Maria Dewitt, N.P.; Decision and Order, 106581-106582 [2024-31330]
Download as PDF
ddrumheller on DSK120RN23PROD with NOTICES1
Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 249 / Monday, December 30, 2024 / Notices
Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 270 (2006) (‘‘The
Attorney General can register a
physician to dispense controlled
substances ‘if the applicant is
authorized to dispense . . . controlled
substances under the laws of the State
in which he practices.’ . . . The very
definition of a ‘practitioner’ eligible to
prescribe includes physicians ‘licensed,
registered, or otherwise permitted, by
the United States or the jurisdiction in
which he practices’ to dispense
controlled substances. § 802(21).’’). The
Agency has applied these principles
consistently. See, e.g., James L. Hooper,
M.D., 76 FR 71371, 71372 (2011), pet.
for rev. denied, 481 F. App’x 826 (4th
Cir. 2012); Frederick Marsh Blanton,
M.D., 43 FR 27616, 27617 (1978).5
According to California statute,
‘‘dispense’’ means ‘‘to deliver a
controlled substance to an ultimate user
or research subject by or pursuant to the
lawful order of a practitioner, including
the prescribing, furnishing, packaging,
labeling, or compounding necessary to
prepare the substance for that delivery.’’
Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11010 (West
2024). Further, a ‘‘practitioner’’ means a
person ‘‘licensed, registered, or
otherwise permitted, to distribute,
dispense, conduct research with respect
to, or administer, a controlled substance
in the course of professional practice or
research in [the] state.’’ Id. § 11026(c).
Here, the undisputed evidence in the
record is that Registrant lacks authority
to practice medicine in California. As
discussed above, an individual must be
a licensed practitioner to dispense a
controlled substance in California.
Thus, because Registrant lacks authority
to practice medicine in California and,
therefore, is not authorized to handle
controlled substances in California,
Registrant is not eligible to maintain a
DEA registration. Accordingly, the
Agency will order that Registrant’s DEA
registration be revoked.
5 This rule derives from the text of two provisions
of the CSA. First, Congress defined the term
‘‘practitioner’’ to mean ‘‘a physician . . . or other
person licensed, registered, or otherwise permitted,
by . . . the jurisdiction in which he practices . . . ,
to distribute, dispense, . . . [or] administer . . . a
controlled substance in the course of professional
practice.’’ 21 U.S.C. 802(21). Second, in setting the
requirements for obtaining a practitioner’s
registration, Congress directed that ‘‘[t]he Attorney
General shall register practitioners . . . if the
applicant is authorized to dispense . . . controlled
substances under the laws of the State in which he
practices.’’ 21 U.S.C. 823(g)(1). Because Congress
has clearly mandated that a practitioner possess
state authority in order to be deemed a practitioner
under the CSA, DEA has held repeatedly that
revocation of a practitioner’s registration is the
appropriate sanction whenever he is no longer
authorized to dispense controlled substances under
the laws of the state in which he practices. See, e.g.,
James L. Hooper, M.D., 76 FR at 71371–72; Sheran
Arden Yeates, M.D., 71 FR 39130, 39131 (2006);
Dominick A. Ricci, M.D., 58 FR 51104, 51105
(1993); Bobby Watts, M.D., 53 FR 11919, 11920
(1988); Frederick Marsh Blanton, M.D., 43 FR at
27617.
Drug Enforcement Administration
VerDate Sep<11>2014
23:58 Dec 27, 2024
Jkt 265001
Order
Pursuant to 28 CFR 0.100(b) and the
authority vested in me by 21 U.S.C.
824(a), I hereby revoke DEA Certificate
of Registration No. FA0060359 issued to
Soroosh Armandi, D.O. Further,
pursuant to 28 CFR 0.100(b) and the
authority vested in me by 21 U.S.C.
823(g)(1), I hereby deny any pending
applications of Soroosh Armandi, D.O.,
to renew or modify this registration, as
well as any other pending application of
Soroosh Armandi, D.O., for additional
registration in California. This Order is
effective January 29, 2025.
Signing Authority
This document of the Drug
Enforcement Administration was signed
on December 20, 2024, by Administrator
Anne Milgram. That document with the
original signature and date is
maintained by DEA. For administrative
purposes only, and in compliance with
requirements of the Office of the Federal
Register, the undersigned DEA Federal
Register Liaison Officer has been
authorized to sign and submit the
document in electronic format for
publication, as an official document of
DEA. This administrative process in no
way alters the legal effect of this
document upon publication in the
Federal Register.
