Department of Transportation January 2013 – Federal Register Recent Federal Regulation Documents

In this document, PHMSA is seeking additional comment on the impact of changes to the requirements for the air transport of lithium cells and batteries that have been adopted into the 2013-2014 International Civil Aviation Organization Technical Instructions on the Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air (ICAO Technical Instructions), and subsequently incorporated by reference in a final rule published elsewhere in this issue of the Federal Register. PHMSA is considering the long-term impacts of permitting shippers and carriers to choose between compliance with the existing HMR, or compliance with the ICAO Technical Instructions 2013-2014 edition, when transporting batteries domestically by air. Incorporation by reference of the 2013-2014 Edition of the ICAO Technical Instructions will allow each shipper and carrier to choose the method of compliance that is most appropriate for its operation; likewise, each shipper and carrier will have the responsibility to ensure that the proper method of compliance is chosen for each shipment, since the chosen method may not comply with the ICAO Technical Instructions. PHMSA is seeking supplemental comments to our January 11, 2010, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) and our April 11, 2012, request for additional comment in light of the publication of the HM-215L final rule. Specifically, PHMSA is seeking comment on whether to require mandatory compliance with the 2013-2014 ICAO Technical Instructions for all shipments of lithium batteries by air, both foreign and domestic. Based on the comments received, PHMSA may issue a final rule to revise the HMR to reflect the lithium battery provisions specified in the 2013-2014 Edition of the ICAO Technical Instructions.

This document responds to administrative appeals generated as a result of certain amendments adopted in an international harmonization final rule published on January 19, 2011. The January 19, 2011 final rule amended the Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMR) by revising, removing or adding proper shipping names, the hazard class of a material, packing group assignments, special provisions, packaging authorizations, packaging sections, air transport quantity limitations, and vessel stowage requirements. The amendments were necessary to align the HMR with recent revisions to international standards for the transport of hazardous materials by all modes. In this final rule, PHMSA amends the HMR as a result of administrative appeals submitted in response to various amendments adopted in the January 19, 2011 final rule. This document also addresses recent actions taken by the International Civil Aviation Organization's (ICAO) Dangerous Goods Panel (DGP) regarding certain lithium ion battery-powered mobility aids (e.g., wheelchairs, travel scooters) offered by passengers for air transport and passenger notification of hazardous materials restrictions by operators. Further, this final rule adopts amendments to the HMR as a result of two administrative appeals submitted by an appellant in response to a final rule published February 2, 2010, that revised shipper responsibilities related to packaging design variation, manufacturer notification, and recordkeeping requirements for certain packaging types.

FMCSA announces its decision to renew the exemptions from the vision requirement in the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations for 12 individuals. FMCSA has statutory authority to exempt individuals from the vision requirement if the exemptions granted will not compromise safety. The Agency has concluded that granting these exemption renewals will provide a level of safety that is equivalent to or greater than the level of safety maintained without the exemptions for these commercial motor vehicle (CMV) drivers.

The NHTSA announces a meeting of NEMSAC to be held in the Metropolitan Washington, DC, area. This notice announces the date, time, and location of the meeting, which will be open to the public. The purpose of NEMSAC, a nationally recognized council of emergency medical services representatives and consumers, is to provide advice and recommendations regarding Emergency Medical Services (EMS) to DOT's NHTSA and to the Federal Interagency Committee on EMS (FICEMS).

We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus Model A330-202, -203, -223, -243, -302, -323, -342, and -343 airplanes; and Model A340-313 airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports that a specific batch of cargo doors might have deviations in quality related to door structure, such as irregular bore holes, improper application of sealant and paint, or uncleanliness. This AD requires inspecting to identify the part and serial numbers of the forward and aft cargo doors, and replacing the affected cargo doors. We are issuing this AD to prevent the degraded structural capability of the cargo door, a primary structure, from leading to failure of the door, which could lead to a breach through the door or the door detaching from the airplane, resulting in potential rapid decompression.

We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 737-300, -400, and -500 series airplanes. That AD currently requires repetitive inspections for cracking of the crown area of the fuselage skin, and corrective actions if necessary. This new AD adds repetitive inspections for cracking using different inspection methods and inspecting additional areas, and corrective actions if necessary. This new AD also requires additional repairs to previously repaired areas and repetitive inspections for loose fasteners and replacement if necessary in certain previously repaired areas. This AD also reduces certain compliance times and extends certain other compliance times. This AD was prompted by additional reports of cracking at the horizontal chem-mill steps away from the lap joints over the entire crown area, and vertical chem-mill cracks adjacent to the butt joints. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct fatigue cracking of the fuselage skin, which could cause the fuselage skin to fracture and fail, and result in rapid decompression of the airplane.