Average Fuel Economy Standards for Light Trucks; Model Years 2008-2011, 51414-51466 [05-17006]
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Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 167 / Tuesday, August 30, 2005 / Proposed Rules
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration
49 CFR Parts 523, 533 and 537
[Docket No. 2005–22223]
RIN 2127–AJ61
Average Fuel Economy Standards for
Light Trucks; Model Years 2008–2011
National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration (NHTSA),
Department of Transportation.
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.
AGENCY:
SUMMARY: This notice proposes to
reform the structure of the corporate
average fuel economy (CAFE) program
for light trucks and proposes to establish
higher CAFE standards for model year
(MY) 2008–2011 light trucks. Reforming
the CAFE program would enable it to
achieve larger fuel savings while
enhancing safety and preventing
adverse economic consequences.
During a transition period of MYs
2008–2010, manufacturers may comply
with CAFE standards established under
the reformed structure (Reformed CAFE)
or with standards established in the
traditional way (Unreformed CAFE).
This will permit manufacturers to gain
experience with the Reformed CAFE
standards. In MY 2011, all
manufacturers would be required to
comply with a Reformed CAFE
standard.
The reform is based on vehicle size.
Under Reformed CAFE, fuel economy
standards are restructured so that they
are based on a measure of vehicle size
called ‘‘footprint,’’ the product of
multiplying a vehicle’s wheelbase by its
track width. Vehicles would be divided
into footprint categories, each
representing a different range of
footprint. A target level of average fuel
economy is proposed for each footprint
category, with smaller footprint light
trucks expected to achieve more fuel
economy and larger ones, less. Each
manufacturer would still be required to
comply with a single overall average
fuel economy level for each model year
of production. A particular
manufacturer’s compliance obligation
for a model year is calculated as the
harmonic average of the fuel economy
targets in each size category, weighted
by the distribution of manufacturer’s
production volumes across the size
categories.
The proposed Unreformed CAFE
standards are: 22.5 miles per gallon
(mpg) for MY 2008, 23.1 mpg for MY
2009, and 23.5 mpg for MY 2010. The
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Reformed CAFE standards for those
model years would be set at levels
intended to ensure that the industrywide costs of the Reformed standards
are roughly equivalent to the industrywide costs of the Unreformed CAFE
standards in those model years. For MY
2011, the Reformed CAFE standard
would be set at the level that maximizes
net benefits, accounting for
unquantified benefits and costs. We
believe that all of the proposed
standards would be set at the maximum
feasible level, while accounting for
technological feasibility, economic
practicability and other relevant factors.
Since a manufacturer’s compliance
obligation for a model year under
Reformed CAFE depends in part on its
actual production in that model year,
the obligation cannot be calculated with
absolute precision until the final
production figures for that model year
become known. However, a
manufacturer could calculate its
obligation with a reasonably high degree
of accuracy in advance of that model
year, based on its product plans for the
year. Prior to and during the model year,
the manufacturer would be able to track
all of the key variables in the formula
used for calculating the obligation (e.g.,
distribution of production among the
categories and vehicle fuel economy).
This notice publishes estimates of the
compliance obligations, by
manufacturer, for MYs 2008–2011 under
Reformed CAFE, using the fuel economy
targets proposed by NHTSA and the
product plans submitted to NHTSA by
the manufacturers in response to a
request for product plans published in
December 2003.
This rulemaking is mandated by the
Energy Policy and Conservation Act
(EPCA), which was enacted in the
aftermath of the energy crisis created by
the oil embargo of 1973–74. The
concerns about energy security and the
effects of energy prices and supply on
national economic well-being that led to
the enactment of EPCA remain alive
today. Sustained growth in the demand
for oil worldwide, coupled with tight
crude oil supplies, is the driving force
behind the sharp price increases seen
over the past several years. Increasingly,
the oil consumed in the U.S. originates
in countries with political and
economic situations that raise concerns
about future oil supply and prices.
We recognize that financial
difficulties currently exist in the motor
vehicle industry and that a substantial
number of job losses have been
announced recently at large full-line
manufacturers. Accordingly, we have
carefully balanced the cost of the rule
with the benefits of conservation. We
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believe that, compared to Unreformed
CAFE, Reformed CAFE would enhance
overall fuel savings while providing
vehicle makers the flexibility they need
to respond to changing market
conditions. Reformed CAFE would also
provide a more equitable regulatory
framework by creating a level-playing
field for manufacturers, regardless of
whether they are full-line or limited-line
manufacturers. We are particularly
encouraged that Reformed CAFE would
reduce the adverse safety risks
generated by the Unreformed CAFE
program. The transition from the
Unreformed to the Reformed system
would begin soon, but ample lead time
is provided before Reformed CAFE takes
full effect in MY 2011.
We recognize also that our proposals
were derived from analyses of
information from a variety of sources,
including the product plans submitted
by the manufacturers in early 2004. We
fully anticipate that the manufacturers
will respond to this proposal by
providing revised plans that reflect
events since then. We will evaluate the
revised plans, the public comments, and
other information and analysis in
selecting the most appropriate standards
for MYs 2008–2011.
DATES: Comments must be received on
or before November 22, 2005. We have
provided more than the normal 60-day
comment period because of the
complexity of this rulemaking.
However, because of that complexity,
the necessity for ensuring sufficient
time for careful analysis of the public
comments and other available
information, and for meeting the April
1, 2006 statutory deadline for issuing a
final rule on the CAFE standard for MY
2008, extensions of the comment due
date will not be possible. To ensure the
agency’s consideration of their
comments, the public should submit
them to the agency not later than the
comment due date.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments
by any of the following methods:
• Web site: https://dms.dot.gov.
Follow the instructions for submitting
comments on the DOT electronic docket
site.
• Fax: 1–202–493–2251.
• Mail: Docket Management Facility;
U.S. Department of Transportation, 400
Seventh Street, SW., Nassif Building,
Room PL–401, Washington, DC 20590–
001.
• Hand Delivery: Room PL–401 on
the plaza level of the Nassif Building,
400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington,
DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday
through Friday, except Federal
Holidays.
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• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to
https://www.regulations.gov. Follow the
online instructions for submitting
comments.
Instructions: All submissions must
include the agency name and docket
number or Regulatory Identification
Number (RIN) for this rulemaking. For
detailed instructions on submitting
comments and additional information
on the rulemaking process, see the
Request for Comments heading of the
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of
this document. Note that all comments
received will be posted without change
to https://dms.dot.gov, including any
personal information provided. Please
see the Privacy Act heading under
Rulemaking Analyses and Notices.
Docket: For access to the docket to
read background documents or
comments received, go to https://
dms.dot.gov at any time or to Room PL–
401 on the plaza level of the Nassif
Building, 400 Seventh Street, SW.,
Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5
p.m., Monday through Friday, except
Federal holidays.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For
technical issues, call Ken Katz, Lead
Engineer, Fuel Economy Division,
Office of International Policy, Fuel
Economy, and Consumer Programs, at
(202) 366–0846, facsimile (202) 493–
2290, electronic mail
kkatz@nhtsa.dot.gov. For legal issues,
call Stephen Wood or Christopher
Calamita of the Office of the Chief
Counsel, at (202) 366–2992, or e-mail
them at swood@nhtsa.dot.gov or
ccalamita@nhtsa.dot.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Table of Contents
I. Executive summary
A. Our proposal
B. Energy demand and supply and the
value of conservation
II. Background
A. 1974 DOT/EPA report to Congress on
potential for motor vehicle fuel economy
improvements
B. Energy Policy and Conservation Act of
1975
C. 1979–2002 light truck standards
D. 2001 National Energy Policy
E. 2002 NAS study of CAFE reform
F. 2002 request for comments on NAS
study
G. 2003 final rule establishing MY 2005–
2007 light truck standards
H. 2003 comprehensive plans for
addressing vehicle rollover and
compatibility
I. 2003 ANPRM
1. Need for reform
2. Reform options
J. Recent developments
1. Factors underscoring need for reform
2. Reports updating fuel economy potential
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III. The Unreformed CAFE proposal for MYs
2008–2010
A. Baseline for determining manufacturer
capabilities in MYs 2008–2010
1. General Motors
2. Ford
3. DaimlerChrysler
4. Other manufacturers
B. Selection of proposed Unreformed CAFE
standards—process for determining
maximum feasible levels
C. Technologically feasible additions to
baseline
D. Economic practicability and other
economic issues
1. Costs
2. Benefits
3. Comparison of estimated costs to
estimated benefits
4. Uncertainty
IV. The Reformed CAFE proposal for MYs
2008–2011
A. Proposed approach to reform
1. Establishment of footprint categories
2. Targets
a. Overview of target selection process
b. Industry-wide considerations in
selecting the targets
c. Relative position of the targets
d. Level of the targets
3. Standards and required CAFE levels for
individual manufacturers
4. Why this approach to reform and not
another?
a. Step-function vs. continuous function
b. Categories and targets vs. classes and
standards
c. Footprint vs. shadow or weight
d. Reformed standard vs. Reformed
standard plus backstop
5. Benefits of reform
a. Increased energy savings
b. Reduced incentive to respond to the
CAFE program in ways harmful to safety
i. Reduces incentive to offer smaller
vehicles and to reduce vehicle size
ii. Effectively reduces the difference
between car and light truck CAFE
standards
c. More equitable regulatory framework
d. More responsive to market changes
B. Authority for proposed reform
C. Comparison of estimated costs to
estimated benefits
1. Costs
2. Benefits
3. Uncertainty
D. Proposed standards
V. Implementation of options
A. Choosing the Reformed or Unreformed
CAFE system
B. Application of credits between
compliance options
VII. Impact of other Federal Motor Vehicle
Standards
A. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards
1. FMVSS 138, tire pressure monitoring
system
2. FMVSS 202, head restraints
3. FMVSS 208, occupant crash protection
4. FMVSS 214, side impact protection
5. FMVSS 301, fuel system integrity
6. Cumulative weight impacts of the
FMVSSs
B. Federal Motor Vehicle Emissions
Standards
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1. Tier 2 requirements
2. Onboard vapor recovery
3. California Air Resources Board LEV II
C. Impacts on manufacturers’ baselines
VIII. Need for nation to conserve energy
IX. Applicability of the CAFE standards
A. MDPVs
B. ‘‘Flat-floor’’ provision
X. Rulemaking analyses and notices
A. Executive Order 12866 and DOT
Regulatory Policies and Procedures
B. National Environmental Policy Act
C. Regulatory Flexibility Act
D. Executive Order 13132 Federalism
E. Executive Order 12988 (Civil Justice
Reform)
F. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
G. Paperwork Reduction Act
H. Regulation Identifier Number (RIN)
I. Executive Order 13045
J. National Technology Transfer and
Advancement Act
K. Executive Order 13211
L. Department of Energy review
M. Plain language
N. Privacy Act
XI. Comments
I. Executive Summary
A. Our Proposal
This proposal is part of a continuing
effort by the Department of
Transportation to reform the structure of
the CAFE regulatory program so that it
achieves higher fuel savings while
enhancing safety and preventing
adverse economic consequences. We
have previously set forth our concerns
about the way in which the current
CAFE program operates and sought
comment on approaches to reforming
the CAFE program. We have also
previously increased light truck CAFE
standards, from the ‘‘frozen’’ level of
20.7 mpg applicable from MY 1996
through MY 2004, to a level of 22.2 mpg
applicable to MY 2007. In adopting
those increased standards, we noted that
we were limited in our ability to make
further increases without reforming the
program.
This notice proposes to reform the
structure of the CAFE program for light
trucks based on vehicle size and
proposes to establish higher CAFE
standards for MY 2008–2011 light
trucks. Reforming the CAFE program
would enable it to achieve larger fuel
savings while enhancing safety and
preventing adverse economic
consequences.
During a transition period of MYs
2008–2010, manufacturers may comply
with CAFE standards established under
the reformed structure (Reformed CAFE)
or with standards established in the
traditional way (Unreformed CAFE).
This will permit manufacturers to gain
experience with the Reformed CAFE
standards. The Reformed CAFE
standards for those model years would
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be set at levels intended to ensure that
the industry-wide cost of those
standards are roughly equivalent to the
industry-wide cost of the Unreformed
CAFE standards for those model years.
The additional leadtime provided by the
transition period would aid, for
example, those manufacturers that
would, for the first time, face a binding
CAFE constraint and be required to
make fuel economy improvements
beyond those that they planned on their
own to make.
In MY 2011, all manufacturers would
be required to comply with a Reformed
CAFE standard. The Reformed CAFE
standard for that model year would be
set at the level that maximizes net
benefits.
The Unreformed standards for MYs
2008–2010 are set with particular regard
to the capabilities of and impacts on the
‘‘least capable’’ full line manufacturer
(i.e., one that produces a wide variety of
types and sizes of vehicles) with a
significant share of the market. A single
CAFE level, applicable to each
manufacturer, is established for each
model year.
The Unreformed CAFE standards for
MYs 2008–2010 would be:
MY 2008: 22.5 mpg
MY 2009: 23.1 mpg
MY 2010: 23.5 mpg
We estimate that these standards
could save 5.4 billion gallons of fuel
over the lifetime of the vehicles sold
during those model years, compared to
the savings that would occur if the
standards remained at the MY 2007
level of 22.2 mpg.
The Reformed CAFE approach to
establishing light truck CAFE standards
has the potential of providing even
greater fuel savings. Under Reformed
CAFE, each manufacturer’s required
level of CAFE would be based on target
levels of average fuel economy set for
vehicles of various size categories. The
categories would be defined by vehicle
‘‘footprint’’—the product of the average
track width (the distance between the
centerline of the tires on the same axle)
and wheelbase (basically, the distance
between the centers of the axles). The
target values would reflect the
technological and economic capabilities
of the industry within each of the
footprint categories. The target for a
given size category would be the same
for all manufacturers, regardless of
differences in their overall fleet mix.
Compliance would be determined by
comparing a manufacturer’s
harmonically averaged fleet fuel
economy in a model year with a
required fuel economy level calculated
using the manufacturer’s actual
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production levels and the category
targets.
The range of targets for each model
year would be as follows:
MY 2008: From 26.8 mpg for the
smallest vehicles to 20.4 mpg for the
largest;
MY 2009: From 27.4 mpg for the
smallest vehicles to 21.0 mpg for the
largest;
MY 2010: From 27.8 mpg for the
smallest vehicles to 20.8 mpg for the
largest;
MY 2011: From 28.4 mpg for the
smallest vehicles to 21.3 mpg for the
largest.
The standards based on these targets
would save approximately 10.0 billion
gallons of fuel over the lifetime of the
vehicles sold during those four model
years, compared to the savings that
would occur if the standards remained
at the MY 2007 level of 22.2 mpg. The
Reformed standards for MYs 2008–2010
would save 650 million more gallons of
fuel than the Unreformed standards for
those years. As noted above, the
Reformed standard for MY 2011 would
be the first Reformed standard set at the
level that maximizes net benefits. It
would save an additional 4.1 billion
gallons of fuel.
If all manufacturers complied with
the Reformed CAFE standards, the total
costs would be approximately $6.2
billion for MYs 2008–2011, compared to
the costs they would incur if the
standards remained at the MY 2007
level of 22.2 mpg. The resulting vehicle
price increases to buyers of MY 2008
light trucks would be paid back1 in
1 The payback period represents the length of
time required for a vehicle buyer to recoup the
higher cost of purchasing a more fuel-efficient
vehicle through savings in fuel use. When a more
stringent CAFE standard requires a manufacturer to
improve the fuel economy of some of its vehicle
models, the manufacturer’s added costs for doing so
are reflected in higher prices for these models.
While buyers of these models pay higher prices to
purchase these vehicles, their improved fuel
economy lowers their owners’ costs for purchasing
fuel to operate them. Over time, buyers thus recoup
the higher purchase prices they pay for these
vehicles in the form of savings in outlays for fuel.
The length of time required to repay the higher cost
of buying a more fuel-efficient vehicle is referred to
as the buyer’s ‘‘payback period.’’
The length of this payback period depends on the
initial increase in a vehicle’s purchase price, the
improvement in its fuel economy, the number of
miles it is driven each year, and the retail price of
fuel. We calculated payback periods using the fuel
economy improvement and average price increase
for each manufacturer’s vehicles estimated to result
from the proposed standard, the U.S. Energy
Information Administration’s forecast of future
retail gasoline prices, and estimates of the number
of miles light trucks are driven each year as they
age developed from U.S. Department of
Transportation data. Energy Information
Administration, Annual Energy Outlook 2005 (AEO
2005), Table 100, https://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/
supplement/; and U.S. Department of
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additional fuel savings in an average of
37 months and to buyers of MY 2011
light trucks in an average of 47 months,
assuming fuel prices ranging from $1.51
to $1.58 per gallon.2 We estimate that
the total benefits under the Unreformed
CAFE standards for MYs 2008–2010
plus the Reformed CAFE standard for
MY 2011 would be approximately $7.0
billion, and under the Reformed CAFE
standards for MYs 2008–2011 would be
approximately $7.5 billion.
We have tentatively determined that
the proposed standards under both
Unreformed CAFE and Reformed CAFE
represent the maximum feasible fuel
economy level for each system. In
reaching this conclusion, we have
balanced the express statutory factors
and other relevant considerations, such
as safety concerns, effects on
employment and the need for flexibility
to transition to a Reformed CAFE
program that can achieve greater fuel
savings in a more economically efficient
way.
The Reformed CAFE approach
incorporates several important elements
of reform suggested by the National
Academy of Sciences in its 2002 report
(Effectiveness and Impact of Corporate
Average Fuel Economy (CAFE)
Standards). The agency believes that the
Reformed CAFE approach has four basic
advantages over the Unreformed CAFE
approach.
First, Reformed CAFE will enlarge
energy savings. The energy-saving
potential of Unreformed CAFE is
limited because only a few full-line
manufacturers are required to make
improvements. In effect, the capabilities
of these full-line manufacturers, whose
offerings include larger and heavier
light trucks, constrain the stringency of
the uniform, industry-wide standard. As
a result, the Unreformed CAFE standard
is generally set below the capabilities of
limited-line manufacturers, who sell
predominantly lighter and smaller light
trucks. Under Reformed CAFE, which
accounts for size differences in product
mix, virtually all light-truck
manufacturers would be required to
improve the fuel economy of their
vehicles. Thus, Reformed CAFE will
continue to require full-line
manufacturers to improve the overall
fuel economy of their fleets, while also
Transportation, 2001 National Household Travel
Survey, https://nhts.ornl.gov/2001/index.shtml.
Under these assumptions, payback periods ranged
from as short as 22 months to as long as 48 months,
averaging 35 months for the seven largest
manufacturers of light trucks.
2 The fuel prices used to calculate the length of
the payback periods are those expected over the life
of the MY 2008–2011 light trucks, not the current
fuel prices. Those future fuel prices were obtained
from the AEO 2005.
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requiring limited-line manufacturers to
enhance the fuel economy of the
vehicles they sell.
Second, Reformed CAFE will offer
enhanced safety. The vehicle
manufacturers constrained by
Unreformed CAFE standards are
encouraged to pursue the following
compliance strategies that entail safety
risks: downsizing of vehicles, design of
some vehicles to permit classification as
‘‘light trucks’’ for CAFE purposes, and
offering smaller and lighter vehicles to
offset sales of larger and heavier
vehicles. The adverse safety effects of
downsizing and downweighting have
already been documented in the CAFE
program for passenger cars. When a
manufacturer designs a vehicle to
permit its classification as a light truck,
it may increase the vehicle’s propensity
to roll over.
Reformed CAFE is designed to lessen
each of these safety risks. Downsizing of
vehicles is discouraged under Reformed
CAFE since smaller vehicles are
expected to achieve greater fuel
economy. Moreover, Reformed CAFE
lessens the incentive to design smaller
vehicles to achieve a ‘‘light truck’’
classification, since small light trucks
would be regulated at roughly the same
degree of stringency as passenger cars.
Third, Reformed CAFE provides a
more equitable regulatory framework for
different vehicle manufacturers. Under
Unreformed CAFE, the cost burdens and
compliance difficulties have been
imposed primarily on the full-line
manufacturers who have large sales
volumes at the larger and heavier end of
the light-truck fleet. Reformed CAFE
spreads the regulatory cost burden for
fuel economy more broadly across
vehicle manufacturers within the
industry.
Fourth, Reformed CAFE is more
market-oriented because it more fully
respects economic conditions and
consumer choice. Reformed CAFE does
not force vehicle manufacturers to
adjust fleet mix toward smaller vehicles
unless that is what consumers are
demanding. As the industry’s sales
volume and mix changes in response to
economic conditions (e.g., gasoline
prices and household income) and
consumer preferences (e.g., desire for
seating capacity or hauling capability),
the level of CAFE required of
manufacturers under Reformed CAFE
will, at least partially, adjust
automatically to these changes.
Accordingly, Reformed CAFE may
reduce the need for the agency to revisit
previously established standards in light
of changed market conditions, a difficult
process that undermines regulatory
certainty for the industry. In the mid-
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1980’s, for example, the agency relaxed
several Unreformed CAFE standards
because fuel prices fell more than had
been expected when those standards
were established and, as a result,
consumer demand for small vehicles
with high fuel economy did not
materialize as expected. By moving to a
more market-oriented system, the
agency may also be able to pursue more
multi-year rulemakings that span larger
time frames than the agency has
attempted in the past.
The agency is also issuing, along with
this notice, a notice requesting updated
product plan information and other data
to assist in developing a final rule. We
recognize that the manufacturer product
plans relied upon in developing this
proposal—those plans received in early
2004 in response to a 2003 request for
information—may already be outdated
in some respects. We fully expect that
manufacturers have revised those plans
to reflect subsequent developments.
We solicit comment on all aspects of
this proposal. In particular, we solicit
comment on (1) whether the proposed
levels of maximum feasible CAFE reflect
an appropriate balancing of the explicit
statutory factors and other relevant
factors, (2) whether CAFE reform should
be designed based on size categories or
as a continuous function, (3) whether
the reform should be based on a single
size attribute or whether adjustments
should also be made for attributes such
as towing capability and cargo hauling
capability, and (4) whether the threeyear transition period is necessary or
whether it can be reduced to achieve a
more rapid transition to the Reformed
CAFE system. Other specific areas
where we request comments are
identified elsewhere in this preamble
and in the Preliminary Regulatory
Impact Analysis (PRIA). Based on
public comments and other information,
including new data and analysis, and
updated product plans, the standards
adopted in the final rule could well be
different.
B. Energy demand and supply and the
value of conservation
Many of the concerns about energy
security and the effects of energy prices
and supply on national economic wellbeing that led to the enactment of EPCA
in 1975 persist today.3 The demand for
oil is steadily growing in the U.S. and
around the world. By 2025, U.S.
demand for oil is expected to increase
40 percent and world oil demand is
expected to increase by nearly 60
3 The sources of the figures in this section can be
found below in section VIII, ‘‘Need for Nation to
conserve energy.’’
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percent. Most of these increases would
occur in the transportation sector. To
meet this projected increase in world
demand, worldwide productive capacity
would have to increase by more than 44
million barrels per day over current
levels. OPEC producers are expected to
supply nearly 60 percent of the
increased production. By 2025, nearly
70 percent of the oil consumed in the
U.S. would be imported oil. Strong
growth in the demand for oil
worldwide, coupled with tight crude oil
supplies, is the driving force behind the
sharp price increases seen over the past
four years. Increasingly, the oil
consumed in the U.S. originates in
countries with political and economic
situations that raise concerns about
future oil supply and prices.
Energy is an essential input to the
U.S. economy and having a strong
economy is essential to maintaining and
strengthening our national security.
Conserving energy, especially reducing
the nation’s dependence on petroleum,
benefits the U.S. in several ways.
Reducing total petroleum use decreases
our economy’s vulnerability to oil price
shocks. Reducing dependence on oil
imports from regions with uncertain
conditions enhances our energy security
and can reduce the flow of oil profits to
certain states now hostile to the U.S.
Reducing the growth rate of oil use will
help relieve pressures on already
strained domestic refinery capacity,
decreasing the likelihood of future
product price volatility.
II. Background
A. 1974 DOT/EPA report to Congress on
potential for motor vehicle fuel economy
improvements
In 1974, the Department of
Transportation (DOT) and
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
submitted to Congress a report entitled
‘‘Potential for Motor Vehicle Fuel
Economy Improvement’’ (1974 Report).4
This report was prepared in compliance
with Section 10 of the Energy Supply
and Environmental Coordination Act of
1974, Public Law 93–319 (the Act). The
Act directed EPA and DOT to report on
the practicability of a productionweighted fuel economy improvement
standard of 20 percent for new motor
vehicles in the 1980 time frame. As
required by Section 10 of the Act, the
report included an assessment of the
technological challenges of meeting any
such standard, including lead times
involved, the test procedures required to
determine compliance, the economic
4 The 1974 report is available in the docket for
this rulemaking.
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costs and benefits, the enforcement
means, the effect on energy and other
resources, and the relationship of safety
and emission standards to CAFE.
In the 1974 Report, DOT/EPA said
that performance standards regulating
fuel economy could take either of two
modes: A production-weighted average
standard for each manufacturer’s entire
fleet of vehicles or a fuel economy
standard tailored to individual classes
of vehicles. They identified three forms
that a production-weighted standard
could take:
• A common standard (e.g., 16.8 mpg
for all manufacturers);
• A standard stated as a uniform per
cent improvement (e.g., 20%
improvement for each manufacturer); or
• A variable standard based on the
costs or potential to improve for each
manufacturer.
(1974 Report, p. 77)
As to standards for individual classes,
they identified two different forms:
• A standard stated as uniform
quantity of improvement (e.g., 2.8 mpg
for all classes); or
• A variable standard based on the
potential to improve each class.
(1974 Report, p. 77–78)
DOT/EPA concluded in the 1974
Report that a production-weighted
standard establishing one uniform
specific fuel economy average for all
manufacturers would, if sufficiently
stringent to have the needed effect,
impact most heavily on manufacturers
who have lower fuel economy, while
not requiring manufacturers of current
vehicles with better fuel economy to
maintain or improve their performance.
(1974 Report, p. 12) Productionweighted standards specifically tailored
to each manufacturer would eliminate
some inequities, but were considered to
be difficult to administer fairly. (Ibid.)
B. Energy Policy and Conservation Act
of 1975
Congress enacted the Energy Policy
and Conservation Act (EPCA Pub. L. 94–
163) during the aftermath of the energy
crisis created by the oil embargo of
1973–74. The Act established an
automobile fuel economy regulatory
program by adding Title V, ‘‘Improving
Automotive Efficiency,’’ to the Motor
Vehicle Information and Cost Savings
Act. Title V has been amended from
time to time and codified without
substantive change as Chapter 329 of
title 49, United States Code. Chapter 329
provides for the issuance of average fuel
economy standards for passenger
automobiles and separate standards for
automobiles that are not passenger
automobiles (light trucks).
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For the purposes of the CAFE statute,
‘‘automobiles’’ include any ‘‘4-wheeled
vehicle that is propelled by fuel (or by
alternative fuel) manufactured primarily
for use on public streets, roads, and
highways (except a vehicle operated
only on a rail line), and rated at not
more than 6,000 pounds gross vehicle
weight.’’ They also include any such
vehicle rated at between 6,000 and
10,000 pounds gross vehicle weight
(GVWR) if the Secretary decides by
regulation that an average fuel economy
standard for the vehicle is feasible, and
that either such a standard will result in
significant energy conservation or the
vehicle is substantially used for the
same purposes as a vehicle rated at not
more than 6000 pounds GVWR.
In 1978, NHTSA published a final
rule in which we determined that
standards for vehicles rated between
6000 and 8500 pounds GVWR are
feasible, that such standards will result
in significant energy conservation on a
per-vehicle basis and that those vehicles
are used for substantially the same
purposes as vehicles rated at not more
than 6000 pounds GVWR (March 23,
1978; 43 FR 11995, at 11997). Vehicles
rated at between 6000 and 8500 pounds
GVWR first became subject to the CAFE
standards in MY 1980.
The CAFE standards set a minimum
performance requirement in terms of an
average number of miles a vehicle
travels per gallon of gasoline or diesel
fuel. Individual vehicles and models are
not required to meet the mileage
standard. Instead, each manufacturer
must achieve a harmonically averaged
level of fuel economy for all specified
vehicles manufactured by a
manufacturer in a given MY. The statute
distinguishes between ‘‘passenger
automobiles’’ and ‘‘non-passenger
automobiles.’’ We generally refer to nonpassenger automobiles as light trucks.
In enacting EPCA, Congress made a
clear and specific choice about the
structure of the average fuel economy
standard for passenger cars. After
considering the variety of approaches
presented in the 1974 Report, Congress
established a common statutory CAFE
standard applicable to each
manufacturer’s fleet of passenger
automobiles. The Secretary of
Transportation has the authority to
change the standard if it no longer
represents the ‘‘maximum feasible’’
standard consistent with the criteria set
forth in the statute. Pursuant to that
authority, the Secretary amended the
passenger car standard with regard to
MYs 1986–1989 to address situations in
which, despite manufacturers’ good
faith compliance plans, market
conditions rendered the statutory
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standard impracticable and infeasible.
Since 1990, the CAFE standard for
passenger automobiles has been 27.5
mpg and compliance is determined in
accordance with detailed procedures set
forth in Section 32904(a) and (b).
Congress was considerably less
decided and prescriptive with respect to
what sort of standards and procedures
should be established for light trucks. It
neither made a clear choice among the
approaches (or among the forms of those
approaches) identified in the 1974
Report nor precluded the selection of
any of those approaches or forms.
Further, it did not establish by statute a
CAFE standard for light trucks. Instead,
Congress provided the Secretary with a
choice of establishing a form of a
production-weighted average standard
for each manufacturer’s entire fleet of
light trucks, as suggested in the 1974
Report, or a form of productionweighted standards for classes of light
trucks. Congress directed the Secretary
to establish maximum feasible CAFE
standards applicable to each
manufacturer’s light truck fleet, or
alternatively, to classes of light trucks,
and to establish them at least 18 months
prior to the start of each model year.
When determining a ‘‘maximum feasible
level of fuel economy,’’ the Secretary is
directed to balance factors including the
nation’s need to conserve energy,
technological feasibility, economic
practicability and the impact of other
motor vehicle standards on fuel
economy.
Manufacturers are required to provide
a series of fuel economy reports to both
the EPA and NHTSA. NHTSA requires
manufacturers to provide pre-model
year and mid-model year reports. See 49
CFR part 537. The reports to NHTSA
must include, in part, vehicle model
fuel economy values as calculated under
the EPA regulations, projected sales
volumes, and actual sales volumes as
available. A manufacturer must supply
similar information to the EPA at the
end of a model year, along with actual
production volumes so that its fleet
wide average fuel economy can be
calculated. The EPA then certifies these
reports and submits them to NHTSA so
that we may determine a manufacturer’s
compliance with the CAFE standards.
C. 1979–2002 light truck standards
NHTSA established the first light
truck CAFE standards for MY 1979 and
applied them to light trucks with a
GVWR up to 6,000 pounds (March 14,
1977; 42 FR 13807). Beginning with MY
1980, NHTSA raised this GVWR ceiling
to 8,500 pounds. For MYs 1979–1981,
the agency established separate
standards for two-wheel drive (2WD)
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and four-wheel drive (4WD) light trucks
without a ‘‘combined’’ standard
reflecting the combined capabilities of
2WD and 4WD light trucks.
Manufacturers that produced both 2WD
vehicles and 4WD vehicles could,
however, decide to treat them as a single
fleet and comply with the 2WD
standard.
Beginning with MY 1982, NHTSA
established a combined standard
reflecting the combined capabilities of
2WD and 4WD light trucks, plus
optional 2WD and 4WD standards. After
MY 1991, NHTSA dropped the optional
2WD and 4WD standards. During MYs
1980–1995, NHTSA also separated the
‘‘captive imports’’ 5 of U.S. light truck
manufacturers from their other truck
models in determining compliance with
CAFE standards.
Since the agency sets standards at the
maximum feasible level of average fuel
economy, as required by EPCA, and
since the agency’s determinations about
the maximum feasible level of average
fuel economy in future model years are
highly dependent on projections about
the state of technology and market
conditions in those years, NHTSA twice
found it necessary to reduce a light
truck standard when it received new
information relating to the agency’s past
projections. In 1979, the agency reduced
the MY 1981 2WD standard after
Chrysler demonstrated that there were
smaller than expected fuel economy
benefits from various technological
improvements and larger than expected
adverse impacts from other federal
vehicle standards and test procedures
(December 31 1979; 44 FR 77199).
In 1984, the agency reduced the MY
1985 light truck standards to the
following levels: Combined standard19.5 mpg, 2WD standard-19.7 mpg and
4WD standard-18.9 mpg (October 22,
1984; 49 FR 41250). The agency
concluded that market demand for light
truck performance, as reflected in
engine mix and axle ratio usage, had not
materialized as anticipated when the
agency initially established the MY
1985 standards. The agency said that
this resulted from lower than
anticipated fuel prices. The agency
concluded that the only actions then
available to manufacturers to improve
their fuel economy levels for MY 1986
would have involved product
restrictions likely resulting in
significant adverse economic impacts.
The reduction of the MY 1985 standard
was upheld by the U.S. Circuit Court of
5 ‘‘Captive import’’ means, with respect to a light
truck, one which is not domestically manufactured
but which is imported by a manufacturer whose
principal place of business is the United States. 49
CFR 533.4(b)(2).
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Appeals for the District of Columbia.
Center for Auto Safety v. NHTSA, 793
F.2d 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (rejecting the
contention that the agency gave
impermissible weight to the effects of
shifts in consumer demand toward
larger, less fuel-efficient trucks on the
fuel economy levels manufacturers
could achieve).6
In 1994, the agency departed from its
usual past practice of considering light
truck standards for one or two model
years at a time and published an
Advance Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (ANPRM) in the Federal
Register outlining NHTSA’s intention to
set standards for some, or all, of MYs
1998–2006 (59 FR 16324; April 6, 1994).
On November 15, 1995, the
Department of Transportation and
Related Agencies Appropriations Act for
FY 1996 was enacted. Pub. L. 104–50.
Section 330 of that Act provided:
None of the funds in this Act shall be
available to prepare, propose, or promulgate
any regulations * * * prescribing corporate
average fuel economy standards for
automobiles * * * in any model year that
differs from standards promulgated for such
automobiles prior to enactment of this
section.
Pursuant to that Act, we then issued a
final rule limited to MY 1998, setting
the light truck CAFE standard for that
year at 20.7 mpg, the same level as the
standard we had set for MY 1997 (61 FR
14680; April 3, 1996).
On September 30, 1996, the
Department of Transportation and
Related Agencies Appropriations Act for
FY 1997 was enacted (Pub. L. 104–205).
Section 323 of that Act included the
same limitation on appropriations
regarding the CAFE standards contained
in Section 330 of the FY 1996
Appropriations Act. The agency
followed the same process as the prior
year and established a MY 1999 light
truck CAFE standard of 20.7 mpg, the
same level as the standard that had been
set for MYs 1997 and 1998. Because the
same limitation on the setting of CAFE
standards was included in the
Appropriations Acts for each of FYs
6 NHTSA similarly found it necessary on occasion
to reduce the passenger car CAFE standards in
response to new information. The agency reduced
the MY 1986 passenger car standard because a
continuing decline in gasoline prices prevented a
projected shift in consumer demand toward smaller
cars and smaller engines and because the only
actions available to manufacturers to improve their
fuel economy levels for MY 1986 would have
involved product restrictions likely resulting in
significant adverse economic impacts. (October 4,
1985; 40 FR 40528) This action was upheld in
Public Citizen vs. NHTSA, 848 F.2d 256 (D.C. Cir.
1988). NHTSA also reduced the MY 1987–88
passenger car standards (October 6, 1986; 51 FR
35594) and MY 1989 passenger car standard
(October 6, 1988; 53 FR 39275) for similar reasons.
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51419
1998–2001, the agency followed that
same procedure during those fiscal
years.
While the Department of
Transportation and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act for FY 2001 (Pub. L.
106–346) contained a restriction on
CAFE rulemaking identical to that
contained in prior appropriation acts,
the conference committee report for that
Act directed NHTSA to fund a study by
the NAS to evaluate the effectiveness
and impacts of CAFE standards (H. Rep.
No. 106–940, at p. 117–118).
In a letter dated July 10, 2001,
following the release of the President’s
National Energy Policy, Secretary of
Transportation Mineta asked the House
and Senate Appropriations Committees
to lift the restriction on the agency
spending funds for the purposes of
improving CAFE standards. The
Department of Transportation and
Related Agencies Appropriations Act for
FY 2002 (Pub. L. 107–87), which was
enacted on December 18, 2001, did not
contain a provision restricting the
Secretary’s authority to prescribe fuel
economy standards.
D. 2001 National Energy Policy
The National Energy Policy,7 released
in May 2001, stated that ‘‘(a)
fundamental imbalance between supply
and demand defines our nation’s energy
crisis’’ and that ‘‘(t)his imbalance, if
allowed to continue, will inevitably
undermine our economy, our standard
of living, and our national security.’’
The National Energy Policy was
designed to promote dependable,
affordable and environmentally sound
energy for the future. The Policy
envisions a comprehensive long-term
strategy that uses leading edge
technology to produce an integrated
energy, environmental and economic
policy. It set forth five specific national
goals: ‘‘modernize conservation,
modernize our energy infrastructure,
increase energy supplies, accelerate the
protection and improvement of the
environment, and increase our nation’s
energy security.’’
The National Energy Policy included
recommendations regarding the path
that the Administration’s energy policy
should take and included specific
recommendations regarding vehicle fuel
economy and CAFE. It recommended
that the President direct the Secretary of
Transportation to—
—Review and provide recommendations on
establishing CAFE standards with due
consideration of the National Academy of
Sciences study released (in prepublication
7 https://www.whitehouse.gov/energy/NationalEnergy-Policy.pdf
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form) in July 2001. Responsibly crafted
CAFE standards should increase efficiency
without negatively impacting the U.S.
automotive industry. The determination of
future fuel economy standards must
therefore be addressed analytically and
based on sound science.
—Consider passenger safety, economic
concerns, and disparate impact on the U.S.
versus foreign fleet of automobiles.
—Look at other market-based approaches to
increasing the national average fuel
economy of new motor vehicles.
