Extension of the Prohibition Against Certain Flights in Specified Areas of the Sanaa Flight Information Region (FIR) (OYSC), 106301-106307 [2024-31188]

Agencies

• Federal Aviation Administration
• DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

[Federal Register Volume 89, Number 249 (Monday, December 30, 2024)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 106301-106307]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2024-31188]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 91

Docket No. FAA-2015-8672; Amdt. No. 91-340E]
RIN 2120-AL96


Extension of the Prohibition Against Certain Flights in Specified 
Areas of the Sanaa Flight Information Region (FIR) (OYSC)

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of 
Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Final rule.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: This action extends the prohibition against certain flight 
operations in specified areas of the Sanaa Flight Information Region 
(FIR) (OYSC) by all: U.S. air carriers; U.S. commercial operators; 
persons exercising the privileges of an airman certificate issued by 
the FAA, except when such persons are operating U.S.-registered 
aircraft for a foreign air carrier; and operators of U.S.-registered 
civil aircraft, except when the operator of such aircraft is a foreign 
air carrier, for an additional three years, from January 7, 2025, until 
January 7, 2028. The FAA finds this action necessary to address 
significant, unacceptable safety-of-flight risks to U.S. civil aviation 
operations in the specified areas of the Sanaa FIR (OYSC) stemming from 
heightened regional tensions associated with Houthi weapons employment 
and operational activities. Most recently, Houthi forces have engaged 
in increased weapons employment and operational activities related to 
the Israel-Gaza Conflict, leading in some cases to air defense 
responses. The FAA also takes into account the Houthis' recent history 
of having conducted long-range attacks emanating from the Sanaa FIR 
(OYSC) in other directions, notably against Saudi Arabia and the United 
Arab Emirates (UAE) in 2022. The FAA also republishes the approval 
process and exemption information for this Special Federal Aviation 
Regulation (SFAR), consistent with other recently published flight 
prohibition SFARs.

DATES: This final rule is effective on December 30, 2024.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Bill Petrak, Flight Standards Service, 
through the Washington Operations Center, Federal Aviation 
Administration, 800 Independence Avenue SW, Washington, DC 20591; 
telephone (202) 267-3203; email [email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Executive Summary

    This action extends the expiration date of SFAR No. 115, title 14 
Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) 91.1611, from January 7, 2025, 
until January 7, 2028. SFAR No. 115 prohibits certain flight operations 
in the specified areas of the Sanaa FIR (OYSC) by all: U.S. air 
carriers; U.S. commercial operators; persons exercising the privileges 
of an airman certificate issued by the FAA, except when such persons 
are operating U.S.-registered aircraft for a foreign air carrier; and 
operators of U.S.-registered civil aircraft, except when the operator 
of such aircraft is a foreign air carrier. Since the start of the 
Israel-Gaza Conflict, Houthi forces have launched numerous long-range 
weaponized unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), missiles, and rockets out 
of Houthi-controlled territories in Yemen toward intended targets in 
Israel, the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the Arabian Sea. These 
attacks have been likely attempts to strike Israel and hold maritime 
shipping in the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the Arabian Sea at risk. 
Prior to the 2022 UN brokered ceasefire,

[[Page 106302]]

which has expired, the Houthis conducted similar long-range attacks 
against Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Additionally, Houthi forces armed 
with advanced anti-aircraft weapons systems capable of targeting 
aircraft at or above standard cruising altitudes have successfully 
engaged Western intelligence and surveillance aircraft operating over 
Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen and over the Red Sea.
    Consistent with other recently published flight prohibition SFARs, 
this action also republishes the approval process and exemption 
information for this flight prohibition SFAR.

II. Authority and Good Cause

A. Authority

    The FAA is responsible for the safety of flight in the U.S. and for 
the safety of U.S. civil operators, U.S.-registered civil aircraft, and 
U.S.-certificated airmen throughout the world. Section 106(f) of title 
49, U.S. Code (U.S.C.), subtitle I, establishes the FAA Administrator's 
authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle VII of title 49, 
Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the agency's 
authority. Section 40101(d)(1) provides that the Administrator shall 
consider in the public interest, among other matters, assigning, 
maintaining, and enhancing safety and security as the highest 
priorities in air commerce. Section 40105(b)(1)(A) requires the 
Administrator to exercise this authority consistently with the 
obligations of the U.S. Government under international agreements.
    The FAA is promulgating this rule under the authority described in 
49 U.S.C. 44701, General requirements. Under that section, the FAA is 
charged broadly with promoting safe flight of U.S. civil aircraft in 
air commerce by prescribing, among other things, regulations and 
minimum standards for practices, methods, and procedures that the 
Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce and national 
security.
    This regulation is within the scope of the FAA's authority because 
it continues to prohibit the persons described in paragraph (a) of SFAR 
No. 115, Sec.  91.1611, from conducting flight operations in the 
specified areas of the Sanaa FIR (OYSC) due to the continuing 
significant hazards to the safety of U.S. civil flight operations, as 
described in the preamble to this final rule.

