Department of Transportation 2012 – Federal Register Recent Federal Regulation Documents

We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain BAE SYSTEMS (OPERATIONS) LIMITED Model BAe 146 series airplanes and Model Avro 146-RJ series airplanes. This AD was prompted by hydraulic pipe ruptures in the center of the cabin resulting in passengers being contaminated with hydraulic fluid. This AD requires installing a hydraulic fluid containment system. We are issuing this AD to prevent harmful or hazardous concentrations of hydraulic fluid or hydraulic vapor from entering the passenger compartment, possibly resulting in injury to the passengers.

We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Bombardier, Inc. Model CL-600-2B19 (Regional Jet Series 100 & 440) airplanes. That AD currently requires a one-time inspection of the shafts of the main landing gear (MLG) side-brace fittings to detect corrosion, and the forward and aft bushings in the left-hand and right- hand MLG side-brace fittings to detect discrepancies. The existing AD also requires corrective and related actions if necessary. This new AD requires repetitive detailed inspections for corrosion and damage of the MLG side-brace fitting, and replacing the side-brace fitting shaft with the re-designed side-brace fitting shaft of the MLG if necessary. This AD also requires eventual replacement of certain side-brace fitting shafts with the re-designed part. Replacement with a re- designed side-brace fitting shaft of the MLG is terminating action for the repetitive inspections. This AD was prompted by reports of failure of the side-brace fitting shaft of the main landing gear (MLG) due to corrosion. We are issuing this AD to prevent fractures of the side- brace fitting shafts of the MLG, and possible collapse of the MLG.

As authorized by 46 U.S.C. 12121, the Secretary of Transportation, as represented by the Maritime Administration (MARAD), is authorized to grant waivers of the U.S.-build requirement of the coastwise laws under certain circumstances. A request for such a waiver has been received by MARAD. The vessel, and a brief description of the proposed service, is listed below.

This document grants in full General Motors Corporation's (GM) petition for an exemption of the Cadillac ATS vehicle line in accordance with 49 CFR Part 543, Exemption from the Theft Prevention Standard. This petition is granted because the agency has determined that the antitheft device to be placed on the line as standard equipment is likely to be as effective in reducing and deterring motor vehicle theft as compliance with the parts-marking requirements of the Theft Prevention Standard (49 CFR Part 541).

This document grants in full the Volkswagen Group of America, Inc.'s (Volkswagen) petition for exemption of the Volkswagen Eos vehicle line in accordance with 49 CFR Part 543, Exemption from the Theft Prevention Standard. This petition is granted because the agency has determined that the antitheft device to be placed on the line as standard equipment is likely to be as effective in reducing and deterring motor vehicle theft as compliance with the parts-marking requirements of the Theft Prevention Standard, 49 CFR Part 541, Federal Motor Vehicle Theft Prevention Standard.

This notice contains a summary of a petition seeking relief from specified requirements of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR). The purpose of this notice is to improve the public's awareness of, and participation in, this aspect of the FAA's regulatory activities. Neither publication of this notice nor the inclusion or omission of information in the summary is intended to affect the legal status of the petition or its final disposition.

This notice contains a summary of a petition seeking relief from specified requirements of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) part 25. The purpose of this notice is to improve the public's awareness of, and participation in, this aspect of FAA's regulatory activities. Neither publication of this notice nor the inclusion or omission of information in the summary is intended to affect the legal status of the petition or its final disposition.

We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Bombardier, Inc. Model DHC-8-400 series airplanes. This AD was prompted by cases of on-ground failure of the screw cap or end cap of hydraulic accumulators on other airplane models, resulting in high-energy impact damage to adjacent systems and structure. This AD requires inspecting for a part number and replacing the affected parking brake hydraulic accumulator, and relocating the parking brake accumulator, on the subject airplanes. We are issuing this AD to prevent failure of the screw caps and/or end caps of the parking brake hydraulic accumulator, which could result in damage to the airplane's primary structures, with potential adverse effect on the airplane's controllability.

We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 777-200LR and -300ER series airplanes. This AD requires reviewing the airplane's maintenance records for each rudder power control unit (PCU) to identify the condition of its related reaction link assembly, and replacing the rudder PCU and its related reaction link assembly if necessary. This AD was prompted by a report of an abnormal airframe vibration in the aft fuselage during flight. We are issuing this AD to prevent excessive freeplay in the rudder control surface, which could cause rudder vibration, and result in structural damage severe enough to prevent continued safe flight and landing.

In accordance with Executive Order 13563, ``Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review,'' the Maritime Administration (MarAd) solicited public comment concerning clarification of its regulations pertaining to seamen's claims, administrative action taken against MarAd, and litigation pertaining to such matters. No comments were received as a result of the agency's solicitation. By this rulemaking, MarAd is updating and modernizing the existing regulations and adopting a procedural process to more effectively address claims arising under the Suits in Admiralty Act, the Admiralty Extension Act and the Clarification Act. The existing regulations implement the Clarification Act. The newly added regulations implement a process to resolve administrative claims arising under the Admiralty Extension Act, and both the Suits in Admiralty Act and the Public Vessels Act, respectively.

