Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Electronic Stability Control Systems, 54712-54753 [06-7598]
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Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 180 / Monday, September 18, 2006 / Proposed Rules
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration
49 CFR Parts 571 and 585
[Docket No. NHTSA–2006–25801]
RIN 2127–AJ77
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety
Standards; Electronic Stability Control
Systems
National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration (NHTSA), DOT.
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking
(NPRM).
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AGENCY:
SUMMARY: As part of a comprehensive
plan for reducing the serious risk of
rollover crashes and the risk of death
and serious injury in those crashes, this
document proposes to establish a new
Federal motor vehicle safety standard
(FMVSS) No. 126 to require electronic
stability control (ESC) systems on
passenger cars, multipurpose vehicles,
trucks and buses with a gross vehicle
weight rating of 4,536 Kg (10,000
pounds) or less. ESC systems use
automatic computer-controlled braking
of individual wheels to assist the driver
in maintaining control in critical driving
situations in which the vehicle is
beginning to lose directional stability at
the rear wheels (spin out) or directional
control at the front wheels (plow out).
Based on our own crash data studies,
NHTSA estimates that the installation of
ESC will reduce single-vehicle crashes
of passenger cars by 34 percent and
single vehicle crashes of sport utility
vehicles (SUVs) by 59 percent, with a
much greater reduction of rollover
crashes.
Preventing single-vehicle loss-ofcontrol crashes is the most effective way
to reduce deaths resulting from rollover
crashes. This is because most loss of
control crashes culminate in the vehicle
leaving the roadway, which
dramatically increases the probability of
a rollover. NHTSA estimates that ESC
has the potential to prevent 71 percent
of passenger car rollovers and 84
percent of SUV rollovers in singlevehicle crashes.
NHTSA estimates that ESC would
save 5,300 to 10,300 lives and prevent
168,000 to 252,000 injuries in all types
of crashes annually if all light vehicles
on the road were equipped with ESC
systems. ESC systems would
substantially reduce (by 4,200 to 5,400)
of the more than 10,000 deaths each
year on American roads resulting from
rollover crashes.
About 29 percent of model year (MY)
2006 light vehicles sold in the U.S. were
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equipped with ESC, and manufacturers
intend to increase the number of ESC
installations in light vehicles to 71
percent by MY 2011. This rule would
require a 100 percent installation rate
for ESC by MY 2012 (with exceptions
for some vehicles manufactured in
stages or by small volume
manufacturers). Of the overall projected
annual 5,300 to 10,300 highway deaths
and 168,000 to 252,000 injuries
prevented, we would attribute 1,536 to
2,211 prevented fatalities (including
1,161 to 1,445 involving rollover) to this
proposed rulemaking, in addition to the
prevention of 50,594 to 69,630 injuries.
DATES: You should submit your
comments early enough to ensure that
Docket Management receives them not
later than November 17, 2006.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments
identified by DOT DMS Docket Number
above by any of the following methods:
• Web Site: https://dms.dot.gov.
Follow the instructions for submitting
comments on the DOT electronic docket
site.
• Fax: 1–202–493–2251.
• Mail: Docket Management Facility;
U.S. Department of Transportation, 400
Seventh Street, SW., Nassif Building,
Room PL–401, Washington, DC 20590
• Hand Delivery: Room PL–401 on
the plaza level of the Nassif Building,
400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington,
DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday
through Friday, except Federal
Holidays.
• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to
https://www.regulations.gov. Follow the
online instructions for submitting
comments.
Instructions: All submissions must
include the agency name and docket
number or Regulatory Identification
Number (RIN) for this rulemaking. For
detailed instructions on submitting
comments and additional information
on the rulemaking process, see the
Public Participation heading of the
Supplementary Information section of
this document. Note that all comments
received will be posted without change
to https://dms.dot.gov, including any
personal information provided. Please
see the Privacy Act heading under
Regulatory Notices.
Docket: For access to the docket to
read background documents or
comments received, go to https://
dms.dot.gov at any time or to Room PL–
401 on the plaza level of the Nassif
Building, 400 Seventh Street, SW.,
Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5
p.m., Monday through Friday, except
Federal Holidays.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For
non-legal issues, you may call Mr.
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Patrick Boyd, Office of Crash Avoidance
Standards at (202) 366–2272. His FAX
number is (202) 366–7002.
For legal issues, you may call Mr. Eric
Stas, Office of the Chief Counsel at (202)
366–2992. His FAX number is (202)
366–3820.
You may send mail to both of these
officials at National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration, 400 Seventh
Street, SW., Washington, DC 20590.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Table of Contents
I. Executive Summary
II. Safety Problems Addressed by the
Proposed Standard
A. Single-Vehicle Crash and Rollover
Statistics
B. The Agency’s Comprehensive Response
to Rollover
III. Electronic Stability Control Systems
A. How ESC Prevents Loss of Vehicle
Control
B. Additional Features of Some ESC
Systems
IV. Effectiveness of ESC
A. Human Factors Study on the
Effectiveness of ESC
B. Crash Data Studies of ESC Effectiveness
V. Agency Proposal
A. Definition of ESC
B. Performance Test of ESC Oversteer
Intervention and Stability Criteria
C. Responsiveness Criteria
D. Other Issues
1. ESC Off Switches
2. ESC Activation and Malfunction
Symbols and Telltale
3. ESC Off Switch Symbol and Telltale
E. Alternatives to the Agency Proposal
VI. Leadtime
VII. Benefits and Costs
A. Summary
B. ESC Benefits
C. ESC Costs
VIII. Public Participation
IX. Regulatory Analyses and Notices
I. Executive Summary
As part of a comprehensive plan for
reducing the serious risk of rollover
crashes and the risk of death and serious
injury in those crashes, this rule
proposes to establish Federal Motor
Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No.
126, Electronic Stability Control
Systems, which would require
passenger cars, multipurpose passenger
vehicles (MPVs), trucks, and buses that
have a gross vehicle weight rating
(GVWR) of 4,536 kg (10,000 pounds) or
less to be equipped with an ESC system
that meets the requirements of the
standard. ESC systems use automatic,
computer-controlled braking of
individual wheels to assist the driver in
maintaining control (and the vehicle’s
intended heading) in situations where
the vehicle is beginning to lose
directional stability (e.g., where the
driver misjudges the severity of a curve
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or over-corrects in an emergency
situation). In such situations (which
occur with considerable frequency),
intervention by the ESC system can
assist the driver in preventing the
vehicle from leaving the roadway,
thereby preventing fatalities and injuries
associated with crashes involving
vehicle rollover or collision with
various objects (e.g., trees, highway
infrastructure, other vehicles).
Based upon current estimates
regarding the effectiveness of ESC
systems, we believe that an ESC
standard could save thousands of lives
each year, providing potentially the
greatest safety benefits produced by any
safety device since the introduction of
seat belts. The following discussion
highlights the research and regulatory
efforts that have culminated in the
present proposal.
Since the early 1990’s, NHTSA has
been actively engaged in finding ways to
address the problem of vehicle rollover,
because crashes involving rollover are
responsible for a disproportionate
number of fatalities and serious injuries
(over 10,000 of the 33,000 fatalities of
vehicle occupants in 2004). Although
various options were explored, the
agency ultimately chose to add a
rollover resistance component to its
New Car Assessment Program (NCAP)
consumer information program in 2001.
In response to NCAP’s market-based
incentives, vehicle manufacturers made
modifications to their product lines to
increase their vehicles’ geometric
stability and rollover resistance by
utilizing wider track widths (typically
associated with passenger cars) on many
of their newer sport utility vehicles
(SUVs) and by making other
improvements to truck-based SUVs
during major redesigns (e.g.,
introduction of roll stability control).
This approach was successful in terms
of reducing the much higher rollover
rate of SUVs and other high-center-ofgravity vehicles, as compared to
passenger cars. However, manipulating
vehicle configuration alone cannot
entirely resolve the rollover problem
(particularly when consumers continue
to demand vehicles with greater
carrying capacity and higher ground
clearance).
Accordingly, the agency began
exploring technologies that could
confront the issue of vehicle rollover
from a different perspective or line of
inquiry, which led to today’s proposal.
We believe that our proposed ESC
requirement offers a complementary
approach that would provide substantial
benefits to drivers of both passenger cars
and LTVs (light trucks/vans).
Undoubtedly, keeping vehicles from
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leaving the roadway is the best way to
prevent deaths and injuries associated
with rollover, as well as other types of
crashes. Based on its crash data studies,
NHTSA estimates that the installation of
ESC systems will reduce single vehicle
crashes of passenger cars by 34 percent
and single vehicle crashes of sport
utility vehicles (SUVs) by 59 percent. Its
effectiveness is especially great for
single-vehicle crashes resulting in
rollover, where ESC systems were
estimated to prevent 71 percent of
passenger car rollovers and 84 percent
of SUV rollovers in single vehicle
crashes (see section VII).
In short, we believe that preventing
single-vehicle loss-of-control crashes is
the most effective way to reduce
rollover deaths, and we believe that ESC
offers considerable promise in terms of
meeting this important safety objective
while maintaining a broad range of
vehicle choice for consumers. In fact,
among the agency’s ongoing and
planned rulemakings, it is the single
most effective way of reducing the total
number of traffic deaths. It is also the
most cost-effective of those rulemakings.
We note that this proposal is
consistent with recent congressional
legislation contained in section 10301 of
the Safe, Accountable, Flexible,
Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A
Legacy for Users of 2005 (SAFETEA–
LU).1 That provision requires the
Secretary of Transportation to ‘‘establish
performance criteria to reduce the
occurrence of rollovers consistent with
stability enhancing technologies’’ and to
‘‘issue a proposed rule * * * by October
1, 2006, and a final rule by April 1,
2009.’’
The balance of this notice explains in
detail: (1) The size of the safety problem
(see section II); (2) how ESC systems
would act to mitigate that safety
problem (see section II); (3) the basics of
ESC operation (see section III); (4)
findings from ESC-related research (see
section IV);(5) the specifics of our
regulatory proposal (see section V); (6)
lead time and phase-in requirements
(see section VI), and (7) costs and
benefits associated with this proposal
(see section VII). The following section
summarizes the key points of the
proposal.
A. Proposed Requirements for ESC
Systems
Consistent with the congressional
mandate in section 10301 of SAFETEA–
LU, NHTSA is proposing to require all
light vehicles to be equipped with an
ESC system with, at the minimum, the
capabilities of current production
1 Pub.
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systems. We believe that a requirement
for such ESC systems would be
practicable in terms of both ensuring
technological feasibility and providing
the desired safety benefits in a costeffective manner. Although vehicle
manufacturers have been increasing the
share of the light vehicle fleet equipped
with ESC, we believe that given the
relatively high cost of this technology, a
mandatory standard is necessary to
maximize the safety benefits associated
with electronic stability control, and is
consistent with the mandate arising out
of SAFETEA–LU.
In order to realize these benefits, we
have tentatively decided to require
vehicles both to be equipped with an
ESC system meeting definitional
requirements and to pass a dynamic
test. The definitional requirements
specify the necessary elements of a
stability control system that would be
capable of both effective oversteer and
understeer intervention. These
requirements are necessary due to the
extreme difficulty in establishing a test
adequate to ensure the desired level of
ESC functionality.2 The test is necessary
to ensure that the ESC system is robust
and meets a level of performance at least
comparable to that of current ESC
systems. These requirements are
summarized below.
• Consistent with the industry
consensus definition of ESC contained
in the Society of Automotive Engineers
(SAE) Surface Vehicle Information
Report J2564 (rev. June 2004), we are
proposing to require vehicles covered
under the standard to be equipped with
an ESC system that:
(1) Augments vehicle directional
stability by applying and adjusting the
vehicle’s brakes individually to induce
correcting yaw torques to a vehicle;
(2) Is computer-controlled, with the
computer using a closed-loop
algorithm 3 to limit vehicle oversteer
and to limit vehicle understeer when
appropriate;
2 Without an equipment requirement, it would be
almost impossible to devise a single performance
test that could not be met through some action by
the manufacturer other than providing an ESC
system. Even a battery of performance tests still
might not achieve our intended results, because
although it might necessitate installation of an ESC
system, we expect that it would be unduly
cumbersome for both the agency and the regulated
community.
3 A ‘‘closed-loop algorithm’’ is a cycle of
operations followed by a computer that includes
automatic adjustments based on the result of
previous operations or other changing conditions.
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(3) Has a means to determine vehicle
yaw rate 4 and to estimate its sideslip 5;
(4) Has a means to monitor driver
steering input, and
(5) Is operational over the full speed
range of the vehicle (except below a
low-speed threshold where loss of
control of the vehicle is unlikely).
• The proposed ESC system as
defined above would also be required to
be capable of applying all four brakes
individually and to have an algorithm
that utilizes this capability. The system
would also be required to be operational
during all phases of driving, including
acceleration, coasting, and deceleration
(including braking), and it would be
required to remain operational when the
antilock brake system or traction control
system is activated.
• We are also proposing to require
vehicles covered under the standard to
meet a performance test that would
satisfy the standard’s stability criteria
and responsiveness criterion when
subjected to the Sine with Dwell
steering maneuver test. This test
involves a vehicle coasting at an initial
speed of 50 mph while a steering
machine steers the vehicle with a
steering wheel pattern as shown in
Figure 2. The test maneuver is then
repeated over a series of increasing
maximum steering angles. This test
maneuver was selected over a number of
other alternatives, because we
tentatively decided that it has the most
optimal set of characteristics, including
severity of the test, repeatability and
reproducibility of results, and the ability
to address lateral stability and
responsiveness (see section V.B).
The maneuver is severe enough to
produce spinout for most vehicles
without ESC. The stability criteria for
the test measure how quickly the
vehicle stops turning after the steering
wheel is returned to the straight-ahead
position. A vehicle that continues to
turn for an extended period after the
driver steers straight is out of control,
which is what ESC is designed to
prevent. The stability criteria are
expressed in terms of the percent of the
peak yaw rate after maximum steering
that persists at a period of time after the
steering wheel has been returned to
straight ahead. They require that the
vehicle yaw rate decrease to no more
than 35 percent of the peak value after
one second and that it continues to drop
4 ‘‘Yaw rate’’ means the rate of change of the
vehicle’s heading angle measured in degrees/second
of rotation about a vertical axis through the
vehicle’s center of gravity.
5 ‘‘Sideslip’’ means the arctangent of the lateral
velocity of the center of gravity of the vehicle
divided by the longitudinal velocity of the center
of gravity.
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to no more than 20 percent after 1.75
seconds. Since a vehicle that simply
responds very little to steering
commands could meet the stability
criteria, a minimum responsiveness
criterion is applied to the same test. It
requires that the ESC-equipped vehicle
must move laterally at least 1.83 meters
(half a 12 foot lane width) during the
first 1.07 seconds after the initiation of
steering (a discontinuity in the steering
pattern that is convenient for timing a
measurement).
• Because the benefits of the ESC
system can only be realized if the
system is functioning properly, we are
proposing to require a telltale be
mounted inside the occupant
compartment in front of and in clear
view of the driver and be identified by
the symbol shown for ‘‘ESC Malfunction
Telltale’’ in Table 1 of FMVSS No. 101,
Controls and Displays. The ESC
malfunction telltale would be required
to illuminate not more than two minutes
after the occurrence of one or more
malfunctions that affect the generation
or transmission of control or response
signals in the vehicle’s ESC system.
Such telltale must remain continuously
illuminated for as long as the
malfunction(s) exists, whenever the
ignition locking system is in the ‘‘On’’
(‘‘Run’’) position. (Vehicle
manufacturers would be permitted to
use the ESC malfunction telltale in a
flashing mode to indicate ESC
operation.)
• In certain circumstances, drivers
may have legitimate reasons to
disengage the ESC system or limit its
ability to intervene, such as when the
vehicle is stuck in sand/gravel or when
the vehicle is being run on a track for
maximum performance. Accordingly,
under this proposal, vehicle
manufacturers would be permitted to
include a driver-selectable switch that
places the ESC system in a mode in
which it would not satisfy the
performance requirements of the
standard (e.g., ‘‘sport’’ mode or full-off
mode). However, if the vehicle
manufacturer chooses this option, it
would be required to ensure that the
ESC system always returns to a mode
that satisfies the requirements of the
standard at the initiation of each new
ignition cycle, regardless of the mode
the driver had previously selected. The
manufacturer would be required to
provide an ‘‘ESC Off’’ switch and a
telltale that is mounted inside the
occupant compartment in front of and
in clear view of the driver and which is
identified by the symbol shown for
‘‘ESC Off’’ in Table 1 of FMVSS No. 101.
Such telltale must remain continuously
illuminated for as long as the ESC is in
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a mode that renders it unable to meet
the performance requirements of the
standard, whenever the ignition locking
system is in the ‘‘On’’ (‘‘Run’’) position.
• We are not proposing to require the
ESC system to be equipped with a roll
stability control function (or a separate
system to that effect). Roll stability
control systems involve relatively new
technology, and there is currently
insufficient data to judge the efficacy of
such systems. However, the agency will
continue to monitor the development of
roll stability control systems. Vehicle
manufacturers may supplement the ESC
system we are proposing to require with
a roll stability control system/feature.
B. Leadtime and Phase-In
In order to provide the public with
what are expected to be the significant
safety benefits of ESC systems as rapidly
as possible, NHTSA is proposing to
require all light vehicles covered by this
standard to be equipped with a FMVSS
No. 126-compliant ESC system by
September 1, 2011. We are proposing
that compliance would commence on
September 1, 2008, which would mark
the start of a three-year phase-in period.
Subject to the special provisions
discussed below, the proposed phase-in
schedule for FMVSS No. 126 would be
as follows: 30 percent of a vehicle
manufacturer’s light vehicles
manufactured during the period from
September 1, 2008 to August 31, 2009
would be required to comply with the
standard; 60 percent of those
manufactured during the period from
September 1, 2009 to August 31, 2010;
90 percent of those manufactured
during the period from September 1,
2010 to August 31, 2011, and all light
vehicles thereafter.
In general, we believe that it would be
practicable for vehicle manufacturers to
meet the requirements of the phase-in
discussed above. We anticipate that
vehicle manufacturers would be able to
meet the requirements of the proposed
standard by installing ESC systems
currently in production, and most
vehicle lines would likely experience
some level of redesign over the next four
to five years, which would provide an
opportunity to incorporate an ESC
system during the course of the
manufacturer’s normal production cycle
(see section VI for a more complete
discussion).
However, NHTSA is proposing to
exclude multi-stage manufacturers and
alterers from the requirements of the
phase-in and to extend by one year the
time for compliance by those
manufacturers (i.e., until September 1,
2012). This NPRM also proposes to
exclude small volume manufacturers
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(i.e., manufacturers producing less than
5,000 vehicles for sale in the U.S.
market in one year) from the phase-in,
instead requiring such manufacturers to
fully comply with the standard on
September 1, 2011.
Under our proposal, vehicle
manufacturers would be permitted to
earn carry-forward credits for compliant
vehicles, produced in excess of the
phase-in requirements, which are
manufactured between the effective date
of the final rule and the conclusion of
the phase-in period.6
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C. Anticipated Impacts of the Proposal
As noted above, we believe that ESC
has among the highest life-saving
potential of any vehicle safety device
developed in the past three decades,
ranking with seatbelts and air bags in
terms of importance. NHTSA estimates
that ESC would save 5,300 to 10,300
lives and prevent 168,000 to 252,000
injuries in all types of crashes annuvly
if all light vehicles on the road were
equipped with ESC systems. A large
portion of these savings would come
from rollover crashes. ESC systems
would substantially reduce (by 4,200 to
5,400) of the more than 10,000 deaths
each year on American roads resulting
from rollover crashes.
About 29 percent of model year (MY)
2006 light vehicles sold in the U.S. were
equipped with ESC, and manufacturers
intend to increase the number of ESC
installations in light vehicles to 71
percent by MY 2011.7 This rule would
require a 100 percent installation rate
for ESC by MY 2012 (with exceptions
for some vehicles manufactured in
stages or by small volume
manufacturers). As the discussion below
demonstrates, ESC has very significant
life-saving and injury-preventing
potential in absolute terms, but it does
´
so in a very cost-effective manner vis-avis other agency rulemakings. ESC offers
consistently strong benefits and costeffectiveness across all types of light
vehicles, including passenger cars,
SUVs, vans, and pick-up trucks.
Of the 5,300 to 10,300 highway deaths
and 168,000 to 252,000 MAIS 1–5
injuries which we project will be
prevented annually for all types of
6 We note that carry-forward credits would not be
permitted to be used to defer the mandatory
compliance date of September 1, 2011 for all
covered vehicles.
7 In April 2006, NHTSA sent letters to seven
vehicle manufacturers requesting voluntary
submission of information regarding their planned
production of ESC-equipped vehicles for model
years 2007 to 2012. Manufacturers responded with
product plans containing confidential information.
These agency letters and manufacturer responses
(with confidential information redacted) may be
found in the docket for this rulemaking.
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crashes once all light vehicles on the
road are equipped with ESC, we would
attribute 1,536 to 2,211 prevented
fatalities (including 1,161 to 1,445
involving rollover) to this proposed
rulemaking, in addition to the
prevention of 50,594 to 69,630 injuries.
This compares favorably with the
Regulatory Impact Analyses for other
important rulemakings such as FMVSS
No. 208 mandatory air bags (1,964 to
3,670 lives saved), FMVSS No. 214 side
impact protection (690 to 1,030 lives
saved), and FMVSS No. 201 upper
interior head impact protection (870 to
1,050 lives saved). (See section VII,
Benefits and Costs of this notice and the
Preliminary Regulatory Impact Analysis
submitted to the docket for this
rulemaking). In addition, the agency
estimates that property damage and
travel delay costs would be reduced by
$260 to $453 million annually.
The agency estimates that the
production-weighted, average cost per
vehicle to meet the proposed standard’s
requirements would be $58 ($90.3 per
passenger car and $29.2 per light truck).
These are incremental costs over the MY
2011 installation of ABS, which is
expected to be installed in almost 93
percent of the light vehicle fleet, and
ESC, which is expected to be installed
in 71 percent of the light vehicle fleet.
Vehicle costs are estimated to be $368
(in 2005$) for anti-lock brakes (ABS)
and an additional $111 for ESC, for a
total system cost of $479 per vehicle.
Currently, every vehicle that is
equipped with ESC, is also equipped
with ABS and traction control.
However, the agency believes that
traction control is a convenience
feature. Accordingly, it is not required
by this proposal. We also assumed an
annual production of 17 million light
vehicles (9 million light trucks and 8
million passenger cars). Thus, the total
annual vehicle cost of this regulation,
corresponding to ESC installation
beyond manufacturers’ planned
production, is expected to be
approximately $985 million.
In terms of cost-effectiveness, this
proposal for passenger cars and light
trucks would save 1,536 to 2,211 lives
and prevent 50,594 to 69,630 injuries at
a cost of $0.19 to $0.32 million per
equivalent life saved at a 3 percent
discount rate and $0.27 to $0.43 at a 7
percent discount rate. Again, the costeffectiveness for ESC compares
favorably with the Regulatory Impact
Analyses for other important
rulemakings such as FMVSS No. 202
head restraints safety improvement
($2.61 million per life saved), FMVSS
No. 208 center seat shoulder belts ($3.39
to $5.92 million per life saved), FMVSS
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No. 208 advanced air bags ($1.9 to $9.0
million per life saved), and FMVSS No.
301 fuel system integrity upgrade ($1.96
to $5.13 million per life saved).
We note that the costs for passenger
cars are higher because a greater portion
of those vehicles require installation of
ABS in addition to ESC. Nevertheless,
the proposal remains highly costeffective even when passenger cars are
considered alone. The passenger car
portion of the proposal would save 956
lives and prevent 34,902 injuries at a
cost of $0.35 million per equivalent life
saved at a 3 percent discount rate and
$0.47 at a 7 percent discount rate.
Therefore, the agency deemed it
appropriate to make the proposed
standard applicable to all light vehicles,
because such approach makes sense
from both a safety and cost standpoint.
II. Safety Problems Addressed by the
Proposed Standard
Crash data studies conducted in the
U.S., Europe and Japan indicate that
ESC is very effective in reducing singlevehicle crashes. Studies of the behavior
of ordinary drivers in critical situations
using the National Advanced Driving
Simulator also show a very large
reduction in instances of loss of control
when the vehicle is equipped with ESC.
Based on its crash data studies, NHTSA
estimates that ESC will reduce single
vehicle crashes of passenger cars by 34
percent and single vehicle crashes of
SUVs by 59 percent. NHTSA’s latest
crash data study also shows that ESC is
most effective in reducing single-vehicle
crashes that result in rollover. ESC is
estimated to prevent 71 percent of
passenger car rollovers and 84 percent
of SUV rollovers in single vehicle
crashes. It is also estimated to reduce
some multi-vehicle crashes but at a
much lower rate than its effect on single
vehicle crashes.
A. Single-Vehicle Crash and Rollover
Statistics
About one in seven light vehicles
involved in police-reported crashes
collide with something other than
another vehicle. However, the
proportion of these single-vehicle
crashes increases steadily with
increasing crash severity, and almost
half of serious and fatal injuries occur
in single-vehicle crashes. We can
describe the relationship between crash
severity and the number of vehicles
involved in the crash using information
from the agency’s crash data programs.
We limit our discussion here to light
vehicles, which consist of (1) passenger
cars and (2) multipurpose passenger
vehicles, trucks and buses under 4,536
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kilograms (10,000 pounds) gross vehicle
weight rating (GVWR).8
The 2000–2004 data from the National
Automotive Sampling System (NASS)
Crashworthiness Data System (CDS) and
2004 data from the Fatality Analysis
Reporting System (FARS) were
combined to estimate the current target
population for this rulemaking. It
includes 28,252 people who were killed
as occupants of light vehicles. Over half
of these (15,007) occurred in singlevehicle crashes. Of these, 8,460
occurred in rollovers. About 1.1 million
injuries (AIS 1–5) occurred in crashes
that could be affected by ESC, almost
500,000 in single vehicle crashes (of
which almost half were in rollovers).
Multi-vehicle crashes that could be
affected by ESC accounted for 13,245
fatalities and almost 600,000 injuries.
Rollover crashes are complex events
that reflect the interaction of driver,
road, vehicle, and environmental
factors. We can describe the relationship
between these factors and the risk of
rollover using information from the
agency’s crash data programs.
According to 2004 data from FARS,
10,555 people were killed as occupants
in light vehicle rollover crashes, which
represents 33 percent of all occupants
killed that year in crashes. Of those,
8,567 were killed in single-vehicle
rollover crashes. Seventy-four percent of
the people who died in single-vehicle
rollover crashes were not using a seat
belt, and 61 percent were partially or
completely ejected from the vehicle
(including 50 percent who were
completely ejected). FARS shows that
55 percent of light vehicle occupant
fatalities in single-vehicle crashes
involved a rollover event.
Using data from the 2000–2004 NASS
CDS files, we estimate that 280,000 light
vehicles were towed from a policereported rollover crash each year (on
average), and that 29,000 occupants of
these vehicles were seriously injured. Of
these 280,000 light vehicle rollover
crashes, 230,000 were single-vehicle
crashes. Sixty-two percent of those
people who suffered a serious injury in
a single-vehicle tow-away rollover crash
were not using a seat belt, and 52
percent were partially or completely
ejected (including 41 percent who were
completely ejected). Estimates from
NASS CDS indicate that 82 percent of
tow-away rollovers were single-vehicle
crashes, and that 88 percent (202,000) of
the single-vehicle rollover crashes
occurred after the vehicle left the
8 For brevity, we use the term light trucks in this
document to refer to multipurpose passenger
vehicles, such as vans, minivans, and SUVs, trucks
and buses under 4,536 kilograms (10,000 pounds)
GVWR.
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roadway. An audit of 1992–96 NASS
CDS data showed that about 95 percent
of rollovers in single-vehicle crashes
were tripped by mechanisms such as
curbs, soft soil, pot holes, guard rails,
and wheel rims digging into the
pavement, rather than by tire/road
interface friction as in the case of
untripped rollover events.
B. The Agency’s Comprehensive
Response to Rollover
As mentioned above, this proposal for
ESC is part of the agency’s
comprehensive plan to address the issue
of vehicle rollover. The following
provides background on NHTSA’s
comprehensive plan to reduce rollover
crashes. In 2002, the agency formed an
Integrated Project Team (IPT) to
examine the rollover problem and make
recommendations on how to reduce
rollovers and improve safety when
rollovers nevertheless occur. In June
2003, based on the work of the team, the
agency published a report entitled,
‘‘Initiatives to Address the Mitigation of
Vehicle Rollover.’’ 9 The report
recommended improving vehicle
stability, ejection mitigation, roof crush
resistance, as well as road improvement
and behavioral strategies aimed at
consumer education.
