Pipeline Safety: Pipeline Safety Management System, 13658-13661 [2025-04960]
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13658
Federal Register / Vol. 90, No. 56 / Tuesday, March 25, 2025 / Notices
Respondent
universe
CFR Section/subject
214.517 Retrofitting of existing on-track roadway maintenance machines manufactured on or after January
1, 1991:
—(c) Stenciling the light weight on the machine ......
214.523 Hi-rail vehicles:
—(b) Records of compliance ....................................
—(d)(2) Non-complying conditions—Tagging and
reporting.
214.527 On-track roadway maintenance machines; inspection for compliance and schedule for repairs:
—(b) Inspection for compliance—tagging and reporting non-complying condition.
214.533 Schedule of repairs subject to availability of
parts:
—(d) Records of compliance ....................................
Totals 2 ...............................................................
Total
annual
responses
Average time
per response
Total annual
burden hours
(A)
(B)
(C) = A * B
Wage
rate
Total cost
equivalent
wage rate 1
(D) = C *
800 railroads, 200
contractors.
500
5 minutes .................
41.67
69.79
2,908.15
800 railroads, 200
contractors.
800 railroads, 200
contractors.
5,000
5 minutes .................
416.67
89.13
37,137.80
500
10 minutes ...............
83.33
89.13
7,427.21
800 railroads, 200
contractors.
550
20 minutes ...............
183.33
69.79
12,794.60
800 railroads, 200
contractors.
250
15 minutes ...............
62.50
89.13
5,570.63
800 railroads, 200
contractors.
290,698
N/A ..........................
13,604
N/A
966,583
1 The dollar equivalent cost is derived from the 2023 Surface Transportation Board Full Year Wage A&B data series using the employee group 200 (Professional &
Administrative) hourly wage rate of 50.93 and group 300 (Maintenance of Way & Structures) hourly wage rate of 39.88. The total burden wage rates (Straight time
plus 75%) used in the table are 89.13 (50.93 × 1.75 = 89.13), and 69.79 (39.88 × 1.75).
2 Totals may not add up due to rounding.
Total Estimated Annual Responses:
290,698.
Total Estimated Annual Burden:
13,604 hours.
Total Estimated Annual Dollar Cost
Equivalent: 966,583.
FRA informs all interested parties that
it may not conduct or sponsor, and a
respondent is not required to respond
to, a collection of information that does
not display a currently valid OMB
control number.
Authority: 44 U.S.C. 3501–3520.
Christopher S. Van Nostrand,
Deputy Chief Counsel.
[FR Doc. 2025–04992 Filed 3–24–25; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–06–P
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials
Safety Administration
[Docket No. PHMSA–2025–0018]
Pipeline Safety: Pipeline Safety
Management System
Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration
(PHMSA), Department of
Transportation.
ACTION: Notice; issuance of advisory
bulletin.
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AGENCY:
PHMSA is issuing this
advisory bulletin to promote the
implementation of a pipeline safety
management system (PSMS) by
regulated pipeline owners and
operators.
SUMMARY:
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FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Joseph Yoon by phone at 202–819–1547
or by email at joseph.yoon@dot.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: PSMS
provides a proactive and systematic
approach to risk management of
complex processes across the pipeline
organization to operate safely and to
improve safety performance. PSMS also
provides a scalable framework for
pipeline operators of varying size,
scope, and level of PSMS
implementation maturity. PHMSA
encourages pipeline operators to
develop and to implement PSMS
programs, using a framework such as
the one detailed in American Petroleum
Institute (API) Recommended Practice
(RP) 1173: Pipeline Safety Management
Systems (API RP 1173). The framework
should define the elements for
identifying, managing, and reducing
risks throughout the pipeline life cycle.
Issuance of this advisory bulletin is
consistent with section 205 of the
Protecting our Infrastructure of
Pipelines and Enhancing Safety (PIPES)
Act of 2020 (Pub. L. 116–260),1 which
directs the Secretary of Transportation
(Secretary) to ‘‘promote’’ the
implementation of pipeline safety
management systems by pipeline
operators. It also addresses the National
Transportation Safety Board’s (NTSB)
Safety Recommendation P–24–002.
I. Background
A safety management system (SMS) is
an organization-wide approach to
managing safety risk through systematic
1 See
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procedures, practices, and policies. The
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
defines SMS as a ‘‘formal, top-down,
organization-wide approach to
managing safety risk and assuring the
effectiveness of safety risk controls. It
includes systematic procedures,
practices, and policies for the
management of safety risk.’’ 2 In the
pipeline community, SMS is similarly
described as a ‘‘systematic approach to
managing safety, including the
structures, policies, and procedures an
organization uses to direct and control
its activities.’’ 3
NTSB has long advocated for PSMS
implementation by the pipeline
industry. After investigating two serious
accidents in 2010, NTSB found that
pipeline safety would be enhanced if
pipeline companies implemented SMSs.
The first accident occurred on July 25,
2010, when a 30-inch pipeline ruptured
in Marshall, Michigan, resulting in the
estimated release of 840,000 gallons of
crude oil into the Kalamazoo River. The
second accident occurred on September
9, 2010, when a natural gas transmission
pipeline ruptured in San Bruno,
California, killing eight people, injuring
many more, and destroying 38 homes.