E. 2002 NAS Study of CAFE Reform
In response to direction from
Congress, NAS published a lengthy
report in 2002 entitled ‘‘Effectiveness
and Impact of Corporate Average Fuel
Economy (CAFE) Standards.’’ 8
The report concludes that the CAFE
program has clearly contributed to
increased fuel economy and that it was
appropriate to consider further increases
in CAFE standards. (NAS, p. 3 (Finding
1)) It cited not only the value of fuel
savings, but also adverse consequences
(i.e., externalities) associated with high
levels of petroleum importation and use
that are not reflected in the price of
petroleum (e.g., the adverse impact on
energy security). The report further
concluded that technologies exist that
could significantly reduce fuel
consumption by passenger cars and
light truck fuels within 15 years, while
maintaining vehicle size, weight, utility
and performance. (NAS, p. 3 (Finding
5)) Light duty trucks were said to offer
the greatest potential for reducing fuel
consumption. (NAS, p. 4 (Finding 5))
The report also noted that vehicle
development cycles—as well as future
economic, regulatory, safety and
consumer preferences—would influence
the extent to which these technologies
could lead to increased fuel economy in
the U.S. market. To assess the economic
trade-offs associated with the
introduction of existing and emerging
technologies to improve fuel economy,
the NAS conducted what it called a
‘‘cost-efficient analysis’’—‘‘that is, the
committee [that authored the report]
identified packages of existing and
emerging technologies that could be
introduced over the next 10 to 15 years
that would improve fuel economy up to
the point where further increases in fuel
economy would not be reimbursed by
fuel savings.’’ (NAS, p. 4 (Finding 6))
Recognizing the many trade-offs that
must be considered in setting fuel
economy standards, the report took no
position on what CAFE standards would
be appropriate for future years. It noted,
8 The NAS submitted its preliminary report to the
Department of Transportation in July 2001 and
released its final report in January 2002.
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‘‘(s)election of fuel economy targets will
require uncertain and difficult trade-offs
among environmental benefits, vehicle
safety, cost, oil import dependence, and
consumer preferences.’’
The report found that, to minimize
financial impacts on manufacturers, and
on their suppliers, employees, and
consumers, sufficient lead-time
(consistent with normal product life
cycles) should be given when
considering increases in CAFE
standards. The report stated that there
are advanced technologies that could be
employed, without negatively affecting
the automobile industry, if sufficient
lead-time were provided to the
manufacturers.
The report expressed concerns about
increasing the standards under the
CAFE program as currently structured.
While raising CAFE standards under the
existing structure would reduce fuel
consumption, doing so under alternative
structures ‘‘could accomplish the same
end at lower cost, provide more
flexibility to manufacturers, or address
inequities arising from the present’’
structure. (NAS, pp. 4–5 (Finding 10)) 9
Further, almost all of the committee that
authored the report, including the
committee’s safety specialists, said, ‘‘to
the extent that the size and weight of the
fleet have been constrained by CAFE
requirements * * * those requirements
have caused more injuries and fatalities
on the road than would otherwise have
occurred.’’ (NAS, p. 29) Specifically,
they noted: ‘‘the downweighting and
downsizing that occurred in the late
1970s and early 1980s, some of which
was due to CAFE standards, probably
resulted in an additional 1300 to 2600
traffic fatalities in 1993.’’ (NAS, p. 3
(Finding 2))
To address those structural problems,
the report suggested various possible
reforms.10 The report found that the
9 The report noted the following about the
concept of equity:
Potential Inequities
The issue of equity or inequity is subjective.
However, one concept of equity among
manufacturers requires equal treatment of
equivalent vehicles made by different
manufacturers. The current CAFE standards fail this
test. If one manufacturer was positioned in the
market selling many large passenger cars and
thereby was just meeting the CAFE standard,
adding a 22-mpg car (below the 27.5-mpg standard)
would result in a financial penalty or would require
significant improvements in fuel economy for the
remainder of the passenger cars. But, if another
manufacturer was selling many small cars and was
significantly exceeding the CAFE standard, adding
a 22-mpg vehicle would have no negative
consequences.
(NAS, p. 102).
10 In assessing and comparing possible reforms,
the report urged consideration of the following
factors:
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‘‘CAFE program might be improved
significantly by converting it to a system
in which fuel targets depend on vehicle
attributes.’’ (NAS, p. 5 (Finding 12)) The
report noted
One such system would make the fuel
economy target dependent on vehicle weight,
with lower fuel consumption targets set for
lighter vehicles and higher targets for heavier
vehicles, up to some maximum weight, above
which the target would be weightindependent. Such a system would create
incentives to reduce the variance in vehicle
weights between large and small vehicles,
thus providing for overall vehicle safety. It
has the potential to increase fuel economy
with fewer negative effects on both safety and
consumer choice. Above the maximum
weight, vehicles would need additional
advanced fuel economy technology to meet
the targets. The committee believes that
although such a change is promising, it
requires more investigation than was possible
in this study.
(NAS, p. 5 (Finding 12))
The report noted further that under an
attribute-based approach, the required
CAFE levels could vary among the
manufacturers based on the distribution
of their product mix:
Attribute-Based Fuel Economy Targets
The government could change the way that
fuel economy targets for individual vehicles
are assigned. The current CAFE system sets
one target for all passenger cars (27.5 mpg)
and one target for all light-duty trucks (20.7
mpg). Each manufacturer must meet a salesweighted average (more precisely, a
harmonic mean * * *) of these targets.
However, targets could vary among passenger
cars and among trucks, based on some
attribute of these vehicles such as weight,
size, or load-carrying capacity. In that case a
particular manufacturer’s average target for
passenger cars or for trucks would depend
upon the fractions of vehicles it sold with
particular levels of these attributes. For
example, if weight were the criterion, a
manufacturer that sells mostly light vehicles
would have to achieve higher average fuel
economy than would a manufacturer that
sells mostly heavy vehicles.
(NAS, p. 87)
Based on these findings, the report
recommended
Consideration should be given to designing
and evaluating an approach with fuel
economy targets that are dependent on
Fuel use responses encouraged by the policy,
Effectiveness in reducing fuel use,
Minimizing costs of fuel use reduction,
Other potential consequences
—Distributional impacts
—Safety
—Consumer satisfaction
—Mobility
—Environment
—Potential inequities, and
Administrative feasibility.
(NAS, p. 94).
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vehicle attributes, such as vehicle weight,
that inherently influence fuel use. Any such
system should be designed to have minimal
adverse safety consequences.
(NAS, p. 6, (Recommendation 3))
In February 2002, Secretary Mineta
asked Congress ‘‘to provide the
Department of Transportation with the
necessary authority to reform the CAFE
program, guided by the NAS report’s
suggestions.’’
F. 2002 Request for Comments on NAS
Study
On February 7, 2002, we issued a
Request for Comments (RFC) (67 FR
5767; Docket No. 2002–11419) seeking
data on which we could base an
analysis of manufacturer capability for
the purpose of determining the
appropriate CAFE standards to set for
light trucks for upcoming model years,
beginning with MY 2005. We also
sought comments on possible reforms to
the CAFE program, as it applies to both
passenger cars and light trucks, to
protect passenger safety, advance fuelefficient technologies, and obtain the
benefits of market-based approaches.
While we have considered the
comments, the original RFC was quite
general and the comments received
tended to focus on concerns with the
current program or the generic
admonishment against CAFE reform—
and not on specific potential options. A
more detailed summary of comments
can be found in the advanced notice of
proposed rulemaking (2003 ANPRM)
published on December 29, 2003 (68 FR
74908; Docket No. 2003–16128).
G. 2003 Final Rule Establishing MY
2005–2007 Light Truck Standards
On April 7, 2003, the agency
published a final rule establishing light
truck CAFE standards for MYs 2005–
2007: 21.0 mpg for MY 2005, 21.6 mpg
for MY 2006, and 22.2 mpg for MY 2007
(68 FR 16868; Docket No. 2002–11419;
Notice 3). The agency determined that
these levels are the maximum feasible
CAFE levels for light trucks for those
model years, balancing the express
statutory factors and other included or
relevant considerations such as the
impact of the standard on motor vehicle
safety and employment. NHTSA
estimated that the fuel economy
increases required by the standards for
MYs 2005–2007 would generate
approximately 3.6 billion gallons of
gasoline savings over the 25-year
lifetime of the affected vehicles.
In establishing the standards, the
agency analyzed cost-effective
technological improvements that could
be made to the product offerings
planned by the manufacturers. The
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agency’s projection of CAFE capability
was based on the manufacturers’ most
recently submitted product plans and
technological improvements we
determined to be appropriate and
feasible within the time frame. In the
final rule, we stated that we did not
believe the final rule will necessitate,
nor did we believe it will result in, any
‘‘mix shifting,’’ e.g., decreasing the
production volumes of vehicles that are
heavier or larger and thus have
relatively low fuel economy and
increasing the production volumes of
lighter or smaller vehicles, which might
result in significant employment and/or
average weight reductions were it to
occur.
We further expressed our belief that
the final rule for MYs 2005–2007 will
neither necessitate nor induce
manufacturers to make reductions in
vehicle weight that will adversely affect
the overall safety of people traveling on
the roads of America. Indeed, as the
NAS report noted, there are many
technological means that are available to
manufacturers for improving fuel
economy and are much more costeffective than weight reduction through
materials substitution. Accordingly, we
did not rely on weight reduction.
We recognized in the final rule that
the standard established for MY 2007
could be a challenge for General Motors.
We recognized further that, between the
issuance of the final rule and the last
(MY 2007) of the model years for which
standards were being established, there
was more time than in previous light
truck CAFE rulemakings for significant
changes to occur in external factors
capable of affecting the achievable
levels of CAFE. These external factors
include fuel prices and the demand for
vehicles with advanced fuel saving
technologies, such as hybrid electric
and advanced diesel vehicles. We said
that changes in these factors could lead
to higher or lower levels of CAFE,
particularly in MY 2007. Recognizing
that it may be appropriate to re-examine
the MY 2007 standard in light of any
significant changes in those factors, the
agency reaffirms its plans to monitor the
compliance efforts of the manufacturers.
H. 2003 comprehensive plans for
addressing vehicle rollover and
compatibility
In September 2002, NHTSA
completed a thorough examination of
the opportunities for significantly
improving vehicle and highway safety
and announced the establishment of
interdisciplinary teams to formulate
comprehensive plans for addressing the
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51421
four most promising problem areas.11
Based on the work of the teams, the
agency issued detailed reports analyzing
each of the problem areas and
recommending coordinated strategies
that, if implemented effectively, will
lead to significant improvements in
safety.
Two of the problems areas are vehicle
rollover and vehicle compatibility. The
reports on those areas identify a series
of vehicle, roadway and behavioral
strategies for addressing the problems.12
Among the vehicle strategies, both
reports identified reform of the CAFE
program as one of the steps that needed
to be taken to reduce those problems:
The current structure of the CAFE system
can provide an incentive to manufacturers to
downweight vehicles, increase production of
vehicle classes that are more susceptible to
rollover crashes, and produce a less
homogenous fleet mix. As a result, CAFE is
critical to the vehicle compatibility and
rollover problems.
(a) Highlights of Current Program
In its final rule setting new CAFE
standards for MY 2005–2007 light trucks,
NHTSA stated that it intends to examine
possible reforms to the CAFE system,
including those recommended in the
National Academy of Sciences’ CAFE report.
(b) Proposed Initiatives
Consistent with its statutory authority, the
agency plans to address issues relating to the
structure, operation and effects of potential
changes to the CAFE system and CAFE
standards. In taking this broad view, the
agency recognizes that the regulation of the
(sic) fuel economy can have substantial
effects on vehicle safety, the composition of
the light vehicle fleet, the economic wellbeing of the automobile industry and, of
course, our nation’s energy security.
(c) Expected Program Outcomes
It is NHTSA’s goal to identify and
implement reforms to the CAFE system that
will facilitate improvements in fuel economy
without compromising motor vehicle safety
or American jobs. * * *
* * * NHTSA intends to examine the
safety impacts, both positive and negative,
that may result from any modifications to
CAFE as it now exists. Regardless of the root
causes, it is clear that the downsizing of
vehicles that occurred during the first decade
of the CAFE program had serious safety
consequences. Changes to the existing system
are likely to have equally significant impacts.
NHTSA is determined to ensure that these
impacts are positive.
I. 2003 ANPRM
On December 29, 2003, the agency
published an ANPRM seeking comment
on various issues relating to reforming
the CAFE program (68 FR 74908; Docket
11 A fifth problem area was announced in 2004,
improving traffic safety data.
12 See https://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/vrtc/ca/
capubs/IPTRolloverMitigationReport/; https://wwwnrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/departments/nrd-11/aggressivity/
IPTVehicleCompatibilityReport/.
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No. 2003–16128).13 The agency sought
comment on possible enhancements to
the program that would assist in further
fuel conservation, while protecting
motor vehicle safety and the economic
vitality of the automobile industry. The
agency indicated that it was particularly
interested in structural reform. This
document, while not espousing any
particular form of reform, sought more
specific input than the 2002 RFC on
various options aimed at adapting the
CAFE program to today’s vehicle fleet
and needs.
1. Need for reform
The 2003 ANPRM discussed the
principal criticisms of the current CAFE
program that led the agency to explore
light truck CAFE reform (68 FR 74908,
at 74910–13. First, the energy-saving
potential of the CAFE program is
hampered by the current regulatory
structure. The Unreformed approach to
CAFE does not distinguish between the
various market segments of light trucks,
and therefore does not recognize that
some vehicles designed for
classification purposes as light trucks
may achieve fuel economy similar to
that of passenger cars. The Unreformed
CAFE approach instead applies a single
standard to the light truck fleet as a
whole, encouraging manufacturers to
offer small light trucks that will offset
the larger vehicles that get lower fuel
economy. A CAFE system that more
closely links fuel economy standards to
the various market segments reduces the
incentive to design vehicles that are
functionally similar to passenger cars
but classified as light trucks.
Second, because weight strongly
affects fuel economy, the current light
truck CAFE program encourages vehicle
manufacturers to reduce weight in their
light truck offerings to achieve greater
fuel economy.14 As the NAS report and
a more recent NHTSA study have found,
downweighting of the light truck fleet,
especially those trucks in the low and
medium weight ranges, creates more
13 On the same date, we also published a request
for comments seeking manufacturer product plan
information for MYs 2008–2012 to assist the agency
in analyzing possible reforms to the CAFE program
which are discussed in a companion notice
published today. (68 FR 74931) The agency sought
information that would help it assess the effect of
these possible reforms on fuel economy,
manufacturers, consumers, the economy, motor
vehicle safety and American jobs.
14 Manufacturers can reduce weight without
changing the fundamental structure of the vehicle
by using lighter materials or eliminating available
equipment or options. In contrast, reducing vehicle
size, and particularly footprint, generally entails an
alteration of the basic architecture of the vehicle.
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safety risk for occupants of light trucks
and all motorists combined.15
Third, the agency noted the adverse
economic impacts that might result from
steady future increases in the stringency
of CAFE standards under the current
regulatory structure. Rapid increases in
the light truck CAFE standard could
have serious adverse economic
consequences. The vulnerability of fullline firms to tighter CAFE standards
does not arise primarily from poor fuel
economy ratings within weight classes,
i.e., from less extensive use of fuel
economy improving technologies. As
explained in the 2003 ANPRM, their
overall CAFE averages are low
compared to manufacturers that
produce more relatively light vehicles
because their sales mixes service a
market demand for bigger and heavier
vehicles capable of more demanding
utilitarian functions. An attribute-based
(weight and/or size) system could avoid
disparate impacts on full-line
manufacturers that could result from a
sustained increase in CAFE standards.
2. Reform options
In discussing potential changes, the
agency focused primarily on structural
improvements to the current CAFE
program authorized under the current
statutory authority, and secondarily on
definitional changes to the current
vehicle classification system and
whether to include vehicles between
8,500 to 10,000 lbs. GVWR.
The ANRPM discussed two structural
reforms. The first reform divided light
trucks into two or more classes based on
vehicle attributes. The second was an
attribute-based ‘‘continuous-function’’
system, such as that discussed in the
NAS report. We chose various measures
of vehicle weight and/or size to
illustrate the possible design of an
attribute-based system. However, we
also sought comment as to the merits of
using other vehicle attributes as the
basis of an attribute-based system.
The 2003 ANPRM also presented two
potential options under which vehicles
with a GVWR of up to 10,000 lbs. could
be included under the CAFE program,
were the agency to make the requisite
determinations to include them. One
option would be to include vehicles
defined by EPA as medium duty
passenger vehicles (65 FR 6698, 6749–
50, 6851–6852) for use in the CAFE
program. This definition would
15 However, both studies also suggest that if
downweighting is concentrated on the heaviest
light trucks in the fleet there would be no net safety
impact, and there might even be a small fleet-wide
safety benefit. There is substantial uncertainty
about the curb weight cut-off above which this
would occur.
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essentially make SUVs and passenger
vans between 8,500 and 10,000 lbs.
GVWR subject to CAFE, while
continuing to exclude most mediumand heavy-duty pickups and most
medium- and heavy-duty cargo vans
that are primarily used for agricultural
and commercial purposes. A second
option would be to make all vehicles
between 8,500 and 10,000 lbs GVWR
subject to CAFE standards.
Through the 2003 ANPRM, the agency
intended to begin a public discussion on
potential ways, within current statutory
authority, to improve the CAFE program
to better achieve our public policy
objectives. The agency set forth a
number of possible concepts and
measures, and invited the public to
present additional concepts. The agency
expressed interest in any suggestions
toward revamping the CAFE program in
such a way as to enhance overall fuel
economy while protecting occupant
safety and the economic vitality of the
auto market.
The agency also discussed and sought
comment on the classification of
vehicles as passenger cars or light
trucks. As suggested in numerous of the
comments, we are proposing only to
clarify the applicability of the flat floor
provision to vehicles with folding seats.
See section IX.B below. We are not
otherwise changing those classification
regulations at this time in part because
we believe an orderly transition to
Reformed CAFE could not be
accomplished if we simultaneously
change which vehicles are included in
the light truck program and because, as
applied in MY 2011, Reformed CAFE is
likely to reduce the incentive to produce
vehicles classified as light trucks
instead of as passenger cars. We may
revisit the definitional issues as
appropriate in the future.
J. Recent developments
1. Factors underscoring need for reform
Since our ANPRM was published in
2003, there have been two important
complicating factors that underscore the
need for CAFE reform. One factor is the
fiscal problems reported by General
Motors and Ford, while the other is the
recent surge in gasoline prices, a
development that may be exacerbating
the financial challenges faced by both
companies.
The two largest, full-line light-truck
manufacturers, General Motors and
Ford, have reported serious financial
difficulties. The investment community
has downgraded the bonds of both
companies. Further, both companies
have announced significant layoffs and
other actions to improve their financial
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condition. While these financial
problems did not give rise to the
Administration’s CAFE reform
initiative, the financial risks now faced
by these companies, including their
workers and suppliers, underscore the
importance to full-line vehicle
manufacturers of establishing an
equitable CAFE regulatory framework.
There has also been a sharp and
sustained surge in gasoline prices since
our last light truck final rule in April
2003 and the December 2003 ANPRM
on CAFE reform. According to the
Energy Information Administration
(EIA), the retail price for gasoline in
April 2003 was $1.59 per gallon and in
December 2003 was $1.48 per gallon.16
The weekly U.S. retail price for the
week of August 15, 2005 was $2.55 per
gallon.17
Although the surge of gasoline prices
highlights the need for both more energy
supplies and intensified conservation
efforts, it is important to recognize that
CAFE standards for MYs 2008–2011
should not be based on current gasoline
prices. They should be based on our
best forecast of what average real
gasoline prices will be in the U.S.
during the years that these vehicles will
be used by consumers: the 26-year
period beginning in 2008 and extending
almost to 2040.18 Since miles of travel
tend to be concentrated in the early
years of a vehicle’s lifetime, the
projected gasoline price in the 2008–
2020 period is particularly relevant for
this rulemaking.
When we issued the April 2003 final
rule for MY 2005–2007 light truck
CAFE, we based the final economic
assessment of that rule on estimated
gasoline prices at the pump that ranged
from $1.37 per gallon in 2005 to $1.46
per gallon in 2030 (based on year 2000
prices). Those prices, which are set forth
year by year in our April 2003 Final
Economic Assessment (Docket No.
11419–18358, page VIII–7), were based
on the Energy Information
Administration’s ‘‘Annual Energy
Outlook 2003.’’
The PRIA for this proposed rule has
been based on projected gasoline prices
16 See https://tonto.eia.doe.gov/oog/info/gdu/
gaspump.html.
17 See https://www.eia.doe.gov/oillgas/
petroleum/data_publications/wrgp/
mogas_home_page.html and https://
tonto.eia.doe.gov/oog/info/gdu/gasdiesel.asp.
18 To calculate the fuel savings for the light trucks
manufactured in a model year, we consider the
savings over a 26-year period. The number of light
trucks manufactured during each model year that
remains in service during each subsequent calendar
year is estimated by applying estimates of the
proportion of light trucks surviving to each age up
to 26 years (see Table VIII–2 in the PRIA). At the
end of 26 years, the proportion of light trucks
remaining in service falls below 10 percent.
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from the more recent Annual Energy
Outlook 2005 (AEO2005) (published in
2004 before the recent price rises),
which projected gasoline prices ranging
from $1.51 to $1.58 per gallon.19 These
are the most current long-term forecasts
for gasoline prices available from EIA at
this time. EIA has, however, issued
revised short-term forecasts that project
gasoline prices remaining above $2
through late 2006, significantly higher
than what was projected in AEO2005.
Further, we note that in its August
‘‘International Energy Outlook 2005,’’
EIA’s reference case for future oil prices
‘‘has adopted the Annual Energy
Outlook 2005 (AEO2005) October
futures case, which has an assumption
of higher prices than the AEO2005
reference case and now appears to be a
more likely projection for oil prices.’’
During the rulemaking, we will
continue to consult with EIA and other
experts on projections of likely gasoline
prices over the anticipated lifetime of
light trucks sold in MYs 2008–2011,
including the development of gasoline
price projections for EIA’s Annual
Energy Outlook 2006 (AEO2006). EIA
will be issuing AEO2006, with revised
long-term forecasts, in November 2005.
We are seeking public comment on the
appropriate gasoline price forecast to
use in the final rule, including
consideration of the AEO2006 forecast.
2. Reports updating fuel economy
potential
Additionally, the agency has placed
in the docket for this notice a 2005
document, prepared under the auspices
of the Department of Energy (DOE) for
NHTSA, updating the estimates of lighttruck fuel economy potential and costs
in the 2001 NAS report, ‘‘Effectiveness
and Import of Corporate Average Fuel
Economy (CAFE) Standards. The agency
seeks comments on this document. After
having this document peer reviewed,
the agency will place the peer
reviewers’ reports in the docket for
public comment.
We note that the introduction of the
2005 DOE document states that that
document does not address the costs
and benefits of hybrid and diesel
technology because these matters have
been documented in a 2004 Energy and
Environmental Analysis, Inc. (EEA)
study for the DOE. The title of that
study is ‘‘Future Potential of Hybrid and
Diesel Powertrains in the U.S. LightDuty Vehicle Market.’’20 The agency has
19 https://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/.
20 See https://www-cta.ornl.gov/cta/Publications/
pdf/ORNL_TM_2004_181_HybridDiesel.pdf.
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51423
placed that study in the docket and
seeks comments on it as well.
III. The Unreformed CAFE proposal for
MYs 2008–2010
As part of our Reformed CAFE
proposal, we have crafted a transition
period in which manufacturers have the
option of complying with either the
Reformed or the Unreformed CAFE
systems. During the transition period,
the requirements under the Reformed
CAFE systems are linked to those of the
Unreformed system. The Reformed
CAFE standards for MYs 2008–2010
would be set at levels intended to
ensure that the industry-wide cost of the
Reformed standards are roughly
equivalent to the industry-wide cost of
the Unreformed CAFE standards in
those model years. This approach has
several important advantages. If the
Unreformed standards are judged to be
economically practicable and since the
Reformed standards spread the cost
burden across the industry to a greater
extent, equalizing the costs between the
two systems ensures that the Reformed
standards will be within the realm of
economic practicability. Further, this
approach promotes an orderly and
effective transition to the Reformed
CAFE system since experience will be
gained prior to MY 2011. In this section,
we describe how we developed the
Unreformed CAFE standards.
In developing this proposal for
Unreformed CAFE standards, we first
analyzed the data submitted by the
manufacturers using the same type of
analyses we employed in establishing
light truck CAFE standards for MYs
2005–2007. We determined which
manufacturers have a significant share
of the light truck market, analyzed data
to determine the CAFE ‘‘baseline’’ for
each of those companies, and then
conducted a manual engineering
analysis (the Stage Analysis)—in
conjunction with a computer-based
engineering analysis (the Volpe
Analysis)—to determine what
technologies each company with a
significant share of the market could use
to enhance its overall fleet fuel economy
average.21
21 The ‘‘Stage’’ Analysis primarily involved
application of the agency’s engineering judgment
and expertise about possible adjustments to the
detailed product plans submitted by manufacturers.
The methodology of the Volpe model was described
in detail in the NPRM and Final Rule establishing
light truck CAFE standards for MYs 2005–2007. The
model has been updated and refined, but remains
fundamentally the same. The updated model has
been peer reviewed. The model documentation,
including a description of the input assumptions
and process, as well as peer review reports, will be
made available in the rulemaking docket for this
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Giving particular regard to the
capabilities of the least capable
manufacturer with a significant share of
the market, we have tentatively
determined the maximum feasible fuel
economy levels for MYs 2008–2010. In
doing so, we took into account the four
statutory factors (the nation’s need to
conserve energy, technological
feasibility, economic practicability
(including employment consequences)
and the impact of other regulations on
fuel economy) as well as other included
or relevant considerations such as the
need to protect against adverse safety
consequences.
As noted above, we have tentatively
determined that the following fuel
economy standards for MYs 2008–2010
are the maximum feasible levels under
the Unreformed approach to light truck
CAFE:
MY 2008—22.5 mpg
MY 2009—23.1 mpg
MY 2010—23.5 mpg
We note that although manufacturers
may receive credit toward their CAFE
compliance by placing alternative fuel
vehicles into the market through MY
2008, the statute prohibits us from
taking such benefits into consideration
in determining the maximum feasible
fuel economy standard (49 U.S.C.
32902(h)). Accordingly, the baselines
and projections do not reflect those
credits.
A. Baseline for determining
manufacturer capabilities in MYs 2008–
2010
In evaluating the manufacturers’ fuel
economy capabilities for MYs 2008–
2010, we analyzed manufacturers’
projections of their CAFE and their
underlying product plans and
considered what, if any, additional
actions the manufacturers could take to
improve their fuel economy. In order to
determine the fuel economy capabilities
of manufacturers during MYs 2008–
2010, we first determined the
manufacturers’ fuel economy baselines
for those years. That is, we determined
the fuel economy levels that
manufacturers are planning to achieve
in those years, given the level of the
CAFE standards that they were required
to comply with in MY 2007. We relied
upon the information submitted by
manufacturers in response to the
December 29, 2003 request for product
plans and any additional manufacturer
updates, to determine those plans.
For those manufacturers that did not
submit information for those model
years, we relied on data from the latest
model year for which information from
the manufacturers is available. To the
extent that additional public
information was available regarding the
MY 2008–2010 product plans, we
incorporated that information into the
baselines for those manufacturers.
2. Ford
Ford Motor Company controlled 25.7
percent of the light truck market in the
U.S. in MY 2004. Ford projected that its
light truck fleet would achieve a CAFE
level of 21.6 mpg for MY 2008, 22.0 mpg
for MY 2009 mpg, and 22.3 mpg for MY
2010. Its data were based on sales of
Ford branded vehicles, as well as
Lincoln, Mercury, Mazda, Land Rover
and Volvo branded vehicles.
notice. The agency will respond to the reports, and
the public comments on those reports, at the time
of the final rule.
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1. General Motors
General Motors’ share of the light
truck market for MY 2004 was 31.8
percent. In its submission of MY 2008–
2010 product plans, General Motors
projected that, based on those plans, its
light truck fleet would achieve a CAFE
level of 21.2 mpg for MY 2008, 21.3 mpg
for MY 2009, and 21.3 mpg for MY
2010. Its plans were based on sales of
GMC, Chevrolet, Pontiac, Buick,
Cadillac, Hummer, SAAB, and Saturn
vehicles.22
3. DaimlerChrysler
DaimlerChrysler controlled 19.8
percent of the U.S. light truck market in
MY 2004. DaimlerChrysler submitted
product plans for MYs 2008–2010, and
projected that its light truck fleet would
achieve a CAFE level of 21.9 mpg for
MY 2008, 22.3 mpg for MY 2009, and
22.3 mpg for MY 2010. Its data were
based on sales of Chrysler, Jeep, Dodge,
Mercedes, Mitsubishi, Smart23, and
Sprinter brand vehicles.
22 The agency does not consider the overall fleet
fuel economy projection for a manufacturer to be
entitled to confidential treatment, whether derived
from our own analysis or provided by the
manufacturer. The agency has consistently
published this information in all prior rulemakings
establishing CAFE standards. See for example, 68
FR 16868; April 7, 2003, 67 FR 77015; December
16, 2002, 59 FR 16312; April 6, 1994, and 53 FR
11074; April 5, 1988.
23 The agency notes that some vehicles and
vehicle lines that were included in a manufacturer’s
product plan ultimately may not be produced.
However, the agency relies on the product plans as
submitted. Further, if any vehicles are dropped,
they are expected to constitute a small percentage
of a manufacturer’s fleet and have minimal impact
on a manufacturer’s projected capabilities.
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4. Other manufacturers
Of the remaining manufacturers,
Nissan and Hyundai (including Kia)
provided information regarding sales
and fuel economy projections for their
vehicles through MY 2010.
The balance of the remaining
manufacturers did not provide any MY
2008–2010 information.24 For these
manufacturers (Toyota, Honda, Subaru,
Isuzu, Suzuki, BMW, Porsche, and
Volkswagen), we relied on manufacturer
information from the latest model year
for which it was available, and publicly
available information regarding their
MY 2008–2010 product plans. Toyota,
Honda, and Subaru provided fuel
economy projections for MYs 2005–
2007. The projected levels of fuel
economy provided by Toyota and
Honda would comply with the CAFE
standard for MY 2007. Accordingly, we
used those projected levels for each of
MYs 2008–2010. Subaru’s submission
was supplemented by publicly available
information regarding its future vehicle
fleet to arrive at its MY 2008–2010
baselines.
Isuzu, Suzuki, BMW, Porsche, and
Volkswagen did not submit any
response. For Isuzu and Suzuki’s
baselines, we used the latest year for
which we had product data (MY 2005)
and combined those data with publicly
available information regarding Isuzu
and Suzuki’s future product plans.
Further, since all of the light trucks
produced by Isuzu and Suzuki are sister
vehicles to General Motors vehicles, we
were able to determine the technical
details for those vehicles. BMW,
Porsche, and Volkswagen previously
paid fines in lieu of complying with the
MY 2002 and 2003 light truck CAFE
standards. The agency assumes that
because of that past history and their
low light truck production volumes,
BMW, Porsche, and Volkswagen will
continue to pay fines instead of bringing
their fleets into compliance. Therefore,
we relied on the fuel economy levels
from MY 2005 in projecting the baseline
for these three manufacturers.
Table 1 provides the baseline values
for manufacturers other than General
Motors, Ford, and DaimlerChrysler:
24 In the past, these manufacturers have generally
not provided such information since they have
either chosen to pay civil penalties instead of
complying with the CAFE standards or had fleet
fuel economy averages far enough above the
standards that it was not necessary for them to
make additional improvements in fuel economy.
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TABLE 1.—BASELINE VALUES FOR MANUFACTURERS OTHER THAN GENERAL MOTORS, FORD AND DAIMLERCHRYSLER
[In mpg]
MY 2008
MY 2009
MY 2010
22.9
24.4
20.7
21.8
25.7
21.3
16.8
20.4
21.9
18.8
22.9
24.4
20.8
23.2
26.2
21.3
16.8
20.2
21.9
18.8
22.9
24.4
21.2
22.8
26.2
21.3
16.8
20.1
21.9
18.8
Toyota ..................................................................................................................................................................
Honda ..................................................................................................................................................................
Nissan ..................................................................................................................................................................
Hyundai ................................................................................................................................................................
Subaru .................................................................................................................................................................
BMW ....................................................................................................................................................................
Porsche ................................................................................................................................................................
Isuzu ....................................................................................................................................................................
Suzuki ..................................................................................................................................................................
Volkswagen ..........................................................................................................................................................
B. Selection of Proposed Unreformed
CAFE Standards—Process for
Determining Maximum Feasible Levels
We have tentatively concluded that
the proposed standards for the
Unreformed CAFE system are
technologically feasible and
economically practicable for those
manufacturers with a substantial share
of the light truck market (General
Motors, Ford, and DaimlerChrysler), are
capable of being met without substantial
product restrictions, and will enhance
the ability of the nation to conserve fuel
and reduce its dependence on foreign
oil.
In determining the maximum feasible
fuel economy level, we are required to
consider the four statutory factors and
are permitted to consider additional
societal considerations. The agency has
historically included the potential for
adverse safety consequences when
deciding upon a maximum feasible
level.25 The overarching principle that
emerges from the enumerated factors
and the court-sanctioned practice of
considering safety and links them
together is that CAFE standards should
be set at a level that will achieve the
greatest amount of fuel savings without
leading to adverse economic or other
societal consequences.
As discussed in many past fuel
economy notices, the legislative history
of EPCA explicitly states that NHTSA is
to take industry-wide considerations
25 See, e.g., Center for Auto Safety v. NHTSA
(CAS), 793 F. 2d 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
(Administrator’s consideration of market demand as
component of economic practicability found to be
reasonable); Public Citizen 848 F.2d 256 (Congress
established broad guidelines in the fuel economy
statute; agency’s decision to set lower standard was
a reasonable accommodation of conflicting
policies). As the United States Court of Appeals
pointed out in upholding NHTSA’s exercise of
judgment in setting the 1987–1989 passenger car
standards, ‘‘NHTSA has always examined the safety
consequences of the CAFE standards in its overall
consideration of relevant factors since its earliest
rulemaking under the CAFE program.’’ Competitive
Enterprise Institute v. NHTSA (CEI I), 901 F.2d 107,
120 at n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
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into account in determining the
maximum feasible CAFE levels, and not
necessarily base its determination on
any particular company’s asserted or
projected abilities. This means that
CAFE standards will not necessarily be
set at the precise level that is associated
with the plans of the ‘‘least capable
manufacturer’’ with a substantial share
of the market or that is projected by the
agency for that manufacturer. (For a
discussion of the industry-wide
considerations and the origins of the
‘‘least capable manufacturer’’ concept,
see section IV.A.2.b below.)
It means further that we must take
particular care in considering the
statutory factors with regard to these
manufacturers—weighing their asserted
capabilities, product plans and
economic conditions against agency
projections of their capabilities, the
need for the nation to conserve energy
and the effect of other regulations
(including motor vehicle safety and
emissions regulations) and other public
policy objectives.
This approach is consistent with the
Conference Report on the legislation
enacting the CAFE statute:
Such determination [of maximum feasible
average fuel economy level] should take
industry-wide considerations into account.
For example, a determination of maximum
feasible average fuel economy should not be
keyed to the single manufacturer that might
have the most difficulty achieving a given
level of average fuel economy. Rather, the
Secretary must weigh the benefits to the
nation of a higher average fuel economy
standard against the difficulties of individual
manufacturers. Such difficulties, however,
should be given appropriate weight in setting
the standard in light of the small number of
domestic manufacturers that currently exist
and the possible implications for the national
economy and for reduced competition
association [sic] with a severe strain on any
manufacturer.
S. Rep. No. 94–516, 94th Congress, 1st
Sess. 154–155 (1975).
The agency has historically assessed
whether a potential CAFE standard is
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economically practicable in terms of
whether the standard is one ‘‘within the
financial capability of the industry, but
not so stringent as to threaten
substantial economic hardship for the
industry.’’ 26 See, e.g., Public Citizen,
848 F.2d at 264. In essence, in
determining the maximum feasible level
of CAFE, the agency assesses what is
technologically feasible for
manufacturers to achieve without
leading to adverse economic
consequences, such as a significant loss
of jobs or the unreasonable elimination
of consumer choice.
At the same time, the law does not
preclude a CAFE standard that poses
considerable challenges to any
individual manufacturer. The
Conference Report makes clear, and the
case law affirms: ‘‘(A) determination of
maximum feasible average fuel economy
should not be keyed to the single
manufacturer which might have the
most difficulty achieving a given level
of average fuel economy.’’ CAS, 793
F.2d at 1338–9. Instead, the agency is
compelled ‘‘to weigh the benefits to the
nation of a higher fuel economy
standard against the difficulties of
individual automobile manufacturers.’’
Id. The statute permits the imposition of
reasonable, ‘‘technology forcing’’
challenges on any individual
manufacturer, but does not contemplate
standards that will result in ‘‘severe’’
economic hardship by forcing
26 In adopting this interpretation in the final rule
establishing the MY 1981–1984 fuel economy
standards for passenger cars (June 30, 1977; 42 FR
33534, at 33536–7), the Department rejected several
more restrictive interpretations. One was that the
phrase means that the standards are statutorily
required to be cost-beneficial. The Department
pointed out that Congress had rejected a
manufacturer-sponsored amendment to the Act that
would have required standards to be set at a level
at which benefits were commensurate with costs. It
also dismissed the idea that economic practicability
should limit standards to free market levels that
would be achieved with no regulation.
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reductions in employment affecting the
overall motor vehicle industry.27
As a first step toward ensuring that
the CAFE levels selected as the
maximum feasible levels under
Unreformed CAFE will not lead to
adverse consequences, we reviewed in
detail the confidential product plans
provided by the manufacturers with a
substantial share of the light truck
market (General Motors, Ford and
DaimlerChrysler) and assessed their
technological capabilities to go beyond
those plans. By doing so, we are able to
determine tentatively the extent to
which each can enhance their fuel
economy performance using technology.
C. Technologically Feasible Additions to
Baseline
The agency has analyzed potential
technological improvements to the
product offerings for each manufacturer
with a substantial share of the light
truck market and for the remaining light
truck manufacturers.28 Under the
Unreformed system, we focused on
General Motors, Ford, and
DaimlerChrysler as the manufacturers
with substantial shares of the light truck
market. We also conducted analyses of
the potential for the other manufacturers
to achieve fuel economy levels above
their baselines.
