Restricting the Entry of Foreign Nationals To Protect the United States From Foreign Terrorists and Other National Security and Public Safety Threats, 24497-24505 [2025-10669]
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Federal Register / Vol. 90, No. 110 / Tuesday, June 10, 2025 / Presidential Documents
24497
Presidential Documents
Proclamation 10949 of June 4, 2025
Restricting the Entry of Foreign Nationals To Protect the
United States From Foreign Terrorists and Other National
Security and Public Safety Threats
By the President of the United States of America
A Proclamation
During my first Administration, I restricted the entry of foreign nationals
into the United States, which successfully prevented national security threats
from reaching our borders and which the Supreme Court upheld. In Executive
Order 14161 of January 20, 2025 (Protecting the United States From Foreign
Terrorists and Other National Security and Public Safety Threats), I stated
that it is the policy of the United States to protect its citizens from aliens
who intend to commit terrorist attacks, threaten our national security, espouse
hateful ideology, or otherwise exploit the immigration laws for malevolent
purposes.
I also stated that the United States must be vigilant during the visa-issuance
process to ensure that those aliens approved for admission into the United
States do not intend to harm Americans or our national interests. More
importantly, the United States must identify such aliens before their admission or entry into the United States. The United States must ensure that
admitted aliens and aliens otherwise already present in the United States
do not bear hostile attitudes toward its citizens, culture, government, institutions, or founding principles, and do not advocate for, aid, or support
designated foreign terrorists or other threats to our national security.
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I directed the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Attorney General,
the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of National Intelligence,
to identify countries throughout the world for which vetting and screening
information is so deficient as to warrant a full or partial suspension on
the admission of nationals from those countries pursuant to section 212(f)
of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1182(f). After completing that process, the Secretary of State determined that a number of
countries remain deficient with regards to screening and vetting. Many of
these countries have also taken advantage of the United States in their
exploitation of our visa system and their historic failure to accept back
their removable nationals.
As President, I must act to protect the national security and national interest
of the United States and its people. I remain committed to engaging with
those countries willing to cooperate to improve information-sharing and
identity-management procedures, and to address both terrorism-related and
public-safety risks. Nationals of some countries also pose significant risks
of overstaying their visas in the United States, which increases burdens
on immigration and law enforcement components of the United States, and
often exacerbates other risks related to national security and public safety.
Some of the countries with inadequacies face significant challenges to reform
efforts. Others have made important improvements to their protocols and
procedures, and I commend them for these efforts. But until countries with
identified inadequacies address them, members of my Cabinet have recommended certain conditional restrictions and limitations. I have considered
and largely accepted those recommendations and impose the limitations
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set forth below on the entry into the United States by the classes of foreign
nationals identified in sections 2 and 3 of this proclamation.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, DONALD J. TRUMP, President of the United States
of America, by the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the
laws of the United States of America, including sections 212(f) and 215(a)
of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(f) and 1185(a), and section 301 of title 3, United
States Code, hereby find that, absent the measures set forth in this proclamation, the immigrant and nonimmigrant entry into the United States of persons
described in sections 2 and 3 of this proclamation would be detrimental
to the interests of the United States, and that their entry should be subject
to certain restrictions, limitations, and exceptions. I therefore hereby proclaim
the following:
Section 1. Policy and Purpose. (a) It is the policy of the United States
to protect its citizens from terrorist attacks and other national security or
public-safety threats. Screening and vetting protocols and procedures associated with visa adjudications and other immigration processes play a critical
role in implementing that policy. These protocols enhance our ability to
detect foreign nationals who may commit, aid, or support acts of terrorism,
or otherwise pose a safety threat, and they aid our efforts to prevent such
individuals from entering the United States.
(b) Information-sharing and identity-management protocols and practices
of foreign governments are important for the effectiveness of the screening
and vetting protocols and procedures of the United States. Governments
manage the identity and travel documents of their nationals and residents.
They also control the circumstances under which they provide information
about their nationals to other governments, including information about
known or suspected terrorists and criminal-history information. It is, therefore, the policy of the United States to take all necessary and appropriate
steps to encourage foreign governments to improve their information-sharing
and identity-management protocols and practices and to regularly share
their identity and threat information with the immigration screening and
vetting systems of the United States.
(c) Section 2(b) of Executive Order 14161 directed the Secretary of State,
the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director
of National Intelligence, within 60 days of the date of that order, to jointly
submit to the President, through the Assistant to the President for Homeland
Security, a report identifying countries throughout the world for which
vetting and screening information is so deficient as to warrant a full or
partial suspension on the entry or admission of nationals from those countries
pursuant to section 212(f) of the INA (8 U.S.C. 1182(f)).
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(d) On April 9, 2025, the Secretary of State, with the Assistant to the
President for Homeland Security, presented the report described in subsection
(c) of this section, recommending that entry restrictions and limitations
be placed on foreign nationals of several countries. The report identified
countries for which vetting and screening information is so deficient as
to warrant a full suspension of admissions and countries that warrant a
partial suspension of admission.
(e) In evaluating the recommendations from the Secretary of State and
in determining what restrictions to impose for each country, I consulted
with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General,
the Secretary of Homeland Security, appropriate Assistants to the President,
the Director of National Intelligence, and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. I considered foreign policy, national security, and counterterrorism goals. And I further considered various factors, including each country’s screening and vetting capabilities, information sharing policies, and
country-specific risk factors—including whether each country has a significant terrorist presence within its territory, its visa-overstay rate, and its
cooperation with accepting back its removable nationals.