Heather Achbach,
Federal Register Liaison Officer, Drug
Enforcement Administration.
[FR Doc. 2024–31324 Filed 12–27–24; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410–09–P
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
[Docket No. 24–52]
Maria Dewitt, N.P.; Decision and Order
On June 21, 2024, the Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA or
Government) issued an Order to Show
Cause (OSC) to Maria Dewitt, N.P.
(Respondent). OSC, at 1, 3. The OSC
proposed the revocation of
Respondent’s DEA Certificate of
Registration No. MD7143960, at the
registered address of 9038 High Branch,
San Antonio, Texas. Id. at 1. The OSC
alleged that Respondent’s DEA
registration should be revoked because
Respondent is ‘‘without authority to
handle controlled substances in the
State of Texas, the state in which [she
is] registered with DEA.’’ Id. at 2 (citing
21 U.S.C. 824(a)(3)).
PO 00000
Frm 00176
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
106581
On June 25, 2024, Respondent
requested a hearing and filed an Answer
to the OSC.1 On June 28, 2024, the
Government filed a Notice of Filing of
Evidence and Motion for Summary
Disposition, which Respondent
opposed.2 On August 2, 2024,
Administrative Law Judge Teresa A.
Wallbaum (the ALJ) granted the
Government’s Motion for Summary
Disposition and recommended the
revocation of Respondent’s registration,
finding that because Respondent lacks
state authority to handle controlled
substances in Texas, the state in which
she is registered with DEA, ‘‘[t]here is
no genuine issue of material fact in this
case.’’ Order Granting the Government’s
Motion for Summary Disposition, and
Recommended Rulings, Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decision
of the Administrative Law Judge (RD), at
8–9. Respondent did not file exceptions
to the RD.3
Having reviewed the entire record, the
Agency adopts and hereby incorporates
by reference the entirety of the ALJ’s
rulings, findings of fact, conclusions of
law, and recommended sanction as
found in the RD and summarizes and
expands upon portions thereof herein.
Findings of Fact
The Government has alleged that
Respondent lacks a prescriptive
authority delegation agreement with a
physician, which is required for a Texas
advanced practice registered nurse to
handle controlled substances. RD, at 4,
7–8.4 According to Texas online
records, of which the Agency takes
official notice, Respondent does not
currently have a prescriptive authority
delegation agreement with a physician.5
1 Respondent’s June 25, 2024, hearing request was
an amended version of an initial document filed on
June 24, 2024. Respondent also submitted an
amended version of her Answer on the same day
of its initial filing, June 25, 2024.
2 See Respondent’s Response to Government’s
Motion for Summary Disposition and Request for
Hearing (Opposition).
3 On August 5, 2024, Respondent filed a letter,
dated August 2, 2024, seeking to appeal the ALJ’s
Recommended Decision; however, in this letter,
Respondent did not present any additional
arguments for the Agency to consider.
4 See also Government’s Notice of Filing of
Evidence and Motion for Summary Disposition,
Exhibit (GX) 2.
5 Under the Administrative Procedure Act, an
agency ‘‘may take official notice of facts at any stage
in a proceeding—even in the final decision.’’
United States Department of Justice, Attorney
General’s Manual on the Administrative Procedure
Act 80 (1947) (Wm. W. Gaunt & Sons, Inc., Reprint
1979). Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 556(e), ‘‘[w]hen an
agency decision rests on official notice of a material
fact not appearing in the evidence in the record, a
party is entitled, on timely request, to an
opportunity to show the contrary.’’ Accordingly,
Respondent may dispute the Agency’s finding by
E:\FR\FM\30DEN1.SGM
Continued
30DEN1
106582
Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 249 / Monday, December 30, 2024 / Notices
Texas Medical Board, Healthcare
Provider Search, https://
profile.tmb.state.tx.us/Search.aspx (last
visited date of signature of this Order).
Accordingly, the Agency finds that
Respondent is not currently authorized
to handle controlled substances in
Texas, the state in which she is
registered with the DEA.6
Discussion
ddrumheller on DSK120RN23PROD with NOTICES1
Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(3), the
Attorney General is authorized to
suspend or revoke a registration issued
under section 823 of the Controlled
Substances Act (CSA) ‘‘upon a finding
that the registrant . . . has had his State
license or registration suspended . . .