For the purpose of analyzing the
potential technological improvements,
we applied a three-stage engineering
analysis that we relied upon in previous
light truck fuel economy rulemakings
(Stage Analysis).
At each stage of that analysis, we
added technologies based on our
engineering judgment and expertise
about possible adjustments to the
27 In the past, the agency has set CAFE standards
above its estimate of the capabilities of a
manufacturer with less than a substantial, but more
than a de minimus, share of the market. See, e.g.,
CAS, 793 F.2d at 1326 (noting that the agency set
the MY 1982 light truck standard at a level that
might be above the capabilities of Chrysler, based
on the conclusion that the energy benefits
associated with the higher standard would
outweigh the harm to Chrysler, and further noting
that Chrysler had 10–15 percent market share while
Ford had 35 percent market share). On other
occasions, the agency reduced an established CAFE
standard to address unanticipated market
conditions that rendered the standard unreasonable
and likely to lead to severe economic consequences.
49 FR 41250, 50 FR 40528, 53 FR 39275; see Public
Citizen, 848 F.2d at 264.
28 A more detailed discussion of these issues is
contained in the agency’s PRIA, which has been
placed in the docket for this notice. Some of the
information included in the PRIA, including the
details of manufacturers’ future product plans, has
been determined by the Agency to be confidential
business information the release of which could
cause competitive harm. The public version of the
PRIA omits the confidential information. The PRIA
discusses in detail the fuel economy enhancing
technologies expected to be available during the
MY 2008–2010 time period.
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detailed product plans submitted in
response to the 2003 request for product
plans. Our decision whether and when
to add a technology reflected our
consideration of the practicability of
applying a specific technology and the
necessity for lead-time in its
application.
The agency recognized that vehicle
manufacturers must have sufficient lead
time to incorporate changes and new
features into their vehicles. Further, in
making its lead time determinations, the
agency considered the fact that vehicle
manufacturers follow design cycles
when introducing or significantly
modifying a product. In addition to
considering lead time, the agency added
technologies in a cost-minimizing
fashion. That is, it generally first added
technologies that were most costeffective.
In evaluating which technologies to
apply, and the sequence in which to
apply them, we followed closely the
NAS report. The NAS report estimated
the incremental benefits and the
incremental costs of technologies that
may be applicable to actual vehicles of
different classes and intended uses (see
NAS p. 40).29 The NAS report also
identified what it called ‘‘cost-efficient
technology packages,’’ i.e.,
combinations of technologies that
would result in fuel economy
improvements sufficient to cover the
purchase price increases that such
technologies would require (see NAS p.
64).
The Stage I analysis includes
technologies that manufacturers state as
being available for use by MY 2008 or
earlier, but are choosing not to use them
in their product plans. Many of these
technologies are currently being used in
today’s light duty truck fleet. These
technologies include non-powertrain
applications such as low rolling
resistance tires, low friction lubricants,
aerodynamic drag reduction, and
electric power steering pumps.
The Stage II analysis includes two
major categories of technological
improvements to the manufacturer’s
fleets, the timing of which is tied as
nearly as possible to planned model
change and engine introduction years.
The first of these categories is
transmission improvements, which
consists of the introduction and
expanded use of 5-speed and 6-speed
29 Additionally, as noted above, the agency has
placed in the docket for this notice a document,
prepared under the auspices of the U.S. Department
of Energy for NHTSA, that updates the estimates of
light-truck fuel economy potential in the 2001
National Academy of Sciences (NAS) report,
‘‘Effectiveness and Impact of Corporate Average
Fuel Economy (CAFE) Standards.’’
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transmissions and continuously variable
transmissions (CVTs). The application
of CVTs was restricted to vehicles that
are not designed for rugged off-road
applications and/or the need to haul
heavy loads, such as smaller unibody
SUVs. The second category was engine
improvements, and consisted of
gradually upgrading all light truck
engines to include multi-valve overhead
camshafts, introducing engines with
more than 2-valves per cylinder,
applying variable valve timing/variable
valve lift and timing to multi-valve
overhead camshaft engines, and
applying cylinder deactivation to 6- and
8-cylinder engines.
The Stage III analysis included
projections of the potential CAFE
increase that could result from the
application of diesel engines and hybrid
powertrains to some products. Both
diesel engines and hybrid powertrains
appear in several manufacturers plans
within the MY 2008–2010 timeframe,
and other manufacturers have publicly
indicated that they are looking seriously
into both technologies.
Some of the technologies considered
under the Stage Analysis have been
used in production for over a decade;
e.g., engine friction reduction and low
friction lubricants. Some have only
recently been incorporated in light
trucks; e.g., 5-speed and 6-speed
automatic transmissions and variable
valve timing. Others have been under
development for a number of years, but
have not yet been produced in
significant quantity for an extended
period of time (e.g., cylinder
deactivation, variable valve lift and
timing, CVT, integrated starter
generator, and hybrid drive trains).
Our analysis included the possibility
of limited vehicle weight reduction for
vehicles over 5,000 lbs. curb weight
where we determined that weight
reduction would not reduce overall
safety and would be a cost effective
choice.30 We determined that reducing
the weight of these vehicles would not
reduce overall safety. The Kahane study
found that the net safety effect of
removing 100 pounds from a light truck
is zero for light trucks with a curb
weight greater than 3,900 lbs.31
However, given the significant statistical
uncertainty around that figure, we
30 The amount of projected weight reduction was
two percent for light trucks with a curb weight
between 5,000 and 6,000 lbs and up to four percent
for light trucks with a curb weight over 6,000 lbs.
31 Kahane, Charles J., PhD, Vehicle Weight,
Fatality Risk and Crash Compatibility of Model
Year 1991–99 Passenger Cars and Light Trucks,
October 2003. DOT HS 809 662. Page 161. Docket
No. NHTSA–2003–16318 (https://www.nhtsa.dot.
gov/cars/rules/regrev/evaluate/pdf/809662.pdf).
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assumed a confidence bound of
approximately 1,000 lbs. and used 5,000
lbs. as the threshold for considering
weight reduction.32 We used weight
reduction primarily in conjunction with
a planned vehicle redesign or freshening
and sometimes in concert with a
reduction in aerodynamic drag.
Further, our Stage Analysis does not
apply technologies where it is not
technically sensible to do so. For
instance, we estimate that replacing an
overhead valve engine with a multivalve overhead camshaft engine of the
same displacement and replacing a 4speed automatic transmission with a 5or 6-speed automatic transmission offer
about the same potential level of
improvement. One of them may be more
attractive to a particular manufacturer
because of its cost, ease of
manufacturing, or the model lines to
which it would apply.
The technologically feasible fuel
economy levels determined under the
Stage Analysis were then input into the
Volpe model. The Volpe model uses a
technology application algorithm
developed by Volpe Center staff to
apply technologies to manufacturers’
baselines in order to achieve the fuel
economy levels produced under the
Stage Analysis. This algorithm
systematically applies consistent cost
and performance assumptions to the
entire industry, as well as consistent
assumptions regarding economic
decision-making by manufacturers.
Technologies were selected and applied
in order of ‘‘effective cost,’’ (total
cost ¥ fine reduction ¥ fuel savings
value) / (number of affected vehicles).33
This formula is a private cost concept,
32 See the discussion of ‘‘Effect of Weight and
Performance Reductions on Light Truck Fuel
Economy’’ in Chapter V of the PRIA.
33 In the current model year, the system begins by
carrying over any technologies applied in the
preceding model year, based on commonality of
engines and transmissions, as well as any identified
predecessor/successor relationships among vehicle
models. At each subsequent step toward
compliance by a given manufacturer in the current
model year, the system considers all engines,
transmissions, and vehicles produced by the
manufacturer and all technologies that may be
applied to those engines, transmissions, and
vehicles, where the applicability of technologies is
governed by a number of constraints related to
engineering and product planning. The system
selects the specific application of a technology (i.e.,
the application of a given technology to a given
engine, transmission, vehicle model, or group of
vehicle models) that yields the lowest ‘‘effective
cost’’, which the system calculates by taking (1) the
cost (retail price equivalent) to apply the technology
times the number of affected vehicles, and
subtracting (2) the reduction of civil penalties
achieved by applying the technology, and
subtracting (3) the estimated value to vehicle buyers
of the reduction in fuel outlays achieved by
applying the technology, and dividing the sum of
these components by the number of affected
vehicles.
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i.e., it looks at costs to the manufacturer.
It is used to predict how a manufacturer
would sequence the addition of
technologies to meet a given standard.
The level of fuel economy
improvement resulting from the Stage
Analysis provides the basis for the
proposed Unreformed CAFE standards.
The Volpe model was then used to
estimate benefits and costs. The Volpe
model is given, as an input, the level of
fuel economy improvement and then
proceeds to analyze what technologies
can be added to meet the standard
determined by the Stage Analysis.
Although similar, the two analyses do
not apply exactly the same technologies.
Both are merely ways of achieving the
given standard, not predictions of how
manufacturers will actually meet it. As
explained below in the section on
economic practicability and other
economic issues, additional analysis
was performed to ensure that the
proposed Unreformed CAFE standards
are economically practicable for the
industry.
In its submission, General Motors
described a variety of technologies that
could be used to improve fuel economy.
For each such technology, General
Motors included its estimated fuel
economy benefit, the basis for that
estimate, whether the benefit was direct
or interactive, a description of how the
technology works and how it increases
fuel economy, when the technology
would be available for use, its potential
applications, where it is currently
employed in General Motors’ light truck
fleets, where the technology could
potentially be used, risks in employing
the technology, and potential impacts
on noise, vibration and harshness
(NVH), safety, emissions, cargo and
towing capacity.
The agency relied on these
descriptions in determining which
technologies General Motors could
employ in its fleet during MYs 2008–
2010.34 To assess the fuel economy
impacts of these technologies, we used
either the NAS report’s mid-range
numbers 35 or, when General Motors
submitted higher numbers for a
34 The determination of technology application
that could be employed by a specific manufacturer
was based on confidential information provided by
each manufacturer. The nature of this confidential
information would become apparent from listing
the technologies applied by the agency and
therefore our discussion in the public document is
of a general nature.
35 The NAS report (p. 42) assessed the fuel
consumption impact of technologies applicable to
light trucks, including emerging technologies. For
most of these technologies, the NAS report
presented a range of potential fuel consumption
improvement attributable to each technology.
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51427
particular technology, we used General
Motors’ numbers.
As a result of the Stage Analysis, we
have tentatively concluded that, for
MYs 2008–2010, General Motors is the
least capable of the manufacturers that
have a significant share of the light
truck market. To ensure that the
proposed Unreformed CAFE
improvements would not lead to
economically severe consequences for
the industry, we have given particular
regard to General Motors’ projected
capabilities when balancing the
statutory factors to arrive at the
proposed standards.
We note that when we established the
light truck CAFE standards for MYs
2005–2007, we set the standard for MY
2007 at a level somewhat beyond that
we had determined technologically
achievable by General Motors, then also
the ‘‘least capable manufacturer.’’ We
will carefully review the updated
product plans that we anticipate
General Motors will submit and will
review the projections for General
Motors’ capability when deciding upon
final light truck standards for these
model years. As directed by law, we
will balance all the statutory factors, as
well as our concern for motor vehicle
safety, before conclusively determining
the appropriate level of light truck
CAFE standards for MYs 2008–2010.
Ford and DaimlerChrysler each
submitted information similar to that
provided by General Motors. The agency
engaged in the same type of analysis in
assessing the potential fuel economy
capabilities for those manufacturers.
The agency also engaged in the same
type of analysis in assessing the
potential fuel economy capabilities for
Honda, Hyundai, Nissan and Toyota,
although the information provided by
those companies was less detailed than
that of DaimlerChrysler, Ford and
General Motors.
Upon reviewing the product plans
and making adjustments as described—
and balancing the nation’s need to
conserve energy with what is
technologically feasible, economically
practicable and unlikely to produce
adverse consequences—we have
tentatively determined that the
following light truck CAFE standards
are the maximum feasible fuel economy
levels achievable:
MY 2008–22.5.
MY 2009–23.1.
MY 2010–23.5.
D. Economic Practicability and Other
Economic Issues
As explained above, the agency has
historically reviewed whether a CAFE
standard is economically practicable in
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terms of whether the standard is one
‘‘within the financial capability of the
industry, but not so stringent as to
threaten substantial economic hardship
for the industry.’’ See, e.g., Public
Citizen, 848 F.2d at 264. In the Stage
Analysis, technologies are applied to
project fuel economy levels that would
be technologically feasible for a
manufacturer. When considering
economic practicability, the agency
reviews whether technologically
feasible levels may lead to adverse
economic consequences, such as a
significant loss of sales or the
unreasonable elimination of consumer
choice. The agency must ‘‘weigh the
benefits to the nation of a higher fuel
economy standard against the
difficulties of individual automobile
manufacturers.’’ CAS, 793 F.2d at 1332.
The agency has estimated not only the
anticipated costs that would be borne by
General Motors, Ford, DaimlerChrysler,
Honda, Hyundai, Nissan and Toyota to
comply with the standards under the
Unreformed CAFE system, but also the
significance of the societal benefits
anticipated to be achieved through fuel
savings and other economic benefits
from reduced petroleum use. In regard
to economic impacts on manufacturers
and societal benefits, we have relied on
the Volpe model to determine a
probable range of costs and benefits.
The Volpe model was used to
evaluate the standards initially
produced under the Stage Analysis in
order to estimate their overall economic
impact as measured in terms of
increases in new vehicle prices on a
manufacturer-wide, industry-wide, and
average per-vehicle basis. Like the Stage
Analysis, the Volpe model relies on the
detailed product plans submitted by
manufacturers, as well as available data
relating to manufacturers that had not
submitted detailed information. The
Volpe model is used to trace the
incremental steps (and their associated
costs) that a manufacturer would take
toward achieving the standards initially
suggested by the Stage Analysis.
Based on the Stage and Volpe
analyses, we have concluded that these
standards would not significantly affect
employment or competition, and that—
while challenging—they are achievable
within the framework described above,
and that they would benefit society
considerably. For this analysis, we have
where possible translated the benefits
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into dollar values and compared those
values to our estimated costs for this
proposed rule.
1. Costs
In order to comply with the proposed
Unreformed CAFE standards, we
estimate the average incremental cost
per vehicle to be $56 for MY 2008, $130
for MY 2009, and $185 for MY 2010.
The total incremental cost (the cost
necessary to bring the corporate average
fuel economy for light trucks from 22.2
mpg (the standard for MY 2007) to the
proposed standards) is estimated to be
$528 million for MY 2008, $1,244
million for MY 2009, and $1,798 million
for MY 2010.
Our cost estimates for the proposed
standards under the Unreformed CAFE
system were based on the application of
technologies and the resulting costs to
individual manufacturers. We assumed
that manufacturers would apply
technologies on a cost-effectiveness
basis (as described above). More
specifically, within the range of values
anticipated for each technology, we
selected the most plausible cost impacts
and fuel consumption impacts during
the model years under consideration.
Using the estimated costs and fuel
savings for the different technologies,
the agency then examined the
projections provided by different
manufacturers for their light truck fleet
fuel economy for MYs 2008–2010.
Although the details of the projections
by individual manufacturers are
confidential, present fuel economy
performance indicates that some
manufacturers would, if their planned
fleets remain unchanged, be able to
meet the proposed standards without
significant expenditures. Other
manufacturers would need to expend
significantly more effort than that called
for in their product plans to meet the
proposed standards.
Some manufacturers might achieve
more fuel savings than others using
similar technologies on a vehicle-byvehicle basis due to differences in
vehicle weight and other technologies
present. However, this analysis assumes
an equal impact from specific
technologies for all manufacturers and
vehicles. The technologies were ranked
based on the cost per percentage point
improvement in fuel consumption and
applied where available to each
manufacturer’s fleet in their order of
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rank. The complete list of the
technologies and the agency’s estimates
of cost and associated fuel savings can
be found in the PRIA.
The level of additional expenditure
necessary beyond already planned
investment varies for each individual
manufacturer. We based expenditures
on cost estimates we developed for
various technologies that are both
available to and technologically feasible
for manufacturers within the time frame
covered by this NPRM.
Our cost analysis recognizes the
importance of the competitive market.
We believe that the standards proposed
under the Unreformed CAFE system
will not limit the availability of vehicles
that consumers need and want. We
believe that the standards established in
this final rule will not result in
noticeable changes to power-to-weight
ratios, towing capacity or cargo and
passenger hauling ability. In short, the
standards will not affect the utility of
available vehicles and therefore should
not conflict with consumer preferences.
2. Benefits
In the PRIA, the agency analyzes the
economic and environmental benefits of
the proposed Unreformed CAFE
standards by estimating fuel savings
over the lifetime of each model year
(approximately 26 years). Benefit
estimates include both the benefits to
consumers in terms of reduced fuel use
and other savings such as the reduced
externalities generated by the importing,
refining and consuming of petroleum
products.
The benefits of the proposed increases
in the Unreformed CAFE standards are
estimated to be $64 per vehicle for MY
2008, $142 per vehicle for MY 2009, and
$206 per vehicle for MY 2010. The total
value of these benefits is estimated to be
$605 million for MY 2008, $1,366
million for MY 2009 and $2,007 million
for MY 2010, based on fuel prices
ranging from $1.51 to $1.58 per gallon.
(See the discussion of current fuel
prices vs. the fuel prices during the
lifetime of the MY 2008–2010 light
trucks in section II.J. Recent
developments, above.)
3. Comparison of estimated costs to
estimated benefits
Table 2 compares the incremental
costs and benefits for the Unreformed
CAFE standards.
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TABLE 2.—COMPARISON OF INCREMENTAL COSTS AND BENEFITS FOR THE PROPOSED UNREFORMED CAFE STANDARDS
(In millions)
MY 2008
MY 2009
MY 2010
$528
$605
$1,244
$1,366
$1,798
$2,007
Total incremental costs* ......................................................................................................................................
Total incremental benefits* ..................................................................................................................................
* Relative to the 22.2 mpg standard for MY 2007.
These estimates are provided as
present values determined by applying
a 7 percent discount rate to the future
impacts. In the PRIA, we also use a 3
percent discount rate for discounting
benefits and costs, and request comment
on what discount rates are appropriate
for this rulemaking, including 3, 7, and
10 percent (see Section VIII in the PRIA
for a more detailed discussion). To the
extent possible, we translated impacts
other than direct fuel savings into dollar
values and then factored them into our
cumulative estimates. We obtained
forecasts of light truck sales for future
years from AEO2005. Based on these
forecasts, NHTSA estimated that
approximately 9,480,200 light trucks
would be sold in MY 2008. For MYs
2009 and 2010, we estimated 9,613,100
and 9,754,000 light truck sales,
respectively.
We calculated the reduced fuel
consumption of MY 2008–2010 light
trucks by comparing their consumption
under the proposed standards for those
years to the consumption they would
have if the MY 2007 CAFE standard of
22.2 mpg remained in effect during
those years. First, the estimated fuel
consumption of MY 2008–2010 light
trucks was determined by dividing the
total number of miles driven during the
vehicles’ remaining lifetime by the fuel
economy level they were projected to
achieve under the 22.2 mpg standard.
Then, we assumed that if these same
light trucks were produced to comply
with higher CAFE standards for those
years, their total fuel consumption
during each future calendar year would
equal the total number of miles driven
(including the increased number of
miles driven because of the ‘‘rebound
effect,’’ the tendency of drivers to
respond to increases in fuel economy in
the same manner as they respond to
decreases in fuel prices, i.e., by driving
more),36 divided by the higher fuel
economy they would achieve as a result
of that standard. The fuel savings during
each future year that would result from
the higher CAFE standard is the
36 As described in detail in the PRIA, we use a
20% rebound effect based on a thorough review of
the literature. We are nonetheless aware that there
is ongoing research in this area, and will continue
to assess this assumption in light of new evidence.
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difference between each model year’s
fuel use and the fuel use that would
occur if the MY 2007 standard remained
in effect. This analysis results in
estimated lifetime fuel savings of 0.8
billion, 1.9 billion, and 2.7 billion
gallons for MYs 2008, 2009, and 2010,
respectively.
Finally, we assessed the present value
of each year’s fuel savings by
multiplying the total number of gallons
saved by the forecast fuel prices for that
year and applying a 7 percent discount
rate. (As noted above, we also used a 3
percent discount rate in the PRIA.) Fuel
price forecasts were obtained from EIA’s
Annual Energy Outlook 2005 and
adjusted to exclude state and local
taxes. This analysis resulted in values
for estimated lifetime fuel savings of
$938 million, $2,114 million, and
$3,092 million under the proposed
Unreformed CAFE standards for MY
2008, 2009, and 2010, respectively,
based on fuel prices ranging from $1.51
to $1.58 per gallon.
In the PRIA, we also analyze other
effects of the proposed standards, e.g.,
the impact on vehicle and refinery
emissions, gasoline tanker truck
emissions, and the rebound effect. Our
analysis indicates that the MY 2008
standard would result in a net reduction
of criteria pollutants with a present
value of $15.5 million. For MY 2009,
this net reduction would have a present
value of $34.8 million and for MY 2010
the net reduction of criteria pollutants
would have a present value of $52.1
million. We calculate per mile emission
rates using EPA’s Mobile 6.2 motor
vehicle emissions factor model, and
monetized changes in total emission
levels for criteria pollutants associated
with gasoline production, distribution,
and combustion.37 We also discuss nonmonetized effects.
A more detailed explanation of our
analysis is provided in the PRIA and the
draft Environmental Assessment.
37 The criteria pollutants used for the agency’s
analysis are carbon monoxide, volatile organic
compounds, nitrogen oxides, fine particulate
matter, and sulfur dioxide. Tailpipe emissions from
light trucks are predicted to increase under this
rulemaking due to the rebound effect, while
emissions from refineries and gasoline tanker trucks
are predicted to decrease due to a reduction in
gasoline consumption.
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4. Uncertainty
The agency recognizes that science
does not permit precise estimates of
benefits and costs. NHTSA performed a
probabilistic uncertainty analysis to
examine the degree of uncertainty in the
costs and benefits. Factors examined
included technology costs, technology
effectiveness in improving fuel
economy, fuel prices, the value of oil
import externalities, and the rebound
effect. This analysis employed Monte
Carlo simulation techniques to examine
the range of possible variation in these
factors. The analysis indicates that the
agency is highly certain that the social
benefits of the proposed CAFE levels
will exceed their costs for all 3 model
years of Unreformed standards included
in the proposal.
We solicit comment on whether
proposed levels of maximum feasible
CAFE reflect an appropriate balancing
of the statutory and other relevant
factors. Based on those comments and
other information, including additional
data and analysis, the standards adopted
in the final rule could well be different.
IV. The Reformed CAFE Proposal for
MYs 2008–2011
We are proposing to establish
Reformed standards for MYs 2008–2011.
As noted above, manufacturers would
have a choice of complying with either
Unreformed standards or Reformed
standards during the transition period
spanning MYs 2008–2010. The
transition process should assist the
agency in learning about the industry’s
experiences with Reformed CAFE and
determining the best approach in future
rulemakings.
A. Proposed Approach to Reform
The structure of Reformed CAFE for
each model year would have three basic
elements—
(1)—Six footprint 38 categories of
vehicles.
(2)—A target level of average fuel
economy for each footprint category, as
expressed by a step function. (The step
or ‘‘staircase’’ nature of the function can
be seen in Figure 2 below.)
38 Footprint is an aspect of vehicle size—the
product of multiplying a vehicle’s wheelbase by its
average track width.
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(3)—a Reformed CAFE standard based
on the harmonic production-weighted
average of the fuel economy targets for
each category.
The required level of CAFE for a
particular manufacturer for a model year
would be calculated after inserting the
following data into the standard for that
model year: That manufacturer’s actual
total production and its production in
each footprint category for that model
year.39 The calculation of the required
level would be made by dividing the
manufacturer’s total production for the
model year by the sum of the six
fractions (one for each category)
obtained by dividing the manufacturer’s
39 Since the calculation of a manufacturer’s
required level of average fuel economy for a
particular model year would require knowing the
final production figures for that model year, the
final formal calculation of that level would not
occur until after those figures are submitted by the
manufacturer to EPA. That submission would not,
of course, be made until after the end of that model
year.
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production in a category by the
category’s target.
1. Distribution into footprint categories
Initially, the agency has made a
preliminary determination to place light
trucks up to 8,500 lbs. GVWR into six
categories based on vehicle footprint. As
discussed more fully below, the agency
chose vehicle footprint as the best
potential attribute to use as the basis of
a Reformed CAFE program because it is
an attribute which would best assure
consistency in vehicle design and
structure between model years, is
consistent with our safety concerns, and
may encourage the development and
availability of light-weight materials
whose use might advance fuel economy
and preserve or maybe even enhance
safety.
The six categories were defined after
placing planned light truck production
onto a distribution plot by footprint. We
then sought to place the category
boundaries generally at points
indicating low volume immediately to
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the left and high volume immediately to
the right. Our intent in doing so was to
avoid providing an incentive to increase
vehicle size in order to move a model
into a category with a lower target. We
sought to create a reasonable number of
categories that would also combine, to
the extent practicable, similar vehicle
types into the same category
structures.40
Our preliminary assessment of the
categories is based on the product plan
information available to us when
devising this proposal. These categories
may change based upon our review of
updated product plans received in
response to this NPRM.
Figure 1 provides the distribution of
projected MY 2008–2010 aggregate sales
for the industry:
BILLING CODE 4910–59–P
40 Our effort to do so explains why the boundary
between categories 4 and 5 is between integers. The
agency chose a non-integer boundary for this
boundary because, in doing so, it kept vehicles with
the same nameplate and utility within the same
grouping.
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In determining the number and
location of categories, the agency used
its best judgment applying the
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considerations set forth above. The
agency has made the preliminary
determination to establish 6 categories
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for purposes of this rulemaking, based
on vehicle footprint, as shown in Table
2:
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TABLE 2.—PROPOSED FOOTPRINT CATEGORIES
Footprint categories
1
Range of vehicle footprint (sq. ft.) ...................................
In future rulemakings, the agency may
adjust the footprint categories if
necessary to better represent the fleets
projected for the model years covered.
2. Targets
For each of MYs 2008–2011, the
agency established a target average fuel
economy level for each of the six
footprint categories. The CAFE standard
would be the harmonic productionweighted average of those targets. Thus,
the average fuel economy of a
manufacturer’s vehicles in any
particular footprint category need not
meet the target for that footprint
category. However, to the extent a
manufacturer’s vehicles fall short of the
target in any footprint category, that
shortfall would need to be offset by
exceeding the target in one or more
other footprint categories.
a. Overview of target selection process
We used a three-phase process for
determining targets that represent the
social optimum for the manufacturers as
a group:
In phase one, we applied technologies
to the fleet of each of the seven largest
manufacturers individually until we
reached the point at which the marginal
cost of adding technology equaled the
marginal benefit of that technology for
that manufacturer. We then placed the
modified fleets into the categories.41
In phase two, for each category, we
determined the position of the targets
relative to each other and a temporary
level of the targets by calculating the
average CAFE of those of the seven
largest manufacturers that had vehicles
in that category.
In phase three, we determined the
proposed level of the targets by
simultaneously adjusting all of the
targets upward or downward by a
41 The seven manufacturers are General Motors,
Ford, DaimlerChrysler, Toyota, Honda, Hyundai
and Nissan. We did not include four additional
manufacturers that sell light trucks—Volkswagen,
BMW, Porsche and Subaru—because the first three
historically have paid civil penalties in lieu of
selling a compliant fleet of light trucks and Subaru’s
market share is considerably smaller than any other
company in this market. Together, the seven largest
manufacturers account for approximately 95
percent of the market.
Looking at each manufacturer in this group of
manufacturers, instead of just the least capable
manufacturer as under Unreformed CAFE, provides
us with a much fuller, more robust, and
representative, understanding and estimate of
industry-wide capabilities.
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≤ 43.0
2
3
4
5
> 43.0–47.0
> 47.0–52.0
> 52.0–56.5
> 56.5–65.0
uniform increment of fuel consumption
until we reached the level at which the
marginal cost of adding technology to
meet that level equaled the marginal
benefit of that technology for the seven
largest manufacturers, as a group.
This process for determining targets
was based on the application of
technology under the Volpe model.
Unlike the Unreformed CAFE system,
the Stage Analysis was not used.
b. Industry-wide considerations in
selecting the targets
An Unreformed CAFE standard
specifies a ‘‘one size fits all’’ (uniform)
level of CAFE that applies to each
manufacturer and is set with particular
regard to the lowest projected level of
CAFE among the manufacturers that
have a significant share of the market.
The manufacturer with the lowest
projected CAFE level has typically been
referred to as the ‘‘least capable’’
manufacturer.
As noted above, in selecting the
Reformed CAFE targets, we looked at
the seven largest manufacturers, instead
of focusing primarily on the least
capable manufacturer, because under
Reformed CAFE, it is unnecessary to set
standards with particular regard to the
capabilities of a single manufacturer in
order to ensure that the standards are
technologically feasible and
economically practicable for all
manufacturers with a significant share
of the market. This is true both fleet
wide and within any individual
category of vehicles.
We note that the term ‘‘least capable’’
manufacturer is something of a
misnomer since a manufacturer’s
projected level of CAFE is determined
by two factors: the extent to which small
or large vehicles predominate in the
manufacturer’s planned production mix,
and the type and amount of fuel saving
technologies that the manufacturer is
deemed capable of applying. Two
manufacturers may apply the same type
and amount of fuel saving technologies
to their fleets, yet have differing CAFE
levels, if the proportions of small
vehicles and large vehicles in each
manufacturer’s fleet are not identical.
Thus, a full line manufacturer may have
a lower overall CAFE than a
manufacturer concentrating its
production in the smaller footprint
categories, even though the former
manufacturer has applied as much (or
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> 65.0
more) technology as the latter
manufacturer.
We have set the Unreformed
standards with particular regard to the
‘‘least capable’’ manufacturer in
response to the direction in the
conference report on the CAFE statute
language to consider industry-wide
considerations, but not necessarily base
the standards on the manufacturer with
the greatest compliance difficulties. By
focusing primarily on the least capable
manufacturer with a significant share of
the market, this approach has ensured
that the standards are technologically
feasible and economically practicable
for all or most of the manufacturers with
a significant share of the market. If a
standard is technologically feasible and
economically practicable for the ‘‘least
capable’’ manufacturer, it can be
presumed to be so for the ‘‘more
capable’’ manufacturers. Together, the
manufacturers with a significant share
of the market represented a very
substantial majority of the light trucks
manufactured and thus were deemed to
represent ‘‘industry-wide
considerations.’’
However, this approach limits the
amount of fuel saving possible under
Unreformed CAFE. In the Unreformed
system, the agency is constrained by the
least capable manufacturer to a much
larger degree than in the Reformed
system. Since the Unreformed system is
a uniform, one-size-fits-all standard, the
least capable manufacturer is the one
that specializes primarily in larger light
trucks. Even though these vehicles may
be efficient, they have low fuel
economy. The Unreformed standard is
set relative to the baseline fuel economy
of the least capable manufacturer. This
means that other manufacturers making
smaller vehicles are not required to
make improvements in order to comply
because their vehicles get higher fuel
economy yet may not be very efficient.
The Reformed system takes
manufacturer fleet mix into account and
requires everyone to improve fuel
economy by mandating similar levels of
efficiency.
There is only one way under
Unreformed CAFE of requiring the
‘‘more capable’’ manufacturers with a
significant share of the market, i.e.,
those with projected levels of CAFE
higher than the level projected for the
‘‘least capable’’ manufacturer, to apply
more fuel saving technologies than they
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were already planning to apply. That
way would be for the agency to set a
standard above the capabilities of the
‘‘least capable’’ manufacturer.
There is no need under Reformed
CAFE to set the standards with
particular regard to the capabilities of
the ‘‘least capable’’ manufacturer.
Indeed, it would often be difficult to
identify which manufacturer should be
deemed the ‘‘least capable’’
manufacturer under Reformed CAFE.
The ‘‘least capable’’ manufacturer
approach was simply a way of
implementing the guidance in the
conference report in the specific context
of Unreformed CAFE.
This proposal would change the
context. The very structure of Reformed
CAFE standards makes it unnecessary to
continue to use that particular approach
in order to be responsive to guidance in
the conference report. Instead of
specifying a common level of CAFE, a
Reformed CAFE standard specifies a
variable level of CAFE that varies based
on the production mix of each
manufacturer. By basing the level
required for an individual manufacturer
on that manufacturer’s own mix, a
Reformed CAFE standard in effect
recognizes and accommodates
differences in production mix between
full- and part-line manufacturers, and
between manufacturers that concentrate
on small vehicles and those that
concentrate on large ones.
There is an additional reason for
ceasing to use the ‘‘least capable’’
manufacturer approach. There would be
relatively limited added fuel savings
under Reformed CAFE if we continued
to use the ‘‘least capable’’ manufacturer
approach even though there ceased to be
a need to use it. (This reasoning is very
similar to the reasoning the agency used
under Unreformed CAFE when we
rejected the suggestion by Mercedes
Benz that we should set the standards
at the level achievable by very small
manufacturers.42 In rejecting that
suggestion, we cited the language from
the conference report about considering
industry-wide considerations and not
basing the standards on the
42 61
FR 145, 154; January 3, 1996.
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manufacturer with the greatest
difficulties.)
c. Relative position of the targets
The first phase in determining the
footprint category targets was to
determine separately for each
manufacturer the overall level of CAFE
that would maximize the net benefits for
that manufacturer’s vehicles.
In this phase, as noted above, we
considered the fleet of each of the seven
largest manufacturers without respect to
specific footprint category to which
each of their vehicles is assigned. To
find the socially optimal point for each
of these seven manufacturers, i.e., the
point at which the incremental or
marginal change in costs equals the
incremental or marginal change in
benefits for that manufacturer, we used
the Volpe model to compute the total
costs and total benefits of exceeding the
baseline 43 CAFE by progressively larger
increments. We began by exceeding the
baseline by 0.1 mpg. We then used the
model to calculate the total costs and
total benefits of exceeding the baseline
by 0.2 mpg. The marginal costs and
benefits were then computed as the
difference between the total costs and
total benefits resulting from exceeding
the baseline by 0.1 mpg and the total
costs and benefits resulting from
exceeding the baseline by 0.2 mpg. We
then used the Volpe model to calculate
the total costs and total benefits of
exceeding the baseline by 0.3 mpg and
computed the difference between the
total costs and benefits between 0.2 mpg
43 An important distinction needs to be made
between the baseline and the manufacturer’s
product plan mpg. As discussed earlier, ‘‘baseline’’
is defined as the fuel economy that would exist
absent of the rulemaking, i.e., the model year 2007
standard of 22.2 mpg. The 22.2 mpg baseline differs
from the mpg level reported in a manufacturer’s
product plan. Some manufacturers report fuel
economy levels that are below 22.2 mpg. In that
case, the cost and benefits of going from the product
plan mpg to the baseline (22.2) mpg are not counted
as costs and benefits of the rulemaking, as they
were already counted in the MY 2005–2007 final
rule. Only costs and benefits associated with going
from baseline mpg to a higher standard are counted.
It is important to note that since technology is
applied on a cost effective basis, the most cost
effective technologies will be used to get a
manufacturer from the product plan mpg to the
baseline mpg.
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51433
and 0.3 mpg to determine the marginal
costs and benefits.
We continued making similar
iterations until marginal costs equaled
marginal benefits for that manufacturer.
Performing this iterative process
individually for each manufacturer
pushed each of the seven largest
manufacturers to a point at which net
benefits are maximized for each
manufacturer’s vehicles.
In the second phase, we took the
results of phase one, i.e., each
manufacturer’s vehicles as modified by
the technologies added to them in that
phase, and placed the vehicles into the
categories based on their footprints.
Then, for each category, we determined
the average fuel economy of each of the
largest seven manufacturers that had
vehicles in that footprint category. We
then calculated a single harmonic mean
for each footprint category based on the
average fuel economy of each of the
manufacturers selling vehicles in that
footprint category.
The level of the single harmonic
average or temporary target for each
footprint category relative to the levels
of the temporary targets for the other
footprint categories defines the ‘‘shape’’
of the function on which the standard
is based. The shape remains unchanged
throughout the equal increment
adjustments in phase three below since
the absolute differences (on a gallon per
mile basis) between the targets are
unaffected by those adjustments.
Figure 2 provides an illustrative
example. The figure depicts a step or
‘‘staircase’’ function that steps down,
left to right, from the highest target (for
the footprint category with the vehicles
having the smallest footprints, i.e.,
footprint category 1) to the lowest target
(for the footprint category with the
vehicles having the largest footprints,
i.e., footprint category 6).44 For any
value of footprint within the range of
footprints included in a particular
category, the fuel economy target is the
same.
44 Although the height of each step in the
hypothetical shown in the figure is identical, it is
unlikely that any two steps would be identical in
height.
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levels does not necessarily result in
values that correspond to the optimized
level of effort for the entire industry, as
represented by the seven largest
manufacturers, as a group. To ensure
that the step function is placed at the
level that results in a standard that is
optimal for the seven largest
manufacturers, as a group, phase three
involves the computation of total and
marginal costs and benefits across the
entire industry (using the combination
of the largest seven manufacturers as a
proxy for the entire industry), instead of
manufacturer by manufacturer.
We begin phase three where we began
phase one, i.e., with each
manufacturer’s baseline CAFE derived,
where available, from its product plans.
For MY 2011, we used the same
baselines as we did for MY 2010, except
for manufacturers for which we had MY
2011 product plans from the
manufacturer and thus had a MY 2011
baseline. After converting each
temporary target (determined in phase
two) from miles per gallon to gallons per
mile so that we could adjust the
footprint category targets by a uniform
increment of fuel savings,45 we adjusted
all six targets by an equal increment and
then converted them back to miles per
gallon. We adjusted each category target
by an equal increment so that the final
category target remained relatively close
to each manufacturer’s individual
optimal level in that category (i.e., the
manufacturer-specific levels determined
in the first phase).
The direction of these adjustments
can be either upward or downward,
depending on the marginal costs and
benefits. An example of the process of
adjusting the targets, while maintaining
the shape of the step function, is
illustrated in Figure 3:
45 The relationship between miles per gallon and
fuel savings is not linear. An increase from 20 mpg
to 21 mpg results in a greater fuel savings than an
increase from 30 mpg to 31 mpg. Conversely, the
relationship between gallons per mile and fuel
savings is linear. A change from 0.10 gallons per
mile to 0.09 gallons per mile provides the same fuel
savings as going from 0.20 gallons per mile to 0.19
gallons per mile.
