio companies under Rule 2a–
46(a). 68 OEA then calculated the total
number of eligible portfolio companies
and the percentage of the total public
domestic operating companies that
would qualify as eligible portfolio
companies under amended Rule 2a–
46. 69
As noted above, one commenter
stated that the Reproposing Release
overstated the percentage of companies
65 See
infra note 69.
66 Id.
67 See
supra note 49.
Adopting Release, supra note 2 at text
preceding n.31.
69 OEA estimated the total number of public
domestic operating companies by calculating the
number of companies whose securities were listed
on Nasdaq, the NYSE and the Amex, in addition to
those companies whose securities were trading
through the over-the-counter bulletin board and on
Pink Sheets LLC, correcting these figures for cases
where individual companies had multiple classes of
securities listed, and then removing from these
figures foreign companies, investment companies,
and companies that are excluded from the
definition of investment company by Section 3(c).
68 See
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29049
that would benefit under Rule 2a–46, as
amended by the reproposed rule. 70 The
commenter noted, however, that
regardless of whether or not the
Commission overstated the percentage
of companies, ‘‘the percentage in and of
itself adds little analytical weight in
describing which public companies
need access to capital. * * *’’ The
commenter concluded that ‘‘we believe
that there is no precise percentage of
public companies that can or should be
targeted. * * *’’ 71 While the
commenter agreed that foreign
companies, investment companies and
most companies that are excluded from
the definition of investment company
by Section 3(c) of the Investment
Company Act are excluded from
qualifying as eligible portfolio
companies under the Investment
Company Act, the commenter suggested
that these companies should still be
included as part of the total number of
public companies. Thus, the commenter
suggested that the benefits of the rule
should be calculated by comparing the
total number of companies that would
be eligible portfolio companies under
the rule to the total number of public
companies.
As discussed previously, Section
2(a)(46) excludes from the definition of
eligible portfolio companies foreign
companies, investment companies and
most companies that are excluded from
the definition of investment company
by Section 3(c). Therefore, in
determining the benefits of Rule 2a–46
as amended for purposes of this
analysis, we believe that it is
appropriate to compare the number of
companies that meet the definition of
eligible portfolio company under the
rule with the number of companies that
are not statutorily precluded from being
treated as eligible portfolio companies.
This commenter also argued that
public companies listed on the OTC
Bulletin Board with market
capitalizations of between $0 and $25
million should be excluded from OEA’s
calculations. 72 The commenter
explained that although these
companies qualify as eligible portfolio
companies, ‘‘they are not likely to seek
or be seriously considered appropriate
investments for a BDC.’’ 73 OEA’s
calculations are intended to show the
number of all companies that would fall
within the definition of eligible
portfolio company under Rule 2a–46(b),
however, regardless of whether any
particular company or size of company
70 Williams
& Jensen (Apr. 19, 2007).
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id.
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would be seriously considered by a BDC
for investment purposes. Accordingly,
we have not recalculated the numbers
and percentages stated above to reflect
the commenter’s view.
B. Costs
We received no comments on the
potential costs of our adoption of the
new standard. Although Rule 2a–46(b)
might impose certain administrative
compliance costs on BDCs, it is our
understanding that these costs are
similar to the types of compliance costs
that a BDC currently undertakes when it
invests in a company. Specifically, a
BDC will need to determine, prior to
investing in a company, if the company
has a class of securities listed on an
Exchange and whether that company’s
market capitalization was less than $250
million as of a date within 60 days prior
to the date of the BDC’s investment.
Costs in obtaining this information,
however, will be minimal because
information about the market
capitalization of companies is readily
available from third-party sources.
Finally, we anticipate that Rule 2a–46(b)
will impose only minimal, if any, costs
on portfolio companies.
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V. Consideration of Promotion of
Efficiency, Competition and Capital
Formation
Section 2(c) of the Investment
Company Act mandates that the
Commission, when engaging in
rulemaking that requires it to consider
or determine whether an action is
necessary or appropriate in the public
interest, to consider, in addition to the
protection of investors, whether the
action will promote efficiency,
competition and capital formation. 74 In
the Reproposing Release, we requested
comment on our analysis of the impact
of Rule 2a–46(b) on efficiency,
competition and capital formation. As
discussed in Section II of this Release,
commenters generally supported
expanding the definition to include
Exchange-listed companies with less
than $250 million market capitalization
because of their belief that these
companies often have difficulty
accessing capital. 75 Some commenters
also argued that expanding the rule to
include Exchange-listed companies with
less than $250 million market
capitalization would allow BDCs to
compete with other capital providers,
and that such competition would
benefit shareholders of companies
74 15
U.S.C. 80a–2(c).
75 See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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16:52 May 19, 2008
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seeking capital. 76 We have decided to
amend Rule 2a–46 to expand the
definition of eligible portfolio company
to include Exchange-listed companies
that have a market capitalization of less
than $250 million.
Rule 2a–46(b) is designed to promote
efficiency, competition and capital
formation. Efficiency will be enhanced
because Rule 2a–46(b) expands the
definition of eligible portfolio company
so as to allow BDCs to compete with
other entities that provide capital to
certain companies. Competition for
financing may result in lower cost
capital for current funding needs or may
replace higher cost capital previously
issued, which could potentially allow
companies desiring capital to take on
additional or different investment
projects. Thus, Rule 2a–46(b) will
promote a more efficient allocation of
capital. Rule 2a–46(b) in our view also
will promote efficiency by providing a
workable test for determining whether a
company is an eligible portfolio
company.
We also believe Rule 2a–46(b) will
promote competition. Rule 2a–46(b)
allows BDCs more easily to compete
with other capital providers, and such
competition benefits shareholders of
BDCs, companies receiving the capital
and shareholders of companies
receiving capital. The market for private
equity and debt investments can be
highly competitive. Since their
establishment, BDCs have competed
with various sources of capital,
including private equity funds
(including venture capital funds), hedge
funds, investment banks and other
BDCs, to provide financing to certain
companies. We believe that Rule 2a–
46(b) will encourage such competition.
Such competition also benefits the
qualifying companies in need of capital
and their shareholders because such
companies can more readily consider
BDCs as a source of financing. To the
extent that BDCs provide either
additional or less expensive capital to
these companies, those companies may
be more competitive in the marketplace.
Finally, we believe that Rule 2a–46(b)
may promote capital formation. BDC
investments represent additional capital
to companies. By expanding the
definition of eligible portfolio company,
Rule 2a–46(b) may result in additional
capital investments by BDCs. We
estimate that a total of 1,649 public
domestic operating companies would
qualify as eligible portfolio companies
under Rule 2a–46(b). The rule provides
76 See, e.g., comments of Williams & Jensen (Apr.
19, 2007); comments of Apollo Investment Corp.
(Jan. 2, 2007).
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greater access to public capital by
increasing these companies’ access to
BDC financing.
VI. Paperwork Reduction Act
The Commission has determined that
Rule 2a–46 as amended does not
involve a collection of information
pursuant to the provisions of the
Paperwork Reduction Act [44 U.S.C.
3501 et seq.].
VII. Final Regulatory Flexibility
Analysis
This Final Regulatory Flexibility
Analysis has been prepared in
accordance with 5 U.S.C. 604. It relates
to Rule 2a–46(b) under the Investment
Company Act. An Initial Regulatory
Flexibility Analysis (‘‘IRFA’’) was
prepared in accordance with 5 U.S.C.
603 and was published in the
Reproposing Release. 77
A. Reasons for and Objectives of the
Amendment
As described previously in this
Release, Rule 2a–46(b) more closely
aligns the definition of eligible portfolio
company, and the investment activities
of BDCs, with the purpose that Congress
intended. Specifically, Rule 2a–46(b)
will expand the definition of eligible
portfolio company to include any
domestic operating company with a
class of securities listed on an Exchange
that has a market capitalization of less
than $250 million. These companies
may need BDC financing for continued
growth and development, but,
notwithstanding the fact that their
securities are listed on an Exchange,
may find it difficult to raise additional
capital in new offerings or borrow
money through other conventional
sources.
B. Significant Issues Raised by Public
Comment
When the Commission reproposed
Rule 2a–46(b), comment was requested
on the reproposal and the
accompanying IRFA. None of the
comment letters specifically addressed
the IRFA.
C. Small Entities Subject to the Rule
Rule 2a–46(b) will affect BDCs and
companies that qualify as small entities
under the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
For purposes of the Regulatory
Flexibility Act, a BDC is a small entity
if it, together with other investment
companies in the same group of related
investment companies, has net assets of
$50 million or less as of the end of its
77 Reproposing
VII.
