Denial of Motor Vehicle Defect Petition, 164-166 [E5-8151]
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Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 1 / Tuesday, January 3, 2006 / Notices
• Plenary consensus on process to
complete interim DO–294
document update, Working Groups
comment disposition validation,
action items to Working Groups,
etc.
• Break-out sessions for Working
Groups:
• Working Groups (WG) 1 through 5
meet.
• WG–1, PED Characterization,
Garmin Room
• WG–2, Aircraft Path Loss and Test,
with WG–3, Aircraft Susceptibility,
MacIntosh-NBAA Hilton/ATA
Room
• WG–4, Risk Assessment, Mitigation,
and Process, Colson Board Room
• WG–5, Airplane Design and
Certification Guidance, ARINC
Conference Room
• Chairmen’s strategy session with
Work Group Leaders, MacIntoshNBAA and Hilton-ATA Rooms
Process check and readiness review
for DO–294 document update
• February 2:
• Opening Remarks and Process
Check
• Working Groups Report out on
(Disposition of FRAC comments to
DO–294 Interim document update;
Issues identified, with
recommendation to Plenary for
consensus on closure of issues;
Recommendations for Plenary
consensus on document update
final version; Schedule and TOR
compliance assessment; Phase 2
work remaining: work plan and
schedule)
• WG–1 (PEDs characterization, test
and evaluation)
• WG–2 (Aircraft test and analysis)
• WG–3 (Aircraft systems
susceptibility)
• Proposal for assessing aircraft
systems susceptibility to Phase 2
technologies.
• WG–4 (Risk Assessment, Practical
application, and final
documentation)
• Collaboration with EUROCAE
WG58
• WG–5 (Recommended Guidance for
Airplane Design and Certification)
• Plenary consensus on Interim DO–
294 update document
recommendation to publish
• Updates to Phase 2 work statement,
committee structure, work plan and
schedule, including: Plan for access
to material and organization of data
in appendix CD for Phase 2
document Working Groups’
teleconference and meeting
schedule, plan for Phase 2 work
completion
• Closing Session (Other Business,
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Date and Place of Next Meeting
(April 4–6, 2006, Fourteenth
Plenary at RTCA; July 10–14, 2006,
Fifteenth Plenary at RTCA; October
16–20, 2006, Sixteenth and final
Plenary at RTCA, Closing Remarks,
Adjourn)
• Working Groups to complete action
items and complete interim update
DO–294 for recommendation to
PMC to publish
Attendance is open to the interested
public but limited to space availability.
With the approval of the chairmen,
members of the public may present oral
statements at the meeting. Persons
wishing to present statements or obtain
information should contact the person
listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION
CONTACT section. Members of the public
may present a written statement to the
committee at any time.
Issued in Washington, DC, on December
23, 2005.
Natalie Ogletree,
FAA General Engineer, RTCA Advisory
Committee
[FR Doc. 05–24699 Filed 12–30–05; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–13–M
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration
Denial of Motor Vehicle Defect Petition
AGENCY: National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration, (NHTSA),
Department of Transportation.
ACTION: Denial of a petition for a defect
investigation.
SUMMARY: This notice sets forth the
reasons for the denial of a petition
(Defect Petition 05–002) submitted by
Mr. Jordan Ziprin to NHTSA’s Office of
Defects Investigation (ODI), by letter
dated July 8, 2005, under 49 U.S.C.
30162, requesting that the agency
commence a proceeding to determine
the existence of a defect related to motor
vehicle safety within the electronic
throttle control (ETC) system in model
year (MY) 2002 to 2005 Toyota and
Lexus vehicles, or to reopen Preliminary
Evaluation (PE) 04–021 whose subject
was the ETC system on MY 2002 to
2003 Toyota Camry, Solara and Lexus
ES models. In a letter dated August 18,
2005, Mr. Ziprin amended the petition
to include additional allegations of
interrelated brake and acceleration
problems that allegedly result in
inappropriate and uncontrollable
vehicle accelerations in ETC equipped
MY 2002 to 2005 Toyota and Lexus
vehicles.
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Sfmt 4703
After reviewing the material cited by
the petitioner and other information,
NHTSA has concluded that further
expenditure of the agency’s
investigative resources on the issues
raised by the petition is not warranted.
