Pipeline Safety: Identification and Evaluation of Potential Hard Spots-In-Line Inspection Tools and Analysis, 90827-90829 [2024-26725]
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Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 222 / Monday, November 18, 2024 / Notices
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials
Safety Administration
[Docket No. PHMSA–2024–0176]
Pipeline Safety: Identification and
Evaluation of Potential Hard Spots—InLine Inspection Tools and Analysis
Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration
(PHMSA), Department of
Transportation.
ACTION: Notice; issuance of advisory
bulletin.
AGENCY:
PHMSA is issuing this
advisory bulletin to notify pipeline
owners and operators of the importance
of evaluating their pipeline facilities for
the existence and potential threat of
hard spots in the pipe body. That
susceptibility comes from the plate and
pipe manufacturing and is broader than
previously understood; recent data and
incident investigations indicate that
hard spots could affect multiple
pipelines manufactured prior to 1970.
Hard spots, if not identified and
mitigated, pose a threat to the integrity
of the pipeline from interacting threats
such as coating degradation, soil
chemistry, and/or increased hydrogen
exposure, which can result in hydrogeninduced cracking. Pipeline owners and
operators should consider expanding
their hard spot threat evaluation to all
pipe manufactured prior to 1970,
regardless of manufacturer; collecting
and analyzing data associated with hard
spot magnetic flux leakage in-line
inspection tools; and following industry
best practices when conducting in-line
inspection data analysis.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Max
Kieba, Director, Engineering & Research
Division, at 202–420–9169 or
Max.Kieba@dot.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
lotter on DSK11XQN23PROD with NOTICES1
SUMMARY:
I. Background
The purpose of this advisory bulletin
is to notify owners and operators of gas,
hazardous liquid, and carbon dioxide
pipelines of the importance of
evaluating their pipeline facilities for
the existence and potential threat of
hard spots in the pipe body. A major
tenet of PHMSA’s pipeline safety
oversight program is that pipeline
operators must know and understand
their pipeline systems, and use
appropriate technologies and
procedures to address risks to prevent
pipeline failures while considering the
inherent limitations of such technology.
PHMSA prescribes factors that must be
addressed to mitigate risk and conducts
VerDate Sep<11>2014
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90827
inspections to ensure adequate
measures are carried out effectively.
A hard spot is a defect that is created
at the time the steel plates are rolled
during the pipe manufacturing process.
The creation of hard spots in
manufacturing is not attached to the inservice product. Even where a pipe may
have an intended service at the time of
manufacture, the intended service may
change after manufacture. A localized
increase in hardness produced during
the hot rolling of steel plates as a result
of localized cooling can form a hard
spot. Localized hardening may also
occur through the unintentional
quenching during the manufacturing
process or by cold work. Although hard
spots are more prevalent in plate-formed
pipe, seamless pipe can also be
susceptible to hard spots when poor
controls in the manufacturing process
result in material property variations,
including hardness.1
Hardness can be measured in any
condition, at any time, and is
determined by measuring the depth of
an indentation made by a calibrated
indentation device. There are three
industry standards that address
hardness testing: (1) ASTM E92
Standard Test Methods for Vickers
Hardness of Metallic Materials; (2)
ASTM E10–18 Standard Test Methods
for Brinell Hardness of Metallic
Materials; and (3) ASTM E18–22
Standard Test Methods for Rockwell
Harness of Metallic Materials. Hard
spots found by in-line inspection (ILI)
analysis can be verified through the use
of calibrated devices that press a
specific tool into the plate’s surface and
then measure the resulting width or
depth of the indentation.2 American
Petroleum Institute (API) Specification
5L states that ‘‘[a]ny hard spot larger
than 50 mm (2.0 in) in any direction
shall be classified as a defect if its
hardness exceeds 35 HRC, 345 HV10 or
327 HBW, based upon individual
indentations.’’ 3 4 However, recent
improvements in technology have
revealed incidents on hard spots with
lower hardness measures.
Hard spots generally form on the
surface of pipe and, by themselves, can
be considered a stable threat.
Unfortunately, hard spots can become
unstable when the threat is activated by
a change in service conditions such as
coating degradation, effects of soil
chemistry, and/or influence of the
cathodic protection hydrogen film. The
presence of hydrogen can result in
hydrogen-induced cracking due to
hydrogen accumulation at inclusions,
impurities, and lattice structure
irregularities in the presence of stress on
the steel (e.g., from operating pressures).
Typically, coatings insulate hard spots
from exposure to hydrogen generated by
the cathodic protection system, but
coatings can deteriorate over time.