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most recent fiscal year. 78 As of June
2007, there were 73 BDCs, of which 43
were small entities. A company other
than an investment company is a small
entity under the Regulatory Flexibility
Act if it had total assets of $5 million
or less on the last day of its most recent
fiscal year. 79 We estimate there are
approximately 20 Exchange-listed
companies that may be considered small
entities. 80
As discussed in this Release, Rule 2a–
46(b) is intended to benefit certain
companies that need capital for
continued development and growth, but
may be unable to borrow money through
conventional sources despite their
securities being listed on an Exchange.
Rule 2a–46(b) will also benefit BDCs,
including those that are small entities,
by expanding the number of companies
that BDCs may include as part of their
70% basket. Because none of the
comment letters specifically addressed
the IRFA, we continue to believe that
those BDCs and companies that are
small entities for purposes of the
Regulatory Flexibility Act would not be
disproportionately affected by the
amended rule.
D. Reporting, Recordkeeping and Other
Compliance Requirements
Rule 2a–46(b) will not impose any
new reporting or recordkeeping
requirements on BDCs or on companies.
It also will impose only minimal, if any,
compliance requirements on portfolio
companies.
Rule 2a–46(b) will impose minimal
compliance requirements on BDCs,
including small entities. A BDC would
need to determine, prior to investing in
a company, if the company has a class
of securities listed on an Exchange and
whether that company’s market
capitalization was less than $250
million as of a date within 60 days prior
to the date of the BDC’s investment. We
anticipate that the costs associated with
obtaining this information would be
minimal because such information is
readily available from third-party
sources. Furthermore, it is our
understanding that these costs are
similar to the types of compliance costs
78 17
CFR 270.0–10.
CFR 230.157; 17 CFR 240.0–10.
80 We noted in the Reproposing Release that at
that time we calculated that there were
approximately 2,500 companies, other than
investment companies, that may be considered
small entities. See Reproposing Release supra note
1 at text following n.72. This figure inadvertently
included companies whose securities are not listed
on an Exchange. Rule 2a–46(b), however, only
pertains to companies whose securities are listed on
an Exchange. As discussed above, we estimate that
there are only approximately 20 Exchange-listed
companies that may be considered small entities.
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES
79 17
VerDate Aug<31>2005
16:52 May 19, 2008
Jkt 214001
that a BDC currently undertakes when it
invests in an issuer.
E. Commission Action To Minimize
Adverse Impact on Small Entities
The Regulatory Flexibility Act directs
us to consider significant alternatives
that would accomplish our stated
objectives, while minimizing any
significant adverse impact on small
entities. Alternatives in this category
would include: (1) Establishing different
compliance or reporting standards that
take into account the resources available
to small entities; (2) clarifying,
consolidating, or simplifying the
compliance requirements for small
entities; (3) the use of performance
rather than design standards; and (4)
exempting small entities from the
coverage of the rules, or any part
thereof.
Establishing different compliance or
reporting requirements for small entities
would not be appropriate under Rule
2a–46(b). Rule 2a–46 will not impose
any reporting requirements on BDCs or
on companies. It will also not impose
any compliance requirements on
portfolio companies. Rule 2a–46(b) will,
however, impose some compliance
requirements on BDCs that are intended
to ensure that BDCs invest primarily in
certain types of companies. These
requirements should, however, impose
only minimal burdens on BDCs.
We believe that clarifying,
consolidating or simplifying the
compliance requirements for small
entities would be inappropriate. As
discussed above, Rule 2a–46(b) will not
impose any compliance requirements on
portfolio companies. As noted, Rule 2a–
46(b) will impose some compliance
requirements on BDCs, which we
believe will impose minimal burdens on
BDCs. These requirements are designed
to ensure that BDCs will invest in
companies in accordance with the rule.
We believe that using performance
rather than design standards would add
unnecessary complexity. Rule 2a–46(b)
provides a clear, bright-line, workable
test for determining whether a company
is an eligible portfolio company. A
standard based on performance could be
unduly complicated and cause further
uncertainty to BDCs, including those
that are small entities, when
determining whether a company is an
eligible portfolio company. Likewise,
the use of a performance standard
would bring uncertainty to companies
in determining whether they meet the
definition of eligible portfolio company.
Finally, we believe that it would be
inappropriate to exempt BDCs that are
small entities from the coverage of Rule
2a–46(b). Rule 2a–46(b) should benefit
PO 00000
Frm 00015
Fmt 4700
Sfmt 4700
29051
BDCs and companies, including those
that are small entities, by expanding the
definition of eligible portfolio company
to include certain companies whose
securities are listed on an Exchange.
Exempting BDCs and companies that are
small entities from the amended rule
would be contradictory to the purpose
of this rulemaking.
VIII. Statutory Authority
We are amending Rule 2a–46
pursuant to our rulemaking authority
under Sections 2(a)(46)(C)(iv) and 38(a)
of the Investment Company Act.
List of Subjects in 17 CFR Part 270
Investment companies, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements, Securities.
Text of Rule
For reasons set forth in the preamble,
Title 17, Chapter II of the Code of
Federal Regulations is amended as
follows:
PART 270—RULES AND
REGULATIONS, INVESTMENT
COMPANY ACT OF 1940
1. The authority citation for part 270
continues to read in part as follows:
I
Authority: 15 U.S.C. 80a–1 et seq., 80a–
34(d), 80a–37, and 80a–39, unless otherwise
noted.
*
*
*
*
*
2. Revise § 270.2a–46 to read as
follows:
I
§ 270.2a–46 Certain issuers as eligible
portfolio companies.
The term eligible portfolio company
shall include any issuer that meets the
requirements set forth in paragraphs (A)
and (B) of section 2(a)(46) of the Act (15
U.S.C. 80a–2(a)(46)(A) and (B)) and that:
(a) Does not have any class of
securities listed on a national securities
exchange; or
(b) Has a class of securities listed on
a national securities exchange, but has
an aggregate market value of
outstanding voting and non-voting
common equity of less than $250
million. For purposes of this paragraph:
(1) The aggregate market value of an
issuer’s outstanding voting and nonvoting common equity shall be
computed by use of the price at which
the common equity was last sold, or the
average of the bid and asked prices of
such common equity, in the principal
market for such common equity as of a
date within 60 days prior to the date of
acquisition of its securities by a
business development company; and
(2) Common equity has the same
meaning as in 17 CFR 230.405.
Dated: May 15, 2008.
E:\FR\FM\20MYR1.SGM
20MYR1
29052
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 98 / Tuesday, May 20, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
By the Commission.
Nancy M. Morris,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. E8–11254 Filed 5–19–08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8010–01–P
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES
Food and Drug Administration
21 CFR Part 866
[Docket No. FDA–2008–N–0231]
Medical Devices; Immunology and
Microbiology Devices; Classification of
Plasmodium Species Antigen
Detection Assays
AGENCY:
Food and Drug Administration,
HHS.
ACTION:
Final rule.
SUMMARY: The Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) is classifying
Plasmodium species antigen detection
assays into class II (special controls).
The special control that will apply to
the device is the guidance document
entitled ‘‘Class II Special Controls
Guidance Document: Plasmodium
Species Antigen Detection Assays.’’ The
agency is classifying the device into
class II (special controls) in order to
provide a reasonable assurance of safety
and effectiveness of the device.
Elsewhere in this issue of the Federal
Register, FDA is announcing the
availability of the guidance document
that will serve as the special control for
this device.
DATES: This rule is effective June 19,
2008. The classification was effective
June 13, 2007.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Freddie M. Poole, Center for Devices
and Radiological Health (HFZ–440),
Food and Drug Administration, 2098
Gaither Rd., Rockville, MD 20850, 240–
276–0712.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES
I. What Is the Background of This
Rulemaking?
In accordance with section 513(f)(1) of
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act (the act) (21 U.S.C. 360c(f)(1)),
devices that were not in commercial
distribution before May 28, 1976, the
date of enactment of the Medical Device
Amendments of 1976 (the amendments),
generally referred to as postamendments
devices, are classified automatically by
statute into class III without any FDA
rulemaking process. These devices
remain in class III and require
premarket approval, unless and until
VerDate Aug<31>2005
17:32 May 19, 2008
Jkt 214001
the device is classified or reclassified
into class I or II, or FDA issues an order
finding the device to be substantially
equivalent, in accordance with section
513(i) of the act, to a predicate device
that does not require premarket
approval. The agency determines
whether new devices are substantially
equivalent to predicate devices by
means of premarket notification
procedures in section 510(k) of the act
(21 U.S.C. 360(k)) and 21 CFR part 807
of FDA’s regulations.