The agency accordingly has denied the
petition.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr.
Scott Yon, Vehicle Control Division,
Office of Defects Investigation, NHTSA,
400 7th Street, SW., Washington, DC
20590. Telephone 202–366–0139.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The
petitioner owns a 2002 Toyota Camry
with V6 engine that he purchased new
in March 2002. On July 5, 2005, at
approximately 8:45 p.m., the petitioner
parked his vehicle in the driveway of a
home near his residence in Phoenix,
Arizona and exited the vehicle. Upon
determining that he was at the wrong
address, he re-entered the vehicle,
started the engine, placed his foot on the
brake pedal and shifted the gear selector
to reverse. The petitioner states that he
was steering clockwise as the vehicle
drifted backwards from the driveway
under its own power. He alleges that
without application of the throttle the
vehicle suddenly accelerated backwards
at a high rate causing a loss of vehicle
control. The vehicle appears to have
moved in a circular path and came to
rest with the driver’s door abutted to a
utility box situated on a concrete pad in
front of the home adjacent to where the
vehicle had been parked. According to
the petitioner, he does not recall if he
applied, or attempted to apply, the
brake pedal during this incident. He
stated, however, that he is sure he
would not have applied the throttle
since no application was necessary for
vehicle movement. Although the exact
distance and path the vehicle traveled
during the incident is unknown, the
vehicle damage 1 and incident site
evidence suggests the vehicle yawed
(rotated about a vertical axis) through a
significant angle to reach its final rest
position; this is consistent with the
petitioner’s statement that the vehicle
accelerated at a high rate and is an
indication that a significant throttle
opening occurred. Additionally, the
petitioner describes another incident 2
that happened in April 2002, within the
first few weeks of his ownership, stating
that he did not report the incident at
that time because he felt that his
unfamiliarity with the vehicle may have
caused an error that lead to the incident.
1 Repair damage for the petitioner’s vehicle from
this incident was estimated at $3,000.
2 The incident occurred while the petitioner was
reversing the vehicle at a gas station local to his
residence.
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Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 1 / Tuesday, January 3, 2006 / Notices
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ODI visited the location of both
incidents and performed an inspection
of the petitioner’s vehicle on October 5,
2005, as described in the December 15,
2005 memo to file.’ 3.
The petitioner has submitted several
letters to ODI 3 that contain further
descriptions of his two incidents,
discussions of his review of related
information including information from
ODI’s complaint and investigation
databases, and lists of Vehicle Owner
Questionnaire (VOQ) numbers (reports)
with comments describing his analysis
of each. In total, ODI recognizes 1,172
distinct VOQ reports that the petitioner
has obtained from ODI’s database,
reviewed and submitted to the agency.4
The reports involve MY 2002 to 2005
Toyota products,5 including 4 Lexus
and 15 Toyota models, defining a
vehicle population of some 7.1 million
vehicles.6
In its analysis of the petitioner’s data,
ODI noted that many of the cited reports
involved complaints related solely to
the brake system. Accordingly, ODI
performed an analysis of the ODI
complaint database for all MY 2002 to
2005 light vehicles for reports coded to
the brake system component category.
With the exception of two products,7
the analysis showed that the vehicles
identified by the petitioner were not
over-represented in the complaint
database. Accordingly, ODI determined
that there was insufficient evidence to
support the existence of a brake systemrelated defect in these vehicles.
Additionally, ODI determined that
many of the products identified by the
petitioner were not manufactured with
ETC systems, but were instead built
with mechanical throttle control
systems (typically cable based). In fact,
for the four MYs cited by the petitioner,
only the Toyota Camry and Lexus ES
models were all manufactured with
ETC. For these reasons, ODI restricted
its analysis to petitioner reports
involving MY 2002 to 2005 Camry,
Solara, and ES models (identified
henceforth as the subject vehicles) that
alleged an abnormal throttle control
3 The documents are available for public review
at ODI’s Web site: https://www-odi.nhtsa.dot.gov.
4 This count does not include reports contained
in correspondence received after November 30,
2005.
5 A ‘‘product’’ is defined as a distinct make, model
and model year vehicle.