2 FAA Order 8000.369C, Safety Management
System, (June 24, 2020), https://www.faa.gov/
documentLibrary/media/Order/Order_
8000.369C.pdf.
3 Pipeline SMS Industry Team, Introduction to
Pipeline SMS Implementation, Book 2: What is a
Pipeline SMS?, https://pipelinesms.org/wp-content/
uploads/2021/01/DM2018-045-Pipeline-SMS-Book2_PRINT-READY_CMYK_062119_BrandingUpdates.pdf.
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Federal Register / Vol. 90, No. 56 / Tuesday, March 25, 2025 / Notices
NTSB issued Pipeline Accident
Report NTSB/PAR–12/01 following its
investigation of the former accident.4 In
discussing the benefits of applying SMS
to pipeline systems, NTSB stated:
In recent years, several transportation
modes have implemented SMSs to enhance
the safety of their operations, and the NTSB
has consistently supported these activities.
The NTSB has advocated the implementation
of SMSs in transportation systems by
elevating SMSs to its Most Wanted List.
However, the NTSB has not called for an
SMS in pipeline operations. This Marshall
accident and the 2010 pipeline accident in
San Bruno, California, indicate that SMSs are
needed to enhance the safety of pipeline
operations.
Both the San Bruno accident and the
Marshall accident involved errors at the
management and operator levels in both
pipeline integrity and control center
operations. The delays in recognizing and
responding to the pipeline rupture and the
deficiencies in control center team
performance were prominent aspects of both
accidents. . . .
The evidence from this accident and from
the San Bruno accident indicates that
company oversight of pipeline control center
management and operator performance was
deficient. In both cases, pipeline ruptures
were inadequately identified and delays in
identifying and responding to the leaks
exacerbated the consequences of the initial
pipeline ruptures.
Therefore, the NTSB conclude[d] that
pipeline safety would be enhanced if
pipeline companies implemented SMSs.5
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Having reached these conclusions,
NTSB issued Safety Recommendation
P–12–17 advising API to ‘‘facilitate the
development of a safety management
system standard specific to the pipeline
industry that is similar in scope to
[API’s] Recommended Practice 750,
Management of Process Hazards.’’ API
responded by forming a multistakeholder work group, including
PHMSA representatives, to develop a
PSMS recommended practice, and that
effort ultimately led to the issuance of
API RP 1173 (1st edition) on July 8,
2015.
In response to API RP 1173, the
pipeline industry formed a PSMS
Industry Team (PSMS Team) to educate
stakeholders and to enhance safe
pipeline operations through the
implementation and use of PSMSs.6 The
PSMS Team developed various tools
that pipeline operators could use as
4 NTSB, PAR–12/01, Enbridge Incorporated
Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Rupture and Release,
Marshall, Michigan, July 25, 2010, (July 10, 2012),
https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/
AccidentReports/Reports/PAR1201.pdf.
5 NTSB, PAR–12/01, at 116–117.
6 Pipeline SMS Industry Team, 2016 Liquids
Pipeline SMS Annual Report (2016), https://
pipelinesms.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/APIPipeline-SMS-Annual-Report-2016.pdf.
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guidelines to assist in planning,
developing, and implementing PSMSs.
Since the issuance of API RP 1173 in
2015, PHMSA, States, various industry
associations, and other stakeholders
have encouraged voluntary
implementation of PSMS across the
pipeline industry. In its 2023 Annual
Report, the PSMS Team indicated that
nearly 85 percent of total pipeline
industry mileage is covered by PSMS.7
Information obtained from a 2023
PHMSA voluntary information
collection to determine how many gas
distribution operators are implementing
PSMSs indicated that about 86 percent
of all gas distribution pipeline mileage
is operated by companies that have
begun implementing PSMSs
voluntarily.8
In January 2024, NTSB issued Safety
Recommendation P–24–002 to PHMSA
in response to a pipeline release that
occurred on October 1, 2021, in San
Pedro Bay in California. In that safety
recommendation, NTSB advised
PHMSA to ‘‘[i]ssue an advisory bulletin
to all Pipeline and Hazardous Materials
Safety Administration-regulated
pipeline owners and operators,
promoting the benefits of pipeline safety
management systems and asking them
to develop and implement such a
system based on American Petroleum
Institute Recommended Practice
1173.’’ 9 NTSB stated that ‘‘the
implementation of a robust PSMS
program would have helped’’ the
operator of the ruptured pipeline
‘‘comply with regulations, ensure
employees were following company
procedures, and better prepare
personnel to respond and react to the
conditions found during this release.’’ 10
NTSB concluded that had a PSMS been
in place, the operator ‘‘may have further
evaluated their operations, identified
continuous improvement opportunities,
and better positioned their staff to
respond and react to a leak.’’ 11
In July 2024, NTSB issued a Safety
Alert, ‘‘Pipeline Safety Management
Systems: Vital for the Safe Operation of
7 Pipeline SMS Industry Team, Pipeline SMS
2023 Annual Report, at 7 (July 1, 2024), https://
pipelinesms.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/2023Pipeline-SMS-Annual-Report.pdf.