B. Good Cause for Immediate Adoption

    Section 553(b)(B) of title 5, U.S.C., authorizes agencies to 
dispense with notice and comment procedures for rules when the agency 
for ``good cause'' finds that those procedures are ``impracticable, 
unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.'' Also, section 553(d) 
permits agencies, upon a finding of good cause, to issue rules with an 
effective date less than 30 days from the date of publication. In this 
instance, the FAA finds good cause to forgo notice and comment and the 
delayed effective date because they would be impracticable and contrary 
to the public interest.
    Providing notice and the opportunity for the public to comment here 
would be impracticable. The FAA's flight prohibitions, and any 
amendments thereto, need to include appropriate boundaries that reflect 
the agency's current understanding of the risk environment for U.S. 
civil aviation. This allows the FAA to protect the safety of U.S. 
operators' aircraft and the lives of their passengers and crews without 
over-restricting or under-restricting U.S. operators' routing options. 
However, the risk environment for U.S. civil aviation in airspace 
managed by other countries with respect to safety of flight is fluid in 
circumstances involving fighting, violent extremist and militant 
activity, or periods of heightened tensions, particularly where weapons 
capable of targeting or otherwise negatively affecting U.S. civil 
aviation are or may be present. This fluidity, and the potential for 
rapid changes in the risks to U.S. civil aviation, significantly limits 
how far in advance of a new or amended flight prohibition the FAA can 
usefully assess the risk environment. The delay that would be 
occasioned by providing an opportunity to comment on this action would 
significantly increase the risk that the resulting final action would 
not accurately reflect the current risks to U.S. civil aviation 
associated with the situation and thus would not establish boundaries 
for the flight prohibition commensurate with those risks.
    While the FAA sought and responded to public comments, the 
boundaries of the area in which unacceptable risks to the safety of 
U.S. civil aviation existed might change due to: evolving military or 
political circumstances; violent extremist and militant group activity; 
the introduction, removal, or repositioning of more advanced anti-
aircraft weapon systems; or other factors. As a result, if the 
situation improved while the FAA sought and responded to public 
comments, the rule the FAA finalized might be over-restrictive, 
unnecessarily limiting U.S. operators' routing options and potentially 
causing them to incur unnecessary additional fuel and operations-
related costs, as well as potentially causing passengers to incur 
unnecessarily some costs attributed to their time. Conversely, if the 
situation deteriorated while the FAA sought and responded to public 
comments, the rule the FAA finalized might be under-restrictive, 
allowing U.S. civil aviation to continue operating in areas where 
unacceptable risks to their safety had developed. Such an outcome would 
endanger the safety of these aircraft, as well as their passengers and 
crews, exposing them to unacceptable risks of death, injury, and 
property damage that could occur if a U.S. operator's aircraft were 
shot down (or otherwise damaged) while operating in the specified areas 
of the Sanaa FIR (OYSC).
    Alternatively, if the FAA made changes to the area in which U.S. 
civil aviation operations would be prohibited between a notice of 
proposed rulemaking and a final rule due to changed conditions, the 
version of the rule the public commented on would no longer reflect the 
FAA's current assessment of the risk environment for U.S. civil 
aviation.
    In addition, seeking comment would be contrary to the public 
interest because some of the rational basis for the rulemaking is based 
upon classified information and controlled unclassified information not 
authorized for public release. In order to meaningfully provide comment 
on a proposal, the public would need access to the basis for the 
agency's decision-making, which the FAA cannot provide. Disclosing 
classified information or controlled unclassified information not 
authorized for public release in order to seek meaningful comment on 
the proposal would harm the public interest. Accordingly, the FAA 
meaningfully seeking comment on the proposal is contrary to the public 
interest.
    Therefore, providing notice and the opportunity for comment would 
be impracticable as it would hinder the FAA's ability to maintain 
appropriate flight prohibitions based on up-to-date risk assessments of 
the risks to the safety of U.S. civil aviation operations in airspace 
managed by other countries. It would also be contrary to the public 
interest, as the FAA cannot protect classified information and 
controlled unclassified information not authorized for public release 
and meaningfully seek public comment.
    For the same reasons discussed above, the potential safety impacts 
and the need for prompt action on up-to-date information that is not 
public would make delaying the effective date impracticable and 
contrary to the public interest.

[[Page 106303]]

    Accordingly, the FAA finds good cause exists to forgo notice and 
comment and any delay in the effective date for this rule.