[or] revoked . . . by competent State
authority and is no longer authorized by
State law to engage in the . . .
dispensing of controlled substances.’’
With respect to a practitioner, DEA has
also long held that the possession of
authority to dispense controlled
substances under the laws of the state in
which a practitioner engages in
professional practice is a fundamental
condition for obtaining and maintaining
a practitioner’s registration. Gonzales v.
Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 270 (2006) (‘‘The
Attorney General can register a
physician to dispense controlled
substances ‘if the applicant is
authorized to dispense . . . controlled
substances under the laws of the State
in which he practices.’ . . . The very
definition of a ‘practitioner’ eligible to
prescribe includes physicians ‘licensed,
registered, or otherwise permitted, by
the United States or the jurisdiction in
which he practices’ to dispense
controlled substances. § 802(21).’’). The
Agency has applied these principles
consistently. See, e.g., James L. Hooper,
M.D., 76 FR 71371, 71372 (2011), pet.
for rev. denied, 481 F. App’x 826 (4th
filing a properly supported motion for
reconsideration of findings of fact within fifteen
calendar days of the date of this Order. Any such
motion and response shall be filed and served by
email to the other party and to Office of the
Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration at
dea.addo.attorneys@dea.gov.
6 In her Opposition, Respondent argues that there
are material facts in dispute that require a hearing,
specifically mentioning her state and federal
authority to handle controlled substances.
Respondent’s Opposition, at 6. However, as the ALJ
correctly notes in the RD, Respondent does not
actually dispute the material fact that she lacks state
and federal authority to handle controlled
substances, with Respondent admitting that she has
no current prescriptive authority delegation
agreement with a physician. RD, at 9; Respondent’s
Opposition, at 2, 11. The Agency also agrees with
the ALJ’s finding that the other facts in dispute,
such as Respondent’s address, are immaterial and
not dispositive to the adjudication of the current
matter. RD, at 9 n.7 (citing Michael Jones, M.D., 86
FR 20728, 20729 (2021)).
VerDate Sep<11>2014
23:58 Dec 27, 2024
Jkt 265001
Cir. 2012); Frederick Marsh Blanton,
M.D., 43 FR 27616, 27617 (1978).7
According to Texas statute,
‘‘dispense’’ means ‘‘the delivery of a
controlled substance in the course of
professional practice or research, by a
practitioner or person acting under the
lawful order of a practitioner, to an
ultimate user or research subject. The
term includes the prescribing,
administering, packaging, labeling, or
compounding necessary to prepare the
substance for delivery.’’ Tex. Health &
Safety Code Ann. § 481.002(12) (2024).
Further, a ‘‘practitioner’’ includes ‘‘an
advanced practice registered nurse or
physician assistant to whom a physician
has delegated the authority to prescribe
or order a drug or device . . . .’’ Id.
§ 481.002(39)(D). Texas statute provides
that ‘‘[a] physician may delegate to an
advanced practice registered nurse or
physician assistant, acting under
adequate physician supervision, the act
of prescribing or ordering a drug or
device as authorized through a
prescriptive authority agreement
between the physician and the
advanced practice registered nurse or
physician assistant, as applicable.’’ Tex.
Occ. Code Ann. § 157.0512(a) (2024).
Here, the undisputed evidence in the
record is that Respondent lacks
authority to handle controlled
substances in Texas because she does
not have a prescriptive authority
delegation agreement with a physician.