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I also considered the different risks posed by aliens admitted on immigrant
visas and those admitted on nonimmigrant visas. Persons admitted on immigrant visas become lawful permanent residents of the United States. Such
persons may present national security or public-safety concerns that may
be distinct from those admitted as nonimmigrants. The United States affords
lawful permanent residents more enduring rights than it does to nonimmigrants. Lawful permanent residents are more difficult to remove than
nonimmigrants, even after national security concerns arise, which increases
the costs and aggravates the dangers of errors associated with admitting
such individuals. And although immigrants are generally subject to more
extensive vetting than nonimmigrants, such vetting is far less reliable when
the country from which someone seeks to emigrate maintains inadequate
identity-management or information-sharing policies or otherwise poses risks
to the national security of the United States.
I reviewed these factors and assessed these goals, with a particular focus
on crafting country-specific restrictions. This approach was designed to encourage cooperation with the subject countries in recognition of each country’s unique circumstances. The restrictions and limitations imposed by
this proclamation are, in my judgment, necessary to prevent the entry or
admission of foreign nationals about whom the United States Government
lacks sufficient information to assess the risks they pose to the United
States. The restrictions and limitations imposed by this proclamation are
necessary to garner cooperation from foreign governments, enforce our immigration laws, and advance other important foreign policy, national security,
and counterterrorism objectives.
(f) After reviewing the report described in subsection (d) of this section,
and after accounting for the foreign policy, national security, and counterterrorism objectives of the United States, I have determined to fully restrict
and limit the entry of nationals of the following 12 countries: Afghanistan,
Burma, Chad, Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Haiti, Iran,
Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen. These restrictions distinguish between,
but apply to both, the entry of immigrants and nonimmigrants.
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(g) I have determined to partially restrict and limit the entry of nationals
of the following 7 countries: Burundi, Cuba, Laos, Sierra Leone, Togo,
Turkmenistan, and Venezuela. These restrictions distinguish between, but
apply to both, the entry of immigrants and nonimmigrants.
(h) Sections 2 and 3 of this proclamation describe some of the identitymanagement or information-sharing inadequacies that led me to impose
restrictions. These inadequacies are sufficient to justify my finding that
unrestricted entry of nationals from the named countries would be detrimental to the interests of the United States. Publicly disclosing additional
details on which I relied in making these determinations, however, would
cause serious damage to the national security of the United States, and
many such details are classified.
Sec. 2. Full Suspension of Entry for Nationals of Countries of Identified
Concern. The entry into the United States of nationals of the following
countries is hereby suspended and limited, as follows, subject to the categorical exceptions and case-by-case waivers described in section 5 of this proclamation:
(a) Afghanistan
(i) The Taliban, a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) group,
controls Afghanistan. Afghanistan lacks a competent or cooperative central
authority for issuing passports or civil documents and it does not have
appropriate screening and vetting measures. According to the Fiscal Year
2023 Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Entry/Exit Overstay Report
(‘‘Overstay Report’’), Afghanistan had a business/tourist (B–1/B–2) visa
overstay rate of 9.70 percent and a student (F), vocational (M), and exchange visitor (J) visa overstay rate of 29.30 percent.
(ii) The entry into the United States of nationals of Afghanistan as immigrants and nonimmigrants is hereby fully suspended.
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(b) Burma
(i) According to the Overstay Report, Burma had a B–1/B–2 visa overstay
rate of 27.07 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 42.17
percent. Additionally, Burma has historically not cooperated with the
United States to accept back their removable nationals.
(ii) The entry into the United States of nationals of Burma as immigrants
and nonimmigrants is hereby fully suspended.
(c) Chad
(i) According to the Overstay Report, Chad had a B–1/B–2 visa overstay
rate of 49.54 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 55.64
percent. According to the Fiscal Year 2022 Overstay Report, Chad had
a B–1/B–2 visa overstay rate of 37.12 percent. The high visa overstay
rate for 2022 and 2023 is unacceptable and indicates a blatant disregard
for United States immigration laws.
(ii) The entry into the United States of nationals of Chad as immigrants
and nonimmigrants is hereby fully suspended.
(d) Republic of the Congo
(i) According to the Overstay Report, the Republic of the Congo had
a B–1/B–2 visa overstay rate of 29.63 percent and an F, M, and J visa
overstay rate of 35.14 percent.
(ii) The entry into the United States of nationals of the Republic of
the Congo as immigrants and nonimmigrants is hereby fully suspended.
(e) Equatorial Guinea
(i) According to the Overstay Report, Equatorial Guinea had a B–1/B–
2 visa overstay rate of 21.98 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay
rate of 70.18 percent.
(ii) The entry into the United States of nationals of Equatorial Guinea
as immigrants and nonimmigrants is hereby fully suspended.
(f) Eritrea
(i) The United States questions the competence of the central authority
for issuance of passports or civil documents in Eritrea. Criminal records
are not available to the United States for Eritrean nationals. Eritrea has
historically refused to accept back its removable nationals. According to
the Overstay Report, Eritrea had a B–1/B–2 visa overstay rate of 20.09
percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 55.43 percent.
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(ii) The entry into the United States of nationals of Eritrea as immigrants
and nonimmigrants is hereby fully suspended.
(g) Haiti
(i) According to the Overstay Report, Haiti had a B–1/B–2 visa overstay
rate of 31.38 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 25.05
percent. Additionally, hundreds of thousands of illegal Haitian aliens flooded into the United States during the Biden Administration. This influx
harms American communities by creating acute risks of increased overstay
rates, establishment of criminal networks, and other national security
threats. As is widely known, Haiti lacks a central authority with sufficient
availability and dissemination of law enforcement information necessary
to ensure its nationals do not undermine the national security of the
United States.
(ii) The entry into the United States of nationals of Haiti as immigrants
and nonimmigrants is hereby fully suspended.
(h) Iran
(i) Iran is a state sponsor of terrorism. Iran regularly fails to cooperate
with the United States Government in identifying security risks, is the
source of significant terrorism around the world, and has historically
failed to accept back its removable nationals.
(ii) The entry into the United States of nationals of Iran as immigrants
and nonimmigrants is hereby suspended.
