Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Electronic Stability Control Systems; Controls and Displays, 17236-17322 [07-1649]
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Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 66 / Friday, April 6, 2007 / Rules and Regulations
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration
49 CFR Parts 571 and 585
[Docket No. NHTSA–2007–27662]
RIN 2127–AJ77
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety
Standards; Electronic Stability Control
Systems; Controls and Displays
National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration (NHTSA), DOT.
ACTION: Final rule.
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AGENCY:
SUMMARY: As part of a comprehensive
plan for reducing the serious risk of
rollover crashes and the risk of death
and serious injury in those crashes, this
document establishes a new Federal
motor vehicle safety standard (FMVSS)
No. 126 to require electronic stability
control (ESC) systems on passenger cars,
multipurpose passenger vehicles,
trucks, and buses with a gross vehicle
weight rating of 4,536 Kg (10,000
pounds) or less. ESC systems use
automatic computer-controlled braking
of individual wheels to assist the driver
in maintaining control in critical driving
situations in which the vehicle is
beginning to lose directional stability at
the rear wheels (spin out) or directional
control at the front wheels (plow out).
Preventing single-vehicle loss-ofcontrol crashes is the most effective way
to reduce deaths resulting from rollover
crashes. This is because most loss-ofcontrol crashes culminate in the vehicle
leaving the roadway, which
dramatically increases the probability of
a rollover. Based on the best available
data, drawn from crash data studies,
NHTSA estimates that the installation of
ESC will reduce single-vehicle crashes
of passenger cars by 34 percent and
single vehicle crashes of sport utility
vehicles (SUVs) by 59 percent, with a
much greater reduction of rollover
crashes. NHTSA estimates that ESC has
the potential to prevent 71 percent of
the passenger car rollovers and 84
percent of the SUV rollovers that would
otherwise occur in single-vehicle
crashes.
NHTSA estimates that ESC would
save 5,300 to 9,600 lives and prevent
156,000 to 238,000 injuries in all types
of crashes annually once all light
vehicles on the road are equipped with
ESC systems. The agency further
anticipates that ESC systems would
substantially reduce (by 4,200 to 5,500)
the more than 10,000 deaths each year
on American roads resulting from
rollover crashes.
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Manufacturers equipped about 29
percent of model year (MY) 2006 light
vehicles sold in the U.S. with ESC, and
intend to increase the percentage to 71
percent by MY 2011. This rule requires
installation of ESC in 100 percent of
light vehicles by MY 2012 (with
exceptions for some vehicles
manufactured in stages or by small
volume manufacturers). Once all light
vehicles in the fleet have ESC, of the
overall projected annual 5,300 to 9,600
highway deaths and 156,000 to 238,000
injuries prevented by stability control
systems installed either voluntarily or
under this rulemaking, we would
attribute 1,547 to 2,534 prevented
fatalities (including 1,171 to 1,465
involving rollover) to this rulemaking,
in addition to the prevention of 46,896
to 65,801 injuries by increasing the
percentage of light vehicles with ESC
from 71 percent to 100 percent.
DATES: Effective Date: This final rule is
effective June 5, 2007. The
incorporation by reference of certain
publications listed in the rule is
approved by the Director of the Federal
Register as of June 5, 2007.
Compliance Date: Consistent with the
phase-in commencing September 1,
2008, all new light vehicles must be
equipped with an ESC system that
meets the requirements of the standard
by September 1, 2011, with the
following exceptions. Vehicle
manufacturers need not meet the
standard’s requirements for control and
display requirements for the ESC
malfunction indicator telltale and ‘‘ESC
Off’’ switch and telltale (if provided)
until September 1, 2011 (i.e., at the end
of the phase-in), and vehicles produced
by final-stage manufacturers and alterers
must be equipped with a compliant ESC
system (including the control and
display requirements) by September 1,
2012. However, manufacturers may
voluntarily certify vehicles to FMVSS
No. 126 and earn carry-forward credits
for compliant vehicles, produced in
excess of the phase-in requirements,
that are manufactured between June 5,
2007, and the conclusion of the phasein.
Petitions for Reconsideration: If you
wish to submit a petition for
reconsideration of this rule, your
petition must be received by May 21,
2007.
ADDRESSES: Petitions for reconsideration
should refer to the docket number above
and be submitted to: Administrator,
Room 5220, National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration, 400 Seventh
Street, SW., Washington, DC 20590.
See the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
portion of this document (Section VI;
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Rulemaking Analyses and Notice) for
DOT’s Privacy Act Statement regarding
documents submitted to the agency’s
dockets.
For
non-legal issues, you may call Mr.
Patrick Boyd, Office of Crash Avoidance
Standards (Telephone: 202–366–6346)
(Fax: 202–366–7002).
For legal issues, you may call Mr. Eric
Stas, Office of the Chief Counsel
(Telephone: 202–366–2992) (Fax: 202–
366–3820).
You may send mail to both of these
officials at National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration, 400 Seventh
Street, SW., Washington, DC 20590.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Table of Contents
I. Executive Summary
A. Requirements of the Final Rule
B. Lead Time and Phase-in
C. Differences Between the Final Rule and
the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
D. Impacts of ESC and of the Final Rule
II. Background
A. Overview of the Safety Problem
B. The Agency’s Comprehensive Response
to Rollover
C. Congressional Mandate Under Section
10301 of the Safe, Accountable, Flexible,
Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A
Legacy for Users of 2005
D. Electronic Stability Control as a
Countermeasure to Address SingleVehicle Crashes and Rollovers
III. September 2006 Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (NPRM) and Public
Comments
A. The NPRM
B. Summary of the Public Comments on
the NPRM
IV. The Final Rule and Response to Public
Comments
A. Summary of the Requirements
B. Lead Time and Phase-in
C. Response to Public Comments by Issue
Major Issues
1. Approach of the ESC NPRM
(a) ESC Mandate vs. ESC Standardization
(b) ESC as Part of a Comprehensive
Rollover Safety Program
(c) Need for Common Terminology
2. The Definition of ‘‘ESC System’’ as the
Basis of the Standard
3. Stringency of the Standard
4. Understeer Requirements
5. Lateral Responsiveness Criteria
6. Definition of ‘‘ESC System’’ and
Required Equipment
(a) Clarification of Performance
Expectations
(b) Clarification of Threshold Speed
(c) Estimation of Sideslip—Request to Add
Derivative
(d) Request for Alternate Transducers
(e) Interaction with Other Vehicle Systems
(f) ESC Operation in Reverse
7. ESC Performance Requirements
(a) Definition for ‘‘Lateral Acceleration’’
(b) Lateral Displacement Calculation
(c) Yaw Rate Calculation
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(d) Temperature and Pavement
Specifications
(e) Data Processing Issues
(i) Determination of Beginning of Steering
(ii) Determination of End of Steering
(iii) Removing Offsets
(iv) Use of Interpolation
(v) Method for Determining Peak Steering
Wheel Angle
(vi) Need for a Common Data Processing
Kernel
(f) ESC Initialization Period
(g) ESC Calibration
Other Issues
8. ESC Malfunction Detection
Requirements
(a) Types of Malfunctions to be Detected
(b) Practicability Problems with
Malfunction Detection
(c) Monitoring When System is Off
(d) Minimum Performance Level
9. ESC Telltale Requirements
(a) ESC Telltale
(i) Telltale Symbol Text Enhancements
(ii) Telltale Symbol Alternative: Substitute
Text
(iii) Waiver of Yellow Color Requirement
for ESC Telltale When Message/
Information Center is Used
(iv) Telltale Illumination Strategy
(v) Telltale Extinguishment
(vi) Telltale Location
(vii) Use of ESC Malfunction Telltale to
Indicate Malfunctions of Related
Systems/Functions
(b) ‘‘ESC Off’’ Indication
(i) ‘‘ESC Off’’ Symbol Alternative: Use of
Text
(ii) Waiver of Yellow Color Requirement
When ‘‘ESC Off’’ is Indicated Via
Message/Information Center Text
(iii) ‘‘ESC Off’’ Telltale Clarification
(iv) ‘‘ESC Off’’ Telltale Strategy
(v) Use of Two-Part Telltales
(vi) Conditions for Illumination of ‘‘ESC
Off’’ Telltale: Speed
(vii) Conditions for Illumination of ‘‘ESC
Off’’ Telltale: Direction
(c) Alerting the Driver of ESC Activation
(i) Visual and Auditory Indications of ESC
Activation
(ii) Flashing Telltales as Activation
Indication of Intervention by Related
Systems/Functions
(d) Bulb Check
(i) Waiver of Bulb Check for Message/
Information Centers
(ii) Clarification Regarding Bulb Check
10. System Disablement and the ‘‘ESC Off’’
Control
(a) Provision of an ‘‘ESC Off’’ Control
(b) Switch for Complete ESC Deactivation
(c) ESC Operation After Malfunction and
‘‘ESC Off’’ Control Override
(d) Default to ‘‘ESC On’’ Status
(e) Operation of Vehicle in 4WD Low
Modes
(f) ‘‘ESC Off’’ Control Requirements
(i) Labeling of the ‘‘ESC Off’’ Control
(ii) Location of the ‘‘ESC Off’’ Control
11. Test Procedures
(a) Accuracy Requirements
(b) Tolerances
(c) Location of Lateral Accelerometer
(d) Calculation of Lateral Displacement
(e) Maximum Steering Angle
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(f) Vehicle Test Weight
(g) Data Filtering
(h) Outriggers
(i) Ambient Temperature Range
(j) Brake Temperatures
(k) Wind Speed
(l) Rounding of Steering Wheel Angle at 0.3
g
(m) Vehicle Speed Specification for the
Slowly Increasing Steer Test
(n) Alternative Test Procedures
(o) Representativeness of Real World
Conditions
12. Lead Time and Phase-in
(a) Lead Time for ESC Telltale(s)
(b) Phase-in Schedule
13. Impacts on the Aftermarket
(a) System Adaptability and Sharing ESC
Information
(b) ‘‘Make Inoperative’’ Prohibition
(c) Pass-through Certification
14. Compliance with Relevant Legal
Requirements
(a) Regulatory Flexibility Act
(b) Executive Orders 12866 and 13258
(c) Vehicle Safety Act
15. ESC Outreach Efforts
(a) ESC Test Procedures Workshop
(b) Public Information Campaign
16. Miscellaneous Issues
(a) Linking Brake Light Illumination to ESC
Activation
(b) Vehicles with Dual Wheels on the Rear
Axle
(c) ESC Operation with Towed Trailers
(d) Wheelchair-Accessible Vehicles
V. Benefits and Costs
A. Summary
B. ESC Benefits
C. ESC Costs
VI. Regulatory Analyses and Notices
Appendix: Technical Explanation in
Response to Comments on Understeer
I. Executive Summary
As part of a comprehensive plan 1 that
seeks to reduce the serious risk of
rollover crashes and the risk of death
and serious injury in those crashes, and
that includes a number of
complementary rulemaking actions, this
rule establishes Federal Motor Vehicle
Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 126,
Electronic Stability Control Systems,
which requires passenger cars,
multipurpose passenger vehicles
(MPVs), trucks, and buses that have a
gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) of
4,536 kg (10,000 pounds) or less to be
equipped with an ESC system that
meets the requirements of the standard.
ESC systems use automatic, computercontrolled braking of individual wheels
to assist the driver in maintaining
control (and the vehicle’s intended
heading) in situations where the vehicle
is beginning to lose directional stability
(e.g., where the driver misjudges the
severity of a curve or over-corrects in an
emergency situation). In such situations
(which occur with considerable
1 70
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frequency), intervention by the ESC
system can assist the driver in
preventing the vehicle from leaving the
roadway, thereby preventing fatalities
and injuries associated with crashes
involving vehicle rollover or collision
with various objects (e.g., trees, highway
infrastructure, other vehicles).
Based upon current estimates
regarding the effectiveness of ESC
systems, we believe that an ESC
standard could save thousands of lives
each year, providing potentially the
greatest safety benefits produced by any
safety device since the introduction of
seat belts. The following discussion
highlights the research and regulatory
efforts that have culminated in this
safety standard.
Since the early 1990’s, NHTSA has
been actively engaged in finding ways to
address the problem of vehicle rollover,
because crashes involving rollover are
responsible for a disproportionate
number of fatalities and serious injuries
(over 10,000 of the 33,000 fatalities of
vehicle occupants in 2004). Although
various options were explored, the
agency ultimately chose to add a
rollover resistance component to its
New Car Assessment Program (NCAP)
consumer information program in 2001.
In response to NCAP’s market-based
incentives, vehicle manufacturers made
modifications to their product lines to
increase their vehicles’ geometric
stability and rollover resistance by
utilizing wider track widths (typically
associated with passenger cars) on many
of their newer sport utility vehicles
(SUVs) and by making other
improvements to truck-based SUVs
during major redesigns (e.g.,
introduction of roll stability control).
This approach was successful in terms
of reducing the much higher rollover
rate of SUVs and other high-center-ofgravity vehicles, as compared to
passenger cars. However, manipulating
vehicle configuration alone cannot
entirely resolve the rollover problem
(particularly when consumers continue
to demand vehicles with greater
carrying capacity and higher ground
clearance).
Accordingly, the agency began
exploring technologies that could
confront the issue of vehicle rollover
from a different perspective or line of
inquiry, which led to today’s final rule.
We believe that the ESC requirement
offers a complementary approach that
may provide substantial benefits to
drivers of both passenger cars and LTVs
(light trucks/vans). Undoubtedly,
keeping vehicles from leaving the
roadway is the best way to prevent
deaths and injuries associated with
rollover, as well as other types of
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crashes. Based on its crash data studies,
NHTSA estimates that the installation of
ESC systems will reduce single vehicle
crashes of passenger cars by 34 percent
and single vehicle crashes of sport
utility vehicles (SUVs) by 59 percent. Its
effectiveness is especially great for
single-vehicle crashes resulting in
rollover, where ESC systems were
estimated to prevent 71 percent of
passenger car rollovers and 84 percent
of SUV rollovers in single vehicle
crashes (see Section V).
In short, we believe that preventing
single-vehicle loss-of-control crashes is
the most effective way to reduce
rollover deaths, and we believe that ESC
offers considerable promise in terms of
meeting this important safety objective
while maintaining a broad range of
vehicle choice for consumers. In fact,
among the agency’s ongoing and
planned rulemakings, it is the single
most effective way of reducing the total
number of traffic deaths. It is also the
most cost-effective of those rulemakings.
We note that this final rule also
satisfies the recent mandate in section
10301 of the Safe, Accountable,
Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity
Act: A Legacy for Users of 2005
(SAFETEA–LU).2 That provision
requires the Secretary of Transportation
to ‘‘establish performance criteria to
reduce the occurrence of rollovers
consistent with stability enhancing
technologies’’ and to ‘‘issue a proposed
rule * * * by October 1, 2006, and a
final rule by April 1, 2009.’’ In light of
the tremendous life-saving potential
anticipated to be associated with a
requirement for ESC to be standard
equipment on all light vehicles, the
agency determined that, consistent with
its mission to save lives, prevent
injuries and reduce economic costs due
to road traffic crashes, it was important
to issue a final rule as soon as possible
and accelerate the rate of installation.
Accordingly, today’s final rule is being
published well in advance of the
statutory deadline under SAFETEA–LU.
The balance of this notice discusses
(1) The background regarding the size of
the safety problem, the agency’s
comprehensive response to rolloverrelated safety problems, the agency’s
mandate under SAFETEA–LU, and ESC
systems as a countermeasure to address
single-vehicle crashes and rollovers (see
Section II); (2) the agency’s September
2006 NPRM for ESC and public
comments on that proposal (see Section
III); (3) the requirements and
implementation of the final rule,
including a detailed discussion
regarding resolution of the issues raised
2 Pub.
L. 109–59, 119 Stat. 1144 (2005).
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in public comments (see Section IV);
and (4) costs and benefits associated
with the final rule (see Section V).
However, before turning to this more
detailed analysis, we summarize the key
points of the final rule, including the
requirements for ESC systems under
FMVSS No. 126, lead time and phasein, differences between the final rule
and the NPRM, and the anticipated
impacts of the final rule.
A. Requirements of the Final Rule
After careful consideration of all
available information, including the
public comments, the agency has
decided to adopt in the ESC final rule
most of the elements of the proposed
rule. Consistent with SAFETEA–LU,
NHTSA is requiring all light vehicles to
be equipped with an ESC system with,
at the minimum, the capabilities of
current production systems. We believe
that a requirement for such ESC systems
is desirable in terms of both ensuring
technological feasibility and providing
the desired safety benefits in a costeffective manner. Although vehicle
manufacturers have been increasing the
portion of the light vehicle fleet
equipped with ESC, we believe that
given the relatively high cost of this
technology, a mandatory standard is
necessary to maximize the safety
benefits associated with electronic
stability control, and is required by
SAFETEA–LU.
In order to realize these benefits, we
have decided to require vehicles to be
equipped with an ESC system meeting
definitional requirements and to pass a
dynamic test. The definitional
requirements specify the necessary
elements of a stability control system
that is capable of both effective
oversteer and understeer intervention.
These requirements are necessary due to
the extreme difficulty in establishing
tests adequate, by themselves, to ensure
the desired level of ESC functionality in
a variety of circumstances.3 The test that
3 An equipment requirement is necessary because
it would be almost impossible to devise a single
performance test that could not be met through
some action by the manufacturer other than
providing an ESC system. Establishing a battery of
performance tests to achieve our intended results is
not possible at this time because we have not been
able to develop a practical, repeatable limitundersteer test, and there are no applicable tests in
vehicle dynamics literature. Although the agency
has undertaken its own preliminary research efforts
related to understeer, the complexity of such
research would require several years of additional
work before any conclusions could be reached
regarding an ESC understeer performance test.
Given this, the agency determined that it had
three available options: (1) Delay the ESC final rule
and conduct research and development; (2) drop
the understeer requirement and amend the standard
once an ESC performance test is developed; or (3)
include a requirement for understeer as part of the
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we are adopting is necessary to ensure
that the ESC system is robust and meets
a level of performance at least
comparable to that of current ESC
systems. This approach is similar to the
one we took, for similar reasons, in 1995
in mandating antilock brakes for
medium and heavy vehicles pursuant to
the Intermodal Surface Transportation
Efficiency Act (ISTEA) of 1991.4
These requirements are summarized
below:
• Consistent with the definition of
ESC contained in a voluntary consensus
standard, the Society of Automotive
Engineers 5 (SAE) Surface Vehicle
Information Report J2564 (rev. June
2004), we are requiring vehicles covered
under the standard to be equipped with
an ESC system that:
(1) Augments vehicle directional
stability by applying and adjusting the
vehicle brake torques individually to
induce a correcting yaw moment to a
vehicle;
(2) Is computer-controlled, with the
computer using a closed-loop
definition of ‘‘ESC System,’’ along with requiring
specific components that will permit the system to
intervene in excessive understeer situations.
The agency eliminated the first and second
options on the grounds of safety.
The agency believes that the third option,
adopting an understeer requirement as part of the
definition of ‘‘ESC System,’’ along with a
requirement for specific equipment suitable for that
purpose, will accomplish the purposes of the
statutory mandate. Such requirement is objective in
terms of explaining to manufacturers what type of
performance is required and the minimal
equipment necessary for that purpose. The agency
can verify that the system has the necessary
hardware and logic for understeer mitigation. Since
the necessary components for effective understeer
intervention are already present on all ESC systems,
we believe that manufacturers are highly unlikely
to decrease their ESC systems’ understeer
capabilities simply because the standard does not
have a specific test for understeer. The agency
believes that its chosen approach will ensure that
vehicle manufacturers maintain understeer
intervention as a feature of the ESC system, without
delaying the life-saving benefits of the ESC rule. In
the meantime, the agency will conduct additional
research in the area of ESC understeer intervention
and consider taking additional action, as
appropriate.
Even with an understeer test, the ultimate
practicability of a standard without an equipment
requirement remains in doubt because of the
possible large number of test conditions that would
be required.
4 60 FR 13216 (March 10, 1995).
5 The Society of Automotive Engineers is an
association of engineers, business executives,
educators, and students who share information and
exchange ideas for advancing the engineering of
mobility systems. SAE currently has over 90,000
members in approximately 97 countries. The
organization’s activities include development of
standards, events, and technical information and
expertise used in designing, building, maintaining,
and operating self-propelled vehicles for use on
land or sea, in air or space. See https://www.sae.org.
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algorithm 6 to limit vehicle oversteer
and to limit vehicle understeer;
(3) Has a means to determine vehicle
yaw rate 7 and to estimate its sideslip 8
or the time derivative of sideslip;
(4) Has a means to monitor driver
steering input;
(5) Has an algorithm to determine the
need, and a means to modify engine
torque, as necessary, to assist the driver
in maintaining control of the vehicle,
and
(6) Is operational over the full speed
range of the vehicle (except at vehicle
speeds less than 15 km/h (9.3 mph) or
when being driven in reverse).
• The ESC system, as defined above,
is also required to be capable of
applying brake torques individually at
all four wheels and to have an algorithm
that utilizes this capability.9 Except for
the situations specifically set forth in
part (6) of the definition of ‘‘ESC
System’’ above, the system is also
required to be operational during all
phases of driving, including
acceleration, coasting, and deceleration
(including braking). It is also required to
be capable of activation even if the antilock brake system or traction control
system is also activated.
• In order to ensure that a vehicle is
equipped with an ESC system that
meets the definition of ‘‘ESC System’’
under S4, the final rule requires vehicle
manufacturers to submit, upon the
request of NHTSA’s Office of Vehicle
Safety Compliance, ESC system
technical documentation as to when
understeer intervention is appropriate
for a given vehicle (see S5.6).
Specifically, NHTSA may seek
information such as a system diagram
that identifies all ESC components, a
written explanation describing the ESC
system’s basic operational
characteristics, a logic diagram
supporting the explanation of system
operations, and a discussion of the
pertinent inputs to the vehicle computer
or calculations within the computer and
6 A ‘‘closed-loop algorithm’’ is a cycle of
operations followed by a computer that includes
automatic adjustments based on the result of
previous operations or other changing conditions.
7 ‘‘Yaw rate’’ means the rate of change of the
vehicle’s heading angle measured in degrees/second
of rotation about a vertical axis through the
vehicle’s center of gravity.
8 ‘‘Sideslip’’ means the arctangent of the lateral
velocity of the center of gravity of the vehicle
divided by the longitudinal velocity of the center
of gravity.
9 The standard was developed based on new
vehicles produced in 2005 and 2006. The definition
of ESC is limited to four-wheel ESC systems
because existing two-wheel ESC systems are not
capable of understeer invention or four-wheel
automatic braking during an intervention, even
though these systems also produced substantial (but
lesser) benefits.
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how its algorithm uses that information
and controls ESC system hardware to
limit vehicle understeer.
• We are also requiring vehicles
covered under the standard to meet a
performance test. It must satisfy the
standard’s stability criteria and
responsiveness criterion when subjected
to the sine with dwell steering
maneuver test. This test involves a
vehicle’s coasting at an initial speed of
50 mph while a steering machine steers
the vehicle with a steering wheel
pattern as shown in Figure 2 of the
regulatory text. The test maneuver is
then repeated over a series of increasing
maximum steering angles. This test
maneuver was selected over a number of
other alternatives because we decided
that it has the best set of characteristics,
including severity of the test,
repeatability and reproducibility of
results, and the ability to address lateral
stability and responsiveness.
The maneuver is severe enough to
produce spinout for most vehicles
without ESC. The stability criteria for
the test measure how quickly the
vehicle stops rotating after the steering
wheel is returned to the straight-ahead
position. A vehicle that continues to
rotate for an extended period after the
driver steers straight is out of control,
which is what ESC is designed to
prevent. The quantitative stability
criteria are expressed in terms of the
percent of the peak yaw rate after
maximum steering that persists at a
period of time after the steering wheel
has been returned to straight ahead.
They require that the vehicle yaw rate
decrease to no more than 35 percent of
the peak value after one second and that
it continue to drop to no more than 20
percent after 1.75 seconds. Since a
vehicle that simply responds very little
to steering commands could meet the
stability criteria, a minimum
responsiveness criterion is applied to
the same test.
• Because the benefits of the ESC
system can only be realized if the
system is functioning properly, we are
requiring that a telltale be mounted
inside the occupant compartment in
front of and in clear view of the driver.
The ESC malfunction telltale is required
to illuminate after the occurrence of one
or more malfunctions that affect the
generation or transmission of control or
response signals in the vehicle’s ESC
system. Such telltale must remain
continuously illuminated for as long as
the malfunction(s) exists, whenever the
ignition locking system is in the ‘‘On’’
(‘‘Run’’) position.
• In certain circumstances, drivers
may have legitimate reasons to
disengage the ESC system or limit its
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ability to intervene, such as when the
vehicle is stuck in sand/gravel, is being
used while equipped with snow chains,
or is being run on a track for maximum
performance. Accordingly, under this
final rule, vehicle manufacturers may
include a driver-selectable switch that
places the ESC system in a mode in
which it does not satisfy the
performance requirements of the
standard (e.g., ‘‘sport’’ mode or full-off
mode). However, if the vehicle
manufacturer chooses this option, it
must ensure that the ESC system always
returns to the fully-functional default
mode at the initiation of each new
ignition cycle, regardless of the mode
the driver had previously selected (with
certain exceptions for low speed offroad axle/transfer case selections that
turn off ESC, but cannot be reset
electronically). If the vehicle
manufacturer chooses this option, it
must also provide an ‘‘ESC Off’’ control
and a telltale that is mounted inside the
occupant compartment in front of and
in clear view of the driver. Such telltale
must remain continuously illuminated
for as long as the ESC is in a mode that
renders it unable to meet the
performance requirements of the
standard, whenever the ignition locking
system is in the ‘‘On’’ (‘‘Run’’) position.
• We are not requiring the ESC
system to be equipped with a roll
stability control system. Roll stability
control systems involve relatively new
technology. There is currently an
insufficient body of data to judge the
efficacy of such systems. However, the
agency will continue to monitor the
development of these systems.
B. Lead Time and Phase-In
In order to provide the public with
what are expected to be the significant
safety benefits of ESC systems as rapidly
as possible, compliance with this final
rule is set to commence on September
1, 2008. That date marks the start of a
three-year phase-in period. Subject to
the special provisions discussed below,
NHTSA has decided to require
compliance in accordance with the
following schedule: 55 percent of a
vehicle manufacturer’s light vehicles
manufactured during the period from
September 1, 2008 to August 31, 2009;
75 percent of those manufactured
during the period from September 1,
2009 to August 31, 2010; 95 percent of
those manufactured during the period
from September 1, 2010 to August 31,
2011, and all light vehicles thereafter.
For the reasons discussed in detail in
Section IV.B of this notice, we believe
that it is practicable for vehicle
manufacturers to meet the requirements
of the phase-in discussed above, subject
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to the exceptions below. Because ESC is
so cost-effective and has such high
benefits in terms of potential fatalities
and injuries that may be prevented, the
agency has decided that it is important
to require ESC installation in light
vehicles as quickly as possible. Given
the product plans we have from six
vehicle manufacturers, and the desire to
provide manufacturers with flexibility
by having a carry-forward provision, we
have chosen the most aggressive phasein alternative that we believe is
reasonable (i.e., 55/75/95%). In doing
so, we have carefully considered the
financial and technological
practicability of the final rule (in
keeping with our statutory mandate),
while at the same time facilitating ESC
installation in the light vehicle fleet as
expeditiously as possible.
With the above said, the agency has
decided that it is appropriate to provide
the following exceptions to the phasein. First, we have decided to defer the
standard’s requirements related to the
ESC telltales and controls until the end
of the phase-in (i.e., September 1, 2011
for most manufacturers; September 1,
2012 for final-stage manufacturers and
alterers). Although vehicle
manufacturers generally commented
that they could bring their ESC systems
into full compliance (including the
control and telltale requirements), they
stated that additional lead time would
be necessary to accomplish those
changes, suggesting that they could do
so by the end of the phase-in. As a
complicating matter, vehicle
manufacturers and their trade
associations explained that even though
most current ESC systems would largely
meet the performance requirements of
the proposed standard, manufacturers’
inability to meet the proposed control
and display requirements would
prevent them from earning the carryforward credits needed to comply with
the ESC phase-in schedule. Our analysis
demonstrates that the safety benefits
associated with early introduction of
ESC systems, even without standardized
controls and displays, far outweigh the
benefits of delaying the standard until
all systems can fully meet the control
and display requirements (see FRIA’s
lead time/phase-in discussion).
Accordingly, we believe that it is
preferable to move rapidly to implement
the standard, but to delay the
compliance date only for the ESC
control and telltale requirements.
As proposed, vehicle manufacturers
may earn carry-forward credits for
compliant vehicles, produced in excess
of the phase-in requirements, which are
manufactured between the effective date
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of the final rule and the conclusion of
the phase-in period.10
This final rule excludes small volume
manufacturers (i.e., manufacturers
producing less than 5,000 vehicles for
sale in the U.S. market in one year) from
the phase-in, instead requiring those
manufacturers to fully comply with the
standard beginning on September 1,
2011.
In addition, consistent with the policy
set forth in NHTSA’s February 14, 2005
final rule on certification requirements
for vehicles built in two or more stages
and altered vehicles (70 FR 7414), finalstage manufacturers and alterers are
excluded from the requirements of the
phase-in and are permitted an
additional one year for compliance (i.e.,
until September 1, 2012). However,
final-stage manufacturers and alterers
may voluntarily certify compliance with
the standard prior to this date.
C. Differences Between the Final Rule
and the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
As noted above, NHTSA has decided
to adopt most of the provisions in the
NPRM as part of this final rule. We
made a number of changes in response
to the public comments on the NPRM.
The main differences between the
NPRM and the final rule involve an
increase in the percentages of FMVSS
No. 126-compliant vehicles that must be
produced during the phase-in period, a
delay in the requirements for
standardized symbols and acronyms for
ESC controls and displays until the end
of the phase-in, and the inclusion of
engine control as part of the standard’s
definition of ‘‘ESC system.’’
The following points briefly describe
the main differences between the NPRM
and this final rule.
• In order to increase fleet installation
of life-saving ESC systems, the phase-in
schedule for ESC is being accelerated to
require 55 percent phase-in in the first
year, 75 percent in the second year, and
95 percent in the third year, rather than
the 30 percent, 60 percent, and 90
percent schedule that was proposed (see
S8.1, S8.2, and S8.3 in the regulatory
text of this final rule).
• The effective date for the
requirement to use standardized
symbols and acronyms as well as certain
malfunction detection and ‘‘ESC Off’’
control functions has been moved to the
end of the phase-in period. This was
done in recognition of the fact that
manufacturers will be relying on the
carry-forward and compliance credits
for vehicles in current production that
10 We
note that carry-forward credits may not be
used to defer the mandatory compliance date of
September 1, 2011 for all covered vehicles.
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pass all the ESC performance
requirements, but currently lack the
standardized controls and displays
features proposed in the NPRM (see
S5.3.1, S5.3.2; S5.3.4; S5.3.9; S5.4.2;
S5.5.2; S5.5.3; S5.5.6).
• The definition of ‘‘ESC System’’ has
been changed to require ESC systems
with engine control, a feature that
allows the ESC system to reduce vehicle
speed during an intervention by cutting
engine power as well as by brake
application (see S4 ESC (5)). It was a
feature on most vehicles in the crash
data analysis and on all the vehicles in
the ESC cost study.
• The definition of ‘‘ESC System’’ has
been changed to delete the word ‘‘as
appropriate’’ from the description of
when the system must intervene to
mitigate vehicle understeer (see S4 ESC
(2)). Instead, in order to ensure that a
vehicle is equipped with an ESC system
that meets the definition of ‘‘ESC
System’’ under S4, we have decided to
require vehicle manufacturers to submit,
upon the request of NHTSA’s Office of
Vehicle Safety Compliance, ESC system
technical documentation as to when
understeer intervention is appropriate
for a given vehicle (see S5.6).
Specifically, NHTSA may seek
information such as a system diagram
that identifies all ESC components, a
written explanation describing the ESC
system’s basic operational
characteristics, a logic diagram
supporting the explanation of system
operations, and a discussion of the
pertinent inputs to the vehicle computer
or calculations within the computer and
how its algorithm uses that information
and controls ESC system hardware to
limit vehicle understeer.11
• The ‘‘ESC System’’ definition and
performance requirements have been
changed to refer to generating brake
torques at all four wheels individually,
rather than applying individual brakes,
so that the action of regenerative braking
by electric motors is included (see S4
ESC (1); S5.1.1).
• The definition of ‘‘ESC System’’ has
been further changed to recognize that
some systems operate by estimating the
time derivative of side slip, rather than
by measuring side slip directly. The
final rule also defines the low speed
threshold for ESC operation as 15 km/
h (see S4 ESC (3), (6)).
• The responsiveness criterion has
been changed to a two-stage criterion
with a lower lateral displacement
requirement for large vehicles (i.e., ones
11 We note here that we anticipate that much of
this information is proprietary and would be
submitted under a request for confidential
treatment pursuant to 49 CFR Part 512.
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over 7,716 pounds GVWR). It is applied
during tests with a peak commanded
steering angle of five times or greater
than the steering wheel angle necessary
to produce 0.3g steady-state lateral
acceleration. This is a change from
applying it simply for tests with steering
wheel angles greater than 180 degrees.
It compensates for the slower steering
gear ratios of large vehicles. (see S5.2;
S5.2.3; S6.3.5).
• Low-speed four-wheel-drive (4WD)
modes that have the side effect of
turning off ESC and that are selected by
mechanical controls that cannot be
automatically reset electrically are
excluded from the requirement for
automatic ESC restoration at the next
ignition cycle (see S5.4.1).
• Under the final rule, outriggers will
be used for testing of trucks, MPVs, and
buses, and the maximum weight and
roll moment of inertia are also specified
for outriggers (see S6.3.4).
• The ESC malfunction detection test
procedure has been modified to include
a short driving and turning procedure so
that ESC systems with self-diagnostics
requiring vehicle motion can
accomplish their function (see S7.10.2).
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D. Impacts of ESC and of the Final Rule
Based on its analysis of the best
available data, NHTSA estimates that
ESC—both installed voluntarily and
under this regulatory mandate—will
save 5,300 to 9,600 lives and prevent
156,000 to 238,000 injuries in all types
of crashes annually once all light
vehicles on the road are equipped with
ESC systems. A large portion of these
savings will come from preventing large
numbers of rollover crashes. ESC
systems will substantially reduce (by
4,200 to 5,500) the more than 10,000
deaths that occur on American roads
each year as a result of rollover crashes.
Manufacturers installed ESC in about
29 percent of model year (MY) 2006
light vehicles sold in the U.S., and
intend to increase the percentage of ESC
installation in light vehicles to 71
percent by MY 2011. This rule
accelerates that rate of installation by
requiring a 100 percent installation rate
by MY 2012 (with exceptions for some
vehicles manufactured in stages or by
small volume manufacturers). We took
that step because, in response to public
comments and our review of vehicle
manufacturers’ production plans, we
determined that it is practicable to
increase the percentage of new light
vehicles that must comply with
Standard No. 126 under the phase-in,
thereby accelerating the benefits
expected to be provided by ESC
systems.
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As the discussion below
demonstrates, ESC not only has a very
significant life-saving and injurypreventing potential in absolute terms,
but it also achieves these benefits in a
`
very cost-effective manner vis-a-vis
other agency rulemakings. ESC offers
consistently strong benefits and costeffectiveness across all types of light
vehicles, including passenger cars,
SUVs, vans, and pick-up trucks. Of the
5,300 to 9,600 highway deaths and
156,000 to 238,000 MAIS 1–5 injuries
that we project will be prevented
annually for all types of crashes once all
light vehicles on the road are equipped
with ESC, we attribute 1,547 to 2,534
prevented fatalities (including 1,171 to
1,465 involving rollover) to this
rulemaking, in addition to the
prevention of 46,896 to 65,801 injuries.
The agency estimates that the
production-weighted, average cost per
vehicle to meet the proposed standard’s
requirements will be $58 ($90.3 per
passenger car and $29.2 per light
truck).12 These are incremental costs
over the manufacturers’ MY 2011 plans
for installation of ABS, which is
expected to be installed in almost 93
percent of the light vehicle fleet, and
ESC, which is expected to be installed
in 71 percent of the light vehicle fleet.
Vehicle costs are estimated to be $368
(in 2005$) for anti-lock brakes (ABS)
and an additional $111 for ESC, for a
total system cost of $479 per vehicle.
The total annual vehicle cost of this
regulation, based on ESC installation
beyond manufacturers’ planned
percentages, is expected to be
approximately $985 million.
In terms of cost-effectiveness, this
final rule is expected to save 1,547 to
2,534 lives and prevent 46,896 to 65,801
injuries at a cost of $0.18 to $0.33
million per equivalent life saved at a 3
percent discount rate and $0.26 to $0.45
million at a 7 percent discount rate.
The final rule is highly cost-effective
even when passenger cars are
considered alone. The passenger car
portion of the final rule will save 945
lives and prevent 32,196 injuries at a
cost of $0.38 million per equivalent life
saved at a 3 percent discount rate and
$0.50 at a 7 percent discount rate.
II. Background
A. Overview of the Safety Problem
The following discussion explains the
nature and scope of the safety problem
which the agency seeks to address
through this rulemaking for ESC, based
upon our analysis of recent single12 We note that the costs for passenger cars are
higher because a greater portion of those vehicles
require installation of ABS in addition to ESC.
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17241
vehicle crash and rollover statistics.
About one in seven light vehicles
involved in police-reported crashes
collides with something other than
another vehicle. However, the
proportion of these single-vehicle
crashes increases steadily with
increasing crash severity, and almost
half of serious and fatal injuries occur
in single-vehicle crashes. We can
describe the relationship between crash
severity and the number of vehicles
involved in the crash using information
from the agency’s crash data programs.
We limit our discussion here to ‘‘light
vehicles,’’ which consist of passenger
cars, multipurpose passenger vehicles
(MPVs), trucks, and buses with a gross
vehicle weight rating (GVWR) of 4,536
kilograms (10,000 pounds) or less.13
The 2000–2005 data from the National
Automotive Sampling System (NASS)
Crashworthiness Data System (CDS) and
2005 data from the Fatality Analysis
Reporting System (FARS) were
combined to estimate the current target
population for this rulemaking. It
includes 27,680 people who were killed
as occupants of light vehicles (both
single-vehicle and multi-vehicle
crashes). Over half of these (15,191)
occurred in single-vehicle crashes. Of
these, 8,596 occurred in rollovers.
About 1.0 million injuries (AIS 1–5)
occurred in crashes that could be
affected by ESC, almost 458,000 in
single vehicle crashes (of which almost
half were in rollovers). Multi-vehicle
crashes that could be affected by ESC
accounted for 12,485 fatalities and
almost 547,000 injuries.
Rollover crashes are complex events
that reflect the interaction of driver,
road, vehicle, and environmental
factors. We can describe the relationship
between these factors and the risk of
rollover using information from the
agency’s crash data programs.
According to 2005 data from FARS,
10,836 people were killed as occupants
in light vehicle rollover crashes, which
represents 34 percent of all occupants
killed that year in crashes. Of those,
8,769 were killed in single-vehicle
rollover crashes. Seventy-four percent of
the people who died in single-vehicle
rollover crashes were not using a seat
belt, and 61 percent were partially or
completely ejected from the vehicle
(including 50 percent who were
completely ejected). FARS shows that
55 percent of light vehicle occupant
fatalities in single-vehicle crashes
involved a rollover event.
13 For brevity, we use the term ‘‘light trucks’’ in
this document to refer to multipurpose passenger
vehicles (e.g., vans, minivans, and SUVs), trucks,
and buses with a GVWR of 4,536 kilograms (10,000
pounds) or less.
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Using data from the 2000–2004 NASS
CDS files, we estimate that 266,000 light
vehicles were towed from a policereported rollover crash each year (on
average), and that 29,000 occupants of
these vehicles were seriously injured. Of
these 266,000 light vehicle rollover
crashes, 219,000 were single-vehicle
crashes. Sixty-one percent of those
people who suffered a serious injury in
a single-vehicle tow-away rollover crash
were not using a seat belt, and 52
percent were partially or completely
ejected (including 41 percent who were
completely ejected). Estimates from
NASS CDS indicate that 82 percent of
tow-away rollovers were single-vehicle
crashes, and that 88 percent (197,000) of
the single-vehicle rollover crashes
occurred after the vehicle left the
roadway. An audit of 1992–96 NASS
CDS data showed that about 95 percent
of rollovers in single-vehicle crashes
were tripped by mechanisms such as
curbs, soft soil, pot holes, guard rails,
and wheel rims digging into the
pavement, rather than by tire/road
interface friction as in the case of
untripped rollover events.
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B. The Agency’s Comprehensive
Response to Rollover
As mentioned above, this final rule
for ESC is but one part of the agency’s
comprehensive plan to address the issue
of vehicle rollover. The following
discussion provides background on
NHTSA’s comprehensive plan to reduce
rollover crashes. In 2002, the agency
formed an Integrated Project Team (IPT)
to examine the rollover problem and to
make recommendations on how to
reduce rollovers and to improve safety
when rollovers nevertheless occur. In
June 2003, based on the work of that
team, the agency published a report
titled, ‘‘Initiatives to Address the
Mitigation of Vehicle Rollover.’’ 14 The
report recommended improving vehicle
stability, ejection mitigation, roof crush
resistance, as well as road
improvements and behavioral strategies
aimed at consumer education.
Since then, the agency has been
working to implement these
recommendations as part of its
comprehensive agency plan for reducing
the serious risk of rollover crashes and
the risk of death and serious injury
when rollover crashes do occur. It is
evident that the most effective way to
reduce deaths and injuries in rollover
crashes is to prevent the rollover crash
from occurring. This final rule adopting
a new Federal motor vehicle safety
standard for electronic stability control
systems is one key part of that
comprehensive agency plan.
Moreover, we note that the agency
also published a notice of proposed
rulemaking in the Federal Register in
August 2005, seeking to upgrade our
safety standard on roof crush resistance
(FMVSS No. 216); that notice, like the
present one, contains an in-depth
discussion of the rollover problem and
the countermeasures which the agency
intends to pursue as part of its
comprehensive response to the rollover
problem (see 70 FR 49223 (August 23,
2005)).
C. Congressional Mandate Under
Section 10301 of the Safe, Accountable,
Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity
Act: A Legacy for Users of 2005
During the course of the ongoing
agency’s research into ESC systems,
Congress passed the Safe, Accountable,
Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity
Act: A Legacy for Users of 2005
(SAFETEA–LU).15 Section 10301 of that
Act contains legislative mandates for the
agency to initiate a number of
rulemakings, including ones for rollover
prevention and occupant ejection
prevention. In relevant part, that
provision states:
(a) In General.—The Secretary [of
Transportation] shall initiate rulemaking
proceedings, for the purpose of establishing
rules or standards that will reduce vehicle
rollover crashes and mitigate deaths and
injuries associated with such crashes for
motor vehicles with a gross vehicle weight
rating of not more than 10,000 pounds.
(b) Rollover Prevention.—One of the
rulemaking proceedings initiated under
subsection (a) shall be to establish
performance criteria to reduce the occurrence
of rollovers consistent with stability
enhancing technologies. The Secretary shall
issue a proposed rule in this proceeding by
rule by October 1, 2006, and a final rule by
April 1, 2009.
This SAFETEA–LU mandate is
consistent with the agency’s efforts
under its Comprehensive Rollover
Safety Program (discussed above). The
agency’s research efforts had already
identified electronic stability control
systems as a mature and effective
technology which has had adequate
time to be analyzed in both the
scientific literature, as well as by
NHTSA researchers. These research
results strongly suggest that fleet-wide
installation of ESC systems should yield
tremendous benefits in terms of the
prevention of fatalities and injuries.
Although the agency considered other
potential ‘‘stability enhancing
technologies,’’ there was no evidence to
demonstrate that they would meet the
need for motor vehicle safety (see
Section IV.C.3 below). Accordingly, the
agency has determined that adopting a
requirement for installation of ESC
systems in light vehicles would be
consistent with the statutory mandate
under section 10301 of SAFETEA–LU.
Under our interpretation of that
statutory provision, Congress provided
the agency discretion to evaluate
various stability enhancing technologies
and to adopt a requirement for a system
that the agency determines would best
reduce the occurrence of rollovers. The
agency agrees with Congress regarding
the tremendous life-saving potential
associated with ESC as a proven
stability enhancing technology, and
because of the agency’s prior efforts, it
was possible to publish today’s final
rule well in advance of the statutory
deadline under SAFETEA–LU.
As this final rule makes clear, the
agency has decided to implement the
statutory mandate contained in section
10301 of SAFETEA–LU through
promulgation of a Federal motor vehicle
safety standard for ESC pursuant to 49
U.S.C. Chapter 301, Motor Vehicle
Safety. Adoption of an FMVSS for ESC
meets the statutory directive to
‘‘establish performance criteria’’
consistent with stability enhancing
technologies. Furthermore, this
approach is consistent with the agency’s
implementation of the statutory
mandate for tire pressure monitoring
systems contained in section 1316 of the
Transportation Recall Enhancement,
Accountability, and Documentation
(TREAD) Act.17
D. Electronic Stability Control as a
Countermeasure to Address SingleVehicle Crashes and Rollovers
General Principles of ESC System
Operation
Although Electronic Stability Control
(ESC) systems have been known by a
number of different trade names such as
Vehicle Stability Control (VSC),
Electronic Stability Program (ESP),
StabiliTrak and Vehicle Stability
Enhancement (VSE), their function and
performance are similar. They are
systems that use computer control of
individual wheel brakes to help the
driver maintain control of the vehicle
during extreme maneuvers by keeping
the vehicle headed in the direction the
driver is steering even when the vehicle
nears or reaches the limits of road
traction.
When a driver attempts an ‘‘extreme
maneuver’’ (e.g., one initiated to avoid
16 See
14 See
Docket Number NHTSA 2003–14622–1.
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15 Pub.
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49 U.S.C. 30123 note (2003).
L. 106–414, 114 Stat. 1800 (2000).
17 Pub.
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a crash or due to misjudgment of the
severity of a curve), the driver may lose
control if the vehicle responds
differently as it nears the limits of road
traction than it does during ordinary
driving. The driver’s loss of control can
result in either the rear of the vehicle
‘‘spinning out’’ or the front of the
vehicle ‘‘plowing out.’’ As long as there
is sufficient road traction, a highly
skilled driver may be able to maintain
control in many extreme maneuvers
using countersteering (i.e., momentarily
turning away from the intended
direction) and other techniques.
However, average drivers in a panic
situation in which the vehicle is
beginning to spin out would be unlikely
to countersteer to regain control.
ESC uses automatic braking of
individual wheels to adjust the vehicle’s
heading if it departs from the direction
the driver is steering. Thus, it prevents
the heading from changing too quickly
(spinning out) or not quickly enough
(plowing out). Although it cannot
increase the available traction, ESC
affords the driver the maximum
possibility of keeping the vehicle under
control and on the road in an emergency
maneuver using just the natural reaction
of steering in the intended direction.
Keeping the vehicle on the road
prevents single-vehicle crashes, which
are the circumstances that lead to most
rollovers. However, if the speed is
simply too great for the available road
traction, even a vehicle with ESC will
unavoidably drift off the road (but not
spin out). Furthermore, ESC cannot
prevent road departures due to driver
inattention or drowsiness rather than
loss of control.
How ESC Prevents Loss of Vehicle
Control
The following explanation of ESC
operation illustrates the basic principle
of yaw stability control, but it does not
attempt to explain advanced
refinements of the yaw control strategy
described below that use vehicle
sideslip (lateral sliding that may not
alter yaw rate) to optimize performance
on slippery pavements.
An ESC system maintains what is
known as ‘‘yaw’’ (or heading) control by
determining the driver’s intended
heading, measuring the vehicle’s actual
response, and automatically turning the
vehicle if its response does not match
the driver’s intention. However, with
ESC, turning is accomplished by
applying a brake force at a single wheel
rather than by steering input. (The
uneven brake force from braking only
one wheel creates a yaw torque or
moment that rotates the vehicle around
a vertical axis.)
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Speed and steering angle
measurements are used to determine the
driver’s intended heading. The vehicle
response is measured in terms of lateral
acceleration and yaw rate by onboard
sensors. If the vehicle is responding in
a manner corresponding to driver input,
the yaw rate will be in balance with the
speed and lateral acceleration.
The concept of ‘‘yaw rate’’ can be
illustrated by imaging the view from
above of a car following a large circle
painted on a parking lot. One is looking
at the top of the roof of the vehicle and
seeing the circle. If the car starts in a
heading pointed north and drives half
way around circle, its new heading is
south. Its yaw angle has changed 180
degrees. If it takes 10 seconds to go half
way around the circle, the ‘‘yaw rate’’ is
180 degrees per 10 seconds or 18 deg/
sec. If the speed stays the same, the car
is constantly rotating at a rate of 18 deg/
sec around a vertical axis that can be
imagined as piercing its roof. If the
speed is doubled, the yaw rate increases
to 36 deg/sec.
While driving in a circle, the driver
notices that he must hold the steering
wheel tightly to avoid sliding toward
the passenger seat. The bracing force is
necessary to overcome the lateral
acceleration that is caused by the car
following the curve. The lateral
acceleration is also measured by the
ESC system. When the speed is doubled
the lateral acceleration increases by a
factor of four if the vehicle follows the
same circle. There is a fixed physical
relationship between the car’s speed,
the radius of its circular path, and its
lateral acceleration.
The ESC system uses this information
as follows: Since the ESC system
measures the car’s speed and its lateral
acceleration, it can compute the radius
of the circle. Since it then has the radius
of the circle and the car’s speed, the ESC
system can compute the correct yaw rate
for a car following the path. Of course,
the system includes a yaw rate sensor,
and it compares the actual measured
yaw rate of the car to that computed for
the path the car is following. If the
computed and measured yaw rates
begin to diverge as the car that is trying
to follow the circle speeds up, it means
the driver is beginning to lose control,
even if the driver cannot yet sense it.
Soon, an unassisted vehicle would have
a heading significantly different from
the desired path and would be out of
control either by oversteering (spinning
out) or understeering.
When the ESC system detects an
imbalance between the measured yaw
rate of a vehicle and the path defined by
the vehicle’s steering wheel angle,
speed, and lateral acceleration, the ESC
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system automatically intervenes to turn
the vehicle. The automatic turning of
the vehicle is accomplished by uneven
brake application rather than by steering
wheel movement. If only one wheel is
braked, the uneven brake force will
cause the vehicle’s heading to change.
Figure 1 shows the action of ESC using
single wheel braking to correct the onset
of oversteering or understeering. (Please
note that all Figures discussed in this
preamble may be found at the end of the
preamble, immediately preceding the
proposed regulatory text.)
• Oversteering. In Figure 1 (bottom
panel), the vehicle has entered a left
curve that is extreme for the speed it is
traveling. The rear of the vehicle begins
to slide which would lead to a vehicle
without ESC turning sideways (or
‘‘spinning out’’) unless the driver
expertly countersteers. In a vehicle
equipped with ESC, the system
immediately detects that the vehicle’s
heading is changing more quickly than
appropriate for the driver’s intended
path (i.e., the yaw rate is too high). It
momentarily applies the right front
brake to turn the heading of the vehicle
back to the correct path. It will also cut
engine power to gently slow the vehicle
and, if necessary, apply additional
brakes (while maintaining the uneven
brake force to create the necessary yaw
moment). The action happens quickly
so that the driver does not perceive the
need for steering corrections. Even if the
driver brakes because the curve is
sharper than anticipated, the system is
still capable of generating uneven
braking if necessary to correct the
heading.
• Understeering. Figure 1 (top panel)
shows a similar situation faced by a
vehicle whose response as it nears the
limits of road traction is to slide at the
front (‘‘plowing out’’ or understeering)
rather than oversteering. In this
situation, the ESC system rapidly
detects that the vehicle’s heading is
changing less quickly than appropriate
for the driver’s intended path (i.e., the
yaw rate is too low). It momentarily
applies the left rear brake to turn the
heading of the vehicle back to the
correct path. Again, it will also cut
engine power to gently slow the vehicle
and, if necessary, apply additional
brakes (while maintaining the uneven
brake force to create the necessary yaw
moment).
While Figure 1 may suggest that
particular vehicles go out of control as
either vehicles prone to oversteer or
vehicles prone to understeer, it is just as
likely that a given vehicle could require
both understeer and oversteer
interventions during progressive phases
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of a complex avoidance maneuver such
as a double lane change.
Although ESC cannot change the tire/
road friction conditions the driver is
confronted with in a critical situation,
there are clear reasons to expect it to
reduce loss-of-control crashes, as
discussed below.
In vehicles without ESC, the response
of the vehicle to steering inputs changes
as the vehicle nears the limits of road
traction. All of the experience of the
average driver is in operating the
vehicle in its ‘‘linear range’’, i.e., the
range of lateral acceleration in which a
given steering wheel movement
produces a proportional change in the
vehicle’s heading. The driver merely
turns the wheel the expected amount to
produce the desired heading.
Adjustments in heading are easy to
achieve because the vehicle’s response
is proportional to the driver’s steering
input, and there is very little lag time
between input and response. The car is
traveling in the direction it is pointed,
and the driver feels in control. However,
at lateral accelerations above about onehalf ‘‘g’’ on dry pavement for ordinary
vehicles, the relationship between the
driver’s steering input and the vehicle’s
response changes (toward oversteer or
understeer), and the lag time of the
vehicle response can lengthen. When a
driver encounters these changes during
a panic situation, it adds to the
likelihood that the driver will lose
control and crash because the familiar
actions learned by driving in the linear
range would not be the correct steering
actions.
However, ordinary linear range
driving skills are much more likely to be
adequate for a driver of a vehicle with
ESC to avoid loss of control in a panic
situation. By monitoring yaw rate and
sideslip, ESC can intervene early in the
impending loss-of-control situation with
the appropriate brake forces necessary
to restore yaw stability before the driver
would attempt an over correction or
other error. The net effect of ESC is that
the driver’s ordinary driving actions
learned in linear range driving are the
correct actions to control the vehicle in
an emergency. Also, the vehicle will not
change its heading from the desired
path in a way that would induce further
panic in a driver facing a critical
situation.
Besides allowing drivers to cope with
emergency maneuvers and slippery
pavement using only ‘‘linear range’’
skills, ESC provides more powerful
control interventions than those
available to even expert drivers of nonESC vehicles. For all practical purposes,
the yaw control actions with non-ESC
vehicles are limited to steering.
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However, as the tires approach the
maximum lateral force sustainable
under the available pavement friction,
the yaw moment generated by a given
increment of steering angle is much less
than at the low lateral forces occurring
in regular driving 18. This means that as
the vehicle approaches its maximum
cornering capability, the ability of the
steering system to turn the vehicle is
greatly diminished, even in the hands of
an expert driver. ESC creates the yaw
moment to turn the vehicle using
braking at an individual wheel rather
than the steering system. This
intervention remains powerful even at
limits of tire traction because both the
braking force of the individual tire and
the reduction of lateral force that
accompanies the braking force act to
create the desired yaw moment.
Therefore, ESC can be especially
beneficial on slippery surfaces. While a
vehicle’s possibility of staying on the
road in a critical maneuver ultimately is
limited by the tire/pavement friction,
ESC maximizes an ordinary driver’s
ability to use the available friction.
Overview of ESC Effectiveness in
Preventing Single-Vehicle and Rollover
Crashes
Crash data studies conducted in the
U.S., Europe, and Japan indicate that
ESC is very effective in reducing singlevehicle crashes. Studies of the behavior
of ordinary drivers in critical situations
using the National Advanced Driving
Simulator also show a very large
reduction in instances of loss of control
when the vehicle is equipped with ESC.
Based on its crash data studies, NHTSA
estimates that ESC will reduce single
vehicle crashes of passenger cars by 34
percent and single vehicle crashes of
SUVs by 59 percent. NHTSA’s latest
crash data study also shows that ESC is
most effective in reducing single-vehicle
crashes that result in rollover. ESC is
estimated to prevent 71 percent of
passenger car rollovers and 84 percent
of SUV rollovers in single vehicle
crashes. It is also estimated to reduce
some multi-vehicle crashes but at a
much lower rate than its effect on single
vehicle crashes. The following
discussion explains in detail the
research finding upon which the agency
has relied in determining the
anticipated effectiveness of ESC
systems.
Electronic stability control can
directly reduce a vehicle’s susceptibility
to on-road untripped rollovers as
18 Liebemann et al., (2005) Safety and
Performance Enhancement: The Bosch Electronic
Stability Control (ESP), 19th International
Technical Conference on the Enhanced Safety of
Vehicles (ESV), Washington, DC.
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measured by the ‘‘fishhook’’ test that is
part of NHTSA’s NCAP rollover rating
program. The direct effect is mostly
limited to untripped rollovers on paved
surfaces. However, untripped on-road
rollovers are a relatively infrequent type
of rollover crash. In contrast, the vast
majority of rollover crashes occur when
a vehicle runs off the road and strikes
a tripping mechanism such as soft soil,
a ditch, a curb or a guardrail.
We expect that requiring ESC to be
installed on light trucks and passenger
cars would result in a large reduction in
the number of rollover crashes by
greatly reducing the number of singlevehicle crashes. As noted previously,
over 80 percent of rollovers are the
result of a single-vehicle crash. The
purpose of ESC is to assist the driver in
keeping the vehicle on the road during
impending loss-of-control situations. In
this way, it can prevent the exposure of
vehicles to off-road tripping
mechanisms. We note, however, that
this yaw stability function of ESC is not
direct ‘‘rollover resistance’’ and cannot
be measured by the NCAP rollover
resistance rating.
Although ESC is an indirect
countermeasure to prevent rollover
crashes, we believe it is the most
powerful countermeasure available to
address this serious risk. Effectiveness
studies by NHTSA and others
worldwide 19 estimate that ESC reduces
single vehicle crashes by at least a third
in passenger cars and perhaps reduces
loss-of-control crashes (e.g., road
departures leading to rollovers) by an
even greater amount. In fact, NHTSA’s
latest data study that is discussed in this
section found a reduction in singlevehicle crashes leading to rollover of 71
percent for passenger cars and 84
percent for SUVs. Thus, ESC can reduce
the numbers of rollovers of all vehicles,
including lower center of gravity
vehicles (e.g., passenger cars, minivans
and two-wheel drive pickup trucks), as
19 Aga M, Okada A. (2003) Analysis of Vehicle
Stability Control (VSC)’s Effectiveness from
Accident Data, 18th International Technical
Conference on the Enhanced Safety of Vehicles
(ESV), Nagoya.
Dang, J. (2004) Preliminary Results Analyzing
Effectiveness of Electronic Stability Control (ESC)
Systems, Report No. DOT HS 809 790. U.S. Dept.
of Transportation, Washington, DC.
Farmer, C. (2004) Effect of Electronic Stability
Control on Automobile Crash Risk, Traffic Injury
Prevention Vol. 5:317–325.
Kreiss J-P, et al. (2005) The Effectiveness of
Primary Safety Features in Passenger Cars in
Germany. 19th International Technical Conference
on the Enhanced Safety of Vehicles (ESV),
Washington, DC.
Lie A., et al. (2005) The Effectiveness of ESC
(Electronic Stability Control) in Reducing Real Life
Crashes and Injuries. 19th International Technical
Conference on the Enhanced Safety of Vehicles
(ESV), Washington, DC.
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well as of the higher center of gravity
vehicle types (e.g., SUVs and four-wheel
drive pickup trucks). ESC can affect
both crashes that would have resulted in
rollover as well as other types of crashes
(e.g., road departures resulting in
impacts) that result in deaths and
injuries.
Human Factors Study on the
Effectiveness of ESC
A study by the University of Iowa
using the National Advanced Driving
Simulator demonstrated the effect of
ESC on the ability of ordinary drivers to
maintain control in critical situations.20
A sample of 120 drivers equally divided
between men and women and between
three age groups (18–25, 30–40, and 55–
65) was subjected to the following three
critical driving scenarios. The
‘‘Incursion Scenario’’ forced drivers to
attempt a double lane change at high
speed (65 mph speed limit signs) by
presenting them first with a vehicle that
suddenly backs into their lane from a
driveway and then with another vehicle
driving toward them in the left lane.
The ‘‘Curve Departure Scenario’’
presented drivers with a constant radius
curve that was uneventful at the posted
speed limit of 65 mph followed by
another curve that appeared to be
similar but that had a decreasing radius
that was not evident upon entry. The
‘‘Wind Gust Scenario’’ presented drivers
with a sudden lateral wind gust of short
duration that pushed the drivers toward
a lane of oncoming traffic. The 120
drivers were further divided evenly
between two vehicles, an SUV and a
midsize sedan. Half the drivers of each
vehicle drove with ESC enabled, and
half drove with ESC disabled.
In 50 of the 179 test runs performed
in a vehicle without ESC, the driver lost
control. In contrast, in only six of the
179 test runs performed in a vehicle
with ESC, did the driver lose control.
One test run in each ESC status had to
be aborted. These results demonstrate
an 88 percent reduction in loss-ofcontrol crashes when ESC was engaged.
The study also concluded that the
presence of an ESC system helped
reduce loss of control regardless of age
or gender, and that the benefit was
substantially the same for the different
driver subgroups in the study. Because
of the obvious danger to participants, an
experiment like this cannot be
performed safely with real vehicles on
real roads. However, the National
Advanced Driver Simulator provides
extraordinary verisimilitude with the
20 Papelis et al. (2004) Study of ESC Assisted
Driver Performance Using a Driving Simulator,
Report No. N04–003–PR, University of Iowa.
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driver sitting in a real vehicle, seeing a
360-degree scene and experiencing the
linear and angular accelerations and
sounds that would occur in actual
driving of the specific vehicle.
Crash Data Studies of ESC Effectiveness
There have been a number of studies
of ESC effectiveness in Europe and
Japan beginning in 2003.21 All of them
have shown large potential reductions
in single-vehicle crashes as a result of
ESC. However, the sample sizes of
crashes of vehicles new enough to have
ESC tended to be small in these studies.
A preliminary NHTSA study published
in September 2004 22 of crash data from
1997–2003 found ESC to be effective in
reducing single-vehicle crashes,
including rollover. Among vehicles in
the study, the results suggested that ESC
reduced single vehicle crashes in
passenger cars by 35 percent and in
SUVs by 67 percent. In October 2004,
the Insurance Institute for Highway
Safety (IIHS) released the results of a
study of the effectiveness of ESC in
preventing crashes of cars and SUVs.
The IIHS found that ESC is most
effective in reducing fatal single-vehicle
crashes, reducing such crashes by 56
percent. NHTSA’s later peer-reviewed
study 23 of ESC effectiveness found that
ESC reduced single vehicle crashes in
passenger cars by 34 percent and in
SUVs by 59 percent, and that its
effectiveness was greatest in reducing
single vehicle crashes resulting in
rollover (71 percent reduction for
passenger cars and an 84 percent
reduction for SUVs). It also found
reductions in fatal single-vehicle
crashes and fatal single-vehicle rollover
crashes that were commensurate with
the overall crash reductions cited. ESC
reduced fatal single-vehicle crashes in
passenger cars by 35 percent and in
SUVs by 67 percent and reduced fatal
single-vehicle crashes involving rollover
by 69 percent in passenger cars and 88
percent in SUVs.
(a) NHTSA’s preliminary study
In September, 2004, NHTSA issued an
evaluation note on the Preliminary
Results Analyzing the Effectiveness of
Electronic Stability Control (ESC)
Systems. The study evaluated the
effectiveness of ESC in reducing single
vehicle crashes in various domestic and
21 See
Footnote 10.
J. (2004) Preliminary Results Analyzing
Effectiveness of Electronic Stability Control (ESC)
Systems, Report No. DOT HS 809 790. U.S. Dept.
of Transportation, Washington, DC.
23 Dang, J. (2006) Statistical Analysis of The
Effectiveness of Electronic Stability Control (ESC)
Systems, U.S. Dept. of Transportation, Washington,
DC (publication pending peer review). A draft
version of this report, as supplied to peer reviewers,
has been placed in the docket for this rulemaking.
22 Dang,
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17245
imported cars and SUVs. It was based
on Fatality Analysis Reporting System
(FARS) data from calendar years 1997–
2003 and crash data from five States that
reported partial Vehicle Identification
Number (VIN) information in their data
files (Florida, Illinois, Maryland,
Missouri, and Utah) from calendar years
1997–2002. The data were limited to
mostly luxury vehicles because ESC first
became available in 1997 in luxury
vehicles such as Mercedes-Benz and
BMW. The analysis compared specific
make/models of passenger cars and
SUVs with ESC versus earlier versions
of the same make/models, using multivehicle crash involvements as a control
group.
The passenger car sample consisted of
mainly Mercedes-Benz and BMW
models (61 percent). Mercedes-Benz
installed ESC in certain luxury models
in 1997 and had made it standard
equipment in all their models (except
one) by 2000. BMW also installed ESC
in certain 5, 7, and 8 series models as
early as 1997 and had made it standard
equipment in all their models by 2001.
The passenger car sample also included
some luxury GM cars, which constituted
23 percent of the sample, and a few cars
from other manufacturers. GM cars
where ESC was offered as standard
equipment are the Buick Park Avenue
Ultra, the Cadillac DeVille, Seville STS
and SLS, the Oldsmobile Aurora, the
Pontiac Bonneville SSE and SSEi, and
the Chevrolet Corvette. The SUV make/
models in the study with ESC include
Mercedes-Benz (ML320, ML350, ML430,
ML500, G500, G55 AMG), Toyota
(4Runner, Landcruiser), and Lexus
(RX300, LX470).
The first set of analyses used multivehicle crash involvements as a control
group, essentially assuming that ESC
has no effect on multi-vehicle crashes.
Specific make/models with ESC were
compared with earlier versions of
similar make/models using multivehicle crash involvements as a control
group, creating 2x2 contingency tables
as shown in Tables 1 and 2. The study
found that single vehicle crashes were
reduced by
1 ¥ {(699/1483)/(14090/19444)} = 35
percent
for passenger cars and by 67 percent for
SUVs (Table 1). Similarly, fatal single
vehicle crashes were reduced by 30
percent in cars and by 63 percent in
SUVs (Table 2). Reductions of single
vehicle crashes in passenger cars and
SUVs were statistically significant at the
.01 level, as evidenced by chi-square
statistics exceeding 6.64 in each 2x2
contingency table (Table 1). Reductions
of fatal single vehicle crashes are
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statistically significant at the .01 level in
SUVs and at the .05 level in passenger
cars with chi-square statistic greater
than 3.84 (Table 2).
TABLE 1.—EFFECTIVENESS OF ESC IN REDUCING SINGLE VEHICLE CRASHES IN PASSENGER CARS AND SUVS
[Preliminary study with 1997–2002 crash data from five States]
Single vehicle
crashes
Multi-vehicle
crashes
(control group)
1483 .................
699 ...................
35% ..................
29% to 41% ......
84.1 ..................
19444
14090
..............................
..............................
..............................
512 ...................
95 .....................
67% ..................
60% to 74% ......
104.4 ................
6510
3661
..............................
..............................
..............................
Passenger Cars
No ESC ...........................................................................................................................................................
ESC .................................................................................................................................................................
Percent reduction in single vehicle crashes in passenger cars with ESC .....................................................
Approximate 95 percent confidence bounds ..................................................................................................
Chi-square value .............................................................................................................................................
SUVs
No ESC ...........................................................................................................................................................
ESC .................................................................................................................................................................
Percent reduction in single vehicle crashes in SUVs with ESC ....................................................................
Approximate 95 percent confidence bounds ..................................................................................................
Chi-square value .............................................................................................................................................
TABLE 2.—EFFECTIVENESS OF ESC IN REDUCING FATAL SINGLE VEHICLE CRASHES IN PASSENGER CARS AND SUVS
[Preliminary study with 1997–2003 FARS data]
Fatal single vehicle crashes
Fatal multi-vehicle
crashes
(control group)
186 ...................
110 ...................
30% ..................
10% to 50% ......
6.0 ....................
330
278
..............................
..............................
..............................
129 ...................
25 .....................
63% ..................
44% to 81% ......
16.1 ..................
199
103
..............................
..............................
..............................
Passenger Cars
No ESC ...........................................................................................................................................................
ESC .................................................................................................................................................................
Percent reduction in fatal single vehicle crashes in passenger cars with ESC .............................................