As discussed above, a Texas advanced
practice registered nurse must have a
prescriptive authority delegation
agreement with a physician to dispense
controlled substances in Texas. Thus,
because Respondent lacks authority to
handle controlled substances in Texas,
Respondent is not eligible to maintain a
DEA registration. RD, at 8. Accordingly,
7 This rule derives from the text of two provisions
of the CSA. First, Congress defined the term
‘‘practitioner’’ to mean ‘‘a physician . . . or other
person licensed, registered, or otherwise permitted,
by . . . the jurisdiction in which he practices . . . ,
to distribute, dispense, . . . [or] administer . . . a
controlled substance in the course of professional
practice.’’ 21 U.S.C. 802(21). Second, in setting the
requirements for obtaining a practitioner’s
registration, Congress directed that ‘‘[t]he Attorney
General shall register practitioners . . . if the
applicant is authorized to dispense . . . controlled
substances under the laws of the State in which he
practices.’’ 21 U.S.C. 823(g)(1). Because Congress
has clearly mandated that a practitioner possess
state authority in order to be deemed a practitioner
under the CSA, DEA has held repeatedly that
revocation of a practitioner’s registration is the
appropriate sanction whenever he is no longer
authorized to dispense controlled substances under
the laws of the state in which he practices. See, e.g.,
James L. Hooper, M.D., 76 FR at 71371–72; Sheran
Arden Yeates, M.D., 71 FR 39130, 39131 (2006);
Dominick A. Ricci, M.D., 58 FR 51104, 51105
(1993); Bobby Watts, M.D., 53 FR 11919, 11920
(1988); Frederick Marsh Blanton, 43 FR at 27617.
PO 00000
Frm 00177
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
the Agency will order that Respondent’s
DEA registration be revoked.
Order
Pursuant to 28 CFR 0.100(b) and the
authority vested in me by 21 U.S.C.
824(a), I hereby revoke DEA Certificate
of Registration No. MD7143960 issued
to Maria Dewitt, N.P. Further, pursuant
to 28 CFR 0.100(b) and the authority
vested in me by 21 U.S.C. 823(g)(1), I
hereby deny any pending applications
of Maria Dewitt, N.P., to renew or
modify this registration, as well as any
other pending application of Maria
Dewitt, N.P., for additional registration
in Texas. This Order is effective January
29, 2025.
Signing Authority
This document of the Drug
Enforcement Administration was signed
on December 20, 2024, by Administrator
Anne Milgram. That document with the
original signature and date is
maintained by DEA. For administrative
purposes only, and in compliance with
requirements of the Office of the Federal
Register, the undersigned DEA Federal
Register Liaison Officer has been
authorized to sign and submit the
document in electronic format for
publication, as an official document of
DEA. This administrative process in no
way alters the legal effect of this
document upon publication in the
Federal Register.
Heather Achbach,
Federal Register Liaison Officer, Drug
Enforcement Administration.
[FR Doc. 2024–31330 Filed 12–27–24; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410–09–P
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Drug Enforcement Administration
Robert Esser, D.D.S.; Decision and
Order
On December 18, 2023, the Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA or
Government) issued an Order to Show
Cause (OSC) to Robert Esser, D.D.S., of
Erie, Pennsylvania (Registrant). Request
for Final Agency Action (RFAA),
Exhibit (RFAAX) 2, at 1, 3. The OSC
proposed the revocation of Registrant’s
Certificate of Registration No.
BE3510193, alleging that Registrant’s
registration should be revoked because
Registrant is ‘‘currently without
authority to handle controlled
substances in the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, the state in which [he is]
registered with DEA.’’ Id. at 2 (citing 21
U.S.C. 824(a)(3)).
E:\FR\FM\30DEN1.SGM
30DEN1
Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 89, Number 249 (Monday, December 30, 2024)]
[Notices]
[Pages 106581-106582]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2024-31330]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Drug Enforcement Administration
[Docket No. 24-52]
Maria Dewitt, N.P.; Decision and Order
On June 21, 2024, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA or
Government) issued an Order to Show Cause (OSC) to Maria Dewitt, N.P.
(Respondent). OSC, at 1, 3. The OSC proposed the revocation of
Respondent's DEA Certificate of Registration No. MD7143960, at the
registered address of 9038 High Branch, San Antonio, Texas. Id. at 1.
The OSC alleged that Respondent's DEA registration should be revoked
because Respondent is ``without authority to handle controlled
substances in the State of Texas, the state in which [she is]
registered with DEA.'' Id. at 2 (citing 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(3)).
On June 25, 2024, Respondent requested a hearing and filed an
Answer to the OSC.\1\ On June 28, 2024, the Government filed a Notice
of Filing of Evidence and Motion for Summary Disposition, which
Respondent opposed.\2\ On August 2, 2024, Administrative Law Judge
Teresa A. Wallbaum (the ALJ) granted the Government's Motion for
Summary Disposition and recommended the revocation of Respondent's
registration, finding that because Respondent lacks state authority to
handle controlled substances in Texas, the state in which she is
registered with DEA, ``[t]here is no genuine issue of material fact in
this case.'' Order Granting the Government's Motion for Summary
Disposition, and Recommended Rulings, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law, and Decision of the Administrative Law Judge (RD), at 8-9.