8 See PHMSA, Report to Congress—
Implementation of Safety Management Systems by
Gas Distribution Pipeline Operators (Aug. 2, 2024),
https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/news/report-congressimplementation-safety-management-systems-gasdistribution-pipeline-operators.
9 NTSB, MIR–24–01, Anchor Strike of Underwater
Pipeline and Eventual Crude Oil Release, San Pedro
Bay, Near Huntington Beach, California, October 1,
2021, (Jan. 2, 2024), https://www.ntsb.gov/
investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/
MIR2401.pdf.
10 NTSB, MIR–24–01, at 84.
11 NTSB, MIR–24–01, at 84.
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13659
Pipelines.’’ 12 In that safety alert, NTSB
noted it found that: (1) ‘‘pipeline safety
would be enhanced if companies
implemented [PSMS];’’ (2) ‘‘[a]lthough
PSMS have been adopted by operators
representing 85 percent of industry
pipeline mileage, many operators,
particularly smaller operators, have not
yet adopted PSMS;’’ (3) ‘‘[t]he pipeline
industry continues to have accidents
that could have been prevented or the
consequences more effectively mitigated
had risks been more thoroughly
identified and addressed;’’ and (4)
‘‘[w]ithout full commitment from the
pipeline industry to implement and
mature PSMS, pipeline accidents will
continue to occur and the industry will
not be able to meet their goal of zero
accidents, fatalities, and serious
injuries.’’ 13
NTSB further noted that pipeline
operators can: (1) ‘‘[i]mplement a robust
PSMS as described in API RP 1173. API
RP 1173 Pipeline Safety Management
System requirements provide guidance
for operators to establish a system to
continuously track and improve safety’’;
(2) ‘‘[f]or those who have incorporated
PSMS into their practices, continue to
improve operations and training.
Pipeline operators with PSMS cannot be
complacent. One of the hallmarks of a
good PSMS is that it continuously
evolves and improves safety programs’’;
(3) ‘‘[s]upport revisions to API RP 1173
and other guidance as it is developed to
include small operators and contractors
in their efforts to establish a PSMS.
According to the 2022 Pipeline SMS
Annual Report, ‘Last year also featured
important initiatives to support small
operator and contractor implementation
of RP 1173 along their journey of
continuous improvement and the
combined vision of One Industry, One
Team, One Mission, Pipeline Safety’ ’’;
and (4) ‘‘[w]ith a PSMS, operators can
ensure pipelines are designed,
constructed, operated, and maintained
in a way that complies with more than
the minimum safety standards found in
regulations. Experience has shown that
using a PSMS can be effective and result
in significant reductions of serious
pipeline accidents each year.’’ 14
Section 205 of the PIPES Act of 2020
directed the Secretary to submit to
Congress a report describing the
progress of gas distribution pipeline
operators with respect to
implementation of API RP 1173 and the
feasibility of natural gas distribution
12 NTSB, SA–095, Pipeline Safety Management
Systems: Vital for the Safe Operations of Pipelines
(July 2024), https://www.ntsb.gov/Advocacy/safetyalerts/Documents/SA-095.pdf.
13 NTSB, SA–095 at 1.
14 NTSB, SA–095 at 2–3.
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Federal Register / Vol. 90, No. 56 / Tuesday, March 25, 2025 / Notices
system operators implementing PSMS
based on the size of the operator.
Section 205 further directed the
Secretary and the State authorities with
a certification in effect to promote and
to assess pipeline safety management
system frameworks developed by
operators of natural gas distribution
systems. PHMSA is delegated with
carrying out this mandate.
PHMSA submitted that report to
Congress on August 2, 2024. The report
concluded, among other things, that:
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With respect to [gas distribution] operators
whose leadership have demonstrated a
tangible commitment to implementing a
PSMS, there is a clear trend for larger
operator’s PSMS efforts to be reported as ‘‘ontrack,’’ which accounts for roughly twothirds of the largest category of operators.
However, more than one-half of the smallest
category of operators reported that their
PSMS efforts best fit the ‘‘stalled’’
characterization. Based on the data [collected
by PHMSA from the operators to prepare the
report] . . . small operators are much less
likely to implement a PSMS than large
operators. . . . Although the API RP 1173
framework is intended to be scalable for
pipeline operators of varying size and scope,
and the essential elements of the framework
apply to organizations of any size or
sophistication, it appears that very small
operators need additional guidance to realize
the benefits of implementing a PSMS.
PHMSA recommend[ed] that the American
Gas Association and the American Public Gas
Association continue to promote the
implementation of a PSMS and provide
guidance to their members, particularly the
smaller operators to assist them in realizing
the value of implementing a PSMS program.
