Extension of the Prohibition Against Certain Flights in the Territory and Airspace of Libya, 13070-13076 [2025-04846]

Agencies

• Federal Aviation Administration
• DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

[Federal Register Volume 90, Number 53 (Thursday, March 20, 2025)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 13070-13076]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2025-04846]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 91

[Docket No. FAA-2011-0246; Amdt. No. 91-321G]
RIN 2120-AM03


Extension of the Prohibition Against Certain Flights in the 
Territory and Airspace of Libya

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of 
Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: This action extends the prohibition against certain flight 
operations in the territory and airspace of Libya by all: U.S. air 
carriers; U.S. commercial operators; persons exercising the privileges 
of an airman certificate issued by the FAA, except when such persons 
are operating U.S.-registered aircraft for a foreign air carrier; and 
operators of U.S.-registered civil aircraft, except when the operator 
of such aircraft is a foreign air carrier for an additional three 
years, from March 20, 2025, to March 20, 2028. The FAA finds this 
action necessary to address continuing risks to persons and aircraft 
engaged in such flight operations. The FAA also republishes the 
approval process and exemption information for this Special Federal 
Aviation Regulation (SFAR), consistent with other recently published 
flight prohibition SFARs.

DATES: This final rule is effective March 19, 2025.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Bill Petrak, Flight Standards Service, 
through the Washington Operations Center, Federal Aviation 
Administration, 800 Independence Avenue SW, Washington, DC 20591; 
telephone (202) 267-3203; email [email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Executive Summary

    This action extends the expiration date of SFAR No. 112, title 14 
Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR), 91.1603, from March 20, 2025, to 
March 20, 2028. SFAR No. 112 prohibits certain flight operations in the 
territory and airspace of Libya by all: U.S. air carriers; U.S. 
commercial operators; persons exercising the privileges of an airman 
certificate issued by the FAA, except when such persons are operating 
U.S.-registered aircraft for a foreign air carrier; and operators of 
U.S.-registered civil aircraft, except when the operator of such 
aircraft is a foreign air carrier. The FAA finds this action necessary 
to address the continuing unacceptable safety-of-flight risks to U.S. 
civil aviation in the territory and airspace of Libya due to the 
unstable political and security environment in Libya. Consistent with 
other recently published flight prohibition SFARs, this action also 
republishes the approval process and exemption information for this 
flight prohibition SFAR.

II. Authority and Good Cause

A. Authority

    The FAA is responsible for the safety of flight in the U.S. and for 
the safety of U.S. civil operators, U.S.-registered civil aircraft, and 
U.S.-certificated airmen throughout the world. Section 106(f) of title 
49, U.S. Code (U.S.C.), subtitle I, establishes the FAA Administrator's 
authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle VII of title 49, 
Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the agency's 
authority. Section 40101(d)(1) provides that the Administrator shall 
consider in the public interest, among other matters, assigning, 
maintaining, and enhancing safety and security as the highest 
priorities in air commerce. Section 40105(b)(1)(A) requires the 
Administrator to exercise this authority consistently with the 
obligations of the U.S. Government under international agreements.
    The FAA is promulgating this rule under the authority described in 
49 U.S.C. 44701, General requirements. Under that section, the FAA is 
charged broadly with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air 
commerce by prescribing, among other things, regulations and minimum 
standards for practices, methods, and procedures that the Administrator 
finds necessary for safety in air commerce and national security.
    This regulation is within the scope of the FAA's authority because 
it continues to prohibit the persons described in paragraph (a) of SFAR 
No. 112, Sec.  91.1603, from conducting flight operations in the 
territory and airspace of Libya due to the continuing hazards to the 
safety of U.S. civil flight operations, as described in the preamble to 
this final rule.

B. Good Cause for Immediate Adoption

    Section 553(b)(B) of title 5, U.S. Code, authorizes agencies to 
dispense with notice and comment procedures for rules when the agency 
for ``good cause'' finds that those procedures are ``impracticable, 
unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.'' Also, section 553(d) 
permits agencies, upon a finding of good cause, to issue rules with an 
effective date less than 30 days from the date of publication. In this 
instance, the FAA finds good cause to forgo notice and comment and the 
delayed effective date because they would be impracticable and contrary 
to the public interest.
    Providing notice and the opportunity for the public to comment here 
would be impracticable. The FAA's flight prohibitions, and any 
amendments thereto, need to include appropriate boundaries that reflect 
the agency's current understanding of the risk environment for U.S. 
civil aviation. This allows the FAA to protect the safety of U.S. 
operators' aircraft and the lives of their passengers and crews without 
over-restricting or under-restricting U.S. operators' routing options. 
However, the risk environment for U.S. civil aviation in airspace 
managed by other countries with respect to safety of flight is fluid in 
circumstances involving fighting, violent extremist and militant 
activity, or periods of heightened tensions, particularly where weapons 
capable of targeting or otherwise negatively affecting U.S. civil 
aviation are or may be present. This fluidity, and the potential for 
rapid changes in the risks to U.S. civil aviation, significantly limits 
how far in advance of a new or amended flight prohibition the FAA can 
usefully assess the risk environment. The delay that would be 
occasioned by providing an opportunity to comment on this action would 
significantly increase the risk that the resulting final action would 
not accurately reflect the current risks to