Since then, the agency has been
working to implement these
recommendations as part of it
comprehensive agency plan for reducing
the serious risk of rollover crashes and
the risk of death and serious injury
when rollover crashes do occur. It is
evident that the most effective way to
reduce deaths and injuries in rollover
crashes is to prevent the rollover crash
from occurring. This proposal to adopt
a new Federal motor vehicle safety
standard for electronic stability control
systems is one part of that
comprehensive agency plan.
Moreover, we note that the agency
also published a notice of proposed
rulemaking in the Federal Register in
August 2005, seeking to upgrade our
safety standard on roof crush resistance
(FMVSS No. 216); that notice, like the
present one, contains an in-depth
discussion of the rollover problem and
the countermeasures which the agency
intends to pursue as part of its
comprehensive response to the rollover
problem (see 70 FR 49223 (August 23,
2005)).
III. Electronic Stability Control Systems
Although Electronic Stability Control
(ESC) systems are known by many
different trade names such as Vehicle
Stability Control (VSC), Electronic
9 See
PO 00000
Docket Number NHTSA 2003–14622–1.
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Stability Program (ESP), StabiliTrak and
Vehicle Stability Enhancement (VSE),
their function and performance are
similar. They are systems that uses
computer control of individual wheel
brakes to help the driver maintain
control of the vehicle during extreme
maneuvers by keeping the vehicle
headed in the direction the driver is
steering even when the vehicle nears or
reaches the limits of road traction.
When a driver attempts an ‘‘extreme
maneuver’’ (e.g., one initiated to avoid
a crash or due to misjudgment of the
severity of a curve), the driver may lose
control if the vehicle responds
differently as it nears the limits of road
traction than it does during ordinary
driving. The driver’s loss of control can
result in either the rear of the vehicle
‘‘spinning out’’ or the front of the
vehicle ‘‘plowing out.’’ As long as there
is sufficient road traction, a highly
skilled driver may be able to maintain
control in many extreme maneuvers
using countersteering (i.e., momentarily
turning away from the intended
direction) and other techniques.
However, average drivers in a panic
situation in which the vehicle beginning
to spin out would be unlikely to
countersteer to regain control.
ESC uses automatic braking of
individual wheels to adjust the vehicle’s
heading if it departs from the direction
the driver is steering. Thus, it prevents
the heading from changing too quickly
(spinning out) or not quickly enough
(plowing out). Although it cannot
increase the available traction, ESC
affords the driver the maximum
possibility of keeping the vehicle under
control and on the road in an emergency
maneuver using just the natural reaction
of steering in the intended direction.
Keeping the vehicle on the road
prevents single-vehicle crashes, which
are the circumstances that lead to most
rollovers. However, if the speed is
simply too great for the available road
traction, even a vehicle with ESC will
unavoidably drift off the road (but not
spin out). Furthermore, ESC cannot
prevent road departures due to driver
inattention or drowsiness rather than
loss of control.
A. How ESC Prevents Loss of Vehicle
Control
The following explanation of ESC
operation illustrates the basic principle
of yaw stability control, but it does not
attempt to explain advanced
refinements of the yaw control strategy
described below that use vehicle
sideslip (lateral sliding that may not
alter yaw rate) to optimize performance
on slippery pavements.
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An ESC system maintains what is
known as ‘‘yaw’’ (or heading) control by
determining the driver’s intended
heading, measuring the vehicle’s actual
response, and automatically turning the
vehicle if its response does not match
the driver’s intention. However, with
ESC, turning is accomplished by
applying counter torques from the
braking system rather than from steering
input.
Speed and steering angle
measurements are used to determine the
driver’s intended heading. The vehicle
response is measured in terms of lateral
acceleration and yaw rate by onboard
sensors. If the vehicle is responding in
a manner corresponding to driver input,
the yaw rate will be in balance with the
speed and lateral acceleration.
The concept of ‘‘yaw rate’’ can be
illustrated by imaging the view from
above of a car following a large circle
painted on a parking lot. One is looking
at the top of the roof of the vehicle and
seeing the circle. If the car starts in a
heading pointed north and drives half
way around circle, its new heading is
south. Its yaw angle has changed 180
degrees. If it takes 10 seconds to go half
way around the circle, the ‘‘yaw rate’’ is
180 degrees per 10 seconds or 18 deg/
sec. If the speed stays the same, the car
is constantly rotating at a rate of 18 deg/
sec around a vertical axis that can be
imagined as piercing its roof. If the
speed is doubled, the yaw rate increases
to 36 deg/sec.
While driving in a circle, the driver
notices that he must hold the steering
wheel tightly to avoid sliding toward
the passenger seat. The bracing force is
necessary to overcome the lateral
acceleration that is caused by the car
following the curve. The lateral
acceleration is also measured by the
ESC system. When the speed is doubled
the lateral acceleration increases by a
factor of four if the vehicle follows the
same circle. There is a fixed physical
relationship between the car’s speed,
the radius of its circular path, and its
lateral acceleration.
The ESC system uses this information
as follows: Since the ESC system
measures the car’s speed and its lateral
acceleration, it can compute the radius
of the circle. Since it then has the radius
of the circle and the car’s speed, the ESC
system can compute the correct yaw rate
for a car following the path. Of course,
the system includes a yaw rate sensor,
and it compares the actual measured
yaw rate of the car to that computed for
the path the car is following. If the
computed and measured yaw rates
begin to diverge as the car that is trying
to follow the circle speeds up, it means
the driver is beginning to lose control,
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even if the driver cannot yet sense it.
Soon, an unassisted vehicle would have
a heading significantly different from
the desired path and would be out of
control either by oversteering (spinning
out) or understeering.
When the ESC system detects an
imbalance between the measured yaw
rate of a vehicle and the path defined by
the vehicle’s speed and lateral
acceleration, the ESC system
automatically intervenes to turn the
vehicle. The automatic turning of the
vehicle is accomplished by uneven
brake application rather than by steering
wheel movement. If only one wheel is
braked, the uneven brake force will
cause the vehicle’s heading to change.
Figure 1 shows the action of ESC using
single wheel braking to correct the onset
of oversteering or understeering. (Please
note that all Figures discussed in this
preamble may be found at the end of the
preamble, immediately preceding the
proposed regulatory text.)
• Oversteering. In Figure 1 (bottom
panel), the vehicle has entered a left
curve that is extreme for the speed it is
traveling. The rear of the vehicle begins
to slide which would lead to a vehicle
without ESC turning sideways (or
‘‘spinning out’’) unless the driver
expertly countersteers. In a vehicle
equipped with ESC, the system
immediately detects that the vehicle’s
heading is changing more quickly than
appropriate for the driver’s intended
path (i.e., the yaw rate is too high). It
momentarily applies the right front
brake to turn the heading of the vehicle
back to the correct path. The action
happens quickly so that the driver does
not perceive the need for steering
corrections. Even if the driver brakes
because the curve is sharper than
anticipated, the system is still capable of
generating uneven braking if necessary
to correct the heading.
• Understeering. Figure 1 (top panel)
shows a similar situation faced by a
vehicle whose response as it nears the
limits of road traction is to slide at the
front (‘‘plowing out’’ or understeering)
rather than oversteering. In this
situation, the ESC system rapidly
detects that the vehicle’s heading is
changing less quickly than appropriate
for the driver’s intended path (i.e., the
yaw rate is too low). It momentarily
applies the left rear brake to turn the
heading of the vehicle back to the
correct path.
While Figure 1 may suggest that
particular vehicles go out of control as
either vehicles prone to oversteer or
vehicles prone to understeer, it is just as
likely that a given vehicle could require
both understeer and oversteer
interventions during progressive phases
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of a complex avoidance maneuver such
as a double lane change.
Although ESC cannot change the tire/
road friction conditions the driver is
confronted with in a critical situation,
there are clear reasons to expect it to
reduce loss-of-control crashes, as
discussed below.
In vehicles without ESC, the response
of the vehicle to steering inputs changes
as the vehicle nears the limits of road
traction. All of the experience of the
average driver is in operating the
vehicle in its ‘‘linear range’’, i.e., the
range of lateral acceleration in which a
given steering wheel movement
produces a proportional change in the
vehicle’s heading. The driver merely
turns the wheel the expected amount to
produce the desired heading.
Adjustments in heading are easy to
achieve because the vehicle’s response
is proportional to the driver’s steering
input, and there is very little lag time
between input and response. The car is
traveling in the direction it is pointed,
and the driver feels in control. However,
at lateral accelerations above about onehalf ‘‘g’’ on dry pavement for ordinary
vehicles, the relationship between the
driver’s steering input and the vehicle’s
response changes (toward oversteer or
understeer), and the lag time of the
vehicle response can lengthen. When a
driver encounters these changes during
a panic situation, it adds to the
likelihood that the driver will loose
control and crash because the familiar
actions learned by driving in the linear
range would not be the correct steering
actions.
However, ordinary linear range
driving skills are much more likely to be
adequate for a driver of a vehicle with
ESC to avoid loss of control in a panic
situation. By monitoring yaw rate and
sideslip, ESC can intervene early in the
impending loss-of-control situation with
the appropriate brake forces necessary
to restore yaw stability before the driver
would attempt an over correction or
other error. The net effect of ESC is that
the driver’s ordinary driving actions
learned in linear range driving are the
correct actions to control the vehicle in
an emergency. Also, the vehicle will not
change its heading from the desired
path in a way that would induce further
panic in a driver facing a critical
situation. Studies using a driving
simulator, discussed in Section IV,
demonstrate that ordinary drivers are
much less likely to lose control of a
vehicle with ESC when faced with a
critical situation.
Besides allowing drivers to cope with
emergency maneuvers and slippery
pavement using only ‘‘linear range’’
skills, ESC provides more powerful
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control interventions than those
available to even expert drivers of nonESC vehicles. For all practical purposes,
the yaw control actions with non-ESC
vehicles are limited to steering.
However, as the tires approach the
maximum lateral force sustainable
under the available pavement friction,
the yaw moment generated by a given
increment of steering angle is much less
than at the low lateral forces occurring
in regular driving.10. This means that as
the vehicle approaches its maximum
cornering capability, the ability of the
steering system to turn the vehicle is
greatly diminished, even in the hands of
an expert driver. ESC creates the yaw
moment to turn the vehicle using
braking at an individual wheel rather
than the steering system. This
intervention remains powerful even at
limits of tire traction because both the
braking force of the individual tire and
the reduction of lateral force that
accompanies the braking force act to
create the desired yaw moment.
Therefore, ESC can be especially
beneficial on slippery surfaces. While a
vehicle’s possibility of staying on the
road in a critical maneuver ultimately is
limited by the tire/pavement friction,
ESC maximizes an ordinary driver’s
ability to use the available friction.
B. Additional Features of Some ESC
Systems
In addition to the basic operation of
‘‘yaw stability control’’, many ESC
systems include additional features. For
example, most systems reduce engine
power during intervention to slow the
vehicle and give it a better chance of
being able to stay on the intended path
after its heading has been corrected.
Other ESC systems may go further by
performing high deceleration automatic
braking at all four wheels. Of course,
such braking would be performed
unevenly side to side so that the same
net yaw torque or ‘‘turning force’’ would
be applied to the vehicle as in the basic
case of single-wheel braking.
ESC systems used on vehicles with a
high center of gravity (c.g.), such as
SUVs, are often programmed to perform
an additional function known as ‘‘roll
stability control.’’ Roll stability control
(RSC) is a direct countermeasure for onpavement rollover crashes of high c.g.
vehicles. Some RSC systems measure
the roll angle of the vehicle using an
additional roll rate sensor to determine
if the vehicle is in danger of tipping up.
Other systems rely on the existing ESC
10 Liebemann et al., (2005) Safety and
Performance Enhancement: The Bosch Electronic
Stability Control (ESP), 19th International
Technical Conference on the Enhanced Safety of
Vehicles (ESV), Washington, DC.
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sensors for steering angle, speed, and
lateral acceleration, along with
knowledge of vehicle-specific
characteristics to estimate whether the
vehicle is in danger of tipping up.
Regardless of the method used to
detect the risk of tip-up, the various
types of roll stability control intervene
in the same way. Specifically, they
intervene by reducing lateral
acceleration which is the cause of the
roll motion of the vehicle on its
suspension, thus preventing the
possibility of it rolling so much that the
inside wheels may lift off the pavement.
The intervention is performed the same
way as the oversteer intervention shown
in the Figure 1. The outside front brake
is applied heavily to turn the vehicle
toward a path of less curvature and,
therefore, less lateral acceleration.
The difference between a roll stability
control intervention and an oversteer
intervention by the ESC system
operating in the basic yaw stability
control mode is the triggering
circumstance. The oversteer
intervention occurs when the vehicle’s
excessive yaw rate indicates that its
heading is departing from the driver’s
intended path, but the roll stability
control intervention occurs when there
is a risk the vehicle could roll over.
Thus, the roll stability control
intervention occurs when the vehicle is
still following the driver’s intended
path. The obvious trade-off of roll
stability control is that the vehicle must
depart to some extent from the driver’s
intended path in order to reduce the
lateral acceleration from the level that
could cause tip-up.
If the determination of impending
rollover that triggers the roll stability
intervention is very certain, then the
possibility of the vehicle leaving the
roadway as a result of the roll stability
intervention represents a lower relative
risk to the driver. Obviously, systems
that intervene only when absolutely
necessary and then with the minimum
loss of lateral acceleration to prevent
rollover are the most effective. However,
roll stability control is a new technology
that is still evolving. Roll stability
control is not a subject of this
rulemaking because it is too soon for
actual crash statistics to illuminate its
practical effect on crash reduction.
IV. Effectiveness of ESC
Electronic stability control can
directly reduce a vehicle’s susceptibility
to on-road untripped rollovers as
measured by the ‘‘fishhook’’ test that is
part of NHTSA’s NCAP rollover rating
program. The direct effect is mostly
limited to untripped rollovers on paved
surfaces. However, untripped on-road
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rollovers are a relatively infrequent type
of rollover crash. In contrast, the vast
majority of rollover crashes occur when
a vehicle runs off the road and strikes
a tripping mechanism such as soft soil,
a ditch, a curb or a guardrail.
We expect that requiring ESC to be
installed on light trucks and passenger
cars would result in a large reduction in
the number of rollover crashes by
greatly reducing the number of singlevehicle crashes. As noted previously,
over 80 percent of rollovers are the
result of a single-vehicle crash. The
purpose of ESC is to assist the driver in
keeping the vehicle on the road during
impending loss-of-control situations. In
this way, it can prevent the exposure of
vehicles to off-road tripping
mechanisms. We note, however, that
this yaw stability function of ESC is not
direct ‘‘rollover resistance’’ and cannot
be measured by the NCAP rollover
resistance rating.
Although ESC is an indirect
countermeasure to prevent rollover
crashes, we believe it is the most
powerful countermeasure available to
address this serious risk. Effectiveness
studies by NHTSA and others
worldwide 11 estimate that ESC reduces
single vehicle crashes by at least a third
in passenger cars and perhaps reduces
loss-of-control crashes (e.g., road
departures leading to rollovers) by an
even greater amount. In fact, NHTSA’s
latest data study that is discussed in this
section found a reduction in singlevehicle crashes leading to rollover of 71
percent for passenger cars and 84
percent for SUVs. Thus, ESC can reduce
the numbers of rollovers of all vehicles,
including lower center of gravity
vehicles (e.g., passenger cars, minivans
and two-wheel drive pickup trucks), as
well as of the higher center of gravity
vehicle types (e.g., SUVs and four-wheel
drive pickup trucks). ESC can affect
both crashes that would have resulted in
rollover as well as other types of crashes
11 Aga M, Okada A. (2003) Analysis of Vehicle
Stability Control (VSC)’s Effectiveness from
Accident Data, 18th International Technical
Conference on the Enhanced Safety of Vehicles
(ESV), Nagoya.
Dang, J. (2004) Preliminary Results Analyzing
Effectiveness of Electronic Stability Control (ESC)
Systems, Report No. DOT HS 809 790. U.S. Dept.
of Transportation, Washington, DC.
Farmer, C. (2004) Effect of Electronic Stability
Control on Automobile Crash Risk, Traffic Injury
Prevention Vol 5:317–325.
Kreiss J-P, et al. (2005) The Effectiveness of
Primary Safety Features in Passenger Cars in
Germany. 19th International Technical Conference
on the Enhanced Safety of Vehicles (ESV),
Washington, DC
Lie A., et al. (2005) The Effectiveness of ESC
(Electronic Stability Control) in Reducing Real Life
Crashes and Injuries. 19th International Technical
Conference on the Enhanced Safety of Vehicles
(ESV), Washington, DC.
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(e.g., road departures resulting in
impacts) that result in deaths and
injuries.
A. Human Factors Study on the
Effectiveness of ESC
A study by the University of Iowa
using the National Advanced Driving
Simulator demonstrated the effect of
ESC on the ability of ordinary drivers to
maintain control in critical situations.12
A sample of 120 drivers equally divided
between men and women and between
three age groups (18–25, 30–40, and 55–
65) was subjected to the following three
critical driving scenarios. The
‘‘Incursion Scenario’’ forced drivers to
attempt a double lane change at high
speed (65 mph speed limit signs) by
presenting them first with a vehicle that
suddenly backs into their lane from a
driveway and then with another vehicle
driving toward them in the left lane.
The ‘‘Curve Departure Scenario’’
presented drivers with a constant radius
curve that was uneventful at the posted
speed limit of 65 mph followed by
another curve that appeared to be
similar but that had a decreasing radius
that was not evident upon entry. The
‘‘Wind Gust Scenario’’ presented drivers
with a sudden lateral wind gust of short
duration that pushed the drivers toward
a lane of oncoming traffic. The 120
drivers were further divided evenly
between two vehicles, a SUV and a
midsize sedan. Half the drivers of each
vehicle drove with ESC enabled, and
half drove with ESC disabled.
In 50 of the 179 test runs performed
in a vehicle without ESC, the driver lost
control. In contrast, in only six of the
179 test runs performed in a vehicle
with ESC, did the driver lose control.
One test run in each ESC status had to
be aborted. These results demonstrate
an 88 percent reduction in loss-ofcontrol crashes when ESC was engaged.
The study also concluded that the
presence of an ESC system helped
reduce loss of control regardless of age
or gender, and that the benefit was
substantially the same for the different
driver subgroups in the study. Because
of the obvious danger to participants, an
experiment like this cannot be
performed safely with real vehicles on
real roads. However, the National
Advanced Driver Simulator provides
extraordinary verisimilitude with the
driver sitting in a real vehicle, seeing a
360-degree scene and experiencing the
linear and angular accelerations and
sounds that would occur in actual
driving of the specific vehicle.
12 Papelis et al. (2004) Study of ESC Assisted
Driver Performance Using a Driving Simulator,
Report No. N04–003–PR, University of Iowa.
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B. Crash Data Studies of ESC
Effectiveness
There have been a number of studies
of ESC effectiveness in Europe and
Japan beginning in 2003 13. All of them
have shown large potential reductions
in single vehicle crashes as a result of
ESC. However, the sample sizes of
crashes of vehicles new enough to have
ESC tended to be small in these studies.
A preliminary NHTSA study published
in September 2004 14 of crash data from
1997–2003 found ESC to be effective in
reducing single-vehicle crashes,
including rollover. Among vehicles in
the study, the results suggested that ESC
reduced single vehicle crashes in
passenger cars by 35 percent and in
SUVs by 67 percent. In October 2004,
the Insurance Institute for Highway
Safety (IIHS) released the results of a
study of the effectiveness of ESC in
preventing crashes of cars and SUVs.
The IIHS found that ESC is most
effective in reducing fatal single-vehicle
crashes, reducing such crashes by 56
percent. NHTSA’s later peer-reviewed
study 15 of ESC effectiveness found that
that ESC reduced single vehicle crashes
in passenger cars by 34 percent and in
SUVs by 59 percent, and that its
effectiveness was greatest in reducing
single vehicle crashes resulting in
rollover (71 percent reduction for
passenger cars and an 84 percent
reduction for SUVs). It also found
reductions in fatal single-vehicle
crashes and fatal single-vehicle rollover
crashes that were commensurate with
the overall crash reductions cited. ESC
reduced fatal single-vehicle crashes in
passenger cars by 35 percent and in
SUVs by 67 percent and reduced fatal
single-vehicle crashes involving rollover
by 69 percent in passenger cars and 88
percent in SUVs.
(a) NHTSA’s Preliminary Study
In September, 2004, NHTSA issued an
evaluation note on the Preliminary
Results Analyzing the Effectiveness of
Electronic Stability Control (ESC)
Systems. The study evaluated the
effectiveness of ESC in reducing single
vehicle crashes in various domestic and
imported cars and SUVs. It was based
on Fatality Analysis Reporting System
(FARS) data from calendar years 1997–
13 See
Footnote 10.
J. (2004) Preliminary Results Analyzing
Effectiveness of Electronic Stability Control (ESC)
Systems, Report No. DOT HS 809 790. U.S. Dept.
of Transportation, Washington, DC.
15 Dang, J. (2006) Statistical Analysis of The
Effectiveness of Electronic Stability Control (ESC)
Systems, U.S. Dept. of Transportation, Washington,
DC (publication pending peer review). A draft
version of this report, as supplied to peer reviewers,
has been placed in the docket for this rulemaking.
14 Dang,
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2003 and crash data from five States that
reported partial Vehicle Identification
Number (VIN) information in their data
files (Florida, Illinois, Maryland,
Missouri, and Utah) from calendar years
1997–2002. The data were limited to
mostly luxury vehicles because ESC first
became available in 1997 in luxury
vehicles such as Mercedes-Benz and
BMW. The analysis compared specific
make/models of passenger cars and
SUVs with ESC versus earlier versions
of the same make/models, using multivehicle crash involvements as a control
group.
The passenger car sample consisted of
mainly Mercedes-Benz and BMW
models (61 percent). Mercedes-Benz
installed ESC in certain luxury models
in 1997 and had made it standard
equipment in all their models (except
one) by 2000. BMW also installed ESC
in certain 5, 7, and 8 series models as
early as 1997 and had made it standard
equipment in all their models by 2001.
The passenger car sample also included
some luxury GM cars, which constituted
23 percent of the sample, and a few cars
from other manufacturers. GM cars
where ESC was offered as standard
equipment are the Buick Park Avenue
Ultra, the Cadillac DeVille, Seville STS
and SLS, the Oldsmobile Aurora, the
Pontiac Bonneville SSE and SSEi, and
the Chevrolet Corvette. The SUV make/
models in the study with ESC include
Mercedes-Benz (ML320, ML350, ML430,
ML500, G500, G55 AMG), Toyota
(4Runner, Landcruiser), and Lexus
(RX300, LX470).
The first set of analyses used multivehicle crash involvements as a control
group, essentially assuming that ESC
has no effect on multi-vehicle crashes.
Specific make/models with ESC were
compared with earlier versions of
similar make/models using multivehicle crash involvements as a control
group, creating 2x2 contingency tables
as shown in Tables 1 and 2. The study
found that single vehicle crashes were
reduced by
1 ¥ {(699/1483)/(14090/19444)} = 35
percent
for passenger cars and by 67 percent for
SUVs (Table 1). Similarly, fatal single
vehicle crashes were reduced by 30
percent in cars and by 63 percent in
SUVs (Table 2). Reductions of single
vehicle crashes in passenger cars and
SUVs were statistically significant at the
.01 level, as evidenced by chi-square
statistics exceeding 6.64 in each 2×2
contingency table (Table 1). Reductions
of fatal single vehicle crashes are
statistically significant at the .01 level in
SUVs and at the .05 level in passenger
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cars with chi-square statistic greater
than 3.84 (Table 2).
TABLE 1.—EFFECTIVENESS OF ESC IN REDUCING SINGLE VEHICLE CRASHES IN PASSENGER CARS AND SUVS
[Preliminary Study with 1997–2002 crash data from five States]
Single
Vehicle
Crashes
Passenger Cars:
No ESC ..............................................................................................................................................................
ESC ....................................................................................................................................................................
Percent reduction in single vehicle crashes in passenger cars with ESC ........................................................
Approximate 95 percent confidence bounds .....................................................................................................
Chi-square value ................................................................................................................................................
SUVs:
No ESC ..............................................................................................................................................................
ESC ....................................................................................................................................................................
Percent reduction in single vehicle crashes in SUVs with ESC ........................................................................
Approximate 95 percent confidence bounds .....................................................................................................
Chi-square value ................................................................................................................................................
Multi-Vehicle
Crashes
(control group)
1483 .............
699 ...............
35% ..............
29% to 41%
84.1 ..............
19444
14090
........................
........................
........................
512 ...............
95 .................
67% ..............
60% to 74%
104.4 ............
6510
3661
........................
........................
........................
TABLE 2.—EFFECTIVENESS OF ESC IN REDUCING FATAL SINGLE VEHICLE CRASHES IN PASSENGER CARS AND SUVS
[Preliminary Study with 1997–2003 FARS data]
Fatal Single
Vehicle
Crashes
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with PROPOSAL2
Passenger Cars:
No ESC ..............................................................................................................................................................
ESC ....................................................................................................................................................................
Percent reduction in fatal single vehicle crashes in passenger cars with ESC ................................................
Approximate 95 percent confidence bounds .....................................................................................................
Chi-square value ................................................................................................................................................
SUVs:
No ESC ..............................................................................................................................................................
ESC ....................................................................................................................................................................
Percent reduction in fatal single vehicle crashes in SUVs with ESC ................................................................
Approximate 95 percent confidence bounds .....................................................................................................
Chi-square value ................................................................................................................................................
(b) NHTSA’s Updated Study
NHTSA has now updated and
modified last year’s report, extending it
to model year 1997–2004 vehicles—and
to calendar year 2004 for the FARS
analysis and calendar year 2003 for the
State data analysis. Nevertheless, even
as of 2004, a large proportion of the
vehicles equipped with ESC were still
luxury vehicles. Moreover, only
passenger cars and SUVs had been
equipped with ESC—no pickup trucks
or minivans.
The state databases included crash
cases from California (2001–2003),
Florida (1997–2003), Illinois (1997–
2002), Kentucky (1997–2002), Missouri
(1997–2003), Pennsylvania (1997–2001,
2003), and Wisconsin (1997–2003). The
FARS database included fatal crash
involvements from calendar years 1997
to 2004. The extra year of exposure and
the availability of data from more states
significantly increased the sample size
of crashes of vehicles with ESC. In the
preliminary study, the state crash
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database contained 699 single-vehicle
crashes of cars with ESC and 95 singlevehicle crashes of SUVs with ESC. The
FARS database contained 110 singlevehicle crashes of cars with ESC and 25
single-vehicle crashes of SUVs with
ESC. For the updated study, the state
crash database contains 2,251 singlevehicle crashes of cars with ESC and
553 single-vehicle crashes of SUVs with
ESC, and the FARS database of fatal
single-vehicle crashes contains 157 and
47 crashes respectively, for passenger
cars and SUVs with ESC.
The larger sample of crashes in the
updated study facilitated a new analysis
of the effectiveness of ESC on specific
subsets of single-vehicle crashes (SV
run-off-road crashes and SV crashes
resulting in rollover). It also facilitated
the use of a more focused control group
of crashes that were unlikely to be
affected by ESC so that a new analysis
of the effect of ESC on multi-vehicle
crashes could be undertaken.
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Fatal MultiVehicle
Crashes
(control group)
186 ...............
110 ...............
30% ..............
10% to 50%
6.0 ................
330
278
........................
........................
........................
129 ...............
25 .................
63% ..............
44% to 81%
16.1 ..............
199
103
........................
........................
........................
The basic analytical approach was to
estimate the reduction of crash
involvements of the types that are most
likely to have benefited from ESC—
relative to a control group of other types
of crashes where ESC is unlikely to have
made a difference in the vehicle’s
involvement. Crash types taken as the
new control group (non-relevant
involvements because ESC would in
almost all cases not have prevented the
crash) were crash involvements in
which a vehicle:
(1) Was stopped, parked, backing up,
or entering/leaving a parking space prior
to the crash,
(2) Traveled at a speed less than 10
mph,
(3) Was struck in the rear by another
vehicle, or
(4) Was a non-culpable party in a
multi-vehicle crash on a dry road.
The types of crash involvements
where ESC would likely or at least
possibly have an effect are:
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(1) All single vehicle crashes, except
those with pedestrians, bicycles, or
animals (SV crashes).
(2) Single vehicles crashes in which a
vehicle ran off the road (SV ROR) and
hit a fixed object and/or rolled over.
(3) Single vehicles crashes in which a
vehicle rolled over (SV Rollover),
mostly a subset of SV ROR.