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d. Level of the targets
For each model year after the
transition period of MYs 2008–2010,
i.e., beginning with MY 2011, the third
phase involves determining the level of
the CAFE targets (and thus the level of
the standard) that would require the
economically efficient amount of effort
by the seven largest manufacturers, as a
group, to improve fuel economy. The
process for determining the targets that
require that amount of overall effort
resembles, but is not identical to the
process used in phase one for
determining the optimum levels of each
individual manufacturer.
This third phase of adjustment is
necessary because while the
economically efficient level of CAFE for
each individual manufacturer was
determined in phase one, the
calculation in phase two of the category
averages of those manufacturer-specific
Using the Volpe model, we applied to
each manufacturer’s baseline the
technologies necessary for that
manufacturer to reach the adjusted
targets. Based on each manufacturer’s
baseline, we then calculated total costs
and benefits for each manufacturer.
Then we added the costs for each of the
seven manufacturers together. Likewise,
we added the benefits together.
We then adjusted each target a second
time by the same increment. Again we
added the technologies to the baselines
and again calculated the total costs and
benefits for the seven manufacturers.
Then we compared those totals (for the
seven manufacturers) for the second
adjusted level to the totals for reaching
the first adjusted level, yielding the
marginal costs and benefits of the
adjustment. After each additional
adjustment in the targets, we
determined marginal costs and benefits.
We stopped adjusting the targets when
we reached the point where marginal
costs equaled marginal benefits for the
industry as a whole. This is the point at
which industry-wide net benefits are
maximized. The required levels of CAFE
that are determined for each
manufacturer based on this final
adjustment of targets in phase three
differ from the levels of CAFE
determined for each individual
manufacturer in phase one. The
difference ranges from 1.2 mpg higher
for one manufacturer to 0.8 mpg lower
for another manufacturer.
We are proposing this approach
because we believe it can achieve the
maximum level of technologically
feasible and economically practicable
fuel savings. We recognize that we are
premising our preliminary assessment
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of economic practicability on finding
the level of optimal economic
efficiency. We also recognize that the
agency in the past has expressed its
belief that the statutory consideration of
economic practicability differs from, but
does not preclude consideration of,
cost/benefit analysis. (See, e.g., June 30,
1977; 42 FR 33534, at 33536–7)
We note, however, that the cost/
benefit analyses conducted today
(especially in light of the more recent
addition of an uncertainty analysis
required by OMB Circular A–4) are
substantially more robust than those
conducted in decades past and provide
a more substantial basis for
consideration of economic
practicability. We also believe that the
structure of the proposed Reformed
CAFE standard, which respects the mix
the manufacturer is able to sell, but
demands reasonable fuel economy
increases for all vehicle sizes, reduces
the need to focus on more companyspecific and short-term economic
considerations because it provides more
flexibility for the CAFE program to
respond to changing economic and
market conditions.
We note further that the regulatory
philosophy set forth in Executive Order
12866, ‘‘Regulatory Planning and
Review,’’ is that a rulemaking agency
should set its regulatory requirements at
the level that maximizes net benefits
unless its statute prohibits doing so.
EPCA neither requires nor prohibits the
setting of standards at the level at which
net benefits are maximized.
The agency did identify and consider
a variety of benefits and costs that could
not be monetized. On the benefit side,
for example, there is a significant
reduction in carbon dioxide emissions.
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51435
On the cost side, for example, there is
a risk of adverse safety impacts from
downweighting. Overall, the agency
determined that there is no compelling
evidence that these unmonetized
benefits and costs would, taken
together, alter its assessment of the level
of the standard for MY 2011 that would
maximize net benefits. Thus, the agency
determined the stringency of that
standard on the basis of monetized net
benefits.
EPCA does, however, require that the
maximum feasible level be determined
after considering economic
practicability. Thus, it is possible that,
under certain circumstances, NHTSA
might be required to set CAFE standards
below the level at which net benefits are
maximized if considerations of
economic practicability make it
necessary or prudent to set standards at
a lower level. The agency seeks
comment on the advisability and
potential form of any supplementary
methodological approach—beyond
economic efficiency—to ensuring that
Reformed CAFE standards are set at the
level capable of achieving the maximum
feasible fuel savings, as determined after
consideration of the statutory and other
relevant factors.
MYs 2008–2010. In each of the
transition years, we did not adjust the
targets to the optimal level. Instead, we
adjusted the footprint category targets in
equal increments until the total industry
costs under the Reformed program
approximately equaled the total
industry costs under the Unreformed
program. Cost equalization has several
important advantages. Since the
Unreformed standards were judged to be
economically practicable and since the
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Reformed standards spread the cost
burden across the industry to a greater
extent, equalizing the costs between the
two systems ensures that the Reformed
standards are within the realm of
economic practicability.46 Also, cost
equalization promotes an orderly and
effective transition to the Reformed
system by minimizing the cost
differences between the two choices.
3. Standards and required CAFE levels
for individual manufacturers
The Reformed CAFE standard is an
equation for calculating productionweighted, harmonically-averaged fuel
economy in which the footprint
category targets are constants, total
production and footprint category
production are variables, and the
required level of CAFE must be solved.
The equation is separately solved for
each individual manufacturer, using its
total production and its production in
each footprint category. The solution or
answer is the manufacturer’s required
level of CAFE.47
The required level of CAFE for a
manufacturer for a model year would be
the production-weighted harmonic
average fuel economy of that
manufacturer’s entire product line for
that model year, as determined by
inserting the manufacturer’s total
production and production in each
footprint category into the formula. Each
manufacturer would be subject to the
same fuel economy targets for the same
footprint categories and all
manufacturers would be required to
meet the level of CAFE calculated for it
under the same formula. Individual
manufacturers would face different
required levels of CAFE only to the
extent that they produced different
mixes of vehicle models. In this respect,
the proposal would be no different than
if the agency established multiple
classes. Under a multiple class system,
manufacturers would implicitly have
different requirements at the fleet level
as a result of differences in their fleet
mixes.
The required level would then be
compared to the production-weighted
harmonic average fuel economy of a
manufacturer’s entire product line,
based on the actual fuel economy levels
achieved by each model line. If the
value based on the actual fuel economy
levels were at least equal to the required
level of average fuel economy, then a
manufacturer would be in compliance.
If it were greater than that level, the
manufacturer would earn credits usable
in any of the three preceding or
following model years.
More specifically, the manner in
which a manufacturer’s required overall
CAFE for a model year is computed is
similar to the way in which a
manufacturer’s actual CAFE for a model
year is calculated. The required level is
computed on the basis of the number of
vehicles in each footprint category and
the footprint category targets as follows:
Manufacturer X' s Total Production of Light Trucks
= X' s required level of CAFE
X' s production in category 1 X' s production in category 2
+
+ etc
Target for category 1
Target for category 2
This formula can be restated more
compactly as follows:
Required CAFE Level =
6
N / ∑ ( b i / Target
i=1
i-th footprint category.
The required level is then compared
to the CAFE that the manufacturer
actually achieves in the model year in
question:
Actual CAFE =
i
)
(Required CAFE level sum formula)
N is the total number (sum) of light
trucks produced by a manufacturer,
bi is the number (sum) of light trucks
produced by that manufacturer in
the i-th light truck footprint
category, and
Targeti is fuel economy target of the
6
N / ∑ ( b i / Target
i=1
i
)
N is the total number (sum) of light
trucks produced by the
manufacturer,
nj is the number (sum) of the j-th
model light trucks produced by the
manufacturer,
mpgj is the fuel economy of the j-th
model light truck, and
m is the total number of light truck
models produced.
A manufacturer is in compliance if
the actual CAFE meets or exceeds the
required CAFE.
The method of assessing compliance
under Reformed CAFE can be further
explained using an illustrative example
of a manufacturer that produces four
models in two footprint categories with
targets assumed for the purposes of the
example shown in Table 3:
TABLE 3.—ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE OF METHOD OF ASSESSING COMPLIANCE UNDER A STEP FUNCTION APPROACH
46 We equalized aggregate industry costs between
Reformed and Unreformed CAFE. The costs are not
borne by manufacturers in the same way and costs
for individual manufacturers may differ between
the two systems.
47 In response to the agency’s December 1979
proposal of light truck standards for model years
1983–85, the Regulatory Analysis Review Group
(RARG) suggested a similar approach in March
1980: ‘‘setting fuel economy targets for different
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27
24
22
19
100,000
100,000
100,000
100,000
categories of trucks, and using a pre-determined
fleet mix for each manufacturer to turn these targets
into a composite standard.’’ See Report of the
Regulatory Analysis Review Group, Council on
Wage and Price Stability, March 31, 1980,
submitted as attachment to letter from R. Robert
Russell, Director of the Council, to Joan Claybrook,
Administrator, NHTSA (FE–78–01–N01–175). The
RARG was established by President Carter to review
up to 10 of the most important regulations each year
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43
42
52
54
Footprint
category
target (mpg)
Footprint
category
1
1
4
4
27.3
27.3
22.9
22.9
classified as significant under Executive Order
12044. It was chaired by the Council of Economic
Advisors (CEA) and was composed of
representatives of OMB and the economic and
regulatory agencies. It relied on the staff of Council
on Wage and Price Stability and the CEA to develop
evaluations of agency regulations and the associated
economic analyses and to place these analyses in
the public record of the agency proposing to issue
the regulation.
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...............................................................................................................
..............................................................................................................
..............................................................................................................
Footprint
(sq. ft.)
EP30AU05.007
A
B
C
D
Production
(units)
EP30AU05.006
Fuel
economy
(mpg)
Model
Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 167 / Tuesday, August 30, 2005 / Proposed Rules
Under Reformed CAFE, the
manufacturer would be required to
achieve an average fuel economy level
of:
Actual CAFE =
m
N / ∑ n j / mpg j
j=1
(
)
This fuel economy figure would be
compared with the manufacturer’s
51437
actual CAFE for its entire fleet, i.e., the
production-weighted harmonic mean
fuel economy level for four models in its
fleet:
400,000
= 22.6 mpg
100,000
100,000
100,000
100,000
+
+
+
27.0 mpg 24.0 mpg 22.0 mpg 19.0 mpg
48 In the context of products placed in a multicategory or multi-class system for regulatory
purposes, the term ‘‘edge effects’’ refers to the
incentive for the manufacturers of those products to
modify them, particularly the ones located near the
boundary of an adjacent category or class, i.e., an
‘‘edge,’’ so as to move them into a different category
or class where they will receive more favorable
regulatory treatment.
49 Under a continuous function based on
footprint, any increase (or decrease) in footprint
would result in a decrease (or increase) in the fuel
economy target. Under a step function based on
footprint, the fuel economy target does not change
continuously in response to changes in footprint.
The target would increase only at discrete points
over the range of footprint. Under this proposal, the
targets increase only at the boundaries between
adjacent footprint categories.
4. Why this approach to reform and not
another?
a. Step-function vs. continuous function
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fuel economy to determine the overall
required level for each manufacturer.
Compliance is calculated in virtually
the same manner. In the step-function
approach, the denominator of the
required overall target is the sum of the
number of vehicles in each category
divided by the required fuel economy of
the category. In the continuous function
approach, the denominator of the
required overall target is the sum of the
number of vehicle models divided by
the required fuel economy for that
model derived from the function.
Figure 4 shows an illustrative
example of a continuous function.
EP30AU05.009
While manufacturers generally
recognized the potential advantages of
an attribute-based system, several
commenters (including manufacturers)
on the 2003 ANPRM stated that a
continuous function based on one or
more vehicle attributes would be
preferable to a multi-class attributebased system. Commenters stated that a
system based on a continuous function
would remove the ‘‘edge effects’’ 48
associated with a multi-class system,
that determination of the maximum
feasible standard for a continuous
function would prove simpler than
determining maximum feasible
standards for a series of classes, and that
a continuous function could be
structured to eliminate concern
regarding the agency’s authority to
permit credit transfer between classes.49
The continuous function approach
uses a statistically estimated
relationship between vehicle size and
In the illustrative example, the
manufacturer’s actual CAFE (22.6 mpg)
is less than the required level (24.9
mpg), indicating that the manufacturer
is not in compliance.
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The illustrative continuous function
shown in Error! Reference source not
found.4 is defined by the following
mathematical function:
1
1 1
FOOTPRINT
− exp 1 −
A B
C
In the illustrative function,
A = 20.0 mpg
B = 12.9 mpg
C = 15.3 square feet
The mechanics of defining the
continuous function would be similar to
the procedure used to develop the
proposed MY2011 standard. The
iterative process described above in
‘‘phase one’’ would be used to add fuel
saving technologies to the baseline
technologies for each manufacturer’s
vehicles. Data points representing each
vehicle’s size and fuel economy (as
improved through the phase one
process) would then be plotted on a
graph. Using statistical techniques, a
function would then be fitted through
the data to obtain the continuous
function. The last step would be the
same as described above in ‘‘phase
three’’ for the step function, i.e., the
function would be adjusted (raised or
lowered) until industry-wide net
benefits are maximized, in the case of
MY 2011, or until industry-wide costs
are equal to those of the Unreformed
standards, in the case of MYs 2008–
2010.
Determination of the required level of
CAFE (and of compliance with that
level) is accomplished under a
continuous function system in exactly
the same fashion as under the step
function system, except that there are
vehicle model-specific targets, instead
of category targets. For each vehicle
model, the function shown above in
Figure 4 is used to define a target that
depends on footprint. Examples are
shown in the last column of Table 4.
TABLE 4.—ILUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE OF METHOD OF ASSESSING COMPLIANCE UNDER A CONTINUOUS FUNCTION APPROACH
.......................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................................
......................................................................................................................................
......................................................................................................................................
Under Reformed CAFE using this
illustrative continuous function, the
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27
24
22
19
100,000
100,000
100,000
100,000
manufacturer would be required to
achieve a CAFE of:
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Footprint
(sq. ft.)
43
42
52
54
Vehicle
Model Specific Target
(mpg)
26.8
27.4
23.3
22.8
EP30AU05.012
A
B
C
D
Production
(units)
30AUP2
EP30AU05.011
Fuel
Economy
(mpg)
Model
Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 167 / Tuesday, August 30, 2005 / Proposed Rules
Re quired CAFE =
manufacturer’s actual CAFE, i.e., the
production-weighted harmonic mean
In the illustrative example in Figure 4,
the manufacturer’s actual CAFE (22.6
mpg) is less than the required level (24.9
mpg), indicating that the manufacturer
is not in compliance.
A continuous function and a step
function can have similar properties. As
the number of steps in a step function
increases, the difference between the
step function and a continuous function
decreases. If the number of steps
becomes large enough, a graph of the
step function approaches being a
smooth straight or curved line. In other
words, the step function approaches
being a continuous function as the
number of steps becomes large.
If the step function is composed of
only a few categories, then the incentive
to upsize may be strong because the
rewards for doing so will be significant.
The present car/light truck system is a
good example. This is a system with
basically two steps and the burden of
regulatory compliance decreases if a
vehicle can be designed to be classified
as a light truck instead of as a passenger
car.
The same is true for mix shifting.
When the number of categories is large,
the rewards for mix shifting are limited.
This is because the difference in fuel
economy targets between two adjacent
categories is small and would diminish
the credit that could be earned and used
to subsidize vehicles in other categories.
In contrast, in the Unreformed CAFE
system with a single step from cars to
light trucks, the rewards—in terms of
CAFE compliance—for mix shifting may
be significant. A small SUV can be used
to subsidize a larger vehicle with lower
fuel economy. In the Reformed system,
the rewards of mix shifting are
considerably less.
DaimlerChrysler, Ford, General
Motors, Subaru, and Toyota argued that
the creation of multiple classes might
encourage some manufacturers to
increase weight (or size) or to make
other product changes not desired by
the market solely to optimize
compliance with the regulatory
17:47 Aug 29, 2005
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fuel economy level for four models in its
fleet:
400,000
= 22.6 mpg
100,000
100,000
100,000
100,000
+
+
+
27.0 mpg 24.0 mpg 22.0 mpg 19.0 mpg
structure, resulting in edge effects.
Environmental Defense stated that
product offerings would concentrate at
points that minimize the price of the
design constraint imposed by the CAFE
regulations. Manufacturers argued that,
under a continuous function scheme,
any change to the measured attribute
would result in a vehicle being
subjected to a different standard. They
then stated that because each vehicle
model would be subjected to a different
standard, manufacturers would be
limited in their ability to redesign
vehicles in order to subject a vehicle to
a less stringent standard. Manufacturers
further stated that a continuous weight
based function would allow a
manufacturer to align its products more
with the market.
Conversely, manufacturers stated that,
as the number of classes increased
under a multi-class system, the ‘‘edge
effects’’ of the system would be
amplified because more light trucks
would be adjacent to a boundary
between adjacent classes. Manufacturers
argued that the likelihood of redesign in
order to subject a vehicle to a less
stringent standard would increase.
Environmental Defense stated that even
using a continuous or piecewise linear
function would not completely avoid
the problem of manufacturers shifting
vehicles to a point with a less stringent
standard to minimize compliance costs.
We note that most of the comments
compared a continuous function to a
simple multi-class structure approach,
as opposed to the multiple-category
approach we are proposing. We believe
a step function is easier for the public
to understand than a continuous
function, and would facilitate product
planning. We also believe our proposed
approach minimizes the potential
disadvantages articulated by the
commenters. Specifically, both the
number and the location of the
boundaries for the footprint categories
are designed to minimize any edge
effects.
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NHTSA remains interested in the
concept of a continuous function
standard. This concept was explored
both by NAS in its study (chapter 5 and
attachment 5A) and by NHTSA in its
2003 ANPRM on CAFE reform. Now
that the agency has refined its potential
approach to reforming light truck CAFE,
the agency believes that would be useful
to seek more detailed comments and
analyses regarding the relative
advantages of step function standards
and continuous function standards.
b. Categories and targets vs. classes and
standards
We considered an approach under
which we would establish each
footprint category as a separate class
with its own standard. Thus, for each
model year under reform, there would
have been six different standards,
depending upon the footprint size of the
vehicle. However, there were two
primary shortcomings that led us to
evaluate other approaches for our
Reformed CAFE.
First, transfers of credits earned in a
footprint class in a model year to a
different footprint class in a different
model year would have required a
complicated process of adjustments to
ensure that fuel savings are
maintained.50 This is because credits
earned under the multiple classes and
standards approach would have
differing energy value. Credits earned
for exceeding the higher fuel economy
standard for the smaller footprint
vehicles would have less energy value
than exceeding the lower fuel economy
standard for the larger footprint vehicles
by an equal increment. In fact, if credits
were generated in a class with relatively
high CAFE standards and transferred to
another class with relatively low CAFE
standards, total fuel use by all vehicles
in the two classes might increase. That
50 The 2003 ANPRM on reforming CAFE noted
that the agency had previously concluded that the
credits earned in one class could not be transferred
to another class, but re-examined the legislative
history of the CAFE statute and called that
interpretation into question.
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400,000
= 24.9 mpg
100,000
100,000
100,000
100,000
+
+
+
26.8 mpg 27.4 mpg 23.3 mpg 22.8 mpg
EP30AU05.013
The manufacturer’s required CAFE
would be compared with the
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result would undermine the entire
reform effort by producing lessened
energy security.
One can calculate the appropriate
adjustments for such a credit transfer
system to ensure no loss of fuel savings.
This would ensure equivalent energy
savings. However, instituting a
complicated new process of credit
adjustments would detract from the
benefits of reforming the CAFE program
by making it more difficult to plan for
and determine compliance. Further,
taking this step would not cure another
problem associated with credits. Credits
earned by exceeding a standard in a
model year may be used in any of the
three model years preceding that model
year and, to the extent not so used, in
any of the three model years following
that model year (49 U.S.C. 32903(a)).
They may not, however, be used within
the model year in which they were
earned (Ibid.).
Second, establishing separate
standards for each footprint category
would needlessly restrict manufacturer
flexibility in complying with the CAFE
program. A requirement for
manufacturers to comply with six
separate standards, combined with the
inability either to apply credits within
the same model year or to average
performance across the classes during a
model year, could increase costs
without saving fuel. This would happen
by forcing the use of technologies that
might not be cost-effective. Further,
Congressional dialogue when
considering the enactment of the EPCA
and amendments to it has repeatedly
expressed the view that manufacturers
should have flexibility in complying
with a CAFE program so that they can
ensure fuel savings, while still
responding to other external factors.
Our proposal avoids these
shortcomings. Instead of establishing six
distinct standards for each footprint
category, our proposal establishes six
targets and applies them through a
harmonically weighted formula to
derive regulatory obligations. Credits are
earned and applied under our proposal
in the same way as they are earned and
applied under Unreformed CAFE and in
a manner fully consistent with the
statute. Thus, no complicated new
provisions for credits are needed.
Further, the use of targets instead of
standards allows us to retain the
benefits of a harmonically weighted
fleet average for compliance. This
ensures that manufacturers must
provide the requisite fuel economy in
their light truck fleet, while giving the
manufacturers the ability to average
performance across their entire fleet and
thus the flexibility to provide that level
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of fuel economy in the most appropriate
manner.
c. Footprint vs. shadow or weight
In the 2003 ANPRM, we posited the
possibility of establishing classes of
light trucks defined by various
attributes. We focused our discussion on
vehicle weight and vehicle ‘‘shadow’’
(vehicle length × width), but invited
additional ideas.
Recognizing the links between weight
and vehicle safety, the Alliance, Daimler
Chrysler, Ford, General Motors, Toyota,
and Nissan expressed a preference for
using weight in an attribute-based
system. They also asserted that weight
appears to have the best correlation to
fuel economy, and that weight is
currently used in fuel economy testing.
Further, a weight-based system would
distribute the burden of reducing fuel
consumption equally to all
manufacturers, preventing the systemic
downsizing of vehicles and the
associated detriment to safety.
Honda and other commenters
identified other benefits of a weight
based system: weight based systems are
less complex, have more readily
available data, and are conducive to
grouping all light trucks together in a
single system. However, Honda stated
that weight based systems have
potentially severe consequences on light
truck safety design, are more susceptible
to erosion of fuel economy, and offer
less potential for cost-effective fuel
economy gains.
Other manufacturers noted the
weaknesses in a weight-based system.
DaimlerChrysler commented that a
weight-based system would discourage
investments in weight reduction for
material substitution, and result in lost
opportunities to improve real-world fuel
economy. Volkswagen believes a
weight-based system will reduce the
regulatory incentive to reduce vehicle
weight.
Honda considered the most
constructive alternative to weight to be
a length x width (shadow) attributebased system. Honda stated that such a
system would provide proper safety
incentives. Honda and Rocky Mountain
Institute (RMI) stated that a size-based
system would likely be subject to less
gaming than a weight-based system. As
discussed above, Honda determined that
changes in size are readily apparent to
prospective buyers and change how
they perceive a vehicle competitively,
while weight can be changed
substantially without most customers
being aware of the change. Honda stated
that when purchasing vehicles,
customers typically consider functional
characteristics that are more related to
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size and utility (such as passenger and
hauling capacity), rather than weight.
Other commenters such as
Environmental Defense and Natural
Resource Defense Council stated that if
the agency were to pursue attributebased system, a size-based system
would be preferable to a weight-based
system.
Toyota and Ford questioned the
correlation between size and fuel
economy. Ford stated that there is a very
poor correlation, unlike the correlation
with weight. Ford stated that as the
mass of a vehicle increases, more energy
is required to move it, which results in
increased fuel consumption. However,
Ford continued, the relationship
between size and fuel economy is not as
clear; increases in size do not
necessarily require increased fuel
consumption because a larger sized
vehicle can have a similar weight to a
smaller sized vehicle. Further, General
Motors asserted that weight is the
primary factor affecting safety; therefore,
NHTSA should not adopt a size-based
system.
The agency recognizes that size and/
or weight creep are legitimate concerns
about an attribute-based class system.
There is the potential under such a
system for manufacturers to design
vehicles toward the larger or heavier
categories that may have lower
compliance obligations.
We have decided against premising
our proposal on vehicle weight or
vehicle shadow, and instead decided to
premise it on vehicle footprint. We
share commenters’ concern that vehicle
weight could be tailored more easily
than size to move vehicles into heavier
weight categories with lower CAFE
targets. Weight could be added to a
vehicle near the edge of a category with
minimal impact on design or
performance at relatively low cost.
Similarly, vehicle shadow (in a size
based system) could be tailored for the
same purpose by the simple addition of
bumpers or other vehicle lengthening
features. As a result, both of those
attributes, if used as the foundation of
our program, could fail to achieve our
goals of enhancing fuel economy and
safety with a Reformed CAFE program.
We believe that vehicle footprint is a
better vehicle attribute and an
appropriate foundation for reforming
the CAFE program to advance energy
security and safety. Basing categories on
footprint permits grouping of vehicles in
similar market segments, thus avoiding
grouping light trucks designed to carry
large payloads or a large number of
passengers together with light trucks
designed to carry smaller payloads or a
smaller number of passengers.
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Vehicle footprint is more integral to a
vehicle’s design than either vehicle
weight or shadow and cannot easily be
altered between model years in order to
move a vehicle into a different category
with a lower fuel economy target.
Footprint is dictated by the vehicle
platform, which is typically used for a
multi-year model life cycle. Short-term
changes to a vehicle’s platform would
be expensive and difficult to accomplish
without disrupting multi-year product
planning. In some cases, several models
share a common platform, thus adding
to the cost and difficulty and therefore
unlikelihood of short-term changes.
Moreover, as Honda commented, the
ability to change footprint would be
subject to the limits imposed by
consumer acceptance and preference.
Changes in footprint result in
perceptible changes in performance and
design (e.g., a longer and/or wider
vehicle). The responsiveness of
consumers to those changes is
pronounced, as is evidenced by the fact
that manufacturers market size variant
models, e.g., pick-up trucks in long and
short beds, and light truck models in
longer wheelbase versions. Changes in
footprint solely for the purpose of
moving a vehicle to a footprint category
with a less stringent fuel economy target
could adversely impact consumer
demand for that product and/or increase
cost to the manufacturer. These
considerations regarding footprint allow
us to establish footprint category target
levels and to design our Reformed CAFE
program with more certainty that we
can achieve our objectives.
We also believe that use of the vehicle
footprint attribute helps us achieve
greater fuel economy without having a
potential negative impact on safety.
While past analytic work 51 focused on
the relationship between vehicle weight
and safety, weight was understood to
encompass a constellation of sizerelated factors, not just weight. More
recent studies 52 have begun to consider
whether the relationship between
vehicle size and safety differs. To the
extent that mass reduction has
historically been associated with
reductions in many other size attributes
and given the construct of the current
fleet, we believe that the relationship
between size or weight (on the one
hand) and safety (on the other) has been
similar, except for rollover risks.
Developing CAFE standards based on
vehicle footprint could encourage
compliance strategies that would
decrease rollover risk. Manufacturers
would be encouraged to maintain track
width because reducing it could subject
the vehicle to a more stringent fuel
economy target. Maintaining track
width would potentially allow some
degree of weight reduction without a
decrease in overall safety. Moreover, by
setting fuel economy targets for small
footprint light trucks that approach (or
exceeds) 27.5 mpg, the agency would
provide little incentive, or even a
disincentive, to design vehicles to be
classified as light trucks in order to
comply or offset the fuel economy of
larger light trucks.
The influence of Reformed CAFE on
track width would be reinforced by our
NCAP rollover ratings. Track width is
one of the elements of our Static
Stability Factor, which constitutes a
significant part of our NCAP rollover
ratings and which correlates closely
with real world rollover risk. The
rollover NCAP program (as well as real
world rollover risk) would reinforce
Reformed CAFE by a separate
disincentive to decrease track width.
Overall, use of vehicle footprint
would be ‘‘weight neutral’’ and thus
would not exacerbate the vehicle
compatibility problem. A footprintbased system would not encourage
manufacturers to add weight to move
vehicles to a higher footprint category.
Nor would the system penalize
manufacturers for making limited
weight reductions. By using vehicle
footprint in lieu of a weight based
metric, we intend to facilitate the use of
promising lightweight materials that,
although perhaps not cost-effective in
mass production today, may ultimately
achieve wider use in the fleet, become
less expensive, and enhance both
vehicle safety and fuel economy.53 In
Reformed CAFE, lightweight materials
can be incorporated into vehicle design
without moving a vehicle into a
footprint category with a more stringent
average fuel economy target.
The agency is aware that basing the
Reformed CAFE proposal solely on
footprint can be criticized on the
51 See, Kahane (2003) and Van Auken, R.M. and
J.W. Zellner, An Assessment of the Effects of
Vehicle Weight on Fatality Risk in Model Year
1985–98 Passenger Cars and 1985–97 Light Trucks,
Dynamic Research, Inc. February 2002. Docket No.
NHTSA 2003–16318–2.
52 See, Van Auken, R.M. and J.W. Zellner,
Supplemental Results on the Independent Effects of
Curb Weight, Wheelbase, and Track on Fatality Risk
in 1985–1997 Model Year LTVs, Dynamic Research,
Inc. May 2005. Docket No. NHTSA 2003–16318–17.
53 The Aluminum Association commented that
using aluminum to decrease a vehicle’s weight by
10 percent could improve its fuel economy by 5–
8 percent. The commenter noted that the Honda
Insight, an all aluminum vehicle, is 40 percent
lighter than a comparable steel vehicle. It also
provided data to demonstrate that all aluminum
vehicles have comparable performance in frontal
barrier crash tests as comparable steel vehicles. See
comments provided by the Aluminum Association,
Inc. (Docket No. 2003–16128–1120, pp. 5 and 12).
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51441
grounds that it does not fully account
for other vehicle attributes that are
valuable to consumers and influence
fuel economy. For example, vehicles A
and B may have equal footprint, but
vehicle A may be designed to have
superior towing and/or cargo-hauling
capabilities than vehicle B.54 Vehicle A
may therefore have lower fuel economy
than vehicle B because it is designed to
provide greater utility for consumers.
For vehicle manufacturers that have a
product mix weighted toward vehicles
with superior towing and/or cargohauling capabilities, even Reformed
CAFE, based on a single size attribute,
may not provide a fully equitable
competitive environment. The agency is
seeking comment on whether Reformed
CAFE should be based on vehicle size
(footprint) alone, or whether other
attributes, such as towing capability
and/or cargo hauling capability, should
be considered. If any commenters
advocate one or more additional
attributes, the agency requests those
commenters to supply a specific,
objective measure for each attribute that
is accepted within the industry and that
can be applied to the full range of lighttruck products.
d. Reformed standard vs. Reformed
standard plus backstop
Several commenters argued that a
backstop would be needed under
attribute-based Reformed CAFE. In the
context of Reformed CAFE, NHTSA
understands the term ‘‘backstop’’ to
mean an absolute minimum CAFE
requirement that would apply to a
manufacturer’s overall fleet if the level
of average fuel economy otherwise
required of a manufacturer under a
Reformed CAFE standard fell below the
level of that absolute minimum
requirement. Such a requirement would
essentially be the same as an
Unreformed CAFE standard. Stated
another way, the Reformed standard
with a backstop would require
54 We noted the importance of these capabilities
in the ANPRM:
The market suggests that while some light trucks
may be used primarily to transport passengers, their
‘‘peak use or value’’ capability (towing boats,
hauling heavy loads, etc.) may be a critical factor
in the purchase decision. In other words, a
consumer may require substantial towing capability
only periodically, but nevertheless may base his
purchasing decision on a vehicle’s ability to meet
that peak need rather than his daily needs. The
motor vehicle market has thus developed a demand
for vehicles capable of cross-servicing traditional
needs—that is, for vehicles capable of transporting
people and cargo, for vehicles capable of servicing
personal transportation needs as well as
recreational and commercial ones, and for vehicles
capable of substantial performance, even if such
performance is only needed periodically.
68 FR 74908, at 74913.
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compliance with the greater of the
following fleet wide requirements:
average fuel economy level calculated
under Reformed standard or an equal
cost Unreformed CAFE standard.
These commenters suggested that
unless a backstop in the form of an
absolute fleet wide CAFE standard were
established to supplement attributebased Reformed CAFE standards based
on size or weight, there might be an
overall loss in fleet economy resulting
from mix shifts or from upward weight
or size ‘‘creep.’’ For example,
manufacturers might redesign some of
their vehicles to make them larger or
heavier or they might shift their
production mix so as to increase their
production of vehicles subject to less
stringent standards).
Environmental groups such as the
NRDC and Environmental Defense
urged the agency to adopt a backstop as
a part of any proposed reform. These
commenters suggested that a backstop
would provide a guarantee against any
loss of fuel economy due to increase in
vehicle weight or size.
While some vehicle manufacturers
noted some commenters were likely to
suggest that a backstop might be needed
to prevent erosion of overall fuel
economy, the manufacturers opposed
the concept. DaimlerChrysler and
General Motors stated that these
commenters might argue that a backstop
would be necessary to ensure no loss in
overall economy. These manufacturers
noted that a backstop would have
disparate impacts on manufacturers
because of differences in their fleet
mixes, and that a backstop would lead
to downweighting under a weight based
system. Ford opposed a backstop,
stating that the ‘‘assumption of
wholesale ‘‘upsizing’’ or ‘‘upweighting’’
‘‘is erroneous.’’ General Motors also said
that the risk of such upsizing or
upweighting was overstated.
Manufacturers expressed concern that a
backstop would unduly increase the
complexity of the CAFE program by
applying essentially two different types
of standards. General Motors argued that
establishing separate class standards as
well as a fleet wide standard would be
contrary to legislative scheme
established under the Energy Policy and
Conservation Act in which a vehicle is
placed in a single compliance fleet.
NHTSA is not proposing a backstop
for the following reasons. First,
manufacturers cannot increase the size
or weight of their vehicles or introduce
new, larger vehicles without regard to
consumer demand. They can make
those changes only to the extent that
there is market acceptance of them.
Absent a reliable indication of likely
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market acceptance, manufacturers
would be unlikely to assume the risks
involved in taking these actions. As
Toyota noted, ‘‘Manufacturers must still
be cognizant of other aspects of vehicle
design, such as acceleration, handling,
cornering, and other factors. Adding
weight would be counterproductive to
many of the attributes, and thus careful
consideration would be given by
manufacturers before simply adding
weight for no otherwise apparent
reason.’’
Further, NHTSA believes that given
the cost and difficulty of increasing
vehicle size, the agency’s choice of
footprint, instead of weight or shadow,
as the attribute used in Reformed CAFE
would significantly limit the possibility
that manufacturers would increase
vehicle size beyond the extent sought by
consumers. Increasing vehicle footprint,
like increasing vehicle weight, would
require addressing the other aspects of
vehicle design mentioned in Toyota’s
comment.
Second, establishing a backstop
would not preclude future mix shifts
and design changes. The comments
urging the establishment of a backstop
appear to be premised on a
misconception of how CAFE standards
have been set and adjusted over the life
of the CAFE program. The Unreformed
CAFE program has not sought, and does
not seek, to ignore consumer demand
and freeze the mix or design of vehicles.
The agency has set Unreformed CAFE
standards with particular regard to the
least capable manufacturer’s own
projections about its mix and vehicle
designs in the years to which the
standards will apply ‘‘ adjusted
according to the agency’s
determinations of available costeffective, fuel-efficient technologies that
could be added to that company’s fleet.
Thus, the standards are market based,
set in a fashion that accommodates that
manufacturer’s judgment, adjusted by
the agency for fuel economy
improvements, as to how consumer
demand will change between the time of
a light truck CAFE rulemaking and
those future model years.
Establishing a backstop would also
not preclude the growth in vehicle
weight as a result of the manufacturers’
continued introduction of new
mandatory and voluntary safety features
and non-safety features that would
enhance vehicle utility and consumer
choice. In fact, the agency has
consciously set Unreformed CAFE
standards in the past so as to
accommodate any anticipated
installation of mandatory and voluntary
safety features, as required by statute.
Plans for the installation of these
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features and items of equipment are
reflected in the manufacturers’ baselines
for the purpose of determining their
future capability to improve fuel
economy. To the extent that new safety
requirements are implemented, and to
the extent there is consumer demand for
voluntarily installed equipment, average
weight may increase further. The
implementation of Reformed CAFE
would not and should not change the
practice of accommodating those
manufacturer actions.
In addition, the proponents of the
backstop concept erroneously assume
that unreformed CAFE does not change
when good faith compliance efforts fall
short. When manufacturer plans for
complying with established CAFE
standards have proven insufficient
because of factors outside the control of
the industry, the agency has revisited
both light truck and passenger car CAFE
standards and adjusted them to reflect
more up-to-date, corrected projections
of mix. NHTSA’s actions in this regard
were twice reviewed and upheld by the
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, once with respect
to light trucks, and the other time with
respect to passenger cars. See, CAS, 793
F.2d 1322; Public Citizen, 848 F.2d 256.
Third, the agency plans to
periodically adjust the location of the
boundaries between footprint categories.
Since the agency is likely to adjust the
boundaries each time a new round of
CAFE standards is established, there
would be limited advantage to a
manufacturer’s upsizing some of its
vehicles. Further, it would be difficult
for a manufacturer to predict how
category boundaries might change over
the four to eight year life of a vehicle
design.
Fourth, the agency believes that
supplementing the Reformed CAFE
standards with a backstop would negate
the value of establishing the attributebased standards for some manufacturers
and perpetuate the shortcomings of
Unreformed CAFE. The level of the
backstop would presumably be set at (or
close to) the level of the manufacturer
that would be determined to be the least
capable manufacturer under
Unreformed CAFE. Any manufacturer
that, under Reformed CAFE, would have
a required level of average fuel economy
less than the level of the least capable
manufacturer would have to comply
with the backstop instead.
Fifth, and finally, making vehicles
larger for CAFE compliance purposes is
not cost-free. All else being equal, larger
vehicles are more costly to build and
operate. Market forces or fuel price
increases will restrain consumer
demand for large light trucks with low
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fuel economy, unless the need for utility
justifies the expense to the
manufacturers of producing and to the
consumers of operating large trucks.
5. Benefits of reform
a. Increased energy savings
The Reformed CAFE system would
increase the energy savings of the CAFE
program over the longer term because
fuel economy technologies would be
required to be applied to light trucks
throughout the entire industry, not just
by a limited number of manufacturers.