Recent Pipeline Research Council
International (PRCI) research indicates
that the level of cathodic protection may
also contribute to hydrogen cracking.5
PHMSA has previously discussed, in
public meetings and workshops, the
threat evaluations of pipelines
constructed with pipe manufactured by
A.O. Smith Corporation (A.O. Smith)
from 1948 through 1952 due to the
pipe’s susceptibility to hard spot related
hydrogen cracking.6 In the past 20 years,
the following five incidents highlight
hydrogen-induced cracking of hard
spots. All but one of the incidents
occurred on pipe manufactured by A.O.
Smith.
• On July 18, 2013, a 30-inch natural
gas pipeline ruptured in Natchitoches,
Louisiana. The pipe was manufactured
in 1952 by A.O. Smith. Evidence
suggested the failure was caused by
hydrogen-induced cracking in a hard
spot that was previously reinforced with
a Type A sleeve. The leak, in this
instance, was repaired with a Type B
sleeve.
• On January 14, 2015, a 30-inch
natural gas pipeline ruptured in
1 See Jeremy Faissat et al., ‘‘Pipeline Hard Spots:
How Hard is Hard?,’’ Pipeline Technology Conf.
2021 (Apr. 1, 2021), https://www.pipelineconference.com/abstracts/pipeline-hard-spots-howhard-hard; see also Rosen Group, Presentation,
‘‘Hard Spot Assessment & Integrity Analyses,’’ slide
6 (Dec. 13, 2022), https://primismeetings.phmsa.dot.gov/archive/Day_1_AM_1050_
Hard_Spot_Assessment_-_Integrity_Analysis.pdf
(National Tube pipe).
2 The three hardness units—HRC, HB and HV —
10
can be converted using a standard conversion table.
3 API Specification 5L, ‘‘Specification for Line
Pipe,’’ section 9.10.6, (46th ed., Apr. 2018)
(incorporated by reference under 49 CFR 192.7 and
195.3).
4 49 CFR 192.3 defines a ‘‘hard spot’’ as ‘‘an area
on steel pipe material with a minimum dimension
greater than two inches (50.8 mm) in any direction
and hardness greater than or equal to Rockwell 35
HRC (Brinell 327 HB or Vickers 345 HV10).’’
5 Zoe H. Shall, Presentation, ‘‘PRCI Efforts on
Hard Spots: Past, Present, and Future,’’ slide 15
(Dec. 13, 2022), https://primismeetings.phmsa.dot.gov/archive/Day_1_AM_1020_
PRCI_Efforts_on_Hard_Spots_Dec_2022.pdf.
6 Gery Bauman & Mary McDaniel, Presentation,
‘‘Recent Case Study hard Spts and NTSB
Recommendation P–22–3,’’ slide 20 (Dec. 13, 2022),
https://primis-meetings.phmsa.dot.gov/archive/
MtgHome.mtg@mtg=161.html; see generally,
PHMSA, ‘‘Class Location Special Permits: FAQs,’’
FAQ 34 (June 16, 2010) (providing that hard spots
are a safety condition that may reduce the
toughness of pipe body), https://
view.officeapps.live.com/op/
view.aspx?src=https%3A%2F%2F
www.phmsa.dot.gov%2Fsites
%2Fphmsa.dot.gov%2Ffiles%2Fdocs%2Ftechnicalresources%2Fpipeline%2Fclass-location-specialpermits%2F64051%2Ffaqsclass-location-specialpermits20180726.docx&wdOrigin=BROWSELINK.
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90828
Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 222 / Monday, November 18, 2024 / Notices
Brandon, Mississippi. The pipe was
manufactured in 1952 by A.O. Smith.
The failure was caused by hydrogeninduced cracking in a hard spot greater
than two inches in length, previously
reinforced with a Type A sleeve.
Hardness testing could not be performed
with the sleeve in place.
• On August 1, 2019, a 30-inch
natural gas pipeline ruptured in
Danville, Kentucky. The pipe was
manufactured in 1957 by A.O. Smith.
The failure was caused by hydrogeninduced cracking in a hard spot.
Hardness testing by the National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
identified the origin hard spot was 5.85
inches by 3 inches, and had hardness
values between 362 and 381 Brinell.
Hardness readings extended through the
pipe wall.
• On February 13, 2022, an 18-inch
natural gas pipeline ruptured in Perry
County, Mississippi. The pipe was
manufactured in 1950 by A.O. Smith.
The failure was caused by hydrogeninduced cracking in a hard spot.
Metallurgical testing found hardness
values between 35 to 45 Rockwell, and
was measured at approximately 0.6-inch
by 2.5-inch.
