Jeffrey W. Young, Jr., N.P.; Decision and Order, 106591-106592 [2024-31329]
Download as PDF
Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 249 / Monday, December 30, 2024 / Notices
ddrumheller on DSK120RN23PROD with NOTICES1
prescribe includes physicians ‘licensed,
registered, or otherwise permitted, by
the United States or the jurisdiction in
which he practices’ to dispense
controlled substances. § 802(21).’’). The
Agency has applied these principles
consistently. See, e.g., James L. Hooper,
M.D., 76 FR 71,371, 71,372 (2011), pet.
for rev. denied, 481 F. App’x 826 (4th
Cir. 2012); Frederick Marsh Blanton,
M.D., 43 FR 27616, 27617 (1978).3
According to California statute,
‘‘dispense’’ means ‘‘to deliver a
controlled substance to an ultimate user
or research subject by or pursuant to the
lawful order of a practitioner, including
the prescribing, furnishing, packaging,
labeling, or compounding necessary to
prepare the substance for that delivery.’’
Cal. Health & Safety Code section 11010
(West 2024). Further, a ‘‘practitioner’’
means a person ‘‘licensed, registered, or
otherwise permitted, to distribute,
dispense, conduct research with respect
to, or administer, a controlled substance
in the course of professional practice or
research in [the] state.’’ Id.
section 11026(c).
Here, the undisputed evidence in the
record is that Registrant currently lacks
authority to practice as a dentist in
California. As discussed above, an
individual must be a licensed
practitioner to dispense a controlled
substance in California. Thus, because
Registrant currently lacks authority to
practice as a dentist in California and,
therefore, is not currently authorized to
handle controlled substances in
California, Registrant is not eligible to
maintain a DEA registration.
Accordingly, the Agency will order that
Registrant’s DEA registration be
revoked.
3 This rule derives from the text of two provisions
of the CSA. First, Congress defined the term
‘‘practitioner’’ to mean ‘‘a physician . . . or other
person licensed, registered, or otherwise permitted,
by . . . the jurisdiction in which he practices . . . ,
to distribute, dispense, . . . [or] administer . . . a
controlled substance in the course of professional
practice.’’ 21 U.S.C. 802(21). Second, in setting the
requirements for obtaining a practitioner’s
registration, Congress directed that ‘‘[t]he Attorney
General shall register practitioners . . . if the
applicant is authorized to dispense . . . controlled
substances under the laws of the State in which he
practices.’’ 21 U.S.C. 823(g)(1). Because Congress
has clearly mandated that a practitioner possess
state authority in order to be deemed a practitioner
under the CSA, DEA has held repeatedly that
revocation of a practitioner’s registration is the
appropriate sanction whenever he is no longer
authorized to dispense controlled substances under
the laws of the state in which he practices. See, e.g.,
James L. Hooper, M.D., 76 FR 71371–72; Sheran
Arden Yeates, M.D., 71 FR 39130, 39131 (2006);
Dominick A. Ricci, M.D., 58 FR 51104, 51105
(1993); Bobby Watts, M.D., 53 FR 11919, 11920
(1988); Frederick Marsh Blanton, M.D., 43 FR
27617.
VerDate Sep<11>2014
23:58 Dec 27, 2024
Jkt 265001
Order
Pursuant to 28 CFR 0.100(b) and the
authority vested in me by 21 U.S.C.
824(a), I hereby revoke DEA Certificate
of Registration No. FR4257792 issued to
Samreen Riaz, D.D.S. Further, pursuant
to 28 CFR 0.100(b) and the authority
vested in me by 21 U.S.C. 823(g)(1), I
hereby deny any pending applications
of Samreen Riaz, D.D.S., to renew or
modify this registration, as well as any
other pending application of Samreen
Riaz, D.D.S., for additional registration
in California. This Order is effective
January 29, 2025.