The energy-saving potential of
Unreformed CAFE is limited because
only a few full-line manufacturers are
required to make improvements. In
effect, the capabilities of these full-line
manufacturers, whose offerings include
larger and heavier light trucks, constrain
the stringency of the uniform, industrywide standard. The Unreformed CAFE
standard is generally set below the
capabilities of limited-line
manufacturers, who sell predominantly
lighter and smaller light trucks. Under
Reformed CAFE, which accounts for
size differences in product mix,
virtually all light-truck manufacturers
will be required to improve the fuel
economy of their vehicles. Thus,
Reformed CAFE will continue to require
full-line manufacturers to improve the
overall fuel economy of their fleets,
while also requiring limited-line
manufacturers to enhance the fuel
economy of the vehicles they sell.
Our estimates indicate that the
Reformed CAFE system would result in
greater fuel savings than the
Unreformed CAFE system during the
transition period, though the industrywide compliance costs were equalized
for those model years:
Unreformed CAFE system, the Reformed
CAFE system would allow for greater
fuel savings at levels that remain
economically practicable. We believe
that the Reformed CAFE system would
continue to increase overall fuel
conservation substantially over time.
b. Reduced incentive to respond to the
CAFE program in ways harmful to safety
To appreciate the potential safety
impacts of reforming CAFE, it is
necessary first to understand the key
trends in the light vehicle population
and in the crashes that produce serious
and fatal injuries. Today’s light vehicle
fleet is very different from the fleet of 30
years ago when EPCA was enacted and
even from the fleet of 20 years ago. A
more complex and diverse fleet,
including large numbers of vehicles
such as minivans and SUVs that
scarcely existed before, has replaced the
fleet that was once dominated by
passenger cars. There are now over 102
million light trucks on the road,
including pickups, minivans, and SUVs,
representing about 41 percent of
registered light vehicles in the United
States. Since light trucks now account
for more than 50 percent of new light
vehicle sales, their share of the total
fleet is growing steadily. SUVs account
for about 35 percent of light truck sales.
While the overall light vehicle fleet is
safer as a result of the addition of many
safety features, the new fleet
composition presents new safety issues.
Two issues stand out. Rollovers and
crash compatibility. Both are related to
reforming CAFE.
Pickups and SUVs have a higher
center of gravity than passenger cars and
thus are more susceptible to rolling
over, if all other variables are identical.
Their rate of involvement in fatal
TABLE 4.—ESTIMATED FUEL SAVINGS rollovers is higher than that for
FROM REFORMED AND UNREFORMED passenger cars—the rate of fatal
CAFE SYSTEMS FOR MYS 2008– rollovers for pickups, like the rate for
2010
SUVs, is twice that for passenger cars.
Rollovers are a particularly dangerous
[In billions of gallons]
type of crash. Overall, rollover affects
MY
MY
MY
about three percent of light vehicles
2008
2009
2010
involved in crashes, but accounts for 33
percent of light vehicle occupant
Reformed CAFE
system ...........
0.9
2.2
2.9 fatalities. Single vehicle rollover crashes
account for nearly 8,500 fatalities
Unreformed
CAFE system
0.8
1.9
2.7 annually. Rollover crashes involving
more than one vehicle account for
another 1,900 fatalities, bringing the
The improvement in fuel savings
total annual rollover fatality count to
would be even greater beginning MY
more than 10,000.
2011 when targets are set at the level
that maximizes net benefits. By
Crash compatibility is the other
promoting improvements across the
prominent issue. Light trucks are
entire industry, without as much
involved in about half of all fatal twoinfluence imposed by the manufacturer
vehicle crashes involving passenger
that would be regarded as the least
cars. In the crashes between light trucks
capable manufacturer under the
and passenger cars, over 80 percent of
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51443
the fatally injured people are occupants
of the passenger cars.
The agency believes that the manner
in which fuel economy is regulated can
have substantial effects on vehicle
design and the composition of the light
vehicle fleet. Reforming CAFE is
important for vehicle safety because the
current structure of the CAFE system
provides an incentive to manufacturers
to reduce the weight and size of
vehicles, and to increase the production
of vehicle types (particularly pickup
trucks and SUVs) that are more
susceptible to rollover crashes and are
less compatible with other light
vehicles. For these reasons, reforming
CAFE is a critical part of the agency’s
effort to address the vehicle rollover and
compatibility problems.
i. Reduces the incentive to offer smaller
vehicles and to reduce vehicle size
Fuel price increases and competitive
pressures in the 1970’s and early 1980’s
induced vehicle manufacturers to shift
their production mix toward their
smaller and lighter vehicles to offset the
lower fuel economy of larger and
heavier vehicles and to redesign their
vehicles by reducing their size and/or
weight.55 The need for manufacturers to
make rapid and substantial increases in
passenger car and light truck CAFE in
response to the CAFE standards in late
1970’s and early 1980’s provided an
added incentive for them to take those
actions. Those actions contributed to
many additional deaths and injuries.56
While the adoption of additional safety
performance requirements for those
vehicles has saved lives, even more
lives would have been saved if the
shifting of production mix toward
smaller vehicles and the reduction in
size and/or weight had not occurred.
Without CAFE reform, history is
likely to repeat itself. Significant
increases in Unreformed light truck
CAFE standards, especially if
accompanied by high fuel prices, would
likely induce a similar wave of shifting
production mix toward smaller light
trucks and reducing the size and/or
weight of light trucks.
By choosing to base Reformed CAFE
on a measure of vehicle size (footprint)
instead of weight, the agency is aware
that the CAFE program will continue to
permit and to some extent reward
weight reduction as a compliance
strategy. The safety ramifications of
55 Shifting production mix down toward smaller
vehicles involves decreasing the production
volumes of vehicles that are heavier or larger and
thus have relatively low fuel economy and
increasing the production volumes of lighter or
smaller vehicles.
56 NAS, p. 3.
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downweighting—especially
downweighting that is not achieved
through downsizing—will need to be
examined on a case-by-case basis in
future rulemakings. Historically, the
size and weight of light-duty vehicles
have been so highly correlated that it
has not been technically feasible to fully
disentangle their independent effects on
safety.57 The agency remains concerned
about compliance strategies that might
have adverse safety consequences.
Fortunately, it is possible that some of
the lightweight materials used in a
downweighting strategy may have the
strength and flexibility to retain or even
improve the crashworthiness of vehicles
and the safety of occupants. Moreover,
if downweighting were concentrated
among the heaviest of the light trucks,
any extra risk to the occupants of those
vehicles might be more than offset be
lessened risk in multi-vehicle crashes to
occupants of smaller light trucks and
cars. As manufacturers respond to the
requirements of Reformed CAFE, the
agency intends to monitor whether
downweighting is chosen as a
compliance strategy and, if so, how
downweighting is accomplished, which
vehicles are downweighted, and what
the possible effects on safety (beneficial
and adverse) may be.
Reforming CAFE by basing it on
footprint categories would discourage
reductions in vehicle size and reduce
the likelihood of any new wave of mix
shifting toward smaller vehicles.
Reformed CAFE reduces the incentive to
take those actions because both mix
shifting and reducing vehicle size
would increase the manufacturers’
required level of CAFE for that model
year.
The way in which Reformed CAFE
dilutes the effect of both of those actions
as compliance strategies can be seen by
57 Kahane, C.J., Response to Docket Comments on
NHTSA Technical Report, Vehicle Weight, Fatality
Risk and Crash Compatibility of Model Year 1991–
99 Passenger Cars and Light Trucks, Docket No.
NHTSA–2003–16318–16, 2004 discusses the
historic correlation and difficulty of disaggregating
weight and ‘‘size.’’ Except for a strong correlation
of track width with rollover risk, it shows weak and
inconsistent relationships between fatality risk and
two specific ‘‘size’’ measures, track width and
wheelbase, when these are included with weight in
the analyses. See also Kahane, C.J., Vehicle Weight,
Fatality Risk and Crash Compatibility of Model
Year 1991–99 Passenger Cars and Light Trucks,
NHTSA Technical Report No. DOT HS 809 662,
Washington, 2003, pp. 2–6. Evans, L. and Frick,
M.C., Car Size or Car Mass—Which Has Greater
Influence on Fatality Risk? American Journal of
Public Health 82:1009–1112, 1992, discusses the
intense historical correlation of mass and wheelbase
and finds that relative mass, not relative wheelbase
is the principal determinant of relative fatality risk
in two-car collisions. See also, Evans, L. ‘‘Causal
Influence of Car Mass and Size on Driver Fatality
Risk, ‘‘ American Journal of Public Health, 91:1076–
81, 2001.
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looking at a Reformed CAFE standard.
The target average fuel economy values
for the footprint categories are
constants. Regardless of what
compliance strategy is chosen by a
manufacturer, nothing that the
manufacturer does will change those
values.
The distribution of vehicle models
among the categories and the
production volume of each models,
however, are variables under the control
of the manufacturers. Further, they are
variables not only in the formula for
calculating a manufacturer’s actual level
of CAFE for a model year, but also in the
formula for calculating a manufacturer’s
required level of CAFE for that model
year.
Thus, by changing the distribution of
its production among the footprint
categories, a manufacturer would
change not only its actual level of CAFE,
but also its required level of CAFE. For
example, all other things being equal, if
a manufacturer were to increase the
production of one of its higher fuel
economy models and decrease the
production of one of its lower fuel
economy models, both its actual level of
CAFE and its required level of CAFE
would increase. Likewise, again all
other things being equal, if a
manufacturer were to redesign a model
so as to decrease its footprint (thereby
presumably also decreasing its weight)
sufficiently to move it into a smaller
footprint category, the model would
become subject to a higher target. Again,
as a result, both the manufacturer’s
actual CAFE and required CAFE would
increase.
The reduced effectiveness of those
actions as compliance strategies under
Reformed CAFE would make it more
likely that the manufacturers would
choose two other actions as the primary
means of closing the gap between those
two levels: reducing vehicle weight
while keeping footprint constant, and
adding fuel-saving technologies. Both of
those actions would increase a
manufacturer’s actual CAFE without
changing its required CAFE.
Nevertheless, since a move into other
footprint categories would result in a
change in both actual and required
CAFE, manufacturers would have more
flexibility to respond to consumer
demand for vehicles in other size
categories without harming their ability
to comply with CAFE standards or
adversely affecting safety.
Unreformed CAFE creates an
incentive to reduce weight regardless of
whether footprint also is reduced.
Reformed CAFE reduces that incentive
by linking the level of the average fuel
economy targets to the size of footprint
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so that there is an incentive to reduce
weight only to the extent one can do so
while also preserving size. Reformed
CAFE discourages footprint reduction
because as a vehicle model’s footprint is
reduced, the vehicle moves into
categories with smaller footprints and
higher targets.
We have designed the categories to
increase the extent to which Reformed
CAFE standards will not affect vehicle
size. First, we are dividing the overall
fleet of light trucks into a large enough
number of footprint categories that each
category includes only a relatively
narrow range of footprint. This would
ensure that only a fairly modest
decrease in a model’s footprint would
cause the model to move down into the
next footprint category and become
subject to a higher target. Second, as
noted above, we set the boundaries
between the footprint categories so that
a substantial portion of the vehicles in
each category is located near the lower
end of that category. In that location,
any reduction in a vehicle’s footprint
would be sufficient to move the vehicle
into a lower footprint category and thus
subject it to a higher average fuel
economy target.
ii. Effectively reduces the difference
between car and light truck CAFE
standards
The average fuel economy targets for
the smaller footprint categories of light
trucks would, by MY 2011, be at or near
(and for the smallest light trucks above)
the level of the current 27.5 mpg CAFE
standard for cars. The reduction of the
disparity between car and light truck
CAFE standards—the so-called ‘‘SUV
loophole’’—would promote increased
safety because the disparity has created
an incentive (beyond that provided by
the market by itself) to design vehicles
to be classified as light trucks instead of
cars.58
One way to design vehicles so that
they are classified as light trucks instead
of passenger cars is to design them so
that they have higher ground clearance
and higher approach angles.59 Designing
vehicles with higher ground clearance
results in their having a higher center of
gravity. Generally speaking, light trucks
have a higher center of gravity than cars,
and thus are more likely to rollover.
58 NAS (p. 88) noted that that gap created an
incentive to design vehicles as light trucks instead
of cars.
59 The term ‘‘approach angle’’ is defined by
NHTSA in 49 CFR 523.2 as meaning ‘‘the smallest
angle, in a plane side view of an automobile,
formed by the level surface on which the
automobile is standing and a line tangent to the
front tire static loaded radius arc and touching the
underside of the automobile forward of the front
tire.’’
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Moreover, in order to create a higher
approach angle, it is necessary to raise
or minimize the front structure below
the front bumper, which increases the
likelihood that a light truck will
override a car in a front or rear end
crash with a car. It also increases the
likelihood that when a light truck
crashes into the side of a car, its front
end will pass over the car’s door sill and
intrude farther into the car’s occupant
compartment. In addition to not being
structurally aligned with cars, light
trucks are generally heavier than cars,
which adds to their compatibility
problems with cars.
c. More equitable regulatory framework
The Unreformed CAFE system does
not provide an equitable regulatory
framework for different vehicle
manufacturers. Regardless of their
product mix, all vehicle manufacturers
are required to comply with the same
fleet-wide average CAFE requirement.
For full-line manufacturers, this creates
an especially burdensome task. We note
that these manufacturers often offer
vehicles that have high fuel economy
performance relative to others in the
same size class, yet because they sell
many vehicles in the larger end of the
light truck market, their overall CAFE is
low relative to those manufacturers that
concentrate in offering smaller light
trucks. As a result, Unreformed CAFE is
binding for such full-line
manufacturers, but not for limited-line
manufacturers that predominantly sell
smaller light trucks. The full-line
vehicle manufacturers have expressed a
legitimate competitive concern that the
part-line vehicle manufacturers are
entering the larger end of the light-truck
market with an accumulation of CAFE
credits. While this concern has merit, it
is also the case that some part-line
manufacturers (e.g., Toyota and Honda)
have been industry innovators in certain
technological aspects of fuel-economy
improvement.
The reformed CAFE system will
provide a more equitable regulatory
framework for full-line vehicle
manufacturers without denying a level
playing field to the part-line vehicle
makers. In order to test this proposition
empirically, the agency has presented
simulations of Reformed CAFE in
chapter III of the PRIA for MYs 2002,
2003 and 2004. The two largest full-line
makers (General Motors and Ford)
would have achieved a significantly
improved compliance outcome under
Reformed CAFE, while some part-line
vehicle manufacturers would have faced
a more challenging compliance
obligation.
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d. More responsive to market changes
Reformed CAFE is more marketoriented because it respects economic
conditions and consumer choice.
Reformed CAFE does not force vehicle
manufacturers to adjust fleet mix toward
smaller vehicles unless that is what
consumers are demanding. As the
industry’s sales volume and mix
changes in response to economic
conditions (e.g., gasoline prices and
household income) and consumer
preferences (e.g., desire for seating
capacity or hauling capability), the
expectations of manufacturers under
Reformed CAFE will, at least partially,
adjust automatically to these changes.
Accordingly, Reformed CAFE may
reduce the need for the Agency to revisit
previously established standards in light
of changed market conditions, a difficult
process that undermines regulatory
certainty for the industry. In the mid1980’s, for example, the Agency relaxed
several unreformed CAFE standards
because fuel prices fell more than
expected when those standards were
established and, as a result, consumer
demand for small vehicles with high
fuel economy did not materialize as
expected. By moving to a marketoriented system, the agency may also be
able to pursue more multi-year
rulemakings that span larger time
frames than the agency has attempted in
the past.
B. Authority for Reformed CAFE
proposal
We believe the proposed CAFE
program is both consistent with the
statute and better achieves the
Congressional policy objectives
embedded within it. The proposed
program conforms to the mandates to
establish maximum feasible fuel
economy standards applicable on a fleet
average basis and to the Congressional
intent to establish those standards only
after balancing the nation’s need to
conserve energy, the effect of other
standards on fuel economy,
technological feasibility, economic
practicability and other public policy
considerations.
The statute provides considerable
flexibility with regard to the
establishment and implementation of
light truck standards. Congress
recognized that the universe of light
trucks is comprised of varying types of
vehicles meeting different consumer
needs. The CAFE statute mandates that
we issue one or more average fuel
economy standards for light trucks for
each model year. Congress chose
harmonic averaging over standards
applicable to individual vehicles so that
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51445
the CAFE statute’s overriding goal of
conserving energy would be pursued in
a manner that preserves manufacturer
flexibility and consumer choice. H. Rpt.
94–340, p. 87; S. Rpt. 94–179, p. 6.
An ‘‘average fuel economy standard’’
is defined as ‘‘a performance standard
specifying a minimum level of average
fuel economy applicable to a
manufacturer in a model year.’’ 49
U.S.C. 32901(a)(6). The statute directs
NHTSA to prescribe through regulation
average fuel economy standards for
automobiles (except passenger
automobiles) manufactured by a
manufacturer in a model year. 49 U.S.C.
32902(a). The standard is linked to
‘‘automobiles manufactured by a
manufacturer,’’ which is defined as
including ‘‘every automobile
manufactured by a person that controls,
is controlled by, or is under common
control with the manufacturer, but does
not include an automobile
manufactured by the person that is
exported not later than 30 days after the
end of the model year in which the
automobile is manufactured.’’ 49 U.S.C.
32901(a)(4).
While NHTSA historically has
established a light truck standard with
a single level common to all
manufacturers, the statute does not
require us to do so. Indeed, the statute
expressly defines ‘‘an average fuel
economy standard’’ as a performance
standard applicable to ‘‘a
manufacturer,’’ and directly links the
establishment of standards to the
manufacturer-specific definition of
‘‘automobiles manufactured by a
manufacturer.’’ It appears clear that
Congress left to the agency’s discretion
the determination of whether to
establish a single standard applicable
collectively to all manufacturers or to
set a series of standards applicable to
individual manufacturers to ensure that
each manufacturer achieves the
maximum feasible level it can achieve,
given its product mix.
We note that the statutory text
phrasing with regard to setting
‘‘maximum feasible’’ standards for light
truck manufacturers is susceptible to
more than one interpretation. We are
directed to establish standards for each
model year and instructed: ‘‘each
standard shall be the maximum feasible
average fuel economy level that the
Secretary decides the manufacturers can
achieve in that model year.’’ 49 U.S.C.
32902(a). The use of the plural
‘‘manufacturers,’’ instead of the
singular, could be read to indicate that
Congress intended that the standard for
any given model year collectively be the
maximum feasible level applicable to all
manufacturers. When read in
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conjunction with the other sentences in
that provision, however, the statutory
phrasing could also indicate that, by
using the plural, Congress anticipated
that the standards would reflect the
different product offerings of
manufacturers, but that each standard
would be the maximum feasible for the
manufacturer to which it applied.
Reference beyond the phrasing of that
particular sentence does not provide
much additional clarity. The language
used in the remainder of Section
32902(a) suggests that Congress
anticipated the possibility of standards
set at different levels for different
manufacturers, yet a discussion of
industry-wide considerations in the
legislative history (conference report)
suggests an expectation of a single CAFE
level applicable to all manufacturers.
We believe that Congress left to
NHTSA the discretion to establish light
truck standards in the most effective
way possible to achieve the maximum
level of fuel conservation that is feasible
for each manufacturer. NHTSA must,
consistent with the statute, take
industry-wide considerations into
account to ensure that the methodology
used to establish these levels ensures,
on an industry-wide basis, technological
feasibility and economic practicability
and accounts for the impact of other
regulatory activity.
Our proposal for an approach
requiring improvement by most
manufacturers and resulting in higher
overall fuel savings implements better
and more fully the statutory mandate to
set maximum feasible standards and
adheres more faithfully to the guidance
in the legislative history to base the
standards on industry-wide
considerations than an approach
requiring improvement by only a few
manufacturers in the industry. On both
an industry-wide basis and an
individual manufacturer basis, the
former approach provides no less
assurance than the latter approach that
the resulting standards are
technologically feasible or economically
practicable. In fact, since the former
approach is based on a manufacturer’s
own product mix, it ensures that the
level of average fuel economy required
of each manufacturer is tailored to the
circumstances and thus the capabilities
of that manufacturer.
The methodology proposed today is
similar to an approach suggested to, but
not adopted by, NHTSA in a study
submitted to the agency in 1980. See
Report of the Regulatory Analysis
Review Group, Council on Wage and
Price Stability, March 31, 1980,
submitted as attachment to letter from
R. Robert Russell, Director of the
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Council, to Joan Claybrook,
Administrator, NHTSA. FE–78–01–
No1–175 (Document 175 under Notice 1
in Docket FE–78–01.) After considering
a class-based CAFE system, the RARG
suggested a composite standard
developed by setting fuel economy
targets for various categories of light
trucks and then using a predetermined
fleet mix for each manufacturer to turn
these targets into a composite standard.
In assessing the permissibility of its
suggested approach, the RARG was
considering the CAFE statute in the
wake of its enactment and with an eye
toward developing a system that would
best achieve the Congressional
objectives arising from the oil crisis of
the 1970s. The RARG noted its generally
contemporaneous understanding of the
statutory parameters:
Nothing in the statute forbids this
approach. The statute requires that passenger
car standards be the same for all
manufacturers. There is no similar
requirement for the truck standards. Indeed,
the statute explicitly authorizes separate
standards for different classes of trucks,
which would inevitably result in varying
effects on the different manufacturers. Since
this is explicitly permitted, it seems unlikely
that composite standards, which would
result in similarly varying effects, are
forbidden. NHTSA’s treatment of this issue
in the preamble to its final truck standards
for model years 1980–81 suggests that it
agrees. 43 FR 11997–8. There, NHTSA
discussed a proposed fleet-average standard
at some length ‘‘ eventually rejecting it on
policy grounds ‘‘ without suggesting that it
might be illegal.
RARG Report at 29.60
We agree. In deciding which approach
to propose in this rulemaking for
establishing standards for a model year,
the agency narrowed its choices to two
approaches: establishing conventional
average fuel economy standards, one for
each of several classes, with or without
credit transfer between classes in
accordance with 49 U.S.C. 32903(a), or
establishing average fuel economy
targets, one for each of several attributebased categories, and an overall average
fuel economy standard in the form of a
production-weighted, harmonically
averaged step-function based on a
combination of those targets and each
60 In considering a composite standard approach
suggested by Ford, the agency seemed to confuse
that approach with a class based approach. The
agency noted its belief that a single all-inclusive
standard would provide more flexibility than class
based standards. 45 FR 11997–98. In the final rule,
the agency raised a question about its authority to
implement a composite standard, but did so
without reaching any conclusions and without
offering any analysis of its own or even adopting
that of any participant in the rulemaking. 45 FR
81593 at 81594. We have now conducted our own
legal analysis, which agrees with the RARG’s
analysis.
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manufacturer’s total production and
product mix for that year. NHTSA
believes that either approach is
permissible under the CAFE statute. The
agency also believes that a continuous
function approach would satisfy the
statute.
The statute explicitly authorizes the
former approach, separate standards for
different classes of light trucks. That
class approach would inevitably result
in varying effects on the different
manufacturers, at least partially due to
differences in product mix. If each
manufacturer exactly complied with the
standard for each class, a manufacturer’s
overall CAFE would differ from those of
other manufacturers solely as a function
of each manufacturer’s product mix.
Since the CAFE statute explicitly
permits this, NHTSA believes that the
step-function approach, which would
result in similarly varying effects, is
permissible. Nothing in the statute
explicitly forbids the step-function
approach. While the statute requires
that passenger car standards be the same
for all manufacturers, there is no similar
requirement for the light truck
standards.
The step-function approach is
thoroughly grounded in the CAFE
statute. Under that approach, the
foundation of the standard for each
model year would be the targets for the
categories. The target for each footprint
category would be the same for, and
applicable to, all manufacturers that
produce vehicles in that footprint
category. The selection of the target for
a footprint category would be based on
industry-wide considerations, as
contemplated in the conference report.
Such determination [of maximum feasible
average fuel economy level] should take
industry-wide considerations into account.
For example, a determination of maximum
feasible average fuel economy should not be
keyed to the single manufacturer that might
have the most difficulty achieving a given
level of average fuel economy. Rather, the
Secretary must weigh the benefits to the
nation of a higher average fuel economy
standard against the difficulties of individual
manufacturers. Such difficulties, however,
should be given appropriate weight in setting
the standard in light of the small number of
domestic manufacturers that currently exist
and the possible implications for the national
economy and for reduced competition
association [sic] with a severe strain on any
manufacturer. * * *
S. Rep. No. 94–516, 94th Congress, 1st
Sess. 154–155 (1975).
Specifically, the agency would select
a target based on an average of the levels
of fuel economy improvement that are
technologically feasible and
economically efficient for a much more
substantial part of the industry than is
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focused upon in setting standards
through the traditional method. Each
standard would rest in large part on a
composite of determinations regarding
the average fuel economy achievable by
the manufacturers in each of the
footprint categories. While CAFE
traditionally gave particular regard to
the least capable of the largest three
manufacturers in determining fuel
economy standards, this proposal would
use an average based on the largest
seven manufacturers in setting the
targets. Reliance on a more substantial
portion of the industry for this purpose
would build in a measure of assurance
that the targets are technologically
feasible and economically practicable.
The step-function ultimately picked
as the standard would also be the result
of further consideration of industrywide considerations as well as the
careful balancing, as mandated by
Congress, of the statutory factors,
including the economic practicability
for the industry. Since the product mix
used to help determine a manufacturer’s
required level of fuel economy for a
particular model year would be the
manufacturer’s actual mix in that model
year, instead of in a prior reference year,
a manufacturer would have the
flexibility necessary to vary its mix in
response to changes in consumer
preferences. This aspect of the stepfunction approach automatically builds
in a further measure of assurance that
the standards will not necessitate
product restrictions and thus will be
economically practicable.
Each step-function standard would
apply equally to all manufacturers. To
the extent that different manufacturers
have different product mixes, they
would be subject to different required
levels of average fuel economy.
However, if two manufacturers had the
same product mix and thus were
similarly situated, they would be subject
to the same required level of average
fuel economy.
Each manufacturer’s compliance
obligation is determined through
application of the target numbers to the
step function calculation. The obligation
remains premised on average fuel
economy level for each manufacturer’s
fleet and permits manufacturers to earn
credits or requires them to pay civil
penalties for exceeding or failing to
reach the fuel economy level applicable
to them. The footprint category targets
and standards would be established
within the statutory lead time of 18
months 61 and, because the
61 Under Reformed CAFE, as under Unreformed
CAFE, the agency is proposing to establish
standards for future model years based, in the first
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manufacturers know the formula for
compliance, they have the flexibility to
ensure compliance by monitoring and
adjusting their product offerings. A
manufacturer’s compliance would be
determined at the end of each model
year by comparing the step function
standard derived with the target
numbers to the step function standard
derived with the company’s actual
production weighted fuel economy
performance.
We are proposing to permit
manufacturers the option of complying
with either the Unreformed system or
the Reformed system during the threemodel year transition period. We
believe that the levels established for
each system constitute the maximum
feasible levels for each system. We
recognize that, depending on
manufacturer’s choices, the fuel savings
(and cost burdens) associated with these
three model years may be lower than the
fuel savings that would result if either
the Unreformed or Reformed program
were used alone. NHTSA believes that
this is an acceptable outcome that is
justified by ensuring an orderly
transition to a fully phased-in Reformed
program in MY 2011.
We believe that this proposal presents
an approach having the potential over
time to achieve substantially more
overall fuel savings than the historical
approach to establishing CAFE
standards. In order to ensure both
technological feasibility and economic
practicability, CAFE standards have
traditionally been set with particular
regard to the capabilities of the least
capable manufacturer with a significant
share of the market. This approach
helps to account for the fact that fullline manufacturers, with product
offerings serving the full range of
consumer needs and demand, generally
will have a fleet average fuel economy
level less than those manufacturers who
choose to serve only part of the
instance, on the manufacturers’ own plans
regarding the types and sizes of vehicles they plan
to produce in those years and their projected
production volumes of those vehicles. In
determining the level of the proposed standards, the
agency also increases the level of CAFE above that
achievable under those plans through identifying
technologies that it deems feasible, practicable and
cost-effective.
If manufacturers follow their plans, enhanced to
the extent necessary by the incorporation of
additional fuel savings technologies, their required
level of CAFE will not change. However, under
Reformed CAFE, if they depart from their plans
regarding the size of their vehicles and/or the
distribution of their production and thus produce
vehicles whose size is, on average, larger or smaller
than that of the vehicles in their original plans,
their required level of CAFE will change. If they do
depart from their plans, they could determine, with
a high degree of mathematical precision, the
magnitude of that change.
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market—typically offering products in
the smaller and lighter light truck
category. The traditional approach to
CAFE provides no regulatory incentive
for limited line manufacturers to
incorporate additional technologies
because none are needed to meet CAFE
standards established at an appropriate
level for full-line manufacturers.
Under the program proposed today,
CAFE standards will ultimately be
established in a way that encourages
technology use by all companies, not
just those with lower fleet average fuel
economy levels. By incorporating
available technologies across all
manufacturers, we believe that the
Reformed program will enhance overall
fuel savings over time. This is especially
true after we transition fully to a system
in which the category targets are
established at a level based on
maximizing net benefits.
However, we recognize the inequity of
potentially implementing unanticipated
additional requirements and costs
without providing adequate lead-time.
Just as the law permits us to consider
motor vehicle safety in addition to the
express factors when setting CAFE
standards, we believe the need for
transition is a factor that we should take
into account when moving toward the
Reformed CAFE system. Our
preliminary determination is that
providing a three-year transition period
with a compliance option will provide
an opportunity for experimentation by
the manufacturers and effect a quicker
transition to a system likely to save
more fuel savings over time than would
either implementing an abrupt change
after providing appropriate lead time or
maintaining the status quo. The agency
requests comments on whether a
transition period shorter than three
years would be feasible.
Today’s proposal seeks to ensure that
either system remains economically
practicable and technologically feasible.
By equating overall industry costs
during the transition period with the
overall costs associated with the
traditional approach, we are confident
that the Reformed proposal will not
impose industry costs beyond those
otherwise incurred. In addition, the
same technologies are used in both
analyses, although applied somewhat
differently.
We believe the Reformed proposal
better incorporates the Congressional
intent that we establish CAFE
obligations with an eye toward industrywide considerations. The category
targets are established not by focusing
on one manufacturer, but rather by
averaging the manufacturer-specific
levels derived through the marginal
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cost/benefit analysis, thus including all
complying companies in determining
CAFE responsibilities. The new program
also provides better flexibility—a
significant Congressional concern when
enacting and later amending the CAFE
statute—by better linking CAFE
obligations to each manufacturer’s
actual product sales.
Reformed CAFE continues all the
essential elements required by the
statute. It states CAFE requirements in
terms of miles per gallon, retains the
necessary fleet averaging, allows
manufacturers to earn credits and
requires them to pay fines for shortfalls
and applies a consistent methodology to
all manufacturers with equivalent
category target levels. Reformed CAFE
provides manufacturers with adequate
notice of their responsibilities,
complying with the 18-month lead time
for establishing a standard, while
simultaneously providing the flexibility
to alter their product plans and offerings
in response to changes in market
conditions (a problem that has required
the agency at times to lower previously
established CAFE standards). Reformed
CAFE also enhances our ability to
achieve maximum feasible fuel
economy by focusing on the addition of
available technology to all product lines
and encouraging greater fuel savings
and lower overall industry costs.
C. Comparison of estimated costs and
estimated benefits
1. Costs
In order to comply with the proposed
Reformed CAFE standards, we estimate
the average incremental cost per vehicle
to be $54 for MY 2008, $142 for MY
2009, and $186 for MY 2010. In MY
2011, the incremental cost would be
$275. Under the Reformed CAFE
system, a greater number of
manufacturers would be required to
improve their fleets and make
additional expenditures than under the
Unreformed CAFE system. The total
incremental cost (the cost necessary to
bring the corporate average fuel
economy for light trucks from 22.2 mpg
to the proposed standards) is estimated
to be $505 million for MY 2008, $1,332
million for MY 2009, and $1,802 million
for MY 2010. In MY 2011, the total
incremental cost is estimated to be
$2,656 million. The level of additional
expenditure that would be necessary
beyond already planned investment
varies for each individual manufacturer.
These individual expenditures are
discussed in more detail in the PRIA.
However, as stated above, because the
costs are distributed across a greater
share of the industry, the costs required
of the least capable manufacturer with
a significant share of the market are
lower under the Reformed system than
under the Unreformed system.
2. Benefits
The benefits analysis applied to the
proposed standards under the
Unreformed CAFE system was also
applied to the standards proposed under
the Reformed CAFE system. Benefit
estimates include both the benefits from
fuel savings and other economic
benefits from reduced petroleum use.
The agency relied on the same factors
and assumptions as discussed above for
the proposed Unreformed CAFE
standards. A more detailed discussion
of the application of this analysis to the
required fuel economy levels under the
Reformed CAFE system can be located
in the PRIA.
Adding benefits from fuel savings to
other economic benefits from reduced
petroleum use as a result of the
Reformed CAFE standards produced an
estimated incremental benefit to society,
of $73 per vehicle for MY 2008, $170
per vehicle for MY 2009 and $220 per
vehicle for MY 2010. In MY 2011, the
incremental benefits were estimated to
be $315 per vehicle. The total value of
these benefits is estimated to be $694
million for MY 2008, $1,633 million for
MY 2009, $2,144 million for MY 2010,
$3,069 million for MY 2011, based on
fuel prices ranging from $1.51 to $1.58
per gallon. The benefits analysis for
Reformed CAFE is based on the same
assumptions as the benefits analysis for
Unreformed CAFE, as described above
in III.D.2.
Based on the forecasted light truck
sales from AEO 2005 and an assumed
baseline fuel economy of 22.2 mpg (the
MY 2007 standard), we estimated the
fuel savings from the Reformed CAFE
program. These estimates are provided
as present values determined by
applying a 7 percent discount rate to the
future impacts. We translated impacts
other than fuel savings into dollar
values, where possible, and then
factored them into our total benefit
estimates. This analysis resulted in
estimated lifetime fuel savings of 0.9
billion, 2.2 billion, and 2.9 billion
gallons under the proposed Reformed
CAFE standards for MY 2008, 2009, and
2010 respectively. We estimated the fuel
savings for MY 2011 at 4.1 billion
gallons.
NHTSA estimates that the direct fuelsavings to consumers account for the
majority of the total benefits, and by
themselves exceed the estimated costs
of adopting more fuel-efficient
technologies. In sum, the total
incremental costs by model year
compared to the incremental societal
benefits by model year are as follows:
TABLE 5.—COMPARISON OF INCREMENTAL COSTS AND INCREMENTAL BENEFITS FOR THE PROPOSED REFORMED CAFE
STANDARDS
[In millions]
MY 2008
Total Incremental Costs * .................................................................................................................
Total Incremental Benefits * .............................................................................................................
MY 2009
MY 2010
MY 2011
$505
694
$1,332
1,633
$1,802
2,144
$2,656
3,069
* Relative to the 22.2 mpg standard for MY 2007.
In light of these figures, we have
tentatively concluded that the standards
proposed under the Reformed CAFE
system serve the overall interests of the
American people and is consistent with
the balancing that Congress has directed
us to do when establishing CAFE
standards. For all the reasons stated
above, we believe the proposed
Reformed CAFE standards represent
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fuel economy levels that are
economically practicable and,
independently, that are a cost beneficial
advancement for American society. A
more detailed explanation of our
analysis is provided in the PRIA.
3. Uncertainty
The agency performed a probabilistic
uncertainty analysis to examine the
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variation in estimates of factors that
determine the costs and benefits of
higher CAFE requirements. The analysis
indicates that the Agency is highly
certain that the benefits of the proposed
CAFE levels will exceed their costs for
all 4 model years of Reformed standards
included in the proposal.
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D. Proposed standards
We have tentatively determined that
the Reformed CAFE system and
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associated target levels for MYs 2008–
2011 would result in required fuel
economy levels that are both
technologically feasible and
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51449
economically practicable for
manufacturers. The proposed standard
and target levels are as follows:
BILLING CODE 4910–59–P
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TABLE 6.—PROPOSED TARGETS
Category
1
Range of vehicle footprint (sq. ft.) ...................................
MY 2008 Targets .............................................................
MY 2009 Targets .............................................................
MY 2010 Targets .............................................................
MY 2011 Targets .............................................................
These targets would result in the
required fuel economy levels increasing
each successive year for all
manufacturers except Hyundai. Based
2
≤43.0
26.8
27.4
27.8
28.4
3
4
5
>43.0–47.0
25.6
26.4
26.4
27.1
>47.0–52.0
22.3
23.5
24.0
24.5
>52.0–56.5
22.2
22.7
22.9
23.3
>56.5–65.0
20.7
21.0
21.6
21.9
on the product plans provided by
manufacturers in response to the
December 2003 request for information
and the incorporation of publicly
6
>65.0
20.4
21.0
62 20.8
21.3
available supplemental data and
information, the agency has estimated
the required fuel economy levels for the
individual manufacturers as follows:
TABLE 7.—ESTIMATES OF REQUIRED FUEL ECONOMY LEVELS BASED ON THE PROPOSED TARGET LEVELS AND CURRENT
INFORMATION
[in mpg]
Manufacturer
MY 2008
BMW ................................................................................................................................................
Suzuki ..............................................................................................................................................
Volkswagen ......................................................................................................................................
General Motors ................................................................................................................................
Ford ..................................................................................................................................................
DaimlerChrysler ...............................................................................................................................
Honda ..............................................................................................................................................
Hyundai ............................................................................................................................................
Nissan ..............................................................................................................................................
Toyota ..............................................................................................................................................
Fuji (Subaru) ....................................................................................................................................
Porsche ............................................................................................................................................
Isuzu ................................................................................................................................................
As stated previously, we recognize
that the manufacturer product plans that
we used in developing the
manufacturers’ required fuel economy
levels are likely already outdated in
some respects. We fully expect the
manufacturers to revise those plans to
reflect subsequent developments.
Further, we note that a manufacturer’s
required fuel economy level for a model
year under the Reformed CAFE system
would be based on its actual production
numbers in that model year. Therefore,
its official required fuel economy level
would not be known until the end of
that model year. However, because the
category targets would be established in
advance of the model year, a
manufacturer should be able to estimate
its required level accurately and
develop a product plan that would
comply with that level.