6 Vehicle production was estimated from Early
Warning Reporting data submissions.
7 The MY 2004 RX330 was the subject of PE05–
009 and a service action Toyota subsequently
conducted. The MY 2002 Toyota Tundra product
prompted a number of brake disc-borne vibration
complaints that ODI reviewed but did not find to
be sufficient evidence to indicate the existence of
a safety related defect.
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event. There are approximately 1.9
million subject vehicles in this
population.6 The design and operation
of the subject vehicle’s ETC system,
including the diagnostic and safety
control system, is discussed in the
closing report for PE04–021 and in
information Toyota provided during
PE04–021 and this petition.3
For the total of 1,172 reports to which
the petitioner has directed our attention,
and after excluding the reports
discussed above, ODI identified 432 8
unique subject vehicle VOQ reports
involving throttle control concerns
originating from ETC equipped vehicles;
this appears to be a relatively
comprehensive representation of the
ODI complaint database regarding this
issue on the subject vehicles. Generally
speaking, these reports fall into one of
three categories; (1) those that involve
engine management system (EMS)
related driveability concerns, (2) those
that involve throttle control related
concerns where the brake system was
reportedly ineffective, and (3) those that
involve throttle control related concerns
where the effectiveness of the brake
system was unknown or ambiguous.
ODI found that 171 of the 432 reports
(40%) involved driveability concerns.
These reports describe a condition
where the operator intentionally applies
the throttle pedal, in expectation that
the vehicle will accelerate, and then
experiences a delay or hesitation in
vehicle response.9 Complainants allege
the delay lasts from 2 to 5 seconds and
that during that period the operator
further depresses the accelerator; this
results in a greater than anticipated
vehicle response which is disconcerting
to vehicle occupants.10 Many reports
allege that this condition is a safety
problem. ODI has interviewed several
complainants and found that while they
express concern and frustration over the
issue they nevertheless continue to
operate the vehicle on a daily basis. No
crashes, injuries or fatalities have been
alleged to result from this condition,
despite the large subject vehicle
population and years of exposure. These
complaints, which relate to delayed
throttle response, involve vehicle
response to intentional driver
commands. Therefore, ODI does not
consider this concern to be related to
8 There were a total of 468 reports, but duplicates
(from the same complainant) were eliminated.
9 This is contrary to the other throttle control
categories ODI established and to what the
petitioner alleges, i.e., that the accelerator opened
by itself and the vehicle accelerated without driver
input.
10 This issue is the subject of a Toyota technical
service bulletin intended to address the driveability
condition.
PO 00000
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165
the allegations raised by the petitioner
and these reports do not provide
support for the investigation requested
by the petitioner.
Similarly, 93 of the reports (∼20%)
allege throttle control concerns where
the brake was reported by the operator
to be ineffective at controlling vehicle
movement despite brake application,
indicating that, if the reports are
assumed to be correct, simultaneous
failures of the throttle control and brake
systems must have occurred.11 These
incidents, sometimes referred to as
‘‘sudden or unintended acceleration’’
incidents,12 occurred under various
operating conditions and often resulted
in a crash with alleged injuries and or
fatalities. ODI has interviewed 24 of the
complainants 13 and learned that most
vehicles were subsequently inspected
by dealership, manufacturer and or
independent technical personnel who
were unable to discover any evidence of
a failed or malfunctioning vehicle
component or system or any other
vehicle condition that could have
contributed to the incident.14
Additionally, for reports where an
interview was not conducted, many
state that no vehicle-based cause was
ever found in post-incident vehicle
inspections. For these 93 reports, the
complaint rate of 4.9/100k vehicles is
similar to that of the general vehicle
population and is unremarkable.15 The
complaint trend is also constant and
neither increasing or decreasing.
Accordingly, because these reports do
not appear to indicate a distinct safety
defect that would warrant investigation
11 ODI notes that reports of this nature are not
unique to the subject vehicles or to Toyota
products.
12 Sudden or unintended acceleration events have
been the subject of many public and private studies
which generally conclude that, absent any evidence
to support a vehicle-based failure, the unavoidable
explanation is that driver error—the inadvertent
application of the accelerator rather than the
brake—is the cause of the incidents. For further
information regarding sudden and unintended
acceleration events, see DPs 99–004, 03–003 and
03–007 including the Federal Register notices and
the notes and references contained therein.