(4) Involvements as a culpable party
in a multi-vehicle crash on a dry or wet
road (MV Culpable).
(5) Collisions with pedestrians,
bicycles, or animals (Ped, Bike, Animal).
In the updated study we performed
the state data analysis separately for
each state. Then we used the median of
the estimates from the seven states as
the best indicator of the central
tendency of the data, and the variation
of the seven states as a basis for judging
statistical significance and estimating
confidence bounds. The results of this
analysis are presented in Table 3.
TABLE 3.—UPDATED STUDY—MEAN EFFECTIVENESS OF ESC IN REDUCING CRASHES IN PASSENGER CARS AND SUVS
BASED ON SEPARATE ANALYSES OF 1997–2003 CRASH DATA FROM SEVEN STATES
SV crashes
Passenger Cars:
Mean percent reduction of listed crash
type in passenger cars with ESC.
Approximate 90 percent confidence
bounds.
SUVs:
Mean percent reduction of listed crash
type in SUVs with ESC.
Approximate 90 percent confidence
bounds.
Fatal crashes were analyzed
separately using the FARS database as
SV ROR
SV rollover
MV culpable
34% ...........
46% ...........
71% ...........
11% ...........
34%
20% to 46%
35% to 55%
60% to 78%
4% to 18%
5% to 55%.
59% ...........
75% ...........
84% ...........
16% ...........
¥4% not statistically significant.
47% to 68%
68% to 80%
75% to 90%
7% to 24%
¥28% to 15%.
was done in the preliminary study, but
larger sample sizes were possible
Ped, bike, animal
because of an additional year of data.
The results are given in Table 4.
TABLE 4.—UPDATED STUDY-EFFECTIVENESS OF ESC IN REDUCING FATAL CRASHES OF PASSENGER CARS AND SUVS
BASED ON 1997–2004 FARS DATA
SV crashes
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with PROPOSAL2
Passenger Cars:
No ESC ................
ESC ......................
Percent reduction
of listed crash
type in passenger cars with
ESC.
Approximate 90
percent confidence bounds.
Chi-square value ..
SUVs:
No ESC ................
ESC ......................
Percent reduction
of listed crash
type in SUVs
with ESC.
Approximate 90
percent confidence bounds.
Chi-square ............
SV ROR
SV rollover
MV culpable
Ped, bike, animal
Control group
223 .................
157 .................
35% ................
217 .................
154 .................
36% ................
36 ...................
12 ...................
69% ................
176 .............................
156 .............................
19% not statistically
significant.
46 ...............................
69 ...............................
¥38% not statistically
significant.
166
181
..........................
20% to 51% ...
19% to 51% ...
52% to 87% ...
¥2% to 39% ..............
¥87% to 12% ............
..........................
8.58 ................
8.17 ................
12.45 ..............
1.82 ............................
2.14 ............................
..........................
197 .................
47 ...................
67% ................
191 .................
38 ...................
72% ................
106 .................
9 .....................
88% ................
108 .............................
48 ...............................
38% ............................
56 ...............................
40 ...............................
0% not statistically significant.
153
109
..........................
55% to 78% ...
62% to 82% ...
81% to 95% ...
16% to 60% ................
¥40% to 40% ............
..........................
29.57 ..............
36.44 ..............
42.4 ................
4.89 ............................
0.00 ............................
..........................
The effectiveness of ESC in reducing
fatal single-vehicle crashes is similar to
the effectiveness in reducing singlevehicle crashes from state data that
included mostly non-fatal crashes. In
the case of fatal crashes as well, the
effectiveness of ESC in reducing singlevehicle rollover crashes was particularly
high. The effectiveness of ESC in
reducing fatal culpable multi-vehicle
crashes of SUVs was also higher than in
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the analysis of state data, and the
parallel analysis of multi-vehicle
crashes of passenger cars did not
achieve statistical significance.
The updated study of ESC
effectiveness yielded robust results. The
analysis of state data and a separate
analysis of fatal crashes both reached
similar conclusions on ESC
effectiveness. ESC reduced single
vehicle crashes of passenger cars by 34
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percent and single vehicle crashes of
SUVs by 59 percent. The separate
analysis of only fatal crashes supported
the analysis of state data that included
mostly non-fatal crashes. Therefore, the
overall crash reductions demonstrated a
significant life-saving potential for this
technology. The effectiveness of ESC in
reducing SV crashes shown in the latest
data (Tables 3–4) is similar to the results
of the preliminary analysis.
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The effectiveness of ESC tended to be
at least as great and possibly even
greater for more severe crashes.
Furthermore, the effectiveness of ESC in
reducing the most severe type of crash
in the study, the single-vehicle rollover
crash, was remarkable. ESC reduced
single-vehicle rollover crashes of
passenger cars by 71 percent and of
SUVs by 84 percent. This high level of
effectiveness also carried over to fatal
single-vehicle rollover crashes.
The benefits presented in Section VII
were calculated on the basis of the
single-vehicle crash and single-vehicle
rollover crash effectiveness results of
Table 3 for reductions in non-fatal
crashes and of Table 4 for reductions in
fatal crashes. The single-vehicle rollover
crash effectiveness results were applied
only to first harmful event rollovers
with the lower single-vehicle crash
effectiveness results applied to all other
rollover crashes for a more conservative
benefit estimate.
V. Agency Proposal
As discussed in detail in section VII,
NHTSA’s crash data study leads to the
conclusion that an ESC requirement for
light vehicles would save 1,536 to 2,211
lives annually once all light vehicles
have ESC. The level of life saving
associated with ESC would be second
only to seatbelts among the items of
equipment or elements of design
regulated by the Federal motor vehicle
safety standards. It is further estimated
that an ESC requirement would prevent
between 50,594 and 69,630 MAIS 1–5
injuries annually. The life saving
benefits of ESC are considered very cost
effective with a cost per equivalent
fatality of $0.19 million under the most
favorable assumptions and $0.43
million under the least favorable
assumptions.
In order to capture these significant
safety benefits NHTSA is proposing to
establish FMVSS No. 126, Electronic
Stability Control Systems, which would
require passenger cars, light trucks and
buses that have a GVWR under 4,536 Kg
(10,000 lbs) GVWR to be equipped with
an ESC system with a yaw stability
control function equal to that of vehicles
in current production. The benefits
demonstrated by NHTSA’s crash data
studies and sought by the proposed
safety standard are the result of yaw
stability control greatly reducing singlevehicle crashes and reducing some
multi-vehicle crashes as well. None of
the study vehicles was equipped with a
roll stability control system. Thus, we
are proposing equipment requirements
that are met by every ESC-equipped
vehicle in current production and
performance requirements that we
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believe are met by about 98 percent of
ESC-equipped vehicles in current
production and will require nothing
more than slight retuning of the other
two percent.
We are not proposing a roll stability
control system because there are no data
currently available to determine the
effect of roll stability control on crashes.
However, vehicle manufacturers may
supplement the proposed ESC systems
with roll stability control.
As proposed, FMVSS No. 126 would
incorporate both an equipment
requirement and a performance
requirement. Specifically, we are
proposing an equipment requirement for
ESC that would define the necessary
elements of a yaw stability control
system capable of effective oversteer
and understeer interventions. The ESC
equipment requirement is augmented by
a performance test of the system’s
oversteer intervention. We believe that
an equipment requirement is necessary
because establishing performance tests
that would ensure that the ESC system
operates under all road conditions and
phases of driving is impractical. The
number of tests would be immense, and
many tests (particularly those using
slippery surfaces) would not be
repeatable enough for an objective
regulation. A test requirement for
understeer mitigation is particularly
problematic because the understeer
mitigation for many light trucks is
programmed to occur only on slippery
surfaces to avoid potential roll
instability.
The proposed standard includes a
performance test of oversteer
intervention conducted with a single
highly repeatable maneuver performed
on dry pavement over a range of steering
angles with an automated steering
machine. It is designed to ensure that
the performance of the system is
comparable to current production
systems under a limited set of
conditions that are optimal for
repeatable testing, and it proves that the
ESC system is programmed to perform
its most basic task under ideal
conditions.
Most vehicles without ESC will spin
out in this maneuver; so, a vehicle that
avoids spin-out according to our
objective yaw rate decay definition
demonstrates that it has an ESC system
typical of 2006 production vehicles.
However, the maneuver is not so
extreme that every vehicle without ESC
will actually spin out. A few non-ESC
vehicles will pass this particular
maneuver test, however they would
certainly spin out on slippery surfaces.
Therefore, the test without the
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definition does not assure the safety
benefits of ESC.
All model year 2006 vehicles with
ESC systems would satisfy the
definitional requirements of the
standard. Of the sixty-two ESC vehicles
tested by NHTSA or the Alliance of
Automobile Manufacturers (Alliance),
whose test fleet supplemented
NHTSA’s, only one would need minor
reprogramming to pass the performance
test.
Some of the older vehicles in
NHTSA’s crash data study would not
pass the proposed requirements (e.g.,
among the early ESC systems, there
were some that were not capable of
understeer intervention). Nevertheless,
over 85 percent of the data in NHTSA’s
study represent vehicles (1998–2003
model years) that we believe would
satisfy the proposed requirements of the
new safety standard. The study vehicles
that did not satisfy the proposed
standard had systems that were
beneficial but less effective than the
average.
A. Definition of ESC
The Society of Automotive Engineers
(SAE) Surface Vehicle Information
Report on Automotive Stability
Enhancement Systems J2564 Rev
JUN2004 provides an industry
consensus definition of an ESC system.
The definition in paragraph 4.6 of SAE
J2564 specifies that a ESC system:
(a) Is computer controlled and the
computer contains a closed-loop algorithm 16
designed to limit understeer and oversteer of
the vehicle.
(b) Has a means to determine vehicle yaw
velocity and sideslip.
(c) Has a means to monitor driver steering
input.
(d) Has a means of applying and adjusting
the vehicle brakes to induce correcting yaw
torques to the vehicle.
(e) Is operational over the full speed range
of the vehicle (except below a low-speed
threshold where loss of control is unlikely).
We believe the SAE definition is a
good basis for the proposed equipment
requirement but that it requires minor
clarifications to adequately describe
current production systems. The
definition that NHTSA proposes
contains changes in paragraphs (a) and
(b). Paragraph (a) has been changed to
read: ‘‘(a) is computer controlled with
the computer using a closed-loop
algorithm to limit vehicle oversteer and
to limit vehicle understeer when
appropriate.’’
16 A closed-loop algorithm is a cycle of operations
followed by a computer that includes automatic
adjustments based on the result of previous
operations or other changing conditions.
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This change recognizes that while all
current ESC systems constantly limit
oversteer, many of the systems used on
vehicles with a high center of gravity
only limit understeer on slippery
surfaces where there is no danger that
the understeer intervention could
increase the possibility of tip-up. We
also changed the expression about the
‘‘computer containing the algorithm’’ to
refer to the ‘‘computer using the
algorithm’’ to reduce ambiguity.
Furthermore, we note that ‘‘limiting’’
understeer and oversteer means keeping
those conditions within bounds that
allow ordinary drivers to maintain
control of the vehicle in critical
situations. It does not mean reducing
understeer and oversteer to zero under
all circumstances because that is an
impossibility, certainly not
representative of production ESC
systems.
Paragraph (b) has been changed to
read: ‘‘(b) has a means to determine the
vehicle’s yaw rate and to estimate its
side slip. A distinction has been made
between the ways yaw rate and side slip
are obtained.’’ Current ESC systems use
sensors to measure yaw rate,
constituting an actual determination of
this crucial metric, but they estimate
rather than measure side slip.
Also, the term ‘‘yaw velocity’’ has
been changed to ‘‘yaw rate’’ because that
is the term used in our research reports.
Both terms have the same meaning.
The SAE document also defines four
categories of ESC systems: Two wheel
and four wheel systems, each with or
without engine control. The minimum
system capable of understeer and
oversteer intervention is the four-wheel
system without engine control. SAE
describes systems in this category as
having the following attributes:
(a) The system must have means to
apply all four brakes individually and a
control algorithm, which utilizes this
capability.
(b) The system must be operational
during all phases of driving including
acceleration, coasting, and deceleration
(including braking).
(c) The system must stay operational
when ABS or Traction Control are
activated.
The proposed regulatory language
would require an ESC system that
combines the SAE definition with the
minor clarifications discussed and the
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attributes of the four-wheel system
without engine control. Nothing in the
regulatory language conflicts with
systems that employ engine control.
In addition, the proposed regulatory
language supplements the ESC
equipment definition with a test of
oversteer intervention which would
define the minimum intensity of the
oversteer intervention under certain test
conditions. The test is performed with
the vehicle coasting on a dry pavement
with a high coefficient of friction. The
test conditions are very narrow in
comparison with the operational
conditions specified in the equipment
definition, but they are necessary to
produce a practical test with the high
level of repeatability. The performance
test specifies a severe steering regime
that would produce oversteer loss of
control in nearly every vehicle without
a modern ESC system, and it specifies
a maximum time for the vehicle to cease
its yaw motion after the steering returns
to straight ahead.
At this time, we cannot propose a
similar test of the intensity of the ESC
system’s understeer intervention.
Typically, systems on vehicles with
high centers of gravity do not perform
understeer intervention on dry surfaces
because that could increase the
possibility of an on-road untripped
rollover. In such case, attempting to
maintain the driver’s desired path
would increase lateral acceleration and
roll moment. In fact, roll stability
control works by inducing high levels of
understeer when required to prevent
tip-up. Therefore, tests of understeer
intervention must be performed on low
coefficient surfaces to avoid prohibiting
roll stability control systems.
Unfortunately, the regular methods of
producing wet, slippery, or icy
conditions at automotive proving
grounds are useful only for such
purposes as back-to-back comparisons
of vehicles because repeatable friction
conditions cannot be maintained or
precisely reproduced. A practical test of
understeer intervention is a topic of
ongoing research.
B. Performance Test of ESC Oversteer
Intervention and Stability Criteria
Selection of Maneuver
NHTSA performed research to define
a practical, repeatable and realistic
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54723
maneuver test of ESC oversteer
intervention. We also made use of the
results of testing performed by the
Alliance on some candidate maneuvers
to supplement the agency’s information.
NHTSA’s detailed research report 17 has
been placed in the docket, and this
section represents a summary of its
major points.
The desired test should discriminate
strongly between vehicles with and
without ESC. Vehicles with ESC
disabled were used as non-ESC vehicles
in the research. It must also facilitate the
evaluation of both the lateral stability of
the vehicle (prevention of spinout) and
its responsiveness in avoiding obstacles
on the road, since stability can be
gained at the expense of responsiveness.
The research program consisted of two
phases:
Phase 1: The evaluation of many
maneuvers capable of quantifying the
performance of ESC oversteer
intervention using a small sample of
diverse test vehicles.
Phase 2: Evaluation of many vehicles
using a reduced suite of candidate
maneuvers.
Phase 1 testing occurred during the
period of April through October 2004. In
this effort, twelve maneuvers were
evaluated using five test vehicles.
Maneuvers utilized automated and
driver-based steering inputs. If driverbased steering was required, multiple
drivers were used to assess input
variability. To quantify the effects of
ESC, each vehicle was evaluated with
ESC enabled and disabled. Dry and wet
surfaces were utilized; however, the wet
surfaces introduced an undesirable
combination of test variability and
sensor malfunctions. Table 5
summarizes the Phase 1 test matrix.
Additional details pertaining to Phase 1,
including more detailed maneuver
descriptions and details pertaining to
test conduct, have been previously
documented.18
17 Forkenbrock, G. et al. (2005) Development of
Criteria for Electronic Stability Control Performance
Evaluation, DOT HS 809 974.
18 Forkenbrock et al (2005) NHTSA’s Light
Vehicle Handling and ESC Effectiveness Research
Program, 19th International Technical Conference
on the Enhanced Safety of Vehicles (ESV),
Washington, DC.
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TABLE 5.—NHTSA’S 2004 LIGHT VEHICLE HANDLING/ESC TEST MATRIX
Test group 2
• Slowly Increasing Steer ..................................
• NHTSA J-Turn (Dry, Wet) ..............................
• NHTSA Fishhook (Dry, Wet) ..........................
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with PROPOSAL2
Test group 1
...........................................................................
• Modified ISO 3888–22 ..................................
• Constant Radius Turn ..................................
•
•
•
•
To determine whether a particular test
maneuver was capable of providing a
good assessment of ESC performance,
NHTSA considered the extent to which
it possessed three attributes:
1. A high level of severity that would
exercise the oversteer intervention of
every vehicle’s ESC system.
2. A high level of repeatability and
reproducibility.
3. The ability to assess both lateral
stability and responsiveness.
Phase 2 testing examined the four
maneuvers that were considered most
promising from Phase 1: (1) Sine with
Dwell; (2) Increasing Amplitude Sine
Steer; (3)Yaw Acceleration Steering
Reversal (YASR); and (4) YASR with
Pause.19 The two yaw acceleration
steering reversal maneuvers were
designed to overcome the possibility
that fixed-frequency steering maneuvers
would discriminate on the basis of
vehicle properties other than ESC
performance, such as wheelbase length.
They were more complex than the other
maneuvers, requiring the automated
steering machines to trigger on yaw
acceleration peaks. However, Phase 2
research revealed an absence of effects
of yaw natural frequency. Therefore, the
YASR maneuvers were dropped from
further consideration because their
increased complexity was not warranted
in light of equally effective but simpler
alternatives, and their details will not be
discussed in this summary of NHTSA
research. Additional detail on the
remaining maneuvers is presented
below:
Sine With Dwell
As shown in Figure 2, the Sine with
Dwell maneuver was based on a single
cycle of sinusoidal steering input.
Although the peak magnitudes of the
first and second half-cycles were
identical, the Sine with Dwell maneuver
included a 500 ms pause after
completion of the third quarter-cycle of
the sinusoid. In Phase 1, frequencies of
0.5 and 0.7 Hz were used. In Phase 2,
only 0.7 Hz Sine with Dwell maneuvers
were performed. As described in
NHTSA’s report,20 the 0.7 Hz frequency
was found to be consistently more
severe than its 0.5 Hz counterpart (in
the context of this research, severity was
quantified by the amount of steering
wheel angle required to produce a
spinout). In Phase 1, the 0.7 Hz Sine
with Dwell was able to produce
spinouts with lower steering wheel
angles for four of the five vehicles
evaluated, albeit by a small margin (no
more than 20 degrees of steering wheel
angle for any vehicle).
In a presentation 21 given to NHTSA
on December 3, 2004, the Alliance also
reported that the 0.5 Hz Sine with Dwell
did not correlate as well with the
responsiveness versus controllability
ratings made by its professional test
drivers in a subjective evaluation (the
same vehicles evaluated with the Sine
with Dwell maneuvers were also driven
by the test drivers), and it provided less
input energy than the 0.7 Hz Sine with
Dwell.
mentioned presentation given to
NHTSA on December 3, 2004, the
Alliance also reported that the 0.6 Hz
Increasing Amplitude Sine did not
induce vehicle responses significantly
different than the 0.5 and 0.7 Hz
Increasing Amplitude Sine maneuvers.
To select the best overall maneuver
from those used in Phase 2, NHTSA
considered three attributes: (1)
Maneuver severity, (2) face validity, and
(2) performability. Of the two sinusoidal
maneuvers used in Phase 2, we
determined that the Sine with Dwell
was the best candidate for evaluating
the lateral stability component of ESC
effectiveness because of its relatively
greater severity. Specifically, it required
a smaller steering angle to produce
spinouts (for test vehicles with ESC
disabled). Also, the Increasing
Amplitude Sine maneuver produced the
lowest yaw rate peak magnitudes in
proportion to the amount of steering,
implying the maneuver was the least
severe for most vehicles evaluated by
NHTSA in Phase 2.
The performability of the Sine with
Dwell and Increasing Amplitude Sine
maneuvers is excellent. The maneuvers
are very easy to program into the
steering machine, and their lack of rate
or acceleration feedback loops
simplifies the instrumentation required
to perform the tests. As mentioned
previously, Phase 2 testing revealed that
the extra complexity of YASR
maneuvers was unnecessary because the
tests were not affected by yaw natural
frequency differences between vehicles.
All Phase 2 maneuvers (including the
YASR maneuvers) possess an inherently
high face validity because they are each
comprised of steering inputs similar to
those capable of being produced by a
human driver in an emergency obstacle
avoidance maneuver. However, the
Increasing Amplitude Sine maneuver
may possess the best face validity.
Conceptually, the steering profile of this
maneuver is the most similar to that
expected to be used by real drivers, and
even with steering wheel angles as large
19 Ibid.
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Test group 3
Increasing Amplitude Sine
As shown in Figure 3, the Increasing
Amplitude Sine maneuver was also
based on a single cycle of sinusoidal
steering input. However, the amplitude
of the second half-cycle was 1.3 times
greater than the first half-cycle for this
maneuver. In Phase 1, frequencies of
0.5, 0.6, and 0.7 Hz were used for the
first half cycle; the duration of the
second half cycle was 1.3 times that of
the first.
The Phase 1 vehicles were generally
indifferent to the frequency associated
with the Increasing Amplitude Sine
maneuver. Given our desire to reduce
the test matrix down from three
maneuvers based on three frequencies to
one, NHTSA selected just the 0.7 Hz
frequency Increasing Amplitude Sine
for use in Phase 2. In the previously
20 Forkenbrock, G. et al. (2005) Development of
Criteria for Electronic Stability Control Performance
Evaluation, Dot HS 809 974.
21 Docketed at NHTSA–2004–19951, item 1.
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Closing Radius Turn.
Pulse Steer (500 deg/s, 700 deg/s).
Sine Steer (0.5 Hz, 0.6 Hz, 0.7 Hz, 0.8 Hz).
Increasing Amplitude Sine Steer (0.5 Hz,
0.6 Hz, 0.7 Hz.
• Sine with Dwell (0.5 Hz, 0.7 Hz).
• Yaw Acceleration Steering Reversal (YASR)
(500 deg/s, 720 deg/s).
• Increasing Amplitude YASR (500 deg/s, 720
deg/s).
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as 300 degrees, the maneuver’s
maximum effective steering rate is a
very reasonable 650 deg/sec.
In light of the above, NHTSA is
proposing to use the Sine with Dwell
maneuver to evaluate the performance
of light vehicle ESC systems in
preventing spinout (oversteer loss of
control). On the balance we believe that
it offers excellent face validity and
performability, and its greater severity
makes it a more rigorous test while
maintaining steering rates within the
capabilities of human drivers.
Spinout Criteria
The foregoing maneuver selection
process required a definition of
‘‘spinout.’’ Spinout can be best
explained in the context of the Sine
with Dwell maneuver. Figure 4 shows
the steering wheel angle driven by a
robotic steering machine during three
runs of the maneuver at increasing
steering amplitudes and the resulting
measurements of the yaw rate of an
actual vehicle being tested. The
maneuver is the same as that shown in
Figure 2, except that the first steering is
to the left in Figure 4 while it is to the
right in Figure 2.
The test protocol requires the test to
be performed at an entrance speed of 50
mph (coasting) in both directions at
increasing steering amplitudes up to a
preset maximum or to the point at
which the vehicle spins out (failing the
test). The preset maximum steering
angle is the larger of either 270 degrees
or an angle equal to 6.5 times the
steering angle that produces 0.3g steady
state lateral acceleration for the
particular test vehicle. This
specification of maximum test steering
angle takes into account differences in
steering gear ratio, wheelbase, and other
factors between vehicles, but provides
for testing to a steering wheel angle of
at least 270 degrees. This maximum
steering wheel angle is not achieved in
the event that the test is terminated by
spinout at a lower steering wheel angle.
As shown in Figure 4, in the first run,
the steering wheel is turned 80 degrees
to the left, then 80 degrees to the right
following a smooth 0.7 Hz sinusoidal
pattern. It is held steady for a dwell time
of 0.5 second at 80 degrees right, and
then returned to zero (straight ahead)
also following a sinusoidal pattern.
After a short lag, the vehicle begins to
yaw counter-clockwise in response to
the left steering. The absolute value of
the yaw velocity increases with the
absolute value of the steering angle, and
then the vehicle changes to clockwise
yaw velocity in response to right
steering. At two seconds after the
beginning of steering, the steering wheel
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has been turned back to straight ahead,
and the yaw rate returns to zero after a
fraction of a second response time. At
that point, the vehicle is being steered
straight ahead, and it is going straight
ahead without any yaw rotation. The
vehicle is responding closely to the
steering input, and the driver is in
control.
When the steering amplitude is
increased to 120 degrees in the next run,
the vehicle achieves greater yaw
velocity because it is following a tighter
path at the same speed, but it exhibits
the same good response to steering and
remains in control.
However, when the steering
amplitude is increased to 169 degrees,
the vehicle spins out, exhibiting
oversteer loss of control. This condition
is identified in the yaw rate trace. When
the steering is straight ahead at time =
2 seconds, the yaw rate for this run is
still about 35 deg/sec. However, there is
a time lag past the instant of steering to
straight ahead even for the previous
runs where there was no loss of control.
What is different is that the yaw rate
does not swiftly decline to zero as it
does with a vehicle under control. At
time = 3 seconds, the yaw rate is still
the same, and it has actually increased
at time = 4 seconds in this example. The
physical interpretation of this graph is
that the driver has turned the wheels
straight ahead and wants the vehicle to
go straight, but the vehicle is spinning
clockwise about a vertical axis through
its center of gravity. It is out of control
in a spinout. The driver’s steering input
is not causing the vehicle to take the
desired path and heading, and the
vehicle would depart the road surface
sideways or even backward.
Figure 4 illustrates that the Sine with
Dwell Maneuver is very severe. It
induced a dramatic spinout in this test
vehicle with only 169 degrees of
steering to one direction followed by
169 degrees to the other. It is possible
that steering angles below 169 degrees
but above 120 degrees would also have
caused spinout. Since the test is
predicated on steering angles up to (or
possibly exceeding) 270 degrees, it
would cause spinout in vehicles with
far greater lateral stability than this test
vehicle.
Figure 5 shows another series of tests
of the same vehicle but with ESC
enabled. The first two runs were at 80
and 120 degrees of steering angle, and
the vehicle’s yaw rate declined to zero
in a fraction of a second after the
steering command. This is the same
good response to steering exhibited by
the vehicle with ESC disabled in the
previous figure. The third run was
conducted at 180 degrees of steering
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angle. This is greater than the 169
degrees that caused a severe loss of
control without ESC, but the yaw rate
returned to zero with the steering angle
just as quickly as in the runs with less
steering.
The final set of curves in Figure 5
represent a run conducted with 279
degrees of steering angle. This would be
the left-right portion of the performance
test proposed for the ESC system of this
vehicle since 279 degrees is 6.5 times
the steering angle that produces 0.3g
steady state lateral acceleration for this
example vehicle. In this case, the yaw
rate did not return to zero nearly
instantaneously as it had at lower
steering angle. Instead, it steadily
declined after the steering was turned to
straight ahead, and the vehicle was
completely stable and going straight in
about 1.75 seconds. Clearly, the vehicle
remained in control compared to its
behavior without ESC (see Figure 4) in
which turning the steering to straight
ahead had no effect on the vehicle’s
heading. However, the ESC system
required some time to cause the vehicle
to stop turning in response to the
driver’s straight ahead steering
command because the preceding
maneuver was so destabilizing. The
time it takes for the vehicle to stop
rotating after it is steered straight ahead
in this maneuver is a measure of the
aggressiveness of the ESC oversteer
intervention. Some of the early ESC
systems were tuned to be less aggressive
than the example vehicle, and the lag
time for the vehicle to ‘‘recover’’ from
the Sine with Dwell Maneuver would be
longer.
The first goal of an ESC system is to
prevent spinout, but there is no hard
quantitative definition of spinout.
Obviously, the example in Figure 4
shows spinout. The vehicle turned
nearly front to rear in four seconds with
the steering wheel straight ahead. In the
example of Figure 5, the vehicle always
responded to steering, but some
response time was required for it to
fully stabilize. In seeking to define
‘‘spinout’’, the agency believes that the
question is: How long must the response
time be before the result would be
considered a spinout in the severe test
maneuver?
NHTSA used an empirical definition
of spinout based on observations from
vehicle maneuver testing as a rule of
thumb. This empirically-based criterion
stipulates that in a symmetric steer
maneuver, in which the amount of right
and left steering is equal, if the final
heading angle is more than 90 degrees
from the initial heading, the vehicle has
spun out. If a symmetric steer maneuver
is performed at a very low speed that
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eliminates tire slippage, the heading
does not change at all. However, a
change of heading of about 20 degrees
would occur even at low speed in the
Sine with Dwell Maneuver because of
the asymmetric dwell portion, making
this empirical criterion more
conservative. NHTSA’s research
report 22 contains a statistical study on
how quickly an ESC system would have
to respond to prevent a heading change
of more than 90 degrees during the Sine
with Dwell Maneuver at 50 mph with
full steering using data from all 40
vehicles tested by NHTSA and the
Alliance.