• On March 8, 2023, a 30-inch natural
gas pipeline ruptured in Fauquier
County, Virginia. The pipe was
manufactured in 1957 by Bethlehem
Steel. The failure was caused by
hydrogen-induced cracking in a hard
spot. Post incident ILI identified six
hard spot features, and hardness values
were confirmed from four features that
ranged from 192–208 Brinell, which was
slightly harder than base hardness
(approximately 170 to 180 Brinell). In
this instance, the operator did conduct
a re-analysis of its data that resulted in
updated results to identify the presence
of additional hard spots.
The NTSB conducted an investigation
following the August 1, 2019, Danville,
Kentucky, incident, and made findings
and recommendations regarding
identification and evaluation of hard
spots.7 Specifically, the NTSB issued
recommendation P–22–003 to PHMSA
to ‘‘[a]dvise natural gas transmission
pipeline operators of the possible data
limitations associated with hard spot
magnetic flux leakage in-line inspection
tools and analyses used in hard spot
management programs and reinforce the
need to follow industry best practices
7 NTSB, Pipeline Investigation Report PIR–22/02,
‘‘Enbridge Inc. Natural Gas Transission Pipeline
Rupture and Fire, Danville Kentucky, Aug. 1, 2019’’
(Aug. 15, 2022), https://www.ntsb.gov/
investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/
PIR22002.pdf.
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17:17 Nov 15, 2024
Jkt 265001
when conducting in-line inspection data
analysis.’’
Following the NTSB investigation
into the Danville incident, PHMSA
reviewed accident data and information
regarding hard spots and the
appropriate methodologies and
technologies for detecting hard spots.
PHMSA met with industry and
technology companies to gather more
information regarding hard spot
management programs; communicate
the results of the data analysis; and
discuss appropriate ILI technologies for
different anomalies, including hard spot
detection. Additionally, PHMSA hosted
an informational three-day public
meeting in December 2022, in Houston,
Texas, to discuss topics relevant to the
pipeline industry.8 One topic in
particular included a discussion of both
the NTSB’s findings and hard spot
safety concerns. PHMSA presented an
overview of the NTSB’s PIR–22/02
report into the Danville incident. During
the December 2022 meeting, PHMSA
invited stakeholders to present
information related to hard spot
methodologies/technologies used for
detecting hard spots and discussed the
circumstances of this incident. PHMSA
has continued to meet with technology
companies to review hard spot studies
and hard spot management programs.
As a result of the studies and
communications, PHMSA has identified
more pipe manufacturers and pipe
manufacture vintages that could have
issues with hard spots. In addition to
A.O. Smith pipe, Bethlehem Steel
Corporation, Kaiser Steel Corporation,
National Tube Supply, Consolidated
Pipe & Supply, Youngstown Sheet and
Tube, United States Steel, Claymont
Steel, and Republic Steel have been
identified as manufacturers with
manufacture dates as recent as 1970
whose pipe may experience hard spots.9
In addition, new technologies and
advancements in ILI have resulted in
the ability to learn more using
previously obtained ILI data. For
example, in the August 2019 Danville,
Kentucky, hard spot failure, the NTSB
investigation determined that the initial
2011 ILI data analysis had identified 16
hard spots in the relevant line section
yet the 2019 re-analysis of the 2011 data
identified 441. The NTSB attributed this
discrepancy in identifications to
8 Information and presentations for this December
2022 public meeting are available at https://primismeetings.phmsa.dot.gov/archive/MtgHome.mtg@
mtg=161.html.
9 Rosen Group, Presentation, ‘‘Hard Spot
Assessment & Integrity Analyses’’ (Dec. 13, 2022),
https://primis-meetings.phmsa.dot.gov/archive/
Day_1_AM_1050_Hard_Spot_Assessment_-_
Integrity_Analysis.pdf.
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significant improvements in computer
hardware, software, and data analysis.10
PHMSA and researchers have found that
older data can be re-analyzed, and
previously unidentified hard spots can
be identified. It is important when
analyzing the possibility of hard spots to
verify the capabilities of the tool and
verify the data collected. PHMSA
believes that data verification should
not be limited in scope and should
include a thorough review of all
relevant data.
PHMSA provides this advisory
bulletin to help gas, hazardous liquid,
and carbon dioxide pipeline owners and
operators and the public understand the
threat of hard spots and how to better
comply with the existing requirements
under federal pipeline safety
regulations. Guidance and advisory
bulletins are not substantive rules; are
not meant to bind the public in any
way; and do not assign duties, create
legally enforceable rights, or impose
new obligations that are not otherwise
contained in those regulations.