[[Page 13071]]

U.S. civil aviation associated with the situation and thus would not 
establish boundaries for the flight prohibition commensurate with those 
risks.
    While the FAA sought and responded to public comments, the 
boundaries of the area in which unacceptable risks to the safety of 
U.S. civil aviation existed might change due to evolving military or 
political circumstances; violent extremist and militant group activity; 
the introduction, removal, or repositioning of more advanced anti-
aircraft weapon systems; or other factors. As a result, if the 
situation improved while the FAA sought and responded to public 
comments, the rule the FAA finalized might be over-restrictive, 
unnecessarily limiting U.S. operators' routing options and potentially 
causing them to incur unnecessary additional fuel and operations-
related costs, as well as potentially causing passengers to incur 
unnecessarily some costs attributed to their time. Conversely, if the 
situation deteriorated while the FAA sought and responded to public 
comments, the rule the FAA finalized might be under-restrictive, 
allowing U.S. civil aviation to continue operating in areas where 
unacceptable risks to their safety had developed. Such an outcome would 
endanger the safety of these aircraft, as well as their passengers and 
crews, exposing them to unacceptable risks of death, injury, and 
property damage that could occur if a U.S. operator's aircraft were 
shot down (or otherwise damaged) while operating in the territory and 
airspace of Libya.
    Alternatively, if the FAA made changes to the area in which U.S. 
civil aviation operations would be prohibited between a notice of 
proposed rulemaking and a final rule due to changed conditions, the 
version of the rule the public commented on would no longer reflect the 
FAA's current assessment of the risk environment for U.S. civil 
aviation.
    In addition, seeking comment would be contrary to the public 
interest because some of the rational basis for the rulemaking is based 
upon classified information and controlled unclassified information not 
authorized for public release. In order to meaningfully provide comment 
on a proposal, the public would need access to the basis for the 
agency's decision-making, which the FAA cannot provide. Disclosing 
classified information or controlled unclassified information not 
authorized for public release in order to seek meaningful comment on 
the proposal would harm the public interest. Accordingly, the FAA 
meaningfully seeking comment on the proposal is contrary to the public 
interest.
    Therefore, providing notice and the opportunity for comment would 
be impracticable as it would hinder the FAA's ability to maintain 
appropriate flight prohibitions based on up-to-date risk assessments of 
the risks to the safety of U.S. civil aviation operations in airspace 
managed by other countries. It would also be contrary to the public 
interest, as the FAA cannot protect classified information and 
controlled unclassified information not authorized for public release 
and meaningfully seek public comment.
    For the same reasons discussed above, the potential safety impacts 
and the need for prompt action on up-to-date information that is not 
public would make delaying the effective date impracticable and 
contrary to the public interest.
    Accordingly, the FAA finds good cause exists to forgo notice and 
comment and any delay in the effective date for this rule.