III. Background

    In its most recent extension of the prohibition against certain 
flights in specified areas of the Sanaa FIR (OYSC),1 2 the 
FAA continued to assess the situation in the specified areas of the 
Sanaa FIR (OYSC) as presenting significant, continuing safety-of-flight 
risks for U.S. civil aviation due to the ongoing conflict between the 
Saudi-led Coalition (SLC) and Houthi forces and the enduring extremist 
or militant threat to U.S. civil aviation operations in those areas. 
Houthi forces had continued to develop, acquire, and employ advanced 
weapons capabilities, including and nontraditional air defense 
capabilities, UAS, and missile capabilities. Collectively, such 
capabilities posed risks to U.S. civil aviation operations at all 
altitudes in the specified areas of the Sanaa FIR (OYSC) and at 
airports in Yemen.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ Extension of the Prohibition Against Certain Flights in 
Specified Areas of the Sanaa Flight Information Region (FIR) (OYSC) 
final rule, 86 FR 69167 (Dec. 7, 2021).
    \2\ Subsequent to the publication of the 2021 final rule, the 
FAA became aware the International Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO) Middle East Air Navigation Planning and Implementation 
Regional Group approved an update to the Regional Air Navigation 
Plan to amend certain waypoints. Some of the amendments affected 
waypoints used by the FAA to demarcate the boundary between the 
airspace in which U.S. operators are prohibited from conducting 
operations and the airspace in which U.S. operators are permitted to 
operate. To address the amendments of waypoints, on September 22, 
2023, the FAA published a technical amendment in the Federal 
Register identifying the new waypoint names and locations to clarify 
where U.S. operators are prohibited from conducting operations due 
to flight safety risks associated with the conflict in Yemen and 
where they are permitted to operate. 88 FR 65319.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Houthi forces operated multiple air defense systems capable of 
targeting aircraft at various altitudes. They had employed increasingly 
capable Iranian-supplied surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and electro-
optical/infrared seeker air-to-air missiles modified for use as SAMs to 
engage aircraft. Houthi air defense capabilities posed an inadvertent 
risk to U.S. civil aviation operations due to the potential for 
misidentification or miscalculation by irregular forces using advanced 
air defense capabilities for which they may not have received adequate 
training and may not have had adequate air surveillance information to 
distinguish accurately between civil aircraft and potential airborne 
threats. In the preamble to the December 2021 final rule, the FAA 
stated that it continued to assess, at that time, that Houthi forces in 
Yemen did not possess functional medium-/long-range strategic SAM 
capabilities. Houthi forces have subsequently acquired longer range 
anti-aircraft weapon systems.
    Additionally, as described in the preamble to the December 2021 
final rule, Houthi forces had targeted international airports in the 
region using weaponized UAS, ballistic, and cruise missiles. Although 
the FAA noted that some Houthi offensive weapons systems had range 
capabilities that would allow them to reach the limited areas of the 
Sanaa FIR (OYSC) in which the FAA permits U.S. civil aviation to 
operate, Houthi forces had not demonstrated an intent to conduct 
weaponized UAS or missile attacks in those areas. Instead, they had 
focused these types of attacks primarily on targets in Saudi Arabia and 
in contested areas of Yemen. In addition, in the preamble to the 
December 2021 final rule, the FAA assessed Houthi weaponized UAS 
operations would only present a safety-of-flight hazard to civil 
aircraft operating off the Yemeni coast if such aircraft were operating 
below cruising altitudes.
    Besides the safety-of-flight risks associated with the SLC-Houthi 
conflict, in the preamble to the December 7, 2021 final rule, the FAA 
assessed extremist or militant groups operating in Yemen likely had 
access to anti-aircraft-capable weapons, including man-portable air 
defense systems (MANPADS), which pose risks up to 25,000 feet. Al-
Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) continued to operate in Yemen 
and historically had attempted to attack Western civil aviation through 
novel improvised explosive devices, including the failed 2009 underwear 
bombing attempt on a U.S.-bound flight and the 2010 printer cartridge 
plot that targeted U.S.-bound cargo flights. Additionally, Islamic 
State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS) cells remained active in Yemen.