Approximate 95 percent confidence bounds ..................................................................................................
Chi-square value .............................................................................................................................................
SUVs
ycherry on PROD1PC64 with RULES2
No ESC ...........................................................................................................................................................
ESC .................................................................................................................................................................
Percent reduction in fatal single vehicle crashes in SUVs with ESC ............................................................
Approximate 95 percent confidence bounds ..................................................................................................
Chi-square value .............................................................................................................................................
NHTSA has now updated and
modified last year’s report, extending it
to model year 1997–2004 vehicles—and
to calendar year 2004 for the FARS
analysis and calendar year 2003 for the
State data analysis. Nevertheless, even
as of 2004, a large proportion of the
vehicles equipped with ESC were still
luxury vehicles. Moreover, only
passenger cars and SUVs had been
equipped with ESC—no pickup trucks
or minivans.
The State databases included crash
cases from California (2001–2003),
Florida (1997–2003), Illinois (1997–
2002), Kentucky (1997–2002), Missouri
(1997–2003), Pennsylvania (1997–2001,
2003), and Wisconsin (1997–2003). The
FARS database included fatal crash
involvements from calendar years 1997
to 2004. The extra year of exposure and
the availability of data from more states
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significantly increased the sample size
of crashes of vehicles with ESC. In the
preliminary study, the state crash
database contained 699 single-vehicle
crashes of cars with ESC and 95 singlevehicle crashes of SUVs with ESC. The
FARS database contained 110 singlevehicle crashes of cars with ESC and 25
single-vehicle crashes of SUVs with
ESC. For the updated study, the state
crash database contains 2,251 singlevehicle crashes of cars with ESC and
553 single-vehicle crashes of SUVs with
ESC, and the FARS database of fatal
single-vehicle crashes contains 157 and
47 crashes respectively, for passenger
cars and SUVs with ESC.
The larger sample of crashes in the
updated study facilitated a new analysis
of the effectiveness of ESC on specific
subsets of single-vehicle crashes (SV
run-off-road crashes and SV crashes
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resulting in rollover). It also facilitated
the use of a more focused control group
of crashes that were unlikely to be
affected by ESC so that a new analysis
of the effect of ESC on multi-vehicle
crashes could be undertaken.
The basic analytical approach was to
estimate the reduction of crash
involvements of the types that are most
likely to have benefited from ESC—
relative to a control group of other types
of crashes where ESC is unlikely to have
made a difference in the vehicle’s
involvement. Crash types taken as the
new control group (non-relevant
involvements because ESC would in
almost all cases not have prevented the
crash) were crash involvements in
which a vehicle:
(1) Was stopped, parked, backing up,
or entering/leaving a parking space prior
to the crash,
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(2) Traveled at a speed less than 10
mph,
(3) Was struck in the rear by another
vehicle, or
(4) Was a non-culpable party in a
multi-vehicle crash on a dry road.
The types of crash involvements where
ESC would likely or at least possibly
have an effect are:
(1) All single vehicle crashes, except
those with pedestrians, bicycles, or
animals (SV crashes).
(2) Single vehicles crashes in which a
vehicle ran off the road (SV ROR) and
hit a fixed object and/or rolled over.
(3) Single vehicles crashes in which a
vehicle rolled over (SV Rollover),
mostly a subset of SV ROR.
(4) Involvements as a culpable party
in a multi-vehicle crash on a dry or wet
road (MV Culpable).
(5) Collisions with pedestrians,
bicycles, or animals (Ped, Bike, Animal).
In the updated study we performed
the state data analysis separately for
each state. Then we used the median of
the estimates from the seven states as
the best indicator of the central
tendency of the data, and the variation
of the seven states as a basis for judging
statistical significance and estimating
confidence bounds. The results of this
analysis are presented in Table 3.
TABLE 3.—UPDATED STUDY—MEAN EFFECTIVENESS OF ESC IN REDUCING CRASHES IN PASSENGER CARS AND SUVS
BASED ON SEPARATE ANALYSES OF 1997–2003 CRASH DATA FROM SEVEN STATES
SV Crashes
SV ROR
SV Rollover
MV Culpable
Ped, bike,
animal
Passenger Cars
Mean percent reduction of listed crash type in
passenger cars with ESC.
Approximate 90 percent confidence bounds ........
34% ..................
46% ..................
71% ..................
11% ..................
34%.
20% to 46% ......
35% to 55% ......
60% to 78% ......
4% to 18% ........
5% to 55%.
¥4% not statistically significant.
¥28% to 15%.
SUVs
Mean percent reduction of listed crash type in
SUVs with ESC.
59% ..................
75% ..................
84% ..................
16% ..................
Approximate 90 percent confidence bounds ........
47% to 68% ......
68% to 80% ......
75% to 90% ......
7% to 24% ........
Fatal crashes were analyzed
separately using the FARS database as
was done in the preliminary study, but
larger sample sizes were possible
because of an additional year of data.
The results are given in Table 4.
TABLE 4.—UPDATED STUDY—EFFECTIVENESS OF ESC IN REDUCING FATAL CRASHES OF PASSENGER CARS AND SUVS
BASED ON 1997–2004 FARS DATA
SV Crashes
SV ROR
SV Rollover
MV Culpable
Ped, bike,
animal
46 .....................
69 .....................
38% not statistically significant.
¥87% to 12%.
Control group
Passenger Cars
No ESC ..................................
ESC ........................................
Percent reduction of listed
crash type in passenger
cars with ESC.
Approximate 90 percent confidence bounds.
Chi-square value ....................
223 ...................
157 ...................
35% ..................
217 ...................
154 ...................
36% ..................
36 .....................
12 .....................
69% ..................
20% to 51% ......
19% to 51% ......
52% to 87% ......
176 ...................
156 ...................
19% not statistically significant.
¥2% to 39% ....
8.58 ..................
8.17 ..................
12.45 ................
1.82 ..................
166
181
2.14.
SUVs
ycherry on PROD1PC64 with RULES2
No ESC ..................................
ESC ........................................
Percent reduction of listed
crash type in SUVs with
ESC.
Approximate 90 percent confidence bounds.
Chi-square value ....................
197 ...................
47 .....................
67% ..................
191 ...................
38 .....................
72% ..................
106 ...................
9 .......................
88% ..................
108 ...................
48 .....................
38% ..................
55% to 78% ......
62% to 82% ......
81% to 95% ......
16% to 60% ......
56 .....................
40 .....................
0% not statistically significant.
¥40% to 40%.
29.57 ................
36.44 ................
42.4 ..................
4.89 ..................
0.00.
The effectiveness of ESC in reducing
fatal single-vehicle crashes is similar to
the effectiveness in reducing singlevehicle crashes from state data that
included mostly non-fatal crashes. In
the case of fatal crashes as well, the
effectiveness of ESC in reducing singlevehicle rollover crashes was particularly
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high. The effectiveness of ESC in
reducing fatal culpable multi-vehicle
crashes of SUVs was also higher than in
the analysis of state data, while the
parallel analysis of multi-vehicle
crashes of passenger cars did not
achieve statistical significance.
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153
109
The updated study of ESC
effectiveness yielded robust results. The
analysis of state data and a separate
analysis of fatal crashes both reached
similar conclusions on ESC
effectiveness. ESC reduced single
vehicle crashes of passenger cars by 34
percent and single vehicle crashes of
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SUVs by 59 percent. The separate
analysis of only fatal crashes supported
the analysis of state data that included
mostly non-fatal crashes. Therefore, the
overall crash reductions demonstrated a
significant life-saving potential for this
technology. The effectiveness of ESC in
reducing SV crashes shown in the latest
data (Tables 3–4) is similar to the results
of the preliminary analysis.
The effectiveness of ESC tended to be
at least as great and possibly even
greater for more severe crashes.
Furthermore, the effectiveness of ESC in
reducing the most severe type of crash
in the study, the single-vehicle rollover
crash, was remarkable. ESC reduced
single-vehicle rollover crashes of
passenger cars by 71 percent and of
SUVs by 84 percent. This high level of
effectiveness also carried over to fatal
single-vehicle rollover crashes.
The benefits presented in Section V
were calculated on the basis of the
single-vehicle crash and single-vehicle
rollover crash effectiveness results of
Table 3 for reductions in non-fatal
crashes and of Table 4 for reductions in
fatal crashes. The single-vehicle rollover
crash effectiveness results were applied
only to first harmful event rollovers
with the lower single-vehicle crash
effectiveness results applied to all other
rollover crashes for a more conservative
benefit estimate.
III. September 2006 Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (NPRM) and Public
Comments
A. The NPRM
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As noted above, NHTSA published an
NPRM on September 18, 2006 that
proposed to establish FMVSS No. 126,
Electronic Stability Control Systems (71
FR 54712). Specifically, it proposed to
require passenger cars, multipurpose
passenger vehicles, trucks, and buses
with a GVWR of 4,536 kg (10,000
pounds) or less to be equipped with an
ESC system that meets the requirements
of the standard. As proposed, the
vehicle would be required to meet a
definitional requirement (i.e., specifying
the necessary elements of a stability
control system that would be capable of
both effective oversteer and understeer
intervention) and to pass a dynamic
performance test. These requirements
are necessary due to the extreme
difficulty in establishing a test adequate
to ensure the desired level of ESC
functionality.24 The test is necessary to
24 Without an equipment requirement, it would
be almost impossible to devise a single performance
test that could not be met through some action by
the manufacturer other than providing an ESC
system. Even a battery of performance tests still
might not achieve our intended results, because
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ensure that the ESC system is robust and
meets a level of performance at least
comparable to that of current ESC
systems.
The NPRM included the following
points, which highlighted the key
provisions of the proposed
requirements. However, for a more
complete discussion—including
detailed information on the proposal, as
well as various potential performance
tests (for both lateral stability and
vehicle responsiveness) and regulatory
alternatives considered by the agency—
interested persons are encouraged to
consult the NPRM.
• Consistent with the industry
consensus definition of ESC contained
in the Society of Automotive Engineers
(SAE) Surface Vehicle Information
Report J2564 (rev. June 2004), we
proposed to require vehicles covered
under the standard to be equipped with
an ESC system that:
(1) Augments vehicle directional
stability by applying and adjusting the
vehicle’s brakes individually to induce
correcting yaw torques to a vehicle;
(2) Is computer-controlled, with the
computer using a closed-loop
algorithm 25 to limit vehicle oversteer
and to limit vehicle understeer when
appropriate;
(3) Has a means to determine vehicle
yaw rate 26 and to estimate its
sideslip 27;
(4) Has a means to monitor driver
steering input, and
(5) Is operational over the full speed
range of the vehicle (except below a
low-speed threshold where loss of
control of the vehicle is unlikely).
• The proposed ESC system, as
defined above, would also be required
to be capable of applying all four brakes
individually and to have an algorithm
that utilizes this capability. The system
would also be required to be operational
during all phases of driving, including
acceleration, coasting, and deceleration
(including braking), and it would be
required to remain operational when the
antilock brake system or traction control
system is activated.
although it might necessitate installation of an ESC
system, we expect that it would be unduly
cumbersome for both the agency and the regulated
community.
25 A ‘‘closed-loop algorithm’’ is a cycle of
operations followed by a computer that includes
automatic adjustments based on the result of
previous operations or other changing conditions.
26 ‘‘Yaw rate’’ means the rate of change of the
vehicle’s heading angle measured in degrees/second
of rotation about a vertical axis through the
vehicle’s center of gravity.
27 ‘‘Sideslip’’ means the arctangent of the lateral
velocity of the center of gravity of the vehicle
divided by the longitudinal velocity of the center
of gravity.
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• We also proposed to require
vehicles covered under the standard to
satisfy the standard’s stability criteria
and responsiveness criterion when
subjected to the Sine with Dwell
steering maneuver test. This test
involves a vehicle coasting at an initial
speed of 50 mph while a steering
machine steers the vehicle with a
steering wheel pattern as shown in
Figure 2 of the NPRM. The test
maneuver is then repeated over a series
of increasing maximum steering angles.
This test maneuver was selected over a
number of other alternatives, because
we tentatively decided that it has the
most optimal set of characteristics,
including severity of the test,
repeatability and reproducibility of
results, and the ability to address lateral
stability and responsiveness.
The maneuver is severe enough to
produce spinout for most vehicles
without ESC. The stability criteria for
the test measure how quickly the
vehicle stops turning after the steering
wheel is returned to the straight-ahead
position. A vehicle that continues to
turn for an extended period after the
driver steers straight is out of control,
which is what ESC is designed to
prevent. The stability criteria are
expressed in terms of the percent of the
peak yaw rate after maximum steering
that persists at a period of time after the
steering wheel has been returned to
straight ahead. The criteria require that
the vehicle yaw rate decrease to no more
than 35 percent of the peak value after
one second and that it continues to drop
to no more than 20 percent after 1.75
seconds. Since a vehicle that simply
responds very little to steering
commands could meet the stability
criteria, a minimum responsiveness
criterion is applied to the same test. It
requires that the ESC-equipped vehicle
must move laterally at least 1.83 meters
(half a 12 foot lane width) during the
first 1.07 seconds after the initiation of
steering (a discontinuity in the steering
pattern that is convenient for timing a
measurement).
• Because the benefits of the ESC
system can only be realized if the
system is functioning properly, we
proposed to require a telltale be
mounted inside the occupant
compartment in front of and in clear
view of the driver and be identified by
the symbol shown for ‘‘ESC Malfunction
Telltale’’ in Table 1 of FMVSS No. 101,
Controls and Displays. The ESC
malfunction telltale would be required
to illuminate not more than two minutes
after the occurrence of one or more
malfunctions that affect the generation
or transmission of control or response
signals in the vehicle’s ESC system.
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Such telltale would be required to
remain continuously illuminated for as
long as the malfunction(s) exists,
whenever the ignition locking system is
in the ‘‘On’’ (‘‘Run’’) position. (Vehicle
manufacturers would be permitted to
use the ESC malfunction telltale in a
flashing mode to indicate ESC
operation.)
• In certain circumstances, drivers
may have legitimate reasons to
disengage the ESC system or limit its
ability to intervene, such as when the
vehicle is stuck in sand/gravel or when
the vehicle is being run on a track for
maximum performance. Accordingly,
under this proposal, vehicle
manufacturers would be permitted to
include a driver-selectable switch that
places the ESC system in a mode in
which it would not satisfy the
performance requirements of the
standard (e.g., ‘‘sport’’ mode or full-off
mode). However, if the vehicle
manufacturer chooses this option, it
would be required to ensure that the
ESC system always returns to a mode
that satisfies the requirements of the
standard at the initiation of each new
ignition cycle, regardless of the mode
the driver had previously selected.
Furthermore, the manufacturer would
be required to provide an ‘‘ESC Off’’
switch and a telltale that are mounted
inside the occupant compartment in
front of and in clear view of the driver
and which are identified by the symbol
or text shown for ‘‘ESC Off’’ in Table 1
of FMVSS No. 101. Such telltale would
be required to remain continuously
illuminated for as long as the ESC is in
a mode that renders it unable to meet
the performance requirements of the
standard, whenever the ignition locking
system is in the On (‘‘Run’’) position.
• We did not propose to require the
ESC system to be equipped with a roll
stability control function (or a separate
system to that effect). Roll stability
control systems involve relatively new
technology, and we decided that there is
currently insufficient data to judge the
efficacy of such systems. However, the
agency stated that it will continue to
monitor the development of roll
stability control systems. The NPRM
also stated that vehicle manufacturers
may supplement the ESC system we are
proposing to require with a roll stability
control system/feature.
In order to provide the public with
the expected significant safety benefits
of ESC systems as rapidly as possible,
the NPRM proposed to require all light
vehicles covered by this standard to be
equipped with a FMVSS No. 126compliant ESC system by September 1,
2011 (subject to the exception below).
The agency proposed that compliance
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would commence on September 1, 2008,
subject to the following phase-in
schedule: 30 percent of a vehicle
manufacturer’s light vehicles
manufactured during the period from
September 1, 2008 to August 31, 2009
would be required to comply with the
standard; 60 percent of those
manufactured during the period from
September 1, 2009 to August 31, 2010;
90 percent of those manufactured
during the period from September 1,
2010 to August 31, 2011, and all light
vehicles thereafter.
The NPRM stated that in order to
encourage early compliance, the agency
proposed that vehicle manufacturers
would be permitted to earn carryforward credits for compliant vehicles,
produced in excess of the phase-in
requirements, which are manufactured
between the effective date of the final
rule and the conclusion of the phase-in
period. However, under the proposal,
beginning September 1, 2011, all
covered vehicles would be required to
comply with the standard, without
regard to any earlier carry-forward
credits.
We proposed to exclude multi-stage
manufacturers and alterers from the
requirements of the phase-in and to
extend by one year the time for
compliance by those manufacturers (i.e.,
until September 1, 2012). This NPRM
also proposed to exclude small volume
manufacturers (i.e., manufacturers
producing less than 5,000 vehicles for
sale in the U.S. market in one year) from
the phase-in, instead requiring such
manufacturers to fully comply with the
standard on September 1, 2011.
International Discussions of a Potential
Global Technical Regulation on ESC
Based upon the agency’s analysis of
available research, we believe that the
benefits of ESC are more broadly
applicable than to just the U.S. driving
environment. Instead, we believe that
ESC has the potential to greatly benefit
road users in all parts of the world.
Therefore, throughout the development
of its ESC proposal, NHTSA made
particular efforts to keep other
governments informed on the progress
of its rulemaking. The agency
accomplished this through several
bilateral exchanges, as well as through
its role in the United National World
Forum for the Harmonization of Vehicle
Regulations (WP.29) in Geneva,
Switzerland.
Specifically, the United States
negotiated the placement of electronic
stability control systems on the Program
of Work of WP.29 under the 1998 Global
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17249
Agreement,28 in order to formalize and
facilitate information exchange on this
topic. Since early 2005, agency officials
have provided formal presentations on
the ESC rulemaking to WP.29 and its
specialized subsidiary body for stability
control systems four times during
formal session meetings. More recently,
in November 2006, the NHTSA
Administrator delivered remarks at the
140th session of WP.29, in which she
outlined the benefits of this new
technology and encouraged the Forum
to pursue the development of a Global
Technical Regulation (GTR) for ESC.
The proposal 29 was met with great
interest and was accepted by several of
the government representatives in
attendance. The representatives were
especially impressed that the benefits of
ESC technology are well-corroborated
through several studies conducted
independently around the world.
Formal work to develop a GTR on
electronic stability control is expected
to begin in 2007.
B. Summary of the Public Comments on
the NPRM
NHTSA received comments on the
September 18, 2006 NPRM from a
variety of interested parties, including
seven automobile manufacturers and
their trade associations,30 nine suppliers
of automobile equipment and their trade
association,31 four safety advocacy
organizations,32 and two other
interested organizations.33 Comments
28 Although commonly referred to as the 1998
Global Agreement, this provision is more formally
titled the ‘‘1998 Agreement Concerning the
Establishing of Global Technical Regulations for
Wheeled Vehicles, Equipment and Parts which can
be Fitted and/or be Used on Wheeled Vehicles.’’
29 See https://www.unece.org/trans/doc/2007/
wp29/ECE-TRANS-WP29-2007-17e.doc.
30 Comments were received from the following
automobile manufacturers and related trade
associations: (1 and 2) Alliance of Automobile
Manufacturers and Association of International
Automobile Manufacturers (joint comments); (3)
Honda Motor Co. Ltd. and American Honda Motor
Co., Inc.; (4) Nissan North America, Inc.; (5) Porsche
Cars North America, Inc.; (6) Toyota Motor North
America, Inc., and (7) Verband der
Automobilindustrie.
31 Comments were received from the following
automobile equipment suppliers and their trade
associations: (1) BorgWarner Torq Transfer Systems,
Inc.; (2) Continental Automotive Systems; (3)
Delphi Corporation; (4) Motor & Equipment
Manufacturers Association; (5) Oxford Technical
Solutions, Ltd.; (6) RLP Engineering; (7) Robert
Bosch Corporation; (8) Specialty Equipment Market
Association, and (9) TRW Automotive.
32 Comments were received from the following
safety advocacy organizations: (1) Advocates for
Highway and Auto Safety; (2) Consumers Union; (3)
Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, and (4)
Public Citizen.
33 Comments were received from the following
other interested organizations: (1) National Mobility
Equipment Dealers Association, and (2) SUVOA.
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were also received from eight
individuals. All of these comments may
be found in Docket No. NHTSA–2006–
25801.
Although certain of the comments
from individuals objected to the ESC
proposal (on the grounds of cost,
newness of the technology, and
concerns that it inappropriately may
wrest vehicle control from the driver
during critical situations), the
overwhelming majority of the
commenters supported establishing a
safety standard for ESC systems as
required equipment on new light
vehicles. Instead, the difference of
opinion among the commenters
involved the stringency of the standard
(including a requirement for advanced
features), the test procedures (including
need for understeer performance
requirements), and the proposed lead
time and phase-in for implementing the
new standard. Other topics included
making the ‘‘ESC System’’ definition
more performance-based, lateral
responsiveness criteria, ESC
performance requirements, ESC
malfunction detection requirements,
ESC telltale requirements, system
disablement and the ‘‘ESC Off’’ switch,
test procedures, impacts on the
aftermarket, comments on the
preliminary regulatory impact analysis
(PRIA), ESC outreach efforts, and other
topics. The following discussion
summarizes the main issues raised by
these public comments and the
positions expressed on these topics. A
more complete discussion of the public
comments is provided under Section
IV.C, which provides an explanation of
the agency rationale for the
requirements of the final rule and
addresses related public comments by
issue.
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IV. The Final Rule and Response to
Public Comments
A. Summary of the Requirements
After careful consideration of the
public comments on the NPRM, this
final rule establishes FMVSS No. 126,
Electronic Stability Control Systems.
Specifically, it requires passenger cars,
multipurpose passenger vehicles,
trucks, and buses with a gross vehicle
weight rating of 4,536 Kg (10,000
pounds) or less to be equipped with an
ESC system that meets the requirements
of the standard, in order to assist the
driver in maintaining control in critical
driving situations in which the vehicle
is beginning to lose directional stability
at the rear wheels (spin out) or
directional control at the front wheels
(plow out). Subject to the phase-in
schedule and the exceptions below,
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compliance with the requirements of the
final rule commences for covered
vehicles manufactured on or after
September 1, 2008 (i.e., MY 2009).
The following points highlight the key
provisions of the final rule.
• Consistent with the industry
consensus definition of ESC contained
in the Society of Automotive Engineers
(SAE) Surface Vehicle Information
Report J2564 (rev. June 2004), we are
requiring vehicles covered under the
standard to be equipped with an ESC
system that:
(1) Augments vehicle directional
stability by applying and adjusting the
vehicle brake torques individually to
induce a correcting yaw moment to a
vehicle;
(2) Is computer-controlled, with the
computer using a closed-loop
algorithm 34 to limit vehicle oversteer
and to limit vehicle understeer;
(3) Has a means to determine vehicle
yaw rate 35 and to estimate its sideslip 36
or the time derivative of sideslip;
(4) Has a means to monitor driver
steering input;
(5) Has an algorithm to determine the
need, and a means to modify engine
torque, as necessary, to assist the driver
in maintaining control of the vehicle,
and
(6) Is operational over the full speed
range of the vehicle (except at vehicle
speeds less than 15 km/h (9.3 mph) or
when being driven in reverse).
• The ESC system as defined above is
also required to be capable of applying
brake torques individually at all four
wheels and to have an algorithm that
utilizes this capability. Except for the
situations specifically set forth in part
(6) of the definition of ‘‘ESC System’’
above, the system is also required to be
operational during all phases of driving,
including acceleration, coasting, and
deceleration (including braking), and it
is required to be capable of activation
even if the anti-lock brake system or
traction control system is also activated.
• In order to ensure that a vehicle is
equipped with an ESC system that
meets the definition of ‘‘ESC System’’
under S4, the final rule requires vehicle
manufacturers to submit, upon the
request of NHTSA s Office of Vehicle
Safety Compliance, ESC system
34 A ‘‘closed-loop algorithm’’ is a cycle of
operations followed by a computer that includes
automatic adjustments based on the result of
previous operations or other changing conditions.
35 ‘‘Yaw rate’’ means the rate of change of the
vehicle’s heading angle measured in degrees/second
of rotation about a vertical axis through the
vehicle’s center of gravity.
36 ‘‘Sideslip’’ means the arctangent of the lateral
velocity of the center of gravity of the vehicle
divided by the longitudinal velocity of the center
of gravity.
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technical documentation as to when
understeer intervention is appropriate
for a given vehicle (see S5.6).
Specifically, NHTSA may seek
information such as a system diagram
that identifies all ESC components, a
written explanation describing the ESC
system’s basic operational
characteristics, a logic diagram
supporting the explanation of system
operations, and a discussion of the
pertinent inputs to the vehicle computer
or calculations within the computer and
how its algorithm uses that information
and controls ESC system hardware to
limit vehicle understeer.
• We are also requiring vehicles
covered under the standard to meet
performance tests. It must satisfy the
standard s stability criteria and
responsiveness criterion when subjected
to the Sine with Dwell steering
maneuver test. This test involves a
vehicle coasting at an initial speed of 50
mph while a steering machine steers the
vehicle with a steering wheel pattern as
shown in Figure 2 of the regulatory text.
The test maneuver is then repeated over
a series of increasing maximum steering
angles. This test maneuver was selected
over a number of other alternatives,
because we decided that it has the most
optimal set of characteristics, including
severity of the test, repeatability and
reproducibility of results, and the ability
to address lateral stability and
responsiveness.
The maneuver is severe enough to
produce spinout for most vehicles
without ESC. The stability criteria for
the test measure is how quickly the
vehicle stops turning after the steering
wheel is returned to the straight-ahead
position. A vehicle that continues to
turn for an extended period after the
driver steers straight is out of control,
which is what ESC is designed to
prevent. The quantitative stability
criteria are expressed in terms of the
percent of the peak yaw rate after
maximum steering that persists at a
period of time after the steering wheel
has been returned to straight ahead. The
criteria require that the vehicle yaw rate
decrease to no more than 35 percent of
the peak value after one second and that
it continues to drop to no more than 20
percent after 1.75 seconds. Since a
vehicle that simply responds very little
to steering commands could meet the
stability criteria, a minimum
responsiveness criterion is applied to
the same test. It requires that an ESCequipped vehicle with a GVWR of 7,716
pounds or less must move laterally at
least 6 feet during the first 1.07 seconds
after the initiation of steering (a
discontinuity in the steering pattern that
is a convenient point for timing a
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measurement). It also requires that a
heavier vehicle with a GVWR up to
10,000 pounds must move at least 5 feet
laterally in the same maneuver for
specified steering angles.
• Because the benefits of the ESC
system can only be realized if the
system is functioning properly, we are
requiring a telltale be mounted inside
the occupant compartment in front of
and in clear view of the driver and be
identified by the symbol or text shown
for ‘‘ESC Malfunction Telltale’’ in Table
1 of FMVSS No. 101, Controls and
Displays. The ESC malfunction telltale
is required to illuminate after the
occurrence of one or more malfunctions
that affect the generation or
transmission of control or response
signals in the vehicle’s ESC system.
Such telltale must remain continuously
illuminated for as long as the
malfunction(s) exists, whenever the
ignition locking system is in the ‘‘On’’
(‘‘Run’’) position. (Vehicle
manufacturers are permitted to use the
ESC malfunction telltale in a flashing
mode to indicate ESC operation.)
• In certain circumstances, drivers
may have legitimate reasons to
disengage the ESC system or limit its
ability to intervene, such as when the
vehicle is stuck in sand/gravel, using
snow chains, or when the vehicle is
being run on a track for maximum
performance. Accordingly, under this
final rule, vehicle manufacturers may
include a driver-selectable control that
places the ESC system in a mode in
which it would not satisfy the
performance requirements of the
standard (e.g., ‘‘sport’’ mode or full-off
mode). However, if the vehicle
manufacturer chooses this option, it
must ensure that the ESC system always
returns to the fully-functional default
mode at the initiation of each new
ignition cycle, regardless of the mode
the driver had previously selected (with
certain exceptions for low speed offroad axle/transfer case selections that
turn off ESC but cannot be reset
electronically). The manufacturer is
required to provide an ‘‘ESC Off’’
control and a telltale that are mounted
inside the occupant compartment in
front of and in clear view of the driver
and which are identified by the symbol
or text shown for ‘‘ESC Off’’ in Table 1
of FMVSS No. 101 or the text ‘‘ESC
Off.’’ Such telltale must remain
continuously illuminated for as long as
the ESC is in a mode that renders it
unable to meet the performance
requirements of the standard, whenever
the ignition locking system is in the
‘‘On’’ (‘‘Run’’) position.
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B. Lead Time and Phase-in
In order to provide the public as
rapidly as possible with what are
expected to be the significant safety
benefits of ESC systems, NHTSA has
decided to require all light vehicles
covered by this standard to be equipped
with a FMVSS No. 126-compliant ESC
system by September 1, 2011 (with
certain exceptions discussed below).
This implementation date for full,
mandatory compliance is the same as
that proposed in the NPRM and is
consistent with our stated intention to
have 90 percent of the subject fleet
equipped with ESC in the 2011 model
year that starts September 1, 2010. The
agency continues to believe that this
schedule for full implementation of the
safety standard for ESC is appropriate,
in order to provide manufacturers
adequate lead time to make necessary
production changes. September 1, 2008
marks the start of a three-year phase-in
period for FMVSS No. 126.
However, in response to public
comments and upon further review of
the production plans 37 voluntarily
submitted by vehicle manufacturers, we
have determined that it would be
practicable to increase the percentage of
new light vehicles that must comply
with Standard No. 126 under the phasein, thereby accelerating the benefits
expected to be provided by ESC
systems. Because ESC is so costeffective and has such high benefits in
terms of potential fatalities and injuries
that may be prevented, the agency
agrees that it is important to require ESC
installation in light vehicles as quickly
as possible. Accordingly, under this
final rule, we are requiring the following
phase-in schedule for FMVSS No. 126:
55 percent of a vehicle manufacturer’s
light vehicles manufactured during the
period from September 1, 2008 to
August 31, 2009 would be required to
comply with the standard; 75 percent of
those manufactured during the period
from September 1, 2009 to August 31,
2010; 95 percent of those manufactured
during the period from September 1,
2010 to August 31, 2011, and all light
vehicles thereafter. (This compares to
the NPRM’s proposal for a 30/60/90/all
phase-in schedule over the same time
periods.)
In order to ensure the financial and
technological practicability of the final
37 In
April 2006, NHTSA sent letters to seven
vehicle manufacturers requesting voluntary
submission of information regarding their planned
production of ESC-equipped vehicles for model
years 2007 to 2012. Six manufacturers responded
with product plans containing confidential
information. These agency letters and manufacturer
responses (with confidential information redacted)
may be found in Docket No. NHTSA–2006–25801.
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17251
rule (in keeping with our statutory
mandate), while at the same time
facilitating ESC installation in the light
vehicle fleet as expeditiously as
possible, the agency analyzed the
product plans submitted by six vehicle
manufacturers, whose combined
production accounts for approximately
87 percent of the new light vehicle
fleet.38 As explained in Chapter VII of
the FRIA, we examined three different
potential phase-in schedules to find the
right balance among these competing
concerns. Based upon this product plan
information and the desire to provide
manufacturers with flexibility by having
a carry forward provision, we have
chosen the most aggressive phase-in
alternative that we believe is reasonable
(i.e., 55/75/95%).
Two factors were controlling in
making the decision as to which
alternative to choose: (1) The ability of
manufacturers to change vehicles from
being equipped with optional ESC to
standard ESC for MY 2010 and MY
2011; and (2) Not forcing any
manufacturer to install ESC in any
make/model for which it was not
planned to be at least an option. The
agency did not believe there was enough
lead time to redesign a make/model to
include ESC by MY 2009. While there
may be enough time to redesign such a
make/model to include ESC by MY
2010, given the carry forward provisions
this was not necessary for any of the six
manufacturers for MY 2010. The second
consideration became a factor once
again in MY 2011, in not going beyond
95 percent (thereby obviating the costly
need to redesign and develop tooling for
a few vehicle lines which will not be
produced in MY 2012).
In general, we anticipate that vehicle
manufacturers will be able to meet the
requirements of the standard by
installing ESC system designs currently
in production (i.e., ones available in MY
2006). Except for possibly some lowproduction-volume vehicles with
infrequent design changes (addressed
below), NHTSA believes that most other
vehicles can reasonably be equipped
with ESC within three to four model
years. We have determined that the
majority of vehicle manufacturers
would be able to meet the first two years
of the revised phase-in schedule,
without revising their current
38 We note that manufacturers’ product plans
have continued to evolve during the course of this
rulemaking. For example, in a September 13, 2006
press release, Ford Motor Company announced that
100 percent of its light vehicle fleet would have
ESC as standard equipment by MY 2010 (see
https://www.consumeraffairs.com/news04/2006/09/
ford_stability.html). The agency has carefully
considered such developments in setting the phasein schedule for this final rule.
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production plans for ESC-equipped
vehicles, given available phase-in
credits under the rule. For the other
manufacturers, they will have to
increase production of ESC-equipped
vehicles to comply with this accelerated
phase-in schedule, but the available
lead time is sufficient to allow for
orderly planning for this increase and to
achieve full implementation.
Furthermore, we do not believe that the
final rule’s phase-in should pose ESC
supply problems; public comments from
vehicle manufacturers and ESC
suppliers did not raise any such supply
concerns, and our analysis of vehicle
manufacturers’ production plans suggest
that the selected phase-in schedule will
result in an installation rate increase of
only a few percentage points in any year
of the phase-in. Overall, we have
determined that the final rule’s phase-in
schedule may be accomplished without
disruptive changes in manufacturer and
supplier production processes.39
After outlining the general parameters
of the phase-in for FMVSS No. 126, we
now turn to a number of exceptions or
exclusions from the phase-in intended
to address certain classes of vehicle
manufacturers that may require
additional time to achieve compliance
and to address certain ESC components
that may pose problems for a broader
range of manufacturers in the short
term. As an initial matter, we now
understand from the public comments
that vehicle manufacturers currently
employ a variety of approaches for ESC
controls and telltales, many of which
would not meet the requirements of the
agency’s proposal. As a complicating
matter, vehicle manufacturers and their
trade associations explained that even
though most current ESC systems would
largely meet the performance
requirements of the proposed standard,
manufacturers’ inability to meet the
proposed control and display
requirements would prevent them from
earning the carry-forward credits
needed to comply with the NPRM’s
aggressive phase-in schedule. Vehicle
manufacturers generally commented
that they could bring their ESC systems
into full compliance (including the
control and telltale requirements) by the
end of the phase-in, and they argued
that it is the performance of the ESC
systems themselves, not the messages
provided by the controls and telltales,
39 We note that the agency has considered the
possibility that external forces (e.g., increases in
gasoline prices, changing consumer preferences)
might affect demand for specific types of vehicles,
such as SUVs, which have higher ESC penetration.
Such concerns provided further reason for the
agency to adopt a phase-in schedule that included
a provision for carry-forward credits.
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that impart safety benefits under the
standard.
After consideration of the numerous
manufacturer comments on this issue,
we have decided to defer the standard’s
requirements related to the ESC telltales
and controls until the end of the phasein (i.e., September 1, 2011 for most
manufacturers; September 1, 2012 for
final-stage manufacturers and alterers);
however, at that point, all covered
vehicles must meet all relevant
requirements of the standard (i.e., no
additional phase-in for the control and
telltale requirements). Manufacturers
are encouraged to voluntarily install
compliant ESC controls and displays
prior to the mandatory compliance date.
Our rationale for this change from our
proposal is as follows.
We now understand that
standardizing ESC controls and telltales
will involve substantial design and
production changes and that additional
lead time will be required to effect those
changes. In addition, our analysis
demonstrates that the safety benefits
associated with early introduction of
ESC systems, even without standardized
controls and displays, far outweigh the
benefits of delaying the standard until
all systems can fully meet the control
and display requirements (see FRIA’s
lead time/phase-in discussion). We do
not believe that implementation of the
entire standard should be delayed until
technical changes related to the ESC
controls and telltales can be fully
resolved, because they would deny the
public the safety benefits of ESC
systems in the meantime. Accordingly,
we believe that it is preferable to move
rapidly to implement the standard, but
to delay the compliance date only for
the ESC control and telltale
requirements.
This final rule also excludes small
volume manufacturers (i.e.,
manufacturers producing less than
5,000 vehicles for sale in the U.S.
market in one year) from the phase-in,
instead requiring such manufacturers to
fully comply with the standard on
September 1, 2011. This exclusion
should facilitate implementation for
low-production-volume vehicles with
infrequent design changes.
Consistent with the policy set forth in
NHTSA’s February 14, 2005 final rule
on certification requirements for
vehicles built in two or more stages and
altered vehicles (70 FR 7414), final-stage
manufacturers and alterers are excluded
from the requirements of the phase-in
and are permitted an additional one
year for compliance (i.e., until
September 1, 2012). However, finalstage manufacturers and alterers may
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voluntarily certify compliance with the
standard prior to this date.
Vehicle manufacturers may earn
carry-forward credits for compliant
vehicles, produced in excess of the
phase-in requirements, which are
manufactured between the effective date
of the final rule and the conclusion of
the phase-in period. (We note that carryforward credits may not be used to defer
the mandatory compliance date of
September 1, 2011 for all covered
vehicles.) The final rule also includes
phase-in reporting requirements for ESC
systems (contained in Subpart I of 49
CFR Part 585) which are consistent with
the phase-in schedule discussed above.
C. Response to Public Comments by
Issue
As noted previously, public
comments on the September 2006
NRPM for ESC raised a variety of issues
with the NPRM’s proposed
requirements. Each of these topics will
be discussed in turn, in order to explain
how these comments impacted the
agency’s determinations in terms of
setting requirements for this final rule.
Major Issues
1. Approach of the ESC NPRM
Subject to the phase-in schedule set
forth in S8, the NPRM for ESC proposed
to require new vehicles covered by
Standard No. 126 to be equipped with
an ESC system that meets the
requirements specified in S5 under the
test conditions specified in S6 and the
test procedures specified in S7 of this
standard (see S5, Requirements). The
proposed standard would apply to
passenger cars, multipurpose passenger
vehicles, trucks, and buses with a gross
vehicle weight rating of 4,536 kilograms
(10,000 pounds) or less (see S3.1,
Application).
NHTSA also noted that the ESC
proposal would implement the
provision in section 10301 of
SAFETEA–LU, which requires the
Secretary of Transportation to ‘‘establish
performance criteria to reduce the
occurrence of rollovers consistent with
stability enhancing technologies’’ and to
issue a final rule by April 1, 2009.
A number of commenters on the
NPRM raised issues regarding the
general approach taken by the agency in
terms of its proposal for ESC. These
comments are discussed immediately
below.
(a) ESC Mandate vs. ESC
Standardization
Mr. Kiefer urged NHTSA to adopt
specifications for standardization of ESC
systems that manufacturers voluntarily
choose to install, rather than mandating
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installation at this time. The commenter
stated that this approach would provide
a trial period during which the ESC
requirements could be evaluated, prior
to fleet-wide installation.
We believe Mr. Kiefer’s suggested
approach falls short in light of the
advanced state of development of ESC
systems. Moreover, our analysis of the
real-world experience with ESC to date
indicates that a rulemaking mandate for
it will save thousands of lives each year
on American roadways. Our analyses
also indicate that a mandate for ESC
will be among the most cost-effective of
NHTSA’s rules ever. Moreover, the
agency is not aware of any significant
operational problems for ESC systems
now in millions of vehicles on the
American roads, nor have ESC suppliers
or vehicle manufacturers indicated that
there are such problems. Under these
circumstances, there is no reason to
delay proceeding to a mandate for this
life-saving technology to be on all light
vehicles.
(b) ESC as Part of a Comprehensive
Rollover Safety Program
The comments of Advocates for
Highway and Auto Safety (Advocates)
included a lengthy discussion of what it
perceives to be the agency’s failure to
carry out a comprehensive rollover
crash safety plan. Public Citizen
similarly argued that the ESC
rulemaking should be part of a
comprehensive rollover plan, and in
particular, it objected to the proposal’s
failure to include a requirement for roll
stability control (cited as currently in
production on the Volvo XC–90).
According to Public Citizen, a
requirement for roll stability control
would lead SUVs to be equipped with
roll sensors, which it argued would in
turn enhance safety features critical for
ejection mitigation such as seatbelt
pretensioners, advanced window
glazing, and side impact airbags.
As we have stated in the past and in
the NPRM for this rule, the agency
adopted such a comprehensive plan in
June 2003, which envisions agency
efforts (several of which are currently
underway) to improve vehicle stability,
ejection mitigation, roof crush
resistance, as well as road
improvements and behavioral strategies
aimed at consumer education. The
relevant legislative provisions contained
in SAFETEA–LU are fully consistent
with the agency’s ongoing efforts to
prevent rollover crashes and to reduce
their severity when they do occur.
Our analysis demonstrates that ESC
systems can have a major positive
impact in terms of preventing loss of
control and keeping the vehicle on the
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roadway, thereby preventing rollovers.
Regarding our decision not to propose a
requirement for roll stability control, the
agency made this determination because
there is little data available to assess
whether that feature actually provides
any additional safety benefits, given that
it appears that some current systems
add this feature to ESC. Note that we
believe that current systems that include
roll stability control will satisfy the
requirements for ESC. Under 49 U.S.C.
30111, a safety standard must be
practicable, meet the need for motor
vehicle safety, and be stated in objective
terms; in setting the standard, relevant,
available motor vehicle safety
information must be considered. In this
case, the dearth of information about
roll stability control effectively
precludes the agency from adopting a
roll stability requirement, because it is
not possible to determine whether this
technology meets the need for safety. At
the same time, this rule does not
establish any barriers to automakers’
adding roll stability control to ESC
systems, nor to customers’ demanding
it. The issue of roll stability control and
other ESC features is discussed in
further detail in Section IV.C.3 of this
document.
Impact on Other NHTSA Rulemakings
Advocates argued that the ESC NPRM
and accompanying PRIA should take
into account that rulemaking’s impact
on the agency’s proposal 40 to upgrade
FMVSS No. 216, Roof Crush Resistance.
The commenter stated that the ESC
benefits assessment is incomplete
because it does not discuss how some
unknown portion of fatalities due to
roof crush will not occur as a result of
ESC intervention to keep the vehicle on
the road (i.e., by preventing the rollover
crash entirely), and it makes essentially
the same point regarding the roof crush
NPRM.
The agency agrees that the ESC rule
would impact the agency’s rulemaking
to amend FMVSS No. 216, Roof Crush
Resistance. The benefits estimated in
the PRIA for FMVSS No. 216, which
accompanied the NPRM published on
August 23, 2005 (70 FR 49223), reflect
the impacts of ESC penetration into the
fleet at that time. As a general matter,
the impact of ESC on FMVSS No. 216
should be addressed in the regulatory
analyses for FMVSS No. 216 rather than
in the ESC rule. Generally, the agency’s
approach for estimating the actual
benefits of any rulemaking is to adjust
the benefits of a later rule to take into
account the impacts of earlier rules.
Therefore, for the ESC rulemaking, the
40 70
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PRIA and this FRIA estimated the
overall benefits of the ESC rule and only
address the impacts of prior
rulemakings on this current rule. The
impact of ESC on other future
rulemakings would be addressed in
those future rules respectively. The
benefits of future rules, including the
roof crush rulemaking, will reflect the
installation of ESC in the vehicle fleet.
(c) Need for Common Terminology
According to Consumers Union,
vehicle manufacturers currently utilize
a variety of acronyms and proprietary
trade names to identify their ESC
systems, which in turn make it more
difficult for consumers to know what to
ask for when shopping for a vehicle. To
limit consumer confusion, Consumers
Union urged NHTSA to require uniform
terminology for how ESC systems are
identified, so as to facilitate vehicle-tovehicle comparisons. The organization
recommended use of the nomenclature
‘‘ESC’’ and the term ‘‘Electronic
Stability Control,’’ which presumably
already have broad consumer
recognition. A similar comment was
provided by Mr. Petkun. These
commenters also argued that the agency
should require the automobile industry
and dealerships to provide training for
sales staff so that they may better
educate and more accurately advise
potential buyers about the value of an
ESC system.
The agency appreciates the
importance of providing consumers
with clear information regarding vehicle
safety features to use when deciding
which vehicle to purchase, because we
believe that such information serves a
safety need (consistent with the
agency’s motor vehicle information
mandate under 49 U.S.C. Chapter 323,
Consumer Information). However, we
do not believe it is necessary to pursue
the use of common terminology for ESC,
for the following reasons. The primary
concern engendering calls for common
terminology involved a consumer’s
ability to know whether a given vehicle
is equipped with ESC or some other
similar-sounding device (e.g., a
manufacturer’s name for traction
control), but that concern has essentially
been eliminated by this final rule,
which mandates installation of a
compliant ESC system on all light
vehicles by the end of the phase-in
period. Absent that concern, there is no
need for NHTSA to dictate how
companies market their products.
2. The Definition of ‘‘ESC System’’ as
the Basis of the Standard
As noted above, the NPRM proposed
to require installation of an ESC system
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that meets the definition contained in
paragraph S4 of the standard, as well as
the requirements of S5.1, Required
Equipment. The proposed definition of
‘‘ESC System’’ specified certain features
that must be present on that equipment,
including that it be capable of applying
all four brakes individually and have a
computer using a closed-loop algorithm
to limit vehicle oversteer and to limit
vehicle understeer when appropriate. In
addition, the system must have a means
to determine the vehicle’s yaw rate and
to estimate its side slip, as well as a
means to monitor driver steering inputs.
Furthermore, the ESC system must be
operational during all phases of driving
including acceleration, coasting, and
deceleration (including braking), except
when the driver has disabled ESC or the
vehicle is below a low speed threshold
where loss of control is unlikely, and it
must remain operational when the
antilock brake system or traction control
system is activated. The ESC system
must also meet the proposed
performance requirements for lateral
stability and vehicle responsiveness (see
S5.2).
BorgWarner Torq Transfer Systems,
Inc. (BorgWarner) stated that the
proposed standard should not mandate
a specific solution in terms of how an
ESC system would operate (i.e.,
requiring a brake-base system), but
instead it should adopt a performance
standard that would encourage
development of new and potentially
improved technologies, ones which may
provide more benefits and/or be more
cost-effective than brake-based ESC
systems. The commenter stated that it is
ultimately the forces at the road/tire
interface that are adjusted by the ESC,
regardless of how that is accomplished.
Accordingly, BorgWarner stated its
opposition to the definition of ‘‘ESC
System’’ as the basis of the standard
because ‘‘* * * other systems such as
effective design of suspension and
steering geometry, active steering, active
suspension, AWD active yaw control,
torque vectoring yaw control, [and]
electronically controlled axle
differentials may increase the vehicle’s
stability threshold such that loss of
control is not imminent within the
scope of the proposed testing
procedure.’’
Delphi Corporation (Delphi) stated
that there are currently various
alternative technologies in various
stages of development that may
substitute for brake-based ESC systems.
According to the commenter, these
include active steering systems (Active
Front Steer, Active Rear Steer, Steer by
Wire, Electric Power Steering), active
drivetrains (Active Differentials,
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Electronic Limited Slip Differentials,
Electric Motor/Generator Devices for
Propulsion/Braking), and active
suspensions (Active Stabilizer Bars,
Active Dampers, Active Springs). Delphi
added that while brake-based ESC
systems are usually restricted to limithandling conditions, other technologies
(such as those mentioned above) can
operate across a range of linear-handling
to limit-handling (i.e., nonlinearhandling) conditions.41 The commenter
stated that alternative technologies such
as Active Front Steer and Active Rear
Steer may actually prevent the vehicle’s
tires from reaching total saturation in
the first place, thereby avoiding
unstable and unresponsive situations.
Delphi also stated that systems using
a combination of steering and braking
actuation are more responsive and are
not necessarily more objectionable to
drivers because they are more predictive
in their operation. Accordingly, Delphi
recommended modifying the ESC
definition in the regulatory text to
permit any actuator device that can
influence the tire/road forces to achieve
improvements in vehicle stability and
responsiveness.42
RLP Engineering expressed concern
that the NPRM’s ‘‘equipment
requirements’’ (i.e., definition of an
‘‘ESC system’’) is based upon current
component technology and
methodology, which could become
outdated. Instead of specifying
components, the commenter
recommended that the agency state
certain objectives and required
outcomes, namely requiring means and
methods of detecting impending vehicle
instability and subsequent means and
methods for actively engaging
appropriate countermeasures. RLP
Engineering argued that such an
41 ‘‘Linear-handling’’ describes the conditions
that average drivers usually face. Drivers are
accustomed to a range of lateral acceleration in
which a given steering wheel movement produces
a proportional change in the vehicle’s heading, so
that one knows with some degree of certainty where
the vehicle will go when the wheel is turned a
certain amount.
‘‘Nonlinear-handling’’ is at the edge of, and
beyond, the range of lateral acceleration to which
drivers are normally accustomed (i.e., above about
one-half ‘‘g’’ on dry pavement for ordinary
vehicles). In such situations, the relationship
between the driver’s steering input and the
vehicle’s response changes, and the lag time of the
vehicle’s response can lengthen.
42 Specifically, the commenter suggested
modifying paragraphs S4 and S5.1.1 of the
proposed standard to read as follows:
S4 Definitions (1) ‘‘* * * augments vehicle
directional stability by applying and adjusting the
wheel forces to induce correcting yaw torques to a
vehicle;’’
S5.1.1 ‘‘Is capable of dynamically adjusting all
four wheel forces and has a control algorithm that
utilizes this capability.’’
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approach would allow for advancement
in the state of the art and elimination of
obsolete vehicle componentry (with the
potential for cost reduction).
According to the Alliance of
Automobile Manufacturers (Alliance)
and the Association of International
Automobile Manufacturers (AIAM), for
some electric or hybrid vehicles, the
industry expects that the appropriate
ESC braking torques could be provided
directly through the vehicle’s
propulsion system (regenerative
braking) without the need to apply the
friction brake, as done by current ESC
systems. The commenters stated that
such systems would potentially provide
enhanced safety benefits in terms of
more rapid and precise applied braking
intervention, as well as longer service
life for the vehicle’s friction brakes.43
After careful consideration of the
comments, we have decided to retain
the approach set forth in the NPRM
(with certain modifications), which
would make the requirements
associated with the definition of ‘‘ESC
System’’ the primary basis of the
standard. Our reasoning for this
decision is as follows.
The agency’s intention in the context
of this ESC rulemaking has been to
spread the proven safety benefits of
current ESC systems across the light
vehicle fleet. Available information
shows that current brake-based ESC
systems are effective and meet the need
for motor vehicle safety. The agency is
not aware of and commenters have not
provided any information to
demonstrate the efficacy of the ESCrelated technologies specified in their
comments as an alternative to brakebased ESC systems.
Furthermore, it is possible for a
vehicle without ESC to be optimized to
avoid spin-out in the narrowly defined
conditions of the ESC oversteer
intervention test (especially if the
standard is silent on understeer) but to
lack the advantages of ESC under other
conditions. The agency has determined
that it is not currently feasible to
develop a comprehensive battery of tests
that could substitute for the knowledge
of what equipment constitutes ESC, and
it remains to be seen if such approach
43 In order to accommodate such technology, the
Alliance/AIAM recommended modifying S4
(definition of ‘‘ESC system’’) and S5.1.1 of the
proposal to read as follows:
S4, Electronic Stability Control System or ESC
System * * *
(1) That augments vehicle directional stability by
applying and adjusting vehicle brake torques
individually to induce a correcting yaw moment to
a vehicle.
S5.1.1 Is capable of applying brake torques
individually to all four wheels and has a control
algorithm that utilizes this capability.
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would ever be practical to set a purely
performance-based standard that would
ensure that manufacturers provide at
least current ESC systems. Therefore, we
have concluded that the standard’s
definition of ‘‘ESC System’’ is necessary
in order to ensure that light vehicles
have the attributes of ESC systems that
produced the large reduction of singlevehicle crashes and rollovers in our
crash data study (as discussed in detail
in Section II.D). We note that a similar
approach of defining heavy truck ABS,
rather than depending solely on
performance requirements, has been
successful under FMVSS No. 121, Air
Brake Systems. The following
discussion explains the identified
obstacles to a strictly performance-based
approach.
Among the challenges associated with
developing a performance test for ESC,
the agency notes that manufacturers
develop ESC algorithms using tests
whose conditions are generally not
repeatable (e.g., icy surfaces which
change by the minute, wet/slippery
surfaces which are not repeatable dayto-day) and through simulation.
Manufacturers also use hundreds of
conditions requiring weeks of testing for
a given vehicle. However, it is not
practicable to use these approaches as
part of a safety standard. Furthermore,
the agency cannot use subjective tests to
determine compliance with a safety
standard.
It is possible to overcome these
limitations by adopting the standard’s
definition of ‘‘ESC System,’’ which is
based on a Society of Automotive
Engineers definition of what ESC is, and
which includes those elements that
account for the cost of those systems.
There is no reason to believe that
manufacturers will incur all the costs of
the ESC equipment and capabilities
required by the standard’s definition
and then just program the system to
achieve limited operation restricted to
the test conditions of the standard. The
standard’s definitional requirement for
‘‘ESC System’’ requires, at a minimum,
the equipment and capabilities of
existing ESC system designs. This
translates into the substantial fatality
and injury benefits provided by existing
ESC systems.
Without the definition of ‘‘ESC
System,’’ it would not be feasible to
comprehensively assess the operating
range of resulting devices, particularly
for understeer intervention, that might
be installed in compliance with the
safety standards. If manufacturers were
to only optimize the vehicle so as to
pass only a few highly-defined tests,
there public would not receive the full
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safety benefits provided by current ESC
systems.44
Under this topic, we also note the
comment from the Alliance/AIAM about
test variability (in the responsiveness
portion of the oversteer intervention
test). Even under test conditions chosen
for high repeatability, these commenters
maintain that the performance
requirements must be decreased to
allow a larger margin of compliance.
Such margins of compliance would
make a very weak standard if based
solely on tests that would be
considerably less repeatable than those
we are using.
The Delphi comment also lists a
number of systems and components that
can influence wheel forces and suggests
that it should be permissible for the
definition of ESC to be satisfied by
systems that can generate wheel force
(i.e., a requirement more open than
compelling a system that must operate
through brake forces). However, the
commenter did not provide any data to
show the effectiveness of such systems,
as would demonstrate that they meet the
need for motor vehicle safety and that
it would be appropriate to substitute
them for proven brake-based ESC
systems. We believe there are good
reasons for the safety standard at least
initially to be based on braking forces
(noting that we have changed the
definition to include all ‘‘braking’’
torques at the wheels (i.e., regenerative
braking by an electric motor as well as
the action of friction brakes)). While
some of the devices mentioned by
BorgWarner and Delphi could create
yaw moments (for ESC interventions) by
driving torques,45 yaw moments created
by braking torques have an advantage in
critical situations because they also
cause the vehicle to slow down.
These commenters also mention a
number of steering-related concepts as
an alternative means of meeting the
standard’s requirements. Specifically,
Delphi stated that active steering
44 The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) experienced problems with heavy duty diesel
manufacturers’ production of engines that met EPA
standards during laboratory testing under EPA
procedures but were turned off under highway
driving conditions. On October 22, 1998, the
Department of Justice and EPA announced a
settlement with seven major diesel engine
manufacturers. Accordingly, we do not believe that
the industry’s ability to circumvent the
requirements of the standard is a theoretical one, as
would permit us to forgo a definition for ‘‘ESC
System.’’
45 ‘‘Driving torque’’ is a force applied by the
engine through the drive train in order to make a
particular wheel turn faster than the others—similar
to ‘‘braking torques’’ which brakes one wheel to
make it turn slower than the others. Either force can
be utilized by an ESC system to change the heading
of the vehicle, although braking torque has the
added benefit of helping slow the vehicle down.
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interventions (in a vehicle that
combines steering and braking in its
ESC) could operate at driving conditions
well below critical levels of tire
saturation (where steering interventions
lose their power) and produce a more
responsive vehicle. While active
steering may be useful in certain
situations, the steering interventions
may not be very helpful at or near the
limit of traction, which is arguably the
critical situation at the heart of this
rulemaking. Again, braking forces have
an advantage over steering forces
because they can create a more powerful
yaw intervention when the vehicle is at
the limit of traction.46
We understand that manufacturers of
a small number of luxury cars are
beginning to add active steering to ESC,
as described by Delphi, which are very
refined vehicle systems that are
carefully designed so as to not annoy
their drivers. We clarify that the
standard in no way prohibits the
addition of refinements to vehicles that
retain the ability to create yaw moments
with brake torques when necessary. The
vehicles in question retain the brakebased ESC as the backstop for stability,
because the brake interventions which
are more noticeable to drivers retain
their power in situations where the
transparent steering interventions might
not be powerful enough. Without data to
assess the effectiveness of these
potential alternative operating features
for ESC (which commenters did not
provide), we have decided that it would
not be appropriate at this time to
abandon the requirement for brake
torque-based systems which have
proven benefits, in favor of concepts
that have not yet demonstrated any
safety benefits, much less the enormous
benefits associated with current brake
torque-based ESC systems.
We acknowledge that in requiring
ESC as it now exists and has proven to
be beneficial, we may be indirectly
impacting hypothetical future
technological innovations. We have to
balance the benefits of saving thousands
of lives a year by requiring ESC systems
with the capabilities of current ESC
systems, against the loss of savings in
the future provided by some even more
advanced ESC technologies. In this case,
we believe that the opportunity to save
this many lives must be selected.
Should new advances lead to forms of
ESC different than those currently
required by this standard, interested
parties can petition the agency to
modify the regulation. We also note that
46 Liebemann et al., Safety and Performance
Enhancement: The Bosch Electronic Stability
Control (ESP), 2005 ESC Conference.
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the vehicle manufacturers who are the
directly regulated parties have not
opposed using the definition for ‘‘ESC
System’’ as the primary requirement of
the standard, and some have actively
supported it. We interpret this to mean
that the vehicle manufacturers are not
aware of any feasible alternative
approach for providing efficacious
electronic stability control in the near
future, other than the approach
described in the definition.
3. Stringency of the Standard
The NPRM proposed in S4 to require
installation of an ESC system that: (1) Is
capable of applying all four brakes
individually and has a control algorithm
that utilizes this capability; (2) is
operational during all phases of driving
including acceleration, coasting, and
deceleration (including braking), except
when the driver has disabled ESC or the
vehicle is below a low speed threshold
where loss of control is unlikely, and (3)
remains operational when the antilock
brake system or traction control system
is activated (see S5.1). The ESC system
also would have to meet the proposed
performance requirements for lateral
stability and vehicle responsiveness (see
S5.2).
Advocates expressed strong support
for a mandate that ESC be provided on
all light vehicles, but it urged the agency
to adopt a more stringent standard in
the final rule. Specifically, Advocates
argued that the proposed requirements
for ESC intervention to increase lateral
stability and to restore proper
directional heading are sub-optimal.
The commenter also objected to what it
characterized as the ‘‘minimal standard’’
that would be set by the proposal, one
which effectively accommodates the
lowest level of all existing ESC system
designs and performance, rather than
pushing for state-of-the-art technology.
According to the commenter, the
proposal would grandfather in all
existing ESC designs, even though not
all ESC systems have the same level of
capabilities.
Advocates also requested that the rule
require certain operating functions
present on many current ESC systems
(e.g., automatic speed reduction
achieved by automatic braking and
engine de-powering/engine control,
traction control, automatic steering, roll
stability control), even though the
agency based its benefits assessment in
the PRIA by ‘‘piggybacking’’ onto these
more robust ESC systems. The
commenter stated that these additional
features, which the agency suggests
have some positive safety value, make
some unknown (i.e., unquantified)
contribution to the anticipated
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reduction in deaths, injuries, and crash
severity associated with the ESC
rulemaking. Advocates added that the
PRIA’s estimated benefits may be
inflated because, given the more
truncated requirements of the proposed
standard, there is no assurance that
manufacturers will continue to install
more complex ESC systems, a result that
would detract from ESC as an advanced
safety technology.
In addition, Advocates urged that the
agency continue its efforts to reconcile
ESC intervention with effective roll
stability control systems, characterizing
the latter as the only means to directly
intervene to prevent imminent rollover
(as compared to ESC’s indirect
contributions through oversteer and
understeer intervention). Although the
commenter seemed to acknowledge that
incorporation of roll stability control
requirements may not be possible
immediately, it stated that the agency
should eventually include performance
specifications for this function as part of
FMVSS No. 126.
Consumers Union expressed general
support for the ESC rulemaking, stating
that stability control systems should be
standard equipment on all vehicles,
especially sport utility vehicles (SUVs).
It further stated that, since 1998, it has
conducted tests on 179 vehicles
equipped with ESC systems, but it has
found considerable variability in the
level of performance across the systems
provided. The commenter stated that
better ESC systems act decisively but
not prematurely, whereas other systems
can be slow to react, help only in certain
situations, and intervene too frequently
during normal driving. Accordingly,
Consumers Union recommended that
NHTSA’s standard should be modeled
after the ESC systems found to be ‘‘best
performers,’’ which it characterized as
ones that are intrusive and very evident
in ‘‘at the limit’’ testing (i.e., at the point
at which loss of vehicle control may be
imminent), but less so during routine
driving.
In addition, Consumers Union stated
that ESC calibration should be adjusted
to match the type of vehicle for which
the system has been developed so that
it complements vehicle and driver
characteristics (e.g., a more intrusive
system for a minivan than for a sports
sedan).
Specifically, Consumers Union stated
that the NPRM’s proposed steering
response 1.07 seconds after the
initiation of steering (minimum of 6 feet
from the center line) is not aggressive
enough, and accordingly, the
commenter reasoned that it could allow
manufacturers to fit low grip tires and
slow steering to improve performance
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under the standard’s test procedures.
Consumers Union expressed concern
that manufacturers may seek to reduce
costs by developing cheaper, less
sophisticated ESC systems which may
pass all the requirements of the
standard, but which may be relatively
less effective in terms of saving lives.
Public Citizen commented that the
agency’s ESC proposal is incomplete
because it does not deal with the full set
of technologies which make up many
current ESC systems, instead proposing
a more limited yaw stability standard.
(Public Citizen also argued that the
agency assessed benefits in the PRIA on
these more advanced ESC systems). For
example, Public Citizen noted that the
Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers
made a presentation to NHTSA in
which it described a number of current
features 47 on ESC systems, including
yaw stability,48 traction control, ABS,49
brake assist, active steering, body roll
control,50 vehicle roll stability control,
corner brake control,51 and electronic
damping control.52 Public Citizen
specifically asked why the agency
considered traction control to be only a
‘‘convenience feature.’’
According to Public Citizen, the ESC
equipment requirements are already
out-of-date and will be obsolete by the
time a final rule is published. The
commenter argued that the proposal
would mislead consumers into thinking
that they are purchasing a true ESC
system using the latest technology.
Public Citizen stated that because the
agency’s proposal would accept the
47 We note that many of the ESC-related features
cited by the commenters may serve similar or
complementary functions, which may vary to some
extent from vehicle to vehicle. However, to the
extent possible, we have tried to generally explain
our understanding of these technologies either in
footnotes or the textual discussion of this
document.
48 ‘‘Yaw stability’’ means an electronic stability
control system of the type required by new FMVSS
No. 126 and explained in section II.D of this
preamble.
49 ‘‘ABS’’ means anti-lock braking system, a
system that controls rotational wheel slip in braking
by sensing individual wheel speeds and adjusting
brake actuating forces in response to those signals.
ABS provides many of the components necessary
for ESC.
50 ‘‘Body roll control’’ is a utilization of electronic
damping control to stiffen the body roll resistance
in a curve to provide a more level ride.
51 ‘‘Corner brake control’’ (CBC) is designed to
improve vehicle stability during a braking event by
adjusting the brake line pressure applied to the
individual wheels. It is a refinement of ABS with
some similarity to ESC, except that CBC
intervention requires the driver to apply force to the
brake pedal, whereas ESC interventions occur
regardless of whether the driver has applied the
brakes.
52 ‘‘Electronic damping control’’ is an electronic
system of shock absorbers having electricallycontrollable damping rates (stiffness) and a control
module to operate them as a system.
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least extensive of current ESC
technologies, it would merely ratify the
status quo and not ‘‘reduce’’ rollover
deaths as Congress required under
SAFETEA–LU. The organization stated
that the agency cannot rely upon an
unenforceable expectation that vehicle
manufacturers will continue to provide
advanced ESC systems, and it expressed
concern that some vehicle
manufacturers might actually strip out
certain ESC-related features on low-cost
vehicles, thereby actually degrading
vehicle safety. In contrast, Public
Citizen argued that the agency should
exert a ‘‘technology forcing’’ influence
with respect to vehicle safety
improvements. Thus, Public Citizen
argued that the ESC proposal would not
go far enough to improve vehicle safety.
Public Citizen stated that the two
studies of the effectiveness of ESC
system prepared by NHTSA, which
used Fatality Analysis Reporting System
(FARS) data for 1997–2004 and State
registration data for 1997–2003,
surveyed a time period during which
ESC technology was a relatively new
technology. As a result, Public Citizen
argued that those studies were
confounded by small sample sizes and
that the results, therefore, make it nearly
impossible to support statistically
significant claims regarding specific
ESC configurations or to separate out
the components which the agency
decided not to include in its proposal.
Again, Public Citizen commented that
the PRIA for the ESC NPRM counts the
benefits of more extensive ESC
technologies, without counting the full
costs for those systems. It argued that
more properly, the agency should have
measured the benefit of a yaw control
system, which is more in line with the
requirements of the agency’s proposal.
In response to these comments
requesting that the agency require
additional features found on some ESC
systems, we have decided to incorporate
a requirement for ESC engine control
but not to require other system
components at this time. Although
discussed in detail immediately below,
the following summarizes our rationale
for this decision.
As a preliminary matter, we find no
merit in Public Citizen’s arguments that
the NPRM’s proposed ESC requirements
fail to satisfy the requirements of the
statutory mandate under SAFETEA–LU.
As discussed previously, the statute
provided the agency with discretion to
adopt performance criteria for
technologies consistent with stability
enhancing technologies. Our research
identified ESC systems as the most
effective of these technologies, and our
proposal was based upon the definition
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for ‘‘ESC System’’ promulgated by the
Society of Automotive Engineers, a
group which is broadly representative of
industry experts. Furthermore, the
Verband der Automobilindustrie (VDA),
an association of German vehicle
manufacturers, acknowledged that
NHTSA’s definition corresponds to
modern ‘‘state-of-the-art’’ ESC systems.
The proposal also established
performance criteria in the form of tests
for lateral stability and vehicle
responsiveness (see Section IV.C.4 and
the Appendix for a discussion of the
agency’s efforts to develop a
performance test for understeer).
Accordingly, this final rule meets the
requirements of SAFETEA–LU.
As discussed above, under 49 U.S.C.
30111, a safety standard must be
practicable, meet the need for motor
vehicle safety, and be stated in objective
terms; in setting the standard, relevant,
available motor vehicle safety
information must be considered. With
the exception of engine control, all of
the other ESC-related components lack
supporting data to assess their
effectiveness and to determine whether
such technologies meet the need for
safety. The commonality of design for
ESC systems that were represented in
the agency’s crash data study focused on
individual brake application and engine
control, and we note that in its
comments, VDA stated that the agency’s
proposed definition for ‘‘ESC system’’
captures the state-of-the-art. Again, even
though certain later ESC designs
incorporate some additional features, it
was not possible to determine the safety
benefits, if any, of these features because
these features were not available on any
of the ESC-equipped vehicles in the
crash data study. Also, some of those
features are directed at comfort and
convenience rather than safety (as
explained below). We do not believe
that there is good reason to postpone the
proven life-saving benefits of basic ESC
systems until such time as the agency
can conduct the necessary research to
assess the panoply of related
components. Accordingly, we believe
that it is not necessary to specify
additional components as part of the
standard’s definition for ‘‘ESC system,’’
but instead, we leave it to the discretion
of vehicle manufacturers to tailor the
features of their individual ESC systems
to the needs of a given vehicle. We note
that the rule does not limit
manufacturers’ ability to develop,
install, and advertise stability control
systems that go beyond its requirements.
At the time of the agency’s analysis,
the U.S. crash data available to NHTSA
to evaluate the benefit of ESC did not
include vehicles newer than 2003.
