Airworthiness Directives; Viking Air Limited (Type Certificate Previously Held by Bombardier Inc. and de Havilland, Inc.) Airplanes, 26228-26231 [2025-11327]

Download as PDF 26228 Federal Register / Vol. 90, No. 117 / Friday, June 20, 2025 / Proposed Rules PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES 1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows: ■ Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. § 39.13 [Amended] 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by: a. Removing Airworthiness Directive 2020–24–07, Amendment 39–21337 (20 FR 19121, December 8, 2020); and ■ b. Adding the following new airworthiness directive: ■ ■ Airbus Helicopters: Docket No. FAA–2025– 1108; Project Identifier MCAI–2025– 00428–R. (a) Comments Due Date The FAA must receive comments on this airworthiness directive (AD) by August 4, 2025. (b) Affected ADs This AD replaces AD 2020–24–07, Amendment 39–21337 (20 FR 19121, December 8, 2020). (c) Applicability This AD applies to Airbus Helicopters Model AS350B3, EC130B4, and EC130T2 helicopters, certificated in any category. (d) Subject Joint Aircraft System Component (JASC) Code 7600, Engine Controls. (e) Unsafe Condition This AD was prompted by reports of the of the engine remaining in idle when the throttle twist grip was turned from the ‘‘IDLE’’ mode to the ‘‘FLIGHT’’ mode. The FAA is issuing this AD to correct the failure of one of the microswitches, 53Ka, 53Kb, or 65K which can prevent the pilot from switching from ‘‘IDLE’’ mode to ‘‘FLIGHT’’ mode during autorotation training making it impossible to recover from a practice autorotation and compelling the pilot to continue the autorotation to the ground. This condition could result in unintended touchdown to the ground at a flight-idle power setting during a practice autorotation, damage to the helicopter, and injury to occupants. ddrumheller on DSK120RN23PROD with PROPOSALS1 (f) Compliance Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified, unless already done. (g) Requirements Except as specified in paragraph (h) of this AD: Comply with all required actions and compliance times specified in and in accordance with European Union Aviation Safety Agency AD 2023–0187R1, dated March 20, 2025 (EASA AD 2023–0187R1). (h) Exceptions to EASA AD 2023–0187R1 (1) Where EASA AD 2023–0187R1 refers to its effective date, November 10, 2023 (the effective date of EASA AD 2023–0187, dated October 27, 2023), or July 19, 2023 (the effective date of EASA AD 2023–0133, dated VerDate Sep<11>2014 17:39 Jun 18, 2025 Jkt 265001 July 5, 2023), this AD requires using the effective date of this AD. (2) Where EASA AD 2023–0187R1 refers to April 13, 2017 (the effective date of EASA AD 2017–0059, dated April 6, 2017), this AD requires using January 30, 2019 (the effective date of AD 2018–26–02, Amendment 39– 19532 (83 FR 66093, December 26, 2018)). (3) Where EASA AD 2023–0187R1 refer to flight hours (FH), this AD requires using hours time-in-service. (4) This AD does not adopt paragraphs (1) and (2) of EASA AD 2023–0187R1. (5) Instead of complying with the compliance times in Table 1 in paragraph (3) of EASA AD 2023–0187R1, this AD requires the helicopters identified under the Helicopters in Pre-MOD 074699 Configuration column to accomplish the actions required by paragraph (3) of EASA AD 2023–0187R1 before the next practice autorotation, within 100 hours time-inservice, or 6 months after January 12, 2021 (the effective date of AD 2020–24–07), whichever occurs first. (6) Where Table 2 in paragraph (4), Table 3 in paragraph (7), and Table 4 in paragraph (9) of EASA AD 2023–0187R1 states ‘‘For helicopters which operate or have operated in salt-laden atmospheric conditions,’’ this AD requires replacing that text with ‘‘For helicopters which operate or have operated in salt-laden atmospheric conditions, or if it cannot be determined if a helicopter has been operated in salt-laden atmospheric conditions.’’ (7) Where paragraph (6) of EASA AD 2023– 0187R1 states ‘‘discrepancies are detected,’’ this AD requires replacing that text with ‘‘marks, residue, corrosion, flaky varnish are detected; the values of the insulation test are less than 10 megaOhms; the microswitch closes in the ‘‘IDLE’’ position and does not open as soon as the twist grip is turned to the ‘‘FLIGHT’’ position; or the microswitch is open in the ‘‘FLIGHT’’ position and does not close as soon as the twist grip is turned to the ‘‘IDLE’’ position’’. (8) Where paragraph (9) of EASA AD 2023– 0187R1 states ‘‘any discrepancy,’’ for purposes of this AD, discrepancy is defined as a nut torque that is outside allowable torque limits, or clearance between the support plate assembly and the washers that is not within 01.mm to 0.3 mm. (9) This AD does not adopt the ‘‘Remarks’’ section of EASA AD 2023–0187R1. (i) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs) (1) The Manager, International Validation Branch, FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, send your request to your principal inspector or local Flight Standards District Office, as appropriate. If sending information directly to the manager of the International Validation Branch, send it to the attention of the person identified in paragraph (j) of this AD and email to: AMOC@faa.gov. (2) Before using any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager of the local flight standards district office/ certificate holding district office. PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 4702 Sfmt 4702 (j) Related Information For more information about this AD, contact Zain Jamal, Aviation Safety Engineer, FAA, 1600 Stewart Avenue, Suite 410, Westbury, NY 11590; phone: (847) 294–7264; email: zain.jamal@faa.gov. (k) Material Incorporated by Reference (1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of the material listed in this paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. (2) You must use this material as applicable to do the actions required by this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise. (i) European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD 2023–0187R1, dated March 20, 2025. (ii) [Reserved] (3) For EASA material identified in this AD, contact EASA, Konrad-Adenauer-Ufer 3, 50668 Cologne, Germany; phone: +49 221 8999 000; email: ADs@easa.europa.eu; website: easa.europa.eu. You may find this EASA material on the EASA website at ad.easa.europa.eu. (4) You may view this material at FAA, Office of the Regional Counsel, Southwest Region, 10101 Hillwood Parkway, Room 6N– 321, Fort Worth, TX 76177. For information on the availability of this material at the FAA, call (817) 222 5110. (5) You may view this material at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For information on the availability of this material at NARA, visit www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ ibr-locations or email fr.inspection@nara.gov. Issued on June 16, 2025. Paul R. Bernado, Acting Director, Compliance & Airworthiness Division, Aircraft Certification Service. [FR Doc. 2025–11339 Filed 6–18–25; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4910–13–P DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Federal Aviation Administration 14 CFR Part 39 [Docket No. FAA–2025–1107; Project Identifier MCAI–2024–00784–A] RIN 2120–AA64 Airworthiness Directives; Viking Air Limited (Type Certificate Previously Held by Bombardier Inc. and de Havilland, Inc.) Airplanes Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT. ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM). AGENCY: The FAA proposes to supersede Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2022–23–08, which applies to all Viking Air Limited (Viking) Model DHC–3 airplanes. AD 2022–23–08 requires a visual inspection of the stabilizer actuator to confirm that the stabilizer SUMMARY: E:\FR\FM\20JNP1.SGM 20JNP1 ddrumheller on DSK120RN23PROD with PROPOSALS1 Federal Register / Vol. 90, No. 117 / Friday, June 20, 2025 / Proposed Rules actuator lock ring is present, correctly seated in the groove in the upper housing, and engaged in the clamp nut, applicable corrective actions, application of a torque seal, and sending the inspection results to the FAA. This proposed AD would require repetitively inspecting the stabilizer actuator to confirm that the stabilizer actuator lock ring is present, correctly seated in the groove in the upper housing, and engaged in the clamp nut; taking applicable corrective actions; applying a witness mark (torque seal); and installing a secondary retention feature as terminating action for the repetitive inspections. This proposed AD would also prohibit the installation of any stabilizer actuator unless it is a serviceable part. The FAA is proposing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products. DATES: The FAA must receive comments on this NPRM by August 4, 2025. ADDRESSES: You may send comments, using the procedures found in 14 CFR 11.43 and 11.45, by any of the following methods: • Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to regulations.gov. Follow the instructions for submitting comments. • Fax: (202) 493–2251. • Mail: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M– 30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590. • Hand Delivery: Deliver to Mail address above between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. AD Docket: You may examine the AD docket at regulations.gov under Docket No. FAA–2025–1107; or in person at Docket Operations between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this NPRM, the mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI), any comments received, and other information. The street address for Docket Operations is listed above. Material Incorporated by Reference: • For Transport Canada material identified in this proposed AD, contact Transport Canada, Transport Canada National Aircraft Certification, 159 Cleopatra Drive, Nepean, Ontario, K1A 0N5, Canada; phone: (888) 663–3639; email: TC.AirworthinessDirectivesConsignesdenavigabilite.TC@tc.gc.ca; website: tc.canada.ca/en/aviation. • You may view this material at the FAA, Airworthiness Products Section, Operational Safety Branch, 901 Locust, Kansas City, MO 64106. For information on the availability of this material at the FAA, call (817) 222–5110. VerDate Sep<11>2014 17:39 Jun 18, 2025 Jkt 265001 FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Brenda Buitrago, Aviation Safety Engineer, FAA, 1600 Stewart Avenue, Suite 410, Westbury, NY 11590; phone: (516) 228–7368; email: brenda.l.buitrago.perez@faa.gov. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Comments Invited The FAA invites you to send any written relevant data, views, or arguments about this proposal. Send your comments to an address listed under ADDRESSES. Include ‘‘Docket No. FAA–2025–1107; Project Identifier MCAI–2024–00784–A’’ at the beginning of your comments. The most helpful comments reference a specific portion of the proposal, explain the reason for any recommended change, and include supporting data. The FAA will consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend the proposal because of those comments. Except for Confidential Business Information (CBI) as described in the following paragraph, and other information as described in 14 CFR 11.35, the FAA will post all comments received, without change, to regulations.gov, including any personal information you provide. The agency will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact received about this NPRM. Confidential Business Information CBI is commercial or financial information that is both customarily and actually treated as private by its owner. Under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5 U.S.C. 552), CBI is exempt from public disclosure. If your comments responsive to this NPRM contain commercial or financial information that is customarily treated as private, that you actually treat as private, and that is relevant or responsive to this NPRM, it is important that you clearly designate the submitted comments as CBI. Please mark each page of your submission containing CBI as ‘‘PROPIN.’’ The FAA will treat such marked submissions as confidential under the FOIA, and they will not be placed in the public docket of this NPRM. Submissions containing CBI should be sent to Brenda Buitrago, Aviation Safety Engineer, FAA, 1600 Stewart Avenue, Suite 410, Westbury, NY 11590. Any commentary that the FAA receives which is not specifically designated as CBI will be placed in the public docket for this rulemaking. Background The FAA issued AD 2022–23–08, Amendment 39–22235 (87 FR 66084, November 2, 2022) (AD 2022–23–08), PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 4702 Sfmt 4702 26229 for Viking Model DHC–3 airplanes, all serial numbers, certificated in any category. The FAA issued AD 2022–23– 08 to correct an unsafe condition identified as a missing stabilizer actuator lock ring. AD 2022–23–08 requires a visual inspection of the stabilizer actuator to confirm that the stabilizer actuator lock ring is present, correctly seated in the groove in the upper housing, and engaged in the clamp nut, applicable corrective actions, application of a torque seal, and sending the inspection results to the FAA. The FAA issued AD 2022–23–08 to address the unsafe condition on these products. Actions Since AD 2022–23–08 Was Issued Since the FAA issued AD 2022–23– 08, Transport Canada, which is the aviation authority for Canada, issued Transport Canada AD CF–2024–46, dated December 23, 2024 (Transport Canada AD CF–2024–46) (also referred to as the MCAI). The MCAI states that a fatal DHC–3 airplane accident occurred on September 4, 2022, at Mutiny Bay, near Freeland, WA. Witnesses reported that the airplane was in level flight before it entered a slight climb, then pitched down in a nearvertical descent until it impacted water resulting in fatal injuries to the pilot and the nine passengers. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) carried out the accident investigation and released a final investigation report on September 29, 2023. The NTSB noted in the report that the stabilizer actuator clamp nut on the accident airplane separated from the stabilizer barrel by unthreading and the lock ring securing the clamp nut to the barrel was missing. The NTSB also found an unapproved moisture seal had been installed on the stabilizer actuator, which is not part of the airplane’s type design, leading to increased rotational friction between the clamp nut and eye bolt, which has the potential to increase the rate of separation between the clamp nut and barrel in the absence of the lock ring. To address the unsafe condition, Transport Canada AD CF–2024–46 requires initial and repetitive inspections of the stabilizer actuator to confirm that the stabilizer actuator lock ring is present, correctly seated in the groove in the upper housing, and fully engaged in the clamp nut. Transport Canada AD CF–2024–46 also requires application of a witness mark (torque seal) and prohibits the installation of a stabilizer actuator that has not been inspected in accordance with Transport Canada AD CF–2024–46 or has not been E:\FR\FM\20JNP1.SGM 20JNP1 26230 Federal Register / Vol. 90, No. 117 / Friday, June 20, 2025 / Proposed Rules marked. If the lock ring is missing or incorrectly installed, Transport Canada AD CF–2024–46 requires the rectification of the actuator in accordance with Viking Service Letter DHC3–SL–27–001, dated October 25, 2022, or replacement with a serviceable actuator, and prohibits the installation of affected parts. The FAA is proposing this AD to ensure that the stabilizer actuator clamp nut does not separate from the stabilizer barrel by unthreading and to ensure that the lock ring securing the clamp nut to the stabilizer barrel does not separate. This condition, if not detected and corrected, could result in a reduction or loss of pitch control during flight with consequent loss of control of the airplane. You may examine the MCAI in the AD docket at regulations.gov under Docket No. FAA–2025–1107. Material Incorporated by Reference Under 1 CFR Part 51 The FAA reviewed Transport Canada AD CF–2024–46, which specifies procedures for initial and repetitive inspections of the stabilizer actuator, applicable corrective actions, and torque seal (witness mark) application. Transport Canada AD CF–2024–46 also prohibits the installation of any stabilizer actuator unless it is a serviceable part. This material is reasonably available because the interested parties have access to it through their normal course of business or by the means identified in ADDRESSES. FAA’s Determination These products have been approved by the aviation authority of another country and are approved for operation in the United States. Pursuant to the FAA’s bilateral agreement with this State of Design Authority, it has notified the FAA of the unsafe condition described in the MCAI referenced above. The FAA is issuing this NPRM after determining that the unsafe condition described previously is likely to exist or develop on other products of the same type design. Proposed AD Requirements in This NPRM This proposed AD would retain none of the requirements of AD 2022–23–08. This proposed AD would require accomplishing the actions specified in Canadian AD CF–2024–46 described previously. See ‘‘Differences Between this Proposed AD and the MCAI’’ for a discussion of the general differences included in this proposed AD. Differences Between This Proposed AD and the MCAI Where Part V of Transport Canada AD CF–2024–46 specifies installing a new clamp nut and safety wire on the horizontal stabilizer as an optional terminating action, this proposed AD would require installing a secondary retention feature using a method approved by the FAA within 330 hours time-in-service, after the effective date of this AD. Where Transport Canada AD CF– 2024–46 requires reporting any movement of the lock ring or witness mark to the Transport Canada Web Service Difficulty Reporting System (WSDRS), this proposed AD would not require that action. Explanation of Required Compliance Information In the FAA’s ongoing efforts to improve the efficiency of the AD process, the FAA developed a process to use some Transport Canada ADs as the primary source of information for compliance with requirements for corresponding FAA ADs. The FAA has been coordinating this process with manufacturers and Transport Canada. As a result, the FAA proposes to incorporate Transport Canada AD CF– 2024–46 by reference in the FAA final rule. This proposed AD would, therefore, require compliance with Transport Canada AD CF–2024–46 in its entirety through that incorporation, except for any differences identified as exceptions in the regulatory text of this proposed AD. Material required by Transport Canada AD CF–2024–46 for compliance will be available at regulations.gov under Docket No. FAA– 2025–1107 after the FAA final rule is published. Costs of Compliance The FAA estimates that this AD, if adopted as proposed, would affect 64 airplanes of U.S. registry. The FAA estimates the following costs to comply with this proposed AD: ESTIMATED COSTS Action Labor cost Inspect lock ring ............................. 1 work-hour × $85 per hour = $85 per inspection cycle. 1 work-hour × $85 per hour = $85 ............................. 17 work-hours × $85 per hour = $1445 ..................... Apply witness mark (torque seal) .. Install secondary retention feature The FAA estimates the following costs to do any necessary actions that would be required based on the results Parts cost of the proposed inspection. The agency has no way of determining the number $0 0 795 Cost per product Cost on U.S. operators $85 per inspection cycle. $85 ..................... $2,240 ................ $5,440 per inspection cycle. $5,440. $143,360. of airplanes that might need these actions: ddrumheller on DSK120RN23PROD with PROPOSALS1 ON-CONDITION COSTS Action Labor cost Install lock ring if missing or incorrectly installed ....... 