IV. Discussion of the Final Rule

    The FAA has assessed the situation in the specified areas of the 
Sanaa FIR (OYSC) and determined that it continues to be hazardous for 
U.S. civil aviation. Since the beginning of the Israel-Gaza Conflict in 
October 2023, Houthi forces have launched numerous attacks likely 
targeting Israel and maritime shipping in the Red Sea, the Gulf of 
Aden, and the Arabian Sea using a variety of weapons including cruise 
missiles, anti-ship ballistic missiles, and weaponized UAS. Such 
attacks present significant risks to safety-of-flight of U.S. civil 
aviation in the specified areas of the Sanaa FIR (OYSC) addressed by 
this flight prohibition SFAR. Although the majority of these attacks 
primarily pose low-altitude risks, Houthi-launched ballistic missiles 
pose risks to aircraft operating at or above standard cruising 
altitudes, as ballistic missile trajectories may ascend through or over 
established air routes. Additionally, ballistic missile operations can 
negatively affect flight safety in the event of a missile failure, as 
falling debris may descend through air routes.
    Houthi forces are also equipped with a variety of advanced anti-
aircraft weapons--including various MANPADS, SAMs, and Iranian-
proliferated loitering munition systems--capable of targeting aircraft 
at or above standard cruising altitudes. In 2023 and 2024, the Houthis 
used these systems to successfully intercept multiple U.S. 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance UAS over Yemen and the 
Red Sea. These weapon systems pose risks to civil aviation operations 
over Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen, with ranges extending beyond 
the specified areas of the Sanaa FIR (OYSC). For example, in November 
2023, the Houthis claimed responsibility for having allegedly shot down 
a MQ-9 Reaper off the western coast of Yemen. Additionally, in late May 
2024, the Houthis claimed responsibility for shooting down another MQ-9 
near Marib, Yemen. Houthi air defense operations have continued over 
Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen and off Yemen's west coast, in 
likely attempts to intercept Western military reconnaissance 
operations. The FAA remains concerned that Houthi forces operating 
advanced anti-aircraft weapons may not have adequate training or 
adequate air surveillance information to distinguish accurately between 
civil aircraft and potential airborne threats. There are concerns that 
Houthi forces may now possess functional medium-range SAMs. These 
circumstances present an unacceptable inadvertent risk of aircraft 
misidentification, which could result in the accidental shoot down of a 
civil aircraft, in the specified areas of the Sanaa FIR (OYSC).
    Additionally, AQAP and ISIS have remained active in Yemen and 
likely have access to a variety of weapons, including small arms; small 
commercially-available UAS, which can be weaponized; and potentially 
legacy MANPADS, posing risks to aircraft up to 25,000 feet.
    Collectively, the various threat actors' existing capabilities, 
coupled with their demonstrated intent to use these weapons, presents a 
continued, significant, and unacceptable level of risk to U.S. civil 
aviation operations at

[[Page 106304]]

all altitudes in the specified areas of the Sanaa FIR (OYSC). Houthi 
cross-border attacks into Saudi Arabia and the UAE ceased following an 
April 2022 United Nations (UN)-brokered temporary ceasefire between the 
Houthis and the SLC, even though the temporary ceasefire expired in the 
fall of 2022 without the Houthis and the SLC agreeing to a longer-term 
formal ceasefire. However, SLC-Houthi cross-border attacks could resume 
with little or no warning--a risk that has significantly increased 
since the start of the Israel-Gaza Conflict in October 2023 due to 
increased regional volatility.
    Therefore, the FAA extends the expiration date of SFAR No. 115, 
Sec.  91.1611, from January 7, 2025, until January 7, 2028, without any 
changes to the boundaries of the SFAR.
    If the risk to U.S. civil aviation safety and security decreases to 
an acceptable level, then further amendments to SFAR No. 115, Sec.  
91.1611, might be appropriate. The FAA will continue to monitor the 
situation and evaluate the extent to which persons described in 
paragraph (a) of this rule might be able to operate safely in the 
specified areas of the Sanaa FIR (OYSC).
    The FAA also republishes the details concerning the approval and 
exemption processes in sections V and VI of this preamble, consistent 
with other recently published flight prohibition SFARs, to enable 
interested persons to refer to this final rule for comprehensive 
information about requesting relief from the FAA from the provisions of 
SFAR No. 115, Sec.  91.1611.

V. Approval Process Based on a Request From a Department, Agency, or 
Instrumentality of the United States Government

A. Approval Process Based on an Authorization Request From a 
Department, Agency, or Instrumentality of the United States Government