PHMSA will continue to work with its state
partners to promote PSMS implementation
by all operators. PHMSA will also continue
participating on API’s task group reviewing
the current API RP 1173 to develop a revision
that provides additional guidance to smaller
operators, enabling them to implement a sizescaled PSMS program.15
Major pipeline accidents with serious
consequences are rare in this country;
but, when they occur, they are generally
because of an alignment of weaknesses
or failures across multiple activities. To
manage the safety of complex processes
involved in the design, installation,
operation, and maintenance throughout
the life cycle of a pipeline, coordinated
actions to address multiple dynamic
activities and circumstances are
required. PSMS, coupled with a strong
safety culture, enables operators to
identify and to analyze hazards
proactively and to manage the
associated risks to prevent harm to
15 PHMSA, Report to Congress—Implementation
of Safety Management Systems by Gas Distribution
Pipeline Operators (Aug. 2, 2024), https://
www.phmsa.dot.gov/news/report-congressimplementation-safety-management-systems-gasdistribution-pipeline-operators.
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people and the environment, and,
ultimately, to reach both PHMSA’s and
the industry’s goal of zero incidents.
PHMSA believes that it is in the best
interest of safety that operators build
and maintain a strong safety culture. A
pipeline operator’s culture comprises,
among other things, the everyday
attitudes, values, norms, and beliefs
with respect to risk, safety, and
environmental protection shared
throughout the organization by leaders
and employees of all levels. Operators
can continuously strengthen their safety
culture by establishing safety as a core
value and, more importantly, through
their everyday actions. Maintaining a
strong safety culture requires operators
to address safety issues proactively, and
to understand and to address threats
against the operator’s safety culture,
such as complacency, fear of reprisal,
overconfidence, and normalization of
deviance. Implementing a well-designed
PSMS strengthens an operator’s safety
culture. Each element of PSMS supports
safety culture and the culture feeds back
into PSMS in a continuous process. This
results in a strong and positive safety
culture, an increasingly mature PSMS,
and enhanced pipeline safety. Building
and nurturing a strong safety culture
helps achieve the best safety outcomes.
API RP 1173 provides several examples
of a positive safety culture that should
be considered by all operators.16
PHMSA is issuing this advisory
bulletin to help promote the benefits of
PSMS more broadly, and to encourage
regulated pipeline owners and operators
to implement PSMS based on API RP
1173 voluntarily as part of their efforts
to build and to maintain a strong safety
culture that improves the safety
performance of their systems.17
Guidance and advisory bulletins are not
rules; are not meant to bind the public
in any way; and do not assign duties,
create legally enforceable rights, or
impose new obligations that are not
otherwise contained in regulations.
II. Advisory Bulletin (ADB–2025–01)
To: Owners and Operators of
Regulated Pipelines.
Subject: Pipeline Safety Management
System.
Advisory: PHMSA is issuing this
advisory bulletin to promote and to
16 API RP 1173: Pipeline Safety Management
Systems, at xi, 7, 8, 10, 16, and 21 (First ed.,
reaffirmed April 2023).
17 PHMSA also notes that the current NTSB Chair
has supported the voluntary adoption of PSMS by
the owners and operators of PHMSA-regulated
pipelines. Statement of Jennifer Homendy, Panel at
2024 Pipeline Safety Trust Conference (Nov. 21,
2024), 24:19 to 29:44 and 36:15–36:30, available at
https://youtu.be/OdlbjKZMYAY?si=Va_
hlyvqRpGhsl8G.
PO 00000
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Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
encourage regulated pipeline owners
and operators in developing and
implementing a pipeline safety
management system (PSMS) based on a
framework such as the one detailed in
the American Petroleum Institute’s
(API) Recommended Practice (RP) 1173:
Pipeline Safety Management Systems
(API RP 1173). This is consistent with
section 205 of the Protecting our
Infrastructure of Pipelines and
Enhancing Safety Act of 2020 (Pub. L.
116–260),18 which directed the
Secretary of Transportation to
‘‘promote’’ the implementation of
pipeline safety management systems by
pipeline operators, and the National
Transportation Safety Board’s (NTSB)
Safety Recommendation P–24–002. This
advisory bulletin promotes the
implementation of PSMSs to improve
the safety performance of the Nation’s
pipeline system continually to protect
the public from the risks associated with
pipelines.
The contents of this advisory bulletin
do not have the force and effect of law.
They are not meant to bind operators
nor the public in any way.
API RP 1173 provides a PSMS
framework that builds upon an
operator’s existing practices with
particular emphasis on proactively
looking for safety gaps, encouraging the
non-punitive reporting of safety issues,
and promptly responding to those
issues. API RP 1173 emphasizes
clarifying the safety roles and
responsibilities of leadership, top
management, and employees at all
levels throughout the operator’s
organization, including contractor
support. PSMS, underpinned by a
strong safety culture, makes safety
programs and processes more effective
to help prevent pipeline accidents.
The 10 essential elements of PSMSs
outlined in API RP 1173, and the
principles underlying them, apply to
operators of any size and complexity.
The complexity of a pipeline operator’s
PSMS program should be appropriate
for the size of their operations and the
risks their systems pose to the public
and environment.
PHMSA encourages the voluntary
adoption of PSMS based on a framework
such as the one detailed in API RP 1173,
as PHMSA believes developing and
implementing PSMS would be an
effective way to enhance pipeline safety
systematically. PHMSA shares NTSB’s
view that a voluntarily adopted PSMS
program can ensure pipelines are
designed, constructed, operated, and
maintained in a way that complies with
18 See
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49 U.S.C. 60103 note.