Two measures of response time were
considered: (1) The remaining yaw rate
(as a percent of peak) one second after
the steering wheel was turned straight
ahead, and (2) the remaining percent of
peak yaw rate after 1.75 seconds. The
peak yaw rate is the highest yaw rate
during the second part of the maneuver.
In the example of Figure 5 (test run with
279 degrees steering wheel angle) the
steering returned to straight ahead at 2
seconds. At 3 seconds (one second
later), the remaining yaw rate was about
30 percent of the peak value achieved at
about 1.2 seconds. At 3.75 seconds (1.75
seconds after zero steer), the remaining
yaw rate is zero percent. Statistical
analyses performed by NHTSA predict
that, if the remaining yaw rate at one
second after zero steer was no more than
35 percent, there is a 95 percent (or
greater) probability that the heading
change will not exceed 90 degrees (no
spinout by the empirical criterion). For
the 1.75 second time interval, a
remaining yaw rate of no more than 20
percent leads to the same prediction.
The heading change criterion and its
statistical interpretation provide a
context in which to view the yaw rate
data in the Sine with Dwell tests
conducted by NHTSA and by the
Alliance on a large sample of 62
vehicles in production in 2005. Figure
6 illustrates the yaw rate response (as a
percent of the second yaw rate peak)
versus time after completion of steer
(COS) input, for the 0.7 Hz Sine with
Dwell maneuver (left to right steering)
for all vehicles tested by NHTSA and
the Alliance. The data represents the
most severe yaw rate response produced
for each vehicle during a particular test
series. The form of the graph
corresponds to the yaw rate curve (for
the 169 degree test) shown in Figure 4,
except that the yaw rate has been
normalized and the time axis has been
shifted by 2.0 seconds so as to focus on
the yaw rate response after COS. The
cluster of curves at the top of Figure 6
represents the yaw rate response for
vehicles with the ESC totally disabled,
and the cluster at the bottom are for
vehicles with the ESC fully enabled.
Figure 7 shows data from the same
vehicles but in a test conducted with
right-left steering rather than left-right
as in Figure 6.
Figures 6 and 7 also show the
proposed criteria for maximum yaw rate
at 1.0 second and 1.75 seconds after
completion of steering. All of the 62
current production vehicles tested met
or exceeded the proposed criteria with
ESC enabled when tested in the leftright sequence as shown in Figure 6.
However, one of the vehicles did not
meet the criteria when tested in the
right-left sequence as shown in Figure 7.
Nevertheless, we believe the proposed
criteria reasonably represent the
minimum performance of the oversteer
intervention for present vehicles with
ESC, and that the vehicle representing
the single exception to the rule can be
tuned to operate as well in the right-left
steering as it did in the left-right test.
NHTSA also tested a number of the
older vehicles whose crash data were
used to evaluate the effectiveness of ESC
in crash reduction. We believe that over
85 percent of these vehicles have ESC
systems that would pass the proposed
criteria. Therefore, the following
proposed performance criteria for the
Sine with Dwell Maneuver test of ESC
oversteer intervention is associated with
the high level of crash prevention
benefits we expect and is also typical of
the minimum performance of the
present fleet of ESC vehicles:
displacement response to the driver’s
steering inputs. An extreme example of
this potential lack of responsiveness
would occur if an ESC system locked
both front wheels as the driver begins an
abrupt obstacle avoidance maneuver.
Assuming the road is reasonably level,
and the surface friction is uniform, it is
very likely the wheel lock would
suppress any tendency for the vehicle to
spin out or tip up. However, having the
wheels lock would also prevent the
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with PROPOSAL2
C. Responsiveness Criteria
NHTSA’s track tests demonstrate
dramatic improvements in yaw stability
provided by ESC. However, NHTSA
believes these improvements should not
come at the expense of poor lateral
22 Forkenbrock, g. et al. (2005) Development of
Criteria for Electronic Stability Control Performance
Evaluation, DOT HS 809 974
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In both criteria,
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vehicle from responding to the driver’s
steering inputs. This would cause the
vehicle to plow straight ahead and
collide with the obstacle the driver was
trying to avoid. Clearly this is not a
desirable compromise.
To ensure an acceptable balance
between lateral stability and the ability
for the vehicle to respond to the driver’s
inputs, NHTSA believes a
‘‘responsiveness’’ criterion must
supplement the agency’s lateral stability
criteria. We propose to use the same
series of tests with the Sine with Dwell
maneuver to characterize both the
aggressiveness of the oversteer
intervention and the lateral
responsiveness of the vehicle. This
maneuver is severe enough to exercise
the ESC system on any vehicle and test
its oversteer intervention, and it is
possible to measure other metrics
during the Sine with Dwell maneuver to
characterize the vehicle’s
responsiveness as well.
NHTSA considered a number of
metrics to describe the ability of the
vehicle to react to the steering input,
especially in the direction of the first
half sine of the steering pattern that
would relate most directly to obstacle
avoidance. These metrics involved the
lateral movement of the vehicle, the
lateral speed of the vehicle, the lateral
acceleration of the vehicle and lag times
and distances between steering inputs
and the various types of responses.
The lateral movement of the vehicle
has the most obvious and direct bearing
on obstacle avoidance. However, the
measurement of lateral movement
appeared to introduce an undesirable
degree of difficulty. NHTSA has been
measuring the path of vehicles during
the development of various rollover and
handling test maneuvers using a
differentially corrected Global
Positioning System (GPS) method. This
method is capable of measuring the
lateral movement of the vehicle at its
center of gravity (a good way to compare
vehicles of different sizes), but it
requires costly instruments both on the
track and in the vehicle and complex
procedures. Instruments imbedded in
the track would seem to be a possible
alternative, but they are also
problematic. It is difficult to place each
test vehicle over the instrumented
section of roadway during the exact
same position in the Sine with Dwell
steering pattern, and it is difficult to
determine the lateral movement of the
center of gravity from roadway sensors
when the vehicles approach at various
side slip angles.
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However, during a briefing 23 on
September 7, 2005, the Alliance
presented a technique that would
greatly simplify the measurement of
NHTSA’s preferred responsiveness
metric—lateral displacement in the
direction of the first steering of the Sine
with Dwell maneuver. It involves
mathematical integration of the onboard
lateral acceleration measurement at the
vehicle center of gravity to obtain lateral
velocity, and then a second integration
of lateral velocity to obtain lateral
displacement. Double integration of
acceleration to calculate displacement is
not used as a general measurement
technique because small errors in zero
levels of acceleration and speed can
produce large errors in displacement
over time. However, the idea presented
by the Alliance required double
integration for only about one second,
and the resulting displacement
calculations were in good agreement
with the GPS measurements for vehicles
tested by NHTSA.
Figure 8 shows the typical lateral
displacement as a function of time for
a vehicle performing the Sine with
Dwell maneuver successfully (without
spinning out). Since the longitudinal
travel is roughly proportional to time,
the bottom trace resembles the path of
the vehicle with the lateral travel
exaggerated. Assuming the wheel is first
turned to the left, the figure shows that
the maximum movement of the vehicle
to the left lags the maximum left
steering angle by almost two seconds in
this example. Because this maneuver
includes a very fast steering reversal, the
steering wheel has been turned sharply
to the right before the vehicle has
achieved its maximum reaction to the
initial left steering.
We propose to use the lateral
displacement at 1.07 seconds after
initiation of steering in the Sine with
Dwell maneuver as the responsiveness
metric rather than the maximum lateral
displacement for the following reasons.
The maximum lateral displacement
occurs later in the maneuver and occurs
at different times for different vehicles.
Therefore, it is subject to greater
potential error from the double
integration technique, and the errors
could systematically affect some types
of vehicles more than others.
More importantly, since the
interpretation of the metric is the
obstacle avoidance capability of the
vehicle, it makes the most sense to
measure the lateral displacement of
every vehicle the same distance from
the initiation of steering. This is
equivalent to placing the same size
23 Docketed
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obstruction at the same place on the
roadway for every vehicle. Since
steering is initiated at 50 mph for all
tests, and not much speed is scrubbed
off in the first second (except for a few
systems that start automatic braking
very early in the maneuver), lateral
displacement at a set time is roughly
equivalent to lateral displacement at a
set distance. Certainly, the difference in
distance traveled among test vehicles is
much less at 1.07 seconds into the
maneuver than at the point of maximum
lateral displacement.
A set time of 1.07 seconds is desirable
because it coincides with an easily
recognized discontinuity in the steering
trace (the dwell period); it is short
enough to assure accuracy of the double
integration technique, and it is long
enough to include a high percent of the
maximum lateral displacement. It is also
important to note that differences
between vehicles in the lateral
displacement metric at 1.07 seconds
correlated well with the subjective
evaluations of vehicle responsiveness
provided by expert drivers from several
vehicle manufacturers.
The choice of the criterion for this
metric was based on the responsiveness
of the present fleet of cars and light
trucks, represented by a group of 61
vehicles in 107 vehicle configurations
(ESC on or ESC off). The group ranged
from high-performance sports cars to a
15-passenger van with ESC and several
long wheelbase diesel pickup trucks
with GVWRs near 4,536 Kg (10,000 lb)
and no ESC. Figure 9 shows the range
of responsiveness for this fleet,
characterized by the proposed metric.
The least responsive vehicles were not
the 15-passenger van or large pickup
trucks, but rather SUVs with roll
stability control. The highest criterion
that can be used without prohibiting
these implementations of roll stability
control is a minimum lateral
displacement of 1.83 m (half a 12-foot
lane width), 1.07 seconds after initiation
of steering in the Sine with Dwell
maneuver conducted with steering
angles of 180 degrees or greater.
Therefore, we are proposing the test
criterion for minimum vehicle
responsiveness described above because
it is practical for all types of light
vehicles including 15-passenger vans,
long wheelbase diesel pickups and
SUVs with roll stability control. All of
the test vehicles would satisfy this
criterion, including nine SUVs with a
roll stability control function. However,
we expect that manufacturers would
make some software alterations to the
roll stability control programs of a few
SUVs to gain a greater margin of
compliance.
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D. Other Issues
1. ESC Off Switches
Many vehicles are equipped with ESC
systems featuring driver-selectable
modes. These modes are generally
subdivided into two groups: (1) Systems
in which the driver has the ability to
fully disable the ESC (i.e., throttle and
brake intervention are both eliminated),
and (2) those in which the ESC may
only be partially disabled. If the option
to fully disable the ESC exists, the
manner in which it is accomplished
depends largely on the vehicle’s make
and model. For some vehicles, disabling
the ESC is accomplished by
momentarily pushing an on/off button
typically located on the instrument
panel, center console, or dashboard.
Other vehicles require the driver to
push the ESC on/off button for
approximately three to five seconds
before the ESC can be fully disabled.
Regardless of which method the
vehicle manufacturer has selected, the
action to manually disable ESC requires
a conscious effort by the driver. The
default setting of every ESC system
known to NHTSA is ‘‘ESC-enabled.’’ In
other words, at the beginning of each
ignition cycle, the ESC is always fully
enabled regardless of what mode the
driver had been operating the vehicle in
during the previous ignition cycle.
Although many contemporary
vehicles are equipped with ESC on/off
switches, simply pushing the ESC on/off
button does not necessarily give the
driver the ability to fully disable the
vehicle’s ESC. For some vehicles, when
the drivers select ‘‘ESC off,’’ they are
actually diminishing, but not fully
removing, the aggressiveness of their
vehicles’ ESC intervention.
Although the crash and test track data
clearly demonstrate the profound safety
benefits of ESC, there are special
circumstances in which drivers may
wish to partially or fully disable their
vehicles’ ESC. Examples of such
situations may include:
• Attempting to ‘‘rock’’ a vehicle
stuck in a deformable surface such as
snow or mud
• Attempting to initiate movement on
deep snow or ice (especially if the
vehicle is equipped with snow chains)
• Driving through a deep, deformable
surface such as mud or sand
• Driving with a compact spare tire,
tires of mismatched sizes or tires with
chains.
To understand how ESC may hinder
a driver’s ability to operate his vehicle
in these special conditions, it is
important to recall the primary ways in
which ESC attempts to improve
stability: (1) Removal or augmentation
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of drive torque, and (2) brake
intervention. In each of the examples
provided above, the vehicle may require
significant longitudinal wheel slip in
order to initiate or maintain forward
progress. If ESC remains fully enabled,
it will endeavor to reduce what it
perceives as excessive wheel slip via
throttle and/or brake intervention. By
reducing wheel slip, the vehicle’s lateral
stability is improved; however, this may
also inhibit forward progress to the
point that the vehicle may become (or
remain) stuck. Not only can this be
frustrating for the driver (i.e., the
vehicle is not responding to their
commands), but it may also introduce a
potential safety problem (e.g., the
vehicle slows to a near stop while
attempting to be driven through a busy
intersection).
Another reason a driver may wish to
disable ESC has less to do with
mobility, and more to do with driving
enjoyment. NHTSA acknowledges there
is a driver demographic that considers
the automobile more than just a means
of transportation. These drivers enjoy
participation in activities such as
motorsports competition and highperformance driving schools. In these
situations, it is quite possible the driver
may not wish to realize the improved
lateral stability offered by a fully
enabled ESC, because the intervention
providing improved lateral stability is
achieved by removing the driver’s
throttle inputs and applying the brakes.
In a controlled environment, such as the
confines of a racetrack, this can be
frustrating for the driver because ESC
intervention will have the effect of
slowing the vehicle and contradict the
driver’s desire to achieve the lowest
possible lap times. In other words,
aggressive intervention intended to
improve safety on the public roads may
not be appropriate at a racetrack.
To accommodate these special
situations, NHTSA believes vehicle
manufacturers should be allowed the
freedom to install ESC on/off switches
on all vehicles. Furthermore, the agency
is hopeful that this provision will have
a positive effect on ESC design
philosophy. For every ESC system
presently in production, there exists a
balance between lateral stability and
intervention magnitude. Generally
speaking, an ESC tuned to optimize
lateral stability will require intrusive
interventions. Conversely, a vehicle
equipped with an ESC designed with
transparent intervention which is not
noticeable to the driver (often associated
with ‘‘sport’’ modes), will tend to
exhibit lower lateral stability. By giving
vehicle manufacturers the freedom to
install ESC on/off switches, both
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intervention strategies can be
accommodated, with the more
aggressive safety-biased tuning set as the
system default. The more sport-oriented,
transparent interventions could then be
accessed via the same switch capable of
fully disabling the ESC. This provision
should satisfy the demand for safe,
versatile, and enjoyable vehicles.
Vehicle and ESC manufacturers have
expressed concern that if ESC on/off
switches were to be prohibited, there
would exist a risk that some drivers will
fully disable their vehicle’s ESC by
other means, such as disconnecting or
removing sensors required by the ESC.
By opting to disable ESC in this manner,
drivers might unknowingly disable
other important safety features such as
the vehicle’s antilock brakes. In some
cases, the vehicle’s electronic brake
proportioning may also be adversely
affected, thereby resulting in a
significant reduction of the vehicle’s
braking capability. Recognizing the
diverse operating conditions their
vehicles may encounter, many vehicle
manufacturers presently equip their
vehicles with ESC on/off switches.
In light of the above, we are proposing
to permit installation of ESC Off
switches as a manufacturer option.
However, in order to preserve the safety
benefits presently associated with ESC,
NHTSA is proposing to require a vehicle
equipped with an ESC on/off switch to
satisfy three important criteria:
1. The vehicle’s ESC must always be
fully enabled at the initiation of each
new ignition cycle, regardless of what
mode the driver had previously
specified.
2. When evaluated with its ESC fully
enabled, the vehicle performance must
be in compliance with the minimum
ESC oversteer intervention and
responsiveness test criteria.
3. The vehicle manufacturer must
provide a telltale light that illuminates
to indicate when the vehicle has been
put into a mode that completely
disables ESC or renders it unable to
satisfy the ESC oversteer intervention
test criteria.
In summary, although there is no way
to guarantee drivers will not use ESC
on/off switches to disable their vehicle’s
ESC during normal driving, potentially
negating the significant safety benefits
such systems offer, NHTSA cannot
ignore the fact there are certain
operating conditions under which on/
off switches are advantageous.
Furthermore, NHTSA anticipates that
ESC developers will utilize this design
flexibility facilitated by the use of ESC
on/off switches to maximize the ESC
effectiveness in its default, fully enabled
mode.
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2. ESC Activation and Malfunction
Symbols and Telltale
Most current ESC systems provide an
indication to the driver when the ESC
system is actively intervening to
stabilize the vehicle and provide a
warning to the driver if ESC is
unavailable due to a failure in the
system. When an ESC Off switch is
provided, a telltale reminds the driver
when the ESC has been disabled.
We believe that there are safety
benefits associated with certain of these
warnings. There is an obvious safety
need to warn the driver in case of an
ESC malfunction so that the system can
be repaired. The safety need to remind
the driver of a driver-selected ESC Off
state is also obvious because the driver
should restore the ESC function as soon
as possible in order to realize the
system’s safety benefits. However, the
safety need for an ESC activation
indicator to alert the driver during an
emergency situation that ESC is
intervening is not obvious, so the
agency undertook research on this point
as discussed below.
NHTSA conducted a study 24 using
the National Advanced Driving
Simulator (NADS) that included
experiments to gain insight into the
various possibilities regarding ESC
activation indicators. The NHTSA study
involved 200 participants in four age
groups and simulated driving on wet
pavement. It used maneuvers similar to
those described in Section IV of the
Papelis study 25 also using the NADS.
The activation indicator experiments
used road departures and eye glances to
the instrument panel as measures of
driver performance. The NHTSA study
compared the performance of drivers
given either no indication of ESC
activation, a steady-burning icon
telltale, a flashing icon telltale, or an
auditory warning. The ESC telltale used
in this study was the ISO J.14 symbol
with the text ‘‘Active’’ under it.
Participants presented with only
auditory ESC activation indications
experienced significantly more road
departures (15) than participants
receiving visual only indications (steady
8, flashing 8) or no ESC activation
indications (7). This finding was most
evident for the older driver group who
experienced a statistically significant
increase in road departure events with
the auditory ESC indication compared
to the other three conditions. Younger
drivers also showed an increased road
departure rate with the auditory ESC
indication, although not at a statistically
significant level. These results of the
road departure study are presented in
Table 6.
TABLE 6.—PERCENT ROAD DEPARTURES BY ESC ACTIVATION INDICATION AND AGE GROUP—ESC TRIALS ONLY
All age
groups
combined
(percent)
None ........................................................................................................
Steady ......................................................................................................
Flashing ...................................................................................................
Auditory ....................................................................................................
Eye glance behavior was examined to
determine whether providing drivers
with an indication of ESC activation
would cause them to glance at the
instrument panel. Results show that
participants presented with a flashing
ESC telltale glanced at the instrument
panel significantly more frequently (14,
Novice
(percent)
7
8
8
15
Younger
(percent)
8
10
9
6
statistically significant) during the
crash-imminent event than did
participants in the other three ESC
conditions. Participants presented with
a flashing ESC telltale also glanced at
the instrument panel approximately
twice during the crash-imminent event
versus once for participants in the other
Middle
(percent)
8
4
6
14
Older
(percent)
6
6
9
10
6
10
8
30
three ESC conditions. However, average
glance duration was approximately
twice as long for the auditory ESC
indication condition than for the other
three ESC conditions (see Table 7),
although this difference was not
statistically significant.
TABLE 7.—EFFECT OF ESC ACTIVATION INDICATION ON EYE GLANCE BEHAVIOR—ESC TRIALS ONLY
Percent trials
with any
glance to
icon
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with PROPOSAL2
None ......................................................................................................
Steady ....................................................................................................
Flashing .................................................................................................
Auditory ..................................................................................................
Number of glances per trial
28
27
41
27
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Overall, the significant finding was
that the drivers who received various
ESC activation indicators did not
perform better than drivers given no
indicator. Therefore, there does not
appear to be a safety need to propose a
requirement for an ESC activation
indicator as part of this rulemaking, and
none is proposed. In fact, presentation
of an auditory indication of ESC
activation was shown to increase the
likelihood of road departure,
particularly for older drivers. As a
result, use of an auditory indication of
ESC activation presented during the
ESC activation is not recommended.
24 Mazzae, E. et al. (2005) The effectiveness of
ESC and related Telltales: NADS Wet Pavement
Study, DOT HS 809 978.
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The flashing indicator was associated
with a greater number of glances to the
instrument panel during the critical
driving maneuvers. Therefore, flashing
would not seem to be a desirable
feature, but there was no measurable
consequence in road departures. The
current practice for many vehicles is to
25 Papelis et al. (2004) Study of ESC Assisted
Driver Performance Using a Driving Simulator,
Report No. N)4–003–PR, University of Iowa.
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Duration of glances(s)
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promote harmonization. Also, acronyms
for different trade names for ESC would
only serve to confuse drivers who
operate different vehicles produced by
different manufacturers.
NHTSA collected data on the
recognition of various identifiers related
to ESC and other vehicle systems by
administration of an icon
comprehension test. A total of 20
members of the general public
participated in this data collection
effort. Gender was balanced. Each
participant was first presented with an
instructional sheet describing the
procedure for the icon test. The
instructions included the following
statement: ‘‘You are driving down the
road and this image illuminates on your
vehicle’s instrument panel * * * ’’.
Participants were then given the test,
which consisted of a hand-sized packet
containing the 20 icons, each on a
different page. Each page contained two
separate questions to ensure that
responses were sufficiently detailed.
The questions were: ‘‘What system or
part of the car is the light referring to?’’
and ‘‘What is the light telling you about
that part or system?’’ A fill-in-the-blank
line for participant response followed
each question.
Responses for ESC-related symbols
were given full credit as correct if they
contained the words ‘‘stability control’’
or ‘‘ESC.’’ ESC icon responses
containing the word ‘‘traction’’ were
given partial credit. Selected results of
the comprehension test are presented in
Figure 10. While few people knew what
‘‘ESC’’ meant, the ISO J.14 icon was the
most successful in communicating to
people a message relating to traction.
The icon consisting of a
counterclockwise, circular arrow
surrounding a triangle containing an
exclamation point, while present in a
number of current vehicles, was not
meaningful to any of the 20
respondents, and there was little
recognition of the triangle without the
arrow.
Based upon the results of this albeit
limited study, the ISO J.14 symbol
appears to be the best choice of the
identifiers in use for a standard symbol
for ESC. As with any symbol, drivers
will have to learn its precise meaning,
but we believe that, to some extent, it
correctly evokes an association with
skidding. Also, the ISO J.14 symbol and
close variations were the symbols used
presently by the greatest number of
vehicle manufacturers that used an ESC
symbol. Therefore, NHTSA is proposing
the ISO J.14 symbol as the required ESC
symbol in FMVSS No. 126.
Once again, the ISO J.14 symbol is
desirable because it connoted the idea of
traction and skidding even to people
who had not heard of electronic stability
control. However, the literal meaning of
the symbol of a vehicle skidding with a
slash through it is the negation of
skidding, which could be assumed to
mean ESC on. The problem with the
slash symbol is not just that a driver
will not understand it and have to
consult the owner’s manual, but that the
driver could reasonably understand it to
have the opposite meaning and believe
it is not necessary to consult the owner’s
manual. Therefore, a purely
pictographic approach to adapting the
ESC symbol for the off switch is not
feasible. NHTSA believes it is necessary
to make the identification of when ESC
is turned off explicit by using the
English word ‘‘OFF,’’ as shown in the
right hand box of Table 8.
The same situation occurs for the
telltale indicating what the current state
of ESC system is. The off switch toggles
the ESC system between the on and off
states. Even someone who understands
that the ESC Off switch is not required
to use ESC normally must be certain of
the ESC state after he has touched the
switch. Therefore, the slash symbol
cannot be used for the telltale either
because it leads to the same ambiguity
regarding the state of the ESC system
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3. ESC Off Switch Symbol and Telltale
There is an obvious safety need to
prevent drivers from misunderstanding
the operation of the ESC Off switch.
Drivers usually encounter vehicle
dashboard switches as a means of
turning on vehicle functions that are off
when the vehicle is started. However, an
ESC Off switch presents the opposite
situation, because full ESC operation is
the default condition of the vehicle
following each ignition cycle. Therefore,
we believe that the switch must be
labeled unambiguously.
The ISO convention is to draw a slash
through a symbol to signify negation—
the disabling or turning off of a vehicle
function. However, Table 8, which
examines potential symbols to indicate
when the ESC system is off, shows that
this convention applied to the ISO J.14
ESC symbol does not create an
unambiguous symbol for ESC off.
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use the same ESC telltale for both
activation and malfunction. It flashes to
indicate activation and stays on
continuously in a steady burning mode
to indicate ESC malfunction. Since
NHTSA is proposing to not regulate the
activation mode, the current practice
need not be affected.
The threshold of ESC intervention
that would trigger an indication of
activation is likely to vary with the
philosophy of the manufacturer. Some
manufacturers would also favor
displaying the activation signal to the
driver shortly after the critical driving
maneuver has ended. This idea may be
more intuitively appealing because the
driver would be warned of slippery road
conditions while avoiding potential
distraction during the critical maneuver.
This rulemaking does not propose
regulation in this area.
NHTSA believes that the symbol used
to identify ESC malfunction (and
activation if the telltale is shared)
should be standardized. This is not the
case for presently available systems.
There are three main types of identifiers
for ESC activation and malfunction. One
type of icon shows the rear of a vehicle
trailed by a pair of ‘‘S’’ shaped skid
marks. This is the ISO ESC symbol
(designated J.14 in ISO standard 2575).
We observed seven variations of this
icon in production vehicles. The second
type is based on a triangle surrounding
an exclamation mark, which is also used
to indicate ABS and traction control
activation on some vehicles. A variation
of this type adds an outer
counterclockwise semicircular arrow to
indicate rotation. The third type
includes English language phrases and
acronyms often referring to trade names
for specific ESC systems.
To the extent possible, NHTSA favors
symbols over English abbreviations to
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 180 / Monday, September 18, 2006 / Proposed Rules
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when the telltale is lighted. Also, even
though it is used for malfunction
indication, the ISO J.14 symbol alone
would create ambiguity about the on/off
state of ESC if it were used with the Off
switch. Therefore, the symbol with the
English word ‘‘OFF’’ is also proposed
for the telltale that will be required for
the ESC Off switch.
E. Alternatives to the Agency Proposal
Section 10301 of the Safe,
Accountable, Flexible, Efficient
Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for
Users of 2005 26 (SAFETEA–LU)
requires that the Secretary ‘‘establish
performance criteria to reduce the
occurrence of rollovers consistent with
stability enhancing technologies’’ and
‘‘issue a proposed rule * * * by October
1, 2006, and a final rule by April 1,
2009.’’ NHTSA has long been concerned
about the number of rollover fatalities
and injuries, and it has pursued a
number of actions in the past to reduce
rollovers that were alternatives to the
present proposal.
One of the past alternatives sought to
require higher rollover resistance for
light trucks. NHTSA published an
Advance Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking in 1992 27 which explored
the idea of setting a minimum level of
rollover resistance based on the track
width and height of the center of
gravity. These are the primary
components of ‘‘geometric stability’’
which can be expressed by metrics such
as Static Stability Factor (SSF) or Tilt
Table Ratio which is a related
measurement using a ‘‘tilt table’’ to
measure how far a vehicle on a platform
could be tilted laterally before tipping
over.
However, the contemplated approach
of regulating the geometric stability of
vehicles did not lead to a mandatory
standard. Its effect would have been
crash mitigation by reducing the
number of single-vehicle crashes that
turn into rollovers rather than crash
prevention. In order to produce life
saving benefits, the proposed geometric
stability level would have had to be
placed above that of almost all
contemporary SUVs, pickup trucks with
four-wheel drive, and full size vans. A
regulation of this type would have made
classes of vehicles with high ground
clearance unavailable to consumers.
Rather than pursue such a
rulemaking, NHTSA chose instead to
add rollover resistance to the NCAP
consumer information program in 2001.
In this way, persons needing vehicles
with high ground clearance (which have
26 Pub.
27 57
L. 109–59, 119 stat. 1144 (2005).
FR 242 (Jan. 3, 1992).
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poorer rollover resistance) could make
an informed choice about the tradeoffs,
but consumers would be encouraged to
choose vehicles with greater rollover
resistance. The NCAP program uses
market-based incentives to encourage
manufacturers to maximize rollover
resistance within the limitations of the
vehicle class. Manufacturers responded
to these NCAP ratings with
improvements in rollover resistance
resulting from the generally wider track
widths of newer SUVs derived from
passenger car platforms and also
improvements where possible in truckbased SUVs during major redesigns. A
recent trend in improving the rollover
resistance of SUVs has been the
addition of roll stability control. This
feature prevents tip-up in the maneuver
test that was added to NCAP in the 2004
model year, resulting in a small
reduction in the predicted rollover rate.