V. Implementation of options
62 The reformed standards are a result of the
product plan data. If the distribution of vehicles or
fuel economies of vehicles changes from year to
year, those changes will be reflected in the category
targets. Because of the process of determining the
category targets, sometimes the targets will not
increase over time in a specific category. This is the
case for 20.8 in category 6 in MY2010. The target
goes from 21.0 in MY2009 to 20.8 in MY2010—a
decrease of 0.2 mpg. This is a result of the product
plan data changing.
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A. Choosing the Reformed or
Unreformed CAFE system
As part of the transition to a fully
phased-in Reform CAFE system in MY
2011, the agency is proposing that for
MYs 2008–2010, manufacturers have
the option of complying under the
Reformed CAFE system or the
Unreformed CAFE system.
Manufacturers would be required to
announce their selection for a model
year in the mid-model year report
required for that model year in 49 CFR
537.7. The mid-model year report is the
most accurate report that the
manufacturers currently provide
directly to NHTSA and does not differ
significantly from their final report. A
manufacturer’s selection would be
irrevocable for that MY. However, a
manufacturer would be permitted to
select the alternate compliance option
in the following MY. Beginning MY
2011, we are proposing to permit
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MY 2009
MY 2010
MY 2011
23.8
26.0
22.7
22.2
22.4
22.8
23.1
24.2
22.1
23.2
24.8
22.3
22.3
24.8
26.7
23.9
22.8
22.9
23.5
24.0
25.9
22.8
24.1
25.6
23.5
22.9
25.1
26.8
24.3
23.2
23.1
23.7
24.2
25.7
23.2
24.5
25.8
24.0
23.2
25.7
27.5
24.8
23.7
23.6
24.2
24.8
26.3
23.7
25.0
26.4
24.5
23.7
compliance only under the Reformed
CAFE system.
The proposed CAFE levels for both
systems have been presented in the
above discussion. However, after
receiving comments and reviewing any
additionally provided data, we may
decide to set the standards at different
levels than those proposed. Factual
uncertainties that could result in lower
standards include the possibility that
planned technological actions may not
achieve anticipated fuel economy
benefits or may prove to be infeasible.
Similarly, factual uncertainties that
could result in higher standards include
the possibility that manufacturers may
be able to improve fuel economy in their
fleets by further technological advances
beyond those currently planned.
B. Application of credits between
compliance options
The EPCA credit provisions would
operate under the Reformed CAFE
system in the same manner as they do
under the Unreformed CAFE system.
Although this goes against intuition, the essential
point is that the overall fuel economy goal for each
manufacturer increases in each year. This type of
phenomenon could be avoided through the use of
a continuous function. See IV.A.4.a. Step-function
vs. continuous function above.
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The harmonic averages used to
determine compliance under the
Reformed CAFE system permit the
amount, if any, of credits earned to be
calculated as under the Unreformed
CAFE system:
Credits = (Actual CAFE¥Standard
CAFE) * 10 * Total Production
Credits earned in a model year could
be carried backward or forward as
currently done in the Unreformed CAFE
system.
Further, credits would be transferable
between the two systems. Both
Unreformed CAFE and Reformed CAFE
use harmonic averaging to determine
fuel economy performance of a
manufacturer’s fleet. Under the
Reformed CAFE, fuel savings from
under- and over-performance with each
category are generated and applied
almost identically to the way in which
this occurs under the Unreformed CAFE
system. As a result, the two systems
generate credits with equal fuel savings
value. Therefore, credits earned in a
model year under Unreformed CAFE
would be fully transferable forward to a
model year under the Reformed CAFE
system, up to the statutory limit of three
years. Likewise, credits under Reformed
CAFE could be carried back to
Unreformed CAFE.
VII. Impact of other Federal Motor
Vehicle Standards
The statute specifically directs us to
consider the impact of other Federal
vehicle standards on fuel economy. This
statutory factor constitutes an express
recognition that fuel economy standards
should not be set without due
consideration given to the effects of
efforts to address other regulatory
concerns, such as motor vehicle safety
and emissions. The primary influence of
many of these regulations is the
addition of weight to the vehicle, with
the commensurate reduction in fuel
economy.
A. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety
Standards
The agency has evaluated the impact
of the Federal motor vehicle safety
standards (FMVSS) using MY 2007
vehicles as a baseline. We have issued
or proposed to issue a number of
FMVSS that become effective between
the MY 2007 baseline and MY 2010.
The fuel economy impact, if any, of
these new requirements will take the
form of increased vehicle weight
resulting from the design changes
needed to meet new FMVSSs.
The average test weights (curb weight
plus 300 pounds) of the light truck fleet
for General Motors, Ford, and
DaimlerChrysler in MY 2008, MY 2009,
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and MY 2010 are 4,904, 4,897, and
4,909, respectively. Thus, overall, the
three largest manufacturers of light
trucks expect weight to remain almost
unchanged during the time period
addressed by this rulemaking. The
changes in weight include all factors,
such as changes in the fleet mix of
vehicles, required safety improvements,
voluntary safety improvements, and
other changes for marketing purposes.
These changes in weight over the three
model years would have a negligible
impact on fuel economy.
NHTSA has issued a number of
proposed and final rules on safety
standards that are proposed to be
effective or are effective between MYs
2008–2010. These have been analyzed
for their potential impact on light truck
fuel economy weights for MYs 2008–
2010:
1. FMVSS 138, tire pressure monitoring
system
As required by the Transportation
Recall Enhancement, Accountability,
and Documentation (TREAD) Act,
NHTSA is requiring a Tire Pressure
Monitoring System (TPMS) be installed
in all passenger cars, multipurpose
passenger vehicles, trucks and buses
that have a Gross Vehicle Weight Rating
of 10,000 pounds or less. The effective
dates are based on the following phasein schedule:
20 percent of light vehicles produced
between September 1, 2005 and August
31, 2006,
70 percent of light vehicles produced
between September 1, 2006 and August
31, 2007,
100 percent of light vehicles produced after
September 1, 2007 are required to
comply.
Thus, for MY 2008, an additional 30
percent of the fleet will be required to
meet the standard as compared to MY
2007. We estimate from a cost teardown
study that the added weight for an
indirect system is about 0.156 lbs. and
for a direct system is 0.275 to 0.425 lbs.
Initially, direct systems will be more
prevalent, thus, the increased weight is
estimated to be average 0.35 lbs. (0.16
kilograms). Beginning in MY 2008, the
weight increase from FMVSS No. 138 is
anticipated to be 0.11 pounds (0.05
kilograms) [0.35 lbs. * 0.3 and 0.16 kg
* 0.3].
As stated in the TPMS final rule,63 by
promoting proper tire inflation, the
installation of TPMS will result in better
fuel economy for vehicle owners that
previously had operated their vehicles
with under-inflated tires. However, this
63 70 FR 18136, 18139; April 8, 2005; Docket No.
2005–28506.
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will not impact a manufacturer’s
compliance under the CAFE program.
Under the CAFE program, a vehicle’s
fuel economy is calculated with the
vehicle’s tires at proper inflation.
Therefore, the fuel economy benefits of
TPMS have not been considered in this
rulemaking.
2. FMVSS 202, head restraints
The final rule requires an increase in
the height of front seat outboard head
restraints in pickups, vans, and utility
vehicles, effective September 1, 2008
(MY 2009). If the vehicle has a rear seat
head restraint, it is required to be at
least a certain height. The initial head
restraint requirement, established in
1969, resulted in the average front seat
head restraints being 3 inches taller than
pre-standard head restraints and adding
5.63 pounds 64 to the weight of a
passenger car. With the new final rule,
we estimate the increase in height for
the front seats to be 1.3 inches and for
the rear seat to be 0.26 inch, for a
combined average of 1.56 inches.65
Based on the relationship of pounds to
inches from current head restraints, we
estimate the average weight gain across
light trucks would be 2.9 pounds (1.3
kilograms). (5.63/3 * 1.56 = 2.93 lbs.)
3. FMVSS 208, occupant crash
protection
This final rule requires a lap/shoulder
belt in the center rear seat of light
trucks. There are an estimated
5,061,07966 seating positions in light
trucks needing a shoulder belt, where
they currently have a lap belt. This
estimate of seating positions is a
combination of light trucks, SUVs,
minivans and 15 passenger vans that
have either no rear seat, or one to four
rear seats that need shoulder belts. This
estimate was based on sales of 7,521,302
light trucks in MY 2000. Thus, the
average light truck needs 0.67 shoulder
belts. The average weight of a rear seat
lap belt is 0.92 lbs. and the average
weight of a manual lap/shoulder belt
with retractor is 3.56 lbs.67 Thus, the
anticipated weight gain is 2.64 pounds
per shoulder belt. We estimate the
64 Tarbet, Marcia J., ‘‘Cost and Weight Added by
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards for Model
Years 1968–2001 in Passenger Cars and Light
Trucks’’, NHTSA, December 2004, DOT–HS–809–
834. Pg. 51. (https://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/cars/rules/
regrev/evaluate/80934.html).
65 ‘‘Final Regulatory Impact Analysis, FMVSS No.
202 Head Restraints for Passenger Vehicles’’,
NHTSA, November 2004, Docket No. 19807–1, pg.
74.
66 ‘‘Final Economic Assessment and Regulatory
Flexibility Analysis, Cost and Benefits of Putting a
Shoulder Belt in the Center Seats of Passenger Cars
and Light Trucks’’, NHTSA, June 2004, Docket No.
18726–2, pg. 33.
67 Tarbet 2004, p. 84.
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average weight gain per light truck for
the shoulder belt would be 1.8 pounds
(0.8 kilograms) (2.64 * .67 = 1.77 lbs.).
A second, potentially more important,
weight increase depends upon how the
center seat lap/shoulder belt is
anchored. The agency has allowed a
detachable shoulder belt in this seating
position, which could be anchored to
the ceiling or other position, without a
large increase in weight (less than 1 lb.).
If the center seat lap/shoulder belt were
anchored to the seat itself, typically the
seat would need to be strengthened to
handle this load (the agency requests
comments on this weight increase). If
the manufacturer decides to change all
of the seats to integral seats, having all
three seating positions anchored
through the seat, then both the seat and
flooring needs to be strengthened (again
the agency requests comments on this
weight increase, which could be 10 to
20 lbs.). The agency requests
manufacturer’s plans in this area and
predicted weight increases.
The effective dates are based on the
following phase-in schedule:
50 percent of light vehicles produced
between September 1, 2005 and August
31, 2006,
80 percent of light vehicles produced
between September 1, 2006 and August
31, 2007,
100 percent of light vehicles produced after
September 1, 2007.
Thus, for MY 2008, an additional 20
percent of the fleet will be required to
meet the standard. We estimate the
average weight gain per light truck for
the shoulder belt would be 0.36 lbs
(0.16 kg) [1.8 pounds (0.8 kilograms) *
0.2] compared to MY 2007. For the
anchorage, the average weight increase
would be 0.2 pounds (0.09 kg) or more.
4. FMVSS 214, side impact protection
On May 17, 2004, NHTSA proposed
to upgrade Federal Motor Vehicle Safety
Standard (FMVSS) No. 214, ‘‘Side
impact protection,’’ to require vehicle
manufacturers to provide head
protection to occupants involved in side
impacts with narrow fixed objects, such
as telephone poles and trees, and in
vehicle-to-vehicle collisions. The
Standard already requires thoracic
protection in a dynamic test (69 FR
27990). If this proposal is adopted as a
final rule, the agency anticipates, based
on current technology, that vehicle
manufacturers would respond by
installing either a combination head/
thorax side air bag or window curtains.
A teardown study of 5 thorax air bags
resulted in an average weight increase
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per vehicle of 4.77 pounds (2.17 kg).68
A second teardown study of 3
combination head/thorax air bags
resulted in a similar average weight
increase per vehicle of 4.38 pounds
(1.99 kg).69 This second study also
performed teardowns of 5 window
curtain systems. One of the window
curtain systems was very heavy (23.45
pounds). The other four window curtain
systems had an average weight increase
per vehicle of 6.78 pounds (3.08 kg) and
that increase is assumed to be the
average for all vehicles in the future.
If manufacturers install thorax bags
with a window curtain, the average
weight increase would be 11.55 pounds
(4.77 + 6.78) or 5.25 kg (2.07 + 3.08). In
MY 2003, about 17 percent of the fleet
had thorax air bags, 7 percent had
combination air bags, and 10 percent
had window curtains. The combined
average weight for these systems in MY
2003 was 1.8 pounds (0.82 kg). Thus,
the future increase in weight for side
impact air bags and window curtains
compared to MY 2003 installations is
9.75 pounds (11.55¥1.8) or 4.43 kg
(5.25¥0.82).
We recognize that many
manufacturers are incorporating side
impact air bags on a voluntary basis.
Therefore, we have included the weight
associated with the proposed FMVSS
No. 214 upgrade in the impacts of the
voluntary improvements discussed
below.
5. FMVSS 301, fuel system integrity
This final rule amends the testing
standards for rear end crashes and
resulting fuel leaks. Many vehicles
already pass the more stringent
standards, and those affected are not
likely to be pick-up trucks or vans. It is
estimated that weight added will be
only lightweight items such as a flexible
filler neck. We estimate the average
weight gain across this vehicle class
would be 0.24 pounds (0.11 kilograms).
The effective dates are based on the
following phase-in schedule:
40 percent of light vehicles produced
between September 1, 2006 and August
31, 2007,
70 percent of light vehicles produced
between September 1, 2007 and August
31, 2008,
100 percent of light vehicles produced after
September 1, 2008 are required to
comply.
68 Khadilkar, et al. ‘‘Teardown Cost Estimates of
Automotive Equipment Manufactured to Comply
with Motor Vehicle Standard—FMVSS 214(D)—
Side Impact Protection, Side Air Bag Features’’,
April 2003, DOT HS 809 809.
69 Ludtke & Associates, ‘‘Perform Cost and Weight
Analysis, Head Protection Air Bag Systems, FMVSS
201’’, page 4–3 to 4–5, DOT HS 809 842.
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51453
Thus, 60 percent of the fleet must
meet FMVSS 301 during the MY 2008–
2010 time period. Thus, the average
weight gain during this period would be
0.14 pounds (0.07 kilograms).
6. Cumulative weight impacts of the
FMVSSs
In summary, NHTSA estimates that
weight additions required by FMVSS
regulations that will be effective in MYs
2008–2010, compared to the MY 2007
fleet will increase light truck weight by
an average of 3.71 pounds (1.67 kg.).
The agency recognizes that there are
several safety improvements being made
voluntarily. Some of these are for
marketing purposes and others are to do
better on government or insurance
industry tests involving vehicle ratings.
Likely voluntary safety improvements
will add 11.75 pounds or more (5.34 kg
or more) compared to MY 2003
installations. A more detailed
discussion of the impact of voluntary
safety improvements is provided in the
PRIA.
B. Federal Motor Vehicle Emissions
Standards
With input from EPA, NHTSA has
evaluated the impact of a number of
vehicle related emissions standards on
fuel economy. In addition, NHTSA’s
draft Environmental Assessment
examines how the CAFE standards
would impact air quality by affecting
emissions of criteria pollutants. Many of
these standards and regulations are
currently being implemented through a
multi-year phase-in. NHTSA believes
there will not be any fuel economy
impact between the MY 2007 baseline
and MY 2010 resulting from federal or
state emissions standards or regulations.
1. Tier 2 requirements
On February 10, 2000, the EPA
published a final rule (65 FR 6698)
establishing new federal emissions
standards for passenger cars and light
trucks. These new emissions standards,
known as Tier 2 standards, focus on
reducing the emissions most responsible
for the ozone and particulate matter
(PM) impact from these vehicles—
nitrogen oxides (NOX) and non-methane
organic gases (NMOG), consisting
primarily of hydrocarbons (HC) and
contributing to ambient volatile organic
compounds (VOC). Passenger cars,
SUVs, pickups, vans, and medium duty
passenger vehicles (MDPVs) 70 are
subject to the same national emission
standards. Vehicles and fuels are treated
70 For a definition and discussion of these
vehicles, see section IX, Applicability of the
standards.
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as a system, so cleaner vehicles will
have low-sulfur gasoline to facilitate
greater emission reductions. The Tier 2
emission standards apply to all
passenger vehicles, regardless of
whether they run on gasoline or diesel
fuel.
Tier 2 standards are fully
implemented for passenger cars and
light trucks (LDT1 and LDT2) in 2007,
and for MDPVs by 2009 at the latest.
Thus, all vehicles subject to the 2008
light truck rulemaking are affected.
When issuing the Tier 2 standards,
EPA responded to comments regarding
the Tier 2 standard and its impact on
CAFE by indicating that it believed that
the Tier 2 standards would not have an
adverse effect on fuel economy. The
EPA stated that it saw no real energy
impacts with respect to the Tier 2
vehicle program and that the
technologies needed for conventional
gasoline engines to meet the Tier 2
standards should have no significant
effect on fuel economy for those
engines, which represent over 99
percent of the current light-duty fleets.
Similarly, EPA states that it does not
believe that the stringent Tier 2
emission standards will preclude
promising fuel efficient technologies.71
EPA Tier 2 emission standards increase
the stringency of the emission standards
of diesel engines starting in 2008.
Several manufacturers have stated that
they have working diesel engines that
will meet the Tier 2 standards. In
addition, the EPA test facility in Ann
Arbor, Michigan has a working
prototype diesel engine that meets the
Tier 2 standard. The agency did not
apply diesel engines frequently as a
CAFE compliance technology because
there were other technologies that were
more cost effective in meeting the
standard.
first apply in MY 2004 and phase-in
over three model years.
The ORVR requirements impose a
weight penalty on vehicles as they
necessitate the installation of vapor
recovery canisters and associated tubing
and hardware. However, the operation
of the ORVR system results in fuel
vapors being made available to the
engine for combustion while the vehicle
is being operated. As these vapors
provide an additional source of energy
that would otherwise be lost to the
atmosphere through evaporation, the
ORVR requirements do not have a
negative impact on fuel economy.
2. Onboard vapor recovery
Based on NHTSA weight versus fuel
economy algorithms, a 3–4 pound
increase in weight equates to 0.01 mpg
fuel economy penalty. Thus, the
agency’s estimate of the safety weight
effects are 0.01 mpg or more for required
additions and 0.03 mpg or more for
voluntary safety improvements for a
total of 0.04 mpg or more.
However, the agency is not certain
whether the additional weight
associated with the FMVSSs that will
(or may) take effect between MY 2007
and 2008, as well as the weight
associated with voluntary safety
improvements, were incorporated into
the manufacturers’ product plans
On April 6, 1994, EPA published a
final rule (59 FR 16262) controlling
vehicle-refueling emissions through the
use of onboard refueling vapor recovery
(ORVR) vehicle-based systems. These
requirements applied to light-duty
vehicles beginning in MY 1998, and
phased-in over three model years. The
ORVR requirements also apply to lightduty trucks with a GVWR of 6,000
pounds or less beginning in MY 2001
and phasing-in over three model years.
For light-duty trucks with a GVWR of
6,001–8,500 lbs, the ORVR requirements
71 See, U.S. EPA, Tire 2 Motor Vehicle Emissions
Standards and Gasoline Sulfur Control
Requirements: Response to Comments, EPA420–R–
99–024, December 20, 1999, pp. 26–11 and 26–12.
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3. California Air Resources Board LEV II
The State of California Low Emission
Vehicle II regulations (LEV II) apply to
passenger cars and light trucks as of MY
2004.72 The LEV II amendments
restructure the light-duty truck category
so that trucks with gross vehicle weight
rating of 8,500 pounds or lower are
subject to the same low-emission
vehicle standards as passenger cars. LEV
II requirements also include more
stringent emission standards for
passenger car and light-duty truck LEVs
and ultra low emission vehicles
(ULEVs), and establish a four-year
phase-in requirement that begins in
2004.
The agency notes that compliance
with increased emission requirements is
most often achieved through more
sophisticated combustion management.
The improvements and refinement in
engine controls to achieve this end
generally improve fuel economy.
In summary, the agency believes there
will be no impact from emissions
standards on light truck fuel economy
between the baseline MY 2007 and MY
2010 fleets.
C. Impacts on Manufacturers’ Baselines
72 Title 13, California Code of Regulations
§§ 1900, 1956.8, 1960.1, 1960.5, 1961, 1962, 1962.1,
1965, 1976, 1978, 2062, and 2101.
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submitted to the agency. Such increases
may have been reflected in the available
data relied upon by the agency to
supplement manufacturer submissions.
Therefore, the agency seeks clarification
on this point.
VIII. Need for Nation to Conserve
Energy
EPCA specifically directs the
Department to balance the technological
and economic challenges with the
nation’s need to conserve energy. While
EPCA grew out of the energy crisis of
the 1970s, the United States still faces
considerable energy challenges today.
Increasingly, U.S. energy consumption
has been outstripping U.S. energy
production. This imbalance, if allowed
to continue, will undermine our
economy, our standard of living, and
our national security. (May 2001
National Energy Policy (NEP) Overview,
p. viii)
As was made clear in the first chapter
of the NEP, efficient energy use and
conservation are important elements of
a comprehensive program to address the
nation’s current energy challenges:
America’s current energy challenges can be
met with rapidly improving technology,
dedicated leadership, and a comprehensive
approach to our energy needs. Our challenge
is clear—we must use technology to reduce
demand for energy, repair and maintain our
energy infrastructure, and increase energy
supply. Today, the United States remains the
world’s undisputed technological leader: but
recent events have demonstrated that we
have yet to integrate 21st-century technology
into an energy plan that is focused on wise
energy use, production, efficiency, and
conservation.
(Page 1–1)
The concerns about energy security
and the effects of energy prices and
supply on national economic well-being
that led to the enactment of EPCA
persist today. The demand for
petroleum is steadily growing in the
U.S. and around the world.
The Energy Information
Administration’s International Energy
Outlook 2005 (IEO2005) 73 and Annual
Energy Outlook (2005) (AEO2005)
indicate growing demand for petroleum
in the U.S. and around the world. U.S.
demand for oil is expected to increase
from 20 million barrels per day in 2003
to 28 million barrels per day in 2025. In
the IEO2005 reference case, world oil
demand increases through 2025 at a rate
of 1.9 percent annually, from 78 million
barrels per day in 2002 to 119 million
barrels per day in 2025. Fifty-nine
percent of the increase in world demand
is projected to occur in the North
73 See https://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/pdf/
0484(2005).pdf.
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America and emerging Asia. Most (61
percent) of the worldwide increases
would occur in the transportation
sector.74
To meet this projected increase in
demand, worldwide productive capacity
would have to increase by more than 42
million barrels per day over current
levels. OPEC producers are expected to
supply 60 percent of the increased
production. In contrast, U.S. crude oil
production is projected to increase from
5.7 million barrels per day in 2003 to
6.2 million in 2009, and then begin
declining in 2010, falling to 4.7 million
barrels per day in 2025. By 2025, nearly
70 percent of the oil consumed in the
U.S. would be imported oil.
Energy is an essential input to the
U.S. economy and having a strong
economy is essential to maintaining and
strengthening our national security.
Secure, reliable, and affordable energy
sources are fundamental to economic
stability and development. Rising
energy demand poses a challenge to
energy security given increased reliance
on global energy markets. As noted
above, U.S. energy consumption has
increasingly been outstripping U.S.
energy production. Conserving energy,
especially reducing the nation’s
dependence on petroleum, benefits the
U.S. in several ways. Improving energy
efficiency has benefits for economic
growth and the environment as well as
other benefits such reducing pollution
and improving security of energy
supply. More specifically, reducing total
petroleum use decreases our economy’s
vulnerability to oil price shocks.
Reducing dependence on oil imports
from regions with uncertain conditions
enhances our energy security and can
reduce the flow of oil profits to certain
states now hostile to the U.S. Reducing
the growth rate of oil use will help
relieve pressures on already strained
domestic refinery capacity, decreasing
the likelihood of product price
volatility.
We believe that the continued
development of advanced technology,
such as fuel cell technology, and an
infrastructure to support it, may help in
the long term to achieve reductions in
74 U.S. oil use has become increasingly
concentrated in the transportation sector. In 1973,
the U.S. transportation sector accounted for 51
percent of total U.S. petroleum use (8.4 of 16.5
million barrels per day (mmbd)). By 2003,
transportation’s share of U.S. oil had increased to
66 percent (13.2 out of 20.0 mmbd). (USDOE/EIA,
Monthly Energy Review, April 2005, Table 11.2)
Energy demand for transportation is projected to
grow by over 67 percent between 2003 and 2025.
(USDOE/EIA, Annual Energy Outlook (Report #
DOE/EIA–0383), January 2005) Demand for lightduty vehicle fuels is projected to increase at a
similar pace. (Id.)
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foreign oil dependence and stability in
the world oil market. The continued
infusion of advanced diesels and hybrid
propulsion vehicles into the U.S. light
truck fleet may also contribute to
reduced dependence on petroleum. In
the shorter term, our Reformed CAFE
proposal would encourage broader use
of fuel saving technologies, resulting in
more fuel-efficient vehicles and greater
overall fuel economy.
We have concluded that the proposed
increases in the light truck CAFE
standards would contribute
appropriately to energy conservation
and the comprehensive energy program
set forth in the NEP. In assessing the
impact of the standards, we accounted
for the increased vehicle mileage that
accompanies reduced costs to
consumers associated with greater fuel
economy and have concluded that the
final rule will lead to considerable fuel
savings. While increasing fuel economy
without increasing the cost of fuel will
lead to some additional vehicle travel,
the overall impact on fuel conservation
remains decidedly positive.
We acknowledge that, despite the
CAFE program, the United States’
dependence on foreign oil and
petroleum consumption has increased
in recent years. Nonetheless, data
suggest that past fuel economy increases
have had a major impact on U.S.
petroleum use. The NAS determined
that if the fuel economy of the vehicle
fleet had not improved since the 1970s,
the U.S. gasoline consumption and oil
imports would be about 2.8 million
barrels per day higher than they are
today. Increasing fuel economy by 10
percent would produce an estimated 8
percent reduction in fuel consumption.
Increases in the fuel economy of new
vehicles eventually raise the fuel
economy of all vehicles as older cars
and trucks are scrapped.
Further, we do not believe that the
increases in the light truck CAFE
standards applicable to MYs 2008–2011
would unduly lead to so-called ‘‘energy
waste.’’ This theory, presented in public
comments during the rulemaking on the
MY 2005–07 light truck standards, rests
on the notion that efforts to reduce
energy use can result in negative
economic effects from losses in product
values, profits and worker incomes. As
discussed above, the agency believes
that the CAFE standards could be
achieved without significant adverse
economic or safety consequences.
Within the bounds of technological
feasibility and economic practicability,
the proposed standards would, in fact,
enhance ‘‘energy efficiency’’ without
significant adverse ancillary effects.
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Our analysis in the Environmental
Assessment indicates that proposed
Reformed standards will result in an
estimated 37.4 million metric tons of
avoided greenhouse gas emissions
(expressed in carbon equivalents) over
the lifetime of the vehicles. They will
further reduce the greenhouse gas
emissions intensity of the transportation
sector of the national economy,
consistent with the President’s overall
climate change policies. In the past,
NHTSA has received comments
regarding the monetary value of the
benefit of avoided greenhouse gas
emissions. However, NHTSA has not
monetized greenhouse gas reduction
benefits in this rule, given the scientific
and economic uncertainties associated
with developing a proper estimation of
avoided costs due to climate change. We
invite comments on this approach.
IX. Applicability of the CAFE
Standards
A. MDPVs
In the 2003 ANPRM, the agency
sought comment on whether to extend
the applicability of the CAFE program to
include vehicles with a GVWR between
8,500 lb. and 10,000 lb., especially those
that are defined by the EPA as medium
duty passenger vehicles (MDPVs).75
Under EPCA, the agency can regulate
vehicles with a GVWR between 6,000 lb.
and 10,000 lb. under CAFE if we
determine that (1) Standards are feasible
for these vehicles, and (2) either that
these vehicles are used for the same
purpose as vehicles rated at not more
than 6,000 GVWR, or that their
regulation will result in significant
energy conservation. The MDPV
category includes vehicles with a GVWR
greater than 8,500 lb but less than
10,000 lb. and that were designed
primarily to transport passengers, i.e.,
large vans and SUVs.
In preparing the NPRM, the agency
analyzed the feasibility of including
MDPVs and the impact of their
75 EPA defines these vehicles as follows:
Medium-duty passenger vehicle (MDPV) means
any heavy-duty vehicle (as defined in this subpart)
with a gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) of less
than 10,000 pounds that is designed primarily for
the transportation of persons. The MDPV definition
does not include any vehicle which:
(1) Is an ‘‘incomplete truck’’ as defined in this
subpart; or
(2) Has a seating capacity of more than 12
persons; or
(3) is designed for more than 9 persons in seating
rearward of the driver’s seat; or
(4) Is equipped with an open cargo area (for
example, a pick-up truck box or bed) of 72.0 inches
in interior length or more. A covered box not
readily accessible from the passenger compartment
will be considered an open cargo area for purposes
of this definition.
(40 CFR § 86.1803–01.)
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inclusion on the fuel savings of the
CAFE standards. The agency believes
that fuel economy technologies
applicable to vehicles with a GVWR
below 8,500 lb. might be applicable to
MDPVs, e.g., low-friction lubricants and
cylinder deactivation. MDPVs are
already required by EPA to undergo a
portion of the testing necessary to
determine fuel economy performance
under the CAFE program. See, 40 CFR
Part 600 Subpart F. If MDPVs were
included in the CAFE standards,
manufacturers would be able to rely on
this testing to generate a portion of the
data necessary to determine fuel
economy performance. A similar test
procedure could be used to generate the
remaining necessary data. Accordingly,
we do not believe that, if MDPVs were
included in the CAFE program, meeting
the additional testing requirements
would be burdensome.
The agency’s analysis of the impact of
including MDPVs on fuel savings
indicated that their inclusion in MYs
2008–2010 would lead to a net loss of
industry-wide fuel savings. Under the
Unreformed CAFE structure, maximum
feasible standards are set with particular
consideration given to the least capable
manufacturer, which has been
determined to be General Motors for this
proposed rule. Almost all of the MDPVs
are produced by General Motors and,
due to their weight, have very low fuel
economy. The inclusion of these
vehicles would lead to greater fuel
savings by General Motors, but less by
the other manufacturers. This would
occur because the addition of the low
fuel economy MDPVs in MYs 2008–
2010 would depress the level of General
Motors’ CAFE and therefore depress the
level of the Unreformed CAFE
standards. We calculate that the
Unreformed CAFE standards for MYs
2008–2010 would be 0.3 mpg lower if
MDPVs were included in those years.
This would affect not only General
Motors, but also some other
manufacturers. Since the MY 2008–2010
Reformed CAFE standards would be set
so as to roughly equalize industry-wide
costs with the MY 2008–2010
Unreformed CAFE standards,
depressing the Unreformed CAFE
standards for MYs 2008–2010 would
also depress the Reformed CAFE
standards for those years. The net effect
of including MDPVs in the MY 2008–
2010 Reformed CAFE standards would
be a reduction in overall fuel savings of
almost 1.1 billion gallons.
The agency seeks comment on
whether MDPVs should be included in
final rule for MY 2011. If the agency
were to include MDPVs, we would
adopt essentially the EPA definition of
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‘‘medium duty passenger vehicles.’’
Inclusion of MDPVs in the MY 2011
Reformed CAFE standard could save an
additional 0.5 billion gallons of fuels.
The associated costs are $200 million
with a per vehicle cost ranging from
$900 to $2800 per vehicle. Based on the
product plans received, the compliance
costs would be borne primarily by one
manufacturer. The agency seeks
comments on the merits of subjecting
these vehicles to the MY 2011 standard.
If we do not regulate MDPVs,
manufacturers could very well decide,
nevertheless, to install fuel-efficient
technologies in their MDPVs as they
become more widely used in their nonMDPV fleet, and thereby less expensive,
in order to improve market demand for
their vehicles. The agency invites
comment on whether ways, other than
inclusion of 8,500–10,000 lb GVWR
light trucks in the CAFE standards, can
be found in EPCA to encourage the
making of improvements in fuel
economy of those vehicles. Can the
agency create mechanisms by which
manufacturers who improve the fuel
economy of those vehicles can receive
credit toward compliance with the light
truck CAFE standards? The provisions
in EPCA regarding credits for light
trucks are less precise than those
relating to passenger cars, although
EPCA does provide that credits for light
trucks are to be earned in the same way
as credits for cars are earned. If the
agency can create such mechanisms,
what requirements and limitations
should the agency establish? For
example, in the absence of an applicable
standard, what reference level of CAFE
could be used to determine the amount
of credit earned by a manufacturer?
B. ‘‘Flat-Floor’’ Provision
The agency has tentatively decided to
amend the ‘‘flat floor provision’’ in the
light truck definition (49 CFR 523.5) to
include expressly vehicles with seats
that fold and stow in a vehicle’s floor
pan. The agency has tentatively
determined that these seats are
functionally equivalent to removable
seats and minimize safety concerns that
arise from the potential of improperly
re-installed seats.
The current regulation classifies as a
light truck any vehicle with readily
removable seats that, once removed,
leave a flat, floor-level surface extending
from the forward most removable seat
mount to the rear of the vehicle (the flat
floor provision). The flat floor provision
originally was based on the agency’s
determination that passenger vans with
removable seats and a flat load floor
were derived from cargo vans (42 FR
38367; July 28, 1977) and should be
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classified as trucks. Because these
passenger vans were derived from cargo
vans, the agency distinguished them
from station wagons—which also had
large flat areas with their seats folded—
and were based on a car chassis.
Currently, the vast majority of
vehicles equipped with stowable seats
are minivans, which tend not to be
based on car chassis and typically
perform very well in crash rating tests.
The stowing of such seats results in a
flat, floor-level surface comparable to
that if the seats were removed. The
cargo space created is functionally
equivalent between the stowable and
removable seats.
Moreover, removable seats are heavy
and cumbersome. The agency
recognizes that consumers could injure
themselves while removing and
reinstalling these seats. Additionally, if
the seats are improperly re-installed, the
seats and related occupant crash
protection systems may not provide the
necessary protection in a collision.
Stowable seats minimize this concern.
The agency has tentatively
determined that by including stowable
seats in the flat floor provision, we
would facilitate the production of
vehicles that achieve high safety ratings,
that have a degree of consumer
preference, and that minimize safety
risks from improper reinstallation/
redeployment. The primary effect of this
amendment would be on the design of
seating in mini-vans, which have
traditionally been classified as light
trucks. With the adoption of this
amendment, mini-vans would be treated
as light trucks regardless of whether
they have removable or fold down
seating.
X. Rulemaking Analyses and Notices
A. Executive Order 12866 and DOT
Regulatory Policies and Procedures
Executive Order 12866, ‘‘Regulatory
Planning and Review’’ (58 FR 51735,
October 4, 1993), provides for making
determinations whether a regulatory
action is ‘‘significant’’ and therefore
subject to OMB review and to the
requirements of the Executive Order.
The Order defines a ‘‘significant
regulatory action’’ as one that is likely
to result in a rule that may:
(1) Have an annual effect on the
economy of $100 million or more or
adversely affect in a material way the
economy, a sector of the economy,
productivity, competition, jobs, the
environment, public health or safety, or
State, local or Tribal governments or
communities;
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(2) Create a serious inconsistency or
otherwise interfere with an action taken
or planned by another agency;
(3) Materially alter the budgetary
impact of entitlements, grants, user fees,
or loan programs or the rights and
obligations of recipients thereof; or
(4) Raise novel legal or policy issues
arising out of legal mandates, the
President’s priorities, or the principles
set forth in the Executive Order.
The rulemaking proposed in this
NPRM will be economically significant
if adopted. Accordingly, OMB reviewed
it under Executive Order 12866. The
rule, if adopted, would also be
significant within the meaning of the
Department of Transportation’s
Regulatory Policies and Procedures.
We estimate that the total benefits
under the Unreformed CAFE standards
for MYs 2008–2010 and the Reformed
CAFE standard for MY 2011 would be
approximately $7.0 billion at a 7 percent
discount rate and at fuel prices ranging
from $1.51 to $1.58 per gallon: $605
million for MY 2008, $1,366 million for
MY 2009, $2,007 million for MY 2010,
and $3,069 million for MY 2011. We
estimate that the total cost under those
standards, as compared to the MY 2007
standard of 22.2 mpg, would be a total
of $6.2 billion: $528 million for MY
2008, $1,244 million for MY 2009,
$1,798 million for MY 2010, and $2,656
million for MY 2011.
Under the Reformed CAFE standards
for MYs 2008–2011, as compared to the
MY 2007 standard of 22.2 mpg, we
estimate the total benefits under the
Reformed CAFE system for MYs 2008–
2011 at $7.5 billion, at a 7 percent
discount rate and at fuel prices ranging
from $1.51 to $1.58 per gallon: $694
million for MY 2008, $1,633 million for
MY 2009, $2,144 million for MY 2010,
and $3,069 million for MY 2011. We
estimate the total cost to be
approximately the same as the cost
under the Unreformed CAFE system,
$6.2 billion.
Because the proposed rule if adopted
would be significant under both the
Department of Transportation’s
procedures and OMB’s guidelines, the
agency has prepared a Preliminary
Regulatory Impact Analysis and placed
it in the docket and on the agency’s Web
site.
B. National Environmental Policy Act
Consistent with the requirements of
the National Environmental Policy Act
and the regulations of the Council on
Environmental Quality, the agency has
prepared a Draft Environmental
Assessment of this proposed action, and
has placed the analysis in the docket.
Based on the Draft Environmental
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Assessment, the agency does not, at this
time, anticipate that the proposed action
would have a significant effect on the
quality of the human environment. The
agency seeks comments on the Draft
Environmental Assessment.
C. Regulatory Flexibility Act
Pursuant to the Regulatory Flexibility
Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq., as amended by
the Small Business Regulatory
Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) of
1996), whenever an agency is required
to publish a notice of rulemaking for
any proposed or final rule, it must
prepare and make available for public
comment a regulatory flexibility
analysis that describes the effect of the
rule on small entities (i.e., small
businesses, small organizations, and
small governmental jurisdictions). The
Small Business Administration’s
regulations at 13 CFR part 121 define a
small business, in part, as a business
entity ‘‘which operates primarily within
the United States.’’ (13 CFR 121.105(a)).
No regulatory flexibility analysis is
required if the head of an agency
certifies the rule will not have a
significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities.
I certify that the proposed amendment
would not have a significant economic
impact on a substantial number of small
entities. The following is the agency’s
statement providing the factual basis for
the certification (5 U.S.C. 605(b)).