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However, the ESC systems of the
vehicles that were part of the agency’s
analysis proved extraordinarily
effective, reducing single-vehicle
crashes from 34 to 59 percent and
reducing rollover in single-vehicle
crashes (the crash type leading to over
80 percent of rollovers) from 71 to 84
percent. The results were statistically
significant and in agreement with
studies by other parties worldwide as
cited in the NPRM. The rule requires
ESC systems at least as capable as those
that produced this extremely high level
of demonstrated, real-world benefits at a
reasonable cost to the public. It does not
simply ‘‘grandfather’’ all existing ESC
systems, and the performance criteria
were developed using contemporary
new vehicles produced in 2005 and
2006. The basis of the standard is a
definition of ESC that specifically
excludes existing two-wheel ESC
systems because they are not capable of
understeer invention or four-wheel
automatic braking during an
intervention, even though these systems
also produced substantial (but lesser)
benefits.
Engine Control
‘‘Engine control’’ means the ability of
an ESC system to determine the need,
and a means to modify engine torque, as
necessary, to assist the driver in
maintaining control of the vehicle.
The commenters argued that the
benefit assessment included the
contributions of ESC engine control. We
have considered this comment and
agree that ESC engine control was a
feature on most vehicles in the crash
data analysis and on all the vehicles in
the ESC cost study. Because ESC engine
control is likely to have influenced the
estimated benefits reported in the PRIA,
we are amending the ‘‘ESC System’’
definition in the standard to include a
requirement for engine control based on
the definition contained in SAE Surface
Vehicle Information Report J2564:
The system must have an algorithm to
determine the need, and a means to modify
engine torque, as necessary, to assist the
driver in maintaining control of the vehicle.
Other Features
The commenters also claimed that the
benefit assessment included the
contributions of such features as
automatic braking, traction control,
active steering, brake assist, and roll
stability control and that the standard
would not achieve the expected benefits
with the required ESC systems.
However, we have determined that it is
not necessary to make additional
modifications related to the other
features cited by commenters. We have
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also decided that the commenters’
recommendations regarding the test
criteria are likewise unnecessary. We
address each of these topics in turn
below.
Automatic Braking
‘‘Automatic braking’’ involves the
application of other brakes in addition
to the brake required to generate the
necessary yaw torque (as described in
the explanation of ESC operation in
Section II.D), along with a heavier
application at the initial brake location
to maintain the yaw torque.
A requirement for automatic braking
would be redundant, because that
feature is simply the application of
other brakes in addition to the brake
already required to generate the
necessary yaw torque. All of the
hardware required for this operation is
already included in the definition of
‘‘ESC System.’’ Automatic braking is
just one of the strategies invoked by the
basic operating software of ESC, but the
circumstances when it is called for and
the severity of the braking are
determined when ESC is tuned for a
specific vehicle. Making ESC a
requirement will not reduce the use of
automatic braking. If anything, use of
ESC on a much greater number of
vehicles will lead to more sophisticated
basic software being delivered to vehicle
manufacturers by suppliers.
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Traction Control
‘‘Traction control’’ reduces engine
power and applies braking to a spinning
drive wheel in order to transfer torque
to the other drive wheel on the axle.
The commenters are mistaken in
attributing ESC benefits to traction
control. Traction control provides
mobility in starting on slippery surfaces,
but it offers no improvement in lateral
stability beyond that already provided
by ESC with engine control. ESC already
reduces engine power when lateral
instability is detected, and there is no
further assistance that traction control
could add.
Active Steering
‘‘Active steering’’ is a computercontrolled function that allows steering
of the front axle (and possibly the rear)
independent of driver input to maintain
stability. As mentioned in Section IV.C2
above, active steering interventions are
not as powerful as ESC brake
interventions in limit situations. (Our
observations lead us to believe that
active steering is being used to delay the
onset of ESC interventions as a driver
satisfaction feature.)
Active steering did not affect our
estimation of benefits because none of
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the vehicles in our data study were
equipped with that feature. Also, only
one of the new vehicles in our research
to develop an oversteer test had this
recently introduced feature. This
vehicle was also the only new vehicle
in our research that failed the oversteer
test criteria. Ironically, this vehicle was
equipped with more cutting edge
technology than the rest of the new test
vehicles.
Brake Assist
‘‘Brake assist’’ causes a maximum
brake application if the driver presses
the brake pedal very quickly in a
manner indicative of panic braking,
even if the driver is hesitant to brake
hard.
Similarly, the benefits we have
attributed to ESC based upon our
research have nothing to do with brake
assist. It is a feature that predates ESC
on the European vehicles in our test
group that had it. Brake assist is not part
of the ESC system; it does not affect yaw
stability, and it was present on both the
non-ESC control vehicles and the ESCequipped vehicles in our study. NHTSA
is examining the merits of brake assist
separately from its ESC research.
Roll Stability Control
‘‘Roll stability control’’ senses the
vehicle’s body roll angle and applies
high brake force to the outside front
wheel to straighten the vehicle’s path
and reduce lateral acceleration if the roll
angle indicates probable tip-up.
Roll stability control was not
responsible for the huge reduction in
rollovers in single-vehicle crashes of 71
percent for cars and 84 percent for
SUVs. None of the vehicles in the crash
data study had roll stability control. The
crash data study was a study of the
benefits of yaw stability control. The
first vehicle with roll stability control
was the 2003 Volvo XC90 (cited by
Public Citizen) which was not in our
data study because it was a new vehicle
without a non-ESC version that could
serve as a control vehicle. It is also a
low-production-volume vehicle that
would have produced very few crash
counts in the 1997–2003 crash data of
our study. A similar roll stability control
system was used on high-volume Ford
Explorers starting in 2005, and
eventually there will be enough
Explorer data to evaluate the
effectiveness of roll stability control.
The agency will track the rollover rate
of vehicles equipped with roll stability
control through analysis of Stategenerated crash data and evaluate its
effectiveness once a sufficient sample
size becomes available (i.e.,
approximately three to four years).
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However, because our data study
showed yaw stability control reducing
rollovers of SUVs by 84% by reducing
and mitigating road departures, and
because on-road untripped rollovers are
much less common events, the target
population of crashes that roll stability
control could possibly prevent may be
very small. If and when roll stability
control can be shown to be costeffective, then it could be a candidate
for inclusion in the standard in
subsequent rulemaking.
In addition, the countermeasure of
roll stability control systems is at least
theoretically not benign. It reduces
lateral acceleration by turning the
vehicle away from the direction the
driver is steering for at least a short
distance. As noted previously, several
individual commenters expressed strong
dissatisfaction that we were proposing a
mandatory safety device in which the
driver yields at least some measure of
vehicle control to a computer. This was
an inaccurate criticism of the pure yaw
stability control system we proposed,
because such system would help the
vehicle go in the direction the driver is
steering. ESC engine control does
require the system to override the
driver’s throttle control which was a
specific complaint of some commenters.
However, requiring systems that
actually countermand the driver’s
steering control requires a high level of
justification, a hurdle which roll
stability control cannot yet surmount
due to the newness of the technology
and the corresponding lack of available
data.
Test Criteria
In terms of future manufacturer
actions, we note that Consumers Union
criticized the test criteria as too weak to
ensure that manufacturers will not
create cheaper, less sophisticated
systems that rely on poor tire traction or
a reduced steering ratio to meet the
performance test. To preclude such
actions, we established criteria for
vehicle responsiveness as well as lateral
stability (see discussion under Section
IV.C.5).
Also, we do not agree with Consumers
Union’s assertions that the standard’s
test criteria are weak. The commenters
offered no recommendations in terms of
how test severity could be improved. As
carefully explained in the NPRM, the
agency knows of no test more suited for
quantifying an ESC system’s ability to
mitigate excessive oversteer while
simultaneously facilitating the
assessment of lateral displacement
capability. Every vehicle we have
evaluated using the lateral stability
performance criteria has demonstrated
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profound differences between tests
performed with fully enabled and fully
disabled ESC. Thus, this test clearly
distinguishes vehicles with properly
tuned ESC systems from comparable
vehicles not so equipped.
4. Understeer Requirements
Under the proposed requirement that
vehicles be equipped with ESC systems
meeting the proposed definition of ‘‘ESC
System,’’ a system must be ‘‘computer
controlled with a computer using a
closed-loop algorithm to limit vehicle
oversteer and to limit vehicle understeer
when appropriate’’ (emphasis added).
The NPRM did not propose a separate
performance requirement for understeer.
(All current ESC designs that NHTSA
has studied appear to already include
provisions for mitigating excessive
understeer.)
BorgWarner suggested that it is
inconsistent for the ESC proposal to
state that the system must meet an
understeer requirement without
defining a test or set of criteria to
objectively measure compliance.
Accordingly, BorgWarner stated that the
agency should either include a
performance requirement for understeer
or eliminate the understeer requirement.
The commenter suggested that the
agency could amend the standard at a
later date, once the parameters of the
understeer performance requirement
and associated test procedure have been
developed.
Delphi stated that while it supports
the eventual incorporation of an
understeer performance requirement
into the ESC standard, the commenter
believes that adoption of the agency’s
proposal would yield significant safety
benefits and that the agency should
proceed quickly to a final rule.
Accordingly, Delphi suggested leaving
an understeer performance requirement
for a separate future rulemaking. Delphi
reasoned that, ultimately, an ESC
system facing an extreme understeer
situation must avoid overreaction that
produces oversteer (excess yaw and side
slip, which may lead to off-road tripped
rollover) or produces excessive lateral
acceleration that may induce on-road
untripped rollover.
Advocates faulted the NPRM, on both
safety and legal grounds, for not
proposing specific performance
requirements for ESC understeer
intervention. The commenter argued
that because the agency has identified
understeer intervention as one of the
necessary elements for an ESC system,
it is obligated to establish performance
requirements (including appropriate test
procedures), without which the
understeer requirement is
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unenforceable. Otherwise, the
commenter stated that some
manufacturers might supply ESC
systems that do not adequately
compensate for understeer loss of
control circumstances, arguing that
there are already vast differences in
tuning among various ESC systems.
Advocates predicted that failure of the
agency to specify understeer
performance requirements would
maintain or expand differences between
ESC performance from one vehicle make
or model to another and could cause the
standard to forgo prevention of
additional fatalities and injuries.
Furthermore, Advocates argued that
since SAFETEA–LU directs the agency
to establish performance criteria for
stability enhancing technologies (i.e.,
noting the plural nature of that statutory
provision, which Advocates suggested
requires something more than an
oversteer criterion alone), including the
understeer component that the agency
has determined to be a necessary part of
ESC systems from a safety perspective is
also required from a legal perspective.
Consumers Union expressed concern
that the agency’s proposal does not
assess an ESC-equipped vehicle’s ability
to reduce understeer through the
standard’s test procedures. The
commenter inquired as to what
percentage of the fatalities to be
addressed by the standard are caused by
understeer as opposed to oversteer, but
the organization stated that it
nevertheless believes that understeer is
an issue that should be addressed by the
agency.
IIHS expressed its agreement with the
agency’s approach to provide both a
definition of an ESC system and a
performance requirement for such
systems. However, because the
proposed ESC performance test does not
fully address understeer, IIHS cautioned
the agency to monitor the performance
of ESC-equipped vehicles to ensure that
they continue to be effective.
Public Citizen also objected to the
omission of a performance test for
understeer intervention, stating that the
agency has not addressed the understeer
performance criteria used by industry or
the potential loss of benefits that would
be attributed to the failure to develop
understeer performance criteria.
According to Public Citizen, the agency
should explain on the record the
available test procedures for understeer
that it examined and explain why those
procedures are inadequate. The
commenter stated that the agency itself
has identified understeer intervention as
an important component of the ESC
system, but without any performance
criteria, neither the agency nor the
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consumer will have any sense of the
effectiveness of the system in that
regard. Accordingly, the commenter
argued that the NPRM is inadequate to
meaningfully address rollover fatalities
as required by the statute, so it
demanded a supplemental notice of
proposed rulemaking (SNPRM) to
correct these perceived deficiencies.
Although Mr. Sparhawk agreed that
ESC systems are likely to provide
substantial benefits, he raised two issues
for resolution in the final rule. Mr.
Sparhawk argued that NHTSA has not
established an adequate record to justify
adoption of an equipment requirement
or to explain why development of a
performance test for understeer was too
difficult and too cumbersome for the
agency and the regulated community.
The commenter stated that the
justification provided by the agency for
not including an understeer test as part
of the ESC proposal requires further
factual and analytical development.
Mr. Sparhawk questioned how,
without an understeer test, the agency
can determine whether that aspect of
the ESC system has the desired level of
functionality or whether the system will
always function as expected. (The
commenter cited NHTSA’s June 2003
report titled ‘‘Initiatives to Address the
Mitigation of Vehicle Rollover,’’ which
noted system-to-system variability in
terms of ESC performance.)
The commenter also stated that
numerous understeer tests have been
developed in Asia, Europe, and North
America, so the record should explain
that these tests do exist, why they are
inadequate, and the urgent need to
move to a final rule even before the
understeer issue can be fully resolved.
Otherwise, one might ask why the
agency simply did not wait for
additional data on this key element
before proceeding with its rulemaking.
In addition, the commenter asked the
agency to explain the factors, elements,
or processes used by the agency to
determine when any battery of tests is
too difficult for incorporation in a
regulation. Mr. Sparhawk also argued
that there is no provision in the statute
permitting the agency to consider
burden on the agency or the regulated
community as a factor when prescribing
a safety standard.
As background for the reader, all light
vehicles (including passenger cars,
pickups, vans, minivans, crossovers,
and sport utility vehicles) are designed
to understeer 53 in the linear range of
53 Although Appendix 1 provides a technical
definition of ‘‘understeer,’’ in lay terms it is
probably best described as the normal condition of
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lateral acceleration,54 although
operational factors such as loading, tire
inflation pressure, and so forth can in
rare situations make them oversteer in
use. This is a fundamental design
characteristic. Understeer provides a
valuable, and benign, way for the
vehicle to inform the driver of how the
available roadway friction is being
utilized, insofar as the driver can ‘‘feel’’
the response of the vehicle to the road
as the driver turns the steering wheel.
Multiple tests have been developed to
quantify linear-range understeer
objectively, including SAE J266,
‘‘Steady-State Directional Control Test
Procedures for Passenger Cars and Light
Trucks,’’ and ISO 4138, ‘‘Road
vehicles—Steady state circular test
procedure.’’ These tests help vehicle
manufacturers design their vehicles
with an appropriate amount of
understeer for normal linear-range
driving conditions. Tests such SAE J266
and ISO 4138 simply measure the small
constant reduction in vehicle turning (in
comparison to the geometric ideal for a
given steering angle and wheelbase) that
characterizes linear range understeer at
relatively low levels of lateral
acceleration. This is much different
from limit understeer in loss-of-control
situations where even large increases in
steering to avoid an obstacle create little
or no effect on vehicle turning.
In the linear range of handling, ESC
should never activate. ESC interventions
occur when the driver’s intended path
(calculated by the ESC control
algorithms using a constant linear range
understeer gradient) differs from the
actual path of the vehicle as measured
by ESC sensors. Since this does not
occur while driving in the linear range,
ESC intervention will not occur.
Therefore, ESC has no effect upon the
linear-range understeer of a vehicle.
most cars for everyday driving. Light vehicles are
designed to be slightly understeer in normal driving
situations, because being understeer provides both
stability (the vehicle is not hugely affected by, e.g.,
small gusts of wind) and lateral responsiveness
(e.g., the vehicle is able to respond to the driver’s
sudden decision to avoid an obstruction in the
roadway by turning the wheel quickly).
54 The ‘‘linear range of lateral acceleration’’ is
referred to in other parts of the preamble as ‘‘linearhandling’’ and ‘‘linear range,’’ and in very basic
terms describes the normal situation of everyday
driving, where a given turn by the driver of the
steering wheel causes an expected amount of turn
of the vehicle itself, because the vehicle is operating
at the traction levels to which most drivers are
accustomed. As the limits of the accustomed
traction levels are approached (elsewhere called
‘‘limit-handling’’), the vehicle begins to enter nonlinear range, in which the driver cannot predict the
movement of the vehicle given a particular turn of
the steering wheel, as on a slippery road or a sharp
curve, where the driver can turn the wheel a great
deal and get little response from the skidding
vehicle.
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Our response to the comments is
explained in more detail in Appendix 1,
below. In overview, the agency
recognizes that understeer intervention
is one of the core functions of an ESC
system, a feature common to all current
production systems. The agency
examined the available research for a
potential ESC understeer test, but such
research did not address understeer in
the context of loss-of-control situations.
Understeer tests in the literature (such
as SAE J266 and ISO 4138) focus on
linear range understeer properties and
are not relevant to the operation of ESC,
as explained above.
Because there are no suitable tests of
limit understeer performance in
existence, NHTSA undertook its own
preliminary research efforts related to
understeer. However, the complexity of
such research would require several
years of additional work before any
conclusions could be reached regarding
an ESC understeer performance test. A
principal complication is that
manufacturers often program ESC
systems for SUVs to avoid understeer
intervention altogether on dry roads
because of concern that the intervention
could trigger tip-up or make the
oversteer control of some vehicles less
certain in high-speed situations. This
common understanding of how current
ESC systems operate related to
understeer has also been observed in the
course of NHTSA’s research; this
principle was discussed in the NPRM,
and no commenter disagreed with this
operational understanding.
We believe it would be unwise to
disregard manufacturers’ exercise of
caution in this circumstance,
particularly in view of the remarkable
reduction in rollover crashes of SUVs
that manufacturers have achieved with
current ESC strategies. Respect for the
manufacturer’s discretion in understeer
strategies is the reason why we added
‘‘when appropriate’’ to the NPRM’s
proposed requirement for understeer
intervention in the ‘‘ESC System’’
definition, which was modeled on the
SAE definition. As a result, tests of
understeer intervention would have to
be conducted on low-coefficient of
friction (‘‘low-coefficient’’) surfaces.
There are two kinds of low-coefficient
test surfaces: (1) Those involving water
delivery to the pavement and pavement
sealing compounds such as Jennite to
reduce the friction of wet asphalt, and
(2) those involving water delivery to
inherently slick surfaces such as basalt
tile pads. Repeatable pavement watering
is confounded by factors like time
between runs, wind, slope, temperature,
and sunlight. Jennite itself is not very
durable, resulting in the coefficient
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changing with wear. Simply wetting the
same surface used for the oversteer test
would not produce a surface slippery
enough to ensure that SUVs would
intervene in understeer. Basalt tile is
extremely expensive, as evidenced by
the lack of large enough basalt test pads
anywhere in the country for this kind of
testing. Moreover, the coefficient of
friction of basalt pads is extremely low,
almost as low as glare ice. Causing
manufacturers to optimize understeer
intervention at extremely low
coefficients like this may create overlyaggressive systems that compromise
oversteer control on more moderate lowcoefficient surfaces. Given the
practicability problems of repeatable
low-coefficient testing, the need for
compliance margins expressed by the
Alliance (see Section IV.C.5) would
likely result in very low criteria.
Development of specific performance
criteria is also problematic. In the
oversteer performance test, the
difference between the maximum yaw
rate achieved and the zero when the
vehicle is steered straight at the end of
the maneuver is large and readily
obvious. In contrast, the difference
between understeer and the ultimate
controlled drift, which is the most any
ESC system can deliver when there is
simply not enough traction for the
steering maneuver, is difficult to
differentiate. Also, the kind of optical
instrumentation that a test would use to
measure possible metrics in an
understeer test such as body and wheel
slip angles does not function reliably for
tests on wet surfaces. There is a real
question whether NHTSA can ever
create criteria for understeer
intervention that would be both
stringent enough for testing and
universal enough to be applied on cars
and SUVs without upsetting legitimate
design compromises.
In light of the above, the agency
determined that it had three available
options: (1) Delay the ESC final rule
until such time as the agency’s research
was completed and an understeer
performance test could be developed;
(2) drop the understeer requirement
from the proposed definition of ‘‘ESC
System’’ and amend the standard at a
future date once an ESC performance
test is developed; or (3) include a
requirement for understeer as part of the
definition of ‘‘ESC System,’’ along with
requiring specific components that will
permit the system to intervene in
excessive understeer situations (e.g.,
capability to brake at four wheels
individually which is necessary for both
oversteer and understeer intervention)
and requiring that manufacturers make
available to the agency, upon request,
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sufficient engineering documentation to
demonstrate the ESC system’s capability
to limit understeer.
The agency quickly decided to
eliminate the option of delaying the ESC
rulemaking, because of the extremely
high life-saving potential of this
rulemaking. To do so would run counter
to the agency’s mission.
Similarly, the agency decided that
eliminating the understeer requirement
from the rule and deferring its adoption
until the completion of future research
would also run counter to safety. As
discussed in Section II.D, understeer
intervention is one of the key beneficial
features in current ESC systems, and we
did not want to set a requirement that
did not ensure the substantial benefits
of current ESC systems.
That left the agency with the third
option (which we have retained in this
final rule) of adopting an understeer
requirement as part of the definition of
‘‘ESC System,’’ along with a
requirement for specific equipment
suitable for that purpose. Such
requirement is objective in terms of
explaining to manufacturers what type
of performance is required and the
minimal equipment necessary for that
purpose. The rule also requires that the
manufacturer must submit to NHTSA,
upon request, the engineering
documentation necessary to
demonstrate the system’s understeer
capability (see S5.6).
Specifically, in order to ensure that a
vehicle is equipped with an ESC system
that meets the definition of ‘‘ESC
System’’ under S4, NHTSA’s Office of
Vehicle Safety Compliance (OVSC) may
ask the vehicle manufacturer to provide
a system diagram that identifies all ESC
components, a written explanation
describing the ESC system’s basic
operational characteristics, and a logic
diagram supporting the explanation of
system operations. In addition,
regarding mitigation of understeer,
OVSC may request a discussion of the
pertinent inputs to the vehicle computer
or calculations within the computer and
how its algorithm uses that information
and controls ESC system hardware to
limit vehicle understeer. (In appropriate
cases in the context of an enforcement
proceeding, NHTSA might ask for
additional data, including the results of
a manufacturer’s understeer testing.) We
note here that we anticipate that much
of the above information is proprietary
and would be submitted under a request
for confidential treatment.
In sum, the agency believes that the
above information will permit the
agency to understand the operation of
the ESC system and to verify that the
system has the necessary hardware and
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logic for mitigating excessive
understeer. This ensures that vehicle
manufacturers are required to provide
understeer intervention as a feature of
the ESC systems, without delaying the
life-saving benefits of the ESC rule
(including those attributable to
understeer intervention). In the
meantime, the agency will conduct
additional research in the area of ESC
understeer intervention and considering
taking additional action, as appropriate.
The Vehicle Safety Act requires that
FMVSS be stated in objective terms.
NHTSA believes that the understeer
requirement is objective, even without a
specific performance test. The definition
of ‘‘ESC System’’ requires not only an
understeer capability (part (2) of the
definition), but also specific physical
components that allow excessive
understeer mitigation (part (1) of the
definition). Based on agency evaluation
of ESC-equipped vehicles so far, we
have identified both the hardware and
the algorithms necessary for an ESCequipped vehicle to be able to mitigate
excessive understeer, as described in
S5.1 of the standard and more fully in
the Appendix.
We note that in the proposed
regulatory text, NHTSA defined ESC as
including an algorithm that would
‘‘limit vehicle understeer as
appropriate,’’ which was intended to
ensure the mitigation of excessive
understeer already performed by
existing ESC systems when the vehicle
has entered the non-linear range and to
prevent any backsliding of the
technology. However, based upon the
concern for objectivity, we have decided
to delete the words ‘‘when appropriate’’
in paragraph (2) of the definition of
‘‘ESC System’’ in S4. We believe that the
provision for ESC system technical
documentation contained in S5.6
provides a clearer picture as to when
understeer intervention is appropriate
for a given vehicle.
Thus, NHTSA plans to enforce the
understeer requirement via a two part
process: Ensuring that vehicles have all
of the hardware needed to limit vehicle
understeer (as required by FMVSS No.
126), and checking engineering
documentation (i.e., logic/system
diagrams and other information
discussed above) provided by the
vehicle manufacturers upon request to
show that the ESC system is capable of
addressing vehicle understeer.
Regarding Consumers Union’s
question about what percentage of the
fatalities to be addressed by the
standard are caused by understeer as
opposed to oversteer, we cannot
quantify this from the available data.
This is because it is exceedingly
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difficult to determine during or after an
accident whether it was caused by
oversteer or understeer, when both
frequently occur at the same time during
accidents.
In conclusion, while NHTSA would
like to include a performance standard
for understeer intervention in FMVSS
No. 126, we do not know of any suitable
performance tests for excessive
understeer mitigation. We are unwilling
to forgo the large safety benefits that
ESC will provide to the American
public in the near future just because we
might, some years from now, be able to
produce a more refined standard. If, in
the future, we see ways to amend
FMVSS No. 126 in a manner that would
increase motor vehicle safety, NHTSA
would consider undertaking additional
rulemaking at that time.
5. Lateral Responsiveness Criteria
The NPRM proposed that under each
test performed under the test conditions
of S6 and the test procedure of S7.9, the
vehicle would be required to satisfy the
responsiveness criterion of S5.2.3
during each of those tests conducted
with a steering amplitude of 180 degrees
or greater. Specifically, proposed
paragraph S5.2.3 provides that lateral
displacement of the vehicle center of
gravity with respect to its initial straight
path must be at least 1.83 m (6 feet)
when computed 1.07 seconds after
initiation of steering. The NPRM further
proposed that the computation of lateral
displacement is performed using double
integration with respect to time of the
measurement of lateral acceleration at
the vehicle center of gravity (see
S5.2.3.1) and that time t=0 for the
integration operation is the instant of
steering initiation (see S5.2.3.2).
The VDA expressed support for the
agency’s proposed requirements for
‘‘Metric Stability.’’ The commenter
confirmed that in similar testing by its
members, measured lateral accelerations
and the subsequent double integration
for the lateral displacements showed
similar values to those tested during the
agency’s development of the NPRM. It
stated that its testing showed that all
passenger cars reached the proposed
limit of 1.83 m after 1.07 s, although
SUVs were more borderline. The
commenter also stated that the required
lateral displacement for proposed
steering wheel angles above 180 degrees
was easily reachable for passenger cars,
although more difficult to achieve for
larger, heavier vehicles with more
indirect steering ratios. According to the
VDA, the accuracy of the lateral
acceleration integration, up to 1.07 s
after initiation of steering, is a sufficient
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and reproducible measurement
procedure.
The VDA supported the agency’s
requirement of stability criteria using
yaw rate measured 1 sec and 1.75 sec
after the end of steering. However, the
VDA offered a recommendation
regarding the proposed responsiveness
test procedure. Specifically, the
commenter urged the responsiveness
metric to include the influence of
steering ratios and possibly vehicle
weight.
Regarding parameters that may
influence test results, the VDA stated
that it did not conduct detailed tests to
examine factors such as proving
grounds, test track surface, slope,
ambient climatic conditions, or brake
temperatures. The commenter stated
that this was not possible in its testing,
because each vehicle manufacturer
member carried out its own testing on
its own test track. Accordingly, the VDA
recommended that the agency should
adopt the Alliance’s recommendations
that take into account relevant
tolerances and influencing parameters.
The Alliance and AIAM stated their
understanding that NHTSA’s intention
in proposing a responsiveness metric as
part of the ESC rulemaking was not to
change the basic responsiveness
characteristics of the current fleet of
vehicles without ESC (which they argue
are satisfactory from a safety
standpoint), but to prevent vehicle
manufacturers from inappropriately
suppressing the vehicle’s natural level
of responsiveness in order to enhance
stability when the ESC system is
activated. In support of this view, the
commenters also pointed out that in the
NPRM, the agency stated its expectation
that approximately 98 percent of current
ESC-equipped vehicles would comply
with the proposal. However, the
Alliance/AIAM argued that given the
observed variability inherent in vehicle
testing, the proposed responsiveness
metric and criteria would not provide
manufacturers with a sufficient margin
to ensure compliance for a number of
vehicles (primarily long wheelbase pickups and stretched limousines) being
tested without ESC (i.e., in a base
handling state).
The Alliance/AIAM comments of
November 17, 2006 presented
considerable detail on three potential
sources of variability: (1) Track
variability; (2) temperature variability,
and (3) run-to-run variability. While
none of the 62 vehicles tested by
NHTSA or the Alliance actually failed
the proposed responsiveness criterion,
the Alliance/AIAM attributed the
success of some of the vehicles to test
conditions (ambient temperature and
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test track) that were at the favorable end
of the variability range. However, the
commenters argued that for compliance
testing purposes, manufacturers would
have to certify that the vehicles would
pass the performance test at the least
favorable end of the variability range.
Therefore, the Alliance/AIAM perceived
the proposed responsiveness criterion as
very demanding because of the large
margin of compliance that would be
necessary for certification, taking into
account the sources of test variability.
The Alliance/AIAM proposed several
alternative responsiveness criteria in
their November 17, 2006 comments in
order to address the problem of
insufficient compliance margins that the
commenters attributed to the inherent
level of test variability. These
suggestions were based on lowering the
lateral displacement criteria from 6 feet
to 4.5 feet (in a range determined
according to the test weight of the
vehicle) or increasing the time for the
vehicle to reach the 6-foot displacement.
On December 21, 2006, the Alliance/
AIAM submitted a supplemental
comment introducing the ideas of
replacing the fixed steering angle of 180
degrees used in the test with a
normalized steering angle that takes into
account differences in vehicle steering
ratio and using the GVWR of the vehicle
rather than the test weight to create a
cut-off point to qualify larger vehicles
for a reduced displacement criteria. The
supplemental comment did not suggest
reducing the stringency of the
responsiveness test of the NPRM as
much as the previous comment. Since
NHTSA wants to preserve the
stringency of the responsiveness test as
much as possible, it considered the
supplemental comment rather than the
original comment in trying to address
the concerns of the Alliance and AIAM.
The Alliance/AIAM supplemental
comment stressed the effect of GVWR
and of steering ratio differences between
vehicles on a reasonable criterion for
lateral displacement in NHTSA’s Sine
with Dwell test maneuver. It used
NHTSA’s proposed criterion of 6 feet of
lateral displacement for vehicles with a
GVWR of 5,500 pounds or less, but the
commenters suggested a small reduction
to 5.5 feet for vehicles over 5,500
pounds GVWR and up to 10,000 pounds
GVWR. The supplemental comment also
suggested using a normalized steering
wheel angle (that would account for
differences in steering ratios between
vehicles) rather than simply 180 degrees
of steering wheel rotation as the
minimum amount of steering for
responsiveness tests. The steering wheel
angle would be normalized by dividing
the first peak steering wheel angle by
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the steering wheel angle at 0.3g
determined by the slowly increasingsteer test (thereby expressing the
amount of steering as a unitless number
or scalar rather than in degrees). The
Alliance/AIAM suggested that the
responsiveness criteria should be
applied for tests using a normalized
steering wheel angle of 5.0 or greater.
NHTSA agrees with Alliance/AIAM
comment regarding the use of the
normalized steering wheel angle of 5.0
as the minimum steering input for
applying the responsiveness test
criteria. The performance test in the
NPRM already includes the procedure
for normalizing the steering wheel angle
and calls for performing the Sine with
Dwell maneuver at normalized steering
wheel angles including 5.0, 5.5, 6.0, and
6.5, at which points responsiveness
would be measured. For contemporary
light vehicles, our data indicate that, on
average, a normalized steering wheel
angle of 5.0 is about 180 degrees.
However, the heavier trucks and vans in
the weight class with a GVWR up to
10,000 pounds tend to have slower
steering ratios, which means that 180
degrees of rotation for those vehicles
produces less steering motion of the
front wheels than for cars (e.g., a
normalized steering wheel angle of 5.0
averages approximately 147 degrees for
passenger cars, 195 degrees for SUVs,
and 230 degrees for pickups). Since
these are the vehicles whose inherent
chassis properties limit responsiveness,
the test becomes very difficult to pass if
they are also tested at lower effective
steering angles at the front wheels.
Thus, the use of normalized steering
wheel angles will remove a systematic
disadvantage for trucks in the test
procedure.
In response to the Alliance/AIAM
comment’s suggestion for applying the
normalized steering angles to the first
actual peak steering wheel angles
measured during the test, we believe
that there are problems with such an
approach. Figure 2 of the regulatory text
shows the ideal steering profile of the
Sine with Dwell maneuver used to
command the steering machine. A
steering machine is utilized because it
turns the steering wheel in the test
vehicles with far greater precision and
repeatability than is possible for a
human driver. However, the power
steering systems of some vehicles do not
permit the steering machines to
accomplish the desired steering profile.
For the reasons discussed below, we
believe the normalized steering angle
should be based on the commanded
angle of a steering machine (which
replaces driver input during the test)
with a high steering effort capacity
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rather than on the measured maximum
steering angle achieved by the machine.
The Alliance/AIAM also suggested
that NHTSA should specify a maximum
steering torque capacity of 50 to 60 Nm
for steering machines to reduce the
variability caused by the choice of
steering machine and to assure
manufacturers that the tests would be
carried out with powerful machines to
maximize the steering input during the
responsiveness test. NHTSA is
specifying (in S6.3.5 of the final rule)
that the steering machine used for the
Sine with Dwell maneuver must be
capable of applying steering torques
between 40 and 60 Nm at steering wheel
velocities up to 1200 degrees per
second. This is a more rigorous
specification than simply a maximum
torque range that does not include speed
capability, and it prevents NHTSA from
conducting compliance tests with some
of the less powerful machines in use by
test facilities.
However, even a robust steering
machine cannot maintain the
commanded steering profile with some
vehicle power steering systems. Some of
the electric power steering systems are
especially marginal in that their power
assistance diminishes at high steering
wheel velocities. In the case of vehicle
power steering limitations, the first
steering angle peak in Figure 2 cannot
be met, but the second peak as well as
the frequency of the wave form are
usually achieved. Thus, marginal
vehicle power steering does not likely
reduce the severity of the oversteer
intervention part of the test, but it will
reduce the steering input that helps the
vehicle satisfy the responsiveness
criteria. If NHTSA were to use the actual
steering angle rather than the
commanded steering angle as the
normalized steering angle for the
responsiveness test, it could create the
unacceptable situation of vehicles that
could not be tested for compliance,
because the test would not allow for
their evaluation. For example, if the
steering machine could not achieve a
normalized steering wheel angle of 5.0
even when commanded to a normalized
angle of 6.5 because of vehicle
limitations, the vehicle could not be
said to fail, no matter how poor its
performance.
Therefore, the agency has decided to
use the commanded steering profile
(using an assuredly robust steering
machine), rather than the measured
steering profile, to calculate the
normalized steering wheel angle used to
assess compliance with our lateral
displacement requirement. We do not
believe that this creates a practical
problem. At this time, the larger
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vehicles have reasonably powerful
steering systems that should enable
them to achieve actual peak steering
angles within at least 10 degrees of the
commanded peak. Furthermore, under
this approach to defining the steering
input, the lateral displacement required
for large vehicles would be reduced to
5 feet rather than the 5.5 feet requested
in the Alliance/AIAM supplemental
comment (with its somewhat higher
measured steering angle). The weaker
electric power steering systems
discussed above are typically found on
cars, and cars tend to be responsive
enough to pass the 6-foot lateral
displacement criterion at normalized
steering wheel angles of less than 5.0.
Therefore, S5.2 of the proposed
standard has been revised to read as
follows:
S5.2 Performance requirements. During
each test performed under the test conditions
of S6 and the test procedure of S7.9, the
vehicle with the ESC system engaged must
satisfy the stability criteria of S5.2.1 and
S5.2.2, and it must satisfy the responsiveness
criterion of S5.2.3 during each of those tests
conducted with a commanded steering wheel
angle of 5A or greater, where A is the steering
wheel angle computed in S7.6.1.
As noted above, the NPRM included
a responsiveness criterion that specified
a minimum lateral movement of 6 feet
during the first 1.07 seconds of steering
during the Sine with Dwell maneuver.
The purpose of the criterion was to limit
the loss of responsiveness that could
occur with unnecessarily aggressive roll
stability measures incorporated into the
ESC systems of SUVs. This is a real
concern, as our research has
demonstrated that one such system
reduced the lateral displacement
capability of a mid-sized SUV below
that attainable with a 15-passenger van,
multiple unloaded long wheelbase
diesel pickups, and even a stretched
wheelbase limousine.
A heavy-duty pickup truck
understeers strongly in this test because
of its long wheelbase and because it is
so front-heavy under the test condition.
The ESC standard is not intended to
influence the inherent chassis
properties of these vehicles (which were
tested without ESC), because low
responsiveness in the unloaded state is
the consequence of a chassis with
reasonable inherent stability in the
loaded state. The standard must avoid
causing vehicles to be designed with
chasses that are unstable at GVWR and
rely on ESC in normal operation.
NHTSA is also aware that some very
large vans with a high center of gravity,
such as 15-passenger vans, rely on their
ESC system to reduce responsiveness
because of special concerns for loss of
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control and rollover. While it is
necessary to respect the responsiveness
limitations appropriate to large vehicles
with commercial purposes, there is no
need for lighter vehicles designed for
personal transportation, including
SUVs, to give up so much of the object
avoidance capability of their chassis
when tuning the ESC system.
NHTSA agrees with the Alliance/
AIAM comment suggesting a lower
responsiveness criterion for vehicles
with higher GVWRs, but we disagree
with the 5,500-pound GVWR break
point suggested by the commenters.
Some large passenger cars, such as the
Mercedes-Benz S-class, have GVWRs
near this level. With this break point,
minivans like the Honda Odyssey and
midsize SUVs like the Toyota 4Runner
and Jeep Cherokee would be considered
to have the same limitations as 15passenger vans and trucks with a GVWR
of 10,000 lbs. We believe a more
representative break point was
established by Standard No. 135, Light
Vehicle Brake Systems, at a GVWR of
3,500 kg (7,716 pounds). Accordingly,
S5.2.3 of the proposed standard has
been revised to read as follows:
S5.2.3 The lateral displacement of the
vehicle center of gravity with respect to its
initial straight path must be at least 1.83 m
(6 feet) for vehicles with a GVWR of 3,500kg
(7,716 lb) or less, and 1.52 m (5 feet) for
vehicles with a GVWR greater than 3,500 kg
(7,716 lb) when computed 1.07 seconds after
the Beginning of Steer (BOS). BOS is defined
in S7.11.6.
6. Definition of ‘‘ESC System’’ and
Required Equipment
As noted above, the NPRM proposed
to require installation of an ESC system
that: (1) Is capable of applying all four
brakes individually and has a control
algorithm that utilizes this capability;
(2) is operational during all phases of
driving including acceleration, coasting,
and deceleration (including braking),
except when the driver has disabled
ESC or the vehicle is below a low speed
threshold where loss of control is
unlikely, and (3) remains operational
when the antilock brake system or
traction control system is activated (see
S5.1). The ESC system must also meet
the proposed performance requirements
for lateral stability and vehicle
responsiveness (see S5.2).
Under S4 of the proposal, an ‘‘ESC
System’’ is defined as a system that has
all of the following attributes: (1) That
augments vehicle directional stability by
applying and adjusting the vehicle
brakes individually to induce correcting
yaw torques to a vehicle; (2) that is
computer-controlled with the computer
using a closed-loop algorithm to limit
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vehicle oversteer and to limit vehicle
understeer when appropriate; (3) that
has a means to determine the vehicle’s
yaw rate and to estimate its side slip; (4)
that has a means to monitor driver
steering inputs, and (5) that is
operational over the full speed range of
the vehicle (except below a low-speed
threshold where loss of control is
unlikely).
According to the VDA, it supports the
definition for ‘‘ESC system’’ included in
the agency’s proposal which
‘‘corresponds to modern state-of-the-art
ESC systems.’’
ycherry on PROD1PC64 with RULES2
(a) Clarification of Performance
Expectations
Delphi expressed support for the
approach in the agency’s ESC proposal
to combine an ESC definitional
requirement with a performance
requirement (i.e., a lane change
maneuver at 50 mph conducted on a dry
surface), until such time as the agency
can conduct relevant research into ESC
operation on slippery surfaces and/or
for extreme understeer condition, which
may support future requirements under
an amended standard. However, Delphi
did recommend that the agency include
an explicit statement in the final rule
about the performance expectations
across all operating conditions.
Specifically, Delphi suggested that the
final rule should state that a vehicle
with ESC should be equally or more
stable and equally or more responsive
than a vehicle without ESC, across all
speeds, road surface frictions, and
maneuvers. The commenter also stated
that improvements in handling stability
should not significantly reduce
handling responsiveness, and visaversa.
We agree that, to the extent possible,
improvements in handling stability
should not significantly reduce
handling responsiveness, and visaversa. To ensure that this goal is
achieved, the standard includes a test
with responsiveness criteria (discussed
in Section IV.C.5) that requires ESCequipped vehicles to demonstrate an
acceptable practical level of lateral
displacement capability in response to a
specified amount of steering.
(b) Clarification of Threshold Speed
In their comments, the Alliance/
AIAM agreed with that portion of the
NPRM providing that ESC systems are
not required to be operational at very
low speeds, even though the system is
technically ‘‘on.’’ However, the
commenters argued that the proposed
language in the definition of ‘‘ESC
System’’ under S4 stating ‘‘except below
a speed threshold where loss of control
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is unlikely’’ is not objective and could
lead to uncertainty in compliance
testing. Accordingly, the commenters
recommended revising the relevant
portion of that definition to read as
follows: ‘‘That is operational over the
full speed range of the vehicle (except
at vehicle speeds less than 20 mph).’’
As reflected in the NPRM, we
originally thought that it would be
appropriate to provide flexibility by
leaving determination of a ‘‘low-speed
threshold where the loss of control is
unlikely’’ to the discretion of vehicle
manufacturers and ESC suppliers.
However, we have decided to grant the
industry’s request that we increase the
specificity of S4 by providing a explicit
threshold speed below which the ESC
system need not operate. The Alliance/
AIAM suggested a low-speed threshold
of 20 mph.
To determine an appropriate lowspeed threshold, NHTSA must consider
three factors:
1. ESC should not be active when the
vehicle’s Antilock Brake System (ABS)
is not active. If the vehicle’s ESC was
active but the ABS was inactive, then
ESC brake applications could result in
one or more of the vehicle’s wheels
locking up. While one wheel locking up
may not cause safety problems, if two or
more wheels lock up, the vehicle may
experience lateral instability. Even at
low speeds, this situation may result in
a safety problem.
2. All ABSs must have a low-speed
threshold below which the ABS
becomes inactive. Otherwise, it would
be impossible to use the vehicle’s brakes
to bring a vehicle to a complete stop,
because the ABS would keep activating
and releasing the brakes when the driver
tried to stop. FMVSS No. 135 does not
currently contain performance
requirements for ABSs; therefore, that
standard does not set a low-speed
threshold for them. However, S7 of
FMVSS No. 135 does indicate that
wheel lock-ups below a low-speed
threshold are not a safety concern. See
S7.1.3(e), S7.2.1(d), and S7.2.3(d) of
FMVSS No. 135. Lock-ups at vehicle
speeds above 15 km/h can cause safety
problems.55 Similarly, ECE Regulation
13–H,56 which does contain
performance requirements for ABSs,
55 See Snyder et al., ‘‘NHTSA Light Vehicle ABS
Performance Test Development’’ (NHTSA Technical
Report), DOT HS 809 747 (June 2005), at 47.
Available at https://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/vrtc/ca/
capubs/ABSperformancefinalreport.pdf.
56 United Nations Economic Commission for
Europe, Regulation No. 13–H, ‘‘Approval of
Passenger Cars with Regard to Braking, Rev. 2,
World Forum for Harmonization of Vehicle
Regulations (WP.29 ECE R13–H), May 11th 1998.
Available at https://www.unece.org/trans/main/
wp29/wp29regs1–20.html.
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sets a low-speed threshold of 15 km/h
(9.3 mph).
3. ESC systems obtain much of their
information about the state of the
vehicle from the ABS’s wheel-speed
sensors. At low vehicle speeds, the ABS
wheel-speed sensors rotate more slowly,
which could create unacceptable
amounts of noise in the data sent to
ESC. The European standard (ECE
Regulation No. 13–H) shows that sensor
data of acceptable quality can be
obtained at speeds down to 15 km/h (9.3
mph), although certain changes may be
required for some current ESC systems
offered in the U.S. market.
Based on the preceding analysis, and
in order to promote consistency with
other FMVSSs and relevant
international regulations, we have
decided upon 15 km/h (9.3 mph) as the
appropriate low-speed threshold above
which ESC must be active. Accordingly,
paragraphs S4 and S5.1.2 of the
regulatory text have been revised to read
as follows:
S4, ESC Definition, Part 6—(6) That is
operational over the full speed range of the
vehicle (except at vehicle speeds less than 15
km/h (9.3 mph) or when being driven in
reverse). * * *
S5.1.2 Is operational during all phases of
driving including acceleration, coasting, and
deceleration (including braking), except
when the driver has disabled ESC, the
vehicle speed is below 15 km/h (9.3 mph),
or the vehicle is being driven in reverse.
Please note that these changes to the
regulatory text provisions related to
when the vehicle is driven in reverse
arise from our response to another
public comment discussed under
Section IV.C.6(f) below.
(c) Estimation of Sideslip—Request to
Add Derivative
Although the comments of Honda
Motor Co. Ltd. and American Honda
Motor Co., Inc. (Honda) agreed that, in
order to ensure proper operation, it is
necessary for the ESC system to
determine the vehicle’s yaw rate (i.e.,
spin), it did not agree that
manufacturers should be required to
measure vehicle sideslip directly. The
commenter stated that manufacturers
should be permitted to utilize other
available status variables for estimating
the spin of a vehicle. Accordingly,
Honda recommended modifying the
definition of ‘‘Electronic Stability
Control System’’ in S4, specifically by
revising the third part of that definition
as follows: ‘‘(3) That has a means to
determine the vehicle’s yaw rate and to
estimate its sideslip or side slip
derivative.’’ As accompanying
clarification, Honda recommended
further clarification to state, ‘‘Sideslip or
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side slip angle means the arctangent of
the lateral velocity of the center of
gravity of the vehicle divided by the
longitudinal velocity of the center of
gravity.’’
The Alliance/AIAM made a similar
comment, arguing that many current
ESC systems do not measure sideslip
directly, but instead use a mathematical
derivative with respect to time in order
to determine the vehicle’s sideslip.
Accordingly, the Alliance/AIAM
recommended revising the ‘‘ESC
System’’ definition in S4 by revising the
third requirement of that definition as
follows: ‘‘(3) That has a means to
determine the vehicle’s yaw rate and to
estimate its side slip or side slip
derivative with respect to time.’’
The agency concurs with these
comments. Because side slip and the
derivative of side slip angle are
intimately mathematically related, when
one of these values is known, it is then
possible to determine the other. This
change will not have any impact on
safety, because it merely permits a key
value for ESC operation to be
determined by alternate means.
Accordingly, we have decided to modify
the relevant portion of the ‘‘ESC
System’’ definition in S4 to read as
follows:
ycherry on PROD1PC64 with RULES2
(3) That has a means to determine the
vehicle’s yaw rate and to estimate its side
slip or side slip derivative with respect to
time.
(d) Request for Alternate Transducers
RLP Engineering recommended
changes to the proposed definition of
‘‘ESC System,’’ particularly the
requirement for the system to have a
‘‘means to determine vehicle yaw rate
and to estimate side slip.’’ According to
the commenter, vehicle instability
occurs only when there is tire sideslip,
not necessarily when there is vehicle
sideslip. RLP Engineering stated that
detection of instability involves
determination of the amount of tire
sideslip and in which wheel(s) it is
occurring (with front tire sideslip
corresponding to understeer and rear
tire sideslip corresponding to oversteer).
The commenter stated that vehicle yaw
rate sensors may or may not be relevant
to determining tire sideslip, and in any
event, there may be other and
potentially better ways to determine
vehicle stability. For example, RLP
Engineering stated that a means of
detecting tire sideslip directly within a
wheel assembly may eliminate the need
for a yaw rate sensor. It also stated that
it could be possible for tire sideslip to
occur in the absence of vehicle sideslip,
such as in an extreme understeer
condition. Accordingly, RLP
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Engineering recommend that the agency
modify the definition of ‘‘Electronic
Stability Control System’’ in S4,
specifically by revising the third part of
that definition to read as follows: ‘‘(3)
That has a means to estimate tire contact
patch sideslip.’’
RLP Engineering made a similar
comment regarding the portion of the
‘‘ESC System’’ definition pertaining to
requirement (4) that the ESC system
have ‘‘a means to monitor driver
steering inputs * * *.’’ The commenter
stated that current ESC systems use
steering wheel angle data as one
information component in estimating
the intended path of a vehicle, as
compared to its actual path. However, it
again commented that if there is a
means of detecting tire sideslip directly
within a wheel assembly, there may be
no need for the steering wheel angle
sensor. Therefore, the commenter
recommended deleting requirement (4)
from the proposed definition of ‘‘ESC
System.’’
When defining the ESC hardware and
software requirements for the proposed
FMVSS No. 126, we attempted to
specify technology known to be
effective in reducing real world crashes.
Contemporary ESC systems meet all the
requirements of S4, but they do not
necessarily estimate the sideslip of the
tire contact patch. As it happens,
NHTSA has yet to see an effective
technology for measuring the sideslip of
the tire contact patch. While we are
encouraged to learn of new technologies
that may improve vehicle safety,
quantifying their effectiveness is not
possible until crash data become
available, even if one would
theoretically expect the alternative
technology to affect vehicle performance
in a similar manner as the proven
technology.
Therefore, we do not concur with RLP
Engineering’s suggested revisions to S4.
We have no effectiveness data for ESCtype systems that estimate the sideslip
of the tire contact patch instead of
determining the vehicle’s yaw rate, or
estimating the vehicle’s sideslip, and
monitoring the driver’s steering inputs.
Until crash data exist for such systems,
we are not willing to treat them as
equivalent to compliant ESC systems
under FMVSS No. 126, which have
demonstrated that they can save
thousands of lives each year.
(e) Interaction With Other Vehicle
Systems
Although proposed paragraph S5.1.3
states, ‘‘Remains operational when the
antilock brake system or traction control
system is activated,’’ the Alliance/AIAM
stated that on current vehicles, these
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systems tend not to be functionally
separate but instead are integrated into
a single system. In order to allow
subsystem arbitration to occur as
needed to optimize ESC performance,
the commenters recommended
modifying paragraph S5.1.3 as follows:
‘‘Remains capable of activation even if
the antilock brake system or traction
control system is also activated.’’
The agency agrees with the Alliance/
AIAM recommendations on this issue.
Anti-lock brakes, traction control, and
ESC systems all utilize the vehicle’s
brake control system to accomplish their
intended stability enhancement goals. It
is imperative that the vehicle’s design
logic for activation of these systems be
integrated so that these systems can
work in unison together addressing
vehicle instabilities. Accordingly, we
are amending S5.1.3 in the manner
suggested by the commenters.
(f) ESC Operation in Reverse
The Alliance/AIAM, Robert Bosch
Corporation (Bosch), Continental
Automotive Systems (Continental),
Delphi, and Nissan North America, Inc.
(Nissan) all requested that the final rule
not require ESC operability when the
vehicle is driven in reverse, a
functionality not presently part of
current ESC systems and one which the
commenters do not believe is a
necessary part of the ESC rulemaking.
Commenters further stated that
requiring ESC operation in reverse
would necessitate costly changes to
current ESC systems.
In response, we note that the agency
never intended the ESC system to be
operable when the vehicle is being
driven in reverse. We agree that
requiring operation in reverse would
necessitate costly changes to current
ESC systems with no anticipated safety
benefit. Our belief is that the main
safety problems while the vehicle is
operating in reverse are backing into/
over pedestrians, backing over edges
(drop-offs), and backing into inanimate
objects (e.g., other vehicles, buildings).
ESC is not expected to help prevent any
of these types of crashes.
Furthermore, vehicles are rarely
driven rapidly in reverse. Therefore, the
provision in S5.1.2 that ESC need not
function when ‘‘the vehicle speed is
below 15 km/h (9.3 mph)’’ means that
ESC would typically not have to be
active when the vehicle is in reverse.
Requiring ESC to be active for those rare
times when the vehicle is backing
rapidly would be unreasonable,
especially since having an active ESC in
this situation would not improve safety.
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provided in response to another public
comment discussed under Section
IV.C.6(b) above.
S4, ESC Definition, Part 6—(6) That is
operational over the full speed range of the
vehicle (except at vehicle speeds less than
15km/h (9.3 mph) or when being driven in
reverse). * * *
S5.1.2 Is operational during all phases of
driving including acceleration, coasting, and
deceleration (including braking), except
when the driver has disabled ESC, the
vehicle speed is below 15 km/h (9.3 mph),
or the vehicle is being driven in reverse.
7. ESC Performance Requirements
Please note that the changes to the
regulatory text about vehicle speeds less
than 15km/h (9.3 mph) have been
The term ‘‘lateral acceleration’’ is
used in the regulation text and so the
agency has decided to add a definition
to section S4. The agency will use the
definition as recommended by the
Alliance/AIAM and provided in SAE
J670E, Vehicle Dynamics Terminology
(rev. July 1976):
ycherry on PROD1PC64 with RULES2
Lateral Acceleration means the component
of the vector acceleration of a point in the
vehicle perpendicular to the vehicle x axis
(longitudinal) and parallel to the road plane.
The formula for computing lateral
acceleration suggested by the
commenters is an abbreviated version of
what NHTSA has been using for many
years. A qualitative description of
NHTSA’s methods for determining the
corrected lateral acceleration have been
included in a new section S7.11 of the
final rule that deals with data
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(a) Definition for ‘‘Lateral Acceleration’’
The Alliance/AIAM and Honda
recommended that the agency include a
definition in S4 of the final rule for the
term ‘‘lateral acceleration,’’ suggesting
use of the following definition from SAE
J670e: ‘‘Lateral Acceleration—The
component of the vector acceleration of
a point in the vehicle perpendicular to
the vehicle x axis (longitudinal) and
parallel to the road plane.’’
processing. A complete suite of the
equations used by NHTSA (i.e., those
applicable to not only lateral
acceleration, but for longitudinal
acceleration as well), are provided in
the laboratory test procedure.
Additionally, these equations have been
incorporated into the Common Data
Processing Kernel described in Section
IV.C.7(e)(vi).
(b) Lateral Displacement Calculation
Regarding calculation of lateral
displacement, paragraphs S5.2.3.1 and
S5.2.3.2 of the proposal stated that such
calculation would use double
integration with respect to time of the
measurement of lateral acceleration at
the vehicle center of gravity (where
time, t = 0, for the integration operation
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The Alliance/AIAM stated that the
NPRM does not define a method of
determining lateral acceleration at the
vehicle’s center of gravity (Aycg). In
response, the commenters
recommended that, in the final rule, the
agency should specify that the
accelerometers be placed on the
centerline of the vehicle and on the
floor between the front and rear seat
whenever possible (or as close to that
location as possible). With respect to
Aycg, the commenters requested that
the agency incorporate the following
formula into the standard:
is the instant of steering initiation), as
expressed by the following formula:
Lateral Displacement = ∫∫ Ay C.G.dt
Delphi agreed that, given the short
interval of time in the initial phase of
the lane change maneuver, it is
reasonable to use double integration of
measured lateral acceleration to
approximate the vehicle’s actual lateral
displacement. Still, the commenter
argued that the two are technically not
exactly equivalent, because lateral
acceleration is measured in the
coordinate frame of the vehicle, whereas
lateral displacement is in the fixed
reference frame of the road (i.e., the
surface of the earth). According to the
commenter, the vehicle frame can rotate
with respect to the earth frame, leading
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Accordingly, the relevant provisions
of the regulatory text have been revised
to read as follows:
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ycherry on PROD1PC64 with RULES2
to an error in the double integration
method. Thus, Delphi stated that it
should be expected that there will
always be a small error in calculation of
a vehicle’s lateral displacement due to
coordinate system differences.
Nevertheless, Delphi commented that
this error is likely to be small enough to
be insignificant when compared to the
actual displacement encountered during
a particular test maneuver, given that
the vehicle’s rotation is small (less than
20 degrees) in the early stage of the lane
change maneuver. However, the
commenter seemed to suggest that the
agency should somehow acknowledge
and account for such error as part of the
ESC performance requirement.
We agree with Delphi’s comment
stating the double integration method
used to calculate lateral displacement
may produce a small error compared to
actual displacement encountered during
a particular test maneuver. However,
like Delphi, we believe that because the
integration interval is short (since lateral
displacement is assessed 1.07 seconds
after initiation of the maneuver’s
steering inputs), the integration errors
are expected to be so small as to be
negligible. Therefore, we do not believe
that any changes to the regulatory text
are needed to account for this
inaccuracy.
(c) Yaw Rate Calculation
The NPRM set forth the following
stability criteria for ESC systems. The
yaw rate measured one second after
completion of the sine with dwell
steering input (time T0 + 1 in Figure 1)
must not exceed 35 percent of the first
peak value of yaw velocity recorded
after the beginning of the dwell period
«
(yPeak in Figure 1) during the same test
run (see S5.2.1), and the yaw rate
measured 1.75 seconds after completion
of the Sine with Dwell steering input
must not exceed 20 percent of the first
peak value of yaw velocity recorded
after the beginning of the dwell period
during the same test run (see S5.2.2).
The Alliance and AIAM requested a
modification to the yaw rate ratio
calculation methodology set forth in
S5.2.1 and S5.2.2, which specify that
‘‘ * * * first peak value of yaw velocity
recorded after the beginning of the
dwell period. * * * ’’ The commenters
stated that the first peak often occurs
near the start of the dwell, and it can
actually occur before the start of the
dwell. In order to account for this
possibility and to ensure that the
calculation is correct and consistent in
all cases, the Alliance/AIAM comments
recommended revising the relevant
language of S5.2.1 and S5.2.2 as follows:
‘‘ * * * first peak value of yaw velocity
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recorded after the steering wheel angle
changes sign (between first and second
peaks) * * * ’’
According to Honda, the proposed
rule would require that the tested
vehicle suppress the yaw rate after
completion of the Sine with Dwell
steering input within the specified
performance requirements, one of which
is that the yaw rate may not exceed the
specified threshold. Honda stated that
the agency itself has acknowledged that
in certain instances, negative yaw rates
may be produced and measured. Thus,
Honda recommended modifying S5.2.1
and S5.2.2 to specify that the
measurement is for the ‘‘absolute value
of yaw rate’’ (rather than simply ‘‘yaw
rate,’’ as proposed), in order ensure that
any negative yaw rate is included in the
standard’s yaw rate calculation.
We agree with the Alliance/AIAM
comment on this issue. Because their
proposed regulatory language better
expresses what NHTSA intended, we
have decided to modify paragraphs
S5.2.1 and S5.2.2 to read as follows:
S5.2.1 The yaw rate measured one second
after completion of the sine with dwell
steering input (time T0 + 1 in Figure 1) must
not exceed 35 percent of the first peak value
of yaw rate recorded after the steering wheel
angle changes sign (between first and second
«
peaks) (yPeak in Figure 1) during the same test
run, and
S5.2.2 The yaw rate measured 1.75
seconds after completion of the sine with
dwell steering input must not exceed 20
percent of the first peak value of yaw rate
recorded after the steering wheel angle
changes sign (between first and second
peaks) during the same test run.
However, we do not agree with
Honda’s comment. A negative yaw rate
ratio can only be achieved when the
yaw rate measured at a given instant in
time is in an opposite direction of the
second yaw rate peak, which can have
a much different meaning than the
absolute value of identical magnitude.
Although it is very unlikely, taking the
absolute value of the yaw rate at 1.0 or
1.75 seconds after completion of steer
could cause a compliant vehicle be
deemed non-complaint if the respective
yaw rate ratios are large enough. For
example, if at 1.75 seconds after
completion of steer a vehicle produces
a yaw rate ratio of ¥21 percent, the
vehicle would be in compliance with
our proposed lateral stability criteria.
However, if the absolute value of the
yaw rate ratio were used (21 percent),
the vehicle’s performance would be
non-compliant.
Requiring a provision that prevents a
negative yaw rate ratio does not simplify
the data analysis process, and can only
confound interpretation of the test data.
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We see no reason to accept this
recommendation from Honda.
(d) Temperature and Pavement
Specifications
As part of the Alliance/AIAM
comment regarding the effect on the
margin of compliance for the
responsiveness criterion (S5.2.3) of the
observed variability inherent in vehicle
testing, the parties made specific
suggestions about the temperature and
pavement specifications (S6) for the test.
The NPRM proposed that the ambient
temperature for testing would be
between 0 °C (32 °F) and 40 °C (104 °F)
(see S6.1.1).
According to the Alliance/AIAM
comments, their research demonstrates
that responsiveness is reduced at higher
temperatures, which is typical of
vehicles with all-season tires. It
recommended that testing should be
conducted in a range of 50 °F to 104 °F,
in order to reduce the temperature
sensitivity effect demonstrated at low
temperatures. The Alliance/AIAM
comments stated that if this more
restricted temperature range is
multiplied by the temperature
sensitivity of the relatively sensitive test
vehicle examined, the maximum change
in lateral displacement due to
temperature variability should be
limited to 0.3 to 0.4 feet.
NHTSA understands the Alliance/
AIAM suggestion to be a comment on
the general desirability of reducing
sources of variability in vehicle testing,
because its suggestion would have the
effect of preventing NHTSA compliance
testing at temperatures that favor a
vehicle’s chance of passing the test.
However, it also has the disadvantage of
reducing the length of the testing season
for NHTSA’s potential compliance test
contractors located in colder States. We
agree with the goal of better
repeatability but prefer a minimum
temperature of 7 °C (45 °F) for the sake
of practicability. We believe that
conducting testing down to 7 °C (45 °F)
will still prevent the low temperature
effects which the commenters seek to
address and will not impact our ability
to evaluate the performance of ESC
systems. Accordingly, we are amending
S6.1.1 to read as follows:
S6.1.1 The ambient temperature is
between 7 °C (45 °F) and 40 °C (104 °F).
The NPRM proposed the following
specifications for the road test surface
(see S6.2). The test would be conducted
on a dry, uniform, solid-paved surface
(i.e., without irregularities and
undulations such as dips and large
cracks) (see S6.2.1). As proposed, the
road test surface would be required to
produce a peak friction coefficient (PFC)
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of 0.9 ± 0.05 when measured using an
American Society for Testing and
Materials (ASTM) E1136 standard
reference test tire, in accordance with
ASTM Method E 1337–90, at a speed of
64.4 km/h (40 mph), without water
delivery (see S6.2.2). The proposal also
specified that the test surface would
have a consistent slope between level
and 2% and that all tests are to be
initiated in the direction of positive
slope (uphill) (see S6.2.3).
The Alliance/AIAM argued that the
actual surfaces of many of the test
facilities used to develop the supporting
performance data (test facility
characteristics provided in a table in the
comments) would not meet the
specifications in the standard. The
commenters argued that the proposed
requirement in S6.2.3 that ‘‘all tests are
to be initiated in the direction of
positive slope (uphill)’’ is unduly
restrictive and would preclude the use
of a number of test tracks where the
slope runs either perpendicular or
diagonal to the length of the track,
because such tracks would not provide
enough room to run the test. The
commenter also stated that their review
suggested that most test tracks have a
slope of 1 percent or less. Accordingly,
the Alliance/AIAM recommended that
in the final rule, the agency should
modify S6.2.3 as follows to tighten the
proposed 2 percent maximum slope
restriction to 1 percent and to eliminate
the direction requirement. More
importantly, the commenters argued
that the lower end of the peak friction
coefficient range was not representative
of the test facilities used in the research.
Therefore, the Alliance/AIAM
recommended increasing the nominal
specification from 0.9 ± 0.05 to 0.95 ±
0.05.
In response to these comments, we
note that NHTSA based its surface
coefficient specification on FMVSS No.
135, Light Vehicle Brake Systems, which
simply specifies a peak friction
coefficient (PFC) of 0.9. While it is
unlikely that any facility has exactly
that PFC, NHTSA’s compliance testing
for Standard No. 135 is performed on a
surface with a PFC somewhat higher
than the specification which creates a
margin for clear enforcement, and
manufacturers who are assuring
themselves of compliance may wish to
test on a surface slightly below the
specification to create a compliance
margin for themselves. In attempting to
increase objectivity by putting a
tolerance on the 0.9 PFC, the NPRM
created the possibility of compliance
tests for Standard No. 126 being
performed on lower coefficient surfaces
than those for Standard No. 135. That
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was not NHTSA’s intention, and we are
changing the specification to match that
in Standard No. 135, using the same
compliance testing conventions.
We are also reducing the maximum
slope tolerance which eliminates the
need for a directional specification. We
agree that most test tracks have a slope
of 1 percent or less, which is so slight
that a directional specification is
unnecessary—in effect, there is no
uphill to worry about. Accordingly, we
are amending S6.2.2 and S6.2.3 to read
as follows:
S6.2.2 The road test surface must produce
a peak friction coefficient (PFC) of 0.9 when
measured using an American Society for
Testing and Materials (ASTM) E1136–93
(1993) standard reference test tire, in
accordance with ASTM Method E 1337–90
(rev. 1996), at a speed of 64.4 km/h (40 mph),
without water delivery. These standards are
here incorporated by reference as explained
in S3.2 above.
S6.2.3 The test surface has a consistent
slope between level and 1%.
(e) Data Processing Issues
In order to ensure consistent
calculation of lateral displacement, the
Alliance and AIAM recommended
specification of the following details
related to data processing in the
regulatory text for FMVSS No. 126.
(i) Determination of Beginning of
Steering
The Alliance/AIAM comments
recommended that the start of steering
be defined as the moment when the
‘‘zeroed’’ steering wheel angle (SWA)
passes through 5 degrees. The
commenters stated that this
modification is important to ensure that
the start of steering is determined to
accurately and consistently calculate
performance metrics for the Sine with
Dwell test.
The process used by NHTSA to
identify ‘‘beginning of steering’’ uses
three steps. In the first step, the time
when steering wheel velocity that
exceeds 75 deg/sec is identified. From
this point, steering wheel velocity must
remain greater than 75 deg/sec for at
least 200 ms. If the condition is not met,
the next time steering wheel velocity
that exceeds 75 deg/sec is identified and
the 200 ms validity check is applied.
This iterative process continues until
the conditions are satisfied. In the
second step, a zeroing range defined as
the 1.0 second time period prior to the
instant the steering wheel velocity
exceeds 75 deg/sec (i.e., the instant the
steering wheel velocity exceeds 75 deg/
sec defines the end of the ‘‘zeroing
range’’) is used to zero steering wheel
angle data. In the third step, the first
instance the filtered and zeroed steering
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wheel angle data reaches ¥5 degrees
(when the initial steering input is
counterclockwise) or +5 degrees (when
the initial steering input is clockwise)
after the end of the zeroing range is
identified. The time identified in Step 3
is taken to be the beginning of steer.
The agency agrees that an
unambiguous reference point to define
the start of steering is necessary in order
to ensure consistency when computing
the performance metrics measured
during compliance testing. The practical
problem is that typical ‘‘noise’’ in the
steering measurement channel causes
continual small fluctuations of the
signal about the zero point, so departure
from zero or very small steering angles
does not indicate reliably that the
steering machine has started the test
maneuver. NHTSA’s extensive
evaluation of zeroing range criteria (i.e.,
that based on the instant a steering
wheel rate of 75 deg/sec occurs) has
confirmed that the method successfully
and robustly distinguishes the initiation
of the Sine with Dwell steering inputs
from the inherent noise present in the
steering wheel angle data channel. As
such, the agency has incorporated the
75 deg/sec criterion described above
plus the commenter’s suggestion of the
5 degree steering measurement into
S7.11, a new section on data processing
added to the final rule in response to
comments. The value for time at the
start of steering, used for calculating the
lateral responsiveness metrics described
in Section IV.C.7(b), is interpolated.
(ii) Determination of End of Steering
The Alliance/AIAM recommended
defining the end of steering event as the
first occurrence of the ‘‘zeroed’’ steering
wheel angle crossing zero degrees after
the second peak of steering wheel angle.
The commenters stated that this
modification is important to ensure that
the end of steering is determined to
accurately and consistently calculate
some of the performance metrics for the
Sine with Dwell test.