III. Background

    In its March 21, 2023, final rule amending and extending the 
prohibition against certain flights in the territory and airspace of 
Libya, the FAA continued to assess the situation in the territory and 
airspace of Libya as hazardous for U.S. civil aviation.\1\ 
Representatives of the Libyan Army of the Government of National Accord 
(GNA) and the Libyan National Army (LNA) General Command of the Armed 
Forces signed a United Nations (UN)-backed ceasefire agreement on 
October 23, 2020. Among other things, the October 2020 ceasefire 
provided for: an immediate ceasefire, effective upon signature of the 
agreement; the departure of all mercenaries and foreign fighters from 
Libya, including its land, air, and sea territory; and the suspension 
of all military training agreements and departure of all training crews 
until a new unified government assumed its functions.
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    \1\ Prohibition Against Certain Flights in the Territory and 
Airspace of Libya final rule, 88 FR 16871 (Mar. 21, 2023; effective, 
Mar. 17, 2023). The FAA notes that, in its March 21, 2023, final 
rule, the FAA assessed the risk to U.S. civil aviation operations in 
the portions of the Tripoli FIR (HLLL) outside the territory and 
airspace of Libya at altitudes below Flight Level (FL) 300 had 
diminished and the situation had stabilized sufficiently to permit 
U.S. civil aviation operations to resume in that airspace. Foreign 
actors had significantly reduced weapons shipments and military 
activities off the coast of Libya. Previously, these activities 
included targeting suspected weapons shipments destined for the 
opposing side or their foreign sponsors. As a result, the risk of 
either side or their foreign sponsors misidentifying civil aircraft 
operations in the overwater portion of the Tripoli FIR as carrying 
weapons shipments destined for the other side or their foreign 
sponsors and mistakenly targeting them had diminished. The reduction 
of widespread conflict had also reduced the risk to U.S. civil 
aviation operations in the small portion of the Tripoli FIR (HLLL) 
that extends into Chad's territorial airspace. Therefore, due to the 
diminished risks to the safety of U.S. civil aviation operations and 
stabilized situation in those portions of the Tripoli FIR (HLLL) 
outside the territory and airspace of Libya, the FAA amended SFAR 
No. 112, 14 CFR 91.1603, to remove the prohibition on U.S. civil 
aviation operations in those areas.
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    Between the October 2020 ceasefire agreement and the issuance of 
the 2023 final rule, the FAA assessed combat operations in Libya had 
significantly decreased, with only intermittent ground clashes between 
opposing factions. In addition, Russian-backed Vagner Group (also 
referred to as private military company (PMC) Wagner) had reduced the 
number of its air defense systems and forces deployed in Libya, with 
more than 1,300 Vagner personnel having departed the country. However, 
protests and the intermittent clashes between the various armed 
factions in Libya continued. Unrest in the capital, in particular, was 
driven by militia infighting and multiple failed attempts by the 
Government of National Stability (GNS) to enter Tripoli and contributed 
to the lack of progress on key milestones set forth in the ceasefire 
agreement.
    When the FAA issued the 2023 final rule, the provisions of the 
ceasefire agreement relating to departure of all mercenaries and 
foreign fighters from Libya and the suspension of all military training 
agreements and departure of all training crews until the Government of 
National Unity (GNU) assumed its functions had not been fully 
implemented. At the time the FAA issued the 2023 final rule, airspace 
deconfliction challenges also remained a safety of flight concern in 
the territory and airspace of Libya. Various armed groups operating in 
Libya continued to have access to advanced anti-aircraft weapons 
systems. The FAA assessed that these groups likely lacked comprehensive 
airspace awareness sufficient to enable effective aircraft 
identification and deconfliction of civil and military flights. These 
circumstances created the potential for localized operational control 
and use of anti-aircraft systems, rather than a coordinated air defense 
command and control structure, posing an enduring inadvertent risk to 
civil aviation operations in the territory and airspace of Libya. The 
FAA assessed that forces aligned with the GNA and the LNA could quickly 
increase force protection measures, such as global positioning system 
(GPS) jamming, air strikes, and the deployment of surface-to-air 
missile (SAM) systems capable of reaching as high as 49,000 feet. In 
addition to

[[Page 13072]]

foreign-operated air defense capabilities, both GNA and LNA forces had 
access to anti-aircraft artillery and advanced man-portable air defense 
systems (MANPADS), some of which have a maximum altitude of 25,000 
feet.
    In August 2022, LNA air defense forces claimed to have shot down a 
U.S. MQ-9 UAS operating in the vicinity of Benghazi during a period of 
increased tensions and threats of renewed violence between competing 
militias vying for control of Tripoli. The MQ-9 was operating in 
support of diplomatic engagements, and the operator had conducted pre-
mission coordination with Libyan authorities. While this incident 
involved a military UAS, it demonstrates the potential for inadequate 
aircraft identification and deconfliction procedures leading to an 
inadvertent shoot down. In addition, despite a reduction in foreign 
presence, tensions in Libya remained elevated, and warring factions in 
Libya and their affiliated foreign sponsors maintained access to 
advanced weapons. Within their respective strongholds in various areas 
of the country, Libya's armed factions had either gained access to, or 
had foreign sponsors equipped with, tactical aircraft, long-range 
weaponized UAS, air defense systems, and GPS jammers.
    Given the tenuous security environment in Libya at the time, the 
FAA remained concerned when it issued the 2023 final rule about the 
continued risk of rapid escalation involving these systems during 
spikes in tensions, which would pose safety-of-flight risks to U.S. 
civil aviation outside the capital region. As a result of the 
continuing unacceptable risks to the safety of U.S. civil aviation 
operations in Libya's airspace at that time, the FAA maintained the 
prohibition on U.S. civil aviation operations at all altitudes in the 
territory and airspace of Libya and extended the expiration date of 
SFAR No. 112, 14 CFR 91.1603, from March 20, 2023, until March 20, 
2025.