If adopted, the proposal would
directly affect thirteen single stage light
truck manufacturers. According to the
Small Business Administration’s small
business size standards (see 5 CFR
121.201), a single stage light truck
manufacturer (NAICS code 336112,
Light Truck and Utility Vehicle
Manufacturing) must have 1,000 or
fewer employees to qualify as a small
business. None of the affected single
stage light truck manufacturers are small
businesses under this definition. All of
the manufacturers of light trucks have
thousands of employees. Given that
none of the businesses directly affected
are small business for purposes of the
Regulatory Flexibility Act, a regulatory
flexibility analysis was not prepared.
D. Executive Order 13132 Federalism
Executive Order 13132 requires
NHTSA to develop an accountable
process to ensure ‘‘meaningful and
timely input by State and local officials
in the development of regulatory
policies that have federalism
implications.’’ Executive Order 13132
defines the term ‘‘Policies that have
federalism implications’’ to include
regulations that have ‘‘substantial direct
effects on the States, on the relationship
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51457
between the national government and
the States, or on the distribution of
power and responsibilities among the
various levels of government.’’ Under
Executive Order 13132, NHTSA may not
issue a regulation that has federalism
implications, that imposes substantial
direct compliance costs, and that is not
required by statute, unless the Federal
government provides the funds
necessary to pay the direct compliance
costs incurred by State and local
governments, or NHTSA consults with
State and local officials early in the
process of developing the proposed
regulation.
We reaffirm our view that a state may
not impose a legal requirement relating
to fuel economy, whether by statute,
regulation or otherwise, that conflicts
with this rule. A state law that seeks to
reduce motor vehicle carbon dioxide
emissions is both expressly and
impliedly preempted.
Our statute contains a broad
preemption provision making clear the
need for a uniform, federal system:
‘‘When an average fuel economy
standard prescribed under this chapter
is in effect, a State or a political
subdivision of a State may not adopt or
enforce a law or regulation related to
fuel economy standards or average fuel
economy standards for automobiles
covered by an average fuel economy
standard under this chapter.’’ 49 U.S.C.
32919(a). Since the way to reduce
carbon dioxide emissions is to improve
fuel economy, a state regulation seeking
to reduce those emissions is a
‘‘regulation related to fuel economy
standards or average fuel economy
standards.’’
Further, such a regulation would be
impliedly preempted, as it would
interfere with our implementation of the
CAFE statute. For example, it would
interfere the careful balancing of various
statutory factors and other related
considerations, as contemplated in the
conference report on EPCA, we must do
in order to establish average fuel
economy standards at the maximum
feasible level. It would also interfere
with our effort to reform CAFE so to
achieve higher fuel savings, while
reducing the risk of adverse economic
and safety consequences.
E. Executive Order 12988 (Civil Justice
Reform)
Pursuant to Executive Order 12988,
‘‘Civil Justice Reform’’ (61 FR 4729,
February 7, 1996), the agency has
considered whether this rulemaking
would have any retroactive effect. This
final rule does not have any retroactive
effect.
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F. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
Section 202 of the Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA)
requires Federal agencies to prepare a
written assessment of the costs, benefits,
and other effects of proposed or final
rules that include a Federal mandate
likely to result in the expenditure by
State, local, or tribal governments, in the
aggregate, or by the private sector, of
more than $100 million in any one year
(adjusted for inflation with base year of
1995). Before promulgating a rule for
which a written statement is needed,
section 205 of the UMRA generally
requires NHTSA to identify and
consider a reasonable number of
regulatory alternatives and adopt the
least costly, most cost-effective, or least
burdensome alternative that achieves
the objectives of the rule. The
provisions of section 205 do not apply
when they are inconsistent with
applicable law. Moreover, section 205
allows NHTSA to adopt an alternative
other than the least costly, most costeffective, or least burdensome
alternative if the agency publishes with
the final rule an explanation why that
alternative was not adopted.
This final rule will not result in the
expenditure by State, local, or tribal
governments, in the aggregate, of more
than $100 million annually, but it will
result in the expenditure of that
magnitude by vehicle manufacturers
and/or their suppliers. In promulgating
this proposal, NHTSA considered
whether average fuel economy
standards lower and higher than those
proposed would be appropriate. NHTSA
is statutorily required to set standards at
the maximum feasible level achievable
by manufacturers and has tentatively
concluded that the proposed standards
are the maximum feasible standards for
the light truck fleet for MYs 2008–2011
in light of the statutory considerations.
G. Paperwork Reduction Act
Under the procedures established by
the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, a
person is not required to respond to a
collection of information by a Federal
agency unless the collection displays a
valid OMB control number. The
proposed rule would amend the
reporting requirements under the 49
CFR part 537, Automotive Fuel
Economy Reports. In addition to the
vehicle model information collected
under the approved data collection
(OMB control number 2127–0019) in
Part 537, light truck manufacturers
would also be required provide data on
vehicle footprint. During the transition
period, manufacturers would also be
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required to specify with which CAFE
system they were complying.
In compliance with the PRA, we
announce that NHTSA is seeking
comment on the proposed revisions to
the collection.
Agency: National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration (NHTSA).
Title: 49 CFR part 537, Automotive
Fuel Economy Reports (F.E.) Reports.
Type of Request: Amend existing
collection.
OMB Clearance Number: 2127–0019.
Form Number: This collection of
information will not use any standard
forms.
Requested Expiration Date of
Approval: Three years from the date of
approval.
Summary of the Collection of
Information
For MYs 2008–2010, we are proposing
to provide manufacturers an option to
comply with one of two CAFE systems.
A manufacturer would be required to
report under which system it chose to
comply during those years.
Manufacturers complying under the
Reformed CAFE system would also be
required to provide data on vehicle
footprint so that the agency could
determine a manufacturer’s required
fuel economy level.
This information collection would be
included as part of the existing fuel
economy reporting requirements.
Description of the Need for the
Information and Proposed Use of the
Information
NHTSA would require this
information to ensure that vehicle
manufacturers were complying with the
light truck fuel economy standards.
NHTSA would use this information to
determine if a manufacturer’s fuel
economy level should be calculated
under the Unreformed or Reformed
CAFE system. NHTSA would use the
footprint data to determine a
manufacturer’s required fuel economy
level under the Reformed CAFE system.
Description of the Likely Respondents
(Including Estimated Number, and
Proposed Frequency of Response to the
Collection of Information)
NHTSA estimates that 13 light truck
manufacturers would submit the
required information. The frequency of
reporting would not change from that
currently authorized under collection
number 2127–0019.
Estimate of the Total Annual Reporting
and Recordkeeping Burden Resulting
from the Collection of Information
NHTSA estimates that each
manufacturer will incur an increase of
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two burden hours per year per report.
This estimate is based on the fact that
data collection will involve only
computer tabulation and that
manufacturers will provide the
information to NHTSA in an electronic
(as opposed to paper) format.
NHTSA estimates that the
recordkeeping burden resulting from the
collection of information will be 0 hours
because the information will be retained
on each manufacturer’s existing
computer systems for each
manufacturer’s internal administrative
purposes.
NHTSA estimates that the total
annual cost burden would be increased
by 551.58 dollars (2 additional burden
hours per light truck manufacturer x 13
light truck manufacturers × 21.23
dollars/hour). There would be no capital
or start-up costs as a result of this
collection. Manufacturers can collect
and tabulate the information by using
existing equipment. Thus, there would
be no additional costs to respondents or
recordkeepers.
NHTSA requests comment on its
estimates of the total annual hour and
cost burdens resulting from this
collection of information. Please submit
any comments to the NHTSA Docket
Number referenced in the heading of
this notice or to: Ken Katz, Lead
Engineer, Fuel Economy Division,
Office of International Policy, Fuel
Economy, and Consumer Programs, at
400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington,
DC 20590. He can also be contacted by
phone, (202) 366–0846; facsimile (202)
493–2290; and electronic mail,
kkatz@nhtsa.dot.gov. Comments are due
by October 31, 2005.
H. Regulation Identifier Number (RIN)
The Department of Transportation
assigns a regulation identifier number
(RIN) to each regulatory action listed in
the Unified Agenda of Federal
Regulations. The Regulatory Information
Service Center publishes the Unified
Agenda in April and October of each
year. You may use the RIN contained in
the heading at the beginning of this
document to find this action in the
Unified Agenda.
I. Executive Order 13045
Executive Order 13045 (62 FR 19885,
April 23, 1997) applies to any rule that:
(1) Is determined to be economically
significant as defined under E.O. 12866,
and (2) concerns an environmental,
health or safety risk that NHTSA has
reason to believe may have a
disproportionate effect on children. If
the regulatory action meets both criteria,
we must evaluate the environmental
health or safety effects of the planned
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rule on children, and explain why the
planned regulation is preferable to other
potentially effective and reasonably
feasible alternatives considered by us.
This proposed rule does not have a
disproportionate effect on children. The
primary effect of this proposal is to
conserve energy resources by setting
fuel economy standards for light trucks.
J. National Technology Transfer and
Advancement Act
Section 12(d) of the National
Technology Transfer and Advancement
Act (NTTAA) requires NHTSA to
evaluate and use existing voluntary
consensus standards in its regulatory
activities unless doing so would be
inconsistent with applicable law (e.g.,
the statutory provisions regarding
NHTSA’s vehicle safety authority) or
otherwise impractical.
Voluntary consensus standards are
technical standards developed or
adopted by voluntary consensus
standards bodies. Technical standards
are defined by the NTTAA as
‘‘performance-based or design-specific
technical specification and related
management systems practices.’’ They
pertain to ‘‘products and processes,
such as size, strength, or technical
performance of a product, process or
material.’’
In meeting the requirement of the
NTTAA, we are required to consult with
voluntary, private sector, consensus
standards bodies. Examples of
organizations generally regarded as
voluntary consensus standards bodies
include the American Society for
Testing and Materials (ASTM), the
Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE),
and the American National Standards
Institute (ANSI). If NHTSA does not use
available and potentially applicable
voluntary consensus standards, we are
required by the Act to provide Congress,
through OMB, an explanation of the
reasons for not using such standards.
The notice proposes to categorize
light trucks according to vehicle
footprint (average track width X
wheelbase). For the purpose of this
calculation, the agency proposes to base
these measurements on those by the
automotive industry. Determination of
wheelbase would be consistent with
L101-wheelbase, defined in SAE J1100
MAY95, Motor vehicle dimensions. The
agency’s proposal uses a modified
version of the SAE definitions for track
width (W101-tread-front and W102tread-rear as defined in SAE J1100
MAY95). The proposed definition of
track width reduces a manufacturer’s
ability to adjust a vehicle’s track width
through minor alterations.
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K. Executive Order 13211
Executive Order 13211 (66 FR 28355,
May 18, 2001) applies to any rule that:
(1) Is determined to be economically
significant as defined under E.O. 12866,
and is likely to have a significant
adverse effect on the supply,
distribution, or use of energy; or (2) that
is designated by the Administrator of
the Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs as a significant energy action. If
the regulatory action meets either
criterion, we must evaluate the adverse
energy effects of the planned rule and
explain why the planned regulation is
preferable to other potentially effective
and reasonably feasible alternatives
considered by us.
The proposed rule seeks to establish
light truck fuel economy standards that
will reduce the consumption of
petroleum and will not have any
adverse energy effects. Accordingly, this
rulemaking action is not designated as
a significant energy action.
L. Department of Energy Review
In accordance with 49 U.S.C. 32902(j),
we submitted this proposed rule to the
Department of Energy for review. That
Department did not make any comments
that we have not addressed.
M. Plain Language
Executive Order 12866 requires each
agency to write all rules in plain
language. Application of the principles
of plain language includes consideration
of the following questions:
• Have we organized the material to
suit the public’s needs?
• Are the requirements in the rule
clearly stated?
• Does the rule contain technical
language or jargon that isn’t clear?
• Would a different format (grouping
and order of sections, use of headings,
paragraphing) make the rule easier to
understand?
• Would more (but shorter) sections
be better?
• Could we improve clarity by adding
tables, lists, or diagrams?
• What else could we do to make the
rule easier to understand?
If you have any responses to these
questions, please include them in your
comments on this proposal.
N. Privacy Act
Anyone is able to search the
electronic form of all comments
received into any of our dockets by the
name of the individual submitting the
comment (or signing the comment, if
submitted on behalf of an association,
business, labor union, etc.). You may
review DOT’s complete Privacy Act
Statement in the Federal Register
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51459
published on April 11, 2000 (Volume
65, Number 70; Pages 19477–78) or you
may visit https://dms.dot.gov.
XI. Comments
Submission of Comments
How Can I Influence NHTSA’s Thinking
on This Notice?
In developing this notice, we tried to
address the concerns of all our
stakeholders. Your comments will help
us determine what standards should be
set for light truck fuel economy. We
invite you to provide different views on
questions we ask, new approaches and
technologies we did not ask about, new
data, how this notice may affect you, or
other relevant information. We welcome
your views on all aspects of this notice,
but request comments on specific issues
throughout this notice. We grouped
these specific requests near the end of
the sections in which we discuss the
relevant issues. Your comments will be
most effective if you follow the
suggestions below:
• Explain your views and reasoning
as clearly as possible.
• Provide empirical evidence,
wherever possible, to support your
views.
• If you estimate potential costs,
explain how you arrived at the estimate.
• Provide specific examples to
illustrate your concerns.
• Offer specific alternatives.
• Refer your comments to specific
sections of the notice, such as the units
or page numbers of the preamble, or the
regulatory sections.
• Be sure to include the name, date,
and docket number of the proceeding
with your comments.
How Do I Prepare and Submit
Comments?
Your comments must be written and
in English. To ensure that your
comments are correctly filed in the
Docket, please include the docket
number of this document in your
comments.
Your comments must not be more
than 15 pages long. (49 CFR 553.21). We
established this limit to encourage you
to write your primary comments in a
concise fashion. However, you may
attach necessary additional documents
to your comments. There is no limit on
the length of the attachments.
Please submit two copies of your
comments, including the attachments,
to Docket Management at the address
given above under ADDRESSES.
Comments may also be submitted to
the docket electronically by logging onto
the Dockets Management System Web
site at https://dms.dot.gov. Click on
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‘‘Help’’ to obtain instructions for filing
the document electronically.
How Can I Be Sure That My Comments
Were Received?
If you wish Docket Management to
notify you upon its receipt of your
comments, enclose a self-addressed,
stamped postcard in the envelope
containing your comments. Upon
receiving your comments, Docket
Management will return the postcard by
mail. Each electronic filer will receive
electronic confirmation that his or her
submission has been received.
How Do I Submit Confidential Business
Information?
If you wish to submit any information
under a claim of confidentiality, you
should submit three copies of your
complete submission, including the
information you claim to be confidential
business information, to the Chief
Counsel, NHTSA, at the address given
above under FOR FURTHER INFORMATION
CONTACT. In addition, you should
submit two copies, from which you
have deleted the claimed confidential
business information, to Docket
Management at the address given above
under ADDRESSES. When you send a
comment containing information
claimed to be confidential business
information, you should include a cover
letter setting forth the information
specified in our confidential business
information regulation. (49 CFR part
512.)
Will the Agency Consider Late
Comments?
How Can I Read the Comments
Submitted By Other People?
You may read the comments received
by Docket Management at the address
given above under ADDRESSES. The
hours of the Docket are indicated above
in the same location.
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List of Subjects in 49 CFR Parts 523,
533, and 537
Fuel economy and Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements.
In consideration of the foregoing, 49
CFR Chapter V would be amended as
follows:
axles, wheelbase is measured to the
midpoint of the centerlines of the
wheels on the rearmost axle.
*
*
*
*
*
3. Section 523.5(a) would be amended
to read as follows:
§ 523.5
Light truck.
*
*
*
*
*
(a) * * *
(5) Permit expanded use of the
automobile for cargo-carrying purposes
or other nonpassenger-carrying
purposes through:
(i) The removal of seats by means
installed for that purpose by the
automobile’s manufacturer or with
simple tools, such as screwdrivers and
wrenches, so as to create a flat, floor
level, surface extending from the
forwardmost point of installation of
those seats to the rear of the
automobile’s interior; or
(ii) The stowing of foldable seats in
the automobile’s floor pan, so as to
create a flat, floor level, surface
extending from the forwardmost point
of installation of those seats to the rear
of the automobile’s interior.
*
*
*
*
*
PART 533—LIGHT TRUCK FUEL
ECONOMY STANDARDS
4. The authority citation for part 533
would continue to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 32902; delegation of
authority at 49 CFR 1.50.
1. The authority citation for part 523
would continue to read as follows:
5. Part 533.5 would be amended by:
A. In paragraph (a) by revising Table
IV and adding Figure I and Table V; and
B. Adding paragraphs (g) and (h).
The revisions and additions read as
follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 32902; delegation of
authority at 49 CFR 1.50.
§ 533.5
PART 523—VEHICLE CLASSIFICATION
We will consider all timely submitted
comments, i.e., those that Docket
Management receives before the close of
business on the comment closing date
indicated above under DATES. Due to
the statutory deadline (April 1, 2006),
we will be very limited in our ability to
consider late-filled comments. If Docket
Management receives a comment too
late for us to consider it in developing
a final rule, we will consider that
comment as an informal suggestion for
future rulemaking action.
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You may also see the comments on
the Internet. To read the comments on
the Internet, take the following steps:
(1) Go to the Docket Management
System (DMS) Web page of the
Department of Transportation (https://
dms.dot.gov/).
(2) On that page, click on ‘‘search.’’
(3) On the next page (https://
dms.dot.gov/search/), type in the fivedigit docket number shown at the
beginning of this document. Example: If
the docket number were ‘‘NHTSA–
2002–12345,’’ you would type ‘‘12345.’’
After typing the docket number, click on
‘‘search.’’
(4) On the next page, which contains
docket summary information for the
docket you selected, click on the desired
comments. You may download the
comments. However, since the
comments are imaged documents,
instead of word processing documents,
the downloaded comments are not word
searchable.
Please note that even after the
comment closing date, we will continue
to file relevant information in the
Docket as it becomes available. Further,
some people may submit late comments.
Accordingly, we recommend that you
periodically check the Docket for new
material.
2. Section 523.2 would be amended
by adding a definition of ‘‘footprint’’ to
read as follows:
§ 523.2
PO 00000
TABLE IV
Definitions.
* * *
Footprint means the product, in
square feet, of multiplying a vehicle’s
average track width by its wheelbase.
For purposes of this definition, track
width is the lateral distance between the
centerlines of the tires at ground when
the tires are mounted on rims with zero
offset. For purposes of this definition,
wheelbase is the longitudinal distance
between front and rear wheel
centerlines. In case of multiple rear
Frm 00048
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Requirements.
(a) * * *
Model year
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
..........................................
..........................................
..........................................
..........................................
..........................................
..........................................
..........................................
..........................................
..........................................
..........................................
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20.7
20.7
20.7
21.0
21.6
22.2
22.5
23.1
23.5
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TABLE V.—CATEGORIES FOR MYS 2008–2011 BASED ON VEHICLE FOOTPRINT (FOOT2) AND THE ASSOCIATED TARGET
FUEL ECONOMY LEVELS (MPG)
Category
1
Range of vehicle footprint ................................................
MY 2008 Targets .............................................................
MY 2009 Targets .............................................................
MY 2010 Targets .............................................................
MY 2011 Targets .............................................................
*
*
*
*
*
(g) For model years 2008–2010, at a
manufacturer’s option, a manufacturer’s
light truck fleet may comply with the
fuel economy level calculated according
to Figure I and the appropriate values in
Table V, with said option being
irrevocably chosen for that model year
2
≤43.0
26.8
27.4
27.8
28.4
3
4
5
>43.0–47.0
25.6
25.4
26.4
27.1
>47.0–52.0
22.3
23.5
24.0
24.5
>52.0–56.5
22.2
22.7
22.9
23.3
>56.5–65.0
20.7
21.0
21.6
21.9
and reported at the time a mid-model
year report is submitted under § 537.7.
(h) For model year 2011, a
manufacturer’s light truck fleet shall
comply with the fuel economy level,
calculated according to Figure I and the
appropriate values in Figures V and VI.
A
B
C
D
E
F
.......................................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................................................
......................................................................................................................................................
......................................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................................................
Note to Appendix A Table 1. Manufacturer
X’s required corporate average fuel economy
Appendix A—Example of Calculating
Compliance Under § 533.5 Paragraph (g)
Assume a hypothetical manufacturer
(Manufacturer X) produces a fleet of light
trucks in MY 2008 as follows:
Volume
27.0
25.6
25.4
22.1
22.4
20.2
level under § 533.5(g) would be calculated as
illustrated in Appendix A Figure 1:
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>65.0
20.4
21.0
20.8
21.3
5a. Part 533 would be amended by
adding Appendix A to read as follows:
Fuel
economy
Model
6
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1,000
1,500
1,000
2,000
3,000
1,000
Footprint
(ft2)
Category
42
44
46
50
55
66
1
2
2
3
4
6
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X did not produce any light trucks in
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Category 5 during MY 2005. Therefore
calculation of Manufacturer X’s required
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corporate average fuel economy level for MY
2008 would only incorporate the fuel
economy target levels for Categories 1, 2, 3,
4, and 6.
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Manufacturer X’s actual CAFE level would
be calculated as illustrated in Appendix A
Figure 2.
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X’s required fuel economy level is 23.2 mpg.
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Therefore, Manufacturer X complies with the
CAFE requirement set forth in § 533.7(g).
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration
PART 537—AUTOMOTIVE FUEL
ECONOMY REPORTS
6. The authority citation for Part 537
would continue to read as follows:
49 CFR Part 533
[Docket No. 2005–22144]
RIN 2127–AJ71
Authority: 15 U.S.C. 2005; 49 CFR 1.50.
7. Section 537.7 would be amended
by revising paragraphs (c)(4)(xvi)
through (xxi) to read as follows:
Light Truck Average Fuel Economy
Standards—Model Years 2008–2011;
Request for Product Plan Information
§ 537.7 Pre-model year and mid-model
year reports.
AGENCY:
*
*
*
*
*
(c) Model type and configuration fuel
economy and technical information.
* * *
(4) * * *
(xvi)(A) In the case of passenger
automobiles:
(1) Interior volume index, determined
in accordance with subpart D of 40 CFR
part 600, and
(2) Body style;
(B) In the case of light trucks:
(1) Passenger-carrying volume,
(2) Cargo-carrying volume; and
(3) Footprint as defined in 49 CFR
§ 523.2.
(xvii) Performance of the function
described in § 523.5(a)(5) of this chapter
(indicate yes or no);
(xviii) Existence of temporary living
quarters (indicate yes or no);
(xix) Frontal area;
(xx) Road load power at 50 miles per
hour, if determined by the manufacturer
for purposes other than compliance
with this part to differ from the road
load setting prescribed in 40 CFR
86.177–11(d);
(xxi) Optional equipment that the
manufacturer is required under 40 CFR
parts 86 and 600 to have actually
installed on the vehicle configuration,
or the weight of which must be included
in the curb weight computation for the
vehicle configuration, for fuel economy
testing purposes.
*
*
*
*
*
Issued: August 23, 2005.
Stephen R. Kratzke,
Associate Administrator for Rulemaking.
[FR Doc. 05–17006 Filed 8–24–05; 8:45 am]
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National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration (NHTSA),
Department of Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Request for comments.
SUMMARY: The purpose of this request
for comments is to acquire new and
updated information regarding vehicle
manufacturers’ future product plans to
assist the agency in analyzing the
proposed light truck corporate average
fuel economy (CAFE) standards for MY
2008–2011, which are discussed in a
companion document published
elsewhere in this issue of the Federal
Register. The agency is seeking
information that will help it assess the
effect of the proposed standards on fuel
economy, manufacturers, consumers,
the economy, and motor vehicle safety.
DATE: Comments must be received on or
before November 22, 2005.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments
[identified by DOT DMS Docket Number
2005–22144] by any of the following
methods:
• Web site: https://dms.dot.gov.
Follow the instructions for submitting
comments on the DOT electronic docket
site.
• Fax: 1–202–493–2251.
• Mail: Docket Management Facility;
U.S. Department of Transportation, 400
Seventh Street, SW., Nassif Building,
Room PL–401, Washington, DC 20590–
001.
• Hand Delivery: Room PL–401 on
the plaza level of the Nassif Building,
400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington,
DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday
through Friday, except Federal
Holidays.
• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to
https://www.regulations.gov. Follow the
online instructions for submitting
comments.
For
non-legal issues, call Ken Katz, Lead
Engineer, Fuel Economy Division,
Office of International Policy, Fuel
Economy and Consumer Programs, at
(202) 366–0846, facsimile (202) 493–
2290, electronic mail
kkatz@nhtsa.dot.gov. For legal issues,
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
PO 00000
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call Steve Wood or Christopher
Calamita, Office of the Chief Counsel, at
(202) 366–2992 or by facsimile at (202)
366–3820.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Introduction
In December 1975, during the
aftermath of the energy crisis created by
the oil embargo of 1973–74, Congress
enacted the Energy Policy and
Conservation Act (EPCA). The Act
established an automotive fuel economy
regulatory program by adding Title V,
‘‘Improving Automotive Efficiency,’’ to
the Motor Vehicle Information and Cost
Saving Act. Title V has been amended
from time to time and codified without
substantive change as Chapter 329 of
Title 49 of the United States Code.
Chapter 329 provides for the issuance of
average fuel economy standards for
passenger automobiles and automobiles
that are not passenger automobiles (light
trucks).
Section 32902(a) of Chapter 329 states
that the Secretary of Transportation
shall prescribe by regulation corporate
average fuel economy (CAFE) standards
for light trucks for each model year.
That section also states that ‘‘[e]ach
standard shall be the maximum feasible
average fuel economy level that the
Secretary decides the manufacturers can
achieve in that model year.’’ (The
Secretary has delegated the authority to
implement the automotive fuel economy
program to the Administrator of
NHTSA. 49 CFR 1.50(f).) Section
32902(f) provides that, in determining
the maximum feasible average fuel
economy level, we shall consider four
criteria: technological feasibility,
economic practicability, the effect of
other motor vehicle standards of the
Government on fuel economy, and the
need of the United States to conserve
energy.
In a companion document, a notice of
proposed rulemaking, published
elsewhere in this issue of the Federal
Register, NHTSA is proposing light
truck average fuel economy standards
for model years (MYs) 2008–2011 under
a new reformed structure. To assist the
agency in analyzing these proposed
CAFE standards, NHTSA has included a
number of additional questions, found
in an appendix to this notice, directed
primarily toward vehicle manufacturers.
To facilitate our analysis of the
potential impacts of the proposal, we
are seeking detailed comments relative
to the requests found in the appendix of
this document. The Appendix requests
information from manufacturers
regarding their product plans—
including data about engines and
transmissions—MY 2005 through MY
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[Federal Register Volume 70, Number 167 (Tuesday, August 30, 2005)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 51414-51466]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 05-17006]
[[Page 51413]]
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Part II
Department of Transportation
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
49 CFR Parts 523, 533, and 537
49 CFR Part 533
Light Trucks, Average Fuel Economy; Model Years 2008-2011; Proposed
Rules
Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 167 / Tuesday, August 30, 2005 /
Proposed Rules
[[Page 51414]]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
49 CFR Parts 523, 533 and 537
[Docket No. 2005-22223]
RIN 2127-AJ61
Average Fuel Economy Standards for Light Trucks; Model Years
2008-2011
AGENCY: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA),
Department of Transportation.
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: This notice proposes to reform the structure of the corporate
average fuel economy (CAFE) program for light trucks and proposes to
establish higher CAFE standards for model year (MY) 2008-2011 light
trucks. Reforming the CAFE program would enable it to achieve larger
fuel savings while enhancing safety and preventing adverse economic
consequences.
During a transition period of MYs 2008-2010, manufacturers may
comply with CAFE standards established under the reformed structure
(Reformed CAFE) or with standards established in the traditional way
(Unreformed CAFE). This will permit manufacturers to gain experience
with the Reformed CAFE standards. In MY 2011, all manufacturers would
be required to comply with a Reformed CAFE standard.
The reform is based on vehicle size. Under Reformed CAFE, fuel
economy standards are restructured so that they are based on a measure
of vehicle size called ``footprint,'' the product of multiplying a
vehicle's wheelbase by its track width. Vehicles would be divided into
footprint categories, each representing a different range of footprint.
A target level of average fuel economy is proposed for each footprint
category, with smaller footprint light trucks expected to achieve more
fuel economy and larger ones, less. Each manufacturer would still be
required to comply with a single overall average fuel economy level for
each model year of production. A particular manufacturer's compliance
obligation for a model year is calculated as the harmonic average of
the fuel economy targets in each size category, weighted by the
distribution of manufacturer's production volumes across the size
categories.
The proposed Unreformed CAFE standards are: 22.5 miles per gallon
(mpg) for MY 2008, 23.1 mpg for MY 2009, and 23.5 mpg for MY 2010. The
Reformed CAFE standards for those model years would be set at levels
intended to ensure that the industry-wide costs of the Reformed
standards are roughly equivalent to the industry-wide costs of the
Unreformed CAFE standards in those model years. For MY 2011, the
Reformed CAFE standard would be set at the level that maximizes net
benefits, accounting for unquantified benefits and costs. We believe
that all of the proposed standards would be set at the maximum feasible
level, while accounting for technological feasibility, economic
practicability and other relevant factors.
Since a manufacturer's compliance obligation for a model year under
Reformed CAFE depends in part on its actual production in that model
year, the obligation cannot be calculated with absolute precision until
the final production figures for that model year become known. However,
a manufacturer could calculate its obligation with a reasonably high
degree of accuracy in advance of that model year, based on its product
plans for the year. Prior to and during the model year, the
manufacturer would be able to track all of the key variables in the
formula used for calculating the obligation (e.g., distribution of
production among the categories and vehicle fuel economy). This notice
publishes estimates of the compliance obligations, by manufacturer, for
MYs 2008-2011 under Reformed CAFE, using the fuel economy targets
proposed by NHTSA and the product plans submitted to NHTSA by the
manufacturers in response to a request for product plans published in
December 2003.
This rulemaking is mandated by the Energy Policy and Conservation
Act (EPCA), which was enacted in the aftermath of the energy crisis
created by the oil embargo of 1973-74. The concerns about energy
security and the effects of energy prices and supply on national
economic well-being that led to the enactment of EPCA remain alive
today. Sustained growth in the demand for oil worldwide, coupled with
tight crude oil supplies, is the driving force behind the sharp price
increases seen over the past several years. Increasingly, the oil
consumed in the U.S. originates in countries with political and
economic situations that raise concerns about future oil supply and
prices.
We recognize that financial difficulties currently exist in the
motor vehicle industry and that a substantial number of job losses have
been announced recently at large full-line manufacturers. Accordingly,
we have carefully balanced the cost of the rule with the benefits of
conservation. We believe that, compared to Unreformed CAFE, Reformed
CAFE would enhance overall fuel savings while providing vehicle makers
the flexibility they need to respond to changing market conditions.
Reformed CAFE would also provide a more equitable regulatory framework
by creating a level-playing field for manufacturers, regardless of
whether they are full-line or limited-line manufacturers. We are
particularly encouraged that Reformed CAFE would reduce the adverse
safety risks generated by the Unreformed CAFE program. The transition
from the Unreformed to the Reformed system would begin soon, but ample
lead time is provided before Reformed CAFE takes full effect in MY
2011.
We recognize also that our proposals were derived from analyses of
information from a variety of sources, including the product plans
submitted by the manufacturers in early 2004. We fully anticipate that
the manufacturers will respond to this proposal by providing revised
plans that reflect events since then. We will evaluate the revised
plans, the public comments, and other information and analysis in
selecting the most appropriate standards for MYs 2008-2011.
DATES: Comments must be received on or before November 22, 2005. We
have provided more than the normal 60-day comment period because of the
complexity of this rulemaking. However, because of that complexity, the
necessity for ensuring sufficient time for careful analysis of the
public comments and other available information, and for meeting the
April 1, 2006 statutory deadline for issuing a final rule on the CAFE
standard for MY 2008, extensions of the comment due date will not be
possible. To ensure the agency's consideration of their comments, the
public should submit them to the agency not later than the comment due
date.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments by any of the following methods:
Web site: https://dms.dot.gov. Follow the instructions for
submitting comments on the DOT electronic docket site.
Fax: 1-202-493-2251.
Mail: Docket Management Facility; U.S. Department of
Transportation, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Nassif Building, Room PL-401,
Washington, DC 20590-001.
Hand Delivery: Room PL-401 on the plaza level of the
Nassif Building, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC, between 9
a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal Holidays.
[[Page 51415]]
Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to https://
www.regulations.gov. Follow the online instructions for submitting
comments.
Instructions: All submissions must include the agency name and
docket number or Regulatory Identification Number (RIN) for this
rulemaking. For detailed instructions on submitting comments and
additional information on the rulemaking process, see the Request for
Comments heading of the Supplementary Information section of this
document. Note that all comments received will be posted without change
to https://dms.dot.gov, including any personal information provided.
Please see the Privacy Act heading under Rulemaking Analyses and
Notices.
Docket: For access to the docket to read background documents or
comments received, go to https://dms.dot.gov at any time or to Room PL-
401 on the plaza level of the Nassif Building, 400 Seventh Street, SW.,
Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday,
except Federal holidays.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For technical issues, call Ken Katz,
Lead Engineer, Fuel Economy Division, Office of International Policy,
Fuel Economy, and Consumer Programs, at (202) 366-0846, facsimile (202)
493-2290, electronic mail kkatz@nhtsa.dot.gov. For legal issues, call
Stephen Wood or Christopher Calamita of the Office of the Chief
Counsel, at (202) 366-2992, or e-mail them at swood@nhtsa.dot.gov or
ccalamita@nhtsa.dot.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Table of Contents
I. Executive summary
A. Our proposal
B. Energy demand and supply and the value of conservation
II. Background
A. 1974 DOT/EPA report to Congress on potential for motor
vehicle fuel economy improvements
B. Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975
C. 1979-2002 light truck standards
D. 2001 National Energy Policy
E. 2002 NAS study of CAFE reform
F. 2002 request for comments on NAS study
G. 2003 final rule establishing MY 2005-2007 light truck
standards
H. 2003 comprehensive plans for addressing vehicle rollover and
compatibility
I. 2003 ANPRM
1. Need for reform
2. Reform options
J. Recent developments
1. Factors underscoring need for reform
2. Reports updating fuel economy potential
III. The Unreformed CAFE proposal for MYs 2008-2010
A. Baseline for determining manufacturer capabilities in MYs
2008-2010
1. General Motors
2. Ford
3. DaimlerChrysler
4. Other manufacturers
B. Selection of proposed Unreformed CAFE standards--process for
determining maximum feasible levels
C. Technologically feasible additions to baseline
D. Economic practicability and other economic issues
1. Costs
2. Benefits
3. Comparison of estimated costs to estimated benefits
4. Uncertainty
IV. The Reformed CAFE proposal for MYs 2008-2011
A. Proposed approach to reform
1. Establishment of footprint categories
2. Targets
a. Overview of target selection process
b. Industry-wide considerations in selecting the targets
c. Relative position of the targets
d. Level of the targets
3. Standards and required CAFE levels for individual
manufacturers
4. Why this approach to reform and not another?
a. Step-function vs. continuous function
b. Categories and targets vs. classes and standards
c. Footprint vs. shadow or weight
d. Reformed standard vs. Reformed standard plus backstop
5. Benefits of reform
a. Increased energy savings
b. Reduced incentive to respond to the CAFE program in ways
harmful to safety
i. Reduces incentive to offer smaller vehicles and to reduce
vehicle size
ii. Effectively reduces the difference between car and light
truck CAFE standards
c. More equitable regulatory framework
d. More responsive to market changes
B. Authority for proposed reform
C. Comparison of estimated costs to estimated benefits
1. Costs
2. Benefits
3. Uncertainty
D. Proposed standards
V. Implementation of options
A. Choosing the Reformed or Unreformed CAFE system
B. Application of credits between compliance options
VII. Impact of other Federal Motor Vehicle Standards
A. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards
1. FMVSS 138, tire pressure monitoring system
2. FMVSS 202, head restraints
3. FMVSS 208, occupant crash protection
4. FMVSS 214, side impact protection
5. FMVSS 301, fuel system integrity
6. Cumulative weight impacts of the FMVSSs
B. Federal Motor Vehicle Emissions Standards
1. Tier 2 requirements
2. Onboard vapor recovery
3. California Air Resources Board LEV II
C. Impacts on manufacturers' baselines
VIII. Need for nation to conserve energy
IX. Applicability of the CAFE standards
A. MDPVs
B. ``Flat-floor'' provision
X. Rulemaking analyses and notices
A. Executive Order 12866 and DOT Regulatory Policies and
Procedures
B. National Environmental Policy Act
C. Regulatory Flexibility Act
D. Executive Order 13132 Federalism
E. Executive Order 12988 (Civil Justice Reform)
F. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
G. Paperwork Reduction Act
H. Regulation Identifier Number (RIN)
I. Executive Order 13045
J. National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act
K. Executive Order 13211
L. Department of Energy review
M. Plain language
N. Privacy Act
XI. Comments
I. Executive Summary
A. Our Proposal
This proposal is part of a continuing effort by the Department of
Transportation to reform the structure of the CAFE regulatory program
so that it achieves higher fuel savings while enhancing safety and
preventing adverse economic consequences. We have previously set forth
our concerns about the way in which the current CAFE program operates
and sought comment on approaches to reforming the CAFE program. We have
also previously increased light truck CAFE standards, from the
``frozen'' level of 20.7 mpg applicable from MY 1996 through MY 2004,
to a level of 22.2 mpg applicable to MY 2007. In adopting those
increased standards, we noted that we were limited in our ability to
make further increases without reforming the program.
This notice proposes to reform the structure of the CAFE program
for light trucks based on vehicle size and proposes to establish higher
CAFE standards for MY 2008-2011 light trucks. Reforming the CAFE
program would enable it to achieve larger fuel savings while enhancing
safety and preventing adverse economic consequences.
During a transition period of MYs 2008-2010, manufacturers may
comply with CAFE standards established under the reformed structure
(Reformed CAFE) or with standards established in the traditional way
(Unreformed CAFE). This will permit manufacturers to gain experience
with the Reformed CAFE standards. The Reformed CAFE standards for those
model years would
[[Page 51416]]
be set at levels intended to ensure that the industry-wide cost of
those standards are roughly equivalent to the industry-wide cost of the
Unreformed CAFE standards for those model years. The additional
leadtime provided by the transition period would aid, for example,
those manufacturers that would, for the first time, face a binding CAFE
constraint and be required to make fuel economy improvements beyond
those that they planned on their own to make.