15 work-hours × $85 per hour = $1,275 .................... Authority for This Rulemaking Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA’s authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the authority of VerDate Sep<11>2014 17:39 Jun 18, 2025 Jkt 265001 the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the Agency’s authority. PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 4702 Sfmt 4702 Parts cost $50 Cost per product $1,325 The FAA is issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General requirements. Under that section, Congress charges the FAA E:\FR\FM\20JNP1.SGM 20JNP1 Federal Register / Vol. 90, No. 117 / Friday, June 20, 2025 / Proposed Rules with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action. Regulatory Findings (c) Applicability This AD applies to Viking Air Limited (Viking) (type certificate previously held by Bombardier Inc. and de Havilland, Inc.) Model DHC–3 airplanes, certificated in any category, as identified in Transport Canada AD CF–2024–46, dated December 23, 2024 (Transport Canada AD CF–2024–46). The FAA determined that this proposed AD would not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This proposed AD would not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. For the reasons discussed above, I certify that the proposed regulation: (1) Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory action’’ under Executive Order 12866, (2) Would not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska, and (3) Would not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act. (d) Subject Joint Aircraft System Component (JASC) Code 5520, Elevator Structure. List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 (g) Required Actions Except as specified in paragraph (h) of this AD: Comply with all required actions and compliance times specified in, and in accordance with, Transport Canada AD CF– 2024–46. Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by reference, Safety. The Proposed Amendment Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part 39 as follows: PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES 1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows: ■ Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. § 39.13 [Amended] 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by: a. Removing Airworthiness Directive 2022–23–08, Amendment 39–22235 (87 FR 66084, November 2, 2022); and ■ b. Adding the following new airworthiness directive: ■ ■ ddrumheller on DSK120RN23PROD with PROPOSALS1 (b) Affected ADs This AD replaces AD 2022–23–08, Amendment 39–22235 (87 FR 66084, November 2, 2022) (AD 2022–23–08). Viking Air Limited (type certificate previously held by Bombardier Inc. and de Havilland, Inc.): Docket No. FAA– 2025–1107; Project Identifier MCAI– 2024–00784–A. (a) Comments Due Date The FAA must receive comments on this airworthiness directive (AD) by August 4, 2025. VerDate Sep<11>2014 17:39 Jun 18, 2025 Jkt 265001 (e) Unsafe Condition This AD was prompted by an investigation of a Viking Model DHC–3 airplane where the lock ring of the stabilizer actuator was found to be missing. The FAA is issuing this AD to ensure that the stabilizer actuator clamp nut does not separate from the stabilizer barrel by unthreading and to ensure that the lock ring securing the clamp nut to the stabilizer barrel does not separate. This condition, if not detected and corrected, could result in a reduction or loss of pitch control during flight with consequent loss of control of the airplane. (f) Compliance Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified, unless already done. (h) Exceptions to Transport Canada AD CF– 2024–46 (1) Where Transport Canada AD CF–2024– 46 refers to its effective date, this AD requires using the effective date of this AD. (2) Where Transport Canada AD CF–2022– 68 requires compliance in terms of hours air time, this AD requires using hours time-inservice (TIS). (3) Where Part V of Transport Canada AD CF–2024–46 specifies installing a new clamp nut and safety wire on the horizontal stabilizer as an optional terminating action using FAA Supplemental Type Certificate SA02761SE, this AD requires installing a secondary retention feature using a method approved by the FAA within 330 hours timein-service after the effective date of this AD. (4) Where Transport Canada AD CF–2024– 46 requires reporting any movement of the lock ring or witness mark to the Transport Canada Web Service Difficulty Reporting System (WSDRS), this AD does not require that action. request to your principal inspector or local Flight Standards District Office, as appropriate. If sending information directly to the manager of the International Validation Branch, mail it to the address identified in paragraph (j) of this AD and email to: AMOC@faa.gov. Before using any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager of the local flight standards district office/certificate holding district office. (j) Additional Information For more information about this AD, contact Brenda Buitrago, Aviation Safety Engineer, FAA, 1600 Stewart Avenue, Suite 410, Westbury, NY 11590; phone: (516) 228– 7368; email: brenda.l.buitrago.perez@faa.gov. (k) Material Incorporated by Reference (1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference (IBR) of the material listed in this paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552 (a) and 1 CFR part 51. (2) You must use this material as applicable to do the actions required by this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise. (i) Transport Canada AD CF–2024–46, dated December 23, 2024. (ii) [Reserved] (3) For Transport Canada material identified in this AD, contact Transport Canada, Transport Canada National Aircraft Certification, 159 Cleopatra Drive, Nepean, Ontario, K1A 0N5, Canada; phone: (888) 663–3639; email: TC.AirworthinessDirectivesConsignesdenavigabilite.TC@tc.gc.ca; website: tc.canada.ca/en/aviation. (4) You may view this material at FAA, Airworthiness Products Section, Operational Safety Branch, 901 Locust, Kansas City, MO 64106. For information on the availability of this material at the FAA, call (817) 222–5110. (5) You may view this material at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For information on the availability of this material at NARA, visit www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ ibr-locations or email fr.inspection@nara.gov. Issued on June 16, 2025. Steven W. Thompson, Acting Deputy Director, Compliance & Airworthiness Division, Aircraft Certification Service. [FR Doc. 2025–11327 Filed 6–18–25; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4910–13–P (i) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs) The Manager, International Validation Branch, FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, send your PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 4702 Sfmt 9990 26231 E:\FR\FM\20JNP1.SGM 20JNP1