Respondent did not file exceptions to the RD.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Respondent's June 25, 2024, hearing request was an amended
version of an initial document filed on June 24, 2024. Respondent
also submitted an amended version of her Answer on the same day of
its initial filing, June 25, 2024.
\2\ See Respondent's Response to Government's Motion for Summary
Disposition and Request for Hearing (Opposition).
\3\ On August 5, 2024, Respondent filed a letter, dated August
2, 2024, seeking to appeal the ALJ's Recommended Decision; however,
in this letter, Respondent did not present any additional arguments
for the Agency to consider.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Having reviewed the entire record, the Agency adopts and hereby
incorporates by reference the entirety of the ALJ's rulings, findings
of fact, conclusions of law, and recommended sanction as found in the
RD and summarizes and expands upon portions thereof herein.
Findings of Fact
The Government has alleged that Respondent lacks a prescriptive
authority delegation agreement with a physician, which is required for
a Texas advanced practice registered nurse to handle controlled
substances. RD, at 4, 7-8.\4\ According to Texas online records, of
which the Agency takes official notice, Respondent does not currently
have a prescriptive authority delegation agreement with a physician.\5\
[[Page 106582]]
Texas Medical Board, Healthcare Provider Search, https://profile.tmb.state.tx.us/Search.aspx (last visited date of signature of
this Order). Accordingly, the Agency finds that Respondent is not
currently authorized to handle controlled substances in Texas, the
state in which she is registered with the DEA.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ See also Government's Notice of Filing of Evidence and
Motion for Summary Disposition, Exhibit (GX) 2.
\5\ Under the Administrative Procedure Act, an agency ``may take
official notice of facts at any stage in a proceeding--even in the
final decision.'' United States Department of Justice, Attorney
General's Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act 80 (1947) (Wm.
W. Gaunt & Sons, Inc., Reprint 1979). Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 556(e),
``[w]hen an agency decision rests on official notice of a material
fact not appearing in the evidence in the record, a party is
entitled, on timely request, to an opportunity to show the
contrary.'' Accordingly, Respondent may dispute the Agency's finding
by filing a properly supported motion for reconsideration of
findings of fact within fifteen calendar days of the date of this
Order. Any such motion and response shall be filed and served by
email to the other party and to Office of the Administrator, Drug
Enforcement Administration at [email protected].
\6\ In her Opposition, Respondent argues that there are material
facts in dispute that require a hearing, specifically mentioning her
state and federal authority to handle controlled substances.
Respondent's Opposition, at 6. However, as the ALJ correctly notes
in the RD, Respondent does not actually dispute the material fact
that she lacks state and federal authority to handle controlled
substances, with Respondent admitting that she has no current
prescriptive authority delegation agreement with a physician. RD, at
9; Respondent's Opposition, at 2, 11. The Agency also agrees with
the ALJ's finding that the other facts in dispute, such as
Respondent's address, are immaterial and not dispositive to the
adjudication of the current matter. RD, at 9 n.7 (citing Michael
Jones, M.D., 86 FR 20728, 20729 (2021)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Discussion
Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(3), the Attorney General is authorized
to suspend or revoke a registration issued under section 823 of the
Controlled Substances Act (CSA) ``upon a finding that the registrant .
. . has had his State license or registration suspended . . . [or]
revoked . . . by competent State authority and is no longer authorized
by State law to engage in the . . . dispensing of controlled
substances.'' With respect to a practitioner, DEA has also long held
that the possession of authority to dispense controlled substances
under the laws of the state in which a practitioner engages in
professional practice is a fundamental condition for obtaining and
maintaining a practitioner's registration. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S.
243, 270 (2006) (``The Attorney General can register a physician to
dispense controlled substances `if the applicant is authorized to
dispense . . . controlled substances under the laws of the State in
which he practices.' . . . The very definition of a `practitioner'
eligible to prescribe includes physicians `licensed, registered, or
otherwise permitted, by the United States or the jurisdiction in which
he practices' to dispense controlled substances. Sec. 802(21).''). The
Agency has applied these principles consistently. See, e.g., James L.