Signing Authority
This document of the Drug
Enforcement Administration was signed
on December 20, 2024, by Administrator
Anne Milgram. That document with the
original signature and date is
maintained by DEA. For administrative
purposes only, and in compliance with
requirements of the Office of the Federal
Register, the undersigned DEA Federal
Register Liaison Officer has been
authorized to sign and submit the
document in electronic format for
publication, as an official document of
DEA. This administrative process in no
way alters the legal effect of this
document upon publication in the
Federal Register.
Heather Achbach,
Federal Register Liaison Officer, Drug
Enforcement Administration.
[FR Doc. 2024–31319 Filed 12–27–24; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410–09–P
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Drug Enforcement Administration
Jeffrey W. Young, Jr., N.P.; Decision
and Order
On June 8, 2021, the Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA or
Government) issued an Order to Show
Cause (OSC) to Jeffrey W. Young, Jr.,
N.P., of Jackson, Tennessee (Registrant).
Request for Final Agency Action
(RFAA), Exhibit (RFAAX) 2, at 1, 4. The
OSC proposed the revocation of
Registrant’s Certificate of Registration
No. MY1093424, alleging that
Registrant’s registration should be
revoked because Registrant is ‘‘currently
without authority to handle controlled
substances in Tennessee, the state in
which [he is] registered with DEA.’’ Id.
at 2 (citing 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(3)).
The OSC notified Registrant of his
right to file a written request for hearing,
and that if he failed to file such a
request, he would be deemed to have
waived his right to a hearing and be in
PO 00000
Frm 00186
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
106591
default. Id. at 2–3 (citing 21 CFR
1301.43). Here, Registrant did not
request a hearing. RFAA, at 2.1 ‘‘A
default, unless excused, shall be
deemed to constitute a waiver of the
registrant’s/applicant’s right to a hearing
and an admission of the factual
allegations of the [OSC].’’ 21 CFR
1301.43(e).
Further, ‘‘[i]n the event that a
registrant . . . is deemed to be in
default . . . DEA may then file a request
for final agency action with the
Administrator, along with a record to
support its request. In such
circumstances, the Administrator may
enter a default final order pursuant to
[21 CFR] § 1316.67.’’ Id. § 1301.43(f)(1).
Here, the Government has requested
final agency action based on Registrant’s
default pursuant to 21 CFR 1301.43(e).
RFAA, at 1.
Findings of Fact
The Agency finds that, in light of
Registrant’s default, the factual
allegations in the OSC are admitted.
According to the OSC, on September 30,
2019, Registrant’s Tennessee registered
nurse license and Tennessee advanced
practice registered nurse certificate both
expired. RFAAX 2, 2. According to
Tennessee online records, of which the
Agency takes official notice, both
Registrant’s Tennessee registered nurse
license and Tennessee advanced
practice registered nurse certificate are
revoked.2 NURSYS License Verification
Search, https://www.nursys.com/LQC/
LQCSearch.aspx (last visited date of
signature of this Order). Accordingly,
the Agency finds that Registrant is not
licensed to practice as a nurse
1 Based on the Government’s submissions in its
RFAA dated June 11, 2024, the Agency finds that
service of the OSC on Registrant was adequate.
Specifically, the included Declaration from a DEA
Diversion Investigator (DI) indicates that on June
14, 2021, a DEA Task Force Officer (TFO)
personally served a copy of the OSC to Registrant
at the West Tennessee Detention Facility in Mason,
Tennessee, where Registrant remained incarcerated.
RFAAX 3, at 2–3, Attachment C.
2 Under the Administrative Procedure Act, an
agency ‘‘may take official notice of facts at any stage
in a proceeding—even in the final decision.’’
United States Department of Justice, Attorney
General’s Manual on the Administrative Procedure
Act 80 (1947) (Wm. W. Gaunt & Sons, Inc., Reprint
1979). Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 556(e), ‘‘[w]hen an
agency decision rests on official notice of a material
fact not appearing in the evidence in the record, a
party is entitled, on timely request, to an
opportunity to show the contrary.’’ Accordingly,
Registrant may dispute the Agency’s finding by
filing a properly supported motion for
reconsideration of findings of fact within fifteen
calendar days of the date of this Order. Any such
motion and response shall be filed and served by
email to the other party and to the DEA Office of
the Administrator, Drug Enforcement
Administration at dea.addo.attorneys@dea.gov.