II. Advisory Bulletin (ADB–2024–01)
To: Owners and Operators of Gas,
Hazardous Liquid, and Carbon Dioxide
Pipeline Systems.
Subject: Identification and Evaluation
of Potential Hard Spots—In-line
Inspection Tools and Analysis.
Advisory: PHMSA is issuing this
advisory bulletin to advise gas,
hazardous liquid, and carbon dioxide
pipeline owners and operators of new
information regarding the potential for
the presence of hard spots in pipelines,
and their associated safety and
environmental risks of leaks or ruptures.
This advisory alerts operators of
advancements in knowledge of hard
spot susceptibility, most notably that
what was once considered to be an issue
confined to a single manufacturer (A.O.
Smith) of specific, limited
manufacturing years, is now understood
to include potentially other
manufacturers and manufacturing years.
Additionally, the presence of hydrogen
may result in hydrogen-induced
cracking due to hydrogen accumulation
at inclusions, impurities, and lattice
structure irregularities in the presence
of stress on the steel. For pipelines, the
stress is typically operational pressure.
Typically, coatings isolate hard spots
from exposure to hydrogen generated by
the cathodic protection system, but
coatings can and do deteriorate over
time. Recent PRCI research indicates
that the level of cathodic protection and
the chemistry of the surrounding soil
may contribute to hydrogen cracking.
10 NTSB,
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PIR–22/02 at 29.
18NON1
Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 222 / Monday, November 18, 2024 / Notices
New technologies and advancements
in ILI have resulted in the ability to
better identify features associated with
hard spots. Additionally, PHMSA and
researchers have found that significant
improvements in computer hardware,
software, and data analysis have
enabled the use of older data to be reanalyzed, and previously unknown
features identified. It is important to
verify the capabilities of the tool and
verify the data when analyzing for the
possibility of hard spots.
For these reasons, pipeline operators
should consider taking the following
actions to ensure pipeline safety:
1. Review all design and construction
records to ensure they are traceable,
verifiable, and complete to determine
whether enough information is available
to identify the pipe manufacturer, the
steel plate manufacturer, and the date of
manufacturing.
2. Review and determine whether or
not the types of pipes in the system are
susceptible to hard spots;
3. Review and determine if known
integrity issues have been experienced
on those pipelines;
4. Develop and implement an
enhanced assessment program to
establish the best approach to material
hardness anomaly validations;
5. Re-evaluate existing ILI data to
support current feature identification;
and
6. Continue sharing information used
to evaluate the identification of hard
spots and the other factors that may
contribute to the destabilization of hard
spots in industry and public pipeline
technical meetings and conferences.
Issued in Washington, DC, on November 1,
2024, under authority delegated in 49 CFR
1.97.
Alan K. Mayberry,
Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety.
[FR Doc. 2024–26725 Filed 11–15–24; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–60–P
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTAION
Office of the Secretary
[Docket No. DOT–OST–2024–0003]
Privacy Act of 1974; System of
Records
Office of the Departmental
Chief Information Officer, Office of the
Secretary of Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Notice of a modified system of
records.
lotter on DSK11XQN23PROD with NOTICES1
AGENCY:
In accordance with the
Privacy Act of 1974, the Department of
Transportation (DOT), Office of the
Secretary (OST), proposes to rename,
SUMMARY:
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17:17 Nov 15, 2024
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update and reissue an existing system of
records notice currently titled ‘‘DOT/All
11, Integrated Personnel and Payroll
System (IPPS).’’ The name of this
system of records notice will be changed
to ‘‘DOT/ALL 11, Consolidated
Automated System for Time and Labor
Entry (CASTLE).’’ The modified system
of records notice (hereafter referred to as
‘‘Notice’’) uses records in this system for
fiscal operations related to payroll,
attendance, leave, insurance, taxes,
retirement, budget, and cost accounting
programs. This system is also used to
control and facilitate payment of
salaries to DOT employees.
DATES: Submit comments on or before
December 18, 2024. The Department
may publish an amended Systems of
Records Notice considering any
comments received. This modified
system will be effective immediately
upon publication. The routine uses will
be effective December 18, 2024.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments,
identified by docket number DOT–OST–
2024–0003 by one of the following
methods:
• Federal e-Rulemaking Portal:
https://www.regulations.gov. Follow the
instructions for submitting comments.
• Mail: Department of Transportation
Docket Management, Room W12–140,
1200 New Jersey Ave. SE, Washington,
DC 20590.
• Hand Delivery or Courier: West
Building Ground Floor, Room W12–140,
1200 New Jersey Ave. SE, between 9
a.m. and 5 p.m. ET, Monday through
Friday, except Federal holidays.