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(i) Libya
(i) There is no competent or cooperative central authority for issuing
passports or civil documents in Libya. The historical terrorist presence
within Libya’s territory amplifies the risks posed by the entry into the
United States of its nationals.
(ii) The entry into the United States of nationals of Libya as immigrants
and nonimmigrants is hereby fully suspended.
(j) Somalia
(i) Somalia lacks a competent or cooperative central authority for issuing
passports or civil documents and it does not have appropriate screening
and vetting measures. Somalia stands apart from other countries in the
degree to which its government lacks command and control of its territory,
which greatly limits the effectiveness of its national capabilities in a
variety of respects. A persistent terrorist threat also emanates from Somalia’s territory. The United States Government has identified Somalia as
a terrorist safe haven. Terrorists use regions of Somalia as safe havens
from which they plan, facilitate, and conduct their operations. Somalia
also remains a destination for individuals attempting to join terrorist groups
that threaten the national security of the United States. The Government
of Somalia struggles to provide governance needed to limit terrorists’
freedom of movement. Additionally, Somalia has historically refused to
accept back its removable nationals.
(ii) The entry into the United States of nationals of Somalia as immigrants
and nonimmigrants is hereby fully suspended.
(k) Sudan
(i) Sudan lacks a competent or cooperative central authority for issuing
passports or civil documents and it does not have appropriate screening
and vetting measures. According to the Overstay Report, Sudan had a
B–1/B–2 visa overstay rate of 26.30 percent and an F, M, and J visa
overstay rate of 28.40 percent.
(ii) The entry into the United States of nationals of Sudan as immigrants
and nonimmigrants is hereby fully suspended.
(l) Yemen
(i) Yemen lacks a competent or cooperative central authority for issuing
passports or civil documents and it does not have appropriate screening
and vetting measures. The government does not have physical control
over its own territory. Since January 20, 2025, Yemen has been the site
of active United States military operations.
(ii) The entry into the United States of nationals of Yemen as immigrants
and nonimmigrants is hereby fully suspended.
Sec. 3. Partial Suspension of Entry for Nationals of Countries of Identified
Concern.
(a) Burundi
(i) According to the Overstay Report, Burundi had a B–1/B–2 visa overstay
rate of 15.35 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 17.52
percent.
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(ii) The entry into the United States of nationals of Burundi as immigrants,
and as nonimmigrants on B–1, B–2, B–1/B–2, F, M, and J visas, is hereby
suspended.
(iii) Consular officers shall reduce the validity for any other nonimmigrant
visa issued to nationals of Burundi to the extent permitted by law.
(b) Cuba
(i) Cuba is a state sponsor of terrorism. The Government of Cuba does
not cooperate or share sufficient law enforcement information with the
United States. Cuba has historically refused to accept back its removable
nationals. According to the Overstay Report, Cuba had a B–1/B–2 visa
overstay rate of 7.69 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of
18.75 percent.
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(ii) The entry into the United States of nationals of Cuba as immigrants,
and as nonimmigrants on B–1, B–2, B–1/B–2, F, M, and J visas, is hereby
suspended.
(iii) Consular officers shall reduce the validity for any other nonimmigrant
visa issued to nationals of Cuba to the extent permitted by law.
(c) Laos
(i) According to the Overstay Report, Laos had a B–1/B–2 visa overstay
rate of 34.77 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 6.49
percent. Laos has historically failed to accept back its removable nationals.
(ii) The entry into the United States of nationals of Laos as immigrants,
and as nonimmigrants on B–1, B–2, B–1/B–2, F, M, and J visas, is hereby
suspended.
(iii) Consular officers shall reduce the validity for any other nonimmigrant
visa issued to nationals of Laos to the extent permitted by law.
(d) Sierra Leone
(i) According to the Overstay Report, Sierra Leone had a B–1/B–2 visa
overstay rate of 15.43 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate
of 35.83 percent. Sierra Leone has historically failed to accept back its
removable nationals.
(ii) The entry into the United States of nationals of Sierra Leone as
immigrants, and as nonimmigrants on B–1, B–2, B–1/B–2, F, M, and
J visas is hereby suspended.
(iii) Consular officers shall reduce the validity for any other nonimmigrant
visa issued to nationals of Sierra Leone to the extent permitted by law.
(e) Togo
(i) According to the Overstay Report, Togo had a B–1/B–2 visa overstay
rate of 19.03 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 35.05
percent.
(ii) The entry into the United States of nationals of Togo as immigrants,
and as nonimmigrants on B–1, B–2, B–1/B–2, F, M, and J visas is hereby
suspended.
(iii) Consular officers shall reduce the validity for any other nonimmigrant
visa issued to nationals of Togo to the extent permitted by law.
(f) Turkmenistan
(i) According to the Overstay Report, Turkmenistan had a B–1/B–2 visa
overstay rate of 15.35 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate
of 21.74 percent.
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(ii) The entry into the United States of nationals of Turkmenistan as
immigrants, and as nonimmigrants on B–1, B–2, B–1/B–2, F, M, and
J visas is hereby suspended.
(iii) Consular officers shall reduce the validity for any other nonimmigrant
visa issued to nationals of Turkmenistan to the extent permitted by law.
(g) Venezuela
(i) Venezuela lacks a competent or cooperative central authority for issuing
passports or civil documents and it does not have appropriate screening
and vetting measures. Venezuela has historically refused to accept back
its removable nationals. According to the Overstay Report, Venezuela had
a B–1/B–2 visa overstay rate of 9.83 percent.
(ii) The entry into the United States of nationals of Venezuela as immigrants, and as nonimmigrants on B–1, B–2, B–1/B–2, F, M, and J visas
is hereby suspended.
(iii) Consular officers shall reduce the validity for any other nonimmigrant
visa issued to nationals of Venezuela to the extent permitted by law.
Sec. 4. Scope and Implementation of Suspensions and Limitations. (a) Scope.