Agencies

[Federal Register Volume 90, Number 117 (Friday, June 20, 2025)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 26228-26231]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2025-11327]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2025-1107; Project Identifier MCAI-2024-00784-A]
RIN 2120-AA64


Airworthiness Directives; Viking Air Limited (Type Certificate 
Previously Held by Bombardier Inc. and de Havilland, Inc.) Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The FAA proposes to supersede Airworthiness Directive (AD) 
2022-23-08, which applies to all Viking Air Limited (Viking) Model DHC-
3 airplanes. AD 2022-23-08 requires a visual inspection of the 
stabilizer actuator to confirm that the stabilizer

[[Page 26229]]

actuator lock ring is present, correctly seated in the groove in the 
upper housing, and engaged in the clamp nut, applicable corrective 
actions, application of a torque seal, and sending the inspection 
results to the FAA. This proposed AD would require repetitively 
inspecting the stabilizer actuator to confirm that the stabilizer 
actuator lock ring is present, correctly seated in the groove in the 
upper housing, and engaged in the clamp nut; taking applicable 
corrective actions; applying a witness mark (torque seal); and 
installing a secondary retention feature as terminating action for the 
repetitive inspections. This proposed AD would also prohibit the 
installation of any stabilizer actuator unless it is a serviceable 
part. The FAA is proposing this AD to address the unsafe condition on 
these products.

DATES: The FAA must receive comments on this NPRM by August 4, 2025.