IV. Discussion of the Final Rule

    The FAA continues to assess the situation in the territory and 
airspace of Libya as being hazardous for U.S. civil aviation. Since the 
2023 final rule, U.S. civil aviation operations in Libya continue to be 
exposed to safety of flight risks associated with political and 
security instability and intermittent clashes between rival armed 
factions, including as recently as December 2024. Despite attempts to 
resolve the discord and implement the 2020 UN-brokered ceasefire 
between factions aligned with the Tripoli-based, UN-recognized GNU and 
the self-declared LNA based in eastern Libya, many terms of the 
ceasefire agreement have not been fulfilled and tensions remain 
elevated.
    Prior to the 2020 ceasefire, forces supporting both the GNA, which 
preceded the GNU, and the LNA employed indirect fire to strike 
airfields and airports across northern Libya. Since the ceasefire, both 
sides have employed manned and unmanned aircraft, SAMs, and/or MANPADs, 
as well as electronic warfare capabilities, to target manned and 
unmanned aircraft and to target or protect airfields/airports and other 
strategic sites. Armed groups continue to compete for control of 
critical infrastructure and resources, such as Tripoli's Mitiga 
International Airport (HLLM), due to the facilities' strategic 
importance and utility for military operations and facilitating 
lucrative illicit activity. The political and security environment 
continues to spur factional clashes, which have been observed as 
recently as mid-December 2024, when clashes included rocket fire near 
Zawiya oil refinery in western Libya.
    The FAA also remains concerned about the adequacy of deconfliction 
of anti-aircraft-capable weapons systems in the hands of various third 
parties with civil air traffic in the territory and airspace of Libya. 
Various third parties, including state actors such as Russia and 
T[uuml]rkiye, continue to maintain a physical presence and operate 
their own anti-aircraft-capable weapons systems in Libya; however, the 
command and control of these systems, adequacy of airspace 
deconfliction, and to what extent Libyan authorities are involved in 
their employment is unclear. Russian private military contractors with 
questionable training and likely limited access to a complete airspace 
picture, operating advanced weapons systems--including anti-aircraft 
capabilities outside of state control--further contribute to the 
significant airspace deconfliction challenges and unacceptable level of 
risk to civil aviation operations in Libya's territorial airspace.
    Additionally, in 2024, foreign entities continued to deploy and 
proliferate additional weapons systems into Libya, further 
demonstrating the complex security and safety environment for civil 
aviation in the country. For example, in July 2024, according to media 
reports, Italian authorities seized two large Chinese military-grade 
UAS that were being smuggled into Libya in violation of a United 
Nations arms embargo. Italian authorities reportedly stated that these 
UAS were over 10 meters (33 feet) long, had a wingspan of approximately 
20 meters (66 feet), and weighed more than three tons. They may have 
been destined for a Libyan faction in eastern Libya.
    Violent extremist organizations (VEOs), including the Islamic State 
of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS)-Libya and al-Qa'ida (AQ)-linked groups 
remain active in Libya, but they likely do not possess the capability 
to identify, track, and engage an aircraft at overflight cruising 
altitudes in the territory and airspace of Libya. Although the FAA 
assesses VEOs lack the resources and access to advanced weapons systems 
necessary to pose a risk to civil aircraft overflight operations, they 
likely maintain the intent to target civil aviation as a target of 
opportunity. Remaining VEOs are likely scattered in southwest Libya and 
focused on supporting Sahel-based associates but could pose a hazard to 
U.S. civil aviation operations in other parts of Libya. Nevertheless, 
VEOs pose a continued, though somewhat diminished, risk to low-altitude 
flight operations below 25,000 feet.
    Therefore, as a result of the continuing, unacceptable risks to the 
safety of U.S. civil aviation operations in the territory and airspace 
of Libya, the FAA extends the expiration date of SFAR No. 112, Sec.  
91.1603, from March 20, 2025, until March 20, 2028. The ongoing 
political and security instability in Libya does not appear likely to 
subside in the reasonably foreseeable future and a three-year extension 
will provide ample time for observing any potential sustained changes 
and reassessment.
    Further amendments to SFAR No. 112, Sec.  91.1603, might be 
appropriate if the risk to U.S. civil aviation safety and security 
changes. In this regard, the FAA will continue to monitor the situation 
and evaluate the extent to which persons described in paragraph (a) of 
this rule might be able to operate safely in the territory and airspace 
of Libya.
    The FAA also republishes the details concerning the approval and 
exemption processes in sections V and VI of this preamble, consistent 
with other recently published flight prohibition SFARs, to enable 
interested persons to refer to this final rule for comprehensive 
information about requesting relief from the FAA from the provisions of 
SFAR No. 112, Sec.  91.1603.