The agency agrees that an
unambiguous point to define the end of
steering is also necessary for
consistency in computing the
performance metrics measured during
compliance testing. The agency has
incorporated the commenter’s
suggestion of the first occurrence of the
‘‘zeroed’’ steering wheel angle crossing
zero degrees after the second peak of
steering wheel angle in S7.11, a new
section on data processing added to the
final rule. While signal noise results in
continual zero crossings as long the data
is being sampled, the first zero crossing
after the steering wheel has begun to
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return to the zero position is a logical
end to the steering maneuver.
(ii) Removing Offsets
The Alliance/AIAM comments
recommended that, given the potential
for the accelerometers used in the
measurement of lateral displacement to
drift over time, the agency should use
the data one second before the start of
steering to ‘‘zero’’ the accelerometers
and roll signal.
Prior to the test maneuver, the driver
must orient the vehicle to the desired
heading, position the steering wheel
angle to zero, and be coasting down (i.e.,
not using throttle inputs) to the target
test speed of 50 mph. This process,
known as achieving a ‘‘quasi-steady
state,’’ typically occurs a few seconds
prior to initiation of the maneuver, but
can be influenced by external factors
such as test track traffic, differences in
vehicle deceleration rates, etc. Any
zeroing performed on test data must be
performed after a quasi-steady state
condition has been satisfied, but before
the maneuver is initiated. The proposed
zeroing duration of one second provides
a good combination of sufficient time
(i.e., enough data is present so as to
facilitate accurate zeroing of the test
data) and performability (i.e., the
duration is not so long that it imposes
an unreasonable burden on the driver).
For past research, NHTSA has used
zeroing intervals between 0.5 and 1.0
seconds. Our experience has shown the
use of a 0.5 second interval is usually
sufficient; however, the 1.0 second is
more conservative and therefore
preferred. We do not believe zeroing
intervals longer than one second will
improve the zeroing accuracy.
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(iv) Use of Interpolation
According to the Alliance/AIAM,
there are several events in the
calculation of performance metrics that
require determining the time and/or
level of an event, including: (1) Start of
steering; (2) 1.07 or 1.32 seconds after
the start of steering; (3) end of steering;
(4) 1 second after the end of steering,
and (5) 1.75 seconds after the end of
steering. The commenters recommended
using interpolation for all of these
circumstances, because such practice
provides more consistent results and is
less sensitive to differing sampling rates
than other approaches (e.g., choosing
the sample that is closest in time to the
desired event). Interpolation is a way of
computing the exact time that the
continuous steering signal crossed zero,
even though the digital samples did not
coincide with the exact zero point, but
rather consisted of one sample slightly
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before the time of zero-crossing and one
slightly after.
In determining specific timed and
measured data points, the agency agrees
with the Alliance and AIAM that the
method of interpolation provides the
most consistent results. Therefore, the
agency will use this method during post
data processing, as specified in S7.11.
(v) Method for Determining Peak
Steering Wheel Angle
The Alliance/AIAM stated that
because metrics for responsiveness are
specified by steering wheel angle
(SWA), a method for determining the
actual SWA needs to be specified in the
final rule for ESC. The commenters
recommended using the first measured
peak SWA, as it is the peak that directly
influences the responsiveness
measurement.
For the reasons discussed in our
response to public comments on our
lateral responsiveness criteria, we have
decided in the final rule to define the
torque capacity of the steering machine
used in the responsiveness test and to
use the commanded peak steering angle,
rather than the measured peak steering
angle, as the indication of tests in which
the vehicle must meet the
responsiveness criteria (see Section
IV.C.5).
(vi) Need for a Common Data Processing
Kernel
According to the Alliance/AIAM, data
processing methods have a significant
impact on the results that are generated.
The commenters stated that as a longerterm objective, the agency should work
with interested parties to develop and
incorporate into the standard (either
directly or by reference) detailed
algorithms for processing of data and
stability/responsiveness metric
calculations. The Alliance/AIAM
commented that a similar procedure is
already in place in other safety
standards (e.g., FMVSS No. 208).
The agency agrees that data
processing methods can have a
significant impact on the results
generated. To address this issue we have
added necessary data processing details
to the regulation text of the standard
and plan to include in the compliance
test procedure the MATLAB code used
for post-processing critical yaw rate and
lateral displacement performance data.
(f) ESC Initialization Period
Delphi stated that most ESC systems
typically require a short initialization
period after the start of each new
ignition cycle, during which time the
ESC system is not operational. The
commenter stated that during this
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period, the ESC performs diagnostic
checks and sensor signal correlation
updates. Delphi commented that the
duration of this ESC initialization
interval may depend upon several
factors, including distance traveled,
speed, and/or signal magnitudes.
In response to other comments, we
have modified S5.1.2 to clarify that ESC
does not need to be active when the
vehicle speed is below 15 km/h (9.3
mph). Therefore, the ESC manufacturer
has a short period of time, from the time
the vehicle’s ignition is turned on to the
time when the vehicle speed first
exceeds 15 km/h (9.3 mph) to initialize
ESC. The process of initializing ESC is,
in many ways, similar to the process of
initializing ABS. ABS systems typically
have completed their initialization by
the time the vehicle reaches speeds of
5 km/h (3.1 mph) to 9 km/h (5.6 mph).
Therefore, NHTSA believes that
allowing up to a speed of 15 km/h (9.3
mph) should be adequate to initialize
ESC.
Honda, Continental and the Alliance/
AIAM have pointed out that some types
of diagnostic checks cannot be
performed unless the vehicle is making
turns or traveling at relatively high
speeds. We have modified S7.10 to
accommodate these types of diagnostic
checks, as explained in the answer to
Issue 8(b) below, ‘‘Practicability
Problems with Malfunction Detection.’’
However, our expectation is that the
ESC manufacturer can assume that the
ESC has not malfunctioned and make
the system operational once driving
situations occur that permit these
diagnostic checks to be performed.
(g) ESC Calibration
Mr. Petkun commented that the
agency should require ESC systems to
be calibrated to activate ‘‘at the precise
moment that the vehicle may go out of
control.’’ The commenter also suggested
that the ESC system should be matched
to the type of vehicle and complement
driver characteristics; for example, Mr.
Petkun stated that a minivan’s ESC
might be tuned to respond to vehicle
movements at a slightly earlier point
than an ESC system on a sports coupe
or sedan.
With respect to Mr. Petkun’s first
comment, it is important to recognize
that determining when ESC intervention
must occur is a complicated balance of
effectiveness and intrusiveness. Loss of
control is not usually a binary
condition. As such, one of the
challenges of designing ESC control
algorithms is how to anticipate when a
loss-of-control situation may occur.
More conservative algorithms may be
tuned to activate sooner than those
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allowing the vehicle to achieve higher
slip angles prior to activation. However,
the longer an intervention is delayed,
the more aggressive it must typically be
later in the maneuver in order to still be
effective. Therefore, determining when
intervention should occur is a decision
not only based on achieving good ESC
performance, but also how sensitive
individual drivers may be to the manner
in which the intervention occurs.
Although NHTSA has no way of
resolving this subjective dilemma (an
issue for each vehicle manufacturer and
its ESC vendor to resolve), we can
objectively assess how effective the final
tuning is on a vehicle’s lateral stability
and responsiveness using the Sine with
Dwell test maneuver and our ESC
performance criteria.
In regards to Mr. Petkun’s second
comment, our discussions with ESC
suppliers and vehicle manufacturers
indicate that while different vehicles
may use much of the same modular ESC
hardware, the software controlling how
each system operates contains make/
model specific information. One way to
ensure that the ESC software has been
appropriately adapted to a particular
make/model is to perform test track
performance evaluations. We believe the
Sine with Dwell maneuver, and the
lateral stability and responsiveness
performance criteria that evaluate the
test output, provide an excellent way of
assessing ESC system performance for
all light vehicles. Regardless of whether
the driver is operating a minivan or a
sports car, we believe the vehicle’s ESC
should perform in an effective manner,
quantified by successfully satisfying our
minimum performance standards.
Other Issues
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8. ESC Malfunction Detection
Requirements
Under paragraph S5.3, ESC
Malfunction, the NPRM proposed that
the vehicle must be equipped with a
telltale that provides a warning to the
driver not more than two minutes after
the occurrence of one or more
malfunctions that affect the generation
or transmission of control or response
signals in the vehicle’s electronic
stability control system. The proposal
also set forth the following additional
requirement related to ESC malfunction
detection.
Specifically, the ESC malfunction
telltale would be required to be
mounted inside the occupant
compartment in front of and in clear
view of the driver (see S5.3.1) and be
identified by the symbol shown for
‘‘ESC Malfunction Telltale’’ in Table 1
of Standard No. 101 (49 CFR 571.101)
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(see S5.3.2). The ESC malfunction
telltale would be required to remain
continuously illuminated under the
conditions specified in S5.3 for as long
as the malfunction(s) exists, whenever
the ignition locking system is in the
‘‘On’’ (‘‘Run’’) position (see S5.3.3), and
except as provided in paragraph S5.3.5,
each ESC malfunction telltale must be
activated as a check of lamp function
either when the ignition locking system
is turned to the ‘‘On’’ (‘‘Run’’) position
when the engine is not running, or
when the ignition locking system is in
a position between ‘‘On’’ (‘‘Run’’) and
‘‘Start’’ that is designated by the
manufacturer as a check position (see
S5.3.4). The ESC malfunction telltale
need not be activated when a starter
interlock is in operation (see S5.3.5).
The ESC malfunction telltale must
extinguish after the malfunction has
been corrected (see S5.3.6).
Under the proposal, manufacturers
would be permitted to use the ESC
malfunction telltale in a flashing mode
to indicate ESC operation (see S5.3.7).
As discussed below, several
commenters raised a variety of concerns
regarding operation of the ESC
malfunction indicator (with malfunction
telltale-related issues addressed later in
this document under section IV.C.9,
ESC Telltale Requirements).
(a) Types of Malfunctions To Be
Detected
In its comments, Nissan objected to
the use of the term ‘‘any ESC
component’’ in the ESC malfunction
detection portion of the standard’s
proposed test procedures (see S7.10.1),
because the company believes that the
term is not objective and is overly
broad. Nissan stated that there are
certain vehicle components which may
be considered part of the ESC system,
but whose failure would not impact the
ability of the vehicle to meet the
performance requirements specified
under S5.2. The company used the
example of a malfunction of the ESC off
switch, the disconnection of which, it
argued, would not ‘‘affect the generation
or transmission of control or response
signals in the vehicle’s electronic
stability control system.’’ Accordingly,
Nissan argued that the agency should
specify which components it deems to
be part of the ESC system for
malfunction testing purposes.
Unless a suitable resolution can be
found to the ‘‘any ESC component’’
issue identified by Nissan, the company
argued that the agency should delay the
effective date for the ESC malfunction
detection requirements until the end of
the phase-in. Otherwise, Nissan again
stated that it may not be able to garner
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sufficient carry-forward credits to meet
the certification requirements of the
phase-in.
Likewise, Toyota Motor North
America, Inc. (Toyota) commented on a
particular problem regarding ESC
malfunction detection that could affect
its phase-in compliance and carryforward credits. Specifically, the
difficulty is encountered because
Toyota’s ESC electronic control unit
(ECU) is integrated into the vehicle’s
ABS ECU. According to the commenter,
the problem involves the proposed test
procedures under S7.10.1, which
provide for ‘‘simulate[ing] one or more
ESC malfunction(s) by disconnecting
the power source to any ESC
component, or disconnecting any
electrical connection between ESC
components.’’ As its vehicles are
currently designed with a single ABS/
ESC ECU, Toyota stated that if the
power source is disconnected, only the
vehicle’s ABS malfunction lamp will
illuminate, not the ESC malfunction
telltale (although the company
anticipates meeting the requirements of
S7.10.1 for all other types of ESC
malfunctions). Although Toyota stated
its belief that illumination of the ABS
malfunction lamp would be sufficient to
warn drivers of a loss of function to the
entire ABS/ESC system, it agreed that it
would be possible to redesign its system
to meet the proposed requirements of
S7.10.1. However, Toyota projects that it
will not be possible to resolve this
problem until the end of the phase-in
period.
In response to the concerns of Nissan
and Toyota, we would start by noting
that the agency has delayed the effective
date of the controls and displays aspects
of the ESC standard to the end of the
phase-in in response to a number of
similar comments. Stated another way,
the ESC system must meet the
malfunction detection requirements of
the standard, according to the final
rule’s general phase-in schedule, but it
need not signal the driver in a
standardized fashion until the end of
the phase-in. This delay in the effective
date for the controls and displays
requirements of the rule includes the
‘‘ESC Off’’ control and telltale, thereby
resolving one specific concern raised by
Nissan related to its ability to earn
carry-forward credits.
As to the broader issue of which
vehicle components are subject to ESC
malfunction testing, we believe that a
rule of reason applies. Simply stated, if
a vehicle malfunction were to ‘‘affect
the generation or transmission of control
or response signals in the vehicle’s
electronic stability control system,’’ it
must be detectable by the ESC system.
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In other words, if the malfunction
impacts the functionality of the ESC
system, the ESC system must be capable
of detecting it. For shared or connected
components, a malfunction need only
be detected to the extent it may impact
the ESC system’s operation. This is
precisely the same malfunction
requirements currently established for
tire pressure monitoring systems
(TPMS) under FMVSS No. 138. We see
no reason why such a requirement,
which is appropriate in the TPMS
context, would be considered overly
broad here. Furthermore, manufacturers
are in a better position than the agency
in terms of knowing the vehicle
components involved in ESC operation.
As a specific example for the sake of
clarity, we would consider the
disconnection of the ‘‘ESC Off’’ switch
to be a malfunction suitable for
simulation under the standard, because
it directly impacts ESC operability (even
though a manufacturer voluntarily
provides such a switch). However, we
would not consider the disconnection of
an ancillary function such as a hillholding aid that may be controlled by a
shared ESC computer to be a fault in the
ESC system itself.
We are aware that because this final
rule accelerates the phase-in schedule
for ESC, it also creates greater pressure
on manufacturers to earn carry-forward
credits by installing compliant ESC
systems as soon as possible. Again,
because we think it is more important
to have operating ESC systems sooner,
we are moving the effective date of the
standardization aspects of controls and
displays to the end of the phase-in
period. The specific difficulties recited
by the commenters are analogous to the
temporary lack of standardization that
we find preferable to an overall phasein delay. Therefore, we have decided to
address these manufacturers’ identified
concerns in the following fashion. The
test of the malfunction indicator calls
for disconnecting various components
to simulate a fault that should be
detected. To reiterate the problems,
when the power to the electronic
control unit of some Toyota ESC
systems is disconnected, the ABS
malfunction telltale illuminates but the
ESC malfunction telltale does not
(because the control unit operates both
systems), and disconnection of the
optional ‘‘ESC Off’’ switch on some
Nissan vehicles will not cause the
malfunction telltale to illuminate. It has
been the industry practice to provide a
separate ESC malfunction telltale, in
order to make consumers aware when
this important safety device is
potentially unavailable, but public
comments have demonstrated that some
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additional time is necessary to
standardize ESC malfunction telltale
operation. We do not believe that
vehicles with these minor deviations in
the malfunction indicator should be
disqualified for phase-in credit.
One solution would be to move the
provision for malfunction detection to
the later effective date of the telltales
and controls standardization. However,
it is not necessary to relax the important
requirement for a malfunction warning
to avoid complicating the phase-in of
ESC. Instead, we have decided to insert
a very narrow temporary exception
under paragraph S5.3.9 to address the
specific malfunction testing issues
brought forward by Nissan and Toyota:
S.5.3.9 Prior to September 1, 2011, a
disconnection of the power to the ESC
electronic control unit may be indicated by
the ABS malfunction telltale instead of the
ESC malfunction telltale, and a
disconnection of the ‘‘ESC Off’’ control need
not illuminate the ESC malfunction telltale.
(b) Practicability Problems With
Malfunction Detection
Under paragraph S7.10, ESC
Malfunction Detection, the proposed
test procedures for FMVSS No. 126 state
that one or more ESC malfunction(s)
would be simulated by disconnecting
the power source to any ESC
component, or disconnecting any
electrical connection between ESC
components (except for electrical
connections for the telltale lamp(s)) (see
S7.10.1). The proposed test procedures
further provide, that with the vehicle
stationary and the ignition locking
system in the ‘‘Lock’’ or ‘‘Off’’ position,
activate the ignition locking system to
the ‘‘On’’ (‘‘Run’’) position and verify
that within two minutes of activating
the ignition locking system, the ESC
malfunction indicator illuminates in
accordance with S5.3 (see S7.10.2).
TRW Automotive expressed concern
that the ESC malfunction detection
portion of the test procedures, as
currently drafted, may pose a safety
hazard to test technicians. Specifically,
TRW Automotive stated that paragraph
S7.10 does not indicate that the vehicle
is to be turned off before ‘‘disconnecting
the power source to any ESC
component,’’ and paragraph S7.10.4
merely states, ‘‘Restore the ESC system
to normal operation and verify that the
telltale has extinguished.’’ The
commenter recommended that those
two provisions be modified to explicitly
state that the vehicle is to be in the ‘‘off’’
state prior to disconnecting or restoring
the ESC system.
Honda stated that its understanding of
S7.10 is that this portion of the test
procedure will be conducted with the
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17271
vehicle stationary. However, Honda
stated that vehicle motion is necessary
for the system to be able to detect
certain ESC malfunctions (e.g., damage
to the pulser of the wheel speed sensor)
and to later extinguish the telltale once
the malfunction is corrected (similar
comment provided by Bosch,
Continental). Accordingly, Honda
sought clarification that testing
conducted pursuant to S7.10 will
involve only those malfunctions
amenable to detection based upon static
activation and deactivation.
Continental argued that some
malfunctions are not time-based, but
instead require comparisons of sensor
outputs generated when the vehicle is
driven. Accordingly, the commenter
recommended elimination of the
requirement that ESC malfunctions be
detected within two minutes of
occurrence, even if the vehicle is
parked. Instead, Continental urged
adoption of the following language:
‘‘The vehicle must be equipped with a
telltale that provides a warning to the
driver when one or more malfunctions
occur that affect the generation or
transmission of control or response
signals in the vehicles electronic
stability control system.’’ (Similar
comments were provided by Bosch and
Delphi.)
Similarly, the Alliance/AIAM
commented that the proposed test
procedure may be inadequate to detect
a full range of electrical component
failures, because some of these
malfunctions cannot be detected when
the vehicle is stationary. Instead, the
commenters suggested that the agency
adopt a more robust ESC malfunction
test that would allow the engine to be
running and the vehicle to be in motion
as part of the diagnostic evaluation. To
this end, the commenters suggested that
the agency replace the existing
provisions at S7.10.2 and S7.10.3 with
the following language:
S7.10.2 With the vehicle initially
stationary and the ignition locking system in
the ‘‘Lock’’ or ‘‘Off’’ position, activate the
ignition system to the ‘‘Start’’ position and
start the engine. Place the vehicle in a
forward gear and obtain a steady speed of 30
mph ± 5 mph. Drive the vehicle for at least
two minutes, including at least one left and
one right turning maneuver. Verify that
within two minutes of obtaining this steady
speed, the ESC malfunction indicator
illuminates in accordance with 5.3.
S7.10.3 Stop the vehicle, deactivate the
ignition locking system to the ‘‘Off’’ of
‘‘Lock’’ position. After a five-minute period,
activate the vehicle’s ignition locking system
to the ‘‘Start’’ position and start the engine.
Verify that the ESC malfunction indicator
again illuminates to signal a malfunction and
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remains illuminated, as long as the engine is
running or until the fault is corrected.
NHTSA agrees with TRW Automotive
that it is always prudent to make the
disconnections and connections of ESC
components with the power turned off,
even though the components are
generally powered by low-voltage DC
current and the risk of harm to the
vehicle would be greater than the risk to
the technicians. Accordingly, we have
amended paragraph S7.10.1 as follows,
but we do not think the reminder need
be repeated in S7.10.4 in view of other
changes to its language being made.
S7.10.1 Simulate one or more ESC
malfunction(s) by disconnecting the power
source to any ESC component, or
disconnecting any electrical connection
between ESC components (with vehicle
power off). When simulating an ESC
malfunction, the electrical connections for
the telltale lamp(s) are not to be
disconnected.
NHTSA does not agree with Honda
that S7.10 should be limited to only
those malfunctions amenable to
detection based upon static activation
and deactivation. Our purpose in
writing S7.10.2 was to ensure that ESC
malfunctions would be detected within
a reasonable time of starting to drive.
The language proposed by the Alliance/
AIAM conforms to our original intent,
while clarifying that the vehicle should
be driven during the proposed twominute period so that the parts of its
malfunction detection capability which
depend on vehicle motion can operate.
Accordingly, we are adopting the
language suggested by the Alliance/
AIAM for S7.10.2 and S7.10.3. We
believe that this change also addresses
the comment by Continental that
malfunction detection is not a timebased function but one that requires
certain driving motions to make ESC
self-testing possible.
ycherry on PROD1PC64 with RULES2
(c) Monitoring When System Is Off
Honda sought clarification of the
proposed standard to ensure that there
is not an unintended requirement for
the ESC system to maintain constant
monitoring even when the ignition key
is in the ‘‘off’’ position. Accordingly,
Honda recommended modifying S5.3.6
to read as follows: ‘‘The ESC
malfunction telltale must extinguish at
the initiation of the next ignition cycle
after the malfunction has been
corrected.’’ Honda also recommended
modifying S7.10.4 to state: ‘‘Deactivate
the ignition locking system to the ‘‘off’’
or ‘‘lock’’ position. Restore the ESC
system to normal operation and verify
that the telltale has extinguished.’’
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Honda is correct that the agency does
not expect the ESC system to maintain
monitoring capability with vehicle
turned off. However, we do not believe
that it is necessary to restrict the
extinguishing of the telltale to the exact
instant of the initiation of the next
ignition cycle. Therefore, we are
amending paragraphs S5.3.6 (now
S5.3.7) and S7.10.4 to read as follows:
S5.3.7 The ESC malfunction telltale must
extinguish at the next ignition cycle after the
malfunction has been corrected. * * *
S7.10.4 Deactivate the ignition locking
system to the ‘‘off’’ or ‘‘lock’’ position.
Restore the ESC system to normal operation,
activate the ignition system to the ‘‘Start’’
position and start the engine. Verify that the
telltale has extinguished.
(d) Minimum Performance Level
BorgWarner commented that the
proposed ESC standard should set a
defined minimum performance level for
a vehicle when the ESC system is
deactivated (i.e., ‘‘off’’) or when there is
an ESC malfunction (which again may
result in a failure mode of ESC ‘‘off’’).
The commenter stated that unless this is
done, negative safety consequences may
arise under conditions where a driver is
not aware of the vehicle’s baseline
stability behavior. BorgWarner argued
that establishing a minimum stability
performance level for a deactivated ESC
system would be analogous to the
minimum performance standard which
the agency adopted for ABS
‘‘foundation’’ brake performance in the
event ABS is deactivated due to a
system malfunction.
NHTSA considers ESC to be a safety
feature added to vehicles whose basic
chassis properties have been designed to
match their intended purposes. Our
discussion in Section IV.C.5 (Lateral
Responsiveness Criteria) is based upon
the expectation by both NHTSA and the
industry that ESC will not cause
changes in the basic chassis properties
of vehicles. We expect that ESC
activations will be rare events in panic
situations and that drivers will not
depend upon the ESC system in the
ordinary operation of the vehicle. In the
case of an ESC malfunction or failure,
the ESC telltale warns the driver that the
ESC system is non-operational and may
require repair. However, pending the
repair, the driver would be no more at
risk than a person driving an older car
without ESC. Unless future
developments prove these assumptions
to be false, there is no need for
additional ‘‘minimum performance’’
requirements on base vehicles equipped
with ESC.
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9. ESC Telltale Requirements
(a) ESC Telltale
As noted above, paragraph S5.3 of the
ESC proposal would require each ESC
system to include an ESC malfunction
telltale mounted inside the occupant
compartment in front of and in clear
view of the driver (see S5.3.1) and
identified by the symbol shown for
‘‘ESC Malfunction Telltale’’ in Table 1
of Standard No. 101 (49 CFR 571.101)
(see S5.3.2). The ESC malfunction
telltale would be required to remain
continuously illuminated under the
conditions specified in S5.3 for as long
as the malfunction(s) exists, whenever
the ignition locking system is in the
‘‘On’’ (‘‘Run’’) position (see S5.3.3), and
except as provided in paragraph S5.3.5,
each ESC malfunction telltale must be
activated as a check of lamp function
either when the ignition locking system
is turned to the ‘‘On’’ (‘‘Run’’) position
when the engine is not running, or
when the ignition locking system is in
a position between ‘‘On’’ (‘‘Run’’) and
‘‘Start’’ that is designated by the
manufacturer as a check position (see
S5.3.4). The ESC malfunction telltale
need not be activated when a starter
interlock is in operation (see S5.3.5).
The ESC malfunction telltale must
extinguish after the malfunction has
been corrected (see S5.3.6). Under the
proposal, manufacturers would be
permitted to use the ESC malfunction
telltale in a flashing mode to indicate
ESC operation (see S5.3.7).
Several commenters raised specific
issues pertaining to the ESC
malfunction telltale, which are set forth
and addressed below.
(i) Telltale Symbol Text Enhancement
Although Advocates supported use of
the ISO symbol, it argued that the
telltale should also include the
abbreviation ‘‘ESC,’’ because that would
allow drivers to better understand that
their vehicle is equipped with an ESC
system.
NHTSA shares the Advocates’
concern regarding the importance of
promoting drivers’ understanding of
ESC and whether or not their vehicle is
equipped with ESC. However, we
believe that augmenting the ESC
malfunction telltale by adding the word,
‘‘ESC,’’ is unlikely to address that
concern. As explained in the NPRM,
NHTSA’s research so far indicates that
most drivers do not yet understand what
‘‘ESC’’ means. Insofar as drivers will
have to learn the precise meaning of any
telltale offered by manufacturers to
convey the idea of ESC, NHTSA does
not believe it necessary at this time to
specifically require a telltale that
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includes both the symbol and the
acronym. We have no evidence that
both together will convey a greater
benefit than either alone. Additionally,
no other FMVSS has required both a
symbol and a text term together for a
telltale, so for the sake of consistency
we are reluctant to do so now. We
believe that the ESC malfunction telltale
symbol and substitute ‘‘ESC’’ text can
effectively be used interchangeably. We
also believe that most drivers become
increasingly familiar with the meaning
of instrument panel telltales over time,
and we expect that this will be the case
with ESC telltales and substitute text, as
well.
Furthermore, NHTSA is sensitive to
vehicle manufacturers’ stated concern
that limited instrument panel area is
available for locating telltales. Paragraph
S5.2.3 of FMVSS No. 101, Controls and
Displays, states that ‘‘[s]upplementary
symbols, words, or abbreviations may be
used at the manufacturer’s discretion in
conjunction with any symbol, word, or
abbreviation specified in Table 1 or
Table 2.’’ Based on the above provision,
augmenting the ISO symbol with the
text ‘‘ESC’’ is permissible, provided that
it does not violate the locational
requirement contained in the definition
of ‘‘adjacent’’ as specified in S4 of
FMVSS No. 101.57
Therefore, for the reasons stated
above, NHTSA believes that it is not
necessary to require addition of the text
‘‘ESC’’ to the ESC malfunction telltale.
(ii) Telltale Symbol Alternative:
Substitute Text
ycherry on PROD1PC64 with RULES2
The Alliance/AIAM asked the agency
to permit the use of the symbol ‘‘ESC’’
without the ISO symbol, as an
alternative to the proposed symbol
when the warning is provided by the
vehicle’s message/information center.
These commenters argued that this
approach is consistent with other
FMVSS No. 101 Table 1 indicators.
(Porsche Cars North America, Inc.
(Porsche) made a similar comment.)
NHTSA agrees with the commenters
that the general approach of FMVSS No.
101 is to provide flexibility to vehicle
manufacturers via alternative text terms
for telltales. Moreover, as the concept of
ESC becomes more widely understood
57 Paragraph S4 of FMVSS No. 101 (49 CFR
571.101 S4) provides:
S4. Definitions.
Adjacent, with respect to a control, telltale or
indicator, and its identifier means:
(a) The identifier is in close proximity to the
control, telltale or indicator; and
(b) No other control, telltale, indicator, identifier
or source of illumination appears between the
identifier and the telltale, indicator, or control that
the identifier identifies.
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by drivers, we expect that offering the
option of using the text term ‘‘ESC,’’ as
opposed to manufacturer-specific ESC
system acronyms, will facilitate driver
recognition of the telltale. This
promotes consistency in the telltale
field, where there currently is little.
Therefore, NHTSA has decided to
permit use of the term ‘‘ESC’’ at the
manufacturer’s discretion instead of the
ISO symbol. As a result, we are
modifying S5.3.2 to read as follows:
S5.3.2 Effective September 1, 2011, must
be identified by the symbol shown for ‘‘ESC
Malfunction Telltale’’ or the specified words
or abbreviations listed in Table 1 of Standard
No. 101 (49 CFR 571.101);
In the event that the text alternative
for the ESC malfunction telltale is
presented via the vehicle’s message/
information center (defined as a
‘‘common space’’ under S4 of FMVSS
No. 101), the conditions of S5.5.2 and
S5.5.5 of FMVSS No. 101 (set forth
below) must be met. While not specified
in the proposed regulatory text, NHTSA
believes it is necessary to modify S5.5.2
and S5.5.5 of FMVSS No. 101 to place
restrictions on the use of the ESC telltale
in a common space. The amended
language reads as follows:
S5.5.2 The telltales for any brake system
malfunction required by Table 1 to be red, air
bag malfunction, low tire pressure, electronic
stability control malfunction, passenger air
bag off, high beam, turn signal, and seat belt
must not be shown in the same common
space.* * *
S5.5.5 In the case of the telltale for a
brake system malfunction, air bag
malfunction, side air bag malfunction, low
tire pressure, electronic stability control
malfunction, passenger air bag off, high
beam, turn signal, or seat belt that is designed
to display in a common space, that telltale
must displace any other symbol or message
in that common space while the underlying
condition for the telltale’s activation exists.
Therefore, when presenting the ESC
malfunction telltale in a vehicle’s
common space display, the malfunction
telltale must not appear in the same
common space as any of the other listed
telltales under paragraph S5.5.2 of
FMVSS No. 101, and, when activated, it
must displace any another message or
symbol in its common space as long as
the ESC malfunction condition exists, as
required under paragraph S5.5.5 of
FMVSS No. 101. For example, in the
event that a failure of the ABS led to an
ESC malfunction, both malfunctions
would be required to be indicated to the
driver and must be presented in
separate common spaces.
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17273
(iii) Waiver of Yellow Color
Requirement for ESC Telltale When
Message/Information Center Is Used
The Alliance/AIAM asked the agency
to waive the yellow color requirement
when ESC malfunction indications are
provided by the vehicle’s message/
information center, due to the difficulty
associated with providing color in a
message/information center (regardless
of whether a text or symbol is used).
The use of message/information
centers for presentation of ESC
malfunction information is permissible
to the extent that the requirements of
FMVSS No. 101 are met (see 49 CFR
571.101 and discussion in Section
IV.C.9(a)(ii) immediately above). The
intent of the color requirements
specified in Table 1 of FMVSS No. 101
is that the color yellow be used to
communicate to the driver a condition
of compromised performance of a
vehicle system that does not require
immediate correction. The International
Standards Organization (ISO) in its
standard titled, ‘‘Road Vehicles—
Symbols for controls, indicators, and
tell-tales’’ (ISO 2575:2004(E)), agrees
with this practice through its statement
of the meaning of the color yellow as
‘‘yellow or amber: Caution, outside
normal operating limits, vehicle system
malfunction, damage to vehicle likely,
or other condition which may produce
hazard in the longer term.’’
In the context of ESC, the agency
purposely chose to associate indication
of an ESC system malfunction with a
yellow, cautionary warning to the
driver. NHTSA believes that this
requirement must be maintained in
order to properly communicate the level
of urgency with which the driver must
seek to remedy the malfunction of this
important safety system.
Furthermore, this policy is consistent
with the agency’s decision in our
September 7, 2005 final rule responding
to petitions for reconsideration of the
Tire Pressure Monitoring System
(TPMS) final rule, in which petitioners
raised the identical issue of waiving the
yellow color requirement for TPMS
malfunctions and low tire pressure
warnings when presented via a
message/information center (see 70 FR
53079 (Sept. 7, 2005)). Therefore,
NHTSA has decided to deny the request
for waiver of the yellow color
requirement for the ESC malfunction
telltale or substitute text when a
message/information center is used.
(iv) Telltale Illumination Strategy
Nissan stated that its current ESC
systems utilize a telltale control logic
that illuminates the ‘‘ESC Off’’ telltale
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whenever the ESC malfunction telltale
is illuminated. Nissan reasoned that this
illumination strategy provides a clear
message to the driver that the
malfunctioning ESC system may not be
able to perform normally and would
therefore be ‘‘off’’ within the meaning of
the standard’s performance
requirements of S5.4, ESC Off Switch
and Telltale (i.e., the system is in a
mode that does not meet the
requirements of S5.2, Performance
Requirements). The commenter sought
clarification that this telltale
illumination strategy is permissible
under the proposed ESC standard. (A
similar comment was provided by the
Alliance/AIAM.)
Nissan has correctly interpreted the
regulatory text to indicate that when an
ESC malfunction situation exists,
manufacturers may choose to illuminate
the ‘‘ESC Off’’ telltale (per Table 1 of
FMVSS No. 101) or display ‘‘ESC Off’’
text in a message/information center in
addition to illuminating the separate
ESC malfunction telltale to emphasize
to the driver that ESC functionality has
been reduced due to the failure of one
or more ESC components.
However, we believe that it is
important to clarify here that the reverse
situation (i.e., illuminating the ESC
malfunction telltale in addition to the
‘‘ESC Off’’ telltale when ESC has been
manually switched off by the driver) is
prohibited, unless an actual ESC
malfunction condition exists. In such
situations, an ESC system actively
disengaged by the driver through an
appropriate control is not
malfunctioning, but is instead
functioning properly. Furthermore, such
an illumination strategy could cause
driver confusion, which may in turn
decrease confidence in the ESC system.
(v) Telltale Extinguishment
TRW Automotive urged NHTSA to
clarify paragraph S5.3.6 of its proposal,
which provides, ‘‘The ESC malfunction
telltale must extinguish after the
malfunction has been corrected.’’ The
commenter argued that this provision
may cause confusion, because it could
be interpreted as implying that all ESC
malfunctions will require corrective
action by a third party (e.g., dealership,
repair shop). Instead, TRW Automotive
stated that there are numerous examples
of situations in which outside
intervention is not required to return the
ESC system to normal operation, such as
where a sensor may become temporarily
inactive but subsequently returned to
service. Accordingly, the company
recommended revising S5.3.6 as
follows: ‘‘The ESC malfunction telltale
must extinguish after the ESC system
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20:29 Apr 05, 2007
Jkt 211001
has determined the malfunction no
longer exists.’’
We clarify that in paragraph S5.3.6 of
the NPRM, NHTSA did not intend to
imply that all ESC malfunctions require
corrective action by a third party.
However, TRW Automotive’s suggested
language is problematic, because, unlike
the agency’s proposed language, it sets
no requirement for the ESC system to
actually determine and recognize that
the malfunction no longer exists.
Therefore, NHTSA has decided to retain
the proposed requirement set forth in
paragraph S5.3.6 without revision as
part of this final rule.
(vi) Telltale Location
Consumers Union argued that, if the
agency does decide to adopt a
requirement for a visual warning of ESC
activation, the standard should require
an appropriate telltale in that vehicle’s
‘‘instrument cluster’’ where its message
would be more prominent, rather than
in the vehicle’s center console (i.e.,
where the radio and climate control
mechanisms are normally located).
In paragraph S5.3.1 of the NPRM for
FMVSS No. 126, NHTSA proposed to
require that the ESC malfunction telltale
‘‘[m]ust be mounted inside the occupant
compartment in front of and in clear
view of the driver.’’ In addition,
paragraph S5.1.2 of FMVSS No. 101
requires that ‘‘telltales and indicators
* * * must be located so that, when
activated, they are visible to the driver
under the conditions of S5.6.1 and
S5.6.2’’ (i.e., the driver has adapted to
the ambient light roadway conditions
and is properly restrained by the seat
belts). NHTSA believes that these
existing requirements are sufficiently
stringent to ensure that vehicle
manufacturers will locate the ESC
malfunction telltale in a reasonable
location, so the agency has decided that
it is not necessary to specify that the
ESC telltale must be located within the
instrument panel area.
(vi) Use of ESC Malfunction Telltale To
Indicate Malfunctions of Related
Systems/Functions
The Alliance/AIAM commented that
NHTSA should allow manufacturers to
use the ESC malfunction indicator to
indicate the malfunction of any ESCrelated system, including traction
control, trailer stability assist, corner
brake control, and other similar
functions that use throttle and/or
individual wheel torque control to
operate and which share common
components with the ESC system. The
commenters stated that this approach
would be directly analogous to the
position the agency has taken with
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Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
respect to the frontal air bag readiness
indicator required by S4.5.2 of FMVSS
No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection.
The commenters quoted a letter from
NHTSA to Porsche dated July 30, 1996,
stating, ‘‘Since the dealer or repair
business can inform the owner which
system is malfunctioning, it does not
matter that the indicator does not make
that distinction.’’
NHTSA understands the commenters’
concerns regarding space limitations in
the instrument panel for incorporation
of additional telltales. While the
International Standards Organization in
its standard titled, ‘‘Road Vehicles—
Symbols for controls, indicators, and
tell-tales’’ (ISO 2575:2004(E)), specifies
telltales for ‘‘traction control’’ and
‘‘traction control off or not available,’’
we agree that our established position
noted by the commenter in relation to
air bags may be similarly applied here.
We believe that a single malfunction
telltale that relates to a vehicle’s
stability-related safety systems generally
is sufficiently informative for the driver,
and it should be effective in conveying
to the driver that a malfunction has
occurred which may require diagnosis
and service by a repair facility. Thus, we
are revising Table 1 of FMVSS No. 101
to include a note referring to the ESC
malfunction telltale that states:
This symbol may also be used to indicate
the malfunction of related systems/functions
including traction control, trailer stability
assist, corner brake control, and other similar
functions that use throttle and/or individual
torque control to operate and share common
components with the ESC system.
(b) ‘‘ESC Off’’ Indication
If the vehicle manufacturer chooses to
install a driver-selectable control (an
‘‘ESC Off’’ control) that places the ESC
system in a mode that does not satisfy
the performance requirements of the
standard, then the proposal would
require the manufacturer to provide an
‘‘ESC Off’’ telltale to alert the driver
when the vehicle has been placed in
such a mode (see S5.4.2). Specifically,
the NPRM proposed that the ‘‘ESC Off’’
switch and telltale must be identified by
the symbol shown for ‘‘ESC Off’’ in
Table 1 of Standard No. 101 (49 CFR
571.101) (see S5.4.3), and the telltale
must be mounted inside the occupant
compartment in front of and in clear
view of the driver (see S5.4.4). The ESC
telltale symbol indicating ‘‘ESC Off’’
proposed by NHTSA consists of the ISO
symbol J.14 with the English word,
‘‘Off,’’ beneath it. No text substitution
for the ‘‘ESC Off’’ telltale was offered as
part of the proposal.
It further proposed that the ‘‘ESC Off’’
telltale remain continuously illuminated
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for as long as the ESC is in a mode that
renders it unable to satisfy the
requirements of S5.2.1, S5.2.2 and
S5.2.3 (see S5.4.5), and except as
provided in paragraph S5.4.7, each
‘‘ESC Off’’ telltale must be activated as
a check of lamp function either when
the ignition locking system is turned to
the ‘‘On’’ (‘‘Run’’) position when the
engine is not running, or when the
ignition locking system is in a position
between ‘‘On’’ (‘‘Run’’) and ‘‘Start’’ that
is designated by the manufacturer as a
check position (see S5.4.6). The ‘‘ESC
Off’’ telltale would not need to be
activated when a starter interlock is in
operation (see S5.4.7). The ‘‘ESC Off’’
telltale would be required to extinguish
after the ESC system has been returned
to its fully functional default mode (see
S5.4.8).
Several commenters raised specific
issues pertaining to the ESC Off control
and telltale, which are set forth and
addressed below.
(i) ‘‘ESC Off’’ Symbol Alternative: Use of
Text
In their comments, the Alliance/
AIAM asked the agency to permit the
use of the text ‘‘ESC Off’’ without the
ISO symbol (J.14) to indicate that the
ESC system has been switched off. The
commenters argued that such approach
is consistent with other FMVSS No. 101
Table 1 indicators.
Pursuant to the discussion in Section
IV.C.9(a)(ii) above, NHTSA has decided
to revise S5.4.3 (now S5.4.2 and S5.5.2)
to permit use of the term ‘‘ESC Off’’ at
the manufacturer’s discretion as follows:
S5.4.2 Effective September 1, 2011, a
control whose only purpose is to place the
ESC system in a mode in which it will no
longer satisfy the performance requirements
of S5.2.1, S5.2.2 and S5.2.3 must be
identified by the symbol shown for ‘‘ESC
Off’’ in Table 1 of Standard No. 101 (49 CFR
571.101) or the text, ‘‘ESC Off’’ as listed
under ‘‘Word(s) or Abbreviations’’ in Table 1
of Standard No. 101 (49 CFR 571.101); * * *
S5.5.2 Effective September 1, 2011, the
‘‘ESC Off’’ telltale must be identified by the
symbol shown for ‘‘ESC Off’’ in Table 1 of
Standard No. 101 (49 CFR 571.101) or the
text, ‘‘ESC Off’’ as listed under ‘‘Word(s) or
Abbreviations’’ in Table 1 of Standard No.
101 (49 CFR 571.101).
ycherry on PROD1PC64 with RULES2
(ii) Waiver of Yellow Color Requirement
When ‘‘ESC Off’’ Is Indicated Via
Message/Information Center Text
In their comments, the Alliance/
AIAM requested a waiver of the yellow
color requirement when ‘‘ESC Off’’
indications are provided via the
vehicle’s message/information center,
due to the difficulty associated with
providing color in a message/
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information center. (Porsche made a
similar comment.)
As explained in Section IV.C.9(a)(iii)
above, the use of message/information
centers for presentation of required ESC
information is permissible to the extent
that the requirements of FMVSS No. 101
are met (see 49 CFR 571.101 and
discussion in Section IV.C.9(a)(ii)
immediately above). The intent of the
color requirements specified in Table 1
of FMVSS No. 101 is that the color
yellow be used to communicate to the
driver a condition of compromised
performance of a vehicle system that
does not require immediate correction.
The International Standards
Organization in its standard titled,
‘‘Road Vehicles—Symbols for controls,
indicators, and tell-tales’’ (ISO
2575:2004(E)), agrees with this practice
through its statement of the meaning of
the color yellow as ‘‘yellow or amber:
Caution, outside normal operating
limits, vehicle system malfunction,
damage to vehicle likely, or other
condition which may produce hazard in
the longer term.’’
NHTSA believes that operating ESC in
a mode other than ‘‘full on’’ qualifies as
a condition of ‘‘compromised
performance.’’ Therefore, NHTSA
believes that the yellow color
requirement must be maintained in
order to properly communicate the
condition of potentially decreased safety
to the driver. Accordingly, NHTSA has
decided to deny the request for waiver
of the yellow color requirement for the
‘‘ESC Off’’ telltale or substitute text
when a message/information center is
used. As noted in Section IV.C.9(a)(iii),
this decision is consistent with the
identical issues raised in petitions for
reconsideration of the TPMS rule.
(iii) ‘‘ESC Off’’ Telltale Clarification
The Alliance/AIAM recommended
that the final rule should clarify that the
‘‘ESC Off’’ telltale can be illuminated
whenever the ESC system is in a mode
other than the fully active system, even
if, at that level, the system would meet
the requirements of FMVSS No. 126.
As discussed above, paragraph S5.4 of
the NPRM proposed to require that the
‘‘ESC Off’’ telltale must remain
continuously illuminated for as long as
the ESC is in a driver-selected mode that
renders it unable to satisfy the
requirements of S5.2.1, S5.2.2 and
S5.2.3 (see S5.4.5). In their comments,
the Alliance/AIAM suggested that
manufacturers should be permitted to
use the ‘‘ESC Off’’ telltale to alert the
driver that the system is in a mode less
than fully active, regardless of whether
it could meet the requirements of S5.2.1,
S5.2.2 and S5.2.3 at that level. After
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17275
careful consideration, NHTSA agrees
that permitting vehicle manufacturers to
employ an illumination strategy as
suggested by the Alliance/AIAM may
help to remind drivers when their
vehicle’s ESC system has been placed in
a mode of less than maximal
effectiveness and to encourage them to
rapidly return the system to fullyfunctional status. Certain modifications
to the regulatory text are required to
achieve this result, because S5.3.1(e) of
FMVSS 101 reads, ‘‘A telltale must not
emit light except when identifying the
malfunction or vehicle condition it is
designed to indicate, or during a bulb
check.’’ Accordingly, it is necessary to
add the following new paragraph S5.5.5
(renumbering subsequent paragraphs):
Notwithstanding S5.3.1(e) of 49 CFR
571.101, the vehicle manufacturer may use
the ‘‘ESC Off’’ telltale to indicate an ESC
level of function other than the fully
functional default mode even if the vehicle
would meet S5.2.1, S5.2.2 and S5.2.3 at that
level of ESC function.
(iv) ‘‘ESC Off’’ Telltale Strategy
Porsche sought clarification that the
following ESC telltale illumination
strategy would be permissible: If the
ESC is deactivated by the driver,
illuminate the ESC symbol in the
instrument panel (by which we assume
Porsche means the ESC malfunction
symbol and not the ‘‘ESC Off’’ symbol),
provide a ‘‘PSM OFF’’ message in the
message/information center, and
illuminate a yellow light-emitting diode
(LED) in the ‘‘ESC Off’’ button which is
in clear view of the driver.
In response to Porsche’s comment, we
note that paragraph S5.3 of the NPRM
states that the ESC malfunction telltale
shall be illuminated ‘‘* * * after the
occurrence of one or more
malfunctions.’’ Manual disablement of
the ESC by the driver does not
constitute an ESC malfunction.
Furthermore, paragraph S5.3.1(e) of
FMVSS 101 requires, ‘‘A telltale must
not emit light except when identifying
the malfunction or vehicle condition it
is designed to indicate, or during a bulb
check.’’ Thus, the ESC malfunction
telltale can only be used when a
malfunction exists.
NHTSA is concerned that if the ESC
malfunction telltale were permitted to
be presented simultaneously with the
‘‘ESC Off’’ telltale, drivers would be
unable to distinguish whether the
system had been switched off or
whether a malfunction had occurred.
Therefore, presentation of the ESC
malfunction telltale in addition to an
‘‘ESC Off’’ indication when ESC has
been disabled via the driver-selectable
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control and no system malfunction
exists is prohibited.
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(v) Use of Two-Part Telltales
Porsche stated that vehicle
manufacturers should be permitted the
flexibility to use two adjacent telltales,
one containing the ISO symbol for the
proposed yellow ESC malfunction
indicator and another yellow telltale
with the word ‘‘Off.’’ Porsche stated that
given the limited space available on the
instrument clusters in their vehicles,
this dual-purpose combination should
be permissible. The Alliance/AIAM
offered the same comment, arguing that
this approach would increase efficiency
by allowing one lamp to be illuminated
to indicate ESC malfunction and both to
be illuminated to indicate that the
system has been turned off or placed in
a mode other than the ‘‘full on’’ mode.
NHTSA acknowledges the
commenters’’ concerns regarding
limited instrument panel area available
for locating telltales. However, we are
not adopting the commenters’
recommendation, because allowing a
two-part telltale in such manner would
create conflicting regulatory
requirements, as discussed below.
Indication of a malfunction condition
must always be the predominant visual
indication provided to the driver by a
telltale. As a result, if a two-part ESC
telltale were used and an ESC
malfunction occurred, only the
malfunction portion of the telltale could
be illuminated. Paragraphs S5.4.2 and
S5.4.3 of the proposed regulatory text
state that a telltale consisting of the
symbol for ‘‘ESC Off’’ or substitute text
(as indicated in Table 1 of FMVSS No.
101) must be illuminated when a
control input to the ESC switch (i.e.,
control) has been made by the driver to
put the vehicle into a non-compliant
ESC mode. If a two-part telltale were
used, and an ESC malfunction condition
occurred after the ESC had been turned
off by the driver, the malfunction
indication would take precedence over
the ‘‘off’’ indication, thereby requiring
that the ‘‘off’’ portion of the two-part
telltale be extinguished. This situation
would be in conflict with S5.4.2 of the
proposed regulatory text. Due to this
conflict, NHTSA has decided to deny
the request to permit use of a two-part
ESC telltale.
(vi) Conditions for Illumination of the
‘‘ESC Off’’ Telltale: Speed
The Alliance/AIAM sought
clarification that the ‘‘ESC Off’’ telltale
(if provided) need not illuminate when
the vehicle is traveling below the lowspeed threshold at which the ESC
system becomes operational.
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We note that under paragraph S5.1.2,
NHTSA’s proposal states that the ESC
system must be ‘‘* * * operational
during all phases of driving including
acceleration, coasting, and deceleration
(including braking), except when the
driver has disabled ESC or when the
vehicle is below a speed threshold
where loss of control is unlikely.’’ Thus,
NHTSA’s proposal provides that the
ESC system need not be functional
when the vehicle is traveling at low
speeds.
Paragraph S5.4.2 of FMVSS No. 126
requires the vehicle manufacturer to
illuminate the ‘‘ESC Off’’ telltale when
the ‘‘vehicle has been put into a mode
that renders it unable to satisfy the
requirements of S5.2.1, S5.2.2 and
S5.2.3.’’ Driving a vehicle at low speeds
does not equate with the vehicle
operator actively using a driverselectable control that places the ESC
system ‘‘into a mode in which it will not
satisfy the requirements of S5.2,’’ as
stated in S5.4. Therefore, NHTSA
believes that the proposed language
does not imply that the ‘‘ESC Off’’
telltale must be illuminated when the
vehicle is traveling at low speeds and is
sufficiently clear in defining the
conditions under which the ‘‘ESC Off’’
telltale must be illuminated. As a result,
NHTSA has determined that no
revisions to the proposed regulatory
language are necessary to address this
issue.
(vii) Conditions for Illumination of the
‘‘ESC Off’’ Telltale: Direction
The Alliance/AIAM, Bosch,
Continental, Delphi, and Nissan
commented that the final rule should be
modified to clarify that there is no need
to illuminate the ‘‘ESC Off’’ telltale
when the vehicle is driven in reverse,
because triggering the telltale under
those circumstances could result in
driver confusion.
As discussed under Section IV.C.6(f)
above, NHTSA did not intend to require
the ESC system to be operable when the
vehicle is driven in reverse, because
such a requirement would necessitate
costly changes to current ESC systems
with no anticipated safety benefit.
Furthermore, we have decided in the
final rule to modify the regulatory
language in S4 of FMVSS No. 126 to
clarify that ESC is intended to function
‘‘over the full speed range of the vehicle
(except at vehicle speeds less than
15km/h (9.3 mph) or when being driven
in reverse). In such instances, the ESC
system has not been turned off, but
instead, it has encountered a situation
in which, by regulation, the ESC system
need not operate; once the vehicle is
returned to forward motion at a speed
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Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
above the minimum threshold, one
would presume that the ESC system
would return to normal operation
automatically.
Requiring the ‘‘ESC Off’’ telltale to
illuminate frequently (given that
reversing the vehicle and low-speed
driving are routine occurrences) would
certainly be perceived as a nuisance by
drivers and might even be mistaken for
a system malfunction. Furthermore, we
note that paragraph S5.4.2 of the
NHTSA proposal comes under the
heading and is in the context of the
‘‘ESC Off’’ Switch and Telltale (see
S5.4). Those provisions already stated
that the ‘‘ESC Off’’ indicator must be
illuminated when the ESC system is
manually disabled (i.e., placed in a noncompliant mode) by the driver via the
‘‘ESC Off’’ switch. For these reasons, the
agency does not believe that any change
to the regulatory text is necessary to
clarify that the ‘‘ESC Off’’ telltale need
not be illuminated when the vehicle is
in reverse gear.
(c) Alerting the Driver of ESC Activation
As noted above, paragraph S5.3.7 of
the NPRM stated that manufacturers
may use the ESC malfunction telltale in
a flashing mode to indicate ESC
operation. However, as was also stated
in the NPRM, NHTSA has not identified
any safety need that would justify a
requirement for provision of an ESC
activation indicator to alert the driver
that the ESC system is intervening
during a loss-of-control situation.58 The
NPRM also stated that the agency does
not recommend use of an auditory
indication of ESC activation.59
(i) Visual and Auditory Indications of
ESC Activation
Regarding the issue of provision of an
indication of ESC activation to the
driver, commenters offered a variety of
viewpoints. In overview, the Alliance/
AIAM expressed support for a visual
telltale. Consumers Union and Toyota
expressed support for both visual and
auditory indications. Advocates
expressed support for a steady-burning
telltale, and Public Citizen stated that an
activation telltale is unnecessary and
potentially distracting to the driver.
These comments are summarized in
detail below.
The Alliance/AIAM expressed
support for allowing the ESC telltale to
be used, at the manufacturer’s option, to
indicate an ESC operating or
‘‘intervention’’ event to the driver.
Consumers Union challenged the
agency’s data suggesting that visual and
58 71
FR 54729 (Sept. 18, 2006).
59 Id.
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audible warnings to the driver when the
ESC system has been activated provide
little or no safety benefit. The
organization stated that testing by its
own engineers suggested that such
warnings are helpful, in that they may
alert drivers earlier regarding slippery
road conditions, thereby causing the
driver to slow down in anticipation of
a potential hazard. Accordingly,
Consumers Union requested that the
agency either include a requirement for
visual and audible warnings of ESC
operation in the final rule or at least
conduct additional research before
deciding to exclude such requirement.
In its comments, the Advocates stated
that NHTSA should allow ESC telltales
to be lit or not lit at the manufacturer’s
discretion when ESC intervenes, but, if
lit, the telltale should not be allowed to
flash. The commenter cited the agency’s
own study, which it interpreted as
suggesting that flashing illumination
increases driver distraction. The
commenter also faulted the agency for
making a tentative determination that a
flashing ESC telltale was not shown to
result in a measurable consequence in
terms of roadway departures, arguing
that the agency should have disclosed
that the portion of the November 2005
study 60 upon which it relied had data
from only 20 subjects in a driving
simulator. The Advocates opined that
this small sample size results in low
statistical power for generalization.
The Advocates also expressed
concern that a flashing telltale could
elicit a panic reaction in some drivers or
be confused with an ESC malfunction
(since an increasing number of telltales
are being wired to flash to indicate
malfunction of the given system). The
commenter expressed concern that ESC
is not an ‘‘automatic’’ technology, in
that it will only attempt to correct the
vehicle’s path if the driver is actively
steering. The Advocates argued that if a
driver panics and fails to even attempt
to steer the vehicle, then the ESC system
cannot intervene to compensate for a
loss of lateral stability.
The Advocates argued that there is no
support in the rulemaking record for
allowing the ESC telltale to flash, but
instead, that approach is arbitrary in
that it contradicts the contrary evidence
presented in NHTSA’s own limited
study (i.e., one showing increased eye
glance distributions away from the
roadway). Instead, the commenter
characterized this issue as the agency
again seeking to permit continuation of
60 Mazzae, E. et al., The Effectiveness of ESC and
Related Telltales: NADS Wet Pavement Study,
(Telltale Study) DOT HS 809 978, NHTSA
(November 2005) (Docket No. NHTSA–2006–
25801–7).
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certain current, suboptimal ESC
systems. For these reasons, the
commenter argued that a flashing ESC
telltale could be detrimental to safety, so
this aspect of the agency proposal
should be reconsidered.
Public Citizen commented that
NHTSA’s position on telltales is sound.
Public Citizen stated its belief that a
telltale for ESC activation indication is
unnecessary and argued that its position
is supported by NHTSA’s own study,
which did not show such indicators to
provide any benefit. Further, Public
Citizen stated concern that an ESC
activation telltale may create a
distraction for drivers or lead to
annoyance, which may cause drivers to
deactivate the ESC system.
Toyota asked whether their current
strategy of providing both visual
(flashing) and auditory indications of
ESC activation indication would be
permissible. The commenter correctly
stated NHTSA research results as
showing that there were increased road
departures and the average glance time
was approximately twice as long for
participants presented with an auditoryonly indication of ESC activation as
compared to those presented with a
steady-burning telltale, flashing telltale,
or no telltale. Toyota postulated that
those responses resulted from the driver
searching for a visual indicator to
explain the meaning of the auditory
indicator. Toyota noted that the NHTSA
study did not test a condition in which
an auditory indication of ESC activation
is presented in addition to the flashing
ESC telltale, as they currently provide in
their vehicles, and, therefore, the
commenter believes that NHTSA’s
recommendation not to use an auditory
indicator refers to an auditory-only
indication, and not to a system such as
Toyota’s that provides both visual and
auditory indications to the driver.
After careful consideration of the
numerous public comments raising this
issue, the agency has decided to retain
the approach toward ESC activation
warnings presented in the NPRM for the
reasons that follow. In a survey
conducted in the early phases of
NHTSA’s human factors research
relating to ESC,61 we examined 28
vehicles equipped with ESC systems
and found that all manufacturers
appeared to provide a visual indication
of ESC activation. The study found that
a majority of vehicle manufacturers
provided such indication using a
symbol, while a few indicated ESC
activation using text. Each vehicle
examined that used a symbol to indicate
ESC activation did so by flashing the
61 Id.
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Frm 00043
telltale. Owner’s manuals examined
typically indicated that the purpose of
the flashing telltale was to inform the
driver that the ESC was ‘‘active’’ or
‘‘working.’’
As discussed in NHTSA’s proposal,
the safety need for an ESC activation
indicator to alert the driver during an
emergency situation that ESC is
intervening is not obvious. It would
seem that with ESC, as with anti-lock
brake systems, vehicle stability would
be increased regardless of whether
feedback was provided to inform the
driver that a safety system had
intervened. No data have been provided
to NHTSA to suggest that safety benefits
are enhanced by alerting the driver of
ESC activations. Nevertheless, the
agency’s current research on the topic of
ESC activation warnings supports the
NPRM’s current approach (with which
the Alliance/AIAM and Public Citizen
agree) that an ESC activation indication
should neither be prohibited nor
required, as explained below.
The results of recent NHTSA
research 62 neither show that alerting a
driver to ESC activation provides a
safety benefit, nor that it may prove to
be a source of distraction that could lead
to adverse safety consequences. Our
research shows that drivers presented
with the flashing telltale were more
likely to glance at the instrument panel
and that these drivers typically glanced
at the panel twice, rather than just once
as for the steady-burning telltale or no
telltale. Insofar as a flashing telltale
draws a driver’s attention away from the
road, where we believe it should be
during an emergency loss-of-control
situation, we cannot logically require it.
Although the Consumers Union
commented that ‘‘their own testing
resulted in [their] engineers finding
these warnings were helpful and alerted
them earlier in their driving to the
possibility of slippery conditions before
an emergency situation may occur,’’ the
commenter provided no indication of
whether the telltale flashed because of
the activation of the ESC system itself,
or due to other traction control
interventions, which are often
connected with the ESC telltale. NHTSA
agrees that it makes sense to alert
drivers to slick road conditions when
the driver is operating the vehicle on the
roadway in a generally straight path, but
disagrees that it would make sense to
draw the driver’s attention away from
the road when they are in the midst of
assessing a crash-imminent situation
and attempting to avoid a collision.
While NHTSA’s research to date
showed that drivers looked at a flashing
62 Id.
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telltale twice as often, this did not result
in significantly different rates for loss of
control, road departures, and collisions
than with steady-burning telltales or no
telltales. Thus, despite the logical risk of
looking away from the road during an
ESC-worthy maneuver, we found no
apparent detriment from the increased
glances at a flashing telltale. NHTSA
therefore cannot agree with Advocates’
comment that NHTSA should allow ESC
telltales to be lit or not lit at the
manufacturer’s discretion when ESC
intervenes, but that lit telltales should
not be allowed to flash, because the
flashing might lead to driver distraction
or panic. Currently available research
results are insufficient to support
prohibition of the existing practice of
providing a visual indication of ESC
activation, but neither do they support
requiring it. Although Consumers Union
engineers have performed their own
informal study, the agency does not
consider their results (without data
being provided), to offer sufficient
justification for requiring a visual
indication of ESC activation.
Consumers Union requested that the
agency either include a requirement for
visual and audible warnings of ESC
operation in the final rule, or at least
conduct additional research before
deciding to exclude such a requirement.
Advocates also criticized the small
sample size of NHTSA’s existing
research in this area. To both
commenters, we respond that, while the
existing research had statistically valid
sample sizes, additional research is
underway to examine driver behavior
and crash-imminent situation outcomes
as a function of whether a flashing ESC
telltale is presented during ESC
activation, versus presentation of the
icon immediately following ESC
activation. Data from this research are
being analyzed, and NHTSA hopes that
the study results will further clarify
which strategy for notifying the driver of
ESC activation is least likely to
negatively impact the driver’s response
to a loss-of-control situation. However,
unless additional research provides
strong, statistically-valid evidence of a
benefit or detriment associated with
presentation of an ESC activation
indication, we will not require or
prohibit such an indication.
To NHTSA’s knowledge, Toyota is the
only manufacturer that currently
presents both a visual and an auditory
indication of ESC activation. As Toyota
correctly pointed out, NHTSA’s recent
ESC study measured a negative
consequence of the presentation of an
auditory-only indicator of ESC
activation, statistically significant for
older drivers in terms of road
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departures. Approximately twice as
many road departures were observed for
participants presented with the auditory
ESC activation indication as compared
to those who were presented with a
steady-burning telltale, flashing telltale,
or no telltale. For this reason, NHTSA
recommended against using an auditory
ESC activation indicator in its proposal.
Toyota postulated that increased
instrument panel glances resulted from
the driver searching for a visual
indicator to explain the meaning of the
auditory indicator. Given that study
results showed drivers presented with
no visual or auditory indication of ESC
activation exhibited instrument panel
glances lasting half the duration of those
observed in conjunction with
presentation of the Toyota auditory ESC
indicator, one can only assume that the
auditory alert produced the longer
glance durations. Toyota has not
provided any data to substantiate its
apparent assertions that providing
simultaneous visual and auditory
indicators would result in: (1)
Instrument panel glances of similar
duration to those observed in the
NHTSA study for participants presented
with only a visual indicator, and (2)
fewer road departures, as were observed
in the other ESC activation indication
conditions.
Consistent with its research, NHTSA
believes that auditory indications of
ESC activation are not necessary and
provide no apparent safety benefit.
However, while NHTSA has conducted
research showing that an auditory
indication of ESC activation elicits
longer instrument panel glances and
may be associated with an increase in
road departures, we do not consider
these results from a single, simulator
study to provide sufficient justification
to prohibit use of an auditory ESC
indicator. Therefore, while we would
discourage Toyota’s use of an auditory
ESC activation warning, even when
combined with a visual indication,
current data do not justify a prohibition
of such approach.
(ii) Flashing Telltale as Indication of
Intervention by Related Systems/
Functions
Honda and the Alliance/AIAM
requested permission to flash the ESC
malfunction telltale to indicate the
intervention of other related systems,
including traction control and trailer
stability assist function. Honda reasoned
that these functions are directly related
to the ESC system and that the driver
would experience the same sensations
from the braking system actuator and
throttle control triggered by operation of
these related systems, as they would in
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Sfmt 4700
the event of ESC activation. In addition
to keeping the driver informed, Honda
also reasoned that this strategy would
aid in minimizing the number of
telltales used for related functions. The
commenter proposed revising paragraph
S5.3.7 as follows: ‘‘The manufacturer
may use the ESC malfunction telltale in
a flashing mode to indicate ESC
operation, or to indicate operation of
functions directly related to stability
control such as a traction control
program.’’
Because NHTSA is not requiring an
ESC activation indication, if vehicle
manufacturers choose to provide one,
they may use it to indicate interventions
by additional related systems in their
discretion. We expect that
manufacturers would explain the
meaning and scope of the activation
indication in the vehicle owner’s
manual, consistent with facilitating
consumer understanding of important
vehicle safety features.
(d) Bulb Check
Except when a starter interlock is in
operation, the NPRM proposed to
require that each ESC malfunction
telltale and each ‘‘ESC Off’’ telltale must
be activated as a check of lamp function
either when the ignition locking system
is turned to the ‘‘On’’ (‘‘Run’’) position
when the engine is not running, or
when the ignition locking system is in
a position between ‘‘On’’ (‘‘Run’’) and
‘‘Start’’ that is designated by the
manufacturer as a check position (see
S5.3.4 and S5.5.6).
(i) Waiver of Bulb Check for Message/
Information Centers
Regarding the NPRM’s proposed bulb
check requirements, the Alliance/AIAM
stated that while such requirements are
appropriate for traditional telltales,
those requirements are not appropriate
for vehicle message/information centers
which do not use bulbs and are
illuminated whenever the vehicle is
operating. According to the
commenters, if there were a problem of
this type, it would be readily apparent
because the entire message/information
center would be blank. Therefore, the
Alliance/AIAM requested that in the
final rule, the agency exclude ESC
system status indications provided
through a message/information center
from the standard’s bulb check
requirements. (Porsche provided a
similar comment on this issue.)
As indicated in paragraphs S5.3.4 and
S5.5.6, any ESC status information
presented via a telltale must have a bulb
check performed for that telltale.
However, NHTSA agrees with the
commenters that a bulb check is not
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relevant or necessary for the type of
display technology utilized for
information/message centers.
Presumably, if an information/message
center experiences a problem analogous
to one which would be found by a
telltale’s bulb check, the entire message
center would be non-operational, a
situation likely to be rapidly discovered
by the driver. Therefore, we have
decided to waive the bulb check
requirement under FMVSS No. 126 for
ESC system status indications provided
via a message/information center. In
response to these comments, we are
adding new paragraphs S5.3.6 and
S5.5.8 as follows:
S5.3.6 The requirement S5.3.4 does not
apply to telltales shown in a common space.
* * *
*
*
*
*
*
S5.5.8 The requirement S5.5.6 does not
apply to telltales shown in a common space.
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(ii) Clarification Regarding Bulb Check
TRW Automotive recommended that
as part of the final rule, the agency
clarify that under paragraph S7.2,
Telltale bulb check, of the proposed test
procedures, the bulb check for the ESC
malfunction telltale and ESC Off telltale
(if provided) may be performed by any
vehicle system and is not required to be
conducted by the ESC system itself.
According to TRW Automotive, many
vehicle systems are able to perform this
function, and most current vehicles are
designed such that the instrument panel
controls the telltales. Thus, the
commenter recommended that the last
sentence of S7.2 (consistent with
paragraphs S5.3.4 and S5.4.6) be revised
to read as follows: ‘‘The ESC
malfunction telltale must be activated as
a check of lamp function for the ESC
malfunction telltale, and if equipped,
the ‘‘ESC Off’’ telltale, as specified in
S5.3.4 and S5.4.6.’’
NHTSA is not concerned with the
precise mechanism of how the bulb
check for an ESC-related telltale is
accomplished, provided that this
performance requirement is met.
Accordingly, we have decided to modify
S7.2 by adopting the language
recommended by TRW Automotive.
10. System Disablement and the ‘‘ESC
Off’’ Control
Under paragraph S5.4, the NPRM
proposed to permit manufacturers to
provide a driver-selectable switch that
places the ESC system in a mode in
which it will not satisfy the
performance requirements of the
standard. However, if an ‘‘ESC Off’’
switch is provided, the vehicle’s ESC
system must always return to a mode
that satisfies the requirements of the
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standard at the initiation of each new
ignition cycle, regardless of what mode
the driver had previously selected (see
S5.4.1). If the system has more than one
mode that satisfies these requirements,
the default mode must be the mode that
satisfies the performance requirements
by the greatest margin (see S5.4.1).
Under the proposal, if an ‘‘ESC Off’’
switch is provided, the vehicle
manufacturer must also provide a
telltale indicating that the vehicle has
been put into a mode that renders it
unable to satisfy the requirements of the
standard (see S5.4.2). The ‘‘ESC Off’’
switch and telltale must be identified by
the symbol shown for ‘‘ESC Off’’ in
Table 1 of Standard No. 101 (49 CFR
571.101) (see S5.4.3). (For further details
of the telltales and symbols for the ‘‘ESC
Off’’ switch and telltale (and issues
relating thereto), see section IV.C.9
above.)