ADDRESSES: You may send comments, using the procedures found in 14 CFR 
11.43 and 11.45, by any of the following methods:
     Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to regulations.gov. Follow 
the instructions for submitting comments.
     Fax: (202) 493-2251.
     Mail: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket 
Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New 
Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590.
     Hand Delivery: Deliver to Mail address above between 9 
a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
    AD Docket: You may examine the AD docket at regulations.gov under 
Docket No. FAA-2025-1107; or in person at Docket Operations between 9 
a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD 
docket contains this NPRM, the mandatory continuing airworthiness 
information (MCAI), any comments received, and other information. The 
street address for Docket Operations is listed above.
    Material Incorporated by Reference:
     For Transport Canada material identified in this proposed 
AD, contact Transport Canada, Transport Canada National Aircraft 
Certification, 159 Cleopatra Drive, Nepean, Ontario, K1A 0N5, Canada; 
phone: (888) 663-3639; email: [email protected]; website: tc.canada.ca/en/aviation.
     You may view this material at the FAA, Airworthiness 
Products Section, Operational Safety Branch, 901 Locust, Kansas City, 
MO 64106. For information on the availability of this material at the 
FAA, call (817) 222-5110.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Brenda Buitrago, Aviation Safety 
Engineer, FAA, 1600 Stewart Avenue, Suite 410, Westbury, NY 11590; 
phone: (516) 228-7368; email: [email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

    The FAA invites you to send any written relevant data, views, or 
arguments about this proposal. Send your comments to an address listed 
under ADDRESSES. Include ``Docket No. FAA-2025-1107; Project Identifier 
MCAI-2024-00784-A'' at the beginning of your comments. The most helpful 
comments reference a specific portion of the proposal, explain the 
reason for any recommended change, and include supporting data. The FAA 
will consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend 
the proposal because of those comments.
    Except for Confidential Business Information (CBI) as described in 
the following paragraph, and other information as described in 14 CFR 
11.35, the FAA will post all comments received, without change, to 
regulations.gov, including any personal information you provide. The 
agency will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal 
contact received about this NPRM.

Confidential Business Information

    CBI is commercial or financial information that is both customarily 
and actually treated as private by its owner. Under the Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA) (5 U.S.C. 552), CBI is exempt from public 
disclosure. If your comments responsive to this NPRM contain commercial 
or financial information that is customarily treated as private, that 
you actually treat as private, and that is relevant or responsive to 
this NPRM, it is important that you clearly designate the submitted 
comments as CBI. Please mark each page of your submission containing 
CBI as ``PROPIN.'' The FAA will treat such marked submissions as 
confidential under the FOIA, and they will not be placed in the public 
docket of this NPRM. Submissions containing CBI should be sent to 
Brenda Buitrago, Aviation Safety Engineer, FAA, 1600 Stewart Avenue, 
Suite 410, Westbury, NY 11590. Any commentary that the FAA receives 
which is not specifically designated as CBI will be placed in the 
public docket for this rulemaking.

Background

    The FAA issued AD 2022-23-08, Amendment 39-22235 (87 FR 66084, 
November 2, 2022) (AD 2022-23-08), for Viking Model DHC-3 airplanes, 
all serial numbers, certificated in any category. The FAA issued AD 
2022-23-08 to correct an unsafe condition identified as a missing 
stabilizer actuator lock ring.
    AD 2022-23-08 requires a visual inspection of the stabilizer 
actuator to confirm that the stabilizer actuator lock ring is present, 
correctly seated in the groove in the upper housing, and engaged in the 
clamp nut, applicable corrective actions, application of a torque seal, 
and sending the inspection results to the FAA. The FAA issued AD 2022-
23-08 to address the unsafe condition on these products.

Actions Since AD 2022-23-08 Was Issued

    Since the FAA issued AD 2022-23-08, Transport Canada, which is the 
aviation authority for Canada, issued Transport Canada AD CF-2024-46, 
dated December 23, 2024 (Transport Canada AD CF-2024-46) (also referred 
to as the MCAI). The MCAI states that a fatal DHC-3 airplane accident 
occurred on September 4, 2022, at Mutiny Bay, near Freeland, WA. 
Witnesses reported that the airplane was in level flight before it 
entered a slight climb, then pitched down in a near-vertical descent 
until it impacted water resulting in fatal injuries to the pilot and 
the nine passengers.
    The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) carried out the 
accident investigation and released a final investigation report on 
September 29, 2023. The NTSB noted in the report that the stabilizer 
actuator clamp nut on the accident airplane separated from the 
stabilizer barrel by unthreading and the lock ring securing the clamp 
nut to the barrel was missing. The NTSB also found an unapproved 
moisture seal had been installed on the stabilizer actuator, which is 
not part of the airplane's type design, leading to increased rotational 
friction between the clamp nut and eye bolt, which has the potential to 
increase the rate of separation between the clamp nut and barrel in the 
absence of the lock ring.
    To address the unsafe condition, Transport Canada AD CF-2024-46 
requires initial and repetitive inspections of the stabilizer actuator 
to confirm that the stabilizer actuator lock ring is present, correctly 
seated in the groove in the upper housing, and fully engaged in the 
clamp nut. Transport Canada AD CF-2024-46 also requires application of 
a witness mark (torque seal) and prohibits the installation of a 
stabilizer actuator that has not been inspected in accordance with 
Transport Canada AD CF-2024-46 or has not been

[[Page 26230]]

marked. If the lock ring is missing or incorrectly installed, Transport 
Canada AD CF-2024-46 requires the rectification of the actuator in 
accordance with Viking Service Letter DHC3-SL-27-001, dated October 25, 
2022, or replacement with a serviceable actuator, and prohibits the 
installation of affected parts.
    The FAA is proposing this AD to ensure that the stabilizer actuator 
clamp nut does not separate from the stabilizer barrel by unthreading 
and to ensure that the lock ring securing the clamp nut to the 
stabilizer barrel does not separate. This condition, if not detected 
and corrected, could result in a reduction or loss of pitch control 
during flight with consequent loss of control of the airplane.
    You may examine the MCAI in the AD docket at regulations.gov under 
Docket No. FAA-2025-1107.