• Instructions: You must include the
agency name and docket number DOT–
OST–2024–0003.
• Instructions: You must include the
agency name and docket number DOT–
OST–2024–0003. All comments
received will be posted without change
to https://www.regulations.gov,
including any personal information
provided. You may review the
Department of Transportation’s
complete Privacy Act statement in the
Federal Register published on April 11,
2000 (65 FR 19477–78).
Privacy Act: Anyone is able to search
the electronic form of all comments
received in any of our dockets by the
name of the individual submitting the
comment (or signing the comment, if
submitted on behalf of an association,
business, labor union, etc.).
Docket: For access to the docket to
read background documents or
comments received, go to https://
www.regulations.gov or to the street
address listed above. Follow the online
instructions for accessing the docket.
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90829
For
questions, please contact Karyn
Gorman, Departmental Chief Privacy
Officer, Privacy Office, Department of
Transportation, Washington, DC 20590;
email: privacy@dot.gov; or 202–366–
3140.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Notice Updates
This Notice includes both substantive
changes and non-substantive changes to
the previously published Notice. The
substantive changes have been made to
the system name, system location,
system manager, authority for
maintenance of the system, purpose of
the system, categories of individuals
covered by the system, categories of
records in the system, routine uses
maintained in the system, policies and
practices for storage of record, policies
and practices for retrieval, retention and
disposal of the records in the system,
and administrative, technical, and
physical safeguards. Non-substantive
changes have been made to record
access procedures and contesting record
procedures as well as revisions to align
with the requirements of Office of
Management and Budget Memoranda
(OMB) A–108 and to ensure consistency
with other Notices issued by the
Department of Transportation.
Background
In accordance with the Privacy Act of
1974, the Department of Transportation
proposes to modify and re-issue an
existing system of records titled ‘‘DOT/
ALL 11, Integrated Personal and Payroll
System, (IPPS)’’ and change the name to
‘‘Consolidated Automated System for
Time and Labor Entry, (CASTLE).’’ This
system of records covers records
collected and maintained for the
purposes of fiscal operations related to
payroll, attendance, leave, insurance,
taxes, retirement, budget, and cost
accounting programs. This system is
also used to control and facilitate
payment of salaries to DOT employees.
The following substantive changes have
been made to the Notice:
1. System Name: This Notice updates
the system name to ‘‘Consolidated
Automated System for Time and Labor
Entry, (CASTLE)’’ from the previous
system name of ‘‘DOT/ALL 11,
Integrated Personal and Payroll System,
(IPPS)’’. The update to the system name
is to better align with the collection of
personally identifiable information in
the system and the purpose of the
collection. This system is also used to
facilitate payment of salaries of DOT
employees.
2. System Location: This Notice
updates the system locations to notify
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]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 89, Number 222 (Monday, November 18, 2024)]
[Notices]
[Pages 90827-90829]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2024-26725]
[[Page 90827]]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
[Docket No. PHMSA-2024-0176]
Pipeline Safety: Identification and Evaluation of Potential Hard
Spots--In-Line Inspection Tools and Analysis
AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA),
Department of Transportation.
ACTION: Notice; issuance of advisory bulletin.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: PHMSA is issuing this advisory bulletin to notify pipeline
owners and operators of the importance of evaluating their pipeline
facilities for the existence and potential threat of hard spots in the
pipe body. That susceptibility comes from the plate and pipe
manufacturing and is broader than previously understood; recent data
and incident investigations indicate that hard spots could affect
multiple pipelines manufactured prior to 1970. Hard spots, if not
identified and mitigated, pose a threat to the integrity of the
pipeline from interacting threats such as coating degradation, soil
chemistry, and/or increased hydrogen exposure, which can result in
hydrogen-induced cracking. Pipeline owners and operators should
consider expanding their hard spot threat evaluation to all pipe
manufactured prior to 1970, regardless of manufacturer; collecting and
analyzing data associated with hard spot magnetic flux leakage in-line
inspection tools; and following industry best practices when conducting
in-line inspection data analysis.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Max Kieba, Director, Engineering &
Research Division, at 202-420-9169 or [email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
The purpose of this advisory bulletin is to notify owners and
operators of gas, hazardous liquid, and carbon dioxide pipelines of the
importance of evaluating their pipeline facilities for the existence
and potential threat of hard spots in the pipe body. A major tenet of
PHMSA's pipeline safety oversight program is that pipeline operators
must know and understand their pipeline systems, and use appropriate
technologies and procedures to address risks to prevent pipeline
failures while considering the inherent limitations of such technology.