Commenters raised a number of issues
regarding these provisions pertaining to
system disablement and the ‘‘ESC Off’’
switch. Most commenters agreed that
there may be a need to disengage the
ESC system in certain driving situations
(e.g., to gain traction in snow, mud).
General comments on this issue (e.g.,
appropriateness and reach of the system
disablement provision) are discussed
immediately below, followed by more
detailed, technical comments.
(a) Provision of an ‘‘ESC Off’’ Control
In its comments, IIHS supported
inclusion of an ESC off switch, because
it agreed that there are situations in
which the system would need to be
disabled (e.g., initiating movement in
deep snow). IIHS also supported the
proposal to have a default mode of ‘‘on’’
for the ESC each time the vehicle is
started.
Mr. Petkun supported the proposal’s
tentative decision to permit vehicle
manufacturers to install ESC off
switches, stating that a driver may need
to disable the ESC system when a
vehicle is stuck in a deformable surface
such as mud or snow, or when a
compact spare tire, tires of mismatched
sizes, or tires with chains are installed
on the vehicle. He agreed that vehicle
manufacturers should provide an easily
identifiable telltale to indicate when the
vehicle has been placed in a mode that
completely disables the ESC system.
In contrast to the comments above,
the Advocates stated that the proposal’s
policy for ESC on-off switches is too
liberal and may place motorists at risk.
Although it agreed that there may be
justification for temporary ESC
disablement where the vehicle needs
full longitudinal tire traction for
negotiating mud, gravel, or snow, the
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commenter did not support ESC
disablement for the purpose of
increasing ‘‘driving enjoyment’’ (similar
comment from Public Citizen). The
organization was particularly skeptical
of the rationale related to racing, arguing
that this small minority of drivers can
disable their ESC systems by other
(unspecified) means. The Advocates’
comments suggested that ESC
disablement could result in the loss of
benefits of an active ESC system for long
distances or considerable periods of
time until the start of the next ignition
cycle. Furthermore, Advocates
expressed concerns that turning off the
ESC system could also disable ABS
operation, thereby negatively impacting
vehicle safety.
In addition, the Advocates made an
analogous argument that NHTSA’s sister
agency, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration (FMCSA), issued a
report 63 in 2005 which recommended
that in no case should drivers of
vehicles greater than 10,000 pounds
GVWR be allowed to disable a Vehicle
Stability System (either roll stability
control or ESC). The commenter argued
that this is another reason for the agency
to reconsider the ease with which a
driver could use an ESC disabling
switch for vehicles under 10,000
pounds GVWR.
Advocates suggested that it may be
unnecessary to permit ESC disablement,
if ESC systems can operate in
conjunction with vehicle traction
control systems. According to the
Advocates, if the agency continues to
believe that ESC disablement switches
should be permitted, disablement
should require either: (1) A long switch
engagement period, or (2) sequential
switch engagement actions.
Despite the reservations of some
commenters, NHTSA continues to
believe that provision of a control for
temporarily disabling ESC will enhance
safety. The rationale for this position is
detailed below.
First, we acknowledge that driving
situations exist in which ESC operation
may not be helpful, most notably in
conditions of winter travel (e.g., driving
with snow chains, initiating movement
in deep snow). ESC determines the
speed at which the vehicle is traveling
via the wheel speeds, rather than using
an accelerometer or other sensor. While
NHTSA is only requiring ESC to operate
at travel speeds of 15 kph (9.3 mph) and
greater, some manufacturers may choose
to design their ESC systems to operate
63 A. Houser, J. Pierowicz, Concept of Operations
and Voluntary Operational Requirements for
Vehicular Stability Systems (VSS) On-Board
Commercial Motor Vehicles, FMCSA–MCRR–05–
006 (July 2005).
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at lower speeds. Thus, drivers trying to
work their way out of being stuck in
deep snow may induce wheel spinning
that implies a high enough travel speed
to engage the ESC to intervene, thereby
hindering the driver’s ability to free the
vehicle.
Second, NHTSA is concerned that if
a control is not provided to permit
drivers to disable ESC when they choose
to, some drivers may find their own,
permanent way to disable ESC
completely. This permanent elimination
of this important safety system would
likely result in the driver losing the
benefit of ESC for the life of the vehicle.
However, as currently designed, ESC
systems retain some residual safety
benefits when they are ‘‘switched off’’
and they also become operational again
at the next ignition cycle of the vehicle.
NHTSA feels that provision of this type
of temporary ‘‘ESC Off’’ control is the
best strategy for dealing with such
situations.
While we acknowledge FMCSA’s
recommendation that drivers of vehicles
with a GVWR greater than 10,000
pounds should not be permitted to
disable a Vehicle Stability System, those
vehicles generally have very different
handling characteristics than the light
vehicles subject to today’s final rule.
Furthermore, the operators of those
vehicles in many cases may be expected
to have different motivations for driving
(i.e., driving for personal reasons, rather
than work reasons). Accordingly, we do
not believe that the referenced FMCSA
recommendation would alter the
identified safety need discussed above
to allow vehicle manufacturers to
include an ‘‘ESC Off’’ control on certain
light vehicles equipped with an ESC
system.
In response to Advocates’ suggestion
that it may be unnecessary to permit
ESC disablement if ESC systems can
operate in conjunction with traction
control, NHTSA does not believe that
ESC disablement should be prohibited
on this basis. This rule mandates ESC,
not traction control, for new vehicles.
For vehicles equipped with ESC but not
with traction control, ESC disablement
may be necessary in certain situations,
as described above. Mandating traction
control as well as ESC, as Advocates’
suggestion would entail, is beyond the
scope of this rulemaking.
(b) Switch for Complete ESC
Deactivation
Consumers Union stated that for
certain sporty models, NHTSA could
permit a separate mode (perhaps
activated with a switch) which would
give the driver discretion to completely
disable the ESC for race track use
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(similar comments by Mr. Cheah and
Mr. Kiefer). Mr. Kiefer added that this
disablement mechanism, which would
fully and permanently disable the
vehicle’s ESC system, should shut down
any vehicle subsystem that intervenes in
the vehicle’s performance, although he
agreed that exceptions may be
warranted (e.g., where the driver wishes
to keep ABS operative).
The proposed regulatory text states
that the ‘‘manufacturer may include a
driver-selectable switch that places the
ESC system in a mode in which it will
not satisfy the performance
requirements’’ specified by NHTSA (see
S5.4 of the NPRM). Because NHTSA is
permitting, rather than requiring such a
switch and is not specifying the extent
to which ESC function must be reduced
via the switch, manufacturers have the
freedom to provide drivers with a
switch that has the ability to completely
disable ESC. Thus, NHTSA believes that
the regulatory text as originally drafted
sufficiently addresses the commenters’
concerns regarding this issue.
(c) ESC Operation After Malfunction
and ‘‘ESC Off’’ Control Override
Honda expressed concern that when
an ESC malfunction is detected, some
drivers may respond by pressing the
ESC Off control (if one is provided).
According to Honda, not all ESC
malfunctions may render the system
totally inoperable, so there may be
benefits to ensuring that the system
remains active in those cases. Thus, the
commenter urged the agency to permit
manufacturers to disable the ESC Off
control in those instances where an ESC
malfunction has been indicated. Honda
recommended adding a new provision
to S5.4 stating, ‘‘Operation of the ESC
off switch may be disabled when the
ESC malfunction telltale is
illuminated.’’
In addition, Honda’s comments also
stated that the company’s current ESC
system designs contain a logic that
permits the system to override the ‘‘ESC
Off’’ control in certain appropriate
situations (e.g., when the TPMS system
detects low tire pressure or a TPMS
system malfunction such as when a
spare tire is in use). Honda argued that
at such times, the benefits of ESC
operational availability are more
important than the ability to disable the
system. The company further argued
that because the ESC Off control is
permitted at the vehicle manufacturer’s
option, the manufacturer should be
accorded discretion to appropriately
limit the operation of that off control.
We agree with the commenter’s
reasoning on both of these issues. It was
never the agency’s intention to require
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that just because the manufacturer
permits the ESC system to be disabled
under some circumstances, the
manufacturer must allow it to be
disabled at all times. If the vehicle
manufacturer believes a situation has
occurred in which it should not be
possible to turn ESC off, then the
manufacturer should be permitted to
override the operation of the ‘‘ESC Off’’
control. Honda’s example of an ESC
system malfunction after which the
driver triggers the ‘‘ESC Off’’ switch is
illustrative of such a situation; in such
cases, the vehicle operator presumably
had desired to maintain ESC
functionality while driving, so the
driver’s action to turn the system off
arguably reflects a reflex reaction that
the system is unavailable and must be
shut down, rather than a reasoned
decision to forgo any residual ESC
benefits that might remain in spite of
the malfunction.
Similarly, it was not the agency’s
intention to require the ESC system to
remain disabled if the vehicle
manufacturer believes a situation has
occurred in which ESC should again
become functional. We do not believe
that any changes to the regulatory text
are necessary regarding this issue.
(d) Default to ‘‘ESC On’’ Status
Although Consumers Union
acknowledged that there may be certain
situations in which ESC disablement
may be appropriate (e.g., vehicles stuck
in snow or mud), it did not support the
proposed requirement that the ESC
system be permitted to remain disabled
until the next ignition cycle (i.e., default
mode upon vehicle start-up be ESC
‘‘on’’). The commenter argued that the
driver may inadvertently forget to
reengage the ESC for the remainder of
the current trip by turning the ignition
off and then on again. Thus, Consumers
Union recommended that the standard
should require that, once disabled, the
ESC system must again become
operational once the vehicle has
reached a speed of 25 mph.
Public Citizen expressed support for a
default setting of ‘‘on’’ for ESC systems
at the start of each ignition cycle
(similar comment by Mr. Petkun).
However, Public Citizen argued that
waiting for the next ignition cycle to
require reengagement of the ESC system
needlessly compromises potential safety
benefits. Accordingly, Public Citizen
urged the agency to consider other
alternatives, such as a time-delay
reminder to re-enable the system or
some other means of automatic reenablement.
In response to these comments, we
note that while paragraph S5.4.1 of the
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proposed regulation states that ‘‘[t]he
vehicle’s ESC system must always
return to a mode that satisfies the
requirements of S5.1 and S5.2 at the
initiation of each new ignition cycle,’’
manufacturers have the freedom to
equip their vehicles with ESC systems
that return to a compliant mode sooner,
based upon an automatic speed trigger
or timeout.
As discussed in Section IV.C.10(a)
above, NHTSA noted two situations in
which drivers may desire to turn off
ESC, specifically when a vehicle is
stuck in the snow and when a driver
chooses to engage in sporty driving or
racing. The latter of these two situations
is the only one that warrants a
potentially more prolonged delay of ESC
re-enablement until the next ignition
cycle. However, if the agency were to
require automatic reengagement of a
fully-functional ESC mode after a
certain time delay or upon the vehicle
reaching a certain speed threshold,
many vehicle operators might face a
considerable obstacle if they wished to
continue engaging in sports driving. As
mentioned above, we believe that there
could be safety disbenefits associated
with sports drivers who try to
permanently disable the ESC system
themselves.
Nevertheless, NHTSA believes that
many vehicle manufacturers will equip
vehicles that are not of a ‘‘sport’’ class
with ESC systems that automatically reengage the operation of the ESC system
based on some threshold reached during
the ignition cycle. Given our assessment
of the situation, NHTSA does not
believe it necessary or advisable to
specify more stringent requirements for
returning ESC to a compliant mode.
(e) Operation of Vehicle in 4WD Low
Modes
The Alliance/AIAM, Bosch,
Continental, Delphi, and Nissan all
stated that there are certain situation in
which the ESC system would not be
able to default to ‘‘on’’ status at the start
of a new ignition cycle. As an example,
Bosch stated that there are certain
vehicle operational modes in which the
driver intends to optimize traction, not
stability (e.g., 4WD-locked high, 4WDlocked low, locking front/rear
differentials). The commenters argued
that an exception should be made in
FMVSS No. 126 for when drivers select
ESC modes for four-wheel drive low,
has locked the vehicle’s differentials, or
has placed the vehicle in other special
off-road chassis modes. According to the
commenters, transition to one of these
modes is mechanical and cannot be
automatically reverted to ‘‘on’’ status at
the start of each new ignition cycle.
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The commenters suggested that this
approach would be consistent with
safety because the operating conditions
for these vehicle modes tend to involve
low-speed driving. The Alliance/AIAM
added that in those cases, the ESC ‘‘Off’’
telltale should be illuminated, in order
to remind the driver of the ESC system’s
status as being unavailable. Bosch
recommended modifying paragraph
S5.4.1 to read as follows: ‘‘The vehicle’s
stability control system must always
return to a mode which satisfies the
requirements of S5.1 and S5.2 at the
initiation of each new ignition cycle,
regardless of the mode the driver had
previously selected, except if that mode
was specifically for enhanced traction
during low-speed, off-road driving.’’
We agree with the commenters that
when a vehicle has been intentionally
placed in a mode specifically intended
for enhanced traction during low-speed,
off-road driving via mechanical means
(e.g., levers, switches) and in this mode
ESC is always disabled, it is not sensible
to require the ESC system to be returned
to enabled status just because the
ignition has been cycled. In these
situations, keeping the ESC disabled
and illuminating the ESC ‘‘Off’’ telltale,
in order to remind the driver of the ESC
system’s status as being unavailable,
makes more sense. We agree with the
comment that making this change to the
regulatory text should have no
substantial effect on safety because the
operating conditions for these vehicle
modes tend to involve low-speed
driving.
In revising the regulatory text
pertaining to this issue, we have
adopted Bosch’s recommended
language, except that a clause has been
added to limit applicability to situations
where the vehicle’s mode transition is
accomplished via mechanical means.
We note that if the vehicle’s mode
transition is accomplished via electronic
means, then the vehicle can reset itself
to a normal traction mode, and the ESC
to active status, with each ignition
cycle. Accordingly, paragraph S5.4.1
has been revised to read as follows:
S5.4.1 The vehicle’s ESC system must
always return to a mode that satisfies the
requirements of S5.1 and S5.2 at the
initiation of each new ignition cycle,
regardless of what mode the driver had
previously selected, except if that mode is
specifically for enhanced traction during
low-speed, off-road driving and is entered by
the driver using a mechanical control that
cannot be automatically reset electrically. If
the system has more than one mode that
satisfies these requirements, the default mode
must be the mode that satisfies the
performance requirements of S5.2 by the
greatest margin.
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(f) ‘‘ESC Off’’ Control Requirements
Under paragraph S5.4.3 of the NPRM,
the agency proposed to require the ‘‘ESC
Off’’ control, if present, to be identified
by the symbol shown for ‘‘ESC Off’’ in
Table 1 of Standard No. 101 (i.e., the
ISO symbol J.14 with the English word
‘‘Off’’).
(i) Labeling of the ‘‘ESC Off’’ Control
While the Alliance/AIAM agreed that
the ‘‘ESC Off’’ control should be
identified, they argued that vehicle
manufacturers should be granted
flexibility in terms of how to identify
the ‘‘ESC Off’’ control. The commenters
stated that it is not necessary to
standardize the identification of the
control because vehicle manufacturers
have been providing drivers with more
detailed feedback on the ESC operating
mode when the system is in other than
the default ‘‘full on’’ mode. If the agency
understands the comment correctly, the
Alliance and AIAM are suggesting that
because vehicle manufacturers are
providing a telltale that would
illuminate whenever the system is in a
mode other than ‘‘full on,’’ they should
be permitted discretion to optimize
control labeling in ways that would
facilitate driver understanding of
variable ESC modes (i.e., permitting a
message other than ‘‘ESC Off’’).
NHTSA shares the commenters’
concern for ensuring driver
understanding of ESC status. We also
agree that it would be beneficial to
encourage drivers to select ESC modes
other than ‘‘full on’’ only when driving
conditions warrant. We feel that
standard control labeling of an actual
‘‘ESC Off’’ control must be maintained
and, therefore, manufacturers must
identify the ‘‘ESC Off’’ control using the
specified ‘‘ESC Off’’ symbol or ‘‘ESC
Off’’ text (which may be supplemented
with other text and symbols). However,
we are distinguishing between an actual
‘‘ESC Off’’ control (i.e., one whose
function is to put the ESC system in a
mode in which it no longer satisfies the
requirements of an ESC system, and
which accordingly must bear the
required ‘‘ESC Off’’ labeling) and two
other possible types of controls (which
would not be required to bear the ‘‘ESC
Off’’ labeling).
The first control to be clarified as
excluded is one which has a different
primary purpose (e.g., a control for the
selection of low-range 4WD that locks
the axles), but which must turn off the
ESC system as a consequence of an
operational conflict with the function
that it controls. In this case, such
control would be made confusing by
adding ‘‘ESC Off’’ to its functional label.
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Nevertheless, in such situations, the
‘‘ESC Off’’ telltale must illuminate to
inform the driver of ESC system status.
The second control to be clarified as
excluded is one that changes the mode
of ESC to a less aggressive mode than
the default mode but which still
satisfies the performance criteria of
Standard No. 126. In such cases, the
manufacturer may label such a control
with an identifier other than ‘‘ESC Off,’’
and the manufacturer is permitted, but
not required, to use the ‘‘ESC Off’’
telltale beyond the default mode to
signify lesser modes that still satisfy the
test criteria.
Accordingly, paragraph S5.4 has been
rewritten to address which vehicle
controls must be identified with the
‘‘ESC Off’’ symbol or ‘‘ESC Off’’ text.
(ii) Location of the ‘‘ESC Off’’ Control
Nissan stated its understanding that
by including the optional ESC off switch
in Table 1 of FMVSS No. 101, Controls
and Displays, such switch is subject to
the requirement of S5.3.2.1 that the
control be visible to a restrained driver.
However, the commenter requested that
vehicle manufacturers be provided
flexibility in the placement of the ESC
off switch for the following reasons.
First, Nissan believes that the ESC off
switch would be infrequently used
during normal driving. Second, the
location of the ESC off switch would
help ensure that disabling of the ESC
reflects a deliberate act by the driver.
Accordingly, Nissan requested that the
final rule exclude the ESC off switch
from the visibility requirements of
FMVSS No. 101.
For the reasons that follow, the
agency has decided that the ‘‘ESC Off’’
switch location must meet the
requirements of FMVSS No. 101 S5.1.1,
which states that ‘‘[t]he controls listed
in Table 1 and in Table 2 must be
located so that they are operable by the
driver under the conditions of S5.6.2
[i.e., while properly restrained by the
seat belt].’’ The commenter correctly
understood the intent of FMVSS No.
101, in noting the implicit requirement
that both telltales and controls be
located such that they are visible to a
belted driver. We believe that handoperated controls should be mounted
where they are easily visible to the
driver so as to minimize visual search
time, because safety may be diminished
the longer a driver’s vision and attention
are diverted from the roadway.
Furthermore, relative consistency of
location across vehicle platforms will
promote easy identification of the
switch when drivers encounter a new
vehicle. Therefore, NHTSA believes
that, consistent with S5.1.1 of FMVSS
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No. 101, it is necessary to require the
‘‘ESC Off’’ switch to be located in a
position where it is visible to a belted
driver.
11. Test Procedures
(a) Accuracy Requirements
Honda requested that the agency
specify accuracy requirements for the
following measurement instruments
used in the ESC test procedures: (1) Yaw
rate sensor; (2) steering machine, and (3)
lateral acceleration sensor. The
commenter stated that such
specifications would assist in the selfcertification process and the agency’s
own compliance testing.
The agency has decided that it is not
necessary to include sensor
specifications as part of the regulatory
text of FMVSS No. 126. NHTSA is
including these sensor specifications in
the NHTSA Laboratory Test Procedures
for Standard No. 126. The Laboratory
Test Procedures provide detailed
instructions to personnel conducting
compliance testing for the agency,
including test equipment to be used and
the limitations on equipment output
variability. Including the acceptable
equipment output variability parameters
in the test procedures does not affect the
substance of the standard’s
requirements, and helps the agency
respond as needed to factors affecting
the availability of test equipment. The
Laboratory Test Procedures will be
made available to the public prior to the
initiation of FMVSS No. 126 compliance
testing, but for those interested, we note
here that the sensor specifications of the
instrumentation used by the agency’s
ESC research program and currently
planned for use in the compliance
testing program are as follows:
Yaw rate: Range ±100 degrees/s;
Nonlinearity ≤0.05% of full scale.
Steering machine encoder: Range ±720
degrees; Resolution ±0.10 degrees
(combined resolution of the encoder
and D/A converter).
Accelerometers: Range ±2 g;
Nonlinearity <50µg/g.2
The agency emphasizes that there is
considerable precedent on the question
of what belongs in the regulatory text as
compared to what belongs in the
compliance test procedure. For
example, neither FMVSS No. 138 (Tire
Pressure Monitoring Systems) nor
FMVSS No. 139 (New Pneumatic Radial
Tires for Light Vehicles) contain
accuracy requirements in the standard,
but rather include them in the test
procedures.
Given how the agency knows that
manufacturers design their vehicles to
pass compliance tests (i.e., with some
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margin to allow for test inaccuracy), we
anticipate that manufacturers should
have no difficulty complying with
specifications contained in the test
procedures rather than in the standard
itself. Manufacturers may base their
margins on their own estimates of the
repeatability and reproducibility of the
Sine with Dwell test. NHTSA has
recently completed a major round-robin
study with industry examining the
reproducibility and repeatability of the
test. Industry, as well as NHTSA, has all
of the raw data, and as the results are
evaluated, we believe that
manufacturers will have more than
sufficient information to make these
decisions.
(b) Tolerances
Under paragraph S7.4, Brake
Conditioning, the NPRM’s proposed test
procedures call for the vehicle to
undertake a series of stops from either
56 km/h (35 mph) or 72 km/h (45 mph)
in order to condition the brakes prior to
further testing under the standard (see
S7.4). In addition, the NPRM called for
the vehicle to undertake several passes
with sinusoidal steering at 56 km/h (35
mph) to condition the tires (see S7.5).
Honda recommended that the agency
outline specific tolerances for vehicle
speed and deceleration to condition the
tires and brakes prior to compliance
testing, thereby helping to ensure
consistent test conditions.
The agency has decided not to make
additional changes to the tire and brake
conditioning provisions of the
regulatory text based upon Honda’s
recommendations, because, for the
reasons discussed below, we believe the
details currently specified in the
proposed regulatory text for FMVSS No.
126 are sufficient. The intent of tire
conditioning is to wear away mold
sheen and to help bring the tires up to
test temperature. Minor fluctuations in
the vehicle speeds specified in S7.5.1
and S7.5.2 should not have any
measurable effect on these objectives.
Similarly, we believe minor fluctuations
in the maneuver entrance speeds and
deceleration specifications provided in
S7.4.1 through S7.4.4 will not adversely
affect the brake conditioning process.
Accordingly, we believe that the
commenter’s recommended tolerances
for vehicle speed and deceleration are
unnecessary.
(c) Location of Lateral Accelerometer
Honda recommended that the final
rule’s test procedures should include
detailed specifications on how to
calculate lateral acceleration. According
to Honda, the NPRM proposed to
require calculation of lateral
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displacement of the vehicle’s center of
gravity based upon lateral acceleration
of the vehicle’s center of gravity.
However, the commenter stated that for
some vehicles, it may not be possible to
install a lateral acceleration sensor at
the location of the vehicle’s actual
center of gravity; in those cases, it
reasoned, a correction factor will be
necessary to accommodate this different
sensor positioning.
We agree with Honda’s comment that
it may not be possible to install a lateral
acceleration sensor at the location of the
vehicle’s actual center of gravity. For
this reason, it is important to provide a
coordinate transformation to resolve the
measured lateral acceleration values to
the vehicle’s center of gravity location.
The specific equations used to perform
this operation, as well as those used to
correct lateral acceleration data for the
effect of chassis roll angle, will be
incorporated into the laboratory test
procedure.
(d) Calculation of Lateral Displacement
As noted above, the NPRM proposed
that under each test performed under
the test conditions of S6 and the test
procedure of S7.9, the vehicle would be
required to satisfy the responsiveness
criterion of S5.2.3 during each of those
tests conducted with a steering
amplitude of 180 degrees or greater.
Specifically, proposed paragraph S5.2.3
provides that lateral displacement of the
vehicle center of gravity with respect to
its initial straight path must be at least
1.83 m (6 feet) when computed 1.07
seconds after initiation of steering. The
NPRM further proposed that the
computation of lateral displacement is
performed using double integration with
respect to time of the measurement of
lateral acceleration at the vehicle center
of gravity (see S5.2.3.1) and that time
t=0 for the integration operation is the
instant of steering initiation (see
S5.2.3.2).
Oxford Technical Solutions, Ltd.
(Oxford) commented that the proposed
ESC test procedures require refinement,
because it believes that the same
vehicle, when tested at different
facilities and by different engineers,
may experience differences in lateral
displacement of up to 60 cm.
Specifically, Oxford identified what it
perceived to be problems with the
proposed test procedures’ computation
of lateral displacement and also the
repeatability of those procedures.
Regarding lateral displacement
computation, Oxford argued that
integrating the accelerometer into a
rotating reference frame does not
compute actual lateral displacement,
because with this technique, a vehicle
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that rotates more (i.e., achieves a higher
yaw angle compared to the original
straight driving line) will yield a
different result, even if the displacement
is the same. Although the commenter
acknowledged the need to set some
value as part of the test (e.g., 1.83
meters, as proposed), it suggested using
some term to prevent confusion, such as
‘‘NHTSA Displacement,’’ ‘‘ESC
Displacement,’’ or ‘‘Spin
Displacement.’’ On this point, Oxford
recommended consideration of the
following language:
The ‘‘Spin Displacement’’ is a doubleintegration of a lateral accelerometer over a
period of 1.071 seconds and the value has to
be 1.83m. The test must be conducted uphill
on your VDA to within 5 degrees of the
uphill direction. The VDA should have an
angle of no more than 2 degrees. The lateral
acceleration must be measured to an
accuracy of 0.03m/s2, including roll effects.
Therefore roll must be measured to an
accuracy of 0.2 degrees relative to gravity.
The accelerometer must have a linearity and
scale factor better than 0.3% and a
bandwidth larger than 25 Hz.
Regarding repeatability, Oxford stated
that up to 60 cm of difference in lateral
displacement could result from small
differences in the conduct of testing,
including:
• Use of a true lateral displacement
measurement (i.e., GPS), as opposed to
the proposed accelerometer technique,
could result in a 6 cm difference.
• Failure to do a roll correction for
the acceleration could result in up to an
18 cm difference.
• Variation for the linearity error of a
low-cost accelerometer could result in
up to a 2 cm difference.
• Depending upon the rainwater runoff angle of the road, there could be up
to a 6 cm difference.
• Variations in the mounting angle of
the accelerometer in the vehicle may
result in about a 9 cm difference.
• If there is a 20 ms timing error in
acquisition, this could result in about an
8 cm difference.
• For accelerometers with a 10 Hz
bandwidth, as compared to a wide
bandwidth, there could be a difference
of about 20 cm.
• There may also be some variation in
the natural drift of vehicles, which can
vary by about 40 cm over 100 m. This
may affect the results by a few
centimeters in the 20 m traveled during
the test. (Changing the tires, keeping the
same tire model, would yield yet a
different result.)
Oxford also suggested that the test
should be based upon ‘‘spin velocity’’
rather than ‘‘spin displacement.’’ The
commenter reasoned that this approach
would render timing less important,
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because spin velocity at 1.071 seconds
is roughly constant, and it argued that
measurements of ‘‘spin velocity’’ would
be easier to repeat.
Technically speaking, as Oxford
points out, the lateral displacement
evaluated under the proposed ESC rule
is not the ‘‘lateral displacement of the
vehicle’s center of gravity,’’ but an
approximation of this displacement. In
the context of the proposal, the location
of the vehicle’s center of gravity
corresponds to the longitudinal center
of gravity, measured when the vehicle is
at rest on a flat, uniform surface.
The lateral displacement metric, as
defined in the ESC NPRM, is based on
the double integration of accurate lateral
acceleration data. Lateral acceleration
data are collected from an
accelerometer, corrected for roll angle
effects, and resolved to the vehicle’s
center of gravity using coordinate
transformation equations. The use of
accelerometers is commonplace in the
vehicle testing community, and
installation is simple and well
understood. Although the use of GPSbased measurements for vehicle
dynamics testing is increasing,
achieving high dynamic accuracy
requires differential post-processing (a
process the agency has found to be timeconsuming), a real-time differential
service, or real-time kinematics base
station correction of the data. Each of
these options introduces significant cost
and complexity to the testing effort.
However, the system described by
Oxford is approximately forty times
more expensive than the calculation
method prescribed by the final rule.
For the purposes of the ESC
performance criteria, we believe use of
a calculated lateral displacement metric
provides a simple, reasonably accurate,
and cost-effective way to evaluate
vehicle responsiveness. Since the
integration interval is short (recall that
lateral displacement is assessed 1.07
seconds after initiation of the
maneuver’s steering inputs), integration
errors are expected to be small. Recent
improvements to the agency’s data
processing routines include refined
signal offset and zeroing strategies that
should minimize the confounding
effects these factors may have on the test
output, thereby ensuring repeatable
results.
These NHTSA-developed routines
used to calculate lateral displacement
during data post-processing will be
made publicly available, in order to
ensure that vehicle manufacturers and
ESC suppliers know exactly how the
responsiveness of their vehicle’s (or
customer’s vehicles) will be evaluated.
If the sensors used to measure the
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vehicle responses are of sufficient
accuracy, and have been installed and
configured correctly, use of the analysis
routines provided by NHTSA are
expected to minimize the potential for
performance discrepancies among
NHTSA and industry test efforts. The
specifications of the accelerometers
used by NHTSA are: (1) Bandwidth
>300 Hz, (2) non-linearity <50 µg/g2, (3)
resolution ≤10 µg, and (4) output noise
≤7.0mV. An overview of all NHTSA
instrumentation used during Sine with
Dwell tests is provided in Table 5.
TABLE 5.—NHTSA SENSOR SPECIFICATIONS
Data measured
Type
Range
Manufacturer
Accuracy
Model No.
Steering Wheel Angle
Angle Encoder ..........
±720 degrees ............
±0.10 degrees1 ..........
Longitudinal, Lateral,
and Vertical Acceleration.
Multi-Axis Inertial
Sensing System.
Accelerometers: ±2g
Angular Rate Sensors: ±100°/s.
Automotive Testing,
Inc.
BEI Technologies,
Inc.
Systron Donner Inertial Division.
Massa Products Corp.
Integral with ATI
Steering Machine.
MotionPak Multi-Axis
Inertial Sensing
System MP–1.
Left and Right Side
Ultrasonic Distance
Vehicle Ride Height.
Measuring System.
Vehicle Speed ........... Radar Speed Sensor
1 Combined
4–40 inches ...............
0.1–125 mph .............
B+S Software und
Messtechnik.
Accelerometers:<50µg/g2 2.
Angular Rate Sensors: ≤0.05%.
0.25% of maximum
distance.
0.1 mph .....................
M–5000/220 kHz.
DRS–6.
resolution of the encoder and D/A converter.
specifications.
2 Non-linearity
(e) Maximum Steering Angle
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For the Sine with Dwell test, the
NPRM proposed to provide that ‘‘[t]he
steering amplitude of the final run in
each series is the greater of 6.5A or 270
degrees.’’ (See S7.9.4)
Toyota expressed concern that S7.9.4
may allow the steering angle to be too
large for vehicles that have a large
steering gear ratio. Toyota stated its
belief that the upper limit of an average
driver’s steering velocity is
approximately 1000°/sec; thus, the
steering angle is 227° under a Sine with
Dwell condition with a frequency of 0.7
Hz. Similarly, Toyota stated that the
steering angle of 270° is equal to the
steering velocity of 1188°/sec, a value
that exceeds the average driver’s
steering velocity. Therefore, Toyota
recommended revising S7.9.4 to state:
‘‘The steering amplitude of the final run
in each series is 270 degrees.’’
NHTSA disagrees with Toyota’s
recommendation. Our own studies have
shown that human drivers can sustain
handwheel rates of up to 1189 degrees
per second for 750 milliseconds. This
steering rate corresponds to a steering
angle magnitude of approximately 303
degrees.64
64 As background, the frequency of the sinusoidal
curve used to command the Sine with Swell
maneuver steering input is 0.7 Hz. Use of this
frequency causes the time from the completion of
the initial steering input (the first peak) to the
completion of the steering reversal (the second
peak) to take approximately 714 ms, regardless of
the commanded steering angle magnitude. We have
performed multiple studies using double-lane
change maneuvers to evaluate the upper limit of
human driver steering capability, and we have
found the results listed above. See Forkenbrock,
Garrick J. and Devin Elsasser, ‘‘An Assessment of
Human Driver Steering Capability,’’ NHTSA
Technical Report, DOT HS 809 875, October 2005.
Available at https://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/vrtc/ca/
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We concede that the method used to
determine maximum Sine with Dwell
steering angles can produce very large
steering angles. Of the 62 vehicles used
to develop the Sine with Dwell
performance criteria, the vehicle
requiring the most steering was a 2005
Ford F250. This vehicle required a
maximum steering angle of 371 degrees
(calculated by multiplying the average
steering angle capable of producing a
lateral acceleration of 0.3g in the Slowly
Increasing Steer maneuver times a
steering scalar of 6.5). Use of this
steering wheel angle required an
effective steering wheel rate of 1454
degrees per second, a magnitude well
beyond the steering capability of a
human driver.
Although we do not believe the
maximum steering angle specified in
S7.9.4 should be revised in the precise
manner recommended by Toyota, we do
believe revision of that specification is
necessary. As such, we have updated
the specification in S7.9.4 to read as
follows:
equipment (automated steering
machine, data acquisition system and
the power supply for the steering
machine), and ballast as required by
differences in the weight of test drivers
and test equipment.
TRW Automotive commented that the
proposed vehicle test conditions for
vehicle weight leave only 240 pounds as
the maximum driver test weight. The
commenter suggested that the total
interior load should be increased to 400
pounds, thereby permitting a maximum
driver test weight of 270 pounds.
According to TRW Automotive, this
modification should not result in a
substantive change to the intent of the
regulation or test results, but it would
provide greater flexibility in testing by
accommodating a broader weight
variance between drivers.
The Alliance/AIAM recommended
modifying S6.3.2 to clarify the location
where ballast (if required) is to be
placed in the vehicle. The commenters
recommended substituting the following
language:
S7.9.4 The steering amplitude of the final
run in each series is the greater of 6.5A or
270 degrees, provided the calculated
magnitude of 6.5A is less than or equal to 300
degrees. If any 0.5A increment, up to 6.5A,
is greater than 300 degrees, the steering
amplitude of the final run shall be 300
degrees.
S6.3.2 Test Weight. The vehicle is loaded
with the fuel tank filled to at least 75 percent
of capacity, and total interior load of 168 kg
(370 lbs.) comprised of the test driver,
approximately 59 kg (130 lbs.) of test
equipment (automated steering machine, data
acquisition system and power supply for the
steering machine), and ballast as required by
differences in the weight of test drivers and
test equipment. Where required, ballast shall
be placed on the floor behind the passenger
front seat or if necessary in the front
passenger foot well area.
(f) Vehicle Test Weight
Under S6.3.2, the NPRM proposed
that the vehicle is to be loaded with the
fuel tank filled to at least 75 percent of
capacity, an total interior load of 168 kg
(370 lbs) comprised of the test driver,
approximately 59 kg (130 lbs) of test
capubs/NHTSA_forkenbrock_driversteering
capabilityrpt.pdf.
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In regard to the TRW Automotive
comment, given that the weight of a
95th percentile male is 225 pounds,65
65 Schneider, L.W., Robbins, D.H., Pflug, M.A.,
and Synder, R.G., ‘‘Development of
Anthropometrically Based Design Specifications for
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we believe that the maximum allowable
weight allocated for the test driver, as
presently specified in the NPRM for
FMVSS No. 126, is conservative and
should not impose an unreasonable
testing burden on parties performing
ESC compliance tests. As such, in this
final rule, we are retaining the total
interior load of 168 kg (370 lbs)
specified in S6.3.2.
In response to the Alliance/AIAM
comment, we note that the standard
does require ballast to be added to a test
vehicle, if necessary, to account for
varying weights of test drivers and test
equipment. We agree with the Alliance/
AIAM comment additional clarification
of where the ballast shall be positioned
is necessary. The agency has decided to
provide further direction in the
standard’s test procedure to ensure
required ballast is appropriately placed
in the vehicle. We concur with the
Alliance/AIAM recommendation, as it
provides a reasonable way to evenly
distribute the load of the driver, steering
machine, and test equipment.
Additionally, we also acknowledge the
very abrupt vehicle motions imposed by
the Sine with Dwell maneuver are
capable of dislodging and/or relocating
unsecured ballast while testing. So as to
maximize driver safety, we have revised
S6.3.2 to read:
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S6.3.2 Test Weight. The vehicle is loaded
with the fuel tank filled to at least 75 percent
of capacity, and total interior load of 168 kg
(370 lbs.) comprised of the test driver,
approximately 59 kg (130 lbs.) of test
equipment (automated steering machine, data
acquisition system and power supply for the
steering machine), and ballast as required by
differences in the weight of test drivers and
test equipment. Where required, ballast shall
be placed on the floor behind the passenger
front seat or if necessary in the front
passenger foot well area. All ballast shall be
secured in a way that prevents it from
becoming dislodged during test conduct.
(g) Data Filtering
According to the Alliance/AIAM,
NHTSA usually incorporates
specifications for its data filtering
method as part of its test report
(presumably referring to the agency’s
laboratory test procedure). However, the
commenters argued that given the
potential for different filtering methods
to significantly influence final results,
the agency should specify its data
filtering methods directly in FMVSS No.
126.
The Alliance/AIAM recommended
the following filtering protocol for all
an Advanced Adult Anthropomorphic Dummy
Family—Volume 1—Procedures, Summary
Findings, and Appendices,’’ The University of
Michigan Transportation Research Institute Report
UMTRI–83–53–1, December 1983, Table 2–5 at 20.
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channels (except steering wheel angle
and steering wheel velocity): (a) Create
a six-pole, low-pass Butterworth filter
with a 6 Hz cut-off frequency, and (b)
filter the data forwards and backwards
so that no phase shift is induced. For
the steering wheel angle channel, the
commenters recommended using the
same protocol, but with a 10 Hz cut-off
frequency. For steering wheel velocity,
the Alliance/AIAM recommended
adoption of a specific calculation
described in Appendix 1 of their
comments.
Data filtering methods can have a
significant impact on final test results
used for determining vehicle
compliance with FMVSS No. 126. The
agency agrees with the Alliance/AIAM
that the same filtering and processing
protocols must be followed in order to
ensure consistent and repeatable test
results. Therefore, the agency has
decided to add a new paragraph S7.11
to the test procedures section of the
final rule’s regulatory text in order to
specify critical test filtering protocols
and techniques to be used for test data
processing, as described in greater detail
above in Section IV.C.7(e), Data
Processing Issues.
(h) Outriggers
Under the proposed test condition in
S6 of the NPRM, paragraph S6.3.4
provides, ‘‘Outriggers must be used for
tests of Sport Utility Vehicles (SUVs),
and they are permitted on other test
vehicles if deemed necessary for driver
safety.’’
According to the Alliance/AIAM,
although the use of outriggers may be
appropriate, the final rule should
explicitly clarify the vehicle classes that
are to be equipped with outriggers
under the standard and set forth the
design specifications for those devices.
The organizations suggested that
requiring outriggers on sport utility
vehicles and ‘‘other test vehicles if
deemed necessary for driver safety’’ is
too open-ended. The commenters
argued that such clarification is
necessary because outriggers can
influence vehicle dynamics in the
subject tests. Thus, the Alliance/AIAM
recommended revising S6.3.4 to read as
follows: ‘‘Outriggers meeting the
specifications of [cite section] must be
used for tests of trucks, multipurpose
vehicles, and buses.’’
The agency agrees that the use of
outriggers has the potential to influence
vehicle dynamics during ESC testing.
Therefore, in order to reduce test
variability and increase the repeatability
of test results, the agency is revising
paragraph S6.3.4 in this final rule to
specify that outriggers are to be used on
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17285
all vehicles other than passenger cars.
Furthermore, the agency has decided to
include maximum weight and roll
moment of inertia specifications for
outriggers in paragraph S6.3.4, and we
will also make available the detailed
design specifications for the outriggers
used by the agency as part of the
NHTSA compliance test procedure for
FMVSS No. 126.
(i) Ambient Temperature Range
Under the proposed test condition in
S6 of the NPRM, paragraph S6.1.1
provides, ‘‘The ambient temperature is
between 0 °C (32 °F) and 40 °C (104 °F).’’
In their comments, the Alliance/
AIAM stated that their analysis has
demonstrated test variability due to
temperature. The Alliance/AIAM
comments also suggested that certain
high performance tires could enter their
‘‘glass transition range’’ 66 which could
introduce further variability at nearfreezing temperatures. For these
reasons, the commenters expressed
concern that the lower bound of the
proposed ambient test range is too low.
Accordingly, the Alliance/AIAM
recommended increasing the lower
bound of the temperature range to 50
degrees F. In addition to reducing test
variability, the commenters stated that
their proposed modification to the
temperature portion of the test
procedures would permit virtually yearround testing at certain facilities (e.g.,
DRI Bakersfield), reduce burdens
associated with confirming compliance
at low temperatures, and avoid
complications of snow and ice during
testing.
A vehicle’s ESC system is designed
for and expected to address stability
issues over a wide range of various
environmental conditions. Testing
conducted by Alliance/AIAM member
companies indicates that lateral
displacement for vehicles equipped
with all-season tires varies with
fluctuating ambient temperatures.
According to the Alliance/AIAM, the
data indicate that lateral displacement
for test vehicles equipped with allseason tires increases as the ambient
temperature decreased, suggesting that
the displacement requirement could be
met more easily at lower ambient
66 We note that this is Alliance/AIAM’s term, not
NHTSA’s. We believe they are referring to a rubber
chemistry issue (i.e., that all rubbery polymers turn
into glassy solids at characteristic low
temperatures), which vary depending on the
polymer composition of the tires. The Alliance/
AIAM seem to assert that because of their
composition, for certain high performance tires, the
‘‘glass transition range’’ (i.e., the temperature range
between the glass temperature and the onset of fully
rubber-like response) may include some of the
lower bound of the proposed ambient test range.
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temperatures. However, this same
relationship was not manifest for test
vehicles equipped with high
performance tires. (Some highperformance tires are not designed for
operation under freezing conditions,
and the performance variability of these
tires under cold ambient temperatures is
unknown, because in our repeatability
studies, we only test tires in the
temperature ranges in which they are
designed to operate.) The Alliance
recommended minimizing potential test
variability by reducing the specified test
condition ambient temperature range.
To minimize test variability the agency
has decided to increase the lower bound
of the temperature range for compliance
testing to 45 degrees F. The agency
believes that 7 °C (45 °F) is appropriate
because it is low enough to increase the
length of the testing season at multiple
testing sites, and also represents the low
end of the relevant temperature range
for at least one brand of high
performance tires of which the agency is
aware.
(j) Brake Temperatures
In their comments, the Alliance/
AIAM stated that several of their
member companies assessed the affect
of brake pad temperatures on ESC test
results, particularly given the potential
for drivers to use heavy braking between
test runs. Included in their comments
were charts based upon their research
that purported to demonstrate variance
in testing due to brake pad temperature
would be an artifact of the test
methodology, not a reflection of
expected ESC performance in the real
world. Therefore, in order to minimize
non-representative test results, the
Alliance/AIAM comments
recommended that the standard’s test
procedures should specify a minimum
of 90 seconds between test runs in order
to allow sufficient time for cooling of
the brake pads.
The test procedure specified in the
NPRM did not address brake
temperature issues that may arise from
heavy braking between test runs.
Because the agency agrees that excessive
brake temperatures may have an effect
on ESC test results, a minimum wait
time between test runs has been
incorporated into the test procedure to
ensure brake temperatures are not
excessive. We believe that 90 seconds,
as proposed by the Alliance/AIAM, is a
reasonable lower bound for the
allowable time between runs. Note that
the procedure specified in the NPRM
does specify a maximum wait time of 5
minutes between test runs to ensure that
the brakes and tires remain at operating
temperatures, a feature we believe is
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important since compliance test
procedures endeavor to simulate real
world driving conditions. For these
reasons, the allowable range of time
between Sine with Dwell tests will be
90 seconds to 5 minutes.
(k) Wind Speed
Under the proposed test condition in
S6 of the NPRM, paragraph S6.1.2
provides, ‘‘The maximum wind speed is
no greater than 10 m/s (22 mph).’’
The Alliance/AIAM expressed
concern that the proposed maximum
wind speed for testing (10 m/s (22mph))
could impact the performance of certain
vehicle configurations (e.g., cube vans,
15-passenger vans, vehicles built in two
or more stages). The commenters
estimated that a cross wind at 22 mph
could reduce lateral displacement at
1.07 s by 0.5 feet, compared to the same
test conducted under calm conditions.
Accordingly, the Alliance/AIAM
recommended revising S6.1.2 to reduce
the maximum allowable wind speed to
5 m/s (11 mph), a figure consistent with
other regulatory requirements (e.g.,
FMVSS No. 135, Light Vehicle Brake
Systems) and ISO 7401.
The agency agrees that wind speed
could have some impact on the lateral
displacement for certain vehicle
configurations, including large sport
utility vehicles and vans. However, we
also believe that reducing the maximum
wind speed to 5 m/s (11 mph) can
impose additional burdens on our test
labs by restricting the environmental
conditions under which testing can be
conducted. With these considerations in
mind, we have decided to modify S6.1.2
to reduce the wind speed requirement
as recommended to 5 m/s (11 mph) for
multipurpose passenger vehicles
(including SUVs, vans, and trucks), but
to keep the specified wind speed for
passenger cars at 10 m/s (22 mph). This
change will reduce test variability for
those vehicles expected to be most
effected by wind speed and to minimize
any additional burdens on test
laboratories.
We note that if we set the wind speed
requirement at 5 m/s (11 mph) for all
light vehicles, that would unduly limit
the number of days on which NHTSA
could perform compliance testing, and
we further believe that wind speed up
to 10 m/s (22 mph) would not have an
appreciable impact on the testing of
passenger cars due to their smaller side
dimensions.
(l) Rounding of Steering Wheel Angle at
0.3 g
Under the proposed test procedure in
S7 of the NPRM, paragraph S7.6.1
provides, ‘‘From the Slowly Increasing
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Steer tests, the quantity ‘‘A’’ is
determined. ‘‘A’’ is the steering wheel
angle in degrees that produces a steady
state lateral acceleration of 0.3 g for the
test vehicle. Utilizing linear regression,
A is calculated, to the nearest 0.1
degrees, from each of the six Slowly
Increasing Steer tests. The absolute
value of the six A’s calculated is
averaged and rounded to the nearest
degree to produce the final quantity, A,
used below.’’
The Alliance/AIAM recommended
against rounding the steering wheel
angle measurement at 0.3 g to the
nearest whole number, because such
methodology potentially increases
variability across test runs. As
demonstrated in a table included in
their submission, the commenters stated
that such an approach could also
increase steering wheel angle variability
at a scalar of 5.0 (where the proposed
responsiveness metric starts) by a factor
of five. They also argued that rounding
to that proposed level of precision (i.e.,
to a whole number) does not simplify
programming or control of the steering
robot. Therefore, in order to eliminate
this source of test variability, the
Alliance/AIAM recommended rounding
the steering wheel angle at 0.3 g to the
nearest 0.1 degrees.
The agency agrees with the Alliance
and AIAM recommendation to round
the steering wheel angle at 0.3 g to the
nearest 0.1 degree, and we have
modified the final rule’s regulatory text
accordingly. Rounding to this level is
not expected to complicate
programming of the automated steering
controller and will decrease the
variability in the number of required
test runs.
(m) Vehicle Speed Specification for the
Slowly Increasing Steer Test
In their comments, the Alliance/
AIAM questioned whether the
proposal’s failure to specify a vehicle
speed for the slowly-increasing-steer
test was an oversight. The commenters
recommended adopting specifications
for a test speed of 80 ± 1 km/h, which
is consistent with the speed for the Sine
with Dwell test.
We agree that a speed tolerance
should be specified for the Slowly
Increasing Steer test, and we have
determined that it should be the same
as the speed tolerance specified for the
Sine with Dwell test. However, we note
that in this final rule, the proposed Sine
with Dwell test speed tolerance has
been revised to better reflect the manner
in which testing is performed; as
revised, the speed tolerance is 80 ± 2
km/h (50 ±1 mph). This speed tolerance
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will also be applicable to the Slowly
Increasing Steer maneuver.
(n) Alternative Test Procedures
Public Citizen stated that in the
NPRM, the agency noted that there is a
trade-off between lateral stability and
intervention magnitude, but the
commenter challenged the agency’s
determination as to where the
appropriate balance should be set.
Public Citizen stated that the agency
should provide an assessment of other
available alternative test procedures and
the agency’s rationale for not adopting
those procedures. The commenter
further argued that the test procedures
which the agency did propose may be
inadequate, particularly if errors in
measurement would allow vehicles to
pass the performance test.
We believe an appropriate balance
between lateral stability and
intervention magnitude is one in which
a light vehicle is in compliance with the
evaluation criteria of FMVSS No. 126,
both in terms of lateral stability and
responsiveness. Development of these
criteria was the result of hundreds of
hours of testing and data analysis. We
are confident these criteria provide an
extremely effective way of objectively
assessing whether the lateral stability of
ESC-equipped vehicle is adequate.
We believe the responsiveness criteria
proposed for use in FMVSS 126, that a
vehicle must achieve at least 6 feet (5
feet for vehicles with a GVWR of greater
than 3500 kilograms) of lateral
displacement when the Sine with Dwell
maneuver is performed with normalized
steering angles (normalized steering
wheel angles account for differences in
steering ratios between vehicles) greater
than 5.0, adequately safeguards against
implementation of overly aggressive
ESC systems, even those specifically
designed to mitigate on road untripped
rollover (i.e., systems that may consider
stability more important than path
following capability). Achieving
acceptable lateral stability is very
important, but should not be
accomplished by grossly diminishing a
driver’s crash avoidance capability.
Intervention intrusiveness can refer to
how the vehicle manufacturer and its
ESC vendor ‘‘tune’’ an ESC system for
a particular make/model, specifically
how apparent the intervention is to the
driver. We do not believe it is
appropriate to dictate this form of
intervention magnitude, as it can be an
extremely subjective specification. As
long as a vehicle’s ESC (1) Satisfies our
hardware and software definitions and
(2) allows the vehicle to comply with
our lateral stability and responsiveness
performance criteria, we believe
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intervention intrusiveness should be a
tuning characteristic best specified by
the vehicle/ESC manufacturers.
In response to the Public Citizen
statement regarding maneuver selection,
we evaluated twelve test maneuvers
before ultimately selecting the Sine with
Dwell maneuver to assess ESC
performance. As explained below, this
evaluation was performed in two stages,
an initial reduction from twelve
maneuvers to four, then from four to
one.
The first stage began with
identification of three important
attributes: (1) High maneuver severity
(‘‘maneuver severity’’); (2) capability to
produce highly repeatable and
reproducible results using inputs
relevant to real-world driving scenarios
(‘‘face validity’’); and (3) ability to
effectively evaluate both lateral stability
and responsiveness (‘‘performability’’).
To quantify the extent to which each
maneuver possessed these attributes,
adjectival ratings ranging from
‘‘Excellent’’ to ‘‘Fair’’ were assigned to
each of the twelve maneuvers, for each
of the three maneuver evaluation
criteria. Of the twelve test maneuvers,
only four received ‘‘Excellent’’ ratings 67
for each of the maneuver evaluation
criteria—the Increasing Amplitude Sine
(0.7 Hz), Sine with Dwell (0.7 Hz), Yaw
Acceleration Steering Reversal (YASR;
500 deg/sec), and Yaw Acceleration
Steering Reversal with Pause (YASR
with Pause; 500 deg/sec steering rate).
Stage two of the maneuver reduction
process used data from 24 vehicles (a
sampling of sports cars, sedans,
minivans, small and large pickup
trucks, and sport utility vehicles
intended to represent a majority of the
vehicles presently sold in the United
States) to compare the maneuver
severity, face validity, and
performability of the four maneuvers
selected in the first stage. The ability of
the four maneuvers to satisfy these three
evaluation criteria were compared and
rank ordered.
Of the four candidate maneuvers, we
concluded the Sine with Dwell and
YASR with Pause were the top
performers in terms of evaluating the
lateral stability component of ESC
67 The adjectival ratings used to rate the test
maneuvers were ‘‘Excellent,’’ ‘‘Good,’’ and ‘‘Fair,’’
with ‘‘Excellent’’ being the best and ‘‘Fair’’ being
the worst. We considered an ‘‘Excellent’’ maneuver
as one capable of adequately demonstrating
whether a vehicle was, or was not, equipped with
an ESC system that satisfied a preliminary version
of our minimum performance criteria. Conversely,
a maneuver assigned a ‘‘Fair’’ rating was unable to
adequately demonstrate whether vehicles evaluated
by NHTSA were, or were not, equipped with ESC
systems capable of satisfying the preliminary
minimum performance criteria.
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functionality. However, due to the fact
that the Sine with Dwell maneuver
required smaller steering angles to
produce spinouts for five of the ten
vehicles evaluated with left-right
steering, and for two of the ten vehicles
with right-left steering (with the
remaining thirteen tests using the same
steering angles), we assigned the Sine
with Dwell maneuver a higher
maneuver severity ranking than that
assigned to the YASR with Pause
maneuver.
Generally speaking, the Increasing
Amplitude Sine and YASR maneuvers
required the most steering to produce
spinouts, regardless of direction of steer.
However, the Increasing Amplitude
Sine maneuver also produced the lowest
normalized second yaw rate peak
magnitudes, implying the maneuver was
the least severe for most of the 24 test
vehicles used for maneuver comparison.
For this reason, we assigned the worst
severity ranking to the Increasing
Amplitude Sine maneuver.
Each of the four candidate maneuvers
possessed inherently high face validity
since they were each comprised of
steering inputs similar to those capable
of being produced by a human driver in
an emergency obstacle avoidance
maneuver. However, of the four
maneuvers, we believed the Increasing
Amplitude Sine maneuver possessed
the best face validity. Conceptually, the
steering profile of this maneuver was
the most similar to that expected to be
used by real drivers,68 and even with
steering wheel angles as large as 300
degrees, the maneuver’s maximum
effective steering rate was a very
reasonable 650 deg/sec. For these
reasons, the Increasing Amplitude Sine
maneuver received the top face validity
rating.
The two YASR maneuvers received
the same face validity ratings, just lower
than that assigned to the Increasing
Amplitude Sine. The YASR steering
profiles were comprised of very
reasonable 500 deg/sec steering rates;
however, their sharply defined,
trapezoidal shapes reduce their
similarity to inputs actually used by
drivers in real world driving situations.
The steering profile of the Sine with
Dwell was deemed very reasonable;
however, the maneuver can require
steering rates very near what we believe
is the maximum capability of a human
driver.
68 In an obstacle avoidance scenario, it is clearly
conceivable that the second steering input may be
larger than the first input. If the first steering input
induces overshoot, the driver’s reversal will need to
be equal to the first steering input plus enough
steering to combat the yaw overshoot.
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The performability of the Sine with
Dwell and the Increasing Amplitude
Sine maneuvers were deemed to be
excellent. These maneuvers are very
easy to program into the steering
machine, and their lack of rate or
acceleration feedback loops simplifies
the instrumentation required to perform
the tests. Conversely, the YASR
maneuvers require the use of
specialized equipment (an angular
accelerometer), and these maneuvers
required an acceleration-based feedback
loop that was sensitive to the
accelerometer’s signal-to-noise ratio
near peak yaw rate. Testing
demonstrated that large steering angles
can introduce dwell time variability
capable of adversely reducing maneuver
severity and test outcome.
After considering the totality of the
test result from our evaluation of the
candidate maneuvers and for the
reasons stated above, the agency
concluded that the Sine with Dwell
maneuver offers the best combination of
maneuver severity, face validity, and
performability. Additional details of the
maneuver selection process are
available in an Enhanced Safety of
Vehicles (ESV) technical paper 69 and an
NHTSA technical report.70
Turning to the statement in Public
Citizen’s comments regarding the
implication of measurement errors, the
commenter stated that ‘‘* * * the error
in measurements would allow vehicles
to pass that did not even meet the * * *
standard of the proposal.’’ This
comment is in response to comments
made by Brendan Watts from Oxford
Technologies, a company that sells
highly accurate (and very expensive)
instrumentation.71 Many of the
concerns expressed by Mr. Watts
(stressing the importance of using
accurate accelerometers and sound data
processing techniques) are not
specifically applicable to the manner in
which we (NHTSA) will be performing
our ESC compliance tests, in that such
concerns have already been addressed
by the agency. For example, the
accelerometers that will be used in ESC
compliance tests are more accurate than
69 Forkenbrock, Garrick J., Elsasser, Devin,
O’Harra, Bryan C., ‘‘NHTSA’s Light Vehicle
Handling and ESC Effectiveness Research
Program,’’ ESV Paper Number 05–0221, June 2005.
(Docket No. NHTSA–2006–25801–5)
70 Forkenbrock, Garrick J., Elsasser, Devin,
O’Harra, Bryan C., Jones, Robert E., ‘‘Development
of Electronic Stability Control (ESC) Performance
Criteria,’’ NHTSA Technical Report, DOT HS 809
974, September 2006. Available at https://wwwnrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/pdf/nrd-01/esv/esv19/05-0221O.pdf.
71 The comments made by Mr. Watts are
specifically addressed in Section IV.C.11(d) of this
document.
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those Mr. Watts indicated may
compromise test accuracy. We
appreciate the data processing concerns
expressed by Mr. Watts (e.g., correcting
lateral acceleration for the effects of roll
angle, or addressing offset from the
vehicle’s center of gravity), but again,
our post-processing routines already
contain algorithms to resolve such
concerns.
We note that all test track evaluations
inherently contain some degree of
output variability, regardless of what
aspect of vehicle performance they are
being used to evaluate. In the context of
ESC compliance, we concede this
variability could result in a marginally
non-compliant vehicle passing the
proposed test, but it is important to
recognize these situations would only
affect a very small population of
vehicles, and that that effect of
instrumentation and/or calculation
errors is likewise believed to be very
small. Since the performance of most
contemporary vehicles resides far
enough away from the proposed
compliance thresholds, we believe it is
extremely unlikely that measurement
complications will be solely responsible
for having the performance of a noncompliant vehicle be deemed
acceptable.
(o) Representativeness of Real World
Conditions
Mr. Kiefer questioned the adequacy of
the agency’s proposed ESC test
procedures. Specifically, the commenter
questioned how many tests are
necessary to ensure that the system is
robust, and how many different
configurations of tires, loading, and
trailering are needed to be
representative of real world driving.
Mr. Cheah also questioned whether it
would be feasible for the ESC test
procedures’ controlled conditions to
adequately represent real world
conditions. He argued that even though
an ESC system may increase safety
under certain conditions, in other cases,
it may add ‘‘unpredictable and unusual
characteristics to the vehicle.’’
NHTSA has reviewed many crash
data studies quantifying real world ESC
effectiveness.72 Regardless of the origin
of the data used for these studies (i.e.,
whether from the United States,
Germany, Japan, France, Sweden, etc.),
all reported or estimated that ESC
systems provide substantial benefits in
‘‘loss of control’’ situations (see Section
II.D). These studies reported that ESC is
expected to be particularly effective in
situations involving excessive oversteer,
72 See 71 FR 54712, 54718 (Sept. 18, 2006)
footnote 11.
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such as ‘‘fishtailing’’ or ‘‘spinout’’
which may result from sudden collision
avoidance maneuvers (e.g., lane changes
or off-road recovery maneuvers).
We note that the Sine with Dwell
maneuver is specifically designed to
excite an oversteer response from the
vehicle being evaluated. While this
maneuver has been optimized for the
test track (because objectivity,
repeatability, and reproducibility are
necessary elements of a regulatory
compliance test), it is important to
recognize that multiple studies have
indicated that the steering angles and
rates associated with the Sine with
Dwell maneuver are within the
capabilities of actual drivers, not just
highly trained professional test drivers.
NHTSA does not know of any
‘‘unpredictable and unusual
characteristics’’ imparted by any ESC
system on the vehicle in which it is
installed. ESC interventions occur in
extreme driving situations where the
driver risks losing control of the vehicle,
not during ‘‘normal’’ day-to-day driving
comprised of relatively small, slow, and
deliberate steering inputs. In these
extreme situations, the driver must still
operate the vehicle by conventional
means (i.e., use of steering and/or brake
inputs are still required to direct the
vehicle where the driver wants it to go);
however, the mitigation strategies used
by ESC to suppress excessive oversteer
and understeer help improve the
driver’s ability to successfully retain
control of the vehicle under a broad
range of operating conditions.
The load configuration used during
the conduct of our ESC performance
tests is known as the ‘‘nominal’’ load
configuration, consisting of a driver and
test equipment. This configuration
approximates a driver and one front seat
occupant. We believe this configuration
is highly representative of how the
majority of vehicles driven on our
nation’s roadways are loaded. Our
analyses, based on results from a
database 73 comprised of 293,000 singlevehicle crashes, indicate that the
average number of passenger car
occupants involved in a single-vehicle
crash was 1.48 occupants per vehicle.
Results for pickups, sport utility
vehicles, and vans were similar (1.35,
73 Data were analyzed for the development of the
rollover NCAP star ratings criteria. It is data for six
States: Florida (1994–2001), Maryland (1994–2000),
Missouri (1994–2000), North Carolina (1994–1999),
Pennsylvania (1994–1997), and Utah (1994–2000).
Only single-vehicle crashes for 100 make-models
were included. Please consult the Rollover NCAP
portion of the NHTSA Web site for further
information (https:///www.nhtsa.dot.gov).
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1.54, and 1.81 occupants per vehicle,
respectively).
We believe it is important for an
objective test procedure to be applicable
to all light vehicles (i.e., vehicles with
a GVWR of 10,000 pounds or less). The
use of multiple load configurations was
considered, but there are an infinite
number of ways drivers can potentially
load their vehicles, and not all vehicles
can be subjected to the same load
configurations.
Although we do believe it is
important to understand how vehicle
loading can influence ESC effectiveness
and presently have research programs
designed to objectively quantify those
effects, we believe requiring ESC on all
light vehicles will save thousands of
lives per year. Accordingly, we do not
believe it is appropriate to delay the
present mandate for ESC, and to thereby
fail to maximize the benefits of this
requirement, pending the outcome of
this additional research. In sum, we
believe that the available data strongly
support our decision to mandate ESC
installation on all light vehicles at this
time.
12. Lead Time and Phase-in
In preparing its ESC proposal, the
agency carefully considered the lead
time necessary for expedient yet
practicable incorporation of this
important safety device. With minor
exceptions discussed below, NHTSA
proposed in the NPRM to require all
light vehicles covered by this standard
to be equipped with a FMVSS No. 126compliant ESC system by September 1,
2011 (see 8.4). However, the agency
proposed to extend by one year the time
for compliance by multi-stage
manufacturers and alterers (i.e., until
September 1, 2012) (see S8.8).
In terms of the phase-in for ESC, the
agency proposed that compliance would
commence on September 1, 2008, which
would mark the start of a three-year
phase-in period (see S8.1 to S8.4).
Subject to the special provisions
discussed below, the agency proposed
the following phase-in schedule for
FMVSS No. 126: 30 percent of a vehicle
manufacturer’s light vehicles
manufactured during the period from
September 1, 2008 to August 31, 2009
would be required to comply with the
standard; 60 percent of those
manufactured during the period from
September 1, 2009 to August 31, 2010;
90 percent of those manufactured
during the period from September 1,
2010 to August 31, 2011, and all light
vehicles thereafter.
The agency proposed to exclude
multi-stage manufacturers and alterers
from the requirements of the phase-in
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and instead require full implementation
at the special mandatory compliance
date applicable to those manufacturers
(i.e., September 1, 2012) (see S8.8). The
NPRM also proposed to exclude small
volume manufacturers (i.e.,
manufacturers producing less than
5,000 vehicles for sale in the U.S.
market in one year) from the phase-in,
instead requiring such manufacturers to
fully comply with the standard on
September 1, 2011 (see S8.7).
Under our proposal, vehicle
manufacturers would be permitted to
earn carry-forward credits for compliant
vehicles, produced in excess of the
phase-in requirements, which are
manufactured between the effective date
of the final rule and the conclusion of
the phase-in period (see S8.5). In the
NPRM, we noted that carry-forward
credits would not be permitted to be
used to defer the mandatory compliance
date for all covered vehicles.
(a) Lead Time for ESC Telltale(s)
Vehicle manufacturers and their
representatives generally did not object
to the lead time provided for meeting
the proposed ESC performance
requirements, although they did request
additional lead time to meet the control
and telltale requirements. For example,
the Alliance/AIAM comments argued
that there is currently a lack of
uniformity among ESC systems in terms
of their labeling and telltales, such that
most existing systems would not meet
those requirements. In fact, the Alliance
and AIAM stated that none of their
members’ ESC systems would fully meet
the proposed requirements. As a result,
they suggested that these ESC systems
may not be fully compliant with the
standard and, therefore, may be
ineligible for carry-forward credits
under the standard.
These commenters also argued that
current ESC systems have a variety of
special-purpose operating modes which
may require specific context-related
labeling. According to the commenters,
these modes are not fully ‘‘off’’ and
provide varying degrees of ESC
intervention, but they will generally not
comply with the proposal’s ‘‘full on’’
performance requirements. The
Alliance/AIAM stated that in some
cases, an ESC system may have more
than one of these special-purpose
modes, so they requested that
manufacturers be given flexibility in
terms of how relevant information is
presented to vehicle operators.
Accordingly, the Alliance/AIAM
requested that the effective date for the
ESC control and telltale requirements
proposed to be contained in FMVSS
Nos. 101 and 126 be postponed until the
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end of the phase-in (i.e., September 1,
2011), with early compliance permitted,
as was done in the agency’s TPMS
rulemaking. The commenters also
requested that ESC-equipped vehicles
produced prior to that date which meet
all other requirements of the standard be
permitted to earn carry-forward credits
under FMVSS No. 126 and the ESC
phase-in reporting provisions of 49 CFR
Part 585, because many manufacturers
will need to use such carry-forward
credits to meet the agency’s aggressive
phase-in schedule.
Honda stated that although it expects
its ESC systems to already meet the
proposed performance requirements,
additional lead time is necessary to
meet the proposed control and telltale
requirements for ESC. As a result of the
proposal, the commenter stated that
every Honda and Acura vehicle would
require a redesign of its instrument
panel to accommodate the proposed
telltale symbol and sizing (i.e., a vertical
layout, which differs from the
company’s current horizontal layout).
According to Honda, the necessary
tooling changes to the instrument panel
assemblies and required
reprogramming, testing, and validation
to the electronic control unit would
involve significant cost; Honda
estimated these costs to range from
$17,000 to $170,000 per model, with a
total expenditure of over $1 million.
Honda stated that in its proposal, the
agency stated its expectation that
approximately 98 percent of the ESC
systems in current vehicles would
already comply with the proposed
requirements, and the remaining two
percent would only require slight
tuning. However, the commenter argued
that the agency must have been focusing
on the ESC performance requirements,
because very few vehicles currently in
production meet the proposed control
and telltale requirements. Looking
beyond the issue of cost, Honda stated
that it would be difficult to make these
changes in line with the proposed
phase-in schedule.
According to Honda, its request for a
delay in implementation of the ESC
control and telltale requirements is
consistent with the approach adopted
by NHTSA in its rulemaking
establishing FMVSS No. 138, Tire
Pressure Monitoring Systems (TPMS).
Honda stated that this approach would
allow the public to receive the
immediate benefit of ESC systems,
while providing the industry adequate
time to ensure compliance with the
entire regulation. Therefore, Honda
requested lead time until the end of the
phase-in period (i.e., September 1, 2011)
to meet the proposed control and telltale
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requirements. Alternatively, the
company requested that the entire
phase-in be delayed, beginning three
years after publication of the final rule
to establish FMVSS No. 126, in order to
provide adequate lead time.