Subject to the exceptions set forth in subsection (b) of this section and
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any exceptions made pursuant to subsections (c) and (d) of this section,
the suspensions of and limitations on entry pursuant to sections 2 and
3 of this proclamation shall apply only to foreign nationals of the designated
countries who:
(i) are outside the United States on the applicable effective date of this
proclamation; and
(ii) do not have a valid visa on the applicable effective date of this
proclamation.
(b) Exceptions. The suspension of and limitation on entry pursuant to
sections 2 and 3 of this proclamation shall not apply to:
(i) any lawful permanent resident of the United States;
(ii) any dual national of a country designated under sections 2 and 3
of this proclamation when the individual is traveling on a passport issued
by a country not so designated;
(iii) any foreign national traveling with a valid nonimmigrant visa in
the following classifications: A–1, A–2, C–2, C–3, G–1, G–2, G–3, G–
4, NATO–1, NATO–2, NATO–3, NATO–4, NATO–5, or NATO–6;
(iv) any athlete or member of an athletic team, including coaches, persons
performing a necessary support role, and immediate relatives, traveling
for the World Cup, Olympics, or other major sporting event as determined
by the Secretary of State;
(v) immediate family immigrant visas (IR–1/CR–1, IR–2/CR–2, IR–5) with
clear and convincing evidence of identity and family relationship (e.g.,
DNA);
(vi) adoptions (IR–3, IR–4, IH–3, IH–4);
(vii) Afghan Special Immigrant Visas;
(viii) Special Immigrant Visas for United States Government employees;
and
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(ix) immigrant visas for ethnic and religious minorities facing persecution
in Iran.
(c) Exceptions to the suspension of and limitation on entry pursuant
to sections 2 and 3 of this proclamation may be made for certain individuals
for whom the Attorney General finds, in her discretion, that the travel
by the individual would advance a critical United States national interest
involving the Department of Justice, including when individuals must be
present to participate in criminal proceedings as witnesses. These exceptions
shall be made only by the Attorney General, or her designee, in coordination
with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security.
(d) Exceptions to the suspension of and limitation on entry pursuant
to sections 2 and 3 of this proclamation may be made case-by-case for
individuals for whom the Secretary of State finds, in his discretion, that
the travel by the individual would serve a United States national interest.
These exceptions shall be made by only the Secretary of State or his designee,
in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security or her designee.
Sec. 5. Adjustments to and Removal of Suspensions and Limitations. (a)
The Secretary of State shall, in consultation with the Attorney General,
the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director for National Intelligence, devise a process to assess whether any suspensions and limitations
imposed by sections 2 and 3 of this proclamation should be continued,
terminated, modified, or supplemented. Within 90 days of the date of this
proclamation, and every 180 days thereafter, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security,
and the Director of National Intelligence, shall submit a report to the President, through the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security, describing
his assessment and recommending whether any suspensions and limitations
imposed by sections 2 and 3 of this proclamation should be continued,
terminated, modified, or supplemented.
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(b) The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Attorney General,
the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of National Intelligence,
shall immediately engage each of the countries identified in sections 2
and 3 of this proclamation on measures that must be taken to comply
with United States screening, vetting, immigration, and security requirements.
(c) Additionally, and in light of recent events, the Secretary of State,
in consultation with the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of National Intelligence, shall provide me an update
to the review of the practices and procedures of Egypt to confirm the
adequacy of its current screening and vetting capabilities.
Sec. 6. Enforcement. (a) The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland
Security shall consult with appropriate domestic and international partners,
including countries and organizations, to ensure efficient, effective, and
appropriate implementation of this proclamation.
(b) In implementing this proclamation, the Secretary of State and the
Secretary of Homeland Security shall comply with all applicable laws and
regulations.
(c) No immigrant or nonimmigrant visa issued before the applicable effective date of this proclamation shall be revoked pursuant to this proclamation.
(d) This proclamation shall not apply to an individual who has been
granted asylum by the United States, to a refugee who has already been
admitted to the United States, or to an individual granted withholding
of removal or protection under the Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment of Punishment (CAT). Nothing in
this proclamation shall be construed to limit the ability of an individual
to seek asylum, refugee status, withholding of removal, or protection under
the CAT, consistent with the laws of the United States.
Sec. 7. Severability. It is the policy of the United States to enforce this
proclamation to the maximum extent possible to advance the national security, foreign policy, and counterterrorism interests of the United States.
Accordingly:
(a) if any provision of this proclamation, or the application of any provision
of this proclamation to any person or circumstance, is held to be invalid,
the remainder of this proclamation and the application of its other provisions
to any other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby; and
(b) if any provision of this proclamation, or the application of any provision
of this proclamation to any person or circumstance, is held to be invalid
because of the lack of certain procedural requirements, the relevant executive
branch officials shall implement those procedural requirements to conform
with existing law and with any applicable court orders.
Sec. 8. Effective Date. This proclamation is effective at 12:01 a.m. eastern
daylight time on June 9, 2025.
Sec. 9. General Provisions. (a) Nothing in this proclamation shall be construed
to impair or otherwise affect:
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(i) the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency,
or the head thereof; or
(ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget
relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.
(b) This proclamation shall be implemented consistent with applicable
law and subject to the availability of appropriations.
(c) This proclamation is not intended to, and does not, create any right
or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable by law or in equity by
any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities,
its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this fourth day
of June, in the year of our Lord two thousand twenty-five, and of the
Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and fortyninth.