25MRN1
Federal Register / Vol. 90, No. 56 / Tuesday, March 25, 2025 / Notices
more than just the minimum safety
standards found in regulations.
For the reasons noted herein, PHMSA
strongly encourages regulated pipeline
owners and operators to take the
following actions to strengthen their
pipeline safety programs:
• Implement a PSMS program and
ensure that the program covers all
essential elements of an effective PSMS,
such as those in API RP 1173.
• Ensure the PSMS program
continuously evolves and improves.
• Maintain a positive safety culture
that continually promotes diligence
throughout the operator’s organization
and addresses issues that can erode the
safety culture.
Issued in Washington, DC, on March 19,
2025, under authority delegated in 49 CFR
1.97.
Linda Daugherty,
Acting Associate Administrator for Pipeline
Safety.
[FR Doc. 2025–04960 Filed 3–24–25; 8:45 am]
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DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
Office of Foreign Assets Control
Notice of OFAC Sanctions Action
Office of Foreign Assets
Control, Treasury.
ACTION: Notice.
AGENCY:
The U.S. Department of the
Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets
Control (OFAC) is publishing the names
of one or more persons and vessels that
have been placed on OFAC’s Specially
Designated Nationals and Blocked
Persons List (SDN List) based on
OFAC’s determination that one or more
applicable legal criteria were satisfied.
All property and interests in property
subject to U.S. jurisdiction of these
persons are blocked, and U.S. persons
are generally prohibited from engaging
in transactions with them. The vessels
placed on the SDN List have been
identified as property in which a
blocked person has an interest.
SUMMARY:
PO 00000
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13661
This action was issued on March
20, 2025. See SUPPLEMENTARY
INFORMATION for relevant dates.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
OFAC: Associate Director for Global
Targeting, 202–622–2420; Assistant
Director for Licensing, 202–622–2480;
Assistant Director for Sanctions
Compliance, 202–622–2490 or https://
ofac.treasury.gov/contact-ofac.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
DATES:
Electronic Availability
The SDN List and additional
information concerning OFAC sanctions
programs are available on OFAC’s
website: https://ofac.treasury.gov.
Notice of OFAC Action
On March 20, 2025, OFAC
determined that the property and
interests in property subject to U.S.
jurisdiction of the following persons are
blocked under the relevant sanctions
authority listed below.
BILLING CODE 4810–AL–P
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]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 90, Number 56 (Tuesday, March 25, 2025)]
[Notices]
[Pages 13658-13661]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2025-04960]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
[Docket No. PHMSA-2025-0018]
Pipeline Safety: Pipeline Safety Management System
AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA),
Department of Transportation.
ACTION: Notice; issuance of advisory bulletin.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: PHMSA is issuing this advisory bulletin to promote the
implementation of a pipeline safety management system (PSMS) by
regulated pipeline owners and operators.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Joseph Yoon by phone at 202-819-1547
or by email at [email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: PSMS provides a proactive and systematic
approach to risk management of complex processes across the pipeline
organization to operate safely and to improve safety performance. PSMS
also provides a scalable framework for pipeline operators of varying
size, scope, and level of PSMS implementation maturity. PHMSA
encourages pipeline operators to develop and to implement PSMS
programs, using a framework such as the one detailed in American
Petroleum Institute (API) Recommended Practice (RP) 1173: Pipeline
Safety Management Systems (API RP 1173). The framework should define
the elements for identifying, managing, and reducing risks throughout
the pipeline life cycle. Issuance of this advisory bulletin is
consistent with section 205 of the Protecting our Infrastructure of
Pipelines and Enhancing Safety (PIPES) Act of 2020 (Pub. L. 116-
260),\1\ which directs the Secretary of Transportation (Secretary) to
``promote'' the implementation of pipeline safety management systems by
pipeline operators. It also addresses the National Transportation
Safety Board's (NTSB) Safety Recommendation P-24-002.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ See 49 U.S.C. 60103 note.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I. Background
A safety management system (SMS) is an organization-wide approach
to managing safety risk through systematic procedures, practices, and
policies. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) defines SMS as a
``formal, top-down, organization-wide approach to managing safety risk
and assuring the effectiveness of safety risk controls. It includes
systematic procedures, practices, and policies for the management of
safety risk.'' \2\ In the pipeline community, SMS is similarly
described as a ``systematic approach to managing safety, including the
structures, policies, and procedures an organization uses to direct and
control its activities.'' \3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ FAA Order 8000.369C, Safety Management System, (June 24,
2020), https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Order/Order_8000.369C.pdf.