We propose to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Diamond Aircraft Industries GmbH Models DA 42, DA 42 M-NG, and DA 42 NG airplanes. This proposed AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as overextension of the main landing gear (MLG) shock absorber that could lead to the MLG jamming in the gear bay and result in damage to the aircraft or occupant injury. We are issuing this proposed AD to require actions to address the unsafe condition on these products.

We propose to supersede an existing airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to certain The Boeing Company Model 757-200 and - 200PF series airplanes. The existing AD currently requires modification of the nacelle strut and wing structure, and repair of any damage found during the modification. Since we issued that AD, a compliance time error involving the optional threshold formula was discovered, which could allow an airplane to exceed the acceptable compliance time for addressing the unsafe condition. This proposed AD would specify a maximum compliance time limit that overrides the optional threshold formula results. We are proposing this AD to prevent fatigue cracking in primary strut structure and consequent reduced structural integrity of the strut.

This action amends the legal description of area navigation (RNAV) route Q-1 by adding two waypoints along the route. In addition, the route description is amended to match a standardized format by adding the appropriate state name to the waypoints, the name and the state of the Point Reyes, CA, navigation aid, and listing of the points in the proper order.

This document announces receipt by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) of a petition for a decision that 1991 Mercedes-Benz G-class (463 chassis) multi-purpose passenger vehicles (MPVs) that were not originally manufactured to comply with all applicable Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS) are eligible for importation into the United States because they have safety features that comply with, or are capable of being altered to comply with, all such standards.

This amendment adopts miscellaneous amendments to the required IFR (instrument flight rules) altitudes and changeover points for certain Federal airways, jet routes, or direct routes for which a minimum or maximum en route authorized IFR altitude is prescribed. This regulatory action is needed because of changes occurring in the National Airspace System. These changes are designed to provide for the safe and efficient use of the navigable airspace under instrument conditions in the affected areas.

This action establishes Class E Airspace at Reidsville, GA. Separation of existing Class E airspace surrounding Swinton Smith Field at Reidsville Municipal Airport, Reidsville, GA, from the Class E airspace of Vidalia Regional Airport, Vidalia, GA, has made this action necessary to enhance the safety and airspace management of Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) operations at the airport. This action also changes the names of both airports and updates the airport's geographic coordinates.

Pursuant to Section 10(a)(2) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (Pub. L. 92-463, 5 U.S.C. App. 2), notice is hereby given of three teleconferences of the Systems Working Group of the Commercial Space Transportation Advisory Committee (COMSTAC). The teleconferences will take place on: Tuesday November 13, 2012, Tuesday December 18, 2012, and Tuesday January 15, 2013. All teleconferences will begin at 1:00 p.m. Eastern Standard Time and will last approximately one hour. Individuals who plan to participate should contact Paul Eckert, Designated Federal Officer (DFO), (the Contact Person listed below) by phone or email for the teleconference call-in number. The purpose of these three teleconferences is to assist the FAA early in its development of regulations to protect occupants of commercial suborbital and orbital spacecraft. In a Federal Register notice dated July 30, 2012, the FAA announced its desire to engage with COMSTAC on a periodic basis, approximately once per month, on specific topics. The three teleconferences announced today are a continuation of the three announced in July. As we noted in the July Federal Register notice, the FAA has not yet targeted a date for proposing regulations to protect the health and safety of crew and space flight participants. However, the FAA believes that the development of sound and appropriate regulations for human space flight can only be achieved with a deliberate, multi-year effort, and that early industry input into this regulatory effort before any formal proposal by the FAA is critical. The topics for the first three teleconferences were: (1) What Level of Safety Should FAA Target? (2) What Should FAA Oversight Look Like? and (3) What Types of Requirements and Associated Guidance Material Should FAA Develop? The topics for three follow-on teleconferences are as follows: (1) Key Terms and Definitions for Commercial Human Space Flight Safety Regulations. We would like to discuss key terms and definitions relevant to commercial human spaceflight regulations, and characterize their potential impacts to the various parties who have a vested interest in the industry. Terms that will be discussed include: a. Abort. b. Contingency. c. Emergency. d. Early Flight Return. e. Landing Site. (2) Aborts and Abort Systems. Abort systems have in the past been an element of many government human space flight systems for the purpose of enhancing occupant safety. We will discuss the following questions from a regulatory perspective: a. Is an abort system a part of fault tolerance? b. Does an abort only apply to the launch/ascent phase, or does it apply to other flight phases as well? c. Should certain types of orbital or suborbital vehicle designs require a launch abort system? d. What should the reliability requirements be for an abort system? e. Is it acceptable to have a different level of care for occupants during an abort? (3) Fault Tolerance, Margin, and Reliability. To allow for industry innovation, the commercial human space flight industry wishes to be free to the maximum extent possible to choose between fault tolerance, design margin, and reliability. We will explore the extent of this desire from a regulatory perspective with the following questions: a. What would be an acceptable rationale at a functional level for a choice of fault tolerance, design margin, or high reliability to protect the safety of spacecraft occupants? b. What is the minimum level of fault tolerance? Is it different for orbital vs. suborbital? c. When is occupant risk high enough to necessitate additional fault tolerance? d. What determines whether fault tolerance is handled at the function level or system level? Interested members of the public may submit relevant written statements for the COMSTAC working group members to consider under the advisory process. Statements may concern the issues and agenda items mentioned above or additional issues that may be relevant for the U.S. commercial space transportation industry. Interested parties wishing to submit written statements should contact Paul Eckert, DFO, (the Contact Person listed below) in writing (mail or email) by November 6, 2012, for the November 13 teleconference, December 11, 2012, for the December 18 teleconference, and January 8, 2013, for the January 15 teleconference. This way the information can be made available to COMSTAC members for their review and consideration before each teleconference. Written statements should be supplied in the following formats: One hard copy with original signature or one electronic copy via email. The FAA may schedule up to 6 more teleconferences in the coming months to allow the U.S. commercial space transportation industry to share views with the FAA on a number of specific topics related to commercial human space flight safety. An agenda will be posted on the FAA Web site at https://www.faa.gov/ go/ast and https://www.faa.gov/about/officeorg/headquartersoffices/ ast/COMSTACworkinggroup/ Individuals who plan to participate and need special assistance should inform the Contact Person listed below in advance of the meeting.