[FR Doc. 2025–10669
Filed 6–9–25; 11:15 am]
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[Federal Register Volume 90, Number 110 (Tuesday, June 10, 2025)]
[Presidential Documents]
[Pages 24497-24505]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2025-10669]
Presidential Documents
Federal Register / Vol. 90 , No. 110 / Tuesday, June 10, 2025 /
Presidential Documents
[[Page 24497]]
Proclamation 10949 of June 4, 2025
Restricting the Entry of Foreign Nationals To
Protect the United States From Foreign Terrorists and
Other National Security and Public Safety Threats
By the President of the United States of America
A Proclamation
During my first Administration, I restricted the entry
of foreign nationals into the United States, which
successfully prevented national security threats from
reaching our borders and which the Supreme Court
upheld. In Executive Order 14161 of January 20, 2025
(Protecting the United States From Foreign Terrorists
and Other National Security and Public Safety Threats),
I stated that it is the policy of the United States to
protect its citizens from aliens who intend to commit
terrorist attacks, threaten our national security,
espouse hateful ideology, or otherwise exploit the
immigration laws for malevolent purposes.
I also stated that the United States must be vigilant
during the visa-issuance process to ensure that those
aliens approved for admission into the United States do
not intend to harm Americans or our national interests.
More importantly, the United States must identify such
aliens before their admission or entry into the United
States. The United States must ensure that admitted
aliens and aliens otherwise already present in the
United States do not bear hostile attitudes toward its
citizens, culture, government, institutions, or
founding principles, and do not advocate for, aid, or
support designated foreign terrorists or other threats
to our national security.
I directed the Secretary of State, in coordination with
the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland
Security, and the Director of National Intelligence, to
identify countries throughout the world for which
vetting and screening information is so deficient as to
warrant a full or partial suspension on the admission
of nationals from those countries pursuant to section
212(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8
U.S.C. 1182(f). After completing that process, the
Secretary of State determined that a number of
countries remain deficient with regards to screening
and vetting. Many of these countries have also taken
advantage of the United States in their exploitation of
our visa system and their historic failure to accept
back their removable nationals.
As President, I must act to protect the national
security and national interest of the United States and
its people. I remain committed to engaging with those
countries willing to cooperate to improve information-
sharing and identity-management procedures, and to
address both terrorism-related and public-safety risks.
Nationals of some countries also pose significant risks
of overstaying their visas in the United States, which
increases burdens on immigration and law enforcement
components of the United States, and often exacerbates
other risks related to national security and public
safety.
Some of the countries with inadequacies face
significant challenges to reform efforts. Others have
made important improvements to their protocols and
procedures, and I commend them for these efforts. But
until countries with identified inadequacies address
them, members of my Cabinet have recommended certain
conditional restrictions and limitations. I have
considered and largely accepted those recommendations
and impose the limitations
[[Page 24498]]
set forth below on the entry into the United States by
the classes of foreign nationals identified in sections
2 and 3 of this proclamation.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, DONALD J. TRUMP, President of the
United States of America, by the authority vested in me
by the Constitution and the laws of the United States
of America, including sections 212(f) and 215(a) of the
INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(f) and 1185(a), and section 301 of
title 3, United States Code, hereby find that, absent
the measures set forth in this proclamation, the
immigrant and nonimmigrant entry into the United States
of persons described in sections 2 and 3 of this
proclamation would be detrimental to the interests of
the United States, and that their entry should be
subject to certain restrictions, limitations, and
exceptions. I therefore hereby proclaim the following:
Section 1. Policy and Purpose. (a) It is the policy of
the United States to protect its citizens from
terrorist attacks and other national security or
public-safety threats. Screening and vetting protocols
and procedures associated with visa adjudications and
other immigration processes play a critical role in
implementing that policy. These protocols enhance our
ability to detect foreign nationals who may commit,
aid, or support acts of terrorism, or otherwise pose a
safety threat, and they aid our efforts to prevent such
individuals from entering the United States.
(b) Information-sharing and identity-management
protocols and practices of foreign governments are
important for the effectiveness of the screening and
vetting protocols and procedures of the United States.
Governments manage the identity and travel documents of
their nationals and residents. They also control the
circumstances under which they provide information
about their nationals to other governments, including
information about known or suspected terrorists and
criminal-history information. It is, therefore, the
policy of the United States to take all necessary and
appropriate steps to encourage foreign governments to
improve their information-sharing and identity-
management protocols and practices and to regularly
share their identity and threat information with the
immigration screening and vetting systems of the United
States.
(c) Section 2(b) of Executive Order 14161 directed
the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, the
Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of
National Intelligence, within 60 days of the date of
that order, to jointly submit to the President, through
the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security, a
report identifying countries throughout the world for
which vetting and screening information is so deficient
as to warrant a full or partial suspension on the entry
or admission of nationals from those countries pursuant
to section 212(f) of the INA (8 U.S.C. 1182(f)).
(d) On April 9, 2025, the Secretary of State, with
the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security,
presented the report described in subsection (c) of
this section, recommending that entry restrictions and
limitations be placed on foreign nationals of several
countries. The report identified countries for which
vetting and screening information is so deficient as to
warrant a full suspension of admissions and countries
that warrant a partial suspension of admission.
(e) In evaluating the recommendations from the
Secretary of State and in determining what restrictions
to impose for each country, I consulted with the
Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the
Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security,
appropriate Assistants to the President, the Director
of National Intelligence, and the Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency. I considered foreign
policy, national security, and counterterrorism goals.
And I further considered various factors, including
each country's screening and vetting capabilities,
information sharing policies, and country-specific risk
factors--including whether each country has a
significant terrorist presence within its territory,
its visa-overstay rate, and its cooperation with
accepting back its removable nationals.
[[Page 24499]]
I also considered the different risks posed by
aliens admitted on immigrant visas and those admitted
on nonimmigrant visas. Persons admitted on immigrant
visas become lawful permanent residents of the United
States. Such persons may present national security or
public-safety concerns that may be distinct from those
admitted as nonimmigrants. The United States affords
lawful permanent residents more enduring rights than it
does to nonimmigrants. Lawful permanent residents are
more difficult to remove than nonimmigrants, even after
national security concerns arise, which increases the
costs and aggravates the dangers of errors associated
with admitting such individuals. And although
immigrants are generally subject to more extensive
vetting than nonimmigrants, such vetting is far less
reliable when the country from which someone seeks to
emigrate maintains inadequate identity-management or
information-sharing policies or otherwise poses risks
to the national security of the United States.