13 A comprehensive driver interview was used to
ascertain specific detail about each incident. Based
on the results of these interviews, ODI would
caution readers of these complaints regarding
conclusions based solely on the content of the
complaint description.
14 A brake system failure that results in brake loss
is highly likely to be easily detectable after it
occurs.
15 For example, two throttle control investigations
are currently underway. For Engineering Analysis
(EA) 05–014 the complaint rate is 230/100k, for
EA05–021 the rate is 685/100k. One of the more
notable sudden acceleration investigations involved
MY 1978—1987 Audi products; the complaint rate
in this investigation was ∼600/100k. Also, see
complaint rates discussed in the Federal Register
notices associated with Defect Petitions (DP) 03–
003 and 03–007.
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and are factually distinguishable from
the specific facts of petitioner’s case, the
reports do not provide support for the
investigation requested by the
petitioner.
The remaining 168 reports (∼40%) are
similar to those investigated during
PE04–021 and to the situation that
petitioner experienced. These reports
typically describe incidents where a
vehicle equipped with ETC is being
maneuvered at slow speed in a close
quarter situation, such as pulling into or
out of a parking space, at which point
the operator alleges that the vehicle
accelerates without driver input and
crashes.11,16 The crashes are generally
low speed crashes, with minor or no
injuries. In the aftermath, operators are
unsure of whether the brakes were
applied or not, sometimes stating that
there was insufficient time to use the
brake pedal. The common thread in
these reports is that the vehicle
accelerated, a crash occurred, and the
operator believes an uncommanded
acceleration caused it.
Prompted by consumer complaints
and DP04–04, PE04–021 investigated
the ETC system on MY 2002 and 2003
subject vehicles and involved many of
the same VOQ reports identified by the
petitioner. ODI opened the investigation
to determine if the system could be the
cause of complaints alleging the engine
speed increased, or failed to decrease,
when the accelerator pedal was not
depressed. During the course of the
investigation, ODI reviewed VOQ and
manufacturer reports, inspected two
complaint vehicles, reviewed relevant
Toyota technical documentation,
analyzed Toyota’s responses to an
information request letter, conducted a
limited control pedal assessment and
attended a Toyota technical
presentation that included the
assessment of two demonstration
vehicles. The investigation closed in
July, 2004, without the identification of
a defect trend, and with the agency
noting that it would take further action
if warranted.
With regard to the 168 reports
recently identified by the petitioner,
ODI has now interviewed 12 110 of these
168 complainants (65%) including 23 of
the 29 (∼80%) MY 2004 to 2005
complainants. Here again, these
interviews revealed that most vehicles
were subsequently inspected by
dealership, manufacturer and/or
independent technical personnel and no
malfunction or failure explaining these
incidents was identified. Many vehicles
involved in these incidents have been
16 ODI notes that driver error is one plausible
explanation for many of these incidents.
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placed back in service and have
accumulated significant service
experience without any recurrence.17
For these 168 reports, the complaint rate
of 8.8/100k vehicles is comparable to
rates for similar vehicles and the
complaint trend is declining.18 None of
this evidence suggests that a vehiclebased cause may exist. Therefore, the
reports have ambiguous significance
and do not constitute a basis on which
any further investigative action can be
initiated.19
In view of the foregoing, it is unlikely
that NHTSA would issue an order for
the notification and remedy of a safetyrelated defect as alleged by the
petitioner at the conclusion of the
requested investigation. Therefore, in
view of the need to allocate and
prioritize NHTSA’s limited resources to
best accomplish the agency’s safety
mission, the petition is denied. This
action does not constitute a finding by
NHTSA that a safety-related defect does
not exist. The agency will take further
action if warranted by future
circumstances.
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 30162(d); delegations
of authority at CFR 1.50 and 501.8.
Issued on: December 23, 2005.
Daniel C. Smith,
Associate Administrator for Enforcement.