PHMSA prescribes factors that must be addressed to mitigate risk and
conducts inspections to ensure adequate measures are carried out
effectively.
A hard spot is a defect that is created at the time the steel
plates are rolled during the pipe manufacturing process. The creation
of hard spots in manufacturing is not attached to the in-service
product. Even where a pipe may have an intended service at the time of
manufacture, the intended service may change after manufacture. A
localized increase in hardness produced during the hot rolling of steel
plates as a result of localized cooling can form a hard spot. Localized
hardening may also occur through the unintentional quenching during the
manufacturing process or by cold work. Although hard spots are more
prevalent in plate-formed pipe, seamless pipe can also be susceptible
to hard spots when poor controls in the manufacturing process result in
material property variations, including hardness.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ See Jeremy Faissat et al., ``Pipeline Hard Spots: How Hard
is Hard?,'' Pipeline Technology Conf. 2021 (Apr. 1, 2021), https://www.pipeline-conference.com/abstracts/pipeline-hard-spots-how-hard-hard; see also Rosen Group, Presentation, ``Hard Spot Assessment &
Integrity Analyses,'' slide 6 (Dec. 13, 2022), https://primis-meetings.phmsa.dot.gov/archive/Day_1_AM_1050_Hard_Spot_Assessment_-_Integrity_Analysis.pdf (National Tube pipe).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hardness can be measured in any condition, at any time, and is
determined by measuring the depth of an indentation made by a
calibrated indentation device. There are three industry standards that
address hardness testing: (1) ASTM E92 Standard Test Methods for
Vickers Hardness of Metallic Materials; (2) ASTM E10-18 Standard Test
Methods for Brinell Hardness of Metallic Materials; and (3) ASTM E18-22
Standard Test Methods for Rockwell Harness of Metallic Materials. Hard
spots found by in-line inspection (ILI) analysis can be verified
through the use of calibrated devices that press a specific tool into
the plate's surface and then measure the resulting width or depth of
the indentation.\2\ American Petroleum Institute (API) Specification 5L
states that ``[a]ny hard spot larger than 50 mm (2.0 in) in any
direction shall be classified as a defect if its hardness exceeds 35
HRC, 345 HV10 or 327 HBW, based upon individual indentations.''
3 4 However, recent improvements in technology have revealed
incidents on hard spots with lower hardness measures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ The three hardness units--HRC, HB and HV10--can
be converted using a standard conversion table.
\3\ API Specification 5L, ``Specification for Line Pipe,''
section 9.10.6, (46th ed., Apr. 2018) (incorporated by reference
under 49 CFR 192.7 and 195.3).
\4\ 49 CFR 192.3 defines a ``hard spot'' as ``an area on steel
pipe material with a minimum dimension greater than two inches (50.8
mm) in any direction and hardness greater than or equal to Rockwell
35 HRC (Brinell 327 HB or Vickers 345 HV10).''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hard spots generally form on the surface of pipe and, by
themselves, can be considered a stable threat. Unfortunately, hard
spots can become unstable when the threat is activated by a change in
service conditions such as coating degradation, effects of soil
chemistry, and/or influence of the cathodic protection hydrogen film.
The presence of hydrogen can result in hydrogen-induced cracking due to
hydrogen accumulation at inclusions, impurities, and lattice structure
irregularities in the presence of stress on the steel (e.g., from
operating pressures). Typically, coatings insulate hard spots from
exposure to hydrogen generated by the cathodic protection system, but
coatings can deteriorate over time. Recent Pipeline Research Council
International (PRCI) research indicates that the level of cathodic
protection may also contribute to hydrogen cracking.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Zoe H. Shall, Presentation, ``PRCI Efforts on Hard Spots:
Past, Present, and Future,'' slide 15 (Dec. 13, 2022), https://primis-meetings.phmsa.dot.gov/archive/Day_1_AM_1020_PRCI_Efforts_on_Hard_Spots_Dec_2022.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
PHMSA has previously discussed, in public meetings and workshops,
the threat evaluations of pipelines constructed with pipe manufactured
by A.O. Smith Corporation (A.O. Smith) from 1948 through 1952 due to
the pipe's susceptibility to hard spot related hydrogen cracking.\6\ In
the past 20 years, the following five incidents highlight hydrogen-
induced cracking of hard spots. All but one of the incidents occurred
on pipe manufactured by A.O. Smith.