I reviewed these factors and assessed these goals,
with a particular focus on crafting country-specific
restrictions. This approach was designed to encourage
cooperation with the subject countries in recognition
of each country's unique circumstances. The
restrictions and limitations imposed by this
proclamation are, in my judgment, necessary to prevent
the entry or admission of foreign nationals about whom
the United States Government lacks sufficient
information to assess the risks they pose to the United
States. The restrictions and limitations imposed by
this proclamation are necessary to garner cooperation
from foreign governments, enforce our immigration laws,
and advance other important foreign policy, national
security, and counterterrorism objectives.
(f) After reviewing the report described in
subsection (d) of this section, and after accounting
for the foreign policy, national security, and
counterterrorism objectives of the United States, I
have determined to fully restrict and limit the entry
of nationals of the following 12 countries:
Afghanistan, Burma, Chad, Republic of the Congo,
Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Haiti, Iran, Libya,
Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen. These restrictions
distinguish between, but apply to both, the entry of
immigrants and nonimmigrants.
(g) I have determined to partially restrict and
limit the entry of nationals of the following 7
countries: Burundi, Cuba, Laos, Sierra Leone, Togo,
Turkmenistan, and Venezuela. These restrictions
distinguish between, but apply to both, the entry of
immigrants and nonimmigrants.
(h) Sections 2 and 3 of this proclamation describe
some of the identity-management or information-sharing
inadequacies that led me to impose restrictions. These
inadequacies are sufficient to justify my finding that
unrestricted entry of nationals from the named
countries would be detrimental to the interests of the
United States. Publicly disclosing additional details
on which I relied in making these determinations,
however, would cause serious damage to the national
security of the United States, and many such details
are classified.
Sec. 2. Full Suspension of Entry for Nationals of
Countries of Identified Concern. The entry into the
United States of nationals of the following countries
is hereby suspended and limited, as follows, subject to
the categorical exceptions and case-by-case waivers
described in section 5 of this proclamation:
(a) Afghanistan
(i) The Taliban, a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) group,
controls Afghanistan. Afghanistan lacks a competent or cooperative central
authority for issuing passports or civil documents and it does not have
appropriate screening and vetting measures. According to the Fiscal Year
2023 Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Entry/Exit Overstay Report
(``Overstay Report''), Afghanistan had a business/tourist (B-1/B-2) visa
overstay rate of 9.70 percent and a student (F), vocational (M), and
exchange visitor (J) visa overstay rate of 29.30 percent.
(ii) The entry into the United States of nationals of Afghanistan as
immigrants and nonimmigrants is hereby fully suspended.
[[Page 24500]]
(b) Burma
(i) According to the Overstay Report, Burma had a B-1/B-2 visa overstay
rate of 27.07 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 42.17
percent. Additionally, Burma has historically not cooperated with the
United States to accept back their removable nationals.
(ii) The entry into the United States of nationals of Burma as immigrants
and nonimmigrants is hereby fully suspended.
(c) Chad
(i) According to the Overstay Report, Chad had a B-1/B-2 visa overstay rate
of 49.54 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 55.64 percent.
According to the Fiscal Year 2022 Overstay Report, Chad had a B-1/B-2 visa
overstay rate of 37.12 percent. The high visa overstay rate for 2022 and
2023 is unacceptable and indicates a blatant disregard for United States
immigration laws.
(ii) The entry into the United States of nationals of Chad as immigrants
and nonimmigrants is hereby fully suspended.
(d) Republic of the Congo
(i) According to the Overstay Report, the Republic of the Congo had a B-1/
B-2 visa overstay rate of 29.63 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay
rate of 35.14 percent.
(ii) The entry into the United States of nationals of the Republic of the
Congo as immigrants and nonimmigrants is hereby fully suspended.
(e) Equatorial Guinea
(i) According to the Overstay Report, Equatorial Guinea had a B-1/B-2 visa
overstay rate of 21.98 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of
70.18 percent.
(ii) The entry into the United States of nationals of Equatorial Guinea as
immigrants and nonimmigrants is hereby fully suspended.
(f) Eritrea
(i) The United States questions the competence of the central authority for
issuance of passports or civil documents in Eritrea. Criminal records are
not available to the United States for Eritrean nationals. Eritrea has
historically refused to accept back its removable nationals. According to
the Overstay Report, Eritrea had a B-1/B-2 visa overstay rate of 20.09
percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 55.43 percent.
(ii) The entry into the United States of nationals of Eritrea as immigrants
and nonimmigrants is hereby fully suspended.
(g) Haiti
(i) According to the Overstay Report, Haiti had a B-1/B-2 visa overstay
rate of 31.38 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 25.05
percent. Additionally, hundreds of thousands of illegal Haitian aliens
flooded into the United States during the Biden Administration. This influx
harms American communities by creating acute risks of increased overstay
rates, establishment of criminal networks, and other national security
threats. As is widely known, Haiti lacks a central authority with
sufficient availability and dissemination of law enforcement information
necessary to ensure its nationals do not undermine the national security of
the United States.
(ii) The entry into the United States of nationals of Haiti as immigrants
and nonimmigrants is hereby fully suspended.
(h) Iran
(i) Iran is a state sponsor of terrorism. Iran regularly fails to cooperate
with the United States Government in identifying security risks, is the
source of significant terrorism around the world, and has historically
failed to accept back its removable nationals.
(ii) The entry into the United States of nationals of Iran as immigrants
and nonimmigrants is hereby suspended.
[[Page 24501]]
(i) Libya
(i) There is no competent or cooperative central authority for issuing
passports or civil documents in Libya. The historical terrorist presence
within Libya's territory amplifies the risks posed by the entry into the
United States of its nationals.