\3\ Pipeline SMS Industry Team, Introduction to Pipeline SMS
Implementation, Book 2: What is a Pipeline SMS?, https://pipelinesms.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/DM2018-045-Pipeline-SMS-Book-2_PRINT-READY_CMYK_062119_Branding-Updates.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NTSB has long advocated for PSMS implementation by the pipeline
industry. After investigating two serious accidents in 2010, NTSB found
that pipeline safety would be enhanced if pipeline companies
implemented SMSs. The first accident occurred on July 25, 2010, when a
30-inch pipeline ruptured in Marshall, Michigan, resulting in the
estimated release of 840,000 gallons of crude oil into the Kalamazoo
River. The second accident occurred on September 9, 2010, when a
natural gas transmission pipeline ruptured in San Bruno, California,
killing eight people, injuring many more, and destroying 38 homes.
[[Page 13659]]
NTSB issued Pipeline Accident Report NTSB/PAR-12/01 following its
investigation of the former accident.\4\ In discussing the benefits of
applying SMS to pipeline systems, NTSB stated:
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\4\ NTSB, PAR-12/01, Enbridge Incorporated Hazardous Liquid
Pipeline Rupture and Release, Marshall, Michigan, July 25, 2010,
(July 10, 2012), https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/PAR1201.pdf.
In recent years, several transportation modes have implemented
SMSs to enhance the safety of their operations, and the NTSB has
consistently supported these activities. The NTSB has advocated the
implementation of SMSs in transportation systems by elevating SMSs
to its Most Wanted List. However, the NTSB has not called for an SMS
in pipeline operations. This Marshall accident and the 2010 pipeline
accident in San Bruno, California, indicate that SMSs are needed to
enhance the safety of pipeline operations.
Both the San Bruno accident and the Marshall accident involved
errors at the management and operator levels in both pipeline
integrity and control center operations. The delays in recognizing
and responding to the pipeline rupture and the deficiencies in
control center team performance were prominent aspects of both
accidents. . . .
The evidence from this accident and from the San Bruno accident
indicates that company oversight of pipeline control center
management and operator performance was deficient. In both cases,
pipeline ruptures were inadequately identified and delays in
identifying and responding to the leaks exacerbated the consequences
of the initial pipeline ruptures.
Therefore, the NTSB conclude[d] that pipeline safety would be
enhanced if pipeline companies implemented SMSs.\5\
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\5\ NTSB, PAR-12/01, at 116-117.
Having reached these conclusions, NTSB issued Safety Recommendation
P-12-17 advising API to ``facilitate the development of a safety
management system standard specific to the pipeline industry that is
similar in scope to [API's] Recommended Practice 750, Management of
Process Hazards.'' API responded by forming a multi-stakeholder work
group, including PHMSA representatives, to develop a PSMS recommended
practice, and that effort ultimately led to the issuance of API RP 1173
(1st edition) on July 8, 2015.
In response to API RP 1173, the pipeline industry formed a PSMS
Industry Team (PSMS Team) to educate stakeholders and to enhance safe
pipeline operations through the implementation and use of PSMSs.\6\ The
PSMS Team developed various tools that pipeline operators could use as
guidelines to assist in planning, developing, and implementing PSMSs.
Since the issuance of API RP 1173 in 2015, PHMSA, States, various
industry associations, and other stakeholders have encouraged voluntary
implementation of PSMS across the pipeline industry. In its 2023 Annual
Report, the PSMS Team indicated that nearly 85 percent of total
pipeline industry mileage is covered by PSMS.\7\ Information obtained
from a 2023 PHMSA voluntary information collection to determine how
many gas distribution operators are implementing PSMSs indicated that
about 86 percent of all gas distribution pipeline mileage is operated
by companies that have begun implementing PSMSs voluntarily.\8\
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\6\ Pipeline SMS Industry Team, 2016 Liquids Pipeline SMS Annual
Report (2016), https://pipelinesms.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/API-Pipeline-SMS-Annual-Report-2016.pdf.
\7\ Pipeline SMS Industry Team, Pipeline SMS 2023 Annual Report,
at 7 (July 1, 2024), https://pipelinesms.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/2023-Pipeline-SMS-Annual-Report.pdf.
\8\ See PHMSA, Report to Congress--Implementation of Safety
Management Systems by Gas Distribution Pipeline Operators (Aug. 2,
2024), https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/news/report-congress-implementation-safety-management-systems-gas-distribution-pipeline-operators.
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In January 2024, NTSB issued Safety Recommendation P-24-002 to
PHMSA in response to a pipeline release that occurred on October 1,
2021, in San Pedro Bay in California. In that safety recommendation,
NTSB advised PHMSA to ``[i]ssue an advisory bulletin to all Pipeline
and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration-regulated pipeline owners
and operators, promoting the benefits of pipeline safety management
systems and asking them to develop and implement such a system based on
American Petroleum Institute Recommended Practice 1173.'' \9\ NTSB
stated that ``the implementation of a robust PSMS program would have
helped'' the operator of the ruptured pipeline ``comply with
regulations, ensure employees were following company procedures, and
better prepare personnel to respond and react to the conditions found
during this release.'' \10\ NTSB concluded that had a PSMS been in
place, the operator ``may have further evaluated their operations,
identified continuous improvement opportunities, and better positioned
their staff to respond and react to a leak.'' \11\
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\9\ NTSB, MIR-24-01, Anchor Strike of Underwater Pipeline and
Eventual Crude Oil Release, San Pedro Bay, Near Huntington Beach,
California, October 1, 2021, (Jan. 2, 2024), https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/MIR2401.pdf.