Hooper, M.D., 76 FR 71371, 71372 (2011), pet. for rev. denied, 481 F.
App'x 826 (4th Cir. 2012); Frederick Marsh Blanton, M.D., 43 FR 27616,
27617 (1978).\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ This rule derives from the text of two provisions of the
CSA. First, Congress defined the term ``practitioner'' to mean ``a
physician . . . or other person licensed, registered, or otherwise
permitted, by . . . the jurisdiction in which he practices . . . ,
to distribute, dispense, . . . [or] administer . . . a controlled
substance in the course of professional practice.'' 21 U.S.C.
802(21). Second, in setting the requirements for obtaining a
practitioner's registration, Congress directed that ``[t]he Attorney
General shall register practitioners . . . if the applicant is
authorized to dispense . . . controlled substances under the laws of
the State in which he practices.'' 21 U.S.C. 823(g)(1). Because
Congress has clearly mandated that a practitioner possess state
authority in order to be deemed a practitioner under the CSA, DEA
has held repeatedly that revocation of a practitioner's registration
is the appropriate sanction whenever he is no longer authorized to
dispense controlled substances under the laws of the state in which
he practices. See, e.g., James L. Hooper, M.D., 76 FR at 71371-72;
Sheran Arden Yeates, M.D., 71 FR 39130, 39131 (2006); Dominick A.
Ricci, M.D., 58 FR 51104, 51105 (1993); Bobby Watts, M.D., 53 FR
11919, 11920 (1988); Frederick Marsh Blanton, 43 FR at 27617.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to Texas statute, ``dispense'' means ``the delivery of a
controlled substance in the course of professional practice or
research, by a practitioner or person acting under the lawful order of
a practitioner, to an ultimate user or research subject. The term
includes the prescribing, administering, packaging, labeling, or
compounding necessary to prepare the substance for delivery.'' Tex.
Health & Safety Code Ann. Sec. 481.002(12) (2024). Further, a
``practitioner'' includes ``an advanced practice registered nurse or
physician assistant to whom a physician has delegated the authority to
prescribe or order a drug or device . . . .'' Id. Sec. 481.002(39)(D).
Texas statute provides that ``[a] physician may delegate to an advanced
practice registered nurse or physician assistant, acting under adequate
physician supervision, the act of prescribing or ordering a drug or
device as authorized through a prescriptive authority agreement between
the physician and the advanced practice registered nurse or physician
assistant, as applicable.'' Tex. Occ. Code Ann. Sec. 157.0512(a)
(2024).
Here, the undisputed evidence in the record is that Respondent
lacks authority to handle controlled substances in Texas because she
does not have a prescriptive authority delegation agreement with a
physician. As discussed above, a Texas advanced practice registered
nurse must have a prescriptive authority delegation agreement with a
physician to dispense controlled substances in Texas. Thus, because
Respondent lacks authority to handle controlled substances in Texas,
Respondent is not eligible to maintain a DEA registration. RD, at 8.
Accordingly, the Agency will order that Respondent's DEA registration
be revoked.
Order
Pursuant to 28 CFR 0.100(b) and the authority vested in me by 21
U.S.C. 824(a), I hereby revoke DEA Certificate of Registration No.
MD7143960 issued to Maria Dewitt, N.P. Further, pursuant to 28 CFR
0.100(b) and the authority vested in me by 21 U.S.C. 823(g)(1), I
hereby deny any pending applications of Maria Dewitt, N.P., to renew or
modify this registration, as well as any other pending application of
Maria Dewitt, N.P., for additional registration in Texas. This Order is
effective January 29, 2025.
Signing Authority
This document of the Drug Enforcement Administration was signed on
December 20, 2024, by Administrator Anne Milgram. That document with
the original signature and date is maintained by DEA. For
administrative purposes only, and in compliance with requirements of
the Office of the Federal Register, the undersigned DEA Federal
Register Liaison Officer has been authorized to sign and submit the
document in electronic format for publication, as an official document
of DEA. This administrative process in no way alters the legal effect
of this document upon publication in the Federal Register.
Heather Achbach,
Federal Register Liaison Officer, Drug Enforcement Administration.
[FR Doc. 2024-31330 Filed 12-27-24; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-09-P