Section 513(f)(2) of the act provides
that any person who submits a
premarket notification under section
510(k) of the act for a device that has not
previously been classified may, within
30 days after receiving an order
classifying the device in class III under
section 513(f)(1) of the act, request FDA
to classify the device under the criteria
set forth in section 513(a)(1) of the act.
FDA shall, within 60 days of receiving
such a request, classify the device by
written order. This classification shall
be the initial classification of the device.
Within 30 days after the issuance of an
order classifying the device, FDA must
publish a notice in the Federal Register
announcing this classification (section
513(f)(2) of the act).
In accordance with section 513(f)(1) of
the act, FDA issued an order on
February 22, 2007, classifying the Binax
NOW Malaria Test in class III, because
it was not substantially equivalent to a
device that was introduced or delivered
for introduction into interstate
commerce for commercial distribution
before May 28, 1976, or a device which
was subsequently reclassified into class
I or class II. On March 22, 2007, Binax,
Inc., submitted a petition requesting
classification of the Binax NOW
Malaria Test under section 513(f)(2) of
the act. The manufacturer recommended
that the device be classified into class II
(Ref. 1).
In accordance with section 513(f)(2) of
the act, FDA reviewed the petition in
order to classify the device under the
criteria for classification set forth in
section 513(a)(1) of the act. Devices are
to be classified into class II if general
controls, by themselves, are insufficient
to provide reasonable assurance of
safety and effectiveness, but there is
sufficient information to establish
special controls to provide reasonable
assurance of the safety and effectiveness
of the device for its intended use. After
review of the information submitted in
the petition, FDA determined that the
Binax NOW Malaria Test can be
classified in class II with the
establishment of special controls. FDA
believes these special controls, in
addition to general controls, will
PO 00000
Frm 00016
Fmt 4700
Sfmt 4700
provide reasonable assurance of safety
and effectiveness of the device.
The device is assigned the generic
name ‘‘Plasmodium species antigen
detection assays.’’ It is identified as a
device that employs antibodies for the
detection of specific malaria parasite
antigens, including histidine-rich
protein-2 (HRP2) specific antigens, and
pan malarial antigens in human whole
blood. These devices are used for testing
specimens from individuals who have
signs and symptoms consistent with
malaria infection. The detection of these
antigens aids in the clinical laboratory
diagnosis of malaria caused by the four
malaria species capable of infecting
humans: Plasmodium falciparum,
Plasmodium vivax, Plasmodium ovale,
and Plasmodium malariae, and aids in
the differential diagnosis of P.
falciparum infections from other less
virulent Plasmodium species. The
device is intended for use in
conjunction with other clinical
laboratory findings.
FDA has identified the following risks
to health associated with the device.
Failure of the test to perform as
indicated may lead to improper patient
management and/or inappropriate
public health responses. For example,
false negative results may lead to delays
in providing, or even failure to provide,
definitive diagnosis and appropriate
treatment. A false positive test result
may subject individuals to unnecessary
and/or inappropriate treatment for
malaria, and failure to appropriately
diagnose and treat the actual disease
condition. The unnecessary use of
alternative drugs, such as quinine,
mefloquine and artemisinin, typically
used in high resistance areas outside the
United States, is problematic because
these drugs are less safe than the first
and second line treatments.
In addition, malaria is a significant
public health issue and is a reportable
disease to the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention. Local and state
health departments are required to
conduct case investigations upon
receiving a report of a malaria infection.
A false positive test result could place
an undue burden on local and state
health department resources and could
also lead to unnecessary public health
actions (e.g., unnecessary or
inappropriate treatment and
management of others in the
community). On the other hand, a false
negative result could lead to a delay in
recognition of increased transmission of
the parasitic infection.
An error in interpretation of results
could also pose a risk, especially
decisions about treatment without
confirmation of negative results by
E:\FR\FM\20MYR1.SGM
20MYR1
Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 98 (Tuesday, May 20, 2008)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 29044-29052]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-11254]
=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
17 CFR Part 270
[Release No. IC-28266; File No. S7-37-04]
RIN 3235-AJ31
Definition of Eligible Portfolio Company Under the Investment
Company Act of 1940
AGENCY: Securities and Exchange Commission (the ``Commission'').
ACTION: Final rule.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The Commission is adopting an amendment to a rule under the
Investment Company Act of 1940 to
[[Page 29045]]
more closely align the definition of eligible portfolio company, and
the investment activities of business development companies (``BDCs''),
with the purpose that Congress intended. The amendment expands the
definition of eligible portfolio company to include certain companies
that list their securities on a national securities exchange.
DATES: Effective Date: July 21, 2008.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Rochelle Kauffman Plesset, Senior
Counsel, Office of Chief Counsel, Division of Investment Management,
(202) 551-6840, Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street, NE.,
Washington, DC 20549-5030.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Commission today is adopting amendments
to Rule 2a-46 [17 CFR 270.2a-46] under the Investment Company Act of
1940 [15 U.S.C. 80a]. \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The amendments were proposed in Definition of Eligible
Portfolio Company under the Investment Company Act of 1940,
Investment Company Act Release No. 27539 (Oct. 25, 2006) [71 FR
64093 (Oct. 31, 2006)] (``Reproposing Release'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table of Contents
I. Executive Summary
II. Background
III. Discussion
A. Rule 2a-46(b)
B. Use of Standard Based on Market Capitalization
C. Dollar Level of Standard
IV. Cost-Benefit Analysis
V. Consideration of Promotion of Efficiency, Competition and Capital
Formation
VI. Paperwork Reduction Act
VII. Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
VIII. Statutory Authority
Text of Rule
I. Executive Summary
A BDC is a closed-end investment company that Congress established
for the purpose of making capital more readily available to certain
types of companies. Under the Investment Company Act (``Investment
Company Act'' or ``Act''), a BDC must invest at least 70 percent of its
assets in ``eligible portfolio company'' securities and certain other
securities. Rule 2a-46 defines the term eligible portfolio company to
include any company whose securities are not listed on a national
securities exchange (``Exchange''). \2\ When we adopted Rule 2a-46 in
2006, we also requested comment on whether to further expand the
definition to include Exchange-listed companies that have (i) less than
$75 million in public float or (ii) less than $150 million in market
capitalization or less than $250 million in market capitalization. \3\
Today we are amending Rule 2a-46 to expand the definition of eligible
portfolio company to include Exchange-listed companies that have less
than $250 million in market capitalization.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Definition of Eligible Portfolio Company under the
Investment Company Act of 1940, Investment Company Act Release No.
27538 (Oct. 25, 2006) [71 FR 64086 (Oct. 31, 2006)] (``Adopting
Release'').
\3\ See Reproposing Release, supra note 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
II. Background
Congress established BDCs as a new category of closed-end
investment companies when it enacted the Small Business Investment
Incentive Act (``SBIIA'') in 1980. \4\ Congress intended that BDCs
would make capital more readily available to certain types of
companies. \5\ To accomplish this purpose, the Investment Company Act
generally prohibits a BDC from making any investment unless, at the
time of the investment, at least 70 percent of its total assets (``70%
basket'') are invested in securities of certain specific types of
companies, including ``eligible portfolio companies.'' \6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Small Business Investment Incentive Act of 1980, Public Law
No. 96-477, 94 Stat. 2274 (1980) (codified at scattered sections of
the United States Code).
\5\ See generally H.R. Rep. No. 1341, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 21
(1980) (``House Report'').
