Current through February, 2024
(a) The chief
election officer or the clerk shall conduct an audit of a random sample of not
less than ten per cent of the precincts employing the electronic voting system,
to verify that the electronic tallies generated by the system in those
precincts equal hand tallies of the paper ballots generated by the system in
those precincts.
(1) The manual audit may be
conducted by election officials or by counting center officials;
(2) Except for designated election officials,
counting center officials, or official, observers, no person shall be permitted
to witness the audit without the authorization of the chief election officer,
clerk, or designated representative. The area in which, the audit is conducted
shall be kept secure;
(3) Observers
may request to conduct a manual audit;
(4) Whenever ballots are removed from
storage, the handling of the ballots shall be witnessed by not less than two
representatives who. are riot of the same political party or official
observers;
(5) Election officials
and. counting center-officials shall certify the conduct of and results of the
manual audit; and
(6) The manual
audit shall not be considered a recount pursuant to the election contest
provisions of the law.
(b) In the event discrepancies are found in
the audit, the chief election officer may authorize an expanded audit to
determine the extent of misreporting within the system.
(1) The chief election officer may use
official observers, election day officials, county or state election employees,
or other designated individuals as part of the expanded audit.
(2) The chief election officer will determine
when the expanded-audit is concluded.
(3) The results of the expanded audit will be
filed with the office of elections.
(c) In lieu of relying on the initial results
from an electronic voting system, the chief election officer may count ballots
or voter verifiable paper audit, trails by hand or with a mechanical tabulation
system, or a combination thereof.
(1) Any
counting of ballots or voter verifiable paper audit trails, through the use of
a mechanical tabulation system, will conform to the marking and vote
disposition rules relating to the voting system that the ballot or voter
verifiable paper audit trails were associated with.
(A) As the marksense ballot voting system, is
a mechanical tabulation system, and the ballots were intended to be read by the
devices associated with that system, the chief election officer, will to the
extent possible, use those voting devices of the system that did not experience
misreporting problems; and
(B) In
the event there are inadequate voting equipment that did not experience
misreporting problems, the chief election officer, in consultation with the
official observers, may use voting equipment that have been repaired to the
satisfaction of the chief election officer.
(2) Any counting by hand of ballots or voter
verifiable paper audit trails will conform to the marking and vote disposition
rules relating to the voting system that the ballot or voter verifiable paper
audit trails were associated with.
(A)
Ballots that were marked for use by a marksense ballot voting system, will be
counted in accordance with those rules associated with that system to the
extent reasonably possible. Any hand count of marksense ballots will not use
any statute or rules associated with the paper ballot voting system, as those
marking instructions and vote disposition rules are uniquely different from
those statutes and rules associated with other voting systems; and
(B) Voter verifiable paper audit trails from
a direct recording electronic device voting system will be counted in
accordance with the ballot selections indicated on them.
(d) The chief election will to the
extent possible, resolve any misreporting problem, prior to the end of the
contest period stated in HRS §
11-173.5,
in the case of a primary, or special primary election, or HRS §
11-174.5,
in the case of a general, special general, or special election. Any resolution
of a misreporting problem shall be documented and filed with the office of
elections.
(e) "Precinct" for
purposes of this rule, consistent with HAR § 3-177-57, refers to the
ballot type that corresponds to the manner in which results are reported (i.e.
if results are reported by state representative district-precinct, such as DP
17-01, then the ballot type associated with DP 17-01 is the applicable precinct
for auditing purposes).
