(4) COMPETITIVE STANDARD.
(a) The commissioner may disapprove an
acquisition if there is substantial evidence that the effect of the acquisition
may be to substantially lessen competition in any line of insurance in this
state or tend to create a monopoly or if the insurer fails to file adequate
information in compliance with sub. (3). In this subsection, a highly
concentrated market is one in which the share of the 4 largest insurers is 75%
or more of the market. Percentages not shown in the tables in this subsection
are interpolated proportionately to the percentages that are shown. If more
than 2 insurers are involved, exceeding the total of the two columns in the
table is prima facie evidence of violation of the competitive standard in this
subsection. For the purpose of this item, the insurer with the largest share of
the market shall be deemed to be Insurer A.
(b) In determining whether a proposed
acquisition would violate the competitive standard of par. (a) of this
subsection, the commissioner shall consider the following:
1. Any acquisition covered under sub. (2)
involving 2 or more insurers competing in the same market is prima facie
evidence of violation of the competitive standards if:
a. The market is highly concentrated and the
involved insurers possess the following shares of the market:
Insurer A Insurer B
4% 4% or more
10% 2% or more
15% or more 1% or more
b. Or, the market is not highly concentrated
and the involved insurers possess the following shares of the market:
Insurer A Insurer B
5% 5% or more
10% 4% or more
15% 3% or more
19% or more 1% or more
2. There is a significant trend toward
increased concentration when the aggregate market share of any grouping of the
largest insurers in the market, from the 2 largest to the 8 largest, has
increased by 7% or more of the market over a period of time extending from any
base year 5 to 10 years prior to the acquisition up to the time of the
acquisition. Any acquisition or merger covered under sub. (2) involving 2 or
more insurers competing in the same market is prima facie evidence of violation
of the competitive standard in par. (a) of this subsection if:
a. There is a significant trend toward
increased concentration in the market.
b. One of the insurers involved is one of the
insurers in a grouping of large insurers showing the requisite increase in the
market share; and
c. Another
involved insurer's market is 2% or more.
3. For the purposes of this subsection:
a. The term "insurer" includes any company or
group of companies under common management, ownership, or control;
b. The term "market" means the relevant
product and geographical markets. In determining the relevant product and
geographical markets, the commissioner shall give due consideration to, among
other things, the definitions or guidelines, if any, promulgated by the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners and to information, if any,
submitted by parties to the acquisition. In the absence of sufficient
information to the contrary, the relevant product market is assumed to be the
direct written insurance premium for a line of business, such line being that
used in the annual statement required to be filed by insurers doing business in
this state, and the relevant geographical market is assumed to be this
state;
c. The burden of showing
prima facie evidence of violation of the competitive standard rests upon the
commissioner.
4. Even if
an acquisition is not prima facie violative of the competitive standard under
par. (a), the commissioner may establish the requisite anticompetitive effect
based upon other substantial evidence. Even if an acquisition is prima facie
violative of the competitive standard under par. (a), a party may establish the
absence of the requisite anticompetitive effect based upon other substantial
evidence. Relevant factors in making a determination under this subdivision
include, but are not limited to, the following: market shares, volatility of
ranking of market leaders, number of competitors, concentration, trend of
concentration in the industry, and ease of entry and exit into the market.
(c) The commissioner
may approve the acquisition if the public benefits of the acquisition exceed
the public benefits which would arise from not lessening
competition.