We believe the NCAP approach has
been a successful way to address the
dilemma of higher rollover resistance
being at odds with some of the features
that draw consumers to light trucks.
Despite the recent trend of
improvement, SUVs cannot match
passenger cars in geometric stability
because taller bodies and higher ground
clearance are the features that
distinguish SUVs from passenger cars.
Nevertheless, the rollover resistance of
SUVs has substantially improved since
the establishment of NCAP ratings, and
consumers are in a better position to
make vehicle decisions for themselves
and for young drivers in their family.
While the use of ESC to prevent single
vehicle crashes is a better way of
reducing rollovers than any
countermeasures previously available,
there are alternatives in terms of how
NHTSA could regulate ESC systems.
The agency considered two alternatives
to the proposal. The first was to limit
the ESC standard’s applicability only to
LTVs. The second alternative was to not
require a 4-wheel system, which would
allow a 2-wheel system to be used by
manufacturers.
The agency considered the first
alternative for two reasons: (a) The ESC
effectiveness rates for LTVs against
single-vehicle crashes were almost twice
as high of the effectiveness rates for
passenger cars (PCs), and (b) LTVs
generally had a higher propensity for
rollover than PCs. The alternative would
address the core rollover issue and
target the high-risk rollover vehicle
population. However, after examining
the safety impact and the costeffectiveness of the alternative, the
agency determined that an excellent
opportunity to reduce passenger car
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crashes would be lost if PCs were
excluded from the proposal.
We examined this alternative by
looking at the impacts of requiring ESC
for passenger cars. Requiring ESC for
passenger cars would save 956 lives and
reduce 34,902 non-fatal injuries.
Following this analysis through the
cost-effectiveness equations, the costeffectiveness analysis shows that ESC is
highly cost-effective for PCs alone. For
PCs, the cost per equivalent life saved
is estimated to be $0.35 million at a 3
percent discount rate and $0.47 million
at a 7 percent discount rate. The benefitcost would be $4.8 billion at a 3 percent
discount rate and $3.8 billion at a 7
percent discount rate.
Given the fact that ESC is highly costeffective and that extending the ESC
applicability to PCs would save a large
number of additional lives (956) and
reduce a large number of additional
injuries (34,902), the agency is not
proposing this alternative.
The second alternative considered
was to require only that ESC operate on
the two front wheels. General Motors
has utilized a 2-wheel ESC system in
many of its ESC-equipped passenger
cars through MY 2005, but it is using 4wheel ESC systems exclusively in MY
2006. All other manufacturers have
utilized a 4-wheel ESC system in their
vehicles. Only 4-wheel systems are
capable of both understeer and oversteer
mitigation.
Statistical analyses comparing 2wheel to 4-wheel ESC systems were
performed.28 The effectiveness
estimates show a potentially enhanced
benefit of 4-wheel ESC systems over 2wheel ESC systems in reducing singlevehicle run-off-road crashes (significant
at the 0.05 level or better), although the
benefit could not have been shown in a
separate analysis of fatal-only crashes
likely due to the small sample size.
The agency’s contractor performed a
teardown study to determine the
difference in costs between a 2-wheel
and 4-wheel system, and it found that
the 2-wheel system is about $10.00 less
expensive. However, it is not intuitively
obvious that the difference need be this
much, and with a sample size of one, it
is possible that other changes in design
may be affecting this estimate.
Since the industry has moved away
from the 2-wheel system on its own, and
it appears that the difference in cost of
$10 or less will be insignificant
compared to the additional benefits
28 Dang, J. (2006) Statistical Analysis of The
Effectiveness of Electronic Stability Control (ESC)
Systems, U.S. Dept. of Transportation, Washington,
DC (publication pending peer review). A draft
version of this report, as supplied to peer reviewers,
has been placed in the docket for this rulemaking.
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achieved with 4-wheel ESC, we are not
providing a full analysis of this
alternative at this time.
Based on the available information,
the agency is proposing the 4-wheel
system. The agency’s decision is based
on our and the industry’s engineering
judgment that the 4-wheel system is
more effective, the effectiveness study
showing that the 4-wheel system is
more effective than the 2-wheel system
in reducing crashes, the industry trend
towards installing the 4-wheel system in
their vehicles, and the minimal cost
differences between 2-wheel and 4wheel ESC systems.
We have also examined the possibility
that there may be alternative approaches
to achieving the benefits of ESC that
could involve simpler or less costly
technology. To answer this question we
first identified the basic functional
requirements of a vehicle control system
that would maintain vehicle path
control in both oversteer and understeer
situations. The first functional
requirement is a means of predicting
what the driver’s intended path, i.e.,
where the driver wants the vehicle to
go. The second functional requirement
is to be able to determine the current
actual path of the vehicle, i.e., its
current dynamic state. The final
requirement is to determine how the
intended and actual paths deviate and
then to exercise automatic control to
minimize or eliminate this deviation.
The basic question then is whether there
exists another fundamentally different
technological approach to achieving the
three key functional requirements
identified above, than those employed
in current ESC systems.
Functional Requirement No. 1: One
may infer the desired path from a
knowledge of the driver’s instantaneous
steering, throttle, and braking
commands as well as the current
dynamic state of the vehicle. This
requires that sensors be installed to
determine the values of each of these
control inputs. Although specific sensor
technology and costs may vary from one
manufacturer to another, there is no
known alternative to acquiring
knowledge of the driver’s intent other
than through this system of vehicle
sensors.
Functional Requirement No. 2: Once
the intended path is established, the
next requirement is determine the
vehicle’s actual path. Here again a range
of sensor information is needed to
establish the vehicle’s dynamic state.
Among the state variables that must be
determined, the two most critical are
lateral acceleration and yaw velocity.
Acquiring information of these
quantities requires special vehicle
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dynamic sensors. Again, though sensor
technology and cost may vary, we are
not aware of any alternative approach to
acquiring this essential information.
Functional Requirement No. 3: With
information on the driver’s desired path
and the actual vehicle path, a means of
comparing the two and eliminating or
minimizing deviations is needed. This
requires an electronic comparator and
error generator. A means of altering the
actual vehicle path so as to bring it into
alignment with the desired path is the
third critical function. The vehicle path
can only be changed as a result of forces
generated between the tire and roadway.
Drivers intuitively rely on lateral tire
forces generated through steering inputs
to change the vehicle heading and path.
Though not comprehended by most
drivers, the heading (and consequently
the path) can also be changed by means
of unbalanced braking forces, which is
the approach used by ESC. We do not
believe that an approach that would
assume control of the driver’s steering
authority as an alternative method of
correcting the vehicle path would be
acceptable to most drivers. Also, braking
intervention at individual wheels is
much more likely to produce the
necessary yaw torque on slippery
surfaces than steering intervention, and
steering intervention would have
limited effect on understeer loss-ofcontrol even on surfaces with high
levels of friction. No manufacturer has
proposed this method of intervention to
correct path deviation in loss of control
situations.
In summary, while specific
differences in the implementation may
exist between ESC systems, the basic
elements of the feed-back control
systems are common to all. We have
concluded that to accomplish the goal of
preventing a vehicle from losing path or
directional control a vehicle must be
equipped with all of the essential
components of the current ESC systems.
There does not appear to be any current
alternative to the technology that is
being mandated that attains the goals of
this proposed rule. We solicit comment
on alternatives to mandating the
installation of ESC, consistent with our
statutory directive.
VI. Leadtime
Considering the very high level of
potential life-saving benefits of this
proposed safety standard, NHTSA
wishes to avoid excessive delay in its
development and implementation.
Except for possibly some lowproduction-volume vehicles with
infrequent design changes, NHTSA
believes that most other vehicles can
reasonably be equipped with ESC
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within three to four model years (MY)
from the date of issuance of a final rule.
This proposal does not require
improvements in ESC technology over
the present 2006 MY systems, and most
vehicles would likely experience some
level of redesign in the next five years
in the normal course of business. There
already is a strong trend to provide ESC
as standard equipment on SUVs, and it
is likely that market segment will be
equipped with ESC prior to a final rule
becoming effective. We have taken these
considerations into account in
proposing both the phase-in plan as
well as the final compliance date for full
implementation of the standard.
Our intention is to have 90 percent of
the subject fleet equipped with ESC in
the 2011 model year that starts
September 1, 2010. Accordingly,
assuming the final rule is published in
June 2008, and becomes effective
September 1, 2008, we are proposing the
following phase-in schedule:
September 1, 2008—30 percent of fleet.
September 1, 2009—60 percent of fleet.
September 1, 2010—90 percent of fleet.
September 1, 2011—All light vehicles.
However, NHTSA is proposing to
exclude multi-stage manufacturers and
alterers from the requirements of the
phase-in and to extend by one year the
time for compliance by those
manufacturers (i.e., until September 1,
2012). This NPRM also proposes to
exclude small volume manufacturers
(i.e., manufacturers producing less than
5,000 vehicles for sale in the U.S.
market in one year) from the phase-in,
instead requiring such manufacturers to
fully comply with the standard on
September 1, 2011.
Under our proposal, vehicle
manufacturers would be permitted to
earn carry-forward credits for compliant
vehicles, produced in excess of the
phase-in requirements, which are
manufactured between the effective date
of the final rule and the conclusion of
the phase-in period. We note that carryforward credits would not be permitted
to be used to defer the mandatory
compliance date of September 1, 2011
for all covered vehicles.
The initial phase-in of 30 percent
occurring almost simultaneously with
the effective date is the result of our
belief that all manufacturers subject to
the phase-in already plan to exceed that
level of ESC installation in the 2009
MY. Confidential information submitted
to NHTSA by many manufacturers
indicate that all responding
manufacturers will exceed a 30 percent
installation rate, and that several will
exceed it by a large margin that would
earn considerable carry-forward credits.
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VII. Benefits and Costs
A. Summary
This section summarizes our analysis
of the benefits, costs, and cost per
equivalent life saved as a result of the
proposed ESC requirement. As noted
previously, the life- and injury-saving
potential of ESC is very significant, both
in absolute terms and when compared
to prior agency rulemakings. This
proposal for ESC, if made final, would
save 1,536 to 2,211 lives and cause a
reduction of 50,594 to 69,630 MAIS 1–
5 injuries annually once all passenger
vehicles have ESC. This compares
favorably with the Regulatory Impact
Analyses for other important
rulemakings such as FMVSS No. 208
mandatory air bags (1,964 to 3,670 lives
saved), FMVSS No. 214 side impact
protection (690 to 1,030 lives saved),
and FMVSS No. 201 upper interior head
impact protection (870 to 1,050 lives
saved). The ESC proposal would also
save $396 to $555 million annually in
property damage and travel delay
(undiscounted). The total cost of the
proposal is estimated to be $985
million.
The proposal is extremely costeffective. The cost per equivalent life
saved would range from $0.19 to $0.32
million at a 3 percent discount and
$0.27 to $0.43 million at a 7 percent
discount. Again, the cost-effectiveness
for ESC compares favorably with the
Regulatory Impact Analyses for other
important rulemakings such as FMVSS
No. 202 head restraints safety
improvement ($2.61 million per life
saved), FMVSS No. 208 center seat
shoulder belts ($3.39 to $5.92 million
per life saved), FMVSS No. 208
advanced air bags ($1.9 to $9.0 million
per life saved), and FMVSS No. 301 fuel
system integrity upgrade ($1.96 to $5.13
million per life saved).
For a more complete discussion of the
benefits and costs associated with this
proposed rulemaking for ESC, please
consult the Preliminary Regulatory
Impact Analysis (PRIA), which is
available in the docket for this
rulemaking.
B. ESC Benefits
As discussed in detail in Chapter IV
(Benefits) of the PRIA, we anticipate
that this rulemaking would prevent
70,344 to 95,153 crashes (1,408 to 2,355
fatal crashes and 69,936 to 91,798 nonfatal crashes). Preventing these crashes
entirely is the ideal safety outcome and
would translate into 1,536 to 2,211 lives
saved and 50,594 to 69,630 MAIS 1–5
injuries prevented.
The above figures include benefits
related to rollover crashes. However, in
light of the relatively severe nature of
crashes involving rollover, ESC’s
contribution toward mitigating the
problem associated with this subset of
crashes should be noted. We anticipate
that this rulemaking would prevent
37,309 to 41,147 rollover crashes (1,057
to 1,314 fatal crashes and 36,252 to
39,833 non-fatal crashes). This would
translate into 1,161 to 1,445 lives saved
and 43,901 to 49,010 MAIS 1–5 injuries
prevented in rollovers.
In addition, preventing crashes would
also result in benefits in terms of travel
delay savings and property damage
savings. We estimate that this
rulemaking would save $396 to $555
million, undiscounted, in these two
categories ($310 to $348 million of this
savings attributable to prevented
rollover crashes).
C. ESC Costs
In order to estimate the cost of the
additional components required to
equip every vehicle in future model
years with an ESC system, assumptions
were made about future production
volume and the relationship between
equipment found in anti-lock brake
systems (ABS), traction control (TC),
and ESC systems. We assumed that in
an ESC system, the equipment of ABS
is a prerequisite. Thus, if a passenger car
did not have ABS, it would require the
cost of an ABS system plus the
additional incremental costs of the ESC
system to comply with an ESC standard.
We assumed that traction control (TC)
was not required to achieve the safety
benefits found with ESC. We estimated
a future annual production of 17 million
light vehicles consisting of nine million
light trucks and eight million passenger
cars.
An estimate was made of the MY 2011
installation rates of ABS and ESC. It
served as the baseline against which
both costs and benefits are measured.
Thus, the cost of the standard is the
incremental cost of going from the
estimated MY 2011 installations to 100
percent installation of ABS and ESC.
The estimated MY 2011 installation
rates are presented in Table 9.
TABLE 9.—MY 2011 PREDICTED
INSTALLATIONS
[Percent of the light vehicle fleet]
ABS
Passenger Cars
Light Trucks ......
ABS + ESC
86
99
65
77
Based on the assumptions above and
the data provided in Table 9, Table 10
presents the percent of the MY 2011
fleet that would need these specific
technologies in order to equip 100
percent of the fleet with ESC.
TABLE 10.—PERCENT OF THE LIGHT VEHICLE FLEET REQUIRING TECHNOLOGY TO ACHIEVE 100% ESC INSTALLATION
None
Passenger Cars .......................................................................................................................................
Light Trucks .............................................................................................................................................
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The cost estimates developed for this
analysis were taken from tear down
studies that contractors have performed
for NHTSA. This process resulted in
estimates of the consumer cost of ABS
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at $368 and the incremental cost of ESC
at $111. Thus, it would cost a vehicle
that does not have ABS currently, $479
to meet this proposal. Combining the
technology needs in Table 10 with the
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ABS + ESC
65
77
ESC only
14
1
cost above and assumed production
volumes yields the cost estimate in
Table 11 for the proposed standard.
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TABLE 11.—SUMMARY OF VEHICLE COSTS FOR THE ESC PROPOSAL
[2005$]
Average
vehicle costs
Passenger Cars .........................................................................................................................................................
Light Trucks ...............................................................................................................................................................
Total ....................................................................................................................................................................
In summary, Table 11 shows that the
new vehicle costs of providing
electronic stability control and antilock
brakes will add approximately $985
million to new light vehicles at a cost
averaging over $58 per vehicle.
In addition, we note that this proposal
would add weight to vehicles and
consequently would increase their
lifetime use of fuel. Most of the added
weight is for ABS components and very
little is for the ESC components. Since
99 percent of light trucks are predicted
to have ABS in MY 2011, the weight
increase for light trucks is less than one
pound and is considered negligible. The
average weight gain for passenger cars is
estimated to be 2.1 pounds, resulting in
2.6 more gallons of fuel being used over
the lifetime of these vehicles. The
present discounted value of the added
fuel cost over the lifetime of the average
passenger car is estimated to be $2.73 at
a 7 percent discount rate and $3.35 at
a 3 percent discount rate.
We have not included in these cost
estimates, allowances for ESC system
maintenance and repair. Although all
complex electronic systems will
experience component failures from
time to time necessitating repair, our
experience to date with existing systems
is that their failure rate is not outside
the norm. Also, there are no routine
maintenance requirements for ESC
systems.
VIII. Public Participation
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How Can I Influence NHTSA’s Thinking
on This Notice?
In developing this notice, NHTSA
tried to address the concerns of all
stakeholders. Your comments will help
us determine what standard should be
set for ESC as part of FMVSS No. 126.
We invite you to provide different views
about the issues presented, new
approaches and technologies about
which we did not ask, new data, how
this notice may affect you, or other
relevant information. We welcome your
views on all aspects of this notice. Your
comments will be most effective if you
follow the suggestions below:
• Explain your views and reasoning
as clearly as possible.
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• Provide empirical evidence,
wherever possible, to support your
views.
• If you estimate potential costs,
explain how you arrived at that
estimate.
• Provide specific examples to
illustrate your concerns.
• Offer specific alternatives.
• Reference specific sections of the
notice in your comments, such as the
units or page numbers of the preamble,
or the regulatory sections.
• Be sure to include the name, date,
and docket number of the proceeding as
part of your comments.
How Do I Prepare and Submit
Comments?
Your comments must be written and
in English. To ensure that your
comments are correctly filed in the
Docket, please include the docket
number of this document in your
comments.
Your comments must not be more
than 15 pages long. (49 CFR 553.21). We
established this limit to encourage you
to write your primary comments in a
concise fashion. However, you may
attach necessary additional documents
to your comments. There is no limit on
the length of the attachments.
Please submit two copies of your
comments, including the attachments,
to Docket Management at the address
given above under ADDRESSES.
You may also submit your comments
to the docket electronically by logging
onto the Dockets Management System
Web site at https://dms.dot.gov. Click on
‘‘Help & Information’’ or ‘‘Help/Info’’ to
obtain instructions for filing your
document electronically.
How Can I Be Sure That My Comments
Were Received?
If you wish Docket Management to
notify you upon its receipt of your
comments, enclose a self-addressed,
stamped postcard in the envelope
containing your comments. Upon
receiving your comments, Docket
Management will return the postcard by
mail. Each electronic filer will receive
electronic confirmation that his or her
submission has been received.
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Total costs
(million)
$90.3
29.2
$728
363
58
985
How Do I Submit Confidential Business
Information?
If you wish to submit any information
under a claim of confidentiality, you
should submit three copies of your
complete submission, including the
information you claim to be confidential
business information, to the Chief
Counsel, NHTSA, at the address given
above under FOR FURTHER INFORMATION
CONTACT. In addition, you should
submit two copies, from which you
have deleted the claimed confidential
business information, to Docket
Management at the address given above
under ADDRESSES. When you send a
comment containing information
claimed to be confidential business
information, you should include a cover
letter delineating that information, as
specified in our confidential business
information regulation. (49 CFR part
512.)
Will the Agency Consider Late
Comments?
We will consider all comments that
Docket Management receives before the
close of business on the comment
closing date indicated above under
DATES. To the extent possible, we will
also consider comments that Docket
Management receives after that date. If
Docket Management receives a comment
too late for us to consider it in
developing a final rule (assuming that
one is issued), we will consider that
comment as an informal suggestion for
future rulemaking action.
How Can I Read the Comments
Submitted by Other People?
You may read the comments received
by Docket Management at the address
given above under ADDRESSES. The
hours of the Docket are indicated above
in the same location.
You may also review filed public
comments on the Internet. To read the
comments on the Internet, take the
following steps:
1. Go to the Docket Management
System (DMS) Web page of the
Department of Transportation (https://
dms.dot.gov/).
2. On that page, click on ‘‘search.’’
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3. On the next page (https://
dms.dot.gov/search/), type in the fourdigit docket number shown at the
beginning of this document. (Example:
If the docket number were ‘‘NHTSA–
1998–1234,’’ you would type ‘‘1234.’’)
After typing the docket number, click on
‘‘search.’’
4. On the next page, which contains
docket summary information for the
docket you selected, click on the desired
comments. You may download the
comments. Although the comments are
imaged documents, instead of word
processing documents, the ‘‘pdf’’
versions of the documents are word
searchable.
Please note that even after the
comment closing date, we will continue
to file relevant information in the
Docket as it becomes available. Further,
some people may submit late comments.
Accordingly, we recommend that you
periodically check the Docket for new
material.
Data Quality Act Statement
Pursuant to the Data Quality Act, in
order for substantive data submitted by
third parties to be relied upon and used
by the agency, it must also meet the
information quality standards set forth
in the DOT Data Quality Act guidelines.
Accordingly, members of the public
should consult the guidelines in
preparing information submissions to
the agency. DOT’s guidelines may be
accessed at https://dmses.dot.gov/
submit/DataQualityGuidelines.pdf.
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IX. Regulatory Analyses and Notices
A. Vehicle Safety Act
Under 49 U.S.C. Chapter 301, Motor
Vehicle Safety (49 U.S.C. 30101 et seq.),
the Secretary of Transportation is
responsible for prescribing motor
vehicle safety standards that are
practicable, meet the need for motor
vehicle safety, and are stated in
objective terms.29 These motor vehicle
safety standards set the minimum level
of performance for a motor vehicle or
motor vehicle equipment to be
considered safe.30 When prescribing
such standards, the Secretary must
consider all relevant, available motor
vehicle safety information.31 The
Secretary also must consider whether a
proposed standard is reasonable,
practicable, and appropriate for the type
of motor vehicle or motor vehicle
equipment for which it is prescribed
and the extent to which the standard
will further the statutory purpose of
reducing traffic accidents and associated
29 49
U.S.C. 30111(a).
U.S.C. 30102(a)(9).
31 49 U.S.C. 30111(b).
32 Id.
30 49
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deaths.32 The responsibility for
promulgation of Federal motor vehicle
safety standards has been delegated to
NHTSA.33
As noted previously, section 10301 of
SAFETEA–LU mandated a regulation to
reduce the occurrence of rollovers
‘‘consistent with stability enhancing
technologies.’’ In developing this
proposed rule for ESC, the agency
carefully considered the statutory
requirements of both SAFETEA–LU and
49 U.S.C. Chapter 301.
First, in preparing this document, the
agency carefully evaluated available
research, testing results, and other
information related to ESC technology.
The agency performed extensive
research on its own and made use of
research performed by the Alliance of
Automobile Manufacturers. We have
also performed analyses of ESC using
actual crash data to determine the
effectiveness of ESC in reducing singlevehicle crashes and rollovers. In sum,
this document reflects our consideration
of all relevant, available motor vehicle
safety information.
Second, to ensure that the ESC
requirements are practicable, the agency
research and the Alliance research
documented the capabilities of current
ESC systems and dynamic performance
of model year 2005 vehicles equipped
with them. We have tentatively
concluded that all current production
vehicles equipped with ESC systems
would comply with the equipment
requirements, that all but one vehicle
would comply with the performance
tests proposed, and that only minor
software tuning would be required to
bring that vehicle into compliance. In
sum, we believe that this proposed rule
is practicable, in that it could be
implemented with existing technology
and is quite cost effective given its
potential to prevent thousands of deaths
and injuries each year, particularly
those associated with single-vehicle
crashes leading to rollover.
Third, the regulatory text following
this preamble is stated in objective
terms in order to specify precisely what
equipment constitutes an ESC system,
what performance is required and how
performance would be tested under the
standard. The proposed definition of an
ESC system is based on an industry
consensus definition developed by the
Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE).
The proposed rule also includes
performance requirements and test
procedures for the timing and intensity
of the oversteer intervention of the ESC
33 49 U.S.C. 105 and 322; delegation of authority
at 49 CFR 1.50.
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54735
system and the responsiveness of the
vehicle. This test procedure involves a
precisely defined steering pattern
performed by a robotic steering machine
under a defined set of test conditions
(e.g., ambient temperature, road test
surface, vehicle load, vehicle speed).
Performance is defined by objective
measurements of yaw rate and lateral
acceleration taken by scientific
instruments at precise times with
reference to the steering pattern. The
standard’s test procedures carefully
delineate how testing would be
conducted. Thus, the agency believes
that this test procedure is sufficiently
objective and would not result in any
uncertainty as to whether a given
vehicle satisfies the requirements of the
ESC standard.
Finally, we believe that this proposed
rule is reasonable and appropriate for
motor vehicles subject to the applicable
requirements. As discussed elsewhere
in this notice, the agency is addressing
Congress’ concern about rollover
crashes resulting in fatalities and
serious injuries. Under section 10301 of
SAFETEA–LU, Congress mandated
installation of stability enhancing
technologies in new vehicles to reduce
rollovers. NHTSA has determined that
ESC systems meeting the requirements
of this proposed rule offer an effective
countermeasure to rollover crashes and
to other single-vehicle and certain
multi-vehicle crashes. Accordingly, we
believe that this proposed rule is
appropriate for vehicles that would
become subject to these provisions
because it furthers the agency’s
objective of preventing deaths and
serious injuries, particularly those
associated with rollover crashes.
B. Executive Order 12866 and DOT
Regulatory Policies and Procedures
Executive Order 12866, ‘‘Regulatory
Planning and Review’’ (58 FR 51735,
October 4, 1993), provides for making
determinations whether a regulatory
action is ‘‘significant’’ and therefore
subject to Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) review and to the
requirements of the Executive Order.
The Order defines a ‘‘significant
regulatory action’’ as one that is likely
to result in a rule that may:
(1) Have an annual effect on the
economy of $100 million or more or
adversely affect in a material way the
economy, a sector of the economy,
productivity, competition, jobs, the
environment, public health or safety, or
State, local, or Tribal governments or
communities;
(2) Create a serious inconsistency or
otherwise interfere with an action taken
or planned by another agency;
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(3) Materially alter the budgetary
impact of entitlements, grants, user fees,
or loan programs or the rights and
obligations of recipients thereof; or
(4) Raise novel legal or policy issues
arising out of legal mandates, the
President’s priorities, or the principles
set forth in the Executive Order.
We have considered the impact of this
action under Executive Order 12866 and
the Department of Transportation’s
regulatory policies and procedures. This
action has been determined to be
economically significant under the
Executive Order, and it is also a subject
of congressional interest and a mandate
under section 10301 of SAFETEA–LU.
The agency has prepared and placed in
the docket a Preliminary Regulatory
Impact Analysis. This rulemaking action
is also significant within the meaning of
the Department of Transportation’s
Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44
FR 11034; February 26, 1979).
Accordingly, this rulemaking document
was reviewed by the Office of
Management and Budget under
Executive Order 12866, ‘‘Regulatory
Planning and Review.’’ The agency has
estimated that compliance with this
proposal would cost approximately
$985 million per year and have net
benefits as high as $10.6 billion per
year. Thus, this rule would have greater
than a $100 million effect.
C. Regulatory Flexibility Act
Pursuant to the Regulatory Flexibility
Act of 1980 (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq., as
amended by the Small Business
Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act
(SBREFA) of 1996), whenever an agency
is required to publish a notice of
rulemaking for any proposed or final
rule, it must prepare and make available
for public comment a regulatory
flexibility analysis that describes the
effect of the rule on small entities (i.e.,
small businesses, small organizations,
and small governmental jurisdictions).
However, no regulatory or flexibility
analysis is required if the head of an
agency certifies that the rule will not
have a significant economic impact on
a substantial number of small entities.
SBREFA amended the Regulatory
Flexibility Act to require Federal
agencies to provide a statement of the
factual basis for certifying that a rule
will not have a significant economic
impact on a substantial number of small
entities.
NHTSA has considered the effects of
this rulemaking action under the
Regulatory Flexibility Act and has
included an initial regulatory flexibility
analysis in the PRE. This analysis
discusses potential regulatory
alternatives that the agency considered
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that would still meet the identified
safety need of reducing the occurrence
of rollovers through stability enhancing
technologies. Alternatives considered
included (a) applying the standard to
light trucks but not to passenger cars
and (b) permitting front-wheel-only ESC
systems that are incapable of understeer
intervention. The first alternative was
rejected because passenger car ESC
systems would save 956 lives and
reduce 34,902 injuries annually at a cost
per equivalent fatality that would easily
justify a separate rule for passenger cars.
The second alternative was rejected
because front-wheel-only ESC systems
would prevent 30 percent fewer singlevehicle crashes without producing a
large cost saving.
To summarize the conclusions of that
analysis, the agency believes that the
proposal would have a significant
economic impact on a substantial
number of small businesses. There are
currently four small domestic motor
vehicle manufacturers in the United
States, each having fewer than 1,000
employees. Although the cost for an
ESC system is relatively high, we
believe that these manufacturers would
be able to pass the associated costs on
to purchasers without decreasing sales
volume, because the demand for these
high-end, luxury vehicles tends to be
inelastic and the increase in total
vehicle cost is expected to be only 0.2–
1.1 percent.