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\6\ Gery Bauman & Mary McDaniel, Presentation, ``Recent Case
Study hard Spts and NTSB Recommendation P-22-3,'' slide 20 (Dec. 13,
2022), https://primis-meetings.phmsa.dot.gov/archive/MtgHome.mtg@mtg=161.html; see generally, PHMSA, ``Class Location
Special Permits: FAQs,'' FAQ 34 (June 16, 2010) (providing that hard
spots are a safety condition that may reduce the toughness of pipe
body), https://view.officeapps.live.com/op/view.aspx?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.phmsa.dot.gov%2Fsites%2Fphmsa.dot.gov%2Ffiles%2Fdocs%2Ftechnical-resources%2Fpipeline%2Fclass-location-special-permits%2F64051%2Ffaqsclass-location-special-permits20180726.docx&wdOrigin=BROWSELINK.
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On July 18, 2013, a 30-inch natural gas pipeline ruptured
in Natchitoches, Louisiana. The pipe was manufactured in 1952 by A.O.
Smith. Evidence suggested the failure was caused by hydrogen-induced
cracking in a hard spot that was previously reinforced with a Type A
sleeve. The leak, in this instance, was repaired with a Type B sleeve.
On January 14, 2015, a 30-inch natural gas pipeline
ruptured in
[[Page 90828]]
Brandon, Mississippi. The pipe was manufactured in 1952 by A.O. Smith.
The failure was caused by hydrogen-induced cracking in a hard spot
greater than two inches in length, previously reinforced with a Type A
sleeve. Hardness testing could not be performed with the sleeve in
place.
On August 1, 2019, a 30-inch natural gas pipeline ruptured
in Danville, Kentucky. The pipe was manufactured in 1957 by A.O. Smith.
The failure was caused by hydrogen-induced cracking in a hard spot.
Hardness testing by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
identified the origin hard spot was 5.85 inches by 3 inches, and had
hardness values between 362 and 381 Brinell. Hardness readings extended
through the pipe wall.
On February 13, 2022, an 18-inch natural gas pipeline
ruptured in Perry County, Mississippi. The pipe was manufactured in
1950 by A.O. Smith. The failure was caused by hydrogen-induced cracking
in a hard spot. Metallurgical testing found hardness values between 35
to 45 Rockwell, and was measured at approximately 0.6-inch by 2.5-inch.
On March 8, 2023, a 30-inch natural gas pipeline ruptured
in Fauquier County, Virginia. The pipe was manufactured in 1957 by
Bethlehem Steel. The failure was caused by hydrogen-induced cracking in
a hard spot. Post incident ILI identified six hard spot features, and
hardness values were confirmed from four features that ranged from 192-
208 Brinell, which was slightly harder than base hardness
(approximately 170 to 180 Brinell). In this instance, the operator did
conduct a re-analysis of its data that resulted in updated results to
identify the presence of additional hard spots.
The NTSB conducted an investigation following the August 1, 2019,
Danville, Kentucky, incident, and made findings and recommendations
regarding identification and evaluation of hard spots.\7\ Specifically,
the NTSB issued recommendation P-22-003 to PHMSA to ``[a]dvise natural
gas transmission pipeline operators of the possible data limitations
associated with hard spot magnetic flux leakage in-line inspection
tools and analyses used in hard spot management programs and reinforce
the need to follow industry best practices when conducting in-line
inspection data analysis.''
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\7\ NTSB, Pipeline Investigation Report PIR-22/02, ``Enbridge
Inc. Natural Gas Transission Pipeline Rupture and Fire, Danville
Kentucky, Aug. 1, 2019'' (Aug. 15, 2022), https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/PIR22002.pdf.
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Following the NTSB investigation into the Danville incident, PHMSA
reviewed accident data and information regarding hard spots and the
appropriate methodologies and technologies for detecting hard spots.
PHMSA met with industry and technology companies to gather more
information regarding hard spot management programs; communicate the
results of the data analysis; and discuss appropriate ILI technologies
for different anomalies, including hard spot detection. Additionally,
PHMSA hosted an informational three-day public meeting in December
2022, in Houston, Texas, to discuss topics relevant to the pipeline
industry.\8\ One topic in particular included a discussion of both the
NTSB's findings and hard spot safety concerns. PHMSA presented an
overview of the NTSB's PIR-22/02 report into the Danville incident.
During the December 2022 meeting, PHMSA invited stakeholders to present
information related to hard spot methodologies/technologies used for
detecting hard spots and discussed the circumstances of this incident.