Nissan stated that depending upon
the design of the vehicle and the extent
of the changes required, it would
require an additional ten months to
three years of lead time in order to meet
the control and telltale requirements in
the ESC proposal. Thus, Nissan also
requested that the agency delay the
effective date of the ESC control and
telltale requirements until the end of the
phase-in (i.e., September 1, 2011)
(similar comment provided by the
Toyota). Nissan stated that without an
extension of the lead time for the
control and telltale requirements, its
current systems would not be eligible
for the carry-forward credits upon
which the company plans to rely in
order to meet the aggressive phase-in
schedule for ESC. The commenter
further noted that the control and
telltale requirements would not impact
the dynamic performance of the ESC
system and that the company has not
received any reports of consumer
confusion associated with its current
ESC telltales and symbols.
Porsche also requested additional lead
time to meet the proposed control and
telltale requirements for ESC, citing the
company’s longer-than-average product
life cycles which present unique
challenges in terms of meeting standard
phase-in schedules. The commenter
stated that the telltale systems for its
vehicles have already been developed,
and it had planned on keeping those
systems unchanged until the next
product cycle (mid-2012 for some
models). Porsche stated that the
proposed ESC off telltale requirements
would substantially disrupt this existing
telltale production strategy.
Accordingly, Porsche requested either
an extension for compliance with the
ESC-related control and display
requirements for all manufacturers until
September 1, 2012, or alternatively, it
requested an extension from those
requirements until that date for any
manufacturer which would be able to
equip 100 percent of their fleet with
vehicles meeting the ESC performance
requirements by September 1, 2008 (a
schedule Porsche expects to meet).
According to the VDA, indicator
symbols and indicator algorithms for
current ESC systems vary considerably
across different vehicle manufacturers.
The commenter stated that
implementing the proposed telltale
requirements within the proposed
phase-in schedule would involve
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considerable effort, particularly in light
of the long lead times associated with
changes to vehicle cockpit designs.
Therefore, the VDA recommended
extending the lead time provided for
implementing the ESC telltale
requirements and to accord vehicle
manufacturers flexibility in terms of
ESC telltale designs for special modes
(e.g., ones for deep snow, snow chains).
In order to provide the public as
rapidly as possible with what are
expected to be the significant safety
benefits of ESC systems, NHTSA has
decided to require all light vehicles
covered by this standard to be equipped
with a FMVSS No. 126-compliant ESC
system by September 1, 2011 (with
certain exceptions discussed below).
Consistent with our proposal,
September 1, 2008 marks the start of a
three-year phase-in period for FMVSS
No. 126.
After consideration of the numerous
manufacturer comments on this issue,
we have decided to defer the standard’s
requirements related to the ESC telltales
and controls until the end of the phasein (i.e., September 1, 2011 for most
manufacturers; September 1, 2012 for
final-stage manufacturers and alterers);
however, at that point, all covered
vehicles must meet all relevant
requirements of the standard (i.e., no
additional phase-in for the control and
telltale requirements). This approach is
consistent with vehicle manufacturers’
request for additional lead time until the
end of the phase-in to bring their ESC
systems into full compliance (including
the control and telltale requirements).
Manufacturers are encouraged to
voluntarily install compliant ESC
controls and displays prior to the
mandatory compliance date. Our
rationale for this change from our
proposal is as follows.
We now understand from the public
comments that vehicle manufacturers
currently employ a variety of
approaches for ESC controls and
telltales, many of which would not meet
the requirements of the agency’s
proposal, and that standardization of
ESC controls and telltales will involve
substantial design and production
changes. We further understand from
the comments that manufacturers’
inability to meet the proposed control
and display requirements would
prevent them from earning the carryforward credits, even though these ESC
systems might otherwise meet the
performance requirements of the
standard. Vehicle manufacturers’
inability to earn carry-forward credits
would likely jeopardize their ability to
meet the standard’s phase-in schedule.
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We agree that it is the performance of
the ESC systems themselves that impart
safety benefits under the standard, and
our analysis demonstrates that the safety
benefits associated with early
introduction of ESC systems, even
without standardized controls and
displays, far outweigh the benefits of
delaying the standard until all systems
can fully meet the control and display
requirements (see FRIA’s lead time/
phase-in discussion). We do not believe
that implementation of the entire
standard should be delayed until
technical changes related to the ESC
controls and telltales can be fully
resolved, because they would deny the
public the safety benefits of ESC
systems in the meantime. Accordingly,
we believe that it is preferable to move
rapidly to implement the standard, but
to delay the compliance date only for
the ESC control and telltale
requirements.
On a related matter, commenters
pointed out that vehicle manufacturers
may earn carry-forward credits for
compliant vehicles, produced in excess
of the phase-in requirements, which are
manufactured between the effective date
of the final rule and the conclusion of
the phase-in period. In clarification, we
would note that vehicles that meet the
performance requirements of FMVSS
No. 126, but do not meet the control and
telltale requirements of the standard
prior to the end of the phase-in are
eligible for carry-forward credits and
may be counted as part of the
manufacturer’s required production
under the phase-in.
In response to the comments of the
Alliance/AIAM and the VDA that the
agency should accord vehicle
manufacturers flexibility in terms of
ESC telltale designs for special modes,
we acknowledge that resolution of this
issue is another factor supporting our
decision to provide additional lead time
for manufacturers to meet the ESC
control and telltale requirements.
However, in terms of the substantive
issue of what message should be
provided by those controls and telltale,
this is a substantive matter which we
are addressing under the public
comment response for ESC telltales (see
Section IV.C.9 of this document).
(b) Phase-in Schedule
Advocates for Highway and Auto
Safety argued that in light of vehicle
manufacturers’ current high level of
installation of advanced ESC systems,
the agency should accelerate is
proposed timetable (similar comment by
IIHS). Advocates argued that this
acceleration should occur in terms of
both the interim percentages within the
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phase-in and the date for mandatory full
compliance in order to bring this
important safety feature to the whole
market more quickly. The Advocates
suggested that full implementation
should occur by September 1, 2010 (i.e.,
one year earlier than proposed in the
NPRM) (similar comment by Consumers
Union, Mr. Petkun). Specifically,
Advocates recommended adoption of
the following implementation schedule
for installation of ESC in the final rule:
• 40 percent of model year (MY) 2008
light vehicles by September 1, 2008.
• 70 percent of MY 2009 light
vehicles by September 1, 2009.
• 100 percent of MY 2010 light
vehicles by September 1, 2010.
• 100 percent of light vehicles
produced by multi-stage manufacturers,
alterers, and small volume
manufacturers by September 1, 2011.
Advocates argued that its
recommended phase-in schedule would
be both realistic and achievable, because
it would be consistent with the
projected ESC installation rates
predicted by vehicle manufacturers and
the agency. The commenter also stated
that given that the proposal would
effectively permit compliance by
currently existing ESC systems, a
protracted phase-in schedule is
unnecessary.
Consumers Union stated that it would
like to see the phase-in be vehicle-typespecific. It recommended that ESC first
be required on all SUVs, followed by
small cars (which the commenter stated
tend to be driven by younger, less
experienced drivers), and then on
family and upscale sedans (which the
commenter stated tend to be driven by
older, more experienced drivers).
Public Citizen argued that because
ESC components are already welldefined and familiar to manufacturers,
extensive research and development for
these systems is not required, and that
given the important life-saving potential
of ESC technology, the agency should
not provide a phase-in schedule slower
than what the industry is already
planning (citing statements by Ford,
General Motors, and DaimlerChrysler).
In addition, Public Citizen also
suggested that the agency should
consider adopting a more aggressive
phase-in schedule for ESC on new light
trucks and SUVs, because of these
vehicles’ higher propensity to roll over.
In order to provide the public as
rapidly as possible with what are
expected to be the significant safety
benefits of ESC systems, NHTSA has
decided to require all light vehicles
covered by this standard to be equipped
with a FMVSS No. 126-compliant ESC
system by September 1, 2011 (with
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certain exceptions discussed below),
with September 1, 2008 marking the
start of a three-year phase-in. This
implementation date for full, mandatory
compliance is the same as that proposed
in the NPRM. The agency continues to
believe that this schedule for full
implementation of the safety standard
for ESC is appropriate, in order to
provide manufacturers adequate lead
time to make necessary production
changes. Even though vehicle
manufacturers are currently introducing
ESC systems into an increasing
percentage of their new vehicle fleets,
that does not mean that these complex
systems can be incorporated into
vehicles without significant
developmental efforts to tune them to
and to incorporate them into a specific
vehicle design.
However, in response to public
comments and upon further review of
the production plans voluntarily
submitted by vehicle manufacturers, we
have determined that it would be
practicable to increase the percentage of
new light vehicles that must comply
with Standard No. 126 under the phasein, thereby accelerating the benefits
expected to be provided by ESC
systems. Because ESC is so costeffective and has such high benefits in
terms of potential fatalities and injuries
that may be prevented, the agency
agrees that it is important to require ESC
installation in light vehicles as quickly
as possible. Accordingly, under this
final rule, we are requiring the following
phase-in schedule for FMVSS No. 126:
55 percent of a vehicle manufacturer’s
light vehicles manufactured during the
period from September 1, 2008 to
August 31, 2009 would be required to
comply with the standard; 75 percent of
those manufactured during the period
from September 1, 2009 to August 31,
2010; 95 percent of those manufactured
during the period from September 1,
2010 to August 31, 2011, and all light
vehicles thereafter. (This compares to
the NPRM’s proposal for a 30/60/90/all
phase-in schedule over the same time
periods.)
In order to ensure the financial and
technological practicability of the final
rule (in keeping with our statutory
mandate), while at the same time
facilitating ESC installation in the light
vehicle fleet as expeditiously as
possible, the agency analyzed the
product plans submitted by six vehicle
manufacturers, whose combined
production accounts for approximately
87 percent of the new light vehicle fleet.
As explained in Chapter VII of the FRIA,
we examined three different potential
phase-in schedules to find the right
balance among these competing
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concerns. Based upon this product plan
information and the desire to provide
manufacturers with flexibility by having
a carry forward provision, we have
chosen the most aggressive phase-in
alternative that we believe is reasonable
(i.e., 55/75/95%).
Two factors were controlling in
making the decision as to which
alternative to choose: (1) The ability of
manufacturers to change vehicles from
being equipped with optional ESC to
standard ESC for MY 2010 and MY
2011; and (2) Not forcing any
manufacturer to install ESC in any
make/model for which it was not
planned to be at least an option. The
agency did not believe there was enough
lead time to redesign such a make/
model to include ESC by MY 2009.
While there may be enough time to
redesign a make/model to include ESC
by MY 2010, given the carry forward
provisions this was not necessary for
any of the six manufacturers for MY
2010. The second consideration became
a factor once again in MY 2011, in not
going beyond 95 percent (thereby
obviating the costly need to redesign
and develop tooling for a few vehicle
lines which will not be produced in MY
2012).
In general, we anticipate that vehicle
manufacturers will be able to meet the
requirements of the standard by
installing ESC system designs currently
in production (i.e., ones available in MY
2006), and most vehicle lines would
likely experience some level of redesign
over the next three to four years, thereby
providing an opportunity to incorporate
an ESC system during the course of the
manufacturer’s normal production
cycle. Except for possibly some lowproduction-volume vehicles with
infrequent design changes (addressed
below), NHTSA believes that most other
vehicles can reasonably be equipped
with ESC within three to four model
years. Furthermore, we do not believe
that the final rule’s phase-in should
pose ESC supply problems; public
comments from vehicle manufacturers
and ESC suppliers did not raise any
such supply concerns, and our analysis
of vehicle manufacturers’ production
plans suggest that the selected phase-in
schedule will result in an installation
rate increase of only a few percentage
points in any year of the phase-in.
Overall, we have determined that the
final rule’s phase-in schedule may be
accomplished without disruptive
changes in manufacturer and supplier
production processes.
As noted immediately above, we have
decided to defer the standard’s
requirements related to the ESC telltales
and controls until the end of the phase-
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in (i.e., September 1, 2011 for most
manufacturers; September 1, 2012 for
final-stage manufacturers and alterers.
We have modified the final rule’s
phase-in reporting requirements for ESC
systems (contained in Subpart I of 49
CFR Part 585) in a manner consistent
with the phase-in schedule discussed
above.
We have decided not to adopt the
suggestion by Consumers Union that the
agency should specify phase-in
requirements for ESC by vehicle type.
We note that vehicle manufacturers
have already been moving aggressively
to include ESC systems in high-centerof-gravity vehicles (e.g., SUVs).
Furthermore, we are concerned that
such action would amount to
unwarranted agency intervention into
the details of manufacturers’ production
plans. It is unclear how such
intervention might impact
implementation of the standard and
installation of ESC systems overall.
Given these concerns, we have decided
not to change our traditional approach
of affording vehicle manufacturers
flexibility in terms of how (i.e., with
which models) they will meet a safety
standard’s phase-in requirements.
13. Impacts on the Aftermarket
The Specialty Equipment Market
Association (SEMA), an aftermarket
trade association representing the
specialty automotive industry,
expressed support for the ESC
rulemaking as an important advance for
automotive safety. However, the
organization expressed concern
regarding the interaction of ESC systems
with products manufactured by its
members (many of which are small
businesses), arguing that current ESC
systems seem to be largely vehiclespecific. According to SEMA, many of
their members’ products (e.g., wheels,
tires, suspension systems), installed
either for repair or replacement of
existing equipment, also increase motor
vehicle safety, so it is imperative that
these products remain available to
consumers and that they operate in
unison with the ESC system.
SEMA explained that as a new and
evolving technology, ESC systems could
potentially be impacted by the
installation of a variety of other
automotive products (e.g.’’ wheels, tires,
suspension systems, drive gear sets,
brake parts/systems) during the life of
the vehicle. The commenter cited the
potential for such modifications to
deactivate the ESC system, to cause its
premature failure, or to reduce its
effectiveness. However, SEMA stated its
impression that neither vehicle
manufacturers, ESC suppliers, nor the
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agency have answers to questions
regarding ESC interaction with other
equipment and systems, and SEMA is
not aware of any available data on this
topic or related testing. It argued that, as
drafted, the agency’s proposal fails to
contemplate the full range of
downstream consequences associated
with the required ESC installation.
According to SEMA, the dearth of
knowledge about how ESC systems will
operate in conjunction with common
vehicle modifications is a fundamental
flaw in the agency’s rulemaking.
In terms of its impact on automotive
aftermarket manufacturers and the
vehicle service industry, SEMA stated
that there is a significant difference
between voluntary installation of the
ESC system and its mandatory
installation under a Federal safety
standard. Specifically, SEMA referred to
the statutory prohibitions on
manufacturing/selling/importing
noncomplying motor vehicles and
equipment (49 U.S.C. 30112) and on
making safety devices and elements
inoperative (49 U.S.C. 30122).
Violations of these provisions can result
in substantial civil penalties.
Accordingly, the commenter cautioned
the agency to fully investigate how the
ESC rule will impact the aftermarket
industry prior to establishing a
mandatory safety standard.
SEMA’s recommended solution is to
either: (1) Delay issuance of a final rule
until the interaction between ESC
systems and aftermarket components is
better understood, or (2) require ESC
systems to be capable of adapting to
subsequent vehicle modifications or
otherwise be capable of being modified
by installers to accommodate
aftermarket equipment. According to
SEMA, the agency should not feel
rushed to issue a final rule, given that
vehicle manufacturers are already ahead
of NHTSA’s proposed phase-in schedule
and that the statute only requires
issuance of a final rule by April 1, 2009.
In response, NHTSA emphasizes that
we are issuing a final rule on ESC
systems before the statutory deadline
(i.e., April 2009) because of the
tremendous safety benefits that we
believe an ESC standard can achieve. If,
as anticipated, an ESC standard can save
thousands of lives each year, clearly we
should establish that standard as soon
as possible. As noted above, ESC
systems were installed on
approximately 29 percent of MY 2006
light vehicles, and that percentage was
expected to rise to 71 percent by MY
2011, consistent with manufacturers’
production plans. However, given ESC’s
estimated high effectiveness rate in
preventing single-vehicle crashes (34
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percent for passenger cars and 59
percent for SUVs) and rollovers (71
percent for passenger cars and 84
percent for SUVs), the agency decided
that it was imperative to mandate ESC
to ensure that all drivers receive the
benefit of this important safety device
(i.e., to close the gap between
manufacturers’ planned installation
rates and the requirement for ESC
systems to be standard equipment on all
light vehicles). For every year that the
final rule is delayed (assuming
consistent lead time and the same
phase-in), we estimate that 1,547–2,534
lives would be lost and 46,896–65,801
injuries would occur over the lifetime of
that model year fleet due to lower ESC
installation rates (see FRIA Executive
Summary, E–2 .74) We believe that result
is unacceptable. Thus, NHTSA will not
delay the issuance of this final rule
simply because the statute allows us
more time.
Furthermore, NHTSA disagrees that
the final rule should be delayed because
it does not analyze all possible
‘‘downstream consequences’’ or impacts
on the aftermarket community to
SEMA’s satisfaction. As discussed in
Section IV.C.14 below, even though
NHTSA has no legal obligation to
analyze the impacts of a rulemaking on
entities not directly regulated by the
rule, we are nevertheless concerned
about the impact our rules have on all
affected parties. Accordingly, we have
considered the effects that the ESC final
rule might have on aftermarket motor
vehicle equipment manufacturers and
the motor vehicle service industry. The
agency is not aware of any significant
compatibility problems between ESC
systems and other vehicle equipment,
and SEMA has not provided any
evidence to substantiate such problems,
either in its comments or in a
subsequent meeting 75 with the agency.
So at this point, delay of the final rule
would be based upon a speculative
concern. Furthermore, we note that with
any complex system, the agency cannot
74 Although the benefit calculation is based on the
annual impact for a full, on-road vehicle fleet, it
would also represent the lifetime savings for a given
model year’s fleet.
75 On January 10, 2007, SEMA officials and other
representatives of the aftermarket industry met with
agency staff to discuss their concerns with the
potential impact of the ESC final rule on their
businesses, consistent with SEMA’s November 17,
2006 comments. However, despite the passage of
almost two months, the industry representatives
were still unable to provide any information
regarding the nature and scope of the identified
problem with aftermarket modifications impacting
ESC system functionality, When asked, the industry
representatives were not able verifiably identify any
modifications that would or would not cause failure
of the ESC systems. (For a record of this meeting,
see Docket No. NHTSA–2006–25801–55.).
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hypothesize on all possible interactions
between required safety technologies
and different vehicle equipment.
Therefore, for all these reasons,
NHTSA will not delay the final rule
until all possible interactions are known
and documented, because that would
frustrate the agency’s purpose of saving
lives as soon as possible. However,
NHTSA recognizes that ESC systems
vary from vehicle to vehicle, and that
additional information will help the
agency and industry to better
understand how ESC systems interact
with other vehicle equipment and
systems. NHTSA will continue to
monitor the data and testing information
we receive on this issue, and we
encourage all interested parties to share
relevant information with the agency
and the public as it becomes available.
Additionally, should we later find
significant safety risks associated with
the interaction between ESC systems
and other equipment and systems
(whether aftermarket or otherwise),
NHTSA will work toward adjusting the
ESC standard to address these possible
problems.
Furthermore, NHTSA disagrees that it
should require ESC systems to be
capable of adapting to subsequent
vehicle modifications, because we
question the feasibility and
practicability of such a requirement due
to the varied and voluminous nature of
the aftermarket vehicle equipment
market. Likewise, NHTSA is not
mandating a requirement that ESC
systems be capable of being modified by
installers to accommodate aftermarket
equipment. NHTSA does not believe
that such a requirement is necessary,
given that the agency has not been
presented with any evidence of a safety
problem or a compatibility problem
between ESC and other vehicle systems
or equipment, and given the tendency
for the market to respond to consumer
demands that sufficient information be
provided to permit third party vehicle
servicing. Nonetheless, NHTSA strongly
encourages SEMA and its members to
develop relationships with vehicle and
ESC system manufacturers to research
and find solutions to these questions.
(a) System Adaptability and Sharing
ESC Information
In describing the need for an ESC
system to be ‘‘adjustable’’ to subsequent
modifications (such as ones permitting
enhanced towing capacity), SEMA
stated that the ESC system should be
sufficiently flexible to allow for
relocated vehicle centers of gravity,76
76 We should note that these modifications
identified by SEMA, particularly any that would
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and changes in roll rate, lateral
acceleration, and related dynamics (e.g.,
changes that may accompany
installation of an aftermarket
suspension system). SEMA called upon
NHTSA to require ESC systems with
‘‘adaptive learning’’ capabilities, such
that the ESC systems recognize
subsequent vehicle modifications and
make corresponding adjustments so that
the vehicle is not taken out of
compliance with FMVSS No. 126. In
addition, the commenter stated that the
agency should require a
reprogrammability requirement as part
of the final rule, in order to ensure
ongoing ESC functionality after
subsequent vehicle modifications.
Furthermore, SEMA called for
original equipment manufacturers (both
ESC suppliers and vehicle
manufacturers) to share relevant ESC
information with aftermarket
manufacturers (e.g., providing access to
software used for ESC calibration). The
commenter stated that aftermarket onboard computer re-programming
companies will also need access to this
information. SEMA commented that
inability of these aftermarket
manufacturers to gain access to ESC onboard communications software may
render installers of these products
unable to determine methods for
keeping the ESC system operational.
According to SEMA, ESC manufacturer
estimates suggest that aftermarket
suppliers will need to operate within
three percent of the ESC’s
predetermined control level, something
currently beyond a majority of legal
aftermarket products. Because these
aftermarket businesses have no
knowledge of the operational limits of
typical ESC systems, SEMA argued that
these businesses need to understand
ESC systems’ failure modes, as well as
the test protocols and standard for
compliance (if any), in order to
understand the design parameters
within which the aftermarket parts must
comply and to provide practical
objectives for their own products to
meet.
NHTSA does not agree that requiring
ESC systems to have ‘‘adaptive
learning’’ capabilities or to be
reprogrammable after all subsequent
vehicle modifications is necessary or
appropriate at this time. In its
comments, SEMA has provided no
evidence that current ESC systems are
even capable of the ‘‘adaptive learning’’
or reprogramming, how that would be
elevate the vehicle’s center of gravity, might affect
the stability of the vehicle and raise safety issues
that are distinct from those addressed by an ESC
system.
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accomplished, or the cost of achieving
such capability if it is possible.77 (The
agency is not aware of any ESC systems
with an adaptive learning capability of
the type suggested by SEMA.) The
requirements NHTSA has decided to
mandate through this final rule are
already being met by the vast majority
of ESC-equipped vehicles in current
production. NHTSA cannot mandate
equipment or performance requirements
without any indication that complying
with them would even be possible.
NHTSA agrees with the commenter
that sharing of information between
vehicle and ESC manufacturers and
aftermarket businesses is important, but
we do not believe that a requirement
that OEMs share ESC information is
necessary at this time. Vehicle and ESC
system manufacturers undoubtedly
realize that aftermarket alterations of
vehicles that could affect ESC systems
are happening and will continue to
happen. NHTSA believes that OEMs
will recognize it to be in their best
interest to share as much nonproprietary information as possible with
the aftermarket sales industry to avoid
rendering ESC systems ineffective
through subsequent vehicle alterations.
Again, NHTSA strongly encourages
OEMs and the aftermarket sales industry
to work together in this regard, but for
now, mandating such cooperation is
beyond the scope of this rulemaking.
Furthermore, we agree that consumers
and the motor vehicle industry (OEM,
aftermarket, and service/repair) should
be vigilant in avoiding alterations which
could render ESC systems inoperative or
lessen their effectiveness. We note that,
as mentioned, we do not yet have any
reliable information on what these ESCdegrading alterations might be and what
effects they might have. Still, to the
extent they become aware of problems,
as one possible measure, vehicle
manufacturers might consider alerting
purchasers to alterations that reasonably
could render ESC systems inoperative or
lessen their effectiveness. We believe
that, to the extent needed, vehicle
manufacturers are in the best position to
communicate specific statements and to
make recommendations about which
alterations may reasonably be expected
to impact ESC systems adversely.
77 In a January 10, 2007 with the agency, SEMA
and other representatives of the aftermarket
industry stated that TRW Inc. has designed an ESC
system capable of adaptive learning regarding
changes in tire sizes (see Docket No. NHTSA–2006–
25801–55). However, even such system would not
be expected to be capable of adaptive learning of
the numerous aftermarket modifications that could
potentially impact the vehicle’s ESC system.
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(b) ‘‘Make Inoperative’’ Prohibition
SEMA argued that, provided the ESC
malfunction lamp does not illuminate,
installers of aftermarket equipment
should not be required to undertake
additional action to confirm that the
vehicle remains in compliance with
FMVSS No. 126. Stated another way,
SEMA asserted that if the ESC
malfunction telltale does not illuminate,
the manufacturer, distributor, dealer, or
motor vehicle repair business should be
able to assume that the ESC system is
operating properly and that the vehicle
modifications in question have not
violated the ‘‘make inoperative’’
prohibition of 49 U.S.C. 30122. The
commenter stated that for the agency to
hold otherwise would place an
impossible burden on the aftermarket
industry and have a strong negative
impact on many small businesses.
According to SEMA, installers generally
lack knowledge as to the changes made
to vehicles before they arrive at their
shops, given the countless possibilities.
Thus, SEMA recommended that
NHTSA state in the final rule that when
a vehicle has been modified and the
malfunction telltale has not been
disabled, one may assume that the
vehicle remains in compliance with
FMVSS No. 126 and that there has been
no violation of the ‘‘make inoperative’’
prohibition (49 U.S.C. 30122). SEMA
reasoned that if the ESC malfunction
telltale does illuminate, it will have
served its purpose of alerting the
consumer as to a potential compatibility
problem, thereby permitting corrective
action to be taken. The commenter
stated that NHTSA has adopted an
identical approach for two other safety
standards—FMVSS No. 110, Tire
Selection and Rims for Motor Vehicles
with a GVWR of 4,536 Kilograms
(10,000 Pounds) or Less, and FMVSS
No. 138, Tire Pressure Monitoring
Systems.
NHTSA recognizes that in previous
rules (e.g., TPMS 78), we have allowed
vehicle modifiers to assume that a
vehicle remains in compliance with the
relevant FMVSS if a malfunction telltale
has not illuminated, but we decline to
do so again for the ESC standard for the
reasons that follow. SEMA has provided
78 We believe that the TPMS rulemaking is
distinguishable from the present ESC rulemaking,
because for TPMS, the agency had a reasonable
degree of certainty that the malfunction indicator
would be able to detect any aftermarket
modifications (e.g., installation of replacement tires)
likely to affect the system’s operation. In contrast,
given the complexity of the ESC system and the
greater number of modifications with the potential
to impact its proper functioning, we do not have the
same level of confidence that the driver would be
accurately informed of the ESC system’s status in
all cases.
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no evidence to establish that aftermarket
modifications have already caused ESC
system malfunctions or any indication
whether such malfunction did or did
not illuminate the ESC telltale.
In most cases, we expect that
replacement of motor vehicle
equipment, such as tire and rims, with
replacement or aftermarket equipment
of the same size would not impact ESC
functionality or result in ‘‘make
inoperative’’ problems. Replacement of
worn or damaged equipment with
similar equipment would likely
constitute a large majority of instances
of aftermarket product usage. However,
NHTSA believes that there may well be
modifications to vehicles that negatively
impact the ESC system without causing
the telltale to illuminate (e.g., changing
the steering ratio through modification
to tie rods and steering arms). It would
not be consistent with the agency’s
safety mission to require drivers to
unwittingly forgo the life-saving benefits
of ESC, without any indication that the
system is malfunctioning due to
subsequent vehicle modifications.
Therefore, we have decided not to grant
SEMA’s request. However, NHTSA will
seek relevant information, monitor this
situation, and take appropriate action as
necessary. And again, NHTSA
encourages SEMA and its members to
develop relationships with vehicle and
ESC system manufacturers to research
and find solutions to these questions.
In the meantime, persons who modify
vehicle may assume that their actions
have made the ESC system inoperative
if those action result in the ESC
malfunction telltale being illuminated
or, regardless of whether the telltale
illuminates, they know based upon
other sources of information that their
actions are likely to make the system
inoperative.
(length, width, height), tires,
suspension/steering geometry, and
suspension/steering components, among
others, such as likely driving
characteristics and conditions). Delphi
stated that brake-based ESC systems are
designed to accommodate routine
variations, but not major modifications
affecting a vehicle’s handling character.
The commenter stated that major
modifications of that nature could result
in improper operation of the ESC
system, causing either unwanted
braking or a failure to intervene when
needed. Delphi further recommended
that the final-stage manufacturer or
alterer should consult with the original
manufacturer and/or the ESC supplier to
determine whether there is a need for
adjustments to the vehicle’s ESC system
in response to the subsequent
modifications.
NHTSA recognizes that many
different subsequent vehicle
modifications have the potential to
affect the ability of an ESC system to
perform as originally designed. The
agency agrees that vehicle/ESC
manufacturers and final-stage
manufacturers and alterers should
communicate as to the effects that
subsequent vehicle modifications may
have on ESC systems, and we strongly
encourage such communication to
ensure proper functioning of the ESC
system. As with other vehicle
technologies that may be affected by
final stages of manufacturing or
subsequent alterations, NHTSA also
encourages OEMs to be in contact with
final-stage manufacturers and alterers,
to the extent possible, to ensure that the
certification of their vehicles under the
ESC standard is not compromised.
(c) Pass-Through Certification
Delphi stated that the NPRM
indicated that final-stage manufacturers
and alterers can rely on the original
manufacturer’s certification of ESC
compliance, provided they make no
modifications to a vehicle’s brake
system. Delphi commented that this
cautionary statement by the agency is
too narrow, suggesting that there should
be clarification that any major
modification to the vehicle’s dynamic
characteristics (e.g., handling,
propulsion) may influence ESC
operation. According to Delphi, a brakebased ESC system is designed and
‘‘tuned’’ or ‘‘calibrated’’ for a specific
vehicle configuration with a specific
dynamic response character (with such
character being determined by factors
such as mass, distribution of mass, size
(a) Regulatory Flexibility Act
SEMA argued that NHTSA’s
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis did not
consider how the rule would potentially
impact manufacturers, installers, and
retailers of aftermarket products that
would have the potential to interact
with the ESC system when installed on
the vehicle. The commenter stated that
the agency is obligated under the
Regulatory Flexibility Act to consider
all reasonable alternatives for crafting
the least burdensome rule. SEMA
suggested that the agency’s analysis was
inadequate because it did not also focus
on the aftermarket industry. Mr.
Sparhawk also argued that the NPRM
failed to adequately analyze the
reasonably foreseeable impacts of the
proposed ESC requirement on small
businesses, as required by the
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14. Compliance With Relevant Legal
Requirements
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Regulatory Flexibility Act, because it
does not consider the impacts on
vehicle repair businesses, instead only
addressing the effects of the proposal on
large manufacturers.
In response, we note that NHTSA is
not required to perform a regulatory
flexibility analysis for entities not
directly impacted by its rulemaking. In
its 2003 publication titled ‘‘A Guide for
Government Agencies: How to Comply
with the Regulatory Flexibility Act’’
(‘‘RFA Guide’’), the Small Business
Administration states that ‘‘[t]he courts
have held that the RFA requires an
agency to perform a regulatory
flexibility analysis of small entity
impacts only when a rule directly
regulates them.’’ 79 The cases cited by
the RFA Guide indicate that a rule
‘‘directly regulates’’ only the entities to
which the rule applies—for example,
electric utilities but not independent
electricity cooperatives in a FERC ratesetting regulation,80 or automobile
manufacturers but not aftermarket
businesses in an EPA ‘‘deemed-tocomply’’ rule.81 In Motor & Equipment
Mfrs. Ass’n v. Nichols, the DC Circuit
described the distinction as follows:
‘‘The RFA itself distinguishes between
small entities subject to an agency rule,
to which its requirements apply, and
those not subject to the rule, to which
the requirements do not apply.’’ 82
This final rule establishes
performance and equipment
requirements for ESC systems. The only
entities subject to these requirements
are vehicle manufacturers and
manufacturers of ESC systems. NHTSA
has already analyzed the potential
impacts of the rule on these directly
affected entities, as the final regulatory
flexibility analysis (contained within
the FRIA) makes clear. Nothing in this
rule subjects the entities described by
SEMA and Mr. Sparhawk to NHTSA’s
regulation.
79 Office of Advocacy, United States Small
Business Administration, ‘‘A Guide for Government
Agencies: How to Comply with the Regulatory
Flexibility Act,’’ 2003, p. 20.
80 Mid-Tex Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), 773 F.2d
327, 341 (DC Cir. 1985) (stating that ‘‘Congress did
not intend to require that every agency consider
every indirect effect that any regulation might have
on small businesses in any stratum of the national
economy.’’).
81 Motor & Equipment Mfrs. Ass’n v. Nichols, 142
F.3d 449, 467 (DC Cir. 1998) (holding that ‘‘Because
the deemed-to-comply rule did not subject any
aftermarket businesses to regulation, EPA was not
required to conduct a flexibility analysis as to small
aftermarket businesses. It was only obliged to
consider the impact of the rule on small automobile
manufacturers subject to the rule, and it met that
obligation.’’).
82 Id., fn 18, at 467 (describing 5 U.S.C. 603(b)(3)
and (4)).
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With that said, although NHTSA has
no obligation to perform a regulatory
flexibility analysis to consider the
potential impacts of this final rule on
such non-directly regulated entities, we
are nevertheless concerned about the
impact our rules have on all affected
parties. Again, we have considered the
effects that the ESC final rule might
have on aftermarket motor vehicle
equipment manufacturers and the motor
vehicle service industry. The agency is
not aware of any significant
compatibility problems between ESC
systems and other vehicle equipment.
However, we note that with any
complex system, the agency cannot
hypothesize on all possible interactions
between required safety technologies
and different vehicle equipment. Again,
we do not believe it appropriate to delay
this final rule for ESC systems and the
significant safety benefits accompanying
them on the basis of speculative
arguments regarding compatibility
problems for which there is no
evidence; we believe that this is
particularly so in light of the substantial
number of vehicles currently equipped
with ESC systems—some portion of
which it is expected would have had
aftermarket modifications of the types
suggested by SEMA—and given that
there has been no indication of any
problem to date. However, to the extent
information suggesting such a problem
exists, the agency will carefully
consider it.
(b) Executive Orders 12866 and 13258
SEMA stated that Executive Order
12866 (Regulatory Planning and
Review), as amended by Executive
Order 13258, requires agencies to write
all rules in plain language, and it also
stated that the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA) requires agencies to include
issues of consequence within a
rulemaking and to provide the
opportunity for public comment. SEMA
argued that the agency’s ESC proposal
did not properly assess the impact of the
ESC rule on the aftermarket community
and that any such impacts (e.g., how the
‘‘make inoperative’’ prohibition applies
to their activities) should be stated in
plain language in the rule.
NHTSA agrees that agencies are
required to write rules in plain language
and to address and provide an
opportunity for public comment on the
substance of the rulemaking, as well as
its impact. However, for the reasons
discussed in the response to the
Regulatory Flexibility Act comment
above, NHTSA disagrees that it is
obligated to assess the indirect impact of
the ESC rule on the aftermarket
community (entities described by
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17295
SEMA) or state any such impacts in the
rule. Nevertheless, because we are
concerned about the impact our rules
have on all affected parties, we have
considered the effects that the ESC final
rule might have on aftermarket motor
vehicle equipment manufacturers and
the motor vehicle service industry.
Again, the agency is not aware of any
significant compatibility problems
between ESC systems and other vehicle
equipment.
(c) Vehicle Safety Act
SEMA asserted that NHTSA’s
proposed rule does not meet the
practicability requirement of the Safety
Act, because it could ‘‘potentially lead
to millions of [subsequently-modified]
vehicles whose compliance with the
ESC standard would be unknown.’’
SEMA also argued that the rule could
‘‘deny consumers the right to
accessorize their vehicles with products
that may provide additional safety
benefits beyond the ESC systems.’’
NHTSA disagrees with these
comments. SEMA has provided no
evidence that the final rule is
impracticable under the Safety Act.
Vehicles currently include many
complex systems, and aftermarket
suppliers are able to produce products
compatible with those systems;
similarly, motor vehicle repair
businesses are currently able to obtain
sufficient information to perform their
work. We do not believe that the
situation with ESC will be any different,
and NHTSA anticipates that the
aftermarket community will be able to
work with OEMs and dealers as the
phase-in progresses to avoid SEMA’s
concern. Additionally, this final rule in
no way denies consumers the right to
modify their vehicles. Individual
vehicle owners are not regulated under
the Vehicle Safety Act nor under this
final rule, and SEMA provided no
evidence that these products would be
incompatible with ESC systems.
15. ESC Outreach Efforts
(a) ESC Test Procedures Workshop
Honda requested that the agency
consider sponsoring a workshop on the
ESC test procedures once a final rule
has been issued, similar to the one the
agency conducted for the TPMS
standard. The commenter suggested that
such a workshop would be useful to
provide manufacturers the opportunity
to understand important details of the
test procedure and to clarify questions
in a practical, hands-on setting.
NHTSA agrees with this suggestion
and will plan to have a workshop on the
ESC test procedures in the near future.
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Details of this ESC workshop will be
announced in a separate Federal
Register notice at least 30 days prior to
the scheduled date of the meeting.
(b) Public Information Campaign
SUVOA, an association representing
owners of sport utility vehicles, pick-up
trucks, and vans, encouraged the agency
to undertake a strong public information
campaign as part of the final rule for
ESC. According to SUVOA, consumers
need to understand how newly required
safety equipment such as ESC works
and how it enhances the safety of their
vehicles, and automobile dealerships
and their salespeople should similarly
be educated regarding the lifesaving
benefits of ESC. SUVOA offered to work
with the agency to contribute to such
communications efforts.
NHTSA’s principal public
information portals are its main agency
Web site (www.nhtsa.dot.gov), the
Safercar.gov Web site, and its
publication ‘‘Buying a Safer Car.’’ In
these information sources, consumers
can already obtain information about
what ESC systems do and which
vehicles were equipped with ESC
systems in 2005, 2006, and 2007.
However, we agree with SUVOA about
the general desirability of increased
public information which could
possibly drive demand for ESC systems
during the phase-in period. We applaud
the efforts of General Motors and Bosch
in particular to educate dealers and
salesman about ESC, and we encourage
other interested parties to help spread
the message regarding the important
benefits provided by ESC systems.
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16. Miscellaneous Issues
(a) Linking Brake Light Illumination to
ESC Activation
Consumers Union suggested that
whenever the vehicle’s ESC system is
activated and intervenes, the vehicle’s
brake lights should be automatically
illuminated in order to alert motorists to
the rear of potentially slippery
conditions and of a slowing vehicle
ahead (similar comment by Mr. Petkun).
The commenter urged the agency to
undertake whatever ancillary
amendments to other safety standards
that may be necessary to effectuate this
change (e.g., possible amendments to
FMVSS No. 105, Hydraulic and Electric
Brake Systems, and FMVSS No. 108,
Lamps, Reflective Devices, and
Associated Equipment).
In our May 26, 2000 letter of
interpretation 83 to Mr. C. Thomas Terry
of General Motors, NHTSA has already
83 See https://isearch.nhtsa.gov/files/
21281.ztv.html.
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established a policy regarding stop
lamps and technologies that make use of
the vehicles brakes (including ESC), and
we intend to follow that interpretation
with regard to FMVSS No. 126, as
discussed below. Under our
interpretation letter to Mr. Terry, only
when a vehicle system operates in a way
that is analogous to the driver using the
brakes to slow the vehicle should the
stop lamps activate. We believe that it
is not desirable to change the meaning
of the stop lamp signal. Traction
control, for example, applies one brake
on an axle at a time to limit wheel spin
for the purpose of accelerating rather
than decelerating the vehicle, so in such
cases, stop lamps should not be
activated. Adaptive cruise control, on
the other hand, uses brakes in the same
way as the driver and should activate
the stop lamp.
We understand that vehicle
manufacturers consider the duration
and mode of ESC operation to determine
whether to activate the stop lamps (to
avoid confusing blinks), but whenever
the system augments the reduction of
engine power with braking intended to
further slow the vehicle (as opposed to
a very short application of a single brake
simply to change the vehicle’s heading),
brake lamp activation would be
expected to occur.
(b) Vehicles With Dual Wheels on the
Rear Axle
According to the Alliance/AIAM,
there are a small number (unspecified)
of incomplete vehicles with a GVWR of
10,000 pounds or less that are equipped
with dual wheels on the rear axle
(‘‘dualies’’), which are typically
completed as commercial vehicles. The
commenters stated that these vehicles
require their own unique ESC
calibration. Based upon the small
number of ‘‘dualies’’ and their unusual
calibration needs, the Alliance/AIAM
requested that the agency exclude these
vehicles from the present ESC
rulemaking and instead consider them
as part of any subsequent ESC
rulemaking for heavy trucks (a category
in which dualies’ ESC systems arguably
more appropriately belong).
In light of the agency’s statutory
mandate under section 10301 of
SAFETEA–LU, NHTSA does not believe
it has the authority to exempt any
vehicles with a GVWR of 10,000 pounds
or less from the requirements of the
Standard No. 126. Accordingly, this
final rule applies to passenger cars,
multipurpose vehicles, trucks and buses
with a gross vehicle weight rating of
4,536 Kg (10,000 pounds) or less, as
originally proposed.
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(c) ESC Operation With Towed Trailers
According to Mr. Feldhus, ESC
systems must be required to have on/off
controls for vehicles capable of towing
a trailer, because current ESC systems
do not communicate with the trailer
when intervening to maintain stability.
He stated that because the ESCequipped towing vehicle’s brake lights
do not activate, the aftermarket trailer’s
brake controllers cannot participate. He
further stated that towing vehicles dive
and trailer hitches rise during heavy
braking, so unless care is taken, a twoto-four ton trailer could lift and
overpower the towing vehicle. Thus,
Mr. Feldhus stated that the agency
should not mandate ESC systems until
such time as it evaluates such effects
using special trailer test rigs that have
motor-controlled swinging masses and
numerous hitch combinations. He also
suggested additional tests simulating air
disturbance from oncoming trucks on
two-lane roads. Ultimately, Mr. Feldhus
recommended adopting specific pass/
fail towing criteria that vehicle
manufacturers must meet, as part of any
safety standard for ESC.
We have no evidence supporting the
supposition that ESC intervention will
adversely affect the safety of a vehicle
hauling a trailer, nor has any vehicle or
ESC manufacturer told us that lack of
communication between a tow vehicle
and trailer will negatively affect ESC
functionality. ESC systems operate in
extreme driving situations where a loss
of control is anticipated (i.e., excessive
oversteer or understeer situations). On
some vehicles with high centers of
gravity, ESC may also intervene during
impending on-road, untripped rollover
situations. In each of these loss-ofcontrol situations, we do not believe
ESC stabilization of the tow vehicle
would result in a subsequent loss of
trailer stability. Accordingly, we see no
reason to revise the regulatory text
regarding this issue.
However, tow vehicle/trailer safety is
an area of ongoing interest to NHTSA,
and the agency always welcomes
information on ways new technology
can improve it. For example, some ESC
systems are now being offered with
trailer stabilization assist (TSA) control
algorithms. These algorithms are
specifically designed to help mitigate
yaw oscillations that can occur when
the vehicle/trailer system is being
operated in certain driving situations.
These systems operate by using the tow
vehicle ESC system to automatically
brake the tow vehicle in a way that
suppresses the trailer yaw oscillations
before they become so large that a loss
of control is evident. Evaluating TSA
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effectiveness is an area of research
presently under consideration at
NHTSA.
(d) Wheelchair-Accessible Vehicles
The National Mobility Equipment
Dealers Association (NMEDA)
commented that ESC system sensors are
normally located under one of the front
row seats. NMEDA argued that because
ESC systems are position-sensitive, their
relocation is likely to affect the
accuracy, performance, and
effectiveness of those systems. (The
commenter pointed to the fact that yaw
rate and sideslip are functions of the
vehicle center of gravity, and also, the
ESC’s horizontal plane of reference will
likely be altered when an ESC system is
relocated, further altering its
performance.) The organization
expressed concern that whenever the
system sensors must be moved in the
process of modifying vehicles to make
them accessible to the disabled, the ESC
system could generate potentially
dangerous and unpredictable vehicle
responses under certain driving
conditions.
Therefore, NMEDA recommended
that the final rule should require an
original equipment manufacturer to
provide a means to permanently
deactivate an ESC system for vehicles
manufactured, altered, or modified after
first sale to accommodate persons with
disabilities. According to NMEDA, it
would be possible to ensure that the
ESC system is not accidentally activated
by equipping the vehicle with a
permanent, key-operated ‘‘off’’
mechanism and an associated warning
lamp (similar to one provided on an air
bag deactivation system). Alternatively,
NMEDA stated that the agency could
specify in the final rule that third
parties are permitted to permanently
deactivate the ESC system on vehicles
that are manufactured, altered, or
modified after first sale to be accessible
to persons with disabilities.
In response to the commenter’s
concerns about vehicles modified to
make them accessible to disabled
individuals, NHTSA believes that no
change is necessary as part of the ESC
final rule. Parties who must certify that
their vehicles are in compliance with
Federal motor vehicle safety standards
prior to first retail sale should have the
capability to ensure the functionality of
the ESC system installed in their
vehicles. However, aftermarket
modifiers who adapt vehicles for
persons with disabilities would not
likely be able to move ESC components
without some level of assistance from
vehicle manufacturers or ESC system
suppliers.
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We strongly urge OEMs to work with
vehicle modifiers to identify alternative
locations or other modification methods
so that the benefits of ESC may be
retained for drivers of adapted vehicles.
The number of vehicles that are popular
for adaptations for persons with
disabilities is quite limited, and we
believe it is practical for manufacturers
to provide assistance to modifiers who
must remove OEM seats, supply
alternative seats, or modify floors, so
that the modifiers may relocate ESC
components in a way that preserves the
proper functioning of the system. (We
understand that General Motors already
provides some technical assistance to
those adapting its vans for disabled
persons.) NHTSA would be willing to
host a technical session to be attended
by OEM engineers, ESC manufacturer
engineers, and representatives of
aftermarket modifiers to facilitate this
discussion.
In addition, NHTSA will consider
whether it is necessary to add language
to 49 CFR 595 Subpart C, Vehicle
Modifications to Accommodate People
With Disabilities, to exempt the modifier
from the ‘‘make inoperative’’
prohibition of 49 U.S.C 30122, as it
applies to FMVSS No. 126 in the event
that: (1) The ESC sensor must be moved
in the modification of a vehicle after
first retail sale to accommodate a person
with a disability, and (2) the OEM has
not provided an alterative position.
V. Benefits and Costs
A. Summary
This section summarizes our analysis
of the benefits, costs, and cost per
equivalent life saved as a result of the
ESC requirements contained in this final
rule. As noted previously, the life- and
injury-saving potential of ESC is very
significant, both in absolute terms and
when compared to prior agency
rulemakings. We anticipate that this
final rule for ESC, compared to a
baseline of manufacturers’ plans of
having 71 percent of the light vehicle
fleet with ESC by MY 2011, will save
1,547 to 2,534 lives and cause a
reduction of 46,896 to 65,801 MAIS 1–
5 injuries annually once all passenger
vehicles have ESC. This compares
favorably with the Regulatory Impact
Analyses for other important
rulemakings such as FMVSS No. 208
mandatory air bags (1,964 to 3,670 lives
saved), FMVSS No. 214 side impact
protection (690 to 1,030 lives saved 84),
84 Note that estimates for the FMVSS No. 214
rulemaking are from the agency’s preliminary
regulatory analysis that accompanied the notice of
proposed rulemaking. When the final rule is
published, the revised regulatory analysis will
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17297
and FMVSS No. 201 upper interior head
impact protection (870 to 1,050 lives
saved). The ESC final rule is expected
to also save $376 to $535 million
annually in property damage and travel
delay (undiscounted). The total cost of
this final rule is estimated to be $985
million.
The ESC final rule is extremely costeffective. The cost per equivalent life
saved is expected to range from $0.18 to
$0.33 million at a 3 percent discount
and $0.26 to $0.45 million at a 7 percent
discount. Again, the cost-effectiveness
for ESC compares favorably with the
Regulatory Impact Analyses for other
important rulemakings such as FMVSS
No. 202 head restraints safety
improvement ($2.61 million per life
saved), FMVSS No. 208 center seat
shoulder belts ($3.39 to $5.92 million
per life saved), FMVSS No. 208
advanced air bags ($1.9 to $9.0 million
per life saved), and FMVSS No. 301 fuel
system integrity upgrade ($1.96 to $5.13
million per life saved).
For a more complete discussion of the
benefits and costs associated with this
rulemaking for ESC, please consult the
Final Regulatory Impact Analysis
(FRIA), which is available in the docket
for this rulemaking.
B. ESC Benefits
As discussed in detail in Chapter IV
(Benefits) of the FRIA, we anticipate
that, when all light vehicles have ESC,
this rulemaking would prevent 67,466
to 90,807 crashes (1,430 to 2,354 fatal
crashes and 66,036 to 88,453 non-fatal
crashes). Preventing these crashes
entirely is the ideal safety outcome and
would translate into 1,547 to 2,534 lives
saved and 46,896 to 65,801 MAIS 1–5
injuries prevented.
The above figures include benefits
related to rollover crashes, a subset of
all crashes. However, in light of the
relatively severe nature of crashes
involving rollover, ESC’s contribution
toward mitigating the problem
associated with this subset of crashes
should be noted. We anticipate that this
rulemaking would prevent 35,680 to
39,387 rollover crashes (1,076 to 1,347
fatal crashes and 34,604 to 38,040 nonfatal crashes). This would translate into
1,171 to 1,465 lives saved and 33,001 to
36,420 MAIS 1–5 injuries prevented in
rollovers.
In addition, preventing crashes would
also result in benefits in terms of travel
delay savings and property damage
savings. We estimate that this
rulemaking would save $376 to $535
reflect the impact of today’s ESC final rule, which
will reduce the benefit of the FMVSS No. 214 rule.
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million, undiscounted,85 in these two
categories ($240 to $269 million of this
savings is attributable to prevented
rollover crashes).
We further note that this rule also has
the effect of causing all light vehicles to
be equipped with anti-lock braking
systems (ABS) as a foundation for ESC.
We anticipate some level of benefits
from improved brake performance on
vehicles not currently equipped with
ABS, but have not attempted to quantify
them. However, the potential benefits of
ABS did not influence our effectiveness
estimates for ESC, because all of the
non-ESC control vehicles in the study
already had ABS. The measure of
unquantified benefits relates to
situations where the ABS system
activates (but the ESC system does not
need to) on vehicles that were not
previously equipped with ABS.
C. ESC Costs
In order to estimate the cost of the
additional components required to
equip every vehicle in future model
years with an ESC system, assumptions
were made about future production
volume and the relationship between
equipment found in anti-lock brake
systems (ABS), traction control (TC),
and ESC systems. We assumed that in
an ESC system, the equipment of ABS
is a prerequisite. Thus, if a passenger car
did not have ABS, it would require the
cost of an ABS system plus the
additional incremental costs of the ESC
system to comply with an ESC standard.
We assumed that traction control (TC)
was not required to achieve the safety
benefits found with ESC. We estimated
a future annual production of 17 million
light vehicles consisting of nine million
light trucks and eight million passenger
cars.
An estimate was made of the MY 2011
installation rates of ABS and ESC. It
served as the baseline against which
both costs and benefits are measured.
Thus, the cost of the standard is the
incremental cost of going from the
estimated MY 2011 installations to 100
percent installation of ABS and ESC.
The estimated MY 2011 installation
rates are presented in Table 6.
TABLE 6.—MY 2011 PREDICTED
INSTALLATIONS
[Percent of the light vehicle fleet]
ABS +
ESC
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ABS
Passenger Cars ....
86
65
85 The present discounted value of these savings
ranges from $247 to $436 million (based on 3
percent and 7 percent discount rates).
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and very little is for the ESC
components. Since 99 percent of light
trucks are predicted to have ABS in MY
[Percent of the light vehicle fleet]
2011, the weight increase for light
trucks is less than one pound and is
ABS +
ABS
considered negligible. The average
ESC
weight gain for passenger cars is
Light Trucks ..........
99
77 estimated to be 2.13 pounds, resulting
in 2.6 more gallons of fuel being used
Based on the assumptions above and
over the lifetime of these vehicles. The
the data provided in Table 6, Table 7
present discounted value of the added
presents the percent of the MY 2011
fuel cost over the lifetime of the average
fleet that would need these specific
passenger car is estimated to be $2.73 at
technologies in order to equip all light
a 7 percent discount rate and $3.35 at
vehicles with ESC.
a 3 percent discount rate.
We have not included in these cost
TABLE 7.—PERCENT OF THE LIGHT
estimates, allowances for ESC system
VEHICLE FLEET REQUIRING TECH- maintenance and repair. Although all
NOLOGY TO ACHIEVE 100% ESC IN- complex electronic systems will
experience component failures from
STALLATION
time to time necessitating repair, our
experience to date with existing systems
ABS +
ESC
None
ESC
only
is that their failure rate is not outside
the norm. Also, there are no routine
Passenger Cars
65
14
21 maintenance requirements for ESC
Light Trucks ......
77
1
22
systems.
TABLE 6.—MY 2011 PREDICTED
INSTALLATIONS—Continued
The cost estimates developed for this
analysis were taken from tear down
studies that contractors have performed
for NHTSA. This process resulted in
estimates of the consumer cost of ABS
at $368 and the incremental cost of ESC
at $111. Thus, it would cost a vehicle
that does not have ABS currently, $479
to meet the requirements of this final
rule. Combining the technology needs in
Table 7 with the cost above and
assumed production volumes yields the
cost estimate in Table 8 for the ESC
standard. Thus, for example, the average
cost for passenger cars, including both
those that require installation of an ESC
system and those that already have it, is
$90.
VI. Regulatory Analyses and Notices
A. Vehicle Safety Act
As noted above, the agency is
implementing the ESC language in
SAFETEA–LU through promulgation of
a Federal motor vehicle safety standard
for ESC pursuant to 49 U.S.C. Chapter
301, Motor Vehicle Safety. Thus, in
developing this final rule for ESC, the
agency carefully considered the
statutory requirements of both
SAFETEA–LU and 49 U.S.C. Chapter
301.
Under 49 U.S.C. Chapter 301, Motor
Vehicle Safety (49 U.S.C. 30101 et seq.),
the Secretary of Transportation is
responsible for prescribing motor
vehicle safety standards that are
practicable, meet the need for motor
TABLE 8.—SUMMARY OF VEHICLE
vehicle safety, and are stated in
COSTS FOR THE ESC STANDARD
objective terms.86 These motor vehicle
[2005$]
safety standards set the minimum level
of performance for a motor vehicle or
Average
Total costs motor vehicle equipment to be
vehicle
(millions)
considered safe.87 When prescribing
costs
such standards, the Secretary must
Passenger Cars ....
$90.3
$722.5 consider all relevant, available motor
Light Trucks ..........
29.2
262.7 vehicle safety information.88 The
Secretary also must consider whether a
Total ..................
58.0
985.2 standard is reasonable, practicable, and
appropriate for the type of motor vehicle
In summary, Table 8 shows that
or motor vehicle equipment for which it
requiring electronic stability control and is prescribed and the extent to which
anti-lock brakes will increase the cost of the standard will further the statutory
new light vehicles on average by $58,
purpose of reducing traffic accidents
totaling $985 million annually across
and associated deaths.89 The
the new light vehicle fleet.
responsibility for promulgation of
In addition, we note that this final
rule is expected to add weight to
86 49 U.S.C. 30111(a).
vehicles and consequently to increase
87 49 U.S.C. 30102(a)(9).
their lifetime use of fuel. Most of the
88 49 U.S.C. 30111(b).
89 Id.
added weight is for ABS components
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Federal motor vehicle safety standards
has been delegated to NHTSA.90 We
describe below our consideration of
these provisions.
First, in preparing this document, the
agency carefully evaluated available
research, testing results, and other
information related to ESC technology.
The agency performed extensive
research on its own and made use of
research performed by the Alliance of
Automobile Manufacturers and its
member companies, plus research from
Hyundai/Kia. We also performed
analyses of ESC using actual crash data
to determine the effectiveness of ESC in
reducing single-vehicle crashes and
rollovers. Furthermore, the agency
carefully considered all of the public
comments submitted on the NPRM for
ESC, along with any accompanying
data, and responded to such information
as part of this final rule. In sum, this
document reflects our consideration of
all relevant, available motor vehicle
safety information.
Second, to ensure that the ESC
requirements are practicable, the agency
research and the industry research
documented the capabilities of current
ESC systems and dynamic performance
of model year 2005 vehicles equipped
with them. ESC is a developed
technology that is currently available on
a wide variety of vehicle types and
models. We have concluded that all
current production vehicles equipped
with ESC systems are capable of
complying with the equipment
requirements, that all but one current
vehicle model are capable of complying
with the performance tests, and that
only minor software tuning would be
required to bring that vehicle model into
compliance. In sum, we believe that this
final rule is practicable for fleet-wide
implementation, in that it may be
implemented with existing technology
and is quite cost-effective, given its
potential to prevent thousands of deaths
and injuries each year, particularly
those associated with single-vehicle
crashes leading to rollover.
Third, the regulatory text following
this preamble is stated in objective
terms in order to specify precisely what
equipment constitutes an ESC system,
what performance is required, and how
performance is tested under the
standard. The final rule’s definition of
an ‘‘ESC System’’ is based on a
voluntary consensus definition
developed by the Society of Automotive
Engineers (SAE). The rule also includes
performance requirements and test
procedures for the timing and intensity
90 49 U.S.C. 105 and 322; delegation of authority
at 49 CFR 1.50.
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of the oversteer intervention by the ESC
system (i.e., a lateral stability criterion)
and the responsiveness of the vehicle
(i.e., a vehicle responsiveness criterion).
This test procedure involves a preciselydefined steering pattern performed by a
robotic steering machine under a
defined set of test conditions (e.g.,
ambient temperature, road test surface,
vehicle load, vehicle speed).
Performance is defined by objective
measurements of yaw rate and lateral
acceleration taken by scientific
instruments at precise times with
reference to the steering pattern. The
standard’s test procedures carefully
delineate how such testing is
conducted.
Historically, the agency has striven to
set motor vehicle safety standards that
are as performance-based as possible,
but we have interpreted our mandate as
permitting the adoption of more specific
regulatory requirements when such
action is in the interest of safety. In the
present case, the agency cannot specify
a practicable and repeatable dynamic
understeer performance test at this time.
As discussed in Section IV.C.4 above,
there is no available test for effective
understeer intervention in non-linearhandling, loss-of-control situations, and
the agency’s own research efforts were
not able to identify a broadly applicable
test for understeer that would ensure
intervention by the ESC system in all
appropriate cases. However, as the court
held in Chrysler Corporation v. DOT,91
NHTSA may specify equipment
requirements as part of an FMVSS
where development of a performance
standard alone would not be practicable
or meet the need for motor vehicle
safety. Such is the case here, thereby
necessitating our adoption of a
definitional requirement for an ESC
system (based upon the definition in
SAE J2564) that has the components/
capabilities for effective understeer (and
oversteer) intervention, consistent with
current production systems. However,
the agency will continue its research
effort pertaining to ESC understeer
intervention and will consider
amending the standard in the future, as
appropriate.
In light of the above, the agency
believes that the regulatory
requirements and test procedures in this
final rule are sufficiently objective and
would not result in any uncertainty as
to whether a given vehicle satisfies the
requirements of the ESC standard.
91 515 F.2d 1053 (6th Cir. 1975) (holding that
NHTSA’s specification of dimensional requirements
for rectangular headlamps constitutes an objective
performance standard under the Vehicle Safety
Act).
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Finally, we believe that this final rule
is reasonable and appropriate for motor
vehicles subject to the applicable
requirements. As discussed elsewhere
in this notice, the agency is addressing
Congress’ concern about rollover
crashes resulting in fatalities and
serious injuries. Under section 10301 of
SAFETEA–LU, Congress mandated
installation of stability enhancing
technologies in new vehicles to reduce
rollovers. NHTSA has determined that
ESC systems meeting the requirements
of this final rule offer an effective
countermeasure to rollover crashes and
to other single-vehicle and certain
multi-vehicle crashes. Accordingly, we
believe that this final rule is appropriate
for vehicles subject to these provisions
because it furthers the agency’s
objective of preventing deaths and
serious injuries, particularly those
associated with rollover crashes.
B. Executive Order 12866 and DOT
Regulatory Policies and Procedures
Executive Order 12866, ‘‘Regulatory
Planning and Review’’ (58 FR 51735,
October 4, 1993), provides for making
determinations whether a regulatory
action is ‘‘significant’’ and therefore
subject to Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) review and to the
requirements of the Executive Order.
The Order defines a ‘‘significant
regulatory action’’ as one that is likely
to result in a rule that may:
(1) Have an annual effect on the
economy of $100 million or more or
adversely affect in a material way the
economy, a sector of the economy,
productivity, competition, jobs, the
environment, public health or safety, or
State, local, or Tribal governments or
communities;
(2) Create a serious inconsistency or
otherwise interfere with an action taken
or planned by another agency;
(3) Materially alter the budgetary
impact of entitlements, grants, user fees,
or loan programs or the rights and
obligations of recipients thereof; or
(4) Raise novel legal or policy issues
arising out of legal mandates, the
President’s priorities, or the principles
set forth in the Executive Order.
We have considered the impact of this
action under Executive Order 12866 and
the Department of Transportation’s
regulatory policies and procedures. This
action has been determined to be
economically significant under the
Executive Order, and it is also a subject
of congressional interest and a mandate
under section 10301 of SAFETEA–LU.
The agency has prepared and placed in
the docket a Final Regulatory Impact
Analysis. This rulemaking action is also
significant within the meaning of the
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Department of Transportation’s
Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44
FR 11034; February 26, 1979).
Accordingly, this rulemaking document
was reviewed by the Office of
Management and Budget under
Executive Order 12866, ‘‘Regulatory
Planning and Review.’’ The agency has
estimated that compliance with this rule
would cost approximately $985 million
per year and have net benefits as high
as $11.4 billion per year. Thus, this rule
would have greater than a $100 million
effect.
C. Regulatory Flexibility Act
Pursuant to the Regulatory Flexibility
Act of 1980 (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq., as
amended by the Small Business
Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act
(SBREFA) of 1996), whenever an agency
is required to publish a notice of
rulemaking for any proposed or final
rule, it must prepare and make available
for public comment a regulatory
flexibility analysis that describes the
effect of the rule on small entities (i.e.,
small businesses, small organizations,
and small governmental jurisdictions).
However, no regulatory or flexibility
analysis is required if the head of an
agency certifies that the rule will not
have a significant economic impact on
a substantial number of small entities.
SBREFA amended the Regulatory
Flexibility Act to require Federal
agencies to provide a statement of the
factual basis for certifying that a rule
will not have a significant economic
impact on a substantial number of small
entities.
NHTSA has considered the effects of
this rulemaking action under the
Regulatory Flexibility Act and has
included a final regulatory flexibility
analysis in the FRIA. This analysis
discusses potential regulatory
alternatives that the agency considered
that would still meet the identified
safety need of reducing the occurrence
of rollovers through stability enhancing
technologies. Alternatives considered
included (a) Applying the standard to
light trucks but not to passenger cars
and (b) permitting front-wheel-only ESC
systems that are incapable of understeer
intervention. The first alternative was
rejected because passenger car ESC
systems would save 945 lives and
reduce 32,196 injuries annually at a cost
per equivalent fatality that would easily
justify a separate rule for passenger cars.
The second alternative was rejected
because front-wheel-only ESC systems
would prevent 30 percent fewer singlevehicle crashes without producing a
large cost saving.
To summarize the conclusions of that
analysis, the agency believes that the
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final rule will have a significant
economic impact on a substantial
number of small businesses. There are
currently four small domestic motor
vehicle manufacturers in the United
States, each having fewer than 1,000
employees. Although the cost for an
ESC system is relatively high, we
believe that these manufacturers should
be able to pass the associated costs on
to purchasers without decreasing sales
volume, because the demand for the
high-end, luxury vehicles produced by
these manufacturers tends to be
inelastic and the increase in total
vehicle cost is expected to be only 0.2–
1.1 percent.
There are a significant number of
final-stage manufacturers and alterers
likely to be impacted by the final rule
for ESC, some of which buy incomplete
vehicles. However, final-stage
manufacturers and alterers typically do
not modify the brake system of the
vehicle (the modification most likely to
impact ESC), so the original
manufacturer’s certification of the ESC
system should pass through for these
vehicles. To the extent other subsequent
vehicle modifications have the potential
to affect the ability of an ESC system to
perform as originally designed, we
encourage vehicle/ESC manufacturers
and final-stage manufacturers and
alterers to communicate as to the effects
that subsequent vehicle modifications
may have on ESC systems in order to
ensure continued proper functioning.
As with other vehicle technologies that
may be affected by final stages of
manufacturing or subsequent
alterations, NHTSA also encourages
OEMs to be in contact with final-stage
manufacturers and alterers, to the extent
possible, to ensure that the certification
of their vehicles under the ESC standard
is not compromised. We believe that
increased costs associated with ESC will
impact all such final-stage
manufacturers and alterers equally, and
that such costs will be passed on to
consumers. Furthermore, we have no
reason to believe that an average cost of
$90 per passenger car and $29 per truck
will cause a significant decline in
overall vehicle sales.
We do not expect manufacturers of
ESC systems to be classified as small
businesses.
The agency also received public
comments from SEMA and Mr.
Sparhawk arguing that the agency is
bound to address the indirect effects
that this regulation would have on
installers of aftermarket vehicle
equipment and motor vehicle repair
businesses.
Although our response to these
commenters is discussed more fully
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under Section IV.C.14(a), we repeat that
this final rule establishes performance
and equipment requirements for ESC
systems and that the only entities
subject to and directly affected by these
requirements are vehicle manufacturers
and manufacturers of ESC systems.
Nothing in this rule subjects the entities
described by SEMA and Mr. Sparhawk
to NHTSA’s regulation. However,
NHTSA nevertheless considered the
effects that the ESC final rule might
have on aftermarket motor vehicle
equipment manufacturers and the motor
vehicle service industry, and based
upon that analysis, the agency is not
aware of any significant compatibility
problems between ESC systems and
other vehicle equipment. Although the
agency will continue to monitor this
issue, we do not believe it appropriate
to delay this final rule for ESC systems
and the significant safety benefits
accompanying them on the basis of
speculative arguments regarding
compatibility problems for which there
is no evidence.
D. Executive Order 13132 (Federalism)
NHTSA has examined today’s final
rule pursuant to Executive Order 13132
(64 FR 43255, August 10, 1999) and
concluded that no additional
consultation with States, local
governments, or their representatives is
mandated beyond the rulemaking
process. The agency has concluded that
the rule does not have federalism
implications, because the rule does not
have ‘‘substantial direct effects on the
States, on the relationship between the
national government and the States, or
on the distribution of power and the
responsibilities among the various
levels of government.’’
Further, no consultation is needed to
discuss the preemptive effect of today’s
rule. NHTSA rules can have preemptive
effect in at least two ways. First, the
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle
Safety Act contains an express
preemptive provision: ‘‘When a motor
vehicle safety standard is in effect under
this chapter, a State or a political
subdivision of a State may prescribe or
continue in effect a standard applicable
to the same aspect of performance of a
motor vehicle or motor vehicle
equipment only if the standard is
identical to the standard prescribed
under this chapter.’’ 49 U.S.C.
30102(b)(1). In addition, we note that
this final rule establishing a safety
standard for electronic stability control
systems was mandated by Congress,
pursuant to section 10301 of SAFETEA–
LU. It is this statutory command that
preempts State law, not today’s
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rulemaking, so consultation would be
inappropriate.
In addition to the express preemption
noted above, the Supreme Court has
also recognized that State requirements
imposed on motor vehicle
manufacturers, including sanctions
imposed by State tort law, can stand as
an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of a NHTSA safety standard.
When such a conflict is discerned, the
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution
makes their State requirements
unenforceable. See Geier v. American
Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000).