\6\ See Section 2(a)(46) of the Investment Company Act
(statutory definition of eligible portfolio company) [15 U.S.C. 80a-
2(a)(46)]. See also Section 55(a) of the Investment Company Act
(regulating the activities of BDCs) [15 U.S.C. 80a-54(a)]. Among
other things, the 70% basket may include securities of eligible
portfolio companies purchased in transactions not involving any
public offering, securities of eligible portfolio companies already
controlled by the BDC without regard to the nature of the offering,
and securities of certain financially distressed companies that do
not meet the definition of eligible portfolio company and that are
purchased in transactions not involving any public offering. See
Section 55(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Investment Company Act defines eligible portfolio company to
include any domestic operating company \7\ that does not have a class
of securities with respect to which a member of an Exchange, broker, or
dealer may extend margin credit pursuant to rules promulgated by the
Federal Reserve Board under Section 7 of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (``Exchange Act''). \8\ At the time that Section 2(a)(46) was
adopted, Congress generally perceived the Federal Reserve Board's
definition of ``margin security'' to be a ``rational and objective test
for determining whether an issuer has ready access to the securities
markets.'' \9\ Nevertheless, Congress recognized that the definition of
eligible portfolio company as adopted, and, in particular, the
definition's reliance on the Federal Reserve Board's margin rules,
might need to be adjusted in the future. \10\ Accordingly, Congress
specifically gave the Commission rulemaking authority under Section
2(a)(46)(C)(iv) of the Investment Company Act to expand the definition
of eligible portfolio company. \11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Section 2(a)(46) of the Investment Company Act defines
eligible portfolio company to include any company that satisfies the
criteria set forth in each of Section 2(a)(46)(A) and Section
2(a)(46)(B) in addition to one of the three criteria set forth in
Section 2(a)(46)(C). Section 2(a)(46)(A) defines eligible portfolio
company to include any company organized under the laws of, and with
its principal place of business in, one or more states of the United
States. Section 2(a)(46)(B) of the Investment Company Act generally
excludes from the definition of eligible portfolio company any
company that meets the definition of investment company under
Section 3 of the Investment Company Act, or that is excluded from
the definition of investment company by Section 3(c) of the Act, but
includes as an eligible portfolio company any small BDC that is
licensed by the Small Business Administration and that is a wholly-
owned subsidiary of a BDC.
\8\ Section 2(a)(46)(C)(i). See also Section 2(a)(46)(C)(ii)
(defines eligible portfolio company to include companies that are
controlled by the investing BDC or certain of its affiliates);
Section 2(a)(46)(C)(iii) (defines eligible portfolio company to
include certain very small companies).
\9\ House Report at 31. The House Report also indicated that
Section 2(a)(46)(C)(i) was ``intended to cover companies which are
unable to borrow money through conventional sources or which do not
have ready access to the public capital markets.'' Id. at 30. In
1980, the Federal Reserve Board periodically published lists of each
company that had a class of securities that was marginable under its
rules. Companies that were not listed as having a class of
marginable securities qualified as eligible portfolio companies.
\10\ See House Report at 31.
\11\ Under Section 2(a)(46)(C)(iv), the term eligible portfolio
company includes any issuer that, in addition to meeting the
requirements of Sections 2(a)(46)(A) and (B), ``meets such other
criteria as the Commission may, by rule, establish as consistent
with the public interest, the protection of investors, and the
purposes fairly intended by the policy and provisions of [the
Act].'' See House Report at 23 (``* * * the Commission is given
rulemaking authority to expand the class of eligible portfolio
companies, following certain specific standards.''). The legislative
history of the SBIIA also makes clear that the intent of this
provision ``is to enable the Commission through the administrative
process to broaden, if appropriate, the category of eligible
portfolio company.'' Congress also noted its expectation that ``the
Commission would institute [rulemaking] proceedings to consider
whether the definition of eligible portfolio company can be
expanded, consistent with the purpose of the legislation, to
increase the flow of capital to small, developing businesses or
financially troubled businesses.'' See House Report at 31. In
providing the Commission with rulemaking authority, Congress noted
``[a]mong the objective factors which the Commission may consider in
[rulemaking] proceedings are the size of such companies, the extent
of their public ownership, and their operating history as going
concerns and public companies.'' Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Since 1980, the Federal Reserve Board has periodically amended its
definition of margin security to increase the types of securities that
would fall within that definition under its rules. In 1998, for reasons
unrelated to small business capital formation, the Federal Reserve
Board amended its definition of margin
[[Page 29046]]
security to include all equity securities that trade on an Exchange or
are listed on the NASDAQ Stock Market, and most debt securities. This
amendment had the result of significantly reducing the companies that
qualify as eligible portfolio companies under Section 2(a)(46) of the
Investment Company Act. \12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Securities Credit Transactions; Borrowing By Brokers and
Dealers, 63 FR 2805 (1998) (adopting final rule amendment). As a
result of these amendments, companies that would have been
considered eligible portfolio companies in 1980 may no longer meet
that definition. See Definition of Eligible Portfolio Company under
the Investment Company Act of 1940, Investment Company Act Release
No. 26647 (Nov. 1, 2004) [69 FR 64815 (Nov. 8, 2004)] (``2004
Proposing Release'') at nn.19-24.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In 2006, we adopted two rules, Rules 2a-46 and 55a-1 under the Act,
to address the impact of the Federal Reserve Board's amendment to its
definition of margin security on the definition of eligible portfolio
company. \13\ Rule 2a-46 defines eligible portfolio company to include
all domestic operating companies \14\ whose securities are not listed
on an Exchange. \15\ Rule 55a-1 conditionally permits a BDC to continue
to invest in any company that qualified as an eligible portfolio
company under Rule 2a-46 when the BDC made its initial investment(s) in
it, but that subsequently does not meet the definition of eligible
portfolio company because it no longer meets the requirements of that
rule. \16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ See Adopting Release, supra note 2.
\14\ Rule 2a-46 incorporates the provisions of Sections
2(a)(46)(A) and (B). See supra note 7.
\15\ 17 CFR 270.2a-46.
\16\ 17 CFR 270.55a-1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
When we adopted Rules 2a-46 and 55a-1, we also proposed to amend
Rule 2a-46 to expand the definition of eligible portfolio company to
include certain public domestic operating companies that list their
securities on an Exchange. \17\ This proposal was designed to address
concerns that part of the rule (proposed in 2004, but not adopted \18\)
would be unworkable and too narrow. \19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ See Reproposing Release, supra note 1.
\18\ See 2004 Proposing Release, supra note 12 (proposed a
definition of eligible portfolio company that would have included
certain financially-troubled Exchange-listed companies).
\19\ For example, some commenters had stated that the proposed
rule would not include some small companies that list their
securities on an Exchange but that nevertheless may have
difficulties accessing conventional sources of capital and raising
additional capital on the public markets. See Reproposing Release,
supra note 1 at n.12 and accompanying text.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the Reproposing Release, we requested comment on alternatives
that would expand the definition of eligible portfolio company to
include domestic operating companies with securities listed on an
Exchange. We asked whether we should expand the definition to include
any such company with (i) a public float of less than $75 million or
(ii) market capitalization of less than $150 million or market
capitalization of less than $250 million. \20\ We explained that the
$75 million public float standard incorporates the size-based standard
used in Form S-3 and Rule 12b-2 which the Commission has used to
delineate between small, unseasoned companies, and larger seasoned
companies whose securities are listed on an Exchange. \21\ We explained
that the market capitalization alternatives are similar to definitions
of ``micro-cap'' company used generally by market participants. \22\ We
also noted that some who had commented on Rule 2a-46 when it was
initially proposed had stated that companies with market
capitalizations in this range generally have limited (if any) analyst
coverage, have lower trading volume and are owned by fewer
institutional investors than companies with higher market
capitalizations. \23\ These commenters concluded that such companies
have difficulty accessing the public capital markets. \24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ See Reproposing Release, supra note 1.
\21\ See, e.g., Form S-3 [17 CFR 239.13]; Rule 12b-2 under the
Exchange Act [17 CFR 240.12b-2].
\22\ See Reproposing Release, supra note 1 at nn.38-40 and
accompanying text.
\23\ Id. at nn.34-43 and accompanying text.
\24\ E.g., comments of Williams & Jensen (Feb. 17, 2006);
comments of Representatives Sue Kelly and Nydia Vel[aacute]szquez
(Jan. 5, 2005) (commenting on the 2004 Proposing Release).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We received letters from fifteen commenters (including eight BDCs
and one legal counsel to BDCs). \25\ Fourteen commenters favored the
$250 million market capitalization standard. \26\ Several commenters
specifically noted that companies meeting such a standard ``often have
difficulty accessing traditional capital sources.'' \27\ Commenters
also stated that the $250 million market capitalization standard is
similar to what most market participants use to identify micro-cap
companies, and that these companies have less analyst coverage,
institutional ownership and lower trading volume. \28\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ The eight BDCs were Allied Capital Corp., American Capital
Strategies Ltd., Apollo Investment Corp., Ares Capital Corp.,
Gladstone Management, Harris & Harris Group, Inc., MCG Capital Corp.
and NGP Capital Resources Company. We also received comments from
two trade associations (The Financial Roundtable and U.S. Chamber of
Commerce), one legal counsel to BDCs (Williams & Jensen), one
investment banker (Ferghana Partners Inc.), one investment adviser
(ThinkEquity Partners LLC) and two individuals. These letters are
available for inspection in the Commission's Public Reference Room
at 100 F Street, NE., Washington, DC 20549 (File No. S7-37-04), and
may be viewed at https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/
s73704.shtml#27539.