[FR Doc. E5–8151 Filed 12–30–05; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–59–P
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration
[Docket No. NHTSA–2005–20288, Notice 2]
Cross Lander USA; Grant of
Application for a Temporary
Exemption From Federal Motor Vehicle
Safety Standard No. 208
AGENCY: National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration (NHTSA), DOT.
ACTION: Grant of Application for a
Temporary Exemption from S4.2 and
S14 of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety
Standard No. 208.
SUMMARY: This notice grants the Cross
Lander USA (‘‘Cross Lander’’)
application for a temporary exemption
from the requirements of S4.2 and S14
of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety
Standard (FMVSS) No. 208, Occupant
crash protection. The exemption applies
17 This observation does not support the existence
of a vehicle-based causal explanation.
18 This is partially due to the effects of publicity
surrounding PE04–021.
19 For this reason, these reports will not be
reflected in the close resume.
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Sfmt 4703
to the Cross Lander 244X vehicle line.
In accordance with 49 CFR part 555, the
basis for the grant is that compliance
would cause substantial economic
hardship to a manufacturer that has
tried in good faith to comply with the
standard.
DATES: The exemption from S4.2 and
S14 of FMVSS No. 208, Occupant crash
protection, is effective from December 1,
2005 until May 1, 2008.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
George Feygin in the Office of Chief
Counsel, NCC–112, (Phone: 202–366–
2992; Fax 202–366–3820; E-Mail:
George.Feygin@nhtsa.dot.gov).
I. Background
Cross Lander, a Nevada corporation,
owns a Romanian vehicle manufacturer
ARO, S.A., which manufactures
multipurpose passenger vehicles built
for extreme off road conditions.1
According to the petitioner, this vehicle
was formerly used by Romanian
military. Cross Lander intends to import
and distribute this vehicle, named the
Cross Lander 244X (‘‘244X’’), in the
United States. A detailed description of
the 244X is set forth in their petition
(Docket No. NHTSA–2005–20288–1).
For additional information on the 244X,
please go to https://
www.crosslander4x4.com/.
In preparing the 244X for sale in the
United States, Cross Lander anticipated
that the Gross Vehicle Weight Rating
(GVWR) of the 244X would exceed
5,500 pounds, which would exclude the
vehicles from the air bag requirements
specified in S4.2 and S14 of FMVSS No.
208. However, because of an unexpected
change in the choice of engine used in
the 244X, the GVWR of the 244X is less
than 5,500 pounds, and it is thus subject
to the requirements in S4.2 and S14.
Because a heavier vehicle would not
have been subject to the applicable air
bag requirements, the petitioner was not
prepared to equip the 244X with a
suitable air bag system. According to the
petitioner, the cost of making the 244X
compliant with FMVSS No. 208 on
short notice is beyond the company’s
current capabilities. Thus, Cross Lander
requests a three-year exemption in order
to develop a compliant automatic
restraint system.
As described below, the petitioner
seeks a temporary exemption because
despite its good faith efforts, it cannot
bring the 244X into compliance with the
applicable air bag requirements without
1 To view the petition and other supporting
documents, please go to: https://dms.dot.gov/search/
searchFormSimple.cfm (Docket No. NHTSA–2005–
20288).
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]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 71, Number 1 (Tuesday, January 3, 2006)]
[Notices]
[Pages 164-166]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E5-8151]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
Denial of Motor Vehicle Defect Petition
AGENCY: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, (NHTSA),
Department of Transportation.
ACTION: Denial of a petition for a defect investigation.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: This notice sets forth the reasons for the denial of a
petition (Defect Petition 05-002) submitted by Mr. Jordan Ziprin to
NHTSA's Office of Defects Investigation (ODI), by letter dated July 8,
2005, under 49 U.S.C. 30162, requesting that the agency commence a
proceeding to determine the existence of a defect related to motor
vehicle safety within the electronic throttle control (ETC) system in
model year (MY) 2002 to 2005 Toyota and Lexus vehicles, or to reopen
Preliminary Evaluation (PE) 04-021 whose subject was the ETC system on
MY 2002 to 2003 Toyota Camry, Solara and Lexus ES models. In a letter
dated August 18, 2005, Mr. Ziprin amended the petition to include
additional allegations of interrelated brake and acceleration problems
that allegedly result in inappropriate and uncontrollable vehicle
accelerations in ETC equipped MY 2002 to 2005 Toyota and Lexus
vehicles.