[[Page 13073]]

V. Approval Process Based on a Request From a Department, Agency, or 
Instrumentality of the United States Government

A. Approval Process Based on an Authorization Request From a 
Department, Agency, or Instrumentality of the United States Government

    In some instances, U.S. Government departments, agencies, or 
instrumentalities may need to engage U.S. civil aviation to support 
their activities in the territory and airspace of Libya. If a 
department, agency, or instrumentality of the U.S. Government 
determines that it has a critical need to engage any person described 
in paragraph (a) of SFAR No. 112, Sec.  91.1603, including a U.S. air 
carrier or commercial operator, to transport civilian or military 
passengers or cargo or conduct other operations in the territory and 
airspace of Libya, that department, agency, or instrumentality may 
request the FAA to approve persons described in paragraph (a) of SFAR 
No. 112, Sec.  91.1603, to conduct such operations.
    The requesting U.S. Government department, agency, or 
instrumentality must submit the request for approval to the FAA's 
Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety in a letter signed by an 
appropriate senior official of the requesting department, agency, or 
instrumentality.\2\ The FAA will not accept or consider requests for 
approval from anyone other than the requesting U.S. Government 
department, agency, or instrumentality. In addition, the senior 
official signing the letter requesting FAA approval must be 
sufficiently positioned within the requesting department, agency, or 
instrumentality to demonstrate that the organization's senior 
leadership supports the request for approval and is committed to taking 
all necessary steps to minimize aviation safety and security risks to 
the proposed flights. The senior official must also be in a position 
to: (1) attest to the accuracy of all representations made to the FAA 
in the request for approval, and (2) ensure that any support from the 
requesting U.S. Government department, agency, or instrumentality 
described in the request for approval is in fact brought to bear and is 
maintained over time. Unless justified by exigent circumstances, 
requesting U.S. Government departments, agencies, or instrumentalities 
must submit requests for approval to the FAA no less than 30 calendar 
days before the date on which the requesting department, agency, or 
instrumentality wishes the operator(s) to commence the proposed 
operation(s).
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    \2\ This approval procedure applies to U.S. Government 
departments, agencies, or instrumentalities; it does not apply to 
the public. The FAA describes this procedure in the interest of 
providing transparency with respect to the FAA's process for 
interacting with U.S. Government departments, agencies, or 
instrumentalities that seek to engage U.S. civil aviation to operate 
in the area in which this SFAR would prohibit their operations in 
the absence of specific FAA approval.
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    The requestor must send the request to the Associate Administrator 
for Aviation Safety, Federal Aviation Administration, 800 Independence 
Avenue SW, Washington, DC 20591. Electronic submissions are acceptable, 
and the requesting entity may request that the FAA notify it 
electronically as to whether the FAA grants the request for approval. 
If a requestor wishes to make an electronic submission to the FAA, the 
requestor should contact the Washington Operations Center by telephone 
at (202) 267-3203 or by email at [email protected] for submission instructions. The 
requestor must not submit its letter requesting FAA approval or related 
supporting documentation to the Washington Operations Center. Rather, 
the Washington Operations Center will refer the requestor to an 
appropriate staff member of the Flight Standards Service for further 
assistance.
    A single letter may request approval from the FAA for multiple 
persons described in SFAR No. 112, Sec.  91.1603, or for multiple 
flight operations. To the extent known, the letter must identify the 
person(s) the requester expects the SFAR to cover on whose behalf the 
U.S. Government department, agency, or instrumentality seeks FAA 
approval, and it must describe--
     The proposed operation(s), including the nature of the 
mission being supported;
     The service the person(s) covered by the SFAR will 
provide;
     To the extent known, the specific locations in the 
territory and airspace of Libya where the proposed operation(s) will 
occur, including, but not limited to, the flight path and altitude of 
the aircraft while it is operating in the territory and airspace of 
Libya and the airports, airfields, or landing zones at which the 
aircraft will take off and land; and
     The method by which the requesting department, agency, or 
instrumentality will provide, or how the operator will otherwise 
obtain, current threat information and an explanation of how the 
operator will integrate this information into all phases of the 
proposed operations (i.e., the pre-mission planning and briefing, in-
flight, and post-flight phases).
    The request for approval must also include a list of operators with 
whom the U.S. Government department, agency, or instrumentality 
requesting FAA approval has a current contract(s), grant(s), or 
cooperative agreement(s) (or its prime contractor has a subcontract(s)) 
for specific flight operations in the territory and airspace of Libya. 
The requestor may identify additional operators to the FAA at any time 
after the FAA issues its approval. Neither the operators listed in the 
original request, nor any operators the requestor subsequently seeks to 
add to the approval, may commence operations under the approval until 
the FAA issues them an Operations Specification (OpSpec) or Letter of 
Authorization (LOA), as appropriate, for operations in the territory 
and airspace of Libya. The approval conditions discussed below apply to 
all operators. Requestors should contact the Washington Operations 
Center by telephone at (202) 267-3203 or by email at [email protected] for instructions on how to submit 
the names of additional operators the requestor wishes to add to an 
existing approval to the FAA. The requestor must not submit the names 
of additional operators it wishes to add to an existing approval to the 
Washington Operations Center. Rather, the Washington Operations Center 
will refer the requestor to an appropriate staff member of the Flight 
Standards Service for further assistance.
    If an approval request includes classified information or 
controlled unclassified information not authorized for public release, 
requestors may contact the Washington Operations Center for 
instructions on submitting it to the FAA. The Washington Operations 
Center's contact information appears in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION 
CONTACT section of this final rule.
    FAA approval of an operation under SFAR No. 112, Sec.  91.1603, 
does not relieve persons subject to this SFAR of the responsibility to 
comply with all other applicable FAA rules and regulations. Operators 
of civil aircraft must comply with the conditions of their 
certificates, OpSpecs, and LOAs, as applicable. Operators must also 
comply with all rules and regulations of other U.S. Government 
departments, agencies, or instrumentalities that may apply to the 
proposed operation(s), including, but not limited to, regulations 
issued by the Transportation Security Administration.