E:\FR\FM\30DEN1.SGM
30DEN1
106592
Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 249 / Monday, December 30, 2024 / Notices
practitioner in Tennessee, the state in
which he is registered with DEA.
ddrumheller on DSK120RN23PROD with NOTICES1
Discussion
Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(3), the
Attorney General is authorized to
suspend or revoke a registration issued
under 21 U.S.C. 823 ‘‘upon a finding
that the registrant . . . has had his State
license or registration suspended . . .
[or] revoked . . . by competent State
authority and is no longer authorized by
State law to engage in the . . .
dispensing of controlled substances.’’
With respect to a practitioner, DEA has
also long held that the possession of
authority to dispense controlled
substances under the laws of the state in
which a practitioner engages in
professional practice is a fundamental
condition for obtaining and maintaining
a practitioner’s registration. Gonzales v.
Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 270 (2006) (‘‘The
Attorney General can register a
physician to dispense controlled
substances ‘if the applicant is
authorized to dispense . . . controlled
substances under the laws of the State
in which he practices.’ . . . The very
definition of a ‘practitioner’ eligible to
prescribe includes physicians ‘licensed,
registered, or otherwise permitted, by
the United States or the jurisdiction in
which he practices’ to dispense
controlled substances. § 802(21).’’). The
Agency has applied these principles
consistently. See, e.g., James L. Hooper,
M.D., 76 FR 71371, 71372 (2011), pet.
for rev. denied, 481 F. App’x 826 (4th
Cir. 2012); Frederick Marsh Blanton,
M.D., 43 FR 27616, 27617 (1978).3
According to Tennessee statute,
‘‘dispense’’ means ‘‘to deliver a
controlled substance to an ultimate user
or research subject by or pursuant to the
lawful order of a practitioner, including
3 This rule derives from the text of two provisions
of the CSA. First, Congress defined the term
‘‘practitioner’’ to mean ‘‘a physician . . . or other
person licensed, registered, or otherwise permitted,
by . . . the jurisdiction in which he practices . . . ,
to distribute, dispense, . . . [or] administer . . . a
controlled substance in the course of professional
practice.’’ 21 U.S.C. 802(21). Second, in setting the
requirements for obtaining a practitioner’s
registration, Congress directed that ‘‘[t]he Attorney
General shall register practitioners . . . if the
applicant is authorized to dispense . . . controlled
substances under the laws of the State in which he
practices.’’ 21 U.S.C. 823(g)(1). Because Congress
has clearly mandated that a practitioner possess
state authority in order to be deemed a practitioner
under the CSA, DEA has held repeatedly that
revocation of a practitioner’s registration is the
appropriate sanction whenever he is no longer
authorized to dispense controlled substances under
the laws of the state in which he practices. See, e.g.,
James L. Hooper, M.D., 76 FR at 71371–72; Sheran
Arden Yeates, M.D., 71 FR 39130, 39131 (2006);
Dominick A. Ricci, M.D., 58 FR 51104, 51105
(1993); Bobby Watts, M.D., 53 FR 11919, 11,920
(1988); Frederick Marsh Blanton, M.D., 43 FR at
27617.
VerDate Sep<11>2014
23:58 Dec 27, 2024
Jkt 265001
the prescribing, administering,
packaging, labeling, or compounding
necessary to prepare the substance for
that delivery.’’ Tenn. Code Ann. § 39–
17–402(7) (2024). Further, a
‘‘practitioner’’ means ‘‘a physician . . .
or other person licensed, registered or
otherwise permitted to distribute,
dispense, conduct research with respect
to or administer a controlled substance
in the course of professional practice or
research in [the] state.’’ Id. § 39–17–
402(23)(A).