After reviewing the material cited by the petitioner and other
information, NHTSA has concluded that further expenditure of the
agency's investigative resources on the issues raised by the petition
is not warranted. The agency accordingly has denied the petition.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. Scott Yon, Vehicle Control
Division, Office of Defects Investigation, NHTSA, 400 7th Street, SW.,
Washington, DC 20590. Telephone 202-366-0139.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The petitioner owns a 2002 Toyota Camry with
V6 engine that he purchased new in March 2002. On July 5, 2005, at
approximately 8:45 p.m., the petitioner parked his vehicle in the
driveway of a home near his residence in Phoenix, Arizona and exited
the vehicle. Upon determining that he was at the wrong address, he re-
entered the vehicle, started the engine, placed his foot on the brake
pedal and shifted the gear selector to reverse. The petitioner states
that he was steering clockwise as the vehicle drifted backwards from
the driveway under its own power. He alleges that without application
of the throttle the vehicle suddenly accelerated backwards at a high
rate causing a loss of vehicle control. The vehicle appears to have
moved in a circular path and came to rest with the driver's door
abutted to a utility box situated on a concrete pad in front of the
home adjacent to where the vehicle had been parked. According to the
petitioner, he does not recall if he applied, or attempted to apply,
the brake pedal during this incident. He stated, however, that he is
sure he would not have applied the throttle since no application was
necessary for vehicle movement. Although the exact distance and path
the vehicle traveled during the incident is unknown, the vehicle damage
\1\ and incident site evidence suggests the vehicle yawed (rotated
about a vertical axis) through a significant angle to reach its final
rest position; this is consistent with the petitioner's statement that
the vehicle accelerated at a high rate and is an indication that a
significant throttle opening occurred. Additionally, the petitioner
describes another incident \2\ that happened in April 2002, within the
first few weeks of his ownership, stating that he did not report the
incident at that time because he felt that his unfamiliarity with the
vehicle may have caused an error that lead to the incident.
[[Page 165]]
ODI visited the location of both incidents and performed an inspection
of the petitioner's vehicle on October 5, 2005, as described in the
December 15, 2005 memo to file.' \3\.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Repair damage for the petitioner's vehicle from this
incident was estimated at $3,000.
\2\ The incident occurred while the petitioner was reversing the
vehicle at a gas station local to his residence.
\3\ The documents are available for public review at ODI's Web
site: https://www-odi.nhtsa.dot.gov.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The petitioner has submitted several letters to ODI \3\ that
contain further descriptions of his two incidents, discussions of his
review of related information including information from ODI's
complaint and investigation databases, and lists of Vehicle Owner
Questionnaire (VOQ) numbers (reports) with comments describing his
analysis of each. In total, ODI recognizes 1,172 distinct VOQ reports
that the petitioner has obtained from ODI's database, reviewed and
submitted to the agency.\4\ The reports involve MY 2002 to 2005 Toyota
products,\5\ including 4 Lexus and 15 Toyota models, defining a vehicle
population of some 7.1 million vehicles.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ This count does not include reports contained in
correspondence received after November 30, 2005.
\5\ A ``product'' is defined as a distinct make, model and model
year vehicle.
\6\ Vehicle production was estimated from Early Warning
Reporting data submissions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In its analysis of the petitioner's data, ODI noted that many of
the cited reports involved complaints related solely to the brake
system. Accordingly, ODI performed an analysis of the ODI complaint
database for all MY 2002 to 2005 light vehicles for reports coded to
the brake system component category. With the exception of two
products,\7\ the analysis showed that the vehicles identified by the
petitioner were not over-represented in the complaint database.