B. Approval Conditions

    If the FAA approves the request, the FAA's Aviation Safety 
organization will send an approval letter to the requesting U.S. 
Government department, agency, or

[[Page 13074]]

instrumentality informing it that the FAA's approval is subject to all 
of the following conditions:
    (1) The approval will stipulate those procedures and conditions 
that limit, to the greatest degree possible, the risk to the operator 
while still allowing the operator to achieve its operational 
objectives.
    (2) Before any approval takes effect, the operator must submit to 
the FAA:
    (a) A written release of the U.S. Government from all damages, 
claims, and liabilities, including without limitation legal fees and 
expenses, relating to any event arising out of or related to the 
approved operations in the territory and airspace of Libya; and
    (b) The operator's written agreement to indemnify the U.S. 
Government with respect to any and all third-party damages, claims, and 
liabilities, including without limitation legal fees and expenses, 
relating to any event arising out of or related to the approved 
operations in the territory and airspace of Libya.
    (3) Other conditions the FAA may specify, including those the FAA 
might impose in OpSpecs or LOAs, as applicable.
    The release and agreement to indemnify do not preclude an operator 
from raising a claim under an applicable non-premium war risk insurance 
policy the FAA issues under chapter 443 of title 49, U.S. Code.
    If the FAA approves the proposed operation(s), the FAA will issue 
an OpSpec or LOA, as applicable, to the operator(s) identified in the 
original request and any operators the requestor subsequently adds to 
the approval, authorizing them to conduct the approved operation(s). In 
addition, as stated in paragraph (3) of this section V.B., the FAA 
notes that it may include additional conditions beyond those contained 
in the approval letter in any OpSpec or LOA associated with a 
particular operator operating under this approval, as necessary in the 
interests of aviation safety. U.S. Government departments, agencies, 
and instrumentalities requesting FAA approval on behalf of entities 
with which they have a contract or subcontract, grant, or cooperative 
agreement should request a copy of the relevant OpSpec or LOA directly 
from the entity with which they have any of the foregoing types of 
arrangements, if desired.

VI. Information Regarding Petitions for Exemption

    Any operations not conducted under an approval the FAA issues 
through the approval process set forth previously may only occur in 
accordance with an exemption from SFAR No. 112, Sec.  91.1603. A 
petition for exemption must comply with 14 CFR part 11. The FAA will 
consider whether exceptional circumstances exist beyond those described 
in the approval process in the previous section. To determine whether a 
petition for exemption from the prohibition this SFAR establishes 
fulfills the standards described in 14 CFR 11.81, the FAA consistently 
finds necessary the following information:
     The proposed operation(s), including the nature of the 
operation;
     The service the person(s) covered by the SFAR will 
provide;
     The specific locations in the territory and airspace of 
Libya where the proposed operation(s) will occur, including, but not 
limited to, the flight path and altitude of the aircraft while it is 
operating in the territory and airspace of Libya and the airports, 
airfields, or landing zones at which the aircraft will take off and 
land;
     The method by which the operator will obtain current 
threat information and an explanation of how the operator will 
integrate this information into all phases of its proposed operations 
(i.e., the pre-mission planning and briefing, in-flight, and post-
flight phases); and
     The plans and procedures the operator will use to minimize 
the risks identified in this preamble to the proposed operations to 
support the relief sought and demonstrate that granting such relief 
would not adversely affect safety or would provide a level of safety at 
least equal to that provided by this SFAR. The FAA has found 
comprehensive, organized plans and procedures of this nature to be 
helpful in facilitating the agency's safety evaluation of petitions for 
exemption from flight prohibition SFARs.
    The FAA includes, as a condition of each such exemption it issues, 
a release and agreement to indemnify, as described previously.
    The FAA recognizes that, with the support of the U.S. Government, 
the governments of other countries could plan operations that may be 
affected by SFAR No. 112, Sec.  91.1603. While the FAA will not permit 
these operations through the approval process, the FAA will consider 
exemption requests for such operations on an expedited basis and in 
accordance with the order of preference set forth in paragraph (c) of 
SFAR No. 112, Sec.  91.1603.
    If a petition for exemption includes information that is sensitive 
for security reasons or proprietary information, requestors may contact 
the Washington Operations Center for instructions on submitting it to 
the FAA. The Washington Operations Center's contact information is 
listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of this final 
rule. Requestors must not submit their petitions for exemption or 
related supporting documentation to the Washington Operations Center. 
Rather, the Washington Operations Center will refer the requestor to 
the appropriate staff member of the Flight Standards Service or the 
Office of Rulemaking for further assistance.