\26\ One commenter did not address this issue. Comments of
Kathryn Ellis (Nov. 26, 2006). In addition, commenters generally
disagreed with the adoption of a public float standard. See infra
Section III.B.
Two commenters also suggested that we include a provision that
would in the future adjust the standard that we adopt today to
reflect inflation. Comments of American Capital Strategies Ltd.
(Dec. 24, 2006); comments of Apollo Investment Corp. (Jan. 2, 2007).
We did not propose such a provision and therefore have not included
it in Rule 2a-46.
\27\ See, e.g., comments of Apollo Investment Corp. (Jan. 2,
2007); comments of Gladstone Management (Nov. 2, 2006). See also
comments of Allied Capital Management (Dec. 21, 2006) (``Public
companies with a market capitalization of up to $250 million . . .
often have trouble accessing the traditional capital markets despite
the fact that their shares are listed on an exchange.'').
\28\ See, e.g., comments of Gladstone Management (Nov. 2, 2006);
comments of American Capital Strategies Ltd. (Dec. 24, 2006);
comments of Apollo Investment Corp. (Jan. 2, 2007).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, in support of the $250 million market capitalization
standard, one commenter provided information about public companies
that have received financing over the past several years and the types
of financing that they have received. \29\ Specifically, the commenter
submitted information regarding public companies that were able to
access the public markets, either by engaging in initial public
offerings or by issuing follow-on equity and debt financing. \30\ The
commenter also provided information regarding the public companies that
had obtained capital through private investment transactions. \31\ In
addition, the commenter provided information regarding the average
institutional leveraged loan size and average high yield issuance size.
\32\ Based on this information, the commenter concluded that companies
with less than $250 million market capitalization are having difficulty
accessing traditional capital sources. \33\ Accordingly, the commenter
urged the Commission to adopt the $250
[[Page 29047]]
million market capitalization standard. \34\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\ Comments of Williams & Jensen (Apr. 19, 2007, May 30,
2007). This commenter also provided information regarding the
investment practices of BDCs. The commenter, focusing on five of the
largest BDCs, provided a description of each BDC's investment focus,
the number of companies in each BDC's portfolio, and the number of
individual investments each BDC made that was greater than $100
million. The commenter also provided the average revenue of the
portfolio companies that are held by four BDCs. Comments of Williams
& Jensen (May 30, 2007).
\30\ Comments of Williams & Jensen (Apr. 19, 2007).
\31\ Comments of Williams & Jensen (May 30, 2007).
\32\ Id.
\33\ Comments of Williams & Jensen (Apr. 19, 2007, May 30,
2007).
\34\ Comments of Williams & Jensen (Feb. 17, 2006, Apr. 19,
2007, May 30, 2007).
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III. Discussion
A. Rule 2a-46(b)
After carefully considering the comments received in response to
both the Reproposing Release and the 2004 Proposing Release, we are
amending Rule 2a-46 to include new paragraph (b). \35\ Rule 2a-46(b)
expands the definition of eligible portfolio company to include any
domestic operating company that has a class of securities listed on an
Exchange and that has a market capitalization \36\ of less than $250
million (calculated using the price at which the company's common
equity is last sold, or the average of the bid and asked prices of the
company's common equity, in the principal market for such common
equity) on any day in the 60-day period immediately before the BDC's
acquisition of its securities. \37\ We believe that the new rule is
consistent with the public interest, the protection of investors and
the purposes fairly intended by the policy and provisions of the
Investment Company Act.
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\35\ We are also designating the current text of Rule 2a-46 as
paragraph (a) of the rule.
\36\ A company's market capitalization for purposes of the rule
is the aggregate market value of the company's outstanding voting
and non-voting common equity securities. See, e.g., Reproposing
Release, supra note 1 at n.16.
\37\ Rule 2a-46(b). This method of calculating market
capitalization was used in both of the proposed market
capitalization alternatives in the reproposal. See Reproposing
Release, supra note 1 at n.16. We received no comment on this
method, and we are adopting it as proposed.
We note that the method of calculating market capitalization is
stated solely for purposes of determining a company's qualification
as an eligible portfolio company. A BDC is required to value its
interests in portfolio companies for purposes of calculating the
BDC's net asset value consistent with Section 2(a)(41) of the
Investment Company Act.
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B. Use of Standard Based on Market Capitalization
As discussed above, one of the alternatives that we proposed used a
public float standard, and the options proposed in the other
alternative used a market capitalization standard. \38\ We have decided
to adopt a market capitalization standard for the reasons discussed
below. For purposes of Rule 2a-46(b), market capitalization is the
aggregate value of a company's outstanding voting and non-voting equity
securities. \39\ In contrast, a company's public float is a company's
market capitalization minus the aggregate market value of common equity
held by the company's affiliates. \40\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\38\ See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
\39\ See supra note 36.
\40\ See, e.g., Reproposing Release, supra note 1 at n.16.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We requested comment on whether it would be burdensome for a BDC to
determine a company's eligible portfolio company status if the standard
is based on public float rather than market capitalization. \41\
Adopting a public float standard in Rule 2a-46(b) would have imposed
burdens that are not present in other Commission rules that incorporate
such a standard. These other Commission rules typically are rules in
which a company is responsible for calculating its own public float to
determine its eligibility in connection with certain registration or
reporting requirements. \42\ Section 55 of the Investment Company Act,
however, effectively requires a BDC to determine whether a target
company qualifies as an eligible portfolio company before investing in
it as part of the BDC's 70% basket. \43\ Consequently it is the BDC,
rather than the target company, that must determine whether a target
company meets the definition of eligible portfolio company under Rule
2a-46(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\41\ Id. at text following n.51.
\42\ See supra note 21.
\43\ Section 55(a) of the Investment Company Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Accordingly, although several commenters stated that both public
float and market capitalization are good indicators of whether a
company is small and unseasoned, all commenters who addressed this
issue preferred a market capitalization standard. \44\ Commenters
stated that information about a company's market capitalization is
readily available through third-party sources, while information about
a company's public float is not. \45\ Commenters generally explained
that, in order for a BDC to calculate a company's public float, as
proposed, it would have to determine the number of shares owned by the
company's affiliates, which is information not readily available on a
current basis through third-party sources. \46\ The BDC therefore would
have to communicate with possible target companies to determine whether
they would qualify under the definition of eligible portfolio company
before making any investment decision.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\44\ See, e.g., comments of American Capital Strategies Ltd.
(Dec. 24, 2006); comments of Gladstone Management (Nov. 2, 2006);
comments of Apollo Investment Corp. (Jan. 3, 2007).
\45\ See, e.g., id.
\46\ See, e.g., comments of American Capital Strategies Ltd.
(Dec. 24, 2006); comments of Ares Capital Corp. (Jan. 2, 2007).
Although Exchange Act reporting companies are required to disclose
their public float on the cover of Form 10-K [17 CFR 249.310], the
form requires a filer to disclose its public float as of the last
business day of the filer's most recently completed second fiscal
quarter. Because Rule 2a-46(b) defines an eligible portfolio company
to be a company that meets the requisite size standard on any day in
the 60-day period immediately before the BDC's acquisition of the
company's securities, the public float information on a company's
Form 10-K always would have been outdated for purposes of the
proposed public float alternative.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Commenters argued that requiring BDCs to determine a company's
public float within the requirements of the proposed rule would place
an unnecessary burden on BDCs and thereby impede appropriate investment
activity. \47\ In contrast, under the adopted market capitalization
standard, a BDC may use information obtained from third parties to
assist it in determining whether a possible investment target is an
eligible portfolio company. In this regard, we note that under the
adopted market capitalization standard, a BDC may use information
obtained from independent third parties to assist it in determining
whether a possible target company is an eligible portfolio company
without communicating with the target company directly. In light of
these burdens and the general public availability of information
regarding a company's market capitalization, we agree with commenters
that a market capitalization standard is appropriate for purposes of
Rule 2a-46.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\47\ See, e.g., comments of American Capital Strategies Ltd.
(Dec. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
C. Dollar Level of Standard
We are adopting new Rule 2a-46(b) to define eligible portfolio
company to include any company that is listed on an Exchange with
market capitalization of less than $250 million. The new standard,
consistent with legislative intent, broadens the definition of eligible
portfolio company. \48\ We estimate that, based on January 31, 2008
data, 6,062 companies, representing 61.3% (6,062/9,883) of all public
domestic operating companies, qualify as eligible portfolio companies
under Rule 2a-46(a). We further estimate that 1,649 Exchange-listed
companies qualify as eligible portfolio companies under Rule 2a-46(b).