Accordingly, ODI determined that there was insufficient evidence to
support the existence of a brake system-related defect in these
vehicles. Additionally, ODI determined that many of the products
identified by the petitioner were not manufactured with ETC systems,
but were instead built with mechanical throttle control systems
(typically cable based). In fact, for the four MYs cited by the
petitioner, only the Toyota Camry and Lexus ES models were all
manufactured with ETC. For these reasons, ODI restricted its analysis
to petitioner reports involving MY 2002 to 2005 Camry, Solara, and ES
models (identified henceforth as the subject vehicles) that alleged an
abnormal throttle control event. There are approximately 1.9 million
subject vehicles in this population.\6\ The design and operation of the
subject vehicle's ETC system, including the diagnostic and safety
control system, is discussed in the closing report for PE04-021 and in
information Toyota provided during PE04-021 and this petition.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ The MY 2004 RX330 was the subject of PE05-009 and a service
action Toyota subsequently conducted. The MY 2002 Toyota Tundra
product prompted a number of brake disc-borne vibration complaints
that ODI reviewed but did not find to be sufficient evidence to
indicate the existence of a safety related defect.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For the total of 1,172 reports to which the petitioner has directed
our attention, and after excluding the reports discussed above, ODI
identified 432 \8\ unique subject vehicle VOQ reports involving
throttle control concerns originating from ETC equipped vehicles; this
appears to be a relatively comprehensive representation of the ODI
complaint database regarding this issue on the subject vehicles.
Generally speaking, these reports fall into one of three categories;
(1) those that involve engine management system (EMS) related
driveability concerns, (2) those that involve throttle control related
concerns where the brake system was reportedly ineffective, and (3)
those that involve throttle control related concerns where the
effectiveness of the brake system was unknown or ambiguous.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ There were a total of 468 reports, but duplicates (from the
same complainant) were eliminated.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ODI found that 171 of the 432 reports (40%) involved driveability
concerns. These reports describe a condition where the operator
intentionally applies the throttle pedal, in expectation that the
vehicle will accelerate, and then experiences a delay or hesitation in
vehicle response.\9\ Complainants allege the delay lasts from 2 to 5
seconds and that during that period the operator further depresses the
accelerator; this results in a greater than anticipated vehicle
response which is disconcerting to vehicle occupants.\10\ Many reports
allege that this condition is a safety problem. ODI has interviewed
several complainants and found that while they express concern and
frustration over the issue they nevertheless continue to operate the
vehicle on a daily basis. No crashes, injuries or fatalities have been
alleged to result from this condition, despite the large subject
vehicle population and years of exposure. These complaints, which
relate to delayed throttle response, involve vehicle response to
intentional driver commands. Therefore, ODI does not consider this
concern to be related to the allegations raised by the petitioner and
these reports do not provide support for the investigation requested by
the petitioner.
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\9\ This is contrary to the other throttle control categories
ODI established and to what the petitioner alleges, i.e., that the
accelerator opened by itself and the vehicle accelerated without
driver input.
\10\ This issue is the subject of a Toyota technical service
bulletin intended to address the driveability condition.
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Similarly, 93 of the reports (~20%) allege throttle control
concerns where the brake was reported by the operator to be ineffective
at controlling vehicle movement despite brake application, indicating
that, if the reports are assumed to be correct, simultaneous failures
of the throttle control and brake systems must have occurred.\11\ These
incidents, sometimes referred to as ``sudden or unintended
acceleration'' incidents,\12\ occurred under various operating
conditions and often resulted in a crash with alleged injuries and or
fatalities. ODI has interviewed 24 of the complainants \13\ and learned
that most vehicles were subsequently inspected by dealership,
manufacturer and or independent technical personnel who were unable to
discover any evidence of a failed or malfunctioning vehicle component
or system or any other vehicle condition that could have contributed to
the incident.\14\ Additionally, for reports where an interview was not
conducted, many state that no vehicle-based cause was ever found in
post-incident vehicle inspections. For these 93 reports, the complaint
rate of 4.9/100k vehicles is similar to that of the general vehicle
population and is unremarkable.\15\ The complaint trend is also
constant and neither increasing or decreasing. Accordingly, because
these reports do not appear to indicate a distinct safety defect that
would warrant investigation
[[Page 166]]
and are factually distinguishable from the specific facts of
petitioner's case, the reports do not provide support for the
investigation requested by the petitioner.
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\11\ ODI notes that reports of this nature are not unique to the
subject vehicles or to Toyota products.