NHTSA has not outlined such potential
State requirements in today’s
rulemaking, however, in part because
such conflicts can arise in varied
contexts, but it is conceivable that such
a conflict may become clear through
subsequent experience with today’s
standard and test regime. NHTSA may
opine on such conflicts in the future, if
warranted. See id. at 883–86.
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E. Executive Order 12988 (Civil Justice
Reform)
With respect to the review of the
promulgation of a new regulation,
section 3(b) of Executive Order 12988,
‘‘Civil Justice Reform’’ (61 FR 4729,
February 7, 1996) requires that
Executive agencies make every
reasonable effort to ensure that the
regulation: (1) Clearly specifies the
preemptive effect; (2) clearly specifies
the effect on existing Federal law or
regulation; (3) provides a clear legal
standard for affected conduct, while
promoting simplification and burden
reduction; (4) clearly specifies the
retroactive effect, if any; (5) adequately
defines key terms; and (7) addresses
other important issues affecting clarity
and general draftsmanship under any
guidelines issued by the Attorney
General. This document is consistent
with that requirement.
Pursuant to this Order, NHTSA notes
as follows. The preemptive effect of this
rule is discussed above. NHTSA notes
further that there is no requirement that
individuals submit a petition for
reconsideration or pursue other
administrative proceeding before they
may file suit in court.
F. Executive Order 13045 (Protection of
Children From Environmental Health
and Safety Risks)
Executive Order 13045, ‘‘Protection of
Children from Environmental Health
and Safety Risks’’ (62 FR 19855, April
23, 1997), applies to any rule that: (1)
Is determined to be ‘‘economically
significant’’ as defined under Executive
Order 12866, and (2) concerns an
environmental, health, or safety risk that
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17301
the agency has reason to believe may
have a disproportionate effect on
children. If the regulatory action meets
both criteria, the agency must evaluate
the environmental health or safety
effects of the planned rule on children,
and explain why the planned regulation
is preferable to other potentially
effective and reasonably feasible
alternatives considered by the agency.
Although the rule for ESC has been
determined to be an economically
significant regulatory action under
Executive Order 12866, the problems
associated with loss of vehicle control
equally impact all persons riding in a
vehicle, regardless of age. Consequently,
this final rule does not involve a
decision based on environmental,
health, or safety risks that
disproportionately affect children and
would not necessitate further analyses
under Executive Order 13045.
G. Paperwork Reduction Act
Under the Paperwork Reduction Act
of 1995 (PRA), a person is not required
to respond to a collection of information
by a Federal agency unless the
collection displays a valid OMB control
number. The Department of
Transportation is submitting the
following information collection request
to OMB for review and clearance under
the PRA.
Agency: National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration (NHTSA).
Title: Phase-In Production Reporting
Requirements for Electronic Stability
Control Systems.
Type of Request: Routine.
OMB Clearance Number: 2127-New.
Form Number: This collection of
information will not use any standard
forms.
Affected Public: The respondents are
manufacturers of passenger cars,
multipurpose passenger vehicles,
trucks, and buses having a gross vehicle
weight rating of 4,536 Kg (10,000
pounds) or less. The agency estimates
that there are about 21 such
manufacturers.
Estimate of the Total Annual
Reporting and Recordkeeping Burden
Resulting from the Collection of
Information: NHTSA estimates that the
total annual hour burden is 42 hours.
Estimated Costs: NHTSA estimates
that the total annual cost burden, in U.S.
dollars, will be $2,100. No additional
resources would be expended by vehicle
manufacturers to gather annual
production information because they
already compile this data for their own
uses.
Summary of Collection of
Information: This collection would
require manufacturers of passenger cars,
multipurpose passenger vehicles,
trucks, and buses with a gross vehicle
weight rating of 4,536 Kg (10,000
pounds) or less to provide motor vehicle
production data for the following three
years: September 1, 2008 to August 31,
2009; September 1, 2009 to August 31,
2010; and September 1, 2010 to August
31, 2011.
Description of the Need for the
Information and the Proposed Use of
the Information: The purpose of the
reporting requirements will be to aid
NHTSA in determining whether a
manufacturer has complied with the
requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle
Safety Standard No. 126, Electronic
Stability Control Systems, during the
phase-in of those requirements. In the
NPRM, NHTSA requested comments on
the agency’s estimates of the total
annual hour and cost burdens resulting
from this collection of information. No
comments were received on this issue.
H. National Technology Transfer and
Advancement Act
Section 12(d) of the National
Technology Transfer and Advancement
Act of 1995 (NTTAA), Public Law 104–
113, section 12(d) (15 U.S.C. 272)
directs NHTSA to use voluntary
consensus standards in its regulatory
activities unless doing so would be
inconsistent with applicable law or
otherwise impractical. Voluntary
consensus standards are technical
standards (e.g., materials specifications,
test methods, sampling procedures, and
business practices) that are developed or
adopted by voluntary consensus
standards bodies, such as the Society of
Automotive Engineers (SAE). The
NTTAA directs NHTSA to provide
Congress, through OMB, explanations
when the agency decides not to use
available and applicable voluntary
consensus standards. The NTTAA does
not apply to symbols.
The equipment requirements of this
standard are based (with minor
modifications) on the SAE Surface
Vehicle Information Report on
Automotive Stability Enhancement
Systems J2564 Rev JUN2004 that
provides an industry consensus
definition of an ESC system. However,
there is no voluntary consensus
standard for ESC that contains any
specifications for a performance test.
The agency has also incorporated by
reference two standards developed by
the American Society for Testing and
Materials (ASTM) in order to provide
specifications for road test surface
conditions for use in the standard’s test
procedures. These are: (1) ASTM
E1337–90 (rev. 1996), Standard Test
Method for Determining Longitudinal
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Peak Braking Coefficient of Paved
Surfaces Using a STD Reference Test
Tire; and (2) ASTM E1136–93, Standard
Specification for a Radial Standard
Reference Test Tire (1993).
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I. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
Section 202 of the Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA)
requires Federal agencies to prepare a
written assessment of the costs, benefits,
and other effects of proposed or final
rules that include a Federal mandate
likely to result in the expenditure by
State, local or tribal governments, in the
aggregate, or by the private sector, of
more than $100 million in any one year
(adjusted for inflation with base year of
1995, currently $122 million in 2005
dollars). Before promulgating a rule for
which a written statement is needed,
section 205 of the UMRA generally
requires NHTSA to identify and
consider a reasonable number of
regulatory alternatives and adopt the
least costly, most cost-effective, or least
burdensome alternative that achieves
the objectives of the rule. The
provisions of section 205 do not apply
when they are inconsistent with
applicable law. Moreover, section 205
allows NHTSA to adopt an alternative
other than the least costly, most costeffective or least burdensome alternative
if we publish with the final rule an
explanation why that alternative was
not adopted.
This final rule is not expected to
result in the expenditure by State, local,
or tribal governments, in the aggregate,
of more than $122 million annually, but
it will result in the expenditure of that
magnitude by vehicle manufacturers
and/or their suppliers.
As noted above, this rulemaking is
being promulgated pursuant to section
10301 of the Safe, Accountable,
Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity
Act: A Legacy for Users of 2005
(SAFETEA–LU). As part of this final
rule, the agency is presenting not only
its regulatory approach for ESC, but also
the regulatory alternatives it considered;
we also present a detailed discussion of
the costs and benefits associated with
the rule (see the FRIA and also Section
V of this document).
In terms of regulatory alternatives
considered, the agency analyzed three
possibilities: (1) Limiting the standard’s
applicability to light trucks and vans
(LTVs); (2) permitting use of 2-channel
ESC systems; and (3) three different
potential phase-in schedules.92 The
92 As explained in Chapter VII of the FRIA, the
agency assessed the following potential phase-in
schedules for ESC: (A) 30%/60%/90% with carry
forward credits (as proposed in the NPRM); (B)
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following briefly explains the
conclusions that the agency reached in
analyzing these available alternatives.
Although the first alternative reduces
overall costs of the regulation and
increases cost-effectiveness (based upon
the higher propensity for LTVs to roll
over), the agency rejected it because our
analysis showed that requiring ESC for
passenger cars would save 945 lives and
reduce 32,196 non-fatal injuries. These
benefits were substantial in their own
right (a net benefit of $4.7 billion at a
3 percent discount rate and $3.7 billion
at a 7 percent discount rate). Further,
ESC was found to be highly costeffective for passenger cars alone ($0.38
million at a 3 percent discount rate and
$0.50 million at a 7 percent discount
rate).
Although the second alternative
would have reduced the cost of the
regulation by approximately $10 per
vehicle, the agency rejected that
alternative because the agency’s
research showed a potentially enhanced
safety benefit from 4-channel ESC
systems, as compared to 2-channel
systems, and also because of the strong
industry trend toward providing 4channel systems. A more detailed
analysis of the regulatory alternatives
considered by the agency may be found
in the FRIA (see FRIA Chapter VII).
In terms of the alternative phase-in
schedules, the agency analyzed a
number of potential alternatives to
identify the schedule that would
facilitate ESC installation in the light
vehicle fleet as expeditiously as
possible, while at the same time ensure
the financial and technological
practicability of the final rule (in
keeping with our statutory mandate). To
this end, the agency analyzed the
product plans submitted by six vehicle
manufacturers, whose combined
production accounts for approximately
87 percent of the new light vehicle fleet.
As explained in Chapter VII of the FRIA,
we examined three different potential
phase-in schedules to find the right
balance among these competing
concerns.
Two factors were controlling in
making the decision as to which
alternative to choose: (1) The ability of
manufacturers to change vehicles from
being equipped with optional ESC to
standard ESC for MY 2010 and MY
2011; and (2) Not forcing any
manufacturer to install ESC in any
make/model for which it was not
planned to be at least an option. The
agency did not believe there was enough
lead time to redesign such a make/
55%/75%/95% with carry forward credits; and (C)
55%/75%/95% without carry forward credits.
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model to include ESC by MY 2009.
While there may be enough time to
redesign a make/model to include ESC
by MY 2010, given the carry forward
provisions, this was not necessary for
any of the six manufacturers for MY
2010. The second consideration became
a factor once again in MY 2011, in not
going beyond 95 percent (thereby
obviating the costly need to redesign
and develop tooling for a few vehicle
lines which will not be produced in MY
2012).
Based upon this product plan
information and the desire to provide
manufacturers with flexibility, we chose
the most aggressive phase-in alternative
with a carry forward provision that we
believe is reasonable (i.e., 55/75/95%).
(We note that the estimates below are
compared to a baseline of the NPRM’s
proposed phase-in schedule of 30/60/
90% with carry-forward credits.)
Although the 55/75/95% phase-in
alternative was not the least costly
(expected to increase total compliance
costs by $295 million), it was
nevertheless very cost-effective ($0.394
to $0.640 million per equivalent life
saved at a 3 percent discount rate;
$0.496 to $0.802 million per equivalent
life saved at a 7 percent discount rate).
Further, this alternative also had the
potential to substantially increase the
number of prevented fatalities (336–550)
and injuries (10,174–14,276) over the
lifetime of the three model years in the
phase-in period. Although the 55/75/
95% without carry-forward credits
alternative theoretically had higher
benefits and was more cost-effective, the
agency determined that based upon
available product plan information, it
may not be practical for manufacturers
to achieve such high installation rates in
such a short timeframe without carryforward credits. Accordingly, the agency
believes that the alternative chosen will
provide the highest achievable level of
incremental benefits among the
schedules with a carry-forward
provision, a feature the agency
determined was necessary for
reasonable implementation of the
standard.
Accordingly, in light of the
substantial benefits in terms of fatalities
and injuries prevented (discussed at
length in the FRIA and elsewhere in this
document), the agency decided to adopt
an ESC requirement for all light
vehicles, even though this alternative
was not the least costly, most costeffective, or least burdensome available.
In light of the demonstrated
effectiveness of ESC in preventing
single-vehicle crashes (including
rollovers), the agency decided that it
would be inappropriate to not make the
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life-saving benefits of ESC available to
all vehicle occupants and in the shortest
timeframe that the agency determined to
be both reasonable and practicable. As
noted previously, we have determined
that the final rule’s phase-in schedule
may be accomplished without
disruptive changes in manufacturer and
supplier production processes.
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In addition, as part of the public
comment process, the agency’s NPRM
also invited suggestions regarding ways
to promote flexibility and to minimize
costs of compliance, while achieving the
safety purposes of SAFETEA–LU. The
overwhelming majority of public
comments supported the ESC
rulemaking and offered no suggested
substitute. However, commenters did
suggest numerous technical changes
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that might be characterized as
promoting flexibility or minimizing
costs. Each such issue is addressed in
this final rule.
J. National Environmental Policy Act
NHTSA has analyzed this rulemaking
action for the purposes of the National
Environmental Policy Act. The agency
has determined that implementation of
this action would not have any
significant impact on the quality of the
human environment.
K. Regulation Identifier Number (RIN)
The Department of Transportation
assigns a regulation identifier number
(RIN) to each regulatory action listed in
the Unified Agenda of Federal
Regulations. The Regulatory Information
Service Center publishes the Unified
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17303
Agenda in April and October of each
year. You may use the RIN contained in
the heading at the beginning of this
document to find this action in the
Unified Agenda.
L. Privacy Act
Please note that anyone is able to
search the electronic form of all
comments received into any of our
dockets by the name of the individual
submitting the comment (or signing the
comment, if submitted on behalf of an
association, business, labor union, etc.).
You may review DOT’s complete
Privacy Act Statement in the Federal
Register published on April 11, 2000
(Volume 65, Number 70; pages 19477–
78) or you may visit https://dms.dot.gov.
BILLING CODE 4910–59–P
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BILLING CODE 4910–59–C
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List of Subjects in 49 CFR Parts 571 and
585
Imports, Incorporation by reference,
Motor vehicle safety, Report and
recordkeeping requirements, Tires.
I In consideration of the foregoing,
NHTSA is amending 49 CFR parts 571
and 585 as follows:
PART 571—FEDERAL MOTOR
VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARDS
1. The authority citation for part 571
continues to read as follows:
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Authority: 49 U.S.C. 322, 30111, 30115,
30117, and 30166; delegation of authority at
49 CFR 1.50.
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2. Section 571.101 is amended by
revising the section heading, S5.5.2,
S5.5.5, and Table 1 to read as follows:
I
§ 571.101
displays.
Standard No. 101; Controls and
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S5.5.2. The telltales for any brake
system malfunction required by Table 1
to be red, air bag malfunction, low tire
pressure, electronic stability control
malfunction, passenger air bag off, high
beam, turn signal, and seat belt must not
be shown in the same common space.
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S5.5.5. In the case of the telltale for a
brake system malfunction, air bag
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malfunction, side air bag malfunction,
low tire pressure, electronic stability
control malfunction, passenger air bag
off, high beam, turn signal, or seat belt
that is designed to display in a common
space, that telltale must displace any
other symbol or message in that
common space while the underlying
condition for the telltale’s activation
exists.
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BILLING CODE 4910–59–P
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Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 66 / Friday, April 6, 2007 / Rules and Regulations
Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 66 / Friday, April 6, 2007 / Rules and Regulations
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3. Section 571.126 is added to read as
follows:
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§ 571.126 Standard No. 126; Electronic
stability control systems.
S1. Scope. This standard establishes
performance and equipment
requirements for electronic stability
control (ESC) systems.
S2. Purpose. The purpose of this
standard is to reduce the number of
deaths and injuries that result from
crashes in which the driver loses
directional control of the vehicle,
including those resulting in vehicle
rollover.
S3. Application and Incorporation by
Reference.
S3.1 Application. This standard
applies to passenger cars, multipurpose
passenger vehicles, trucks, and buses
with a gross vehicle weight rating of
4,536 kilograms (10,000 pounds) or less,
according to the phase-in schedule
specified in S8 of this standard.
S3.2 Incorporation by reference.
ASTM E1337–90 (Reapproved 1996),
Standard Test Method for Determining
Longitudinal Peak Braking Coefficient of
Paved Surfaces Using a STD Reference
Test Tire, and ASTM E1136–93 (1993),
Standard Specification for a Radial
Standard Reference Test Tire, are
incorporated by reference in S6.2.2 of
this section. The Director of the Federal
Register has approved the incorporation
by reference of this material in
accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1
CFR Part 51. Copies of ASTM E1337–90
(rev. 1996) and ASTM E1136–93 (1993)
may be obtained from the ASTM Web
site at https://www.astm.org, or by
contacting ASTM, 100 Barr Harbor
Drive, West Conshohocken, PA 19428–
2959. Copies of ASTM E1337–90
(Reapproved 1996) and ASTM E1136–
93 (1993) may be inspected at NHTSA’s
Office of Rulemaking, 400 Seventh
Street, SW., Washington, DC 20590, or
at the National Archives and Records
Administration (NARA). For
information on the availability of this
material at NARA, call 202–741–6030,
or go to: https://www.archives.gov/
federal_register/
code_of_federal_regulations/
ibr_locations.html.
S4. Definitions.
Ackerman Steer Angle means the
angle whose tangent is the wheelbase
divided by the radius of the turn at a
very low speed.
Electronic Stability Control System or
ESC System means a system that has all
of the following attributes:
(1) That augments vehicle directional
stability by applying and adjusting the
vehicle brake torques individually to
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induce a correcting yaw moment to a
vehicle;
(2) That is computer controlled with
the computer using a closed-loop
algorithm to limit vehicle oversteer and
to limit vehicle understeer;
(3) That has a means to determine the
vehicle’s yaw rate and to estimate its
side slip or side slip derivative with
respect to time;
(4) That has a means to monitor driver
steering inputs;
(5) That has an algorithm to determine
the need, and a means to modify engine
torque, as necessary, to assist the driver
in maintaining control of the vehicle,
and
(6) That is operational over the full
speed range of the vehicle (except at
vehicle speeds less than 15 km/h (9.3
mph) or when being driven in reverse).
Lateral Acceleration means the
component of the vector acceleration of
a point in the vehicle perpendicular to
the vehicle x axis (longitudinal) and
parallel to the road plane.
Oversteer means a condition in which
the vehicle’s yaw rate is greater than the
yaw rate that would occur at the
vehicle’s speed as a result of the
Ackerman Steer Angle.
Sideslip or side slip angle means the
arctangent of the lateral velocity of the
center of gravity of the vehicle divided
by the longitudinal velocity of the
center of gravity.
Understeer means a condition in
which the vehicle’s yaw rate is less than
the yaw rate that would occur at the
vehicle’s speed as result of the
Ackerman Steer Angle.
Yaw rate means the rate of change of
the vehicle’s heading angle measured in
degrees/second of rotation about a
vertical axis through the vehicle’s center
of gravity.
S5. Requirements. Subject to the
phase-in set forth in S8, each vehicle
must be equipped with an ESC system
that meets the requirements specified in
S5 under the test conditions specified in
S6 and the test procedures specified in
S7 of this standard.
S5.1 Required Equipment. Vehicles
to which this standard applies must be
equipped with an electronic stability
control system that:
S5.1.1 Is capable of applying brake
torques individually to all four wheels
and has a control algorithm that utilizes
this capability.
S5.1.2 Is operational during all
phases of driving including
acceleration, coasting, and deceleration
(including braking), except when the
driver has disabled ESC, the vehicle
speed is below 15 km/h (9.3 mph), or
the vehicle is being driven in reverse.
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S5.1.3 Remains capable of activation
even if the antilock brake system or
traction control system is also activated.
S5.2 Performance Requirements.
During each test performed under the
test conditions of S6 and the test
procedure of S7.9, the vehicle with the
ESC system engaged must satisfy the
stability criteria of S5.2.1 and S5.2.2,
and it must satisfy the responsiveness
criterion of S5.2.3 during each of those
tests conducted with a commanded
steering wheel angle of 5A or greater,
where A is the steering wheel angle
computed in S7.6.1.
S5.2.1 The yaw rate measured one
second after completion of the sine with
dwell steering input (time T0 + 1 in
Figure 1) must not exceed 35 percent of
the first peak value of yaw rate recorded
after the steering wheel angle changes
sign (between first and second peaks)
«
(yPeak in Figure 1) during the same test
run, and
S5.2.2 The yaw rate measured 1.75
seconds after completion of the sine
with dwell steering input must not
exceed 20 percent of the first peak value
of yaw rate recorded after the steering
wheel angle changes sign (between first
and second peaks) during the same test
run.
S5.2.3 The lateral displacement of
the vehicle center of gravity with
respect to its initial straight path must
be at least 1.83 m (6 feet) for vehicles
with a GVWR of 3,500kg (7,716 lb) or
less, and 1.52 m (5 feet) for vehicles
with a GVWR greater than 3,500 kg
(7,716 lb) when computed 1.07 seconds
after the Beginning of Steer (BOS). BOS
is defined in S7.11.6.
S5.2.3.1 The computation of lateral
displacement is performed using double
integration with respect to time of the
measurement of lateral acceleration at
the vehicle center of gravity, as
expressed by the formula:
Lateral Displacement = ∫∫ Ay C.G.dt
S5.2.3.2 Time t = 0 for the
integration operation is the instant of
steering initiation, known as the
Beginning of Steer (BOS). BOS is
defined in S7.11.6.
S5.3 ESC Malfunction. The vehicle
must be equipped with a telltale that
provides a warning to the driver of the
occurrence of one or more malfunctions
that affect the generation or
transmission of control or response
signals in the vehicle’s electronic
stability control system. The ESC
malfunction telltale:
S5.3.1 As of September 1, 2011,
must be mounted inside the occupant
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compartment in front of and in clear
view of the driver;
S5.3.2 As of September 1, 2011,
must be identified by the symbol shown
for ‘‘ESC Malfunction Telltale’’ or the
specified words or abbreviations listed
in Table 1 of Standard No. 101 (49 CFR
571.101);
S5.3.3 Except as provided in
paragraph S5.3.4, the ESC malfunction
telltale must illuminate only when a
malfunction(s) exists and must remain
continuously illuminated under the
conditions specified in S5.3 for as long
as the malfunction(s) exists, whenever
the ignition locking system is in the
‘‘On’’ (‘‘Run’’) position; and
S5.3.4 As of September 1, 2011,
except as provided in paragraph S5.3.5,
each ESC malfunction telltale must be
activated as a check of lamp function
either when the ignition locking system
is turned to the ‘‘On’’ (‘‘Run’’) position
when the engine is not running, or
when the ignition locking system is in
a position between ‘‘On’’ (‘‘Run’’) and
‘‘Start’’ that is designated by the
manufacturer as a check position.
S5.3.5 The ESC malfunction telltale
need not be activated when a starter
interlock is in operation.
S5.3.6 The requirement S5.3.4 does
not apply to telltales shown in a
common space.
S5.3.7 The ESC malfunction telltale
must extinguish at the next ignition
cycle after the malfunction has been
corrected.
S5.3.8 The manufacturer may use
the ESC malfunction telltale in a
flashing mode to indicate ESC
operation.
S5.3.9 Prior to September 1, 2011, a
disconnection of the power to the ESC
electronic control unit may be indicated
by the ABS malfunction telltale instead
of the ESC malfunction telltale, and a
disconnection of the ‘‘ESC Off’’ control
need not illuminate the ESC
malfunction telltale.
S5.4. ESC Off and Other System
Controls. The manufacturer may include
an ‘‘ESC Off’’ control whose only
purpose is to place the ESC system in
a mode in which it will no longer satisfy
the performance requirements of S5.2.1,
S5.2.2 and S5.2.3. Manufacturers may
also provide controls for other systems
that have an ancillary effect upon ESC
operation. Controls of either kind that
place the ESC system in a mode in
which it will no longer satisfy the
performance requirements of S5.2.1,
S5.2.2 and S5.2.3 are permitted,
provided that:
S5.4.1 The vehicle’s ESC system
must always return to a mode that
satisfies the requirements of S5.1 and
S5.2 at the initiation of each new
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ignition cycle, regardless of what mode
the driver had previously selected
except if that mode is specifically for
enhanced traction during low-speed,
off-road driving and is entered by the
driver using a mechanical control that
cannot be automatically reset
electrically. If the system has more than
one mode that satisfies these
requirements, the default mode must be
the mode that satisfies the performance
requirements of S5.2 by the greatest
margin.
S5.4.2 As of September 1, 2011, a
control whose only purpose is to place
the ESC system in a mode in which it
will no longer satisfy the performance
requirements of S5.2.1, S5.2.2 and
S5.2.3 must be identified by the symbol
shown for ‘‘ESC Off’’ in Table 1 of
Standard No. 101 (49 CFR 571.101) or
the text, ‘‘ESC Off’’ as listed under
‘‘Word(s) or Abbreviations’’ in Table 1
of Standard No. 101 (49 CFR 571.101).
S5.4.3 A control for another system
that has the ancillary effect of placing
the ESC system in a mode in which it
no longer satisfies the performance
requirements of S5.2.1, S5.2.2 and
S5.2.3 need not be identified by the
‘‘ESC Off’’ identifiers in Table 1 of
Standard No. 101 (49 CFR 571.101), but
the ESC status must be identified by the
‘‘ESC Off’’ telltale in accordance with
S5.5.
S5.5 ESC Off Telltale
S5.5.1 The vehicle manufacturer
must provide a telltale indicating that
the vehicle has been put into a mode
that renders it unable to satisfy the
requirements of S5.2.1, S5.2.2 and
S5.2.3, if such a mode is provided.
S5.5.2 As of September 1, 2011, the
‘‘ESC Off’’ telltale must be identified by
the symbol shown for ‘‘ESC Off’’ in
Table 1 of Standard No. 101 (49 CFR
571.101) or the text, ‘‘ESC Off’’ as listed
under ‘‘Word(s) or Abbreviations’’ in
Table 1 of Standard No. 101 (49 CFR
571.101).
S5.5.3 As of September 1, 2011, the
‘‘ESC Off’’ telltale must be mounted
inside the occupant compartment in
front of and in clear view of the driver.
S5.5.4 The ‘‘ESC Off’’ telltale must
remain continuously illuminated for as
long as the ESC is in a mode that
renders it unable to satisfy the
requirements of S5.2.1, S5.2.2 and
S5.2.3, and
S5.5.5 Notwithstanding S5.3.1(e) of
49 CFR 571.101, the vehicle
manufacturer may use the ‘‘ESC Off’’
telltale to indicate an ESC level of
function other than the fully functional
default mode even if the vehicle would
meet S5.2.1, S5.2.2 and S5.2.3 at that
level of ESC function.
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S5.5.6 As of September 1, 2011,
except as provided in paragraph S5.5.7
and S5.5.8, each ‘‘ESC Off’’ telltale must
be activated as a check of lamp function
either when the ignition locking system
is turned to the ‘‘On’’ (‘‘Run’’) position
when the engine is not running, or
when the ignition locking system is in
a position between ‘‘On’’ (‘‘Run’’) and
‘‘Start’’ that is designated by the
manufacturer as a check position.
S5.5.7 The ‘‘ESC Off’’ telltale need
not be activated when a starter interlock
is in operation.
S5.5.8 The requirement S5.5.6 does
not apply to telltales shown in a
common space.
S5.5.9 The ‘‘ESC Off’’ telltale must
extinguish after the ESC system has
been returned to its fully functional
default mode.
S5.6 ESC System Technical
Documentation. To ensure a vehicle is
equipped with an ESC system that
meets the definition of ‘‘ESC System’’ in
S4, the vehicle manufacturer must make
available to the agency, upon request,
the following documentation:
S5.6.1 A system diagram that
identifies all ESC system hardware. The
diagram must identify what components
are used to generate brake torques at
each wheel, determine vehicle yaw rate,
estimated side slip or the side slip
derivative and driver steering inputs.
S5.6.2 A written explanation
describing the ESC system basic
operational characteristics. This
explanation must include a discussion
on the system’s capability to apply
brake torques at each wheel and how
the system modifies engine torque
during ESC system activation. The
explanation must also identify the
vehicle speed range and the driving
phases (acceleration, deceleration,
coasting, during activation of the ABS or
traction control) under which the ESC
system can activate.
S5.6.3 A logic diagram that supports
the explanation provided in S5.6.2.
S5.6.4 Specifically for mitigating
vehicle understeer, a discussion of the
pertinent inputs to the computer or
calculations within the computer and
how its algorithm uses that information
and controls ESC system hardware to
limit vehicle understeer.
S6. Test Conditions.
S6.1 Ambient conditions.
S6.1.1 The ambient temperature is
between 7 °C (45 °F) and 40 °C (104 °F).
S6.1.2 The maximum wind speed is
no greater than 10 m/s (22 mph) for
passenger cars and 5 m/s (11 mph) for
multipurpose passenger vehicles, trucks
and buses.
S6.2 Road test surface.
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S6.2.1 The tests are conducted on a
dry, uniform, solid-paved surface.
Surfaces with irregularities and
undulations, such as dips and large
cracks, are unsuitable.
S6.2.2 The road test surface must
produce a peak friction coefficient (PFC)
of 0.9 when measured using an
American Society for Testing and
Materials (ASTM) E1136–93 (1993)
standard reference test tire, in
accordance with ASTM Method E 1337–
90 (Reapproved 1996), at a speed of 64.4
km/h (40 mph), without water delivery.
(These standards are here incorporated
by reference as explained in S3.2
above.)
S6.2.3 The test surface has a
consistent slope between level and 1%.
S6.3 Vehicle conditions.
S6.3.1 The ESC system is enabled
for all testing.
S6.3.2 Test Weight. The vehicle is
loaded with the fuel tank filled to at
least 75 percent of capacity, and total
interior load of 168 kg (370 lbs)
comprised of the test driver,
approximately 59 kg (130 lbs) of test
equipment (automated steering
machine, data acquisition system and
the power supply for the steering
machine), and ballast as required by
differences in the weight of test drivers
and test equipment. Where required,
ballast shall be placed on the floor
behind the passenger front seat or if
necessary in the front passenger foot
well area. All ballast shall be secured in
a way that prevents it from becoming
dislodged during test conduct.
S6.3.3 Tires. The vehicle is tested
with the tires installed on the vehicle at
time of initial vehicle sale. The tires are
inflated to the vehicle manufacturer’s
recommended cold tire inflation
pressure(s) specified on the vehicle’s
placard or the tire inflation pressure
label. Tubes may be installed to prevent
tire de-beading.
S6.3.4 Outriggers. Outriggers must
be used for testing trucks, multipurpose
passenger vehicles, and buses. Vehicles
with a baseline weight under 2,722 kg
(6,000 lbs) must be equipped with
‘‘standard’’ outriggers and vehicles with
a baseline weight equal to or greater
than 2,722 kg (6,000 lbs) must be
equipped with ‘‘heavy’’ outriggers. A
vehicle’s baseline weight is the weight
of the vehicle delivered from the dealer,
fully fueled, with a 73 kg (160 lb) driver.
Standard outriggers shall be designed
with a maximum weight of 32 kg (70 lb)
and a maximum roll moment of inertia
of 35.9 kg-m2 (26.5 ft-lb-sec2). Heavy
outriggers shall be designed with a
maximum weight of 39 kg (86 lb) and
a maximum roll moment of inertia of
40.7 kg-m2 (30.0 ft-lb-sec2).
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S6.3.5 Automated steering machine.
A steering machine programmed to
execute the required steering pattern
must be used in S7.5.2, S7.5.3, S7.6 and
S7.9. The steering machine shall be
capable of supplying steering torques
between 40 to 60 Nm (29.5 to 44.3 lbft). The steering machine must be able
to apply these torques when operating
with steering wheel velocities up to
1200 degrees per second.
S7. Test Procedure.
S7.1 Inflate the vehicles’ tires to the
cold tire inflation pressure(s) provided
on the vehicle’s placard or the tire
inflation pressure label.
S7.2 Telltale bulb check. With the
vehicle stationary and the ignition
locking system in the ‘‘Lock’’ or ‘‘Off’’
position, activate the ignition locking
system to the ‘‘On’’ (‘‘Run’’) position or,
where applicable, the appropriate
position for the lamp check. The ESC
malfunction telltale must be activated as
a check of lamp function, as specified in
S5.3.4, and if equipped, the ‘‘ESC Off’’
telltale must also be activated as a check
of lamp function, as specified in S5.5.6.
The telltale bulb check is not required
for a telltale shown in a common space
as specified in S5.3.6 and S5.5.8.
S7.3 ‘‘ESC Off’’ control check. For
vehicles equipped with an ‘‘ESC Off’’
control, with the vehicle stationary and
the ignition locking system in the
‘‘Lock’’ or ‘‘Off’’ position, activate the
ignition locking system to the ‘‘On’’
(‘‘Run’’) position. Activate the ‘‘ESC
Off’’ control and verify that the ‘‘ESC
Off’’ telltale is illuminated, as specified
in S5.5.4. Turn the ignition locking
system to the ‘‘Lock’’ or ‘‘Off’’ position.
Again, activate the ignition locking
system to the ‘‘On’’ (‘‘Run’’) position
and verify that the ‘‘ESC Off’’ telltale
has extinguished indicating that the ESC
system has been reactivated as specified
in S5.4.1.
S7.4 Brake Conditioning. Condition
the vehicle brakes as follows:
S7.4.1 Ten stops are performed from
a speed of 56 km/h (35 mph), with an
average deceleration of approximately
0.5 g.
S7.4.2 Immediately following the
series of 56 km/h (35 mph) stops, three
additional stops are performed from 72
km/h (45 mph).
S7.4.3 When executing the stops in
S7.4.2, sufficient force is applied to the
brake pedal to activate the vehicle’s
antilock brake system (ABS) for a
majority of each braking event.
S7.4.4 Following completion of the
final stop in S7.4.2, the vehicle is driven
at a speed of 72 km/h (45 mph) for five
minutes to cool the brakes.
S7.5 Tire Conditioning. Condition
the tires using the following procedure
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to wear away mold sheen and achieve
operating temperature immediately
before beginning the test runs of S7.6
and S7.9.
S7.5.1 The test vehicle is driven
around a circle 30 meters (100 feet) in
diameter at a speed that produces a
lateral acceleration of approximately 0.5
to 0.6 g for three clockwise laps
followed by three counterclockwise
laps.
S7.5.2 Using a sinusoidal steering
pattern at a frequency of 1 Hz, a peak
steering wheel angle amplitude
corresponding to a peak lateral
acceleration of 0.5–0.6 g, and a vehicle
speed of 56 km/h (35 mph), the vehicle
is driven through four passes
performing 10 cycles of sinusoidal
steering during each pass.
S7.5.3 The steering wheel angle
amplitude of the final cycle of the final
pass is twice that of the other cycles.
The maximum time permitted between
all laps and passes is five minutes.
S7.6 Slowly Increasing Steer Test.
The vehicle is subjected to two series of
runs of the Slowly Increasing Steer Test
using a constant vehicle speed of 80 ±
2 km/h (50 ± 1 mph) and a steering
pattern that increases by 13.5 degrees
per second until a lateral acceleration of
approximately 0.5 g is obtained. Three
repetitions are performed for each test
series. One series uses counterclockwise
steering, and the other series uses
clockwise steering. The maximum time
permitted between each test run is five
minutes.
S7.6.1 From the Slowly Increasing
Steer tests, the quantity ‘‘A’’ is
determined. ‘‘A’’ is the steering wheel
angle in degrees that produces a steady
state lateral acceleration (corrected
using the methods specified in S7.11.3)
of 0.3 g for the test vehicle. Utilizing
linear regression, A is calculated, to the
nearest 0.1 degrees, from each of the six
Slowly Increasing Steer tests. The
absolute value of the six A’s calculated
is averaged and rounded to the nearest
0.1 degrees to produce the final
quantity, A, used below.
S7.7 After the quantity A has been
determined, without replacing the tires,
the tire conditioning procedure
described in S7.5 is performed
immediately prior to conducting the
Sine with Dwell Test of S7.9. Initiation
of the first Sine with Dwell test series
shall begin within two hours after
completion of the Slowly Increasing
Steer tests of S7.6.
S7.8 Check that the ESC system is
enabled by ensuring that the ESC
malfunction and ‘‘ESC Off’’ (if provided)
telltales are not illuminated.
S7.9 Sine with Dwell Test of
Oversteer Intervention and
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Responsiveness. The vehicle is
subjected to two series of test runs using
a steering pattern of a sine wave at 0.7
Hz frequency with a 500 ms delay
beginning at the second peak amplitude
as shown in Figure 2 (the Sine with
Dwell tests). One series uses
counterclockwise steering for the first
half cycle, and the other series uses
clockwise steering for the first half
cycle. The vehicle is provided a cooldown period between each test run of
90 seconds to five minutes, with the
vehicle stationary.
S7.9.1 The steering motion is
initiated with the vehicle coasting in
high gear at 80 ±2 km/h (50 ±1 mph).
S7.9.2 In each series of test runs, the
steering amplitude is increased from run
to run, by 0.5A, provided that no such
run will result in a steering amplitude
greater than that of the final run
specified in S7.9.4.
S7.9.3 The steering amplitude for
the initial run of each series is 1.5A
where A is the steering wheel angle
determined in S7.6.1.
S7.9.4 The steering amplitude of the
final run in each series is the greater of
6.5A or 270 degrees, provided the
calculated magnitude of 6.5A is less
than or equal to 300 degrees. If any 0.5A
increment, up to 6.5A, is greater than
300 degrees, the steering amplitude of
the final run shall be 300 degrees.
S7.9.5 Upon completion of the two
series of test runs, post processing of
yaw rate and lateral acceleration data is
done as specified in S7.11.
S7.10 ESC Malfunction Detection.
S7.10.1 Simulate one or more ESC
malfunction(s) by disconnecting the
power source to any ESC component, or
disconnecting any electrical connection
between ESC components (with the
vehicle power off). When simulating an
ESC malfunction, the electrical
connections for the telltale lamp(s) are
not to be disconnected.
S7.10.2 With the vehicle initially
stationary and the ignition locking
system in the ‘‘Lock’’ or ‘‘Off’’ position,
activate the ignition locking system to
the ‘‘Start’’ position and start the engine.
Place the vehicle in a forward gear and
obtain a vehicle speed of 48 ± 8 km/h
(30 ± 5 mph). Drive the vehicle for at
least two minutes including at least one
left and one right turning maneuver.
Verify that within two minutes of
obtaining this vehicle speed the ESC
malfunction indicator illuminates in
accordance with S5.3.
S7.10.3 Stop the vehicle, deactivate
the ignition locking system to the ‘‘Off’’
or ‘‘Lock’’ position. After a five-minute
period, activate the vehicle’s ignition
locking system to the ‘‘Start’’ position
and start the engine. Verify that the ESC
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malfunction indicator again illuminates
to signal a malfunction and remains
illuminated as long as the engine is
running or until the fault is corrected.
S7.10.4 Deactivate the ignition
locking system to the ‘‘Off’’ or ‘‘Lock’’
position. Restore the ESC system to
normal operation, activate the ignition
system to the ‘‘Start’’ position and start
the engine. Verify that the telltale has
extinguished.
S7.11 Post Data Processing—
Calculations for Performance Metrics.
Yaw rate and lateral displacement
measurements and calculations must be
processed utilizing the following
techniques:
S7.11.1 Raw steering wheel angle
data is filtered with a 12-pole phaseless
Butterworth filter and a cutoff frequency
of 10Hz. The filtered data is then zeroed
to remove sensor offset utilizing static
pretest data.
S7.11.2 Raw yaw rate data is filtered
with a 12-pole phaseless Butterworth
filter and a cutoff frequency of 6Hz. The
filtered data is then zeroed to remove
sensor offset utilizing static pretest data.
S7.11.3 Raw lateral acceleration data
is filtered with a 12-pole phaseless
Butterworth filter and a cutoff frequency
of 6Hz. The filtered data is then zeroed
to remove sensor offset utilizing static
pretest data. The lateral acceleration
data at the vehicle center of gravity is
determined by removing the effects
caused by vehicle body roll and by
correcting for sensor placement via use
of coordinate transformation. For data
collection, the lateral accelerometer
shall be located as close as possible to
the position of the vehicle’s longitudinal
and lateral centers of gravity.
S7.11.4 Steering wheel velocity is
determined by differentiating the
filtered steering wheel angle data. The
steering wheel velocity data is then
filtered with a moving 0.1 second
running average filter.
S7.11.5 Lateral acceleration, yaw
rate and steering wheel angle data
channels are zeroed utilizing a defined
‘‘zeroing range.’’ The methods used to
establish the zeroing range are defined
in S7.11.5.1 and S7.11.5.2.
S7.11.5.1 Using the steering wheel
rate data calculated using the methods
described in S7.11.4, the first instant
steering wheel rate exceeds 75 deg/sec
is identified. From this point, steering
wheel rate must remain greater than 75
deg/sec for at least 200 ms. If the second
condition is not met, the next instant
steering wheel rate exceeds 75 deg/sec
is identified and the 200 ms validity
check applied. This iterative process
continues until both conditions are
ultimately satisfied.
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S7.11.5.2 The ‘‘zeroing range’’ is
defined as the 1.0 second time period
prior to the instant the steering wheel
rate exceeds 75 deg/sec (i.e., the instant
the steering wheel velocity exceeds 75
deg/sec defines the end of the ‘‘zeroing
range’’).
S7.11.6 The Beginning of Steer
(BOS) is defined as the first instance
filtered and zeroed steering wheel angle
data reaches ¥5 degrees (when the
initial steering input is
counterclockwise) or +5 degrees (when
the initial steering input is clockwise)
after time defining the end of the
‘‘zeroing range.’’ The value for time at
the BOS is interpolated.
S7.11.7 The Completion of Steer
(COS) is defined as the time the steering
wheel angle returns to zero at the
completion of the Sine with Dwell
steering maneuver. The value for time at
the zero degree steering wheel angle is
interpolated.
S7.11.8 The second peak yaw rate is
defined as the first local yaw rate peak
produced by the reversal of the steering
wheel. The yaw rates at 1.000 and 1.750
seconds after COS are determined by
interpolation.
S7.11.9 Determine lateral velocity by
integrating corrected, filtered and
zeroed lateral acceleration data. Zero
lateral velocity at BOS event. Determine
lateral displacement by integrating
zeroed lateral velocity. Zero lateral
displacement at BOS event. Lateral
displacement at 1.07 seconds from BOS
event is determined by interpolation.
S8. Phase-in schedule.
S8.1 Vehicles manufactured on or
after September 1, 2008, and before
September 1, 2009. For vehicles
manufactured on or after September 1,
2008, and before September 1, 2009, the
number of vehicles complying with this
standard must not be less than 55
percent of:
(a) The manufacturer’s average annual
production of vehicles manufactured on
or after September 1, 2005, and before
September 1, 2008; or
(b) The manufacturer’s production on
or after September 1, 2008, and before
September 1, 2009.
S8.2 Vehicles manufactured on or
after September 1, 2009, and before
September 1, 2010. For vehicles
manufactured on or after September 1,
2009, and before September 1, 2010, the
number of vehicles complying with this
standard must not be less than 75
percent of:
(a) The manufacturer’s average annual
production of vehicles manufactured on
or after September 1, 2006, and before
September 1, 2009; or
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(b) The manufacturer’s production on
or after September 1, 2009, and before
September 1, 2010.
S8.3 Vehicles manufactured on or
after September 1, 2010, and before
September 1, 2011. For vehicles
manufactured on or after September 1,
2010, and before September 1, 2011, the
number of vehicles complying with this
standard must not be less than 95
percent of:
(a) The manufacturer’s average annual
production of vehicles manufactured on
or after September 1, 2007, and before
September 1, 2010; or
(b) The manufacturer’s production on
or after September 1, 2010, and before
September 1, 2011.
S8.4 Vehicles manufactured on or
after September 1, 2011. All vehicles
manufactured on or after September 1,
2011 must comply with this standard.
S8.5 Calculation of complying
vehicles.
(a) For purposes of complying with
S8.1, a manufacturer may count a
vehicle if it is certified as complying
with this standard and is manufactured
on or after June 5, 2007, but before
September 1, 2009.
(b) For purpose of complying with
S8.2, a manufacturer may count a
vehicle if it:
(1) (i) Is certified as complying with
this standard and is manufactured on or
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after June 5, 2007, but before September
1, 2010; and
(ii) Is not counted toward compliance
with S8.1; or
(2) Is manufactured on or after
September 1, 2009, but before
September 1, 2010.
(c) For purposes of complying with
S8.3, a manufacturer may count a
vehicle if it:
(1)(i) Is certified as complying with
this standard and is manufactured on or
after June 5, 2007, but before September
1, 2011; and
(ii) Is not counted toward compliance
with S8.1 or S8.2; or
(2) Is manufactured on or after
September 1, 2010, but before
September 1, 2011.
S8.6 Vehicles produced by more
than one manufacturer.
S8.6.1 For the purpose of calculating
average annual production of vehicles
for each manufacturer and the number
of vehicles manufactured by each
manufacturer under S8.1 through S8.4,
a vehicle produced by more than one
manufacturer must be attributed to a
single manufacturer as follows, subject
to S8.6.2:
(a) A vehicle that is imported must be
attributed to the importer.
(b) A vehicle manufactured in the
United States by more than one
manufacturer, one of which also
markets the vehicle, must be attributed
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to the manufacturer that markets the
vehicle.
S8.6.2 A vehicle produced by more
than one manufacturer must be
attributed to any one of the vehicle’s
manufacturers specified by an express
written contract, reported to the
National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration under 49 CFR Part 585,
between the manufacturer so specified
and the manufacturer to which the
vehicle would otherwise be attributed
under S8.6.1.
S8.7 Small volume manufacturers.
Vehicles manufactured during any of
the three years of the September 1, 2008
through August 31, 2011 phase-in by a
manufacturer that produces fewer than
5,000 vehicles for sale in the United
States during that year are not subject to
the requirements of S8.1, S8.2, S8.3, and
S8.5.
S8.8 Final-stage manufacturers and
alterers.
Vehicles that are manufactured in two
or more stages or that are altered (within
the meaning of 49 CFR 567.7) after
having previously been certified in
accordance with Part 567 of this chapter
are not subject to the requirements of
S8.1 through S8.5. Instead, all vehicles
produced by these manufacturers on or
after September 1, 2012 must comply
with this standard.
BILLING CODE 4910–59–P
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17316
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Production year means the 12-month
period between September 1 of one year
and August 31 of the following year,
inclusive.
PART 585—PHASE-IN REPORTING
REQUIREMENTS
4. The authority citation for part 585
continues to read as follows:
I
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 322, 30111, 30115,
30117, and 30166; delegation of authority at
49 CFR 1.50.
5. Subpart H is added and reserved.
6. Subpart I is added to read as
follows:
I
I
Subpart I—Electronic Stability Control
System Phase-In Reporting Requirements
Sec.
585.81 Scope.
585.82 Purpose.
585.83 Applicability.
585.84 Definitions.
585.85 Response to inquiries.
585.86 Reporting requirements.
585.87 Records.
585.88 Petition to extend period to file
report.
Subpart I—Electronic Stability Control
System Phase In Reporting
Requirements
§ 585.81
Scope.
This subpart establishes requirements
for manufacturers of passenger cars,
multipurpose passenger vehicles,
trucks, and buses with a gross vehicle
weight rating of 4,536 kilograms (10,000
pounds) or less to submit a report, and
maintain records related to the report,
concerning the number of such vehicles
that meet the requirements of Standard
No. 126, Electronic stability control
systems (49 CFR 571.126).
§ 585.82
Purpose.
The purpose of these reporting
requirements is to assist the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration
in determining whether a manufacturer
has complied with Standard No. 126 (49
CFR 571.126).
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§ 585.83
Applicability.
This subpart applies to manufacturers
of passenger cars, multipurpose
passenger vehicles, trucks, and buses
with a gross vehicle weight rating of
4,536 kilograms (10,000 pounds) or less.
However, this subpart does not apply to
manufacturers whose production
consists exclusively of vehicles
manufactured in two or more stages,
and vehicles that are altered after
previously having been certified in
accordance with part 567 of this
chapter. In addition, this subpart does
not apply to manufacturers whose
production of motor vehicles for the
United States market is less than 5,000
vehicles in a production year.
§ 585.84
Definitions.
For the purposes of this subpart:
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§ 585.85
Response to inquiries.
At any time prior to August 31, 2011,
each manufacturer must, upon request
from the Office of Vehicle Safety
Compliance, provide information
identifying the vehicles (by make,
model, and vehicle identification
number) that have been certified as
complying with Standard No. 126 (49
CFR 571.126). The manufacturer’s
designation of a vehicle as a certified
vehicle is irrevocable. Upon request, the
manufacturer also must specify whether
it intends to utilize carry-forward
credits, and the vehicles to which those
credits relate.
§ 585.86
Reporting requirements.
(a) General reporting requirements.
Within 60 days after the end of the
production years ending August 31,
2009, August 31, 2010, and August 31,
2011, each manufacturer must submit a
report to the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration concerning its
compliance with Standard No. 126 (49
CFR 571.126) for its passenger cars,
multipurpose passenger vehicles,
trucks, and buses with a gross vehicle
weight rating of less than 4,536
kilograms (10,000 pounds) produced in
that year.
Each report must—
(1) Identify the manufacturer;
(2) State the full name, title, and
address of the official responsible for
preparing the report;
(3) Identify the production year being
reported on;
(4) Contain a statement regarding
whether or not the manufacturer
complied with the requirements of
Standard No. 126 (49 CFR 571.126) for
the period covered by the report and the
basis for that statement;
(5) Provide the information specified
in paragraph (b) of this section;
(6) Be written in the English language;
and
(7) Be submitted to: Administrator,
National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, 400 Seventh Street,
SW., Washington, DC 20590.
(b) Report content.
(1) Basis for statement of compliance.
Each manufacturer must provide the
number of passenger cars, multipurpose
passenger vehicles, trucks, and buses
with a gross vehicle weight rating of
4,536 kilograms (10,000 pounds) or less,
manufactured for sale in the United
States for each of the three previous
production years, or, at the
manufacturer’s option, for the current
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production year. A new manufacturer
that has not previously manufactured
these vehicles for sale in the United
States must report the number of such
vehicles manufactured during the
current production year.
(2) Production. Each manufacturer
must report for the production year for
which the report is filed: the number of
passenger cars, multipurpose passenger
vehicles, trucks, and buses with a gross
vehicle weight rating of 4,536 kilograms
(10,000 pounds) or less that meet
Standard No. 126 (49 CFR 571.126).
(3) Statement regarding compliance.
Each manufacturer must provide a
statement regarding whether or not the
manufacturer complied with the ESC
requirements as applicable to the period
covered by the report, and the basis for
that statement. This statement must
include an explanation concerning the
use of any carry-forward credits.
(4) Vehicles produced by more than
one manufacturer. Each manufacturer
whose reporting of information is
affected by one or more of the express
written contracts permitted by S8.6.2 of
Standard No. 126 (49 CFR 571.126)
must:
(i) Report the existence of each
contract, including the names of all
parties to the contract, and explain how
the contract affects the report being
submitted.
(ii) Report the actual number of
vehicles covered by each contract.
§ 585.87
Records.
Each manufacturer must maintain
records of the Vehicle Identification
Number for each vehicle for which
information is reported under
§ 585.86(b)(2) until December 31, 2013.
§ 585.88
report.
Petition to extend period to file
A manufacturer may petition for
extension of time to submit a report
under this Part. A petition will be
granted only if the petitioner shows
good cause for the extension and if the
extension is consistent with the public
interest. The petition must be received
not later than 15 days before expiration
of the time stated in § 585.86(a). The
filing of a petition does not
automatically extend the time for filing
a report. The petition must be submitted
to: Administrator, National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration, 400
Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC
20590.
Issued: March 22, 2007.
Nicole R. Nason,
Administrator.
[Note: The Following Appendix Will
Not Appear in the Code of Federal
Regulations.]
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APPENDIX: Technical Explanation in
Response to Comments on Understeer
This appendix explains NHTSA’s
reasoning regarding the issue raised by
public comment on Understeer
Requirements, as discussed in the Response
to Comments section of the Final Rule (see
Section IV.C.4). This is an area of ongoing
research by vehicle dynamics researchers
involving concepts that are beyond what is
usually discussed in a first-year graduateschool-level course on vehicle dynamics. We
have done our best to address this subject in
a way that will be easily understandable by
the general reader. Nevertheless, some
aspects of the following discussion are
unavoidably fairly technical.
Explanation of Linear and Non-Linear
Understeer
First, we wish to clarify what we mean by
linear and non-linear range understeer since
some of the commenters did not appear to
understand the fundamental issues
associated with the agency’s decision to
include an understeer requirement in the
definition of ESC System.
Understeer has proven to be an extremely
useful concept for characterizing the lateral
response of a vehicle. Section III.A, How ESC
Prevents Loss of Vehicle Control 93 of the
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM)
attempts to explain the concepts of
understeer and oversteer to the reader in nontechnical terms. However, the full scientific
definitions of understeer and oversteer are
presented here in order to lay the technical
groundwork for the discussions that follow.
Many alternative definitions of understeer
have been developed. The Society of
Automotive Engineers’ (SAE) definitions of
understeer and its opposite, oversteer, taken
from SAE J670e,94 are:
‘‘9.4.7 UNDERSTEER/OVERSTEER
GRADIENT—The ratio of the steering wheel
angle gradient to the overall steering ratio
quantity obtained by subtracting the
Ackerman steer angle gradient from the ratio
of the steering wheel angle gradient to the
overall steering ratio.’’
‘‘9.4.9 UNDERSTEER—A vehicle is
understeer at a given trim 95 if the ratio of the
steering wheel angle gradient to the overall
steering ratio is greater than the Ackerman
steer angle gradient.’’
‘‘9.4.10 OVERSTEER—A vehicle is
oversteer at a given trim if the ratio of the
steering wheel angle gradient to the overall
steering ratio is less than the Ackerman steer
angle gradient.’’
SAE J670e defines ‘‘steering wheel angle
gradient’’ and ‘‘Ackerman steer angle
gradient’’ as follows:
‘‘9.4.5 STEERING WHEEL ANGLE
GRADIENT—The rate of change in the
steering wheel angle with respect to change
93 71
FR 54712, 54716–54718 (Sept. 18, 2006).
J670e, ‘‘Vehicle Dynamics Terminology,’’
SAE Recommended Practice, Issued by the SAE
Vehicle Dynamics Committee July 1952, last revised
July 1976.
95 For the reader’s reference, ‘‘trim’’ is roughly
defined as the vehicle’s weight distribution at a
given time. For example, loading the vehicle’s trunk
changes the trim.
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94 SAE
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in steady state lateral acceleration on a level
road at a given trim and test conditions.’’
‘‘Note 14 ACKERMAN STEER ANGLE
GRADIENT is equal to the wheelbase divided
by the square of the vehicle speed (rad/ft/
sec2).’’
Consider the linear range of vehicle
handling. The linear range is defined as the
region of handling where the lateral
acceleration versus steering wheel angle gain
remains approximately constant (meaning
that the understeer gradient is essentially
constant).96 The boundaries of the linear
range depend upon the friction of the surface
being driven on. The linear range occurs for
lateral accelerations between 0.1 and 0.4g on
a high friction surface such as dry asphalt or
concrete. For a slippery, moderately low
friction surface such as a wet road, the linear
range would be lower, perhaps between
lateral accelerations of 0.05 and 0.2g
(depending upon the surface of the road),
while on ice the limits of the linear range
would be still lower.
All light vehicles (including passenger
cars, pickups, vans, minivans, crossovers,
and sport utility vehicles) are designed to
understeer in the linear range of lateral
acceleration, although operational factors
such as loading, tire inflation pressure, and
so forth can in rare situations make them
oversteer in use. This is a fundamental
design characteristic. Understeer provides a
valuable, and benign, way for the vehicle to
inform the driver of how the available
roadway friction is being utilized. Multiple
tests have been developed to objectively
quantify linear-range understeer, including
SAE J266 and ISO 4138.
In the linear range of handling, ESC should
never activate. ESC interventions occur when
the driver’s intended path (calculated by the
ESC control algorithms using a constant
linear range understeer gradient) differs from
the actual path of the vehicle as measured by
ESC sensors. Since by definition, this
relationship is not violated while driving in
the linear range, ESC intervention will not
occur. Therefore, ESC has no effect upon the
linear-range understeer of a vehicle.
Solving the linear range differential
equations of motion for what the Millikens 97
refer to as the ‘‘Elementary Automobile’’ or
‘‘bicycle’’ model reveals that the understeer
gradient has some very interesting
mathematical properties.
First, the solutions to the linear range
differential equations of motion are
unconditionally stable 98 provided that the
96 A less technical way of describing ‘‘linear
range’’ would be the normal situation of everyday
driving, where a given turn by the driver of the
steering wheel causes an expected amount of turn
of the vehicle itself, because the vehicle is operating
at the traction levels to which most drivers are
accustomed.
97 Milliken, W.F., and Milliken, D.L., p. 144,
‘‘Race Car Vehicle Dynamics,’’ SAE International,
1995
98 ‘‘Unconditionally stable’’ for a motor vehicle
means that, regardless of the weight distribution,
suspension configuration, tire cornering stiffness, or
vehicle speed (provided the vehicle can be modeled
by the Elementary Automobile or ‘‘bicycle’’ model),
the vehicle will return to straight ahead driving
after enough time (usually only a couple of seconds)
has passed after the return of the steering wheel to
the straight ahead position.
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understeer gradient is positive (i.e., the
vehicle is understeer). For an oversteer
vehicle,99 solutions to the linear range
differential equations of motion become
unstable if the vehicle’s speed exceeds the
critical speed. The value of the critical speed
depends upon the degree of oversteer the
vehicle exhibits (and on other vehicle
properties); however, a vehicle with
reasonable amounts of oversteer can easily
exceed the critical speed and become
unstable during normal driving.
What does it mean when the solutions to
the linear range differential equations of
motion become unstable? It means that as
soon as the unstable vehicle encounters a
disturbance input (and in real driving,
disturbance inputs such as small wind gusts
or small bumps in the road occur very
frequently), the actual solutions of the
differential equation will rapidly diverge
from the nominal solutions. In the real world,
this means that the driver can no longer
control the unstable vehicle by using the
steering wheel. The unstable vehicle
generally will rotate rapidly about a vertical
axis (spin) and may change its direction of
motion regardless of what the driver does
with the steering wheel. From the safety
point of view, a vehicle becoming unstable
often has severe negative consequences,
ranging from road departure to sideways
impacts with off-road obstacles to tripped
rollover.
Returning to the mathematical properties
of the understeer gradient, we find that it also
is a key parameter in determining the lateral
responsiveness 100 of the vehicle. According
to the solutions to the linear range
differential equations of motion, the more a
vehicle understeers, the less lateral
responsiveness it will have (assuming, of
course, that all other parameters are held
constant).
For a vehicle to be safe, it must have
adequate lateral responsiveness. Vehicles
with too little lateral responsiveness will not
be able to successfully maneuver around
pedestrians, vehicles, or other objects that
99 A simple test illustrates the concepts of
understeer and oversteer. A vehicle is driven
around a circle at a constant speed, then the speed
is slowly increased. If the vehicle tends to go off
the outside of the circle so that the driver must
increase steering to maintain the circle, then the
vehicle is considered to be an understeer vehicle.
If the vehicle tends to go off the inside of the circle
so that the driver must reduce steering to maintain
the circle, then the vehicle is considered to be an
oversteer vehicle. Understeer and oversteer can
affect the stability of a vehicle; however, just
because a vehicle is an oversteer vehicle does not
mean that it is uncontrollable. A more detailed
discussion of understeer and oversteer and their
impact on stability and control is contained in (a)
William F. Milliken and Douglas L. Milliken,
‘‘Simplified Steady State Stability and Control,’’
Chapter 5, and ‘‘Simplified Transient Stability and
Control,’’ Chapter 6 in Race Car Vehicle Dynamics
(Warrendale, PA: Society of Automotive Engineers,
1995) 123–229 and 231–277; and (b) Thomas D.
Gillespie, ‘‘Rollover,’’ Chapter 9 in Fundamentals of
Vehicle Dynamics (Warrendale, PA: Society of
Automotive Engineers, 1992) 309–333.
100 Lateral responsiveness is defined here as how
much a vehicle moves sideways in a given amount
of time due to a specified rotation of the steering
wheel.
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may suddenly intrude into the roadway.
They will also be more difficult to steer
around turns in the road, requiring the driver
to initiate steering earlier than for vehicles
with adequate lateral responsiveness.
A safe vehicle, then, requires both stability
and adequate lateral responsiveness. In the
linear range of handling, this is achieved by
having the vehicle understeer to a moderate
degree. This explains why all light vehicles
are designed to understeer in the linear range
of lateral acceleration.
Next, consider driving situations that are
outside of the linear range of handling. In
this situation, the differential equations of
motion, even for the ‘‘Elementary
Automobile’’ or ‘‘bicycle’’ model become
non-linear, complicated, and beyond the
ability of humans to solve analytically.
Vehicle dynamics simulations have been
developed that use numerical integration to
predict the vehicle trajectories.
Unfortunately, the prediction of vehicle
trajectories is insufficient to determine the
stability of the vehicle, although it can be
used to determine the lateral responsiveness
of the vehicle.
To determine the stability of the solutions
of the non-linear range differential equations
of motion, the ‘‘Method of Liapunov’’ 101 is
used. The Method of Liapunov consists of
linearizing the non-linear differential
equations about an operating point of the
vehicle. Liapunov proved that the stability of
the solutions of the linearized differential
equations about an operating point is the
same as the stability of the original nonlinear differential equations about that same
operating point. The term that determines the
stability of the solutions of the linearized
differential equations about an operating
point is called the non-linear understeer
gradient. However, unlike the linear
understeer gradient, the non-linear
understeer gradient is no longer constant. It
will vary as a function of the vehicle’s lateral
acceleration.
Just as is the case for the linear range
vehicle, for a vehicle to be safe at an
operating point in the non-linear range, we
must have both stability and adequate lateral
responsiveness. Again, this is achieved by
designing the vehicle to understeer to a
moderate degree. However, for reasons that
are explained below, it is impossible to attain
ycherry on PROD1PC64 with RULES2
101 Birkhoff, G. and Rota, G.C., pp 134–136,
‘‘Ordinary Differential Equations,’’ Blaisdell
Publishing Company, 1969.
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this desirable condition over the entire nonlinear operating range of the vehicle.
What NHTSA Means by Mitigating Excessive
Understeer
All motor vehicles are limited as to how
sharply they can turn. This fact has
important implications for the non-linear
understeer/oversteer of vehicles.
The behavior of a vehicle when turning as
sharply as possible is referred to as the limit
behavior of the vehicle. For vehicles with
four wheels and two axles, there are exactly
four possible limit behaviors. Each of these
cases, and its implications for limit
understeer/oversteer are discussed below.
Case 1—The vehicle plows out. For this
case, how sharply the vehicle can turn is
limited by the friction between the roadway
and the tires on the vehicle’s front axle.
When the tires on the vehicle’s front axle are
producing as much side force as the road/tire
friction permits, we say that the vehicle’s
front tires are saturated. When the front tires
saturate before the rear tires, the vehicle
continues to travel forward in as tight a curve
as it can manage. The turn will not become
tighter, even if the driver turns the steering
wheel requesting a sharper turn. We call this
behavior vehicle plow-out. While from a
safety point of view it is never good for a
vehicle to reach limit behavior, plow-out is
the most benign form of limit behavior.
Mathematically, plow-out corresponds to the
non-linear understeer gradient remaining
positive and becoming infinite at the limit of
handling.
Case 2—The vehicle drifts out. For this
case, the tires on both the vehicle’s front and
rear axles saturate at exactly the same time.
Drift-out is extremely rare; it is very hard to
saturate both axles at the same time. When
drift-out occurs, the vehicle continues to
travel forward in as tight a curve as it can
manage (similar to plow-out) except that the
vehicle will slowly (far more slowly than for
Case 3, below) rotate about its vertical axis.
Due to this slow rotation of the vehicle, from
a safety point of view drift-out is not as
benign as plow-out but it is better than spinout (Case 3, below). Mathematically, drift-out
corresponds to the non-linear understeer
gradient remaining positive and becoming
infinite at the limit of handling.
Case 3—The vehicle spins out. For this
case, the tires on the vehicle’s rear axle
saturate first. When spin-out occurs, the
vehicle continues to travel forwards in a
curve while the rear of the vehicle rapidly
rotates about its vertical axis. From the safety
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point of view, vehicle spin-out is very bad
with negative consequences ranging from
road departure to sideways impacts with offroad obstacles to tripped rollover.
Mathematically, spin-out corresponds to the
non-linear understeer gradient becoming
negative and infinite (i.e., the vehicle
oversteers to an extreme degree) at the limit
of handling.
Case 4—The vehicle rolls over. For this
case, the tires on the vehicle’s front and rear
axles do not reach saturation. Instead, before
the friction limit is reached, the vehicle’s
tires leave the roadway and the vehicle
rotates rapidly about its longitudinal axis
onto its side or roof. From the safety point
of view, vehicle rollover is the worst type of
limit behavior. It is also the only type of limit
behavior in which the vehicle’s behavior at
the limit does not determine the non-linear
understeer gradient at the limit of handling.
Either understeer or oversteer, and by any
amount, is possible for this case.
Summarizing the above cases, at the limit
of handling a vehicle’s understeer gradient
will either be positive and infinite (plow-out
and drift-out), negative and infinite (spinout), or not determined (rollover). While both
spin-out and rollover are major safety
concerns, this discussion is concerned with
mitigating excessive understeer. Therefore, in
the following discussion, we will only deal
with the case in which a vehicle’s understeer
gradient is positive and infinite at the limit
of handling. Vehicles that behave in this
manner are called ‘‘terminally
understeering.’’
A terminally understeering vehicle’s
understeer gradient will then be a positive
constant in its linear range and positive and
infinite at the limit of handling. Between the
upper limit of the linear handling range and
the limit of handling, the non-linear
understeer gradient will be positive and
monotonically increasing. (Vehicles with
local maxima in their non-linear understeer
gradient usually become terminally oversteer
although we are not aware of any proofs that
this must occur.) Figure 1 shows a typical
understeer gradient curve for a hypothetical
vehicle without ESC (the curve marked
‘‘Original’’). The goal of mitigating excessive
understeer is to use the ESC to reduce the
non-linear understeer gradient over the range
from 40 to 95 percent friction utilization to
closer to the linear range understeer gradient.
The curve marked ‘‘Reduced’’ in Figure 1
shows a hypothetical example of mitigation
of excessive understeer.
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Need for Care in Mitigating Excessive
Understeer
Conceptually, the idea of ESC understeer
mitigation makes good physical sense. In a
situation where the vehicle does not
sufficiently respond to the driver’s steering
input (e.g., ‘‘plowing’’ when the driver
attempts to steer around a corner), the
automatic application of single-wheel
braking torque to reduce understeer and
increase the vehicle’s lateral responsiveness,
thereby tightening the turning radius, seems
like a logical course of action. NHTSA
researchers have participated in ESC
demonstrations specifically designed to
showcase understeer mitigation effectiveness,
and acknowledge that in certain driving
situations, performed with certain vehicles,
at certain vehicle speeds, the technology can
suppress excessive understeer, thereby
improving the driver’s ability to control the
vehicle. However, truly understanding both
what understeer mitigation can and, equally
importantly, cannot do, is deceptively
complicated. In fact, there are certain
situations where understeer mitigation could
potentially produce safety disbenefits if not
properly tuned.
The technique used for mitigating
excessive understeer is to apply unbalanced
vehicle braking so as to generate an
oversteering moment. Clearly, if too much
oversteering moment is generated, then the
vehicle may oversteer and spin out with
obvious negative safety consequences.
Another possible problem with understeer
mitigation is that reducing the non-linear
understeer gradient increases the lateral
responsiveness of the vehicle. This increases
the lateral acceleration the vehicle can attain.
For vehicles with low static stability factors
and/or soft (in roll) suspensions, this may
result in untripped rollover. Keep in mind
that the idea of roll stability control (RSC) is
to prevent untripped rollover by momentarily
inducing excessive understeer, thereby
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reducing the lateral responsiveness of the
vehicle and decreasing the lateral
acceleration. Excessive understeer mitigation
acts like anti-RSC. Based on this concern,
ESC manufacturers generally do not perform
understeer mitigation on high-coefficient-offriction pavements for vehicles for which
untripped rollover is possible (sport utility
vehicles, pickup trucks, full sized vans).
For the reasons discussed above,
understeer mitigation must be performed
with great care. Too much mitigation can
create safety problems (spin out or rollover).