Material Incorporated by Reference Under 1 CFR Part 51

    The FAA reviewed Transport Canada AD CF-2024-46, which specifies 
procedures for initial and repetitive inspections of the stabilizer 
actuator, applicable corrective actions, and torque seal (witness mark) 
application. Transport Canada AD CF-2024-46 also prohibits the 
installation of any stabilizer actuator unless it is a serviceable 
part.
    This material is reasonably available because the interested 
parties have access to it through their normal course of business or by 
the means identified in ADDRESSES.

FAA's Determination

    These products have been approved by the aviation authority of 
another country and are approved for operation in the United States. 
Pursuant to the FAA's bilateral agreement with this State of Design 
Authority, it has notified the FAA of the unsafe condition described in 
the MCAI referenced above. The FAA is issuing this NPRM after 
determining that the unsafe condition described previously is likely to 
exist or develop on other products of the same type design.

Proposed AD Requirements in This NPRM

    This proposed AD would retain none of the requirements of AD 2022-
23-08. This proposed AD would require accomplishing the actions 
specified in Canadian AD CF-2024-46 described previously. See 
``Differences Between this Proposed AD and the MCAI'' for a discussion 
of the general differences included in this proposed AD.

Differences Between This Proposed AD and the MCAI

    Where Part V of Transport Canada AD CF-2024-46 specifies installing 
a new clamp nut and safety wire on the horizontal stabilizer as an 
optional terminating action, this proposed AD would require installing 
a secondary retention feature using a method approved by the FAA within 
330 hours time-in-service, after the effective date of this AD.
    Where Transport Canada AD CF-2024-46 requires reporting any 
movement of the lock ring or witness mark to the Transport Canada Web 
Service Difficulty Reporting System (WSDRS), this proposed AD would not 
require that action.

Explanation of Required Compliance Information

    In the FAA's ongoing efforts to improve the efficiency of the AD 
process, the FAA developed a process to use some Transport Canada ADs 
as the primary source of information for compliance with requirements 
for corresponding FAA ADs. The FAA has been coordinating this process 
with manufacturers and Transport Canada. As a result, the FAA proposes 
to incorporate Transport Canada AD CF-2024-46 by reference in the FAA 
final rule. This proposed AD would, therefore, require compliance with 
Transport Canada AD CF-2024-46 in its entirety through that 
incorporation, except for any differences identified as exceptions in 
the regulatory text of this proposed AD. Material required by Transport 
Canada AD CF-2024-46 for compliance will be available at 
regulations.gov under Docket No. FAA-2025-1107 after the FAA final rule 
is published.

Costs of Compliance

    The FAA estimates that this AD, if adopted as proposed, would 
affect 64 airplanes of U.S. registry.
    The FAA estimates the following costs to comply with this proposed 
AD:

                                                 Estimated Costs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                Cost on U.S.
              Action                    Labor cost        Parts cost    Cost per product          operators
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Inspect lock ring................  1 work-hour x $85              $0  $85 per inspection    $5,440 per
                                    per hour = $85 per                 cycle.                inspection cycle.
                                    inspection cycle.
Apply witness mark (torque seal).  1 work-hour x $85               0  $85.................  $5,440.
                                    per hour = $85.
Install secondary retention        17 work-hours x $85           795  $2,240..............  $143,360.
 feature.                           per hour = $1445.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The FAA estimates the following costs to do any necessary actions 
that would be required based on the results of the proposed inspection. 
The agency has no way of determining the number of airplanes that might 
need these actions:

                                               On-Condition Costs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                    Action                                Labor cost              Parts cost   Cost per product
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Install lock ring if missing or incorrectly    15 work-hours x $85 per hour =            $50              $1,325
 installed.                                     $1,275.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Authority for This Rulemaking

    Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to 
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the 
authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, Aviation Programs, 
describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.
    The FAA is issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in 
Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General requirements. 
Under that section, Congress charges the FAA

[[Page 26231]]

with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by 
prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the 
Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This 
regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses 
an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products 
identified in this rulemaking action.

Regulatory Findings

    The FAA determined that this proposed AD would not have federalism 
implications under Executive Order 13132. This proposed AD would not 
have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship 
between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution 
of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.
    For the reasons discussed above, I certify that the proposed 
regulation:
    (1) Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive 
Order 12866,
    (2) Would not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska, and
    (3) Would not have a significant economic impact, positive or 
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria 
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

    Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by 
reference, Safety.