(ii) The entry into the United States of nationals of Libya as immigrants
and nonimmigrants is hereby fully suspended.
(j) Somalia
(i) Somalia lacks a competent or cooperative central authority for issuing
passports or civil documents and it does not have appropriate screening and
vetting measures. Somalia stands apart from other countries in the degree
to which its government lacks command and control of its territory, which
greatly limits the effectiveness of its national capabilities in a variety
of respects. A persistent terrorist threat also emanates from Somalia's
territory. The United States Government has identified Somalia as a
terrorist safe haven. Terrorists use regions of Somalia as safe havens from
which they plan, facilitate, and conduct their operations. Somalia also
remains a destination for individuals attempting to join terrorist groups
that threaten the national security of the United States. The Government of
Somalia struggles to provide governance needed to limit terrorists' freedom
of movement. Additionally, Somalia has historically refused to accept back
its removable nationals.
(ii) The entry into the United States of nationals of Somalia as immigrants
and nonimmigrants is hereby fully suspended.
(k) Sudan
(i) Sudan lacks a competent or cooperative central authority for issuing
passports or civil documents and it does not have appropriate screening and
vetting measures. According to the Overstay Report, Sudan had a B-1/B-2
visa overstay rate of 26.30 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate
of 28.40 percent.
(ii) The entry into the United States of nationals of Sudan as immigrants
and nonimmigrants is hereby fully suspended.
(l) Yemen
(i) Yemen lacks a competent or cooperative central authority for issuing
passports or civil documents and it does not have appropriate screening and
vetting measures. The government does not have physical control over its
own territory. Since January 20, 2025, Yemen has been the site of active
United States military operations.
(ii) The entry into the United States of nationals of Yemen as immigrants
and nonimmigrants is hereby fully suspended.
Sec. 3. Partial Suspension of Entry for Nationals of
Countries of Identified Concern.
(a) Burundi
(i) According to the Overstay Report, Burundi had a B-1/B-2 visa overstay
rate of 15.35 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 17.52
percent.
(ii) The entry into the United States of nationals of Burundi as
immigrants, and as nonimmigrants on B-1, B-2, B-1/B-2, F, M, and J visas,
is hereby suspended.
(iii) Consular officers shall reduce the validity for any other
nonimmigrant visa issued to nationals of Burundi to the extent permitted by
law.
(b) Cuba
(i) Cuba is a state sponsor of terrorism. The Government of Cuba does not
cooperate or share sufficient law enforcement information with the United
States. Cuba has historically refused to accept back its removable
nationals. According to the Overstay Report, Cuba had a B-1/B-2 visa
overstay rate of 7.69 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of
18.75 percent.
[[Page 24502]]
(ii) The entry into the United States of nationals of Cuba as immigrants,
and as nonimmigrants on B-1, B-2, B-1/B-2, F, M, and J visas, is hereby
suspended.
(iii) Consular officers shall reduce the validity for any other
nonimmigrant visa issued to nationals of Cuba to the extent permitted by
law.
(c) Laos
(i) According to the Overstay Report, Laos had a B-1/B-2 visa overstay rate
of 34.77 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 6.49 percent.
Laos has historically failed to accept back its removable nationals.
(ii) The entry into the United States of nationals of Laos as immigrants,
and as nonimmigrants on B-1, B-2, B-1/B-2, F, M, and J visas, is hereby
suspended.
(iii) Consular officers shall reduce the validity for any other
nonimmigrant visa issued to nationals of Laos to the extent permitted by
law.
(d) Sierra Leone
(i) According to the Overstay Report, Sierra Leone had a B-1/B-2 visa
overstay rate of 15.43 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of
35.83 percent. Sierra Leone has historically failed to accept back its
removable nationals.
(ii) The entry into the United States of nationals of Sierra Leone as
immigrants, and as nonimmigrants on B-1, B-2, B-1/B-2, F, M, and J visas is
hereby suspended.
(iii) Consular officers shall reduce the validity for any other
nonimmigrant visa issued to nationals of Sierra Leone to the extent
permitted by law.
(e) Togo
(i) According to the Overstay Report, Togo had a B-1/B-2 visa overstay rate
of 19.03 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 35.05 percent.
(ii) The entry into the United States of nationals of Togo as immigrants,
and as nonimmigrants on B-1, B-2, B-1/B-2, F, M, and J visas is hereby
suspended.
(iii) Consular officers shall reduce the validity for any other
nonimmigrant visa issued to nationals of Togo to the extent permitted by
law.
(f) Turkmenistan
(i) According to the Overstay Report, Turkmenistan had a B-1/B-2 visa
overstay rate of 15.35 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of
21.74 percent.
(ii) The entry into the United States of nationals of Turkmenistan as
immigrants, and as nonimmigrants on B-1, B-2, B-1/B-2, F, M, and J visas is
hereby suspended.
(iii) Consular officers shall reduce the validity for any other
nonimmigrant visa issued to nationals of Turkmenistan to the extent
permitted by law.
(g) Venezuela
(i) Venezuela lacks a competent or cooperative central authority for
issuing passports or civil documents and it does not have appropriate
screening and vetting measures. Venezuela has historically refused to
accept back its removable nationals. According to the Overstay Report,
Venezuela had a B-1/B-2 visa overstay rate of 9.83 percent.
(ii) The entry into the United States of nationals of Venezuela as
immigrants, and as nonimmigrants on B-1, B-2, B-1/B-2, F, M, and J visas is
hereby suspended.
(iii) Consular officers shall reduce the validity for any other
nonimmigrant visa issued to nationals of Venezuela to the extent permitted
by law.