    In some instances, U.S. Government departments, agencies, or 
instrumentalities may need to engage U.S. civil aviation to support 
their activities in the specified areas of the Sanaa FIR (OYSC). If a 
department, agency, or instrumentality of the U.S. Government 
determines that it has a critical need to engage any person described 
in paragraph (a) of SFAR No. 115, Sec.  91.1611, including a U.S. air 
carrier or commercial operator, to transport civilian or military 
passengers or cargo or conduct other operations in the specified areas 
of the Sanaa FIR (OYSC), that department, agency, or instrumentality 
may request the FAA to approve persons described in paragraph (a) of 
SFAR No. 115, Sec.  91.1611, to conduct such operations.
    The requesting U.S. Government department, agency, or 
instrumentality must submit the request for approval to the FAA's 
Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety in a letter signed by an 
appropriate senior official of the requesting department, agency, or 
instrumentality.\3\ The FAA will not accept or consider requests for 
approval from anyone other than the requesting U.S. Government 
department, agency, or instrumentality. In addition, the senior 
official signing the letter requesting FAA approval must be 
sufficiently positioned within the requesting department, agency, or 
instrumentality to demonstrate that the organization's senior 
leadership supports the request for approval and is committed to taking 
all necessary steps to minimize aviation safety and security risks to 
the proposed flights. The senior official must also be in a position 
to: (1) attest to the accuracy of all representations made to the FAA 
in the request for approval, and (2) ensure that any support from the 
requesting U.S. Government department, agency, or instrumentality 
described in the request for approval is in fact brought to bear and is 
maintained over time. Unless justified by exigent circumstances, 
requesting U.S. Government departments, agencies, or instrumentalities 
must submit requests for approval to the FAA no less than 30 calendar 
days before the date on which the requesting department, agency, or 
instrumentality wishes the operator(s) to commence the proposed 
operation(s).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \3\ This approval procedure applies to U.S. Government 
departments, agencies, or instrumentalities; it does not apply to 
the public. The FAA describes this procedure in the interest of 
providing transparency with respect to the FAA's process for 
interacting with U.S. Government departments, agencies, or 
instrumentalities that seek to engage U.S. civil aviation to operate 
in the area in which this SFAR would prohibit their operations in 
the absence of specific FAA approval.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The requestor must send the request to the Associate Administrator 
for Aviation Safety, Federal Aviation Administration, 800 Independence 
Avenue SW, Washington, DC 20591. Electronic submissions are acceptable, 
and the requesting entity may request that the FAA notify it 
electronically as to whether the FAA grants the request for approval. 
If a requestor wishes to make an electronic submission to the FAA, the 
requestor should contact the Washington Operations Center by telephone 
at (202) 267-3203 or by email at [email protected] for submission instructions. The 
requestor must not submit its letter requesting FAA approval or related 
supporting documentation to the Washington Operations Center. Rather, 
the Washington Operations Center will refer the requestor to an 
appropriate staff member of the Flight Standards Service for further 
assistance.
    A single letter may request approval from the FAA for multiple 
persons described in SFAR No. 115, Sec.  91.1611, or for multiple 
flight operations. To the extent known, the letter must identify the 
person(s) the requester expects the SFAR to cover on whose behalf the 
U.S. Government department, agency, or instrumentality seeks FAA 
approval, and it must describe--
     The proposed operation(s), including the nature of the 
mission being supported;
     The service the person(s) covered by the SFAR will 
provide;
     To the extent known, the specific locations in the 
specified areas of the Sanaa FIR (OYSC) where the proposed operation(s) 
will occur, including, but not limited to, the flight path and altitude 
of the aircraft while it is operating in the specified areas of the 
Sanaa FIR (OYSC) and the airports, airfields, or landing zones at which 
the aircraft will take off and land; and
     The method by which the requesting department, agency, or 
instrumentality will provide, or how the operator will otherwise 
obtain, current threat information and an explanation of how the 
operator will integrate this information into all phases of the 
proposed operations (i.e., the pre-mission planning and briefing, in-
flight, and post-flight phases).
    The request for approval must also include a list of operators with 
whom the U.S. Government department, agency, or instrumentality 
requesting FAA approval has a current contract(s), grant(s), or 
cooperative agreement(s) (or its prime contractor has a subcontract(s)) 
for specific flight operations in the specified areas of the Sanaa FIR 
(OYSC). The requestor may identify additional operators to the FAA at 
any time after the FAA issues its approval. Neither the operators 
listed in the original request, nor any operators the requestor 
subsequently seeks to add to the approval, may commence operations 
under the approval until the FAA issues them an Operations 
Specification (OpSpec) or Letter of Authorization (LOA), as 
appropriate, for operations in the specified areas of the Sanaa FIR 
(OYSC). The approval conditions discussed below apply to all operators. 
Requestors should contact the Washington Operations Center by telephone 
at (202) 267-3203 or by email at [email protected] for instructions on how to submit 
the names of additional

[[Page 106305]]

operators the requestor wishes to add to an existing approval to the 
FAA. The requestor must not submit the names of additional operators it 
wishes to add to an existing approval to the Washington Operations 
Center. Rather, the Washington Operations Center will refer the 
requestor to an appropriate staff member of the Flight Standards 
Service for further assistance.
    If an approval request includes classified information or 
controlled unclassified information not authorized for public release, 
requestors may contact the Washington Operations Center for 
instructions on submitting it to the FAA. The Washington Operations 
Center's contact information appears in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION 
CONTACT section of this final rule.
    FAA approval of an operation under SFAR No. 115, Sec.  91.1611, 
does not relieve persons subject to this SFAR of the responsibility to 
comply with all other applicable FAA rules and regulations. Operators 
of civil aircraft must comply with the conditions of their 
certificates, OpSpecs, and LOAs, as applicable. Operators must also 
comply with all rules and regulations of other U.S. Government 
departments, agencies, or instrumentalities that may apply to the 
proposed operation(s), including, but not limited to, regulations 
issued by the Transportation Security Administration.