\49\ Accordingly, we estimate that 7,711 companies, representing 78%
(7,711/9,883) of all public domestic operating companies
[[Page 29048]]
qualify as eligible portfolio companies under Rule 2a-46 as amended.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\48\ Supra note 11. As discussed above, the $250 million market
capitalization standard is a level similar to what most market
participants generally view to be ``micro-cap'' companies, a term
used to identify small public companies. See Reproposing Release,
supra note 1 at nn.38-40 and accompanying text.
\49\ We note that our estimates reflect only companies with less
than $250 million market capitalization whose securities are listed
on Nasdaq, the New York Stock Exchange (``NYSE'') and the American
Stock Exchange (``Amex'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the Reproposing Release, we noted a general concern raised by
commenters in response to the 2004 Proposing Release \50\ that
companies with market capitalization up to $300 million are followed by
fewer analysts, have lower institutional ownership and have lower
trading volume than companies at higher levels of market
capitalization. \51\ These commenters concluded that companies having
market capitalization below that amount may have more difficulty
accessing public capital. We generally agreed that there may be some
correlation between the size of a company, based on these factors, and
the ability of a company to access public capital. \52\ We specifically
requested comment on whether any of the alternative standards would
better align the definition of eligible portfolio company with the
purpose that Congress intended when it adopted the SBIIA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\50\ Supra note 12.
\51\ Comments of Representatives Sue Kelly and Nydia Velazquez
at n.12 (Jan. 5, 2005); comments of Williams & Jensen (Feb. 17,
2006). These commenters also referred to analysis prepared by our
Office of Economic Affairs (``OEA'') in connection with Securities
Offering Reform. See memorandum dated December 3, 2004 (``OEA
Memorandum'') attached to comments of Williams & Jensen (Feb. 17,
2006), infra note 58.
\52\ See Reproposing Release, supra note 1 at text following
n.36.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Commenters universally favored the $250 million market
capitalization standard. Commenters argued that companies with market
capitalization of less than $250 million often have difficulty
accessing traditional forms of capital and that adoption of the
standard thus would be consistent with Congressional intent. \53\ One
commenter also provided information regarding the limited number of
follow-on offerings of equity and debt securities by Exchange-listed
companies and stated that this information ``clearly demonstrates that
the vast majority of companies with market capitalizations of $250
million or less * * * have significantly limited access'' to the public
equity and debt markets. \54\ This commenter also argued that market
participants that provide public capital are not servicing the needs of
these companies. \55\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\53\ E.g., comments of Allied Capital Management (Dec. 21,
2006); comments of Apollo Investment Corp. (Jan. 2, 2007).
\54\ See comments of Williams & Jensen (Apr. 19, 2007).
\55\ Comments of Williams & Jensen (May 30, 2007).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Most commenters responding to the alternatives proposed in the
Reproposing Release also argued that companies with less than $250
million market capitalization have difficulty accessing public capital
because generally these companies are followed by fewer analysts, have
lower institutional ownership and lower trading volume than larger
companies. \56\ One commenter specifically noted that companies with
less than $250 million market capitalization ``have spotty analyst
coverage at best, * * * few or no institutional investors, and * * *
thin trading volumes'' and that ``these are characteristics of
companies that would not in today's market have ready access to public
capital.'' \57\ This commenter referred to information developed by our
Office of Economic Analysis (``OEA'') about those factors that were
prepared for purposes other than this rulemaking. \58\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\56\ See, e.g., comments of Gladstone Management (Nov. 2, 2006);
comments of Apollo Investment Corp. (Jan. 2, 2007); comments of Ares
Capital Corp. (Jan. 2, 2007).
\57\ Comments of Williams & Jensen (Apr. 19, 2007).
\58\ The commenter had attached to its comment letter statistics
that were prepared in connection with the Final Report of the
Advisory Committee on Smaller Public Companies. See Background
Statistics: Market Capitalization & Revenue of Public Companies,
August 1, 2005, at Table 7 (Analyst Coverage and Institutional
Holdings by Market Capitalization), attached to comments of Williams
& Jensen (Apr. 19, 2007). This commenter had attached to a prior
comment letter an earlier memorandum prepared by OEA that sets forth
data regarding analyst coverage, institutional ownership and average
daily trading for publicly traded companies between 1997 and 2003.
See OEA Memorandum dated December 3, 2004 attached to comments of
Williams & Jensen (Feb. 17, 2006) (exhibit entitled ``SEC Data
Demonstrates Lack of Market Following for Companies with Market
Capitalizations of $300 million or Less''). OEA prepared this
memorandum in connection with the Securities Offering Reform
rulemaking. See Securities Offering Reform, Securities Act Release
No. 8591 (July 19, 2005) [70 FR 44722 (Aug. 3, 2005)].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As we stated in the Reproposing Release, we believe that there is
some correlation between analyst coverage, institutional ownership and
trading volume and the ability of a company to access public capital.
\59\ Based on the comments we received, and our review of those factors
with respect to companies with less than $250 million market
capitalization, we believe that a distinction can be made with respect
to a company's ability to access public capital at $250 million market
capitalization. OEA has considered this information and determined that
fewer than 50% of companies with market capitalizations of less than
$250 million are followed by more than two analysts and that these
companies generally have lower institutional ownership and are more
thinly traded than larger companies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\59\ See Reproposing Release, supra note 1 at n.37 and
accompanying text.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Moreover, in the Reproposing Release we requested comment on
whether adoption of a $250 million market capitalization standard would
result in BDCs focusing their investment activities in companies at the
higher end of the standard to the detriment of smaller companies. \60\
Commenters responded that adoption of a $250 million market
capitalization standard would not have this result, with some arguing
further that larger companies do not necessarily present a more
attractive investment in comparison to smaller companies. \61\
Commenters also argued that historically, BDCs have not invested in
larger non-public companies at the expense of smaller non-public
companies, and that there is no reason to suggest that this would occur
in the context of public companies. \62\ In light of these comments, we
are persuaded that our adoption of the $250 million market
capitalization standard is not likely to result in BDCs focusing their
investment activity on larger companies to the detriment of smaller
companies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\60\ See id. at n.47 and accompanying text. We requested comment
on this issue in response to a comment made by one commenter to the
2004 Proposing Release. This commenter raised the concern that BDCs
might not provide financing for smaller Exchange-listed companies if
the Commission adopts a standard higher than $100 million market
capitalization. See comments of Capital Southwest Corp. (Dec. 28,
2004).
\61\ See, e.g., comments of MCG Capital Corp. (Dec. 27, 2006);
comments of American Capital Strategies Ltd. (Dec. 24, 2006).
\62\ See comments of Harris & Harris Group (Jan. 3, 2007);
comments of ThinkEquity Partners LLC (Dec. 6, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Accordingly, we conclude that adoption of the $250 million market
capitalization standard is an appropriate standard for purposes of the
amended rule and we believe that it is consistent with the public
interest, the protection of investors and the purposes fairly intended
by the policies and provisions of the Investment Company Act. \63\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\63\ We are persuaded that our adoption of the $250 million
market capitalization standard is not inconsistent with our other
rules that distinguish between smaller and larger companies because
of the different purposes of these rules. For example, Form S-3
incorporates a $75 million public float standard (in addition to
other factors) to identify those companies about which sufficient
information is publicly available to allow them to take advantage of
our integrated disclosure system. See Revisions to the Eligibility
Requirements for Primary Securities Offerings on Forms S-3 and F-3,
Securities Act Release No. 8878 (Dec. 19, 2007) [72 FR 73534 (Dec.
27, 2007)]; Simplification of Registration for Primary Securities
Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 6943 (July 16, 1992) [57 FR
32461 (July 22, 1992)]. In contrast, Rule 2a-46(b) incorporates a
$250 million market capitalization standard to identify companies
that are having difficulty accessing public capital and may benefit
from greater access to BDC financing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 29049]]
IV. Cost-Benefit Analysis
We are sensitive to the costs and benefits that result from our
rules. In the Reproposing Release we requested public comment and
specific data regarding the costs and benefits of reproposed Rule 2a-
46(b). As discussed below, we received one comment regarding the
Commission's estimate of the companies that would benefit from the
reproposed rule. \64\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\64\ Comments of Williams & Jensen (Apr. 19, 2007).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A. Benefits
Rule 2a-46(b) more closely aligns the definition of eligible
portfolio company, and the investment activities of BDCs, with the
purpose that Congress intended. Specifically, Rule 2a-46(b) expands the
definition of eligible portfolio company to include any domestic
operating company with a class of securities listed on an Exchange that
has a market capitalization of less than $250 million.
