Department of Transportation April 13, 2016 – Federal Register Recent Federal Regulation Documents

The FAA proposes to rule and invites public comment on the release of land at the Humboldt Municipal, Humboldt, Iowa, under the provisions of 49 U.S.C. 47107(h)(2).

We propose to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain International Aero Engines AG (IAE) V2500-A1 turbofan engines. This proposed AD was prompted by a report of an uncontainment caused by a high-pressure turbine (HPT) seal release. This proposed AD would require removing from service the HPT No. 4 bearing front seal seat, part numbers (P/Ns) 2A0066, 2A1998, and 2A3432, and the HPT No. 4 bearing rear seal seat, P/Ns 2A0067, 2A1999, and 2A3433, and replacement with parts eligible for installation. This proposed AD would also require inspecting the HPT rotor and stator assembly, and, if necessary, their replacement with parts that are eligible for installation. We are proposing this AD to prevent failure of the HPT stage 2 seals, uncontained HPT seal release, damage to the engine, and damage to the airplane.

This notice announces the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) intent to cancel the following Technical Standard Orders (TSOs): -C42, Propeller Feathering Hose Assemblies; -C53c, Fuel and Engine Oil System Hose Assemblies; and -C75, Hydraulic Hose Assemblies. The intent is to combine the updated requirements of the aforementioned TSOs into TSO-C140, Aerospace Fuel, Engine Oil, and Hydraulic Hose Assemblies. The impact of cancelling these TSOs will not affect current design or production approvals for an existing TSO-C42, -C53c, or -C75 authorization (TSOA). However, modifications to TSO-C42, -C53c, and - C75 TSOAs will no longer be accepted after the effective cancellation date. Generally, we will not accept applications for the previous revisions after the cancellation date of these TSOs. We may do so, however, up to six months after publication of this cancellation notice if we know that work was being done against the prior minimum performance standard before the cancellations became effective. Articles approved under those cancelled TSOAs may continue to be produced under the provisions of their original approvals.

This action corrects administrative errors in a final rule published in the Federal Register of March 8, 2016, that establishes Class E airspace at Willapa Harbor Heliport, South Bend, WA, by amending the assigned paragraph for rule incorporation within FAA Order 7400.9Z, by correcting format errors in the text header of the airspace legal description, and by correcting inconsistent airport name information in the airspace legal description. These changes do not affect the boundaries or operating requirements of the airspace.

This action proposes to modify Class E airspace extending upward from 700 feet above the surface at De Quincy Industrial Airpark, De Quincy, LA; Minden-Webster Airport, Minden, LA; and Slidell, Airport, Slidell, LA. Decommissioning of non-directional radio beacon (NDB), cancellation of NDB approaches, and implementation of area navigation (RNAV) procedures have made this action necessary for the safety and management of Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) operations at the above airports. This action also proposes to remove Class E airspace extending upward from 700 feet above the surface at Homer Municipal Airport, Homer, LA, as controlled airspace is no longer needed. Additionally, the geographic coordinates at De Quincy Industrial Airpark, Minden-Webster Airport, and Slidell Airport would be adjusted to coincide with the FAA's aeronautical database.

We are revising an earlier proposed airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 767-200, -300, and -400ER series airplanes. The NPRM proposed an inspection for plastic couplings, corrective actions if necessary, and installation of new spray shrouds. The NPRM was prompted by a report of the engine indication and crew alerting system (EICAS) display system malfunctioning during flight. This action revises the NPRM by adding, for certain airplanes, a general visual inspection of the spray shield and related investigative and corrective actions if necessary. We are proposing this supplemental NPRM (SNPRM) to prevent an uncontrolled water leak from a defective potable water system coupling, which could cause the main equipment center (MEC) line replaceable units (LRUs) to become wet, resulting in an electrical short and potential loss of several functions essential for safe flight. Since these actions impose an additional burden over that proposed in the NPRM, we are reopening the comment period to allow the public the chance to comment on these proposed changes.

We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus Model A300 B4-600, B4-600R, and F4-600R series airplanes, and Model A300 C4-605R Variant F airplanes (collectively called Model A300- 600 series airplanes), modified by a particular supplemental type certificate (STC). This AD was prompted by a report of chafing found on the overflow sensor harness of the surge tank, and subsequent contact between the electrical wiring and fuel tank structure. This AD requires a one-time inspection for damage of the outer tank overflow sensor harness, and repair if necessary. This AD also requires modification of the sensor harness. We are issuing this AD to prevent chafing of the harness and subsequent contact between the electrical wiring and fuel tank structure, which could result in electrical arcing and a fuel tank explosion.

We propose to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Airbus Defense and Space S.A. Model CN-235, CN-235-200, and CN-235-300 airplanes. This proposed AD was prompted by reports of main landing gear (MLG) access doors detaching from the airplane as a result of excessive vibration and metal fatigue in the attach fittings. This proposed AD would require modification of the MLG access door by replacing seals in the MLG fairing and, for certain airplanes, adding an additional bolt. We are proposing this AD to prevent a fracture in the MLG access door associated with excessive vibration and metal fatigue in the attach fittings. This condition could lead to MLG access door detachment and consequent impact of flight controls, resulting in reduced control of an airplane.

We are superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2013-22-11 for certain The Boeing Company Model 747-400 and -400D series airplanes. AD 2013-22-11 required repetitive inspections to detect cracks in the floor panel attachment fastener holes of certain upper deck floor beam upper chords, repetitive inspections, corrective actions if necessary, and replacement of the upper deck floor beam upper chords. Since we issued AD 2013-22-11, we received a report that certain fastener holes in the upper deck floor beam upper chords may not have been inspected in accordance with AD 2013-22-11. This AD adds additional repetitive inspections for cracks for certain airplanes, and corrective actions if necessary. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct fatigue cracking in certain upper chords of the upper deck floor beam. Such cracks could become large and cause the floor beams to become severed and result in rapid decompression or reduced controllability of the airplane.

We are superseding airworthiness directive (AD) 92-06-10 for SOCATA Models MS 880B, MS 885, MS 892A-150, MS 892E-150, MS 893A, MS 893E, MS 894A, MS 894E, Rallye 100S, Rallye 150ST, Rallye 150T, Rallye 235E, and Rallye 235C airplanes. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as fatigue failure of the nose landing gear wheel axle. We are issuing this AD to require actions to address the unsafe condition on these products.

We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 787-8 airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports indicating that the ram air turbine (RAT) assembly may fail to operate if deployed at low airspeeds. This AD requires replacing either the RAT pump and control module assembly or the entire RAT assembly. We are issuing this AD to prevent failure of the RAT assembly to operate at low air speeds. The volume fuse on the RAT assembly may be activated in-flight before the RAT is deployed. This may lead to improper pump hydraulic pressure offloading when the RAT is needed. Failure of the RAT to operate in an all engine out event would result in loss of control of the airplane.