B. Approval Conditions

    If the FAA approves the request, the FAA's Aviation Safety 
organization will send an approval letter to the requesting U.S. 
Government department, agency, or instrumentality informing it that the 
FAA's approval is subject to all of the following conditions:
    (1) The approval will stipulate those procedures and conditions 
that limit, to the greatest degree possible, the risk to the operator, 
while still allowing the operator to achieve its operational 
objectives.
    (2) Before any approval takes effect, the operator must submit to 
the FAA:
    (a) A written release of the U.S. Government from all damages, 
claims, and liabilities, including without limitation legal fees and 
expenses, relating to any event arising out of or related to the 
approved operations in the specified areas of the Sanaa FIR (OYSC); and
    (b) The operator's written agreement to indemnify the U.S. 
Government with respect to any and all third-party damages, claims, and 
liabilities, including without limitation legal fees and expenses, 
relating to any event arising out of or related to the approved 
operations in the specified areas of the Sanaa FIR (OYSC).
    (3) Other conditions the FAA may specify, including those the FAA 
might impose in OpSpecs or LOAs, as applicable.
    The release and agreement to indemnify do not preclude an operator 
from raising a claim under an applicable non-premium war risk insurance 
policy the FAA issues under chapter 443 of title 49, U.S. Code.
    If the FAA approves the proposed operation(s), the FAA will issue 
an OpSpec or LOA, as applicable, to the operator(s) identified in the 
original request and any operators the requestor subsequently adds to 
the approval, authorizing them to conduct the approved operation(s). In 
addition, as stated in paragraph (3) of this section V.B., the FAA 
notes that it may include additional conditions beyond those contained 
in the approval letter in any OpSpec or LOA associated with a 
particular operator operating under this approval, as necessary in the 
interests of aviation safety. U.S. Government departments, agencies, 
and instrumentalities requesting FAA approval on behalf of entities 
with which they have a contract or subcontract, grant, or cooperative 
agreement should request a copy of the relevant OpSpec or LOA directly 
from the entity with which they have any of the foregoing types of 
arrangements, if desired.

VI. Information Regarding Petitions for Exemption

    Any operations not conducted under an approval the FAA issues 
through the approval process set forth previously may only occur in 
accordance with an exemption from SFAR No. 115, Sec.  91.1611. A 
petition for exemption must comply with 14 CFR part 11. The FAA will 
consider whether exceptional circumstances exist beyond those described 
in the approval process in the previous section. To determine whether a 
petition for exemption from the prohibition this SFAR establishes 
fulfills the standards described in 14 CFR 11.81, the FAA consistently 
finds necessary the following information:
     The proposed operation(s), including the nature of the 
operation;
     The service the person(s) covered by the SFAR will 
provide;
     The specific locations in the specified areas of the Sanaa 
FIR (OYSC) where the proposed operation(s) will occur, including, but 
not limited to, the flight path and altitude of the aircraft while it 
is operating in the specified areas of the Sanaa FIR (OYSC) and the 
airports, airfields, or landing zones at which the aircraft will take 
off and land;
     The method by which the operator will obtain current 
threat information and an explanation of how the operator will 
integrate this information into all phases of its proposed operations 
(i.e., the pre-mission planning and briefing, in-flight, and post-
flight phases); and
     The plans and procedures the operator will use to minimize 
the risks identified in this preamble to the proposed operations, to 
support the relief sought and demonstrate that granting such relief 
would not adversely affect safety or would provide a level of safety at 
least equal to that provided by this SFAR. The FAA has found 
comprehensive, organized plans and procedures of this nature to be 
helpful in facilitating the agency's safety evaluation of petitions for 
exemption from flight prohibition SFARs.
    The FAA includes, as a condition of each such exemption it issues, 
a release and agreement to indemnify, as described previously.
    The FAA recognizes that, with the support of the U.S. Government, 
the governments of other countries could plan operations that may be 
affected by SFAR No. 115, Sec.  91.1611. While the FAA will not permit 
these operations through the approval process, the FAA will consider 
exemption requests for such operations on an expedited basis and in 
accordance with the order of preference set forth in paragraph (c) of 
SFAR No. 115, Sec.  91.1611.
    If a petition for exemption includes information that is sensitive 
for security reasons or proprietary information, requestors may contact 
the Washington Operations Center for instructions on submitting it to 
the FAA. The Washington Operations Center's contact information is 
listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of this final 
rule. Requestors must not submit their petitions for exemption or 
related supporting documentation to the Washington Operations Center. 
Rather, the Washington Operations Center will refer the requestor to 
the appropriate staff member of the Flight Standards Service or the 
Office of Rulemaking for further assistance.

VII. Regulatory Notices and Analyses

    Federal agencies consider the impacts of regulatory actions under a 
variety of executive orders and other requirements. First, Executive 
Order 12866, Executive Order 13563, and Executive Order 14094 
(``Modernizing Regulatory Review'') direct that each Federal agency 
shall propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned determination 
that the benefits of the

[[Page 106306]]

intended regulation justify the costs. Second, the Regulatory 
Flexibility Act of 1980 (Pub. L. 96-354) requires agencies to analyze 
the economic impact of regulatory changes on small entities. Third, the 
Trade Agreements Act (Pub. L. 96-39) prohibits agencies from setting 
standards that create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of 
the United States. Fourth, the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 
(Pub. L. 104-4) requires agencies to prepare a written assessment of 
the costs, benefits, and other effects of proposed or final rules that 
include a Federal mandate that may result in the expenditure by State, 
local, and tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private 
sector, of $100 million or more (adjusted annually for inflation) in 
any one year. The current threshold after adjustment for inflation is 
$183 million using the most current (2023) Implicit Price Deflator for 
the Gross Domestic Product. This portion of the preamble summarizes the 
FAA's analysis of the economic impacts of this final rule.
    In conducting these analyses, the FAA has determined this final 
rule has benefits that justify its costs. This rule is a significant 
regulatory action, as defined in section 3(f)(4) of Executive Order 
12866 as amended by Executive Order 14094. As 5 U.S.C. 553 does not 
require notice and comment for this final rule, 5 U.S.C. 603 and 604 do 
not require regulatory flexibility analyses regarding impacts on small 
entities. This rule will not create unnecessary obstacles to the 
foreign commerce of the United States. This rule will not impose an 
unfunded mandate on State, local, or Tribal governments, or on the 
private sector, by exceeding the threshold identified previously.