Many public companies that are included as eligible portfolio
companies under Rule 2a-46(b) may need capital for continued
development and growth, but, notwithstanding that their securities are
listed on an Exchange, may find it difficult to raise capital through
additional offerings or borrow money through other sources. By amending
the definition of eligible portfolio company to include these
companies, such companies will benefit because of the expanded sources
of capital from which the companies may seek to obtain financing.
Increased competition among capital providers will benefit shareholders
of companies seeking capital.
Rule 2a-46(b) also benefits BDCs by expanding the universe of
investments that BDCs may include as part of their 70% basket. This
will allow BDCs to make additional investments to companies that
qualify as eligible portfolio companies under the rule, which in turn
could benefit BDC shareholders. Rule 2a-46(b) also benefits BDCs by
addressing the uncertainty caused by changes in the margin rules in the
operation of BDCs.
In the Reproposing Release, OEA estimated, using June 30, 2006
data, that there were a total of 1,562 domestic operating companies
whose securities were listed on Nasdaq, the NYSE and Amex that have a
market capitalization of less than $250 million. At that time OEA
estimated that 6,041 domestic operating companies that qualified as
eligible portfolio companies under Rule 2a-46 as initially adopted.
Accordingly, OEA calculated that 7,603 companies, representing 77.2%
(7,603/9,845 \65\) of public domestic operating companies, would
qualify as eligible portfolio companies if the $250 million market
capitalization standard was adopted.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\65\ See infra note 69.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Using January 31, 2008 data, OEA estimates that there were a total
of 1,649 domestic operating companies whose securities were listed on
Nasdaq, the NYSE and the Amex that have a market capitalization of less
than $250 million. OEA further estimates that approximately 6,062
companies qualify as eligible portfolio companies under Rule 2a-46, as
initially adopted (now Rule 2a-46(a)). Accordingly, OEA calculates that
7,711 companies, representing 78% percent (7,711/9,883 \66\) of public
domestic operating companies, qualify as eligible portfolio companies
under amended Rule 2a-46.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\66\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
OEA reached its estimates by first calculating the number of
companies whose securities were listed on Nasdaq, the NYSE and the
Amex. OEA then deducted from this estimate all foreign companies,
investment companies and companies that are excluded from the
definition of investment company by Section 3(c) of the Investment
Company Act (because both Section 2(a)(46) of the Investment Company
Act and Rule 2a-46 exclude these types of companies from the definition
of eligible portfolio company), and corrected for cases where
individual companies had multiple classes of securities listed. OEA
then determined the number of companies that had a market
capitalization of less than $250 million. \67\ Using the same
methodology, OEA determined the number of companies that qualify as
eligible portfolio companies under Rule 2a-46(a). \68\ OEA then
calculated the total number of eligible portfolio companies and the
percentage of the total public domestic operating companies that would
qualify as eligible portfolio companies under amended Rule 2a-46. \69\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\67\ See supra note 49.
\68\ See Adopting Release, supra note 2 at text preceding n.31.
\69\ OEA estimated the total number of public domestic operating
companies by calculating the number of companies whose securities
were listed on Nasdaq, the NYSE and the Amex, in addition to those
companies whose securities were trading through the over-the-counter
bulletin board and on Pink Sheets LLC, correcting these figures for
cases where individual companies had multiple classes of securities
listed, and then removing from these figures foreign companies,
investment companies, and companies that are excluded from the
definition of investment company by Section 3(c).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As noted above, one commenter stated that the Reproposing Release
overstated the percentage of companies that would benefit under Rule
2a-46, as amended by the reproposed rule. \70\ The commenter noted,
however, that regardless of whether or not the Commission overstated
the percentage of companies, ``the percentage in and of itself adds
little analytical weight in describing which public companies need
access to capital. * * *'' The commenter concluded that ``we believe
that there is no precise percentage of public companies that can or
should be targeted. * * *'' \71\ While the commenter agreed that
foreign companies, investment companies and most companies that are
excluded from the definition of investment company by Section 3(c) of
the Investment Company Act are excluded from qualifying as eligible
portfolio companies under the Investment Company Act, the commenter
suggested that these companies should still be included as part of the
total number of public companies. Thus, the commenter suggested that
the benefits of the rule should be calculated by comparing the total
number of companies that would be eligible portfolio companies under
the rule to the total number of public companies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\70\ Williams & Jensen (Apr. 19, 2007).
\71\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As discussed previously, Section 2(a)(46) excludes from the
definition of eligible portfolio companies foreign companies,
investment companies and most companies that are excluded from the
definition of investment company by Section 3(c). Therefore, in
determining the benefits of Rule 2a-46 as amended for purposes of this
analysis, we believe that it is appropriate to compare the number of
companies that meet the definition of eligible portfolio company under
the rule with the number of companies that are not statutorily
precluded from being treated as eligible portfolio companies.
This commenter also argued that public companies listed on the OTC
Bulletin Board with market capitalizations of between $0 and $25
million should be excluded from OEA's calculations. \72\ The commenter
explained that although these companies qualify as eligible portfolio
companies, ``they are not likely to seek or be seriously considered
appropriate investments for a BDC.'' \73\ OEA's calculations are
intended to show the number of all companies that would fall within the
definition of eligible portfolio company under Rule 2a-46(b), however,
regardless of whether any particular company or size of company
[[Page 29050]]
would be seriously considered by a BDC for investment purposes.
Accordingly, we have not recalculated the numbers and percentages
stated above to reflect the commenter's view.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\72\ Id.
\73\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
B. Costs
We received no comments on the potential costs of our adoption of
the new standard. Although Rule 2a-46(b) might impose certain
administrative compliance costs on BDCs, it is our understanding that
these costs are similar to the types of compliance costs that a BDC
currently undertakes when it invests in a company. Specifically, a BDC
will need to determine, prior to investing in a company, if the company
has a class of securities listed on an Exchange and whether that
company's market capitalization was less than $250 million as of a date
within 60 days prior to the date of the BDC's investment. Costs in
obtaining this information, however, will be minimal because
information about the market capitalization of companies is readily
available from third-party sources. Finally, we anticipate that Rule
2a-46(b) will impose only minimal, if any, costs on portfolio
companies.
V. Consideration of Promotion of Efficiency, Competition and Capital
Formation
Section 2(c) of the Investment Company Act mandates that the
Commission, when engaging in rulemaking that requires it to consider or
determine whether an action is necessary or appropriate in the public
interest, to consider, in addition to the protection of investors,
whether the action will promote efficiency, competition and capital
formation. \74\ In the Reproposing Release, we requested comment on our
analysis of the impact of Rule 2a-46(b) on efficiency, competition and
capital formation. As discussed in Section II of this Release,
commenters generally supported expanding the definition to include
Exchange-listed companies with less than $250 million market
capitalization because of their belief that these companies often have
difficulty accessing capital. \75\ Some commenters also argued that
expanding the rule to include Exchange-listed companies with less than
$250 million market capitalization would allow BDCs to compete with
other capital providers, and that such competition would benefit
shareholders of companies seeking capital. \76\ We have decided to
amend Rule 2a-46 to expand the definition of eligible portfolio company
to include Exchange-listed companies that have a market capitalization
of less than $250 million.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\74\ 15 U.S.C. 80a-2(c).
\75\ See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
\76\ See, e.g., comments of Williams & Jensen (Apr. 19, 2007);
comments of Apollo Investment Corp. (Jan. 2, 2007).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rule 2a-46(b) is designed to promote efficiency, competition and
capital formation. Efficiency will be enhanced because Rule 2a-46(b)
expands the definition of eligible portfolio company so as to allow
BDCs to compete with other entities that provide capital to certain
companies. Competition for financing may result in lower cost capital
for current funding needs or may replace higher cost capital previously
issued, which could potentially allow companies desiring capital to
take on additional or different investment projects. Thus, Rule 2a-
46(b) will promote a more efficient allocation of capital. Rule 2a-
46(b) in our view also will promote efficiency by providing a workable
test for determining whether a company is an eligible portfolio
company.
We also believe Rule 2a-46(b) will promote competition. Rule 2a-
46(b) allows BDCs more easily to compete with other capital providers,
and such competition benefits shareholders of BDCs, companies receiving
the capital and shareholders of companies receiving capital. The market
for private equity and debt investments can be highly competitive.