Here, the undisputed evidence in the
record is that Registrant lacks authority
to practice as a nurse practitioner in
Tennessee. As discussed above, an
individual must be a licensed
practitioner to dispense a controlled
substance in Tennessee. Thus, because
Registrant lacks authority to practice as
a nurse practitioner in Tennessee and,
therefore, is not authorized to handle
controlled substances in Tennessee,
Registrant is not eligible to maintain a
DEA registration. Accordingly, the
Agency will order that Registrant’s DEA
registration be revoked.
Order
Pursuant to 28 CFR0.100(b) and the
authority vested in me by 21 U.S.C.
824(a), I hereby revoke DEA Certificate
of Registration No. MY1093424, issued
to Jeffrey W. Young, Jr., N.P. Further,
pursuant to 28 CFR 0.100(b) and the
authority vested in me by 21 U.S.C.
823(g)(1), I hereby deny any pending
applications of Jeffrey W. Young, Jr.,
N.P., to renew or modify this
registration, as well as any other
pending application of Jeffrey W.
Young, Jr., N.P., for additional
registration in Tennessee. This Order is
effective January 29, 2025.
Signing Authority
This document of the Drug
Enforcement Administration was signed
on December 20, 2024, by Administrator
Anne Milgram. That document with the
original signature and date is
maintained by DEA. For administrative
purposes only, and in compliance with
requirements of the Office of the Federal
Register, the undersigned DEA Federal
Register Liaison Officer has been
authorized to sign and submit the
document in electronic format for
publication, as an official document of
DEA. This administrative process in no
way alters the legal effect of this
PO 00000
Frm 00187
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
document upon publication in the
Federal Register.
Heather Achbach,
Federal Register Liaison Officer, Drug
Enforcement Administration.
[FR Doc. 2024–31329 Filed 12–27–24; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410–09–P
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Notice of Lodging of Proposed
Consent Decree Under the
Comprehensive Environmental
Response Compensation and Liability
Act
On December 19, 2024, the
Department of Justice lodged a proposed
Consent Decree with the United States
District Court for the Western District of
Virginia in the lawsuit entitled United
States and Commonwealth of Virginia,
Secretary of Natural and Historic
Resources v. FMC Corporation, Civil
Action No. 5:24–CR–108.
The lawsuit was initiated by a
complaint filed by the United States and
the Commonwealth of Virginia (the
‘‘Trustees’’) in their capacity as the
legally designated trustees for natural
resources in Virginia. The complaint
alleged, inter alia, that the Defendant
was liable for damages for injury to,
destruction of, or loss of natural
resources resulting from the release of
hazardous substances at and from the
Avtex Fibers, Inc. Site (the ‘‘Site’’) in
Front Royal, Virginia, pursuant to three
statutes: the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation
and Liability Act of 1980, the Virginia
State Water Control Law, and the
Virginia Waste Management Act.
The Consent Decree resolves the
claims of the Trustees against the
Defendant for a total payment of
$1,674,361. Of this amount, $1,393,219
will be paid into the United States’
Natural Resource Damages Assessment
and Restoration ‘‘(NRDAR’’) Fund
managed by the U.S. Department of the
Interior, which will reimburse the
Department’s natural resource damages
assessment activities and fund projects
aimed at restoring the injured natural
resources at the Site. The remaining
$281,142 will be paid to the
Commonwealth of Virginia for
restoration of injured natural resources
arising from groundwater contamination
at the Site, and to reimburse the
Commonwealth’s natural resource
damages assessment costs. In addition,
as part of the settlement the United
States will pay $2,496,305 into the
NRDAR Fund to support restoration
projects. This latter amount will resolve
the alleged liability of four settling
E:\FR\FM\30DEN1.SGM
30DEN1
Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 89, Number 249 (Monday, December 30, 2024)]
[Notices]
[Pages 106591-106592]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2024-31329]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Drug Enforcement Administration
Jeffrey W. Young, Jr., N.P.; Decision and Order
On June 8, 2021, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA or
Government) issued an Order to Show Cause (OSC) to Jeffrey W. Young,
Jr., N.P., of Jackson, Tennessee (Registrant). Request for Final Agency
Action (RFAA), Exhibit (RFAAX) 2, at 1, 4. The OSC proposed the
revocation of Registrant's Certificate of Registration No. MY1093424,
alleging that Registrant's registration should be revoked because
Registrant is ``currently without authority to handle controlled
substances in Tennessee, the state in which [he is] registered with
DEA.'' Id. at 2 (citing 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(3)).