A. Regulatory Evaluation

    This rule prohibits U.S. civil flights in the specified areas of 
the Sanaa FIR (OYSC) due to the significant hazards to U.S. civil 
aviation described in this preamble. The alternative flight routes 
result in some additional fuel and operations costs to the operators, 
as well as some costs attributed to passenger time. Accordingly, the 
incremental costs of the extension of this flight prohibition SFAR are 
minimal. By prohibiting unsafe flights, the benefits of this rule will 
exceed the minimal flight deviation costs. Therefore, the FAA finds 
that the incremental costs of extending SFAR No. 115, 14 CFR 91.1611, 
will be minimal and are exceeded by the benefits of avoided risks of 
deaths, injuries, and property damage that could occur if a U.S. 
operator's aircraft were shot down (or otherwise damaged) while 
operating in the specified areas of the Sanaa FIR (OYSC).

B. Regulatory Flexibility Act

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA), in 5 U.S.C. 603, requires an 
agency to prepare an initial regulatory flexibility analysis describing 
impacts on small entities whenever 5 U.S.C. 553 or any other law 
requires an agency to publish a general notice of proposed rulemaking 
for any proposed rule. Similarly, 5 U.S.C. 604 requires an agency to 
prepare a final regulatory flexibility analysis when an agency issues a 
final rule under 5 U.S.C. 553 after that section or any other law 
requires publication of a general notice of proposed rulemaking. The 
FAA concludes good cause exists to forgo notice and comment and to not 
delay the effective date for this rule. As 5 U.S.C. 553 does not 
require notice and comment in this situation, 5 U.S.C. 603 and 604 
similarly do not require regulatory flexibility analyses.

C. International Trade Impact Assessment

    The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (Pub. L. 96-39) prohibits Federal 
agencies from establishing standards or engaging in related activities 
that create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United 
States. Pursuant to this Act, the establishment of standards is not 
considered an unnecessary obstacle to the foreign commerce of the 
United States, so long as the standard has a legitimate domestic 
objective, such as the protection of safety, and does not operate in a 
manner that excludes imports that meet this objective. The statute also 
requires consideration of international standards and, where 
appropriate, that they be the basis for U.S. standards.
    The FAA has assessed the potential effect of this final rule and 
determined that its purpose is to protect the safety of U.S. civil 
aviation from risks to their operations in the specified areas of the 
Sanaa FIR (OYSC), a location outside the U.S. Therefore, the rule 
complies with the Trade Agreements Act of 1979.

D. Unfunded Mandates Assessment

    Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104-
4) requires each Federal agency to prepare a written statement 
assessing the effects of any Federal mandate in a proposed or final 
agency rule that may result in an expenditure of $100 million or more 
(in 1995 dollars) in any one year by State, local, and Tribal 
governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector; such a mandate 
is deemed to be a ``significant regulatory action.'' The FAA currently 
uses an inflation-adjusted value of $183 million in lieu of $100 
million.
    This final rule does not contain such a mandate. Therefore, the 
requirements of title II of the Act do not apply.

E. Paperwork Reduction Act

    The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3507(d)) requires 
the FAA to consider the impact of paperwork and other information 
collection burdens it imposes on the public. The FAA has determined no 
new requirement for information collection is associated with this 
final rule.

F. International Compatibility and Cooperation

    In keeping with U.S. obligations under the Convention on 
International Civil Aviation, the FAA's policy is to conform to 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Standards and 
Recommended Practices to the maximum extent practicable. The FAA has 
determined no ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices correspond to 
this regulation. The FAA finds this action is fully consistent with the 
obligations under 49 U.S.C. 40105(b)(1)(A) to ensure the FAA exercises 
its duties consistently with the obligations of the United States under 
international agreements.
    While the FAA's flight prohibition does not apply to foreign air 
carriers, DOT codeshare authorizations prohibit foreign air carriers 
from carrying a U.S. codeshare partner's code on a flight segment that 
operates in airspace for which the FAA has issued a flight prohibition 
for U.S. civil aviation. In addition, foreign air carriers and other 
foreign operators may choose to avoid, or be advised or directed by 
their civil aviation authorities to avoid, airspace for which the FAA 
has issued a flight prohibition for U.S. civil aviation.