Problems With Performance Tests for
Mitigating Excessive Understeer
All current ESC designs that NHTSA has
studied appear to include provisions for
mitigating excessive understeer. How do we
know this? We know this from driving these
vehicles in the sort of maneuvers in which
understeer mitigation should be performed
and evaluating the resultant vehicle
performance.
How are ESC algorithms for mitigating
excessive understeer developed? Designers
use a combination of analysis, vehicle
dynamics simulation, and evaluation based
on engineering judgment to develop the
algorithms.
NHTSA cannot rely upon analysis, vehicle
dynamics simulation, or evaluation based on
engineering judgment for ensuring
compliance with NHTSA regulations. We
need a performance test, one that is objective,
repeatable, generates reproducible results, is
practicable to perform, and has acceptable
face validity (i.e., passing the test must
enhance safety).
Tests designed to measure linear range
understeer gradient (e.g. SAE J266 and ISO
4138) are not suitable to evaluate an ESC’s
understeer mitigation performance. ESC
interventions occur when the driver’s
intended path differs from the actual path of
the vehicle, as discussed above. Since this
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17319
relationship is not violated during linear
range driving, by the definition of linear
range, ESC intervention will not occur.
Without intervention, assessment of ESC
performance is not possible.
NHTSA has carefully examined the
existing vehicle dynamics literature
including both the SAE and ISO standards.
We have been unable to find any test
designed to measure the non-linear
understeer gradient over the full non-linear
range of vehicle handling. A variety of
theoretical difficulties make it unlikely that
such test will ever be developed.
In order for ESC understeer mitigation to
occur during a non-linear understeer
mitigation scenario, differences between the
calculated and actual paths of the vehicle
must exceed a manufacturer-specified
allowable threshold. NHTSA knows of no
existing test protocol capable of objectively
evaluating non-linear understeer mitigation.
(Note that this is a somewhat different
problem than that of measuring the nonlinear understeer gradient over the full nonlinear range of vehicle handling. The
theoretical problems referred to above do not
prevent the development of an objective test
for evaluating non-linear understeer
mitigation.)
What are the principal challenges to
developing a suitable, objective, non-linear
understeer mitigation performance test?
Dry Test Challenges
Understeer mitigation is only possible for
vehicles that are designed to exhibit nonlinear and terminal understeer. Although a
reduction of understeer may allow the tires
of these vehicles to better utilize the available
friction, the subsequent increase in
maximum lateral acceleration capacity is not
desirable for all vehicles. Some vehicles,
particularly those with low static stability
factors such as sport utility vehicles, or those
having soft (in roll) suspensions, understeer
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designed into the chassis helps reduce the
risk of on-road untripped rollover. By
attempting to remove understeer, it is
possible ESC could increase the likelihood of
on-road untripped rollover.102 Discussions
with ESC manufacturers have indicated that
tests performed on a high friction surface at
moderate to high speeds may not trigger any
understeer intervention from this type of
vehicles’ ESC systems. For this reason,
NHTSA has concluded that it would be
inappropriate to require that understeer
mitigation occur in situations where vehicles
are being operated on high friction surfaces
at high speeds.
Unfortunately, the specific details of this
potential compromise are not fully
understood. NHTSA does not know of any
vehicle whose understeer mitigation
algorithms induce on-road untripped
rollover, and therefore has no test data to
objectively quantify the extent to which
understeer mitigation may increase the
likelihood of on-road untripped rollover
beyond that realized with the same vehicle
evaluated with ESC disabled. Nevertheless, if
NHTSA were to require that understeer
mitigation effectiveness be evaluated using a
test performed on a dry high coefficient
surface, the potential for achieving good
understeer control on the test track at the
expense of compromised real world driving
safety cannot be ignored.
NHTSA notes that ESC systems containing
rollover mitigation control (RSC) algorithms
present another reason that understeer
mitigation should not be evaluated on high
friction surfaces. To create a state of nonlinear understeer for testing purposes, large
steering wheel angles and rates must be
inputted. For vehicles with RSC, these severe
inputs may be interpreted as a threat to the
vehicle’s roll stability. If RSC intervention
occurs, the effect will be a brief period of
substantially increased understeer, where no
understeer mitigation would occur. Although
NHTSA has no crash data quantifying the
safety benefits of RSC, we do not want to
preclude implementation of RSC technology
as the result of an inappropriate understeer
mitigation test.
In summary, performing tests designed to
evaluate ESC understeer mitigation
technology on dry, high friction surfaces
presents too many problems. NHTSA then
considered whether it could mandate such
tests on low friction surfaces, as discussed
below.
Wet Test Challenges
So as to avoid the problems associated
with testing on dry, high-friction surfaces,
NHTSA believes that ESC understeer
mitigation performance testing must be
performed on a low-friction test surface such
as wet Jennite or wet basalt tiles. Use of low
friction surfaces, where peak coefficient of
friction would be expected to range between
0.3 and 0.5, would prevent the development
of lateral accelerations capable of inducing
on-road untripped rollover. This fact alone
102 It is important to note that the braking action
present during ESC understeer mitigation
intervention will help slow the vehicle somewhat,
decreasing the amount of energy available to
produce rollover.
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resolves many of the issues that plague the
use of high friction surfaces for understeer
mitigation assessment. NHTSA does not
expect any adverse repercussions for
requiring a properly tuned ESC to invoke
understeer mitigation on low friction
surfaces, regardless of vehicle type.
Furthermore, since on-road untripped
rollover is not expected, RSC intervention
should not confound understeer mitigation
assessment on low friction surfaces, as
activation of such interventions should not
occur.
Unfortunately, low friction tests have
historically been plagued with high test
variability when compared to otherwise
equivalent tests performed on high friction
surfaces. They can also be confounded by
hydroplaning, and can be difficult-toimpossible to perform within the confines of
the relatively small low friction test pads
available at the various proving grounds.
Resolution of these matters is imperative if
understeer mitigation effectiveness is to be
objectively assessed.
NHTSA performed numerous low-friction
tests during the 2006 testing season. Most of
these tests were based on the ‘‘ramp steer’’
maneuver, a test NHTSA believes is its best
candidate for objectively evaluating ESC
understeer mitigation performance. This
maneuver uses a steering ramp (input at one
of eight steering velocities) from zero to a
target steering wheel angle, a brief pause, and
a return of the steering wheel back to zero
degrees. Using the ramp steer maneuver, data
were collected during tests performed with
three passenger cars, one sports car, three
sport utility vehicles, and one 15-passenger
van. To compare how the maneuver output
might change as a function of surface, tests
were performed on the Transportation
Research Center’s (TRC) Vehicle Dynamics
Area Jennite pad, and on the General Motors
Milford Proving Grounds basalt tile pad.
Results from this testing will be provided in
a detailed technical report, to be released
spring 2007.
NHTSA is presently evaluating two ways
to reduce factors contributing to test
variability on low friction surfaces,
specifically in the realm of improved water
delivery and optimized water delivery-totest-conduct timing. Preliminary results from
NHTSA’s 2006 understeer mitigation
research indicated similar variability for tests
performed on Jennite and basalt. From a
logistics standpoint, this is important since
basalt test pads of dimensions appropriate for
use in understeer mitigation are not common.
NHTSA knows of only one basalt pad
capable of supporting understeer mitigation
tests (located at the General Motors Milford
Proving Grounds), and considers even the
dimensions of this pad to be only marginally
adequate. Construction of a new basalt
facility capable of supporting ramp steer tests
is cost-prohibitive for NHTSA, as such
facilities cost millions of dollars. TRC’s
Jennite pad is also marginal for understeer
mitigation testing. Again, increasing the size
of the TRC Jennite pad will be extremely
expensive, although not to the extent a basalt
facility would be.
In short, resolution of low friction testing
issues is the topic of ongoing research, and
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the primary challenge in the development of
an objective and repeatable way of assessing
light vehicle understeer mitigation
effectiveness. However, there are many issues
that remain to be resolved, ranging from a
lack of large-enough test surfaces to possible
performance criteria before NHTSA could
have a suitable low coefficient of friction
understeer mitigation performance test.
Based on preliminary results from
NHTSA’s 2006 understeer mitigation
research, we have investigated two possible
types of low coefficient of friction understeer
mitigation performance tests. The easier type
of test to perform will be called the
Understeer Presence test, the more difficult
type, the Full Understeer Performance test.
The Understeer Presence test would check
that a vehicle is equipped with an ESC
system that will limit vehicle understeer in
at least some conditions. We are fairly
confident that this test can be developed with
one to two years of research. The drawback
of this test is that it will accomplish nothing
more than providing a means for NHTSA to
check that a vehicle meets the understeer
mitigation requirements of FMVSS 126. It is
not clear that this test will be as robust as the
method (see discussion below) that NHTSA
intends to use in the absence of this test to
check compliance with the understeer
mitigation portion of FMVSS 126. In other
words, having this test will do nothing to
improve vehicle safety beyond the understeer
requirement presently specified in FMVSS
No. 126. Based on this fact, NHTSA’s has no
plans at this time to expend further effort to
develop the Understeer Presence test.
The Full Understeer Performance test
would actually impose further understeer
mitigation requirements beyond those
currently specified in FMVSS 126. We hope,
but do not know, that these additional
understeer mitigation requirements would
further enhance vehicle safety.
Unfortunately, development of the Full
Understeer Performance test is expected to
take at least five years and require provision
of substantial financial resources.
To summarize the above discussion, we do
not know of any existing objective
performance tests for understeer mitigation.
We believe that it is not appropriate to
perform an understeer mitigation
performance test on a dry, high coefficient of
friction test surface. NHTSA has been
working on a low coefficient of friction
understeer mitigation performance test and
has found some approaches that its
researchers believe to be promising.
However, considerable work remains to
develop such a performance test.
How NHTSA Will Enforce FMVSS No. 126
Requirements Without an Understeer
Performance Test
The final regulatory text for FMVSS No.
126 requires light vehicles to be equipped
with a system meeting the definition of ESC.
A portion of the revised ESC definition from
that standard is:
Electronic Stability Control System or ESC
System means a system that has all of the
following attributes:* * *
(2) That is computer controlled with the
computer using a closed-loop algorithm to
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limit vehicle oversteer and to limit vehicle
understeer; (emphasis added)* * *
Without having a performance test for
understeer mitigation, how will NHTSA
ensure that light vehicles are equipped with
a system that will limit vehicle understeer
under these circumstances? This will be
accomplished through a two part process:
ensuring that vehicles have all of the
hardware needed to limit vehicle understeer
(as required by FMVSS No. 126), and
checking engineering documentation
provided by the vehicle and ESC
manufacturers that the ESC algorithm is
capable of recognizing and limiting excessive
understeer.
The regulatory text of FMVSS No. 126
includes S5.1 Required Equipment. Under
this section, S5.1.1 mandates that light
vehicles must have an ESC system as follows:
S5.1.1 Is capable of applying brake
torques individually to all four wheels and
has a control algorithm that utilizes this
capability.
Having the capability of applying all four
brakes individually is necessary to allow the
ESC to limit vehicle understeer when
appropriate. ESC systems have been
developed (called two-channel ESC systems)
that are capable of applying only the
vehicle’s front brakes. These two-channel
ESC systems can prevent crashes from
occurring in three of the four ways that fourchannel ESC systems can prevent crashes,
although perhaps not as well. Two-channel
ESC can: (1) Prevent the vehicle from
becoming oversteer and spinning out, (2)
preventing untripped vehicle rollovers by
using RSC-type algorithms, and (3) slow the
vehicle down. What two-channel ESC cannot
do is mitigate excessive understeer.
The development of an ESC algorithm is a
large and complicated task. Development of
the understeer mitigation portion of such an
algorithm requires much analysis, vehicle
dynamics simulation, and testing by
engineers. We anticipate that ESC
manufacturers will document the results of
such analysis, simulation, and testing. This
engineering documentation can be shown to
NHTSA when it is necessary to demonstrate
that an ESC algorithm is capable of limiting
vehicle understeer when appropriate.
In summary, we believe that the
requirement that all light vehicles be
equipped with an ESC system capable of
applying all four brakes individually,
combined with the engineering
documentation developed by ESC
manufacturers, will be sufficient to enforce
the understeer requirements of the ESC
definition in FMVSS No. 126.
Responses to Other Understeer-Related
Issues
One commenter stated that some
manufacturers might supply ESC systems
that do not adequately compensate for
understeer loss of control circumstances,
arguing that there are already vast differences
in tuning among various ESC systems. They
predicted that failure of the agency to specify
understeer performance requirements would
maintain or expand differences between ESC
performance from one vehicle make or model
to another and could cause the standard to
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forgo prevention of additional fatalities and
injuries. The commenter did not provide any
data to support this ‘‘prediction.’’ NHTSA
will continue to monitor the safety
performance of vehicles equipped with
different ESC systems. If we do see safety
related differences between ESC
performances from one vehicle make or
model to another, we will use the
information to require safer ESC systems.
Unfortunately, we do not know today, and
are unlikely to know for the next several
years, what understeer performance
requirements would improve safety.
One commenter argued that since
SAFETEA–LU directs the agency to establish
performance criteria for stability enhancing
technologies (i.e., noting the plural nature of
that statutory provision, which they
suggested requires something more than an
oversteer criterion alone), including the
understeer component that the agency has
determined to be a necessary part of ESC
systems from a safety perspective is also
required from a legal perspective. We do not
agree with this comment. While SAFETEA–
LU does direct the agency to establish
performance criteria (which we agree is
plural) for stability-enhancing technologies,
having both lateral stability and lateral
responsiveness criteria in the current FMVSS
126 fulfills this Congressional requirement
without adding an understeer performance
test.
Conclusions about Understeer Mitigation
Multiple commenters have requested that
we include a performance test for excessive
understeer mitigation in FMVSS 126. A
number of other questions about understeer
mitigation were also asked in these
comments.
We have tried in our response to these
comments to fully explain NHTSA’s position
on this important issue. Unfortunately,
mitigation of excessive understeer is an
extremely complex technical problem, so our
response has been long and technical. In this
final section of the response, we will try to
summarize the results of the previous
discussion.
First, excessive understeer mitigation
involves the non-linear understeer gradient,
a very different quantity than the linear
understeer gradient (a calculation that is
commonly mentioned in vehicle dynamics
literature). While the non-linear understeer
gradient shares many important properties
with the linear understeer gradient, the nonlinear gradient is both theoretically and
practically a far more complex concept.
Figure 1, presented previously, probably
gives the clearest idea as to what we mean
by mitigation of excessive understeer. The
goal is for ESC to change the non-linear
understeer gradient of the vehicle from the
higher to the lower curve.
For reasons that were explained, mitigation
of excessive understeer must be performed
with great care. Too much mitigation can
create safety problems (spin out or rollover).
Tests designed to measure linear range
understeer gradient (e.g. SAE J266 and ISO
4138) are not suitable to evaluate an ESC’s
understeer mitigation performance. ESC
interventions occur when the driver’s
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17321
intended path (i.e., that calculated by the
ESC control algorithms) differs from the
actual path of the vehicle (i.e., as measured
by ESC sensors). Since by definition, this
relationship is not violated during linear
range driving, ESC intervention will not
occur. Without intervention, assessment of
ESC performance is not possible.
NHTSA has carefully examined the
existing vehicle dynamics literature
including both the SAE and ISO standards.
We have been unable to find any test
designed to measure the non-linear
understeer gradient over the full non-linear
range of vehicle handling. A variety of
theoretical difficulties make it unlikely that
such test will ever be developed.
In order for ESC understeer mitigation to
occur during a non-linear understeer
mitigation scenario, differences between the
calculated and actual paths of the vehicle
must exceed a manufacturer-specified
allowable threshold. NHTSA knows of no
existing test protocol capable of objectively
evaluating non-linear understeer mitigation.
(Note that this is a somewhat different
problem than that of measuring the nonlinear understeer gradient over the full nonlinear range of vehicle handling. The
theoretical problems referred to above do not
prevent the development of an objective test
for evaluating non-linear understeer
mitigation.)
Performing tests designed to evaluate ESC
understeer mitigation technology on dry high
friction surfaces presents too many problems.
Rather, NHTSA believes it is much more
appropriate to perform such tests on low
friction surfaces.
NHTSA would like to include a
performance standard for understeer
mitigation in FMVSS No. 126. Unfortunately,
we do not know of any existing objective
performance tests for understeer mitigation.
We believe that it is not appropriate to
perform an understeer mitigation
performance test on a dry, high coefficient of
friction test. NHTSA has been working on a
low coefficient of friction understeer
mitigation performance test and has found
some approaches that its researchers believe
to be promising. However, considerable effort
remains to develop such a performance test.
Based on expected costs and benefits,
NHTSA is not currently developing such a
test.
Without having a performance test for
understeer mitigation, how will NHTSA
ensure that light vehicles are equipped with
a system that will limit vehicle understeer
when appropriate? This will be
accomplished through a two part process:
ensuring that vehicles have all of the
hardware needed to limit vehicle understeer
(as required by FMVSS No. 126), and
checking engineering documentation
provided by the vehicle and ESC
manufacturers that the ESC algorithm is
capable of limiting vehicle understeer when
appropriate.
In conclusion, while NHTSA would like to
include a performance standard for
understeer intervention in FMVSS No. 126,
we unfortunately do not know of any suitable
performance tests for mitigation of excessive
understeer. We are unwilling to forgo the
E:\FR\FM\06APR2.SGM
06APR2
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Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 66 / Friday, April 6, 2007 / Rules and Regulations
large safety benefits that ESC will provide to
the American public in the near future just
because we might, some years from now, be
able to produce a better standard. If, in the
future, we see ways to improve FMVSS No.
126 to increase motoring safety, NHTSA
would at that time undertake another
rulemaking activity to gain those benefits.
[FR Doc. 07–1649 Filed 4–5–07; 8:45 am]
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06APR2
Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 72, Number 66 (Friday, April 6, 2007)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 17236-17322]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 07-1649]
[[Page 17235]]
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Part II
Department of Transportation
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National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
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49 CFR Parts 571 and 585
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Electronic Stability Control
Systems; Controls and Displays; Final Rule
Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 66 / Friday, April 6, 2007 / Rules
and Regulations
[[Page 17236]]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
49 CFR Parts 571 and 585
[Docket No. NHTSA-2007-27662]
RIN 2127-AJ77
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Electronic Stability
Control Systems; Controls and Displays
AGENCY: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), DOT.
ACTION: Final rule.
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SUMMARY: As part of a comprehensive plan for reducing the serious risk
of rollover crashes and the risk of death and serious injury in those
crashes, this document establishes a new Federal motor vehicle safety
standard (FMVSS) No. 126 to require electronic stability control (ESC)
systems on passenger cars, multipurpose passenger vehicles, trucks, and
buses with a gross vehicle weight rating of 4,536 Kg (10,000 pounds) or
less. ESC systems use automatic computer-controlled braking of
individual wheels to assist the driver in maintaining control in
critical driving situations in which the vehicle is beginning to lose
directional stability at the rear wheels (spin out) or directional
control at the front wheels (plow out).
Preventing single-vehicle loss-of-control crashes is the most
effective way to reduce deaths resulting from rollover crashes. This is
because most loss-of-control crashes culminate in the vehicle leaving
the roadway, which dramatically increases the probability of a
rollover. Based on the best available data, drawn from crash data
studies, NHTSA estimates that the installation of ESC will reduce
single-vehicle crashes of passenger cars by 34 percent and single
vehicle crashes of sport utility vehicles (SUVs) by 59 percent, with a
much greater reduction of rollover crashes. NHTSA estimates that ESC
has the potential to prevent 71 percent of the passenger car rollovers
and 84 percent of the SUV rollovers that would otherwise occur in
single-vehicle crashes.
NHTSA estimates that ESC would save 5,300 to 9,600 lives and
prevent 156,000 to 238,000 injuries in all types of crashes annually
once all light vehicles on the road are equipped with ESC systems. The
agency further anticipates that ESC systems would substantially reduce
(by 4,200 to 5,500) the more than 10,000 deaths each year on American
roads resulting from rollover crashes.
Manufacturers equipped about 29 percent of model year (MY) 2006
light vehicles sold in the U.S. with ESC, and intend to increase the
percentage to 71 percent by MY 2011. This rule requires installation of
ESC in 100 percent of light vehicles by MY 2012 (with exceptions for
some vehicles manufactured in stages or by small volume manufacturers).
Once all light vehicles in the fleet have ESC, of the overall projected
annual 5,300 to 9,600 highway deaths and 156,000 to 238,000 injuries
prevented by stability control systems installed either voluntarily or
under this rulemaking, we would attribute 1,547 to 2,534 prevented
fatalities (including 1,171 to 1,465 involving rollover) to this
rulemaking, in addition to the prevention of 46,896 to 65,801 injuries
by increasing the percentage of light vehicles with ESC from 71 percent
to 100 percent.
DATES: Effective Date: This final rule is effective June 5, 2007. The
incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the rule
is approved by the Director of the Federal Register as of June 5, 2007.
Compliance Date: Consistent with the phase-in commencing September
1, 2008, all new light vehicles must be equipped with an ESC system
that meets the requirements of the standard by September 1, 2011, with
the following exceptions. Vehicle manufacturers need not meet the
standard's requirements for control and display requirements for the
ESC malfunction indicator telltale and ``ESC Off'' switch and telltale
(if provided) until September 1, 2011 (i.e., at the end of the phase-
in), and vehicles produced by final-stage manufacturers and alterers
must be equipped with a compliant ESC system (including the control and
display requirements) by September 1, 2012. However, manufacturers may
voluntarily certify vehicles to FMVSS No. 126 and earn carry-forward
credits for compliant vehicles, produced in excess of the phase-in
requirements, that are manufactured between June 5, 2007, and the
conclusion of the phase-in.
Petitions for Reconsideration: If you wish to submit a petition for
reconsideration of this rule, your petition must be received by May 21,
2007.
ADDRESSES: Petitions for reconsideration should refer to the docket
number above and be submitted to: Administrator, Room 5220, National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 400 Seventh Street, SW.,
Washington, DC 20590.
See the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION portion of this document (Section
VI; Rulemaking Analyses and Notice) for DOT's Privacy Act Statement
regarding documents submitted to the agency's dockets.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For non-legal issues, you may call Mr.
Patrick Boyd, Office of Crash Avoidance Standards (Telephone: 202-366-
6346) (Fax: 202-366-7002).
For legal issues, you may call Mr. Eric Stas, Office of the Chief
Counsel (Telephone: 202-366-2992) (Fax: 202-366-3820).
You may send mail to both of these officials at National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC
20590.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Table of Contents
I. Executive Summary
A. Requirements of the Final Rule
B. Lead Time and Phase-in
C. Differences Between the Final Rule and the Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking
D. Impacts of ESC and of the Final Rule
II. Background
A. Overview of the Safety Problem
B. The Agency's Comprehensive Response to Rollover
C. Congressional Mandate Under Section 10301 of the Safe,
Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy
for Users of 2005
D. Electronic Stability Control as a Countermeasure to Address
Single-Vehicle Crashes and Rollovers
III. September 2006 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) and Public
Comments
A. The NPRM
B. Summary of the Public Comments on the NPRM
IV. The Final Rule and Response to Public Comments
A. Summary of the Requirements
B. Lead Time and Phase-in
C. Response to Public Comments by Issue
Major Issues
1. Approach of the ESC NPRM
(a) ESC Mandate vs. ESC Standardization
(b) ESC as Part of a Comprehensive Rollover Safety Program
(c) Need for Common Terminology
2. The Definition of ``ESC System'' as the Basis of the Standard
3. Stringency of the Standard
4. Understeer Requirements
5. Lateral Responsiveness Criteria
6. Definition of ``ESC System'' and Required Equipment
(a) Clarification of Performance Expectations
(b) Clarification of Threshold Speed
(c) Estimation of Sideslip--Request to Add Derivative
(d) Request for Alternate Transducers
(e) Interaction with Other Vehicle Systems
(f) ESC Operation in Reverse
7. ESC Performance Requirements
(a) Definition for ``Lateral Acceleration''
(b) Lateral Displacement Calculation
(c) Yaw Rate Calculation
[[Page 17237]]
(d) Temperature and Pavement Specifications
(e) Data Processing Issues
(i) Determination of Beginning of Steering
(ii) Determination of End of Steering
(iii) Removing Offsets
(iv) Use of Interpolation
(v) Method for Determining Peak Steering Wheel Angle
(vi) Need for a Common Data Processing Kernel
(f) ESC Initialization Period
(g) ESC Calibration
Other Issues
8. ESC Malfunction Detection Requirements
(a) Types of Malfunctions to be Detected
(b) Practicability Problems with Malfunction Detection
(c) Monitoring When System is Off
(d) Minimum Performance Level
9. ESC Telltale Requirements
(a) ESC Telltale
(i) Telltale Symbol Text Enhancements
(ii) Telltale Symbol Alternative: Substitute Text
(iii) Waiver of Yellow Color Requirement for ESC Telltale When
Message/Information Center is Used
(iv) Telltale Illumination Strategy
(v) Telltale Extinguishment
(vi) Telltale Location
(vii) Use of ESC Malfunction Telltale to Indicate Malfunctions
of Related Systems/Functions
(b) ``ESC Off'' Indication
(i) ``ESC Off'' Symbol Alternative: Use of Text
(ii) Waiver of Yellow Color Requirement When ``ESC Off'' is
Indicated Via Message/Information Center Text
(iii) ``ESC Off'' Telltale Clarification
(iv) ``ESC Off'' Telltale Strategy
(v) Use of Two-Part Telltales
(vi) Conditions for Illumination of ``ESC Off'' Telltale: Speed
(vii) Conditions for Illumination of ``ESC Off'' Telltale:
Direction
(c) Alerting the Driver of ESC Activation
(i) Visual and Auditory Indications of ESC Activation
(ii) Flashing Telltales as Activation Indication of Intervention
by Related Systems/Functions
(d) Bulb Check
(i) Waiver of Bulb Check for Message/Information Centers
(ii) Clarification Regarding Bulb Check
10. System Disablement and the ``ESC Off'' Control
(a) Provision of an ``ESC Off'' Control
(b) Switch for Complete ESC Deactivation
(c) ESC Operation After Malfunction and ``ESC Off'' Control
Override
(d) Default to ``ESC On'' Status
(e) Operation of Vehicle in 4WD Low Modes
(f) ``ESC Off'' Control Requirements
(i) Labeling of the ``ESC Off'' Control
(ii) Location of the ``ESC Off'' Control
11. Test Procedures
(a) Accuracy Requirements
(b) Tolerances
(c) Location of Lateral Accelerometer
(d) Calculation of Lateral Displacement
(e) Maximum Steering Angle
(f) Vehicle Test Weight
(g) Data Filtering
(h) Outriggers
(i) Ambient Temperature Range
(j) Brake Temperatures
(k) Wind Speed
(l) Rounding of Steering Wheel Angle at 0.3 g
(m) Vehicle Speed Specification for the Slowly Increasing Steer
Test
(n) Alternative Test Procedures
(o) Representativeness of Real World Conditions
12. Lead Time and Phase-in
(a) Lead Time for ESC Telltale(s)
(b) Phase-in Schedule
13. Impacts on the Aftermarket
(a) System Adaptability and Sharing ESC Information
(b) ``Make Inoperative'' Prohibition
(c) Pass-through Certification
14. Compliance with Relevant Legal Requirements
(a) Regulatory Flexibility Act
(b) Executive Orders 12866 and 13258
(c) Vehicle Safety Act
15. ESC Outreach Efforts
(a) ESC Test Procedures Workshop
(b) Public Information Campaign
16. Miscellaneous Issues
(a) Linking Brake Light Illumination to ESC Activation
(b) Vehicles with Dual Wheels on the Rear Axle
(c) ESC Operation with Towed Trailers
(d) Wheelchair-Accessible Vehicles
V. Benefits and Costs
A. Summary
B. ESC Benefits
C. ESC Costs
VI. Regulatory Analyses and Notices
Appendix: Technical Explanation in Response to Comments on
Understeer
I. Executive Summary
As part of a comprehensive plan \1\ that seeks to reduce the
serious risk of rollover crashes and the risk of death and serious
injury in those crashes, and that includes a number of complementary
rulemaking actions, this rule establishes Federal Motor Vehicle Safety
Standard (FMVSS) No. 126, Electronic Stability Control Systems, which
requires passenger cars, multipurpose passenger vehicles (MPVs),
trucks, and buses that have a gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) of
4,536 kg (10,000 pounds) or less to be equipped with an ESC system that
meets the requirements of the standard. ESC systems use automatic,
computer-controlled braking of individual wheels to assist the driver
in maintaining control (and the vehicle's intended heading) in
situations where the vehicle is beginning to lose directional stability
(e.g., where the driver misjudges the severity of a curve or over-
corrects in an emergency situation). In such situations (which occur
with considerable frequency), intervention by the ESC system can assist
the driver in preventing the vehicle from leaving the roadway, thereby
preventing fatalities and injuries associated with crashes involving
vehicle rollover or collision with various objects (e.g., trees,
highway infrastructure, other vehicles).
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\1\ 70 FR 49223, at 49229 (August 23, 2005).
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Based upon current estimates regarding the effectiveness of ESC
systems, we believe that an ESC standard could save thousands of lives
each year, providing potentially the greatest safety benefits produced
by any safety device since the introduction of seat belts. The
following discussion highlights the research and regulatory efforts
that have culminated in this safety standard.
Since the early 1990's, NHTSA has been actively engaged in finding
ways to address the problem of vehicle rollover, because crashes
involving rollover are responsible for a disproportionate number of
fatalities and serious injuries (over 10,000 of the 33,000 fatalities
of vehicle occupants in 2004). Although various options were explored,
the agency ultimately chose to add a rollover resistance component to
its New Car Assessment Program (NCAP) consumer information program in
2001. In response to NCAP's market-based incentives, vehicle
manufacturers made modifications to their product lines to increase
their vehicles' geometric stability and rollover resistance by
utilizing wider track widths (typically associated with passenger cars)
on many of their newer sport utility vehicles (SUVs) and by making
other improvements to truck-based SUVs during major redesigns (e.g.,
introduction of roll stability control). This approach was successful
in terms of reducing the much higher rollover rate of SUVs and other
high-center-of-gravity vehicles, as compared to passenger cars.
However, manipulating vehicle configuration alone cannot entirely
resolve the rollover problem (particularly when consumers continue to
demand vehicles with greater carrying capacity and higher ground
clearance).
Accordingly, the agency began exploring technologies that could
confront the issue of vehicle rollover from a different perspective or
line of inquiry, which led to today's final rule. We believe that the
ESC requirement offers a complementary approach that may provide
substantial benefits to drivers of both passenger cars and LTVs (light
trucks/vans). Undoubtedly, keeping vehicles from leaving the roadway is
the best way to prevent deaths and injuries associated with rollover,
as well as other types of
[[Page 17238]]
crashes. Based on its crash data studies, NHTSA estimates that the
installation of ESC systems will reduce single vehicle crashes of
passenger cars by 34 percent and single vehicle crashes of sport
utility vehicles (SUVs) by 59 percent. Its effectiveness is especially
great for single-vehicle crashes resulting in rollover, where ESC
systems were estimated to prevent 71 percent of passenger car rollovers
and 84 percent of SUV rollovers in single vehicle crashes (see Section
V).
In short, we believe that preventing single-vehicle loss-of-control
crashes is the most effective way to reduce rollover deaths, and we
believe that ESC offers considerable promise in terms of meeting this
important safety objective while maintaining a broad range of vehicle
choice for consumers. In fact, among the agency's ongoing and planned
rulemakings, it is the single most effective way of reducing the total
number of traffic deaths. It is also the most cost-effective of those
rulemakings.
We note that this final rule also satisfies the recent mandate in
section 10301 of the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient
Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users of 2005 (SAFETEA-LU).\2\
That provision requires the Secretary of Transportation to ``establish
performance criteria to reduce the occurrence of rollovers consistent
with stability enhancing technologies'' and to ``issue a proposed rule
* * * by October 1, 2006, and a final rule by April 1, 2009.'' In light
of the tremendous life-saving potential anticipated to be associated
with a requirement for ESC to be standard equipment on all light
vehicles, the agency determined that, consistent with its mission to
save lives, prevent injuries and reduce economic costs due to road
traffic crashes, it was important to issue a final rule as soon as
possible and accelerate the rate of installation. Accordingly, today's
final rule is being published well in advance of the statutory deadline
under SAFETEA-LU.
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\2\ Pub. L. 109-59, 119 Stat. 1144 (2005).
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The balance of this notice discusses (1) The background regarding
the size of the safety problem, the agency's comprehensive response to
rollover-related safety problems, the agency's mandate under SAFETEA-
LU, and ESC systems as a countermeasure to address single-vehicle
crashes and rollovers (see Section II); (2) the agency's September 2006
NPRM for ESC and public comments on that proposal (see Section III);
(3) the requirements and implementation of the final rule, including a
detailed discussion regarding resolution of the issues raised in public
comments (see Section IV); and (4) costs and benefits associated with
the final rule (see Section V). However, before turning to this more
detailed analysis, we summarize the key points of the final rule,
including the requirements for ESC systems under FMVSS No. 126, lead
time and phase-in, differences between the final rule and the NPRM, and
the anticipated impacts of the final rule.
A. Requirements of the Final Rule
After careful consideration of all available information, including
the public comments, the agency has decided to adopt in the ESC final
rule most of the elements of the proposed rule. Consistent with
SAFETEA-LU, NHTSA is requiring all light vehicles to be equipped with
an ESC system with, at the minimum, the capabilities of current
production systems. We believe that a requirement for such ESC systems
is desirable in terms of both ensuring technological feasibility and
providing the desired safety benefits in a cost-effective manner.
Although vehicle manufacturers have been increasing the portion of the
light vehicle fleet equipped with ESC, we believe that given the
relatively high cost of this technology, a mandatory standard is
necessary to maximize the safety benefits associated with electronic
stability control, and is required by SAFETEA-LU.
In order to realize these benefits, we have decided to require
vehicles to be equipped with an ESC system meeting definitional
requirements and to pass a dynamic test. The definitional requirements
specify the necessary elements of a stability control system that is
capable of both effective oversteer and understeer intervention. These
requirements are necessary due to the extreme difficulty in
establishing tests adequate, by themselves, to ensure the desired level
of ESC functionality in a variety of circumstances.\3\ The test that we
are adopting is necessary to ensure that the ESC system is robust and
meets a level of performance at least comparable to that of current ESC
systems. This approach is similar to the one we took, for similar
reasons, in 1995 in mandating antilock brakes for medium and heavy
vehicles pursuant to the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency
Act (ISTEA) of 1991.\4\
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\3\ An equipment requirement is necessary because it would be
almost impossible to devise a single performance test that could not
be met through some action by the manufacturer other than providing
an ESC system. Establishing a battery of performance tests to
achieve our intended results is not possible at this time because we
have not been able to develop a practical, repeatable limit-
understeer test, and there are no applicable tests in vehicle
dynamics literature. Although the agency has undertaken its own
preliminary research efforts related to understeer, the complexity
of such research would require several years of additional work
before any conclusions could be reached regarding an ESC understeer
performance test.
Given this, the agency determined that it had three available
options: (1) Delay the ESC final rule and conduct research and
development; (2) drop the understeer requirement and amend the
standard once an ESC performance test is developed; or (3) include a
requirement for understeer as part of the definition of ``ESC
System,'' along with requiring specific components that will permit
the system to intervene in excessive understeer situations.
The agency eliminated the first and second options on the
grounds of safety.
The agency believes that the third option, adopting an
understeer requirement as part of the definition of ``ESC System,''
along with a requirement for specific equipment suitable for that
purpose, will accomplish the purposes of the statutory mandate. Such
requirement is objective in terms of explaining to manufacturers
what type of performance is required and the minimal equipment
necessary for that purpose. The agency can verify that the system
has the necessary hardware and logic for understeer mitigation.
Since the necessary components for effective understeer intervention
are already present on all ESC systems, we believe that
manufacturers are highly unlikely to decrease their ESC systems'
understeer capabilities simply because the standard does not have a
specific test for understeer. The agency believes that its chosen
approach will ensure that vehicle manufacturers maintain understeer
intervention as a feature of the ESC system, without delaying the
life-saving benefits of the ESC rule. In the meantime, the agency
will conduct additional research in the area of ESC understeer
intervention and consider taking additional action, as appropriate.
Even with an understeer test, the ultimate practicability of a
standard without an equipment requirement remains in doubt because
of the possible large number of test conditions that would be
required.
\4\ 60 FR 13216 (March 10, 1995).
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These requirements are summarized below:
Consistent with the definition of ESC contained in a
voluntary consensus standard, the Society of Automotive Engineers \5\
(SAE) Surface Vehicle Information Report J2564 (rev. June 2004), we are
requiring vehicles covered under the standard to be equipped with an
ESC system that:
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\5\ The Society of Automotive Engineers is an association of
engineers, business executives, educators, and students who share
information and exchange ideas for advancing the engineering of
mobility systems. SAE currently has over 90,000 members in
approximately 97 countries. The organization's activities include
development of standards, events, and technical information and
expertise used in designing, building, maintaining, and operating
self-propelled vehicles for use on land or sea, in air or space. See
https://www.sae.org.
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(1) Augments vehicle directional stability by applying and
adjusting the vehicle brake torques individually to induce a correcting
yaw moment to a vehicle;
(2) Is computer-controlled, with the computer using a closed-loop
[[Page 17239]]
algorithm \6\ to limit vehicle oversteer and to limit vehicle
understeer;
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\6\ A ``closed-loop algorithm'' is a cycle of operations
followed by a computer that includes automatic adjustments based on
the result of previous operations or other changing conditions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(3) Has a means to determine vehicle yaw rate \7\ and to estimate
its sideslip \8\ or the time derivative of sideslip;
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\7\ ``Yaw rate'' means the rate of change of the vehicle's
heading angle measured in degrees/second of rotation about a
vertical axis through the vehicle's center of gravity.
\8\ ``Sideslip'' means the arctangent of the lateral velocity of
the center of gravity of the vehicle divided by the longitudinal
velocity of the center of gravity.
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(4) Has a means to monitor driver steering input;
(5) Has an algorithm to determine the need, and a means to modify
engine torque, as necessary, to assist the driver in maintaining
control of the vehicle, and
(6) Is operational over the full speed range of the vehicle (except
at vehicle speeds less than 15 km/h (9.3 mph) or when being driven in
reverse).
The ESC system, as defined above, is also required to be
capable of applying brake torques individually at all four wheels and
to have an algorithm that utilizes this capability.\9\ Except for the
situations specifically set forth in part (6) of the definition of
``ESC System'' above, the system is also required to be operational
during all phases of driving, including acceleration, coasting, and
deceleration (including braking). It is also required to be capable of
activation even if the anti-lock brake system or traction control
system is also activated.
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\9\ The standard was developed based on new vehicles produced in
2005 and 2006. The definition of ESC is limited to four-wheel ESC
systems because existing two-wheel ESC systems are not capable of
understeer invention or four-wheel automatic braking during an
intervention, even though these systems also produced substantial
(but lesser) benefits.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In order to ensure that a vehicle is equipped with an ESC
system that meets the definition of ``ESC System'' under S4, the final
rule requires vehicle manufacturers to submit, upon the request of
NHTSA's Office of Vehicle Safety Compliance, ESC system technical
documentation as to when understeer intervention is appropriate for a
given vehicle (see S5.6). Specifically, NHTSA may seek information such
as a system diagram that identifies all ESC components, a written
explanation describing the ESC system's basic operational
characteristics, a logic diagram supporting the explanation of system
operations, and a discussion of the pertinent inputs to the vehicle
computer or calculations within the computer and how its algorithm uses
that information and controls ESC system hardware to limit vehicle
understeer.
We are also requiring vehicles covered under the standard
to meet a performance test. It must satisfy the standard's stability
criteria and responsiveness criterion when subjected to the sine with
dwell steering maneuver test. This test involves a vehicle's coasting
at an initial speed of 50 mph while a steering machine steers the
vehicle with a steering wheel pattern as shown in Figure 2 of the
regulatory text. The test maneuver is then repeated over a series of
increasing maximum steering angles. This test maneuver was selected
over a number of other alternatives because we decided that it has the
best set of characteristics, including severity of the test,
repeatability and reproducibility of results, and the ability to
address lateral stability and responsiveness.
The maneuver is severe enough to produce spinout for most vehicles
without ESC. The stability criteria for the test measure how quickly
the vehicle stops rotating after the steering wheel is returned to the
straight-ahead position. A vehicle that continues to rotate for an
extended period after the driver steers straight is out of control,
which is what ESC is designed to prevent. The quantitative stability
criteria are expressed in terms of the percent of the peak yaw rate
after maximum steering that persists at a period of time after the
steering wheel has been returned to straight ahead. They require that
the vehicle yaw rate decrease to no more than 35 percent of the peak
value after one second and that it continue to drop to no more than 20
percent after 1.75 seconds. Since a vehicle that simply responds very
little to steering commands could meet the stability criteria, a
minimum responsiveness criterion is applied to the same test.
Because the benefits of the ESC system can only be
realized if the system is functioning properly, we are requiring that a
telltale be mounted inside the occupant compartment in front of and in
clear view of the driver. The ESC malfunction telltale is required to
illuminate after the occurrence of one or more malfunctions that affect
the generation or transmission of control or response signals in the
vehicle's ESC system. Such telltale must remain continuously
illuminated for as long as the malfunction(s) exists, whenever the
ignition locking system is in the ``On'' (``Run'') position.
In certain circumstances, drivers may have legitimate
reasons to disengage the ESC system or limit its ability to intervene,
such as when the vehicle is stuck in sand/gravel, is being used while
equipped with snow chains, or is being run on a track for maximum
performance. Accordingly, under this final rule, vehicle manufacturers
may include a driver-selectable switch that places the ESC system in a
mode in which it does not satisfy the performance requirements of the
standard (e.g., ``sport'' mode or full-off mode). However, if the
vehicle manufacturer chooses this option, it must ensure that the ESC
system always returns to the fully-functional default mode at the
initiation of each new ignition cycle, regardless of the mode the
driver had previously selected (with certain exceptions for low speed
off-road axle/transfer case selections that turn off ESC, but cannot be
reset electronically). If the vehicle manufacturer chooses this option,
it must also provide an ``ESC Off'' control and a telltale that is
mounted inside the occupant compartment in front of and in clear view
of the driver. Such telltale must remain continuously illuminated for
as long as the ESC is in a mode that renders it unable to meet the
performance requirements of the standard, whenever the ignition locking
system is in the ``On'' (``Run'') position.
We are not requiring the ESC system to be equipped with a
roll stability control system. Roll stability control systems involve
relatively new technology. There is currently an insufficient body of
data to judge the efficacy of such systems. However, the agency will
continue to monitor the development of these systems.
B. Lead Time and Phase-In
In order to provide the public with what are expected to be the
significant safety benefits of ESC systems as rapidly as possible,
compliance with this final rule is set to commence on September 1,
2008. That date marks the start of a three-year phase-in period.
Subject to the special provisions discussed below, NHTSA has decided to
require compliance in accordance with the following schedule: 55
percent of a vehicle manufacturer's light vehicles manufactured during
the period from September 1, 2008 to August 31, 2009; 75 percent of
those manufactured during the period from September 1, 2009 to August
31, 2010; 95 percent of those manufactured during the period from
September 1, 2010 to August 31, 2011, and all light vehicles
thereafter.
For the reasons discussed in detail in Section IV.B of this notice,
we believe that it is practicable for vehicle manufacturers to meet the
requirements of the phase-in discussed above, subject
[[Page 17240]]
to the exceptions below. Because ESC is so cost-effective and has such
high benefits in terms of potential fatalities and injuries that may be
prevented, the agency has decided that it is important to require ESC
installation in light vehicles as quickly as possible. Given the
product plans we have from six vehicle manufacturers, and the desire to
provide manufacturers with flexibility by having a carry-forward
provision, we have chosen the most aggressive phase-in alternative that
we believe is reasonable (i.e., 55/75/95%). In doing so, we have
carefully considered the financial and technological practicability of
the final rule (in keeping with our statutory mandate), while at the
same time facilitating ESC installation in the light vehicle fleet as
expeditiously as possible.
With the above said, the agency has decided that it is appropriate
to provide the following exceptions to the phase-in. First, we have
decided to defer the standard's requirements related to the ESC
telltales and controls until the end of the phase-in (i.e., September
1, 2011 for most manufacturers; September 1, 2012 for final-stage
manufacturers and alterers). Although vehicle manufacturers generally
commented that they could bring their ESC systems into full compliance
(including the control and telltale requirements), they stated that
additional lead time would be necessary to accomplish those changes,
suggesting that they could do so by the end of the phase-in. As a
complicating matter, vehicle manufacturers and their trade associations
explained that even though most current ESC systems would largely meet
the performance requirements of the proposed standard, manufacturers'
inability to meet the proposed control and display requirements would
prevent them from earning the carry-forward credits needed to comply
with the ESC phase-in schedule. Our analysis demonstrates that the
safety benefits associated with early introduction of ESC systems, even
without standardized controls and displays, far outweigh the benefits
of delaying the standard until all systems can fully meet the control
and display requirements (see FRIA's lead time/phase-in discussion).
Accordingly, we believe that it is preferable to move rapidly to
implement the standard, but to delay the compliance date only for the
ESC control and telltale requirements.
As proposed, vehicle manufacturers may earn carry-forward credits
for compliant vehicles, produced in excess of the phase-in
requirements, which are manufactured between the effective date of the
final rule and the conclusion of the phase-in period.\10\
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\10\ We note that carry-forward credits may not be used to defer
the mandatory compliance date of September 1, 2011 for all covered
vehicles.
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This final rule excludes small volume manufacturers (i.e.,
manufacturers producing less than 5,000 vehicles for sale in the U.S.
market in one year) from the phase-in, instead requiring those
manufacturers to fully comply with the standard beginning on September
1, 2011.
In addition, consistent with the policy set forth in NHTSA's
February 14, 2005 final rule on certification requirements for vehicles
built in two or more stages and altered vehicles (70 FR 7414), final-
stage manufacturers and alterers are excluded from the requirements of
the phase-in and are permitted an additional one year for compliance
(i.e., until September 1, 2012). However, final-stage manufacturers and
alterers may voluntarily certify compliance with the standard prior to
this date.
C. Differences Between the Final Rule and the Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking
As noted above, NHTSA has decided to adopt most of the provisions
in the NPRM as part of this final rule. We made a number of changes in
response to the public comments on the NPRM. The main differences
between the NPRM and the final rule involve an increase in the
percentages of FMVSS No. 126-compliant vehicles that must be produced
during the phase-in period, a delay in the requirements for
standardized symbols and acronyms for ESC controls and displays until
the end of the phase-in, and the inclusion of engine control as part of
the standard's definition of ``ESC system.''
The following points briefly describe the main differences between
the NPRM and this final rule.
In order to increase fleet installation of life-saving ESC
systems, the phase-in schedule for ESC is being accelerated to require
55 percent phase-in in the first year, 75 percent in the second year,
and 95 percent in the third year, rather than the 30 percent, 60
percent, and 90 percent schedule that was proposed (see S8.1, S8.2, and
S8.3 in the regulatory text of this final rule).
The effective date for the requirement to use standardized
symbols and acronyms as well as certain malfunction detection and ``ESC
Off'' control functions has been moved to the end of the phase-in
period. This was done in recognition of the fact that manufacturers
will be relying on the carry-forward and compliance credits for
vehicles in current production that pass all the ESC performance
requirements, but currently lack the standardized controls and displays
features proposed in the NPRM (see S5.3.1, S5.3.2; S5.3.4; S5.3.9;
S5.4.2; S5.5.2; S5.5.3; S5.5.6).
The definition of ``ESC System'' has been changed to
require ESC systems with engine control, a feature that allows the ESC
system to reduce vehicle speed during an intervention by cutting engine
power as well as by brake application (see S4 ESC (5)). It was a
feature on most vehicles in the crash data analysis and on all the
vehicles in the ESC cost study.
The definition of ``ESC System'' has been changed to
delete the word ``as appropriate'' from the description of when the
system must intervene to mitigate vehicle understeer (see S4 ESC (2)).
Instead, in order to ensure that a vehicle is equipped with an ESC
system that meets the definition of ``ESC System'' under S4, we have
decided to require vehicle manufacturers to submit, upon the request of
NHTSA's Office of Vehicle Safety Compliance, ESC system technical
documentation as to when understeer intervention is appropriate for a
given vehicle (see S5.6). Specifically, NHTSA may seek information such
as a system diagram that identifies all ESC components, a written
explanation describing the ESC system's basic operational
characteristics, a logic diagram supporting the explanation of system
operations, and a discussion of the pertinent inputs to the vehicle
computer or calculations within the computer and how its algorithm uses
that information and controls ESC system hardware to limit vehicle
understeer.\11\
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\11\ We note here that we anticipate that much of this
information is proprietary and would be submitted under a request
for confidential treatment pursuant to 49 CFR Part 512.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The ``ESC System'' definition and performance requirements
have been changed to refer to generating brake torques at all four
wheels individually, rather than applying individual brakes, so that
the action of regenerative braking by electric motors is included (see
S4 ESC (1); S5.1.1).
The definition of ``ESC System'' has been further changed
to recognize that some systems operate by estimating the time
derivative of side slip, rather than by measuring side slip directly.
The final rule also defines the low speed threshold for ESC operation
as 15 km/h (see S4 ESC (3), (6)).
The responsiveness criterion has been changed to a two-
stage criterion with a lower lateral displacement requirement for large
vehicles (i.e., ones
[[Page 17241]]
over 7,716 pounds GVWR). It is applied during tests with a peak
commanded steering angle of five times or greater than the steering
wheel angle necessary to produce 0.3g steady-state lateral
acceleration. This is a change from applying it simply for tests with
steering wheel angles greater than 180 degrees. It compensates for the
slower steering gear ratios of large vehicles. (see S5.2; S5.2.3;
S6.3.5).
Low-speed four-wheel-drive (4WD) modes that have the side
effect of turning off ESC and that are selected by mechanical controls
that cannot be automatically reset electrically are excluded from the
requirement for automatic ESC restoration at the next ignition cycle
(see S5.4.1).
Under the final rule, outriggers will be used for testing
of trucks, MPVs, and buses, and the maximum weight and roll moment of
inertia are also specified for outriggers (see S6.3.4).
The ESC malfunction detection test procedure has been
modified to include a short driving and turning procedure so that ESC
systems with self-diagnostics requiring vehicle motion can accomplish
their function (see S7.10.2).
D. Impacts of ESC and of the Final Rule
Based on its analysis of the best available data, NHTSA estimates
that ESC--both installed voluntarily and under this regulatory
mandate--will save 5,300 to 9,600 lives and prevent 156,000 to 238,000
injuries in all types of crashes annually once all light vehicles on
the road are equipped with ESC systems. A large portion of these
savings will come from preventing large numbers of rollover crashes.
ESC systems will substantially reduce (by 4,200 to 5,500) the more than
10,000 deaths that occur on American roads each year as a result of
rollover crashes.
Manufacturers installed ESC in about 29 percent of model year (MY)
2006 light vehicles sold in the U.S., and intend to increase the
percentage of ESC installation in light vehicles to 71 percent by MY
2011. This rule accelerates that rate of installation by requiring a
100 percent installation rate by MY 2012 (with exceptions for some
vehicles manufactured in stages or by small volume manufacturers). We
took that step because, in response to public comments and our review
of vehicle manufacturers' production plans, we determined that it is
practicable to increase the percentage of new light vehicles that must
comply with Standard No. 126 under the phase-in, thereby accelerating
the benefits expected to be provided by ESC systems.
As the discussion below demonstrates, ESC not only has a very
significant life-saving and injury-preventing potential in absolute
terms, but it also achieves these benefits in a very cost-effective
manner vis-[agrave]-vis other agency rulemakings. ESC offers
consistently strong benefits and cost-effectiveness across all types of
light vehicles, including passenger cars, SUVs, vans, and pick-up
trucks. Of the 5,300 to 9,600 highway deaths and 156,000 to 238,000
MAIS 1-5 injuries that we project will be prevented annually for all
types of crashes once all light vehicles on the road are equipped with
ESC, we attribute 1,547 to 2,534 prevented fatalities (including 1,171
to 1,465 involving rollover) to this rulemaking, in addition to the
prevention of 46,896 to 65,801 injuries.
The agency estimates that the production-weighted, average cost per
vehicle to meet the proposed standard's requirements will be $58 ($90.3
per passenger car and $29.2 per light truck).\12\ These are incremental
costs over the manufacturers' MY 2011 plans for installation of ABS,
which is expected to be installed in almost 93 percent of the light
vehicle fleet, and ESC, which is expected to be installed in 71 percent
of the light vehicle fleet. Vehicle costs are estimated to be $368 (in
2005$) for anti-lock brakes (ABS) and an additional $111 for ESC, for a
total system cost of $479 per vehicle. The total annual vehicle cost of
this regulation, based on ESC installation beyond manufacturers'
planned percentages, is expected to be approximately $985 million.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ We note that the costs for passenger cars are higher
because a greater portion of those vehicles require installation of
ABS in addition to ESC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In terms of cost-effectiveness, this final rule is expected to save
1,547 to 2,534 lives and prevent 46,896 to 65,801 injuries at a cost of
$0.18 to $0.33 million per equivalent life saved at a 3 percent
discount rate and $0.26 to $0.45 million at a 7 percent discount rate.
The final rule is highly cost-effective even when passenger cars
are considered alone. The passenger car portion of the final rule will
save 945 lives and prevent 32,196 injuries at a cost of $0.38 million
per equivalent life saved at a 3 percent discount rate and $0.50 at a 7
percent discount rate.
II. Background
A. Overview of the Safety Problem
The following discussion explains the nature and scope of the
safety problem which the agency seeks to address through this
rulemaking for ESC, based upon our analysis of recent single-vehicle
crash and rollover statistics. About one in seven light vehicles
involved in police-reported crashes collides with something other than
another vehicle. However, the proportion of these single-vehicle
crashes increases steadily with increasing crash severity, and almost
half of serious and fatal injuries occur in single-vehicle crashes. We
can describe the relationship between crash severity and the number of
vehicles involved in the crash using information from the agency's
crash data programs. We limit our discussion here to ``light
vehicles,'' which consist of passenger cars, multipurpose passenger
vehicles (MPVs), trucks, and buses with a gross vehicle weight rating
(GVWR) of 4,536 kilograms (10,000 pounds) or less.\13\
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\13\ For brevity, we use the term ``light trucks'' in this
document to refer to multipurpose passenger vehicles (e.g., vans,
minivans, and SUVs), trucks, and buses with a GVWR of 4,536
kilograms (10,000 pounds) or less.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The 2000-2005 data from the National Automotive Sampling System
(NASS) Crashworthiness Data System (CDS) and 2005 data from the
Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS) were combined to estimate the
current target population for this rulemaking. It includes 27,680
people who were killed as occupants of light vehicles (both single-
vehicle and multi-vehicle crashes). Over half of these (15,191)
occurred in single-vehicle crashes. Of these, 8,596 occurred in
rollovers. About 1.0 million injuries (AIS 1-5) occurred in crashes
that could be affected by ESC, almost 458,000 in single vehicle crashes
(of which almost half were in rollovers). Multi-vehicle crashes that
could be affected by ESC accounted for 12,485 fatalities and almost
547,000 injuries.
Rollover crashes are complex events that reflect the interaction of
driver, road, vehicle, and environmental factors. We can describe the
relationship between these factors and the risk of rollover using
information from the agency's crash data programs.
According to 2005 data from FARS, 10,836 people were killed as
occupants in light vehicle rollover crashes, which represents 34
percent of all occupants killed that year in crashes. Of those, 8,769
were killed in single-vehicle rollover crashes. Seventy-four percent of
the people who died in single-vehicle rollover crashes were not using a
seat belt, and 61 percent were partially or completely ejected from the
vehicle (including 50 percent who were completely ejected). FARS shows
that 55 percent of light vehicle occupant fatalities in single-vehicle
crashes involved a rollover event.
[[Page 17242]]
Using data from the 2000-2004 NASS CDS files, we estimate that
266,000 light vehicles were towed from a police-reported rollover crash
each year (on average), and that 29,000 occupants of these vehicles
were seriously injured. Of these 266,000 light vehicle rollover
crashes, 219,000 were single-vehicle crashes. Sixty-one percent of
those people who suffered a serious injury in a single-vehicle tow-away
rollover crash were not using a seat belt, and 52 percent were
partially or completely ejected (including 41 percent who were
completely ejected). Estimates from NASS CDS indicate that 82 percent
of tow-away rollovers were single-vehicle crashes, and that 88 percent
(197,000) of the single-vehicle rollover crashes occurred after the
vehicle left the roadway. An audit of 1992-96 NASS CDS data showed that
about 95 percent of rollovers in single-vehicle crashes were tripped by
mechanisms such as curbs, soft soil, pot holes, guard rails, and wheel
rims digging into the pavement, rather than by tire/road interface
friction as in the case of untripped rollover events.
B. The Agency's Comprehensive Response to Rollover
As mentioned above, this final rule for ESC is but one part of the
agency's comprehensive plan to address the issue of vehicle rollover.
The following discussion provides background on NHTSA's comprehensive
plan to reduce rollover crashes. In 2002, the agency formed an
Integrated Project Team (IPT) to examine the rollover problem and to
make recommendations on how to reduce rollovers and to improve safety
when rollovers nevertheless occur. In June 2003, based on the work of
that team, the agency published a report titled, ``Initiatives to
Address the Mitigation of Vehicle Rollover.'' \14\ The report
recommended improving vehicle stability, ejection mitigation, roof
crush resistance, as well as road improvements and behavioral
strategies aimed at consumer education.
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\14\ See Docket Number NHTSA 2003-14622-1.
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Since then, the agency has been working to implement these
recommendations as part of its comprehensive agency plan for reducing
the serious risk of rollover crashes and the risk of death and serious
injury when rollover crashes do occur. It is evident that the most
effective way to reduce deaths and injuries in rollover crashes is to
prevent the rollover crash from occurring. This final rule adopting a
new Federal motor vehicle safety standard for electronic stability
control systems is one key part of that comprehensive agency plan.
Moreover, we note that the agency also published a notice of
proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register in August 2005, seeking to
upgrade our safety standard on roof crush resistance (FMVSS No. 216);
that notice, like the present one, contains an in-depth discussion of
the rollover problem and the countermeasures which the agency intends
to pursue as part of its comprehensive response to the rollover problem
(see 70 FR 49223 (August 23, 2005)).
C. Congressional Mandate Under Section 10301 of the Safe, Accountable,
Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users of
2005
During the course of the ongoing agency's research into ESC
systems, Congress passed the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient
Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users of 2005 (SAFETEA-LU).\15\
Section 10301 of that Act contains legislative mandates for the agency
to initiate a number of rulemakings, including ones for rollover
prevention and occupant ejection prevention. In relevant part, that
provision states:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ Pub. L. 109-59, 119 Stat. 1144 (2005).
(a) In General.--The Secretary [of Transportation] shall
initiate rulemaking proceedings, for the purpose of establishing
rules or standards that will reduce vehicle rollover crashes and
mitigate deaths and injuries associated with such crashes for motor
vehicles with a gross vehicle weight rating of not more than 10,000
pounds.
(b) Rollover Prevention.--One of the rulemaking proceedings
initiated under subsection (a) shall be to establish performance
criteria to reduce the occurrence of rollovers consistent with
stability enhancing technologies. The Secretary shall issue a
proposed rule in this proceeding by rule by October 1, 2006, and a
final rule by April 1, 2009.
This SAFETEA-LU mandate is consistent with the agency's efforts
under its Comprehensive Rollover Safety Program (discussed above). The
agency's research efforts had already identified electronic stability
control systems as a mature and effective technology which has had
adequate time to be analyzed in both the scientific literature, as well
as by NHTSA researchers. These research results strongly suggest that
fleet-wide installation of ESC systems should yield tremendous benefits
in terms of the prevention of fatalities and injuries. Although the
agency considered other potential ``stability enhancing technologies,''
there was no evidence to demonstrate that they would meet the need for
motor vehicle safety (see Section IV.C.3 below). Accordingly, the
agency has determined that adopting a requirement for installation of
ESC systems in light vehicles would be consistent with the statutory
mandate under section 10301 of SAFETEA-LU. Under our interpretation of
that statutory provision, Congress provided the agency discretion to
evaluate various stability enhancing technologies and to adopt a
requirement for a system that the agency determines would best reduce
the occurrence of rollovers. The agency agrees with Congress regarding
the tremendous life-saving potential associated with ESC as a proven
stability enhancing technology, and because of the agency's prior
efforts, it was possible to publish today's final rule well in advance
of the statutory deadline under SAFETEA-LU.
As this final rule makes clear, the agency has decided to implement
the statutory mandate contained in section 10301 of SAFETEA-LU through
promulgation of a Federal motor vehicle safety standard for ESC
pursuant to 49 U.S.C. Chapter 301, Motor Vehicle Safety. Adoption of an
FMVSS for ESC meets the statutory directive to ``establish performance
criteria'' consistent with stability enhancing technologies.
Furthermore, this approach is consistent with the agency's
implementation of the statutory mandate for tire pressure monitoring
systems contained in section 13\16\ of the Transportation Recall
Enhancement, Accountability, and Documentation (TREAD) Act.\17\
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\16\ See 49 U.S.C. 30123 note (2003).
\17\ Pub. L. 106-414, 114 Stat. 1800 (2000).
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D. Electronic Stability Control as a Countermeasure to Address Single-
Vehicle Crashes and Rollovers
General Principles of ESC System Operation
Although Electronic Stability Control (ESC) systems have been known
by a number of different trade names such as Vehicle Stability Control
(VSC), Electronic Stability Program (ESP), StabiliTrak and Vehicle
Stability Enhancement (VSE), their function and performance are
similar. They are systems that use computer control of individual wheel
brakes to help the driver maintain control of the vehicle during
extreme maneuvers by keeping the vehicle headed in the direction the
driver is steering even when the vehicle nears or reaches the limits of
road traction.
When a driver attempts an ``extreme maneuver'' (e.g., one initiated
to avoid
[[Page 17243]]
a crash or due to misjudgment of the severity of a curve), the driver
may lose control if the vehicle responds differently as it nears the
limits of road traction than it does during ordinary driving. The
driver's loss of control can result in either the rear of the vehicle
``spinning out'' or the front of the vehicle ``plowing out.'' As long
as there is sufficient road traction, a highly skilled driver may be
able to maintain control in many extreme maneuvers using
countersteering (i.e., momentarily turning away from the intended
direction) and other techniques. However, average drivers in a panic
situation in which the vehicle is beginning to spin out would be
unlikely to countersteer to regain control.
ESC uses automatic braking of individual wheels to adjust the
vehicle's heading if it departs from the direction the driver is
steering. Thus, it prevents the heading from changing too quickly
(spinning out) or not quickly enough (plowing out). Although it cannot
increase the available traction, ESC affords the driver the maximum
possibility of keeping the vehicle under control and on the road in an
emergency maneuver using just the natural reaction of steering in the
intended direction.
Keeping the vehicle on the road prevents single-vehicle crashes,
which are the circumstances that lead to most rollovers. However, if
the speed is simply too great for the available road traction, even a
vehicle with ESC will unavoidably drift off the road (but not spin
out). Furthermore, ESC cannot prevent road departures due to driver
inattention or drowsiness rather than loss of control.
How ESC Prevents Loss of Vehicle Control
The following explanation of ESC operation illustrates the basic
principle of yaw stability control, but it does not attempt to explain
advanced refinements of the yaw control strategy described below that
use vehicle sideslip (lateral sliding that may not alter yaw rate) to
optimize performance on slippery pavements.
An ESC system maintains what is known as ``yaw'' (or heading)
control by determining the driver's intended heading, measuring the
vehicle's actual response, and automatically turning the vehicle if its
response does not match the driver's intention. However, with ESC,
turning is accomplished by applying a brake force at a single wheel
rather than by steering input. (The uneven brake force from braking
only one wheel creates a yaw torque or moment that rotates the vehicle
around a vertical axis.)
Speed and steering angle measurements are used to determine the
driver's intended heading. The vehicle response is measured in terms of
lateral acceleration and yaw rate by onboard sensors. If the vehicle is
responding in a manner corresponding to driver input, the yaw rate will
be in balance with the speed and lateral acceleration.
The concept of ``yaw rate'' can be illustrated by imaging the view
from above of a car following a large circle painted on a parking lot.
One is looking at the top of the roof of the vehicle and seeing the
circle. If the car starts in a heading pointed north and drives half
way around circle, its new heading is south. Its yaw angle has changed
180 degrees. If it takes 10 seconds to go half way around the circle,
the ``yaw rate'' is 180 degrees per 10 seconds or 18 deg/sec. If the
speed stays the same, the car is constantly rotating at a rate of 18
deg/sec around a vertical axis that can be imagined as piercing its
roof. If the speed is doubled, the yaw rate increases to 36 deg/sec.
While driving in a circle, the driver notices that he must hold the
steering wheel tightly to avoid sliding toward the passenger seat. The
bracing force is necessary to overcome the lateral acceleration that is
caused by the car following the curve. The lateral acceleration is also
measured by the ESC system. When the speed is doubled the lateral
acceleration increases by a factor of four if the vehicle follows the
same circle. There is a fixed physical relationship between the car's
speed, the radius of its circular path, and its lateral acceleration.
The ESC system uses this information as follows: Since the ESC
system measures the car's speed and its lateral acceleration, it can
compute the radius of the circle. Since it then has the radius of the
circle and the car's speed, the ESC system can compute the correct yaw
rate for a car following the path. Of course, the system includes a yaw
rate sensor, and it compares the actual measured yaw rate of the car to
that computed for the path the car is following. If the computed and
measured yaw rates begin to diverge as the car that is trying to follow
the circle speeds up, it means the driver is beginning to lose control,
even if the driver cannot yet sense it. Soon, an unassisted vehicle
would have a heading significantly different from the desired path and
would be out of control either by oversteering (spinning out) or
understeering.
When the ESC system detects an imbalance between the measured yaw
rate of a vehicle and the path defined by the vehicle's steering wheel
angle, speed, and lateral acceleration, the ESC system automatically
intervenes to turn the vehicle. The automatic turning of the vehicle is
accomplished by uneven brake application rather than by steering wheel
movement. If only one wheel is braked, the uneven brake force will
cause the vehicle's heading to change. Figure 1 shows the action of ESC
using single wheel braking to correct the onset of oversteering or
understeering. (Please note that all Figures discussed in this preamble
may be found at the end of the preamble, immediately preceding the
proposed regulatory text.)
Oversteering. In Figure 1 (bottom panel), the vehicle has
entered a left curve that is extreme for the speed it is traveling. The
rear of the vehicle begins to slide which would lead to a vehicle
without ESC turning sideways (or ``spinning out'') unless the driver
expertly countersteers. In a vehicle equipped with ESC, the system
immediately detects that the vehicle's heading is changing more quickly
than appropriate for the driver's intended path (i.e., the yaw rate is
too high). It momentarily applies the right front brake to turn the
heading of the vehicle back to the correct path. It will also cut
engine power to gently slow the vehicle and, if necessary, apply
additional brakes (while maintaining the uneven brake force to create
the necessary yaw moment). The action happens quickly so that the
driver does not perceive the need for steering corrections. Even if the
driver brakes because the curve is sharper than anticipated, the system
is still capable of generating uneven braking if necessary to correct
the heading.
Understeering. Figure 1 (top panel) shows a similar
situation faced by a vehicle whose response as it nears the limits of
road traction is to slide at the front (``plowing out'' or
understeering) rather than oversteering. In this situation, the ESC
system rapidly detects that the vehicle's heading is changing less
quickly than appropriate for the driver's intended path (i.e., the yaw
rate is too low). It momentarily applies the left rear brake to turn
the heading of the vehicle back to the correct path. Again, it will
also cut engine power to gently slow the vehicle and, if necessary,
apply additional brakes (while maintaining the uneven brake force to
create the necessary yaw moment).
While Figure 1 may suggest that particular vehicles go out of
control as either vehicles prone to oversteer or vehicles prone to
understeer, it is just as likely that a given vehicle could require
both understeer and oversteer interventions during progressive phases
[[Page 17244]]
of a complex avoidance maneuver such as a double lane change.
Although ESC cannot change the tire/road friction conditions the
driver is confronted with in a critical situation, there are clear
reasons to expect it to reduce loss-of-control crashes, as discussed
below.
In vehicles without ESC, the response of the vehicle to steering
inputs changes as the vehicle nears the limits of road traction. All of
the e