There are a significant number of
final-stage manufacturers and alterers
that could be impacted by the proposed
rule for ESC, some of which buy
incomplete vehicles. However, finalstage manufacturers and alterers
typically do not modify the brake
system of the vehicle, so the original
manufacturer’s certification of the ESC
system should pass through for these
vehicles. We believe that increased costs
associated with ESC would impact all
such final-stage manufacturers and
alterers equally, and that such costs
would be passed on to consumers.
Furthermore, we have no reason to
believe that an average cost of $90 per
passenger car and $29 per truck will
cause a significant decline in overall
vehicle sales.
We do not expect manufacturers of
ESC systems to be classified as small
businesses.
D. Executive Order 13132 (Federalism)
Executive Order 13132 sets forth
principles of federalism and the related
policies of the Federal government.
NHTSA has analyzed this rule in
accordance with the principles and
criteria set forth in Executive Order
13132, Federalism, and has determined
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that it does not have sufficient Federal
implications to warrant consultation
with State and local officials or the
preparation of a Federalism summary
impact statement. The rule will not have
any substantial impact on the States, or
on the current Federal-State
relationship, or on the current
distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various local
officials. However, under 49 U.S.C.
30103, whenever a Federal motor
vehicle safety standard is in effect, a
State may not adopt or maintain a safety
standard applicable to the same aspect
of performance which is not identical to
the Federal standard, except to the
extent that the state requirement
imposes a higher level of performance
and applies only to vehicles procured
for the State’s use.
E. Executive Order 12988 (Civil Justice
Reform)
Pursuant to Executive Order 12988,
‘‘Civil Justice Reform’’ (61 FR 4729,
February 7, 1996), the agency has
considered whether this proposed rule
would have any retroactive effect. This
proposed rule would not have any
retroactive effect. Under 49 U.S.C.
30103, whenever a Federal motor
vehicle safety standard is in effect, a
State may not adopt or maintain a safety
standard applicable to the same aspect
of performance of a motor vehicle or
motor vehicle equipment which is not
identical to the Federal standard, except
to the extent that the State requirement
imposes a higher level of performance
and applies only to vehicles procured
for the State’s use. 49 U.S.C. 30161 sets
forth a procedure for judicial review of
final rules establishing, amending, or
revoking Federal motor vehicle safety
standards. That section does not require
submission of a petition for
reconsideration or other administrative
proceedings before parties may file suit
in court.
F. Executive Order 13045 (Protection of
Children From Environmental Health
and Safety Risks)
Executive Order 13045, ‘‘Protection of
Children from Environmental Health
and Safety Risks’’ (62 FR 19855, April
23, 1997), applies to any rule that: (1)
Is determined to be ‘‘economically
significant’’ as defined under Executive
Order 12866, and (2) concerns an
environmental, health, or safety risk that
the agency has reason to believe may
have a disproportionate effect on
children. If the regulatory action meets
both criteria, the agency must evaluate
the environmental health or safety
effects of the planned rule on children,
and explain why the planned regulation
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is preferable to other potentially
effective and reasonably feasible
alternatives considered by the agency.
Although the proposed rule for ESC
has been determined to be an
economically significant regulatory
action under Executive Order 12866, the
problems associated with loss of vehicle
control equally impact all persons
riding in a vehicle, regardless of age.
Consequently, the proposed rule does
not involve a decision based on
environmental, health, or safety risks
that disproportionately affect children
and would not necessitate further
analyses under Executive Order 13045.
G. Paperwork Reduction Act
Under the Paperwork Reduction Act
of 1995 (PRA), a person is not required
to respond to a collection of information
by a Federal agency unless the
collection displays a valid OMB control
number. The Department of
Transportation is submitting the
following information collection request
to OMB for review and clearance under
the PRA.
Agency: National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration (NHTSA).
Title: Phase-In Production Reporting
Requirements for Electronic Stability
Control Systems.
Type of Request: Routine.
OMB Clearance Number: 2127–New.
Form Number: This collection of
information will not use any standard
forms.
Affected Public: The respondents are
manufacturers of passenger cars,
multipurpose passenger vehicles,
trucks, and buses having a gross vehicle
weight rating of 4,536 Kg (10,000
pounds) or less. The agency estimates
that there are about 21 such
manufacturers.
Estimate of the Total Annual
Reporting and Recordkeeping Burden
Resulting From the Collection of
Information: NHTSA estimates that the
total annual hour burden is 42 hours.
Estimated Costs: NHTSA estimates
that the total annual cost burden, in U.S.
dollars, will be $2,100. No additional
resources would be expended by vehicle
manufacturers to gather annual
production information because they
already compile this data for their own
uses.
Summary of Collection of
Information: This collection would
require manufacturers of passenger cars,
multipurpose passenger vehicles,
trucks, and buses with a gross vehicle
weight rating of 4,536 Kg (10,000
pounds) or less to provide motor vehicle
production data for the following three
years: September 1, 2008 to August 31,
2009; September 1, 2009 to August 31,
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2010; and September 1, 2010 to August
31, 2011.
Description of the Need for the
Information and the Proposed Use of
the Information: The purpose of the
reporting requirements will be to aid
NHTSA in determining whether a
manufacturer has complied with the
requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle
Safety Standard No. 126, Electronic
Stability Control Systems, during the
phase-in of those requirements. NHTSA
requests comments on the agency’s
estimates of the total annual hour and
cost burdens resulting from this
collection of information. These
comments must be received on or before
October 18, 2006.
H. National Technology Transfer and
Advancement Act
Section 12(d) of the National
Technology Transfer and Advancement
Act of 1995 (NTTAA), Public Law 104–
113, section 12(d) (15 U.S.C. 272)
directs NHTSA to use voluntary
consensus standards in its regulatory
activities unless doing so would be
inconsistent with applicable law or
otherwise impractical. Voluntary
consensus standards are technical
standards (e.g., materials specifications,
test methods, sampling procedures, and
business practices) that are developed or
adopted by voluntary consensus
standards bodies, such as the Society of
Automotive Engineers (SAE). The
NTTAA directs NHTSA to provide
Congress, through OMB, explanations
when the agency decides not to use
available and applicable voluntary
consensus standards. The NTTAA does
not apply to symbols.
The equipment requirements of this
standard are based (with minor
modifications) on the SAE Surface
Vehicle Information Report on
Automotive Stability Enhancement
Systems J2564 Rev JUN2004 that
provides an industry consensus
definition of an ESC system. However,
there is no voluntary consensus
standard for ESC that contains any
specifications for a performance test.
I. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
Section 202 of the Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA)
requires Federal agencies to prepare a
written assessment of the costs, benefits,
and other effects of proposed or final
rules that include a Federal mandate
likely to result in the expenditure by
State, local or tribal governments, in the
aggregate, or by the private sector, of
more than $100 million in any one year
(adjusted for inflation with base year of
1995, so currently about $118 million in
2004 dollars). Before promulgating a
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rule for which a written statement is
needed, section 205 of the UMRA
generally requires NHTSA to identify
and consider a reasonable number of
regulatory alternatives and adopt the
least costly, most cost-effective, or least
burdensome alternative that achieves
the objectives of the rule. The
provisions of section 205 do not apply
when they are inconsistent with
applicable law. Moreover, section 205
allows NHTSA to adopt an alternative
other than the least costly, most costeffective or least burdensome alternative
if we publish with the final rule an
explanation why that alternative was
not adopted.
This proposal would not result in the
expenditure by State, local, or tribal
governments, in the aggregate, of more
than $118 million annually, but it
would result in the expenditure of that
magnitude by vehicle manufacturers
and/or their suppliers.
In this proposed rule, the agency is
presenting not only its proposed
regulatory approach for ESC, but also
the regulatory alternatives it has
considered. In addition, as part of the
public comment process, the agency is
open to suggestions regarding ways to
promote flexibility and to minimize
costs of compliance, while achieving the
safety purposes of the Safe,
Accountable, Flexible, Efficient
Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for
Users of 2005.
J. National Environmental Policy Act
NHTSA has analyzed this proposed
rulemaking action for the purposes of
the National Environmental Policy Act.
The agency has determined that
implementation of this action would not
have any significant impact on the
quality of the human environment.
K. Regulation Identifier Number (RIN)
The Department of Transportation
assigns a regulation identifier number
(RIN) to each regulatory action listed in
the Unified Agenda of Federal
Regulations. The Regulatory Information
Service Center publishes the Unified
Agenda in April and October of each
year. You may use the RIN contained in
the heading at the beginning of this
document to find this action in the
Unified Agenda.
L. Privacy Act
Please note that anyone is able to
search the electronic form of all
comments received into any of our
dockets by the name of the individual
submitting the comment (or signing the
comment, if submitted on behalf of an
association, business, labor union, etc.).
You may review DOT’s complete
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Privacy Act Statement in the Federal
Register published on April 11, 2000
(Volume 65, Number 70; pages 19477–
78) or you may visit https://dms.dot.gov.
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Proposed Regulatory Text
List of Subjects in 49 CFR Parts 571 and
585
Imports, Motor vehicle safety, Report
and recordkeeping requirements, Tires.
In consideration of the foregoing,
NHTSA is proposing to amend 49 CFR
parts 571 and 585 as follows:
PART 571—FEDERAL MOTOR
VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARDS
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1. The authority citation for part 571
continues to read as follows:
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Authority: 49 U.S.C. 322, 30111, 30115,
30117, and 30166; delegation of authority at
49 CFR 1.50.
2. Section 571.101 is amended by
revising Table 1 to read as follows:
§ 571.101
displays.
Standard No. 101; Controls and
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3. Section 571.126 is added to read as
follows:
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§ 571.126 Standard No. 126; Electronic
stability control systems.
S1. Scope. This standard establishes
performance and equipment
requirements for electronic stability
control (ESC) systems.
S2. Purpose. The purpose of this
standard is to reduce the number of
deaths and injuries that result from
crashes in which the driver loses
directional control of the vehicle.
S3. Application. This standard
applies to passenger cars, multipurpose
passenger vehicles, trucks, and buses
with a gross vehicle weight rating of
4,536 kilograms (10,000 pounds) or less,
according to the phase-in schedule
specified in S8 of this standard.
S4. Definitions.
Ackerman Steer Angle means the
angle whose tangent is the wheelbase
divided by the radius of the turn at a
very low speed.
Electronic Stability Control System or
ESC System means a system that has all
of the following attributes:
(1) That augments vehicle directional
stability by applying and adjusting the
vehicle brakes individually to induce
correcting yaw torques to a vehicle;
(2) That is computer controlled with
the computer using a closed-loop
algorithm to limit vehicle oversteer and
to limit vehicle understeer when
appropriate;
(3) That has a means to determine the
vehicle’s yaw rate and to estimate its
side slip;
(4) That has a means to monitor driver
steering inputs, and
(5) That is operational over the full
speed range of the vehicle (except below
a low-speed threshold where loss of
control is unlikely).
Oversteer means a condition in which
the vehicle’s yaw rate is greater than the
yaw rate that would occur at the
vehicle’s speed as result of the
Ackerman Steer Angle.
Sideslip or side slip angle means the
arctangent of the lateral velocity of the
center of gravity of the vehicle divided
by the longitudinal velocity of the
center of gravity.
Understeer means a condition in
which the vehicle’s yaw rate is less than
the yaw rate that would occur at the
vehicle’s speed as result of the
Ackerman Steer Angle.
Yaw rate means the rate of change of
the vehicle’s heading angle measured in
degrees/second of rotation about a
vertical axis through the vehicle’s center
of gravity.
S5. Requirements. Subject to the
phase-in set forth in S8, each vehicle
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must be equipped with an ESC system
that meets the requirements specified in
S5 under the test conditions specified in
S6 and the test procedures specified in
S7 of this standard.
S5.1 Required Equipment. Vehicles
to which this standard applies must be
equipped with an electronic stability
control system that:
S5.1.1 Is capable of applying all four
brakes individually and has a control
algorithm that utilizes this capability.
S5.1.2 Is operational during all
phases of driving including
acceleration, coasting, and deceleration
(including braking), except when the
driver has disabled ESC or the vehicle
is below a low speed threshold where
loss of control is unlikely.
S5.1.3 Remains operational when
the antilock brake system or traction
control system is activated.
S5.2 Performance Requirements.
During each test performed under the
test conditions of S6 and the test
procedure of S7.9, the vehicle with the
ESC system engaged must satisfy the
stability criteria of S5.2.1 and S5.2.2,
and it must satisfy the responsiveness
criterion of S5.2.3 during each of those
tests conducted with a steering angle
amplitude of 180 degrees or greater.
S5.2.1 The yaw rate measured one
second after completion of the sine with
dwell steering input (time T0 + 1 in
Figure 1) must not exceed 35 percent of
the first peak value of yaw velocity
recorded after the beginning of the
dwell period
during the same test run, and
S5.2.2 The yaw rate measured 1.75
seconds after completion of the sine
with dwell steering input must not
exceed 20 percent of the first peak value
of yaw velocity recorded after the
beginning of the dwell period during the
same test run.
S5.2.3 The lateral displacement of
the vehicle center of gravity with
respect to its initial straight path must
be at least 1.83 m (6 feet) when
computed 1.07 seconds after initiation
of steering.
S5.2.3.1 The computation of lateral
displacement is performed using double
integration with respect to time of the
measurement of lateral acceleration at
the vehicle center of gravity, as
expressed by the formula:
Lateral Displacement = ∫∫Ayc.g.dt
S5.2.3.2 Time, t = 0 for the
integration operation is the instant of
steering initiation.
S5.3 ESC Malfunction. The vehicle
must be equipped with a telltale that
provides a warning to the driver not
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more than two minutes after the
occurrence of one or more malfunctions
that affect the generation or
transmission of control or response
signals in the vehicle’s electronic
stability control system. The ESC
malfunction telltale:
S5.3.1 Must be mounted inside the
occupant compartment in front of and
in clear view of the driver;
S5.3.2 Must be identified by the
symbol shown for ‘‘ESC Malfunction
Telltale’’ in Table 1 of Standard No. 101
(49 CFR 571.101);
S5.3.3 Must remain continuously
illuminated under the conditions
specified in S5.3 for as long as the
malfunction(s) exists, whenever the
ignition locking system is in the ‘‘On’’
(‘‘Run’’) position; and
S5.3.4 Except as provided in
paragraph S5.3.5, each ESC malfunction
telltale must be activated as a check of
lamp function either when the ignition
locking system is turned to the ‘‘On’’
(‘‘Run’’) position when the engine is not
running, or when the ignition locking
system is in a position between ‘‘On’’
(‘‘Run’’) and ‘‘Start’’ that is designated
by the manufacturer as a check position.
S5.3.5 The ESC malfunction telltale
need not be activated when a starter
interlock is in operation.
S5.3.6 The ESC malfunction telltale
must extinguish after the malfunction
has been corrected.
S5.3.7 The manufacturer may use
the ESC malfunction telltale in a
flashing mode to indicate ESC
operation.
S5.4 ESC Off Switch and Telltale.
The manufacturer may include a driver
selectable switch that places the ESC
system in a mode in which it will not
satisfy the performance requirements of
S5.2.1, S5.2.2 and S5.2.3 provided that:
S5.4.1 The vehicle’s ESC system
must always return to a mode that
satisfies the requirements of S5.1 and
S5.2 at the initiation of each new
ignition cycle, regardless of what mode
the driver had previously selected. If the
system has more than one mode that
satisfies these requirements, the default
mode must be the mode that satisfies
the performance requirements of S5.2 by
the greatest margin.
S5.4.2 The vehicle manufacturer
must provide a telltale indicating that
the vehicle has been put into a mode
that renders it unable to satisfy the
requirements of S5.2.1, S5.2.2 and
S5.2.3.
S5.4.3 The ‘‘ESC Off’’ switch and
telltale must be identified by the symbol
shown for ‘‘ESC Off’’ in Table 1 of
Standard No. 101 (49 CFR 571.101).
S5.4.4 The ‘‘ESC Off’’ telltale must
be mounted inside the occupant
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compartment in front of and in clear
view of the driver.
S5.4.5 The ‘‘ESC Off’’ telltale remain
continuously illuminated for as long as
the ESC is in a mode that renders it
unable to satisfy the requirements of
S5.2.1, S5.2.2 and S5.2.3, and
S5.4.6 Except as provided in
paragraph S5.4.7, each ‘‘ESC Off’’
telltale must be activated as a check of
lamp function either when the ignition
locking system is turned to the ‘‘On’’
(‘‘Run’’) position when the engine is not
running, or when the ignition locking
system is in a position between ‘‘On’’
(‘‘Run’’) and ‘‘Start’’ that is designated
by the manufacturer as a check position.
S5.4.7 The ‘‘ESC Off’’ telltale need
not be activated when a starter interlock
is in operation.
S5.4.8 The ‘‘ESC Off’’ telltale must
extinguish after the ESC system has
been returned to its fully functional
default mode.
S6. Test Conditions.
S6.1. Ambient conditions.
S6.1.1 The ambient temperature is
between 0 °C (32 °F) and 40 °C (104 °F).
S6.1.2 The maximum wind speed is
no greater than 10m/s (22 mph).
S6.2. Road test surface.
S6.2.1 The tests are conducted on a
dry, uniform, solid-paved surface.
Surfaces with irregularities and
undulations, such as dips and large
cracks, are unsuitable.
S6.2.2 The road test surface must
produce a peak friction coefficient (PFC)
of 0.9 ± 0.05 when measured using an
American Society for Testing and
Materials (ASTM) E1136 standard
reference test tire, in accordance with
ASTM Method E 1337–90, at a speed of
64.4 km/h (40 mph), without water
delivery.
S6.2.3 The test surface has a
consistent slope between level and 2%.
All tests are to be initiated in the
direction of positive slope (uphill).
S6.3 Vehicle conditions.
S6.3.1 The ESC system is enabled
for all testing.
S6.3.2 Test Weight. The vehicle is
loaded with the fuel tank filled to at
least 75 percent of capacity, and total
interior load of 168 kg (370 lbs)
comprised of the test driver,
approximately 59 kg (130 lbs) of test
equipment (automated steering
machine, data acquisition system and
the power supply for the steering
machine), and ballast as required by
differences in the weight of test drivers
and test equipment.
S6.3.3 Tires. The vehicle is tested
with the tires installed on the vehicle at
time of initial vehicle sale. The tires are
inflated to the vehicle manufacturer’s
recommended cold tire inflation
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pressure(s) specified on the vehicle’s
placard or the tire inflation pressure
label. Tubes may be installed to prevent
tire de-beading.
S6.3.4 Outriggers. Outriggers must
be used for tests of Sport Utility
Vehicles (SUVs), and they are permitted
on other test vehicles if deemed
necessary for driver safety.
S6.3.5 A steering machine
programmed to execute the required
steering pattern must be used in S7.5.2,
S7.5.3, S7.6 and S7.9.
S7. Test Procedure.
S7.1 Inflate the vehicles’ tires to the
cold tire inflation pressure(s) provided
on the vehicle’s placard or the tire
inflation pressure label.
S7.2 Telltale bulb check. With the
vehicle stationary and the ignition
locking system in the ‘‘Lock’’ or ‘‘Off’’
position, activate the ignition locking
system to the ‘‘On’’ (‘‘Run’’) position or,
where applicable, the appropriate
position for the lamp check. The ESC
system must perform a check of lamp
function for the ESC malfunction
telltale, and if equipped, the ‘‘ESC Off’’
telltale, as specified in S5.3.4 and
S5.4.6.
S7.3 ‘‘ESC Off’’ switch check. For
vehicles equipped with an ‘‘ESC Off’’
feature, with the vehicle stationary and
the ignition locking system in the
‘‘Lock’’ or ‘‘Off’’ position, activate the
ignition locking system to the ‘‘On’’
(‘‘Run’’) position. Activate the ‘‘ESC
Off’’ switch and verify that the ‘‘ESC
Off’’ telltale is illuminated. Turn the
ignition locking system to the ‘‘Lock’’ or
‘‘Off’’ position. Again, activate the
ignition locking system to the ‘‘On’’
(‘‘Run’’) position and verify that the
‘‘ESC Off’’ telltale has extinguished
indicating that the ESC system has been
reactivated as specified in S5.4.
S7.4 Brake Conditioning. Condition
the vehicle brakes as follows:
S7.4.1 Ten stops are performed from
a speed of 56 km/h (35 mph), with an
average deceleration of approximately
0.5 g.
S7.4.2 Immediately following the
series of 56 km/h (35 mph) stops, three
additional stops are performed from 72
km/h (45 mph).
S7.4.3 When executing the stops in
S7.4.2, sufficient force is applied to the
brake pedal to activate the vehicle’s
antilock brake system (ABS) for a
majority of each braking event.
S7.4.4 Following completion of the
final stop in S7.4.2, the vehicle is driven
at a speed of 72 km/h (45 mph) for five
minutes to cool the brakes.
S7.5 Tire Conditioning. Condition
the tires using the following procedure
to wear away mold sheen and achieve
operating temperature immediately
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before beginning the test runs of S7.6
and S7.9.
S7.5.1 The test vehicle is driven
around a circle 30 meters (100 feet) in
diameter at a speed that produces a
lateral acceleration of approximately 0.5
to 0.6 g for three clockwise laps
followed by three counterclockwise
laps.
S7.5.2 Using a sinusoidal steering
pattern at a frequency of 1 Hz, a peak
steering wheel angle amplitude
corresponding to a peak lateral
acceleration of 0.5–0.6 g, and a vehicle
speed of 56 km/h (35 mph), the vehicle
is driven through four passes
performing 10 cycles of sinusoidal
steering during each pass.
S7.5.3 The steering wheel angle
amplitude of the final cycle of the final
pass is twice that of the other cycles.
The maximum time permitted between
all laps and passes is five minutes.
S7.6 Slowly Increasing Steer Test.
The vehicle is subjected to two series of
runs of the Slowly Increasing Steer Test
using a steering pattern that increases by
13.5 degrees per second until a lateral
acceleration of approximately 0.5 g is
obtained. Three repetitions are
performed for each test series. One
series uses counterclockwise steering,
and the other series uses clockwise
steering. The maximum time permitted
between each test run is five minutes.
S7.6.1 From the Slowly Increasing
Steer tests, the quantity ‘‘A’’ is
determined. ‘‘A’’ is the steering wheel
angle in degrees that produces a steady
state lateral acceleration of 0.3 g for the
test vehicle. Utilizing linear regression,
A is calculated, to the nearest 0.1
degrees, from each of the six Slowly
Increasing Steer tests. The absolute
value of the six A’s calculated is
averaged and rounded to the nearest
degree to produce the final quantity, A,
used below.
S7.7 After the quantity A has been
determined, without replacing the tires,
the tire conditioning procedure
described in S7.5 is performed
immediately prior to conducting the
Sine with Dwell Test of S7.9.
S7.8 Check that the ESC system is
enabled by ensuring that the ESC
malfunction and ‘‘ESC Off’’ (if provided)
telltales are not illuminated.
S7.9 Sine with Dwell Test of
Oversteer Intervention and
Responsiveness. The vehicle is
subjected to two series of test runs using
a steering pattern of a sine wave at 0.7
Hz frequency with a 500 ms delay
beginning at the second peak amplitude
as shown in Figure 2 (the Sine with
Dwell tests). One series uses
counterclockwise steering for the first
half cycle, and the other series uses
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clockwise steering for the first half
cycle. The maximum time permitted
between each test run is five minutes.
S7.9.1 The steering motion is
initiated with the vehicle coasting in
high gear at 80 ± 1 km/h (50 ± 1 mph).
S7.9.2 In each series of test runs, the
steering amplitude is increased from run
to run, by 0.5A, provided that no such
run will result in a steering amplitude
greater than that of the final run
specified in S7.9.4.
S7.9.3 The steering amplitude for
the initial run of each series is 1.5A
where A is the steering wheel angle
determined in S7.6.1.
S7.9.4 The steering amplitude of the
final run in each series is the greater of
6.5A or 270 degrees.
S7.9.5 Notwithstanding S7.9.4, the
test is terminated after a run in which
the vehicle does not satisfy S5.2.1 or
S5.2.2.
S7.10 ESC Malfunction Detection.
S7.10.1 Simulate one or more ESC
malfunction(s) by disconnecting the
power source to any ESC component, or
disconnecting any electrical connection
between ESC components. When
simulating an ESC malfunction, the
electrical connections for the telltale
lamp(s) are not to be disconnected.
S7.10.2 With the vehicle stationary
and the ignition locking system in the
‘‘Lock’’ or ‘‘Off’’ position, activate the
ignition locking system to the ‘‘On’’
(‘‘Run’’) position. Verify that within two
minutes of activating the ignition
locking system, the ESC malfunction
indicator illuminates in accordance
with S5.3.
S7.10.3 Deactivate the ignition
locking system to the ‘‘Off’’ or ‘‘Lock’’
position. After a five-minute period,
activate the vehicle’s ignition locking
system to the ‘‘On’’ (‘‘Run’’) position.
Verify that the ESC malfunction
indicator again illuminate to signal a
malfunction and remains illuminated as
long as the ignition locking system is in
the ‘‘On’’ (‘‘Run’’) position.
S7.10.4 Restore the ESC system to
normal operation and verify that the
telltale has extinguished.
S8 Phase-in schedule.
S8.1 Vehicles manufactured on or
after September 1, 2008, and before
September 1, 2009. For vehicles
manufactured on or after September 1,
2008, and before September 1, 2009, the
number of vehicles complying with this
standard must not be less than 30
percent of:
(a) The manufacturer’s average annual
production of vehicles manufactured on
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or after September 1, 2005, and before
September 1, 2008; or
(b) The manufacturer’s production on
or after September 1, 2008, and before
September 1, 2009.
S8.2 Vehicles manufactured on or
after September 1, 2009, and before
September 1, 2010. For vehicles
manufactured on or after September 1,
2009, and before September 1, 2010, the
number of vehicles complying with this
standard must not be less than 60
percent of:
(a) The manufacturer’s average annual
production of vehicles manufactured on
or after September 1, 2006, and before
September 1, 2009; or
(b) The manufacturer’s production on
or after September 1, 2009, and before
September 1, 2010.
S8.3 Vehicles manufactured on or
after September 1, 2010, and before
September 1, 2011. For vehicles
manufactured on or after September 1,
2010, and before September 1, 2011, the
number of vehicles complying with this
standard must not be less than 90
percent of:
(a) The manufacturer’s average annual
production of vehicles manufactured on
or after September 1, 2007, and before
September 1, 2010; or
(b) The manufacturer’s production on
or after September 1, 2010, and before
September 1, 2011.
S8.4 Vehicles manufactured on or
after September 1, 2011. All vehicles
manufactured on or after September 1,
2011 must comply with this standard.
S8.5 Calculation of complying
vehicles.
(a) For purposes of complying with
S8.1, a manufacturer may count a
vehicle if it is certified as complying
with this standard and is manufactured
on or after (date to be inserted that is 60
days after publication date of final rule),
but before September 1, 2009.
(b) For purpose of complying with
S8.2, a manufacturer may count a
vehicle if it:
(1)(i) Is certified as complying with
this standard and is manufactured on or
after (date to be inserted that is 60 days
after date of publication of the final
rule), but before September 1, 2010; and
(ii) Is not counted toward compliance
with S8.1; or
(2) Is manufactured on or after
September 1, 2009, but before
September 1, 2010.
(c) For purposes of complying with
S8.3, a manufacturer may count a
vehicle if it:
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(1)(i) Is certified as complying with
this standard and is manufactured on or
after (date to be inserted that is 60 days
after date of publication of the final
rule), but before September 1, 2011; and
(ii) Is not counted toward compliance
with S8.1 or S8.2; or
(2) Is manufactured on or after
September 1, 2010, but before
September 1, 2011.
S8.6 Vehicles produced by more
than one manufacturer.
S8.6.1 For the purpose of calculating
average annual production of vehicles
for each manufacturer and the number
of vehicles manufactured by each
manufacturer under S8.1 through S8.4,
a vehicle produced by more than one
manufacturer must be attributed to a
single manufacturer as follows, subject
to S8.6.2:
(a) A vehicle that is imported must be
attributed to the importer.
(b) A vehicle manufactured in the
United States by more than one
manufacturer, one of which also
markets the vehicle, must be attributed
to the manufacturer that markets the
vehicle.
S8.6.2 A vehicle produced by more
than one manufacturer must be
attributed to any one of the vehicle’s
manufacturers specified by an express
written contract, reported to the
National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration under 49 CFR Part 585,
between the manufacturer so specified
and the manufacturer to which the
vehicle would otherwise be attributed
under S8.6.1.