\10\ NTSB, MIR-24-01, at 84.
\11\ NTSB, MIR-24-01, at 84.
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In July 2024, NTSB issued a Safety Alert, ``Pipeline Safety
Management Systems: Vital for the Safe Operation of Pipelines.'' \12\
In that safety alert, NTSB noted it found that: (1) ``pipeline safety
would be enhanced if companies implemented [PSMS];'' (2) ``[a]lthough
PSMS have been adopted by operators representing 85 percent of industry
pipeline mileage, many operators, particularly smaller operators, have
not yet adopted PSMS;'' (3) ``[t]he pipeline industry continues to have
accidents that could have been prevented or the consequences more
effectively mitigated had risks been more thoroughly identified and
addressed;'' and (4) ``[w]ithout full commitment from the pipeline
industry to implement and mature PSMS, pipeline accidents will continue
to occur and the industry will not be able to meet their goal of zero
accidents, fatalities, and serious injuries.'' \13\
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\12\ NTSB, SA-095, Pipeline Safety Management Systems: Vital for
the Safe Operations of Pipelines (July 2024), https://www.ntsb.gov/Advocacy/safety-alerts/Documents/SA-095.pdf.
\13\ NTSB, SA-095 at 1.
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NTSB further noted that pipeline operators can: (1) ``[i]mplement a
robust PSMS as described in API RP 1173. API RP 1173 Pipeline Safety
Management System requirements provide guidance for operators to
establish a system to continuously track and improve safety''; (2)
``[f]or those who have incorporated PSMS into their practices, continue
to improve operations and training. Pipeline operators with PSMS cannot
be complacent. One of the hallmarks of a good PSMS is that it
continuously evolves and improves safety programs''; (3) ``[s]upport
revisions to API RP 1173 and other guidance as it is developed to
include small operators and contractors in their efforts to establish a
PSMS. According to the 2022 Pipeline SMS Annual Report, `Last year also
featured important initiatives to support small operator and contractor
implementation of RP 1173 along their journey of continuous improvement
and the combined vision of One Industry, One Team, One Mission,
Pipeline Safety' ''; and (4) ``[w]ith a PSMS, operators can ensure
pipelines are designed, constructed, operated, and maintained in a way
that complies with more than the minimum safety standards found in
regulations. Experience has shown that using a PSMS can be effective
and result in significant reductions of serious pipeline accidents each
year.'' \14\
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\14\ NTSB, SA-095 at 2-3.
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Section 205 of the PIPES Act of 2020 directed the Secretary to
submit to Congress a report describing the progress of gas distribution
pipeline operators with respect to implementation of API RP 1173 and
the feasibility of natural gas distribution
[[Page 13660]]
system operators implementing PSMS based on the size of the operator.
Section 205 further directed the Secretary and the State authorities
with a certification in effect to promote and to assess pipeline safety
management system frameworks developed by operators of natural gas
distribution systems. PHMSA is delegated with carrying out this
mandate.
PHMSA submitted that report to Congress on August 2, 2024. The
report concluded, among other things, that:
With respect to [gas distribution] operators whose leadership
have demonstrated a tangible commitment to implementing a PSMS,
there is a clear trend for larger operator's PSMS efforts to be
reported as ``on-track,'' which accounts for roughly two-thirds of
the largest category of operators. However, more than one-half of
the smallest category of operators reported that their PSMS efforts
best fit the ``stalled'' characterization. Based on the data
[collected by PHMSA from the operators to prepare the report] . . .
small operators are much less likely to implement a PSMS than large
operators. . . . Although the API RP 1173 framework is intended to
be scalable for pipeline operators of varying size and scope, and
the essential elements of the framework apply to organizations of
any size or sophistication, it appears that very small operators
need additional guidance to realize the benefits of implementing a
PSMS. PHMSA recommend[ed] that the American Gas Association and the
American Public Gas Association continue to promote the
implementation of a PSMS and provide guidance to their members,
particularly the smaller operators to assist them in realizing the
value of implementing a PSMS program. PHMSA will continue to work
with its state partners to promote PSMS implementation by all
operators. PHMSA will also continue participating on API's task
group reviewing the current API RP 1173 to develop a revision that
provides additional guidance to smaller operators, enabling them to
implement a size-scaled PSMS program.\15\
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\15\ PHMSA, Report to Congress--Implementation of Safety
Management Systems by Gas Distribution Pipeline Operators (Aug. 2,
2024), https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/news/report-congress-implementation-safety-management-systems-gas-distribution-pipeline-operators.
Major pipeline accidents with serious consequences are rare in this
country; but, when they occur, they are generally because of an
alignment of weaknesses or failures across multiple activities. To
manage the safety of complex processes involved in the design,
installation, operation, and maintenance throughout the life cycle of a
pipeline, coordinated actions to address multiple dynamic activities
and circumstances are required. PSMS, coupled with a strong safety
culture, enables operators to identify and to analyze hazards
proactively and to manage the associated risks to prevent harm to
people and the environment, and, ultimately, to reach both PHMSA's and
the industry's goal of zero incidents.