Since their establishment, BDCs have competed with various sources of
capital, including private equity funds (including venture capital
funds), hedge funds, investment banks and other BDCs, to provide
financing to certain companies. We believe that Rule 2a-46(b) will
encourage such competition. Such competition also benefits the
qualifying companies in need of capital and their shareholders because
such companies can more readily consider BDCs as a source of financing.
To the extent that BDCs provide either additional or less expensive
capital to these companies, those companies may be more competitive in
the marketplace.
Finally, we believe that Rule 2a-46(b) may promote capital
formation. BDC investments represent additional capital to companies.
By expanding the definition of eligible portfolio company, Rule 2a-
46(b) may result in additional capital investments by BDCs. We estimate
that a total of 1,649 public domestic operating companies would qualify
as eligible portfolio companies under Rule 2a-46(b). The rule provides
greater access to public capital by increasing these companies' access
to BDC financing.
VI. Paperwork Reduction Act
The Commission has determined that Rule 2a-46 as amended does not
involve a collection of information pursuant to the provisions of the
Paperwork Reduction Act [44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.].
VII. Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
This Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis has been prepared in
accordance with 5 U.S.C. 604. It relates to Rule 2a-46(b) under the
Investment Company Act. An Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
(``IRFA'') was prepared in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 603 and was
published in the Reproposing Release. \77\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\77\ Reproposing Release supra note 1 at Section VII.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A. Reasons for and Objectives of the Amendment
As described previously in this Release, Rule 2a-46(b) more closely
aligns the definition of eligible portfolio company, and the investment
activities of BDCs, with the purpose that Congress intended.
Specifically, Rule 2a-46(b) will expand the definition of eligible
portfolio company to include any domestic operating company with a
class of securities listed on an Exchange that has a market
capitalization of less than $250 million. These companies may need BDC
financing for continued growth and development, but, notwithstanding
the fact that their securities are listed on an Exchange, may find it
difficult to raise additional capital in new offerings or borrow money
through other conventional sources.
B. Significant Issues Raised by Public Comment
When the Commission reproposed Rule 2a-46(b), comment was requested
on the reproposal and the accompanying IRFA. None of the comment
letters specifically addressed the IRFA.
C. Small Entities Subject to the Rule
Rule 2a-46(b) will affect BDCs and companies that qualify as small
entities under the Regulatory Flexibility Act. For purposes of the
Regulatory Flexibility Act, a BDC is a small entity if it, together
with other investment companies in the same group of related investment
companies, has net assets of $50 million or less as of the end of its
[[Page 29051]]
most recent fiscal year. \78\ As of June 2007, there were 73 BDCs, of
which 43 were small entities. A company other than an investment
company is a small entity under the Regulatory Flexibility Act if it
had total assets of $5 million or less on the last day of its most
recent fiscal year. \79\ We estimate there are approximately 20
Exchange-listed companies that may be considered small entities. \80\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\78\ 17 CFR 270.0-10.
\79\ 17 CFR 230.157; 17 CFR 240.0-10.
\80\ We noted in the Reproposing Release that at that time we
calculated that there were approximately 2,500 companies, other than
investment companies, that may be considered small entities. See
Reproposing Release supra note 1 at text following n.72. This figure
inadvertently included companies whose securities are not listed on
an Exchange. Rule 2a-46(b), however, only pertains to companies
whose securities are listed on an Exchange. As discussed above, we
estimate that there are only approximately 20 Exchange-listed
companies that may be considered small entities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As discussed in this Release, Rule 2a-46(b) is intended to benefit
certain companies that need capital for continued development and
growth, but may be unable to borrow money through conventional sources
despite their securities being listed on an Exchange. Rule 2a-46(b)
will also benefit BDCs, including those that are small entities, by
expanding the number of companies that BDCs may include as part of
their 70% basket. Because none of the comment letters specifically
addressed the IRFA, we continue to believe that those BDCs and
companies that are small entities for purposes of the Regulatory
Flexibility Act would not be disproportionately affected by the amended
rule.
D. Reporting, Recordkeeping and Other Compliance Requirements
Rule 2a-46(b) will not impose any new reporting or recordkeeping
requirements on BDCs or on companies. It also will impose only minimal,
if any, compliance requirements on portfolio companies.
Rule 2a-46(b) will impose minimal compliance requirements on BDCs,
including small entities. A BDC would need to determine, prior to
investing in a company, if the company has a class of securities listed
on an Exchange and whether that company's market capitalization was
less than $250 million as of a date within 60 days prior to the date of
the BDC's investment. We anticipate that the costs associated with
obtaining this information would be minimal because such information is
readily available from third-party sources. Furthermore, it is our
understanding that these costs are similar to the types of compliance
costs that a BDC currently undertakes when it invests in an issuer.
E. Commission Action To Minimize Adverse Impact on Small Entities
The Regulatory Flexibility Act directs us to consider significant
alternatives that would accomplish our stated objectives, while
minimizing any significant adverse impact on small entities.
Alternatives in this category would include: (1) Establishing different
compliance or reporting standards that take into account the resources
available to small entities; (2) clarifying, consolidating, or
simplifying the compliance requirements for small entities; (3) the use
of performance rather than design standards; and (4) exempting small
entities from the coverage of the rules, or any part thereof.
Establishing different compliance or reporting requirements for
small entities would not be appropriate under Rule 2a-46(b). Rule 2a-46
will not impose any reporting requirements on BDCs or on companies. It
will also not impose any compliance requirements on portfolio
companies. Rule 2a-46(b) will, however, impose some compliance
requirements on BDCs that are intended to ensure that BDCs invest
primarily in certain types of companies. These requirements should,
however, impose only minimal burdens on BDCs.
We believe that clarifying, consolidating or simplifying the
compliance requirements for small entities would be inappropriate. As
discussed above, Rule 2a-46(b) will not impose any compliance
requirements on portfolio companies. As noted, Rule 2a-46(b) will
impose some compliance requirements on BDCs, which we believe will
impose minimal burdens on BDCs. These requirements are designed to
ensure that BDCs will invest in companies in accordance with the rule.
We believe that using performance rather than design standards
would add unnecessary complexity. Rule 2a-46(b) provides a clear,
bright-line, workable test for determining whether a company is an
eligible portfolio company. A standard based on performance could be
unduly complicated and cause further uncertainty to BDCs, including
those that are small entities, when determining whether a company is an
eligible portfolio company. Likewise, the use of a performance standard
would bring uncertainty to companies in determining whether they meet
the definition of eligible portfolio company.
Finally, we believe that it would be inappropriate to exempt BDCs
that are small entities from the coverage of Rule 2a-46(b). Rule 2a-
46(b) should benefit BDCs and companies, including those that are small
entities, by expanding the definition of eligible portfolio company to
include certain companies whose securities are listed on an Exchange.
Exempting BDCs and companies that are small entities from the amended
rule would be contradictory to the purpose of this rulemaking.
VIII. Statutory Authority
We are amending Rule 2a-46 pursuant to our rulemaking authority
under Sections 2(a)(46)(C)(iv) and 38(a) of the Investment Company Act.
List of Subjects in 17 CFR Part 270
Investment companies, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements,
Securities.
Text of Rule
For reasons set forth in the preamble, Title 17, Chapter II of the
Code of Federal Regulations is amended as follows:
PART 270--RULES AND REGULATIONS, INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT OF 1940
0
1. The authority citation for part 270 continues to read in part as
follows:
Authority: 15 U.S.C. 80a-1 et seq., 80a-34(d), 80a-37, and 80a-
39, unless otherwise noted.
* * * * *
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2. Revise Sec. 270.2a-46 to read as follows:
Sec. 270.2a-46 Certain issuers as eligible portfolio companies.
The term eligible portfolio company shall include any issuer that
meets the requirements set forth in paragraphs (A) and (B) of section
2(a)(46) of the Act (15 U.S.C. 80a-2(a)(46)(A) and (B)) and that:
(a) Does not have any class of securities listed on a national
securities exchange; or
(b) Has a class of securities listed on a national securities
exchange, but has an aggregate market value of outstanding voting and
non-voting common equity of less than $250 million. For purposes of
this paragraph:
(1) The aggregate market value of an issuer's outstanding voting
and non-voting common equity shall be computed by use of the price at
which the common equity was last sold, or the average of the bid and
asked prices of such common equity, in the principal market for such
common equity as of a date within 60 days prior to the date of
acquisition of its securities by a business development company; and
(2) Common equity has the same meaning as in 17 CFR 230.405.
Dated: May 15, 2008.
[[Page 29052]]
By the Commission.
Nancy M. Morris,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. E8-11254 Filed 5-19-08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8010-01-P