Department of Transportation August 20, 2013 – Federal Register Recent Federal Regulation Documents

We propose to supersede an existing airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to certain Piper Aircraft, Inc. Models PA-28-140, PA- 28-150, PA-28-160, PA-28-180, PA-28R-180, and PA-28R-200 airplanes. AD 71-21-08, Amendment 39-1312 (36 FR 19572, October 8, 1971) currently requires replacement of the fuel selector valve cover. Since we issued AD 71-21-08, it has been found that a similar fuel selector valve issue exists in additional serial numbered airplanes not identified in the existing AD. This proposed AD would add additional airplanes to the AD's applicability section and changes the compliance time of the required actions. We are proposing this AD to correct the unsafe condition on these products.

We propose to supersede an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for Bell Helicopter Textron (Bell) Model 222, 222B, 222U, 230, and 430 helicopters. The existing AD currently requires inspecting parts of the main rotor hydraulic servo actuator (servo actuator) for certain conditions and replacing any unairworthy parts before further flight. Since we issued the AD, a new stainless steel piston rod has been manufactured. We propose requiring the installation of a servo actuator assembly with this piston rod and setting an interval for the next overhaul at 10,000 hours time-in-service (TIS) or 10 years, whichever comes first. The proposed actions are intended to detect pitting or penetration of the base metal of the piston rod that could lead to the piston rod's failure, the servo actuator's failure, and the loss of helicopter control.

We propose to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD) for various restricted category helicopters, originally manufactured by Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. (Bell), model numbers HH-1K, TH-1F, TH- 1L, UH-1A, UH-1B, UH-1E, UH-1F, UH-1H, UH-1L, and UH-1P. The current type certificate holders include but are not limited to Arrow Falcon Exporters Inc.; AST, Inc.; Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc.; Global Helicopter Technology, Inc.; Hagglund Helicopters, LLC; International Helicopters, Inc.; JJASPP Engineering Services, LLC; Northwest Rotorcraft, LLC; OAS Parts LLC; Richards Heavylift Helo, Inc.; Robinson Air Crane, Inc.; Rotorcraft Development Corporation; San Joaquin Helicopters; Smith Helicopters; Southern Helicopter, Inc.; Southwest Florida Aviation International, Inc.; Tamarack Helicopters, Inc; and Southwest Florida Aviation, Inc. This proposed AD would require inspecting the tail rotor (T/R) cable assembly for an incorrectly machined body. This proposed AD is prompted by a report from Bell that a defective body on the cable prevents the barrel assembly from fully engaging in the body cavity. The proposed actions are intended to prevent disengagement of the cable from the barrel, failure of the T/R pitch control, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.

The Surface Transportation Board (Board) is amending its rules to require rail carriers that submit to the Board R-1 reports that identify information on capital and operating expenditures for Positive Train Control (PTC) to separately report those expenses so that they can be viewed both as component parts of, as well as separately from, other capital investments and expenses. PTC is an automated system designed to prevent train-to-train collisions and other accidents. Rail carriers with traffic routes that carry passengers and/or hazardous toxic-by-inhalation (TIH) or poisonous-by-inhalation (PIH) materials, as so designated under federal law, must implement PTC according to federal legislation. Pursuant to the notice of proposed rulemaking published in the Federal Register on October 13, 2011, we are adopting supplemental schedules to the R-1 to require financial disclosure with respect to PTC to help inform the Board and the public about the specific costs attributable to PTC implementation.

We are superseding airworthiness directive (AD) 2004-13-06 for certain Airbus Model A319 and A320 series airplanes. AD 2004-13-06 required repetitive detailed inspections to detect cracks in the keel beam side panels, and repair if necessary. This new AD requires repetitive eddy current inspections for cracking in the keel beam side panels, and corrective actions if necessary. This AD was prompted by reports of cracks on the side panels of the keel beams. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct fatigue cracks on the side panels of the keel beams, which could result in reduced structural integrity of the airplane.

NHTSA is adopting amendments to certain provisions of the early warning reporting (EWR) rule and the regulations governing motor vehicle and equipment safety recalls. The amendments to the EWR rule require light vehicle manufacturers to specify the vehicle type and the fuel and/or propulsion system type in their reports and add new component categories of stability control systems for light vehicles, buses, emergency vehicles, and medium-heavy vehicle manufacturers, and forward collision avoidance, lane departure prevention, and backover prevention for light vehicle manufacturers. These amendments will also require light vehicle manufacturers to segregate their Service Brake EWR data into two new discrete component categories. In addition, NHTSA will require motor vehicle manufacturers to report their annual list of substantially similar vehicles via the Internet. As to safety recalls, we will now require certain manufacturers to provide a VIN-based recalls lookup tool on their Web site or the Web site of a third party; require the submission of recalls reports and information via the Internet; and require adjustments to the required content of the owner notification letters and envelopes required to be issued to owners and purchasers of recalled vehicles and equipment.

We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Bombardier, Inc. Model DHC-8-102, -103, and -106 airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report of cracking in a lower longeron in a nacelle. This AD requires repetitive inspections for cracking of the lower longerons in the nacelles, and replacement with new longerons or repair if necessary. Additionally, this AD specifies an optional terminating action. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct such cracking, which could result in degradation of the structural integrity of the nacelle and possible collapse of the main landing gear (MLG).