S8.7 Small volume manufacturers.
Vehicles manufactured during any of
the three years of the September 1, 2008
through August 31, 2011 phase-in by a
manufacturer that produces fewer than
5,000 vehicles for sale in the United
States during that year are not subject to
the requirements of S8.1, S8.2, S8.3, and
S8.5
S8.8 Final-stage manufacturers and
alterers.
Vehicles that are manufactured in two
or more stages or that are altered (within
the meaning of 49 CFR 567.7) after
having previously been certified in
accordance with Part 567 of this chapter
are not subject to the requirements of
S8.1 through S8.5. Instead, all vehicles
produced by these manufacturers on or
after September 1, 2012 must comply
with this standard.
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Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 180 / Monday, September 18, 2006 / Proposed Rules
PART 585—PHASE-IN REPORTING
REQUIREMENTS
4. The authority citation for part 585
continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 322, 30111, 30115,
30117, and 30166; delegation of authority at
49 CFR 1.50.
5. Subpart I is added to read as
follows:
Sec.
Subpart I—Electronic Stability Control
System Phase-in Reporting Requirements
585.81 Scope.
585.82 Purpose.
585.83 Applicability.
585.84 Definitions.
585.85 Response to inquiries.
585.86 Reporting requirements.
585.87 Records.
585.88 Petition to extend period to file
report.
Subpart I—Electronic Stability Control
System Phase-in Reporting
Requirements
§ 585.81
Scope.
This subpart establishes requirements
for manufacturers of passenger cars,
multipurpose passenger vehicles,
trucks, and buses with a gross vehicle
weight rating of 4,536 kilograms (10,000
pounds) or less to submit a report, and
maintain records related to the report,
concerning the number of such vehicles
that meet the requirements of Standard
No. 126, Electronic stability control
systems (49 CFR 571.126).
§ 585.82
Purpose.
The purpose of these reporting
requirements is to assist the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration
in determining whether a manufacturer
has complied with Standard No. 126 (49
CFR 571.126).
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§ 585.83
Applicability.
This subpart applies to manufacturers
of passenger cars, multipurpose
passenger vehicles, trucks, and buses
with a gross vehicle weight rating of
4,536 kilograms (10,000 pounds) or less.
However, this subpart does not apply to
manufacturers whose production
consists exclusively of vehicles
manufactured in two or more stages,
and vehicles that are altered after
previously having been certified in
accordance with part 567 of this
chapter. In addition, this subpart does
not apply to manufacturers whose
production of motor vehicles for the
United States market is less than 5,000
vehicles in a production year.
§ 585.84
Definitions.
For the purposes of this subpart:
Production year means the 12-month
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period between September 1 of one year
and August 31 of the following year,
inclusive.
§ 585.85
Response to inquiries.
At any time prior to August 31, 2011,
each manufacturer must, upon request
from the Office of Vehicle Safety
Compliance, provide information
identifying the vehicles (by make,
model, and vehicle identification
number) that have been certified as
complying with Standard No. 126 (49
CFR 571.126). The manufacturer’s
designation of a vehicle as a certified
vehicle is irrevocable. Upon request, the
manufacturer also must specify whether
it intends to utilize carry-forward
credits, and the vehicles to which those
credits relate.
§ 585.86
Reporting requirements.
(a) General reporting requirements.
Within 60 days after the end of the
production years ending August 31,
2009, August 31, 2010, and August 31,
2011, each manufacturer must submit a
report to the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration concerning its
compliance with Standard No. 126 (49
CFR 571.126) for its passenger cars,
multipurpose passenger vehicles,
trucks, and buses with a gross vehicle
weight rating of less than 4,536
kilograms (10,000 pounds) produced in
that year. Each report must—
(1) Identify the manufacturer;
(2) State the full name, title, and
address of the official responsible for
preparing the report;
(3) Identify the production year being
reported on;
(4) Contain a statement regarding
whether or not the manufacturer
complied with the requirements of
Standard No. 126 (49 CFR 571.126) for
the period covered by the report and the
basis for that statement;
(5) Provide the information specified
in paragraph (b) of this section;
(6) Be written in the English language;
and
(7) Be submitted to: Administrator,
National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, 400 Seventh Street,
SW., Washington, DC 20590.
(b) Report content.
(1) Basis for statement of compliance.
Each manufacturer must provide the
number of passenger cars, multipurpose
passenger vehicles, trucks, and buses
with a gross vehicle weight rating of
4,536 kilograms (10,000 pounds) or less,
manufactured for sale in the United
States for each of the three previous
production years, or, at the
manufacturer’s option, for the current
production year. A new manufacturer
that has not previously manufactured
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these vehicles for sale in the United
States must report the number of such
vehicles manufactured during the
current production year.
(2) Production. Each manufacturer
must report for the production year for
which the report is filed: The number of
passenger cars, multipurpose passenger
vehicles, trucks, and buses with a gross
vehicle weight rating of 4,536 kilograms
(10,000 pounds) or less that meet
Standard No. 126 (49 CFR 571.126).
(3) Statement regarding compliance.
Each manufacturer must provide a
statement regarding whether or not the
manufacturer complied with the ESC
requirements as applicable to the period
covered by the report, and the basis for
that statement. This statement must
include an explanation concerning the
use of any carry-forward credits.
(4) Vehicles produced by more than
one manufacturer. Each manufacturer
whose reporting of information is
affected by one or more of the express
written contracts permitted by S8.6.2 of
Standard No. 126 (49 CFR 571.126)
must:
(i) Report the existence of each
contract, including the names of all
parties to the contract, and explain how
the contract affects the report being
submitted.
(ii) Report the actual number of
vehicles covered by each contract.
§ 585.87
Records.
Each manufacturer must maintain
records of the Vehicle Identification
Number for each vehicle for which
information is reported under
§ 585.86(b)(2) until December 31, 2013.
§ 585.88
report.
Petition to extend period to file
A manufacturer may petition for
extension of time to submit a report
under this Part. A petition will be
granted only if the petitioner shows
good cause for the extension and if the
extension is consistent with the public
interest. The petition must be received
not later than 15 days before expiration
of the time stated in § 585.86(a). The
filing of a petition does not
automatically extend the time for filing
a report. The petition must be submitted
to: Administrator, National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration, 400
Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC
20590.
Issued: September 7, 2006.
Stephen R. Kratzke,
Associate Administrator for Rulemaking.
[FR Doc. 06–7598 Filed 9–14–06; 10:00 am]
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Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 71, Number 180 (Monday, September 18, 2006)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 54712-54753]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 06-7598]
[[Page 54711]]
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Part II
Department of Transportation
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
49 CFR Parts 571 and 585
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Electronic Stability Control
Systems; Proposed Rule
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 180 / Monday, September 18, 2006 /
Proposed Rules
[[Page 54712]]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
49 CFR Parts 571 and 585
[Docket No. NHTSA-2006-25801]
RIN 2127-AJ77
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Electronic Stability
Control Systems
AGENCY: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), DOT.
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: As part of a comprehensive plan for reducing the serious risk
of rollover crashes and the risk of death and serious injury in those
crashes, this document proposes to establish a new Federal motor
vehicle safety standard (FMVSS) No. 126 to require electronic stability
control (ESC) systems on passenger cars, multipurpose vehicles, trucks
and buses with a gross vehicle weight rating of 4,536 Kg (10,000
pounds) or less. ESC systems use automatic computer-controlled braking
of individual wheels to assist the driver in maintaining control in
critical driving situations in which the vehicle is beginning to lose
directional stability at the rear wheels (spin out) or directional
control at the front wheels (plow out).
Based on our own crash data studies, NHTSA estimates that the
installation of ESC will reduce single-vehicle crashes of passenger
cars by 34 percent and single vehicle crashes of sport utility vehicles
(SUVs) by 59 percent, with a much greater reduction of rollover
crashes.
Preventing single-vehicle loss-of-control crashes is the most
effective way to reduce deaths resulting from rollover crashes. This is
because most loss of control crashes culminate in the vehicle leaving
the roadway, which dramatically increases the probability of a
rollover. NHTSA estimates that ESC has the potential to prevent 71
percent of passenger car rollovers and 84 percent of SUV rollovers in
single-vehicle crashes.
NHTSA estimates that ESC would save 5,300 to 10,300 lives and
prevent 168,000 to 252,000 injuries in all types of crashes annually if
all light vehicles on the road were equipped with ESC systems. ESC
systems would substantially reduce (by 4,200 to 5,400) of the more than
10,000 deaths each year on American roads resulting from rollover
crashes.
About 29 percent of model year (MY) 2006 light vehicles sold in the
U.S. were equipped with ESC, and manufacturers intend to increase the
number of ESC installations in light vehicles to 71 percent by MY 2011.
This rule would require a 100 percent installation rate for ESC by MY
2012 (with exceptions for some vehicles manufactured in stages or by
small volume manufacturers). Of the overall projected annual 5,300 to
10,300 highway deaths and 168,000 to 252,000 injuries prevented, we
would attribute 1,536 to 2,211 prevented fatalities (including 1,161 to
1,445 involving rollover) to this proposed rulemaking, in addition to
the prevention of 50,594 to 69,630 injuries.
DATES: You should submit your comments early enough to ensure that
Docket Management receives them not later than November 17, 2006.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments identified by DOT DMS Docket Number
above by any of the following methods:
Web Site: https://dms.dot.gov. Follow the instructions for
submitting comments on the DOT electronic docket site.
Fax: 1-202-493-2251.
Mail: Docket Management Facility; U.S. Department of
Transportation, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Nassif Building, Room PL-401,
Washington, DC 20590
Hand Delivery: Room PL-401 on the plaza level of the
Nassif Building, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC, between 9
a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal Holidays.
Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to https://
www.regulations.gov. Follow the online instructions for submitting
comments.
Instructions: All submissions must include the agency name and
docket number or Regulatory Identification Number (RIN) for this
rulemaking. For detailed instructions on submitting comments and
additional information on the rulemaking process, see the Public
Participation heading of the Supplementary Information section of this
document. Note that all comments received will be posted without change
to https://dms.dot.gov, including any personal information provided.
Please see the Privacy Act heading under Regulatory Notices.
Docket: For access to the docket to read background documents or
comments received, go to https://dms.dot.gov at any time or to Room PL-
401 on the plaza level of the Nassif Building, 400 Seventh Street, SW.,
Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday,
except Federal Holidays.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For non-legal issues, you may call Mr.
Patrick Boyd, Office of Crash Avoidance Standards at (202) 366-2272.
His FAX number is (202) 366-7002.
For legal issues, you may call Mr. Eric Stas, Office of the Chief
Counsel at (202) 366-2992. His FAX number is (202) 366-3820.
You may send mail to both of these officials at National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC
20590.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Table of Contents
I. Executive Summary
II. Safety Problems Addressed by the Proposed Standard
A. Single-Vehicle Crash and Rollover Statistics
B. The Agency's Comprehensive Response to Rollover
III. Electronic Stability Control Systems
A. How ESC Prevents Loss of Vehicle Control
B. Additional Features of Some ESC Systems
IV. Effectiveness of ESC
A. Human Factors Study on the Effectiveness of ESC
B. Crash Data Studies of ESC Effectiveness
V. Agency Proposal
A. Definition of ESC
B. Performance Test of ESC Oversteer Intervention and Stability
Criteria
C. Responsiveness Criteria
D. Other Issues
1. ESC Off Switches
2. ESC Activation and Malfunction Symbols and Telltale
3. ESC Off Switch Symbol and Telltale
E. Alternatives to the Agency Proposal
VI. Leadtime
VII. Benefits and Costs
A. Summary
B. ESC Benefits
C. ESC Costs
VIII. Public Participation
IX. Regulatory Analyses and Notices
I. Executive Summary
As part of a comprehensive plan for reducing the serious risk of
rollover crashes and the risk of death and serious injury in those
crashes, this rule proposes to establish Federal Motor Vehicle Safety
Standard (FMVSS) No. 126, Electronic Stability Control Systems, which
would require passenger cars, multipurpose passenger vehicles (MPVs),
trucks, and buses that have a gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) of
4,536 kg (10,000 pounds) or less to be equipped with an ESC system that
meets the requirements of the standard. ESC systems use automatic,
computer-controlled braking of individual wheels to assist the driver
in maintaining control (and the vehicle's intended heading) in
situations where the vehicle is beginning to lose directional stability
(e.g., where the driver misjudges the severity of a curve
[[Page 54713]]
or over-corrects in an emergency situation). In such situations (which
occur with considerable frequency), intervention by the ESC system can
assist the driver in preventing the vehicle from leaving the roadway,
thereby preventing fatalities and injuries associated with crashes
involving vehicle rollover or collision with various objects (e.g.,
trees, highway infrastructure, other vehicles).
Based upon current estimates regarding the effectiveness of ESC
systems, we believe that an ESC standard could save thousands of lives
each year, providing potentially the greatest safety benefits produced
by any safety device since the introduction of seat belts. The
following discussion highlights the research and regulatory efforts
that have culminated in the present proposal.
Since the early 1990's, NHTSA has been actively engaged in finding
ways to address the problem of vehicle rollover, because crashes
involving rollover are responsible for a disproportionate number of
fatalities and serious injuries (over 10,000 of the 33,000 fatalities
of vehicle occupants in 2004). Although various options were explored,
the agency ultimately chose to add a rollover resistance component to
its New Car Assessment Program (NCAP) consumer information program in
2001. In response to NCAP's market-based incentives, vehicle
manufacturers made modifications to their product lines to increase
their vehicles' geometric stability and rollover resistance by
utilizing wider track widths (typically associated with passenger cars)
on many of their newer sport utility vehicles (SUVs) and by making
other improvements to truck-based SUVs during major redesigns (e.g.,
introduction of roll stability control). This approach was successful
in terms of reducing the much higher rollover rate of SUVs and other
high-center-of-gravity vehicles, as compared to passenger cars.
However, manipulating vehicle configuration alone cannot entirely
resolve the rollover problem (particularly when consumers continue to
demand vehicles with greater carrying capacity and higher ground
clearance).
Accordingly, the agency began exploring technologies that could
confront the issue of vehicle rollover from a different perspective or
line of inquiry, which led to today's proposal. We believe that our
proposed ESC requirement offers a complementary approach that would
provide substantial benefits to drivers of both passenger cars and LTVs
(light trucks/vans). Undoubtedly, keeping vehicles from leaving the
roadway is the best way to prevent deaths and injuries associated with
rollover, as well as other types of crashes. Based on its crash data
studies, NHTSA estimates that the installation of ESC systems will
reduce single vehicle crashes of passenger cars by 34 percent and
single vehicle crashes of sport utility vehicles (SUVs) by 59 percent.
Its effectiveness is especially great for single-vehicle crashes
resulting in rollover, where ESC systems were estimated to prevent 71
percent of passenger car rollovers and 84 percent of SUV rollovers in
single vehicle crashes (see section VII).
In short, we believe that preventing single-vehicle loss-of-control
crashes is the most effective way to reduce rollover deaths, and we
believe that ESC offers considerable promise in terms of meeting this
important safety objective while maintaining a broad range of vehicle
choice for consumers. In fact, among the agency's ongoing and planned
rulemakings, it is the single most effective way of reducing the total
number of traffic deaths. It is also the most cost-effective of those
rulemakings.
We note that this proposal is consistent with recent congressional
legislation contained in section 10301 of the Safe, Accountable,
Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users of
2005 (SAFETEA-LU).\1\ That provision requires the Secretary of
Transportation to ``establish performance criteria to reduce the
occurrence of rollovers consistent with stability enhancing
technologies'' and to ``issue a proposed rule * * * by October 1, 2006,
and a final rule by April 1, 2009.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Pub. L. 109-59, 119 Stat. 1144 (2005).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The balance of this notice explains in detail: (1) The size of the
safety problem (see section II); (2) how ESC systems would act to
mitigate that safety problem (see section II); (3) the basics of ESC
operation (see section III); (4) findings from ESC-related research
(see section IV);(5) the specifics of our regulatory proposal (see
section V); (6) lead time and phase-in requirements (see section VI),
and (7) costs and benefits associated with this proposal (see section
VII). The following section summarizes the key points of the proposal.
A. Proposed Requirements for ESC Systems
Consistent with the congressional mandate in section 10301 of
SAFETEA-LU, NHTSA is proposing to require all light vehicles to be
equipped with an ESC system with, at the minimum, the capabilities of
current production systems. We believe that a requirement for such ESC
systems would be practicable in terms of both ensuring technological
feasibility and providing the desired safety benefits in a cost-
effective manner. Although vehicle manufacturers have been increasing
the share of the light vehicle fleet equipped with ESC, we believe that
given the relatively high cost of this technology, a mandatory standard
is necessary to maximize the safety benefits associated with electronic
stability control, and is consistent with the mandate arising out of
SAFETEA-LU.
In order to realize these benefits, we have tentatively decided to
require vehicles both to be equipped with an ESC system meeting
definitional requirements and to pass a dynamic test. The definitional
requirements specify the necessary elements of a stability control
system that would be capable of both effective oversteer and understeer
intervention. These requirements are necessary due to the extreme
difficulty in establishing a test adequate to ensure the desired level
of ESC functionality.\2\ The test is necessary to ensure that the ESC
system is robust and meets a level of performance at least comparable
to that of current ESC systems. These requirements are summarized
below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Without an equipment requirement, it would be almost
impossible to devise a single performance test that could not be met
through some action by the manufacturer other than providing an ESC
system. Even a battery of performance tests still might not achieve
our intended results, because although it might necessitate
installation of an ESC system, we expect that it would be unduly
cumbersome for both the agency and the regulated community.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Consistent with the industry consensus definition of ESC
contained in the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) Surface Vehicle
Information Report J2564 (rev. June 2004), we are proposing to require
vehicles covered under the standard to be equipped with an ESC system
that:
(1) Augments vehicle directional stability by applying and
adjusting the vehicle's brakes individually to induce correcting yaw
torques to a vehicle;
(2) Is computer-controlled, with the computer using a closed-loop
algorithm \3\ to limit vehicle oversteer and to limit vehicle
understeer when appropriate;
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ A ``closed-loop algorithm'' is a cycle of operations
followed by a computer that includes automatic adjustments based on
the result of previous operations or other changing conditions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 54714]]
(3) Has a means to determine vehicle yaw rate \4\ and to estimate
its sideslip \5\;
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\4\ ``Yaw rate'' means the rate of change of the vehicle's
heading angle measured in degrees/second of rotation about a
vertical axis through the vehicle's center of gravity.
\5\ ``Sideslip'' means the arctangent of the lateral velocity of
the center of gravity of the vehicle divided by the longitudinal
velocity of the center of gravity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(4) Has a means to monitor driver steering input, and
(5) Is operational over the full speed range of the vehicle (except
below a low-speed threshold where loss of control of the vehicle is
unlikely).
The proposed ESC system as defined above would also be
required to be capable of applying all four brakes individually and to
have an algorithm that utilizes this capability. The system would also
be required to be operational during all phases of driving, including
acceleration, coasting, and deceleration (including braking), and it
would be required to remain operational when the antilock brake system
or traction control system is activated.
We are also proposing to require vehicles covered under
the standard to meet a performance test that would satisfy the
standard's stability criteria and responsiveness criterion when
subjected to the Sine with Dwell steering maneuver test. This test
involves a vehicle coasting at an initial speed of 50 mph while a
steering machine steers the vehicle with a steering wheel pattern as
shown in Figure 2. The test maneuver is then repeated over a series of
increasing maximum steering angles. This test maneuver was selected
over a number of other alternatives, because we tentatively decided
that it has the most optimal set of characteristics, including severity
of the test, repeatability and reproducibility of results, and the
ability to address lateral stability and responsiveness (see section
V.B).
The maneuver is severe enough to produce spinout for most vehicles
without ESC. The stability criteria for the test measure how quickly
the vehicle stops turning after the steering wheel is returned to the
straight-ahead position. A vehicle that continues to turn for an
extended period after the driver steers straight is out of control,
which is what ESC is designed to prevent. The stability criteria are
expressed in terms of the percent of the peak yaw rate after maximum
steering that persists at a period of time after the steering wheel has
been returned to straight ahead. They require that the vehicle yaw rate
decrease to no more than 35 percent of the peak value after one second
and that it continues to drop to no more than 20 percent after 1.75
seconds. Since a vehicle that simply responds very little to steering
commands could meet the stability criteria, a minimum responsiveness
criterion is applied to the same test. It requires that the ESC-
equipped vehicle must move laterally at least 1.83 meters (half a 12
foot lane width) during the first 1.07 seconds after the initiation of
steering (a discontinuity in the steering pattern that is convenient
for timing a measurement).
Because the benefits of the ESC system can only be
realized if the system is functioning properly, we are proposing to
require a telltale be mounted inside the occupant compartment in front
of and in clear view of the driver and be identified by the symbol
shown for ``ESC Malfunction Telltale'' in Table 1 of FMVSS No. 101,
Controls and Displays. The ESC malfunction telltale would be required
to illuminate not more than two minutes after the occurrence of one or
more malfunctions that affect the generation or transmission of control
or response signals in the vehicle's ESC system. Such telltale must
remain continuously illuminated for as long as the malfunction(s)
exists, whenever the ignition locking system is in the ``On'' (``Run'')
position. (Vehicle manufacturers would be permitted to use the ESC
malfunction telltale in a flashing mode to indicate ESC operation.)
In certain circumstances, drivers may have legitimate
reasons to disengage the ESC system or limit its ability to intervene,
such as when the vehicle is stuck in sand/gravel or when the vehicle is
being run on a track for maximum performance. Accordingly, under this
proposal, vehicle manufacturers would be permitted to include a driver-
selectable switch that places the ESC system in a mode in which it
would not satisfy the performance requirements of the standard (e.g.,
``sport'' mode or full-off mode). However, if the vehicle manufacturer
chooses this option, it would be required to ensure that the ESC system
always returns to a mode that satisfies the requirements of the
standard at the initiation of each new ignition cycle, regardless of
the mode the driver had previously selected. The manufacturer would be
required to provide an ``ESC Off'' switch and a telltale that is
mounted inside the occupant compartment in front of and in clear view
of the driver and which is identified by the symbol shown for ``ESC
Off'' in Table 1 of FMVSS No. 101. Such telltale must remain
continuously illuminated for as long as the ESC is in a mode that
renders it unable to meet the performance requirements of the standard,
whenever the ignition locking system is in the ``On'' (``Run'')
position.
We are not proposing to require the ESC system to be
equipped with a roll stability control function (or a separate system
to that effect). Roll stability control systems involve relatively new
technology, and there is currently insufficient data to judge the
efficacy of such systems. However, the agency will continue to monitor
the development of roll stability control systems. Vehicle
manufacturers may supplement the ESC system we are proposing to require
with a roll stability control system/feature.
B. Leadtime and Phase-In
In order to provide the public with what are expected to be the
significant safety benefits of ESC systems as rapidly as possible,
NHTSA is proposing to require all light vehicles covered by this
standard to be equipped with a FMVSS No. 126-compliant ESC system by
September 1, 2011. We are proposing that compliance would commence on
September 1, 2008, which would mark the start of a three-year phase-in
period. Subject to the special provisions discussed below, the proposed
phase-in schedule for FMVSS No. 126 would be as follows: 30 percent of
a vehicle manufacturer's light vehicles manufactured during the period
from September 1, 2008 to August 31, 2009 would be required to comply
with the standard; 60 percent of those manufactured during the period
from September 1, 2009 to August 31, 2010; 90 percent of those
manufactured during the period from September 1, 2010 to August 31,
2011, and all light vehicles thereafter.
In general, we believe that it would be practicable for vehicle
manufacturers to meet the requirements of the phase-in discussed above.
We anticipate that vehicle manufacturers would be able to meet the
requirements of the proposed standard by installing ESC systems
currently in production, and most vehicle lines would likely experience
some level of redesign over the next four to five years, which would
provide an opportunity to incorporate an ESC system during the course
of the manufacturer's normal production cycle (see section VI for a
more complete discussion).
However, NHTSA is proposing to exclude multi-stage manufacturers
and alterers from the requirements of the phase-in and to extend by one
year the time for compliance by those manufacturers (i.e., until
September 1, 2012). This NPRM also proposes to exclude small volume
manufacturers
[[Page 54715]]
(i.e., manufacturers producing less than 5,000 vehicles for sale in the
U.S. market in one year) from the phase-in, instead requiring such
manufacturers to fully comply with the standard on September 1, 2011.
Under our proposal, vehicle manufacturers would be permitted to
earn carry-forward credits for compliant vehicles, produced in excess
of the phase-in requirements, which are manufactured between the
effective date of the final rule and the conclusion of the phase-in
period.\6\
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\6\ We note that carry-forward credits would not be permitted to
be used to defer the mandatory compliance date of September 1, 2011
for all covered vehicles.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
C. Anticipated Impacts of the Proposal
As noted above, we believe that ESC has among the highest life-
saving potential of any vehicle safety device developed in the past
three decades, ranking with seatbelts and air bags in terms of
importance. NHTSA estimates that ESC would save 5,300 to 10,300 lives
and prevent 168,000 to 252,000 injuries in all types of crashes annuvly
if all light vehicles on the road were equipped with ESC systems. A
large portion of these savings would come from rollover crashes. ESC
systems would substantially reduce (by 4,200 to 5,400) of the more than
10,000 deaths each year on American roads resulting from rollover
crashes.
About 29 percent of model year (MY) 2006 light vehicles sold in the
U.S. were equipped with ESC, and manufacturers intend to increase the
number of ESC installations in light vehicles to 71 percent by MY
2011.\7\ This rule would require a 100 percent installation rate for
ESC by MY 2012 (with exceptions for some vehicles manufactured in
stages or by small volume manufacturers). As the discussion below
demonstrates, ESC has very significant life-saving and injury-
preventing potential in absolute terms, but it does so in a very cost-
effective manner vis-a-vis other agency rulemakings. ESC offers
consistently strong benefits and cost-effectiveness across all types of
light vehicles, including passenger cars, SUVs, vans, and pick-up
trucks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ In April 2006, NHTSA sent letters to seven vehicle
manufacturers requesting voluntary submission of information
regarding their planned production of ESC-equipped vehicles for
model years 2007 to 2012. Manufacturers responded with product plans
containing confidential information. These agency letters and
manufacturer responses (with confidential information redacted) may
be found in the docket for this rulemaking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Of the 5,300 to 10,300 highway deaths and 168,000 to 252,000 MAIS
1-5 injuries which we project will be prevented annually for all types
of crashes once all light vehicles on the road are equipped with ESC,
we would attribute 1,536 to 2,211 prevented fatalities (including 1,161
to 1,445 involving rollover) to this proposed rulemaking, in addition
to the prevention of 50,594 to 69,630 injuries. This compares favorably
with the Regulatory Impact Analyses for other important rulemakings
such as FMVSS No. 208 mandatory air bags (1,964 to 3,670 lives saved),
FMVSS No. 214 side impact protection (690 to 1,030 lives saved), and
FMVSS No. 201 upper interior head impact protection (870 to 1,050 lives
saved). (See section VII, Benefits and Costs of this notice and the
Preliminary Regulatory Impact Analysis submitted to the docket for this
rulemaking). In addition, the agency estimates that property damage and
travel delay costs would be reduced by $260 to $453 million annually.
The agency estimates that the production-weighted, average cost per
vehicle to meet the proposed standard's requirements would be $58
($90.3 per passenger car and $29.2 per light truck). These are
incremental costs over the MY 2011 installation of ABS, which is
expected to be installed in almost 93 percent of the light vehicle
fleet, and ESC, which is expected to be installed in 71 percent of the
light vehicle fleet. Vehicle costs are estimated to be $368 (in 2005$)
for anti-lock brakes (ABS) and an additional $111 for ESC, for a total
system cost of $479 per vehicle. Currently, every vehicle that is
equipped with ESC, is also equipped with ABS and traction control.
However, the agency believes that traction control is a convenience
feature. Accordingly, it is not required by this proposal. We also
assumed an annual production of 17 million light vehicles (9 million
light trucks and 8 million passenger cars). Thus, the total annual
vehicle cost of this regulation, corresponding to ESC installation
beyond manufacturers' planned production, is expected to be
approximately $985 million.
In terms of cost-effectiveness, this proposal for passenger cars
and light trucks would save 1,536 to 2,211 lives and prevent 50,594 to
69,630 injuries at a cost of $0.19 to $0.32 million per equivalent life
saved at a 3 percent discount rate and $0.27 to $0.43 at a 7 percent
discount rate. Again, the cost-effectiveness for ESC compares favorably
with the Regulatory Impact Analyses for other important rulemakings
such as FMVSS No. 202 head restraints safety improvement ($2.61 million
per life saved), FMVSS No. 208 center seat shoulder belts ($3.39 to
$5.92 million per life saved), FMVSS No. 208 advanced air bags ($1.9 to
$9.0 million per life saved), and FMVSS No. 301 fuel system integrity
upgrade ($1.96 to $5.13 million per life saved).