We propose to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Pratt & Whitney Canada Corp. (P&WC) PT6C-67C turboshaft engines. This proposed AD was prompted by five reported incidents of second stage power turbine (PT) disk damage. This proposed AD would require initial and repetitive borescope inspections to verify the presence of a retaining ring securing the PT baffle located near the second stage PT disk. If the engine fails the inspection, this proposed AD would also require removing the engine from service before further flight. We are proposing this AD to prevent damage to the PT disk which, if undetected, could cause uncontained PT disk failure and loss of control of the helicopter.

We propose to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Airbus Model A330-200 Freighter, -200, and -300 series airplanes; and Model A340-200, -300, -500, and -600 series airplanes. This proposed AD was prompted by a report that erroneous height indication by one radio altimeter with engaged flare and retard mode, in case of go-around, might lead to a temporary loss of airplane longitudinal control. This proposed AD would require revising the airplane flight manual. We are proposing this AD to ensure that the flightcrew applies the appropriate operational procedures in the event of an erroneous indication of the radio altimeter, which could result in temporary loss of airplane longitudinal control.

The Department is correcting a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) published in the Federal Register. In that document, the Department proposed, among other modifications, to change the Uniform Report of DBE Commitments/Awards and Payments form found in our regulations. As this is an information collection covered by the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA), the Department should have included a discussion of this collection in the ``Paperwork Reduction Act'' section of the NPRM in order to comply with the PRA's procedural requirements. Today, the Department is correcting this omission by including discussion of the Uniform Report collection and providing the public with 60 days from today to comment both on this collection and all other aspects of the NPRM. Thus, the original end of the comment period, November 5, 2012, has been extended until December 24, 2012.

Mazda North American Operations (MNAO),\1\ on behalf of Mazda Motor Corporation of Hiroshima, Japan (Mazda),\2\ has determined that certain Mazda brand motor vehicles manufactured between 2007 and 2012 for sale or lease in Puerto Rico, do not fully comply with paragraph S4.5 of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 138, Tire Pressure Monitoring Systems. MNAO has filed an appropriate report dated June 21, 2012, pursuant to 49 CFR Part 573, Defect and Noncompliance Responsibility and Reports.

This action amends the airspace description for Class D and Class E airspace at Jack Northrop Field/Hawthorne Municipal Airport, Hawthorne, CA. The FAA is taking this action in response to a request from the Southern California Terminal Radar Approach Control to clarify the legal description of the controlled airspace. Some exclusionary language was omitted and the Class E extension was recorded as 1.5 nautical miles and should have been .5 nautical miles. This action enhances the safety and management of aircraft operations for the Hawthorne, CA, area.

We propose to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Airbus Model A318, A319, and A320 series airplanes. This proposed AD was prompted by fuel system reviews conducted by the manufacturer, which revealed that certain fuel pumps under certain conditions can create an ignition source in the fuel tank. This proposed AD would require modification of the center tank fuel pump control circuit by installation of ground fault interrupters (GFIs). This proposed AD would also require either replacement of the GFI or deactivation of the associated fuel pump following failure of any post-modification operational test of the GFI. We are proposing this AD to prevent the potential of ignition sources inside fuel tanks, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in fuel tank explosions and consequent loss of the airplane.