The Proposed Amendment

    Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the 
Administrator, the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.


Sec.  39.13  [Amended]

0
2. The FAA amends Sec.  39.13 by:
0
a. Removing Airworthiness Directive 2022-23-08, Amendment 39-22235 (87 
FR 66084, November 2, 2022); and
0
b. Adding the following new airworthiness directive:

Viking Air Limited (type certificate previously held by Bombardier 
Inc. and de Havilland, Inc.): Docket No. FAA-2025-1107; Project 
Identifier MCAI-2024-00784-A.

(a) Comments Due Date

    The FAA must receive comments on this airworthiness directive 
(AD) by August 4, 2025.

(b) Affected ADs

    This AD replaces AD 2022-23-08, Amendment 39-22235 (87 FR 66084, 
November 2, 2022) (AD 2022-23-08).

(c) Applicability

    This AD applies to Viking Air Limited (Viking) (type certificate 
previously held by Bombardier Inc. and de Havilland, Inc.) Model 
DHC-3 airplanes, certificated in any category, as identified in 
Transport Canada AD CF-2024-46, dated December 23, 2024 (Transport 
Canada AD CF-2024-46).

(d) Subject

    Joint Aircraft System Component (JASC) Code 5520, Elevator 
Structure.

(e) Unsafe Condition

    This AD was prompted by an investigation of a Viking Model DHC-3 
airplane where the lock ring of the stabilizer actuator was found to 
be missing. The FAA is issuing this AD to ensure that the stabilizer 
actuator clamp nut does not separate from the stabilizer barrel by 
unthreading and to ensure that the lock ring securing the clamp nut 
to the stabilizer barrel does not separate. This condition, if not 
detected and corrected, could result in a reduction or loss of pitch 
control during flight with consequent loss of control of the 
airplane.

(f) Compliance

    Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified, 
unless already done.

(g) Required Actions

    Except as specified in paragraph (h) of this AD: Comply with all 
required actions and compliance times specified in, and in 
accordance with, Transport Canada AD CF-2024-46.

(h) Exceptions to Transport Canada AD CF-2024-46

    (1) Where Transport Canada AD CF-2024-46 refers to its effective 
date, this AD requires using the effective date of this AD.
    (2) Where Transport Canada AD CF-2022-68 requires compliance in 
terms of hours air time, this AD requires using hours time-in-
service (TIS).
    (3) Where Part V of Transport Canada AD CF-2024-46 specifies 
installing a new clamp nut and safety wire on the horizontal 
stabilizer as an optional terminating action using FAA Supplemental 
Type Certificate SA02761SE, this AD requires installing a secondary 
retention feature using a method approved by the FAA within 330 
hours time-in-service after the effective date of this AD.
    (4) Where Transport Canada AD CF-2024-46 requires reporting any 
movement of the lock ring or witness mark to the Transport Canada 
Web Service Difficulty Reporting System (WSDRS), this AD does not 
require that action.

(i) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)

    The Manager, International Validation Branch, FAA, has the 
authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the 
procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, 
send your request to your principal inspector or local Flight 
Standards District Office, as appropriate. If sending information 
directly to the manager of the International Validation Branch, mail 
it to the address identified in paragraph (j) of this AD and email 
to: [email protected]. Before using any approved AMOC, notify your 
appropriate principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, 
the manager of the local flight standards district office/
certificate holding district office.

(j) Additional Information

    For more information about this AD, contact Brenda Buitrago, 
Aviation Safety Engineer, FAA, 1600 Stewart Avenue, Suite 410, 
Westbury, NY 11590; phone: (516) 228-7368; email: 
[email protected].

(k) Material Incorporated by Reference

    (1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the 
incorporation by reference (IBR) of the material listed in this 
paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552 (a) and 1 CFR part 51.
    (2) You must use this material as applicable to do the actions 
required by this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise.
    (i) Transport Canada AD CF-2024-46, dated December 23, 2024.
    (ii) [Reserved]
    (3) For Transport Canada material identified in this AD, contact 
Transport Canada, Transport Canada National Aircraft Certification, 
159 Cleopatra Drive, Nepean, Ontario, K1A 0N5, Canada; phone: (888) 
663-3639; email: [email protected]; website: tc.canada.ca/en/
aviation.
    (4) You may view this material at FAA, Airworthiness Products 
Section, Operational Safety Branch, 901 Locust, Kansas City, MO 
64106. For information on the availability of this material at the 
FAA, call (817) 222-5110.
    (5) You may view this material at the National Archives and 
Records Administration (NARA). For information on the availability 
of this material at NARA, visit www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations or email [email protected].

    Issued on June 16, 2025.
Steven W. Thompson,
Acting Deputy Director, Compliance & Airworthiness Division, Aircraft 
Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 2025-11327 Filed 6-18-25; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P
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