PHMSA has continued to meet with technology companies to review hard
spot studies and hard spot management programs. As a result of the
studies and communications, PHMSA has identified more pipe
manufacturers and pipe manufacture vintages that could have issues with
hard spots. In addition to A.O. Smith pipe, Bethlehem Steel
Corporation, Kaiser Steel Corporation, National Tube Supply,
Consolidated Pipe & Supply, Youngstown Sheet and Tube, United States
Steel, Claymont Steel, and Republic Steel have been identified as
manufacturers with manufacture dates as recent as 1970 whose pipe may
experience hard spots.\9\
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\8\ Information and presentations for this December 2022 public
meeting are available at https://primis-meetings.phmsa.dot.gov/archive/MtgHome.mtg@mtg=161.html.
\9\ Rosen Group, Presentation, ``Hard Spot Assessment &
Integrity Analyses'' (Dec. 13, 2022), https://primis-meetings.phmsa.dot.gov/archive/Day_1_AM_1050_Hard_Spot_Assessment_-_Integrity_Analysis.pdf.
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In addition, new technologies and advancements in ILI have resulted
in the ability to learn more using previously obtained ILI data. For
example, in the August 2019 Danville, Kentucky, hard spot failure, the
NTSB investigation determined that the initial 2011 ILI data analysis
had identified 16 hard spots in the relevant line section yet the 2019
re-analysis of the 2011 data identified 441. The NTSB attributed this
discrepancy in identifications to significant improvements in computer
hardware, software, and data analysis.\10\ PHMSA and researchers have
found that older data can be re-analyzed, and previously unidentified
hard spots can be identified. It is important when analyzing the
possibility of hard spots to verify the capabilities of the tool and
verify the data collected. PHMSA believes that data verification should
not be limited in scope and should include a thorough review of all
relevant data.
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\10\ NTSB, PIR-22/02 at 29.
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PHMSA provides this advisory bulletin to help gas, hazardous
liquid, and carbon dioxide pipeline owners and operators and the public
understand the threat of hard spots and how to better comply with the
existing requirements under federal pipeline safety regulations.
Guidance and advisory bulletins are not substantive rules; are not
meant to bind the public in any way; and do not assign duties, create
legally enforceable rights, or impose new obligations that are not
otherwise contained in those regulations.
II. Advisory Bulletin (ADB-2024-01)
To: Owners and Operators of Gas, Hazardous Liquid, and Carbon
Dioxide Pipeline Systems.
Subject: Identification and Evaluation of Potential Hard Spots--In-
line Inspection Tools and Analysis.
Advisory: PHMSA is issuing this advisory bulletin to advise gas,
hazardous liquid, and carbon dioxide pipeline owners and operators of
new information regarding the potential for the presence of hard spots
in pipelines, and their associated safety and environmental risks of
leaks or ruptures. This advisory alerts operators of advancements in
knowledge of hard spot susceptibility, most notably that what was once
considered to be an issue confined to a single manufacturer (A.O.
Smith) of specific, limited manufacturing years, is now understood to
include potentially other manufacturers and manufacturing years.
Additionally, the presence of hydrogen may result in hydrogen-induced
cracking due to hydrogen accumulation at inclusions, impurities, and
lattice structure irregularities in the presence of stress on the
steel. For pipelines, the stress is typically operational pressure.
Typically, coatings isolate hard spots from exposure to hydrogen
generated by the cathodic protection system, but coatings can and do
deteriorate over time. Recent PRCI research indicates that the level of
cathodic protection and the chemistry of the surrounding soil may
contribute to hydrogen cracking.
[[Page 90829]]
New technologies and advancements in ILI have resulted in the
ability to better identify features associated with hard spots.
Additionally, PHMSA and researchers have found that significant
improvements in computer hardware, software, and data analysis have
enabled the use of older data to be re-analyzed, and previously unknown
features identified. It is important to verify the capabilities of the
tool and verify the data when analyzing for the possibility of hard
spots.
For these reasons, pipeline operators should consider taking the
following actions to ensure pipeline safety:
1. Review all design and construction records to ensure they are
traceable, verifiable, and complete to determine whether enough
information is available to identify the pipe manufacturer, the steel
plate manufacturer, and the date of manufacturing.
2. Review and determine whether or not the types of pipes in the
system are susceptible to hard spots;
3. Review and determine if known integrity issues have been
experienced on those pipelines;
4. Develop and implement an enhanced assessment program to
establish the best approach to material hardness anomaly validations;
5. Re-evaluate existing ILI data to support current feature
identification; and
6. Continue sharing information used to evaluate the identification
of hard spots and the other factors that may contribute to the
destabilization of hard spots in industry and public pipeline technical
meetings and conferences.
Issued in Washington, DC, on November 1, 2024, under authority
delegated in 49 CFR 1.97.
Alan K. Mayberry,
Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety.
[FR Doc. 2024-26725 Filed 11-15-24; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-60-P