VII. Regulatory Notices and Analyses

A. Regulatory Evaluation

    This rule has been determined to be a significant regulatory action 
pursuant to section 3(f)(4) of Executive Order 12866. This rule 
continues to prohibit U.S. civil flights in the territory and airspace 
of Libya due to the significant hazards to U.S. civil aviation 
described in this preamble. While alternative flight routes result in 
some additional fuel and operations costs to the operators, as well as 
some costs attributed to passenger time, the benefits of this rule in 
prohibiting unsafe flights will exceed the minimal flight deviation 
costs. Therefore, the FAA finds that the incremental costs of extending 
SFAR No. 112, Sec.  91.1603, will be minimal and are exceeded by the 
benefits of avoided risks of deaths, injuries, and property damage that 
could occur if a U.S. operator's aircraft were shot down (or otherwise 
damaged) while operating in the territory and airspace of Libya.
    This rule is exempt from Executive Order 14192 (Unleashing 
Prosperity Through Deregulation) as it is a regulation issued with 
respect to a national security or homeland security function of the 
United States.

B. Regulatory Flexibility Act

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA), in 5 U.S.C. 603, requires an 
agency to prepare an initial regulatory flexibility analysis describing 
impacts on small entities whenever 5 U.S.C. 553 or any other law 
requires an agency to publish a general notice of proposed rulemaking 
for any proposed rule. Similarly, 5 U.S.C. 604 requires an agency to 
prepare a final regulatory flexibility analysis when an agency issues a 
final rule under 5 U.S.C. 553 after that section or any other law 
requires publication of a general notice of proposed rulemaking. The 
FAA concludes good cause exists to forgo notice and comment and to not 
delay the effective date for this rule. As 5 U.S.C. 553 does not 
require notice and comment in this situation, 5 U.S.C. 603 and 604 
similarly do not require regulatory flexibility analyses.

[[Page 13075]]

C. International Trade Impact Assessment

    The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (Pub. L. 96-39) prohibits Federal 
agencies from establishing standards or engaging in related activities 
that create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United 
States. Pursuant to this Act, the establishment of standards is not 
considered an unnecessary obstacle to the foreign commerce of the 
United States, so long as the standard has a legitimate domestic 
objective, such as the protection of safety, and does not operate in a 
manner that excludes imports that meet this objective. The statute also 
requires consideration of international standards and, where 
appropriate, that they be the basis for U.S. standards.
    The FAA has assessed the potential effect of this final rule and 
determined that its purpose is to protect the safety of U.S. civil 
aviation from risks to their operations in the territory and airspace 
of Libya, a location outside the U.S. Therefore, the rule complies with 
the Trade Agreements Act of 1979.

D. Unfunded Mandates Assessment

    Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104-
4) requires each Federal agency to prepare a written statement 
assessing the effects of any Federal mandate in a proposed or final 
agency rule that may result in an expenditure of $100 million or more 
(in 1995 dollars) in any one year by State, local, and Tribal 
governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector; such a mandate 
is deemed to be a ``significant regulatory action.'' The FAA currently 
uses an inflation-adjusted value of $183 million in lieu of $100 
million.
    This final rule does not contain such a mandate. Therefore, the 
requirements of Title II of the Act do not apply.

E. Paperwork Reduction Act

    The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3507(d)) requires 
the FAA to consider the impact of paperwork and other information 
collection burdens it imposes on the public. The FAA has determined no 
new requirement for information collection is associated with this 
final rule.