\12\ Sudden or unintended acceleration events have been the
subject of many public and private studies which generally conclude
that, absent any evidence to support a vehicle-based failure, the
unavoidable explanation is that driver error--the inadvertent
application of the accelerator rather than the brake--is the cause
of the incidents. For further information regarding sudden and
unintended acceleration events, see DPs 99-004, 03-003 and 03-007
including the Federal Register notices and the notes and references
contained therein.
\13\ A comprehensive driver interview was used to ascertain
specific detail about each incident. Based on the results of these
interviews, ODI would caution readers of these complaints regarding
conclusions based solely on the content of the complaint
description.
\14\ A brake system failure that results in brake loss is highly
likely to be easily detectable after it occurs.
\15\ For example, two throttle control investigations are
currently underway. For Engineering Analysis (EA) 05-014 the
complaint rate is 230/100k, for EA05-021 the rate is 685/100k. One
of the more notable sudden acceleration investigations involved MY
1978--1987 Audi products; the complaint rate in this investigation
was ~600/100k. Also, see complaint rates discussed in the Federal
Register notices associated with Defect Petitions (DP) 03-003 and
03-007.
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The remaining 168 reports (~40%) are similar to those investigated
during PE04-021 and to the situation that petitioner experienced. These
reports typically describe incidents where a vehicle equipped with ETC
is being maneuvered at slow speed in a close quarter situation, such as
pulling into or out of a parking space, at which point the operator
alleges that the vehicle accelerates without driver input and
crashes.\11,16\ The crashes are generally low speed crashes, with minor
or no injuries. In the aftermath, operators are unsure of whether the
brakes were applied or not, sometimes stating that there was
insufficient time to use the brake pedal. The common thread in these
reports is that the vehicle accelerated, a crash occurred, and the
operator believes an uncommanded acceleration caused it.
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\16\ ODI notes that driver error is one plausible explanation
for many of these incidents.
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Prompted by consumer complaints and DP04-04, PE04-021 investigated
the ETC system on MY 2002 and 2003 subject vehicles and involved many
of the same VOQ reports identified by the petitioner. ODI opened the
investigation to determine if the system could be the cause of
complaints alleging the engine speed increased, or failed to decrease,
when the accelerator pedal was not depressed. During the course of the
investigation, ODI reviewed VOQ and manufacturer reports, inspected two
complaint vehicles, reviewed relevant Toyota technical documentation,
analyzed Toyota's responses to an information request letter, conducted
a limited control pedal assessment and attended a Toyota technical
presentation that included the assessment of two demonstration
vehicles. The investigation closed in July, 2004, without the
identification of a defect trend, and with the agency noting that it
would take further action if warranted.
With regard to the 168 reports recently identified by the
petitioner, ODI has now interviewed \12\ 110 of these 168 complainants
(65%) including 23 of the 29 (~80%) MY 2004 to 2005 complainants. Here
again, these interviews revealed that most vehicles were subsequently
inspected by dealership, manufacturer and/or independent technical
personnel and no malfunction or failure explaining these incidents was
identified. Many vehicles involved in these incidents have been placed
back in service and have accumulated significant service experience
without any recurrence.\17\ For these 168 reports, the complaint rate
of 8.8/100k vehicles is comparable to rates for similar vehicles and
the complaint trend is declining.\18\ None of this evidence suggests
that a vehicle-based cause may exist. Therefore, the reports have
ambiguous significance and do not constitute a basis on which any
further investigative action can be initiated.\19\
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\17\ This observation does not support the existence of a
vehicle-based causal explanation.
\18\ This is partially due to the effects of publicity
surrounding PE04-021.
\19\ For this reason, these reports will not be reflected in the
close resume.
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In view of the foregoing, it is unlikely that NHTSA would issue an
order for the notification and remedy of a safety-related defect as
alleged by the petitioner at the conclusion of the requested
investigation. Therefore, in view of the need to allocate and
prioritize NHTSA's limited resources to best accomplish the agency's
safety mission, the petition is denied. This action does not constitute
a finding by NHTSA that a safety-related defect does not exist. The
agency will take further action if warranted by future circumstances.
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 30162(d); delegations of authority at CFR
1.50 and 501.8.
Issued on: December 23, 2005.
Daniel C. Smith,
Associate Administrator for Enforcement.
[FR Doc. E5-8151 Filed 12-30-05; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-59-P