G. Environmental Analysis

    The FAA has analyzed this action under Executive Order 12114, 
Environmental Effects Abroad of Major Federal Actions, and DOT Order 
5610.1C, Paragraph 16. Executive Order 12114 requires the FAA to be 
informed of environmental considerations and take those considerations 
into account when making decisions on major Federal actions that could 
have environmental impacts anywhere beyond the borders of the United 
States. The FAA has determined this action is exempt pursuant to 
Section 2-5(a)(i) of Executive Order 12114 because it does not have the 
potential for a significant effect on the environment outside the 
United States.

[[Page 106307]]

    In accordance with FAA Order 1050.1F, Environmental Impacts: 
Policies and Procedures, paragraph 8-6(c), the FAA has prepared a 
memorandum for the record stating the reason(s) for this determination 
and has placed it in the docket for this rulemaking.

VIII. Executive Order Determinations

A. Executive Order 13132, Federalism

    The FAA has analyzed this rule under the principles and criteria of 
Executive Order 13132. The agency has determined this action will not 
have a substantial direct effect on the States, or the relationship 
between the Federal Government and the States, or on the distribution 
of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. 
Therefore, this rule will not have federalism implications.

B. Executive Order 13211, Regulations That Significantly Affect Energy 
Supply, Distribution, or Use

    The FAA analyzed this rule under Executive Order 13211. The agency 
has determined it is not a ``significant energy action'' under the 
Executive order and will not be likely to have a significant adverse 
effect on the supply, distribution, or use of energy.

C. Executive Order 13609, Promoting International Regulatory 
Cooperation

    Executive Order 13609 promotes international regulatory cooperation 
to meet shared challenges involving health, safety, labor, security, 
environmental, and other issues and to reduce, eliminate, or prevent 
unnecessary differences in regulatory requirements. The FAA has 
analyzed this action under the policies and agency responsibilities of 
Executive Order 13609 and has determined that this action will have no 
effect on international regulatory cooperation.

IX. Additional Information

A. Electronic Access

    Except for classified and controlled unclassified material not 
authorized for public release, all documents the FAA considered in 
developing this rule, including economic analyses and technical 
reports, may be accessed from the internet through the docket for this 
rulemaking.
    Those documents may be viewed online at https://www.regulations.gov 
using the docket number listed above. A copy of this rule will be 
placed in the docket. Electronic retrieval help and guidelines are 
available on the website. It is available 24 hours each day, 365 days 
each year. An electronic copy of this document may also be downloaded 
from the Office of the Federal Register's website at https://www.federalregister.gov and the Government Publishing Office's website 
at https://www.govinfo.gov. A copy may also be found at the FAA's 
Regulations and Policies website at https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies.
    Copies may also be obtained by sending a request to the Federal 
Aviation Administration, Office of Rulemaking, ARM-1, 800 Independence 
Avenue SW, Washington, DC 20591, or by calling (202) 267-9677.

B. Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act

    The Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 
(SBREFA) (Pub. L. 104-121) (set forth as a note to 5 U.S.C. 601) 
requires FAA to comply with small entity requests for information or 
advice about compliance with statutes and regulations within its 
jurisdiction. A small entity with questions regarding this document may 
contact its local FAA official, or the persons listed under the FOR 
FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT heading at the beginning of the preamble. 
To find out more about SBREFA on the internet, visit https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/sbre_act/.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 91

    Air traffic control, Aircraft, Airmen, Airports, Aviation safety, 
Freight, Yemen.

The Amendment

    In consideration of the foregoing, the Federal Aviation 
Administration amends chapter I of title 14, Code of Federal 
Regulations, as follows:

PART 91--GENERAL OPERATING AND FLIGHT RULES

0
1. The authority citation for part 91 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(f), 40101, 40103, 40105, 40113, 40120, 
44101, 44111, 44701, 44704, 44709, 44711, 44712, 44715, 44716, 
44717, 44722, 46306, 46315, 46316, 46504, 46506-46507, 47122, 47508, 
47528-47531, 47534; Pub. L. 114-190, 130 Stat. 615 (49 U.S.C. 44703 
note); Sec. 828 of Pub. L. 118-63, 138 Stat. 1330 (49 U.S.C. 44703 
note); articles 12 and 29 of the Convention on International Civil 
Aviation (61 Stat. 1180), (126 Stat. 11).


0
2. Amend Sec.  91.1611 by revising paragraph (e) to read as follows:


Sec.  91.1611  Special Federal Aviation Regulation No. 115--Prohibition 
against certain flights in specified areas of the Sanaa Flight 
Information Region (FIR) (OYSC).

* * * * *
    (e) Expiration. This SFAR will remain in effect until January 7, 
2028. The FAA may amend, rescind, or extend this SFAR, as necessary.
    Issued in Washington, DC, under the authority of 49 U.S.C. 106(f), 
40101(d)(1), 40105(b)(1)(A), and 44701(a)(5).

Michael G. Whitaker,
Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2024-31188 Filed 12-27-24; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P