F. International Compatibility and Cooperation

    In keeping with U.S. obligations under the Convention on 
International Civil Aviation, the FAA's policy is to conform to 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Standards and 
Recommended Practices to the maximum extent practicable. The FAA has 
determined no ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices correspond to 
this regulation. The FAA finds this action is fully consistent with the 
obligations under 49 U.S.C. 40105(b)(1)(A) to ensure the FAA exercises 
its duties consistently with the obligations of the United States under 
international agreements.
    While the FAA's flight prohibition does not apply to foreign air 
carriers, DOT codeshare authorizations prohibit foreign air carriers 
from carrying a U.S. codeshare partner's code on a flight segment that 
operates in airspace for which the FAA has issued a flight prohibition 
for U.S. civil aviation. In addition, foreign air carriers and other 
foreign operators may choose to avoid, or be advised or directed by 
their civil aviation authorities to avoid, airspace for which the FAA 
has issued a flight prohibition for U.S. civil aviation.

IX. Executive Order Determinations

A. Executive Order 13132, Federalism

    The FAA has analyzed this rule under the principles and criteria of 
Executive Order 13132. The agency has determined this action will not 
have a substantial direct effect on the States, or the relationship 
between the Federal Government and the States, or on the distribution 
of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. 
Therefore, this rule will not have federalism implications.

B. Executive Order 13211, Regulations That Significantly Affect Energy 
Supply, Distribution, or Use

    The FAA analyzed this rule under Executive Order 13211. The agency 
has determined it is not a ``significant energy action'' under the 
executive order and will not be likely to have a significant adverse 
effect on the supply, distribution, or use of energy.

C. Executive Order 13609, Promoting International Regulatory 
Cooperation

    Executive Order 13609 promotes international regulatory cooperation 
to meet shared challenges involving health, safety, labor, security, 
environmental, and other issues and to reduce, eliminate, or prevent 
unnecessary differences in regulatory requirements. The FAA has 
analyzed this action under the policies and agency responsibilities of 
Executive Order 13609 and has determined that this action will have no 
effect on international regulatory cooperation.

X. Additional Information

A. Electronic Access

    Except for classified and controlled unclassified material not 
authorized for public release, all documents the FAA considered in 
developing this rule, including economic analyses and technical 
reports, may be accessed from the internet through the docket for this 
rulemaking.
    Those documents may be viewed online at https://www.regulations.gov 
using the docket number listed above. A copy of this rule will be 
placed in the docket. Electronic retrieval help and guidelines are 
available on the website. It is available 24 hours each day, 365 days 
each year. An electronic copy of this document may also be downloaded 
from the Office of the Federal Register's website at https://www.federalregister.gov and the Government Publishing Office's website 
at https://www.govinfo.gov. A copy may also be found on the FAA's 
Regulations and Policies website at https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies.
    Copies may also be obtained by sending a request to the Federal 
Aviation Administration, Office of Rulemaking, ARM-1, 800 Independence 
Avenue SW, Washington, DC 20591, or by calling (202) 267-9677.

B. Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act

    The Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 
(SBREFA) (Pub. L. 104-121) (set forth as a note to 5 U.S.C. 601) 
requires FAA to comply with small entity requests for information or 
advice about compliance with statutes and regulations within its 
jurisdiction. A small entity with questions regarding this document may 
contact its local FAA official or the persons listed under the FOR 
FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT heading at the beginning of the preamble. 
To find out more about SBREFA on the internet, visit https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/sbre_act/.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 91

    Air traffic control, Aircraft, Airmen, Airports, Aviation safety, 
Freight, Libya.

The Amendment

    In consideration of the foregoing, the Federal Aviation 
Administration amends chapter I of title 14, Code of Federal 
Regulations, as follows:

PART 91--GENERAL OPERATING AND FLIGHT RULES

0
1. The authority citation for part 91 continues to read as follows:


[[Page 13076]]


    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(f), 40101, 40103, 40105, 40113, 40120, 
44101, 44111, 44701, 44704, 44709, 44711, 44712, 44715, 44716, 
44717, 44722, 46306, 46315, 46316, 46504, 46506-46507, 47122, 47508, 
47528-47531, 47534, Pub. L. 114-190, 130 Stat. 615 (49 U.S.C. 44703 
note); articles 12 and 29 of the Convention on International Civil 
Aviation (61 Stat. 1180), (126 Stat. 11).


0
2. Amend Sec.  91.1603 by revising paragraph (e) to read as follows:


Sec.  91.1603  Special Federal Aviation Regulation No. 112--Prohibition 
Against Certain Flights in the Territory and Airspace of Libya.

* * * * *
    (e) Expiration. This SFAR will remain in effect until March 20, 
2028. The FAA may amend, rescind, or extend this SFAR, as necessary.

    Issued in Washington, DC, under the authority of 49 U.S.C. 
106(f), 40101(d)(1), 40105(b)(1)(A), and 44701(a)(5).
Christopher J. Rocheleau,
Acting Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2025-04846 Filed 3-19-25; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P