We note that the costs for passenger cars are higher because a
greater portion of those vehicles require installation of ABS in
addition to ESC. Nevertheless, the proposal remains highly cost-
effective even when passenger cars are considered alone. The passenger
car portion of the proposal would save 956 lives and prevent 34,902
injuries at a cost of $0.35 million per equivalent life saved at a 3
percent discount rate and $0.47 at a 7 percent discount rate.
Therefore, the agency deemed it appropriate to make the proposed
standard applicable to all light vehicles, because such approach makes
sense from both a safety and cost standpoint.
II. Safety Problems Addressed by the Proposed Standard
Crash data studies conducted in the U.S., Europe and Japan indicate
that ESC is very effective in reducing single-vehicle crashes. Studies
of the behavior of ordinary drivers in critical situations using the
National Advanced Driving Simulator also show a very large reduction in
instances of loss of control when the vehicle is equipped with ESC.
Based on its crash data studies, NHTSA estimates that ESC will reduce
single vehicle crashes of passenger cars by 34 percent and single
vehicle crashes of SUVs by 59 percent. NHTSA's latest crash data study
also shows that ESC is most effective in reducing single-vehicle
crashes that result in rollover. ESC is estimated to prevent 71 percent
of passenger car rollovers and 84 percent of SUV rollovers in single
vehicle crashes. It is also estimated to reduce some multi-vehicle
crashes but at a much lower rate than its effect on single vehicle
crashes.
A. Single-Vehicle Crash and Rollover Statistics
About one in seven light vehicles involved in police-reported
crashes collide with something other than another vehicle. However, the
proportion of these single-vehicle crashes increases steadily with
increasing crash severity, and almost half of serious and fatal
injuries occur in single-vehicle crashes. We can describe the
relationship between crash severity and the number of vehicles involved
in the crash using information from the agency's crash data programs.
We limit our discussion here to light vehicles, which consist of (1)
passenger cars and (2) multipurpose passenger vehicles, trucks and
buses under 4,536
[[Page 54716]]
kilograms (10,000 pounds) gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR).\8\
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\8\ For brevity, we use the term light trucks in this document
to refer to multipurpose passenger vehicles, such as vans, minivans,
and SUVs, trucks and buses under 4,536 kilograms (10,000 pounds)
GVWR.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The 2000-2004 data from the National Automotive Sampling System
(NASS) Crashworthiness Data System (CDS) and 2004 data from the
Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS) were combined to estimate the
current target population for this rulemaking. It includes 28,252
people who were killed as occupants of light vehicles. Over half of
these (15,007) occurred in single-vehicle crashes. Of these, 8,460
occurred in rollovers. About 1.1 million injuries (AIS 1-5) occurred in
crashes that could be affected by ESC, almost 500,000 in single vehicle
crashes (of which almost half were in rollovers). Multi-vehicle crashes
that could be affected by ESC accounted for 13,245 fatalities and
almost 600,000 injuries.
Rollover crashes are complex events that reflect the interaction of
driver, road, vehicle, and environmental factors. We can describe the
relationship between these factors and the risk of rollover using
information from the agency's crash data programs.
According to 2004 data from FARS, 10,555 people were killed as
occupants in light vehicle rollover crashes, which represents 33
percent of all occupants killed that year in crashes. Of those, 8,567
were killed in single-vehicle rollover crashes. Seventy-four percent of
the people who died in single-vehicle rollover crashes were not using a
seat belt, and 61 percent were partially or completely ejected from the
vehicle (including 50 percent who were completely ejected). FARS shows
that 55 percent of light vehicle occupant fatalities in single-vehicle
crashes involved a rollover event.
Using data from the 2000-2004 NASS CDS files, we estimate that
280,000 light vehicles were towed from a police-reported rollover crash
each year (on average), and that 29,000 occupants of these vehicles
were seriously injured. Of these 280,000 light vehicle rollover
crashes, 230,000 were single-vehicle crashes. Sixty-two percent of
those people who suffered a serious injury in a single-vehicle tow-away
rollover crash were not using a seat belt, and 52 percent were
partially or completely ejected (including 41 percent who were
completely ejected). Estimates from NASS CDS indicate that 82 percent
of tow-away rollovers were single-vehicle crashes, and that 88 percent
(202,000) of the single-vehicle rollover crashes occurred after the
vehicle left the roadway. An audit of 1992-96 NASS CDS data showed that
about 95 percent of rollovers in single-vehicle crashes were tripped by
mechanisms such as curbs, soft soil, pot holes, guard rails, and wheel
rims digging into the pavement, rather than by tire/road interface
friction as in the case of untripped rollover events.
B. The Agency's Comprehensive Response to Rollover
As mentioned above, this proposal for ESC is part of the agency's
comprehensive plan to address the issue of vehicle rollover. The
following provides background on NHTSA's comprehensive plan to reduce
rollover crashes. In 2002, the agency formed an Integrated Project Team
(IPT) to examine the rollover problem and make recommendations on how
to reduce rollovers and improve safety when rollovers nevertheless
occur. In June 2003, based on the work of the team, the agency
published a report entitled, ``Initiatives to Address the Mitigation of
Vehicle Rollover.'' \9\ The report recommended improving vehicle
stability, ejection mitigation, roof crush resistance, as well as road
improvement and behavioral strategies aimed at consumer education.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ See Docket Number NHTSA 2003-14622-1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Since then, the agency has been working to implement these
recommendations as part of it comprehensive agency plan for reducing
the serious risk of rollover crashes and the risk of death and serious
injury when rollover crashes do occur. It is evident that the most
effective way to reduce deaths and injuries in rollover crashes is to
prevent the rollover crash from occurring. This proposal to adopt a new
Federal motor vehicle safety standard for electronic stability control
systems is one part of that comprehensive agency plan.
Moreover, we note that the agency also published a notice of
proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register in August 2005, seeking to
upgrade our safety standard on roof crush resistance (FMVSS No. 216);
that notice, like the present one, contains an in-depth discussion of
the rollover problem and the countermeasures which the agency intends
to pursue as part of its comprehensive response to the rollover problem
(see 70 FR 49223 (August 23, 2005)).
III. Electronic Stability Control Systems
Although Electronic Stability Control (ESC) systems are known by
many different trade names such as Vehicle Stability Control (VSC),
Electronic Stability Program (ESP), StabiliTrak and Vehicle Stability
Enhancement (VSE), their function and performance are similar. They are
systems that uses computer control of individual wheel brakes to help
the driver maintain control of the vehicle during extreme maneuvers by
keeping the vehicle headed in the direction the driver is steering even
when the vehicle nears or reaches the limits of road traction.
When a driver attempts an ``extreme maneuver'' (e.g., one initiated
to avoid a crash or due to misjudgment of the severity of a curve), the
driver may lose control if the vehicle responds differently as it nears
the limits of road traction than it does during ordinary driving. The
driver's loss of control can result in either the rear of the vehicle
``spinning out'' or the front of the vehicle ``plowing out.'' As long
as there is sufficient road traction, a highly skilled driver may be
able to maintain control in many extreme maneuvers using
countersteering (i.e., momentarily turning away from the intended
direction) and other techniques. However, average drivers in a panic
situation in which the vehicle beginning to spin out would be unlikely
to countersteer to regain control.
ESC uses automatic braking of individual wheels to adjust the
vehicle's heading if it departs from the direction the driver is
steering. Thus, it prevents the heading from changing too quickly
(spinning out) or not quickly enough (plowing out). Although it cannot
increase the available traction, ESC affords the driver the maximum
possibility of keeping the vehicle under control and on the road in an
emergency maneuver using just the natural reaction of steering in the
intended direction.
Keeping the vehicle on the road prevents single-vehicle crashes,
which are the circumstances that lead to most rollovers. However, if
the speed is simply too great for the available road traction, even a
vehicle with ESC will unavoidably drift off the road (but not spin
out). Furthermore, ESC cannot prevent road departures due to driver
inattention or drowsiness rather than loss of control.
A. How ESC Prevents Loss of Vehicle Control
The following explanation of ESC operation illustrates the basic
principle of yaw stability control, but it does not attempt to explain
advanced refinements of the yaw control strategy described below that
use vehicle sideslip (lateral sliding that may not alter yaw rate) to
optimize performance on slippery pavements.
[[Page 54717]]
An ESC system maintains what is known as ``yaw'' (or heading)
control by determining the driver's intended heading, measuring the
vehicle's actual response, and automatically turning the vehicle if its
response does not match the driver's intention. However, with ESC,
turning is accomplished by applying counter torques from the braking
system rather than from steering input.
Speed and steering angle measurements are used to determine the
driver's intended heading. The vehicle response is measured in terms of
lateral acceleration and yaw rate by onboard sensors. If the vehicle is
responding in a manner corresponding to driver input, the yaw rate will
be in balance with the speed and lateral acceleration.
The concept of ``yaw rate'' can be illustrated by imaging the view
from above of a car following a large circle painted on a parking lot.
One is looking at the top of the roof of the vehicle and seeing the
circle. If the car starts in a heading pointed north and drives half
way around circle, its new heading is south. Its yaw angle has changed
180 degrees. If it takes 10 seconds to go half way around the circle,
the ``yaw rate'' is 180 degrees per 10 seconds or 18 deg/sec. If the
speed stays the same, the car is constantly rotating at a rate of 18
deg/sec around a vertical axis that can be imagined as piercing its
roof. If the speed is doubled, the yaw rate increases to 36 deg/sec.
While driving in a circle, the driver notices that he must hold the
steering wheel tightly to avoid sliding toward the passenger seat. The
bracing force is necessary to overcome the lateral acceleration that is
caused by the car following the curve. The lateral acceleration is also
measured by the ESC system. When the speed is doubled the lateral
acceleration increases by a factor of four if the vehicle follows the
same circle. There is a fixed physical relationship between the car's
speed, the radius of its circular path, and its lateral acceleration.
The ESC system uses this information as follows: Since the ESC
system measures the car's speed and its lateral acceleration, it can
compute the radius of the circle. Since it then has the radius of the
circle and the car's speed, the ESC system can compute the correct yaw
rate for a car following the path. Of course, the system includes a yaw
rate sensor, and it compares the actual measured yaw rate of the car to
that computed for the path the car is following. If the computed and
measured yaw rates begin to diverge as the car that is trying to follow
the circle speeds up, it means the driver is beginning to lose control,
even if the driver cannot yet sense it. Soon, an unassisted vehicle
would have a heading significantly different from the desired path and
would be out of control either by oversteering (spinning out) or
understeering.
When the ESC system detects an imbalance between the measured yaw
rate of a vehicle and the path defined by the vehicle's speed and
lateral acceleration, the ESC system automatically intervenes to turn
the vehicle. The automatic turning of the vehicle is accomplished by
uneven brake application rather than by steering wheel movement. If
only one wheel is braked, the uneven brake force will cause the
vehicle's heading to change. Figure 1 shows the action of ESC using
single wheel braking to correct the onset of oversteering or
understeering. (Please note that all Figures discussed in this preamble
may be found at the end of the preamble, immediately preceding the
proposed regulatory text.)
Oversteering. In Figure 1 (bottom panel), the vehicle has
entered a left curve that is extreme for the speed it is traveling. The
rear of the vehicle begins to slide which would lead to a vehicle
without ESC turning sideways (or ``spinning out'') unless the driver
expertly countersteers. In a vehicle equipped with ESC, the system
immediately detects that the vehicle's heading is changing more quickly
than appropriate for the driver's intended path (i.e., the yaw rate is
too high). It momentarily applies the right front brake to turn the
heading of the vehicle back to the correct path. The action happens
quickly so that the driver does not perceive the need for steering
corrections. Even if the driver brakes because the curve is sharper
than anticipated, the system is still capable of generating uneven
braking if necessary to correct the heading.
Understeering. Figure 1 (top panel) shows a similar
situation faced by a vehicle whose response as it nears the limits of
road traction is to slide at the front (``plowing out'' or
understeering) rather than oversteering. In this situation, the ESC
system rapidly detects that the vehicle's heading is changing less
quickly than appropriate for the driver's intended path (i.e., the yaw
rate is too low). It momentarily applies the left rear brake to turn
the heading of the vehicle back to the correct path.
While Figure 1 may suggest that particular vehicles go out of
control as either vehicles prone to oversteer or vehicles prone to
understeer, it is just as likely that a given vehicle could require
both understeer and oversteer interventions during progressive phases
of a complex avoidance maneuver such as a double lane change.
Although ESC cannot change the tire/road friction conditions the
driver is confronted with in a critical situation, there are clear
reasons to expect it to reduce loss-of-control crashes, as discussed
below.
In vehicles without ESC, the response of the vehicle to steering
inputs changes as the vehicle nears the limits of road traction. All of
the experience of the average driver is in operating the vehicle in its
``linear range'', i.e., the range of lateral acceleration in which a
given steering wheel movement produces a proportional change in the
vehicle's heading. The driver merely turns the wheel the expected
amount to produce the desired heading. Adjustments in heading are easy
to achieve because the vehicle's response is proportional to the
driver's steering input, and there is very little lag time between
input and response. The car is traveling in the direction it is
pointed, and the driver feels in control. However, at lateral
accelerations above about one-half ``g'' on dry pavement for ordinary
vehicles, the relationship between the driver's steering input and the
vehicle's response changes (toward oversteer or understeer), and the
lag time of the vehicle response can lengthen. When a driver encounters
these changes during a panic situation, it adds to the likelihood that
the driver will loose control and crash because the familiar actions
learned by driving in the linear range would not be the correct
steering actions.
However, ordinary linear range driving skills are much more likely
to be adequate for a driver of a vehicle with ESC to avoid loss of
control in a panic situation. By monitoring yaw rate and sideslip, ESC
can intervene early in the impending loss-of-control situation with the
appropriate brake forces necessary to restore yaw stability before the
driver would attempt an over correction or other error. The net effect
of ESC is that the driver's ordinary driving actions learned in linear
range driving are the correct actions to control the vehicle in an
emergency. Also, the vehicle will not change its heading from the
desired path in a way that would induce further panic in a driver
facing a critical situation. Studies using a driving simulator,
discussed in Section IV, demonstrate that ordinary drivers are much
less likely to lose control of a vehicle with ESC when faced with a
critical situation.
Besides allowing drivers to cope with emergency maneuvers and
slippery pavement using only ``linear range'' skills, ESC provides more
powerful
[[Page 54718]]
control interventions than those available to even expert drivers of
non-ESC vehicles. For all practical purposes, the yaw control actions
with non-ESC vehicles are limited to steering. However, as the tires
approach the maximum lateral force sustainable under the available
pavement friction, the yaw moment generated by a given increment of
steering angle is much less than at the low lateral forces occurring in
regular driving.\10\. This means that as the vehicle approaches its
maximum cornering capability, the ability of the steering system to
turn the vehicle is greatly diminished, even in the hands of an expert
driver. ESC creates the yaw moment to turn the vehicle using braking at
an individual wheel rather than the steering system. This intervention
remains powerful even at limits of tire traction because both the
braking force of the individual tire and the reduction of lateral force
that accompanies the braking force act to create the desired yaw
moment. Therefore, ESC can be especially beneficial on slippery
surfaces. While a vehicle's possibility of staying on the road in a
critical maneuver ultimately is limited by the tire/pavement friction,
ESC maximizes an ordinary driver's ability to use the available
friction.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Liebemann et al., (2005) Safety and Performance
Enhancement: The Bosch Electronic Stability Control (ESP), 19th
International Technical Conference on the Enhanced Safety of
Vehicles (ESV), Washington, DC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
B. Additional Features of Some ESC Systems
In addition to the basic operation of ``yaw stability control'',
many ESC systems include additional features. For example, most systems
reduce engine power during intervention to slow the vehicle and give it
a better chance of being able to stay on the intended path after its
heading has been corrected.
Other ESC systems may go further by performing high deceleration
automatic braking at all four wheels. Of course, such braking would be
performed unevenly side to side so that the same net yaw torque or
``turning force'' would be applied to the vehicle as in the basic case
of single-wheel braking.
ESC systems used on vehicles with a high center of gravity (c.g.),
such as SUVs, are often programmed to perform an additional function
known as ``roll stability control.'' Roll stability control (RSC) is a
direct countermeasure for on-pavement rollover crashes of high c.g.
vehicles. Some RSC systems measure the roll angle of the vehicle using
an additional roll rate sensor to determine if the vehicle is in danger
of tipping up. Other systems rely on the existing ESC sensors for
steering angle, speed, and lateral acceleration, along with knowledge
of vehicle-specific characteristics to estimate whether the vehicle is
in danger of tipping up.
Regardless of the method used to detect the risk of tip-up, the
various types of roll stability control intervene in the same way.
Specifically, they intervene by reducing lateral acceleration which is
the cause of the roll motion of the vehicle on its suspension, thus
preventing the possibility of it rolling so much that the inside wheels
may lift off the pavement. The intervention is performed the same way
as the oversteer intervention shown in the Figure 1. The outside front
brake is applied heavily to turn the vehicle toward a path of less
curvature and, therefore, less lateral acceleration.
The difference between a roll stability control intervention and an
oversteer intervention by the ESC system operating in the basic yaw
stability control mode is the triggering circumstance. The oversteer
intervention occurs when the vehicle's excessive yaw rate indicates
that its heading is departing from the driver's intended path, but the
roll stability control intervention occurs when there is a risk the
vehicle could roll over. Thus, the roll stability control intervention
occurs when the vehicle is still following the driver's intended path.
The obvious trade-off of roll stability control is that the vehicle
must depart to some extent from the driver's intended path in order to
reduce the lateral acceleration from the level that could cause tip-up.
If the determination of impending rollover that triggers the roll
stability intervention is very certain, then the possibility of the
vehicle leaving the roadway as a result of the roll stability
intervention represents a lower relative risk to the driver. Obviously,
systems that intervene only when absolutely necessary and then with the
minimum loss of lateral acceleration to prevent rollover are the most
effective. However, roll stability control is a new technology that is
still evolving. Roll stability control is not a subject of this
rulemaking because it is too soon for actual crash statistics to
illuminate its practical effect on crash reduction.
IV. Effectiveness of ESC
Electronic stability control can directly reduce a vehicle's
susceptibility to on-road untripped rollovers as measured by the
``fishhook'' test that is part of NHTSA's NCAP rollover rating program.
The direct effect is mostly limited to untripped rollovers on paved
surfaces. However, untripped on-road rollovers are a relatively
infrequent type of rollover crash. In contrast, the vast majority of
rollover crashes occur when a vehicle runs off the road and strikes a
tripping mechanism such as soft soil, a ditch, a curb or a guardrail.
We expect that requiring ESC to be installed on light trucks and
passenger cars would result in a large reduction in the number of
rollover crashes by greatly reducing the number of single-vehicle
crashes. As noted previously, over 80 percent of rollovers are the
result of a single-vehicle crash. The purpose of ESC is to assist the
driver in keeping the vehicle on the road during impending loss-of-
control situations. In this way, it can prevent the exposure of
vehicles to off-road tripping mechanisms. We note, however, that this
yaw stability function of ESC is not direct ``rollover resistance'' and
cannot be measured by the NCAP rollover resistance rating.
Although ESC is an indirect countermeasure to prevent rollover
crashes, we believe it is the most powerful countermeasure available to
address this serious risk. Effectiveness studies by NHTSA and others
worldwide \11\ estimate that ESC reduces single vehicle crashes by at
least a third in passenger cars and perhaps reduces loss-of-control
crashes (e.g., road departures leading to rollovers) by an even greater
amount. In fact, NHTSA's latest data study that is discussed in this
section found a reduction in single-vehicle crashes leading to rollover
of 71 percent for passenger cars and 84 percent for SUVs. Thus, ESC can
reduce the numbers of rollovers of all vehicles, including lower center
of gravity vehicles (e.g., passenger cars, minivans and two-wheel drive
pickup trucks), as well as of the higher center of gravity vehicle
types (e.g., SUVs and four-wheel drive pickup trucks). ESC can affect
both crashes that would have resulted in rollover as well as other
types of crashes
[[Page 54719]]
(e.g., road departures resulting in impacts) that result in deaths and
injuries.
A. Human Factors Study on the Effectiveness of ESC
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ Aga M, Okada A. (2003) Analysis of Vehicle Stability
Control (VSC)'s Effectiveness from Accident Data, 18th International
Technical Conference on the Enhanced Safety of Vehicles (ESV),
Nagoya.
Dang, J. (2004) Preliminary Results Analyzing Effectiveness of
Electronic Stability Control (ESC) Systems, Report No. DOT HS 809
790. U.S. Dept. of Transportation, Washington, DC.
Farmer, C. (2004) Effect of Electronic Stability Control on
Automobile Crash Risk, Traffic Injury Prevention Vol 5:317-325.
Kreiss J-P, et al. (2005) The Effectiveness of Primary Safety
Features in Passenger Cars in Germany. 19th International Technical
Conference on the Enhanced Safety of Vehicles (ESV), Washington, DC
Lie A., et al. (2005) The Effectiveness of ESC (Electronic
Stability Control) in Reducing Real Life Crashes and Injuries. 19th
International Technical Conference on the Enhanced Safety of
Vehicles (ESV), Washington, DC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A study by the University of Iowa using the National Advanced
Driving Simulator demonstrated the effect of ESC on the ability of
ordinary drivers to maintain control in critical situations.\12\ A
sample of 120 drivers equally divided between men and women and between
three age groups (18-25, 30-40, and 55-65) was subjected to the
following three critical driving scenarios. The ``Incursion Scenario''
forced drivers to attempt a double lane change at high speed (65 mph
speed limit signs) by presenting them first with a vehicle that
suddenly backs into their lane from a driveway and then with another
vehicle driving toward them in the left lane. The ``Curve Departure
Scenario'' presented drivers with a constant radius curve that was
uneventful at the posted speed limit of 65 mph followed by another
curve that appeared to be similar but that had a decreasing radius that
was not evident upon entry. The ``Wind Gust Scenario'' presented
drivers with a sudden lateral wind gust of short duration that pushed
the drivers toward a lane of oncoming traffic. The 120 drivers were
further divided evenly between two vehicles, a SUV and a midsize sedan.
Half the drivers of each vehicle drove with ESC enabled, and half drove
with ESC disabled.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Papelis et al. (2004) Study of ESC Assisted Driver
Performance Using a Driving Simulator, Report No. N04-003-PR,
University of Iowa.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In 50 of the 179 test runs performed in a vehicle without ESC, the
driver lost control. In contrast, in only six of the 179 test runs
performed in a vehicle with ESC, did the driver lose control. One test
run in each ESC status had to be aborted. These results demonstrate an
88 percent reduction in loss-of-control crashes when ESC was engaged.
The study also concluded that the presence of an ESC system helped
reduce loss of control regardless of age or gender, and that the
benefit was substantially the same for the different driver subgroups
in the study. Because of the obvious danger to participants, an
experiment like this cannot be performed safely with real vehicles on
real roads. However, the National Advanced Driver Simulator provides
extraordinary verisimilitude with the driver sitting in a real vehicle,
seeing a 360-degree scene and experiencing the linear and angular
accelerations and sounds that would occur in actual driving of the
specific vehicle.
B. Crash Data Studies of ESC Effectiveness
There have been a number of studies of ESC effectiveness in Europe
and Japan beginning in 2003 \13\. All of them have shown large
potential reductions in single vehicle crashes as a result of ESC.
However, the sample sizes of crashes of vehicles new enough to have ESC
tended to be small in these studies. A preliminary NHTSA study
published in September 2004 \14\ of crash data from 1997-2003 found ESC
to be effective in reducing single-vehicle crashes, including rollover.
Among vehicles in the study, the results suggested that ESC reduced
single vehicle crashes in passenger cars by 35 percent and in SUVs by
67 percent. In October 2004, the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety
(IIHS) released the results of a study of the effectiveness of ESC in
preventing crashes of cars and SUVs. The IIHS found that ESC is most
effective in reducing fatal single-vehicle crashes, reducing such
crashes by 56 percent. NHTSA's later peer-reviewed study \15\ of ESC
effectiveness found that that ESC reduced single vehicle crashes in
passenger cars by 34 percent and in SUVs by 59 percent, and that its
effectiveness was greatest in reducing single vehicle crashes resulting
in rollover (71 percent reduction for passenger cars and an 84 percent
reduction for SUVs). It also found reductions in fatal single-vehicle
crashes and fatal single-vehicle rollover crashes that were
commensurate with the overall crash reductions cited. ESC reduced fatal
single-vehicle crashes in passenger cars by 35 percent and in SUVs by
67 percent and reduced fatal single-vehicle crashes involving rollover
by 69 percent in passenger cars and 88 percent in SUVs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ See Footnote 10.
\14\ Dang, J. (2004) Preliminary Results Analyzing Effectiveness
of Electronic Stability Control (ESC) Systems, Report No. DOT HS 809
790. U.S. Dept. of Transportation, Washington, DC.
\15\ Dang, J. (2006) Statistical Analysis of The Effectiveness
of Electronic Stability Control (ESC) Systems, U.S. Dept. of
Transportation, Washington, DC (publication pending peer review). A
draft version of this report, as supplied to peer reviewers, has
been placed in the docket for this rulemaking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(a) NHTSA's Preliminary Study
In September, 2004, NHTSA issued an evaluation note on the
Preliminary Results Analyzing the Effectiveness of Electronic Stability
Control (ESC) Systems. The study evaluated the effectiveness of ESC in
reducing single vehicle crashes in various domestic and imported cars
and SUVs. It was based on Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS)
data from calendar years 1997-2003 and crash data from five States that
reported partial Vehicle Identification Number (VIN) information in
their data files (Florida, Illinois, Maryland, Missouri, and Utah) from
calendar years 1997-2002. The data were limited to mostly luxury
vehicles because ESC first became available in 1997 in luxury vehicles
such as Mercedes-Benz and BMW. The analysis compared specific make/
models of passenger cars and SUVs with ESC versus earlier versions of
the same make/models, using multi-vehicle crash involvements as a
control group.
The passenger car sample consisted of mainly Mercedes-Benz and BMW
models (61 percent). Mercedes-Benz installed ESC in certain luxury
models in 1997 and had made it standard equipment in all their models
(except one) by 2000. BMW also installed ESC in certain 5, 7, and 8
series models as early as 1997 and had made it standard equipment in
all their models by 2001. The passenger car sample also included some
luxury GM cars, which constituted 23 percent of the sample, and a few
cars from other manufacturers. GM cars where ESC was offered as
standard equipment are the Buick Park Avenue Ultra, the Cadillac
DeVille, Seville STS and SLS, the Oldsmobile Aurora, the Pontiac
Bonneville SSE and SSEi, and the Chevrolet Corvette. The SUV make/
models in the study with ESC include Mercedes-Benz (ML320, ML350,
ML430, ML500, G500, G55 AMG), Toyota (4Runner, Landcruiser), and Lexus
(RX300, LX470).
The first set of analyses used multi-vehicle crash involvements as
a control group, essentially assuming that ESC has no effect on multi-
vehicle crashes. Specific make/models with ESC were compared with
earlier versions of similar make/models using multi-vehicle crash
involvements as a control group, creating 2x2 contingency tables as
shown in Tables 1 and 2. The study found that single vehicle crashes
were reduced by
1 - {(699/1483)/(14090/19444){time} = 35 percent
for passenger cars and by 67 percent for SUVs (Table 1). Similarly,
fatal single vehicle crashes were reduced by 30 percent in cars and by
63 percent in SUVs (Table 2). Reductions of single vehicle crashes in
passenger cars and SUVs were statistically significant at the .01
level, as evidenced by chi-square statistics exceeding 6.64 in each 2x2
contingency table (Table 1). Reductions of fatal single vehicle crashes
are statistically significant at the .01 level in SUVs and at the .05
level in passenger
[[Page 54720]]
cars with chi-square statistic greater than 3.84 (Table 2).
Table 1.--Effectiveness of ESC in Reducing Single Vehicle Crashes in
Passenger Cars and SUVs
[Preliminary Study with 1997-2002 crash data from five States]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Multi-Vehicle
Single Vehicle Crashes
Crashes (control
group)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger Cars:
No ESC....................... 1483................. 19444
ESC.......................... 699.................. 14090
Percent reduction in single 35%.................. ..............
vehicle crashes in passenger
cars with ESC.
Approximate 95 percent 29% to 41%........... ..............
confidence bounds.
Chi-square value............. 84.1................. ..............
SUVs:
No ESC....................... 512.................. 6510
ESC..........