In MY 2011, all manufacturers would be required to comply with a
Reformed CAFE standard. The Reformed CAFE standard for that model year
would be set at the level that maximizes net benefits.
The Unreformed standards for MYs 2008-2010 are set with particular
regard to the capabilities of and impacts on the ``least capable'' full
line manufacturer (i.e., one that produces a wide variety of types and
sizes of vehicles) with a significant share of the market. A single
CAFE level, applicable to each manufacturer, is established for each
model year.
The Unreformed CAFE standards for MYs 2008-2010 would be:
MY 2008: 22.5 mpg
MY 2009: 23.1 mpg
MY 2010: 23.5 mpg
We estimate that these standards could save 5.4 billion gallons of
fuel over the lifetime of the vehicles sold during those model years,
compared to the savings that would occur if the standards remained at
the MY 2007 level of 22.2 mpg.
The Reformed CAFE approach to establishing light truck CAFE
standards has the potential of providing even greater fuel savings.
Under Reformed CAFE, each manufacturer's required level of CAFE would
be based on target levels of average fuel economy set for vehicles of
various size categories. The categories would be defined by vehicle
``footprint''--the product of the average track width (the distance
between the centerline of the tires on the same axle) and wheelbase
(basically, the distance between the centers of the axles). The target
values would reflect the technological and economic capabilities of the
industry within each of the footprint categories. The target for a
given size category would be the same for all manufacturers, regardless
of differences in their overall fleet mix. Compliance would be
determined by comparing a manufacturer's harmonically averaged fleet
fuel economy in a model year with a required fuel economy level
calculated using the manufacturer's actual production levels and the
category targets.
The range of targets for each model year would be as follows:
MY 2008: From 26.8 mpg for the smallest vehicles to 20.4 mpg for
the largest;
MY 2009: From 27.4 mpg for the smallest vehicles to 21.0 mpg for
the largest;
MY 2010: From 27.8 mpg for the smallest vehicles to 20.8 mpg for
the largest;
MY 2011: From 28.4 mpg for the smallest vehicles to 21.3 mpg for
the largest.
The standards based on these targets would save approximately 10.0
billion gallons of fuel over the lifetime of the vehicles sold during
those four model years, compared to the savings that would occur if the
standards remained at the MY 2007 level of 22.2 mpg. The Reformed
standards for MYs 2008-2010 would save 650 million more gallons of fuel
than the Unreformed standards for those years. As noted above, the
Reformed standard for MY 2011 would be the first Reformed standard set
at the level that maximizes net benefits. It would save an additional
4.1 billion gallons of fuel.
If all manufacturers complied with the Reformed CAFE standards, the
total costs would be approximately $6.2 billion for MYs 2008-2011,
compared to the costs they would incur if the standards remained at the
MY 2007 level of 22.2 mpg. The resulting vehicle price increases to
buyers of MY 2008 light trucks would be paid back\1\ in additional fuel
savings in an average of 37 months and to buyers of MY 2011 light
trucks in an average of 47 months, assuming fuel prices ranging from
$1.51 to $1.58 per gallon.\2\ We estimate that the total benefits under
the Unreformed CAFE standards for MYs 2008-2010 plus the Reformed CAFE
standard for MY 2011 would be approximately $7.0 billion, and under the
Reformed CAFE standards for MYs 2008-2011 would be approximately $7.5
billion.
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\1\ The payback period represents the length of time required
for a vehicle buyer to recoup the higher cost of purchasing a more
fuel-efficient vehicle through savings in fuel use. When a more
stringent CAFE standard requires a manufacturer to improve the fuel
economy of some of its vehicle models, the manufacturer's added
costs for doing so are reflected in higher prices for these models.
While buyers of these models pay higher prices to purchase these
vehicles, their improved fuel economy lowers their owners' costs for
purchasing fuel to operate them. Over time, buyers thus recoup the
higher purchase prices they pay for these vehicles in the form of
savings in outlays for fuel. The length of time required to repay
the higher cost of buying a more fuel-efficient vehicle is referred
to as the buyer's ``payback period.''
The length of this payback period depends on the initial
increase in a vehicle's purchase price, the improvement in its fuel
economy, the number of miles it is driven each year, and the retail
price of fuel. We calculated payback periods using the fuel economy
improvement and average price increase for each manufacturer's
vehicles estimated to result from the proposed standard, the U.S.
Energy Information Administration's forecast of future retail
gasoline prices, and estimates of the number of miles light trucks
are driven each year as they age developed from U.S. Department of
Transportation data. Energy Information Administration, Annual
Energy Outlook 2005 (AEO 2005), Table 100, https://www.eia.doe.gov/
oiaf/aeo/supplement/; and U.S. Department of
Transportation, 2001 National Household Travel Survey, https://
nhts.ornl.gov/2001/index.shtml. Under these assumptions, payback
periods ranged from as short as 22 months to as long as 48 months,
averaging 35 months for the seven largest manufacturers of light
trucks.
\2\ The fuel prices used to calculate the length of the payback
periods are those expected over the life of the MY 2008-2011 light
trucks, not the current fuel prices. Those future fuel prices were
obtained from the AEO 2005.
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We have tentatively determined that the proposed standards under
both Unreformed CAFE and Reformed CAFE represent the maximum feasible
fuel economy level for each system. In reaching this conclusion, we
have balanced the express statutory factors and other relevant
considerations, such as safety concerns, effects on employment and the
need for flexibility to transition to a Reformed CAFE program that can
achieve greater fuel savings in a more economically efficient way.
The Reformed CAFE approach incorporates several important elements
of reform suggested by the National Academy of Sciences in its 2002
report (Effectiveness and Impact of Corporate Average Fuel Economy
(CAFE) Standards). The agency believes that the Reformed CAFE approach
has four basic advantages over the Unreformed CAFE approach.
First, Reformed CAFE will enlarge energy savings. The energy-saving
potential of Unreformed CAFE is limited because only a few full-line
manufacturers are required to make improvements. In effect, the
capabilities of these full-line manufacturers, whose offerings include
larger and heavier light trucks, constrain the stringency of the
uniform, industry-wide standard. As a result, the Unreformed CAFE
standard is generally set below the capabilities of limited-line
manufacturers, who sell predominantly lighter and smaller light trucks.
Under Reformed CAFE, which accounts for size differences in product
mix, virtually all light-truck manufacturers would be required to
improve the fuel economy of their vehicles. Thus, Reformed CAFE will
continue to require full-line manufacturers to improve the overall fuel
economy of their fleets, while also
[[Page 51417]]
requiring limited-line manufacturers to enhance the fuel economy of the
vehicles they sell.
Second, Reformed CAFE will offer enhanced safety. The vehicle
manufacturers constrained by Unreformed CAFE standards are encouraged
to pursue the following compliance strategies that entail safety risks:
downsizing of vehicles, design of some vehicles to permit
classification as ``light trucks'' for CAFE purposes, and offering
smaller and lighter vehicles to offset sales of larger and heavier
vehicles. The adverse safety effects of downsizing and downweighting
have already been documented in the CAFE program for passenger cars.
When a manufacturer designs a vehicle to permit its classification as a
light truck, it may increase the vehicle's propensity to roll over.
Reformed CAFE is designed to lessen each of these safety risks.
Downsizing of vehicles is discouraged under Reformed CAFE since smaller
vehicles are expected to achieve greater fuel economy. Moreover,
Reformed CAFE lessens the incentive to design smaller vehicles to
achieve a ``light truck'' classification, since small light trucks
would be regulated at roughly the same degree of stringency as
passenger cars.
Third, Reformed CAFE provides a more equitable regulatory framework
for different vehicle manufacturers. Under Unreformed CAFE, the cost
burdens and compliance difficulties have been imposed primarily on the
full-line manufacturers who have large sales volumes at the larger and
heavier end of the light-truck fleet. Reformed CAFE spreads the
regulatory cost burden for fuel economy more broadly across vehicle
manufacturers within the industry.
Fourth, Reformed CAFE is more market-oriented because it more fully
respects economic conditions and consumer choice. Reformed CAFE does
not force vehicle manufacturers to adjust fleet mix toward smaller
vehicles unless that is what consumers are demanding. As the industry's
sales volume and mix changes in response to economic conditions (e.g.,
gasoline prices and household income) and consumer preferences (e.g.,
desire for seating capacity or hauling capability), the level of CAFE
required of manufacturers under Reformed CAFE will, at least partially,
adjust automatically to these changes. Accordingly, Reformed CAFE may
reduce the need for the agency to revisit previously established
standards in light of changed market conditions, a difficult process
that undermines regulatory certainty for the industry. In the mid-
1980's, for example, the agency relaxed several Unreformed CAFE
standards because fuel prices fell more than had been expected when
those standards were established and, as a result, consumer demand for
small vehicles with high fuel economy did not materialize as expected.
By moving to a more market-oriented system, the agency may also be able
to pursue more multi-year rulemakings that span larger time frames than
the agency has attempted in the past.
The agency is also issuing, along with this notice, a notice
requesting updated product plan information and other data to assist in
developing a final rule. We recognize that the manufacturer product
plans relied upon in developing this proposal--those plans received in
early 2004 in response to a 2003 request for information--may already
be outdated in some respects. We fully expect that manufacturers have
revised those plans to reflect subsequent developments.
We solicit comment on all aspects of this proposal. In particular,
we solicit comment on (1) whether the proposed levels of maximum
feasible CAFE reflect an appropriate balancing of the explicit
statutory factors and other relevant factors, (2) whether CAFE reform
should be designed based on size categories or as a continuous
function, (3) whether the reform should be based on a single size
attribute or whether adjustments should also be made for attributes
such as towing capability and cargo hauling capability, and (4) whether
the three-year transition period is necessary or whether it can be
reduced to achieve a more rapid transition to the Reformed CAFE system.
Other specific areas where we request comments are identified elsewhere
in this preamble and in the Preliminary Regulatory Impact Analysis
(PRIA). Based on public comments and other information, including new
data and analysis, and updated product plans, the standards adopted in
the final rule could well be different.
B. Energy demand and supply and the value of conservation
Many of the concerns about energy security and the effects of
energy prices and supply on national economic well-being that led to
the enactment of EPCA in 1975 persist today.\3\ The demand for oil is
steadily growing in the U.S. and around the world. By 2025, U.S. demand
for oil is expected to increase 40 percent and world oil demand is
expected to increase by nearly 60 percent. Most of these increases
would occur in the transportation sector. To meet this projected
increase in world demand, worldwide productive capacity would have to
increase by more than 44 million barrels per day over current levels.
OPEC producers are expected to supply nearly 60 percent of the
increased production. By 2025, nearly 70 percent of the oil consumed in
the U.S. would be imported oil. Strong growth in the demand for oil
worldwide, coupled with tight crude oil supplies, is the driving force
behind the sharp price increases seen over the past four years.
Increasingly, the oil consumed in the U.S. originates in countries with
political and economic situations that raise concerns about future oil
supply and prices.
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\3\ The sources of the figures in this section can be found
below in section VIII, ``Need for Nation to conserve energy.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Energy is an essential input to the U.S. economy and having a
strong economy is essential to maintaining and strengthening our
national security. Conserving energy, especially reducing the nation's
dependence on petroleum, benefits the U.S. in several ways. Reducing
total petroleum use decreases our economy's vulnerability to oil price
shocks. Reducing dependence on oil imports from regions with uncertain
conditions enhances our energy security and can reduce the flow of oil
profits to certain states now hostile to the U.S. Reducing the growth
rate of oil use will help relieve pressures on already strained
domestic refinery capacity, decreasing the likelihood of future product
price volatility.
II. Background
A. 1974 DOT/EPA report to Congress on potential for motor vehicle fuel
economy improvements
In 1974, the Department of Transportation (DOT) and Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) submitted to Congress a report entitled
``Potential for Motor Vehicle Fuel Economy Improvement'' (1974
Report).\4\ This report was prepared in compliance with Section 10 of
the Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination Act of 1974, Public
Law 93-319 (the Act). The Act directed EPA and DOT to report on the
practicability of a production-weighted fuel economy improvement
standard of 20 percent for new motor vehicles in the 1980 time frame.
As required by Section 10 of the Act, the report included an assessment
of the technological challenges of meeting any such standard, including
lead times involved, the test procedures required to determine
compliance, the economic
[[Page 51418]]
costs and benefits, the enforcement means, the effect on energy and
other resources, and the relationship of safety and emission standards
to CAFE.
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\4\ The 1974 report is available in the docket for this
rulemaking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the 1974 Report, DOT/EPA said that performance standards
regulating fuel economy could take either of two modes: A production-
weighted average standard for each manufacturer's entire fleet of
vehicles or a fuel economy standard tailored to individual classes of
vehicles. They identified three forms that a production-weighted
standard could take:
A common standard (e.g., 16.8 mpg for all manufacturers);
A standard stated as a uniform per cent improvement (e.g.,
20% improvement for each manufacturer); or
A variable standard based on the costs or potential to
improve for each manufacturer.
(1974 Report, p. 77)
As to standards for individual classes, they identified two
different forms:
A standard stated as uniform quantity of improvement
(e.g., 2.8 mpg for all classes); or
A variable standard based on the potential to improve each
class.
(1974 Report, p. 77-78)
DOT/EPA concluded in the 1974 Report that a production-weighted
standard establishing one uniform specific fuel economy average for all
manufacturers would, if sufficiently stringent to have the needed
effect, impact most heavily on manufacturers who have lower fuel
economy, while not requiring manufacturers of current vehicles with
better fuel economy to maintain or improve their performance. (1974
Report, p. 12) Production-weighted standards specifically tailored to
each manufacturer would eliminate some inequities, but were considered
to be difficult to administer fairly. (Ibid.)
B. Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975
Congress enacted the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA Pub.
L. 94-163) during the aftermath of the energy crisis created by the oil
embargo of 1973-74. The Act established an automobile fuel economy
regulatory program by adding Title V, ``Improving Automotive
Efficiency,'' to the Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act.
Title V has been amended from time to time and codified without
substantive change as Chapter 329 of title 49, United States Code.
Chapter 329 provides for the issuance of average fuel economy standards
for passenger automobiles and separate standards for automobiles that
are not passenger automobiles (light trucks).
For the purposes of the CAFE statute, ``automobiles'' include any
``4-wheeled vehicle that is propelled by fuel (or by alternative fuel)
manufactured primarily for use on public streets, roads, and highways
(except a vehicle operated only on a rail line), and rated at not more
than 6,000 pounds gross vehicle weight.'' They also include any such
vehicle rated at between 6,000 and 10,000 pounds gross vehicle weight
(GVWR) if the Secretary decides by regulation that an average fuel
economy standard for the vehicle is feasible, and that either such a
standard will result in significant energy conservation or the vehicle
is substantially used for the same purposes as a vehicle rated at not
more than 6000 pounds GVWR.
In 1978, NHTSA published a final rule in which we determined that
standards for vehicles rated between 6000 and 8500 pounds GVWR are
feasible, that such standards will result in significant energy
conservation on a per-vehicle basis and that those vehicles are used
for substantially the same purposes as vehicles rated at not more than
6000 pounds GVWR (March 23, 1978; 43 FR 11995, at 11997). Vehicles
rated at between 6000 and 8500 pounds GVWR first became subject to the
CAFE standards in MY 1980.
The CAFE standards set a minimum performance requirement in terms
of an average number of miles a vehicle travels per gallon of gasoline
or diesel fuel. Individual vehicles and models are not required to meet
the mileage standard. Instead, each manufacturer must achieve a
harmonically averaged level of fuel economy for all specified vehicles
manufactured by a manufacturer in a given MY. The statute distinguishes
between ``passenger automobiles'' and ``non-passenger automobiles.'' We
generally refer to non-passenger automobiles as light trucks.
In enacting EPCA, Congress made a clear and specific choice about
the structure of the average fuel economy standard for passenger cars.
After considering the variety of approaches presented in the 1974
Report, Congress established a common statutory CAFE standard
applicable to each manufacturer's fleet of passenger automobiles. The
Secretary of Transportation has the authority to change the standard if
it no longer represents the ``maximum feasible'' standard consistent
with the criteria set forth in the statute. Pursuant to that authority,
the Secretary amended the passenger car standard with regard to MYs
1986-1989 to address situations in which, despite manufacturers' good
faith compliance plans, market conditions rendered the statutory
standard impracticable and infeasible. Since 1990, the CAFE standard
for passenger automobiles has been 27.5 mpg and compliance is
determined in accordance with detailed procedures set forth in Section
32904(a) and (b).
Congress was considerably less decided and prescriptive with
respect to what sort of standards and procedures should be established
for light trucks. It neither made a clear choice among the approaches
(or among the forms of those approaches) identified in the 1974 Report
nor precluded the selection of any of those approaches or forms.
Further, it did not establish by statute a CAFE standard for light
trucks. Instead, Congress provided the Secretary with a choice of
establishing a form of a production-weighted average standard for each
manufacturer's entire fleet of light trucks, as suggested in the 1974
Report, or a form of production-weighted standards for classes of light
trucks. Congress directed the Secretary to establish maximum feasible
CAFE standards applicable to each manufacturer's light truck fleet, or
alternatively, to classes of light trucks, and to establish them at
least 18 months prior to the start of each model year. When determining
a ``maximum feasible level of fuel economy,'' the Secretary is directed
to balance factors including the nation's need to conserve energy,
technological feasibility, economic practicability and the impact of
other motor vehicle standards on fuel economy.
Manufacturers are required to provide a series of fuel economy
reports to both the EPA and NHTSA. NHTSA requires manufacturers to
provide pre-model year and mid-model year reports. See 49 CFR part 537.
The reports to NHTSA must include, in part, vehicle model fuel economy
values as calculated under the EPA regulations, projected sales
volumes, and actual sales volumes as available. A manufacturer must
supply similar information to the EPA at the end of a model year, along
with actual production volumes so that its fleet wide average fuel
economy can be calculated. The EPA then certifies these reports and
submits them to NHTSA so that we may determine a manufacturer's
compliance with the CAFE standards.
C. 1979-2002 light truck standards
NHTSA established the first light truck CAFE standards for MY 1979
and applied them to light trucks with a GVWR up to 6,000 pounds (March
14, 1977; 42 FR 13807). Beginning with MY 1980, NHTSA raised this GVWR
ceiling to 8,500 pounds. For MYs 1979-1981, the agency established
separate standards for two-wheel drive (2WD)
[[Page 51419]]
and four-wheel drive (4WD) light trucks without a ``combined'' standard
reflecting the combined capabilities of 2WD and 4WD light trucks.
Manufacturers that produced both 2WD vehicles and 4WD vehicles could,
however, decide to treat them as a single fleet and comply with the 2WD
standard.
Beginning with MY 1982, NHTSA established a combined standard
reflecting the combined capabilities of 2WD and 4WD light trucks, plus
optional 2WD and 4WD standards. After MY 1991, NHTSA dropped the
optional 2WD and 4WD standards. During MYs 1980-1995, NHTSA also
separated the ``captive imports'' \5\ of U.S. light truck manufacturers
from their other truck models in determining compliance with CAFE
standards.
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\5\ ``Captive import'' means, with respect to a light truck, one
which is not domestically manufactured but which is imported by a
manufacturer whose principal place of business is the United States.
49 CFR 533.4(b)(2).
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Since the agency sets standards at the maximum feasible level of
average fuel economy, as required by EPCA, and since the agency's
determinations about the maximum feasible level of average fuel economy
in future model years are highly dependent on projections about the
state of technology and market conditions in those years, NHTSA twice
found it necessary to reduce a light truck standard when it received
new information relating to the agency's past projections. In 1979, the
agency reduced the MY 1981 2WD standard after Chrysler demonstrated
that there were smaller than expected fuel economy benefits from
various technological improvements and larger than expected adverse
impacts from other federal vehicle standards and test procedures
(December 31 1979; 44 FR 77199).
In 1984, the agency reduced the MY 1985 light truck standards to
the following levels: Combined standard-19.5 mpg, 2WD standard-19.7 mpg
and 4WD standard-18.9 mpg (October 22, 1984; 49 FR 41250). The agency
concluded that market demand for light truck performance, as reflected
in engine mix and axle ratio usage, had not materialized as anticipated
when the agency initially established the MY 1985 standards. The agency
said that this resulted from lower than anticipated fuel prices. The
agency concluded that the only actions then available to manufacturers
to improve their fuel economy levels for MY 1986 would have involved
product restrictions likely resulting in significant adverse economic
impacts. The reduction of the MY 1985 standard was upheld by the U.S.
Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Center for Auto
Safety v. NHTSA, 793 F.2d 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (rejecting the
contention that the agency gave impermissible weight to the effects of
shifts in consumer demand toward larger, less fuel-efficient trucks on
the fuel economy levels manufacturers could achieve).\6\
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\6\ NHTSA similarly found it necessary on occasion to reduce the
passenger car CAFE standards in response to new information. The
agency reduced the MY 1986 passenger car standard because a
continuing decline in gasoline prices prevented a projected shift in
consumer demand toward smaller cars and smaller engines and because
the only actions available to manufacturers to improve their fuel
economy levels for MY 1986 would have involved product restrictions
likely resulting in significant adverse economic impacts. (October
4, 1985; 40 FR 40528) This action was upheld in Public Citizen vs.
NHTSA, 848 F.2d 256 (D.C. Cir. 1988). NHTSA also reduced the MY
1987-88 passenger car standards (October 6, 1986; 51 FR 35594) and
MY 1989 passenger car standard (October 6, 1988; 53 FR 39275) for
similar reasons.
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In 1994, the agency departed from its usual past practice of
considering light truck standards for one or two model years at a time
and published an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) in the
Federal Register outlining NHTSA's intention to set standards for some,
or all, of MYs 1998-2006 (59 FR 16324; April 6, 1994).
On November 15, 1995, the Department of Transportation and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act for FY 1996 was enacted. Pub. L. 104-50.
Section 330 of that Act provided:
None of the funds in this Act shall be available to prepare,
propose, or promulgate any regulations * * * prescribing corporate
average fuel economy standards for automobiles * * * in any model
year that differs from standards promulgated for such automobiles
prior to enactment of this section.
Pursuant to that Act, we then issued a final rule limited to MY 1998,
setting the light truck CAFE standard for that year at 20.7 mpg, the
same level as the standard we had set for MY 1997 (61 FR 14680; April
3, 1996).
On September 30, 1996, the Department of Transportation and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act for FY 1997 was enacted (Pub. L. 104-205).
Section 323 of that Act included the same limitation on appropriations
regarding the CAFE standards contained in Section 330 of the FY 1996
Appropriations Act. The agency followed the same process as the prior
year and established a MY 1999 light truck CAFE standard of 20.7 mpg,
the same level as the standard that had been set for MYs 1997 and 1998.
Because the same limitation on the setting of CAFE standards was
included in the Appropriations Acts for each of FYs 1998-2001, the
agency followed that same procedure during those fiscal years.
While the Department of Transportation and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act for FY 2001 (Pub. L. 106-346) contained a
restriction on CAFE rulemaking identical to that contained in prior
appropriation acts, the conference committee report for that Act
directed NHTSA to fund a study by the NAS to evaluate the effectiveness
and impacts of CAFE standards (H. Rep. No. 106-940, at p. 117-118).
In a letter dated July 10, 2001, following the release of the
President's National Energy Policy, Secretary of Transportation Mineta
asked the House and Senate Appropriations Committees to lift the
restriction on the agency spending funds for the purposes of improving
CAFE standards. The Department of Transportation and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act for FY 2002 (Pub. L. 107-87), which was enacted on
December 18, 2001, did not contain a provision restricting the
Secretary's authority to prescribe fuel economy standards.
D. 2001 National Energy Policy
The National Energy Policy,\7\ released in May 2001, stated that
``(a) fundamental imbalance between supply and demand defines our
nation's energy crisis'' and that ``(t)his imbalance, if allowed to
continue, will inevitably undermine our economy, our standard of
living, and our national security.'' The National Energy Policy was
designed to promote dependable, affordable and environmentally sound
energy for the future. The Policy envisions a comprehensive long-term
strategy that uses leading edge technology to produce an integrated
energy, environmental and economic policy. It set forth five specific
national goals: ``modernize conservation, modernize our energy
infrastructure, increase energy supplies, accelerate the protection and
improvement of the environment, and increase our nation's energy
security.''
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\7\ https://www.whitehouse.gov/energy/National-Energy-Policy.pdf
_____________________________________-
The National Energy Policy included recommendations regarding the
path that the Administration's energy policy should take and included
specific recommendations regarding vehicle fuel economy and CAFE. It
recommended that the President direct the Secretary of Transportation
to--
--Review and provide recommendations on establishing CAFE standards
with due consideration of the National Academy of Sciences study
released (in prepublication
[[Page 51420]]
form) in July 2001. Responsibly crafted CAFE standards should
increase efficiency without negatively impacting the U.S. automotive
industry. The determination of future fuel economy standards must
therefore be addressed analytically and based on sound science.
--Consider passenger safety, economic concerns, and disparate impact
on the U.S. versus foreign fleet of automobiles.
--Look at other market-based approaches to increasing the national
average fuel economy of new motor vehicles.
E. 2002 NAS Study of CAFE Reform
In response to direction from Congress, NAS published a lengthy
report in 2002 entitled ``Effectiveness and Impact of Corporate Average
Fuel Economy (CAFE) Standards.'' \8\
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\8\ The NAS submitted its preliminary report to the Department
of Transportation in July 2001 and released its final report in
January 2002.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The report concludes that the CAFE program has clearly contributed
to increased fuel economy and that it was appropriate to consider
further increases in CAFE standards. (NAS, p. 3 (Finding 1)) It cited
not only the value of fuel savings, but also adverse consequences
(i.e., externalities) associated with high levels of petroleum
importation and use that are not reflected in the price of petroleum
(e.g., the adverse impact on energy security). The report further
concluded that technologies exist that could significantly reduce fuel
consumption by passenger cars and light truck fuels within 15 years,
while maintaining vehicle size, weight, utility and performance. (NAS,
p. 3 (Finding 5)) Light duty trucks were said to offer the greatest
potential for reducing fuel consumption. (NAS, p. 4 (Finding 5)) The
report also noted that vehicle development cycles--as well as future
economic, regulatory, safety and consumer preferences--would influence
the extent to which these technologies could lead to increased fuel
economy in the U.S. market. To assess the economic trade-offs
associated with the introduction of existing and emerging technologies
to improve fuel economy, the NAS conducted what it called a ``cost-
efficient analysis''--``that is, the committee [that authored the
report] identified packages of existing and emerging technologies that
could be introduced over the next 10 to 15 years that would improve
fuel economy up to the point where further increases in fuel economy
would not be reimbursed by fuel savings.'' (NAS, p. 4 (Finding 6))
Recognizing the many trade-offs that must be considered in setting
fuel economy standards, the report took no position on what CAFE
standards would be appropriate for future years. It noted,
``(s)election of fuel economy targets will require uncertain and
difficult trade-offs among environmental benefits, vehicle safety,
cost, oil import dependence, and consumer preferences.''
The report found that, to minimize financial impacts on
manufacturers, and on their suppliers, employees, and consumers,
sufficient lead-time (consistent with normal product life cycles)
should be given when considering increases in CAFE standards. The
report stated that there are advanced technologies that could be
employed, without negatively affecting the automobile industry, if
sufficient lead-time were provided to the manufacturers.
The report expressed concerns about increasing the standards under
the CAFE program as currently structured. While raising CAFE standards
under the existing structure would reduce fuel consumption, doing so
under alternative structures ``could accomplish the same end at lower
cost, provide more flexibility to manufacturers, or address inequities
arising from the present'' structure. (NAS, pp. 4-5 (Finding 10)) \9\
Further, almost all of the committee that authored the report,
including the committee's safety specialists, said, ``to the extent
that the size and weight of the fleet have been constrained by CAFE
requirements * * * those requirements have caused more injuries and
fatalities on the road than would otherwise have occurred.'' (NAS, p.
29) Specifically, they noted: ``the downweighting and downsizing that
occurred in the late 1970s and early 1980s, some of which was due to
CAFE standards, probably resulted in an additional 1300 to 2600 traffic
fatalities in 1993.'' (NAS, p. 3 (Finding 2))
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\9\ The report noted the following about the concept of equity:
Potential Inequities
The issue of equity or inequity is subjective. However, one
concept of equity among manufacturers requires equal treatment of
equivalent vehicles made by different manufacturers. The current
CAFE standards fail this test. If one manufacturer was positioned in
the market selling many large passenger cars and thereby was just
meeting the CAFE standard, adding a 22-mpg car (below the 27.5-mpg
standard) would result in a financial penalty or would require
significant improvements in fuel economy for the remainder of the
passenger cars. But, if another manufacturer was selling many small
cars and was significantly exceeding the CAFE standard, adding a 22-
mpg vehicle would have no negative consequences.
(NAS, p. 102).
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To address those structural problems, the report suggested various
possible reforms.\10\ The report found that the ``CAFE program might be
improved significantly by converting it to a system in which fuel
targets depend on vehicle attributes.'' (NAS, p. 5 (Finding 12)) The
report noted
\10\ In assessing and comparing possible reforms, the report
urged consideration of the following factors:
Fuel use responses encouraged by the policy,
Effectiveness in reducing fuel use,
Minimizing costs of fuel use reduction,
Other potential consequences
--Distributional impacts
--Safety
--Consumer satisfaction
--Mobility
--Environment
--Potential inequities, and
Administrative feasibility.
(NAS, p. 94).
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One such system would make the fuel economy target dependent on
vehicle weight, with lower fuel consumption targets set for lighter
vehicles and higher targets for heavier vehicles, up to some maximum
weight, above which the target would be weight-independent. Such a
system would create incentives to reduce the variance in vehicle
weights between large and small vehicles, thus providing for overall
vehicle safety. It has the potential to increase fuel economy with
fewer negative effects on both safety and consumer choice. Above the
maximum weight, vehicles would need additional advanced fuel economy
technology to meet the targets. The committee believes that although
such a change is promising, it requires more investigation than was
possible in this study.
(NAS, p. 5 (Finding 12))
The report noted further that under an attribute-based approach,
the required CAFE levels could vary among the manufacturers based on
the distribution of their product mix:
Attribute-Based Fuel Economy Targets
The government could change the way that fuel economy targets
for individual vehicles are assigned. The current CAFE system sets
one target for all passenger cars (27.5 mpg) and one target for all
light-duty trucks (20.7 mpg). Each manufacturer must meet a sales-
weighted average (more precisely, a harmonic mean * * *) of these
targets. However, targets could vary among passenger cars and among
trucks, based on some attribute of these vehicles such as weight,
size, or load-carrying capacity. In that case a particular
manufacturer's average target for passenger cars or for trucks would
depend upon the fractions of vehicles it sold with particular levels
of these attributes. For example, if weight were the criterion, a
manufacturer that sells mostly light vehicles would have to achieve
higher average fuel economy than would a manufacturer that sells
mostly heavy vehicles.
(NAS, p. 87)
Based on these findings, the report recommended
Consideration should be given to designing and evaluating an
approach with fuel economy targets that are dependent on
[[Page 51421]]
vehicle attributes, such as vehicle weight, that inherently
influence fuel use. Any such system should be designed to have
minimal adverse safety consequences.
(NAS, p. 6, (Recommendation 3))
In February 2002, Secretary Mineta asked Congress ``to provide the
Department of Transportation with the necessary authority to reform the
CAFE program, guided by the NAS report's suggestions.''
F. 2002 Request for Comments on NAS Study
On February 7, 2002, we issued a Request for Comments (RFC) (67 FR
5767; Docket No. 2002-11419) seeking data on which we could base an
analysis of manufacturer capability for the purpose of determining the
appropriate CAFE standards to set for light trucks for upcoming model
years, beginning with MY 2005. We also sought comments on possible
reforms to the CAFE program, as it applies to both passenger cars and
light trucks, to protect passenger safety, advance fuel-efficient
technologies, and obtain the benefits of market-based approaches.
While we have considered the comments, the original RFC was quite
general and the comments received tended to focus on concerns with the
current program or the generic admonishment against CAFE reform--and
not on specific potential options. A more detailed summary of comments
can be found in the advanced notice of proposed rulemaking (2003 ANPRM)
published on December 29, 2003 (68 FR 74908; Docket No. 2003-16128).
G. 2003 Final Rule Establishing MY 2005-2007 Light Truck Standards
On April 7, 2003, the agency published a final rule establishing
light truck CAFE standards for MYs 2005-2007: 21.0 mpg for MY 2005,
21.6 mpg for MY 2006, and 22.2 mpg for MY 2007 (68 FR 16868; Docket No.
2002-11419; Notice 3). The agency determined that these levels are the
maximum feasible CAFE levels for light trucks for those model years,
balancing the express statutory factors and other included or relevant
considerations such as the impact of the standard on motor vehicle
safety and employment. NHTSA estimated that the fuel economy increases
required by the standards for MYs 2005-2007 would generate
approximately 3.6 billion gallons of gasoline savings over the 25-year
lifetime of the affected vehicles.
In establishing the standards, the agency analyzed cost-effective
technological improvements that could be made to the product offerings
planned by the manufacturers. The agency's projection of CAFE
capability was based on the manufacturers' most recently submitted
product plans and technological improvements we determined to be
appropriate and feasible within the time frame. In the final rule, we
stated that we did not believe the final rule will necessitate, nor did
we believe it will result in, any ``mix shifting,'' e.g., decreasing
the production volumes of vehicles that are heavier or larger and thus
have relatively low fuel economy and increasing the production volumes
of lighter or smaller vehicles, which might result in significant
employment and/or average weight reductions were it to occur.
We further expressed our belief that the final rule for MYs 2005-
2007 will neither necessitate nor induce manufacturers to make
reductions in vehicle weight that will adversely affect the overall
safety of people traveling on the roads of America. Indeed, as the NAS
report noted, there are many technological means that are available to
manufacturers for improving fuel economy and are much more cost-
effective than weight reduction through materials substitution.
Accordingly, we did not rely on weight reduction.
We recognized in the final rule that the standard established for
MY 2007 could be a challenge for General Motors. We recognized further
that, between the issuance of the final rule and the last (MY 2007) of
the model years for which standards were being established, there was
more time than in previous light truck CAFE rulemakings for significant
changes to occur in external factors capable of affecting the
achievable levels of CAFE. These external factors include fuel prices
and the demand for vehicles with advanced fuel saving technologies,
such as hybrid electric and advanced diesel vehicles. We said that
changes in these factors could lead to higher or lower levels of CAFE,
particularly in MY 2007. Recognizing that it may be appropriate to re-
examine the MY 2007 standard in light of any significant changes in
those factors, the agency reaffirms its plans to monitor the compliance
efforts of the manufacturers.
H. 2003 comprehensive plans for addressing vehicle rollover and
compatibility
In September 2002, NHTSA completed a thorough examination of the
opportunities for significantly improving vehicle and highway safety
and announced the establishment of interdisciplinary teams to formulate
comprehensive plans for addressing the four most promising problem
areas.\11\ Based on the work of the teams, the agency issued detailed
reports analyzing each of the problem areas and recommending
coordinated strategies that, if implemented effectively, will lead to
significant improvements in safety.
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\11\ A fifth problem area was announced in 2004, improving
traffic safety data.
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Two of the problems areas are vehicle rollover and vehicle
compatibility. The reports on those areas identify a series of vehicle,
roadway and behavioral strategies for addressing the problems.\12\
Among the vehicle strategies, both reports identified reform of the
CAFE program as one of the steps that needed to be taken to reduce
those problems:
\12\ See https://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/vrtc/ca/capubs/
IPTRolloverMitigationReport/; https://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/
departments/nrd-11/aggressivity/IPTVehicleCompatibilityReport/.
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The current structure of the CAFE system can provide an
incentive to manufacturers to downweight vehicles, increase
production of vehicle classes that are more susceptible to rollover
crashes, and produce a less homogenous fleet mix. As a result, CAFE
is critical to the vehicle compatibility and rollover problems.
(a) Highlights of Current Program
In its final rule setting new CAFE standards for MY 2005-2007
light trucks, NHTSA stated that it intends to examine possible
reforms to the CAFE system, including those recommended in the
National Academy of Sciences' CAFE report.
(b) Proposed Initiatives
Consistent with its statutory authority, the agency plans to
address issues relating to the structure, operation and effects of
potential changes to the CAFE system and CAFE standards. In taking
this broad view, the agency recognizes that the regulation of the
(sic) fuel economy can have substantial effects on vehicle safety,
the composition of the light vehicle fleet, the economic well-being
of the automobile industry and, of course, our nation's energy
security.
(c) Expected Program Outcomes
It is NHTSA's goal to identify and implement reforms to the CAFE
system that will facilitate improvements in fuel economy without
compromising motor vehicle safety or American jobs. * * *
* * * NHTSA intends to examine the safety impacts, both positive
and negative, that may result from any modifications to CAFE as it
now exists. Regardless of the root causes, it is clear that the
downsizing of vehicles that occurred during the first decade of the
CAFE program had serious safety consequences. Changes to the
existing system are likely to have equally significant impacts.
NHTSA is determined to ensure that these impacts are positive.
I. 2003 ANPRM
On December 29, 2003, the agency published an ANPRM seeking comment
on various issues relating to reforming the CAFE program (68 FR 74908;
Docket
[[Page 51422]]
No. 2003-16128).\13\ The agency sought comment on possible enhancements
to the program that would assist in further fuel conservation, while
protecting motor vehicle safety and the economic vitality of the
automobile industry. The agency indicated that it was particularly
interested in structural reform. This document, while not espousing any
particular form of reform, sought more specific input than the 2002 RFC
on various options aimed at adapting the CAFE program to today's
vehicle fleet and needs.
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\13\ On the same date, we also published a request for comments
seeking manufacturer product plan information for MYs 2008-2012 to
assist the agency in analyzing possible reforms to the CAFE program
which are discussed in a companion notice published today. (68 FR
74931) The agency sought information that would help it assess the
effect of these possible reforms on fuel economy, manufacturers,
consumers, the economy, motor vehicle safety and American jobs.
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1. Need for reform
The 2003 ANPRM discussed the principal criticisms of the current
CAFE program that led the agency to explore light truck CAFE reform (68
FR 74908, at 74910-13. First, the energy-saving potential of the CAFE
program is hampered by the current regulatory structure. The Unreformed
approach to CAFE does not di