Sec. 4. Scope and Implementation of Suspensions and
Limitations. (a) Scope. Subject to the exceptions set
forth in subsection (b) of this section and
[[Page 24503]]
any exceptions made pursuant to subsections (c) and (d)
of this section, the suspensions of and limitations on
entry pursuant to sections 2 and 3 of this proclamation
shall apply only to foreign nationals of the designated
countries who:
(i) are outside the United States on the applicable effective date of this
proclamation; and
(ii) do not have a valid visa on the applicable effective date of this
proclamation.
(b) Exceptions. The suspension of and limitation on
entry pursuant to sections 2 and 3 of this proclamation
shall not apply to:
(i) any lawful permanent resident of the United States;
(ii) any dual national of a country designated under sections 2 and 3 of
this proclamation when the individual is traveling on a passport issued by
a country not so designated;
(iii) any foreign national traveling with a valid nonimmigrant visa in the
following classifications: A-1, A-2, C-2, C-3, G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4, NATO-1,
NATO-2, NATO-3, NATO-4, NATO-5, or NATO-6;
(iv) any athlete or member of an athletic team, including coaches, persons
performing a necessary support role, and immediate relatives, traveling for
the World Cup, Olympics, or other major sporting event as determined by the
Secretary of State;
(v) immediate family immigrant visas (IR-1/CR-1, IR-2/CR-2, IR-5) with
clear and convincing evidence of identity and family relationship (e.g.,
DNA);
(vi) adoptions (IR-3, IR-4, IH-3, IH-4);
(vii) Afghan Special Immigrant Visas;
(viii) Special Immigrant Visas for United States Government employees; and
(ix) immigrant visas for ethnic and religious minorities facing persecution
in Iran.
(c) Exceptions to the suspension of and limitation
on entry pursuant to sections 2 and 3 of this
proclamation may be made for certain individuals for
whom the Attorney General finds, in her discretion,
that the travel by the individual would advance a
critical United States national interest involving the
Department of Justice, including when individuals must
be present to participate in criminal proceedings as
witnesses. These exceptions shall be made only by the
Attorney General, or her designee, in coordination with
the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland
Security.
(d) Exceptions to the suspension of and limitation
on entry pursuant to sections 2 and 3 of this
proclamation may be made case-by-case for individuals
for whom the Secretary of State finds, in his
discretion, that the travel by the individual would
serve a United States national interest. These
exceptions shall be made by only the Secretary of State
or his designee, in coordination with the Secretary of
Homeland Security or her designee.
Sec. 5. Adjustments to and Removal of Suspensions and
Limitations. (a) The Secretary of State shall, in
consultation with the Attorney General, the Secretary
of Homeland Security, and the Director for National
Intelligence, devise a process to assess whether any
suspensions and limitations imposed by sections 2 and 3
of this proclamation should be continued, terminated,
modified, or supplemented. Within 90 days of the date
of this proclamation, and every 180 days thereafter,
the Secretary of State, in consultation with the
Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security,
and the Director of National Intelligence, shall submit
a report to the President, through the Assistant to the
President for Homeland Security, describing his
assessment and recommending whether any suspensions and
limitations imposed by sections 2 and 3 of this
proclamation should be continued, terminated, modified,
or supplemented.
[[Page 24504]]
(b) The Secretary of State, in consultation with
the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland
Security, and the Director of National Intelligence,
shall immediately engage each of the countries
identified in sections 2 and 3 of this proclamation on
measures that must be taken to comply with United
States screening, vetting, immigration, and security
requirements.
(c) Additionally, and in light of recent events,
the Secretary of State, in consultation with the
Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security,
and the Director of National Intelligence, shall
provide me an update to the review of the practices and
procedures of Egypt to confirm the adequacy of its
current screening and vetting capabilities.
Sec. 6. Enforcement. (a) The Secretary of State and the
Secretary of Homeland Security shall consult with
appropriate domestic and international partners,
including countries and organizations, to ensure
efficient, effective, and appropriate implementation of
this proclamation.
(b) In implementing this proclamation, the
Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland
Security shall comply with all applicable laws and
regulations.
(c) No immigrant or nonimmigrant visa issued before
the applicable effective date of this proclamation
shall be revoked pursuant to this proclamation.
(d) This proclamation shall not apply to an
individual who has been granted asylum by the United
States, to a refugee who has already been admitted to
the United States, or to an individual granted
withholding of removal or protection under the
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment of Punishment (CAT). Nothing in
this proclamation shall be construed to limit the
ability of an individual to seek asylum, refugee
status, withholding of removal, or protection under the
CAT, consistent with the laws of the United States.
Sec. 7. Severability. It is the policy of the United
States to enforce this proclamation to the maximum
extent possible to advance the national security,
foreign policy, and counterterrorism interests of the
United States. Accordingly:
(a) if any provision of this proclamation, or the
application of any provision of this proclamation to
any person or circumstance, is held to be invalid, the
remainder of this proclamation and the application of
its other provisions to any other persons or
circumstances shall not be affected thereby; and
(b) if any provision of this proclamation, or the
application of any provision of this proclamation to
any person or circumstance, is held to be invalid
because of the lack of certain procedural requirements,
the relevant executive branch officials shall implement
those procedural requirements to conform with existing
law and with any applicable court orders.
Sec. 8. Effective Date. This proclamation is effective
at 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time on June 9, 2025.
Sec. 9. General Provisions. (a) Nothing in this
proclamation shall be construed to impair or otherwise
affect:
(i) the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or
the head thereof; or
(ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget
relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.
(b) This proclamation shall be implemented
consistent with applicable law and subject to the
availability of appropriations.
(c) This proclamation is not intended to, and does
not, create any right or benefit, substantive or
procedural, enforceable by law or in equity by any
party against the United States, its departments,
agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or
agents, or any other person.
[[Page 24505]]
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this
fourth day of June, in the year of our Lord two
thousand twenty-five, and of the Independence of the
United States of America the two hundred and forty-
ninth.
(Presidential Sig.)
[FR Doc. 2025-10669
Filed 6-9-25; 11:15 am]
Billing code 3395-F4-P