PHMSA believes that it is in the best interest of safety that
operators build and maintain a strong safety culture. A pipeline
operator's culture comprises, among other things, the everyday
attitudes, values, norms, and beliefs with respect to risk, safety, and
environmental protection shared throughout the organization by leaders
and employees of all levels. Operators can continuously strengthen
their safety culture by establishing safety as a core value and, more
importantly, through their everyday actions. Maintaining a strong
safety culture requires operators to address safety issues proactively,
and to understand and to address threats against the operator's safety
culture, such as complacency, fear of reprisal, overconfidence, and
normalization of deviance. Implementing a well-designed PSMS
strengthens an operator's safety culture. Each element of PSMS supports
safety culture and the culture feeds back into PSMS in a continuous
process. This results in a strong and positive safety culture, an
increasingly mature PSMS, and enhanced pipeline safety. Building and
nurturing a strong safety culture helps achieve the best safety
outcomes. API RP 1173 provides several examples of a positive safety
culture that should be considered by all operators.\16\
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\16\ API RP 1173: Pipeline Safety Management Systems, at xi, 7,
8, 10, 16, and 21 (First ed., reaffirmed April 2023).
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PHMSA is issuing this advisory bulletin to help promote the
benefits of PSMS more broadly, and to encourage regulated pipeline
owners and operators to implement PSMS based on API RP 1173 voluntarily
as part of their efforts to build and to maintain a strong safety
culture that improves the safety performance of their systems.\17\
Guidance and advisory bulletins are not rules; are not meant to bind
the public in any way; and do not assign duties, create legally
enforceable rights, or impose new obligations that are not otherwise
contained in regulations.
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\17\ PHMSA also notes that the current NTSB Chair has supported
the voluntary adoption of PSMS by the owners and operators of PHMSA-
regulated pipelines. Statement of Jennifer Homendy, Panel at 2024
Pipeline Safety Trust Conference (Nov. 21, 2024), 24:19 to 29:44 and
36:15-36:30, available at https://youtu.be/OdlbjKZMYAY?si=Va_hlyvqRpGhsl8G.
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II. Advisory Bulletin (ADB-2025-01)
To: Owners and Operators of Regulated Pipelines.
Subject: Pipeline Safety Management System.
Advisory: PHMSA is issuing this advisory bulletin to promote and to
encourage regulated pipeline owners and operators in developing and
implementing a pipeline safety management system (PSMS) based on a
framework such as the one detailed in the American Petroleum
Institute's (API) Recommended Practice (RP) 1173: Pipeline Safety
Management Systems (API RP 1173). This is consistent with section 205
of the Protecting our Infrastructure of Pipelines and Enhancing Safety
Act of 2020 (Pub. L. 116-260),\18\ which directed the Secretary of
Transportation to ``promote'' the implementation of pipeline safety
management systems by pipeline operators, and the National
Transportation Safety Board's (NTSB) Safety Recommendation P-24-002.
This advisory bulletin promotes the implementation of PSMSs to improve
the safety performance of the Nation's pipeline system continually to
protect the public from the risks associated with pipelines.
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\18\ See 49 U.S.C. 60103 note.
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The contents of this advisory bulletin do not have the force and
effect of law. They are not meant to bind operators nor the public in
any way.
API RP 1173 provides a PSMS framework that builds upon an
operator's existing practices with particular emphasis on proactively
looking for safety gaps, encouraging the non-punitive reporting of
safety issues, and promptly responding to those issues. API RP 1173
emphasizes clarifying the safety roles and responsibilities of
leadership, top management, and employees at all levels throughout the
operator's organization, including contractor support. PSMS,
underpinned by a strong safety culture, makes safety programs and
processes more effective to help prevent pipeline accidents.
The 10 essential elements of PSMSs outlined in API RP 1173, and the
principles underlying them, apply to operators of any size and
complexity. The complexity of a pipeline operator's PSMS program should
be appropriate for the size of their operations and the risks their
systems pose to the public and environment.
PHMSA encourages the voluntary adoption of PSMS based on a
framework such as the one detailed in API RP 1173, as PHMSA believes
developing and implementing PSMS would be an effective way to enhance
pipeline safety systematically. PHMSA shares NTSB's view that a
voluntarily adopted PSMS program can ensure pipelines are designed,
constructed, operated, and maintained in a way that complies with
[[Page 13661]]
more than just the minimum safety standards found in regulations.
For the reasons noted herein, PHMSA strongly encourages regulated
pipeline owners and operators to take the following actions to
strengthen their pipeline safety programs:
Implement a PSMS program and ensure that the program
covers all essential elements of an effective PSMS, such as those in
API RP 1173.
Ensure the PSMS program continuously evolves and improves.
Maintain a positive safety culture that continually
promotes diligence throughout the operator's organization and addresses
issues that can erode the safety culture.
Issued in Washington, DC, on March 19, 2025, under authority
delegated in 49 CFR 1.97.
Linda Daugherty,
Acting Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety.
[FR Doc. 2025-04960 Filed 3-24-25; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-60-P