The OSC notified Registrant of his right to file a written request
for hearing, and that if he failed to file such a request, he would be
deemed to have waived his right to a hearing and be in default. Id. at
2-3 (citing 21 CFR 1301.43). Here, Registrant did not request a
hearing. RFAA, at 2.\1\ ``A default, unless excused, shall be deemed to
constitute a waiver of the registrant's/applicant's right to a hearing
and an admission of the factual allegations of the [OSC].'' 21 CFR
1301.43(e).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Based on the Government's submissions in its RFAA dated June
11, 2024, the Agency finds that service of the OSC on Registrant was
adequate. Specifically, the included Declaration from a DEA
Diversion Investigator (DI) indicates that on June 14, 2021, a DEA
Task Force Officer (TFO) personally served a copy of the OSC to
Registrant at the West Tennessee Detention Facility in Mason,
Tennessee, where Registrant remained incarcerated. RFAAX 3, at 2-3,
Attachment C.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Further, ``[i]n the event that a registrant . . . is deemed to be
in default . . . DEA may then file a request for final agency action
with the Administrator, along with a record to support its request. In
such circumstances, the Administrator may enter a default final order
pursuant to [21 CFR] Sec. 1316.67.'' Id. Sec. 1301.43(f)(1). Here,
the Government has requested final agency action based on Registrant's
default pursuant to 21 CFR 1301.43(e). RFAA, at 1.
Findings of Fact
The Agency finds that, in light of Registrant's default, the
factual allegations in the OSC are admitted. According to the OSC, on
September 30, 2019, Registrant's Tennessee registered nurse license and
Tennessee advanced practice registered nurse certificate both expired.
RFAAX 2, 2. According to Tennessee online records, of which the Agency
takes official notice, both Registrant's Tennessee registered nurse
license and Tennessee advanced practice registered nurse certificate
are revoked.\2\ NURSYS License Verification Search, https://www.nursys.com/LQC/LQCSearch.aspx (last visited date of signature of
this Order). Accordingly, the Agency finds that Registrant is not
licensed to practice as a nurse
[[Page 106592]]
practitioner in Tennessee, the state in which he is registered with
DEA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Under the Administrative Procedure Act, an agency ``may take
official notice of facts at any stage in a proceeding--even in the
final decision.'' United States Department of Justice, Attorney
General's Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act 80 (1947) (Wm.
W. Gaunt & Sons, Inc., Reprint 1979). Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 556(e),
``[w]hen an agency decision rests on official notice of a material
fact not appearing in the evidence in the record, a party is
entitled, on timely request, to an opportunity to show the
contrary.'' Accordingly, Registrant may dispute the Agency's finding
by filing a properly supported motion for reconsideration of
findings of fact within fifteen calendar days of the date of this
Order. Any such motion and response shall be filed and served by
email to the other party and to the DEA Office of the Administrator,
Drug Enforcement Administration at [email protected].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Discussion
Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(3), the Attorney General is authorized
to suspend or revoke a registration issued under 21 U.S.C. 823 ``upon a
finding that the registrant . . . has had his State license or
registration suspended . . . [or] revoked . . . by competent State
authority and is no longer authorized by State law to engage in the . .
. dispensing of controlled substances.'' With respect to a
practitioner, DEA has also long held that the possession of authority
to dispense controlled substances under the laws of the state in which
a practitioner engages in professional practice is a fundamental
condition for obtaining and maintaining a practitioner's registration.
Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 270 (2006) (``The Attorney General
can register a physician to dispense controlled substances `if the
applicant is authorized to dispense . . . controlled substances under
the laws of the State in which he practices.' . . . The very definition
of a `practitioner' eligible to prescribe includes physicians
`licensed, registered, or otherwise permitted, by the United States or
the jurisdiction in which he practices' to dispense controlled
substances. Sec. 802(21).''). The Agency has applied these principles
consistently. See, e.g., James L. Hooper, M.D., 76 FR 71371, 71372
(2011), pet. for rev. denied, 481 F. App'x 826 (4th Cir. 2012);
Frederick Marsh Blanton, M.D., 43 FR 27616, 27617 (1978).\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ This rule derives from the text of two provisions of the
CSA. First, Congress defined the term ``practitioner'' to mean ``a
physician . . . or other person licensed, registered, or otherwise
permitted, by . . . the jurisdiction in which he practices . . . ,
to distribute, dispense, . . . [or] administer . . . a controlled
substance in the course of professional practice.'' 21 U.S.C.
802(21). Second, in setting the requirements for obtaining a
practitioner's registration, Congress directed that ``[t]he Attorney
General shall register practitioners . . . if the applicant is
authorized to dispense . . . controlled substances under the laws of
the State in which he practices.'' 21 U.S.C. 823(g)(1). Because
Congress has clearly mandated that a practitioner possess state
authority in order to be deemed a practitioner under the CSA, DEA
has held repeatedly that revocation of a practitioner's registration
is the appropriate sanction whenever he is no longer authorized to
dispense controlled substances under the laws of the state in which
he practices. See, e.g., James L. Hooper, M.D., 76 FR at 71371-72;
Sheran Arden Yeates, M.D., 71 FR 39130, 39131 (2006); Dominick A.
Ricci, M.D., 58 FR 51104, 51105 (1993); Bobby Watts, M.D., 53 FR
11919, 11,920 (1988); Frederick Marsh Blanton, M.D., 43 FR at 27617.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to Tennessee statute, ``dispense'' means ``to deliver a
controlled substance to an ultimate user or research subject by or
pursuant to the lawful order of a practitioner, including the
prescribing, administering, packaging, labeling, or compounding
necessary to prepare the substance for that delivery.'' Tenn. Code Ann.
Sec. 39-17-402(7) (2024). Further, a ``practitioner'' means ``a
physician . . . or other person licensed, registered or otherwise
permitted to distribute, dispense, conduct research with respect to or
administer a controlled substance in the course of professional
practice or research in [the] state.'' Id. Sec. 39-17-402(23)(A).
Here, the undisputed evidence in the record is that Registrant
lacks authority to practice as a nurse practitioner in Tennessee. As
discussed above, an individual must be a licensed practitioner to
dispense a controlled substance in Tennessee. Thus, because Registrant
lacks authority to practice as a nurse practitioner in Tennessee and,
therefore, is not authorized to handle controlled substances in
Tennessee, Registrant is not eligible to maintain a DEA registration.
Accordingly, the Agency will order that Registrant's DEA registration
be revoked.
Order
Pursuant to 28 CFR0.100(b) and the authority vested in me by 21
U.S.C. 824(a), I hereby revoke DEA Certificate of Registration No.
MY1093424, issued to Jeffrey W. Young, Jr., N.P. Further, pursuant to
28 CFR 0.100(b) and the authority vested in me by 21 U.S.C. 823(g)(1),
I hereby deny any pending applications of Jeffrey W. Young, Jr., N.P.,
to renew or modify this registration, as well as any other pending
application of Jeffrey W. Young, Jr., N.P., for additional registration
in Tennessee. This Order is effective January 29, 2025.
Signing Authority
This document of the Drug Enforcement Administration was signed on
December 20, 2024, by Administrator Anne Milgram. That document with
the original signature and date is maintained by DEA. For
administrative purposes only, and in compliance with requirements of
the Office of the Federal Register, the undersigned DEA Federal
Register Liaison Officer has been authorized to sign and submit the
document in electronic format for publication, as an official document
of DEA. This administrative process in no way alters the legal effect
of this document upon publication in the Federal Register.
Heather Achbach,
Federal Register Liaison Officer, Drug Enforcement Administration.
[FR Doc. 2024-31329 Filed 12-27-24; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-09-P